Posterior Analytics
Aristotle sets out the conditions under which scientific arguments will provide true knowledge; where true conclusions are deduced from first principles and basic principles are used to explain more complex ones.
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, trans. E.S. Bouchier, B.A. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1901).
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- Author: Aristotle
- Translator: Edmund Spencer Bouchier
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Table of Contents
- INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
- CONTENTS.
- BOOK I.
- CHAP. I.: Whether a Demonstrative Science exists
- CHAP. II.: What Knowing is, what Demonstration is, and of what it consists
- CHAP. III.: A refutation of the error into which some have fallen concerning Science and Demonstration
- CHAP. IV.: The meaning of ‘Distributive,’ ‘Essential,’ ‘Universal’
- CHAP. V.: From what causes mistakes arise with regard to the discovery of the Universal. How they may be avoided
- CHAP. VI.: Demonstration is founded on Necessary and Essential Principles
- CHAP. VII.: The Premises and the Conclusion of a Demonstration must belong to the same genus
- CHAP. VIII.: Demonstration is concerned only with what is eternal
- CHAP. IX.: Demonstration is founded not on general, but on special and indemonstrable principles; nor is it easy to know whether one really possesses knowledge drawn from these principles
- CHAP. X.: The Definition and Division of Principles
- CHAP. XI.: On certain Principles which are common to all Sciences
- CHAP. XII.: On Questions, and, in passing, on the way in which Sciences are extended
- CHAP. XIII.: The difference between the Demonstration and Science of a thing’s Nature and those of its Cause
- CHAP. XIV.: The figure proper to Demonstrate Syllogism
- CHAP. XV.: On immediate negative propositions
- CHAP. XVI.: On ignorance resulting from a defective arrangement of terms in mediate propositions
- CHAP. XVII.: On ignorance resulting from a defective arrangement of terms in immediate propositions
- CHAP. XVIII.: On ignorance as resulting from defective sense perception
- CHAP. XIX.: Whether the Principles of Demonstration are finite or infinite
- CHAP. XX.: Middle terms are not infinite
- CHAP. XXI.: In Negations some final and ultimate point is reached where the series must cease
- CHAP. XXII.: In Affirmations some final and ultimate point is reached where the series must cease
- CHAP. XXIII.: Certain Corollaries
- CHAP. XXIV.: Whether Universal or Particular Demonstration is superior
- CHAP. XXV.: That Affirmative is superior to Negative Demonstration
- CHAP. XXVI.: Direct Demonstration is superior to Reduction per impossible
- CHAP. XXVII.: What science is more certain and prior, and what less certain and inferior
- CHAP. XXVIII.: What constitutes one or many Sciences
- CHAP. XXIX.: Concerning many Demonstrations of the same thing
- CHAP. XXX.: On fortuitous occurrences
- CHAP. XXXI.: Sense perception cannot give Demonstrative Science
- CHAP. XXXII.: On the difference of Principles corresponding to the difference of Syllogisms
- CHAP. XXXIII.: The distinction between Science and Opinion
- CHAP. XXXIV.: On Sagacity
- BOOK II.
- CHAP. I.: On the number and arrangements of Questions
- CHAP. II.: Every question is concerned with the discovery of a Middle Term
- CHAP. III.: The distinction between Definition and Demonstration
- CHAP. IV.: The Essence of a thing cannot be attained by Syllogism
- CHAP. V.: Knowledge of the Essence cannot be attained by Division
- CHAP. VI.: The Essence cannot be proved by the Definition of the thing itself or by that of its opposite
- CHAP. VII.: Whether the Essence can in any way be proved
- CHAP. VIII.: How the Essence can be proved
- CHAP. IX.: What Essences can and what cannot be proved
- CHAP. X.: The nature and forms of Definition
- CHAP. XI.: The kinds of Causes used in Demonstration
- CHAP. XII.: On the Causes of events which exist, are in process, have happened, or will happen
- CHAP. XIII.: On the search for a Definition
- CHAP. XIV.: On the discovery of Questions for Demonstration
- CHAP. XV.: How far the same Middle Term is employed for demonstrating different Questions
- CHAP. XVI.: On inferring the Cause from the Effect
- CHAP. XVII.: Whether there can be several causes of the same thing
- CHAP. XVIII.: Which is the prior cause, that which is nearer the particular, or the more universal?
- CHAP. XIX.: On the attainment of Primary Principles
- APPENDIX. PRIOR ANALYTICS. BOOK II.
- CHAP. XXIII.: On Induction
- XXIV.: On Example
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