Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense
Johnston introduces his selection of some representative works of the Scottish School of Common Sense by Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, James Beattie, and Dugald Stewart.
Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, edited, with an introduction by G.A. Johnston (Chicago: Open Court, 1915).
Copyright:
The text is in the public domain.
People:
- Editor: George Alexander Johnston
- Author: Dugald Stewart
- Author: James Beattie
- Author: Adam Ferguson
- Author: Thomas Reid
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Table of Contents
- CONTENTS
- SELECTIONS FROM THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE
- INTRODUCTION
- THOMAS REID
- I.—: INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE
- § 1.: The Importance of the Subject, and the Means of Prosecuting It
- § 2.: The Impediments to our Knowledge of the Mind
- II.—: ANALYSIS OF A TYPICAL SENSATION
- § 1.: The Sensation considered abstractly
- § 2.: Sensation and Remembrance, Natural Principles of Belief
- § 3.: Judgment and Belief in some Cases precede Simple Apprehension
- § 4.: Two Theories of the Nature of Belief Refuted—Conclusions from what hath been said
- § 5.: Apology for Metaphysical Absurdities—Sensation without a Sentient, a Consequence of the Theory of Ideas—Consequences of this Strange Opinion
- § 6.: The Conception and Belief of a Sentient Being or Mind is suggested by our Constitution—The Notion of Relations not always got by comparing the Related Ideas
- § 7.: There is a Quality or Virtue in Bodies, which we call their Smell—How this is connected in the Imagination with the Sensation
- § 8.: That there is a Principle in Human Nature, from which the Notion of this, as well as all other Natural Virtues or Causes, is derived
- § 9.: Whether in Sensation the Mind is Active or Passive?
- III.—: KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
- § 1.: Of Hardness
- § 2.: Of Natural Signs
- § 3.: Of Extension
- § 4.: Of the Visible Appearances of Objects
- § 5.: Of Perception in General
- § 6.: Of the Process of Nature in Perception
- Appendix: Of Cause and Power
- IV.—: THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND
- § 1.: Principles taken for Granted
- § 2.: Of Hypotheses and Analogy
- § 3.: Of Perception
- § 4.: Of Sensation
- § 5.: Of Primary and Secondary Qualities
- § 6.: Of Conception
- § 7.: Of Judgment
- § 8.: Of Common Sense
- § 9.: The First Principles of Contingent Truths
- § 10.: First Principles of Necessary Truths
- V.—: OF MORALS
- § 1.: Of Benevolent Affection in General
- § 2.: There are Rational Principles of Action in Man
- § 3.: Of Regard to Our Good on the Whole
- § 4.: Of the Notion of Duty, Rectitude, Moral Obligation
- § 5.: Observations concerning Conscience
- § 6.: That Moral Approbation implies a Real Judgment
- ADAM FERGUSON
- OF MAN’S PROGRESSIVE NATURE
- JAMES BEATTIE
- OF THE PERCEPTION OF TRUTH IN GENERAL
- DUGALD STEWART
- I.—: OF THE OBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY, AND THE METHOD OF PROSECUTING PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES
- II.—: OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
- III.—: OF THE POWER WHICH THE MIND HAS OVER THE TRAIN OF ITS THOUGHTS
- IV.—: OF THE INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION ON OUR ACTIVE PRINCIPLES, AND ON OUR MORAL JUDGMENTS
- V.—: OF CERTAIN LAWS OF BELIEF, INSEPARABLY CONNECTED WITH THE EXERCISE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, MEMORY, PERCEPTION, AND REASONING
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