On Executive Power in Great States

Clark’s article is useful because it explicitly flags reasons to be skeptical of big claims about the book’s stature and helps you see where Necker departs from Montesquieu and the American founders (e.g., giving the executive more weight; preferring “interlacing” over strict separation).

Craiutu’s framing helps you isolate Necker’s distinctive move (collaboration/links between branches rather than strict separation) and, by doing so, clarifies exactly what a Madisonian/Montesquieuian or radical-republican critique would target.

Necker’s argument for a strong but limited executive can be read as a moderate corrective to Rousseau’s emphasis on popular sovereignty and legislative supremacy.

This is the most important theoretical backdrop. Necker’s concern with balance and moderation draws heavily on Montesquieu’s separation of powers, though Necker is more executive-friendly.

Hume’s skepticism about pure popular rule parallels Necker’s worries about instability in large modern states.

With this book, Madame de Staël develops and refines Necker’s moderate constitutionalism while critiquing both absolutism and revolutionary excess.

Baker’s book gives excellent understanding of the conceptual stakes of executive vs. legislative power in revolutionary France.