An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections (1742, 2002)
The first half of the work presents a rich moral psychology built on a theory of the passions and an account of motivation deepening and augmenting the doctrine of moral sense developed in the Inquiry. The second half of the work, the Illustrations, is a brilliant attack on rationalist moral theories and is the font of many of the arguments taken up by Hume and used to this day.
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002).
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
Table of Contents
- The Essay
- Remarks Concerning the Editions
- Editorial Principles
- the preface
- the contents
- treatise i: An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions
- section i: A general Account of our several Senses and Desires, Selfish or Publick
- section ii: Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes
- section iii: Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions.Hutcheson: 25
- section iv: How far our several Affections and Passions are under our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Observations about their Objects.
- section v: Hutcheson: 20A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the several Senses, as to Intenseness and Duration.
- section viHutcheson: 5: Some general Conclusions concerning the best Management of our Desires. With some Principles necessary to Happiness.Hutcheson: 10
- treatise ii: Illustrations uponthe Moral Sense
- Hutcheson: 5section i Concerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable to Truth or Reason.
- section ii: Hutcheson: 25Concerning that Character of Virtue and Vice, The Fitness or Unfitness of Actions.
- section iii: Mr. Woolaston’s Significancy of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue considered
- Hutcheson: 20section iv: Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense.
- Hutcheson: 25section v: Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit; and be rewardable upon the Supposition, that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected fromHutcheson: 30 Affection or Instinct.
- Hutcheson: 5section vi: How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action virtuous
- Textual Notes
- Treatise i: An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions
- Treatise ii: Illustrations upon the Moral Sense