The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 9 (The Power to Tax)
Vol. 9 of The Collected Works. Originally published in 1980, The Power to Tax was a much-needed answer to the tax revolts sweeping across the United States. The public-choice approach to taxation which Buchanan had earlier elaborated stood in direct opposition to public-finance orthodoxy. What Buchanan and Brennan constructed in The Power to Tax was a middle ground between the two.
Another copy of this book can be found in HTML format at our sister website Econlib.
The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 9 The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000).
Copyright:
Foreword and coauthor note © 2000 Liberty Fund, Inc. © 1980 Cambridge University Press.
People:
- Author: Geoffrey Brennan
- Author: James M. Buchanan
Formats:
| Format | Description | Size |
|---|---|---|
| EBook PDF | This text-based PDF or EBook was created from the HTML version of this book and is part of the Portable Library of Liberty. | 3.28 MB |
| HTML | This version has been converted from the original text. Every effort has been taken to translate the unique features of the printed book into the HTML medium. | 767 KB |
| LF Printer PDF | This text-based PDF was prepared by the typesetters of the LF book. | 921 KB |
| MARC Record | MAchine-Readable Cataloging record. | 2.22 KB |
Table of Contents
- Contents
- Foreword
- Geoffrey Brennan
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- The Power to Tax
- 1.: Taxation in Constitutional Perspective
- 1.1.: The Notion of a “Constitution”
- 1.2.: The Logic of a Constitution
- 1.3.: The Means of Constitutional Constraint
- 1.4.: The Wicksellian Ideal and Majoritarian Reality
- 1.5.: The Power to Tax
- 1.6.: The Enforceability of Constitutional Contract
- 1.7.: Normative Implications
- 2.: Natural Government A Model of Leviathan
- 2.1.: Leviathan as Actuality and as Contingency
- 2.2.: Monopoly Government and Popular Sovereignty
- 2.3.: The Model of “Leviathan”: Revenue Maximization
- 2.4.: The Model of Leviathan as Monolith
- 2.5.: The Constitutional Criteria
- 3.: Constraints on Base and Rate Structure*
- 3.1.: Government as Revenue Maximizer Subject to Constitutional Tax Constraints
- 3.2.: Tax-Base and Tax-Rate Constraints in a Simple Model
- 3.3.: One among Many
- 3.4.: Tax Limits and Tax Reform
- Appendix: Progression in the Multiperson Setting
- 4.: The Taxation of Commodities
- 4.1.: The Conventional Wisdom
- 4.2.: Constitutional Tax Choice
- 4.3.: Alternative Forms of Commodity Tax: The Choice of Base
- 4.4.: Uniformity of Rates over Commodities
- 4.5.: Uniformity of Rates over Individuals
- 4.6.: Discrimination by Means of the Rate Structure
- 4.7.: Summary
- Appendix
- 5.: Taxation through Time Income Taxes, Capital Taxes, and Public Debt
- 5.1.: Income Taxes, Capital Taxes, and Public Debt in Orthodox Public Finance
- 5.2.: The Timing of Rate Announcement
- 5.3.: Income and Capital Taxes under Perpetual Leviathan
- 5.4: Leviathan’s Time Preference
- 5.5.: The Time Preference of the Taxpayer-Citizen with Respect to Public Spending
- 5.6.: The Power to Borrow
- 5.7.: Conclusions
- 6.: Money Creation and Taxation
- 6.1.: The Power to Create Money
- 6.2.: Inflation and the Taxation of Money Balances: A “Land” Analogy
- 6.3.: Inflation and the Taxation of Money Balances
- 6.4.: Inflationary Expectations under Leviathan
- 6.5.: Inflation, Wealth Taxation, and the Durability of Money
- 6.6.: The Orthodox Discussion of Inflation as a Tax
- 6.7.: The Monetary Constitution
- 6.8.: Inflation and Income Tax Revenue
- 6.9.: Monetary Rules and Tax Rules
- 7.: The Disposition of Public Revenues*
- 7.1.: The Model
- 7.2.: Public-Goods Supply under a Pure Surplus Maximizer: Geometric Analysis
- 7.3.: The Surplus Maximizer: Algebraic Treatment
- 7.4.: The Nonsurplus Maximizer
- 7.5.: Toward a Tax Policy
- 8.: The Domain of Politics
- 8.1.: Procedural Constraints on Political Decision Making
- 8.2.: The Rule of Law: General Rules
- 8.3.: The Domain of Public Expenditures
- 8.4.: Government by Coercion
- 9.: Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority
- 9.1.: Toward a Tax Constitution for Leviathan in an Open Economy with Trade but without Migration
- 9.2.: Tax Rules in an Open Economy with Trade and Migration
- 9.3.: Federalism as a Component of a Fiscal Constitution
- 9.4.: An Alternative Theory of Government Grants
- 9.5.: A Tax Constitution for a Federal State
- 9.6.: Conclusions
- 10.: Toward Authentic Tax Reform Prospects and Prescriptions
- 10.1.: Taxation in Constitutional Perspective
- 10.2.: Tax Reform as Tax Limits
- 10.3.: Tax-Rate Limits: The Logic of Proposition 13
- 10.4.: Tax-Base Constraints
- 10.5.: Aggregate Revenue and Outlay Limits: Ratio-Type Proposals for Constitutional Constraint
- 10.6.: Procedural Limits: Qualified Majorities and Budget Balance
- 10.7.: Toward Authentic Tax Reform
- Epilogue
- Selected Bibliography
Loading...