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Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (LF bi-lingual ed.) (1747) [1747]

Edition used:

Francis Hutcheson, Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria with a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, edited and with an Introduction by Luigi Turco (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007).

About this Title:

This Liberty Fund publication of Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria is a parallel edition of the English and Latin versions of a book designed by Hutcheson for use in the classroom. General Editor Knud Haakonssen remarks that “Hutcheson’s Institutio was written as a textbook for university students and it therefore covers a curriculum which has an institutional background in his own university, Glasgow. This was a curriculum crucially influenced by Hutcheson’s predecessor Gershom Carmichael, and at its center was modern natural jurisprudence as systematized by Grotius, Pufendorf, and others… . The Institutio is the first major [published] attempt by Hutcheson to deal with natural law on his own terms… . It therefore encapsulates the axis of natural law and Scottish Enlightenment ideas, which so many other thinkers, including Adam Smith, worked with in their different ways. It is of great significance that this work issued from the class in which Smith sat as a student.”

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Table of Contents:

Edition: current; Page: [i]
philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria with a short introduction to moral philosophy
Edition: current; Page: [ii]

natural law and enlightenment classics

Knud Haakonssen

General Editor

Edition: current; Page: [iii]

Francis Hutcheson

Edition: current; Page: [iv] Edition: current; Page: [v]
natural law and enlightenment classics
Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria with A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy
Francis Hutcheson
Edited and with an Introduction by Luigi Turco
Collected Works and Correspondence of Francis Hutcheson
liberty fund
Edition: current; Page: [vi]

This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

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Printed in the United States of America

Frontispiece: Detail of a portrait of Francis Hutcheson by Allan Ramsay (ca. 1740–45), oil on canvas, reproduced courtesy of the Hunterian Art Gallery, University of Glasgow.

11 10 09 08 07 c 5 4 3 2 1

11 10 09 08 07 p 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hutcheson, Francis, 1694–1746.

[Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria. English]

Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria: with a short introduction to moral philosophy/Francis Hutcheson; edited and with an introduction by Luigi Turco.

p. cm. (Natural law and enlightenment classics)

(Collected works and correspondence of Francis Hutcheson)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

isbn-13: 978-0-86597-452-4 (hc: alk. paper)

isbn-13: 978-0-86597-453-1 (pbk.: alk. paper)

1. Ethics—Early works to 1800. 2. Philosophy, Modern—Scotland—Early works to 1800.

3. Philosophy, Modern—18th century. I. Turco, Luigi. II. Title.

b1501.p4513 2007

171′.2—dc22 2006024255

liberty fund, inc.

8335 Allison Pointe Trail, Suite 300

Indianapolis, Indiana 46250-1684

Edition: current; Page: [vii]


  • Introduction ix
  • Acknowledgments xxiv
  • Abbreviations xxv
  • General Note xxvii
  • philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy 1
  • Bibliography of Ancient Literature Referred to by Hutcheson 291
  • Bibliography of Modern Literature 293
  • Index 297
Edition: current; Page: [viii] Edition: current; Page: [ix]


Francis Hutcheson is considered by many scholars to be the father of the Scottish Enlightenment. His thought variously influenced leading figures in eighteenth-century Scotland, such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid, in the rest of Europe, and in America. Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury and other neo-Stoic philosophers, viewed philosophy, not as a mere theoretical exercise, but as having a practical function. His argument for a virtuous life and for an active involvement in public life was based on his belief in the benevolence of God, the harmony of the universe, and men’s sociable dispositions. Hutcheson had the great merit of turning Shaftesbury’s aristocratic language into clear and concrete prose that well matched the empirical turn of mind in eighteenth-century Britain and could be understood by a wide readership. Hutcheson criticized the pessimistic account of human nature inherent in the legalistic conception of morality and justice in seventeenth-century Protestant theology and jurisprudence.

Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria was aimed at university students and had a large circulation within Scottish universities, Irish and English dissenting academies, and American colleges. The aim of the text was twofold: on one hand, to put forward an optimistic view of God, human nature, and the harmony of the universe; on the other hand, to provide students with the knowledge of natural and civil law required by the university curriculum.

This work was preceded by An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), a work largely influenced by the thought of Lord Shaftesbury and Richard Cumberland and reacting to the skeptical moral teaching of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees; and by An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations on the Moral Edition: current; Page: [x] Sense (1728), an answer to his critics. Hutcheson considered the two Inquiries on beauty and virtue, the Essay on passions, and the Illustrations to be complementary and referred to them as “the four treatises” which constituted his moral teaching. From 1725 to 1742 he carefully made additions and corrections to these works, a sign that he never judged them to be surpassed. However, Hutcheson’s moral thought is also presented in his Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria, published in 1742 with a revised second edition in 1745—and translated into English with the title A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy in 1747—as well as in A System of Moral Philosophy, published posthumously in 1755 by his son Francis, but already circulating among his friends in 1737.

Therefore, we have three different versions of Hutcheson’s moral thought, and scholars have always found some difficulties in explaining their different aims and in finding consistency among them. In a celebrated monograph of 1900, William Robert Scott argued that there was a development in Hutcheson’s moral thought and identified four phases, from the Shaftesburian Inquiries, through the influence of Bishop Butler in the Essay and Illustrations, to the Aristotelian Institutio, and finally to the Stoic System. However, given Hutcheson’s remarks in the preface to the Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria, it is more reasonable to consider this work to be an elementary book addressed to the young who study at universities, and not to a learned, adult public audience. Hutcheson was aware that “many such compends have been published by very learned men,” but added that “every teacher must use his own judgment on these subjects.” He thought that the “method and order which pleased” him “most” was “pretty different from what has of late prevailed,” and that it would “be of use to the students to have in their hands an abridgement, containing the method and the principal heads of argument, to recall to their memories the points more largely insisted upon in their lectures.” Combined with comments we have from William Leechman, James Wodrow, and William Thom on Hutcheson’s teaching, these remarks clearly suggest that the Institutio mostly reflects Hutcheson’s “private” (that is, advanced) afternoon lectures in Latin and were designed to help his students to elaborate their theses, according to the custom of the time. Also, the evidence suggests that his System of Moral Philosophy reflects his early morning public (that is, Edition: current; Page: [xi] more basic) lectures in English.1 As will be evident to the modern reader, this does not mean that the Institutio and the System were not elaborate works.

Hutcheson’s remarks may also help us solve some problems about the order of composition of the two works. In 1737 he stated that the System “has employed my leisure hours for several summers past,” and it is possible that the composition of the Institutio dated to the same early years of his teaching in Glasgow as the System since the second and third books seem to be an enlargement of the Institutio. Some scholars have conjectured that the Institutio, as well as Hutcheson’s Logic and Metaphysics, could even have been composed during the twenties when he was teaching in the Dublin Academy that he then ran. This could explain why he wrote Latin compends in subjects he never taught in Glasgow.2

While it is possible that an early manuscript version of the Institutio existed in the early thirties or even in the twenties, the first edition published in 1742 might differ at least as much from it as the two published editions differ from each other. In any case, a careful reading of the parallel chapters in the Institutio and the System does not allow us to establish a definite order of composition. In many cases the System seems to enlarge on subjects already treated in the Latin work, but there are chapters of the Institutio that present a more ordered and concise exposition than the corresponding chapters of the System.

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The Institutio

Hutcheson found himself in the difficult position of having to instruct his students in the principles and subtleties of natural and civil law even though he was a keen critic and severe judge of one of the most important systems of such law, that of Pufendorf. In a letter to the London Journal of 1724, he had criticized Pufendorf for his “grand argument” that “the belief of a deity” “is true” “because it is necessary to support society.”3 In his inaugural lecture at Glasgow in November 1730, he castigated Pufendorf for his pessimistic account of the state of nature and for assuming that “men were driven in society only for the sake of external advantage, and for fear of external evils, but in opposition to their natural turn of mind and to all natural affections and appetites.”4

Pufendorf’s De officio hominis et civis (an abridgement of his De jure naturae et gentium) was a standard text in the teaching of natural law in Protestant universities, and Hutcheson keeps close to the order of Pufendorf’s exposition while modifying its moral foundations. In Book III of the Institutio Hutcheson accurately summarizes Pufendorf’s discussion in Book II of De officio (the duties of the citizen). The contents of Book I of Pufendorf’s De officio, on the duties of mankind or the law of nature, are dealt with in two different books of Hutcheson’s work: In Book II of the Institutio (Elements of the law of nature) Hutcheson refers to juridical notions he derives directly from Pufendorf (law of nature, classification of rights, acquisition and transferring of property, contracts, oaths, obligations, etc). In Book I he replaces Pufendorf’s legalistic ethics with the ethics of his own Inquiry. The two first chapters are devoted respectively to the description of human nature and its basic sociability, and to the summum bonum or happiness and virtue, according to the Stoic perspective, especially as set out in Cicero’s De finibus and Tusculanae Disputationes, Books 4 and 5.

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The first chapter of Book I, the longest of the Institutio, is a careful description of the several powers of human nature. Hutcheson begins from the peculiarities of the human body as compared with the bodies of animals, and passes to the external senses and to the faculties of understanding and will, to concentrate his account on his preferred theme, the reflex or internal senses. Different sections are dedicated to the sense of beauty, sympathy, the moral sense, the sense of honor, and the sense of ridicule, as well as to the affections and the passions of the soul. It is by the sense of beauty that we receive pleasant perceptions in observing proportion, harmony or grandeur, and novelty in the objects of nature or the fine arts. Sympathy or sensus communis, as Hutcheson calls it following Shaftesbury, is the reflex sense by which we rejoice in the prosperity of others, or sorrow with them in their distress.

However, the most important sense is the moral sense or the “sensus decori or honesti,” as Hutcheson calls it following Cicero,5 by which we approve every action springing from benevolent affections or passions and disapprove any contrary disposition. To the moral sense is connected the sense of honor and shame which gives us pleasure or pain when others approve or condemn our conduct. Hutcheson stresses not only the innateness but also the supremacy of the moral sense over every other sense and its authority in regulating our conduct. With this thesis, absent in the first editions of the Inquiry, Hutcheson approaches the ethics of Butler, where conscience has a hegemonic role. However, he explicitly opposes Butler’s ethics when he considers benevolence to be as ultimate and basic a principle of human conduct as self-love. Hutcheson carefully distinguishes, in accordance with Stoic and Ciceronian doctrine, between the calm and rational desires and aversions inspired by these senses, and the turbulent motions of the passions. The multitude of these instinctive senses and desires is a proof “that man was destined by nature for action.” Further, the stress on human industry, another Ciceronian feature, is a novelty in the Institutio.6

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In Book V of De finibus and in Tusculan Disputations Cicero discusses whether virtue is the only good (the Stoic thesis) or we need also some natural good, such as health or riches (the Aristotelian thesis). So the argument is about the relationship between virtue and happiness, and Cicero says that we need some external prosperity. In the second chapter of the first book of the Institutio, Hutcheson considers the relationship between virtue and happiness, or, more generally, between our senses and happiness. Happiness and misery are the sum of pleasures and pains that differ according to their dignity or quality and according to their duration. Considering in turn the external and internal senses and the pleasures we get from them, he reaches the conclusion that “happiness consists in the virtues of the soul, and in the continued exercise of them in good offices” together with “a moderate degree of external prosperity,”7 again a conclusion close to the Stoicism of Cicero, mitigated by the teaching of the Peripatetic school.

Three chapters are devoted to the duties of man toward God, other men, and himself. In this way Hutcheson follows a common division, present also in Pufendorf’s De officio but quite different in content from Pufendorf. For example, Pufendorf’s chapter on the duty to oneself focuses on the right to self-defense, but Hutcheson’s chapter is a warm invitation to the practice of virtues and to the control of the passions, a duty we owe to ourselves, if we want to be happy (cf. Chapter 2). The three chapters on duties are preceded by a chapter dedicated to the classification of virtues, according to the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Ciceronian division, into the four cardinal virtues.

How is the ethics of moral sense of the first book connected with the doctrine of rights in the second book? From the beginning, Hutcheson’s ethics has an antilegalistic feature that renders problematic its connection with the natural law legacy. The conception that moral behavior depends on the law of a superior who threatens sanctions debases morality, in Hutcheson’s eye. Moreover, the moral sense discovers moral excellence in those actions or characters that are inspired by benevolent intentions. Actions which Edition: current; Page: [xv] spring from self-love or personal interest, as legal actions do, are indifferent from a moral point of view. In each of his three works—the “four treatises,” the Institutio, and the System—Hutcheson finds different ways to escape from his impasse.

In the Institutio, Hutcheson attaches a moral value to the common good of the system of human creatures. The moral sense makes us approve benevolent affections; in combination with natural religion it lets us discover a God provided with the same kind affections toward his creatures and, possibly, an analogous moral sense. In this way the common good of the system, as well as every action which contributes to it, acquires a moral value. Every action that is morally innocent, even if inspired by interest or self-love, and that contributes to the common good of the whole has the status of a right guaranteed by the law.8 So Hutcheson is able to arrive, independently, at the notion of a “divine law of nature” that commands us to worship God and promote “the common good of all and of particular men and societies,”9 as well as at the notion of right “as a faculty or claim” guaranteed by a law “to act, or possess, or obtain something from others.”10 An alternative way to arrive at the same conclusion is provided by Hutcheson’s moral calculus. This computation was first proposed in the Inquiry in order to ascertain the degree of benevolence or virtue implied in any action, moving from the idea that, ceteris paribus, there is a relation between the degree of benevolence and the amount of good produced. Since the aim of morally good affections is to maximize the common good, every action that contributes to this goal has a moral value and therefore has to be guaranteed by natural and civil laws.11 In this light, it makes sense that Hutcheson puts forward the discussion of the state of nature in the second book while Pufendorf treats it only in his book on government.

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The natural condition of man is a state of innocence and sociability. Hutcheson does not use the traditional term “state of nature,” but prefers to call it a state of freedom, reacting, as Titius and Barbeyrac before him, to the pessimism of Hobbes and Pufendorf. He distinguishes between perfect rights that are necessary to the survival of society and that must be sanctioned by civil law, and imperfect rights that cannot be rendered a matter of compulsion in society without greater loss than benefit; he lists the rights of individuals, such as rights to life, reputation, and private judgment. The explanation of the origin of property and the method of acquiring and transferring it is followed by contracts, the conditions of their validity, and the obligations implied in speech and oaths. The concluding chapters of the second book explain that recourse to violence is licit when rights are violated. Hutcheson also enlarges on the rights of war and on the ways in which controversies must be decided in the state of natural liberty. In short, Book II touches upon all the subjects treated by Pufendorf in the first book of De officio, and when Hutcheson deviates from Pufendorf, it is in most cases under the influence of Gershom Carmichael’s annotations to Pufendorf’s work, as we will see.

The third book of Hutcheson deals with the subjects treated by Pufendorf in his second book. On the themes of marriage, parental power, and master-servant relationships, Hutcheson stresses the equal obligation of man and woman to fidelity in marriage and their equal partnership and authority in the education of children, and he challenges the principles on which natural jurists defend slavery. Every man is born free, and no just war can justify slavery for the population or conquest of its territory. Hutcheson also challenges the violent origin of the state and espouses Pufendorf’s doctrine that the state is founded on the consent of people expressed in three acts: (1) a contract of union among citizens, (2) a decree of the people concerning the form of government and the nomination of governors, and (3) a covenant between the governors and the people “binding the rulers to a faithful administration of their trust, and the people to obedience.”12 As a state is “a society of free men united under one government for their common Edition: current; Page: [xvii] interest,” Hutcheson defends the right of resistance,13 even in the state where the prince’s power has not been limited by the original contract. He denies the existence and legitimacy of monarchies founded on a pretended “divine right,” the patrimonial states, and is sarcastic about the subtleties of inheritance in hereditary monarchies.14 He follows Locke in the division of powers among the different organs of the state, Aristotle in his discussion of the forms of government, and Harrington in stressing the importance of the different forms of government and the necessity of some agrarian law to moderate the amount of lands owned by a single citizen. According to Hutcheson, the state has the duty, not only to provide for the safety and prosperity of the citizen, but also to provide for general religious instruction and to promote all the incentives to cultivating the four cardinal virtues. In the last chapters of the third book, on the laws of war, on treaties, and on ambassadors, Hutcheson follows not only Pufendorf, but also the Dutch natural jurist Cornelis van Bijnkershoek; this is a sign, perhaps, that Hutcheson thinks his compendium fit for a larger audience than the students of Glasgow or for Glaswegian students who have to complete their legal studies abroad.

Hutcheson and Carmichael

In his Preface Hutcheson declares that much of his compendium “is taken . . . from Pufendorf’s smaller work, de officio hominis et civis, which that worthy and ingenious man the late Professor Gershom Carmichael of Glasgow, by far the best commentator of that book, has so supplied and corrected that the notes are of much more value than the text.”15 In addition to minor points that Hutcheson receives from Carmichael, there are basic and deep agreements between the pupil and his former teacher. First of all they agree on the two precepts in which the law of nature is summarized,16 veneration of God and promotion of the common good, though Hutcheson does not want to start from the law of nature as a commandment of Edition: current; Page: [xviii] God, but rather wants to derive it from his teleological recognition of providence and the powers of human nature. Hutcheson follows Pufendorf and Carmichael’s theory of the original contract, concurs with Locke and Carmichael that even in a just war the conquerors have no right to enslave a nation, and concurs with Carmichael that most of the people in a conquered nation are innocent, that a slave is not property, and that children of slaves are born free. He shares Carmichael’s defense of the right of resistance and his strictures against the peculiar sanctity of the sovereign authority and against the legitimacy of patrimonial states. Hutcheson’s chapter on quasi-contracts17 is derived from Carmichael, and he clearly acknowledges the implications of this doctrine for his view of the duties of children to their parents, of orphans to their adoptive parents, and for his polemic against slavery; he uses it also to state that the original contract binds posterity without consent.18

Hutcheson and Hume

Hutcheson received a copy of the first and second books of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature from Henry Home early in 1739, and, months later, Hume sent him the manuscript of the third book, Of Morals. Very likely he received a visit from David Hume in the winter of 1739–1740. Whereas Hutcheson’s reaction to the first two books was positive, differences appeared between the two men concerning morality.

We know of these differences through four extant letters from Hume to Hutcheson. Whereas Hume had to defend himself against the accusation of lacking “warmth in the Cause of Virtue,” he criticized Hutcheson for founding the notion of “natural” on final causes.19 Since they agreed that morality is founded on sentiment and not on reason, they must also agree Edition: current; Page: [xix] that “it regards only human Nature and human life” and that nothing is known about the morality of superior Beings.20 They had a number of differences also concerning the notion of virtue. According to Hume and in contrast to Hutcheson, benevolence is not the sole or chief virtue, justice is an artificial virtue, natural abilities like the accomplishments of body and mind are virtues, and utility perceived through sympathy is the foundation of merit. Hume also declared that he took his “Catalogue of Virtue from Cicero’s Offices.”21

In 1742 Hutcheson presented Hume with a copy of his Institutio Compendiaria and received the fourth of Hume’s letters. While Hume reassured Hutcheson on the purity and elegance of his Latin, he added some critical reflections on particular points of Hutcheson’s book. He could not approve the distinction between calm affections and passions, Hutcheson’s adoption of Butler’s hegemonic moral sense, his explanation of the origin of property and justice, or his fear of deriving “any thing of Virtue from Artifice and human Conventions.” Moreover he repeated, as a common opinion, that Hutcheson “limited too much” his “ideas of Virtue.”

Did Hutcheson answer Hume’s criticisms? The first edition of the Institutio is already in many ways an answer to Hume. The first chapter of the first book presents a teleological approach to ethics that we cannot find in the earlier “four Treatises,” and the first chapter of the second book culminates in two general laws of nature, where the first states, “God is to be worshipped with all love and veneration.” In the second chapter on the summum bonum, Hutcheson presents a general catalogue of virtues in which the four cardinal virtues appear after the kind affections. Moreover, he begins to talk about “some natural sense, different from the moral one, but not unlike it, by which we relish and value some powers of the mind and the body,” that is, Hume’s “natural abilities.” In his System of Moral Philosophy, he will enlarge on this sense, calling it “a sense of decency or dignity” and stressing its independence “from any indications of advantage by the spectators.”22 Moreover, Hutcheson, in his third chapter, adds a large Edition: current; Page: [xx] list of virtues as specifications of the four cardinal virtues, a catalogue nowhere else so detailed, not even in the works of Cicero, Aristotle, or Henry More, to whom Hutcheson refers his readers.

In his second edition of 1745, Hutcheson does not change any word in the passages criticized by Hume, but his answer to Hume becomes more evident. In his Preface he declares: “The design of Cicero’s books de officiis, which are so very justly admired by all, has been mistaken inconsiderately by some very ingenious men, who speak of these books as intended for a compleat system of morals or ethicks.” But “The doctrine concerning virtue, and the supreme good, which is the principal <and most necessary> [three words omitted from the 1747 translation] part of ethicks, is to be found elsewhere. Nay in his own books de finibus, and Tusculan questions.” According to the Stoics, “the officia, or external duties of life” are “things indifferent, neither morally good nor evil.” Therefore, Cicero’s de officiis show “how persons in higher stations, already well instructed in the fundamentals of moral philosophy, should so conduct themselves in life, that in perfect consistence with virtue they may obtain great interest, power, popularity, high offices and glory.” Hume is certainly a likely target of this criticism.23

Hutcheson adds also two sections to the second chapter of the first book, presenting a detailed account of the passions according to the common Aristotelian and Ciceronian distinction—also adopted by Hume—of three classes of goods and evils: of the body, of the soul, and external goods.24 In this way Hutcheson can complete his account of human nature without renouncing his distinction between calm affections and turbulent passions. Finally, Hutcheson adds a seventh and last chapter to his first book. This chapter does not present new matter: the first section stresses the teleological and religious perspective of his ethics, the second section returns again to the four cardinal virtues, while the third is a warm encouragement to the practice of virtue and to confidence in God, with long quotations from Cicero. We can say that Hutcheson, fearful of the secularization of morals Edition: current; Page: [xxi] that Hume derives from human sentiments, tries to enforce the religious foundation, expands on his original idea that virtue is based on benevolence by tying it to the classical tradition of the four cardinal virtues, and presents his system as authorized by the most approved and cherished of the classical authors, Marcus Tullius Cicero, who used Aristotelian ideas to mitigate the rigorous teaching of the Stoics.

Editorial Principles

This edition is based on the second edition published in 1745, Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria, Libris III. Ethices et Jurisprudentiae Naturalis Elementa Continens, Glasguae, Typis Roberti Foulis, M DCC XLV, and compared with the 1742 first edition, published with the same title and by the same publisher. The revisions that may have a substantial relevance have been included in the text by internal citations. While almost all additions and deletions are pointed out, more than 50 percent of the substitutions of mere stylistic relevance are not indicated: these include changes in capitalization, differences in spelling, minute changes of punctuation, changes in the order of words, and changes of verbal tenses and modes, of synonymic conjunctions, prepositions, and adverbs. Other relevant changes, such as a different order of paragraphs, are noted. In sum, the changes included in the text are indicated in the following way:

1. Strings of text (sentences or words) added to the 1745 edition are enclosed in {braces}.

2. Strings of text (sentences or words) deleted from the 1745 edition are enclosed in <angle brackets>.

3. Strings of text changed in the 1745 edition are indicated as follows: both the new and the old strings are enclosed in [square brackets] with the 1745 text first. To ease reading, the square brackets around 1745 text have been left out in cases where the change concerned no more than three words and the same number of words as in the 1742 text. So, for example, at page 3, line 4, “cognitu facilior [cognitione prior]” means that “cognitu facilior” of the 1745 edition is a substitution for “cognitione prior” of the first edition. So readers who want to read just the corrected 1745 edition have to accustom themselves to overlook strings in angle brackets, strings in square Edition: current; Page: [xxii] brackets where single, and strings in the second angle brackets where double.

Hutcheson draws heavily on Cicero for words, sentences, and parts of sentences. In adding quotation marks and references, I have restored to Cicero most of what was his own. Finally, a few printer’s errors have been silently corrected, and Greek standard characters are used instead of the original eighteenth-century abbreviations.

The English Translation

A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, in Three Books, Containing the Elements of Ethicks and the Law of Nature was printed in Glasgow by Robert Foulis in 1747. In the present edition, the Latin text and the text of the English translation are presented on facing pages. As we learn from the advertisement of the anonymous translator, Hutcheson would have preferred that the book had not been translated, but having found it impossible, he “therefor thought it proper it should rather be done in Glasgow.” I have not been able to identify the author of the translation, but he is likely to be a person with whom Hutcheson was acquainted. Internal evidence shows that he was familiar with Hutcheson’s thought as well as with the literature on natural law. Moreover, he had in his hands the manuscript of A System of Moral Philosophy, as many added notes and the wording of several sentences depend on it. In the advertisement the translator says also that he used “some few Latin terms of art in the second and third book,” and he omitted a few sections “relating solely to some Latin ways of speaking in the civil law”; at the same time, he “inserted some short sentences, or added a note or two, to make some point clearer.” Therefore in the present edition there are the following alterations:

1. Strings of text (sentences or words) added by the translator are enclosed in {braces}.

2. Significant strings of text (sentences or words) omitted from the 1747 translation are added, enclosed in <angle brackets>.

3. Cases in which the translation is significantly unfaithful: More accurate translations are added in square brackets in the text where feasible, otherwise in the notes. I kept these interpositions to a minimum, allowing Edition: current; Page: [xxiii] for a margin of arbitrariness, as in all translation. So readers who want to read the 1747 translation as corrected by the editor have to accustom themselves to overlook strings in square brackets where single, and strings in the second angle brackets where double, as well as strings in braces.

In both the Latin and the English text, notes by Hutcheson and by the translator are preceded by the original footnote markers (*, †, ‡, §, ‖, #). Editor’s notes are added to the original notes in square brackets or, when required, separately numbered.

I have made the English version with its annotation self-contained and independent of the Latin text, with only occasional, necessary references to the notes of the latter.

Edition: current; Page: [xxiv]


My thanks are due in the first place to Knud Haakonssen, the general editor of this series, for the extremely valuable guidance and encouragement that he gave me at various stages in producing this edition of Hutcheson’s Institutio and its old translation, the Short Introduction. I am also indebted to James Moore for many discussions on Hutcheson’s views, and I have found especially helpful his notes and commentaries on the writings of Gershom Carmichael. I am grateful to my friend and colleague Giancarlo Giardina, of the Department of Classical and Medieval Philology at the University of Bologna, for discussing a few passages of Hutcheson’s Institutio.

Finally, I wish to express my special gratitude to Dan Kirklin, managing editor of the publishing department of Liberty Fund, for the very intelligent and superlatively kind assistance he gave me in revising the proofs of this rather complicated edition.

Edition: current; Page: [xxv]


Works by Francis Hutcheson
Inquiry on Beauty The first treatise of An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; In Two Treatises. I. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design. II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil. London, 4th ed., 1738.
Inquiry on Virtue The second treatise of the preceding.
Essay on Passions The first part of An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations On the Moral Sense. London, 3rd ed., 1742.
Illustrations The second part of the preceding.
Institutio Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria, Ethices & Jurisprudentiae Naturalis elementa continens. Glasgow, 1742, 2nd ed., 1745.
Short Introduction A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy. Glasgow, 1747.
Synopsis Synopsis metaphysicae, ontologiam & pneumatologiam complectens. Glasgow, 1744.
System A System of Moral Philosophy. London, 1755.
Other Works
De finibus Cicero. De finibus bonorum et malorum.
De iure belli Grotius, Hugo. De iure belli ac pacis libri tres, in quibus ius naturae et gentium, item iuris publici praecipua explicantur. Paris, 1625.
De officiis Cicero. De officiis.
De officio Pufendorf, Samuel von. De officio hominis et civis iuxta legem naturalem libri duo. Lund, 1673.
De iure nat. Pufendorf, Samuel von. De iure naturae et gentium libri octo. Lund, 1672.
Notes on Puf. Carmichael, Gershom. Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The Writings of Gershom Carmichael. Ed. J. Moore and M. Silverthorne. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002.
Tusc. Disp. Cicero. Tusculanae disputationes.
Two Treatises Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. London, 1689.
Edition: current; Page: [xxvii]


In both the Latin and the English texts, angle brackets < >, square brackets [ ], and braces { } have the same meanings, namely, respectively, that angle brackets enclose omitted text, square brackets enclose changed text, and braces enclose added text. Note that in the Latin text the editor had to compare the 1745 edition with the 1742 edition, whereas in the English text he had to compare the 1747 English translation with the 1745 Latin edition. That means that a reader who wants to know if a passage in the English text was added to the 1745 second edition must look for braces at the corresponding passage on the Latin facing page. Braces in the English text mean only that the translator added text that is unsupported by the Latin. Where a whole chapter or section was added, the editor noted that fact in the footnote to the English text.

To save space, the footnotes to the English sometimes begin on the left-hand page; a short rule —————————— is used, when needed for clarity, to separate the footnotes to the English from the footnotes to the Latin.

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Ethices et Jurisprudentiae Naturalis

Elementa continens.

Auctore Francisco Hutcheson

in Academia Glasguensi P.P.

Editio altera auctior et emendatior.

Ο‘ ἀνεξέταστος βίος, οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ.

Plat. Apol.1


Typis Roberti Foulis, Academiae Typographi;

apud quem venales prostant.

m dcc xlv.

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containing the

elements of ethicks

and the

law of nature.


late professor of philosophy in

the university of glasgow.

translated from the latin.


Printed and sold by Robert Foulis.

Printer to the University.

mdccxlvii. Edition: 1745; Page: [8a]

Edition: current; Page: [none] Edition: current; Page: [2]


The Author of this book had no inclination that it should be translated, as he wishes that all our students were much enured to the latin tongue, which for the two last centuries, (and in many preceeding, in such style as they had) was the common channel of communication among the Learned through all Europe. He was abundantly aware that such compends, wrote in the most succinct manner their authors could, and yet touching at a great variety of subjects, with hints of the principal topicks of reasoning, must appear very jejune and unpleasant to common readers: not to mention the unavoidable terms of art, which can scarce be turned into easy common language. But he found that the preventing a translation was impossible; as it Edition: 1745; Page: [10a] was designed in London soon after the publication of the first edition. He therefor thought proper it should be rather done in Glasgow. The English reader must excuse the translator in the use of some few latin terms of art in the 2d and 3d books, and in the omission of a section or two relating solely to some latin ways of speaking in the civil law. He has sometimes inserted a short sentence, or added a note or two, to make some points clearer. He needs the readers indulgence too, if, in following the original pretty closely, he sometimes makes sentences too long, or not so smooth and easy as our native tongue would require.

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In celebri apud antiquos Philosophiae divisione, quae pars moralis appellabatur, has complexa est disciplinas; Ethicam, strictius dictam, quae hominum mores internos regere profitetur et emendare, et Jurisprudentiam naturalem. Hujus deinde tres sunt partes: prima, Jurisprudentia privata, quae jura docet legesque in libertate naturali vigentes: altera, Oeconomica, leges tradens et jura quibus regenda est domus: tertia est Politica, quae Rerum publicarum formas explicat, ipsarumque inter se jura. Harum omnium in hoc libello prima traduntur elementa: quibus perlectis, tyronibus facilior erit aditus, ad clarissima, in hac philosophia, sive antiquorum Platonis, Aristotelis, Xenophontis, Ciceronis; sive nuperorum, Grotii, Cumberlandi, Puffendorfii, Harringtoni, aliorumque scripta et inventa cognoscenda.

Nobis etiam non monentibus, perspicient Eruditi, quanta hujus libelli pars ex claris Edition: 1745; Page: [ii] aliorum scriptis est deprompta; ex Cicerone et Aristotele; atque, ut alios sileam recentiores, ex Puffendorfii de Off. Hom. et Civis libello; quem, vir optimus, doctissimus, Gerschomus Carmichael nuper in hac Academia P. Professor, inter omnes ejusdem commentatores palmam ferens, ita supplevit et emendavit, ut libri substantiâ, quam vocant, multo pluris sint accessiones. [De instituto meo autem, quod] [Cur autem] post tot hujusmodi libellos a viris doctissimis conscriptos, hunc contexendum susceperim, [sic habetote] [haec causa est]: Docenti cuique suo utendum judicio, sua arridet methodus, docendi ratio, rerum series, [argumentorumque momenta, quae discentium ingeniis, ut juvenum captus est, optimè accommodata, atque ad sensus penitùs permanantia, sibi videntur. Quumque nostra methodus, istis quae nuper invaluerunt, non paullum discrepet; si quid ea afferat [quae discentium captui accommodatissima sibi videtur. Si quid autem in nostra methodo sit quod discipulis prodesse potest, eorum intererit, breve aliquod Edition: current; Page: [4] in manibus terere syntagma, quod rerum seriem, summaque disputationum capita exhibeat; ipsisque omnia vivâ voce fusius explicata, in memoriam revocet. Edition: 1745; Page: [iii]

{Ciceronis de officiis libros suo merito laudatissimos, viri quidam docti, tanquam Ethices totius summarium complexos absolutum, inconsideratè nuper laudarunt; quum ipse saepius testetur, totam de virtute summoque bono doctrinam, Ethices partem longè praestantissimam et maximè necessariam, alibi quaerendam; cujus etiam locos praecipuos, in libris de Finibus et Tusculanis, ipse antea tractaverat: quinetiam moneat, se, in libris de Officiis, praecepta tradidisse, Stoicos potissimùm secutum; quibus tantum inter virtutes, et officia ex virtute, discrimen esse placuit, ut haec in rerum mediarum, quae nec bonae sint nec malae, numero habuerint. Docent itaque hi de officiis libri, qua ratione, viri honesto loco nati, virtutumque cognitione satis ante instructi, vita sit instituenda, ut honestati verae is semper adhaerescens, opes, potentiam, gratiam, honores, et gloriam consequatur.

In hoc libello denuo excudendo, quaedam addenda videbantur, et non pauca corrigenda. Cogitabam etiam claros in hac philosophia scriptores, et antiquos et nuperos passim citare, locosque librorum commonstrare. Verum Edition: 1745; Page: [iv] reputabam; hoc iis solùm profuturum quorum in manibus essent ipsi libri; qui Edition: current; Page: [5] nullo fere negotio, consultis librorum indicibus, eadem sibi reperire possent: labori igitur et ingrato et parum necessario peperci. Vix ipsos latet in Philosophia tyrones, Ethices fundamenta, et generalem omnem de moribus doctrinam, apud antiquos modo laudatos, et Cumberlandum, comitemque de Shaftesbury, copiose explicatam esse: nullumque de jure naturali et gentium locum, scriptores claros Grotium et Puffendorfium, Barbeyracii commentariis uberrimis auctos, Harringtonium, Lockium, et Bynkershokium, ne plures memorem, intactum reliquisse: apud Barbeyracium etiam reperiuntur nuperorum nomina, qui singulas quaestiones plenius exposuerunt: quorum libri, iis qui uberiores de locis singulis disquisitiones perspicere volunt, sedulo sunt evolvendi.}

Vobis, Juvenes, non Eruditis, haec scribuntur elementa: quibus paulum immorati, ad majora progredimini et ampliora; ad omnis scientiae, omnis elegantiae, artiumque bonarum inventores et excultores eximios scriptores Graecos et Romanos <perlegendos>. Dumque hos exprimitis, Edition: 1745; Page: [v] puriores sacrarum literarum, quae miseris mortalibus certam vitae beatae spem reducunt, fontes aditote; ut animos vestros omni virtute exornetis, ad omnia officia honestiora instruatis, cognitionisque sitim ingenuam et laudabilem expleatis. {Animis igitur vestris medeatur Philosophia; inanes solicitudines detrahat, cupiditatibus liberet; pellat timores: ita morati sitis, ita animo et vita constituti, ut ratio postulat: neque hanc disciplinam ostentationem scientiae, sed legem vitae sanctissimam putetis, quam nemo sine scelere, nemo impunè spreverit; cujusque monitis parere, quantum animo conniti possumus, summa est naturae nostrae dignitas, summa sapientia, vitaeque prosperitas.}

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Βίον αιροῦ τὸν ἄριστον,· ἡδὺν δ’ αὐτὸν ἡ συνήθεια ποιήσει.


Ἤδη οὐ̑ν ἀξίωσον σεαυτὸν βιου̑ν ὡς τέλειον καὶ προκόπτοντα· καὶ πα̂ν τὸ βέλτιστον ϕαινόμενον ἔστω σοι νόμος ἀπαράβατος

Epictet. Enchir.2

Ἀνδρας γενομένους ὁ θεὸς παραδίδωσι τῇ ἐμϕύτῳ συνειδήσει ϕυλάττειν, ταύτης ὀῦν ϕυλακῦς μηδαμῶς καταϕρονητεόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῷ Θεῷ ἀπάρεστον, και τῷ ἰδίῳ συνειδότι ἐχθροι ἐσόμεθα.

Ejusd. Fragment.3

Αἱροῦ πρότερον τὰς επιθυμίας κολάζειν, ἤ διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας κολάζεσθαι.


Ἑνὶ τέρπου καὶ προσαναπαύου, τὡ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικη̑ς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ πρα̂ξιν κοινωνικὴν σὺν μνήμῃ Θεοη̑.

M. Antonin.5

Ἐπὶ πὰση ὁρμῃ̑ καὶ σμικρου̑ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος Θεὸν ἀεί που δει̑ καλου̑σιν.

Plato, in Tim.6

Ἀθανάτοις τε Θεοι̑ς καὶ ἡμι̑ν χάρματα δοίης.

incerti Poetae7
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The [In the] celebrated division of philosophy among the ancients {was into the rational or logical, the natural, and the moral. Their}<the branch that was called> moral philosophy contained these parts, ethicks taken more strictly, teaching the nature of virtue and regulating the internal dispositions; and the knowledge of the law of nature. This later contained, 1. the doctrine of private rights, or the laws <and rights> obtaining in natural liberty. 2. Oeconomicks, or the laws and rights of the several members of a family; and 3. Politicks, shewing the various plans of civil government, and the rights of states with respect to each other. The following books contain the elements of these several branches of moral philosophy; which if they are carefully studied may give the youth an easier access to the well known and admired works either of the ancients, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Cicero; or of the moderns, Grotius, Cumberland, Puffendorf, Harrington and others, upon this branch of philosophy.

The learned will at once discern how much of this compend is taken from the writings of others, from Cicero and Aristotle; and to name no other moderns, from Puffendorf’s smaller work, de officio hominis et civis, which that worthy and ingenious man the late Professor Gerschom Carmichael of Glasgow, by far the best commentator on that book, has so supplied and corrected that the notes are of much more value than the text. The reasons Edition: 1745; Page: [ii] of my undertaking to compose anew a compend of this branch of philosophy, after so many such compends have been published by very learned men, were these; Every teacher must use his own judgment on these subjects, use his own method, and that disposition of the several parts, and those arguments which seem to him of greatest force, best suited to the apprehensions of the students, and aptest to touch their hearts on such subjects. And as the method and order which pleased me most is pretty different from what has of late prevailed; if it can be Edition: current; Page: [4] of any advantage in education, it must be of use to the students to have in their hands an abridgement, containing the method and the principal heads of argument, to recall to their memories the points more largely insisted upon in their lectures.1

The design of Ciceros books de officiis, which are so very justly admired by all, has been mistaken inconsiderately by some very ingenious men, who speak of these books as intended for a compleat system of morals or ethicks. Whereas Cicero expresly declares, that the doctrine concerning virtue, and the supreme good, which is the principal <and most necessary> part of ethicks, is to be found elsewhere. Nay in his own books de finibus, and Tusculan questions, he had previously treated these subjects more copiously.{*} And he tells us expressly,{} that in his book de officiis he follows the Edition: 1745; Page: [iii] Stoicks, and uses their way of treating this subject. Now ’tis well known that the Stoicks made such difference between virtue, which they counted the sole good, and the officia, or external duties of life, that they counted these duties among the things indifferent, neither morally good nor evil.{} The design then of these books de officiis is this; to shew how persons in higher stations, already well instructed in the fundamentals of moral philosophy, should so conduct themselves in life, that in perfect consistence with virtue they may obtain great interest, power, popularity, high offices and glory.2

In the second impression of this book some few additions seemed necessary and several amendments. The author once intended to have made references all along to the more eminent writers, antient or modern, who treated the several subjects. But considering that this could be of no use except to those who have the cited books at hand, and that such could easily by their indexes find the Edition: current; Page: [5] corresponding places for themselves: he spared himself that disagreeable and unnecessary labour. All who have looked into such subjects know that the general doctrine and foundations of morals may be found in the antients above mentioned, and in Dr. Cumberland, and in Lord Shaftesbury: and that scarce any question of the law of nature and nations is not Edition: 1745; Page: [iv] to be found in Grotius, Puffendorf, especially with Barbeyrac’s copious notes, Harrington, Lock, or Bynkershoek, to mention no more. Nay in Barbeyrac one finds the principal authors who have published large dissertations on particular heads. Such as want more full discussions of any such points, must have recourse to these authors.3

These elementary books are for your use who study at Universities, and not for the learned. When you have considered them well, go on to greater and more important works. Go to the grand fountains of all the sciences, of all elegance; the inventers and improvers of all ingenious arts, the Greek and Roman writers: and while you are drawing from them what knowledge you can, have recourse also to yet purer fountains, the holy Scriptures which alone give to sinful mortals any sure hopes of an happy immortality; that you may adorn your souls with every virtue, prepare yourselves for every honourable office in life, and quench that manly and laudable thirst you should have after knowledge. {Let not philosophy rest in speculation} let it be a medicine for the disorders of the soul, freeing the heart from anxious solicitudes and turbulent desires; and dispelling its fears: let your manners, your tempers, and conduct be such as {right} reason requires. Look not upon this part of philosophy as matter of ostentation, or shew of knowledge, but as the most sacred law of life and conduct, which none can despise with impunity, or without impiety toward God: and whose precepts whoever seriously endeavours to obey, as far as he is capable, shews the truest worth and excellence, and the highest wisdom; and is truly the most prosperous as to his greatest interests in life.4 Edition: 1745; Page: [v] Edition: 1745; Page: [vi]

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Choose the best course of life, and custom will make it the most pleasant.


Assume to yourself to live like a perfect man, or one who has made great proficiency in philosophy, and let it be an inviolable law, to act the part that appears most virtuous.


{Other animals are committed to the government of men, but} God has committed men to the government of their own natural conscience. This governor we never should disobey; for it is offensive to God, and makes us enemies to the conscience within us.

Epictet. Fragm.

Choose rather to correct your own passions, than to be corrected and punished on their account.

The same author.

In this one thing delight and rest yourself, in going on constantly from one social action to another with remembrance of the Deity.

Marcus Antonin.

In every design, or attempt whether great or small we ought to invoke God.


Give joy to the immortal Gods and those that love you.

An unknown Poet in Antonin.
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In epistola ad Juvent. Philosophia moralis “ars vitae ad virtutem et beatitudinem assequendam instituendae.” Ejus partes Ethica, et Jurisprudentia naturalis. Hujus itidem tres partes. 1. Jurisprudentia privata. 2. Oeconomica. 3. Politica. [In a Letter to the youth, moral philosophy is the art of living to pursue virtue and happiness. Its parts are Ethics, and Natural jurisprudence. The parts of the last are three: 1. Private jurisprudence 2. Economics 3. Politics.] p. 3. Operis suscipiendi causa. [The reason for undertaking this work.] p. 4. Quo consilio scripti libri Ciceronis de officiis. [The design of Cicero’s De officiis.] p. 5. et cohortatio ad Philosophiam. [and an exhortation to philosophy.]

  • LIB. I. Ethica. [Ethics.]
    • Cap. I. De natura humana. [On human nature.]
      • 1. Philosophia moralis ars architectonica aliis imperans. [Moral philosophy is a superior art commanding the others.] pag. 1. Ex hominis natura eruenda officiorum notitia. [The knowledge of our duties has to be dug up from human nature.] p. 2.
      • 2. Constat homo ex animo et corpore. In quo sita corporis praestantia et infirmitas. [Man consists of soul and body. Excellences and weaknesses of the body.] p. 3, 4.
      • 3. Animi partes sive facultates, intellectus et voluntas. Ad intellectum referuntur sensus: iique externi vel interni. [The parts or powers of the soul, understanding and will. The senses report to the understanding and they are external or internal.] 4, 5. Sensibus prima boni malique notitia paratur. [Senses provide the first acquaintance of good and evil.] ibid. Quaedam perceptiones mediae. [Perceptions of a middle kind.] ib. Aliae antecedentes et directae, nullâ alia praeeunte; aliae reflexae. [Some perceptions are antecedent and direct, others are reflexive.] 6. Edition: current; Page: [8]
      • 4. Sensus interni quales. [Which are the internal senses.] ib. Sensu percipiuntur omnes ideae. [All the ideas are perceived by sense.] 7. Vis rationis. [The power of reason.] ib. Hae vires a Deo ad homines pervenerunt, Deique consilium ostendunt. [These powers are given to men by God and show his wisdom.] ib.
      • 5. Bona sensu prius quam ratione percipiuntur. [Every sort of good is perceived by sense before reasoning.] 8. De voluntate. [On will.] ib. Sui in optimo statu conservandi studium cuique infixum, omniumque appetitio quae ad vitam faciunt beatam, et contrariorum fuga. [In every man is rooted the study to preserve himself in the best condition, the desire of all the things that make for a happy life, and the avoidance of the contraries.] 8, 9. Gaudia et moerores unde nascuntur. [The causes of joy and sorrow.] 9. Quatuor voluntatis motus. [Four motions of the will.] ib.
      • 6. Motus perturbati sive passiones; a voluntate diversae. [The passions or turbulent motions; they are different from the calm motions of the will.] Edition: 1745; Page: [ii] 10. Appetitus rationalis et sensitivus. [The appetite is rational or sensitive.] ib. Hic dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem. [The last one is divided into concupiscible and irascible.] ib. Passionum quatuor genera; cujusque partes plurimae. [Four general classes of passions. Of each class there are many subdivisions.] 11.
      • 7. Voluntatis motus vel gratuiti, vel ex philautia orti. [The motions of the will are disinterested or selfish.] ib. Utrumque genus vel purum, vel perturbatum. [Each kind is calm or turbulent.] ib. Eorum partes. [Their parts.] 12. Quae propter se expetenda. [What is desired for itself.] 13. Homini naturalis est benevolentia gratuita. [Disinterested benevolence is rooted in human nature.] ib.
      • 8. Sensus reflexi, quibus cernuntur. Pulchritudo; Harmonia, rerum convenientia. [The reflexive senses, by which we perceive beauty, harmony, and the concord of things.] 14, 15. et laeta sit veri cognitio. [and the discovery of truth is joyful.] ib.
      • 9. Sympathia, sive sensus communis. [Sympathy, or common sense.] 15.
      • 10. Homo ad agendum natus. Recti et honesti sensus, explicatur. [Man was destined by nature for action. The sense of what is right and honourable is explained.] 16–23.
      • 11. Comprobationis gradus varii; unde pietatis, et amicitiae sanctitas elucet. [The different degrees of approbation; whence the sanctity of piety and friendship shines forth.] 23–26.
      • 12. Sensus hujus principatus, cui in omni vita parendum. [The supremacy of this sense which we ought to obey throughout our lives.] ib. Edition: current; Page: [9]
      • 13. Laudis et vituperii sensus. [The sense of honour and shame.] 28. Homines in eo sibi invicem similes. [Uniformity of mankind in this sense.] 29.
      • 14. Sensus ridiculi. [The sense of the ridiculous] 30.
      • 15. Bona animi, corporis, et externa; et proinde appetitiones variae, sive suam, sive aliorum foelicitatem consectantes: quae et hominum moribus afficiuntur. [The goods of the soul, of the body, and the external goods. And accordingly the several appetites toward our own happiness or that of others. These are also influenced by men’s characters.] 30–34.
      • 16. aliae naturales, aliae opinabiles. [Some appetites are natural, others less general.] 34.
      • 17. Idearum conjunctiones, memoria, habitus. [The associations of ideas, memory, and habits.] 35–37. Usus sermonis. [The use of speech.] 37. Ingeniorum diversitas, ejusque causae. [The diversity of tempers, and their causes.] 37–39.
      • 18. Qua ratione cernitur partium ordo, a natura destinatus. [Perception of the order of our powers designed by nature.] 39–42.
    • Cap. II. De summo bono et virtute. [On the supreme good and virtue.] 42.
      • 1. Intellectus imperium in voluntatem. Voluntatis motus, et libertas. [The command of the understanding over the will. The motions of the will, and liberty.] 43, 44. Voluntatis in intellectum potestas. [The power of the will over the understanding.] ib.
      • 2. Axiomata de finibus et mediis. [The maxims concerning means and ends.] 44. Summum bonum quale. [What is the supreme good.] 45. Edition: 1745; Page: [iii]
      • 3. Bona alia aliis contraria. [Some goods are inconsistent with others.] ib. Bonorum instituenda comparatio, ratione dignitatis et diuturnitatis, [We must compare enjoyments according to their dignity and duration.] 45, 46.
      • 4. Indolentia non bonorum finis. [Absence of uneasiness is not the chief good.] 47. Corporis voluptates vilissimae, minimeque diuturnae, neque omnes virtutibus contrariae. [Bodily pleasures are the meanest and the shortest. They are not always opposite to virtues.] 47–51.
      • 5. Quae ex vitae cultu, et artibus ingenuis, digniores; vitam tamen beatam haud praestant. [The pleasures which arise from the elegance of life and from ingenious arts are more worthy, yet they do not cause happiness.] 51–54.
      • 6. Sensus communis magna vis ad vitam beatam aut miseram. [Common sense is of great importance for our happiness or misery.] 54. Voluptates ejusdem honestae, et diuturnae; dolores itidem graves, et diuturni. [Its pleasures are worthy and lasting; likewise its sorrows are deep and lasting.] 55. Unicum horum malorum perfugium. [The sole refuge from these evils.] ib. Edition: current; Page: [10]
      • 7. Recti honestique sensus: ejus vis maxima ex perceptionum dignitate et duratione. [The sense of what is right and honourable. Its intensity is the greatest for the dignity and duration of its perceptions.] 56–58.
      • 8. Laudis et vituperii sensus, ad eadem omnia hortabitur. [The sense of honour and shame exorts to the same deeds.] 58.
      • 9. Ut etiam voluptates quaedam leviores. [As well as some pleasures of a lighter kind.] 59.
      • 10. Divitiarum potentiae que momentum. Sui conservandi studium saepe nimium. [The importance of wealth and power. The desire of self-preservation is often too strong.] 60, 61. In virtute sita est vita beata. [Happiness consists in virtue.] 62.
      • 11. Quod ex malorum inter se comparatione confirmatur. Errorum causae. [The same conclusion is confirmed by comparing the several evils. Causes of mistakes.] 62. Mala gravissima, ex aliorum miseria, et cujusque vitiis, nascuntur. [The most grievous evils arise from the distresses of others, and from the consciousness of moral turpitude.] 63–65. Summum bonum formale in virtute, una cum vitae perfectae prosperitate. [The formal supreme good consists in virtue, together with well-being lasting throughout a complete lifetime.] 65. Virtutis summa, in Deo amando, et benevolentia erga homines exercenda. [The sum of virtue consists in loving God and cultivating benevolence toward mankind.] ib.
      • 12. Deus, summum bonum objectivum. [God is the objective supreme good.] 66.
    • Cap. III. Virtutum divisiones. [The divisions of virtues.]
      • 1. Virtutis natura; ejusque gradus. [The nature of virtue and its degrees.] 66–69.
      • 2. Virtutes, vel intellectuales, vel morales. [Virtues are intellectual or moral.] 69. Virtus quî mediocritatem servet. [How virtue consists in mediocrity.] 70.
      • 3. Cardinales quatuor; earumque definitiones et partes. [Four cardinal virtues; their definitions and branches.] 71–74.
      • 4. Virtutum origo et causae. [The source and causes of virtues.] 75. Virtutes hae inter se conjunctae. [These causes are connected together.] 76. Mediocritas haud prima virtutis notio. [The primary notion of virtue does not consist in the middle way.] ib. Edition: 1745; Page: [iv]
      • 5. Alia divisio utilior, prout virtutes Deum, homines aut nosmet ipsos respiciunt. [Another more useful division, according as virtues take notice of God, other people, or ourselves.] 76. Edition: current; Page: [11]
    • Cap. IV.
      • 1. Pietatis erga Deum partes duae; verae sententiae, cultusque iis consonus. [Two parts of piety toward God: true opinions and worship suited to them.] 77.
      • 2. Ex pietate nascuntur virtutes purissimae, gaudiaque maxima. [From piety arise the purest virtues and the greatest delights.] 77–80. Hominibus depravatis non desperandum. [Corrupted men ought not to despair.] 80.
      • 3. Cultus externi natura et utilitas. [The nature and utility of external worship.] 82.
    • Cap. V. Officia erga homines. [The duties toward other men.] 84.
      • 1. Arctiores hominum conjunctiones et vincula naturalia. [The strongest human ties and natural bonds.] 85. In affectionibus benignis jucunditas summa. [The highest delight in kind affections.] 86.
      • 2. Aliae aliis honestiores. [The more honourable mutual affections.] ib. Virtutum sociarum summa. [The sum of all social virtues.] ib.
      • 3. Arctiorum societatum utilitas et sanctitas. [Utility and sanctity of the stronger ties.] 87. Caritates arctiores haud reprimendae. [We ought not weaken our tender affections.] ib. Indicia in vultu. [Their appearance in countenance.] 88.
      • 4. Amicitiae ortus. [The source of Friendship.] 89. Inter solos bonos. [Only among the virtuous.] 90. Amicitiae leges, ejusque utilitas. [The laws of friendship and its utility.] ib.
      • 5. Amor duplex, benevolentia et complacentia. Haec saepe nimia, non illa. [Love is divided into benevolence and complacence. The last is often too great, not the first.] 90, 91.
    • Cap. VI. De animi cultura. [On the culture of the mind.] 92.
      • 1. Rerum cognitio necessaria; summi boni, Dei, hominisque. [The knowledge of things is necessary: of the supreme good, of the nature of God and men.] 93.
      • 2. Pietas erga Deum, rerumque externarum despicientia. [Piety towards God and contempt of external things.] 94, 95. Usu exercitationeque opus. [The need of habit and practice.] 96.
      • 3. Mediocritas inter appetituum excessus et defectus. [The middle way between the excess and the defect of our appetites.] 96. Omnes appetitus utiles esse possunt. [All the appetites may be advantageous.] 97. Mediocres venustissimi et tutissimi. [Their moderate degree is the most graceful and safest.] 99. Quod plurium exemplis illustratur. [Illustration of this by many examples.] 99–104. Edition: current; Page: [12]
      • 4. Corporis cura. Ars quaedam eligenda. Variae artes inter se comparantur. [The care of our body. We ought to choose an art or occupation. Different occupations are mutually compared.] 104.
    • Cap. VII. De virtutis studio excitando. [On inciting the study of virtue]
      • 1. Virtutum invitamenta, ex Dei consilio jussuque et animorum immortalitate. [The inducements to virtue from divine wisdom and command and from the immortality of the soul.] 105–108.
      • 2. Virtutum utilitates. [The advantages of several virtues.] 108–111. Edition: 1745; Page: [v]
      • 3. Earum excitandarum rationes [Motives to the study of virtue.] ib. Transitio ad jurisprudentiam. [Transition to jurisprudence.] 113.
  • LIB. II. Jurisprudentia Privata. [Private jurisprudence]
    • Cap. I. De lege naturali. [On the law of nature.]
      • 1. Unde, legis, juris, et imperii justi notio. [The first notions of law, right, and just power.] 114.
      • 2. Divini imperii jus. [The right of divine command.] 116.
      • 3. Rationis dictata practica sunt leges divinae. [The practical dictates of reason are divine laws.] 117. Legis partes duae. praeceptum et sanctio. [In every law there are two parts, the precept and the sanction.] ib.
      • 4. Leges pro varia promulgandi ratione, naturales vel positivae. [Laws are natural or positive according to the different manners of promulgation.] 118. Ratione materiae, necessariae, vel non-necessariae. [As to the matter: necessary or not necessary.] 119.
      • 5. 6. Privilegium, aequitas, et dispensatio. [Privilege, equity, and dispensation.] 119.
      • 7. Jus naturae primarium et secundarium. [Law of nature primary and secondary.] 121. Duo praecepta generalia. [Two general laws.] ib.
    • Cap. II. De Juris natura et divisionibus. [On the nature of rights, and their divisions.]
      • 1. Explicando hominum jura, explicantur leges. [By explaining the rights of men, the laws are explained.] 122. Jus, prout est qualitas moralis, definitur. [The definition of right as a moral quality.] 96. Ejusdem notio neque semper legis, neque communis utilitatis rationem includit. [The notion of right does not always have reference to a law or to the common interest.] 124. Nullum communi utilitati adversatur. [No private right can oppose the common interest.] 125. Edition: current; Page: [13]
      • 2. Juri omni respondet obligatio. ejus notio duplex, altera sensum cujusque internum, altera legem, respiciens; earumque definitiones. [To each right there is a corresponding obligation. The latter has two sides and two definitions, one refers to the internal sense of each person, the other to the law.] 126.
      • 3. Jura perfecta vel imperfecta. Inter ea limites non facilè cernuntur. [Perfect and imperfect rights. The boundaries between them are not easily seen.] ib. Jura externa. [External rights.] 127.
      • 4. Jura quae alienari possunt, vel non possunt. [Rights that can be alienated and those that cannot.] 128. Generalia duo societatis praecepta. [Two general precepts of society.] 129.
    • Cap. III. De virtutum et vitiorum gradibus. [On the various degrees of virtue and vice.]
      • 1. Conscientia definitur. [How to define Conscience.] 129. Variae ejusdem divisiones. Bonitas materialis, et formalis. [Its various divisions. Formal and material goodness.] 130.
      • 2. Imputatio, quid sit. Quae moralem speciem afficiunt vel intellectum, vel voluntatem, vel rei momentum, respiciunt. [What is imputation. The circumstances that affect the moral good relate either to the understanding, or to the will, or to the importance of the action.] 131. imputationi necessaria, libertas. [Liberty is necessary to imputation.] ib. Quaenam necessaria, aut impossibilia. [Which events are necessary or impossible.] ib. Quae ab invitis per vim, aut per Edition: 1745; Page: [vi] ignorantiam fiunt, quaeque mixta dicuntur, quo modo imputantur. [How what is done by force against one’s will, or through ignorance, or actions called mixed are imputed.] ib.
      • 3. Ignorantia, involuntaria, vel voluntaria: haec affectata, vel supina. [Voluntary or involuntary ignorance.] 132. Involuntaria duplex. [Involuntary ignorance twofold.] 133. Ignorantia juris, vel facti. [Ignorance of right or of fact.] ib.
      • 4. Quaestiones de conscientia errante. [Questions about an erroneous conscience.] 133.
      • 5. 6. Voluntatis propensiones, quo modo honestatem aut turpitudinem augent aut minuunt. [How the dispositions of the will increase or abate integrity or turpitude.] 135.
      • 7. Actionum momenta et eventus, quo modo imputantur. [How the importance and the effects of actions are imputed.] 140.
      • 8. Habitus moralem speciem afficiunt. [Habits affect the morality of actions.] 142. Aliorum actiones nonnunquam imputantur. [Sometimes the actions of others are imputed.] 143.
      Edition: current; Page: [14]
    • Cap. IV. De jure hominum naturali. [On the natural rights of men.] 143.
      • 1. Status quid: is duplex, vel naturalis libertatis, vel adventitius. [What is a state: a state is one of two: either of natural liberty or adventitious.] 144. Status libertatis non est status belli. [The state of liberty is not a state of war.] ib.
      • 2. Jura privata, publica, communia. [Private, publick, and common rights.] 145. unde primo singulorum jura privata innotescunt. [Whence private rights of individuals first become known.] ib. Jura vel naturalia, vel adventitia. [Natural or adventitious rights.] 146.
      • 3. Jura perfecta et imperfecta. [Perfect and imperfect rights.] ib. Jura naturalia perfecta recensentur. [Perfect natural rights reviewed.] 146–148.
      • 4. Naturalis hominum aequalitas. [Men’s natural equality.] ib.
      • 5. Jura naturalia imperfecta. [Imperfect natural rights.] 149.
      • 6. De beneficentia et liberalitate. [On beneficence and liberality.] 150.
    • Cap. V. De jure adventitio. [On the adventitious rights.]
      • 1. Jura adventitia vel realia, vel personalia. [Adventitious rights real or personal.] 151. Realium praecipua, rerum dominia. [The principal real right is property.] ib. Jus utendi rebus inanimis. [The right of using inanimate things.] 152, 153.
      • 2. 3. Ut etiam animatis; et carne vescendi. [The right of using animals, and of eating their flesh.] 153.
      • 4. Dominium quid sit ejusque causae. [What is property and its grounds.] 154.
    • Cap. VI. De dominii acquirendi rationibus. [On the methods of acquiring property.]
      • 1. 2. Dominium vel primum vel derivatum. [Property is either original or derived.] 156. Primum, occupatione constituitur. [Original property arises from first occupation.] 157. Quaenam jure potior. [Which methods of occupation are more righteous.] 158.
      • 3. Quousque occupare potest quisquam. [How long anybody can occupy.] 161. Edition: 1745; Page: [vii]
      • 4. Quae res communes. [Which things are for perpetual community.] 163. Communio negativa vel positiva. [Negative or positive community.] 164.1 Res nullius, sacrae, sanctae, religiosae. [Things sacred, holy, or religious.] ib. Res publicae. [Public goods.] 165. Usucapio. [Prescription.] ib. Edition: current; Page: [15]
      • 5. Accessiones variae, quo jure teneantur. [With what right different accessions are held.] 166. Quae jura in Dominio continentur. [Which rights are included in property.] 167.
    • Cap. VII. De jure derivato. [On the derived rights.]
      • 1. Discrimen inter jura realia et personalia. [The distinction between real and personal rights.] 168.
      • 2. Jura derivata, partes dominii, vel totum dominium. [Derived rights are either parts of property or complete property.] 170. Partes quatuor. [Four parts of the right of property.] ib. Possessoris rei alienae et Bonae fidei possessoris obligatio. [Obligation of the person who possesses another’s goods and of the presumptive proprietor.] ib.
      • 3. Juris haereditarii fundamentum. [The ground of the right of heirs in entail.] 172.
      • 4. 5. De pignore et hypotheca. [On pledges, mortgages.] 173. et servitutibus. [and servitudes.] 174.
    • Cap. VIII. De dominii transferendi rationibus. [On the methods of transferring property.] 175.
      • 1. 2. Rationes variae. [The various methods.] ib. Jus testamenti. [The right of succession.] ib.
      • 3. Successio ab intestato, ejusque ordo. [Intestate succession; its order.] 177.
      • {4. Successio linealis non naturalis. [Lineal succession not natural.] 180.}
    • Cap. IX. De contractibus. [On contracts.] 181.
      • 1. 2. Contractus necessarii. [Contracts are necessary.] ib. et quousque obligant. [How long they oblige.] 182.
      • 3. Tres loquendi formulae. [Three forms of speaking.] ib.
      • 4. Tria in pactis spectanda, intellectus, voluntas, materia. [Three circumstances to be considered in contracts, understanding, will, and matter.] ib. Judicium maturum. [The maturity of judgment.] 184. [.] 185.
      • 5. De erroribus inter paciscendum. [On errors in contracting.] 187.
      • 6. 7. Pacta expressa et tacita. [Expressed and tacit contracts.] 189. absoluta et conditionalia. [Absolute and conditional contracts.] 191.
      • 8. 9. Quis metus impedit obligationem. [Which sort of fear makes the contract void.] 192–196. Edition: current; Page: [16]
      • 10. Materia, licita, et possibilis. [The matter of contracts must be lawful and possible.] 195. De facinore turpi. [On unlawful contracts.] 197.
      • 11. Realibus cedunt personalia jura. [Personal rights yield to real rights.] 198.
      • 12. Paciscimur per internuncios. [We may contract by agents.] 199.
    • Cap. X. De sermocinantium officiis. [On duties in the use of speech.]
      • 1. Veritas et fides per se, et sua natura, pulchra, et in vita necessaria. [Truth and faith are, for themselves and in their nature, beautiful and necessary in life.] 200.
      • 2. Signorum duplex usus, eorumque leges. [The two uses of speech, and their laws.] 201.
      • 3. De sermonis usu cautiones. [Cautions in the use of speach.] 203–206.
      • 4. Officia in sermone honestiora. [The more honourable duties in speach.] 206.
    • Cap. XI. De jurejurando et votis. [On oaths and vows.] 208.
      • 1. Jurisjurandi definitio et usus. [The nature of oaths and their use.] ib. Edition: 1745; Page: [viii]
      • 2. Quis invocandus et qua formula? [Who ought to be invoked and in which form.] 209. Jus jurandum non mutat officium. [Oath does not alter a duty.] 211.
      • 3. Sine acceptione non obligat. [Oath does not oblige without acceptance.] ib.
      • 4. Voti natura non immutat obligationes aut officia. [The nature of vows does not alter obligations and duties.] 212.
    • Cap. XII. De rerum pretio. [On the value of goods.]
      • 1. Unde pendet. [The grounds of value.] 214.
      • 2. Pretium eminens quale. [What is eminent value.] 215.
      • 3. 4. Nummorum usus. [The use of coinage.] 216. et pretium mutabile. [And the change of its value.] 217.
    • Cap. XIII. De variis contractuum generibus. [On the several sorts of contracts.] 219.
      • 1. Benefici et onerosi; mandatum. [Beneficent and onerous contracts; mandate.] ib.
      • 2. 3. Commodatum. [Gratuitous loan for use.] 220. depositum. [Deposit.] 221. Actiones directae et contrariae. ib.
      • 4. In contractibus onerosis servanda aequalitas. [In honerous contracts goods or rights of equal value must be transferred.] 222. Edition: current; Page: [17]
      • 5. Permutatio. Emptio venditio. [Barter. Buying. Selling.] 223.
      • 6. Locatio conductio. [Letting and hiring.] 224.
      • 7. Mutuum. Aequi foenoris mensura. [Loans for consumption. The just interest of money.] 225.
      • 8. Qui contractus aleam continentes probandi. [Which contracts about hazards are to be approved.] 226.
      • 9. Fidejussiones et pignora. [Bail or sureties, and pledges.] 228.
    • Cap. XIV. Obligationes quasi ex contractu. [On obligations like those from contracts.] 230.
      • 1. 2. Earum duo genera. [Two sorts of them.]
      • 3. Alumni adversus altorem obligatio. [The obligation of an indigent child toward his maintainer.] 233.
    • Cap. XV. Jura ex damno dato. Jura Belli. [On rights arising from damage done, and the rights of war.] 235.
      • 1. 2. De damno sarciendo. [On repairing damage.] ib. et aestimando. [And on valuing it.] 236.
      • 3. De damno fortuito et damno injuriâ. [On damage done by accident and damages done injuriously.] 238.
      • 4. De Bello ejusque generibus. [On War and its different kinds.] 239.
      • 5. Bella nonnunquam licita. Tria spectanda. [Wars often lawful. Three points to be settled.] 240.
      • 6. Causae justae, in libertate, vitâque civili. [Just causes in natural liberty and in civil society.] 242.
      • 7. 8. Terminus a quo, et ad quem. [The term of commencing and the term of ending war.] 244. Quae vindicta damnanda. [Which revenges are to be condemned.] 245.
      • 9. Condicta certamina ferè semper illicita. [Duels almost always unlawful.] 246.
      Edition: current; Page: [18]
    • Cap. XVI. De jure extraordinario; et jure omnium communi. [On extraordinary rights, and on the common rights of mankind.] 249.
      • 1. Tempore mutato mutantur officia. [Duties are changed by a change of circumstances.] ib.
      • 2. Exceptiones causis tantum gravissimis dandae. [Exceptions are to be allowed only for the most serious reasons.] 250. Diluuntur objectiones. [Objections answered.] 251.
      • 3. Doctrinae hujus cautiones. [Cautions in applying this doctrine.] 252.
      • 4. Humani generis jura communia. [The common rights of mankind.] 254. Edition: 1745; Page: [ix]
    • Cap. XVII. De juris interitu. &c. [How rights and obligations cease. Etc.] 256.
      • 1. Tribus modis tolluntur obligationes. Solutione, cessione, et conditionis defectu. [Obligations are taken away three ways, by payment, remission, or defect of conditions.] ib.
      • 2. De litibus in libertate dirimendis. [The several ways of ending controversies in natural liberty.] 258.
      • 3. De interpretatione ejusque regulis. [On interpretation and its rules.] 259.
  • LIB. III. Oeconomices et Politices elementa. [The elements of Economics and politics]
    • Cap. I. De conjugio. [On marriage.] 262.
      • 1. 2. Conjugia necessaria et naturalia. [Marriage necessary and natural.] 263.
      • 3. Plato notandus aliique. [A comment on Plato and others.] 264.
      • 4. Coërcenda venus nefanda, amoresque vagi. [Monstrous lust and dissolute procreation are to be restrained.] 266.
      • 5. Matrimonii leges quatuor. [Four laws of marriage.] 267–270.
      • 6. Matrimonii impedimenta naturalia et moralia, aetas inhabilis, contractus prior, et arcta sanguinis conjunctio. [Impediments of marriage natural and moral: improper age, prior contracts, and consanguinity.] 270.
      • 7. Repudiorum causae. [Causes of divorce.] 273.
      Edition: current; Page: [19]
    • Cap. II. De parentum et liberorum officiis. [On the Duties of Parents and Children.] 275.
      • 1. Potestatis Parentalis fundamentum et fines. [The grounds of parental power, and the extent of it.] ib.
      • 2. Utrique parenti competit. [It is common to both parents.] 276.
      • 3. Legibus civilibus augeri potest. [Parental power may be enlarged by civil laws.] 278.
      • 4. Liberorum parentumque officia. [The duties of parents and children.] ib.
    • Cap. III. De herorum et servorum jure. [On the rights of masters and servants.] 279.
      • 1. Unde orta servitus. [The origin of servitude.] ib. Ejusque leges variae. [And its several laws.] 280.
      • 2. Servorum ob damnum datum aut delictum quaenam jura. [The rights of those in servitude due to damage or crime.] 281. Quo jure captivi. [The rights of captives.] 282.
      • 3. Herorum et servorum officia. [Mutual duties of masters and servants.] 285.
    • Cap. IV. De civitatum origine. [On the origin of States.] 286.
      • 1. 2. Quaenam ad vitam civilem invitarunt. [What recommends civil life to men.] ib.
      • 3. Non rectè per vim constitui potest civitas. [The State can not have been constituted rightfully by violence.] 289.
      • 4. Vitae civilis opportunitates. [The conveniences of civil life.] 290. Civitas definitur. [The definition of State.] ib. civile et despoticum contraria. [Civil and despotic power are opposite.] ib.
    • Cap. V. De interna civitatum structura, et summae potestatis partibus. [On the internal structure of States; and the parts of supreme Power.] 291.
      • 1. Ex solo populi consensu oritur jus imperandi. [Civil power only arises from the consent of the people.] 292. Unica exceptio. [The sole exception.] ib.
      • 2. Tres actus in imperio constituendo. [Three deeds necessary to constitute a state.] 293. Quo modo ad posteros transmittatur obligatio civilis. [How posterity is bound.] ib. Edition: 1745; Page: [x]
      • 3. Civitas una persona. jus omne publicum quale. [The state is conceived as one person. The nature of publick law.] 295. Edition: current; Page: [20]
      • 4. Potestatis summae partes immanentes vel transeuntes. [The several parts of supreme power.] ib. Immanentes tres. [Three immanent.] ib. Transeuntes duae. [Two transient.] ib. Jus imperii eminens. [The greater rights.] 297. Jura majestatis minora. [The smaller rights.] ib.
      • 5. Quis summum habet imperium. [Who has the supreme power.] ib. In omni civitate majestas eadem. [In every State the same sovereignty.] 298. Quaenam civitates foederatae, quid systema civitatum. [What is an alliance of States, what is a System of States.] ib.
    • Cap. VI. De variis rerumpub. formis. [Of the various forms of government.] 299.
      • 1. Simplicium tria genera. [Three simple kinds.] ib.
      • 2. Cujusque plures species. [Of each several species.] 300. Mixtarum ingens numerus. [A great number of mixed forms.] 301.
      • 3. Quatuor in politia spectanda. [Four main advantages to be pursued.] ib. Imperii nexus inter eos qui reipub. praesunt. [Some civil bond of union among the subjects in which power is lodged.] 302. Dominium est unicum potestatis fundamentum. [Power only rests on property.] ib. Absint parum civilia jura aut privilegia. [No unequal privileges should be granted.] 303. Quid praecipuè per politiam praecavendum. [What especially to beware of.] ib. Quis civium numerus maximè idoneus. [The fittest number of citizens for a State.] 304.
      • 4. Monarchiae opportunitates, legibus circumscriptae praecipuè. [The advantages and disadvantages of monarchy, especially of those limited by laws.] 305. Aristocratiae commoda et incommoda. [The advantages and disadvantages of aristocracy.] ib. Democratiae item. [And of democracy.] 306. Tabellarum usus. [The use of the ballot.] ib.
      • 5. Formae mixtae omnium optimae. [Mixed forms of government are the best of all.] ib. Quae praecipuè in iis observanda. [What especially is to be observed in them.] 307–309.
    • Cap. VII. De summi imperii Jure, ejusque acquirendi rationibus. [On the Rights of supreme Power, and the Ways of acquiring it.] 309.
      • 1. Potestas in diversis civitatibus diversa. Quae justa. [Power different in different States. Which one is just.] 310. De Imperii Jure Divino. [On civil power by divine right.] ib.
      • 2. 3. Populo sui defendendi jus est, contra eos qui Reipub. praesunt. [The people has a right of defence against those who govern.] 311. Interregnum. [The nature of an inter-regnum.] 313. Edition: current; Page: [21]
      • 4. Officia adversum Reges. [What is due to princes.] 314.
      • 5. Libertas naturalis et civilis. [Liberty natural and civil.] 315.
      • 6. Qualis rectorum sanctitas et majestas, et unde. [Which are the sacred rights and majesty of governors, and from where.] ib.
      • 7. Nulla imperii forma a Deo praescripta. [No form of government ordered by God.] 316.
      • 8. 9. Quale jus imperii ex victoria. [What right to rule from conquest.] 317.
      • 10. Regna patrimonialia nullo jure arrogantur. [Patrimonial kingdoms are not granted by any right.] 320. Edition: 1745; Page: [xi]
      • 11. De succedendi jure, quique regnorum haeredes excludendi. [On the right of succession and of excluding heirs.] 321.
      • 12. De Regis aut populi jure in colonias. [The right of people or king over their colonies.] 323.
    • Cap. VIII. De Legibus condendis et Jurisdictione. [On making Civil Laws and on their Execution.] 325.
      • 1. Quousque circa hominum sententias, ritusque sacrorum, pertineat potestas civilis. [What is relevant to civil power in the religious opinions and worship of men.] 325–327.
      • 2. Virtutes fovendae. Temperantia. [Virtues to be chiefly encouraged. Temperance.] ibid.
      • 3. 4. Diligentia, industria. [Diligence, Industry.] 330. Justitia. [Justice.] ib.
      • 5. Fortitudo, et scientia militaris. [Fortitude and military arts.] 331.
      • 6. Prohibenda exterorum in civitate potestas. [No subjects should depend on any foreign State or power.] 332.
      • 7. Legum civilium materia. [The subject-matter of civil laws.] ib.
      • 8. Legum sanctiones. Existimatio, honor. [The sanctions of laws. Reputation. Honours.] 333.
      • 9. Poenae et castigationis natura. [The nature of punishment and chastisement.] 334. poenarum mensura. [The measure of punishment.] ib. Quae προσωποληψία damnanda. [What respect of persons lawful, what unlawful.]
      • 10. De poenis universitatum. [On the punishment of corporations.] 336.
      • 11. Leges de tributis sanctissime servandae. [Obligation to pay tribute.] 337.
      • 12. Civium officia adversus civitatis rectores. [The duties of citizens toward governors.] ib.
      Edition: current; Page: [22]
    • Cap. IX. De Jure Belli. [The Rights of War.] 339.
      • 1. Belli jura eadem quae in libertate. [The rights of war are the same as in natural liberty.] ib. Bellum solenne. [Solemn war.] ib. Indictio non necessaria. [A previous declaration not necessary.] 340.
      • 2. 3. Jus gentium necessarium et voluntarium. [Publick law, necessary or voluntary.] 341. Belli causae et termini. [The causes and terms of war.] ib. Quae fallendi artes licitae. [Which arts of deceiving are lawful.] 342. Jura voluntaria. [Voluntary laws of war.] ib.
      • 4. Quo jure res hostium capiuntur. [The right of seizing the goods of enemies.] 343.
      • 5. Quae civitates medias spectant jura. [Laws relating to neutral states.] 344. De perfugis protegendis. [The protection of fugitives.] 347.
    • Cap. X. De Foederibus, Legatis, et Civitatum interitu. [On Treaties, Ambassadors, and the dissolution of Civil Societies.] 348.
      • 1. Quando danda exceptio vis et metus. [When objection arises from force or fear.] ib. Foedera realia et personalia. [Real and personal treaties.] 349.
      • 2. Omnes legati liberarum civitatum pares. [The rights of ambassadors of independent States are all the same.] ib. legatorum jura. [The rights of ambassadors.] 350.
      • 3. De civili vinculo solvendo. [How states are dissolved.] 352.
      • 4. Quo jure civitas sui partem, aut provinciam, aut civem strenuum dedere potest. [Rights of alienating parts of the State or provinces, or of giving up citizens.] ib.
      • 5. Civitate deleta, quo jure sint cives et provinciae. [The rights of provinces and citizens of a destroyed state.] 354. Civium manente civitate officia. [Our duty to our Country.] 355.
Edition: current; Page: [7]


 In the Preface. The division of philosophy into 3 parts. The several branches of moral philosophy. 1. The Author’s intention in this compend. 2. The design of Cicero’s books de officiis. ib. An account of this 2d edition. 3. And an exhortation to philosophy. 4.

  • BOOK I. The Elements of Ethicks.
    • Chapt. I. Of human nature and its various parts or powers. p. 1.
      • 1. How moral philosophy an art superior to others. 1. derived from the structure of our nature. 2. the method of treating it. ib.
      • 2. The human body its dignity. 3.
      • 3. The powers of the soul, understanding and will. 4. the senses external and internal, whence our notions of good and evil. 4, 5. Sensations of a middle kind, their use. sensations direct and reflex. 6. Edition: current; Page: [8]
      • 4. Internal sense, consciousness, or reflection. 6. Reason. ib. the knowledge of God and his will. 7.
      • 5. The sublimer senses. ib. The will and its calm motions. 7, 8.
      • 6. The passions distinct from them. 8. their divisions. 9.
      • 7. Affections selfish or disinterested. 10. disinterested, calm or passionate. 11. ends ultimate or subordinate. 12. two general determinations of mind. ib.
      • 8. The reflex senses. 12. The pleasures of imagination in beauty, musick, painting, and all imitation. 13. in grandeur, novelty, knowledge. ib. 14.
      • 9. Sympathy with others. 14.
      • 10. Man fitted for action. 15. Reflex senses to regulate our actions. ib. the sense of moral good and evil, or conscience. 16. the objects of approbation and condemnation. 17. this sense natural without views of interest. 17. objections answered. 19, 20.
      • 11. Degrees of virtue. 21. degrees of vice also various. 21, 22, 23. Edition: 1745; Page: [viii]
      • 12. The Conscience or moral sense the guide of life. 23. its supremacy. 24, 25. Edition: current; Page: [9]
      • 13. The sense of honour and shame. 26. the uniformity of these senses. 27.
      • 14. The sense of what’s ridiculous, laughter. 28.
      • 15. Several sorts of good, and passions toward them. 28, 29. The species of selfish desires and aversions. 29. and of disinterested. 30. species of selfish joy and sorrow. ib. of disinterested joy and sorrow. 31.
      • 16. All these how natural. 31.
      • 17. Associations of ideas and habits. 32. their influence. ib. subordinate desires. 33. The power of speech. 34. Diversities of temper. 35. and present depravation of mankind. ib.
      • 18. ’Tis the business of philosophy to shew the natural order of the several parts, and how they may conspire to one end. 36.
    • Chapt. II. Of the Supreme Good. 39.
      • 1. The influence of the understanding over the will. ib. the mutual power of the will. 40.
      • 2. The nature of good and final causes. 40. How goods are estimated, and what the characters of the Supreme Good. 41, 42.
      • 3. The instability and inconsistency of several sorts. 42.
      • 4. Absence of uneasiness not the chief good. 43. Sensual pleasures the meanest sort. 44. they are recommended by false colours. 45. condemned even by the voluptuous. 46. virtue admits the best enjoyment of them. ib.
      • 5. The pleasures of grandeur and elegance and the ingenious arts not sufficient alone. 47, 48.
      • 6. Our sympathy of great importance. 49. and very lasting, but wholly depending on Providence. 50. Edition: current; Page: [10]
      • 7. Pleasures of a moral kind the highest. 51. joined with those of piety the most durable also. 52.
      • 8. The importance of the sense of honour. 53.
      • 9. The pleasures of mirth conspire with the moral. 54.
      • 10. As do also the pursuits of wealth and power, and desires of life. ib. 55. our happiness therefor depends on virtue. 56.
      • 11. The opposite evils compared. 56. No pain opposite to some internal pleasures. 57. Virtue no natural occasion of evil. ib. The sole cure of sympathetick pains from piety. 58. Moral evil the greatest, conjoined with infamy. 58, 59. The sum of virtue and happiness. ib.
      • 12. all dependent on the Deity. ib. Edition: 1745; Page: [ix]
    • Chapt. III. Of the Divisions of Virtue. 61.
      • 1. The general notion of virtue and its higher kinds. ib. lower degrees. ib. virtuous powers and habits. 62. manly dispositions approved. ib.
      • 2. Virtues intellectual and moral, first intellectual. 63. moral how placed in mediocrity. 64. cardinal virtues four. 65.
      • 3. Prudence its parts. ib. Fortitude. ib. 66. Temperance and its branches. 67. Justice the chief virtue. ib.
      • 4. The true spring of virtue. 68, 69. mediocrity not its primary notion. 70.
      • 5. Another obvious division. ib.
      Edition: current; Page: [11]
    • Chapt. IV. Our Duties toward God. 72.
      • 1. Just opinions and affections suited to them contain all piety. ib. affections due to the natural attributes. ib.
      • 2. Affections suited to the moral attributes. 73. Grounds of a general hope to sinners. 74, 75. the divine goodness the sole ground of stable tranquillity. ib. Piety natural. 76. the acts of worship their intention and use. ib.
      • 3. Publick worship due. 77, 78.
    • Chapt. V. Our Duties toward mankind. 79.
      • 1. Natural affections shew our duties. ib.
      • 2. and are great sources of happiness. 80. the sum of social virtues. 81.
      • 3. Our ordinary duties spring from less extensive affections: which all should cherish. ib. other obvious indications of duty. 82, 83.
      • 4. The nature and rules of friendship. 83, 84.
      • 5. A due proportion of affections. 85, 86.
    • Chapt. VI. Duties toward ourselves. 87.
      • 1. Obtaining knowledge and just opinions chiefly about the Deity. ib. and our own nature. ib. 88.
      • 2. The belief of a providence. 89. and contempt of external things. ib. knowledge insufficient without practice. 90, 91.
      • 3. The several branches of virtue. 91. no natural passion useless. ib. moderate ones often lovely and useful. 92, 93. Love of life. 93. desire of pleasures. ib. Liberality and frugality. 94. Magnificence. ib. Magnanimity. ib. Ambition. 95. Love of fame. ib. wise resentment. ib. just indignation. 96. Veracity, candour. ib. Courtesy. ib. Modesty. 97. Edition: current; Page: [12]
      • 4. Care of the body. 98. some occupation or business. ib. the dignity of several professions. ib.
    • Chapt. VII. Practical Considerations &c. 100. Edition: 1745; Page: [x]
      • 1. Our higher powers lead to virtue, ib. a sense of duty and a moral providence universal. 101.
      • 2. Motives to virtue. 102. ’tis generally both pleasant and advantageous. ib. this shewn of Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude. 103, 104.
      • 3. All our virtues the gifts of God. 105. we should have a full persuasion of the excellency of virtue. 106, 107.
      • 4. and know the particular laws of nature. 107.
  • BOOK II. Elements of the Law of Nature.
    • Chapt. I. Of the Law of Nature. 109.
      • 1. The general doctrine of morals. ib. The notions of right and wrong. ib. Law of nature what. ib. 110. The notion of a law. 111.
      • 2. The Deity’s right of governing founded on his moral perfections. ib. Human power how founded. 112.
      • 3. God the author of the law of nature. ib. Two parts in a law, the precept and sanction. 113.
      • 4. Laws natural and positive in a double sense. ib.
      • 5. Privilegia. 114. Equity. ib. 115.
      • 6. Dispensations twofold. 115. what is a dispensation properly. ib. 116.
      • 7. Laws primary and secondary. 116. two general laws. 117.
    • Chapt. II. Of Rights and their divisions. 118.
      • 1. A social life necessary. ib. 119. Edition: current; Page: [13]
      • 2. Rights of men how notified, and what. 119. no right valid against the general good. 120. the notion of obligation twofold. 121.
      • 3. Rights perfect and imperfect. 122. various degrees of them. ib. 123. External rights. 123. no opposition among just rights. ib.
      • 4. What rights alienable, and what not. 124. two general social laws. ib.
    • Chapt. III. Degrees of virtue and vice and the circumstances on which they depend. 125.
      • 1. Conscience what. ib. its different divisions. Actions good materially or formally. ib. 126.
      • 2. Circumstance affecting the morality of actions threefold. 126. Liberty necessary. ib. Actions of three sorts called involuntary. 127.
      • 3. Ignorance and error voluntary or not. ib. of law or fact. 128.
      • 4. Questions about an erroneous conscience. 129.
      • 5. Circumstances affecting morality which relate to the will. 130. Kind affections of different moral beauty. ib. 131, 132, 133. Edition: 1745; Page: [xii]
      • 6. General rules of estimation. 133. Private interests abate the virtue of actions. 134.
      • 7. The importance of actions affects their morality. 135. how the events of them are imputed. 136, 137.
      • 8. The effects of custom and habit. 137. when actions of others are imputed. 138.
      Edition: current; Page: [14]
    • Chapt. IV. Of the nature of rights of individuals. 139.
      • 1. The several states of men. ib. State of natural liberty. ib. society absolutely necessary. 140.
      • 2. Rights private, publick, or common to all. 141. Right natural or acquired. ib.
      • 3. Private natural rights. 141, 142. that of private judgment, &c. 142.
      • 4. The natural equality of men. 143. no natural right to power. 144.
      • 5. The imperfect natural rights. ib. 145.
      • 6. The rules of beneficence. 145, 146.
    • Chapt. V. Real adventitious rights and property. 147.
      • 1. Real right, property. ib.
      • 2. Right of dominion over animals. ib. 148.
      • 3. The eating of flesh. 148, 149.
      • 4. Foundations of property. 149. Community of goods pernicious. 150, 151.
    • Chapt. VI. Methods of acquiring property. 152.
      • 1. Original property from occupation. ib.
      • 2. What sort of occupation preferable. 153, &c.
      • 3. Perpetual property. 156. when property begins. ib. how far it extends. 157.
      • 4. Things destined to be common. 158. Community negative and positive. 159. Edition: current; Page: [15]
      • 5. Goods of communities or societies. ib. Prescription. 160. Appendages how occupied. ib Accessions, rules about them. ib. 161. Several rights included in full property. 162.
    • Chapt. VII. Of derived property. 163.
      • 1. Rights real and personal, how they arise. ib. 164.
      • 2. Parts of property subsisting separately. 165. Possession. ib. Presumptive property, and rules about it. 165, &c.
      • 3. Rights of entail. 168.
      • 4. Pledges and mortgages. ib. 169.
      • 5. Servitudes. 169, 170.
    • Chapt. VIII. The transferring of property, successions, testaments, &c. 171.
      • 1. Property transferred by the deed of the proprietor, &c. ib.
      • 2. Transferring on the event of death, wills. ib. Just debts preferable. 172. Edition: 1745; Page: [xiii]
      • 3. Property transferred by law during life. 173. and on the event of death. ib. The natural order of succession. 174, 175.
      • 4. lineal succession not natural. 175, 176.
    • Chapt. IX. Of Contracts in general. 177.
      • 1. The necessity of contracts. ib. 178. they found perfect rights. ib.
      • 2. They oblige tho’ made imprudently. 179. Matters of Commerce. ib.
      • 3. Three forms of speaking to be distinguished. ib. 180.
      • 4. Understanding necessary. 180. The case of minors and madmen. 181, 182.
      • 5. Mistakes and errors in contracts. 182, 183.
      • 6. Voluntary consent necessary. 184, 185. Tacit conventions. ib. conditions. ib. mutual consent. ib.
      • 7. What conditions to be regarded. 186.
      • 8. The exception of force and fear. 187, 188. Faith due to bad men. 188.
      • 9. Force used by one of the parties, twofold. 189, 190. Edition: current; Page: [16]
      • 10. The matter of contracts must be possible. 191. and lawful. ib. Contracts about the rights of others. 192, 193.
      • 11. What prior contracts make void the subsequent. 193.
      • 12. Obligations contracted by others in our name. 194.
    • Chapt. X. Our obligations in speech. 195.
      • 1. An immediate sense recommending veracity. ib.
      • 2. An important division of signs. 196, 197. two rules. 198.
      • 3. Several necessary observations. 198, 199, 200.
      • 4. General duties in conversation. 201. what speech obscene. 202.
    • Chapt. XI. Of Oaths and Vows. 203.
      • 1. The use of oaths and their nature. ib. 204.
      • 2. The manner of demanding them and what obligation produced. 204, 205.
      • 3. The various kinds of oaths. 206, 207.
      • 4. Vows their nature and use. 207, 208.
    • Chapt. XII. Of the Values of Goods and of Coin. 209.
      • 1. In commerce all things must be valued; the grounds of value. ib. 210.
      • 2. Necessity for some standard. 211.
      • 3. The design of coinage. ib.
      • 4. Value of money not arbitrary. 212, 213.
    • Chapt. XIII. Of the several sorts of Contracts. 214.
      • 1. Contracts beneficent or onerous. Mandatum. ib.
      • 2. Loan for use or consumption. 215.
      • 3. Depositing. 216.
      • 4. The nature of onerous contracts. ib. Ground of merchants profit. 217. Edition: 1745; Page: [xiv] Edition: current; Page: [17]
      • 5. Barter, buying and selling, contracts of hazard. 217.
      • 6. Hiring and setting to hire. 218.
      • 7. Loans for consumption at interest. Interest how just. 219.
      • 8. Contracts of insurance. Gaming and wagering how far lawful. 220, 221.
      • 9. Bail, pledges and mortgages. 221, 222.
    • Chapt. XIV. Obligations like those from Contracts. 223.
      • 1. Obligationes quasi ex contractu, of what nature; two classes of them: one from intermeddling with the goods of others. ib. 224.
      • 2. Obligations to indemnify administrators, or such as sustain loss for our advantage. 224, 225.
      • 3. The case of orphans maintained, and the children of slaves with other obligations of the second class. 225, &c.
    • Chapt. XV. Rights arising from damage done, and the Laws of War. 228.
      • 1. Every one obliged to repair what damage he does. ib. Punishments for injuries necessary. ib. 229.
      • 2. Damage what, and who are bound to repair it. 229, 230.
      • 3. Damages by accident, by slaves, or by cattle. 230, 231. The obligation to forgive injuries. 231.
      • 4. When force may be justly used. Different kinds of war. 231, 232. publick and private, solemn and not solemn. 232.
      • 5. War may be lawful. 233. three points to be settled. ib.
      • 6. Just causes in natural liberty. 234. and in civil society. 235.
      • 7. The just time of commencing in liberty. ib. 236. and in civil life. 236.
      • 8. The bounds of our claims in liberty. ib. and under government. 237. A right of punishing in natural liberty. 236. violent prosecution. 237.
      • 9. Duels unlawful. 237, 238. The use of courts of honour. 239. One sort of duels just on one side. 239, 240. Edition: current; Page: [18]
    • Chapt. XVI. Extraordinary rights in cases of necessity. The common rights of mankind. 241.
      • 1. Exceptions in cases of necessity. ib.
      • 2. Such necessity must be manifest and very great. 242. Objections answered. 243.
      • 3. Necessary cautions in applying this doctrine. 244, 245.
      • 4. The common rights of mankind as a system. 246, 247.
    • Chapt. XVII. How rights and obligations cease. How controversies are decided in natural liberty, &c. 248.
      • 1. Obligations are taken away three ways, by payment, remission, or defect of conditions, ib. 249. Edition: 1745; Page: [xv]
      • 2. The several ways of ending controversies. 249. who proper arbiters. 250. how they should proceed. ib.
      • 3. General rules of interpretation. 251, 252.
      • 4. The last result in controversies is force, hence the necessity of civil government. 253.
  • BOOK III. The Principles of Oeconomicks and Politicks.
    • Chapt. I. Concerning Marriage. 255
      • 1. Reason for marriage among those of the human species. ib. 256, &c.
      • 2. Chiefly from the duty of educating offspring. 256.
      • 3. Plato’s scheme censurable. 257, 258.
      • 4. Grounds of marriage-laws. Who bound to marry. 259.
      • 5. Four chief articles. 1. Fidelity in women. 2. The like obligation on men. Polygamy unjust. 3. Joint aid in educating and providing for children. 4. The bond perpetual. 259, 260, 261.
      • 6. Impediments, either nullities, or causes of divorce. some natural, some moral. 262. prior contracts. 263. and consanguinity. ib. 264.
      • 7. The causes of divorce, various. 265, 266. the duties in marriage. 266.
      Edition: current; Page: [19]
    • Chapt. II. The Duties of Parents and Children. 267.
      • 1. The grounds of parental power, and the extent of it. ib. 268.
      • 2. ’Tis common to both parents. 268. Rights and obligations of parents. 269.
      • 3. Parental power enlarged by civil laws. ib. 270.
      • 4. Duties of adult children. 270, 271.
    • Chapt. III. Of Masters and Servants. 272.
      • 1. The original of servitude, with necessary remarks. ib. 273.
      • 2. The sole just causes of slavery. 273, 274. the Roman unjust. 274. captives should not be made slaves. ib. objections answered. 274, 275, &c.
      • 3. Mutual duties. 278.
    • Chapt. IV. The Origin of Civil Government. 279.
      • 1. The two motives to civil society under government, the fears of injuries and the natural approbations of virtue. 279, 280.
      • 2. The stronger motive the fear of injuries. 280, 281. No other preservative sufficient. 281.
      • 3. The first polities not from force. 282.
      • 4. Polity better than any anarchy. 282, 283. the ends of polity. 283, 284. Edition: 1745; Page: [xvi]
    • Chapt. V. The internal structure of States; and the parts of supreme Power. 285.
      • 1. Civil power from consent and contract. ib.
      • 2. How power and polity is constituted. 286. How posterity bound. ib. 287.
      • 3. The nature of publick law. 288. Edition: current; Page: [20]
      • 4. The several parts of supreme power; the legislative. ib. 289. the raising of tributes. 289. the executive. ib. the smaller rights. 290.
      • 5. Who has the supreme power. ib. a system of states. ib. 291.
    • Chapt. VI. Of the various plans of Polity. 292.
      • 1. The simple kinds. ib. The acts of a council what. ib.
      • 2. Different kinds of monarchy. 293. of aristocracies and democracies. ib.
      • 3. Four main advantages to be pursued. 294, &c. some civil bond of union among the subjects in which power is lodged. 295. Power rests on property. ib. No unequal privileges. 296. nor impunity in abuse of power. ib. The best number for a state. ib. 297.
      • 4. The advantages and disadvantages of monarchy. 297, 298. and of aristocracies. 298. and democracies. ib. The use of the ballot. ib. 299.
      • 5. The advantages of the mixed forms, and how they should be constituted for the general safety. 299, &c. a censorial power. 301.
    • Chapt. VII. The Rights of supreme Power, and the Ways of acquiring it. 302.
      • 1. Civil power is determined by the constitution, and fundamental laws. ib. may sometimes be justly revoked or abrogated. ib. No other divinity or sacredness in the rights of princes than in private rights. 303.
      • 2. In every plan of polity the people may have a right of defence and resistance. 304, 305. who should judge in such questions. ib.
      • 3. The nature of an inter-regnum. 306. Edition: current; Page: [21]
      • 4. What is due to good princes. ib. what to such conquered. 307.
      • 5. Liberty natural and civil. ib.
      • 6. The rights of governors derived from some deed of the people. ib. 308.
      • 7. No form more divine than another. 308.
      • 8. A full inquiry into the rights of conquest. 309, 310.
      • 9. The right of punishing can never subject a whole people. 311, 312. Edition: 1745; Page: [xvii]
      • 10. No patrimonial kingdoms. 313. The conqueror may afterwards acquire a right. 314.
      • 11. Sovereignty how forfeited, and heirs justly excluded. 315, 316. several forfeitures of civil power. 316, 317.
    • Chapt. VIII. Of Civil Laws and their Execution. 318.
      • 1. The nature and end of civil laws. ib. Liberty of conscience, with a publick leading by the magistrate. ib. 319. Persecution unjust. 319, 320.
      • 2. The example of governors most effectual. 320. virtues to be chiefly encouraged; Temperance. 321. Luxury destructive. ib. Temperance promotes industry. 322.
      • 3. Industry the main foundation of wealth. ib. 323.
      • 4. Justice highly necessary. 323.
      • 5. Fortitude and military arts universal. 324.
      • 6. No subjects should depend on any foreign state or power. ib. 325.
      • 7. Civil laws should confirm the laws of nature. 325.
      • 8. Sanctions of laws various. Honours. 326.
      • 9. The nature of punishments. 327. Intentions how punishable. 328. What respect of persons lawful, what unlawful. ib.
      • 10. Punishments of corporations. 329.
      • 11. Obligation to pay tribute. ib. 330.
      • 12. The duties of subjects toward governors, and others. 330. Edition: current; Page: [22]
    • Chapt. IX. The Laws of War. 332.
      • 1. What requisite to an open, solemn war. ib. Civil wars favourable. 333.
      • 2. Publick law, necessary or voluntary. ib. Laws of war. ib. 334.
      • 3. Voluntary laws of war. 335.
      • 4. Rights of reprisals. ib.
      • 5. Laws relating to neutral states. 337, &c.
    • Chapt. X. Of Treaties, Ambassadors, and the dissolution of Civil Societies. 341.
      • 1. The nature of publick Treaties. ib. Hostages. 342.
      • 2. The natural rights of ambassadors. ib. their customary rights. ib. subject to no foreign court. ib. 343. their houses sanctuaries. 343. their powers over their own retinues. ib. just defence against them. 344. Precedency. ib.
      • 3. How states are dissolved. ib.
      • 4. Rights of alienating provinces. 345. of giving up citizens. 346.
      • 5. What rights when a state is dissolved. ib. and revives again. ib. 347.
      • Our duty to our Country. 347.
Edition: current; Page: [23]

Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria with A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy


LIBER I: Ethices Elementa.

CAPUT I: De Hominis Natura ejusque Partibus.

I. Quemadmodum caeterae omnes artes et disciplinae, bonum aliquod {naturae accommodatum} consequendum tanquam finem suum respiciunt; Philosophiam moralem, quae vitae totius ordinandae ars est, finem spectare longe praestantissimum necesse est; quum se ducem profiteatur, quantum hominum viribus fieri potest, ad vitam [eam quae maximè est secundum naturam, quam docet etiam esse beatissimam] [beatam], cui inservire debent omnia quae caeteris artibus effici possunt. Suo igitur jure in caeteras imperium sibi arrogare videtur{, eatenus saltem ut praescribat quasnam quisque, et quem ad finem, excolere debeat}. Quum [vero communis haec sit anticipatio sive naturae judicium, quod in animorum affectione aliqua aut habitu, atque actionibus consentaneis] [autem constet inter omnes, in virtutibus ipsis, atque in officiorum functione], vel situm sit [esse] illud Beate vivere, vel eorundem Edition: 1745; Page: [2] ope {parari et} obtineri; [in quo philosophorum omnium, rationibus utcunque discrepantium, consentit oratio, docentium in ipsis virtutibus officiorumque functione, summi boni adipiscendi, sive beate vivendi, spem omnem esse sitam;] [(si modo virtutem appellent “vires animi aut habitus praestantissimos,” atque officia, descriptione hujusmodi rudi & generali, “actiones omnes quae ex virtutibus proficiscuntur,” aut quae, secundum rectam rationem, hominis summo bono assequendo inserviunt)] in Philosophia morali <tradenda,> haec <duo> imprimis sedulo erunt investiganda, [quaenam vita sit secundum naturam; quaenam beatissima] [in quo sita sit vita beata]; quidque sit ipsa virtus.

Edition: current; Page: [24]

Quicunque divina mente et ratione, cum mundum hunc universum, tum genus humanum fabricatum fuisse credit, expectabit in ipsa hominis natura et constitutione [fabrica] repertum iri indicia haud obscura, quae monstrent, quodnam sit hominis {munus et} opus proprium, ad quodnam vitae genus et officia, sit a natura provida et solertissima subornatus; quaenam denique res vitam homini beatam efficere possint. Intrandum igitur in hominum naturam, ut perspiciamus “quid simus, quidnam victuri gignamur,”1 et quos Deus nos esse jusserit. {Dei autem naturaeque voluntas optimè innotescet anquirentibus, quaenam sint ea omnia quae sensu quovis naturali nobis commendantur, quaeque eorum praecipua; ad quaenam appetenda naturâ impellamur; quaenam denique ad vitam beandam vim habeant maximam.} In hac disquisitione leviter tantum attingenda ea quae ad alias pertinent disciplinas [scientias], ut in his praecipue moremur Edition: 1745; Page: [3] quae ad mores regendos plurimum valent.

More omnium disciplinarum, a notioribus ad magis obscura detegenda progredimur: neque, rerum dignitate ducti, ab iis quae naturâ prima sunt, Dei nempe Op. max. voluntate <non> ordimur; sed a naturae nostrae constitutione, quae cognitu facilior [cognitione prior] est; ut eâ perspectâ colligamus, quodnam [de animorum affectionibus et actionibus nostris Dei] [circa animi nostri consilia et actiones, divini] fabricatoris sit consilium et voluntas. Neque prorsus omittenda ea officiorum indicia aperta, quae vitae humanae commoditates [commoda] atque utilitates exhibent externae; licet forte ex alio fonte fluat omnis vera virtus, quàm ex istiusmodi voluptatum aut utilitatum appetitione [appetitionibus], <quae continent res externae>.

II. Primo igitur, constat homo ex animo [anima] et corpore, quorum utrumque suas habet vires partesque naturales: corporis partes cognitionem habent faciliorem, medicis propriam; hoc <tantum> obiter attingimus, illud Edition: current; Page: [25] ita formatum esse, ut longe aliorum animantium corporibus antecellat. {Non solum enim} sensuum organis, [partibusque, aliis ad vitam cujusque, aliis ad generis conservationem aptissimis instructum est, verum etiam iis artificiosissime fabricatis, quae operi cuique, mentisque solertis et artificiosae imperiis infinitis exequendis commodissime inserviant] [instructum est, partim ejus, aliae ad vitam cujusque, aliae ad genus humanum conservandum sunt aptissimae; aliae ad motus omnes pro mentis imperio peragendos, infinitamque eam actionum varietatem, quam efficere voluerit mens solers et artificiosa]. Edition: 1745; Page: [4] Non praetereunda est forma ad dignitatem erecta, et contemplationi idonea; membrorum motus facillimi et celeres; tot artium ministrae manus <solertissime fabricatae>; vultusque ad omnium animi motuum indicia exhibenda flexibilis{; quaeque ad vocis variae et orationis usum in corpore machinata est natura:} quae omnia fusius persequuntur anatomici.

Artificiosam [Exquisitam] hanc corporis compagem [machinam], fluxam et caducam esse, novis quotidie egentem ciborum fulturis, et continuo vestitu, alioque cultu, quò a malis innumeris extrinsecus irruentibus protegatur, norunt omnes: in tutelam igitur data est animo sagaci et provido, quae altera pars hominis, eaque longe praeclarior.

III. Animi autem partes, quarum est adspectus illustrior, sunt variae{*}: ad duas tamen reducuntur classes; quarum altera vires omnes cognoscendi continet, quae Intellectus dicitur; altera vires appetendi quae dicitur voluntas.

Intelligendi vires sunt plures, ideo hic brevius percurrendae, quod in iis plenius explicandis versentur Dialecticae et Philosophiae primae scriptores. Primo veniunt sensus, Edition: 1745; Page: [5] quo nomine appellatur “Animi quaevis constitutio aut conformatio naturalis, cujus vi certas Ideas aut species ex certis Edition: current; Page: [26] accipit [recipit] rebus objectis”: Suntque hi sensus vel externi vel interni. Externi a corporeis pendent organis, ita constituti, ut ex motu quovis validiore, aut mutatione in corpore, sive per vim extrinsecus impressam, sive per vim internam, confestim oriatur in animo perceptio quaedam aut informatio. Gratae sunt, aut saltem non molestae perceptiones, quae excipiunt motus, mutationes, [impulsionesque] [aut impressiones] corpori utiles aut innocuas; molestae vero et cum dolore conjunctae, quas excitant mutationes corpori nociturae.

Corporis voluptates et dolores quamvis satis valide animum commoveant, breves sunt plerumque et fluxae <admodum>: neque voluptatum {istiusmodi} praeteritarum recordatio {per se} grata est, aut dolorum molesta.

Sensibus his primam [primas] bonorum malorumque notitiam adipiscimur [comparamus notitias]. Quae res {sensibus externis objectae} gratas excitant perceptiones, sunt bonae, quae molestas malae. <Earum quae sensibus obiciuntur externis> Quae aliis {sensibus subtilioribus} cernuntur [percipiuntur] motum excitantes gratum, bona [itidem] [simili ratione] dicuntur, et quae molestum, mala. Beatitudo vulgò dicitur is [in universum, est] “status ubi rerum {motum} gratum <sensum> excitantium suppetit copia, dolore {omni graviori} amoto.” Miseria, “ubi irruunt Edition: 1745; Page: [6] dolores crebri et diuturni, omnia ferè grata excludentes.”

A corpore pendent etiam Perceptiones quaedam mediae, <nulla aut> exigua cum voluptate aut dolore per se conjunctae; quae rerum externarum suppeditant notiones [ideas], earumque mutationes indicant. His corporum quorum vis magnitudines, figuras, situs, motum, aut quietem cognoscimus; quae omnia visu et tactu praecipue cernuntur [percipiuntur]; neque sensum excitant per se vel gratum vel molestum; licet nos saepe certiores faciant eventuum, ex quibus, alia de causa, cupiditatem [laetitiam] aut iram, gaudia aut moerores colligamus.

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Corporis voluptates et dolores, nobis cum mutis animalibus communes, nonnullum ad vitam vel beatam vel miseram momentum afferunt [habent]. Perceptiones mediae, rerum externarum qualitates indicantes, magnum praebent in vita usum, in actionibus externis regendis, in rerum cognitione, et in artibus fere omnibus capiendis et exercendis.

Utrumque {hoc} perceptionum {externarum} genus dici potest directum et antecedens; quòd non alias ideas aut species praecurrentes exigat. Aliae autem sunt perceptiones, etiam earum specierum quae non sine organis corporeis ad animum perveniunt, quas, distinguendi causa, dicimus reflexas aut subsequentes, quia alias prius admissas subsequantur Edition: 1745; Page: [7] ideas; de quibus mox erit agendum. Hactenus de sensibus externis.

IV. Sensus interni, sunt illae animi vires, quibus omnia quae intra se fiunt, aut ipse secum molitur, percipit; sive actiones, sive passiones, judicia, voluntates, desideria, gaudia, dolores, et agendi consilia. Hae vires, conscientiae internae, aut reflexionis nomine, apud claros scriptores appellantur; quibus omnia quae in ipsa mente fiunt cernuntur [objiciuntur], pariter ac sensibus externis res externae. Hi sensus externi et interni omnem suppeditant idearum supellectilem, [aut] [et ratiocinandi] materiam, in qua exercetur homini propria rationis vis; quae plenius forent declaranda, nisi ad logicam pertinerent.

Rationis ope, rerum relationes, quae dicuntur, <et> cognationes, et nexus cernere valet mens; “consequentia” et “causas, earumque progressus, et antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adjungit et annectit futuras, et facile totius vitae cursum videt, ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.”2

Rationis usu facilè innotescit, mundum universum Dei sapientissimi opt. max. consilio ab initio fuisse constitutum, et omni tempore administratum,3 atque humano generi tributam esse hanc rationis, supra caetera animantia, praestantiam, una cum caeteris omnibus Edition: 1745; Page: [8] sive corporis sive animi viribus, unde hominibus elucere poterit parentis sui, creatoris et conservatoris Edition: current; Page: [28] munificentissimi, ratio et consilium; quaeque hominum officia, quod vitae genus et institutio, ipsi sint grata.

V. Quum autem omne ferè bonum, quod momentum aliquod per se afferre potest ad vitam beatam, sensu aliquo proximo ratiocinationem omnem antecedente, percipiatur; rationis enim est, bona, quae sensu prius erant percepta, inter se comparare, iisque consequendis idoneas monstrare rationes et subsidia: sublimiores idcirco sensus omnes, aut percipiendi vires, sunt sedulo observandae, quippe monstraturae {quaenam naturae sint aptissima, atque} ex quibus <demum rebus> conficiatur vita beata. [Quaedam tamen antè de voluntate dicenda,] [Harum tamen explicationi praemittenda est voluntatis contemplatio;] quia et animi motus, voluntates, desideria et agendi consilia contemplantur hi sensus subtiliores, et varia inter ea cernunt discrimina.

Ubi primum igitur, ex sensu qualicunque grato aut molesto, boni aut mali cujusvis notitiam adepta est mens, sua sponte subnascuntur motus quidam, ab omni sensuum perceptione diversi, boni nempe appetitio seu desiderium, et mali fuga et aversatio. Semper etenim se prodit insita quaedam omni naturae ratione praeditae propensio aut impetus altè infixus [proclivitas altè infixa], ad omnia ea appetenda, quae Edition: 1745; Page: [9] [ad vitam facere videntur beatam] [ipsius facere videntur beatitudinem], atque ad contraria omnia amolienda. Quamvis enim pauci serio secum examinaverunt quaenam sint ea quae ad vitam vel beatam vel miseram, vim habent maximam [maximum habent momentum]; omnia tamen appetunt homines naturâ, quae aliquod hujusmodi momentum afferre videntur ad [vitam beatam] [beatitudinem], et contraria fugiunt: quumque plura occurrunt, quae simul consectari [prosequi] nequeat mens, illa naturâ appetit, si modo tranquillo tantum motu feratur, quae caeteris plus [pollere] [habere momenti] videntur. Ubi vero, in eadem re, variae simul commiscentur bonorum et malorum species, appetit aut fugit mens, prout plus boni aut mali in re objecta inesse videatur.

Praeter hoc desiderium et fugam proprios [aversationem, primarios] voluntatis tranquillae motus, recensentur alii duo, gaudium et tristitia. Sunt vero hi novi potius mentis status, aut sensus subtiliores, quam impulsiones [motus] ad agendum. Hac autem ratione, quodammodo conficiuntur quatuor motuum classes, antiquioribus decantatae; qui omnes ad voluntatem, κατ̓ ἐξοχὴν, sive appetitum rationalem referuntur. Ubi boni spectatur adeptio, oritur desiderium; ubi mali spectatur depulsio, cautio aut aversatio. Ubi Edition: current; Page: [29] bonum contigit, aut malum est depulsum, oritur gaudium; ubi malum premit, aut bonum est amissum, tristitia. Edition: 1745; Page: [10]

VI. Ab his animi {placidi} motibus purioribus, et tranquilla [tranquillo] stabilique beate vivendi [suae beatitudinis] appetitione, quae ratione utuntur duce; diversi plane sunt motus quidam vehementiores et turbidi, quibus, secundum naturae suae legem, saepe agitatur mens, ubi certa species ipsi obversatur, atque bruto quodam impetu fertur ad quaedam agenda, sequenda, aut fugienda, quamvis nondum, adhibita in consilium ratione, secum statuerat ea ad vitam facere vel beatam vel miseram. Hos motus quisque intelliget, qui, in se descendens, in memoriam revocaverit quali animi impetu fuerat abreptus, quae passus, quum {acriore} libidine, ambitione, ira, odio, invidia, amore, commiseratione, laetitia, aut metu, agitabatur; etiam ubi nihil de earum rerum, quae mentem commoverant, cursu ad vitam beatam aut miseram serio cogitarat. Quid quod saepe in partes contrarias distineantur et distrahantur homines, cum “aliud cupido, mens” vero, ejusque appetitus tranquillus, “aliud suadeat.”4

Perturbatos hosce {animi} motus reducunt antiqui in ἐπιθυμίαν et θυμὸν; quorum utrumque a voluntate, βοὺλησι, est diversum; prior, voluptatis spectat adeptionem, posterior, doloris depulsionem. Utrumque continet ὀρέξις ἀλόγος, sive appetitus sensitivus, qui scholasticis est vel irascibilis vel concupiscibilis: Edition: 1745; Page: [11] eorum motus passiones appellant. {Appetitum hunc parum aptè sensitivum vocant, nisi vox sensus, ad alias a Edition: current; Page: [30] sensibus externis percipiendi vires porrigatur: etenim species quaedam nulli sensui externo obviae, motus animi turbulentiores non raro excitant; ambitionem, congratulationem, malevolentiam, gloriaeque et divitiarum libidines, offensionesque contrarias. Isti autem nomini subesse volunt, omnes appetitiones et offensiones vehementiores et improvidas, sensuque turbido conjunctas.} Istiusmodi motuum quatuor sunt genera, qui bonum spectant consequendum, cupiditatis; qui malum depellendum, metus; qui bonum quod contigit, aut malum quod depulsum est, laetitiae, qui bonum amissum aut malum imminens, aegritudinis [doloris] nomine notantur. Horum cujusque etiam plura sunt genera, aut partes, pro rerum varietate quam spectant variae passiones, quibus sunt nomina notissima, Edition: 1745; Page: [libido] quaeque ex iis quae mox sunt dicenda, satis cognosci poterint.

VII. Voluntatis motuum, sive puriorum sive turbidorum, alia est divisio, prout sibi quisquam expetit voluptatem aliquam aut utilitatem, aut alteri. Gratuitam esse aliquando hominum bonitatem, nullam suam utilitatem spectantium, ubi animo benigno et amico alteri consulunt, satis constabit si quisque Edition: 1745; Page: [12] se excusserit, si vitae suae consilia amica et caritates, {studia denique et dilectiones quibus bonos clarosque prosequimur;} si morientium curas et studia, officiorumque in extremo spiritu conservationes perspexerit; praecipue vero clarorum virorum facta, et consilia, et mortes pro amicis, pro liberis, pro patria, praemeditatas et voluntarias.

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Voluntatis motus hi gratuiti, sunt vel puri vel perturbati, quales et illi quibus sibi consulit quisque{, eaque consectatur quae sibi grata videntur}. <Atque> Varii qui {in utroque genere} existunt animi motus, simpliciores aut magis inter se implicati, innumera obtinent nomina, pro variis rebus expetitis aut declinatis; atque prout vel se respicit mens, vel alios homines, eorumque mores, et fortunas; aut caritates, et conjunctiones varias, quibus nobiscum, aut inter se, colligantur; aut contra, odia, et dissidia quibus distrahuntur illi, quibus aliquid animum nostrum commovens obvenerat; aut qui suis consiliis, aut actionibus, hisce eventibus causam dederant{. Diversi longe sunt hi motus benigni a tranquillo communis foelicitatis desiderio, neque ex eo nascuntur: etenim per se suâque sponte existunt, ea specie causâve oblatâ, quae iis excitandis apta nata est. Iis explicandis commodior erit locus, postquam subtiliores animi sensus explicuerimus, citra Edition: 1745; Page: [13] quorum notitiam plurimi voluntatis motus intelligi nequeunt.}5

Quae sensu quovis proximè commendantur sunt omnia propter se expetenda; in iisque, aut eorum praecipuis et maximis, situs est bonorum finis. Quumque usu rationis compertum fuerit, res per se neutiquam jucundas, comparandis rebus aliis, per se bonis et expetendis, inservire; <haec etiam> omnia quibus ea est vis expetentur, propter ea quibus assequendis inservire videntur; qualia sunt opes, divitiae, potestas.

Quemadmodum vero, praeter passiones eas, aut motus perturbatos, qui Edition: current; Page: [32] bus certas res, naturae lege sibi commendatas, sui causa quisque exquirit, insita est homini tranquilla propensio, aut impulsio quaedam valida, cogitabundo cuivis obvia, [ad vitam ex ipsius natura beatissimam] [ad maximam quam capit ejus natura beatitudinem] appetendam; cujus appetitus ope caeteros animi motus, sui causa quicquam anquirentes, regere possit et reprimere: sic, quicunque animo tranquillo aliorum naturas, ingenia, mores, in suo conspectu posuerit, similem inveniet animi propensionem, ad communem omnium, eamque maximam, [prosperitatem et felicitatem] [beatitudinem] expetendam. Quam animi affectionem, sensu suo interno maxime comprobatam, quicunque seria meditatione excoluerit, eam adeo validam poterit efficere, ut caeteris omnibus appetitionibus, Edition: 1745; Page: [14] sive suam, sive paucorum quorumvis utilitatem spectantibus, imperare possit, easque regere aut reprimere.

VIII. His de voluntate breviter expositis, progredimur ad alios animi sensus declarandos, quos diximus reflexos aut subsequentes; quibus novae cernuntur species, novae admittuntur perceptiones, ex rebus sensu aliquo, externo aut interno, praeceptis; ex aliorum etiam hominum conditione, aut eventibus etiam ratiocinatione aut testimonio cognitis, oriundae. Horum quosdam, minus ad rem nostram facientes, obiter attingemus, in aliis magis necessariis moraturi. Visu et auditu cum caeteris animalibus communi utuntur homines: apud hos vero, “aurium” et oculorum “est admirabile quoddam et artificiosum judicium,”6 quo multa cernunt subtiliùs; in formis corporeis, pulchritudinem, venustatem, partium convenientiam; in sonis, gratum concentum et harmoniam; in artibus, “in pictis, fictis, coelatis,”7 in ipso motu et actione, imitationem: quae omnia humaniore nos perfundunt voluptate. Huic comparandae inserviunt artes plurimae, et mechanicae et liberales; hanc consectantur homines in iis operibus, eoque instrumento omni, quae vitae usus et necessitates requirunt.

Sunt et non dissimiles perceptiones gratae, ex rei objectae amplitudine Edition: current; Page: [33] subnascentes, Edition: 1745; Page: [15] atque ex ipsa novitate, pro naturali cognitionis et scientiae appetitu.

In ingenuis hisce voluptatibus numeranda est ea humanissima, quae ex veri cognitione exsurgit; quam omnes propter se appetunt; quaeque pro ipsarum rerum dignitate, cognitionisque evidentia, laetior est et jucundior.

Quae sensibus hisce commendantur omnia sunt quidem propter se, et sua sponte, expetenda. Etenim solertissimo et benignissimo Dei opt. max. consilio, in uberiorem vitae commoditatem, ita fabricati sunt hi sensus, et appetitus, ut ea fere omnia nobis proxime et per se commendent, quae, et alia ratione, vel nobis vel humano generi sunt profutura.

IX. Sunt et subtiliores alii sensus et utiliores; qualis est ea sympathia, sive sensus communis, cujus vi super aliorum conditione commoventur homines, {idque innato quodam impetu, consilium omne aut rationem praevertente,} ex aliorum foelicitate, gaudium, ex infortuniis moerorem colligentes; prout et ridentibus arrident, et flentibus collachrymant; etiam ubi nulla suae conditionis habetur ratio: Unde sit {etiam} ut nemo satis beatus esse possit, ex eo solo quod sibi suppetant omnia ad vitae copiam et jucunditatem facientia: hoc etiam expetet Edition: 1745; Page: [16] quisque, ut suppetant et ea quae aliis sibi caris vitam praestare possint beatam; quippe quorum [horum enim] miseriâ omnis vitae suae status perturbaretur.

Mira hac naturae vi, quadam quasi contagione, una cum gratuita bonitate, efficitur, ut vix ullae sint voluptates, ne corporis quidem, quae aliorum consortio non plurimum adaugeantur. Nulla est laeta aut hilaris animi commotio, quae non inter plures dispertiri et diffundi flagitet. Vix quicquam gratum, laetum, facetum, aut jocosum, quod non ex pectore exardescat, ebulliat, atque inter alios prorumpere gestiat: neque quicquam homini gravius aut tristius, quam aliorum, praecipue immerentium, spectare aerumnas, dolores, moerores, miseriam.

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X. Hominem vero ad agendum esse natum monstrant omnes ejus vires, instinctus, et desideria actuosa{; quod et sensus cuique alte infixus confirmabit. “Appetit enim animus aliquid agere semper, neque ulla conditione quietem sempiternam potest pati”: “neque si jucundissimis nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari; idque si nobis nostrisve accidat, mortis instar putemus”8}. Facultatis etiam [fere] cujusque in homine comes est et moderator sensus aliquis, eum ejusdem usum comprobans, qui [universis est commodissimus] [maxime est secundum naturam], vitaeque communi Edition: 1745; Page: [17] maxime profuturus [profuturum]. Muta etiam animantia, quamvis fortè nullos habeant hujusmodi sensus subtiliores, quos reflexos diximus, instinctu quodam tamen, omnem voluptatis notitiam aut spem antecedente, incitantur quaeque ad ea quae sunt secundum cujusque naturam; et in iis summam sibi inveniunt foelicitatem; aut saltem optimè generis sui foelicitati inserviunt. Tales et in hominibus reperiuntur instinctus plurimi; qui rationis et in se [suaque agendi consilia introspiciendi] [reflectendi] vi instructi, variis etiam gaudent sensibus reflexis, quibus subtilius est judicium de plurimis quae sensus fugiunt crassiores; praecipue vero de omni virium insitarum usu. His {etenim sensibus} cuique {proxime et per se} commendatur is naturalium virium usus, qui maximè est secundum naturam; quique aut sibi aut humano generi est maxime profuturus: idemque in alio comprobatur, et fit per se laetabilis et gloriosus. In ipso corporis statu, et motu, cernimus aliquid sua sponte et per se gratum; quod et in alio comprobamus. Invoce et gestu; in corporis, ipsiusque animi viribus; in artibus imitatricibus, quas antea diximus; in ipsis actionibus externis, et exercitationibus, quibus vel in gravioribus negotiis, vel animi causa utimur, aliud alio cernitur magis decorum, et homine dignum; quamvis nulla virtutis moralis Edition: 1745; Page: [18] specie commendetur. {In iis tamen quae homini propriae sunt viribus, earumque usu, praecipue elucet Edition: current; Page: [35] omnis venustas, omne decus. Quae caeteris animalibus sunt communes, eae humiles, hominisque praestantia parum dignae. Inter ea quae homini sunt propria, a voluntariis tamen virtutibus diversa, praecipua est veri cognitio. “Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem, in qua excellere pulchrum putamus: labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi, malum et turpe ducimus.”9}

Quod vero attinet ad vires animi illustriores, voluntatis motus, et graviora agendi consilia; insitus est omnium divinissimus ille sensus, decorum, pulchrum, et honestum, in animi ipsius motibus, consiliis, dictis, factisque cernens. Hoc sensu certum homini ingenium et indoles, agendi genus quoddam, vitaeque ratio <quaedam> et institutio, ab ipsa natura commendatur; atque in consentaneis officiis peragendis, et recordandis, sensu mens pertentatur laetissimo; contrariorum vero omnium piget pudetque. Aliorum etiam facta aut consilia honesta favore prosequimur et laudibus; eosque in quibus est virtutis significatio, majore amplectimur benevolentia et caritate. Contraria aliorum facta, aut consilia, damnamus et detestamur. Quae hoc sensu comprobantur recta dicuntur, Edition: 1745; Page: [19] et pulchra; et virtutum nomine appellantur: quae damnantur, soeda dicuntur, aut turpia aut vitiosa.

Comprobationem movent voluntatis motus, et agendi consilia omnia benigna, aut illae animi propensiones{, vires} et habitus, qui ex ea gratuita bonitate fluere, aut cum ea connecti videntur; {aut indolem erectiorem, sublimioribus gaudiis deditam, neque suae solum voluptati humiliori aut utilitati intentam indicare;} aut saltem qui contrariam indolem, angustam et humilem sui curam aut philautiam, suam ipsius solummodo respicientem utilitatem aut voluptatem <humiliorem>, excludere censentur. Quae damnantur sunt vel haec ipsa philautia {nimia}, vel morosae, iracundae, invidae, aut malignae animi affectiones, quibus incitantur homines ad alios laedendos; aut denique nimiae humiliorum voluptatum libidines.

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Innatum esse homini hunc sensum, testimonio omnium gentium et seculorum, plurima suis suffragiis comprobantium et damnantium, [suae utilitatis ratione omni detracta,] [quamvis nulla suae utilitatis habeatur ratio] satis confirmatur. Quas utilitates astutè saepe spectari volunt, aut comprobandi et damnandi causas callidè commenti sunt quidam non indocti, [ex illis ipsis deprompta argumenta,] [his fere omnibus] sensum hunc esse innatum, omnibusque his causis priorem, satis ostendunt [efficiatur:]. Edition: 1745; Page: [20] Quae ipsi agenti obventurae sperantur [sunt] utilitates, sive apertiores sive magis latentes, sua ipsi consilia et actiones commendare possunt, non vero aliis, qui nullum inde capiunt fructum. Utilitates aliis ex actione quavis obventurae, sine proximo decori sensu, eam neutiquam ipsi agenti commendabunt.10 Quantumvis [Utcunque] ipse qui agit sua moveatur utilitate, [ea tamen apud alios] [ejus tamen ratio abita, apud ceteros,] actionis honestatem imminuere videtur, <aut> nonnunquam omnino tollere. Beneficentiam eam praecipuè [solam] comprobant homines, quam putant gratuitam; quam fucatam simulatamque esse norunt, oderunt. Ubi utilitates apertiores, gloria, gratia, remuneratio spectantur praecipue, exigua aut nulla videtur esse honestas: Haec enim officiorum simulatione, sine ulla vera bonitate, assequimur.

11Quid, quod et {ipsi agenti et aliis,} eo honestior videtur recta actio, magisque laudabilis, quo majore cum labore, damno, aut periculo fuerat conjuncta. {Non igitur consilia actionesque honestae ea specie commendantur, quod ipsi prosint qui easdem susceperat: neque magis quod nobis spectantibus et comprobantibus prosint. Eâdem enim laude admirationeque prosequimur res praeclare gestas heroum priscorum, in primis mundi seculis, unde ad nos nihil emolumenti pervenisse arbitramur. Virtutem etiam in hoste, Edition: 1745; Page: [21] nobis formidolosam, comprobamus: proditoris contra, quem ob nostram utilitatem mercede corrupimus, perfidiam odimus Edition: current; Page: [37] et detestamur, ut etiam aliorum libidines sibi opportunas flagitiosi.

Neque dixeris ideo officia comprobari quod populari fama sint gloriosa, aut praemia consecutura; haec enim ei soli qui officiis fungitur eadem commendabunt.} Nemo {deinde} laudat, aut ab aliis laudem sperare potest, qui non sentit esse aliquid quod et sibi, et aliis, per se, sua sponte, et sua natura, videatur laudabile. Nemo gratiam referendam sperat, nisi qui eo ipso fatetur benevolentiam, et beneficentiam, esse per se et sua natura amabilia. Nemo praemia a Deo potest sperare, nisi qui credit esse aliquid quod ipsi Deo videtur per se amabile, et praemio dignum. Nemo poenas a Deo metuit, nisi pro meritis. Qui leges Dei laudat, ideo laudat quod ea jubeant quae per se sunt recta, justa, pulchra; vetentque omnia contraria.

{Hunc sensum a natura datum, atque ideo plurima per se, sua vi, sua sponte videri recta, honesta, pulchra, laudabilia, ostendunt et animi placidi motus, et turbidi, vi prorsus naturali excitati; qui suam cujusque utilitatem haud respicientes, ex aliorum moribus et fortunis observatis nascuntur, palamque Edition: 1745; Page: [22] testantur quales nos esse velit natura, de his mox erit agendum. Per omnium vitas, vitae que fere partes omnes, serpit hic sensus, neque ullam fere delectationem ingenuam, aut artem, sui expertem esse sinit. Hinc omnis fere pendet Poëtica et Rhetorica, ipsaeque pictorum, eorumque qui signa fabricantur, sculptorum, histrionumque artes: in amicis, conjugibus, sodalibus eligendis plurimum valet, seque in ipsos lusus jocosque insinuat. Qui haec omnia pensitaverit, nae ille cum Aristotele consenserit “ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ad intelligendum et agendum esse natum, quasi mortalem Deum.”12

Neque verendum ne hac ratione, quae sensui cuidam, ipsi quidem animo non corpori naturâ insito, virtutum vitiorumque notitias omnes tandem acceptas refert, virtutis dignitati et constantiae quicquam detrahatur. Stabilis enim est natura, sibique semper constans: neque magis metuendum, ne hominum naturâ mutatâ, evertantur virtutum fundamenta, quam ne Edition: current; Page: [38] sublata gravitate, mundi compages dissolvatur. Neque huic rationi consequens est, omnia ipsi Deo a primo fuisse ita paria et indifferentia, ut aliter constitutis hominum sensibus, alia omnia honesta aut turpia efficere potuisset. Si quidem enim Edition: 1745; Page: [23] Deus a primo fuit sapientissimus, perspiciebat, affectiones animi benignas iis insitas animantibus, qui sibi invicem suis actionibus prodesse aut obesse possent, omnium saluti inservituras: contrariarum autem omnia contraria fore consequentia; neque aliter fieri potuisse: eum itidem sensum inserendo, qui omnia benigna et benefica comprobaret, perspexit se ea omnia cuique per se grata effecturum, quae alia omni ratione, toti horum animantium universitati necessario profutura essent: contrarium autem sensum qui contraria probaret inserendo, (quod an fieri poterat vix satis apparet,) ea per se grata reddidisset, quae, aliis de causis, et singulis et universis fuissent nocitura. Deus igitur a primo bonus et sapiens, sensum hunc amica et benigna comprobantem, necessario inserere voluit; neque virtutis natura magis est mutabilis, quam Dei ipsius bonitas et sapientia. His quidem Dei virtutibus ab hac quaestione sejunctis, nihil certi maneret.}13

XI. Comprobationis autem diversi sunt gradus, virtutumque species aliae aliis pulchriores, ut et vitiorum, turpiores. “Inter benevolas animi affectiones aequè late patentes, magis decorae sunt stabiles et tranquillae, quam perturbatae.” “Inter animi motus pariter tranquillos et puros, aut pariter turbatos et vehementes, illi Edition: 1745; Page: [24] magis laudantur qui latius patent, et maxime qui latissime, ad totam scil. rerum sensu praeditarum universitatem pertinentes.”14

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Diximus ex virtutis comprobatione ardentiorem efflorescere amorem, in eos qui virtute videntur praediti. Quumque in omnes nostras vires, affectiones, sensus, vota, appetitiones, animum [mens] reflectere possimus, eaque contemplari; ille ipse decori et honesti sensus acrior, ardentior virtutis appetitio, et honestiorum omnium amor et caritas, omnino comprobabitur; neque ulla animi affectio magis, quam optimi cujusque dilectiones et caritates. Atque quum ipse Deus omnis boni et honesti sit fons inexhaustus, et exemplar absolutum, cui et innumeris beneficiis omnino gratuitis acceptis devinciuntur homines; nulla animi affectio magis comprobabitur, quam summa in Deum veneratio, ardentissimo cum amore, et studio illi obsequendi cui gratiam referre nequimus, conjuncta; una cum fidentis submissione animi, se suaque omnia ipsi permittentis, stabilique [ipsius virtutes] [ipsum in omni virtute] imitandi studio, quousque patitur naturae nostrae imbecillitas.

Damnantur itidem magis malignae omnes animi affectiones, et agendi consilia, quo deliberata sunt magis et obstinata. Levior Edition: 1745; Page: [25] {paulò} est eorum turpitudo quae ex subita quadam, et brevi transitura cupiditate sunt profecta; longèque levior eorum quae ex subito metu aut ira. Damnatur maxime ea sordida et rebus suis semper attenta philautia, quae omnem humaniorem sensum excludit, omnes affectiones benignas superat, atque ad alios quoscunque sui causa laedendos incitat.

Merito inter turpissima, et naturâ ratione praeditâ indignissima, censetur omnis in Deum impietas; sive admittantur ea scelera quae Dei contemptum palam produnt; sive ea sit de Deo colendo incuria, ut nulla de eo meditatio, nulla sit ejus veneratio, nulla ei gratia habeatur. Neque quicquam affert, vel ad pietatis laudem et necessitatem minuendam, aut impietatis turpitudinem, quod Deo neque prodesse possit hominum pietas, neque obesse impietas. Etenim animi affectiones spectat praecipue, et comprobat Edition: current; Page: [40] aut damnat, hic recti et honesti sensus, non earum in rebus externis efficaciam. Depravatus est et detestabilis, qui benefico et optime merito non habet gratiam, etsi eam referre nequeat; quique vel viros claros atque optimè meritos non amat, laudat, celebrat; quamvis eos nequeat ad altiores dignitates aut opes promovere. Sponte sua prorumpit ingenium probum et honestum, sive Edition: 1745; Page: [26] quis potest quicquam illorum gratia quos amat et veneratur efficere, sive non potest. Haec omnia non adeo ratiocinatione, sed intimo potius probi cujusque sensu innotescunt.

XII. Sublimior hic sensus, quem vitae totius ducem constituit ipsa natura, etiam atque etiam est considerandus; quippe qui de omnibus animi viribus, motibus, et agendi consiliis judicat; inque ea omnia suo jure arrogat sibi imperium; gravissimamque eam sert sententiam, in ipsis virtutibus, ipsoque pulchri et honesti studio, sitam esse et hominis dignitatem sive praestantiam {naturalem}, et vitam beatissimam. Qui sensum hunc sovent excoluntque, ejus vi sentiunt se confirmari posse ad gravissima pericula subeunda, aut maximas rerum externarum jacturas lubenter faciendas, ne amicorum, patriae, aut communem omnium utilitatem, ullamve officii sui partem deserant: eâque sola ratione, suam indolem vitaeque rationem, sentiunt se penitus posse comprobare. Acri item morsu cruciantur, caecisque verberibus caeduntur, qui hunc animi spernunt principatum, officia sua externorum malorum metu, aut utilitatum appetitione deserentes.

Divinioris [Sublimioris] hujus sensus, qui animi affectiones gratuitas et latissimè patentes commendat Edition: 1745; Page: [27] praecipuè, principatus elucet cum sua sponte, suaque vi, tum quod sibi {praecipuè} plaudat vir bonus, suum probet ingenium, sibique vel maxime placeat, quum reprimit, non solum eos omnes appetitus, sive humiliores, sive sublimiores, qui suae prospiciunt utilitati aut voluptati; verum arctiores quasque στοργῦς aut amicitiae caritates,15 ipsumque patriae amorem; quo communi et majori omnium consulat Edition: current; Page: [41] foelicitati. Bonitatem enim eam latissimè patentem, caeteris omnibus <praeponit> animi affectionibus, sive suam spectent utilitatem, sive eorum qui arctiore quavis necessitudine sibi devinciuntur{, non praeponit solum hic sensus; verum etiam laetiore honestatis veraeque gloriae conscientia, damna omnia, gaudiaque omissa, et jacturas honestatis causa factas cumulatissimè pensabit; quippe quae ipsam officiorum honestatem et speciem praeclaram adaugent praecipue, et huic sensui commendant: cui nihil simile in alio quolibet sensu, se inferiorem reprimente, reperitur}. Qui vero secus egerit {ac monet hic sensus,} hic vere sibi plaudere nequit, si internum animi sensum exploraverit. Quum de aliorum indole, consiliis factisque judicamus, similia omnia semper comprobamus, immo ab iis flagitamus; omniaque semper damnamus contraria; quum nulla nostrae utilitatis ratione judicium depravatur. Edition: 1745; Page: [28] {Atque idcirco quamvis omnia quae homini naturâ eveniunt, aut in hominem cadere possunt, naturalia quodammodo dicantur; ea tamen sola quae parti huic diviniori, cujus est in reliquas imperium naturale, se probant, secundum naturam, eique apta et convenientia dicenda.}

XIII. Huic conjunctus est et sensus alter, qui homini jucundissimam facit eam comprobationem, et caritatem, quam ab aliis, ipsius facta et consilia spectantibus, consequitur; molestissimas, è contrario, facit aliorum ipsius facta recolentium censuras, vituperationes, omnemque infamiam; quamvis neque ex gloria speret emolumentum quodvis aliud oriturum, neque ex infamia incommodum: haec enim propter se expetuntur, aut fugiuntur. Edition: current; Page: [42] Unde et gloria delectantur plurimi, etiam superstite, quamvis nullum ejus sensum se sperent habituros. {Neque ideo tantum laudem appetunt homines quod ipsorum virtuti praestantiaeque testimonium ferat, ipsorumque de se judicium honorificum confirmet. Honore enim delectantur etiam viri optimi, sibique suae virtutis satis conscii.

Hunc sensum a caeteris quidem diversum, at priori, cujus est de virtute vitioque judicium, subnixum, a natura datum esse, satis docet ille animi motus naturalis, qui Edition: 1745; Page: [29] pudor aut verecundia appellatur, vultûs rubore se prodens: quem non virtutis solum verum omnis decentiae custodem cernimus, humiliorumque appetituum praesentem et vigilem moderatorem; unde} laudis16 hic et vituperii sensus magnum praebet in vita usum, in hominibus ad omnia praeclara incitandis, iisque ab omni inhonesto, turpi, flagitioso, aut injurioso, deterrendis.

In hoc recti honestique sensu, et altero cum eo conjuncto, laudis scil. aut vituperii, multo minus sibi invicem dissimiles reperiuntur homines quam in caeteris; si modo eadem species proxima, ab intellectu, diversis hominibus repraesentetur; eadem nempe studia et animi affectiones, dijudicanda, honesta sint an turpia. Ubi vero contrariae sunt hominum de vita beata sententiae, aut de iis quae ad vitam pertinent beatam, eamve praestare possunt; non mirum est eos, (etsi similis sit omnino de moribus omnium sensus) quum de actionibus judicant externis, in diversa omnia abire, actionesque laudare et vituperare contrarias: Aut si <diversi> homines {alii alias et} contrarias habeant de legibus divinis opiniones, hi ea credentes vetita, quae illis licita et honesta videntur; quum inter omnes conveniat, Deo esse parendum: aut denique, si contrariae foveantur de aliorum Edition: current; Page: [43] indole, ingenio, et moribus opiniones; his eos credentibus Edition: 1745; Page: [30] probos, pios, et benignos, quos illi censent inter saevos et improbos. His de causis in diversa omnia abibunt, quamvis, simili de moribus sensu, eaedem animi affectiones omnibus a natura commendentur.

XIV. “Quum sensuum horum ope,” alia “venustâ, decorâ,” gloriosâ, aut “venerandâ” specie vestiantur; alia, vili et erubescendâ; si quando uni eidemque rei, plures et sibi invicem contrariae simul inducantur species, existet novus quidam sensus, “eorum quae dicuntur ridicula, aut ad risum movendum idonea.” Quum vero communis sit de humanae naturae dignitate, “prudentiaque quadam” majore “et solertia, opinio”; in hominum dictis factisque, ea “risum movere solent peccata turpia, quae non sunt cum gravi dolore aut interitu conjuncta”: haec enim “magis commiserationem excitarent.” Risus quidem est animi commotio jucunda; derideri autem, et ludibrio esse, fere cunctis est molestum, quod et homines studiose solent praecavere, gloriae nempe plerumque cupidi. Hinc non levis erit hujusce, sive sensus, sive facultatis, in moribus hominum corrigendis, usus. “Risum” etiam movere solent alia qualiacunque, “quae simul praeclaram aliquam exhibent speciem,” <cum> vili tamen et despiciendae immistam; ex qua observata non levis oritur aliquando nec inutilis voluptas, nec spernendum Edition: 1745; Page: [31] colloquii condimentum, et curarum graviorum requies et levamen.17

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{XV. Prout hominum varii sunt sensus, varia admodum itidem cernuntur bona et mala: quorum omnium tamen triplex est ratio; alia enim animi, alia Corporis, alia externa. Ad animum referuntur ingenium perspicax et acutum, memoria tenax, scientiae, artes, prudentia, virtutesque omnes voluntariae: Ad Corpus, sensus integri, vires, valetudo, velocitas, agilitas, pulchritudo: Externa sunt libertas, honores, imperia, divitiae. Quumque omnia quae sensu quolibet commendantur, ad se exquirendum appetitum stimulare soleant, quaeque improbantur ea voluntas aspernetur; varii itidem erunt voluntatis motus, sive mens placide feratur sive perturbatione agitetur. Quatuor animi motus placidos antea memoravimus, Desiderium, Fugam, Gaudium, et Tristitiam; quatuor item turbidos, Libidinem, metum, laetitiam et aegritudinem. Horum vero cujusque plures sunt partes, a se invicem longe diversae, pro rerum quas sequimur aut fugimus diversitate, prout nobis aliisve prospicimus, atque prout nostris aliorumve rebus prosperis aut adversis commovemur: Inter hos ipsos motus aliorum fortunas respicientes insignia sunt discrimina, pro variis eorum moribus et ingeniis, variisque inter se Edition: 1745; Page: [32] conjunctionibus aut dissidiis, eorumque causis.

Longum foret haec omnia persequi, variasque apud doctos passionum divisiones examinare: praecipua tantum attingemus; et motuum nomina notabimus, quae nonnunquam promiscuè sive ad perturbationes sive ad constantias notandas adhibentur.

1. Qui cupiditati sive libidini subjiciuntur motus turbidi, sui cujusque bona corporis aut externa spectantes, sunt cibi, potusque, cupediarum, et veneris appetitiones; honoris item, imperii et divitiarum, quae ambitio et avaritia vocantur. His contraria mala propulsant et adspernantur offensiones contrariae, timores, scil. et Irae, quae fugae aut metui subjiciuntur.

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Animi sui bona spectant, cognitionis, scientiarum, artium, virtutumque appetitiones, et proborum imitatrix aemulatio. Contraria aspernantur, Pudor et verecundia. motuum hujusmodi plurimis desunt nomina signata.

2. Aliorum res prosperas expetunt Benevolentia, στοργὴ, caeteraeque cognationum caritates. Probis et bene meritis res prosperas consectantur Favor, Gratia et Officiositas venerabunda. Eorum res adversas avertere student Metus, Irae, Commiserationes, Indignationes. Malorum, contra, et improborum Edition: 1745; Page: [33] res prosperas impedire Invidentiâ et indignatione conamur.

3. Quae Laetitiae subjiciuntur perturbationes, sui cujusque corporis bona aut externa spectantes sunt Delectatio, Superbia, Arrogantia, Exultatio, Jactatio. Horum tamen bonorum usus diuturnior fastidium nonnunquam aut nauseam parit. Ex malis contrariis instantibus oriuntur, Aegritudo, Angor, Desperatio, apud antiquos quidem Ira dicitur; “Libido eum puniendi qui videatur laesisse injuriâ”;18 quam idcirco libidini potius subjiciunt quam offensioni contrariae.

Ex animi sui bonis praesentibus, virtutibus praecipuè voluntariis, oriuntur Plausus interni, praedicandi studium, honesta Superbia, et Gloriatio. Ex malis contrariis Pudor, animique morsus, Demissio et Infractio. Illa laetitiae, haec aegritudinis sunt partes.

4. Aliorum virtutes nobis obversantes excipiunt amor, favor et veneratio, consuetudineque adjunctâ, amicitia: Aliorum vitia, excipiunt offensiones contrariae, Odium, Contemptio, Detestatio, quae aegritudini sunt affinia.

Ex proborum et bene meritorum rebus secundis, laeta nascitur Congratulatio; ex adversis, Moeror, Misericordia, et Indignatio. Ex improborum rebus adversis ἐπιχαιρεκακία sive malevolentia, et exultatio; ex Edition: 1745; Page: [34] eorundem rebus secundis Moeror, et Indignatio.

Qui horum omnium definitiones videre cupit, consulat Aristotelem, Ciceronem, Andronicum, aliosque. Quae exposuimus satis confirmant aliquid esse per se, suâ naturâ, suaque vi, rectum honestum et laudabile, ejusque Edition: current; Page: [46] sensum homini innatum; quum mores hominum sequantur horum motuum naturalium plurimi; atque in simili fortuna, mores hominum contrarii contrarios animi motus in nobis excitare soleant, nulla nostrae utilitatis specie objectâ.}19

{XVI. Horum motuum nonnulli ita naturali impetu incitantur, ut pauci in ulla vitae parte eorum expertes reperiantur, victus, amictus, aliûsque cultus appetitio, famis, sitis, frigoris, aut caloris sensu molesto excitatur. “Commune animantium omnium,” ad certam aetatem, “est conjunctionis appetitus, procreandi causa, et in eos qui procreati sunt praecipua quaedam cura.”20 Qua ex stirpe inter homines oriuntur caeterae cognationum et affinitatum caritates. Vi pariter naturali, licet non adeo continua aut necessaria, caeteri motus, occasione oblatâ, existunt. Virtutum significatio amorem, comprobationem et amicitiam excitat; conatus quosque honestos favore studioque prosequimur, successus gratulamur, et frustrationes Edition: 1745; Page: [35] deploramus et indignamur: atque ex rebus improborum similibus motus naturâ existunt contrarii: Beneficia accepta gratiam movent; injuria aut noxa, iram et ultionem; Miseria aliena, immerentium praecipuè, commiserationem. Naturales itidem sunt appetitiones cognitionis virtutumque omnium, gloriae, valetudinis, virium, formae, voluptatis; omnium denique quae sensu quolibet commendantur.}21

XVII. [XV.] Neque omittendae sunt aliae quaedam naturae nostrae partes aut vires, quae pariter ad voluntatem vel intellectum pertinere possunt; qualis est ea cujus vi ideas quaslibet aut animi affectiones, utcunque inter se longe dispares, quae simul acrius animum commoverant, ita in posterum conjungimus, ut harum una deinceps in mente excitata, alias omnes, secum Edition: current; Page: [47] olim conjunctas, repraesentatura sit, idque consestim, sine ullo voluntatis imperio. Huic idearum conjunctioni accepta est referenda, rerum praeteritarum sere omnis revocatio et memoria, et facilis sermonis usus. Ex incauta tamen idearum conjunctione et complicatione, plurimum saepe adaugentur humiliores omnes cupiditates; quum voluptatibus humilioribus conjunctae sunt species omnino alienae, at longe magis praeclarae, ita ut haud facile divelli possint. Hinc Edition: 1745; Page: [36] ex elegantiae cujusdam, aut artis ingenuae, aut prudentiae, immò liberalitatis et beneficentiae, opinione, aut specie conjuncta, sortiuntur voluptates quaedam, et res externae, miram quandam, at minime naturalem vim, desideria hominum commovendi, et magnum videntur habere ad vitam beatam momentum. {Plurimum igitur intererit qualis cujusque sit institutio, quales familiaritates, consuetique eorum sermones quibuscum vivitur: horum enim omnium vis magna, sive ad mores emendandos, sive ad depravandos.}

Huic affines sunt habitus. Ita enim nata sunt et mens et corpus, ut omnes eorum vires consuetudine, et exercitatione, augeantur et perficiantur. Usu quidem frequentiore voluptatum imminuitur jucunditas, et dolorum itidem molestia: consuetae verò ubi desunt voluptates, molestius oritur desiderium. Unde, ad omnes sive actiones sive voluptates consuetas magis sumus proclives, et difficilius ab iis cohibemur.

Quae propter se sunt expetenda, sensu aliquo, diximus, proximè commendari. Homo autem animal acutum, sagax, memor, ratione praeditum et consilio,22 alia quaevis expetet, quae rerum per se expetendarum copiam consicere valent: quales sunt divitiae, et potentia, quae cunctis hominum Edition: 1745; Page: [37] studiis et desideriis, sive honestis, sive flagitiosis, benevolis aut malevolis, inservire possunt; unde et ab omnibus expetuntur.

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Ad fabricam hominum, qui tanta rationis vi, tot sensibus praeclaris sunt instructi, tot societatis vinculis et caritatibus inter se devincti, absolvendam, adjunxit Deus opt. max. orationis et eloquendi vim:{*} “quae primum efficit ut ea quae ignoramus, discere, et ea quae scimus, docere possimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes comprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus: haec nos juris, legum, urbium societate devinxit: haec a vita immani et fera segregavit.”

Quamvis vero hae omnes quas recensuimus naturae nostrae vires, aut partes, sint hominibus ita communes, ut haud fere cuiquam <mortalium> quaevis earum prorsus deesse videatur; mira tamen est ingeniorum inter homines diversitas, cum aliae <atque diversissimae> naturae partes, apud alios, <caeteris partibus> longè praepolleant viribus, et vitae regant tenorem. Apud multos [alios] vehementiores sunt voluptatum humiliorum appetitus; aliis humaniorum et elegantiorum acrior est sensus et appetitio: apud alios eminent cognitionis studia; apud alios <viget> praecipue Edition: 1745; Page: [38] ambitio, aut futuri provida nimis avaritia: vigent apud alios benignae animi affectiones, miserorum commiseratio, benevolentia, et beneficentia, et harum comites et fautores, virtutis amor et honestatis studium; alii ad iras, odia, et invidiam sunt proniores. In hac vero hominum conditione, quam cernimus depravatam esse et degenerem, humiliores, fere ubique, et minus honestae libidines dominantur; quaeque purior monstraret ratio maxime esse appetenda, ea plurimi parum norunt, aut parum in iis cognoscendis versantur; parciusque igitur in iisdem anquirendis occupantur.

Hanc ingeniorum diversitatem, ab ipsis incunabulis aliquando conspicuam, mirum in modum augent et confirmant mores, instituta, disciplinae, consuetudines, habitus, et exempla dissimilia et contraria: ne de corporum constitutione varia, cujus explicatio medicorum est, agamus{: Quinetiam in moribus hominum corrumpendis eadem vim habent haud exiguam. Non tamen inde solum satis explicari posse videtur ea communis omnium imbecillitas aut pravitas; quae tanta est ut sine morbis vitiisque, quorum Edition: current; Page: [49] tamen longe alii apud alios sunt gradus et genera, nemo nascatur: In se quisque formam et notionem viri boni reperiet, Edition: 1745; Page: [39] quae mortalium nemini ab omni parte conveniet; immo plurimos officii sui numeros se praeteriisse fatebuntur optimi quique; quamvis haud spernendos dederit natura igniculos, ingeniisque nostris innata sint quaedam virtutum semina, quae quidem raro adolescere patimur.23 Sed de morborum causis et medicina, ut de omnis mali origine, variae fuerunt neque improbabiles philosophorum conjecturae: de causis tamen eorundem, et de medicina salutari, nemo, nisi Deo monstrante, quod satis liqueat quicquam affirmare potest}. Qui vero seriò operam dederit in veris et praecipuis bonis cognoscendis, iisque a fallacibus, et falsis secernendis, atque in partibus animi nobilioribus excolendis, poterit hic perturbatos animi motus reprimere, atque ingenium, sive naturale sive adventitium, non parum immutare, et in melius emendare.

XVIII. [XVI.] Qui multiplicem sensuum horum perspexerit varietatem, quibus res adeo dispares hominibus commendantur appetendae; animique propensiones pariter multiplices, et mutabiles; et inter se saepe pugnantes appetitus, et desideria, quibus suam quisque consectatur utilitatem, eamque variam, aut non minus variam voluptatem; eam etiam ingenii humanitatem, affectionesque benignas multiplices; humana Edition: 1745; Page: [40] huic natura prima specie videbitur chaos quoddam, rudisque rerum non bene junctarum moles, nisi altius repetendo, nexum quendam, et ordinem a natura constitutum, et principatum deprehenderit, aut ἡγημονικὸν aliquod, ad Edition: current; Page: [50] modum caeteris ponendum idoneum. Philosophiae munus est hoc investigare, atque monstrare qua demum ratione haec sint ordinanda; miro enim artificio

Hanc Deus, et melior litem natura diremit.24

Quod aliquatenus perspici poterit ex iis quae diximus, decori et honesti sensum explicantes. Neque longa opus est disputatione, aut conquisitis argumentis, quum in se descendendo quisque inveniet, se, illa honestum a turpi discernendi facultate, {ad imperandum, totamque vitam regendam natâ,} esse praeditum, cujus ope cernere licebit, eum vitae tenorem atque ordinem, quem solum poterit comprobare, {quique igitur est maxime secundum naturam;} ubi scil. vigent benevolae omnes et gratuitae animi affectiones, simul et communi omnium consulimus utilitati; amicorum, necessariorum, aut nostro privato duntaxat consulentes commodo, ubi majori omnium non obstat foelicitati: omnemque ubi morum excolimus mansuetudinem, bonitatem, pietatem, easque Edition: 1745; Page: [41] animi, corporisque vires, quibus Deo hominibusque inservire possimus. Quae insuper animi vis, recti et honesti jucundissimo sensu, et bonae spei pleno, mentem perfundens, nos ad officia quaevis, etiam laboriosa et periculosa, suscipienda poterit obfirmare, eaque peracta munificentissime remunerare.

Quin et ipsa ratio, perlustrans ea veri indicia, quae nobis exhibet nostra aliarumque rerum constitutio, ostendet foelicitatem maximè stabilem et homine dignissimam, eodem vitae tenore, quo communi consulitur utilitati, cuique parari; et eam plerumque rerum externarum copiam, quae alias praebet voluptates, in suo genere laetissimas. Haec etiam monstrabit, Dei opt. max. providentia omnia administrari; unde nova elucebit spes et laetissima. Hinc colliget, ea dogmata de officiis, quae ex mentis humanae rerumque Edition: current; Page: [51] aliarum fabrica observatâ eruerat, legum divinarum habere vim, monstrantium quaenam Deus a nobis exigat, quaenam ei grata, quibusque ejus comprobationem et favorem simus consequuturi. Hinc melioris, post corporis interitum, vitae exsurget spes, atque in omni honesto officio animi obfirmatio et fiducia; hinc divina pietatis et religionis gaudia animum percipient; omniaque laeta et gloriosa, sub Edition: 1745; Page: [42] numinis benigni auspiciis, bonus quisque, non sibi solum, verum bonis omnibus, rerumque omnium universitati, poterit polliceri. {His etiam constitutis et perspectis, amico foedere conspirabunt omnia naturae principia, quae suae cujusque, quaeque aliorum utilitati prospiciunt.}

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CAPUT II: De Summo Bono et Virtute.

I. Pleniore naturae humanae, ejusque partium, exposita descriptione, progredimur anquirere de finibus bonorum et malorum, sive de hominis summo bono, et vitae degendae ratione.

Non multum morabimur in quaestionibus illis decantatis, de intellectus imperio in voluntatem, aut voluntatis in intellectum, quae potius ad pneumatologiam pertinent. Haec obiter monenda, ignoti nullam esse cupidinem; menti tamen a primo insitas esse plures propensiones ad certas res, ubi primum aliquam earum adepta fuerit notitiam, appetendas, atque ad contrarias propulsandas; quam velleietatem simplicem dicunt scholastici. Quae ubi ita valida fuerit, ut mentem ab aliis rebus praesentibus exquirendis aut perfruendis, possit avocare, ipsiusve Edition: 1745; Page: [43] inertiam excutere, studium excitabit rei expetitae consequendae subsidia et rationes omnes cognoscendi; perspiciendique quaenam earum sint maxime idoneae: quibus exploratis, permovebit etiam, secundum Stoicos, ad ea consilia exsequenda, sive ad stabile agendi propositum; quam volitionem, dicunt scholastici, efficacem. Haerent in hac parte Peripatetici quidam, negantes voluntatem necessario sequi vel ultimum intellectus judicium practicum, licet plerumque sequatur. Vim sui impellendi flectendique voluntati tribuunt, quae, “positis his omnibus ad agendum praerequisitis, quae dicuntur, agere potest, vel non agere, (addunt quidam etiam) hoc agere, vel huic contrarium.”1 Haec philosophiae primae scriptoribus permittimus dijudicanda. In universum Edition: current; Page: [53] vero videtur, potestatem aliquam, vel imperium, improprie admodum tribui posse intellectui; cujus quippe munus solum est verum cernere: velle autem, jubere, aut imperare, voluntatis.

Voluntatis in intellectum imperium non aliud est quam quod potest quisque, [prout voluerit] [pro suo arbitrio], animum ad hanc vel illam partem examinandam convertere; atque ubi summa non occurrit evidentia, assensionem cohibere et amplius pronunciare. Representatis vero certis indiciis, assensionem cohibere Edition: 1745; Page: [44] nequit, aut contrariae inhaerere sententiae; immo ubi speciosiora ab una parte occurrunt argumenta, <pro> voluntatis imperio nequit homo eam partem non existimare probabiliorem. Atque haec hactenus.

II. Neque magis moramur in quaestionibus plurimis theoreticis, de generalibus boni finisque ideis, aut divisionibus; utpote facilibus, et ad pneumatologiam pertinentibus. Haec sunt in promptu axiomata. 1. Rerum aliae propter se expetuntur; aliae quod aliis rebus comparandis inserviant; aliae denique ob utrumque. 2. Omnia propter se expetita, vi quadam aut sensu proximo, aut instinctu, et naturali quadam commendatione, nulla ratiocinatione praeeunte, nobis conciliantur. Rationis {enim} est, ea investigare quorum ope res hujusmodi parari possint: aut, si {inter varios fines} contentio quaedam aut comparatio fiat, [cernere qui] [quinam fines] sint maxime expetendi; quaeque iis assequendis optimè inserviant. 3. Triplici sub specie res nobis commendantur, jucundi, utilis, et honesti. Jucunda dicuntur, omnia quae sui causa quisquam expetit, ut aliqua voluptate fruatur; rarò tamen in hoc genere ponuntur sublimiores ex {rerum cognitione et} virtute voluptates. Utilia sunt, quae propter alia, non propter se appetuntur. Honesta sunt ipsae virtutes, quae sua propria specie ac dignitate animum Edition: current; Page: [54] Edition: 1745; Page: [45] commovent. 4. Boni cujusvis ad vitam beatam momentum, pendet ex ipsius et dignitate et diuturnitate [duratione]. In bonorum enim dignitate magna est varietas. Quae sensibus ejusdem generis percipiuntur, quales sunt omnes {ferè} voluptates corporis nobis cum beluis communes, eorum digniora sunt quaeque majora et gratiora, quae et intensiora vulgo dicuntur. Quae altioribus percipiuntur animi viribus, suam propriam habent dignitatem, quae proxime et per se elucet, omniumque ita movet comprobationem, ut laudentur hi, beatique censeantur, recteque egisse, qui hisce delectationibus omnem corporis posthabuerunt voluptatem. Quod de iis cernere licet, qui artibus elegantioribus, doctrinae studiis, et praecipue ipsi virtuti et officiis honestis, se totos dediderunt.

Naturae igitur sagaci et providae, hoc summum est bonum, “quod propter se expetendum est; quo referuntur fere omnia, ipsum vero nusquam; quod summam habet dignitatem; quod stabile est, et vitam beatam potest praestare.”2

III. In vita beata quaerenda, quae vel omnibus, vel plurimis et praecipuis, debet esse bonis cumulata, monendum est, neminem omnis voluptatis usum copiosissimum sibi posse polliceri, aut omnium malorum amotionem. Ut fluxae sunt et instabiles res Edition: 1745; Page: [46] humanae, ita omnis quae ex rebus externis pendet voluptas est itidem incerta. Mutantur et intereunt subinde res ipsae; mutabile est hominis ingenium; mutabilis et incerta ea valitudo, quae ad voluptatem fruendam exigitur. Externa omnia, non in nostra potestate, sed in fortunae posita esse videntur temeritate; aut verius, divina reguntur providentia, quae nemini, quod ad res attinet externas, [ab instabili et variâ] [de stabili & inconcussa] cavit fortunâ.

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Quid, quod et inter se pugnant ipsae voluptates; neque potest idem, omnibus simul conquirendis strenuam navare operam, aut conquisitis jucunde frui: immo etiam, sublimiorum voluptatum dignitas istiusmodi consortium aspernatur; earumque pulchritudo, {sensusque laetissimus} non parum ex eo pendet, quod ob eas, humiliores plurimas omisimus et sprevimus, labores etiam et aerumnas forti animo pertulimus.

Quum igitur datum non sit bonis omnibus copiose frui, aut omnia effugere mala; inquirendum est deinceps, quae bona sint praecipua, maximeque ad vitam beatam facientia? quaeque mala gravissima, vitaeque statum tranquillae maxime turbantia? Inter se comparanda sunt, igitur, ea bona quae diversis hominum sensibus commendantur, eorumque et dignitas spectanda, et {diuturnitas Edition: 1745; Page: [47] sive} duratio. Malorum pariter comparanda inter se sunt genera, ut videamus quodnam sit extremum, aut gravissimum.

IV. {Hic obiter monendum; quod quamquam Hieronymo Rhodio, aliisve ejusdem sententiae patronis, largiundum sit, ipsam doloris omnis vacuitatem consecutionem afferre voluptatis cujusdam; atque statum hunc non dolendi (adeo benigna est naturae nostrae conformatio) jucunditatem quandam laetamve constantiam comitari; dummodo nulla interea cupiditate aut metu mens agitetur; ita ut qui malo omni careat verè sit in bonis: nobis tamen tot sensibus atque appetitibus actuosis a natura instructis, ea indolentiae jucunditas haud quaquam satis est ad bene vivendum; quum neque magna sit, neque homine dignissima, neque eum habeat ictum quo pellat animum, ut inde petantur initia agendi. Aliis igitur bonis judicanda est vita beata, quae sensu aliquo percipiuntur.}

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Et primo, patet corporis voluptates nullam habere dignitatem3 ob quam laudari possint. Sit quamvis grata earum titillatio, aut motus jucundi; humiles tamen sunt sua natura omnes, et plurimae [prae pudore celandae] [erubescendae]: cito etiam fluunt; praeteritarumque insuavis erit recordatio, nihil secum ferens laetabile aut gloriosum, quod graviora vitae Edition: 1745; Page: [48] incommoda, aut aerumnas, lenire possit aut compensare.

Neque dixerit quisquam, communi hominum suffragio eas maxime comprobari, ideo quod hominum bona pars iis solis ferè inhiet. Enimvero hoc a vero adeo est alienum, ut pauci admodum reperiantur, qui, sedato paulum brevi libidinis fervore, non fatebuntur, eas voluptates vitam beatam praestare non posse. Mortalium etiam nequissimi, imperfectis quibusdam aut fucatis virtutum speciebus plurimum capiuntur, et delectantur; amicitiis, scil. et officiis benignis, erga eos quos sibi vel natura devinxit vel consuetudo, quosque pro temerario judicio maximi faciunt. Neque omnino cessando, aut hisce solis voluptatibus fruendo, se foelices autumant: his {etenim} adjungunt saepe actiones plures et officia, quae sibi videntur honesta. {Atque vigeant quamvis appetitiones humiliores, viribusque polleant; ea tamen animi pars cujus est in reliquas omnes imperium naturale, quae divinior est, atque cujus monitis praecipuè judicandum quid Deus postulet et natura, voluptates corporis tanquam homine parum dignas aspernatur, atque potius a vita beata semovendas arbitratur.}

Quid memorem, voluptates corporis furtivis coloribus amicitiae, commoditatis, beneficientiae, Edition: 1745; Page: [49] saepe esse [vestitas et ornatas] [coopertas], atque elegantiorum artium voluptatibus conditas, quae cunctis {alioquin} viles essent et erubescendae. Quid? quod rarius iis fruendis repugnare videatur decori, et honesti sensus; quia saepissime, pro mira perturbationum fallacia, videntur hae voluptates innocuae. At contra, virtutes, propriâ sua et vera dignitate se bonis commendant, eosque faciunt beatos. Neque enim Edition: current; Page: [57] lascivia, et lusu, et joco comite levitatis, sed saepe etiam tristes, sua bonitate, firmitate, et constantia sunt beati.

A luxuriosorum {etiam} judicio provocare licet, qui ventribus dediti, nunquam delectationes homine digniores, et honestiores, ex stabili probitatis et constantis virtutis sensu oriundas, experti sunt. Malè verum hi corrupti judices examinant: nobiliores apud eos hebescunt sensus. Animi autem gravitas et constantia, virtutesque omnes, sensus haud obtundunt externos. Sentiunt viri boni omnem in voluptate corporis jucunditatem, eâque spreta, virtuti adhaerescunt; omne, aut longe longeque maximum, sentientes in ea positum esse momentum ad vitam beatam. Honestis hominum istiusmodi studiis non se immiscet voluptas; neque ea commendat, quod sint efficientia voluptatum. Edition: 1745; Page: [50] Immo ab ipsis potius laboribus, molestiis, periculis, commendatur virtus,

  • Per damna per caedes, ab ipso
  • Ducit opes animumque ferro.4

Quin et luxuriosorum haec comprobantur suffragiis. Quotusquisque enim adeo perditi est ingenii, qui non praeclara aliqua virtutis specie, magis quam ulla corporis voluptate, commovebitur? qui amici causâ non omittet voluptatem; aut ad famam tuendam, et contumeliam repellendam, non etiam labores suscipiet et pericula? Quotusquisque solis hisce corporis voluptatibus solitariis, se totum dare poterit, sine socia ulla aut amica hilaritate? Qui rari reperiuntur, eos caeteri omnes, tanquam hominum monstra, oderunt, et detestantur. Quam brevis est harum voluptatum sensus? qui nempe omnis ab ipso appetitus pendet vigore; quo cessante, cessat voluptas, longa relinquens intervalla ingrata, et taedii plena futura, nisi honestioribus studiis repleantur.

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Monstrat etiam ratio, quod observasse in hac quaestione multum profuerit, vitam temperati, et modesti, honestis studiis occupatam, donec naturales recurrant et vigeant appetitiones, saepe admittere eum, qui et tutissimus est, et laetissimus, humiliorum Edition: 1745; Page: [51] voluptatum sensum, quas nempe rarior semper commendat usus. Adeo commoda, igitur, est naturae nostrae ratio, tanta virtutis bonitas, tam lene imperium, ut non ab eo voluptatum humiliorum usu, sibi addictos cohibeat, qui, ratione rite subductâ, erit jucundissimus: licet hoc quidem imperet, ut vegeti conserventur sensus animi nobiliores, reprimendisque cupiditatibus, ubi virtuti obstiterint, pares. At contra, dominante libidine, exiguus est aut nullus virtuti locus; exulat omne gaudium illud longe maximum, quod ex recti et honesti sensu oritur, et bene merendi memoria: immo plerumque exulant humaniores ex artibus ingenuis voluptates.

V. Veniat deinceps in medium ea delectatio, quae ex vitae cultu, ornatu, et elegantia, oritur; quae, quamvis beluinis voluptatibus longe anteponenda, neque tamen est aut magna aut diuturna. Exigua haec praebere potest solamina malorum, quae vitam maxime vexant humanam; quales sunt corporis morbi; aut animi, iis saepe molestiores; metus, scil. angores, solicitudines, moerores. Res ad vitae ornatum et splendorem spectantes, donec videntur novae, sunt etiam gratae; jucunditatem autem imminuit usus et consuetudo. Consuetorum saepe nos satietas capit, et taedium; novaque, pro mira in hac re Edition: 1745; Page: [52] ingenii mutabilitate, confestim expetimus, innumeris nos objicientia curis, quorum etiam mox poenitebit.

Quid? quod omnia haec amicam postulant cum aliis conjunctionem. Liberalitatis, commoditatis, et bonitatis, in foelicitate cum aliis communicanda, specie quadam haec ornata, laeta nobis fiunt et gloriosa. Horum etiam fere omnia, pessimis mortalium et miserrimis, cum optimis esse possunt communia.5

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Spectetur etiam quae ex artibus ingenuis percipitur voluptas; eaque humanissima, quae veri cognitionem comitatur. Eam quidem cuilibet corporis voluptati longe anteferendam, testatur ingenui cujusque sensus: stabilis etiam est magis et diuturna. Libero igitur quovis tempore, quum nulla nos avocant officia honestiora, quicquid curae aut operae huic comparandae impenditur, jure laudabitur; ejusque laeta erit recordatio. {Hic proprius humanitatis cibus, haec homine digna delectatio; haec partis divinioris exercitatio et perfectio; purior est haec voluptas, et honestior, et jucundior, virtutibusque voluntariis amica.} Hanc [Haec] tamen <omnia> vitam beatam non posse praestare, facile intelligitur; quum neque dignissima sit <quae ex his oritur> delectatio; et, majori cuidam et digniori, quae ex virtute, officiisque exsurgit honestis, et humano generi Edition: 1745; Page: [53] aut amicis profuturis, sua natura, inserviat omnis in artibus aut scientiis peritia. Unde et sensu omnium comprobabitur is, qui rerum vel praestantissimarum studia abjecerit, aut distulerit, ubi amicis, aut patriae laboranti, est succurendum; aut quum officio quovis amico et benigno abiis studiis avocatur.

Finge homini haec omnia quae ad vitae ornatum spectant, una cum corporis voluptatibus, virgulâ divina esse suppeditata, eundemque saepe in rerum maximarum contemplatione otiosè occupari; quum, tamen, is nec quemquam amet, nec ab ullo ametur; nullusque apud eum locus sit officiis ullis amicis aut benignis: aut finge naturales eum habere animi erga alios affectiones; omnes tamen ipsi propinquos, aut caritate conjunctos, esse miseros: quis eousque hominem ex homine exuit, ut talem sibi optaret conditionem, eamve putet invidendam; et non potius aut miserrimam, aut detestandam? Quid si etiam subnascantur motus animi tetrici, invidentia, odium, suspicio, metus; quae mentem benignis affectionibus vacuam plerumque occupant, quamvis in summa degatur rerum aliarum copia: omnino miserrima erit haec vitae conditio, omnis liquidae voluptatis expers, et Edition: current; Page: [60] morte vel saevâ magis metuenda. Edition: 1745; Page: [54]

At contra, amica vitae societas, amor mutuus, et fiducia, et honesta officia, vitam laboriosam, et aerumnosam, exoptandam efficere possunt, et laudabilem.

VI. Progrediamur ad alium beatitudinis aut miseriae fontem, sensum nempe communem, aut sympathiam; per quam ex aliorum conditione foelici aut misera, gaudia colligimus aut moerores; atque fatebuntur fere omnes, magnam admodum [ejusdem vim esse ad vitam vel beatam vel miseram] [hinc hauriri posse vel beatitudinem, vel miseriam]. Quis est enim, Deum testor et homines! qui non longè praetulerit liberorum suorum, propinquorum, amicorum, civium, libertatem, foelicitatem, virtutem, omni non solum corporis jucunditati, verum et omni, quae ex artibus, aut rerum cognitione, oriri potest? Quis non omnia haec lubens projiceret, potius quam eos videat in conditione vitae vel misera, vel erubescenda? Ubi vigent et excoluntur animi affectiones homini naturales, vix quicquam majus afferre potest, ad vitam vel beatam vel miseram, momentum, quam aliorum hominum status, et fortunae. Quanta malorum nostrorum aderit levatio, ex eorum foelicitate qui nobis sunt carissimi? Quantaque omnis nostrae vitae disturbatio, ex eorum miseria?

Hanc animi sympathiam omnino comprobamus: aliorum dolere infortuniis honestum Edition: 1745; Page: [55] est; neque hanc indolem nostram immutatam volumus, quamvis nobis moerores et luctus creet graves, licet haud erubescendos. Durum, contra, et ferreum ingenium, etsi hiscuris et moeroribus immune, damnamus; immo miserum censemus, quia turpissimum.

Diuturna etiam esse possunt haec gaudia et moerores, prout eorum quos amamus, permanet vita beata aut misera. Immo amicorum infortunia praeterita, longo post tempore, in memoriam non sine gravi dolore possumus revocare. Hac etiam de causa, magnum affert hic sensus momentum, ad vitam beatam vel miseram.

Quae ex hoc fonte hauriri potest foelicitas, non est in nostra potestate, a providentia nempe pendens divina: hanc igitur nemo magis sibi praestare potest, quam humiliorem istam quae corpore percipitur. Neque quicquam refert observasse, plurimos suo vitio aut culpa esse miseros, quamvis nihil ipsis externum desit. Etenim hoc ipsum est miserrimum, et praecipue deplorandum, quod sua culpa tot sint miseri, vel quod omnem vitae beatae Edition: current; Page: [61] spem, in rebus vilioribus et caducis collocent. Qui se miseros putant, omnes sunt miseri; quamvis mutato ingenio, rebus externis non immutatis, beatis esse liceret.

Non aliud horum malorum datur perfugium, non aliud tranquillitatis, aut stabilis gaudii Edition: 1745; Page: [56] fundamentum, animo vere benigno, quam ut Deum opt. max. mundi rectorem semper respiciat; solidis argumentis sibi persuasum habens, omnia, consilio ipsius benignissimo et sapientissimo, in communem omnium foelicitatem administrari; omniaque quae conspiciuntur mala, {multa quidem et varia,} non plura aut majora esse, quam quae, in mundi universi salutem et perfectionem, exigit optima divini imperii ratio; quorum plurima tandem foeliciter cadent iis etiam ipsis quorum calamitates deploramus.

VII. Sequitur alius decori et honesti sensus huic affinis, cujus est in vita momentum maximum: quod quisque perspiciet, qui aliquid in aliorum utilitatem strenuè, amicè, piè et fortiter gestum, in animum revocare potest; atque observaverit quanto gaudio mentem perfundat ejus recordatio? Quo sensu spectet alios? quanta caritate, quo benevolentiae ardore eos prosequatur, qui in istiusmodi officiis occupantur? quamque beatos eos esse existimet, in ipsis laboribus et periculis; immo quum mortes subeunt pro amicis aut patria, {aut} pro vera in Deum pietate propaganda, voluntarias? Quae sibi somnia vigiles fingunt homines otiosi, integram pro se aut suis, depingentes vitae rationem, quam putant foelicissimam, satis ostendunt, nullam {animo} concipi posse vitae beatae Edition: 1745; Page: [57] rationem, sine omnium fere virtutum officiis continuis et fortibus, inter labores et pericula inlustratis. Haec a primis puerorum aetatibus menti alte infixa haerent. Testatur tota naturae nostrae fabrica, nos ad agendum esse natos; atque in agendo ex virtute, [vitam reperturos beatissimam] [beatitudinem reperturos summam] prae qua sordent voluptates.

Quanto deinde gaudio, summa cum tranquillitate et fiducia conjuncto, expletur vir bonus, qui Deo se similem praestare, quantum fieri potest, conatus, eum sibi propitium habet, rectorem, patremque, et remuneratorem Edition: current; Page: [62] munificentissimum: qui omnia benignissimo illius numine regi vertique credens, lubens fidensque amplectitur omnia quae eveniunt; ea optimo esse consilio destinata, atque sibi etiam profutura, compertum habens; qui summam novit et amat bonitatem, in eaque delectatur contemplandâ et imitandâ.

Huc accedit, quod diuturna sunt, et permanentia gaudia, quae ex recti conscientia oriuntur, et officii prudenter gnaviterque peracti. Labores honestos, et molestias brevi transituras, excipit recordatio gloriosa, et laetissima. Officiorum honestorum nunquam taedebit virum bonum; immo ejus accenditur magis quotidie animus, ad nova ejusmodi officia peragenda, et clariora. Accedat et gaudium haud leve, quum de eorum foelicitate Edition: 1745; Page: [58] gratulamur, quibus profuerunt nostra officia; proborum omnium comprobationes et laudationes, pro meritis sperandae; laetaeque spes, omnia a Deo hominibusque consequendi, quae ad securitatem faciunt aut prosperitatem. Neque ulli deesse possunt honestiorum officiorum opportunitates, si quisque pro sua conditione ei rei unice studeat. Ubi inopi et imbecillo bene de hominibus, in rebus externis promerendi, occasio deest; potest hic, hominibus optima quaeque precatus, atque verae pietatis, et humillimorum officiorum exemplo, pro virili profuturus, pia cum fiducia et gaudio[, ingenuae suae honestatis veraeque probitatis, Deum judicem aequissimum, et hominum sapientiores quosque, comprobatores fautoresque fore, sibi tuto promittere] [divinae se providentiae curandum permittere].

VIII. Hunc sensum consequitur laudis et vituperii sensus acerrimus. Laus quidem et gloria, ubi antecesserat honestas, accessione haud spernendâ complebit vitam beatam: per se autem parum efficiet. Vanum enim et leve est ingenium, quod falsus honor juvare poterit. Vera quidem gloria radices agit et propagatur; falsa vero omnia tanquam flosculi decidunt. De falso honore nemini exploratum esse potest eum in vesperam duraturum. Veritatis tanta est vis, ut saepe supra hominum opinionem, {sive ad personam Edition: 1745; Page: [59] speciosam mendacibus et malitiosis eripiendam,} sive ad infamiam refellendam mendacem, virtutemque calumniis oppressam vindicandam et Edition: current; Page: [63] illustrandam, mirum in modum valeat. Quumque actiones solum honestas laus naturâ insequatur, bene sanum suadebit et impellet omnis ea famae et gloriae appetitio, ad vitam ex virtute degendam atque ad omnia officia honesta obeunda.

IX. Ne denique silentio transeamus eam foelicitatem qualemcunque, quae in leviore quadam est sita laetitia aut hilaritate, ex jocis, ludisque, et risu orta: hoc obiter monendum; nisi mentis omnino hebescat acies, projiciaturque omnis homine digna ratio et meditatio, atque summa subnascatur rerum maximarum incuria turpissima; non alia ratione quam per virtutis et officiorum omnium conservationem, hominem sibi vel tranquillitatem vel hilaritatem posse polliceri. Ubi enim vel turpitudinis suae conscientiâ ulceratus est animus, vel vigent maligni et tetrici animi motus, virtutibus contrarii; aut metus et suspiciones, vitiorum comites assidui; nullam is liquidae voluptatis cujuscunque partem gustare valebit. Non abs re in hoc negotio dixeris,

Sincerum est nisi vas, quodcunque infundis acescit.6 Edition: 1745; Page: [60]

Stabilis tum demum et vera erit animi hilaritas, omni ingenuo joco, ludoque perfruendo idonea, ubi comitem habuerit ingenii humanitatem, morum mansuetudinem, mentem sibi recti consciam, et amicam cum bonis vitae societatem. Quicquid igitur est in his rebus expetibile, illud omne etiam ad virtutes omnes excolendas cohortabitur, et ad omnia vitae officia conservanda.

X. Quod ad opes attinet et potestatem; quicquid in illis est aestimabile [expetibile], ad eadem omnia sanum quemque incitabunt; quùm aliorum gratiâ et benevolentiâ, eaque fide, quam nobis apud alios comparamus, et parentur opes facillime, et conserventur. Neque opes quamvis magnae, contra hominum odia et invidiam quemquam [possessorem] tueri poterunt. Haec autem cum non propter se appetantur, verum ad alia quaedam referantur, ex iis quae de praestantissimis diximus voluptatibus, de vera rerum utilitate, et vitae foelicitate, constabit, eos potentiae aut divitiarum fructum capere tutissimum, {laetissimum} et simul honestissimum, qui ad liberalitatem eas referunt et beneficientiam.

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Quum autem omni animanti hic imprimis a natura datus sit appetitus, ut se vitamque suam conservet, de eo pauca hic dicendum; qui quidem, ut plerique alii, nimius esse potest. Neque enim ipsum vivere Edition: 1745; Page: [61] adeo per se expetendum est, ac beatè vivere. Constat etiam vitam aliquando minime esse exoptandam; ubi scil. cum gravi turpitudine aut ignominia, et scelerum atrociorum conscientiâ est conjuncta, aut cum gravioribus corporis cruciatibus. Mortem sibi carissimi exoptaret amicus, ubi non aliter haec illi effugienda forent mala. Moriendum est omnibus; et id incertum, an eo ipso die: prudentis igitur saepe est, et sibi consulentis, vitam gravibus periculis ultro objicere, quum hoc postulet sanctum aliquod vitae officium, ne propter vitam vivendi solam perdere velit causam. Obfirmandus igitur est animus contra mortis terrores; qui enim mortem semper impendentem timet, quî poterit animo consistere? hac autem praecipue ratione est obfirmandus, si ab adolescentia sit seriò meditatum, post mortem, si modo eâ deleantur animi, sensum fore nullum; certè igitur non molestum: at si non deleantur; quod spondet et Dei benignissimi providentia, et ipsa animi natura pene divina; bonis omnibus sensus erit optandus: atque hanc vitam caducam et aerumnosam, excipiet ea quae sola vita est nominanda.

In eo igitur conspirant omnia quae diximus, ut doceatur vitam beatam esse sitam in ipsa virtute, aut in agendo ex virtute Edition: 1745; Page: [62] praestantissima; quae tamen complenda est ex modicis saltem corporis et fortunae bonis{, ita ut sanitas saltem adsit, earumque rerum modica copia quibus sibi negatis doleat natura humana}. Sufficit per se virtus ad vitam beatam; quae tamen est cumulanda vitae perfectae prosperitate, ut fiat beatissima.

XI. Confirmabitur etiam haec sententia uberius, si contentio fiat et comparatio malorum, quae variis hisce bonis contraria, diversos hominum sensus Edition: current; Page: [65] afficiunt. Atque primo, licet corporis dolores majores habeant impetus, quam ejusdem voluptates, ut ad se conservandos acriori stimulo incitentur homines; extremum tamen malorum non sunt censendi. In errorem inducuntur homines, quod saepe turpitudinem aliquam leviorem, ipso periculi imminentis metu quodammodo imminutam, comparare soleant cum corporis cruciatibus gravissimis. Quorundam tamen facinorum tanta est turpitudo, tanti sunt aliquando conscientiae semet damnantis cruciatus, tamque saeva verbera; tanti etiam moerores et luctus ex eorum qui nobis sunt devinctissimi miseria subnascentes, ut omnes longe superent corporis dolores, et statum efficiant longe miserrimum.

Quod ad diuturnitatem [durationem] attinet, breves fere sunt corporis dolores, ut et ejus voluptates. Edition: 1745; Page: [63] Si longus sit dolor, aut levior est, aut pluribus intervallis dolore vacuis plerumque distinctus. Gravissimi dolores nequeunt esse diuturni, quia morte delentur.7 Praeteritorum, ubi nihil simile in posterum timetur, haud molesta, immo potius suavis est recordatio,8 quandoque etiam gloriosa.

Voluptatibus elegantioribus, ex formarum specie perspecta, ex sonorum harmonia, et imitationibus artificiosis, iisque quae ad vitae ornatum referuntur et elegantiam, ortis, nulli sunt naturâ dolores contrarii. Voluptatis enim, non doloris, hi sensus nati sunt praebitores et ministri. Ubi quidem acriora sunt harum rerum desideria, aut ubi ex iis gloria captatur, molestum erit homini despe sua decidere; grave erit absentium desiderium. His vero rebus plane carere, non necessariò affert molestiam; cum multis sit vitae status tranquillus et foelix, qui ea non habent; unde neque curant habere.

{Quod vero praecipuè ad rem attinet: corporis doloribus aut damnis neutiquam per se nos objiciunt virtutes, eave invehunt: avertunt potius, iisque medentur. Si quidem casu incurrant dolores aut damna, (de quo haud magis improbis quam probis cautum esse potest;) aut si ipsius virtutis causa dolores aut damna sint perferenda, (quod etiam incidere potest; in graviora tamen et Edition: 1745; Page: [64] foediora, longè saepius homines conjiciunt flagitia et scelera:) Edition: current; Page: [66] ea fortiter sustinere aut obterere docebit virtus, multoque et vario solatio sublevabit: monstrabit enim sapientia, ea esse virtutum clarissimarum materiam, campumque in quo se exerceant, sibique novas adsciscant vires: quodque iis fortiter ferendis nostra in Deum pietas, patientia, et magnanimitas illustrabuntur, firmabuntur et tandem munificentissimè remunerabuntur.}

Gravior saepè est ea quae ex aliorum infoelicitate oritur miseria, cui neque ulla voluptatum, aut rerum externarum, copia, levamen afferre potest. Nec gravis solum, verum etiam diuturna solet esse ea moestitia; quum omnis de amicorum aut dilectorum graviore infortunio aut dedecore cogitatio, semper futura sit molesta. Non alia hujus aegritudinis saepe restat consolatio, quam quae depromitur ex stabili in Deo opt. max. omnia gubernante, fiducia{, qua solâ probi bonique animos suos erigere possunt}.

Omnium tamen malorum gravissimum est animi depravati, scelerisque sui sensu vexati, turpitudo; quae nempe hominem ipsum sibi odiosum facit, suumque ingenium, quod sibi maxime est intimum, vile sibi reddit, et pudendum, {immo probrosum} et detestandum. Diuturna etiam est ea aegritudo Edition: 1745; Page: [65] miserrima; quum omnis scelerum suorum aut flagitiorum recordatio, homini sit gravis et erubescenda; eamque molestiam vix, ac ne vix quidem, morum emendatione, aut damni dati reparatione, possit tandem exuere. Hanc comitantur solicitudines, metus, angores: atque prout pessime de aliis fuit meritus, vigebit continua de Deo hominibusque suspicio, ne pro meritis sibi rependant.

Huic naturâ conjuncta est infamia, quae si modo vera, graviter etiam et diu excruciat animum, omnemque excludit verae amicitiae, aut gratiae apud alios consequendae, {eorumque studia in nostram utilitatem adsciscendi} spem.

Haec omnia ostendunt, non sine causa placuisse veteri Academiae et Peripateticis, [vitam beatam] [beatitudinem] sitam esse {in} Ενέργεια χατ´ Edition: current; Page: [67] ἀρετὴν αῤιστὴν ἐν βιω τελείω.9 Quod summum bonum est formale, quod dicitur.10

Eadem igitur vitae beatae summa, quae et virtutum. Ut nempe Deum toto amemus animo, et homines stabili prosequamur benevolentia, omnesque animi corporisque vires quae communi inservire possint utilitati, studiose excolamus{: in quibus sita est ea vita quae maxime est secundum naturam}.

XII. Ex animis autem nostris hoc nunquam excidere debet, nos totos a Deo pendere, Edition: 1745; Page: [66] omniaque [omnesque] et animi et corporis bona [perfectiones], ipsasque virtutes omnes, a Deo ad nos pervenisse; et sola Dei provida tutela conservari posse et foveri. Quumque honestum omne ingenium {foras spectet}, aliorum prospiciens et consulens foelicitati, quae omnis a Deo pendet, quamque nullae hominum vires praestare possunt; nullum certè laetae spei, tranquillitati stabili, aut solido gaudio, potest substerni fundamentum, praeter solam, in Deo, quem optimum novimus et maximum, fiduciam; quâ nosmet, nobisque caros, immo mundum universum ipsius permittimus providentiae, de omnium rerum benignissimâ administratione securi. Recte igitur dixerunt philosophi scholastici ipsum Deum esse summum hominis bonum quod vocant objectivum; ex quo cognito, amato {et redamante,} exsurgit bonis omnibus summa foelicitas.

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CAPUT III: De variis Virtutum Divisionibus.

I. Quum igitur vitam secundum virtutem actuosam, ostendimus esse summum bonum; inquirendum est accuratius quaenam sint virtutes, quae ex virtute actiones, et erga quos sint exercendae. Edition: 1745; Page: [67]

In recti et honesti explicatione, docuimus animi virtutes praecipuas esse benevolos voluntatis motus, et consilia agendi ex propensa in alios voluntate: praestantiores deinde esse eas animi affectiones benignas, quae tranquillae sunt; eamque praestantissimam quae patet latissime: in praestantissimarum numero etiam posuimus ardentem virtutis ipsius amorem, summam animi in ea delectationem, ejusque excolendi studium; cui conjunctus est erga omnes virtute praeditos amor ardentior, et erga honestissimum quemque ardentissimus; unde pietatis in Deum elucebat honestas summa, et quantopere ad eam sanctissime colendam teneamur.

Inter virtutes mediocres aut infimas, recensentur et caritates arctiores, quas vel natura constituit vel consuetudo: clariores tamen illae, quas “morum” excitavit “bonorum similitudo”:1 unde et amicitiae, quam gignit conservatque virtutum significatio, elucet sanctitas. Laudabilis etiam et decora est erga quosvis comitas, moresque mansueti et benigni.

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Virtutibus etiam annumerantur illi habitus qui nobiliores animi vires perficiunt; qui cum benigno ingenio sunt natura conjuncti, eique inserviunt; aut qui denique libidines aut perturbationes quascunque virtutibus obstantes reprimunt, cohibent [superant] aut excludunt; Edition: 1745; Page: [68] hosque omnes, tanquam per se honestos, comprobamus. Solertissimo enim consilio, ita a Deo fabricata est mens humana, ut animi vires et affectiones eo magis comprobet, idque proximè et per se, quo majorem vim [majus momentum] habent ad totius humani generis foelicitatem. Hinc [non solum] [etiam] comprobantur arctiores benevolentiae affectiones et caritates, in vita admodum necessariae, ubicunque majori plurium non obstant utilitati; [verum etiam] [comprobatur] animus simplex, ingenuus, et fallere nescius; abstinentia etiam, continentia, et fortitudo; quae scil. animum ostendunt honesti sensu acriore imbutum, atque voluptatum, dolorum, et utilitatum externarum despicientia confirmatum. Quaedam etiam decori species cernitur in eo corporis motu et statu, qui virtutum exhibet indicia: contrariae autem omnes sive animi sive corporis affectiones displicent, odioque dignae censentur.

Quid, quod sensu quodam, a jam memorato quidem diverso, at non prorsus dissimili, comprobantur et animi et corporis vires habitusque, a virtutibus voluntariis omnino diversi. Quas homini dedit Deus vires, earum usum qui maxime est secundum naturam, vitaeque humanae utilissimum, nobis etiam natura commendavit. Unde et comprobantur studia cognitionis, atque artium elegantiorum; diligentia item et industria, et Edition: 1745; Page: [69] in laboribus perferendis patientia. Hominem etiam magis decere videntur exercitationes illae, quae vel ingenium ostendunt acrius, et sublimius; vel corporis vires augent et confirmant. [Voluptatum, contra, humiliorum consectatio ardentior, animique aut corporis mollities, honestis laboriosisque officiis inutilis, quaeque eam produnt omnia, ea hominis praestantia parum digna, parumque decora.][: quae, contra, animi, corpisve mollitiem produnt, honestis, & laboris officiis inutilem, eae parum decorae.]

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{II. Generali hac virtutis informatione exposita, profuerit etiam varias ejus partes et genera recensere, ut eorum quodque lumen suum ostendens nos magis ad se alliciat.}

2Virtus, voce laxius acceptâ, omnem notat in re quacunque vim, quae naturae sentientis foelicitati inservire potest: arctius accepto vocabulo, notat habitum aliquem vires animi perficientem: quo sensu[. Hoc modo] dividuntur virtutes in intellectuales, quae omnem in artibus et scientiis ingenuis animi culturam continent; et morales, quae κατ´ ἑξοχὴν virtutes vocantur, et voluntatem perficiunt; quae praecipùè sunt ethici fori. {Ethico tamen haud praetereundae virtutes intellectuales, non ideo solum, quod ex iis oriatur homine dignissima voluptas, cui animus assuetus, sensumque nactus sublimiorem, humiles et vitiosas spernet voluptates; quare Edition: 1745; Page: [70] et scientiae ψυχῦς καθάρματα jure censeantur: verum etiam quod virtutibus voluntariis plurimum auxilii afferant. Ex altiore enim naturae totius mundique cognitione, elucebunt Dei conditoris virtutes, accendetur pietas, rerumque humanarum parabitur despicientia; quaeque virum bonum plurimum ornabit et perficiet, sive modestia, sive ταπεινοϕροσύνη, quae ex tenuitatis et imbecillitatis humanae conscientia oritur: neque sine multiplici rerum vulgarium peritia, rebus gerendis necessaria prudentia adesse poterit. Ad alias tamen disciplinas haec omnia pertinent. De toto genere monemus, haec “duo vitia” esse fugienda, “unum, ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus, iisque temere assentiamus.” Quocirca “ad res considerandas et tempus, et diligentia,” et animus praejudicatis opinionibus et perturbationibus vacuus est adhibendus. “Alterum” est “ne nimis magnum studium in res obscuras et difficiles, easdemque non necessarias,” conferamus.3

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Quod ad virtutes Ethicas et voluntarias attinet: earum alii alias tradiderunt divisiones.} Aristotelici hoc praecipue spectantes quod variis animi perturbationibus, sive passionibus immoderatis, a recto tramite abripiamur, quum interea hi omnes naturae impetus sive instinctus, provido Dei consilio, in aliquam vitae utilitatem insiti fuerint; virtutem Edition: 1745; Page: [71] definiverunt “habitum deliberativum in mediocritate situm, secundum rectam rationem.”4 Ex hoc virtutis haud levi officio, quod ab extremis excessuum aut defectuum, animi motus, qui saepe solent esse immodici, cohibeat; in virtutibus explicandis percurrerunt varias passiones, earumque varios gradus, justo vehementiores, aut languidiores; medios monstrantes esse tutissimos et utilissimos, et maxime decoros; quos volunt esse virtutes. [Habitus autem qui eam conservant mediocritatem, celebrem apud antiquos partitionem persequentes,] [Has autem omnes, prout sunt internae animi affectiones] ad quatuor reducunt capita, quae cardinales appellantur virtutes; prudentiam, justitiam, temperantiam, et fortitudinem: ex quibus animi affectionibus praestantissimis, tanquam ex fontibus, manare voluerunt reliquas omnes virtutes.

III [II]. Prudentiam volunt esse attentum et sagacem dijudicandi habitum, inter ea quae in vita prodesse possunt aut nocere, rerum usu et meditatione comparandum, et conservandum; qui quidem ad omnia fere officia rite obeunda est necessarius{; in intellectualium potius quam moralium numero habendus. Veram tamen solidamque prudentiam assequetur nemo, nisi cui animus virtutibus voluntariis excultus est, rectique et honesti sensu acriori imbutus, “pectusque Edition: 1745; Page: [72] generoso honesto incoctum.”5 Caeteros decipit prava quaedam solertia aut astutia, verae prudentiae imitatrix, quae ab ea tamen abest distatque plurimum. Huic virtuti contraria sunt temeritas, imprudentia, ingenii confidentis arrogantia, astutia}.

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Fortitudinem dicunt virtutem animum contra omnes in officio obeundo labores et pericula obfirmantem;6 quaeque metus omnes aut vanos aut nimios reprimit; rerumque humanarum parit despicientiam, perspectâ earum natura; omnes scil. utilitates externas prae ipsa honestate, et laeta recti conscientia, cujus Deus testis erit et comprobator, sordere: nihilque hominem tantum timere aut fugere debere, quam vitia omnia, et animi depravati turpitudinem: quumque omnibus brevi sit moriendum, mortem, vel immaturam, cum honestate conjunctam, esse vitae inhonestae et ignominiosae longe anteponendam: unde et excelsus dicitur animus, et magnus, nulla re externa concutiendus.7

{Hic animus magnus et excelsus in tribus praecipue cernitur, in honesti amore studioque eximio; in ea “rerum humanarum,” quam diximus, “despicientia”; atque “animi” ab omni “perturbatione”8 liberi tranquillitate. Fortitudinis igitur laudem neutiquam assequitur qui vitia, turpitudinem, aut justam non Edition: 1745; Page: [73] metuit infamiam. Fortis est potius et prudentis, haec omnia studiosè declinare, pericula item qualiacunque quae nulla officii ratio subire suadet. Quoniam vero duplex est appetitus ἀλογός, ἐπιθυμία et θυμός: atque huic modum ponere volunt fortitudinem, illi Temperan-tiam;9 fortitudinis partes, praeter magnanimitatem, constantiam, tolerantiam, patientiam, recensent etiam lenitatem et clementiam, ita tamen ut reipub. causa adhibeatur severitas, et nemesis justa, vitia omnia et injurias expellens et coërcens.

Fortitudini adversantur hinc timiditas, ignavia, earumque comes saevitia; illinc audacia et temeritas; quacum saepe conjuncta est superba “pertinacia” et ambitio, “sive nimia cupiditas principatus,”10 aequo civium juri contrariae.}

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Temperantiam <autem> describunt, virtutem quae humiliores omnes appetitus, corporis voluptatem consectantes, cohibet et regit; quibus nempe voluptatibus, tanquam esca, ad turpia plurima alliciuntur homines, honestaque officia deserere coguntur. Huic praecipue adjungunt decori et pulchri in dictis, factis, consiliisque, conservandi studium, cui maxime obstant humiliorum voluptatum illecebrae. {Temperantiae partes sunt Modestia, verecundia, castitas, frugalitas, ἐυτέλεια, sive animus tenui et simplici victu cultuque Edition: 1745; Page: [74] contentus, atque in omni morum spurcitie coercenda severitas. Huic virtuti adversantur luxus, ingluvies, temulentia, impudentia, lascivia, obscoenitas, mollities, et delicatum in victu cultuque fastidium.} Edition: 1745; Page: [Atque]

Omniúm vero virtutum principem, cui inserviunt caeterae, volunt justitiam; quae est “habitus animi, communi utilitate conservatâ, suam cuique tribuens dignitatem.”11 Hujus ambitu includunt omnes animi affectiones benignas, quibus amica conservari potest hominum consociatio; aut aliquid conferri in aliorum hominum utilitatem: quales sunt liberalitas, beneficientia, magnificentia, amicitia, bene merentium grata memoria, comitas, mansuetudo, {veritas, fides, hospitalitas,} patriae caritas, [pietasque omnis, praecipue erga Deum,] [Atque ipse in Deum pietas] qui civitatis antiquissimae et sanctissimae, cujus caeterae sunt partes, rector est et parens. Priorum trium virtutum natura, ex iis quae de summo diximus hominum bono,{*} et earum rerum quas appetimus comparatione, innotescet: justitiae natura, ex iis quae de vario hominum jure sunt dicenda.

Edition: 1745; Page: [III] Has quanquam virtutes volunt esse inter se necessario conjunctas, in gradu etiam temperantiae, sive medio, aeque ac in heroico; ex singulis Edition: current; Page: [74] tamen quaedam propria deducunt Edition: 1745; Page: [75] officia, idque non inconcinne. <alia tamen videtur ratio & facilior & magis a natura.> Sed haec hactenus.

{IV. Suboritur hic quaestio subdifficilis, de virtutis origine, an scil: naturâ hominibus obveniat, an consuetudine et institutione, an instinctu quodam divino. Qua de re breviter monendum; quae naturâ eveniunt ea omnia Deo accepta referenda: neque minorem benefico gratiam habendam, ideo quod, pro larga ipsus bonitate, eadem quamplurimis dederat beneficia; vel quod stabili quadam ratione, certaque naturae lege ab ipso constituta, ex ea eventuum serie, cujus ipse moderator fuerat et dispensator, haec commoda nobis obvenerint; vel etiam interventu aliorum, quibus ipse usus est ministris aut legatis. Ob ipsas igitur virtutes omnis Deo gratia habenda. Neque incredibile videatur, Deum mundi universi moderatorem suo numine homines ad honesta et praeclara ducere et instigare; incredibile potius, eum in bonis praecipuis largiundis, quam in vilioribus, esse restrictiorem. Cunctis quidem quae a fortuna pendent opportunitatibus plus pollet natura, atque multo magis instinctus divinus. Vires tamen insitas plurimum promovebit doctrina, institutio, et exercitatio. Ut omnes hae causae conspirent praecipuè optandum. Sine doctrina non nunquam valebit ipsa natura instinctusque Edition: 1745; Page: [76] divinus: sine aliqua ἐυϕυία,12 sive naturali virtutis indole, Edition: current; Page: [75] quae saltem virtutes capere possit, (quam nemini ferè prorsus negatam videmus,) nihil valebit disciplina: sine qua tamen rarius in ulla arte quicquam praeclari sperare licebit.}

Neque moramur in Aristotelis mediocritate examinanda, quae quamvis cognitione haud indigna sit, primariam tamen virtutis aut honesti notionem non attingit. Atque licet non solum in appetitionibus humilioribus, aliisve nobilioribus, quibus quisque suam tantum spectat utilitatem, verum etiam in arctioribus benevolentiae vinculis, mediocritas quaedam, ab extremis excessûs aut defectûs utrinque reducta, sit laudanda; nullus tamen potest esse excessus in iis animi propensionibus quae sunt honestissimae; amore nempe et veneratione Dei opt. max., caritate illa quae totum complectitur humanum genus, aut in ipso {verae} virtutis amore<, si modo verae adsint de virtute sententiae>.

V.[IV.] Utilior forte, et magis a natura petita, et facilior, alia videbitur divisio, pro eorum erga quos virtutes sunt exercendae diversitate, in pietatem erga Deum, et bonitatem erga homines: tertium adjungi potest genus, earum virtutum quae suam cujusque respiciunt perfectionem. Atque licet nihil sit in ipsa philautia praeclari aut honesti; [hominisque] [Neque aliter hominis] erga se officia {ita} sint venusta et Edition: 1745; Page: [77] laudanda, [si] [quam quatenus] vel ad pietatis vel ad bonitatis officia referantur; horum tamen consideratio non est omittenda, cum, aliis omnibus officiis peragendis, homines magis reddant expeditos et idoneos.

Hanc divisionem persecuturis, prima se offert pietas erga Deum; quae consideranda est, ut ipsius innotescat et natura, et ad vitam beatam momentum: proxime veniunt virtutes erga homines alios: et denique, ea sui cultura quae et pietati et humanitati exercendae inserviet.

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CAPUT IV: De Virtutibus et Officiis erga Deum.

I. Duabus partibus absolvitur omnis erga Deum pietas, ut scil. [vera de Deo sentiamus] [veras foveamus de Deo sententias], et cultum praestemus veris [hisce] sententiis consonum. Veras de Deo sententias docet [philosophia prima] [metaphysica], aut ea pneumatologiae pars, quae theologia dicitur naturalis. Deum nempe esse Ens primum, et a nullo alio pendens; omni perfectione absolutum <et infinitum>; potentissimum, sapientissimum, et optimum sive benignissimum; mundi universi creatorem, fabricatorem, moderatorem, omnisque boni fontem inexhaustum. His, in ethicis utimur ut concessis, anquirentes Edition: 1745; Page: [78] de iis animi affectionibus, et cultu sive interno sive externo, qui sint his sententiis consoni.

Monstrabit cujusque sensus, tantam naturae primae praestantiam, et amplitudinem infinitam, omni admiratione, et celebratione, summaque animi submissi veneratione, esse accipiendam. Quumque nulla homini sit appetitio magis naturalis illâ veri cognoscendi, rerumque causas perscrutandi maximarum, et cognitione dignissimarum; nullum erit hominis opus, Dei cognoscendi studio, virtutumque divinarum venerabunda contemplatione, aut honestius aut jucundius. Neque quidem, sine ea naturae praestantissimae cognitione, eximiae intelligendi vires, a natura datae, satis exerceri possunt aut expleri.

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II. Quod ad attributa attinet quae moralia dicuntur: numen omnium primum et benignissimum, quod pro infinita sua vi, bonitate, et sapientia, omnia solertissime fabricavit, suam rei cuique dans naturam, vires, sensus, appetitus, rationem, ipsasque virtutes; largaque manu suppeditans quibusque, ea omnia quae {secundum suam cujusque naturam}, ad voluptatem, [beateque vivendum] [aut beatitudinem, naturae ipsorum accomodatam] facere possunt; animo agnoscendum est gratissimo, amore gratuito, comprobatione et laudatione, laetaque spe et fiducia, Edition: 1745; Page: [79] ab omni arrogantia et superbia purgata.

Si plenior habeatur bonitatis divinae et sanctitatis ratio; quòd omni virtute et bonitate delectetur; quod bonos omnes comprobet et amet; omnibus hinc effulgebunt bonis spes laetiores, major et laetior fiducia, cum ardentiore virtutis et Dei ipsius amore; stabilique securitate et tranquillitate, animi se suaque omnia divinae permittentis providentiae. Existet etiam Dei imitandi studium, iisque qui in Deo sunt similes sovendi animi affectiones; et stabile simul consilium ea omnia pro virili agendi, quibus explere valeamus munus quod nobis imposuit Deus et natura, sive cadat fortuna secunda, sive adversa.

Haec Dei ob omnem virtutem et bonitatem gratuitam venerandi colendique, contemplatio, quem {bonus quisque} testem animo intuetur, et comprobatorem, [nos] [virumque quemque bonum] perducet ad καταληκτικὸν illud, summum purissimae virtutis apicem, ut in ipso Deo imitando et amando, munusque nobis assignatum obeundo; in ipsa denique virtute, et officiis, omnem, aut longe praecipuum, officiorum fructum petendum censeamus. Neque sine ea Dei agnitione, eoque in Deum animo, poterit vir bonus et benignus quicquam fidenter sperare, vel de se, vel de suis quos Edition: 1745; Page: [80] habet carissimos, aut de rerum universitate. Neque satiari potest aut expleri ipsa virtus, omni hominum generi benigne prospiciens, aut ipse honestissimus virtutis amor et comprobatio, nisi aliqua natura reperiatur, virtute omni perfectissima; in qua cognita, amata, et redamante, possit vir Edition: current; Page: [78] bonus conquiescere; seque, suos omnes, et totum hominum genus, illius providentiae benignae securus committere.

{Atque quamvis nemo sit qui imbecillitate animi varia, morbisque et vitiis non laboret; quique vitae suae actae tenorem examinans, plurimis gravissimisque erroribus se implicatum, plurima turpia et foeda in Deum hominesque admisisse, non inveniet, unde et poenas haud leves sibi irrogandas jure metuet: tanta tamen Dei conspicitur bonitas et clementia; tantâ lenitate mitique indulgentia, in homines imbecillos et depravatos, per tot secula imperium exercuit; ut iis quibus ipsum pie colere, ejusque praeceptis, quantum hominum infirmitas contendere potest, parere cordi est, haud quaquam desperandum videbitur, quin seriâ poenitentia, virtutisque studio conantibus, Deus futurus sit propitius et placabilis; quippe qui pro sapientia sua immensa, eam clementiam, et imperii sui legumque majestatem, inter se amicè conciliandi, rationem aliquam Edition: 1745; Page: [81] excogitare potest. Idque nemini dubium esse potest, quod nobis satis est, in pietate perfecta vim ad beate vivendum esse maximam, ejusque assequendae studia sincera, vel ad foelicitatem consequendam, vel ad miseriae levationem plurimum valitura.}

Ad Deum suâ naturâ referuntur sublimiores animi vires: a Deo ortae, ad Deum nos revocant et retrahunt rationis vires egregiae, animi affectiones et caritates omnes latius diffusae, ipse etiam decori et honesti sensus et amor. His vinculis ad Deum aptatur et alligatur natura omnis ratione praedita, Edition: current; Page: [79] cui nobiliores animi sui partes curae est excolere. Neque Deum tantum ideo amat, quod ex eo sibi speret foelicitatem: ex ipsa enim virtutis omnisque praestantiae comprobatione, sensuque quem homini inseruit natura, per se, et sua sponte, gratuitus efflorescit amor et veneratio eorum in quibus conspiciuntur virtutes, nulla suae utilitatis habita ratione.

Quum vero voluntatis motus, et propensiones omnes vegetiores, sua sponte se exerant, atque vicissim exercitatione vigeant et augeantur; saepius, et statis temporibus, exercenda est pietas, in officiis honestissimis et laetissimis, Deum contemplando, et laudando, gratias ei agendo, {delictorum veniam obnixè Edition: 1745; Page: [82] rogando,} nos nostraque ipsi secura cum fiducia permittendo; ejus et auxilia implorando, ut animos virtutibus excolere, et mores emendare, omniaque honesta vitae officia obire valeamus. Quin etiam perfectissimum illud omnis virtutis exemplar saepius recolendo, accendetur omnis honestatis studium ardentius.

{Cavendum autem ne vana quadam opinione abrepti, pietatem nostram cultumve, Deo utilitatem aliquam afferre putemus, eumve sui causa cultum a nobis flagitare. Nostra in eo praecipue vertitur utilitas; nostri causa eum Deus exigit, ut summa fruamur foelicitate et virtute, purissimisque animi gaudiis. Qui hanc de praeceptis religiosis fovet sententiam, ab utroque extremorum pariter abhorrebit; impietate scil: quae in religiosi cultus omnis neglectu aut contemptione sita est; et superstitione, quae saevum quoddam, immane, aut morosum horret quod sibi finxit numen, cultu ritibusque inanibus aut inhumanis placabile.}

III. Hactenus de cultu Dei interno. Natura autem nihil amat solitarium; sua sponte coram aliis prorumpunt animi motus, et quasi contagio alios afficiunt. Non secretò solum, verum palam etiam, et publice colendus est Deus, ut magis vigeat nostra pietas; similisque in aliis sensus excitetur; Edition: 1745; Page: [83] Edition: current; Page: [80] eamque beatitudinem et perfectionem cum aliis communicemus.

Commendantur et haec officia sua utilitate: cuique prosunt, quod suam cujusque augeant pietatem; ex communi vero omnium pietate, omnes ad omnia vitae munera obeunda promptiores longe fiunt et alacriores, et ab omni improbo et iniquo coërcentur. Atque inde est quod semper apud homines invaluit haec persuasio, ad homines in officio continendos, atque ad eorum conjunctionem et consociationem tuendam et conservandam, plurimum posse religionem.

Quum {Dei} cultus omnis externus sit piorum animi affectuum declaratio; patebit, in his cultum eum praecipue versari, ut Dei laudes celebremus, easque aliis illustremus; ut gratias palam agamus, nostramque in eo fiduciam profiteamur; ut precibus in solemni hominum coetu invocantes, ejus potentiam, providentiam, et bonitatem agnoscamus: ut delictorum confessione, misericordiam imploremus et veniam; nos denique totos ipsi ducendos, regendos, et emendandos permittamus. {Ubi pia foventur istiusmodi dogmata quae memoravimus, iisque convenientes voluntates, accendetur etiam studium anquirendi de omnibus quae dederit Deus suae voluntatis documentis; cujus quaecunque eluxerit significatio, sive per Edition: 1745; Page: [84] ipsam rerum naturam, sive alio quovis miro et clariori, supra vulgarem naturae sortem, indicio, quod sperasse videntur philosophorum principes, eam vir bonus, laetus amplexabitur.}

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CAPUT V: De Officiis erga alios Homines exercendis.

I. Quae erga homines exercendae sunt virtutes et officia, eodem recti honestique sensu cernuntur et commendantur; atque ad eas virtutes fovendas et exercendas, variis impulsionibus naturalibus incitamur. Insita sunt cuique benigniorum plurima affectionum genera, pro diversis hominum conjunctionibus et necessitudinibus, a natura constitutis. Maribus et foeminis mutuos inseruit natura amores, {animos miris modis accendentes;} neque [non] tam beluinam respicientes voluptatem, quam amicam vitae societatem, summa ea caritate devinctam, quam virtutum opinio utrinque accenderat; quarum indicia edere solet et ipsa corporis pulchritudo. Insitum est sobolis procreandae desiderium, et procreatae praecipua cura, et amor eximius et singularis: haec subsequuntur fratrum, sororumque Edition: 1745; Page: [85] {germanorum et patruelium}, consobrinorum, sobrinorumque, quin [et] etiam affinium, caritates.

Quin et subtiliora quaedam sunt societatis vincula. (1) Boni bonos, “moribus” inter se “similes” necessario diligunt, quasi propinquitate “conjunctos” et natura.1 (2) “Beneficiis ultro citro datis acceptisque,” magis inter se “devinciuntur” homines.2 (3) Serpit etiam latius benevolentia in familiaritatibus et viciniis, ubi <ulla est> virtutum vel vulgarium {facta est} significatio. (4) Porrigit se etiam ad cives; ubi plures, ratione monstrante, communis utilitatis causa, sub uno imperio sunt conjuncti. (5) Atque tandem complexu suo totum continet genus humanum, et siqua sunt alia animantium genera superiora. (6) Hisce conjuncta est miserorum commiseratio, Edition: current; Page: [82] et sublevandi studium; atque cum foelicioribus, ubi nulla intervenerat simultatis causa, laeta congratulatio.

Per se et sua sponte comprobantur hi motus benigni; in iis quisque sibi placet; lubens iisdem, tanquam naturae accommodatis, indulget; et similes quosque in aliis comprobat et veneratur. Contrarii autem motus, qui saepe in homines cadunt, ira, odium, invidentia, ultionis appetitio, et malevolentia omnis, sunt proximè et per se molesti; in iis recordandis nemo sibi placere, aut Edition: 1745; Page: [86] similes in aliis comprobare potest; saepe sunt erubescendi et detestandi: quumque videntur et justi et necessarii, nihil in se continent aut laetabile, aut gloriosum.

{II}. Satis docuimus quantum hae affectiones benignae, cum officiis quae ex iis fluunt, ad vitam beatam conferant. Norunt omnes, qui non exuta humanitate induerunt beluae feritatem, sine mutuo amore, benevolentia et beneficientia, vix ullam percipi posse foelicitatem: neque vitam solitariam, quantumvis copiosam, homini esse vitalem. Stabiliores etiam et latius patentes quasque animi affectiones benignas, diximus esse honestiores. Neque tamen ad vitam beatam sufficient, sine actione, voluntates ignavae, quamvis benignae: vires enim insitas excolere et exercere est laetissimum; propensamque voluntatem naturâ sequuntur actiones et officia benigna.

Haec igitur est virtutum sociarum summa, ut quisque humani generis fovens caritatem, communi omnium pro viribus consulat prosperitati [foelicitati]: atque interea, arctiores omnes, in variis vitae necessitudinibus, propensiones foveat, singulorum quorumvis, quod patitur communioris ratio, inserviens utilitati et foelicitati.

{III.} Quum autem paucis, communi omnium utilitati propius inserviendi, vires Edition: 1745; Page: [87] et occasiones suppetant; quisque tamen aliquid in propinquorum, amicorum, vicinorum, aut civium utilitatem, afferre [conferre] queat; Edition: current; Page: [83] (qua ratione etiam communi humani generis inserviet foelicitati;) in arctioribus hisce officiis rectè versamur, ubi communiori non adversantur utilitati, neque officiorum latius patentium adest opportunitas. Immo in eo naturam sequimur et Deum, qui arctioribus hisce naturae vinculis, alios aliis fecit nobis longè cariores, nostraeque curae et benevolentiae praecipuae commendavit.

Haud igitur reprimendi, aut imminuendi, arctiores hi diligendi sensus, in vita, et jucundi saepe, et necessarii. Immo omnes fovendi potius et augendi, ut cujusque est momentum ad communem omnium utilitatem. Quae tamen latissime patet benevolentia, ea praecipue fovenda; ipse etiam honesti amor, atque stabile Deo in omnibus obsequendi studium; quibus moderatoribus subjectae caritates arctiores, virtutis carmen optime absolvent. Hoc etiam sua cujusque utilitas postulat: quum, ut plenius mox docebitur, ita nati sint homines, ut sine aliorum ope et auxilio, sine mutuo officiorum commercio, singuli {neque} suae saluti, nedum vitae foelicitati aut jucunditati, consulere valeant [nequeant]. Atqui, amicis praecipue Edition: 1745; Page: [88] officiis et beneficientia, concilianda est aliorum benevolentia; eorumque studia, ad nostram utilitatem amplificandam, adsciscenda. Contrario autem animi habitu, sordidâ philautiâ, multoque magis vi et injuriis, alienantur a nostra utilitate vicinorum animi; nascuntur odia, et dissidia; mala insuper omnia ab omnibus nobis infensis merito metuenda. Immo existunt in animis nostris affectus tetrici et molesti, continuae vigent suspiciones, et metus non vani: quum, ad injurias propulsandas et ulciscendas, incitentur non solum hi quos injuriae proxime tetigerunt, verum intacti, quibus super conditione communi est cura.

{Neque alia praetereunda quae, mirâ solertia, hominum conjunctioni amicae tuendae, injuriisque et damnis avertendis, machinata est natura. Quanta enim vultui venustas accedit ex amica laetitia et hilaritate moderata, laetâque sympathia et gratulatione! Quanta pulchritudo ex animo constante, Edition: current; Page: [84] sibique recti conscio, atque ex interna sui comprobatione! In amici, ejusve qui grato beneficii sensu movetur, vultu, quae gratia, quamque mitis flamma ex benignis emicat oculis! Intentatâ autem injuria aut noxa, ubi ejusdem propulsandae spes est, in vultu torvo se prodit ira, trucibus ex oculis ignes existunt terribiles. Ubi, contra, nulla mali Edition: 1745; Page: [89] avertendi spes est, quanta eloquentiae vi instruxit natura, non homines solum, verum et muta penè animantia, premente tristitia, dolore, metuque graviore? Qualis illa vox flebilis et querula! Qualis vultus oculique moesti et dejecti, suspiria, lachrymae, gemitus! Quanta eorum omnium vis ad commiserationem apud omnes excitandam, quò promptius opem ferant, maturiusve ab incoepta injuria abstineant?}

{IV.} Amicitiam hoc loco indictam transire, vetat et ipsius honestas et utilitas: quam admirabilem benevolentiae magnitudinem qui ab indigentia ortam volunt, ut quod quisque minus per se consequi possit, id accipiat ab alio, humilem illi tribuunt et minimè generosum ortum, et fundamentum parum firmum: quum, commutatâ utilitate, tolleretur omnis ex hoc fonte profluens amicitia: quae omnis etiam fucata foret simulatio, non vera benevolentia.

Oritur igitur amicitia ex naturali ea honestatis, quam saepius memoravimus, comprobatione: cujus ubi fit significatio, inter eos quibuscum vivimus, per se efflorescit summa caritas et benevolentia. Sua enim sponte “bonos boni diligunt adsciscuntque sibi, quasi propinquitate conjunctos et natura.”3 Quae caritas, {studio perspecto,} “beneficiisque ultro” “citro datis acceptisque,”4 ita Edition: 1745; Page: [90] augetur, ut nulli naturae conjunctioni cedat; atque ea omnia quae nobismet, amicis etiam, ipsorum causa, exoptamus.

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Quum autem mali, naturâ mobiles et varii, neque aliis, neque sibi diu placere possint; solos inter bonos stabilis esse potest amicitia; quippe quam sola virtus aut gignere potest aut continere. Unde constabit, honesta tantummodo ab amicis postulanda, aut amicorum rogatu facienda; ne subducto fundamento, corruat amicitia. Est igitur amicitia, “animorum moribus et honestate similium, mutua cum caritate arcta conjunctio”;5 quae, cui contigit, ei est optimus et jucundissimus, ad virtutem et vitam beatam, comitatus. “Quid” enim “dulcius,” quid utilius, “quam habere” virum probum et prudentem, “quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum?” Quis “esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi” habeas “qui illis, aeque ac tu ipse, gauderet? Adversas vero ferre difficile esset, sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret”: et in utrisque, prudentia sua et consilio tibi opituletur. “Amicitia quoquo te verteris praesto est: nullo loco excluditur, nunquam intempestiva est aut molesta”: “nam et secundas res facit splendidiores; et adversas, partiens communicansque, leviores.”6

{V.} De benignis autem omnibus animi Edition: 1745; Page: [91] affectionibus sedulò observandum, quod, quamvis nimia esse nequeat, quae latissime patet erga omnes, benevolentia; neque nimius Dei opt. max. aut verae virtutis amor; amores tamen arctiores, quos vel accendit sanguinis conjunctio, vel consuetudo, quantumvis per se venusti, nimii aliquando esse possunt, neque viro bono penitus probandi. Duplex est amor, alter benevolentiae, quo aliis bene esse volumus; alter comprobationis aut dilectionis; quae dicitur complacentia; quo moribus aliorum delectamur, et eorum frui cupimus consortio. In priore, non adeo facile extra oleas vagamur; si modo semper adsit debita divinae providentiae animi submissio, et justa in Deo fiducia; atque si, pro dignitate suâ, magis vigeat ea quae ad omnes pertinet benevolentia; ita ut nunquam amici utilitati, majorem plurium, aut digniorum, aut omnium Edition: current; Page: [86] communem, posthabeamus. De complacentia vero, qui locus magis lubricus, et amicitiae vicinior, sedulo cavendum ne in indignos feratur; ne ad turpia nos alliciat; nevè ita totum occupet hominem, ut amico amisso, aut gravioribus calamitatibus implicito, concidat planè animus, caeterisque omnibus humanitatis aut pietatis officiis fiat ineptus. Praecaventur autem optimè haec incommoda, non reprimendo amores Edition: 1745; Page: [92] hosce sanctos, etsi arctiores; sed potius summam erga Deum venerationem et amorem fovendo, spemque praecipuam in eo locando, et fiduciam; simul et curas cogitationesque, animo aequiore, porrigendo, ut in aliis etiam similes cernamus virtutes, iis haud inferiores, quas in amicis tanta cum delectatione admirabamur.

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CAPUT VI: De Officiis cujusque erga se, et de Animi Cultura.

I. Quum pleraque erga se officia, suae cuique utilitatis ratio commendet, ea non aliter honestam et laudabilem induunt speciem, quam si ad Dei cultum, aut aliorum utilitatem referantur: quod si fiat, nulla erunt sanctiora aut magis laudanda.

Animi cultura in his praecipue vertitur, ut mens veris imbuatur sententiis circa res ad officium pertinentes; atque quam maximam sibi comparet rerum digniorum scientiam; quae omnis est frugifera, conferens aliquid ad bene beateque vivendum, cùm sua jucunditate non levi, tùm quod ducat ad virtutes divinas illustrandas, et faciliorem officiorum cognitionem et functionem. Species enim ab intellectu repraesentatas Edition: 1745; Page: [93] sequuntur fere voluntatis motus. {Uberiori igitur scientiae parandae, ab iis opera danda quibus adsunt ingenii vires et opportunitates; omnium vero officium est, studio et diligentiâ prudentiam vitae moderatricem parare.} Addiscendum igitur, recte ea aestimare quae appetitus stimulare solent; perspiciendumque quid quaeque “ad bene beateque vivendum”1 afferant, et qui sint “fines bonorum et malorum”;2 quibus cognitis, inventa est totius vitae ratio. Altè igitur infigendum, quod supra attigimus, summum hominis bonum esse situm, in ipsa pietate erga Deum, et erga homines benevolentiâ et beneficientiâ.

Natura idcircò divina, omnesque ejus virtutes immensae, pro viribus explorandae; praecipuè quae venerationem nostram, amorem, fiduciamque Edition: current; Page: [88] alliciunt. Delendaeque omnes opiniones aut suspiciones voluntatis cujuspiam aut consilii in Deo, quae summae ipsius sapientiae, aut bonitati humano generi consulenti, adversentur.

Sedulo etiam discendum est, quid homines simus, quos Deus esse velit, quod munus, quam personam, communem aut cuique propriam, imposuit; ut Deum sequamur, et naturam, unicum ad vitam beatam ducem.

Intrandum est in naturam humanam; aliorum Edition: 1745; Page: [94] etiam indoles, agendi principia, et consilia, perspicienda; ne deteriora fingamus aliorum ingenia, quam recta monstrabit ratio. His enim perspectis, praecidentur plurimi motus animi tetrici et maligni, ira, odium, et invidia; fovebitur humanitas, commiseratio, placabilitas denique omnis, et clementia.

{II.} Profuerit etiam saepius hoc reputare, quod ex animo excidere nunquam debet, Dei providentiâ, vel efficiente, vel sanctissimè permittente, omnia evenire: quaeque aspera videntur et injuriosa, aut contumeliosa, ea materiam esse virtutibus bonorum divinioribus objectam, in qua se exerceant et augeant: in ipsis autem virtutibus summum est bonum.

“Rerum” autem aliarum “adhibenda est despicientia”;3 quam comparabit quicunque sedulo perpenderit, quam viles, sordidae, fluxae, et caducae, sint corporis voluptates, quaeque res iis inserviunt, atque ipsa quidem corpora! Quam exigua sint gaudia, quam parum necessaria, quae ex vitae cultu et splendore percipiuntur; quamque etiam incerta; quot curis paranda {et servanda}, et quam cito satietatem aut nauseam allatura! Deinde, quam imperfectae sint omnes scientiae, ad novas obscuritates, “ancipitesque cogitandi Edition: current; Page: [89] curas,” et tenebras, animum Edition: 1745; Page: [95] subinde ducentes impeditum; nostramque, de rebus fere cunctis, detegentes caecitatem aut hebetudinem! Quantula {itidem} res sit gloria, ab ignaris saepe immerito collata; aevi brevis et incerti spatio fruenda, per exiguam terrae partem permeans, cum omni laudatorum et laudantium memoria, aeterna nocte mox obruenda! {Eadem etiam brevis aevi memoria et meditatio, animum ad aspera omnia et adversa ferenda aut spernenda confirmabit: praecipue hoc adjuncto, animum fortiter perpetientem et perferentem, vires suas amplificaturum; atque ad instar ignis validi, omnia conjecta in suam naturam convertentis, aestuque ardentiore prorumpentis; se ea ipsa mala in insignioris laudis virtutisque materiam convertere posse.} Ut brevi praecidamus; humana omnia fluxa, incerta, putida, brevis dieculae spatio interitura, in immenso et utrinque porrecto aeternitatis oceano, mox absorbenda. Quid enim est in hominis vita diu? “cedunt et dies et menses et anni”: cuique “moriendum” “est; et illud incertum, an hoc ipso die”:4 quumque advenerit supremum tempus, omne quod praeteriit effluxit: tantum remanet quod virtue et recte factis consecutus sis; beatae immortalitatis spem praebens laetam, quae sola animum vera fortitudine confirmare, et divini imperii Edition: 1745; Page: [96] justitiam et bonitatem illustrare potest.

5Quemadmodum autem in caeteris artibus, praecepta percepisse parum est, neque quicquam magna laude dignum, sine usu et exercitatione, consequi possumus; in ethica, quae est ars vitae, multo magis, rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat. Suum igitur arrogent sibi justum imperium mens et ratio, viresque animi paene divinae, in appetitus omnes humiliores; eosque regere et reprimere assuescant. Quod quidem continuam ferè, in degenere hoc humani generis statu, flagitat meditationem, attentionem, et disciplinam interiorem; cui plurimum conferent Edition: current; Page: [90] officia pietatis erga Deum, adoratio, preces, delictorum confessio, et pia vota.

{III.} Ad virtutes plenius intelligendas, et a vitiis secernendas, atque ad animum virtutibus exornandum, haud parum conferet virtutes recensere, earumque characteres et nomina signata; atque ostendere vitia illis opposita, ubi peccatur in appetituum naturalium vel excessu vel defectu, inter quos mediocritatem servant virtutes. Passionum sive perturbationum explicatio ad pneumatologiam pertinet. Singulas enumerare, earumque diversos gradus laudandos aut vituperandos, eorumque characteres Edition: 1745; Page: [97] praecipuos et signa, longam exigeret disputationem et variam. Quin etiam optime coletur omnis virtus, ubi verae foventur, quas diximus, circa res omnes humanas, quae appeti solent, [opiniones;] [sententiae] eaeque crebra meditatione alte sunt infixae; atque usu et disciplinâ, partes animi praestantiores humilioribus [imperare assuescunt] [imperant].

Hoc interim monemus de appetitibus sive perturbationibus, earum nullam esse, simpliciter et in toto genere damnandam; nullam esse, quae non insignem aliquando vitae hominum afferat utilitatem; quum saepè ipsius cui inest, saepe aliorum ad quos forte attinet, inservire possit commoditati {, foelicitati, aut virtuti augendae et conservandae}. Fieri quidem potest, ut naturae praestantiori, cui majores sunt animi vires, inutiles essent futuri motus istiusmodi perturbati; hominibus tamen saepe sunt necessarii. Est cujusque appetitûs status quidem medius, saepe et utilis et venustus. Qui ad eam mediocritatem non perveniunt, homini ipsi, hominumve societati minus sunt utiles. Qui verò exultantes, “sive cupiendo sive fugiendo,” “finem et modum transeunt,”6 sunt ipsi homini cui insunt, et molesti et turpes, vitaeque hominum inimici, et saepè pestiferi. {Mediocritates autem Edition: current; Page: [91] plurimas non solum innocuas, verum et virtutum ministras Edition: 1745; Page: [98] et satellites, virtutumque authores, ad officia plurima honestissima instigantes, immo ipsas esse virtutes merito arbitramur. His animi impulsionibus motibusque, sive cupiendo sive fugiendo, vitâ sensuque fruimur pleniore, augentur animi vires, cursusque incitatur: unde easdem animae alas, aut quadrigas, appellavit Plato.

Neque dubiis signis monstravit natura quid velit postuletque. Dum enim moderati sunt hi motus, ratione in consilium adhibita, omnia manent venusta et decora. Quum vero motu turbido et effraenato abripimur, nihil mente agitare, nihil ratione, nihil cogitatione consequi possumus; atque a proposito saepius aberrare necesse est, neque interea ulla decori conservatio. “Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum, aut eorum qui libidine aliqua, aut metu commoti sunt, aut voluptate nimia gestiunt: quorum omnium vultus, voces, status, motusque,”7 a natura recedunt.}

Mediocribus igitur appetitionibus, et ab extremis utrinque reductis, honesta virtutum nomina sunt imposita, ut et extremis, vitiorum inhonesta. Mediocribus tamen quibusdam, desunt signata nomina; unde incautè statuerunt quidam, quosdam esse animi [motus toto genere] [affectus prorsus] malos, et per se damnandos. His tamen vitiosis affectibus Edition: 1745; Page: [99] respondent et innocui quidam ejusdem generis gradus, et necessarii.

Modicum, exempli causa, vitae conservandae studium, est et necessarium, et haud molestum. Ubi hoc deficit, existit ingenium audax, temerarium et incautum, ipsi homini saepè inquietum, saepe pestiferum, et humanae Edition: current; Page: [92] etiam societati. Ubi nimium est hoc studium, existit metus, et pusillanimitas, et ignavia; {qui mentis habitus} et hominum societati {sunt} inutiles <affectus>, et ipsi cui insunt molestissimi; eum omnibus injuriis, et contumeliis, et dedecori objicientes.

Modicae voluptatum appetitiones sunt et utiles et necessariae, neque homini molestae. Ubi existit ἀναισθησία,8 parum vitae jucunditati prospicitur: rarius tamen ab hac parte peccatur. Ubi nimia est cupiditas, quae luxuries aut intemperantia dicitur, excluduntur fere omnia vitae gaudia honestiora; neque famae et honestati, neque sanitati, aut rei familiari, aut ipsi vitae conservandae, consulitur; ipsaque haec indoles tantum non continuis obnoxia est molestiis.

In rebus utilibus duae versantur virtutes; frugalitas nempe, quae prudens est rei familiaris cura; et liberalitas, quae nos ad bene faciendum faciles efficit [facit proclives]. Illa huic omnino est necessaria: utraque est jucunda, et utilis, et honesta; prior tamen utilitati magis Edition: 1745; Page: [100] inservit, posterior honestati. Prioris excessus, et posterioris defectus, est avaritia; qua vix ullum est animi vitium aut foedius aut molestius; rerum copiam appetens neque necessariam, neque unquam utendam; summis saepe malis comparandam, curaque majore et metu servandam. Frugalitatis defectus et liberalitatis excessus, est profusio aut prodigalitas; rei familiari pestifera, neque vitae jucunditati, aut saluti consulens, neque ipsi, quam praecipue appetere solet, famae.

Liberalitatis apex est magnificentia, ubi prudenter, honesta de causa, magni fiunt sumptus. Ab hac deficit parci et avari, sibi ingrata, et molesta, liberalitatis affectatio. Modum superat, hominum parum elegantium aut ornatorum omnia profundens ἀπειροκαλία,9 et inutilis et indecora.

Fortitudinis, ad eundem modum, apex est magnanimitas; sive animus altus, constans, et rebus externis inconcussus, solam in omnibus spectans honestatem. Cui ab una parte opponitur audax superbia et arrogantia; animi Edition: current; Page: [93] affectio homini ipsi molestissima; neque aliorum, neque suae, aut saluti, aut libertati, aut famae satis consulens: ab altera, opponitur pusillanimitas, aut formidolosum ingenium, inutile et molestissimum. Edition: 1745; Page: [101]

De potentiae appetitione, eadem fere omnia dicenda; modicam utilem esse viro bono, minimèque molestam; nimiam autem, molestissimam et turpissimam; sibique et aliis periculosam. Ubi justo languidior est, opportunitatibus oblatis, deseritur et honestatis locus, et virtutis.

Laudis appetitus modicus, nihil ferè dicere attinet, quantam praestet utilitatem, si simul major sit virtutis. Nimius tamen est inquietus et molestus, omnemque ipsius virtutis veram imminuit gloriam et inquinat: ubi abest omnis, deest etiam stimulus, ad officia honesta suscipienda, saepe haud inutilis.

Neque ira omnis et iracundia damnanda; licet nulla admodum sit venusta. Injuriarum, quae rarior esse solet ἀναισθησία, satis foret homini incommoda, eum nempè contumeliis et petulantiae objiciens; neque suae prospiciens famae, neque suorum saluti. Iracundia quae nimia, est et ei cui inest molestissima, et saepe pestifera; neque ullus est animi affectus hominum societati perniciosior.

Justa quaedam, et homine libero digna est indignatio, cum ad opes aut honores provehuntur indigni. Cui nulla inest hujusmodi affectio, parum sibi, aut suis, aut patriae est prospecturus: ubi tamen est nimia, Edition: 1745; Page: [102] aut non justa de causa, (quae invidia dicitur, unde nascuntur odia inveterata;) deterrima est animi rubigo, ei cui inest et molestissima, et turpissima, omnia saepe miscens divina et humana.

De his autem omnibus quae irae sunt affines, aut malignae videntur, animi affectionibus, hoc omninò tenendum, iis non amplius indulgendum quam exigit sui aut suorum conservatio, aut communis utilitatis cura: quibus Edition: current; Page: [94] quidem, si absque irâ satis consuli possit, nihil in ira erit laudabile aut venustum. Contra, lenitate et mansuetudine, placabilitate et clementia, nihil amabilius, nihil honestius.

{Inter} virtutes quae homileticae dicuntur {prima est veritas, animique candor: de quibus fusius alias.* His contraria sunt mendacia, fallaciae, fraudes; simulatio itidem dissimulatioque omnis malitiosa.

In eodem genere sunt virtutes aliae, eorum quibuscum vivitur voluptati, aut gratiae apud eos ineundae inservientes,} comitas, urbanitas, concinnitas, suavitas, εὐτραπελία,10 facetiae; <sunt> omnino laudandae et decorae, hominum conjunctioni conservandae aptissimae, his opposita sunt utrinque vitia. Ab una parte, servile scurrae ingenium, omnia ad voluptatem aliorum loquentis, et Edition: 1745; Page: [103] assentantis, atque ad obscoenos aut illiberales descendentis jocos; ab alterâ, gravis, inconcinna, et agrestis rixantium asperitas, quae nullam iis, quibuscum vivitur, exhibet reverentiam, quaeque inani libertatis specie commendatur. Horum vitiorum incommoda non attinet dicere; quum sint et per se invenusta, et saepe pestifera{: omniumque una cautio est, ut cum mores nostri puri sint et emendati, eos quibuscum vivimus et vereri et diligere videamur}.

De verecundia breviter monendum, eam ex ipso recti et honesti sensu acriore subnasci; et in junioribus spem dare ingenii foelicioris, ad omnem virtutem optime subornati. Ubi nimia tamen est in aetate matura, hominem ab officiis honestis capessendis saepe cohibet: ubi aut exigua est aut nulla, deest virtutis et honesti custos potentissimus.

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Qui haec omnia uberius explicata legere cupit, consulat Aristotelem, et Aristotelicos{*}. Hoc obiter monemus, quum tot verae virtuti utrinque immineant fata, summa opus esse cura, attentione, et disciplina; ut cohibeantur aut regantur hi animi motus perturbati; ut vigeat semper decori Edition: 1745; Page: [104] et honesti sensus, et recta ratio; nobiliores etiam et tranquillae voluntatis affectiones, quae et suam cujusque, et humani generis communem spectant foelicitatem.

{IV.} Neque corporis omittenda est cura, cujus vires et valetudo, temperantia et exercitatione conservandae atque augendae; ut rationi obedire possit, in omni labore perferendo, quem exigunt officia honesta.

Quumque parum humano genere prodesse possunt hi, qui non artem aliquam maturè didicerunt, in qua se exerceant; eligenda cuique est ars ingenio apta, aut vitae institutum licitum, et humano generi profuturum. Neque hoc munere eximendi sunt illi, quibus tantae suppetunt facultates, ut quaestus faciendi causa hoc non sit necessarium. Enimvero illorum praecipuè est, publicae consulere utilitati, juris legumque peritiam, aut politicam prudentiam comparare, aut eam rerum humanarum notitiam, quibus, vicinis omnibus, consilio, opibus, gratia, et auctoritate prodesse possint; ne inutilia sint terrae onera, frugibus tantum consumendis nati.

Artium autem quaeque, quo major ei inest prudentia et ingenii solertia, et quo major ad vitam communem quaeritur utilitas, eo est honestior. Ob Edition: current; Page: [96] utramque causam Edition: 1745; Page: [105] commendantur doctrina rerum honestarum, jurisprudentia, medicina, studia militaria, et caeterae elegantiores.11 Ob utilitatem, et non levem ingenii solertiam, commendatur mercatura copiosior, et artes quaedam mechanicae. Agriculturâ vero, nulla innocentior, nulla dulcior, nulla homine, nulla libero dignior.12

In arte eligenda, totâque vitâ constituenda, “ad suam cujusque naturam” et ingenium, “consilium est omne revocandum.”13 “Ad hanc autem rationem, quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, utriusque omnino ratio est habenda, in deligendo genere vitae, sed naturae magis; multo enim est firmior et constantior.”14

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1{CAPUT VII: De Virtutis Studio excitando et retinendo.

I. Virtuti strenuam operam esse navandam, vix opus est ut pluribus doceamus. Cognito enim et persuaso, in ea praecipue sitam esse vitam beatam, caeteraque omnia incerta, infirma, fragilia, caduca, hominisque praestantia parum digna; ea vitae via ingrediunda videbitur, quam Edition: 1745; Page: [106] intimus cujusque sensus ratioque monstrabit esse maxime secundam naturam, quaeque ad veram hominique propriam ducit foelicitatem: quo pacto etiam quod in homine summum est maximeque divinum exercebitur et perficietur, munusque a Deo impositum explebitur.

Quorsum enim animos nobis largitus est Deus tot virtutibus capiendis exercendisque aptos? Quorsum tributae tot egregiae vires, tantumque ad optimas artes instrumentum; rationis orationisque facultates eximiae, cognoscendi studia, “rerum innumerabilium memoria,” “conjectura consequentium non multum a divinatione differens,” humiliorum appetituum “moderator pudor,”2 tot propensiones benignae aliorum utilitati prospicientes, sensusque honestum turpi aequum iniquo secernens, atque in laboribus perferendis animi robur et magnitudo? Quorsum ea veri investigatio quae ad coelum ipsum penetravit, Deum mundi rectorem, ejusque Edition: current; Page: [98] virtutes immensas agnovit, vitaeque aeternae post corporis interitum spem laetam ostendit?

Quid loquor de sapientiae studiosis? Quae est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, apud quos de numine aliquo, officioque ipsis praescripto, personâque aliqua imposita, et de animorum immortalitate, pro ipsorum Edition: 1745; Page: [107] meritis, beata aut misera, non maneat firma omnium consensio? Haec igitur naturae judicia merito existimamus, naturae apta, firmisque et apertis rationibus subnixa, quae “una cum seculis aetatibusque hominum inveterarunt,” quum “ficta” omnia et “vana diuturnitate extabuerunt.”3

Aliae ex philosophia prima petantur rationes; hoc sedulo monemus: Quae validissima docent argumenta, ex solertissima mundi structura petita, naturam sagacem et artificiosam hunc mundum corporeum in initio constituisse, omnique tempore regere et movere; iis prorsum simillima pariter ostendere, qualitatum moralium, virtutum vitiorumque, habitam fuisse rationem; naturasque omnes rationis participes justo regi imperio, ita ut tandem bonis omnibus benè sit, malis male. Quumque in hac vita non raro aliter eveniat, alia speranda est totius divinae administrationis explicatio, Deo op. max. usquequaque digna. Quod uberius confirmabit ipsa animi natura penè divina: “tanta enim animorum celeritas,” “tanta memoria praeteritorum, futurorumque prudentia, tot virtutes, tot artes, tot scientiae, tot inventa,” vetant “eam naturam, quae res eas continet,” putare “esse mortalem”:4 Immortalitatis autem spes, gravissima suggeret virtutum Edition: 1745; Page: [108] invitamenta, atque ab omni turpitudine maxime deterrebit.

II. Quo autem alacrius virtuti operam demus, haec semper in promptu sint; quod animum studiis rebusque honestis intentum vires raro deficient: aderit Edition: current; Page: [99] opitulator Deus: vigilando, agendo, bene consulendo, prospere omnia cedent: novas in dies vires mens adipiscetur, humilioribus appetitibus reprimendis pares: quaeque primo dura et difficilia videantur, ea usus facillima faciet et jucundissima: laboris cujusque honesti, brevi effluxerit omnis molestia, laetaque semper manebit memoria.

2. Ne autem a virtutis studio, rerum externarum avidae cupiditates, aut voluptatum illecebrae nos avocent, solida et stabilia quae honestatem comitantur gaudia et spes laetissimae saepius pensitandae. Multum etiam profuerit, res humanas attentius introspicere, earundemque despicientiam, saepius antea memoratam adhibere, vitaeque brevitatem, mortemque omnibus instantem saepius intueri.

3. Sed quoniam utilitati externae et voluptati, cujus modus quidam est et naturalis et necessarius, aliquid dandum; dummodo meminerimus alia longe esse praestantiora: ne illi omni bellum indicendum videatur, singulas virtutes animo percurramus, Edition: 1745; Page: [109] ut videamus quantum earum quaeque ad vitae prosperitatem ipsamque voluptatem afferat.

Prudentia, eaque animi vis, qua motus inconsultos et improvidos regere valet, in omni pariter vitae institutione est necessaria, ut finem qualemcunque expètitum assequamur, neque in ea quae praecipue aversamur libidinibus occaecati praecipites feramur.

Quae justitiae partes sunt, ad pacem colendam, ad offensiones declinandas, ad incolumitatem, gratiam, famam, fidem, opes, authoritatem parandam plurimum valent, atque etiam amicitiam “et caritatem, vitae sine metu degendae praesidium firmissimum.”5 Eae enim virtutes semper alunt aliquid, tum “vi sua” et “natura, quod tranquillet animos; tum spe, nihil earum rerum defuturum quas natura non depravata desideret.”6 Cujus, contra, “in mente consedit” vis et injustitia, “hoc ipso quod adsint, turbulenta” Edition: current; Page: [100] non potest non fieri; suspicioneque, “solicitudine,” metuque, “noctes atque dies exesa.”7 Quid loquar de pietate? qua propitius fit Deus mundi rector, omnisque fortunae dispensator; qui piis et bonis si non jucunda, aptissima cuncta dabit et optima; unde etiam vitae beatae et aeternae spe laeta, mortalium animi erigentur. Edition: 1745; Page: [110]

Quae temperantiae subjiciuntur virtutes reliquarum omnium fautrices fidissimae, corporis sanitati et viribus inserviunt; quinetiam pulchritudini; quum animi sedati, ut fere omnium virtutum, insit in ipso vultu significatio. Bonis externis etiam augendis, manifesto utiles sunt frugalitas, victus cultusque tenuis, diligentia et industria: hisque omnibus adversatur luxuria omnis et intemperantia; corporis vires, valetudinem, formam, labefactans, infamiae et contemptui objiciens, animi aciem obtundens, omnesque appetitus humiliores effraenatos reddens et intractabiles.

Nostrae et nostrorum saluti prospiciunt fortitudo, virtutesque fortitudini affines. Ignaviâ autem et timiditate non solum virtutis locum deseremus, verum in ea nosmet nostrosque saepe conjiciemus pericula, unde facile eripuisset fortitudo, animusque praesens. Hujus virtutis expertem, penes alios erit, malorum graviorum comminatione, impium efficere et sceleratum: qua servitute nihil saevius aut turpius. Si quis autem gravioribus malis sit obnoxius, iisve virtutis ipsius causa objiciatur; illi “magnum illud et difficile certamen” inituro, et “cum capitali adversario dolore” depugnaturo, “omnes patientiae et fortitudinis rationes” excitandae,8 legesque in memoriam revocandae, Edition: 1745; Page: [111] quae vetant effoeminari virum, “debilitari, dolore frangi, succumbere.”9 Praecipue vero reputet, nunc esse certamen honestissimum; adesse Olympia; omnia Dei numine evenire: Deum certaminis esse spectatorem, judicem, et remuneratorem; ignavumque et stolidum, propositâ laude et honestate, vitae caducae, morborum vi alioqui, et saepe cum saeviori Edition: current; Page: [101] cruciatu, et sine honore periturae, quin etiam rediturae, parcere. Virtutis, magnitudinis animi, pietatis, patientiae fomentis hujusmodi, dolores mitigari, mortisque terrores imminui solent.

III. Virtutes omnes a Deo ad homines pervenisse, saepius dictum. Ipsorum igitur Philosophorum monitis, Deus precibus supplicibus obnixe invocandus, ut divinis illis donis nos exornet; nobisque strenuam dantibus operam vires animosque sufficiat: neminem enim censuerunt virum magnum sine afflatu divino unquam fuisse. Quid quod et per se, suaque vi, virtutum immensarum quae in Deo sunt venerabunda contemplatio, gratiarum actiones, laudationes, delictorum confessiones, preces, non solum pietatem erga Deum augent foventque, verum etiam omnem morum probitatem et bonitatem. Ad Deum igitur in omni περιστάσει10 confugientes, ejusque auxilio freti, animis Edition: 1745; Page: [112] praesentibus, honestoque et decoro retinendo semper intentis, in memoriam revocemus, quibus virtutibus exercendis nunc adsit occasio? quibus animi viribus nos instruxerit Deus et natura, ut cum istiusmodi casibus conflictemur? Quam laeta et gloriosa futura sit victoriae, officiique conservati memoria? quamque pudendum, si levi aliqua dulcedine aut dolore victi, nosmet turpitudine et dedecore conspurcemus?

Omnia virtutis colendae praecepta fusius exponere, ab instituto nostro alienum. Consulantur Philosophi Graeci, Romani, aliique qui eam materiam copiosius tractarunt: atque de singulis vitae officiis, quicquid ἁψικάρδιον,11 animumque excitans occurrerit, condatur componaturque, ut in vitae usus depromatur.* “Extruamus denique animo magnitudinem excellentiamque virtutum, atque non dubitabimus quin earum compos”12 Edition: current; Page: [102] “quisquis est,” “sibique ipse placatus, ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat, is sit sapiens quem quaerimus, is sit beatus: cui nihil humanum aut externum intolerabile ad dimittendum animum, aut nimis laetabi[bhle ad efferendum videri potest.” “Nam quid aut in studiis Edition: 1745; Page: [113] humanis, aut in tam exigua brevitate vitae, magnum sapienti videri potest, qui semper animo sic excubat, ut ei nihil improvisum accidere possit, nihil inopinatum, nihil novum.”13

IV. Quandoquidem vero, hoc viro bono praecipue propositum est, ut vitam agens secundum naturam, in communem aliquid afferat prosperitatem, quae citra varias plurium conjunctiones et consociationes conservari nequit: studiose etiam anquiret de omnibus rectae rationis praeceptis, quibus singulae vitae partes ad naturam conformentur, quibusque servatis, hominum conjunctionem munifice pro virili tueri possit et conservare.14 Haec praecepta verò collecta et composita Jus Naturale conficiunt: quae altera Philosophiae moralis pars est vitae regendae utilissima.}

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LIBER II: Jurisprudentiae Naturalis Elementa.Edition: 1745; Page: [114]

CAPUT I: De Lege Naturali.

I. Quo melius {ad naturam conformentur singulae vitae partes,} hominumque inter se officia et jura intelligantur, prius exponenda est doctrina generalior, complicatas quasdam, in ethicis, notiones evolvens et explicans; quam [breviter exhibemus] [proxima tria capita exhibent].

Primas honesti et turpis notiones, in libro superiore, ex hominis conformatione deduximus; ex quibus constiterit, ea omnia recte {sive jure} fieri, possideri, aut ab aliis postulari, quae vel ad communem omnium faciunt utilitatem, vel singulorum propriam, Edition: 1745; Page: [115] nemini nocentem, communique utilitati non repugnantem. Unde dicitur quisque jus habere, ad ea omnia agenda, habenda, aut ab aliis consequenda: quique {alium quemvis} impediret ita agere aut habere, aut quod ita postulatur praestare recusaret, injuriam facere diceretur.

Altius verò rem repetenti patebit, hanc naturae nostrae fabricam, clara continere indicia voluntatis Dei, alias hominum actiones jubentis, alias vetantis. Edition: current; Page: [104] {Atque licet legis notio, cui congruant aut non congruant voluntates aut actiones, sit artificialis et factitia; ita tamen ubique gentium et in omni tempore hominibus familiaris et facilis fuit, ut meritò naturalis etiam dicatur. Etenim justae potestatis cognitio facillima est, ex ea quam in liberos immaturos, ipsis utilissimam, parentibus natura tribuit.} Idque usu {etiam omnibus} compertum, homines {adultos} non semper suo marte, sed aliorum monitis saepius scire quae sint vitae profutura aut nocitura; (prudentiorum enim judicio et monitis, cognitionis et prudentiae humanae bona pars innititur:) quumque hominum quosdam caeteris multò esse solertiores, fatebuntur et ipsi qui minus sapiunt; jubebit semper ἡγεμονικὸν illud cuique infixum, ut coetus hominum numerosiores, in communem conjuncti utilitatem, prudentioribus quibusdam Edition: 1745; Page: [116] rectionem omnium permittant, cogantque renitentes, ut eorum jussis obsequantur qui hoc legitimum nacti sunt imperii jus. Hinc [pervulgata] [omnibus nota] est justi imperii notio [justa imperandi potestas]; ubicunque scil: ex ipsa imperii delati forma et modo satis constat, nulla fore imperantibus ad peccandum invitamenta, aut spem saltem nullam aut exiguam, imperio sibi permisso in populi perniciem impunè abutendi. Cuique notissima igitur est legis vis et natura, quae est “jure imperantis voluntas, subditis declarata, actiones alias jubens, alias vetans, praemiis propositis et poenis.”

II. Quum autem constet, Deum esse et optimum et maximum, constabit etiam, ad omnium communem, et cujusque propriam pertinere foelicitatem, ut omnes Deo, sive jubenti, sive vetanti, pareant; cui sanctissime devinciuntur Edition: current; Page: [105] ab ipso creati, conservati, bonisque plurimis munificentissimè cumulati. Constabit ibidem, omnia jussis Dei adversantia, communi etiam adversari foelicitati, animumque prodere ingratissimum. Unde et manifestum est, Deum jure pleno, virtutibus suis perfectissimis innixo, imperium sibi in omnes vindicare.

Sed quum homo, nè suae quidem prudentiae, nedum stabilis et sincerae bonitatis, fidem {satis firmam} apud alios facere queat; Edition: 1745; Page: [117] quippe quam saepe imitaretur obscura malitia, nullo certo indicio a verâ bonitate secernenda, siquidem ea ratione ad imperia ascendere daretur: quumque nullum imperium suspectum et formidatum, populo de sua salute dubio, utile aut laetum esse possit; non ex prudentiae suae aut bonitatis opinione eximia, recte imperium sibi arrogabit homo, si absit eorum consensus qui imperio subjiciuntur, neque ipsis satis cautum sit, ne potestas assumpta in populi perniciem convertatur.

III. Quumque porro [rerum omnium rector et] [hominum] fabricator Deus, eum recti et honesti sensum nobis inseruit, easque rationis vires, quarum ope, observatâ nostra rerumque aliarum naturâ, facile intelligimus quaenam communi omnium, et propriae cujusque inserviant utilitati, quaenam eidem obsint; et simul perspicimus, benigna vitae officia, ipsi qui iis fungitur, fore plerumque utilia, contraria vero inutilia; obtinebunt haec omnia rectae rationis praecepta,{*} sive dictata practica, vim legis a Deo jussae, sancitae, et promulgatae.

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In omni lege duae sunt partes praeceptum et sanctio: illud. jubet aut vetat; haec monstrat praemia iis tribuenda qui legi paruerint, Edition: 1745; Page: [118] poenasque eos manentes qui eam violaverint. In legibus civilibus, praeter praemia quibusdam propria, hoc commune est, ut qui paruerint, omni civium jure, et communibus vitae civilis commodis, fruantur. Poenae verbis disertis plerumque sunt annexae. Legum naturalium sanctiones innotescunt, quo modo et praecepta. Omnia nempe animi gaudia, spesque laetae, quae virtutes suâ natura comitantur; omnes item utilitates, sive sponte ab honestis officiis nascentes, sive ab hominum comprobatione et benevolentia, sive ab ipso Deo sperandae; sive in hac vita, sive in illa quae insecutura est, sunt legum naturalium praemia. Poenae sunt, mala omnia interna aut externa, ex vitiis sua sponte nascentia, animi morsus, inquietudines, ipsique metus molestissimi; omnia denique quae a Deo hominibusque infensis, recta docet ratio esse metuenda.

IV. Lex etiam divina, pro varia promulgandi ratione, vel est naturalis, vel quae positiva dicitur. Naturalis, per rationem rerum constitutionem observantem innotescit; positiva, signis institutis, voce nempe aut scripto, promulgatur.

Leges voce promulgatae aut scripto, sunt ratione materiae, vel necessariae, vel non necessariae. Utilitatem {quidem} aliquam communem spectare debet, et solet, omnis Edition: 1745; Page: [119] lex: Aliae tamen leges monstrant ejus consequendae rationes unicas et necessarias, adeo ut contrariae leges inutiles essent aut pestiferae; aliae {contra} inter diversas rationes, quarum nulla omnino incommoda, optimas eligunt; aut inter aequè commodas, unam; ubi Edition: current; Page: [107] {hoc} exigit vita communis, ut in unâ quadam plures conveniant.{*} Quod usu venit in locis, temporibus, aliisque ejusmodi constituendis, ubi pluribus commune negotium simul est obeundum. Hae dicuntur etiam, ratione materiae, positivae; illae naturales.

V. Leges fere omnes, praecipue naturales, totum respiciunt populum, vel omnes ex certo ordine. Inter homines nonnunquam feruntur privilegia; eaque vel in gratiam, vel in odium. Est privilegium, “lex privata, unum aut paucos respiciens.” Si ob merita praeclara, in gratiam feratur privilegium, neque communi obsit utilitati, est justum. Incidere potest {etiam}, licet rarius, ut in odium scelerati et malitiosi, justum irrogari possit privilegium.

Aequitas, sive επιεικεία, est “legis correctio et emendatio, ubi verba legum causis non sunt adaequata”; magis, utpote, aut minus quam par est porrecta. Locum habet hoc aequitatis genus, tantum in legibus quae Edition: 1745; Page: [120] verbis enunciantur. Lex {enim} naturalis, non verbis, sed [ast] ratione duce, omnia ex aequo et bono determinat.

VI. Dispensationes, quas vocant, invexit jus canonicum, quibus aliquis legibus solvitur. Harum varia sunt genera; dantur enim exemptiones, sive immunitates, vel a praecepto, vel sanctione. Ubi quidem ita delicti admissi Edition: current; Page: [108] datur venia, aut tollitur sanctio, ut communi interea satis consulatur utilitati, legumque conservetur vis et majestas, nihil est in eo iniqui. Istiusmodi dispensationes nonnunquam largiendi potestas, summis plerumque permittitur civitatum rectoribus. <Praecedens> A praecepti verò justi vinculo immunitas, aegerrimè admittenda.

At (1.) nulla intelligitur esse dispensatio, si quis eo usus jure quod ipsi leges tribuunt, aut potestate quavis sibi per leges permissâ, vicini perimat obligationem, aut novam ipsi imponat. Ut si creditor debitum remittat; aut civitatis rector ea agat quae jure potest, per se, vel per alios suo mandato instructos.

(2.) Legibus aliquando minimè iniquis, sive divinis, sive humanis, datur quibusdam immunitas a poenis externis, quas actionibus parum honestis promeruere; ubi pro populi hebetudine, vel moribus pravis, non Edition: 1745; Page: [121] alia ratione, graviora praecaveri possunt mala. At neque hoc volunt essedispensare.

(3.) Nulla rectoris cujusvis permissione, aut jussu, vel pravi animi motus fieri possunt boni, vel ex bonis mali: neque magis immutari potest actionum, ex animi virtutibus aut vitiis manantium, natura. Dispensationes igitur a praeceptis, quas volunt canonici, tantum sunt justae, quando leges ipsae sunt aut improbae aut stolidae: quarum ingentem farraginem invexit jus canonicum.

VII. Jus naturale, quum legum multitudinem in corpus quoddam compositam sonat, aliud dicitur primarium, aliud secundarium: hoc mutabile, illud immutabile volunt. Non tamen ex propositionibus evidentibus et noeticis, Edition: current; Page: [109] constat prius; neque ex dianoeticis solis, posterius: quaeque etiam ex certis sequuntur praemissis conclusiones, pariter sunt certae et immutabiles. Neque alio sensu est utilis haec distinctio, quam si praecepta, quae ad vitam tolerabilem sunt omnino necessaria, dicantur primaria; quae autem ad vitae ornatum, et uberiorem foelicitatem faciunt, secundaria. Neque in foro Dei, sunt haec prioribus mutabiliora; quamvis violantibus saepius detur immunitas a poenis externis.

Ex iis quae in libro superiore sunt dicta, patebit officia nostra omnia, prout lege quadam Edition: 1745; Page: [122] naturali a Deo praecepta {sunt}, duabus monstrari legibus primariis: quarum prima est, Deum esse colendum; cum quo conjunctum est, quod ei in omnibus sit obsequendum.

Altera est, communi omnium utilitati et foelicitati, et singulorum quorumvis, dummodo ea communiori aut majori non adversetur, esse prospiciendum.

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CAPUT II: De Juris Natura et divisionibus.

I. Quum communi omnium saluti et prosperitati conservandae,] [Quod ut fiat,]1 amica hominum societas conjunctioque sit omnino tuenda et conservanda, [quod per se satis patet; atque simul haec sit officiorum erga homines summa ut omnium saluti et foelicitati prospiciamus, constabit] [ut ex mox dicendi patebit. Hac autem de causa] actiones omnes, quibus quisquam sibi, aut suis ita benefacit, ut aliorum utilitati non obsit, esse omnino licitas; quum, qui uni prodest parti, caeteris inviolatis, toti etiam prosit societati. Deinde, quum sint utilitates plurimae et voluptates; quas, {nemine laeso}, sibi aut suis, in certo rerum statu, comparare possunt homines, {studioseque appetere solent,} quasque iis salvas praestari, nec ab aliis hominibus Edition: 1745; Page: [123] impediri, auferri, aut intercipi, humanae interest societatis; quum id {et ad singulorum foelicitatem, et} ad amicam hominum conjunctionem conservandam pertineat; ad has utilitates aut voluptates capiendas, censentur homines habere jura, eâ altera, quam diximus; lege naturali planè constituta, aut munita: quippe quae jubeat et confirmet {omnia} quae quicquam ad communem omnium, aut singulorum, ubi nemini nocetur, conferunt utilitatem: haec igitur omnia jurè fieri dicuntur. {Quinetiam quae cujusque sunt erga alios officia honesta, ea et cuique sensus animi sublimiores commendant; eademque isti, in amica vitae conjunctione, suo merito, aut jure aliquo, postulare possunt, et expetere atque expectare solent:} vix igitur commodius {officiorum praecepta, aut} naturae Leges, quae dicuntur, speciales, {sive jurisprudentia naturalis,} tradi poterunt, quam explicando omnia quae vel singulis hominibus, hominum coetibus, Edition: current; Page: [111] aut denique humano generi competunt, aut competere possunt jura; ea quippe omnia lege aliqua speciali muniri censentur.

{Varia igitur hominum jura monstrant primò sensus appetitionesque naturales, ea exposcentes quae ad suam cujusque aut suorum utilitatem faciunt, aut officia erga alios amica commendantes: quae tamen omnia, Edition: 1745; Page: [124] secundum rectam rationem, communi utilitate ita dirigenda, ne quid contra eandem admittatur aut ab aliis postuletur.}

[Haec altera est juris notio praeter eam modò explicatam, quando legum collectionem sonat: notat enim saepius]2 [Praeter eam juris significationem, quam memoravimus, alia est ejus acceptio;] qualitatem quandam moralem[, aut facultatem homini rectè concessam.] [homini competentem notans.]. Qua autem ratione, ex recti et honesti sensu, ortatur haec juris notio, nulla legis cujuslibet habita ratione, satis est dictum.{*} Cognita autem legis naturalis, quae omnia continet rectae rationis praecepta, sive dictata practica, notione, expeditiores erunt, et breviores rerum moralium definitiones, quum ad legem referuntur; atque eundem praestabunt usum, si modo hoc teneamus, leges omnes naturales, communem omnium utilitatem, et singulorum, communiori utilitati non adversantem unicè spectare.

Jus igitur est, “Facultas homini lege concessa, ad aliquid agendum, habendum, aut ab alio consequendum.” Non tamen, {quod antea docuimus,} juris omnis notio prima includit vel legis concedentis rationem, vel communis utilitatis ab eo proventurae. Recti enim et honesti sensu, atque sensu cujusque communi, comprobabitur, quicunque, nemine laeso, vel sibi vel suis prodest, sive agendo, sive occupando, ante legem Edition: 1745; Page: [125] ullam, aut Edition: current; Page: [112] communiorem utilitatem spectatam. Ex singulorum foelicitate exsurgit communis omnium foelicitas: {atque} in suam cujusque, et suorum utilitatem, cuique inseruit Deus naturales appetitus et caritates; comprobantur etiam, aut saltem non damnantur, conatus ex his orti, idque per se; ubi nec alterius adversantur utilitati, neque sensui aut appetitui nobiliori obstare videntur. Hinc et jure suo quisque ea agere aut occupare censetur, ex quibus nullum aliis oritur damnum; ipsi vero qui agit aut occupat, iisve quos caros habet, nascitur emolumentum.

Hoc tamen omnino tenendum; nullum esse jus privatum ad quicquam agendum, habendum, aut consequendum, quod communi omnium utilitati est contrarium: haec enim omni sive singulorum, sive coetuum juri, modum ponere debet.

II. Quumque hominum saluti, ne de vita dicamus copiosa et jucundâ, necessaria sit plurium conjunctio, ubi vigeant commercia, et mutua auxilia; (quod quidem satis notum est omnibus, neque disputatione eget;) quae ad hominum conjunctionem amicam, et consociationem, tuendam sunt necessaria, ea lege naturali omninò jubentur: quaeque societatis tuendae ratio exigit, ut cuique permittantur agenda, habenda, aut Edition: 1745; Page: [126] ab aliis consequenda, ea dicitur quisque jure suo agere, tenere, aut postulare.

{Ut} juri omni respondet lex quaedam, jus illud constituens aut confirmans, ita etiam obligatio. Dicimur obligari ad aliquid agendum, aut alteri dandum faciendum, cum internus cujusque sensus eas actiones aut praestationes esset comprobaturus, omniaque contraria, tanquam turpia et foeda, improbaturus. Eâdem ratione intelligitur obligatio ad abstinendum: atque hoc sensu, [separatâ legis notione] [ante legem latam] intelligitur obligatio. Alia vocis acceptione, omnis referenda est ad legem obligatio, et praecipuè ad divinam; quum scil. notat “gravissimum, ex suae utilitatis ratione, invitamentum, ad aliquid agendum, aut omittendum, homini propositum”: quod legibus praecipue fieri potest divinis. Atque huc recidunt Edition: current; Page: [113] fere omnes obligationis definitiones, quas afferunt illi, qui eam omnem ex legibus ortam volunt: neque aliud sonant metaphorica illa, vinculum juris, necessitate astringens; aut, necessitas absoluta homini imposita.

III. Jura, pro diversa ad societatem tuendam et excolendam necessitate, dividuntur in perfecta, et imperfecta: illorum tanta est necessitas, ut iis communiter spretis et violatis, disturbanda foret omnis hominum societas et conjunctio. Sunt igitur Edition: 1745; Page: [127] hujusmodi jura omnibus per vim conservanda et defendenda; eorumque violatio poenis gravissimis est coercenda.

Imperfecta quae dicuntur jura, ad societatem excolendam et ornandam, plurimum nonnunquam conferunt; atque [eorum] [ad ea praestanda] quae jure imperfecto exiguntur, sanctissima saepe est obligatio: sunt tamen ejusmodi, ut graviora sequerentur incommoda, nisi cujusque pudori et honestati ea permittantur praestanda, aut negligenda; in iis cuique religiose <observandis &> praestandis, elucent illae bonorum virtutes, quibus praecipue laus et gloria comparatur.

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Non vero facilè definiuntur limites inter jura omnia perfecta et imperfecta. Sensim enim, et per innumeros gradus, ascendimus a levissimo quoque jure imperfecto, per graviora et sanctiora, ad ea quae a perfectis vix secerni possunt; prout varii sunt hominum necessitudines, et merita, et dignitates, quibus innituntur jura imperfecta. Debentur viro cuivis innocenti, licet alienigenae, quaedam humanitatis officia; quae sanctiore jure postularet civis, aut vicinus; multò sanctiore propinqui, amici, fratres, parentes; haec tamen omnia censentur jura imperfecta.

Tertium addi potest juris, fucati potius quam veri, genus; quod dicitur externum; quum scil. utilitatis cujusdam remotioris ratio Edition: 1745; Page: [128] exigit, ne impediantur homines quaedam agere, possidere, aut ab aliis deposcere, quae tamen parum honeste, aut non sine turpitudine, in ea causa, agi, possideri, aut flagitari possunt. Hae juris species inanes, nulli viro bono placiturae, saepe oriuntur ex contractibus temerariis, aut ex legibus nonnunquam civilibus minime damnandis.

Patet interea, nullam esse posse pugnam inter vera jura, sive perfecta, sive imperfecta: saepe tamen juri imperfecto obstare potest jus externum: imperfecta autem non sunt per vim asserenda, aut vindicanda; {cumque juris tuendi tantum causa suscipienda sint bella,} nequit <igitur> esse bellum utrinque justum.

IV. In duo etiam genera dividuntur jura, prout alienari possunt, aut non possunt. Prioris generis sunt ea, quae et verè transferre valemus, quaeque translata aliquem praebent in vita usum. Ubi alterutra deficit conditio, alienari nequeunt jura. Patet igitur internas animi, de religione et cultu Dei, Edition: current; Page: [115] sententias, et affectus internos, quum utraque deficiat conditio, ab omnibus pactis et legibus esse immunes: suo enim cuique judicio necessario utendum; neque utile esse potest, quemquam contra animi sui sententiam quicquam profiteri; aut in Deo colendo ea agere, quae ipse putat esse impia aut vana. Edition: 1745; Page: [129] Ex generali hac de jure doctrina, efficitur duo esse primaria in societate tuenda praecepta. (1.) “Nequis alterum laedat”; aut dolorem aliquem vel molestiam, hominum societati neque necessariam neque utilem, alteri creet. Dein (2.) “ut quisque pro virili, in communem utilitatem aliquid conferat”; suorum saltem, aut vicinorum utilitati consulens. Atque qui societatis aut systematis parti cuivis prodest, nullo aliis illato detrimento, toti etiam prodest societati.

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CAPUT III: De Virtutum et Vitiorum Gradibus, inter se comparatis{; iisque quae speciem moralem afficiunt}.

I. Conscientiae nomen decantatum, primariò denotat ipsum honesti et turpis sensum; aut saltem [in omni conscientiae notione includitur necessariò hic sensus,] [hunc ei sempre antecessione sensum, necesse est;] sine quo nulla cerneretur honesti aut turpis species. Hoc autem posito, ratio monstrabit, quaenam sint actiones externae, quae laudandas aut damnandas indicant animi affectiones. Vulgo definitur conscientia, “judicium hominis de actionibus suis, quod ad moralem attinet speciem,” sive de actionibus Edition: 1745; Page: [130] ad legis praescriptum examinatis. Dicitur vero actio homini imputari, sive laudi aut vitio verti, quia ex ipsius voluntate orta, ingenium ejus indicat esse honestum aut turpe.

Conscientia est vel certa, vel probabilis; dubia, vel scrupulosa; quae ex ipsis vocabulis satis innotescunt. Quum de agendo deliberamus, dicitur antecedens; quum de praeteritis est judicium, dicitur subsequens.

Viri boni conscientia antecedens, anquirit de momento quod habet actio quaevis, ad omnium, aut singulorum utilitatem; quae bonitas dicitur materialis. Ea enim ratione materiae est bona actio, quae lege praecipitur, aut communi inservit utilitati, quocunque demum animo fuerit suscepta. Conscientia subsequens spectat etiam quo animo, quo consilio, actum erat; in quo sita est bonitas, quae dicitur, formalis. Actio enim legi in adjunctis omnibus Edition: current; Page: [117] consentanea [conformis], vel quae ex honestis animi affectionibus profecta est, formaliter est bona.

II. Quae in virtutibus et vitiis comparandis spectantur adjuncta, vel ad intellectum referuntur, vel ad voluntatem, vel {ad} rei ipsius quae agitur momentum, una cum agentis viribus pensitatum.

Hic autem ante omnia constat, eas solas actiones laudi verti aut vitio, sive imputari, Edition: 1745; Page: [131] quae ab homine fiunt sciente et volente, quaeque si nollet, non fierent: easque tantum omissas imputari, quae si studium non defuisset, fieri poterant: [cujusmodi omnes] [quae] etiam liberae dicuntur, et solae ingenii vel honesti vel turpis sunt indicia. Necessaria igitur, quae nobis vel insciis, vel nolentibus, eveniunt, non imputantur: neque impossibilia, quae dicuntur, omissa: quae, nempe, etiamsi quis maxime voluisset, fieri non poterant. Non tamen idem de iis dicendum, quae ipsum tantum hominis ingenium, aut animi motus vehementiores, fecerunt necessaria; aut quae ideo tantum impossibilia sunt, quod ea sit hominis indoles, ut ea neutiquam velle possit. {In ipsa enim voluntate, animique habitibus praecipue sita est honestas aut turpitudo: quinetiam suam sibi indolem moresque sponte sibi homines effingunt; aut ea saltem plurimum immutare valent.}

Quae inviti [agere dicuntur] [agunt] homines, ea vel vi adacti, ubi valentior renitentis membra impellit vel ignorantiâ et errore inducti agunt, ubi non norunt quid agitur: quaedam denique sunt mixta; ubi quod minime per se gratum est, ad gravius aliquod malum avertendum suscipitur. Quae ab invitis vi adactis [fieri dicuntur] [fiunt], {ea} soli cogenti imputantur: Edition: current; Page: [118] quae ab ignaris, tunc tantum Edition: 1745; Page: [132] imputantur, quum ignorantia est culpanda. Mixta omnia imputantur; sunt enim libera, quippe ab agentis voluntate profecta. Imputantur autem in malam partem, aut bonam prout quae ex actione nascuntur mala, sunt iis quae avertuntur majora, aut minora. Mala verò turpia, malis physicis sunt multo graviora.

III. Quamvis autem in ipsa voluntate, ejusque moribus, praecipuè sita sit omnis honestas aut turpitudo; ipsius tamen rei, quae agitur, ignorantia, actionis speciem moralem afficiet. Licet enim mala appeteret vir optimus, siquidem ipsi bona videantur, et honesta; error tamen aut ignorantia saepe haud culpâ vacat, siquidem voluntaria sit, et vincibilis; quum, nempe, diligentiâ, ut a viris probis fieri solet, adhibitâ, verum innotuisset. Quae quidem involuntaria, et invicta est ignorantia, ab omni culpa vacat.

Voluntaria, deinde, vel est affectata, quam dicunt, [sive sponte arcessita, ubi licet erroris adsit suspicio, de industria tamen] [ubi animo destinato] verum exquirere nolumus; vel supina, ubi socordes, et de officio praestando improvidi et incauti, animum ad eam rem non advertimus. Prior turpitudinem neque tollit neque imminuit: posterior paulum imminuit; idque prout major minorve fuerat socordia Edition: 1745; Page: [133] et negligentia; faciliorque, aut minus facilis officii cognitio.

Involuntaria est ignorantia, vel in se, sed non in sua causa, vel et in se, et in sua causa. Prioris generis est ubi verum inter agendum scire nequit homo; poterat tamen scivisse, si debitam antea adhibuisset diligentiam, qualem solent viri probi: posterioris, quum ne eâ quidem adhibita, verum scire poterat. Haec autem sola, non illa, ab omni crimine excusat. Quamvis, enim, in eo nulla sit turpitudo, quod ea nunc agat homo, quae sibi recta videntur; Edition: current; Page: [119] hic tamen error, eum antegressae arguit negligentiae, quae ingenium prodit parum honestum.

Ignorantia est vel juris, vel facti. Quae divisio in legibus positivis praecipuè locum habet: prout ignota est aut lex, aut rei quae agitur natura. In lege naturali, ipsa rei naturâ probè perspectâ, cum effectis, et eventuum consecutione, utilibus aut nocituris, lex ipsa innotescit.

IV. Quaestionibus, quae de conscientia errante moveri solent, hinc responderi poterit.

(1.) Ipse error, aut legis naturalis ignorantia, non rarò est culpanda; variè [diversissimè] tamen, pro variâ hominum perspicacia, et solertia; diversisque veri cognoscendi opportunitatibus; Edition: 1745; Page: [134] et perinde ut facilior est, vel minus facilis, ipsarum legum cognitio.

(2.) Quae turpia credimus, reclamante conscientia agere, aut quae videntur honesta omittere, quia pravum indicat ingenium, in quo non dominatur honesti amor, semper est damnandum; variis tamen gradibus, pro delicti admissi turpitudine varia, aut officii omissi dignitate, rationum insuper, quae ad peccandum impulerunt, gravitate aut dignitate. Saepe enim gravissimorum malorum metus, saepe amicitia, et parentum amor, στοργὴ dicta, saepe ipsa patriae caritas, homines ad iniqua impellunt; quae omnia non parum actionis turpitudinem imminuunt.

(3.) Quanquam qui conscientiae erranti morem gerit non in eo peccat quod id faciat; non tamen est a crimine penitus immunis; quum ipse error saepè sit culpandus. Culpa tamen gravior est aut levior pro ipsa errorum natura. Alii enim errores per se animum produnt turpem, odio, superbia, aut saevitia agitatum: alii vero negligentiam solùm, aut honestiores animi propensiones haud satis valuisse, indicant.

(4.) Magis plerumque peccat qui conscientiae renititur erranti, quam qui ei obsequitur. Uterque erroris culpâ tenetur; prior vero, etiam prodit honesti curam exiguam, Edition: 1745; Page: [135] et magnam legum divinarum incuriam. Ubi Edition: current; Page: [120] vero humaniores animi motus, conscientiae obstabant erranti, imperia aliorum, non veram rei honestatem aut bonitatem spectanti, confusâque et fallaci ejus umbra deceptae; ingenium nonnunquam videbitur minus depravatum ex eo quod egerat homo, contra quam istiusmodi conscientia monuerat, quam si ei paruisset.

V. Quae ad voluntatem pertinent adjuncta, in actionibus inter se comparandis spectanda, ex supra dictis intelligi possunt: quum honesti sint animi motus benigni; turpes, maligni; immo nimia philautia, aut nimiae humiliorum voluptatum appetitiones: interque affectiones benignas, laudabiliores sint stabiles magis et tranquillae; et tranquillarum honestissimae, quae patent latissimè.

1. Officia igitur deliberata, consilioque stabili suscepta, iis quae ex perturbato quovis, et brevi amoris aestu nascuntur, sunt honestiora.

2. Turpiora pariter sunt delicta et injuriae, quae destinato consilio, aut odio fiunt inveterato; quam quae ex ira, metu, aut vehementiore fluunt cupiditate. {De ira metuque observandum, quod, quia ad beate jucundève vivendum hoc imprimis exigatur, ut antè amoveantur dolores ferè Edition: 1745; Page: [136] omnes, atque virtus prima sit vitia fugisse; idcirco et acriores sunt animi motus omnes mala adspernantes, iis quae bona consectantur.} Actionum Edition: current; Page: [121] {igitur} turpitudinem plerumque {magis} imminuunt vehementiores istiusmodi perturbationes{, quibus haud facile obsistitur}; non tamen {omnem} penitus tollunt: quum, cui cordi est honestas, quique seriò hoc ageret, motus {etiam} hosce reprimere possit, eousque saltem ne in actiones prorumpant externas.

3. Eadem benefaciendi studia, aut aeque late patentia, ab omnibus, quamvis virtute paribus, non sunt expectanda: quum adeo diversa sint hominum ingenia, vires, opportunitates, otia, aut negotia.

4. Inter arctiores animi affectiones benignas, non leve est discrimen, pro variis amoris causis, quarum aliae aliis multo sunt honestiores. Quae ex nostrâ cum alterius utilitate conjunctâ, oritur benevolentia, quamvis turpitudine vacet, nihil tamen habet praeclari; quum cadere in hominem turpissimum, et erga turpissimos exerceri queat. Neque {per se} praeclara est ea caritas quae inter sanguine conjunctos, aut amantes, intercedit. Perturbati fere sunt hi motus, arctisque limitibus inclusi: atque ita nati sunt homines, ut qui nihil altius sapiunt his non careant. Nihil tamen magis Edition: 1745; Page: [137] contra naturam, nihil turpius, quam ut haec inter necessarios omnino desiderentur. Durus sit omnino et ferreus oportet, qui ne ex causis quidem hisce naturalibus, omniumque validissimis, concipit animum benignum.

Praeclarior paulo ea quae ex beneficiis acceptis oritur benevolentia, et gratiae referendae studium, ubi abest fucata omnis novis beneficiis captandis <destinata> amicitiae simulatio. Huic affinis est miserorum commiseratio, et sublevandi studium. Arctiores tamen sunt et hae animi propensiones: qui validis hisce causis non commovetur nemo est, nisi omnem simul exuerit humanitatem. In hujusmodi officiis vulgaribus non admodum elucet virtus; in iis tamen neglectis aut detrectatis, summa turpitudo.

Praeclarior longe est ea benevolentia et caritas, quam morum similitudo Edition: current; Page: [122] bonorum allexit. Ostendit enim acriorem honesti sensum, et amorem; {qui etiam} sua sponte ad plures pertineret, in quibus similis virtutum esset significatio. Huic autem praestat amor patriae alte infixus. Omnium tamen pulcherrima, ea stabilis animi prudentis affectio, quae universum benevolentia complectitur humanum genus; et singulis oblatâ occasione consulit.

Exigit autem, quod facile patet, communis Edition: 1745; Page: [138] utilitatis ratio, animi appetitionibus et naturae instinctu commendata, ut quisque, quantum patitur communis utilitas, sui, eorumque quos sibi commendarunt necessitudines arctiores et naturales, curam habeat praecipuam; utque in officiis huic curae consentaneis plerumque occupetur: quibus nempe solis {fere}, hominum pars longe maxima, communi utilitati inservire possint.

VI. Haec in universum tenenda; quo arctiore et validiore naturae vinculo adstringimur ad officia quaevis, eo minor erit in iis servatis honestas, et major in neglectis turpitudo. Quo sanctiore juris vinculo tenemur, quo pleniore jure postulatur officium, eo minus laudabile est praestitisse, magisque vituperabile praetermisisse, aut detrectasse. Quo debiliore jure postulari poterat officium, eo minus est flagitiosum detrectasse, eo honestius ultro praestitisse; si modo adsit sanctiora officia praestandi cura major, pro eorum sanctitate.

In actionibus et consiliis damnandis, minor, caeteris paribus, erit turpitudo, quo speciosiores causae ad peccandum impulerunt. Patriae amori posthabuisse eam justitiam, quae et exteris omnibus consulit; aut patriae utilitatem, amicorum aut bene de nobis meritorum utilitati posthabuisse, non perinde foedum, ac si quis suae haec utilitati Edition: 1745; Page: [139] posthabuisset, aut voluptati; quae causa est omnium infima.

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Quantum ad actionem simpliciter bonam hominem incitaverit suae utilitatis appetitio, tantum praeclarae speciei deteritur; et nulla alia re expetitâ, nulla manet laus, licet actio sit licita.

Ubi suae utilitatis ratio, quae ejusmodi est ut virum etiam bonum non parum commoveret, hominem ad peccandum incitaverit; turpitudo, eâ de causa imminuitur. Animi autem motus perturbati, quos excitare solent mala graviora, {nobis nostrisve} imminentia, virum bonum magis concutiunt, quam qui spectant utilitatum novarum aut voluptatum adeptionem: multo igitur magis delicti turpitudinem elevant. Voluptatum quidem appetitiones nimiae sunt per se turpissimae, indicantes levissimam et vilissimam animi partem caeteris prorsus dominari.

Quae suscipimus officia praeclara, si nobis damnosa sint, aut multo cum labore et periculo conjuncta, ea tanto sunt honestiora. Quum vero aliorum utilitatem praecipuè spectent {viri boni} virtutes praeclarae, {non ea gaudia interna ex suae virtutis opinione eximia, aut gloriâ, oritura;} ad suae voluptatis, aut utilitatis, aliorsum spectantes illecebras spernendas, animum suum confirmare Edition: 1745; Page: [140] conabitur vir bonus: quod optime fieri potest, ubi haec altè menti insident, Dei opt. max. providentiâ mundum administrari, bonisque omnibus optimè consuli; unicamque, ad vitam beatam et immortalem, per virtutem patere viam. Has igitur spes eximias, ex animo minimè ejiciet {vir bonus}: eas vero fovebit et confirmabit, ut in omni virtute sit perfectior et constantior.

VII. Quod ad rei quae agitur naturam, agentisque vires, attinet; haec vera videntur. (1.) Pro ratione momenti, quod actio quaevis ad communem affert utilitatem, quamque expetebat agens, eam, caeteris paribus, esse honestiorem.

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(2.) Caeteris item paribus, posito quovis actionis momento, ejus honestas, pro virium ratione inversa quae dicitur, major erit aut minor: id est, majorem ostendit is virtutis indolem, qui in re tenui, opibusque exiguis, beneficientiâ opulentos aequat.

(3.) Eadem ferè de actionum malarum turpitudine dicenda: eam scil. caeteris paribus, servare rationem detrimenti secuturi directam, et virium inversam. Id est, turpiora sunt quae graviora post se trahunt damna; quaeque ab imbecillioribus, contentis tamen nervis omnibus, perpetrata, animum produnt ad nocendum obfirmatum.

(4.) In aestimando autem actionis momento, Edition: 1745; Page: [141] spectanda est omnis eventuum consecutio, qui provideri poterant, quique citra actionem non evenissent; idque sive sua sponte et consecutione naturali sequantur; sive intervenientibus aliorum actionibus, quas elicuerat haec actio, aut provocarat. Prospiciet enim vir bonus ea omnia, quae ex actionibus suis evenire possunt; cavebitque, ne quid temerè agat, contra communem utilitatem, aut quod ad damnum publicum aut privatum inferendum, ansam est praebiturum, aut irritamentum non necessarium.

De actionum eventibus haec tenenda: Commodum publicum, etsi provisum, nisi etiam inter agendum expetitum {fuerat}, neutiquam actionem honestare, aut laudi verti posse; quum honestam non indicet voluntatem. Damnum vero publicum, quod provideri [praevideri] poterat, quamvis neque expetitum erat, neque provisum [praevisum], actionis turpitudinem augere; quum ipsa de publicis commodis aut incommodis incuria et negligentia sit turpis, debilesque ostendat fuisse affectiones animi benignas.

(5.) Neque tamen mala est omnis actio unde damna oritura praevidentur; neque mala omnia quae ex actione eveniunt, quamvis praevisa, eandem turpem reddunt, nisi et propter se expetita fuerant. Ex bonis Edition: 1745; Page: [142] quippe et malis eventibus, mixtum est omnium ferè actionum externarum momentum. Nullum est vitae institutum, quod non sua habeat et commoda Edition: current; Page: [125] et incommoda; quae omnia ad calculos vocanda. Eae igitur actiones ratione momenti sunt bonae, ubi commoda, quae sine istiusmodi incommodis parari non poterant, haud parum praeponderant: Eaeque malae, unde incommoda oriuntur commodis plura et majora; aut ubi haec sine illis parari poterant.

(6.) In foro Dei tamen, et conscientiae, imputantur haec omnia, non prout re verà eveniunt; verum prout [eorum spes erat probabilis] [probabiliter sperari poterant eventura]. Non enim in ipsis eventibus sita est honestas aut turpitudo; sed in animi consiliis, et voluntate. Unde pari saepe sunt in culpa hi, quorum alter casu, aut aliorum cura impeditus, nemini nocuit, alter verò gravissime. Neque minus laudandus qui honesta pro viribus, etsi frustrà, conatus est, quam quibus omnia ex voto contigerunt.

VIII. Inter ea quae voluntatem et agendi vires afficiunt numerantur habitus, et consuetudines: quae licet praesentium voluptatum sensum imminuant, absentium tamen augent desiderium molestum, hominesque ad eas insectandas propensiores reddunt, agendique dant facilitatem. Habitus hi, ut sponte fuerant adsciti; sic actionum Edition: 1745; Page: [143] intermissione, cautioneque et diligentiâ, reprimi potest eorum vis, et penitus deleri. Quomodocunque igitur, actionis rectae honestatem minuant virtutum habitus, hominis tamen et ingenii laudem augent. Habitus, contra, pravi, utcunque actionis cujusque turpitudinem minuant, hominem tamen ipsum turpiorem faciunt, magisque damnandum.

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Homini denique laudi dantur aliorum actiones, quin et causarum naturalium et inanimarum effectus exoptati; quatenus, actionibus suis honestis, aliquid ad eos attulit. Imputantur et damna, ex aliorum vitiis, aut rerum etiam inanimarum moribus orta; quatenus, vel faciendo, vel non faciendo, secus quam debebat, ad ea quicquam attulit.

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CAPUT IV: De Jure Privato Naturali.

I. <Ex dictis constat> Propria singulis officia, {jam diximus,} vix [non] expeditius declarari posse, quam percurrendo diversa quae hominibus competunt jura, una cum iis quae cuique respondent obligationibus; pro diverso hominum statu, variisque vitae necessitudinibus. Edition: 1745; Page: [144]

Status est, “Hominis conditio permanens, varia jura, et longam obligationum seriem includens”: Estque vel solutus et liber quem constituit ipsa natura; vel adventitius, ab aliquo hominum instituto ortus.

Libertatis solutae et naturalis status est, “eorum qui nulli communi hominum imperio subjiciuntur.” Qui quidem primus erat inter adultos, parentum potestate solutos: quem et quoddam hominum genus semper retinebit; summi saltem civitatum diversarum rectores, ipsaeque {inter se} civitates.

Denominatur {autem} status a jure et legibus in eo vigentibus, non ab iis quae, pro hominum pravitate, contra leges fiunt. Est igitur libertatis naturalis status, amicus et pacatus; innocentiae et beneficientiae status, non rapinae, violentus et hostilis. Quod recti et honesti sensus, et suae utilitatis ratio, cuique satis monstrabunt. Etenim [Enim]1 absque plurium consortio, (quod observasse profuerit estque in promptu,) absque plurium auxiliis, officiorumque amicorum commercio, neque nasci poterant homines, neque conservari, nedum ulla vitae commoditate aut jucunditate frui. Constat Edition: current; Page: [128] etiam, nemini eas esse vires, ut sibi polliceri possit, se alios quosvis devicturum, quos laedere cupiverit, Edition: 1745; Page: [145] aut spoliare; quosve injuriis intentatis, pro eorum super conditione communi curâ, sibi hostes concitaverit. Vix fere quisquam est cui ad ulciscendum [laedendum] desunt vires, ubi indignatione justa commovetur: hominumque vires sunt ad laedendum plerumque {longè} efficaciores, quam ad alios beatos conservandos. Quae in rebus externis sita est prosperitas [beatitudo], a corporis, ejusque partium omnium, valetudine pendet; quae infirma et fragilis, vi quantulacunque facile turbatur; resque exigit complures, quae laedi, interverti, aut corrumpi possunt. Perspecta haec hominum conditio infirma, et incerta, bene sano cuique monstrabit, pacem et amicitiam, quantum fieri potest, cum omnibus esse colendam.

II. Jura, prout lege naturali proximè constituta {sunt} vel in utilitatem singulorum, vel universitatis aut populi, vel in omnium communem, dividuntur in privata, publica, et communia. Jura cujusque privata primò indicant ipsi cujusque appetitus naturales, et sensus, ea seligentes quae ad cujusque faciunt foelicitatem: recti etiam honestique sensus, animique motus benigni, {satis docent hanc} facultatem, sibi utilia aut jucunda parandi, cuique permittendam; eamque defendendam omnibus commendant. Edition: 1745; Page: [146]

Primò, igitur, spectanda sunt naturae cujusque principia:* deliberatio dein revocanda, secundum rectam rationem, ad aliorum majores quasque utilitates, et omnium communem: ut, his non repugnantibus, cuique ea Edition: current; Page: [129] agere, habere, exigere, permittatur, quae nemine laeso, ipsi sunt commoda aut grata.

Singulorum jura sunt vel naturalia, vel adventitia. Naturalia, nullo hominum facto aut instituto praeeunte, cuique tribuit natura. Adventitia, ex aliquo hominum facto aut instituto nascuntur.

III. Singulorum jura naturalia, sunt vel perfecta, vel imperfecta. Inter jura cujusque naturalia et perfecta, haec sunt praecipua: (1.) Jus ad vitam, et corporis integritatem; (2.) Jus pudicitiae conservandae; (3.) et existimationis, quae dici solet, simplicis sive famae viri probi et hominum societate non indigni. (4.) Jus ad libertatem; sive jus [suo arbitratu] [pro suo arbitrio] agendi quaecunque nulla lege prohibentur. (5.) Jus etiam in vitam suam, eo usque ut possit quisque se non solum periculis quibusvis, verum et certae morti objicere, ubi id exegerit sanctum aliquod officium, unde major humano generi, aut praestantioribus quibusvis, orietur utilitas, quam quae ipsius vitam compensabit; Edition: 1745; Page: [147] quod et recti honestique sensus, et virtutis amor, cuique commendabit.

{(6.)} Est etiam cuique jus, cujus sensus altè a natura est infixus, suo utendi judicio, quod sine ulla alteri illata injuria [fiat] [fieri potest], in omnibus quae ad officium, praecipue vero ad Dei cultum [de deo colendo], spectant. Contra suum de officio judicium, nemo quicquam recte agit: neque in simulatione, aut dissimulatione, ulla est virtus; immo saepe maxima turpitudo. Non igitur in commercia veniunt, animi, de religione aut virtute, sententiae. Nullus est ejusmodi commercii usus: neque fieri potest, ut ea judicet quisquam quae alter voluerit. Patet igitur alienari non posse hoc jus; {eosque} nihil agere, qui sententias pacisci velint, easve aliorum arbitrio permittere. Finge aliquem temerè judicasse, falsasque fovere de religione sententias: is, dummodo nemini noceat, suo utitur jure externo; Edition: current; Page: [130] id est, graviora longe sequerentur incommoda, si alteri illum poenis coercere, aut malorum metu ut contrariam profiteatur sententiam cógere, permitteretur.

{(7.)} Est etiam jus cuique naturale, rebus communibus communiter utendi; atque, ut is ipsi pateat aditus, qui caeteris, ad jura adventitia acquirenda; utque cum aequalibus aequaliter excipiatur. {(8.)} Est etiam jus connubia ineundi, cum omnibus qui volunt, Edition: 1745; Page: [148] si modo sui sint juris, nulloque priore contractu, [aliove justo impedimento prohibeantur] [impediti]: neque est tertio cuivis, aut homini aut coetui, prohibendi jus. Neque cuiquam qui nullum nactus est imperium in alios, jus est volentes prohibendi, ne societates quasvis, sui commodi causa ineant, aut commercia {exerceant} innoxia.

Haec cuique competere jura perfecta, monstrabit sensus cujusque, et naturae prima: neque iis violatis constare posset vita inter homines socia et pacata. Ea etiam confirmabit communis utilitatis ratio, animique affectiones omnes honestiores.

{IV.} Hoc vero sunt omnes pares et aequales, quod adultis omnibus jura haec naturalia pariter competant, et lege naturali muniantur; quae jubet ut cuique consulamus, quantum communis patitur utilitas: utque tenuioribus et hebetioribus sua tueamur exigua; aequè ac ampliora sua, potentioribus aut solertioribus. Communis etenim hoc exigit utilitas, idque sanctissimè, ne quis mortalium ratione praeditus, nisi sponte sua, aut ob delictum, alienae subjiciatur voluntati, nulla suae utilitatis habita ratione: dummodo Edition: current; Page: [131] magna aliqua populi utilitas, in casu quodam rariore, id non flagitet. Nemo enim adeo est hebes, aut de suis suorumque rebus adeo securus et improvidus, cui non sit Edition: 1745; Page: [149] mortis instar, se suosque ex aliena pendere voluntate, et alterius inservire libidini, gravissimis contumeliis semper obnoxios. Naturâ igitur nemo est servus, nemo dominus. His tamen non obstantibus, plura sunt prudentioribus et melioribus jura imperfecta, quae aliis non competunt; majorque iis cultus debetur, et officia praestantiora.

Quum vero nulla sint indicia certa, aut criteria, quorum ope inter omnes convenire possit, quinam hominum sint caeteris solertiores et meliores; quumque et hebetiores, praestantem sibi saepe arrogent prudentiam; omniumque pessimi malitiosè saepe simulent probitatem et bonitatem, a verâ haud facilè secernendam; patet, nullo prudentiae aut probitatis obtentu, posse quemquam, jure, in alios invitos imperium sibi arrogare. Hoc enim communi maxime obesset foelicitati.

V. Omni singulorum juri imperfecto, respondet obligatio aliqua aut officium, recti et honesti sensu, et communi omnium utilitate, saepe sanctissime commendatum. Haec sunt praecipua. Cuique jus est exigendi ea ab aliis officia, quae accipienti prosunt, danti vero neque sunt molesta nec damnosa. Est et cuivis innocuo jus ad humaniora ea officia, quae ipsi multo magis sunt profutura, quam praestantem gravatura. Quae causa praecipuè est calamitosi cujusque, Edition: 1745; Page: [150] aliorum egentis auxilio. Honestioribus, licet non calamitosis, jus est ad aliorum officia majora, ad suffragia, praesertim, quibus ad honores altiores promoveantur. Jus etiam est cuique, non suo merito infami, ut legibus aequis, in societates aut civiles aut religiosas, ad vitam commodiorem, aut magis piam degendam, recipiatur. Jus denique est cuique innoxio, ut humanis et benignis, pariter cum paribus, excipiatur Edition: current; Page: [132] officiis; atque cum imparibus, pro ratione dignitatis.

VI. De beneficientia et liberalitate constat, beneficii momentum ad accipientis utilitatem, esse pro ipsius beneficii ratione, accipientisque indigentiâ, majus vel minus: danti vero graviora esse, aut leviora, beneficia, pro eorundem pretio, dantisque inopia. Unde accipienti egeno saepe sunt utilissima, quae danti opulento sunt minimé gravia.

Beneficientia, quae virum bonum maxime decet, et in qua praecipue elucet virtus, has “habet cautiones”: (1.) “ne obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videtur fieri, et caeteris.” (2.) Deinde “ne major” “sit quam facultates,” suumque fontem exhauriat. (3.) “Tum ut cuique pro dignitate tribuatur.”2 In dignitate aestimanda “spectandi sunt” 1. “Mores” hominum; 2. “Animus erga nos”; Edition: 1745; Page: [151] 3. Vitae communitas et conjunctio; 4. Et denique “officia ante in nos collata.”3 Horum nullum est negligendum; minime quod ultimum posuimus, quum “nullum” sit “officium gratiâ referenda magis necessarium,” aut vitae hominum magis utile;4 ingrato autem animo nihil turpius aut inutilius. Gratiae igitur referendae, ubi simul caetera praestari nequeunt, cedunt pleraque liberalitatis officia.

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CAPUT V: De Jure Adventitio reali, et Rerum Dominio.

I. Adventitia, quae ex hominum instituto aliquo aut facto oriuntur, jura, sunt vel realia, quae dicuntur, vel personalia. Illa “rem aliquam certam et definitam proxime spectant”: haec vero “certum hominem sive personam”: {de his plenius alias}.

Inter jura realia, prima veniant in medium rerum dominia: quorum origo et causae declarandae. Monstrant primò externi hominum sensus et appetitus, certas res in victum et amictum exposcentes; mutorumque animalium sensus similes, et appetitus, (ad quos regendos aut cohibendos, Edition: 1745; Page: [152] nullam aliam habent facultatem superiorem,) monstrant, res inanimas, animalium causâ, a Deo benigno fuisse fabricatas, ut vita foret ipsis laeta et copiosa: animalium autem terrestrium praecipui sunt homines. Hoc etiam confirmabit ratio, docens, quae gignuntur è terra, citò sua sponte interitura, non in alium usum, divinâ bonitate et sapientia digniorem, destinata esse, quam ut animalium, praecipue vero hominum, utilitati inserviant aut foelicitati.

II. Quamvis autem, homini innata quaedam bonitas, et commiseratio, ad ipsas pertineat beluas, ab omni in eas retrahens saevitia, quam non exigit gravior hominum utilitas, quorum cuique major longe erit cura, et commiseratio: cernent tamen homines, vitam sibi duram omnino et laboriosam futuram, nisi jumentorum laboribus subleventur. Cernent etiam, jumenta Edition: current; Page: [134] omnia, atque animalium mitiora, quorum hominibus praecipuus est usus, sine hominum provida curâ, conservari non posse; hiberna nempe fame, et frigore, aut ferarum vi peritura: neque hominibus, in se conservandis semper occupatis, siquidem nullum a jumentis accederet auxilium, mutis animalibus conservandis aut protegendis vacaturum. Monstrat igitur ipsa ratio, animalia mitiora, praecipue quae laboribus ferendis sunt idonea, Edition: 1745; Page: [153] hominum fidei et imperio esse permissa, ut hominum solertiâ conservata, curae hujus et custodiae, laboribus suis, persolvant, mercedem: atque hac ratione communitatem quandam, aut societatem, in communem utriusque generis utilitatem, esse constitutam; ubi imperant animalia ratione praedita, et serviunt rationis expertia.

Quae laboribus ferendis inutilia sunt animalia muta, ab iis, alia ratione, hominibus persolvenda est merces defensionis et custodiae, cum haud levi hominum labore conjunctae; quibus nempe silvestres agri sunt in pascua mitigandi, atque ferae et rapaces beluae abigendae. Lacte nempe aut lana, hominibus persolvenda est ea merces, qui, aliâ lege, labores, iis conservandis necessarios, perferre nequirent.

III. Quin et si victûs, pro hominum numero, ita maligna esset copia, ut plurimis fame pereundum foret, nisi mutorum animalium carne vescerentur; monstrabit ratio, illa animalia haud graviore morte perire, inopinatò in hominum cibum mactata, quàm omnibus, ab hominum tutela exclusis, pereundum esset: immò fame, frigore, aut ferarum vi, immaturiùs pleraque perirent et saeviùs. Non igitur iniquè aut crudeliter, at potius prudenter et benigne, agitur, ubi homines hanc leonum, ursorum, Edition: 1745; Page: [154] luporum, canum aut vulturum praedam, saevius perituram, in suos usus intervertunt.

Videmus insuper mutorum animalium genera debiliora, in fortiorum et sagaciorum cibum a natura esse destinata. Quo eorum usu hominibus Edition: current; Page: [135] negato, et pauciora istorum generum propagarentur et conservarentur; eorumque animalium vita minus foret tuta aut copiosa. Exigit etiam universorum animalium utilitas, ut conservetur et augeatur genus ratione praeditum, nobilioris foelicitatis aut miseriae, et diuturnioris, capax; quamvis generum [animalium] inferiorum imminutionem exigeret {ea} praestantiorum conservatio. Haec omnia satis docent et confirmant jus illud humani generis commune, ad omnem ex rebus inferioribus, etiam animatis, fructum capiendum. Omnis tamen in bruta animalia saevities, hominibus inutilis, est omninò vituperanda.

IV. Dominii vero privati alia est ratio. Dominium primum et integrum [illibatum], “Jus omnem rei usum capiendi, eamque domini arbitratu alienandi,” notat. Insitae sunt cuique solertia quaedam et vires, ad res aliquas occupandas idoneae; atque ad agendum proclives sunt homines. Arctiores animi affectus benigni, una cum philautia, quemque incitant, ad res, sibi et suis Edition: 1745; Page: [155] necessarias, anquirendas et occupandas: in istiusmodi solertia et industria delectatur gnavus quisque, et strenuus; et in eo sibi plaudit, quod suo labore, amicorum officiorum materiam comparavit. Docet etiam recti honestique sensus, inhumani esse et maligni, alteri, res ejus labore partas aut excultas eripere, cum possit quisque suo se labore sustentare. In promptu est, fructus sponte nascentes ne vel centesimum quemque alere posse: omnium igitur labore et diligentia conservandum est humanum genus. Quod igitur est diligentiae fovendae necessarium, est et humano generi conservando necessarium: citra vero dominium, ex labore in rebus occupandis et excolendis impenso, oriundum, non amplius philautia, aut arctioris caritatis stimuli, homines ad labores perferendos incitabunt; neque quidem ipsa quae latissimè patet benevolentia: quum omnium intersit, ut Edition: current; Page: [136] omnes, pro virili, labores vitae necessarios ferant. Nemo autem impenderet labores, nisi ipsi proprius esset rerum suo labore partarum usus; aliter enim, ignavis et nebulonibus, operum patientes omnes et strenui, praedae essent et ludibrio.

Neque quidem alia ratione jucunda erit hominum vita, aut vigebit omnium diligentia et patientia, quam cuique permisso omni, Edition: 1745; Page: [156] rerum, quas suo labore paravit et excoluit, usu; et facultate libera, iis quos habet carissimos, de eo quod ipsi superest, gratificandi. Hinc et jucundi fient labores et honesti; vigebunt amicitiae, et mutua bonorum officia; atque suâ inopia, et {ipsi} ignavi, ad labores perferendos cogentur. Neque sperari poterit in vita civili, ea continua magistratuum cura et fides, quae cunctos, ad labores debitos in commune conferendos, adigat, atque res communes, cuique, pro indigentia et meritis, sine gratia aut odio, distribuat. Neque, si ita se res haberet, in imperantium fide et prudentiâ ea esse posset civium fiducia, quae aeque jucundos redderet labores, ac si cuique, [suo arbitratu,] [pro suo judicio] res suo labore partas, suis impertire permittatur.

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CAPUT VI: De Dominii Acquirendi Rationibus.

I. Dominium est vel primum, vel derivatum. Primum, quod ex rerum antea communium occupatione oritur et culturâ. Derivatum, quod a priore domino, ad novum est translatum. Edition: 1745; Page: [157]

Qui res sua sponte, sine culturâ, homini utiles aut jucundas, sive pro naturali sui conservandi appetitu, sive animo in alios benevolo, primus occupavit, primus eas oculo cernendo, manu aut instrumento quovis mox arrepturus; vel sua solertia et labore includendo; aut quacunque ratione, humanis usibus propius admovendo; ideo censetur earum dominus, quoniam si alius quispiam, qui suo se labore sustentare posset, res ita occupatas huic eriperet, ipsiusque spes et conatus redderet irritos, ab omni humanitate recederet, societatem vitae abrumperet, et perpetuis contentionibus materiam esset praebiturus. Si quis enim, huic aliquid occupanti, illud rectè nunc posset eripere; simili jure poterit et aliud denuò. Quodque huic eripienti est jus, alii cuivis, in simili competet causâ: qua ratione omnis occupantium labor irritus fieri posset, ipsique ab omni rerum usu excludi, nisi perpetuis se bellis defenderent.

Nugantur illi, qui somniantes rerum dominia physicas quasdam esse qualitates, aut vincula inter res et dominum, in eo disputant, non tantam esse primò videndi, tangendi, feriendi, aut includendi vim, ut sancta constituat Edition: current; Page: [138] dominii jura; quique quaestionem movent, quaenam harum rationum vim habeat maximam. Etenim dominii causas Edition: 1745; Page: [158] investigantes, non aliud quaerimus, quam ut cognoscatur, in quibus causis et adjunctis, {quove rerum statu,} humanum sit, et erga singulos aequum, et simul hominum consociationi tuendae idoneum et necessarium, ut uni permittatur omnis quarundam rerum usus, caeterique ab eo arceantur; quo ipso cognito, munitur via facilis, ad dominii acquirendi rationes et regulas cognoscendas.

II. De diversis occupandi rationibus, ita statuendum videtur; inhumanum esse et iniquum, nulla premente necessitate, aliorum innocuos labores, inchoatos, nec dum intermissos, impedire; eorumve fructus, praematura nostra occupatione, intervertere. Si quis igitur res sibi anquirens necessarias, rem aliquam prior vidit, confestim arrepturus, aut persecuturus; qui in simili non fuerat causa, inique ageret et inhumaniter, si celerius currendo rem prius arriperet, quam antea non quaerebat. Si plures simul, res sibi necessarias anquirentes, eandem rem viderint, {quam eorum quisque facile capere posset,} ea erit his omnibus communis, quamvis unus primus {attigerit vel} arripuerit, nisi legibus civilibus, aut moribus, aliter sit constitutum. Si unus prior viderit, confestim arrepturus, alter vero prioris consilii gnarus, similes tamen ipse res anquirens, rem Edition: 1745; Page: [159] prior arripuerit, ea res videtur communis. Nullae enim stant ab una parte causae magis humanae, quam quae ab alterâ. Si quis suo labore aut solertia feras incluserit, irretiverit, aut captu faciliores fecerit, eas huic eripere, nulla premente graviore necessitate, iniquum esset et inhumanum; licet neque primus eas vidisset, neque attigisset. Si pluribus innotuerit rem quandam esse dominio vacuam, et cuivis occupaturo patere; pluresque, non hujus consilii sibi mutuo conscii, eam occupare simul statuerint, et conati fuerint; eo quidem more, qui communi hominum consensu invaluit, dominus erit qui primus advenerit: ubi autem nihil in mores est inductum, {istiusmodi} res omnibus citius aut serius occupantibus, erit communis, aut communiter habenda, aut inter hos plures, Edition: current; Page: [139] pro ratione operarum et impensarum, quas prudenter et bona fide, in ea occupanda singuli contulerunt, dividenda; siquidem eorum nulli defuit bona fides, aut justa diligentia. Immo, etsi plures consilii hujus mutuo sibi conscii fuerant, recte tamen omnes occupant, et dominium obtinent commune. Neque tardioribus citra culpam; aut iis qui strenuam navantes operam, casu quodam impediebantur, aditus ad rem communem est praecludendus.

In causis hujusmodi spectandum, primo, Edition: 1745; Page: [160] si quae humaniores suadeant rationes, ut uni prae caeteris faveatur; haec imprimis, ne innocuorum aut honestorum laborum fructus intervertantur, aut probi et industrii spes et conatus fiant irriti. Si omnibus faveat haec ratio, res debet esse omnibus communis. Si qui casus rariores ancipiti ansam praebeant disceptationi; atque res quaedam neque communiter haberi, neque sine dispendio dividi, aut commode distrahi possint, hominum conventione aut <pro> more instituto, dominium illi assignandum, cui favent istiusmodi adjuncta, quorum ea est vis, ut lites inextricabiles et bella praecavere valeant. Atque ideo tantus ubique favor comitatur prius occupantem, aut qui rem palam emerat, et cui palam fuit tradita: atque haec publica exigit utilitas.

Si inter se plures pacti fuerint, rem fore illius qui primo occupaverit; et de occupandi modo etiam pacisci oportebat: de quo si nihil convenerat, plures occupandi rationes censeri possunt pares, et commune erit dominium. Haec ad pacem tuendam sunt aptissima.

{De eo quidem quod in variis istiusmodi causis, singuli summo jure sibi arrogare possint, lites fortè incident inextricabiles: semper tamen qui virtuti student, quid postulet aequitas et humanitas, quidque viro bono Edition: 1745; Page: [161] dignum, nisi se nimium amaverint, facile perspicient. Neque querendum, quod in his aliisque causis quibusdam, non satis clare docuerit natura, quam propè ad injurias et fraudes, sine tamen turpitudine et infamia accedere Edition: current; Page: [140] possimus; quum tam clarâ voce nos ad omnem honestatem, liberalitatem, et beneficientiam cohortetur.}

III. Quum autem homo sit naturâ sagax et futuri providus, non solum in praesentem sui aut suorum usum, recte res occupabit, verum et in futurum, ubi alii gravi non premuntur necessitate. Quumque res plurimae, ut hominum usui uberius et diutius inserviant, longa egeant et laboriosa cultura; ut ad eam adhibendam incitentur homines, ipsis perpetuus earum rerum permittendus est usus, sive dominium perpetuum, laboris et solertiae naturale et justum praemium. Quâ in causa sunt arva, pascua, vineae, oliveta, pomaria, horti, jumenta, et his similia plurima.

Inchoatur autem dominium, inchoatâ rerum prius communium cultura; plenum est, quum designavit occupator quousque, per se, vel per alios sibi adsciscendos, excolere et velit et possit. Iniquum enim est aut impedire labores innocuos, aut eorum fructus intervertere.

Terminatur vero dominium, aut occupandi Edition: 1745; Page: [162] jus, occupantis, eorumque, quos sibi adsciscere potest, excolendi viribus. Neque primo appulsu in vastam insulam, plurium familiarum capacem, pluriumque cultura egentem, fieri potest unus paterfamilias totius insulae dominus. Quisque recte occupat quantum poterit excolere: inculta manent communia. Neque primo classis suae appulsu domina sit civitas vastae continentis, plurium civitatum capacis, cui excolendae unius civitatis coloniae neutiquam sufficerent. Recte occupat haec civitas quantum spes est se posse modico et justo tempore excolere; suosque jure porrigunt coloni limites, ultra id quod possunt quinquennio primo aut decennio mitigare; neutiquam vero ultra Edition: current; Page: [141] [quam ulla est excolendi spes] [omnem regionis occupatae excolendae spem]. Justum autem excolendi tempus, primis occupantibus concedendum, virorum prudentium arbitrio definiri debet, vicinarum, aeque ac hujus civitatis, habita ratione, prout numerosiores sunt, novisque magis indigentes sedibus; aut minus numerosae, civesque laxius habitantes. Ubi novis plures indigent sedibus, rectè istius continentis partes incultas, a cultis remotiores, occupabunt aliae civitates, ea inconsultâ, aut invitâ, quae prima partem occupaverat. Neque ea exigere potest, ut hi advenae civili ipsius imperio se subjiciant. Satis est si Edition: 1745; Page: [163] aequae pacis legibus consentiant. Veruntamen prout in libero populo justae aliquando sunt leges agrariae, paucorum opes nimias, et civitati periculosas, cohibentes; civitatibus ita vicinis jus est, mature praepedire eas unius occupationes, ex quibus, ipsi earum libertati aut majestati, periculum imminere videatur; nisi alia ratione satis sibi cavere poterint. Communi enim utilitati adversatur quam maximè, ut unius civitatis superbiae, avaritiae, ambitioni, aut luxui, aliarum jura, majestas, libertasque, permittantur pessundanda.

Singulis tamen hominibus, ut et hominum coetibus, permittenda sunt rerum quarundam dominia jure acquisita, supra eum modum, quem exigit ipsorum usus; quum eae commerciis praebeant materiam, cum aliis rebus quibus indigent commutandae.

IV. Ex his dominii causis patebit, res usus inhexausti, ita occupari non posse, ut ab earum usu alii arceantur; praecipue etiam, quod nullo hominum labore res istiusmodi meliores fieri possint. Si quidem ad tutiorem earundem usum, sumptus exigantur aut labores, recte hoc exigunt hi, qui utiles eos sumptus aut labores impenderant, ut iis compensandis caeteri, pro rata Edition: current; Page: [142] parte, aliquid conferant. Aer igitur, lumen solis, aqua profluens, et oceanus, omnibus Edition: 1745; Page: [164] manent communia; quin et freta. Transeuntibus autem recte imponi potest tributum aliquod, ab ea civitate, cujus propugnaculis, aut navibus armatis arcentur piratae, tutumque omnibus per ea freta munitur iter: quod tamen tributum non est augendum, ultra rationem sumptuum, omnibus transeuntibus utilium. Cunctis autem permittendus omnis rerum communium usus, qui non etiam vicini soli, ab aliis occupati, usum includit.

Hinc constat, res a Deo hominibus fuisse relictas, in ea communione quae dicitur negativa, non positiva. Illa est “status rerum in medio positarum, ut occupationi pateant”: haec vero “status rerum quae sunt in plurium dominio indiviso,” ad quas nempe sibi sumendas, sine dominorum omnium consensu, nemini jus est. Recte igitur quivis, caeteris inconsultis, res prius {negative} communes occupabit; neque in dominio primo constituendo, omnium de rebus dividendis conventionibus opus fuit.

Quae nullius dicuntur res, occupationi tamen non patentes, neque omnibus communes, sunt in dominio coetus, aut universitatis: ut res sacrae, <et> sanctae, [et religiosae; quarum nonnullae quidem sunt] [Religiosae sunt aliquando inter] res familiares; quamvis legibus quibusdam superstitiosis, Edition: 1745; Page: [165] prohibeatur aliquando, ne quis res istiusmodi ad alios usus convertat. Neque enim res istae usum aliquem Deo praestare possunt; neque ipsius jus dominii in omnia, ullo hominum facto augeri potest, vel imminui.

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Res publicae, quamvis extra singulorum patrimonia et commercia, veniunt tamen in populorum commercia, sive inter se, sive cum privatis: ut theatra, porticus, viae, balnea.

Res olim occupatae, communes fieri possunt, si a domino sint projectae, aut postquam vindicare eas poterat diu neglectae; quod etiam animum abdicandi satis indicare potest. Diuturna earum possessio quemvis constituet dominum. Ubi dominus rei, invitè licet amissae, non apparet, cedit possessori. Sunt autem aliae causae, haud iniquae, cur alia usucapio, legibus civilibus, in communem utilitatem, et ad fraudes praecavendas constituatur.

Cum solo occupato, occupantur et ea, quorum nullus aliis potest esse usus, sine usu soli; ut lacus, stagna, et flumina ripas occupatas interfluentia: immo et ea, quorum ex usu promiscuè permisso, rebus nostris periculum immineret; ut sinus, longius a mari in agros occupatos recedentes, partesque maris littoribus propiores, unde bellicis tormentis Edition: 1745; Page: [166] laedi possint res nostrae. Non tamen occupantur fera animalia, quae sponte se subducere possunt, et in quibus custodiendis, aut includendis, nullus est impensus labor. Licet recte alios ab aucupio, venatione, aut piscatu, in solo nostro, possimus arcere.

V. Accessiones appellantur, omnes fructus, incrementa, alluviones, commixtiones, confusiones, specificationes, quae dicuntur, et meliorationes: de quibus hae regulae facillimae.

1. Rei nostrae accessiones omnes, quae nullam alterius rem aut operam includunt, sunt nostrae; nisi quis alius jus aliquod recte acquisivit, nostro derogans aliquid dominio.

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2. Ubi citra dolum malum, aut culpam, plurium res aut operae, ad rem aliquam conficiendam, aut conflandam concurrerunt, aut rem fecerunt meliorem; dominium est hisce pluribus commune, pro rerum aut operarum quas singuli contulerunt ratione. Res igitur ipsa est his communiter, aut vicibus alternis, in eadem ratione, utenda; aut inter hos ita dividenda, si sine dispendio hoc fieri possit.

3. Quorum si nullum possit fieri, qui minore cum incommodo, re communi carere possunt, eam cedere debent magis indigenti, Edition: 1745; Page: [167] acceptâ compensatione, a viro probo definiendâ.

4. Ubi dolo malo, aut culpa lata, res aut opera aliena rei meae est immista, unde mihi sit minus utilis; ejus pretium ab eo, qui dolo aut culpâ, rem meam contrectavit, est mihi praestandum; immo praestandum quod mea interesset, salvam habuisse rem meam et intactam: atque rem meam mihi inutilem ipse sibi habeat. Si vero res mea mihi facta fuerit utilior, mea erit; tantumque illi a me praestandum, quantum ipsius opera factus sum locupletior.

Plenum igitur Dominium continet haec quatuor. (1.) Jus rei possidendae. (2.) Jus omnem ejus usum capiendi. (3.) Jus alios ab eo arcendi. (4.) Jus, prout domino libuerit, eam transferendi, vel absolutè, vel sub conditione quavis licita, et in quemcunque eventum; sive totam, sive mutilam; aut quemcunque ejus licitum usum, alteri permittendi. Jure saepe civili imminuuntur dominii jura, saepe priorum dominorum factis aut contractibus. Edition: 1745; Page: [168]

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CAPUT VII: De Jure Derivato, ejusque Causis.

I. Derivata jura adventitia sunt vel realia vel personalia. Juris realis materia, sunt ipsa rerum dominia; personalis materia est libertas naturalis, jus scil. cujusque pro sua voluntate et judicio agendi, suasque res administrandi. Hujusmodi juris parte aliqua, ad alterum translata, subnascitur eidem jus personale.

Ad hanc distinctionem, cui et in lege naturali est locus, explicandam, primo monendum, quod mutua officia, et junctos plurium labores, saepe communis exigat utilitas: quodque, aucto hominum numero, multò foelicius suppetent cunctis res utiles, ubi quisque sibi artem aliquam eligens, in ea se exercet; ejusque peritus, magnam comparat rerum quarundam copiam, quas rebus aliorum, diversas artes exercentium, commutare poterit; quàm si quisque, per vices, omnes artes utcunque exerceret, in earum nullâ ad insignem perventurus solertiam.

Constat etiam, post homines multiplicatos, agros omnes ferè, brevi ita fuisse occupatos, ut non paucis, unde se alere possint, nulli restarent occupandi. Illis igitur Edition: 1745; Page: [169] relictae erant vires suae et artes, ut suis operis, vulgaribus aut artificiosis, pro aliis rebus commutatis, sibi res compararent necessarias. Locupletiores vero aliorum operis et artificiis, plerumque maxime indigent; quae salvo pudore, ab aliis gratis expectare haud possunt: Edition: current; Page: [146] crebris igitur {semper} opus erat pactis, (quorum natura deinceps plenius explicanda,) quibus et dominia {sive jura realia} transferrentur; et jura personalia, ad certam mensuram aut quantitatem ab aliis exigendam, sive debita, constituerentur.

Conveniret autem non raro inter paciscentes, ut dominus, omni rei suae dominio neutiquam translato, eam creditori ita subjiceret, ut nisi ad diem praestitutum aliunde solutum fuerit debitum, ex ea re distracta, aut vendita, solveretur: hac ratione constituebatur creditori jus reale. Aliquando patrifamilias assiduo et industrio, ita fidem haberet creditor, ut nullam posceret hypothecam, contentus jure personali, non unam aliquam debitoris rem, prae alia, respiciente. Ex damno item dato, simile oriretur jus tantummodò personale. Commerciorum vero gliscentium fides sanctissimè servanda, formulas quasdam semper exigebat solennes et publicas; quibus adhibitis, plena intelligebatur dominii fieri translatio, Edition: 1745; Page: [170] contractu nullo priore, qui latuerat, eludenda. Quod nisi obtineretur, nemo quicquam emere vellet, sibi forte, ex contractu aliquo latente, cum tertio quodam prius inito, mox eripiendum. Obligationes suas quascunque, vir bonus sanctissime spectabit, etiam personales: commerciorum autem fides necessario servanda hoc exigit, ut pactis, bona fide et publicè, ad jura realia transferenda initis, jura cedant personalia, quamvis priora.

II. Jura realia derivata, sunt vel pleni dominii partes quaedam, a reliquis separatae, vel ipsa dominia [ab uno ad alterum translata] [nova]. Partes quae Edition: current; Page: [147] separatae solent manere, sunt quatuor; scil. 1. Jus possidendi rem alienam, quae sine vi aut dolo, ad aliquem pervenerat. 2. Jus haereditarium, 3. Jus pignoris aut hypothecae, (4)1 et servitutes.

Qui rem alienam, sine vi aut dolo possidet, vel novit eam esse alienam; vel ex causa probabili, credit eam esse suam: atque hic proprie dicitur bonae fidei possessor.

Qui vi aut dolo, sine justa causa rem alienam possidet, ei nullum est jus: quum domino, aut ejus nomine reposcenti cuilibet, jus sit eam possessori injusto eripiendi, ut domino reddatur. Qui tamen sine vi aut dolo possidet quod novit esse alienum; ut qui res Edition: 1745; Page: [171] amissas aut naufragas invenit; ei jus est eas retinendi, quod valebit contra omnes praeter dominum, [per se, aut per alium,] [ad ejus mandatarium] reposcentem. Qui si nullus vindicet, res cedit possessori. Tenetur autem possessor publicè denunciare, res eas apud se esse, domino repetenti reddendas: eas enim celasse, crimen habet furti. Recte tamen a domino exigit impensas, in iis conservandis aut denunciandis, prudenter erogatas.

Bonae fidei possessor, primo, rem tenetur cum fructibus extantibus domino reddere. 2. Dein si res, ejusve fructus sint consumpti, tenetur domino praestare quantum ex rei alienae usu factus est locupletior, quòd rebus suis interea pepercerat; vel quantum, pro sua conditione, ipsius interfuit tam diu lautius vixisse. Iniquum enim est hominem, hominis non consentientis incommodo, suum augere aut commodum aut voluptatem.

3. Ubi res ipsae, earumve fructus periere; ea praestare non tenetur bonae Edition: current; Page: [148] fidei possessor, aut fructus quos percipere neglexerat; utebatur enim rebus tanquam suis. Cessat autem bona fides, ubi primum possessori innotuit probabilis suspicandi causa, rem esse alienam: eaque cessante, omnia latâ culpa, neglecta aut omissa, praestare tenetur. Edition: 1745; Page: [172]

4. Quum rem oneroso partam titulo, domino reddit bonae fidei possessor, pretium ab auctore suo recte reposcit.

5. Ubi auctor solvendo non est, haud aequior est domini causa, quam bonae fidei possessoris. Neque enim sanctius est domini jus, quam quo res emptione, successione, testamentis, aut donationibus {partae} tenentur; quippe quibus plerumque constituuntur ipsa dominia. Quumque certum alteri aut utrique damnum sit ferendum, neque ulla publicae utilitatis ratio, uni prae altero faveat; nisi quid aliter suadeant humanitatis aut liberalitatis rationes, {damnum} inter eos dividendum videtur: {idque eo magis, quod saepè bonae fidei possessor rem alienam sibi parando, domino negotium gesserat utile, quippe cui aliter nulla rei suae vindicandae fuisset copia}. Si quis dixerit hoc esse utile, ut caveant emptores, ne res emant furtivas. Res suas, contra, diligentius custodiant domini; ne in eas, ipsorum negligentia amissas, aut raptui expositas, incidant viri probi, tanquam in laqueos.

6. Rem suam, a bonae fidei possessore alteri donatam, a donatario recte vindicat dominus, neque illi ullum est repetendi jus.

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III. De jure haereditario certum est, eum qui pleno jure est dominus, posse rem suam ad quemvis, in quemcunque eventum, Edition: 1745; Page: [173] et sub conditionibus quibusvis licitis transferre. Haeredis igitur cujusque substituti non minus sanctum est jus, quam donatarii. Neque minus inhumanum est, cohibere dominum, ne ad haeredem substitutum, sibi carum, rem suam in certum eventum transferat; quam prohibere ne amico vivus donet, aut ad haeredem proximum, in mortis eventum transferat. Non minus inhumanum est, haeredis secundi aut tertii spem, sine justa causa praecidere, quam amici dona intervertere. Rectè tamen leges civiles, in communem utilitatem, [vetant in infinitum porrigere] [vetare possunt, ne in infinitum porrigantur] haec jura, possessoribus fortè gravia futura, aut ipsae civitati: prout prodigae et inconsultae donationes, aequi judicis sententia, rescindi possunt.

IV. Ad eorum jura quibus aliquid debetur confirmanda {et munienda} dantur pignora, ea lege, ut res oppignorata, nisi ante statum diem solutum fuerit debitum, cedat creditori; quae est lex commissoria, nihil iniqui continens, si modo debitori reddendum sit quod superest pretii, ex re vendita, post solutionem illius quod debebatur. Saepe vero non traditur res creditori; sed ipsi in eam, per formulas quasdam publicas, constituitur jus reale, quod hypotheca dicitur. Quod cum sit, huic creditoris juri, cedunt omnia jura adversus debitorem personalia, Edition: 1745; Page: [174] quamvis priora, quae ante hypothecam constitutam non publice innotuerant. Neque recte queruntur isti, quorum jura personalia juri cedunt reali subsequenti: sibi enim imputent quod posthabeantur <ipsi>, minore cautione contenti, iis quos prioris sui juris non monuerant, quique majorem impetrarunt cautionem, citra quam, fidem debitoris haud fuissent sequuti.

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V. Inter jura realia, denique, sunt servitutes: “jura scil. certi usus ex re aliena percipiendi”; quae ex contractu nascuntur; aut ex eo quod, in dominio transferendo, haec sibi prior dominus retinuit; aut denique ex lege civili. Servitutes omnes sunt jura realia, definitam rem spectantia; pro variis tamen, ut vocantur, subjectis quibus competere videntur, non objectis quae spectant, dividuntur in reales et personales. Hae in certi hominis gratiam constituuntur, eo defuncto interiturae. Illae in praedii vicini commoditatem constitutae, cuicunque ejus domino competent. Personales sunt, ususfructus, usus, habitatio, et similes quaedam aliae. Reales sunt vel urbanae, vel rusticae. Urbanae sunt oneris ferendi, tigni immittendi, altius tollendi, aut non tollendi, luminum, prospectus, &c. Rustica, contra, spectant praedia, iter, actus, via, &c. de quibus jureconsulti uberius. Edition: 1745; Page: [175]

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CAPUT VIII: De Dominii transferendi Rationibus, per Contractus, Successiones, aut Testamenta.

I. Ab uno ad alterum transit plenum dominium, vel facto domini voluntario; vel absque eo, vi legis naturalis aut civilis. Atque utroque modo transit, vel inter vivos, vel in eventum mortis.

Facto prioris domini inter vivos voluntario, transit dominium, vel gratis, donationibus; vel ex causa onerosa, in commerciis, ubi pro re datur res pretio aequalis, aut jus aliquod remittitur. Hoc transferendi [donandi] jus in dominio includi antea monuimus. De pactis erit posthac agendum.

II. Facto prioris domini {voluntario}, in eventum mortis, transit dominium per testamentum, quod jure naturali, est “quaevis voluntatis domini, de bonis suis, in eventum mortis transferendis, declaratio, quae dilucidè probari potest”; de iis enim quae probari nequeunt, et de iis quae non sunt, idem est judicium.

Aequum esse ut testamenta valeant, quum nihil continent iniqui, ostendit ipsum dominii jus, et commune omnibus ferè consilium, Edition: 1745; Page: [176] in rebus ultra suos usus comparandis; ut iis, nempe, gaudeant illi quos quisque habet carissimos. Durum esset et inhumanum, atque industriae inimicum, prohibere ne [suo arbitratu] [pro suo arbitrio] quisque res suo labore innocuo partas, ad quos velit, in quemcunque eventum, transferre possit. Grave <foret>, atque admodum incommodum, homines vivos et validos {eo} adigere, ut jus aliquod in res suas, ad cognatos aut amicos <transferant>, plenum Edition: current; Page: [152] et irrevocabile {ipsis sit transferendum}: crudele foret, morientibus illud qualecunque cognatis aut amicis benefaciendi solatium praeripere; crudele et iniquum <amicis> superstitibus, haeredibus institutis aut legatariis, amicorum morientium beneficia, ipsis destinata, intervertere. Spreta igitur metaphysicorum subtilitate, dicentium, absurdum esse hominem tunc velle aut agere, quum amplius velle aut agere nequeat; testamenta recte censentur jure naturali confirmari.

Quum vero ex bonis nostris plurima sint praestanda, quae alii jure perfecto, vel perfectis proximo, postulant; aes {scil:} alienum dissolvendum, {damna sarcienda,} soboles conservanda, parentes egeni alendi; irrita erunt testamenta juri istiusmodi contraria. Immo, ubi desunt parentes et liberi, par est ut propinquis inopia laborantibus, nisi manifesta obstet causa, detur testamenti inofficiosi Edition: 1745; Page: [177] querela. Leges naturales, non minus quam civiles, <recte> etiam prospiciunt, ne quid testamento contra communem utilitatem sanciatur: atque jubent eas, quibus falsariorum artes praecaveantur, in testamentis, ubi fieri potest, adhiberi formulas solennes; citra quas testamenta confirmari nequeunt.

III. Legis naturalis vi, vel invito priore domino, inter vivos transfertur dominium, ad id praestandum quod alter suo jure postulare poterat, quodque dominus praestare detrectaverat. Haec plenius erunt explicanda, ubi dicemus de jure quod ex contractu oritur, aut ex damno, sive injuriâ dato, sive absque injuriâ.

Legis item naturalis vi, sine facto prioris domini, in eventum mortis transit dominium, in successionibus ab intestato. Cujus sunt hae causae apertissimae; quod certum sit homines, in bonis ultra suos usus congerendis, Edition: current; Page: [153] semper hoc spectare, ut iis prosint quos maxime diligunt. Hoc hominum propositum omnibus notum, continua est voluntatis testatio, ubi nihil contrarium disertè sunt testati. Liberi autem et cognati, pro communi hominum ingenio, caeteris fere omnibus sunt multo cariores: atque his praecipue comparare student, non solum necessaria vitae praesidia, verum et quae ad vitae Edition: 1745; Page: [178] copiam, et ornatum pertinent. Quin et liberis et cognatis egenis, ab ipsa natura, quae sanguinis junctionem benevolentiae et caritatis vinculum esse voluit, tributum est jus, si non perfectum, certe perfecto proximum, ad necessaria vitae praesidia, et ad ea etiam quae faciunt ad uberiorem copiam, et vitae prosperitatem, a parentibus et cognatis consequenda, nisi justam iis dederint offensionis causam. Durum est igitur, hominibus eripere hoc mortis inopinae, quam nemo satis cavere potest, qualecunque solatium, quod soboli et cognatis profutura sint, quae suâ industria paraverunt. Haec liberorum et cognatorum, ex sanguinis conjunctione, atque ipsa naturâ orta jura violare, et aequissimas, ex cognatorum benevolentia, spes intervertere, durum est et iniquum.

Quid; quod, ubi certus de cognatorum successione mos invaluit, recte colligitur, defunctum, si modo nihil contra testatus sit, bona eo more descendere voluisse: ea igitur succedendi ratio eodem nititur juris fundamento quo et testamenta.

Ubi nulli sunt liberi aut cognati propinquiores, eadem fere argumenta humaniora suaderent, ad successionem vocandos esse amicos, si qui fuerant defuncto caeteris longe cariores. Ubi tamen, more aut lege, cognati vel remotissimi, amicis praetermissis, Edition: 1745; Page: [179] {semper} vocantur; ex <praesumenda> defuncti voluntate {satis manifesta}, illorum jus est potius; nisi ostendi possit, cognatos hosce defunctum fuisse perosum. Moris {hujus} a majoribus traditi, hae praecipuae sunt causae, quod natura plerumque caros faciat cognatos: quod cognationis facillimè cernantur gradus, amicitiae vero difficillimè: quodque videamus eos, qui vitam habuerant victumque communem, cum amicis, magis quam cognatis, his tamen prae illis, bonorum haereditates testamentis plerumque relinquere.

Cognati ad succedendum recte vocantur pro cognationis gradibus, et gradu pares pariter. Primo veniunt liberi, inter quos rectè vocantur nepotes, Edition: current; Page: [154] saltem secundum stirpes; humanitas et aequitas aliquando vocarent secundum capita, ubi gravi plures orphani premuntur inopia. Una cum liberis rectè vocarentur parentes egeni, ad necessaria saltem vitae praesidia; non inique una cum his vocarentur fratres probi et egeni. Ubi desunt liberi parentesque, vocandi sunt fratres et sorores {superstites}; <una> cum {quibus} defunctorum liberi in stirpes vocandi, si non aliquando in capita: qui ubi desunt, consobrini recte vocantur sobrinique; iisque non superstitibus, eorum liberi, atque ita deinceps.

IV. Quamvis vitae civilis ratio non raro exigat, ut bonorum intestati pars melior Edition: 1745; Page: [180] maribus deferatur, quam quae foeminis, in eodem gradu; aut inter mares, seniori, major, quam quae juniori: haud tamen inter gradu pares, ingens, his de causis, ponet discrimen. Jus autem naturale, <nullum facit discrimen> inter gradu pares, [sexu aut aetate] [sexus causa aut aetatis] {antecedentibus nihil praecipui tribuit}: neque novit successionem linealem; ubi uni, prae reliquis gradu paribus, defuncti persona est gerenda, eique bonorum longe pars maxima tribuenda. Ea successio est tota juris civilis, a natura et humanitate saepius longissime recedens. In primo enim gradu, sexus praestantiae cedunt omnia alia; in secundo gradu et remotioribus, et ea {sexûs et aetatis inter gradu pares} praestantia, et sanguinis etiam proximitas posthabetur; [idque ante omnia spectatur, cujusnam parens defunctus sexu primum, deinde aetate antecesserit] [de defunti olim parentis aetati, aut sexui]. Nepti enim, pronepti, aut abnepti infanti, ex filio seniore defuncto, posthabebitur non solum nepos aut pronepos ex filio juniore; verum et ipse filius secundus, annis et prudentia maturus. Atque similia omnia fiunt inter fratrum et sororum liberos, ad successionem vocandos. Edition: 1745; Page: [181]

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CAPUT IX: De Contractibus.

I. Quum ad hominum salutem, ne de vitae jucunditate dicatur, necessariae sint rerum permutationes et mutua auxilia; data est iis a Deo benigno, non ratio solum, sed et oratio, sive usus sermonis, quo sententias, desideria, voluntates, consilia, proposita, possint aliis declarare. Facultatis hujus comes est et moderator sensus quidam subtilior, ex veri etiam cognoscendi appetitione naturali non parum confirmatus, quo vera omnia, simplicia, fidelia, comprobamus; falsa, ficta, fallacia odimus. Veritas autem et fides, non solum suâ propriâ nobis se commendant pulchritudine; mendacia vero et fraudes, sua nos turpitudine offendunt; verum et manifesta communis utilitatis ratio ad veritatem et fidem, tanquam communi saluti necessarias, bene sanos invitabit; atque mendacia et fraudes ostendet esse hominum generi pestifera.

In operis aut rebus permutandis, in rebus communi plurium opera gerendis, sententiae, voluntates, consilia, sunt mutuò declaranda: atque ubi alteri affirmamus nos aliquid [ideo daturos, facturos,] [praestituros, daturus eo fine] ut ille vicissim Edition: 1745; Page: [182] aliquid det aut praestet, pacisci dicimur. Est enim pactum, “duorum aut plurium consensus in idem placitum, obligationis constituendae aut tollendae causa datus.” Quod et contractus dicitur, jure enim naturali non distinguuntur.

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Pactorum usus est omnino necessarius; nec minus necessaria rerum contractarum fides. Egent et locupletiores rebus tenuiorum et operis, quas gratis poscere nequeunt. Colloquiis igitur et pactis opus est, ut de rebus aut operis mutuo praestandis conveniat. Fingantur omnes ad mutuam opem vicinis amicè praestandam vel paratissimi; sine pacto tamen non potero mihi cujusvis opem polliceri. Quum enim ego vicini cujusdam opera indigeo, fieri potest ut ille aliis officiis sanctioribus, alii praestandis, distineatur; aut operâ iis praebenda, qui sibi commodius paria [vicem] rependere possunt.

Sanctissima esse fidei servandae jura, non solum ostendit fidei lumen per se elucens, verum et gravissima quae vitam humanam vexant mala, ex perfidia orta. Fidem enim datam fallere, caeteris paribus, magis est contra naturam, graviorque injuria, et turpior; quam par officium <humanum>, alia debitum ratione, omittere aut denegare. Fide quippè violatâ, aliorum rationes ea innixae, gravissime Edition: 1745; Page: [183] turbantur; ipsique damno afficiuntur [datur] et contumelia, quod fidem nostram fuerint secuti, quum alia ratione sibi prospicere [cavere] potuissent, Ex commerciorum necessitate patet, jura quae ex pacto aut contractu oriuntur, esse perfecta, et per vim asserenda. Perfidus quantum in se est, omnia socia hominum officia è vita tollit.

II. Praeterea, quamvis vir bonus nullum sibi ex alterius inscitia aut temeritate, commodum captaret; immo, {saepe alium} quemvis a pacti, magis illi incommodi, quam sibi commodi, obligatione liberaret, si modo damnum sibi datum sarciatur; tanta tamen est fidei in commerciis conservandae necessitas, atque cavillationes excludendi, quae sub levioris cujuslibet incommodi obtentu nascerentur; ut, circa res quae sunt commerciorum materia, hominumque prudentiae et potestati lege naturali subjectae, pactis quamvis temerariis constituantur jura quaedam externa; quibus etsi uti nollet vir bonus, communis tamen utilitatis causa, ea sunt eousque confirmanda, ut, ubi in iis persequendis perstat is cui quid inde debetur, vim etiam adhibiturus, nemo ei recte vim opponere possit. De pactis hisce tenet haec regula; Edition: current; Page: [157] “Plurima fieri non debent quae facta valent.”

Commerciorum materia sunt operae nostrae, Edition: 1745; Page: [184] aut res illae, quarum commutationes crebras exigit vitae communis ratio, quibusque commutatis, neque violatur reverentia quae Deo debetur, neque cujusquam jus perfectum; quarum denique administratio, nulla lege speciali nobis praeripitur.

III. A pactis diversae sunt nudae propositi nostri declarationes, quae neque in alterum jus transferunt, neque ad perstandum in eo consilio nos obligant. Ad pacta propius accedunt quae dicuntur promissa imperfecta; ubi intelligitur, vel ex verbis, vel ex more instituto, nullum nos cogendi jus in alterum transferri; solâ verò probitate, aut pudore nos obligari; atque ea solum lege, nisi is cui promissum est, suâ culpâ, nobis mutandi consilii causam dederit, ita se gerendo, ut beneficio destinato fuerit indignus. Qua etiam de re judicium sibi reservasse intelligitur promissor; tantumque teneri ad damnum sua inconstantia datum sarciendum, quamvis sine causa consilium mutasse videatur.

IV. In contractuum obligatione, et exceptionibus legitimis explicandis, tria sunt spectanda; intellectus, nempe, et voluntas, actionum humanarum duo principia interna; atque ipsa materia in qua versantur.

De intellectu patet, communem hoc exigere utilitatem, atque ipsam humanitatem, Edition: 1745; Page: [185] ne cui fraus inferatur, ex ipsius circa res suas inscitia quae culpa vacat. Unde contractus [juniorum, qui minores dicuntur,] [minorum] quique ob judicii imbecillitatem, negotiorum suorum naturam nondum intelligunt, rarius [neutiquam] obligant: quod de mente captorum, aut delirantium pactis est dicendum; atque etiam de pactis ebriorum, {quamdiu omnis consilii et prudentiae expertes sunt}. Quamvis enim ebrietas, non Edition: current; Page: [158] sine gravi culpa, poenis coercenda, arcessatur; dolosis tamen, ea occasione lucrum sibi captare, haud permittendum. {De ebriorum criminibus aut injuriis dissimilis est ratio: licet enim non teneantur homines, se semper rebus suis curandis et administrandis idoneos conservare, se tamen semper praestare tenentur innocuos et justos.} Ubi alterum latuerat alterius ebrietas; tenebitur ebrius, discussa crapula, damnum, sua culpa alteri datum, praestare. Ebrietatis vero plures sunt gradus: quorum quidam, licet homines magis solitò incautos, aut temerarios faciant, non tamen eos omni rationis usu spoliant. Si quidem ex his omnibus darentur exceptiones, incertum foret omne inter homines commercium. De hisce vero causis, non aliter quam viri probi arbitrio interposito, sigillatim judicari poterit.

De immaturo juniorum [minorum] judicio, ante legis Edition: 1745; Page: [186] civilis definitionem, idem <foret> dicendum: cum aliis citiùs, aliis feriùs, efflorescat commerciis idonea prudentia. Ne vero pacta omnia aut pleraque maneant dubia, et cavillationibus obnoxia; certa aetas, in omni hominum coetu est determinanda, ad quam qui pervenerit, is sui juris censendus est, et idoneus rerum suarum administrator. Haec aetas ita est definienda [determinanda], ut quam paucissimi animo maturi, a rebus suis gerendis cohibeantur, et quam paucissimi improvidi ad eas gerendas admittantur. Non malè ex jure civili receptum est, ut ante annum quartum decimum exactum, in maribus, et duodecimum in foeminis, impuberes, qui et pupilli vocantur, a rebus gerendis arceantur; sintque in naturali parentum tutela; aut, his defunctis, in eorum tutela quos vel testamento parentes, vel leges civiles tutores constituerunt, ad aetatem usque pupillarem [finitam: atque dein] [qua elapsa] ad annum vicesimum primum, aut vicesimum quintum, ut olim jure civili, ita sint sub curatoribus, ut sine eorum consensu nihil paciscendo agere possint Edition: current; Page: [159] minores, unde alteri jus nascatur, aut res ipsorum obligentur.

Contractu quidem minores non sunt laedendi; neque tamen aliorum damnis sunt locupletandi. Ubi [tamen quicquam] [quid] cum iis pactum fuerit, atque ab altera parte praestitum, Edition: 1745; Page: [187] si ipsorum intersit ut pactum confirmetur, tenentur postquam adoleverit ratio, promissa et conventa praestare: si non intersit; quicquid ex pacto ab altero acceperant, aut ejus pretium reddendum; aut denique quantum ulla ratione eo facti sunt locupletiores; aut quantum ipsorum interfuit, pro sua conditione, id olim accepisse. Non raro quidem, ante annos legitimos, res suas satis commodè administrare possunt minores; [quumque ita se res habet, neque ab altera parte] [atque, ubicunque nullus] intervenerat dolus malus, aut culpa, in foro Dei et conscientiae, quod actum est, aeque ac inter adultos, valet.

Ubi quidem adsunt parentes, tutores, aut curatores publicè constituti; iis inconsultis vix sine culpa aut dolo, de re graviori, cum minoribus poterit quisquam pacisci: qui nempe vehementi feruntur impetu et improvido, ad promittendum faciles, cupidi, utilium tardi provisores [provisiores], liberales, spei pleni, et diffidere nescii.

V. Qui ad paciscendum permotus fuerat errore aliquo circa rem ipsam, ejusve qualitates aestimabiles, quarum {scil.} plerumque praecipua in pactis istiusmodi habetur ratio, pacto non tenebitur; eique, errore deprehenso, quicquid ex pacto solverit reddendum. Non tamen ita censetur errasse, qui alias expectabat qualitates quam prae Edition: 1745; Page: [188] se tulerat, quaeque in rebus istiusmodi reperiri non solent. Si vero tantum erratum fuerat de re alia, aut eventu diverso, quo tamen errore aliquis ad paciscendum permotus erat: deprehenso errore, debet alter, ex humanitate, poenitendi locum dare ei qui erraverat, si is omne damnum inde oriturum, praestare sit paratus. Non vero hoc pleno jure postulandum; nisi is qui erravit, illud de quo erratum fuit tanquam pacti conditionem diserte pronunciaverit.

Rei, de qua initur pactum, natura, ejusque qualitates aestimabiles, earumque defectus quarum causâ pacta {istiusmodi} solent iniri, pacti essentiam, ut dicitur, attingunt. Ubi de his erratum est, errore deprehenso, non tenebitur qui erraverat. Ubi tantum de pretio erratum est; deceptus jure suo Edition: current; Page: [160] exigere potest, ut quod sibi deest suppleatur; aut quod ultra pretium dederat, reddatur: aut, altero hoc nolente, ut pactum sit nullum.

Qui culpa sua, aut temeritate, de rebus pacti praecipuis erravit, causamve alterius errori dedit, alteri damnum datum tenetur praestare. Qui vero dolum malum adhibuit, tenetur praestare quantum alterius interest ut pactum bona fide expleatur. {Neque eorum quae, dolo decepti, isti qui dolum adhibuit promisimus, ulla est obligatio: quia istius dolo, nobis defuit ea rei quae agitur notitia, Edition: 1745; Page: [189] quae ad paciscendum aut promittendum est necessaria; atque iste ad damnum injuria datum sarciendum tenetur.}

Ubi tertius aliquis dolum adhibuit, eo non colludente, sed inscio, quo cum paciscor; pactum erit ratum. Ab eo tamen, qui dolum adhibuit, exigendum est quantum mea interfuisset, non deceptum fuisse.

VI. In pactis semper intelligitur, voluntatem adesse se obligandi, ubi ejus sit significatio. Neque ulla esset fides, si valeret exceptio ex arcana voluntate, sermoni aut signis editis contrariâ.

Vocibus et scriptis paciscendi animus commodissimé declaratur; sufficit tamen signum quodcunque, de quo inter paciscentes convenit, aut quod pro more consueto consensum indicat. Immo et actionum quarundam ea est natura, ut nemo nisi insanus aut improbus eas suscipiat, qui non certis pacti legibus etiam consentit. Ex hisce igitur, quemvis consensisse merito colligitur, [nisi cunctis quorum interest praemonitis, contrarium testatus fuerit] [si non contra intervenerat praemonitio, aut aperta testatio]. Ubi per eas actiones consensus indicatur, pactum dicitur tacitum. Quod eo indicio Edition: current; Page: [161] secernitur ab obligatione quasi ex contractu orta, de qua alias, quod in hac, nulla obligationem tollere potest denunciatio [praemonitio] contraria, in illo potest.

Primariis et expressis pacti legibus, ex Edition: 1745; Page: [190] rei natura {saepe} intelligitur, leges et conditiones tacitas esse adjectas [tacitae saepe adjici], quales negotiis istiusmodi adjici, ex rei natura, aut more, intelligunt omnes sanâ mente praediti.

Ad rerum dominia aut alia jura transferenda, sive gratis, sive ex causa onerosa, exigitur et accipientis et dantis consensus. Quum rem transferendi, aut amico donandi animus, haud indicet, aut rei suae projiciendae, aut alteri nolenti obtrudendae, voluntatem. Levioribus tamen indiciis colligitur, adesse rei utilis accipiendae voluntatem; et semper quidem ex praecedente rogatione, si quod oblatum est ei respondeat.

Quum autem in pleno dominio includatur jus, rem, sub licita quavis conditione, aut in quemvis eventum, transferendi, aut amicorum fidei committendi, donec de sperato eventu constiterit; de haereditatibus et legatis patet, valere testatoris voluntatem, eo usque ut manere debeant haereditates, et res legatae, apud fidei-commissarios, donec de haeredum eas adeundi, aut legatariorum accipiendi voluntate constiterit. Quin et recte servantur res in eorum gratiam qui nondum sunt nati. Iniquum enim est impedire testatorem, ne res suas {cognatorum aut} amicorum soboli, si qua suscepta fuerit, conservet. Iniquum est, beneficia, a parentibus, cognatis, aut amicis destinata, nascentibus Edition: 1745; Page: [191] praeripere. Haeredi tamen aut legatario nolenti, nihil recte obtrudi potest. Infantium [item, perinde ac] [vero et] nondum natorum, habenda est omnino ratio, et res haereditariae, quamvis nullus sit fidei commissarius, iis, ab humano genere, aut a quovis occasione oblata, sunt conservandae.

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VII. Pendet contractuum vis ex contrahentium voluntate aut consensu; qui si tantum sub conditione dabatur, eâ deficiente, nulla erit obligatio. Debet autem de conditione adjecta utrinque constare, ne commercia omnia fiant incerta. Solae igitur valent conditiones, quas aut alteruter diserte pacto adjecerat, aut ex negotii natura, utrinque intellectum iri, bona fide putaverat; non eae quas tacite alter in animo fovebat, in hujusmodi negotiis non semper intelligendae. Si quid alter inter paciscendum, praestare susceperit, aut alteri affirmaverit, quo ad paciscendum alliceretur, id quidem conditionis vim habere censebitur.

Quum contractus dividuntur in absolutos et conditionales; conditio propriè est “eventus quidam, alteri, aut utrique paciscentium, incertus, atque a pactis praestationibus diversus; qui si non accidat, nullus erit contractus.” Conditio apertè impossibilis adjecta, ostendit nihil actum esse. De rebus illicitis, (quae aliquando dicuntur Edition: 1745; Page: [192] moraliter impossibilia,) ab alterutra parte praestandis, sive de facinore turpi, mox erit dicendum. Facinus quidem turpe, a tertio quopiam, sine ulla [ullo] paciscentium conspiratione [concursu] peragendum, potest esse justa conditio; si modo nullae ex pacto proponantur facinoris illecebrae.

Conditiones, si sint penes alterum paciscentium, dicuntur voluntariae, sive potestativae; si non sint, dicuntur fortuitae, sive non potestativae; sunt et quaedam mixtae. Ad voluntarias aut mixtas praestandas, neuter obligari censetur.

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VIII. Consensum voluntarium impedire potest metus: cujus duplex est natura. {Vel} enim est suspicio probabilis, alterum, postquam meam partem explevero, me decepturum: vel [alias] denotat timorem ex gravi malo intentato ortum. De priore haec tenenda videntur. 1. Qui cum improbis et sceleratis, quorum mores antea noverat, sponte paciscitur, omnino tenetur. 2. At ubi post contractum innotescit alterius improbitas aut scelus; non quidem eo ipso abrumpitur contractus; quod tamen a me praestandum est tantisper differre licebit [potero], donec contra istius perfidiam, mihi, pro viri prudentis arbitrio, satis sit cautum. Omnis quidem fides tolleretur, si nulla cum improbis et sceleratis, {iisve qui diversa tenent de Edition: 1745; Page: [193] religione dogmata,} esset servanda; [quum nullae sint notae manifestae, aut signa satis certa, quibus honestos a turpibus secernere queamus;] [cum nulla sint de moribus & virtute hominum indubitata criteria] atque pro mentis humanae caecitate, [adeo diversae, immo contrariae semper fuerint de religione, atque etiam de hominum] [, diversissimae, de aliorum] moribus, apud diversos, sententiae.

De secundo metus genere, ubi metu mali mihi injuste intentati, ad paciscendum impulsus fui, duplex est quaestio, prout intentatum fuit malum ab eo quocum paciscor, vel ab altero. Ubi ab altero, atque pacto inito contra mala mihi intentata, viri cujusquam probi auxilium arcesso; pactum omnino valebit nisi alia de causa, aliquid iniqui contineat. Auxilium enim in periculis avertendis praestitisse, officium saepe utilissimum est, et mercede dignissimum.

Si quidem {ab altero} mihi immerito malum intentatum fuerat, ni cum tertio non colludente quiddam paciscar, ego verò ei tertio metum meum celare cogar: pactum irritum erit, postquam ostendero, metu injustè incusso, mihi ademptam fuisse libertatem, negotiis gerendis necessariam; omne tamen damnum huic tertio a me datum, ut a me avertantur pericula, Edition: current; Page: [164] praestare teneor. Idem etiam dicendum, ubi, pro mea timiditate, Edition: 1745; Page: [194] metus nimius erat et temere conceptus.

Quae quispiam promittit aut paciscitur legitimae potestatis metu, ea etiam praestare tenetur: quum huic potestati jure subjectus esse intelligatur.

IX. At ubi metu mali injustè intentati, aliquid illi qui metum incusserat promissum est; hoc omnino spectandum utrum sub juris specie aliqua probabili, qua vir caetera probus aliquando decipi potest{, malum fuerit intentatum}; an contra, nulla juris specie obtentâ, quae hominem istiusmodi fallere posset. In priore causâ, quamvis qui metum incussit, nullum re vera jus acquirat, quo recte uti possit; remotiore tamen communis utilitatis ratione habita, quod actum est jure externo nonnunquam valebit. De jure suo aliquando errare humanum est. Hinc et inter homines haud improbos saepè nascuntur bella, quae aut pactis, aut alterius internecione, finienda {sunt}: ut pactis finiantur longe satius est: eorum tamen nullus esset usus, si semper valeret vis injustae et metus exceptio, quae utrique parti semper pateret. Contra foedera igitur pacem reducentia, non admittenda est haec exceptio, ubi speciosae utrinque fuerant bellandi causae, et bellum sub juris tuendi specie {probabili} susceptum erat. Si quidem foederis Edition: 1745; Page: [195] leges sint omnino iniquae, humanitati omni contrariae, parti devictae, vitae conditionem miseram omnino et servilem rediturae; haec, nulla juris specie munita, non valent; justa manebit exceptio.

Sin autem, nullâ juris specie, vis scelerata ad pacta extorquenda intentetur; pacta nihil valent. Vi enim istiusmodi adhibitâ, omnia hominum jura Edition: current; Page: [165] abdicantur: omnia quae ex lege naturali, aut hominum aequitate, poterant a quopiam flagitari, repudiantur et remittuntur. Qui {istiusmodi} vim adhibet, se humani generis hostem profitetur, nullaque juris societate devinctum. Postulat {igitur} communis utilitatis ratio, ut haec hominum monstra, quacunque ratione exscindantur. {Fingamus insuper haec promissa obligare. Quantumcumque tamen ei qui vim adhibuit ex promisso debeatur, tantundem et ipse damni injuriâ dati nomine alteri debebit: per compensationem igitur, promissi obligatio tolletur.} Neque dixeris promissorem, ex ipsâ negotii naturâ, huic vis et metus exceptioni tacito pacto renunciasse{: nam ipsum id renunciasse coactum, in damnum deputandum esset}. Tacitonè insuper pacto, is acquiret jus, qui ne pacto quidèm, diserte enunciato, in ea causa acquirere poterat; quique hìc ea agit, quae omnis humani juris abdicationem planissime continent?

Quamvis autem istorum hominum, in omni Edition: 1745; Page: [196] aliorum jure pessundando, nulla habenda sit ratio; ubi tamen ad saniorem mentem redituri videntur, praeteritorum veniam petentes, ex locis munitis descensuri, arma tradituri, atque in posterum satisdare volentes; et ubi non sine innocentium strage, aut sanguine multo, coerceri aut deleri possunt; communis aliquando exigit utilitas, ut pacta cum iis inita, [malis gravioribus avertendis] [hisce finibus] inservientia, sanctissime serventur: civibusque, quibus damnorum pensationem ab iis exigere, aut res suas vindicare, non permittitur, publicè praestandum est damnum.

X. Ut pacta aut promissa valeant, ipsorum materia, aut res utrinque praestandae, intra paciscentium vires esse debent. Unde ad ea, quae a nobis volentibus fieri non possunt, quae dicuntur impossibilia, nulla est obligatio. Si quid promissum fuerat, quod postea casu, aut sine paciscentium culpa existit impossibile, omnia istâ causâ data, sunt reddenda, aut pensando [compensanda]. Ubi alterutrius dolus, aut lata culpa, in rei impossibilitate Edition: current; Page: [166] celanda, aut efficiunda, intervenerit, hic quod interest praestare tenebitur.

Debet etiam pactorum materia esse licita; id est, de iis tantum rebus aut operis {paciscendum} quae, commerciis aptae, alienari possunt, quarumque administratio humanae committitur prudentiae, neque lege Edition: 1745; Page: [197] speciatim homini praeripitur. Ad ea enim praestanda quae vel reverentiam Deo debitam, vel alterius jus perfectum, violant, quaeve lege prohibentur speciali, neque nostrae subjiciuntur potestati, nulla ex pacto nasci potest obligatio.

1. Si igitur paciscentium uterque, rem esse ita illicitam noverat, aut nosse debuerat, nulla erit pacti obligatio: conductori, ante facinus patratum poenitenti, quicquid ex pacto dederat reddendum est. Facinore autem patrato, neque patratori dandum est praemium, neque datum conductor reposcere poterit: ab utroque poenae gravissimae expetendae.

Si post pactum initum, facinoris turpitudo, quae inter paciscendum latuerat, alterutri innotescat; ei, facinore nondum patrato, poenitentiae locus est: qui conductus est acceptam mercedem reddere tenetur. Neque facinore patrato, mercedem exigere poterit patrator, nisi ipsius ignorantia culpâ caruit: si modo ipsi, aequè ac conductori, turpe fuit facinus. Sin autem conductori soli adhaerebat turpitudo, patrator rectè mercedem exigit. Humani generis interest, ut nulla sint {ex pactis} scelerum invitamenta; nullaque in istiusmodi pactis fides.

Sin autem, eo tantum illicita sit rei cujuslibet {promissae} praestatio, quod aliquis incautè, Edition: 1745; Page: [198] et contra viri prudentis officia, res suae potestati permissas administravit; rerum contractarum fides adeò sancte est servanda, Edition: current; Page: [167] ut “quae fieri non debebant, facta saepe valeant.”

Quod de re impossibili dictum est, tenet de re aut actione aliena, si quis de iis quae potestati suae non subjiciuntur pactus fuerit. Qui in istiusmodi pactis, aut promissionibus, dolo usus est, quod interest praestare tenebitur: qui culpa quemvis decepit, illi damnum praestandum.

XI. Qui de re sua quavis aut opera pactus est, non omnem circa eam confestim amisit potestatem; nisi istiusmodi pactum fuit, quod totum rei dominium transtulit, jus alteri constituens reale et plenum, omnemve de operis suis in posterum paciscendi, facultatem sibi adimens. Unde, licet pactum jus tantum personale constituens antecesserat, tertio cuivis, prioris pacti inscio, constitui poterit jus reale, contra jus prius personale valiturum. Interveniente verò hujus tertii haud inscii dolo, pactum erit irritum. Dolis enim confirmandis, pacto* itidem qualicunque, ad eludenda quaevis officia humana, planè excogitato, quum id neutrum contrahentium latere poterat, lex naturalis maxime adversatur. In aliis Edition: 1745; Page: [199] autem causis, “pactorum, quae cum eodem ineuntur, priori posterius derogabit.” In pactis autem quae eadem de re cum diversis conficiuntur, “quae jura tantum personalia constituunt, iis cedent quae jura constituunt realia”; si modo abfuerat illius dolus, aut lata culpa, ad quem transferendum erat jus reale. In pactis denique uniusmodi quae cum diversis ineuntur, “qui tempore prior, jure potior.”

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XII. Paciscimur etiam per legatos et internuncios, sive mandatarios. Ubi {plena ipsis permissa potestas, neque} ulla [nulla] sunt mandata mutuò declaranda, legatorum potestatem ejusque potestatis fines monstrantia; ad ea obligari censemur, quae legati pro sua prudentia gesserint: nisi ostendi possit legatos dolosè egisse, aut praemii spe fuisse corruptos; aut pactum adeò manifestè iniquum sit, ut, viro prudente arbitro, doli mali det indicia. Quas leviores, legati culpa, patimur injurias, eae in ipsum legatum vindicandae. Potestatis autem legato permissae finibus apertè declaratis, quod ultrà a legato actum fuerit neutiquam obligabit. Edition: 1745; Page: [200]

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CAPUT X: De Sermocinantium Officiis.

I. Doctrinae de contractibus affinis est illa quae de usu sermonis versatur. Quum caeteris animalibus eo praestent homines, quod non rationis solum, verum et orationis facultate ornantur, qua praecipuè hominum societas continetur, vigentque commercia, atque officia omnia amica; eo Dei dono eximio ita utendum est, ut exigit officii nostri, communisque utilitatis ratio.

Qua de re haud sanè levi, in ipsa naturae nostrae structura, non desunt divini consilii indicia. Sensu enim cujusque proxime commendatur is sermonis usus, quem communis exigit utilitas. In prima et tenella aetate, proclives sunt pueri ad omnia quae norunt palam declaranda. Simulationi omni et dissimulationi natura repugnat; donec rerum usu, incommoda non levia sequi observantur simplicem eam et apertam, omnium quae animo insunt, declarationem, quam proxime et per se essemus comprobaturi. Suadebit quidem recta ratio, communis utilitatis cura, eaque quâ sibi quisque consulit prudentia, ut nonnulla tegamus, Edition: 1745; Page: [201] taceamus, eumque primum animi impetum cohibeamus: hoc vero stabile consilium, eo tantum utendi sermone, qui cum animi sententia congruit, quique alios non decipiet, {non solum} animi sensus per se <& utilitatis communis ratio> comprobat [comprobant], sive de nostris, sive de aliorum moribus judicemus{; verum etiam recta ratio, communisque utilitatis cura, idem ab omnibus postulat}.

Quum enim non solum cognitionis nostrae pars magna, aliorum sermonibus innitatur; verum etiam vitae negotia et consilia, eâ regantur rerum humanarum notitia, quam ex aliorum sermonibus comparamus, [etiam eorum qui] [quorum plures] nullo proprio juris vinculo, animi sui his de rebus sententias, nobiscum communicare tenebantur; [non aliter quam servatâ in sermone fide et veritate,] [nisi in sermone servavetur fides et veritas, omnia] haec vitae sociae commoda <tollerentur>, omnisque ea <vitae> jucunditas, quae ex mutua in aliorum verbis fiducia oritur, {conservari potest}.

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Quae de sermone sunt dicta, ad alia etiam signa pertinent, quae ad animi sententias declarandas adhibentur; scripturam, nempe, vel vulgarem, vel hieroglyphicam, aut symbola.

II. Signorum autem, quorum significatio sive ex ipsorum natura, sive ex instituto aut consuetudine pendet,* duplex est Edition: 1745; Page: [202] usus: unus, ubi is qui signis utitur, neutiquam profiteri intelligitur, se animi sui sententiam cum aliis communicaturum; {iste verò} qui ea signa cernit, pro sua solertia, quaedam colligit esse vera, quamvis nihil causae sit cur credatur, alterum eo animo signa dedisse, ut se rei cujusvis faceret certiorem. Alter signorum usus eam in se habet vim, ut justam det causam colligendi, istum qui signa dederat, eo fecisse animo, ut nobis rem aliquam indicaret: quod et ipso signorum usu, prae se ferre videtur.

In signorum usu prius memorato, nulla propria est obligatio: ne quis enim, sine justa causa, alterum laedat, est obligatio communis. Ubi tamen justa est laedendi causa, ut in bello justo, nihil prohibet, quo minus his utamur dolis, quae {consilia imperatoria, sive} strategemata dicuntur. Immo, si nemini noceatur, hoc signorum usu, vel amicissimum fallere licebit.

De altero signorum usu longe aliter statuendum: nullo enim sive inter omnes, sive inter eos qui colloquuntur, praeeunte pacto, hic signorum usus, pacti taciti vim {in se} continet. Qui enim ea alteri dat signa, cum eo recte intelligitur pacisci, se animi sui sententiam, per haec signa, ei declaraturum, secundum interpretandi modum, vel naturalem, vel usu institutum, nisi Edition: current; Page: [171] subsit causa Edition: 1745; Page: [203] aliqua utrinque cognita, cur ab eodem deflectat. Si enim nulla istiusmodi subsit pactio, frustra quisquam alterum alloqueretur, frustra alloquenti auscultaret. {Atque idem de aliis signis tenendum, sive naturalibus sive institutis, quorum similis est usus.}

Hae igitur de sermone scriptisque leges. 1. Prima; “Ubi aliis est jus qualecunque, veras loquentium sententias sciendi, non solum vera sunto quae dicuntur, verûm nihil celanto.” Quae testium in judiciis est causa, eorumque qui artem aliquam totam, aliis tradere sunt polliciti.

2. Altera lex est. “Quamvis aliis nullum sit jus proprium, ubi tamen eos alloquimur, nihil dicendum, quod non animi sententiis [congruat] [sit consonum], secundum interpretandi modum, qui apud probos et prudentes invaluit.” A mendacii igitur crimine non est immunis, qui sermonem ab animi sententia discrepantem [sententiae dissonum] profert, quamvis insolita quadam interpretandi ratione, aut per adjectionem quandam in mente suppressam, [inter se congruere possint] [consonus effici possit]. Permissâ enim artium istiusmodi licentia, omni dolo et fraudi patebit via.

III. Quo plenius cernatur hac in re officium, haec sedulò observanda: 1. Signa omnia, verba praecipue et scripta, ea ratione quae in morem abiit, adhibenda esse, Edition: 1745; Page: [204] non spectata etymologia, aut antiqua quavis significatione, et inusitata. Verborum formulis, honoris aut urbanitatis causa vulgò usurpatis, nemo decipitur; neque enim ea significare intelliguntur, quae in aliis rebus adhibita significarent.

2. Si omnibus quorum interest innotuerit, in quibusdam rebus concessam esse fallendi licentiam; neque eum qui decipitur, ubi verum resciverit, de injuria queri solere; [quae in iisdem versantur] [plurimae sunt] simulandi, aut dissimulandi artes, <quae> omni vitio carent. Quod non solum Edition: current; Page: [172] in rebus ludicris, verum et seriis quibusdam, obtinetur; ubi nos aliorum prudentiae regendos permisimus; ut medicis, aegroti; imperatori, milites.

3. Quin etiam, si mos inductus fuerit, ut hostes fictis sermonibus se invicem, ubi possunt, decipiant; neque decepti ea de causa querantur, jura gentium humaniora, fuisse ab hoste violata; censeri potest, nova quadam pactione tacita, remissum esse jus illud ortum ex pactione ea tacita, quam in se continet ipsum alloquium. Haud tamen, sine causa gravissima, vir animi candidi et probi, ea arte uti vellet; quum turpitudinis non levis speciem habere videatur.

4. Pactis autem vel foederibus quibusvis hostem decipere, neque unquam receptum fuit, nec recipi debet. <Non> Absque foederibus Edition: 1745; Page: [205] enim, {neque} conservari possunt mitiores et humaniores belli gerendi rationes; nec [aut] maxima hominum saevitia praecaveri; nec [aut] denique, sine alterutrius partis internecione, vel miserrima servitute, pax bello mutari potest.

5. Haec vero, in sermone, verborum obligatio, ut et caeterae omnes in conventione tacita fundatae, tempestivè omnes quorum interest praemonendo, tolli potest aut praecaveri.

6. Praeter exceptionem vis et metus, antea memoratam, aliam dandam volunt nonnulli, hinc ortam, quod nonnunquam non alia ratione quam mendacio, a viris innocentibus et optimis, aut a populo fortè universo, averti possunt mala gravissima. Qualiscunque sit hujus exceptionis vis, patet eam non huic loco soli convenire, quum in aliis fere cunctis legibus, quae dicuntur speciales, ut postea{*} docebitur, ei itidem sit locus.

7. Ubi insidioso et maligno consilio, explorantur hominis cujusquam de certa re sententiae, easque captiosis quaestionibus eliciunt inimici, nullo suo utentes jure; ubi et ipsum silentium totam rem aperiret, et malis gravioribus causam praeberet; si quidem homini occurrat istiusmodi responsio, Edition: 1745; Page: [206] quae viris probis, nullo praejudicio aut affectu pravo in ea interpretanda occaecatis, veram indicaret sententiam, quae tamen responsio aliud longe Edition: current; Page: [173] insidiosis hisce significare videbitur; eâ licebit viro bono uti, quamvis inimicos ea ratione deceptum iri praevideat.

8. Quum fides in omni sermone conservata, tantam hominum vitae afferat utilitatem, haud levioribus de causis, quales saepe occurrunt, mendacio uti licebit: veluti ad iratos demulcendos, moestos consolandos, aut levius aliquod commodum consequendum, aut malum, minimè gravissimum, effugiendum. Alia enim ratione, verâ nimirum et simplici, istiusmodi bona comparari, eaque mala vel averti, vel fortiter ferri, plerumque possunt. Atque licet semel prosperè cedere potest mendacium, quum nondum innotuit, nos {in istiusmodi causis} nulla sermonis religione teneri; ubi tamen hoc palam factum est, passimque vagatur haec mentiendi licentia, nemini ulla erit auctoritas, omnisque tolletur fiducia. Hactenus de fide in verbis servanda.

IV. Alia autem sunt sermonis sanctissima officia. Illud inprimis, ut quisque sermone aliis prodesse studeat, verâ virtute laudanda et fovenda, vanisque hominum de foelicitate, et vitae prosperitate, opinionibus Edition: 1745; Page: [207] et somniis corrigendis: utque docendo, monendo, hortando, consolando, quandoque et objurgando, benefaciendi amicam exerceat voluntatem. Inter quae officia sunt haec honestissima, aversos componere amicos, inimicitias praecavere, et dissidentes {inter sese} conciliare. Neque quicquam cautiùs vitabit vir bonus, quam alterius cujusquam famam laedere. Immo non solum a falsis abstinebit criminibus; verum, ubi nulla major utilitas, aut innocentium ne a recto tramite seducantur cura, contrarium exegerit, arcana aliorum celabit vitia. Famâ enim amissâ, difficilius ad meliorem revocantur frugem, quorum Edition: current; Page: [174] vita vitiis est mendosa: et quo plures vitiis conspiciantur cooperti, eo aliorum flagitia fiunt impudentiora.

Observarunt grammatici, plurima rerum nomina, praeter rem primario loco denotatam, adsignificare etiam loquentis affectus: inde sit ut res plurimae triplici notentur nomine; uno medio, rem nudam exhibente; altero, loquentis etiam delectationem, amorem et cupidinem, notante; tertio denique, contrarios odii et offensionis motus. Hinc constabit, quamvis nullum sit Dei aut naturae opus viri boni cognitione et sermone indignum, magna tamen in ipso sermone prodi posse animi vitia, ubi de hominum agitur vitiis et libidinibus; quum scil. adhibentur Edition: 1745; Page: [208] voces quae loquentis indolem flagitiosam produnt, atque in audientium animis, similes incendunt libidines. Hic vero est sermo obscoenus et detestandus.

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CAPUT XI: De Jurejurando et Votis.

I. Ad hominum pacta, promissa, et testimonia de rebus gravioribus confirmanda, accedit jusjurandum. Est autem jusjurandum “actus religiosus quo ad rem dubiam confirmandam, Deus testis et vindex invocatur.” Tanta quidem est in omni pacto et sermone, viri boni fides, ut eum jurejurando adstringere non sit opus, apud eos quibus est notus: sed ubi res aguntur eorum, quibus viri probitas non est perspecta; illius et promissa et testimonia <apud eos> jurejurando sunt confirmanda; quum {in} jurejurando nulla insit in Deum impietas, sed potius pietas. Qui enim religiose jurat, Dei omnia intuentis, et regentis, providentiam simul et justitiam agnoscit.

Quum autem apud omnes gentes semper invaluit haec persuasio, justa Dei providentia mundum administrari, et improbis supplicia irrogari; Dei testis et vindicis invocatio, sensum officii hominum animis altiùs Edition: 1745; Page: [209] infigit, eosque poenarum metu a fraude deterret. Neque enim censendum est, ea invocatione Deum magis attentum fieri, aut acriorem perfidiae vindicem; aut consensu nostro novum puniendi jus illi tributum. Longè quidem gravius est perfidiae scelus, ubi quis promissum aut pactum juratum violaverit; aut alios testimonio juratus deceperit.

De re leviore jurare, aut nulla de causa, omnino impium est: quum numinis reverentiam, quae bonis debet esse perpetua, imminuat, summaeque majestatis contemptum prodat. Ubi autem crebra in civitate sunt perjuria, eorum crimine premuntur et rectores, si jusjurandum levibus de causis, et Edition: current; Page: [176] quum minime est necessarium, saepius exigatur: aut ubi de eo praestando quod a juratis postulamus, jurejurando caveri nequit; vel quia res ipsa fieri non poterit, vel quia juratis nonnunquam illicita videbitur: aut si exigatur ubi gravia sunt perjurii invitamenta, una cum spe homines impunè fallendi. Pessime etiam de religione merentur, qui gravem aliquam et solennem verborum formulam, ad animos hominum religionis sensu percellendos [afficiendos] idoneam, in jurejurando non adhibent.

II. Quamvis in jurejurando, frustra invocetur aliquid divina potestate destitutum, Edition: 1745; Page: [210] tanquam testis et vindex; sunt tamen jurandi formulae {quaedam}, non quidem satis commodae, at haud plane illicitae, ubi Dei nomine non adhibito, qui jurat, [sibi suisque aut rei alicui sibi carae admodum aut necessariae, dira quaedam a Deo precari] [in rem aliquam sibi caram admodum aut necessariam, Dei vindictam imprecari] intelligitur; aut ubi Deus ipse, per metonymiam invocatur.

Frustra autem adigeretur aliquis ad jurandum, per eum quem neque divina potestate praeditum, neque exercere in homines imperium credit. Sunt tamen Dei veri descriptiones omnibus communes, quibus utendum erit, quum a pluribus diversa de Deo sentientibus, exigendum est jusjurandum.

In jurejurando, ut de pactis dictum, is rite censetur jurasse, atque perjurii poenis, si fidem fefellerit, esse obnoxius, qui jurandi animum prae se ferens, ea quae a jurantibus solent, signa adhibuit.

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Quamvis jusjurandum una cum promisso aut testimonio, in eadem sententia includi possit, est tamen jusjurandum actus ab omni pacto aut narratione diversus; Dei nempe testis et vindicis invocatio, si quid contra officium egerimus, unde patet, hominum officia jurejurando neutiquam immutari; novamve quod ad materiam attinet, obligationem constitui; nec promissum pactumve Edition: 1745; Page: [211] justa de causa irritum, ratum fieri, aut justam excludi exceptionem; nec conditionalia mutari in absoluta; nec ratum fieri quod contra jus alterius perfectum, aut de re aliena, potestati nostrae non commissa, factum est; neque quod pietatem Deo debitam violat, legesve definitas, quas vocant speciales, certas actiones omnino prohibentes, et paciscendi de iis omnem nobis adimentes potestatem. In rebus vero nostrae potestati permissis, ut simplici pacto, sic multo sanctiùs [magis] eo quod jurejurando confirmatum est, obligamur; etiam ubi temere, et contra prudentiae et humanitatis officia, jurati promisimus: nisi paciscentium intervenerit dolus, ad eludenda officia quaedam humaniora.

III. Sine acceptione autem, nulla erit promissionis obligatio; quin et iste cui promissum est, de suo jure cedere, et promissorem liberare potest. Quod fiet etiam, tempestive declarato ejus dissensu, cujus consensus priùs erat necessarius, quam possit vel is qui promisit se ad rem quamlibet praestandam adstringere, vel alter rem oblatam accipere.

Ubi jusjurandum quisquam suo jure a nobis exigit, {verborumque formulam praescribit}; si de ipsius sensu constet, eo sensu nobis est jurandum; si ex animi sententia fieri possit: sin minus, a jurejurando est abstinendum.Edition: 1745; Page: [212] Neque delegati, qui aliorum nomine, eorum forte qui summo imperio praesunt, jusjurandum exigunt, formulam praescriptam interpretandi jus habent.

Jusjurandum, pro vario usu, est vel promissorium quod vocant, vel assertorium. Hoc, judice exigente, dicitur necessarium; et litigantium alterutro, Edition: current; Page: [178] coram judice, alteri id deferente, dicitur judiciale. Si extra judicium sponte juretur, dicitur jusjurandum voluntarium. Quod in actionibus criminalibus, ad probationem imperfectam refellendam exigitur, dicitur purgatorium.

Ubi autem de capite agitur aut fama, quum tanta sint ad pejerandum invitamenta; minime commoda videtur aut justa quaestionis exercendae ratio, jusjurandum exigere purgatorium. Hac enim ratione absolventur perjuri et scelerati; convincentur illi soli, quibus tanta est pietas, ut ne vel ad famam aut vitam tuendam, se perjurio sint adstricturi: quos, viro bono satius videbitur, incerti criminis (cujus homines tali indole praeditos, mox serio plerumque poenitet,) poenas effugere <mallet>, quam ut sua ipsorum pietate teneantur.

IV. Votum est “promissio religiosa [promissum religiosum] qua ipsi Deo, ad certas res aut operas praestandas, nos adstringimus.” In votis, Edition: 1745; Page: [213] non intelligitur jus ad homines esse translatum, nisi et pactum intercesserit.

Votorum unicus est usus, ut Deum sanctissimum, justissimum, omniaque intuentem verentibus, pia omnia et honesta agendi consilia fiant constantiora; eoque magis officium deserere vereamur, ne nosmet etiam atroci perjurii crimine implicemus.

Quum autem sine illius consensu cui promissum est, nulla sit promissi obligatio, constetque Deum opt. max. quae quisquam contra officium quodvis, temerè, incautè, aut timidè, promiserat, accipere nolle; quumque homines incautos, meticulosos, iracundos, aut superstitiosos insidiosè captare; aut contra communem utilitatem, aut humanitatem, certis hominum ordinibus favere, et in eorum opibus augendis, se procuratorem ostendere vafrum, omnia undique corradentem, Deo minimè sit dignum; hinc satis efficitur votum non obligare, ad ea facienda aut praestanda, quae non piè Edition: current; Page: [179] et humaniter, citra votum fieri poterant aut praestari. Multo minus valent vota, quae ex odio, invidia, aut ira injusta aut nimia; aut contra cujuslibet jus perfectum, aut ipsa aequitatis et humanitatis officia, suscipiuntur. Neque igitur nova obligationis materia, per vota constitui poterit. Edition: 1745; Page: [214]

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CAPUT XII: De Rerum Pretio.

I. Quo facilius res et operae inter homines permutari possint, earum pretia sunt aestimanda. Nemo enim res insignis et diuturni usus aut voluptatis, mutare velit iis, quarum exigua est utilitas aut voluptas: neque res quae multo parantur labore, rebus parabilibus.

Rei cujusvis pretium huic nititur fundamento, quod res ipsa ad usum aliquem aut voluptatem ministrandam est apta; absque hoc, nullum erit pretium. Hoc autem posito, rerum pretia majora erunt, prout magis [iis homines indigent] [major est hominum indigentia], ipsaeque res difficiliùs parantur. Indigentia erit major, pro ambientium numero, et majore rerum necessitate, aut usu gratiore. Acquirendi difficultas ex plurimis oritur causis; nempe ex ipsius materiae penuria; ex acquirendi labore; ex casibus iis qui proventum aliquando faciunt minus uberem; ex ingenii rarioris elegantia, quae in artibus quibusdam exigitur; ex artificum dignitate, eorumque honestiore et lautiore, pro nostratium moribus, vivendi conditione; hujus enim Edition: 1745; Page: [215] sumptum suppeditare debent artificiorum pretia.

Rerum autem utilissimarum saepe nullum, saepe exiguum est pretium. Ubi enim earum tanta est copia, ut ubique nullo fere labore reperiantur, nullum erit pretium: ubi labore facili et minime artificioso comparantur, exiguum. Pro insigni enim Dei bonitate, quae res sunt utilissimae, et maxime necessariae, illae copiosae sunt et parabiles.

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Rebus quibusdam utilissimis, nullum est pretium, quia sunt sua natura communes; aliis, quia in commercia non aliter veniunt, quam tanquam aliarum rerum appendices, quarum pretia quidem augere possunt, non vero ipsae per se aestimari; aliis denique, quia lege, vel naturali vel positiva, prohibetur earum emptio venditio, cujusmodi sunt res {sacrae, munera item,} aut officia, aut jura sacra; eaque stipendia, quibus alendi sunt viri, his officiis obeundis destinati; aut quae illorum fidei committuntur, ut sint eleemosynarum materies. Horum emptio venditio, ex nota satis historia, simoniae nomen est consecuta.

II. Quum vero saepe incidere soleat, ut mihi suppetat quarundam rerum, ultra meos usus, copia, desint autem aliae, quarum est apud alium copia, iste vero nulla re Edition: 1745; Page: [216] mea indigeat: quumque ego rem mihi non necessariam, pro re alterius mutare velim, mea tamen alterius rem pretio longe superet; nec tamen, sine gravi dispendio, in partes secari possit: ad commercia expediunda, constituendum est pretium aliquod eminens: id est, res quaedam, aliarum rerum omnium mensura, ad quam earum pretia exigantur, est constituenda; cujus tanta [sit oportet] [est] indigentia, ut quisque res suas cum ea mutare velit, quoniam ejus ope res quasvis sibi comparare potest. Etenim ejus rei, ob id ipsum quod aliarum sit mensura, existet maxima indigentia.

Huic rei, quae aliarum sit mensura, hae debent esse qualitates; inprimis, ut sit pretiosa, ita ut ejus pondus exiguum, et ad portandum facile, majorem aliarum rerum molem, aestimatione aequet. 2. Ut sit aliquid stabile, neque sua sponte brevi periturum, neque multum usu deterendum. 3. Ut sine dispendio quasvis admittat divisiones. Ea verò omnia, solis metallis rarioribus, auro nempe, et argento conveniunt; quae igitur omnis pretii mensurae, apud gentes cultiores, sunt constituta.

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III. Ad praecavendam vero omnem in laminis accurate dividendis molestiam, atque ut cautum sit de metallorum puritate, inventi sunt nummi; quorum excudendi Edition: 1745; Page: [217] potestate, viris fidis commissâ, et de metalli puri et non adulterati, quod singulis nummis inest, justo pondere cautum erit; et quaevis, de qua conventum est, summa, sine molestia persolvi poterit.

Edition: 1745; Page: [III]1 Vera metallorum, quin et nummorum, atque rerum ferè omnium aestimatio, pro majore eorum copia, imminuitur, pro minore augetur. Res per se ad vitam necessariae, pretia retinent stabiliora; quae tamen, pro majore aut minore anni cujusque ubertate, non parum immutantur. Ad stipendia igitur perpetua, aut reditus certos constituendos, quibus homines semper in eadem vitae conditione ali possint, certae earum rerum mensurae, quae simplici hominum labore non artificioso comparantur, sunt potius definiendae{; qualia sunt frumentum, quaeque alia simpliciori victui aut cultui inserviunt}.

{IV.} In civitate cui sunt cum vicinis commercia, nullo imperantium decreto immutari possunt vera nummorum pretia, earumve aestimatio pro ratione quam ad merces habent. Non enim nummorum nomina apud nos legitima curant exteri, metallorum {puriorum} tantummodo spectantes quantitates; iis igitur mercium pretia respondebunt. Veruntamen, post nummorum nomina lege constituta, multorumque cum multis res rationesque Edition: 1745; Page: [218] contractas, et pactiones, de pecuniae his nominibus definitae summis numerandis; nummorum pretio lege nova aucto, fraudantur creditores; et imminuto, fraudantur debitores.

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Quin etiam eveniet, ut metallorum inter se aestimatio nonnunquam immutetur, si aut alterutrius major solito effodiatur copia; aut si alterutrius, tantum, magnus sit in vitae cultu et ornatu usus; aut si magna ejusdem vis exportetur. Et nisi in eadem ratione immutentur nummorum pretia legitima, exportabuntur nummi, quibus, pro vera metalli aestimatione, justo minus imponitur pretium, et invehentur illi quibus nimium; non sine gravi civitatis incommodo.

Sicubi pro hujusmodi nummis, fiant alii ex metallis vilioribus; quod dignitate deest pondere pensandum [compensandum]; aut secus, cessabunt cum exteris commercia. Quae nummorum vice funguntur chirographa <quaedam>, aut tesserae, eam vim ideo tantum obtinent, quod de veris nummis solvendis idoneam faciant fidem. Edition: 1745; Page: [219]

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CAPUT XIII: De variis Contractuum Generibus Post Pretia Rerum constituta.

I. Dividuntur contractus in beneficos et onerosos. Benefici, ubi intelligitur, contrahentium alteri commodum aliquod gratis afferri: onerosi, ubi {utriusque pariter spectatur utilitas, atque} hoc agere profitentur paciscentes, ut res vel operae pretio aequales mutuo transferantur.

Beneficorum tria sunt genera decantata, mandatum, commodatum, et depositum; quibus accenseri potest mutuum gratuitum.

Mandatum est “contractus ubi quis alterius negotia sibi commissa, gratis obeunda suscipit.” In quo si rei expediundae ratio fuerit praescripta, eam observare tenetur mandatarius; aut suo periculo ab [eadem discessum erit] [ea recesserit]. Si vero negotium ipsius prudentiae permissum fuit; non perfectae obligationi aut officio defuisse censebitur, si eam adhibuit diligentiam, quam istiusmodi negotiis, et suis, adhibere solent viri probi et diligentes. Neque ad damnum culpâ quavis levissima datum, praestandum tenebitur; nisi vel summam pollicitus fuerat diligentiam; eamve plane exigat negotii natura; Edition: 1745; Page: [220] aut ultro se obtruserat, ubi aptiorum aderat copia.

De omni verò contractu benefico tenendum, eum qui in alterum contulit beneficium, non graviorem subire obligationem, quam vel disertè suscepit, vel suscipiendam plane monuit ipsa res: Eum autem in quem confertur beneficium, pro gratiae referendae officio, ad summam adstringi Edition: current; Page: [185] diligentiam, atque ad omne damnum culpa datum praestandum; ne quem suae beneficientiae poeniteat.

II. Commodatum est “contractus quo quis rei suae usum alteri gratis concedit.” Tenetur Commodatarius. 1. Ad summam diligentiam, et damnum vel levissimâ culpa datum praestandum. 2. Ad omnem etiam casum, cui res commodata apud dominum non fuisset obnoxia, praestandum; nisi commodator humaniter de jure suo cesserit. 3. Neque alium recte capit ejusdem usum quam qui est concessus. 4. Exacto [Elapso] deinde tempore, reddenda est res salva, neque magis detrita, quam usu concesso voluisse censendus est commodator. 5. Humanitas etiam juberet, ante tempus praestitutum [elapsum] rem domino magis ea indigenti reddere, aut damnum ex eo quod non reddatur ortum praestare.

Tenetur contra commodator, sumptus Edition: 1745; Page: [221] omnes in rem suam factos commodatario praestare, praeter eos qui ad rei habilis usum sunt plerumque necessarii; aut saltem persolvere quantum res sua sibi facta est utilior, et ipse ideo locupletior. A commodato distinguitur mutuum gratuitum, quod hoc in rebus constituatur fungibilibus, quae non in specie sed in genere redduntur: i. e. in aequalibus mensuris, ponderibus, aut quantitatibus.

III. Depositum, quod est mandati genus, est “contractus, quo quis rem alienam, a domino commissam, gratis custodiendam suscipit.” Depositarius ad mediam viri prudentis diligentiam tenetur, et ad damnum lata culpa datum, praestandum. 2. Neque re deposita, sine domini consensu, uti licet. 3. Eam domino reposcenti debet reddere, nisi ad facinus aliquod patrandum Edition: current; Page: [186] reposcat, quod depositarius jure suo per vim prohibere potest. 4. Depositarius ab omni sumptu et impensis in re custodienda prudenter erogatis, immunis est servandus.

In his contractibus, ut etiam in tutela et negotiis gestis, ad illud consequendum quod primo et praecipue spectabatur, datae erant actiones directae; ut contra mandatarium, ad res rationesque reddendas; contra commodatarium et depositarium, ad res reddendas. His autem dabantur actiones contrariae, Edition: 1745; Page: [222] ut damna sibi et sumptus praestentur.

IV. In contractibus onerosis, profitentur contrahentes, se res corporales, aut incorporales quae dicuntur, sive jura, mutuo transferre aestimatione aequales. Atque idcirco inter bonos nihil simulandum aut dissimulandum: omnes mercium aut rerum qualitates aestimabiles, earumve defectus et vitia sunt declaranda: et ubi temere ab aequalitate recessum est, minus habenti quod deest, viri prudentis arbitrio supplendum; idque jure perfecto iste exigere potest. Quamvis, ne fatigentur praetores, nisi ob injurias graviores non dantur in foro actiones.

A contractibus onerosis, eo secernitur donatio reciproca, quod in hac rerum datarum non spectetur aequalitas.

Ex dictis de pretio constat, in mercium pretiis aestimandis, habendam esse rationem, non solum pecuniae in iis emendis, apportandis, custodiendis, erogatae, atque usurae cessantis; verum et laboris ab ipso mercatore impensi; cujus pretium pro hominum istiusmodi conditione honestiore est aestimandum, et mercibus imponendum. Hoc vero laboris pretium et curae, est vulgaris et quotidiani mercatorum lucri fundamentum. Quumque insuper merces invectae aut exportatae variis sint periculis obnoxiae, Edition: current; Page: [187] Edition: 1745; Page: [223] ad ea praestanda, mercium servatarum pretium, pro periculorum ratione, non injuriâ augetur. Quumque etiam damnis obnoxii sint mercatores, ex eo quod, mercium, quarum copiam invexerant, pretium, insperata apud alios copia imminuatur; ad haec etiam praestanda, lucrum justum sibi captant ex mercibus copiosius convectis, quum insperatâ earundem apud alios penuria pretium augetur.

V. Contractuum onerosorum haec sunt genera. 1. Permutatio, quum res re mutatur. 12. Emptio venditio, quum “res pecunia mutatur.” Hujus forma simplicissima est cum merces traduntur, pecunià soluta. Si vero de mercibus ad certum diem tradendis conveniat, pretiò vel soluto, vel de eo solvendo cautione data, quae venditori idonea videtur; ante diem, merces venditoris periculo manent; post diem <elapsum>, si nulla tradendi fuerat in ipso mora, in depositarii loco erit venditor; ut et ab initio fuisset si ab initio merces obtulisset paratas.

Emptioni venditioni plura adjici solent pacta aut leges; addictio scil. in diem, ubi pretii in diem differtur solutio; ante quem licet aut emptori, aut venditori, meliorem accipere conditionem: quae si non offeratur, [obligabit] [validus erit] contractus. Adjicitur etiam lex commissoria, ut si pretium ante statum Edition: 1745; Page: [224] diem solutum non fuerit, pactum sit irritum. Lex item retractûs, sive redemptionis, satis nota. Jus denique protimesios, ut si emptor rem rursum vendere voluerit, prior dominus pretium aequale soluturus, caeteris emptoribus praeferatur. Quae res auctione, aut sub hasta venduntur, plurimô licitanti cedunt.

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Venduntur aliquando non res certae, sed earum spes incertae. Quibus contractibus non deerit aequalitas, in omni contractu oneroso conservanda, si verum rei ipsius <consequendae> pretium, ea ratione spei pretium superet, quâ metus pretii frustra perituri, spem superat rei consequendae.

VI. Locatio conductio est “contractus, in quo pro certa mercede, rei nostrae usus aut opera alteri addicitur.” Locator rem usui idoneam praestare tenetur et conservare: conductor, ea uti, ut rebus similibus et suis solent viri probi; et quicquid sua culpa lata periit praestare. Ubi nullâ conductoris culpa, res locata periit; non ulterius solvenda erit merces. Aut si casu imminuatur usus, eadem ratione imminuenda est merces. Ubi rei proventus est incertus; ut uberior conductoris lucro, ita malignior istius damno cedit: exceptis casibus rarioribus et calamitosis, quorum aleam conductorem Edition: 1745; Page: [225] suscepisse non [putandum] [est aestimandus]; quales sunt bella, diluvia, pestilentiae.

Qui opus faciundum conduxit, traditâ sibi materia aliena; ad eam diligentiam tenetur, quam viri probi adhibere solent; et ad damnum lata culpa datum praestandum. Qui ad certum aliquod opus brevi peragendum, conductus est; mercedem exigere nequit, si quo casu ab opere peragendo impediatur. Qui vero continuam alicujus operam conduxit, videtur breviorum morborum operas impedientium, quibus etiam robustiores obnoxii sunt, pericula subire; ita ut nihil ea de causa pensioni detrahere possit.

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VII. Mutuum est “contractus, ubi datur alicui res fungibilis, ea lege, ut tempore convento reddendae sint aequales rerum similium quantitates.” Si non sit gratuitum, danda etiam est usura. Res maxime fungibiles sunt nummi.

Quamvis autem nummi non sunt per se frugiferi, neque aliae fere res fungibiles; nummis tamen emi possunt res frugiferae, eorumque ope in commerciis lucrum potest esse multo uberius: foenoris igitur aliquid, pro lucri hujus ratione, ob pecuniam mutuo datam, exigere minime est iniquum. Neque in civitatibus ubi vigent commercia, sine gravi incommodo prohiberi possunt istiusmodi Edition: 1745; Page: [226] pacta; licet in agricolarum [rusticorum] republica populari, {qualis Hebraeorum fuit,} non sint necessaria.

Foenoris aequi mensura major erit aut minor, prout minor est aut major nummorum qui in commerciis exercendis locantur copia. Quum major est, {atque ideo apud nostros carius emuntur merces exportandae,} minus ex data quavis summa lucrum orietur; minus igitur debet esse foenus: ubi minor est pecuniae copia, {viliùsque ideo emuntur merces exportandae;} ex data quavis summa majus orietur lucrum; majus igitur persolvi poterit foenus. Horum omnium, in legibus civilibus foenus definientibus, ratio habenda; neque aliter vim poterunt obtinere.

In societatis contractu, jura et obligationes ex sociorum conventione et arithmeticorum regulis notissimis innotescunt.

VIII. Diximus {jam antea, non omnes} contractus quibus aleae aliquid inest, <non esse omnes> inaequalitatis nomine damnandos. Immo istiusmodi quidam sunt omnino probandi, et hominum societati utilissimi; praecipue qui de naufragii, latrocinii, aut incendii periculis avertendis aut praestandis fiunt. Per hos enim strenuis plurimis et gnavis salva conservatur sors, quae aliter periisset. Continent hi contractus publici, societatis magnae Edition: current; Page: [190] Edition: 1745; Page: [227] de damnis communicandis initae, vim humanam et salutarem: ex mercedibus enim, ab iis solutis quorum salvae sunt merces, praestantur minus foelicium damna.

Neque reprehendendum, si plures, rem collatâ pecunia, animi causa emptam, sortium arbitrio permittant: si modo nemo tantam his periculis objecerit facultatum suarum partem, ut ejus jacturâ, sibi aut suis, vitae praesidia aut ornamenta praeripiantur.

Idem de sponsionibus, et variis ludorum generibus statuendum. Neque sunt haec ideo vituperanda quod aleam contineant; neque sunt omnia iniqua. At primo, nihil viro bono et prudente est indignius, quam, nulla premente necessitate, res sibi et suis necessarias aut utiles, incertae subjicere aleae; aut lucrum ex aliorum temeritate, immeritò sibi captare. Improbandi sunt igitur istiusmodi contractus, nisi in rebus versentur levioribus, quas locupletioribus animi causa projicere licet. Quin etiam, nihil a viro bono alienius quam se totum rebus ludicris dare, iisve multum temporis impendere; aut ita nugis se assuescere, ut ad seria minus habilis minusve propensus [proclivis] reddatur.

Quod attinet ad istiusmodi contractus celebriores quibus alea inest, quibusque plures res suas implicare solent; quum in communem Edition: 1745; Page: [228] utilitatem nihil conferant, paucos tantum temerè ex plurium dispendiis locupletantes; quumque ad eos ineundos proclives admodum sint homines, pro opinione vana quam de sua foelicitate fovere solent; legibus civilibus omnino sunt coercendi: ne opes, quae in opificiis aut mercatura occupatae, rei publicae prodessent, inutiliter ad haec parum honesta, et fraudibus innumeris obnoxia, convertantur; aut insociabilis, stolida, et ignava foveatur avaritia.

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IX. Ad contractus firmandos accedunt fidejussiones et pignora. Fidejussor is est qui subsidiariam subit obligationem debiti praestandi, si ipse debitor solvere detrectaverit, aut non sit solvendo. Quumque creditor illi magis quam ipsi debitori saepe fidat; non minus sancta illius est obligatio. Neque ullae subterfugiendi artes fidejussori sunt licitae, quae non fuissent, si sua ipsius causa debitum contraxisset: neque recte quidem solutionem differt, nisi fraudulenta existat, inter creditorem et debitorem, contra se collusio.

Potest fidejussor vel pignore dato, vel jurejurando, firmius adstringi quam ipse debitor: ast prout est fidejussor, neque re, neque loco, tempore, aut causa, plus debere potest. Ordinis beneficium recte exigit fidejussor, Edition: 1745; Page: [229] ut prius nempe [debitor excutiatur, quam ipse appelletur] [cum ipso debitore lis discutiatur]; et beneficium divisionis, ubi plures fuere fidejussores; nisi hisce renunciaverit.

Qui in causa criminali subsidiariam subeunt obligationem, vades dicuntur. Ad poenas vero corporales subeundas vix recte admittuntur, nisi sceleris fuerant fautores. Jure tamen ad pecuniam, multae nomine, praestandam teneri possunt.

De pignore jam diximus{*} quaedam, et de hypotheca: ubi oppignorata est res fructuosa, a mercede aut sorte deducendi sunt fructus; neque justa est in pignoribus lex commissoria, nisi quod ex pignoris distracti pretio superest debito soluto, debitori reddatur. Custodiendum est pignus ea diligentia media, qua res suas custodit bonus paterfamilias; quum utriusque partis hac in re spectetur utilitas. A pignore differt hypotheca, quod haec, re non tradita, sed debito solvendo subjectâ, constituatur. In utroque est jus reale, cui cedunt et priora jura personalia. Edition: 1745; Page: [230]

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CAPUT XIV: De Obligationibus quasi ex Contractu ortis.

I. Has praeter obligationes et jura, sunt et alia, quae nascuntur ex facto aliquo licito ejus adversus quem valent. De iis quae ex facto illicito oriuntur, in capite sequente agendum. Ex factis licitis [jura orta fundantur] [ortum jus omne, fundatur] vel in ipso dominii jure, vel in manifesta societatis amicae conservandae ratione. Quae hujusmodi juri respondent obligationes, ne actionum multiplicarentur formulae, eas ex contractu ortas fingunt jureconsulti. Sunt vero a pactis tacitis diversi, quod in tacitis ex facto quodam consensus vere indicari intelligitur; in his vero, propter manifestam rei aequitatem fingitur. In illis, denuntiatione [praemonitione] contraria, praecaveri [praepediri] potest quae ex solo consensu {aliàs} oriretur obligatio: in his neutiquam; quippe in aliâ fundata causâ aequissima{, neque ab illius qui obligatur consensu pendens}.

Obligationum quae quasi ex contractu oriuntur, duo sunt genera; alterum earum quae hinc oriuntur, quod quispiam rebus alienis, aut alteri quocunque modo obligatis, Edition: 1745; Page: [231] sine contractu se immiscuerit: alterum, quum quisquam aliquod sibi commodum, alteri nec donanti nec consentienti damnosum aut sumptuosum, derivaverit. Ad priorem classem refertur ejus obligatio qui sine vi aut dolo rem possidet alienam, ut eam cum fructibus reddat. {Huc etiam} refertur et ejus qui negotium utile gesserat, <; qui scil.> res <tractavit> alterius, vel absentis et nescii, vel ob rationis et prudentiae idoneae defectum, consentire non valentis, {tractando}: qui Edition: current; Page: [193] {scil}: tenetur ad rationes et res ipsas cum emolumentis reddendas. Quod spectatur in negotiorum gestorum et tutelae actionibus directis.

Ad hanc etiam refertur classem haeredis testamento instituti obligatio, defuncti creditores et legatarios respiciens; quae nempe oritur ex haereditatis aditione [ereditate adita]. Omnia enim defuncti bona, aeri alieno dissolvendo, et omni, quod quisquam jure suo pleno postulare potest, praestando subjiciuntur. Qui haereditatem adit, unicam unde ea praestari possunt materiam, ea omnia, quousque [sufficiunt] [pertinere possunt] bona haereditaria, deductis impensis in iis tractandis, praestare tenetur. Justum autem est inventarii beneficium{; ne ultra haereditatem haeres obligetur}. Neque, ad haec jura explicanda, opus est haeredem Edition: 1745; Page: [232] fingere eandem esse cum defuncto personam.

II. Quod ad alteram attinet classem, ubi [scil: quis aliquam utilitatem,] [quicquam sibi commodum] alteri nec donanti, nec gratis damnum perferre volenti damnosam, sibi [damnosum, aliquis] adscivit: ad eam referuntur ejus obligationes, cujus absentis et inscii, aut, ob rationis et prudentiae necessariae defectum, consentire non valentis, negotia sunt utiliter gesta, aut res administratae; ut eum qui negotia gesserat, aut tutorem, indemnem praestet, et labores omnes utiles compenset, eorumque contractus, bona fide, ipsius nomine initos, confirmet. Huc spectant negotiorum gestorum, et tutelae actiones contrariae. Impensarum etiam, quae in pupillis alendis, educandis, aut arte quavis imbuendis, prudenter factae sunt, eadem est ratio.

Quae quidem in liberis suis alendis erogarunt parentes non egeni, ex communi parentum affectione [affectu], donandi animo erogasse censentur, ubi contrariae voluntatis nulla fuit significatio. Quin et tenentur parentes, pro sua conditione, liberis necessaria praebere vitae praesidia, et ornamenta; et quod ex bonis superest iis potissimum relinquere. Premente Edition: current; Page: [194] vero egestate, aut si cui forte ex liberis aliunde suppetant facultates, non iniquum foret parentem liberos Edition: 1745; Page: [233] ad calculos vocare, ut sibi persolvantur quae erogaverit; sive ad ipsum in senectute alendum, sive ut caeteros liberos eo melius alere possit.

{III.} Si quis verò alienum aluerit inopem, id gratis factum fuisse non temerè est judicandum: immo potius eo jus esse constitutum in alumnum, ut omnia in ejus utilitatem prudenter erogata, ipsius laboribus compensentur; haud vero ea quae ad familiae altoris [herilis] ornatum pertinebant. Quumque insuper, {quae} in prima alumnorum aetate [erogata sunt omnino] [, quaedam sint erogata, quae] perirent, si immaturi obirent alumni; amplius aliquid exigere poterunt altores, pro hujus periculi ratione: quo jure ipsis concesso, haec humanitatis officia alacrius suscipient. Decrescit vero post primos alumni cujusque annos hoc periculum, atque primas tantum impensas graviore foenore onerare potest. Est igitur alumnus inops in causa debitoris, nullo suo crimine obaerati, a quo exigi saepe possunt operae, donec per eas dissolvatur aes alienum; qui tamen omnia alia retinet hominum jura: et simul ac vel laboribus suis, (quorum sibi utilissimos et maxime quaestuosos, ad viri probi arbitrium, ipsi est eli gendi jus,) vel amicorum liberalitate, debitum fuerit solutum, tollitur omne altoris jus. Ratione vero subducta pateret, neminem Edition: 1745; Page: [234] esse alumnum, sit {modo} ei mens sana et corpus sanum, qui [quin] ante annum trigesimum, laboribus suis, omnia quae altori debuit, praestare {non} posset: neque ex hac causa recte oriri posse servitutem haereditariam, quamvis altori, pro periculi ratione, in Edition: current; Page: [195] modum foenoris nautici, amplius esset solvendum: quod tamen exigere haud sineret humanitas, ab iis qui gravi aliqua premuntur necessitate; nulla autem gravior esse potest quam infantis inopis, omni parentum auxilio destituiti.{*}

Ad hanc etiam refertur classem ejus obligatio, qui favore necessitatis usus, alteri damnum dedit; qua de re postea erit agendum: atque ejus qui indebitum accepit tanquam debitum; aut aliquid ex pacto quovis aut promisso, cui legitima opponi poterat exceptio; aut ob rem aut operam, a se praestandam, quam non praestitit.

Quum res plurium communis, unius opera aut impensis est conservata aut exculta; caeterorum erga hunc obligatio ad posteriorem hanc classem, hujus erga caeteros, ad priorem est referenda.

Obligationes alium tenentes ab eo qui contraxerat, sunt veri contractus, ubi alterius Edition: 1745; Page: [235] mandato aut jussu res contractae sunt: sin secus, sunt in causa negotiorum gestorum.

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CAPUT XV: Jura ex Damno dato, atque ex aliorum Injuriis orta. Jura Belli.

I. Ex iis quae saepius sunt dicta constabit, teneri quemque damnum, alteri non consentienti, a se datum praestare. Incidunt autem [Incidere possunt] causae, in quibus vir optimus ea agere possit, et debeat, quae aliis damno erunt: ubi scil. aut res suae longe pretiosiores conservari, aut mala graviora, sibi suisque imminentia, aliter averti nequeant, quam ea agendo quae aliis levia quaedam damna sunt allatura. Suo forte jure ea aget vir bonus, suscepto tamen hoc onere, damni omnis, sui aut suorum causa aliis dati, pensandi: quum et communis utilitatis et juris aequi ratio hoc exigat, ne quis ob suam utilitatem aliorum immerentium imminuat utilitates; aut si quid istiusmodi necessario factum fuerit, ut ubi primum fieri potest damnum resarciatur.

Quod et de damno injuriâ magis est manifestum. Conservari enim nequiret hominum conjunctio et societas, nisi necessaria Edition: 1745; Page: [236] cuique foret damni abs se injuriâ dati praestatio; quae igitur per vim recte exigetur. Frustra ferrentur leges, vim omnem vetantes et injurias, si tamen iis violatis, lucrum injustum improbi obtinere possint.

Quin et societatis humanae salus hoc exigit, ut malorum graviorum metu ab injuriis improbi coerceantur, ne perpetuam iis praedam et ludibrium se praebeant omnes probi. Quamvis igitur benevolentiam omnem, clementiam et mansuetudinem, etiam erga improbos, nobis commendet Deus et natura; majorem tamen innocuorum et proborum commendant curam et commiserationem. Citra odia etiam et malevolentiam, improbi ab injuriis per vim et poenas coerceri, atque ab iis damni pensatio, cautioque ne in Edition: current; Page: [197] posterum laedant, exigi poterint{: quae potius in beneficiis habenda}.

II. Damni nomine intelliguntur, non solum rerum nostrarum direptiones, corruptiones, detentiones injustae; verum et fructuum sive naturalium sive civilium interceptiones; atque omnia etiam incommoda quae ex primo damno promanarunt; lucrum scil. omne cessans, non minus quam damnum emergens.

Qui vel per se, vel per alios, vel faciendo vel non faciendo, secus quam obligatione perfecta tenebatur, damno causam dedit, Edition: 1745; Page: [237] aut occasionem citra quam non evenisset, is damnum intulisse censetur. Qui malis laetantur alienis, qui injurias laudant, aut ad eas hortantur, improbum quidem produnt animum: quum tamen citra ea, saepe eaedem illatae fuissent injuriae; ea, ut poenis coercenda sunt, rarò tamen homines, per se, [ad damna pensanda obstringunt] [damno praestando obnoxios reddunt]. Ubi plures communi consilio, injuriam intulerunt; singuli pro omnibus, et omnes pro singulis, ad damnum pensandum [compensandum] tenentur. Ubi vero unus aliquis totum compensaverit; nihil amplius eo nomine laesus a caeteris exigere potest. Is tamen, qui totum pensavit [compensavit], recte divisionis contra socios postulabit beneficium. Poenarum causa est diversa {: quippe quae communis utilitatis causa irrogandae sunt.} Inter damni auctores praecipuus habetur qui caeteros imperio adegerat. Hic igitur, ubi fieri potest, primo est appellandus: ubi non potest, a patratoribus rectè exigitur damni praestatio; quandoquidem nullam hic ab ea obligatione immunitatem, iis dare poterat. Et quantumvis patratores, {qui} ad graviora, quae ipsis imminebant, mala declinanda, damna aliis dederant tantummodò leviora, necessitatis favore ab omni [culpa sint] [vitio] excusandi; non tamen cessabit damni sarciendi obligatio; quum non teneantur Edition: 1745; Page: [238] vicini immerentes, mala illis imminentia, suo damno redimere.

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III. Qui citra culpam, damnum casu dedit fortuito; ad id sarciendum non pleno tenetur jure. Immo ex officio communis utilitatis causa honeste suscepto, praecipue in rebus trepidis, ubi difficile est satis cavere, quamvis viri strenui incuriâ leviore damnum acceptum sit, id publicè sarciendum.

Damna data a mercenariis, sine heri mandato, ipsos solos onerant. A mancipiis data, dominum obligant, ad mancipium ea lege distrahendum, qua hominis obaerati facultates; quae cum omni aeri alieno solvendo non sufficiunt, inter creditores pro rata dividendae sunt. Hinc, mancipii pretium, quod domini jus est; et illinc, damnum datum est aestimandum, quod laesi jus est; et pro eorum ratione, mancipii pretium est dividendum, aut pensatio a domino praestanda. Quod et de pauperie a quadrupede facta, tenendum. Si quid aliter in laesorum gratiam definiverunt [determinarunt] leges* civiles, hoc secutae sunt, ut domini, in servis suis et animalibus coercendis, fiant diligentiores.

Qui sine dolo damnum dedit, se paratum ostendere tenetur ad ea danda facienda, quae viro probo videbuntur aequa; et laeso sponte testari, dolum <a se> nocendique animum Edition: 1745; Page: [239] abfuisse. Quem damni malo animo dati vere poenitet, hic damnum ultro sarcire, et veniam petere debet, et cautionem offerre, ad viri probi arbitrium, de non in posterum laedendo. Injuriae enim neminem verè poenitet, immo in ea perstat, qui non ad haec praestanda paratus est, aut qui lucrum injuria partum detinet. His autem oblatis, laesus veniam petenti dare, et in gratiam cum eo redire tenetur. Quod eo alacrios praestandum, quod saepius sibi quisque, si non hominum Edition: current; Page: [199] vicinorum, Dei saltem opt. max. clementiâ eget et veniâ.

IV. Quum vero animo obstinato vicinus injuriam intentat, neque monitus a proposito dimoveri potest; aut damnum a se injuriâ datum sarcire negat; aut denique quae jure nostro postulamus, praestare pertinaciter renuit: exigit non solum nostra, verum et omnium communis utilitas et salus, ut per vim depellatur injuria intentata; damnique pensatio, et quicquid nobis debetur, extorqueatur; eaque etiam {ut} improbo irrogentur mala, quorum terrore et ipse in posterum, et caeteri, ad injurias tardiores reddantur.

Haec juris violenta defensio aut vindicatio, est bellum: quod “status est per vim certantium juris tuendi causâ.” Quum autem in civitatibus constituendis praecipuè Edition: 1745; Page: [240] spectatum fuit, quod omnibus notum, ut civium lites ab arbitris aequis dirimantur, et praecaveantur mala ab hominum infensorum iracundia metuenda; apparebit, longe aliter juris nostri defensionem et vindicationem, in vita civili, ac in libertate naturali esse instituendam.

Bella sunt vel publica vel privata. Publica, quae a civitate aut populo suscipiuntur: privata, quae apprivatis. Publica sunt vel solemnia, vel minus solemnia. Solemnia (quae et justa vocant Romani, qualicunque de causa, nisi planè nefaria suscepta fuerint,) “quae populi nomine, eorumque jussu qui [reip. Praesunt] [summo sunt in imperio] utrinque, sub aliqua juris specie geruntur.” Publica quae minus solemnia, ab altera tantum parte, aut populi, aut rectorum jussu geruntur. Qualia praedonibus, aut civibus seditiosis et turbulentis inferuntur; vel quae civilia dicuntur, ubi de populi, aut de regni jure aliquo, inter diversas civium factiones decertatur.

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De singulorum in libertate degentium privatis bellis nunc dicendum: quae tamen de his statuuntur, simili de causa, tenent in bellis publicis; quum in pari libertatis statu, inter se constituantur ipsae [diversae] civitates liberae, earumque rectores summi.

V. Bella et publica et privata nonnunquam Edition: 1745; Page: [241] esse licita, immo communi saluti saepe necessaria, ex dictis fatis constat: neque omnia prohibent sacrae literae; quippe quae imperii civilis jura confirmant, magistratibus jus gladii tribuunt,{*} et bellatores quosdam egregios laudant {et celebrant}.

In utroque belli genere, tria spectanda; {quaenam scil.} causae justae; quodnam belli inchoandi tempus, et {qui} petendi fines; (quae, terminus a quo, et terminus ad quem, dicuntur:) quae omnia, ubi de singulorum bellis agitur, variè definienda, prout bellantes vel in vita degunt civili, vel in libertate naturali.

Ante omnia monendum; injuriam quamvis atrocem, ab altero nobis illatam [non obstare, quo] [nihilo tamen] minus, adversus eundem colenda sit benevolentia: quinetiam ejusdem foelicitas expetenda est, quantum patitur hominum meliorum, omniumque communis utilitas. Quam haec patitur clementiam, erga vel pessimos, boni cujusque sensus comprobabit. Intentatâ igitur, aut illatâ injuriâ, ad eam avertendam, damnive pensationem, cautionemque in posterum consequendam, cuncta leniora prius tentanda. Neque omne jus suum amittit hostis quamvis injustus; neque contra eum datur licentia Edition: 1745; Page: [242] infinita; sed ea sola, quae vel injuriae repellendae, vel damno sarciendo, vel melioribus in posterum protegendis est necessaria. Quae horum nulli commodè inservit saevitia, turpis est et detestanda{: quum sine necessitate, hominibus quibusdam gravia invehat mala, caeteris inutilia, et saepe exemplo cunctis nocitura}.

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VI. {Belli} in libertate naturali {suscipiendi} causa justa, est juris perfecti quaevis violatio. Nullum enim erit jus tutum, nulla vitae securitas, nisi contra injurias inferentem ad vim confugere liceat, ne quis injurias a se illatas impunè ferat. Levioribus injuriis nobis saepius illatis maximae collabentur opes: neque innocuis tolerabilis foret vitae conditio, improborum petulantiae inultae semper obnoxia. Injurias leviores ferendas suadebit humanitas, si modo damna reparari possint, et a viris caetera probis, per brevem iram, cujus mox eos poenitebit, inferantur: hanc tamen patientiam, ab altero nemo suo jure postulare poterit. Quae rariores et insolitae sint bellorum causae haud improbandae, nondum {aut} illatâ aut intentatâ injuriâ,* alias docebitur.

Ubi igitur violatum est jus, sive rebus nostris ereptis aut laesis, sive quae nostro Edition: 1745; Page: [243] petimus jure denegatis; aut ubi vicino cuivis par sit injuria; licet, immo saepe honestum est, eos quoscunque, qui juri nostro, aut vicini cujusvis, tuendo aut vindicando se opponunt, per vim cogere, ut ab injuriis desistant, nobisque et vicinis quae debentur, praestent. Res in specie debitas per vim occupare licet: aut si harum non sit copia, res quaslibet hostiles, quae iis omnibus quae debentur praestandis sufficient. In jure nostro aestimando, labores omnes et damna, quibus causam dederat injuria hostilis, sunt computanda. Immo poenae nomine, aut cautionis de non laedendo, res hostiles jure occupantur, quantum arbitro prudenti necessarium videbitur.

In statu quidem civili ea injuria sola, a cive qui in jus vocari potest, intentata, vi privata recte propulsatur, quae damnum minitatur irreparabile. Aliarum depulsionem, damnique pensationem, tutius magistratui permittimus. Quae nullo ejusdem auxilio praecaveri possunt aut reparari, illas vi omni necessaria aut commoda jure propulsamus. Si quis etiam [civium] [jure civis], civilem exuerit, conditionem, aut ita occultè injurias inferat, ut Edition: current; Page: [202] vix in jus vocari possit; contra eum* vigent omnia quae in libertate jura: quales sunt praedones furesque nocturni. Edition: 1745; Page: [244] Contra alios cives, juris vindicatio judicibus permittenda.

VII. Terminus a quo {in libertate} inchoanda est juris violenta defensio aut vindicatio, est, ubi alter vel denuntiatione, vel actione hostili, aliove indicio certo, nosmetipsos, aliumve innocuum laedendi consilium declaraverit, nec monitus desistat. Neque enim primus ictus est excipiendus; quippe qui lethalis esse potest: neque expectandum donec inferatur injuria, quae forté reparari nequiret; cujusve illatae pensationem infoelicius exegeris, quam nondum illatam propuleris. Injurias igitur tardius molientem maturè opprimere licebit.

In statu civili, vim cum graviore aliorum periculo conjunctam, haud recte prius adhibemus, quam aggressor nos ad eas redegerit angustias, ut neque sine periculo fugere liceat, neque a civibus, aut magistratibus auxilii sit copia.

VIII. Terminus sive finis, ultra quem in statu libero non recte producitur bellum, hic est; quum aggressor, aut injuriae auctor, vel poenitentia ultro permotus, vel vi coactus, a laedendo abstinuerit, omnisque damni a se dati pensationem, cautionemque in posterum, ad viri probi arbitrium, obtulerit. Haec si pertinaciter detrectaverit, per vim jure extorquentur. Quin et humani generis Edition: 1745; Page: [245] interest, ut ei qui atrocius sine ulla juris specie deliquerit, aliisque exemplo suo injuriarum et scelerum auctor fuerit, ejusmodi supplicia irrogentur, quibus non solum ipse, sed et alii omnes ab ejusmodi delictis deterreantur.

Quae causae ostendunt poenas in vita civili jure irrogari, eaedem omnes statui libero conveniunt: quamvis in eo neque adeo facilè irrogari, aut prudenter Edition: current; Page: [203] temperari possint. Neque vel poenarum causae, easve expetendi rationes, imperium civile exigunt in eo qui irrogat, neque ut is qui punitur imperio sit subditus.

In statu civili, periculo praesente depulso, non producendum est bellum. Damni enim pensatio, omnisque in posterum cautio, in judiciis, non hominum infensorum vi, est exigenda. Omnis quae jure adhibetur vis, vel jus nostrum tuendum, vel utilitatem aliquam communem, spectare debet. Quae horum neutrum spectat, quaeque cum odio et malevolentia est conjuncta, ea est vindicta, quae et lege naturali damnatur et Christiana.

Quum porro jura nostra non solum rem aliquam habendam, quam recte vi defendimus, verum et quaedam ab aliis consequenda spectent; in libertate, quae ab aliis jure sed frustra flagitavimus, per vim vindicare Edition: 1745; Page: [246] aut persequi licet. In vita civili {contra}, ea vindicatio omnis, actione intentata, sive de debito, sive de damno, etiam infecto, magistratuum prudentiae et judiciis est permittenda. De jure nostro in statu libero persequendo, {ubi} de belli causis agebatur [agentes] satis {ante} diximus.

IX. Hinc etiam [Ex dictis] patet, condicta privatorum certamina, quae nunc duella vocantur, ubi provocans et provocatus se ultro in loco sistunt condicto, extrema omnia invicem inferre parati, nulla {satis probabili} juris specie, vel inter homines liberos, vel cives, defendi posse. Juris nostri defendendi aut persequendi modum longe commodiorem, ostendet recta ratio; ut nempè vel arbitris compromisso <constitutis> permittatur litem dirimere; vel, ubi hoc alter detrectaverit, ut cum eorum auxiliis, quos nobis causae nostrae aequitas, aut rei communis cura, socios adjunxerit, bello aperto jus nostrum persequamur. Quod ad opprobria attinet [verbaque contumeliosa] [& calumnias], {et falsa crimina;} ea per duellum refellere, Edition: current; Page: [204] et ineptissimum est, et saepe saevissimum. Quum caeca omnino sit martis hujusmodi alea; et poena saepe major quam delictum. Si quis alterius famam falsis laeserit criminibus, aut etiam arcana ejus vitia inhumaniter divulgando, nullo hoc exigente officio: in statu libero, Edition: 1745; Page: [247] quo dignus est supplicium, ad viri prudentis arbitrium, ei est irrogandum; qua in re ab humanioribus vicinis auxilia petenda. Si quis in eo statu, nullâ injuria lacessitus, animum erga nos declaraverit hostilem, is quidem tutissima {potius} ratione improvisò videretur [est] opprimendus; aut, quantum exigit nostra aliorumque incolumitas, poenis {palàm} coercendus. Neque vel in vita civili, si hostilem civis contra me ostendat animum; hominum fugere congressus, aut omissis officiis quae sunt foris peragenda, intra aedes me continere teneor, nisi quatenus humanitas, aut salutis meae cura, id moneat. Atque si quis in me versantem in rebus licitis, injuste impetum fecerit; recte me cum istius caede defendero. Immo, procaces istiusmodi et petulantes occidere, officium est hominum vitae amicissimum. Haec omnia sine condicto certamine fieri possunt.

Sin autem tanta rectores civitatum ceperit rei maximae incuria, ut ad civium famam, contra opprobria aut falsa crimina, defendendam, nullae sint idoneae leges, nulla judicia; atque si invaluerit mos, a barbaris et superstitiosis deductus seculis, ut infamis, novisque semper injuriis dignus habeatur, iisque sit obnoxius, qui propter opprobria quaedam [aut maledicta in se conjecta] [accepta], Edition: 1745; Page: [248] auctorem ad certamen condictum non provocaverit, aut ab altero qui se laesum putat provocatus, certamen detrectaverit: Certaminum ejusmodi crimen, in civitatis rectores praecipuè est conferendum; quamvis non prorsus immunes sint ipsi qui decertant; is praecipuè qui alterum provocavit. Alia enim plerumque ratione vir bonus famam tueri, et fortitudinem {etiam} ostendere poterit, [si qua aut bellum publicum ingruerit, aut] [ubi scil.] alter ipsum per vim aggressus fuerit.

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Unica forte de causa* justum esse potest, ab altera saltem parte, certamen sponte susceptum; ubi scil. hostis publicus potentior, προμαχοῦ cujusdam virtute fidens, foedus de pace conditionibus aequis reducenda, ea solum lege, nobiscum inire velit, si hic a nostrae gentis πρόμαχῳ in certamine victus fuerit. Res quidem graviores, quae solae bellorum justae sunt causae, duelli istiusmodi aleae committere dirimendas, saevum est et stolidum: quippe quae per arbitros melius dirimi poterant. Si vero hostis potentior in istiusmodi praelii eventum controversiam conjicere, neque eam leniore ratione dirimere velit; {is} maxime laudandus, qui ad majorem innocentium stragem praecavendam, patriam suo periculo defendere Edition: 1745; Page: [249] ea ratione conatur, quae spem ostendit maxime probabilem.

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CAPUT XVI: De Jure extraordinario ex Necessitate, omniumque Jure communi.

I. Officia ferè omnia sensu proximè, cuique monstrari et commendari, saepius jam dictum: inter varias item honesti species, naturalem esse ordinem; aliasque, quamvis per se pulchras, aliis pulchrioribus, et ad communem utilitatem momentum majus afferentibus, in contentione cedere: honestique praecipuam venustatem, in iis animi affectionibus et consiliis, quae maximae omnium utilitati inserviunt, elucere. Hinc efficitur, omnia privatorum jura, omnesque leges speciales, majori plurium utilitati, aut omnium communi, posthabendas. Quam vis igitur rationis {rectae} dictata, leges speciales appellatae, quasque libero quovis tempore migrare turpissimum, officia viro bono fere semper digna jubeant; tempore tamen mutato, nonnunquam commutatur officium; casusque quidam rariores, in ipsis legibus excepti intelliguntur.

Non igitur, premente necessitate, violandae Edition: 1745; Page: [250] leges naturales, aut iniqua et improba facienda. Immo qui exceptione utitur legitima, sibique concessa, aut legi paret sanctiori quae minus sanctae aliquid derogat, is eo ipso legi paret. Legum aut socialium ea sanctissima, quae singulorum, aut pauciorum saluti et utilitati, omnium communem anteponit.

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II. Quum vero hominis cujusque probi sensus, legum specialium vim et majestatem conservandam moneat; ab iis levi de causa minimè discedendum: neque levis est necessitas quae iis quicquam derogare [putanda est] [debet]. Non solum igitur, quae incommoda ex iis servatis continuò sequerentur, quaeque commoda praesentia ab iisdem deflectere suadeant, cautissimè circumspiciendum; verum praecipuè, sintne quaedam incommoda graviora, ex ea in causis similibus licentia omnibus permissa, <forent> in posterum metuenda. Ponamus, exempli gratia, aliquid quod latius pateat: quum tanta sit fidei et veritatis, sive in sermone, sive in commerciis rebusque contractis, religiosè observatae utilitas; et tanta pariter, ex conservato dominii jure, liberâque rerum suarum possessione et administratione cuique permissâ, oriatur vitae securitas et mutua fiducia; oportet gravissimae sint causae, ingentia mala avertenda, aut bona consequenda, quae justitiae Edition: 1745; Page: [251] regulis hisce quicquam derogabunt. Neque ad causas leviores extendi debet necessitatis favor: {etenim} prospicienda {etiam} graviora longê incommoda, quamvis remota, quae ex earum legum auctoritate de causa quavis leviore imminuta, sunt tandem nascitura. Excipiendi igitur casus tantùm gravissimi, ubi mala his omnibus incommodis graviora sunt avertenda; quibus casibus, qui leviores et magis consuetos annumeraret, improbus planè sit oportet et sceleratus.

Frustra dixeris, nullius utilitatis causâ facienda turpia et inhonesta. Nemo negat. Sed quaerimus, num casu quodam rariore, haec turpia sint et inhonesta? [Neque deliberandum,] [Non] an propter utilitatem deserenda sit honestas; sed, an non magnam utilitatem honestas nonnunquam sequatur? Neque magis attinet dicere, legi divinae semper adhaerendum; caetera, {rerum} eventus nempe, casusque futuros, judicii nostri non esse, eaque Deo permittenda. Haec {Philosophi} quidam minime mali, sed non satis acuti. Quaerimus enim, an in ipsa Dei lege hi casus excipiantur? et numnam exceptiones, eadem ratione, qua ipsae leges innotescant? Si nostri Edition: current; Page: [208] judicii non sint rerum eventus; neque sunt ipsae leges; quippe quas rerum eventus vitae hominum amicos aut inimicos prospiciendo indagamus. Primos Edition: 1745; Page: [252] enim animi impetus quosque, non esse solos vitae duces, inter omnes constat.

Hoc {quidèm} necessitatis obtentu, <forte> abutentur homines improbi, utilitati inhiantes, aut voluptatibus unicè dediti: non tamen sine ea morum pravitate et nequitia, quae nulla legum religione contineri posset. Homines itidem iracundi, ultionisque cupidiores, omni de violenta sui defensione doctrina abutentur. Non tamen idcirco vituperanda est omnis violenta sui defensio; neque magis vituperanda {igitur} omnis, a legum{, quibus plerumque parendum,} normâ, {in casibus rarioribus} declinatio. Temporibus saepius cedunt dominii privati jura: re alienâ, domino inconsulto, aut invito, uti licet, vel abuti, quum id exigit plurium conservatio; ut in jacturis faciendis, aedibusque incendii sistendi causa diruendis. Temporibus etiam nonnunquam cedunt jura sanctiora. Civibus fortissimis rectè imperatur ut, ad patriam tutandam, certae morti se objiciant. Ponte dejecto, aut portâ clausâ, quibus plerumque defendendi sunt omnes cives, hosti vel saevissimo objiciendi cives hectoridae. Splendido reique Romanae salutari mendacio nobilis est rex Hostilius. At plurimas habet lubrica haec doctrina cautiones.

III. {1.} In legibus duabus primariis de Edition: 1745; Page: [253] Deo colendo, et communi omnium utilitate promovenda, nullae sunt exceptiones. Immo quae in legibus specialibus valent exceptiones, in hac altera generali fundantur. Dei Edition: current; Page: [209] quidem cultus externus, nulli certo tempori necessariò alligatur.

2. Quo honestius est cujusque ingenium, eo minus ad exceptiones in leviore quavis causa sua admittendas, aut necessitatis veniam sibi arrogandam, erit proclivis.

3. Omnium quae ex juris hujusmodi insoliti usu, sive consecutione naturali, sive ex hominum pravitate et temeritate nascuntur, ratio habenda. Non tamen ut hominibus denegentur omnia jura, quorum speciem fallacem opponent improbi. Verum haec ipsa mala, ab hominum improbitate metuenda, ad calculos sunt vocanda: causisque tantum gravissimis exceptiones dandae; quibus, in rebus levioribus abutetur nemo, nisi ea sit pravitate et nequitia, ut legem quamvis notissimam violaturus esset.

4. Quo sanctior, vitaeque hominum utilior est lex, eo graviores oportet esse causas, ob quas danda exceptio.

5. Causae quae ex aliorum utilitate, aut omnium {communi} petuntur, iis quas quisquam ex sua aut suorum utilitate petit, longe sunt honestiores. De sua utilitate suoque jure aliquid remittere, viro bono saepe licet, Edition: 1745; Page: [254] saepe honestum est: communem vero utilitatem deserere non licet. “Temporibus igitur prudenter parendum.”

6. Nulla necessitas tanta est, ut cuivis, mala sibi imminentia, in alios immeritos conjicere, iisve avertendis, alios paribus aut gravioribus malis implicare liceat: huic enim adversatur utilitas communis.

7. Quaecunque damna, ad mala graviora a nobis nostrisque avertenda, in alios non consentientes conjicimus [damus], ea omnia praestare sanctissimè tenemur. Juri huic {mala nostra graviora aliorum levioribus redimendi} Edition: current; Page: [210] in libertate, extra ordinem singulis competenti, respondet in vita civili, imperii jus eminens; de quo aliàs.

IV. Ex communi hominum cognatione et caritate, jura quaedam communia nascuntur, quae non unius aut paucorum, sed omnium communi utilitati inserviunt [prospiciunt]: haec igitur, occasione datâ, cuique tuenda sunt et persequenda. {Ante} juris publici [explicationem haec ideo exponenda] [explicationi, horum explicatio ideo praemittenda], quod haec in libertate, ante civitates constitutas, {aequè} vigeant. Eorum pauca ponemus exempla quae latius pateant.

1. Cuique, occasione oblata, totique adeò humano generi, jus est prohibendi ne quisquam, sine justa causa e vita excedens, officia, humano generi, ejusve parti cuivis, Edition: 1745; Page: [255] debita defugiat. Prohibendum igitur [item], ne quis se ipse interimat; aut corpus mutilando vitae muneribus ineptum reddat.

2. Jus {omnium commune} est, perniciosos pessimique exempli mores coercendi [prohibendi], quamvis nemo quisquam, prae aliis, iis laedatur. Coercenda venus naturae repugnans et nefanda; partuum etiam abactiones, artesque omnes humano generi inimicae.

3. Impediendum {item}, ne quis res suas, quae vitae hominum plurimum prodesse possunt maligno perdat animo, aut inutiles perire sinat.

4. Omnibus et singulis jus est, injuriam alii cuivis inferendam propulsandi, illatamque vindicandi: poenas item in eos qui injuriam intentarunt irrogandi, quarum terrore isti, caeterique omnes, ad injurias tardiores reddantur.

5. Humano generi jus est prohibendi, ne, qui arcanum aliquod hominibus salutare invenerit, ejus notitiam secum interire sinat; eumque vel poenâ proposita cogendi, ut aequis legibus id cum aliis communicet, cunctisque quibus sit opus ejusdem usum impertiat.

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6. Hoc etiam abs quovis hominum, cui vires suppetunt, jure exigit humanum genus, nisi ipsi suppetat etiam rerum copia; ne se ignaviae dedat, liberalium et munificorum Edition: 1745; Page: [256] eleemosynam, iis qui se alere nequeunt, in suos usus iniquè praerepturus. Ad victum et amictum, arte aliqua licita, aut laboribus, parandum, istiusmodi fuci cogendi.

Perfecta videntur haec {quae diximus} jura, quae humano generi tanquam populo aut universitati competunt. Alia sunt imperfecta; quibus quae respondent officia, pudori cujusque et honestati permittenda; quae satis intelligi poterunt, ex iis quae de virtutibus diximus.*

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CAPUT XVII: De Juris <abolitione sive> interitu. De Litibus in Libertate dirimendis, et Interpretatione.

I. Tribus modis tolluntur obligationes: solutione illius quod debebatur; cessione in debitoris gratiam, idque vel gratis, vel ex causa onerosa; et conditionis defectu.

Rectè solvit vel ipse debitor, vel alius quilibet ipsius mandato, ipsiusve nomine, ita ut ipsius manifestè intersit, dummodo loco et tempore constituto fiat. Ubi {quidem} debitoris non interest; creditor alteri cuiquam, fortè inhumano, solvere volenti, actionem Edition: 1745; Page: [257] suam adversus debitorem cedere neutiquam tenetur. Haec tenenda [obtinent] ubi vel res certa, vel pecunia numeranda, vel opera quaevis vulgaris debebatur: quippe in quibus creditoris haud interest quis solvat. In iis autem, quae honoris causa praestantur operis, aut in quibus ingenii spectatur elegantia, secus se res habet.

In rebus item fungibilibus, iisve quarum pretia ad certam rei istiusmodi mensuram rediguntur, si [quidem utriusque] [modo] solutionis dies adest aut praeteriit, compensatio admittenda, ubi ad aequalem summam duo sibi mutuo creditores sunt{: immo pro concurrentis summae ratione, ex majore deducendum; ut tantum id quod reliquum est deberi censeatur}.

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2. Ad cessiones pertinent transactiones omnes, et obligationes quibus lites tolluntur: delegationes item, ubi vice sua debitor alium dat reum creditori consentienti, aut cui is jusserit: Condonationes etiam expressae vel tacitae; acceptilationes itidem; dissensus que mutuus.

3. Ob conditionis defectum, tollitur obligatio alterius partis perfidiâ; si modo pactum irritum fieri mallet altera, quam perfidum cogere ut promissis maneat. Mutato item statu, quae in eo fundata erat obligatio tollitur. Tempore dein exacto [elapso], dissolvuntur Edition: 1745; Page: [258] obligationes ad certum temporis terminum constitutae. Morte denique solvuntur obligationes, quae certos quosdam homines aut personas solùm respicientes, neque ad haeredes erant transmittendae, neque adversus haeredes valiturae. De quibus omnibus ex rei natura, aut ipso contractu, facilè constabit.

II. In libertate lites amica litigantium disceptatione optime dirimuntur; amicorum deinde communium, aut vicinorum officiis; puro denique sive absoluto compromisso, quo res viri probati arbitrio permittitur; idque vel secundum partium jura perfecta; vel ex aequo et bono, ut inter bonos benè agier.1 Hac posteriore via vir bonus suas cum vicinis controversias dirimi volet.

Viri cordati, nulla necessitudine arctiore contendentium alterutri devincti, quibusque nihil lucri accessurum est, quoquo modo lis dirimatur, arbitri eligendi. Qui, quum nulla ipsorum utilitate, neque gratiâ aut odio, ab aequo et bono abripiantur, quamvis ipsis contendentibus neque prudentiores sint neque aequiores, facilius tamen quae vera et aequa perspicere poterunt. Eorum arbitrio litigantibus standum, nisi doli {fortè} comperta sint indicia; pactum nempe aliquod de lite in alterutrius gratiam dirimendâ; Edition: current; Page: [214] aut adeo manifesta arbitrii iniquitas, ut Edition: 1745; Page: [259] dolum plane prodat: qualis arbitrii Romani inter Nolanos et Neapolitanos.{*} Levior enim iniquitas [si quae existat] [quaeque], probabili juris specie sussulta, compromissi obligationem neutiquam solvit.

Quod si arbitri neque ex litigantium [partium] confessione, syngraphis, aliisve istiusmodi documentis, verum eruere valeant; citandi testes, et jurisjurandi religione astringendi. De testibus primo videndum Cassianum illud, cui bono; et duo minimùm exigendi. Quamvis enim pro testium numero non augeatur fides, uniusque probi et spectati multum valeat testimonium; unus tamen, modo malitiosus, versutus, animique fidens, narrationem falsam ita callidè contexere poterit, ut nulla judicis arbitrive solertia adduci possit, ut secum discrepet, dolumque prodat. Duo vero aut plures, de iis omnibus rei judicandae adjunctis, quae neminem qui interfuit latere solent, (qualium ingens judici solertiori occurret numerus,) seorsum interrogati, si vel contraria plura testentur; vel eadem omnia aut recordari, aut oblivisci, prae se ferant; manifesta dabunt fraudis fallaciaeque indicia.

III. In vera promissorum, contractuum, testamentorum, legumque scriptarum sententia eruenda, interpretandi regulis opus Edition: 1745; Page: [260] est, ex arte grammatica, aut critica praecipuè depromendis.

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Imprimis monendum; qui paciscentis speciem prae se ferens, ea dedit signa, quae dare solent qui quicquam promittunt, eum ad id praestandum teneri, quamvis alia secretò secum tunc temporis agitantem. Neque aliter ulla esset commerciorum fides.

2. Verborum popularium et usitatorum ea est significatio quam usus confirmat, omissis causis aut vocum originibus; nisi adsint insuetae significationis [acceptionis] indicia.

3. Artium vocabula et nomina signata, ex peritorum definitionibus interpretanda.

4. Ubi orationis, aut scripti ejusdem, partes diversae sibi invicem lucem praeferre possunt, obscuriora [et dubia perspicuis aperienda] [per magis perspicua sunt explicanda].

5. Ubi absurdi aliquid aut secum pugnantis, verba sensu simplici et figura nudato [continere videntur] [continerent], [neutiquam verò si figurata habeantur] [quod tamen tolleretur, si figurat haberentur]: figurata omnino habenda.

6. In scripto istiusmodi, cujus partes priores nullum jus transferunt, in illum qui non et posterioribus consenserit, “posteriora prioribus derogant”: quod in testamentis, pactisque, quae cum eodem contrahuntur, obtinetur.

7. Ex materia, adjunctis, effectibus, et Edition: 1745; Page: [261] consequentibus, ad veram verborum sententiam dijudicandam indicia promuntur. Verus enim est sensus qui cum materia et adjunctis convenit, quique nihil absurdi secum trahit.

8. Ex paciscentium fine aut scopo cognito, atque ex legum ratione unicâ aut integra, optima petuntur ad pacta legesque interpretandas adjumenta [criteria].

9. Perinde etiam ut est materia favorabilis aut odiosa, porrigitur vel coarctatur verborum interpretatio.

IV. Ubi vero contendentium alter, aut uterque, suis fretus viribus, aut adversarii apud vicinos gratiam, aut astutiam metuens malitiosam, litem arbitris dirimendam permittere recusat; non aliud restat perfugium, quam ut jura sua [uterque cum amicorum auxilio] [quisque] per vim tueatur aut persequatur. Unde crebra in libertatis statu oriri bella necesse est, cum magno vicinorum incommodo et periculo saepe conjuncta. Quae ut praecaverentur Edition: current; Page: [216] mala, [utque] [hominum coetus] multi sub prudentiorum imperio, ad lites dirimendas, et exterorum vim ingruentem efficacius repellendam conjungerentur, credibile est homines ad civitates et imperia civilia constituenda confugisse.

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LIBER III: Oeconomices et Politices Elementa.Edition: 1745; Page: [v]

CAPUT I: De Conjugio.

I. Status liberi, ab ipsa natura constituti, obligationes et jura, in superiore libro explicata sunt: ad status adventitios, hominum facto aliquo aut contractu constitutos, nunc progredimur.

Status hi sunt vel domestici, qui paucorum, unius nempe familiae respiciunt utilitatem; vel publici, qui multorum utilitati inserviunt, civium nempe omnium in republica, aut plurium etiam civitatum.

De statu omni et necessitudine domestica agit ars Oeconomica; cujus elementa, tribus percurremus capitibus. Sunt et alii quidam status adventitii, eorum nempe qui ad arctiorem aliquam communitatem, in universitate, Edition: 1745; Page: [263] civili imperio subjecta, sunt consociati; quorum genera sunt infinita, neque in philosophia explicanda.

II. [Non ultra unius animalis aetatem, duraturum erat quodque animantium genus] [Unius tantum aetatis essent omnia animantium terrestrium genera], nisi hoc machinata fuisset natura, ut in omni genere mares forent et foeminae, procreandi vi et appetitu instructi, et praecipuâ quadam in procreatos curâ in eum finem donec se ipsi conservare possint. Mutis quidem animalibus conservandis nihil amplius {ferè} machinata est natura; quippe quae brevi et facili matrum cura conservari possunt et educari, neque ulla ab vivendum arte indigent; quum ab ipsa natura vestiantur, quaedam etiam armentur; pastumque iis copiosè, qui cuique aptissimus est, sponte submittat ipsa terra. Hominum autem vitae conservandae et excolendae, Edition: current; Page: [218] artes exiguntur plurimae et inventa. Delicatiora enim sunt hominibus corpora, exquisitiore victu et cultu tuenda; animique artium jucundissimarum capaces. Provido igitur naturae consilio, diutius manet eorum soboles tenera et invalida, adultorum sedulâ egens et continua curâ; ut eo facilius ab adultis regatur, atque prius, artibus variis, et disciplinis, ad vitam commode degendam inservientibus, imbuatur, quam vires intractabiles adipiscatur. Edition: 1745; Page: [264]

Gravi huic et necessario muneri explendo, quod etiam per στοργὴν insitam utrique parenti natura imposuit, quum impares {plerumque} sint matres; utriusque labores, et curae diuturnae exiguntur: quae tolerabiles non erunt, nisi parentibus mutuo amore et stabili amicitia conjunctis: quum et nova subinde iis nascitura erit soboles, {quae} eadem curâ per magnam vitae partem prorogatâ, conservanda erit. Muneri huic pergravi alacrius procurando et obeundo, maribus et foeminis miros inseruit natura amores; quos magis accendit virtutum in moribus, atque ipsa forma, significatio, quam illa caeca, et cum mutis animalibus communis, corporum miscendorum libido. Monstrant hi amores non aliter sobolem humanam esse propagandam, quam a parentibus fida et constanti amicitia, <conjunctis> et firmo {etiam} de continua vitae consuetudine et communis sobolis curâ, foedere conjunctis [devinctis]. Omnis enim fida amicitia perpetuitatem expetit: quaeque a certo temporis termino pendet, aut ab eventis quae conjuges fidissimi nequeunt praestare, nulla est.

[III.] Conjugum hi amores, et στοργὴ; a natura insita, ostendunt notandum esse Platonem et alios quosdam minime malos; quibus, a naturâ, et communi etiam utilitate, audacius recedentibus, placuit, per prolem, neutri Edition: current; Page: [219] Edition: 1745; Page: [265] parentum agnoscendam, civitates suas esse reficiendas; ut {scilicet} avertantur incommoda quaedam, viâ multò leniore et gratiore praecavenda. Nullae quippe leges, nulli mores eousque valere poterunt, ut in parentibus de sua sobole incertis, omnique στοργὴ; vacuis, idoneam communis sobolis curam excitarent. Quod etiam si fieri possit, gravatissime tamen ab iis praestarentur haec officia, in sobole {incerta} conservanda et educanda, molestissima, quae in sobole certâ, per στοργὴν, fiunt levia et jucunda. [Incognita] [Sublata cognitione] insuper sobole, tollitur gravissimum omnis diligentiae et industriae invitamentum. Quin et in civitate sua Plato, ob causam non satis idoneam nec ad intelligendum facilem, civium paucorum tantum et praestantiorum habuit rationem, caeteris longe pluribus neglectis, et miserae servituti subjectis.

Quid, quod etiam incommoda, ex [eo quod cuique nota sit sua soboles] [sua cujusque sobolis cognitione], metuenda, per leges de juniorum educatione accuratiore, de testamentis, et successionibus, melius praecaveri poterant. Neque cognitae sanguinis junctioni adscribendae sunt hae seditiones, et factiones crebrae, quibus civitates saepe videmus vexatas. Tollenda pariter foret et omnis amicitia; aut major {certè} in amicis aut Reipub. partibus eligendis, Edition: 1745; Page: [266] prudentia hominibus tribuenda, quam, in liberis et cognatis educandis, aut haeredibus instituendis, iisdem tribuit Plato.

De multorum imbecillitate, quos tamen haeredes instituendos suaderet στοργὴ, metus est inanis. Invalidis saepe valida est soboles; validisque, invalida; sive animum spectes sive corpus. Neque ut omnes cives vel robusti vel solertes sint, ulli civitati opus est: saepe etiam ingenio et virtute pollent, quibus exiguae sunt corporis vires.

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IV. Non igitur hujusmodi malorum metu, tot et tantae ipsius naturae commendationes negligendae: sed potius rectae rationis dictata omnia et praecepta, monstrantia qua demum ratione fida in conjugio amicitia, ad sobolem educandam necessaria, conservari possit, naturae leges censeri debent. Coërcenda igitur non solum venus nefanda, in Deum naturamque contumax, hominumque generi pestifera; verum et concubitus vagi, quos nullum de amica vitae consuetudine antecesserat foedus, quippe qui promiscuè permissi, juniorum et animos perderent et corpora; sobolem incertam, omnique patrum cura destitutam, propagarent; matresque incautas ab omni honesta vitae conditione exclusas, ad infamiam, inediam, omniaque flagitia projicerent. Atque Edition: 1745; Page: [267] utinam patribus, talium flagitiorum auctoribus, eadem inureretur infamia.

Matrimonium inire tenentur adulti, quibus ad familiam, pro ipsorum conditione, alendam, facultates suppetunt; quique ea sunt prudentiâ quae familiae, regendae, sobolique educandae, est necessaria; nisi officiis honestioribus et hominum generi utilioribus distineantur. Turpe quidem est cuivis, sine gravi causa, curas et officia humano generi, pro suis partibus praestanda, detrectasse.

V. Foederis conjugialis [ineundi] leges hae sunt praecipuae. Prima, “ut foemina viro castum servet cubile”: quum nihil magis nefarium sit, aut injuriosum, quam foetum viro supponere adulterinum [spurium], bonorum haeredem; et στοργὴν, verae tantum soboli debitam, dolosè intervertere.

2. Altera est lex, “ut parem uxori vir servet fidem.” Iniquissimum enim foret, ut uxoris amores conjugiales, et curae omnes, {unà cum dote,} uni viro ejusque soboli devoveantur, quum {interea} viri amores, uxori primae Edition: current; Page: [221] ejusque soboli debiti, a nova quavis uxore, aut pellice, earumque sobole interversi, {cum re etiam familiari} dispertiantur<, ejusque bona inter omnes dividenda permittantur,>.

Cohibendi igitur viri, ne plures simul habeant uxores; non ideo solùm quod iniquum Edition: 1745; Page: [268] sit; verum quod omnem tollat e conjugio amicitiam; contentiones alat perpetuas; foeminas injuriosiùs tractatas, adulteriis objiciat; virorum animos vagis pervertat libidinibus, et ἄστοργους reddat; sobolem quibusdam submittat nimis numerosam, et ideo negligentius educandam, nullaque in parentem dissolutum pietate imbutam. Quinetiam, quum mares foeminis numero pares conservet Dei providentia; {siquidem viris plures simul habere uxores liceret,} plurimi a conjugio et sobole suscipienda excluderentur, humanis immunes vinculis, quibus praecipue colligantur societates; neque tamen {inde} populus fieret numerosior.1

3. Lex tertia est; “ut voluntatum et studiorum conjunctione, familiae communis prosperitati, liberis praecipuè <vero> communibus educandis et amplificandis, prospiciant.”

Ut ad has leges observandas sint homines paratiores, a primis annis colenda est et fovenda ea verecundia, et pudicitia, quam ingenuo cuique altè infixit ipsa natura. Damnanda igitur omnis in sermone aut moribus obscoenitas, et impudica lascivia; quae pudorem minuit, et verecundiae laxat vincula, quibus continentur juniores, foeminae praecipuè, ne vitae se miserae et infami objiciant.

4. Est et quarta {conjugii} lex; “ut foedus Edition: 1745; Page: [269] sit perpetuum, sola morte solvendum”; quod et verae amicitiae necessarium, postulatque fere sobolis, pro bona vitae parte nasciturae, educatio diuturna, utrique parenti [a natura commendata] [imposita]. Ab omni etiam humanitate abhorreret, conjugem repudiare amantem et fidelem, propter causas cum nulla turpitudine Edition: current; Page: [222] conjunctas; sterilitatem, nempè, aut valetudinem infirmam; aut casum tristem, a nemine mortalium praestandum, et repudiandae pariter deflendum; liberorum scil. communium interitum.

Quod ad imperium attinet, aut propriam aliquam potestatem conjugum alteri permittendam, amori ea omnis adversari videtur conjugiali, qui aequam potius commendat societatem. Neque quicquam aliud viris potiores tribuere videtur partes, quam quod gravioribus plerumque muneribus obeundis sint aptiores, quibus [postponenda] [cedere debunt] minus gravia, domi ab uxoribus obeunda.

Leges quatuor jam memoratae, adeo sunt necessariae, ut si quae his derogent pacta, quamvis iis temere consenserint vir et uxor, ea tamen sunt irrita.* Est igitur matrimonium, Edition: 1745; Page: [270] “foedus inter marem et foeminam, de individuo vitae consortio, et sobole suscipienda et educanda, initum.”

VI. Matrimonii impedimenta, vel offendunt contractum a primo {nullum aut} irritum fuisse, vel prius ratum rumpunt. Prioris generis quaedam sunt naturalia, quaedam moralia.

In naturalium numero, praeter manifestam infirmitatem corporis ad conjugium plane inhabilis, sunt pravitates quaedam insignes, et morbi saeviores et insanabiles, quae amicae vitae societati, aut sobolis vitalis procreationi repugnant; quales sunt fatuitas perpetua aut insania, lepra, aliique ejusmodi. Aetas deinde admodum provecta, {foeminae praesertim,} irritum reddit cum juniore initum conjugium. Si quidem {vir et foemina ambo} Edition: current; Page: [223] aetate provectiores, de convictu amico inter se paciscantur, nihil impedit. Tertium est impedimentum, si alterutrius aetas ita sit immatura, ut non adsit obligationi constituendae necessarius rationis usus. Absurdum enim est, ut quibus, nulla alia in re, pacto quovis se obligare, per aetatem permittitur, Edition: 1745; Page: [271] in hac tamen longe gravissima iisdem liceat. Haec omnia legibus civilibus sunt sancienda.

Moralia, quae contractum a primo non obligasse ostendunt, impedimenta, censentur, contractus prior, et nimis arcta sanguinis conjunctio.

Quod ad prius attinet: si qui, mala utrinque fide, novum ineant contractum, prioris cum tertio initi non ignari; pactum irritum est, et paciscentes justis poenis se reddunt obnoxios. Ubi quidem unius tantum intervenerat dolus, ita alteri favendum, ut ob promissionem aut contractum clandestinum, non {eo invito} abrumpendum sit matrimonium perfectum, quod insecutus est convictus: prout in aliis negotiis, priora jura personalia cedunt juri reali: istiusmodi dolosis tamen poenae irrogandae. Ne vero etiam post matrimonia perfecta fraudibus sit locus, palam ante denuncianda omnia quae conficiuntur, et confectorum continuò publica fieri debet denunciatio.

An jure etiam naturali nuptias impediat arctior sanguinis nexus, altioris est indaginis. Inter parentes et liberos, {sive} in linea recta, quae dicitur, ascendentes et descendentes, in infinitum, nuptias {omninò} prohibere videtur lex naturalis; non solum ob aetatum discrimen insigne, verum multo magis, Edition: 1745; Page: [272] quod amor et consuetudo conjugialis, ei adversetur {erga parentes} venerationi, quam liberis inseruit ipsa natura, et {educatio} confirmavit. De nuptiis consanguineorum in linea transversa, quas adferunt rationes viri docti, vix quicquam affirmant. Quia vero apud plurimas Edition: current; Page: [224] gentes{*} legis Judaicae ignaras, ejusmodi nuptiae habebantur impurae et nefariae, credibile est et eas in prima mundi aetate, lege aliqua positiva, cujus diu manserunt vestigia, fuisse a Deo vetitas. Ea autem lex hoc praecipue spectasse videtur, ut familiae gentesque plurimae ea devinciantur caritate et benevolentia, quae ex affinitate et sanguinis conjunctione oriri solet. Aliis forte [etiam sobolis nasciturae commoditatibus] [commoda hominibus nascituris] prospexit Deus, eo quod gentes varias, conjugiis inter se misceri jussit.

Jure Civili, ut Christianorum etiam moribus, prohibentur nuptiae omnibus qui sunt intra quartum gradum: et in hunc modum computantur gradus: consanguineis communis fuerat stirps aliqua, a qua quot intervenerant utrinque generationes totidem sunt gradus. Simili etiam ratione, quisque cum prioris conjugis cognatâ, intra quartum gradum, qui dicitur affinitatis, matrimonium contrahere prohibetur. Jus vero canonicum Edition: 1745; Page: [273] eadem retinens verba, longius multo nuptiarum impedimenta aut prohibitiones porrigit, gradus numerando [supputando] secundum generationes in linearum tantum alterâ, ea quidem longiore, ubi non sunt aequales; adeo ut reapse prohibeantur nuptiae inter eos qui sunt intra septimum juris civilis gradum.

VII. Causae ob quas rumpuntur matrimonia, sunt legum praecipuarum violationes: adulterium scil. aut obstinata desertio; capitalia item odia, et injuriae atrociores, omnem amicitiae in posterum, aut tuti convictûs et jucundi, spem adimentes. Soluto has ob causas matrimonio, in conjugem infidelem, et scelerum participes, graviore supplicio animadvertendum est; quum injuriae in conjugio illatae, damna dent graviora, atque altiora mentibus infigant vulnera, quam quae extremis [capitalibus] coërcentur suppliciis, furta et rapinae. Alteri vero conjugi novum inire licet omnino matrimonium; nihil enim iniquius esset, quam ob acceptam injuriam, lege etiam novam inferre, innocentibus a matrimonio cohibitis, atque a sobolis Edition: current; Page: [225] novae suscipiendae solatio. Neque conjugi nocenti, si modo vitâ frui permittatur, adimenda est connubii ineundi potestas, nisi fortè cum sceleris socio. Permittantur isti nuptiae, saltem cum iis qui similibus delictis sunt infames. Edition: 1745; Page: [274]

Quae in Evangelio habentur sententiae, repudia omnia, solâ adulterii causa excepta,* prohibentes, sunt omnino ellipticae; quales et illae quae omne vetant jusjurandum. Damnant scil. omnes quae apud Judaeos admissae erant causas, eâ unicâ exceptâ. Aliam vero diserte ostendit {D.} Paulus, apertissima ratione, et latius patente, confirmatam; desertionem nempe in qua obstinato animo perseveratum est.

In conjugio officia fido et constanti amore, omnique morum comitate, una cum prudenti rei familiaris curâ, continentur. Quibus praecipue inserviet omnis virtutis cultura, mansuetudinis praecipue et patientiae; atque ut uterque perturbatis animi motibus, quos negotia saepe excitabunt domestica, modum ponere assuescat. His sine virtutibus, vix gratus esse poterit convictus continuus, rerumque omnium societas. Quibus autem rationibus augeri possit res familiaris, ab iis petendum qui in artibus versantur quaestuosis. Edition: 1745; Page: [275]

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CAPUT II: De Parentum et Liberorum Officiis.

I. Quum diu infirma maneat hominum soboles, se conservare nescia, aliorumque continua egens tutela, ut iis artibus et moribus quorum in vita est usus imbuatur; hoc onus parentibus apertè imposuit Deus et natura, eximiam inserendo procreatorum curam. Tributa est igitur parentibus ea omnis potestas quam haec exigit tutela; eique liberos subjectos esse voluit natura. Ea parentum curâ et amore, satis plerumque cautum est liberorum tempestivae manumissioni et libertati, quippe sine quâ beatè vivere nequeunt, cui rei parentes praecipue studere solent.

Consilii in liberis immaturis inopia, quique parentibus infixus est amor gratuitus, duo parentum potestatis fundamenta, eam ostendunt haud esse perpetuam; at tum demum desinere quum adoleverit eorum aetas et prudentia. Manet tamen idem parentum amor, ad omnia eos excitans officia, quibus liberos adultos, vel ope vel consilio juvare possunt.

Ostendunt et eadem omnia, potestatem hanc ad supplicia quaevis graviora, quae aetatis Edition: 1745; Page: [276] tenerae haud exigere potest tutela, neutiquam esse porrigendam; multo minus ad vitam, aut omnem libertatem tollendam. Nullo jure egerit parens qui liberos in perpetuam vendiderit servitutem, aut onere quovis praegraverit, ultra impensarum modum quae in iis educandis, viro prudenti erogandae viderentur.

II. Utrique etiam parenti pariter commissa est haec potestas; nisi quod in re familiari administranda, potiores paulo sunt patris partes: eo tamen defuncto aut absente, omnem eam potestatem jure sibi vindicabit mater.

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Nugantur {isti} omnes qui potestatem hanc in sola fundari volunt{*} procreatione; ridiculè secuti, in re dissimillimâ, jurisconsultorum axiomata, de rerum inanimarum specificationibus, et accessionibus, vel de pecorum foeturâ, quae nullum habent rationis usum, jurisve notitiam. Dei planè arte fabricata sunt liberorum et corpora et mentes, ut in aequalem vitae conditionem, et aequi juris usum tandem perveniant, licet aliquamdiu aliorum prudentia sint regendi. {Etenim} rerum dominia aliaque jura habent liberi, ab omni parentum potestate exempta; qui non aliud, in liberorum bona aliunde derivata, jus habent, quam tutores. {Hanc} a natura sibi Edition: 1745; Page: [277] commissam tutelam qui abdicaverit, prolem exponendo aut negligendo, omnem {is} abdicat potestatem cum ea tutela conjunctam: quam omnem sibi acquisiverit, quisquis prolem abjectam alere voluerit et educare.

Liberis praebere tenentur parentes, idque sanctissimè, non solum necessaria vitae praesidia, verum et ornamenta; eorumque uberiori foelicitati studere: praecipue vero, et doctrinâ et exemplo, mores eorum ad omnem virtutem conformare; citra quam liberis vita erit infoelix et ignominiosa [erubescenda], quantumvis rerum externarum copia abundet.

Quae erogant parentes in liberos queis nullae aliunde sunt facultates, ea donare intelliguntur; atque calculos ita subducere, ut ob victum et amictum pretium exigatur, nisi magna premuntur ipsi parentes inopia, ab omni abhorreret humanitate. Premente vero egestate, aut ubi liberis aliunde pervenerant opes, parentes omnia in liberos prudenter erogata jure reposcunt; eaque parenti egeno, liberi, etiam laboribus suis, praestare tenentur. Quantumvis igitur, pro communi parentum affectione [affectu], recte intelligatur, Edition: current; Page: [228] liberorum non minus quam sui causâ, parentes rem comparasse familiarem, unde et liberorum ad parentum haereditates succedendi jus innotescit; non tamen eo minus, Edition: 1745; Page: [278] immo eo magis sancta est liberorum ad gratiam habendam et referendam obligatio: quo firmior enim, quo magis gratuita, atque ab ipsa natura profecta est amicitia et benevolentia, eo pluris est aestimanda, eoque major debetur gratia.

III. Parentum potestas legibus civilibus augeri potest, ut et ea quae magistratibus quibuslibet data est. {Etenim} imperium civile diversis causis innixum, et majora omnia spectans, pertinet ultra imperii parentalis fines. Quasi enim ex contractu, {imperatorum potestas} ad ea omnia recte extenditur, quae ab iis merito flagitari possunt, qui, ob communem plurium utilitatem consociati, omnium consilio et viribus proteguntur, cunctaque vitae civilis commoda et ornamenta sortiuntur, quique haec omnia posteris tradere sanctissimè tenentur. Jure [Minores] igitur <aut> pupilli obsides tradi possunt exteris; ad extrema etiam pericula adeunda, quum civitatis hoc exigit salus, rectè adiguntur.

IV. Liberi quamvis adulti, ad pietatem in parentes observantiamque, et ad gratiam referendam, sanctissime tenentur; non solum ob parentum merita, quibus {digna} rarò liberi [rependere] [vicem reddere] possunt; verum, ut Deum sequantur ducem et naturam, qui nos his parentibus ortos, cumque his sanguine, caritate, et veneratione ab incunabulis inchoatâ, Edition: 1745; Page: [279] conjunctos esse voluerunt. Eorum igitur mores, parum licet commodos, amicissimè ferre decet; prout et illi, olim, nostros diu pertulerunt. In matrimonio praecipuè contrahendo, parentum auctoritatem sequi tenentur liberi; quum parentum multum intersit, quibus liberi, in vitae communitate omnium arctissima, se adjungant; unde nascituri sunt nepotes, ineorum Edition: current; Page: [229] jura et nomina saepe, semper in στοργὴν, successuri.

Parentum imperium saepe excipit potestas patrisfamilias; quae tanta est, quantam, suo consensu, vel palam declarato vel tacitò, eam fecerunt liberi adulti, aut alii, qui sua sponte, potestatis quam arrogavit conscii, in ipsius degunt domo.

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CAPUT III: De Herorum et Servorum Jure.

I. Aucto hominum genere, subinde extiterunt plures suis {solùm} laboribus alendi, quibus nempe nulla rerum necessariarum erat [suppetebat] aliunde copia; alii vero <fuere> opulenti, plurium ministerio et operis, ad vitam [faciliùs agendam] [faciliorem], indigentes. Hinc orta est conditio servilis, pactis innixa. Quae utrum a primo perpetua fuerat, an temporaria, parum attinet exquirere; quum utrobique, excepta diuturnitate [duratione], eadem fuere jura et obligationes, quae sequuntur sunt magis ad rem: Edition: 1745; Page: [280]

1. Sani hominis et validi labores et operae longe pluris sunt aestimandae, quam ipsius victus simplicior et amictus: quippe videmus istiusmodi homihnes operis suis, aliquid etiam ad voluptatem et ornatum, aut ad familiam alendam, comparare. Si quis igitur incautus nihil ultra victum et amictum, pro operis suis fuerat stipulatus; ex eo contractu, utpote apertè oneroso, jure pleno{*} exigere potest ut quod deest ad aequalitatem ipsi suppleatur.

2. Ubi nihil de operarum genere diserte convenit, intelligitur servum sibi suscepisse eas solum operas, quas heri non inhumani a servis solent exigere; seque hero modicè castigandum permisisse, quoties cessaverit, aut familiae statum turbaverit. Caetera omnia hominum jura naturalia aut adventitia ipsi servo manent intacta.

3. Si quidem satis innotuerit, in moribus esse, patresfamilias sejunctos [segreges], in domesticos suos imperium aliquod civile sibi arrogare; huic etiam, quousque non ab humanitate abhorret, servum se subjecisse merito colligitur. Servi quidèm operas jure exigit herus; caetera retinet jura servus, quae cuivis ex populo manent sub imperio civili; omnia certe jura naturaliaquae Edition: current; Page: [231] alienari nequeunt: et ad omnem vim iis defendendis necessariam, Edition: 1745; Page: [281] contra herum ea violaturum, recte procurrit.

4. Ubi de certis tantum operis pactum fuit, ad has solas obligatur servus. Quin imo, licet quascunque praestare posset operas susceperit, easque perpetuas; non tamen idcirco dominus eum invitum alteri emancipare poterit: quum servi plurimum intersit cui serviat domino, et in quâ domo. Servorum autem hujusmodi omnium libera nascitur proles.

II. Hactenus de servitute sponte contracta. Deterior longe istiusmodi servorum conditio, qui ob grave damnum a se datum, quod alia nequeunt pensare [compensare] ratione, aut qui ob delictum atrox, poenae nomine, ad perpetuas operas <praestandas> addicuntur.

Neque tamen vel hi omnia hominum amittunt jura: ea enim sola, quae damno reparando inserviunt, quibusve ne similes in posterum injuriae inferantur caveri poterit, ipsis adimenda. In sceleratissimos, si modo ipsorum vitae parcatur, postquam, ad omnes a similibus delictis deterrendos, publicas poenas pertulerunt, non est ultra saeviendum, quum labores ipsis impositos non detrectant. Immo juris quicquid ipsis manet, recte per vim defendent. Quum vero in servitute his de causis constituenda, aliorum tantum spectetur utilitas, herus istiusmodi servum invitum, ad alterum transferre potest. Edition: 1745; Page: [282] Nulla vero de causa, ex hominum numero, in belluarum, aut rerum inanimarum ordinem, servi jure detrudi possunt, ita ut nullius juris sint participes.

In hanc deterrimam conditionem, omnes in bello captos detruserunt olim gentes haud caetera barbarae, {temerè in semet legem sancientes iniquissimam, atque} mirum in modum conspirantes ad gravissimas contumelias Edition: current; Page: [232] et aerumnas, sibi fortè, aut posteris, olim arcessendas. Qua de re hi veri videntur aphorismi.{*}

1. Qui injustam in bello causam tuetur, nullum in res aut homines captos jus acquirit, quo salva fide et justitia uti possit, quamvis rebus captis impune frui liceat; quod jure quodam munitur externo; de quo alias.{}

2. Qui justam habuit belli causam, intra justos tamen petendi fines se continere debet: neque quicquam a victis exigere <potest> nisi vel poenae nomine, vel damni reparandi; vel ut in posterum de non laedendo caveatur.{}

3. Poenae nomine nihil ab iis exigi potest qui nihil ad bellum attulerunt, vel faciendo vel non faciendo secus quam debebant; quae longe plurium civium adultorum est causa: ne de uxoribus dicamus et liberis, qui duas aut tres conficiunt civitatis cujusque Edition: 1745; Page: [283] partes; quibusque bonorum omnium dominium cum patribus familias est commune. Nec, si tributa in belli sumptus pependerant patres familias, ullo ob id crimine sunt obstricti. Haec sub gravi solverant necessitate, per vim alias et supplicia extorquenda. Quamvis etiam, speciosis permoti rationibus a principibus suis denunciatis, bello consenserant; invicta erat ferè eorum ignorantia: neque quicquam eorum consensus ad bellum attulit, neque dissensus bellum prohibuisset: neque adeo arcta est conjunctio quaevis politica, ut unius delictum in alterum non consentientem transferri debeat.

4. [6.]1 Quod ad ipsos attinet milites, qui consiliorum publicorum neque participes, neque fautores, speciosis illecti causis nomina dederunt; illis ob Edition: current; Page: [233] ignorantiam, et parendi necessitatem, venia danda. Conscriptis enim imperata detrectare facinus est capitale. Ab illis igitur, poenae nomine, quicquam gravius exigere inhumanum esset; si modo ab iisdem in posterum satis caveri possit: quod, illaesa eorum libertate, eos apud se detinendo, aut in civitatem suam aut colonias adscribendo, victor semper sibi poterit praestare. Quae omnia suaderet humanitas, {bellique casus ancipites,} et fortunae bellicae maxima inconstantia.

5. [4.] Non alio juris fundamento quicquam Edition: 1745; Page: [284] a civibus innoxiis postulat victor, damni reparandi nomine, quam quod substernitur actichonibus noxalibus et de pauperie; quod scil. qui quaedam suae utilitatis praesidia sibi adscivit, ex quibus alii nullâ suâ culpâ damnum sunt passi, is vel damnum sarcire, vel, si malit, rem damnosam laeso dedere teneatur. Jure igitur aliquando a victis civibus id exigit victor, ut ipsorum deserant principes, belli injusti auctores; aut eos damna reparare cogant, aut ipsi ea reparent. Horum autem victis danda optio. Haec quidem de iis civibus qui imperia {civilia} primi constituerunt; aut de potentioribus, quorum auctoritate et consilio injustum bellum erat susceptum; quique poterant principes injusta molientes cohibuisse, apertius tenent: caeterorum, qui parum in Republica possunt, favorabilior est in ipso damno praestando causa.

6. [5.] Ubi primum vero hostes vel sponte victori damna data repararunt, vel ipse victor, rebus eorum per vim occupatis, damnorum compensationem est consecutus, una cum cautione in posterum, ad viri probi arbitrium; nihil amplius a civibus devictis exigere potest. Haec vero omnia, leniore multò ratione assequi possunt victores, quam adempta civibus innoxiis libertate. Ad damna [haec] autem praestanda primòtenentur qui imperio praesunt; his vero cessantibus, tenentur cives. Edition: 1745; Page: [285]

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7. Servorum omnium sobolem esse naturâ liberam, satis antea ostendimus.{*}

8. Qui hominem [servum] emit, aut <eum> emptum {in servitute} vi detinet, ipsius est ostendere eum jure libertatem amisisse. {Rei de qua disceptatur} antiquus semper adest dominus; quum adultos quosque sui juris constituat natura. Possessoris igitur violenti est probare se jure possidere; non [liberale judicium implorantis, ostendere] [servi, probare propositionem negantem] se non jure libertatem amisisse.

9. Neque dixeris, captivos nisi vendi possent, interemptum iri, ideoque vitam ipsam emptoribus debere. Esto. Hinc tamen non alia emptoribus nascuntur jura, quam quae negotium utile gerenti, aut vitam civis contra latrones defendenti, aut captum a piratis redimenti, aut morbos et vulnera graviora, sine ope medicâ lethalia, sananti. His omnibus impensae, et laborum curaeque pretia, quodque aequius melius, sunt persolvenda: nullum tamen imperii herilis jus inde nasci potest.

III. Ut servi cujusque, qui jure alteri subjicitur, officium est, strenuam et fidam, domino, aut hero potius, operam praestare; Deumque communem omnium dominum, omnia intuentem, in omni ministerio praecipuè respicere: ita domini est, nihil ultra Edition: 1745; Page: [286] juris sui limites a servo exigere, atque ab omni abstinere saevitia, ut decet hominem, communis cognationis, humanaeque conditionis instabilis memorem; quique novit animos servorum et corpora, eâdem, qua nostra, materiâ constare, et paribus elementis; Deoque, communi omnium parenti, et domino, vitae actae rationem esse reddendam.

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CAPUT IV: De Civitatum Origine et Causis.

I. De domesticis societatibus [hactenus.] [satis dictum:] ad civitatum causas et jura explicanda progredimur. Per societates et conjunctiones jam memoratas, si nemo suo deesset officio, copiosa satis esset hominum vita et jucunda. Ad civitates igitur et imperia civilia constituenda [impulit metus] [permoti fuerunt homines metu] malorum quae vel ex hominum imbecillitate vel improbitate oriri possent. Haud tamen idcirco naturae contraria dicenda est vita civilis: quicquid enim monstrabit ea ratio quam nobis natura inseruit, ad mala prohibenda, aut commoda consequenda, necessarium esse aut utile, illud omne est maxime secundum animantis providi et sagacis naturam. Jure igitur dicuntur homines ϕύσει ζῶα πολιτικὰ.

Fingamus autem omnes ita esse probos, ut ea sola consultò velint <aut cupiant>, quae ipsis justa videntur; erroribus tamen de suo et aliorum Edition: 1745; Page: [287] jure, suae utilitatis appetitione et perturbationum impetu {deceptos}, saepe esse obnoxios: lites hinc saepe exsurgere necesse esset. Fingamus et plures esse ita suspiciosos, ut lites ortas arbitris permittere nollent, timentes quisque alterius gratiam, aut artes, quibus arbitros corrumpere posset. Huc si accedat nimia utrinque virium suarum fiducia, et in sua sententiâ Edition: current; Page: [236] tuendâ pervicacia, non sine saevis belli malis lites in libertate dirimentur.

Quin et imperia civilia hominibus propius commendavit ipsa natura. Mortalium nonnulli caeteris multo sunt solertiores; quod et caeteri non raro fatebuntur: poterunt hi solertiores et sagaciores plurima in communem excogitare utilitatem, omnium viribus exsequenda; poterunt et optimas monstrare rationes, quibus sibi quisque et suis consulere posset, si modo eorum monitis paruerint. Quod si {his ingenii viribus et} solertiae conjunctae sint virtutes praeclarae, bonitas, justitia, fortitudo; earum significatio fidem apud omnes conciliabit, et omnium accendet studia, ad viros his ornatos virtutibus, honoribus et potestate ornandos et amplificandos; hisque auctoribus, foelicia omnia et laeta arbitrabuntur se consecuturos. Ad civitates igitur constituendas non solum injuriarum metus, verum et virtutes hominum egregiae, Edition: 1745; Page: [288] et naturalis virtutum comprobatio, plurimum contulisse videtur.

II. Si vero etiam spectetur plurium improbitas, morumque depravationes, avaritia, ambitio, luxuries; tum vero patebit sine potestate civili, hominum non modo utilitati, et foelicitati, sed nedum saluti, satis consuli posse: eâque solâ, malis hisce ab hominum vitiis oriundis, optimum, et in improvidi et incauti cujusque oculos incurrens, remedium adhiberi. In magno enim concilio, quamvis ita vigeat injustitia, ut occasione oblata, quisque suicausa, injusta ageret; idem tamen alium {sui ordinis} moribus parem, eademque peragentem, si modo ipse nullum inde capiat fructum, odio habebit et damnabit. Ab istiusmodi igitur hominum concilio, alîus cujusque improbitatem damnantium, quamvis suae quisque secretò indulgeret, nunquam leges condentur iniquae. Quemque suam profiteri injustitiam pudebit; et sibi quisque ab aliorum metuet improbitate, nisi justis et aequis Edition: current; Page: [237] legibus, et poenâ repraesentata, coërceantur.

Neque alia ratione hominibus satis caveri poterit. Licet enim non adeo depravati essent homines, plurimosque incitaret humanitas et recti honestique sensus, ad vicinos ab injuriis defendendos; <illi> ex metu tamen aut ignavia saepe hoc desererent officium, ubi Edition: 1745; Page: [289] cum periculo esset conjunctum. Quinetiam ipsorum fortium et proborum multitudo, nisi uno regatur consilio, pro diversis, de opis ferendae ratione, sententiis, et quorundam pertinaciâ, in diversa omnia abiret; disjunctaque et discors, paucioribus et minus strenuis conjunctis praedae esset et ludibrio.

His {libertatis solutae} incommodis perspectis, credibile est, prudentiores et sagaciores hoc praecipuum excogitasse remedium, ut magnus hominum numerus inter se paciscantur, de societate ineunda, in singulorum, communemque omnium salutem et utilitatem, communi prudentiorum consilio regenda: cujus commoditatibus palam expositis, alios etiam sibi socios adscivisse{, iisque societatis arctioris ineundae auctores extitisse}.

III. Qui civitatum originem ambitiosorum adscribunt violentiae; id [quidem] [jam antea, alia ratione] factum statuunt, [ante eam vim, quam ejusdem causam esse volunt] [cujus de prima origine & causa anquirunt]. Nemo enim unus, sine plurium antea sibi subjectorum ope, hominum multitudinem, civitati constituendae idoneam, sibi poterat subjicere. Constituta igitur fuit civitas, ante eam vim cui primum civitatum ortum adscribunt.

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Si quis dixerit, patremfamilias opulentum, suis et domesticorum viribus vicinos sibi subjicere potuisse: Esto. At non nomina, sed Edition: 1745; Page: [290] res ipsae sunt spectandae. Regio enim imperio nonnunquam utebantur patresfamilias opulentiores: atque insuper, justas nos imperii justi causas quaerimus, non injusti violentas.

IV. Ad communem utilitatem plurimum hoc conferre, quod imperitiorum multitudo prudentiorum regatur consilio et ratione, negaverit nemo. Quod si ex inepta Reipub. forma eveniat, ut parum prudentibus, aut improbis nimia permittatur potestas, hoc etiam plurimum obesse posse, fatebuntur omnes; prout in aliis rebus, rei optimae cujusque pessima poterit esse depravatio. Nihil tamen hinc vitae civilis utilitati aut dignitati detrahetur. {Etenim} ingenii vires hominibus a Deo sunt datae, ut optimas, ex innumeris quae excogitari possunt, imperii formas sibi eligant.

Est igitur civitas “liberorum hominum coetus, sub uno imperio in communem omnium utilitatem consociatus.” Communem omnium utilitatem potestatis civilis finem esse, inter omnes convenit. Hoc contendit populus; in hoc se jactant Reges omnes, qui non insano scelere, humanae conditionis obliti, Dei opt. max. jura sibi arrogant, aut iis etiam ampliora. Quicquid est civile, id toto coelo, ut aiunt, distat a dominatione despotica. Ea sola igitur potestas civilis Edition: 1745; Page: [291] est justa, quae communi inservit utilitati. Quae huic obstat, utcunque populi hebetioris et incauti consensu constituta, nullo munitur jure. Vitium contractui inhaesit; quia in iis erratum est, quae hic praecipuè spectari omnibus est notissimum.

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{Hic} mirari subit, quorundam{*} non indoctorum orationes, in vitae civilis incommodis et oneribus molestis depingendis, ita nonnunquam exultare, ac si ab ea vita ineundâ homines vellent deterrere; quod tamen ne fiat, libertatis statum, pari modo, deformant, [in larvam] [larvarum] omnium maxime horribilem. Utrique quidem statui sua sunt commoda et incommoda. Non levia in libertate solutâ mala sunt subinde metuenda; atqui non continua. Malis {quidem} in vita civili metuendis, nisi in civitate constituenda aberat omnino prudentia, [paria, immo majora, eademque crebriora, in homines solutos cadere possunt: atque etiam, in vita civili,] [graviora quidem & craebriora, in libertate sunt metuenda,] contra ea mala, aliorum auxilia certius quisque sibi polliceri potest.

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CAPUT V: De interna Civitatum Structura, et summi Imperii Partibus.

I. Quum imperatorum nemo suum sibi populum progenuit, neque, si progenuisset, Edition: 1745; Page: [292] potestatem parentis in fratres adultos, ad haeredem transmittere posset; {(}quippe quae parentum στοργὴ, et immaturo liberorum judicio, tanquam unico fundamento, innitatur;{)} a parentali neutiquam deducenda est potestas civilis{, quamvis ejusdem exemplum quoddam adumbratum fuerit}. Neque, in populum universum justiùs arrogari potest potestas herilis; quod ex jam dictis satis constat. Neque deinde oraculo Deus reges, aut alios creat magistratus, modumve imperii certum, aut fines constituit. Nec denique vires nullo jure innixae justam potestatem tribuere possunt. {Restat} igitur {ut ipsius} Populi conventione et decreto verum omne jus imperii constituatur.

In casibus forte rarioribus, res aliter se habere potest. Quum enim populi salus et foelicitas sit unicus imperii finis; ubi satis huic consulitur, a viro prudente et praepotente, {eâ scil.} formâ imperii praescripta, quam omnes periculo <tandem> facto libenter sunt amplexuri; poterit idem, non inique, populum rudem et rerum civilium imperitum, licet nondum consentientem, imperii [forma continere legitima] [formam praeferibere legitimam], communi foelicitati inserviente, quam omnes {eidem assueti} suffragiis suis mox sunt comprobaturi. Quum vero nemo de sua salute dubius et metuens, cui praecipua hominum jura, minime contra potentiorum Edition: 1745; Page: [293] vim tuta esse et munita videntur, beatus esse possit; {idcirco} nisi vel antecedat populi Edition: current; Page: [241] consensus, vel subsequatur, justum esse nequit imperium.

II. In potestate civili, ratione et via constituendâ, haec tria ut concurrant est necesse; primo, Pactum omnium inter se, quo convenit, ut <in> unum populum, communi regendum consilio, conficiant [coalescant]: deinceps sequitur populi decretum, imperii formam modumque constituens, rectoresque designans. <Tertio> denique, pactum inter rectores designatos, et populum, hunc ad obsequium, illos ad imperii sibi in communem utilitatem {permissi} administrationem fidelem adstringens. In primis quidem civitatibus constituendis, vix est credibile popellum rudem et incautum, egregias quorundam virtutes suspicientem, haec omnia hoc ordine disertis transegisse verbis. In omni tamen justa imperii civilis constitutione,{*} actum est aliquid, quod horum omnium vim in se continet; quum omnibus satis notus sit unicus potestatis deferendae et suscipiendae finis.

Qua autem ratione in posteros eorum qui primi civitatem constituerunt, transmittatur haec obligatio civilis, ex his monitis constabit.

1. Civium quisque non sibi solum, verum Edition: 1745; Page: [294] et liberis, a civitate defensionem stipulatur, et omnia vitae civilis commoda. Liberis gestum est negotium utilissimum; unde {et} citra suum consensum, ad ea omnia, pro ipsorum viribus, facienda praestanda adstringuntur, quae ob istiusmodi commoda ab adultis jure flagitari poterant. Nihil autem aequius quam ut singuli, pro virili parte, eam tueantur civitatem, neque ab ea intempestive discedant, cujus beneficio diu protecti, innumeris potiti fuerant vitae excultae Edition: current; Page: [242] commodis; utque haec a majoribus accepta ad posteros transmittant.

2. Quum non sine gravi periculo, manerent agri intra civitatis fines ab ipsius imperio immunes, hosti aut fugitivis recipiendis patentes; jure censentur omnes cives agros suos ita imperio subjecisse civili, ut eorum dominium {aut usus}, nemini qui non civitati subjectus degat, cedere possit.

3. Libero tamen quovis tempore, iniquum videtur cives prohibere, ne, solo mutato agrisque venditis, civitate etiam mutari possint. Reipub. enim, singuli plerumque, per tributa, aliaque ipsis onera {quotannis} imposita, [beneficia accepta pensant:] [beneficiorum acceptorum compensationem praestant.] neque aequum fuerit eos impedire, quo minus alibi melius sibi consulant. Nec metus ne civitas ulla penitùs deseratur, nisi quae vel pessime sit instituta vel administrata: qua quidèm in Edition: 1745; Page: [295] causa, potiore jure cives postulant ut civitate mutari liceat, neque in civitate inviti manere cogantur.

III. Civitas in hunc modum constituta personae unius rationem subit, cui jura competunt ab omni privatorum jure [disjuncta] [diversa]; quin et obligationibus, quibus tenetur nemo privatus, adstringitur: rerumque omnium administrationem certis hominibus aut conciliis committit. Inter diversas istiusmodi civitates, in libertate quippe naturali degentes, idem fere jus, eaedemque leges naturales, quae inter singulos in primaeva libertate vigebant; eadem, aut iis simillima, sunt civitatum jura perfecta; eadem debentur mutuo officia humana; similis est pactorum obligatio; idem se suaque per vim defendendi jus: eadem {denique inter se} ratio est omnium Edition: current; Page: [243] civitatum, quae non sub vicinae cujuspiam ditione tenentur, sive eae majores sint sive minores; quocunque demum nomine vocentur, sive humili, sive glorioso. Facili igitur nominum et personarum mutatione, jus naturale privatum sit jus fere omne publicum, cujus necessaria est obligatio. De voluntario jure publico, aliàs.

IV. Potestatis quae ad civitatem regendam exigitur, partes, aut summi jura imperii, sunt vel majora vel minora. Majora, intra civitatis fines exsequenda, immanentia, Edition: 1745; Page: [296] a quibusdam appellantur: quae exteros respiciunt, transeuntia dicuntur. Prioris generis sunt, primò, jura legum jubendarum quibus civium actiones sunt regendae, et jura ipsis tuenda, legum naturalium habita semper ratione.

2. Jus deinde exigendi tributa {ea} omnia, aut reditus publicos, quos prudens exigerit reipublicae administratio: quod jus in priori contineri potest. Tributa dixerunt Romani quae a civibus persolvebantur; vectigalia, quae a provinciis subactis. Ex quibus omnibus, quae ad principum familias sustinendas destinantur, res Fisci dicuntur; quae vero in Reipub. usus impendenda sunt, ad aerarium deferuntur. In priora, principibus electione nova creatis, jus est quale usufructuariis; {in regnis} haereditariis vero, jus {regis idem ferè quod} feudatarii: neutris licet privatis suis debitis imperii successores onerare. Aerarii autem in Reipub. usus administratio sola rectoribus quibusvis commissa intelligitur.

3. Tertium est jus legum exsequendarum, quae executiva dicitur potestas; jurisdictionem omnem continens ad lites dirimendas, et jus magistratus creandi et ministros, ad rempublicam administrandam, et tributa exigenda.

Jura transeuntia ad haec reducuntur capita. Edition: 1745; Page: [297] 1. Jus belli, quod in se omne belli gerendi arbitrium continet, in [militibus conscribendis] [exercitu conscribendo], ducibusque sive summis sive inferioribus constituendis.

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2. Jura foederum faciendorum; cui connexum est jus legatos mittendi, ad foedera, quae aut pacem reducant, aut commercia conservent, transigenda.

Ab his diversum est jus imperii eminens, quo in casibus gravioribus et insolitis recte utuntur imperatores, [invadentes in] [contra] ea civium jura, quae libero quovis tempore, sunt {iisdem} sanctissime conservanda; quandam, {exempli causa,} rei familiaris partem, aut operas, etiam cum summo conjunctas periculo, exigentes, ultra quam aliàs praestare tenentur. Huic imperatorum juri, respondent in statu libero insolita ea quae premente necessitate oriuntur jura.

Minora imperii jura haec sunt; “Dignitates civiles tribuendi [conferendi], nummos cudendi, nundinas feriasque permittendi, liberos, [natalium infamiâ sublatâ, legitimos reddendi,] [legitimandi] {universitates constituendi,} aetatis veniam largiendi, poenas remittendi, debitoribus inducias dandi”; et id genus alia; quibus, utpote facilibus, neque civitati omni necessariis, non immoramur.

V. Summum in civitate imperium is homo, aut plurium concilium, habere censetur, Edition: 1745; Page: [298] qui majora quae diximus imperii jura, vel omnia, vel pleraque, [suo arbitratu] [pro suo prudentia] exsequi potest; neque alterius, aut hominis aut concilii, potestati {ita} subjicitur, ut ejus voluntate ipsius actus fieri possint irriti. Summam saepe habet potestatem, qui non habet infinitam, nullisve limitibus circumscriptam; immo qui ne vel perpetuam; neque imperio successuros designare, aut leges quibus civitas erat fundata immutare potest. Summus ille erit imperator, cui praecipuae potestatis civilis partes permittuntur, suo arbitratu, intra certos fines, in reipublicae utilitatem exercendae: qui neque alterius jussu, aut mandato subinde interposito, civitatem regit; cujusque actus, intra potestatis sibi permissae fines, a nullius consensu vim sortiuntur.

In omni civitate, summa alicubi reperitur potestas, quae majestas dicitur, vel apud regem, vel senatum, vel populum. Neque eam imminuunt cum exteris inita foedera, quamvis incommoda, nisi majora civitati ipsi adimant Edition: current; Page: [245] imperii jura, aut prohibeant ne sui juris persona quae dicitur politica maneat.

Si quidem pluribus civitatibus hoc, quacunque de causa, eveniat, ut uni homini aut uni concilio perpetuo, quarundam imperii partium concedatur administratio; illae civitatum systema constituunt: quales, ex noto Edition: 1745; Page: [299] apud antiquos exemplo, civitates dicuntur Achaicae. In unam autem civitatem plures tum demum coalescere dicuntur, et unam gerere personam, quum uni homini, aut uni concilio, aut iisdem vel hominibus, vel conciliis, permittuntur omnes potestatis partes majores, quà omnium fines patent, administrandae.

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CAPUT VI: De variis Rerumpublicarum Formis.

I.1 Simplicium civitatum tria sunt genera. Ubi omnes imperii partes uni homini committuntur, dicitur monarchia; cujus varia sunt nomina: ubi concilio unico, idque ex optimatibus constat, aristocratia; si vero ex omnibus civibus, [aut honestioribus quibusdam ad rempublicam procurandam] [eorumve] delegatis constet concilium, dicitur democratia.

Concilium, cui permissa est potestas, id voluisse censetur quod pluribus placuit; nisi lege aut decreto quodam primario, quo civitas fundatur, cautum sit, quota concilii pars rerum publicarum administrationi sit necessaria. Praecavenda etiam sallacia satis nota, semperque metuenda ubi quaestio [tripartita aut quadripartita] [trimembris] decidenda est{: quod scil. incidere possit, ut eam sententiam quae longè Edition: 1745; Page: [300] pluribus displicet, comprobent tamen plures, quam qui reliquarum unam ullam. Quod fiet quaestione}<, ea> vel ad bimembres duas reducta, vel membro uno {aut altero}, suffragiis de eo prius latis, excluso: quod etiam in magistratibus, ubi plures sunt petitores, creandis observandum.

(II.) Generis cujusque simplicis {civitatum} plures sunt partes. Monarchia enim vel est absoluta et interminata, ubi {scilicet} unius prudentiae tota permittitur reipublicae administratio, nullis positis limitibus, praeter eos qui ex politiae omnis natura et fine intelliguntur; vel est terminata, ubi legibus quibus civitas fundatur, aut in ipsa potestate deferenda, certis terminis Edition: current; Page: [247] circumscribitur imperium, populique jura quaedam sanctiora {inde} eximuntur. Utriusque generis monarchae vel jure haereditario succedunt, vel a populo creantur aut eliguntur: idque vel in perpetui imperii jus, vel temporarii.

Aristocratiae pariter plura sunt genera, hisque consimilia: absoluta nempe, sive infinita; aut terminata, et lege circumscripta: haereditaria, aut creationibus novis reficienda; perpetua, aut temporaria. In hac temporaria, pro certo tempore suffragii jure gaudent senatores; quo peracto, sufficiuntur in eorum locum alii: quod si populi suffragiis fiat, et civis cujuscunque, qui se petitorem Edition: 1745; Page: [301] profiteatur, habenda sit ratio, democraticum potius videtur concilium: sin per cooptationem reficiatur senatus; aut optimatibus solis petere liceat; erit aristocraticum. Si ex censu majore petendi jus oriatur, proprie oligarchicum dicitur; aut ubi agrorum quorundam domini, eo ipso fiunt senatores <quod eos jure possideant>. Ubi vero hi soli qui, honoribus functi, gratiam fidemque consecuti sunt, creari possunt; a quibusdam, κατ´ ἑξοχὴν aristocratia, aut politia dicitur.

Conciliorum popularium dissimilia [diversa] etiam genera; comitia curiata et centuriata duorum exhibent exempla. In illis suffragii pari jure utebantur [gaudebant] cives omnes; in his pro ratione census; quae {idcirco} dicebantur timocratica. Sorte etiam alicubi definiebatur, quibus dandum esset in comitiis suffragii jus. Alicubi ex tribubus aut curiis diversis, quibus distinctus fuerat populus, {ad rem communem gerendam} eligebantur delegati, qui concilium constituerent populare.

Junctarum et multiplicium formarum ingens est numerus, prout cum diversis monarchiae generibus conjunguntur concilia varia [diversa], vel senatoria vel popularia; atque prout variae imperii partes vel regi, vel senatui, vel concilio populari, vel omnibus simul permittuntur.

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III. Ut formas praestantiores a deterioribus Edition: 1745; Page: [302] secernere valeamus, haec pauca sedulo sunt spectanda.

1. Ut foelix sit reipublicae status, quatuor hisce in {omni} politia prospiciendum [retinenda]; ut scil. imperatoribus adsit prudentia, optima quaeque prospiciens; {deinde ut adsit} fides communi consulens prosperitati; {tum} ut conservetur concordia; denique ut reipublicae negotia et celeriter et secreto possint expediri. De his ubi satis est cautum, non melius communi civium prosperitati, per politiam consuli poterit.

2. Ubicunque non uni homini aut concilio, sed pluribus datae sunt summae potestatis partes; inter eos intervenire debet aliquis imperii nexus, ne in omnia contraria abire possint: ne scil. Rex, inconsulto aut invito concilio, vel senatorio, vel populari, quicquam gravius moliri queat; nec concilia, rege inconsulto aut invito; neve unum concilium, altero invito. Si hac de re satis cautum fuerit, melius inter diversos, sive diversa quae dicuntur subjecta, dividuntur imperii partes, quam si omnes uni, sive regi sive concilio, mandarentur.

3. Stabile neutiquam erit imperii jus, nisi rerum dominio aut opibus fultum: aliter fluctuationibus et seditionibus perpetuis civitas vexabitur. Rerum enim dominia potentiam secum ferunt, quae jura nullis opibus subnixa Edition: 1745; Page: [303] evertet, aut ipsa labantibus [cum] divitiis collabetur. Stabile tum demum erit regnum haereditarium, ubi agris suffultum est aut provinciis haereditariis: stabile senatus imperium, ubi agrorum bona pars est senatorum: stabilis civitas popularis, ubi vigent leges agrariae; aut ubi alia quavis ratione agri inter plurimos dividuntur dominos. Quamvis autem seduli et solertiores, non nisi gravi de causa sunt cohibendi, quo minus rem suam familiarem bonis artibus augeant; (quod democratia vel optima permittet, quantum exigere potest vitae vel jucunditas vel voluptas quaevis, viro bono expetenda,) non tamen cum plurium salute, aut libertate, pensanda est inanis paucorum vel ambitio, vel luxuries, vel avaritia. In omni igitur populo Edition: current; Page: [249] libero, jure per leges agrarias praecavetur, ne nimiae evadant [sint] paucorum opes, et toti civitati metuendae.

4. Cavendum etiam, ne iniqua, aut parum civilia, cuivis ordini tribuantur jura, quibus caeteri omnes a republica {capessenda} summisque honoribus excludantur; perpetuis enim seditionibus materiam praebebunt.

5. Quum parum referat qualis sit civitatis institutio, si modo solis prudentibus et bonis commissa sit potestas; cui tamen rei nulla ratione satis caveri poterit; hoc in civitate constituenda praecipuè erit spectandum, Edition: 1745; Page: [304] ut insidis et malis, quamvis potestatem adepti fuerint, nulla aut exigua ad peccandum sint invitamenta; aut saltem nullae impunitatis, aut commodi sui augendi spes, ubi perfidè rempublicam administraverint.

6. Quis vero ad [coetum civilem] [civitatem] optimè constituendum hominum numerus potissimum requiratur, definiri nequit. Paucis neque vires neque opes suppetent, quibus se contra praedonum manus defendant, aut ea comparent, quae ad uberiorem faciunt vitae ornatum aut jucunditatem. Ubi contra, magnus est numerus civium magnam regionem occupantium, non adeo accurate omnia procurari, aut a civibus fraudes, injuriae, et vexationes prohiberi poterunt: paucioribus praeterea patebit aditus ad rempublicam, ut virtutes latius patentes addiscant atque exerceant, quam si ab iisdem hominibus plures constitutae fuissent civitates. Ubi quidem ingentes civitates sunt constitutae, neque jam hominibus <non> est integrum, ut se in civitates dividant commodissimas; vicinis omnibus forte profuerit, sui contra nimias vicinorum opes defendendi gratia, in majores congregare civitates. Quemadmodum etiam, inter cives, ad paucorum nimias opes praecavendas, et potentiam caeteris metuendam, justae sunt leges agrariae, eodem jure civitates vicinae nimias alterius cujusque opes Edition: 1745; Page: [305] Edition: current; Page: [250] merito habent suspectas, siquidem ejusdem etiam mores cupiditate vincendi inflammentur; iisque, opibus augendis, per vim, si aliter fieri nequeat, modum ponere licet, antequam tantae evaserint ut libertati et saluti suae cautum esse nequeat.

IV. Monarchia simplex has habet opportunitates; {quod} civitatis concordiae consulat; et per eam secretò et expeditè res geri possint. In monarchia autem haereditaria, neque de prudentia regis, neque de fide caveri poterit. De electorum prudentia melius cavetur; non item de fide: et {hujusmodi} rege defuncto, seditionibus bellisque civilibus janua patebit. In haereditaria absoluta sive infinita, sunt omnia incerta. In haereditaria terminata, non de prudentia, at melius multo cautum est de fide; quum rex leges eas quibus fundata erat civitas violando, aut potestatis sibi commissae fines transiliendo, se planè tyrannum profiteatur; ipsiusque perfidiâ regni jus omne abdicatum esse facile inter omnes constet. Unde etiam populo jus oritur, ut, eo deturbato, novum creare regem, aut novam Reipub. formam instituere liceat. <Ast> In regnis verò {legibus} terminatis et circumscriptis, perpetuae ferè vigent factiones, et bella subinde nascuntur civilia.

In simplicioribus aristocratiis haereditariis, Edition: 1745; Page: [306] de senatorum prudentia rarô, de fide nunquam satis cautum est, neque quidem de concordia, aut expedita et arcana Reipub. administratione. Inter senatores ad munus electos, melius de prudentia et fide, parum vero de concordia, aut negotiis celeriter et secretò gerendis, caveri poterit.

In concilio populari fides semper vigebit, et tum demum prudentia, ubi vel censui respondet suffragii jus, vel consilium ex honestioribus paucis a Edition: current; Page: [251] populo delegatis constat. Neque tamen inter hosce speranda concordia, aut expedita et arcana reip. administratio.

In magno quovis concilio per tabellas optime feruntur suffragia: sic enim non metuendae erunt potentiorum offensiones, neque suffragia largitionibus corrumpere in promptu erit. Atque licet, pudore sublato, locus sit gratiae, odio, et invidiae; his {tamen} rariùs, nisi objustam causam, populi pars major incitabitur. Sin autem sors, aliqua ex parte immisceatur, omnis excludi poterit largitio; gratiaeque, odio, aut invidiae grassanti saepe obstruetur iter.{*} Sola tamen sorte res decidere graviores, aut magistratus delegatosve designare [constituere], parum erit tutum; quum sorti, quantumvis omni gratia et contumelia vacet, nulla sit prudentia rerumve judicium.

V. Rerumpub. formas simpliciores parum Edition: 1745; Page: [307] esse commodas, haec satis ostendunt. Neque antiquissima quaeque sunt optima; sic enim ad pelles, antra, glandesque redire oporteret. Quod a {regum} adulatoribus jactari solet, monarchiam primum in terris nomen imperii fuisse, monarchiae neutiquam est honorificum. Hoc enim est dicere, rudi eam et incauto popello placuisse, prudentioribus et cultioribus haud diu placituram. Etenim in nullo rerum genere minus sperare licet prima quaeque opera perfecta fore et absoluta, quam in civitatibus constituendis, ubi maxima opus est rerum notitia et prudentia, [non sine meditatione alta] [multa meditatione], vitaeque usu diuturno et vario, comparandâ. Quae formas quasque simplices comitantur incommoda graviora, ad mixtas et multiplices confugiendum esse docent: mixtarum autem eam esse optimam ubi tres illae artificiosè Edition: current; Page: [252] inter se compinguntur formae, monstrant singularum seorsim haud leves opportunitates: quod et antiquorum gravissimis placuit.

Concilio igitur populari, quod ex {honestioribus ad rem communem gerendam} delegatis constet, quibus idcirco nunquam fides, raro prudentia deesse poterit, maximae imperii partes committendae. Leges igitur sanciat istud concilium, et de rebus statuat gravissimis. Per leges etiam agrarias, haud ita arctas tamen ut industriae modicaeve vitae Edition: 1745; Page: [308] elegantiae adversentur, concilio isti {sua} conservanda est potestas.

Senatui item ex paucis, a populo electis, quorum in Reipub. negotiis diu spectata fuit prudentia et fides, permittatur, ut de legibus et Repub. disceptent, et ad concilium populare referant; ita ut sine senatus auctoritate nihil gravius fieri possit. In utroque concilio etiam, ita decedentibus succedant homines novi, sive ea legibus annalibus instituatur rotatio, ut neque concilia ex novis omnibus constent, neque cuiquam suffragii perpetuum jus sit, aut potestas perpetua. In omnibus pariter magistratibus prosunt leges annales, ut caveatur ne quis nimiam sibi comparet potentiam aut gratiam; utque [quam plurimi] [plures] eam usu addiscant prudentiam, easque artes quae Reipub. sunt necessariae aut utiles; ne necesse sit ut tota civitas unum tantum aut paucos spectet, spemque omnem in iis solis collocet. Ubi vigent istiusmodi leges, Reipub. non deerunt imperatorum, aut magistratuum officio functorum, prudentia et virtus: neutiquam enim aegre ferent, quod pro legum sanctarum praescripto, tempore definito munera deponant.

Ad subita autem et inopina pericula avertenda, atque ad negotia secretò et celeriter obeunda, necessaria est potestas quaedam regia aut dictatoria, Edition: current; Page: [253] nullo tamen alio fundamento Edition: 1745; Page: [309] praeter ipsas leges innixa; cui permittendum belli arbitrium, legumque tutela et administratio. Arbitri etiam officio fungetur rex, si qua inter senatum et populum suboriatur contentio.

Magistratuum creandorum jus, tribus hisce potestatibus simul permittendum, aut inter eas dividendum: ut scil. quibus majore opus est prudentia, a senatu eligantur; quorum opera celeriore [celeri] et expeditiore opus fuerit, a rege; quique populi jura tueantur et conservent, a populo aut concilio populari creentur.

Profuerit etiam plurimum censoriam semper adesse potestatem, ut civium mores emendentur, omnesque flagitiosi et improbi, cujuscunque fuerint ordinis aut dignitatis civilis, de loco dimoveantur.

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CAPUT VII: De summi Imperii Jure, ejusque acquirendi rationibus.

I. [Rerumpub. Rectoribus] [Qui summo cum imperio sunt] ea est potestas, ea jura, quae primaria populi tribuerunt decreta. In omnibus quidem civitatibus, eadem alicubi, saltem apud populum universum, sita est potestas. Quae tamen vel regi, vel concilio, vel utrique committitur <potestas>, Edition: 1745; Page: [310] in diversis civitatibus [longissimè diversa] [diversissima] est. In quibusdam enim, quaedam populi jura, ab omni imperantium potestate eximuntur: in aliis, omnia eorum prudentiae et fidei permittuntur. Quum tamen solus imperii constituendi finis, quod omnes agnoscunt, sit populi salus et foelicitas; quaecunque [eidem accommodata non est] [hinc aberrat] potestas, ea est injusta; quam populus, qui temere eam donaverat, repetere aut abrogare poterit, quum idipsius exegerit salus. Neque quicquam fingi potest perfidum magis aut fastuosum, quam ut [si] hi, quibus in populi salutem et utilitatem commissa erat potestas, eam, licet populo pestiferam, sui causa per vim retinere conentur.

Optandum quidem foret, ut potestas olim permissa, amicis potius disceptationibus, quam vi repetatur: neque ubi vel mediocriter communi consultum est saluti et prosperitati, ad vim et bella civilia, leviori aliqua de causa, decurrendum. Verum ubi haud satis de populi libertate et salute cautum Edition: current; Page: [255] esse constat, pluraque mala, ex ipsa imperii formâ fore nascitura, eaque diuturniora, quam ex rerum commutatione violenta; tum demum et per extrema omnia {res novare}, imperiique formam modumque immutare licitum erit et honestum.

Quae de proprio rectorum civilium, praecipuè regum, jure divino, et sanctitate quadam Edition: 1745; Page: [311] inviolabili jactantur, mera sunt adulantium somnia. Divinum est jus omne quod Dei et naturae lege sancitur. Divina sunt populi pariter ac imperantium jura. Immo, quandoquidem haec in illorum tutelam sunt constituta, illa his sunt et graviora et sanctiora. Imperantis quidem jus, singulorum seorsim jure quovis gravius est; universorum verò neutiquam. Plurima civis privatus perferre patique debet iniqua, potius quam contra regem caetera aequum et reipub. utilem, quicquam hostile moliretur; si modo sibi soli periculum immineat. Verum ubi communia omnium jura a rege pessundantur; quaeque uni intentantur, aliis omnibus mox metuenda erunt; tum vero manifesta regis perfidia, omneque imperii jus amissum.

II. Populo jura sua contra rectores quoscunque per vim defendere licet. Si quidem ii quorum imperium est legibus circumscriptum, ea invadant jura, quae populus in imperio deferendo sibi retinuit et reservavit; non dubium est quin populo, [juris sui tuendi causa, ad vim procurrere] [iura sua per vim defendere] liceat. Quin et ad rectores, quorum imperium absolutum est nullisque legibus circumscriptum, coërcendos, vis recte adhibetur; ubi civili animo exuto dominatum occupare conantur, in suam libidinem aut utilitatem, communi Edition: 1745; Page: [312] spretâ, omnia convertentes; vel ubi animum in cives hostilem produnt; aut ita nequiter rempub. administrant, ut ne vel sanctissima populi jura, quaeque ad vitam tolerabilem sunt necessaria, tuta Edition: current; Page: [256] maneant. Neque qui hoc populo tribuit, dabit quoque eum regibus esse superiorem: servis enim vel in deterrima conditione degentibus jus est, ut contra dominorum injurias atrociores se per vim defendant.

Si hìc moveatur quaestio, cujus hac in causa sit judicium, numnam qui summo imperio praesunt <et> rempub. male administrârint, suâque perfidia jus omne amiserint? Si non populi, quod ipsius causa agatur; ob eandem causam, neque imperantis erit judicium. Ad aequos igitur decurrendum esset arbitros, vel nostrates, vel externos, si res sineret: sin minus, populi certe potius erit judicium, a quo magistratibus olim mandatum erat imperium, cujusque negotia geruntur, cujus etiam gratiâ potestas omnis fuit constituta. De re fere quavis humanum est errare{: neque errorum immunes sunt ipsi rectores}. Saepe de jure publico, saepe de privato sui defendendi jure erratum est; nontamen ideo tollenda sunt haec hominum jura, sive privata sive publica.

His quidem in rebus gravissimis, cuncta cautissimé pensitanda; neque ob leviores Edition: 1745; Page: [313] imperantium injurias aut errores, quales in homines haud improbos aliquando cadere possunt, in bella civilia, omnium saepe saevissima, cives sunt conjiciendi. Ubi vero alia ratione populus salvus esse nequit; et perfidis dolosisque facinoribus, imperii jus omne amiserunt imperantes; jure per vim regno exui possunt, aliis in eorum locum suffectis, aut nova imperii formâ constitutâ.

Neque motibus civilibus bellisve fovendis apta est haec, de sancto populi jure se contra tyrannos defendendi, doctrina. Immo contrariis feré dogmatis Edition: current; Page: [257] haec mala praecipue imputanda. Nimia fere semper fuit populi patientia, et inepta imperantium veneratio; quae tot civitatum monstra, aut potius miseros et abjectos servorum greges, sub dominis saevissimis et nequissimis, jura omnia divina et humana impudenter miscentibus, per terrarum orbem pepererunt.1

III. Tyranno exturbato, aut rege qui ad munus electus fuit extincto, ubi nihil de successione est praestitutum, aut denique stirpe regia extincta in regnis haereditariis, nascitur interregnum. His in casibus, quamvis nihil legibus publicis sit cautum, haud quidem tollitur populi conjunctio civilis: primo enim, quod diximus, pacto obligantur omnes, ut communi consilio communi prospiciant saluti. Existet aliquamdiu democratia Edition: 1745; Page: [314] quaedam, ubi plurium aut praestantiorum, qui reipub. negotia gerere solebant, suffragiis erit statuendum, qualis in posterum futura sit reipub. forma, quibusque deinceps permittendum imperium. Neque paucioribus, caeteris invitis, civilis vinculi licet esse immunibus; nisi pars major planè iniquas et pestiferas reipub. administrandae rationes ineant.

IV. Principibus quorum probitas fidesque satis est spectata, debetur pietas omnis et observantia; iique cum summo civium periculo, sive contra caecos tumultus, sive aperta bella, sunt defendendi; neque culpis eorum aut vitiis levioribus, qualia aliquando in viros minime malos cadere possunt, cives ab ea obligatione exsolvuntur. Si vero hoc incidat ut devincantur et a dignitate deturbentur, vel ab imperii competitoribus, vel hostibus externis, ita utnulla Edition: current; Page: [258] spes sit reliqua, eos jus suum antiquum recuperare posse; principum est regumve de jure suo ultro cedere: immo id omne pro extincto est habendum; quum omnis inter imperantes et populum obligatio sit mutua, mutuisque officiis conservanda: quae quum ab altera parte praestari nequeunt, nulla alteri sunt praestanda. Omnibus igitur prius tentatis, populus jure se victori submittet, quum suae saluti aliter consulere nequeat. Edition: 1745; Page: [315] Mirae quidem foret arrogantiae, si quis suae dignitatis aut utilitatis causa, totam civitatem et populum pessundatum velit et laniatum.

V. Quemadmodum naturalis libertas est jus pro sua cujusque voluntate agendi, intra legum naturalium limites, (quae nulla foret si nullae essent leges, hanc libertatem caeteraque jura cuique munientes;) sic dicimus populum esse liberum, quum non ad alterius praescriptum, sed [suo arbitratu] [ad suum arbitrium] intra legum civilium sines, cuique [manet] [permissa est] agendi facultas. Non igitur leges libertati repugnant, sed acerba aut morosa hominum imperia. Liber Romanis dicebatur populus, ubi concilio populari imperii summa erat permissa, et parendi imperandique vices obtinebantur.

VI. Vix alia ratione quam populi decreto voluntario, potestatem civilem jure constitui posse, satis jam disputatum [dictum]; neque imperatores aliam habere sanctitatem aut majestatem, quam quae hinc oritur, quod hominum multitudo jura, quisque sua, uni homini aut concilio permiserat administranda. Ex quadam libertatis naturalis parte, a singulis ad imperantem translata, aut ex singulorum dominiis eidem aliquatenus subjectis, nascitur legum condendarum potestas. In libertate, quisque vitae necisque jus hactenus Edition: 1745; Page: [316] in se habebat, ut officia honesta quantocunque cum periculo suscipere liceret; quumque communis hoc postulat utilitas, aliis se dirigendum Edition: current; Page: [259] in his officiis obeundis permittere{: unde imperii militaris jus}. In libertate etiam, inter hominum jura erat, ut eum qui ipsis injuriam intentaverat aut fecerat, summis coércerent suppliciis; communique innocuorum saluti, si ita facto opus esset, ejusdem caede prospicerent. Hinc oritur jus omne poenas delictis aequas irrogandi, sive jurisdictio quae criminalis dicitur. Neque ad potestatem aliquam a Deo proximè derivatam, ad haec aut alia majestatis jura explicanda, decurrendum.

VII. Neque una reipub. forma prae caeteris, alia de causa, divina est habenda, quam quod per eam optimè communi consulatur prosperitati; quod in monarchiis infinitis et haereditariis minime contingit. Quid? quod nulla lege divina, naturali aut positiva, monstratur succedendi, ratio; num scil. satis sit successio quaevis haereditaria, eaque vel agnationis, vel cognationis jure; an contra exigatur linealis. De re familiari ad cognatos transmittenda, non leves sunt juris naturalis obscuritates; licet, re generaliter spectata, manifestum sit, bona in familiae aut gentis utilitatem acquisita, sanguinis sequi debere conjunctionem. Quod vero ad imperia attinet, Edition: 1745; Page: [317] (non in unius familiae dignitatem, sed in populi universi utilitatem destinata,) nulla subest causa, cur in iis deferendis spectetur sanguinis conjunctio; multo minus cur linealis admittatur successio qualiscunque.{*} Ex legibus humanis aut populi scitis, saepe temerariis et incautis, haec omnia nascuntur.

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VIII. Illud autem jus, vulgo jactatum, quo in populum devictum imperium civile sibi arrogat victor, non meliore plerumque innititur fundamento, quam quod {sibi} [arrogant latrones ac praedones maritimi] [latronibus ac praedonibus maritimis arrogatur]. Nam primo, qui justam bellandi causam non habuit, nihil quicquam ullo jure capit aut detinet. Edition: 1745; Page: [(2)] Deinde, fingatur causa vel justissima, certi tamen, ut ante dictum,{*} sunt petendi fines: neque contra hostes quicquam jure aget victor, quod neque ad injuriam avertendam, neque ad damnum reparandum, neque ad injurias in posterum praecavendas, necessarium est aut utile: si quid amplius exegerit, justitiae fines transit. Ad injuriam vero avertendam, aut damnum pensandum, nunquam necessarium est aut utile, ut civitati et populo victo, in provinciam redacto, adimatur libertas publica et majestas. Immo communi plerumque repugnat utilitati, ut civitates opes suas sic augeant, potentiamque adipiscantur vicinis metuendam. Diu Edition: 1745; Page: [318] plerumque antequam debellatur civitas, victorique subjicitur, depulsa est omnis injuria, damnumque cumulatissime pensatum. Pensationem [pensatur. Compensationem] fere semper sibi prius arripiunt victores, ex rebus hostium mobilibus, quam eorundam penitus devincatur civitas. Hac ratione damnum lubentes praestarent hostes devicti, vel si opus sit, stipendium quotannis penderent (quibus certè omnia damna cumulatissime reparari possunt) potius quam, a missâ patriae civitatis libertate, exteris se subjicerent.

Quod ad cautionem attinet: quibus {rationibus}, ab injuriis a civitate devicta, haud tamen exhausta, in posterum inferendis, satis cautum est, iis multo magis, a civitate {jam} exhausta et tantum non deleta, cautum erit. A civitate autem opibus valente satis cautum est traditis obsidibus, navibusve Edition: current; Page: [261] armatis, vel oppidis in confinio munitis; vel victoris praesidiis in urbes munitas acceptis. Immo saepe sufficit quod earum urbium munimenta diruantur. Neque ulla est civitas devicta, quin omnia haec lubens praestaret, potius quam vicinae civitati provincia fieret.

IX. Si quid poenae nomine, ad omnes ab injuriis deterrendos, sit exigendum, id a solis delinquentibus exigi debet. Populi vero devicti pars longe maxima, nullo crimine Edition: 1745; Page: [319] obligatur, ideo quod a rectoribus suis ciebantur bella {vel} maxime nefaria. A victis igitur hoc solum jure exigere potest victor, ut rectores suos injustos aut dedant aut defendere desinant, ut de illis poenas factis dignas sumat. At propter ea quae injustè aut inhumaniter in bello fiunt publico, poenas exigere vetat communis utilitas. In civitate semper spes est, magistratus, viribus suis legumque auctoritate sublevatos, poenas de civibus crimine obstrictis sumere posse: At civitatum bella gerentium vires, per socios et foederatos, ita plerumque sunt aequales, ut anceps sit belli fortuna; quibusque causae sunt justissimae, exitus tamen sit incertus. Ab omni igitur in devictos saevitia abstinendum, ne ad hostes exemplum transferatur, qui causam injustam tuentur, quae {tamen} ipsis justa videatur. Neque ideo quod causam suam justam putant victores, legem saevam, contra se forte aut suos postea valituram, sanciant.

Neque credibile est ullam conventionem tacitam inter civitates dissidentes intercessisse, ut ibi imperium foret unde victoria fuerit. Contraria omnia palam testatur qui bellum movet, nisi ubi disertis verbis istiusmodi pactum fuit initum. Ipso bello, se omni ratione, jura sua defensurum aut persecuturum, significat et denunciat: neque populus, Edition: 1745; Page: [320] quamvis debellatus, qui novis sociis aut opibus adscitis bellum renovaverit, fidem violasse Edition: current; Page: [262] censetur. Quid, quod nemo dixerit, eum cui causa sua videtur justa, tali legi consensisse: atqui sine hujus consensu, alterius partis, {quicquid de ipsius causa senserit,} intervenisse consensum, colligi nequit. Hi denique victorum fautores, solos imperantes consensisse volunt: quo vero jure hi, quorum in tutelam permittitur populus, populi jura omnia, vel absolutè, vel sub conditione, alienare possunt? Finge istud disertis verbis {ab iis} pactum fuisse; ob id ipsum, homines illi perfidi et audaces, omne imperandi jus amiserunt; neque quae ab iis transiguntur civitatem obligare possunt.

X. Quum igitur {illi} scriptores <fere> omnes, qui regna quaedam patrimonialia esse contendunt, quae regis arbitrio alienari, aut dividi possunt, ea ex sola ferè victoria profecta statuant; nullo idcirco jure ea arrogari, satis [docuimus] [ex dictis constat]. Quinetiam, si forte accidat ut populus aliquis, ab saevis hostibus ingruentibus perterritus, populo potentiori se suaque omnia dedat, solum hoc stipulatus, ut contra calamitatem imminentem protegatur; nihilo {tamen} magis ea pactione regnum patrimoniale constituitur.{*} Ne quid enim de metus exceptione dicatur; aut quod pactum istud Edition: 1745; Page: [321] plane onerosum, sit tamen inaequale; ex ipso pacto {reique natura} patet, quod colligi nequeat, tale quicquam fuisse factum. Quippe, qui se civitati excultae, humanae, imperiumque lene exercenti dedunt, minimé censeri poterunt consensisse, ut {istius arbitratu, quovis modo vexentur aut lacerentur; utque} <et> alteri cuivis vel regi vel populo barbaro subjiciantur; aut saeviore regantur imperio, quam exercebant illi cui se dediderunt. Edition: current; Page: [263] Quinetiam si quid istiusmodi moliatur haec civitas dominans, jure sibi jugum excutient qui longè alia lege se isti subjecerunt. Ad arbitros {enim} provocare licet et deditiis, si quid crudelius ipsis sit impositum, ultra {id,} quod salutis et defensionis pretium, jure exigi poterat.

Neque ex populi devicti pacto aut promisso, quod vis minax extorserat, victorijus imperii nascitur. Eam enim vim esse injustam satis ostendimus.{*} Sin verò a victore, aequa reipub. forma populo devicto constituatur, quae satis ipsius conservat jura, communemque tuetur prosperitatem; ita ut populus, post periculum factum, ei formae se submittere non recuset; ex hoc consensu imperii jus oriri quodque praecesserat vitium purgari poterit.

XI. Quum insuper nullis causis naturalibus Edition: 1745; Page: [322] libus {et necessario obligantibus}, sed solo populi decreto, innitatur cujusvis ex regia sobole aut gente jus, ut regi defuncto succedat; decreti hujus verba eodem modo sunt interpretanda, quo {istiusmodi verba} in caeteris legibus de successionibus haereditariis: eaque censenda est hac de re fuisse populi voluntas, quae verbis iisdem aliis de rebus declaratur. Ubi igitur, in aliis bonis haereditariis, quisque delicto suo, jus suum, non solum pro se, verum etiam pro liberis et cognatis amittit, idem etiam de imperii jure haereditario est censendum. Immo, rei familiaris dispar [dissimilis] est ratio. Ea familiae alendae et amplificandae gratia acquisita fuit: unde liberi, et saepe cognati, jure postulant ut ex re familiari alantur et amplificentur: durumque est et iniquum, ut unius delictum immerentibus noceat, bonaque, quae naturae lege iis rediissent, intervertat. De imperii jure omnia alia dicenda; quod neutiquam ob regiam stirpem, aut ob aliquid quod ipsi regi, ejusve soboli debebatur; Edition: current; Page: [264] sed ipsius civitatis gratiâ, utque praecaveantur mala ex novorum regum creationibus subinde metuenda, constitutum fuit. Potiore igitur jure in causam commissi cadunt regna haereditaria, quam privatorum haereditates.

Ut igitur populus suo jure perfidum regem de solio deturbat; potiore certè jure Edition: 1745; Page: [323] praecavere potest, ne quis succedat qui reipub. administrandae est ineptus; qui ea fovet dogmata, quae sanctissima populi jura pessundare eum promovebunt, quum primùm potestatem fuerit adeptus; qui insana quadam superstitione percitus, summae potestatis partes haud leves, ad regem quendam exterum, sub falso pontificis nomine, transferet; aut qui se jure divino munitum credit, quo fretus <omnia> civitatis jura audacissime perrumpet, omnesque imperii sibi permissi limites transiliet; seque officio defuturum existimabit, nisi cives summorum cruciatuum metu cogat, ut dogmata absurdissima credant, vel saltem credere simulent; cultumque Deo praestent quem nefarium putant. Qui regni haeres talia profitetur dogmata, {eave palam ejurare rogatus detrectat,} potiore jure excluditur, quam qui plane fatuus est aut insanus: quum istiusmodi dogmata populo libero magis sint perniciosa, quam ulla regis fatuitas aut insania.

XII. Quae de regibus diximus, de cunctis tenent civitatum rectoribus, atque de populi ipsius in provincias aut colonias imperio. Si qui cives, populi aut magistratuum permissu, e civitate suis sumptibus migrent, novas sibi sedes quaesituri; illi [civitatem liberam, ditionisque omnis externae immunem] [sociam civitatem] sibi jure constituunt. Qui publicis Edition: 1745; Page: [324] impensis ea mittuntur lege, ut coloniae modo sub civitatis ditione maneant, ad ejusdem potentiam aut opes augendas; haud aequum est ut eorum quam civium Edition: current; Page: [265] caeterorum deterior sit conditio. Jura omnia, illis concessa, sunt religiose conservanda. Si quid durius in colonos patria civitas statuerit, ipsique satis per se sibi prospicere possint; aut si tyrannide oppressa sit civitas, ipsiusve forma in deteriora omnia immutata; hoc sibi jure arrogabunt coloni, ut sui sint in posterum juris, sociae civitatis officia praestare parati. Neque pacta, in quibus contrahendis, de iis quae in istiusmodi negotiis praecipuè spectari solent, erratum est, magnum hominum numerum, civitati beatae constituendae idoneum, ad ea subeunda adstringunt, quae ipsorum prosperitati et saluti adversantur. Neque quicquam graviora in hominum vitam mala invexit, quam vana et insolens, sive regum sive populorum, cupiditas, imperii sui fines porrigendi, aliosque populos in suam ditionem redigendi, dum neque suae neque eorum foelicitati prudenter consulunt. Hinc ingentia et immania exsurrexerunt imperia, vicinis omnibus gravia et pestifera, et brevi, cum misera hominum strage ruitura. Edition: 1745; Page: [325]

Edition: current; Page: [266]

CAPUT VIII: De Legibus condendis, et de Jurisdictione.

I. Inter imperii jura immanentia, est legum jubendarum et administrandarum potestas. Omnis lex aliquam civitatis utilitatem spectare debet, legibusque ea omnia sancienda quae communi inserviunt prosperitati, quantum penes homines est eam procurare aut augere. Si quidem in ipsa imperii constitutione, ea tantummodo potestas rectoribus permissa fuerit, quae in rebus externis tuendis versatur; illi de civium animis virtute colendis, aut de cultu religioso, nihil pro imperio statuere poterunt. Verum ubi eorum arbitratui conceduntur certi reditus, in communem utilitatem impendendi, aut ubi totius [plena] reipublicae administratio ipsis est permissa; quum ex hominum virtute pendeat praecipuè eorum foelicitas, hoc illis qui reipub. praesunt imprimis curae esse debet, ut per disciplinam et institutionem, primis ab annis, imbuantur civium animi iis sententiis et moribus, quibus ad omnia virtutis officia reddantur paratiores.

Cuique tamen conservandum jus illud sanctissimum suo utendi judicio; cui aperte Edition: 1745; Page: [326] repugnant leges omnes poenaeque latae de hominum sententiis, sive celatis, sive palam factis, si modo civium moribus non sint pestiferae. Immo, etsi istiusmodi dogmata ab iis divulgentur qui ad ea divulganda religione se putant adstrictos, satius est plerumque, cautione, de non laedendo, officiisque civilibus praestandis, a caeteris exactâ, in ea tantum facinora gravius animadvertere, quae religione malesuadâ perciti admiserunt, Edition: current; Page: [267] quam poenas ob ipsas sententias divulgatas irrogare. Istiusmodi dogmata pleraque melius saniorum hominum prudentiae et ingenio explodenda permittuntur.

Quum tamen in civitate omni, civium pars longe maxima suo judicio strenue uti nolit; [plurimique] [ast plurimi], speciosa decepti pietatis aut acrioris judicii ostentatione, quae prae se ferre solent homines quidam astuti et vafri, his se temerè tradant ducendos; eorum est qui reipub. praesunt cavere, ut constituantur viri graves et docti, qui sententias omnes saniores, et de religione et officiis civilibus, populum doceant, easque uberius et fusius illustrent, rationibusque et argumentis confirment, ne malis aliorum artibus ab officiis honestis detorqueatur. Et, si modo vel mediocris adsit principibus viris prudentia, neque absurda plane aut inhumana foveant dogmata, populum, ejusve saltem partem Edition: 1745; Page: [327] longe maximam, habebunt flexibilem, ut quocunque duxerint sequutura sit: ita ut nihil a diversis paucorum sententiis sit metuendum.

Ubi exigitur ut populus sacrorum ritibus, aut dogmatis, vanis, falsis et stolidis, aut inutilibus quantumvis veris, assentiantur, et dissentientibus irrogantur poenae; gravis plerumque pernicies civitati oritur: quum, ut diversa sunt hominum ingenia, in his praecipuè rebus, ad sententias longissimè diversas semper sunt proclives. Cives vel optimi his de causis vexati civitatem deserent; seditionibus discordiisque permiscebuntur omnia; atque ab officiis civilibus, artibusque reipub. profuturis, ad nugas saepe ineptiasque civium animi avocabuntur. Ob sententias igitur de religione, quantumvis falsas, aut sacrorum ritus quoslibet, dummodo nemini noceant, cives boni haud vexandi, ullove civium jure excludendi.

II. Ad virtutem omnem in civitate fovendam praecipuè conducunt imperatorum exempla; a quibus si probi soli, morumque integritate spectati, ad Edition: current; Page: [268] honores evehantur, ardentiora accendentur omnis honestatis studia. Virtutis speciem populus favore nunquam non prosequitur. A populo verè libero soli ferè morum probitate insignes, ad honores provehentur; [neque honores et imperia Edition: 1745; Page: [328] eorum mores immutabunt, si, legum annalium praescripto, ea brevi] [praecipue si, secundum leges annales, brevi ipsis numera] sint deponenda. Qualis est ipse rex, qui a rege creantur sunt futuri.

Post pietatem erga Deum, in qua sita est summa cujusque foelicitas, quaeque ad alias omnes virtutes fovendas plurimum confert, virtutes in civitate praecipuè colendae sunt temperantia, justitia, fortitudo, et diligentia.

Temperantiam, qua non solum libidines corporis voluptatem respicientes cohibentur, verum omnis luxuria, sumptusque nimii in vitae ornatum et splendorem erogandi, civitati necessariam esse fatebuntur omnes, quibus ipsius natura est perspecta. Certus est voluptatis modus, et gratus et innocuus, a Deo et natura concessus, cui fruendae plurima benignissime ipsa machinata est. Neque damnandus est voluptatum usus, si modo nulli officio adversentur, neque ad hominum mentes ita effoeminandas aut depravandas pertineant, ut absentium voluptatum desiderio crucientur, aut vitae officia deserant, iisve voluptates anteponant. Luxuria igitur est “voluptatum appetitio nimia, quae officio adversatur.” Neque voluptatum modus definiri potest, nisi et facultatum, et necessitudinum, et officiorum, et valetudinis ratio habeatur. Luxuria autem, quum Edition: 1745; Page: [329] facultatum sit prodiga, hominesque faciat rerum plurimarum indigentes et avidos, atque ad officia quae patriae aut amicis debentur <relinquendae>, quum voluptati repugnant, relinquenda [reddat] proclives; cives etiam ad patriam vel tyranno vel hosti prodendam incitabit; si quando ea ratione opes in luxum Edition: current; Page: [269] profundendas [impendendas] sibi comparare possint. Luxuriosis enim omnia venalia.

Neque dixeris luxuriam ad artes et opificia fovenda vel necessariam vel utilem. Etenim sine ulla luxurie foveri possunt artes omnes aut necessariae aut elegantiores. Opulentioribus sine crimine coëmere licet opera quaevis artificiosa et elegantiora, quatenus sinit officiorum et necessitudinum ratio. Quique, pro sua benignitate, plurimas sibi negant voluptates, iidem eas ipsas, aut alias saltem civitati pariter profuturas, soboli, cognatis, amicis, fruendas plerumque largiuntur. Hi igitur una cum amicis, magis opificibus prosunt quam luxuriosi.

Quid, quod et sobrius quisque et providus, diuturna in vita et copiosâ, plura fere consumat quam prodigus, qui plurium annorum morbis et inedia, brevis luxuriae poenas pendit. Quumque mores superiorum imitari soleant inferiores, cito ad infimos, ipsosque opifices, descendet haec pestis; quorum operae idcirco cariùs erunt emundae: Edition: 1745; Page: [330] merces igitur {nostratium}, pretio aucto, exteri non sunt coëmpturi, quum vilius veneant quae in civitatibus aliis, ubi viget sobrietas et temperantia, conficiuntur.

III. De diligentia et industria fovenda vix dicere attinet, quum ab ea ferè sola civitatis cujusque opes pendeant et potentia. Fovenda est agricultura, ne quid, ad populum alendum, de civitatis opibus decedat; utque fruges suppetant et frumentum exteris vendendum, nostratibusque materies omnis, in qua elaborent opifices; quae, alioqùi ab exteris esset emenda. Fovendae pariter omnes artes et simpliciores et elegantiores, ne exterorum operis et opificiis emendis civitatis opes dilabantur. Exercenda etiam Edition: current; Page: [270] mereatura, et piscatus, ubi ejusdem est copia. Quin et mercibus, sive nostris sive alienis, vehendis, construendae sunt naves; artesque nauticae addiscendae, quae et divitiis augendis inserviunt, et civitati in bello protegendae. Neque artibus hisce suus deesse debet honos, ne honestiore loco natis <non> prorsus indignae censeantur.

IV. Justitiam civitati necessariam esse nemo negat. Ubi enim non vigent leges et judicia, (sine quibus, quae vel natura tribuit vel industria, nemini sunt tuta,) omnes ab industria deterrentur. Quin etiam quum mercium omnium, pro mercatorum Edition: 1745; Page: [331] periculis, augeantur pretia; ubi non viget justitia, quae damna {mercatoribus} dant emptores fraudulenti, ea mercium pretio sunt reparanda; eisque onerabuntur emptores probi et candidi. Quaevis igitur gens vicina, ubi conservatur rerum contractarum fides, similes merces viliùs vendere poterit. Civitas igitur ubi impunitae sunt fraudes fallaciaeque, praecipua ex commerciis et opificiis emolumenta est amissura.

De judiciis legibusque interpretandis longum esset dicere. Hoc tantum monemus, legibus paucis et simplicioribus cives satis protegi posse, si modo ita constituantur judicia, ut solis probis et aequis, fideique spectatae judicibus, lites dijudicandae permittantur. Multum etiam profuerit si calumniatoribus et temerè litigantibus poenae graviores irrogentur[: quarum exempla] [Antiquiores] Romanorum leges exhibent aliis civitatibus imitanda.{*}

V. Virtutes artesque bellicae civibus quibuslibet honestioribus sunt dignissimae. Nulli igitur militiae munus perpetuum esse debet; omnibus vero per vices obeundum. [Atque licet ubi mos invaluit, ut] [Quamvis autem ubi] Edition: current; Page: [271] in perpetuam militiam conscribantur hi fere soli, qui aliis muneribus sunt inutiles, nebulones, civitatis purgamenta, {usu veniat, ut} quicunque aliquot stipendia meruit, pacis artibus Edition: 1745; Page: [332] exercendis parum idoneus reddatur; aliter se res haberet, si per vices haec munera civibus optimis essent obeunda. Quae res maximas praeterea haberet opportunitates: rerum militarium scientiam haberent omnes: deleto uno exercitu, non deficeret alter: deletis imperatoribus, plures praestò essent ei muneri aptissimi: populi denique armati armisque assueti jura, non facile pessundaret vel civis ambitiosus et audax, vel hostis.

VI. Legibus atque ipsa reipub. formâ cavendum est, ne qui cives vel inter se, vel cum exteris, sive regibus sive sacerdotibus, arctius quam cum patria conjungantur; neve aliunde spes habeant majores. Civesque ab eorum errore abducendi, qui pacta, a majoribus scelerata fraude deceptis inita, contra patriae salutem et prosperitatem valere credunt. Ad veram enim religionem conservandam, neque necessarium est neque utile, {ut} sacerdotibus imperia civilia qualiacunque permittantur; multo minus ut omnes ubique gentium sacerdotes, una regantur potestate, quae in pluribus civitatibus honores et dignitates, immo opes ingentes, et proventus fere regios, largiri possit; et cui in plurimis rebus gravioribus, ad opes potentiamque pertinentibus, ultimum permittatur judicium.

VII. Legibus civilibus sancienda et Edition: 1745; Page: [333] confirmanda praecipuè juris naturalis praecepta; et de negotiis et actionibus formulae constituendae, ad fraudes praecavendas aptissimae. In rebus suis gerendis, ipsisque opificiis, Edition: current; Page: [272] docendus est populus; eaque omnia definienda quae lege naturali non satis definiuntur.

Ex legum civilium systemate vel optimo, quibusdam nasci solent jura quaedam externa, quae impunè, licet parum honestè, persequi possunt: neque iis vim, aut actionem in foro, opponere licebit: sanctissima etiam officia plurima cujusque pudori permittenda. Sunt et legum beneficia quaedam ejusmodi, ut quamvis iis uti nollet vir bonus, petenti tamen haud recte negari poterunt. Quae quidem pactiones aut testamenta legibus civilibus non confirmantur, quoniam absunt praescriptae formulae, ea vir bonus saepe rata habebit, si modo neque testatoris aut paciscentis potestatem excesserint, neque quicquam iniqui aut inhumani contineant.{*} Si vero in horum alterutro erratum fuerit, legum beneficio jure uti poterit.

VIII. Leges praemiis et poenis sanciuntur. Omni civium jure et beneficiis frui, legum civilium commune est praemium; quibusdam propria sunt praemia, honores, dignitates, divitiae. Honor naturalis est “aliorum Edition: 1745; Page: [334] bona de nobis ob praestantiam nostram opinio.” Honores civiles sunt “ea cultus et observantiae indicia, quae viris claris ex legum praescripto exhibentur.”

Existimatio simplex, sive “viri innocui et hominum societate non indigni, fama,” nemini a reipub. rectoribus causa indictâ est eripienda. Existimatio eximia, quae a quibusdam intensiva dicitur, a nemine jure pleno exigi potest. Nemo enim ad alterius voluntatem judicare, aut magni eos aestimare potest, in quibus non cernit virtutes eximias. De externis vero honoris indiciis, Edition: current; Page: [273] ut de omni jure quod res externas spectat, eorum est definire qui reipub. praesunt: qui si justis tantum de causis honores {civiles} largiantur, magni apud omnes sapientes erunt <honores civiles>: sin saepius aliter fiat, viles erunt et despiciendi, solâque simulatione aut sannis excipiendi. Quales saepe conspiciuntur honores haereditarii, ubi nulla est potestas censoria.

IX. Proprie vereque huc spectant omnes poenae, ut improbis earum metu ab injuriis absterritis, caeteri tuto vitam degant: castigatio, ipsius qui delictum admiserat utilitatem spectat; et damni reparatio, laesi; quae etiam nullo antecedente delicto, jure nonnunquam exigitur.

Non ex odio aut ira, neque ex ea indignatione quam in proborum animis excitat Edition: 1745; Page: [335] delicti turpitudo, poenae praecipue irrogandae; sed ex communis potius utilitatis conservandae studio, et innocuorum curâ. Unica igitur poenarum mensura non est ipsa delicti turpitudo, sed communis potius omnium utilitas ex poenis oritura. Impunita igitur et inulta recte manent delicta quaedam turpissima. Contra ea, si aliter salva nequit esse civitas, gravioribus rectè coërcentur suppliciis, quae non adeo magnam ingenii pravitatem produnt. Ingratis, aut inhumanis, nulla irrogatur poena: severius puniuntur qui majestatis crimen, licet sub fallaci juris specie, admiserunt. Ob utrumque severius animadvertendum in eos qui potestate civili sibi permissa perfidiose abutentes, cives suos vexant et spoliant.

Quamvis necesse non sit {(nec quidem saepè fieri potest,) ut ipsa agendi consilia turpia, aut} primi voluntatis motus improbi poenis coërceantur; quales nonnunquam in bonorum animis subitò existunt, quosque ipsi ultro Edition: current; Page: [274] mox sunt repressuri: qui tamen in externos proruperunt actus istiusmodi, qui casu tantummodo, aut per aliorum vim et solertiam, irriti fuerunt, quibusque capitale ostenditur odium, et laedendi consilium, summis illi sunt coërcendi suppliciis. Exigit quidem nonnunquam communis utilitas, ut Edition: 1745; Page: [336] facinoribus parum honestis praemia decernantur [sit praemium], utque nefariis ignoscatur.

Damnanda in judiciis est ea προσωποληψία quae <eas> respicit sontium necessitudines, aut facinorum adjuncta et qualitates eas, quae neque delicti turpitudinem, neque poenae sensum, communemve utilitatem afficiunt [respiciunt]. Quae enim vel hominum vel facinorum adjuncta aut qualitates, horum quodvis afficiunt, ea omnino spectanda. Unde, caeteris paribus, pro reorum censu, augendae sunt poenae pecuniariae; et pro corporis robore, poenae quae corpore luuntur: poenae, contra, cum infamia conjunctae, pro majore reorum dignitate sunt minuendae.

Non tamen, pro majore delictorum atrocitate, sine fine augenda <sunt> supplicia et cruciatus. Ex crebris enim cruciatuum saeviorum spectaculis, imminui solet apud cives morum mansuetudo, saeviusque nascitur ingenium.

X. Ob delictum alienum nemo poenis est obnoxius: neque ob patris familias delictum recte publicatur tota res familiaris: ex ea prius praestanda omnia, quae jure suo, naturâ pactove constituto, postulare possunt conjux, et liberi, aut alii innoxii. Neque ob ullum delictum poena universitati recte irrogatur. Puniendi soli qui deliquerunt, sive privati, sive universitatis rectores. Ipsi Edition: 1745; Page: [337] quidem universitati aliquando recte adimuntur ea, sive jura, sive propugnacula aut arma, quibus ad nocendum fuerat instructa, si aliter de non laedendo cautum esse nequeat. Ad damnum ex bonis {suis} publicis praestandum Edition: current; Page: [275] nonnunquam tenebitur universitas, aut, ubi illa desunt, ex privatorum bonis; quum quae singuli suae utilitatis causa adsciverant sibi praesidia, aliis evadunt damnosa.

XI. Leges per quas imponuntur tributa, nisi majora sint quam sumptus quos civitatis tutela exigit, justissimo innituntur fundamento; quum populi totius negotiis expediundis erogentur. Eae igitur leges non sine furti crimine a civibus violantur. Neque haec injuria tam rectoribus ipsis obest, quam civibus aliis magis probis, qui quod defuerit supplere adiguntur, aliisque, ea de causa, damnis premuntur et oneribus. Tributa autem, nisi instituto civium censu, aequa ratione imperari nequeunt.

XII. Civium adversum rectores suos haec sunt officia: imprimis, rectorum justis et legibus et imperiis parere tenentur, idque sanctissimè.

2. Deinde, quum quod imperatum est in imperantis continebatur potestate, civibus plerumque parendum, quamvis non satis honestè et prudenter imperatum judicent: quod Edition: 1745; Page: [338] in bellicis praecipuè patet imperiis. Si enim civibus permittatur de imperiis judicium, neque ipsis parendum foret, quoties mandata civitati parum commoda videntur; tolleretur omnis disciplina militaris, et in multitudinem solutam et inconditam exercitus converteretur.

3. Hinc etiam efficitur, quod in iis rebus quae imperantium arbitrio permittuntur, cives rectè, immo honestè, ea imperia exsequi possunt quae imperatoribus foedo vertenda sunt vitio; quum, ruptis disciplinae vinculis, Edition: current; Page: [276] mala multo graviora plerumque sint metuenda, quam quae ex imperatis peractis essent oritura.

4. Sin autem adeo nefaria et pestifera videantur imperia, ut gravior inde civitati oritura sit pernicies, quam si penitus evertatur istorum imperatorum potestas; rectè imperia detrectabunt cives: {sedulo} cavendum tamen ne temere iis de rebus judicent.

5. Ubi aliquid imperatur quo divini Numinis majestas impiè laeditur, quove violantur hominum immerentium jura perfecta, aut quod imperantis potestati non erat permissum; imperium istud neminem obligat: immo saepe honestissimum est, quaevis potius perferre supplicia, quam, exemplo perniciem in totam civitatem trahente, istiusmodi parere imperiis. Quo jure imperantibus vim Edition: 1745; Page: [339] aliquando opponere possunt cives, satis antea dictum.{*}

Communia civium officia, ex conjunctionis civilis indole et causis; singulorum propria, ex ipsorum statu, conditione, et muneribus susceptis, satis innotescunt.

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CAPUT IX: De Jure Belli.

I. Belli, pacis, et foederum jura dicuntur transeuntia, quia exteros ferè spectant. Belli jura praecipua, in superiore libro satis explicavimus, ubi de privatorum bellis agebamus, monstratis eorum causis et terminis. Quae fere omnia conveniunt bellis civitatum, quae libertatis statum inter se conservant, qualem inter homines singulos ipsa natura constituit.

Bellorum publicorum minus solennium perfacilis est cognitio, ex magistratuum jure antea explicato, quo cives reprimunt tumultuantes, eoque civium jure, quod contra eos vicissim qui summo imperio praesunt tueri possunt.{*} “Bellum eorum jussu quibus Edition: 1745; Page: [340] summa est potestas utrinque susceptum,” dicitur solenne, sive justum. Neque semper necessarium est ut publicè indicatur aut denuncietur; quod tamen populo cultiore plerumque dignum est, neque sine causa graviori omittendum. Ab eo qui se contra vim defendit illatam, haud necessariò prius bellum indicitur; neque quidem semper ab eo qui vim infert: quoties scil. res subito est gerenda, neque bellum prius indici poterat, nisi omissâ rei bene gerendae occasione commodissima.

Qui viri graves et docti bellum necessario prius indicendum statuerunt, jus Romanorum foeciale temerè secuti sunt. Quum autem per vim decertare Edition: current; Page: [278] praeter naturam sit; viro bono indignum est ut ad id confugiat, nisi causis, ubi primum tuto fieri potest, palam indicatis; ut sciant omnes eum alia ratione jura sua tueri aut persequi non potuisse.

In bellis civilibus, <quae saepe speciosis de causis utrinque suscipiuntur> eodem favore utramque partem prosequi debent vicini omnes, quo illos quos inter bellum solenne geritur: quum in bellis civilibus, ab altera parte non minus justae, ab altera speciosae, {saepe} sint belli causae, quam quae in bellis solennibus: neque qui probabili de causa bella civilia movet, ullo hominum jure se abdicasse censendus <est>. Edition: 1745; Page: [341]

II. Belli jura vel eos inter quos bellum geritur, vel vicinos neutri parti se adjungentes spectant, “Quae recta ratio monstrat in communem utilitatem necessariò esse observanda,” ea dicuntur juris esse publici et necessarii: “quae vero in morem vetustas gentium approbatione perduxit,” ita tamen ut aliis atque aliis moribus mutari, aut significatione prius factâ confestim tolli possint, ea sunt juris gentium voluntarii.

[Quae belli causae sint justae, antea docuimus*] [Belli causas antea diximus.] Hoc solum de civitatibus monendum, quod quemadmodum inter cives, damni infecti datur actio, nimiaeque paucorum opes, quamvis eas sine injuria congerere velint, legibus tamen agrariis prohibentur: sic{, si de periculo imminente, ratione leniori caveri nequeat,} justa aliquando erit belli causa, nimia vicinae civitatis potentia, indies magis magisque gliscens; praecipue ubi animum ostendunt cives laudis bellicae nimis avidum, atque a pacis artibus alienum: ita ut vicinis vitam tutò degere non liceat, nisi ipsi Edition: current; Page: [279] pariter, mitioribus omissis artibus, ad studia bellica se totos convertant: <praesertim ubi ab ista civitate, haud aliter vicinis ut non laedantur satis caveri potest.> hoc tamen inter jura rariora censendum.

In bellis publicis iidem sunt petendi sines et justa initia, sive termini a quo, et ad quem, quae in bellis privatis. Edition: 1745; Page: [342] Belli gerendi rationes sunt aut vis aperta, aut istiusmodi fallendi artes,{*} quae nullam de sententiis nostris communicandis pacti vim continent. Vis autem in sola acie, aut contra repugnantes, licita est et probanda; quamvis pro more illo, qui ubique gentium invaluit, inhumanissimo, omnia in quoslibet ex hostili populo, externâ juris specie, impune fieri possint. Est hoc quoque receptum, hostem fictis fallere narrationibus, aut sermone quovis, si pacti forma penitus absit. Quum vero pactis solis pax reduci possit, aut, manente bello, averti saevitia ab omni abhorrens humanitate; neque hostem foederis aut pacti specie decipere receptum est, neque umbrâ quidem justitiae fieri potest.

III. Sunt et quaedam alia, pacto tacito aut consuetudine, introducta, quorum obligatio tolli potest, si modo illi quorum interest tempestive praemoneantur: ne scil. quisquam venenis in bello utatur; aut sicarios, ad reges ducesve hostiles clam necandos, ex ipsorum civibus aut militibus conducat. Ut sacri sanctique inter hostes sint nuncii quivis aut legati, juris est naturalis et necessarii; quum illorum tantum interventu, sine partis alterutrius internecione, pax bello mutari, aut belli gerendi rationes humaniores iniri possint. Jure tantum voluntario receptum Edition: 1745; Page: [343] est, ut etiam privatis rogantibus, modo sint inermes, iter per hostium fines facere, aut in hostium agris aut urbibus aliquamdiu commorari liceat.

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IV. Quo jure res civium ab hoste capiuntur paucis expediendum.

1. Tenentur gentes pace utentes, cives suos omnes, a latrociniis, aut injuriis quibuslibet, vicinis inferendis, coërcere: aut si quem vicinae gentis civem laeserint, eos cogere, ut damnum abs se datum reparent. De civibus loquimur, qui non praedonum more vitam exuere civilem.

2. Rebus repetitis neque redditis, civitas laesa jure bellum movet; res suas, aut civium suorum, apud hostem detentas, jure occupat: cujus si non sit copia, damni pensationem [compensationem] ab iis qui damnum dederant, vel ab ipsa exigit civitate, quae eos defendendo, iisve receptum praebendo, in se crimen derivavit. Eadem omnia apertiora, si publico consilio injuria fuit illata.

3. Ubi civitatis iniquae bona publica occupandi deest copia; civium hostilium bona privata, civitas laesa jure occupabit, donec omne damnum ab injuria ortum sit pensatum [compensatum]. Quum enim in civium omnium utilitatem civitas fuerat constituta, civilisque imperantibus tributa potestas; tenentur cives ea praestare damna, quae ex eo orta sunt Edition: 1745; Page: [344] praesidio, quod utilitatis suae causâ sibi adsciverant: atqui civitatum rectores, ex eo quod praedones protexerint, eos ad injurias hasce inferendas incitarunt, easque defenderunt.

4. Qui verò <innocui> cives hostiles damna haec, insontes, ex causa publica perferunt, jure a suis imperatoribus hoc exigunt, ut publicè haec ipsis praestentur, aut ex eorum bonis qui sua culpâ damnis causas praebuerunt. Aequius quidem foret et facilius, si civium hostilium bona capta, pignoris in modum detinerentur, donec laesae civitati aliunde fieret compensatio; eâque publicè factâ, tum demum sua privatis restituerentur. Mos tamen invaluit diversus. Captae res mobiles dominos omnino mutasse censentur, ubi primum in hostium delatae praesidia, vel ei qui eas ceperat, vel civitati Edition: current; Page: [281] fuerint adjudicatae; ita ut postea receptae, a priore domino postliminii jure vindicari nequeant: neque ulli in posterum vindiciarum liti pateant, postquam, specioso quovis titulo acquisitae, intra civitatis non hostilis fines pervenerunt.

V. Quae civitates medias, neutri bellantium palam faventes, spectant jura, breviter attingemus. 1. Vicina quaevis civitas, nullo de auxiliis alterutri praebendis foedere devincta, vicinorum bellis neque invita Edition: 1745; Page: [345] implicari, neque ex iis damna pati debet.

2. Si foedere de auxiliis mittendis utrique adstringatur media civitas; vel neutri mittenda auxilia; vel si malit, illi cujus causa sibi justa videtur; et tum demum bello se immiscebit. Istiusmodi enim foedera tunc modò obligant, quum bello subest causa justa; neque paciscentium quemquam ad bellum iis, quibus priore foedere publico devincti erant, inferendum adstringunt.

3. Res mobiles ab utravis parte captas et abjudicatas, jure emit, aut, {alio} quovis titulo legitimo, sibi comparat civitas media; neque eas domini priores jure vindicabunt. Ad mediam civitatem ejusve cives non attinet judicare, quo jure res captae fuerant. Saepenumero ne vel norunt quod istae res venales praedae pars fuerant.

4. Rerum immobilium alia longè ratio. Eas civitati sibi non inimicae fuisse ereptas, mediam civitatem latere nequit: sua autem emptione domini prioris jus, ad eas per vim recipiendas, praecluderetur. Quae quidem urbi cuivis, castello, aut praedio, debebantur a vicinis servitutes reales, aut pensiones annuae, illae novo possessori postulanti jure praestantur: idque denegare tacitum in se haberet contra causam ejus judicium: quaeque hujusmodi novo possessori praestita fuerant, Edition: 1745; Page: [346] ea antiquus dominus, rebus Edition: current; Page: [282] suis immobilibus receptis, repetere nequit. Nullo tamen jure novus possessor, nisi bello finito, ipsas servitutes in perpetuum abolere, aut sortem debitam remittere potest, ita ut domini prioris, rebus suis receptis, jus tollatur.

5. Quicquid eorum, qui bellum gerunt, uni, a civitate media concessum fuerit, idem alteri concedendum; sive uni concesserit, ut milites ex suis civibus conscribat; sive copias suas militares eidem conducendas praebuerit; sive armis militaribus aut commeatibus supportatis adjuverit; ea omnia alteri etiam facienda. Arma quidem hostium alterutri vendere, aut commeatum etiam, in urbem aliquam aut regionem armis obsessam, invehere, civitatibus mediis negatur, nisi bello se immiscere velint.

6. Civitas media neutiquam prohibenda, ne, cum earum utrâque quae bellum inter se gerunt, commercia exerceat, nisi forte in armis aut apparatu bellico invehendo. Utrique naves onerarias locare, et, ex earum mercibus vehendis, justum sibi lucrum captare potest. Quod cum sit, hostium merces, non vero ipsae civitatis mediae naves, jure capi possunt et publicari. Civitas etiam media eorum naves, inter quos bellum geritur, ad merces suas vehendas conducere potest: Edition: 1745; Page: [347] quae naves si ab hoste capiantur, jure publicantur; non vero mediae civitatis merces. Neque pignorisjus quodvis aut hypothecae, in res captas olim constitutum, amittit civitas media.

7. Merito item receptum, ut neutri, intra mediae civitatis sines, hostibus suis vim inferre liceat, homines ipsos eorumve naves aut merces capiendo aut perdendo. Porrigi autem censentur civitatis cujusque fines, non solum ad portus, sed etiam ad maris sinus intra agros ejus recedentes, et littora, partesque maris propinquiores, unde aut ipsi ab hostibus, aut hostes ab ipsis, tormentis bellicis laedi possint. Si enim bellantibus intra mediae civitatis fines sibi invicem vim inferre liceret; bellum alienum in civitatem mediam, non sine plurimis incommodis et periculis, transportaretur: omniaque interea cum bellantium utroque commercia penitus tollerentur.

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8. Quod ad perfugas attinet: bellantium neutri permittitur, ut, intra mediae civitatis fines, imperium aut jurisdictionem cum vi conjunctam in cives proprios exerceat, nisi potestate prius a media civitate impetrata. Homines {quidèm} atrociorum scelerum rei, minimè in media civitate protegendi; sed capti, suis ad supplicium sunt tradendi. Qui vero milites ab utrovis ad mediam confugerunt Edition: 1745; Page: [348] civitatem, aut qui religionis ergô, aut ob simultates civiles, aut quaecunque speciosis de causis ab aliqua reipub. factione incoepta fuerant, patriâ sunt profugi; de iis invaluit mos, idemque humanissimus, ut tutum in omni civitate vicina receptum habeant et protegantur; dummodo nihil hostile contra suae civitatis rectores illic moliantur.

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CAPUT X: De Foederibus, Legatis, et Civitatum Interitu [Deletione].

I. Bella foederum ope plerumque componuntur; quorum jura praecipua de singulorum pactis agentes docuimus. In foederibus vero pacem reducentibus, vis et metûs exceptioni vix est locus: alioquin controversiae veteres, quae bellis causam dederant, semper renasci possent. Valebit tamen ea exceptio, quoties illata fuerit vis apertè iniquissima, nulla juris specie innixa; aut ubi pacis leges impositae ab omni aequitate et humanitate abhorrent.

1Quod ubi evenerit, ad arbitros provocare licebit; parte vero altera id detrectante, Edition: 1745; Page: [349] non aliud perfugium restabit, quam ut utraque pro se judicet, quantumque fieri potest sibi consulat.

Foedera sunt vel realia, vel personalia: Haec rariùs inita, ipsos civitatum rectores praecipue spectant, cumque ipsis intereunt: realia populum spectant, qui sensu quodam immortalis dici potest. Sunt etiam foedera vel aequalia, vel inaequalia: nec omnia foedera inaequalia populi majestatem imminuunt.{*}

Ad foedera firmanda dabantur olim obsides. Qui mos ideo exolevisse videtur, quod haud sine summâ morum saevitia et immanitate, obsides immeriti durius tractari poterant, ubi suae civitatis perfidiâ violatum esset foedus.

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II. In foederibus faciendis adhibentur legati, aut internuntii. Qui omnes, quibuscunque nominibus sint insignes, eodem utuntur jure naturali, quum ad liberae civitatis negotia obeunda veniunt. Legatos sanctos habendos antea dictum. Jure etiam postulant, ut apud eos ad quos mittuntur mandata exponant. Ut etiam iis petentibus {ibidem} <in ea civitate ad quam missi fuerant> commorari concedatur, humanitas quidem suaderet; pleno tamen jure non est postulandum: quum legati, praesertim solertiores, speculatorum munere saepius fungi Edition: 1745; Page: [350] soleant: dumque commorantur, eo solo proteguntur [gaudent] jure naturali et necessario, quo et inquilini.

Jure autem publico et voluntario, [plurimas habent immunitates et beneficia] [plurimis gaudent immunitatibus, privilegiis, & beneficiis], et ipsi legati, et omnis eorum comitatus necessarius. Quae omnia tamen, vicinis maturè praemonitis, civitas quaevis sine injuria immutare poterit.

1. Hoc imprimis receptum, quod legatus in forum alienum non sit vocandus, eidemque cui antea jurisdictioni obnoxius sit. Quod hoc consilio institutum videtur, quod quo vigilantius munere suo fungitur {legatus}, eo magis civitatis ubi commoratur populo suspectus erit et invisus; ideoque si illic causam dicere cogeretur, metus esset, ne coram judicibus minus aequis agendum foret. Sibi caveant igitur isti cives, neque cum legato inter ipsos commorante, quem in jus vocare nequeunt, contractus ineant. At si quid gravius admiserit legatus, domum est remittendus: bellumque, si opus fuerit, regi populove a quo missus fuerat, indicendum, nisi illi irrogentur poenae, aut omne [a se illatum] [quod dederat] damnum praestare cogatur. Ubi quidem mercaturae se immiscuit legatus, merces civitati ubi commoratur subjiciuntur, nisi legationi obeundae sint necessariae.

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2. Legato ipsiusque comitibus necessariis Edition: 1745; Page: [351] (quorum numerum et nomina rogatus exhibere tenetur,) asylum praestat ipsius domus. Magistratuum tamen ibidem in cives suos, aut inquilinos alios, potestatem imminuere nequit, iisdem etiam praestando asylum. Quantus autem cum legato admittendus sit comitatus, civitatis ubi commoraturus est judicio permittendum.

3. Legato in suos jus idem est quod patrifamilias, aut quantum, in eorum litibus privatis, ipsi sua dederat civitas. Supplicii vero gravioris de suis sumendi jus, nisi civitatis ubi commoratur permissu, sibi arrogare nequit legatus, aut ipse quidem rex in aliena civitate degens.

4. Adversum legatos interdictis est locus, ut a vi cives nostri defendantur; qui, et per se, vim vi jure repellere possunt.

5. Exulem quempiam aut perfugam facinorosum legatum accipere, nulla tenetur civitas: eum tamen jure in vincula non conjiciet, neque ad supplicium detinebit.

6. Quales legatis honores sint deferendi, et quinam praestantiores habendi, solis civitatum pactis est definiendum. Eo praestantior habendus videretur quisque, quo prudentius instituatur civitas cujus negotia obit, aut quo ipse reliquis virtute et honore sit insignior. Regia potestas haereditaria nullisque limitibus circumscripta, ad legatos honestandos Edition: 1745; Page: [352] nihil affert, si veras rerum causas, non mores a regnis barbaris deductos, spectare velimus.

III. De civili vinculo solvendo haec breviter monenda. Primo, Civilem nexum [obligationem] perpetuo solvi exilio, non vero temporario, neque relegatione quamvis perpetuâ.

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2. Nemini jus esse plenum, civitatem suam ipsâ inconsultâ deserere, nisi legibus permittatur.

3. Ubi vel per vim externam, vel factionem praepotentem, multum immutata fuerit reipub. forma; civibus diffentientibus saluti suae alibi gentium melius consulere, immo et provinciis se in libertatem vindicare, licebit: quippe quae, ut antea dictum,{*} sua solum voluntate, Reip. longe aliter ac nunc est constitutae, subjiciebantur.

4. In melius mutatâ repub. eam nulla juris specie cives deserere possunt.

5. Utcunque ab ipsius civibus immutetur reipub. forma, manent omnia cum externis inita foedera realia.

IV. Quo jure civitas regionis suae partem aliquam aut provinciam, cum populo illic degente, hosti, aut extero cuivis dedere possit, ex [iis quae antè diximus] [dictis] facilè intelligitur. Primo, quum communis utilitatis causa, in quâ sua cujusque continetur, Edition: 1745; Page: [353] civitatis aut populi partes quaeque, ut etiam provinciae, se toti civitati subjecerunt; nullo jure civitas partes sui quasvis, aut provincias, invitas extero cuivis dedere poterit, easve obligare, ut se isti subjiciant quamvis aliter melius sibi consulere possint. At contra, quum ad ea quae fieri nequeunt praestanda nulla civitas obligetur, si sui partem aliquam aut provinciam civitas defendere nequeat, eam jure indefensam relinquet; et, si aliter suae saluti consulere nequeat, ne eam amplius defendat pacto se adstringet: quo tamen pacto, nulla huic parti aut provinciae imponitur obligatio, quo minus sibi alia ratione prospiciat, vel novos adsciscendo socios, vel tertiae cuivis civitati se adjungendo, aut subjiciendo, quo ab hoste ingruente protegatur. Pactum enim illud {de communi omnium defensione}, quo in civitatem coaluit populus, illudve quo Edition: current; Page: [288] provincia se subjecerat, in eo casu, ejusdemmodi est cum pactis de iis quae fieri nequeunt praestandis.

Quod de populi parte aut provincia, idem dicendum de cive strenuo et forti, quem ob virtutem invisum, hostis sibi tradi postulat: qui quidem, gravi premente necessitate, nonnunquam esset deserendus, neque amplius defendendus; ut dedatur vero, aut prohibeatur quo minus alibi suae saluti consulat, minime convenit. Edition: 1745; Page: [354]

V. De civitatum interitu [deletione] haec tenenda. Civitate penitus devictâ, civibus quibusvis, provinciis item, sibi quantum possunt prospicere licet; sive alii se adjungere velint civitati, sive novam sibi in provincia constituere. Civium quidem est, pro patria omnia subire pericula, neque temere de ejus salute spem deponere. Si tamen sat patriae sit datum, neque tamen defendi possit, jure, qua ratione possunt, sibi suisque prospiciunt.

2. Si quo casu insperato reviviscat civitas, quae aliquamdiu extincta jacebat [fuerat]; ei se adjungere tenentur cives omnes et provinciae, nisi interea novo atque aequo foedere teneantur. Quae autem foedera, a civibus dissipatis, aut a provinciis, bona fide, dum antiqua civitas extincta fuit, cum exteris jungebantur, eorum firma manebit obligatio.

3. Quae diu deleta [extincta] fuit civitas, civitati victrici in provinciae modum subjecta, omnia amisit in cives profugos aut provincias suas jura. Neque si in iisdem finibus qui a civitate antiqua occupabantur, nova olim constituatur, ea prioris jura sibi arrogare poterit. Diversae saepe civitates populique, temporibus diversis, eosdem occupant agros: agrisque mutatis, eadem manet civitas; immo quum vel nullos prorsus habeat.

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Manente civitate unus omnium debet esse Edition: 1745; Page: [355] animus, omnia pro patria et facere et pati, quae antiquissimae sanctissimaeque civitatis, in qua continetur universum genus humanum, cujusque rector et parens est Deus, legibus non adversantur. “Cari sunt liberi, cari conjuges, parentes, propinqui, amici, familiares; omnes tamen omnium caritates patria una complexa est: pro qua vir bonus non dubitabit mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus.”2

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BOOK I: The Elements of Ethicks.

CHAPTER I: Of Human Nature and its Parts.

I. As all other arts <and sciences> have in view some <natural> good to be obtained, as their proper end, Moral Philosophy, which is the art of regulating the whole of life, must have in view the noblest end; since it undertakes, as far as human reason [powers] can go, to lead us into that course of life which is most according to the intention of nature, and most happy, to which end whatever we can obtain by other arts should be subservient. Moral Philosophy therefore must be one of these commanding arts which directs how far the other arts are to be pursued.1 <As, however, a common suggestion or natural judgment tells us that happiness, or the means to obtain it, consists in some affection or habit of the soul and in the consequent actions> [a]nd since all Philosophers, even of the most opposite schemes, agree in words at least, that “Happiness either consists in virtue and virtuous offices, or is to be obtained and Edition: 1745; Page: [2] secured by them”:2 The chief points to be enquired into in Morals [Moral Philosophy] must be, what course of life is according to the intention of nature? wherein consists happiness? and what is virtue?3

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All such as believe that this universe, and human nature in particular, was formed by the wisdom and counsel of a Deity, must expect to find in our structure and frame some clear evidences, shewing the proper business of mankind, for what course of life, what offices we are furnished by the providence and wisdom of our Creator, and what <therefore> are the proper means of happiness. We must therefore search accurately into the constitution of our nature, to see what sort of creatures we are; for what purposes nature has formed us; what character God our Creator requires us to maintain. Now the intention of <God and> nature with respect to us, is best known by examining what these things are which our natural senses {or perceptive powers} recommend to us, and what the most excellent among them? and next, what are the aims of our several natural desires, and which of them are of greatest importance to our happiness? In this inquiry we shall lightly pass over such natural powers as are treated of in other arts [sciences], dwelling chiefly upon those which are of consequence in regulating our morals.

In this art, as in all others, we must proceed from the subjects more easily known, to those that are more obscure; and not follow the priority of nature, or the dignity of the subjects: and therefore don’t deduce our first notions of duty from the divine Will; but from the constitution of our nature, which is more immediately Edition: 1745; Page: [3] known; that from the full knowledge of it, we may discover the design, intention, and will of our Creator as to our conduct [affections and actions].4 Nor will we omit such obvious evidences of our duty as arise even from the considerations of our present secular interests; tho’ it will perhaps hereafter appear, that all true virtue must have some nobler spring than any desires of worldly pleasures or interests.

II. First then, Human nature consists of soul and body, each of which has its proper powers, parts, {or faculties}. The inquiry into the body is more easy, and belongs to the Physicians. We only transiently observe, that it is Edition: current; Page: [25] plainly of a more noble{*} structure than that of other animals. It has not only organs of sense and all parts requisite either for the preservation of the individual or of the species, but also such as are requisite for that endless variety of action and motion, which a rational and inventive spirit may intend, and these organs formed with exquisite art. One cannot omit the dignity of its erect form, so plainly fitted for {enlarged} contemplation; the easy and swift motions of the joints; the curious structure of the hand, that great instrument of all ingenious arts; the countenance, so easily variable as to exhibit to us all the affections of the soul; and the organs of voice, so nicely fitted for speech in all its various kinds, and the pleasure of harmony. These points are more fully explained by Anatomists.

This curious frame of the human body we all see to be fading and perishing; needing daily new recruits by Edition: 1745; Page: [4] food, and constant defence against innumerable dangers from without, by cloathing, shelter, and other conveniencies. The charge of it therefore is committed to a soul endued with forethought and sagacity, which is the other, and by far the nobler part in our constitution.

III. The parts or powers of the soul, which present us with a more glorious view, are of various kinds: but they are all reducible to two classes, the Understanding and the Will.5 The former contains all the powers which aim at knowledge; the other all our desires {pursuing happiness and eschewing misery}.

We shall but briefly mention the several operations of the understanding, because they are sufficiently treated of in Logicks and Metaphysicks. The first in order are the senses: under which name we include every “constitution or power of the soul, by which certain {feelings,} ideas or perceptions Edition: current; Page: [26] are raised upon certain objects presented.” Senses are either external, or internal {and mental}. The external depend on certain organs of the body, so constituted that upon any impression made on them, or motion excited, whether by external impulses or internal forces in the body, a certain feeling [perception] or notion is raised in the soul. The feelings [perceptions] are generally either agreeable, or at least not uneasy, which ensue upon such impressions and changes as are useful or not hurtful to the body: but Edition: 1745; Page: [5] uneasy feelings ensue upon those which are destructive or hurtful.6

Tho’ bodily pleasure and pain affect the soul pretty vehemently, yet we see they <usually> are of short duration and fleeting; and {seldom} is <not> the bare remembrance of past bodily pleasures agreeable, <n>or the remembrance of past pain in it self uneasy{, when we apprehend no returns of them}.

By these senses we acquire the first notions of good and evil.7 Such things as excite grateful sensations of this kind, we call good; what excites painful or uneasy sensations, we call evil. Other objects also when perceived by some other kinds of senses, exciting also agreeable feelings, we likewise call good, and their contraries evil. Happiness in general, is “a state wherein there is plenty of such things as excite these grateful sensations of one kind or other, and we are free from pain.” Misery consists in “frequent and lasting sensations of the painful and disagreeable sorts, excluding all grateful sensations.”

There are also certain perceptions dependent on bodily organs, which are of a middle nature as to pleasure or pain, having a very small degree of either joined immediately with them: these are the perceptions by which we discern the primary qualities of external objects and any changes befalling them, their magnitude, figure, situation, motion or rest: all which are discerned chiefly by sight or touch, and give us neither pleasure nor pain of themselves; tho’ they frequently intimate to us such events as occasion desires or aversions, joys or sorrows.8 Edition: 1745; Page: [6]

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Bodily pleasures and pains, such as we have in common with the brutes, are of some importance to our happiness or misery. The other class of perceptions, which inform us of the qualities and states of things external to us, are of the highest use in all external action, in the acquiring of knowledge, in learning and practising the various arts of life.

Both these kinds of external perceptions may be called direct and antecedent, because they presuppose no previous ideas <or forms>. But there’s another class of perceptions employed about the objects of even the external senses, which for distinction we call reflex or subsequent, because they naturally ensue upon other ideas previously received: of these presently. So much for external sensation.

IV. Internal senses are those powers {or determinations} of the mind, by which it perceives or is conscious of all within itself, its actions, passions, judgments, wills, desires, joys, sorrows, purposes of action. This power some celebrated writers call consciousness or reflection, which has for its objects the qualities, actions or states of the mind itself, as the external senses have things external. These two classes of sensation, external and internal, furnish our whole store of ideas, the materials about which we exercise that noblest power of reasoning peculiar to the human species. This also deserves a fuller explication, but it belongs to Logick.9

’Tis by this power of reason, that the soul perceives the relations and connexions of things, and their consequences and causes; inferrs what is to ensue, or Edition: 1745; Page: [7] what preceded; can discern resemblances, consider in one view the present and the future, propose to itself a whole plan of life, and provide all things requisite for it.

By the exercise of reason it will easily appear, that this whole universe was at first framed by the contrivance and counsel of a most perfect intelligence, and is continually governed by the same; that it is to him mankind owe their preeminence above other animals in the power of reason, and in all these excellencies of mind or body, which clearly intimate to us the will Edition: current; Page: [28] of our munificent Creator and Preserver; and shew us what sort of offices, what course of life he requires of us as acceptable in his sight.

V. Since then every sort of good which is immediately of importance to happiness, must be perceived by some immediate power or sense, antecedent to any {opinions or} reasoning: (for ’tis the business of reasoning to compare the several sorts of good perceived by the several senses, and to find out the proper means for obtaining them:) we must therefore carefully inquire into the several sublimer perceptive powers or senses; since ’tis by them we discover what state or course of life best answers the intention of {God and} nature, and wherein true happiness consists. But we must premise some brief consideration of the Will, because the motions of the will, our affections, desires and purposes, are the objects of these more subtile senses, which perceive various qualities and important differences among them.

As soon as the mind has got any notion of good or evil by grateful or uneasy sensations of any kind, Edition: 1745; Page: [8] there naturally arise certain motions {of the Will}, distinct from all sensation; to wit, Desires of good, and Aversions to evil. For there constantly appears, in every rational being, a stable essential propensity to desire its own happiness, and whatever seems to tend to it, and to avoid the contraries which would make it miserable. And altho’ there are few who have seriously inquired what things are of greatest importance to happiness; yet all men naturally desire whatever appears to be of any consequence to this end, and shun the contrary: when several grateful objects occur, all which it cannot pursue together, the mind while it is calm, {and under no impulse of any blind appetite or passion,} pursues that one which seems of most importance. But if there should appear in any object a mixture of good and evil, the soul will pursue or avoid it, according as the good or the evil appears superior.

Beside these two calm primary motions of the Will, desire and aversion, there are other two commonly ascribed to it, to wit, Joy and Sorrow. But these two are rather to be called new states, or finer feelings or senses of the soul, than motions of the will naturally exciting to action. In this manner however we make up these four species mentioned by the antients, all <specially> referred to the Will, or rational appetite: when good to be obtained Edition: current; Page: [29] is in view, there arises Desire; when evil to be repelled, Aversion: when good is obtained or evil avoided, arises Joy; when good is lost, or evil befallen us, Sorrow.10

VI. But beside the calm motions or affections of the soul and the stable desire of happiness, which employ Edition: 1745; Page: [9] our reason for their conductor, there are also others of a very different nature; certain vehement turbulent Impulses, which upon certain occurrences naturally agitate the soul, and hurry it on with a blind inconsiderate force to certain actions, pursuits, or efforts to avoid, exerted about such things as we have never deliberately determined to be of consequence to happiness or misery. Any one may understand what we mean by these blind impetuous motions who reflects on what he has felt, what violent propensities hurried him on, when he was influenced by any of the keener passions of lust, ambition, anger, hatred, envy, love, pity, <delight> or fear; without any previous deliberate opinion about the tendency of these objects or occurrences which raised these several passions to his happiness or misery. These passions are so far from springing from the previous calm desire of happiness, that we find them often opposing it, and drawing the soul contrary ways.11

These several passions [violent motions of the soul] the antients reduce to two classes, to wit, the passionate Desires, and the correspondent Aversions; both which they teach to be quite distinct from the Will; the former aiming at the obtaining some pleasure or other, and the latter the warding off something uneasy. Both are by the schoolmen said to reside in the sensitive <or irrational> appetite; which they subdivide into the{*} concupiscible and irascible; and their impulses they call Passions. The sensitive appetite is not a very proper name for these determinations of the soul, unless the schoolmen would use the Edition: 1745; Page: [10] word senses in a more extensive signification, Edition: current; Page: [30] so as to include many perceptive powers of an higher sort than the bodily senses. For ’tis plain that many of the most turbulent passions arise upon certain occurrences which affect none of the external senses; such as ambition, congratulation, malicious joy, the keen passions toward glory and power, {and many others,} with the turbulent aversions to their contraries. The schoolmen however refer to this sensitive appetite all the vehement inconsiderate motions of the will, which are attended with confused uneasy sensations, whatever their occasions be.

Of these passions there are four general classes: such as pursue some apparent good are called {passionate Desires or} Cupidity; such as tend toward off evil are called Fears{, or Anger}; such as arise upon obtaining what was desired or the escaping evil, are turbulent Joys; and what arise upon the loss of good, or the befalling of evil, Sorrows. {[nor have we in our language words appropriated so as to distinguish between the several calm and passionate motions of the will.]}12 Of each class there are many subdivisions according to the variety of objects about which they are employed, which <have very familiar names and> will be further explained hereafter.

VII. There’s also another division of the motions of the will whether calm or passionate, according as the advantage or pleasure in view is for ourselves or others.13 That there is among men some disinterested goodness, without any views to interests of their own, but pursuing ultimately the interests of persons beloved, must be evident to such as examine well their Edition: 1745; Page: [11] own hearts, the motions of friendship or natural affection; and the love and zeal we have for worthy and eminent characters: or to such as observe accurately the cares, the earnest desires, of persons on their deathbeds, and their friendly offices to such as they love even with their last breath: or, in the more heroic characters, their great actions and designs, and their marching willingly and deliberately to certain death for their children, their friends, or their country.

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The disinterested affections are either calm, or turbulent and passionate, even as the selfish in which one pursues what seems advantageous or pleasant to himself. And the several affections or passions, whether more simple or complicated, have a variety of names as their objects are various, as they regard one’s self, or regard others, and their characters, fortunes, endearments, and the several social bonds with us or with each other; or <on the contrary> the enmities or dissentions by which they are set at variance; or as their former conduct or designs have occasioned these events which excite our passions.

14 These particular kind passions are quite different from any calm general good-will to mankind, nor do they at all arise from it. They naturally arise, without premeditation or previous volition, as soon as that species or occasion occurs which is by nature adapted to raise them. We shall have a more proper place to explain them a little further after we have mentioned the more sublime perceptive powers; without the knowledge of which many motions of the will must remain unknown [unintelligible]. Edition: 1745; Page: [12]

What any sense immediately relishes is desired for itself ultimately; and happiness must consist in the possession of all such objects, or of the most important and excellent ones. But when by the use of our reason we find that many things which of themselves give no pleasure to any sense, yet are the necessary means of obtaining what is immediately pleasant and desirable, all such proper means shall also be desired, on account of their ends. Of this class are, an extensive influence in society, riches, and power.

But as beside the several <natural> particular passions of the selfish kind15 there is deeply rooted in the soul a steddy propensity or impulse Edition: current; Page: [32] toward its own highest happiness, which every one upon a little reflection will find, by means whereof he can repress and govern all the particular selfish passions, when they are any way opposite to it; so whosoever in a calm hour takes a full view of human nature, considering the constitutions, tempers, and characters of others, will find a like general propension of soul to wish the universal prosperity and happiness of the whole system. And whosoever by frequent impartial meditation cultivates this extensive affection, which the inward sense of his soul constantly approves in the highest degree, may make it so strong that it will be able to restrain and govern all other affections, whether they regard his own happiness or that of any smaller system or party.16

VIII. Having given this summary view of the Will, we next consider these senses we called reflex or subsequent, by which certain new forms or perceptions are received, in consequence of others previously Edition: 1745; Page: [13] observed by our external or internal senses; and some of them ensuing upon observing the fortunes of others, or the events discovered by our reason, or the testimony of others. We shall only transiently mention such of them as are not of much importance in morals, that we may more fully explain those which are more necessary.

17The external senses of Sight and Hearing we have in common with the Brutes: but there’s superadded to the human Eye and Ear a wonderful and ingenious Relish or Sense,18 by which we receive subtiler pleasures; in material forms gracefulness, beauty and proportion; in sounds concord and harmony; and are highly delighted with observing exact Imitation in the works of the more ingenious arts, Painting, Statuary and Sculpture, and in motion and Action; all which afford us far more manly pleasures than the external senses. These are the Pleasures to which many arts both mechanic and liberal are subservient; and men pursue them even in all that furniture, those utensils, which are otherways requisite for the conveniency of life. And the very grandeur and novelty of objects excite some grateful perceptions Edition: current; Page: [33] not unlike the former, which are naturally connected with and subservient to our desires of knowledge. Whatever is grateful to any of these perceptive powers is for it self desirable, and may on some occasions be to us an ultimate end. For, by the wise <and benevolent> contrivance of God, our senses and appetites are so constituted {for our happiness}, that what they immediately make grateful is generally Edition: 1745; Page: [14] on other accounts also useful, either to ourselves or to mankind.

Among these more humane pleasures, we must not omit that enjoyment most peculiarly suited to human nature, which arises from the discovery of Truth{, and the enlarging of our knowledge}; which is ultimately desirable to all; and is joyful and pleasant in proportion to the dignity of the subject, and the evidence or certainty of the discovery.19

IX. There are other still more noble senses and more useful: such is that sympathy or fellow-feeling,20 by which the state and fortunes of others affect us exceedingly, so that by the very power of nature, previous to any reasoning or meditation [purpose], we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and sorrow with them in their misfortunes; as we are disposed to mirth when we see others chearful, and to weep with those that weep, without any consideration of our own Interests. Hence it is that scarce any man can think himself sufficiently happy tho’ he has the fullest supplies of all things requisite for his own use or pleasure: he must also have some tolerable stores for such as are dear to him; since their misery or distresses will necessarily disturb his own happiness.

By means of this sympathy and of some disinterested affections, it happens, as by a sort of contagion or infection, that all our pleasures, even these of the lowest kind, are strangely increased by their being shared with others. There’s scarce any chearful or joyful commotion of mind which does not naturally require to be diffused and communicated. Whatever is agreeable, Edition: 1745; Page: [15] pleasant, witty, or jocose naturally burns forth, and breaks out among others, and must be imparted. Nor on the other hand is there any thing more uneasy or grievous to a man than to behold the distressing toils, pains, griefs, or misery of others, especially of such as have deserved a better Fate.

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X. But further: that man was destined by nature for action plainly appears by that multitude of active instincts and desires natural to him; which is further confirmed by that deeply implanted sense {approving or condemning certain actions}. The soul naturally desires action; nor would one upon any terms consent to be cast into a perpetual state of sleep, tho’ he were assured of the sweetest dreams. If a sleep like that of {*} Endymion were to befal ourselves or any person dear to us, we would look upon it as little better than Death. Nature hath therefore constituted a certain sense or natural taste to attend and regulate each active power, approving that exercise of it which is most agreeable to nature and conducive to the general Interest. The very brute animals, tho’ they have none of these reflex senses we mentioned, yet by certain instincts, even previously to any experience or prospect of pleasure, are led, each according to its kind, to its natural actions, and finds in them its chief satisfactions or at least are subservient to their particular happiness. Human nature is full of like instincts; but being endued with reason and the power of reflecting on their own sentiments and conduct, they have also various reflex senses with a nice discernment Edition: 1745; Page: [16] {and relish} of many things which could not be observed by the grosser senses, especially of the exercise of their natural powers.21 By these senses that application of our natural powers is immediately approved which is most according to the intention of nature, and which is most beneficial either to the individual or to mankind; and all like application by others is in like manner approved, and thus made matter of joy and glorying. In the very posture and motion of the body, there is something which immediately pleases, whether in our own, or that of others: in the voice and gesture, and the various abilities of body or mind, in the ingenious arts of imitation <already mentioned>, in external actions and exercises, whether about serious business or recreations, we discern something graceful and manly, {and the contrary ungraceful and mean}, even without any appearance of moral virtue in the one, {or vice in the other}. But still it is chiefly in these abilities and exercises which are peculiar to mankind that grace and dignity Edition: current; Page: [35] appear; such as we have in common with beasts appear of less dignity. And among the human pursuits which yet are different from moral [voluntary]22 virtues, the pursuits of knowledge are the most venerable. We are all naturally inquisitive and vehemently allured by the discovery of truth. Superior knowledge we count very honourable; but to mistake, to err, to be ignorant, to be imposed upon, we count evil and shameful.

But to regulate the highest powers of our nature, our affections and deliberate designs of action in important affairs, there’s implanted by nature the noblest and most divine of all our senses, that Conscience [sense] by Edition: 1745; Page: [17] which we discern what is graceful, becoming, beautiful and honourable in the affections of the soul, in our conduct of life, our words and actions. By this sense, a certain turn of mind or temper, a certain course of action, and plan of life is plainly recommended to us by nature; and the mind finds the most joyful feelings in performing and reflecting upon such offices as this sense recommends; but is uneasy and ashamed in reflecting upon a contrary course. Upon observing the like honourable actions or designs in others, we naturally favour and praise them; and have an high esteem, and goodwill, and endearment toward all in whom we discern such excellent dispositions: and condemn and detest those who take a contrary course. What is approved by this sense we count right and beautiful, and call it virtue; what is condemned, we count base and deformed and vitious.

The Forms which move our approbation are, all kind affections and purposes of action; or such propensions, abilities, or habits of mind as naturally flow from a kind temper, or are connected with it; or shew an higher taste for the more refined enjoyments, with a low regard to the meaner pleasures, or to its own interests; or lastly such dispositions as plainly exclude a narrow contracted selfishness aiming solely at its own interests or sordid pleasures. The forms disapproved are either this immoderate selfishness; or a peevish, angry, envious or ill-natured temper, leading us naturally to hurt others; or a mean selfish sensuality.

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That this sense is implanted by nature, is evident from this that in all ages and nations certain tempers Edition: 1745; Page: [18] and actions are universally approved and their contraries condemned, even by such as have in view no interest [utility] of their own. Many artful accounts of all this as flowing from views of interest have been given by ingenious men;23 but whosoever will examine these accounts, will find that they rather afford arguments to the contrary, and lead us at last to an immediate natural principle prior to all such views.24 The agent himself perhaps may be moved by a view of advantages of any sort [by a view of more open or more hidden utility] accruing only to himself, to approve his own artful conduct; but such advantages won’t engage the approbation of others <that do not gain any profit by it>: and advantages accruing to others, would never engage the agent, without a moral sense, to approve such actions. How much soever the agent may be moved by any views of his own interest [utility]; yet this when ’tis known plainly diminishes the beauty of the action, and sometimes quite destroys it. Men approve chiefly that beneficence which they deem gratuitous and disinterested; what is pretended, and yet only from views of private interest, they abhor. When the agent appears to have in view the more obvious interests of getting glory, popularity, or gainful returns, there appears little or nothing honourable. ’Tis well known that such advantages are attainable by external actions, and hypocritical shews, without any real inward goodness.

But further, does not every good action appear the more honourable and laudable the more toilsome, dangerous or expensive it was to the undertaker? ’Tis plain therefore that a virtuous course is not approved under that notion of its being profitable to the agent.25 Edition: 1745; Page: [19] Nor is it approved under the notion of profitable to those who approve it, for we all equally praise and admire any glorious actions of antient Heroes from which we derive no advantage, as the like done in our own times. We approve even the virtues of an enemy that are dreaded by us, and yet condemn the useful services of a Traytor, whom for our own interest we have bribed into perfidy. Nay Edition: current; Page: [37] the very Dissolute frequently dislike the vices of others which are subservient to their own.

Nor can it be alleged that the notion under which we approve actions is their tendency to obtain applause or rewards: for this consideration could recommend them only to the agent. And then, whoever expects praise must imagine that there is something in certain actions or affections, which in its own nature appears laudable or excellent both to himself and others: whoever expects rewards or returns of good offices, must acknowledge that goodness and beneficence naturally excite the love of others. None can hope for Rewards from God without owning that some actions are acceptable to God in their own nature; nor dread divine punishments except upon a supposition of a natural demerit in evil actions. When we praise the divine Laws as holy, just and good, ’tis plainly on this account, that we believe they require what is antecedently conceived as morally good, and prohibit the contrary, {otherwise these Epithets would import nothing laudable}.

That this sense is implanted by nature, and that thus affections and actions of themselves, and in their Edition: 1745; Page: [20] own nature, must appear to us right, honourable, beautiful and laudable, may appear from many of the most natural affections of the Will, both calm and passionate, which are naturally raised without any views of our own advantage, upon observing the conduct and characters and fortunes of others; and thus plainly evidence what Temper nature requires in us. Of these we shall speak presently. This {moral} sense diffuses it self through all conditions of life, and every part of it; and insinuates it self into all the more humane amusements and entertainments of mankind. Poetry and Rhetorick depend almost entirely upon it; as do in a great measure the arts of the Painter, Statuary, and Player. In the choice of friends, wives, comrades, it is all in all; and it even insinuates it self into our games and mirth. Whosoever weighs all these things fully will agree with Aristotle “That as the Horse is naturally fitted for swiftness, the Hound for the chace, and the Ox for the plough, so man, like a sort of mortal Deity, is fitted by nature for knowledge, and action.”

Nor need we apprehend, that according to this scheme which derives all our moral notions from a sense, implanted however in the soul and not dependent on the body, the dignity <and firmness> of virtue should be impaired. For the constitution of nature is ever stable and harmonious; nor need we fear that any change in our constitution should also change the Edition: current; Page: [38] nature of virtue, more than we should dread the dissolution of the Universe by a change of the great principle of Gravitation. Nor will it follow from this scheme, Edition: 1745; Page: [21] that all sorts of affections and actions were originally indifferent to the Deity, so that he could as well have made us approve the very contrary of what we now approve, by giving us senses of a contrary nature. For if God was originally omniscient, he must have foreseen, that by his implanting kind affections, in an active species capable of profiting or hurting each other, he would consult the general good of all; and that implanting contrary affections would necessarily have the contrary effect: in like manner by implanting a sense which approved all kindness and beneficence, he foresaw that all these actions would be made immediately agreeable to the agent, which also on other accounts were profitable to the system; whereas a contrary sense (whether possible or not we shall not determine,) would have made such conduct immediately pleasing, as must in other respects be hurtful both to the agent and the system. If God therefore was originally wise and good, he must necessarily have preferred the present constitution of our sense approving all kindness and beneficence, to any contrary one; and the nature of virtue is thus as immutable as the divine Wisdom and Goodness. Cast the consideration of these perfections of God out of this question, and indeed nothing would remain certain or immutable.26

XI. There are however very different degrees of approbation and condemnation, some species of virtues much more beautiful than others, and some kinds of vices much more deformed. {These maxims generally hold.} “Among the kind motions of the Will of equal extent, the calm and stable are more beautiful Edition: 1745; Page: [22] than the turbulent or passionate.” And when we compare calm affections among themselves, or the passionate among themselves, “the more extensive are the more amiable, and these most excellent which are most extensive, and pursue the greatest happiness of the whole system of sensitive nature.”27

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It was already observed that our esteem of virtue in another, causes a warmer affection of good-will toward him: now as the soul can reflect on all its powers, dispositions, affections, desires, senses, and make them the objects of its contemplation; a very high relish for moral excellence, a strong desire of it, and a strong endearment of heart toward all in whom we discern eminent virtues, must it self be approved as a most virtuous disposition; nor is there any more lovely than the highest love towards the highest moral excellency.28 Since then God must appear to us as the Supreme excellence, and the inexhaustible fountain of all good, to whom mankind are indebted for innumerable benefits most gratuitously bestowed; no affection of soul can be more approved than the most ardent love and veneration toward the Deity, with a steddy purpose to obey him, since we can make no other returns, along with an humble submission and resignation of ourselves and all our interests to his will, with confidence in his goodness; and a constant purpose of imitating him as far as our weak nature is capable.

{The objects of our condemnation are in like manner of different degrees.} Ill-natured unkind affections and purposes are the more condemned the more stable and deliberate they are. Such as flow Edition: 1745; Page: [23] from any sudden passionate desire are less odious; and still more excusable are those which flow from some sudden fear or provocation. What we chiefly disapprove is that sordid selfishness which so engrosses the man as to exclude all human sentiments of kindness, and surmounts all kind affections; and disposes to any sort of injuries for one’s own interests.

We justly also reckon Impiety toward God to be the greatest depravation of mind, and most unworthy of a rational Being, whether it appears in a direct contempt of the Deity; or in an entire neglect of him, so that one has no thoughts about him, no veneration, no gratitude toward him. Nor is it of any avail either to abate the moral Excellence of Piety, or the deformity of impiety, to suggest that the one cannot profit him, nor the other hurt him. For what our [conscience or moral sense] [sense of what is right Edition: current; Page: [40] and honourable] chiefly regards are the affections of the heart, and not the external effects of them. That man must be deemed corrupt and detestable who has not a grateful heart toward his benefactor, even when he can make no returns: who does not love, praise and celebrate the virtues of even good men, tho’ perhaps he has it not in his power to serve or promote them. Where there is a good heart, it naturally discovers itself in such affections and expressions, whether one can profit those he esteems and loves or not. These points are manifest to the inward sense of every good man without any reasoning.

XII. This nobler sense which nature has designed to be the guide of life deserves the most careful consideration, since it is plainly the judge {of the whole of life,} Edition: 1745; Page: [24] of all the various powers, affections and designs, and naturally assumes a jurisdiction over them; pronouncing that most important sentence, that in the virtues themselves, and in a careful study of what is beautiful and honourable in manners, consists our true dignity, and natural excellence, and supreme happiness. Those who cultivate and improve this sense find that it can strengthen them to bear the greatest external evils, and voluntarily to forfeit external advantages, in adhering to their duty toward their friends, their country, or the general interest of all: and that in so doing alone it is that they can throughly approve themselves and their conduct. It likewise punishes with severe remorse and secret lashes such as disobey this natural government constituted in the soul, or omit through any fear, or any prospect of secular advantages, the Duties which it requires.

That this Divine Sense {or Conscience} naturally approving these more extensive affections should be the governing power in man, appears both immediately from its own nature, {as we immediately feel that it naturally assumes a right of judging, approving or condemning all the various motions of the soul; as also} from this that every good man applauds himself, approves entirely his own temper, and is then best pleased with himself when he restrains not only the lower sensual appetites, but even [as well as] the more sublime ones of a selfish kind [concerning his own pleasure and utility], or [but even] the more narrow and contracted affections of love toward kindred, or friends, or even his country, when they interfere with the more extensive interests of mankind, and the common prosperity of Edition: current; Page: [41] Edition: 1745; Page: [25] all. Our inward conscience of right and wrong [This sense] not only prefers the most diffusive goodness to all other affections of soul, whether of a selfish kind, or of narrower endearment: but also abundantly compensates all losses incurred, all pleasures sacrificed, or expences sustained on account of virtue, by a more joyful consciousness of our real goodness, and merited glory; since all these losses sustained increase the moral dignity and beauty of virtuous offices, and recommend them the more to our inward sense:{*} which is a circumstance peculiar to this case, nor is the like found in any other sense{, when it conquers another of less power than its own}. And further, whoever acts otherways cannot throughly approve himself if he examines well the inward sense of his soul: when we judge of the characters and conduct of others, we find the same sentiments Edition: 1745; Page: [26] of them: nay, this subordination of all to the most extensive interests is what we demand from them; nor do we ever fail in this case to condemn any contrary conduct; as in our judgments about others we are under no byass from our private passions and interests. And therefor altho’ every event, disposition, or action incident to men may in a certain sense be called natural; yet such conduct alone as is approved by this diviner faculty, which is plainly destined to command the rest, can be properly called agreeable or suited to our nature.29

XIII. With this moral sense is naturally connected that other {of Honour and Shame}, which makes the approbations, the gratitude, and esteem of others who approve our conduct, matter of high pleasure; and their censures, and condemnation, and infamy, matter of severe uneasiness; even altho’ we should have no hopes of any other advantages from their approbations, or fears of evil from their dislike. For by this sense these things are made good or evil immediately and in themselves: and hence it is that we Edition: current; Page: [42] see many solicitous about a surviving fame, without any notion [hope] that after death they shall have any sense of it{, or advantage by it}. Nor can it be said{*} that we delight in the praises of others only as they are a testimony to our virtue and confirm the good opinion we may have of our selves: for we find that the very best of mankind, who are abundantly conscious of their own virtues, and need no such confirmation, yet have pleasure in the praises they obtain. Edition: 1745; Page: [27]

That there’s a natural sense {of honour and fame30}, founded indeed upon our moral sense, or presupposing it, but distinct from it and all other senses, seems manifest from that natural <motion of the soul that is called shame or> modesty, which discovers itself by the very countenance in blushing; which nature has plainly designed as a guardian not only to moral virtue, but to all decency in our whole deportment, and a watchful check upon all the motions of the lower appetites.31 And hence it is that this sense is of such importance in life, by frequently exciting men to what is honourable, and restraining them from every thing dishonourable, base, flagitious, or injurious.

In these two senses, of moral good and evil, and of honour and shame, mankind are more uniformly constituted than in the other senses; which will be manifest if the same immediate forms or species of actions be proposed to their judgment; that is, if they are considering the same affections of heart whether to be approved or condemned, they would universally agree. If indeed they have contrary opinions of happiness, or of the external means of promoting or preserving it, ’tis then no wonder, however uniform their moral senses be, that one should approve what another condemns <when they judge external actions>. Or if they have contrary opinions about the divine Laws, some believing that God requires what others think he forbids, or has left indifferent; while all agree that it is our duty to obey God: or lastly, if they entertain contrary opinions about the <natural dispositions, Edition: current; Page: [43] manners, and> characters of men {or parties}; some believing that sect or party to be honest, pious and good, which others take to be savage or wicked. On these accounts they may Edition: 1745; Page: [28] have the most opposite approbations and condemnations, tho’ the moral sense of them all were uniform, approving the same immediate object, to wit, the same tempers and affections.32

XIV. When by means of these senses, some objects must appear beautiful, graceful, honourable, or venerable, and others mean and shameful; should it happen that in any object there appeared a mixture of these opposite forms or qualities, there would appear also another sense, of the ridiculous [of those things that we call ridiculous or apt to excite laughter]. And whereas there’s a general presumption of some dignity, prudence and wisdom in the human species; such conduct of theirs will raise laughter as shews “some mean error or mistake, which yet is not attended with grievous pain or destruction to the person”: for all such events would rather move pity. Laughter is a grateful commotion of the mind; but to be the object of laughter or mockery is universally disagreeable, and what men from their natural desire of esteem carefully avoid.

Hence arises the importance of this sense or disposition, in refining the manners of mankind, and correcting their faults. Things too of a quite different nature from any human action may occasion laughter, by exhibiting at once some venerable appearance, along with something mean and despicable. From this sense there arise agreeable and sometimes useful entertainments, grateful seasoning to conversation, and innocent amusements amidst the graver business of life.33

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XV.34 These various senses men are indued with constitute a great variety of things good or evil; all Edition: 1745; Page: [29] which may be reduced to these three classes, the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, and the goods of fortune or external ones. The goods of the soul are ingenuity and acuteness, a tenacious memory, the sciences and arts, prudence, and all the voluntary virtues{, or good dispositions of Will}. The goods of the body are, perfect organs of sense, strength, sound health, swiftness, agility, beauty. External goods are liberty, honours, power, wealth. Now as all objects grateful to any sense excite desire, and their contraries raise aversion; the affections of the will, whether calm or passionate, must be equally various. We already mentioned the four general classes [calm affections] to which they may be reduced, to wit, desire, aversion, joy and sorrow{: nor have we names settled to distinguish always the calm from the passionate, as there are in some other languages.} <and the four turbulent motions: lust, fear, delight, and distress>. But of each of these four there are many subdivisions, and very different kinds, according to the very different objects they have in view, and according as they are selfish or disinterested, respecting our own fortunes or those of others. And then among those which respect the fortunes of others there are great diversities, according to the different characters of the persons, their fortunes, and different attachments, friendships or enmities, and their various causes.

To pursue all these distinctions, and examine the several divisions made by the learned, would be tedious. We shall briefly mention the principal Passions, the names of which are also often used for the calm steddy affections of the will; {[nay the same name is often given to desires and joys, to aversions and sorrows.]} Edition: 1745; Page: [30]

1. The several species of desire of the selfish kind respecting one’s own body or fortune, are the natural appetites of food, whether plainer or more exquisite, lust, ambition, the desires of praise, of high offices, of wealth <that are called ambition and avarice>. Their contraries are repelled by the aversions of fear and anger, {and these of various kinds.}

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The goods of the soul we pursue in our desires of knowledge, and of virtue, and in emulation of worthy characters. Their contraries we avoid by the aversions of shame and modesty; we are on this subject often at a loss for appropriated names.

2. The disinterested Desires respecting any sort of prosperity to others, are benevolence or good-will, parental affections, and those toward kinsmen. The affections of desire toward worthy characters, are favour or good wishes, zealous veneration, gratitude. The aversions raised by their misfortunes are fear, anger, compassion, indignation. The prosperity of bad characters moves the aversions of envy and indignation.

3. The several species of Joy respecting ones own prosperous fortunes, are delectation, pride, arrogance, <pertness,> ostentation. And yet a long possession of any advantages of the body or fortune often produces satiety and disgust. From the contrary Evils arise sorrow, vexation, despair. Anger indeed by the Antients is always made a species of desire, to wit, that of punishing such as we apprehend have been injurious.

From our possessing the goods of the soul, especially virtuous affections [voluntary virtues], arise the internal joyful applauses of conscience, an honourable pride and glorying. From Edition: 1745; Page: [31] the contrary evils arise shame, remorse, dejection, and brokenness of spirit, which are species of sorrow.

4. The virtues of others observed raise joyful love, and esteem, and veneration, and where there’s intimacy, the affections of Friendship. The vices of others move a sort of sorrowful hatred, contempt or detestation. The prosperity of the virtuous, or of our benefactors, raises a joyful congratulation; their adversities raise grief, pity, and indignation. The adversities of the vitious often raise joy and triumph, and their prosperity grief and indignation.

Whoever is curious to see large catalogues of the several motions of the Will may find them in Aristotle’s Ethicks, Cicero’s 4th Tuscul. and Andronicus <and others>.35 But from what is above mentioned ’tis manifest that there’s some natural sense of right and wrong, something in the temper and affections Edition: current; Page: [46] we naturally approve for it self, and count honourable and good; since ’tis from some such moral species or forms that many of the most natural passions arise; and opposite moral characters upon like external events raise the most opposite affections, without any regard to the private interests of the observer.

XVI. Some of these affections are so rooted in nature that no body is found without them. The appetites toward the preservation of the body are excited in every stage of life by the uneasy sensations of hunger, and thirst, and cold. The desire of offspring at a certain age, and parental affection is also universal; and in consequence of them the like affections toward kinsmen.36 The other affections when the objects are presented are equally natural, tho’ not so necessary <and continuous>. Edition: 1745; Page: [32] The appearance of virtue in another raises love, esteem, friendship: Honourable designs are followed with favour, kind wishes, and zeal: their successes move joyful congratulation, and their disappointment sorrow and indignation; and the contrary affections attend the prosperity of the vicious{, even tho’ we apprehend no advantage or danger to ourselves on either side}. Benefits received with a like natural force raise gratitude; and injuries, resentment and anger; and the sufferings of <others, specially of> the innocent, pity. We also justly count natural the desires of knowledge, of the several virtues, of <fame,> health, strength, beauty, pleasure, and of all such things as are grateful to any sense.37

XVII. There are some other Parts of our constitution not to be omitted, which equally relate to the understanding and will. Such as that natural disposition to associate or conjoin any ideas, or any affections, however disparate or unlike, which at once have made strong impressions on our mind; so that whensoever any occasion excites one of them, the others will also Edition: current; Page: [47] constantly attend it, and that instantly, previous to any desire. To this association is owing almost wholly our power of memory, or recalling of past events, and even the faculty of speech.38 But from such associations incautiously made {we sometimes are hurt in our tempers.} The meaner pleasures of sense, and the objects of our lower appetites, acquire great strength this way, when we conjoin with them some far nobler notions, tho’ not naturally or necessarily allied to them, so that they cannot easily be separated. Hence by some notions of elegance, ingenuity, or Edition: 1745; Page: [33] finer taste, of prudence, <even of> liberality and beneficence, the luxurious ways of living obtain a much greater reputation, and seem of much more importance to happiness than they really are. Hence ’tis of high consequence in what manner the young are educated, what persons they are intimate with, and what sort of conversation they are inured to; since by all these, strong associations of ideas are formed, and the tempers often either amended or depraved.39

Of a like nature to these are Habits, for such is the nature both of the soul and body that all our powers are increased and perfected by exercise. The long or frequent enjoyment of pleasures indeed abates the keenness of our sense; and in like manner custom abates the feelings of pain.40 But the want of such gratifications or pleasures as we have long been enured to is more uneasy, and our regret the keener. And hence men are more prone to any pleasures or agreeable courses of action they are accustomed to, and cannot so easily be restrained from them.

We have already shewed that whatever is ultimately desirable must be the object of some immediate sense. But as men are naturally endued with some acuteness, forethought, memory, reason, and wisdom, they shall also naturally desire whatever appears as the proper means of obtaining what is immediately desirable; such means are riches and power, which may be subservient to all our desires whether virtuous or vitious, benevolent or malitious; and hence it is that they are so universally desired. Edition: 1745; Page: [34]

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To finish this structure of human Nature, indued with such powers of Reason, such sublime perceptive powers, such social bonds of affection, God has also superadded the powers of speech and eloquence, by which we are capable of obtaining information of what we were ignorant of, and of communicating to others what we know: by this power we exhort, by this we persuade, by this we comfort the afflicted, and inspire courage into the fearful; by this we restrain immoderate foolish transports, by this we repress the dissolute desires and passionate resentments; this power has conjoined us in the bonds of justice and law and civil polity, this power has reclaimed Mankind from a wild and savage life.

Altho’ all these several powers and faculties we have mentioned are so common to all mankind, that there are scarce any entirely deprived of any one of them; yet there is a wonderful variety of tempers: since in different persons different powers and dispositions so prevail that they determine the whole course of their lives. In many the sensual appetites prevail; in others there’s an high sense of the more humane and elegant pleasures; in some the keen pursuits of knowledge, in others either ambition or anxious avarice: in others the kind affections, and compassion toward the distressed, <benevolence> and beneficence, with their constant attendants and supporters, an high sense of moral excellence and love of virtue: others are more prone to anger, envy, and the ill-natured affections.41 In the present state of mankind which we plainly see is depraved and corrupt, sensuality and mean selfish pursuits are the most universal: Edition: 1745; Page: [35] and those enjoyments which the higher powers recommend, the generality are but little acquainted with, or are little employed in examining or pursuing them.

This diversity of Tempers, sometimes observable from the cradle, is strangely increased by different customs, methods of education, instruction, habits, and contrary examples; not to speak of the different bodily constitutions, which belong to the art of Medicine. The same causes often concur to corrupt the manners of men, tho’ our depravation in our present state cannot wholly be ascribed to them. For such is the present condition of mankind, that none seem to be born without some weaknesses or diseases Edition: current; Page: [49] of the soul, or one kind or other, tho’ in different degrees. Every one finds in himself the notion of a truly good man, to which no man ever comes up in his conduct. Nay the very best of mankind must acknowledge that in innumerable instances they come short of their duty{, and of that standard of moral goodness they find within them}. And altho’ nature has given us all some little sparks as it were to kindle up the several virtues; and sown as it were some seeds of them; yet {by our own bad conduct and foolish notions} we seldom suffer them to grow to maturity. <On the causes of these diseases of the soul, and on the origin of evil, various and not unlikely were the conjectures of philosophers.> But a full and certain account of the original of these disorders, and of the effectual remedies for them, {in all the different degrees in which they appear in different persons,} will never be given by any mortal without a divine revelation.42 And yet whosoever will set himself heartily to inquire into the true happiness of human nature, to discover Edition: 1745; Page: [36] the fallacious appearances of it, and to cultivate the nobler faculties of the soul, he will obtain a considerable power over the several turbulent passions, and amend or improve in a great degree his whole temper and disposition, whether it be what nature first gave him, or what his former conduct and circumstances have made it.

XVIII. The consideration of all that variety of Senses or tastes, by which such a variety of objects and actions are naturally recommended to mankind, and of a like multiplicity of natural desires; and all of them pretty inconstant and changeable, and often jarring with each other, some pursuing our own interests or pleasures of one or other of the various kinds mentioned, and some pursuing the good of others; as we have also a great many humane kind affections: This complex view, I say, must at first make human nature appear a strange chaos, or a confused combination of jarring principles, until we can discover by a closer attention, some natural connexion or order among them, some governing principles [principle] naturally Edition: current; Page: [50] fitted to regulate all the rest.43 To discover this is the main business of Moral Philosophy, and to shew how all these parts are to be ranged in order: and we shall find that with wonderful wisdom

God and kind nature has this strife composed.

Of this we may have some notion from what is above explained about that moral Power, that sense of what is becoming and honourable in our actions. Nor need we long dissertations and reasoning, since by inward reflection and examining the feelings of our hearts, we Edition: 1745; Page: [37] shall be convinced, that we have this moral power {or Conscience} distinguishing between right and wrong, plainly destined and fitted to regulate the whole of life; which clearly discovers to us that course and conduct, which alone we can entirely approve <and therefore which is most in accordance with the intention of nature>; to wit, that in which all kind affections are cultivated, and at the same time an extensive regard maintained toward the general happiness of all; so that we pursue our own interests, or those of our friends, or kinsmen, no further than the more extensive interests will allow; always maintaining sweetness of temper, kindness, and tender affections; and improving all our powers of body or mind with a view to serve God and mankind. This same moral sense also filling the soul with the most joyful satisfaction and inward applauses, and with the most cheering hopes, will strengthen it for all good offices, even tho’ attended with toil and dangers, and reward our efforts with the most glorious recompense.

Nay our reason too reviewing the evidence exhibited to us in the whole order of nature, will shew us that the same course of life which contributes to the general prosperity, procures also to the agent the most stable and most worthy felicity; and generally tends to procure that competency of external things which to a good mind is in its kind the most joyful. The same reason will shew us that the world is governed by the wisest and best Providence; and hence still greater and more joyful hopes will arise. We shall thence conclude that all these practical truths discovered from reflection Edition: current; Page: [51] on our own constitution and that of Nature, have the nature and force of divine Laws pointing out what Edition: 1745; Page: [38] God requires of us, what is pleasing to him, and by what conduct we may obtain his approbation and favour. Hence the hopes of future happiness after death, and a strength and firmness of soul in all honourable designs. Hence the soul shall be filled with the joys of Piety and Devotion; and every good mind shall expect every thing joyful and glorious under the protection of a good Providence, not only for itself but for all good men, and for the whole universe. And when one is persuaded of these Truths, then both our social and our selfish affections will harmoniously recommend to us one and the same course of life and conduct.

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CHAPTER II Edition: 1745; Page: [39]: Concerning the Supreme Good.

I. Having in the former chapter premised a pretty full description of human Nature and its several powers, we proceed to inquire into <the ends of Goods and Evils, or> the Supreme Good or Evil{, and wherein the chief Happiness of mankind consists}, with the proper plan of life in order to obtain it.

We shall lightly pass over certain celebrated questions about the mutual powers of the understanding and will over each other, which properly belong to Pneumaticks {or Metaphysicks}. We only suggest in passing, 1. That what is wholly unknown cannot be the object of desire, and yet there are certain natural propensities {or instincts in each species} toward certain objects or actions, as soon as it obtains any notion of them, and aversions to their contraries. These the schoolmen call the first simple motions of Will. When these are so strong as to call off the mind from any other objects it may have been employed about, and surmount its sloth, {or any dispositions to rest,} it raises also a desire of searching out the proper means <and reasons> of obtaining the objects desired, and of discovering which of them are most eligible: and when this point is settled, then, according to the Stoicks, we are determined to execute these means, or there arises the effectual purpose of action [that steddy purpose of action that Schoolmen call effectual volition].1 Many [Some] of the Peripateticks deny that the Will is certainly determined to follow even the last practical Edition: 1745; Page: [40] judgments, tho’ it generally does so. They alledge that it has an inherent power, notwithstanding any judgments or desires about the proper ends or means, of determining it self to act or abstain; nay some add, that it can determine it self to either of the contraries, to pursue good, or to pursue evil even under that notion. Let Metaphysicians determine these points. This in general Edition: current; Page: [53] seems true that we cannot properly ascribe any active <ruling> power to the understanding, about our conduct in life. ’Tis its business only to discover Truth; whereas willing, ordering, commanding, purposing, are acts of Will.2

The will again seems to have no other power over the understanding than this, that a man may as he wills turn his understanding to consider all the evidence on either side, and where the highest evidence does not occur, he can suspend any {peremptory} assent, and resolve upon a further hearing of the cause. But wherever full, certain evidence appears, he cannot at pleasure withhold his assent, or assent to the other side. Nay where on one side he sees superior probabilities [better reasons], he cannot avoid judging that side to be more probable.

II. We also pass over some speculative questions about the general notions of Good, and Final Causes or Ends, and their divisions; as they are easy and belong to other sciences. These maxims seem evident. 1. The objects of desire are pursued either ultimately for themselves, or as means to something further, or on both accounts. 2. Whatever is ultimately desirable is either recommended by some immediate sense or some natural instinct or impulse, <and approbation> prior to all reasoning. ’Tis Edition: 1745; Page: [41] the business of reason to find out the means of obtaining what we desire: or if various objects of desire interfere, to inquire which of them is of most importance to happiness, and what the best means of obtaining such objects. 3. Things are recommended to our pursuit, under one or other of these three forms or notions, either as pleasant, profitable, or honourable. Under the notion of pleasure are such things pursued in which we have only in view some grateful sensation to ourselves; and yet moral writers seldom include under this branch of pleasant, either the moral virtues, or the sciences and ingenious arts. These things are called profitable which are desired as means of somewhat further. The honourable are the several virtues {either intellectual or moral,} which recommend themselves by their own peculiar dignity, Edition: current; Page: [54] {very different from the lower sorts of pleasures}. 4. The importance or moment of any good toward our felicity depends on its dignity and duration. There’s a great difference among the several sorts of good in point of dignity. When we compare together the goods corresponding to senses of the same order, such as those relating to the external senses [those pleasure of body that we have in common with beasts], the dignity is just the intenseness of the pleasure in the sensation. But the objects of the superior senses have their own peculiar excellence, {not to be compared with the lower pleasures,} appearing of it self, and raising the desires of such as know them; so that we approve and praise, and count the persons happy, and wise in their conduct, who despise all bodily pleasures in comparison with them. ’Tis thus we plainly judge of the man who prefers the joys <of refined arts,> of knowledge, and of Edition: 1745; Page: [42] virtue and virtuous action to all others, and devotes himself entirely to them{, in opposition to even the highest sensual enjoyments}.3

To a rational being therefor who is indued with forethought these must be the characters of his supreme Good: “It must be something ultimately desirable to which most other things are referable <while it is not a means to anything else>; which has the highest dignity, which is stable {or durable}, and sufficient to satisfy or make happy.”

III. In our enquiries after happiness, which must either consist in the full enjoyment of all sorts of good, or at least in that of the principal sorts, we must observe, that ’tis impossible for one to ensure to himself the full enjoyment of all sorts of pleasure, and an immunity from all evil. According to the uncertain fleeting nature of human affairs, all external enjoyments must be uncertain. The objects themselves are perishable; and our own tastes and relishes are changeable; our health of body on which many enjoyments depend is very unstable: external objects depend not on our power, but {as ’tis commonly said}, are the Gifts of Fortune, or more properly, depend upon the Divine Providence, which has ensured no man in the constant possession of them.

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Need we also mention that there are many inconsistencies among the several enjoyments, so that one cannot vigorously pursue or enjoy them all: nay such is the dignity of the superior enjoyments, that they scorn such conjunction with the lower; their beauty and highest joy arises from our having despised and sacrificed Edition: 1745; Page: [43] to them the lower pleasures, and even resolutely exposed our selves to toils and distresses on their account.

Since then there’s no obtaining a full enjoyment of all sorts of good, or avoiding of all evil, we must carefully enquire which sorts of good are the most important to happiness, and what evils are the most grievous, and most eversive of tranquillity and happiness. We must therefor compare together the several goods which affect the various senses, and that both in respect to dignity and duration: and in like manner compare the several evils to discover which of them are most grievous and destructive.4

IV. We may here transiently notice, that tho’ we grant to Hieronymus of Rhodes, and some others of antiquity, that upon the mere removal of all pain there naturally ensues a state in it self grateful and pleasant: and that a stable sort of tranquillity and joy accompanies an intire immunity from uneasy sensations, so kind is the constitution of our nature, provided the mind is not disturbed by any keen desires or fears; so that their maxim is true, that wherever there’s freedom from all evil there must be the possession of some good: yet ’tis plain that beings endued with so many senses and active appetites and desires, cannot be made happy by mere indolence.5 This pleasure is but of a low kind, nor has it any dignity; much less can it have such force upon the soul as to be the spring of our actions and conduct in life. Happiness therefor must depend upon other sorts of goods suited to our perceptive powers. Edition: 1745; Page: [44]

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In the first place ’tis plain that bodily pleasures have none of that dignity which is the object of praise. Were the sensations never so intense, yet they all are plainly mean, and many of them shameful: they are transient too and fleeting; nor does the remembrance of past enjoyments give any such pleasure, or yield any such matter of joy or glorying, which could allay any sorrows or distresses in life, or support us under them.

Nor can it be justly alledged, that the common sentiments of mankind seem to make these the highest of all, because we see the greater part of men much devoted to them alone. This is so far from truth, that there are few to be found, who, when the fervor of their passions is a little cooled, won’t own, that such pleasures are quite insufficient to happiness. The most worthless characters have some imperfect <and artificial> notions of virtues almost continually influencing them; some friendships, some kind offices towards such as either nature or acquaintance hath attached to them, and whom they rashly happen to esteem. Nor can any one deem himself happy in constant inactivity or sensual enjoyments: they must conjoin with them frequent actions and offices, which according to their notions are virtuous. But, how strong soever the lower appetites may be {in proportion to the nobler}, yet still that diviner faculty naturally destined to govern the rest, and from whose dictates we are chiefly to judge of the intention of God and nature, rather scorns and rejects sensual enjoyments, as below the dignity of the rational nature, and will not allow them to make a part of the true happiness.6 Edition: 1745; Page: [45]

Need we further insist that sensual pleasures are almost continually recommended by some borrowed colours of a moral kind, of friendship, humanity, beneficence, or an elegant taste; otherways they would be despicable and shameful. Nay our {conscience or moral} sense <of what is right and honourable> seldom appears in opposition to them; since by the strange deceit of the passions, we generally persuade ourselves of their innocence.7 But on the other hand the virtues charm and make us happy by their own native beauty and dignity: nor are we to imagine that happiness is found only in mirth, gayety, lasciviousness or diversions, the amusements Edition: current; Page: [57] of weaker minds. There’s an higher happiness to the grave who are intent on serious business, from their own goodness, strength of mind, and steddiness.

There’s just cause too of appealing from the judgment of the voluptuous, who given up to sensuality, seldom experience the joys of a virtuous sort most becoming the rational nature, and never feel the pleasures of entire stable integrity and goodness. They are corrupt judges, having the nobler senses of the soul much stupified. But the external senses are never imagined to be any way impaired by the greatest dignity and steddiness of soul in all the moral virtues.8 The good man knows all the good in sensual pleasures, and despises it that he may adhere to virtue; finding upon full knowledge of both, that in virtue consists the supreme good.9 These honourable enjoyments are never blended with sensual pleasures, or recommended to us as the means of obtaining them; on the contrary, Edition: 1745; Page: [46] they are chiefly recommended by the labours, troubles and dangers incurred;

  • Midst losses, deaths, deriving force
  • And spirit from the hostile sword.
  • Hor.

Nay we have in this cause frequent testimonies from the voluptuous themselves. How few are such abandoned wretches as not to be much more affected with the beauty of some virtues, than with any bodily pleasures? Who won’t sometimes in serving a friend, or maintaining their own moral characters, or refuting certain calumnies, expose themselves to toils and danger, and forego pleasures?10] How few are devoted to mere solitary sensuality without any social friendly affections and joys? The few who are so, the world looks upon as monsters, and detests them. And then how transient and fleeting are these pleasures, since they depend entirely upon the continuance of the appetite? when the natural craving is sated, all pleasure is gone; and there must be long, tedious and disagreeable intervals, unless they are filled up with more honourable pursuits.

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A little reflection too will shew us, what is of high importance in this matter, that in a temperate <and restrained> course of life, filled up with the most virtuous pursuits, till the natural appetites recurr, there is generally that enjoyment of the lower pleasures which is both safest and most delightful; since moderation and abstinence heightens the enjoyment. With such goodness is our nature constituted {by God}, so gentle is the reign of virtue, that it restrains not its subjects from that enjoyment of bodily pleasures, which upon a right estimate will Edition: 1745; Page: [47] be found the sweetest: altho’ this she demands, that we should still preserve so lively a sense of the superior pleasures, as may be sufficient to controul the lower appetites, when they make any opposition.11 But on the other hand under the empire of sensuality there’s no admittance for the virtues; all the nobler joys from a conscious goodness, a sense of virtue, and deserving well of others, must be banished; and generally along with them even the rational manly pleasures of the ingenious arts.

V. Let us next consider that pleasure which arises from the elegance and grandeur of life: this no doubt is of a far superior kind to brutal sensuality, and yet is neither very great nor durable. Such things can give small alleviation to any of the important evils of life, such as bodily diseases, or those of the mind, which are often more severe, our own <fears,> anxieties, sollicitudes, sorrows. While these matters of ornament, elegance or grandeur are new to us, they are pretty agreeable; but being a short while enured to them puts an end to their pleasure: we are soon cloyed; and if the taste continues, we fall a hunting after something new, with a strange caprice and inconstancy; exposing ourselves to innumerable chagrins and sollicitudes, to obtain what again we shall presently be cloyed with and nauseate.

Need we insist further that all these things require also some friendly society: their principal charm is in some notions of liberality, kindness, good-will, and sharing of pleasures with others: by these chiefly they are made joyful to us and matter of glorying. And Edition: 1745; Page: [48] then such things may be enjoyed by the very worst and most wretched of mankind as well as by the most worthy.

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Let us subjoin to these the pleasures of the ingenious arts, and that most truly manly sort which we enjoy in knowledge and the sciences: these the sense of every one who has any tolerable genius or gentlemanly taste, must indeed prefer far above any bodily pleasures; and they are also far more durable and stable. Whenever therefor we have leisure from the honourable offices of life, what study or pains we employ about them is truly laudable, and the remembrance of it will be agreeable. This is the natural food of the rational nature, and a pleasure suited to it; this is the proper exercise and improvement of that diviner part: these pleasures are of a purer kind, and more honourable and joyful, and friendly too to the voluntary virtues. And yet we may easily see that they alone are not sufficient to happiness: they are not absolutely the highest; and are plainly in their own nature destined for something further, even for these honourable offices by which we may serve our friends or our country.12 And hence it is that all men must approve one who would throw aside even the most delightful studies about the most important subjects, when he were called to succour his friends or his country, or to perform any kind or friendly office.

Let us imagine with our selves a person possessed of every ornament and elegance of life, along with all the means of bodily pleasures, and this by some miraculous providence [by a magic wand]; and that he were employed Edition: 1745; Page: [49] in the noblest contemplations with uninterrupted leisure, and yet void of all social affection, neither loving any nor beloved, without any opportunities of friendly offices: or imagine him retaining the natural affections toward others, but that all his kinsmen, all the objects of his love are {calamitous and} miserable: Is there any man so divested of humanity as to wish for such a lot to himself, or think it desirable?13 must not every one look upon it as miserable and detestable? Imagine further, that the morose unkind affections also arise, envy, hatred, suspicion, fear; passions which generally fill up the vacancy of the kind affections in our hearts, even when we live in the greatest affluence: surely this state of life must be deemed most miserable, void of all true pleasure, and more to be dreaded Edition: current; Page: [60] than even a painful death. And yet on the other hand, friendly society in life, mutual love and confidence, and virtuous offices, can make a laborious toilsome life, even amidst distresses, desirable and glorious.

VI. Let us proceed to another source of happiness or misery, our sympathy or social feelings with others, by which we derive joys or sorrows from their prosperity or adversity. And this all must allow to be of great importance <for our happiness or misery>. For, in the name of all that’s sacred! who would not prefer beyond all comparison the liberty, virtue, and felicity of his children, his kinsmen and friends, his countrymen, not only to sensual pleasures, but to the noblest pleasures {of a selfish sort} in the arts and sciences? who would not rather forego them all than behold all such as are dear to him in a condition either miserable or shameful? While there’s any life or Edition: 1745; Page: [50] vigour in the natural affections of the social kind, scarce any thing can more affect our happiness or misery than the fortunes of others. What powerful relief under our own misfortunes arises from seeing the prosperity of such as are dear to us! and how is all our enjoyment of life destroyed and beat to pieces by seeing their misery!

This social sympathy we naturally approve: to be touched deeply with the misfortunes of others is honourable; nor can we wish to be divested of this sense even when it occasions to us severe <even if not shameful> distresses and sorrows: and the contrary temper, the hard insensible heart, tho’ free from such cares and sorrows, we naturally detest, and deem it miserable because it is odious and base.

The joys or sorrows of this class may also be very lasting, according as the prosperity or adversity of the persons we love continues. Nay we have deep sorrow in reflecting upon the distresses or deaths of friends for a long time after these events: this duration of these sensations adds exceedingly to their importance.

What happiness we derive from this source is plainly independent of us, and is determined by Providence. No man can insure it to himself any more than external pleasures. Nor is it of consequence to prevent sympathetick pain, to think that men are generally the guilty causes of their own miseries <although no external good fails them>. Nay this very thing is chiefly deplorable and most pityable, that men are made miserable by their own Edition: current; Page: [61] faults, placing their hopes of happiness in such mean perishing objects. All who deem themselves miserable are truly so, even altho’ a Edition: 1745; Page: [51] change in their own tempers would, in the same external circumstances, make them happy.

There’s plainly no other refuge from these evils, no other foundation for tranquillity or stable joy to a kind heart, but a constant regard to the Deity and his wisdom and goodness governing this world; with a stable persuasion that all is ordered in the wisest and best manner for the universal felicity; and that all that variety of evil we behold is yet no more or greater than what is requisite <by the perfect wisdom of God> for the prosperity and perfection of the universe, and may at last also frequently tend to the real good of these very persons whose misfortunes we bewail.

VII. The next source of happiness or misery naturally connected with the former, is that {conscience or} sense of what is right and honourable, which is also of great importance in life. This any one may perceive who can recollect any offices he has done for others with vigour, friendliness, an high sense of duty, or fortitude; and observes with what joy the remembrance must fill his soul. What are our sentiments of others? with what endearment, what ardent good-will do we embrace such as are engaged in such offices? and how happy do we deem them even amidst their toils and dangers; nay when they are voluntarily exposing themselves to certain death for their friends, their country, or for the propagation of true religion? The very resveries of men at leisure, when they are imagining to themselves, or those they love, a whole plan of life of the greatest dignity and happiness they can conceive, sufficiently shew that they can have no notion of an happy Edition: 1745; Page: [52] course of life without a continued course of steddy virtue, display’d amidst toils and dangers. These sentiments appear rooted in our hearts from our childhood. The whole frame of our nature shews that we are destined for action, and that in virtuous action alone we can find the highest happiness, in comparison with which all sensual pleasures appear despicable.

And then, with what joy, with what tranquillity and confidence must a good man be filled, who endeavouring to resemble the Deity as far as he can, is persuaded that he has the Deity for his propitious kind Ruler, Father, Edition: current; Page: [62] and munificent Rewarder; who, being assured that all events are governed and disposed of by his Providence, willingly embraces whatever befals him, firmly trusting that it is ordered with perfect wisdom, and shall tend to his good: one who knows and loves the Supreme-excellence, and is frequently employed in the contemplation and imitation of it.

Add to all this, that these joys are the most stable and durable which arise from a consciousness of our good dispositions, and of having acted according to them. The honourable toils and troubles are soon over, and are succeeded by joyful and glorious reflections. The {taste is not changeable or inconstant; the} practice of virtue is never cloying; nay it rather whets anew our appetite for further good offices of the same or a nobler kind. To this are joined these further pleasures, when we congratulate with those we have served effectually; when we justly expect the approbation and praises of mankind; when we have the joyful hopes of obtaining from God and men whatever is Edition: 1745; Page: [53] requisite for our safety and felicity. Nor need any one fear the want of opportunities for exercising his virtues in good offices, if he is heartily set upon them, according to the condition of life allotted him. The indigent or weak may not be capable of important services to others in external things. But such a one, having most ardent wishes for the prosperity of mankind, and resolved to profit them at least by his example of piety, and by such mean offices as are in his power, may with an humble confidence and joy approve this goodness of his heart, these honourable affections to God the most equitable judge, and to the wisest of mankind, and expect their favour, approbation and protection.

VIII. What naturally ensues upon this sense, is that of honour and infamy, which is a very keen and lively one. Praise and glory when they are founded upon virtue, make no small accession to happiness; but without this foundation they are of little consequence. That must be an unfair and trifling mind which can be delighted with praises it knows not to be due to it. True glory like a lively tree spreads its roots deep, and diffuses its branches: but false glory like the blossoms, must soon fall. No man can be assured that groundless honours can remain with him even for a day. Such is the power of truth, that it frequently prevails beyond all expectation, either in the unmasking of ostentatious hypocrites or in vindicating the injured character, Edition: current; Page: [63] and rescuing virtue from calumnies. And since the true object of praise is virtue alone; that natural strong passion for praise should excite every Edition: 1745; Page: [54] wise man to regulate his whole life according to the rules of virtue, and employ himself continually in some truly honourable offices.

IX. That we may not quite omit another source of enjoyment tho’ of a lower kind; that which consists in mirth and gaiety, amidst sports, diversions and jesting; we shall only briefly suggest, that unless the nobler powers be much stupified, and we cast aside all manly thought and reflection, indulging a base negligence about the most important concerns, we can no other way than by virtue and a careful regard to the duties of life, promise to ourselves either tranquillity or chearfulness. For when the soul is galled and ulcered either with remorse, or with the ill-natured envious passions opposite to virtue, or with fears and suspicions, {constantly attendants of vices,} there can be no undisturbed enjoyment of any satisfaction. In this matter the common similitude holds, “whatever is poured into a sour cask must soon grow acid.” ’Tis then alone we can be truly easy and cheerful, fit to relish all manly pleasantries and mirth, when we are possessed of a courteous, humane, sweet temper, with a good conscience, and maintaining a friendly social intercourse with good men. Whatever therefore is valuable in gayety and mirth, should also excite us to cultivate all kinds of virtue, and persuade us to activity in discharge of all the duties of life.

X. As to wealth and power; whatever good is in them, should naturally lead a wise man into the same virtuous course: since it is by obtaining the favour and good-will of others, and maintaining credit in society, that wealth and power are easiest obtained and preserved: Edition: 1745; Page: [55] nor can the greatest wealth or power secure its possessor against a general hatred or resentment. But as wealth and power are not desired for themselves, but for further purposes; from what we have shewn to be the noblest pleasures of life, and our highest advantage and happiness, it must appear, that they alone reap the true fruits, and have the safest and sweetest and most honourable enjoyment of wealth or power, who employ them in liberality and beneficence.

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But since one of the first and strongest principles in all animals is the desire of self-preservation, we must offer a few thoughts on this head. ’Tis plain this desire like most others may be too strong: nor is mere living so much the object of it, as an happy life: and ’tis certain that in some circumstances life ceases to be desirable: as for instance, when we cannot preserve it without great baseness, ignominy and remorse; or must continue it under grievous bodily pain. The most friendly heart would wish for the death of his friend, when he cannot otherways escape these evils. Death is a certain event to all, and no man knows how soon it may happen. It must therefor often be wise conduct for for one’s own interest to expose his life to the greatest dangers when any sacred duty requires it, that he may not for the preservation of life lose all that makes it worth retaining. We ought therefor to fortify our minds against the terrors of death: for one who dreads an evil always impendent{, and that may surprize us every moment}, can retain no tranquillity. And this strength of mind is to be obtained by deep meditation from our youth, that after death, if it destroys the Edition: 1745; Page: [56] mind as well as the body, ’tis impossible there can be any evil, or any uneasy sensation. But if our souls perish not in death, which we justly conclude both from the goodness of God and the divine powers of the soul it self; then all good men may hope for a joyful state, and that this <wretched14 and> fading mortal life shall be succeeded by a new life of a nobler kind, which alone deserves that name.

The whole former reasonings unite in this conclusion, that happiness consists in the virtues of the soul, and in the continued exercise of them in good offices: to the completion of which however some moderate advantages with respect to the body and fortune are requisite, at least that we enjoy health, and such a competence of external things as may satisfy the painful cravings of nature. From the possession of virtue alone life is to be counted happy: but to make it compleatly so there must be a moderate degree of external prosperity.

XI. The same conclusion is further confirmed by comparing the several evils contrary to the several sorts of good already compared. And here in the first Edition: current; Page: [65] place, ’tis plain that the strength and force of bodily pain is greater in proportion than that of bodily pleasures; and this wisely ordered, that we may be the more strongly excited to our own preservation: and yet they are not to be looked upon as the greatest of evils. Men are often led into this mistake by comparing some smaller kinds of moral turpitude, even when they are excused in some measure or alleviated by the greatness of the temptation [by the fear of some incumbent danger], with the highest bodily tortures. Edition: 1745; Page: [57] But some crimes are so detestable, and must occasion such self-abhorrence, and torturing remorse, and some sorrows and distresses occasioned by the misery of persons very dear to us are so deep, as to occasion misery superior to any bodily torments.

And then as to duration, the pain of the body, as well as its pleasures, can seldom be very durable. Such pain as is lasting must generally be of a lighter sort, or admit of frequent intervals of ease. The severer kinds must generally soon end in death: and the remembrance of past pain when we dread no returns of the like, has nothing uneasy in it, nay is sometimes sweet, and matter of glorying.15

The more elegant pleasures of the arts, from beauty, harmony, and ingenious imitation, and all these things which relate to the ornament or grandeur of life, have no proper pain opposite to them. These more sublime senses are the avenues of pleasure and not of pain. Where indeed men have indulged strong desires of such gratifications, or affect glory and eminence by them, it may be very uneasy to be disappointed, and we may regret much the want of them. But an absolute want of them is not a natural necessary cause of any misery. Nay we see that the greater part of men are abundantly easy without them, and therefor have no solicitude to procure them.

But ’tis of the highest use to observe, that virtue of it self has no natural tendency to expose us to any of these external losses or pains: nay it rather prevents or removes them. But if it should be our fortune to incurr such losses or pain, from which surely the vitious Edition: 1745; Page: [58] are no more secured than the virtuous; or if sometimes on account of virtue we should be exposed to such evils, which is sometimes the case, (tho’ men are much more frequently involved by their vices in such evils, and that in a more shameful Edition: current; Page: [66] base way) Virtue can teach us to bear such evils with resolution, or to conquer them; or will afford us a variety of strong consolations under them. Just reflection will shew us that such events are the proper matter of exercise for the most glorious virtues, the course in which they must run, and train themselves, acquiring daily new force: that it is by bearing them with patience that our resignation to God, our submission, and magnanimity must be display’d, strengthened, and at last gloriously rewarded.

The miseries of the sympathetick kind from the distresses of others are often more severe, nor can they be allayed by any sensual pleasures or any external objects. Such distresses are also very lasting: since all remembrance or reflection upon any grievous misfortune or infamy of any person dear to us must always be matter of great uneasiness. There is scarce any consolation under such distress except what must be derived from resignation and trust in the Deity; by which alone it is that good men can support their spirits in all events.16

But still the most grievous of all evils is the moral turpitude of a depraved heart conscious of its own baseness. This makes a man odious to himself; and makes his own temper, what’s most essential and intimate to him, appear base and shameful, nay ignominious Edition: 1745; Page: [59] and detestable. This evil too is of the most lasting nature; since the remembrance of our past crimes or impieties must ever be grievous and shameful. Nor can we shake off this uneasy tormenting feeling unless by an entire alteration of temper, and reparation of any injuries we have done; nor will this it self do it effectually. It’s common attendants too are solicitudes, fears, anxieties; and, as such persons have deserved ill of God and mankind, they must live in a perpetual dread that they shall be repaid according to their demerits.

Along with these inward causes of misery, comes also infamy; which when justly deserved gives severe and lasting torment, excludes all hopes of true friendship or favour with others, and of obtaining their faithful assistances for our advantage.

From all this we see that it was with the justest reason the old Academy and the Peripateticks placed happiness in “a constant activity according to the highest virtue in a prosperous course of life.” This the schoolmen call Edition: current; Page: [67] the supreme formal good. The same therefor is the summary notion of happiness and of virtue: to wit, “that we should love and reverence the Deity with all our soul, and have a stedfast goodwill toward mankind, and carefully improve all our powers of body and mind by which we can promote the common interest of all”; which is the life according to nature.

XII. But we ought always to keep this in our thoughts, that we entirely depend on God; that all the goods either of mind or body, all our virtues, have Edition: 1745; Page: [60] been derived from him, and must be preserved or increased by his gracious Providence: and since every good temper must always extend its views abroad, studiously pursuing the happiness of others, which also entirely depends on the will of God, and cannot be ensured by human power: there can be no other stable foundation of tranquillity and joy than a constant trust in the goodness, wisdom and power of God, by which we commit to him ourselves, our friends, and the whole universe, persuaded that he will order all things well. The schoolmen therefor justly call God the supreme object of happiness, or the supreme objective good,17 from the knowledge and love of whom, with the hopes of being favoured by him, our supreme happiness must arise.

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CHAPTER III Edition: 1745; Page: [61]: Concerning the Chief Divisions of Virtue.

I. 1Having shewn that our chief good consists in virtuous activity, our next Inquiry must be, what are the several virtues? and what actions flow from them? and toward what objects?

In explaining our natural {conscience or} sense of what is good and honourable, we shewed that the chief virtues of the soul are kind affections and beneficent purposes of action: and that of these the calm {and stedfast} are more excellent than the passionate, and that the most extensive are the most excellent. Amongst the most excellent too we placed an ardent love of moral excellence, <the highest delight of the soul in it,> an earnest desire of increasing it in ourselves, and an high esteem and love toward all who are possessed of it, with the highest love toward the supreme excellence. Whence appeared our duty of loving God with the highest veneration, and the sacred obligations we are under to cultivate such affections.2

In the middle or lower classes of virtues we placed these narrower affections which either nature or acquaintance have excited: of these the more lovely are such as arise in a virtuous heart upon observing in others the like virtuous dispositions: and hence such friendships as virtue has begot and nourished must appear very lovely.3 There’s also something very engaging in a general courtesy, and sweetness of deportment toward all we have any intercourse with. Edition: 1745; Page: [62]

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We reckon also among the virtues all these habits {or dispositions}, which tend to improve the nobler powers of the soul, or are naturally joined with or subservient to generous affections; and all such too as tend to restrain the meaner sensual appetites, the ordinary obstacles to virtue, and gives us a power to controll them: all these we immediately esteem for themselves. For by the wise contrivance of our Creator, our natural taste [human mind] is so formed, that we immediately approve and esteem all such affections or powers, the more in proportion as they are of greater importance to the general good. And hence it is that we not only approve {and love} the kind affections of a more contracted kind, which are so necessary in the several relations of life, while they are not opposite to any more extensive interest; but we also immediately approve a sincere, ingenuous, candid temper; we praise abstinence or contempt of {wealth and} pleasure, and fortitude: as all these naturally evidence a mind possessed of an high taste for moral excellence, confirmed by an indifference about, or contempt of sensuality, and external advantages, or disadvantages. Nay we immediately relish such a state or motion in the body as carries natural indications of virtue; and all the contrary dispositions whether of mind or body appear disagreeable and offensive.4

Need we mention again some natural sense, different from the moral one, but not unlike it, by which we relish and value some powers of the mind and the body quite different from any of the voluntary virtues. To all the powers God has given us there’s conjoined some sort of sense or relish, recommending that exercise Edition: 1745; Page: [63] of them we call natural, which is also the most subservient to the general good. Hence we highly approve the pursuits of knowledge and the ingenious arts, a capacity of application, industry, and perseverance. Nay even in bodily exercises {and recreations}, we most approve these which either shew something of ingenuity or strength, or tend to encrease them.5 <On the contrary, the eager seeking after lower pleasures, the effeminate softness of body and soul, useless for honourable and industrious offices, and all those conveniences that foster that softness, are not worthy and suitable to human excellence.>

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II. Having given this general {rude} draught of the virtues, ’tis proper to consider their several kinds, that each of them displaying its beauty to us, may more allure us to pursue them.6 Virtue in the largest acceptation, may denote any power or quality which is subservient to the happiness of any sensitive being. In its stricter acceptation it denotes any habit or disposition which perfects the powers of the soul; and thus virtues are divided into the intellectual, which include all improvements of the mind by ingenious arts and sciences; and moral, which are chiefly counted virtues, being perfections of the will {and affections}7; and these are the chief object of Ethicks.

And yet the intellectual virtues are not to be altogether omitted in Morals; not only because they afford a noble branch of happiness, pleasures exceedingly becoming our rational nature; to which whosoever is enured, and has got an high taste for them, is enabled to contemn the meaner enjoyments which lead to vice; whence the sciences have justly been deemed purifications of the soul:* but because they give a more direct aid to the moral virtues. For from a deeper enquiry into nature and the universe, the perfections Edition: 1745; Page: [64] of the great Creator are displayed, our dutiful veneration toward him increased, the mind led into a just contempt for the low worldly pursuits of mankind; and that humility, or deep consciousness of our own weakness and manifold imperfections, is obtained, which is a chief ornament and perfection in a good character. Nay, without a great deal of knowledge in the lower and ordinary affairs of life, we must be deficient in that practical prudence which is always necessary in our conduct. But these virtues or accomplishments belong principally to other branches of philosophy, or arts. This we suggest only in general, that in the pursuits of knowledge these two faults are to be cautiously avoided, the one that of rash precipitate assenting<, taking as known what is unknown>; and for this purpose we must both take time and make vigorous application, and bring along a mind free from prejudices and prepossessions, or any passionate attachments. The other fault is employing too much keeness upon subjects, perhaps <obscure and> difficult, but of small use or necessity in life.

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As to the moral virtues seated in the will; the divisions given of them by different authors are very different. The followers of Aristotle, having this principally in view, that ’tis by immoderate ungoverned passions that we are led into vice, while yet all these passions have been wisely implanted in our nature by the Deity for necessary purposes, they define virtue, “a considerate habit of the soul preserving a mediocrity according to right reason”;8 as indeed it is a great part of the office of virtue to keep the several affections, which are frequently disorderly, from both Edition: 1745; Page: [65] the extremes of excess and defect. In this view, to explain the several virtues they go through the several natural passions, and their several degrees, when they are either too languid or too vehement; and shew that the middle degrees are the safest, the most advantageous, and the most graceful; and these they count virtuous. Now the several habits by which this mediocrity is preserved, according to a celebrated division among the Antients, they reduce to four classes, which are called the Cardinal Virtues; Prudence, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude: from which they derive all the several branches of virtue.9

III. Prudence they describe “a cautious habit of consideration and forethought, discerning what may be advantageous or hurtful in life”; which must be acquired and preserved by experience and frequent meditation. This habit no doubt is necessary in all the business of life. But one would think prudence were rather to be ranked among the intellectual than the moral virtues: and yet no man can attain to the true solid prudence, whose heart is not improved by the moral virtues, with an high sense of moral excellence; and who has not deeply imbibed the more generous sentiments of goodness. Others may have a sort of crafty sagacity in worldly affairs, which assumes to it self the title of Prudence and Wisdom, but yet is very remote from it. The vices opposite to this virtue are rashness, inconsiderateness, a foolish self-confidence, and craft.

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Fortitude they define to be “that virtue which strengthens the soul against all toils or dangers we Edition: 1745; Page: [66] may be exposed to in discharge of our duty”:10 ’tis this virtue which represses all vain or excessive fears, and gives us a superiority to all the external accidents of our mortal state; grounded on a thorough knowledge of their nature, that no external advantages are to be compared in point of happiness with the possession of virtue, and gaining the approbation of our own hearts, and of God, to whom our tempers must be perfectly known; and that nothing ought so much to be dreaded <or shunned> as vice and the moral deformity of the soul: and consequently, since death must soon befal us in all events, that an early death with virtue and honour is highly preferable to the longest ignominious life. On such principles as these must be founded that true greatness and elevation of mind which is not to be disturbed by external accidents.11

This true grandeur of mind is discovered in these three things; in an high relish and love of moral excellence; in that superiority to and contempt of external accidents just now mentioned; and in a tranquillity free from passion.12 There is therefor no true fortitude in not dreading moral turpitude or just infamy: the truly brave and wise avoid these things above all; as they will also decline any dangers to which no virtuous offices call them. Now as our passionate motions are of two kinds; one, that of passionate desires, the other that of aversions, fears or anger;13 and fortitude regulates these latter, as Temperance does the former; among the branches of Fortitude, are reckoned beside Magnanimity, Constancy, Hardiness, and Patience, Lenity also of temper and Clemency; and, Edition: 1745; Page: [67] when the publick interest requires it, Rigour and Severity, with such just Resentment as is requisite to repell or restrain injuries.

The vices opposite to Fortitude on one hand, are Pusillanimity and Cowardice, and their common attendant Cruelty; on the other hand, furious boldness and Temerity, which is often attended with obstinacy and ambition, or too keen desires of eminence, inconsistent with that equality of right which should be maintained in every free state.

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Temperance is that virtue which restrains and regulates the lower appetites toward sensual pleasures; as ’tis by them that men are most frequently ensnared into all manner of vices, and into a neglect of every thing honourable. In this virtue most remarkably appears the grace and beauty of manners [of words, actions and purposes], which is quite destroyed by sensuality [by the allurements of lower pleasures].

The several branches of Temperance are {Moderation of mind}, Modesty, Chastity, Frugality, a Contentment with, or Relish for plain simple fare, and a Severity of manners in opposition to all obscenity and lewdness. The opposite vices are Luxury, Gluttony, Drunkenness, Impudence, Wantoness, Obscenity, effeminate Softness, and Delicacy as to food and other cares about the body.

But Justice they make the sovereign virtue to which all the rest should be subservient: this they define “an habit constantly regarding the common interest, {and in subserviency to it,} giving or performing to each one whatever is due to him upon any natural claim.”14 Under it they include all the kind dispositions of heart Edition: 1745; Page: [68] by which a friendly intercourse is maintained among men, or which leads us to contribute any thing to the common interest. Such as Liberality, Beneficence, Friendliness, Gratitude, Magnificence, Courtesy, Humanity, Veracity, Fidelity, Hospitality, Love of our Country, Dutiful affection in the sacred relations of life, and principally Piety toward God, who is conceived as the Ruler and Father of that most venerable and sacred political Body, the Rational Creation, of which our several countries are but small parts. The nature of the three former cardinal virtues may be known from what was said above about the supreme Good, and the comparisons made of the several objects of our natural desires: and the nature of Justice will be more fully explained in the second Book,* where we treat of the several rights of mankind.

These {four} virtues they maintain to be naturally connected and inseparable not only in their highest degree, which they call the Heroic; but in the middle degree, called that of Temperance, {when the lower appetites are easily governed: altho’ they may be separated in the first weaker disposition Edition: current; Page: [74] called the degree of Continence.} And yet from each of them some peculiar duties are derived which they dilate upon very agreeably. But so far for this subject.

IV. There arises here a question of some little difficulty about the original of virtue, whether it arises from the very constitution of our nature, or from instruction and habit, or by some divine influence or power. On which subject we briefly suggest, that whatever Edition: 1745; Page: [69] flows from any natural principles is as much owing to God, {and we are as much indebted to him for it, as if it had in an extraordinary manner been effected by his power}. Nor ought our gratitude to be less for any benefit, on this account that the liberal Donor has diffused the like goodness amongst many, or that these benefits have been bestowed upon us in a certain regular method, according to some fixed laws, in consequence of a stable series of causes determined at first by the goodness and wisdom of the Author of nature; or because he has used other voluntary agents as his ministers and instruments, {whom he has inclined or excited to do us such good offices}. Any virtues therefor {which we find in ourselves} should be the chief matter of thanksgiving and praises to God. And yet there’s nothing incredible in this that the universal Governor of the world should also by his power inspire and excite men to whatever is glorious and honourable: nay ’tis rather improbable that he who had displayed such goodness in bestowing external advantages on us, should not also exert the same goodness and power in bestowing the more noble benefits. {*} <Nature has a great power, and providence much more, concerning the circumstances that depend on fortune. But instruction, education and discipline would advance the internal powers a great deal>. The concurrence of these {three} causes to be sure [must undoubtedly make men virtuous] [should be desiderable]. We sometimes see an happy natural disposition, with something like a divine impulse, produce great matters without much aid from instruction {or discipline}: but without some tolerable natural disposition, Edition: 1745; Page: [70] at least without a natural taste Edition: current; Page: [75] or capacity for virtue (which however scarce any one wants altogether) instruction {or custom} would be of little or no effect. {Of these two a good natural disposition seems of greater consequence, as nature is a more stable principle. And yet instruction and habit wonderfully improve the natural disposition;} and ’tis but seldom that without their aids we can expect to see any thing great and eminent.

We shall not dwell further upon that mediocrity insisted on {so much} by Aristotle: for tho’ it well deserves our consideration, yet ’tis plain that the primary notion of virtue does not consist in it. And however it may hold not only as to our lower appetites, and some of the more sublime ones by which we are pursuing more manly enjoyments of a selfish kind, but even in the more narrow affections of good-will, that a middle degree, equally removed from both the extremes of excess and defect, is the most laudable; yet there can be no excess in these affections in which virtue chiefly consists, to wit in the <reverence and> love of God, and in that extensive good-will toward all, or in the love of moral excellence, {provided we have just notions of it}.15

V. There’s another division more obvious and perhaps more natural, according to the several objects toward whom our virtues are to be exercised, into Piety toward God, and Good-will toward Men: to which a third branch may be added of such virtues {as immediately relate to ourselves}, by which a man immediately aims at his own perfection. And altho’ there be nothing morally lovely in mere self-love, and it Edition: 1745; Page: [71] must be some reference to our duty to God, or to that toward men, which must make a man’s duties toward himself appear venerable or amiable; yet this third branch must not be omitted, since it is by means of a proper self-culture that we must be <fit and> prepared for any honourable services to God or mankind{; and with this reference they are exceedingly amiable}.

In pursuit of this last division, we first explain the duties of Piety, both to shew their true nature, and their importance toward our happiness; next we consider our duties toward our fellows; and lastly that self-culture which is subservient to Piety and Humanity.

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CHAPTER IV Edition: 1745; Page: [72]: Our Duties toward God.

I. Piety consists in these two essential parts, first in just opinions {and sentiments} concerning God, and then in {affections and} worship suited to them.1

The just opinions concerning God are taught in <that part of pneumatology that is called> natural Theology or Metaphysicks: to wit, that the Deity is the original independent Being, compleat in all possible perfection, of boundless power, wisdom and goodness, the Creator, Contriver and governor of this world, and the inexhaustible source of all Good. We take these principles as granted in treating of Morals, and inquire what affections of soul, what worship internal or external is suited to them.2

The inward sense {of the heart}3 must shew at once, that this preeminence and infinite grandeur of the original cause of all, ought to be entertained with the highest admiration and praise and submissive veneration of soul: and since there’s no desire more becoming the rational nature than that of knowledge, and of discovering the {natures and} causes of the greatest subjects, no occupation of the mind can be more honourable, or even delightful, than studying to know <God and reverently surveying> the divine perfections: nor indeed without ascending to the knowledge of the supreme Excellency, can these honourable intellectual powers we are endued with find a proper object fully to exercise and satisfy them. Edition: 1745; Page: [73]

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II. As to the moral Attributes of God: that original and most gracious Power which by its boundless Force, Goodness, and Wisdom has formed this Universe <with the greatest skill>, granting to each being its proper nature, powers, senses, appetites, or reason, and even moral excellencies; and with a liberal hand supplying each one with all things conducive to such pleasure and happiness as their natures can receive; this Power, I say, should be acknowledged with the most grateful affections, with generous love, and the highest praises and thanksgiving; and with a joyful hope and confidence, purified from all {vanity,} pride, or arrogance, {since we are such dependent creatures, who owe to it all we enjoy}.

If we more fully consider the divine Goodness and moral Perfection; that the Deity must delight in all virtue and goodness; that he must approve and love all good men: this will suggest to all such still more joyful hopes, with an higher and more delightful confidence and trust, and more ardent love of virtue and of the Deity. Hence will arise a stable security and tranquillity of the soul, which can commit it self and all its concerns to the divine Providence. Hence also a constant endeavour to imitate the Deity, and cultivate in ourselves all such affections as make us resemble him; with a steddy purpose of exerting all our powers in acting well that part which God and nature has assigned us, whether in prosperity or adversity.

Such contemplations of the venerable and adorable Excellency and gratuitous Goodness of God, whom Edition: 1745; Page: [74] every good man regards as the witness and approver of his actions, will lead us to an ultimate resting in virtue: that highest purity of it, by which we look upon [conformity to the divine Will] [the imitation and love of God], the discharging the duty assigned us by him, and performing our part well, as [the chief good, the chief] [the whole or the most important and desirable] fruit of virtue. Nor without this knowledge of the Deity, and these affections, can a good benevolent heart find any sure ground of hope and security, either as to it self or the dearest objects of its affection, or as to the whole state of the universe. Nor can the virtuous mind, which extends its affectionate concerns to all mankind, or the love <and praise> of moral excellence it self, ever be satisfied and at rest, unless it be assured that there’s some excellent Being complete in every perfection, in the knowledge and love of which, with a prospect of being beloved by it, it can fully acquiesce, and commit it self and the Edition: current; Page: [78] dearest objects of its cares, and the whole of mankind to his gracious providence with full security.4

And altho’ there’s none of human race who are not involved in manifold weaknesses<, vices,> and disorders of soul, none who upon reflection won’t find themselves intangled in many errors and misapprehensions about matters of the greatest importance {to the true happiness of life}; and in the guilt of manifold crimes committed against God and our fellow-creatures; on account of which they may justly dread {the divine justice, and apprehend} some impendent punishments: yet such is the divine goodness and clemency; with such long-suffering and mercy has he continued for many ages to exercise his gracious providence about weak corrupted Edition: 1745; Page: [75] mortals, that such as sincerely love [worship] him, and desire, as far as human weakness can go, to serve him with duty {and gratitude}, need not entirely lose hopes of his favour. Nay they have some probable ground to expect, that God will be found propitious and placable to such as repent of their sins and are exerting their utmost endeavours in the pursuits of virtue; and that his infinite wisdom {and goodness} will find out some method of exercising his mercy toward a guilty world, so as not to impair the authority of his laws and the sanctity of his moral administration, {tho’ human wisdom should never particularly discover it}. And further, what is sufficient for our purpose in the present question can admit of no debate; that the perfection of virtue, must constitute our supreme felicity; and that the ardent desires, and sincere efforts to attain it, cannot fail of a most important effect, either in obtaining compleat felicity, {or at least some lower degree of it,} or a great alleviation of misery.5

The sublimer powers of the soul of their own nature lead us to the Deity: as they are derived from him, they powerfully draw us back to him again. Our high powers of reason, our benevolent affections of the more extensive kinds, and our natural sense and love of [moral excellence] [what is right and honourable], have all this natural tendency. By these bonds all rational beings are as it were connected with and affixed to the Deity, if they have Edition: current; Page: [79] any care to cultivate these higher powers. Nor is the spring of this divine love the mere prospect of our own felicity to be found in him: for from our natural Edition: 1745; Page: [76] sense and approbation of moral excellence, wheresoever it is discovered, there must arise a disinterested love and veneration, detached from all considerations of our own interests.

And further since all the more lively affections of the soul naturally display themselves in some natural expressions, and by this exercise are further strengthned; the good man must naturally incline to employ himself frequently and at stated times in some acts of devotion, contemplating and adoring the divine excellencys; giving thanks for his goodness; humbly imploring the pardon of his transgressions; expressing his submission, resignation, and trust in God’s Providence; and imploring his aid in the acquisition of virtue, and in reforming his temper, that he may be furnished for every good work. For the frequent meditation upon the supreme and perfect model of all goodness must powerfully kindle an ardent desire of the same {in every ingenuous heart}.

But here we must avoid any imaginations that our piety or worship can be of any advantage to the Deity, or that he requires it of us, for any interest of his own. ’Tis rather our own interest that is promoted by it, and ’tis for our sakes that God enjoins it; that we may obtain the truest felicity, and excellence, and the purest joys. By entertaining these sentiments concerning the worship of God, we shall be secured from both the extremes, of impiety on one hand, which consists in a neglect and contempt of all religious worship; and superstition on the other, which is an abject dread of Edition: 1745; Page: [77] a cruel or capricious Dæmon men form to themselves, which they conceive appaisable by savage or fantastick rites.6

III. Hitherto we have treated of internal worship. But our nature scarcely relishes any thing in solitude; all our affections naturally discover themselves before others, and infect them as with a contagion. This shews that God is not only to be worshipped in secret, but [openly] in publick; which also tends to increase our own devotion, and to raise like sentiments in Edition: current; Page: [80] others, and makes them thus partakers of this sublime enjoyment.7 This social worship {is not only the natural result of inward piety, but} is also recommended by the many advantages redounding from it; as it has a great influence in promoting a general piety: and from a general sense of religion prevailing in a society all its members are powerfully excited to a faithful discharge of every duty of life, and restrained from all injury or wickedness. And hence it is that mankind have always been persuaded, that religion was of the highest consequence to engage men to all social duties, and to preserve society in peace and safety.8

The external worship must be the natural expressions of the internal devotion of the soul; and must therefor consist in celebrating the praises of God, and displaying his perfections to others; in thanksgivings, and expressions of our trust in him; in acknowledging his power, his universal Providence and goodness, by prayers <in solemn assemblies> {for what we need}; in confessing our sins, and imploring his mercy <and forgiveness>; and finally in committing Edition: 1745; Page: [78] ourselves entirely to his conduct, government, and correction, with an absolute resignation.9

Where such devout sentiments [doctrines] are cherished, and affections suitable to them, there must be kindled an ardent desire of inquiring into all indications of the Divine will. And whatever discoveries we find made of it, whether in the very order of nature, or by any supernatural means, which some of the wisest of the Heathens [the best philosophers] seem to have expected, the good man will embrace them with joy.

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CHAPTER V Edition: 1745; Page: [79]: Our Duties toward Mankind.

I. The <virtues and> duties to be performed toward others are in like manner pointed out to us by our natural sense of right and wrong [by the same sense of what is right and honourable]; and we have many natural affections exciting us to <to cherish and practise> them. There are many sorts of kind affections in the several relations of life, which are plainly implanted by nature. Thus nature has implanted in the two sexes a strong mutual affection, which has a wonderful power, and has in view not so much the low gratification common to us with brutes, as a friendly society for life, founded upon that endearment which arises from a mutual good opinion of each others moral characters, of which even beauty of form gives some evidence. There’s also implanted a strong desire of offspring, and <a special care and> a very tender peculiar affection toward them. In consequence of this, there are also natural affections among brothers, sisters, cousins, and remoter kindred, and even such as are allied by marriages.1

But there are still more subtile social bonds. Good men who know each other have a natural affection not unlike that among kinsmen. 2. Men are still further bound by an intercourse of mutual offices. 3. But benevolent affections still spread further, among acquaintance and neighbours, where there’s any measure even of the commonest virtues. 4. Nay they diffuse themselves even to all our Countrymen, members of the Edition: 1745; Page: [80] same polity, when multitudes are once united in a political body for their common interest. 5. And {in men of reflection} there’s a more extensive good-will embracing all mankind, or all [higher kinds of] intelligent natures <if there are any>. 6. Along with these, there’s a tender compassion toward any that Edition: current; Page: [82] are in distress, with a desire of succouring them; and a natural congratulation with the prosperous, unless there has interveened some cause of aversion or enmity.

These kind affections [motions] are immediately approved for themselves: every one feels a complacence in them, and applauds himself in indulging them as some way suited to his nature <and approves and honours like affections in others>: but the contrary affections [motions] which are occasionally incident to men, such as anger, hatred, envy, revenge, and malice, are of themselves uneasy; nor can any one applaud himself in remembring them, or approve like passions in others: they are often matter of shame and remorse; and even when they seem justifiable and necessary, yet they contain nothing joyful, nothing glorious.

II. We have abundantly shewn how much these kind affections with the suitable virtuous offices contribute to our happiness. All men who have not quite divested themselves of humanity, and taken up the temper of savage beasts, must feel that without mutual love, good-will and kind offices, we can enjoy no happiness: and that solitude, even in the greatest affluence of external things, must be miserable. We also shewed that the calm, steddy [that the more stable and more extensive] affections were more honourable {than the turbulent}. But we must still remember, that mere kind affection without action, or slothful wishes Edition: 1745; Page: [81] will never make us happy. Our chief joy consists in the exercise of our more honourable powers; and when kind affections are tolerably lively they must be the spring of vigorous efforts to do good.

This therefore is the sum of all social virtues, that with an extensive affection toward all, we exert our powers vigorously for the common interest, and at the same time cherish all the tender affections in the several narrower relations, which contribute toward <the utility and> the prosperity of individuals, as far as the common interest will allow it.

III. But as there are very few who have either abilities or opportunities of doing any thing which can directly and immediately affect the interests of all; and yet every one almost can contribute something toward the advantage of his kinsmen, his friends or his neighbours, and by so doing plainly Edition: current; Page: [83] promotes the general good; ’tis plainly our duty to employ our selves in these less extensive offices, while they obstruct no interest more extensive, and we have no opportunities of more important services. In doing so we follow nature and God {its author}, who by these stronger bonds has made some of mankind much dearer to us than others, and recommended them more peculiarly to our care <and benevolence>.

We must not therefor, {from any airy views of more heroic extensive offices,} check or weaken the tender natural affections, which are great sources of pleasure in life, and of the greatest necessity. Nay ’tis our duty rather to cherish and encrease them, in proportion to their importance to the common interest. But at the same time we should chiefly fortify the most extensive Edition: 1745; Page: [82] affections, the love of moral excellence, and the steddy purpose of conformity to the divine will. While these nobler affections have the controll of all the rest, the strengthning the tender affections in the several narrower attachments of life will rather tend to compleat the beauty of a moral character, and the harmony of life. The interest too of each individual should lead him to this cultivation of all kind affections; since, as we shall presently shew, so are we formed by nature that no man {in solitude}, without the aids of others and an intercourse of mutual offices, can preserve himself in safety or even in life, not to speak of any pleasure or happiness. Now ’tis plain, that ’tis only by kind offices and beneficence that we can procure the good-will of others, or engage their zeal to promote our interests: whereas by contrary dispositions, by a sordid selfishness, and much more by violence and injuries, we incur the hatred of others; wrath and discord must arise, and we must live in perpetual dread of the evils which the resentments of others may occasion to us. Nay further from such conduct there naturally arise in our own minds all the sullen, uneasy passions of suspicion, {jealousy,} and too well grounded fears: since not only the persons immediately injured, but all others who have any regard to the common interest, are roused {by a just indignation} to repell and revenge any injuries attempted against their neighbours.

Nor should we omit some other wonderful contrivances in nature to preserve a social life among men and avert injuries <and damages>. What a manifest accession of beauty Edition: 1745; Page: [83] is made to the countenance from friendly mirth, and cheerfulness, and an affectionate sympathy and congratulation Edition: current; Page: [84] with others? How much grace arises from a resolute conscious virtue, and the inward applauses of a good heart? What charms in the countenance, what gentle flames sparkle in the eyes of a friend, or of one who is full of gratitude for any kindness received. On the other hand, when an injury is received or apprehended, and there’s hope of {avenging and} repelling it, in what storms of countenance does resentment discover it self, and what wrathful flames flash from the eyes? But when there’s no hopes of repelling the injuries intended, with what powerful eloquence has nature instructed even the dumb animals, as well as mankind, under any oppressive sorrow or pain, or any great terror? How moving is that mournful wailing voice, that dejected countenance, weeping and downcast eyes, sighs, tears, groans? How powerfully do they move compassion in all, that they may <promptly> either give succour in distress, or desist from the intended injuries?2

IV. In this place we must not pass by the virtue of Friendship, which is so lovely and so useful in life. To alledge that this ardent affection of such admirable force, arises merely from a sense of our own {weakness and} indigence, that so what one cannot obtain by his own power, he may by the aids of others; is ascribing to it a mean and despicable original, and a very unstable foundation: since at this rate any change of interest, {so that we apprehended trouble or inconvenience by our friendlyness,} must at once destroy all affection or good-will: nay indeed there could be no Edition: 1745; Page: [84] real love, but a mere hypocritical profession of it, from such views of interest.

The true spring of friendship therefor must be that natural approbation and love of moral excellence already mentioned. For whensoever virtue appears in the manners of those with whom we are acquainted, there must arise immediately{, without views of interest,} an high esteem and love toward them. For the Good, as a sort of kindred souls naturally love and desire the society of each other. This love when it is strengthened by seeing each others friendly zeal, and by an intercourse of mutual services, becomes at last as strong as any tyes of blood; so that we have the same ultimate concern about our friends that we have about our selves.

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But as vitious men are naturally inconstant and variable, with such opposite passions as hinder them from either pleasing themselves long, or being agreeable to others; stable friendship is only to be found among the Good: since it must both be produced and preserved by virtue. And hence flows the grand rule of friendship, that we neither ought to desire our friends concurrence in any thing vitious, nor concurr in it at his request; least we undermine its only foundation. Friendship therefor is “the affectionate union of minds resembling each other in virtuous manners.”3 Which whosoever enjoys, will find it the most agreeable companion in the road to virtue and happiness. What can be sweeter, what more useful than to have a wise worthy friend with whom we may converse as freely as with our own soul: what enjoyment Edition: 1745; Page: [85] could we have of prosperity without the society of one who as much rejoices in it as we do ourselves? and for adversity, ’tis hard to bear it without the Society of such as perhaps suffer more by sympathy than we do. In both fortunes we need exceedingly the wise counsel of friends: friendship which ever way we turn us will be a present aid; no station excludes it; ’tis never unseasonable or troublesome. ’Tis the chief ornament of prosperity, and exceedingly alleviates our adversities by bearing a share in them.

V. We may further observe in relation to the kind affections, that tho’ the most extensive good-will toward all can never be too great, nor can our love of God and virtue admit of any excess; yet all the more contracted affections, arising either from the tyes of blood, or acquaintance, however lovely of themselves, may sometimes be excessive, and beyond that proportion which a good man would approve. Love is often divided into that of benevolence or good-will, and that of complacence or esteem, by which we are pleased with the tempers of others and desire their society.4 In the former branch there’s less danger of exceeding the just bounds, provided we retain a just submission to, and trust in the divine Providence, and preserve the more extensive affections in their proper superiority, so as not to sacrifice the interest of our country, or of the larger societies, or of persons of superiour Edition: current; Page: [86] worth, to that of our friends, or favourites. But the love of complacence which comes nearer to friendship, stands on more slippery ground. We ought to be very cautious that this affection be not employed about unworthy Edition: 1745; Page: [86] objects; or allure us to any thing vitious; nor so engross the whole man, that if these beloved persons be removed from us, or be involved in any calamities, our souls should sink entirely, and become unfit for all offices of piety and humanity. The best preventive of these evils, is not a restraining and checking all the tender affections of a narrower kind; but rather the cultivating the highest love and veneration toward the Deity, placing our hope and confidence in his Providence; and enlarging our views and concerns with more equitable minds toward the rest of mankind, that we may also discern what real excellencies are among them, perhaps equalling or surpassing those we had with such fond admiration beheld in our peculiar favourites.

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CHAPTER VI Edition: 1745; Page: [87]: Concerning our Duties toward Ourselves, and the Improvement of the Mind.

I. As {powerful} motives of private interest naturally excite us to our several Duties toward ourselves; to give them something venerable and laudable they must be {ultimately} referred either to the service of God, or some advantages to be procured to others. With this reference they become highly virtuous and honourable.1

The culture of our minds principally consists in forming just opinions about our duty; and in procuring a large store of valuable knowledge about the most important subjects: as indeed all branches of knowledge have some use, and contribute in some measure to happiness, either by the immediate pleasure, or by discovering more fully to us the divine perfections, or enabling us better to know and discharge our Duty; since the affections of the will naturally follow the judgments formed by the understanding. All therefor who have abilities and proper opportunities, ought to apply themselves to improve their minds with an extensive knowledge {of nature} in the sciences; and ’tis the duty of all to acquire by diligent meditation and observation that common prudence which should constantly govern our lives. We ought therefor to make just estimates of all things which naturally raise our desires, consider thoroughly Edition: 1745; Page: [88] their importance to happiness, and find out wherein consists our supreme good; the discovery of which must also discover the true plan of life. <As we observed before> We should therefor deeply impress this on our minds, that our chief good is placed in devout affections toward God, and good-will and beneficence toward mankind.

The divine nature therefor and its boundless exellencies should be matter of our most careful inquiry; especially those attributes which excite our Edition: current; Page: [88] pious veneration, love, and trust in him. And we are to extirpate all imaginations or suspicions, of any purposes in God which are inconsistent with the perfection of wisdom, goodness, and love to his creatures.

We ought also carefully to study our own nature and constitution; what sort of beings God requires we should be; what character* either more general, or more peculiar to each one, God requires he should support and act up to in life: that thus we may follow God and nature as the sure guide to happiness.

We ought therefor to enter deeply into human nature; observing both in ourselves and others the true principles of action, the true tempers and designs: least we rashly form worse notions of our fellows than just reason would suggest. By a thorough view of these things, we should often prevent or suppress many of the harsher and ill-natured passions, anger, hatred, and envy; Edition: 1745; Page: [89] and cherish humanity, compassion, lenity, forgiveness and clemency.2

II. This should also continually be in our thoughts, that all things fall out according to the divine counsel, either directly ordering them, or at least, permitting them with the most perfect purity, {for some excellent purposes}: and that consequently what appears to us harsh, injurious, or ignominious, may be designed to afford occasion for exercising and strengthening the most divine virtues of the Good; and in them consists their chief felicity.

The soul should be inured to a generous contempt of other things; and this we may acquire by looking thoroughly into them: by observing how mean, sordid, fading, and transitory are all bodily pleasures, all the objects that afford them, and our very bodies themselves! by observing how small these joys are and how little necessary, which arise from the external elegance and grandeur of life; and how uncertain they are; what cares they cost in acquiring and preserving; and how soon they cloy and give disgust! {as to speculative knowledge;} how uncertain and imperfect are many sciences, Edition: current; Page: [89] leading the embarassed mind into new obscurities and difficulties and anxious darkness; and discovering nothing more clearly than the blindness {and darkness}, or the small penetration of our understanding <into almost everything>. Again how poor an affair is glory {and applause}! which is ordinarily conferred by the ignorant, who cannot judge of real excellence; our enjoyment of which is confined within the short space of this life; which can be diffused through but a small part of this earth; and which must Edition: 1745; Page: [90] soon be swallowed up in eternal oblivion along with all the remembrance either of these who applaud or of the persons applauded. This [thought too of] [recollection and meditation on] the shortness of life, will equally enable the soul to bear or despise <hardness and> adversity; taking this also along, that the soul who bears it well, will obtain new and enlarged strength; and like a lively fire, which turns every thing cast upon it into its own nature, and breaks forth superiour with stronger heat, so may the good man make adverse events matter of new honour and of nobler virtues. To sum up all briefly, all things related to this mortal state are fleeting, unstable, corruptible; which must speedily perish, and be presently swallowed up in that boundless ocean of eternity. For what can be called lasting in human life? Days, months, and years are continually passing away; all must die, nor is any sure that death shall not surprise him this very day: and when that last hour overtakes him, all that’s past is lost for ever; nor can there remain to him any enjoyment, except of what he has acted virtuously; which may yield some joyful hope of an happy immortality. This hope alone can be the foundation of true fortitude[; this prospect alone can fully satisfy the mind as to] [and exalt] the justice and benignity of the divine administration.

But as in other arts, the mere knowledge of the precepts is of little consequence, nor can any thing laudable be obtained without practice and exercise; so in moral philosophy, which is the art of living well, the importance of the matter requires habit and continual exercise. Let our <Mind and> Reason therefor, and the other divine parts [powers] in our constitution, assume to themselves Edition: 1745; Page: [91] their just right of commanding the inferiour faculties [desires], and enure them to a constant subjection. And this in our present degenerate state must require almost continual <meditation,> attention and internal discipline; to the success of which it will contribute Edition: current; Page: [90] much that we be frequently employed in the offices of Piety {and Devotion} toward God, in adoration {of his perfections}, prayers, confession of sin, and pious {desires, and} vows of obedience.

III. To apprehend more fully the nature of virtue and vice, and to adorn the soul with every moral excellency, it may be of use to run over the several species of virtue, with their characteristicks, and established names; and observe the several opposite vices, whether in the excess or defect of some natural desire <whereas virtue preserves a middle degree between them>.3 The explication of the several Passions <or perturbations> belongs to [another branch of Philosophy] [pneumaticks]. To count them all over, and mark their several degrees whether laudable or censurable, with their several signs or characters, would require a very long discourse, with great variety of matter: but what’s of most importance to lead us to virtue, is the forming just estimates of all {human affairs, all} the objects of the natural desires; and by frequent meditation deeply infixing in our hearts just impressions of their values [them], and habituating the superior parts of the soul to a constant command over the inferior.

This however must be remembered concerning our natural desires and passions, that none of them can be pronounced absolutely evil in kind: none of them which may not sometimes be of great use in life, either to the person in whom they reside, or to others of mankind: Edition: 1745; Page: [92] in <preserving and> promoting either their Advantage, pleasure, or {even their} virtue. Superior orders of intelligence who have the superior powers more vigorous, may perhaps stand in no need of such violent motions or instigations; but to mankind they seem often necessary. And there is a moderate degree of each of them which is often advantageous, and often laudable. Such affections as don’t come up to this moderate degree are not sufficient for the purposes either of the individual, or those of society; and such as are too luxuriant and vehement, whether in pursuit of good or repelling of evil, and pass over the proper bounds, become uneasy and dishonourable to the person in whom they are, and are hurtful or pernicious Edition: current; Page: [91] to Society.4 The moderate degrees of several passions we justly deem not only innocent, but exceedingly subservient to virtue, as its guards or ministers; nay as the springs of many honourable actions, and as real virtues. By means of these better passions whether in pursuit of good or warding off of evil, we enjoy a more lively sense of life, the force of the soul is enlarged, and its activity invigorated: whence Plato calls these passions the wings or chariot-horses of the soul.5

Nature has given us the clearest indications of what she requires in this matter. For while these passions are kept moderate under just government, and directed by reason, the whole deportment is graceful and lovely. But when we are hurried away by any furious unbridled passion, we are utterly incapable of exercising our reason, or finding out what is wise and becoming us; we quite miss the very aim of the passion it self, Edition: 1745; Page: [93] and our whole deportment is disagreeable and deformed. Observe the very countenances of persons enraged, or of such as are transported with any ardent enflamed desire, or distracted with terror, or fluttering with joy. Their whole air [countenance and voices], the whole state and motion of the body becomes {deformed and} unnatural.

We therefor give the honourable titles of virtues to these moderate passions, equally confined from the two extremes; and call the extremes vices. But we have not appropriated names for the moderate and just degrees of several passions; and hence some have rashly imagined, that some of our natural passions are wholly and absolutely evil. And yet ’tis plain that there are also certain moderate degrees of these passions both innocent and necessary.

To illustrate all this by examples. A moderate desire of self-preservation is both necessary and easy. Where this is awanting, men shew a desperate audacious disposition without any caution. This temper is generally restless, turbulent, and destructive both to the person himself and to the society Edition: current; Page: [92] he lives in. Where this care of self-preservation is excessive, it appears in Timidity and cowardice; dispositions quite useless to the publick, and tormenting to the person, exposing him to all injuries and affronts <and dishonour>.

A moderate relish for sensual pleasures is useful, nay necessary <and easy>. An entire insensibility would deprive one of a great deal of innocent pleasure; but seldom meet we with any thing wrong on this side. Where the taste is too high, which we call luxury or intemperance, it generally excludes all the more manly enjoyments, Edition: 1745; Page: [94] neither consulting reputation nor honour; nor even health or fortune, or the preservation of life. This turn of mind too must frequently expose a man to continual chagrin and uneasiness.

About our estates or worldly goods two virtues are employed, frugality, which consists in a wise management of them family estates {for honourable purposes}, and liberality, which excites us to acts of kindness to others. The former is absolutely necessary to the exercise of the later: both are pleasant, advantageous, and honourable: the former more peculiarly subservient to our advantage, and the latter to our honour. The excess of frugality and defect of liberality is avarice, which is among the most deformed and most uneasy vices, pursuing stores quite unnecessary, and which it never intends to use; stores that must be obtained with much toil and uneasiness, and need rather more <trouble and anxiety> to preserve them. The defect of frugality and excess of liberality is prodigality, destructive to our fortunes, little subservient to the pleasure or safety of life, or even to fame, which it seems chiefly to have in view.

The highest pitch of liberality is called magnificence, where great expences are wisely employed for some honourable purposes. The defect of this is seen in an affectation or shew of magnificence with an unwilling narrow heart. The excess is sometimes seen in the inelegant boundless profusion of persons who have no just notion of decency and elegance.

The highest pitch of fortitude is in like manner called magnanimity; or an elevation and firmness of soul, which no circumstances of fortune can move, aiming Edition: 1745; Page: [95] solely at moral excellence in all its conduct. The extreme in excess often appears in a desperate audacious ambition, stopping Edition: current; Page: [93] at no dangers<, and arrogance>. Such a temper must be dangerous and uneasy to the possessor, and inconsistent with his safety, as well as that of others; as also destructive of the liberty and dignity of all around. The other extreme is pusillanimity or cowardice, rendering a man useless and miserable.

The like holds as to the desire of power and promotion in the world: a moderate degree is useful and sits easy on a good man: when it grows excessive, ’tis both uneasy and restless, and very vitious, and dangerous to it self and all around. Where it is too faint and weak even when just occasions offer, men abandon the proper station or opportunities of virtue and honour.

So also a moderate desire of fame is manifestly of great use, if we have yet higher desires of virtue. The excess of this desire is restless and uneasy, and often defiles and debases the true beauty of virtuous actions. Where men want this desire, or have it very languid, they want a very potent incitement to all virtuous offices.

Nor can all anger or resentment be condemned, altho’ there’s little lovely in any degree of it. An entire insensibility of all injuries, of which there are but few instances, would be a very inconvenient disposition; exposing a man to the contumelies and petulance of others; nor well consistent with his own character, or the safety of such as he is bound to protect. Excessive anger on the other hand is a most tormenting passion, Edition: 1745; Page: [96] and often destructive to the person in whom it is found; nor is there any passion more dangerous to society.

There’s a certain just indignation, becoming a good man, when the worthless are promoted to power or dignity. One void of such sentiments would be too little solicitous about the interests either of his friends or his country. But where this passion is excessive, or rises without just cause (which we call envy, the common spring of inveterate malice) it is the most destructive poison [rust] to the soul, tormenting to the breast where it resides, and extremely vitious, leading into the most horrid crimes.

This is to be observed of all the unkind passions which partake of anger, that they should be indulged no further than is plainly necessary for our own preservation or that of our friends [and country] [or concern for common Edition: current; Page: [94] interest]. If we could without these passions ensure their safety, there would be nothing desireable or laudable in them: nay on the other hand, nothing is more lovely <or honourable> than lenity, mercy, placability and clemency.

Among the virtues of social conversation, the first and chief is veracity and candour, of which we shall treat more fully in* another place. The opposite vices are all as it were defects: lyes, deceit, fraud, crafty hypocrisy and dissimulation.

In the same class are some other virtues tending to give pleasure to and oblige all we converse with; such as courtesy, good-manners, complaisance, sweetness, pleasantry, wit: all which are laudable and graceful, and promote friendliness and good-will in society. There Edition: 1745; Page: [97] are opposite vices on both hands: on the one, a servile fawning, and flattery, and scurrility; having no other view than insinuating by any sort of pleasure into the favour of those it makes court to, and stooping into the most ungentlemanly or obscene jests: on the other, a troublesome, unmannerly rusticity and roughness, shewing no respect or deference to company, but pleasing it self with a shew of liberty and boldness. ’Tis needless to dwell upon the inconveniences arising from these vices, as they are always mean and indecent, and often lead to the greatest mischiefs. The true preservative against both extremes is first to take care to attain a truly virtuous temper; and then, to maintain both a real good-will and a respect for those with whom we live in society.

As to modesty {and bashfulness}, ’tis worth our notice that this passion plainly arises from a lively sense and solicitude about what is decent [right] and honourable, and hence gives in our youth hopeful prognosticks of a fine genius, well formed by nature for every thing virtuous. But where it is excessive in maturer years it often retards or withholds men from acting an honourable part: where this sense is very weak or wholly awanting, men want a powerful guardian to every virtue.

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A more copious explication of all this subject may be found in Aristotle and his followers:<*> we may however suggest {before we quit it}, that since such fatal dangers threaten virtue as it were on both hands, we should certainly apply the greatest care and attention and self-discipline, in governing our several passions, in maintaining a lively and vigorous sense of moral excellence, Edition: 1745; Page: [98] and cultivating our rational powers [right reason] and the nobler and more extensive calm affections, [whether toward our own true interests or those of mankind] [that look at our own or at the common happiness of mankind].

IV. There’s also some care to be taken of our bodies. Strength and health is to be acquired or preserved chiefly by temperance and exercise; that so our bodies may be enabled to obey the commands of the soul, in enduring all toils we may incurr in discharge of our duty.

And since men can do little service to society who have not in their younger years been trained to some useful art or occupation: every one should timeously choose some one, suited to his genius, lawful in its nature, and of use to mankind.6 Nor ought such as are born to estates, who therefor need not for their own support any lucrative profession, think themselves exempted from any such obligation. For it seems more peculiarly incumbent on them{, as Providence exempts them from other cares,} to contribute to the publick interest, by acquiring a compleat knowledge of the rights of mankind, of laws, and civil polity; or at least such acquaintance with all the common business of mankind, that they may be able either by superiour wisdom, or by their interest<, favour,> and influence, to serve {their country or} their neighbours; and not be useless loads of the earth, serving only to consume its products.7

As to the several professions or occupations [arts], we deem them reputable on these two accounts, as they either require a finer genius and greater wisdom, or as they are of greater use in society. On both accounts the occupation Edition: current; Page: [96] of teaching others the grand principles of piety Edition: 1745; Page: [99] and virtue, {or even the more ingenious arts,} is reputed honourable; so are also the professions of law, medicine, and war, and some others of the more elegant arts. The more extensive merchandise, and even some mechanick arts, are justly reputable both on account of their great utility, and the considerable abilities of mind requisite in them. {Agriculture has been the chief delight of the finest spirits, as} no manner of life is more innocent, none affording sweeter amusements, none more becoming a rational creature, or a person of genteel taste in life <than agriculture>.

In the choice of our occupation or profession for life, our chief regard should be to our natural genius. But as our success in any occupation depends in the first place upon our genius, and next to it upon favourable circumstances of fortune, regard is to be had to both, but chiefly to our natural genius: for nature is a much surer and steddier principle.8

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CHAPTER VII Edition: 1745; Page: [100]: Some Practical Considerations to Excite and Preserve the Study of Virtue.

I. We need not now spend many words in shewing the necessity of <strenuously> pursuing virtue. For if we are sufficiently persuaded that in it consists our chief felicity, and that all other things are uncertain, weak, fading and perishing, nor sufficiently adapted to the dignity of the rational nature, we must deem it necessary to enter upon that course of life which our {conscience or} inmost sense, as well as {right} reason recommends, as most suited to our nature, and which leads to the peculiar happiness of rational beings: by which means also we exercise and improve these powers which are supreme and most God-like in our constitution, and discharge the office imposed upon us by God {and nature}.1

With what other view has God given us souls so well fitted for the knowledge and practice of so many virtues? To what purpose so many noble powers, such furniture of soul for most excellent arts {and offices}; the powers of reason and speech, {the powers of invention,} the desires of knowledge, an almost boundless retention and memory of things past, a provident sagacity about futurity resembling divination, a sense of what is honourable and shameful as the controller of our lower appetites; so many kind affections consulting the good [interests] of others, a {conscience or} sense distinguishing the right Edition: 1745; Page: [101] from the wrong, the honourable part from the vitious and base: along with a strength and grandeur of mind for enduring dangerous toils? To what purpose that penetration into nature which reaches even to the heavens, discovers the Deity presiding in the universe, Edition: current; Page: [98] discerns his infinite perfections, and raises us to the hopes of immortality after the dissolution of the body?

Do we speak only about Philosophers? what nation or clan is there where there has not always prevailed an universal and firm persuasion, that there is a Deity, that he enjoins certain duties upon mankind, appoints them a certain moral character they must maintain; and that their future state after death shall be happy or miserable according to their conduct in this world. These therefor are the dictates of nature, sentiments adapted to our frame, and supported by obvious reasons, which continue coeval with mankind; whereas the credit of ill-founded <and vain> fictions by length of time has always decayed, and at length vanished away.

Metaphysicians suggest many other arguments for the immortality of the soul; we only suggest here, that as the ingenious and artificial structure of the universe affords the strongest arguments for the existence of artificial intelligence, [the Creator][, the forever mover and ruler] of this material frame, so arguments exactly parallel to them{, from the structure of our souls,} shew that God has also a regard to the moral qualities, the virtues and vices {of rational creatures}; and that he exercises a just moral government over them, under which happiness must be secured at last to the virtuous, and misery alloted to the Edition: 1745; Page: [102] vitious. And since we see that this does not hold universally in the present state of this world, we may reasonably expect another display or unfolding of the divine administration in a future state, in every respect worthy of God. This too is confirmed by the very nature of the soul it self. For that wonderful life and activity of our minds, that extensive remembrance, that sagacious foresight, those noble powers and virtues, those ingenious arts and sciences and inventions, make it incredible that substances [natures] containing such excellencies can perish {along with these despicable bodies}. Now such prospects of immortality must suggest the most potent motives to all virtue, and the strongest dissuasives from vice.

II. And that we may with greater resolution endeavour to cultivate all virtue, let us have always at hand these thoughts; (1.) That where there’s an hearty inclination to what is honourable and good, we seldom want strength in execution, and have ground to hope for the divine assistance. {We even see Edition: current; Page: [99] in the ordinary course of things, that} by vigilance, activity, and wise deliberation, all matters generally succeed prosperously: men daily increase in ability; their superiour powers acquire new strength and command over the lower appetites; and what at first appeared hard and difficult, by custom is made easy and even delightful. The toil and trouble of any honourable offices will soon be past and gone, but the remembrance of them will remain perpetual matter of joy.

(2.) But least the keen desires of the external advantages, and the alluring pleasures of this life should abate Edition: 1745; Page: [103] our virtuous pursuits; we should frequently consider with the deepest attention what stable and solid joys and hopes accompany virtue: we should consider also the nature of all worldly enjoyments, and obtain that just contempt of them we often mentioned; and ever keep in view the shortness of this life, and that death must soon overtake us all.

(3.) And yet since there’s a certain measure of external pleasures and enjoyments natural and necessary, we must have some regard to them; provided we still remember that there are others much more important. That we may not therefore seem obliged as it were to declare war against all the conveniences or pleasures of this life, let us run over the several virtues, and see how much each of them generally contributes to our present prosperity and pleasure.2

Prudence which restrains the inconsiderate foolish impulses of the passions, must be alike necessary in every course of life whatsoever, that we may effectually pursue any end we propose, and not blinded by lust run headlong into the objects of our strongest aversions.

The several branches of Justice are of the greatest consequence to maintain peace, to avoid offending {and provoking} others, to obtain safety, favour, reputation, credit, wealth, extensive influence, and friends, which are the surest defences against all dangers in life. These virtues in their own nature preserve the soul easy and calm, and yield a joyful hope that we shall always obtain such things as are [naturally necessary and desirable] [desired by a uncorrupted nature]. On the other hand, where designs of violence Edition: current; Page: [100] and injustice Edition: 1745; Page: [104] possess the heart, as they are turbulent and uneasy in their own nature, so they devour the breast with perpetual suspicions, solicitudes, and fears. Need we speak of {the highest branch of justice,} Piety towards God? this secures to us the favour of the supreme Governour of the world, the sovereign Arbiter of our fortunes, who will always provide for the virtuous, if not the things at present most pleasurable, yet such as are truly fittest for them, and most advantageous and pleasant at last. And from piety will arise the hope of immortality which can always support the soul {in every circumstance of fortune}.

The several parts of Temperance, as they faithfully cherish all other virtues, so they tend to preserve and improve our health, strength, and even the beauty and grace of our persons; as the tranquillity and inward ease of the soul shews it self in the countenance. And frugality, a sparing simple way of living, diligence, and industry, are plainly subservient to wealth and affluence: which luxury and intemperance tend to destroy; as they also impair our health, strength, and beauty, and expose us to infamy and contempt; stupifying the nobler parts of the soul, and making all the lower appetites outragious and intractable.

Fortitude and all its parts are a safeguard to ourselves and our friends. Whereas by cowardice <and timidity> we not only quit our station of honour and virtue, but often involve ourselves in such dangers as we might easily have escaped by fortitude and presence of mind. The person void of this virtue must be in the power of others to make him what they please, by the threats of evil; Edition: 1745; Page: [105] even to involve him in the most impious and basest vices; which is a state of miserable servitude. If any good man is threatned with great dangers, or exposed to them even on account of his virtues; as on such occasions he is entering on the most difficult combat, encountering with our most capital adversary, pain; ’tis his business to rouse up all the forces of fortitude and patience and resignation, to recollect the sacred laws of these virtues, which prohibit any effeminate weakness, prohibit our sinking or losing spirit, or crouching under this load. Let him think with himself, now he’s ingaged in the most honourable combat, more glorious than the Olympicks; God presides the witness, judge, and rewarder; ’tis cowardly and foolish when the prize is so glorious, to spare a life that must soon perish however, and perhaps in a more tormenting manner, Edition: current; Page: [101] <without honour,> by the force of some disease; a life too that does not extinguish the soul, but shall return to us again. ’Tis by {such representations made to ourselves of the honourable forms of} virtue, {fortitude,} magnanimity, duty to God, and patient resignation, that such pains are abated, and the terrors of death in some measure taken away.

III. It was formerly observed that ’tis from God we have derived all our virtues.3 The Philosophers therefor{, as well as Divines,} teach us to have recourse frequently to God by ardent prayers, that, while we are exerting ourselves vigorously, he would also adorn us with these virtues, and supply us with new strength. They taught that no man ever attained true grandeur of mind without some inspiration from God. Need we add, Edition: 1745; Page: [106] that the very contemplation of the divine perfections, with that deep veneration which they excite, thanksgivings, praises, confessions of our sins, and prayers, not only increase <and cherish> our devotion and piety, but strengthen all goodness of temper and integrity. We ought therefor to have recourse to the Deity in all difficulties, trusting in his aid, with firm purposes of acting that part which is most honourable; and recall to our thoughts, what virtues this emergence gives opportunity to exercise, what furniture or armour has God and nature given us for encountering with such dangers? how joyful shall the remembrance be of our conquering such temptations, and discharging our duty well? and how shameful to be conquered by the allurements of some trifling pleasure, or the terrors of a little pain, and thus debase ourselves by a vitious and ignominious behaviour.

’Tis not our present purpose to unfold at length all the precepts and motives to virtue. They may be found in the Greek and Roman Philosophers and [modern authors] [and others that managed this subject more plentifully): {in perusing whom} it may be proper to collect and keep ready for our use all the more lively and affecting sentiments which occurr: “and let us form and settle in our minds a lively notion of the grandeur and excellence of the several virtues, so that we mayn’t question but that such as are possessed of them” {must be the truly wise and completely happy Edition: current; Page: [102] characters}.* “Such a man must be satisfied with himself, neither pining and fretting under troubles, nor broken with any terrours, nor tormented with any impatient ardent desires, nor Edition: 1745; Page: [107] dissolved in trifling pleasures and joys: to him no accidents of this mortal state appear so intolerable as to sink his spirits, nor so joyful as to give him high transports. And what is there in the pursuits of this world, and in this short transitory life, that can appear of great consequence to a truly wise man, whose soul is so constantly upon the watch, that nothing happens to him unforeseen or surprizing, nothing unexpected, nothing new.”

IV. Now as ’tis the grand view of the good man, that according to the intention of nature he should always be employed in contributing something to the general interest and happiness, which plainly requires that large numbers of mankind should be joined in an amicable society; he ought also carefully to enquire into all the rules or dictates of right reason, by which every part of life is to be regulated, and by observing which he may on his part preserve this social union among mankind: and these precepts or conclusions of right reason collected together make what we call the Law of Nature; which is the next branch of Moral Philosophy, of great use in the conduct of life. Edition: 1745; Page: [108]

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BOOK II: Elements of the Law of Nature.Edition: 1745; Page: [109]

CHAPTER I: Of the Law of Nature.

I. That we may shew how all the several parts of life may be brought into a conformity to nature, and the better discern the several Rights and Duties of Mankind, we shall premise the more general Doctrine in Morals, <unfolding and> explaining some pretty complex notions {and terms constantly occurring}; and this is “the subject of this and the two following chapters.”1

In the preceeding book we shewed, how from the very structure of our nature we derived our first notions of right and wrong{, virtuous and vitious, in our affections and actions}: and that it was then right and just that any Person should act, possess, or demand from others{, in a certain manner}, “when his doing so tended Edition: 1745; Page: [110] either directly to the common interest of all, or to the interest of {some part or} some individual, without occasioning any detriment to others.”2 And hence we say in such cases that a man has a right thus to act, possess or demand: and whoever would obstruct or hinder him thus to act or possess, or would not comply with such demand, is said to do an injury or wrong.

But resuming this matter a little higher; ’tis plain that this structure of our nature exhibits clear evidences of the will of God {and nature about Edition: current; Page: [104] our conduct}, requiring certain actions and prohibiting others.3 The notion of a law to which our <wills or> actions may be compared, is, no doubt, artificial, formed upon observation: and yet it has in all ages been so obvious and familiar to men that it may also be called natural. For the notion of a just power, or right of governing others, is obviously intimated, from that power nature has invested the Parent with, over his children, so manifestly tending to their good. And this too is known to all by constant experience, that the bulk of mankind don’t by any nice reasonings or observation of their own discover what is advantageous or hurtful in life; nay that the greater part of the practical sagacity and wisdom of the generality depends upon the discoveries and instructions of a few, who have had greater penetration and sagacity: and since {’tis commonly known, and} even the men of less sagacity acknowledge it, {that there are great diversities of genius,} and that some few have superior abilities to the common herd: that moral [ruling] principle implanted in all must also recommend it as advantageous to all, that large societies of men united for Edition: 1745; Page: [111] their common interest, should commit the administration of their common concerns to {a council of} a few of the wiser sort, and compell any who may thereafter be refractory to submit to their orders, who have thus obtained a just right of governing. Hence the notion of just power, or of a right of governing, is among the most common and familiar with mankind, when from the very plan and model of power constituted, there’s tolerable precaution taken that the Rulers shall have either no inducements to abuse it to the detriment of the whole body, or no hopes of doing so with impunity. Hence the notion of [the force and nature of] law too is obvious to all, to wit, “The will of those vested with just power of governing, declared to their subjects, requiring certain actions and forbidding others with denunciations of rewards or punishments.”4

II. Now since ’tis generally agreed among men, that the Deity is endued with the highest goodness, as well as with wisdom and power; it must obviously follow that an universal compliance with the will of God must tend Edition: current; Page: [105] both to the general good, and to that of each individual; to which compliance also we are most sacredly bound in gratitude, as we were created <and preserved> by him, and are constantly deriving good from his munificent hand: it must also in like manner follow, that all disobedience to the will of God must be opposite to the common felicity, and shew a base ungrateful mind.5 Now these considerations plainly shew that it is perfectly just and right in the Deity to assume to himself the government of his rational creatures, and that his right is founded upon his own moral excellencies. Edition: 1745; Page: [112]

But since no man can give sufficient evidence to the satisfaction of all, that he is possessed even of superiour wisdom, and much less of his stable inflexible goodness; since ambitious dissimulation would always make the greatest shew of goodness, if this were a sure step to ascend to power; nor can men search into each others hearts to detect such hypocrisy: and since no power generally suspected and dreaded can make a people, who are diffident of their most important interests, easy or happy; no man can justly assume to himself power over others upon any persuasion of his own superior wisdom or goodness, unless the body of the people are also persuaded of it, or consent to be subjected to such power, upon some reasonable security given them, that the power intrusted shall not be abused to their destruction.

III. And further since it was God our Creator <and ruler> who implanted this sense of right and wrong in our souls, and gave us these powers of reason, which observing our own constitution, and that of persons and other things around us, discovers what conduct tends either to the common prosperity of all, or that of individuals, and what has a contrary tendency; and shews also that all sorts of kind offices generally tend to the happiness of the person who discharges them, and the contrary offices to his detriment: all these precepts or practical dictates of right reason are plainly so many laws,* enacted, ratified by penalties, and promulgated by God {in the Edition: current; Page: [106] very constitution of nature}. [As words or writing Edition: 1745; Page: [113] are not essential to the nature of a law, but only the most convenient way of notifying it.]6

In every law there are two parts, the precept and the sanction.7 The precept shews what is required or forbidden; and the sanctions contain the rewards or punishments abiding the subjects, as they observe or violate the precept. In Civil Laws, beside the peculiar rewards or premiums proposed in some of them, there is this general reward understood in them all, that by obedience we obtain {the defence and protection of the state}, with the other common advantages of a civilized life, and [all] the rights of citizens. The penalties of human laws are generally expressed. The sanctions of the law of nature are known and promulgated in like manner with the preceptive part. The rewards are all those internal joys and comfortable hopes which naturally attend a virtuous course; and all these external advantages whether immediately arising from good actions, or generally obtained by the good-will and approbation of others, or of the Deity, whether in this life or in a future state. The penalties are all those evils internal or external, which naturally ensue upon vice; such as remorse, solicitude, and distressing fears and dangers: in fine, all these evils which right reason shews may probably be expected to ensue through the just resentment of the Deity or of our fellow-creatures.

IV. The divine laws according to the different manners of promulgation are either natural or positive.8 Natural laws are discovered by our reason observing the natures of things. Positive laws are revealed only by words or writing. Laws <revealed by words or writing> may again be divided according Edition: 1745; Page: [114] to the matter of them into the necessary and the not-necessary.9 Every sort of law indeed should have in view some real benefit to the state: but some laws point out the sole and necessary means of obtaining some great benefit{, or of averting some great evil}; so that contrary {or even different} laws could not answer the necessary purposes of society: while others only fix upon the most convenient means, where many others might have tolerably answered the end; or, where there’s a variety of means Edition: current; Page: [107] equally apposite, yet fix upon one set of them, when ’tis necessary that multitudes should agree in using the same means.10 Such is the case in appointing set times and places, and other circumstances, where matters of common concern are to be transacted jointly by many.11 These latter sort of laws are also called positive as to their matter, and the former natural, in the same respect.12

V. Laws generally respect alike a whole people, or at least all of a certain class or order; this holds as to all natural laws. But sometimes civil laws are made in singular cases, respecting only one person; these the Romans called privilegia; which were either out of singular favour, or singular resentment. If such privileges are granted for extraordinary merits, and have no pernicious tendency toward the body, they are very justifiable. Cases may happen too, tho’ seldom, in which it may be just to bring to punishment some very artful dangerous criminal by a special law{, which is not to be made a precedent in the ordinary procedure of justice}.

Equity is {sometimes understood as something distinct Edition: 1745; Page: [115] from strict law, being} “the reasonable wise correction of any imperfection in the words of the law, [by their being either not sufficiently extended, or too extensive in regard to the true reason or design of the law.] [when they are not adequate to the circumstances.]” This equity has place only as to laws promulgated in words; for the law of nature determines all points, not by words but, by right reason, and what is humane and good.13

VI. The doctrine of the <so called> dispensations was brought in by the Canon-law. A dispensation is “the exempting one {out of special favour} from the obligation of a law.”14 Dispensations <or immunity> are either from the preceptive part, or from the sanction, in remitting the penalty. Where the penalty is remitted or altered in such a manner as consists with Edition: current; Page: [108] the common safety, and does not weaken the authority and influence of the law, it is not to be blamed. Such a dispensing power {for singular important reasons} is frequently vested in the supreme Rulers or Magistrates of States. But for {previous}15 exemptions from the preceptive part of any wise law they can never be reasonable.

But first, we don’t count it a dispensation when any one, using his own right and the ordinary power vested in him by law, frees another from some legal obligation, or imposes a new one. As when a creditor remits a debt; or the supreme Governor <acts or> commissions subjects to act in his name what he has a right to execute, {tho’ without such commission these subjects had acted illegally in doing so}.

Again, sometimes by laws, whether divine or human, an external impunity may be justly and wisely granted Edition: 1745; Page: [116] to such conduct as is very vitious and culpable; if either through the stupidity or depravity of the people such vices could not be restrained without much greater inconvenience than what arises from the permission of them. But this comes not up to the notion of dispensation.

But in the third place, no grant or permission of any governor, human or divine, can make evil malevolent affections become morally good or innocent, or benevolent ones become evil: nor can the moral nature of actions flowing from them be any more altered by mere command or permission. The dispensations therefor, the Canonists intend, are then only justifiable, when the laws themselves are bad or imprudent, of which the Canon-law contains a great multitude.

VII. The Law of nature as it denotes a large collection of precepts is commonly divided into the primary and secondary; the former they suppose immutable, the latter mutable. This division is of no use as some explain it,* that the primary consists of self-evident <and noetic> propositions, and Edition: current; Page: [109] the secondary of such as require reasoning.16 Many of those they count primary require reasoning <and the other way round>: nor are just conclusions more mutable than the self-evident premises. The only useful sense of this distinction is, when such precepts as are absolutely necessary to any tolerable social state are called the primary; and such as are not of such necessity, but tend to some considerable improvement or ornament of life Edition: 1745; Page: [117] are called secondary. But these latter in the sight of God and our own consciences are not mutable, {nor can be transgressed without a crime, more than the primary;} altho’ there may be many political constitutions where the violation of these secondary precepts passes with impunity.

From the doctrine of the former book it must appear, that all our duties, as they are conceived to be enjoined by some divine precept [natural law ordered by God], are included in these two general [primary] laws, the one that “God is to be worshipped {with all love and veneration}”: and in consequence of it, that “he is to be obeyed in all things.”

The second is, that “we ought to promote {as we have opportunity} the common good of all, and that of particular {societies or} persons, while it no way obstructs the common good, or that of greater societies.”

Edition: current; Page: [110]

CHAPTER II Edition: 1745; Page: [118]: Of the Nature of Rights, and Their Several Divisions.

I. Since it is manifestly necessary to the common interest of all that large numbers of men should be joined together in amicable societies, and as this is the sum of all our duties toward men that we promote their happiness {as we have opportunity}; it must follow that all actions by which any one procures to himself or his friends any advantage, while he obstructs no advantage of others, must be lawful: since he who profits one part without hurting any other plainly profits the whole. Now since there are many enjoyments and advantages naturally desired by all, which <in safe circumstances> one may procure to himself, his family or friends, without hurting others, and which ’tis plainly the interest of society that each one should be allowed to procure, without any obstruction from others, (since otherways no friendly, peaceable society could be maintained:) [since it is relevant to the preservation of a friendly society as well as to the happiness of individuals] we therefor deem that each man has a right to procure and obtain {for himself or his friends} such advantages and enjoyments; which Right is plainly established and secured to him by the second general precept above mentioned, enjoining and confirming whatever tends to the general good of all, or to the good of any part without detriment to the rest. In all such cases therefor men are said to act according to their right. Edition: 1745; Page: [119]1 And then, as the several offices due to others are <also> recommended to us by the sense of our own hearts [by our higher senses]; so others in a social life have a claim to them, and both desire, and naturally or justly expect them from us, as some way due to them: in consequence of this it must appear, that the several rules of duty, or special laws of nature [or laws of nature called special], <or natural jurisprudence>, cannot be delivered in a more easy manner than by considering all the several claims Edition: current; Page: [111] or rights competent either to individuals, to societies, or to mankind in general as a great body or society; all which are the matter of [deemed granted by] some special laws.

The several rights of mankind are therefor first made known, by the natural feelings of their hearts, and their natural desires, pursuing such things as tend to the good of each individual or those dependent on him: and recommending to all certain virtuous offices. But all such inclinations or desires are to be regulated by right reason, with a view to the general good of all <so that nothing is allowed or claimed against the common interest>.

Thus we have the notion of rights as [This is another notion of righ