The Critique of Judgement
One of Kant’s major works of philosophy which were designed to place the discipline on a sound rational footing. This volume deals with aesthetic and teleological questions.
Kant’s Critique of Judgement, translated with Introduction and Notes by J.H. Bernard (2nd ed. revised) (London: Macmillan, 1914).
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The text is in the public domain.
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- Author: Immanuel Kant
- Translator: J.H. Bernard
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Table of Contents
- COPYRIGHT
- CONTENTS
- EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
- GLOSSARY OF KANT’S PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS
- PREFACE
- INTRODUCTION
- I.: OF THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
- II.: OF THE REALM OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL
- III.: OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT AS A MEANS OF COMBINING THE TWO PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO A WHOLE.
- IV.: OF JUDGEMENT AS A FACULTY LEGISLATING A PRIORI
- V.: THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE IS A TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDGEMENT.
- VI.: OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FEELING OF PLEASURE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.
- VII.: OF THE AESTHETICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.
- VIII.: OF THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE
- IX.: OF THE CONNEXION OF THE LEGISLATION OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THAT OF REASON BY MEANS OF THE JUDGEMENT
- PART I: CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
- FIRST DIVISION: ANALYTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
- FIRST BOOK: ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL
- FIRST MOMENT: OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE1 ACCORDING TO QUALITY
- § 1.: The judgement of taste is aesthetical
- § 2.: The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested
- § 3.: The satisfaction in the PLEASANT is bound up with interest
- § 4.: The satisfaction in the GOOD is bound up with interest
- § 5.: Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction
- EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE FIRST MOMENT
- SECOND MOMENT: OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, VIZ. ACCORDING TO QUANTITY
- § 6.: The beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction
- § 7.: Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic
- § 8.: The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of Taste only as subjective
- § 9.: Investigation of the question whether in the judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object
- EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE SECOND MOMENT
- THIRD MOMENT: OF JUDGEMENTS OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE RELATION OF THE PURPOSES WHICH ARE BROUGHT INTO CONSIDERATION THEREIN.
- § 10.: Of purposiveness in general
- § 11.: The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object ( or of its mode of representation)
- § 12.: The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds
- § 13.: The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion
- § 14.: Elucidation by means of examples
- § 15.: The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection
- § 16.: The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure
- § 17.: Of the Ideal of beauty
- EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL DERIVED FROM THIS THIRD MOMENT
- FOURTH MOMENT: OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE MODALITY OF THE SATISFACTION IN THE OBJECT
- § 18.: What the modality in a judgement of taste is
- § 19.: The subjective necessity, which we ascribe to the judgement of taste, is conditioned
- § 20.: The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense
- § 21.: Have we ground for presupposing a common sense?
- § 22.: The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense
- EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE FOURTH MOMENT
- GENERAL REMARK ON THE FIRST SECTION OF THE ANALYTIC
- SECOND BOOK: ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME
- § 23.: Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime
- § 24.: Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the sublime
- A.: —Of the Mathematically Sublime
- § 25.: Explanation of the term “sublime”
- § 26.: Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime
- § 27.: Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime
- B.: —Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature
- § 28.: Of Nature regarded as Might
- § 29.: Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature
- GENERAL REMARK UPON THE EXPOSITION OF THE AESTHETICAL REFLECTIVE JUDGEMENT
- DEDUCTION OF [PURE1] AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENTS
- § 30.: The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful.
- § 31.: Of the method of deduction of judgements of Taste
- § 32.: First peculiarity of the judgement of Taste
- § 33.: Second peculiarity of the judgement of Taste
- § 34.: There is no objective principle of Taste possible
- § 35.: The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in general
- § 36.: Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste
- § 37.: What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of Taste
- § 38.: Deduction of judgements of Taste
- Remark
- § 39.: Of the communicability of a Sensation
- § 40.: Of Taste as a kind of sensus communis
- § 41.: Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful
- § 42.: Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful
- § 43.: Of Art in general
- § 44.: Of beautiful Art
- § 45.: Beautiful Art is an art, in so far as it seems like nature
- § 46.: Beautiful Art is the art of genius
- § 47.: Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius
- § 48.: Of the relation of Genius to Taste
- § 49.: Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius
- § 50.: Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful Art
- § 51.: Of the division of the beautiful arts
- § 52.: Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product
- § 53.: Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts
- § 54.: Remark
- SECOND DIVISION: DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
- § 55
- § 56.: Representation of the antinomy of Taste
- § 57.: Solution of the antinomy of Taste
- Remark I.
- Remark II.
- § 58.: Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement.
- § 59.: Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality
- APPENDIX
- § 60.: Of the method of Taste
- PART II: CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT
- § 61.: Of the objective purposiveness of Nature
- FIRST DIVISION: ANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT
- § 62.: Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished from that which is material
- § 63.: Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of nature
- § 64.: Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes
- § 65.: Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings
- § 66.: Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised beings
- § 67.: Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of purposes
- § 68.: Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science
- SECOND DIVISION: DIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT
- § 69.: What is an antinomy of the Judgement?
- § 70.: Representation of this antinomy
- § 71.: Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy
- § 72.: Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of nature
- § 73.: None of the above systems give what they pretend
- § 74.: The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable
- § 75.: The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement
- § 76.: Remark
- § 77.: Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural purpose is possible
- § 78.: Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature.
- METHODOLOGY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT.1
- § 79.: Whether teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of nature
- § 80.: Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose.
- § 81.: Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product.
- § 82.: Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised beings
- § 83.: Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system
- § 84.: Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself
- § 85.: Of Physico-theology
- § 86.: Of Ethico-theology
- Remark
- § 87.: Of the moral proof of the Being of God
- § 88.: Limitation of the validity of the moral proof
- Remark
- § 89.: Of the use of the moral argument
- § 90.: Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God
- § 91.: Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith
- General remark on Teleology
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