The Contents of the &illegible; Part.

• CHAP. I.  Of Vsurpation, what it is. A Case propounded, wherein it is not hard to determine whether Vsurpation be chargeable, or not.
• CHAP. II.  Of yeelding Obedince to a Power usurped as above said. That it is not lawfull to give up ones self to the Allegiance of such a Power.
• CHAP. III.  This Question discussed. Whether submission to, and acting under a usurped Power, for the time, be lawfull, with a reservation of allegiance to the lawfull Power, supposed to be expulsed.
• CHAP. IV.  The obligatorinesse of the Oaths and Covenant, urged in the second Chapter against Obedience to Vsurpers, made good against divers late Authors.
• CHAP. V.  The Reasons brought for obedience to Vsurpers, and acting under them, Answered.

To the Reader.

If thou knewest the Gentleman the Authour of this Tract, thou wouldest reade it for his sake. And if thou once reade it through without prejudice, thou wilt respect it for its own sake.

His eminent fidelity to the Parliament, according to their first declared principles, is evidenced, as heretofore by severall appearings and sufferings in their behalf, so now by this Tract. It is weighty for the matter, and wisely handled for the manner and method of it. A strain of Religion, and strength of Reason running all along through it. His weapons are spirituall, the Word of God and right reason, not carnall policy or power, weapons now most in use.

He judgeth of actions (as wise men doe) by themselves, not by their successes: he accounts not prosperous vice a vertue, nor prevalent resistance of lawfull Magistracy lesse sinfull, then if it had not been prevalent, nor the Mahumetan party to be any whit the more blessed or beloved of God, because by force or fraud (through Gods permission) they at first raised, and have for sundry centuries of years continued to themselves a large Empire by the ruine of many millions of Christian Souls: knowing that the prosperity of fools (that is of Hypocrites and wicked men) shall at last destroy them. Prov 1. 32.

By that wisdome which is from above, which is first pure then peaceable, he rightly seeks after Peace, by clearing up Truth, promoting righteousnesse: proportioning to each their own due, and placing them in their own rank and station, Truth, order, rightteousnesse are foundations and pillars, if not parts of true Peace; without these either there is no peace (as if the servants of this City being more & stronger, then their Masters should slay or banish them, & quietly divide amongst themselves their Lands and Goods, were this a Peace?) or if it may be called a peace, it is but a base brutish, &illegible; practise, and destroy the mightle and holy people. Dan. 23, 24, 25.

This Authors real for the obligation of solemne Oaths, Vows, and Covenants may well be born with; if it be a fault, there is but little (too little) of it in England. But the good man though he sweareth to his own hurt, changeth not. Psal. 15. 4.

I will say no more, but Tolle lege, take up and read, understand what them readest; Remember and practise what thou understandest to be the will and minde of God, and pray for such (whether of the Gentry, Ministery, or others) as long, and labour for thy Information, and reformation, if them wandrest; and for thy confirmation, and consolation if them walkest aright. The God of truth and peace be with thee. Amen.

Of Vsurpation, what it is; a Case propounded, wherein it is not hard to determine whether Vsurpation be chargeable, or not.

USurpation is an intrusion into the Seat of Authority, a presuming to possesse, and manage the place & power thereof without a lawfull calling, right, or title thereunto. A lawfull call or title to that rule, and Government which is supreme (of which I have to speak) is derived, or comes from God, There is no power but of God, (saith the Apostle) the powers that be are ordained of God: Rom. 13. 1. It were a sense too large, and not to be defended to take these words absolutely, and unlimitedly of all power, in regard either of title, or measure, and use. An unjust power in regard of Measure, or the stretching of Power beyond its due bounds, or the abuse of it is generally denyed to be of God by way of warrant; and an unjust power in regard of title, or an Authority set up, and admitted against, or without right, God himself denyes to be of him. They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew it not: saith he, Hosea 8.4. Which speech is by the current ofa Expositors applyed to Jeroboam, and his successors, coming in to be Kings of Israel in that manner as they did; For although Jeroboam had a prediction (yea, suppose it a grant) that he should be King of ten Tribes, 1 King. 11. 29. yet the people, at Solomons death, had no command, or direction from God to cast off Rehoboams government, and make him their King; it was therefore sedition, and rebellion in them; and both a manifest breach of the fifth Commandment;Vide Paræum in Hos. 8. 4. and of the positive Law of God, Dent. 17. 14, 15. and Jeroboam was faulty in that, though he had Gods preconcession of a Kingdom over ten Tribes; yet having had no order from him about the time, manner, or the particularten which they should be; he did not seek and tarry for a further direction, and calling from God; as David did in the like caseb. And although the Lord, when it was done, testified that the thing was from himc; yet we must understand it to have been so by his permissive counsell, and generall concourse, or providence onely, as all actions as they are actions, and all events that are evils of punishment; and as they are such, are, though the actors among men that bring them be never so sinfull in them; but not by his approbation, appointment, or constitution; the event was from God; but not the sinfull means by which it was accomplished; he ordered the evil carriage of men to that effect, but he gave them no order for that evil carriage: so that though, in a sense, it was of him; yet in regard of authorizing, it was without, and against him, and, in the Apostles sense, none of Gods ordinance. But of this we shall have occasion to speak again hereafter.

God giveth a calling, or invests with a right to Soveraignty, either immediately, by making and declaring the choice, and designing the person himself; or mediately, by committing it to the people to elect, and constitute both their form of Government, and the persons that are to sway it over them, which he hath done to all Nations; yet with a reservation to himself of power to interpose with his own immediate designation when he pleaseth: and when he doth not so, the vote of the people is the voice of God, (ordinarily) and they passing their consent when a Magistrate is to be set over them, that power, so constituted, is of God, as his ordinance. And this may be the reason why that, which in one place is called the ordinance of God, is, in another called the ordinance of man, or an humane creature: 1 Pet. 2. 13. By the former way the Judges and Kings of Israel had, or ought to have had their admission to rule,d and that was extraordinary, and peculiar to that people; the latter is the onely ordinary, lawfull, and warrantable way of creating a right, and title to the &illegible; of Magistracy in other Nations. And as in the former the call of God was sometimes personall, or of one single person; as was that of Moses, Joshus, Samuel, Saul, and others: and again, sometimes lineall, or of a whole race: as was that of David and his seede: So it is in the latter,f the peoples constitution of their Governors may either be individuall, or intransient; as in those kingdoms, or States which are called (in a strict acception) Elective; or it may be continuated, and successive; as in those Kingdoms, or Principalities which are called hereditary, and possessed by descent: both wayes Princes are by the peoples Election, and Consent; and the latter is preferred, by many wise Statists, before the formerg.

I shall not insist on the distinctions, that might be observed touching the manner of the peoples passing their consent; nor determine which of them is sufficient, and which not, to make this right or title, whether it must be antecedent to possession, or may be consequent, expresse, or tacite: collective, or representative: absolute, or conditionated: free, or enforced: revocable, or irrevocable. The consideration of these is not materiall to the resolution of what is in question; it sufficeth that it be yeelded, that the peoples consent is (besides that which is by commission immediately sent and signed from heaven) the onely derivation of a lawfull call, or claim to Governmenth. When our Saviour Christ (who being such an extraordinary person, might have warrant to do what would have been presumption in any other) was appealed to in a cause that appertained to the civill Magistrates decision; he refused to deal in it, with these words, Who made me a Judge, or a divider over you? according to which words of him, who was the truth, he that may rule, must be placed in that office by some body, and may not undertake it of himself: no man may take this honour to himself, or be his own advancer to the Throne; but he must be installed by another: and what other creature, besides the Nation it self, can challenge a power to appoint over it its Rulers is not to me imaginable. Angels are not of this Occonomie, do not intermeddle in this businesse, and for other people, or forrein States they are but in an equalitie, and have no partnership in this matter; they have no more to do to impose Governors over their neighbours, then they have reciprocally over them; and to whichsoever may attempt it towards the other, by the analogy of our Saviours words, it may be said,Luk. 12. 13, 14. Who made thee a Judge, or Rule-maker over me?

A calling from the people, who are to be subject being so necessary, and essentiall to a humanely constituted Magistracie; it is easie to discern what is Usurpation, viz: that which is opposite to it, or privative thereof, which is a snatching hold of the Scepter, and wresting it out of the hands of those who are to dispose of it, or have it committed to them: it is ordinarily termed, a tyrannie in regard of title, or without title: The distinction betwixt lawfull Magistrates and Tyrants is thus given by Aristotle:h Kings do reign, not onely according to the Law, but over them that consent to them; Tyrants rule over men against their wils.Etenim si nolentibus imperatut, regnum protinus esse definit. Tyrannis efficirur quæ vi dominatur. If any govern against the minde of the governed, it ceaseth to be a Kingdom, and becometh a Tyrannie which ruleth by force. All lawfull power then is founded upon the wils of those over whom it is set; Contrariwise Usurpation is built upon the will and power of them that hold the Government; it is a self-created, or self authorised Power, such was that ofi Cinna, and Carbo, who made themselves Consuls, without any Court-election, in the time of the Romane sociall war betwixt Sylla and Marius and that ofk Julius Cæsar who made himself Consul, together with Publius Servilius; such was that of the Chaldeans over the Jews, Hab. 1. 7. Their judgement and their dignity shall proceed of themselves, saith the Prophet, that is, as Deodate expounds it, they received no Law,Verum regnum est imperium voluntate civium delatum: at si quis vel fraude, vel violentia dominatur manileste Tyrannis est. idem. li. 5. num. 112. nor assistance from any; their right consists in their will, and the execution in their power.

Usurpation being defined, we may proceed to distinguish of it according to severall heights, or degrees it is capable of; as 1. It is either where the Throne is vacant, and undisposed of (which may happen sundry wayes, as when a Common-wealth is new erected, or the possessors of the Government resigne, or are extinct, and none left to lay claim to it) or, where it is full, and possessed de jure, and the Rulers are onely violently extruded, and kept out.

2. Usurpation is either meerly in point of Title, and administration of a received and settled Government; or by way of innovating in the Government it self; over-turning the constitution of it, and forming it a new.

3. It may come to be acted either from those without, viz: Forreiners, and strangers to the State; or by Natives, and naturall Subjects of the Kingdome.

4. It is done by these, either against the single tye and duty of obedience and Allegiance owed to the present lawfull Authority; or against Allegiance bound with Oaths and sacred Covenants. All the sorts of each of these distinctions are direct, and formall usurpations, but the latter of each far surpasseth the other respectively, and a conspiration of them all makes an Usurpation of a meridian altitude; when a party owing obedience and subjection to a long continued, and undoubted lawfull power, and solemnly sworn to submit too, and support that Government, shall rise up, and presume to thrust out the possessors, and invest it self, yea, and not onely seize on the Power; but of its own minde, and will, or, by its force alone, abolish the settled, and set up a new mould of government; this is Usurpation to the culmen or height of it.

Having thus found out what Usurpation, and what the Zenith of it is; we may put a case wherein it will be easie to give a Judgement cleerly. Suppose a Nation in America, whose fundamentall government is, and hath been anciently and confessedly constituted, and placed in a King, an House of Peers, and an House of Commons sitting in a collaterall, or coordinate rank, in regard of supremacy of power; the King being the supreme in order (unto whom, in such an association, Oaths of Allegiance and supremacy are generally sworn) next to him the Peers as the Upper, and the Commons as the Lower House of Parliament. Suppose also, the King, according to his place, summoning them, and they conformably assembling together in Parliament, and he and they personally concurring to act in the highest affairs of government; in the processe whereof differences arise betwixt the King, and the said two Houses; which grow to that height, as that he in person departs from them, a war breaks out betwixt them; the Kingdom is divided by partieship with them, on the one side or the other; the two Houses continue acting joyntly, no: onely in managing their military defence; but in the other publick, both religious and civill affairs of the Kingdom; they petition, remonstrate, and declare for a necessitie of an association, and conjunction of the King and the two Houses as the fundamentall constitution, and government of the Kingdome; they enter into, and prescribe to the people Protestations, Vows, Oaths, and Covenants, for the upholding of the Authority and Power of both so constituted: they professedly fight for that associated Power, they proclaim them Enemies and Traitors, they prosecute them with fire and sword, sequestration of estates, and other punishments, that go about to divide them asunder, or oppose the aforesaid Authority; and all this they do, and avow as the indispensably necessary discharge of their trust. Suppose after all this, the Army raised and imployed by the said two Houses in the aforesaid war, consederating in their Leaders (as by the immediate sequell manifestly appears) with a small party in the Lower House; Remonstrates to that House (without any addresse to the other) many high and strange things they would have done by them, and amongst the rest, that the King be proceeded against, as for treason, and other capitall crimes; in like manner his two eldest Sons, if they render not themselves within a day to be set them: that it be declared that the peoples Representatives in the House of Commons shall have the supreme Power, and all other shall be subject to them; in which demands, that House not being so obsequious to them as they expect, but standing upon the collegueship of that Government, which they with their associates, the King, and the House of Peers are intrusted with; the Army, forthwith, marcheth up to the doores, and by force of Arms selzeth on, and shuts up in hold one sort of them; and by a strong guard set at their doores shuts out another, suffering onely a small number of them, and such as please them to sit in the House. Suppose lastly, this little number, left in the House, shall approve of, and second these proceedings of this Army; and by their act, or Vote confirm the seclusion of that greater number of the Members of that House; and, taking upon them to Act in the name of that House, shall Enact or declare themselves to be the onely Supreame Authority in the Nation, and by that pretended solitarinesse, and supremacy of power shall take away, and abolish the other House of Parliament, destroy the life of the King, deny, and disanull the Title of his Heirs, and Successors, to the Crown and Kingdome; abollish the office of a King, and ordain and govern solitarily over the people, as their onely supreame Power, and require their obedience, and subjection as to such. The quare, in this case thus propounded is, whether this said party, as thus acting, and as to this latitude of Authority, be usurpers, yea, or no? whether this their removing others from the Seat of Supreame Power, and assuming it peculiarly to themselves, be, or be not Usurpation (as Usurpation hath been before prescribed) and that to the very apex, or highest pinacle of it; yea, whether they be, or be not guilty of a double Usurpation?

First, in usurping the name and Authority of that House. It may haply be said for this. 1. That possibly they may make a quorum, or as many in number as are required to act. R: But are they not supposed to be under actuall and present force, which hath been, without contradiction by any, adjudged a ground of nullity to Parliamentary proceedings. For though all are not required to be present, yet the House must be free for all to come to, that their acts may be free and authorative.

2ly, That perhaps they may be most willing, voluntary, and free in their acts, and the force that hath taken away others may be no force but a security to them, being of the same principles, apprehensions, and designes with them. R: But though they as men may be free, yet taking upon them the name of the House, are they free as an House? the House includeth virtually every Member of it, many whereof being violently excluded by those that guard the meeting place, how free soever those persons are that sit, how can the House be said to be free? nay, doth not their voluntarinesse and free complyance make the Usurpation compleater? Could they be said to be enforc’d to declard, and act such things, we might by a favourable interpretation, onely judge their Acts to be null; but when their proceedings flow from their own wils, and they so concur to the exclusion of others more then themselves from the exercise of the power they with them are intrusted with, and assume to themselves a power, never confirmed on them by the people, but meerly of their own creation, how can this be lesse then Usurpation to the life?

2ly, In usurping (in the name of that House) the sole supremacy of Power in the Nation. It will be pleaded: perhaps, that the House of Commons, in the supposed case, is the onely Representative of the people, to whom alone the Nation hath committed the Supreme Power. R: 1. That House is not a Representative of the whole Nation, but onely of the Commons, which though the bulk, and far more numerous part; yet cannot stand for the whole in choosing a Representative, but onely for themselves. 2. If it could be made good, a that to that House, the whole Nation, in the originall constitution of Government, had committed the sole Power; the quare would easily be cast in the negative: but how will that be proved? The case, as it is put, presupposeth Antiquitie, and by past practise: and the actings of the present House of Commons, untill brought under force, to proclaim the quite contrary. 3. If nothing, ab origine, can be shewed for that, did the King that summoned this Parliament, or the People that chose this House of Commons, supposed in the Case, passe over any such prerogative to them de novo; If either of them did, let us hear how. 4. It is too grosse an absurdity to be charged upon the supposed present, and all former Representatives; that being intrusted by the people with the sole Supremacy, they have of themselves associated to them the King, and the House of Peers, it being beyond the power of the constituted, and onely in the Constitutors to make such an alteration in the fundamentall Constitution; as Representatives cannot make Representatives or Proxies, so can they not take in Associates, or advance others, not impowered by them that impowered them into a Collegueship with them. I leave it therefore to every Reader to determine the Case, and passe Judgement. Whether the sole supreme Power, in the presupposed party, be derived to them legitimately, or be not a Self-created-power, and so a meer Usurpation, and that of the fullest dimension; being against a lawfully settled Government, in prejudice both of the just Magistrates and the people: and in contradiction to both the single tye of Subjects Allegiance to Soveraignty, and the sacred sanction of Vows, Oaths, and Religious Covenants.

Of yeelding obedience to a Power usurped at abovesaid. That it is not lawfull to give up ones self to the Allegiance of such a Power.

COncerning Obedience to an usurped Authority, I meet with two opinions, which I shall severally examine. 1. Is of those who hold obedience as due, and necessary; and that in as full á manner to such, as it is to the lawfullest Power. This is held, and argued for in a Tract, entituled, The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government: as also in A Discourse, wherein is examined, what is particularly lawfull; &c. By Aat: Asbeam Gent: See in his 2d. Part, cap: 9. Although indeed they both propound their opinion in the Title of their Discourse for obedience as lawfull; yet, in the prosecution, they plead for it in that fulnesse of latitude as due, and necessarie. This their Tenent they strive to maintain in relation to the present State of England. I shall deal with it in reference to the case above proposed, and in thesi: 2. Is of those who, reserving their obedience as due and devoted to the lawfull Power, supposed to be still existent; do yet conceive they may submit and act under a usurped Power for the time, and during the intervall of its prevalency.

I begin with the former; wherein it is asserted by one of the foresaid Authorsa, (nd the other comes not short of him in the sense and current of his Discourse) That upon the issue of a warre, and the Expulsion of a just party, a man may lawfully give up himself to the finall Allegiance of the unjust party. Against this Position must my Judgement stand, which dictates to me that I owe no obedience to an Usurper; and to yeeld up my self in obedience or Allegiance unto Usurpers, who have no other title but their usurpation, is unjustifiable, and unlawfull, and that upon these grounds.

1. I cannot (if I would) yeeld up my self in obedience to him that hath no authority over me; take him as a Usurper, and my Allegiance is incompetible to him; obedience and authority; Magistrate, and Subject, are tearms of relation, and do Se mutuo ponere & tellere: they are inseparable from one another; if there be no Magistracy in him, there can be no obedience properly, and formally in me to him. I may (either warrantably or unwarrantably) do an act possibly which he commandeth, but that cannot be truly and properly said to be an act of obedience to him: his authority is null, of no realityb. He is no Magistrate, but a private person; my fellow Subject, (if one of the Nation) or a forreiner to me; his commanding over me and others is, as if a private Souldier should take upon him to give orders to his Company, or an inferiour Officer to an Army; or a servant should offer to rule over his fellow-servants.

In saying he is a usurper, you say enough for the nullifying of his Authority, and my obedience; whatever strength he may have to compell, he hath no Authority to command me: He is a Magistrate that bath the Subjects committed to his charge and care, say the Leyden Divinesc in their Synopsis, and principality, Lypsiusd defines to be, A government delivered by Custome, or Law, and constitution to him that sustains is; and undertaken and managed by him for the good of the Subjects. Another defines a Magistrate to bee A publick person, elected by succession, let, or suffrage; which hath the right and power of Consultation, Judgement, and Command.

2. I may not (if I could) yeeld up my self as a Subject to the Usurper; in so doing, I should take away the right of the lawfull Magistrate which he hath over me, and injure him in the allegiance which I stand tyed in to him, and he still retaineth the claim of at my hands. The Magistrate is (in the case in hand) granted to be in being; he is but deprived of possession and enjoyment, not of property or title; he is yet standing in the relation of a Magistrate to me; and is onely outed of his station perforce. The obedience of a Subject is not so arbitrary, or loose a thing, as that I may place and remove it at pleasure, or as affairs go; but it is a debt which I must render to him unto whom it is due.Rom. 13. 7. Neither is Soveraignty so common, ambulatory, or prostitute a matter, as that its title ceaseth unto him that is violently extruded, or dispossessed of it, and becometh any ones that by force captivates it to himself; the expulsed Magistrate still standing upon his claim and right, and the power in possession having no title but his injurious and forcible entrance; the Subject is not disobliged from him that is expelled, nor at his choice to transfer his obedience to another, neither can the violent intruder challenge it. But in respect of the consequence of that which I here assert as unto resolution in this case, and for that I find the Gentleman, in the afore-named Discoursef positively delivering the direct contrary to it; and that which is (as I think) very strange doctrine both in Christianity and politiques, viz: That we are bound to own Princes so long as it pleaseth God to give them power to command us; and when we see others possest of their Powers,Part. 1. Chap. 5 page 22, 23. Part. 2. cap 9. page 90. we may then say, that the King of kings hath changed our Vice-royes; And further, that the point of right is a thing alwayes doubtfull;—possession generally is the strongest title that Princes have. And if possession was really the truest evidence to us of their (to wit, the expelled Princes) rights, then it is equitable to follow it still, though it be perhaps in a person of more injustice then they were. And the other book, I before cited, (viz: The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government) maintains the same thing (both whose arguments, for what they say, I shall take notice of, when I have layed down mine own sense and Reasons) I shall therefore here labour to make good these two things: 1. That meer forcible extrusion deprives not any lawfull Magistrate of his right and title to supreame Power. 2. That violent possession gives no right to the Seat of Authority; and consequently the Subjects allegiance is not turned about by the changes of powerfull possession, and dispossession.

1. Forcible extrusion or dispossession divests not of Dominion, that the state of the Subjects allegiancee should be altered by it.

First, if the vindication or recovery of a Princes, or peoples right of Dominion, out of which he, or they are elected, or excluded be a justifiable ground for his, their, and others in their behalf leavying and waging war, and prosecuting with the sword those that withstand the said recovery; then the right of him that is expulsed by force is not cancelled, or disanulled. The reason of this consequence is of it self evident, for nothing can be the ground of a war but a just and reall title, either to be defended, or recovered; but I assume, the recovery or redemption of a Princes or peoples right to a Kingdome with-held, or wrested from him or them, is a just ground of drawing the Sword, and commencing a war. This is proved (if it needeth any proof) by the war of the Judges & people of Israel, against the Kings and Nations that at severall times invaded and ruled over them; against whom they rose up, and rescued themselves, and the Dominion of their Land from them: the story of which acts, we have in the book of Judges, and by the warres of Samuel and Saul against the Philistines recorded in the 1. Book of Samuel: as also by Davids warlike undertaking against, and suppression of Absolom, who had carried away all Israel after him, into a Rebellion against David, & expulsed him out of the Land, 2 Sam. 15. &c. and 19. 9. In like manner by Jehoiada’s and the peoples rising in Arms against Athalia, the usurping Queen, in the right of Joash; and their suppressing, and destroying her,1 Macca. chap. 1. &c. and enthroning him by force of Arms. 2 King. 11. And by the wars of the Maccabees against Antiochus, Epiphanes, and his successors.g And the many undoubtedly lawfull wars of other Princes and States in such causes as these, which to insist on is superfluous in so clear a matter.

Secondly, If right and title to Soveraignty be not built upon possession, but upon the Law of the Land, or other consent of the people, then it is not lost by dispossession; this consequence is founded upon that which a learned &illegible;h saith, Is a received maxime almost unshaken, and infallible, Nihil magis nature consentantum est, quam ut iisdem modis res dissalvantur quibui constituantur: There is nothing more agreeable to nature, then that things should be disolved by the same means they are constituted. From which he Infers, very pertinently to our case in hand, That if the part of the people, or Estate be somewhat in the Election, you cannot make them nulles or ciphers in the prorivation or translation. But the right and title of Soveraignty is not built upon possession, (which the proof of the latter Position will clear) but upon the peoples consent, which hath gone for so currant an axiome, especially of late, that it will certainly passe without contradiction.

Thirdly, If a private property be not lost by losse of possession, neither (or rather much lesse) can such a publique property be lost by that means; there can be no such difference made betwixt them as to enervate this consequence, and however, who sees not the incongruitie of this, that that which is the conservatory and protection of a private mans property, should be of a so much more slipperie tenure then it; but a private property is not lost by dispossession, if it were, for what use serveth the Law, or Magistracy? one main end of which hath been, to vindicate the Subjects right from usurpation, or what call you property? But he that either hath any, or granteth such a thing to be as property, will let this assumption passe.

Fourthly, If violent extrusion take away a Soveraignes right, then rebellion where it prospers and prevails is no treason; for there can be no treason, or other crime imputed as against the Crown, dignity, or authority of them, whose right therein is extinct and null; so that they are onely (according to this opinion) traitors or rebels, that rise up in Arms, and rebellion against the lawfull Power, and do not succeed and speed according to their desires. By this account, treason and rebellion shall consist, not in the maliciousnesse of the intent or attempt; but in the misfortune of successe, or impotency of the prosecution of it.

Fifthly, If force dissolve Magistracy; then that prohibition of resistance under pain of domination. Rom. 13. 2. is in vain, in that it concerns onely them that cannot resist effectually, and is no more then if he had said, resist not ye that want power to do it, lest if ye do, ye incur damnation: for they that have power, and please to use it to the deposing of the Magistrate, being that in so doing they put an end to his fight, how can guilt remain on them?

2. Violent intrusion into, and possession of the Seat of Authority gives no right to it; and consequently neither draws allegiance after it, nor evacuates it in relation to another.

First, an unjust action cannot produce, or create a right.i Morall good, and evill are at such distance, that the one cannot be the cause, the other the effect; but violent intrusion into Authority is an unjust action: Luk. 12. 14. Man who made me a Judge, &c. and that whether it be by one that should be a Subject to that power, Rom. 13. 2. Whosoever therefore resisteth, &c. ver. 5. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, &c. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13. or by a Forreiner, Judg. 11. 12. 27. 2 Chron. 20. 10.

2ly, If violent occupation made a right;k then it were lawfull for any, that could make a sufficient strength for it, to rise up in Arms, invade, and seise on any Kingdome or Territory, he can prevail over; yea to kill and destroy men and Countreys for Empire and Dominion, asl Cæsar inclined to hold; for that which is of it self the way and means to place a man in a lawfull estate, or calling, and makes him a lawfull possessor of it, must needs be lawfull: but it cannot be held lawfull for any, that can finde power, and advantage, to invade Crowns and Countreys, as is evident by the proof of the Assumption of the preceeding Argument.

3ly, If possession by power give a title; then its unlawfull for an oppressed Prince, or people to raise warre, or use any other means to expell an Invader, or remove such as have come in, and hold meerly by force; for its unlawfull to resist, or fight against a just Magistrate, Rom 13. 1, 2. But it is lawfull for an oppressed Prince or people, by Arms, or otherwise to free themselves from a forcible Usurper, as manifestly appeareth by those presidents given in the proof of the assumption of the first argument for the former Proposition, to wit, the wars of Israel in the book of Judges, and 1. of Samuel, of David, Jehoiadah, and the Maccabees, and by the known Law and practise of all Nations, and consent of all Divines, and Christians, who with one vote allow defensive and recuperative Arms, excepting the Anabaptists, and some ancient Hereticks of their stamp.

4ly, All force ought to presuppose a right in that about which it is conversant; whether for the defence or recovery of its wars (saith Francis Lord Verulam,m &c.) (I speak not of ambitious predatorie wars) are suits of appeal to the tribunall of Gods justice, when there are no superiors on earth to determine the cause, and they are as civill Pleas, either Plaints or Defences: Force therefore cannot create a right, seeing it is to follow it, and both give it the precedencie in time, and own it as its ground-work; Adde to this, that the Sword is committed to the Magistrate (and to him alone, saith Peter Martyrn) as its subject or owner; so that the Magistrate is before it, not made by it. The Sword makes not the Magistrate, (that is, it is not its principle of Generation,) but the Magistrate à warranto authorizeth the Sword; the sword may make for his conservation, but not for his Creation.

5ly, If force give a title (renitente populo) then that late so much decantated Aphorisme, All Power (to wit, Authority) is from the People, must be called in again; yea all Donations, Elections, Compacts and Covenants betwixt Prince and people are void, and null businesses. A third person that can get hold or power, and lists to usurp, may dissolve and evacuate them all; yea the Prince that comes in by them, when once he hath possession of the Power, holds by his power, and not by them, and can no longer, nor further look to retain his right to Authority then he can enforce it; and what Turkish and tyrannicall practises doth this doctrine put him upon of necessitie, if he will sit fast.

Mr. Asheam part. 1. ca. 2. Sect. 4.6ly, No man naturally is more a Magistrate then another: Magistracy being in truth not a naturall, but a civill relation; as is that of husband and wife, master and servant: it must therfore be founded on some mutuall and reciprocall act, or agreement of both parties, to wit, Rulers and Subjects; and cannot result out of the action of one alone of them, nor can neither partie be meerly passive, in contracting such a relation. A mutuall civill obligation cannot arise but of the joynt or interchangeable concurrance of both.

7ly, Power and right, as also possession and right, are separable, as all experience demonstrates; so it was in the controversie betwixt David and Absolom, and so it frequently happens to be: successe and victory doth not seldome follow the wrong party; and he would be thought irrationall amongst all men, wheresoever in the world, but where reason it self is brought under tyrannie, that should say, successe is the onely Arbitrator of Controversies of right, and is ever infallible.

8ly, Strength and Authority also are two distinct and separable things, and rarely meet in the same subject, but where either bruitishnesse, or all miseries prevail; man hath dominion given him over the beasts, many whereof are (and were by creation) stronger then he; What is a Generals natural strength to that of the Army over which he commands? What is a Kings, or a Counsels personall strength to that of the body of the people over which it sways? yea what is the hand in the naturall body to all the members under its government, in point of force? We see a small board or two, put in the place of a rudder, guides the whole vessel. Amongst some beasts indeed the strongest rules; but amongst men it is not regularly so: yea, among some unreasonable Animals, not force, but fitnesse designed by Election obtains the rule. Bees, they say, choose their king, of whomo Plinie observes, that either he hath no sting, or Nature hath denyed him the use of it; being onely armed with majestie. And Aristotle saith,p It is by a kinde of naturall equitie and merit, that he that is of a sage and disercet understanding should rule; on the other hand he should obey, and be in subjection, that hath more strength of body, and Arms to perform service.

9ly, Where there is no title but power, there can be no rule for Government but power and will: onely that which gives right to Magistracy must set bounds to it; how can they be tyed to Laws, in exercising Government, that are tyed to none in coming by it? If the basis or bottome of Government be power, that must also be the measure of it;q so that a Magistrate, so holding, is confined to no justice, or Law; restrained from no violence, or sacriledge that his Power may extend to. That power, against whose forcible intrusion the Laws, and Constitutions made by Prince and people, for the settling of the Crown or Soveraigne rule, are of no validity, can reasonably have no obligation upon it from any other Laws made by the same parties;r the Authority that makes the Law is the Soul that quickens it; the Law springs from Authority, as the act doth from its habit or principle; so that grant, or prostitute Authority to the Sword as its right, and you subvert all settled Laws, whether fundamentall or superstructory; and this all experience, as well as reason, dictates; for where, or in what Age did meer force assume the Empire without a lawlesse arbitrarinesse challenged to it self?

10ly, If your yeeld the Sword such a right where it can be master in the publick or civill State; why should it not have the same interest in the private, domesticall, and personall? So that pyrates, theeves, and robbers, may justly claim a right to that which they can lay their hands on, and be accountable to none for their spoil and rapine.

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&illegible;ος.11ly, Whereas the Apostle to the Romans Chap. 13. 2. forbiddeth resistance (or contraordination) to the lawfull power ordained of God, and that upon pain of damnation to be received by him that doth it, if force give a right to that power; his action, that resists with victory, shall be justifiable, and the resister shall gain a Crown instead of receiving damnation; and none shall fall under the guilt and penalty of resistance, but he that offers to resist, and cannot make it good. The sense then which this Position puts upon this text is catachresticall, and it glosseth the words so, as to be an incouragement to resist the power, for he that resisteth the power prosperously (according to it) possesseth justly that ordinance of God, and in truth purchaseth to himself (not damnation, but) domination.

Having thus, I hope, sufficiently cleered the duty of Allegiance to be not the violent intruders, but the oppressed and violently extruded Magistrates; I shall proceed to other Reasons against Subjects giving up themselves to the obedience of a usurping party.

3. If I should do that, I should yeeld assistance to the Usurper in his wrong doing, and usurpation; and so become a partaker of his sin: obedience to one, as the supreame Magistrate, is a comprehensive thing, and includes many duties towards him at a power, viz: Receiving Commission from him for offices, or acts otherwayes not competible to me; maintaining and defending him in his power by pay, counsell, intelligence, Arms, and prayers; all which I am bound to yeeld the Usurper, to my power, if I resigne mine allegiance up to him: and how shall I do these things, and not 1. support, and have communion with him in his wickednes. 2. Combine against, betray, and resist the right of the injuriously dethroned Magistrate. 3. And make my self uncapable of obedience, or being a Subject to the lawfull Power hereafter.

4. It were a publick wrong to the Nation I am a member of so to bestow mine allegiance; were I and the Countrey free from all tye of subjection (in the presupposed Case) to the expulsed Magistrate; yet I could not lawfully make such a private bargain of my allegiance, its the part and duty of a particular person in a Nation (that is joyned together as one body politick or Common-wealth) not to choose his head, or supreame Governor by his single election, or vote, but, when a new Magistracy is to be erected, or Magistrate advanced, to attend the common and generall vote of the people, or body politick he is of; solitarily, or with a small party to alter the state and posture of my publick allegiance (in this case) would be sedition, and faction; the current of the people or community I am of it to be followed, at least where they justly dispose of the Soveraignty over them. It was in it self a loyall, and right resolution (had it been in such a case as this, and not misapplyed) which Hushai exprest, Nay, but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose; his will I be, and him will I follow; It would be to me (I confesse) a difficult case, and harder then I will here undertake to resolve, if the body of the Kingdom (in the case in hand) should either collectively, or representatively conspire; notwithstanding their oaths, vows, and Covenants, to abrogate the ancient Soveraigne Power, and to set up the Usurpers; but that’s not the present case, here is no generall consent of the Kingdom presupposed, or pleaded for in behalf of the Usurper; the dispute is about obedience to meer Usurpation. And in this state of things, to leave every man free, to make over his allegiance by himself, is to open a doore to more divisions then ever yet were in any Age, or Nation, and would confound all, not an heptarchy; but a chiliarchy,1 Sam. 10. 27. 2 Sam. 19. 41. 20. 1. or myriarchy might follow. When Saul had a generall vote of the people to be King, they were children of Belial that refused him; and at Davids re-invelling after Absoloms treason, and fall, the men of Israel challenged them of Judah for going about to restore the King without them; the far greater part of the Kingdom, and that man of Belial, Sheba, the son of Bichri, was justly pursued with the sword unto death, for blowing a trumpet of defection from David, when they both had consented to re-advance him.

5. But there is a bar yet behinde, of as main a strength as any yet stood on, to keep back such a submittance to the Usurper, and that is the Oaths, Vows, Protestations, and Covenants presupposed above to be taken by the people, for their owning, obeying and defending the power or Magistracy displaced, and In opposition to whose right the Usurper comes and continues in.

I have hitherto discussed the question in a case without reflection upon any particular Kingdom, or reall Subject; and so I shall do still, onely I shall borrow leave, in the prosecution of this Argument, to presuppose, in the aforesaid Case, the Oaths and Covenant were the same that have been taken in this Kingdom of England. The Author of the book called, The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government, in his 11. page moveth an inquiry thus: It were good to consider whether there be any clause in any Oath, or Covenant, which, in a fair and common sense, forbid obedience to the Commands of the present Government, and Authority: and proceeding, he onely makes enquiry into one clause of the Oath of Allegiance, which he thives to bow to his sense, and passeth by all besides. I shall speak to what he saith on that clause anen; and shall here onely interrogate, or propound by way of quære, concerning divers clauses in the Oaths, Protestations, Vows and Covenants.

First, concerning the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, whereas in the former, it is sworn, I shall bear faith, and true Allegiance to his Majestie, his Heirs, and Successors: and him and them will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all conspiracies, and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his, or their persons, their Crown, or dignity. And in the latter, I shall bear faith, and true allegiance to the Kings Highnesse, his Heirs, and lawfull Successors: and, to my power, shall assist, and defend all jurisdictions, priviledges, preheminencies, and Authorities granted to the Kings Highnesse, his Heirs, and Successors; or united and annexed to the Imperiall Crown of this Realm. First, do not these Oaths binde, whomsoever hath taken them, clearly, plainly, and in terminis to an Allegiance, over-living his Majesties person, and pitched upon his Heirs and Successors; so that he is not free from the Oaths at his Majesties decease, or then left at randome to pay his allegiance to whom he will choose? 2. Do they not intend, by His Majesties Heirs and Successors, the same persons, joyning them together with the copulative (and) and not using the discretive (or) and the former Oath twice comprizing both in the following clauses under the same terme or pronoune, (viz: them, theirs) so that, according to these Oaths, His Heirs, are of right his successors, and none can be his Successor, (whilest he hath an Heir, and longer the Oath lasts not) but his Heir; and If any conspiracy or attempt should be made to prevent his Heir from being and continuing his successor, or to make any one his successor that is not his heir, (if he hath one) is not the Subject sworn, by vertue of this Oath, to continue his allegiance to his Heir as the right successor, and to defend him in that his right to his uttermost? 3. And doth not the tearm (lawfull) annexed to Successors (in the Oath of Supremacy) manifestly exclude all cavill of a distinction betwixt Heirs and successors; the word (lawfull) (whether you interpret it of legitimation of birth, or proximity of succession in regard of line, according to the Law of the Land, entailing the Crown upon his Majesties issue; or rather both the latter including the former, restraining successors from meaning any other then his heirs? 4. And do not both these Oathes binde the swearer to assist and defend to his uttermost power, against all attempts, Monarchy, or the Kingly Office, and Government (in the race of his Majestie) cleerly expressed by many tearms, to wit, Their Crown or dignity, all jurisdictions, priviledges, preheminences, and Authorities, granted to the Kings Highnesse, his heirs, and successors, or united, and annexed to the Imperiall Crown of this Realm. How then can he yeeld obedience to them that are not his heirs, nor lawfull successors, nor do so much as wear his Crown, or sway the Regall Scepter? How can he not oppose, and withstand them in the assistance and defence of the right of his Majesties heirs and lawfull successors?

2. Concerning the Vow and Protestation of the 5. of May, 1641, and the Solemn League and Covenant. 1. How can any that hath taken the said Protestation according to it, maintain and defend the true Protestant Religion, expressed in the Doctrine of the Church of England, against all Popery, and Popish innovations within this Realm, contrary to the same Doctrine; and yet yeeld obedience to an usurping authority, coming in, and holding in derogation of, and opposition to the lawfull Prince; when as the publick doctrine of that Church (layed down in the 2. Tome of Homilies, and the last Homily thereof approved of by the 35. Article of Religion) fully and flatly refuteth, and condemneth any Subjects removing, or disposing their Prince, upon any pretence whatsoever?

2ly, How can any man according to the Protestation, maintain and defend, the power and privileges of Parliament, and according to the Covenant preserve the rights and privileges of Parliament; and yet yeeld obedience to a small party of one of the Houses of Parliament, as the Supreame Power, the said party excluding the rest of that House, and the other House wholly; and deposing the lawfull Prince, and abolishing the Office of the King, whose presence, personall, or legall, and politicall, hath been declared inseparable from the Parliament, and joyning with an Army, that with force hath demanded, and carried on these things?

3. How can be, according to the Protestation, maintain and defend the lawfull rights, and liberties of the Subjects, and, according to the Covenant, preserve the liberties of the Kingdom; and yet obey, and own a meerly usurped power. Whereas the most fundamentall civill Liberty of a Kingdom, and Subjects is to have a Government over them, set up by the constitution, or consent of the people; not obtruded on them by those, who of their own will and power, without any calling from them, assume it to themselves?

4. How can he, according to the Covenant, preserve and defend the Kings Majesties Person, and Authority, &c. and yet yeeld obedience to those usurpers, who, after his death, cast down his Authority, and place themselves instead thereof as the Supreame Power; whereas his Authority, in the plain intention of the Covenant, is to be preserved and defended beyond the tearme of his life, and in his posterity; as it appears from this clause compared with those words in the preface, Having before our eyes the glory of God,—the honour and happinesse of the Kings Majestie, and his posterity?

5. Lastly, how doth he, according to the Protestation, to his power, and as far as lawfully he may, oppose, and by all good wayes, and means endev’ur to bring to condigne punishment all such as shall either by force, practise, counsels, plots, conspiracies, or otherwise, do any thing to the contrary of any thing in this present Protestation contained; and, according to the Covenant, not suffer himself directly, or indirectly, by whatsoever combination, persuasion, or terror to be divided, or withdrawn from this blessed Union and conjunction; whether to make defection to the contrary part, or give himself to a detestable indifferencie, or neutrality in this cause, which so much concerneth the glory of God, the good of the Kingdome, and honour of the King, but, all the dayes of his life, zealously, and constantly continue therein against all opposition, and promote the same, according to his power, against all lets and impediments whatsoever, that yeeldeth allegiance, and obedience to a party standing, and leading all those that agree to obey them in so palpable contradiction, and opposition to some materiall points, and concernments of Religion, divers most fundamentall rights of the Parliament and people, and all the Authority and whole being of the King, contained and covenanted for, in the aforesaid Protestation and Covenant respectively.

The question discussed, Whether submission to, and acting under a usurped Power for the time, be lawfull, with a reservation of Allegiance to the lawfull Power supposed to be expulsed.

I Now come to enquire into the other opinion before mentioned, viz: That one may submit, and act under a usurped Power, for the time, and during the intervall of its prevalency; with reservation of allegiance, as due and cordially devoted to the lawfull Power expulsed. And about this we shall not insist long, because we finde not much contestation or difficulty.

In regard of the justnes, and necessity of some things which may be the subject, or matter of the Usurpers command, and the Arbitrarinesse of others, and the lawfulnesse of either, not depending upon the command or warrant of a superior, but resulting out of the nature of the action it self; so that a private man might do it, were there no Magistrate to command it, or no command from the Magistrate for it. We must needs grant, there are things which may be done upon the Usurpers command or injunction, (though not because or by vertue of it) for the command of him that unwarrantably assumeth power, cannot, by it self, make that unlawfull which were lawfull if that were not. For instance, the performance of acts of common equity, charity, order, publick utility, and self-preservation is requisite: suppose it be in concurrence with a Usurpers command, and in thus doing we do materially, but not formally obey him; the ground of acting, in such things, being not at all any relation, or principle of subjection to him; but conscience of obedience to the will of God, and doe respect to others, and our own safety, and good. Under this sort of actions I comprehend:

1. Taking up Arms for the preservation of our selves and the Countray against a common Enemy, upon the Usurpers summons; the which we might do of our selves, were there no Authority; or if a just Authority were in being, yet if it could not, or did not, maturely enough call us forth to it.

2. Payment of taxes, and bearing other impositions for the usurping Power, where, and while we are under his compulsive power, because such contributions may, and will be taken whether I will pay them or not; and I yeeld them under his enforcement, as a ransome for my life, or liberty, or somewhat else that is better to me then the payment; and consequently I am to choose the parting with it as the lesse evil, rather then with that which is better, which to loose is to incur a greater evill for the avoidance of a lesse. In this point Mr. Ascbans, the afore named Author, (Part. 2. Chap. 1. page 35.) determineth well (had he not contradicted (as I understand him) that he delivers in this and the next Chap. with that assertion of his part. 1. cap. 6. page 25.) distinguishing rightly betwixt that which cannot be had, nor the value of it, unlesse I actually give it; and that which may be taken whether I contribute it or no. Of this latter kinde is paying of Taxes in this case;a herein I am but morally passive, as a man that is fallen into the hands of a pack of bloodie theeves; and, being demanded it, takes his purse out of his pocket, and delivers it to them, though with his own hand (saith that Author) he puts his purse into their hands, yet the Law cals not that a gift, nor excuseth the thief for taking it, but all contrary. Or a man, apprehended by a party of the inviding Enemies, or Usurpers Army, walks or rides along with them to their muster or battell, when as he cannot escape them, and otherwise they would draw him. But it is commonly objected thus. Obj. This payment or other charge is taken, and will be used to an evill use as to maintain Usurpation. R: But that’s beyond my deliberation, not in my power to prevent; it will not be avoided by putting them to force it from me, but rather more gain will accrue to them, and damage to me, if I stand out; my denying will be made an occasion by them to take more: this case is like that of entering into a Covenant with those that in covenanting we know before hand will swear by a false god, wherein, Divinesb resolve, the partie swearing by the true God participateth not in his sin that swears by a false one, in as much as he communicates with him in the Covenant, not in the oath taken on his part, and provides thereby for his necessarie security; and thus did Abraham, and Jacob, in their respective Covenants with Abimelech and Laban.

3. Complaining, petitioning, or going to Law before the Magistrates or Courts authorized by the Usurpers. (Provided, you give not the Usurpers, to whom you petition, such Titles as you give to the lawfull Magistrate.) In thus doing, I seek my necessary self preservation; neither do I yeeld,Excusantur à peceato inducendi tyrannutn ad actum, & opus &illegible; petentes ab illo &illegible; quia non retunt actun illititum, sed justitam illius ottin illiciti pie interpre. tandx sunt petitiones tam iustitiæ quam tionestu uratiæ quæ ofteraneur Tyrannis, seillcerss vis, seu ex que vis detinere, & exercere hoc diminium, utere illo juste, utere honesle, utere pie, utere ad utilitatem publicam, & priratorum, prout deceret dominium nec intendunt, nec petunt actum usurpatum, led qualitattm iamctam inactu usurpato exercendo. Caietam Iummula, Tit. Remp. tyrannice, &c. or ascribe to them to whom I have recourse any just power of judicature, or participate in their sin of usurping it; onely I acknowledge they have might and ability in their hand to right me; which, though they ought not to assume, yet I may take the benefit of their unjust use of it; as a poore man may receive relief at the hands of him that hath gotten those goods he distributeth unjustly; and I may receive my money, with a good conscience, from the hands of a thief that is willing to return it to me, though he took it by robbery, from another thief that robbed me of it; and if the party, with whom I have a controversie for my right, will agree to refer the matter, betwixt us, to a private person as an Arbitrator, and stand to his arbitrement; that is a lawfull means of coming by my own, though by his help, and award that hath not claim of Authority over me; my submitting therefore my private right to the judgement of an usurping Magistracy, is no placing or owning a publick power of judicature to be in him. It hath been ordinary (and there is no doubt of the lawfulnesse of it) for a Souldier to ask quartor, a prisoner liberty, a man his plundered goods of his Enemy: yet in all this there is no concession of a legall power in that Enemie to be a Judge over the said Petitioners, either in case of life, goods, or liberty; onely in the form of addresse to the Usurper, we had need be cautelous that such a style be not used as will be a plain concession of his title to the power which he usurps.

But, in granting liberty of concurrence with some commands of an usurped Authority, we neither yeeld any obedience at all to be due, or performable to it; nor can we allow a correspondence with it in divers things, and therefore we are to put a difference.

First, betwixt things that are in themselves necessary, and those that are of a middle or an indifferent nature in themselves considered. In the latter; though, in some cases, I may act upon the Usurpers injunction; as our Saviour payed tribute where he was not bound to it, to avoid scandall; yet I must be cautious, 1. of owning, justifying, or upholding the usurpation, or injustice of the party commanding, the very appearance whereof I must as much as I can avoid. So did our Saviour, in paying the tribute gatherers their demand, by declaring his freedome, and the consideration upon which he payed, viz: not the equity of the demand, but his willingnesse to prevent scandall. And therefore in the observing of a duty of Religion, necessary in it self, and appointed, by unjustifiable Authority, to be kept on such a set day, which is in it self, arbitrary, the best way is, to take another day for it, for the &illegible; of the appearance of the evill of obeying an unjust power. 2. Of doing any thing that I may foreses will bring a worse scandall being acted, then the omission of it would; it being required of a Christian, where scandall-takeing lyes both wayes (as not seldome it doth) to shun the offence that is of worse consequence, which is usually that which is more generally taken, or by persons more considerable, or worthy of tender respect. The Apostle Paul, condemning Judaisme in Peter, and others at Antiocle, practised in favour of a few, where the most part were Gentlle Christians, Gal. 2. 11. &c. but admitted it at Jerusalem, where the greater sort were beleeving Jews, Act. 21. 20, &c.

2. Betwixt morall, or prudentiall acts competible to private men, or subjects, and politicall acts, or judiciall proceedings that flow from power, and Authority inherent in the person that acts them, or are the issues of distributive justice, and either come forth from a person clothed with Government, or unto which is requisite a stamp of Authority to make them lawfull, and justifiable: as to bear the office of a Magistrate, or Commander in Civill or Military affairs, or to be any under Agent, or servant in carrying on, or assisting the Government. An Usurper, in giving out Commissions, Commands or Warrants for proceedings of this nature, I conceive may not, in this kinde, be obeyed. Men are not to act as subordinate rulers, or agents, under such a power, or as sent by him as supreame in the Apostles sense, 1 Pet. 2. 14. For,

1. The Usurpers authority being indeed null, and of no effect, he being in truth but in a private mans capacity, as to the power he assumes; he cannot communicate, or derive any authority unto me, whereby I may act, that which before I could not; so that those actions, which require the seal of Authority to make them lawfull, and which without it would be irregular and sinfull, it must needs be clearly unlawfull for me to do, by vertue of his Commission. Conscientious advised men will generally judge it presumption, violence, oppression, bloodshed, respectively for a private man to take upon him of himself, to imprison, chastise, amerce, or put to death any supposed, or really manifested malefactor; and if I have no other humane warrant but the Usurpers, it leaving me but in a private mans capacitle, will leave my actions of that nature under no better a character. If I should, being about such undertakings, be asked that question of our Saviour, Lick. 12. 14. Man, who made thee a judge, or a divider over us? What satisfaction would it be to him that so enquireth, or to mine own conscience to alledge the name of the Usurper, who, as to supreme Authority, and consequently to the making of a competent Officer of Justice, is as good as no body.

2ly, So to act would make me a usurper also, and bring me in to be a partner in the supreame usurpers sins; in as much as politicall or State instruments, to wit, their subordinate agents, share together with the superior in the morall qualification of the work of Government.

3ly, This were manifestly to uphold, and maintain Usurpation; thus I should contribute assistance and support to the unjust power, and oppose the right of him, or them against whom he holds it; they that favour this kinde of acting as requisite, in regard of the subjects protection, and safetie, seem not to consider, that a subordinate officers acting looketh upward, as well as downward; and he that is such a one to the Usurper, serves his turn of subsistence in an unlawfull possession as much, or more then the subjects benefit. For first, he acknowledgeth and justifieth his authority as sufficient and valid by &illegible; under, and by it. 2. He keeps up that authority, and extends it to as many as he hath to do with: 3. He gives an example and encouragement to others to embrace and propagate it, as he himself doth. 4. He layes an ingagement upon himself to stand or fall with the Usurper; and so to do his utmost for him. 5. He involves himself, either wittingly, or blindfoldly in a concurrence with those counsels, and actions, which both in their own nature, and in the intention, and projection of the Usurper, directly tend to the Usurpers establishment, and the impeachment of the lawfull Governors claim, and re-advancement.

Upon these grounds, and the like, the secluded and the so-joyned members (in the case stated. Chap. 1.) had need be advised well before they enter, or act among the presupposed Usurpers: though they might be admitted by them without questioning, or purging, I question how they can enter amongst them without self-sovling: though they should, in going in, resolve to act honestly, yet, I see not how they can be untainted in a concession with those, who in their present comprehension or totality, assume a power not legally in them, and act legislatively, and otherwise in the highest sphere of Supreamacie: a force being upon the House, and the majority of Members, and the Authority of the King, and the Lords-House being professedly excluded by them. They that are out may do well to resolve, before they joyn, how it can be lawfull for them that sit to act at all (though never so just things) the whole, or body, to which they belong, being so mangled in its Members, and manacled in its freedome. And, if at all they may act, how according to Law, conscience, and their Oaths and Covenants, they can govern in that solitarinesse of supreamacie,Et magnum sit τν πολιτικοιτ
&illegible;τφν σιμμαζαν,
&illegible; sit in Consilium tyrinni, si &illegible; aliqna de re buna deliberaiutus sit. Quare si quid ejusmoli evenerit ut accersamur, quid censeas mihi saciendum, &illegible; scribien. Nihil &illegible; mihi adhue accidit. quod majoris coasilit ed. M. T. Cicero, epist. ad T. Pomp. Atticum. I. to ep. 1. and deposition of their compeers: if they think these things unjustifiable in them that sit, have they not cause to be warie how they involve themselves in such mens actings, whilest they stand in that posture? Besides, that they in coming in help to strengthen the usurpers by increasing their number, and giving them countenance in the eye of the Kingdom, as much as if they in all things concurred with them; for without the House, who knows how men sway, on give their vores? And, on the other hand, they weaken and much prejudice the claim of the lawfull Power, by appearing on the contrary party, putting themselves into an incapacity to act for it, as otherwise they might, and ingaging themselves to assist, or at least, not to oppose the Usurpers.

Finally, let them recollect, before they enter that doore, what they have sworn to his late Majestie, his Heirs, and lawfull Successors; what to the Parliaments Power, rights and priviledges, and what to the Kingdom, and Subjects lawfull rights and priviledges; and deliberate how they, keeping of those things, and sitting down with these men, will be reconciled. I finde that even wise Heathens have scrupled at this, without the supposition of such Oaths.

The obligatorinesse of the Oaths and Covenant, urged in the 2d. Chap: against obedience to Vsurpers, made good against divers late Authors.

BEfore I take in hand to answer Arguments that are brought for the confirmation of those two opinions for obedience to Usurpation, and against which I have argued in the preceding Chapters; it will be convenient in this place to take notice of such allegations and Exceptions, as are made against the obligation of the Oaths and Covenants before urged as binding out from that obedience: sundry late Authors having pleaded that the Oaths, and Covenant either are not now in force, but expired, or do not extend too, and binde in the case to which they are applyed. I begin with the Remonstrance presented to the House of Commons, Novemb: 20. 1648. which unto the clause in the Solemn League and Covenant, Art: 3. obliging to endevour to preserve and defend the Kings Majesties person and Authority, in the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdom: alledgeth divers things, some of which concern onely the obligation to the preservation of the Kings person, those are past consideration, other reflect upon it in relation to his Authority, as unto which I have urged it to be still in force, and therefore shall examine what the Remonstrance saith for the invalidating of it as unto that, bringing in onely so much of its argumentation, as can be construed to tend to this purpose: and of this nature I observe two Allegations.

1. The words (in the preservation and defence of the true Keligion, and Liberties of the Kingdoms) are a restriction to the engagement for preservation of the Kings person, and Authority, so as to oblige them to no further, nor in any other way then shall be consistent with the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdoms, but if by reason and experience we finde the preservation and defence of her person to be not safe, but full of visible danger (if not certainly &illegible;) to Religion, or publick interest, then &illegible; (by the &illegible; is self) the preservation of his person or authority is not to be endevoured so far, or in such away, or at least the Covenant obligeth not to it, but against it: page 55, 56.

1. It is not necessary nor proper to take the words, in the preservation, &c. as restrictive to the engagement either way, that is either for the preservation and defence of the Kings person and Authority on the one hand; or of the true Religion and Liberties of the Kingdoms on the other: It is not necessarie (I say) for those words in the Article (in our severall vocations) are an expresse, and fully sufficient restriction, taking in, and binding to all lawfull and just wayes of preserving and defending each of them, and excluding all unlawfull. Neither is it proper, [in] there being clearly conjunctive, and as much as [with] and equally looking both wayes, that is, both to the preservation and defence of that which goes before, and that which follows, unto the preservation and defence of all which (though they be not of equall worth or intrest, so that one of them must come behinde the other in the order of our endevours of their preservation and defence, yet) the Covenant binds equally (in regard of the firmnesse of the obligation) yet if any shall still contend, that clause to be restrictive in that manner which the Remonstrance saith, I will not strive in a verball contention with him; for the taking of it so no more lesseneth our obligation to the preservation of the Kings Authority, then if it had not been inserted; we being tyed notwithstanding it, so all just wayes of preservation therof, and no more had been involved if it had been left out.

2. But the sinews of this Argument lyeth in the pretended or implyed inconsistency betwixt the preservation and defence of Religion and the Kingdoms liberties; unto which I say:

1. There is doubtlesse a fair consistencie, non-opposition, or agreement betwixt the safetle of every one of these, the being of each of them may and can stand with the other, it is a groundlesse surmise, and grosse absurditle to imagine an inconsistency betwixt the just intrests of any of them, our taking of them together into the Covenant yeeldeth thus much; if there were any incoexistency amongst them, we could not have sworn to their joynt preservation; or if we did, the Oath was of impossibles, and so (as to this branch) both unlawfull and void, or non-obliging in the making of ita.

2. An endevour to preserve the one and the other will well enough stand together; a lawfull power indeed actually and effectually to preserve them all may happen to be wanting, and any one of them may fall under danger, and I may want just means to relieve it, but an endevour (which can onely Import a doing what is within power and warrant) may be yeelded still to the preservation of every of them.

3. Seeing then that an inconsistibility either of the things one with another, or of the endevouring their preservation cannot be pleaded as possibly incident or occurrent, evident it is, that there cannot at any time lye a necessitie of taking away of any of them, and that the obligation of the Covenant to the endevour of preserving every of them continually stands in force during their respective existence, and consequently it bindeth out from intending, seeking, attempting, or prosecuting the abolishing or destruction of any of them; for that is indeed truly inconsistent with the said endevour, and therefore a palpable violation of the Covenant.

It must here be granted, that the lawfull and necessary defence and preservation of one of them, sometimes may so imploy me that I cannot at that time by the same means act for the others safety; yet what I act for one, may put the other in hazard, and in the issue not onely be accompanied with, but (though against my will, and endevours to the utmost of my lawfull capacity) contingently, and besides my intention prove the losse and raine of the other: and this is incident not from any contrariety or Inconsistency that is betwixt them, but both because they are distinct, and separable things, and so cannot alwayes, and by the same medium be concurrently prosecuted: and because some of them are more worthy then the other, which must therefore have the preheminency thus far, that if they cannot altogether with my best endeavours be secured, I am to prefer the security of the most precious, and expose any of the other rather to danger then it. As for instance, it will (I soppose) be admitted to be agreeable to the Covenant, for the Kingdoms rather to omit the safe-guarding of their Liberties, and put them to the hazard then the true Religion, where both cannot be joyntly put out of danger: but all this amounts not to a disobligement from the endevour of preserving them all; nor to a liberty upon any emergency of active, direct, and purposed making away, or removing of any of them, though under pretence of securing the other. I have read of one Alcon, who finding his son fast on sleep upon the grasse, and a Serpent creeping upon his breast, he not apprehending how otherwise it was possible to save his son, took his Bowe, and shot at the Serpent upon the boyes breast, which (though to the manifest endangering of his life) yet he chose rather to take that course, then by suffering the Serpent to leave his life to a more certain destruction; and either his art or good hap was such, as that he prevented and slew the Serpent, and preserved his Son:b those whom we are bound and most solicitous to preserve, we may upon an extreame exigence put in some hazard that we may preserve them; but there is a great difference betwixt this, and a deliberate purposed, declared prosecuting them to destruction.

Manilius ll 3.3. But how doth the Remonstrancer prove the Assumption, viz: The inconsistency pretended betwixt the endevour of the preservation of the Kings person and Authority, and the preservation of Religion and liberty? thus he saith, By reason, and experience we finde the preservation and defence of his person and Authority, to be not safe, but full of visible danger (if not certainly destructive) to religious or publick Interest.

If the one could be said to be certainly destructive to the other, you would have said it without an [if not] but it seems you have not confidence to assever so much, and yet they cannot be purely inconsistent without such a destructivenesse; so that your own extenuation sufficiently discovers the weaknes of your proof, all that you affirm is, That there is no safetie, but a full visible danger in the preservation which you impugne.

1. The danger you pretend is in the disposall and use of the things to be preserved, not in the nature of the things. For Instance, the Kings Authority is politically and morally good, the ordinance of God, and if well used may be eminently advantagious; if evilly used may be dangerous enough to Religion and liberties: the like may also be said or the privileges of the Parliament, and of the liberties of the Kingdoms in relation to Religion, and to each other; will you thence infer an inconsistency of these with Religion, or a disobligement from the Covenant for preservation and defence of these?

2. As there may be danger that way to the things specified, so there may be danger and insecurity to the same things on the other hand, viz: in the destruction of the Kings person (suppose it were undone) and Authority, and let impartiall Reason and Experience judge, whether the preservation or destruction thereof hath more danger in it to Religion, and the Kingdoms Liberty.

3. But seeing there may be some danger on each side, and in the preservation of the Kings Authority, there is no more pretended but danger, and that but of suffering, not of sin, it is apparent, that as there is no such inconsistency as is intimated, so the obligation of the Covenant to the preservation of the Kings Authority stands good, and our safest way is to avoid the horrid sin, and greater danger of Covenant-breaking, by standing upon the said preservation.

2ly, The other thing which the Remonstrance alledgeth, and is to be cleared is this. Where severall persons joyning to make a Covenant, do make a covenanting clause therein to the good or benefit of another person not present, no party to the agreement, but whom, and whose Interest they would willingly provide for as well as for their own, to the end he might joyn with them in the agreement, and partake the benefit thereof as well as themselves, if this absent party (when it is tendered to him for his conjunction) shall not accept the Agreement, but refuse to joyn in, and oppose it, and begin, prosecute and multiply contests with all the Covenanters about the matters contained in it. Surely that person in so doing by his once refusing upon a fair and full tender, sets the other Covenanters free from any further obligation, by vertue of that Covenant, at to what concerns his benefit or interest therein. Now whether this be not your case, &c.

1. True indeed, a releasement from Covenants and promissory oaths, which concern matters betwixt man and man is granted lawfull some wayes: But, 1. this must be done by the party with whom the Covenant, and to whom the Oath is madec, but as the Remonstrancer acknowledgeth, this Covenant was made the King being not present, nor a party covenanting, or covenanted with but a third person, the persons covenanting, and covenanted with mutually (as by the Introductory part is manifest) were the Noblemen, Barons, Knights, &c. in the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, it was it may be desired, and hoped that the King and his Issue would afterwards approve and joyn in it, but the Covenant war actually plighted, and therefore did actually binde in every branch of it they not taking it; and (the parties with whom we covenanted not releasing us) the pretended refusall of the King could be no discharge from it. 2. A releasement can be made by the party covenanted with and sworn too, onely where the Covenant is for the particular and proper interest of that party, or so far onely as concerneth him, but not to the prejudice of a third parties concernment without his consentd; but the Covenant (even in that part of it) was not meerly or chiefly of a private or personall importance to the King himself, but was, and is of a publick interest to the Covenanters themselves and the Kingdoms; the Kings refusall therefore and opposition to it could be no release from it: we say on all hands, the King is for the Kingdom as the means is for the end. We have ten parts in the King, said the men of Israel of David; and at another time they said and sware, Thou shalt no more go out with us to battell, that thou quench not the light of Israel. What portion have we in David? and we have none inheritance in the son of Jesse, the ten Tribes said, when they made a revolt from, and rebelled against Reheboam.

The Introduction of the Covenant in laying down the concernments and ends for the making of it, expresseth it self thus: Having before our eyes the glory of God, and the advancement of the kingdom of our Lord, and Saviour Jesus Christ, the honour and happinesse of the Kings Majestie, and his posterity, and the true publick liberty, safety, and peace of the Kingdoms wherein every ones private condition is included. And a little afterwards, We have for the preservation of our selves, and our Religion from utter ruine and destruction, resolved, and determined to enter into a mutuall and solemne, League and Covenant, &c. And Art: 6. it styleth its cause, This Common cause of Religion, liberty and peace of the Kingdoms: which cause, it saith presently after, so much concerneth the glory of God, the good of the Kingdoms, and honour of the King.

2. The King never refused to agree to, nor did he oppose the matter of this particular clause: as touching this there could be no dissent on his part, his prescribing and standing upon the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, wherein this clause is contained, his avowing the difference and war on his part to be for the defence of his person, and authority; his putting forth Oaths to them that adhered to him for the preservation of these, makes it as clear as noon-day that he refused and opposed not this branch. Now upon this consideration, the Remonstrancer hath not onely falled in his allegation, but overthrown his own argument; he saying in the place before cited, Although the Kings refusing sets the Covenanters free from any further obligation by vertue of that Covenant, at to what concerns his interest and benefit therein, yet the Covenant at to other matters concerning the right and benefit of the Covenanters one from another stands still obliging, and in force. I may by the same reason say, the Kings refusing the Covenant upon exception against other clauses, not this, and his opposing other matters in the Covenant, not this, could not dis-ingage or release the Covenanters from this, about which there was not the least dissent or reluctancy, but a concurrence full enough on his part; so that the Covenant must stand still obliging and in force as to this part.

3. If the Kings said refusall and opposition could have discharged us from this member of the Covenant as to his own person and interest in the Authority, yet with all your straining you cannot stretch them to our release from preservation and defence of the Kingly Authority in relation to his posterity, who were in proximity to him interested in it; and for whose interest therein the Covenant was also madee; and whose refusall of it, nor yet a tender of it to them, you do not, cannot once plead.

I have done with the wrong glosse of the Remonstrancer endeavouring to impeach the obligation of this clause of the Covenant. I finde another (a deare friend of his) tampering with it also to elude the tye of it; and he offers it no lesse violence, but in a more unhandsome and grosse manner. It is that Polemick, or Army-Divine, Mr. J. G. in his Defence of the Honourable Sentence, &c. The man in that book undertaketh, and bends his skill to a double unhappie, and crosse designe, to wit, to varnish and guild over that which is very foule, and to besmear and obscure that which is very clear. In his prosecution of the latter he fals upon this sentence of the Covenant, in dealing with which he correspondeth with the Remonstrancer, and as this hath challenged to himself a prerogative to enforce men and Magistrates, so doth he arrogate to himself to be a bold enforcer of words and Covenants; a more strange and presumptuous perverting of plain words, I never read nor heard, then that which he useth to this clause, when he saith, page 51. Evident it is, that those words in the Covenant in the preservation and defence of the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdoms, import a condition to be performed on the Kings part, without the performance whereof, the Covenant obligeth no man to the preservation or defence of his Person or Authority. And this condition he makes to be, page 52, 53. That he preserve and defend the true Religion, and liberties of the Kingdom: and of this his paraphrase of the words he saith, If this be not the clear meaning and importance of them, the Covenant is a Barbarian unto me, I understand not the English of it. The vast exorbitancy, audaciousnesse, and impietie of this his wresting, and straining of these plain words, I leave the Reader to take the measure of: I shall onely endeavour to free them from this his distortion.

1. Let the words themselves speak, they do not say in his preservation and defence, &c. but in the preservation and defence, &c. plainly referring to the same preservation and defence of Religion and Liberties which is before promised, and sworn in this and the preceding Articles, and as evidently referring to the same persons preservation, and defence of them here, which are to preserve and defend them in the former clauses, and which are to preserve and defend the Kings Majesties person and Authority in this, viz: the Covenanters. If the Covenant had intended to pitch the preservation and defence in this clause upon another person, or persons, as the performers besides those to whom the same actions are referred immediately before, it would have pointed them out distinctly; but when it expresses no other, ordinary construction will attribute them to the parties before nominated; and no regular construction can put them upon any other. This reading is plain English to him that knows the language, and will understand, and Mr. G. proves himself a barbarous dealer with the covenant, in that he will have it, either to admit of his antigramaticall sense, or to be a Barbarian to him. I dare appeal to Mr. Gs. own conscience, if it be not either speechles, or a Barbarian to him, whether, when he took this Covenant, he understood this clause in the meaning he would now thrust upon it; or rather hath not played the Dœdalus since, in shaping, and bringing forth this sense to serve his turn, and defend what hath been since acted.

2. In making this the importance of those words, Mr. G. contradicts his friend, or Patron the Remonstrancer, in his expounding of them, and takes away the very medium, or ground of his argument before brought in out of his book, page 55, 56. and answered above. For he page 55. takes those words either at a restriction to the engagement for preservation of the Kings person and Authority, to wit, at obliging no further then it consistent therewith: yea he protoseth whether the said engagement may not be so understood as to be fulfilled in the preservation of Religion and Liberties; neither of which senses can carry that clause to the King as the performer: and in page 56. he explaineth this preservation, and defence of Religion, and liberties to be the Parliaments Covenanted utmost endeavour to preserve them. Let Mr. J. G. then leave endeavouring to reconcile the Covenant and his cause which are at too great odds to be reconcileable, and go make the Remonstrancer and himself friends, who differ so diametrically in their sense of these words.

3. How will Mr. G. make this sense of his, and the proceedings against the late King stand together? for before the King was so proceeded against, he had consented to all that was positively proposed to him for Religion, at least for 3. yeers; and for the privative part propounded, to wit, the Abolition of Episcopacy he had not denyed it, but granted the present suspension, and referred the utter extirpation of it to the deliberation of the Assembly, and ordering of Parliament; against whose consent he had agreed nothing should be done for the restoring of it: and had granted fully the Parliaments overtures for Liberties. Neither doth the Remonstrancer, or any other (as far as I have observed) insist on the shortnesse of the Kings concessions in any particulars of either nature, as the ground of those capitall proceedings, but on the inexpiablenesse of his former facts, and the unsafenesse of trusting him for future upon any tearms. If then the King, immediately before the fatall prosecution against him, did (as his present state would permit) concur so amply in the preservation of Religion and Liberties, they were bound that had taken this Covenant by vertue of this clause taken in Mr. Gs. sense, whatever had been his former carriage) then to endeavour the preservation of his person and Authority. The Covenant in this branch is indefinite, and unrestrained in regard of time; it doth not say (suppose Mr. Gs. meaning had been its words) we shall preserve the Kings person and Authority, if he shall (within a yeer or two after this) preserve Religion, and Liberties; but obligeth the Covenanters whenever the King should joyn in preserving Religion and Liberties (as Mr. G. understandeth it) to the preservation of his person and Authority. Here then Mr. G. instead of weakning the Covenant, as to the end it was urged by those whom he opposeth, hath by wringing turned it against himself, and that his adored cause which he would have defended and that with more strength then is in any of those reasons (or rather shifts and colours) brought by himself for any other Roseius — for it.

4. If that indeed were the sense of that clause which he would out-face us into the accepting of, what can be said against the binding of it to the preservation and defence of the kingly Authority still? (though the then King be deceased) it being before proved, that this clause obligeth to it in reference to the Kings pollerity, against whom there can be Objection of a fail in this supposed condition, it being unperformable without default whilest possession of the Authority is with-held; and the Authority being with-held before, either any refusal of the supposed condition, by him that should perform it, or any overture so him, for the obtaining of it be made.

I have thus done with the exceptions made against the obligatorinesse of the Covenant, in the matter in hand; I now passe to the Examination of what is pleaded against the force of the Oaths of Allegiance amongst the impugners of them; Ile begin with him whom I had last to deal with, Mr. J. G. who in the same book, pag: 58, 59, 60. thinks to discharge us from these bonds, with a Reason framed as followeth.

(In recitall whereof I shall rehearse as much of him as expresseth his Argumentation, omitting those two hetorogeneous instances [of keeping back a mad mans sword, and of a States dis-engagement from league with another State that hath first broken league with it] as impertinent both to his reason and our case.)

Peter Martyr (saith Mr. G.) well abserves concerning the promises of God [that they are to be understood according to the present state and condition of things when they are mad.] meaning that no performance of them is intended by God in ease men shall decline from that integrity under which, and in relation unto which such promises were made unto them: so neither are the promises of men, whether made with oath, or without to be so understood, or if the makers of them stood bound to perform the terms of them under any possible change or alteration what soever in the persons to whom they are made. Chrysostome writing upon those words, Matth. 19. 28. Shews, that Judas, though the promise of sitting upon a throne was made unto him as well as unto any other, yet by reason of that change which afterwards appeared in him, through his wickednesse, forfeited and lost his right of interest in that promise, nor doth any promise though confirmed with an oath, of allegiance, obedience, or subjection unto a King, and his Successors, or posterity, binde any longer or otherwise, either before God or men, then whilest, and or this King or his successors, shall continue in the some department of themselves in the discharge of their trust, and administration of their power, whereby they commended themselves to us at the time when we sware such allegiance to them, and in consideration and expectation whereof the same war sworn by us; therefore the King being so notoriously changed, &c. evident it is that God himself by the tenor and impartment of his promises, and Jesus Christ by the like tenor and import of his, fully and fairly acquits us from all engagements, and lyes which the Oath of Allegiance at the time of our taking it layed upon us.

2 Pet 1. 4. Psal. 138. 2.What? and must the exceeding great and precious promises of God, and his fidelity and truth therein, which he hath magnified above all his Name, be thus traduced? must the honour of God, which it so much concerned in taking, and violated in breaking an Oath, be yet much more impeached in the bringing in, and mis-reporting of his example to patronise mens falshood and perjury therein? And when an Oath cannot lawfully be dispensed with, or justly rendred non-obliging, must the forcible and ungodly bursting of it asunder be fathered on him, who in the Truth, the Amen, the faithfull and true witnesse?

But to endeavour a vindication briefly.

1. Mr. G. you have here done that learned and solid Divine P. Martyr a double wrong. 1. In curtailing his sentence, and breaking it off in the middle, suppressing those following words which would have cleared his sense to be none of yours. 2. In mis-translating the words which you cite, his words truly rendered and rehearsod out are these, Therefore those promises of God, (to wit, that of our Saviour, Matth. 19. 28; which he had in the Section last before brought in, with Chrysostomes interpretation upon it, quoted by you, and those of Gen. 9. 2. Jer. 18. 7, 8. with Chrysostome also upon them) are to be understood with reference to the present state of things, wherefore when we hear the promises of God, it behoves us thus to conceive, either they have some condition annexed, or they are layed down absolutely; Furthermore either they are of force onely for the present time, or they must be fulfilled in after timef. It is by this recitall evident, how you by leaving out the word [ille] have falsified P. Martyrs text, who is speaking onely of some particular promises, conditionally made, and (as he saith) respecting the present time which he distinguisheth from others; but you would have him understood of any promises, and draw an universall negative from his words.

2. You are not content to misconstrue this servant of God, but you dare to mis-represent, and mistate the minde of God himself; you say indefinitely of the promises of God, That no performance of them is intendedly God, &c. where as the Scripture is clear (and most unhappie were men if it were otherwise) that 1. there are absolute promises wherein performance is intended by God, notwithstanding men shall decline in these said integrity, and whereunto such promises have no relation as to their validity or fulfilling. Take for instance, Psal. 89. 33, 34. Hosea 14. 4. Ezek. 36. 25. &c. Heb. 8. 10. &c. 2. In conditionall promises, though there may be partiall and temporary declinings in men from their said integritie (as there was eminently in Peter, one of those parties to the promise, Matth. 19. 28.) yet God performeth the promise to true beleevers, through, and for Christs sake, In whom all the promises are yea and Amen, and that alwayes,2 Cor. 1. 20. if it be a promise of the life which is to comes and often, if it be a promise of the life that now is, namely, when it is good for them, according to those promises, Psal. 84. 11. Rom. 8. 28. 1 Cor. 3. 21. And if there be a performance by God, certainly there was an intention in him of that performance, notwithstanding such declining, For he worketh all things after the counsell of his own will. And for this you might have hearkened to P. Martyr your own Author, In the place whither he referreth you in the Section quoted by you, speaking thus. But because the conditions of legall promises could not be performed by men, God out of his own mercy hath substituted Evangelicall promises in their place, which though they have conditions annexed, yet they are held out gratis. And a little further he saith, The Evangelicall promise may stand good without those conditions. How this is, he presently after explains thus. Therefore impossible conditions are annexed, that men warned of their infirmity, and fully understanding it, they may betake themselves to Christ, of whom they being received into favour, and justification being obtained, they may obtain those very promises, for us to them they of Legall are made Evangelicallg.

3. You rest not in this mis-alledging of Gods promises, (though in it, you bewray audaciousnesse, and unsoundnesse enough) but you rise higher in presumption, making an odious comparison, or rather equalitie between God and man, in promises and covenants, whereas the case of the covenanting of these two is far enough different; for if it were granted, that God in some of his conditionall promises intendeth no performance nor obligation on his part, but upon condition of mans perseverance, must there needs be therefore an equivalency, or conformity throughout thereunto in mans Covenants with man? must they therefore be all of them so made or understood? or rather is there not of right a vast disparity? God is no mans debtor, he is not bound to man, there is no right in the creature from God, he can claim nothing from him, otherwise then by promise: God may do what he will with his own, and all is his own. But with man it is not so,Alia enim tatio est obligation is ubi debitum sundatur inpremissione, ubi veto promissio sundatur in debito longè alia. D. Sand. de jutament, prælect 6. Sect. 9. either towards God, or man, he stands in divers relations, and is tyed in many duties, even towards men, before he covenant or swear, unto which single tye, the bonds of Oaths and expresse and solemn Covenants are often in weightie matters added, for confirmation and greater security. And thus it is in the point in hand, there is Allegiance due without the interposition of an Oath, or any such engagement by particular persons; we are in a settled State, born Subjects, and both claim the immunity and protection, and owe the duty of such, without personall indenting, or oath-taking; and this obedience is owing to Princes, or Magistrates without condition of Religion, or Justice on their part performed; the Scripture is clear for an irrespective (and in regard of the Rulers demeanor) absolute subjection: Exid. 20. 12. 21. 25. Rom. 13. 1, 2, &c. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13. 1 Sam. 24. 6. 7. 26. 9, 10, 11. Jer. 27. 12. 29. 7. Matth. 22. 21. And the Doctrine of orthodox Divines generally is, that obedience is due to the most degenerate, tyrannicall, and oppressive Magistratesh. When therefore this necessary and unconditionated duty (as to the parties behaviour) becomes the subject of an oath, or personall engagement, it is not capable of capitulations or conditions to be performed by the persons sworn to, upon which the obligation of the oath shall be dependent; to admit such qualifications, would frustrate the end of a promissory oath, which is to give assurance and security (and that the strongest men can give) to the party unto whom the oath is made, of what, either was before, or is then made due by promise; instead whereof the inserting of conditions of this nature in this case would make what was before clearly owing now more dubious and uncertain to the expectation of the proprietor: and would be apt to beget in the debtor a perswasion, (upon non-performance of conditions) of a discharge as well from the matter, as from the obligation of the Oath.

4. Of Humane Covenants, or promissory oaths, whereof the subject or matter is arbitrary, and we are not otherwise bound to then by Covenant, or Oath, there are severall sorts,i some are absolute, having no expresse condition annexed, but are simply undertaken, saving that those generall and constant provisoes of every promise or oath which need now expressing, are to be understood therein, viz: that the thing when it comes to be performed be lawfull and possible, and notwithstanding the understanding of which the obligation is absolute. As for instance, such was that promise and oath of Joseph to his father Jacob, Gen. 47. 29, 30, 31, &c. and that of the children of Israel to each other, Judg. 21. 5. And that of Jonathan to David, 1 Sam. 20. 12, 13. Others again are conditionall, wherein something future, that is contingent, or depending upon mans will is particularly, and expresly comprised as a qualification of the matter to be performed, the failing of which is a discharge of the person engaging from the promise or oath. Such was that of the servant to Abraham, Gen. 24. 2. 3. 4. 8. 9. And that of the Spics to Rahab, Joshus 2 12. to 21. Now then for Mr. G. to say generally of all oaths and promises whatsoever, whether they be of things in their own nature necessary, or of things arbitrary; whether they be absolute, or conditionall; and to say specially of all promises and oaths of Allegiance, or subjection, and particularly of these oaths in question, that they are conditionall, and binde no longer, nor any otherwise then whilest, and as the partie covenanted with, or sworn to, behaves himself as he did at the time of covenanting, is both in it self, and by what is here said, as also by the ordinary practise of men in Indentures, and oaths apparently inconsistent, and absurd; and to infer such an universall loosening of men from Oaths and Covenants, of what nature soever, upon the parties miscarriage to whom the engagement is made, from the conditionallty of some divine promises, is (besides the impietie of it above denoted) an insupportable non sequitur, and by Mr Gs. &illegible; never to be maintained; yet this is all the Logick of this Argument.

Having thus (I hope) sufficiently taken away the Exceptions of this Author against the force of the Oath of Allegiance, I leave him thaining and travailing about that stone of Sisisbus, (to wit, the guilt of Royall blood) which he labours to 100l away in that his book, and proceed to another.

The &illegible; I meet with that strikes at the obligation of this Oath, is one that asserteth himself to be of those whom he that I had last to do with, professeth himself a Champion against, that is, the Presbyterian part, but in this (as far as my ken will reach) he is alone for them: I mean the Author of The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government, who in his 11. and 12 pages pleadeth against is with the Reasons which follow, being here set down by parcels, with my Answer to them so distinguisht.

1. It were good (saith he first) to consider, whether there be any clause in any Oath or Covenant, which in a fair and common sense forbids obedience to the Commands of the present Government, and Authority, much lesse when no other can be bad, and so the Common-wealth must go to ruine.

1. The many clauses of severall Oaths, and of the Covenant and Protestation, which strictly forbid such obedience, I have urged [Chap. 2.] whither I refer him.

2. But by his last sentence recited [much lesse when no other, &c.] together with his marginall quotation [of a Popish Schoolman or Casuist telling us, When a thing sworn is too difficult, or he that swore is by the change of abilities or estate rendered lesse apt to perform: or lastly, when the thing sworn is an hindrance to the swearer from consulting the publick good, then there is a lawfull cause of dispensing in the Oath] he seems as if he would insinuate a cessation of the Oath in our case, unto which I say.

1. Take dispensation, in the usuall Popish accuption, and all; power of dispensing in Oaths and Vows, in whomsoever it be supposed to be, is denyed with one consent, (as far as I have observed, or ever heard) by Protestant professors: and it is a meer popish doctrine, and papall arrogation exploded from amongst us.k And this Oath hath it self precluded and cut off all use of this shift of a dispensation in these words. I do beleeve, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any other person whatsoever, hath power to absolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof. And this I the rather note, upon occasion of this Authors quoting a Doctor of the Papacy for the dispensabilitie of an Oath, in regard that some of late (if I mistake not) have taken upon them to discharge people from this Oath, or (which is all one) from the Allegiance therein sworn to. Unto which act I shall onely speak thus much, either they assume power to do this as the party to whom the Oath is taken, or as a superior, by the analogie of that Law, Numb: 30. 3, 4. But, 1. they cannot do it as the party sworn to in that Oath, for they are not that partie in the Oath, the King, and his Heirs, and Successors are the onely persons to whom, and in whose behalf the Oath is taken, and consequently they onely that can release from it as parties; nay they are the party swearing, and therefore far from a capacity of discharging others from that Oath, as presently I shall shew. 2. Neither can they do it as a superior by the equity of that Law, Numb: 30. For, 1. their lawfull superiority in the case they now stand, is the matter under question. 2. The power of a superior to undo the Oath, or bond of the inferior, prevails onely in those matters wherein the party is under the power of the superior, and not in other matters, which are without the extent of the superiors authorityl. Now this Oath concerns a duty owing to another, which they that interpose to discharge from it have no right to dispose of. 3. But however the superior can onely by the Law cited, or any other right come in to make void the Oath of the inferior, which was taken without his knowledge and consent,Animad
vertendum tamen est penes hos non esse satultatem reseindendi quodll. her &illegible; subditorum; sedillud &illegible; cuius materia est &illegible; &illegible; subitsts Alsled. Theol. Cas. cap 15. and that also he may onely do in the day that he hears of it; but if he either allow the making of it, or declare not against it presently, when he comes to know of it, he hath no power thenceforth to recall it, as is clear by the Text. Now the Oath of Allegiance was so far from being disallowed, or declared against as soon as it was known, that it was inacted and injoyned by both Houses of Parliament, and moreover it was constantly to be taken by all the Members of the Lower House at their entrance into that House; so that besides their incompetency to discharge from the Oath who have assented to it; Let any man shew how they who are parties to the oath, and have themselves taken it can disanull it; the obliged parties disanulling is a strain above Papall dispensation.

2. But to speak to these causes of dispensing with an Oath according to the Casuists Divinity, which the Author applyeth to the case in hand. 1. When the thing sworn is too difficult, or the sweater it by the change of ability,Reg. 2. num. 16. or estate, rendred lesse apt to perform. If by this difficulty of the thing, and unaptnesse of the person sworn, he mean, the thing is become impossible, and the partie utterly unable to observe it. All reasonable men will grant so far as the impossibility lyes and so long as it continues the Oath binds not, but this is not to our Authors purpose, for to cease from an act, that is, from obedience to the present Government, can never be impossiblem. But if he intend by difficultie and unaptnesse, that the thing sworn to will bring hard tearms upon the swearer, or breed him temporall losse, and trouble, this is no cause to infringe thetye of an Oath, or give a discharge from it; He that hath sworn to his own hurt, must not therefore change from it: Psal. 15. 4.

2. When the thing sworn is an impediment to the swearer from consulting the publick good.Obligatio tollitur quoad id solum quod est factu impossibile quoad reliqum vero maner, & qui non potest omne quod debet, debts tamen omne quod potest. Idem Sect. 12.

1. If the thing sworn should become privative of, or opposite to, the publick good, or well-being of the Nation in Its own nature, & necessarily, it were unlawfull, and consequently the oath would be void, for to a sinfull thing there can be no obligation. But if it be onely of that nature which they call impeditive of a greater good, that is, if it stand in the way (not of the good of the Kingdom simply, and absolutely respected, but onely) of some higher degree of good supposed to be attainable; this consideration will not bear that weight, as to frustrate an oath. As for example, when a people that hath sworn obedience to a lawfull form of Government, which yet is not absolutely the best, as suppose to a Democracy, or Aristocracy, or that hath sworn obedience to a lawfull Prince, who yet is not simply the ablest that can be found for regall parts and qualifications, such may not take themselves discharged from their Oath, because there may be a better modell of Government, or a better qualified person to make a Prince sound out, and for that cause cast off their present Government and King, and set up another because comparatively better. It was doubtlesse better for the people of Israel, that the Gibeonites had been destroyed, as the rest of the Canaanites were (if there had been no oath to the contrary) then that they were spared (besides that the sparing of them was against an expresse positive Law:Est regula iuris, &illegible; impossibilis nulla est obligatio. Deut. 20. 16.) and so the congregation judged, and therefore grudged at the sparing of of them: yet in that case the Oath for sparing them stood inviolable. Josh. 9. 15. 18, 19. 2 Sam. 21. 1, 2, &c. It was in like sort for the Kingdoms greater good, that Zedekiah and his people should be free from Nebuchadnezzar subjection, yet that was not a dissolution of that Kings Covenant and Oath, Ezek. 17. 12, 13, &c. 2. It will at no hand be granted, that to withhold obedience from a usurped Power is in it self impeditive of the publick good at all, I know inconveniencies are by this Author urged to follow, if such a Power be not obeyed; as that, Else all Authority must fall to the ground, and so confusion, (which is worse then titular tyrannie) be admitted. But all Authority hangs not upon the back of Usurpation, this may come down shortly again, and that recover it self, and stand upright. Present quietnesse and security are like to be but in a sickly state, obey, or obey not; and for justice, as there is none where every man is left to himself, so there is usually little to be had from the hands of an unjustly gotten Power; Dominion being wont to be worn as it was come byn. An Issachar-like bowing down under the Common-wealths oppressions is not for publick good (neither were we told thus when the Parliament began to stand up, and awaken the people to shake off Expilation and oppression) the Orator will tell us, Servitude is the worst of Evils, and to be repelled at the charge not onely of war, but deatho. Nay Religion will dictate to us in the words of the wisest earthly King, That righteousnesse exalteth a Nation; and, The throne is establisht by righteousnesse. Under Usurpation then we can expect no settlement; and to submit to it, is to help to fasten that which is certain to fall, and to fall with the greater confraction, by how much it is more favoured. Commotion and tumultuousnesse is sure (in reason) to follow violent domination. Let Israels many and turbulent changes of their Kings (after their departure from the house of David) be a president for it, of whose kings for their speedie and fatall ends, it may be said, as it was of many of the Romane Cæsars, that they rather seemed to be kings in a Scene, or personated on the Stage then reall Authorities. The standing off from obedience is but like to speed the Commotions, and make them easier. To perswade men to couch down under Usurpation, when it is gotten up to rave troubles, is as if a man that is got into the briars should stick therein, because he may take himself in offering to get out; or he that hath a fostered sore, or grown disease in his body, should let it alone, and go on, because it will stir the humours, and cost him some pain to be cured.

2. The same Author proceeds, And whether it, (to wit, any clause in any Oath or Covenant) forbids obedience to the present Authority, more then to Laws that have been formerly enacted, by those which came into Authority meerly by Power. 1. You have not yet produced any former Princes that had any hand in the making of a Law, that came into the regall Authority meerly by power; for although some of them got possession by the Sword, yet (to omit the alledging of other title) they were confirmed, by the Kingdoms consent in Parliament, before they concurred in Enacting Laws for the Kingdom. 2. The Laws you reflect on were not meerly made by those Princes whom you pretend to have come in meerly by Power, but were constituted by Parliamentary Enacting; And for any former Parliaments coming into the Authority meerly by force, you neither do nor can alledge any thing.

3. He urgeth further. If it be seid, that in the Oath of Allegiance, allegiance is sworn to the King, his heirs and successors, if his heirs be not his successors, how doth that Oath binde? Either the word successors must be super fluous, or it must binde to successors as well as to heirs; and if it binde not to a successor that is not an heir, how can it binde to an heir that is not a successor? And if you will know the common and usuall sense (which should be the meaning of an Oath) of the word Successors, you need not so much ask of Lawyers and learned persons, as of men of ordinary knowledge, and demand of there who was the successor of William the Conquerour, and see whether they will not say W: Rufus, and why succeeded Rich: the 3d: and whether they will not say, Hen: the 7th: and yet neither of them was heir: so in ordinary acception the word Successor is taken for him that actually succeeds in Government, and not for him that is actually excluded.

This Author in these lines raiseth much duit, that it may serve him for a double end: 1. To obscure the genuine sense of this clause of the Oath, that it may not seem to make against him, as indeed it doth; and then to detort and wrest it, to the advantage of his Usurpers interest. 1. Howould cast a mist upon the words of the Oath, to over cloud its true sense, and this he attempts in the fore cited Discourse untill you come to this mark ∥: he endeavours i: by placing an ambiguity in the word [Successors], and setting it at odds with the word [Heirs] whereas this clause of the Oath is clear enough in it self, and far enough from the use he would make of it; and firm enough to the sense which he opposeth. Which that I may evince, I desire the Reader to observe these two things.

1. That the Oath intends by Heirs, and Successors, the same persons which may evidently appear, 1. By the manifest drift of the Oath, and intention of the Authority that prescribed it, which is the continuance and assurance of the Crown (upon concession of his then Majesties just title) to his Heirs in succession after him, and one another lineally, and the defence of them therein against all other corrivals or opposers; this I cannot see which way will be gainsayed; and being so, it will inforce us to grant the Oath, and Oath-giver, could not mean by successors any other then heirs. 2. In that the words [heirs and successors] are joyned by the copulative [and], whereas if they should have intended different parties, the discretive [or] should, in true syntaxis have been put betwixt them. 3. In that his heirs and successors are immediately in the Oath denoted by the same pronounce [them], and again by the same possessive [their] in those words, (and him and [them] will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all conspiracies and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his or [their] persons, [their] Crown or dignity) but if they be not the same persons, how come they to be thus particled together? especially how can they immediately after his Majestie be instituted to the same Allegiance, and defence therein in relation to the same Crown and dignity; admit them divers, and the Oath will import a contradiction: and will any man imagine, so irrationall a thing as that Authority hath so long imposed, and the Kingdome, especially the most intelligent persons in it, have universally taken an Oath so irreconcileable to it self. 4. The Law of the Land (unto which this Oath must needs be yeelded to be consonant) ordains his Heirs to be his Successors.

2. That the Oath understands by Successors, those onely that are so de jure, and not any others, that contrary to right may intrude into the royall Seat, and injuriously make themselves successors onely de facto. For, 1. In the Oath we swear Allegiance, and defence to Successors; now what man of conscience would ever impose, or take an Oath of this nature to any (but in his intention) a just party, for to such a one alone could he swear in righteousnesse according to Jer. 4.2. 2. The Oath appropriates the Crown and dignity to Successors, as theirs, in these words, [their Crown and dignity] now theirs, and their right are all one. 3. The Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy must needs accord, and this may be the best Explanatorie of that: now this, viz: the Oath of Supremacy prefixeth the word [lawfull] to Successors, and confineth our allegiance to his lawfull Successors in these words, The Kings highnesse, his Heirs, and lawfull Successors: which epithite will not permit the word Successors, either in that or in the Oath of Allegiance (unlesse you will unreasonably make them jarring) to be carried to any successor but him that is such of right. And this reason will also irrefragably confirm the former Proposition, viz: that the Oath intends by Heirs and Successors, the same persons, for who are his lawfull Successors? the Law will tell you, his Heirs.

By these two Propositions (sufficiently cleared I hope) we may understand how the Oath (in that clause) binds; and that, 1. There is no superfluitie in the word Successors; for an Identity in sense of divers words is no vain Tantalogie, many words signifying the same thing being ordinarily used (and especially in Oaths, and such like punctuall forms, and particularly in the Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy in divers other clauses) for explication, and significancies sake. And though heirs and successors in the clause in hand mean the same persons, yet it may be in a divers consideration, as thus: They are Heirs in his Majesties life time, and Successors at his death respectively. 2. That the Oath binds neither to his Heirs, nor Successors disjunctively, or the one taken from the other, but to both conjunctively, as one: and taking Successors aright, that is, for lawfull successors, we need not, cannot say that it binds either to a successor that is not an heir, or to an heir that is not a successor, viz: de jure, though perhaps he may be prevented, or delayed from actuall succession, or rather possession.

2. But this Author will have [Successors] to signifie such as are so de facts, and do actually succeed in Government; And by this means this passage of the Oath shall make for the Usurper if he be in possession. I have said (I think) that which is enough to fore-stall this alreadie, but let his Argument be heard, and receive a formall Answer; it is in effect thus.

The common and ordinary acception of the word Successor, means him that actually succeeds in Government; but the word Successor in this Oath, must be understood in the common and ordinary acceptiont Ergo, the word Successor in this Oath must mean him that actually succeeds in Government.

1. I answer to the major by denying it if taken universally; and if it be not, the Syllogisme is false: the major not being universall in the first figure. For although one common sense of the word Successor, is he that actually succeeds whether by right or wrong, yet that’s not the sole usuall acception of the word, and this I shall evince the same way that he goes about to prove his acceptation to be the common one; and in so doing, confute also his proof of his major which is thus. If you would know (saith he) the common sense of the word Successors, ask not so much Lawyers and learned persons, as men of ordinary knowledge, and demand of them who &illegible; William the Conquerours successor? they will say, W: Rufus. Who succeeded Rich: the 3d: they will say, H: the 7th: and yet neither of them was heir. R. Although I yeeld not his rule to be the best (for if Successor be a tearme used in the Law (as it is in this Oath prescribed by Law) Lawyers, and learned men in the Law, were there any obsenrity would be the fittest Interpreters of it; for it is a maxime, we must beleeve every one in his own facultie or Actp) yet I shall refer the matter to it so the question may be rightly propounded, and as the case in hand will allow. This Author propounds it fallaciously, and unapplicably to the present purpose, in that he demands de præterits, and so as the question onely interrogates of an actuall Successor [who was successor, or did succeed such a one?] and then the answer (whether made by men learned or unlearned) must needs bring in him that did succeed in fact. But let the question be put de future, and thus onely it is sutable to a promissory oath which respecteth the future time, and a thing to be done in it; and consequently to this Oath which is promissory, and runs de future. I shall bear faith and true Allegiance; and I will defend, &c. and was taken of a successor not that had succeeded, but that was to succeed, and it will be this, who is to be his Majesties successor? and then let even the man of ordinary knowledge answer it, and see whether he will not say, not every one that can catch it, but he that hath right to the Crown. And by this sitting of the question to the current of the Oath, and the resolution that the thing it self gives to it, as the proof of his Proposition is taken off, so the contradictory to it is necessarily inferred, to wit, that the sole, common and ordinary acception of the word Successor, is not him that actually succeeds in Government. But if the word Successor be capable of a divers acceptation, what obligation can there be to successors in the Oath? R: Although Successor in common usage may be taken two wayes, to wit, either for a successor in fact, or a successor in right, yet in the Oath it can be taken but in the latter sense. For, 1. It is a rule for the finding out of the sense of an Oath agreed on among Casuists, that in Oaths injoyned, or imposed by others, we must construe them in that sense which is known, or may most probably be judged to be the prescribersq; but his end in this Oath being the support of his Crown in a lineall succession from himself, according to his right settled by the Laws, his sense intended by Successors could onely be, they that are such de jure, and the same that are his heirs. 2. To take the word in the other sense, viz: for Successors de facto, how unjustly soever possessed is inconsistent. 1. With the nature of an Oath, which must be taken in righteousnesse: Jer. 4. 2. that is, to oblige onely to that which is just. 2. With the word Heir, which being placed first in the Oath, must first be served; and successor can be onely understood in congruity with it. 3. With the Oath of Supremacy, which bindeth us to the lawfull Successors. 4. With the Law of the Land, which appointeth succession to the Heir. 5. With a possibility of keeping the Oath, for if heirs and successors mean divers persons, how can the Oath of Allegiance, and defence of the Regall dignity be observed towards both?

Having vindicated this passage of the Oath of Allegiance from this Authors distortion, I cannot let him passe without without a brief animadversion or two more. 1. Whilest he contends about the sense of Successors, and would have it understood of actuall succeeders, that it may favour the Usurpers, he forgets what is the object of that succession, viz: a Crown, and regall dignity, wherein by vertue of that Oath those Successors are to be defended: wheras they whose power he pleads for, (and in whose behalf he undertook to answer this clause, as not forbidding obedience to them) have not onely put by the rightfull Successor, but abolished the Crown and Regall dignity it self; unto what then would he have his mecenates to be successors? or how will he reconcile obedience to them with defence of the Grown, and royall dignity? 2. It is to be admired, that a person of so fair a character (as is given him by the worthy Authors of the Religious Demurrer) should begin this Section of his with a generall deliberative, (It were good to consider, whether there be any clause in any Oath or Covenant, which forbids obedience to the Commands of the present Government,) and yet take no notice of any thing in this or the other Oaths and Covenants, save of this clause onely in this Oath, which it seems he thought he could not onely loosen from obliging against him, but draw over to be accident to him, which how well he hath performed, I leave the Reader to consider. And I further admire how (seeing he accounteth Oaths sacred bonds, and reverend obligements) he feared not to use such enforcement to the clear letter of so tender and sacred a thing; for though any body can say a tyrant fine titule, or a Usurper is a Successor de facto when he is in, yet that he is such a successor as the Oath intends, viz: one that we are sworn in allegiance to, and are bound by that Oath to defend to the uttermost of our power, &c. Having withall (probably at the same time) sworn in the Oath of Supremacy Allegiance to the lawfull Successors, and to our power to assist, and defend all jurisdictions, priviledges, &c. belonging to those Successors, is a grosser interpretation, then I hope he himself will own when he considers it, or any considering and conscientious men can receive. And I could wish he would consider, whether when he took the Oath he had this sense in his minde, or rather it be not newly excogitated, upon the coming into question of these late transactions; and how neerly this practise entrencheth upon perjuryr.

4. But having said what he thinks fit to the clause, he will have one glance at the urgers of it. Yet with all this quære may be added, while the son is in the same posture in which the father was, how comes this Oath at this time to stand up, and plead for disobedience in regard of the Son, that was asleep, and silent in regard of the Father?

1. They that plead this Oath for disobedience, or rather denying obedience to the present Power in regard of the Sons right, did the same in regard of the Father; when it was apparent, that not a meer defence of Religion and Liberties, and a recovery of the Kings personall presence to the Parliament was the end of the war, but the Fathers death, and the Sons dis-inheriting, with the deflowering of the Crown, and over-turning of the Throne it self. Witnesse (amongst other testimonies) what the London, Essex, Lancashire, and Banbury Ministers have declared publickly in their respective writings, they are alike sworn to, have according to their power and vocations, stood for the Authority of both, and not allowed the deposition of either, or the usurpation of their Power by others: they have prayed against, bewayled, stood astonied at, witnessed against the proceedings that have been against both of them: and to this day they lament that the clear Word of the Lord, held forth by their testimonies, hath not prevailed for the prevention or retractation of those direfull, and (the world throughout) scandalous courses.

2. The Son cannot yet be in the same posture his Father was in, whilest an overture or proposall for satisfaction hath not once been made to him, wherein he is in the view of the Kingdom more harshly and extreamly dealt with then even his Father was; and as his Fathers sufferings as to life were without president, so are his as to succession to the Crown.

Mr. Ashcom (whom I had in hand before, Chap. 2.) hath divers strange, and unapproveable passages reflecting upon the Oaths under debate; which I shall cull out as I meet with them in severall places. In his 2d. part, Chap. 8. Sect. 6. he layes down foure Cases, wherein he saith, Subjects are freed from their sworn Allegiance. His three first, (viz: 1. If a Prince abandon. 2. If he alienate. 3. If Nero-like through mad furis or folly, he seek in an hostile way the destruction of his whole Kingdom) will I presume be taken not to concern our case in hand; the fourth possibly may be judges applicable to it, which therefore I shall take notice of: and a brief animadversion will serve, he delivering it (as he doth other odde and unfound stoffe) with a pythagoricall magisteriousnesse, and without the assistance of reason to induce a perswasion to it in the Reader.

Fourthly, (saith he) if the Prince have part of the supreame right, and the people the other part, then notwithstanding an Oath of Allegiance to him, he may be opposed if he invade the other part of Supreame right. And a few lines after he affirms with Gestius, He may lose huright by the Law of War. And in the next Section he saith of all those foure Cases, and therefore of this, That they shew how we are absolved in our own consciences from all Oath and Contract, when one party forfeits his Conditions first.

The defensive opposing of a Prince, invading his Compeers part by the party invaded where the Supreame right is so shared, (supposing the Oath of Allegiance to be cautioned according to that sharing) I shall not dispute, it being beside the present question; but his losing his right by the Law of War; and the Subjects absolution from Oath upon that his supposed forfeiture of conditions, I shall a little call into question. 1. He tels us (if we will take it upon his word) if the Prince invade the others right, he may lose his right by the Law of War. What the Law of War means (if diverse, or varying from Gods, and other humane Laws) I understand not, nor is it materiall; in discerning into the permanency, or cessation of right, and of an oath concerning it, we are to have recourse to the Law of God, and Nature; and if by these the Princes title, and Subjects oath remain firm, notwithstanding his invading the peoples right, the Law of war like Alexanders Sword may violently cut in sunder, but it cannot unloose either the single tye of right, or the superadded of an oath. How should this forfeiture come? if any wayes, by way of satisfaction for the trespasse upon the others right. But theologicall Justice appoints not, that where one invadeth anothers right, the Invaders right should thereupon be cancelled; and that it may be lawfull for the invaded, upon that injury received, to invest himself therewith, and finally to alienate and disposse him of it. A liberty of defence it permitteth to the Invaded in relation to his own right, and a prosecution of the Invader unto his full satisfaction for the wrong inferred by him, and for that end (if there be no other mean but war left to effect it) the invaded (if he have power of war) may sease the Invaders right unto a just recovery or restitution of his own; but that being compassed, and proportionable satisfaction for the trespasse being given or gained, the Invaded party must sit down therewith, and not extend his line over all his late Invaders right. Every transgression towards man cals for satisfaction; and whoso doth wrong, is bound to make reparation; and his right is responsible, or obnoxious sofar: but it is more then summum jus to carry this compensation to a totall and perpetuall translation of the Injurers possession to the Injured: totall confiscation is too high a penalty to be set upon every encroachment. Look into the laws and rules of satisfaction in Scripture, as Exod. 22. 1, 2, &c. Levit. 6. 4, 5. 2 Sam. 12. 6. Luk. 19. 8. and it will appear the deepest amounts but to a fourefold restitution of the damage. Nay look into that order (which comes home to our Case) concerning the Princes of Israel, who having formerly used oppression, violence, spoil, and exaction towards the people of God, are not therefore adjudged to be deprived of their whole Inheritance (Office, and all) but are onely reduced to their own portion: Ezek. 45. 7, 8, 9. But because this Gentleman flies to the Law of War for this his extreame dealing with Princes, hear what a learned Judge, and profound Statesman delivers, in the case, in relation to that very rule. It is the Lord Verulam, who (insisting on the fullnesse of a war on the King of Englands part with Spaine, for the recovery of the Palatinate, although the Paulsgrave in whose behalf that war should be commenced,Considerations touching war with Spaine, written by the right honourable Frane’s Lord Verulam pag. 3, 4, 5, 6. should be accounted to have made an unjust war in Bahemia, by means whereof he came to lose the Palatinate) resolves thus: An offensive warre is made, which is unjust to the Aggressour, the prosecution, and race of the war carrieth the Defendant to assail, and invade the ancient and indubitate patrimonie of the first aggressor, which is now turned Defendant, shall he sit down, and not put himself in defence? or, if he be dispossest, shall be not make a war for the recovery? No man is so poore of judgement as will affirm it. This resolution he confirms with many instances worthy to be perused in the Author; and in the end with this Reason: Wars are vindict; revenges, reparations; but revenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first wrong or damage. And within a few lines after he saith of the case he is arguing: It is the more clear on our part, because the possession of Bohemia is settled with the Emperour. For, though it be true, that Non datur compensatio injuriarum, yet were there somewhat more colour to detain the Palatinate, as in the nature of a Recovery in value, or compensation, if Bohemia had been lost, or were still the stage of War. According to the rule of Justice then, yea even that of War, the peoples right being recovered, and satisfaction given or tendered for the securing of it for future, the late invasive Prince should injoy his right again, and the oath that was given for the securing of it stands in force, and obligeth to it. And this may be further cleared, in that the Solemne League and Covenant was prescribed, and taken when the King was judged to be in the actuall invasion of the peoples rights; when the people could not be reasonably required to swear the said Covenant in behalf of the Kings right, if such an invasion did forfeit it, and absolve the Subjects from their oaths to him; and if they did then swear, they cannot afterward plead an absolution from their Oaths by vertue of that invasion. And if the late Kings actions cou’d be a forfeiture of all rights, and dissolution of all Oaths as to himself (which I cannot yeeld) yet how can either of them be said to be disanulled in relation to his Heir, upon whom the right legally descends, and unto whose title the Oaths were sworn. If it be said, he was partaker in the same actions, the Religious Demurrer will tell you,1. part, pag. 8. that the right and title to the Crown upon his Fathers death, deth quit him from all stain by the Laws of the Land.

2ly, Whereas he would infer this absolution from all oaths, by the Princes forfeiture of his Conditions first. What Conditions doth he mean? 1. If he understand any conditions to be in the Subjects Oaths which are to be fulfilled by the Prince, upon which tearms the Subjects Oaths shall binde, he is besides the book; the Oaths of the people put no conditions upon the Prince, but are all absolute and irrespective, and run without ifs, or and’s; in like manner as the obligation of Subjects allegiance to their Soveraigne is irrespective according to Divine Institution, as I have before (in this Chap.) proved. If this Author fancy any such conditions in the peoples Oaths, let him shew where they lye, and what they are. 2. If he mean conditions in the Kings Oaths of Government, they are also unconditioned, or not dependant on tearms to be kept on the Subjects part: and, as the Subjects miscarriage is not a releasement of the King from his Oath of Government, so the Kings failing is no discharge of the Subject from his Oath: the validity, or obligation of either cannot be said to hang on the performance of the other; unlesse it could be proved that each part swore with respect to the others observation of his duty and oath, which neither the tenor of the Oaths, nor the subject matter of them will permit to be granted; nor hath this or any other Author that I have seen, said any thing to prove that.

3ly, If by conditions he mean the capitulations which the Kingdom may be supposed to have made with him at his Installment in the Throne, upon the keeping,At si duo homines mutuo se obligent promissis diversi generis, aut non codem tempore, aut alias citra mutuum respectum: violata ab uno fides non liberat alterum obligatione; sed uterque renetur id servare quod ipse juravit, etiamsi alter quid suarum crat partium non effecetit, exempli gratia. Rex aliquis simpliciter, & citra respectum ad sidelitatem &illegible; iurat le regnum administratum iustè & secundum leges: subditi alio tempore simpliciter & citra respectum ad Principis officium iurant se el debitam &illegible; & abedientium præstituros, utrique obligantur quod lui est officii sideliter facere, et si delecerit altera &illegible; suo o licio: ita ut neque Rex solums sit a suo iuramento, si &illegible; &illegible; obsequm a non &illegible; nec subditisuo, si Rex a &illegible; tramite &illegible; &illegible; D Sanderf de Iurament. oblig. prælect. 4. Sect. 8. or breaking whereof he should enjoy, or lose his dignity; there are no such capitulations made either with him personally, or with any of his predecessors to be alledged; they are inconsistent with the Supreame Power entrusted with him. The truth is, it is a weak error, though somewhat apt to possesse the minds of unconsidering men, that in those estates of life ordained of God for the help of man, wherein there is a mutuall relation, and answerable offices to be performed (as of Magistrate, and Subject; parent, and childe; husband, and wife, Master, and servant) where there is a departure from duty on the one side, there is a cessation of the debt of duty on the other. If this were so, it were a frivolous thing for men, subject to corruption, to contract any relations; and there would be no place left for the exercise of gentlenesse, patience, charity, betwixt relatives, nor for the inferiors passive obedience in case of innocencie; but this is directly contradicted by that of the Apostle Peter, 1 Pet 2. 18, 19, 20. and those rules of the Apostles, Rom. 12. 17. 1 Thes. 5. 15. 1 Pet. 3. 9. There are indeed some particular cases wherein the beneficiall duty of those relations is expireable, as is that of the married in case of adultery; that of parents when their children are rebellious &illegible; that of Magistrates towards a Subject capitally offensive. But such particulars are warranted by Scripture; otherwise, wherein God hath not given a discharge, man may not. Now let any case, wherein the Subject is disengaged by Divine Warrant upon the Magistrates mis-administration, be produced, and made out to extend to the paid in hand, and it will be yeelded; But this is yet to be done. But I go on to another passage of the Author.

In the same Chap: Sect: 7. he hath these words. Now I shall endeavour to shew how a man may take an Oath from an is just invading party, contrary to those Oaths which perhaps he took first from the just party, who possibly brake no conditions with him. This his undertaking he prosecuter in Sect: 10. while he saith thus. I conceive but two wayes of taking such opposite Oaths. To take an Oath in contradiction of a former Oath, is so high a matter, that the way to it had need to be very clear; and It can be no way allowable save one, that is, when the former Oath ceaseth to oblige; let us examine therefore whether his two wayes fall under this one. When it is in stopping wherein as man may justly presume that the right party for a time releases him of his former Oath or duty to him. 1. The tweaners presumption that the partle sworn to, doth releve him from his former Oath, unesse he hath actually released him, and declared so to him, is unto him no dis-obligation; there can be no just presumption of such a releasement, without such an antecedent act of the same party without it evidently appearing, it is but a groundlesse presumption, and highly impions: it is &illegible; to the taking of an opposite Oath, the content of the party &illegible; to being not passed, of made known to him, this &illegible; is but the swearers own act, and his own act cannot di charge him; what is it that must be the ground of this &illegible; &illegible; The obliged persons perswation of the equity in &illegible; of the thing? that’s but his own judgement, the party he is bound to may haply judge otherwise; however it is at the best but a probable, not a certain ground to conclude upon, that another doth a thing because it is just, and that the party thereupon consents to a release is but his own fiction, till he hath so exprest himself to him. This were an easie way of escaping out of any promissory oath to man, and would be ordinary if it would hold; for men would be apt to induce themselves to beleeve an expediencie and justnesse of an absolution from the party, when their oaths pinch them in the performance; but this presumption is but a superficiall device.

1. The party sworn (in the case in hand) standing upon his title, preventeth this presumption, and plainly declareth the contrary: 3. In the Solemne League and Covenant, the party sworn to (as before hath been manifested) is not the King, but the people of all ranks within the three Kingdoms entring into the same Covenant: and how can they be presumed to release one, whilest they hold themselves bound by it? 4. The Protestation of the 5. of May, 1641. is a Vow; now Divines resolve, that though an Oath may be cancelled by the party to whom it is made, yet a Vow no man can remit, because it is made to God as the party, and no man hath to do in altring the right wherein we are bound to him. The things therefore concerning the Government included in that Vow, cannot so much as be pretended to be unloosed by this way.Dico relaxationem istam in juramentis, fædetibus, pactl, altisque contractibus humanis locsi habere, non itern in votis. ratlo diserminis est, quis vota Dto siunt ut parti; ab homiue autem ea sola relixari fas estquæ homini lacta sunt D. San l. de jurament. oblig. prælect. 7. Sect 8.

2. His other way he thus layes down. A man cannot by Oath be obliged further to any power, then to do his utmost; and the Oath is to be understood conditionally, if the action, or passion may be for that Powers advantage. In an Army each man being obliged by Oath to lose his life for the Prince, rather then turn back, or avoid any danger; this Army having done its utmost, is beaten; and now the Souldiers can do no more for their Prince then dye; in those straights therefore it is not repugnant to their Oath to ask quarter, or a new life, and having taken it, they are bound in a new and just obligation of fidelity to those whom they were bound to kill few houres &illegible; They who live under the full Power of the unjust party, may be said to take quarter, and to be in the same condition with the former: and so have the liberty to oblige themselves to that which the Prince now cannot but expect from them, viz: to swear to those under whose Power they live, that they will not attempt any thing against them. All that this amounts to is, it is præter, non contra prlus juramentum; and as the condition which is the ground of this promissory Oath is such, that it is impossible for a man in it to advance his parties cause, so it is impossible for him to be bound to an impossibility. Here is much strength of confidence in asserting, but none of Reason to awarrant, and prove what is here intended to be concluded. That a Souldier, or Subject, being sworn to serve his Prince to the utmost of his power, may ask, and take quarter, and passively submit to a captivating Enemy, when he is fully under his power, I shall not call into question; his Oath binding him to do what he can, for his Soveraigne forbids him not to yeeld when he can do no longer; and for him to suffer death, or harder usage by contesting with his enemy, when he lyes at his mercy, as his Oath binds not to it, so it is for his Princes disadvantage, there being yet hope that his life may be reserved, and his liberty recovered, for his Princes further service according to his Oath, in regard whereof he is rather in that case bound to ask, and take quarter, then bound out from it, but what of all this? will it thence follow, That the Souldier, or Subject thus brought under an adverse party to his Prince, oueth fidelity, and may oblige himself by Oath to that party not to attempt against him? If his Allegiance and Oath were expired, there were some probable way for it; but here is little said, or can be said for that. Let us particularly examine, what this man alledgeth.

1. He hath done what he could, and the Oath bound him to no more. R: He hath done what he could hitherto, and so far hath kept his Oath; but if the Oath was (as the Oaths in the case under debate are) not limited to that particular designe, or battell, wherein the Prince hath the worse, and his sworn followers are fallen into the unjust parties hands, but to indure whilest life lasts, and the Prince hath any service for him, he hath not done what possibly he may yet do, nor hath he satisfied his Oath, so that it can demand no more of him.

2. He hath a new life given him of his conquering Enemy, and thence becomes bound to him. This is but a rhetoricall flourish, or complement, and hath no Logick in it, his life is the same it was, and therefore the man is still under the same obligation of his duty and oath which he was before under. If this Author can prove his life to be really another, I will grant an evacuation of all his former contracted obligations. And in truth although the custome of Warcals an Enemies sparing of the life of a worsted person Mercy, yet if that persons cause were good, though he hath found bad successe, he hath not forselted his life to his prevailing Enemy, neither is he beholding or in debt to him for it, no more then a true man oweth his life to those theeves that onely rob him; or a weak man is indebted for his life to a strong man, because he kils him not. 3ly. This is besides, and not against the former Oath. 1. If it be not against it, you are besides your undertaking, and prevaricate it, for you promised to show how a man might take an Oath contrary to his former Oaths. 2. But it is plainly against the former, for to swear to do the utmost that can be for, the Prince, and to swear not to attempt any thing against that Princes Enemy which hath dispossest him of his right can be no other then contraries. 4. It is impossible for him to be bound to an impossibility, and it is now impossible for him to advance his parties cause. That which is in it self,Sed rei impossibility ex accidente tancum aliquautum diversaest extio. Vt si quia &illegible; foir re centurn intra unensem, quod non est per se impossibile casit aliquo in opino int. rian impedtatur, ut non possit tantum pecumæ lummam te &illegible; æsi utn const &illegible; non obligetur in soro conseientiæ ad saciendum quod promisit, seif: ad solvondu n toru n debitum debito tempore quod iam redditum est et impossibale; oblignut men &illegible; um quod in se est, viz ad solvendum qo ntum potest, & quam cito potest &illegible; in que est quia cum in hoe &illegible; impossibilitas impediti obligationem: obligatio tollnor quoid idio um quod est factu impossibile, quoad reliquum vero maner, & qui non sorest &illegible; quod debet, debet tamen omne quod potest. D Sanders, de Iur. oblig. prælest 2. Sect 12. or in its own nature impossible, an oath cannot binde to; but that which is in it self probable, and therefore promised under an Oath, may by accident, or by the interposition of some casuall impediment become impossible, this is very ordinary, and this kinde of impossibility doth not dissolve an Oath, but only suspends it for the time, untill the present impediment be removed: so that though the Oath binde not to the hic and nune of the accident all impossibility, yet it stands in force till, and obligeth to the thing as it is in it self possible, and may (the obstacle being removed) be hereafter feasible. 2. Whilest it is impossible for him to advance his parties cause, it is a frivolons thing for him to swear that he will attempt nothing for his party against the Enemy, for so he onely swears not to attempt an Impossibility; and when this impossibility ceaseth, the former Oath to his Prince taketh place: so that this objected Impossibility can be no warrant for such a latter oath..

Our Author in his Chap: 9. Sect. 3. thus opposeth the obligation of the Oaths: God saith, By me Princes reigne the governing Powers which are, are of God. God hath declared that he will chastise, and change Princes, and Governors; and when we see the changes and chastisements, we may be sure they are by Gods order, yea, though the invading or succeeding Governors &illegible; like John, Nebuchadnezzar, or those who by cruelty sheev us nothing but Gods wrath. Wherefore it can be no lesse then sin in us, or treason against God, to sayes: we will never obey any, but this, or that Prince, or State, or any bat of such a Family: for this depends on Gods Providence and Justice, which sets bounds to the ducation of Governors, and Governments. 1. It is certain that all the Kings and Potentates of the Earth are set up and pulled down by God, and every change of Governors, even the advancement of those who are heavie scourges to the people, is in a sence by and from him; and it is as certain, that some Princes in some sence are not of God, as is clear enough, Hosea 8.4. We must therefore distinguish thus. 1. A thing is said to be of God, in that it was fore-seen, and pre-ordained of him before it came to passe; and salleth out by his providence and disposall. And thus every act or event is by him, whether it be right, or wrong, agreeable or repugnant to his revealed will or Commandment: 2 Chron. 25. 20. 2 Sam. 24. 1. So are all thefts, robberies, oppressions, murthers, violent dispossessions, and occupations. Thus even Antichrists power that is derived to him by the divell is yet given him of God, Rev. 13. 5. 7. 17. 17. And so was Pilates power to crucifie Christ: Joh. 19. 10, 11. 2. To be of God, importeth the thing to be injoyned, warranted or approved by his word, or revealed will; and thus Gomaliel useth the tearins, when he speaks hypothetically of the Apostles preaching and working miracles. If it be of God, in opposition to that which is of men, although in the former acception nothing is of men, but it is of God also. Act. 5. 38, 39. Now to discern what is of God, so as to impose upon us, we must not go to his secret will or providence, many things come about to us that way which we are not bound to embrace and acquiesce in, but may, yea ought to use remedy against, and strive to avert, or remove, such as are tentations to sin, diseases of the body, captivity, oppression, dishonour, defamation, and such like. These evils, albeit we are patiently and submissively to bear them for the pretent, as they come from Gods correcting hand, when they are come to passe; yet we are allowed and required to seek the preventing of them when threatned, and the removall of them when befallen; Unjustly advanced Magistrates are of this nature; A passive submission under whom as a divine castigation, whilest we can finde no redresse, is expedient; but an embracement of them (as those that are authorised and warranted by God) active obedience to them, and maintenance or support of them (which is the matter in question) cannot upon this ground be inferred as necessary. To do evill, because it is in the power of our hand by Providence, or to perswade others, or our selves to sit down under intolerable wrongly because they are come to passe that way, is an ungodly and so &illegible; construction of Divine Providence, and of a late invention in these every way &illegible; times.

2ly, This Author in urging obedience upon this account, not onely crosseth Scripture and reason, but &illegible; adicteth himself in what he saith elsewhere: for the making good of this, I shall onely present the Reader with his own words pa. 79. &illegible; many times stading some Nations grosly &illegible; and obnoxicus to his soverest &illegible; &illegible; &illegible; gives them up as a prey to another &illegible; thus were the seven Nations; and afterwards Israel it self &illegible; then in the hands of &illegible; which particular case is not a generall argument, or consequence (at some about it) for the moment of Government, or latitude of subsection in all Kingdoms. And pag. 89: he speaking of Antichrists dominain, saith, There is one kinde of &illegible; which by no possission or prescription can ever become lawfull; and a Christian can never submit himself to it, without wounding his conscience and faith. And yet let this man say if this power of Antichrist be not of God, and by his providence in the fertie wherein his Argument runs. 3. Whoever said, that men might swear they will never obey any but this or that Prince, State, or Family? or who ever knew it required, or done? All oaths, and particularly those of obedience, carry sill in them a caution of possibilitie; and when the matter becomes in it self impossible, the Oath ceaseth, and is void: We therefore swear to obey Princes, and States, whilest is pleaseth God to continue them to us; and this tye a present interruption of Government (though to an invaders full possession) cannot dissolve: the oath, and allegiance of Israel contracted with David, 1 Chron. 11.4. continued till his death, though Absolon rose up against him, drew all Israel after himself, and drave him out of the Land: 2 Sam. 19.9. But when a Prince or Family is irrecoverably lost to a Kingdom the Oath expireth.

The Reasons brought for obedience to the Usurpers, answered.

THe next, and last part of my work is to answer those Arguments that I have met with, which are brought for the obedience which I have disallowed in the 2d. and 3d. Chapters: the book entituled, The lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government, saith the most for such obedience of any that I know; it therefore I shall chiefly deal with.

1 Argument.First, his first and main Argument is taken from that of the Apostle, Rom. 13. 1, &c. from this text his Argument set in scame is this: If the Apostle commands submission and obedience, and that for conscience sake unto those in his time that came unlawfully into their power, and authority, then obedience to such may be now lawfull. But the Apostle commands submission, and obedience, and that for conscience sake unto those that in his time came unlawfully into their power and authority. Ergo. The major will not be stood upon. The minor is to be denyed; And for his full confutation therein, and vindication of the Apostle in this text, I shall, 1. by way of Elenthus make good the contradictory to this Proposition. 2. Answer what he brings for the maintenance of it.

1. Then I am to clear this contradictory to his minor, viz: That the Apostle in commanding obedience to the higher powers, can onely be understood of such as possesse their Authority lawfully, or have a just title, and regular calling thereunto. And this I shall undertake to do out of the Apostles own words, or by the characters he gives of the Powers he would have obeyed.

1. There is (saith the Apostle) no power but of God.

1. To be of God here must import not meerly a permisive counsell, or providence, but a divine approbation, authorization, and vocation; they are said to be of God thus, that come in by Gods way, or are called to their places as God hath appointed in his Word; and that, not the former onely, but this stricter sense of being of God must be here taken, appears thus. 1. Otherwise the Apostle had said no more for Magistrates in this Character then the Scripture saith of plagues, faminess and other judgementsa, yea of the sins of men, which in the first and larger sense are said to be of God, 2 Sam. 24. 1. 2 Chron. 25. 20. 2. A derivation of them from God in regard of providence meerly, could be no argument for obedience, non-resistance to them, and maintenance of them; for we are not to subject ourselves to, support, and refrain from resisting a thing meerly upon this ground, because it comes by providence; then a forrein Enemy that invades us, or a robber must be submitted unto, and may not be resisted; the plague or other sicknesses in the body, nay the outward temptations to sin might not be prevented or removed, for all these come by proidence But the Apostle alledgeth their being of God, here as an argument for subjection to, non-resistance, and maintenance of them.

2. By Powers in this place, this Author tels us, he means not meerly power, or authority abstracted from persons, but persons clothed with that Authority. Now that persons clothed with Authority may be said to be of God, there must be not onely Gods institution of the office, or magistracy in the abstract, for the meer ordaining of the office makes not this or that man a Magistrate more then another, but also his ordering of the persons to the office, but they that are thus ordered of God (viz: not providentially alone, but by way of vocation, approbation, and authorization, as it is above proved, the sense of the words [of God] must import) to the Magistrates place, must needs be granted to be lawfully possest of it, or to have to it a just title. This universall negative therefore of the Apostle, There is no power but of God, must not be taken in the simply universal sense, as if there were no other power in the world but such, but as a restrained universall, to wit, There is no lawfull power but of God:Hoses 1. 4. and so alone can I conceive it consistable with that of the Prophet, They have set up Kings, but newly me; they have made Princes, and I know it not. These two sayings of the holy Ghost must needs be true, and therefore must not be contradictories? which they are not, If you take them uttered in a divers respect, the former of a lawfull, the latter of an illegall magigracie.

Jude 4.2ly, The powers here are said to be ordained of God: and v. 2. to be the ordinance of God; that is, not by his decree, or handiework meerly, of ungodly men are said to be ordained to condemnation; and the being and posture of heaven and earth are said to be Gods ordinances,Ier. 33. 25. but by his word or written sanction, a person in this acception is to be tearmed Gods ordinance, that is, by divine &illegible; put into a place, or state: those Magistrates then onely can be said to be ordained of God; and his ordinance, that (for the substance at least) enter by the doore that he hath made, or the means and manner he hath prescribed. The sons of Aaran in their priesthood, and the Levites in their ministery were Gods ordinance, in as much as they were ordained according to Gods appointment. Whereas Korah, and his company,Levit. 8. though they officiated as Priests, yet they were not so, because they wanted that ordination. A man and a woman are by Gods ordinance husband and wife, who are espoused together according to divine rule, and not they who onely perform the acts of such one to another. In like manner, not whosoever can get into the feas, of Authority by any means are Gods ordained, but they who come in according to Gods prescript and regulation.Numb. 8. Absolem, and Adenijab, though they go; into the kingdom of Israel, were not Gods ordinance; but David, and Solemon, whose places they usurped were, these being put into the place by Gods direction.

Gen. 14.3ly, The Power here may not be &illegible; under pain of damnation: v. 2. But, 1. An &illegible; Power, or they that get men under their command by force without right, may be resisted, and subdued. Abraham and his consederates justly took up Arms, and by them resened Lot, and the Sodemites from Chederlaomer, and his participhants. The Judges and Tribes of Israel righteously warred against, and vanquished the Nations that successively obtained and exercised dominion over them, in the book of Judges: so did Samuel and Saul against the Philistines, that were for a time their masters:1 Sam. 2, 8, 9, &c. 1 Sam. So did David, whilest he was king in Hebron, with the house of Judah, against &illegible; Abner, and all Israel: so did David and his man against Absolom and the people that followed him so did Jehoiadah in the right of Joash, against Athalia. Lastly, thus did the Maccabees against Antiocbus and his race;3. 1. Which examples I but mention, having urged the most of them beforeb 2 Sam. 18. And indeed to imagine the Apostle here to tye men conscientiously, and under pain of damnation to obey,2 King. 11. and sit down without any reluctancy under, yea to maintain, assist, and sight, for them, who do by force, without any right at all, usurp Authority over them; though they were Turks, theives, Irish, Rebels, Papists, or whoever, the worst of men, and cruellest of Tyrants, and though the sufferers should come to have strength in their hands to relieve themselves, is an imposition (I think) beyond the thoughts of any sober minde, and that which none, but they of the Anabaptisticall spirit will advisedly own, and them also we may rather finde saying, then doing so; the proceedings of the Parliament, yea of all parties on both sides in the late warre disclaim this doctrine; yea the Army it self may be judge in this matter, who must either condemne this sense, or all their own warlike actions; this would make the Apostle not onely to put an insupportable passivenesse upon people, but to discourage just Magistracy, it opposed, and grown weak, whereas his manifest scope is to uphold it. 2, They that come in by meer force, with expulsion of the just Magistrate, have apparently committed this crime of resisting the Power that is the ordinance of God, and so have incurred the sentence of damnation, or condemnation (which may be understood of punishment by men) and its a strange conceit to think, that the Apostle doth here at once both condemne their act, and confirm their authority gotten by it, and that the same persons should by the same means be both the resisters that are αννε&illegible;γμεος, or set in an opposite order to that ordinance, and condemned for it, and the power and ordinance it self that is to be obeyed, and no resisted. 3. If they that come in by force against the just Magistrate are the resisters of the Power here to be submitted unto, then those that shall obey those resisters in the full latitude of obedience here injoyned (which comprehends assistance and maintenance of them) do become therein resisters of the said just Power also: so that obedience to the Usurpers is rather forbidden, then taught in this text.

4ly, The Power here to be obeyed, is the minister of God to thee, a revenger to execute wrath, &c. v: 4. 1. No man can be called a minister of God, but he that is called of God to that service, wherein he is his Minister, not onely the office must be authorized, but the person must be invested with it by God; there must be some act of God, either immediately or mediately put forth towards the person, or this relation to him of being his Minister cannot be founded; now whosoever is the subject of such a divine act or vocation, hath without controversie a just title to Magistracie. 2. He that is a Revenger to execute wrath under and for God, (that is not by providence onely, as thieves, robbers, and forrein invaders are, but by place and calling) not for destruction, but for good, he must receive a warrant from God for it: vengeance is Gods alone, by property, so that none can take it in hand but by deputation from him others whatever power they have to do it, are expresly prohibited to be a vengers, immediately before this text, Chap. 12. 17. Now he that receives a warrant from God for it, is lawfully impowered.

By every one of these Characters assisted by the Apostle, to the Magistracy spoken of in this text, it must needs be evinced, That the Apostle in commanding obedience to the higher Powers, can onely be understood of such as possesse their Authority lawfully, or have a just title thereunto: and this is the contradictory to his Minor, which I undertook to make good.

2. I come in the 2d. place to give Answer to what he urgeth for the proof of his Minor, which may be gathered up thus. The Romane Emperors, Claudius and Nero, came unlawfully into their Power, or Authority: but the Apostle commands submission and obedience to them; Ergo.

In this Syllogisme both his premises are peceant, and may be denyed. 1. For the minor the Apostle speaks in the generall of powers, without particular application to the Roman, or any otherc; the carrying of them to the Romane Emperors is this Authors own. If he shall say he may safely argue a thesi, ad hypothesin, or from the generall to the particular, his true, if he hold to such hypotheses, or particulars as are contained under the thesis or generall: but it is not granted to him, that the Apostle in this text speaks illimitedly, and without exception of all men that by any means may get power into their hands; but on the contrary it is stood upon, that he intends his precept onely of lawfully called Magistrates, (the which I have above proved) he cannot therefore include under the Apostles generall, them whom he supposeth to have unlawfully got into their power, this were Transire à genere in genus, or to argue A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Neither can he be allowed to argue after that manner here, seeing he hath begun his Argument ab hypothess, ad thesin, or from the particular to the generall, for this were to walk in a round, and to prove this by that, and that by this circularly. As for that which he hinteth on as if he would prove the minor by it, viz: this Epistle was written in the time of Claudius, or Nero, it hath no shadow of proof in it: for they were not the onely Powers then in being: there were others even among the Romanes as wel as they, himself nameth the Consuls, and Senate, as those to whom the power of right belonged, and they were then existent, and in some possession and use of the power: although the Emperours ruled with them, and in some things over-ruled them, as they were haply in other things ruled by themd; there being a kinde of mixture of power, and alternatenesse of prevalency betwixt them. Now that the Emperors were then in place (whereas others also were in power) is no more a proof that the Apostle commands obedience to the Emperours, then the being of false Apostles, and Ministers among the Churches, when the Apostle wrote to Christians to obey, and follow them that had the rule over them, proves that he commanded them obedience to those false Apostles and Ministers.

2ly, The major Proposition (That the Emperour, Claudius and Nero came unlawfully into their Authority) must also be denyed: taking [unlawfully] in the sense of the question, or case in hand, that is, in regard of title: for, although the tumultuousnes of the Souldiers, and the craft of the persons interested, were ingredients in the manner of their entrance, yet they were not the basis of their claim, or ground-work of their title: but they had, or came to have, before this precept of the Apostle could Intervene, sufficient challenge thereto, otherwise; we must therefore distinguish betwixt an error, or unlawfulnesse in the way, or manner of a Princes coming in, or obtaining possession of the throne, and an unlawfulnesse in regard of title, or of that which is of the substance or essence of his calling to that place. The former is that which can onely be objected against these two Emperours; the latter is the unlawfulnesse in the case, or question, viz: when the Rulers hold meerly by usurpation, or have no other colour of claim but force, or other intrusion: and to argue from the former to the latter, is plainly fallacious, being A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. But let us hear what unlawfulnesse the Author urgeth against the Emperours, and see whether it be not shore of that which is under debate, multis parasangis.

The Gonsuls and Senate (he saith) anciently had the chief power of Government, these at the death of C: Caligula entred into a consultation how they might restore the Common-wealth to her ancient freedome, which by the Cæsars had been taken from them, Claudius in the intrim is proclaimed Emperour by the Souldiers, and takes it upon him: Nero his successor was also fiest saluted Emperour, by the Souldiers: Britannicus, who was Claudius Son being kept in by the cunning of Nero’s Mother.

Unto all this the Answer is easie. Notwithstanding all these disorderly proceedings, these two had a title (for substance) found and good enough to the rule they bare: take for this a short narration out of History.

The Romane State was often changed, and received many forms of Government successivelye, the beast in the Apocalyps wherein the great Waore fitteth, is by the current of &illegible; understood to be the City or State of Rome: and his seven heads are construed to be seven forms of Regiment that have been in it, viz: Kings, Consuls, Tribunes, Decemviri, Dictators, Emperours, and Popes.f If Antiquity must decide which of these Governments had the best title to be over the Romanes, it will give it to the Cæsars, for the kingly (from which that of Emperours essentially differs not) was the first in time among themg. If possession must determine it, the Emperours were at this present in the Throne, and had been for a considerable time, for foure of them had reigned in succession to one another before Claudim came in. It the consent and constitution of the people (which is the truest groundwork) must carrie it, the Emperours also were supported with this title, both originally, as to the form of Policy, at the first setting up of kings, in the infancy of this State, and personally at their respective comings in. By what means this consent was gained from the people, it is not necessary to insist, it were easie to prove, that if there were any unworthy carriage in it, it was as much at least on the submitters as on the Cæsars part.* Julius Cæsar (the first of them) had a concurrent agreement of the State which was (for substance) valid enough;h so had Augustus after himi: the same had Tiberius his next successor.k Caligula the next to him had the cheerfullest, and most affectionate assent that ever Prince hadl. By this time the Government of the Cæsars had by these reiterated acts of consent, establishment from the people sufficient to give it a just title, and free it from usurpation; The next that followed was Claudius, who was left by Tiberius joynt Heir with Caligulam, but was put by for the time by the excessive love which the people bate unto Caligulan; after whose death, the Consuls, Senate, and City Regiments talked indeed of standing up for a publick liberty. But Claudius being saluted Emperour by some of the watch, and the cry of the City Souldiers being at length that one should have the rule; the Consuls, and Senate, perceiving the Souldiers bent that way, and thereupon fearing a combustion, and suspecting their own inability to make good their designe, they being divided also among themselves, and other competitors for the Empire beginning to start up, and Agrippa the king of the Jews, strongly counselling and perswading them to it, they withered, and shrunk in with their undertaking, and at last accepted of Claudiuso: as for Nero who came in next, Britannieus indeed was neerer to the Empire in succession then he, but Agrippina, mother to Nero had prevailed with her husband Claudius to adopt Nero, and prefer him before his own Son Britannieus; which he did with the Senates consent p: Nero accordingly succeeded him, and had the consent of the State at his inauguration, without any reluctancyq.

It appears by all this, that the Cæsars, and particularly Claudius, and Nero, (insisted on by this Author) had other foundation for their Empire besides the Souldiers promoting, and sufficient to give them a lawfull calling, and title to their rule, and to excuse them from Usurpation, such as hath been afore described. And that Claudius came in (though crosse to some unripened motions, and consultations of theirs, yet) not against any Act or Decree of the Senate; but with their concurrent or subsequent approbation.

If it be objected in behalf of the Usurpers in our case, that they also have a consent of the people, by the act of the presupposed House of Commons. I answer, besides what hath been said in the close of the first Chapter, of the peoples noncommittance of any power to their Representees, to alter any thing in the constitution of the Supreame Power, or to erect a new one; all that they have to do, being to manage that proportion which is committed to them: there are moreover two main things that Impeach that Acts validity. 1. That the Lords who are an eminent integrall part of the Kingdom, as also the far greater part of the elected Commons, are, not only absent (so that a very small part of the Kingdom, even locally considered is represented by them that sit) but not permitted to come in, and professedly shut out (and consequently the parts of the Kingdom which they represent are excluded) at the passing of this consent. 2. That the object and actors in this consent, the promoted and promoters are the same persons; on whom is the new Supreme Power conferred, but on themselves that confer it? You cannot finde two parties in this act, an agent, and a patient; so that it is so far from being a legitimate contract, or transaction, that it is no politicall act at all. What reckoning shall we make of that consent which men bestow on themselves, in relation to an interest of power over others? if such a grant could create a right, few men that could get strength would lack preserment.

Having thus answered this Authors main Argument, I shall in the cost be briefer. 2. He alledgeth, In this Nation many persons have been settled in supreame Authority by meer force, without title of Inheritance, not any three immediately suceeding each other have come to the Crown by true line all succession. Five Kings on a row (the Conquerous being the first) bad no title at all by proximity of blood, Hen: the 7th by meer power came in, was made King, in, and by an Army, upon this foundation of military power he got himself crowned at Westminster, and called a Parliament, wherein the Crown was entailed upon him, and his Heirs. Those that came in thus, the main body of this Nation did obey, yes doth yeeld subjection unto their Laws to this day. Not to stand to examine what he asserts in these premises: 1. The mistake of this Argument is, that because the Kings by him mentioned came not in by true succession, or proximity of blood, they therefore must needs be granted to have come in by force alone, or otherwise unlawfully; whereas though, some of them entred by the Sword, others by anticipation, yet they all, whose persons were, and Laws now are obeyed, had the concurrent, or subsequent consent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, and that without their Houses being dismembred, and a force set at their doores. 2. The Laws made by those Princes were not made by them alone, but by them with the Parliament; and by them, not as so entring, but as received by Parliament, and so legally invested. 3. The three last Princes of this Realm did come in by an indubitate lineall succession, and proximity of blood, and the Son of the last is in being, and claiming by that title. It is observable then that this title should be denied, and cut off, when it was at the clearest state. 4. No doubt there have been unjustify able proceedings about the Crown by some of the former possessors of it: which have been followed with remarkable punishments, and publick calamities sufficiently pointing out their injustice, and fore-warning others from making them their examples to practise by. What hath been, is no warrant to conscience that the same may be done.

3ly, He cites some Divines, and Casuists as concurrent with him in his opinion. Their words are too many for me to recite, and the nature of this kinde of Argument exacteth no long Answer. In a word therefore. 1. Axorius his words allow obedience to Tyrants in regard of title, with restriction, and in some cases, (such as are granted by me, Chap. 3d.) But your part is to prove obedience to them, in its full latitude as you have propounded your thesis, without limitation, and concluded (though not validly) by your first Argument.

2. Alfred distinguisheth of Tyrannus, titulo, & exercitio, a Tyrant in regard of title, and in regard of use: and his words immediately before these alledged by you are spoken of the latter, and so may therefore these be understood; but the former onely is the subject of our question. Besides within a few lines before he hath this passage: A Tyrant without title, who is an invader, every private man may, and ought to destroy, for he is not a Prince but a private personr. Which wil not stand with the words quoted by you, if understood of a Tyrant in regard of title.

3. Pareus in your place speaks nothing pro, or con, of obedience to Usurpers, but is explicating how the Apostle is to be taken in those words, The powers that be, are of God, ordained of God: and he distinguishes thus in the words brought in by you. The power which is of God is one thing, the getting, and use of the power is another, which is indifferent, sometimes lawfull, sometimes unlawfull, ut in dubiiss. Whither if you had followed him, you should have found him answering the doubt about Nimrods power thus We must discern betwixt the power which is ever of God, and betwixt the getting and usage of the power, which as to men is often most unjust not of God, but of mens Iusis, and Satons malicet By which words it is evident, you have but half quoted him, as well as impertinently; and if his Authority may sway with you, unjustly gotten power is not of God, in regard of the person, or man, owning it, and consequently not to be obeyed by vertue of Rom. 13.

4. For the rest I have not their books to peruse, but their sayings set down by you reach not the case at all. This therefore I offer you produce any one, or more Authors, of any account amongst Protestants, that allow obedience to an unlawfull Power, [in the full latitude of obedience to a Magistrate, where there is &illegible;-ingagement of conscience pleaded by Law, ancient inheritance, and oaths sworn to another Power in being, claiming, and endeavouring to recover his right] and I will (by Gods assistance) return you a particular Answer.

4ly, His next Reason is, Either that authority which is thus taken by power must be obeyed, or else all Authority and Government must fall to the ground, and so confusion be admitted.

First, why must this needs follow? 1. May not Usurpation fall to the ground, how strongly soever it be set up, and lawfull Government be raised up again? The experience of former times hath observed, That no ill gotten power can be long livedu. Although (faith Cicero) Laws should be plunged over head, and Liberties over-owed by the power of a party, they will sometimes recover again. There is no strength of any power so great, that it can contiune by keeping men in aw, &c.

2ly, If Usurpation have a party to joyn with it, that party will suffice to administer such justice as that Authority will afford; if it have no party, it fals to the ground (for it subsists onely perforce) and a clear way is open for the right Government to take place: which will be so much the more readily entertained, by how much it hath been interrupted*.

2ly, However things succeed, evill of sin must not be done, that good of profit may be attained. It must first be proved lawfull to obey, before this Reason can be heard, which will onely plead its expediencle, if it be honest. Though commodum may be consulted, especially publicum, yet we must first be satished of the justum of it. It was not long ago pleaded, Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum. And we were not told thus, when the late wars for Laws and Liberty were first begun: If this be a cogent reason now, it was to have been so then; and we might better have prevented the miseries of a war by &illegible; to it, then by refusing it, have, by so dear a means, purchased to ourselves an harder condition, and now be bound to bide under it for that very reason.

3ly, If Government fall, and Confusion come, let them bear the gullt that have wrought these effects: we that detract from obedience shall onely bear the misery of it, which will be lighter to us, it may be hoped, then their greatnesse with the gullt it is gotten, and kept by, will be to them.

Fifthly, he addes, Otherwise the King being for the Commonwealth, and not the Common-wealth for the King, the end should be destroyed for the means, the whole for a part. First, the King as a man, yea as a royall person, or most noble part of the Common-wealth, is not the prime matter to be layed on the ballance; but if the King may be lookt at as ours, and so as we are in piety, and justice bound to him, to seek his preservation, and yeeld him our obedience; thus considering him, equity and a good conscience are the things stood for as the end; which although they may undergo the notion of means in reference to the Common-wealths good, yet they are desirable, and to be sought absolutely, and for themselves; and the subordinate means of the Common-wealths politicall good, must be subordinated or submitted to them, and that end is onely so far, and by such means to be pursued, as will consist with these. 2ly, The Parliament, and the Army also, &illegible; no more then a means, or a part in relation to the collective Common-wealth. Must not the rights of these therefore be stood for, with the hazard of the whole? If this rule might have guided matrin relation to their claims, such courses and avents as have been, had been prevented. 3ly, Though certain destruction of the end, or whole, must not be run upon for the means, or part, yet those may be hazarded for the saving of these from certain destruction. As we see it ordinarily, men do adventure their lives and liberties for the preservation, or recovery of their estates by war; and their whole bodies for the regaining of their healths, or one wounded, or festered member, by Physick or Chyrurgery. 4ly, We are not active in the destroying of the end, or whole (if they be destroyed) and we were better both to suffer their destruction, and suffer in it, then sinfully to concur in destroying the means, or a part, or in substituting an unlawfull means, or part for the legitimate, that we might preserve them.

Sixthly, If a masters &illegible; had thrown the master over-board, and by power would suffer no other to guide the ship but himself, if the marriners will not obey &illegible; commanding aright for the guiding of the ship, the ship and themselves most needs perish. 1. I conceive the marriners may in this case obey the Masters Mate for self-preservation, till they come to shore; in like manner that we may obey an Usurpers power, that is, act according to his command in a thing which is not onely law full, but simply necessarie both to be done, and to be done by us, as in the case of self-preservation, by repelling a for rain Enemy, or common danger of certain and important consequence; but shall it be inferred from hence, that the marriners are bound to obey the Mate, or we an Usurper, in all other things of his own concernment, or separable from self-preservation, and every other necessary duty. I am bound to submit my self to the wholesome, and necessary direction of my Pastor, and Physician in their respective ordering, touching my soul and body: must I say therefore I must resigne up my self in obedience to them in all other matters? 2ly, The case is not parallel. For, 1. The mariners (without respect to their exigence) in that posture are bound to obey none, the Master being dead, and so are conscience free. But the people (in the case) have a Magistrate surviving, and challenging power over them, to whom they have sworn Allegiance. 2ly, The Mariners are supposed without obedience to the Mate, to be sure of destruction: but by what hath been above said, it cannot be pleaded that the Nation, or the scruplers at obedience without obeying are sure to perish.

Seventhly, you quote a saying out of Cajetanx, but it suits not with the obedience you stand for; he in all that Discourse speaks nothing at all for any obedience to Tyrants in respect of title, his subject being the point of going to such Tyrants for Law and Justicey, (of which I have spoken Chap. 3.) and his whole speech being confined to it.

Eightly, lastly, (for I will not follow you in repeating again what you had said before, and I have answered above) What can the common people do in this case? they cannot judge of titles; but they see who doth visibly, and actually exercise Authority. 1. Brult beasts do indeed onely see him that actually leads, or drives them; and therefore they follow without making difference betwixt the owner and a thief: but are men, though but common people so stupid? The people yoo speak of are not altogether so bruitish, they themselves disprove you, if you observe (as it is easie to discern) whom they generally abhor from, and whom they look towards: and whoso shall compare their visible bent with your present book, they whom you make but like Balssms dumb Asse, yet in this case do speak with mans voice, and forbid the madnesse, &c. 2ly, If they be so incapable of discerning of titles, wherefore hath not onely the late King, but the Parliament published so many Declarations, and Appeals to the people, wherein they plead for the Justnesse of their title, to what they stood and fought for? yea why hath the Parliament drawn the people into the Protestation, the 2d. Vow, and Oath, and the Solemne League and Covenant, all which concern the severall claims and rights of King and Parliament? either they are thereby supposed to be somewhat competent to judge of those titles; or it was both vainly, and irreligiously done to lead them into such sacred bonds, which we may neither take, nor cause others to take, but in judgement. Jer. 4. 2.

3ly, Although they, yea the primest Statesmen, may finde it difficult enough to judge of titles in some nice, and intricate cases that may happen, yet the present case is not so deep or doubtfull, the right of title in this question is written with clear and capitall letters, in Laws, Oaths, and actions open before all. Yea this Author in the title and current of his book, (as doth Mr. Asheans in his) plainly enough grants where the right of title is.

This Author in the latter end of a second Edition of his book, viz: beginning at pag. 15. addeth some things upon the question of active obedience, and acting under this present power, and government. Although this Edition come in late, and in some passages is but an amplification in tearms, not in matter, of what he had said before; yet I shall take a brief notice (whether sufficient let the Reader judge) of the things in it, that may seem materiall.

First, he premiseth, That the present Power is in possession of the whole Land, and no visible force to oppose, and so it is not like that between David and Absolom, when David had an Army in view. Consult the text, and you shall finde the case exactly parallel. 1. The present Power is in possession of the whole Land; you say, you mean of this side the Sea, not of Ireland also; sutable hereunto Absolom was possest of all the Land unto Jordan, yea, and he went over Jordan, and pitched in Gilead, and all the people throughout all the Tribes of Israel had anointed him King over them: on the other hand David and his men fled out of Jerusalem, and out of the Land, beyond Jordan, and stayed not till be came to &illegible; by the ford Jabeck. 2 Sam. 15. 14, &c. 17. 22. 24, 25. 26. 19. 9, 10.

2ly, You adde, And no visible Force to oppose, whereas David had an Army in view. David had no Army in view within that land before spoken of: all that he had was at Mahanaim. And though there be no visible Force to oppose in England, yet there is said to be a considerable Force in Ireland, and it may appear by the Preparations sent thither. Besides there is one thing indeed wherein Davids condition, and his whom the present Power excludeth, differ, but not to the advantage of this Authors Reason, which is, that David had no other Kingdom to own, and declare for him, which yet he hath.

Secondly, You come with Arguments. 1. Obedience to such a Power in good things is lawfull. But acting for Justice and order in a good thing: Ergo: I have before distinguisht betwixt morall acts which are for private men to do, though there were no Authority; and politicall acts, which flow from magistracy. The latter sort of acts may not be done in obedience to an usurped Power, for the Reasons given before. The execution of justice is a good act in it self, but it is not good to be done by every man, nor upon every mans command; but is onely good in him that is lawfully authorized to it.

2ly, You say, what reason is it, that those that will not act because they hold it unlawfull, should expect that others should do an unlawfull act to benefit them? To this set Cajetan (an Author cited by you, and that in the place you cited from him) answer you; They are excused from the sin of inducing the Tyrant to an act unlawfull for him, that ask Justice of him, because they do not petition him for the unlawfull act, but for the justice of that unlawfull act: is in honestly done to perswade him to use his power lesse sinfully. This Petitions is its effect thus &illegible; Seeing &illegible; wilt hold and exercise this power, use it justly, use it honestly, use it religiously; use it to the benefit of the publick, and of private men, as it would became the Power. It is plain such Petitioners intend not to ask the Tyrant to usurp the act of Judicature, because they had &illegible; he would give it over: but seeing he doth usurp domizion, and judgement, they intend he should use justly and honestly his usurped Power and Judgement: and that which they intend, that they petition for: so that they neither intend nor petition for an usurped act, but an holy quality in the exercising of that usurped act*.

Again, Why should others give right to them, that will not give right to others? A fallacious, and frivolous interrogation in the true meaning of it. In commutative justice (wherein the rule of doing as we would be done unto) onely holds, with reference to persons that are to do it) they who refuse magistraticall acts, are ready to render every mans right to him. But this question would have a private man (such as they are) to have no distributive justice, or right by the Magistrate done him, even when the Magistrate is lawfull, because he cannot, and therfore will not vicissim administer distributive justice to the Magistrate. Every common Judgement knows that a private subject is to receive judiciall right, but not to give it.

3ly, It is cleared before in this Discourse, that those who have gotten to be Powers (though by force) ought to give justice to those whose government they have undertaken, but (supposing them to be but one, or a few) this they cannot do without subordinate agents; to disallow acting under them then, it to say in effect they shall not give justice. 1. Suppose them but one or a few, and they cannot get or keep the place by force. Suppose them many, & they have no need (in that respect) of others to be their under agents. 2ly, If this that you say be cleared, or so much as said before, I have forgotten it, though I have read all that is before, and rest confident there is no such thing. When you shew where this is said and cleared, I shall them find by what reasons it is maintained, and so give you an Answer thereunto. In the meantime, that which is here but barely affirmed, it is sufficient for me to deny. It you could clear this, the whole question were decided. If he ought to give justice, he hath a speciall warrant, and calling to it, and how Force can give such a calling you have not yet &illegible; to clear, the contrary I have brought many reasons for (Chapter 2.) and am therefore before hand with you in this point. It will be confest, that if a man will take upon him to administer judgement he were better, or it is a lesse evill in him, to do right, then wrong therein: but of two evils of sin, neither is to be admitted.

4ly, This Doctrine of not acting is the very doctrine of Levelling. For when no man may act, every man may take freely from is neighbour, &c. 2. Levelling may be the consequent or non acting, but it cannot be the consequent of it; it is the consequence of &illegible; doings, who take away the settled Magistracy. 2. Levelling in point of goods, you like not it seems: but why do you not as well abhor from it in point of Government? that’s but levelling the private, this is levelling the publick interest; that Levelling can never come in, till this Levelling go before, and lead the way, but who are Levellers this latter, and (as you see) worse way, but they that teach, or practise the deserting of the lawfull, establisht Magistrate, and the competency, yea duty, of any that have force to play the Magistrate. Hence ariseth that which they cal an interpretative consent of the people: because it is supposed every rationall man doth consent that there should be order, property, and right, given under a tyrant, rather then all to be under confusion, &c. 1. Every rationall man consents indeed that there should be order, property and right; and his being under a tyrant (by experience of the want) confirms his consent to the necessity thereof: but that such things should be maintained magistratically by a tyrant (in regard of title) you see (if all that are your Antagonists in this question be not stark Irrationals) some rationall men deny. And in this they appear rationall, in that they would hear some reason for it, before they consent to it. Which rather then you will &illegible; yourself to give (for truly it is hard to do) you choose to suppose them that will not consent without it, to be out of the number of rationall men. 2ly, This shift of an interpretative consent of the people, that the Usurper shall administer judgement, will not serve you. For, 1. It will be difficult to finde out, and agree, when such an interpretative consent is given by the people. 2ly, What thing is it? as near as I can conjecture it is possibly. 1. Either that these men shall be the Power, or Magistrate; and then, 1. Either the people had power to give this consent, and this makes these men no Usurpers, but lawfull Magistrates, & so puts them out of the compasse of this question. 2. Or they had no power, being pre-ingaged, and then this consent is void, and null, because it prejudicates anothers right. 2. Or it is, that these men, though they have no consent of theirs to be Magistrates, but come in, and hold against their wils, and by their own meer force, and against anothers right, yet they shall for present execute judgement, because it cannot be had otherwayes. This consent (suppose it really past by the people) cannot bottome their acting, or others under them. For it is in the essence of it an unlawfull act, and therefore of no force. It is of the same validity as was that of the people which joyned with Korah, and his company, who gave consent, that though Korah, and the rest were no Priests, yet they should offer incense; or as that would be, if the people of a Congregation now, that can procure no lawfull Minister, should take a private man, and say, this man is no Minister, yet he shall, in this defect of one, preach, and administer the Sacraments to us. Such consents are contradictions to the establisht ordinance of God, appointing that no stranger to those functions shal execute those acts. In like sort it is in this point of Magistracy.

5ly, How could Ezra, and Nehemiah justifie their acting under the Persian Monarch, who had no right to the Crown of Judah, either by blood or just conquest. 1. That the Persian Monarch had not that right, you say, but prove it not, but if just conquest give a title, Cyrus the first Persian King justly warred against Balshasar the last Chalcedon Monarch as Historiansa say, and therefore justly conquered him, and his Empire; under which the Jews were then subjected, and that by speciall warrant from God. Jer. 27. 12. to 16. 29. 1. to 8. 21. 8, 9. 38. 17. to 21. 2ly, But Cyrus had both an indubitable title to that Empire, and an unquestionable Commission for what he did in reference to the Jews releasement from captivity, and restauration of their Temple, Keligion, and Civill State; and that from God himself, by immediate designation. Hear what he himself saith in his Proclamation, unto which he was stirred up in spirit by the Lord. Thus saith Cyrus King of Persia, all the kingdoms of the earth, hath the Lord God of heaven given me, and he hath charged me to build him an house in Jerusalem which is in Judah. 2 Chron. 36. 22, 23. Ezra 1. 1, 2. And compare this with what the Lord saith not onely of, but to this Cyrus. Isa. 44. 28. 45. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13. and a clear calling or title to the Empire of the world, and to the acting of what he did in reference to Judea, will appear to be in him. It is conceived that Cyrus had certain knowledge of this Commission, recorded and given to him by name, in that Prophesie of Isaiah, and that by means of Daniel the Prophetb; and that which is therein written he understood to be his charge given of God, which he mentioneth in the aforesaid Proclamationc. Adde to this that Mr. Divdati interpreteth that speech of God to Cyrus, viz: I girded thee. Isa. 45. 5. of the Lords making him King, and giving him power and authority: v. 1. And that of ver. 13. I have raised him up in righteousnesse, he understands thus. That is, by a firm decree of my justice, and by a just calling. Now if Cyrus the first of the Persians had a valid title, what can controul his Successors right in Judea?

2ly, If there had been no right in the Persian King over Judea, yet the acting of Ezra and Nebemiah, could be no president or warrant for a now acting under a usurped Power in the case we have in hand. 1. Consider the speciall qualification, and call of these two persons.Ezra 7. 1. 2. 1. For Ezra, he was a Scribe, and a Priest, and some think one of the highest, to wit, that he was that Josedech, who was the father of &illegible; the high Priest (this is Jerems opiniond; and so might be authorized by vertue of that office, to transact all that he is said to have done in his book. 2. He is said by some of the Ancients to be a Prophet, Neither can he be denyed so to be, (saith a late learned and solid Divinee) in that he was a Pen-man of Scripture. 3ly, And besides these functions, he seems to have had a speciall call of God in his undertaking what he did: it is said, The hand of the Lord his God was upon him, when he first enterprized his work: Ezra 7. 6. which phrase is often reiterated upon the severall passages of his imployment. Chap. 7. 9. 28. &c.

2ly, Nebemiah was the Governor. Neb. 8. 9. 10. 1. 12. 26. it is not any where said (that I finde) that he was sent with that power by the Persian King, but it is more probable he was chosen to that office by the people of Judah, both because he was one that was very zealous for the interest and publick advantage of that Nation, and by reason he came thither some yeers* after Ezra, and acted in conjunction with him. Neb. 8. 9. Now in Artaxerxes letter to Ezra, at his first going up from Babylon to Jerusalem, it is committed to Ezra’s trust, To set Magistrates and Judges up among the people: Ezra 7. 25. with this proviso, After the wisdome of thy God that is in thine hand; by which is meant the Law of God. But by the Law of God the people of Israel were to create their own Magistrates and Kings, Dent. 16. 18. 17. 14, 15. And besides his Governorship it seems he had (in like manner to Ezra) a divine instigation, and vocation to his work. It is said, That God put that in his heart to do at Jerusalem; which he went about, and when he was come thither,Neb. 2. 12. &illegible; he told them of the band of his God which was good upon him: upon which report, they said, Let us rise up and build.

2. Let it be more narrowly observed, what Ezra’s Commission was from Artaxerxes, and it will be found, 1. That he himself was not authorized to fine, imprison, and put to death, as this Author affirmeth; let the text be better marked, Chap. 7. 26. 2. In the charge of setting up Magistrates and Judges, it cannot be thought he was intended to do it; otherwise then as a private man, or Priest might be instructed to do it, viz: with the peoples concurrence; For he (as I even now observed) was to manage that businesse after the wisdom of his God that was in his hand, to wit, according to divine Law, which appointeth the people to do it.

3ly, That in all this Commission he and therest that went up with him were authorized to do no more, and in no other manner then the Law of God required: Ezra 7. 14. 18. 23. 25. and consequently they were warranted before by it, to do all that they did, and this of Artaxerxes was but an encouragement, & strengthening of them to it. 4ly, Whatsoever he acted, Chap. 10. in the matter of the Oath, Proclamation and reformation in the point of marriage. Besides that there was nothing done by him in it, that was solely appertaining to the Magistrates office; all that he transacted was by the motion, appointment, and consent of the Congregation, the Princes and the Elders: Ezra 10. 1. 3. 7. 8. &c. ver. 12. 19. yea even by the free assent of the parties. 3ly, As for all the authoritative actings of Nebemiah, which he alledgeth they must be attributed to his place of Governor, and whence that is to be derived, I have spoken before.

Lastly, You bring in the Judgement of two or three Popish Divines. Which I shall altogether passe over, for that their reasons taken from the tacite, or interpretative consent of the people, the confusion that comes in by having no government, and the expedience of choosing the lesser of two evils, I have answered before. Only one thing brought in, by the last of them being not before answered, I shall here reply to; which is as followeth.

It is manifest that the Romanes by tyranny did possesse Judea, in that very time wherein Christ and John Baptist did preach, yet Christ, Matt. 22. did teach, that tribute was to be given to Cæsar. yea himself did give it, John Bapt: Luk. 3. commanded the souldiers this onely, that they should do violence to no man, and be content with their &illegible; wherein he did rather perswade them to continue in the service of Cæsar.

First, To that of Christ, Matth. 22. wherein the main of this allegation lyeth. wch is stuck at by many, I have two things to say.

First, His Answer to the Question about the lawfulnesse of giving tribute to Cæsar is to be weighed, and therein it may be questioned, whether he positively taught that tribute was to be rendred to Cæsar. His words are. Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsars: and unto God the things that are Gods. Here Christ delivers a precept of giving to God and Cæsar each their right in the generall, without asserting, or explaining what the right of either is in particular, or &illegible; king application to the case, then before him; he seems to leave them that moved the question to do that. His words determine not the point either way expresly; all that can be inferred from the plain current of them, is a conditionall rule equally favouring the affirmative, and negative; if it be Cæsars due, render it; if not, &c. Such a waving answer will not appear unbeseeming him, if it be considered who they were that propounded the quære, to wit, the &illegible; with the chief Priests and Scribes; and with what intention it was put forth by them, viz: to entangle him, and so to betray him to the Governor for his destruction: See v: 15. and Luk. 20. 19, 20. and how well this was known to him: v: 18. The case was put not so much of conscience, as of designe; and there was this bisormed, or cornuted trap in it. If he should disallow that tribute paying, they would accuse and prosecute against him, before the Romane Governor as an enemy to Cæsars, if he should hold with it, they would traduce him to the people, as one that consented to the Romanes tyranny, and sacriledgea; Upon this ground he might prudently (and justly enough) give an Answer not to satisfie the doubt, but to silence the propounders. And unto this interpretation Mr. Calvin inclineth*. He so tempered (saith he) his &illegible; by his &illegible; wisdome, that he might render himself obnoxious to neither &illegible; &illegible; did indeed so expresly command tribute paying to Cæsar in these words, which were publickly, and before all uttered in the Temple with what face or colour could they, within two or three dayes after, accuse him unto Pilate; as one whom they found perverting the Nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar. Luk. 23. 2. This accusation would import to us, his Answer under question to have been so positive, and punctuall, for tribute paying; for though no doubt these men accused him maliciously, and would not stick to do it falsly, yet they would have some hint, or appearance of occasion for it, as in other their accusations they by straining, and misconstruction had.

2ly, But unto those who will not beleeve, but that in the said words he teacheth paying tribute to Cæsar: I further answer. Let the notion under which he is supposed to enjoyn it be observed, and the so understanding him will help not to strengthen, but to answer the Argument. He commands them to render that which he speaks of to Cæsar as a due or right: b Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsars; now if tribute or any thing else belonging to a Magistrate were Cæsars due and right, then was Cæsar no Usurper, but a lawfull Magistrate, for tribute of due can onely belong to a rightfull Soveraigne. A debt on the Subjects part of tribute must needs infer a right to it in the Magistrate, to whom it is payable; and a right in him to it must needs infer a right in him to all allegiancec. How it came about that the Romanes were invested with the Soveraignty of Judea, is not necessary for me to clear, when there is (taking the words in this latter sense) so plain a proof that it was so in these words of our Saviour.

But for the Readers sake, I will observe thus much out of History to him. About 152 years before the birth of our Saviour, the government of Judea came to be in the Maccabees who were Priests. At that time Judos Maccabetes being in fear of that grand Enemy of the Jews, Antiochus sought aid of, and entred into a League of friendship with the Romanes;d which continued till about 60 yeers before the birth of Christ, when Hircanus and Aristobulus, the Sons of Alexander falling into contention for the Kingdom; and Aristobulus the more warlike man having possess himself of it, and usurped it from Hircanus the elder brother, in whom the right then was, the said Hircanus fled to the Romanes for remedy, and by the mediation of Antipater, he procured Pompey (then nigh that Countrey with an Army) to undertake his aid; who thereupon besieged Jerusalem: Hircanus his party within the City immediately delivered it up to him, and Aristobulus friends withdrew into that part where the Temple stood, which was by Pompey taken by storme; and by this means that City came into the hands of the Romanes, and Hircanus was restored to the high priesthood and kingdome of Judea. Who, with the party that cleaved to him against Aristobulus, having gained the upper hand of those that usurped over them, they were fain by the same means to keep it, by which they got it, to wit, by the Romane power and protectione. Whence it may appear, that the Jews under Hircanus, were not brought under the Romane subjection by meer force, but (through the necessity of their affairs, whereinto they were driven by the factions within themselves) from their own consent and choice. And to this dedition of the Jews to the Romanes,Non propter inopiam &illegible; &illegible; facultates sed ut in cos qui &illegible; ludæ orum seditiones accederet. De bello Iudaic & li. 1. ca. 8. agreeth that saying of Josephus concerning Pompey, when he had taken Jerusalemf: He did as becometh a good Generall, rather by good turns, then by terror conciliate the people to himself. And another passage in the same Author plainly proves it. &illegible; that Antipater replying to the accusations of Antigonus the Son of the aforesaid Aristobulus, layed in by him against Hircanus, and himse’f before Cæsar, complainseth of Antigonus, That be sought not relief of Cæsar, because he was poore, but that he might kindle Jewish &illegible; against those who had made a dedition of themselves. And thus continued this relation and subordination of the Jews unto the Romanes, to our Saviours time, and that still with a faction,Nam divisi trant Iudæi Interse, ita ut part dandum &illegible; tributura Cæsari, pars negaret qui &illegible; facienant cum Pharilæis, qui sentisbant populum Dei debere liberum esse nec tributa pindere Implæ porestant Cæsaris, qui dindum sentisbant facitbant cum Herode, qui Cælaris paries tueba &illegible; &illegible; ideo &illegible; dicebantur. part of them adhering to the Cæsarian Authority, and part reluctating; which division among themselves occasioned the question to be really controverted amongst them, which is here insidiously propounded to Christ about the lawfulnesse of giving tribute to Cæsar; the party that was for the negative were the Pharisees faction, whose reputing and speaking of the Romanes as Usurpers, might occasion that vulgar opinion of their power which we meet with in some Authors, viz: that they were indeed in our Saviours time syrants without title over Judea; Although it is evident (by what is here said) that they came into their Authority by the consent of the Juster, and better authorized party, and at this time had one part agreeing to them.

2ly, That which is further alledged, viz: That our Saviour himself payed Cæsar tribute, and that John Baptist perswaded the souldier to continus in his service, is taken off sufficiently by what is already said; for if Cæsar was a lawfull Prince to the Jews, these things make nothing for the Arguer.

I have thus gone through, and endeavoured to give a satisfactory Answer to every Argument, which by this Author, or any other I have observed to be urged for the obedience which in this Treatise I impugne. If I had been apprehensive of, or cou’d have extracted any materiall argumentative grounds out of Mr. &illegible; Discourse, for his high assertions mentioned in my 2d. Chapter, I had here taken notice of them. If he hath any brief and slander hints of Reasons, I suppose them to be Answered in what I have already said.Museul in loc. Vide &illegible; Ians. in comment, in concord, ca. 156.

Endnotes

 [a ] Zanchius, Iunius, Geneva Interpret. Pareus, Diodates Anotations of Divines in locum.

 [b ] 2 Sam. 2. 1.

 [c ] 1 King. 12. 24.

 [d ] &illegible; 7. 14.

 [e ] 2 Sam 7. 12.

 [f ] &illegible; &illegible; &illegible; &illegible; &illegible; ipsi. nec boni fine. quos represset &illegible; &illegible; &illegible; Gentium repagule duplici, Electionis & successionis, &c. Iusti Lipsi polit: l. 2. c 4.

 [g ] Minore discrimine sumi principem quam quam quaeri. Tacit. Hist. l. 2.

 [h ] Quirtum vera regalis Monarchiæ genus est quæ iam temporibus Heroicis voluntate civium, & &illegible; legibus stque institutis approbata est. Aristot politicli 3. num. 85. Luk. 12. 13, 14.

 [h ] Reges enim non solum secondum legibus, sed etiam volentibus, Tyranni autem invitis imperant. Arislot. polit. l. 3. num. 87.

 [i ] Deinde Clana, Cubo sese, sine comitiis consules creabant in &illegible; Chro. Carion. li. 2.

 [k ] Ex Dictatore Consulem se cum P. Stevilio ipse tacit. Cluver. Hist. li. 7. pag. 235.

 [a ] A Discourse, wherein is examined. &c. by Ant: Asbeam Gent: Part. 2. Chap. 9. pa. 84.

 [b ] Tyrannus, ab quet &illegible; qui est invasor, quillbet privatur potest, debet e media tollere: neque enim ille Rex est, sed privata persona, &c. Alsted. Theol. Cas. cap. 17. Regul 8.

 [c ] Magistratus subditos sider, ac cutæ suæ commissos tanquam Dei minister puber. nat. Synops. put. &illegible; disput. 50. thes. 3.

 [d ] Principatus est imperium moribus aut legibus delatom susceptum, gestumque parentium bo. no. Iust. Lyps. polit. li. 2. c. 3.

 [e ] Magistratus est publica persona successions, sorte, aut suffragio electa, &c Io: Cab Sphæra, Cin l. 4. cap. 15.

 [f ] Discourse of Ant: Asheame part. 2. ca 9. page 18.

 [g ] Ioseph. de Bell: Iudaic. lib. 1. cap. 1. Cron. Casion. lib. 2.

 [h ] Considerations touching a warre with Spaine, written by Francis Lo: Verulam, &c. pa. 3d.

 [i ] Non est æquum ut ex actu injusto, ius sibi quis acquirat D. Sand. do Iuramenti oblig. Prælect. 6. sect. 4.

 [k ] O pubes domitura Deos, quodcunquæ videtis pugnan do dabitur: præstat victoria mundum. Cl. Claudiani Giganto machia.

 [l ] Cicero seribens de officiis tertio libro semper Cæsarem in ore habuisse Euripidis versus, quos sic ipse convertit: nam si violandum est ius regnami gratia violandum est. ahis rebus pietatem colas Sueron. in Iul. Cæs.

 [m ] Considerations touching a warre with Spaine. pa. 2d.

 [n ] Gladius (ut ad Romanes &illegible;) &illegible; &illegible; est &illegible; Loc. commun. &illegible; 4. ca. 20. loc. 12.

 [o ] Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. 11. Chap. 17.

 [p ] Arist. politic. lib. 1. num. 8. Naturali enim jure meritoq; &illegible; ut qui provida mente sagacique fuerit, is imperet, ac duminatur, qui &illegible; &illegible; viribus & lacertis hæc ipsa obtre onssie, is contra subjiciatur, & serviat.

 [q ] Nec quisquam imperium slagitie quæsitum bonis artibus exercuit. Tacit. Histor. 2.

 [r ] Magistratus eâ lex animata. P. Martyr.

 [a ] Nolite igitus fortunam iu culpam convcrtere; neque regis injuriam hojus crimen putate; nec confillum ex necessitate, nec voluntatem ex vi interpretari. Cicero Orat. 39. pro C. Ra bino possumo. So he defendeth Posthumus his changing his Romantic gown for a cloak at Alexandria as compelled by K: Ptolomie.

 [b ] Augustious ad publicolans. Epist. 154. Gen. 2 l. 31. 31. 31.

 [a ] Regula juris rei impossibilis nulls obligatio.

 [b ] Ars erat esse &illegible; &illegible; tura petie &illegible; Et parner invenem somnoque & morte leravit.

 [c ] Si li cui juratur ratum habuerit iuramentum, & velin servari, non potest &illegible; alia quacunq, terria persona &illegible; ratle est, quia nemo potest &illegible; alteri acquisitum, nisi ipse consenserit adimere. D Saunderson de &illegible; 1. rom oblig. prælect. 7. Sect, 8.

 [d ] Dico sexto, relaxationem partis valere ad vinculum juramenti solvendum, quantum ipsius interest: non tamen valers in præiudicium terriæ personæ. Ratio est, quia potest quibbet per actum suum de iure proprio quantum vult remitteret sed non pocest quisquam de alieno iure quicquam demere, ipso vel inconsulto vel invita, si alterius &illegible; &illegible; aliquo suo iure obligationem non solvi, obligatio non solvitur, Ibid.

 [e ] Having before our &illegible; honour &illegible; Happinesse of thrillings &illegible; and his posterity.

 [f ] Promissiones &illegible; illæ Ded &illegible; præsenti &illegible; intelligendæ furit. Quamoth &illegible; Dei promissiones &illegible; sic oportet cogliare: vel conditionem ahquam conjunctam habent vel abso &illegible; ponuntur. Dein vel in hoc tantum tempus valent velin posterun sunt implendæ. P. Martyr loc. com class. 3. ca. 13. Sect. 5. mis cited by him ca. 12.

 [g ] Sed cum illæ ab hominibus præstari non &illegible; Deus ex sua &illegible; subject promissiones Evangelitas &illegible; loco: quæ quim vis conditiones adiectas habent tamen afferuntur gratis. Promissio Evancelica sine allis conditionious conflare potast, &illegible; conditiones impossibiles adiecta sont, ut homines &illegible; infirmitatis admonerentur ca que ponitus intellecta, so conferent ad Christum à quo recepti in gratiam, adepte iam &illegible; illa eadem promissa possens obtinete. Nam quod ad &illegible; iam ex legalibus redduniur Evingelicæ. P. Mart. Ioc. com. Class 3 c. 12. Sect. 4.

 [h ] Cal. Instit. 1. 4. c. 20. Sect. 24. 25. &c. P. Mart. Ioc. com. clas. 4. ca. 20. Sect. 12. 18 19. Alsted, Theol. cas. cap. 17. Reg. 8. num. 9. Schar. symph. 5. epoe. Quæst. 44. & 45. cue Perk. cas. consci. B. 3. cha. 6. Sect. 1.

 [i ] Vide Alsted. Theol case 5. Reg. 2. num 3.

 [k ] Vide D. Sanderson de jur. oblig. Pralect. 7. Sect. 3. & 4s They say, in omni voto, aut juramen to subintelligi debere illam conditionem si Domino l’apæ placuerit,

 [l ] Vide D Sander. de iuram, oblig. prælect. 5. Sect. 5. & prælect 7. Sect. 6.

 [m ] Qui sacit quod in se suit ut adimpleret quod promiserat inramenti sidem exolvit. D. Sanders de luram. oblig. prælect 2, Sect. 10.

 [n ] Nec quisquam imperium slagitie quæsitum bonis artibus exercuit Tacit.

 [o ] Et nomen pacis dulce est. & ipsa res salutaris, sed inter pacem & seruitutem plurimum interest; pax est tranquil a liberton servitus malorum omnium postremum, non modo bello sed morte etiam repeltendum. Cicero in M. Anton Philip 1 æ. Prov. 14. 34. 16. 12.

 [p ] Credendum est &illegible; artifici in arte &illegible;

 [q ] Vide D Sanders. de juramoblig. prælect. 6. Sect. 9. Ant. &illegible; Discourse 2d. part. Chap. 41.

 [r ] Alterum perjurii genus est &illegible; juraveris, non syncerè agere, sed novo alique. excogitato commento iuramentivim (salvis tamen verbis) declinare & eludere D. Sanders. de Iuram. oblig. prælect. 6. Sect. 7.

 [a ] Fanatici dicant potestates omnes sic a Deo esse, sicut pestes, morbl, & pænæ a Deosunt. Pareus in loc.

 [b ] Tyrannum absque titulo qui est invaser, quilibee privatus potest, debere medio tollere, neque enim ille Rex est, sed private persons. Alsted Theol. Cas ca. 17. Reg. 8.

 [c ] Non de hoe vel il & principe loquitur, sed de ipsare, Chrysost. apud Pareum in loc.

 [d ] Quinetlam speciem quendam libertatis induxit, conservatis senatui & Magistratibus, & maiestate pristinâ & poreslace; neque tam privatum quidquam, neque tam magnum rublici privatique negotia suit, de quo non ad P. C. &illegible; &c. Vide Sueton. Tibet ca. 30, 31, 32. Heb. 13. 7. 27.

 [e ] Tacit. Annal. l. 1. c. 1.

 [f ] Brightman, Mede. Symonds, Napier. Forbs, &illegible; Apuc, 17.

 [g ] Vibem Romam’s principio Reges habuete. Tacit. Annal. l. 1. c. 1.

 [* ] Vide Tacit. Annal. li. 1. ca. 1, 2,.

 [h ] Tum vero absent &illegible; Dictator creatus pacifq; & belli dominus. Cluveti Histor., mundi, lib. 7. pag. 236. Vide Chreniton. Carton l. 2. pa. 180, 181. Muneribus, monumentis. longlariis, epulis multitu linem impentam &illegible; suos præmiis, adversarios elementiæ &illegible; &illegible; Quid multa? &illegible; jam liberæ civititi, pattim meru, pattim patientia consuetudinem serriendi. Cicero in N. Anton Philip 12. Orat. 44.

 [i ] Cæsari quia arms &illegible; &illegible; pro &illegible; Romano imperium à Senatu datum, cum Consularibus ornamentis. Cluveti Histor. lib. 7. pag. 240.

 [k ] Sex. &illegible; & Sex. Apuleius Coss primiia verba &illegible; Cæsaris &illegible; apudque cos Seina Strato, & C. Tutranius: mox Senatus milesque & populus Tacit. Annal. l. 1. ca 2. Vide &illegible; in Tiber. c. 14.

 [l ] Sic imperium adepti as popusum Romanum, vel ut ita dicam, hominum penus vnti compotem fruit, &illegible; us Princeps, &c Vide Sneton. In Caliguls. c. 13, 14.

 [m ] Vide Sueton. in Tiber. c. 76.

 [n ] Vide eundem in Calig c. 14.

 [o ] Verum postere die Senatu segniore in exequendis conatibus, per tædium, ac dis. sentionem diversa censentium, & multitudine quæ circumstabat &illegible; rectorem jam, & nominatim exposcente, armatos pro concione jurare in nomen &illegible; passus est. Sueton in Claudi c. 10. &illegible; cius imperium non parum contuit Agrippa Res Iudæorum, autor & Claudio &illegible; dignitatis, & Senatui non offendi &illegible; &illegible; Senate segniore in exequendis conatibus, & milite urbano Prætorianis se aggregante, in Claudii &illegible; iuratum est. Cluver. Histor. lib. 3. pag 267. Hoc exemplo optimates deserti in magno &illegible; esse cæperone, ac deinceps videntes fibl adversationem &illegible; non esse, secuti &illegible; ad Claudlum translerant. Claudius &illegible; in castris &illegible; senatum, & indulgenti homort complexus, egressut cum patribus confestim obtulit Deo hostias, &illegible; mosest proimperio supplicari. Ioseph. de bello Iudaic. lib. 2. ca. 10. Vide eundem Antlq. Iudaic. lib. 19 c. 3.

 [q ] Sententiam inclitam secuts pattum consulta; nec dubitatum est apud &illegible; Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. c. 14.

 [r ] Alfred Theol: cus cap. 170 reg. 8.

 [s ] Aliud est potesta quæ a Den est, aliud acquisitio, & usur; out statis, quæ &illegible; alias legitima, alias illegitima. Par. in Rom. 13.

 [t ] Discernend &illegible; inter potestatem ‘quæ’ &illegible; Deo est, & inter acquisitionem. & &illegible; pationem quæ quoad homine &illegible; &illegible; &illegible; non a Deo sed ab hominum affectibus, & Satana malitia. Ib. in Dub. 3.

 [u ] Nulla quaesita setlete potentia diuturna esse potest. Q Curt. apud Lyps. Polit. lit 2. c 4. Quam via enim demersæ sint leges alicujus opibus quimris tremilacta libertas, emergunt tamen hæc aliquande — nec vero ulla via imperii tinea est quæ prements metu possie esse diuturna. Testis est Phalarls, culus est preter cæteros nobilitata crudelitas — la quem universa Agrigentinorum moltitudo impertum, socit Quid? Macedones nonos Demetrlum reliquerunt, universique se ad Pyrrhum contuletunt? Quid? Lacedemonios in Iuste imperantos nonne repente omnes fers socit deserverunt, spect uoresque se otiosos præbuetunt leuctricæ calamitatis? Cicero de officiit lib 2. Ad tempus &illegible; insidiosa & violenta valere possunt inventa hominum, sed absque iostitia, & æquitate prevalete non possunt dio: quippe vana & infirma sunt stratagemata civitatis quæ columna virtuos non sulciuneur. Boter Tractit. lib. 8. cap 6.

 [* ] Arelote: autem morsus sunt &illegible; libertatu. quam retentæ. Cicero de offic. lib. 2.

 [x ] &illegible; Tit. Rempub. Tyrannice, &c.

 [y ] Nunquid &illegible; Tyranno peccent illi qui recurrunt ad ipsum pro justitia.

 [* ] Excusatar à &illegible; inducendi Tyrannum ad actum, & opus fibi illicitum petences ab illo iustitiam: quia non petunt actum illicitum, sed justitism illius actus illiciti. Sanctè suadetur, quod minus male utatur dominio illo; scils si vis. seu ex quo vis detinere, & exercert hoc dominium, utere illo iusle, utere &illegible; utere pie, utere ad &illegible; public &illegible; & privatorum prout deceret dommium. Conslat &illegible; quod non &illegible; &illegible; petere, ut tyrannut utatur tyrannide, ut usurpet actum &illegible; &illegible; malient ut &illegible; &illegible; & iudle &illegible; led ex quo usurpat libi dominium ac iudicium, intendunt ut &illegible; ut pic utatur usurpito dominio, & &illegible; &illegible; & qu dintenduor hoc petunt; &illegible; qued nec intendunt, non patunt actum usurpatum. sed qualitatem sanctum in actu usurpato &illegible; Caietan Summul Tit. Remp. Tyrannies, &c.

 [a ] &illegible; fiducia &illegible; inferi bellum Cyro &illegible; justurn bellum adversus Tyrannum Babylonicum Chr. Cation. li. 2. pag. 69. Balshasar conspicatus Cyri, & Medorum potentiam coalescere, Cræsum ad infringendas corum &illegible; incitat. Cluveni Hist. li 6. pa. 64.

 [b ] Agnovit hoc ipse Cyrus, & publico est edicto ad hunc modum testatus: Hæc dicit &illegible; Persarum, &c primo Esdra. Musculuin &illegible; 45. 18 Cyrus lecto vaticinio Isaiæ de se nominatim edito Isa. 45. proposuit edictam quo Iudæ is in Babylonis captirus, reditum in partiam, & facultatem, in slaur and i templi concessit. &illegible; Chronol. in 1 l. Herodat p. 147. Arbitror &illegible; & runc cum rexit Persiam Daniel, præsos in Sufis fuisse ejus auditorum Cyrum &illegible; & &illegible; dediciste veram de Deo, & de &illegible; doctrinam, & prædictiones Isaiæ &illegible; &illegible; nomen Cyri expresse &illegible; est. Chron Cation. li. 2. p2. 69.

 [c ] See Annotations of I &illegible; &illegible; on 2 Chron. 36. 22. & Ezra 1. 2. Diodat. Ibid. Musculu: in Isa. 45. 1. 13.

 [d ] &illegible; in August. de clret. Dei lib. 28. cap. 36.

 [e ] Mr. Roberts his Clavis Bibliorum on Ezra.

 [* ] Ezra 7. 7. &illegible; with Mehe. 1. 1.

 [a ] Marlorat, Muscal. Dieterius &illegible; Deodate.

 [* ] Ita temporarit responssi admirabill sua sapientia, &illegible; neutri parti se redderts &illegible; Calv. apud Marlorat. in locum.

 [b ] Render as a debt. Rom. 13. 7. Annot of Divines.

 [c ] Non dicit date ergo, &illegible; illi interog assent, &illegible; date se dicit zeddito tanquam ce quæ erus suut, quæ. que ab eo accepistis. Reddire, inquit, Cæsarl, sed quæ Cæsat tis sent, &illegible; &illegible; sua iurt postulare potest, Jansen. com. in cove. c. 116.

 [d ] Ioseph: de bello Iudaic l. 1. c. 1. &illegible; &illegible; carlon li. 2. pag. 138.

 [e ] Iose, de bello Iudaic l. 1. c. 4. 5. 6. Antiq. Iudaic l. 14 ca. 1. 2. &c. &illegible; carian li. 2. pa. 118. Stella in lo c 20. 22.

 [f ] Per quæ sicut &illegible; imperatorem decust bene voleutia potius quam timore plebem &illegible; De bello &illegible; li. 1. ca. 1.

The good VVomens CRYES against the Excise, on all their Commodities.

Good People all that heare our Cryes,

Pitty poore Womens Miseries.

WE cannot now set on the Pot, with a Sheeps-head dyd of the rot, Oynon nor Oatemell use God-wot; (pox take them:) When that we goe to salt our meat, or to make Pyes to bake and eat, this damn’d Excise lies in the heat that bakes them: We cannot wash our Smocks or Shirts, when we have gilded them by squirts, but straight in an Excise-man blurts, and smells too’t. Excise for Soape the Knave requires, Excise for Log-wood us’d by Dyers, to maintain Rogues, Knaves, Flooks, and Lyars, pray looke too’s. Tobacco two shillings the pound, the Devill sure will them confound, good people pray come curse them round, and spare not. Excise on Ale, Excise on Salt, Excise on Cloath, Excise on Malt; Excise on what so ere you call’t, and feare not. All Linnen fine or course must pay, Excise, or else they I tak’t away, Lord who ere thought to see this day, in England? for Feather-beds, for Chairs, for Stooles; for Childrens Babyes, Caps for Fooles, and for all handy-crafts-mens tools, these Knaves stand Excise for Paper I must pay, or else my Muse must pine away; they care not what I write or say, in anger. Excise they have for Pots and Pans, for Pigins, Noggins, and for Cans, yet Harry Martins ware free stands, to bang her Excise &illegible; as Aquvaite the Juncto hath to make them mighty; and when they’r warm’d, O then they’l fight, ye, with ten whores: Excise on Sugar browne and white, Excise on Candles that wee light, but when King Charles comes, then wee’l fight, and quit scores. Excise on Spirits they doe lay, but from such Spirits Lord we pray, deliver us and chase away, these vermin; they doe Excise Wine by the Tun, and all the Liquors that doe run, a Halter catch them, or a Gun, that harme men: Sweet Sugar-Candy cannot scape, no more then can the juice of Grape; Ferriting, Shoostrings, Laces, Tape, they get by: Hatbands, Ribands, Gloves, and Hats; and for our Beds the very Mats, Tinder-Boxes and Rat-Traps, they live by. Excise for Pepper, Currans, Figs; for Capons, Rabbits, and for Pigs, for Childrens Tops and Whirlygigs, pox rate them. For Earthen Ware and Skins of Leather, a Halter tye them fast together, that they may hang in wind and weather, to state them: Excise on Cheese and Butter too, the more for to augment our woe, good God what will these Rebells doe? to begger’s. Excise on Glasses brittle Ware; Excise on all save of our care, we must lie hard, and hardly fare, guds doggers: Excise on Pewter, Tin, Lead, Brasse; to furnish out each ignorance Asse; and Assessments for Sir Thomes, and Cromwell: thus doe they rack, thus doe they rave; the more we give, the more they crave; else plundered by each Rogue and Knave, and Rake-hell. The Bishops Lands and all their store, they’ve lately sold, and yet are poore, and like the Horse-Leach cry more, more, and threaten. But if all things hit but aright, and Charles the second comes to fight; the Rebells will be hang’d downe-right, or beaten: Tom Ladle then will rue his folly, and Bradshaw Jack be melancholly, the Loyallists be briske and jolly, to &illegible; Though these have murthered the King, they must not thinke to scape the string; a joyfull sight to see them swing, ne’re feare it. The roguerie that these Knaves have hatch’d, in all the world cannot be match’d, but in their snare they will be catch’d, in halters: Wee’l Bonfires light with Cromwells Nose, and Tyburne deck with Charles I is foes, and Gregory shall have all their Clothes, when’t aliers. Then will the Sisters snot and snivell, and all the Saints make pittious drevil, when Cromwel marches to the devil in earnest Corbet will close Mourner bee, and Mildmay swing in a whimsie; Hie then quoth Lenthall, up goe we, intrue jeast. Such Hypocrits can never scape, that murther, steale, and commit Rape; for them the mouth of hel doth gape, wide ope; were ever people deceiv’d thus? was ever King so glorious? or Religion reform’d thus? by Pope: Gun-powder Traytors did but intend, to bring their King to such an end; but that the Devill was not their friend, betray’d them; but these have in an open Hall, with impudence gone beyond all; nor did those bloody Traytors fall, dismay them. They butcher’d Charles at his owne gate, they tooke his Jewells, Money, Plate; and call themselves a Free State, by plunder: They sold his Haire, his Blood, and Crowne; they keep the Prince too from his own, were ever such damn’d Traytors knowne, O wonder! They sold his Houshold-stuffe & Goods, his Mannors, Forrests, Chases, Woods; yet seek to shed his Childrens bloods, like Devills: They damn’d their souls by treacherie; sacriledge, and perjurie; of covetousnesse no end we see, of evills. Our Husbands they no work can get, our Children starve for want of meat, and all we earne must make Knaves great, in bravery; whilst Cromwells Trull sits like a Queen; in Cloath of Silver, Sattin green, eats all the dainties can be seen, by slavery: Then doth her Stallion feed his fill, and of his Lust then has his will; Morley must make, and Noll must kill, ’tis pretty: each stinking Pusse, that t’other day, served the Hogs, and went to hay, now’s clad in the Queens rich aray, ’th’City Whilst Fairfax with’s bable-Nose, weares the Kings rich Gloves and Cloaths, and of his Hangings doth dispose, God save us: his Fro that came from Rotterdam and makes the simpleton a R— as proud as is the Devills Damme, out-brave us: whilst Mistris Pride, that stinks of graines, must have two maids beare up her traines, although her legges be full of Blaines, and itchie. These be the Nobles of our Land, greatest in power and command; for which you worke, you fight, you stand, they’l sit ye. When Bradshaw’s Doxie doth lie in, she has the Queens Childbed linnen, as if the Brat to Charles were Kin, her Bastard: That great Lollpoop’s no sooner up, but has his Caudle in the Kings Cup; and like his blood, doth swallow’t up, base dastard: Then doth he unto White-hall hie, with brace of Pages hanging by, to invent more tyranny and treason: but if good women, you’l be rul’d, wee’l be by him no longer fool’d, and that his courage should be cool’d, is reason. Ione Burvet then upright did stand, and silence with her voice command, would take the businesse in hand, to pox him: to Westminster straight she hies, under the Cloister where he lies, and all her cunning there she tries, to crosse him precending great busines she had; of which he said he should be glad, but in the end it proved so to Bradshaw into a roome he tooke her then, and soone commanded out his men; and stoutly they fell to it then, without Law. Ione Burnes then came back a pace, when Iack had quibl’d her Law-Case, & shriv’d Ione like a-Babe of Grace, and after, to the Committee Ione back did come, and told them the great worke was done; they gave her thanks, and home she run, in laughter. The Women then did chuse a Cryer; and so adjourn’d unto the fire, and did Iones witty trick admire, with wonder; this was the businesse of that day, they all adjourn’d and went their way; and met again the next Thursday, like thunder. The first thing that they took in hand, was the abuses of the Land, and how in baste they might disband, the Army; Then up stood Dall, and Sis, and Sue; and said, that Women the Lurdanes slew, that rob’d good people of their due; and harm ye: Quoth Iudeth then, one of my name kill’d &illegible; of great same; and Ioel did doe the same to Sisera: did not Ester the Iows preserve; when Haman did from Justice swerve? more lies upon us when we starve, O Mordecay Hang Haman up agen I cry, that hath sentenc’d us Iews to dye, revenge is fit for tyranny, a Gallowes. Iack Bradshaw shall the same fate feele, and so shall Cooke, Wild, Iermin, Steele, all drunk into perdition reele, what follows? I dare not them with Hell affright, the Worm of Conscience so doth bite, they cannot rest by day nor night in quiet: and when that they doe goe to eat, they still feare poyson in their meat, their jealousie is wonderous great in diet. When they doe think to rest in bed, some bloody vision frights their head, of righteous Charles they murthered at White-hall; but if we doe not end the strife, which must be with their cursed life; of Children, Father, Sonne and Wife, be hang’d all. The Independent race we know, hold Tenents tending to our woe, and Englands fatall overthrow, do study: but if we cannot understand, how they have late o recome the Land, and now have all at their command, w’are mudds. No Law but th’Sword they will rule by, their boundlesse wills &c tyranny; good women all their Acts desie, and eurse them: their Father Lucifer and Pride, with Cremwell that damn’d Regicide, and the Cirie hath them supply’d, and nurst them. The Common Cuckolds of Guild-hall, with Atkins, sob, Tychburn, and all, that &illegible; Grapes hath turn’d to Gall, and VVorm wood; Caryl, Carter, Gong; and Nye, that can sweare, forsweare, sawn, and lye, to every wind their sayles they’l try, wore nere good: Then in come Meg and loyall Doll, and bid a pox of God take Noll, and all the Rebells in VVhite-hall, confounded; quoth Meg the Devill take them all; quoth Doll I hope to see them fall, or else be hang’d before VVhite-hall, each Roundhead. Quoth Sis, a plague take Bradshaw Iack, quoth Sue, the devill take the pack; Heaven grant they ne’re may hanging lack, nor curses: and when they’r at the point to die; Heaven nor Physitian hear their cry, all Ministers comfort them deny, and Nurses. Quoth Moll, some plague give them their hire, that they may dye like Pym their Squire, like Dortslaw, or like Macquire, be hanged: quoth Besse, a while Ide have them stay, till. Destruction makes them way; and when the King shall win the day, be banged, Quoth Kate, my wishes they shall have, each perjured Rebell, Foole, and Knave, may hang in Chaines and want a grave, to bury: quoth Ruth, professe I doe not think, but that the Knaves begin to stink; being even now at Destructions brink, to ferry. Quoth Prue, Charon will surely take then in, and Furyes whip them for their sin; not sparing VVeaver, not Evelyn, nor Grimston: quoth Deb, may Fairfax, Pride, and Rich, Hewson, and Ioyce, that lowsie stitch, have fire and scorpions at at their breech, and Brimston; quoth Peg, good Sisters I could curse, but ’twill but make them worse and worse, like Foxes they thrive better thus, in Treason: give them but Rope, they’l hang themselves, and wrack their hopes on Rocks and Shelves, and thats the end of all such Elves in Reason. Lets all set forwards and redresse our grievances, quoth Madge and Besse, and snatch these Sonnes of Wickednesse, in sunder: content (quoth Meg) my Distaffe shall upon their pates so heavy fall, that Ile goe neere to beat them all, with wonder. Lets chuse a Generall (quoth Kate) and we their Pride will soone abate; it is not done with talke and prate; but action: they then proceeded to a Choice, and every Woman had her Voice, and so they chose them lusty Joyce, call’d Blackston. A Virago strong and stout that had bin try’d full many a bout, and ne’re would turne tayle, nor give out, but forward: shee’d made an Asse of many a man, that none before her long could stan: when she but drew, away they ran a full yard. They all agreed to raise new force, Side-saddles, Pistols, women, Horse, with Spits, and Fire-forks, to take course, with the Army. This news came quickly to VVhite-hall, and did so fright the Rebells all, that they to Counsell straight did fall, to harms ye: one said ’twas fit that women should, take the Engagement, if they would, or else they should by them be fool’d, and floured. Their Members too, that were but weaks, would be disabled to speake, and then their Trade must surely breake, when cried. Let Bradshaw be made High-Constable, and Denby President of State-Table, and then, come women we are able, to stand tav’s; quoth Denby, I accept the place, ’cause the black patches in my face, will make the women run apace, and ne’re doo’s. Quoth Harry Mild-may it is fit, that straight we doe new forces get, one beat me in the Gravill-pit, and craz’d me: quoth Martin, I will never turn, although they did my weapon burne, and once in fight my heare did earne, they maz’d me. But let them come, Ile fight againe, and so I hope will Harry Veine, it is not fit such queans should reigne, and vapour: and though my Body be not sound, I still have force to keep my ground, & with half weapon can them wound, then caper. Quoth Weaver, pray be not dismayd, I fear we are all on’s betrayd, the plot’s discovered by my Maids great belly: A lack quoth Bradshaw, as you are men, lets make an Act to banish them, ten miles from London, surely then, Ile tell ye: we may sit still by free consent, gather Excise and Assessment, and all live Kings by Praliament ev’rlasting. Pray here me though, quoth Baron Wild, Mr. Weavers Maid that seems with Child, I search’d her and my shirt desoyl’d, ’twas fasting: I sent her then to Justice Lowder, left in her breech shee carried powder, and hee got her a place to shroud her, till layed. But if you take it for a plot, referre her case to Mr. Scot, least the House and Tower should God-wor, betrayed. A generall feare surpriz’d them all, they doe like Babels builders call; who sayes that Pride won’t have a fall deceive us: now they have rob’d us of our Gold, murther’d our King and his Goods sold, they will ’tis thought run from their Hold, and leave us.

Pray stop them not, give them free way to goe,

The longer they stay here, the more’s our woe.

Mary Stiff, Cler. to the House.

An Appeale to all Englishmen, to judge between Bondage and Freedome, sent from those that began to digge upon George Hill in Surrey; but now are carrying on, that publick work upon the little Heath in the Parish of Cobham, neare unto George Hill, wherein it appeares, that the work of digging upon the Commons, is not onely warranted by Scripture, but by the Law of the Common-wealth of England likewise.

BEhold, behold, all Englishmen, The Land of England now is your free Inheritance: all Kingly and Lordly entanglements are declared against, by our Army and Parliament. The Norman power is beaten in the field, and his head is cut off And that oppressing Conquest that hath raigned over you by King and House of Lords, for about 600. yeares past, is now cast out, by the Armies Swords, the Parliaments Acts and Lawes, and the Common-Wealths Engagement.

Therefore let not Sottish coverousnesse in the Gentrey, deny the poore or younger Brethren, their just Freedom to build and plant Corne upon the common wast Land: nor let slavish fear, possesse the hearts of the poor, to stand in awe of the Norman Yoake any longer, seeing it is broke. Come, those that are free within, turn your Swords into Plough-shares, and Speares into pruning-hookes, and take Plow and Spade, and break up the Common Land, build you Houses, sow Corne, and take possession of your own Land, which you have recovered out of the hands of the Norman oppressour.

The common Land hath lain unmanured all the dayes of his Kingly and Lordly power over you, by reason whereof, both you and your Fathers, (many of you) have been burthened with poverty, And that Land which would have been fruitfull with Corne, hath brought forth nothing but heath, mosse, furseys, and the curse, according to the words of the Scriptures: A fruitful Land is made barren, because of the unrighteousnesse of the People that ruled therein, and would not suffer it to be planted, because they would keep the Poer under bondage, to maintain their own Lordly Power, and conquering covetousnesse.

But what hinders you now? will you be slaves and beggers still, when you may be Freemen? will you live in straits, and die in poverty, when you may live comfortably? will you allwayes make a profession of the words of Christ and Scripture: the sum whereof is this. Do as you would be done unto, and live in love? And now it is come to the point of fulfilling that righteous Law: wil you not rise up & act, I do not mean act by the sword, for that must be left? But come, take Plow & Spade, build & plant, & make the wast Land fruitfull, that there may be no begger nor idle person among us; for if the wast Land of England were manured by her Children, it would become in a few yeares the richest, the strongest, and flourishing Land in the World, and all Englishmen would live in peace and comfort; And this freedom is hindered by such as yet are full of the Norman base blood, who would be free men themselves, but would have all others bond-men and Servants, nay slaves to them.

The Law of the Scriptures gives you a full freedom to the Earth, and makes Man-kind free in all his Members; for God, or the creating spirit, is no respector of persons.

The Ministers who preache up the Law of the Scriptures, plead for their Freedom in the Earth, and say, The Labourer is worthy of his hire. But these Ministers, are faulty in two things. First, They will set themselves to work, in that they will run before they be sent, and then force the People by the power of the Sword-Law, to give them wages, or Labourers hire. And they will not take 12 d. a day as other Labourers have, but they will compell 100 l. or more to be paid them yearly. Secondly, They lay claime to Heaven after they are dead, and yet they require their Heaven in this World too, and grumble mightily against the People that will not give them a large temporal maintenance. And yet they tell the poor People, that they must be content with their Poverty, and they shall have their Heaven hereafter. But why may not we have our Heaven here, (that is, a comfortable livelihood in the Earth) And Heaven hereafter too, as well as you, God is no respector of Persons?

Therefore say we, while we have bodies that must be fed and cloathed, let us have Earth to plant, to raise food and rayment by our labours, according to the Law of our Creation, and let us live like men of your own Image and forme.

But if you say, that this is onely old Adams condition to look after the Earth; but the new Adam Christ, lookes after Heaven above, and mindes not the Earth. As one publick Minister told us, why truly then we say, you make old Adam who brings in the curse to be more rational and tender over our bodies; then the second Adam Christ who brings in the blessing to all Nations.

But if it be old Adams condition to desire a Livelihood as we are men, and to live free from straits: Then I would have all those Ministers to cast aside their 100 l. or 200 l. a yeare, and go and beg their food and rayment of others, and expect their Heaven hereafter, as they bid the poor men do.

But you covetous blind deceivers, know this, that as old Adam brings Man-kind into bondage and straits, so the second Adam brings Man-kind into Freedom, plenty and peace, here in this Earth while bodies are living upon earth: therefore he is said to be the joy of all Nations here on Earth, and the restorer of the whole Creation, that groanes under bondage here on Earth.

Well Englishmen, The Law of the Scriptures, gives you a free and full Warrant to plant the Earth, and to live comfortably and in love, doing as you would be done by: And condemns that covetous Kingly and Lordly power of darkness in men, that makes some men seeke their freedom in the Earth, and to deny others that freedom. And the Scriptures do establish this Law, to cast out Kingly and Lordly self-willed and oppressing power, and to make every Nation in the World a free Common-wealth. So that you have the Scriptures to protect you, in making the Earth a common Treasury, for the comfortable Livelihood of your bodies, while you live upon Earth.

Secondly, You have both what the Army and Parliament have done to protect you, as it will appeare by this graduall consideration.

First, King Charles was the successour of the Norman conquest, and raigned as a Conquerour over England, for his Power held the Land from us, and would rather see us die in poverty, or hang us up, then suffer us to plant the Commons for our livelihood. And Lords of Mannours hold claiming to their Copy-holds, and to the Commons, under or from the King: so that Kings and Lordly power, is the power of the Conquest over the people.

Secondly, Our Common-wealths Army have sought against the Norman Conquest, and have cast him out, and keepes the field. By vertue of which victory, both the Title of the King, and the Title of Lords of Mannors to the Land as Conquerors is lost. And the Land now is as free to others as to them; yea, according to Davids Law, to them that staid at home with the stuffe, as to them that went our to warre: And by this victory, England is made a free Common-wealth. And the common Land belongs to the younger Brother, as the Enclosures to the elder Brother, without restraint.

Then Thirdly, The Parliament, since this victory, have made an Act or Law, to make England a free Common-wealth. And by this Act they have set the People free, from King and House of Lords that ruled as Conquerors over them, and have abolished their self will and murdering Lawes, with them that made them.

Likewise they have made another Act or Law, to cast our Kingly Power, wherein they free the People from yielding obedience to the King, or to any that holds claiming under the King: Now all Lords of Mannours, Tything Priests and impropriators, hold claiming or Title under the King, but by this Act of Parliament we are freed from their Power.

Then lastly, The Parliament have made an Engagement, to maintain this present Common-wealths Government, comprised within those Acts or Lawes against King and House of Lords. And calles upon all Officers, Tenants, and all sort of People to subscribe to it, declaring that those that refuse to subscribe, shall have no priviledge in the Common-wealth of England, nor protection from the Law.

Now behold all Englishmen, that by vertue of these 2. Lawes, and the Engagement, the Tenants of Copyholds, are freed from obedience to their Lords of Mannors, and all poor People may build upon, and plant the Commons, and the Lords of Mannours break the Lawes of the Land & the Engagement, & still uphold the Kingly and Lordly Norman Power, if they hinder them, or seek to beat them of from planting the Commons.Jerard Winstanley.
Richard Maidley.
Thomas James.
John Dickins.
John Palmer.
John South, Elder.
Nathaniel Helcomb.
Thomas Edcer.
Henry Barton.
John South.
Jacob Heard.
Thomas Barnat.
Anthony Wren.
John Hayman.
William Hitchcock.
Henry Hancocke.
John Barty.
Thomas Starre.
Thomas Adams.
John Coulton.
Thomas South.
Robert Saycar.
Daniel Freland.
Robert Draper.
Robert Coster.

Neither can the Lords of Mannors compell their Tenants of Copy-holds, to come to their Court-Barons, nor to be of their Juries, nor take an Oath to be true to them, nor to pay fines, Heriots, quit-rent, nor any homage, as formerly, while the King and Lords were in their power. And if the Tenants stand up to maintain their Freedom, against their Lords oppressing power, the Tenants forfeit nothing, but are protected by the Laws and Engagement of the Land.

And if so be, that any poor men build them houses, and sow Corne upon the Commons, the Lords of Mannors cannot compell their Tenants to beat them of: And if the Tenants refuse to beat them off, they forfeit nothing, but are protected by the Lawes and Engagement of the Land. But if so be, that any fearfull or covetous Tenant, do obey their Court-Barons, and will be of their Jury, and will still pay Fines, Heriots, quit-Rents, or any homage as formerly, or take new Oaths, to be true to their Lords, or at the Command of their Lords, do beat the poor men off from planting the Commons; then they have broke the Engagement, and the Law of the Land, and both Lords and Tenants are conspiring to uphold or bringin the Kingly and Lordly Power again, and declare themselves enemies to the Army, and to the Parliament, and are traytors to the Commonwealth of England. And if so be they are to have no protection of the Lawes, that refused to tak the Engagement, surely they have lost their protection by breaking their Engagement, and stand lyable to answer for this their offence, to their great charge and trouble, if any will prosecute against them. Therefore you Englishmen, whether Tenants or labouring men, do not enter into a new bond of slavery, now you are come to the point that you may be free, if you will stand up for freedom; for the Army hath purchased your freedom. The Parliament hath declared for your freedom, and all the Lawes of the Commonwealth are your protection, so that nothing is wanting on your part, but courage and faithfulness, to put those Lawes in execution, and to take possession of your own Land, which the Norman Power took from you, and hath kept from you about 600. yeares, which you have now recovered out of his hand. And if any say that the old Lawes and Customes of the Land, are against the Tenant and the poor, and intitle the Land onely to the Lords of Mannours still, I answer, all the old Lawes are of no force, for they are abolished, when the King and House of Lords were cast out. And if any say, I but the Parl: made an Act to establish the old Lawes, I answer, this was to prevent a sudden rising upon the cutting off the Kings head; but afterwards they made these 2. Lawes, to cast out Kingly Power, and to make England a Commonwealth. And they have confirmed these 2. by the Engagement, which the People now generally do own and subscribe: therefore by these Acts of freedom, they have abolished that Act that held up bondage. Well, by these you may see your freedom, and we hope the Gentry hereafter, wil cheat the poor no longer of their Land, and we hope, the Ministers hereafter will not tell the poor they have no right to the Land, for now the Land of England,And divers others that were not present when this went to the Presse. is and ought to be a common Treasury to all Englishmen, as the severall portions of the Land of Canaan, were the common Livelihood to such and such a Tribe; both to elder and younger Brother, without respect of persons. If you deny this, you deny the Scriptures. And now we shall give you some few encouragements out of many, to move you to stand up for your freedom in the Land, by acting with Plow and Spade upon the Commons.

1. By this meanes within a short time, there will be no begger nor idle person in England, which will be the glory of England, and the glory of that Gospel, which England seemes to prosesse in words. 2. The Wast and common Land being improved, will bring in plenty of all Commodities, and prevent famine, and pull down the prizes of Corne, to 12 d. a Bushel, or lesse. 3. It will prove England to be the first of Nations, or the tenth part of the City Babylon, which falls off from the covetous beastly Government first; and that sets the Crown of freedom upon Christs head, to rule over the Nations of the world, and to declare him to be the joy and blessing of all Nations. This should move all Governours to strive, who shall be the first that shall cast down their Crownes, Scepters, and Government at Christs feete, and they that will not give Christ his own glory, shall be shamed. 4. This Commonwealths freedom, will unite the hearts of Englishmen together in love so that if a forraign enemy endeavour to come in, we shall all with joynt consent rise up to defend our Inheritance, and shall be true one to another. Whereas now, the poor see, if they fight, and should conquer the Enemy yet either they or their Children are like to be slaves still, for the Gentrey will have all. And this is the cause why many run away and faile our Armies in the time of need. And so through the Gentries hardness of heart against the poor: The Land may be left to a forraigne enemy for want of the poores love sticking to them; for say they, we can as well live under a forraign enemy working for day wages, as under our own brethren, with whom we ought to have equal freedom by the Law of righteousness. 5. This freedom in planting the common Land, will prevent robbing, stealling, and murdering, and Prisons will not so mightily be filled with Prisoners; and thereby we shall prevent that hart-breaking spectacle of seeing so many hanged every &illegible; as there are. And surely this imprisoning and hanging of men is the Norman power still, and cannot stand with the freedom of the Commonwealth, nor warranted by the Engagement; for by the Lawes and Engagement of the Commonwealth, none ought to be hanged, nor put to death for other punishments may be sound out And those that do hang or put to death their fellow Englishmen, under colour of Lawes, do break the Lawes and the Engagement by so doing, and casts themselves from under the Protection of the Commonwealth, and are traytors to Englands freedom, and upholders of the Kingly murdering power. 6. This freedom in the common earth, is the powers right by the Law of Creation &illegible; equity of the Scriptures, for the &illegible; was not made for a few, but for whole Mankind, for God &illegible; no respector of Persons.*

March. 26. 1650.

Endnotes

 [* ] Now these few Considerations, we offer to all England, and we appeale to the judgment of all rational and righteous men, whether this we speak, be not that substantiall Truth brought forth into action, which Ministers have preached up, and all religious men have made profession of; for certainly, God who is the King of righteousness, is not a God of words only, but of deedes; for it is the badge of hypocrisie, for a man to say, and not to do. Therefore we leave this with you all, having peace in our hearts, by declaring faith fully to you, this light that is in us, and which we do not onely speake and write, but which we do easily act & practise. Likewise we write it, as a Letter of congratulation, and encouragement to our dear fellow Englishmen, that have begun to digge upon the Commons, thereby taking possession of their freedom in Willinborow in Northamptonshire: And at Cox Hall in Kent, waiting to see the chains of slavish fear to break and fall off from the hearts of others in other Countries, till at last the whole Land is filled with the knowledge & righteousness of the restoring power, which is Christ himself, Abrahams seed, who will spread himself til he become the joy of all Nations.

To the Reader.

PErhaps thou art of an Opinion contrary to what is here written: I confesse, that for a Time I my Self was so too, till some Causes made me reflect with an impartial eie upon the Affairs of this new Government.

Hereupon, beginning seriously to search into the nature of it, with the many Pleas and Objections made against it; And supposing those learned men who wrote before these Times, were most likely to speak Truth, as being un-interested in our Affairs, and un-concerned in the Controversie, I took a view of their Reasons and Iudgments; and from thence made so many Collections, that putting Them in order, and comparing all together, They soon made a Conquest over mee and my Opinion.

I know the high Talkers, the lighter, & censorious part of People will shoot many a bitter Arrow to wound my Reputation, and charge mee with Levity and Inconstancie, because I am not obstinate like themselves, against Conscience, Right Reason, Necessity, the Custome of all Nations, and the Peace of our own. But this Sort of men I reckon inter Bruta animantia; among whom to doe well is to hear ill; who usually speak amisse of those things that they do not, or will not understand. From Them therefore I appeale to the great Tribunall, where it is known I have in this dealt faithfully; And to the more sober Intelligences, here below, with whom these Papers must needs find the more free entertainment, because free from partiality, and the least Tincture of Faction.

And that they may be the fitter to walk abroad in the world, I have divided them into Two Parts, and accommodated Them with a Method, suitable to those two Parties whereof the world consists; viz: the Consciencious man, and the Worldling. The former will approve nothing but what is just and equitable; and therefore I have labored to satisfie him (as I have done my Self) touching the Justice of Submission: The latter will imbrace any thing, so it make for his Profit; and therefore I have shewn him the Inconveniences and Dangers, that wil follow his opposition of a settlement. Now, though the other should continue obstinate in their erroneous pretences; yet of this latter sort, I dare promise my Self an abundance of Proselyts, the greater part of the world being led more by Appetites of Convenience and Commodity, than the Dictates of Conscience: And it is a more current way of perswasion, by telling men what will be profitable and convenient for them to do, than what they ought to doe.

But Prethee read, and then doe what thou list: I have only one word more; & that is to our modern Pharisee, the Consciencious Pretender, and principall Disturber of the publique Peace. If hee will not be convinced by so clear Testimonies, but raise more dust about our ears, to amaze the People, it must be concluded; That all this noise of Church-Reformation, Conscience, and Covenant, is a mere malicious Designe to drive on a Faction, for the casting down of our present Governers, that they may set up Themselves in the Seat of Authority.—Farewell, and be wise. Being convinced of the Truth of these Things, I conceive my Self obliged, to shew others the same way of Satisfaction.

The Contents of the First Part.

• Chap. I.  THat Governments have their Revolutions, and fatall Periods.
• Chap. II.  That the Power of the Sword is, and ever hath been, the Foundation of all Titles to Government.
• Chap. III.  That Non-submission to Government justly deprives men of the benefit of its Protection.
• Chap. IV.  That a Government erected by a Prevailing Part of the People, is as valid de Jure, as if it had the ratifying Consent of the whole.
• Chap. V.  That the Oath of Allegiance, and Covenant, are no justifiable Grounds to raise a new Warre, in, or against the Common-wealth of England.

The Intent of the First Part is, to prove the Necessity and Equity: Of the Second, to manifest the Utility and Benefit of a Submission.

The Case of the Common-wealth, stated.

Endnotes

 [* ] Continua est rebus generatio & corripio. Arist. de gen. & corr. lib. 12. cap. 10. 3 Annal. Certic cunt cuncta Temporibus. Nasei debeus, crescere & extingui. Seneca consol. ad Hel.——Numina rebus Crescendi posucre modum. Lucan. Cic. de divia. Numeri fatales, vel periodi. Plat.

 [* ] Peucerus de divinat. gen. fol. m. 30. & Gregor. Richter. axiom. polit. 1. & Occonom. 5. cum &illegible; aliic. Herod.

 [* ] Hoc est, anno ab V. C. 244.

 [* ] Irriti sunt conatun bumani. Vide Richter. 684.

 [* ] Nulla vis bumani vel virtus, meruisse unquam potuit, ut quod præscripsit fatalis ordo, non fiat. Ammian. lib. 23.

 [* ] Ad &illegible; gladii sui appellavit. Girard. l. 21. Pasquier. 5. cap. 7.

 [† ] Jactitare solebas, suà &illegible; opera effectum fuisse, ut Reguil Gallicanum quasi ex Tutelâ, ad plenam Pubertatem fueris redactum. Besoldus in Synopsi. c. 4.

 [* ] Norman, ille Spurius, Guilhelmus dictus, Anglicanum Regnum vi occuptoit; Legésq; tulit, nullas a cepit. Besoldus in Synopsi. lib. 1. cap. 14.

 [* ] Necessitas summa reducit res ad &illegible; Ius naturæ. Grotius de Iure belli. l. 2. c. 6. Grotius, inter Prolegomena de Iure Belli.

 [* ] Iure belli.

 [† ] Si qui fare suo uti non possion, corñ jus accrescit præsentibus. Grotius de Jure Belli, lib. 2 c. 5.

 [* ] Lib. de legib. 3. cap. 10.

 [* ] Sanders ibid. &illegible; sensum aliquam juramento à nobis prœstito, aut ejus alicuè parti affingamus, proprii commodi aut utilitatis causà, quam non quivis vir alius pius & prudens (quiest liberioris Iudicii, utpote cujà nibil interest) ex ipsis verbis facilè eliceres.

 [* ] Omnia debent esse cadem quæ fuerint cum promitteres, ut promittentis sidem teneas.

 [* ] Quia cũ omnia divine Providentiæ & voluntali subsint, nec sit in cujusvis hominis potestate omnes futures Casus præstare; qui fecit quod in se fuit ut adimpierec quod promisrat, Iuramenti fidem exeluit. Rei Impossibilis Sanders. Ibid.

 [* ] Potestates apud Ammlanum aliosque &illegible; penes quos saut Iura militaria. Arnold. Clapmar. de Iure Imperii. lib. 1. cap. 10. Viactur Apostolus voluisse tollere frivolä bominum curiosiatem &c. Calv. in Rom. cap. 13. Quum quætitur cui parendü, non est spectandum qualis sit qui potestatem exercet, nec quo Iurc, vel injuria, qulo potestatem invaserit. Dacet. in Rom. 13.

 [* ] Sacramentum capitis diminutione sublatum.

 [† ] Petr. Greg. Tolos. lib. 11. de Repub. cap. 3. pag. 656.

 [* ] Mercenarii militia fides ex fortund pendet: qua inclinante ad hostes, ipsi etiam spem atq; animum ed inclinant. Francise. Patrit. lib. 9. de Reg. Tit. 15.

 [† ] Soleut plus lucrum quam causam sequi bellaudi: Et ita facile ab hostibus, vel majore stipeudio, vel donis, corrumpi possuns. Petr. Greg. Tolos. ubi supra.

 [* ] See the new Acts of Treason, and the Act for establishing an High Court of Iustice.

 [* ] He was afterwards King, by the name of Henry 2. See Daniel. in the life of King Stephen.

 [* ] Leges opprimis Timor. Sen. Herc. Fur.

 [(a) ] Auferre, trucidare, rapere. Tac. in Agric.

 [(b) ] Plutarch in vitâ Catonis.

 [(c) ] Delatores per pramia eliciunt. Tacit. Annal. 4.

 [(d) ] Boni quàm mali suspectiores sunt, semperque quem ex malâ.

 [† ] Regni causà &illegible; violandum esse.

 [* ] Regni causà sceleratum esse.

 [a ] Principi nibit est injustũ quod fructuasum.

 [b ] Ubi honesta tantùm dominantì licens, procariò reguatur.

 [† ] Quamvis bonus asq, clement fit, qui plua potest, tamen quia mate esse licet, formidatur. Salust. ad Cæs.

 [* ] Dulce matum vindicta.

 [* ] Monarchæ non amant Ordinum Conventua crobriores. Besold. de Simulachris Rerumpub.

 [* ] Semiramis.

 [* ] Ab istis exerciti but, quos defendendt sui causæ attraxcrunt, evertuntur. Peucer. Auxiliætores, ut &illegible;, postea finne domins. Strigel. 2. Paralip. 28.

 [* ] Maxima pars vulgi capitur Ambagibus.

 [* ] Immedicabile vulnus Euse recidendum est. Ovid.

 [† ] See the Irish Bishop’s Sermon at the Hague, in print.

 [* ] See the Case of the Kingdome Stated. Anne 1647.

 [* ] See the Case of the Kingdom, ut supra.

 [* ] In &illegible; at Spiritualia.

 [† ] Not out of any good will toward England, but because their discipline was not like to be set up here, if Hamilton had prevailed.

 [* ] Indeque frequeniantur Agrariæ Leges; qua probibent, me quis nimis dives efficirur. Besold. in Synops. de Democr.

 [* ] Plebs ut prone iu miscricordiā, ita immodica in savitiam.

 [† ] Clap. de Arcan. dom. pop.

 [* ] &illegible; nimirum, solutiq; & magis sine dominio, quam in Libertate. 2. Annal. Genus bominum agreste, sine legibus, sine Imperio, liberū, atque solutum. Salust.

 [† ] Quouiā ca demum Libertas Romæ est, non Senatū, non Magistratus, non Leges, non mares majorum, non Instituta &illegible; non Disciplinam vereri Militiæ. Liv. l. 5.

 [* ] Tales longè sunt crudeliores, et longè plus necent quam soli Tyranni, &c.

 [† ] Omnium prope Judicio &illegible; eb qudd inibi liceutia pro libertate habeatur.

 [† ] Componi non possunt, nisi Imperio ed &illegible; devoluto Clapm. de Arc. Imp. l. 2. cap. 14.

 [* ] Eam Rempublican &illegible; civilibus fesson, nomine Principis, sub Imperium accepit. Tacit. Ann. 1.

 [† ] Tumultus populares parturiunt regnum.

 [* ] Aquin. de Regim. Princ. l. 4. cap. 15.

 [* ] Δ&illegible;μοε&illegible;&illegible;ία ε&illegible;&illegible;ος, &illegible; πολ&illegible;&illegible;εία λλ πά&illegible;&illegible;ων πολ&illegible;ν πολί&illegible;είων. Plato.

 [† ] Ex Favore & pretio, populus distribuebat Magistraeus. Polyb. 6. &illegible; à preparuts. 1. disc.

 [* ] Summa Rerii sit penes pancos, qui &illegible; reliquos virtute & &illegible; Polit. 1.

 [† ] Bodinus. 6. de Repub. cap. 4.

 [* ] Ostracismus used at Athens, as Petalismus else-where; when the People banished any eminent man, the Sentence was written either upon the Shell of a Fish, or an Olive-leafe. Arist. 3. polit. c. 13.

 [* ] Ingrata patria, ne ossa quidom mea habes.

 [a ] Ubi Imperium plebis est, ibi Patricios ac nobites, multis magn squo Injurils, affici necesse est. Arist. 3. polit. cap. 7. Inveratissinum suit in Rep. Romana odium plebis atversùs Patricios.

 [b ] Livius lib. 4. & 5.

 [† ] Clapm. de Arcan. l. 2. C. 13.

 [† ] Auderentue postulare, ut cùm bina Iugera agri plebi dividerentur, ipsis plus quinquaginta jugera habere liceret? Liv. l. 10.

 [* ] If this Government be destroyed, we must expect a regall, or a Presbyterian, or a popular Tyranny.

 [† ] Mach. de Repub. l. 1. c. 16. 17. & 18.

 [† ] &illegible; suit dami Industriæ, forle justum &illegible; animus in consulendo liber; neq; libidini, neque delicto obnexius. Salustius; de Catone in suâ Concione ad Romanes Consules.

 [* ] Sam Daniel. of the State of Britain.

 [* ] Incredibile est memoratus, quatum alepta libertate, in brevi Romana Civitae creverit. Salust.

 [† ] De summoperè placent; cò quod in iis, magis quàm in alio genere Rerumpublicarum, commune bonum conservetur, Ius suum cuique æqualiter distribuatur, Civium animi vehementius ad virtutem, &c. Fr. Guicciard. lib. 10. Hist.

 [* ] Yam obstiuatè Ius suum &illegible; us Turelcæ perfidiæ se committere maluerint, quàm Sceptris hæreditariũ eum potivi. Besold. de Successione regia. cap. 5.

 [* ] Orat. ad Epist. Philippi.

 [† ] Curtius, l. 6. suæ demptũ glerie existimans quicquid cecisset aliene.

 [* ] Sepulveda. Comm. ad Arist. Polit. 3. c. 9.

 [* ] Joh. Leo. lib. 8.

 [* ] Curt. apud Alex. lib. 8.

 [† ] Omnes intelligant, salvi esse velint, necessitari esse parendum. Cic. de offic. lib. 2.

 [a ] Tac. Hist. 4. Dissolutionem Imperii doccut, si fructus quibus Republica sustinetur, diminusantur.

 [b ] Tac. Annal. 14.

 [* ] Inter Arma silent Leges.

 [* ] See Axiom. polit. Rich. 57. p. 152.

To the Honourable, the Commons assembled in Parliament.

THat if it be altogether uncomfortable to say unto the naked and destitute of daily food, be you warmed and filled, when nothing is given needful for the body, how extreamly grievous would it be to lay unto such, ye are warmed, ye are filled, when their cold and hunger is increased; but nothing ministred for sustentation.

And yet except we should stifle our Consciences, betray the truth, and by a sinful silence, even break out hearts; we cannot but attest and bear witnes, that, of this ad and woful nature is our misery.

For how uncomfortable, yea, what torment of spirit, must it necessirily be to a people that have done and suffered so much and so many several kinds of afflictions, for recovery of our Native Liberties, and for redress of grievances, not only to be frustrated in all our hopes, and to be deprived of them by those who can and ought in Conscience to restore the one, and to redress the other, (being oblieged thereunto by all possible tyes both to God and Man,) but to be born down continually, by private and publick discourses, (yea, and to have it dangerous for any to deny) that we are a free people, that we have injoyed the first, and that this is the second year of Englands Liberty, when God he knoweth, we find and feel the contrary: our just fundamental Liberties, being never more invaded and restrained, our burthens never more grievous, and which maketh them ten fold more grievous: our very groans, sighes and complaints (of late) meet with no relief, but are attended with threats, bonds, imprisonments, yea death it self; a condition sufficient to distract us, but that God, we trust, supports us for better things, in dread of whose awful and glorious name, we dare neither by speech nor silence call good evil, nor evil good; we dare not say, our Liberties are restored, or our grievances as yet redressed.

And although there are a sort of men, formerly full of complaints, for want of those Liberties, and frequent in Petitions for them, whose mouthes being since stop’t with Offices and imployment of gain, Honour, or domination, or by relations to such as have them, that are not only silent themselves, as to any complaint now, but make it their works to suppress and silence all others, and to boast of the happiness and freedom of these sad times; yet the woful lamentations of well minded people, throughout the Land, bear witness against them; and the things themselves bear witness against them, and against all such unchristian delusions: We judge our selves bound in Conscience, to bear our witness perpetually, though 10000. High Courts of Justice (those new English Monsters;) were set up to terriefie or devoure us, chusing rather to suffer for a cause so evidently righteous, then to enjoy the pleasures of corruption, for a season; and it will be good that all such mockers, remember that it will be bitterness in the latter end.

And that it may not be said unto us, as it was to the over-grieved Israelites, ye are idle, ye are idle, or that we intend to asperse or scandalize Authority, (a hard measure we frequently meet withall.) In the bowels of Christ Jesus we beseech you, bear with us in comparing times with times, and the things of the former times of bondage, with the present; so much cryed up, for Liberty and Freedom.

And surely it will be found, and cannot be denyed, that if it were a breach of known liberty, and a sore grievance that any Laws should be made, or Customs brought in, contrary to our Native Liberties contained in Magna Charta: such being null and void in themselves, and not to be obeyed, though made in full Parliament: (as appeareth in the case of Empson and Dudley) how exceeding grievous must the late Act declaring what shall be treason, that for unlicensed Printing, and that for erecting the High Court of Justice, &c. appear in these times; was imprisonment for debt, confest by all to be an incroachment upon our just Right? and is it not lamentable, it should be continued to the ruine of the poorer, and to the sheltering of the richer sort of debters, as it is known to be? was it grievous, that all men were made liable to be attached by Pursevants, to be adjudged, fined, imprisoned, by the Councel-board High Commission and Star-Chamber, without being tryed by Juries, to be examined against themselves, and imprisoned in illegal Prisons, and remote Castles, and there to be most barbarously abused? And doth not the same dealing from a continued Parliament, a Councel of State and Committees, executed by Messengers, and Souldiers too, violently hauling and terrifying people, prove much more grievous? If Tythes were then a burthen to the industrious and conscientious, is it not much heavier now, being exacted upon treble damages? If Customs then were accounted an unreasonable burthen, distructive to traffique and navigation, can they be less, being required with more strictness and severity? If Patents and Projects, and Ship-money, were intolerable burthens and grievances: how much more burthensome and destructive to Trade, is the Excise and the perplexities thereon depending to all Trades-men, and consequently to all industrious people? If the great number of Officers belonging to the High Commission Star-Chamber Councel-board, to Pattentees, Projectors, Bishops, Courts, and the like, bred and fostered an interest against the common freedom of the People, to their excessive charge and trouble: all such being arguers for arbitrary power, and maintained by the sweat of other mens browes, is it not so and much more, by those many imployed about Customs, Excise, and in Committees: in so much, as men can hardly say any thing, or discourse together, for fear of being insnared in their words by some of them? If it were then deemed most injurious, to make it dangerous to mention a Parliament: is it not most lamentable, that it should be now as dangerous to move for a new Parliament, after so long continuance, and so many grievances unremoved? If Conscience then were oppressed by Oaths of Allegiance and supremacy is not the enforcement of the Engagement upon penalty of being out-law’d, a greater grievance? If Conscience in divine worship were free only to some, is not its freedom restrained now? or should we for that one part of our just freedom, fell all the rest of our Birth-right, (God forbid) and the liberty of Printing more restrained, (except to books maintaining the most tyranous principles &illegible; Book entituled, The Case of the Common-wealth of England stated, and the like, which to the shame of these times were freely licenced. If those &illegible; were judged of cruelty, in censuring men to be whipt, gag’d, and pillor’d, for small or verbal things; how can that time escape that makes the like verbal things Capital, as is evident in many Acts of this Parliament? If it were deemed of dangerous consequence, that almost all Officers & Magistrates, both civil & military, as Judges, Sheriffs, and Justices, &c. were not chosen in a free way by the People, (as by right they ought) but were chosen and imposed by the Court, thereby to incline all men and things to the bent of one particular party or Interest, rather then to the impartial good of all, is it not as prejudicial to be so now? If monopolizing of the principal Marchandizes of the Nation by Companies, were then esteemed a most pernitious evil, they remain still much after the same manner, and so also do Law-sutes, and all proceedings in Law, continue as full of tedious chargable perplexities as ever, and the numbers of Lawyers, Attorneys, Solicitors, Goalers, and their Officers, all feeding themselves fat, as the other Officers forementioned) by the spoyles of the distressed, never more countenanced, yea, 1000. pounds a peece per annum, added to the Judges above their ordinary Fees, which alone was formerly accounted a large proportion, and great preferment. If tryals by extraordinary packt Commissions of Oyer and Terminer, and Tryals by Court-Martials, (though of loose and dissolute people) were esteemed utterly destructive to the Lives & Liberties of the People, (as appeareth by the Petition of Right,) are not those kinds of Tryals more frequent now, or can any thing exceed in dangerous Tryals by HighCourts of Iustice, a Court against which no legal defence or priviledge is permitted, it being to be admired, that in times pretending liberty, there should be found persons to serve in such a Court. If these are the effects of Freedom, then are we free indeed; but if they are, we have lost our understandings. If then be considered the manifold miseries accompanying these ten years strife for liberty, as decry of Trade, excessive Taxes, Poverty and War: to supply which, a new and never before heard of grievance is added, as the loss of Servants and Children, through a liberty given them, to betake themselves to Arms, though against their Master or Parents liking, to the impoverishment of whole Families, and to the unexpressible grief of many tender-hearted Fathers and Mothers. And then if the Parliaments Declarations in behalf of Magna Charta, and the Petition of Right, with all things concerning Life, Limb, Liberty, and Estate, be duly weighed, and after them, those of the Army, manifesting a most deep sense of the long suffering of the Nation, for want thereof: would it not pierce and grieve the most hard and stony heart, that yet all things should remain in this woful condition, as is evident they now do? And that through discontents, divisions, and distractions, arising from so continued an unsettlement, and the presumption of enemies thereupon, a War should frequently be threatned within the bowels of the Land, (as more then once hath been seen) and that a more dangerous one then any yet is now already begun, and yet no regard taken for the real restoration of our liberties, or redress either of old or new grievances, (the only means of reconcilement) but in place thereof, all mouthes are stopt with the meer Title of a free Common-wealth, and of a free people, to the heightening of all discontents, and withholding from the Army the assistance of thousands of zealous cordial people, that upon the real (but not verbal) restoration to just Liberties, and the real redress of those known grievances, would readily assist them.

And therefore as you tender the preservation of Parliaments, from utter annihilation, (a thing much to be feared upon prevalence of an Enemy, which God defend) the supply and recruit of this Army, the speedy ending of this most threatning War, as you regard the end for which the people chose you, or that for which the Army reserved you; when they excluded the greater number of your own Members: as you regard you own safeties, or that which is above all the known will of God in the keeping of a good Conscience, and performance of all your promises and vowes, made in his all-seeing presence: We beg and beseech you for the tender mercies of Christ, that you will be pleased instantly to make a plenary restoration to our fundamental liberties, and really redress all the grievances forementioned; and for a clear pledge of your full purpose therein, that you will immediatly and for ever abolish the High Court of Justice, (that Serpent ready with open mouth to devoute us: and from which, none can be safe, whilst treacherous Informers can be found) and to null all things and proceedings appertaining thereunto, as a Plant, which our fore Fathers never planted, but would have ventured all they had willingly, to have rooted out any jurisdiction of so forraign a breed, so expresly opposite to all English Liberties, as is manifest by what trouble and danger they under went in all former times.

But if so be the whole work be too hard for you, or that you cannot agree therein, before the War growes to fast upon you; We beseech you then to remember the humble Petition and advice of his Excellency and Councel of Officers, the 20. of Jan. 1649. with those other Petitions to the same effect, concerning the way of settlement by an agreement of the People, and that you will be pleased to give countenance and protection to all peaceable people, in entering into such an agreement as themselves shall judge most effectual to their own safety, Freedom and well-being, and whereby they may set such express bounds and limits, to all kinds of Authorities, so restore and establish their fundamental Liberties, and so unrevocably remove their burthens, and redress their grievances, as shall not be in the power of future Authorities or persons (without certainty of punishment) to supplant the one, or to re-impose the other; and this work we trust in God, you will freely incourage, having acknowledged by your votes, the People to be the original power, from whom all just Authorities are derived, which were unavailable, if you should (which God forbid) withhold them from exercising the same, in a work wherein they are so nearly concerned: and which once effected, would render the Nation absolutely free, (not in word only) but in deed and in truth, to the exceeding joy of your humble, (but as yet grieved Petitioners, and of all well-minded people) restore it to much more unity within it self, and so, would become more formidable to all sorts of Enemies, your labours would be exceedingly abated. And in countenancing so just, so due a work, would bring great Honour to God, Peace, Freedom, and prosperity to the Common-wealth, be at rest in your own Consciences, guarded by the cordial volentary affection of the People, whilst you live here, and remain as a sweet favor to all Posterity. And thus as faithful Witnesses to the Truth, and in behalf of the Nations just Rights, we have discharged our Consciences, referring the Issue and our selves wholly to God, whom we continually worship in spirit and in truth; and before whose righteous judgement we must all one day appear: and therefore although for the Truths sake, our portion in this life should be scofs, reproaches, afflictions, poverty, imprisonment, or Death: We have chosen it, rather then at that great and terrible day of the Lord, to have our portion with the Hypocrite, or that our Consciences should then testifie against us, that we have made lyes our refuge. This is printed only for the better gathering of Subscriptions, ’tis desired you would make no other use of it.

Aug: 31 1650.

To the Supreme Authority, the Parliament of the Common-wealth of England.

THAT one of the greatest means (under God) of the comfortable subsistence of this Island in all ages, hath been the giving encouragement to the industrious mannagers of Trade and Traffick: which by reason of those long and many continued troubles, both at home and abroad upon the Nation, and those extraordinary Imposts upon most Commodities, hath bred such consumption in the Trade of the Nation, that it hath brought thousands of Families (that formerly lived comfortably) into extraordinary wants and straits: And amongst all the Trading people of this Land, your Petitioners humbly conceive, that none whatsoever groan under a more insupportable burthen then your Petitioners do, as appears by these particulars following.

First, For that being Sope-makers, they pay Excise for all imported materials they make their Sope of; as for Pot-ashes, Oyl, and Tallow, and not onely so, But

Secondly, As if they with some few others were strangers to the Commonwealth of England, and not capable of the enjoyment of the Liberties and Freedoms thereof; A heavy and grievous burthen is laid upon their shoulders, when as it toucheth not the little fingers of the Generality of the people of this Nation: viz. That after they have with a great deal of bazard, labour, and toyl, made their materials into Sope, then they are constrained to pay 4s. 8d. Excise out of every Barrel they make; so that thereby in effect. they pay Excise for the sweat of their browes, and the labour and toil of their hands; and this is required of them, and that whether they gain or lose by their Commodity; which is a burthen so intollerable, as (if not speedily removed) will unavoydably ruine them; of which, about five years since they most grievously complained, and were thereupon largely promised case thereof, but never enjoyed it to this day: And therefore now they are necessitated humbly to tender these following reasons for the speedy removal of it for ever.

First, Because, that although by the late wars in Poland by the Tartars, Pot-ashes (by reason of their scarcity) grew of late years to so great a price, that many in England were incouraged to make Pot-ashes, for which they neither pay Excise nor Custome; and yet by reason of the late plenty of Out-landish ashes, by means of which at London, not being able to get their accustomed price for theirs, that for two or three years by past, they have borne, they make them in holes and corners in the Country into Sope, where constantly (as partly may appear by the books of Excise at the grand Office thereof) stealing the Excise of the 4s. 8d. per Barrel, and paying originally no Custome nor Excise, either for their Pot-ashes, or their Yallow, by reason whereof (although for want of skil &c. They make base and unmarchantable Soape) they are able so much to undersel your Petitioners, as that of late they are much impoverished in their wade, the chief means of their livelyhood: And therefore though it have formerly appeared unreasonable to your Honors to lay Excise upon Native Commodities; we hope it will now, much more, appear unreasonable to continue Excise upon Native and bare handy labour, and the sweat of the browes of English men, denominated in words, to be free by birth.

Secondly, Because by the aforesaid meanes the Excise of Sope is so decayed, as that the now incomb of the revenue of it is humbly conceived to add little advantage to the publick purse.

Thirdly, And principally, your Petitioners are English men by birth and breeding, and pay all other manner of taxes freely and willingly, with other people of their Neighbourhood; And several of them also have freely and resolutely with their swords in their hands adventured their lives, and all that is dear to them for the Common Liberties of the Nation, and in the eye of the Law are guilty of no manner of Acts, that renders them either in reason or Justice worthy of being punished with a punishment above the generallity of the Nation; neither can they in any sense, see any reason at all why an Excise should be set upon the sweat of their browes, when almost the whole people of the Land go free in that particular.

Therefore, forasmuch as you have altered the Government of this Nation, from a Kingdom to a Common-wealth, and slited the last year, the first year of England’s freedom, by God grace: And forasmuch as by your primitive Declarations you declare, that the meanest Commoner of England is equally intituled by birth-right unto the common enjoyment of the Liberties of the Nation with the greatest Subject: And forasmuch as by your late Declaration in Feb. 1648. You positively declare, you are firmly resolved to maintain, preserve, and defend the fundamental Lawes of the Nation, with all things incident and belonging unto the lives, liberties, and properties of the people: Amongst all which Fundamental Laws they are sure of it) this is one of the chiefest; that no one little handful of people shall be burthened in bearing, or contributing to the common charge of the Nation in such a way, as that the Universality, are not touched at all in that kinde.

Wherefore they most humbly pray, (and the rather, for that you are now about settling new Commissioners or Governors of the Excise) that you would make them like the universallity of their brethren, the freemen of England, and totally for ever of your selves, without referring them any more to any Committees whatsoever, take off the Excise of the sweat of their browes, and the labour of their hands; (viz) the aforesaid 45. 8d. per Barrel Excise upon Sope; that so they may thereby once again look upon themselves, as Denizens, and not Aliens to England, and thereby be incouraged, without murmuring, or secret repining of heart, to venture their all, for the common preservation of the Land of their Nativity.

The Copy of the forementioned Answer thus followeth:
TO THE HONOURABLE, the Committee of Parliament for the Regulating the NEW IMPOST of EXCISE where Colonel George Thompson hath the Chair.

MAy it please this Honourable Committee to vouchsafe unto us without offence the same liberty with our pens, that you have before (we humbly thank you therefore) already granted us with our tongues, viz. free liberty to speak for our selves and for the removall of our burthens.

So it is, may it please your Honours that by wofull experience we finding our Estates and Trades daily sinking by reason of &illegible; double Excise upon the things we trade in, after we have born the burthen of it for seven years together, as long as it was possible for us to stoop under it and not to have our backs broke by it; for the prevention of which, we lately presented our humble Petition to the Parliament, truly staring our case and humbly craving relief in our oppressions, the copy of which is hereunto annexed; which said Petiton was read in Parliament the 24 day of September last: upon the reading of which, they were pleased to make an Order, the Copy of which thus followeth:

By which Order the state of our business is referred to the consideration of this Honourable Committee; upon whom tending the third of this present October, which time you were pleased to afford unto us liberty to open unto you the equity and justice of our Petition, and more fully to state unto you our grievances, as also to answer severall of your Objections, arising from the losse that would upon the removal thereof accrue unto the State in its Revenue; and upon the whole you were then pleased to make an Order that the Commissioners of the Excise should be authorised to send up unto your Honours an accompt what Excise hath been made of Soap, and the materials it is made of every year since the first imposition of Excise upon it, and that we should tend upon your Honors the tenth day of this present October to hear your further result upon our businesse, which we did accordingly; and then instead of receiving satisfaction for the removall of the grievances complained of in our Petition, you were pleased to shew and read unto us certain Propositions made unto you by persons whose names certainly we cannot learn, though we earnestly entreated the knowledge of them from you, and from whom we desire no other favour, but that they will with us appear face to face before you, where we doubt not but by word of mouth to make those propositions (when they have said for them what they can) to appear unto your judgments to be as irrational unjust, and as inconsistent with the peace, safety and freedom of this Nation as the principals and habitual practice of those persons that made them are, (if they be the men that by private hands are told us to be) but upon our giving to your Honors a present and considerable satisfactory answer to the said propositions, and upon our earnest desire that we might have from your Clark copies of papers, and a weeks time to present unto you a written Answer to them, you were honorably pleased to grant it; for which we return you our most humble thanks, and therewith tender unto you a copy of the said propositions, and our humble and joynt avowed answer unto them, which thus followeth.

The forementioned Account or Certificate of the Commissioners of Excise, thus followeth.

The Commissioners for Excise do by their Accomptent humbly certifie by the account books in London certainly, and from the Sub-Commissioners accounts, as near as can be collected by estimate.