On War, vol. 1

Vol. 1 of Clausewitz’s magnum opus in which he ponders the revolution in military affairs made possible by the “nation at arms” during the French Revolution. He did not live to see the book appear in print but its influence was profound in Prussia and then in the unified German nation state during the course of the 19th century. This edition is noteworthy for appearing during the First World War in England.
On War, trans. Col. J.J. Graham. New and Revised edition with Introduction and Notes by Col. F.N. Maude, in Three Volumes (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & C., 1918). Vol. 1.
Copyright:
The text is in the public domain.
People:
- Author: Carl von Clausewitz
- Translator: Colonel James John Graham
- Introduction: Colonel Frederic Natusch Maude
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Table of Contents
- INTRODUCTION
- CONTENTS
- PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
- NOTICE
- INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR
- BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ
- BOOK I: ON THE NATURE OF WAR
- CHAPTER I: WHAT IS WAR?
- 1.: INTRODUCTION.
- 2.: DEFINITION.
- 3.: UTMOST USE OF FORCE.
- 4.: THE AIM IS TO DISARM THE ENEMY.
- 5.: UTMOST EXERTION OF POWERS.
- 6.: MODIFICATION IN THE REALITY.
- 7.: WAR IS NEVER AN ISOLATED ACT.
- 8.: WAR DOES NOT CONSIST OF A SINGLE INSTANTANEOUS BLOW.
- 9.: THE RESULT IN WAR IS NEVER ABSOLUTE.
- 10.: THE PROBABILITIES OF REAL LIFE TAKE THE PLACE OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE EXTREME AND THE ABSOLUTE.
- 11.: THE POLITICAL OBJECT NOW REAPPEARS.
- 12.: A SUSPENSION IN THE ACTION OF WAR UNEXPLAINED BY ANYTHING SAID AS YET.
- 13.: THERE IS ONLY ONE CAUSE WHICH CAN SUSPEND THE ACTION, AND THIS SEEMS TO BE ONLY POSSIBLE ON ONE SIDE IN ANY CASE.
- 14.: THUS A CONTINUANCE OF ACTION WILL ENSUE WHICH WILL ADVANCE TOWARDS A CLIMAX.
- 15.: HERE, THEREFORE, THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY IS BROUGHT INTO REQUISITION.
- 16.: ATTACK AND DEFENCE ARE THINGS DIFFERING IN KIND AND OF UNEQUAL FORCE. POLARITY IS, THEREFORE, NOT APPLICABLE TO THEM.
- 17.: THE EFFECT OF POLARITY IS OFTEN DESTROYED BY THE SUPERIORITY OF THE DEFENCE OVER THE ATTACK, AND THUS THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION IN WAR IS EXPLAINED.
- 18.: A SECOND GROUND CONSISTS IN THE IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
- 19.: FREQUENT PERIODS OF INACTION IN WAR REMOVE IT FURTHER FROM THE ABSOLUTE, AND MAKE IT STILL MORE A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES.
- 20.: THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF CHANCE ONLY IS WANTING TO MAKE OF WAR A GAME, AND IN THAT ELEMENT IT IS LEAST OF ALL DEFICIENT.
- 21.: WAR IS A GAME BOTH OBJECTIVELY AND SUBJECTIVELY.
- 22.: HOW THIS ACCORDS BEST WITH THE HUMAN MIND IN GENERAL.
- 23.: WAR IS ALWAYS A SERIOUS MEANS FOR A SERIOUS OBJECT. ITS MORE PARTICULAR DEFINITION.
- 24.: WAR IS A MERE CONTINUATION OF POLICY BY OTHER MEANS.
- 25.: DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF WARS.
- 26.: THEY MAY ALL BE REGARDED AS POLITICAL ACTS.
- 27.: INFLUENCE OF THIS VIEW ON THE RIGHT UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY HISTORY, AND ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORY.
- 28.: RESULT FOR THEORY.
- CHAPTER II: END AND MEANS IN WAR
- CHAPTER III: THE GENIUS FOR WAR
- CHAPTER IV: OF DANGER IN WAR
- CHAPTER V: OF BODILY EXERTION IN WAR
- CHAPTER VI: INFORMATION IN WAR
- CHAPTER VII: FRICTION IN WAR
- CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUDING REMARKS, BOOK I
- BOOK II: ON THE THEORY OF WAR
- CHAPTER I: BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR
- CHAPTER II: ON THE THEORY OF WAR
- 1.: THE FIRST CONCEPTION OF THE “ART OF WAR” WAS MERELY THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMED FORCES.
- 2.: TRUE WAR FIRST APPEARS IN THE ART OF SIEGES.
- 3.: THEN TACTICS TRIED TO FIND ITS WAY IN THE SAME DIRECTION.
- 4.: THE REAL CONDUCT OF WAR ONLY MADE ITS APPEARANCE INCIDENTALLY AND INCOGNITO.
- 5.: REFLECTIONS ON MILITARY EVENTS BROUGHT ABOUT THE WANT OF A THEORY.
- 6.: ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE THEORY.
- 7.: LIMITATION TO MATERIAL OBJECTS.
- 8.: SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS.
- 9.: VICTUALLING OF TROOPS.
- 10.: BASE.
- 11.: INTERIOR LINES.
- 12.: ALL THESE ATTEMPTS ARE OPEN TO OBJECTION.
- 13.: AS A RULE THEY EXCLUDE GENIUS.
- 14.: THE DIFFICULTY OF THEORY AS SOON AS MORAL QUANTITIES COME INTO CONSIDERATION.
- 15.: THE MORAL QUANTITIES MUST NOT BE EXCLUDED IN WAR.
- 16.: PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY OF A THEORY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR.
- 17.: FIRST SPECIALITY.—MORAL FORCES AND THEIR EFFECTS. (HOSTILE FEELING.)
- 18.: THE IMPRESSIONS OF DANGER. (COURAGE.)
- 19.: EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF DANGER.
- 20.: OTHER POWERS OF FEELING.
- 21.: PECULIARITY OF MIND.
- 22.: FROM THE DIVERSITY IN MENTAL INDIVIDUALITIES ARISES THE DIVERSITY OF WAYS LEADING TO THE END.
- 23.: SECOND PECULIARITY.—LIVING REACTION.
- 24.: THIRD PECULIARITY.—UNCERTAINTY OF ALL DATA.
- 25.: POSITIVE THEORY IS IMPOSSIBLE.
- 26.: MEAN SLEFT BY WHICH A THEORY IS POSSIBLE (THE DIFFICULTIES ARE NOT EVERYWHERE EQUALLY GREAT).
- 27.: THEORY MUST BE OF THE NATURE OF OBSERVATION, NOT OF DOCTRINE.
- 28.: BY THIS POINT OF VIEW THEORY BECOMES POSSIBLE, AND CEASES TO BE IN CONTRADICTION TO PRACTICE.
- 29.: THEORY THEREFORE CONSIDERS THE NATURE OF ENDS AND MEANS—ENDS AND MEANS IN TACTICS.
- 30.: CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALWAYS ATTEND THE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS.
- 31.: LOCALITY.
- 32.: TIME OF DAY.
- 33.: WEATHER.
- 34.: END AND MEANS IN STRATEGY.
- 35.: CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ATTEND THE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS OF STRATEGY.
- 36.: THESE FORM NEW MEANS.
- 37.: STRATEGY DEDUCES ONLY FROM EXPERIENCE THE ENDS AND MEANS TO BE EXAMINED.
- 38.: HOW FAR THE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS SHOULD BE CARRIED.
- 39.: GREAT SIMPLIFICATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED.
- 40.: THIS EXPLAINS THE RAPID GROWTH OF GREAT GENERALS, AND WHY A GENERAL IS NOT A MAN OF LEARNING.
- 41.: FORMER CONTRADICTIONS.
- 42.: ON THIS ACCOUNT ALL USE OF KNOWLEDGE WAS DENIED, AND EVERYTHING ASCRIBED TO NATURAL TALENTS.
- 43.: THE KNOWLEDGE MUST BE MADE SUITABLE TO THE POSITION.
- 44.: THE KNOWLEDGE IN WAR IS VERY SIMPLE, BUT NOT, AT THE SAME TIME, VERY EASY.
- 45.: OF THE NATURE OF THIS KNOWLEDGE.
- 46.: SCIENCE MUST BECOME ART.
- CHAPTER III: ART OR SCIENCE OF WAR
- 1.—: USAGE STILL UNSETTLED (POWER AND KNOWLEDGE. SCIENCE WHEN MERE KNOWING; ART, WHEN DOING, IS THE OBJECT.)
- 2.: DIFFICULTY OF SEPARATING PERCEPTION FROM JUDGMENT. (ART OF WAR.)
- 3.: WAR IS PART OF THE INTERCOURSE OF THE HUMAN RACE.
- 4.: DIFFERENCE.
- CHAPTER IV: METHODICISM
- CHAPTER V: CRITICISM
- CHAPTER VI: ON EXAMPLES
- BOOK III: OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL
- CHAPTER I: STRATEGY
- OBSERVATION.
- 1.: POSSIBLE COMBATS ARE ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS TO BE LOOKED UPON AS REAL ONES.
- 2.: TWOFOLD OBJECT OF THE COMBAT.
- 3.: EXAMPLE.
- 4.: WHEN THIS VIEW IS NOT TAKEN, THEN A FALSE VALUE IS GIVEN TO OTHER THINGS.
- CHAPTER II: ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY
- CHAPTER III: MORAL FORCES
- CHAPTER IV: THE CHIEF MORAL POWERS
- CHAPTER V: MILITARY VIRTUE OF AN ARMY
- CHAPTER VI: BOLDNESS
- CHAPTER VII: PERSEVERANCE
- CHAPTER VIII: SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS
- CHAPTER IX: THE SURPRISE
- CHAPTER X: STRATAGEM
- CHAPTER XI: ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN SPACE
- CHAPTER XII: ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN TIME
- CHAPTER XIII: STRATEGIC RESERVE
- CHAPTER XIV: ECONOMY OF FORCES
- CHAPTER XV: GEOMETRICAL ELEMENT
- CHAPTER XVI: ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE ACT IN WARFARE
- CHAPTER XVII: ON THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR
- CHAPTER XVIII: TENSION AND REST The Dynamic Law of War
- BOOK IV: THE COMBAT
- CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTORY
- CHAPTER II: CHARACTER OF THE MODERN BATTLE
- CHAPTER III: THE COMBAT IN GENERAL
- CHAPTER IV: THE COMBAT IN GENERAL (CONTINUATION)
- CHAPTER V: ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE COMBAT
- CHAPTER VI: DURATION OF THE COMBAT
- CHAPTER VII: DECISION OF THE COMBAT
- CHAPTER VIII: MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS TO A BATTLE
- CHAPTER IX: THE BATTLE* ITS DECISION
- CHAPTER X: EFFECTS OF VICTORY (continuation)
- CHAPTER XI: THE USE OF THE BATTLE (continued)
- CHAPTER XII: STRATEGIC MEANS OF UTILISING VICTORY
- CHAPTER XIII: RETREAT AFTER A LOST BATTLE
- CHAPTER XIV: NIGHT FIGHTING
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