Gustave de Molinari, Evenings on Saint Lazarus Street: Discussions on Economic Laws and the Defence of Property (1849) (2019 draft)

Gustave de Molinari, Les Soirées de la Rue Saint-Lazare: Entretiens sur les lois économiques et défense de la propriété (Evenings on Saint Lazarus Street: Discussions on Economic Laws and the Defence of Property) (1849)

Title Page of the original 1849 edition
The photo of Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) which accompanied his obituary in the Journal des économistes

Introduction

Date: July 17, 2019

This is the third draft (July 2019) of a book that will be published by Liberty Fund in 2022. The page numbers of the original edition are indicated with square brackets, e.g. [p. 200] and many of the quotes are in both French and English for the moment. For further information see the Molinari Project Page and the main Molinari page which lists books by him in the OLL.

Original Title page quote:

"It is necessary to refrain from attributing to the physical laws which have been instituted in order to produce good, the harms which are the just and inevitable punishment for the violation of this very order of laws." F. Quesnay.

Another quote:

"Liberty! That was the cry of the captives of Egypt, the slaves of Spartacus, the peasants of the Middle Ages, and more recently of the bourgeoisie oppressed by the nobility and religious corporations, of the workers oppressed by their masters and the guilds. Liberty! That was the cry of all those who found their property confiscated by monopoly and privilege. Liberty! That was the burning aspiration of all those whose natural rights had been forcibly repressed." (S12, pp. 000.)


Table of Contents


1. Front Matter

"

Acknowledgements

The editor would like to thank above all the late Leonard Liggio (1933-2014) for introducing me to the ideas of Gustave de Molinari over 35 years ago. This began a lifetime interest in the French classical liberal tradition which shows no sign of stopping.

When I was researching my undergraduate Honors thesis on Molinari I was living in Sydney, Australia and had the great fortune to use the Mitchell Library which is part of the State Library of New South Wales and which has not only a magnificent reading room but also had an extensive collection of free trade literature including a complete set of the Journal des Économistes to which Molinari had contributed as author and editor for 60 years. This puzzled me at first until I realized that before the Federation of the Australian colonies in 1901 the colony of New South Wales had been a staunch free trade state and Victoria a strongly protectionist one. In order to keep the members of parliament in New South Wales fully informed about the free trade cause the library had collected an enormous amount of material about free trade, in both English and French. Unfortunately, the newly formed Commonwealth of Australia adopted the protectionist policies of Victoria and the free traders of New South Wales lost out until the tariff cuts of the 1970s and 1980s. Fortunately, I eventually became the unexpected beneficiary of the purchasing policies of the Mitchell librarians in the late 19th century. For that, whoever they might have been, I would like to offer a belated thank you as well.

A third person I would like to thank is Professor Robert Leroux of the University of Ottawa who was such a congenial and thought-provoking collaborator on two anthologies of 19th century French classical thought which we have edited together. Molinari played a bit part in both of them.

Then there is Spencer Heath McCallum who sold me his collection of Molinari books when I was a poor student studying at Stanford. He wanted them to go to a good home. I think I have have done that. So, a heartfelt thanks to Spencer for giving me some biblio-orphans to look after.

Abbreviations

ACLL - Anti-Corn Law League

AEPS - Annuaire de l'économie politique et de la statistique

Cours - Molinari’s economic treatise Cours d'économie politique

CPE - Collection des Principaux économistes

CR - Compte rendu (book review)

CW - Liberty Fund’s edition of the Collected Works of Bastiat (CW3 is vol. 3)

DEP - Dictionnaire de l’économie politique

ES - Bastiat’s Economic Sophisms, so ES1 = Economic Sophisms. Series 1

FFTA - French Free Trade Association (Association de la liberté des échanges )

JDD - Journal des débats

JDE - Journal des économistes

LdT - Charles Dunoyer, De la liberté du travail (1845)

PoS - “The Production of Security” (Molinari’s February 1849 article)

SEP - Société d’économie politique (the Political Economy Society)

LE - Bastiat’s magazine Le Libre-Échange

Les Soirées - Molinari’s book

S1 - the first conversation or Soirée

T. - Tome or volume, so T.1 = vol. 1

Key Terms

Certain terms used by Molinari require careful translation in order to fully capture the nuances of his thought as well as his radicalism. When Molinari uses the same word repeatedly we have refrained from finding synonyms but kept the same word in order to preserve his use of sometimes technical economic language as well as to show the patterns in his thinking, for example in his use of the word “l’entrepreneur." The following terms should be noted:

Association, Organisation - these were two key words used by socialists like Victor Considerant and Louis Blanc to describe how they would like to see industry and labor organized in a socialist system: the “organisation of industry” by the state into “national or social workshops”, and the “association of workers” into cooperative living and working arrangements as opposed to private property, wages, and exchanges on the free market. Molinari capitalizes these words when he uses them in a socialist sense, and leaves them in lower case when he uses them in a free market sense.

le communiste, communisme - Molinari contrasts competitive free market economic activity with two other forms, that of “le monopole" (monopoly) and that of “le communisme." By monopoly he means any economic or political activity which is controlled by and operated for the benefit of a small group such as the monarch or the ruling elites of a country. By "communiste" he means any economic or political activity which is controlled by and operated for the benefit of the people or the nation as a whole. We have usually translated "communiste" as communist, though sometimes “communal,” ”socialist,” or "statist" would be preferred. Another translation might also be “collectivist.”

le droit de quelque chose vs. le droit à quelque chose - Molinari was clear to distinguish between two different kinds of rights (le droit). The socialists advocated for example "le droit au travail" - the right of a worker to a job - whereas the Economists advocated "le droit du travail" - the right of working, or of anybody to engage in work of some kind, or “la liberté du travail” (the liberty of working).

les Économistes - originally the word referred to the 18th century economists known as the Physiocrats, such as Quesnay and Turgot. The free market economists of Molinari’s day in the Guillaumin network also referred to themselves as “the Economists." Molinari speaks through the voice of “The Economist” in each of the Soirées.

l’affranchissement de la propriété - The phrase "the emancipation or liberation of property" sums up Molinari's overall plan of reform of French society. He also uses the phrase “l’affranchissement complet, absolu de la propriété” (the complete and absolute emancipation of property).

l’entrepreneur - always translated as entrepreneur because of the enormous importance Molinari placed on the role of the entrepreneur in a free economy. In addition to generic examples such as “les entrepreneurs d'industrie” (industrial or manufacturing entrepreneurs) he has many very specific examples in mind as well. Molinari wanted to deregulate every monopolized or highly regulated sphere of economic activity which would give rise to new industries in those areas, each with their own kind of entrepreneurs who would provide these goods and services on the free market. Where Molinari mentions these new kinds of entrepreneurs specifically by name we have been faithful to his word use. For example, “l’entrepreneur de pompes funèbres” (entrepreneurs in the funeral business) and “les entrepreneurs d’education" (entrepreneurs in the education business).

industriel, industrielle - Molinari confusingly uses these two words in different ways throughout Les Soirées. When he uses "industriel" as a noun, as in "les industriels", he is referring to those individuals who are engaged in any productive economic activity designed to produce goods or services for the market. [See also “le producteur” and “l’entrepreneur”]. This usage harks back to the theory of “l'industrielisme" developed by Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer during the 1820s. When he uses it as an adjective, as in "les enterprises industrielles" (industrial enterprises) or "les crises industrielles" (industrial crises) he is using it in the more modern sense of industrial or manufacturing activities.

laissez faire, laissez-faire - Molinari uses these expressions as an exhortation and as the name of a particular economic policy. The hyphenated version, "laissez-faire", describes the policy of allowing economic activity to proceed unregulated by government, as in "ce régime de laissez-faire absolu" (this regime of absolute laissez-faire). Some times Molinari urges that something be allowed to function freely ("laissez faire") or allowed to move freely ("laissez passer"), as in "laissez faire l'industrie privée" (Let private industry be free to go about its business).

la liberté de qch. - The liberty or freedom of engaging in a particular kind of economic activity. Molinari had in mind a dozen or so specific areas of economic activity which should be "emancipated" to allow entrepreneurs to step in to provide new kinds of goods and services to consumers. The model was "la liberté des échanges" (literally the liberty of exchanges or trade, but better known in English as “free trade”) which he extended to other areas such as “la liberté de l’enseignement” (the liberty of education), “la liberté des banques” (free banking), and “la liberté de gouvernement” (the competitive provision of security in the free market, or competing government).

les lois naturel(s), lois économique(s) - Molinari thought the world was governed by three sets of interlocking natural laws, the natural laws of the physical world, such as "la loi de la gravitation" (the law of gravitation), "les lois naturelles" (the natural laws) of the moral and social world, such as justice, property, and utility, and a small number of “les lois économiques" such as “la loi naturelle de l’économie des forces ou du moindre effort” (the natural law of the economising of forces, or the law of the least effort), “la loi naturelle de la concurrence” (the natural law of competition), and “la loi de l’offre et de la demande” (the law of supply and demand), among others.

la monnaie, l'argent, la numéraire, l'espèce - Molinari uses a bewildering number of words for money. We have tried to simplify this somewhat by translating "la monnaie" and "l'argent" as money in the general sense, "la numéraire” as cash in the form of silver or gold coins, and “l'espèce” on rare occasions as specie, or gold or silver coins. Whenever he specifically refers to any paper form of money such as “la monnaie de papier” (paper money) we have clearly indicated this in the notes.

la production, le producteur, le consommateur - since Molinari wanted to open up every area of economic activity to competition he believed that each one would have its own form of production, producers, consumers, and entrepreneurs (see section on “l'entrepreneur"). We have preserved his use of these terms, such as the following specific examples "la production de la sécurité" (the production of security), "les producteurs de sécurité" (the producers of security), "les consommateurs de sécurité" (the consumers of security), "la production de l’enseignement" (the production of education), and "les consommateurs de monnaie" (the consumers of money).

les produits matériels, les produits immatériels - Molinari expanded J.B. Say's idea of "non-material goods" or services to include not just the productive economic activities of lawyers, doctors, teachers, and judges but also those of theater directors and actors and producers of security.

la propriété extérieur - translated as "external property" or “external property rights” by which Molinari means the right to own the property which lies outside or is external to one's body and which he has created by his labor and effort.

la propriété intérieur - translated as "internal or personal property" or "internal or personal property rights” by which he means the right every individual has to “self-ownership”, that is the property right a man has in himself and the right to use his abilities freely, insofar as he causes no damage to the property of others.

le régime - translated as regime, society or system depending upon the context. Some of his uses of the term are standard, as in "l’ancien régime" (the old regime), while others are unique to him, such as "ce régime de laissez-faire absolu" (this regime or system of absolute laissez-faire), "un régime de libre gouvernement" (a system of free or competing governments), and "le régime mi-propriétaire, mi-communiste" (this system of part-private and part-communist property ownership).

Soirées - usually refers to an evening event where people come together to eat, drink, and discuss ideas. We have translated the word as “Evening” in the title of the book and for each chapter, but it might also be understood as the “conversations” which were held at such an evening event.

la spoliation, le spoliateur, spolié - Throughout we have translated “la spoliation" and its related words “le spoliateur" and “le spolié" as plunder, the plunderer, and the plundered. Molinari (and Bastiat) thought that organized plunder and resistance to it was a driving force of history which took the form of “an endless struggle … between the oppressors and the oppressed, the plunderers and the plundered.” “La spoliation légale” (legal plunder) was the organised violation and expropriation of the property rights of individuals by a ruling elite which controlled the organs of state power (this was a concept which originated with Bastiat and taken up by Molinari.

In addition, the following less crucial, but still important and interesting terms should be noted:

actif - Molinari describes men as “des êtres actifs et libres” (free and acting beings), who “act” in order to achieve the goals they set themselves.

la Bourse, les bourses du travail - "La Bourse" (with a capital B) was the main Stock Exchange in Paris. Molinari wanted to establish something similar for workers which he called "la bourse du travail" (Labour Exchange) where employers and workers could come together to buy and sell labour more efficiently.

l’interlope - literally an "interloper" was a merchant ship which broke the monopoly trading rights of a state privileged trading company. Molinari uses it to describe a number of illicit, black market, or "pirate" economic activities such as carrying mail, making loans, or engaging in prostitution.

un milieu libre - Molinari described the world in which he wanted to live as "un milieu libre" which we have translated as a free milieu but could just as accurately translated as "a free society." He also used many other similar phrases such as "un régime de pleine liberté" (a regime of complete liberty), "un régime de la propriété illimitée" (a society of unlimited property rights), and "un régime de laisser-faire absolu" (a society of absolute laissez-faire), among several others.

A Chronology of the Life and Works of Molinari

1819-1840: childhood and youth spent in Liège

•     Born 3 March 1819 in Liège, then in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (and after 1830 Belgium)

•     it is possible that he began studying medicine in Brussels before he moved to Paris.[1]

•     it is also possible that he worked in a cotton factory for six years before coming to Paris which sparked his interest in labour matters.[2]

1840-1851: journalist, free trade activist, and economist in Paris

1840-47

•     circa 1840 comes to Paris from Belgium where he finds work as a journalist

•     1842-43 writes biographies for the magazine, Le biographe universel, including one on the Minister of Finance Comte Roy, and on the author and politician Lamartine, which he publishes as his first book, a Biographe politique de M. A. de Lamartine (1843). His first piece appears in January 1842 as a monthly "Chronique politique"

•     1843-46 works as a journalist writing for La Nation and Le Courrier français on economic topics such as railroads, workers' rights, labour exchanges, and slavery. Meets Hippolyte Castille who also works for the Courrier français and attends Castille's soirées at his house in the rue Saint-Lazare 1844-48, other attendees include Bastiat, Garnier, Fonteyraud, and Coquelin.

•     1846 publishes his first book on economics, Études économiques. L'Organisation de la liberté industrielle et l'abolition de l'esclavage (Economic Studies on the Organization of Industrial Liberty and the Abolition of Slavery) (1846) with a quote on the front page "Laissez faire, laissez passer." The book is reviewed very favorably by Joseph Garnier in the JDE thus beginning Molinari's long association with the journal.

•     1846 meets Bastiat in early 1846 in the offices of Le Courrier français who comes to thank them for reviewing his first book of Economic Sophisms. Bastiat agrees to publish some future sophisms in the journal, possibly edited by Molinari. Molinari joins Bastiat's Free Trade Society in July (founded 1 July 1846, Bastiat is Secretary General), becoming one of the associate secretaries, along with Adolphe Blaise, Charles Coquelin, Alcide Fonteyraud, Joseph Garnier; Coquelin is one of the key speakers at la Salle Montesquieu where meetings were held; he is invited to attend banquet in 18 Aug. 1846 in Paris in honour of Richard Cobden. In Sept. publishes two critical letters in the Courrier français addressed to Bastiat criticizing him and the FTA for not being radical enough in their demands to abolish protectionism.

•     1847 Molinari formally enters into the Guillaumin network; publishes his first article in the Jan. edition of the JDE on agriculture in England; between 1847-52 writes on economic conditions in England and Ireland, history of economic thought, tariffs, articles in JDE, DEP

•     is invited to join the Political Economy Society (founded 15 Nov. 1842), becomes full member in 1847. Founding members were five: Eugène Daire, Joseph Garnier, Adolphe Blaise, Guillaumin, et Pierre Bos-Darnis (dropped out when he became a protectionist)

•     Attends as delegate of the SEP the first congress of economists held in Brussels 16-18 September 1847 - French delegation includes Charles Dunoyer, Horace Say, Joseph Garnier, Alcide Fonteyraud, Adolphe Blanqui, Guillaumin, Molinari. It was also attended by Karl Marx who was to present a paper so it possible that they met.

•     publishes the first of many books by Guillaumin on Histoire du tarif (The History of Tariffs) (1847); begins editorial work on the last two volumes of the Collections des Principaux économistes on 18th century economic thought.

•     late 1847 begins teaching a course on economics at the Athénée royal de Paris which is interrupted by the Revolution; resumed teaching course when he went to Brussels in 1852. Published as Cours d'économie politique (1st ed. 1855, 2nd ed. 1863)

•     1847-48 helps Castille and Bastiat edit journal about intellectual property: Le travail intellectuel (Intellectual Labour) 1847-48)

1848

•     February - the day after the Revolution breaks out he, Bastiat, and Castille start their first small magazine which appears daily and which they hand out on the streets of Paris, La République française. 30 issues appeared between 26 Feb. - 28 March 1848

•     March - active in a political club, "Le Club de la liberté du travail" (The Club for the Liberty of Working), founded by Coquelin with Fonteyraud as one of the key speakers, to publicly debate socialists on "the right to work," forced to close when communist thugs use violence against them

•     writes four signed articles and book reviews for the JDE and many unsigned articles and reports about the events of 1848, including "L'utopie de la liberté (lettre aux socialistes, par un RÉVEUR)" (The Utopia of Liberty: A Letter to the Socialists by a Dreamer) in June appealing for a coalition between the economists and the socialists

•     June 1848 joins Bastiat, Garnier, Coquelin, Fonteyraud in editing and publishing a second revolutionary magazine to appeal to ordinary workers which they hand out on the streets of Paris, Jacques Bonhomme (11 June- 13 July 1848), 4 issues appeared, forced to close because of the violent crack down by the police after the June Days rioting

•     June-December 1848 - works closely with the editorial staff at the JDE reporting on political and intellectual developments during the year, especially the debate in the Chamber on the "right to work" clause in the new constitution

•     Dec. Molinari in an unsigned article sums up the events of the year on behalf of the editors of the JDE concluding that the "fever" of socialism has temporarily subsided but he expects another outbreak at any time

1849

•     January writes an important article on Thiers' book De la propriété (On Property) in JDE criticizing the conservatives for defending property poorly against the socialists

•     February writes "De la production de la sécurité" (The Production of Security) for the JDE in which he gives the first defense of the anarcho-capitalist argument for the private provision of police and defense. This is taken up again in S11 of Les Soirées

•     July/Aug. assists Garnier in organizing an international Peace Congress in Paris the president of which was Victor Hugo and at which Bastiat gives an important speech. Molinari wrote a report on the meeting published in JDE in Sept.

•     Sept. most likely date of publication of Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare. Announced in Oct. 1849 Guillaumin catalog.

•     Oct. Molinari's book Les Soirées is critically discussed at the regular monthly meeting of the Political Economy Society. Dunoyer says he has been "swept away by illusions of logic." Bastiat and others argue that the state must have supreme power in order to defend property rights; the participants also criticize him for objecting to eminent domain laws.

•     Nov. Charles Coquelin critically reviews Les Soirées in the JDE, he agrees with most of the book but objects to Molinari using the figure of "The Economist" to put forward his own views about the private production of security.

1850-51

•     writes nine articles and book reviews for the JDE during this period, including the obituary of Bastiat in February 1851.

•     assists in the editing and publishing of the DEP edited by Coquelin and Guillaumin, writes 25 principle articles and four biographical articles, including the ones on Liberté du commerce, Liberté des échanges, Paix, Guerre, Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix), Propriété littéraire, Servage, Tarifs de douane, Théatres, Travail, Union douanière, Usure

•     the coup d'état of Louis Napoleon on 2 Dec. 1851 forces Molinari into a self-imposed exile in Brussels

•     The first period in GdM's professional life came to an end with death of 3 close colleagues and his decision to leave Paris at end of 1851: Fonteyraud 1849 (death in cholera epidemic); F. Bastiat 24 Dec. 1850 (throat cancer); Ch. Coquelin 1852 (heart attack August 1852).

1852-1868: academic economist and free market lobbyist and journalist in Brussels.

•     moves to Brussels to teach economics at the Musée royal de l'industrie belge, later at Institut supérieur du commerce d'Anvers (Antwerp); he is active in the Belgian free trade movement and attempts to set up Labour Exchanges

•     Oct. 1852 writes an analysis of the 1848 Revolution and the coup d'état of Louis Napoléon based upon his theory of class interests, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel (1852). This is followed in 1861 by a book examining the political and economic thought of Emperor Napoleon III, Napoleon III publiciste (1861).

•     1855-68 edits and publishes his own journal the Économiste belge to promote free trade and labour exchanges

•     1855 publishes his treatise of economics based upon his lectures, Cours d'économie politique (2nd ed. 1863).

•     1855 publishes a second book of "conversations" about free trade between a rioter, a prohibitionist or protectionist, and an economist, Conservations familières sur le commerce des grains (1885)

•     1857 writes a book on the 18th century peace advocate L'abbé de Saint-Pierre (1857)

•     1859 debates Frédéric Passy on compulsory education, De l'enseignement obligatoire in which Molinari argues that the state should compel parents to educate their children but not provide that education.

•     1861 publishes an account of his visit to Russia and the abolition of serfdom, Lettres sur la Russie (1861); also a collection of his economic articles from the previous 15 years, Questions d'économie politique et de droit public.

•     1868 - his wife Edmée died at the age of 50 on October 30, 1868; he closes his magazine Économiste belge in December and moves back to Paris

1869-1881: returns to journalism in Paris

•     Molinari works for the prestigious Journal des Débats, serves as chief editor 1871-1876

•     1870-71 in Paris during the Paris Commune and the formation of the Third Republic; writes accounts of the socialist political clubs and the socialist movement during the Commune, Les Clubs rouges pendant le siège de Paris (The Red Clubs during the Siege of Paris) (1871) and Le Mouvement socialiste et les réunions publiques avant la révolution du 4 septembre 1870 (The Socialist Movement and their Public Meetings before the Revolution of 4 Sept. 1870) (1872)

•     1873 writes his first and only book on political and constitutional theory, La République tempérée (The Strengthened Republic) (1873) as the constitution of the Third Republic is being developed

•     1874 - is elected a corresponding member of the Institute (Académie des sciences morales et politiques)

•     1876 travels to Canada and the US to cover the centennial celebrations and writes accounts of his travels

•     1877-79 - writes a series of articles in the JDE which becomes his first book on historical sociology which is published in 1880, L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle (Economic Evolution in the 19th Century) (1880)

1881-1909: editor of JDE, very prolific period in his life; writes on economics and historical sociology and his travels

•     1881 Appointed editor of JDE in October when Joseph Garnier dies;

•     1881-83 - begins another multi-part series of articles in the JDE which becomes his second book on historical sociology, L'évolution politique et la Révolution (Political Evolution and the Revolution) (1884)

•     1881-86 continues to travel abroad and writes several books about his travels - visits Canada, US, Jersey, Russia, Corsica, Panama, Martinique, Haiti

•     1881-87 writes a series of books on economic topics - protectionism, slavery, and agriculture, e.g. Conversations sur le commerce des grains et la protection de l'agriculture (1886)

•     1887-93 writes a series of books on the natural laws and the moral philosophy of political economy, e.g. Les Lois naturelles de l'économie politique (Natural Laws and Political Economy) (1887)

•     1887-98 - writes several articles and a book on the growing threat of war, eg. a series of letters printed in The Times (of London) on organizing a "League of Neutrals" (28 July, 1887), " A Syndicat of Peace" (1 Nov. 1893), and "The Assurance of Peace" (21 Oct. 1895); and a book on Grandeur et decadence de la guerre (The Grandeur and Decadence of War) (1898)

•     1892-1901 - writes books on Malthus, labour exchanges, the social question, science and religion, and the future of liberty, e.g. Les Bourses du Travail (Labour Exchanges) (1893), Comment se résoudra la question sociale (1896), Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la Société future (1899)

•     1901-1902 - writes two important articles and a book surveying the achievements of liberty during the 19th century and its bleak future in the 20th, "Le XIXe siècle", JDE (Jan. 1901); "Le XXe siècle", JDE (Jan. 1902); Les Problèmes du XXe siècle (1901).

1909- 1912: retirement

•     1909 - Molinari is forced to resign as editor of the JDE because of ill health

•     1911 writes his last book at age 92 appropriately called Ultima Verba: Mon dernier ouvrage (Last Words: My Last Book) (1911)

•     Died 28 January 1912 in Adinkerque, Belgium (buried in Père-Lachaise cemetery in Paris).

A Note on the Sources

Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare

There was only one edition of Les Soirées published in the 19th century. The publication of Les Soirées was first announced in the October 1849 supplement to the May Catalog of the Guillaumin publishing firm so it most likely came off the presses in the late summer or early fall of 1849. It was priced at 3 fr. 50c. The announcement included the full table of contents and the following rather cautious comment: “Nous donnons ci-après la tables des chapitres de cet ouvrage, remarquable par la hardiesse et l’originalité des vues de l’auteur.” (We provide below the table of contents of this book which is remarkable for the boldness and originality of the author’s views). It was discussed at the 10 October meeting of the Political Economy Society and a review by Charles Coquelin was published in the 15 November issue of JDE.

On the title page Molinari’s affiliation was given as “Member of the Political Economy Society of Paris” and the quotation was from François Quesnay’s:“Le droit naturel” (Natural Law) (1765): “Il faut bien se garder d’attribuer aux lois physiques les maux qui sont la juste et inévitable punition de la violation de l’order même de ces lois, instituées pour opérer le bien.” (It is necessary to refrain from attributing to the physical laws which have been instituted in order to produce good, the evils which are the just and inevitable punishment for the violation of this very order of laws.)

No other edition of the book was published by Guillaumin, possibly because of its controversial subject matter, and there was no translation into other European languages.

A second French edition was published by the Institut Coppet in Paris in November 2014 edited by Benoît Malbranque.[3]

Other frequently used texts

For information about French economic and political policies and institutions, biographical information about political figures and political economists, and the French press we used the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique (1852-53) for its compendious collection of biographical, bibliographical, and statistical articles and Newman and Simpson’s Historical Dictionary of France from the 1815 Restoration to the Second Empire (1987).

For economic data and information about the French government’s budgets for 1848-49 we used the relevant volumes of the Annuaire de l'économie politique et de la statistique (Guillaumin, 1847-1850).

For information about the activities of the economists and the state of economic theory in the late 1840s we used the minutes of the meetings of the Société d’Économie Politique (The Political Economy Society) in Annales de la Société d’Économie politique (1846-1853) and the articles, reviews, and reports in the Society’s Journal des économistes.

We have also used the correspondence and other works by his friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) since they shared so much in common (in spite of their age difference) and worked together closely in the period 1846-1850.

For information about contemporary word usage we used the 1835 edition of the Dictionnaire de l'Académie française (6th ed.)

2. Editor’s Introduction by David M. Hart

I. Who is GdM and why he is important?

Brief Bio of GdM

“He firmly believed in a future of liberty and peace, but is it even necessary to say that the moment was not well chosen to plead the cause of liberty and peace?”[4]

Introduction

Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912)[5] was born in Liège when it was still part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (it was later incorporated into the new Kingdom of Belgium in 1830) but spent most of his working life in Paris, becoming the leading representative of the laissez-faire school of classical liberalism in France (the so-called “Paris School” of political economy)[6] in the second half of the nineteenth century. His liberalism was based upon the theory of natural rights (especially the right to self-ownership, private property, and individual liberty), a policy of complete laissez-faire in economic matters, and “la liberté du gouvernement” in politics (by this he meant the private provision of police and defence services by competing insurance companies or small proprietary communities).

By living so long (he lived to be 92)[7] Molinari had the misfortune of living through and participating in the rise and decline of the classical liberal movement in France during the 19th century. He was born four years after the defeat of Napoléon Bonaparte and the collapse of his Empire and died two years before the outbreak of the First World War, which destroyed the European liberal order and ushered in a decades-long period of militarism, interventionism, communism, fascism, and welfare-statism. He lived through the reigns of three monarchs (Louis XVIII, Charles X, and Louis Philippe), three revolutions (the Revolution of July 1830, the February Revolution of 1848, and the Paris Commune of 1871), two republics (the Second (1848) and the Third (1875)), and another Emperor Napoléon (self-declared the “3rd” in 1852). He was also active during two periods when classical liberal ideas were flourishing, that of the 1840s in the last years of Louis Philippe’s reign (which was eventually severely weakened by the February 1848 revolution and the rise of another Napoléon), and then that of the Third Republic in the mid-1870s, before it too lost its way and re-erected tariff barriers, became a colonial empire, entered an arms race with the other great European powers, and saw the rise of a new and powerful socialist movement.

He also had the time to write a lot of books: about 50 at my last count,[8] or even more if one were to include the scores of articles he wrote for magazines and journals (like the JDE, the Économiste belge, the JDD) or the many articles for the DEP (1852-53). For the latter he wrote 25 principle articles and five biographical articles which alone make up 176 pages of double-columned densely printed text.[9] In the first period of his life as an author, the 12 years between the publication of his first book on Lamartine (1843)[10] and his treatise on economics (1855)[11] he published at least 12 volumes of material which were made up of nine separate books, at lest one long book’s worth of articles for the DEP, two large volumes of 18th century economic thought which he edited, 32 articles and reviews he wrote for the JDE (perhaps another volume’s worth of material), and countless other articles for smaller magazines and journals. Les Soirées was published in the middle of this first very active period of what would be a long and productive life.

Summary of his career

His career began during the 1840s and early 1850s. He left his native Liège in about 1840 to go to Paris to seek work as a journalist,[12] initially writing biographies of famous people for a magazine,[13] before moving on to journals like La Nation and Le Courrier français where he could pursue his growing interest in economic matters, such as the right of workers to join unions, the economics of slavery and serfdom, and French tariff policy.[14] In 1846 he became involved with Frédéric Bastiat’s French Free Trade Association and the group of free market political economists who had gathered around the Guillaumin publishing firm and the Political Economy Society and its monthly journal, the Journal des Économistes (JDE). In 1847 he began writing articles for the JDE,[15] began work editing a two volume scholarly collection of 18th century economic writings for Guillaumin,[16] wrote a two volume history of tariffs,[17] and got an opportunity to give lectures on political economy at the private Athénée royal de Paris.[18]

During the 1848 revolution he vigorously opposed the rise of socialism and co-wrote and handed out on the streets of Paris two anti-socialist, free market newspapers with Bastiat and other radical friends,[19] and wrote a monthly “Chronique” or commentary on the events of the revolution for the JDE. In the first months of the Revolution when hundreds of “political clubs” sprang up throughout Paris to discuss all manner of political and economic issues, once the strict censorship laws were no longer enforceable, Molinari and his economist friends started their own club, the “Club de la liberté du travail” (the Club for the Freedom of Working), to confront the socialists face to face with their demands for a government guaranteed job for all, or what they called “le droit au travail” (the right to a job). Their club was forced to close when a group of socialists broke into a meeting and beat up the economists. Later, Molinari regretted that the economists had not stood up to the violent socialists, whom he called a “une bande de communistes” (a communist gang), instead of turning the other cheek and withdrawing.[20] Nevertheless, on the eve of the bloody “June Days” uprising Molinari had not completely given up the hope of reasoning with them. He wrote an unsigned article in the JDE appealing to the socialists to form an alliance with the economists in their struggle since he believed they shared much the same goals (“utopias of liberty”) but differed on the best means to achieve them.[21] The offer became moot after martial law was declared and the press and political clubs were more strictly regulated before eventually being closed down.

In late 1848 and early 1849 Molinari turned towards other matters. He was working full-time writing for the JDE about the debates in the Chamber about the creation of the new Republican constitution, especially the attempt by the socialists and their allies to get a “right to work” clause inserted, and then the election of its first President in December - Louis Napoléon Bonaparte won with 74% of the vote, with General Cavaignac, who had put down the June Days uprising and had imposed martial law, with 19%; and the socialist Ledru-Rollin with 5%. It seemed to the economists, as expressed by Molinari in an end of year summation of the years’ tumultuous events, that the “fever” of socialism had abated, at least “from below” (i.e. from socialist agitators on the streets), but that another outbreak could occur at any time, perhaps this time “from above” (i.e. from interventionists operating from deep within the state).[22]

Sometime in late 1848 or early 1849 it appears that a conscious decision was made by the publisher Guillaumin and his colleagues in the Political Economy Society to launch a more concerted propaganda effort to refute socialist ideas. This would be a two-pronged attack, one at a popular level and another aimed at intellectuals and the political elite. Molinari would be active in both campaigns. On the popular level, Molinari was inspired by Bastiat’s considerable success at refuting popular fallacies about tariffs and subsidies in his two volumes of Economic Sophisms which had appeared at the beginning of 1846 and the beginning of 1848, and by the work of the English woman Harriett Martineau whose work he reviewed for the JDE in April 1849.[23] It was probably then that he decided to write his own collection of “conversations” between “a Socialist,” “a Conservative,” and “an Economist” to show how the natural laws of political economy and an economic system based upon private property could solve France’s problems. He wrote this book over the summer of 1849 and it was published in September.

On the more intellectual front was the compendious Dictionnaire de l'économie politique (1852-53) which was edited by Charles Coquelin and co-edited by Molinari.[24] It was designed to bring together in two very large volumes the best theoretical arguments, the most detailed statistical evidence, and the most comprehensive bibliography on key topics, in order to finally defeat the advocates of government intervention and regulation of the economy. Molinari wrote the main articles dealing with free trade, tariffs, and the grain industry; as well as those on labor (both free and coerced (slavery and serfdom)); colonies, and on war and peace.

1849 in some ways was a tuning point in the radicalization of Molinari’s thinking about the scope of economic theory and the proper role of the state. Two of the themes that went through Les Soirées and his articles in the DEP was the idea that all human activity should be examined from an economic perspective (such as the Church, the family, fine arts, emigration, fashion, public monuments, the theatre, the rise of cities and towns, the rise of nation states)[25] and that all public goods could and should be offered privately and competitively on the free market, including the provision of “security” (i.e. police and national defense). He shocked his colleagues with his article on “The Production of Security” in the JDE in February 1849 and continued to develop these ideas in S11. It was not the only thing that shocked his colleagues. There was also his belief that the state had no right to confiscate private property even for public works programs. Both these contentious points met with sharp criticism in a series of meetings of the Political Economy Society which his book provoked in November 1849, January and February 1850.[26]

Molinari’s stay in Paris came to an end with the coup d’état of Louis Napoléon of 2 December 1851. The new constitution banned the President from seeking re-election so in order to get around this restriction he dissolved the National Assembly, arrested the 300 Deputies who had opposed his effort to change the constitution in his favor (including Alexis de Tocqueville), and introduced martial law. A plebiscite ratified his actions with a vote of 92% in favor. Molinari left Paris in disgust and went into voluntary exile in his native Belgium to escape the authoritarian regime of the soon to be declared “Emperor Napoleon III” under which he refused to live.

After leaving Paris at the end of 1851, Molinari moved to Brussels where he became a professor of political economy at the Musée royale de l'industrie belge, published a significant treatise on political economy Cours d'économie politique (1855), and was the owner and publisher of the journal L’Économiste belge (The Belgian Economist) (1855-68) in which he analyzed the political and economic issues of the day from a radical free market perspective. He also wrote two very critical books on the coming to power, the rule, and the ideas of Emperor Napoléon III, Les Révolutions et le despotisme (1852) and Napoleon III publiciste (1861), the former being an excellent example of classical liberal class analysis[27] of the groups who benefited or lost from the coming to power of the new Emperor, in this case the class of “les payeurs de taxes” (tax payers) who were pitted against the class of “les mangeurs de taxes” (tax eaters). Molinari also thought it was the function of the economists to be “les teneurs de livres de la politique” (the bookkeepers of public policy) who could draw up a balance sheet of society showing the profits and losses which resulted from conflicts such as wars and revolutions, and he concluded that from an economic perspective they should be avoided at all costs.[28] After some street protests in Brussels against the high price of bread in 1854 he wrote a second collection of “conversations” about government restrictions on the grain trade, Conservations familières sur le commerce des grains (1855) where the conversations were between a food rioter, a prohibitionist or protectionist, and an economist. During the Crimean War (1853-56) when France, England and the Ottoman Empire fought the Russian Empire over the rights of the Christian minority in Palestine, he wrote a long book about the history of one of the founders of the peace movement in Europe Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743), L'abbé de Saint-Pierre ... et d'un précis historique de l'idée de la paix perpétuelle (1857).[29]

It should be noted that as a result of his deep knowledge of the economics of slave and serf labor[30] Molinari was invited by Tsar Alexander II of Russia in February 1860 to advise him and his senior bureaucrats on the abolition of serfdom which he was planning and would enact in the Emancipation Manifesto of 3 March, 1861. Molinari spent six months traveling across Russia observing the economic conditions of the country and speaking to groups of politicians, bureaucrats, academics, and journalists along the way.[31]

After the death of his wife in 1868 Molinari returned to Paris to work for the prestigious Journal des débats, becoming editor from 1871 to 1876. This period coincided with the Franco-Prussian War (July 1870 to May 1871), the Paris Commune (March to May 1871), and the formation of the Third Republic (established by the Constitution of 1875), events which he covered in detail for the JDD. As he had done in February and March 1848, Molinari roamed the streets of Paris observing the discussions and debates taking place in the political clubs which had sprung up at the start of the Commune and which resulted in two interesting eye-witness accounts, Les Clubs rouges pendant le siège de Paris (The Red Clubs during the Siege of Paris) (1871) and Le Mouvement socialiste et les réunions publiques avant la révolution du 4 septembre 1870 (The Socialist Movement and their Public Meetings before the Revolution of 4 Sept. 1870) (1872). He also wrote his one and only work of political theory La République tempérée (The “Tempered” or Hardened Republic) (1873) as the constitution of the Third Republic was being discussed. His solution to the problem of creating a republic with limited powers was a popularly elected lower chamber which would initiate legislation and an upper chamber made up of the highest taxpayers who could veto spending bills. These works were recognised by the French Academy whose members elected Molinari a corresponding member in 1874. Also for the JDD he began taking trips abroad and commenting on his travels with his usual astute economic insights. In 1876 he traveled to the United States and Canada in order to visit Philadelphia during the centennial celebrations of the Declaration of Independence which produced the first of several books of his travel writing.[32]

At the age of 62, when other men might have been thinking of retiring (by then he had written over 20 books), he entered another productive phase of his career when he was appointed editor of the leading journal of political economy in France, the Journal des économistes (1881-1909). During this period he wrote another 20 books including a pair of important books on historical sociology on the rise of the state and free market institutions, L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle (1880) and L'évolution politique et la Révolution (1884), which deserve serious attention by scholars. These works were in many ways strikingly similar to work being done by Herbert Spencer on political sociology, especially his distinction between the industrial and militant types of societies, but there is no evidence that they knew what the other was doing. Neither one cites the other, so it appears that these two classical liberal sociologists were working completely independently of each other like two giant liberal ships passing through the night unaware of each other’s existence.[33]

As the call for higher tariffs became louder, Molinari turned for a third time to writing a popular work, yet another collection of conversations about free trade, Conversations sur le commerce des grains et la protection de l’agriculture (1886), which responded to the volte-face of the protectionists who now wanted protection from “too much” grain (from abroad) instead of protection from “too little” grain which had been the demand in the 1840s and 1850s. He also produced a never ending stream of commentary on political and economic events, including more accounts of his travels, the relationship between moral theory and political economy,[34] a defence of Malthusianism,[35] works on science and religion,[36] labour exchanges,[37] international arbitration, and the increasingly worrying problem of “la recrudescence du militarisme” (the recurrence of militarism).[38] The pair of articles he wrote for the JDE at the turn of the century summing up the liberal achievements of the 19th century and warning about the crises to come in the 20th as a result of war and socialism, are particularly noteworthy for their breadth of vision and their prescience.[39]

For example:

Thus one can predict that the struggle to take control the state and to make the laws, which in the 19th century took place between the conservative party and the liberal party, will in the 20th century take place between the conservative party and the socialist party. One can also predict that this struggle will be no less fierce, and by all appearances no less unproductive than that which took place previously, and that it will give rise to the same series of revolutions, coups d’états, with the same bloody outcome of foreign wars and colonial expeditions which have constituted what one might call the debits in the ledger of 19th century civilisation.[40]

He was even more pessimistic in his second last book some six years later, Économie de l’histoire (1908):

… we can conclude that for as long as the state remains in the hands of the upper and middle classes the decline of the civilized nations will continue for centuries until it ends in ruin, while it will only take a few years of democratic socialist rule to bring an end to their existence and that of civilisation itself.[41]

He “retired” in November 1909 at the age of 90 as his health was failing but he still had one more book left in him which he appropriately called Ultima Verba: Mon dernier ouvrage (Last Words: My Final Work) (1911) in which he summed up his life and the progress, or lack thereof, of liberty during the 19th century and he reiterated his chillingly accurate prognosis for the fate of liberty and the rise of statism and interventionism in the 20th.

He died on 28 January 1912 in the channel town of Adinkerque, Belgium and was buried in Père-Lachaise cemetery in Paris.

Some personal information about him

Concerning his private life, very little is known about Molinari’s own family as he was a very private person and there are no extant family letters. A recent biographer Gérard Minart tells us that his father Philippe was a homeopathic doctor who had served in Napoléon’s army and settled in Liège after the wars; that he had a brother Eugène who was a lawyer and who assisted him when he lived in Brussels in the 1850s and 1860s in publishing a short-lived magazine, La bourse du travail (The Labor Exchange), in an effort to establish a labour exchange in Belgium; and that he was married to Edmée de Molinari, née Terrillon; and that he had two sons, Edmond and Maurice. We do not know when Molinari got married but we know that Edmée died at the age of 50 on October 30, 1868 in Paris (it is possibly that she was from Paris and they had met while Molinari was living there in the 1840s). Molinari it seems was so stricken with grief that he immediately closed his journal L’Économiste belge in December 1868 after 14 years of publication. Soon after he left Brussels and moved to Paris to resume his career as a journalist. His son Edmond was an engineer by training and worked in Kiev, Ukraine and later worked as a Consul there for the French government; Maurice may have trained as a scientist or agricultural expert as he worked in an agricultural laboratory in Gustave’s home town of Liège.[42]

II. The Political and Intellectual Context in which Les Soirées was written

“Whatever might happen, the future belongs to free trade. Indeed, what an admirable thing! Mankind has really piled up injustice upon injustice, inequality upon inequality; the classes whose influence predominates in society have really amassed a stack of cash at the expense of the mass of ignorant and needy people; whatever one might do, the day will come when their stack of cash will collapse, when injustice will inevitably be replaced by justice, and when inequality will be replaced by equality.”[43]

The rebirth of the liberal movement in Paris in the 1840s

The first generation of the Paris School of political economy came to a figurative and some cases literal end with the overthrow of the the Bourbon monarchy by the Orléanist branch of the family under Louis Philippe in July 1830. Censorship, limited teaching possibilities, exile, and death had depleted their ranks. Benjamin Constant died in 1830, Jean-Baptiste Say in 1832, Destutt de Tracy in 1836, and Charles Comte in 1837. When Molinari came to Paris around 1840 the school was in the process of rebuilding, largely through the efforts of the publisher Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin (1801-1864) and his network of friends and allies - “le réseau Guillaumin” (the Guillaumin network) so aptly named by Gérard Minart[44] - and it would be through this network that Molinari would eventually thrive intellectually. Guillaumin and his financial supporters, the businessman Horace Say (son of Jean-Baptiste Say), the industrialist Casimir Cheuvreux, and the Duc d’ Harcourt, founded the Political Economy Society in 1842 which held monthly meetings; the Journal des Économistes in 1841 which appeared monthly and provided a forum for discussion of economic ideas; and the publishing firm of “Guillaumin and Company” (founded in 1837) which published the monographs written by the economists, but also undertook expensive projects such as encyclopedias and dictionaries of commerce and economics, collections of economic data, and large scholarly collections of classics of economic thought.

The core members of this network were four individuals whom Minart has wittily called “The Four Musketeers” of French political economy.[45] In addition to Guillaumin there was the industrialist, economist, and editor Charles Coquelin (1802-1852), the magistrate, free trade activist and politician Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850), and eventually the young Molinari himself. The name is appropriate both because Bastiat, like D’Artagnan, came from Gascony, and because Dumas’ novel of the same name was beginning to appear in serial form in a Paris magazine at this time.[46] A case could be made to expand Minard’s “Four Musketeers” to “Seven Musketeers” as there were three other young men Molinari’s age with whom he became friends and who were also very active in the inner core of the Guillaumin network. They were the economist, journalist, and editor Joseph Garnier (1813-1881), the journalist and historian Hippolyte Castille (1820-1886), and the economist and free trade activist Alcide Fonteyraud (1822-1849). While they were all together in Paris in the mid and late 1840s the other six members of the group provided Molinari with a network of organisations and social relationships which helps us understand the context in which Molinari wrote Les Soirées and began planning and perhaps even writing his entries for the DEP in 1849 and the intellectual currents which were swirling around him. These personal networks included the broad Guillaumin publishing network, the members of the Political Economy Society and its journal the JDE, the Political Economy Section of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences (which had been refounded in 1832), the personal salons of Castille, Anna Say, and Hortense Cheuvreux, Bastiat’s Free Trade Association, and Joseph Garnier’s Friends of Peace association which held a major international conference in Paris in August 1849.

The intellectual and political contexts

Political Context - massive public works

When the young Molinari arrived in Paris a massive new public works project, the “fortifications of Paris” was just about to get underway. This as well as another, the building of the French railway system, would dominate the city of Paris for the next ten years. These large-scale and high cost public works projects added considerable burdens on the French economy, especially the taxpayers and the property owners who had their land compulsorily acquired by the state (see S3). A government plan was approved in 1842 to regulate the building of five massive railway lines (and their associated grand railway stations in Paris) which would radiate out from the capital to serve the needs of the provinces. One of these stations was the “La Gare Saint-Lazare” on Saint Lazarus street, after which Molinari’s book is entitled. The state partnered with companies which were granted concessions to operate the lines with the state building the tunnels, bridges, and the stations, and the railway companies laying the track and owning the carriages. The state also set the charges the private railway companies could charge. The chance to get potentially lucrative government concessions led to several speculative booms in railway stocks on the Paris stock exchange and eventually the government was “forced” to take control and nationalise the railway companies.

The large public works program known as “Thiers’ Wall” was the brain child of the Prime Minister Adolphe Thiers who persuaded the King and his cabinet to undertake a massive program to surround Paris with fortifications to prevent any foreign occupation of the city as had happened in 1815 when the British, Austrians, Prussians, and Russians took control after the fall of Napoléon I.[47] The plan, at a cost of 140 million francs, was to build a 33 km (20.6 miles) wall encircling the city (only slightly less than the I-465 freeway which rings Indianapolis today) with a deep ditch and gently sloping embankment on the outside with land cleared for two hundred meters (the glacis) to provide a good line of fire for the army to ward off any invading troops. Considerable privately owned land had to be resumed by the state in order to clear the land and build the wall and the access roads. The wall was made of masonry 3.5 meters thick and 10 meters high and contained 95 multi-directional firing points (bastions) at regular intervals, 17 gates, 23 barriers, eight entry points for trains, and five entry points for ships on canals and the river. There would also be an outer ring of 16 free standing “star-shaped” forts to complete the defensive perimeter around the city. The construction began in 1841 and was completed on schedule in 1844 with much of the labor being done by young army conscripts.

When they had finished, Paris was surrounded by three concentric walls which had been built by the state: an inner wall surrounding the old part of the city, the octroi customs wall, built in the 1780s to make tax collection easier for the private tax collecting agency known as the Farmers General, the new “Thiers wall” which surrounded the city, and the third outer ring of 16 free-standing forts. Critics at the time, including some generals, argued that this project was pointless and would be made redundant by technological innovations. Others, like the astronomer and liberal François Arago,[48] argued that the 40,000 or so soldiers in and around the city were just as well placed to suppress any uprising which might occur within as they were to prevent any foreign invaders entering from without - thus creating what they believed was the “embastillement de Paris” (Bastille-ization of Paris). Economists like Michel Chevalier was appalled at how much time and labor was expended on its construction by conscript labor.[49] As it turned out, the nearby troops were used to bloodily repress rioters in February and June 1848 and to impose martial law between June and October 1848 thus dramatically proving Arago’s point. The ultimate economic waste of these projects was realized in 1859 when Emperor Napoleon III began his rebuilding of Paris under Baron Hausmann and the inner ring of octroi walls and gates were torn down. The Thiers’ wall lasted until the 1920s when it was largely torn down as well leaving only a few sections as reminders. Most of the state-owned land where the wall used to stand was later used for “le boulevard périphérique de Paris” (the Paris ring road) which is the 35 km freeway which now encircles Paris.

Molinari’s response to the compulsory acquisition of land and buildings by the state to build the railway network and the fortifications of Paris was to oppose this on the grounds that it violated the property rights of the owners. It is discussed in S3.

Free Trade

The founding fathers of political economy, Adam Smith in Britain and Jean-Baptiste Say in France, had a great deal to say about the subsidies to favored industries and regulations on trade which lay at the heart of mercantilism and their theoretical arguments for free trade remained the staple of the French economists for several decades. Although the theory of free trade was well established and overwhelming, the politics which lay behind protectionism remained the problem. The powerful agricultural and manufacturing interests, what Molinari called “la ligue tenace des intérêts privilégiés” (the tenacious league of privileged interests) made up of the “des grands propriétaires” (the large landowners) and “l’aristocratie marchande” (the merchant aristocracy),[50] which controlled the French state were determined to retain their privileges, which they were able to do so long as the restrictions on who was allowed to vote and stand for election remained in place. Only those who paid the most in direct taxes like that on land (le cens) were eligible to vote and in Molinari’s day this limited the franchise to about 200-240,000 taxpayers, or what Bastiat called “la class électorale” (the electoral or voting class).[51]

A similar situation existed in Britain and the liberal reformers recognized that they could not introduce trade liberalization until they had first opened up voting to the middle class, which they successfully did with the Reform Act of 1832. The Anti-Corn Law League (ACLL) was established soon after this electoral victory in 1838 by Cobden and Bright and after eight years of agitation and lobbying they were successful in repealing the protectionist Corn Laws in early 1846. It took a combination of the newly enfranchised and liberal thinking middle class, a new group of rising and very articulate manufacturers like Richard Cobden and John Bright, and some free trade-minded officials in the Board of Trade to tip the balance in favor of free trade. Nothing like this existed in France when Molinari began working for the free trade movement in the mid-1840s

There were three occasions after 1815 when tariff reform was seriously debated in the Chamber of Deputies. The first was in 1821-22 during the Restoration (in which Benjamin Constant played an important role), the second was in 1831-33 soon after the installation of the July Monarchy (led by Duvergier de Hauranne, Alexandre de Laborde, and the duc d’Harcourt), and the third was in 1847 on the eve of the 1848 Revolution. Only in the latter case was there a serious chance of any liberalization since the free trade movement which had emerged in 1846 was stronger than at any time previously in the 19th century. The success of the ACLL in 1846 galvanized the French free traders to organize a similar free trade group, the Association pour la liberté des échanges (the French Free Trade Association), which they did in July 1846 with Bastiat as Secretary of the Board and editor of its journal Libre-échange (Free Trade) and Molinari as one of several “adjunct secretaries.” As part of the Association’s campaign to lobby the Chamber for tariff reform in 1847 Molinari wrote a two volume History of Tariffs and an article on English agriculture for the JDE.[52] He also entered into a sometimes bitter argument with Bastiat over the Association’s strategy - should it be pushing for immediate and total abolition of all tariffs (Molinari’s position) or moderate reforms spaced out over a ten year period (Michel Chevalier’s position which was also shared by Bastiat to some degree)?[53]

The campaign for tariff reform ultimately came to nothing as there were very few free traders among the deputies or peers in the Chamber and the protectionists had much more experience in working with elected politicians, especially within the committees set up to review new legislation. It became clear that as the tariff reform proposal worked its way through committee the free traders had been out-manoeuvred by the protectionists and the measure was defeated. The free traders kept lobbying for another year but finally gave up when the revolution broke out in February 1848 and the spectre of socialism became a more pressing matter for them. The French Free Trade Association was wound up in April.

Molinari discusses free trade and protection in S7.

Socialism and the 1848 Revolution

Socialism was the third major issue the Economists faced in the 1840s and which came to a head with the creation of the National Workshops scheme under Louis Blanc in February 1848. The socialists had been building a campaign of criticism of key aspects of the free market system throughout the 1840s. The very notion of the right to private property was attacked, as was the legitimacy of profit, interest, and rent. Proudhon had famously declared that “property is theft” in his book Qu’est-ce que la propriété? ou Recherches sur le principe du Droit et du Gouvernement (What is Property? Or Research into the Principle of Justice and Government) (1840), and Louis Blanc and Victor Considerant had been attacking the system of wage labour and employment in privately owned workshops and factories. The ideas of both men became very influential after the Revolution broke out in February 1848 as they were part of the provisional government and were elected to the Constituent Assembly where they attempted to put their ideas into practice in the National Workshops and the legislation on the “right to work” (right to a job). Louis Blanc in particular was influential as the president of “Commission du gouvernement pour les travailleurs” (Government Commission for the Workers) (also known as the Luxembourg Commission) which oversaw the National Workshops program, and his debates with the liberal Léon Faucher in the Chamber of Deputies.

Louis Blanc’s most influential work was l’Organisation du travail (The Organisation of Work) (1839) which was first published as an article and was reprinted many times throughout the 1840s. He thought that free competition was nothing more that “un système d’extermination” (a system of extermination) for the working class, a cause of ruin for the bourgeoisie, and would lead inevitably to war with the best practitioner of competition, namely “perfidious Albion” or England. These dire consequences could only be averted if the government became “le régulateur suprême de la production” (the supreme regulator of production) armed with “une grande force” (great coercive powers) “faire disparaître, la concurrence” (to make free competition disappear). His strategy was to use two things to achieve this: “l’organisation” and “l’association,” the organisation of industry and the association of workers, which became socialist slogans during the 1840s. His aim was to create state funded “ateliers sociaux” (social workshops) in all the most important branches of industry throughout the economy. Using capital which had been set aside for this purpose (exactly how this would be done was not specified), the state would be the sole director of the social workshops and would regulate their activity.

The first serious efforts by the economists to criticize Blanc’s ideas were by Michel Chevalier in 1844 and Charles Dunoyer in 1845. As the professor of Political Economy at the Collège de France Chevalier wrote a long critique of Blanc in the Journal des Débats in August 1844 and then again in more detail in 1848.[54] He identified two fundamental flaws in Blanc’s theory which would make his schemes unworkable: the assumption that human societies are principally governed by a sense of duty, not the personal self-interest of the individuals which make up that society; and that the guiding principle of “absolute equality” of wages in the social workshops will encourage an increase in productivity on the part of the workers. Chevalier rejected both as “radicalement erronées” (profoundly wrong) and proceeded to elaborate at some length the incentive problems which would lead the social workshops to ruin.

Another early response to the socialists before the Revolution was written by the doyen of the older generation of liberals, Charles Dunoyer, in a long “post-scriptum” at the end of the first volume of his De la liberté du travail (On the Liberty of Working) (1845) the very title of which challenged the socialists’ notion of “le droit au travail” (the right to a job). The three volumes of his magnum opus was devoted to exploring how the principle of the complete liberty to work and produce had evolved historically and what it would mean for human prosperity when a society based upon absolute freedom of working had been brought into existence. Naturally, he found the objections of socialists like Considerant and Blanc to be wrong and misplaced. Dunoyer summed up his objections in five points: that fully free markets did not exist anywhere so it was false to blame economic problems on what did not yet exist (this argument is similar to the one adopted by Molinari when choosing the quotation by Quesnay on the front page of Les Soirées);[55] the socialists did not recognize the great advances which had already been made in bringing people out of poverty, especially since the Revolution of 1789 had destroyed so many of the restrictive practices of the Old Regime; that the real causes for poverty had not been properly identified by the socialist critics, which were caused by the persistence of restrictions on trade and production, the burden of taxes, and the never-ending problem of war; that the remedies proposed by the socialists, namely “the organisation of industry” and “the association of workers” into government controlled “social workshops” would not work; and finally that the real remedy for poverty was more of what the socialists rejected, namely the creation of “un régime de plus en plus réel de liberté et de concurrence” (a more and more genuine regime of liberty and competition).[56]

It did not take Bastiat long to turn his sharp wit and insights onto the socialists after his arrival in Paris in 1845. He began with a sharply worded letter to the classical liberal poet and statesman Lamartine in January 1845 criticizing him for toying with the socialist idea of a “right to a job” after which he addressed himself directly to the socialists.[57] In June 1846 he criticized François Vidal’s idea of the government redistributing wealth and treating workers like so many cogs in a machine run by government bureaucrats; and Vidal again in January 1847 for advocating coerced rather than voluntary association;[58] and on the eve of the revolution (January 1848) a much more extensive critique of socialist idea’s about “artificial” organisation as he called their plans for restructuring society.[59] Since his prime focus at the time was opposing the protectionists, he did not have time to go into much detail in rebutting the socialists’ critique of competition and private property. He would do this after the Revolution when the threat of socialism forced the economists to temporarily abandon the free trade cause. He would eventually write a dozen or so anti-socialist pamphlets marketed by Guillaumin as “M. Bastiat’s Petits Pamphlets” which were specifically focussed on the ideas of the leading socialists writers and politicians.[60] One of Bastiat’s wittiest criticisms of the socialist plans which flourished in the early months of the Second Republic was his repost to Victor Considerant’s demand that the government fund an experimental socialist community in order to demonstrate the viability of socialism. Bastiat immediately counter-demanded, in a “Petition from an Economist” (2 March 1848), that the government should set up competing experimental communities to see which one produced the greatest peace and prosperity. He wanted to register with the government his own experimental low tax, laissez-faire, free trade community just outside Paris in order to put socialism to a real test to see which community was truly the best.[61]

Like everyone else, the economists were surprised when revolution broke out on February 22-24, that the July Monarchy was so quickly overthrown, and that socialists like Louis Blanc would come to power in the months that followed. They decided to suspend their free trade activities (the FFTA was closed down) and to focus their energies on opposing the new threat of socialism. The circle of economists around the Guillaumin publishing firm organized six different lines of attack against the growing influence of the socialists in the 15 months between the beginning of the revolution in February and March 1848 and June 1849.[62]

The immediate response of the economists was to focus on what Molinari would later call “le socialisme d’en bas” (socialism from below),[63] or socialism as articulated by ordinary people in the streets. This they did by producing their own newspapers or journals which they could hand out on the streets of Paris and starting their own political club to debate the socialists face to face in the first heady days of the Revolution. Molinari and Bastiat began their first journal in late February, La République française, which lasted for a month. This was followed by a second one in June, Jacques Bonhomme, which also only lasted for a month. Molinari joined with Charles Coquelin and Alcide Fonteyraud to form a political club, “le Club de la liberté du travail,” in March to debate the socialists over the issue of the right to a government funded job for all workers (le droit au travail).

In the medium term several of the economists stood successfully for election to the new Constituent Assembly in the April 1848 election (such as Léon Faucher, Bastiat, and Wolowski) and debated the socialists on the floor of the Chamber and in the committees (like Bastiat in the Finance Committee). They were very active over the summer of 1848 when the new constitution was being debated and succeeded in having the more extreme demands of the socialists considerably watered down but not eliminated in the final version of the Constitution which was promulgated on November 12. Also in the medium term they got a stream of anti-socialist articles published, not only in their own JDE (Bastiat and Molinari) but also in some of the high-brow magazines like the Journal des Débats (Michel Chevalier) and the Revue de deux mondes (Faucher).

In the longer term, Guillaumin organized a blitz of newly commissioned pamphlets and books on socialism in particular but also on the “social question” in general over the coming three years. The number of titles which came off their press in 1848 was a record 67 (only equalled in 1867, and nearly equalled in 1872 with 66), and between 1848-50 a total of 109 books and pamphlets were published. The firm also issued in late 1848 a special six page supplement to their Catalog called “Publications nouvelles sur les questions économiques à l’ordre du jour” (New Publications on the economic questions of the day) which prominently featured the works of Bastiat but also included Molinari’s early work on Études économiques. Bastiat would go on to write 12 anti-socialist pamphlets for Guillaumin between June 1848 and July 1850 which the firm advertised as a specially priced set called “Monsieur Bastiat’s Little Pamphlets.”[64] Molinari’s collection of conversations, Les Soirées, has to be seen in the context of this broader anti-socialist publishing campaign of the Guillaumin firm.

However, the pièce de résistance for the firm was the monumental encyclopedia of economic theory, policy, statistics, and history entitled the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique which would appear between 1852 and 1853 and in which Molinari would also play a major role. It was a two volume, 1,854 page, double-columned, nearly two million word encyclopedia of political economy and is unquestionably one of the most important publishing events in the history of mid-century French classical liberal thought and is unequalled in its scope and comprehensiveness. This was to be the main weapon for the economists in their battle against what Molinari termed “le socialisme d’en haut” (socialism from above), i.e. the “socialist” or rather interventionist ideas held by powerful economic interests (such as manufacturers and landowners), the political elites, senior government bureaucrats, and the Bonapartists around Louis Napoléon. The aim was to assemble a summary of the state of knowledge of liberal political economy with articles written by leading economists and business leaders on key thematic topics, biographies of key historical figures, bibliographies of the most important books, and copious amounts of economic and political statistics. As an unsigned blurb from 1853 describing the purpose of the DEP project put it:[65]

We hoped that this Dictionary might become the great arsenal from which the friends of political economy and true progress, men of good will and good sense, will be able to find the arms required to get the better of both the dangerous innovations (of socialism) and the old errors of business as usual (by the conservatives).

The young Molinari was one of the assistant editors on the project which has headed by Charles Coquelin, until he died from a heart attack in August 1852 after completing work on volume one, after which an editorial committee, of which he was a member, took over. The project was announced in the May 1849 Guillaumin catalog as being “in preparation” so Molinari would have been working on both the DEP project and writing Les Soirées over the summer of 1849 and much of the content for both overlapped considerably. He wrote 25 of the principle articles (the fourth highest after Coquelin with 70, Horace Say with 29, and Joseph Garnier with 28) and was singled out by the editor of the JDE, Joseph Garnier, as having played a key role in the project, and in the original Editor’s Preface he was mentioned as one of the five most important contributors. Among the articles he wrote for the DEP which have a direct bearing on Les Soirées are the following: Beaux-arts (Fine Arts), Céréales (Grain), Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges (Free Trade), Paix, Guerre (Peace and War), Propriété littéraire (Literary Property), Tarifs de douane (Tariffs), Theâtres (Theatres), Travail (Labour), Union douanière (Customs Union), Usure (Usury).[66]

What should be noted about this six-pronged attack on the socialists by the economists was that Molinari was active in five of them (the political clubs, street journalism, writing a book for a popular audience, and writing for more elite audiences with the DEP project and his many articles in JDE). The only activity he did not get involved in was running for elected political office.

III. The Structure and Content of Les Soirées

What are Economists?

“Political economy is the mother science of real liberalism…
The economists are the bookkeepers of politics…
Unfortunately, hardly anyone listens to the economists.”[67]

The tradition of popularizing economic ideas

When the Economists decided to expand their program to popularize economic ideas in the aftermath of the events of 1848 they had a long tradition upon which to draw.[68] Perhaps Jean-Baptiste Say was the first of the modern economists to attempt to reach out to a broader audience with his Catéchisme d’économie politique, ou Instruction familière (Catechism of Political Economy, or Familiar Lessons) (1815). Say realized that his highly regarded Treatise (1803, then revised in 1814, 1817) had had some success among the educated elites but that the events of the Revolution and the interventionism of Napoleon’s Empire and then of the Restoration showed that economic illiteracy was rife. Living in a Catholic society (although not a Catholic himself) Say no doubt thought that the rather heavy handed, top-down approach of a catechism of questions with accompanying sound free market responses would be attractive to his readers but one is not convinced of this approach from reading it today. Say tried another tack a couple of years later when he introduced limited conversations between stock characters in a work published to coincide with the revised and expanded 3rd edition of the Traité, called the Petit volume contenant quelques apperçus des hommes et de la société (A Small Book containing Some Insights into Men and Society) (1817). The Petit volume contained “quelques apperçus” or what might be called “pensées” similar to those of Montesquieu, which were rambling musings on economic related matters designed to appeal to the reader who knew nothing about economics and whom Say obviously thought did not really care for economics, with the occasional brief dialogs thrown in for good measure: for example, between “Alceste” and “Philinte” or between “The Architect” and “The Author.”

Another much more successful approach was taken in England by a brace of English women authors who were able to make a living, surprisingly for the times, by writing popular “conversations” or “tales” about free market ideas for the new audience of voracious readers which the more widespread literacy in an emerging liberal society like pre-Victorian Britain was creating. Jane Haldimand Marcet (1769–1858)[69] and Harriet Martineau (1802–1876)[70] both wrote multi-volume works defending the free market during the late 1810s through the 1830s which went through many editions, such was their popularity. As mentioned above, Molinari must have come across the translation of Martineau’s book in early 1849, reviewed it in the JDE in April, and decided to write his own version for the Guillaumin firm.

Another example was the very successful Anti-Corn Law League propagandist Colonel Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783–1869). He turned the “free market catechism” into a clever and witty format with which to ridicule the protectionists in a way which had completely eluded the rather staid J.B. Say 20 years earlier. The first edition of his Catechism on the Corn Laws; With a List of Fallacies and the Answers had appeared in 1827 and by 1834 had gone through 18 editions.

However, the acknowledged master at appealing to a more popular audience was Frédéric Bastiat who, in a series of short, witty, and often very clever articles which appeared in the Courrier français, the JDE, and Libre-échange between 1845 and early 1848, perfected the dialogue or conversational style which would make him famous.[71] One of Bastiat’s preferred methods of arguing was to create a dialog between two or more individuals each of whom represented one of the sides in the free trade vs. protectionism debate. These were much shorter and pithier than the “conversations” devised by Martineau or later by Molinari in his “soirées” and much, much funnier and cleverer. Following the success of Bastiat’s Economic Sophisms, at least in terms of sales and his reputation if not in immediate ideological impact, other economists tried to replicate his work in the late 1840s and early 1850s. The work of Cherbuliz,[72] Wolowski, Fonteyraud,[73] and even Molinari pale into insignificance when compared to the stylistic and conceptual brilliance of Bastiat’s Economic Sophisms. Molinari might have been conceptually brilliant, radical, and innovative at times but stylistically he was staid and conventional. One could never say that about Bastiat.

Why the Soirée format?

As the reviewer of Les Soirées wrote in the JDE (signed “Ch. C” so most likely Molinari’s friend and colleague Charles Coquelin)[74] he was puzzled why Molinari would call his book “Les Soirées,” a word which suggests a sophisticated social gathering held after the evening meal, and not something more straightforward such as “entretiens” (discussions) which would have been a better description of the book’s contents and which might have taken place in a bar over a drink or two.

However, the use of the term “Soirées” was a fairly common one at this time so it was not inappropriate for Molinari to choose it as part of his title. At one extreme, one can find books written during the 1790s and the Napoleonic period with “Soirées” in the title which involve discussions between ordinary people over political or religious topics (“Village Soirées,” “Thatched Cottage Soirées,” or even “Soirées in the village of Ferney (the village where Voltaire lived)”).[75] At the other extreme, there is the well known example which would definitely have been known to Molinari, namely Joseph de Maitre’s Les Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg, ou Entretiens sur le gouvernement temporel de la Providence (1821) in which conversations were held between members of the high aristocracy and political elite, Le Chevalier (The Knight), Le Comte (The Count), and Le Sénateur (The Senator).[76] A more radically different collection of speakers and conversations than Molinari’s could hardly be imagined.

It is also quite likely Molinari modeled the book on the real soirées he had attended in Paris in the late 1840s and based some of the conversations on ones he had heard or even participated in himself. So perhaps the title is not such a bad one. There were at least three “soirées” within the Economists’ social circle in Paris during the late 1840s which Molinari would have been familiar with, and no doubt attended. The wives of the two leading financial supporters of the Guillaumin group, Anna Say (née Cheuvreux and the wife of the businessman Horace Say) and Hortense Cheuvreux (née Gérard, the wife of the manufacturer Casimir Cheuvreux) ran sophisticated salons for the liberal élite and we know from Bastiat’s letters that he attended several times along with other luminaries such as the scientist Jean-Jacques Ampère and the politician and historian Alexis de Tocqueville.[77] We have no extant letters from Molinari to tell us about his social life, but as an active member of the Guillaumin network and a close friend of Bastiat he too would likely have attended from time to time.

A third soirée which we know Molinari and Bastiat attended was the one run by the radical republican journalist Hippolyte Castille at his stately home on number 75, Saint Lazarus street which was a large and imposing house which had once been the Paris residence of Cardinal Fesch (1763-1839) who was the uncle of Napoléon Bonaparte and the archbishop of Lyon. The rue Saint-Lazare was one of the busiest boulevards in Paris and the location of the relatively new Saint-Lazare railway station (originally built in 1837 and then enlarged between 1842-53 when Molinari was living in Paris). Castille’s soirée was active between 1844 and the outbreak of the Revolution in February 1848 and was attended by radical republican friends of Castille associated with the magazine Le Courrier français as well as some of the economists such as Frédéric Bastiat, Gustave de Molinari, Joseph Garnier, Alcide Fonteyraud, and Charles Coquelin, who also made up the core of radicals who published and handed out on the streets of Paris two anti-socialist magazines in March and June 1848. No doubt Molinari met some socialists there and probably debated them much as “The Economist” does in the book. The location of Castille’s soirée on Saint Lazarus Street is also important for suggesting the title of his book.

The Identity of the Speakers

Les Soirées consist of 12 “soirées” or conversations which take place between an Economist, a Conservative, and a Socialist. The Economist’s share of the conversation is substantially larger than the other two speakers with 78.1% of the total. The Socialist enjoys the second largest share of the conversation with 12.2%; and the Conservative gets the smallest share with 9.7%. Together the two opponents of the Economist get 21.9% of the conversation.[78] The book is obviously a device for Molinari to express his views on a range of topics through the mouth of “the Economist.”

It is clear that “the Economist” is Molinari’s mouthpiece as he was an advocate of free banking and the private provision of security, and an opponent of the compulsory acquisition of property by the state, positions which were radical even among the circle of Economists and only Molinari shared all three positions. This was pointed out by Charles Coquelin in his review of Les Soirées who observed that Molinari put into the mouth of “the Economist” views about the private provision of security which no other economist held. This is certainly true. On other matters covered by “The Economist” there would be not much to quibble about as they were fairly standard positions held by most of the economists, such as abolishing tariffs, deregulating certain heavily regulated or monopolized industries, and cutting taxes on the poor. Molinari would have known that his views on “the production of security” were controversial as his article on that topic had been published in the JDE the previous February. But there were reasons why he might have been feeling a bit cocky and felt he was able to speak on behalf of all the Economists on this matter. He had had a meteoric rise through the ranks of the economists over the previous two or three years. His economic journalism at the Courrier français had been discovered by Bastiat in 1846, his book on labour issues and slavery had been reviewed very favorably by Garnier in the JDE in May 1846, he had been made a member of the Political Economy Society in 1847 and represented them at a European-wide conference of Economists in Brussels in September (which interestingly was also attended by Karl Marx),[79] his first book on tariffs had also been published by Guillaumin in 1847, and he had been accepted by Guillaumin to work on their most prestigious project at that time which was the last two volumes of their monumental history of economic thought the Collection des Principaux Économistes during 1847-48, and he had published 10 articles and book reviews in the JDE between 1847-49. So he may have felt that he had made the transition from economic journalist to economist proper and was entitled to speak as “The” Economist in his conversations.

The Socialist is probably an amalgam of the three leading socialists of the 1840s, Proudhon, Victor Considerant, and Louis Blanc, and his views are fairly orthodox and not controversial in any way. Their views have been briefly discussed above and “The Socialist” could well be an amalgam of all three.

The Conservative is harder to pin down. There were two groups of conservatives which Molinari might have had in mind - the hard core ultra-royalist and Catholic groups of the Restoration period who wanted to restore as many aspects of the old regime as possible, and the more moderate conservative constitutional monarchists who opposed republicanism, democracy, and free trade during the July Monarchy. The leading conservatives of the Restoration (1815-1830) were the political thinkers Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), Louis de Bonald (1754-1840), and F. R. Chateaubriand (1768-1848). During the July Monarchy (1830-1848) it was politicians such as Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877) and François Guizot (1787-1874), and protectionist manufacturers like Antoine Odier (1766-1853) and Pierre Mimerel (1786-1872) who headed the protectionist group the Association of National Labor. The Conservative in the Soirées seems to be an amalgam of several of these figures, with perhaps Thiers playing a leading role.

Two Major Themes: Private Property and Economic Laws

“The fundamental law upon which all social organization lies and from which flow all other economic laws, is property. … the wretchedness and the iniquities from which men have never ceased to suffer, do not come from property. I maintain that they come from transgressions, by individuals or society itself, temporary or permanent ones, legal or illegal, committed against the principle of property.” (S1 pp. ???)

The subtitle of the book, “Discussions on Economic Laws and the Defence of Property,” tells us that Molinari intended to weave two general themes throughout the conversations, namely to defend the idea of the right to own property and to show how the natural laws of economics operated in society, two things which were rejected by both conservatives and socialists alike.

Molinari believes that the need for and desire to own property is a natural instinct inherent in all human beings and that therefore “la société n’a pas institué la propriété; c’est bien plutôt la propriété qui a institué la société” (society did not create property, but property which created society) (S1).[80] He concludes that man thus “owns himself”, i.e. “il est le maître de sa personne et qu’il peut disposer à son gré de toutes les virtualités qui composent son être, soit qu’elles y adhèrent, soit qu’il les en ait séparées” (he is master of his own person and may use as he chooses all the potential attributes constituting his person, whether they remain part of him, or whether he has separated them from himself.) It is from this idea that Molinari derives his distinction between “internal” and “external” property rights and it is by working through the implications of this distinction that provides the structure for the book.

By “la propriété intérieure” (internal or personal property rights) he means the right every individual has to “self-ownership,” or in other words that nobody has the right “obliger un être actif et libre à entreprendre un travail qu’il n’entreprendrait pas de lui-même” (to force a free and acting being to undertake work he would not personally undertake) (S1). He concludes that to protect “internal property” individuals should be free to enter any occupation or economic activity without hindrance by the state. By “la propriété extérieure” (external property rights) he means the right to own the property which lies outside or is external to his body and which he has created by his labor and effort, which implies the right to dispose of them “comme bon lui semble” (as he sees fit) (S8). From this he concludes that any good or service created by an individual should be left free to be kept, consumed, or exchanged without hindrance by the state.

Molinari also linked property rights to the different forms individual liberty could take which he likewise more fully developed in his later writings, in particular his treatise Cours d’économie politique (1855). In the Soirées he specifically mentions nine different kinds of liberty, which he expanded to 15 in the Cours. These “liberties” included standard ones like “la liberté des échanges” (the liberty of trade, or free trade, in S7) and “la liberté des communications” (the liberty of communications, or free speech, in S6), as well as rather unusual and more radical ones like “la liberté des banques” (the liberty of banking, or free banking, in S8) and “la liberté de gouvernement” (the liberty of government, or the private and competitive provision of security, in S11).[81]

Over the course of his life Molinari wrote a great deal about what he called the “natural laws” of political economy which he was beginning to develop in the Soirées but did not complete until much later.[82] In summary, he thought there were six “natural laws” which operated regardless of any individual’s or government’s hopes or desires:

•    “la loi naturelle de l’économie des forces ou du moindre effort” (the natural law of the economising of forces, or the exertion of the least effort)

•    “la loi naturelle de la concurrence” (the natural law of competition) or “la loi de libre concurrence” (the law of free competition)

•    “la loi naturelle de la valeur,” sometimes also expressed as “la loi de progression des valeurs” (the natural law of value, or the progression of value)

•    “la loi de l’offre et de la demande” (the law of supply and demand)

•    “la loi de l’équilibre” (the law of economic equilibrium)

•    “Thomas Malthus’ law of population growth”

He used his theory of economic laws and private property to explore what the proper functions of the state should be. His answer was that government activity had to be very limited (if it did anything at all) on the grounds of both utility (it could not violate economic laws with impunity) as well as morality (it was an unjust violation of an individual’s right to property to be taxed or have his property confiscated against his will). The conclusion was that all occupations monopolized or regulated by the state should be open to all and that all “public goods” provided by the state at taxpayer expense should be privatized and opened up to competition. He deals with this issue in the following Soirées: in S3 (forests, canals, waterways), S8 (private banks and money, mail delivery), S9 (bakers, butchers, printers etc.), and S11 (security, police, and defence).

Furthermore, Molinari believed that every heavily regulated or monopolized industry was a potential market which would bring forth its own entrepreneurs who would seek to satisfy consumer demand by offering these goods and services and thereby make profits from doing so. Since the natural laws of political economy applied to everything, inevitably there could be “markets in everything and entrepreneurs for everything”, even such unusual ones as “entrepreneur de pompes funèbres” (entrepreneurs in the funeral business), “entrepreneurs d’industrie agricole” (entrepreneurs in the agriculture industry) who would replace the small and unviable family-owned farms, “entrepreneurs de prostitution” (entrepreneurs in the prostitution business), and perhaps most interestingly “le laborieux entrepreneur, naguère ouvrier” (entrepreneur who has emerged from the working class) or in other words the “self-made” entrepreneur who rises out of the working class to run and own their own business enterprise.[83]

Thus, in each of the Soirées Molinari, i.e. “the Economist,” takes two or three examples of highly regulated occupations or government provided public goods to show both the Conservative and the Socialist how the many economic and social problems facing France could be solved by the strict application of respect for private property, respect for the natural laws of political economy, a government policy of untrammeled laissez-faire, and a society based upon free markets, entrepreneurs, and voluntary organisations and associations. Sometimes he sides with the Conservative and at other times he sides with the Socialist in what is a complex ideological dance between the three parties.

Also scattered throughout the book are six longer pieces in which Molinari (the Economist) gives a mini-lecture or “speech” on key topics. Four are quite long (1,500-2,000 words): the “man as an economic actor” speech (2,000) in S1 (below, pp. 000), the “individual sovereignty vs. communism” speech (2,000) in S11 (below, pp. 000); and one very long speech in the final Soirée (3,500) which is really two speeches back-to-back, his “summation” speech (2,000) (below, pp. 000) and then his “Spartacus” speech (1,500) (below, pp. 000) where he concludes the book with an impassioned plea for liberty and a description of how its full implementation has been prevented throughout history. There are also two smaller speeches; “the law of supply and demand” speech (900) in S6 (below, pp. 000), and “the tyranny of the majority” speech (800) in S11 (below, pp. 000). There are in addition several pieces by the Economist of about 500 words which we have not counted as “speeches” as such. These speeches give us an idea of what issues Molinari thought were more important and thus required a lengthier exposition. It should be noted that four of them came in the final two Soirées, two in S11 which was his most controversial Soirée on the private production of security, and then two in the final Soirée when he was wrapping things up.

The Topics discussed in the Soirées

The range of topics covered in the conversations is very broad, perhaps broader than might be implied by the subtitle of the book. In many ways one might consider Les Soirées to be an important and early, perhaps the first, one volume survey of classical liberal ideas ever written, which attempted to rigorously and consistently apply the principles of individual liberty, property rights, and free markets to all aspects of social existence and to develop a comprehensive set of reform proposals which would bring about “un régime d’entière liberté” (a society of complete liberty). This would become more common in the 20th century with works such as Ludwig von Mises’s Liberalism (1929), Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and Murray Rothbard’s For a New Liberty (1973). However, in his own day this was much rarer but might include, before he wrote Les Soirées in 1849, such works as Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen (1792, 1851); Benjamin Constant, Principes de politique, applicables à tous les gouvernemens représentatifs (1815); and afterwards, Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics: or, The Conditions essential to Happiness specified, and the First of them Developed (1851), John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), and Bruce Smith, Liberty and Liberalism (1888).[84]

After a brief introduction (S1) where some theoretical matters are discussed, such as the nature of human action, self-interest, the origin and nature of property, and the natural laws which govern economic activity, Molinari focuses the conversations on a number of very specific contemporary issues and concerns for which he provides considerable historical and economic information and a list of the things he thought were wrong with French economic and political policies in the late 1840s, and what should be done to change French society if their “party” (or a real Economist) got into power. One might also view it as an extended explanation of what Bastiat’s “utopian politician” planned to do if he were made Prime Minister.[85]

The structure of the book is as follows:

•    Infringements on “external property” rights are covered in four of the 12 Soirées:

•    S2 which deals with literary, artistic, and intellectual property such as inventions and trade marks

•    S3 on the compulsory acquisition of property by the state, other state owned property such as ownership of mines, forests, canals and waterways, spring water

•    S4 on agriculture and land ownership

•    S6 on the exchange of labour which Molinari regards as a form of external property and the worker as a “merchant of labour services”[86]

•    Infringements on internal property are explicitly covered in two of the 12 Soirées:

•    S8 which is a critique of state monopolies such as the issuing of money, banks, the post office, subsidized and public theatres, libraries, subsidies to religion, state education

•    S9 is a critique of heavily regulated industries such as banking, bakeries, butchers, printers, lawyers, stock brokers, prostitutes, funeral directors, owners of cemeteries, doctors, teachers

•    In three other Soirées the type of property is not specified but seems to be “internal” by his definition:

•    S4 on the right to transfer property by means of wills and inheritance laws

•    S5 which is a defense of capital and lending at interest

•    S6 on the right of association and unions, wage rates and the exchange of labour

•    S7 on the right to trade and a critique of protectionism

•    the last three Soirées deal with more specialized topics:

•    S10 has a critique of state funded charity and welfare, a defence of Malthusian ideas on population, marriage laws and families

•    S11 on the production of security, i.e. the private provision of police and defence), private insurance companies, liberty of government, the jury system, nationalism

•    S12 contains his theory of rent, his summing up, and his rousing final speech on the struggle of mankind to be free

IV. The Impact of Les Soirées

[his “Spartacus speech which concludes Les Soirées]

“Liberty! That was the cry of the captives of Egypt, the slaves of Spartacus, the peasants of the Middle Ages, and more recently of the bourgeoisie oppressed by the nobility and religious corporations, of the workers oppressed by masters and guilds. Liberty! That was the cry of all those who found their property confiscated by monopoly and privilege. Liberty! That was the burning aspiration of all those whose natural rights had been forcibly repressed.” (S12, pp. 000.)

His immediate impact

The immediate impact of the book was mixed. It and his “Production of Security” article in February provoked considerable controversy and debate among the Economists but he did not convince them of the soundness of his position concerning either the private provision of security[87] or his opposition to eminent domain laws. The PoS article was reissued as a pamphlet,[88] which suggests there was some interest in it, but the book with its S11 was never reissued. However Guillaumin did published two more books of his conversations in 1855 and 1886, but they were strictly limited to the issue of free trade vs. protection and did not cover the much broader ground he had dealt with in Les Soirées.

So we are left with the question whether popular books like Les Soirées or the more intellectual works like DEP had much impact on thinking and policy at the time. On the one hand, Michel Chevalier was able to continue Bastiat’s work within Napoléon III’s government and persuaded him to sign a Free Trade Treaty with England in 1860 (Richard Cobden was the signatory for England), much against the wishes of the powerful manufacturing and farming lobbies, which ushered in a period of relative free trade in France which lasted until the Méline tariff increased rates in 1892.[89]

On the other hand, Molinari was realistic enough to see that he was tilting at statist windmills in his book. He probably accurately summed up the impact he thought he had had in the words he put into the mouth of the Protectionist in his third collection of conversations in 1886:

The Protectionist (addressing the Economist): Besides, what is the good of swimming against the current? What good has that done you? You have spent your entire life rejecting the opinions of the entire world. You have spent it promoting unpopular doctrines; and what has happened to you? I am sorry to tell you that you have achieved nothing.[90]

He would have had to wait another 70 years before some of his more radical ideas would be appreciated by a new generation of economists and historians.

Molinari’s impact on the modern libertarian movement

Molinari is interesting to modern readers for a number of reasons. Firstly, because of the extraordinary events he lived through and commented upon in great detail; secondly, because his very long life symbolized the rise and fall of the European classical liberal movement itself, rising out of the rubble of the Napoleonic wars and being on death’s bed on the eve of World War I; and finally because of the influence he would have, long after his death, on the modern libertarian movement which emerged in post-World War II America.

By the end of the 19th century Molinari’s views had fallen out of favour, along with the “Paris School” in general. His colleague and contemporary Frédéric Passy (1822-1912) was vainly trying to defend the “School of Liberty” as he called it, from its detractors even in 1890.[91] Only a very few, like the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, had any kind words to say of his work.[92] The American political theorist John Joseph Lalor (1840-1899) edited an American version of the DEP in 1881, the Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States, which included 100 entries from the DEP which he had got translated, including seven by Molinari (which are included in the Addendum). The impact of this infusion of French political economy into America seems to have been minimal in anything. By the time Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy appeared in 1926, for all intents and purposes Molinari no longer existed. Even in Schumpeter’s comprehensive history of economic thought (1954), Molinari and his fellow “anti-étatistes” were dismissed as “indefatigable”, unscientific, and rather forlorn as they “stood staunchly by the drooping flag of unconditional free trade and laissez-faire.”[93]

It was only the chance rediscovery of the work of Frédéric Bastiat in the early 1940s by the American newspaper publisher R.C. Hoiles who was based in Orange County, California, and Leonard E. Read, the general manager of the Los Angeles branch of the United States Chamber of Commerce, that some of the key figures of the “Paris School” of political economy eventually became known to a small group of New York city-based economists and historians who were attending Ludwig von Mises’ seminar at NYU. Hoiles used his Freedom Newspapers presses to re-issue some of Bastiat’s books in 1944[94] and Read would launch a 20 year program to translate more of Bastiat’s writings and to publish them and a biography of his life and work under the Foundation for Economic Education imprint.[95] It was during the 1950s when this publishing program was underway that Murray Rothbard and his Circle Bastiat in New York City became aware of the French school of political economy, beginning with Bastiat, and via his writings the work of Charles Dunoyer,[96] Charles Comte, and ultimately Gustave de Molinari.

Rothbard was working on his treatise on economics, Man, Economy and State (1962), throughout the 1950s when his group of like-minded students and young scholars, the Circle Bastiat, encountered Molinari’s ideas about the private provision of security. Rothbard was sufficiently taken by these ideas to incorporate them into his treatise and its companion volume Power and Market: Government and the Economy (1970) where the idea of competing police and courts was developed at some length. Rothbard’s innovation was to see the fit between Austrian economics, classical liberal political theory, and Molinari’s private production of security and to merge them into a new political and economic whole which became known as “anarcho-capitalism.” This was the “first wave” of interest in Molinari’s ideas and was initially limited to Rothbard and his friends in the Circle Bastiat.

Rothbard’s work sparked a flood of tracts by other libertarians, which we could call “the second wave,” often published privately by obscure presses and handed around the new libertarian movement during the early 1970s. In chronological order we can list the following contributors to the new theory: Roy Childs,“Objectivism and the State: An Open Letter to Ayn Rand” (1969), Morris and Linda Tannahill, The Market for Liberty (1970), Jerome Tuccille, Radical Libertarianism: the Right Wing Alternative (1970), Jarrett Wollstein, Society without Coercion: A New Concept of Social Organization (1970), Richard and Ernestine Perkins, Precondition for Peace and Prosperity: Rational Anarchy (1971), David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism (1973), and Rothbard again with a another book published this time by a more mainstream publisher, For a New Liberty (Macmillan, 1973). The early work of this author might also be included in the latter part of the second wave. It was an undergraduate thesis on Molinari with a translation of the Eleventh Soirée included as an Appendix which appeared in 1979. Many of these early texts can be found in the excellent anthology Anarchy and the Law (2007) edited by Edward Stringham.

A “third wave” of interest is currently still underway. It includes work by individuals within the libertarian movement such as Randy Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and The Rule of Law (Clarendon Press,1998), David D. Friedman, Law’s Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why It Matters (Princeton University Press, 2000), Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Peter T. Leeson, Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think (Cambridge University Press, 2014). There are also a growing number of other scholars who are interested in some of the original ideas Molinari had about Labor Exchanges and the transfer of information within an economy, his travel writing, and his views on the abolition of slavery.[97] Significantly, there is also interest being expressed by historians and legal theorists who are exploring historical examples of the private provision of law such as the law merchant,[98] ancient Ireland and Iceland,[99] and the American west in the 19th century,[100] and even in early 18th century pirate societies.[101]

American interest in the work of Bastiat and Molinari has been joined by a French interest The first book-length biography of Molinari[102] appeared in France only in 2012 but this had been preceded by 25 years of rediscovery of the broader 19th century French classical liberal movement through the work of scholars such as Florin Aftalion, Yves Breton, Michel Lutfalla, Alain Madelin, Jacques Garello, Philippe Nemo, Gérard Minart, Michel Leter, and Robert Leroux.[103] The Complete Works of Bastiat have been republished for the first time in over 100 years by Jacques de Guenin[104] and several volumes of his writings have appeared separately. A ten volume collection of the complete works of J.B Say is being edited under the direction of André Tiran published by Economica.[105] So far there has not been any attempt to republish the works of two other key figures, namely Charles Comte, and Charles Dunoyer.

More recently, the Paris based Institut Coppet has begun an ambitious publishing program in the bicentennial year of Molinari’s birth (2019). They began with a reprint of the magazine Molinari co-founded in June 1848, Jacques Bonhomme, in 2014; to be followed by a comprehensive anthology of Molinari’s writings on the State (2019); and a multi-volume collection of his other major works.[106]

Interestingly, there is a free market think tank based now in Paris, Brussels, and Montréal founded in 2003 which is named after Molinari, the Institut Économique Molinari.[107]

It is hoped that this, the first translation of the entire book, will help scholars better understand Molinari’s ideas, the historical and intellectual context in which his ideas appeared, his importance in the history of classical liberal and libertarian thought, and give him due recognition for the radicalism and originality of his thought, and his commitment over a long lifetime to the cause of individual liberty.

As Molinari said at the close of his rather pessimistic book on the grain trade published in 1886:

We are in too much of a hurry. Progress is not made in a straight line. It is like the Saint-Gothard Tunnel. There are times when one has to turn back on one’s tracks. We are in one of these moments now. We retreat so that we can advance.[108]

Perhaps Molinari would agree that at long last, his long retreat during the 20th century is finally being reversed.


Evenings on Saint Lazarus Street

3. Molinari’s Preface

Editor’s Note

Molinari introduces his collection of Soirées or “conversations” by stating that  the natural laws which govern the operation of society, especially the economy, need to be recognized, understood, and allowed to function without interference if society is to avoid all sorts of harms. He believes the 18th century “Economists” (the Physiocrats) were well aware of this important fact as he makes clear in the quote from François Quesnay on the book’s title page:

It is necessary to refrain from attributing to the physical laws which have been instituted in order to produce good, the evils which are the just and inevitable punishment for the violation of this very order of laws.[109]

However, in his own day the Socialist school (especially Victor Considerant and Louis Blanc) denied this to be the case, and the Conservatives (like Adophe Thiers) recognized this truth only partially. The latter in particular were a special problem for Molinari because, although they said they were defenders of property, they in fact misunderstood the true importance of property rights in the functioning of the economy, defended the principle very poorly and incompletely in the face of recent socialist criticism, and thought they too could violate economic laws with impunity when they thought it was in their interests to do so (as with protectionism).

The aim of Molinari in this book, acting as the representative of the current generation of “Economists,” somewhat controversially as it turned out, was to step into the breach and provide a better defense of the natural laws which governed the economy and of the right to property upon which the successful functioning of the economy depended. To do the former, he began to draw up a comprehensive list of these natural economic laws to which he would refer throughout the course of the Soirées;[110] to do the former he planned to discuss all the myriad ways in which property rights were currently being violated in France and to suggest ways in which “the full emancipation of property”[111] might be achieved. This emancipation of property, he believed, could be achieved by the complete deregulation of the French economy in general, and by the private provision of all public goods and government monopolies in particular.

In each of the following Soirées Molinari, i.e. “the Economist,” will take one or two examples of highly regulated occupations or government provided public goods to show both the Conservative and the Socialist how the many economic and social problems facing France could be solved by the strict application of respect for private property, respect for the natural laws of political economy, a government policy of untrammeled laissez-faire, and a society based upon free markets and voluntary organisations and associations.[112] Sometimes he sides with the Conservative and at other times he sides with the Socialist in what is a complex ideological dance between the three parties.

To demonstrate the intellectual tradition he will be drawing upon, Molinari concludes his preface with a lengthy list of other 18th and 19th century economists who shared his views about the operation of the free market.[113] Nevertheless, he hints in the final paragraph that some people might think he has gone “too far” in his defense of these principles He was perhaps anticipating the reaction of some of his colleagues when they read the Soirées (especially S11 on the private production of security) and rejected it as so many “chimeras and utopias,” words which were usually reserved to criticize the socialists. The book was reviewed fairly positively by Charles Coquelin in the October 1849 issue of the JDE except for some of Molinari's more radical ideas about police and defense. At the monthly meeting of the Société d'Économie Politique on 10 October to discuss Molinari’s book not one of those present came to Molinari's defense on these matters. The main critics were Charles Coquelin who began the discussion, then Frédéric Bastiat, and finally Charles Dunoyer. It was the latter who summed up the view of the Economists that Molinari had been “swept away by illusions of logic."[114]

Nevertheless, Molinari remained confident that he and the other Economists have indeed discovered “the economic truth” which lies behind all of France’s economic problems.

[The Preface]

[1][115]

Society, according to the Economists of the eighteenth century,[116] is organized on the basis of natural laws, whose essence is justice and utility. When these laws are misunderstood, society suffers. When they are fully respected, society enjoys the greatest possible abundance and justice reigns in human relations.

Are these laws of providence respected or unrecognized today? Do the sufferings of the masses have their origin in the economic laws which govern society or in the obstacles placed in the way of their beneficent operation? Such is the question which recent events have raised for us.

To this question the socialist schools reply, sometimes by denying that the economic world is governed, as is the physical world, by natural laws, and at other times by arguing that these laws are imperfect or defective, and that the suffering of society [2] stems from their imperfections and defects.

The more timid conclude that we must modify these laws; the more daring believe that we must wipe the slate clean of an organization which is fundamentally bad and to replace it with an entirely new organization.

The base on which the whole edifice of society rests is property.[117] Socialists therefore strive to alter or replace or destroy the principle of property.

Conservatives defend property; but they defend it badly.[118]

Here is why.

Conservatives are naturally partisans of the status quo. They think the world is all right as it is and are terrified by the very idea of changing anything. Consequently, they avoid sounding out the real depths of society, fearful as they are of finding any distress which might require any reform of existing institutions.[119]

On the other hand they dislike theories and have little faith in foundational principles. Only reluctantly will they discuss property. It would seem that they are afraid to shine a light on this holy principle. Following the example of those [3] ignorant and savage Christians who used to proscribe heretics rather than refute them, they invoke the law rather than science to get the better of the aberrations of socialism.

I have come to the conclusion that the socialist heresy demands a different refutation and property a different defense.

Recognizing, with all the economists, that the natural organization of society rests on property, I have sought to discover whether the suffering denounced by the socialists, suffering no one who was not blind, or in bad faith, could deny, do or do not have their origin in property.

The result of my studies and of my research, has been to the effect that society’s sufferings, so far from originating in the principle of property, on the contrary, flow from direct or indirect attacks on this principle.

From this I have reached the conclusion that the way to improve the lot of the working classes lies purely and simply in the emancipation of property.[120]

The substance of these dialogues is that the principle of property is the basis for the natural organization of society, that this core truth has never ceased to be held partly in check or misconstrued, that harm has flowed from the deep wounds inflicted on [4] property, that finally the emancipation of property would restore society’s natural organization, and that such an organization is intrinsically just and useful.

The thesis whose defense I am undertaking is not new; all the economists have defended property, and political economy is only the demonstration of the natural laws based on property. Quesnay, Turgot, Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and J.B. Say devoted their lives to observing these laws in operation and demonstrating them. Their disciples, MacCulloch, Senior, Wilson,[121] Dunoyer, Michel Chevalier, Bastiat, Joseph Garnier etc., are passionately committed to the same task. I have limited myself to following the path they have set.

It may perhaps be thought that I have gone too far, and that by sticking too strictly to the basic principles, I have failed to avoid the pitfalls of chimeras and utopias. This does not matter, however, since I retain the profound conviction that economic truth hides behind what on the surface are chimeras and utopias. It is also my profound conviction that only the complete and absolute emancipation of private property can save society, by making a reality of all the noble and generous hopes held by the friends of justice and humanity.


4. Evenings on Saint Lazarus Street: The First Evening

Editor’s Note

The first Soirée is where Molinari lays the foundation for the rest of the book. He asserts that society is governed by natural laws which are unchangeable and absolute and that humans ignore them at their peril; that humans are “free and acting beings” who are driven by self-interest to improve their situation and for whom property ownership is instinctive; that property ownership is the foundation stone for economic activity; and that interference with property rights by state restrictions and controls leads to very serious bad consequences.

What he is trying to address here is what was called at the time “the social problem.”[122] He mentions it in the subtitle to the chapter but nowhere else in the book. It referred to the criticisms by socialists of the problems which were emerging in the industrializing societies of Europe during the 1830s and 1840s, such as poverty, unemployment, poor health, hard working conditions, unequal taxes and privileges, and lack of political representation. Molinari just assumes the reader knows what he means by this expression and leaves it to the “Socialist” to give voice to it: “to want the reign of force and fraud to yield to that of justice; to wish that the poor were no longer exploited by the rich; to want everyone rewarded according to his labor.” Like the Socialist, but unlike the Conservative, the Economist wants to solve the social problem quickly and justly but, unlike the Socialist, to do so within the confines placed upon society by the “immutable and absolute” natural laws of economics, while preserving the right to property in the process.

Unfortunately Molinari does not discuss the natural laws which governed political economy in any detail here but we have reconstructed them from other things he wrote later.[123] He puts into the mouth of the Conservative, who does not believe that these natural laws are “principes absolus” (absolute principles) a useful summary of what Molinari in fact believes, namely that there are “absolute principles in economic science and moral theory which are completely applicable at all times and in all places.”

The Economist then provides one of several set pieces in the book, where he gives a mini-lecture or speech on what he believes.[124] In this section (about 2,000 words) he presents his theory of the nature of man as an economic actor ("an acting and free being”) who is driven by self-interest to act, work, and produce in order to consume the things he needs to survive. He comes to realize that he can increase his productive output by minimizing his efforts and maximizing his satisfactions by exchanging with other members of his kind. This in turn requires associating with others in various ways, in particular in the division of labor and the joint defense of his goods (his "property") from theft and destruction.

Twice in this Soirée (and nowhere else in the book) Molinari describes men as “des êtres actifs et libres” (free and acting beings), who “act” in order to achieve the goals they set themselves It seems Molinari is trying to generalize about economic behavior and is toying with what in the 20th century would become known as the Austrian theory of “human action” which was developed by the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises in Human Action (1949). Bastiat was doing something very similar in his innovative use of “Crusoe economics” to discuss the economic choices faced by an individual like Robinson Crusoe on the Island of Despair, but he took this analysis much further than Molinari did.[125] It is an example of what might be called their proto-Austrian way of looking at economic behavior in which the idea of “human action” played an important role.

Molinari believes that the need for and desire to own property is a natural instinct inherent in all human beings and that therefore "society did not create property, but property which created society." He concludes that man thus "owns himself," i.e. "he is master of his own person and may use as he chooses all the potential attributes constituting his person, whether they remain part of him, or he has in fact separated himself from them." It is from this idea that Molinari derives his distinction between "internal" and "external" property rights and it is by working through the implications of this distinction that provides the structure for the book.

Firstly, by “la propriété intérieure” (internal or personal property right) he means the right every individual has to “self-ownership.” In remarks scattered throughout S1, S2, and S8 we can glean some more details about what he meant. For example, “the right of a free and acting being to undertake work of his own choosing” (S1); “the property right a man has in himself;” of the right he has to use his abilities freely, insofar as he causes no damage to the property of others (S1); and "the property of man in his person, in his faculties, in his powers" (S8). He also defines this kind of property right negatively, as in the following, “internal property is violated when an an acting and free being is forced to undertake work he would not personally have chosen to undertake, or is forcibly barred from engaging in certain kinds of work” (S1).

Secondly, by “la propriété extérieure” (external property right) he means the right to own the property which lies outside or is external to one's body and which he has created by his labor and effort. For example, "man’s property right to the fruits of his labor" (S1); “the right to own the part of his powers which he separates from himself by working (i.e. the products of his own labor), and the right to dispose of them as he sees fit” (S1). Molinari is articulating a Lockean notion of how property legitimately becomes one's property by "mixing one's labor" with them, or in Molinari’s case when we “apply some portion of our resources and faculties to the things which nature has put freely at our disposal; at the moment when we complete the work of nature by giving these things a new aspect; at the moment when we add to the natural value which inheres in them, an artificial value.”

It should be noted that Molinari’s ideas about “internal” property (especially the notion of “le Moi” (the self)) and its extension into the “external” property of things came from an essay by Louis Leclerc which he quotes at some length in a footnote in this Soirée.

Molinari then uses this distinction between "internal" and "external" property to structure the rest of the book as follows:

•     S1 contains a general theoretical section on human action, self-interest, and the origin and nature of property, and a list of how these property rights are infringed by the state

•     Infringements on external property rights are covered in 3 of the 11 Soirées:  it is explicitly mentioned in title of S2 (which deals with literary, artistic, intellectual property (inventions, trade marks)) and S3 (compulsory acquisition of property by the state, other state own property); and it is mentioned at the beginning of S6 (dealing with the exchange of labor - “We can think of labor as external property.”)

•     Infringements on internal property are covered in 2 of the 11 Soirées:  explicitly in the title in S8 (government monopolies) and S9 (heavily regulated industries)

•     In three other Soirées the type of property is not specified but seems to be “internal” by his definition: S4 (on wills and agriculture); S5 (credit and interest); S6 (exchange of labor and unions); S7 (free trade and protection)

•     the last three Soirées deal with more specialized topics: S10 (population theory and charity), S11 (the private provision of police and defense), S12 (his theory of rent, his summing up, and his rousing final speech on the struggle of mankind to be free)

Another theme we can identify in the book is that of the private provision of so-called "public goods" which traditionally have been thought to be able to be provided only by the government in the form of a state monopoly. He deals with this issue in the following Soirées: in S3 (forests, canals, waterways), S8 (private banks and money, mail delivery), S9 (bakers, butchers, printers etc.), and S11 (security, police, and defense).

The economist concludes this Soirée with a list of infringements to these two different kinds of property with a very strong suggestion as to how he will remedy this in the course of the book:

Is it a matter of the property right a man has in himself; of the right he has to use his abilities freely, insofar as he causes no damage to the property of others? In the present society, the highest posts and the most lucrative professions are not open; one cannot practice freely as a solicitor, a priest, a judge, bailiff, money-changer, broker, doctor, lawyer or professor. Nor can one freely be a printer, a butcher, baker or entrepreneur in the funeral business. We are not free to set up a commercial organization, a bank, an insurance company,[126] or a large transport company, nor free to build a road or establish a charity, nor to sell tobacco or gunpowder, or saltpeter, nor to carry mail, or print money, nor to meet freely with other workers to establish the price of labor. The property right a man has in himself, his internal property, is in every detail shackled.
A man’s property right to the fruits of his labor, his external property, is equally impeded. Literary and artistic property and the property right of inventions are recognized and guaranteed only for a short period. Material property is generally recognized in perpetuity, but it is subject to a multitude of restrictions and charges. Gifts, inheritance and loans are restricted too. Trade is heavily encumbered as much by capital transfer taxes, registration charges, and stamp duty, by the octrois (city) taxes and by customs duties, as by the privileges granted to agents working as intermediaries in certain markets. Sometimes, in addition, trade is completely prohibited outside certain limits. Finally, the law of expropriation on the grounds of public utility, endlessly threatens such weak remnants of property rights that the other restrictions have spared.

The net result of this, according to the Economist in the first words he speaks, is “Nous voulons la réformer” (we want to reform society).

Molinari also makes reference in this Soirée to slavery and serfdom which was one of his great interests at this time. He published on the abolition of slavery in the French colonies in 1846,[127] he wrote the long bibliographic article on slavery (“Esclavage”) in the DEP, as well as a shorter article on serfdom (“Servage”). In the latter he concluded that serfdom was “a vestige of a barbarous epoch” and that it would inevitably disappear. Given his deep interest in slavery and serfdom Molinari leapt at the chance to visit Russia at the invitation of Alexander II to give some lectures on political economy. Molinari spent four months traveling in Russia from February to July 1860, on the eve of the emancipation of the serfs in February 1861.[128] So it is perhaps not surprising that he would conclude the Soirées with an impassioned plea for liberty in the closing paragraphs of S12 where he contrasts liberty and the oppressed such as the Roman slaves led by Spartacus.

[5]

SUMMARY : The status of the social problem. [129] – That society is governed by natural laws which are immutable and absolute. – That property is the foundation of the natural organization of society. – Property (rights) defined. – A list of the current infringements of the principle of (the right to) property.

[SPEAKERS: A conservative.- A socialist.- An economist.[130]]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Let us debate among ourselves, calmly, the formidable problems thrown up in these last few years. You [the Socialist], who wage a bitter war against present institutions, and you [the Economist], who defend them with certain reservations, what are you actually seeking?

THE SOCIALIST.

We want to reconstruct society.

THE ECONOMIST.

We want to reform it.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Oh you dreamers, my good friends, I would ask for nothing better [6] myself, were it possible. But you are chasing chimeras.

THE SOCIALIST.

What? To want the reign of force and fraud to yield to that of justice; to wish that the poor were no longer exploited by the rich; to want everyone rewarded according to his labor – is all this to pursue a chimera, then?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This ideal, which all the utopians[131] have put forward since the world began, unfortunately cannot be realized on this earth. It is not given to men to attain it.

THE SOCIALIST.

I believe quite the opposite. We have lived till now in a corrupt and imperfect society. Why should we not be permitted to change it? As Louis Blanc said, if society is badly constructed, can we not rebuild it? Are the laws on which this society rests, a society gangrenous to the very marrow of its bones, eternal and unchangeable?[132] We have endured them thus far. Are we condemned to do so forever?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

God has willed it thus.

THE ECONOMIST.

Beware of taking God’s name in vain.[133] Are you sure that the miseries of society really stem from the laws on which society is based? [7]

THE SOCIALIST.

Where then do they come from?

THE ECONOMIST.

Could it not be that these miseries have their origin in the attacks made on the fundamental laws of society?

THE SOCIALIST.

A likely story that such laws exist!

THE ECONOMIST.

There are economic laws which govern society just as there are physical laws which govern the material world. Utility and justice are the essence of these laws. This means that by observing them absolutely, we are sure to act usefully and justly for ourselves and for others.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Are you not exaggerating a little? Are there really principles at work in the economic and moral sciences, ones absolutely applicable in all ages and places? I have never believed, I am bound to say, in absolute principles.[134]

THE ECONOMIST.

What principles do you believe in, then?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

My goodness, I believe, along with all the other men who have looked closely at the things of this world, that the laws of justice and the rules of utility are essentially shifting and variable. I believe, accordingly, that we cannot base any universal and absolute system on these laws. M. Joseph de Maistre [135] was wont to say: everywhere I have seen men, but nowhere have I seen Man.[136] Well, I believe that one can say likewise, that there are societies, having particular laws, appropriate to [8] their nature, but that there is no Society governed by general laws.

THE SOCIALIST.

Perhaps so, but we want to establish this unitary and universal society.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I still believe with M. de Maistre that the laws spring from circumstances, and have nothing fixed about them…Do you not know that a law considered just in one society, is often regard as unjust in another? Theft was permitted in certain conditions in Sparta; polygamy is allowed in the Orient and castration tolerated too. Would you say, therefore, that the Spartans were shameless thieves and that Asians are despicable debaucherers? No! If you consider things rationally, you will conclude that the Spartans in permitting theft, were obeying the particular demands of their situation, while Asians, in authorizing polygamy and tolerating castration, are subject to the influence of their climate. Read Montesquieu again![137] This will persuade you that moral law does not take the same form in all places and at all times. You will agree with him that justice has nothing absolute about it. Truth this side of the Pyrenees, error the other side, said Pascal. Read Pascal again![138]

What is true of the just is no less true of the useful. You speak of the laws of utility as if they were universal and permanent. Your error is truly profound! Do you not know that economic laws have varied, and vary still, endlessly, as do moral laws?[139] … Will your counter-argument be that nations fail to recognize their [9] true interests when they adopt diverse and flexible economic legislation? You have against you, however, centuries of experience. Is it not proven, for example, that England owed her wealth to protectionism? Was it not Cromwell’s famous Navigation Act which was the starting point for her maritime and colonial greatness? She has recently abandoned this protectionism, however.[140] Why? Because it has ceased to be useful to her, because it would spell her ruin after having made her rich. A century ago free trade would have been fatal to England; today it gives a new lease of life to English commerce. That is how much circumstances have changed!

In the domain of the just and the useful, all is mobility and diversity. To believe as you seem to do, in the existence of absolute principles, is to go astray lamentably, to misunderstand the very conditions for the existence of societies.

THE ECONOMIST.

So you think that there are no absolute principles, either in morality or in political economy; you think everything is shifting, variable, and diverse in the sphere of the just and in the sphere of the useful; you think that justice and utility depend on place, time, and circumstance. Well, the socialists have the same opinion as you. What do they say? They say that new laws are needed for new times. That the time has come to change the old moral and economic laws which govern human societies.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is criminal folly! [10]

THE SOCIALIST.

Why? Until now you have governed the world. Why should it not be our turn to govern it? Are you made of superior stuff to us? Or can you really affirm that no one is more fit than you to govern men? We put it to the vote of everyone. Ask the opinion of the wretched souls who languish at the bottom of society, ask whether they are satisfied with the fate which your lawmakers have left them. Ask them if they think they have obtained a fair share of the world’s goods. As to your laws, if you had not framed them according to the selfish interests of your class, would your class be the only one to prosper? So, what would be criminal about our establishing laws which advantaged everybody equally?

You accuse us of attacking the eternal and unchanging principles on which society rests: religion, family, and property. On your own admission, however, there are no eternal and unchanging principles.

Perhaps you might cite property, but in the eyes of your jurists, what is property in fact? It is a purely human institution which men have founded and decreed and which they are consequently in a position to abolish. Have they not, moreover, very quickly reorganized it? Does property today resemble ancient Egyptian or Roman property or even that of the Middle Ages? The appropriation and exploitation of man by man used to be accepted. You no longer accept this today, or anyway not in law. In most ancient societies the ownership of land was reserved to the state; you have rendered landed property accessible to everyone. [11] You have, on the other hand, refused to give full recognition to certain kinds of property; you have denied the inventor the absolute title to his invention, and to the man of letters the absolute ownership of his writings.[141] You also came to understand that society had to be protected against the excesses of individual ownership of property and for the general good you passed the law of expropriation.[142]

Well, what are we doing now? We are limiting property a bit more; we are subjecting it to more numerous restrictions, and to heavier burdens, in the public interest. So are we so guilty? Was it not you who marked out the direction we now follow?

As to the family, you admit that it has legitimately been able to assume in other eras and other countries, a different organization from that which prevails today with us. Why then, should we be forbidden to modify it again? Cannot man unmake everything he has made?

Then there is religion! Have not your lawmakers, however, always arranged it as they saw fit? Did they not begin by authorizing the Catholic religion to the exclusion of the others? Did they not finish by permitting all faiths and by funding some of them?[143] If they were able to regulate the manifestation of religious feeling, why should it be forbidden to us to regulate it in our turn?

Property, family, religion – you are soft wax which so many lawmakers have marked with their successive imprints – why should we not mark you also with ours? Why should we abstain from touching things which others have so often touched? Why should we respect relics [12] whose guardians themselves have felt no scruple in profaning?

THE ECONOMIST.

The lecture is deserved. You conservatives, who admit no absolute, pre-existing, and eternal principle in morality, any more than in political economy, no principle equally applicable to all eras and places, look where your doctrines lead! People throw them back at you. After having heard your moralists and your jurists deny the eternal laws of the just and the useful, only to put in their place this or that fleeting expedient, adventurous and committed minds, substituting their ideas for yours, wish to rule the world after you and differently from you. And if you conservatives are right, when you insist that no fixed and absolute rule governs the moral and material arrangement of human affairs, can one condemn these reorganizers of society?[144] The human mind is not infallible. Your lawmakers were perhaps wrong. Why should it not be given to other lawmakers to do better?

When Fourier, drunk with pride, said: All the legislators before me were wrong, and their books are fit only to be burned, might he not, according to your own judgment, have been right? If the laws of the just and the useful come from men, and if it falls to men to modify them according to time, place and circumstance, was not Fourier justified in saying, with his eyes on history, that long martyrology of the nations, that the social legislation of the ancients had been conceived within a false system and that the organization of a new social state was called for? In your insistence that no absolute and superhuman principle governs [13] societies, have you not opened the floodgates to the utopian torrent? Have you not authorized the first comer to refashion these societies you claim to have made? Does not socialism flow from your own doctrines?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What can we do about it? We are well aware, please believe me, of the chink in our armor. Therefore we have never denied socialism absolutely. What words do we use, for the most part, for socialists? We tell them: between you and us the difference is only a matter of time. You are wrong today, but perhaps in three hundred years, you will be right. Just wait!

THE SOCIALIST.

And if we do not want to wait?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

In that case, so much the worse for you! Since without prejudice to the future of your theories, we regard them as immoral and subversive for the present, we will hound them to our utmost ability. We will cut them down as the scythe cuts down tares[145]… We will dispatch you to our prisons and to penal servitude, there to attack the present institutions of religion, family, and property.[146]

THE SOCIALIST.

So much the better. We rely on persecution to advance our doctrines. The finest platform one can give to an idea is the scaffold or the stake. Fine us, imprison us, deport us… we ask nothing better. If you could reestablish the Inquisition against socialists we would be assured of the triumph of our cause. [14]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

We are still in a position not to need this extreme remedy. The majority and power are on our side.

THE SOCIALIST.

Until the majority and power turn in our direction.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Oh I am quite aware that the danger is immense; still we will resist until the end.

THE ECONOMIST.

And you will lose the contest. You conservatives are powerless to conserve society.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is a very categorical statement.

THE ECONOMIST.

We will see if it is well-founded or not. If you do not believe in absolute principles, you must – is it not the case? – consider nations as artificial aggregations, successively constituted and perfected by the hand of man. These aggregations may have similar principles and interests, but they can also have opposing principles and interests. That which is just for one, may not be just for the other. What is useful for this one, may be harmful to that one. What is the necessary result, however, of this antagonism in principles and interests? War.[147] If it be true that the world is not governed by universal and permanent laws, if it is true that each nation has principles and interests which are special to it, interests and principles essentially variable according to circumstances and the [15] times, is war not in the nature of things?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Obviously we have never dreamed the dream of perpetual peace like the noble Abbé de Saint-Pierre.[148] M. Joseph de Maistre has anyway shown beyond doubt that war is inevitable and necessary.[149]

THE ECONOMIST.

You admit then, and in effect you cannot not admit, that the world is eternally condemned to war?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

War occurred in the past, we have it in the present, so why should it cease to be in the future?

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, but in the past in all societies the vast majority of the population were slaves or serfs.[150] Well, slaves and serfs did not read newspapers or frequent political clubs[151] and knew nothing of socialism. Take the serfs of Russia! Are they not such stuff as despotism can mould at will? Does it not make of them, just as it pleases, mere drudges or cannon-fodder?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yet it is clear that there was good in serfdom.

THE ECONOMIST.

Unfortunately, there is no longer any way of reestablishing it among us. There are no longer slaves nor serfs. There are the needy multitudes to whom you cannot deny the free communication of ideas, to whom indeed you are constantly requested all the time to make [16] the realm of general knowledge more accessible. Would you prevent these multitudes, who are today sovereign, from drinking from the poisoned well of socialist writings? Would you prevent their listening to the dreamers who tell them that a society where the masses work hard and earn little, while above them lives men who earn a lot while working very little, is a flawed society and one in need of change? No! You can proscribe socialist theories as much as you like, but you will not stop their being produced and propagating themselves. The press will defy your prohibitions.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Ah, the press, that monumental poisoner. [152]

THE ECONOMIST.

You can muzzle it and proscribe it for all you are worth. You will never be done with slaying it. It is a Hydra whose millions of heads would defeat even the strength of Hercules.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

If we had a decent absolute monarchy…

THE ECONOMIST.

The press would kill an absolute monarchy just as it killed the constitutional monarchy, and failing the press, books, pamphlets and conversation would do the trick.

Today, to speak only of the press, that powerful catapult is no longer directed solely against the government, but against society too.

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, for some years the press has been on the march, thank God!

THE ECONOMIST.

Once it stirred up revolutions in order to change [17] the type of government; it stirs them up today to change society itself. Why should it not succeed with this plan as it did with the other? If nations were fully guaranteed against foreign conflicts, perhaps we could succeed in bringing to heel for good the violent and anarchic factions which operate domestically. You yourself agree, however, that foreign war is inevitable, since principles and interests are changeable and diverse and no one can claim in response that war, harmful today to certain countries, will not be useful to them tomorrow. Well, if you have no faith in anything save sheer force to put socialism down, how are you going to succeed in containing it, when you are obliged to concentrate that force, your final resort, on the foreign enemy? If war is inevitable, is not the coming of revolutionary socialism inevitable too?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That, alas, is what I am truly afraid of. This is why I have always thought of society as marching briskly towards its ruin. We are the Byzantine Greeks and the barbarians are at the gates.

THE ECONOMIST.

Is that the position you have reached? You despair of the fate of civilization and you watch the rise of barbarism, waiting for that final moment when it comes pouring over your battlements.[153] You really are so many Byzantine Greeks ...  Well if that is how it is, let the barbarians in. Better still, go out to meet them and hand the keys to the sacred city over to them, humbly. Perhaps you will succeed in assuaging their fury. [18] Beware, however, of redoubling and pointlessly prolonging your resistance. Does not history record that Constantinople was sacked and that the Bosphorus was full of blood and corpses for four days?[154] You Greeks of the new Byzantium, be fearful of the fate of your ancestors and please spare us the agony of a hopeless resistance and tbe quickmake speed to hand it over.

THE SOCIALIST.

So are you acknowledging that the future belongs to us?

THE ECONOMIST.

God forbid! I do think, however, that your enemies are wrong to resist you if they have despaired of defeating you, and I imagine that in not attaching themselves to any fixed and immutable principle, they have ceased to expect to be victorious. Conservatives are powerless to conserve society, that is all I wanted to demonstrate. Now, however, I will tell you other organizers, that you too would be powerless to organize it. You could take Byzantium and sack it; but you would not be able to govern it.

THE SOCIALIST.

What do you know about it? Have we not ten organizations for your one?[155]

THE ECONOMIST.

You have just put your finger on it. Which socialist sect do you belong to? Please tell me. Are you a Saint-Simonian?[156]

THE SOCIALIST.

No? Saint-Simonianism is old hat. To begin with, it was an aspiration rather than a program… And the disciples have ruined the aspiration without finding the program. [19]

THE ECONOMIST.

Are you a Phalansterian? [157]

THE SOCIALIST.

It’s an attractive idea but the morality of Fourierism is quite risqué.[158]

THE ECONOMIST.

Are you a Cabetist?

THE SOCIALIST.

Cabet is a brilliant mind but uncultured.[159] He understands nothing, for example, about art. Imagine if you will, the people in Icaria painting statues. The faces of Curtius - that is the ideal of Icarian art. What a barbarian![160]

THE ECONOMIST.

Are you a follower of Proudhon?[161]

THE SOCIALIST.

Proudhon, is he not a fine destroyer for you? How well he demolishes things! Up to now however all he has managed to set up is his exchange bank and that is not enough.[162]

THE ECONOMIST.

So, not Saint-Simon, not Fouriér, nor Cabét, nor Proudhon. So what are you then?[163]

THE SOCIALIST.

I am a socialist.

THE ECONOMIST.

Tell us more though. To what type of socialism do you subscribe?[164]

THE SOCIALIST.

To my own. I am convinced that the great problem of the organization of labor has not yet been resolved. We have cleared the ground, we have laid the foundations, but we have not built the structure. Why should I not seek like [20] anyone else to build it? Am I not driven by the pure love of humanity? Have I not studied science and meditated for a long time on the problem? And I think I can say that…well not yet actually…there are certain points which are not completely clear ( pointing to his forehead) but the idea is there…and you will see it later on.

THE ECONOMIST.

This is to say that you too are looking for your version of the organization of labor. You are an independent socialist. You have your own particular bible. In fact, why not? Why should you not receive like anyone else the spirit of the Lord? Then again, why should it not come to others as much as to you? So we have lots of different approaches to the organization of labor.

THE SOCIALIST.

So much the better. The people will be able to choose.

THE ECONOMIST.

Right by a majority vote. But what will the minority do?

THE SOCIALIST.

It will give in to the majority.

 THE ECONOMIST.

And if it resists? I admit of course that it will submit willingly or by force. I admit that the organization favored by the majority of voters will be installed. What will happen if someone – you, me or someone else – discovers a superior arrangement?

THE SOCIALIST.

That is not likely.

THE ECONOMIST.

On the contrary, it is very likely. Do you not believe in the dogma of indefinite perfectibility? [21]

THE SOCIALIST.

Most certainly. I believe that humanity will cease to progress only if it ceases to exist.

THE ECONOMIST.

Well, where does the progress of humanity usually come from? If one is to believe your learned men, it is society which makes man. When social organization is bad, man either stagnates or retrogresses. When it is good, man grows and progresses…

THE SOCIALIST.

What could be more true?

THE ECONOMIST.

Could there be anything more desirable in the world, then, than securing the progress of our organization of society? If this is to happen, what will the constant preoccupation of the friends of humanity have to be? Will it not be to invent and plan more and more perfect organizations?

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, probably. What do you see as wrong about that?

THE ECONOMIST.

In my view this means permanent anarchy. A way of organizing society has just been set up and it functions, more or less well or badly, because it is not perfect…

THE SOCIALIST.

Why not?

THE ECONOMIST.

Does not the doctrine of indefinite perfectibility exclude perfection? What is more I have just cited you half a dozen versions of socialism and you were not satisfied with any of them. [22]

 THE SOCIALIST.

That proves nothing against the ones which will appear later. And so I have the strong conviction that the one I favor…

THE ECONOMIST.

Fourier worked out his perfect arrangements and yet you do not want them. Likewise you will run up against people who do not like yours. Some sort of system is in operation, whether good or bad. Most people like it, but a minority do not. From this springs conflict and struggle. Take note, moreover, that future arrangements possess an enormous advantage over present ones. People have not yet noticed their shortcomings. In all probability the new system will carry the day… until such time as it too is replaced by a third system. But do you really believe that a society can change its arrangements on a daily basis, without danger? Look what an appalling crisis a simple change of government has entailed for us.[165] What would it be like with a with a change in the whole of society?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

The mere thought of it makes me shiver. What a frightful mess! Well, is that not the spirit of innovation for you?

THE ECONOMIST.

Try as you might, you will not stop it. The spirit of innovation is a fact ...

THE CONSERVATIVE.

To the world’s misfortune.

THE ECONOMIST.

Not so. Without the spirit of innovation, men would still be eating acorns or [23] nibbling grass. Without the spirit of innovation, you would be an uncouth savage, dwelling under the trees, rather than a worthy man of property with a house in town and another in the country, well fed, well-clad and well-housed.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Why has not the spirit of innovation stayed within its proper limits?

THE SOCIALIST.

Selfish fellow!

THE ECONOMIST.

The spirit of innovation in man has no limits and will perish only when man himself perishes. It will modify perpetually everything men have set up, and if, as you assert, the laws which regulate human societies are of human origin, the spirit of innovation will not be checked in the face of these laws. It will modify them, change them, and overthrow them for as long as the human sojourn on earth continues. The world is given to incessant revolutions, to endless strife, unless…

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Unless…

THE ECONOMIST.

Unless, in fact, there are absolute principles, unless the laws which govern the moral and economic world, are pre-established laws like those which govern the physical world.[166] If it were thus, if societies had been set up by the hand of Providence, would one not have to take pity on the pygmy, swollen with pride, who tried to substitute his work for that of the Creator? Would it not be just as childish [24] to want to change the foundations on which society rests as to change the orbit of the earth?

THE SOCIALIST.

Without any doubt. Do they exist, though, these providential laws, and even supposing they do, are justice and utility among their key features?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is grossly impious. If God has organized the various societies Himself, if He made the laws which regulate them, it is obvious that these laws are in their essence just and useful and that the sufferings of mankind flow from our not observing them.

THE ECONOMIST.

Well said, but are you not in your turn obliged to admit that these laws are irreversible and unchangeable?

THE SOCIALIST.

Well, why do you not reply then? Are you unaware, therefore, that nature proceeds only by universal and unchangeable laws? I also ask whether nature could proceed otherwise. If natural laws were partial, would they not come into conflict with each other constantly? If they were variable, would they not leave the world exposed to endless disruption? I can no more conceive that a natural law might not be universal and unchanging than you can conceive that a law emanating from God might not have justice and utility at its core. The only thing is, I doubt whether God was involved in the organization of human societies. Do you know why I am skeptical about this? Because your societies have detestable arrangements, because the history of humanity until now has been no more [25] than a deplorable, hideous tale of crime and poverty. To attribute to God Himself the arrangements of these societies, vile and poverty-stricken as they are – would this not be to hold Him responsible for evil? Would this not be to justify the criticism of those who accuse Him of injustice and cruelty?

THE ECONOMIST.

May I be permitted to suggest that from the fact that these providential laws exist, it does not necessarily follow that mankind must prosper? Men are not mere bodies, lacking life and will, like the spheres one sees moving in an eternal order under the governance of physical laws. Men are free and acting beings;[167] they can obey or not obey the laws that God has given them. The only thing is, when they do not follow them they are rendered criminal and wretched.

THE SOCIALIST.

If it were indeed thus, they would always obey them.

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, if they were familiar with them, and being thus familiar, knew that non-compliance with these laws must inevitably do them harm. That, however, is precisely what they do not know.

THE SOCIALIST.

So are you asserting that all the miseries of humanity have their origin in the non-observation of the moral and economic laws which govern society?

THE ECONOMIST.

I am saying that if humanity had always obeyed these laws, the sum total of our misery would likewise always have been the smallest conceivable. Does that answer you sufficiently? [26]

THE SOCIALIST.

Absolutely. I would very much like to know, however, precisely what these miraculous laws are.

 THE ECONOMIST.

The fundamental law on which rests all social organization, and from which flow all the other laws, is PROPERTY.[168]

THE SOCIALIST.

Property? Come off it! Surely it is precisely property from which flow all the evils of humankind.

THE ECONOMIST.

I assert the contrary. I assert that the wretchedness and the injustices from which men have never ceased to suffer, do not come from property. I maintain that they come from transgressions, by individuals or society itself, temporary or permanent ones, legal or illegal, committed against the principle of property. I am saying that had property been faithfully respected from the beginning of the world, humanity would continually have enjoyed, in every era, the maximum welfare consistent with the degree of advancement of the arts and sciences, along with complete justice.

THE SOCIALIST.

What a lot of assertions! And it would seem that you are in a position to substantiate your claims.

THE ECONOMIST.

I would think so.

THE SOCIALIST.

All right, so substantiate them then!

THE ECONOMIST.

I ask nothing better. [27]

THE SOCIALIST.

First of all, please be so good as to define “property."

THE ECONOMIST.[169]

I will do better than that; I will start by defining man himself, at least from the economic point of view.

Man is a combination of physical, moral, and intellectual powers. These various powers need to be constantly exercised, constantly restored by the acquisition of other similar powers. When they are not so restored, they perish. This is as true of intellectual, and moral powers as it is of physical ones.

Man is thus perpetually obliged to acquire new powers. How is he made aware of this need? By pain and sorrow. Any loss of powers is painful. Any acquisition of powers, any achievement is accompanied, on the other hand, by enjoyment. Driven by this double spur, man takes care endlessly to exercise or increase the set of physical, intellectual and moral powers which constitute his being. This is the reason for his activity.

When this activity occurs, when man acts with a view to repairing or increasing his powers, we say that he is working. If the elements from which man extracts the potential advantages he acquires, were always within his reach, and nature had prepared them for his use, his work would be reduced to a negligible level. That, however, [28] is not how things are. Nature has not done everything for man; she has left him much to do. She supplies him liberally with the raw material for all the things he needs to perfect himself, but she obliges him to give a host of diverse forms to this raw material in order to make it usable for him.

The preparation of things necessary to consumption is called production.

How is production effected? By the action of the powers or faculties of man on the elements with which nature supplies him.

Before he can consume, man is therefore obliged to produce. All production implying some expenditure of powers, also implies pain and effort. One undergoes this effort and suffers this pain with a view to gaining some enjoyment, or, and this comes to the same thing, sparing oneself some worse suffering. One gains this pleasure or avoids this suffering by means of consumption. To produce and consume, to endure and enjoy, that is human life in a nutshell.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Are you so bold as to say that in your view pleasure ought to be the sole purpose man should aim at on this earth?

THE ECONOMIST.

Do not forget that this involves moral and intellectual enjoyment as well as the physical kind. Do not forget that man is a physical, moral, and intellectual being. The whole question is: will he develop in these three respects or will he degenerate? If he neglects his moral and intellectual needs entirely, in favor of his physical appetites, he will degenerate morally and [29] intellectually. If he neglects his physical needs so as to increase his intellectual and moral ones, he will degenerate physically. In both eventualities he will suffer in the one direction, while enjoying himself to excess in the other. Wisdom consists in maintaining the balance between the faculties with which one has been endowed, or in producing such a balance when it does not exist. Political economy, however, does not have to concern itself, or not directly anyway, with this inner ordering of our human faculties. Political economy is concerned only with the general laws governing the production and consumption of wealth. The way in which each individual should deploy the restorative powers of his being, concerns morality.

To suffer as little as possible, physically, morally, and intellectually, and to enjoy as much as possible, from this triple point of view – this is what constitutes, in the final analysis, the great motivating principle in human life, the pivot around which all our lives move. This motive or pivot[170] is known as self-interest.

THE SOCIALIST.

You regard self-interest as the sole motive of human action and you say that it consists in sparing oneself pain and obtaining gratification. But is there not any more noble motive to which one might appeal? Might one not find the more elevated stimulus of the love of humanity more exciting than the ignoble lure of personal pleasure? Instead of yielding to self-interest, might one not obey the imperative of devotion to others? [30]

THE ECONOMIST.

Devotion to others is no more than one of the constituent parts of self-interest.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What does that mean? Are you forgetting that devotion implies sacrifice and that sacrifice involves suffering?

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, sacrifice and suffering on one side, but satisfaction and enjoyment on another. When one sacrifices oneself for one’s neighbor, one condemns oneself, usually at least, to some material privation, but one experiences in exchange, moral satisfaction. If the effort involved outweighed the satisfaction derived from it, one would not sacrifice oneself for someone else.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What about the martyrs?

THE ECONOMIST.

The martyrs themselves could supply me with witnesses in support of my case. In them, the moral sentiments of religion outweighed the physical instinct of self-preservation. In exchange for their bodily suffering they experienced moral pleasure of a more intense kind. When one is not armed to a high degree with religious feeling, one does not expose oneself, at least not willingly, to martyrdom. Why is this? It is because the moral satisfaction derived is weak and one finds it too dearly purchased in terms of the physical suffering.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But if that is the way of it, the men in whom physical appetite predominates, will always sacrifice the satisfaction of their more lofty aspirations, to that of their [31] lower ones. Their interest will always be to wallow in the gutter…

THE ECONOMIST.

This would be so if human existence were limited to this earth. The individuals in whom physical appetites predominate would, in such a case, have no interest in repressing them. Man is not, however, or does not believe himself to be, a creature of a mere day. He has faith in a future life and strives to perfect himself, in order to ascend to a better world rather than descend to a worse one. If he foregoes certain pleasures in this life, it is in order to acquire superior ones in another life.

If he has no faith in these future satisfactions, or reckons them inferior to those present satisfactions which religion and morality command him to give up in order to obtain them, he will not agree to this sacrifice.

Whether the satisfaction is present or future, however, whether it is located in this world or another, it is always the end which man selects for himself, the constant and unchanging motive behind his actions.

THE SOCIALIST.

When it is elaborated like this, one can, I think, accept self-interest as the sole motive of man’s actions.

THE ECONOMIST.

Driven by his own self-interest, as he sees it, man acts and works. It is the role of religion and morality to teach him how best to invest his effort…

Man therefore strives incessantly to reduce the sum of his sorrows and increase that of his joys. How can he achieve this double outcome? By [32] obtaining, in exchange for less work, more things suitable for consumption, or, which comes to the same thing, by perfecting his labor.

How can man perfect his labor? How can he obtain a maximum of satisfaction in exchange for a minimum of effort?

He can do it by managing efficiently the powers he possesses, by carrying out the work which best suits his abilities and by accomplishing the task in the best possible way.

Now experience proves that this result can be secured only through the most perfect division of labor.

Men’s best interests naturally lie therefore in the division of labor. The division of labor, however, implies a bringing-together of individuals, societies, and exchanges.[171]

If men remain isolated, if they satisfy all their needs individually, they will expend the maximum effort to obtain a minimum of satisfaction.

Even so, this interest which men have in uniting, with a view to reducing their labor and increasing their economic satisfaction, would perhaps not have been sufficient to bring them together, had they not been first of all drawn to each other by the natural stimulus of certain needs which cannot be met in isolation, plus the need to defend – what shall we call it? – their property.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What? Are you saying property exists in isolation? According to those learned in law, it is society which creates it. [33]

THE ECONOMIST.

If society creates it, then society can abolish it too, a consideration which would make the socialists who demand its abolition less egregiously guilty. Society did not, however, create property, it being rather the case that property created society.

What is property?[172]

Property derives from a natural instinct with which the whole human species is endowed. This instinct reveals to man, prior to any reflection, that he is master of his own person and may use as he chooses all the potential attributes constituting his person, whether they remain part of him, or he has in fact separated himself from them.

THE SOCIALIST.

Separated? What does this mean?

THE ECONOMIST.

Man has to produce if he wants to consume. In producing he expends, separates from himself, a certain part of his physical, moral, and intellectual powers. Products contain the effort expended by those who made them. Man does not cease to own, however, these efforts he has separated from himself under the pressure of necessity. Human understanding is not deceived and will condemn, without distinction, infringements of internal and external property rights.[173]

When man is denied the right to own the [34] part of his powers which he separates from himself when he is working, when the right to dispose of it is allocated to others, what happens? That separation, that using up of his powers, implies some degree of pain, and the man thus ceases working unless someone forces him to.

To abolish the rights of man to the ownership of the fruits of his labor, is to prevent the creation of the products concerned.

To seize control of a part of these products is likewise to discourage their creation; it is to slow down man’s activity by weakening the motive impelling him to act.

In the same way, to threaten internal property; to force a free and acting being to undertake work he would not personally undertake, or to bar him from [35] certain branches of work, that is to deflect his faculties away from the use he would naturally select, is to diminish that man’s productive power.

Any assault on property, internal or external, alienated or not, is contrary to utility as well as to justice.

How does it happen then, that assaults have been made against property, in every period of history?

Given that any work entails an expenditure of effort, and any expenditure of effort a degree of pain, some men have wished to spare themselves the latter, whilst claiming for themselves the satisfaction it provides. They have consequently made a speciality of stealing the fruits of other men’s labor, either by [36] depriving them of their external property, or reducing them to slavery. They have gone on to construct societies organized to protect them and the fruits of their pillaging against their slaves or against other predators. This lies at the origin of most societies.[174]

This quite unwarranted usurpation by the strong of the property of the weak, however, has been successively repeated. From the very beginnings of society an endless struggle has existed between the oppressors and the oppressed, the plunderers and the plundered; from the very beginning of societies, the human race has constantly sought the emancipation of property. History abounds with this struggle. On the one hand you see the oppressors defending the privileges [37] they have allotted themselves on the basis of the property of others; on the other we see the oppressed, demanding the abolition of these unjust and dreadful privileges.[175]

The struggle goes on and will not cease until property is fully emancipated.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But there are no more privileges![176]

THE SOCIALIST.

But property has all too many privileges!

THE ECONOMIST.

Property is scarcely freer today than it was before 1789. It may even be less free. Only, there is a difference: before 1789, the restrictions placed on property rights were advantageous to some people: today, for the most part, no one benefits, without these restrictions being any the less harmful, however, to all of us.[177]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Where, though, do you see these pernicious restrictions?

THE ECONOMIST.

I am going to enumerate the main ones…

THE SOCIALIST.

One further observation. I readily accept property as supremely just and useful in the state of nature. A man lives and works alone. It is entirely fair that this man should have sole enjoyment of the fruits of his labor. It is equally useful that he be assured of holding on to his property. Can this regime of individual property be maintained fairly and usefully, however, in the social state? [38]

I am also happy to admit that justice and utility prescribe, in this common state as much as in the other, that the entire property of each individual and that portion of his powers that he has alienated from his person by working, be recognized as his. Would individuals really, however, be able to enjoy these two forms of property, if society were not organized in such a way as to guarantee them this satisfaction? If this indispensable organization did not exist; if by some mechanism or other, society did not distribute to each person the equivalent of his labor, would not the weak man find himself at the mercy of the strong, would not some people’s property be perpetually intruded on by the property of others? And if we were so imprudent as to emancipate property fully, before society was fully empowered with this distributive mechanism, would we not be witness to increasing encroachments of the strong on the property of the weak? Would not the complete emancipation of property aggravate the harm rather than correcting it?

THE ECONOMIST.

If the objection were sound, if it were necessary to construct a mechanism for the distribution to each person of the equivalent of his labor, then clearly socialism would clearly have its raison d’être and I like you would be a socialist. In fact, this mechanism you wish to establish artificially, exists naturally and it works. Society has been organized: the evil which you attribute to its lack of organization, derives from obstacles preventing the free play of that organization.

THE SOCIALIST.

Do you have the audacity to claim that, by allowing all men to manage their property as they see fit, in the social circumstances [39] we live in, we would find things working out by themselves in such a way as to render each man’s labor as productive as possible, and the distribution of the fruits of the labor of all, fully just? …

THE ECONOMIST.

I do to claim this.

THE SOCIALIST.

So you think it would become unnecessary, leaving aside production, to plan at least distribution and exchange, to free up circulation ...

THE ECONOMIST.

I am sure of it. Let property owners freely go about their business. Let property circulate and everything will work out for the best.[178]

In fact, property owners have never been left to go freely about their business and property has never been allowed to circulate freely.

Judge for yourself.

Is it a matter of the property right a man has in himself; of the right he has to use his abilities freely, insofar as he causes no damage to the property of others? In the present society, the highest posts and the most lucrative professions are not open; one cannot practice freely as a solicitor, a priest, a judge, bailiff, money-changer, broker, doctor, lawyer or professor. Nor can one straightforwardly be a printer, a butcher, baker or entrepreneur in the funeral business.[179] We are not free to set up a commercial organization, a bank, an insurance company,[180] or a large transport company, nor free to build a road or establish a charity, nor to sell tobacco or gunpowder, or saltpeter, nor to carry [p.40] mail, or print money,[181] nor to meet freely with other workers to establish the price of labor.[182] The property right a man has in himself, his internal property, is in every detail shackled.

A man’s property right to the fruits of his labor, his external property, is equally impeded. Literary and artistic property and the property right of inventions are recognized and guaranteed only for a short period. Material property is generally recognized in perpetuity, but it is subject to a multitude of restrictions and charges. Gifts, inheritance, and loans are restricted too. Trade is heavily encumbered as much by capital transfer taxes, registration charges and stamp duty, by the octrois (city) taxes and by customs duties, as by the privileges granted to agents working as intermediaries in certain markets. Sometimes, in addition, trade is completely prohibited outside certain limits. Finally, the law of expropriation on the grounds of public utility,[183] endlessly threatens such weak remnants of property rights that the other restrictions have spared.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

All the restrictions you have just listed were established in the interests of society.

THE ECONOMIST.

That may be true. Those who introduced them, however, brought about a pernicious result, for all these restrictions act, in different degrees, and some with considerable impact, as causes of injustice and harm to society.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So that by destroying them we would come to enjoy a veritable paradise on earth. [p..41]

THE ECONOMIST.

I do not say that. What I do say is that society would find itself in the best possible situation, in terms of the present state of development in the arts and science.

THE SOCIALIST.

And you are setting out to prove it?

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes.

THE CONSERVATIVE. AND THE SOCIALIST.

Now there is a utopian for you!

Molinari’s Long Footnote about Leclerc and External property

One of our most distinguished economists, M. L. Leclerc,[184] has recently put forward a theory on the origin of external property, very like the one above. The differences are in form rather than in substance. Instead of an alienation of internal powers, M. Leclerc sees in external property a consumption of life and bodily organs. I quote:

The phenomenon of the gradual consumption and of the extinction, not of the individual self, which is immortal, but of life; this unthinkable breakdown of the faculties and organs, when it takes place as a result of the useful effort called work, seems to me very worthy of attention; for although this outcome is unavoidable, either to maintain the productive effort itself, or to supplement what may still be in working order or perhaps replace what can no longer work, it is quite clear that such an outcome is painfully achieved. Its real costs include the amount of time it took, and if we may put it thus, the call it made on the faculties and bodily organs irrevocably used up to obtain it. This part of my life and my strength is gone forever. I can never recover it. Here it is, invested as it were, in the result of my efforts. It alone represents what I used legitimately to possess and no longer have. I did not use only my natural right in practising this substitution. I followed my conservative instinct; I submitted myself to the most imperious of necessities. My property rights are there! Work is therefore the certain foundation, the pure source, the holy origin of the rights of property. Otherwise the self is not primordial and original property, and the faculties, an expansion of the self and the organs put to its service, do not belong to it, which would be intolerable.
“To make use of one’s time," “to waste it," “to use it well or badly”; “to work oneself to death in order to live”; “to devote an hour or a day”: these are familiar phrases used for centuries, integral parts of any human language, which itself is thought made manifest. The self[185] is therefore perfectly aware of foolish or wise, useful or unproductive deployment of its powers, and as it also knows that these powers belong to it, it readily infers from this a potential and exclusive claim on the useful outcomes of this inevitable extinction, when it has been laboriously and fruitfully achieved. Public awareness upholds, directly and spontaneously, these serious principles, these strikingly obvious truths, apparently without engaging in the long disquisitions which we intellectuals regard as obligatory.
Yes, my life belongs to me, as does the right to make of it, freely, a generous sacrifice to humankind, to my country, to my fellow-man, to my friend, my wife, my child. My life is mine, I devote a part of it to what may serve to prolong it. What I have obtained is therefore mine and I can also devote it entirely to those who are dear to my affections. If the effort is successful, religion explains this in terms of divine favor; if it is skillful, the economist can attribute it to the improved operation of my faculties; if by chance the output exceeds my needs, it is quite obvious that the surplus [36] again belongs to me. I therefore have a right to use it to add other satisfactions to that of living. I have a right to keep it aside for the child whom I might father, or against that terrible time of powerlessness, old age. Whether or not I convert the surplus, or trade it, utility for utility, value for value, it is still mine, since, as cannot be emphasized too much, it remains always the clear representation of a part of my life, of my faculties, and my bodily parts, expended in work, which produces this surplus. Have I not committed part of the time given to me to live on earth, so as to possess, honorably and legitimately, something which, when I close my eyes for the last time, I bequeath to those I love – clothes, furniture, goods, a house, land, contracts, money, and so on. Am I not, in reality, leaving my life and my faculties to those whom I love? I might have spared myself some effort or rendered that effort less painful, or increased my personal consumption. How much sweeter it is, however, to me, to transfer to my loved ones what was mine by right! This is a warm and consoling thought, which bolsters up courage, charms the heart, inspires and safeguards virtue, inclines us to noble commitments, holds different generations together, and results in an improvement of our human lot, by the gradual growth of wealth.[186]

5. The Second Evening

Editor’s Note

In this evening’s Soirée the Economist continues the discussion on the distinction between internal and external property, in particular on that kind of “external property” called “intellectual property”[187] which included things such as the right of authors to own their own literary works (copyright), artists to own their own works of art, inventors and factory technicians to own their own inventions (patents and trade marks), and so on. He also discusses the problem of counterfeiting and the pirating of books and inventions created by others.

It is curious that Molinari would begin with this topic as it was quite obscure in comparison with other topics which concerned the Economists at this time, such as taxes, tariffs, and government regulation of businesses. The question of intellectual property rights had become an issue in the 1840s under the persistent criticism of socialists like Louis Blanc who, in the 6th edition of Organisation du travail (1845), had described intellectual property as “ce prétendu droit” (this so-called right) which was a form of theft and harmful to society, was thus “anti-social”, and should be abolished.[188] The issue had also come up for discussion in the Chamber of Deputies between April 1845 and July 1847 when an official Report on “marques de fabrique” (brands or trade marks) by M. Drouyn de Lhoys was tabled. Before the official report was tabled the government seemed to favor a free market solution whereby producers and merchants would use a voluntary system for establishing and enforcing trade marks ("la marque facultative”) but the official Report came down in favor of a government funded and policed system of “la marque obligatoire” (compulsory trade marks and brands). The economist Renouard thought this was a serious setback for the freedom of consumers to decide for themselves and would prove to be a heavy burden on taxpayers.[189]

Another factor which might have brought this topic to Molinari’s mind at this time was the fact that his friend and colleague who worked with him on the journal the Courrier français, Hippolyte Castille, and whose home on la rue Saint-Lazare hosted a regular soirée for radicals which Molinari attended, had started his own journal dedicated to intellectual property matters called Le travail intellectuel, journal des intérêts scientifiques, littéraires et artistiques (Intellectual Labor: A Journal to Defend Scientific, Literary, and Artistic Interests) in late 1847. It was edited by Castille and largely written by him, although both Molinari and Bastiat contributed material to it occasionally.

Under the general idea of “la propriété intellectuelle” (intellectual property) the Economist has several things in mind: “propriété littéraire” (literary property, i.e. of authors), “propriété artistique” (artistic property, which could mean either that of artists and painters, or of industrial designers), “droit de copie” (copyright), “marques de fabrique” (trade marks), and “brevets d’invention” (patents). In addition to countering the criticism of the socialists and the government’s attempts to regulate matters more formerly, economists like Molinari and Bastiat were engaged in a theoretical debate with their colleagues over the question of whether or not intellectual creations contained “value” and were thus a form of property which could be owned (and for how long), and that could be traded with others.[190] Both were influenced by J.-B. Say’s ideas about “non-material goods” (or “services”) and in their own different ways wanted to replace the traditional (i.e. Smithian-Ricardian) focus on “objective” amounts of a quantity such as labor which was supposedly “embedded” in the object being exchanged, with a radically new focus on the “subjective” assessment or evaluation of the value of an object by each individual participating in the exchange. Bastiat turned to the idea of the mutual exchange of “services”; Molinari turned to the idea of a subjectively determined and changing hierarchy of individual needs and the gradual reduction of scarcity caused by technological and economic progress.

The members of the Political Economy Society were deeply divided on the issue. On one side were Molinari, Émile Laboulaye, Frédéric Passy, Prosper Paillottet, (as well as Hippolyte Castille and Marcellin Jobard who were not members of the Society), who believed in a “complete (and) perpetual” right to intellectual property. On the other side, there were Louis Wolowski, Charles Renouard, Charles Coquelin, and Jules Dupuit who believed that it should be a limited right of short duration, that it was a “license” for first use but not an absolute and eternal property right. Bastiat fell somewhere between the two camps.[191] The defenders of a “perpetual” right to intellectual property broke off to form their own journal, Le travail intellectuel, in 1847 to promote their views under the editorship of Hippolyte Castille.

Charles Coquelin, in particular, strenuously objected to Molinari's view that inventors should have their inventions (“brevets d'invention” or patents) protected forever as perpetual property rights. He describes Molinari and Jobard as “zealous partisans” of this view which is nothing but “puerile eccentricities." Coquelin argues that inventions are not a right of property but rather “a right of priority” which the state recognized but only for a limited period of time. Under the old regime inventors had no rights under French law until the Revolution introduced the Law of 7 January 1791 sponsored by de Bouffiers who took a very favorable view of the property rights of inventors. The Law of 5 July 1844 defined what could and could be protected by patents. The former were new industrial products and new methods of producing industrial products. What were not protected by government patent were pharmaceutical products and financial and credit instruments, in order to prevent the practice of “charlatanism” in these industries.[192]

There is also a lengthy discussion in this Soirée about the copyright held by authors and their publishers. This was a concern because of rampant importing of pirate editions of French language books, especially from Belgium, at a time when there was no international agreement on the protection of copyright. Prussia and England had begun to recognize reciprocal international copyright agreements only in 1838 but this did not spread to the rest of Europe until the Berne Convention of 1886. Under the old regime “droit de copie” (copyright) existed in perpetuity but it was enjoyed at the pleasure of the sovereign and not by legal right. This right was lost if an author granted the copyright to a publisher. The author then only had copyright until his death, after which the book entered the public domain. During the Revolution copyright was protected under the law and it could be transferred without restriction but it was limited in duration. According to the law of 19 July 1793 copyright was granted to the author for life and to his/her heirs for 10 years after their death; the Decree of 5 February 1810 extended the right of heirs to 20 years. These laws remained in effect up until the mid-19th century, with only a slight modification with the law of 3 August 1844.[193]

[42]

SUMMARY: Infringements of external property rights. – Literary and artistic property. – Counterfeiting – Ownership of inventions. THE SOCIALIST.

You have undertaken to prove to us that the harm attributed to property, in reality stems from attacks made on property.[194] Are you in the frame of mind to begin proving this paradox?

THE ECONOMIST.

Would to God you were teaching such paradoxes… I drew the distinction between internal and external property. The first consists in the right every man has to dispose of his physical, moral, and intellectual faculties, as well as of the body which both houses those faculties and serves them as a tool. The second inheres in the right every man has over that portion of his faculties which he has deemed fit to separate from himself and to apply to external objects.

THE SOCIALIST.

Where do our property rights with respect to external objects begin and end?

THE ECONOMIST.

They begin at the moment when we apply some portion of our resources and faculties to the things which nature has put freely at our disposal; [43] at the moment when we complete the work of nature by giving these things a new aspect; at the moment when we add to the natural value which inheres in them, an artificial value. They finish at the time when that artificial value is extinguished.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What do you mean by “value”?[195]

THE ECONOMIST.

I mean by “value” that quality which things have or which is given to them to satisfy human needs.

Thus man possesses his own being and the things, artificial or natural, which depend on his being, his faculties, his body, and the things he makes.

The works of man, from which external property derives, are of two kinds: material and non-material.[196]

The law recognizes material property in perpetuity, that is to say as long as the object owned, lasts. By contrast, law restricts non-material property to a rather brief time period. Both have the same origin, however.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Do you mean to say that you are treating the property of an invention or a piece of music in the same way as property in houses or land?

THE ECONOMIST.

Absolutely. Do they not both have their origin equally in work? From the moment effort is expended and value created, whether the effort involves the nerves or the muscles, whether the value be applied to a tangible object [44] or an intangible one, a new property is created. It matters little under what form it manifests itself.

If it is a question of a plot of land under cultivation, it will be for the most part physical force which has been expended; if it is a piece of music, it is the intellectual faculties, with the help of certain physical and moral resources which will have been set to work. But short of placing cognitive faculties below physical powers, or even more, short of claiming that man possesses, in his intelligence, less legitimate claims than those of his physical powers, can one establish some difference between these two sorts of property?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So you would want the inventor of a machine, the author of a book, the composer of a piece of music, to retain total ownership of their work and in perpetuity be able to give them away, bequeath them or sell them. You would want them to be granted even the right to destroy them. You would want the heirs of Bossuet,[197] Pascal[198] and Molière[199] to be allowed to deprive humanity of the immortal works of these mighty geniuses. Well, that is taking exaggeration to barbarous heights.

THE SOCIALIST.

Bravo!

THE ECONOMIST.

Applaud, that is the right response. Are you quite aware of what doctrine you have just been supporting, Mr Conservative?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

The doctrine of common sense in my opinion. [45]

THE ECONOMIST.

Not so, the doctrine of communism.[200]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You must be joking. I maintained the rights of society over the products of the mind, that is all.

THE ECONOMIST.

That is just what the communists do. Only, they are more logical than you. They support the rights of society over everything, over material products as well as non-material ones. They say to the workers: fulfill your daily tasks, according to your powers, but instead of claiming the products of your labors, the valuable things you have created, for yourselves, hand them over to the general association of the citizens, to the community itself, which will take upon itself the responsibility of sharing justly among all, the fruits of each person’s efforts. You will get your share. Now is it not true that that is the language of the communists? [201]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, that is just the language of that insane sect which robs the worker of the legitimate fruit of his labor, in order to give him some arbitrary share of the output of all.

THE ECONOMIST.

Truly you speak with the voice of wisdom. Do you not admit, therefore, that they are stealing all or part of the fruits of his labor, in order to place that whole or that part with the community?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is theft!

THE ECONOMIST.

Well this theft is something society practices every day [46] to the detriment of men of letters, artists, and inventors.

You are familiar with the law in France regulating literary property. While the ownership of material things – land, houses, furniture – is without date, literary property is limited to the twenty years following the death of the author-owner.[202] The Constituent Assembly had even gone so far as granting only ten years.

Before the Revolution the legislation was in some respects much more just…

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Before the Revolution you say?

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes. You know that at that time all rights, the right to work as well as the right to own, emanated from the King. Authors therefore obtained for themselves and their heirs, when they asked for it, the exclusive right to exploit their books commercially. This privilege was without limits; unfortunately it was revocable at will; moreover, it was subject in practice to tiresome restrictions. When an author sold his work to a book seller, the exclusive right to exploit his works died with him. Only those who had inherited could keep this right exclusively.

THE SOCIALIST.

So the heirs of Molière, La Fontaine[203] and Racine[204] had sole right to benefit from the works of their illustrious ancestors until 1789?

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes. One can find a proclamation by the Council of 14 September, 1761, which maintains the prerogatives of their ancestor for [47] La Fontaine’s grandchildren, seventy years after his death. If the Constituent Assembly had understood its mission fully and properly, it would have recognized and guaranteed literary property by freeing it from the shackles of ancient privilege, which the ancien régime had recognized even while circumscribing it. Unfortunately, communist ideas had already germinated at that time in French society. A living resumé of the philosophical and economic doctrines of the eighteenth century, the Constituent Assembly included the disciples of Rousseau and Morelly as well as those of Quesnay and Turgot.[205] It drew back therefore from outright recognition of intellectual property. It mutilated that legitimate property in order to bring down the price of works of the mind.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Was not this praiseworthy end achieved? Suppose that the literary property of Pascal, Molière and La Fontaine had not been annulled to the benefit of the community, would we not be obliged to pay more for the work of these illustrious geniuses? And can one weigh the interests of a few against the interests of everyone?

THE ECONOMIST.

“When the savages of Louisiana want some fruit,” says Montesquieu, “they cut the tree at its base and gather the fruit. That is what despotism does."[206] That is what communism does too, the author of The Spirit of the Laws would have said had he lived in our times. When you limit literary property thus, what are you doing? You are diminishing its market value. I produce a book and I offer to sell it to a book seller. If the ownership of this book is guaranteed to him in perpetuity, he will obviously be able to pay me for it and [48] at a better price than if twenty years after my death this property perishes.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Surely that is very unimportant in practice. How many books live another twenty years after the death of their author?

THE ECONOMIST.

You are furnishing me with another weapon to use against you. There are two sorts of books; those which do not last and those which do. Your law limiting the life of intellectual property leaves the value of the first kind intact and diminishes the value of the second. Let me give you an example. A man of genius has written a book destined to last down the ages. He is going to take it to his book-seller. Can the latter pay more for this immortal book than for run of the mill stuff destined for oblivion, after a fleeting success? No, because while the book may not die, the property in the work dies, or, which comes to the same thing, it falls into the public domain. After a certain number of years, its titleholder is legally dispossessed. Your law rewards mediocrity and penalizes genius.

So what happens? What we see is the number of lasting books diminishing and the number of short-lived ones increasing. “Time,” says Aeschylus, “respects only what it has founded."[207] With very few exceptions, the masterpieces which the past has bequeathed us have been the fruit of very long labor. Descartes gave most of his life to writing his Meditations.[208] Pascal made as many as thirteen copies of his Provincial Letters before handing them over to the printers.[209] Adam Smith pondered the economic problems of society for thirty years [49] before penning his immortal treatise The Wealth of Nations.[210] When the man of genius does not, however, enjoy a degree of affluence, can he sow for so long without harvesting? Is he not, pressed by the spur of life’s necessities, to supply the fruits of his mind while they are not yet mature?

Easy and uncomplicated literature is much denounced, but can we have any other kind? How can we avoid light-weight work when the value of painfully achieved creations is brought down to the level of trivial writings? You will propose in vain that men of letters sacrifice their personal interests to those of art. The men of letters will not listen and in the main they are right. They too have family duties to fulfill, children to raise, parents to care for, debts to pay, a position to maintain. Can they neglect these natural and sacred duties, out of a love of art?

They make do and they head for the type of literature in which making do is easiest. In science the same situation engenders the same deplorable results. It is no longer observation which dominates modern science, but hypothesis. Why? Because you can construct a hypothesis more quickly than you can observe a law. Because you can make books more easily out of hypotheses than you can out of observations. And one also has to add that the hypothesis is often more striking. Paradox is more astonishing than truth. It becomes successful more easily. It probably loses that success more rapidly too. Meanwhile, the fellow who improvises with paradox gets rich, while the [50] patient seeker after truth battles with poverty. Given this, is it surprising that paradoxes abound and real science becomes more and more rare?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You neglect to say that the government undertakes to look after men with distinguished careers in science or the arts. Society has rewards and honors for truly learned men and real men of letters.

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, and in this whole absurd system there is nothing less absurd. Just look at it. You devalue the property of real learned men and writers, in the alleged interests of posterity. Some sense or other of natural justice, warns you, however, that you are plundering them. So you extract from society a tax whose proceeds you allot to them. You have a budget for the arts and letters.[211] I take it that the funds raised in this budget are always justly shared and reach the people the law is aiming at (and you will know whether my hypothesis is correct); is this penalty any the less tainted with injustice? Is it right to oblige taxpayers to finance a tax to the advantage of future consumers of literature? Is not this a communism of the worst kind, this one which reaches beyond the grave?[212]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Where do you see this alleged communism?

THE ECONOMIST.

In a communist society, what does the government do? It seizes the product of the labor of each person in order to distribute it freely to all. Well, what does [51] government do, when it puts a time limit on literary property? It takes a part of the property of the learned man and the man of letters and distributes it free of charge to posterity; after which it obliges taxpayers to give a part of their property free of charge to learned men and men of letters.

The latter lose out in this communist arrangement, since the proportion of property stolen from them is larger than the benefit which is granted to them.

Taxpayers lose even more in this way, for they get nothing for the amount which they are forced to pay.

Do at least the readers of books gain something?

Present day readers gain nothing since writers gain temporarily an absolute right of property over their works.

Future consumers are able, probably, to buy older works more cheaply; on the other hand they are less lavishly supplied with them. In other respects books which last across the ages experience all the inconveniences which attach to communism. Fallen into the public domain they cease to be the objects of that attentive and vigilant care that an owner knows how to give to his own. Even the best editions are full of alterations and mistakes.

Shall I say something of the indirect harm which results from the constraints on literary property – shall I speak about counterfeiting?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What connections do you see between counterfeit editions and the legal limitations on literary property? [52]

THE ECONOMIST.

What is counterfeiting, in effect, other than a limitation on literary property, in terms of place, where your law limits it in terms of time?[213] Is there in reality the least difference between these two sorts of attack on property? I will go further. It is the limitation in time which gives rise to the limitation in place.

When material property was thought of as a simple privilege emanating from the sovereign’s goodwill, this privilege expired at the borders of each state. The property of foreigners was subject to the right of confiscation.

When material property came to be recognized everywhere as an imprescriptible and sacred right, the right of confiscation ceased to be applied to it.

Only intellectual property is still subject to this barbarous law. In all justice, however, can we justifiably complain? If we respect intellectual property less than material property, can we oblige outsiders to respect it equally?

THE SOCIALIST.

Perhaps not. But you are taking no account of the moral advantages of counterfeiting. It is thanks to them that French ideas spread abroad. Doubtless our men of letters and our pundits lose out; but civilization gains. What does the interest of a few hundred individuals matter compared to the wider interests of humanity?

THE ECONOMIST.

You are now using with respect to the advantage of foreign consumers the same argument you have just used about the [53] advantages to future ones. Let me refute the argument from the point of view of consumption in general.

France is perhaps in all the world, the country where literary production is most active and abundant. Books are very expensive here, however. We pay 15 francs for a two-volume novel, while in Belgium the same two volumes cost only 1 franc 50c.[214] Should we attribute this price difference solely to the rights of authors? Not so. On the admission of the interested parties themselves, it stems mainly from the slender market base available to French booksellers. If illegal printing came to be suppressed, the two volumes which sell at 15 francs in France would probably fall to 5 francs on the general market, or perhaps even lower. In this case the foreign consumer would pay 3 francs 50c more than under the system of counterfeiting; on the other hand the French consumer would pay 10 francs less. From the viewpoint of general consumption, would this not be obviously advantageous?

A few years back I heard M. Chaix d’Est-Ange, in the Chamber of Deputies, defending counterfeiting in terms of the dissemination of enlightenment.[215] It is thanks to counterfeiting, he said, that French ideas penetrate foreign parts. Possibly so, one might have replied to this distinguished lawyer; on the other hand this practice prevents French ideas from penetrating France herself.

Foreign consumers would pay a little more for our books if counterfeiting ceased, and so on. We would supply them, however, with better and [54] more numerous ones. Would they not benefit equally with us?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I agree. I definitely think that you are right and I am am inclined to rally to the cause of literary property.

THE ECONOMIST.

I would have been able to develop further some considerations on the expansion and stability which full recognition of literary property would bestow not only on the work of literary people but on book selling too… Since I have won my case, however, I do not insist on it.

Since you grant me literary property you must also grant me artistic property.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

In what does artistic property consist?[216]

THE ECONOMIST.

If it is a question of a painting, statue, or monument,[217] artistic property consists in the right to dispose of it like any other material property and to have it reproduced or give exclusive right to its reproduction by sketching or engraving etc. If it is an industrial design or technical drawing, artistic property resides likewise in an exclusive right of reproduction. It goes without saying that this property can be given away or sold like any other property.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I don’t see any difficulty here. It might be agreed, however, to make an exception for industrial designs and technical drawings. Craftsmen, draftsmen, and industrial designers [55] would make excessive demands if they were granted absolute property rights over their work.

THE ECONOMIST.

Ah, so I’ve got you again Mr Communist-Conservative.[218] Well let me tell you that quite inadvertently the legislative regulators under the Empire let that form of property escape any time limits. This salutary forgetfulness inevitably bore excellent fruit. Our industrial designs and technical drawings are today unrivalled in the world.

This is easily explained. On the one hand the industrialists who buy from the craftsmen these industrial designs and technical drawings, being guaranteed perpetual tenure of this property, can pay the highest possible price. On the other hand the craftsmen, guaranteed a good price, put in the time and care necessary for their production.

THE SOCIALIST.

But are you also aware of what has happened? I bet you will never guess. These industrialists, who are such fierce protectors of property, one day realized that they were paying too much for their industrial designs and technical drawings. The issue was put on the agenda one day in their Chambers of Commerce and Industrial Improvement Societies. It was unanimously agreed that the harm arose from the perpetual nature of property. As a result they immediately demanded that the government should curtail it. The government hastened to comply with this demand from the big barons of industry. The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce rushed through a legal reform reducing to three, five, ten and fifteen years, the property rights pertaining to industrial designs and technical drawings. [56] The project was presented to both Chambers and discussed in the Upper Chamber….[219]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

And adopted?

THE SOCIALIST.

No! The February Revolution forced it from the agenda. You can be quite sure, nevertheless, that discussion of the matter will be resumed and that the law will be passed. These conservatives, however, who strike so ruthlessly at the property of craftsmen, who never hesitate to engage in communism when it is to their advantage, hound communists like so many wild beasts.[220]

THE ECONOMIST.

If the industrialists of whom you speak had thought properly about their true interests; if they had entertained a few sound notions of political economy, they would have understood that in hurting craftsmen they would inevitably hurt themselves too. When the law has limited property rights to industrial designs and technical drawings, these creative works will probably be sold at a lower price; but will they retain the same degree of perfection? Will not elite craftsmen turn away from this branch of work when their output is not properly rewarded?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

They could still be paid properly, it seems to me.

THE ECONOMIST.

If houses could be possessed for three years only, would not their prices fall. [57]

THE SOCIALIST.

Assuredly. One would not put a high price on a house of which one could be dispossessed in three years’ time.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Under these arrangements we would build only hovels.

THE ECONOMIST.

Well if the law likewise reduced the market value of industrial designs and technical drawings, henceforth industrial designs and technical drawings would be nothing but cheap junk.

In this case, however, will our fabrics and bronze wares, in which the design, the pattern itself, often constitutes the whole price, still be able to meet foreign competition? In limiting the property rights of craftsmen, will our industrialists not be cutting down the tree to obtain the fruit?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is true.

THE ECONOMIST.

You see where constriction of property leads. Maybe things become common; but either they are badly produced or no longer produced.

If you support indefinite property rights over creative works, you must support them also in respect of inventions.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Indefinite property rights over inventions! This would be the death of industry, which is already mercilessly fleeced by inventors.

THE ECONOMIST.

In fact, however, inventions, like works of literature and art, are the fruit of the mind put to work. [58] If the latter give rise to unlimited and absolute property rights, why should the former, which have the same origin, give rise only to limited and conditional rights?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Are not the interests of society at stake here? I understand granting a right of unlimited and absolute ownership to writers and artists. That has only minor importance. At a pinch the world could do without artists and writers.

THE SOCIALIST.

Goodness me!

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But we could not get by without inventors. It is they who supply the tools and processes used in agriculture and industry.

THE ECONOMIST.

Thus it is not a question of getting rid of inventors or reducing their numbers. It is a question of increasing their numbers by guaranteeing that their labor receives the remuneration due to it.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is something I want to see. In decreeing the ownership of inventions in perpetuity, however, are you not putting agriculture and industry forever under the yoke of a small number of inventors? Are you not subjecting the most vital branches of production to demanding, intractable, horrible monopolies? Suppose, for example, that the inventor of the plough had retained the property rights of his invention, and that that right had been transmitted intact until the present era, what would have happened? [59]

THE ECONOMIST.

We would have had today more and better tools for ploughing.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is completely absurd!

THE ECONOMIST.

Let us talk about it. You are familiar with the legislation which regulates inventions today. Inventors are guaranteed property rights over their inventions for five, ten, and fifteen years, on the condition of paying the tax authorities 500 francs in the first case, 1,000 francs in the second, and 1,500 francs in the third. Now it is perfectly possible for an invention not to yield the inventor what he had expected from it. In this case he finds himself punished, fined for having invented something.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I have never said the present law is perfect. It can be reformed. But to grant the inventor perpetual ownership rights to his work: this is madness!

THE ECONOMIST.

In whose interest do you wish to deprive the inventor of part of his property rights. Is this in the interests of present consumers? No, because you grant the inventor his property for five, ten, or fifteen years. In this period he naturally draws the maximum possible share which will soon be denied him. He exploits his monopoly very rigorously. It is therefore solely in the interests of posterity that you would dispossess inventors.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

It is in the interests of progress and civilization. [60] Moreover, how could we disentangle and demarcate the rights of inventors. All inventions are interconnected somewhere or other.

THE ECONOMIST.

As do all forms of material property. That does not stop each person at the end of the day protecting the integrity of his own.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, but this would be much more difficult in the domain of invention. Would not the recognition of the property of inventors give rise to a myriad of legal actions?

THE ECONOMIST.

Is not the abolition of property a strange way of preserving it from the dangers of legal wrangling? Moreover, the difficulty you are emphasizing occurs every day and is every day resolved. The fact that the property from inventions is guaranteed for five, ten, or fifteen years, gives rise to legal cases, just as though it were perpetual. These cases are judged and that is that. Your objection fails before the facts. So again I say that you wish to limit the property rights to inventions in the interests of posterity.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Doubtless.

THE ECONOMIST.

There are in the West of the American Union immense, virgin lands which are every day taken up by the intrepid emigrants who go there. When these pioneers of civilization see a plot which takes their fancy, they stop their wagons, pitch their tent, and first with the axe [61] and secondly with the plough, they clear and dig the soil. They give value to this soil which previously had none. Well, this value created by labor, would you find it just for the community to appropriate it after five, or ten, or fifteen years, instead of allowing the worker to bequeath it to his posterity?[221]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Heavens above; but that would be communism, barbarism! Who would want to clear land on these terms? Even so, is there even the least analogy between the work of the pioneer and that of the inventor? Is not intelligence a common fund of humanity? Can one limit its fruits entirely to oneself? Does not the inventor draw considerable benefit, moreover, from the discoveries of predecessors and the knowledge which has been built up in society? If he did not engage in invention, would not someone else, taking advantage of these discoveries and this common knowledge, engage in invention in his place?

THE SOCIALIST.

The objection applies to the person who clears the land as much as to inventor. Society would not be able to say to this first occupant of the land: you are going to make land hitherto unproductive, valuable: all right; we consent. Do not forget, however, that the soil is God’s work and not yours. Do not forget that while its fruits belong to all, the land itself belongs to no one.[222] So enjoy this plot of land for a few years, but after that be sure to restore it to humanity, which holds it from God. If you do not submit with good grace to this legitimate restitution, we know very well how to use force [62] to make the right of everyone prevail against the egoism of a single person. What? Are you resisting? Are you objecting that you alone, by the sweat of your brow, created the value that I am now demanding be taken from you? You rebellious and unnatural proprietor! Could you have created this value, without the tools and the knowledge which the community supplied you with? Reply!

THE ECONOMIST.

And the proprietor would doubtless reply: The community has indeed supplied me with tools and knowledge but I have paid for them. My forebears and I have acquired by our work everything we possess. Society has therefore no right to the fruits of my present work. And if, abusing its power, it steals my property, holding it in common, or handing it over to men who did not create it, it will be committing the most unjust and heinous kind of plunder.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Well replied. Answer that one for me, you communist gentlemen!

THE SOCIALIST.

Answer it yourself. If society accepts that it has no claim to the property of those who clear the land, although they work on previously common land, although they use prior discoveries and knowledge, it would obviously not be able to claim anything against the property of inventors.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That depends on the demands of the general interest. If the [63] community seizes some land, five, ten, or fifteen years after it has been cleared….

THE ECONOMIST.

And if that community forces the person who clears the land to pay 500 francs, 1,000 francs, or 1,500 francs before he knows whether or not the land will be fertile….

THE SOCIALIST.

And whatever the extent of the cleared land….

THE CONSERVATIVE.

It is certain that there will not be much clearing of land and that the community itself will be the loser.

THE ECONOMIST.

It is the same with inventions. Much less is invented under a regime of limited property rights than would be invented under a regime of unlimited property rights.[223] Now since society can advance only on the basis of feats of invention, posterity, whose interests you have invoked, would obviously gain from the recognition of inventors’ property rights, just as it benefits from recognition of landed property.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Perhaps you are right for the majority of inventions. There are some, however, so necessary that one could not leave them long in private possession. I cited the case of the plough. Would it not be a dreadful misfortune if a single individual had the right to make and sell ploughs, if the property rights with respect to that tool, so vital to agriculture, had not entered the public domain?

 THE SOCIALIST.

It would be disastrous in fact. [64]

THE ECONOMIST.

Let us examine together how things would have turned out if the inventor of the plough had enjoyed property rights over his invention, instead of being denied these. Here is my unequivocal reply: No! Society serves its true interests by recognizing the rights of the inventor of the plough, not by seizing for itself this property which is due to the work of one of its own members and making it common to all. No! Society has hindered the progress of agriculture instead of facilitating it and in plundering the inventor it is plundering itself.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is a paradox!

THE ECONOMIST.

We will see this clearly. What is the plough and what use is it?

The plough is an instrument pulled by beasts of burden, horses, or bullocks, under the control of a man, and which serves to open up the soil. Before the invention of the plough what did people use to cultivate the ground? They used the spade. There you have two very distinct tools therefore, with the aid of which the same work can be accomplished; two tools which compete the one with the other. This competition is, in truth, very unequal since the plough is infinitely better than the spade; and rather than resorting to this latter tool, the least economic of them all, most farmers would resign themselves to paying a substantial surcharge to the holders of the property right in the plough. But in the end the fields will not remain uncultivated. The spade would be used to that point when the holders of the property right in the plough, [65] noticing that in extremity people could get by without them, would be more accommodating.

What would result however from this situation in society, with its being faced with the inflated claims of the owners of certain indispensable tools? That there would be a huge interest in multiplying the number of these tools and making more perfect versions. [224] At a time when the price of the plough, for example, was soaring, would not anyone who invented a tool as economic or more so to do the same job, make a fortune? And if he wished in his turn to raise considerably the price of his invention, would he not find his claims checked, first by the very fact of two old tools, to which one could always revert, and secondly by the fear of stirring up a wave of new competition, since he would have increased interest in discovering a more perfect tool. So you see that monopoly ought never to be feared because there would always be on the one hand the existing and effective competition of less perfect tools and on the other hand the eventual competition of more perfect tools, quite soon.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Is not the field of invention limited?

THE ECONOMIST.

The plains of the mind are still more vast than the earth. In what branch of production can one assert that there is no further progress to be realized, nor discoveries to be made? Have no fear that the history of invention is ending; the powers of humanity will fail [66] before invention has come to an end.

Do you believe for example that we could not find anything better, when it comes to ploughing tools, than the present ones? Is not the plough, compared to the devices employed in manufacturing, a barbarous implement? The plough is a device moved by animal force. Now, does not manufacturing industry owe the immense progress it has realized over half a century to the substitution of the inanimate power of steam for the brute force of animals? Why does this economic substitution of inanimate for animal power not operate in agriculture too? Why has a steam driven device not replaced the plough in the way that the mule jenny has replaced the hand loom, and as the steam mill has replaced the grinding wheel turned by a blind horse, as the plough itself drawn by the power of beasts of burden replaced the spade powered by man?

If from the beginning, property rights over inventions had been recognized and respected to the same degree as material property, is it not at least probable that this benevolent progress would already have been accomplished? Is it not probable that steam would have already transformed and multiplied agricultural production as it has transformed and multiplied industrial production? Would not the result have been an immense advantage to the whole of humanity?

From all this my conclusion is that society would have had, from the start the very greatest interest in recognizing and respecting [67] property rights applied to inventions including the invention of the plough.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So you believe that there will be all the more invention insofar as the property rights of invention are more extensive and better guaranteed?

THE ECONOMIST.

Most assuredly I do. It was as late as the eighteenth century that people began to recognize property rights in inventions. So let us compare the discoveries within a given period before and after that time.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That would seem to argue against your theories because property rights in inventions are not unlimited.

THE ECONOMIST.

If property rights in a field of wheat after the field had long been in common ownership, came to be recognized and guaranteed for five, ten, or fifteen years vested in a single individual, would the growth in the production of wheat prove anything against unlimited property rights?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Probably not…But do not certain things discover themselves, so to speak, all on their own? There are discoveries which are in the air.

THE ECONOMIST.

Just as there are harvests which are under the earth. It is a question only of making them emerge. But rest assured that “chance” does not take care of this requirement. How did you discover the law of gravity? they asked Newton one day. “By thinking about it all the time,” replied the man of genius. Watt,[225] Jacquart,[226] Fulton,[227] [68] would probably have given the same reply to a similar question. Chance invents nothing. It does not open up the realm of the mind any more than that of material things. So let us leave chance out of it.

They say that if a discovery were not made today it would be made tomorrow; but could this hypothesis quite as justly be applied to the clearing of land, as to new combinations of ideas and to inventions? If the backwoodsmen[228] who emigrate to the west stayed at home, might one not agree that other backwoodsmen would go to set themselves up on the same virgin lands before five, ten, or fifteen years had passed? So why therefore don’t we limit the property rights of the former? Why? Because if we did limit them nobody would wish to lose himself in the solitude of the west either today or tomorrow. Likewise, believe you me, nobody would strive to take up the discoveries which are in the air if no one had a personal interest in so doing.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You forget that glory and the even more noble desire to serve humanity act no less powerfully than personal interest does on inventors.

THE ECONOMIST.

Glory and the desire to serve the human race constitute a part of human interest and are not distinct from it as I have already shown you. But these elevated motives are not enough. Like writers and artists, inventors are subject to human weakness. Like them, they are obliged to feed, clothe, and house themselves and usually also to look after a family. If you offer them no other appeal than glory and the satisfaction of having [69] served humanity they will be obliged for the most part to give up pursuing invention as a career. The rich alone will be able to invent, write, sculpt, and paint. Now since rich people are not very active workers civilization will scarcely advance.

THE SOCIALIST.

Now then Mr Conservative admit with good grace that you have been beaten. If you support the perpetuity of material property you cannot but support that of intellectual property. There are the same right and the same necessities in both forms (always supposing of course that one recognizes this right and these necessities). Agree therefore to recognize property rights in invention as you have recognized the other kinds.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

All that may be true in theory but, goodness me, in practice I prefer stay with the status quo.

THE SOCIALIST.

If we decide to let you![229]


6. The Third Evening

Editor’s Note

In this Soirée Molinari continues his discussion of infringements or violations of what he calls “external property,” that is the right to own things which lie outside a person’s body.

The topics he covers here include the following. One of his more controversial opinions was that the state did not have the right to confiscate or expropriate private property for reasons of public utility, even with compensation. This had become a pressing issue in the 1840s with the construction of the immense fortifications of Paris in 1841-44 and the building of the network of railways centered on Paris after 1842. He also discusses the right to own mineral rights below ground and provides a brief history of French legislation before concluding that the first user should have full rights to any mineral deposits found. Next, he examines property which was owned by different branches of the state (the central government, the Departments, and the Communes), such as forests, roads, canals, rivers and dams, and how these might be run better by private, profit making bodies. This is the first of four instances where Molinari discusses how public goods might be provided privately and voluntarily by entrepreneurs operating in the free market. The others are in S8 (private banks and money, mail delivery), S9 (bakers, butchers, printers etc.), and S11 (security, police, and defense). This leads Molinari to discuss in more general terms the nature of property rights and the proper functions of government.

The expropriation of private property by the state

The expropriation of private property by the state had become an issue in the early 1840s with the massive fortifications of Paris planned by Thiers which took place between 1841 and 1844, and the government’s participation in building the new national railway network after 1842.

The first was an initiative of Adolphe Thiers who planned to build a massive military wall around the city of Paris and an accompanying complex of 16 large forts.[230] This was completed in 1844 at a cost of fr. 150 million and required large amounts of private land which had to be forcibly acquired by the French state for their construction, especially for the wide free-fire zone outside the wall which required the demolition of private farms and the relocation of the inhabitants. The total expenditure would have been much higher if the state had not used the labor of thousands of conscripts to dig the ditches and build the wall. This was strenuously opposed by liberals like the economist Michel Chevalier, the mathematician François Arago, and by Molinari here.[231]

The subject of railways was on many people’s minds in the late 1840s as the government had passed a major piece of legislation in 1842 which laid out how railway development would take place with government planning and assistance which included the compulsory acquisition of land for building purposes. The law of 11 June 1842 authorized the French state to partner with private companies in the building of five railroad networks spreading out from Paris. The government would build and own the right of way, bridges, tunnels and railway stations, while private industry would lay the tracks, and build and maintain the rolling stock and the lines. The government would also set rates and regulate safety. The first railway concessions were issued by the government in 1844-45 triggering a wave of speculation and attempts to secure concessions from the government. The first major line was the “chemin de fer du Nord” (June 1846) followed by the “chemin de fer d'Amiens à Boulogne” (May 1848). Between 1842 and the end of 1847 the state had spent about fr. 420 million in subsidies, loan guarantees, and construction costs.[232] As well, he main station on the rue Saint-Lazare was also being rebuilt and expanded at this time.

The right to a legally determined, prior compensation for property confiscated by the state was enshrined in the Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen in June 1791 (Article 19) and in the Civil Code of 1804 (articles 544 and 545). The Law of 8 March 1810 established tribunals for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation payments. As canal building and then railways became more common the law had to be amended. The Law of 7 July 1833 (amended by the Law of 6 May 1841) created special juries made up of 16 local landowners, “jurys d’expropriation” (or Compensation Juries), which would meet to assess the value of the confiscated property and determine the level of compensation the state would pay for the confiscated land.[233] It was similar to the eminent domain laws in the United States. Molinari did not object to the amounts offered in compensation but to the fact that compulsory expropriation of property had taken place and had thus violated the property owners’ rights. His hard core opposition to compulsory state acquisition of private property upset the other members of the Political Economy Society who generally believed in its benefit to the common good but may have had some reservations about its excessive use. They expressed their opposition to Molinari’s position in their meeting of October 1849 shortly after the appearance of the book.[234]

Ownership of mineral resources

Concerning the ownership of mineral resources, Molinari takes sides here in a debate which had divided the economists since before the Revolution.[235] The Physiocrat Turgot argued in the 1770s that first use and occupancy by an individual bestowed a property right to the resource which was owned by that individual. Liberal revolutionaries like Mirabeau (Gabriel Honoré Riqueti) and post-revolutionary liberals like Charles Comte believed that ownership of mineral resources resided with the nation which could sell or license them at will. Other post-revolutionary liberals like Charles Dunoyer believed that owners of surface land also owned the mineral rights to the resources under their land. Molinari clearly sided with Turgot in arguing that the first user or occupant was the just owner of the property.

The matter was a concern when Molinari was writing as it was clear the number of mines which had opened in France as industrialization began in earnest lagged far behind that of England, and the discovery of gold in California the previous year. Mining rights and land ownership issues in California would have been very much on Molinari’s mind at this time. The California gold rush had began with the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in January 1848 and the hundreds of thousands of gold seekers who flocked to the gold fields were known as the “forty niners” (1849). At this time California was not yet a state in the Union (it was admitted in September 1850) and was occupied by the U.S. following the Mexican-American War 1846-1848. The treaty which ended the war and which ceded California to the U.S. was signed in February 1848. Land ownership, especially mining rights, were in a state of flux. For the time being, Mexican mining law continued to apply whereby the first to stake a claim to mining land created “ownership” of it as far as later arrivals were concerned. Molinari was fascinated by the U.S. and travelled there extensively in the 1870s writing a series of articles for the Journal des Débats on the centennial exhibition which was held in Philadelphia in 1876 which were published as book.[236]

Property owned by the state

State owned property (“la domaine public”) was considerable in France and included property and real estate. Under “meubles” (property) was the following: the national printing service, the contents of the National Libraries, the contents of the National Archives, the contents of the art galleries, museums, and scientific laboratories, the arms held by the armed forces and navy, the furnishings and equipment of the government administration, and the contents of all government owned factories and workshops. The complete value of this property of the state is not known as it was not officially assessed at the time. However, the armed forces did give a figure for the value of the firearms it owned (fr. 1.12 million) and its ships (fr. 120 million). Under “immeubles” (real estate) was the following: public buildings, forges, foundries, workshops, land, forests, national roads, railways, canal tow paths, and lakes. The value of the latter was estimated in January 1850 to be worth fr. 1.3 billion. The earnings from government owned property was estimated in 1850 to have been fr. 221 million, or 6.4% of total government income.[237]

In addition, there were many industries in which the French state either ran government owned factories or had an outright monopoly. Under the category of “privileged” or “legal monopolies” were the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, gunpowder, the delivery of mail, the issuing of money, education, and public works. There were also numerous areas of economic activity which could only be practiced with a government issued license such as mines, legal notaries, lawyers, bailiffs, money changers, brokers, printers, book sellers, bakers, butchers, and porters.[238]

As the book unfolds, we will see how many of these areas of state monopoly or government licensing Molinari wanted to open up to private ownership and competition. A key concept in his thinking was an expanded role of the entrepreneur, a word which he uses throughout Les Soirées (37 times) and identifies 12 specific kinds of entrepreneurial activity. There are the usual “entrepreneurs d'industrie” (industrial or manufacturing entrepreneurs) but also some unusual ones such as “entrepreneurs d'education” (entrepreneurs in the education business), “le laborieux entrepreneur, naguère ouvrier” (entrepreneurs who have emerged from the working class), “entrepreneurs de pompes funèbres” (entrepreneurs in the funeral business), and even “entrepreneurs de prostitution” (entrepreneurs in the prostitution business). Molinari believed that nearly all economic activities run by the state should either be abolished or privatized and supplied competitively on the free market by such entrepreneurs. Even in those very small number of areas where the state played a role it should conduct its affairs like any other entrepreneur and provide its services as cheaply and efficiently as possible.[239]

The nature of property rights

As he discusses state expropriation of private property, the ownership of mineral resources, state owned property, and industries monopolized by the government, Molinari takes the opportunity to express his own thoughts on the nature of property rights and the proper function of government. The latter he will take up again in the most controversial chapter of the book (S11) where he argues for the private and competitive provision of police and national defense services. The influence of Leclerc and Victor Cousin on Molinari’s idea of “self-ownership” has been noted in S1.

Concerning the acquisition of external objects such as land, Molinari was influenced by the work of Charles Comte, especially his Traité de la propriété (1834).[240] Comte argued that the communal or tribal ownership of land could be transformed into legitimate private ownership by a process of an individual forgoing immediate consumption in order to save enough resources to survive long enough to engage in the more protracted process of cultivating a plot of land until the next harvest. This resulted in dramatically higher output than hunting and gathering or other communal activities; less land in total was used in food production; and the value of the surrounding land was increased in value as a result. Thus, Comte concluded, no “usurpation” was committed in this original act of privatization of the land (pp. 150-51). Although neither Molinari nor Comte mentions John Locke by name there is an obvious parallel here to the Lockean proviso concerning the end of the state of nature - that “enough, and as good, left in common for others.”

The proper functions of the state

Largely as a result of Molinari’s book, the Political Economy Society held a series of debates on the proper functions of the sate in October 1849, January 1850, and February 1850.[241] The members of the Society were split into four camps on the question of how limited the powers of the state should be. At the furthest extreme was Molinari who advocated the private provision of all public goods, including police protection and national defense. Next to him, with an “ultra-minimalist” view of state functions was Bastiat who believed the state should limit itself strictly to protecting the liberty and property of citizens and providing only a very few public goods such as water supply, rivers, and managing the state-owned forests. The bulk of the members of the Society were supporters of a limited state along the lines defined by Adam Smith, namely, police and defense, and a broader range of public goods than the “ultra-minimalists” like Bastiat wished to allow, such as the delivery of letters and issuing currency. The fourth group was a heterogenous group of members such as the economist Wolowski and various lawyers and politicians who thought the government should be involved in providing subsidized land credit, savings banks, and other services to citizens because it could do so better than private enterprise.

In this Soirée there are discussions of the private provision of roads, canals, and water supply to cities.

On Harmony and Equilibrium

In this Soirée Molinari makes the claim that “naturellement tous les intérêts s’accordent” (the various interests are naturally in agreement) which a core belief of Bastiat concerning “the harmony of interests” which he was developing at the same time in his treatise Economic Harmonies (1850). Later in Les Soirées Molinari does use the word “harmony” (below, pp. 000) but here he uses words such as “coincider” or “accorder." A good summary of the topic is provided by Charles Coquelin, the editor of the DEP, who noted the concurrent emergence of the term “harmony” in France and the U.S. at roughly the same time: Bastiat’s Economic Harmonies in 1850 and Henry Carey’s The Harmony of Interests in 1851.[242] Carey accused Bastiat of plagiarizing the idea but this charge was later withdrawn. It seems that Molinari was working on a similar idea with his theory of equilibrium which he thought was one of the several natural laws of political economy. When left to operate freely the supply of and demand for goods and services would tend (or gravitate) towards a point of equilibrium at a given price. This tendency towards equilibrium could be disrupted or disturbed either by natural causes (such as crop failures or floods) or by artificial causes (such as tariffs, taxes, subsidies, and government regulation). His theory also had a moral dimension in that Molinari believed that "la loi d’équilibre qui agit incessamment pour faire régner l’ordre dans la production et la justice dans la distribution de la richesse" (the law of equilibrium which acts constantly to make order reign in the area of production and justice in the area of the distribution of wealth).[243]

[70]

SUMMARY – Infringement of external property rights (continued). – The law of compulsory acquisition for reasons of public utility. – Legislation relating to mines. – The public domain, property belonging to the State, Departments, and Communes. – Forests. – Roads. – Canals. – Waterways. – Mineral waters. THE ECONOMIST.

We have noted that property rights with respect to works of the mind are very badly treated under the present regime. Material property is more favored in the sense that it is guaranteed in perpetuity. This recognition and guarantee, however, are in no sense absolute. An owner can have his property confiscated under the law of expropriation for reasons of public utility.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What? Do you wish to abolish that tutelary law without which no undertaking on the grounds of public utility would be possible?

THE ECONOMIST.

What do you understand by an undertaking on the grounds of public utility?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

An undertaking on grounds of public utility is…an undertaking [71] useful to everybody, a railway, for example.

THE ECONOMIST.

Oh, and is not a farm which produces food for everybody not an undertaking also useful to all? Is not the need to eat at the very least as universal and necessary as the need to travel?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

No doubt, but a farm is a rather limited individual enterprise.

THE ECONOMIST.

Not always. In England there are immense farms. In the colonies there are farms which belong to numerous and powerful companies. Anyway, what does it matter? The usefulness of an enterprise is not always a function of the space it occupies and the law does not inquire whether an enterprise known as “a public utility” is owned by a company or isolated individual.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

We could not establish any analogy between a farm or a plantation and a railway. The development of a railway is subject to certain natural exigencies; the slightest deviation in the route, for example, can entail a large increase in costs. Who will pay for this increase? The public. Well, I ask you, must the interest of the public, the interest of society be sacrificed to the stubbornness and greed of some landowner?

THE SOCIALIST.

Ah, Mr Conservative. These are words which reconcile me to you. You are a fine fellow. Let us shake on it.

THE ECONOMIST.

There are in the Sologne vast stretches of extremely poor land.[244] The poverty stricken peasants who farm there receive only a meager return for the most laborious efforts. Yet close to their wretched hovels rise magnificent chateaux with immense lawns where wheat would grow in abundance. If the peasants of the Sologne demanded that these good lands be expropriated and transformed into fields of wheat, would not the public interest require that this be granted them?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You go too far. If the law of expropriation were used in the cause of public utility to transform lawns and pleasure gardens into fields of wheat, what would happen to the security of property? Who would want to manicure a lawn, lay out a park, decorate a chateau?

THE SOCIALIST.

Expropriation always entails an indemnity.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But the indemnity is not always big enough. There are things for which no indemnity could compensate. Can you pay for the roof which has sheltered generations, the hearth around which they have lived, the great trees which witnessed their births and their deaths? Is there not something of the sacred in these centuries old homes, in which the traditions of the ancestors live on, [73] in which so to speak the very soul of the family breathes? Is not the expulsion of a family forever from its ancient patrimony, the commission of a deeply immoral assault?

THE ECONOMIST.

Except, of course, when it is a question of building a railway.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Everything depends on the extent to which the undertaking is useful.

THE SOCIALIST.

But is anything more useful than farming devoted to the people’s subsistence? For my part I strongly hope that the law of expropriation for reasons of public utility will soon be given enlarged scope. The Convention had potatoes grown in the Tuileries gardens. What a sublime example! May our legislative Assemblies keep it forever in mind! How many thousands of hectares lie unproductive around the luxurious residences of the lords of the earth? How many mouths could we feed, how much work could we distribute by handing over these fine lands to workers ready to farm them? Oh you rich aristos,[245] one day we will plant potatoes in your sumptuous flowerbeds; we will sow turnips and carrots in place of your dahlias and your Bengal rose bushes! We will expropriate you for the sake of public utility.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Fortunately the Expropriation Boards[246] will not give permission for these barbarous projects.

THE SOCIALIST.

Why not? If public utility demands that your chateaux [74] with their lawns and parklands be replaced by fields of potatoes why should the Boards not agree to the expropriation? If some grant it happily when it is a question of turning farmlands into railways, will not others agree to it with all the more reason when it is a question of replacing luxurious parklands with farming? Will you cite in your reply to me the actual composition of the Expropriation Boards? They are made up of big landlords, a fact of which I am not unaware, but this latter kind of panel will not escape the law of universal suffrage any more than the former will. We will have small owners and workers coming on to them, and then my word… big property will dance a merry tune.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is a subversive proposal of the first order.

THE ECONOMIST.

What do you expect? A law you established yourself is being enlarged and its application generalized on grounds of social utility. Your work is being completed. Can you complain about it?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I know very well that expropriation in the service of public utility has its dangers, especially since that accursed revolution… Is it not however indispensable? Are not private interests perpetually at war with public interests?

Moreover does not this law contain an implicit recognition of property? If the state did not respect property rights, would it have gone to the trouble of demanding a law of expropriation from the Legislative Chambers? Would simple ordinances not have sufficed? [75] Does the law of expropriation on the grounds of public utility not subsume an implicit recognition of property?

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, in the way that rape subsumes an implicit recognition of virginity.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What about the indemnity?

THE ECONOMIST.

Do you think any indemnity could compensate for a rape? Now if I do not want to hand over my property to you and by using your superior strength you rob me of it, are you not committing a serious crime? [247] The indemnity will not efface this assault made against my rights. But, you will object, the public interest may require the sacrifice of certain private interests, and this necessity must be provided for. And this is you, a conservative who is speaking to me in these terms? Is it really you denouncing for my benefit the antagonism between the public interest and private interests? Do take care, are you not talking socialism?

THE SOCIALIST.

Probably. To each his own.[248] We have denounced and were the first to do so, this sad idea of an opposition between the public interest and private interests.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes but how can you put an end to it?

THE SOCIALIST.

That is very simple. We get rid of private interests. We bring about the return of the wealth of each to the domain of all. We apply on an immense scale [76] the law of expropriation in the cause of public utility.

THE ECONOMIST.

And if there truly is antagonism between the interest of each person and the interest of all, you are acting very wisely and your adversary is in error in not following you all the way.

THE SOCIALIST.

You are being sarcastic! Do you happen to believe that private interests naturally coincide with public interest by themselves?

THE ECONOMIST.

If I were not convinced of it, I would have become a socialist a long time ago. I would wage, as you do, perpetual war against private interests, I would demand a tightly knit association, a community, and who knows what else. I would not wish at any price to maintain a social order where no one would prosper save on the condition of hurting other people. Thank God, however, that society is not constructed in this way. The various interests are naturally in agreement.[249] The interest of each person coincides naturally with the interest of all. Why therefore make laws which put the former at the mercy of the latter? Either these laws are pointless, or as the socialists claim, society needs remaking.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You argue as if all men had an accurate understanding of what is in their own interest. Well, this is false. Men frequently mistake what is in their interest.

THE ECONOMIST.

I know perfectly well that men are not infallible; I also know, however, that each man is the best judge of his own interest. [77]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Perhaps you are right in principle, but in practice some people are truly obstinate and stupid.

THE ECONOMIST.

Not so obstinate and not so stupid when their interests are in question. I admit, however, that people of that type can ruin some useful enterprises. Do you think that the present law does not cause more harm than they would be able to? Does it not compromise the security of present property and does it not menace it in the future too?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

It is quite certain that socialism would make a truly deplorable use of the law of expropriation in the cause of public utility.

THE ECONOMIST.

And you conservatives who passed that law, would you willingly oppose its application? Is this not a dangerous weapon which you have forged for your enemies’ use? By declaring that some majority or other has the right to seize an individual’s property when the public interest demands it, have you not supplied socialism in advance with a justification for such expropriation and a legal means of carrying it out?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Alas! But who could foresee that infernal revolution?

THE ECONOMIST.

When one engages in law making, one has to foresee everything.

Along with this law which threatens property right down [78] to its roots, our Code includes other laws involving partial attacks on certain property; mining legislation for example.[250] Like the works of the mind, mines end up outside the common law.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Is this not a special kind of property and ought it not therefore to be subject to special laws?

THE SOCIALIST.

What does today’s legislation with regard to the mines say?

THE ECONOMIST.

French legislation on the mines has for a century undergone very diverse modifications. Under the Ancien Régime the mines were considered as belonging to the royal domain. The king granted mining licences as seemed to him appropriate, to the finder, to the owner of the land, or to any other, in exchange for a tenth of the annual output. When the Revolution liberated property and labor, people must have hoped that this advantage would be extended to mining property; unfortunately it did not turn out that way. The law makers refused to grant subterranean property its charter of liberation.[251]

Three opinions emerged on the issue of this kind of property. Some said that underground property was simply attached to surface property; according to others it belonged to the whole community; according to a third group it reverted to the finders. In this last view, the only just one, the only one consistent with law, the owners of the land could demand only a simple indemnity for those parts of the surface of the land which were necessary for exploiting the mineral deposits, and the government [79] likewise could not demand anything save a tax for the legal protection granted to the miners.

THE SOCIALIST.

According to you then, the ownership of mines ought therefore to be classed in the same category as property rights over inventions?[252]

THE ECONOMIST.

Precisely. Let us suppose you are a gold prospector. After a lot of searching you have managed to find a seam of this precious metal. You have the sole right to exploit this seam that you alone have discovered.

THE SOCIALIST.

On this reckoning the whole of America should have belonged to Christopher Columbus who had discovered it.

THE ECONOMIST.

You are forgetting that America was already to a great extent owned at the time of Christopher Columbus’s discovery. Moreover, it is a rule of the law of nations that uninhabited land belongs to the first to discover it.

THE SOCIALIST.

If however, after having discovered it, these first comers decide that it is not appropriate to exploit it, their property rights die. How do you explain this demise of property rights?

THE ECONOMIST.

The right of property does not die. One ceases to possess only when one renounces that possession. If I have discovered a mine I will exploit it or I will cede it to someone who will exploit it. The case will be the same if I have discovered land: I will exploit it or sell it. [80]

THE SOCIALIST.

What if you keep it without exploiting it?

THE ECONOMIST.

It will be my right but not in my interest. Looking after anything is costly: you have to pay for the security of property. If therefore I do not want to develop the land or mineral deposit which I have discovered, and if no one wants to buy it from me I will soon give up on looking after it; for it will incur losses rather than profits for me. So there is, you see, no drawback in leaving to the finder the full disposition of whatever he has discovered.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

The discoverer of a deposit possesses a right to it; that seems to me quite legitimate. It is right that his work of discovery be remunerated. Do not society and those who own the surface of the land, however, also have some rights on what is underground? Society protects those who work the mines and it supplies them with the means to work them. As for the owners of the surface of the land, do they not have a claim on the ground below by the very fact of occupying the surface? Where is the boundary between the two properties?

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, where is the boundary?

THE ECONOMIST.

Neither society nor the owners of the land can claim the least right to what is underground. I have already demonstrated to you in respect of inventions, that society has no right to the fruits of the work of individuals. There is no point going over this again. As [81] for the owners of the surface land, Mirabeau[253] has clearly refuted their claims to the ownership of the sub-soil: “The idea that being the owner of a stream or river makes one the owner of the ground below our fields seems to me as absurd as the idea of preventing the passage of a hot air balloon because it passes over the property of a particular landowner.” [254] Why is this absurd? Because the ownership of the fields lies solely in the value which work has given to the surface of the land and the owners of the land have contributed nothing of value to what lies below the soil, just as they have contributed nothing to the air above it. Search out who has worked or is working and you will always know who possesses or ought to possess a thing.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But is it possible to discover a mine and to exploit it without the agreement of those who own the surface land?

THE ECONOMIST.

What happens is this. You ask the owners of the land for permission to explore the ground, at the same time undertaking to give them a payment or part ownership of the mine by way of compensation for the damage which may be caused to them. Once the mine is opened up, you divide up the potential profits and set to work on it. If the exploitation of what lies under the ground is such as to harm the surface property, the owners of that property obviously have the right to oppose this or to claim a further indemnity. Their choice will be the indemnity, since the opening of a mine, by providing a new market for their products, directly or indirectly increases their incomes. In this way, interests which appear opposed, are naturally reconciled. [82]

Unfortunately, the Constituent Assembly and Mirabeau himself, did not understand that the ownership of mineral resources could without any drawbacks, be left unregulated. They attributed the ownership of mines to the nation. They produced a form of underground communism.[255] The law of 1791 put the government in charge of allocating the ownership of mineral deposits, and it limited the tenure of licences to fifty years. Moreover the government was given the power to withdraw these licences if the mines were not maintained in good shape or if they stopped operating for a while.[256]

Undoubtedly the most destructive clause in this legislation was the one limiting the length of leases. Given the huge capital investments mining demands and the preparatory work sometimes stretching over several years, it was important above all that entrepreneurs be assured as to the future; to limit the enjoyment of their rights was to force them to limit their efforts to invest; it was to place an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of their developing the mining of minerals.

The government’s prerogative to withdraw licences in certain specified circumstances also entailed very serious drawbacks. It is not easy to determine whether a mine is being well or badly managed. Opinions can be divided on the most appropriate means of exploitation. It was argued against wholly unrestricted exploitation, for example, that the managements extracted the richest seams first of all and neglected the others. Were they not, however, in taking such a decision, merely acting in the most rational way? Was it not obvious one should start with the most productive [83] parts of the mining project? In starting with developing the less rich seams, would not the licencees have damaged their infant enterprise? Nor could it easily be decided with any greater certainty whether a developer was right or wrong to abandon all or part of his project for a while. His personal interest, which was to keep it all going constantly, was in this respect an insufficient guarantee. Unless demand slowed down, in which case the partial or total cessation of extracting minerals would of course be justified, what interest could he have in interrupting work?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

They reformed that bad law.

THE ECONOMIST.

They reformed it very incompletely. The law of 21 April, 1810, which replaced it, gave the government the right to grant or withdraw licences. The difference, however, is that licences ceased to be limited to fifty years. Even so, in other ways the situation of mine owners has been worsened. The 1810 law forbade them to sell in lots or to split up their mines without a prior authorization from the government, and it subjected their mining to a surveillance system created for this purpose. Furthermore, it maintained the alleged rights of surface landowners, and entrusted the Council of State with the task of determining the amounts of compensation to be granted them. Mining found itself, in this way, closely regulated and heavily burdened.

So what was the result of this law? It was to [84] reduce to the minimum the mining of minerals.[257] Who would want today to be a discoverer of mines? Who would want to specialize in finding new deposits of various minerals? Before a discovery can be exploited, does one not have to lobby for a licence for long years (the licence to a property which one created by one’s own work), and having obtained it, submit oneself to an irksome surveillance and brutish directions from the administration of mining? What would happen to our agriculture, I ask you, if our farmers could not remove a shovelful of earth without the approval of some official from the Ministry of Agriculture? If they could not sell the merest parcel of land without the say-so of government? If in a word the government took it upon itself the right to take their property from them, at will? Would not this be the death of our farming? Would not investable funds soon turn away from so detestably oppressed an industry? …Well in fact investment capital has been turned away from mining ventures. It has been necessary to grant them special privileges to attract it back. It has been necessary to keep out foreign competition, and there has thus been facilitated on the domestic front the establishment of an immense monopoly, to persuade investment funds to venture to participate in an industry subservient to the government’s good pleasure. It has been necessary to burden consumers of mineral products with some of the damage inflicted on the ownership of mines. Is this not barbarous?

Let us suppose on the contrary that in 1789 the oppressive right which monarchs had taken upon themselves to cede the ownership of mines at will, had simply been abolished; [85] let us suppose further that this ownership had been freely given and guaranteed to those who had created it. Would not the production of mines have developed to the maximum, without there having been any need to protect it? Might not that source of production which still yields only scant output flow copiously in the long run?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, ownership is a marvelous thing. One works with such ardor when one is always sure of possessing the fruits of one’s labor, and of being able to dispose of it at will – consuming it, giving it away, lending it, or selling it, all without hindrance, harassment or irritation. Property! That is the real California. Long live property![258]

THE SOCIALIST.

Long live labor!

THE ECONOMIST.

Labor and property go together, since it is work which creates property and property which calls out for labor. So long live labor and property!

Government harms the development of production, not only by hampering individual ownership, but also by claiming certain properties for itself. Alongside the property of individuals there is, as you know, the public domain or common property. The state, the departments and the communes, own considerable wealth: fields, meadows, forests, canals, roads, and buildings and the like. Do not these diverse properties, which are managed in [85] society’s name, constitute a genuine case of communism?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, to a certain extent. Could things be arranged otherwise, however? Does not the government have to have certain kinds of property at its disposal? It is set up to provide certain services to society…

THE ECONOMIST.

What services?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

The government must…govern.

THE SOCIALIST.

Govern, by Jove! What do you mean by that, however? Is it not to manage various interests and harmonize them?

THE ECONOMIST.

There is no need for interests to be managed or harmonized. They manage and harmonize themselves quite well without anyone interfering.

THE SOCIALIST.

If that is how it is, what must government do?[259]

THE ECONOMIST.

It must guarantee for each individual his freedom of activity, the security of his person, and the preservation of his property. To exercise this particular function, to render this special service to society, government has to have access to certain resources. Anything more it possesses is unnecessary.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But if it provides other services to society, if it supplies education, if it funds religion, if it contributes [87] to the transport of men or merchandise by land or by water, if it makes tobacco, or porcelain, or carpets, or gunpowder or saltpeter…[260]

THE ECONOMIST.

In a word if it is communist! Well it does not need to be communist. Like any entrepreneur[261] the government must do one thing and one only, or risk doing what it does very badly. All governments have as their main function the production of security.[262] Let them confine themselves to that.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You have just given us a very rigorous application of the principle of the division of labor. What you would like to see then is the disappearance of the public sector, with the state selling the greater part of its property, and with all production becoming, in a word, specialized.

THE ECONOMIST.

I would like this for a better development of production. In England there was recently an inquiry into the management of public property.[263] Nothing could be more instructive than the results thrown up by this research. In England the public domain consists of ancient fiefdoms of the crown, which have now become public property. These properties are huge as well as magnificent. In the hands of individuals, they would yield a worthwhile output. Controlled by the state they yield almost nothing.

If you will allow I will give you a single example.

The main wealth of this domain consists in the four forests of New Forest, Walham, Whittlewood, and Whychwood.[264] These forests are entrusted to guardians who [88] administer them. These are the Dukes of Cambridge and Grafton, Lord Mornington, and Lord Churchill. The guardians receive no formal payment but are allotted a very sizable payment in kind, including game, timber etc. The annual income from the New Forest adds up on average to £56,000 or £57,000 sterling, approximately Fr 1, 500,000. The Treasury has never received more than £1,000 of this income, while the maintenance of the forest between 1841 and 1847 cost the state more than £2,000.[265]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is a flagrant abuse. Do not forget, though, that this is happening in aristocratic England.

THE ECONOMIST.

Plenty of other abuses happen in our democratic France. It has long been known, in France and in England, that the management of state property is dreadful.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is only too true. There are types of property that obviously must remain in the hands of the state, the roads for example.[266]

THE ECONOMIST.

In England the roads are owned by individuals, and nowhere does one see them so well maintained.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What about the tolls then? Traffic is not free in England as it is in France.

THE ECONOMIST.

Excuse me, but it is much freer in Great Britain, [89] for road communications are much more numerous. And do you know why? Quite simply because the government has left it to individuals to build roads and has not got involved in building them itself.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But I ask once more, what about the tolls?

THE ECONOMIST.

Oh, do you think then that the roads in France are built and maintained for nothing? Do you think that the public does not pay for their construction and maintenance as happens in England? Only, here is the difference. In England road construction and costs are paid for by those who use them; in France they are paid by the taxpayers, including the goatherds of the Pyrenees and the peasants of the Landes[267] who do not set foot twice a year on a national highway. In England it is the user of such means of transport who pays for them in the form of tolls; in France the whole community pays in the shape of taxes, often of a most excessive and irksome kind. Which is preferable? [268]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

And the canals, is it not appropriate for them to be left in the public domain?

THE ECONOMIST.

No more so than the roads. In which countries are the canals the most numerous, the best constructed and the best maintained? Is it in the countries where they are in the hands of the state? No! It is in England and [90] in the United States where that have been built and are used by private groupings of private individuals.[269]

THE SOCIALIST.

Would not roads and canals constitute oppressive monopolies if they were privately owned ?

THE ECONOMIST.

You forget that they engage in mutual competition. I will show you later on[270] that in any enterprise subject to the free regime of free competition,[271] price must necessarily fall to the level of real costs of production or use and that the owners of a canal or road cannot receive anything in excess of the just remuneration of their capital and their labor. This is an economic law as positive and exact as a law of physics.

Most natural waterways, which require a certain amount of management and maintenance work, could with advantage be privately owned in the same way. You know to what inextricable difficulties the common ownership of waterways gives rise today. The dams lead to countless legal cases, and irrigation systems are obstructed everywhere. It would be different if each lake or waterway had its owners against whom those living beside the water could have recourse in case of damage, and who would have responsibility for providing artificial waterfalls and establishing irrigation canals where need arose. [272]

The state is still the owner of most sources of mineral water. So these are very badly run, though not lacking in administrators and inspectors. Moreover, under the pretext that artificial mineral waters serve as medicine, their production has been [91] put under government surveillance. Yet more administrators and inspectors!

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Ah, government is our great running sore![273]

THE ECONOMIST.

There is only way to heal that particular sore, and that is by governing less.


7. The Fourth Evening

Editor’s Note

In this Soirée Molinari turns to the question of inheritance laws, in particular how they effect the ownership of agricultural land, and how French agriculture could be made more productive.

There were two sides to the question of inheritance; a theoretical one concerning the right of a property owner to give or bequeath their property to somebody else at their own discretion; and a legal and historical question concerning the impact of specific changes to French legislation regarding inheritance. Concerning the former, Molinari distinguished between two different types of “liberty” or rights - what he called “la liberté de l’héritage” (the freedom to bestow an inheritance) and “le droit à l’héritage” (the right to an inheritance). This was a similar distinction the Economists made between the “la liberté du travail” (the freedom of working) and “le droit au travail” (the right to a job).[274] In his view the property owner, by their very right to own property, should have the right to dispose of this property as they saw fit, to give it to one child, or all of their children, or none, as they saw fit. In this matter, Molinari was working within the tradition established by Charles Comte in his Traité de la propriété (1834) where he says:

The capacity to dispose of things is one of the essential elements of all property ...  If I had wanted to combat, in this book, the errors which spring from the Abbey Raynal on the right of children to receive the property which their parents leave upon their death, I would have argued that the spirit of family is one of the principal causes behind the production and the conservation of wealth; that a man in order to ensure the survival of his children devotes himself to working and imposes on himself sacrifices which no other feeling produces in him; that families develop in themselves habits which are in keeping with their standard of living; and that if the wealth of an individual is not allowed to be passed on to his descendants then it will impose the harshest deprivations upon them …; and finally, that a nation where children are prevented from inheriting property from their parents would descend in a few short years to a level much lower than the inhabitants of Egypt under the Mamelukes or the Greeks under the Turks.[275]

Concerning the French legal and historical situation regarding inheritance, the background issue was the increasing “morcellement” (fragmentation) of French agricultural land in the 19th century which came about because of the change in the laws of inheritance introduced during the Revolution. Under the Old Regime there existed the law of entail (“substitution”) which was designed to preserve aristocratic land holdings by preventing them from being sold or divided. During the Revolution the Law of 1791 required the equal division of property among the children (“the law of equal division”) so that all would have a future means of income and support.[276] The sentiment behind this change was to “democratize” French society by making it difficult for the aristocracy to recreate its social and economic base in the countryside as well as to create a new class of peasant proprietors. When Napoléon codified French law in the Civil Code (1804) Articles 913 and 914 placed very strict limits on what a property owner was able to do when it came to passing property to their children. Molinari quoted these in a long footnote (see below, pp. 000):

Art. 913. Gifts, either by way of acts between living persons, or by will and testament, may not exceed half the wealth of the benefactor if he has one living child at the time of his death; a third if he has two living children; a quarter if he has three or more children.
Art. 915. Gifts, either by way of acts between living persons, or by will and testament, may not exceed half the wealth of the benefactor if he has one or several ascendants on either the paternal or maternal side, or three quarters if he has ascendants on one side only.

The consequence of these laws was the “morcellement,”or the constant splitting of property into ever smaller pieces.[277] The Economists were divided over the pros and cons of large-scale versus small-scale farming. The Physiocrats and Adam Smith believed that small-scale farming was more profitable because the farmer had a very direct and close personal interest in making it so. In the 19th century Sismondi shared this view based upon his study of the Italian peasantry. On the other hand the English traveler Arthur Young thought that the poverty he saw in rural France on the eve of the French Revolution was due to the excessive subdivision of farms which made them unprofitable to run. This view was also shared by Thomas Malthus. John Ramsay McCulloch believed that the greater productivity of British agriculture could be explained by its inheritance laws which encouraged the preservation of larger estates.[278] This view was shared by Molinari who argued that only large-scale farms could spread the risk and raise the capital to improve agricultural output, as was the case in Britain. He devoted space in this Soirée to quoting at some length an English Parliamentary Inquiry of 1846 Report to show the superiority of English inheritance laws over the French.

In order to make French agriculture more viable Molinari argued that it had to move away from being a family run, small-scale “atelier” or workshop farm, to being a large-scale, for-profit business run by agricultural entrepreneurs, or what he called “entrepreneurs d’industrie agricole” (entrepreneurs in the agriculture industry). They would follow the example of their manufacturing colleagues and sell shares in their farming businesses and run them like an anonymous limited company (“la société anonyme perpétuelle”). It is in the course of making these arguments that the Economist engages in some word play with and teasing of the Socialist over the socialists’ use of the term “Association” which had become one of their slogans during the 1840s and during the Revolution of 1848. Depending upon what kind of socialist “The Socialist” is, the term “Association” will have different meanings. Some of the more extreme socialist groups like the Fourierists advocated the communal ownership of land and its cooperative working by all members of the community. Others thought that small private landowners could pool their resources in some kind of co-operative arrangement advocated by Proudhon. If this were done voluntarily, the Economist would not have any objection, but the kind of “Association” he has in mind are efficient large-scale for profit capitalist agri-businesses and not less efficient small-scale, voluntary socialist experiments.[279] He responds to the Socialist by saying that he too is in favor of “associations agricoles” which we have translated as “farming companies” as both the French words “association” and “société” can be translated as “company,” which is of course not what the Socialist has in mind.

[92]

SUMMARY: The right to make a will. –Legislation regulating inheritance. – The right to inherit. – Its moral outcomes. – Its material outcomes. – Comparison of French and British agriculture. – On entail and its utility. The natural organization of farming under a regime of free property. THE ECONOMIST.

Those who have taken it upon themselves the right to put limitations on property have not failed to limit its free disposition as well. The gifting, bequeathing, lending, and exchanging of property have all been subjected to a multitude of encumbrances.

The giving away of certain property is subject to irksome and costly formalities. Making a will is even more constrained. Instead of leaving to the father of the family the free disposition of his wealth, the law obliges him to leave it in more or less equal portions to his legitimate children. If one of his children feels wronged by the sharing out, he has the right to have the will invalidated.[280] [93]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Are you are also attacking, therefore, this law which protects family and property?

THE ECONOMIST.

I am attacking this law which is destructive of family and property.[281] It is in the name of a higher law than that of fathers of families, that society has regulated inheritance, is it not? Why, though, should it not go on to use this superior right to claim for itself, tomorrow, this property which it had at its disposal yesterday? If it has been able to say to the father of the family “you will not dispose of your wealth according to your own will but according to mine,” could it not very well also say to him “it suits me henceforth that you alienate your wealth in my favor?” Is not the abolition of inheritance, that is to say the elimination of individual property, subsumed in a law which attributes to society the unchallengeable right to dispose of inheritance?

Is not the destruction of paternal authority, that is to say the [94] destruction of the family, likewise subsumed in a law which takes away from the father of the family the free disposition of his wealth in order to grant his children an effective right to an inheritance?[282]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

A right to an inheritance you say?

THE ECONOMIST.

To tell children that they have a right to demand from their father virtually equal shares in his inheritance, whatever their conduct has been, whatever their feelings in his regard; to tell them they have the right to have his will invalidated if they find themselves slighted in the sharing, is this not to sanctify the right to an inheritance? Is it not to give the child a share in his father’s property? Is this not to allow him to consider and demand as a debt, what he once regarded and received as a kindness. Where nature made a son, will your law not be creating a creditor?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But is this not a trifling thing, making a parent share his wealth fairly [95] between his children? Without the law which regulates the shares, would not the children be endlessly frustrated – cheated and inveigled out of what is rightfully theirs? Has not the law prevented all frauds and resolved all difficulties?

THE ECONOMIST.

By breaking family links; by rendering the father’s authority illusory. No doubt if the right to make a will was free, the father might distribute his wealth very badly. Is he not always held in check, however, by those powerful restraints that no man-made law could possibly replace – paternal love and the sense of justice? If those two feelings have been silenced in his heart, do you think your law would make them speak out? Do you believe that the father will not find some roundabout means of disposing of his wealth to his children’s disadvantage? If these feelings are present in him, what good is your law? And then you put forward as a matter of principle the equality of shares as the ideal standard of justice. Are you entirely sure, however, that this brutal equality is always just? Are you also quite sure that a father cannot favor one child without plundering the others? By going so far as to admit that the son has to all intents and purposes some claim on his father’s wealth…

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What? The son would have no claim on the paternal inheritance? But if this were so he could be dispossessed if there were no will.

THE ECONOMIST.

The conclusion is false. The children’s claim is based in this case on the likelihood of the legacy. The inheritance has to be theirs, not because they possess a potential claim [96] on that inheritance, but because the father has probably bequeathed it to them.

By fathering a child, the father agrees to accept the moral obligation to feed him and to prepare him to earn his living, nothing more and nothing less. If it pleases him to give his child something extra, this is an outcome of his own wishes.

Even allowing your alleged right to an inheritance, however, do you believe that a bad son has the same claim on the paternal estate as a good one? Do you think that a father is bound, from the point of view of natural justice, to bequeath part of his wealth to some miserable creature who has been the despair and shame of his family? Do you not think, on the contrary, that he will be bound to deprive this degraded being of the wherewithal for indulging his evil passions? Can the right to disinherit not be useful and just sometimes?

In the eyes of your legislators, however, the father is a creature at once bereft of the notion of justice and of paternal feeling. He is a ferocious beast who incessantly watches his progeny in order to devour them. The law must intervene to protect them. Society must bind this heartless barbarian, this so-called father, hand and foot to prevent his sacrificing his innocent family to his base inclinations.

Our sad legislators have not noticed that their law would be effective only in weakening respect for authority and family feeling. Does respect for authority still exist in France?

THE CONSERVATIVE

Ah! You have just touched on the most lamentable scourge [97] of our time. The present generation has indeed lost the respect for authority – that is only too true. The Union has published some admirable articles on the subject.[283] Who will restore respect for authority for us? The son no longer respects his father. Grownups respect nothing, not even God. Respect for authority is the very anchor of salvation for our society, tossed hither and thither by the storms of revolution, like some ship…

THE SOCIALIST.

Please do not go on about it. We have read the articles in the Union.

THE ECONOMIST.

You broke that anchor of salvation with your own hands, the day you attacked the sacred rights of the father of the family, the day when you gave the son a claim on his father’s property, the day when by taking away from him the fearsome weapon of disinheritance, you handed him over to the mercies of his rebellious children.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What about the reform school?

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, this is what you have given him in exchange. Short of having lost all human feeling, though, can a father consent to his son’s being put on this highway to penal servitude? Better to suffer rebellion than draw infamy down on oneself and family.

I know quite well that the father can defy the law and disinherit his intractable son in fact if not legally; but he is forced to act in secret, avoiding the greedy and jealous eye of his creditor. He no longer uses [98] legitimate means to bequeath his wealth; indeed he makes an immoral infringement on his son’s claim to that wealth. His behavior is no longer that of an owner freely handing over what is his; it is rather that of a debtor surreptitiously getting rid of a mortgaged property. That which would secure the father’s authority, if the right to inheritance did not exist, serves today only to debase it.

I will not speak to you of the hatreds which spring up in families when a father considers it appropriate to favor one of his children. In countries where there is no right to inheritance, in the United States for example,[284] the other children respectfully bow their heads in the face of this sovereign decision of the paternal will, and they conceive no adverse feelings towards the child whom the father has favored. In countries where the right to an inheritance is recognized, such an act becomes, on the contrary, a profound source of family disunion. In fact is not this straightforward act, often so amply justified by the circumstances – the frailty or incapacity of the preferred child, the care he has bestowed on his father – from the point of view of the legality you espouse, a veritable plundering, a theft? Your law is a new species of harpy,[285] which has corrupted family feelings by interfering with them. Having brought about this, do you now complain that the disorder into which you threw the family now propagates itself in the society at large?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But if the moral results of the law of equal shares leave something to be desired, does that law not have at least some admirable outcomes? It has made everyone a proprietor. Every peasant [99] with his plot of land to work has been sheltered from want.

THE ECONOMIST.

Are you really sure of this? For my part I hold that no law has been so disastrous for the situation of the laboring poor, both in farming and industry.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Would you prefer, by any chance, the rights of the oldest and of entail?[286]

THE ECONOMIST.

This is abuse of another sort; another kind of attack on property rights. In truth, however, I do think I would prefer them really.

THE SOCIALIST.

The dividing up of plots[287] is certainly the curse of our farming and Association[288] is without doubt our last hope.

THE ECONOMIST.

I think so too.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What? You prefer the feudal arrangements of primogeniture and entail to equal sharing. Yet you are for association. Now there is a manifest contradiction.

THE ECONOMIST.

I do not think so. What are the essential conditions of any economic production? Stability, with security of possession on the one hand; a bringing together of adequate powers of production on the other. Well the present arrangement comprises neither stability nor sufficiency of productive powers. [100]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I agree with you that the leases are too short-term and that our inheritance laws have made undivided ownership of farming plots singularly precarious; I agree too that farming is short of capital but what is to be done about it? There is talk of the organization of agricultural credit and for my part I would think along those lines were it not so difficult to find a good system.[289]

THE ECONOMIST.

A system of agricultural credit, however excellent, would remedy nothing. Under present property arrangements, an increase in the number of institutions of credit would scarcely serve to lower the rate of interest in farming areas. It would be different if our farms were soundly established like those in England.

THE SOCIALIST.

You dare to suggest England as a model for us? Oh, well I grant you that the state of the helots[290] in our countryside is truly wretched, but is it not a thousand times preferable to that of the English peasants? Are not the English workers exploited by an aristocracy which devours their substance much as the vulture devoured Prometheus’ liver?[291] Is not England the country where the saddest scenes of the dark drama of man exploiting man are played out? Is not England the great whore of capital? England! Oh do not speak to me of England![292]

THE ECONOMIST.

Yet the condition of the English peasant, exploited [101] by the aristocracy, is infinitely superior to that of the peasant proprietor of France.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Come on now!

THE ECONOMIST.

I notice in your library two works by Messieurs Mounier and Rubichon, one called Agriculture in France and England and another called The Role of the Nobility in Modern Societies, which will furnish me with indisputable evidence in support of what I am saying.[293]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I humbly confess not to have read them.

THE ECONOMIST.

That was a mistake on your part. You would have found all the information needed to settle the question which concerns us. It is a summary of the voluminous inquiries published by order of the English Parliament, on the state of agriculture and the condition of farming people. As I leaf through it at random, I find an extract from the most recent inquiry (1846).[294]

The Chairman of the Inquiry is speaking to Mr Robert Baker, an Essex farmer, who works some 230 hectares.

Q. What is the standard diet of agricultural laborers?
A. They eat meat and potatoes. If flour is cheap, however, they do not eat potatoes. This year (1846) they are eating the best white bread. Mr Robert Hyde-Gregg, for some twenty years one of the biggest manufacturers in Great Britain, [102] for his part gives the following answers to questions on the situation of laborers in manufacturing.
Q. When you say that the laborer in manufacturing districts eats a lot of potatoes, do you mean by this that, as in Ireland, potatoes are the people’s basic food, or are they consumed along with meat?
A. In general the dinner consists of potatoes and pork, while the breakfast and supper consist of tea and bread.
Q. Do the workers generally have pork?
A. I can fairly say that they all eat meat for dinner.
Q. During the time you have been observing things, has there been a great change in the diet of industrial laborers? Have they replaced oat flour with wheat flour?
A. This change has certainly taken place. I remember that in all the workers’ houses one used to see flat cakes of rough bread hung up; there is nothing like that now.
Q. Today’s population, then, as far as bread goes, has improved its diet, using wheat flour rather than oat flour?
R. Yes, absolutely.

Now I will present some evidence relating to workers in France and England.

Mr Joseph Cramp, expert land evaluator in the country of Kent, and a farmer for forty four years, came to France and took the trouble to make himself familiar with the condition of French agriculture. He was interviewed as to the condition of farm laborers in Normandy.

Q. Following your observations of the conditions of the workers in [103] Normandy, do you think they are better dressed and better fed than the workers in the Isle of Thanet,[295] where you live?
A. No. I have been in their homes, and I have seen them having their meals, which are such that I hope never to see an Englishman sitting down to such bad food.
Q. The workers in the Isle of Thanet eat the best white bread, is that not so?
R. Always.
Q. And in Normandy the farm workers do not eat it?
R. No. They were eating bread whose color came close to that of this inkwell here.
Q. How many hectoliters of wheat[296] are produced per hectare in the Isle of Thanet?
A. About twenty nine.
Q. Having lived and farmed in the Isle of Thanet for so long, can you say if the condition of farm laborers has improved or worsened since you first got to know the region?
A. It has improved.
Q. In every respect?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you think then that the workers are better dressed and educated?
A. Better fed, better dressed, better educated.

You see then that the condition of the agrarian populations in England is infinitely superior to that of ours. These people do not own the land. The proprietors of the land in Great Britain [104] are some thirty five or thirty six thousand souls, mostly descendants of former conquerors.[297]

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, the land in England belongs to the aristocracy and the English people pay two or three billion a year to that haughty and idle caste for the right to work the soil.

THE ECONOMIST.

It is true that this is rather expensive. So the English have begun to cut back on the landlords’ share[298] by abolishing the Corn Laws.[299] You will see however, that even at this oppressively inflated price, the English have found it really advantageous to maintain their aristocracy, while we committed the sin of hastily eliminating ours.

THE SOCIALIST.

Oh, dear me!

THE ECONOMIST.

Let me finish. How have the English succeeded in drawing from their soil much more and far better produce than we have from ours. The answer is in perfecting their agriculture, in making it undergo a series of progressive transformations.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What transformations?

THE ECONOMIST.

British landowners successively replaced their small farms, insufficiently capitalized, by larger farms [105] much more heavily capitalized. It is thanks to this progressive substitution of factory-like agriculture for the small workshop approach to farming that progress was achieved.[300] The inquiry carried out by MM. Mounier and Rubichon, gives the following information on the distribution of the British population:

Families working in agriculture, 961,134

Families working in industry, commerce etc., 2,453,041

These 961,134 families employed in agriculture supplied some 1,055,982 able bodied workers to cultivate 13,849,320 hectares, yielding an output of 4,000, 500,000 francs.

In France agricultural output yielded only 3,523,000,861,000 francs in 1840, yet it was worked by a population of 18,000,000 individuals yielding an active workforce of five to six millions. This means that the output of a French farm laborer is four to five times less productive than that of one in England. You must understand now why our population is less well fed than that of Great Britain.

THE SOCIALIST.

You are taking no account of the enormous tribute the English farmers pay to the aristocracy.

THE ECONOMIST.

If as the statistics show, the farming population of England is better fed than ours, despite the tribute paid to the aristocracy, is this not incontestable proof that by producing more they also receive more? [106]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is clear.

THE ECONOMIST.

And if it is true that owing to the care of the aristocracy, British agriculture has made immense and rapid progress; if it is true that it is because of this aristocratic management that a farm worker produces more and earns more in England than in France, has not England been right to preserve her aristocracy?[301]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, but at least the French peasant is the owner of the land.

THE ECONOMIST.

Is it better to earn ten on your own land or twenty on land belonging to some unknown third party?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

It is better to earn twenty anywhere.

THE SOCIALIST.

Very well! Is it really the case, however, that there is an indispensable link between these two things, the preservation of the aristocracy and the progress of British agriculture? Is it not likely that British agriculture would have achieved even greater progress if England had got rid of its aristocracy, as we have got rid of ours. Has not French agriculture made progress since ’89?

THE ECONOMIST.

I do not think it has. Mounier and Rubichon say very strongly that instead of progressing it has regressed. A field which yielded 10 before 1789 now yields only 4. Perhaps they exaggerate the [107] harm. Note, however, one incontestable fact: if the volume of food produced by a given labor force has not declined, the quality of the overall mass of food has fallen. It is notorious that the consumption of meat has gone down. In Paris itself, this centre where all the productive forces of France converge, they eat less meat than in 1789. According to Lavoisier,[302] the average consumption in Paris (including fowl and game) was then 81.5 kilos per head; by 1838 it had fallen to 62.3 kilos. The fall was no less marked in the rest of the country. According to old documents quoted in the Imperial statistics, the average consumption of each inhabitant of France (excluding cooked meats) was: in 1789, 13.13 kilos; in 1830 only 12.36 kilos; and in 1840, 11.29 kilos. The consumption of an inferior meat – pork – has on the contrary, grown. Today per capita consumption is 8.65 kilos per head.

To sum up, the consumption of meat in France is at only 8.65 kilos per head.

In the USA the average is 122 kilos.

In England it is 68 kilos.

In Germany it is 55 kilos.

Moreover, it is probable that our consumption will go on falling constantly, if our farming system stays the same, for the price of meat goes on rising gradually.

If we divide France into nine regions, we find that the price of meat has risen between 1824 and 1840:[303]

In the first region, the North West, by 11%
In the second region, the North, by 22% [108]
In the third region, the North East, by 28%
In the fourth region, the West, by 17%
In the fifth region, the centre, by 19%
In the sixth region, the East, by 21%,
In the seventh region, the South West by 23%
In the eighth region, the South by 30%
In the ninth region, the South East by 38%

Well you know that the retail price of meat is the surest index of a people’s prosperity.

THE SOCIALIST.

I agree with you here; but show us once again, very clearly, the connection which exists, according to you, between the deterioration of our agriculture and our law of the equal division of inherited property. How does the one lead to the other?

THE ECONOMIST.

I have forgotten one other matter, namely that our soil is naturally more fertile than the British soil…But to answer your question, let me note that England owes the stability of its farming to the care taken by the aristocracy and to the laws which in that country ensure, at least in part, freedom of inheritance.[304]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Freedom of inheritance you say. What about entails and the rights of the first born? ...

THE ECONOMIST.

They are perfectly free in that no law obliges the father of the family to establish them. It is tradition which decides and that tradition is based on economic necessities.

Here is what entails consist in.

At the time of the marriage of his eldest son, usually, or at any other time convenient for him to choose, the owner of the land bequeaths his property to his eldest grandson, or in the absence of a grandson, his eldest granddaughter. If at the time of the entail, the owner has a living son and living grandson, he can extend the entail further and designate his great-grandson or great-granddaughter but his right covers only the first unborn generation. In Scotland there is no such limit and a proprietor can entail his wealth in perpetuity.[305]

The act of entail once accomplished, the owner and his living inheritors lose the right to dispose freely of the land; they are now only its usufructuaries. They cannot burden it with mortgages, nor sell it whole or in part. An entailed property can be neither seized nor confiscated. It is regarded as a sacrosanct legacy which no one is allowed to deflect from its intended purpose.

At the age of twenty-one the designated beneficiary for whom the entail has operated can break it, but does not commonly do so except to renew it, adding to it certain clauses necessitated by the current situation the family finds itself in. In this way properties are handed on, whole and intact, from generation to generation.

Now let us consider what purpose entails have.

They bestow on farms what our own farms lack, namely stability. In France perspectives are only for a lifetime; in England everything is reckoned in the long term. Our farms [110] are exposed to endless fragmentation by being shared out; British farms run no risks of that kind.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Does this risk really have the importance you give it? It matters rather little whether the land is more or less split up, provided it is well farmed.

THE ECONOMIST.

Ask the farmers and they will tell you that all farms have to be of a certain size to be worked with maximum economy.[306] This is easy to understand. You can employ the most advanced methods and tools only when the farming is on a very large scale. In England ordinary farms are of three hundred and fifty or four hundred hectares. These farms are heavily capitalized. In France the number of these large farms is extremely limited.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Why?

THE ECONOMIST.

He who sets up some agrarian enterprise does not know whether it will be fragmented and destroyed when he dies. There is nothing he can do to prevent it from fragmentation. Has not the law limited his right to bequeath? He is therefore not very enthusiastic about heavy investment in agriculture. Is the ordinary farmer more so? In France the leases are very short-term; it is a marvel if you see one of twenty one years. I do not need to explain to you the reason for these short-term leases: you will have guessed it! When ownership itself is short-term, it is not possible to arrange long leases. When, however, the farmer himself [ p. 111] occupies his land for only three, six, or nine years, he invests the least possible capital; he economizes on fertilizer, he does not put up fencing, he does not renew his equipment; and on the other hand he exhausts the soil as much as possible.

In England the stability which the system of entails has given to agriculture, has brought stability also to rental farming, in the form of long-term leases. So the farmers, confident of reaping themselves what they have sown, generally apply their economic efforts into making the land fertile.

THE SOCIALIST.

Yet the farmer is subject, in England as in France, to the tyranny of landowners.

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, but it is a very gentle tyranny. In England there are farmers who have held the same farm, father and son, from time immemorial. Most have no lease, so strong is the confidence which the landowners inspire in them. This confidence is rarely misplaced; only rarely will an owner decide to expel a farmer with age-old links to his family. There are, nevertheless, in England as elsewhere, different kinds of tenure. In the North a system of leases covering the life-times of three persons is commonly used. The farmer designates himself, and likewise two of his children, and the lease runs until the death of the last one of the three. The average duration of these leases is estimated at fifty four years. When one of the designated children has just died, the farmer ordinarily is authorized to substitute another name [112] for that of the dead person, and thus to prolong the duration of the lease.

When the lease has a fixed term, its duration is commonly determined by that of the crop rotations. For rotations of six and nine years, it is nineteen years but it is rare for the lease not to be renewed.

The sizable fluctuations to which the price of wheat has been exposed for some time, have given rise to a new form of lease. I want to speak about variable leases, leases varying from year to year according to ups and downs of the cereal markets. A farm will be rented for example for the value of a thousand quarters of wheat; if in 1845 the price of wheat is fifty six shillings, the farmer has to pay two thousand eight hundred pounds sterling in farm rent; if in 1846 the price rises to sixty shillings he will pay three thousand pounds sterling. The average price of wheat in the county is used to calculate these values.

We can see that farmers can safely risk their capital in enterprises so solidly based. We can see too that capitalists[307] will willingly lend to them. The big farmers manage to borrow at four per cent and sometimes even at three. One runs in fact almost no risk investing one’s capital in the soil. Farms are not exposed to losing their value by fragmentation or sale intended to end their undivided ownership. Farmers and landowners being established, so to speak, in perpetuity, provide lenders with maximum guarantees. Hence the low rates of interest in agriculture; hence also the considerable numbers of banks established to serve as intermediaries between capitalists and entrepreneurs in the agriculture industry,[308] land owners or farmers. [113]

The English people, endlessly presented to you as deprived of any ownership of the land in Great Britain, in reality possess far more landed wealth than the French people themselves. If they do not use their capital to buy actual land, they do invest it in the land itself whose productivity they thus increase.

In France on the contrary people buy the land but they invest scarcely any capital in it. It could not be otherwise. One does not happily lend to a small farmer whose existence is only half assured for a few years; one even hesitates to lend to the small proprietor whose tiny plot of land may, from one day to the next, be split up yet again between a number of inheritors. Add to this the costly formalities, the delays and insecurity of mortgage lending and you have the explanation of the high interest rates in agriculture.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, usury is gnawing away at our countryside.

THE ECONOMIST.

Usury perhaps![309] Examine however the composition of the ten or fifteen per cent which our farm people pay to the usurers, weigh up the risks of loss and the expenses involved and you will be convinced that this usury is in no way illegitimate. You will be convinced that in respect of the extent and the likelihood of agricultural risk, the interest on loans made to agriculture is not in any way worse than the interest on ordinary loans. Since the agricultural banks which people are so keen on[310] will not eliminate these risks, they will contribute only feebly to bringing down the rate of agricultural interest. [114]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So what must be done then to restore to our farming lands the security they have lost? Should we re-establish entails?

THE ECONOMIST.

God forbid! We must first of all restore to owners the right of disposing freely of their property. This way we will slow down the dividing up of land and give farms a degree of that precious stability which they are lacking today. Capital will then flow more readily into agriculture and its price will fall. If at the same time one rids the soil of the heavy taxes which afflict it and if one improves our mortgage arrangements, if we free our industrial and farming associations from the shackles which Imperial legislation has fastened on them, we will soon see a veritable revolution at work in our agriculture. Numerous companies will be established to develop the land as happened for the operation of the railways and mining, etc. Now since these associations have an interest in being established for the long term, the cultivation of the land will achieve an almost unshakeable stability. Ownership of the land, once it has been divided into tradeable shares[311] will be exchanged and divided without farming being under the slightest threat. Agriculture will be established in the most economic way possible.

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, applying the principle of Association to agriculture will put an end to our woes.

THE ECONOMIST.

Perhaps we do not understand association in the same [115] way. Whatever may be the case I think that the future of our agriculture and of our industry belongs to the anonymous limited company.[312] Outside this form of development, at once flexible and stable, I see no way of keeping the effort of work always proportionate to the resistance of nature. While we have been awaiting the setting up of such an arrangement, we have been under too much pressure to have done with the old institutions. By destroying entails hastily, by then hindering the establishment of farming companies,[313] we have left agriculture to all the miseries of fragmentation. Production carried out in progressively smaller “workshop” farms[314] has meant retrogression rather than progress. The labor of the farm worker has become less and less productive. While the English worker, aided by machinery perfected by the large agricultural sector produces five, the French worker produces only one and a half, and the greater part of this feeble output goes to the capitalists who risk their funds in our poor “agricultural workshops."

This is the explanation of the poverty which is gnawing away the French countryside. This is why we are threatened by a new Jacquerie.[315] Do not attribute this Jacquerie to socialism, attribute it rather to those miserable law makers who while decreeing with one hand equality of land ownership, hindered with the other the formation of industrial companies[316] and heaped taxes on farming. These are the guilty men!

Perhaps we will succeed in avoiding the catastrophes which such sad errors prepared the way for, but we will have to hurry. From day to day the harm gets worse; from day to day France’s situation gets closer to that [116] of Ireland.[317] But our peasants do not have the forbearance of the Irish peasants…..

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Ah! We live in very sad times. The countryside is rotten.

THE ECONOMIST.

Whose fault is it, if not that of the legislators who have attacked the stability of property and the sanctity of the family? The socialist preachers can attack these two holy institutions as much as they like, they will never harm them as much as you yourselves did, by inscribing in your Legal Codes the right to an inheritance.

Molinari’s Long Footnote on Legislation about Making a Will

The right to make one’s will is limited in France, mainly by Articles 913 and 915 of the Civil Code.

Art. 913. Gifts, either by way of acts between living persons, or by will and testament, may not exceed half the wealth of the benefactor if he has one living child at the time of his death; a third if he has two [93] living children; a quarter if he has three or more children.
Art. 915. Gifts, either by way of acts between living persons, or by will and testament, may not exceed half the wealth of the benefactor if he has one or several ascendants on either the paternal or maternal side, or three quarters if he has ascendants on one side only.

It must be said in justification of the authors of the Civil Code, however, that they had had predecessors more illiberal still. By the law of 7th March 1793, the Convention had completely abolished the right to make a will. This law was conceived as follows:

One mode of Inheritance. The right to dispose of one’s wealth, either following one’s death, or between living persons, or by contractual donation in direct line of descent, is abolished: in consequence, all descendants will have an equal right to share the wealth of their ascendants.

The authors of the Civil Code were unanimous in recognizing that [94] this law had made a grave attack on paternal authority. Unfortunately they did not dare do more than half reform it.

Under the Roman Republic, the unlimited right to bequeath had been consecrated by the Law of the Twelve Tables. Divers successive attacks were made on this right, however. Justinian limited the disposable portion of the inheritance to a third when there were four children and a half when there were five or more.

In England, one can dispose in one’s will of all one’s real estate, without restrictions and of a third of one’s movable property; the other two thirds belong to the wife and children. Landed property goes by right to the eldest son, only when there is no will.

In the United States the right of bequeathing is completely free.[318]


8. The Fifth Evening

Editor’s Note

In this Soirée the topic for discussion is the nature of capital, the lending of capital (and money in general) at interest, and the role of government (if any) in regulating the rate of interest or providing cheap credit to “the people.” Molinari’s purpose in writing this chapter is to defend on theoretical grounds the legitimacy and utility of capital accumulation and lending money at interest from its socialist critics, as well as to argue for the ending of the government’s monopoly of issuing money (see S8 for more on free banking) and its regulation of the rate of interest on loans.

The immediate context for this discussion was the attempt by socialists like Proudhon to set up a system of Exchange Banks (Banques d'échange) or People's Banks which would offer low interest rate loans to workers (no more than 1%) because they regarded the charging of interest as a form of theft. They did not believe bankers or owners of capital were true “workers” who had used their labor to create their wealth and therefore had no right to profit from it by charging interest when they made loans. After the February Revolution of 1848 broke out Proudhon wrote pamphlets[319] defending his idea and attempted to set up such a bank.[320] He applied for an act of incorporation in January 1849 but was not able to raise the capital of fr. 50,000 it needed.

In order to counter this push for Peoples’ Banks and government subsidized loans or heavily regulated interest rates, Molinari’s older friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat began writing pamphlets in 1849 defending the justice of owning capital and charging interest on loans, such as “Capital and Rent” (February 1849), “Damned Money! (April 1849), and “Capital” (mid 1849), before engaging Proudhon head on in a five month long debate about “free credit” soon after the appearance of Molinari’s book in the fall of 1849.[321] Molinari’s discussion in this chapter should be seen in the light of this ongoing debate.

Although there were private banks in France the government had considerable control and influence in banking matters. The central bank was the Bank of France which was modeled on the Bank of England and was founded as a private bank in 1800 with Napoleon as one of the shareholders. It was granted a monopoly in issuing currency in 1803. Payment in specie upon demand was suspended twice in the 19th century, both times during revolutions - 1848-1850 and 1870-1875. The banks of the different Départementes were merged into the Bank of France in 1848 in an attempt to solve the fiscal crisis brought on by the Revolution. Concerning interest rates, the Physiocrat Turgot in 1789 wrote a Mémoire on interest for the Constituent Assembly[322] in which he advocated the complete liberalization of the laws regarding the charging of interest. The Assembly passed legislation legalizing the charging of interest but allowed the state to set the maximum allowed rate. The Law of 1807 set the rate for civil transactions at 5% and for commercial transactions at 6%.

For many working men and women a common source of small loans was the government monopoly pawn shops or “monts-de-piété.”[323] The name is a corruption of the Italian “monte di pietà” or “mercy loan” which were bodies established in the 15th century to provide loans to the poor. The monts-de-piété were formerly established in France in 1777 as a state privileged institution with a monopoly of the pawn broking business which could lend at 10% interest. During the inflation of the early part of the French Revolution the monts-de-piété were forced to close in 1795, only to reopen in 1797, and were re-regulated under the Empire in year XII. In 1844 the monts-de-piété of Paris lent fr. 25.6 million. By 1847 there were 45 monts-de-piété across France which loaned a total of fr. 48.9 million. Horace Say described them as “ne sont autre chose que des banques privilégiées de prêts sur gages” (nothing more than state privileged banks in the pawn broking business).

Concerning the theoretical defense of charging interest on loans, Molinari makes a fairly traditional Smithian argument that it is the price of money and, like all prices, it is determined by the cost of production, which, if left alone by government interference, will inevitable reach the level of its “natural price” through a process of competition and the operation of the “economic natural law” which is supply and demand. The Socialist also shares this view of price but differs from the Economist in that he believes that labor is one of major costs of production (along with materials) and that the labor of the “capitalist” is clearly missing from this equation. The Economist replies with a list of other “costs” which the lender of money has to cover before any profits can be made. These include the opportunity cost of foregoing present consumption in order to save money for the future,[324] the risk of loss or damage if loans are not repaid, and a payment for the “entrepreneurial labor” which the banker or capital owner undertakes to organize and run his business efficiently. He believes that these costs have been ignored or misunderstood by the socialist critics of interest. Interestingly, Molinari also criticizes Bastiat’s theory of interest for having ignored the opportunity costs and the risks faced by those lending the capital.[325]

However, Bastiat would in turn criticize Molinari for being too dependent on the labor theory of value. He explicitly says, in a manner Marx would probably have agreed with, that “things are exchanged in terms of their cost of production, that is to say according to the quantities of labor which they embody. These quantities of labor are the foundation of their exchange value.” (below, pp. 000). At the very time Molinari was writing the Soirées Bastiat was trying to reformulate the classical theory by putting the idea of the mutual exchange of “services” at the heart of production and exchange rather than “labor.” These services were “estimated” or valued by each individual consumer and producer according to their particular needs and situation, and an exchange was merely the “mutual exchange of services.”[326] Thus Bastiat was hinting at a “subjectivist” or “Austrian” view of the matter which would emerge in the 1870s during the so-called “Marginal Revolution.”[327]

Molinari concludes with the idea that if the government doesn’t deregulate the money lending business a black market will inevitably emerge in order to satisfy the needs of consumers. He calls them “les prêteurs interlopes” (interloper or pirate money lenders). Molinari uses the word “interlope” three times in Les Soirées. It is defined in the 1835 edition of the official dictionary of the Académie française[328] as a merchant ship which broke the monopoly trading rights of a state privileged trading company, usually in the colonies. In other words it was a trading vessel which broke the law in order to engage in private trade. By analogy, Molinari is using it to describe economic activity which breaks the restrictive laws banning or regulating certain trading activities. He sees this in a positive light and thus it has no negative connotations.[329]

Molinari would return to the topic of interest in 1852 when his article on “Usury” appeared in the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique.[330] Many of the arguments he makes in this Soirée were presented in a more structured form in that article. He would later devote several long chapters to money, banking, capital, and interest in his treatise Cours d’économie (1855, 1863).[331]

[117]

SUMMARY: The right to lend. –Legislation regulating lending at interest. – Definition of capital. – Motives driving capital formation. – On credit. – On interest. – On its constituent elements. – Labor. – Hardship. – Risks. – How these conditions can be alleviated. – That the laws cannot achieve this. – The disastrous results of legislation limiting the rate of interest. THE CONSERVATIVE.

Rotten usurer! To lend money to a scatterbrain who squanders his inheritance in advance on the young ladies of the Opéra, and, heavens above, at what a rate of interest!

THE ECONOMIST.

So whom are you railing at?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

At a damned money-lender[332] who has decided to lend a huge sum to one of my sons.

THE ECONOMIST.

At what rate?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

At 2% a month, 24% a year, no more nor less!

THE ECONOMIST.

That is not very dear. Imagine if you were still [118] in the flower of youth, strong and healthy. Next, imagine that the law categorically forbade lending at interest. The legal rate of interest is five per cent in civil matters and six in commercial matters.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Well it is precisely because the legal interest rate is five or six per cent that people should not be lending at twenty four.

THE ECONOMIST.

Lending happens, however. And to be wholly truthful with you I will say that I think the law counts for a part of this twenty four per cent.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What? But does not the law authorize me to pursue this vile money-lender…. ?

THE SOCIALIST.

This capitalist bloodsucker….

THE ECONOMIST.

Who lends at above the legal rate. So this is the issue then. I will tell you what is going to happen. You are going to sue the money-lender with whom your son has allowed himself to get involved in order to anticipate his inheritance. The man will have to defend himself. The case will be judged and he will win for lack of sufficient evidence. But the proceedings will even so have cost him money. Moreover his reputation will have suffered a new blemish. All these are risks to which he would not be exposed if there were no laws limiting the rate of interest. Now a lender has to cover his risks.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, but twenty four per cent? [119]

THE ECONOMIST.

If we consider how short the supply of funds is today, and how risky investments are, especially if the borrower is an habitué of Breda-Street,[333] and also how the regulatory system has inflated the cost of legal proceedings, we will find at the end of the day that twenty four per cent is not excessive.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You’re joking. If that were the case, why should legislation have limited the legal rate of interest to five or six per cent?

THE ECONOMIST.

Because the legislator concerned was a poor economist.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So you want usury to be permitted henceforth?

THE SOCIALIST.

And you want labor to be handed over without mercy to the tyranny of capital?

THE ECONOMIST.

On the contrary I want the rate of interest always to be as low as possible. That is why I urge lawmakers not to get involved in the matter.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But if you put no brakes on the greed of money-lenders, where in that case will the exploitation of heads of families stop?

THE SOCIALIST.

But if the law does not limit the power of capitalists where will the exploitation of the workers stop? [120]

THE ECONOMIST.

Oh really!

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So justify this anarchical and immoral doctrine of laisser-faire.

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, justify this “bankocratic” [334] and Malthusian doctrine of laisser-faire.

THE ECONOMIST.

What a charming alliance….So tell me then, oh worthy and venerable conservative, did you not applaud the famous proposal of M. Proudhon, regarding the gradual abolition of interest?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I? I denounced it with the full force of my indignation.

THE ECONOMIST.

You were wrong. You showed yourself to be utterly illogical in denouncing it. What did M. Proudhon want? He wanted, by means of government action, to reduce interest to zero.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Dreadful utopian!

THE ECONOMIST.

This utopian, however, was content to follow the early lead of your legislators. The only difference is that instead of holding himself to your legal limit of five or six percent, he demanded that the limit be lowered to zero.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Is there no difference, then, between these two limits? Certainly one can fairly say to people: you will not lend at more than five or six per cent. That is a reasonable, [121] an honest level. To oblige them to lend for nothing, however, is that not plundering them, the….Oh, those thieving socialists!

THE ECONOMIST.

It makes me very angry; but it is you who brought them into existence, those thieves. Socialism is only a radical exaggeration, though a perfectly logical one, of your laws and regulations. You decided, in the interest of society, that it should be the law which decides what happens to the estates left by heads of family. Socialism decides, in the interests of society, that it will be handed over by law to the community. You have decided that various industries shall be run and their workforce paid by the state; socialism has decided that all industries shall be run, and all their employees paid for, by the state. You decided that interest would be limited to five or six per cent; socialism decides that it shall be reduced to zero.

If you had the right to limit the rate of interest, that is to say partially to do away with interest payments, socialism has a perfect right, it seems to me, to do away with them entirely.

THE SOCIALIST.

This is incontestable. We have the right, by the very reckoning of our enemies, and we use it to the full. So in what way are we blameworthy?

That conservatives show consideration towards capital, is understandable. They live on it. They have felt themselves, however, the need to put limits on capitalist exploitation;[335] and they have protected themselves against the most wily and greedy people in their own gang. Capitalists have forbidden lending at very high interest by [122] condemning it as usury. We in turn have arrived on the scene, however, and recognizing the inadequacy of this law we have undertaken to cut out the evil at its root and we have said: let the legal rate of interest henceforth be lowered from five or six per cent to zero. You protest! But if the capitalists have been able legitimately to demand the abolition of gross usury, why should we be committing a crime by demanding the abolition of petty usury? In what way is the one more legitimate than the other?

THE ECONOMIST.

Your claims are perfectly logical. The only thing is you would no more be able to reduce the rate of interest to zero than the legislators of the Empire were able to lower it to a maximum of five or six per cent. You would end up like them causing it to rise further.

THE SOCIALIST.

What do you know about it ?

THE ECONOMIST.

I could invoke the history of all such laws setting a maximum rate[336] and prove to you consulting the evidence that each time people have wanted to limit the price of things whether labor, capital, or goods, they have invariably pushed it up. I would like to get you to see however, the why and wherefore of this rise. I prefer to explain to you how it comes about that interest should naturally be sometimes at ten, fifteen, twenty, and thirty per cent, sometimes at five, four, three, and two per cent and even lower; and how it arises that no ad hoc legislation can make it go below this.

Do you know what the price of things is made up of?

THE SOCIALIST.

What you economists usually say [123] is that the price of things is constituted by their cost of production.

THE ECONOMIST.

And in what does the cost of production consist?

THE SOCIALIST.

Again according to the Economist, the cost of production is made up from the labor needed to produce a given merchandise and put it on the market.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, but does the price at which things sell always represent exactly the cost of the labor required, that is their costs of production?

THE SOCIALIST.

No, not always. The costs of production represent what Adam Smith, rather wisely in my opinion, has called the natural price of things. Now this same Adam Smith notes that the price at which things sell, the market price, does not always coincide with the natural price.[337]

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, but Adam Smith also notes that the natural price is, as it were, the central point around which the market price gravitates constantly, and towards which it is irresistibly drawn back.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

How does that happen?

THE ECONOMIST.

When the price of a good exceeds its cost of production, those who produce it or who sell it realize an exceptional return. The lure of this unusual return [124] attracts competition and to the extent that this competition mounts, the price falls.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Where does it all stop?

THE ECONOMIST

The limit is the cost of production. Sometimes also the price falls below these costs. In this latter case, however, production ceasing to yield a sufficient return, itself slows down, the market becomes depleted and prices rise again. Thanks to this economic law of gravitation, prices tend always and irresistibly, to attain their natural level; that is to say to represent exactly the amount of labor the merchandise has cost. I will have occasion to come back later to this law which is really the keystone of the economic edifice.[338]

To resume: interest is constituted by the cost of production. The market rate of interest gravitates continuously round the cost of production.

THE SOCIALIST.

And from what, may I ask, is the cost of production of the rate of interest made up?

THE ECONOMIST.

From the labor costs and the risks of losses or damage, from which must be deducted…

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What’s that?

THE ECONOMIST.

From the labor costs and the risks of losses or damage.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is what is not clear. [125]

THE ECONOMIST.

This will become clear shortly. First, what things does one lend?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Well, we lend things which possess some value.

THE ECONOMIST.

Having a value means, as you know, being suitable for satisfying one or other of the needs of man. How do things acquire such a property? Sometimes they possess it naturally; sometimes it is bestowed on them by labor.

The value which nature imparts to things is free. Nature works for nothing. Only man has his labor paid for, or to put it better, exchanges his labor for that of others. Things are exchanged in terms of their cost of production, that is to say according to the quantities of labor which they embody. These quantities of labor are the foundation of their exchange value. The more one possesses things which embody labor, the richer one is: in fact the better one can satisfy one’s needs, either by consuming these things or exchanging them for other consumable things. If we do not want to consume them right away we can either store them or lend them.

Those things which embody useful labor are known as “capital."

Capital is accumulated by savings.

Two motives drive man to save.

The first arises from the very nature of man. Working life scarcely stretches beyond two thirds of the human lifetime. In his infancy and in his old age, [126] man consumes without producing. He is therefore obliged to put aside a portion of his daily labor to bring up his family and to provide for his own livelihood in his old age. This is the first motive which leads man not to consume immediately the whole value of his labor, in other words to accumulate capital.

There is another motive as well. If need be, man can produce without capital ... 

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Where do you see this happening?

THE ECONOMIST.

Do you think the first men were born with a bow and arrows, an axe, and a plane to hand? At a pinch we can produce without capital but not on any kind of scale. In order to create many useful things in return for little effort, one needs numerous, sophisticated tools; the production of certain things demands, moreover, a lot of time. Now the producer cannot survive during this time unless he gets a sufficient advance supply of food, unless he has a certain capital at his disposal. The individual therefore has an interest in putting by some of his output, in accumulating capital, in order to be able to increase his production while reducing his efforts, in order to make his labor more fruitful.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That’s right.

THE ECONOMIST.

But this second motive which leads to the accumulation of capital, is far less general than the first. It acts [127] only on industrial entrepreneurs[339] and those who aspire to become such.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is to say on everybody.

THE ECONOMIST.

No! There are many laborers in manufacturing who do not dream of becoming manufacturers,[340] many farm laborers who have no ambition to run farms, many bank clerks who do not aspire to set up a bank. And as industry develops on a bigger scale, there will be fewer and fewer such aspirants.

In the present state of affairs, the manufacturing entrepreneurs[341] are already in a minority. If they were limited to just their own savings, to the capital they are able to accumulate themselves, this would be completely inadequate.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

There is no doubt about that. If each manufacturing entrepreneur,[342] manufacturer, farmer, or merchant found himself limited to his own resources; if he had at his disposal only his own capital, production would be endlessly stymied by lack of sufficient funds.

THE SOCIALIST.

Whereas there would be in the hands of non-entrepreneurs,[343] a considerable quantity of inactive capital.

THE ECONOMIST.

We have overcome that difficulty by means of credit.

THE SOCIALIST.

Say rather that we should have overcome it. Unfortunately society has not yet been able to organize the supply of credit. [128]

THE ECONOMIST.

Credit has been organized since the beginning of the world. On the day when, for the first time one man lent to another some product of his own labor, credit was invented. Since that day it has never stopped developing. Intermediaries have set themselves up between the capitalists and the entrepreneurs. The numbers of these traders in capital, bankers, or business agents, have multiplied enormously. Stock exchanges have been set up where one can sell capital wholesale and retail.

THE SOCIALIST.

Ah, the stock exchange….that vile haunt of the pimps of capital, where they gather to negotiate their foul purchases. When are we going to close these temples of usury?

THE ECONOMIST.

Then you had better close “le marché des Innocents” (The Innocents’ Market),[344] too, since theft takes place there as well…Capital lending has been organized on a huge scale and it is destined to develop much further once it has ceased to be directly and indirectly hobbled.

Capital is accumulated in all its forms. In what form however is it accumulated most willingly? In the form of durable objects, not cumbersome, and easily exchanged. Certain objects combine these qualities to a higher degree than all the others; I mean precious metals. The price of precious metals has consequently become the bench mark for all prices. When somebody lends his capital in a less durable and more readily depreciating form, the borrower has to be paid compensation for this difference in durability and tendency to depreciation. Furnishings and houses [129] are let out more expensively than a sum of money of the same value.

When someone lends capital in the form of precious metal, the price of the loan takes the name interest, when the loan is transacted in another form, when people are lending land, houses, furniture, the price is called rent.[345]

Interest is therefore the sum we pay for the use of a certain quantity of labor accumulated in the most durable form, the least inconvenient, and the most freely exchangeable.

Sometimes this use of capital costs more, sometimes less, sometimes it is free and sometimes the capitalists even pay a premium to those to whom they entrust their capital.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Are you joking? Wherever can lenders be seen paying interest to their borrowers? The world would be upside down!

THE ECONOMIST.

Do you know on what conditions the first deposit banks which were established in Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Genoa took in capital deposits?[346] In Amsterdam the capitalists first of all paid a premium of ten florins when an account was opened for them; next they paid an annual custody fee of one per cent. Moreover the various monies at that time being subject to sizable depreciations, the bank levied a variable charge on the sum deposited. In Amsterdam this charge was commonly 5%. Well, despite the harshness of these conditions, the capitalists preferred to entrust their funds to a bank, rather than keeping them or lending them directly to people who had need of them. [130]

THE SOCIALIST.

At that time interest was less.

THE ECONOMIST.

That is right. Well, as in all eras, the man who has accumulated capital has to engage in a certain supervision and to run certain risks if he looks after it himself; since it can happen that it is less trouble and he runs fewer risks if he lends it, interest can therefore, at any time, fall to zero or even below zero.

You also understand, however, that if this negative part of the costs of production were to become very substantial; if holding capital were subject to very great risks, such as a lack of security or excessive taxation; if lending too offered only inadequate security, accumulation would come to a halt. People would stop saving their funds if they could no longer count on consuming them themselves, at least for the most part. Man would start living from day to day, ceasing to care for his old age, and for the future of his family, without concerning himself any more with perfecting or expanding his production. Civilization would regress rapidly under such a regime.

The weaker the negative part of interest, the more powerful is the stimulus which drives man to save.

Let us have a look now at the positive part of interest.

This latter represents labor, losses, and risk.

If you go to a certain amount of trouble, if you experience certain losses, if you run certain risks in [131] the keeping of your own capital, you are routinely obliged to take even more care, to sustain even more damage, and run even more risks if you lend it.

In what circumstances are you, as a capitalist, disposed to lend out funds?

It is when you yourself have no use for them at present. You lend money willingly until the time comes when you need it yourself. Two borrowers, two men with a present need for capital, approach you: with which one will you deal? You will choose, will you not, the one who gives you the better financial and moral guarantees, the richer and more upright of the two, the one who will reimburse you the more reliably? Unless, however, his competitor happens to offer you a higher price, in which case you will weigh the difference in risk and rates offered and then decide. If you go for the second, it will be because the better rate seems to you to balance and go a little beyond balancing, the difference in financial and moral guarantees.

Thus the function of interest payments is to cover risks.

You lend your capital for a pre-arranged period; but are you quite sure you will not need it during this period? Could not some accident come your way obliging you to seek access to your savings? Does it not also happen, rather frequently, that we lend funds which we need ourselves? In the first case the harm is only potential; in the second it is real; but whether real or potential, does it not require some payment?

Interest serves therefore to compensate for such losses. [132]

You keep your wealth in a safe, or a barn, or elsewhere. If you lend it out, you will have to go to some trouble, that is do a certain amount of work, moving it and having the loan recorded, as well inspecting the use to which the loan will be put. These tasks must be paid for.

Interest therefore serves to pay for this labor.

A premium serving to cover risk, a compensatory payment to cover losses, a cash sum to pay for work done: such are the positive elements in the cost of production of interest payments.

These three elements appear, in different degrees, in all loans made at interest.

THE SOCIALIST.

We would abolish them if we socialized credit.[347]

THE ECONOMIST.

Really? Are there any risks? If you are a lender you can do as much as you like, whether you are banker, a financial agent, a supplier of capital, or a saver, but you will still always be at risk when you lend.

Unless:

1.You are dealing with people of absolute integrity and perfect knowledge;

Or

2. You are dealing with people whose work is not exposed, directly or indirectly, to any chance catastrophe.

Short of this, you are running risks, and people will have to pay you a premium to cover them.

THE SOCIALIST.

I agree; but if industry were less [133] risky, this premium could be considerably reduced.

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, considerably. So rather than setting up commercial banks, study the real causes which make industry a risky undertaking and study also the causes which change a population’s morality or lessen its knowledge.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is a point of view which seems to me rather novel. Interest rates can be lower, then, in a country which has high standards of morality and practical knowledge than in a country where these qualities are scarce.

THE ECONOMIST.

Better to say that this ought to be lower. Do you not lend more willingly to an honest man than to some fellow who is half rogue?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That goes without saying.

THE ECONOMIST.

Well what you do, everyone else does too. The rate of interest rises in proportion as morality declines. It also rises as knowledge is lessened or is mistaken. Take these economic maxims to heart and know how to apply them appropriately.

The risks which undoubtedly constitute the most considerable element in the costs of production of interest, can fall very significantly indeed, but I doubt whether they can vanish completely. [134]

THE SOCIALIST.

If memory serves me well, one of the leading figures of the Saint-Simonian school, M. Bazard, thought quite the opposite.[348]

THE ECONOMIST.

You are muddling things. Here is what M. Bazard wrote in his preface to the French translation of Bentham’s Defense of Usury:[349]

“ …It is permissible to conclude that interest, as representing the rent accruing to the tools of production, has a tendency to disappear completely, and that of the elements which compose it today, the insurance premium is the only one which has to remain, while itself diminishing, because of progress in industrial organization, as compared to solely those risks which can be regarded as beyond the foresight and wisdom of human beings."[350]

Like M. Bazard, I doubt whether the risks of lending can ever disappear completely; for I do not think we can ever succeed in eliminating all the accidents, natural or otherwise, which threaten capital lending. Those who use capital, those who risk its destruction, will always have to pay an insurance premium to cover this risk.

THE SOCIALIST.

But a mutual benefit insurance company[351] ….

THE ECONOMIST.

No such company could prevent real risks from falling on people. You lend money to a farmer whose work-sheds may [135] be destroyed by a fire or whose harvests may be ravaged by hail, or weevils, or some other thing. Consequently you are running various risks. These risks must be covered, otherwise, you do not lend.

THE SOCIALIST.

But what if the farmer is insured against fire, hail, and weevils?

THE ECONOMIST.

He will still pay an annual premium on the capital you have lent him to increase his equipment and expand his cultivation; only instead of paying you he will pay it to underwriters. He will pay them less, since insurance is their speciality and it is not yours; but he will pay it to them. The parts of the interest he will pay annually to have the use of your capital are separate but they will remain nonetheless.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

And the rent; do you agree with M. Bazard that it could disappear?

THE ECONOMIST.

The rent, as defined by M. Bazard, is the portion of the cost of production of interest representing compensation for loss and the payment of labor.[352]

Can one relinquish capital, without experiencing any loss as a consequence of its absence? Yes, if one is sure of not having need of it until the time when it will be reimbursed,[353] or perhaps again of being able to recover it or realize it without loss. Will these two circumstances happen one day in an orderly, normal, [136] permanent way? Will it turn out that all the capital used in production will be reimbursable or realizable without loss at the behest of the lenders?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Pure daydreaming!

THE ECONOMIST.

I would not be so sure. We should note that all the capital employed or even employable in production, does not constitute all the capital at society’s disposal. One generally lends only such capital as one does not need at present. Well it could turn out that we do not lend any other kind of capital. In this case we will not suffer any real loss by lending. Will it be feasible likewise to eliminate potential losses? Will the development of capital one day operate sufficiently perfectly that the exit of capital from production will routinely be compensated for, by capital entry? I could not say but this is possible. If the production and circulation of capital were not slowed and harassed by a thousand obstacles, we would soon be fully informed in this regard.

There remain the payments remunerating the labor involved in the loan, the trouble the lender has to go to in undertaking the loan. The work is real and, like all real work, merits payment.

The invention and proliferation of banks has resulted in the shifting and the division of this labor. The capitalist who sends his money to a bank now incurs very little inconvenience. On the other hand the bank which lends this money to an industrial entrepreneur carries out serious work and accumulates very considerable costs. This work must be paid for and these costs must be covered. Who should [137] pay? Obviously he who uses the capital, provided that he can pass them on to the consumer of the goods produced with the aid of the capital.

Can it be supposed that these costs will ever disappear? No! While they can fall as a result of the proliferation of specialist intermediaries working in the field of capital lending, they could not be eliminated. A bank has to pay and will always have to pay for its premises and pay its employees etc. There at least, we see one part of the cost of production of interest that is indestructible.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is most fortunate.

THE ECONOMIST.

Why would you say this? Is not the society which consumes the products of labor also interested in their selling at the lowest possible price? Well, the interest on capital figures to a greater or lesser extent in the prices of all things. If it did not exist or were smaller, one could buy these things in exchange for a smaller amount of labor, because they would contain less labor.

The general affluence of populations grows in proportion as interest rates fall; it would be at its maximum if interest came to fall naturally to zero.

THE SOCIALIST.

I grasp perfectly this analysis of the costs of the production of interest; I see that interest is composed of real parts which must be covered, without which….without which….

THE ECONOMIST.

…the capitalists would not lend their capital, or if they were forced to lend they would stop accumulating it, [138] they would stop saving. Now since capital, with the exception of precious metals and a few other goods, is largely destructible, the material capital of society today – fields of wheat, pasturage, vineyards, houses, furniture, tools, provisions – would just disappear in a very few years if we did not take care to renew them by means of work and savings.

THE SOCIALIST.

You have successfully conveyed my own thinking. I also understand that these different parts of the costs of production tend naturally to fall. But is the market rate of interest therefore always the exact representation of the elements or costs of production of interest?

THE ECONOMIST.

The same holds for capital as for everything. When people are offering more capital than is demanded, the market rate of interest will fall. Even so, it could never fall much below the cost of production of interest, for we would rather hang on to capital than lend it out at a loss. The price could rise above these costs when demand for capital is greater than its supply. If the disproportion becomes too marked, however, the capital attracted by the increasingly large premium offered to it, will soon come flooding into the market and equilibrium will reestablish itself. The market price will in this case converge once again towards the natural price.

This equilibrium establishes itself on its own, unless artificial obstacles prevent its doing so. I will talk about these obstacles when we are considering the banks.[354] In the main, however, it is on the costs of production that we must make an impact if we have to act to lower [139] the rate of interest in an ordered and lasting way. The fact is that these costs could not be lowered, either in whole or in part, by means of a law.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So here we are, back with the legal rate!

THE ECONOMIST.

One can no more say to a capitalist: “You[355] will not lend your capital at above a maximum interest rate of five or six per cent,” than you can to a merchant: “You will not sell your sugar for more than a maximum price of eight sous a pound."[356] If at eight sous the merchant cannot cover the cost of production of the sugar and remunerate his own labor, he will stop selling sugar. Likewise, if being subject to an interest rate maximum of five or six per cent, the capitalist is not covering the risks of the loan, nor the loss resulting from going a while without his capital, nor the work he had to put in to his lending, he will cease lending.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But they do not stop. My usurer…

THE ECONOMIST.

Or if he continues to lend, will he not be obliged to add to the interest he is making, a premium for the extra risks he runs in breaking the law? This is just what your usurer has not failed to do. If there were no law limiting the rate of interest, he might have charged only twenty per cent or even less.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What? You think that the cost of production of the interest on the capital lent to my son really amount to twenty per cent? [140]

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, I think so. There are great risks in lending to the youthful customers of Breda Street. Will you not admit that these friendly discounters of the right to an inheritance do not supply moral guarantees of a very substantial sort.[357]

THE SOCIALIST.

All things considered, though, the laws against usury cannot have had really catastrophic effects. They are so easily evaded.

THE ECONOMIST.

Do not be so sure! Many men find themselves in a situation such that they cannot borrow, short of paying heavy interest. Well, the law having banned so-called usurious loans, the people who conform religiously to the present law, whether it be good or bad, abstain from lending to these needy men. The latter are reduced to approaching certain individuals not burdened with these scruples, men who profit from being few in number and from the urgency of their clients’ needs by raising the rate of interest yet again.

The law restricting the rate of interest establishes, you see, a real monopoly in favor of the least scrupulous lenders, and to the detriment of the poorest borrowers. It is thanks to this absurd law that the interlopers who lend money[358] or usurers bleed dry the workers or shopkeepers who incur short-term debts, or traders who have just experienced a disastrous loss, and many others.

Do you now understand that political economy takes a stand, in the interests of the masses, against this [141] limitation on the right to lend, and undertakes the defense of usury?

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, I understand. I see that the law does not prevent usury and that, on the contrary, it makes it more bitter. I see that if this restrictive law were to be abolished, the most needy borrowers would pay smaller premiums to the lenders.

THE ECONOMIST.

That would be an immense benefit to the poorest classes in society. Let us therefore demand the abolition of state controlled interest rates.[359] It would be the best way of getting the better of the usurers and of putting an end to usury.


9. The Sixth Evening

Editor’s Note

In this Soirée Molinari begins a discussion of the right to exchange which he will continue in S7 where he turns to free trade and protectionism. Here he discusses the right to exchange one’s own labor, the legal restrictions which prevent workers from forming trade unions, how the price of a “perishable commodity” like labor is determined, how workers can organize in order to support themselves in times of labor surpluses, and how “artificial obstacles” like government restrictions restrict the number of jobs which are available. There is brief discussion about the price of wheat during periods of shortages but he leaves the main discussion of free trade to the following chapter. The Economist also in this Soirée gives one of his mini-lectures or speeches on what he believes - this time on "the law of supply and demand.”

The issue of “labor” became increasingly important for the Economists during the 1840s as a result of the critical onslaught of the socialists. The Economists responded with their own intellectual counter-attack, most notably the massive three volume work “On the Freedom of Working” by the doyen of the Economists, Charles Dunoyer.[360] Dunoyer had spent 20 years working on his magnum opus which finally appeared to much acclaim in 1845 and his view dominated the thinking of the economists at this time. He defined liberty as the ability to work at what one chose, to gradually have the obstacles to work removed, and more generally to expand one’s sphere of action. Thus, working lay at the core of what it meant to be free:

What I call liberty, in this book, is the power which men acquire in order to use their strength more easily, to the degree to which they are freed from the obstacles which originally hindered them in its exercise. I also say that a man is all the more free to the extent that he is able to rid himself of the things which prevent him from making use of his strength, to the extent to which he is able to remove these impediments from his presence, to the extent that he is able to expand and unblock his sphere of action.[361]

Molinari would develop a slightly different view of both liberty and labor to Dunoyer but they shared much in common.[362] Concerning labor, Molinari came to view labor very much from the perspective of “exchange” (which is why he includes it in this Soirée). Even if he had nothing else, a laborer owned his own person and his own faculties and should be regarded as a “marchand de travail” (a merchant or trader of his own labor) which he could exchange with others in return for wages.[363]

So it is not surprising that Molinari took a great interest in labor issues soon after he arrived in Paris in the early 1840s. He saw labor as just another form of exchange which should be freed from external restrictions; he saw unions as just another example of a voluntary association between free individuals to achieve shared goals;[364] and he saw the unequal punishment meted out to labor unions vis-à-vis employers associations as a violation of the principle of equality under the law. He first became active in labor matters in 1845-46 when he intervened in a court case against Parisian carpenters who had tried to start a union because he thought they had been unfairly treated under the law and tried to raise money to help pay their court costs. He later gave an open address to Parisian workers in 1846 on the need for a “Bulletin du travail” (Labor Market Report) which would provide information to workers on prices and availability of jobs much like the “Bulletin de la Bourse” (Stock Market Report) provided prices and availability of stocks and bonds to investors.[365] This he thought would even up the balance of power between employees and employers. He included an appendix at the end of this chapter where he summarizes his scheme for a fully fledged “Bourse du travail” (Labor Exchange) which he continued to advocate for the rest of his long life. His plan was to use the new technology of the electric telegraph to transmit information instantaneously about wage rates and the availability of jobs across the length and breadth of Europe to facilitate the movement of laborers - just as stock prices, interest rates, and the price of gold and other commodities were transmitted to the Bourses (Stock Exchanges) for the benefit of the capitalists, merchants, and manufacturers.

The sticking point for the Economists was the unfair nature of the laws regarding the punishments for forming associations by employers and workers. This began during the Revolution with legislation introduced by Jean Le Chapelier, the notorious “Le Chapelier Law,” which was enacted on 14 June, 1791. These restrictions were tightened in the Penal Code which stated that any “coalition” (or association) by employers to conspire to keep wages low could be punished by imprisonment from six days to a month and a fine. Any “coalition” (or union) organized by workers to attempt to raise their wages could be punished by much harsher penalties with imprisonment of at least one month and no more than three months, with union leaders getting two to five years. Furthermore, associations of employers were largely ignored by the police, while unions were harshly punished. Molinari quotes the relevant articles in this chapter (see below, pp. 000).

Molinari continued his critique of Articles 414, 415, 416 of the Penal Code after he left Paris in 1852 in a Petition to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives in 1857 with a thousand signatures in support. He criticized the “deplorable inequality” which these Articles created between workers and their employers and reminded the legislators that

if you accept the idea that the regime of the liberty of labor is beneficial, it is on the condition that this liberty is a real one; that it is on the condition that the same rights which are granted to industrial entrepreneurs vis-à-vis the workers are also granted to the workers vis-à-vis the entrepreneurs.[366]

The second part of the Soirée deals with the price of labor and how it is determined. Molinari uses the example of the price of a perishable commodity (like oranges) which can fluctuate rapidly and has to be sold before it rots, and compares it to a durable commodity (like diamonds) which a jeweler can hold for as long as he likes until he can get a better price. Labor, Molinari argues, is more like a perishable commodity which can place the laborer in a difficult situation in times of labor surpluses, but occasionally in the driver’s seat in times of labor shortages. Since he is a strict Malthusian,[367] Molinari’s solution to an over supply of labor is for workers in the longer term to limit the size of their families (and hence the number of future workers), and in the short term to form voluntary associations like unions to raise money to support unemployed members or to subsidize them to temporarily withdraw their own labor from the market.

Towards the end of the Soirée the Economist makes a very interesting point which he does not explore in any detail, namely that many of the obstacles to full and steady employment are “artificial” (created by government intervention) and not “natural” (such as crop failures or floods). By artificial obstacles[368] he means such things as state provided charity (which creates negative incentives to work), restrictions on the free movement of labor (such as the requirement for workers to carry their government issued “workbooks” at all times),[369] restrictions on the free entry or workers into certain occupations (trade guilds restricted the number of new apprentices who could be admitted), and most intriguingly the recurrence of periodic “industrial crises.” The Economists in the 1840s were beginning to develop a theory to explain the periodic commercial crises which afflicted the economy. A leader in this field was Charles Coquelin who argued that the central bank with its government monopoly in the issuing of money was the key to understanding the problem.[370] Its manipulation of the money supply distorted the economy which led to the need for “corrections” which were manifested as commercial or industrial crises which had a particularly deleterious effect on ordinary workers. Unfortunately Molinari does not go into any details here but merely refers to it in passing.[371]

Molinari would go on to write the article on “Travail” (Labor) in the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique (1852-53)[372] and three lengthy chapters on “Labor” in his treatise Cours d’économie politique (1855, 1863).[373]

[142]

SUMMARY: The right to exchange. – On the exchange of labor. –Laws regulating unions. – Articles 414 and 415 of the Penal Code – The Union of Paris Carpenters, 1845. – Proof of the law which makes the price of things gravitate towards their cost of production. – Its application to labor. – That the worker can sometimes dictate terms to the employer. – An example from the British West Indies. – The natural organization of the sale of labor. THE ECONOMIST

Exchange is even more hindered than lending and borrowing. The exchange of labor is subject to legislation on passports and workbooks and to union law;[374] buying and selling of real-estate is subject to costly and oppressive formalities; the trade in goods is burdened, domestically, by various indirect taxes, notably by licensing duties, and externally by customs. These different infringements on the property of those who engage in exchange, result invariably in reducing output and disrupting the just distribution of wealth.

Let us consider first of all the obstacles placed in the way of the free exchange of labor.

THE SOCIALIST

Ought we not, before that, finish examining the various aspects of external property? [143]

THE ECONOMIST

We can think of labor as external property. The entrepreneur who buys labor does not buy all the worker’s faculties and productive powers; he buys the portion of these which the worker separates from himself by the act of working. The exchange is not really concluded or closed until the worker, who has separated from himself a part of his intellectual and moral capabilities, has received in exchange, products (most commonly precious metals) likewise containing a certain quantity of labor. This is truly, therefore, an exchange of two external properties.

To be just, all exchange must be perfectly free.[375] Are not two men who effect an exchange the best judges of their interest? Can a third party legitimately intervene and oblige one of the two contracting parties to give more or receive less than he would have given or received had the exchange been a free one? If one or the other reckons that the thing he is being offered is too dear, he will not buy it.

THE SOCIALIST

What if he is forced to buy it in order to live? What if a worker, pressured by hunger, is obliged to relinquish[376] a considerable amount of labor in exchange for a very low wage?

THE ECONOMIST

This is an objection which will oblige us to follow a very long, roundabout route.

THE SOCIALIST

Admit, though, that the objection is a very strong one…it really contains the whole socialist case. The socialists have [144] recognized, confirmed, that there is not and cannot be equality under the present arrangement for the exchange of labor; that the employer is in the nature of things stronger than the worker, so that he can always lay down the law to the latter and does so. Having clearly asserted this manifest inequality, they have sought the means of eliminating it. They have found two of these: the intervention of the state between seller and buyer of labor; and the Association of Workers which cuts out the private sale of labor.

THE ECONOMIST

Are you quite sure that the inequality of which you speak exists?

THE SOCIALIST

Am I sure of it? But the masters of political economy themselves have recognized this inequality. If I had the works of Adam Smith to hand…..

THE CONSERVATIVE

Here they are in my library.

THE ECONOMIST

Here is the page.

THE SOCIALIST

Give me your attention please:

What are the common wages of labor, says Adam Smith, depends every where upon the contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labor.
It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorizes, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long–run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate.

Please listen to this, too:

We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters; though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and every where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labor above their actual rate. To violate this combination is every where a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which nobody ever hears of [146] Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labor even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen; who sometimes too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labor. Their usual pretense are, sometimes the high price of provisions; sometimes the great profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have always recourse to the loudest clamor, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands. The masters upon these occasions are just as clamorous upon the other side, and never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity against the combinations of servants, laborers, and journeymen. The workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of those tumultuous combinations, which, partly from the interposition of the civil magistrate, partly from the superior steadiness of the masters, partly from the necessity which the greater part of the workmen are under of submitting for the sake of present subsistence, generally end in nothing, but the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders.[377] [147]

So there you have, is it not true, an eloquent condemnation of your system of free competition, from the pen of the very master of economic science? In the arguments over wages, the employer is stronger than the worker – Adam Smith himself confirms it! After this admission by the master himself, what ought his disciples to have done? If they had truly possessed any love of justice and humanity, ought they not to have searched for ways to establish equality in the relations of employers and workers? Have they fulfilled this duty? ... With what have they proposed to replace the wage earners, that ultimate embodiment of servitude, as M. de Châteaubriand has so aptly put it?[378] What do they propose in place of this unjust and primitive laissez-faire which builds the prosperity of the master on the ruin of the workers? What have they proposed, I ask you?

THE ECONOMIST

Nothing.

THE SOCIALIST

In fact they said they could do nothing against the natural laws which govern society; they have shamefully confessed their powerlessness to come to the aid of the workers. This duty of justice and humanity, which they have failed to recognize, has been fulfilled, however, by us socialists. In replacing the wage earners by Associations of Workers we have put an end to the exploitation of man by man and to the tyranny of capital.

THE ECONOMIST

I…um! [148]

THE CONSERVATIVE

Allow me first of all to make a simple observation. In the passage from Adam Smith which has just been cited, the subject is laws which repress unequally the employers’ coalitions and those of the workers. Thank God, we do not have anything like this in France. Our laws treat all equally. There are no longer inequalities in France.

THE ECONOMIST

You are wrong. On the contrary, French law has established a flagrant inequality between employer and worker. To prove this to you it will be enough for me to read articles 414 and 415 of the Penal Code.[379]

Art.414. Any coalition between those who give the workers employment, which is aimed at forcing down wages, unjustly and improperly, followed by an attempt at carrying this out or actually beginning to do so, will be punished by an imprisonment of from six days to a month, and a fine ranging from two hundred to three thousand francs.
Art.415. Any coalition, either attempted or initiated, on the part of the workers, which is aimed at bringing all work to a halt simultaneously, forbidding activity in a workshop, preventing people going there or staying there before or after certain hours, and in general, stopping, preventing or making production more expensive, will be punished by an imprisonment of at least one month and no more than three months. The ringleaders or instigators will be punished with an imprisonment of two to five years.

As you see, the employers can be prosecuted only when there is an unjust or improper move on their part to force wages down; the workers are prosecuted [149] purely and simply for attempting to form coalitions; moreover the punishments are monstrously unequal.

THE CONSERVATIVE

Has not the National Assembly reformed these two articles?[380]

THE SOCIALIST

It would perhaps have reformed them were it not for the opposition of an economist.[381] In the meantime these articles remain in force and God knows what disastrous influence they exert on the price of labor. Remember the union of Parisian carpenters in 1845. The workers formed a union to obtain a rise of one franc on their wage, which at that time stood at four francs.[382] The management combined to resist.

THE CONSERVATIVE

The union was never established.

THE SOCIALIST

On the contrary it was fully established. At that time when associations were explicitly forbidden, the employers of carpenters had obtained authorization for the setting up a Chamber of Syndics for the improvement of their industry; but in this Chamber of Better Business there was more concern with wages than with anything else.[383]

THE CONSERVATIVE

So what do you know about it?

THE SOCIALIST

The discussions during the legal proceedings have clearly established the facts. The representatives of the workers addressed their remarks to the chairman of the carpenters’ trade association in order to gain an increase in wages. The chairman turned this down after a long deliberation among the participants. The employers, however, were not [150] prosecuted and in reality they could hardly be so. They had combined, truth to tell, but not to lower wages “unjustly and improperly” ; they had combined to prevent wages rising.

THE ECONOMIST

Which came down to exactly the same thing.

THE SOCIALIST

But the legislators under the Empire had not understood it in this way. The employers were sent away absolved. The leaders of the workers’ union were condemned, some to five years, others to three years of imprisonment.

THE ECONOMIST

Yes, this was one of the most deplorable condemnations which the annals of justice record.

THE CONSERVATIVE

If I am not mistaken the union resorted to blatant abuses. Certain workers ill treated fellow workers who had not wanted to go along with the union. But your theory of laissez-faire perhaps authorizes such procedures.

THE ECONOMIST

Much less than your theory does. When people say unlimited freedom, they mean equal freedom for everybody, equal respect for the rights of one and all. Now when a worker prevents another worker from working, by intimidation or violence, he is making an assault on a right, he is violating property, he is a tyrant and a plunderer and ought to be sternly punished as such. The workers who had committed this kind of offence in the case of the carpenters, were in no way excusable and it was right [151] and proper to condemn them. But not all of them had been involved. The union chiefs had neither carried out nor ordered any violence. They were however more severely punished than the others.

THE CONSERVATIVE

The law will be reformed.

THE ECONOMIST

As long as it remains it will be an unjust law.

THE CONSERVATIVE

What? Even though it no longer upheld any difference between masters and workers?

THE ECONOMIST

Yes. What does Adam Smith say? He says the employers can make agreements with much greater ease than the workers and that the law can get them much less easily.[384] Now if the law strikes at four trades unions for every one association of the employers, is the law just?

In practice, the effect of this law is disastrous for the workers. The employers, knowing that the law restrains them only with difficulty, while it restrains the workers easily, are encouraged to raise and submit excessive claims in the management of labor prices. Any law with respect to these unions, however equal we make it, therefore constitutes an intervention by society in favor of the employer. In the end, people were convinced of this in England and this law relating to unions, which had incurred the just condemnations of Adam Smith, was duly abolished.

THE CONSERVATIVE

Let us see though! Are unions legitimate or are they not? Do they constitute a fraudulent agreement or a proper one? That is the question. Well, on this question [152] the opinion of our General Assemblies has never been in doubt. The members of our first Constituent Assembly and of the Convention itself, set their faces unanimously against any union, any agreement either on the part of the entrepreneurs or the workers. Chapelier,[385] a member of the National Convention, in one of his reports wrote the following sentence which has become famous: “It is absolutely necessary to stop both entrepreneurs and workers from combining over their alleged common interests."[386] What do you think of that?

THE ECONOMIST

I think the most discerning specialist in criminal law would be hard put to find anything criminal in the action of two or more men coming to an understanding in order to secure an increase in the price of their merchandise; I think that in issuing laws in order to suppress this alleged crime, we encroach unjustly and harmfully on the property rights of producers[387] and workers.

I go further. In forbidding unions we are preventing agreements which are often crucial.

THE SOCIALIST

Have not the economists always regarded unions as harmful or at least as pointless?

THE ECONOMIST

That depends on the circumstances and on the way combinations are led. In order to have you see clearly, however, those circumstances in which a union can be useful, and how it must be led to yield good results, I am obliged to return to the fundamentals of the debate. You have asserted that no justice is possible under [153] the wage-system; that the employer, being naturally stronger than the worker, must therefore naturally oppress him.

THE CONSERVATIVE

That outcome is not inevitable. There are philanthropic sentiments which moderate the excessive sharpness which private interests may display.

THE ECONOMIST

Not at all. I accept the outcome as inevitable and believe it to be such. We do not pursue philanthropy in the domain of business, and rightly so, for philanthropy would be out of place there. We will return to this issue later….[388]

So you are of the opinion that the employer can always dictate to the worker and that therefore the wage system precludes justice.

THE SOCIALIST

I share Adam Smith’s opinion.

THE ECONOMIST

Adam Smith said that the employer can oppress the worker more easily than the worker can oppress the employer; he does not say that the employer always finds himself necessarily in a position to lay down the law to the worker.

THE SOCIALIST

He identified a natural inequality which exists in favor of the employer.

THE ECONOMIST

Yes but this inequality can be absent. The situation may be such that the worker is stronger than the employer.

THE SOCIALIST

If the workers form a union? [154]

THE ECONOMIST

No, without their combining. I will give you an example in a moment. Now, if inequality does not always come about may it not be the case that it never does ?

THE SOCIALIST

Good! You are coming over to the idea of the organization of labor.[389]

THE ECONOMIST

God preserve me from that!

On my way here I passed by Fossin’s boutique.[390] There were, in the display window, very beautiful sets of diamonds. On the pavement opposite an orange-seller was offering her wares. She had oranges of two or three grades and on one corner of her stall a packet of over ripe oranges which she was selling at a cut price.

THE CONSERVATIVE

What is this riddle about?

THE ECONOMIST

I would ask you to observe the difference between the two industries. Fossin sells diamonds, an essentially durable product. Whether or not a purchaser comes, the diamond merchant can wait without fearing that his merchandise will undergo the least deterioration. If the orange-seller, however, does not succeed in getting rid of her wares, she will soon be left without a single sound orange. She will be forced to throw her merchandise on to the waste heap. There is, certainly, a striking difference between the two kinds of industry. Fossin can wait a long time for buyers without worrying that his products will spoil, but the orange seller cannot. Does this mean that the orange-seller [155] is more exposed than Fossin to purchasers laying down the law?

THE SOCIALIST

That depends. If the orange-seller does not take care to match exactly the quantity of her goods to the number of her buyers, she will be obliged to cut her prices or waste some of her oranges.

THE CONSERVATIVE

Well, she will be doing very bad business.

THE ECONOMIST

So, will any orange seller who knows her trade carefully avoid loading herself with goods that she may not sell at a profitable price?

THE CONSERVATIVE

What do you understand by profitable price?

THE ECONOMIST

I understand by it the price which covers the cost of production of the good including the natural profit[391] for the merchant.

THE SOCIALIST

You are not resolving the difficulty. In a year in which the orange harvest is superabundant, what will one do with the surplus if the traders demand no more than usual? Will the superabundant oranges have to be left to rot?

THE ECONOMIST

If more oranges are harvested, more will be supplied and the price will fall. With a falling price, demand will increase and the harvest surplus will thus find buyers. [156]

THE SOCIALIST

By what proportion will it fall?

THE ECONOMIST

According to all the research gathered so far, we can assert the following:

When supply exceeds demand in arithmetic progression, price falls in geometric progression, and similarly when demand exceeds supply in arithmetic progression, price rises geometrically.[392]

You will not be slow to spot the beneficial results of this economic law.[393]

THE SOCIALIST

If such a law exists, must it not have on the contrary, essentially dire results? Suppose for example that the proprietor of orange groves normally harvests five hundred thousand oranges a year and can sell them at two centimes a piece. This gives him a sum of ten thousand francs with which he pays his workers and his own labor as director of the farm, covering in a word his cost of production. A year of abundance comes along. Instead of five hundred thousand oranges he harvests a million. As a result he supplies twice as many oranges to the market. In line with your economic law, the price falls from two centimes to half a centime, and the unfortunate owner, victim of abundance, receives only five thousand francs for a million oranges, when in the previous year he had received ten thousand francs for half that number. [157]

THE CONSERVATIVE

Certainly a super abundance of goods is sometimes harmful. We had better ask our farmers if they prefer a year of abundance or an average year, a year where grain is at twenty two francs or a year when it falls to ten francs.[394]

THE ECONOMIST

These are economic phenomena that can be explained only by the law which we have just formulated. It does not follow at all from that law, however, that the doubling of a harvest must lead to a three quarters fall in price, since demand always grows more or less insofar as price falls. Let us go back to the example of the owner of orange groves. At two centimes a piece this owner would cover the cost of production of five hundred thousand oranges. If the harvest were to double, the cost of production would not increase in the same proportion. Nevertheless they would increase. You need more labor to gather a million oranges than to gather five hundred thousand. Moreover the owners will be forced to pay this labor more because wages always rise when the demand for labor increases. The costs of production will therefore rise by half perhaps. They will climb from ten thousand to fifteen thousand francs. To cover this last sum, which represents his cost of production, the proprietor will have to sell his harvest of oranges at a rate of one and a half centimes each.

The question is whether, even if he succeeded in selling five hundred thousand oranges at two centimes each, he would succeed in selling a million at a centime and a half. Would a lowering of price by half [158] a centime be enough to bring about a doubling of demand?

If the reduction in price is not sufficient, our proprietor will have to lower his price further for fear of not selling some of his merchandise. This, however, will mean he faces losses. If he sells only nine hundred thousand oranges at a centime and a half, he will not cover his costs; if he sells a million at a centime and a quarter, he will lose even more.

Experience is the only guide in this case. A given drop in price does not increase the demand for all goods equally. A fall by half in the price of sugar, for example, can double consumption. A fall by half in the price of oats or buckwheat will occasion only a weak expansion in demand for these two products. In a year when the harvest exceeds customary expectations, it is therefore hard to know whether it is better to increase supply in line with the increase in the harvest, or to hold back part of the output in order to maintain the price.

THE SOCIALIST

And if the commodity is not conservable, it will be advantageous to let it go to waste, therefore.

THE ECONOMIST

Yes, or what comes to the same thing economically, to distribute it gratis to people who could not have bought it at any price. There are very few goods, however, that one cannot conserve in one form or another.

If you still have some doubt about the economic law I have just indicated, look at what happened recently in the grain trade.[395] In 1847 our grain harvest was in deficit; instead of [159] gathering sixty million hectoliters of wheat we harvested only about fifty million.[396]

You know what effect this harvest deficit had commercially. From twenty or twenty two francs, its normal price level, wheat rose to forty or fifty francs. The following year, on the contrary, the harvest was abundant, yielding ten or twelve million hectoliters more than usual. From forty or fifty francs, price fell then by successive stages to fifteen francs, and in certain areas as low as ten francs. In the first of these two years, a fall in supply of a quarter led rapidly to a doubling of price; in the second a rise in supply of a quarter drove price successively down to a half of its normal level. [397]

The same law regulates the price of all goods. The only thing is, we must always take good note when we are studying this law, of the increase in demand which results from a fall in price and vice versa.

THE SOCIALIST

If a slight fall in supply can lead to such a sizable increase in price, I am beginning to understand a fact that until now had remained very obscure to me. At the end of the last century there was a famine in Marseille. The price of wheat had risen very high… but not high enough for the liking of certain merchants who undertook to make it rise further still. Consequently they thought about throwing part of their supplies into the sea. This happy idea was hugely profitable for them. But a child had witnessed their impious and criminal action. His young soul reacted [160] with profound indignation. He wondered what this society could be in which it proved useful to some to starve others, and he declared everlasting war on a civilization which gave birth to such abominable excesses. He devoted his life to putting together a new form of Organisation… This child, this reformer, was, as you know, Fourier.[398]

THE ECONOMIST

The anecdote may be true since this happens often in years of famine as also in years of plenty; but for me this proves only one thing: that Fourier was a very bad observer.

THE SOCIALIST

Goodness me!

THE ECONOMIST[399]

Fourier saw the effect but he did not see the cause. At that time purchases of foreign wheat were encumbered by the difficulty of communication and also by the customs regulations. So the domestic suppliers of wheat enjoyed an effective monopoly. To make this monopoly even more fruitful, they did not put on to the market, did not put on sale, more than a part of their output. If the law had not interfered in their activities, they would have kept the rest in the warehouse, for wheat is one of those goods which can be stored for a very long time. Unfortunately there were at that time laws against monopolists. These laws forbad merchants to keep in store more than a certain quantity of foodstuffs. Faced with the alternative of putting all their wheat on the market, or destroying some of it, they often found it more advantageous to [161] adopt the latter option. It was barbarous, it was horrible if you will, but whose fault was it?

Under a regime of complete economic liberty[400] nothing like this could happen. Under this regime, the price of all goods tends naturally to fall to the lowest level possible. Indeed the very fact that a small difference between the two levels of supply and demand, leads to a sizable difference in price, means that equilibrium must necessarily establish itself. As soon as the supply of a commodity is not sufficient in respect of demand, its price rises with such rapidity, that it is soon found very profitable to bring an additional amount of that commodity to the market. Now men being naturally on the lookout for all business which yields them some advantage, the various competitors combine to fill the gap.

As soon as the deficit is closed and equilibrium re-established, the flows stop of their own accord; for prices tending to fall progressively as supplies increase, it does not take long for suppliers to be making losses.

Thus if producers or merchants are left completely free to take their goods where the need for them is felt, supplies will also always be as closely proportionate as possible to the requirements of consumption; if on the contrary, in one way or another there are attacks on freedom of communication,[401] if merchants are harassed during the free exercise of their industry, it will take a long time for equilibrium to be reached, and in the interval the leading producers in the market will be able to realize huge returns, at the expense of the unfortunate consumers. [162]

Let us note again that returns increase all the more with people’s increasing inability to go without the commodity. Let us suppose that a company gains a monopoly over the sale of oranges in a country. If this company takes advantage of its monopoly in order to reduce by a half the quantity of oranges supplied compared to previously, in the hope of increasing the price fourfold, demand will likewise decrease. As a result, while the gap between supply and demand still remains very small, the market price of oranges will not be able to rise much above the natural price.

It will be different if a company manages to grab a monopoly of the production or sales of cereals. Since wheat is a commodity of primary necessity, a cut in half in the supply and the resulting steady increase in price will occasion only a slight contraction in demand. Such a fall in supply which would make the price of oranges rise only very little would result in a doubling or tripling of the price of wheat.

When a commodity is an absolutely prime necessity like wheat, demand shrinks only with the loss of part of the population or the exhaustion of its resources.

In brief, in certain circumstances a given commodity whose price could not rise very high in ordinary circumstances, suddenly acquires uncommon value. For example, let’s transport an orange seller into the midst of a caravan which is crossing the desert. At first, [163] she has to sell her merchandise at a modest price for fear of not selling anything. But, water becomes scarce and immediately the demand for oranges doubles, trebles, quadruples. The price rises steadily as demand increases. It is not long before it exceeds the resources of the less affluent travelers and threatens the resources of the richest travelers: in a few hours the worth of an orange can climb in this way a million times. If the orange seller, herself suffering from thirst, reduces her supply as her own need becomes more urgent, a point will come when the price of oranges exceeds all the available resources of her companions in the caravan, be they all nabobs.

By observing carefully this economic law you will be explaining to yourself a host of phenomena which until now probably have eluded you. You will know precisely why producers, in certain areas, have always aimed at obtaining exclusive privilege or monopoly with the respect to the sale of their products; why above all they show themselves very keen on monopolies which affect goods of primary necessity; why in a word these monopolies have been the terror of populations since the dawn of time.

I now return to my orange seller and to Fossin.

THE CONSERVATIVE

At last!

THE ECONOMIST

Thanks to the special nature of his merchandise which is durable, Fossin can, without too much inconvenience, increase [164] his supply of precious stones beyond the needs of the moment. Nothing forces him to release the surplus immediately. The orange seller finds herself in a very different situation. If she has bought more oranges than she can sell at a worthwhile price, she lacks the ability to hold the surplus indefinitely in reserve, since these oranges are subject to decay. By putting her whole stock on sale, however, she is at risk of lowering the price of oranges to the point of losing even the value of this surplus. What will she do therefore? Will she destroy this surplus with which she has unwisely burdened herself? No! She will sell it outside its normal market, or perhaps wait for some of her oranges to be slightly spoiled so that she can sell them to a particular group of purchasers, in such a way as not to compete with the rest of her supply. This explains those little piles of semi-spoiled oranges on the corner of the sellers’ stalls.

THE CONSERVATIVE

What does it matter to us?

THE ECONOMIST

You will soon see. These piles of fruit are more in evidence the less the merchants understand their business, or when the consumption of oranges is subject to stronger fluctuations. We would see fewer of them encumbering the stalls, however, if the sellers knew exactly how to proportion their purchases to their sales, and also if consumption were never subject to sudden variations. If conditions were like that, the orange sellers would always be able, like Fossin, to [165] balance their supply to the demand, without experiencing losses; they would stop selling part of their output at a loss for fear that the surplus would spoil, or wait until that surplus is ruined to sell it off dirt cheap.

THE CONSERVATIVE

No doubt.

THE ECONOMIST

Well, if you examine closely the situation of workers with respect to the entrepreneurs of industry, you will find it perfectly analogous to that of orange-sellers with respect to their buyers.

If you examine likewise the situation of entrepreneurs with respect to workers, you will find it absolutely the same as Fossin’s with respect to their clientele.

Labor indeed is an essentially perishable commodity, in the sense that the worker, quite lacking in resources, risks perishing in a short space of time if he does not succeed in selling his goods. Thus the price of labor can fall to an excessively low level at times when the supply of labor is sizable and when the demand for it is weak.

Fortunately charity intervenes at this point by removing from the market in order to feed them for nothing, a section of the workers who are offering their labor unsuccessfully. If the charity is insufficient the price of labor continues to fall until part of the labor unsuccessfully offered, perishes. Then equilibrium starts to establish itself again.

The entrepreneur who offers wages to the workers [166] is not obliged, at least usually, to hurry himself up to the same degree. When labor is scarce on the market, the entrepreneur can hold in reserve some of these wages, and like Fossin, proportion his supply to demand.

There are, however, exceptions to this rule. It sometimes happens that entrepreneurs have to accept lower profits, to concede to paying high wages in exchange for a smaller supply of labor, or, if I may use the common expression, to find the workers laying down the law to the management. This happens when they have a need for more labor than currently available on the market.

This is what happened in the British West Indies at the time of emancipation.[402] When slavery kept the workers on the plantations, the owners had enough ready labor to keep their holdings more or less profitable.[403] When slavery had been abolished, however, a great number of slaves began to work on their own account. The numbers who continued to work in the production of sugar-cane proved insufficient. At the same time the laws of supply and demand made their influence felt on the price of labor. In Jamaica, where the daily work of a slave yielded scarcely 1 fr. in revenue, the same quantity of free labor was sold for 3, 5, 10 or even as much as 15 or 16 fr.[404] This absorbed the greater part of the indemnity paid to the planters. Soon, however, after very many owners had abandoned their plantations, because they were unable to pay these exorbitant wages, demand [167] fell, while on the other hand, the appeal of these wages having drawn in labor from every country, even from China, supply increased. Thanks to this double movement which ceaselessly and irresistibly realigned supply and demand, the price of labor in the British West Indies has today reverted more or less to its natural level.

THE SOCIALIST

What do you mean by the natural wage level?

THE ECONOMIST

I mean by this, the sum necessary to cover the cost of production of the labor. I will give you a fuller explanation of the situation in a subsequent discussion.[405]

You see, in short, that entrepreneurs cannot escape the laws of supply and demand any more than the workers themselves can. When the equilibrium between them is adversely disturbed, when the balance of labor is in favor of the workers, the entrepreneurs can doubtless keep in reserve – usually at least – some portion of the wages they pay, and thereby prevent the wage climbing too high. They can imitate the jewelers who hang on to their jewels and precious stones rather than sell them unprofitably. In the end, however, a point comes when under threat of going bankrupt or of giving up their business they are forced to put the wages they have available onto the market.

When equilibrium moves against the workers, when the balance of labor favors the entrepreneurs, the workers are, even so, commonly forced to sell their labor, unless charity comes to their aid, or they succeed, one way or [168] another in withdrawing the excess labor from the market. The situation is then worse than that of the employers when the latter are short of labor, because they are like the orange traders in that they sell a not very durable commodity, one which perishes easily or is easily destroyed.

If, however, well aware of the nature of their commodity, they had exercised sufficient prudence never to overload the market, and always to proportion their supply of it to demand, would not they, too, like the orange sellers who know their business, always sell their wares at a worthwhile price?[406]

THE SOCIALIST

Is it indeed always possible to align supply and demand? Do the workers have the power to prevent crises from overturning industry? Can they also easily shift excess labor from one place to another, the way bales of merchandise are transported? This equilibrium, which would allow workers to sell their labor at a decent price, must it not, in the very nature of things, be incessantly disrupted to their disadvantage? And in this case, will not the price of labor, like that of any other perishable good, drop in the most frightful way?

THE ECONOMIST

The obstacles which you attribute to nature are more often than not artificial. If you study industrial crises more closely, you will see that they almost always have their origin in the restrictions which hamper production and the circulation of wealth, at various points around the world. Look more closely also for the causes of [169] the difficulties workers encounter in aligning their supply to the level of demand. You will find that these difficulties arise, in the main, either from the institutions of state charity, which encourage workers to increase in number constantly, or from the obstacles put in the way both of workers’ easily associating with each other, and of the free circulation of labor, obstacles such as economic legislation on unionization, on apprenticeships, or labor workbooks and passports. Then there is civil legislation refusing foreigners equal rights with those of nationals. However weak the action of these artificial obstacles on the behavior of supply and demand may be, they are registered very substantially, even enormously, on the movement of prices, since the arithmetic increase on one hand, engenders a geometric increase on the other.

I have already shown you that the laws against unionization must necessarily and inevitably strengthen the employers’ side in wage discussions. In the absence of these dire laws, moreover, the workers would always have ways – lacking to them today – to secure the prompt alignment of the supply of labor to the demand for it. Let me explain.

I return to the example of the seller of oranges, assuming that she sells some hundred oranges every day. One day the demand falls by half; no more than fifty are now purchased. If she persists on this particular day with her wish to sell a hundred, she will have to drop the price sharply and will experience a marked loss. It will be better for her to remove the excess fifty oranges from the market, even if the fruit set aside might perish during the day.

Well, the situation is exactly the same for those sellers of labor, the workers. [170]

THE CONSERVATIVE

I would like to see this, but who will volunteer to play the part of the oranges destined to rot in the shop?

THE ECONOMIST

No one, individually! If the workers are intelligent, however, and if the law does not prevent their coming to agreement amongst themselves, do you know what they will do? Instead of letting wages fall progressively as demand falls, they will remove from the market that surplus whose presence generates that fall.

THE CONSERVATIVE

But here again, who will agree to being withdrawn from the market?

THE ECONOMIST

Probably no one will do so, unless the workers as a whole compensate those who will be withdrawn; but there will be competition to quit the market if the mass of workers provides compensation to the withdrawn workers equal to the wages they were receiving at work.

THE CONSERVATIVE

Do you believe the workers remaining in employment will regard this scheme as in their interests?

THE ECONOMIST

I think so. Let’s take an example. One hundred workers receive a wage of four francs a day. Demand happens to fall by a tenth. If our hundred workers nevertheless persist in offering their labor, by how much will the wage fall? It will fall not by a tenth but by close to a fifth, (it would be exactly a fifth if the fall in the price of the commodity did not always increase demand by some small amount); it will fall to 3 fr. 20. The total sum of wages will fall from 400 fr. to 320 fr. But if the workers [171] in concert withdraw from the market the ten surplus workers, granting them compensation equal to the wage, perhaps 40 fr in total, instead of receiving no more than 320 fr. ( 100 x 3 fr. 20), they will receive 360 fr. (90 x 4). Instead of losing 80 fr., they will lose only 40 fr.

You see that unions can have their usefulness, that they are required, perhaps accidentally, by the very nature of the goods which workers bring to the market. To ban them is therefore, with regard to the great mass of workers, to commit a real act of plunder.

If trades unions were legal, while at the same time the laws on labor workbooks and passports did not harass the movements of workers, you would see the mobility of labor developing rapidly on an immense scale. Adam Smith, looking into the extremely low level of wages in certain localities said: “After all that has been said of the levity and inconstancy of human nature, it appears evidently from experience that a man is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported.” [407] The means of communication however have been very much improved today compared with what they were in Adam Smith’s time. With the railways and the aid of the electric telegraph, we can rapidly and cheaply transport a great mass of workers from one place, where labor abounds, to another where it is in short supply.

You will understand, nevertheless, that this commerce in labor[408] could not undergo the development of which it is capable, while the law continued to shackle it.

THE SOCIALIST

The government should go so far as to guide the workers [172] in their searching. It ought to indicate to them the places where labor is abundant and where it is scarce.

THE ECONOMIST

Let private industry be free to go about its business[409] and it will serve the workers much better than the government could. Give complete freedom of movement and association to the workers and they will be perfectly able to seek out the places where the sale of labor operates most advantageously; active and shrewd intermediaries will help them at the lowest possible price (provided that no one takes it upon himself to limit the number of these intermediaries, nor to regulate their activities). The supply of and demand for labor, which spontaneously move one towards the other, will in these circumstances, come to equilibrium without difficulty.

Let the workers be free to go about their business,[410] allow the free movement of labor, that is the solution to the problem of the wage earners.

Appendix: Molinari’s Plan for a Labor Exchange

Struck, some years ago, by the difficulties workers experience in finding the places where they can obtain a good market for that type of merchandise we call labor, I called for the establishment of a labor exchange,[411] along with publicity for the current rates, on the lines of what is done for capital and consumer goods.[412]

Later I tried to put flesh on this idea, and in the Courrier français, edited at that time by M. X. Durrieu, I addressed the following appeal to the workers of Paris:[413]

For a long time the capitalists, producers and merchants, have been taking advantage of the publicity that the press offers them, for placing their capital or selling their merchandise most advantageously. All the newspapers regularly publish a bulletin of the Stock Exchange. All have also opened their columns to industrial and commercial advertising.
If such publicity renders to capitalists and merchants, services whose importance today no one could deny, why [173] should they not also be put within the reach of the workers? Why not use it to light the way for workers in search of employment, as it already helps capitalists looking for markets for their funds and merchants seeking to place their merchandise? Is not the worker who lives by the sweat of his brow or the use of his mind, at least as keen to know which places attract the most advantageous wages, as the capitalist or trader can be to know the markets where their funds or goods will fetch the highest rewards? His physical strength and his brain are his personal capital: it is by exploiting them, making them work, and exchanging their output for the output of other workers like himself, that he manages to subsist.
…It is the press which publishes the industrial bulletins. It would also be the press that would publish an employment bulletin.
So we propose to all government bodies in Paris, to publish each week, free of charge, an employment bulletin, indicating the level of wages and the disposition of supply and demand. We would divide this government bulletin by the different days of the week, in such a way that each trade had its publication on a fixed day.
If our suggestion is accepted by the government, we will ask our colleagues in the various Départements to publish employment bulletins for their localities, as we will publish the one for Paris. Each week we will bring them all together and create from them a general bulletin. In this way, every week, all the workers in France will be able to have in front of them, a picture of the employment circumstances in the various parts of the country.
We will be aiming above all at the workers employed by the government in Paris. They are already organized. They already have official Labor Exchanges. Nothing would be easier than for them to advertise the bulletin of their daily transactions. Nothing would be easier than for them to provide France with publicity for the labor-force.” (Courrier français 26th July 1846).

Following this appeal, I got in touch with some of the Parisian guilds, among others with the Stonemasons, who introduced me to one of their comrades, surnamed Parisien la Douceur, one of the most intelligent workers whom [174] I have met. Parisien la Douceur liked my plan very much and promised to explain it to the Stonemasons’ Guild. Unfortunately, the Guild did not share its delegate’s opinion. Fearing that the publication of wage data in Paris might attract a considerable increase in the number of workers in this great centre of population, it refused to collaborate with me. Nor were my attempts elsewhere more successful.

After the February Revolution, I tried to launch this idea again. I wrote to M. Flocon, at that time Minister of Agriculture and Commerce,[414] to enlist his support, if not for building a Labor Exchange in Paris, at least for putting the already established Stock Exchange at the service of the workers. Businessmen go to the Stock Exchange in the afternoon; could not the workers go there in the morning? Such is the question which I put to M. Flocon; but M. Flocon, busy with lots of other things did not reply to me.

The same idea was taken up again some time later, and a plan for a Labor Exchange was even presented to the Chief of Police, M. Ducoux, by an architect, M. Leuiller. M. Emile de Girardin[415] gave his support to this initiative and he even offered to devote part of page 4 of La Presse to publicizing labor business.

In order to give the reader an idea of how far this very necessary publicity might extend, and of the services it could render to the workers in their capacity as traders in labor,[416] with the help of the electric telegraph and the railways, I reproduce here an extract from a pamphlet in which I developed this idea at some length:[417]

Let us examine how the electric telegraph should be set up in such a way as to give workers in all countries the means of ascertaining instantly the places where labor is demanded on the most advantageous conditions.
The telegraph lines have been established alongside the railways.
In every one of the great states of Europe, the main railway lines gravitate towards the Capital as to a common center. They link all the secondary towns to the metropolis. The secondary towns, in their turn, serve as centers for other means of communication which terminate in population centers of the third rank.
Suppose that in France, for example, there are established in twenty secondary towns, markets and Labor Exchanges, dealing both with the sale of labor and the placement of capital and [175] goods. Let us also suppose that the morning is given over to labor transactions and the afternoon to those of capitalists and merchants. Let us see next how the labor market works.
On the day of the opening of twenty Exchanges, workers who lack employment and directors of industrial firms who need labor, go to the market, the former to sell, the latter to purchase, labor. A note is made of the number of transactions effected, and at what price, and of the relative proportions of jobs offered and jobs demanded. The market bulletin, drawn up at the end of the session, is sent by telegraph to the central Stock Exchange. Twenty bulletins arrive at the same time at this central gathering point, where a general bulletin is composed. This latter, which is dispatched immediately, either by rail or by telegraph, to each of the twenty Secondary Exchanges, can be published everywhere before the Exchange opens the next day.
Informed by the general labor bulletin, as to the situation in the various labor markets of the country, the workers available in certain centers of production, can send their supply details to those where there are jobs available. Let us suppose, for example, that three carpenters are without work in Rouen, while in Lyon the same number of workers in the same trade are in demand at a wage of 4 fr. Having consulted the labor bulletin published in the morning paper, the Rouen carpenters go to the exchange, where the telegraph line comes in, and they send a message to Lyons along these lines:
Rouen ––– Rouen 3 carpenters at fr. 4.50 ––– Lyon
The message goes to Paris and from there to Lyon. If the wage asked by the Rouen carpenters is acceptable to the employers in Lyon, the latter respond immediately with an agreed sign of acceptance. If they think the wage asked too high, negotiations takes place between the two parties. If eventual agreement is reached, the carpenters, bearing the message of agreement stamped by the employee at the telegraph, make their way immediately to Lyon by railway. The transaction has been concluded as rapidly as it could be in the Rouen exchange.
Let us now assume that Frankfurt is the central point on which converge all the telegraph lines connecting with the various central Stock Exchanges of Europe. It is to Frankfurt that all the general bulletins of [176] each country come, there also that a general European bulletin is put together and sent to all the Central exchanges, whence it is transmitted to all the secondary ones. Thanks to this publicity mechanism, the number of jobs and the numbers of workers available, along with the wages on offer or asked for, are made known to us, almost instantly, everywhere in Europe.
Suppose, then, that an unemployed seaman in Marseilles, looking at the European bulletin of labor, learns that there is a shortage of sailors in Riga and that a decent wage is being offered in that port.
He goes to the Exchange and sends Riga a telegram offering his services. From Marseilles his message goes to Paris, in two or three stages, depending on the power of the transmission. From Paris the message is sent to Frankfurt, from Frankfort it goes to Moscow, the Central Exchange in Russia, and from Moscow to Riga. This distance, in the region of 4000 kilometers, is covered in two or three minutes. The reply is transmitted in the same way. If telegrams are priced at the rate of five centimes per hundred kilometers, our seaman will pay about fr. 4 for the telegraph messages sent and received. If his demands are agreed to, he will take the train and arrive in Riga in five days. On the supposition that his fare will be set at the lowest price possible, say, ½ centime per kilometer, his costs of moving, including the telegrams, will add up to some fr. 24.
Thus Europe becomes one huge market, where labor transactions are carried out as rapidly and easily as in a city market-place. The Exchanges of Europe correspond with those of Africa and Asia by way of Constantinople.
Thus steam locomotion and the electric telegraph are, in a sense, the physical tools of the liberty of working. By giving individuals the means of freely arranging their affairs and of always making their way to countries where life is easier and more agreeable, these vehicles of providence push societies irresistibly in the direction of progress.

10. The Seventh Evening

Editor’s Note

In this Soirée Molinari returns to discuss in more detail the right of exchange, with particular reference to protectionism, mercantilism, and free trade.[418] He talks about the vested interests who benefitted from protectionism and the kinds of arguments they have put forward in its defense; the theory of the balance of trade; Say’s law of markets; the importance of the English free trade movement; and the distortions in the structure of production caused by the protection of and subsidies to domestic industries.

Molinari was actively involved, both intellectually and politically, in the free trade movement in France from its inception in February 1846. It was modeled on the English Anti-Corn Law League which had been founded in 1838 in Manchester by Richard Cobden and John Bright and which succeeded in having the protectionist Corn Laws repealed in early 1846. This provided the impetus for the creation of the Bordeaux Free Trade Association which was was founded in February 1846 and then quickly followed by a national Paris-based Association in July 1846[419] to which Molinari was appointed deputy secretary and Frédéric Bastiat the secretary of the Board and editor of its journal, Le Libre-Échange. As discussed in the Introduction, Molinari had a dispute with Bastiat over the strategy which the FFTA should adopt,[420] with Bastiat and Chevalier urging a more cautious approach with a lengthy transition period before full repeal of the tariffs was enacted, while Molinari was an “immediatist” by wanting the immediate repeal of all tariffs on the grounds that they were a form of plunder and hence unjust.

The following year, the supporters of free trade in the Chamber of Deputies  attempted to get legislation introduced to cut French tariffs along the lines of the British example but were unsuccessful. As part of this campaign the Guillaumin firm published Molinari’s first major book, a two volume history of tariffs in France: Histoire du tarif (1847), so by the time he came to write this Soirée in mid-1849 he was well versed in both the theory and the history of free trade and protectionism. In his history of tariffs he discussed in considerable detail the vested interests like the industrialists and the large land owners who had made huge fortunes in the iron and coal industries (such as the Anzin coal company which he mentions in a long footnote, below pp. 000) and agriculture as a result of protectionist policies during the Restoration of the monarchy (1815-1830) and the July Monarchy (1830-1848), especially with the Tariff Law of 1822.[421] In this Soirée the Economist quotes at some length part of the Tariff Commission’s Report written by the Deputy and ardent protectionist Fauvelet de Bourrienne[422] as an example of the kinds of arguments put forward by the protectionists.

Among the Economists there was general agreement that there should be a low tariff for fiscal purposes only, that is to raise money for essential government services. Since there was no income tax at this time, governments raised revenue with a combination of direct taxes (on things like land, personal property, doors and windows), fees and levies (such as stamp duty and registration fees), indirect taxes (on alcohol, domestic sugar, salt, and the monopoly sale of tobacco), and customs duties. In 1848 the French government raised a total of 1,371 million francs which was made up of 421 million francs from direct taxes (31%), 307 million francs from indirect taxes (22%), 263 million francs from fees and levies (19%), and 202 million francs from customs and the salt monopoly (15%).[423] Bastiat, for example, wanted to abolish most if not all direct and indirect taxes and replace them with a very low universal income tax and a low tariff on all goods. He believed that the ideal rate of tariffs for strictly fiscal purposes was 5% on all imported goods and 5% on all exported goods. This would be sufficient to raise enough revenue to pay for the very limited functions he believed the state should undertake, namely internal police, external defense, and some public goods. Anything above this 5% rate he considered to be “protectionist.”[424] Molinari was even more radical than Bastiat on this point as he regarded all forms of tariffs as a kind of highway robbery which should be abolished immediately.

In addition to the standard arguments for free trade, such as lower prices for consumers, the greater productivity made possible by the international division of labor, the reduction of tension between nations over trade policy, and the idea that protection does not increase the total amount of national production but merely “displaces” or distorts it, there are some other interesting things to note. First is Molinari’s long quotation from a famous speech by one of the leading orators of the English Anti-Corn Law League, William Fox, on how even the most doctrinaire protectionist land owner hypocritically made use of goods imported from all over the world and were thus already heavily dependent on trade with foreigners.

Secondly, for the first time Molinari introduces the idea of the “self-made” entrepreneur into his growing list of those who engaged in entrepreneurial activities. He uses the expression “le laborieux entrepreneur, naguère ouvrier” (the hardworking entrepreneur who has emerged from the working class) which one might also translate it as “the self-made entrepreneur.” This is a revolutionary notion that ordinary workers might be able to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps and become successful and perhaps even prosperous, if only they had the freedom to so.

A third thing to note is his discussion of Sismondi concerning the suffering of the working classes and its causes. Sismondi was a Swiss historian and economist who had written De la richesse commerciale (1803) which was quite Smithian in its support for the free market but after a trip to England when it was in the midst of an economic depression following the Napoleonic Wars he wrote a more critical work Nouveaux principes d'économie politique (1819) where he expressed his concern for the welfare of those at the bottom of the economic ladder and attributed it to the periodic economic crises which afflicted industrial societies. Molinari replied to Sismondi’s criticisms in the Cours d’économie politique where he developed his theory of equilibrium to explain how markets gravitate or tend towards a point if equilibrium between supply and demand unless external disturbing factors are present, such as wars (in this case the disruptions caused by the Napoleonic Wars), famines, or perverse government regulations. It were these factors, Molinari believed, and not the free market system itself, which is the true cause of the workers’ suffering.

After he wrote this Soirée Molinari returned to the topic of free trade and tariffs with several articles which he wrote for the DEP in 1852. Given the importance of free trade to the Economists this was a special honor for the young man (he would have just turned 30 when he began work on these essays). He wrote  the two main articles on “Free Trade” (Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges) and “Tariffs” (Tarifs de douane), another on the key topic of “Grain” (Céréales), one on “Customs Unions” (Union douanière), and one on the history of the “French Free Trade Association” (Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)). [425]After he left Paris in 1852 to take up a teaching position at the Musée royal de l'industrie belge he would write a second book of “soirées” or conversations, this time exclusively about free trade and protection,  Conservations familières sur le commerce des grains (Familiar (or well-known) conversations about the grain trade) (1855). Thirty years later he was still arguing for free trade when he republished the Conservations familières in 1886 with a new post-script to bring it up to date for a new era of growing protectionism in France.

[177]

SUMMARY: Right to exchange (continued). – International trade – The protectionist system. – Its purpose. – M. de Bourrienne’s Aphorisms. – Origin of the protectionist system. – The mercantilist system. – Arguments for protection. – Currency depletion. – Independence from other countries. – Increase in domestic production. – That the protectionist system has reduced overall output. – That it has made production unstable and distribution unjust. THE ECONOMIST.

The free trade in products is even more restricted than the free trade in labor. The commerce in real-estate is subject to bothersome and costly formalities, and moveable property is hampered or totally blocked by various indirect taxes, notably by city tolls[426] and by customs.

Let me leave aside, for the moment, restrictive laws whose purpose is to raise taxes, and busy myself with those whose purpose is mainly obstruction.

I want to talk about customs duties.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Were not customs duties set up with taxation in mind? [178]

THE ECONOMIST.

Sometimes, but rarely. For the most part, customs duties were set up solely to put barriers in the way of trade.

THE SOCIALIST.

This is the protectionist system.

THE ECONOMIST.

Well, protectionism prevails in all civilized countries, perhaps with the exception of England and the United States, where they tend to become purely fiscal in function.

Fiscal customs, those whose sole function is to fill the coffers of the Treasury, are everywhere violently attacked by the supporters of protectionism. The latter want to exclude the interests of the Treasury from the issue of customs, so that they can busy themselves exclusively with what they call the interests of industry.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So are these two interests contradictory?

THE ECONOMIST.

If we take the protectionist point of view, yes. In 1822, M. de Bourrienne, the author of the Report of the Commission looking into the the customs law regarding the importation of foreign iron, identified clearly and fully endorsed that opposition.[427]

“ Any country,” he said, “where customs duties had no purpose other than a fiscal one, would be walking at top speed to its perdition. If the interest of the Treasury carries the day over the general interest, the result would be no more than a brief advantage, to be paid for dearly one day.
A country can have great prosperity with very little revenue from the Customs. It could have huge Customs receipts and yet be failing financially, in a state of [179] of decline; perhaps it could be proved that the latter fact is a result of the former.
Customs duties are not a tax but rather an incentive for agriculture, trade, and industry, and the laws which set them up have sometimes to be political in intent, must always offer protection and can never pursue fiscal purposes.
Since the duties do not serve the interests of the Treasury, the tax which results from the duty is only incidental.
One proof that the customs tax is only incidental is that the duty on exports is almost nil and that legislators when they impose an import tax on certain objects, have the intention that they shall not enter, or enter as little as possible. The increase or decrease in tax revenue must never stop this tax.
…If the law you are subject to leads to a fall in the revenue from customs tax, you ought to congratulate yourself. This will be proof that you have attained the purpose proposed, of slowing down dangerous imports and favoring useful exports."

The purpose of which M. de Bourrienne speaks has been perfectly attained in France. Our tariffs are aimed essentially at protection. Our customs laws were established in such a way as to prevent as far as possible, the entry of foreign goods to France. Well, goods which do not enter do not pay duty, as M. Bastiat, author of Economic Sophisms has wittily shown. A protective tariff must be the least productive possible to attain the purpose proposed.[428]

A fiscal tariff on the contrary must be as productive as possible.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

If, however, a protective tariff harms on the one hand the interests of the Treasury, it does much better on the other hand in protecting the nation’s industry against foreign competition. Protection fills the gap which exists naturally between the cost prices of certain domestic products and the prices of comparable foreign goods.

THE ECONOMIST.

This is M. de Bourrienne’s doctrine. We will very soon see if it fulfills its purpose. First I will observe, however, that the Customs duties were established in the last three centuries, neither to swell the coffers or the Treasury, nor to bring the cost price of domestic products into line with those of foreign products.

For a long time it was very widely believed that wealth resided solely in gold or silver. Each country therefore strove to discover means of attracting foreign gold, and having attracted it, of preventing its leaving. They had the idea of encouraging the export of domestic commodities and blocking the importation of foreign ones. According to the theorists of this system any difference would inevitably be paid in gold or silver. The larger this difference the more was the country enriching itself.

When exports exceeded imports (or at least when it was thought they did) people said that they had a favorable balance of trade.[429]

The system was called the mercantilist system.[430] [181]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You take a high and mighty position. Let me tell you then that today the supporters of the protectionist system repudiate, just as you do, illusions about the balance of trade. In England you will never find the advocates of protection basing their case on the balance of trade. If we confused the protectionist system with the mercantilist system, would we then be making a distinction between similar and non-similar products? If our intended purpose was to attract precious metals into the country and to prevent their ever leaving, would we not be indiscriminately denying ourselves all manner of foreign products, in order to receive in exchange only gold and silver? We are happy, as you know, to concentrate our attacks on similar products, and even then not on them all. We are happy to let in products which are inferior to our own.

THE ECONOMIST.

You have to admit that your generosity is not very great. I did not say that the mercantilist system is the same as protectionism, but rather that it was its point of departure. It began with the blocking of the imports of foreign goods, in order to import more gold and silver. Later people came to think that this purpose would be even more rapidly attained if the development of the export industries were stimulated. As a result, through a combination of prohibitions and subsidies, this category of industries was favored. The same methods were used to set up new industries in the country.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That’s right. [182]

THE ECONOMIST.

The wish was to free the nation from the tribute it paid to foreigners for the products of these industries. It was Colbert who protected and developed mercantilism in this way.[431]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

The great Colbert, the restorer of French industry!

THE ECONOMIST.

I would more happily call him the destroyer of French industry.

So you realize that mercantilism engendered protectionism. More often than not, in truth, the theory of the balance of trade was invoked only as pretext. While protectionism impoverished the masses, it enriched certain producers…

THE SOCIALIST.

That is well understood. If the prices of goods rise in geometric progression while supply diminishes in arithmetic progression,[432] the producers who obtained exclusion of the products of their foreign competitors, must realize sizable profits.

THE ECONOMIST.

They do indeed realize them. The consequence is that most of our great industrial fortunes date from the establishment of the principal protectionist duties.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

According to you, then, our producers owe their wealth solely to the protection of the law, with their work apparently deserving no remuneration. [183]

THE SOCIALIST.

Their work deserved the return it obtained quite naturally before the establishment of protectionist duties. We do not attack legitimate gains; we attack those acquired improperly, fraudulently, by way of protectionist duties.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Fraudulently!

THE ECONOMIST.

The word is too strong.[433] [434] The producers who invoked the theory of the balance of trade were probably hardly concerned at all with the general conclusions of that theory. They had little in mind beyond the particular advantages which they could derive from it ... 

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Would you tell us what you know about it? [184]

THE ECONOMIST.

I will let you be the judge. Would you ever consider pressing for a law which did not favor your particular interest?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Probably not. No more would I solicit, however, for a law which favored my individual interest rather than the general interest.

THE ECONOMIST.

I quite sure of that. This is why I reject this word “fraudulently." Producers of yesteryear demanded protectionist duties with a view to increasing their profits; but did not mercantilism, in recommending protection, put them in conformity with their beliefs?

THE SOCIALIST.

Would the mass of the people be any less plundered if the mercantilist system was false?

THE ECONOMIST.

My goodness! How many people would be plundered if the theories of socialism were put into effect? Yet there are very honest men among the Socialists.

THE SOCIALIST.

I do not accept your comparison. The producers who invoked the sophisms of mercantilism[435] were concerned solely with their private interest; in their eyes the notion of the general interest was only a pretext or an empty formula. We socialists, on the contrary, have only the general interest in mind.

THE ECONOMIST.

If this is true, if it is only the interest of humanity which [185] drives you to demand measures whose application would be fatal to humankind, you are, indeed, more excusable than the producers in question. Would you really dare to claim, however, that you are never motivated by the stirrings of vanity, pride, ambition, or hatred? Are all your apostles equally mild and humble of heart?

The producers who demanded the establishment of protectionist duties based themselves on mercantilism. If we abandon this system, are we not agreeing thereby that they were in error?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Let us understand one another. In fact I condemn mercantilism. I do not believe in the balance of trade, an old economic error. But does it really follow that the producers were wrong to demand protectionist duties?

THE ECONOMIST.

The conclusion seems logical to me. If these producers begging for protectionism had good reasons to put forward, why would they have used a bad one?

THE SOCIALIST.

Quite right!

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Careful! I do not accept mercantilism with all its excesses, but does not this system also embody some truths? No doubt money is not the whole of wealth, but is it not an important part of it? Does not a nation expose itself to appalling catastrophes when it lets all its cash be depleted? Protectionism shelters it [186 from these menacing disasters when it prevents the over-importation of foreign goods.

According to you, protectionism has the sole effect of allowing domestic producers to sell very profitably goods which they previously sold very unprofitably. You have forgotten to say, however, that by establishing new industries in the country, protectionism strengthens national independence and permits fruitful use of previously idle capital and labor. You have forgotten to say that protectionism increases the power and wealth of a country.

THE ECONOMIST.

You have just expounded the three main arguments for the protectionist system.[436] Please allow me to put the first to one side; I will take it up again when we discuss money.[437] As for the argument about dependence on foreigners, it is one which has been exposed a hundred times before. You yourself, if you reject the balance of trade argument, if you accept that products are bought with other products,[438] must you not accept too that when two nations trade with each other, their dependence is mutual?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

We have to take into account of the nature of the goods exchanged. Is it prudent, for example to depend on foreigners for a product that is of primary necessity?

THE ECONOMIST.

England is, you will agree, an essentially prudent nation. She has voluntarily exposed herself, however, to dependence on Russia and the United States, her two great rivals, for her [187] supplies of wheat.[439] Apparently she does not consider the argument about dependence on foreign sources truly convincing. I think it pointless to dwell on this issue.[440]

I now turn to your third argument, which has much more weight and is much more difficult to refute. You say that protectionism, by bringing about the introduction of certain new industries to the country, has increased the use of capital and labor, and thus increased national wealth.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This seems to me incontestable, and since you are fond of examples I am going to give you one. In the past, England got her cotton goods from India. One day the idea came to her of keeping these Indian goods out.[441] What happened? The market finding itself without the greater part of its ordinary requirements, the production and sale of [188] domestically produced cotton goods immediately benefitted hugely. Capital and labor , to this production. England which had produced scarcely more than a few thousand yards of cotton fabric, now made thousands of millions. Instead of a few hundred spinners and weavers working from home, she now had thousands operating in immense factories. Her wealth and power suddenly increased enormously. Are you so bold as to claim, in view of these facts, that the prohibition of cotton yarn and cotton goods from India was not beneficial to England?

THE SOCIALIST.

Yet on the other hand the Indians who lost the English market were ruined. Millions of men on the banks of the Indus and the Ganges found themselves deprived of work while the manufacturers of Manchester established the basis of their colossal fortunes, and while workers were attracted by unusually high wages, and flooded into this new metropolis of cotton production, the workshops of India fell away into [189] ruin, and the Hindu workers were swept away in a tide of poverty and famine.

THE ECONOMIST.

That is a fact. The markets for the spinners and weavers of India becoming blocked, these workers were obliged to fall back on other branches of production. Unfortunately the latter were already sufficiently supplied with labor. The wage level in India therefore fell below the cost of production of labor, that is to say below the sum necessary for the worker to keep himself and perpetuate himself. It fell…until poverty, famine and the epidemics which are their inseparable companions, having performed their function, equilibrium between the supply of and the demand for labor began to re-establish itself and wages to rise.[442]

THE SOCIALIST.

So the prosperity of the English manufacturers had for its stepping stones the corpses of Indian workers.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What do you expect? The profit of the one spells the loss of the other, as Montaigne said.[443]

THE SOCIALIST.

If protectionism cannot establish itself without this funereal cortège of ruin and poverty, it is an immoral and dreadful system and I repudiate it.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Good heavens! If Providence had made of all humanity only a single nation, then a system which thrust down certain members of this huge nation in order to raise up other members, which ruined the Hindus in order to enrich the English, could, indeed, be called [190] immoral and dreadful. Providence has not, however, put one, single people into the world; rather she has sown the nations like so many grains of wheat, telling them to increase and prosper.[444] It is a misfortune that the interests of these various nations are now diverse or opposite; but what is to be done about it? Each people must naturally devote itself to increasing its power and wealth. Protectionism is one of the most powerful and surest ways of achieving this double result. So, we resort to protectionism. It certainly is unfortunate that foreign workers are deprived of their means of sustenance. Should not the interests of the domestic labor force take precedence over the rest, however? If a simple legislative measure serves to provide employment and bread to the domestic workforce, is not the lawmaker obliged to pass this measure without inquiring whether the inhabitants of the banks of the Ganges or the Indus are going to suffer because of it? Should not each person concern himself with his own poor people before fretting about those of others? And if this example is universally pursued, if each nation pursues that legislation which best suits its individual interests, will not all things move, in the final analysis, in the best possible direction? Will not all the nations come to enjoy all the prosperity of which they are capable? ...  So you see that protectionism is dreadful and immoral only when you examine it superficially. And you also see that statesmen would be profoundly wrong to adopt your false cosmopolitanism.

THE ECONOMIST.

Mr Huskisson[445] once uttered the following remarkable words in the English parliament: “Protectionism [191] is an invention whose patent is close to expiry. It has already lost much of its value now that all the nations have seized upon it."[446] All I need to do to destroy your objections, is to enlarge upon these comments by one of England’s most illustrious supporters of free trade.

What happened, actually, when England had brutally replaced the work of the weavers of Surat, Madras, and Bombay, in order to benefit the manufacturers of Manchester and their workers? What happened was that all the other nations, seduced by this apparent advantage, wanted likewise to replace foreign industries. France, which produced only a part of the cotton, wool, iron, and pottery needed for domestic consumption, wanted to produce all she could possibly consume in the way of these goods. Germany and Russia did likewise. There was nowhere, not even the smallest countries – Belgium, Holland, and Denmark – in which the aim was not to replace foreign industries with their own. In a word the drive towards protectionism was general.

What came of it you know. The outcome was that those destroyers of entire industries found themselves having their own labor destroyed in turn.[447] England which had stolen the cotton goods industry from India, lost, along with a part of this same industry, several of its other branches of production. France, which following the English example, had destroyed several industries in foreign countries, found a part of her own destroyed in turn as well. Most notably Germany protected herself as a form of reprisal against French silks, fashionable goods, and wines….You steal some of your neighbor’s markets and he steals [192] some of yours. This was universal pillaging.

At the time when this pillaging of foreign industries was at its most active, a very clever pamphlet was published in England. The frontispiece carried a cartoon showing a cage of monkeys. Half a dozen monkeys, lodged in separate cages, had their daily meal in front of them. But instead of eating in peace the portion which the zoo-keeper had generously given them, every one of these wicked animals was doing his best to steal his neighbors’ share, without noticing that the latter were doing the same to him. Each one of them was working hard to steal from his neighbors his livelihood which he could reach easily just in front of him, and a lot of food was being wasted in the scuffle.[448] [449]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But were not the strongest bound to have the advantage in the struggle? Could they not grab the share of others and still keep their own?

THE ECONOMIST.

With monkeys that is possible; but it is not so with nations. No nation is strong enough to say to others: “I will protect my production against your industries, but I forbid you to do the same against mine; I will destroy some of your markets, but I forbid you to touch mine.” If a nation dared to employ such language, all the others would unite to rule that nation out of bounds, and the coalition would be left the stronger.

THE SOCIALIST.

In such a way, that all in all no one gains from these mutual depredations, and that the pillagers [193] gain proportionately less as the pillaging becomes more general.[450]

THE ECONOMIST.

Precisely.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But when one country has adopted protectionism, are not the others obliged to adopt it too? Must they allow their industries to be pillaged without resorting to reprisals?

THE ECONOMIST.

This is a subject for debate.

I must first of all, however, give you a full demonstration of the way in which protectionism has been harmful to the general development of production.

So let us look first at what was happening at the time when protectionism was first established. Each nation acquired some of the goods it needed for production from its neighbors and furnished them in turn with other products.

What products did it supply and what did it receive?

It supplied those products which the nature of its soil and the particular talents of its producers allowed it to produce with the least effort. It received those things it would not have been able to produce without devoting more effort to them.

In truth, does this not tell you what international trade must have been like before the advent of protectionism?[451]

THE SOCIALIST.

This is the natural way in which things develop. [194]

THE ECONOMIST.

What did protectionism do? Did it increase the total sum of production? No more than did the pillaging monkeys in the English pamphlet increase their food supply, when they stole each other’s scraps. Judge for yourselves.

England stole the cotton industry from India. If her production increased accordingly, India’s fell in the same proportion. France stole part of the English linen industry; if France produced that much more, England produced that much less. Germany took from France part of its silk production; if Germany produced more thereby, France produced less by the same amount… Protectionism therefore did not and could not have the effect of increasing the general level of production.

I will now add that protectionism has, and is bound to have, the effect of reducing the overall level of production.

This is how it happens:

Why did England protect herself against Indian cottons, French silk, and Belgian cloth? Because these goods were invading part of her market. Why did they invade it? Because, allowing for differences in quality, they were cheaper than their English counterparts. If they had not been cheaper, they would not have got into England.

That being so, what was the first result of the law which forbade these goods access to the English market? It was to create an artificial deficit in domestic [195] supply. The larger this deficit, the more the prices of indigenous goods were naturally bound to rise.

Before the establishment of protectionism, the annual consumption of cloth in England amounted, I suppose, to some twenty million ells,[452] with half the total coming from abroad.

THE SOCIALIST.

How could England supply the rest, if foreign cloth was so much cheaper than her own?

THE ECONOMIST.

There are many varieties of the same good. There are, for example, a very large number of grades of cloth. England produces certain of these grades more cheaply than Belgium, while Belgium makes some grades of cloth cheaper than England does.

Let me resume. Foreign cloth comes to be banned in England. Supply having been halved, how much will the price rise? It will rise in geometric progression. If it had been at 15 fr an ell, it could reach 60 fr.

When the price of a product rises suddenly, however, what happens? Unless the product happens to be of prime necessity, in which case there is no way it could ever fall noticeably, the rise in price will cause a more or less marked contraction in consumption, according to the nature of the product. If the demand for cloth was twenty million ells when price stood at 15 fr., it would scarcely get to four or five millions ells at 60 fr. With prices falling at this point, demand will again start to rise. These fluctuations will continue almost indefinitely. Having ranged across the whole scale taking in both its extremities, however, [196] these fluctuations will converge successively on a central point, which represents the total cost of production of cloth in England.

You already know why the price of a product cannot stay very long either above or below its cost of production.

The production costs of English cloth, however, are higher than those of foreign cloth. They are and must be, otherwise protection would be entirely pointless. When one can sell at a lower price than one’s competitors, one does not need protection to drive them from the market; they remove themselves. I take it that if the cost of production of foreign cloth are 15 fr. the costs of English production will be 18 fr. This, then, is the level towards which the price of cloth will gravitate from now on in England. At the price of 18 fr., however, people will purchase less cloth than would be the case at 15 fr. If people bought twenty million ells in the period of free entry of foreign goods, they will buy only sixteen or seventeen million after these goods have been prohibited entry.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Maybe so! Will not the increase in national production, however, which will have climbed from ten million ells to seventeen million, compensate, and more, for the slight decline in consumption?

THE ECONOMIST.

For the moment, that is not the issue. Does protectionism result in a decrease or increase in general production, that is the question? Well, if the production of English cloth has grown by seven million, by contrast that of foreign cloth has fallen [197] by ten million, which clearly means, I think, a reduction of three million in general production.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, but that reduction is only temporary. The growth of an industry in a country always leads to an improvement in manufacturing procedures. Where the market price was 18 fr. it soon falls to 17, 16, 15 fr. or even lower. Consumption rises in this eventuality to the level which existed before the import controls, or even ends up exceeding it.

THE ECONOMIST.

Meanwhile, I find that there has been an increase in the price, associated with a fall in consumption, and consequently a fall in the level of general production. I note further that protectionism has had, and was bound to have, as its first outcome, a fall in general production. Henceforth this will be taken for granted in the discussion.

I claim, furthermore, that the general lowering of production is not accidental or temporary…I maintain that it is permanent…and let us get it straight, it will last as long as protection itself.

Why did the English manufacturers not produce themselves the twenty million ells of cloth purchased in their country? Because foreigners produced at a better price, at lower cost, half of these twenty million ells.

What is the reason for this difference in the cost of production of the same good as between one country and another? It lies in natural differences in climate, soil, and national aptitudes. Well, I ask you, can import laws suppress these national differences? Will decrees to the effect [198] that Belgian and French cloth will no longer have access to the English market, somehow endow English producers with the means of producing as well and as cheaply, these particular kinds of cloth? Will the law have supplied the climate, the water, the soil, the workers themselves, with the qualities or capabilities necessary for this particular kind of production? …But if the import laws have not brought about this miraculous transformation, will not the kinds of cloth which England obtained in France, be dearer to make and worse made in England?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Often these differences are hardly noticeable. In such a case, the progress resulting from the instantaneous development of an industry in the homeland itself, is more than sufficient to compensate for them.

THE ECONOMIST.

Let us see how things work out in practice.

A certain category of foreign goods can without much ado be forbidden to the home market. Germany, for example, establishes a prohibitive duty on Parisian bronze wares and ironmongery. The casters of bronze and ironmongers of Germany consequently begin to produce articles they have never been involved with before. Before they complete their apprenticeship with respect to this new manufacture, they set up a lot of schools of instruction and provide consumers with imperfect and expensive products. Years pass before they reach the standard of foreign production, if they ever do reach it.

Let us imagine, for a moment, that prohibition had never [199] been established. Would Parisian ironmongery and bronze wares have remained just the same as before?

What was the effect of the German customs restrictions on these two Parisian industries? By cutting back their market, this legislation caused them to retrogress, or at least, it slowed down their progress. You know of course how industrial progress happens. It happens through the division of labor. The greater the division of labor, the greater are the improvements in and multiplication of products.

Now, under what circumstances can the division of labor be taken to its maximum extent? Isn’t this when the market is as extensive as possible?

When a market is closed, when the extent of the market is reduced, few manufacturers stop work completely, but most reduce their production. Reducing their output means they can no longer benefit from division of labor; they are forced to use less economic procedures.

The progress in hardware production and the bronze industry therefore slowed down in France. Did it become more vigorous in Germany, in such a way as to make up for the loss in the general level of production? Let us have a look at this. Several years passed before the hardware producers and the makers of bronze wares in Germany reached the level attained by their French rivals at the time the protection was established. During these years the French industry would have continued to make progress. Naturally more favored than its rival, would it not have made more progress, much to the advantage of general consumption?

Perhaps you would like a final argument, by way of proof.

Protectionism has been in force everywhere [200] for half a century. Certainly the industries enlarged by tariff protection have had time to equal and surpass their former rivals. Have they surpassed them? Have they even equaled them? Are they in condition to stand up to foreign competition? Ask their opinion and see what they say.

THE SOCIALIST.

Oh! They will say unanimously, what they said in 1834 – that they need protection more than ever.[453]

THE ECONOMIST.

This means that after half a century of protection, they still cannot achieve the quality and low prices of their rivals.

By displacing a host of industries, in the teeth of what nature dictated should happen, protectionism has had the result, as it was bound to have, of pushing up the cost of production of everything, or, which comes to the same thing, of holding up the natural lowering of these costs.

Now it is a law of nature that the market price of things, tends to align itself to the costs of production, and it is another law that consumption diminishes as price rises.

I have already shown you, mathematically, I think, that protectionism has increased the costs of production. That increases in the cost of production lead to increases in prices, which in turn lead to a reduction in consumption, is just as clearly established. I am therefore justified in concluding that protectionism has diminished the general wealth of the world. [201]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Your argument, I have to confess, seems to me difficult to refute. In the event, however, general wealth may have been reduced, and the individual wealth of certain countries may have increased. Given this eventuality, were not the favored countries right to adopt protectionism?

THE ECONOMIST.

But the eventuality of which you speak can scarcely be taken as acceptable, let us agree on this. If adopting protectionism has inevitably caused this reduction, a loss in the collective wealth of the nations, this general loss must also necessarily have registered itself in individual losses. If everybody has lost, it is difficult to imagine how some may have gained.

England, which you have in mind, has undoubtedly destroyed many foreign industries, but foreign countries have also destroyed many of hers too. If England had not adopted protectionism, she would have perhaps have produced less wheat, fewer cotton goods and silks, but she would have produced more iron, more steel, more tin, more machinery etc. Her share of the general dividend would perhaps be relatively smaller, but the dividend itself being larger, her share would be actually larger.

Protectionism, however, has not only reduced the abundance of wealth, it has also rendered production inevitably unstable, and its distribution necessarily unjust.

If these arrangements were fully applied everywhere, in a complete and stable way, if an impassable barrier forever separated each nation from its neighbors, we might perhaps succeed in avoiding the disturbances in these unchanging markets. [202] Protectionism however is nowhere applied in a stable and complete way, nor could it be. All nations have foreign dealings and they cannot dispense with them.

Now, these indispensable relations are daily troubled by modifications to the Customs arrangements of the forty to fifty nations which impose Customs duties. Sometimes it concerns a duty being increased, sometimes a duty being reduced, sometimes a subsidy being granted, sometimes one being withdrawn. What is the result of these endless modifications of tariffs?[454] A fall in employment on the one hand, an increase in employment on the other. Any law which closes or contracts openings for employment steals the means of existence for hundreds or thousands of workers, by building colossal fortunes elsewhere…And these laws can be counted in their thousands since the establishment of protectionism.

Subject to these endless disturbances, production becomes intrinsically precarious. Considerable capital has been committed to setting up cloth or silk manufacture. Hundreds of workers are enabled to earn a living. Suddenly, the raising of a foreign tariff closes the market. The workers have to be dismissed and the machinery left to rust or sold off for scrap. The bad effects do not stop there, however. When a factory closes all the industries supplying it are hit in their turn. Once they are affected they spread around them the contagion of misfortune. The disturbance which arose in an isolated place, stretches out in successive waves across the whole industrial world [205]. People get hit and more often than not, do not even know where the blow came from.[455]

If a tariff is lowered and general production is increased, there is a very marked benefit; if a tariff is raised, however, there is, likewise, a very marked loss. The capitalist loses his capital, the worker loses his job. The former faces inevitable ruin, the latter death.

THE SOCIALIST.

It is frightful.

THE ECONOMIST.

While producing results like these on the one hand, on the other the law swiftly rewards, as if on the throw of a dice, the producers who have become masters of the market. In truth their prosperity does not last long. Capital and labor rush en masse towards the protected industries. Often indeed, they hurry there on an excessive scale. More disruptions and more people ruined!

Under this regime, production is nothing more than a game of chance, in which some become rich and others are ruined, according to fortune’s whims, in which the hard-working entrepreneur, formerly a worker,[456] suddenly sees the fruits of a lifetime of working and saving vanish away, while elsewhere rich capitalists see their capital double or treble.

People never hurt their fellow human beings with impunity however.[457] A long cry of bitterness and anger rang out one day in the ears of the few beneficiaries of this system. Unfortunately those who uttered it and those who echoed it, did not perceive the cause of the harm. M.de Sismondi[458] [204], who was the first to explain in eloquent terms this universal cry, did not know that he should go back to the source of so many disastrous disturbances. The socialists who succeeded him did worse still. They attributed the harm to apparent causes which were precisely opposite to the real ones. They imputed to property, harm which arose precisely from violations of people’s freedom to to use or dispose of their property as they wish.

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, this system was bound to cause great harm, and we have not perhaps taken sufficient account of it.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

We would have been better off doing without it, I agree. But since it has been adopted, is it not best to retain it? Most of our industries have grown big under the wing of protectionism, let us not forget this. Would it not be imprudent to take it away from them?

THE ECONOMIST.

If the protectionist system is bad, it should obviously be abandoned. England has already given us the example of returning to free trade. Let us imitate her.[459]

THE SOCIALIST.

With what would you replace protective tariffs? [205]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Perhaps by fiscal tariffs?

THE SOCIALIST.

From the point of view of stability of production, fiscal tariffs are scarcely preferable to the other ones. They are modified just as frequently. Moreover a fiscal tariff is always more or less protectionist.

THE ECONOMIST.

I am not unaware of this. So I would not accept a fiscal tariff other than as a last resort. It is less bad than a protectionist tariff, but it is still bad. If we want to give production the greatest possible productivity and stability, we have to move towards the suppression every kind of tariff, and towards complete free trade and the absolute respect for the right to trade.[460]

Note well moreover, that this result cannot be fully achieved without the total abolition of all Customs duties. As long as one Customs Office remains standing, it will cause disruption and ruin across the entire area of production.

Let the main industrial nations, however, renounce these old instruments of war, and improvement will soon be noticeable.

THE SOCIALIST.

How many reforms remain!

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, how many real reforms!

Molinari’s Long Footnote on William J. Fox, the Anti-Corn Law League, and Dependency on Foreign Markets

Editor’s Note

William Johnson Fox (1786-1864) was a Member of Parliament, a journalist and renowned orator, and one of the founders of the Westminster Review. He became one of the most popular speakers of the Anti-Corn Law League and delivered courses to the workers on Sunday evenings. He served in Parliament from 1847 to 1863. Molinari quotes William Fox's speech from the translation provided by Bastiat in his book Cobden et la Ligue (1845). Bastiat wrote a very lengthy introduction on the history and the ideas of the Anti-Corn Law League and followed this with copious translations he had made of League speeches and newspaper articles. Molinari took Fox's quote from the section on a meeting held at the Covent Garden Theater on 25 January 1844.[461] Fox first gave a version of this speech at Rochdale on November 25, 1843[462] and it proved so popular that he gave a slightly longer version of it at the Covent Garden Theater on January 25, 1844, where it was picked up by the press and later translated into several European languages.[463] We provide below the original 1844 version alongside a translation of Molinari's quote from Bastiat's translation into French. Bastiat's version is interesting for two reasons: firstly, he has highlighted by italicizing the names of the countries from which all the products come from, and second, he has edited the piece considerably, including inserting the word “aristocracy” in the first line to make clearer his anti-aristocratic political purpose.

Molinari’s Long Footnote [464]

One of the eminent members of the Anti-Corn Law League, Mr W. J. Fox, has admirably refuted this argument about foreign dependency. Although this passage has been quoted often, I will give in to the temptation to reproduce it again. It is a little masterpiece:[465]

[William Fox’s original speech:]

 ...  It is a favorite theme, this independence of foreigners. One would imagine that the patriotism of the landlord’s breast must be most intense. Yet he seems to forget that he is employing guano to manure his fields; that he is spreading a foreign surface over his English soil, through which every atom of corn is to grow; becoming thereby polluted with the dependence upon foreigners which he professes to abjure.
To what is he left, this disclaimer against foreigners and advocate of dependence upon home? Trace him through his career. This was very admirably done by an honourable gentleman, who just now addressed you, at the Salisbury contest. His opponent urged this plea, and Mr. Bouverie stripped him, as it were, from head to foot, that he had not an article of dress upon him which did not render him in some degree dependent upon foreigners. We will pursue this subject, and trace his whole life. What is the career of the man whose possessions are in broad acres? Why, a French cook dresses his dinner for him, and a Swiss valet dresses him for dinner; he hands down his lady, decked with pearls that never grew in the shell of a British oyster; and her waving plume of ostrich-feathers certainly never formed the tail of a barn-door fowl. The viands of his table are from all the countries of the world; his wines are from the banks of the Rhine and the Rhone. In his conservatory, he regales his sight with the blossoms of South-American flowers. In his smoking room, he gratifies his scent with the weed of North America. His favorite horse is of Arabian blood; his pet dog of the St. Bernard’s breed. His gallery is rich with pictures from the Flemish school, and his statues from Greece. For his amusements, he goes to hear Italian singers warble German music, followed by a French ballet. If he rises to judicial honours, the ermine which decorates his shoulders is a production that was never before on the back of a British beast. His very mind is not English in its attainments; it is a mere pic-nic of foreign contributions. His poems and philosophy are from Greece and Rome; his geometry is from Alexandria; his arithmetic is from Arabia; and his religion from Palestine. In his cradle, in his infancy, he rubbed his gums with coral from Oriental oceans; and when he dies, his monument will be sculptured in marble from the quarries of Carrara.
And yet this is the man who says: “Oh! let us be independent of foreigners! Let us submit to taxation; let there be privation and want; let there be struggles and disappointments; let there be starvation itself; only let us be independent of foreigners!” I quarrel not with him for enjoying the luxuries of other lands, the results of arts which make it life to live. I wish that not only he and his order may have all the good that any climate or region can bear for them - it is their right, if they have wherewithal to exchange for it; what I complain of is, the sophistry, the hypocrisy, and the iniquity of talking of independence of foreigners in the article of food, while there is dependence in all these materials of daily enjoyment and recreation. Food is the article the foreigner most wants to sell; food is that which thousands of our operatives most want to buy; and it is not for him - the mere creature of foreign agency from head to foot - to interpose and say: “You shall be independent; I alone will be the very essence and quintessence of dependence.” We compromise not this question with parties such as these; no, nor with the legislature.[466]

[Bastiat’s translation quoted by Molinari and retranslated back into English:]

To be independent of foreigners is a favorite theme of the aristocracy. But who then is this great lord, this advocate of national independence, this enemy of all reliance on foreigners? Let us look at his life. A French cook prepares dinner for the master, and a Swiss valet dresses the master for dinner. Milady who takes his hand is utterly resplendent in pearls, which you never in find in English oysters, while the feather which flutters from her head never comes from the tail of an English turkey. The meats on his table come from Belgium and his wines from the Rhine or the Rhône. He rests his eyes on flowers from South America and he gratifies his sense of smell with the smoke from a leaf which comes from North America. His favorite horse is of Arab origin, and his dog [188] is a St Bernard. His art gallery abounds in Flemish paintings and Greek statues. Does he want entertainment? He goes to listen to Italian singers performing German music, the whole thing rounded off with a French ballet. Does he rise to distinction as a judge? The ermine which adorns his shoulders had never until then been seen on the back of any British animal. His mind itself is a multicolored weave of exotic elements. His philosophy and poetry come from Greece and Rome, his geometry from Alexandria, his arithmetic from the Arabs, and his religion from Palestine. In his cot he pressed his baby teeth on a teething ring of coral from the Indian Ocean. When he dies, Carrara marble will crown his tomb…and this is the man who says ‘Let us be independent of the foreigner.’[467]

11. The Eighth Evening

Editor’s Note

In this Soirée Molinari turns to infringements or violations of what he calls “internal” property rights, which as he defined it in S2 is “the right every man has to dispose of his physical, moral, and intellectual faculties, as well as of the body which both houses those faculties and serves them as a tool.” We might also call this the right to act or to engage in various activities without interference by the state. This right or “freedom” is violated when the state prevents a person from engaging in certain activities, such as starting a private mail delivery company to compete with the state’s monopoly, a bank minting its own private currency in competition with the legal tender laws of the state, a company building a private road and charging tolls for people to use it, a theater which opens to put on new and perhaps unauthorized plays to paying customers, or “an entrepreneur in the education business” starting up their own private school to teach an innovative curriculum to fee paying students.

These examples which Molinari discusses in some detail here comprise a mixture of so-called “public goods” provided exclusively by the state, or monopolies run by private groups which have been exclusively authorized by the state to do so. This is the second of four instances where Molinari discusses how public goods might be provided privately and voluntarily by entrepreneurs operating in the free market. The others are in S3 (forests, canals, waterways), S9 (bakers, butchers, printers etc.), and S11 (security, police, and defense). Below (p. 000) he describes the current French system of some private and free industries, some heavily regulated or privately monopolized industries, and considerable state monopolized industries as “le régime bâtard” which might be translated as this “bastard,” “hybrid,” or “mongrel” regime.

The Economists were divided into several camps on the issue of the private provision of public goods such as roads and bridges, with Adam Smith arguing for a “user pays’ system in most cases, J.B. Say preferring to see the government provide those public goods which were not profitable to the private sector, and Molinari taking the most extreme view that every public good, not just transport, could and should be provided privately and competitively, as we will see here and in S8 and S11. In general, Molinari believed that all government economic monopolies were more expensive and less efficiently run than their private counterparts. He makes some brief remarks here about how this was bound to be the case and only later develops his thoughts into a more coherent form in his treatise Cours d’économie politique written a few years later. There he discusses what he calls “the anti-economic” nature of government activity and draws up a list of four ways governments “sin” against or violate the natural laws of political economy.[468]

The original insight that Molinari had in his chapters on the private provision of public goods was that every economic activity could be seen as an “industry” which had costs which it had to cover and potential profits which could be made. This meant that the good or service in question could be “made” or “produced” (he talks about “la fabrication des monnaies” (the manufacture of money), “la production de l’enseignement” (the production of education), and “la production de sécurité” (the production of security), and that there would be “entrepreneurs” ready and willing to manufacture or produce these goods or services (he talks about “entrepreneurs d’education" (entrepreneurs in the education business) and a “producteur de sécurité” who was also an entrepreneur).

For reasons of space we can only mention briefly three representative examples of Molinari’s thinking on these matters here, namely free banking and the private issuance of money, the state regulation and funding of theaters, and the role of the state in providing education.

The orthodox view of money held by the political economists was expressed by Michel Chevalier in the entry on “Monnaie” in the DEP[469] where he stated that money was either gold or silver of a defined weight and purity which was issued by a state mint or other government regulated body. Molinari here adopts the opposing view of his friend and colleague Charles Coquelin (1803-1852)[470] who, in a series of articles and a book called Du crédit et des banques (1848), defended the idea of “free banking,” which is the view that private banks should be allowed to competitively issue their own currency which could be redeemed for gold upon demand. Coquelin's and Molinari's view was not the mainstream economists' position which was closer to Chevalier’s.

Molinari was a great fan of the theater and wrote several articles on it from an economic and political perspective.[471] Music, art, theater, and other forms of fine art were heavily regulated by the French state. They could be subsidized, granted a monopoly of performance, the number of venues and prices of tickets were regulated, and they were censored and often shut down for overstepping the bounds of political acceptability. Molinari argued for the separation of “theaters and the state,” in other words an end to all state subsidies and support in exchange for the complete liberty of theater owners to put on whatever they wished. He summed up his view in a very angry and sarcastic article on “Théâtres” in DEP in which he denounced the censorship and regulation of the theater industry as “tyrannical” and the regulators as “the most fanatical partisans of the principle of authority.”

The education system was heavily regulated by the state[472] but the French classical liberals, like their counterparts in England, were divided about what to do about this. Some like the free trader Richard Cobden believed that the state should provide universal free education. In France Molinari and Frédéric Passy debated the matter in the pages of L’Économiste belge in 1857-58 in which Passy advocated no state intervention in education whatsoever, while Molinari believed that education was so important that the state should force parents to send their children to schools, in other words he supported a form of compulsory education as part of the “tutelary” or protective function of the state. However, he believed that the schools should be provided only by the free market not by the state at taxpayer’s expense. This is one of the few areas where Molinari was less radically liberal than his colleagues.[473] Nevertheless, he thought that education was an “industry” in which there would be “la production de l’enseignement” (the production of education) and where “entrepreneurs d’education" (entrepreneurs in the education business) will emerge to establish schools and sell education services to fee paying consumers.

[206]

SUMMARY: Infringements of internal property rights. – Industries monopolized or subsidized by the State. – The production of money. – The nature and uses of money. – Why a country could not run out of money. – Communication routes. – Managed expensively and badly by the state. – Carrying letters. – Postmasters. – That government intervention in production is always harmful. – Subsidies and privileges for theaters. – Public libraries. – Subsidies to religion. – Monopoly of teaching. – Its dire results. THE ECONOMIST.

It is not just external property which is infringed upon; people also infringe upon the property of man in his person, in his faculties, in his powers: that is to say, his internal property. [474]

Internal property is violated when a man is forbidden to use his faculties as he sees fit, when he is told:

“You[475] will not work in such and such an industry or, if you do, you will be subject to certain constraints; you will be required to observe certain regulations. The natural right you possess to use your faculties in the way most useful to you and yours will be diminished or regulated. -- By what right? -- By virtue of the superior rights of society.”
“But what if I do not put my [207] abilities to any harmful use?”
“Society is convinced that you could not work freely in some industries without harming it.”
“But what if society is wrong? What if in using my abilities in this or that branch of production I do not cause society any harm?”
“In that case so much the worse for you. Society cannot be wrong.”

In deceiving itself thus, however, does not society inflict upon itself some damage? Rules which hinder the activity of the producer, do they not result inevitably, for certain, in reducing production by raising the price of goods? If one industry is burdened with rules and harassed while other industries remain free, will not people turn to these others by preference? Otherwise, if we are prepared to operate in the highly regulated activity, will we not pass on to the consumers some part of the burden of this harassment and regulation?

Let us leave to one side the regimes in which all production is regulated, even more so, those in which no worker is allowed to use his abilities freely, in which labor is still enslaved. Thank God these monstrosities are beginning to be rare. Let us consider only those hybrid regimes[476] where certain industries are free, others regulated, and yet others are monopolized by the state.

Such is the deplorable regime which obtains today in France.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Are you claiming that the government hurts society by regulating certain branches of production, and by engaging in certain industries itself. [208]

THE ECONOMIST.

That is what I am claiming.

All regulation, as well as all monopoly, leads to an increase, direct or indirect, in the price of goods, and therefore to a fall in production.

Government produces more expensively and less well than individuals; in the first place because by managing several industries, it fails to recognize, if not in the details at least at the level of higher management, the economic principle of the division of labor; in the second place because by itself assuming either directly or indirectly the monopoly of an industry, if fails to recognize the economic principle of free competition.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

In the event, therefore, the government produces money, builds roads and railways, and provides education more expensively and at a lower quality than individuals would.

THE ECONOMIST.

Without any doubt.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Even money!

THE ECONOMIST.

Money like any other commodity.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Is not the minting of coins a prerogative of sovereignty?

THE ECONOMIST.

No more so than the manufacture of nails or of buttons for gaiters. Why should the manufacture of money be [209] the prerogative of sovereignty? What is money? An instrument with the aid of which the exchange of value takes place….

THE SOCIALIST.

There are also direct exchanges. A host of exchanges also take place with paper money.

THE ECONOMIST.

There are very few direct exchanges, and there will be fewer and fewer to the extent that the division of labor continues to grow. A man who passes his life making a tenth part of a pin could not directly exchange his product for the things he needs.[477] He is obliged to barter first of all against some intermediate merchandise, which can easily be exchanged with other things. This intermediate merchandise must be durable, easy to divide and to transport. Various metals -- gold, silver, copper -- in different degree possess these qualities. This is why we have made from them instruments of exchange, money.

As for paper, it can also serve as money but on condition that it represents real value, value already created, value made concrete in an existing object, available and capable of serving as money.[478]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

This is what the supporters of paper money unfortunately do not understand.

THE ECONOMIST.

But you yourself give me the impression of not having a proper idea of what money is, when you tell me that the production of this vehicle of exchange is a prerogative of sovereignty. It is not because a sovereign [210] has marked a piece of gold or silver with his head that the coin has value, it is because it contains a certain quantity of labor. Whether it be made or marked by a government or individual, matters little. No I am mistaken! Individuals would make it better and cheaper. They would also take care to supply the market with that variety of money which the needs of circulation demand. Moreover, if from the very start, money had been made by individuals, forgery would have been rarer.

THE SOCIALIST.

How can you know that?

THE ECONOMIST.

The forgeries formerly committed by the very people who had the exclusive right to repress all types of pillage and fraud, itself inevitably went unpunished.[479] To which one must add that the public had no way of avoiding it, since the monarchs claimed for themselves the exclusive right to mint money.

If the manufacture of money had remained open, individuals would have undertaken it as people will undertake any industry which will yield a profit.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Can the manufacture of money yield a profit?

THE ECONOMIST.

As with any other manufacture. In France the government charges three francs for the minting of a kilogram of silver, and nine in the case of gold. This virtually covers the costs of producing [211] the money. In England minting is free.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Ah! Can you find me an individual who is prepared to work for nothing then?

THE ECONOMIST.

Please be wary of terms like gratis, free, gratuity.[480] Nothing which requires labor is free; the point being that there are different ways of remunerating this labor. In France the users of money pay directly for its production; in England taxpayers pay the cost of production indirectly in the form of taxes.

Which of these two ways of remunerating labor is the more economic and the more just? It is obviously the former. In France the production of money costs a certain sum annually, shall we say a million? Individuals who have the ingots transformed into coinage reimburse this million directly. If minting were free as in England the costs of production would be paid by taxpayers. The collection of tax revenues, however, is not free; in France it is never less than thirteen per cent of the principal.[481] So if our minting were free, it would cost not a million but one million, one hundred and thirty thousand francs.

So much for the economics of things being free.

Now let us look for the justice of “free” production. Who has to pay for a product? He who consumes it, is that not true? Who must, in consequence, bear [212] the costs of making that money? Those who use that money.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But everybody uses it.

THE ECONOMIST.

The difference being that certain individuals, the richest people, use it a lot; others, the poorest, use it very little. When minting is paid for directly, it is paid for by the users of money in proportion to that use; when it is paid indirectly, when it is free, it is paid for by everybody, by small consumers as by large, often by the former more than by the latter. That depends on the basis of the taxation. Is that fair?

If the government produces money free of charge, the costs of money production are raised to their maximum; if it gets reimbursed directly for minting, likewise it produces money more expensively than private production would, because the production of money is not its speciality.

If minting had remained free, it would in all probability have been carried out by the great goldsmiths companies. Under this regime, with consumers able to refuse money made by forgers, and, what is more, to inflict on them punishment as an example to others, forgery would have been extremely rare.

THE SOCIALIST.

But by joining forces in order to supply less money than is demanded, would not your free manufacturers [213] have realized enormous profits at the expense of the public?

THE ECONOMIST.

No. First of all because one can, if need be, use ingots in place of money; next because free competition does not take long to smash even the strongest cartels.[482] When the equilibrium between supply and demand is broken, prices soon yield a return which the competition seeks to share in. In this case people start to produce outside the cartel, until the market price falls again to the level of the cost of production.

THE SOCIALIST.

Ah! It is always the same law.

THE ECONOMIST.

Always. And this law explains also why a country could never run out of money. When the needs arising from circulation come to exceed the supply of money, the price of metals rises progressively. In this event people no longer export ingots; they find it on the contrary advantageous to import them up to the point when equilibrium is re-established.

THE SOCIALIST.

What you have said demolishes one of the big arguments used by protectionists..[483]

I have another objection. If the production of money was free, would it be possible to have a single currency? Would not each producer supply a different kind of money? We would no longer know where we were.

THE ECONOMIST.

There are thousands of producers of calicoes, and yet [214] there is only a small number of types of calico. In Manchester, twenty or thirty manufacturers weave lengths of identical quality and size. It would be the same with money; the only coins struck would be those which the public found convenient and advantageous to use. If all the nations wanted to use the same currency we would arrive quite naturally at a single one. If they preferred different money and measures, suitable to their own ways and their particular needs, why I ask you would people take it into their heads to impose a single currency?

THE SOCIALIST.

You could well be right and I understand up to a certain point, that one might leave the production of money to private industry. The producers can in fact engage in competition with each other in such a way as to make the development of a monopoly impossible. Is the same true however for all the industries of which the government has taken over? For example are not communication routes natural monopolies?

THE ECONOMIST.

There are no natural monopolies. How could the builders and operators of communication routes achieve profits from monopoly? By raising the price of transportation above its cost of production. But as soon as the market price exceeds the cost of production, competition is irresistibly drawn in…

THE SOCIALIST.

In this case would they not build two or three parallel routes from one point to another? [215]

THE ECONOMIST.

That would not be necessary. Competition in the means of communication, notably improved roads, railways, and canals, etc., happens across a very wide range. Let the Le Havre to Strasbourg railway put up its fares, for example, and immediately the movement of travelers and goods to the centre of Europe will shift in favor of Antwerp or Amsterdam. For intermediate points, there is competition from canals, rivers, almost parallel sections of rail, or ordinary roads, competition which becomes more active in the face of attempts at monopoly…provided, of course, that the competition remains free.

Provided this condition exists, the market price for transport can never exceed the costs of production for very long.

Well I think you will certainly agree with me, that individuals build and run roadways better and cheaper than governments. Would you compare the roads in England with those in France?[484]

THE SOCIALIST.

This is an incontestable fact. Is it not essential, however, that traffic remains free and at no charge for the user?

THE ECONOMIST.

Have we not examined in depth already the mystery of things which are free? Have you forgotten that no good whatsoever – money, teaching, transport – could be provided free by the government, unless it were paid for by the taxpayers? Have you forgotten that in this case the good’s costs, over and above its ordinary cost of production, include the additional cost [216] of collecting the tax? So if our roads were not free, they would be financed by those who use them, to the degree to which they use them, and the roads would be cheaper.

What is true of the great highways is no less true of little roads. These petty governments[485] we call départements and communes, build roads at their own cost without, however, having central government approval. These roads, voted for by majorities on the councils of the communes and departments, are built and used at the cost of all taxpayers. Under the monarchical regime, when rich taxpayers alone had places on the councils of the communes, the departments, or the central state, the poor peasants were required to contribute a large part of the work decreed…to whose profit? I leave you to think about it. The corvées of the Ancien Régime had reappeared under the benign guise of “compulsory contributions in kind.”[486]

The only way to put an end to this scandalous injustice is to hand over roads, great and small, to private industry, as well as all forms of transport.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Without making an exception of letter delivery?

THE ECONOMIST.

Without making an exception of letter delivery.[487]

THE SOCIALIST.

Oh, come on!

THE ECONOMIST.

The post has not always been in government hands.[488] [217] Before the 1789 Revolution, the letter post had been contracted out to individual companies (or “farmers”).[489] In 1788 this lease brought in twelve million to the state. As you well know, however, the tariff on the letters was very high. The big farmers knew with regard to this, how to bribe the administrators in charge of working out and regulating the tariffs.[490] They flourished under this system but the public were paying handsomely for their good living.

What had to be done to remedy the manifest abuses of this system of farming out state contracts? Quite simply the remedy was to hand over the post to free competition. Under this new regime, the movement of letters would have promptly fallen to the lowest possible price. The preferred choice was to leave the post in the hands of the state. The public gained nothing from this, indeed the contrary! The post remained very expensive and became much less reliable. As you know very well, the abuse of trust and also general unreliability, have multiplied frightfully in the postal service.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is all too true.

THE ECONOMIST.

For a long time, moreover, the government claimed the right to infringe the confidentiality of correspondence. It is not long since the Cabinet Noir was suppressed, and some people claim it still exists.[491] The worst of it is that we do not have the power to avoid these risks and these insults to the public. It is strictly forbidden for individuals to handle the post. Interlopers who deliver the mail[492] are subject to severe penalties. [218]

THE SOCIALIST.

How barbarous!

THE ECONOMIST.

That is the advantage of communism for you ... .If the post were free you would be able to hold the carriers involved to account, both for the violation of your correspondence, and for stealing from you. Given the government’s communist monopoly,[493] none of this is practicable. You are at the mercy of the administrators.

THE SOCIALIST.

At least it has ended up with their giving us postal reform. [494]

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, but postal reform[495] has destroyed one abuse only to replace it with another. In England, reform has for several years caused a considerable deficit in the receipts. The tariff had been so reduced that half the charge of the postal service was falling on the taxpayers. The service was half free. Now is it not fair that the cost of correspondence should be met by the correspondents? Why should some poor uneducated peasant who neither writes nor receives letters throughout his life, contribute to paying for the carriage of the heavy missives from Monsieur Turcaret or the love-letters of his neighbor Mr. Lovelace?[496] Is there a communism more unjust and awful than that?

Shall I talk about the privileges enjoyed by mounted postmen? In past times, the postmasters set up by Louis XI, enjoyed a monopoly in passenger transport.[497] Little by little they were obliged to share this monopoly [219] with the royal parcel service, and finally to leave a space for free enterprise. Given their insistent demands, however, the new entrepreneurs were obliged to pay the masters of the coaching inns, whose horses they did not use, an indemnity of twenty five centimes per delivery and for each horse in harness (law of the fifteenth ventôse in year XIII).[498] The overall indemnity had risen to a figure of six million francs per year. But the railways have considerably reduced that windfall. The consequence was loud complaints from the postmasters. They wanted to force the railway companies also, to pay them subsidies. The companies resisted. The question is on-going.

It has to be said in defense of the postmasters, that regulations dating from the reign of Louis XI, oblige them to have available teams of horses in places where these teams are perfectly pointless. But is it not absurd to pay pensions to one industry which no longer functions, at the expense of another which does? Is it not at once absurd and grotesque to force entrepreneurs in the coach business[499] to pay a fee for the idle horses of the postmasters?

THE SOCIALIST.

It is indeed absurd and grotesque. But if the government, the départements and the communes ceased completely their intervention in the transport industry in the construction of roads, canals, bridges and streets, if they stopped setting up communications between diverse parts of the country and seeing to it that established communications are maintained, would individuals take on the burden of this indispensable work? [220]

THE ECONOMIST.

Do you believe that a stone thrown up into the air will end up falling?

THE SOCIALIST.

That is a law of physics!

THE ECONOMIST.

Well it is in virtue of the same physical law that all useful things, roads, bridges, canals, bread, meat etc get produced as soon as society needs them. When a useful thing is demanded , the production of that thing tends naturally to operate with an intensity of movement equal in intensity of movement to that of a falling stone.

When a useful thing is demanded without being produced yet, the ideal price, the price which would be put on it if it were produced, grows in geometric progression while the demand grows in arithmetic progression.[500] A moment comes when this price rises high enough to surmount all current obstacles and when production begins to take place.

This being so, the government could not interfere with any aspect of production without causing harm to society.

If it produces something later than private individuals would have done, it harms society by depriving it of the thing in question during the interval.

If it produces it at the same time as private individuals, its intervention is still harmful, because it will produce at a higher price than private individuals. [221]

Last of all, if it produces it earlier, society is nonetheless harmed…You are protesting. I am going to prove it to you.

What does one produce with? With present labor and past labor or capital. How does an individual starting a new industry secure for himself labor and capital? By going to look for workers and capital in those places where the services of these agents of production are least useful and where consequently they are paid the lowest.

When the demand for a new product is weaker than that for established ones, when producing it one would not recover the costs incurred, individuals will carefully abstain from production. They begin production only from the time when they are sure of covering their costs.

When government gets ahead of them, is it going to find the labor and capital it needs? It finds them where the individual producers themselves would have got them, from the society itself. But by beginning production before the costs can yet have been covered, or even before the ordinary profits of this new industry have reached the level of those of existing industries, does not the government divert capital and labor from more useful employment than it is giving them? Does it not impoverish rather than enrich society?

For example, the government has undertaken to build too early certain stretches of canal which cross deserts. The labor and capital it has devoted to the building of these canals, still unfinished after a quarter of a century, were certainly better engaged where it found them. On the other hand it began building the telegraphs, for which it had reserved the monopoly or licence for itself, too late [222] and then it did not build enough of them. We have only two or three electric telegraph lines and they are still for the exclusive use of the government and the railways. In the United States, where this industry is under free enterprise, the electric telegraph is everywhere and serves everybody.[501]

THE SOCIALIST.

I agree with these observations as applied to industries of a purely material nature; but you are pretty well bound to agree, I would think, that the government must be concerned in some degree with the intellectual and moral development of society. Does it not have the right, indeed the duty, to impose an advantageous direction on the arts and on literature, as well as on education, and to intervene in religious services? Can it abandon these noble branches of production, to all the winds of private speculation?

THE ECONOMIST.

Without doubt it would have this right and would be held to the fulfilling of this duty, if its intervention, in this area of the domain of production, were not always and necessarily as harmful here as in the rest.

Are we speaking of the fine arts?[502] The government gives pensions to some men of letters and pays subsidies to some theaters. I think I have proved to you that writers could easily do without the miserable pension allocated to them, if their property rights were fully recognized and respected.

The grants to the theaters are among the most blatant and scandalous abuses of our day. [223]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

It has been proven times many that the Théâtre-Français and the Opéra could not survive without subsidies. Do you wish, by any chance, to do away with the Théâtre-Français and the Opéra?[503]

THE ECONOMIST.

Notice first of all what profound injustice hides under this regime of subsidies. Each year the state spends more than two million to maintain two or three Parisian theaters.[504] These theaters are precisely the ones frequented by the richest element of the Parisian bourgeoisie. Who pays these two million? All taxpayers do, including the poor peasant of Lower Brittany, who in his entire life has never set foot in, and never will, the auditorium of a theater, unlike members of the wealthy audience of the Opéra Orchestra. Is this justice? Is it fair to make a poor farmer, who passes his day stooped over the handle of his plough, contribute to the dainty pleasures of the rich Parisian bourgeoisie?

THE SOCIALIST.

It is exploitation![505]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Once again, however, would you prefer that there were no Opéra and no Théâtre-Français? What about our nation’s glory!

THE ECONOMIST.

When Louis XIV crushed the people with taxes in order to build his cold and pathetic Château at Versailles;[506] when he reduced the wretched country folk to eating grass, to help pay for the sumptuous expenditures of his court, did he not also invoke the glory of France? Glory! In what do you think it consists? [224]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

In the great things which a nation is able to accomplish.

THE ECONOMIST.

Nothing is greater or more splendid than justice. If an age should dawn when the many cease to be plundered for the sake of the few, and justice comes to be the sovereign law of society, that will be the greatest of the centuries.

I do not believe, however, that the theater needs subsidies. On the contrary, I think theaters are harmed by subsidies. Subsidized theaters are the ones which most mismanage their business. Why? I will tell you.

First of all you should note that they are robbed of part of their subsidy in various ways. A subsidized theater is required to grant free entry to ministers, to influential representatives of government, to a host of political figures, high and low. So the subsidy works, in the first place, to secure free access to the pleasures of theater-going to a crowd of people…

THE SOCIALIST.

Who are absolutely in a position to pay their own way.

THE ECONOMIST.

Much more so, for certain, than those who do pay for them. In the second place, the subsidies serve to enrich the most unscrupulous directors. If a theater has a deficit of fifty thousand francs, the director asks for a subsidy of a hundred and fifty thousand. They give it to him. He pays off his deficit, gives up his subsidy, and goes off to enjoy the income[507] the state has provided for him.

Subsidized theaters are constantly in [225] debt. Is this in spite of the subsidy or because of it? Judge for yourselves.

A firm under free enterprise, a firm obliged to cover all its costs itself, achieves prodigious efforts to attain this end. It improves the quality of its product, it lowers its price, and comes up every day with some new way of attracting customers. For the firm, this is a question of life or death. A firm enjoying special treatment and subsidies does not make these efforts. Assured of receiving a living, even when its customers may have deserted it completely, even when its annual deficit may be as high as its total costs, it tends, naturally, to look after itself as opposed to the public. If Tortoni[508] received a government subsidy for selling his ice-creams, would he take as much trouble to make sure his trade went well? Would not his ice-creams become detestable, like certain theater pieces put on at a certain theater, and would not the public, which loves good ice-creams, desert his establishment en masse? You can easily see what a subsidy given to the national ice-cream industry would have succeeded in doing.

There are, however, worse things than subsidies. There are privileges. In France the theater industry is not open to all. It is not just anyone who is allowed to open a theater, nor even any comparable institution. Recently, when the cafés lyriques (musical cafés) became popular, the privileged theaters were very put out. The directors collectively petitioned for the suppression of this rival industry. The minister refused to comply with their petition, but he forbade the musical cafés: first, to put on any [226] plays, and secondly forbade their singers to wear costumes. Is not such a ban worthy of the Middle Ages?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I have to confess it is ludicrous.

THE ECONOMIST.

This is what happened in 1849 and it happened to the most intellectual nation on earth. The directors, however, are not especially guilty. They are bowing to imperatives created by their privileges.

The regime of privilege is by its very nature precarious. All such privileges are temporary. Now the first condition of all economic production, is clear and unrestricted ownership. In any industry there are general costs whose repayment calls for a long time-period. Examples include the building, improvement, and decoration of the premises. If these costs are spread across a long period of production they become almost unnoticeable. When, on the contrary, they are concentrated into a short period of time, they raise the cost of the expenditure significantly. When the tenure is short-term, people tend to run up as few costs as possible. Few halls are worse constructed and maintained than Parisian theater auditoria. The costs of decorating them nevertheless are a heavy charge on their directors’ budgets.

Furthermore, like any industry, theaters have their good and bad seasons. If the theater industry were free one would work less in poor seasons than in good seasons so that one did not work at a a loss. Theaters are forced to work the whole year round, whether they make [227] profits or not. This is an explicit condition of their privileged status.

THE SOCIALIST.

What an unimaginable absurdity!

THE ECONOMIST.

Their costs of production therefore increase by the whole sum of what they are obliged to lose in a bad season. Add to this the very high taxes levied to support the Welfare Office[509] and you will get an idea of the excessively high price charged for shows.[510] You will also understand why the directors pursued their competitors so relentlessly.

If the theater industry was free, the costs of building and maintaining the auditoria could be spread across an indefinite period. Production could also be geared to the demands of consumers. There would be lots of plays in a good season and a few in a bad one. The costs of production would then fall to the lowest possible level, and the competition would take care of aligning market prices with the costs of production. The lowering of prices would increase consumption and therefore production. There would be more theaters, more actors, more authors.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Wouldn’t art be degraded by becoming more popular? [228]

THE ECONOMIST.

I am convinced, on the contrary, that art would become more noble and broadened in its appeal. Every time production is developed it improves. People say today that dramatic art is languishing and demeaned. Put your trust in freedom to pick it up and reinvigorate it.

What is true for theaters is also true for libraries, museums, exhibitions, and academies.

THE SOCIALIST.

What? You would like the state to cease opening its libraries to the public free of charge?

THE ECONOMIST.

I am of the view that public libraries should be closed in the interests of spreading knowledge.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Oh! That is too extreme a paradox. I will protest to the bitter end.

THE ECONOMIST.

Protest by all means but listen. The state owns a certain number of libraries.[511] The government opens some of them to the public, free of charge. It does not open all of them, please note. Some libraries are only pretexts for employing librarians. The annual expenses entailed by the management of public libraries, including in this the maintenance of buildings, add up to more than a million.[512] This means that all taxpayers have to contribute, so that certain individuals can go and study or read, for nothing, at the National Library, the Mazarin Library and elsewhere. If public libraries were run by private individuals, we [229] would first of all save the whole cost of collecting these taxes. The users of books would pay a smaller sum than the one paid today by the nation.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, but they would pay something, while today they pay nothing. And is it not a false economy to skimp on learning?

THE ECONOMIST.

You are right that it is a false economy. I would ask you, however, to have a good look at how the million which taxpayers make a present of every year to book enthusiasts, is used. Look at private establishments in France, and if you can find a single one whose administration is as bad as that of the National Library, for example, one in which wealth is as badly used and the public as badly served, I will say you have won the case.

THE SOCIALIST.

Service at the National Library is certainly deplorably organized. There is not a single manufacturing firm in France that does not do its stocktaking every year. The Library has not yet managed to complete its own one. Its catalogue, begun many years ago, is still not finished. One could, however, administer this great national institution better.

THE ECONOMIST.

I do not think so. As long as it remains locked into the vast communism which is the state,[513] the National Library cannot be administered any better.

In reality, then, the communist management of the public libraries [230] has the result of keeping most of the treasures of learning away from the public. Put this capital in the hands of private industry and you will see to what good use the latter will be able to put it. The riches of science come to us slowly and intractably today. You will see how swift and easy our access to them will become. We will no longer wait long hours and often long days, in vain, for a book or manuscript. Service will be immediate. Private industry does not make people wait.[514]

Would science lose out in all this?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Is not a compromise possible? Could not the present libraries get by alongside libraries run by private industry?

THE ECONOMIST.

This is the hybrid regime we have today.[515] On the one hand we have public libraries, whose vast resources remain more or less unproductive; on the other hand there are expensive and badly supplied reading rooms.

If the free libraries did not exist, the reading rooms would be on a bigger scale; all the precious output of science and literature would accumulate in them in a useful fashion; each category of knowledge would soon acquire a specialist library, in which those who undertake research would lack for nothing; and where the wealth of scientific and literary publications would on completion be put immediately at the disposal of the public. At the same time, free competition would oblige these establishments to lower their prices to the lowest possible level.

THE SOCIALIST.

All the same, poor students and needy scholars would have plenty to complain of under this regime.

THE ECONOMIST.

Library and reading room expenses are the smallest element in the costs of an education. As for poor scholars, they generally work for booksellers who take account of their research costs. A part of these costs falls on taxpayers today. Would it not be fairer if they were exclusively charged to purchasers of books? Moreover, the latter would not lose out thereby, since the books would become more substantial if the business of research became easier.

I was therefore not engaging in paradox at all when I said that we should close the public libraries in the interests of the spreading of knowledge. Maintaining free libraries is communism; and whether the issue is science or industry, communism is barbarous.

This detestable communism is also to be found in the domains of education and religion.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Attack the universities as much as you like, but for pity’s sake respect religion. Religion is our mainstay.

THE ECONOMIST.

It is even in the interest of religion that the state should stop subsidizing religious services.[516]

Is it fair that a man who does not practice any of the religions recognized by the state, should be required, nevertheless, to pay their salaries? Is it fair that one should pay for something [232] which one does not use? Does not all religious morality condemn an abuse and plunder of this kind? Such plunder and abuse, however, are committed every day in France, for the benefit of recognized religions. So much the worse for taxpayers who follow religions that the state does not recognize! [517]

Do you think this flagrant injustice is beneficial to religion?

Do you also not think that these faiths would be better administered if the state did not subsidize them? Do you not think the services of religion would be distributed with more intelligence and zeal if the state did not guarantee churchmen a stipend, come what may?[518] Besides, experience has already pronounced on the matter. Nowhere are religious services better managed than in the United States, where the different faiths receive no subsidies. Many enlightened churchmen believe that the same arrangements would give France the same results.[519]

THE SOCIALIST.

This experiment should be carried out.

THE ECONOMIST.

The present regime of education is more defective still than that of religion. The nation allots an annual sum of seventeen millions to a business which distributes education in the name of the state, and which deals high-handedly with rival enterprises.[520]

Under the Ancien Regime, education was, [233] like all other industries, in the hands of certain privileged corporations. The Revolution destroyed these privileges. Unfortunately the Constituent Assembly and the Convention hastened to decree the establishment of state schools, schools run at the expense of the state, of the départements, or communes. Napoleon extended and radicalized this communist notion in founding the University.

Grafted as it was onto the traditions of the Ancien Régime, and nurtured under the jealous eye of despotism, the University dispensed in the nineteenth century, the education of the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries. It set about teaching dead languages as people had taught them in those times, without suspecting in the least that what might be useful in the sixteenth century might well not be so in the nineteenth.[521]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Why is that?

THE ECONOMIST.

I can accept that the ancient languages were generally taught at the time of the Renaissance. Nations which had scarcely emerged from the darkness of the middle ages, had barely developed science and literature as yet. To equip themselves with knowledge, ideas, and images, they had to draw on the vast store of antiquity, whose riches had just come to light. The indispensable tool for the assimilation of these intellectual riches was language. One could not learn what the Ancients knew, without a knowledge of Greek and Latin.

In the nineteenth century the situation has changed. All the ideas, all the knowledge of antiquity have passed into the modern languages. We can learn everything the ancients knew without knowing the ancient languages.[234] Modern languages are a universal key which opens up both past and present. The dead languages resemble today those ancient and impressive machines that get put in the Conservatory of Arts and Crafts, but which are no longer used in manufacturing.[522]

I am well aware that people have claimed knowledge of the dead languages to be essential for learning living ones. If this were so, however, would we not be obliged to learn half a dozen ancient languages in order to know French, for God knows how many elements went into the formation of our language? A whole lifetime would not be enough. Moreover, how many college pedants write fluently in Latin, and cannot spell in French? Voltaire was certainly weaker in Latin than the Jesuit Patouillet or Father Nonotte. [523] The dead languages are tools which pointlessly clutter up the brain and often obliterate it.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What do you mean?

THE ECONOMIST.

I mean that by teaching Greek and Latin to children, we are prematurely communicating to them the ideas, beliefs and passions of two nations, without doubt very civilized for the era they lived in, but who would today be regarded as barbarians. This is true above all of their moral outlook. By submitting today’s children to a regime of Greek and Latin, one is filling their minds with the prejudices and vices of a civilization scarcely beyond its earliest stages, instead of communicating to them (p235) the knowledge and the moral outlook of an advanced civilization; we are turning them into rather immoral little barbarians…[524]

If education had enjoyed the benefit of freedom instead of passing from the detestable regime of privilege to the still more detestable communist monopoly, it would have rejected long ago this ancient tool kit of dead languages, just as industries in free competition rid themselves of old machinery. We would teach children what is useful or is harmful to them; we would stop teaching them what is useless or harmful to them. Latin and Greek would be relegated to the brains of those museum pieces we call polyglots.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I agree with you that there are considerable reforms to be done in University management. It was dreadful for example to oblige those institutions which were rivals to the University to pay it an annual contribution; it was scarcely less so to prevent these establishments from opening without special authorization, and to impose on them inspection by the University’s agents. Would it not be good, however, to allow the existence, alongside individual institutions which are henceforth totally private, of the institutions of the state and the communes? Would not this beneficial competition serve the progress of education admirably?

THE ECONOMIST.

This regime would scarcely be preferable to the present one. Let me give my reasons:

Educational establishments belonging to the state and to the communes do not cover their costs and are not [236] required so to do. The Treasury and the communal budgets take care of their deficits. The tax payers, those who have no children as well as those who do have, provide part of the costs of this communist education. Now I ask you, can private enterprise compete on a regular basis with these half-free establishments? This half-free condition is, in truth, often very costly, perhaps because of the poor quality of the teaching, perhaps because of the high level of total costs. Have not the establishments of the state and the communes the wherewithal to lower their prices indefinitely? Has it not even been mooted that education be made entirely free? In reality this would make it as expensive as it could possibly be, but this outcome would at the same time make all competition impossible. If the state generously undertook the supplying of cloth at half-price or free, who would consider continuing with the making of cloth? Could cloth production under free enterprise ever assume any really large scale, given the presence of a competitor handing over its goods for nothing?

Liberty in education will remain the purest illusion until the state, the départements, and the communes cease completely and absolutely to meddle in public education.

THE SOCIALIST.

Could not the state and commune schools manage their costs as well as those of private production?

THE ECONOMIST.

Let them try! Let us abolish the budget for state education. Let us make the University and communes establishments [237] cover all their costs and you will soon be astonished.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Will you not at least agree with me that the state should retain the overseeing of educational establishments?

THE ECONOMIST.

I do not see any difficulty there. I think, however, that state surveillance would rapidly become pointless under a regime of true liberty.

What prevents state establishments today from improving in quality and price terms alike, is the precarious existence that the unequal competition from the University imposes on them. Freedom would give them stability. Teaching in these circumstances would become organized on an immense scale, in the same way as any industry whose future is guaranteed will organize and develop itself. The directors of the institutions, with their interest in making known the progress achieved in their establishments, would open their doors to the public. Fathers would be able to judge for themselves the quality of the diet, material, intellectual and moral, being given to their children. Keeping a watch on what was happening in this way, would be just as good as or better than being observed by University inspectors.

THE SOCIALIST.

This advertising of state education would please me well enough; but I ask you once more do you think private industry could meet all the needs of education?

THE ECONOMIST.

Put your trust in the law of supply and demand. As soon as some educational need made itself truly felt [238] it would be in someone’s interest to satisfy it. Under this regime, the production of education,[525] which the trammels of the regulatory system have confined within limits that are too narrow, would not be long in reaching workable proportions. Teaching would be better and cheaper, and therefore more extensive. The poor would no longer contribute to the paying of educational costs for the rich man’s child, the single man would no longer be taxed to the benefit of the married one. Production would be more abundant, and distribution fairer. What more could you ask for?


12. The Ninth Evening

Editor’s Note

Here Molinari continues his discussion of infringements or violations of internal property rights, or the right of a self-owning individual to associate with whomever they chose and to undertake any kind of work they wished to. The specific cases he focuses on here are the right of association (this time to form business corporations - he dealt with the right to form labor unions in S6), private banks to issue their own currency in competition with the state bank, and a list of other occupations in which entry was heavily regulated or restricted, such as bakers, butchers, printers, lawyers, stock brokers, prostitutes, funeral directors, cemetery owners, lawyers, doctors, and teachers.

This Soirée is the third of four instances where Molinari discusses how public goods might be provided privately and voluntarily by entrepreneurs operating in the free market. The others are in S3 (forests, canals, waterways), S8 (private banks and money, mail delivery), and S11 (security, police, and defense).

The most contentious arguments Molinari puts forward in this Soirée is his defense of “la liberté des banques” (free banking) and free market brothels run by “entrepreneurs de prostitution” (entrepreneurs in the prostitution business).

The history of banking and currency issue had been so tumultuous during the Revolution and the Napoleonic period that a number of economists looked to market-based solutions to the problems, most notably Charles Coquelin whose ideas on “free banking” influenced Molinari and Bastiat. Between 1789 and 1796 the cash-strapped National Assembly issued a paper currency called the “Assignat” which were originally issued as bonds based upon the value of the land confiscated from the church and the nobility (“les biens national”) and were intended to pay off the national debt. Later they became legal tender in 1791. Overissue led to a spectacular hyperinflation which wiped out their value in a few years. The initial number issued in April 1790 was 400 million; in September 1792 2.7 billion were in circulation; and by the beginning of 1796 when they were abandoned there were perhaps 45 billion in circulation.[526] In an effort to control the rise in prices caused by this inflation various attempts were unsuccessfully made to regulate prices such as the “Maximum” in 1793.

As a result of this experience the Bank of France, modeled on the Bank of England, was founded as a private bank in 1800 with Napoleon as one of the shareholders. It was granted a monopoly in issuing currency in 1803. Payment in specie upon demand was suspended twice in the 19th century, both times following a revolution - 1848-1850 and 1870-1875. The banks of the different Départements were merged into the Bank of France in 1848 in an attempt to solve the fiscal crisis brought on by the February Revolution.

The term Molinari uses here is “la liberté des banques” (free banking) which refers to the theory developed by Charles Coquelin[527] in the mid 1840s that private banks in a completely free market would compete to provide banking services even in such things as the issuing of money, which would no longer be a government monopoly. Larry White states that “Proponents of free banking have traditionally pointed to the relatively unrestricted monetary systems of Scotland (1716–1844), New England (1820–1860), and Canada (1817–1914) as models.[528] Charles Coquelin wrote a series of articles on free banking in the early 1840s for La Revue des Deux-Mondes and these ideas were further developed in his major book on the subject, Du Crédit et des Banques (1848).[529] Several, but not all, of the economists advocated free banking, most notably Molinari and Bastiat. In addition to the work of Coquelin, Molinari would have been aware of Bastiat’s work in 1849 on money and credit in which he expressed similar views. Shortly after Molinari’s book appeared in September 1849 Bastiat began a long and bitter debate with Proudhon over the latter’s critique of the legitimacy of interest and his plans to start of low interest “Peoples Bank.”

Molinari has some very harsh words to say about the banking system in France which was based upon the issuing of money unbacked by gold reserves which sometimes suspended the redemption of paper notes upon demand (he called it “la fausse monnaie” (false money) which can also be translated as counterfeit or fake money); as well as the bankers themselves, calling them “une véritable aristocratie financière” (a veritable financial aristocracy) and the system they controlled as “la féodalité financière” which we have translated as “finance feudalism.” It should be noted that Molinari puts into the mouth of the Socialist another derogatory name for the banking elite, “bankocrats,” which he no doubt agreed with as well.[530]

Concerning the prostitution industry, prostitution was legal in France until 1946 though heavily regulated.[531] A “maison de tolérance” (brothel) could be established with the permission of the police and health authorities on condition that the “femmes publiques” (“ladies of the night” or prostitutes) undergo regular health inspections (at least once every two weeks) and carry at all times an identity card which they had to present to police upon demand. Males could not own brothels so they were run by a manageress (a “directrice” or madam) who had silent partners (usually men) who would put up the capital for the business. As setting up a “maison” fully furnished was expensive many women preferred to freelance (“prostitution interlope”) by renting cheap rooms (“hotel garni” or “maison garnie”) and working from there, thus avoiding surveillance by the health inspectors as well as the madam. This was illegal under a police ordinance of 6 November 1778 which was revived in the Law of 30 September 1828. Boarding house owners who rented such rooms were liable to a heavy 500 livres fine.

Molinari calls the individuals who would run brothels in a deregulated, free market “entrepreneurs de prostitution” (entrepreneurs in the prostitution business) which suggests that he thinks they are running a business much like many others which provided a voluntary service to customers but which were heavily regulated by the government, with unfortunate consequences. Like most grey or black market activities where there is high demand and profits to be made, regulated prostitution attracted what he called “la prostitution interlope” (interloper or freelance prostitution) since any highly regulated industry raises prices and thus attracts black market or underground operators who undercut those high prices.[532]

It might seem shocking to modern readers that a mid-19th century economist would think along these lines but it reveals one of Molinari’s revolutionary approaches to the study of society, namely the application of economic analysis to everything, even things which had never been treated in this way before, such as the provision of security and prostitution in the Soirées; in the soon to follow DEP entries on emigration, the origin of the state, fine arts, fashion, public monuments, theatres, the formation and development of cities and towns, and foreign travel;[533] and in his later writings on the family and the the Catholic Church. It was his view that every branch of human activity was a potential "industry" in which "entrepreneurs" would emerge to organize the "production" of whatever good or service was relevant to that industry in order to satisfy the demands of "consumers" of that good or service.[534] He even thought that the new entrepreneurs would not all come from the wealthier and and better educated classes but also from the ranks of the working class. He envisaged the rise of the "self-made" entrepreneur, "le laborieux entrepreneur, naguère ouvrier" (entrepreneur who has emerged from the working class), who rises out of the working class to run and own their own business enterprise. And in the case of brothels, even entrepreneurial women.

In addition to two very lengthy quotations from Coquelin on “Legislation concerning Commercial Organization” and “J.B. Say on the Bank of France, Molinari has an interesting quotation from Michel Chevalier’s recent book on De la liberté aux États-Unis (On Liberty in the U.S.) (1849) in which he describes the extraordinary freedom of entry into trades and professions in America and which both of them thought should be the model for heavily regulated France.

[239]

SUMMARY: Infringements of internal property rights (continued). – Right of association. – Legislation which in France regulates commercial companies. – The public limited company and its advantages. – On banking monopolies. – Functions of banks. – Results of government intervention in the affairs of banks. – High rate of interest. – Legal bankruptcies. – Other privileged or regulated industries. – Bakeries. – Butchers. – Printing. – Lawyers. – Stock and investment brokers. – Prostitution. – Funeral Homes. – Cemeteries. – The Bar. – Medicine. – Teachers. – Article 3 of the law of July 7-9, 1833. THE SOCIALIST.

I thought until the present time that the Revolution of 1789 had completely enfranchised labor and that we lived under a régime of absolute laissez-faire. I am beginning to cast my mistake aside.

THE ECONOMIST.

Not only has labor not been completely enfranchised, but in certain branches of production retrogression has gone beyond that of the privileged companies.[535] Instead of once privileged industries being made free they have been made state monopolies. Now, a state monopoly signals the infancy of any society.[536] In place [240] of the institutions of the middle ages, what was substituted? The institutions of Ancient Egypt. This did not, however, stop some industries from continuing to have special privileges. The fact is that our economic system is a strange jumble of monopolized, privileged, and free industries.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Then where are there these industries with special privileges? Is it not the case, according to M. Thiers,[537] that all the privileges were abolished that famous night of the fourth of August?[538]

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, according to M. Thiers; not according to the true account.[539] There remains in France a host of privileged or controlled industries. We have to put banks at the top of the list. Then come baking, the meat trades, printing, theaters, insurance, the buying and selling of state property, medicine, the Bar, Ministerial offices, prostitution and a number of others which I forget.[540]

Let us add again that Association,[541] that indispensable vehicle of industrial progress, is not freely available in France.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Ah! This time I have caught you in glaring inaccuracy. I know my Constitution well.

Article 8. Citizens have the right of association, to assemble peacefully without arms, to petition and to make public their opinions by means of the press or otherwise.
The exercise of these rights has no limit other than the rights and liberty of others and the safety of the public.[542] [241]

So you see that a right of association obtains in France. Perhaps there is only too much of it?

THE ECONOMIST.

Political associations are free in France… more or less. It is not the same with business associations. As you know, the number of kinds of association is almost boundless. Well, French law recognizes only three kinds of association: partnerships; limited partnerships; and public limited companies.[543] Save for a few irritating formalities, the first two are free; the third, however, which is the most developed, the one most useful to large-scale industrial enterprise, is subject to prior authorization.[544]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

All right! People want authorization and, after a careful examination, the government grants it, if there are grounds.

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, if there are grounds. And you forgot to say that authorization frequently arrives only six months, a year, or two years afterwards, that is to say too late. You know enough about industry to know that a delay of six months is enough to cause most enterprises to be abandoned.

Socialists complain of the slowness with which business associations are establishing themselves in France. They do not see that the commercial code has put things in good order by narrowly confining the right of association. A peculiar blindness!

Partnership does not involve large accumulations of capital, especially in a country where wealth holdings are notably sub-divided; limited partnerships as they are at present regulated, put the share-holders [242] at the mercy of a business manager and you know what that results in….The public limited company alone involves huge agglomerations of capital built out of small holdings and the best possible management.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is not proven.

THE ECONOMIST.

Take a good look at the individual industrial entrepreneur and what do you find? A capitalist and a manager of labor, a man who receives a return for his capital and a payment for his work. Take a look at the public limited company and what will you find? Workers who supply labor and receive a wage, capitalists who supply capital and receive interest. What is combined in the case of an industrial entrepreneur is separated in the limited company. This separation is one more step taken in the direction of the division of labor; it constitutes progress.

I will give you the proof of this by pointing out to you some of the inherent advantages of the limited company.

Preeminent among these is the ability to set up production projects on an immense scale. This means always being able to match the strength of the effort to that of the obstacles, and thereby cut the costs of production to a minimum.

The second advantage of the limited company lies in the superior administration which it allows. An industrial entrepreneur has responsibility only to himself. The director of a limited company is responsible to his shareholders. He must give them an account of his activities and justify them. This requirement, inherent in the very nature of the limited company, entails [243] on the part of the director, the need to act with intelligence and probity. If he did not manage the business intelligently, the shareholders would not fail to remove him. If he engaged in shady operations, would he really dare to give a public account of them to a meeting of the shareholders? Well, with the system of accountancy in use today, he would not be able to keep secret any of his activities.

Where limited companies are the rule, industrial enterprises would necessarily be managed with intelligence and integrity. Industry would necessarily be led by the most capable and upright men.

Industrial fraud would disappear under this regime. In which industries is fraud most common? In those which operate in small, segmented, and precarious units. When one cannot count on the future, or construct a large-scale commercial entity, one is inclined to seek by all possible means, to make a lot of money quickly. The quality of products is corrupted. Merchandise known to be poor is sold as good quality stuff. When one faces on the other hand an indefinite time period ahead and one is deploying very considerable capital, one is concerned to acquire a good reputation in order to keep one’s clients. So good products are supplied along with reliable business dealings.

In enterprises organized on a large scale and in a stable way there is more integrity than in weak and precarious firms. Compare the various branches of production in France, England, [244] Holland, etc., and you will be convinced of the absolute correctness of this fact. Adulteration and fraud do not have their origin in industrial liberty; they arise on the contrary from obstacles to the free and full development of industry.

The third advantage of public limited companies and perhaps the most important, is to make the situation of each enterprise a matter of public knowledge; it is to make clear on a daily basis the prosperity or the weak performance of various branches of production.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

How is that so?

THE ECONOMIST.

When a firm manages to sell its products at a price which breaks even, we say it is at par; when the cost of production is not covered it is working at a loss; when the cost of production is more than covered, it is in profit. In a system with individualized production it is extremely difficult to grasp these different industrial situations accurately and to know when one can fruitfully put one’s capital in a firm and when one cannot. You often risk further building up an already very lively branch of production, while others are waiting in vain for funds and labor. These mistakes cease to be possible in the case of limited companies. Each company having an interest in making public what it is doing in order to facilitate trading, day by day information is available as to the situation of different branches of production. By taking a look at Stock Exchange prices, we know which firms are loss-making and which are [245] profitable, and which are breaking even. One knows exactly which one to invest in to achieve the greatest profit. If for example the share price in blast furnaces is better than that in zinc processing one would put one’s capital into the iron industry rather than zinc industry. Thus iron production will be increased. What will the result be? That the market price of iron will fall until it matches exactly the costs of production: the price of shares falling in these circumstances to par, people will stop moving towards this branch of production for fear of no longer covering their costs.[545]

Thanks to this publicly available information on industrial share prices, production is self regulating, in a way so to speak “mathematical.” We are no longer exposed to producing too much of one thing and too little of another, to allowing certain prices to rise and others to fall wildly. An endless cause of disturbance disappears from the arena of production.

Notice then the singularly democratic character of limited companies. The industrial entrepreneur is the irresponsible and absolute monarch; the limited company governed by shareholders and run by a director and board of responsible people, is the republic. Having been monarchical, production becomes republican. That shows to you, once again, that monarchy is on the way out.

THE SOCIALIST.

Society splits up into a multitude of little republics, each one having a special and economically limited purpose. Now that is a very remarkable change. [246]

THE ECONOMIST.

And one not sufficiently remarked on. Unfortunately the barbaric legislation of the imperial code presents an obstacle to this beneficial transformation. ….

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Is not the transformation of which you speak, however, naturally confined to certain industries? Would there not be serious disadvantages if the limited liability régime were to be applied to agriculture, for example?

THE ECONOMIST.

What disadvantages? The limited company would solve the twin problem of the fragmentation of landed property[546] and the economic concentration of farms. The limited company would permit agriculture to be carried out on an immense scale and make farming a very long term concern, by dividing landed property up indefinitely into shares of fr.1000, fr.500, and smaller shares of fr.100, fr.50, and fr.10. From the point of view of the economics of farming, this change would have an incalculable impact. What disadvantages do you see in it? Would not a limited company have an interest in cultivating the soil as well as possible? If it farmed it badly, would it not it not be forced to close down, after its capital was used up, and leave its position, either to other firms or isolated individuals? If you see nothing amiss with an area of land in the possession, in perpetuity, of a single individual, why should you think it amiss for a collection of individuals to possess it? Does not the [247] single owner carry on as well as the association of proprietors?[547]

THE SOCIALIST.

This is quite right. In truth, I cannot imagine why the limited company has not yet been applied to the cultivation of the soil.

THE ECONOMIST.

Why is agriculture, in France, and elsewhere, the most burdened of economic sectors? Why is the limited company so tightly regulated?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Perhaps the prior authorization demanded for the limited company is now pointless; but do you not admit that government could scarcely give up the right to exert rigorous supervision over that sort of organization?

THE ECONOMIST.

It would be much more to the point to monitor small private firms. Limited companies publish full accounts of their activities, operating quite openly, while small private firms keep what they are doing secret…..

Do you know what effect government supervision has on limited companies? It serves first of all to diminish the vigilance of shareholders, who trust quite happily in government supervision. It also serves to hamper the development of productive operations. Finally it serves to secure comfortable jobs for the government’s minions.

THE SOCIALIST.

That settles the matter! [248]

THE ECONOMIST.

The imperial commissioners, whether of the Crown or the nation, with jurisdiction over insurance companies, railway companies and the like, are no more nor less pointless, no more or less excessive, than those well known councilors, examiners of pigs’ tongues,[548] inspectors of woodpiles etc., who flourished under the ancien régime.

I think that should enlighten you on how much credit should be given to the obstacles placed in the way of the right of association.[549] [249]

Besides these restrictions which apply in a general way to industrial and commercial enterprises, there are others which apply particularly to those which devote themselves to commercial banking.

Our public banks are still subject to the regime of privilege. [250]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I must warn you that on this score I will wage all out war on you. I am not a supporter of free banking and I never will be. I cannot understand how the government can allow anyone who wishes, to print paper money or to issue assignats, and toss them freely into circulation. Moreover, [251] what this marvelous utopia of free banking leads to has already been shown ...

THE ECONOMIST.

Where?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

In the United States and you know what it led to there. A general bankruptcy. God preserve us from a [252] similar calamity. I would rather have a bit less freedom and a bit more security.

THE ECONOMIST.

The only trouble is that your information is quite false. The banks are free in the [253] United States, only in the case of six individual States: Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont. And it is precisely these six states and only they which stayed clear of the general bankruptcy.

If you are skeptical I would beg you to read the remarkable works of MM. Carey[550] and Coquelin on the banks.[551] In them you will learn that the free banks of America caused fewer disasters than the protected banks of Europe.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

And yet I have often heard the complete opposite asserted.

THE ECONOMIST.

By people about as well informed as you. By minds imbued with all the prejudices of the regulatory regime, who never fail, on an a priori basis and when they have no information, to lay disorders in production at the door of laissez-faire.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Agree at least that it would be highly imprudent to authorize the first person who came along to issue money in paper form.

THE ECONOMIST.

You do not really believe that. Does not everyone, do not you and I, sir, create paper money? Do we not give our creditors promises every day to pay on such and such a date, such [254] and such a sum of cash? We would give them notes payable in other merchandise, in products made by ourselves, for example, if they were happy to accept notes issued on such a basis. Unfortunately, they do not want to. Why? Because they can always exchange cash against all sorts of merchandise, whilst they cannot easily make satisfactory use of other goods. What would my boot-maker do, for example, with a newspaper article which I undertook to deliver to him three months later, in exchange for a pair of boots? It is probably true, in the end, that a journalist like myself [552] does pay for his boots with newspaper articles; but this does require after all that I succeed in placing them. If I gave my boot-maker a promise payable in leader-articles for Paris newspapers instead of money, it would be up to him to place these leaders and Lord knows whether he would manage it. So he will not accept anything payable except in good, old-fashioned money.[553]

What do these promissory notes do? For the most part, they serve the process of circulation. If they did not exist, we would have to replace them with sums in gold or silver. As an individual who issues these promissory notes, I am therefore issuing money. Can I indefinitely issue this paper money? I have the right to do this; if it seems sound to me, I can make millions of promises to pay; I can fill a room with them. The question, however, is not making them, but of exchanging them against things of real value, of value incorporated in the form of cash, clothes, boots, furniture, etc. Well, will it be possible for me to exchange my promises to pay indefinitely against these valuable things? It will not! [255] I will barely be able to exchange them for more than the sum which people assume I am in a position to pay. Before accepting my notes, people will enquire as to my situation, my financial resources, my intelligence, my integrity, and my health. After all that, they will decide whether my promise to pay is worthwhile or not. There are clever people who will attempt to have their notes valued at more than they will in fact realize; on the other hand, there are incompetents who will not manage to place theirs for as much as they are worth. In general, however, each person’s credit matches his abilities.

THE SOCIALIST.

However, that is quite a difficult assessment to make.

THE ECONOMIST.

It also requires the most delicate tact to make this assessment. Bankers acquire and develop this tact through long experience. Those who do not have it go on to ruin themselves. If the government dared to run a bank in the way it runs so many things, you would soon see the capital from this omnibus banker[554] disappear … Fortunately, the government has not yet become the universal banker. So it is still hardly possible to pump more promises into circulation than one can reimburse.

What difference is there between a bank’s promise to pay and an individual’s? None, save that the one is payable on demand and the other is payable at the contracted due date. Both must be equally supported by real assets before they are accepted. Your promise will be accepted only on the assumption that it will be paid on the due date; we accept bank notes only [256] if we are sure we can convert them into cash.

When banknotes are not reimbursable in cash, that is to say in the form of a good, one easily exchangeable, easily put into circulation; when they are reimbursable in land or houses, for example, they undergo a depreciation precisely matching the difficulty of exchanging land or houses against a good more readily circulated; when they are reimbursable neither on demand nor by some specified due date, in anything possessing real value – cash, houses, land, furniture, etc., – they lose all value, and cease to be anything other than scraps of paper.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

How does it happen then that people accept banknotes instead of demanding cash?

THE ECONOMIST.

Because such means of circulation are more convenient, easier to move, and less costly, that is all.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Once again, though, is not the government right to intervene in order to stop the banks issuing more notes than they can reimburse?

THE ECONOMIST.

By that reckoning it should intervene also in order to stop individuals from issuing more promissory notes than they can finance. Why does it not do so? First because it is impossible and next because it is pointless. I have no need to show you that it is impossible; I will, however, show you in two words why it is pointless. Your [257] individual issues are not restricted by your will alone; they are limited by the will of others. When people judge that you have gone beyond your ability to pay, they refuse to accept your promises of payment, and your note issue finds itself halted. Certainly, no government could judge as accurately as the interested parties themselves, precisely when an individual has exceeded his financial means. The intervention of the government to regulate credit at the individual level, even supposing it were possible, would therefore be absolutely pointless.

What is true for individuals who issue promissory notes, is no less true for banks who issue notes in the form of notes redeemable in cash on demand.

What is the function of banks, or at least, their main function? It is to discount notes. It is to exchange valuable assets realizable in the future, for assets whose value is already realized or immediately realizable, such that they can be put into circulation immediately. It is the buying of promissory notes with cash or notes representing cash. [555]

If a bank only uses cash to complete this discount transaction those who sell notes payable at some future date run no risk, unless the money is counterfeit. [556] Surely, the holders of notes payable at some future date are not so stupid as to exchange them for counterfeit money. [557]

If the bank pays for these promissory notes, not in cash but in notes payable on demand, the outcome is different, I agree. The bank might, tempted [258] by this profitable discounting, to issue a sizable quantity of notes without worrying whether it will always and in all circumstances, able to redeem them.

Just as the bank does not accept promissory notes from individuals, however, when it does not have sufficient trust in their being reimbursed, likewise individuals will not accept the bank’s notes when they lack the certainty of being able to realize them, always and in all circumstances.

If individuals judge that the bank is not able to redeem its notes, they do not take them or they demand cash. Or perhaps they do take them, but subject to discounting against risk of non-payment.

How can the public know whether a bank is in a position to honor its notes redeemable on demand?

Since the public does not accept them, unless it is fully reassured in this respect, the banks have an interest in making their situation public. Therefore they publish weekly or monthly accounts of their dealings.

In these accounts members of the public can see how much financial paper has been issued and the total reserves both in cash and in portfolio form. They can compare assets with liabilities and hence judge whether they can continue or not to accept the bank’s notes, and at what price.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What if the bank presents a false account of the situation?

THE ECONOMIST.

In a word, it engages in fraud. In this case the [259] the holders of its notes can have or ought to have the power to have this bank’s directors punished as fraudsters and counterfeiters, and get themselves reimbursed by the responsible shareholders to the full extent of the theft committed against them.

Moreover, the public, guided by its interest, is prudent enough to deal only with the banks whose directors and administrators offer sufficiently firm moral guarantees.

You can see then that if the government can dispense with intervening to prevent individuals from duping the banks, it can also equally well manage without intervening to prevent the banks from duping individuals. [558]

Experience here is fully in accordance with theory. The free banks of Massachusetts, Vermont, etc., have caused far fewer disasters than the privileged chartered banks of Europe.

If attempts by the government to intervene in order to regulate the issuing of banknotes are pointless, what purpose does its intervention serve?

I will explain to you in a few words what purpose it serves.

The intervention of the government in questions of credit, in the end always comes down to this: it is to grant a bank the exclusive right to issue banknotes payable on demand. When a bank possesses this right, it can easily take on any competition. Other financial companies, being restricted to cash and fixed-term notes, are in no condition to compete with the privileged bank:

In the first place, because banknotes payable on demand [260] are superior as instruments of circulation, to cash or promissory notes.

In the second place, because paper money can be made available more cheaply than cash. The reason is this.

It is true enough that banknotes must always be based on real and exchangeable value. The bank must always be in a position to convert them into cash. Here is what happens, however: when a bank is on stable foundations, it is not as a rule faced with more than a small number of bills to redeem. It can therefore dispense with the need to always have on hand a sum of cash equal to the sum of its notes in circulation. It has to be in a position to get this sum, if the situation arises when the redemption of all its outstanding notes is demanded; it has to have at its disposal a sufficient amount of assets which can easily be converted into cash; this is all that it required! Nothing more could be asked of it. However, these assets, made up of shares in railway and insurance companies and various revenue-yielding properties, add up to less than the cash value of the sum total of interest payments owed.

The less cash the bank is forced to keep in reserve and the cheaper it can sell its notes redeemable on demand, the lower it can hold down the discount rate. Ordinarily the banks do not hold in cash more than a third of the value of their total note issue. [559] The level of the cash reserve however is entirely subordinate to circumstance. The bank has to maintain larger or smaller holdings of cash, according to whether monetary crises [560] [261] are more or less to be feared, and also according to the ease or difficulty with which the other assets constituting its reserves, can be realized in cash. The question is a delicate one. The bank is moreover, soon alerted by the reduction of its discounts, that it is below the necessary limit. For the public is not slow to buy fewer notes when it has less confidence in their reimbursement.

A bank specifically authorized to issue bank notes redeemable on demand, therefore has a double advantage: it can supply an instrument of circulation which is perfectly tuned to those demanding money, and this perfectly tuned instrument can also supply more cheaply than its rival banks can supply the cruder instrument, namely cash. In this way it easily shrugs off all competition.

If the privileged bank however succeeds in remaining sole arbiter of the market, will it not lay down the law to the purchasers of money? Will it not force them to pay more for its bank notes than they would pay under a regime of free competition?

THE SOCIALIST.

That would seem inevitable to me. It is the law of monopoly.

THE ECONOMIST.

The shareholders of the privileged bank will benefit from the difference. In truth they will be obliged to admit some co-sharers to the profits of their fruitful monopoly.

In a large country, when a bank obtains the exclusive right to issue banknotes redeemable on demand, all competition succumbing in the face of this privilege, it will find its clientele increasing enormously. Soon it [262] is no longer large enough for the latter; it abandons some of its work and therefore some of its profits to a few chosen bankers. It now accepts only bills bearing three good signatures and surrounds its discounting with formalities and difficulties, such that those demanding its notes are obliged to have recourse to intermediary bankers with accounts open at the bank. [561]

This simplifies quite considerably the work of the privileged bank. Rather than having to deal with several thousand individuals, it now need handle only a small number of bankers, whose operations it can easily oversee, although these privileged intermediaries naturally see to it that their services get paid well. Thanks to their small numbers they can lay down the law with regard to the public. Thus they constitute, under the wing of the privileged bank, a veritable financial aristocracy, [562] which shares with the bank the advantages of that privileged status.

These advantages, however, cannot go beyond certain limits. When the bank and its intermediaries push the discount rate too high, the public turn to bankers who do their discounting in cash or term deposit accounts. Unfortunately, the murderous competition of the privileged establishment, by greatly reducing the number [263] of the former and permitting them only a precarious existence, leads to a permanently excessive discount price.

In times of crisis the privileges some banks have, lead to even more deadly results.

I have said to you that a bank must always have been in a position to reimburse its notes in cash. What happens when it is not in a position to reimburse them all? What happens is that the notes which cannot be reimbursed depreciate in value. Who has to accept this depreciation? The bearers of the notes. They undergo virtual bankruptcy.

Well, do you know the purpose of these privileges? They effectively authorize the banks to get away, legally, with bankruptcy of this sort. The Bank of France and the Bank of England have on numerous occasions been authorized to suspend payments in cash. The Bank of England was a notable case of this in 1797. Those holding notes lost up to 30% during the course of the suspension. The Bank of France was given the same leeway in 1848. [563]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Its notes lost very little value.

THE ECONOMIST.

The magnitude of the loss does not affect the matter. If they had lost only a thousandth per cent in one day, those bearing this loss would still have been victims of a bankruptcy.

If these two Banks had not been privileged, their shareholders would have been obliged to pay the notes presented for redemption, down to the very last sou. In that eventuality those holding notes would have lost nothing; on the other hand the shareholders would have had to impose [264] on themselves sufficient sacrifice to fulfill all the Bank’s obligations. This, though, is a risk that all capitalists whose funds are engaged in production run…with the exception, however, of those who enjoy the privilege of imposing their losses on the public.

THE SOCIALIST.

Now I see why in 1848 the shareholders of the Bank of France were paid their customary dividends, while all other industrial and commercial companies experienced losses.

THE ECONOMIST.

Let us be fair, however. The shareholders of privileged banks deserved far less condemnation than the governments which handed out these privileges. In France, as in England, the privileges dispensed by the Bank came at a heavy price. In exchange for this favor, the government took possession of all or part of the capital spent by the shareholders. Not being in a position to repay them in times of crisis, it extricated itself from this embarrassment, by authorizing the Bank to suspend its payments in cash. Being unable to fulfill its engagements towards the Bank, it authorized the Bank to fall short in its undertakings to the public. [564] [265]

Formerly, when governments found themselves unable to pay their debts, they debased their coinage, adding copper or lead to it, or perhaps even reducing the weight of the coins. These days they go about it differently: they borrow large sums from those establishments exclusively authorized, by themselves, to issue paper money. Deprived of its natural and requisite foundation, this money depreciates in times of crisis. The government then intervenes in order to make the public bear the weight of the depreciation.

What is the difference between these two procedures?

In a regime of free competition, no such plundering arrangements would be possible.

In this regime, banks would have enough capital to fulfill their commitments, failing which the public would not accept their notes. In times of crisis, they alone would bear the natural losses of the contraction of circulation; they would not be permitted to offload it onto the public.

Furthermore, in this regime it would also mean that competition between the banks [267] would promptly force down the rate of discount, [565] now held at the highest level possible.

Finally, this regime would generate, on a large and growing scale, banknotes of real value, rather than bad debt, such currency being distributed according to the needs of the public and no longer to suit the convenience of parties granted special privileges. Almost the entire circulation would be economically produced in paper form, rather than expensively in cash.

THE SOCIALIST.

I have to say that you have very much shaken my deepest beliefs. Goodness! Can that finance feudalism [566] whose existence I attributed to free competition, really have sprung up as a result of monopoly? Goodness! Do the high cost of discounting and the disastrous ups and downs in the circulation of our money supply result from privilege and not from liberty? [268]

THE ECONOMIST.

Precisely. You socialists are as wrong about the banks as you are about everything else. You thought the banks were subject to the regime of laisser-faire, and you attributed to freedom, abuses, and miseries which have their origin in privilege. This has been the huge and deplorable error you have made about everything.

THE SOCIALIST.

Indeed, this is quite possible.

THE ECONOMIST.

If we had enough time to take a look at all the other industries which either enjoy special privileges or are closely regulated, such as bakery, meat production, printing, the lawyers, brokerage, sale of public property, the Bar, medicine, prostitution, etc., you would see that privilege and regulation have always delivered the same disastrous results economically: a reduction and deterioration in production on the one hand, disorder and unjust distribution on the other.

Limits were put on the numbers of bakers in the main population centers. It became apparent, however, that this limitation put the people at the mercy of the bakers and so a maximum price was put on bread. [567] The wish was to correct one rule by imposing another. Was it successful? The manipulations which take place on a daily basis in the flour market, are evidence to the contrary. Speculators conspire with the bakers to create an artificial rise in the price of flour, the maximum is raised above the real price of the grain, and the authors of this immoral maneuvering pocket the difference. [269]

There are some towns in France where bakery has remained free, for example in Lunel, and nowhere do people eat bread of better quality or at a lower price.

You know how profitable privileges have been to foreign exchange dealers in the case of the small numbers in whom they have been invested; you also know how much the privileges of lawyers have raised the price of civil lawsuits while at the very same time reducing the security of one’s deposit. In no free industry have failures been as numerous and as scandalous as is the case with the lawyers.

The privileges which the printers possess have increased the price of printing by creating a veritable surcharge for the printers. [568] In Paris these charges come to at least twenty five thousand francs. The printing workers, along with the bakers’ and butchers’ boys and the notaries’ clerks, find themselves stuck their whole life long in the lower grades of the business; not possessing sufficient capital to take out a patent or incur any costs, they cannot become entrepreneurs or business managers. Another injustice!

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You drew attention to prostitution too. Is not the limitation on the numbers of brothels necessary in the interests of public morality?

THE ECONOMIST.

The obstacles applied to the multiplication of brothels do nothing save to increase the profits of the business manageresses and their silent partners, while lowering the wages of the unfortunates who trade in their beauty and their youth. Sizable fortunes are drawn from this [270] sordid exploitation….The monopoly of the brothels is reinforced by regulations which forbid prostitutes to stay in rented furnished rooms. Those lacking the means for buying furniture are forced to put themselves at the mercy of the entrepreneurs in the prostitution business or interlopers who engage in prostitution. [569]

THE SOCIALIST.

Do you not think prostitution will disappear one day?

THE ECONOMIST.

I do not know. In any case, however, it will not be made to go away by means of coercive regulation. On the contrary that would make it more dangerous.

In a regime in which property was fully respected, and in which, as a result, poverty was reduced to a minimum, prostitution would diminish considerably, for poverty is prostitution’s very own great and indefatigable supplier. In such a regime there would only be voluntary prostitutes. Things being thus, it would be a better situation, it seems to me if prostitution were specialized, in conformity to the division of labor, rather than universalized. I would rather a few women prostituting themselves a lot than a lot of women prostituting themselves a little.

You would scarcely guess where privilege and communism have nestled most closely to one another: in the coffins where our sad mortal remains are laid; in the cemeteries where our human dust is buried. Funeral homes and cemeteries are both privileged and public. One cannot bury a corpse at will; nor are we free to open a cemetery.

In Paris, the administration of funeral services is leased out [271] to a single firm.[570] The cost of that lease is truly excessive, absorbing as much as some three quarters of the presumed income. And payments are made not to the municipality but to the church businesses recognized by the state. So much the worse for the dead of religions not officially recognized! The total revenue from this funerary taxation covers the minor expenses of the parishes, the payment of well-known preachers, the cost of the sumptuous decorations in the month of Mary, etc. Heretical or orthodox, the dead can scarcely claim much!

Handed over thus to a management endowed with special privilege and, into the bargain, exorbitantly taxed, funeral services could scarcely be other than expensive and of poor quality. The service costs eight or ten times more than it would in a free market system, and its inadequacy is confirmed at all times when death rates are out of the ordinary.

Present funeral arrangements mean that the modest savings of a worker vanish under the costs of burial, unless his children resign themselves to accepting the charity of a pauper’s burial. Is there a more monstrous unfairness?

The cemeteries, vast hostelries of death, belong to the municipalities. One is not allowed to compete with them by using free market cemeteries.[571] Moreover, reserved places are extremely expensive. Six feet square in the Père Lachaise cemetery, costs more than an acre of land elsewhere. [572] Only the rich man can go to kneel at the tomb of his fathers; the pauper is reduced to being laid to rest on the bank of the common ditch, where, squeezed together like grains in a [272] grinder, dwell the successive generations of the poor. The most savage hordes would be horrified by this communism of the grave; we are used to it … or to put it better, we tolerate it as we do so many other abuses which torment us … Have you noticed sometimes in our cemeteries, women of the common folk trying to find the place where their father, their husband, or their child has been laid? These women had placed there a little cross with an inscription painted in white. But the cross has disappeared under a new layer of coffins. Wearied by a hopeless searching, they go away heavy hearted, carrying with them, the funeral wreath, purchased with a week’s retched wages …

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Let us leave this sad subject. In your list of privileged industries, you cited the bar, medicine, and the professoriate. Everyone is free however to become a doctor or a lawyer or a professor.

THE ECONOMIST.

This is doubtless true, but these professions are tightly regulated. Well any regulation which obstructs entry to a profession or branch of production, or which hinders the exercise of these, contributes inevitably to raising their costs.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What? You want people to practice medicine and law freely, and to teach as they wish … But what will happen to us in the name of God?

THE ECONOMIST.

What will happen to us? We will be cured much more quickly and cheaply. Our law suits will [273] will cost us less and our children will receive a better education, that is all! If you want that, put your trust in the law of supply and demand, under a regime of free competition. If teaching were freed thus, would entrepreneurs in the education business[573] stop demanding good teachers? Would the latter not have an interest as a consequence, in being able to supply substantial and wide knowledge? Would not their salaries be in proportion to their merits? If the exercise of medicine came to be released from the regulation which impedes it, would the sick continue any less to seek out the best doctors? Among the studies imposed on doctors and lawyers today, how many are pointless practically? How many displace vital knowledge? What use, I ask you, are Latin and Greek to doctors and lawyers?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

To want lawyers and doctors to stop learning Latin and Greek, is that not going too far?

THE ECONOMIST.

The costs of this Latin and Greek are in part met by taxpayers, who sustain these university establishments, and in part by the clients of lawyers and doctors. Well I wonder to myself in vain what a lawyer and a doctor, who have to discuss French laws and heal French people who are sick, can do with Latin or Greek. All the body of Roman law has been translated, along with Hippocrates and Galen.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What about medical terminology then? [274]

THE ECONOMIST.

Do you think an illness named in French cannot be healed as easily as one named in Latin or Greek? When therefore, will we deal with it as it deserves, with this evil charlatanism of false and formulaic etiquette that Molière pursued with such remorseless good sense?[574]

It would take volumes, however, to count the host of privileges and regulations which obstruct the entry to the most crucial professions and which hamper the carrying out of the most vital work.[575].

I will finish by quoting a final pronouncement from that monument of barbarism known as the Code français.

There is the general complaint that the great public utilities have scarcely developed in France. Do you want to know why? Read this article of the law of the 7-9th of July, 1833.[576]

Art. 3. All large-scale public works, roads of highest quality [275] and docks undertaken by the state or by private companies, with or without tolls, with or without subsidies from the Treasury, with or without sale of public land, may not be carried out, except under a legal enactment which will be confirmed only after a government inquiry. An ordinance will suffice to authorize the building of roads, canals and branch railways, not exceeding twenty kilometers in length, of bridges and all other projects of lesser importance. This ordinance must also be preceded by an inquiry.

Well, do you know how much time it takes to mount a ministerial inquiry, to discuss a law, or introduce an ordinance? Will you complain, then, knowing this, that the spirit of business does not develop in France? Complain rather that the unfortunates you have garrotted cannot walk!

1. Molinari’s Long Footnote 1: Coquelin on Legislation concerning Commercial Organizations

In an article on “Les Sociétés commerciales en France et en Angleterre” (Commercial companies in France and England) in the Revue des Deux Mondes (Review of the Two Worlds) [of 1st of August, 1843], M. Charles Coquelin has insisted above all on the need for full liberty to commercial associations. Here are some extracts from this remarkable essay:

In recent years schools of philosophy have formed, which claim to be leading humanity, by means of the process of association, towards purposes as yet unknown. Is there any need to name them, when the last syllables of their sonorous proclamations still echo all around us? What did the leaders of these schools want? To improve the existing order, to purge this human society of the blemishes which the work of the ages has formed, to continue the efforts of past generations to perfect by degrees its procedures and structures? All this was not enough to satisfy the ambitions of these doctors of philosophy. The society we have, had not in their view been sufficiently controlled; it was not sufficiently absolute, not sufficiently restricted; it left too much room to human free will; it was too regarding of human spontaneity. What they wanted was an utterly unitary society with a single centre and single leader, a society universal in its reach and universal in its purpose, where human individuality disappears in the current of social action, one possessed of a single spirit and a single motivation, where man knows only one bond, one which clasps him, so to speak, whole and entire. This is what these so-called apostles of human sociability wanted. Is that what the future holds in store for us? Is this how progress has to unfold? The truth is far from this: the study of the true character of man and the knowledge of the facts of history, show us on the contrary, that in the natural course [249] of things, every day has the social bond dividing and multiplying; that humankind, in its normal development, in its real aspiration to progress, rather than leading society to such a narrow and wretched uniformity, tends constantly to divide and diversify its forms, to spread it, so to speak, to objects more numerous and varied, every day.
Man is a social creature, some say, and on this basis they want him to be absorbed in one and only one kind of society, as if the social proclivity attributed to him can be exercised only there. Yes, man is a social being; more social than any other sensitive creature. Herein is his most distinctive and his noblest attribute. Along with the feelings of sociability, however, he cherishes within himself a pressing need for freedom and for a certain spontaneity in his relationships. He is a dynamic and diverse being as much as a social one, and he inclines by instinct towards a society as dynamic and diverse as his own nature. So instead of binding himself, once and for all, to a single societal form, by a heavy chain which will impede his freedom of movement, he must instead bind himself by countless light reins, which by connecting him on all sides to his fellow men, nevertheless respect the way in which his lively nature works. This is what reason demands; this is where progress lies ... .
In years past the principle of association was not widely applied in France. Whether before or after the Revolution, one found scarcely more than a few of those stunted organisations that the basic development of society achieves but few or none of those powerful conglomerations of capital and labor which put a nation’s commerce up to the level of large-scale enterprise. Lots of people put the blame on the spirit of the French people, little disposed, they say, to become involved in commercial enterprises. Without dwelling on this explanation, which seems to us premature, we will [250] show that the cause of the harm is entirely a matter of the law regulating our industries.
The law of 1807,[577] which regulates commercial enterprises, has subsisted unchanged until the present. It is in its underlying structure and purpose that we must search for the causes of the torpor in which business languishes among us, as also in the abuses and scandals which have attended its only too rare applications. We can sum it up thus: the law recognizes only three kinds of business companies: partnerships; limited partnerships; and public limited companies.
Under partnership, all the members must be mentioned by name in a published legal agreement and their names only can be part of the corporate name. They are, moreover, united by the bonds of a narrow agreement, being fully responsible without limit, on pain of their person and goods alike, for all undertakings contracted by the society, and for the social undertakings contracted by each one of them, provided he has signed under the company name.
The limited partnership involves a contract between one partner or a number of joint partners, and one financial backer or several associated financial backers, called “sponsors” or limited share associates. Partners’ names are the only ones which are posted in the legal agreement. They alone can sign under the company name. Management is theirs alone. As regards them, the firm exercises all the aspects of a partnership. As for the sponsors, they are liable for losses only to the extent of the financial contribution they have made or of the funds which they owe the firm.
The public limited company is not based on signatures under the company name. It is not designated by the name of any of the associates. It is named through the specification of the purpose of the enterprise. All the associates of the company, without [251] distinction, enjoy the advantage of liability only up to the limit their agreed holdings. The company is administered by executives under revocable contract, partners or not, salaried or not, who contract with respect to their management of the company, no personal or collective obligation with respect to the operations of the company, and who are responsible only for the carrying out of their mandate.
When one considers in overall terms the system I have just explained, one cannot help being struck by the restrictive spirit which dominates it and gives itself away, just in these few words: the law recognizes three types of commercial company. Association being no more than a natural act, one would expect it necessarily to be regulated in a spontaneous way between the contracting parties, in ways and under conditions freely determined by themselves, according to their interests and needs. We find, on the contrary, that the law substitutes itself in certain respects, for the parties to the contract: it encroaches on their freedom by dictating to them the kind of association allowed to them, specifically restricting them to choosing between the three forms it has itself established. It goes even further, by imposing on each of these specified forms, narrow and unbending rules, whose application it is not permissible even to modify according to different circumstances ... .
What exactly is the public limited company in France today? Is it by chance a form of association which commerce might be able to apply to its own purposes? It quite obviously is not; it is a form reserved by legal privilege for certain outstanding firms, whose out of the ordinary size and glamorous performance recommend them. It is only these, effectively, which can present themselves to the Council of State with any reasonable chances of success, on which chances public opinion is formed, and which have in their favor the support of the established authorities and of some [252] powerful men. Firms of this kind are rare and whatever their individual importance, that fact in itself renders them of secondary interest for the nation. As for the host of second order enterprises, or to put it another way, those whose usefulness is less apparent and which can only perhaps be appreciated at the local level, access to the status of public limited company is absolutely forbidden them.
In the face of factors like these, we can see why association has not been able to make great progress in France and why, inevitably, commerce is almost entirely deprived of its benefits. Indeed, until these last few years, in which the spirit of association, anxious to get itself up to date, has burst through the legal barriers, scarcely anything about France’s appearance could offer us a single clue as to the creative potential of this union of commercial forces. At present, which are the rare companies with extensive joint-stock in our country? In England, under more favorable yet still too stern conditions, association has been developed for a long time on a vastly stronger basis. The number of joint-stock companies which that country contains is incalculable; the imagination would be staggered with the volume of capital involved and, with the amount of freedom they enjoy, these companies have produced marvels. It is the same in the United States. Without our counting the innumerable joint-stock banks that country has, each sizable part of the Union has can number a host of firms of all types, some of them enormous. The smallest cities, the towns, even the villages, have their own. They support, reinforce and energize private enterprise, at the same time as they complement it. In overall terms, whether they confine themselves to the role of protecting individual firms, or commit themselves to operations of an exceptional kind, their activity and their immense resources, increase the industrial power and wealth of the country. What a long way we are from this marvelous development!
2. Molinari’s Long Footnote 2: Say on the Bank of France

[264]

In a letter addressed to M. Napier, in Edinburgh, J.-B. Say provided an interesting account of the privileged status of the Bank of France. Here are a few instructive extracts from that letter:

 ... ..The Bank was recognized by the Bonaparte government, and received from him, by a law of the 24 germinal in the year XI (14th April, 1803), the exclusive right to put bearer-bills into circulation.[578].
The apparent motive was to give the public a more solid guarantee of notes issued. The real motive was to make the bank pay [265] for the exclusive privilege of having in circulation, notes bearing no interest. It paid for this exclusive privilege, as did the Bank of England, by making loans to the government.
Events moved on. The Battle of Austerlitz took place. The public, which knew that the Bank had been obliged to lend Bonaparte 20 million of its bills, taking a look at the military strength of this Austrian prince and Russia, thought he was doomed, and themselves rushed to the Bank to have their holdings of its bills reimbursed. The Bank suspended payment in December 1805. The Battle of Austerlitz took place on December 2nd. The capitulation of Presbourg was the outcome of the (French) victory. Bonaparte emerged more than ever the master of France’s resources. He settled his debts with the Bank which accepted his payments again from the beginning of 1806.
Bonaparte took advantage of the extreme difficulties into which he himself had cast the Bank, and to avoid, so he said, the embarrassment that had forced him to suspend payments on his bearer bills, he changed the Bank’s administration under a law he had passed on 22 April 1806.
This law meant that the administration of the Bank was handed over to a governor (Jaubert) and two Deputy-Governors, all three nominees of the Head of State, but who were responsible to the general body of shareholders, as represented by the two hundred most notable of them.
At the same time, the Bank’s capital, which comprised 45,000 shares at Fr. 1000, was increased to 90,000 shares, constituting a capital of Fr. ninety million.
The needs of the public, which it was said, called for heftier [266] discounts, and the purpose, which the government affected to hold, of taking shares in this establishment, were the apparent motive. The real reason, on the government’s part, was the improved access to larger-scale borrowing, which it would gain from the enlargement of the Bank’s capital.
The new shares were sold profitably from the establishment’s point of view. The credit and power of the government were taken to the highest possible point by these unexpected successes.
The governor of the Bank exercised huge influence over the board of directors, made up of big wholesalers, of whom some were given honorary titles and others positions for their protégés. This influence was not a matter of duress but it was insurmountable. Upright characters who scorned the advantages one can draw from financial transactions, were in a minority in all the deliberations involved. The capital of the Bank, in various forms, (some in 5% consolidated funds, some in Treasury bonds, or the takings from taxation) was entrusted whole and entire to the government; but at the same time people resisted as far as they could from lending it their bearer bills, because the latter, having no security other than unenforceable undertakings by the government, would not be reimbursable on presentation.
 ...  In 1814, when France, divided by factions of interest and opinion, was invaded by all the armies of Europe, the government forced the bank to make it some extraordinary loans. At that time, its loans and enforceable undertakings, exceeded [267] its stock of cash and short-term paper, by about 20 million. As a result, on January 18th, when those in possession of its paper, driven by fear, presented themselves en masse, to get their bills honored, the Bank was obliged, not to suspend payment completely, but to reduce reimbursement to Fr. 500,000 per day. Each payment was limited to a Fr. 1,000 note per person. The Bank reduced its discounting, called in its dated paper, and from the month of the February following, it resumed its payments with an open counter and for all sums.
At this time, its loans to the government, on the basis of Treasury Bonds or tax receipts, or on any other paper earning interest payments, are as high as twenty six millions.
J.-B. Say.
Paris, 14th August, 1816.

(Mélanges d’Économie politique. Oeuvres de J.-B. Say; Collection of Guillaumin and Company)

We know that the Bank has not ceased to be the supplier of government, to the great disadvantage of those obliged to suffer the consequences its privileged operations.[579]

3. Molinari’s Long Footnote 3: Chevalier on the Right to enter Professions in America

The privilege which, in France, results from the saleability, at very high prices, of positions of responsibility, established by the law of April 20th, 1816, and in various other countries, is based on regulations, which have determined, in the public interest, real or imagined, the numbers of persons permitted to work in certain occupations, does not exist in the United States. Everyone is free to become an auctioneer, exchange dealer, bailiff, attorney, notary, insofar as these professions have their analogues in America, for the judiciary and ministerial system there is quite different.

The tendency today is to do away even with the guarantees which society once thought must be demanded of the man who aspires to defend the widow and the orphan or of anyone out to manage the lives of his fellow-citizens. In Massachusetts (I advisedly refer to the more enlightened states) to be a lawyer required one, before 1836, to have been admitted to the degree of Bachelor of Law by a university, or anyway effectively to have passed a certain number of years in the office of a practitioner, who would in due course present the candidate to the court. To practice medicine, or what is different again, to have the right to pursue a client for payment of a professional bill, one had to have acquired pass grades at the medical school of the University of Harvard, near Boston. Today you can be a lawyer in Massachusetts, on the sole condition of passing a public examination in front of a jury of lawyers, chosen for each session by the judge. As for medicine, the examination clause is no longer binding, even for claims over honoraria. Since 1836, the small barrier separating that profession from complete freedom has disappeared.

(Michel Chevalier, De la Liberté aux états-Unis. – Extract from the Revue de Deux-Mondes (Review of Two Worlds), July 1st 1849, p.20).[580]


13. The Tenth Evening

Editor’s Note

Having spent the first nine Soirées discussing a broad range of infringements to “internal” and “external” property rights Molinari now turns in the last three Soirées to more specialized topics which he treats in greater depth: S10 (on population growth and state funded charity), S11 (the private provision of police and defense), S12 (his theory of rent, his summing up, and his passionate conclusion about mankind’s struggle to be free).

In this Soirée he deals with the issue of population, its growth, whether or not Malthus’s prediction that its exponential growth would outstrip the capacity of the land to feed the increasing number of mouths (especially in Ireland), and how state charity creates perverse economic incentives for planning the size of one’s family and thus for population growth. Molinari also takes the discussion into a couple of unusual directions, such as how the “quality” of a given population might be improved (40 years later he would develop this into a theory of “viriculture” or the “growing or cultivation of men”),[581] and his economic analysis of the family and the role of “les entrepreneurs de population” (entrepreneurs in the population growing business) which he would explore in greater depth in his treatise Cours d’économie politique six years later.[582]

Many of these issues are explored in greater depth in the glossaries and the essays in Further Aspects of Molinari’s Thought; such as the glossaries “Irish famine of 1845-1852,” “Poor Law or Poor Rate,” “Race, Eugenics, and Tutelage;” and in Further Aspects, "Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family,” especially the section on “Moral Restraint.”

The three dominant figures in classical political economy in the first half of the 19th century were Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo with their theories of the labor theory of value and the provision of public goods (Smith), the theory of population growth (Malthus), and the theory of rent (Ricardo). John Stuart Mill would play an important role in the second half of the century after the publication of his Principles of Political Economy in 1848 but Molinari was unaware of this work when he wrote Les Soirées. In the last three Soirées Molinari criticised the first two giants of political economy with his thoughts on population (S10), the private provision of the key public good of security (S11), and rent (S12). He would not address the question of value in any detail until his treatise on political economy which did not appear until a few years later (1855, 1863).

The issue of population growth and how to feed all the new mouths had been originally raised by Malthus during the French Revolution when Malthus published the first edition of An Essay on the Principle of Population (1st ed., 1798; 2nd revised and enlarged ed. 1803). The immediate problem was the economic disruption and high taxes caused by the revolutionary wars and how this would disrupt food production and distribution, and thus harm the poor in Britain and Europe. His famous conclusion was the pessimistic one summarized in his law of population growth that “population, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical ratio; and subsistence for man in an arithmetical ratio,” to which he added the most unfortunate observation that:

A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society do not want his labor, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him.[583]

He was vigorously taken to task for this, and along with him the entire classical school of economics, by socialists like Proudhon who denounced him for his heartlessness towards the poor.

Molinari began as an ardent Malthusian under the influence of Joseph Garnier[584] but he later softened his views as he came to believe that individuals could learn “self-government” and exercise “moral restraint,” foresight, rationally plan the size of their families, and thus live responsibly within their means without being a burden on taxpayers for support. Perhaps under the influence of Bastiat who rejected orthodox Malthusianism quite early,[585] Molinari realized that Malthus had underestimated the ability of the free market, free trade, and industrialization to increase output at a faster pace than population growth. In his treatise on political economy published shortly after Les Soirées he was still a fairly strong Malthusian but by the time the second revised and enlarged edition appeared in 1864 he had moderated his views considerably as a result of a critical review by Charles Dunoyer.[586] He now supported what he called “self-government” by individuals who would exercise moral restraint “sainement appliquée” (correctly applied). By this he meant that individuals should enjoy “la liberté de la reproduction” (the freedom to reproduce) and that any restraint to be exercised would be “la contrainte libre” (restraint exercised voluntarily by individuals) and not “la contrainte imposée” (constraint or force imposed by the government).

Previous attempts to deal with poverty included the English Poor Rate which was a dedicated tax to fund welfare for the poor which had been created during the Tudor period; in France, during the Revolution “mendicité” (begging) was harshly dealt with, even criminalized, and during the Empire (decree of July 1808) it was recognized that the government should provide beggars with offers of work before punishment was imposed. Each department was ordered to establish a work house (“dépots de mendicité”) to be funded by local tax payers, but the cost of this became prohibitive and the work houses were either closed down or farmed out to contractors. The issue of poverty caused by population growth was not just historical as the contemporary famine in Ireland (1845-52) clearly indicated and the socialists, especially after the Revolution of February 1848 had very different solutions for the “social problem” than did the Economists. and this is what Molinari was addressing in this Soirée.

The Economists distinguished between “la charité légale” (state charity) which is a government guaranteed right to charity of all or some group of citizens, and “la charité privée” (private charity) which was charity funded and distributed by private groups voluntarily. Molinari and the economists were especially interested in “la charité légale” which became an issue with the promulgation of the constitution of the Second Republic on 4 November 1848 which stated that all citizens had a right to government supplied (i.e. taxpayer funded) welfare (see the Preamble, section VII and Article XIII). It was closely tied in their minds to the idea of the “droit au travail” (right to a job) which was another policy pursued by the socialists in the Second Republic. The great concern the Economists had with state funded and organized charity was twofold: that it would discourage private. voluntary charitable giving, and create perverse incentives for the poor and unemployed not to seek work more actively.

Molinari’s solution to the population problem was to remove all government barriers which restricted greater food production (such as more secure land titles for poor farmers especially in Ireland) or which prevented surplus food from being imported into France from other parts of Europe (free trade); and to encourage workers to take responsibility for limiting the size of their families voluntarily, what was called somewhat coyly the exercise of “moral restraint.” The latter was a controversial matter and was condemned by the Catholic Church which put some of the economists’ writings on the Index of banned books (such as the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique).

In the longer term, Molinari also had some curious ideas about improving the quality of the human population which borders on a kind of voluntary eugenics, but ultimately escapes being categorized as such by his assertion that all he wants to do is “get rid of the artificial (i.e. government imposed) obstacles which prevent the different races of humanity from coming closer together” through a process of free and open immigration and free mingling of peoples across the globe. He also believed that workers would organize their own self-help and charitable organisations in order to feed themselves in times of economic difficulty and find jobs for their children.

[276]

SUMMARY: On compulsory state charity and its influence on population. – The law of Malthus. – Defense of Malthus. – On the population of Ireland. – How to put an end to poverty in Ireland. – Why state charity creates an artificial growth in population. – On its moral influence on the working classes. – That state charity discourages private charity. – On the quality of the population. – Ways of improving the population. – The mixing of the races. – Marriage. – Unions based on mutual feelings. – Ill-matched unions. – Their influence on race. – In what situation, under what regime would the population most easily maintain itself at its standard of living. THE ECONOMIST.

I will speak to you today about the disruption and disasters caused by state charity,[587] by the welfare institutions maintained , organized, and financed at the government’s expense and that of the regional départements and communes. These institutions, whose costs are met by all taxpayers without distinction, constitute one of the most harmful of the attacks on property. From the point of view of the population ...

THE SOCIALIST.

Here we go! Ecce iterum Crispinus. Here is Crispinus again.[588] The Malthusian returns. I wager you are going to call for the abolition of welfare offices in the interests of the poor [277]; but you will not be listened to I warn you. The 1848 Constitution imposed on society the obligation to provide assistance.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

And society will be well able to fulfill this duty.

THE ECONOMIST.

Then so much the worse! How can a government help the poor? By giving them money or help in kind. Where can this money and this help be found? In the taxpayers’ pockets. You see the government forced therefore to resort to the Poor Rate,[589] that is to say to the most frightful engine of war which has ever been directed against the poor.

THE SOCIALIST.

Malthusian! Malthusian! Malthusian!

THE ECONOMIST.

Certainly, that is an insult which honors me. I am a Malthusian when it comes to the population, I am a Newtonian when it comes to gravity, and a Smithian when we are talking about the division of labor.

THE SOCIALIST.

We are definitely going to fall out. I began, if I have to confess it to you, by letting myself be shaken by your doctrines. I was surprised to find myself praising property and admiring its very fertile results … but, it would be impossible for me to admire Malthus and even more impossible to praise him. Goodness! You would actually dare to undertake the justification of that blasphemer who himself dared to say that “a man arriving without means of existence on land already occupied, will have to leave,”[590] of that heartless economist [278] who was the apologist of infanticide, plague, and famine! You could as well defend Attila or Mandrin.[591]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You will bear witness that we detest Malthus as much as you yourselves do. Le Constitutionnel recently displayed its disregard for this deplorable fetish of English political economy.[592]

THE ECONOMIST.

Have you read Malthus?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I have read the passages quoted by Le Constitutionnel.

THE SOCIALIST.

And I have read the passages quoted by M. Proudhon.[593]

THE ECONOMIST.

These are the same, or rather it is the same, for it is that passage alone they quote. Moreover, however barbaric this passage seems, it is for all that the expression of the truth.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

How dreadful!

THE SOCIALIST.

That’s appalling!

THE ECONOMIST.

And yet they contain an essential human truth, as I will prove to you.

Tell me, then, do you think that the earth can provide all the raw materials necessary for the maintenance of a limitless number of human beings?

THE SOCIALIST.

Definitely not! The earth can never feed more than a limited number of inhabitants. Fourier reckoned this number at [279] three to five billion.[594] The population today, however, numbers scarcely a billion.[595]

THE ECONOMIST.

You accept that there is a limit, and indeed it would be absurd to maintain that the world could feed two, three, four, or five hundred billion people.

Do you believe that the reproductive power of the human race is limited?

THE SOCIALIST.

I could not say.

THE ECONOMIST.

Look at everything which lives or grows and you will find that nature has been immensely generous with the seeds it supplies. Each kind of vegetable spreads a thousand times more seeds than the land makes fertile. Animal species are likewise provided with a superabundance of seed.

Could things be arranged differently? If animal life and vegetable life possessed only limited reproductive power, would not the slightest catastrophe be sufficient to annihilate their species? Could the organizer of everything[596] have managed without providing them with almost unlimited reproductive power?

Vegetable and animal species, however, never exceed certain limits, either because not all the seeds are fertilized, or because some of them which have been fertilized, die. It is thanks to the non-fertilization of seeds or to the swift destruction of fertilized ones, that they balance themselves with the amount of food which nature offers them.

Why should man be shielded from this law which regulates all animal and vegetable species? [280]

Imagine that man’s reproductive power had been limited, imagine that any union could produce only two individuals; would humanity then, I will not say have multiplied, but simply maintained itself? Instead of propagating themselves in such a way as to people the earth, would not the different races of mankind have been successively extinguished, through the contingency of sickness, war, accident, etc.? Was it not necessary for man, like the animals and plants, to be provided with superabundant reproductive power?

If man possesses, like other animal and vegetable species, superabundant powers of reproduction, what must he do? Must his kind proliferate as they do, leaving to nature the task of destroying their surplus? Must man reproduce without worrying about the fate of his offspring any more than animals or plants do? No, being equipped with reason and foresight, man naturally acts in accord with Providence to maintain his kind within proper limits; he likewise refrains from giving birth to beings doomed in advance to destruction.

THE SOCIALIST.

Doomed to destruction ...

THE ECONOMIST.

Let us see. If man used all his reproductive power as he is only too disposed to; if the number of men as a consequence were one day to pass the limit of the means of subsistence,[597] what would happen to the individuals produced in excess of that limit? What happens to the plants which multiply beyond the nutritive potential of the soil?[598] [281]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

They perish.

THE ECONOMIST.

And can nothing save them?

THE SOCIALIST.

The productive power of the land could be increased.

THE ECONOMIST.

Up to a certain limit. That limit reached, however, imagine that the plants multiplied in such a way as to exceed it. What would be bound to happen?

THE SOCIALIST.

Obviously in that case the surplus will die.

THE ECONOMIST.

And can nothing save it?

THE SOCIALIST.

Nothing can save it.

THE ECONOMIST.

Well what happens to plants happens also to men, when the limit of their means of subsistence is exceeded. That is the law which Malthus recognized and confirmed; there we find the explanation of this famous passage for which you and yours condemn him: “A man who arrives in a world already occupied, etc.” And how did Malthus recognize this law? By looking at the facts! By establishing that in all the countries where population has passed the means of subsistence, the surplus has perished through famine, illness, infanticide, etc., and that the destruction has not ceased to carry out its funereal function until the point where population has been pulled back to its necessary equilibrium. [282]

THE SOCIALIST.

To its necessary equilibrium … So you think that the countries where Malthus observed his law in operation would not have been able to feed their excess population; you think that our beautiful France, where harsh circumstances decimate generations of poor people, could not feed those who die prematurely.

THE ECONOMIST.

I am convinced that France could feed more people and feed them better if the multitude of economic abuses which I have drawn to your attention had ceased to exist. While we are waiting, however, for light to be shone upon these abuses, while we wait for them to disappear, it is wise not to go beyond the present means of subsistence. Therefore let us demand, vigorously, the reforms necessary to push back the limits of the means of subsistence, and also let us recommend with Malthus, until that is achieved, prudence, abstinence, and moral restraint.[599] Later, when the complete emancipation of property[600] has made production more abundant and distribution more just, abstinence will become less rigorous, without, however, ceasing to be necessary.[601]

THE SOCIALIST.

Does not this abstinence, this moral restraint, hide a gross immorality?[602]

THE ECONOMIST.

What immorality? Malthus thought that people were making themselves guilty of a real crime by bringing into the world beings destined inevitably to perish. He advised, consequently, [285] that we abstain from creating them. What do you find immoral in this advice?

THE SOCIALIST.

Nothing, but you know very well that complete abstinence is not possible in practice, and God knows what immoral compromise you have conjured up.

THE ECONOMIST.

I beg you to believe that we have conjured up nothing at all. The compromise of which you speak was being practiced long before Malthus was busy working on the laws of population. Political economy never recommended it, speaking only of moral restraint. … As for deciding whether this compromise is immoral or not, this is not a matter for us economists; consult in this connection the Academy of Moral and Political Science (moral science section).[603]

THE SOCIALIST.

I will, without fail.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I understand very well that the population can exceed the limits set by the means of subsistence; but is it easy to establish that limit? Can we say, for example, that the population has gone beyond the subsistence limit in Ireland?

THE ECONOMIST.

Yes, and the proof of it is that every year a part of the Irish population dies from hunger and poverty.

THE SOCIALIST.

While the rich and powerful aristocracy which exploits Ireland has a splendid existence in London and Paris.[604] [284]

THE ECONOMIST.

If you looked closely at the causes of this monstrous inequality, you would locate them once again in the attacks made against property. For several centuries confiscation was the order of the day in Ireland. Not only did the Saxon conquerors[605] confiscate the land-holdings of the Irish people, but they also destroyed Irish productive output, by burdening it with deadly restrictions. These barbarities came to an end but the social conditions they established were maintained and aggravated, to England’s great shame.

THE SOCIALIST.

Add it was to England’s profit too.

THE ECONOMIST.

No, because today Irish poverty is maintained and increased on the one hand by the special taxes which England imposes on herself to feed the poor of Ireland, and on the other by the routine taxes she raises to protect the persons and property of the Irish aristocracy.[606]

THE SOCIALIST.

What, are you saying you would like England to let the Irish poor perish without helping them?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What, do you want England to permit the murder of Irish property owners and the pillaging of their property?

THE ECONOMIST.

I would like to see England say to the landed aristocracy in Ireland: “You possess the greater part of Irish capital and land; well, defend your property yourselves. I no longer wish to devote a single man or a single shilling to this venture. Nor do I [285] want to continue any more to maintain the poor souls you have allowed to multiply on the soil of Ireland. If the wretched Irish peasants unite to burn your country houses and share out your estates between them, so much the worse for you. I do not wish to concern myself any longer with Ireland."

Ireland would ask for nothing better, as you know. “Be so kind,” said the elderly O’Connell[607] to the members of the British Parliament, “as to take your hands off us. Leave us to our own destiny. Allow us to govern ourselves”!

If England complied with this constant request from the champions of Irish independence, what would happen to Ireland? Do you think the aristocracy would abandon its rich estates to the mercy of starving bands of Whiteboys?[608] Most certainly not! It would swiftly abandon its splendid houses in the West End of London and the Faubourg Saint Honoré in Paris,[609] to go to the defense of its threatened properties. It would then understand the need to heal Ireland’s terrible wounds. It would use its capital to develop and improve agriculture. It would begin to produce food for those it has reduced to the last extremities of poverty. If it did not take this course, if it continued in the idle spending of its income abroad, while famine did its work in Ireland, would it manage without outside help, to hold on to its land and property for very long? Would it not soon be dispossessed of its domains, by the legions of the poor who are everywhere in Ireland?

THE SOCIALIST.

If England withdrew the support of its land and sea forces, [286] this would change the situation very markedly; nothing could be surer. Would the Irish not, however, have an interest in the pure and straightforward confiscation of the property of this heartless aristocracy?

THE ECONOMIST.

This would be a very strict application of the idea of “an eye for an eye.” I do not know how far it is just, how far it is moral, to punish one generation for the crimes committed by earlier ones. I do not know if the descendants of the victims of Drogheda and Wexford have the right to make the present landowners of Ireland expiate the crimes of brigands in the pay of Henry VIII, Elizabeth, and Cromwell.[610] But to consider the problem from the simple point of view of utility, the Irish would be wrong to confiscate the wealth of their aristocracy. What would they do with it? They would have to share it between a vast number of peasants, who would end up exhausting the soil, for lack of the capital to apply to it. On the contrary, by respecting the property of the aristocracy, they would allow this rich, powerful, and enlightened class to take care of the transformation of the land and thus contribute its proper share in the elimination of Irish poverty. The Irish poor would be the principal beneficiaries.

As long as English taxpayers, however, bear the costs of supplying security to the landowners, and food to Ireland’s poor, you may be sure that the former will continue with the idle spending of their wealth abroad and the latter with their rapidly increasing numbers in the midst of dreadful poverty. You may also be quite sure that the Irish situation will go from bad to worse. [287]

THE SOCIALIST.

That English taxpayers should cease paying the costs of the government of Ireland seems entirely just to me; but would it not be inhuman to abandon the Irish poor to their fate?

THE ECONOMIST.

The Irish landowners should be left to struggle with them. Left to themselves the Irish aristocracy will impose on their own class the harshest sacrifices to maintain their poor. This is what their interest will require, since charity, all things considered, is less expensive than repression. They will, however, measure the help they give precisely in relation to the real needs of the population. To the extent that the development of production will increase the employment of labor, it will diminish the total of almsgiving. The day when output is sufficient to feed the population, the aristocracy will cease its regular contributions to poverty relief. In this new circumstance, no artificial causes will be such as to promote excessive population growth in Ireland.

THE SOCIALIST.

So you believe that state charity causes an artificial and abnormal growth of population.

THE ECONOMIST.

This fact has been clearly established, following the inquiries relating to the Poor Rate in England. This fact is effortlessly self-explanatory. What do these so-called relief agencies do? They distribute the means of subsistence to the poor, gratis. If these institutions are established by law, if they introduce an guaranteed source of income, if they create an inheritance for the poor, people will always be found to devour [288] that income, to enjoy that patrimony; we will encounter them all the more, as charitable institutions become more numerous, richer, and more accessible.

You will then see a slackening in the powerful motivation which impels a man to work so as to feed himself and his family. If the parish or commune grants the worker a wage supplement, he will reduce proportionately the length of his working day and the sum total of his efforts; if people open crèches and shelters for children, he will have more of them. If hospices[611] are founded and retirement pensions established for the elderly, he will cease worrying about the fate of his parents and about his own old age; if, finally, hospitals are opened for impoverished sick people, he will stop saving up against the days of illness. Soon you will see this man whom you have freed from the obligation to fulfill most of his duties towards his own and towards himself, devoting himself like a brute to his vilest instincts. The more charitable institutions are opened, the more you will see taverns and brothels opening too. … Ah, well-meaning philanthropists, the socialists of almsgiving, you take it upon yourselves to provide for the needs of the poor, as the shepherd undertakes to provide for those of his flock, you substitute your own responsibility for individual responsibility and you think the worker will continue to prove hardworking and farsighted! You think he will still work for his children when you have arranged for the cheap raising of this human livestock in your crèches; you think that when, at his expense, you have opened free hospices, he will continue looking after his old father; you think he will still save against the [289] bad times when your welfare agencies and hospitals have been made available to him. You had better think again! In eliminating responsibility you have eliminated foresight too. Where nature has put men, your communistic philanthropy will soon leave only beasts.

And these brutes whom you have created, these brutes deprived of all moral sense, will proliferate in numbers to the point where you will be quite incapable of feeding them. Then you will utter cries of distress, in which you will condemn the weaknesses of the human heart and the doctrines which overexcite them. You will cast anathema on sensual indulgence, you will denounce the incitements of the daily newspapers and I do not know what else. Unhappy people!

THE CONSERVATIVE.

The abuse of charitable institutions can without doubt cause grave disorder in the economy and society; but is it possible to dispense entirely with these institutions? Can we leave the multitudinous poor to die without help?

THE ECONOMIST.

Who is talking to you of leaving them to die without help? Let private charity freely go about its business[612] and it will help them more than your official institutions do! It will help them without breaking family ties, without separating a mother from her child, without taking the old man away from his son, without depriving the sick husband of the care his wife and daughters will provide. Private charity springs from the heart and respects the heart’s attachments.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

State charity does not impede private charity. [290]

THE ECONOMIST.

You are wrong. State charity discourages private charity, or causes it to dry up. The state charity budget in France reaches a hundred million.[613] That sum is levied on the income of all taxpayers. Now private charity is not drawn from some alternative source. When the state charity budget is increased, the private one is therefore necessarily decreased. And the decrease on one side exceeds the increase on the other. When society takes care of the maintenance of the poor, are we not naturally inclined to leave their care to society? We have paid a contribution towards the state charity agency, so that is where we send the poor. This is how the heart becomes closed to charity.

Another even more efficient means has been employed, however, to root out from our souls, the most noble and generous feeling that the Creator has planted there. We may not have dared to forbid the rich to engage in charity but we have certainly forbidden the poor to ask for it. French law regards begging[614] as a crime and it punishes the beggar as though he were a thief. Begging is strictly forbidden in most of our provinces. Well, if the poor man commits a crime by accepting alms, does not the rich man become an accomplice by giving it to him? Charity has become criminal by virtue of the law. How can you want that noble plant to remain sturdy, when everything you do serves to wither and destroy it?

THE SOCIALIST.

It could indeed be the case that state enforced charity has diminished voluntary giving. According to your own doctrines, however, is [291] this a social ill? If charity provokes the artificial growth of the population, if as a consequence it engenders more harm than it cures, is it not desirable that we reduce it to its minimum, nay that we even eliminate it entirely?

THE ECONOMIST.

I have said to you that state charity necessarily results in the artificial development of the population, I did not speak to you about private charity. I beg you not to confuse them. However developed private charity is, it remains essentially precarious, it does not supply a stable and regular provision to a specific segment of the population; nor, moreover, does it change any of the moral motivations of the human soul.

He who receives material aid from an office of state welfare, or goes into a hospital where he is coldly received, where he sometimes even serves as a guinea pig for experiments, neither feels nor could feel any gratitude for the service rendered to him. Moreover, to whom would he address his gratitude? To government or to the taxpayers? But the government is represented by cold accountants and the taxpayers pay their dues most reluctantly. The man whom society helps could not possibly feel gratitude towards a cold abstraction. He will be more inclined to think that society is acquitting itself of its debt to him and criticize it for not doing so more amply.

By contrast, a person whose poverty is relieved by an active and sensitive charity, almost always keeps alive the memory of this kindness. By receiving help, he contracts a moral obligation. Well, rich or poor, the average man [292] does not like to contract more obligations than he can repay, morally or materially. He will accept a kindness graciously, but he will not agree to live on kindness. He would resign himself to the hardest sacrifices, he would load himself with the most repugnant tasks, rather than remain forever dependent on his benefactor. He would die of shame if he were to increase further the burden of his indebtedness through a culpable lack of foresight. Rather than destroying the moral motivation of the human heart, private charity strengthens and sometimes develops it. It raises man up rather than degrading him.

Therefore there is no way in which private charity could promote population growth. It would tend on the contrary to slow it down.

No more could it become, as does state welfare, a dangerous source of divisions and hatreds. Increase the numbers of so-called philanthropic institutions in France, continue the state regulation of charity, complete your work by forbidding him who engages in charity from doing so, as you already forbid him who receives it from taking it and you will soon see the results.

On the one hand you will find an enormous herd-like group of men, receiving as though it were so much debt, the harsh and stinting charity of the Treasury. These men will bitterly resent the wealthy classes for the stinginess of their charity, in the context of a poverty which that very charity has caused to grow endlessly.

On the other hand you will find taxpayers weighed down with taxation and who shy away from making a heavy burden even heavier, by adding voluntary charity to the kind already imposed by the state. [293]

In such a situation can public order be maintained for long? Can such a divided society, one in which no moral tie now holds the rich and the poor together, avoid being torn apart? England was nearly destroyed by the poverty caused by the Poor Rate. Let us be very fearful of following the same path. Let us give to charity individually; let us no longer engage in communal philanthropy! ...

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes, I understand clearly the difference between these two forms of charity; but ought not private charity to be directed and organized?

THE ECONOMIST.

Leave it alone.[615] It is sufficiently active and ingenious to distribute its goods in the most functional way. Its instincts serve it better than your directives ever could.

THE SOCIALIST.

I agree with you that private charity is preferable to state charity. I even agree that the latter results in proliferation of poverty. What, though, if the population increases in such a way as to exceed the number of jobs supplied by production and by the private charity budget? What should we do then? Would we have to let the excess population perish?

THE ECONOMIST.

We would have to get private charity to double its zeal, and above all take care not to engage in state welfare, for the latter having the inevitable effect both of reducing the [294] total funds available to poverty relief and of increasing the numbers of the poor, would aggravate the harm rather than assuaging it.

I say, however, that in a regime in which the property of all was respected, under one in which the economic laws which govern society would cease to be misunderstood and violated, that surplus population would never come about.

THE SOCIALIST.

Prove it!

THE ECONOMIST.

Let me first tell you a few words about the factors which depress the quality of the population,[616] which reduce the numbers of men fit for labor whilst increasing those of the invalids, idiots and cretins, blind people and deaf-mutes, whom society must feed.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That is a side to the question which is not without interest.

THE ECONOMIST.

And one far too neglected.

Man is a combination of diverse possibilities and powers. These possibilities or powers – of instinct, feeling, and intelligence – assume different proportions as between individuals. The most complete man is the one whose faculties have the most energy; the most perfect man is the one whose faculties are at once the most energetic and the most harmoniously balanced.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I can more or less see where you are going with this; [295] but do you therefore think we can breed humans as we do animals?

THE ECONOMIST.

The English have managed to improve their sheep and cattle in an almost miraculous way; they manufacture sheep – literally – of a certain size, of a certain weight, and even of a certain color. How have they obtained these results? By crossing certain breeds and by choosing among these breeds, those individuals which will mate the most usefully.

Is it not plausible that the laws which govern the reproduction of animal species also govern that of man? Notice that the numerous races or varieties which humanity comprises, are very diversely endowed. Among the inferior races,[617] the moral and intellectual faculties exist only in the embryonic state. Certain races have some faculties particularly well developed, while the rest of their organization is backward or feeble. The Chinese, for example, have a highly developed sense of color; on the other hand they are almost entirely lacking in the instinct for struggle, or combativeness. The Indians of North America, by contrast, are distinguished by their instinctual aggressiveness and cunning, and also by a harmonious ear for sounds. [618] The distinctive abilities of races are transmitted without significant modification, as long as the races do not mix. The Chinese have always been colorists; they have never been distinguished by their bravery. The Indians [296] have always been brave and cunning and spoken in harmonious dialects.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

That would lead us to set up stud-farms[619] for the improvement of the human race.

THE ECONOMIST.

Not at all. It suggests we should get rid of the artificial obstacles which prevent the different races of humanity from coming closer together.

THE SOCIALIST.

But this coming together must be directed and organized.

THE ECONOMIST.

This coming closer together will be directed and organized all on its own. The various forces in the human mind which drive people to set up families, obey it would seem, the same law of gravitation which governs matter.[620] The most forceful faculties attract the weakest ones of the same species. It is commonly observed, for example, that the gentlest and least individualistic characters are irresistibly drawn to the most arrogant and aggressive ones. Large forces attract small ones, the result being an average closer to the ideal equilibrium of human organisation.

This equilibrium tends to set itself up through the natural and spontaneous manifestation of individual fellow feeling and affinities. And since all physical organisation depends on the orderly arrangement of physical, moral, and intellectual faculties, the body improves itself in tandem with the mind.

If you accept this theory, you have to accept [297] also that out of the immense diversity of types and individuals, there must be a coming together of two beings attracted to each other with the greatest intensity, whose union yields, consequently, the most useful average. Between these two beings the union is necessary and eternal. It is called marriage.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Ah! So you support marriage.[621]

THE ECONOMIST.

I think that marriage is a natural institution. Unfortunately, look what has happened. Owing to the immense moral and material upheavals society has endured, very many people have ceased to contract unions based purely on mutual feeling. Racial prejudice or financial interest have been preferred as determining criteria, in the great issue of marriage, to natural affinities. Thus we have seen badly matched couples, and as a result of these unions, a degeneration, both of individuals and of the race. Badly matched unions being liable to break up, those who make the laws have proclaimed the indissolubility of marriage and prescribed harsh penalties for adulterers. Despite this law, however, nature has never ceased to take its course in spite of the law and, in the event, bad marriages have been no less likely to be dissolved.

When a union is badly matched, when two incompatible persons are brought together, the outcome of this monstrous coupling could scarcely be anything other than a monster itself.

Everybody knows that the superior races who have governed Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire, have mostly been of bastard stock. Why? Because natural, mutual attractions, rarely determined their [298] unions. The races of royalty in particular rarely formed alliances other than in the light of political interests. So they degenerated more swiftly and completely than the others. What would have happened to the race of the French Bourbons after the reign of the imbecile Louis XIII, if it had not regained energy from the vigorous blood of the Buckinghams?[622] What happened to the Bourbons of Spain and Sicily, the Habsburgs, and the offspring of the House of Hanover? What other families have produced so many cretins, idiots, monomaniacs, and scrofulous offspring?

Let us look at the history of the French nobility in this light.[623] In the middle ages, purely material considerations seem to have exerted only a feeble influence on aristocratic unions, as the history and literature of the time reveal. So this race maintained itself healthy and vigorous. Later, marriages became mere associations of lands and names. Alliances were negotiated between families rather than being arranged between the truly interested parties. People who did not know each other got married. What was the result? That proper unions became a mere fiction and that adulterous relationships proliferated, to the point of becoming the norm. An unhealthy promiscuity ended up by penetrating the French nobility and corrupting it to its very marrow.

The same abuses are reborn in our times. The inflated fortunes that monopolies and privileges have given rise to, tend to get together, in spite of natural propriety. Civil law, by establishing the right to an inheritance,[624] has contributed further to making marriage a matter purely of material interests. Finally, the instability which menaces all our lives under the present economic regime, has brought about [299] an avid search for those sordid pairings which it is conventional to call good marriages.

Those imperfect and depraved beings who spring from badly matched unions or clandestine liaisons, being able neither to manage their wealth, or earn their living, rely on the support of their families or on public charity. In Sparta, they were drowned in the river Eurotas.[625] Our customs are gentler. We leave these semblances of humanity, fruits of greed or libertinism, to vegetate. If it would be a crime to destroy them, however, is it not an even greater crime to give birth to them?

If you make short work of bad laws and prejudices which prevent the useful coming together of the races, or which encourage the pairing of sordid interests to the detriment of unions based on mutual feeling, you can significantly improve the quality of the population, and by the same token you relieve charity of a substantial part of its burden.

All things returning to their natural order, an excess population would never then be anything we need fear.

I define as excess any level exceeding both the jobs made available by economic production and the ordinary resources of charity.

THE SOCIALIST.

Do you think then that we will always have to have recourse to charity?

THE ECONOMIST.

I do not know. It will depend absolutely on the enlightenment and foresight of individuals. If we assume a society where property is fully respected, where the openings for [300] labor will always be at their maximum, where at the same time the distribution of information on labor transactions will always enable us to know whether there is an excess supply of labor or a shortage,[626] it is obvious that in that society the employable proportion of the population will be kept in work without difficulty.

When the supply of labor exceeds the demand, as I have said to you, the price of labor falls with such rapidity, that the workers, like all other buyers and sellers, have an interest in withdrawing part of their commodity from the market. If they do not withdraw it, if at the same time charitable activity does work sufficiently to come to the aid of those thrown out of the workshop and onto the street, the market price of labor can fall far below its costs of production. …

THE SOCIALIST.

What do you mean by the cost of production of labor?

THE ECONOMIST.

I mean the expenditures incurred in order for labor to be produced and to renew itself. These costs vary, essentially, according to the type of labor. A man who uses only his physical powers, can, at a pinch, restrict his consumption to purely physical things; a man who brings into play moral and intellectual resources, cannot conserve and perpetuate them if he does not look after them like his physical powers. The cost of production of labor is all the higher when that labor demands the contribution of a larger number of faculties. To put it in a nutshell, the cost of production of labor is proportional to the extent and intensity of the efforts involved.

If the remuneration of a particular type of labor ceases to cover its costs of production, the workers will immediately [301] direct themselves to branches of production which demand less effort for the same pay. In this case the price of labor will immediately rise in the abandoned industry, and equilibrium will soon be re-established. It is in this fashion that the vast scale of earned incomes naturally arranges itself, from the remuneration of the monarch[627] to the pay of the humblest wage-laborer. Unfortunately, privileges and monopolies often shatter this natural harmony, by setting up excessive levels of pay to the advantage of certain occupations and certain industries. Freedom alone establishes a fair pattern of remuneration.

To the extent that the worker uses more of his intellectual and moral faculties at work, the costs of the production of labor rise. Now in all branches of production, the progress of machinery has the effect of making labor less physical and more intellectual. The more such progress proceeds, the more we find the costs of production of labor rising accordingly. At the same time, the growth of output, the fruits of progress, permits these increased costs to be covered. In an era of barbarism, purely physical labor asks for little and receives less; in a civilized era, labor having become more intellectual, demands much and can obtain even more.

This, however, is on condition that the number of workers does not exceed the number of available jobs, otherwise the market price of labor will fall inevitably below its costs of production.

THE SOCIALIST.

Unless the workers remove the excess supply from the market.

THE ECONOMIST.

Which they will not fail to do in a completely free society. Surplus workers would be fed by employed ones, with the help of voluntary charity. In such circumstances would not the population tend to diminish by itself? Insofar as subsidies by workers and charitable almsgiving extended to more and more people, would not the ever growing difficulty of getting jobs for their children induce people to raise fewer of them? In such circumstances moral restraint would then be exercised and the natural equilibrium of population effortlessly re-established. The opposite circumstance would occur if there were insufficient workers for the available jobs. Quite sure of being able both to feed and find work for their children, the heads of families would raise more of them. Marriage would become more popular and more fruitful, until equilibrium had been restored between population and the means of existence.

This is how the problem of population would be resolved in a regime of full economic liberty. This is the way, moreover, that it always resolves itself eventually. In the meantime, however, how much suffering is caused, sometimes by the artificial and unforeseen contractions in demand for labor, sometimes by the insufficiency of state charity or the stimulus the latter gives to the growth of population! These sufferings would at least be reduced to the lowest possible level, if not entirely eliminated in a system where the number of jobs available to labor and the gifts of voluntary charity were raised to the maximum amount.


14. The Eleventh Evening

Editor’s Note

This is the last of the four instances where Molinari discusses how public goods might be provided privately and voluntarily by entrepreneurs operating in the free market. The others are in S3 (forests, canals, waterways), S8 (private banks and money, mail delivery), and S9 (bakers, butchers, printers etc.). It is also the second of the three Soirées devoted to a more specialized topic which Molinari treats in some detail. They are S10 (population growth and charity), S11 (the private provision of police and defense), S12 (his theory of rent,  his summing up, and his rousing concluding speech).

In this Soirée Molinari continues the argument he first introduced in his February 1849 article in the JDE, “The Production of Security.”[628] The foundation stone of his argument was the universal applicability of one of the natural laws of economics, in this case “la loi de la libre concurrence” (the law of free competition), which he believed applied to all government monopolies, including that of the provision (or “production” as he termed it) of security. Another innovation was to think of security as just another “industry” where profits could be made, where a “price” could be charged for “services rendered” by “producers” or “entrepreneurs” to willing “consumers.” Here and in S11 he explicitly referred to “la production de la sécurité” (the production of security) and "les producteurs de sécurité" (producers of security) who were also “entrepreneurs,” "les consommateurs de sécurité” (consumers of security), "le prix de la sécurité” (the price of security), and “compagnies d’assurances sur la propriété” (property insurance companies) which would charge for security by “l’abonnement” (subscription) or “la prime” (a premium).[629] Once this intellectual leap of thinking about security as a business had been made it was not so hard to imagine how already existing firms (in this case insurance companies) might have an incentive to provide these services and how they might go about charging for them (like insurance premiums for property which had been insured against theft).

The journal article was later reissued as a separate pamphlet by Guillaumin which suggests that it had aroused some interest and Molinari returned to the topic in this Soirée some months later. What was different this time was that he presented his argument for the privatizing of police services at the end of a book which contained many other, perhaps less controversial, examples of public goods which he believed could and should be privately and competitively provided.

In both the journal article and in S11 Molinari provided a list of some of the terms and conditions which a budding security entrepreneur in “l'industrie de la sécurité” (the security industry) would have to offer consumers in order to get their business and to provide an effective service. There are subtle differences between the list in the journal article and in S11 so we include them both here for consideration. In the journal article he states:[630]

1.      that the producer of security would establish certain penalties for those who committed offences against individuals and those who violated property, and that the consumers of security would accept being subjected to these penalties in the case where they themselves committed these abuses against person or property;
2.      that the producer of security would impose on the consumers of security certain obligations for the purpose of assisting it (the producer) in discovering the perpetrators of the offences
3.      that the producer of security would regularly impose a certain premium to cover its costs of production as well as the normal profit for its industry, which would vary according to the situation of the consumers, their particular occupations in which they were engaged, and the extent, value, and nature of their property.

This key passage would be changed slightly for S11 where Molinari replaced the terms “le producteur” (the producer of security) with “les compagnies d’assurances” (insurance companies) and “les consommateurs” (consumers) with “les assurés” (the insured). The word “prime” (premium) remained the same in both cases. In S11 the conditions were:

1. For the insurance companies to establish certain penalties for offenders against persons and property, and for those insured to accept these penalties, in the event of their committing offences against persons and property.
2. For the companies to impose on the insured certain restrictions intended to facilitate the detection of those responsible for offences.
3. For the companies, on a regular basis, in order to cover their costs, to levy a certain premium, varying with the situation of the insured and their individual occupations, and the size, nature and value of the properties to be protected.

Some of the other issues he deals with in this Soirée are his distinction between free governments and “communist” governments, by which he meant what we might call “communal” or “state monopoly” governments; the pros and cons of centralization versus decentralization of state power; his objections to the jury system; and the problem of nationalism. The Economist also in this Soirée gives two of his mini-lectures or speeches on what he believes - this time on "individual sovereignty vs. communism” and "the tyranny of the majority.”[631]

This Soirée was Molinari’s most controversial as it dealt with how the public good of police and national defense, traditionally provided as by the state as a monopoly, might be provided privately and competitively on the free market. Charles Coquelin, the reviewer of Molinari's book in the JDE in October 1849[632] criticized Molinari for putting forward a view of government in the name of “The Economist” which no other Economist of the period supported, thus suggesting that this was a widely held view. It aroused considerable opposition in the Political Economy Society where it was debated shortly after the book appeared in its October 10, 1849 meeting where not one of those present came to Molinari's defense.[633] This was the first of three such debates Molinari’s writings triggered on the general topic of the legitimate functions of the state.[634] Charles Coquelin rejected Molinari’s argument because he thought a supreme authority had to exist and that function was reserved for the state alone. As he put it, “beneath the state, competition is possible and productive; above the state, it is impossible to put (competition) into practice and even to conceive of it.” Frédéric Bastiat agreed that “the use of force can only be the attribute of a supreme power” which was the state. The sentiments of the Society were summed up by its president Charles Dunoyer who concluded that Molinari had “let himself be mislead by illusions of logic, and that competition between companies exercising government-like functions was utopian.”

[303]

SUMMARY: On government and its function [635] – Monopoly governments and communist governments. – On the liberty of government. [636] – On divine right. – That divine right is the same as the right to a job. – The vices of monopoly government. – War is the inevitable consequence of this system. – On the sovereignty of the people. – How we lose our sovereignty. – How we can retrieve it. – The liberal solution. – The communist solution. – Communist governments. – Their vices. – Centralization and decentralization. – On the administration of justice. – On its former organisation. – On its current organisation. – On the inadequacy of the jury system. – How the administration of security and of justice could be made free. – The advantages of free governments. – How nationality should be understood. THE CONSERVATIVE.

Under your system of absolute property rights and of full economic freedom, what is the function of government? [304]

THE ECONOMIST.

The function of the government consists solely in assuring everyone of the security of his property.

THE SOCIALIST.

Right, this is the “State-as-Policeman” of Jean-Baptiste Say.[637]

But I in turn have a question to put to you:

There are in the world today two kinds of government: the former trace their origin to an alleged divine right ... ..

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Alleged? Alleged? Meaning what?

THE SOCIALIST.

The others spring from popular sovereignty. Which of them do you prefer?

THE ECONOMIST.

I want neither one nor the other. The former are monopoly governments and the latter are communist governments. In the name of the principle of property, in the name of the right I possess to provide myself with security, or to buy it from whomever seems appropriate to me, I demand free governments.[638] [305]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Which means?

THE ECONOMIST.

It means governments whose services I may accept or refuse according to my own free will.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Are you being serious?

THE ECONOMIST.

You will soon see. You are a partisan of divine right,[639] are you not?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Since we have been living in a republic, I have rather inclined to that persuasion, I confess.

THE ECONOMIST.

And you regard yourself as an opponent of the right to a job?[640]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Regard myself? Why, I am quite sure of it. I attest ... ..

THE ECONOMIST.

Bear witness to nothing, for you are a declared supporter of the right to a job.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But once again, I ... ..

THE ECONOMIST.

You are a supporter of divine right. Well, the principle of divine right is absolutely identical with that of the right to a job.

What is divine right? It is the right which certain families possess to the government of the people. Who conferred it on them? God himself.

Just read [306] M. Joseph de Maistre’s Considerations on France and his pamphlet The Generating Principle of Political Constitutions:[641]

Man cannot create a sovereign, says M. De Maistre. At most he can serve as an instrument for dispossessing a sovereign and delivering his estates into the hands of another sovereign, himself a prince by birth. Moreover, there has never been a sovereign family whose origin could be identified as plebeian. If such a phenomenon were to appear, it would be a new era for the world.
… It is written: It is I who make the kings. This is not a statement made by the Church, nor a preacher’s metaphor; it is the literal, simple, and palpable truth. It is a law of the political world. God makes kings, quite literally so. He prepares royal families. He nurtures them within a cloud which hides their origin. Finally they appear, crowned with glory and honor. Then they assume their place.[642]

All of which signifies that God has invested certain families with the right to govern men and that nobody can deprive them of the exercise of this right.

Now if you recognize that certain families have the exclusive right to carry out that special form of industry which we call government, if furthermore you agree with most of the theorists of divine right, that the people are obliged to supply, either subjects to be governed, or funds, in the form of unemployment benefits to members of these families – all this down through the centuries – are you then properly justified in rejecting [307] the right to a job? Between this improper demand that society supply the workers with work which suits them, or with a sufficient benefit in lieu thereof, and this other improper demand that society supply the workers of royal families with work appropriate to their abilities and to their dignity, namely the work of government, or else with a salary at least to meet minimum subsistence, where is the difference?

THE SOCIALIST.

In truth there is none.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What does it matter if the recognition of divine right is indispensable to the maintenance of society?

THE ECONOMIST.

Could not the Socialists reply to you that the recognition of the right to a job is no less necessary to the maintenance of society? If you accept the right to a job for some, must you not accept them for everyone? Is the right to a job anything other than an extension of divine right?

You say that the recognition of divine right is indispensable to the maintenance of society. How then does it happen that all nations aspire to rid themselves of these monarchies by divine right? How does it happen that old monopoly governments are either ruined or on the edge of ruin?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

The people are in the throes of vertigo.

THE ECONOMIST.

That is a widespread vertigo. Believe me, however, the people have good reasons for liberating themselves from [308] their old despots. Monopoly government is no better than any other. One does not govern well and above all one does not govern cheaply, when there is no competition to be feared, when the governed are deprived of the right to choose their rulers freely. Grant a grocer the exclusive right to supply a particular part of town,[643] forbid the inhabitants of that district to buy any commodities from neighboring grocers or even to provide themselves with their own groceries, and you will see what trash the privileged grocer will end up selling and at what price. You will see how he lines his pockets at the expense of the unfortunate consumers, what regal splendor he will display for the greater glory of the neighborhood ...  Well, what is true for the smallest services is no less true for the greatest ones. A monopoly government is certainly worth more than that of a grocery shop. The production of security[644] inevitably becomes expensive and of poor quality when it is organized as a monopoly.

The monopoly of security is the main cause of the wars which up until our own day have caused such distress to the human race.[645]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

How should that be so?

THE ECONOMIST.

What is the natural inclination of any producer, privileged or otherwise? It is to increase the numbers of his clients in order to increase his profits. Well, under a regime of monopoly, what means can producers of security[646] employ to increase their clientele? [309]

Since the people do not count in such a regime, since they are simply the legitimate domain over which the Lord’s anointed can hold sway, no one can call upon their assent in order to acquire the right to administer them. Sovereigns are therefore obliged to resort to the following measures to increase the number of their subjects: first they may simply buy provinces and realms with cash; secondly they marry heiresses, either bringing kingdoms as their dowries or in line to inherit them later; or thirdly by naked force to conquer their neighbors’ lands. This is the first cause of war!

On the other hand when peoples revolt sometimes against their legitimate sovereigns, as happened recently in Italy and in Hungary,[647] the Lord’s anointed are naturally obliged to force back their rebellious herd into obedience. For this purpose they construct a Holy Alliance[648] and they carry out a great slaughter of their revolutionary subjects, until they have put down their rebellion. If the rebels are in league with other peoples, however, the latter get involved in the struggle, and the conflagration becomes general. A second cause of war!

I do not need to add that the consumers of security,[649] pawns in the war, also pay the costs.

Such are the advantages of monopoly governments.

THE SOCIALIST.

Therefore you prefer governments based on the sovereignty of the people. You rank democratic republics higher than monarchies or aristocracies. About time!

THE ECONOMIST.

Let us be clear, please. I prefer governments [310] which spring from the sovereignty of the people. But the republics which you call “democratic” are not in the least the true expression of the sovereignty of the people. These governments are extended monopolies, forms of communism. Well, the sovereignty of the people is incompatible with monopoly or communism.

THE SOCIALIST.

So what is the sovereignty of the people, in your view?

THE ECONOMIST.[650]

It is the right which every man possesses to use freely his person and his goods as he pleases, the right to govern himself.

If the sovereign individual has the right to use his person and his goods, as master thereof, he naturally also has the right to defend them. He possesses the right of free defense.[651]

Can each person exercise this right, however, in isolation? Can everyone be his own policeman or soldier?

No! No more than the same man can be his own ploughman, baker, tailor, grocer, doctor, or priest.

It is an economic law that man cannot fruitfully engage in several jobs at the same time. Thus, we see from the very beginning of human society, all industries becoming specialized, and the various members of society turning to occupations for which their natural abilities best equip them. They gain their subsistence by exchanging the products of their particular occupation for the various things necessary to the satisfaction of their needs.

A man who lives alone is, incontestably, fully master of his [311] sovereignty. The trouble is this sovereign person, obliged to perform himself all the tasks which provide the necessities of life, finds himself in a wretched condition.

When a man lives in society, he can preserve his sovereignty or lose it.

How does he come to lose it?

He loses it, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, when he ceases being able to use as he chooses, his person or his goods.

Man remains completely sovereign only under a regime of complete freedom. Any monopoly or special privilege is an attack launched against his sovereignty.

Under the ancien régime, with no one having the right freely to employ his person or use his goods, and no one having the right to engage freely in any industry he liked, sovereignty was narrowly confined.

Under the present régime, infringements of his sovereignty, by a host of monopolies and privileges which restrict the free activities of individuals, have not ceased. Man has still not fully recovered his sovereignty.

How can he recover it?

There are two opposing schools, which offer quite opposite solutions to this problem: the liberal school and the communist school.

The liberal school says: eliminate monopolies and privileges, give man back his natural right to carry out freely any work he chooses, and he will have full exercise of his sovereignty.

The communist school says to the contrary: be careful not to allow everyone the right to produce freely anything [312] he chooses. This will lead to oppression and anarchy! Grant this right to the community and exclude individuals from it. Let all individuals unite and organize production communistically. Let the state be the sole producer and the sole distributer of wealth.

What is there behind this doctrine? It has often been said: slavery. It is the absorption and cancellation of individual will by the collective will. It is the destruction of individual sovereignty.

The most important of the industries organized in common is the one whose purpose is to protect and defend the ownership of persons and things, against all aggression.

How are the communities formed in which this activity takes place, namely the nation and the communes?[652]

Most nations have been successively enlarged by the alliances of owners of slaves or serfs as well as by their conquests. France, for example, is the product of successive alliances and conquests. By marriage, by force, or fraud,[653] the rulers of the Île de France successively extended their authority over the different parts of ancient Gaul. The twenty monopolistic governments which occupied the land area of France at that time, gave way to a single monopolistic government. The kings of Provence, the dukes of Aquitaine, Brittany, Burgundy, and Lorraine, the counts of Flanders etc., gave way to the King of France.

The King of France was given charge of the internal and external defense of the state. He did not, however, [313] manage internal defense and civil administration on his own.

Originally, each feudal lord managed the policing[654] of his domain; each commune, freed by the use of force or by buying their way out from the onerous tutelage of his lord, handled the policing of his recognized area.

Communes and feudal lords contributed to some extent to the general defense of the realm.

We can say that the King of France had a monopoly of the general defense and the feudal lords and the burghers of the cities and towns had a monopoly of local defense.

In certain communes, policing was under the direction of an administration elected by city burghers, as in Flanders, for example. Elsewhere, policing was set up as a privileged corporation such as the bakers, butchers, and shoe makers, or in other words like all the other industries.

In England this latter form of the production of security has persisted until modern times. In the City of London, for example, policing was until not long ago still in the hands of a privileged corporation. And what was extraordinarily strange, this corporation refused to come to any agreement with the police of other districts, to such an extent that the City became a veritable place of refuge for criminals. This anomaly was not removed until the era of Sir Robert Peel’s reforms.[655]

What did the French Revolution do? It took from the king of France the monopoly of the general defense; but it did not destroy this monopoly. It put it in the hands [314] of the nation, organized henceforth like one immense commune.

The little communes into which the former kingdom of France was divided, continued to exist. Their number was even considerably increased. The government of the large commune had the monopoly of general defense, while the governments of the small communes, under the surveillance of the central government, exercised the monopoly of local defense.

This, however, was not the end of it. Both at general commune level and at individual commune level, other industries were organized, notably education, religion, and transport, etc., and citizens were variously taxed to defray the costs of these industries which were organized communally.

Later, the socialists, poor observers of what was going on if ever there were any, not noticing that the industries which were organized in the general commune or the individual communes, functioned both more expensively and less efficiently than the industries which remained free, demanded the communal organization of all branches of production. They wanted the general commune and the individual communes no longer to limit themselves to policing, to building schools, constructing roads, paying the salaries of priests, opening libraries, subsidizing theaters, maintaining stud farms, manufacturing tobacco, carpets, porcelain, etc., but rather to set about producing everything.

The public’s sound common sense was shocked by this most distasteful utopia, but it did not react further. People understood well enough that it would be disastrous to produce everything in common. What they [315] did not understand was that it was also ruinous to produce certain specific things in this way. They continued therefore to engage in partial communism, while despising the socialists calling at the top of their voices for full communism.

The conservatives, however, supporters of partial communism and opponents of full communism, today find themselves divided on an important issue.

Some of them want partial communism to continue to operate mainly in the general commune; they support centralization.

The others, on the other hand, demand a much larger allocation of resources for the small communes. They want the latter to be able to engage in diverse industries such as founding schools, constructing roads, building churches, subsidizing theaters, etc., without needing to get the authorization of the central government. They demand decentralization.

Experience has revealed the faults of centralization.[656] It has shown that industries run by the large commune, by the state, supply dearer goods and ones of lower quality than those produced by free industry.

Is it the case, however, that decentralization is superior? Is the implication that it is more useful to free the communes, or – and this comes down to the same thing – allow them freely to set up schools and charitable institutions, to build theaters, subsidize religion, or even also engage freely in other industries?

What do communes need to meet the expenses of the services of which they charged with? They need capital. Where can they get access to it? In [316] private individuals’ pockets and nowhere else. Consequently they have to levy various taxes on the people who live in the communes.

These taxes consist for the most part today, in the extra centimes added to the taxes paid to the state. Certain communes, however, have also received authorization to set up around their boundaries a small customs office to exact tolls.[657] This system of customs, which applies to most of the industries which have remained free, naturally increases the resources of the commune considerably. So the authorization for setting up tolls is frequently sought from the central government. The latter rarely grants it[658] and, in this, is acting wisely; on the other hand it quite often permits the communes to exert their authority in an extra-ordinary manner, or to put it another way, it permits the majority of the administrators of the commune to set up an extraordinary tax which all the people they administer are obliged to pay.

Let the communes be emancipated, permit the majority of the inhabitants in each locality to have the right to set up as many industries as they please, and force the minority to contribute to the expenses of these industries organized communally, then let the majority be authorized to establish freely every kind of local tax, and you will soon see as many small, various, and separate states being set up in France as one can count communes. You will see in succession, forty four thousand internal customs created in order to meet the local tax bill, under the title tolls; you will see in a word the reconstitution of the middle ages.

Under this regime, free trade and the liberty of working [317] will be under assault, both by the monopolies which the communes will grant to certain branches of production, and by the taxes which they will levy on certain other branches of production to support the industries operated communally. The property of all will be exposed to the mercy of majorities.

I ask you, in the communes where socialist ideas predominate, what will happen to property? Not only will the majority levy taxes to meet the expenses of policing, road maintenance, religion, charitable institutions, schools, etc., but it will levy them also to set up communal workshops, trading outlets, etc. Will not the non-socialist minority be obliged to pay these local taxes?

Under such a regime, what happens to the people’s sovereignty? Will it not disappear under the tyranny of the majority?

More directly even than centralization, decentralization leads to complete communism, that is to say to the complete destruction of sovereignty.

What has to be done to restore to men that sovereignty which monopoly robbed them of in the past; and which communism, that extended monopoly, threatens to rob them of in the future?

Quite simply the various industries formerly established as monopolies and operated today communally, need to be given their freedom. Industry still managed or regulated by the state or by the communes, must be handed over to the free activity of individuals.

In this way, man possessing, as was the case before the establishment of societies, the right to apply his faculties freely, to any kind of labor, without hindrance [318] or any charge, will once again fully enjoy his sovereignty.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

You have reviewed the various branches of industry which are still monopolies, or enjoy privileges, or are subject to controls, proving to us, with greater or lesser success, that for the common good such production should be left in freedom. Very well then. I do not wish to return to a worn-out subject. Is it really possible, however, to take away from the state and from the communes the task of general and local defense?

THE SOCIALIST.

And the administration of justice too?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Yes, and the administration of justice. Is it possible that these industries, to use your word, might be undertaken other than collectively, by the nation and the commune?

THE ECONOMIST.

I would perhaps be willing to say no more about these two particular communisms if you were to agree very frankly to leave me all the others; if you would agree to reduce the size of the state so that henceforth it would be only a policeman, a soldier, and a judge. This, however, is impossible! ...  For communism in matters of security is the keystone of the ancient edifice of servitude. Anyway, I see no reason to grant you this one rather than the others.

You must choose one or the other:

Either communism is better than freedom, and in that case all industries should be organized in common, in the state or in the commune. [319]

Or freedom is preferable to communism, and in that case all industries still organized in common should be made free, including justice and police, as well as education, religion, transport, production of tobacco, etc.

THE SOCIALIST.

This is logical.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But is it possible?

THE ECONOMIST.

Let us see! Are we talking about justice? Under the old regime the administration of justice was not organized and its workforce paid, communally. It was organized as a monopoly and its workforce paid by those who made use of it.

For a number of centuries, no activity was more independent. It constituted, like all the other forms of material or non-material production, a privileged corporation. The members of this corporation could bequeath their offices or functions to their children, or even sell them. Possessing these offices in perpetuity, the judges made themselves well-known for their independence and integrity.

Unfortunately these arrangements had, looked at in another way, all the vices inherent in monopoly. Monopolized justice was paid for very dearly.

THE SOCIALIST.

And God knows how many complaints and claims required the payment of bribes to the judges.[659] Witness the little verse scrawled on the door of the Palais de Justice after a fire: [320]

One fine day, Dame Justice
Set the palace all on fire
Because she’d eaten too much spice.[660]

Should not justice be essentially free of charge? Now, does not being free of charge entail collective organisation?

THE ECONOMIST.

The complaints were about the justice system receiving too many bribes. It was not a complaint about the bribing itself. If the system had not been set up as a monopoly, if the judges had been able to demand only what was their legitimate payment for their industry, people would not have been complaining about the corruption.

In some countries, where those due to be tried had the right to choose their judges, the vices of monopoly were greatly alleviated. The competition established in this case by the different courts improves the justice process and makes it cheaper. Adam Smith attributed the progress of the administration of justice in England to this cause. His words are striking and I hope the passage will allay your doubts: [321]

The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognizance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. The court of king’s bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognizance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanor. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king’s revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognizance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging that he could not pay the king, because the defendant would not pay him. In consequence of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would chuse to have their cause tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure, formed by this emulation, which antiently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy, which the law would admit, for every sort of injustice. Originally the courts of law gave damages only for breach of contract. The court of chancery, as a court of conscience, first took upon it to enforce the specifick performance of agreements. When the breach of contract consisted in the non–payment of money, the damage sustained could be compensated in no other way than by ordering payment, which was equivalent to a specifick performance of the agreement. In such cases, therefore, the remedy of the courts of law was sufficient. It was not so in others. When the tenant sued his lord for having unjustly outed him of his lease, the damages which he recovered were by no means equivalent to the possession of the land. Such causes, therefore, for some time, went all to the court of chancery, to the no small loss of the courts of law. It was to draw back such causes to themselves that the courts of law are said to have invented the artificial and fictitious writ of ejectment, the most effectual remedy for an unjust outer or dispossession of land. [661]
THE SOCIALIST.

But once again would not a system with no charges be preferable?

THE ECONOMIST.

So you have not yet given up the illusion of something being free of charge. Do I need to demonstrate to you again that the administration of justice without charges is more expensive than the alternative, given the cost of collecting the taxes paid out to maintain your free courts and to give salaries to your free judges.[662] Need I show you again that the provision of justice at no charge is necessarily unjust because not everyone makes equal use of the justice system and not everyone is equally litigious? What is more, justice is far from free under the present regime, as you are aware. [322]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Legal proceedings are ruinously expensive. Can we complain, however, about the present administration of justice? Is not the organization of our courts beyond reproach?

THE SOCIALIST.

Goodness! Beyond reproach! An Englishman whom I accompanied one day to the Criminal Court, came away from the hearing quite indignant. He could not conceive how a civilized people could permit a prosecutor of the Crown or the Republic to engage in rhetoric when calling for a death sentence. He was horror-struck that such eloquence could be used to provide bodies to the executioner. In England they are content to lay out the accusation before the court; they do not try to inflame it.

THE ECONOMIST.

Add to that the proverbial delays in our law courts, the sufferings of the unfortunates who await their sentences for months, sometimes for years, when the inquiry could be conducted in a few days; the costs and the enormous losses which these delays entail, and you will be convinced that the administration of justice has scarcely advanced in France.

THE SOCIALIST.

We should not exaggerate, however. Today, thank Heaven, we have the jury system.

THE ECONOMIST.

Which means that, not content with forcing taxpayers to pay the costs of the justice system, we also make them carry out the functions of judges. This is pure communism: ab uno disce omnes.[663] Personally, I do not think [323] the jury is any better at judging than the National Guard, another communist institution!, is at making war.[664]

THE SOCIALIST.

Why is that?

THE ECONOMIST.

Because the only thing one does well is one’s trade or speciality, and the jury’s speciality is not acting as a judge.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

So it suffices for the jury to identify the crime and to understand the circumstances in which it was committed.

THE ECONOMIST.

This is to say that it carries out the most difficult, most thorny function of the judge. It is a task so delicate, demanding judgment so sane and so practiced, a mind so calm, so dispassionate, so impartial, that we entrust the job to the chance of names in a lottery. It is exactly as if one drew by lot the names of the citizens who would be entrusted every year with the making of boots or the writing of tragedies for the community.[665]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

The comparison is forced.

THE ECONOMIST.

It is more difficult in my opinion to deliver a good judgment than to make a fine pair of boots or to produce a few hundred decent rhyming couplets. A perfectly enlightened and impartial judge is rarer than a skillful shoemaker or a poet capable of writing for the Théâtre Français.

In criminal cases, the jury’s lack of skill [324] is revealed every day. Sad to say, however, only scant attention is ever paid to mistakes made in the Criminal Court. Nay, I would go further. People regard it almost as a crime to criticize a judgment rendered in court. In political cases does not the jury tend to pronounce according to its opinion, white (conservative) or red (radical), rather than according to what justice demands? Will not any man who is condemned by a conservative jury be absolved by a radical one and vice versa?

THE SOCIALIST.

True alas!

THE ECONOMIST.[666]

Already minorities are very weary of being judged by juries belonging to majorities. See how it turns out ... 

Is the point at issue the industry which supplies our external and internal defense?[667] Do you think it is worth much more than the effort committed to justice? Do not our police and especially our army cost us very dearly for the real services they supply us with?[668]

In short, is there no disadvantage in this industry of defense being in the hands of the majority?

Let us examine this issue.

In a system in which the majority determines the level of taxation, and directs the use of public funds, must not taxation weigh more or less heavily on certain parts of the society, according to the predominant influences? Under the monarchy, when the majority was purely notional, when the upper class claimed for itself the right to govern the country to the exclusion of the rest of the nation,[669] did not taxation weigh principally on the consumption [325] of the lower classes, on salt, wine, meat, etc.?[670] Doubtless the bourgeoisie played its part in paying these taxes, but the range of its consumption being infinitely wider than that of the consumption of the lower classes, its income ended up, all said and done, much less affected. To the extent that the lower class, in becoming better educated, will gain more influence in the state, you will see a contrary tendency emerge. You will see progressive taxation, today turned against the lower class, turned against the upper class. The latter will doubtless resist this new tendency with all its powers. It will cry out and protest, quite rightly, against this plunder and this theft; but if the communal institution of universal suffrage is maintained, if a surprise reversal of power does not once again put the government of society into the hands of the rich classes, to the exclusion of the poor classes, the will of the majority will prevail, and progressive taxation will be established. Part of the property of the rich will then be legally confiscated to relieve the burden of the poor, just as a part of the property of the poor has been confiscated for too long in order to relieve the burden of the rich.[671]

But there is worse still.

Not only can the majority of a communal government set the level of taxation wherever it chooses, but it can also make whatever use of that taxation it chooses, without taking account of the will of the minority.

In certain countries, the government of the majority uses a portion of public monies to protect essentially illegitimate and immoral properties. In [326] the United States, for example, the government guarantees the southern planters the ownership of their slaves.[672] There are, however, in the United States, abolitionists who rightly consider slavery to be a theft. It counts for nothing! The communal mechanism obliges them to contribute out of their wealth to the maintenance of this sort of theft. If the slaves were to try one day to free themselves of this wicked and dreadful yoke, the abolitionists would be required to go and defend, by force of arms, the property of the planters. That is the law of majorities.

Elsewhere, it can come about that the majority, pushed by political intrigue or by religious fanaticism, declares war on some foreign nation. However much the minority are horrified by this war, and curse it, they are obliged to contribute their blood and their funds to it. Once again this is the law of the majority.

So what happens? What happens is that the majority and the minority are in perpetual conflict and that war sometimes comes down from the parliamentary arena into the streets.

Today it is the red minority which is in revolt.[673] If this minority were to become a majority, and if using its majority rights, it reshaped the constitution as it wished, if it decreed progressive taxation, forced loans, and paper money, who could assure you that the whites would not be in revolt tomorrow?

There is no lasting security under this system. And do you know why? Because it endlessly threatens property; because it puts at the mercy of a majority, whether blind or enlightened, moral or immoral, the persons and the goods of everybody.

If the communal regime, instead of being applied [327] as in France, to a multitude of objects, found itself narrowly limited as in the United States, the causes of disagreement between the majority and the minority being less numerous, the disadvantages of this regime would be fewer. They would not, however, disappear entirely. The recognized right of the majority to tyrannise over the will of the smaller, would still in certain circumstances be likely to cause a civil war.[674]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Once again, though, it is not easy to see how industry which provides the security of persons and property, could be managed, if it were made free. Your logic leads you to dreams worthy of an inmate at Charenton.[675]

THE ECONOMIST.

Oh, come on ! Let us not get angry. I suppose that after having recognized that the partial communism of the state and of the commune is decidedly bad, we could let all the branches of production operate freely, with the exception of the administration of justice and public defense. Thus far I have no objection. But a radical economist, a dreamer,[676] comes along and says: Why then, after having freed the various uses of property, do you not also set free those who guarantee the upholding of property rights? Just like the others, will not these industries be carried out in a way more just and useful if they are made free? You maintain that it is impracticable. Why? On the one hand, are there not, in society, men especially suited, some to judge the disputes which arise between proprietors and to assess the offenses committed against property, others [328] to defend the property of persons and of things, against the assaults of violence and fraud? Are there not men whom their natural aptitudes make especially fit to be judges, policemen, or soldiers? On the other hand, do not all proprietors, without exception, have need for security and justice? Are not all of them inclined, therefore, to impose sacrifices on themselves to satisfy this urgent need, above all if they are powerless to satisfy it themselves, or can do so only by expending a lot of time and money?

Now, if on the one hand there are men suitable for meeting one of society’s needs, and on the other hand men ready to make sacrifices to obtain the satisfaction of this need, is it not enough to allow both groups to go about their business freely[677] so that the good demanded, whether material or non-material, is produced and that the need is satisfied?

Will not this economic phenomenon be produced irresistibly, inevitably, like the physical phenomenon of falling bodies?

Am I not justified in saying, therefore, that if a society renounced the provision of public security, this important industry would nonetheless be carried out? Am I not right to add that it would be done better in the régime of liberty than the régime of community?

THE CONSERVATIVE.

In what way?

THE ECONOMIST.

That does not concern the Economists. Political economy [329] can say: if such a need exists, it will be satisfied and done better in a regime of complete freedom than under any other. There is no exception to this rule. As to how this industry will be organized, what its technical procedures will be, that is something which political economy cannot tell us.[678]

Thus I can affirm that if the need for food is plainly visible in society, this need will be satisfied, and satisfied all the better, when each person remains as free as possible to produce food or to buy from whomever he thinks fit.

I can give assurances, too, that things will work out in exactly the same way, if rather than food, security is the issue.

Therefore, I maintain that if a community were to announce that after a given delay, say perhaps a year, it would give up financing the pay of judges, soldiers, and policemen, at the end of the year that community would not possess any fewer courts and governments ready to function; and I would add that if, under this new regime, each person kept the right to engage freely in these two industries and to buy their services freely from them, security would be generated as economically and as well as possible.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I still say that this is inconceivable.

THE ECONOMIST.

At the time when the regulatory regime kept industry prisoner within its communal boundaries, and when each privileged corporation had exclusive control of [330] the communal market, people said that society was threatened, each time some audacious innovator strove to attack that monopoly. If anyone had come and said at that time that instead of the feeble and stunted industries of the privileged corporations, liberty would one day build immense factories turning out cheaper and superior products, this dreamer would have been very smartly put in his place. The conservatives of that time would have sworn by all the gods that such a thing was inconceivable.

THE SOCIALIST.

Oh come on! How can it be imagined that each individual has the right to create his own government, or to choose his government, or even not choose it ... ? How would things turn out in France, if having freed all the other industries, French citizens announced by common agreement, that after a year, they would cease to support the government of the community?

THE ECONOMIST.

On this subject all I can do is conjecture. This, however, is more or less how things would turn out. Since the need for security is still very great in our society, it would be profitable to set up businesses which provide government services.[679] Investors could be certain of covering their costs. How would these firms be set up? Isolated individuals would not be adequate, any more than they would suffice for building railways, docks etc. Huge companies would be set up, therefore, in order to produce security. These would acquire the resources and the workers they needed. As soon as they felt ready to operate, [331] these property-insurance companies[680] would look for a clientele. Each person would take out a subscription[681] with the one which inspired him with most confidence and whose terms seemed to him the most favorable.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

We would queue up to take out subscriptions. Most definitely we would queue up!

THE ECONOMIST.

This industry being free, we would see as many companies set up as could usefully be formed. If there were too few, if, consequently the price of security[682] rose too high, people would find it profitable to set up new ones. If there were too many, the surplus ones would not take long to be dissolved. The price of security would in this way always be led back to the level of its costs of production.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

How would these free companies arrange things among themselves in order to provide national security?

THE ECONOMIST.

They would reach agreement as do monopoly or communist governments today, because they would have an interest in so doing. The more, in fact, they agreed to share facilities for the apprehension of thieves and murderers, the more they would reduce their costs.

By the very nature of their industry, these property-insurance companies would not be able to venture outside certain prescribed limits: they would lose by maintaining police in places where they had very few clients. Within their district they would nevertheless not be able [332] to oppress or exploit their clients, on pain of seeing competition spring up immediately.

THE SOCIALIST.

And if the existing company wanted to prevent the competitors establishing themselves?

THE ECONOMIST.

In a word, if they encroached on the property of their competitors and on the sovereignty of all ... Oh! In that case all those whose property and independence were threatened by the monopolists would rise up and punish them.

THE SOCIALIST.

And if all the companies agreed to establish themselves as monopolies, what then? What if they formed a holy alliance[683] in order to impose themselves on their peoples , and if, emboldened by this coalition, they mercilessly exploited the unfortunate consumers of security, and if they extracted from them by way of heavy taxes the greater part of the fruit of the labor of these peoples ?

THE ECONOMIST.

If, to tell the whole story, they started doing again what the old aristocracies did right up until our era ... Well, then, in that case the peoples would follow the advice of Béranger:

People of the world, form a Holy Alliance
And take each other by the hand.[684]

They would unite in their turn and since they possess means of communication which their ancestors did not, and since they are a hundred times more numerous than their old rulers, the holy alliance of the aristocracies would soon be destroyed. No one would any longer be tempted in this case, I swear to you, to set up a monopoly. [333]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What would one do under this regime to repulse a foreign invasion?

THE ECONOMIST.[685]

What would be the interest of the companies? It would be to repel the invaders, for they themselves would be the first victims of the invasion. They would agree among themselves, therefore, in order to repel them, and they would demand from those they insured, a supplementary premium[686] for saving them from this new danger. If the insured preferred to run the risks of invasion, they would refuse to pay this supplementary premium; if not they would pay it and they would thus put the companies in a position to ward off the danger of invasion.

Just as war is inevitable in a regime of monopoly, so peace is inevitable under a regime of free government.[687]

Under this regime governments can gain nothing through war; on the contrary they can lose everything. What interest would they have in undertaking a war? Would this be to increase their clientele? But the consumers of security, being free to create their own government as they saw fit, would escape their conquerors. If the latter wished to impose their domination on them, after having destroyed the existing government, the oppressed would immediately demand the help of other nations ... .

Wars of company against company could take place, moreover, only insofar as the shareholders[688] were willing to advance the costs. Now, war no longer being able to bring to anyone an increase in the number of clients, since consumers will no longer allow themselves to be conquered, the [334] costs of war would obviously no longer be covered. Who would want therefore to advance them the funds?

I conclude from this that war would be physically impossible under this system, for no war can be waged without an advance of funds.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

What conditions would a property-insurance company impose on its clients?

THE ECONOMIST.

These conditions would be of several different kinds.

In order to be in a position to guarantee full security of person and property to those they have insured, it would be necessary:[689]

1. For the insurance companies to establish certain penalties for offenders against persons and property, and for those insured to accept these penalties, in the event of their committing offenses against persons and property.
2. For the companies to impose on the insured certain restrictions intended to facilitate the detection of those responsible for offenses.
3. For the companies, on a regular basis, in order to cover their costs, to levy a certain premium, varying with the situation of the insured and their individual occupations, and the size, nature and value of the properties to be protected.

If the conditions stipulated were acceptable to the consumers of security, the deal would be concluded; otherwise the consumers would approach other companies, or provide for their security themselves.

Follow this hypothesis in all its details, and I think you will be convinced of the possibility of [335] transforming monopolistic or communist governments into free governments.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

I still see plenty of difficulties in this. For example, who will pay the national debt?[690]

THE ECONOMIST.

Do you think that in selling all the property today held in common – roads, canals, rivers, forests, and buildings used by all the commune governments, the equipment of all the communal services – we would not very easily succeed in paying off the debt? The latter does not exceed six billion. The value of communal property in France is quite certainly far greater than that.

THE SOCIALIST.

Would not this system entail the destruction of any sense of nationality? If several property-insurance companies established themselves in a country, would not national unity be destroyed?

THE ECONOMIST.

First of all, national unity would have to exist before it could be destroyed. Well, I do not see national unity in these shapeless agglomerations of people, formed out of violence, which violence alone maintains, for the most part.

Next, it is an error to confuse these two things, which are naturally very distinct: the nation[691] and the government. A nation is one when the individuals who compose it have the same customs, the same language, the same civilisation; when they constitute a distinct and original variety of the human race. Whether this nation [335] has two governments or only one, matters very little, unless one of these government surrounds, with an artificial barrier, the territories under its domination, and undertakes incessant wars against its neighbors. In this last instance, the instinct of nationality will react against this barbarous fragmentation and artificial antagonism imposed on a single people, and the disunited fractions of the people will very quickly attempt to draw together again.

Now governments have until our time divided people in order to retain them the more easily in obedience; divide and rule, such has been at all times the fundamental maxim of their policy. Men of the same race, to whom a common language would supply an easy means of communication, have reacted vigorously against the enactment of this maxim; at all times they have striven to destroy the artificial barriers which separated them. When they achieved this result, they wished to have a single government in order not to be disunited again. Note, however, that they have never demanded that this government should separate them from other people ... So the instinct of nationality is not selfish, as is often claimed; it is, on the contrary, essentially sympathetic towards others. Once the various governments cease dragging peoples apart and dividing them, you will see a given nationality happily accepting several others. A single government is no more necessary to the unity of a people, than a single bank, a single school, a single religion, a single grocery store, etc. [337].

THE SOCIALIST.

There, in truth, we have a very strange solution to the problem of government!

THE ECONOMIST.

It is the sole solution consistent with the nature of things.[692]


15. The Twelfth and Last Evening

Editor’s Note

This Soirée is the last of the three Soirées devoted to a more specialized topic which Molinari treats in some detail. They are S10 (population growth and charity), S11 (the private provision of police and defense), S12 (his theory of rent, his summing up, and his rousing concluding speech).

In this final Soirée Molinari discusses his theory of rent before giving two of his mini-lectures or speeches on what he believes - this time his "summation" speech of the contents of the entire book and his "Spartacus" speech where he concludes the book with an impassioned plea for liberty and a description of how its full implementation has been prevented throughout history, and the stark choice which now faces France.

It is curious that Molinari has the Socialist interrupt the Economist here to ask for a “clarification” on the nature of rent just as he is about to provide us with a resumé of the book's arguments.. It seems that Molinari felt obliged for some reason to insert at this late stage a ten page digression on the nature of rent. Normally in economic treatises one begins with the basic principles such as prices, exchange, production, labor, interest, profit, and rent before moving onto other matters. Molinari discusses interest in S5 which is where a discussion of rent might have been expected as well. The reason might lie in the work of other economists who were providing new theories of rent with which Molinari disagreed, and this was his opportunity to reply to them.[693]

Socialists like Proudhon, Louis Blanc, and Victor Considerant had spent a great deal of time in the 1840s and into the Second Republic criticizing the classical economists’ views on the legitimacy of profit, interest, and rent as they regarded this income as “unearned.” Throughout 1849 Bastiat had taken time away from completing his treatise on economics, the Economic Harmonies, in order to write a stream of pamphlets replying to the socialists’ critique of property, profit, interest, and rent. He had already published “Capitale et rente” (Capital and Rent) (February 1849), “Le capital” (Capital) (possibly early 1849), and was about to launch into a long correspondence with Proudhon between October 1849 and March 1850 which was published as a book “Gratuité du crédit” (Free Credit) in March 1850.[694] When time permitted he was also getting ready for publication a long chapter on rent which would be published in the first edition of Economic Harmonies which appeared in early 1850. In his new theory of rent he argued that rent was justified because it was just another example of the mutual exchange of “a service for a service” and that there was nothing special about the productivity of land or the “les services agricoles” (farming services) which brought the products of the land to the consumer.

Also during 1849 Molinari had been replying to critiques of property, interest, and rent in articles in the JDE such as his review of Thiers’ book De la propriété in January and a letter to the editor in June in which he criticized both Proudhon and Bastiat.[695] He may have seen a draft of Bastiat’s forthcoming chapter on rent in Economic Harmonies and which might have been the immediate trigger for his digression on rent which was inserted rather awkwardly in S12. Molinari thought that rent was a temporary abnormal increase in returns caused by “une perturbation” (a disturbance or disruption) or “les circonstances artificielles” (artificial circumstances) (such as a bad harvest or a government subsidy) which would eventually disappear as economic equilibrium was re-established.[696] In S12 he argues that most people have things back to front when they try to explain the origin of rent. The farmer does not, in his view “sell his wheat at a higher price because he pays a rent; he pays a rent because he sells his wheat at a higher price. Rent does not act as a cause in the formation of prices; it is only a result.” From this he concludes that “rent represents no work completed nor any compensation for losses undergone or to be undergone” which is in direct opposition to Bastiat’s theory of compensation for a service rendered.

Molinari would expand on his ideas about the connection between rent and temporary disturbances in his treatise Cours d'économie politique (1855) in two lengthy chapters on land and rent.

As soon as the Economist has finished talking about how the disturbing factors which give rise to rent gradually disappear, both the Conservative and the Socialist leap in to interrupt him to demand that he provide a summary of the discussions they have had over the previous 11 evenings and bring the book to a close. The Economist obliges with a lengthy two-part speech of some 3,500 words which continues until the second last page. The culmination of his summary of the book is a restatement of one of the natural laws of political economy, that of "la loi de progression des valeurs" (the natural law of value, or the progression of value), which will see “the market price of all things, labor, capital, and goods, gravitating incessantly and irresistibly towards the limit of the cost of production of these things,” with the only proviso that the market be left to operate in “un milieu libre” (in a free milieu), that is “a milieu in which the property rights of each person with respect to his faculties and the results of his labor are fully respected.”[697]

Without stopping to let his interlocuteurs respond, the Economist launches into his second speech on the centuries-long struggle by the oppressed slaves and serfs of Europe for greater liberty, epitomized by Spartacus and the slave uprising against the Romans he organized, and the enormous obstacles they have faced up until the present. The struggle as the Economist now sees it is between two groups who oppose property rights, the socialists who want “to increase the number of restrictions and levies which already weigh on property” and the conservatives who want “purely and simply to preserve those which already exist.” On the very last page, as he finishes this speech, the Socialist meekly capitulates to the weight of the Economist’s arguments and the Conservative reluctantly agrees as well.

The Economist's last words with which he concludes Les Soirées makes it very clear that the reader must choose between two different social systems, one based upon state control of property ("communism") or one based upon private property. The current "régime bâtard" (bastard or hybrid regime) of part-property and part-communism he believed was unsustainable in the long run both practically and morally.

[336]

SUMMARY: Rent. – Its nature and its origin. – Resumé and conclusion. THE ECONOMIST.

Our discussions are drawing to a close. Do you want me to give you a resumé of our work, as they say in the National Assembly?

THE SOCIALIST.

I have a clarification to ask of you before that.

You have told us that the costs of production of anything are made up of the labor costs and the interest on capital; you added that the market price of things tends naturally and irresistibly to an equilibrium with their costs of production. You have not, however, said a word about rent.

THE ECONOMIST.

Rent does not play any part in the cost of production of things.

THE SOCIALIST.

What are you saying? Do you deny that thousands of individuals exist, not on interest payments or wages, but on a rent?

THE ECONOMIST.

I will not deny it. [339]

THE SOCIALIST.

So where does that rent reside if not in the price of things? If the smallholder paid no rent to his proprietor, would he not be able to sell his wheat cheaper? When he produces wheat, is he not bound to include the rent in his costs of production?

THE ECONOMIST.

He does not sell his wheat at a higher price because he pays a rent; he pays a rent because he sells his wheat at a higher price. Rent does not act as a cause in the formation of prices; it is only a result.

THE SOCIALIST.

Cause or result, is it any the less a fact, any the less unjust? Goodness! There we have a man who possesses, by way of inheritance, a huge expanse of land on which neither he nor his family have expended any labor. This land belongs to him because it once fell into the hands of one of his ancestors, the chief of one of the barbarian hordes which invaded and devastated the country.[698] Since that time the lord of this land has obliged the peasant to hand over a third or a half of the fruits of his hard labor, by way of rent. Thousands of men have lived and still live by extracting this payment from the labor of their peers. Is this just?

Should not governments put an end to this monstrous abuse, either by seizing the land in order to restore it to the workers, or by imposing on the proprietors obligations which absorb the value of the rent? All incomes have their origin in labor, saving only this one. Is it not time that this exception was stopped? Did not J.-B. Say, himself, agree that the [340] income derived from rent was the least respectable of all?[699] Give me what you take in rent and I will allow you to keep your property.

THE ECONOMIST.

Grant me property and I will guarantee you that the rent will vanish of its own accord.

THE SOCIALIST.

Rent vanish on its own? That would be curious!

THE ECONOMIST.

Rent is not, as you seem to believe, the fruit of property. Rent is on the contrary, the product of various attacks made on property, since societies began.

In his researches on the origin of rent, Ricardo recognized that it was not part of the costs of production.[700] This means that if products never sell at a price higher than their costs of production, above the quantity of labor they have required, there would be no rent.

If rent is not part of the costs of production, what is it then?

It is the difference which exists between the market price of things (the price at which they sell) and their cost of production.

THE SOCIALIST.

What does it matter, I repeat, that rent is not reckoned in the costs of production, if it is counted in the market price and therefore paid?

THE ECONOMIST.

This matters enormously. The costs of production, [341] being made up of the labor necessary for the production of a product, cannot help but be part of the price paid. Whatever exceeds the costs of production, on the contrary, cannot be part of of the price paid.

THE SOCIALIST.

I am beginning to understand.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

And I think I have understood all too well.

THE ECONOMIST.

Do not worry. If rent is not included in the costs of production, the implication is:

1. That it (rent) represents no work completed nor any compensation for losses undergone or to be undergone.
2. That it is the result of artificial circumstances, which are bound to disappear along with the causes which gave rise to them.

What are these causes? What causes are there which raise and maintain the market price of things above their costs or production, or make them fall below these costs, against the force of the natural law which acts constantly to align the market price with the costs of production?

That is how the question should be framed.

THE SOCIALIST.

If the economic law which brings the market price closer to the cost of production is the same as the physical law which governs the fall of bodies and maintains the equilibrium of liquid surfaces, I do not understand why its action should be disturbed by artificial causes.

THE ECONOMIST.

You are not thinking about the dams and the uneven pieces of ground which disturb the natural flow of the water. [342]

THE SOCIALIST.

Yes but the level always re-establishes itself.

THE ECONOMIST.

You are wrong. New artificial levels are established. The natural level does not reappear until after the dam has been broken. Now, with each person having wanted to increase the flow of water on his side without bothering about his neighbor, the field of production has been criss-crossed by a multitude of dams. Some of them have had more water than they needed; others have been drained.

The economic equivalents of dams are called monopolies and privileges.

Now we will see how the workings of monopoly and privileges generate rent.[701]

If an industry is subject to the law of free competition, it will not for very long be able to sell its products at prices higher or lower than its costs of production. Therefore it will not give rise to any rent. Those who manage it will receive only the legitimate return to their labor and the compensation necessary for the use of their capital.

If, on the contrary, certain producers enjoy the exclusive privilege of selling their merchandize in a given district, these producers will be able to conspire in always supplying this good in a quantity lower than that demanded. By this means they will succeed in raising its market price above the costs of production. The difference constitutes their rent.

On the other hand, when a commodity has been overproduced, in relation to the number of [343] consumers who can reimburse its costs of production, the market price falls below those costs, and the difference once again constitutes a rent. Only this rent, instead of being paid by the consumer, is payed by the producer. Of course, this could happen only accidentally.

The production of goods of prime necessity can just on its own give rise to a considerable rent.

If one lowers the supply of luxury goods in an artificial way, with the price rising, demand will contract. In this circumstance, the price will fall rapidly, and the rent with it.

Suppose the question concerns wheat. If supply is lower than demand, the going price of wheat can rise in almost unlimited fashion. Let us examine how things work out in this connection and how the rent of land is established.

A tribe lives in the midst of a vast tract of land. It is small in numbers, and content to bring into cultivation the best fields, those which yield a sizable product, in exchange for rather little effort. This tribe’s numbers start to grow. If it cannot extend its territory further, either because of lack of security against the outside, or because of internal obstacles making difficult its natural expansion, what will happen?

If it is not permitted to get its shortfall of food from outside, that is from regions where the fertile lands more than suffice to feed the population, domestic shortages will force it to pay a [344] price for wheat above its costs of production. In this instance a rent from land will be created.

The rise in the price of wheat, however, will immediately initiate the cultivation of cereals on land of second quality, or more precisely lands less suitable for that particular crop. Since the production of wheat on this land is more expensive than on land of the first quality, the owners will obtain less rent. It may even happen that the marketing of a new quantity of wheat will push the market price down to the level of the cost of production of the lands recently brought under cultivation, or perhaps even lower than that. In the first case, the owners of these lands will cover just the bill for their cost of production, and will receive no rent; in the second case, the cost of production will not even be covered, and the rent will fall as a result; which will bring about the abandonment of the lands cultivated beyond the basic requirements.

If, on the contrary, the lands recently put into cultivation are still not enough to make good the deficit in demand, with the market price continuing to yield a rent, yet further lands, of lower quality than the previous ones, will be brought into wheat production. This trend will continue until the market price ceases to exceed the cost of production of cereals in the lands most recently put into cultivation.[702]

Thus we see in certain countries where the population has grown excessively without being able to spread out, and where at the same time food from outside cannot gain access, soil which is almost barren bearing stunted crops of wheat, while good lands give rise to an enormous rent. [345]

THE SOCIALIST.

Do you believe that if no artificial obstacle had got in the way of the natural expansion of populations, if no institution or preconceived notion had over-stimulated the growth of the population, if, in a word, the movement of food had always been free, the rent from land would never have been created?

THE ECONOMIST.

I am sure that such is the case. In those circumstances, what would have happened is this. The various people on the land would have planted in each type of land whatever cultivable crop was most appropriate for that land to grow, and they would have survived by exchanging their surplus natural production for the commodities produced under the same conditions by the other peoples. As long as the demand for these diverse commodities, cultivated on their specific lands, did not exceed supply, there would be no rent created. Now, with this mode of natural land-use, with the soil yielding maximum production, the population would easily have been able to align itself always with the available means of subsistence.

THE SOCIALIST.

This would be true if the various resources which the land contains and which labor transforms into consumable products, turned out to be proportional in their quantities to the various needs of man; if the extent of the wheat-lands were proportionate to the overall consumption of wheat; if the fields of olive-trees and rape seeds were proportionate to the overall consumption of oil; if deposits of ore and coal matched the overall consumption of metals and coal; but does this harmony between our [346] various needs and the resources necessary to satisfy them, exist naturally? Is it not true that certain things are not found in sufficient abundance, given the need for them, and isn’t one therefore always obliged to pay a price for them which is higher than the costs of production? The lands which contain raw materials and the people provided with the faculties with which to gain access to them, do they not enjoy a true natural monopoly in the sense that they must either pay or receive a rent?

THE ECONOMIST.

There are no natural monopolies. Providence has precisely proportioned to our various needs the diverse riches she has put at our disposal. If we have used our free will and our powers, however, to destroy or waste some of these riches instead of using them all, if we have spent centuries quarreling over small patches of land instead of spreading ourselves freely across the immense areas opening out before us; if, by confining ourselves within narrow limits, we have directly or indirectly overstimulated the reproduction of our species, if we have refused commodities coming from places where they were produced to best advantage, in order to produce them ourselves counter to nature, if in our ignorance we have thus distorted the essential order which the creator had in his wisdom established, is this the fault of Providence?

If, to speak only of France, our institutions of state charity have encouraged the abnormal growth [347] of the population; if at the same time, our customs regulations have blocked the entry of foreign cereals, in such a way that it has become advantageous to chop down magnificent stands of olive-trees in order to replace them with wheat fields of wretched quality, is this Providence’s fault?

If our legislation on mines, by stopping the development of mineral production, while our customs regulations were preventing the import of mineral products from abroad, has created an artificial gap in our supply of iron, lead, copper, tin, etc., is this the fault of Providence?

If a detestable monopoly, by deflecting education from its natural path, has made a large number of people unequipped for many useful employments and at at the same time steered others to an excess of training in other areas, is that the fault of Providence?

If, finally, as a result of the perverse outcomes in the natural order of society, arising from monopoly and privileges, with certain individuals becoming masters at satisfying their wildest desires, while the masses can barely meet their primary needs, the natural order of consumption has been distorted, such that some commodities have been too much in demand and others too little, is that the fault of Providence?

THE SOCIALIST.

No, you are right, it is the fault of mankind!

THE ECONOMIST.

Just let these disturbing factors disappear,[703] however, and you will soon see the natural order of society re-establishing itself, as one sees the natural course of water re-establishing itself after the destruction of a dam; you will see production [348] concentrated in the areas where it can operate most advantageously and consumption reassume its normal proportions; you will see as a consequence large fluctuations in the market price and the natural price growing smaller and smaller, becoming almost undetectable and finally disappearing, taking rent with them. Then you will see production operating with the maximum abundance and distribution working in conformity with the laws of justice.

You will see this even more clearly when I have summarized for you the ideas of which I have given you an account in these discussions.

THE CONSERVATIVE AND THE SOCIALIST.

Please be so kind, then, as to give us this summary.

THE ECONOMIST.[704]

With pleasure!

We took man as our starting-point. Man is driven by his physical, moral, and intellectual needs to engage in production. To this end, he employs his physical, moral, and intellectual faculties. The effort he imposes on these faculties in order to produce is called “labor." Each effort requires a corresponding process of recovery, otherwise the powers are wasted, the faculties deteriorate, and the human being wastes away, instead of maintaining themselves or progressing.

Since every effort entails some pain, and every payment received or good consumed provides some enjoyment, man, driven by his self-interest, naturally devotes himself [349] to expending less effort and receiving more things suitable for his consumption.

This result is obtained by means of the division of labor.

The division of labor implies exchange, relationships, society.

Here a serious problem emerges.

In the state of nature (assuming that this condition has ever existed) the efforts of man are at their minimum strength, but the individual who carries them out awards himself all the benefit. He consumes everything he produces.

In the social state, man’s efforts acquire their maximum strength, thanks to the division of labor. Can each producer, however, always preserve intact the result of his efforts? Does the social condition allow the same justice, from this point of view, as the state of nature? How, for example, can a man who spends his life producing the tenth part of a pin,[705] obtain payment as fairly matching his efforts, as can the isolated savage, who, having brought down a deer, consumes this product of his labor all on his own?

How? By means of property.

What is property? It is the natural right to freely use one’s faculties and the product of one’s labor.

How do the production and distribution of wealth operate under the regime of property?

Man produces all the things he needs by means of his labor, acting on the raw materials [350] provided by nature. His labor is of two kinds:

When man exerts himself to produce something, this effort is called labor. When the effort is complete, when the result has been a product, this product takes the name “capital." All capital consists of accumulated labor.

Now all production requires the contribution of these two factors: present labor and accumulated labor.

It is between these two factors that the product is shared.

How is it shared? In proportion to the costs of production of each party, that is to say the sacrifices endured or the efforts made by both the owner of present labor, or worker, and the owner of accumulated labor, or capitalist.

In what do the costs borne by the capitalist consist?

They consist in the labor provided by the capitalist, in supplying his capital to a productive endeavor, of the sacrifice he imposes on himself, and the risks he runs in engaging his capital in production.

This labor, this sacrifice, and these risks, are the constituent elements of interest.

In what does the cost of production borne by the worker consist?

In the total effort which the worker expends in putting his abilities to work. These abilities are of various kinds – physical, moral, and intellectual – according to the nature of the work. They require, if they are to be carried out, without impairing the worker’s productive abilities, a certain [351] flow of compensation, again varying with the nature of the work.

This compensation, which is necessary to the accomplishment of the labor, constitutes the elements of wages.

The combination of interest and wages represent the cost of production of products of all kinds.

For example:

Of what do the costs of production of a piece of calico consist?

They consist, in the first place:

Of the wages and salaries of workers, foremen, and the entrepreneurs in the weaving industry.

Of the interest on the capital set to work by the entrepreneurs in the weaving industry. This capital comprises buildings, machinery, raw materials, cash for paying the workers, etc. The capitalist who has relinquished the use of this cash, receives interest covering his work as a lender or shareholder, his sacrifices, and his risk of capital deterioration or loss.

This results in the initial interest payments and initial wages and salaries.

Before being woven, the cotton has been spun. To spin it, it was necessary, in the same way, to set the capital and labor in motion – the labor of entrepreneurs, foremen, spinners; capital expenditure on buildings, machines, fuel, raw materials, and cash.

This is the second set of interest payments and wages and salaries.

Before being spun, the cotton was transported. To transport it, the cooperation of merchants, brokers, porters, ship-owners, entrepreneurs in the haulage business[706] were required: the work of merchants, brokers, [352] porters, ship-owners, sailors, carters; capital in the form of shops and stores, offices, wagons, ships, provisions for the crew, coaches or wagons, and cash.

This is the third set of interest payments and payments of wages.

Before being transported, the cotton had to be grown. Again, this required capital and labor: the labor of the plantation managers, of foremen and workers; capital in the form of land made cultivable, of buildings, seed, machinery, cash. (If the workers are free, they are usually paid in cash; if they are slaves, they are paid, without any free negotiation, in food, clothing, and lodging; in both cases, the price of cotton must cover their costs, along with the earnings of the entrepreneur and the foremen, as well as the interest on the capital advanced to the workers before the sale of whatever product the harvesting yields).

This is the fourth set of interest payments and wages.

Add to this the payments made to storekeepers who put the pieces of calico within the reach of the consumer and cut them up for him according to his specified needs, and the interest on the capital put to work by these indispensable intermediaries, and you will have the overall costs of the production of calico.

Let us suppose that a plantation had supplied a thousand bales of cotton, and that from these thousand bales, twenty five thousand pieces of calico of fifty ells in length have been manufactured. Suppose, also, that these twenty five thousand pieces have been further cut into unbleached sections, at a price of 30 centimes per ell and you will have a total of… fr. 375,000. [353]

This sum of fr. 375,000 will have been distributed among all those who have contributed to the production of the calico, from the slave and the planter, to the shopkeeper and his assistant.

According to what law, however, did the distribution of this sum of fr. 375,000 between all those who contributed to forming its value, actually operate? What law determined the fair rate of interest of the capitalists, and the fair wages of the workers, as also the fair price of the product which yielded this interest and these wages?

This law, which is the true regulator of the economic world, I have explained thus:

When supply exceeds demand in arithmetic progression, the price falls in geometric progression, and, likewise, when demand exceeds supply in arithmetic progression, the price rises in geometric progression.

Under the rule of this law, operating in a free milieu,[707] no one can set a price for interest, wages, or products above or below the sum necessary to place that interest, wage, or product on the market, that is to say at above or below the sum of all the efforts and sacrifices which they really cost.

This is because, consistent with this law, the market price of all things, whether interest, wages, or products, is immediately and irresistibly pulled to the level of their costs of production.

How?

Man is both a producer and a consumer and is endlessly obliged, in a society where the division of labor has resulted in most acts of production being specialized, [354] to supply what he produces so that he can demand, in exchange, the things which he needs.

When one asks for a thing, one consults only the extent and the intensity of the need one has for it; nor is one concerned with what it might have cost to produce. It may therefore happen that one imposes on oneself, in order to acquire it, sacrifices and efforts considerably greater than those which its production cost. As the witness of experience shows, this is what happens when a great number of individuals need a commodity and few individuals produce it, when it is in much demand and there is little supply of it. In this case, experience also shows that a slight disproportion between demand and supply, engenders a rapid movement in price. When the disproportion increases in arithmetic progression, the change in price grows and accelerates in geometric progression.

As the price increases, however, it also acts more strongly to bring back the equilibrium between supply and demand.

When the price at which a thing sells greatly exceeds the efforts and sacrifices which its production required, the host of men occupied in less advantageous production, or whose capital, intelligence, and labor happen just now to be inactive, are immediately motivated to produce this thing. The inducement is all the stronger when the price rises higher, when the gap between demand and supply is more notable. Under the pull of this inducement, a greater or a lesser number of competitors comes forward therefore, to increase production and satisfy demand more completely. [355]

There will, however, be a limit to this increase in production. What will this limit be?

If the price rises in geometric progression when demand rises above supply, it likewise falls in geometric progression, when supply exceeds demand. If therefore, spurred by the lure of profit, producers increase supply, a point will come when the market price of the good falls to the level of its cost of production. If people in this situation continue bringing to the market larger and larger quantities of this good, and if the increase in demand does not balance that of supply, we will see the market price falling progressively below the costs of production.

But, to the degree that the disparity increases in this way, the producers who are less able to cover their costs have greater interest in turning towards other branches of production. To the degree that the price drops even further, this will cause supply to slow more rapidly until the point is reached where the price returns to the cost of production.

Thus we see the market price of all things, labor, capital, and goods, gravitating constantly and inevitably towards the limit of the cost of production of these things, that is to say towards the sum of the real efforts and sacrifices that their production incurred.[708] [356]

If the price of all these things, however, is constantly and inevitably driven back to the limit of their cost of production, to the sum of real efforts and sacrifices which they have incurred, each person must inevitably receive, in the social state as much as in a state of nature, the just payment of his efforts and sacrifices.

With this difference: that a man who lives alone, producing everything for himself, is forced to spend much effort in securing a small number of satisfactions, while a man who lives in society, enjoying the advantage of the division of labor, can obtain lots of satisfaction for very little effort. This satisfaction will be all the more and the [357] effort all the less, to the degree that progress has further developed the division of labor, and thereby cut the cost of production of things.

Unfortunately,[709] if numerous efforts have served to develop production economically, numerous obstacles have been raised at the same time, by ignorance or human perversity, both to impede this development and to disturb the natural and just distribution of wealth.

It is in a free milieu, in a milieu in which the property rights of each person with respect to his faculties and the results of [358] his labor are fully respected, that production develops to the maximum, and that the distribution of wealth is proportioned inevitably according to the efforts and sacrifices each person has made.

Now from the beginning of the world, the strongest and most dishonest men have infringed the internal or external property of other men, in order to consume some of their share in the fruits of production. From this arose slavery, monopolies, and privileges.

At the same time as they destroyed the just distribution of wealth, such slavery, monopolies, and privileges slowed down production, either by reducing the incentive producers had to make things, or in deflecting them away from the kind of production they could most usefully pursue. Oppression engendered poverty.

For long centuries, humanity groaned in the limbo of servitude. From one age to another, however, the somber clamor of distress and anger echoed in the hearts of the enslaved and exploited masses. The slaves rose up against their masters, demanding liberty.

Liberty! That was the cry of the captives of Egypt, the slaves of Spartacus,[710] the peasants of the Middle Ages, and more recently of the bourgeoisie oppressed by the nobility and religious corporations, of the workers oppressed by masters and guilds. Liberty! That was the cry of all those who found their property confiscated by monopoly and privilege. Liberty! That was the burning aspiration of all those whose natural rights had been forcibly repressed. [359]

A day came when the oppressed found themselves strong enough to rid themselves of oppressors. It was at the end of the eighteenth century. The main industries providing for the needs of all were still organized in closed and privileged corporations. The nobility who provided internal and external defense and security were a corporation; the Parliaments which dispensed justice were a corporation; the clergy who conducted religious services were a corporation; the university and the religious orders who provided education were a corporation; the bakers, the butchers: corporations. These different Estates[711] were, for the most part, independent of each other, but all found themselves subordinate to the armed body which guaranteed the material privileges of each one.

Unfortunately, when it seemed the hour had come to pull down this regime of injustice, no one knew with what to replace it. Those who had some notion of the natural laws which govern society, spoke out in favor of laissez-faire. Those who did not believe in the existence of these natural laws protested, on the contrary, with all their might against laissez-faire and demanded the substitution of a new organisation in place of the old. The leading supporter of laissez-faire was Turgot.[712] At the head of the organizers and neo-regulators,[713] was Necker.[714]

These two opposed tendencies, without including people of a reactionary persuasion, divided the French Revolution between them. The liberal element dominated the Constituent Assembly, but it was not pure. The liberals themselves did not yet have enough faith in freedom to entrust [360] the direction of human affairs entirely to it. Most material production was freed from the bonds of privilege, but non-material production, with, first and foremost, the defense of property and justice, were organized on the basis of communist theories. Less enlightened than the Constituent Assembly, the Convention proved to be even more communist. Compare the two Declarations of the Rights of Man of 1791 and 1793, and you will see the proof of this.[715] Finally, Napoleon, who combined the passions of a Jacobin with the prejudices of a reactionary, without any tinge of liberalism, tried to reconcile the communism of the Convention, with the monopolies and privileges of the Ancien Régime. He organized communalist[716] education, subsidized communalist religion, set up a department of bridges and highways with the purpose of establishing a vast communalist network of communication, and decreed the introduction of conscription, that is to say a communalist army. Furthermore, he centralized France like some vast commune. Nor was it any fault of his that in that centralized commune all production was not organized on the model of the University[717] and the state control of the tobacco industry.[718] If war had not prevented him, as he himself declared in his Mémoires, he would certainly have accomplished these great things. On the other hand, he revived in this organized France most of the privileges and restrictions of the Ancien Régime;[719] he reconstituted the nobility’s prerogative; reestablished the privileges of the meat trade, of baking, [361] of printing, of the theaters and of banks; restricted the free arrangement of labor by legislation on apprenticeships, on labor workbooks and on labor unions; the right to lend by the law of 1807; the right to make wills by the Civil Code; the right to trade by the Continental Blockade and the multitude of decrees and regulations relating to the customs. In a word, he refashioned, under the influence of two inspirations born of opposite viewpoints but equally regulatory, the old network of obstacles which had in former times shackled property.

We have lived until now under this dreadful regime, one aggravated further by the Bourbon Restoration (involving the reestablishment of the sale of offices[720] in 1816 and the increasing of Customs barriers in 1822), but far from the injustices and poverty of our present day society being attributed to that regime, property and freedom have been held to blame. The learned men of socialism, misunderstanding the natural organization of society, and unwilling to recognize the deplorable outcomes of the restoration of the privileges of the ancien régime, along with the introduction of revolutionary or Imperial communism, maintained that the former society was offensive in its very foundations, namely property, and strove to organize a new society on a different basis. That led them to utopias, some merely absurd, others immoral and abominable. Moreover, we have seen them at work.[721]

Fortunately, the conservatives put up a barrier against the terrifying incursions of socialism; but having no more precise idea of the natural organization of society than their opponents, they could not defeat them other than out in the streets.[722] The conservatives, supporters of the status quo because [362] they found it profitable and moreover not worth worrying too much about, opposed the socialist innovations just as they had in the course of the preceding years, opposed the property-based innovations of the supporters of the freedom of education and commerce.

It is between these two sorts of opponents of property, the former wishing to increase the number of restrictions and levies which already weigh on property, the others wishing purely and simply to preserve those which already exist, that the debate occurs today. On the one hand we have M. Thiers[723] and the old committee of the Rue de Poitiers;[724] and on the other Messieurs Louis Blanc, Pierre Leroux, Cabet, Considerant, Proudhon. The spirit of Necker dominates both groups. I no longer detect the influence of Turgot.

THE SOCIALIST.

If society is naturally organized and all that is required is to destroy the obstacles blocking the free play of its organization, that is to say the attacks made on property, in order to raise total production to the maximum consistent with the present state of advancement in the arts and sciences, and thereby render the distribution of wealth fully just, it is assuredly pointless to look any more to artificial organizations. There is nothing else to do other than to bring society back to a situation of pure property rights.[725]

THE CONSERVATIVE.

But how many changes must we make to reach that point? It makes one shudder!

THE ECONOMIST.

Not so, because all the reforms needed to achieve this are consistent with justice and utility and would not offend any legitimate [363] interest nor cause any harm to society.

THE SOCIALIST.

Furthermore, one way or another, reforms, either for property or against property, will have to be made. Two systems are before us: communism and property. We have to go in one direction or the other. The regime of part-property and part-communism under which we live, cannot last.

THE ECONOMIST.

It has already meant appalling catastrophes for us and perhaps some new ones lie in wait for us too.

THE CONSERVATIVE.

Alas!

THE ECONOMIST.

We must therefore escape from this dilemma. Well, we can only leave by way of communism or by the way of property:

You must choose!

END.

Molinari’s Long Quotation from Adam Smith on Market and Natural Prices

Without determining this law, and also without defining very precisely the role it plays in the production, Adam Smith clearly indicated it in this passage:

8. The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole value of the rent, labor, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Such people may be called the effectual demanders, and their demand the effectual demand; since it may be sufficient to effectuate the bringing of the commodity to market. It is different from the absolute demand. A very poor man may be said in some sense to have a demand for a coach and six; he might like to have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity can never be brought to market in order to satisfy it.
9. When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market falls short of the effectual demand, all those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither, cannot be supplied with the quantity which they want. Rather than want it altogether, some of them will be willing to give more. A competition will immediately begin among them, and the market price will rise more or less above the natural price, according as either the greatness of the deficiency, or the wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors, happen to animate more or less the eagerness of the competition. Among competitors of equal wealth and luxury the same deficiency will generally occasion a more or less eager competition, according as the acquisition of the commodity happens to be of more or less importance to them Hence the exorbitant price of the necessaries of life during the blockade of a town or in a famine.
10. When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it cannot be all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Some part must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price which they give for it must reduce the price of the whole. The market price will sink more or less below the natural price, according as the greatness of the excess increases more or less the competition of the sellers, or according as it happens to be more or less important to them to get immediately rid of the commodity. The same excess in the importation of perishable, will occasion a much greater competition than in that of durable commodities; in the importation of oranges, for example, than in that of old iron.
11. When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient to supply the effectual demand and no more, the market price naturally comes to be either exactly, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. The whole quantity upon hand can be disposed of for this price, and cannot be disposed of for more. The competition of the different dealers obliges them all to accept of this price, but does not oblige them to accept of less ...
15. The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this center of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it.[726]

16. Addendum

Editor’s Introduction

The following Addendum includes two important essays Molinari wrote before the publication of Les Soiréesin September 1849 (“The Right to Vote” (July 1846) and “The Production of Security” (JDE, Feb. 1849); the minutes of the three meetings of the Political Economy Society in late 1849 and early 1850 which discussed some of the issues about the proper function of the the state which Molinari had raised in his February article and then in his book; and seven of the 30 entries he wrote for the DEP which appeared in 1852 and which he was probably working on concurrently with his book over the course of 1849.

The two most controversial issues Molinari raised in Les Soirées which raised the ire of his colleagues in the Political Economy Society was his opposition to the government’s power to confiscate private property for public works programs, such as the building of the railroads and stations, and the fortification wall around Paris, the so-called “Thiers Wall” (discussed in S3); and his arguments about the private provision of security by insurance companies (in S11). The two essays he wrote before his book and the minutes of the discussion of the PES throw some light on these two matters.

While he was writing Les Soirées over the summer of 1849 Molinari was also working on 30 articles which would appear in the most important publication the Guillaumin publishing form had undertaken up to that time, namely the Dictionary of Political Economy. Both Les Soirées and the DEP were part of the Guillaumin  firm’s strategy of opposing “false” economic ideas concerning protectionism and socialism among ordinary people (for whom Les Soirées and Bastiat’s many pamphlets were written) as well as among the political and intellectual elite (for whom the DEP was written). The purpose of the latter was to assemble a compendium of the state of knowledge of liberal political economy with hundreds of articles written by leading economists on key topics, biographies of important historical figures, annotated bibliographies of the most important books in the field, and tables of economic and political statistics. Molinari explained the reasons behind the DEP project in a review of the work he wrote for the JDE in December 1853 after the second volume had appeared in print: [727]

Thus M. Guillaumin had at his disposal the workers he required to erect a monument which would be worthy of political economy. Circumstances were also most favorable for the construction of this monument. The February Revolution had revealed what chasms had opened up under society because of the ignorance of economics of governments and the people. Wasn’t this the moment to present in a vast and harmonious whole the achievements of the science which had plumbed these chasms and shown how to fill them in? M. Guillaumin understood this and he began the publication of the Dictionary of Political Economy in the last months of 1850.

The DEP project was most likely conceived in late 1848 or early 1849, was announced in the Guillaumin catalog of May 1849 as being “in preparation,” was made available in subscription form in August 1849, and the first volume of which was printed in book form in early to mid-1852. So, Molinari would have been working on both projects during 1849 and it is not surprising therefore to see a certain overlap between Molinari’s two concurrent projects for which he used much the same source material, used the same examples to illustrate his arguments, and even quoted from the same texts. The result was a two volume, nearly 2,000 page, double-columned, nearly 2 million word encyclopedia of political economy which appeared in 1852-53.

Molinari was a major contributor, writing 25 principle articles and 5 biographical articles. In the acknowledgements he was mentioned as one of the five key collaborators on the project. Among the articles he wrote which have a bearing on Les Soiréesare the following: Beaux-arts (Fine Arts), Céréales (Grain), Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges (Free Trade), Paix, Guerre (Peace and War), Propriété littéraire (Literary Property), Tarifs de douane (Tariffs), Theâtres (Theatres), Travail (Labour), Union douanière (Customs Union), Usure (Usury). Other major contributors included the editor Charles Coquelin (with 70 major articles), Horace Say (29), Joseph Garnier (28), Ambroise Clément (22), and Courcelle-Seneuil (21). Maurice Block wrote most of the biographical entries. The complete list of Molinari’s contributions to the DEP is as follows (the entries which appear in this Addendum are in bold):

Biographical Articles (5):

1. “Necker,” T. 2, pp. 272-74.

3. “Peel (Robert),” T. 2, pp. 351-54.

4. “Saint-Pierre (abbé de),” T. 2, pp. 565-66.

5. “Sully (duc de),” T. 2, pp. 684-85.

Principle Articles (25):

1. “Beaux-arts” (Fine Arts), T. 1, pp. 149-57.

2. “Céréales” (Grain), T. 1, pp. 301-26.

3. “Civilisation” (Civilization), T. 1, pp. 370-77.

4. “Colonies,” T. 1, pp. 393-403.

5. “Colonies agricoles” (Agricultural Colonies), T. 1, pp. 403-5.

6. “Colonies militaires” (Military Colonies), T. 1, p. 405.

7. “Émigration” (Emigration), T. 1, pp. 675-83.

8. “Esclavage” (Slavery), T. 1, pp. 712-31.

9. “Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)” (Free Trade Associations), T. 2, p. 45-49.

10. “Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges” (Freedom of Commerce. Free Trade), T. 2, pp. 49-63.

11. “Mode” (Fashion), T. 2, pp. 193-96.

12. “Monuments publics” (Public Monuments), T. 2, pp. 237-8.

13. “Nations” (Nations), T. 2, pp. 259-62.

14. “Noblesse” (The Nobility), T2, pp. 275-81

15. “Paix, Guerre” (Peace. War), T. 2, pp. 307-14.

16. “Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix)” (The Society and Congress for Peace), T. 2, pp. 314-15.

17. “Propriété littéraire et artistique” (Literary and Artistic Property), T. 2, pp. 473-78

18. “Servage” (Serfdom), T. 2, pp. 610-13

19. “Tarifs de douane” (Customs Tariffs), T. 2, pp. 712-16.

20. “Théâtres” (Theaters), T. 2, pp. 731-33.

21. “Travail” (Labor), vol. 2, pp. 761-64.

22. “Union douanière” (Customs Union), vol. 2, p. 788-89.

23. “Usure” (Usury), vol. 2, pp. 790-95.

24. “Villes” (Towns), T. 2, pp. 833-38.

25. “Voyages” (Travel), T. 2, pp. 858-60.

The topics he focused on were two that were dear to his heart and on which he had already written, namely free trade and slavery. Concerning free trade, he wrote the articles on Grain, Free Trade Associations, Freedom of Commerce. Free Trade, Customs Tariffs, and Customs Union. Concerning slavery, he wrote the articles on Slavery and Serfdom. On more specialised topics on which he would also write in Les Soirées, we should note those on Fine Arts, Literary and Artistic Property, Theaters, Labor, and Usury. Another group of topics that deserve special mention are those to which one normally would not expect to see economic analysis applied, such as Emigration, Fashion, Public Monuments, and Travel. The latter suggest that Molinari had an innovative way of thinking about all manner of social and cultural problems and using economic analysis to deepen our understanding of them in new and interesting ways.

Thirty years after the appearance of the DEP the American political scientist and economist John Joseph Lalor (1840-1899) attempted to do something similar for the English-speaking world with his Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States (first ed. 1881-84, second edition 1899). In addition to his own formidable list of American authors he included translations of one hundred articles from the DEP including many by Bastiat, Henri Baudrillart, Michel Chevalier, Cherbuliez, Ambroise Clément, Charles Coquelin, Léon Faucher, Joseph Garnier, J.E. Horn, Louis Leclerc, H. Passy, members of the Say family, Courcelle-Seneuil, and of course Molinari. This constituted a veritable “who’s who” of the economists in the Guillaumin network. Just as America was moving further into the protectionist camp, Lalor and his colleagues were translating some of the hardest of hard-core French free trade advocates, such as Molinari’s “Freedom of Commerce. Free Trade,” and offering it to American readers. The impact of this infusion of French political economy into America seems to have been minimal if anything, but it was a remarkably undertaking.

We have revised and updated Lalor’s translations of Molinari’s contributions to the Cyclopedia for inclusion in this Addendum. Some terms have been changed to be in accordance with the terminology used throughout Les Soirées. We have included Molinari’s own footnotes in the following articles. All the others are by the editor. Many of Molinari’s footnotes are vary sparse so we have made the references more complete where necessary. Some passages that were cut from the Lalor version have been restored and this has been indicated in the footnotes.

“The Right to Vote” (23 July, 1846)

Source

Originally published in Courrier français (23 juillet 1846). Republished in Questions d’économie politique (1861), vol. 2, Section III. La Liberté de gouvernement — La Guerre, pp. 271-75.

Text

Men join together in a society with the goal of guaranteeing the security of their persons and their goods. The state is nothing more than a big mutual insurance company.[728]

Every person who consents to be part of society, every person who wishes to enjoy the benefits that society provides its members ought naturally to contribute to the costs of the association; every person ought to contribute to the support of the government which is charged by society to establish security for the benefit of all.

All members of the association have a right to equal protection by the government. However, everybody does not contribute in an equal manner to the public expenses.

The inequality which exists in the distribution of the charges is a result of the inequality which exists in human abilities and in the inequality of wealth, which is a natural consequence of the former.

Since all humans beings are not endowed with equal abilities, they do not receive equal value for the use of their faculties. In a society where one does not intend to interfere with the free employment of human faculties, the wealth of the various members of the association would be in proportion to the extent and the strength of each person’s faculties.

Wealth and property thus being unequal, the state will naturally devote unequal amounts to their protection. In general, it will spend for the protection of each piece of property a sum which is proportional to the value of the thing which is being protected or insured.

From this we get the combination of the principle of the proportionality of the public charges paid with that of the principle of the equality of the protection provided.

Now it is a matter of determining to what degree the citizens who are equally protected by the government but unequally burdened to contribute to the maintenance of the government, ought to participate in the management of public affairs.

Every citizen who pays a share of the public expenses is a shareholder in society.[729] He contributes to the maintenance of society in proportion to the value of his shares, that is in proportion to the taxes which he pays.

In every well organized business the rights of the shareholder are proportional to the value of his investment. An investment represents in effect a certain quantity of work which the shareholder voluntarily gives up, but only on the condition that he can direct and supervise its use. If this power of direction and supervision does not correspond to each person’s investment, if for example, the shareholders whose investment is worth two shares do not have a greater power of direction and supervision than those whose investment is worth only one share, obviously there would be an injustice, an inequality; there would be a reduction in the rights of some and an irrational increase in the rights of others; there would be plunder of the more intelligent and active workers to the profit of the less intelligent and less active workers.

By following this train of thought one inevitably comes to this conclusion: that the right to vote, the right to take part in the management of the affairs of this large mutual insurance company that is called “society,” is proportional and as a result ought to be proportional to the investment made by each shareholder; that is to say, to the amount of taxation levied on each citizen.

This proportionality of the right to vote, far from harming political equality, as some incorrectly assert, is the surest and best guarantee of it.

Apart from this just and necessary proportionality, there is in fact only two political systems which are equally contrary to political equality.

The first consists in refusing all voting rights to the smaller shareholders in society, i.e. to citizens who pay the smallest amount of taxes. Under the rule of this political system, we know what happens: the large shareholders, the payers of the “cens” tax have the right to vote,[730] and govern society entirely for their own profit; the laws which ought to equally protect all citizens are used to increase the property of the strongest shareholders to the detriment of the property of the weakest ones; and political equality is thus destroyed.

The second political system consists in making the right to vote universal and uniform. In this system there arises a problem opposed to that which one might expect: the property of intelligent and hard working men is found to be at the mercy of the mass of incapable and lazy men. No respect for one’s acquired rights, no effective protection for one’s life and property can exist under such a régime. Now, when the rights of citizens cease to be be effectively protected, when the caprice of the masses prevails over the law, when it transpires, as in the United States for example, that fear of displeasing the people paralyses the free exercise of the rights of individuals, what happens to political equality?

Since the natural consequence of the proportionality of paying public charges is the proportionality in the right to vote, the latter therefore, to repeat ourselves, is the true guarantee of political equality and, as a result, the only rational basis for the government which is charged with providing it.

It now remains for us to examine the means to apply this system.

Doubtless it is impossible today to evaluate the amount of taxes paid by each citizen;[731] but on the other hand, we can measure the income of each citizen. Every citizen who wishes to enjoy the right to vote can declare and verify the amount of his income. Now, in principle at least, since tax represents only a proportionate fraction of each person’s income, it does not matter if one takes as a a basis for the right to vote the amount of income earned or the tax paid.

We know full well that in practice tax is not exactly proportional to the income of each person, but it is a failing of our fiscal machine which we think is not useful to hold to account, given the general result which the application of this system would provide.

It is estimated that the income of France is 8 to 9 billion francs.[732] Now since the total income of the present class of “censitaires” (tax payers) - taking an average income of 10,000 francs, which is admittedly on the high side - does not surpass as a result the sum of 2 billion 500 million francs, if the right to vote was at the same time made universal and proportional, the present class of “censitaires” would number no more than a quarter of the total number of (national) representatives.

Whatever the particular inequalities might be, inequalities which the general application of the principle of liberty would moreover quickly make disappear, the rights of the masses would inevitably receive by the introduction of this political system a significant and immediate benefit, without at the same time the rights of the current privileged minority being sacrificed.

“The Production of Security” (JDE, Feb. 1849)

Source

Gustave de Molinari, "De la production de la sécurité," Journal des Economistes, Vol. XXII, no. 95, 15 February, 1849, pp. 277-90.

Published as a separate pamphlet: De la Production de la sécurité, par M. G. de Molinari. Extrait du n° 95 du “Journal des économistes”, 15 février 1849. (Paris : Guillaumin, 1849). In-8° , 16 p.

The Production of Security [733]

There are two ways of considering society. According to some, the development of different human associations is not subject to providential, unchangeable laws. Rather, these associations, having originally been organized in a purely artificial manner by early legislators, can later be modified or remade by other legislators, in step with the progress of social science. In this system the government plays a considerable role, because it is upon it, the custodian of the principle of authority, that the daily task of modifying and remaking society devolves.

According to others, on the contrary, society is a purely natural fact. Like the earth on which it stands, society moves in accordance with general, preexisting laws. In this system, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as social science; there is only economic science, which studies the natural organism of society and shows how this organism functions.[734]

We propose to examine, within the latter system, what is the function of government and its natural organization.

I.

In order to define and delimit the function of government,[735] it is first necessary to investigate what society is and what its purpose is.

What natural impulse do men obey when they come together to form a society? They are obeying the impulse, or, to speak more exactly, the instinct of sociability. The human race is essentially sociable. Like beavers and the higher animal species in general, men have an instinctive inclination to live in society.

What is the raison d'être of this instinct?

Man experiences a multitude of needs, on whose satisfaction his happiness depends, and whose non-satisfaction entails suffering. Alone and isolated, he could only provide in an incomplete, insufficient manner for these constant needs. The instinct of sociability brings him together with his fellow humans, and pushes him to communicate with them. Once this has been established, under the impulse of the self-interest of the individuals thus brought together, a certain division of labor is established, necessarily followed by exchanges. In brief, we see an organization emerge, by means of which man can much more completely satisfy his needs than he could by living in isolation.

This natural organization is called society.[736]

The purpose of society is therefore the most complete satisfaction of man's needs. The division of labor and exchange are the means by which this is accomplished.

Among the needs of man, there is one particular type which plays an immense role in the history of humanity, namely the need for security.

What is this need?

Whether they live in isolation or in a society, men are, above all, interested in preserving their existence and the fruits of their labor. If the sense of justice were universally prevalent on earth; if, consequently, each man confined himself to laboring and exchanging the fruits of his labor, without wishing to take the life or to to seize by violence or fraud, the fruits of other men's labor; if everyone had, in a word, an instinctive horror of any act harmful to another person, it is certain that security would exist naturally on earth, and that no artificial institution would be necessary to establish it. Unfortunately this is not the way things are. The sense of justice seems to be the preserve of only a few higher and exceptional temperaments. Among the inferior races, it exists only in a rudimentary state. Hence the innumerable violations, ever since the beginning of the world, since the days of Cain and Abel, of the lives and property of individuals.

Hence also the creation of institutions whose purpose is to guarantee to everyone the peaceful possession of his person and his goods.

These institutions were called governments.

Everywhere, even among the least enlightened tribes, one encounters a government, so universal and urgent is the need for security provided by a government.

Everywhere, men resign themselves to the most extreme sacrifices rather than do without government and hence security, without realizing that in so doing, they are thinking incorrectly.

Suppose that a man found his person and his standard of living constantly menaced; wouldn't his first and most pressing preoccupation be to protect himself from the dangers that surrounded him? This preoccupation, these efforts, this labor, would necessarily absorb the greater portion of his time, as well as the most energetic and active faculties of his mind. In consequence, he could only devote insufficient and uncertain efforts, and his divided attention, to the satisfaction of his other needs.

Even though this man might be asked to surrender a very considerable portion of his time and his labor to someone else who takes it upon himself to guarantee the peaceful possession of his person and his goods, wouldn't it be to his advantage to agree to this transaction?

Still, it would obviously be no less in his self-interest to procure his security at the lowest price possible.

II.

If there is one well-established truth in political economy, it is this:

That in all cases, for all commodities that serve to provide for the material or non-material needs of the consumer, it is in the consumer's best interest that labor and trade remain free, because the freedom of working and of trade have as their necessary and permanent result the maximum lowering of prices.

And this as well:

That the interests of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever should always prevail over the interests of the producer.

Now in pursuing these principles, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion:

That the production of security should, in the interests of the consumers of this non-material good, remain subject to the law of free competition. [737]

Whence it follows:

That no government should have the right to prevent another government from going into competition with it, or to require consumers of security [738] to come exclusively to it for this commodity.

Nevertheless, I must admit that, up until the present, one recoiled before this rigorous implication of the principle of free competition.

One economist who has done as much as anyone to extend the application of the principle of liberty, M. Charles Dunoyer, thinks "that the functions of government will never be able to fall into the domain of private activity.”[739]

Now here is a a clear and obvious exception to the principle of free competition.

This exception is all the more remarkable for being unique.

Undoubtedly, one can find economists who establish more numerous exceptions to this principle; but we may emphatically affirm that these are not pure economists. True economists are generally agreed, on the one had, that the government should restrict itself to guaranteeing the security of its citizens, and on the other hand, that the freedom of working and of trade should otherwise be complete and absolute.

But why should an exception be made for security? What special reason is there that the production of security cannot be left to free competition? Why should it be subjected to a different principle and organized according to a different system?

On this point, the masters of economic science are silent, and M. Dunoyer, who has clearly noted this exception, does not investigate the grounds on which it is based.

III.

We are consequently led to ask ourselves whether his exception is well founded, in the eyes of an economist.

It offends reason to believe that a well established natural law can admit of any exceptions. A natural law must hold everywhere and always, or be invalid. I cannot believe, for example, that the law of universal gravitation, which governs the physical world, is ever suspended at any moment or at any place in the universe. Now I consider economic laws to be like natural laws, and I have just as much faith in the principles of the division of labor, the freedom of working, and free trade, as I have in the law of universal gravitation. I believe that while these principles can be subject to disturbances, they admit of no exceptions.

But, if this is the case, the production of security should not be removed from the law of free competition; and if it is removed, society as a whole will suffer a loss.

Either this is logical and true, or else the principles on which economic science is based are invalid.

IV.

It thus has been demonstrated a priori, to those of us who have faith in the principles of economic science, that the exception indicated above has no raison d’être, and that the production of security, like anything else, should be subject to the law of free competition.

Once we have acquired this conviction, what remains for us to do? It remains for us to investigate how it has come about that the production of security has not been subjected to the law of free competition, but rather has been subjected to different principles.

What are those principles?

Those of monopoly and communism.

In the entire world, there is not a single institution of the security industry[740] that is not based on monopoly or on communism.

In this connection, we add, in passing, a simple remark.

Political economy has disapproved equally of monopoly and communism in the various branches of human activity, wherever it has found them. Is it not then strange and unreasonable that it accepts them in the security industry?

V.

Let us now examine how it is that all known governments have either been subjected to the law of monopoly, or else organized according to the communistic principle.

First let us investigate what is understood by the words monopoly and communism.

It is an observable truth that the more urgent and necessary are man's needs, the greater will be the sacrifices he will be willing to endure in order to satisfy them. Now, there are some things that are found abundantly in nature, and whose production does not require a great expenditure of labor, but which, since they satisfy these urgent and necessary wants, can consequently acquire an exchange value all out of proportion with their natural value.[741] Take salt for example. Suppose that a man or a group of men succeed in having the exclusive production and sale of salt assigned to themselves.[742] It is apparent that this man or group could raise the price of this commodity well above its value, well above the price it would have under a regime of free competition.

One will then say that this man or this group possesses a monopoly, and that the price of salt is a monopoly price.

But it is obvious that the consumers will not consent freely to paying the excessive  monopoly surtax. It will be necessary to compel them to pay it, and in order to compel them, the employment of force will be necessary.

Every monopoly necessarily rests on force.

When the monopolists are no longer as strong as the consumers they exploit, what happens?

In every instance, the monopoly finally disappears either violently or as the outcome of an amicable transaction. What is it replaced with?

If the aroused and rebellious consumers secure the means of production of the salt industry, in all probability they will confiscate this industry for their own profit, and their first thought will be, not to leave it to free competition, but rather to exploit it, in common, for their own account. They will then name a director or a directive committee to operate the saltworks, to whom they will allocate the funds necessary to defray the costs of salt production. Then, since past experience has made them suspicious and distrustful, since they will be afraid that the director named by them will seize production for his own benefit, and simply reconstitute by open or hidden means the old monopoly for his own profit, they will elect delegates or representatives entrusted with appropriating the funds necessary for production, with watching over their use, and with making sure that the salt produced is equally distributed to those entitled to it. The production of salt will be organized in this manner.

This form of the organization of production has been named communism.

When this organization is applied to a single commodity, the communism is said to be partial.

When it is applied to all commodities, the communism is said to be complete.

But whether communism is partial or complete, political economy is no more tolerant of it than it is of monopoly, of which it is merely an extension.

VI.

Isn't what has just been said about salt applicable to security?[743] Isn't this the history of all monarchies and all republics?

Everywhere, the production of security began by being organized as a monopoly, and everywhere, nowadays, it tends to be organized communistically. Here is why.

Among the material and non-material commodities necessary to man, none, with the possible exception of wheat,[744] is more indispensable, and therefore none can support quite so large a monopoly tax.

Nor is any quite so prone to monopolization.

What, indeed, is the situation of men who need security? It is weakness. What is the situation of those who undertake to provide them with this necessary security? It is force. If it were otherwise, if the consumers of security were stronger than the producers, they obviously would not need their assistance.

Now, if the producers of security[745] are originally stronger than the consumers, won't it be easy for the former to impose a monopoly on the latter?

Everywhere, when societies originate, we see the strongest, most warlike races seizing the government of these societies exclusively for themselves. Everywhere we see these races seizing the monopoly of security[746] within certain more or less extensive boundaries, depending on their number and strength.

And, this monopoly being, by its very nature, extraordinarily profitable, everywhere we see the races invested with the monopoly of security devoting themselves to bitter struggles, in order to add to the extent of their market, the number of their coerced consumers, and hence the size of their profits.

War has been the necessary and inevitable consequence of the establishment of the monopoly of security.

Another inevitable consequence has been that this monopoly of security has engendered all the other kinds of monopolies.

When they saw the situation of the monopolizers of security,[747] the producers of other commodities could not help but notice that nothing in the world is more advantageous than monopoly. They, in turn, were consequently tempted to add to the profits from their own industry by the same process. But what did they require in order to create a monopoly of the commodity they produced, to the detriment of the consumers? They required the use of force. However, they did not possess the force necessary to contain the resistance of the consumers whose interests were being harmed. What did they do? They borrowed it, for a financial consideration, from those who had it. They petitioned and obtained, at the price of an agreed upon fee, the exclusive privilege of carrying on their industry within certain determined boundaries. Since the taxes[748] for these privileges brought the producers of security a considerable sum of money, the world was soon covered with monopolies. Labor and trade were everywhere shackled, chained up, and the condition of the masses remained as miserable as possible.

Nevertheless, after long centuries of suffering, as enlightenment spread through the world little by little, the masses who had been smothered under this web of privileges began to rebel against the privileged, and to demand liberty, that is to say, the suppression of monopolies.

This process took many forms. What happened in England, for example? Originally, the race which governed the country[749] and which was organized into orders (feudalism), having at its head a hereditary director (the king), and an equally hereditary administrative council (the House of Lords), originally set the price of security, which it had monopolized, at whatever rate it pleased. There was no negotiation between the producers of security and the consumers. This was the regime of “serving at the King’s pleasure.”[750] But as time passed, the consumers, having become aware of their numbers and strength, rose up against this regime of pure arbitrary rule, and they obtained the right to negotiate with the producers over the price of this commodity. For this purpose, they sent delegates to the House of Commons to discuss the level of taxes, that is, the price of security.[751] They were thus able to obtain some relief from the financial pressure they were under. Nevertheless, the producers of security had a direct say in the naming of the members of the House of Commons, so that debate was not entirely free, and the amount of the tax, the price of this commodity, remained above its natural value. One day the exploited consumers rose up against the producers and dispossessed them of their industry.[752] They then undertook to carry on this industry by themselves and chose for this purpose a director of operations[753] assisted by a Council. Thus communism replaced monopoly. But the scheme did not work, and twenty years later, primitive monopoly was re-established. Only this time the monopolists were wise enough not to restore the absolutist rule of “the king’s pleasure”; they accepted free debate over taxes, being careful, all the while, constantly to corrupt the delegates of the opposition party. They gave these delegates control over various posts in the administration of security,[754] and they even went so far as to allow the most influential (of them) into the heart of their Upper Council. Nothing could have been more clever than thus behavior. Nevertheless, the consumers of security finally became aware of these abuses, and demanded the reform of Parliament. This long contested reform was finally achieved,[755] and since that time, the consumers have won a significant lightening of their burdens.

In France, the monopoly of security, after having similarly undergone frequent vicissitudes and various modifications, has just been overthrown for the second time.[756] As once happened in England, monopoly for the benefit of one caste, and then in the name of a certain class of society, was finally replaced by communal production.[757] The consumers as a whole, behaving like shareholders,[758] named a director responsible for supervising the actions of the director and of his administration.

We will content ourselves with making one simple observation on the subject of this new regime.

Just as the monopoly of security logically had to give rise to all the other monopolies, so communistic security[759] must logically give rise to all the other forms of communism.

In reality, we have a choice of two things:

Either communistic production is superior to free production, or it is not.

If it is, then it must be for all things, not just for security.

If not, progress requires that it be replaced by free production.

Complete communism or complete liberty: that is the alternative![760]

VII.

But is it conceivable that the production of security could be organized other than as a monopoly or communistically? Could it conceivably be left to free competition?

The response to this question on the part of political writers is unanimous: No.

Why? We will tell you why.

Because these writers, who are concerned especially with governments, know nothing about society. They regard it as an artificial construction, and believe that the mission of government is to modify and remake it constantly.

Now in order to modify or remake society, it is necessary to be empowered with an authority which is superior to that of the various individuals of which it is composed.

Monopolistic governments[761] claim to have obtained from God himself this authority which gives them the right to modify or remake society according to their fancy, and to dispose of persons and property however they please. Communistic governments appeal to human reason, as manifested in the majority of the sovereign people.

But do monopolistic governments and communistic governments truly possess this superior, irresistible authority? Do they in reality have a higher authority than that which free governments[762] could have? This is what we must investigate.

VIII.

If it were true that society were not naturally organized, if it were true that the laws which govern its motion were to be constantly modified or remade, the legislators would necessarily have to have an unchangeable and sacred authority. Being the heirs of Providence on earth, they would have to be regarded as almost equal to God. If it were otherwise, would it not be impossible for them to fulfill their mission? Indeed, one cannot intervene in human affairs, one cannot attempt to direct and regulate them, without daily offending a multitude of interests. Unless the custodians of power are believed to belong to a higher species or have been charged with a mandate from heaven, those whose interests have been harmed will resist.

From this idea comes the fiction of divine right.

This fiction was certainly the best imaginable. If you succeed in persuading the multitude that God himself has chosen certain men or certain races to give laws to society and to govern it, no one will dream of revolting against these appointees of Providence, and everything the government does will be accepted as well done. A government based on divine right is indestructible.

On one condition only, namely that one believes in divine right.

Indeed, if one dares to think that the leaders of nations do not receive their inspirations directly from Providence itself, that they obey purely human impulses, the prestige that surrounds them will disappear and one will irreverently resist their sovereign decisions, as one resists anything manmade whose utility has not been clearly demonstrated.

It is accordingly fascinating to see the pains theorists of divine right take to establish the superhuman nature of the races who have taken possession of human government.

Let us listen, for example, to M. Joseph de Maistre:[763]

Man cannot create a sovereign. At most he can serve as an instrument for dispossessing a sovereign and delivering his estates into the hands of another sovereign, himself a prince by birth. Moreover, there has never been a sovereign family whose origin could be identified as plebeian. If such a phenomenon were to appear, it would be a new era for the world.
… It is written: It is I who make the kings. This is not a statement made by the Church, nor a preacher’s metaphor; it is the literal, simple, and palpable truth. It is a law of the political world. God makes kings, quite literally so. He prepares royal families. He nurtures them within a cloud which hides their origin. Finally they appear, crowned with glory and honor. Then they assume their place.[764]

According to this system, which embodies the will of Providence in certain men and which invests these chosen ones, these anointed ones with a quasi-divine authority, the subjects evidently have no rights at all. They must submit, without question, to the decrees of the sovereign authority, as if they were the decrees of Providence itself.

According to Plutarch, the body is the instrument of the soul, and the soul is the instrument of God.[765] According to the divine right school, God selects certain souls and uses them as instruments for governing the world.

If men had faith in this theory, surely nothing could unsettle a government based on divine right.

Unfortunately, they have completely lost faith.

Why?

Because one fine day they took it into their heads to question and to reason, and in questioning, in reasoning, they discovered that their governors governed them no better than they, simply mortals without any communication with Providence, could have done themselves.

It was free inquiry that discredited the fiction of divine right, to the point where the subjects of monarchs or of aristocracies based on divine right obey them only insofar as they think it in their own self-interest to obey them.

Has the communist fiction fared any better?

According to the communist theory, of which Rousseau is the high-priest, authority does not descend from on high, but rather comes up from below. The government no longer looks to Providence for its authority, it looks to united mankind, to the one, indivisible, and sovereign nation.

Here is what the communists, the partisans of the sovereignty of the people, assume. They assume that human reason has the power to discover the best laws and the organization which most perfectly suits society; and that, in practice, these laws reveal themselves at the conclusion of a free debate between conflicting opinions. If there is no unanimity, if there is still dissension after the debate, the majority is in the right, since it comprises the larger number of reasonable individuals. (These individuals are, of course, assumed to be equal, otherwise the whole structure collapses.) Consequently, they insist that the decisions of the majority must become law, and that the minority is obliged to submit to it, even if it is contrary to its most deeply rooted convictions and injures its most deeply held interests.

That is the theory; but, in practice, does the authority of the decision of the majority really have this irresistible, absolute character as assumed? Is it always, in every instance, respected by the minority? Could it be?

Let us take an example.

Let us suppose that socialism succeeds in propagating itself among the working classes in the countryside as it has already among the working classes in the cities; that it consequently becomes the majority in the country and that, profiting from this situation, it sends a socialist majority to the Legislative Assembly and names a socialist president.[766] Suppose that this majority and this president, invested with sovereign authority, decrees the imposition of a tax on the rich of three billions, in order to organize the labor of the poor, as M. Proudhon demanded.[767] Is it probable that the minority would submit peacefully to his iniquitous and absurd, yet legal and constitutional plunder?[768]

No, without a doubt it would not hesitate to disown the authority of the majority and to defend its property.

Under this regime, as under the preceding, one obeys the custodians of authority only insofar as one thinks it in one's self-interest to obey them.

This leads us to affirm that the moral foundation of authority is neither as solid nor as wide, under a regime of monopoly or of communism, as it could be under a regime of liberty.

IX.

Suppose nevertheless that the partisans of an artificial organization, either the monopolists or the communists, are right; that society is not naturally organized, and that the task of making and unmaking the laws that regulate society continuously devolves upon men, look in what a sad and sorry situation the world would find itself. The moral authority of governors rests, in reality, on the self-interest of the governed. The latter having a natural tendency to resist anything harmful to their self-interest, authority which was not recognized would continually require the help of physical force.

The monopolists and the communists, furthermore, completely understand this necessity.

If anyone, says M. de Maistre, attempts to detract from the authority of God's chosen ones, let him be turned over to the secular power, let the hangman perform his duties.[769]

If anyone does not recognize the authority of those chosen by the people, say the theorists of the school of Rousseau, if he resists any decision whatsoever of the majority, let him be punished as an enemy of the sovereign people, let the guillotine perform its justice.

These two schools, which both take artificial organization as their point of departure, necessarily lead to the same conclusion: TERROR.

X.

Allow us now to formulate a simple hypothesis.

Let us imagine a newly created society: The men who are part of it it are busy working and exchanging the fruits of their labor. A natural instinct reveals to these men that their persons, the land they occupy and cultivate, the fruits of their labor, are their property, and that no one, except themselves, has the right to dispose of or touch this property. This instinct is not hypothetical; it exists. But man being an imperfect creature, this awareness of the right of everyone to his person and his goods will not be found to the same degree in every soul, and certain individuals will attempt to attack, by violence or by fraud, the persons or the property of others.

Hence, the need for an industry that prevents or suppresses these violent or fraudulent aggressions.

Let us suppose that a man or a combination of men comes and says:

In return for a payment, I will undertake to prevent or suppress attacks against against persons and property.
Let those who wish their persons and property to be protected from all aggression just talk to me.

Before making a deal with this producer of security,[770] what will the consumers do?

In the first place, they will find out if he is really strong enough to protect them.

In the second place, whether he offers a moral guarantee so that one would not have to fear him undertaking the very aggressions he has promised to suppress.

In the third place, whether any other producer of security, offering equal guarantees, is willing to offer them this commodity on better terms.

These terms would be of various kinds.

In order to be able to guarantee the consumers full security of their persons and their property, and, in case of harm, to pay them compensation which is proportioned to the loss suffered,[771] it would be necessary, therefore:

1. that the producer of security would establish certain penalties for those who committed offences against individuals and those who violated property, and that the consumers of security would accept being subjected to these penalties in the case where they themselves committed any offences against person or property;
2. that the producer of security would impose on the consumers of security certain obligations for the purpose of assisting it (the producer) in discovering the perpetrators of the offences
3. that the producer of security would regularly impose a certain premium[772] to cover its costs of production as well as the normal profit for its industry, which would vary according to the situation of the consumers, the particular occupations in which they were engaged, and the extent, value, and nature of their property.[773]

If these terms, necessary for carrying on this industry, are agreeable to the consumers, a deal will be made. Otherwise the consumers will either do without security, or seek out another producer.

Now if we consider the particular nature of the security industry, it is apparent that the producers will necessarily restrict their clientele to certain territorial boundaries. They would be unable to cover their costs if they tried to provide police services[774] in localities comprising only a few clients. Their clientele will naturally be clustered around their business headquarters.[775] They would nevertheless be unable to abuse this situation by dictating conditions to their consumers. In the event of an exorbitant rise in the price of security, the consumers would always have the option of giving their patronage to a new entrepreneur, or to a neighboring entrepreneur.[776]

This option the consumer retains of being able to buy security wherever he pleases brings about continual competition[777] among all the producers, each producer striving to maintain or increase his clientele by attracting them with cheaper prices[778] or of faster, more complete, and better justice.[779]

If, on the contrary, the consumer is not free to buy security wherever he sees fit,[780] you will immediately see open up considerable opportunities for businesses to engage in arbitrary practices and bad management. Justice becomes slow and costly, the police become troublesome, individual liberty is no longer respected, the price of security[781] is raised exorbitantly and is unequally levied, according to the power and influence of this or that class of consumers. The insurers (who provide security)[782] will engage in bitter struggles to wrest customers from one another. In a word, all the abuses inherent in monopoly or in communism suddenly begin to appear.

Under the regime of free competition, war between the producers of security entirely loses its justification. Why would they make war? To conquer consumers? But the consumers would not allow themselves to be conquered. They certainly would be careful not to have their persons and property insured[783] by men who would unscrupulously attack the persons and property of their competitors. If some audacious conqueror tried to impose the law on them, they would immediately call to their aid all the free consumers[784] menaced by this aggression, and they would bring him to justice. Just as war is the natural consequence of monopoly, peace us the natural consequence of liberty.

Under a regime of liberty, the natural organization of the security industry would be no different from that of other industries. In small districts a single entrepreneur[785] could suffice. This entrepreneur might leave his business to his son, or sell it to another entrepreneur. In larger districts, one company by itself would bring together enough resources to carry on this important and difficult business adequately. If it were well managed, this company could easily last, and security would last with it. In the security industry, just as in most of the other branches of production, the latter mode of organization (one large company) will probably replace the former (a single entrepreneur), in the end.

In one case this might result in a monarchy, in the other case it might result in a republic; but it would be a monarchy without a monopoly and a republic without communism.

In both cases, this authority would be accepted and respected in the name of utility, and would not be an authority imposed by terror.

It will undoubtedly be disputed whether such a hypothetical situation is realizable. But, at the risk of being considered a utopian, we affirm that this is not disputable, that a careful examination of the facts will decide the problem of government more and more in favor of liberty, just as it does all other economic problems. We are convinced, so far as we are concerned, that one day associations will be established to agitate for free government,[786] as they have already been established on behalf of free trade.

And we will not hesitate to add that after this reform has been achieved, and all artificial obstacles to the free action of the natural laws that govern the economic world have disappeared, the situation of the various members of society will become the best possible.

Minutes of the meetings of La Société d'économie politique discussing the Role of the State (Oct. 1849 - Feb. 1849

Editor’s Note

We include in this Addendum the minutes of three meetings of the Political Economy Society which held monthly meetings in Paris to discuss issues of the day and newly published books of interest to its members. These three meetings  (October, 1849, January 1850, and February 1850) were on the topic of the limits to the size and scope of government activities, a topic which had been sparked by the publication of Molinari’s provocative article on “The Production of Security” (JDE, Feb. 1849) and Les Soirées (Sept. 1849).

The members of the PES found many of Molinari’s arguments about eliminating government monopolies for the provision of public goods and fully protecting the property rights of individuals from encroachment by the state very controversial and provocative. They especially objected to his arguments in S3 where he rejected completely the principle of the compulsory expropriation of property by the state for reasons of public utility, and S11, where he advocated the private and competitive provision of security (both police and national defense) by voluntary associations such as insurance companies.

The Society seemed to be split into four camps.[787] At the furthest extreme was Gustave de Molinari who did not attend any of the sessions as he was universally criticized for his advocacy of the private provision of all public goods, including police protection and national defense, and probably thought it better not to provoke his colleagues with his physical presence. Next to him, with an “ultra-minimalist” view of state functions was Bastiat and Hovyn-Tranchère who believed the state should limit itself strictly to protecting the liberty and property of citizens and providing only a very few public goods such as water supply, rivers, and managing the state-owned forests.[788] The bulk of the members of the Society seemed to be supporters of a limited state along the lines defined by Adam Smith, namely, police and defense, and a broader range of public goods than the “ultra-minimalists” like Bastiat wished to allow, such as the delivery of letters and issuing currency. The fourth group was a heterogenous group of members such as the economist Wolowski and various lawyers and politicians who thought the government should be involved in providing subsidized land credit, savings banks, and other services to citizens because it could do so better than private enterprise.

Three members of the Society defended the third view more formally in a series of rebuttals to Molinari’s more extreme position. The first was Charles Coquelin, the editor of the DEP, who reviewed Les Soirées very critically in November, the month following the first meeting, in November 1849.[789] The second was Ambroise Clément who wrote an essay “The Rational Duties of Political Authority,” which was published in the February 1850 issue of the JDE.[790] The third was by the permanent president of the Society, Charles Dunoyer, who had summed up the feelings of the Society at the meeting with his statement that Molinari “s’est laissé égarer par des illusions de logique” (has allowed himself to be carried away by delusions of logic). Dunoyer would go onto write the entry on “Government” for the DEP (1852) and a follow up article in the JDE on “The Limits of Political Economy and the Functions of Government (Dec. 1852).[791]

In spite of this opposition from his colleagues, Molinari continued to work on these ideas for at least the next 30 years.

The minutes of these meetings were first published in Bastiat’s Collected Works, vol. 4 (forthcoming), and are reproduced here in a slightly edited form. Some of the more detailed footnotes have been omitted and not all of the participants have been identified for reasons of space.

1. Minutes of the October 1849 meeting of La Société d'économie politique

Source

“Séance de 10 oct. 1849,” in “Chronique,” JDE, T. 24, no. 103, October 1849, pp. 315-16; also ASEP (1889), pp. 82-86.

Text

[The meeting began with a discussion of the progress which had been made in the teaching of political economy, before turning to the topic of the functions of the state.]

After these discussions M. (Horace) Say who presided at the meeting, proposed to bring the conversation around to a very difficult subject (one which had already been abandoned in a previous meeting because of a digression on the topic of state assistance to the poor), namely on the question of knowing where the limits were between the functions of the state and individual activity; if these limits were well defined, and if there was a way to make them more precise. Unfortunately, as M. Say said, this subject was suggested to him by reading the book just published by M. Molinari (Evenings on Saint Lazarus Street, dialogs on several principles of social economy) and it wouldn’t take very much more for the main question to once again be treated very timidly and for the discussion to get sidetracked onto the other topics treated by Molinari such as the principle of compulsory expropriation of property by the state for reasons of public utility, which he had fought against in a very absolute manner.[792] Nevertheless, the conversation was very lively and instructive at the same time. The following gentlemen spoke in turn (on the topic): Messieurs (Charles) Coquelin, Bastiat, (Félix Esquirou) de Parieu, (Louis) Wolowski, (Charles) Dunoyer, (Pierre) Sainte-Beuve (Representative of l’Oise, who was attending for the first time, as was M. (Salomon) Lopès-Dubec, Representative of la Gironde), (Denis Louis) Rodet, and (Claude-Marie) Raudot (Representative of Saône-et-Loire).

M. Coquelin took as his starting point M. Molinari’s opinion that in the future competition will be established between insurance companies which will be capable of guaranteeing security for the citizens who would be their clients. He noted that M. Molinari had not taken care to ensure that, without a supreme authority, justice had a legal sanction, and that competition, which was the sole remedy against fraud and violence, and which alone was capable of making the nature of things triumph in the mutual relations between human beings, could not exist without this supreme authority, without the state. Beneath the state, competition is possible and productive; above the state, it is impossible to put competition into practice and even to conceive of it. Bastiat spoke in the same vein as M. Coquelin. He believes that the functions of the state ought to be confined to guaranteeing justice and security; but, since this guarantee only exists through force, and that force can only be the attribute of a supreme power, he does not understand how society would function with a similar power assigned to groups which were equal to each other, and which would not have a superior point of reference. M. Bastiat then wondered if this idea, that the state ought to undertake no other function than to guarantee security, when expressed in such a very well-defined, clear, and obvious manner, might become useful and effective propaganda given the presence of socialist ideas which are expressed everywhere, even in the minds of those who would like to fight it.

M. de Parieu, following Molinari in his discussion of a very distant ideal society, thought that the question which was raised by the latter concerned the struggle between liberty and nationalism.[793] Now, it was possible that the two principles could be reconciled quite naturally. Switzerland already offered the example of populations which let go of old cantons in order to form independent States. They decentralized power in a certain way but they remained united by the tie of nationality. M. Rodet similarly cited analogous examples from the history of the American Union.

M. Wolowski expressed the opinion that civilisation consists of the coexistence of the two principles marching in parallel: the principle of liberty of the individual and the principle of the social state, which ought not be misunderstood and which is endowed with its own life. The Honorable Representative did not think that the future lay with the breaking up of nations, on the contrary he believed in their enlargement by means of successive annexations of territory.

M. Dunoyer, like M. Coquelin and M. Bastiat, thinks that M. de Molinari let himself be mislead by illusions of logic, and that competition between companies exercising government-like functions was utopian, because it would lead to violent struggles. Now these struggles would only come to an end with the use of force, and it is more prudent to leave force where civilisation had put it, in the hands of the state. Furthermore, M. Dunoyer believes that in fact competition had already entered into government by the role played by representative institutions. For example, in France all the parties are engaged in a real competition, and each of them offers its services to the public who really make a choice every time they vote in elections. M. Dunoyer also wanted to say that if M. de Molinari had been too absolute in forbidding any kind of expropriation of property for reasons of public utility, perhaps it was because some others in recent times had been too ready to violate property rights; he cited the actions of the government before February 1848, as well as the theories espoused within the Constituent Assembly itself, with the support it must be said of the majority. M. Saint-Beuve and M. Bastiat did not accept this accusation directed against the majority of the Assembly to which they belonged. The fact remains that if indeed the Constituent Assembly made any decisions in the sense mentioned by M. Dunoyer there was always grounds to believe that it wasn’t the perfectly sound judgement of the majority, not one based upon economic reason, but one taken by the spirit of political reaction against the extreme left, dominated by socialism, that caused them to act in this way.

M. Raudot, who spoke last, shared M. Wolowski’s opinion about the probability which favored the formation of larger and larger States in the future; but he thought that this concentration of political power would lead people to the greatest tyranny and greatest poverty imaginable, if the state continued to want to absorb everything and to bring the municipalities under a tutelage which would anger the communes and give rise to socialism, the dangers of which we were beginning to understand.

As one can see, the original question put forward by M. Say had not been specifically addressed but several members at the meeting promised to return to it in the future.

2. Minutes of the January 1850 meeting of La Société d'économie politique

Source

“Séance de 10 jan. 1850,” in “Chronique,” JDE, 15 January 1850, T. XXV, pp. 202-205; also ASEP (1889), pp. 94-100.

Text

One of the most sensitive questions that one can examine, one which at the same time applies to political economy and all the other sciences, including that of political philosophy, has been touched upon, and several other matters treated in depth, at the previous meeting of the Political Economy Society.

Already on more than one occasion, at the insistence of some members, this question has been made the order of the day, but the conversation constantly ended up in a digression or focused on one particular case, such as state assistance for the poor, expropriation of private property on the grounds of public utility, etc. This time, although some members who took part in this interesting discussion took pleasure in pursuing some particular questions, such as the state monopoly of insurance, land credit, as well as others, were happy to see that the problem was frankly taken up, probed, dug into, clarified, and even partly resolved.

To begin, the floor was given to M. Wolowski, Representative of the People, who would like to expand the functions of the state and to make it grease the wheels of the administration and take advantage of state centralization to introduce a better system of insurance, and to establish in France institutions of land credit such as that which have been established in Germany and Poland. M. Wolowski thinks that it would be both useful and advantageous for the state, while not becoming involved in the operations of banking itself, to be able to centralize the payment of interest on land debt and mortgages, the repayment of this debt, and to provide a guarantee for the paper which covers these debts and mortgaged property. In addition he thinks that the state can be usefully employed in the organization of retirement savings banks because it will inspire the greatest confidence possible for bank transfer payments and provide the greatest security for the payment of retirement pensions.

In doing all this. M. Wolowski believes that the state can act without using force against anyone, and should act only by making these facilities open in such as way as to stimulate and enrich the planning of the citizens, and at the same time removing parasitical jobs from the body politic. The Honorable Representative thinks that, although our country is too given to state intervention, and he is fearful every time this intervention is used to regulate the production of wealth, he finds that it (intervention) is advantageous in all those institutions whose purpose is the preservation of this wealth.

M. Hovyn-Tranchère put on trial the mania for state intervention in general. He had in mind for good reason the example of socialism pure and simple; and he showed that between the economic theories of the Luxembourg Palace[794] and many of those men who belonged to the parties most opposed to them there was no more difference than logic pushed to its extreme by the revolutionaries of the kind we have just mentioned, and that logic which is incompletely followed by the others. state intervention is the scourge of our day; M. Hovyn-Tranchère believes that we have to fight it everywhere and to the bitter end, and that at the present moment it is even dangerous to halt the discussion at more specialised topics where there might perhaps be some advantage in letting the state intervene more or less.

Directing our attention to the matter of land credit, M. Hovyn-Tranchère, said with good reason that the numerous illusions which are floating about concerning this matter (and which have been entertained by many members of the Constituent Assembly, notably by the Agriculture Committee, (on this see the very surprising report by M. Flandin), have no other cause than ignorance of the most elementary principles of political economy. After some reflection on this, the Honorable Representative thinks that the greatest and sole service which could be given to the system of land credit and to indebted land owners is to facilitate the sale of their goods and their bankruptcy by reducing the property transfer tax.

This subject naturally led the Honorable Member to speak about the present state of eduction which he judged by the fruits which they bear, namely with the greatest harshness. The majority of men who become active in political affairs make concessions to socialism. They speak so eloquently about “order” and “liberty;” they demonstrate their courage but leave no trace of their passage. Since the level of understanding and public morality is getting lower, the Honorable Member concluded that if the tree has produced such fruit for such a long time then it is maggot ridden and it is time to cut it down.

As his general conclusion M. Hovyn-Tranchère thinks that the men charged with the administration of the country ought to stop abruptly and immediately going down the path which intervention is taking us to our ruin.

M. Bastiat spoke along the same lines as M. Hovyn. It is precisely the progress made by the insurance industry which shows what kind of a future the principle of state supported association has, and the danger that it would have posed had the state seized control of this branch of human activity; it would have found its progress ipso facto halted and paralyzed, and would have never made any progress if, from the beginning, the state had intervened with its shackles and its bureaucratic practices. He finds the same arguments apply to the development of workers’ self-help banks,[795] and he insisted especially on this point that the state by intervening halts individual activity, gets in the way of social action, and weakens the energy which drives the human species to improve and develop itself. M. Bastiat only recognizes and accepts the utility of state intervention in the enforcement and guarantee of security, things which require the use of force.

The Honorable Member (Bastiat) opposed a point made by M. Wolowski by arguing that the state had even less reason to involve itself in the preservation of wealth than in its production, since it required more moral strength, foresight, and individual energy to keep what one had acquired than to earn it.

M. Cherbuliez suddenly entered the conversation by asking what could be a solution to the problem posed by the Political Economy Society, namely to identify the general principles, so to speak the higher and governing principles, by means of which it would be possible to determine whether a given function of the state was within the purview of the government or whether it ought to be left to private industry.

By analyzing state activity in this way, M. Cherbuliez thinks that it includes three things: the unity of its goal, the unity of its management, and the bringing together of the force needed to achieve this goal.

By testing the issues of security and education against this principle he showed that in the case of security there was necessarily unity of purpose and unity of management for all members of the society, since everyone was interested in having order maintained and justice provided in the same manner; and finally in order to achieve this result, that is was essential that society gather together all its forces. It is not the same for education. Here, the unity of purpose does not exist; citizens are catholics, protestants, jews, etc., believers and non-believers; there are a thousand ways open to them to provide education for their children, and the unity of management simply leads to tyranny for education, and for learning under this bastard of a standard under which we now groan.

M. de Colmont, continuing the discussion on the topic of finding a general principle, thought that the activity of government ought to be brought to bear in the defense of all interests, and be restricted to the maintenance of all liberties and all faculties, expressions which are, so to speak, synonyms. It is this which should occupy the administration of justice and the levying of taxes which this task requires. This is why the government, led by the way things are, has to retain the monopoly of the issuing of money, since there are advantages and security for everyone that this issuing of money be confined to its sole care. It is the same for the Postal Service and all state functions where it is recognized that state action is indispensable to maintain the full exercise of the liberties and faculties of every person.

In the eyes of M. (Horace) Say, the most practical criterium for judging if a function ought to be reserved to the state, or to be forbidden to it, is this: Does the state do better or worse than private industry? For example, by analyzing labor and the development of mutual Benefit Societies M. Say showed that the state would never have been able to avoid the difficulties which this industry faced; that it would never have been able to assess the risks; and that it would never have been able to know how to combat the false declarations and claims with the same skill as the Companies driven by private interest. It is quite the opposite with security, concerning which it is impossible to do better than to place a part of the state’s revenue in common, so that officers of an association which has been organized in the general interest[796] can guarantee us security, justice, order, and the freedom of working, consuming, bequesting, giving away our goods, and exchanging with whomever it seems in our interest to do so. It goes without saying that in several of these matters the state in no way achieves its goal, and that liberty is still strangely unknown to it.

M. Coquelin recalled a general principle which he had already expressed in a previous discussion.[797] According to him, the state must intervene in matters of security and justice; it alone, soaring above all human activities like a Mount Sinai, can guarantee liberty and competition which are the life blood of all industries. But below this Mount Sinai, M. Coquelin allows no exceptions to the principle of competition, not even that of the railways, which he does however appreciate might cause some people to hesitate.

Before closing the meeting, the President of the Society M. Charles Dunoyer was keen to make one observation of some usefulness, especially for those who might conclude from the general tendency of economists to reduce the functions of the state, that their intention would be to reduce it to nothing. He said that the simplest government, one which only looked after guaranteeing security, justice, liberty, the property of all citizens, would still necessarily intervene in all human activity; that it would intervene more than ever only in a legitimate manner, to pass good laws which would suppress everything which was bad and improper, as well as to enforce the application of these laws. It is not a small service, for example, to provide justice; today it (this service) is only provided in a very incomplete manner, and it is only by including it in its great and good area of specialization that the state will be able to perfect its activity, to better guarantee security, to better help liberty and equality triumph among mankind, and to better serve civilisation.

With the observation by M. Joseph Garnier that this discussion had led to the production of several general principles which needed to be thought about, gone into more detail, and compared, the Society decided that it would take up this matter again at a future meeting.

3. Minutes of the February 1850 meeting of La Société d'économie politique

Source

“Séance de 10 fev. 1850,” in “Chronique,” JDE, T. XXV, no. 107, 15 fev., 1850, pp. 202-5; also ASEP (1889), pp. 100-5.

Text

We are publishing in this issue a well-researched article by our colleague (Clément)[798] on the fundamental question of the limit to the reasonable functions of political authority, with which the Political Economy Society concerned itself in its last two meetings.

We summarized the substance of the ideas which were expressed on this tricky subject in the meeting of 10 January, and we sketched in just a few words the opinions of the Members who spoke at the last meeting, according to the resumé of the previous discussion which was presented by M. Joseph Garnier, upon the invitation of the President M. Dunoyer.

M. Michel Chevalier established that in principle the solution to the problem posed by the Society was only found in an ideal world which civilisation would gradually reach; this ideal world consists of a maximum of liberty granted to the citizens and of a minimum of functions reserved for the government. But it is difficult to specify what this maximum and this minimum are, since they depend on the potential of individual industry, the aptitudes of citizens, and the energy of society. It is even necessary that we give up the desire to formulate these limits; and to imitate the English and Americans who, every time they had to get the state to intervene in large enterprises, did not dream of turning their “conduct of the moment” into a general system, but left it as a measure of expediency.[799]

When it was a question of the Erie canal, people were not troubled with the question of knowing whether it was worth more if the state built the canals or didn’t; they asked who could do it: and as it was stated earlier if individuals couldn’t undertake the building of this public utility the state intervened; but the intervention of the state was the rule of the moment, and later private companies were allowed to do it. Things happened the same way in England.

Furthermore, in the state of New York, they realized that there were not enough college professors, that there were not enough of them to satisfy the needs of the public; and the government, without establishing the principle that it would take control of education, set up a university, all the while not getting itself involved in secondary education, the need for which the free schools were fully satisfying.

In France, we have the all too frequent habit of wanting to generalize and establish some unchanging principles which apply to everything. Thus, there are those who, by turning some things into principles, have reached the conclusion that the state should never alone be responsible for the railways. In this way too, opponents of commercial liberty have pushed their opposition to the extreme and have created this mad theory of national labor,[800] something which is incompatible with all progress and all reforms.

M. Bastiat remarked that the English appeared to him to be be much more willing to take up questions of principle than M. Michel Chevalier said. When it was a question of free trade,[801] M. Cobden and his friends at the very start went down to the basics of the doctrine and during the memorable campaign they never stopped proclaiming its legitimacy and drawing conclusions from that.

Returning to the main point of the discussion, M. Bastiat said that, since society was based upon a general exchange of services, this exchange ought to be undertaken freely and that the state, by intervening and by wishing to provide services, violated the liberty of the buyers of these services, by forcing them (the buyers) to accept them and to pay for them at a fixed price. From this he concluded once again the injustice of government intervention everywhere, except in the production of security and the administration of some commonly owned property, such as water supply, rivers, etc., to which some group of citizens, as a collective entity, had delegated some of its rights and powers in order to support.

M. Charles Renouard, a Councillor in the Supreme Court (Cassation) and one of the vice-presidents of the Society, recognized that the state had two duties, outside of which its intervention appeared to him to be harmful.

The first of these duties of the state was not to oppose the free development of morality and liberty by mixing itself in the affaires of its citizens; the second was to administer well what comprised the common interest, to maintain security and justice within the country, to guarantee the independence of the country, to maintain good relations with other societies across the world, and to establish a public force with sufficient men and finances to inspire respect. Beyond the fulfilling of these duties, the government would usurp its proper functions.

In an animated and thoughtful conversation M. Renouard insisted on the importance of not doing harm; assuredly, doing good was preferable, but in the absence of doing good, the absence of doing)harm is a great good next to harm. Now, it is in abstaining more and more from seizing control of various branches of work that governments will at least stop doing a certain amount of harm, and will leave society to free itself from its diapers and advance towards liberty, morality, and civilisation. M. Renouard was pleased to say that taking everything into consideration mankind was steadily advancing towards progress, and that one could see this march just by considering some quite short periods of time. Society was much better off than it was 50 years ago, and 50 years ago it was much better than it had been in the time of Louis XIV, who was a great king but under whom none of us today would want to live.

The floor was then given to M. (Alphonse) Rodière, professor in the Faculty of Law in Toulouse and who was also teaching a free course in political economy to some students in that town. M. Rodière was currently in Paris as an examiner at the School of Law in Paris and had been invited to attend the meeting by the Society. M. Rodière remarked that there were only two logical positions to take in this serious matter: that of the socialists who want the state to do everything, and that of the economists who want the state to concern itself only with what is necessary or indispensable. The state ought to ensure respect for good laws, whether between one nation and another, or between one individual or another; it ought to maintain security, justice, the organization of a public armed force, and to concern itself with some other related matters. At this time in France, the state has obviously gone beyond the limits of these natural functions, since there is a government employee for every 16 inhabitants[802], and perhaps even one for every nine if one includes the army in this average. By going to the root of the matter one can see in this fact the principle cause of the political spasms and the revolutions which have followed one after the other in our country.

M. Dussart, former Councillor of State, emphasised the necessity of the government in exercising its control over everything. He cited on this subject, the activity of the communal authorities who have to look after lighting, paving, running water, etc. activities which have been neglected in England, to the point where, in researching the causes of the high mortality rate)during the cholera epidemic, it was revealed that is some parts of London some sewers and dung pits had not been emptied for 50 years.[803] He cited this recent law passed by Parliament which ordered an Irish land owner to “do justice to his land,” that is to say to invest the necessary capital to maintain it or abandon it. From these and other facts, M. Dussart concluded that, without being too specific, he was in favor of quite extensive intervention by the state. His observations provoked several objections. As for the law on Ireland, it is doubtful whether experience has shown it to be profitable, and that this attack on the liberty of the landowners has been useful to the unfortunate people of that country.

M. Rodet, who completely supported the opinions expressed by M. Michel Chevalier, replied to M. Dussart that, had the system of intervention, control, and centralization existed then, the town of Bourges would never have been able to give Jacques Cujas a teaching position.[804] Today the state would say to the municipal government of this town: “It is I alone who ought to teach the law.” M. Rodet added that the state should only do what the communes cannot do, and that the latter should only concern themselves with a few general matters which were unrelated to the work of its citizens.

M. Howyn-Tranchère closed the meeting by explaining clearly that in England and America, examples cited by M. Michel Chevalier and M. Rodet, that the principle of non-intervention was accepted; that the problem had been resolved in the public mind and in the government’s mind; and that it was quite the opposite in our country, where as a result the principle of non-intervention had to be brought to the public’s attention every time they strayed from it. M. Howyn remarked that, furthermore, the acts of intervention which have been cited are those of a particular state, of a “politicised" state, and not those of the state in the abstract; while here at home intervention always comes from the central state, from the central bureaucracy.

A Selection of Articles from the DEP (1852-53)

Introduction

While he was writing Les Soirées over the summer of 1849 Molinari was also working on 30 articles which would appear in the most important publication the Guillaumin publishing form had undertaken up to that time, namely the Dictionary of Political Economy.[805] Both Les Soirées and the DEP were part of the Guillaumin  firm’s strategy of opposing “false” economic ideas concerning protectionism and socialism among ordinary people (for whom Les Soirées and Bastiat’s many pamphlets were written) as well as among the political and intellectual elite (for whom the DEP was written). The purpose of the latter was to assemble a compendium of the state of knowledge of liberal political economy with hundreds of articles written by leading economists on key topics, biographies of important historical figures, annotated bibliographies of the most important books in the field, and tables of economic and political statistics.

The DEP project was most likely conceived in late 1848 or early 1849, was announced in the Guillaumin catalog of May 1849 as being “in preparation,” was made available in subscription form in August 1849, and the first volume of which was printed in book form in early to mid-1852. So, Molinari would have been working on both projects during 1849 and it is not surprising therefore to see a certain overlap between Molinari’s two concurrent projects for which he used much the same source material, used the same examples to illustrate his arguments, and even quoted from the same texts.

We have made considerable use of the DEP in our research into French economic thought as it provides a great deal of information about French government policy, economic data on a broad range of topics, contemporary literature on economic thought, and most importantly, the state of mind of the French political economists in the mid-19th century.

Molinari was a major contributor to the Project, writing 25 principle articles and five biographical articles. Other major contributors included the editor Charles Coquelin (with 70 major articles), Horace Say (29), Joseph Garnier (28), Ambroise Clément (22), and Courcelle-Seneuil (21). Maurice Block wrote most of the biographical entries. Molinari’s articles were the following (those in bold are inlcuded in this Addendum):

Biographical Articles (5):

1. “Necker,” T. 2, pp. 272-74.

3. “Peel (Robert),” T. 2, pp. 351-54.

4. “Saint-Pierre (abbé de),” T. 2, pp. 565-66.

5. “Sully (duc de),” T. 2, pp. 684-85.

Principle Articles (24):

1. “Beaux-arts” (Fine Arts), T. 1, pp. 149-57.

2. “Céréales” (Grain), T. 1, pp. 301-26.

3. “Civilisation” (Civilization), T. 1, pp. 370-77.

4. “Colonies,” T. 1, pp. 393-403.

5. “Colonies agricoles” (Agricultural Colonies), T. 1, pp. 403-5.

6. “Colonies militaires” (Military Colonies), T. 1, p. 405.

7. “Émigration” (Emigration), T. 1, pp. 675-83.

8. “Esclavage” (Slavery), T. 1, pp. 712-31.

9. “Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)” (Free Trade Associations), T. 2, p. 45-49.

10. “Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges” (Freedom of Commerce. Free Trade), T. 2, pp. 49-63.

11. “Mode” (Fashion), T. 2, pp. 193-96.

12. “Monuments publics” (Public Monuments), T. 2, pp. 237-8.

13. “Nations” (Nations), T. 2, pp. 259-62.

14. “Noblesse” (The Nobility), T2, pp. 275-81

15. “Paix, Guerre” (Peace. War), T. 2, pp. 307-14.

16. “Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix)” (The Society and Congress for Peace), T. 2, pp. 314-15.

17. “Propriété littéraire et artistique” (Literary and Artistic Property), T. 2, pp. 473-78

18. “Servage” (Serfdom), T. 2, pp. 610-13

19. “Tarifs de douane” (Customs Tariffs), T. 2, pp. 712-16.

20. “Théâtres” (Theaters), T. 2, pp. 731-33.

21. “Travail” (Labor), vol. 2, pp. 761-64.

22. “Union douanière” (Customs Union), vol. 2, p. 788-89.

23. “Usure” (Usury), vol. 2, pp. 790-95.

24. “Villes” (Towns), T. 2, pp. 833-38.

25. “Voyages” (Travel), T. 2, pp. 858-60.

The topics he focused on were two that were dear to his heart and on which he had already written, namely free trade and slavery. Concerning free trade, he wrote the articles on Grain, Free Trade Associations, Freedom of Commerce. Free Trade, Customs Tariffs, and Customs Union. Concerning slavery, he wrote the articles on Slavery and Serfdom. On more specialised topics on which he would also write in Les Soirées, we should note those on Fine Arts, Literary and Artistic Property, Theaters, Labor, and Usury. Another group of topics that deserve special mention are those to which one normally would not expect to see economic analysis applied, such as Emigration, Fashion, Public Monuments, and Travel. The latter suggest that Molinari had an innovative way of thinking about all manner of social and cultural problems and using economic analysis to deepen our understanding of them in new and interesting ways.

Interestingly, some thirty years later the American political theorist John Joseph Lalor (1840-1899) edited an American version of the DEP in 1881, the Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States, which included 100 entries from the DEP which he had translated, including seven by Molinari (which are included in this Addendum). Just as America was moving further into the protectionist camp, Lalor and his colleagues were translating some of the hardest of hard-core French free trade advocates, such as Molinari’s “Freedom of Commerce. Free Trade,” and offering it to American readers. The impact of this infusion of French political economy into America seems to have been minimal if anything, but it was a remarkably undertaking.

We have included Molinari’s own footnotes in the following articles. All the others are by the editor. Many of Molinari’s footnotes are vary sparse so we have made the references more complete where necessary. Some passages that were cut from the Lalor version have been restored and this has been indicated in the footnotes. Furthermore, Lalor’s translations have been updated and modernized and some terms have been changed to be in accordance with the terminology used throughout Les Soirées.

Cities and Towns

Source

“Villes,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 833-38.

In John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol 1 Abdication-Duty, “Cities and Towns,” pp. 468-73. Trans. E. J. Leonard.

Text

I. How towns originate. Circumstances which determine the choice of location or lead to its abandonment.

Towns are aggregations of people and of industries, and they are formed under the natural pressure to satisfy certain needs. Their development is in no way arbitrary. Sometimes princes have entertained the illusion that they had only to issue a royal fiat to make a new city rise and flourish; but experience has rarely failed to convince them that they had presumed too much with their power. Without doubt, a monarch may, by changing the seat of his empire, as Peter the Great did, for example, create a center of population and wealth. The public functionaries of all grades and those who aspire to these positions, being obliged to live in the capital and to spend their salaries or incomes there, necessarily attract around them a population of tradesmen, artisans, and domestic servants; but, unless the new city provides a location favorable for certain branches of production (and in this case the intervention of the government is not necessary in order to found it) there will be no significant development. However, here one exception should be made. If the government continually enlarges its functions, if it attempts to pursue of a policy of centralisation and communism[806] at the expense of the liberties of the country, and, in consequence, increases the number of persons in its employ, the town where it has established the seat of its power will not fail to grow and to acquire wealth: but it is questionable whether the country will have a reason, in this case, to be pleased with the prosperity of its capital. If, on the contrary, the government has only limited powers, if it has only a few persons in its employ, its capital, in case no other industry can be advantageously established there, will be forced to occupy a very modest position in comparison with the centers of manufacturing or commercial production. Such is the case with Washington, the capital of the American Union. J. B. Say has clearly shown in his Traité this powerlessness of governments to establish cities and towns and make them prosperous.

“It is not sufficient,” he says, “to lay out a town and to give it a name, for it to exist in fact, it must be furnished by degrees with industrial talents, with tools, raw materials, and everything necessary to maintain the workmen until their products may be completed and sold; otherwise, instead of founding a town, one has only put up theatrical scenery, which will soon fall, because nothing sustains it. This was the case with Yekaterinoslav, in Taurida, as the emperor Joseph II. foreshadowed, when, after having been invited to lay in due form the second stone of that town, he said to those around: ‘I have finished a vast enterprise in one day, with the empress of Russia; she has laid the first stone of a town, and I the last.’
Nor does moneyed capital suffice to establish a large manufacturing business and the active production necessary to form a town and make it grow: a locality and national institutions which favor that growth are also necessary. There are perhaps some deficiencies connected with the location of the city of Washington, which prevent its becoming a great capital; for its progress has been very slow in comparison with what is common in the United States. While the situation of Palmyra, in former times, rendered it populous and rich, notwithstanding the sandy desert by which it was surrounded, simply because it had become the entrepôt of the commerce of the Orient with Europe. The prosperity of Alexandria and Thebes in Egypt was due to the same cause. The decree of its rulers would not alone have sufficed to make it into a city with a hundred gates and as populous as Herodotus represents it. The key to its importance must be sought in its position between the Red Sea and the Nile, between India and Europe.[807]

Let us now attempt to give a brief outline of the requirements which have determined the establishment of towns and the choice of their location. The necessity of providing for their security must, more than any other cause, have originally prompted men to create towns. They understood that by joining together in fortified places, they would be more secure than if they were scattered over a vast extent of territory. To this necessity, which was felt by mankind in the earlier ages, were joined the special advantages of manufacturers and commerce. While agricultural production extends, from its nature, over a considerable surface, most of the branches of industrial and commercial production require, on the contrary, a certain concentration. Let any one examine them in the various civilized countries, and he will find they have collected about a few centres. Thus, in France, the silk industry has its principal seats at Lyons and Saint Etienne; the cotton industry at Lille, Rouen, and Mulhouse; the wool industry at Rheims, Elbeuf, Sédan, etc.; and the fashion industry is in Paris. What particular causes have determined the establishment of any industry in any particular locality rather than another, is of itself an interesting subject of investigation. Sometimes it has been the vicinity of the raw material, or of a market, sometimes the special aptitudes of the people, and again a combination of these various circumstances.

The location of the industries does not stop here: in the towns where they become established, we see them select certain quarters and certain streets as their centres. This sub-localization by quarters and streets is notably observable in Paris; and one may find some interesting remarks on the subject in the Inquiry into the Industries of Paris undertaken under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce.[808] The same fact is observable in civilizations which have little analogy with ours. To cite only one example: a Spanish traveler, Don Rodrigo de Vivéro, who gave, in 1608, an interesting description of Yeddo, the capital of Japan, mentions this distribution of the industries through certain quarters and streets as the most salient feature which had attracted his attention.[809]

“All the streets,” he says, “have covered galleries, and each one is occupied by persons of the same business. Thus the carpenters have one street, the tailors another, the jewelers another, etc. The tradesmen are distributed in the same manner. Provisions are also sold in places appropriated to each kind. Lastly, the nobles and important personages have a quarter by themselves. This quarter is distinguished by the armorial bearings, sculptured or painted over the doors of the houses.”

With the exception of a few slight differences, is not this description applicable to most of the capitals of Europe? Thus the same economic necessities are felt in the most varied civilizations, and give them a common form.

Numerous causes, however, are constantly at work, to change the location of industries, and in consequences, of the centres of population supported by these industries. The usual result of every industrial or commercial improvement is to move the place where production occurs. When the route around the cape of Good Hope was discovered, Venice lost much of her importance. Later, the invention of machines for spinning and weaving cotton built up the prosperity of Manchester at the expense of that of Benares and other cities of India, which had previously been the centres of cotton manufactures. In like manner we to-day see steam locomotion give rise to new cities or exert sudden pressure on old ones which were remaining stationary. The city of Southampton, for example, acquired in a few years considerable importance, because its port was thought well adapted to be a center to some lines of ocean steamers. Let a new system of navigation appear, and perhaps Southampton will be abandoned for another port whose situation is more in harmony with the particular requirements of the new system. Thus cities and towns experience, to their advantage or detriment, the influence of causes which modify from day to day the conditions of existence and production.

We said above that governments have only have a weak power to create new towns, and, above all, to make them prosperous. We might add that neither do they possess to any higher degree the power of destroying existing towns or changing their location. In vain did the victorious barbarians employ fire and sword in the cities they had conquered; in vain did they plow up the ground of these condemned cities and sow them with salt: as it was not in their power to destroy the natural advantages which had led the people to gather there, in a few years the mischief was repaired and life circulated more freely than ever in the very places that a foolish pride had devoted to eternal solitude. Barriers to the free circulation of men and things have unfortunately been more effective than projectiles or incendiary torches, in destroying the centres of population and wealth. Many a flourishing city has been transformed into a veritable necropolis by restrictions depriving it of its commerce or of a market for its products. In the seventeenth century we find a notable instance of this. The Dutch, jealous of the prosperity of Antwerp, succeeded in obtaining the closing of the Scheldt river (by the Treaty of Munster 1648) and this barbarous measure, which was continued in force for two centuries, gave a mortal blow to the commerce of Antwerp and to the industries of the Flemish people, of which the Antwerp merchants had been the active intermediary agents. More recently, we have seen the port of Bordeaux, formerly one of the most frequented in France, deserted as a result of the system of trade prohibition.

Population and wealth are not only changed by being displaced from one town to another; they change from place to place within the same town. New quarters arise within the towns or in their suburbs, while the old ones are abandoned and fall into decay. These local changes are brought about by causes, manifest or latent, whose action modifies in the course of time the requirements or conveniences which had determined the choice of the first location. The general improvement in in security may be considered the most important of these causes. Let us dwell a moment on this point.

The old towns of Europe were, for the most part, built on elevated plateaus or on hills more or less steep; so that their inhabitants had constantly to ascend and descend, which occasioned a considerable waste of energy in daily transportation. Besides, these towns were usually restricted to a narrow enclosure, the dwellings pressed upon one another like the cells in a hive. Why was it that our ancestors dwelt in a manner so devoid of economy, so uncomfortable, and sometimes so unhealthy? To explain this curious fact we must take into account the condition of Europe after the invasion of the barbarians. Insecurity was then universal. The conquerors had built retreats for themselves in the most inaccessible places, and they swept down like vultures from their nests, over the neighboring regions, to pillage or make them pay ransom money. Too weak to resist, the former inhabitants of the country, who were the victims of their plundering, came to terms with them, as one comes to terms with bandits in countries where the government is without power. They secured the protection of the most powerful bands by paying them a regular tribute, and they had their dwellings as near as possible to their protectors. They generally settled around strong castles, so as to be able to take refuge in them in case of danger. The first houses were situated just below the castle, and the others were placed lower and lower down the slope, like an amphitheatre. As soon as the inhabitants became sufficiently numerous, they surrounded their city with walls and towers to complete their system of defense. Thus were built most of the towns which originated in the middle ages.

When we consider the necessities of the times, the narrowness of the streets is also explicable. It was due to the fact that the fortifications had been made within as restricted a circle as possible, in order to make the defense easier and less costly. When the population increased, they were consequently obliged to build their houses higher and to reduce the width of the streets, in order to keep within their original limits. Sometimes, indeed, they moved the walls back; but it was only as a last resort that they submitted to a measure so costly.

But by degrees general security increased. The feudal system disappeared, and with it the internal wars ended. Then began a movement which resulted in changing the location of the city population. From the heights to which care for their safety had obliged them to confine themselves, they descended to the plains, where they could dwell more comfortably and at less expense. The faubourgs (suburbs) owe their origin to that increase of security which allowed peaceable men engaged in the industries to live henceforth outside the city fortifications.[810] Accelerated, moreover, by another cause, which we shall consider later, this displacement of the town population has become generally more and more general: everywhere we see the inhabitants of the old towns leave the homes they have dwelt in for ages, to occupy new homes, less expensive, more comfortable, and more healthful.

II. Of the relative size of city or town and country population. Causes which determine and modify it.

The foundation and choice of location of cities and towns are determined, as we have just seen, by the state of civilization and of the technology of production. The same is true of the proportion between the population and wealth of towns and of rural districts. This proportion is essentially diverse and variable. It differs according to the countries and the time. When production has made little progress, when men are obliged, in consequence, to employ the greater part of the productive forces at their disposal in procuring for themselves the necessities of life, the industries which provide for less urgent wants can not be developed, for lack of consumers. The towns where these industries center because of their nature and their special fitness for them, progress in that case only with extreme slowness. It is then in countries and at times when production, and especially agricultural production, has realized the most progress, that the town population must be, and in fact is, the greatest.

Let us take for examples two countries whose positions in the scale of production are very unlike, viz., England and Russia. In England, where the town population exceeds by far the rural population, the number of families engaged in agriculture was estimated in 1840 at only 961,134, while that of families engaged in manufactures, commerce, etc., was 2,453,041.

The 961,134, families engaged in agriculture furnished 1,055,982 effective laborers, who produced enough food to sustain the greater part of the English people. In countries where agriculture is less advanced, two or three times as many hands, relatively, are required to give an equivalent product: and the natural result is that the town population can not be so numerous.[811] Such is the case in France; such is especially the case in Russia, where the agricultural production undertaken by the serfs has remained in its infancy. According to M. Tégoborski, one can only count 733 towns having a population of 5,356,000 inhabitants out of a total population of about 60 million, while in Austria there are 773 towns, in Prussia 979, in France 901, for populations numerically smaller. The backward state of Russian agriculture is certainly the primary cause of the small growth of urban population in Russia. The peculiar organization of the industries there has also had somewhat to do with the result.[812]

“The manufacture of small articles,” says M. Tegoborski, “such as are made in the various trades, is located, in Russia, in the rural districts rather than in the towns: it is carried on by village communities, which take the product of their labor to the fairs: this is why the fairs in Russia are of more importance than in other countries. In other countries the workmen in the towns, for the most part, supply the demands of the rural districts: with us, it is often the reverse, and the shoemakers, joiners, and locksmiths of the villages provide for the wants of the townsmen. … Any one may obtain convincing proof of this lack of artisans in Russia, in most of our towns, by examining the statistics of the trades of other countries and taking some of the most common as a basis of comparison. Thus, for example, in Prussia, the trades of shoemakers, glove makers, joiners, wheelwrights, glaziers, blacksmiths, locksmiths, and braziers numbered, in 1843, 322,760 masters and journeymen for a population of 15,471,765, being 21 workmen to 1,000 inhabitants: and when we take the statistics of the towns, this proportion rises in the large towns, to 40 workmen, masters and journeymen, belonging to these various trades, to 1,000 inhabitants of the total town population, which is three, four, or even more times the proportion we find in the towns of Russia.”

In our day improvements which effect an economic change in production result in a rapid increase of the town population. From what has heretofore been said we may conceive that it would be so.[813]

“In France, for example,” says M. Alf. Legoyt, “the population increased, from 1836 to 1851, 6.68 per cent. For the entire period, or 0.44 per cent. per annum. In 166 towns having 10,000 souls and over, the increase in the same interval was 24.24 per cent. or 1.616 per cent. a year. In 10 years the increase of the town population was then 16 per cent., while that of the total population was only 6 per cent.

The case is similar in England. According to the tables of the last census, the town population of Great Britain (England and Scotland), which was in 1801 only 3,046,371, attained in 1851 the number of 8,410,021. This is an increase of 176 per cent., while the total increase of the population in the same period, was only 98 per cent. And if we observe in what towns the increase has been the most considerable, we find in the first place the great manufacturing towns and the commercial ports. While the population of the county towns increased only 122 per cent., that of the manufacturing ones increased 224 per cent., and that of the seaports, London excepted, 195 per cent. In the towns devoted especially to iron industries, the increase was 289 per cent., and in the centres of cotton manufacture, 282 per cent.

Every improvement in the technology of production can only accelerate this increase of the town population. Should we lament it, or rejoice at it? This is a much contested question, but the economists agree in deciding it in favor of the cities. Adam Smith and J. B. Say, notably, prove that the multiplication and the enlargement of towns are desirable, even looking at the matter with reference to the interests of the rural districts. Adam Smith, who examined this subject with his usual insight, concludes that the rural districts have derived three principal benefits from the development of manufacturing and commercial towns.[814]

1. By affording a great and ready market for the rude produce of the country, they gave encouragement to its cultivation and further improvement. This benefit was not even confined to the countries in which they were situated, but extended to all those with which they had any dealings.
2. The wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was frequently employed in purchasing such lands as were to be sold, of which a great part would frequently be uncultivated. Merchants are commonly ambitious of becoming country gentlemen; and when they do, they are generally the best of all improvers. A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chiefly in expense, etc.
3, and lastly. Commerce and manufacturers gradually introduced order and good government, and, with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbors, and of servile dependency upon their superiors.

The development of the town population is not then a fact at which we need be troubled. Doubtless temptations are greater and bad examples more numerous in town than in the country; but how much more abundant and within the reach of all are the means of enlightenment and moral improvement! The statistics of criminal justice show, that the town population does not furnish a proportionally greater contingent of criminals than the rural population; and yet it is worthy of note that the police is much more effective in towns than it can be in the rest of the country.[815]

The same improvements which increase the town population, tend also to improve their dwellings. Under the influence of improved security, we have seen towns descend from the summit of plateaus and the sides of hills, to the plains: we shall see them, according to all appearances, extend over a wider and wider surface, as means of communication become less expensive and more rapid. Great improvements have already been realized in this direction. As well as in the cleanliness and repair of streets, and the internal comfort of dwellings and economy in their management. Who can predict what the future may yet have in store for us?

III. The administration of cities and towns. What it is, and what it ought to be

Towns have commonly an administration of their own. Sometimes each quarter even has its own. This administration sometimes is appointed by a superior authority, in other cases from the inhabitants of the city themselves. This latter way of appointing (an administration), which obliges the administrators to answer for their actions to those who are administered, is usually the better. As to the course to pursue in order to govern a city well, it does not differ from that which should be pursued in the government of a nation. A city administration, like a national one, should exercise only such functions which, by their nature, cannot be left to competition between private individuals.[816] Now these functions are not numerous, and they become less and less so, as progress causes the obstacles to disappear which either prevent or obstruct the action of competition.[817] In fact, whatever the zeal or the devotion of a municipal administration, it is not in the nature of things that the services which are organized in common in the city should be of as much importance as those which are left to private individuals. Doubtless the desire to merit public esteem should press the administrators to do well: but does this motive ever prove as powerful as the interest which stimulates private industry? We may prefer the intervention of municipalities to that of the government for the organization of certain services, and the establishment and maintenance of certain regulations of public utility; but it is well, as far as possible, to dispense with both.

Unfortunately, municipal administrations have the defect of all governments; they like to assume importance, and, with that view, they are constantly enlarging their powers and, in consequence, the amount of their expenses. In our times they are especially possessed with a mania for undertaking public works and buildings. They appear convinced that by demolishing old quarters at the expense of new; by by erecting building upon building; by giving, on the least pretext, balls, concerts, and grand displays of fire works, they contribute effectively to the prosperity and greatness of their cities. Need we say that they are going directly away from the end they wish to attain? These public works, these buildings, these sumptuous entertainments, are very costly, and recourse must always be had at last to taxes, to cover the expenses. Then they tax a multitude of things which serve to feed, clothe, shelter, and warm the population, among whom exists a class, unfortunately the most numerous, who barely possess the means of providing for the absolute necessities of (their) existence. In a word, the expense of city living is artificially increased. And with what result? Population and manufactures relocate as far as possible from a locality where lavishly spending city administrators have permanently established high prices: they settle in preference outside the limits where this economic plague rages.[818] And (and it is a point worthy of note) this change of location, so fatal to landowners in the old towns, has become easier and easier. At a time when lack of security forced people to concentrate in localities which nature had fortified and where technology came to the aid of nature, when, on the other hand, the difficulty of constructing artificial means of communication and maintaining them in good condition rendered the natural ways, such as navigable rivers more valuable, the number of locations suited to become centres of population, was very limited. At the same time the slowness with which private dwellings and public buildings were constructed, (years were sometimes devoted to the building of a house, and centuries to the construction of a cathedral), condemned the people who changed their location, to endless privations and discomforts. Circumstances combined to give existing towns, considered as places of residence, a veritable natural monopoly. But, influenced by the progress already mentioned, this monopoly is disappearing more and more, and as a result, it daily becomes easier for the people to rid themselves of the burden which a bad administration imposes upon them. Nor do they neglect to do so; for we see them abandoning towns where the expenses of living is too great, (commencing in the quarters less favorably situated), and enlarging the faubourgs or creating, farther away, new centres of activity and wealth.[819] Thus, by drawing largely on the wallets of tax payers and unscrupulously issuing any number of bills of credit on future generations, high spending city administrators) far from adding to the prosperity of their cities, end by precipitating them into inevitable ruin. Economy in expenditure should be the supreme rule in the government of cities, as well as in the government of nations. By observing this rule, much more than by increasing the number of old buildings demolished, new ones built, or by holding public festivals, municipal administrations may acquire serious and lasting claims to public gratitude.

Civilization

Source

“Civilisation,” DEP, T. 1, pp. 370-77.

Lalor: John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). Vol. 1 Abdication-Duty. “Civilization,” pp. 485-93.

Text

Civilization is made up of the combined material and moral progress that humanity has made and that it continues to make every day. The source of this progress is to be found in the faculty which has been given to man of learning about himself and the world in which he lives, and of accumulating this knowledge, passing it on to others, and combining these all together. Thus material progress is the result of the more and more extended knowledge which observation gives us of [486] the natural resources of our globe, and of the means of developing them; moral progress likewise is developed by means of the more and more exact and complete ideas which observation provides, of our nature, the society in which we live, and our destiny.

Man’s wants are the powerful stimulants which urge him to increase his observation and to accumulate knowledge. Nature furnishes him with the material necessary to satisfy these wants, but this material he must collect and fashion for his use. None of his appetites can be satisfied without effort and labor. Now, this effort, this labor, by the very nature of his constitution, implies suffering. It is his interest, consequently, to reduce his labor as much as possible, while increasing his satisfaction; it is his interest to obtain a maximum of satisfaction with a minimum of labor. How can he reach this end? By one means and by one means only, by applying more and more efficient processes to the production of the things he needs. And how can he discover these processes? Only by observation and experience.

Urged by hunger, primitive man attacked the animals that were least able to defend themselves, and devoured them. He discovered that the flesh of some of these animals was fit to appease his hunger, and agreeable to the taste; but it was hard for him to procure a sufficient quantity of it regularly, for most of these animals were swifter of foot than he was. Spurred on by want, he endeavored to overcome this difficulty, and succeeded. A savage more intelligent than the rest, noticing the property in certain kinds of wood which allowed them to be bent without breaking, and to straiten out again with a violent recoil after being bent, thought of utilizing this force to hurl projectiles. The bow was invented. It at once became easier for man to feed himself. He could now turn his thoughts to observation in another field and combine his observations so as to increase his enjoyments and diminish his pains. At the same time his moral wants, awakened by a multitude of mysterious phenomena, urged him onward in this direction, as well as his physical wants. Must not the terrible phenomenon of death, for instance, by filling his soul with curiosity, dread, and sometimes with grief, have incited him to penetrate the secret of his destiny? Thus, incessantly urged onward by the increasing and irresistible wants of his nature, man has never ceased, since the beginning of the world, to pile observation on observation, one kind of knowledge on another, and thus to improve his material and moral condition.

Civilization, therefore, seems to us a natural fact; it is the result of man’s very nature, of his intelligence, and his needs. Its source is in observation stimulated by self interest, and it has no limit but that of the knowledge which is given to man to accumulate and combine under the pressure of his needs. Now, this limit we can not see; whence it follows that it has been possible to say with truth that progress is indefinite.

Civilization, however, although inherent in human nature, has not equally developed among all nations. Certain peoples have remained, even to our day, plunged in the darkness of primitive barbarism, while at their very side we find civilization arrayed in all its power. To what is this inequality of development to be attributed? We must attribute it to the inequality of the physical and moral faculties of the different races of men; we must attribute it also to the surroundings in the midst of which each race is developed. We must attribute it, to use the language of economists, to the amount of natural goods, both external and internal,[820] which the Creator has bestowed upon each people. Now, these raw materials of civilization are very unequally distributed: between the ignorant Botocudo[821] and the Anglo-Saxon, who has become his neighbor, the distance, from both a physical and a moral point of view, is immense, and between these two varieties of the human species, who seem to form the extreme links in the chain of the varieties, of man, we find a whole multitude of races all unequal, all different; just as, between the sands of the Sahara and the alluvial soil of Senegal there are many degrees of fertility!

We must carefully examine how these natural inequalities have acted upon civilization. If two nations, unequally favored with internal goods, be placed in similar environments, it is evident that the one best provided with this natural capital,[822] will develop more rapidly and more completely than the other. It is also clear that if two nations, equally favored with internal gifts, be placed amid unequal environments, their development also will be unequal. The influence of natural goods, and of their unequal distribution upon civilization, has not as yet, we believe, been sufficiently studied and appreciated. On the other hand, the influence of external surroundings has been much better recognized and more attention has been called to it. Jean Bodin,[823] Montesquieu,[824] and Herder,[825] clearly demonstrated its importance. They might even be accused of having exaggerated it.

However this may be, by taking well into account these natural elements of civilization, we can readily understand how certain races have reached a very high degree of civilization, while others have remained plunged in barbarism. If, for instance, we but study the natural history of the various races of men who inhabit the archipelagoes of the Pacific ocean, and their physical surroundings, we will comprehend why they have remained the most backward of the human species. In the first place, these tribes are generally of very weak intellect; they have but a small share of that faculty of observing, and of accumulating and combining their observations, which constitutes the essential driving force of civilization. In the second place, the mildness of the climate and the natural fertility of the soil enabling them to satisfy, without labor, their most basic needs, leaves their minds without any stimulant to action. Finally, their topographical situation, by isolating them from the rest of mankind, has restricted them to the development of their own resources, to their own limited elements of civilization. To obtain other resources or elements of civilization, they would have had to cross the abyss of the ocean. But to traverse the ocean, they would have had to know the art of navigation, to be acquainted with the compass, etc., a knowledge beyond the reach of their understanding. These tribes of men, lost in the immensity of the ocean, were thus condemned to languish for a longer time than the rest of mankind in the darkness of barbarism. In all probability they would still be plunged in this darkness had not light come to them from without, had not nations already advanced in civilization begun to visit them.

But suppose that these tribes, instead of being separated from civilization by the depths of the ocean, had lived on or near the main land, their condition certainly would have been very different. In the course of time they would have communicated with one another, they could have intermingled, they would have exchanged their discoveries and their products. This contact and this intermingling of tribes differently endowed, would have resulted in a civilization, coarse and incomplete, no doubt, but which would have produced a social state far superior to that of all the isolated tribes of the Polynesian archipelagoes. This is one example of the influence of natural goods, internal and external, upon civilization.

Let us give another illustration. At the opposite extremity of the scale of civilization is Great Britain. The inhabitants of Great Britain are a composite people, the product of six or seven races, which successively invaded British soil, whose different aptitudes united and combined to develop it. The natural conditions of the soil, climate, and topographical situation of Great Britain, admirably assisted the work of civilization. The soil is fertile, but its fertility is not exuberant enough to allow those who cultivate it to become the victims of indolence. The climate, although not exceedingly rigorous, renders clothing and shelter necessary to man. Lastly, Great Britain is separated from the continent by an arm of the sea, which, while it protects the inhabitants from foreign invasion, allows them easy communication with other nations abundantly provided with the elements necessary to progress. Favored by such a combination of natural advantages, civilization could not but develop rapidly.

Let us suppose, however, that the inhabitants of Great Britain had been cast upon the shores of New Zealand;[826] that, consequently, they could not intermingle with such people as those who successively came to settle beside them, nor communicate with a continent on which civilization had already shed its light, is it not likely that they would today differ very little from the natives of New Zealand? Now that the influence which the distribution of natural goods, both internal and external, exercises on civilization is clearly recognized, let us see what influence the state of the relations which men bear to one another may exercise on their progressive activity; under what social circumstances they are most stimulated to utilize the elements of progress at their disposal.

If civilization is a product of our mind, stimulated by our needs, it is evident that it will develop more rapidly in proportion as man may more freely employ his faculties in channels suitable to them, and in proportion as he is himself certain of enjoying the fruit of his efforts. If I have an aptitude for mathematics, and am forced, without any regard for my talent, to devote myself to painting, the most active and powerful part of my mind will remain almost inactive. I might have been able to solve a number of mathematical problems; but as I was forbidden to devote myself to this work, for which I was naturally fitted, the problems which I might have solved will not be solved at all, or at least they will be solved later, and civilization will be thereby retarded by so much. On the other hand, I may paint, but, as I have little talent for the art of painting, I shall contribute nothing to its progress. A good mathematician has been spoiled in me to make a bad painter. To interfere with the liberty of working, therefore, is to nullify and to suppress the forces which would have stimulated human progress; it is in some sense to amputate that part of the mind which would have contributed most effectively to the advancement of civilization. The progress of civilization is permanently hindered by the restrictions which close the ranks of certain professions to men who might excel in them, or when admission to them is rendered expensive and difficult, when immutable rules prescribe for each the career he must follow.[827]

All attacks on the right of property[828] are another cause which retards civilization. Why does a man condemn his mind to the labor of accumulating, combining, and applying observations to the satisfaction of his needs? Is it not because this labor procures him enjoyment or spares him trouble? He has no other aim. But if he be deprived of this enjoyment, in whole or in part; if the fruit of his self-imposed labor be consumed by others, what reason would he have left to put his mind to work or otherwise? If, for instance, another compels this man to work for him, to cultivate his field, to grind his corn, and leaves him barely enough of the fruit of his own labor to subsist upon; if, in a word, he be a slave, what interest can he have to improve the cultivation of his land or the grinding of corn? What will it avail him? Does he not know that the fruit of his laborious research will belong entirely to his master, that is, to his natural enemy, to the person who each day robs him of his legitimate wages to appropriate them to himself? Why, then, should he add to the gratification of a man who unjustly deprives him of his own? Slavery, therefore, which is, however, but one of the innumerable forms of plunder, appears as one of the most serious obstacles that impede human progress;[829] in like manner, every arbitrary or legal act which injures or menaces property, natural or [488] acquired, delays the progress of civilization, by weakening the incentive which urges men to extend the circle of their knowledge and their acquisition.

Liberty, which allows every man to draw the utmost possible benefit from the gifts with which nature has endowed him, and the right of property, which entitles him to the absolute enjoyment of these gifts, and of the fruit which he can derive from them, are the necessary conditions of human progress. Plunder, under the multitude of forms which it assumes, is the great obstacle that retards, and has, from the beginning of the world, retarded the development of civilization

This being the case, it would seem that men should have, from the very beginning, contrived some means of maintaining inviolable their rights of liberty and property. Unfortunately they have learned only after a long and hard experience, how essential respect for liberty and property is to their well being. If we try to leave this experience out of consideration, and examine the natural conditions in which men were placed in the beginning, taking into account their instincts, their wants, and the means which they had of satisfying them, we will be convinced that they could not begin except by plunder.

Ignorant men, barely having left the state of nature,[830] with no other guide than their instincts, no acquired experience either of the world or of themselves, were obliged to supply needs felt anew every day, and which had to be satisfied under pain of death. Lacking the tools and knowledge necessary to assure them a regular food supply, they were incessantly exposed to the hardship of extreme hunger. When one of these ignorant and famished beings met one of his fellowmen, who, more fortunate than he, had succeeded in getting some prey, a struggle for it was inevitable. Why should not a starving and destitute man attempt to possess himself of the booty which came his way? Having no scruples about robbing the bee of its honey or devouring a sheep, why should he respect man? There is undoubtedly a natural instinct which prompts beings of the same species not to injure one another, but must not this instinct, whose intensity varies in different individuals, have yielded before the all-powerful pressure of want? Let us picture to ourselves what would happen even in our day, notwithstanding the great progress we have made, notwithstanding our acquisitions in the physical and moral order, if there were no superior force established to suppress individual cruelty, and society were abandoned to anarchy. The most frightful disorder would inevitably result from this condition of things. Robberies and murders would increase in a frightful manner, until such time as men had reorganized a force to repress this. For still stronger reasons must not the result have been the same in the first ages of the world?

History proves, moreover, that abuse of power was widespread in these first historical periods, whose innocence has been so loudly vaunted by the poets. The liberty and property of the weak were always at the mercy of the strong. Every one was thus constantly exposed to be robbed of the fruit of his labors. Consequently, no one took any interest in increasing his possessions or accumulating property. Progress was impossible under this system. What was the result? The experience of the evils of anarchy led men to combine together in order to better protect their liberty and property. Associations were formed everywhere, and in them murder and robbery were forbidden and punished. Still the action of restoring peace of these mutual protection companies[831] was at first very limited: if men appreciated clearly enough the necessity of living at peace with their immediate neighbors, the inconveniences of a war with men a little farther away did not impress them so forcibly. They often even believed it to be in their interest to conquer and plunder them. Experience had gradually to extend the domain of peace, that is, the systematized and organized respect for liberty and property.[832] Little by little, people dwelling in close proximity to one another, and nearly equal in strength, became convinced, by the results of their various encounters, that they lost more than they gained by making war. They, therefore, agreed to suspend their hostilities, to make truces, particularly, if they were employed in agriculture, especially during seed-time and harvest. They finally entered into alliances, whether to attack or to defend themselves in common. Between these people who had declared truces or concluded treaties there was regular communication. They imparted to each other the knowledge they had acquired and accumulated. Exchange of products and exchange of ideas took place at the same time. Thus we find that civilization developed in proportion as the experience of the evils of war enlarged the sphere of peace.[833] The same result was obtained when one group extended its dominion over other people, for the conquerors soon perceived that it was to their interest to maintain peace in the regions under their rule. Under the domination of the Romans, for example, the most civilized nations of the world ceased to make war on one another, and magnificent roads united these nations which had so long been strangers and enemies. The progress made by each of them in its isolation extended to all. The Christianity of Judea, the philosophy and arts of Greece, the legislation of Rome spread to Africa, Spain, Gaul, and Germany, and reached even to Great Britain. At the same time commerce was developing, and useful plants, together with the art of cultivating them, passed from one country to another: the cherry was imported from Asia Minor into Europe, the vine was transported into Gaul; in a word, civilization under all its forms progressed from the east to the west

Nevertheless, in these first ages of humanity, peace could be neither general nor lasting: in the midst of the pacified nations, slavery in all its degrees appeared as a permanent cause of conflict. From without, hordes of barbarians coveted the wealth accumulated by these civilized peoples. All the early centres of civilization, Persia, Egypt, the Roman empire, after a thousand intestine struggles, became, as is well known, the prey of barbarians.

The great invasions which occupy so large a place in the history of the world had not everywhere and always the same results. They were, according to circumstances, favorable or disastrous to the progress of humanity. In order to appreciate the influence they exercised from this point of view, we must ascertain first, what amount of material and non-material capital[834] was destroyed in the course of the invasion; we must examine also whether, the conquest once completed, the conquerors and the conquered gained by their contact with each other more liberty and security; whether the forces leading to progress were increased. Anarchy, slavery, and war are the great obstacles in the way of civilization; but frequently these obstacles either destroyed or weakened one another. Sometimes slavery put an end to anarchy, and sometimes war to slavery. There was retrogression wherever the result of the conflict was a decrease in the liberty or security which had been acquired, and, on the other hand, there was progress whenever the sum total of liberty and security in the world was increased by the conflict: at least whenever the destruction of capital caused by the conflict was not great enough to counterbalance the gain which had been made.

We can not say, for instance, whether the invasion of the Roman empire by the barbarians of the north hastened or retarded the progress of civilization; whether or not the immense destruction of material and non-material capital occasioned by this cataclysm was compensated for by acquisitions of another nature;[835] whether or not, if the Roman empire had lasted, the different varieties of men who today inhabit Europe would have been so advantageously intermingled; whether or not slavery would have continued for a longer time. We have not the data necessary to solve this historical problem. We can, however, conjecture that, if the establishment of Roman domination over nations, most of which had adopted slavery, could still serve the cause of civilization by causing peace to reign among these nations, by increasing, consequently, the amount of security which the world enjoyed, without noticeably diminishing the sum total of its liberty; in like manner, the establishment of the barbarians upon the ruins of the Roman domination contributed to the progress of civilization by hastening the abolition of slavery, and thus increasing the amount of liberty possessed by the human race.

Be this as it may, liberty and security have been making constant progress ever since the downfall of the Roman empire, and especially since the end of the feudal barbarism which replaced it.[836] This progress, whether quickened or not by the invasion of the barbarians who overran the old civilized countries, wonderfully aided the development of modern civilization. Thenceforth, as man had greater liberty to employ for the increase of his well-being the elements of progress at his disposal, and felt more assured of being able to preserve the fruit of his labors, he gave greater scope to his activity. He explored the material and the moral world with a power and a success of which he before had no idea. He discovered all at once the means of better preserving the things he had already acquired, and of multiplying and propagating new ones more rapidly. Some of these discoveries have exercised such an influence upon the march of civilization that we must dwell upon them for a moment.

We will mention first the invention of gunpowder. The immediate effect of this discovery was to change the proportion between the labor and capital necessary to the exercise of what we may call the military industry.[837] It required less labor and more capital, fewer men and more machines. One piece of cannon served by eight men took the place of a hundred archers. What was the result? Civilized nations acquired an enormous advantage over barbarous peoples from the point of view both of attack and defense. The superiority of their tools of war, together with their superiority in the capital necessary to put this costly machinery[838] in operation, assured them predominance. Thenceforth new invasions of barbarians coming to destroy the things previously acquired by civilization were no longer to be feared. Moreover, now that they were freed from the corruption of slavery, which might in time render invasions useful, the civilized nations acquired in this respect a security which they did not enjoy in ancient times. Instead of being subjugated anew by the barbarians, they everywhere began to subject the barbarians to their rule.[839]

Thus were the achievements of civilization permanently assured, while a process was soon after discovered whereby to propagate, at small expense and with marvelous rapidity, the knowledge accumulated by the human mind: we refer to the invention of printing. But a short time ago, the diffusion of the non-material capital of humanity was difficult and costly; sometimes even a part of previously acquired knowledge was lost. Thanks to the printing press, it became possible to reproduce indefinitely the same observation, the same thought, and the same invention, and to send it thus multiplied through the immensity of the ages.[840]

Nor is this all. Civilization in ancient times was local. Each nation, separated from neighboring nations, either by physical obstacles, or by the hatred or prejudices of centuries, had its own narrow and isolated civilization.[841] Thus, in the first place, a more and more extended experience of the evils of war, together with the progress of moral and political sciences, began to draw nations together by showing them that it was to their interest to dwell together in peace, and exchange with one another the products of their industry. Thus, again, the application of steam and electricity to locomotion, by annihilating space, so to speak, renders more and more practicable this exchange, which is now recognized as useful. Thus, thanks to this material and moral progress, local civilizations, formerly isolated, hostile, and without regular communication, began to unite, preserving in a general civilization their own peculiar characteristics.

But if we seek out the origin of this great progress which has assured and accelerated the march of civilization, we shall find that it comes, like all other progress, from the employment of the human mind in the observation of the phenomena of the moral and physical world; an employment which has become more general and more fruitful in proportion as men have been more interested in engaging in it. The men who have systematized the method of observation, and first among them Sir Francis Bacon,[842] have been objects of great praise, and surely this is only just. We must not, however, forget that this method was known and practiced from the very beginning of the world, since it is to observation, and to experience which is but another form of observation, that all human progress is due. If it was less fruitful in ancient times, it was, primarily, because the collection of previous knowledge which could be used to acquire new knowledge was less; it resulted also from the fact that, as liberty and property were less generally guaranteed than now, fewer men were interested in observing and in utilizing their observations. The use of technology,[843] for instance, which was abandoned for the most part to slaves, remained of necessity at a standstill. What interest would the slaves have had in improving it? But must not this lack of progress in certain essential branches of human knowledge in turn slowing down the rise of all the others? Do we not know that all progress is connected, and that discoveries made in any part of the domain of industry lead to others, frequently in an opposite end of this domain? There is certainly little connection between the manufacture of glass and the observation of celestial bodies; and still, how much has the progress in the art of glass-making advanced the progress of astronomy! In ancient times the lack of progress in technology, which slavery had degraded, deprived men of the ideas and tools necessary to enlarge the circle of their knowledge. In consequence, the method of observation was less effective in their hands, and sometimes even remained sterile. What was the result? Men, pressed for the solution of certain problems, and not perceiving how to solve them, declared the method of observation powerless, and built, upon the fragile basis of hypothesis, systems to which science was destined to do justice at a later day. The method of observation was discredited, especially when certain classes believed themselves interested in maintaining the solutions given by hypotheses; but this discrediting of the method of observation which had its first source in slavery was inevitably bound to disappear with it. In proportion as slavery disappeared, and the gap in the progress of technology began to be filled up, the method of observation, provided with new tools, acquired a range which no one would before have imagined it capable of. Its efficacy in solving problems which had before been regarded as beyond the human mind, then became manifest to all. The honor of being the first to recognize this fact belongs to Bacon; but does not the credit of popularizing and universalizing the method of observation belong still more to liberty than to Bacon? Isn’t it from the very moment when observation acquired liberty as an all-powerful ally and, to the degree that it had more liberty, observation increased its efforts and obtained the most marvelous results? Since the advent of industrial liberty, for example, has not the domain of civilization extended more, in one century, than it had in twenty centuries before?

By becoming more general, under the influence of the progress we have just described, the power of civilization has increased in an incalculable degree. Formerly, each isolated nation was confined almost exclusively to its own resources to develop its knowledge and increase its prosperity. Now, as the aptitudes of men are essentially different, according to race, climate, and circumstances of place; as the qualities of the soil are no less so, and the same piece of land is not equally well adapted for all kinds of crops; each isolated civilization necessarily remained incomplete. Only certain privileged individuals could use for the satisfaction of their wants, products brought from other parts of the globe.[844] The mass of the people were obliged to content themselves with the products of their own country, and the small extent of the market proved an insurmountable obstacle to the progressive developments of these products. The lack of communication was to a certain extent compensated for by artificially increasing the number of national industries, by learning about the industries of foreign nations. Unfortunately, this assimilation, useful when restricted within certain limits, was carried too far. Countries wished to produce everything, even those things which cost less when bought from foreign countries; and in this they partially succeeded by banning the use of imported goods.[845] But they still failed to attain the desired result, which was to increase the amount of things calculated to satisfy the needs of their inhabitants. Instead of increasing the number of their satisfactions, they reduced them. Instead of advancing in civilization, they relapsed into barbarism. We must add, however, that observation and experience are constantly endeavoring to do away with this error, as they have already done away with so many others. The more enlightened nations begin to perceive that it is their interest to obtain the greatest possible amount of satisfaction, for the smallest amount of effort, and that they can never attain this end by barricading themselves against the cheapness of goods. The time will come when they themselves will tear down the artificial barriers with which they have surrounded themselves in place of the natural barriers which the steam engine had broken down. On that day the elements of civilization which God has placed at the disposal of the human race, and the material and non-material capital which man has accumulated in the course of the centuries, will be best and most fruitfully employed; on that day also will the natural division of labor among the different nations, now impeded by artificial restrictions, be fully developed. We do not know, and it would be superfluous to conjecture, to what height civilization thus universalized will rise, and to what degree it will increase man’s moral and material satisfactions, while diminishing his efforts and his suffering. All that we can say is, that considering the progress which civilization has already made, the human mind, provided with a capital which increases so much more rapidly the more it accumulates; provided with all the tools necessary to preserve and propagate what it has required; urged on by needs which have never yet been satisfied, and which seem insatiable, will continue constantly to advance with a more rapid and a surer step until it reaches the undefined limit beyond which it cannot go.

Nevertheless, some minds are still in doubt as to the future of civilization, and present various objections on this point which it will be well to answer. Their principal objection may be thus stated: if civilized nations have no longer to fear the invasions of barbarians from without, are they not, on the other hand, daily more and more exposed to be overrun by the barbarians from within?[846] Do they not run the risk of falling back into barbarism, or at least of remaining for a long time stationary, by becoming the prey of those men who have not ceased to wallow in primitive ignorance. Doubtless civilization may be retarded in a country by ignorance, or, what amounts to the same thing, by the mistaken interest of a ruling class.[847] Nevertheless, this cause, antagonistic to civilization, has not so much influence as is attributed to it. If it is a multitude, imbued with utopian ideas, that seizes control of the government of society, experience, or even the simple discussion of these theories, readily proves to them their emptiness, and, as the multitude is most interested in the good government of society, a reaction takes place in its midst; it divests itself of its dangerous illusions, and civilization at once resumes its onward march. If society is, on the contrary, under the domination of a class attached to the maintenance of old abuses, the evil caused by these abuses after a greater or less delay, according to the more or less advanced state of the communication of ideas finally becomes manifest to every one. Then the pressure of public opinion puts an end to it.

A grave question here presents itself incidentally. Is it well to crush, if necessary, the resistance of the class attached to established abuses, to resort to revolutions to destroy these abuses, or is it better to wait till they disappear of themselves under pressure of the progress made outside the range of their baneful influence? This question plainly admits of two solutions, according to the circumstances of time and place. It may be affirmed, however, that in our day the peaceful solution is generally the better. Think, indeed, with an unprejudiced mind, of the results of certain events of quite recent occurrence, the enormous amount of capital they consumed, the active forces they absorbed, the dire calamities they produced; take into account, at the same time, the progress made since the invention of printing, and the application of steam to locomotion, and be convinced that revolution is too high a price to pay for progress in our day, and that it is best, therefore, to abstain from it, even in the interest of civilization.

A second objection, no less frequently urged, is the following: material wellbeing is not developed except at the expense of public morality; men become morally more corrupt, in proportion as their condition improves materially, and their civilization, so brilliant on the surface, is rotted from within. Nothing could be more false.[848] In the first place, the history of civilization proves that the branches of human knowledge which contribute to improving the moral nature of man, do not develop less rapidly than those which tend to develop his material prosperity. Religion, for instance, has never ceased, in the course of ages, to grow in perfection and purity, and to exercise, for this very reason, a most beneficial influence over human morality.[849] How superior is Christianity to Paganism in this respect! And can we not easily perceive progress in Christianity itself? Is not the Christian religion of today a more perfect instrument of moralization than it was in the days of the St. Dominics and the Torquemadas?[850] Do not the philosophical sciences also, and political economy in particular, labor more effectively every day to improve men’s morals by showing them every day more clearly that the observance of the laws of morality is an essential condition of their existence and well-being? In the second place, ought not material progress of itself, far from being an obstacle to the moral development of the human race, contribute, on the contrary, to sustain it? By rendering man’s labor more fruitful, and his existence easier, must it not tend to diminish the force and frequency of the temptations which impel him to violate the laws of morality in order to satisfy his material appetites? Experience, moreover, confirms these deductions drawn from the observation of our nature. The criminal records prove that the poorer classes commit, other things being equal, a greater number of crimes than the [492] richer classes; they prove also that crime decreases and morals improve in proportion as the comforts of life are extended to the lower strata of society. This objection, based upon a so-called moral erosion of nations occasioned by the development of material prosperity, is therefore at variance with observation and experience.

The third objection claims that the progress of industry has increased inequality among men. It holds that the tendency of industrial progress is to concentrate, on the one hand, masses of capital, and, on the other, multitudes of men whose condition becomes every day more miserable. Historical facts give the lie to this assertion. Compare the social inequality which exists in our day with that which existed in the time of the Roman empire; contrast with the slaves of the latifundia and the powerful head of a patrician family, the poorest workman with the richest of our bankers; and say whether the extremes of the social scale, far from having become more widely separated, have not come nearer together! Progress favors equality, or at least its continual tendency is to reduce social inequalities to the level of natural inequalities. We notice, in fact, that liberty and property are better guaranteed in proportion as civilization gains ground, and that the progress made in guaranteeing liberty and property, is the essential condition of all other progress. Now, if each man is obliged to depend upon his own industry for a livelihood; if there is no longer any plunder, open or hidden, to give to one man the fruits of another’s labor; if, in a word, the most powerful and active causes of inequality disappear, must not social differences inevitably end by coming down to the level of the differences which nature has made between men?

The only cause that could maintain and even aggravate these inequalities, by attributing to those who control the means of subsistence and the tools of labor an unwarranted predominance, is the permanent excess of population. Fortunately, the multiplication of the human species does not depend solely upon man’s power to reproduce; it depends also upon his foresight. Man has the power to control the production of beings like himself; he can speed up or slow down this production, depending upon whether he foresees that his own condition and that of the beings whom he brings into the world will be improved or impaired thereby.[851] But this foresight, which puts a beneficial limit to reproduction, naturally acquires greater strength and greater control in proportion as man becomes more enlightened.

In his Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, Condorcet demonstrated[852] that there would be less and less reason to fear an excess of population, owing to the natural development of foresight under the influence of civilization.[853]

Suppose,” he says, “the limit (at which population pressed on the means of subsistence) has been reached, no dreadful consequences would result, either to the well-being of the human species, or to its indefinite perfectibility; provided we suppose that before that limit was reached the progress of reason kept pace with the progress of the arts and sciences; … men would then know that, if they had duties to beings not yet in existence, these duties consist, not in giving them existence, but happiness; these duties have for their object the general well-being of the human species, or of the society in which those who are bound by them live or of the family to which they belong; and not the puerile idea of loading down the earth with useless and unhappy beings. There might, therefore, be a limit to the sum total of the means of subsistence, and consequently to the possible maximum of population, without its resulting in the premature destruction of a portion of living beings, which is so contrary to nature and social prosperity.”

We see that the different elements of our nature, and of the world in which we live, are so disposed that civilization appeared as an inevitable and irresistible fact. There is nothing, however, of fatality about it, inasmuch as it continually feels the influence of our free will. If it is not in the power of any one to stop it, or cause it to go backwards, each one can nevertheless exert an influence over its progress, and perhaps also over its end result. Infringe the liberty and property of others; do not utilize as much as you might the productive forces at your disposal; be lazy, ignorant and wasteful; and you will retard civilization. On the contrary, set an example of moral virtue, of respect for liberty and property, of the spirit of research, of diligent and hard work, and you will contribute your share toward advancing it. Each individual acts upon civilization for good or for evil, within the more or less extended sphere of his activity. Only, each one being more and more interested to act in such a manner as to contribute to its progress, the number of the acts which advance it surpass every day more and more the number of those which retard it. The general impulse given to civilization depends upon the sum of the faculties and needs which have been assigned to man, and upon the natural resources which have been placed at his disposal; but nonetheless it still remains subject to the action of man’s free will for any mishaps in its unfolding. Civilisation is a providential not an inevitable matter.

Now that we have described the elements of civilization, and have shown with the aid of what material and moral instruments the great work is carried on, how it can be accelerated and how retarded, let us sum up in a few words the economic characteristics by which civilization is recognized, and the end toward which it tends.

Civilization is seen to be the development of the power of man over nature. Now, there is an external sign by which this development may be recognized: the division of labor. The country in which labor is most divided in all its branches, where, for this very reason, social relations are most developed, is therefore evidently that in which civilization is most advanced.

Civilization has for its end the better satisfaction of our material and moral needs. It leads us, by progressively ameliorating the conditions of our existence, toward the ideal of the power and of the beauty adapted to our nature and the resources which the Creator has placed at our disposal.

The idea of an indefinitely improving civilization is modern.[854] In ancient times, when material progress was impeded by slavery, men could not conceive of any other progress than that of the sciences and the fine arts. Still the sight of the dangers to which civilized people were exposed, the destruction of so many local civilizations by the invasion of barbarians, must have eradicated all ideas of general and uninterrupted progress. This idea could hardly appear until after the invention of gunpowder and of printing. Its germination was slow. Vico prepared the way for it by collecting, in a systematic manner, the observations which he had made upon the development of civilized nations;[855] but Turgot was the first who enunciated it, supporting it by positive data (in his Discours en Sorbonne, and in his Essais de géographie politique).[856] Condorcet, with some differences, amplified the ideas of Turgot. In Germany, Kant discovered civilization in the spread of human liberty;[857] Herder studied, somewhat vaguely perhaps, its natural elements;[858] the economist Storch undertook to propound the theory of it.[859] Although incomplete, and faulty in certain respects, this theory is still worthy of study. At a later period Guizot drew a picture of the progress of civilization in Europe, and especially in France:[860] but the insufficiency of his economic knowledge is seen in his work, which is otherwise one of the most remarkable of the French historical school.[861] Lastly, civilization has also had its fiction writers. Taking no account either of the nature of man, nor of the conditions of his development, as observation and experience reveal them to us; the socialists have built up imaginary civilizations, as false or incomplete as the data upon which they rest.[862] Observation, which is the first tool of civilization, is also the only tool we can use to recognize and describe it.

Fashion

Source

“Mode,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 193-96.

Lalor: John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 2 East India Co. - Nullification. “Fashions, Political Economy of,” pp. 161-64.

Text

Fashion exercises considerable influence on a number of industries, particularly on those pertaining to clothing and lodging. Every change in fashion is a source of profit to some persons and of loss to others. A man who invents a new design or a new combination of colors in dry goods, or a new style of furniture or of a coat, and who succeeds in bringing his invention into fashion, may derive great profits from it, especially if his right to it is guaranteed him.[863] (See “Literary and Artistic Property.”)[864] On the other hand, the individuals who possess a supply of articles which are out of fashion, experience a loss. It is the same with the manufacturers and workmen who devote themselves to the production of these articles, when the new fashion varies noticeably from the old.

“It is well known,” said Malthus, “how subject particular manufactures are to fail, from the caprices of taste. The weavers of Spitalfields were plunged into the most severe distress by the fashion of muslins instead of silks; and great numbers of workmen in Sheffield and Birmingham were for a time thrown out of employment, owing to the adoption of shoe strings and covered buttons, instead of buckles and metal buttons”[865]

Thousands of similar examples might be cited.

McCulloch finds in these disturbances occasioned by fashion an argument for the poor-tax.

“It may be observed,” he says, “that owing to changes of fashion, … those engaged in manufacturing employments are necessarily exposed to many vicissitudes. And when their number is so very great as in this country [England], it is quite indispensable that a resource should be provided for their support in periods of adversity.”[866]

We do not wholly share the opinion of Mr. McCulloch on this subject. How, in fact, does fashion operate on certain industries and on certain classes of laborers? It acts as a risk. Now this risk, which may result in losses to the manufacturers and in stoppage of work to the workmen, must necessarily be covered, so that the profits of the one class and the wages of the other may be in just proportion to the average profits and wages in other branches of production. If it were otherwise, if the risk arising from the fluctuations of fashion were not completely covered, capital and labor would soon cease to be directed to branches of industry subject to this particular risk. Then, competition diminishing in these branches, profits and wages would not fail to increase until there was compensation for the risk. This being granted, suppose a law intervenes to guarantee to the workman a minimum amount of food during the time he is thrown out of employment in consequence of the variations of fashion; what will be the result? The risk arising from that cause being partially covered or compensated, the result will be that the wages of the workman will be lowered by an amount precisely equal to the risk covered, that is to say, by the amount of the tax. How then can the tax be an advantage to the workman, since it will not in reality have increased the amount of his resources? Doubtless the workman might have squandered his wages and have found himself destitute when the fashion changed, and the consequences of the risk fell upon him. The poor-tax is nothing but a compulsory savings bank, whose funds are levied from his wages, and on which he has the right to draw when out of employment. But must not a bank of this kind, by freeing the workman from the necessity of foreseeing the critical periods and providing for them, perpetuate his intellectual and moral inferiority? Is it not an insurance for which he pays too high a premium? (See “Wages” and the “Poor Tax.”)[867]

J. B. Say looked at the influence of fashion from a different point of view. According to that eminent economist, the frequency of changes in fashion occasions a ruinous waste.

“A nation and private individuals will give evidence of wisdom,” he says, “if they will seek chiefly articles of slow consumption but in general use. The fashions of such articles will not be very changeable. Fashion has the privilege of spoiling things before they have lost their utility, often even before they have lost their freshness: it increases consumption, and condemns what is still excellent, comfortable and pretty, to being no longer good for anything. Consequently, a rapid succession of fashions impoverishes a state by the consumption it occasions and that which it arrests.”[868]

These words of M. Say are evidently most judicious but we need not because of them, or because of the above-quoted observation of Malthus, condemn fashion from an economic point of view; for if fashion causes a certain harm and certain disturbances, especially when its fluctuations are too frequent, in return, it is one of the prime movers of artistic and industrial progress. This will be apparent from a single hypothetical case.

Let us suppose that fashion should cease to exercise its influence; that the same taste and the same style should continue to prevail indefinitely, in respect to clothing, furniture, and dwellings will not this permanence of fashion give a mortal blow to artistic and industrial progress? Who, pray, will exercise his ingenuity to invent anything new in the line of clothing, furniture, or dwellings, if the consumers have a dread of change, if every modification of fashion is considered an outrage, or even forbidden by law? People, in that case, will always do the same things, and, in all likelihood, will always do them, besides, in the same manner. Let the taste of the consumers, on the other hand, be variable, and the spirit of invention, of improvement, will be powerfully stimulated. Every new combination adapted to please the taste of consumers becoming then a source of profit to the inventor, every one will exercise his ingenuity in devising something new, and the activity thus given to the spirit of invention will be most favorable to the development of industry and the fine arts. It will sometimes happen, doubtless, that ridiculous fashions will replace elegant ones; but under the influence of a desire for change, for flitting about like a butterfly, as a Fourierist would say,[869] which gives birth to fashion, this invasion of bad taste would be transient, and people would continually advance by improvement upon improvement.

On examining the influence which fashion exercises over the development of industry and the fine arts, one becomes convinced that the invigorating impulse which it gives to the spirit of invention and improvement more than compensates for any injury it causes. Besides, fashions have their life expectancy, whose average may be easily calculated, and which the experience of producers, since they do not have have a “table of mortality rates” prepared ad hoc, is skilled in estimating. Rarely does an intelligent manufacturer produce more of any design or shade than the consumption can absorb before this design or this shade is out of fashion; and if, perchance, his forecast has proved incorrect, if the fashion passes by sooner than he had foreseen, he easily finds some way of getting rid of the excess of his merchandise among the large class of consumers who are behind the times. A certain kind of fabric or a certain hat which has become out of date in Paris, may yet, after two or three years, delight the ladies of lower Brittany or of South America.

We have just pointed out the influence fashion has on production. Let us now consider briefly its characteristics and the causes which determine its variations. Fashion is not alone affected by the physical influence of the temperature of a country and the moral influence of the taste and character of the population, it is also largely subject to the influence of the social and economic organization. The institutions of a people are reflected in it as in a mirror. Consequently, in countries where the abuses of privilege and despotism permit a class considered to be superior to maintain their idleness at the expense of the rest of the nation, the fashions are commonly ostentatious and complicated. They are ostentatious, because those who are privileged feel the necessity of dazzling the multitude by the splendor of their external appearance, and of thus convincing them that they are made of superior clay: “from porcelain clay of earth,” as the poet Dryden said.[870] The fashions are also complicated, because the privileged class have all the leisure necessary to devote a long time to their appearance, the sumptuousness of which serves, as has been said, to inspire in the vulgar an exalted idea of those who wear it. But let the condition of society be changed; let those who are privileged disappear; let the upper classes, henceforth subject to the law of competition, be obliged to employ their faculties in earning their living; we at once see fashions become simpler; and the embroidered coats, short clothes, dresses with trains or with paniers, in a word, all the magnificent and complicated apparel of aristocratic fashion are seen to disappear, to give place to attire easily adjustable and comfortable to wear.

In a witty pamphlet entitled England, Ireland and America, by a Manchester Manufacturer,[871] Richard Cobden pointed out, in 1835, with much acuteness and humor, the necessities which had operated within a half century to bring about this economic change of fashion. Mr. Cobden depicted the old London merchant with his magnificent costume and his formal manners, and showed how merciless competition caused the disappearance of this model of the good old times, to replace it with a modern type, with dress and habits infinitely more economical.[872]

“Such of our readers,” he says, “as remember the London tradesman of thirty years ago, will be able to call to mind the powdered wig and the queue, the precise shoes and buckles, and the unwrinkled silk hose and tight inexpressibles that characterized the shop-keeper of the old school. Whenever this stately personage walked abroad on matters of trade, however pressing or important, he never forgot for a moment the dignified step of his forefathers, while nothing gratified his self-complacency more than to take his gold-headed cane in hand, and, leaving his own shop all the while, to visit his poorer neighbors, and to show his authority by inquiring into their affairs, settling their disputes, and compelling them to be honest and to manage their establishments according to his plan. His business was conducted throughout upon the formal mode of his ancestors. His clerks, his shopmen and porters, all had their appointed costumes; and their intercourse with each other was disciplined according to established laws of etiquette. Every one had his especial department of duty, and the line of demarcation at the counter was marked out and observed with all the punctilio of neighboring but rival states. The shop of this trader of the old school retained all the peculiarities and inconveniences of former generations; its windows displayed no gaudy wares to lure the vulgar passer-by, and the panes of glass, inserted in ponderous wooden frames, were constructed exactly after the ancestral pattern…
The present age produced a new school of traders, whose first innovation was to cast off the wig, and cashier the barber with his pomatum-box,[873] by which step an hour was gained in the daily toilet. Their next change was, to discard the shoes and the tight unmentionables, whose complicated details of buckles and straps and whose close adjustment occupied another half hour, in favor of Wellingtons and pantaloons, which were whipped on in a trice, and gave freedom, though, perhaps, at the expense of dignity, to the personal movements during the day. Thus accoutered, these supple dealers whisked or flew, just as the momentary calls of business became more or less urgent; while so absorbed were they in their own interests that they scarcely knew the names of their nearest neighbors, nor cared whether they lived peaceably or not, so long as they did not come to break their windows.
Nor did the spirit of innovation end here; for the shops of this new race of dealers underwent as great a metamorphosis as their owners. While the internal economy of these was reformed with a view to give the utmost facility to the labor of the establishment, by dispensing with forms and tacitly agreeing even to suspend the ordinary deferences due to station, lest their observance might, however slightly, impede the business in hand; externally, the windows, which were constructed of plate glass, with elegant frames extending from the ground to the ceiling, were made to blaze with all the tempting finery of the day.
We all know the result that followed from this very unequal rivalry. One by one, the ancient and quiet followers of the habits of their ancestors yielded before the active competition of their more alert neighbors. Some few of the less bigoted disciples of he old school adopted the new-light system; but all who tried to stem the stream were overwhelmed; for with grief we add, that the very last of these very interesting specimens of olden time that survived, joining the two generations of London tradesmen whose shops used to gladden the soul of every Tory pedestrian in Fleet street, with its unreformed windows, has at length disappeared, having lately passed into the Gazette, that Schedule A of anti-reforming traders.[874]

From this ingenious and clever sketch we can clearly see the necessity which determined the simplification of the fashions of the old régime. This necessity arose from the suppression of the ancient privileges which permitted a member of the corporate body of tradesmen, or a manufacturing mechanic who had attained the rank of master, to pass his time attending to his appearance, or to meddle in the quarrels of his neighbors, instead of giving his attention to his own business: it arose from the extensive growth of competition, which obliged every merchant, every manufacturer, every head of a business enterprise, to take into account the value of time, under penalty of seeing his name finally inscribed under the fatal heading of a bankrupt. A régime of competition does not permit the same fashions as a régime of privilege; and fashion is as sensitive to modifications arising from the interior economy of society as it is to changes of temperature.

This being so, it is obvious that it is wrong for a government to attempt to influence fashion by obliging, for example, its servants to wear sumptuous and elaborate apparel. In fact, one of two results follow. Either the state of society is such that the ruling classes find it to their advantage to display a certain ostentation in their dress; and in this case it is useless to impose it on them, or even to recommend it to them. Or the state of society is such that people in all ranks of society have something better to do than to spend a long time over their appearance and dress: in this case, what good can result from the intervention of government in matters of fashion? If sumptuousness of attire becomes general, if men accustom themselves to spending part of their time to their way of dressing which is demanded by their business affairs, will not society suffer harm? If, on the contrary, the example given above is not followed, if the magnificence of the costumes of the court and the ante-chamber is not imitated, will not this display form a shocking disharmony in the business world?[875] Will it not produce an impression analogous to that one receives from a masquerade? A government should then carefully avoid interference in this matter, even if it means encouraging lace trimming and embroidery within the nation. It should follow fashions, not guide them.

To recapitulate: Fashion, looked at from an economic point of view, exercises on the improvement of production an influence whose utility more than compensates for the damage which may result from its fluctuations. On the other hand, it is naturally established and modified by various causes, among which economic causes hold an important place. When people do not understand the necessities which determine its changes, they establish artificial fashions, which have the double disadvantage of being anti-economic and ridiculous.

Fine Arts

Source

“Beaux-arts,” DEP, T. 1, pp. 149-57.

Lalor: John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 2 East India Co. - Nullification. “Fine Arts,” Vol. 2, pp. 206-11.

Text

The taste for the beautiful, that is to say, the need felt for a certain order and a certain harmony in things which affect the senses and the mind, either in sound, color, form, or movement, gave birth to the fine arts. To arrange sounds, forms, colors, or movements in a manner which shall produce an agreeable impression upon the senses or the mind, is the object of the musician, the painter, the architect, the sculptor, the poet, or, to use a general term, of the artist. In the specialist dictionaries the domain of the fine arts is commonly restricted to painting, sculpture, architecture, and music. Some even give the name of art only to the imitation by mechanical means of all forms in their highest degree of natural or ideal beauty. This is what the Germans call plastic art. This word embraces only such arts as drawing, painting, sculpture, and architecture, together with engraving and mosaic work.[876] But this definition is obviously too narrow. When a musician or a dancer awakens in the mind a sense of the beautiful, the one by harmonious cadences, the other by graceful and expressive movements, they are artists in the same sense that the painter, the sculptor, or the architect is. It is of little importance what may be the material or the instrument which the artist employs to operate upon the senses and the mind, provided he succeeds in pleasing them. The fine arts might, therefore, be defined in a general manner as any application of human labor to the production of the beautiful.

The fine arts are found among all nations, even the most barbarous, but they are more or less perfect, more or less developed, according to the state of civilization and the peculiar aptitudes of the people. The Greeks seem to have possessed in the highest degree the taste for the beautiful, and the faculties necessary to satisfy this elevated need of the senses and the mind. Hence Greece was for a long time a wonderful studio, in which painters, sculptors, architects, musicians, and poets vied with each other in ministering to the ruling passion of an artistic people. Other nations, like the ancient Mexicans, seem to have been entirely destitute of the feeling of the beautiful. The forms of the Grecian statues and monuments are as beautiful as those of the Mexican statues and monuments are hideous.

Man could make no great advance in the fine arts until after his more pressing needs were satisfied. Music and dancing probably were the first. Although the art of the architect and the sculptor could not be developed before the trade of the mason or the stone-worker, man needed only the graceful play of the limbs to invent dancing, and the free use of his voice or to dare blowing into a reed to invent music.

In his little known essay “Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called the Imitative Arts,” Adam Smith devotes himself to making some ingenious conjectures concerning the origin of music, danse, and poetry, and also in what way the first steps of progress in these different arts had to have taken place:[877]

After the pleasures which arise from the gratification of the bodily appetites, there seem to be none more natural to man than Music and Dancing. In the progress of art and improvement they are, perhaps, the first and earliest pleasures of his own invention; for those which arise from the gratification of the bodily appetites cannot be said to be his own invention. No nation has yet been discovered so uncivilized as to be altogether without them. It seems even to be amongst the most barbarous nations that the use and practice of them is both most frequent and most universal, as among the negroes of Africa and the savage tribes of America. In civilized nations, the inferior ranks of people have very little leisure, and the superior ranks have many other amusements; neither the one nor the other, therefore, can spend much of their time in Music and Dancing. Among savage nations, the great body of the people have frequently great intervals of leisure, and they have scarce any other amusement; they naturally, therefore, spend a great part of their time in almost the only one they have.
What the ancients called Rhythmus, what we call Time or Measure, is the connecting principle of those two arts; Music consisting in a succession of a certain sort of sounds, and Dancing in a succession of a certain sort of steps, gestures, and motions, regulated according to time or measure, and thereby formed into a sort of whole or system; which in the one art is called a song or tune, and in the other a dance; the time or measure of the dance corresponding always exactly with that of the song or tune which accompanies and directs it.
The human voice, as it is always the best, so it would naturally be the first and earliest of all musical instruments: in singing, or in its first attempts towards singing, it would naturally employ sounds as similar as possible to those which it had been accustomed to; that is, it would employ words of some kind or other, pronouncing them only in time and measure, and generally with a more melodious tone than had been usual in common conversation. Those words, however, might not, and probably would not, for a long time have any meaning, but might resemble the syllables which we make use of in fol-faing, or the [416] derry-down-down of our common ballads; and serve only to assist the voice in forming sounds proper to be modulated into melody, and to be lengthened or shortened according to the time and measure of the tune. This rude form of vocal Music, as it is by far the most simple and obvious, so it naturally would be the first and earliest.
In the succession of ages it could not fail to occur, that in room of those unmeaning or musical words, if I may call them so, might be substituted words which expressed some sense or meaning, and of which the pronunciation might coincide as exactly with the time and measure of the tune, as that of the musical words had done before. Hence the origin of Verse or Poetry.

It was possible to develop painting, sculpture, and, above all, architecture, only by the aid of technology. The trade of building must necessarily have preceded architecture. It was the latter’s mission to give to each individual edifice the kind of beauty appropriate to its purpose and to local exigencies. In architecture, as in literature, the same style would not apply equally well to all kinds of work. The architect is bound to give, for example, a religious character to a church, a secular character to be theatre or ball room. The Gothic style up to the present time seems to be that which is most appropriate to the manifestation of religious sentiment. In the Gothic cathedral, the ethereal height of the arches, the vast depth of the nave, and the mysterious subdued light from the windows, join with the profound and solemn accents of the Gregorian chant and the grave and majestic tones of the organ, in awakening the sentiment of veneration. The colorful style of the renaissance is better calculated to excite mundane and worldly thoughts. Hence it is the one chosen for theatres and ball rooms.

The original propensities of nations have naturally exercised a great influence upon the development of the fine arts. Only a religious and melancholy people could have invented Gothic architecture. In Greek architecture is found that exquisite elegance which marked all the customs as well as all the works of the privileged Hellenic race. The affected and bizarre customs of the Chinese are also found reflected in their architecture as well as in their dress.

The necessities of climate and the configuration of the ground have exercised a great influence upon the development of architecture, and they have often determined the character of it. Necessities of another order have also operated upon the development of architecture and other arts.

Throughout all antiquity is seen the influence which the fine arts exercised over the mind. For a long time they were considered as an instrumentum regni (tool of the king), as a means of appealing to and mastering the imagination by terror or respect. The gigantic constructions of the Assyrians and Egyptians, constructions the utility of which we vainly endeavor to discover to-day, had perhaps no other object. These exterior signs of power were then necessary to make a simple-minded people accept the absolute dominion of a race or caste. Those who claimed to be the representatives of divinity upon earth were obliged to show themselves superior to other men, in everything that was considered to be a manifestation of strength or majesty. The co-operation of the fine arts was indispensable to the display of their power. They needed them to construct their temples and palaces, to ornament them with magnificent decorations, and to fashion their garments and their arms. Architects, painters, sculptors, musicians, and poets were no less necessary to them than soldiers and priests in sustaining the imperfect and vicious structure of their dominion. Hence the particular care which governments in all ages have given to the development of the fine arts, and the ostentatious protection which they have accorded them, very frequently to the great detriment of other branches of production.

Although, in the past, the fine arts were powerful auxiliaries of politics and religion, fortunately, as nations have developed intellectually and morally as their minds and sentiments have broadened and become refined, this display has exercised less influence over the minds of the people, and the fine arts have lost their political and religious importance. The taste for the beautiful has ceased little by little to be used as an instrument of domination.

Economists have asked themselves two main questions on the subject of the fine arts. They have inquired, first, whether the fine arts are a kind of national wealth and second, whether the intervention of the government to [208] protect them is necessary.

Do the products of the fine arts constitute a kind of wealth? As regards all that concerns architecture, painting, and sculpture, there can be no doubt as to the answer. A building, a statue, and a picture are material riches, the accumulation of which evidently augments the capital of a nation. But can as much be said of the products of music and dancing? Can the talent of the musician and the dancer be regarded as productive? Adam Smith says, no; J. B. Say and Dunoyer[878] say, yes. According to Smith’s doctrine, the name “products” can not be given to things which are consumed at the very moment of their creation. To which J. B. Say answers, and rightly, as we think:[879]

If we descend to things of pure enjoyment, we can not deny that the representation of a good comedy gives as much pleasure as a box of bonbons or an exhibition of fire-works. I do not consider it reasonable to claim that the painter’s talent is productive, and that the musician’s is not so.

But although J. B. Say recognizes the musician’s talent as productive, he does not admit that its products can contribute to the increase of a nation’s capital. He states his reasons for this opinion as follows:[880]

It results from the very nature of immaterial products that there is no way to accumulate them, and that they can not serve to augment the national capital. A nation which contains a great number of musicians, of priests and of clerks, might be a nation well endowed as to amusements and doctrines, and admirably well administered, but its capital would not receive from all the work of these men any increase, because their products would be consumed as fast as they were created.

But does it follow, because a product, material or nonmaterial, is consumed immediately after having been created, that it does not increase the capital of a nation? May it not increase, if not its external capital, at least its internal capital, or, to make use of Storch’s expression,[881] the capital of its physical, intellectual, and moral faculties? Would a population deprived of the services of clergymen, administrators, musicians, and poets, a population, consequently, to which religious, political and artistic education was wanting, be worth as much as one sufficiently provided with those different services? Would not man, considered at the same tme as capital and as an agent of production, be worth less under the former circumstances than under the latter?

In his work, De la liberté du travail, M. Charles Dunoyer has completely demonstrated that the consumption of the material or non-material products of the fine arts develops in man valuable and essential faculties;[882] whence it results that artistic products of the fine arts develops in man valuable faculties; whence it results that artistic production, material or non-material, cannot be considered unproductive.

Let us complete this demonstration of the productiveness of the fine arts by means of a simple hypothesis. Suppose her musicians and singers were taken away from Italy, would she not be deprived of a kind of wealth, even if these artists were replaced by an equal number of laborers, carpenters, and blacksmiths? Italy profits by the work of her musicians and her singers as absolutely as she does from the products of agriculture or of manufacturing industry.[883] In the first place she consumes a part of it herself, and this consumption serves to educate the Italian people by developing their minds, by refining and polishing their manners. Then, another part of the products of the fine arts, of which Italy is the nursery, is exported each year. Italy supplies a great number of foreign theatres with its composers, its musicians, and its singers. In exchange for their non-material products, these art-workers receive other products purely material, a part of which they commonly bring back to their own country. What laborer, for instance, would have added so much as Rossini to the wealth of Italy? What seamstress or dressmaker, however capable or industrious, would have been worth as much as Catalani[884] or Pasta[885] from the same point of view? The production of the fine arts can not then be considered unproductive for Italy.

The fine arts, then, can contribute directly to increase the capital of a nation, whether material capital or non-material capital, which resides in the physical, moral, and intellectual faculties of the population. They are in consequence productive in the same degree and in the same sense that all the other branches of human work are.

Artistic production also, like all others, is effected by previous accumulation, the co-operation of capital and labor. In this respect artistic production offers no particular point of interest, except that it gives birth more frequently than any other kind of production, agricultural industry excepted, to natural monopolies. Great artists possess a natural monopoly, in this sense, that the competition among them is not sufficient to limit the price of their work to the level of what is strictly necessary for them to execute it. Jenny Lind[886] possessed a natural monopoly, for the remuneration which she obtained on account of the rarity of her voice, was very disproportionate to what was strictly necessary for her to exercise her profession of a singer. The difference forms a kind of rent, of the same nature exactly as rent derived from land.[887] If nature and art had produced a thousand Jenny Linds, instead of producing but one, it is evident that the monopoly which she enjoyed would not have existed, or that it would have been infinitely less productive. Painters, sculptors, and architects possess in their reputation a still more extensive monopoly, for it exists and is principally developed after their death. The value of this monopoly depends upon the merit of the artist and upon the quantity of his works. According as the number of works produced by a painter or sculptor is more or less considerable, the price of each one is more or less high. Where the merit is equal, the pictures or statues of the masters who produced the least have a greater pecuniary value than those of the masters whose productions are numerous. Thus, for example, an ordinary picture by the Dutch painter, Hobbema,[888] commonly sells for more than an ordinary picture by Rubens,[889] although Hobbema does not rank so high in art as Rubens. But the former produced only a small number of pictures, while the latter left an enormous number of works. Supposing, also, that the pictures of Ingres[890] and Horace Vernet[891] were equally prized by amateurs, the former would always have a higher monetary value to the latter, simply because they are rarer. The differences in the price of objects of art, and the variations which their value in exchange undergoes, notably when fashion takes up again a style which it had abandoned, are curious to study; some valuable ideas are found here in regard to the influence which the fluctuations of demand and supply exercise upon prices, also some interesting information as to the origin, progress, and end of natural monopolies.

After having examined the question of the productiveness of the fine arts, we must now see if this kind of production should be specially directed and encouraged by the government, or should be abandoned to the free action of individuals, like all other kinds of production.

The Egyptians and almost all the nations of antiquity condemned to slavery their prisoners of war, and sometimes entire nations whom they had subjugated. They employed these slaves to construct their monuments. We know that the Israelites helped to build the pyramids. But the Egyptian monuments are more remarkable for their gigantic proportions than for their beauty. It is plain that the object of the people, or rather of the caste which instructed them, was to inspire the mind with awe rather than to charm it. In Greece the products of the fine arts have quite a different character. They bear above all the imprint of liberty. Greek art was not subject to a government or a caste. The greatest number of Greek monuments were built by means of voluntary contributions. The famous temple of Diana at Ephesus, for instance, was erected by the aid of contributions from the republics and kings of Asia, as later was St. Peter’s at Rome in part by the money of Christendom. When Erostratus reduced it to ashes, a new subscription was made to rebuild it. All the citizens of Ephesus considered it an honor to contribute. The women even sacrificed their jewels.[892] At Delphos, also, the temple was rebuilt, after a fire, at the public expense. The architect, Spantharus of Corinth, was engaged to complete it, for the sum of 300 talents. Three-fourths of this sum was furnished by the different cities of Greece, and the other fourth by the inhabitants of Delphos, who collected money even in the most distant countries to aid in completing their quota. A certain Athenian added a sum of money for the decorations, which were not included in the original plan. The greater part of the ornaments of the temple were offerings from the cities of Greece or from private citizens. Thirteen statues by Phidias were a gift from the Athenians. These statues were the result of a tenth part of the plunder taken by the Athenians from the plains of Marathon. A great number of other objects of art commemorated the victories of the different peoples of Greece in their intestine wars.[893]

A part of the revenue of the Greek temples was applied to the support of the priests, and another part to the support and decoration of the buildings. The priests made the greatest sacrifices to ornament the dwelling place of the gods, and these sacrifices were rarely unproductive, for in Greece, as elsewhere, the best lodged gods were always those which brought in the most revenue. The fine arts were also nurtured by the rivalries of the small states, into which Greek territory was divided, as to which should have the finest temples, statues, and pictures. This competition, pushed to excess gave rise to more than one abuse. Thus it was agreed, after the invasion of the Persians, that henceforth a contribution should be levied upon Greece to defray the common expenses, and that the Athenians should be made the holders of it. Pericles did not hesitate to divert these funds from their proper destination, and employ them for the decoration of Athens. Such an odious abuse of confidence aroused the indignation of all Greece against the Athenians, and was one of the principal causes of the Peloponnesian war.

The Romans, less happily endowed than the Greeks, from an artistic point of view, did not make such considerable sacrifices for the encouragement of the fine arts. At Rome, as in Egypt, the arts were chiefly employed to display to the conquered nations the power and majesty of the sovereign people. The construction of monuments of the arts was still among the Romans a means of keeping their troops in habits of work and of occupying their slaves. The taste for the beautiful did not enter much into these enterprises, and art naturally felt the effects of this. Still, under Augustus, there was at Rome a great artistic movement, a movement which was due in great part to the development of communication between Rome and Greece. Augustus had built the portico of Octavia, the temple of Mars Ultor, the temple of Apollo, the new Forum, and many other monuments of less importance. His friends, L. Cornificius, Asinius Pollion, Marcius Philippus, Cornclius Balbus, and his son-in-law Agrippa, erected at their own expense a great number of monuments. Attributing to himself, as is common among sovereigns, all the merit of the advance which the arts had made under his reign, Augustus said, some time before his death: “I found Rome a city of clay bricks, and left it a city of marble.”[894] At Rome, as in Greece, the statues were innumerable. The greater part of the chief citizens erected statues to themselves at their own expense. The censors endeavored to deprive them of this trifling satisfaction, by forbidding the erection of statues at Rome without their permission. But as this prohibition did not extend to the statues which decorated country houses, the rich citizens evaded the ordinance of the censors, by multiplying their effigies in their splendid villas.

At the time of the downfall of the Roman empire, the barbarians destroyed with stupid rage the finest masterpieces of ancient art. The fine arts then disappeared with the temporary eclipse of civilization. But they soon sprang up again, thanks to the expansion of the religious sentiment supported by municipal liberties. Gothic art owes its birth and progress to the Christian sentiment developed in the emancipated communes of the middle age. A fact which is generally ignored is, that the expense of constructing the greater number of the magnificent cathedrals which adorn European cities, was in great part defrayed by voluntary contributions of residents of the city, nobles, bourgeois, or simple journeymen. Nothing is more interesting, even from the simple economic point of view, than the history of these wonders of Gothic art. At a time when poverty was universal, nothing but religious enthusiasm could have made people decide to impose upon themselves the necessary sacrifices for their erection. And nothing was neglected to rouse and excite this enthusiasm. The bishop and the priests furnished an example by sacrificing a part of their revenues to aid in constructing the cathedral; indulgences without end were promised to those who contributed to the holy work, either by their time or their money. When there was need of it, miracles happened to animate the languishing zeal of the faithful. By casting a glance over the history of the principal cathedrals, one will be convinced that diplomatic skill was no less needed than artistic genius to bring those great religious enterprises to fruition. At Orléans, for instance, Saint Euverte[895] having undertaken the construction of the first cathedral in the fourth century, an angel revealed to this pious bishop the very place where it should be built. In digging the foundations of the building the workmen found a considerable amount of treasure; and the very day of the consecration of the church, at the moment when Saint Euverte was celebrating mass, a dazzling cloud appeared above his head, and from this cloud issued forth a hand, which blessed three times the temple, the clergy, and the assembled people! This miracle converted more than seven thousand pagans, and gave a great reputation to the church of Orléans.

At Chartres, Bishop Fulbert[896] devoted in the first place three years’ income and the income from the abbey, to the construction of the cathedral; afterward he bequeathed a considerable sum to continue the work. The pious Matilda, wife of William the Conqueror, was associated with him in his work, and gave the greater part of the lead roofing of the cathedral. A physician of Henry I. built at his own expense one of the lateral portals.[897] Those who had no money gave their work. Artisans[898] from all professions voluntarily offered their services as workers in this entreprise which had been blessed by heaven. A large number of the inhabitants of Rouen and others dioceses in Normandy, equipped with the blessing of their archbishop or bishop, came to join these workers. The band of pilgrims choose a leader from among selves who allocated to each person the job that he had to carry out. The works was carried out with reverence, and during the night altar candles were placed on the wagons around the church and they stayed awake by singing.

At Strasburg, great indulgences were promised to the faithful who would contribute to the building of the cathedral. Gifts flowed in from all parts. Still the construction of that magnificent cathedral lasted for nearly four centuries. Commenced in the twelfth century, it was not finished till the fifteenth. The construction of the cathedral gave a great reputation to the stone-workers of Strasburg. These workmen, who furnished the greatest architects of the time, formed in the German empire, as well as in France, a body distinct from that of ordinary masons. Up to the time of the French revolution, they continued to be in charge of the repair and preservation of the Strasburg cathedral.[899]

The cathedrals of Europe, therefore, the most magnificent and most original monuments which it possesses, are due, in a great part, to the zeal and the faith of individuals. Sometimes, doubtless, this faith and zeal were excited by pious frauds;[900] sometimes also the pride of the bourgeois and the workmen were appealed to, to induce them to construct a more spacious and more beautiful cathedral than that of a neighboring and rival city; but in general no recourse was had to coercive measures; there was no levying of taxes to be specially devoted to the construction of churches, the sacrifices which the clergy generously imposed upon themselves and the voluntary gifts of the faithful were sufficient, and assured the multiplication of masterpieces of the Gothic art in an age of universal misery and barbarism.

In Italy the constitution of a multitude of small municipal republics was especially favorable to the development of the fine arts. Rivals in commerce, the Italian republics were also rivals in the arts. The rich merchants of Genoa, of Pisa, of Florence, and of Venice made it a point of honor to protect the arts and to endow their cities with magnificent monuments. This spirit of emulation seized the popes, and Rome disputed with Florence for the great artists of Italy. The basilica of St. Peter’s was commenced; but as the ordinary resources of the papacy were insufficient to complete this immense enterprise, recourse was had to a special issue of indulgences; unfortunately this particular kind of paper, having been made too common, depreciated in value, and ended by being refused in a great number of Christian countries. So the gigantic basilica was never completely finished. With the political and commercial decline of the republics, which spread like a network over Italian soil, commenced that of the fine arts in Italy. The encouragement of despotism was never able to restore them to the splendor which they had in the time of the municipal republics of the middle ages and of the renaissance.

In France, Louis XIV, thought that in his own interests it was his duty to protect the arts. So prompted by the great king, Colbert[901] founded the Academy of Fine Arts.[902] Unfortunately, the great king and his minister did not continue to support this innovation. Louis XIV. spent enormous sums upon his royal dwellings. Under his reign the fine arts became the auxiliaries of war in crushing other nations.

In his learned Histoire de la vie et de l’administration de Colbert, M. Pierre Clément[903] estimated at 165,000,000 livres in the money of the period, the sums which Louis XIV. spent on buildings, and in the encouragement of the fine arts and manufactures. The details are as follows:

 

Livres

Total expense of Versailles: Churches, Trianon, Clagny, St. Cyr: the Marly machine; the river Eure; Noisv and Molineaux

81,151,414

Pictures, stuffs, silverware, antiques

6,386,674

Furniture and other expenses

13,000,000

Chapel (constructed 1699-1710)

3,260,241

Other expenses of all kinds

13,000,000

Total for Versailles and surroundings

116,796,429

   

Saint Germain

6,455,561

Marly (not including the machine which figures in the Versailles item)

4,501,279

Fontainebleau

2,773,746

Chambord

1,225,701

Louvre and Tuileries

10,608,969

Arch of Triumph of St. Antoine (demolished in 1716)

513,755

Observatory of Paris (constructed 1667-72)

725,174

Royal Hotel and Church of the Invalides

1,710,332

Place Royal of the Hotel Vendôme

2,062,699

The Val-de-Gràce

3,000,000

Annunciades of Meulan

88,412

Canal of the two seas (not including what was furnished by the estates of Languedoc)

7,736,555

Manufactories of Gobelins and Savonnerie

3,645,943

Manufactories established in many cities

1,707,990

Pensions and gratuities to men of letters

1,979,970

[sub total added by me]

48,736,086

[Grand total added by me]

165,532,515

Grand total

165,534,515

“By taking as a base, adds M. Clément, the mean value of the mark of silver in Louis XIV’s time and in 1846, we shall find that the approximate value of the above is about 350,000,000 francs. But when we remember the wonders of Versailles alone, it is probable that all the buildings of Louis XIV., if executed in our day, would cost not far from a billion.”[904]

Still these ostentatious expenditures contributed in no way to the progress of the fine arts. Under Louis XIV. art was only a reminder of antiquity or of the renaissance. In the eighteenth century, taste in art, fettered by the immutable rules of the state-subsidized academies, became more and more corrupt. The revolution destroyed official protection, but it was wrong in not stopping there; the vandals of that time placed their sacrilegious hands upon the masterpieces of the past, as if they were suspected of royalism. On the other hand, the ridiculous imitations were reproduced no less ridiculously in the arts. To the corrupt taste of Watteau, Boucher and Vanloo, succeeded the false taste of the school of David.[905] Napoleon did not fail to re-establish official protection. “I wish,” he wrote to his minister of the interior, Count Cretet, “I wish the fine arts to flourish in my empire.” But the fine arts did not hasten to obey the injunction of the despot, and the imperial epoch was anything but artistic.[906]

Since this time we haven’t stopped officially protecting the arts in France. Here is what their budget was in 1849:[907]

 

Francs

French Académie in Rome

122,000

Special School of Beaux-Arts in Paris

109,000

Conservatory of Music and Drama

165,500

Churches in Lille and Toulouse

6,000

Free Schools of Design

54,800

National Museums (personnel)

158, 700

Id. (physical)

151,700

Works of Art and the Decoration of Public Buildings

900,000

Acquisition of Paintings for the Louvre

50,000

Preservation of Ancient Historical Monuments

745,000

Subsidies and Subscriptions

186,000

Annual Payments and Support given to artists, playwrights, composers, and to their widows

37,700

Subsidies to the National Theatres

1,474,000

[my total - total in DEP is incorrect]

4,001,700

Total

4,260,100

The administration of Beaux-Arts depends upon the budget of the Ministry of the Interior.[908] It is made up of one division whose Director is specially charged with the task of “making art flourish in France,” to use the expression of Napoléon. In the budget for the support of religion there are still some paragraphs which more or less directly concern the Beaux-Arts. This is what we find for 1849:

 

Francs

For the maintenance and large-scale repair of diocesan buildings

1,700,000

Support for acquisitions or works concerning churches and presbyteries

1,000,000

Restoration of the Cathedral of Paris

550,000

Extraordinary work on diocesan buildings, churches, temples, And presbyteries

1,000,000

[my total]

4,250,000

Total

4,250,000

Outside of the ordinary budget there are frequent votes for allocation of monies to build or finish buildings which are called “national,” whether they are at the expense of the state or the municipal budgets. To cite some figures, the following “extraordinary” amounts have been set aside: 10 million to the construction of the Arc-de-Triomphe de l'Étoile; 11 million 500 thousand to the Palace of the Council of State, 7 million 500 thousand to the Stock Exchange,[909] 13 million 400 thousand francs for the Church of Madeleine, and 2 million for the Notre-Dame-de-Lorette.

The grants that the French government gives to the Beaux-Arts is therefore quite considerable. At least if it contributes to making them progress! But in France like everywhere else, progress in the arts is almost always achieved outside of the sphere of government. Among the paintings ordered by the government over the past 20 years can one cite a single work “outside the norm”? Historical and religious genres which are particularly protected have reached a state of complete decadence. Paintings of the countryside, of interiors, the actual genres which the public alone supports by buying them, is progressing. Similarly, if the construction of public buildings leaves much to be desired, that of individual homes has made considerable progress in terms of elegance and comfort. Furthermore one can perfectly explain why the government is not suited to protecting the Beaux-Arts. The government as protector of the arts is personified by the nature of administration and in how one becomes a minister. Administration is routine by its very nature; a minister, usually a former lawyer, professor, or journalist, in taking possession of his portfolio does not inevitably acquire the taste of a Mécène[910] or a Medici. Besides, he has many other concerns to attend to: he has to correspond with the Prefects; to instruct the Mayors of towns, to direct the police (gendarmerie), and to defend the policies of the government in the Chamber. He lacks the time to direct or supervise the use of the funds granted to support the Beaux-Arts. He is forced to leave this task up to his subordinates who are no more accountable than he himself is for the good use of these grants. Should one be surprised after all this, if the support funds which were so painfully snatched from the tax-payers now serve rather to feed bureaucratic intrigue and savoir-faire than to encourage artistic merit and knowledge?[911]

The establishment of a university subsidized by the Beaux-Arts administration again has had the result of perpetuating classical habits of thinking and in provoking an often exaggerated and eccentric reaction against these habits. The celebrated “war of the classics and the romantics” had its main cause in the protection which the government gave to the classics. The latter wanted to preserve at all costs the imitation of the Greek or Roman style, by stating that if one went beyond this one would fall into the most dreadful anarchy. Their adversaries wished on the contrary to innovate at any price, and it didn’t matter in what way since one had to replace the imitation of antiquity with that of the middle ages or the Renaissance: in the presence of the classical “conservatives,” they (the romantics) stood in quite well for the “socialists.” But if the government had not taken upon itself to artificially support the old classical habits, if education and the practice of the Beaux-Arts had been completely left to individuals to face the costs and risks, isn’t it likely that the errors of the past would have been more quickly rectified and that the protest of Romanticism would have been less violent, and less muddled. Without the abuses and habits of our economic and administrative régime, wouldn’t we have seen socialism disappear? Government protection has thus been damaging to the arts in the same way. We have no need to add that it has been even more damaging to the public treasury: we pay first of all for the education and support of artists; then we pay for the buildings erected by them, and these buildings reproduced in the Greek and Roman style, these buildings whose style and layout suit neither the requirements of their particular specification, nor the demands of the climate, have not failed to be very uncomfortable and to be very expensive.

“Architecture,” says M. Horace Say who has seen close up the abuses of this branch of the university and protectionist régime, “is taught at Paris at the School of Fine Arts. In order to gain admission to this school it is necessary to have made a beautiful drawing; anything beyond this is considered to be a very little use. In order to graduate with honors it is necessary to have made an even more beautiful drawing, and thereby to get to be sent at government expense to the School which France runs in Rome. Having arrived under the beautiful sky of Italy, the pupil of architecture, the comrade of the painter, the sculptor, and the musician, feels his imagination blossoming: he grabs his paintbrush; his watercolors take on more vigor; he makes his skies azure blue and reproduces all the ruins he sees. Having reached the age of maturity he finally returns to France. He has especially familiarized himself with the practices of a world which no longer exists but he knows little of the needs of our own time, very little of mathematics, less still of physics, chemistry, mechanics; he has given little thought to how to calculate the forces, measure the weights, or the strength of building materials; and has no idea of the use of wood or iron which has become the common practice in Germany and England, any more than the methods used in Prussia and Russia to properly seal doors and to make homes warm.
The artistic student of architecture, after having thus fulfilled the intentions of the government which has watched over his education and which has demanded of him nothing more than what he has done, looks for a way to create a name for himself through his work, by giving everything he makes the cachet that he has unlocked the secret of architecture by contemplating Greek and Roman ruins. In his turn he wishes to gain entry to the Academy and access to it is made easy by the camaraderie of the School of Rome. While waiting for this appointment he gets all the goodwill of the administration of the office of Beaux-Arts in the Ministry of the Interior. He becomes a member of the Council of Civil Buildings, and from then on he can contribute to stopping by his veto any useful project which deviates from what he considers to be the classical rules of architecture. We know that the tutelage which is imposed on the Communes requires that they cannot erect any kind of structure without having got their plans previously approved by the Minister. Now, the Minister only gives his approval after having received the advice of the Council of Civil Buildings, and the classical school of architecture, which generally provides quite poor plans and very incomplete projects, is thus yet again in a position to get rejected everything which does come from them or which is theirs.”[912]

Thus one can see that a monopoly in matters relating to the arts is not worth any more than one relating to matters in industry or commerce.

It is a common opinion[913] that modern civilization is not favorable to the progress of the fine arts. As proof in support of this opinion, are cited the English and Americans, who, at the head of industrial civilization, are in a state of inferiority from an artistic point of view. But it is forgotten that all nations are not endowed with all aptitudes, any more than all soils are provided with fertility of all kinds. While certain northern nations obtained as their heritage industrial genius, artistic aptitudes fell to the lot of the southern nations. Certain nations have been for centuries the workshops of the fine arts, as others have been the workshops of manufacturing industry. As international exchange becomes more developed, this division of labor will be more marked, and it will facilitate more and more the progress of the fine arts as well as that of the industrial arts.[914] The progress of the arts will be accelerated also by the spread of comfort, which will increase their market, and by the progress of industry, which will place new materials and new tools at their disposal. Fewer palaces, perhaps, will be built, fewer battle pieces painted than in the past, but railway stations and palaces for industrial expositions will be constructed;[915] the splendid and grand landscapes of the new world, which steamships render more and more accessible to European artists, will be painted; and statues will be erected to useful men instead of to conquerors. On the other hand, the use of light materials, of iron and glass for example, renders possible to-day artistic combinations unknown to the ancients. The employment of new tools, invented or perfected by industry, will give birth to progress in other ways. Has not the multiplication of musical instruments already given an immense impetus to instrumental music?[916] In an artistic sense, as in all others, modern civilization is probably destined to surpass ancient civilization. But if liberty was the essential condition of the progress of the arts in the past, it will be no less so in the future. Like all other branches of production, and more still because of the character of spontaneity which is peculiar to them, and which has given to them the name of liberal arts, the fine arts will progress the more rapidly the sooner they are freed from all protection and all shackles.

Freedom Of Commerce and Free Trade

Source

“Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 49-63.

John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 3 Oath - Zollverein. “Protection,” pp. 413-23.

Editor’s Note

Lalor omitted the first part of Molinari’s article “Ses bases naturelles” (Its Foundation in Nature) where he discusses how trade and exchange is an inherent part of human nature (both theoretically and historically), how once exchange between individuals takes place it is soon followed by the practice of the division of labour both domestically and internationally, which results in massive increases in human productivity and wealth. This introductory section has been translated by us and included where it belongs in Molinari’s original article. The long Bibliography of American works which Lalor added has been cut for reasons of space.

Text

I. Its Foundation in Nature.

If there is any principle which is solidly supported by the evidence it is assuredly that of free trade.[917] In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to cast one’s eye over the nature of man and the environment in which he is found.

Man has physical, intellectual, and moral needs, the satisfaction of which is necessary for the maintenance of his existence and the improvement of his being. He has to feed, clothe, and house himself under the threat of dying; he has to develop his mind and his soul, under the threat of living simply the life of an animal.

To acquire these necessities for his existence, man has at his disposal a part of creation, and he is equipped with faculties with whose assistance he can extract from the environment in which he lives all the elements needed for his material and moral subsistance. The earth with its countless varieties of minerals, plant and animal life, its oceans, its mountains, its fertile soil, the atmosphere which surrounds it, the steady stream of warmth and light which feed the life on its surface, here is the bounty which Providence has put in the service of humanity. However, neither the various elements which make up the natural bounty of subsistence, nor the faculties which mankind has at his disposal to make use of them, have been distributed in an equal and uniform manner. Each region of the globe has its own particular geological make up: here lies immense strata of coal deposits, iron ore, lead, copper; there lie gold, silver, platinum, and precious stones. There is the same diversity in the distribution of plant and animal species: the sun, which warms and lights up the earth unequally, which gives warmth and light lavishly to certain regions, while at the same time leaves others in the freezing cold and darkness, marks out for each species the boundaries of its existence which it cannot escape. Furthermore, there is the same diversity in distribution of human abilities. A brief examination is sufficient to show that all nations have not been endowed with the same aptitudes, that the French, the English, the Italians, the Germans, the Russians, the Chinese, the Indians, the Africans have their own particular skills, whether they come from their race, or the natural circumstance of soil or climate; that the physical, intellectual, and moral strengths of men vary according to one’s race, nation, and family; that there are no two individuals in the world with the same abilities and skills. There is diversity and inequality in the factors of production in the different regions of the globe; and no less pronounced diversity and inequality in the skills among human beings. This then is the spectacle with which creation presents us.

Out of this natural arrangement of things arises the necessity to trade. Since no region of the globe can be the center for all industries, and since no individual can produce in isolation all the things necessary for the satisfaction of his needs, what do men do? Those who are less well endowed, those who are in a transition period between the human race and the other animal species, content themselves with products which they are capable of fabricating themselves and for which they have the raw materials at hand. They remain stuck in primitive barbarism and they find themselves constantly subjected to the harshest privation. Such are the natives of New Holland (Australia)[918] and some of the archipelagos in the South Seas. However, the more intelligent of them came to realize that there is a procedure which will soon put at their disposal all the resources of creation. Instead of producing everything poorly, each person applies himself to doing those things which his particular skills and the kind of raw materials he has at his disposal, allows him to produce easily; and that he exchanges these for the things which he produces with difficulty or of which he is incapable. Thanks to this procedure, which is both so simple and so productive, each person can get a greater and greater quantity of things which are necessary for the satisfaction of his needs, and which will expand and improve his existence without limit. (See, “Exchange.”)[919]

Thus exchange appears to be a necessity which arises from the nature of man and from the circumstances in which he finds himself; and the freedom to trade is nothing less than the liberty of working, which is a natural institution.

Once the practice of trading has been discovered, the division of labour can be established and industry can be improved. (See, “The Division of Labour”).[920] Then exchanges multiply and the sphere in which they can operate is enlarged. This sphere is initially quite limited and it varies considerably according to the kind of goods traded. Heavy and bulky goods can only be traded over a short distance from their place of production; objects which contain a considerable value in a small volume, such as precious metals, food, arms, and luxury goods like jewelry and perfume, they alone can be carried to far off markets. But gradually the obstacle of distance can be overcome. Countries which have the advantage of being criss-crossed by numerous streams of navigable water, and bathed by the ocean, are the first to offer the spectacle of an expanded commerce, and as a result of this very fact they become the principal centres of civilisation itself. Man-made routes into the interior are then opened up and the sphere of exchange is enlarged with each improvement in communication routes and the means of locomotion. In our day, the most ordinary foodstuffs and the most unprocessed material are transported very much further than precious metals, gemstones, and luxury goods could have been previously. Don’t we now go looking for fertilizer and guano even as far as the Pacific Ocean? The result of this steady expansion of the sphere of trade is easy to appreciate. If, as observation proves, the different nations of the earth are endowed with particular skills, and if each region of the globe has its special areas of production, as the sphere of trade is expanded we will see each nation choose to devote themselves to the industries which best suit their skills as well as the nature of their soil and climate. We will see the division of labour extended more and more among the different nations. Each industry will be situated where the best conditions for production are, and the end result will be that all the things which are necessary to satisfy the needs of men will be able to be obtained in the greatest abundance for the least amount of trouble.

Such is the inevitable result of the unlimited and endless expansion of the sphere within which trade is conducted. That this result conforms with the general plan of creation cannot be denied. If Providence had wanted mankind to remain isolated, without any communication between each other, wouldn’t it have put it (mankind) within the immediate reach all the elements needed for production? Wouldn’t it (Providence) have also endowed mankind with all the necessary skills to the same degree? If it (Providence) has shared out differently and unequally the factors and the tools of production across the surface of the globe, isn’t this proof that the endless expansion of trade is a providential necessity to which men are bound to obey? One might object that man is wrong to give his needs such an importance that it is necessary for him to rope in the entire world in order to satisfy them? One might also object that this life of primitive simplicity which was content with the food, clothing, and other useful objects which their native soil and local industry could supply, is preferable to this frantic search for pleasure which drives men to explore the furthest reaches of the globe in order to satisfy his appetites or his fantasies? But isn’t it enough to push this objection a bit further to show its inanity? Whatever the manner in which mankind governs his needs, whether he prefers his physical appetites, or whether he tips the balance towards his intellectual and moral appetites, doesn’t the beneficial necessity of exchange remain the same? Where would civilisation be if non-material goods, for example, weren’t able to be exchanged between one nation and another? if the philosophy and the fine arts had remained in Greece, the science of legislation in Rome, and the Christian religion in Judea? Haven’t the minds of modern nations become more cultivated and their morality improved by means of these products which had foreign origins? What nation would be able to flatter itself that it had been able to combine the philosophical and artistic skills of the Greeks, the legal science of the Romans, and the religious ideas of the Jews?

Let us imagine that, at the time when exchange began to be practiced, some tyrants who had been indoctrinated by some sophists had completely forbidden free trade; let us imagine they had prohibited the exchange of products, whether material or non-material, and that this prohibition had been maintained: isn’t it obvious that humanity would have remained stuck in a state of barbarism for eternity? Isn’t it obvious that the condition of the nations which at present are found at the head of civilisation, would not have surpassed that of the natives of New Holland (Australia)?

II. The Shackles placed on Free Trade

1. Fiscal Duties.

Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of free trade, it has been restricted by two kinds of measures, fiscal and prohibitory ones.[921] We shall first consider the former.

It is easy to understand why exchanges would be restricted for a fiscal purpose. As soon as new communication routes began to be opened up and exchanges multiplied governments began to realise that it was both possible and profitable to tax goods which came to market via these new routes. At first the tax was a simple toll for meeting the expense of maintaining the roads worn down by the transportation of merchandise: soon it served also to reimburse the treasury for other public services, among which may be counted the security afforded those making the exchanges. But, in imposing a tax of this kind, the end in view was not the restriction of trade, it was simply to procure as much money as possible for the treasury, and this fiscal end could only be attained on condition that exchanges were not too restricted.

Unfortunately, good financial practices were rarely followed in this matter. In the middle ages, for example, every country was divided up into a multitude of little seignories or castellanies,[922] whose proprietors seized the right of taxing the exchanges which took place within their territorial limits. One can see in the article “Douane” (Customs Duties) how tolls of all kinds multiplied at this time.[923] This is why, when these artificial obstacles were added to the natural obstacle of distance and thus blocked trade, commerce was not able to expand. This is why industry, now limited to the market of the castellany or the commune, remained for a long time in its infancy. As the means of production could not be developed, wealth and civilization made no progress, except on the seacoasts and along the great rivers, where fewer obstacles impeded free circulation.

Later, once the feudal system had disappeared, the number of tolls was reduced, and there was at the same time improved security for transportation. Immediately, the sphere of the exchanges expanded, a better division of labor became possible, and public wealth developed as if by magic. The establishment of the uniform tariff of Colbert in France,[924] and the abolition of internal customs duties by the Constituent Assembly,[925] contributed greatly to these results. (See “Customs Duties.”)

In our day the octroi[926] and excise duties, river tolls, tonnage duties, etc., in Europe, which directly affect the movement of goods, have a purely fiscal character. Until better means have been found for providing for public expenses, or until the government functions which are paid for by taxes are more and more returned to the domain of private industry, it will be difficult to find a substitute for these taxes. It is only to be regretted that they have become so numerous and are so exorbitant; for, by their excess, they hinder the growth of trade, retard progress in the division of labor, and consequently prevent, in no small degree, an increase of revenue to the treasury. (See “Taxes.”)[927]

In spite of the fetters to the development of trade which result from the establishment of fiscal taxes, in principle no objections to these taxes can be raised. If they restrict the sphere of exchanges, it is an unavoidable accident; but it is not their purpose to restrict them.

2. Protective or Prohibitory Duties. Their character and effects.

Protective or prohibitory duties have an entirely different character. The latter are established with a direct view to limiting the scope of exchange. They restrict in order to restrict. The governments which have persistently imposed them, apparently with the idea that the organization and development of trade could not be safely left to the rule of Providence, have intervened “to regulate the matter.” We shall see whether these organizers of trade were well inspired. But let us first ascertain what are the components which constitute the protective system.

Considered as a whole and as they exist in our own day, the protective or prohibitory system includes two kinds of obstacles, viz., prohibitions or protective duties on the importation of goods, and prohibitions or duties on their export. It also includes premiums granted for the import or export of certain goods. Finally, it serves as a basis for the colonial system (see “Colonial System”),[928] as well as for the majority of tariff agreements or commercial treaties.

Prohibitions or protective duties imposed on imported goods are intended to favor the development of certain branches of domestic production at the expense of similar foreign industries.

Prohibitions of exports are sometimes imposed in order to keep at a low price certain foodstuffs which are essential for domestic industry or consumption, or to deprive foreign industries or consumers from having them.

Premiums on export are pecuniary encouragements awarded to certain branches of domestic industry at the expense of other branches. Sometimes their purpose is to hasten the development of an industry deemed necessary, or to counteract to some degree the protective duties imposed by foreign countries. Sometimes, again, they are imposed simply as a remedy for a sudden economic crisis. Drawbacks[929] are premiums to reimburse the exporter of a manufactured good, for the tax paid on the raw materials which were imported. Premiums on imports are ordinarily of a temporary nature; for example, they have been used during periods of shortages in order to encourage imports of food. (See “Premiums.”)[930]

Customs agreements and commercial treaties are partial and temporary breaches in the wall of prohibitory tariffs, in favor of certain nations with which it is desired to maintain especially friendly relations. (See “Trade Treaties.”)[931]

Prohibitions or protective taxes on imports constitute the principle component of the system. To obtain a clear idea of the manner in which they operate, let us take an example. Suppose that nation A annually supplies nation B with a million kilogrammes of spun cotton. Why does B buy this cotton from A instead of spinning it itself? Because the factories in A are so situated and organized as to produce spun cotton of a better quality and at a lower price than factories in B could possibly do: because nation A is more advantageously situated in respect to the conditions for the manufacture of cotton. If it were not so, cotton would be manufactured in B as well as in A. But a politician in B persuades himself that it would be useful to “kidnap”[932] this industry from the foreigner, and that the importation of cotton thread should be prohibited. Suppose this politician can prevent the people of B from receiving the million kilogrammes of cotton which had been annually supplied to them by A, especially if the the frontier is easy to guard and is provided with a sufficient number of upright and well-paid customs officers. He can also promote with the same measure the building of a certain number of mills in B for spinning cotton. Can he place these spinning mills under conditions of production as favorable as those of the mills of A? Can he cause cotton to be spun as well and as economically as in A? No; for he is not a master who can change the natural conditions of cotton production; all he can do is to prevent cotton which has been spun at low cost from entering B. There his power stops. Nation B now ceases to be “invaded” (this is a sacred term in the prohibitionist’s vocabulary)[933] by the million kilogrammes of spun cotton from A. It makes its own cotton; but this cotton costs more than that from A, and is of a poorer quality; and less of it is consequently consumed. Before prohibition, B consumed a million kilogrammes of spun cotton; after prohibition, it consumed no more than six or seven hundred thousand kilogrammes; as a result the total production of cotton is reduced by the difference. Now let us suppose that nation A imitates the conduct of B, and prohibits, for example, the importation of spun flax, which it formerly received in exchange for its supplies of cotton. Flax will begin to be spun in A; but as it will be spun at greater cost than in B, and not so well, the total production of linen will in turn be reduced. Less will be produced by both nations, though with as great or greater expenditure of effort than before; and one country will not be as well provided with linen, and the other with cotton.

At the time when this destructive policy became the law in international relations, and every nation was trying to “kidnap” industries from foreigners, a very witty pamphlet was published in England, under the title “Monkey Economists.”[934] A cartoon representing a cage of monkeys served as a frontispiece. Half a dozen monkeys in separate cages were about to get their daily food; but, instead of each one consuming in peace the serving which the zookeeper was liberally dispensing, these animals were each mischievously attempting to “kidnap” the servings of their neighbors, without realising that the latter were engaged in the same operation. Thus every one was taking a great of trouble to steal the food which could have been easily found right in front of him; and the common fund of food was reduced by what was wasted or lost in the scramble.

Exactly this has been the conduct of governments which have adopted the errors of the prohibitory system. They have neglected the bounty which Providence bestowed upon them, to steal with great difficulty that which had been allotted to their neighbors. They have, by their mischievous jealousy, made production more difficult and less abundant: they have retarded the growth of prosperity among the people. A politician who imposes a prohibitory or protective duty, acts precisely the reverse of an inventor who discovers a new process for making production better and more economical: he invents a way to make production more expensive and less good: he invents a process which compels people to abandon fertile land and productive mines, to cultivate bad land and work poor mines. He is “an inventor in reverse,”[935] an agent of barbarism, just as an inventor is an agent of civilization.

This becomes even more evident when we examine the influence of the prohibitory régime on the progress of industry in general. The division of labor is, as everyone knows, the principal ingredient for a cheap market; the more labor is divided, the more the cost of production is reduced, and the more, consequently, prices are reduced. The arguments of Adam Smith on this point have become classic. But on what conditions can labor become more and more divided? On condition that it can find a continually widening market:[936]

As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market …
It is impossible there should be such a trade as even that of a nailer in the remote and inland parts of the Highlands of Scotland. Such a workman at the rate of a thousand nails a day, and three hundred working days in the year, will make three hundred thousand nails in the year. But in such a situation it would be impossible to dispose of one thousand, that is, of one day’s work in the year.

The division of labor, then, can be extended only as the market is increased. Hence every reduction in the extent of the market must inevitably reverse the division of labor and slow down industrial progress. Now, by systematically taking away from the most favorably located industries a part of their market, the prohibitory system compels manufacturers to reduce the scale of their production, and to use less of the division of labor. In cotton manufacturing, for example, it would require the spinners to spin coarse and fine grades at the same time, instead of confining themselves to a few grades or to a single one. Thus production would become more costly and less perfect. It is true, however, that if prohibition contracts the business of the established firms, it gives rise to new ones. But what is the situation of these? Placed, relatively to their rivals, in unfavorable condition of production, they can not create a market for their products outside of the domestic one. Now, this market is limited. An effort is made, it is true, to remedy its insufficiency by establishing premiums on exports, which will permit the protected industries to compete in the markets of their competitors. But, since this method is extremely costly and manifestly unjust (See, “Premiums.”)[937] it can be employed only to a limited degree. On the one side, then, the industry situated under favorable natural conditions is injured; and on the other, establishments which prohibition has made to spring up artificially, find themselves so situated that they can not extend their market without imposing the most onerous sacrifices on the nation. Thus the artificial breaking up of the markets, caused by the prohibitory régime, has everywhere retarded the development of the division of labor, slowed the progress of industry, and at the same time perpetuated high prices.

This is not all. High prices are not the only evil which the prohibitory régime has perpetuated, if not engendered. To this evil may be added another not less disastrous one, viz., instability. The industries which prohibition makes spring up under unfavorable economic conditions, are continually exposed to fatal wounds. If the prohibitory duty which permits their existence were to be lowered, or if surveillance on the frontiers is relaxed, they will inevitably be deprived of a part of their trade. They then suffer all the disasters which are produced by industrial crises, and their very existence will be compromised. They resemble those hot-house plants which die as soon as one ceases to supply them with the heating necessary to maintain their artificial existence. The condition of the domestic industries is no longer secure. They have nothing to fear, it is true, for their home market, because they are so situated as to stand up to foreign competition; but the markets they have been able to create abroad are largely precarious. At any moment prohibition may “kidnap” these markets away from them, on which their existence in part depends.[938] Haven’t we recently seen France slap prohibitory duties on the importation of linen thread and fabric and thus inflict a heavy blow on the English and Belgian linen industry? Haven’t we also seen the United States change their tariffs four or five times in less than 20 years back and forth from a more liberal one to a more prohibitive one, and to cause as a result of these sudden reversals of policy a series of crises in the industries engaged in supplying their market? Thus there is a permanent risk which the prohibitory regime imposes on production as a whole, and this risk cannot fail to influence in a disastrous way the development of industry as well as the condition of the workers.

Prohibitory duties on exports are generally less important than others, but their effects are no more salutary. One usually resorts to them in order to prevent or to restrict the export of food products and certain raw materials essential to industry. Let us see how they operate. Two cases may occur: 1st, where the production of the good whose export is interfered with, is limited by nature; 2nd, where it may be indefinitely increased. In the former case, which is rarer, prohibition acts at first simply as a tax levied upon certain producers for the benefit of certain consumers. Suppose, for example, the French government should prohibit the export of wine from the Clos-Vougeot[939] or Château-Lafite.[940] What would be the result? It is not likely that a smaller quantity of these wines would be produced; but the producers, obliged henceforth to offer their whole vintage of these exquisite wines in the home market, would no longer derive as much profit from them. They would suffer for the benefit of a certain class of French consumers. Such would be the immediate effect of the imposition of the prohibitory duty. But the consumers would have to suffer in their turn. With the best wines being taxed for the benefit of home consumers, the production of fine wines would be discouraged. No attempt would be made to improve the inferior wines, in case they should also be taxed. The home consumers would obtain, it is true, the best wines at a lower price; but they would have to give up the advantages they might have received from an improvement in the quality of the inferior wines. The final result of this would be that they would be more poorly provided with fine wines, and would have to pay more for them.

In the second case, the prohibition on exports would be immediately followed by a reduction in the production of the prohibited good. If the latter were, for example, wheat or any other article of food, or silk, flax, or raw hemp, the production of these items would be gradually reduced until it had adjusted to the size of the market. Prices would doubtless fall sharply in the meantime; but it would not be long before they would again rise to a level above what they had been previously. In fact, the reduction in the size of the market would compel producers to restrict their operations; they will no longer be able to take advantage of the same level of the division of labour, nor to use as economically their tools and production methods; and the costs of production, which are the definitive regulators of market prices, will rise as a result. As in the first case, and even more quickly, consumers will become the dupes[941] of a measure originally adopted in order to benefit them But if the purpose of the prohibition is to deprive a rival industry of the material it needs, this selfish measure will result in encouraging the production of a similar good abroad. Thus England, by putting a high export duty on coal, contributed to the development of mining in Belgium.

To sum up, then, high prices on the one hand, and instability on the other, are the inevitable consequences of the prohibitory régime; the high prices arising from the bad conditions of production in which this régime places the industries, and the obstacles it erects to the progress of the division of labor; and the instability resulting from modifications in the tariffs, which continually disrupt the markets.

3. Causes which have led to the establishment of the Protective or Prohibitory Régime.

It must seem astonishing that a system so clearly disastrous to the people, so opposed to progress in wealth and civilization, could have become established. Its origin must be principally attributed to certain circumstances inherent in the condition of barbarism and war in the midst of which it arose. Nations, which had been from their beginning hostile to each other, and almost constantly at war, could not exchange their products in any permanent or regular manner. Each was obliged to provide for itself most of consumption goods. War then acted as an artificial obstacle added to the natural obstacle of distance.[942] When peace followed war, this artificial obstacle disappeared. Unfortunately, its removal was only accidental and temporary: a new war soon arose, and the obstacle reappeared at once. Let us endeavor to obtain a clear idea of the effect which sudden changes of this sort might have on the state of production. Suppose two nations, C and D, the first supplying the second with woolen goods while receiving in exchange silk goods. A war arises, and exchanges are immediately interrupted. The consumers of D can no longer receive the woolen goods which the producers of C had been accustomed to supplying them. The consumers of C are deprived, in their turn, of the silk goods they were getting from D. Meanwhile, the demand continues, on the one side for woollen goods, and on the other for silk. This, then, is what will probably happen. The manufacturers of woolen goods in C, whom the war has deprived of their market, will begin to produce silks, and the manufacturers of silks in D will set about producing woolen goods. Each nation will thus succeed in obtaining as before the war, the goods it needs. To be sure, the conditions will be less favorable. The silks which C will manufacture will probably be dearer and not as good as those which D supplied. The woollen goods which D will make will probably be inferior to those it acquired from C; but, on both sides, it will be found more advantageous to employ the capital and the labor whose market the war has cut off, than to leave them idle; on both sides, also, people will prefer to pay a higher price for the goods they need, than to do without them. The war, as we see, brings about a coerced displacement[943] of certain industries, which is a retrograde step. It ruins the most vigorous branches of production, those which had been able to create an external market, and to replace them with artificial industries which only the interruption of international communication allows them to survive. But peace eventually comes: and the protection which the war gave C in the manufacture of silks, and D in the manufacture of woolen goods, immediately vanishes. It is evident that these war industries[944] must fail, unless an equivalent obstacle replaces that of war, in order to protect them. If the condition of the world is such that the peace can be lasting, it will most assuredly be better to let them fail, and thus permit production to resume its natural place; but if war is the natural condition of communities, if peace intervenes only as a short truce, perhaps it will be preferable to renounce relations whose precarious existence is a constant source of disastrous perturbations. Prohibition will then appear as a veritable insurance premium which is granted to the industries to which war has given rise, and whose maintenance it was made necessary.

Thus, for example, the prohibitory system was considerably extended in Europe and America at the end of the continental war.[945] (See “Customs Duties.)[946] During the war the general interruption of communication had led to the establishment of a certain number of industries under bad economic conditions. When the war ceased, the manufacturers loudly demanded that the obstacle of trade prohibition replace that of war, to protect them. Governments hastened to defer to their demands. This was unquestionably a great mistake; for, at a time when peace has become the normal condition of communities, prohibition is no longer anything but a costly anachronism. In this new situation it costs less to suffer the disturbances which a temporary war may cause in international relations, than to pay a heavy war premium for twenty or thirty years to avoid them. However, one can understand how the prohibitory régime should have come to prevail to a certain degree at the end of a war which convulsed the world for a quarter of a century, and made communities take a step backward toward barbarism.

On the other hand, it is more difficult to understand how this war régime could have been extended and made worse, as it was, long after peace had become established. This is connected with certain effects of prohibition, of which it is important to take account.

We have spoken above of a politician who would enact prohibitions or protective duties as “an inventor in reverse.” Let us pursue the comparison, and we shall discover the motives which have contributed to extending and making more burdensome the prohibitory régime in a time of peace. Suppose that an inventor discovers a process which permits a saving of 10 per cent in the cost of production of a certain good: by lowering the price of that article 5 per cent, he will obtain an advantage over his competitors, and make a considerable profit. This profit is the difference between the savings realised in production and the quantity of goods sold whose price has been lowered, and this constitutes the profitable premium of his invention. Now, what takes place when a prohibitory duty is imposed? An artificial deficit is immediately produced in the market, and this deficit brings about an increase in the price. A certain good which was purchased at an average price of twenty cents, for example, can no longer be purchased under thirty cents. This is an artificial increase of one-half, and is caused by the rupture of the link between the foreign producers and the domestic consumers. Suppose the prohibited good could be produced in the country at an average price of twenty-two cents: capital would be invested in that new industry; for it would receive, besides the ordinary profits of other branches of production, an extraordinary premium equal to eight cents. This premium would result from the difference between the price at which the good can be produced in the country, and the artificial price which prohibition has created. It is then obvious that if the profits of invention are based on the lowering of prices, those of prohibition are based in just the same way on the increase in their prices.

But is the extraordinary premium arising from prohibition a lasting one? Must not the profits in the protected industries finally fall to the level of those in other branches of production, as a result of domestic competition? That will depend on the nature of the protected industry. If the industry is one whose essential components are not limited in the country, the premium will have only a temporary character; for new factories will be established with a view of obtaining the premium as long as it shall continue. Domestic competition will then lower prices so much as to destroy the premium. Sometimes even the increase of the protected industry will not stop at its necessary limit, and prices will suddenly fall below the costs of production. The result will be an economic crisis, which will swallow up a good part of the profits from the premium gained from the increased prices. Prices will afterward rise again; but the protected industry will have ceased to realize profits greater than those of other branches of production. Its patent will have expired,[947] to use an apt phrase of Mr. Huskisson.[948] It will be otherwise if the protected industry is not capable of unlimited expansion; if it is, for example, food production in a country where land suitable for growing wheat is scarce, or the production of coal, iron, or lead, in countries where mineral deposits are rare. In such cases, the increased price may be obtained for any length of time. If prohibition has increased the price from twenty to thirty, the supply will be sufficiently small not only to maintain this price, but even to increase it gradually along with the increase of population and public wealth. Then the holders of protected natural monopolies, such as land or mines, will see their profits increase every year; they will continually grow rich without having to take the least amount of trouble.

But, whether the premium which raises prices is lasting or temporary, the attraction of that premium is sufficient, and more than sufficient, to increase the number of prohibitions. What is more tempting, in fact? While money is so difficult to make under the abominable law of competition, here a new process has been discovered the use of which will enable one to grow rich in the blink of an eye. Who would not hasten to use and to abuse so marvelous a process? Who would not run a machine to manufacture premiums[949] until resources ran out? To be sure, these premiums can be obtained only at the cost of the ruin or impoverishment of others; they constitute an obvious form of plunder, real robbery. But does one stop for such minor considerations when a fortune is in question? Besides, is not this plunder legal?[950] Is not this robbery consecrated by the practice of all civilized nations? Is it not universally admitted that one may confiscate, by means of a simple statute, the customers of a foreign industry, and impose on the “protected nation” an extra tax to increase the price of the goods, payable into the hands of those who have profited from these “confiscated customers?”[951]

Meanwhile, some theorists dare to denounce so unjust and disastrous a violation of property rights.[952] They demand free trade by invoking justice and basing it upon the interests of the masses. But there is no embarrassment in replying to these theorists. In the first place, they are accused of propounding a mere theory;[953] and, in the eyes of many people, the accusation is enough to condemn them. Then, a search is made in the old arsenal of popular errors and favorite prejudices, for all sorts of formidable weapons which people use to crush so pernicious a theory. By the same reasoning that caused inventors in former times to be persecuted and derided, the promoters of free trade are treated as dangerous dreamers, while the supporters of the prohibitory régime are considered to be benefactors of humanity.

The list is long of the sophisms[954] which have been employed to disguise the true motives for the raising of custom barriers since the establishment of the general peace (after 1815). Often, it is true, these sophisms were employed in good faith by people who thought that, by enriching themselves by means of the international plunder known as trade prohibition, they were contributing to the greatness and prosperity of their homeland. Almost always too, ignorance of sound economic notions has been so general that the act of profiting by premiums, which raised prices while establishing an industry contrary to nature, was considered, even by the victims of prohibition, as a work of patriotic devotion. We do not intend to take up all the sophisms which have been forged to justify prohibition and glorify the prohibitionists. This would be an endless task. We shall confine ourselves to a review of those most frequently employed.

4. Review of the Sophisms of Protectionists.

1. That a nation should not allow itself to become dependent on foreign countries, especially for goods of prime necessity.

This argument was the most important of those which were brought forward by English prohibitionists against the free traders[955] who advocated the repeal of the corn laws. “Is is not,” they said, “renouncing our political independence, to put ourselves under the obligation of resorting to foreigners for our food? Would not a nation whose enemies cut off food supplies be obliged to surrender at their mercy?” What could be more irrational than such a concern? When two nations trade with each other, is not the dependence which results from this mutual? If England depends today on Russia, France, and the United States for its food supply, do not these three countries in their turn depend upon England for their supplies of iron, coal, cotton goods, woollen fabrics, etc.? Besides, even granting that England should fall out with most of the nations which supply her with wheat, could she not, for a small increase in price, make up the shortfall from other nations? Did not the gigantic folly of the continental blockade demonstrate the impossibility of commercially isolating a powerful nation? And as for a small nation, do not the commercial relations which such a nation establishes abroad furnish it with new guarantees of independence, by linking its cause to all the interests which it has been able to join together to its own through trade?

One of the most brilliant orators of the anti-corn law league in England, Mr. W. J. Fox,[956] shows up with marvelous skill the outdated character of the argument for independence of foreigners, in the following celebrated passage:[957]

To be independent of foreigners is a favorite theme of the aristocracy. But who then is this great lord, this advocate of national independence, this enemy of all reliance on foreigners? Let us look at his life. A French cook prepares dinner for the master, and a Swiss valet dresses the master for dinner. Milady who takes his hand is utterly resplendent in pearls, which you never in find in English oysters, while the feather which flutters from her head never comes from the tail of an English turkey. The meats on his table come from Belgium and his wines from the Rhine or the Rhône. He rests his eyes on flowers from South America and he gratifies his sense of smell with the smoke from a leaf which comes from North America. His favorite horse is of Arab origin, and his dog [p. 188] is a St Bernard. His art gallery abounds in Flemish paintings and Greek statues. Does he want entertainment? He goes to listen to Italian singers performing German music, the whole thing rounded off with a French ballet. Does he rise to distinction as a judge? The ermine which adorns his shoulders had never until then been seen on the back of any British animal. His mind itself is a multicolored weave of exotic elements. His philosophy and poetry come from Greece and Rome, his geometry from Alexandria, his arithmetic from the Arabs, and his religion from Palestine. In his cot he pressed his baby teeth on a teething ring of coral from the Indian Ocean. When he dies, Carrara marble will crown his tomb…and this is the man who says ‘Let us be independent of the foreigner.’

Isn’t this refutation as definitive as it is filled with witty barbs? Lets us only add that England, by making itself dependent for its food on Russia, on France, and on the United States, its “natural enemies”, has dramatically weakened the significance of the sophism of “being independent of foreigners.”[958] (See “Balance of Commerce.”)[959]

2. That a nation should avoid increasing its purchases from foreign countries, in order to prevent an exhaustion of its stock of money.

Here we see the old sophism of the balance of trade. This sophism, formerly on every one’s lips, is now much less employed, English prohibitionists, in particular, seem to be ashamed of using it. That an argument, formerly so general, should have become thus discredited, is due to several causes: in the first place, to the war to the death the economists have waged against the doctrine of the balance of trade; then, to the decrease in the relative importance of the import and export of money in transactions between people of different nations; finally, to experience, which successively demonstrated that the removal of custom barriers between the different provinces of France, between England and Ireland, and between the states of the Zollverein,[960] was followed by none of the monetary disasters predicted by the advocates of the mercantilist system. However, the prejudice has not disappeared; and as long as the laws of the circulation of monetary are not commonly understood, it will be possible to stir up the masses against free trade, by alarming them with the phantom of an exhaustion of the supply of money. (See “Balance of Trade.”)[961]

3. That it is necessary to compensate domestic industry for the taxes imposed on them by protectionist duties.

If the English prohibitionists made little use of the sophism about the exhaustion of money, they made, on the other hand, abundant use of that on compensatory duties. “The English farmers,” they said, “bear taxes more numerous and more severe than those of Russian farmers. Is it not just to make compensation for the difference, by a protective duty? Is it not just to equalize the conditions of domestic production with those of foreign production?”[962] Now, in the first place, do these differences in the data concerning taxes always signify what they seem to signify? It was certainly true that the English farmers did pay more taxes than their Russian competitors. But did they not also enjoy better security and more freedom? Were they not better protected against plunder and arbitrary government? and was not this greater liberty and security worth much more than the higher taxes they had to pay? In the second place, can protection really compensate for the burdens which excessive taxation imposes on a country’s production? To protect domestic agriculture, under the pretext that it is more encumbered by taxes than its rivals, will doubtless provide compensation to farmers, by allowing them to increase the price of their products. But upon whom will fall the burden from which you have relieved them? Upon all the other branches of production, which will pay more dearly for their raw materials and food for their workers. What is gained on one side is lost on another. Unless a way can be found by which a tax which enters the treasury can be paid by nobody, compensatory duties can not relieve the tax burden on production. Now, if they can neither destroy nor reduce the evil which is necessarily connected with the existence of every tax, of what use is it to displace this evil?[963] Wouldn’t it be more worthwhile to displace (or move) the tax itself, if necessary, rather than to displace the effects of the tax by this convoluted and surreptitious procedure?

4. That “domestic labor” must be protected, to prevent the number of those employed in production falling in number as a result of foreign competition, and thus to guarantee the standard of living of the workers.

This sophism is worthy of notice, because it gives prohibition the attractive appearance of philanthropy. If landholders and manufacturers loudly demand prohibitory legislation, it is not to make extraordinary profits at the expense of their rivals; O no! it is only to insure work and good wages for domestic workers; it is to keep the working classes from the sad results of unlimited competition, etc., etc. But if such were the only aim of the prohibitionists, would they confine themselves to slapping bans on products from abroad? Would they not prohibit, above all, the importation of foreign workers who come to compete with domestic workers? Do we, however, observe that they abstain from employing foreign workmen, even at the times when they most energetically plead the necessity of protecting “domestic labor”? No: they have no scruples of this kind.[964] Isn’t the contradiction between their argument and their conduct striking? (See “Emigration.”)[965] Now, is it true that the prohibitionist system increases the number of productive jobs in domestic industry? Let us see. We have observed that prohibitions have just the opposite effect on prices from that produced by new machines; that by inducing certain industries to set themselves up in bad economic conditions, and by impeding progress in the division of labor, they bring about an increase of prices, while new machines cause lower prices. Now, do machines have the result of decreasing the number of productive jobs? Does not experience, on the contrary, attest that the end result has been to increase it, by the general increase of consumption? Are there not to-day, for instance, more productive jobs in the cotton industry, than there were before the steam engine and the mule jenny had transformed that industry? A man who proposed breaking the spinning machines and the looms, and replacing them with hand-workers, in order to increase the number of jobs, wouldn’t he rightly qualify as being mad? But if new machines result in the end in increasing in the number of productive jobs, must not prohibition result in reducing the number? If we took at the interests of the working classes, in what respect are the errors of the prohibitionists better than those of the destroyers of machines?

By making all costs greater, the prohibitory system diminishes consumption, and consequently production, and the number of productive jobs. This is how it protects domestic labor. But does it not, at least, tend to give it more stability? Does it not afford security to the worker against industrial crises, as the prohibitionists affirm? However, isn’t it the very opposite of this assertion that we should adopt? Haven’t we already noted that the prohibitory system, by putting industry at the mercy of the changing opinions of legislators, has created permanent instability in all branches of production? Haven’t we noted that any change to tariffs inevitably causes a crisis in the industrial sector? Isn’t it to the constant disturbances in the markets that the prohibitory system has brought about that we have to credit so many of the dreadful crises which have harmed the lives of workers The history of modern industry gives us some sad lessons on this subject. One may read on its every page of the cruel evils which this system for “protecting domestic labor” has brought upon the laboring classes. (See “Pauperism.”)[966]

5. That nationality should be made the basis of the trading system.

This argument was the basis of Dr. List’s national system of political economy.[967] But in studying the history of the formation of states, and examining the elements which constitute them, one readily perceives that nationality can not serve as a basis for a trading system. States have been formed, for the most part, by conquest, and enlarged either by royal alliances, by wars, or by diplomacy. No economic consideration has controlled their formation. When the map of Europe was made over at the congress of Vienna (1814-15), for example, did any one consult the interests of the industries and the commerce of the peoples whose nationality they were changing? Did any one ask whether the situation of the Rhine provinces and of the other countries which were then separated from the French empire, made that separation advantageous or injurious to the countries concerned?[968] Were serious studies made of the situation of industry and commerce in Holland and Belgium before uniting these two countries? No: the question was not even mooted. Political considerations and diplomatic intrigues alone decided the new configuration of the states. Why should an attempt he made to establish a national trading system based upon so-called economic necessity, in states whose formation was controlled by no economic views, states of which the hazards of war and of alliances alone decided the boundaries? Is it not the height of absurdity to transform these frontiers, which chance events have alone determined, and which it may enlarge or contract tomorrow, into formal boundaries which limit trade? Is not an economic system which is founded on a political basis and which is politically modifiable, a monstrosity to which good sense objects?

6. If the protective system did not exist, it would perhaps be well not to invent it; but to attempt to destroy it today would be to pronounce a death sentence on a multitude of industries, to bring about ruinous displacements of capital and of labor, etc., etc.

We have pointed out above the striking analogy between the introduction of a new machine and the removal of a trade prohibition. The result of each is to replace a cheap market with a high-priced one, and abundance with shortages. But all progress, from whatever source, is accompanied by some disturbance, by some economic crisis. All progress displaces capital and lives. Must we renounce permanent progress, to avoid this temporary disturbance? Must we give up new machines, new methods, and new ideas, under the pretense that they upset the old machines, the old methods, and the old ideas? Shall we immobilize humanity, to prevent some displacement of lives? Let us hear Dr. Bowring[969] on this subject, in his speech at the congress of economists, at Bruxelles, in 1847,[970] where he admirably refuted this objection with its paralyzing consequences:[971]

“The displacement of capital,” he said, “the displacement of capital! Why, it is a sign of progress. Has not the plow displaced the spade? What became of the copyists after the invention of printing? … We formerly had thousands of little boats on the Thames: what has become of them, now that the Thames is furrowed by hundreds of steamboats? But are not the interests of the worker himself served by a so rapid and economical means of transportation? The first time I ever went to London I had to pay four shillings to go from one part of the city to the other: today I make the same trip for six pence; and if you ask how this has been brought about, I answer: by the displacement of labor and capital. This displacement may be found everywhere. I was born in a town which figures in the commercial history of my country. I have seen there, at Exeter, an entire industry, the woolen industry, abandoned. I have seen, in the port of that city, ships from all countries, and have heard my ancestors speak of their relations with the most distant lands. But as soon as steam was introduced into the factories, fuel being dear in that part of the country, the industry relocated to where it was cheap. Well, capital was displaced; but the population has nevertheless increased. When I left Exeter the population was 25,000 inhabitants; now it is 40,000. The workers have taken up other employments.
But what has displaced labor? What has displaced capital? What has displaced industries? What has put them on a false basis? What has built them upon sand? The prohibition of trade. What we ask for, is to be able to found industry upon a rock from which no violent infringement could dislodge it?”

But would the displacements that could occur by replacing the old way of trade prohibition with the new way of free trade, take place on the scale as has been attributed to them? Would the introduction of free trade become the signal for the ruin of a multitude of industries? Would one see entire countries deserted for others, as the prohibition pessimists affirm? Observation and experience agree in contradicting these gloomy predictions. The London exposition (of 1851)[972] convinced the most prejudiced minds that the great industries of the various countries of Europe had reached a nearly equal level of progress, and that no nation possessed a decidedly marked superiority over their rivals.[973]

“The crystal palace,” says Michel Chevalier, in his interesting letters on the London exposition, “is a good place to prove this similarity, this fraternity, this equality of the industries of the principal nations of western civilization. It is manifest there, it forces itself upon our attention. When I go from the English department to the French, then to that occupied by the Zollverein, or to the Swiss, or the Belgian, or the Dutch, I find goods of nearly equal merit, which show evidence of nearly the same skill and experience, and at nearly the same prices. This is more especially manifest in regard to England and France, especially if we take the trouble to complete our exhibit at London by recalling the goods we had in Marigny Square in 1849, of which the aggrieved producers refused to send samples to London. In thus speaking of equality, I do not mean that the products of the principal nations are identical, on the contrary, they are diverse, they have their peculiar stamp. They reveal special industrial skills, a distinct originality, but they manifest a nearly equal level of progress. If one is surpassed in one kind of goods, it is first in another, perhaps similar and equally difficult: and we can not doubt, that, with a little incentive, each nation could equal the one which excels it in any particular product. If raw materials were equally cheap everywhere (and they would be if the legislators of certain countries would abolish the wholly artificial causes of high prices which they have agreed to multiply), the cost of production for manufactured goods would be nearly the same, and these diverse countries would be nearly equal to each other with respect to having cheap markets.”

In a recent polemic brought on by the celebrated speech by M. Thiers on the commercial régime of France[974] a distinguished industrialist from Mulhouse, M. Jean Dolfus has corroborated the statements of Chevalier. According to M. Dolfus the prohibitory régime had the unique effect of preventing the coton industry from adopting the progress achieved by its rivals. It acts purely and simply as a cause of our backwardness.[975]

“We do not,” he says, “keep pace with England in industrial progress. A dozen years ago they began to replace the old hand spinning machines with ones which can spin without the help of a worker; today, for certain types of thread, no other machines exist. All have been obliged to follow this progress. With us, on the contrary, people still make money while using very antiquated machines; and the sum appropriated to compensate for the annual depreciation, at least in the spinning of cotton, is scarcely necessary, for it is not generally employed to improve the machines.
Why have not the improvements adopted in England become necessary in France? Because everyone stays with the old way, and continues to make spun goods that could be manufactured at much less expense, by a little additional outlay. My firm has a spinning mill of 25,000 spindles, 20,000 of which are for calico: it could, by replacing its looms, a part of which are nearly forty years old, spin a kilogramme for twenty centimes cheaper than it does today: but domestic competition is not sufficient to compel them to do it. Is not this conclusive? Who pays the twenty centimes? The consumer, the country. The Committee for the Protection of National Labor[976] did not think it best to change our looms, because many spinners might thus be thrown out of employment. But can we with impunity resist progress in this way? On this principle we should return to the spinning wheel, and regret all the mechanical progress made in the last fifty years. If spinning can be done more economically, consumption will increase; more cotton goods will be sold, more machines will be constructed, and more labor will be needed.”

Thus, in the view of manufacturers themselves, the prohibitory régime holds back production. Let this régime be abolished, and every industry which is located under favourable natural conditions will inevitably expand considerably. It will doubtless then be necessary to exercise more intelligence, activity, and energy, in order to preserve and increase one’s trade; for free trade is not such an easy ride as prohibition. Every industry would be at once obliged to employ every new improvement to keep up with its rivals. But would not humanity as a whole profit by the great boost production would have received? Wouldn’t people be more abundantly provided with all things, and wouldn’t their minds, forced to be more alert out of necessity, thus become more receptive to all kinds of enlightenment?

Necessity is a powerful incentive to progress, and the chief result of free trade will be to make progress more and more necessary. Look for example at British agriculture. How many times have the prohibitionists predicted that it could not survive the competition of the United States, Poland, and Russia! How many times have they depicted its fields as devastated, its laborers ruined and dispersed by the storm of free trade, and old England, deprived of this main-stay of her power, disappearing from the list of nations! Well, the corn laws have been abolished,[977] free trade is enthroned, and what has become of British agriculture? Has it sunk in the storm? Has its capital been destroyed, and its fields submerged by the “deluge of foreign grain?” Have land proprietors and farmers carried into effect their threat to emigrate to America, abandoning their fields to the thorn and the briar? No. Scarcely had the corn laws been repealed, when the agriculturists, redoubling their efforts, made improvement the order of the day in every direction. The old tools and the old methods were abandoned; and agriculture, so long given over to routine, assumed a rank among the most progressive industries. Thus transformed under the strong pressure of foreign competition, it now makes light of the efforts of its rivals, and the agriculturalists shrug their shoulders contemptuously at the phantom which formerly terrified them.[978]

“Although the abundance and low price of food had weighed heavily on British agriculture for some time,” wrote recently a skilled British agriculturalist, M. Mechi, “competition has so driven improvements that I think that we will end up beating the world in wheat as well as in calico cloth.”

And this was an industry which was to be inevitably ruined by free trade!

Observing, then, as Chevalier and Blanqui[979] did at the universal exposition in London, the condition of the industries of the civilized world, and investigating carefully the results already obtained by tariff reforms, one becomes convinced that the ruinous displacement of production, the destruction of protected industries, and so many other calamities, which, according to the prohibitionists, were inevitably to accompany the coming of free trade, were true phantoms. One also becomes convinced, that the adoption of the “new way” would strengthen and develop industries everywhere, instead of jeopardizing and ruining them.

Here we bring to an end our review of the sophisms of the prohibitionists, although the subject is far from exhausted. But these unsound arguments have been refuted by all the economists in succession since Adam Smith and Turgot. A refutation which is full of impish and witty eloquence can be found in Bastiat’s Economic Sophisms, to which we refer our readers.[980]

III. Conclusion.

Free trade is a factor in the appearance of both cheap markets and economic order. As soon as it is established, industry, now having access to an unlimited market, will undergo all the development of which it is capable. At the same time, it will achieve the maximum amount of stability by no longer being built on a foundation of sand but of solid rock (according to the colourful expression of Dr. Bowring). After the high costs and instability which are inherent in the artificial regime of prohibition will come the low costs and stability which are the natural consequences of a return to the order established by Providence. Now, is it idealistic to expect such beneficial progress? Isn’t free trade an economic ideal which we are forbidden to ever reach? Isn’t it a humanitarian dream as the defenders of prohibition claim? But just look at the signs of the time and then draw your own conclusion. Is not one of the most absorbing interests of our time, the steady improvement of the means of communication? Are not all civilized nations multiplying across their territory canals, railroads, and electric telegraphs at every opportunity? Are not steam and electricity more and more cutting away the natural obstacle of distance? Now, what is the economic result of this marvellous progress which today is the object of emulation across the world? Isn’t it to expand the extent of trade more and more? Aren’t railroads, steam ships, electric telegraphs nothing more than powerful tools which cut away and devour distance to the benefit of trade between city and city, and nation and nation. But, my goodness! While nations are making gigantic sacrifices to multiply the tools which facilitate trade, on the other hand they continue to maintain the prohibitory system which prevents it! With one hand they stimulate the development of trade and hinder it with the other! Such a flagrant contradiction must grab everyone’s attention in the end! Either one gives up steam power and the electric telegraph, or one gives up the prohibitory system, because the simultaneous existence of these forces for civilization and this relic of barbarism is much too absurd a nonsense.

But there is little likelihood that steam locomotion and the electric telegraph will be abandoned. On the contrary, everywhere the prohibitory régime has been under attack. Governments have finally understood that prohibitory duties brought them nothing, and that they could make an excellent deal by replacing them with fiscal duties. Sir Robert Peel took this position as the starting point of his financial policy, and the budget of Great Britain, whose accounts showed a constant deficit before Peel’s reforms, afterward presented a regular surplus revenue.[981] The same reform introduced in the United States produced similar results.[982] Financial necessity thus combines with economic necessity and the progressive tendencies of our age, to breach the walls of the prohibitory régime. Prohibitions may be compared to the chains which were used in the middle ages in difficult times to bar the streets. In our day they are a relic of a system of defense which the progress of civilization has rendered useless and outmoded. Thus, the frontiers will cease to be barred, as the streets have ceased to be barred: and, with apologies to the utopians of old who placed their ideal society in the past, liberty will at last become the universal law which governs human transactions.[983]

Long Footnote 1.

On this matter one can find some valuable information in the Inquiry into the Iron Industry which was published in 1829.[984] One learns that the iron industry received in 1822 an extraordinary supplement to its tariff protection. Soon afterwards this industry underwent a considerable expansion but, and this is a striking and curious thing, it employed for this development English capital and English workers. The iron forge owners, who were the beneficiaries of this much increased premium paid for by French consumers, thus had to share this premium with the latter, the very people the legislators had wanted to hit. The testimony of M. Boigues, owner of the Fourchambault mines, and M. Wilson, manager of the mines at Le Creusot, confirm in particular that English workers were in the majority in the new establishments. We will limit ourself to quoting the testimony of M. Wilson:

Question: How many and what kind of workers do you employ for the making of iron? What is the proportion of English workers and French workers?

Answer: 126 workers, namely 28 puddlers, 6 fire workers, 42 rollers, and 80 other workers. In the first year of operation, with the exception of simple tasks, all the workers were English. In the second year, we began to employ French puddlers who were quite well trained. After 1824 half of the workers we employed in puddling were French; but we have never employed French workers at Charenton for rolling. The English puddlers earned 14 francs per 1,000 kg, and French puddlers 10 francs; English rollers were paid at the rate of 10 francs per 1,000 kg of iron, and they would produce 80,000 kg per week. Thus they received 800 francs per week, out of which they had to pay the cost of assistants and aids. I estimate that what remained as their wage was about 100 francs per week.

Q: Did the wages of the French workers rise to the level of the English workers, or did the wage of the English workers drop to the level of the French workers?

A: On the contrary, there was a lowering of the wage of the French workers; both now only earn 8 francs for puddling 1,000 kg of iron.[985]

The same thing occurred in 1841 and 1842 when the tariff on cotton and linen was increased to a prohibitive level. The new “French” factories that prohibition had encouraged to expand had done so principally with the assistance of a large importation of English capital and workers.

Nations

Source

“Nations,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 259-62.

John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 2 East India Co. - Nullification. “Nations, in Political Economy,” pp. 956-59.

Text

From the earliest historical periods humanity has been broken up[986] into a multitude of nations, dissimilar in manners, aptitudes, and language, and possessing different institutions. Each of these nations has its own particular features and its own existence, its own autonomy.

This phenomenon, which is of great interest to all branches of moral and political science, will be considered here only from an economic point of view.

The economist must first inquire whether the breaking up[987] of humanity into a multitude of nations is beneficial, or whether it would not be better, as some declare, for the human race to form only one community, a universal monarchy, or a universal republic. There can be no doubt as to the answer to this question. The splitting up[988] of humanity into nations has utility, because it develops a principle of emulation[989] of considerable power. There is in each nation a feeling of honor, or a kind of collective self-esteem, which, when directed toward useful ends, can accomplish wonders. An example of this was furnished at the universal exposition in London,[990] to which most of the civilized nations brought examples of their industry and each made it a point of honor not to be too far behind its rivals. If humanity formed only a single political unit, wouldn’t the sprit of emulation, thus deprived of the stimulant of national honor, manifest itself to a lesser degree? Another drawback, more serious still, would result from the (political) unification of humanity: the errors made by the government of society would extend much farther than they do in the existing state of affairs. If a bad policy is taken today by a government, if a false theory is applied to the management of the affairs of a nation, the harm which results from it is confined to a certain locality. Other nations can refrain from repeating an experience, the results of which have been disastrous. If all humanity, on the contrary, were subjected to a uniform law, would not the harm resulting from the application of a bad policy be universal? As for the progress which improves the human condition, everybody knows that the (political) fragmentation of society[991] creates no obstacle whatsoever to its spreading. When an experiment has succeeded in one nation, are not all the other nations interested in adopting it themselves? Are they not most frequently obliged to do so by the pressure of competition?

The fragmentation of humanity into autonomous nations may therefore be considered as essentially economic. Besides, this fragmentation is a result of the original arrangement of things; it is a natural phenomenon that no artificial combination can destroy nor even noticeably modify. Conquerors, for instance, have dreamt of the utopia of a universal monarchy. Have they succeeded in realizing it? Have not those who have approached nearest to it, seen their gigantic political establishments dissolve by the very force of things? Has not experience taught them that there are limits which no domination can exceed in any lasting manner? Other utopians have dreamt of having a single religion, and some have wished to impose it by violence; but it was useless for them to employ fire and the sword to achieve their goal, and they failed. Religious beliefs have continued to reflect the diversity of temperaments, of manners, and of the enlightenment of different nations. Others, finally, have dreamt of having a single language, and we have seen governments attempt to impose a uniform language upon peoples of different origin, whom they had united under their rule.[992] Not long ago, the Dutch government, for example, attempted to replace the French language with the Dutch language in some of the southern provinces of the old kingdom of the Netherlands. What was the result? Quite simply, that the legally imposed language was hated by the population on which it was imposed and that this experience, contrary to the nature of things, greatly contributed to the fall of the government which tried to do this.[993] Languages like religious beliefs and political institutions, are the expression of the individual spirit of different nations, and they satisfy the needs or the preferences (of the people) which one might attempt to satisfy in vain by other means. The form of institutions and of language can without doubt be modified in an artificial manner, but their substance will nevertheless remain: even if the words change, the accents remains.

Although it would be absurd to wish to remove, for the sake of a utopian unity, the characteristic marks of nationalities, it does not follow that nations must be isolated from and kept in a permanent state of hostility toward each other. The autonomy of nations implies neither isolation nor hostility. Nations are interested in communicating freely with one another, in order that they may increase in wealth and power; they are still more interested in living in peace with one another.

These truths, too long unrecognized, have been admirably demonstrated by economists, especially by J. B. Say. To those who pretend, for instance, that a nation can only be enriched by the impoverishment of its rivals, the illustrious author of the theory of markets[994] replies correctly that:[995]

“A nation bears the same relation to a neighboring nation that a province does to another province, that a city does to the countryside; it is interested in seeing it prosper, and certain to profit by its wealth. The United States are right, then, for example, it always having tried to encourage industry in the savage tribes which surround them; it has been their purpose to obtain something from them in exchange; for nothing can be gained from people who have nothing to give. It is of advantage to humanity for a nation to conduct itself toward others, under all circumstances, according to liberal principles. It will be shown, by the brilliant results it will obtain from so doing, that vain systems, disastrous theories, are the exclusive and jealous maxims of the old states of Europe, which they with effrontery endow with the name of practical truths, because, unfortunately, they put them in practice.”

Nothing is more deceitful, adds this judicious economist, than the advantage which a nation thinks it gains by encroaching upon the domain of another, by the conquest of a province or a colony of a rival power.[996]

“If France had possessed,” he says, “at any time whatever, an economic government, and had employed for improving the provinces in the centre of the kingdom, the money which she expended for conquering distant provinces and colonies which could not be kept, she would be much more happy and more powerful. Highways, parish roads, canals for irrigation and navigation, are the means which a government has always at its disposal to improve provinces which are unproductive. Production is always expensive in a province, when the expense of the transportation of its products is great. An interior conquest indubitably increases the strength of a state, as a distant conquest almost always weakens it. All that constitutes the strength of Great Britain is in Great Britain itself; it has been made much stronger by the loss of America; it will be more so when it shall have lost India.”

Also J. B. Say is thoroughly convinced that, when economic knowledge is more widely diffused, when the true sources of the prosperity and the greatness of nations shall be better known, the old policy, which consists in conquering new territory in order to tax its people to excess, in taking possession of new markets in order to subject them to a selfish and pitiless exploitation, this evil policy of antagonism and hatred, will end by losing all credit.

“All this old policy will perish,” he says. “Strength will come from meriting (someone’s) favour and not in demanding it by force. The effects which are made to secure domination procure only an artificial greatness, which necessarily makes an enemy of every foreigner. This system produces debts, abuses, tyrants, and revolutions; while the attraction of a reciprocal agreement procures friends, extends the circle of useful relations; and the prosperity which results from it is lasting, because it is natural.”[997]

If, then, economists do not share the illusions of the humanitarian socialists, who would like to unite all nations into a single flock, ruled by an all-governing shepherd;[998] if they do not think that there would be any utility removing, in an artificial manner, the characteristic differences of nations; if they only accept with reservations the beautiful verses of the author of the Marseillaise of Peace:[999]

Nations! mot pompeux pour dire barbarie! …
Déchirez ces drapeaux! une autre voix vous crie;
L’égoisme et la haine ont seuls une patrie;
La fraternité n’en a pas;
Nations! such a pompous word to describe barbarity! …
Tear up these flags! another voice cries out to you;
Selfishness and hatred alone have a country;
Fraternity does not

If they think that nations have their raison d’être even in the bosom of civilization, they do not work less actively to demolish the walls of separation, which old errors, prejudices of centuries, and barbarous hatreds have raised between nations; they show nations that it is in their interest to exchange their ideas and their products in order to increase their wealth, their power, and their civilization; they condemn war as a bad gamble, as an operation in which the risks of loss exceed the chances of gain; and without being humanitarians or advocates of unity,[1000] they show nations the true methods of realizing practical fraternity. (See the article on “Peace.")[1001]

Errors no less fatal, on the subject of the internal government of nations, have attracted the attention of economists. Just as it was once the common belief that a nation could only become powerful and rich by weakening and impoverishing its rivals, an excessively large share of influence and activity in the life of nations was granted to the government. Because the government and society remained joined together in primitive communities, when the division of labor had not yet separated social functions (from each other), it was thought that it must always be so; it was thought that it was the task of the government to give movement and action to the social organism, and make life flow there; it was thought that nothing could be done except by the impulse of this sovereign driving force. Political economy has put an end such a disastrous an error. Economists have demonstrated that the functions of government should be reduced and made more and more specialized, by virtue of the principle of the division of labor,[1002] rather than extended and multiplied; they have demonstrated that communism belonged to the infancy of nations, and that it ceased to be expedient in their maturity. With the coolness of a surgeon who removes a cancer, J.B. Say has shown to what point a government which is not strictly limited to fulfilling its natural functions can cause trouble, corruption, and discomfort in the economy of the social body, and he has stated that in his eyes a government of this kind was a veritable ulcer.[1003]

This colorful expression, ulcerous government,[1004] employed by the illustrious economist to designate a government which interferes improperly in the domain of private activity, has frequently been used by interventionist and socialist writers to criticise political economy. Some even have taken it as a foundation for the assumption that political economy has misunderstood the importance of the mission with which governments are charged in society, and they have accused it of having given birth to the celebrated doctrine of an-archy. But, nothing is less merited than such criticism. Political economy, rightly understood, leads no more to the abolition of governments[1005] than it does to the destruction of nationalities.[1006] J. B. Say says:

When authority is not plunderous itself, it procures for nations the greatest of benefits, that of protecting them from plunderers. Without this protection which lends the aid of all to the needs of one alone, it is impossible to conceive any important development of the productive faculties of man, of land, or of capital; it is impossible to conceive the existence of capital itself, since capital is only values accumulated and working under the safeguard of public authority. It is for this reason that no nation has ever arrived at any degree of wealth, without having been subject to a regular government; it is to the security which political organization procures, that civilized nations owe not only the innumerable and varied productions which satisfy their wants, but also their fine arts, their leisure hours, the fruit of accumulation, without which they could not cultivate their intellectual gifts, nor consequently rise to all the dignity that the nature of man admits of.”[1007]

Political economy is not therefore an-archic. Economists are perfectly convinced that governments play a necessary part in society, and it is precisely because they appreciate all the importance of this part, that they consider that governments should be occupied with nothing else.[1008] Finally, economists think that the same practices of scrupulous economy, which are the rule in private industry, should be the rule also in the government of nations.[1009]

Let us again quote J. B. Say, on this subject:[1010]

A nation which only respects its prince when he is surrounded with pomp, with glitter, with guards, with horses, with all that is most expensive, has to pay for it. It economizes, on the contrary, when it grants its respect to simplicity rather than to display, and when it obeys the laws without display.
… Causes (which are) purely political, and the form of government which they produce, influence the costs of the salaries of civil and judicial functionaries, of (political) representation, and finally of those costs which public institutions and establishments require. Thus, in a despotic country, where the prince disposes of the property of his subjects, he alone fixing his salary, that is to say, what he uses of the public funds for his own personal benefit, his pleasures, and the maintenance of his household, that salary may be fixed higher than in the country where it is negotiated by the representatives of the prince and those of the tax payers.
The salaries of subordinates depend also either upon their individual influence, or upon the general system of government. The services which they render are costly or cheap, not only in proportion to the price paid for them, but also according as their duties are more or less well performed. A service poorly performed is expensive, although very little may be paid for it; it is expensive if there is but little need of it. It is like a piece of furniture which does not serve the purpose for which it was intended, of which there is no need, and which is a trouble rather than a benefit. Such were, under the old French monarchy, the positions of grand-admiral, grand-master, grand-cupbearer, master of the hounds, and a multitude of others, which served only to add lustre to the crown, and many of which were only methods employed to distribute perquisites and favors.
For the same reason, when the machinery of the administration is complicated, the people are made to pay for services which are not indispensable to the maintenance of public order; this is like giving a useless shape to a product, which is not worth more on that account, and is generally worth less. Under a bad government, which can only support its encroachments, its injustices, its exactions, by means of numerous satellites (hangers-on), of an active system of espionage, and by the multiplication of prisons; these prisons, spies, and soldiers are costly for the people, who are certainly not happier on that account.

To sum up, political economy recognizes that the fragmentation of humanity into nations has its utility and its raison d’étre; it recognizes that no nation, unless it be composed of angels, would be able to do without government; but, at the same time, it demonstrates that nations have an interest in establishing their foreign policy upon peace, and their domestic policy upon economy; it demonstrates that nations have an interest in maintaining free and friendly relations with one another, and to be governed as little as possible.

Nobility

Source

“Noblesse,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 275-81.

John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 2 East India Co. - Nullification. “Nobility,” pp. 1,033-39.

Notes

Item added: 13 Oct. 2016

English version edited for CLCA book - has long Fns - “Molinari on Class”

1st Edit: checked against PDF 11 Aug. 2018

Text

NOBILITY. By this, or by some equivalent term, has been designated in all times the body of men who have claimed for themselves in an exclusive manner the higher functions of society. Most frequently this body established its rule by conquest. Thus the nobility of most of the states of Europe owes its origin to the barbarous hordes which invaded the Roman empire, and divided its remains among themselves. At first these troops of emigrants, whom the inadequate supplies of food and the allure of booty drove them down from the regions of the north to those of the south, overran and laid waste the civilized world; but soon, either because the moveable capital which served them as their prey began to be used up, or because the more intelligent understood that a regular exploitation would be more profitable to them than simple pillage, they established a fixed residence for themselves upon the ruins of the world they had laid waste and conquered.

This establishment of the barbarians in the old domain of civilization, and the institution of a feudal nobility which was the result of it, had a utility which it would be unjust to ignore. It must not be forgotten that the Roman empire, internally undermined and corrupted by the cancer of slavery,[1011] had ended by falling into ruins, and that the wealth accumulated by the Græco-Roman civilization was at the mercy of the barbarians. In so critical a situation, the establishment of the Goths, the Vandals, the Lombards, and other emigrants from the north upon the territory which they had ravaged, was beneficial. Having become owners of the greatest part of the capital which the conquered nations had accumulated upon the land, these barbarians were henceforth interested in defending it against the hordes which came after them. It was thus that the old enemies of civilization became its defenders, and that the wealth accumulated by antiquity, in passing from the weak hands of its old owners to those of the conquerors of the north, who were more numerous, more courageous, and stronger, was preserved from total annihilation. The destructive wave of invasion stopped before this new rampart, raised up in the place of the dismantled rampart of Roman domination. The Huns, for example, who had come from the depths of Tartary to share the spoils of the old world, were destroyed or repulsed by the coalition of the Goths and Franks, who had settled in Italy and in Gaul; and later the Saracens, no less formidable than the Huns, met the same fate.

If the Goths and the Franks had not appropriated the fixed capital of the nations they had subjugated, would they have risked their lives and their booty to repulse the fierce soldiers of Attila? And what would have remained of the old civilization, if this barbarian chief of a nomadic race had continued to overrun and ravage Europe? Would not Greece, Italy, Gaul, and Spain, dispossessed of their movable and personal wealth, and deprived of the greatest part of their population, have ended by presenting the same spectacle of desolation and ruin as the empire of the Assyrians and the kingdom of Palmyra? When, therefore, we take into account the circumstances which accompanied the establishment of the barbarians in the bosom of European civilization, we see that this violent substitution of a new race of proprietors for the old race presents rather the characteristics of the expropriation of private property in the name of public utility (i.e. eminent domain)[1012] than those of plunder properly so called. Hence, this extremely important consequence, that the property of the nobility which had its origin in conquest does not deserve the anathema which certain socialists have launched against it; because the original titles of the nobility to their estates was founded on general utility, that is to say, upon justice.

The conditions for the establishment of the barbarians in the bosom of the civilized world were extremely varied. Historians have nevertheless demonstrated that they generally took for themselves two-thirds of the land; this was, for example, the proportion in Gaul, when it was conquered by the Franks. This proportion, however, was not arbitrary; it was determined by the necessities of the situation. In each subjugated nation there was an aristocracy of land owners, dating most frequently from an earlier conquest, whom the conquerors were interested in treating with a certain restraint, in order not to push them to the dangerous extreme of despair. Depending upon whether this aristocracy had preserved more or less strength and influence, the conquerors left it a more or less considerable portion of its domains, limiting themselves to subjecting it to some modest fees. Hence there were two kinds of domains, and the title of francs alleux (freeholds) was given to lands occupied by the conquerors, as the count de Boulainvilliers explains very clearly.[1013]

“The Gallic land owner,” says this learned historian of the French nobility, "was required to pay certain tributes of the fruits and revenues of his lands, according to the demands of the victors. The Frank, who possessed his lands entirely free and unburdened (“franches” - free from taxes), had a more absolute and more perfect ownership of them; hence this distinction was marked by the term salic lands, meaning lands or alleux of the Franks, called also Salians; in a word, francs-alleux, that is to say, absolutely and thoroughly their own, hereditary, and free even from all tribute of the fruits. Terra salica, quae salio militi; aut regi assignata erat, dicta ad differentiam allodialis, quae est subditorum. (Basnage, on the word Alleu.)[1014] This method of dividing the conquered lands was imitated by the Goths, who called the lands which they had retained sortes gothicas, and those which they had left to the Romans, sortes romanas. The Normans did the same thing in regard to the old possessors of Neustria when they conquered it, and this was the origin of the greater part of freeholds; for the complete freedom from taxation of these lands, the owners of which only came under the jurisdiction of God alone (as Boutillier says in his Somme), also entitled them to be called francs-alleux (freeholds)."

There were, therefore, two nobilities facing each other after the conquest, the one composed of members of the conquering army, and the other composed of the old land owners not completely dispossessed. The former, whose lands were free from tax, were at first in the ascendency; but after long struggles, of which the fine novel, Ivanhoe, for example,[1015] gives a picturesque sketch, these two nobilities, drawn together by common interests, generally ended by merging into one.

It sometimes occurred to the conquerors to make an inventory of the wealth which they had appropriated; this was especially the case in England after the Norman conquest. The results of this curious inquiry were embodied in the Domesday Book.[1016]

The division of the booty and of the lands was carried out in an unequal manner between the chiefs and the soldiers of the conquering army. This inequality was based upon the unequal share which each had taken, according to his rank in the army, in the work of conquest. The distinction of rank was determined by the necessities of the enterprise. When the barbarians invaded a country, they chose the chiefs from among the most courageous and capable of their number, and they obeyed them in the common interest. The chiefs chose aids or comrades (comites) to carry out their orders; and a military hierarchy, based upon the necessities of the enterprise which was to be carried out, was thus organized by itself. Once the conquest was accomplished, it was natural that the share in the booty should be proportional to the rank which each man, having any claim to it, held in the army of invasion. The supreme chief had, therefore, the greatest share, both in personal effects and in land; the lesser chiefs and the common soldiers of the conquest obtained shares proportional to their rank, or to the services which they had rendered. These divisions were frequently the occasion of bloody quarrels, which the necessities of common defense alone were able to bring to an end.

When the booty to be divided comprised, besides personal effects, immovable property, land, or houses, the army of invasion dispersed, and each one of its members occupied the share which had fallen to him in the division. But in dispersing across a conquered country which was still a potential enemy, and exposed for that matter to new invasions, the conquerors took care to preserve their military organization; they remained organized in such a way that, at the first appearance of danger, they might immediately assemble their ranks under the banner of the chief. It is thus that the feudal régime was created. The characteristic trait of this system was the rigorous maintenance of the hierarchical organization of the conquering army, and the obligations which flowed from it. At the first call of the supreme chief, emperor, king, or duke, the lesser chiefs assembled the mass of those workers who had participated in the conquest. Each was bound, under pain of forfeiture, to report at the call of his superior in the hierarchy; the army was soon on foot again, in good order, to defend its domains, either against a revolt from within or an aggression from without.

The chiefs thus preserved their rank after the dispersal of the conquering army. Each rank had its particular name, sometimes of barbarian origin, sometimes borrowed from the Roman hierarchy. This name passed from the man to the domain; hence kingdoms, duchies, marquisates, counties, baronies, etc. Those of the conquering army who possessed no rank, but who had obtained a lot of land, simply took the name of “francs tenanciers” ( freeholders), and their lands that of “terres franches” (in English, freeholds), and they formed the lower grade of the nobility.[1017] Being obliged to march under the command of the chiefs, they enjoyed as compensation, like the latter, the privilege of being exempt from taxes, and that of sending representatives to the assemblies or parliaments of the nobility, in which the interests of their orders were discussed.

Nevertheless, it was important to assure the longevity of this organization which the care for the common defense required. The right of primogeniture and of entail were introduced to assure this longevity. Each having obtained a portion of the land, on condition of fulfilling certain obligations, it was essential, in the first place, that this share should not be divided up; in the second place, that it should not pass into the hands of a foreign or hostile family. The division of the land would have destroyed the pledge which assured the exact fulfillment of the military services, upon which depended the common security; it would have introduced anarchy into the conquering army, by necessitating a continual reorganization of the hierarchy. The introduction into the ranks of the army of men belonging to the conquered race, which could have taken place after the alienation or sale of the lands occupied by the conquerors, would have been no less dangerous. The law of primogeniture and entail served to preserve the conquerors from this two-fold peril. The law of primogeniture maintained intact the domain, which was the pledge of the fulfillment of the duty of each toward all, by transmitting it from generation to generation to the eldest son of the family. Entail prevented foreigners or enemies from slipping into the ranks of the army, by not allowing the noble proprietors to alienate their domains.

The primitive organization of the conquering army could therefore be perpetuated after the conquest had been accomplished, and the nobility formed itself into a veritable guild at the very top of society.

This organization had the obvious utility, in that it prevented the country, in which the conquering army had established itself, from becoming constantly the prey of new hordes of barbarians. It had its inevitable drawbacks, in that it delivered the industrious population over to the mercy of a greedy and brutal horde, who most frequently used without any restraint its right of conquest.

At first the condition of the subject population was very hard. The conquerors were subject to laws and obligations based upon their common interest; these laws and these obligations, which extended to all, to the chiefs as well as to the soldiers, protected to a certain degree the weak against the strong. But nothing similar existed in favor of the conquered; the latter were the prey which the conquerors disposed of at their pleasure. Perhaps it was good that it was so, at least in the very beginning; for if the conquerors had not had a maximum of interest in assuming the risks to property, which at that time was subject to continual aggression, they would, according to all appearances, have remained ordinary nomadic pillagers,[1018] and the capital accumulated by civilization would have been entirely destroyed. But this absolute power of the conquerors over the conquered, whether it was necessary or not, could not fail to produce the most monstrous oppression. The serf or subject of a lord was taxable, and liable to forced labor at his pleasure, which signified that the lord could dispose, according to his will, of the property of the unhappy serf, and sell him, and his family, after having confiscated his goods. Every individual, merchant or other, who crossed the domain of a lord, was also exposed to being pillaged, reduced to slavery, or massacred. Fortunately, this violent state of affairs could not last; order and justice have such utility, that they re-establish themselves in some way, after the most terrible social upheavals. The lords were not slow to see that it was in their interest to grant their serfs, farmers, or artisans, certain guarantees of security, and not to take their property in a violent and arbitrary manner, in order to get more from them. Hence, the emergence of customs. These customs, whose utility for the master as well as for the subject was proved by experience, ended by becoming a solid barrier against the arbitrariness of the lords. The condition of the serf, protected by custom, became more bearable, and the revenue of the lord was increased in consequence; the farmers, being less exposed to plunder, agriculture began to flourish again, and famines, after having been the rule, became each year less frequent. Artisans, who were concentrated in the towns and therefore in a better state than the farmers to look after each other, obtained even more quickly guarantees against arbitrary power; they were allowed, on condition of certain fixed fees, and sometimes even on condition of an indemnity paid only once once, to carry out their occupation in peace, and the by-laws of corporations were at first nothing but records of the customs, agreements, or transactions, which protected them from the rapacity of the lords. The same customs were established and the same arrangements worked for the benefit of commerce. At first the merchants, who had took the risk of trading from city to city as they had done in the time of Roman domination, had been dispossessed, reduced to slavery, or massacred by the barbarian lords, whose domains they traversed. But soon, all commerce having ceased, the lords themselves realized the inconveniences of this state of things. What did they do? For their capricious and arbitrary acts of plunder, they substituted fixed and regular feudal fees; they guaranteed to the merchants free and safe passage through their domains, on condition of their paying a toll. This was still onerous, without doubt; for each country being divided into a multitude of little seigniorial estates, a merchant, who had to travel through a rather small stretch of country, was obliged to pay a multitude of tolls. But it was less onerous than pillage and murder; and commerce, thus protected by the better understood interest of the lords, again assumed some activity.

Improvements did not stop here. Events and progress of different kinds weakened successively the feudal nobility, either by diminishing the importance of the part it played, or by increasing the power of the classes, which were subordinate to it.

As soon as feudalism was firmly set up and established, the danger of invasions became less; not, however, as the historian Robertson[1019] has declared, because the source from where they flowed had dried up. There were still, in the north of Europe and in the centre of Asia, large numbers of people who were greedy for booty, and ready to throw themselves upon the countries in which the arts of civilization had accumulated wealth; but, between these hungry multitudes and the prey which they coveted, the rampart of feudalism had been raised. After having vainly attempted to make a breach in this rampart, which replaced that of the Roman legions, the barbarian hordes drew back one after the other into the heart of Asia, and descended upon India and China. Then the conquerors, established upon the ruins of the Roman empire, could enjoy a little peace. But peace was foreign to their nature. They wore themselves out with internal struggles. The weaker lords were subjugated or dispossessed by the stronger. The supreme chief, who at first had had no authority over his old companions, except when there was question of providing for the common defense, profited by their disagreements to increase his power at their expense. He granted his alliance and his protection to the weak, on condition that they made themselves dependent on him and paid tribute to him. It was in this way that most of the freeholds were changed into fiefs.[1020]This modification of the feudal system had very important consequences. The number of internal struggles decreased, because the more powerful lords no longer dared to attack the weak, when the latter had become vassals of the king. On the other hand, the king, who collected tribute from the lands of those whom he protected, saw that they brought in more for him, to the extent that the taxes collected for the benefit of the lords were less numerous and less burdensome. He endeavored, therefore, to diminish the number of individual tolls, and to reduce the demands the lords made on their serfs. His salutary intervention was felt also in the system of money. In the beginning, each lord had assumed for himself the right to coin money, imposing upon the inhabitants of his domains the obligation of using only the coinage stamped with his head. Money soon became as bad as it could possibly be, while the subjects of the lords had no means of protecting themselves from the damage caused them by the debased money. It was quite otherwise, when, the freeholds having been transformed into fiefs, the king levied taxes upon the domains of his vassals. To prevent the loss which the debasement of the money caused in the payment of taxes, he appointed inspectors (juges-gardes) who were charged with the surveillance of the coinage of the lords, and with preventing them from melting down and debasing his own money. Gradually, as the power of these protectors of the weak increased, he confiscated or bought the right of coinage from the lesser lords and appropriated it for himself. The industrious classes did not fail to profit by these changes. Their condition was improved again when the most bellicose and turbulent part of the nobility went to the crusades. The lords, convinced that the conquest of the east would makes their fortunes in this world and would assure their salvation in the next, granted their multitudes of serfs liberty at a low price. And as very few of them returned from “that religious California of the middle ages”,[1021] the serfs, who had bought their liberty, were able to keep it. Finally, the bourgeoisie of the cities, having become rich and powerful by their industry, undertook to make themselves completely independent of their lords. The communal movement commenced, and this movement, assisted by the kings, who sold their protection to the bourgeoisie of the communes, as they had before sold it to the lesser lords, contributed also to weakening the power of the nobility.

The feudal system thus fell little by little into ruins. The subject classes advanced each day with a more rapid step toward their enfranchisement, inscribing upon their banners the word liberty. (See “Bourgeoisie.”)[1022] The substitution of fire arms for the old tools of war gave the coup de grâce to feudalism, by permitting thence-forth the industrious classes to protect themselves against the invasions of the strong races of the north. Artillery had considerable advantages over and thus replaced the iron-clad giants of chivalry, and the noble order ceased to be the necessary rampart of civilization. Since the services which it rendered were losing their value, the supremacy and the privileges which it continued to claim for itself were borne with less patience. Above all was this the case in France, where, the royal power having ended by reducing the nobility to the condition of servants of the court, it presented the spectacle of the saddest moral and material decay. Its eldest sons, provided with magnificent sinecures, expended their incomes in idleness, and ran into debt to avoid being eclipsed by an industrious bourgeoisie, whose wealth kept increasing. Its younger sons, too numerous for the employments which the monarch had at his disposal, and too proud to devote themselves to commerce and industry,[1023] filled the gaming houses and places of ill repute. The nobility, thus degraded, lost its old ascendency over the masses, and in 1789 the industrious classes rose up against he domination by a caste, which no longer could make arrogance and privileges forgotten through the magnitude of its services. The French nobility disappeared, swallowed up in the whirlpool of the revolution.

The following, according to the learned author of La France avant la révolution, is an account of the rights and feudal privileges which the nobility still enjoyed when the great catastrophe occurred:[1024]

“In almost all the rural districts there existed numerous vestiges of the feudal system. Each village had its lord, who, in general, possessed the best lands, and had certain rights over those which did not belong to him. Thus, there was the exclusive right of hunting upon all the territory of the fief; there was the tithe, the extent of which was more or less great; there was, with each transfer of property, the tax on the lot of land and on its sale. The lord could retain, for the price of sale, the land sold in his territory, could force the inhabitants to grind their grain in his mill, to bake their bread in his oven, to make their wine in his press, etc. On the vassal were incumbent also certain personal services, such as the obligation to work a certain number of days without compensation, which were called corvées, to render certain services under certain determined circumstances, etc. In some provinces, like Franche-Comté and Burgundy, mortmain existed still in many of the villages; the peasant could not quit the land or marry without permission of his lord, under pain of losing his property, and if he left no children, the lord was his heir.
But Louis XVI. had abolished mortmain in all the domains of the crown, and many lords followed his example. Justice was administered in the first resort, and sometimes in the last, by judges appointed by the lord. Finally, the clergy took the tithes, the government the villain tax and the tax on salt, and the peasant was subject, besides, to the corvée and the duty to serve in the militia , while all the nobles and almost all the bourgeois functionaries were exempt from it."

Finally, the nobility monopolized most of the great offices of the state, and had at its disposal numerous sinecures.

There are no precise data as to the number of the members of the French nobility, at the time when the revolution deprived them of their privileges. According to Sieyès, their number did not exceed 110,000. This is the way in which Sieyès made his calculation:[1025]

“I know," he said, “of one way to estimate the number of individuals of this order: it is to take the province where this number is the best known and compare it with the rest of France. That province is Brittany, and I remark in advance that it has more nobles than the others, either because they do not give up their noble privileges there, or because of the privileges which the families retain, etc., etc. There are in Brittany 1,900 noble families; I will say 2,000. Estimating each family as having five persons, there are in Brittany 10,000 nobles of all ages and of both sexes. The total population is 2,800,000 individuals. The ratio to the entire population of France is one to eleven. We must then multiply 10,000 by eleven, and we have 110,000 nobles at the most for the whole of the kingdom."

The author of La France avant la révolution thinks that the opinion of Sieyès is very near the truth.

Like the French nobility, but with more success, the British nobility has endeavored to maintain its old supremacy. No aristocracy has been able to derive more advantage from its position. With the establishment of the corn laws, it has endeavored to raise the value of the lands belonging to its eldest sons. By expanding the colonial empire of England, it has gradually increased the arena open to its younger sons.[1026] Nevertheless the industrious classes have come to understand that the costs of this policy of monopoly fall chiefly upon them, while the aristocracy receives the most evident benefit from it. These classes have fought against the political and economic monopolies of the aristocracy, and thanks to the great agitation of the Anti-Corn Law League, and to the reforms of Sir Robert Peel, continued by Lord John Russell, this work of enfranchisement is very far advanced.

It is necessary to add, however, that if the British aristocracy has shown itself harsh in the matter of monopolies, it has displayed great and solid qualities in the exercise of the functions it has monopolized. It has done even better. Whenever it has discovered a man of eminent ability in the lower strata of society, it has had the intelligence and the skill to make a place for him in its own ranks. It is thus that it has known how to render its monopoly bearable, and to preserve a great and legitimate ascendency over the country.

When the noble classes shall have finally ceased to be privileged in a direct or indirect manner, it is probable that the titles which serve to distinguish them will lose their value. For this value depends much less upon a prejudice of opinion than upon the positive advantages which they can confer. These advantages amount to nothing in the liberal professions: let a merchant, for example, be noble or common, the credit which he enjoys in the market remains the same.[1027] But it is quite otherwise in the functions which are connected with the government. It is rare that the nobility is not favored in an exceptional manner in the distribution of offices and of honors. Even in countries where the principle of equality has been proclaimed most emphatically, noble titles are all too often a piece of paper whose value is underwritten by the wallet of the taxpayers. As long as this piece of paper maintains its value, this will be proof that society has still not yet finished with the régime of privilege.[1028]

These old qualifications of the nobility constitute besides a peculiar anachronism in the organization of modern society. As has been seen above, the titles of duke, marquis, count, and baron served to designate the grades of the military hierarchy of feudalism; they roughly corresponded to the modern ranks of general, colonel, major, and captain. Would not bankers, manufacturers, scholars, or artists, invested with these titles borrowed from feudal hierarchy, present a somewhat ridiculous spectacle? Would they not have just as much reason for adorning themselves with the titles of mandarin, grand-serpent, or sagamore? How would this last nomenclature be more absurd than the other? Have our bankers, our manufacturers, our scholars, and our artists any more resemblance to the fierce warriors of the middle ages than they have to Indian chiefs or Chinese mandarins?

The privileges, and probably also the titles, of nobility will end by disappearing with so many other remnants of the old régime of servitude. But does this mean that our society is destined some day to undergo the process of egalitarian leveling ? By no means. There will always be, in the work of production, superior and inferior functions, functions requiring in a high degree the cooperation of the moral and intellectual faculties of man, and functions for which lesser skills will be sufficient. The former will always be better remunerated and more honored than the latter. The aristocracy of society will be formed by the former, and this natural nobility, so much more respectable because it will be better founded upon the superiority of merit and upon the greatness of its services, will have no need to make a show of haughty pretensions and superannuated titles in order to obtain public recognition.

Long Footnote 1.

(Molinari's note.) [Editor’s note: Some sections of the quote were omitted by Molinari. These are indicated in bold. The translation we have used is by William Hazlitt. His footnotes have been omitted.] The Domesday Book is nothing but a great inventory of the Norman conquest. We quote from the excellent history of M. Augustin Thierry some interesting details concerning the origin of this curious inquiry, and upon the way in which it was drawn up:

From this epoch dates a spirit of mutual distrust and secret hostility between the king and his old friends; they accused each other of avarice and selfishness. William reproached the Norman chiefs with caring more for their private interest than for the common safety; with thinking more of building farms, raising flocks, or forming studs, than of holding themselves in readiness against the native or foreign enemy. In their turn, the chiefs reproached the king with being beyond all measure greedy of gain, and with desiring to appropriate to himself, under false pretexts of general utility, the wealth acquired by the labour of all. In order to rest his demand of contributions, or money services, on a fixed basis, (King) William ordered a general territorial inquest to be made, and a register prepared of all the mutations of property brought about in England by the conquest; he desired to know into what hands throughout the country the Saxon domains had passed, and how many of these still retained their possessions in virtue of special agreements with himself or his barons, how many acres of land there were in each domain, how many were sufficient for the maintenance of a man-at-arms, and how many men-at-arms there were in each province or county of England; what was the gross amount derived in various ways from the cities, towns, boroughs and hamlets, what was the exact property of each earl, baron, knight, or sergeant-at-arms; what land, how many men holding fiefs on that land, how many Saxons, how much cattle, and how many ploughs each possessed.
This undertaking, in which modern historians have thought they discerned the stamp of administrative genius, was simply the result of the peculiar position of the Norman king, as chief of a conquering army, and of the necessity of establishing some kind of order in the chaos of the conquest. This is so entirely the case, that in other conquests, the details of which have been transmitted to us, for example, in that of Greece by the Latin crusaders in the thirteenth century, we find the same kind of inquest instituted by the chiefs of the invasion, on a wholly similar plan.
In virtue of the orders of king William, Henry de Ferrieres, Walter Giffard, Adam, brother of Eudes the seneschal, and Remi, bishop of Lincoln, with other personages selected from among the officers of justice and of the Exchequer, made a progress through the counties of England, establishing a court of inquiry in each place of any importance. They summoned before them the Norman viscount of each province, or of each Saxon shire, a personage whom the Saxons, in their language, still called by the ancient title of shire-reve or sheriff. They then summoned, or caused the viscount to summon, all the Norman barons of the neighbourhood, and called upon them to state the precise limits of their possessions and of their territorial jurisdictions; then some of the inspectors, or commissioners delegated by them, proceeded to each large domain and to each district, or hundred, as the Saxons called it. There they made the French men-at-arms of each seigneur, and every English inhabitant of the hundred, declare upon oath how many free-holders or lease-holders there were on the domain,1 what portion each occupied in full and modified property, the names of the actual holders, the names of those who had possessed them before the conquest, and the various mutations of property that had taken place since. So that they required, say the narratives of the time, three declarations concerning each estate; what it had been in the time of king Edward; what it was when William gave it, and what it was at the time being. Under each particular return was inscribed this form: “This is what has been sworn by all the Frenchmen and all the Englishmen of the hundred.”
In each town they inquired what taxes the inhabitants had paid to the ancient kings, and what the town produced to the officers of the Conqueror; how many houses the war of the conquest or the construction of fortresses had done away with; how many houses the conquerors had taken; how many Saxon families, reduced to utter poverty, were not in a condition to pay anything. In cities, they took the oath from the high Norman authorities, who convoked the Saxon citizens in their old Guildhall, now become the property of the king or of some foreign baron; lastly, in places of less importance, they took the oath of the royal provost, of the priest, and of six Saxons or villeins, as the Normans called them, of each town. This survey occupied six years, during which the commissioners of king William went over all England, with the exception of the mountainous districts, north and west of Yorkshire, that is to say, the five modern counties of Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland, and Lancashire. …
However this may be, the register, or, to use the old term, the terrier of the Norman conquest, makes no mention of the domains conquered beyond the province of York. The compilation of this roll for each county mentioned in it, was formed on an uniform plan. The king’s name was placed at the head, with the list of his lands and revenues in the county; then followed the names of the chiefs and lesser proprietors, in the order of their military rank and territorial wealth. The Saxons who had been spared by special grace in the great spoliation, figured only in the last ranks; for the few men of that race who remained free proprietors, or tenants, en chef du roi, as the conquerors expressed it, possessed only very small estates. They were inserted at the end of each chapter under the name of thanes of the king, or with various qualifications derived from offices in the royal household. The other names of Anglo-Saxon aspect which occur here and there in the roll, belonged to men who farmed portions, of greater or less extent, of the domains of the Norman earls, barons, knights, sergeants-at-arms or cross-bow-men.
Such is the form of the authentic and still existing book, whence have been derived most of the facts as to expropriations given in the present work. This precious volume, in which the conquest was registered in its entirety, so that its memory might never be effaced, was called by the Normans, le grand rôle, le rôle royale, or le rôle de Winchester, because it was preserved in the treasury of the cathedral of that city. The Saxons called it by a more solemn name, Dom-boc, or Doomsday Book, because it contained their sentence of irrevocable expropriation.

A. Thierry, Histoire de la Conquête d’Angleterre par les Normands, T. II, pp. 237-44.

[Editor’s note: In Augustin Thierry, History of the Conquest of England by the Normans (1856), vol. 1, pp. 299-303.]

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Long Footnote 2.

(Molinari's note.) Montesquieu has revealed with great clarity the nature of this transformation of the feudal system, as well as the causes which determined it.

THE manner of changing an allodial estate into a fief, may be seen in a formulary of Marculfus. The owner of the land gave it to the king, who restored it to the donor by way of usufruit, or benefice, and then the latter nominated his heirs to the king.
In order to find out the reasons which induced them thus to change the nature of the allodia, I must trace the source of the ancient privileges of our nobility, a nobility who for these eleven centuries have been ready to undergo every hardship, and to spill their blood in their country’s service.
They who were seized of fiefs enjoyed very great advantages. The composition for the injuries done them was greater than that of freemen. It appears by the formularies of Marculfus, that it was a privilege belonging to the king’s vassal, that whoever killed him should pay a composition of six hundred sous. This privilege was established by the Salic law†, and by that of the Ripuarians; and while these two laws ordained a composition of six hundred sous for the murder of the king’s vassal, they gave but two hundred sous for the murder of a person freeborn, if he was a Frank or Barbarian living under the Salic law; and only a hundred for a Roman.[1029]

After having enumerated various other privileges which the vassals of the king enjoyed, the author of the Esprit des lois adds:

It is very natural therefore to think that those Franks who were not the king’s vassals, and much more the Romans, became fond of entering into the state of vassalage; and that they might not be deprived of their demesnes, they devised the usage of giving their allodium to the king, of receiving it from him afterwards as a fief, and of nominating their heirs. This usage was continued, and took place especially during the times of confusion under the second race, when every man being in want of a protector, was desirous to incorporate himself with the other lords, and to enter as it were, into the feudal monarchy, because the political no longer existed.[1030]

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Long Footnote 3.

(Molinari's note.) Noble prejudice banned poor nobles from entering into industry and commerce, which had formerly been degraded by slavery. It was not till the eighteenth century that there began to be a reaction against this prejudice. A writer, who then enjoyed some notoriety, the abbé Coyer, wrote a work entitled the Noblesse commerçante (The Business-Minded Nobility),[1031] in which he urged the nobles to have recourse to the useful and remunerative occupations of industry and commerce to restore their patrimonies, which the abuse of luxury had considerably reduced. The work of the abbé Coyer was well received by the young nobility, who were beginning to be impregnated with philosophic ideas; but it excited in the highest degree the indignation of the partisans of the old ideas. An aristocratic writer, the chevalier d'Areq, undertook to refute the unseemly and incongruous propositions which were advanced therein. The arguments of this defender of noble prejudice were not lacking in a certain originality. The chevalier d'Areq stated, in the first place, with a sorrowful horror, that the nobility was only too disposed to follow the degrading counsels of the abbé Coyer, and he begged them, in the name of their honor and of the safety of all, to pause on the brink of so fatal an abyss.

“It would be necessary, on the contrary" he exclaimed with indignation, "to place new barriers between the nobility and the path it is proposed to open. Without such barriers, instead of seeing only one gentleman in a family follow this path, it is to be feared that all, or at least almost all, the members of the family will rush into it, and that we shall see a crowd of nobles upon our merchant vessels, with no other arms than the pen, instead of seeing them upon our war vessels, the sword in their hands to defend the timid trader.
… It is asked, what do you wish a gentleman to do, who only possesses ancient titles, one more reason to make him blush for his misery? Is it in France that they dare to put this question? Is it in France that a gentleman remains idle upon his estate, while victory is waiting to crown the nobility on the battle-fields? Is it in France that a gentleman is advised to give himself over to baseness, to infamy, in short, to dishonor the name of his ancestors, virtuous, without doubt, since they were judged worthy of nobility, with no other pretext than to save him from indigence, while there is a gracious monarch to serve, a country to defend, and arms always ready for whoever wishes to walk down the road of honor?"[1032]

The chevalier d'Areq then reprimanded the nobility for its excessive luxury; he begged them to practice economy, and ended by posing this curious dilemma:

“Commerce on a large scale, the only commerce which can be suitable for the nobility, if indeed commerce can be suitable for it, is not carried on without the funds necessary to purchase the raw materials, and without which, desire, zeal, activity and intelligence become useless tools. Either the nobility, which it is wished to make commercial, possesses these funds, or it does not possess them. If it possesses them, it has no need of commerce; these funds should be sufficient for its subsistence, while awaiting the reward which its merit and its services should naturally provide for it. (pp. 97-98)… If the nobility has not the funds necessary for the purchase of the commodities, in what way can it take the first steps in commerce? A gentleman acknowledges no other masters but God, honor, his country, and his king. Is it then into the service of a commoner that one wants to subject him under the title of an apprentice? Is it by laying aside the trappings of war to don the harness of servitude that one claims will lead him to make his fortune? By what means! With what shame! Is not indigence a thousand times preferable to him?"[1033]

The abbé Coyer replied with two volumes, entitled, Développement et défense du système de la noblesse commerçante;[1034] and Grimm, giving an account of the quarrel in his correspondence (1757),[1035] wrote a plea in favor of the military nobility. The question remained undecided, and in our days there are still many nobles imbued with the prejudice which the abbé Coyer combated. Yet the most obstinate are willingly resigned to "break with tradition” by investing their funds in industry, provided that the investment is remunerative.

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Long Footnote 4.

(Molinari's note.) According to Bentham, no system of rewards is more costly than that which consists in according titles of nobility as a payment for services rendered to the state. The following are the reasons given by the illustrious utilitarian philosopher for his opinion:[1036]

“It is commonly said that rewards in honors cost the state nothing. This is an error; for not only do honors render services dearer, but moreover there are burdens which can not be estimated in money. All honor supposes some pre-eminence. Among individuals placed on a level of equality, some can not be favored by a degree of elevation, except by making others suffer by a relative abasement. This is true, above all, of permanent honors, of those which confer rank and privileges. There are two classes of persons at whose expense these honors are conferred: the class from which the new dignitary is taken, and the class into which he is introduced. The more, for example, the number of the nobles is increased, the more their importance is diminished and the more the value of their order is detracted from.
 … Profusion of honors has the two-fold disadvantage of debasing them and of causing also pecuniary expenses. If a peerage is given, a pension must frequently be added to it. If only to maintain the dignity of it.
It is thus that the hereditary nobility has raised the rate of all rewards. If a simple citizen has rendered brilliant services, it is necessary to begin by taking from the common class and raising him to the rank of nobility. But nobility without an independent settlement is only a burden. Therefore it is necessary to add to it gratuities and pensions. The reward becomes so great, so onerous, that it can not be paid all at once. It is necessary to make of it a burden, with which posterity is loaded.
It is true that posterity must pay in part for the services, the fruits of which it shares; but if there were no noble by birth, personal nobility would be sufficient. Among the Greeks a pine branch or a handful of parsley, among the Romans a few laurel leaves, rewarded a hero.
Fortunate Americans, fortunate for so many reasons, if, to have happiness, it is sufficient to possess all that constitutes happiness! This advantage is still yours. Respect the simplicity of your manners and customs; take care never to admit an hereditary nobility. The patrimony of merit would soon become that of birth. Give pensions, raise statutes, confer titles; but let these distinctions be personal. Preserve all the force, all the purity of honor; do not alienate that precious fund of the state in favor of a haughty class, which will not be slow in using it against you."[1037]

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17. Appendix 1: Further Aspects of Molinari’s Life and Thought

1. The Dreamer (le Rêveur) of Radical Liberal Reforms

Molinari refers to himself as a “dreamer” several times in Les Soirées and in other writings and these dreamers were of three kinds.[1038] The first kind of dreamer was the classical liberal activist during the 1848 Revolution who thought he could appeal to “the socialists” to join a coalition of radicals in a joint struggle against privilege. In the 15 June issue of the JDE he wrote an anonymous letter to a group of unspecified socialists (perhaps Proudhon and his followers might have been the most sympathetic to his arguments) asking them to recognize the common goals the economists shared with the socialists,[1039] namely the desire for justice and material abundance for ordinary working people, and to find some way to reconcile the different means they had chosen to achieve these goals, namely the socialists’ dream of “the organization of labor” and the economists’ dream of “the liberty of working.” The mistake the socialists made, in Molinari’s view, was to attribute all the current ills of French society to out of control free competition which was the result of a policy of laissez-faire put into place by the French government. A closer examination of the economic policies adopted by the state showed in fact that the opposite of laissez-faire had been the policy for hundreds of years. At no time in French history had this ever been the case. Like the other economists, Molinari argued that it was the persistence of state sanctioned monopolies, restrictions on foreign trade, taxes on basic necessities, and suffocating regulation of the economy in general which was the cause of the misery of French workers.

The timing of this appeal to the socialists was unfortunate because it was published a week before the violent riots of the June Days (23-26 June 1848) which led to a crackdown on dissent by the National Guard and the Army under General Cavaignac and the declaration of martial law. The violence of the revolution turned conservatives and many economists against the revolution thus making Molinari’s appeal to them for an alliance moot. Perhaps for this reason Molinari did not reveal that he was in fact the author until 50 years later in an appendix he included with Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la société future (1899).[1040]

The second kind of dreamer was the “économiste radical, un rêveur” (a radical economist, a dreamer) of Les Soirées (S11) who wanted to push the principle of individual property rights and the law of free competition to their absolute limits resulting in “la société à la propriété pure” (the society of pure property rights) (S12). In this he wanted to appeal to his fellow economists many of whom he thought were not as consistent as he was in applying economic theory to society’s problems. Very early on in Les Soirées the Conservative refers to both the Socialist and the Economist as foolish dreamers (“O rêveurs, mes bons amis” (Oh you dreamers, my good friends)) (S1) who are pursuing unrealizable dreams. In S11 the Economist also refers to himself as un novateur audacieux” (a daring innovator) who will most probably be dealt with in the same way as all “dreamers” have been over the centuries who challenged the status quo, “de la belle manière” (in the grand manner). In using this phrase Molinari was perhaps anticipating the reaction of some of his colleagues when they read the Soirées, especially S11 on the private production of security. At the monthly meeting of the Société d'économie Politique on 10 October of that year not one of those present came to Molinari's defense on the issue of the right of the government to confiscate private property for public works (eminent domain) and the private and competitive production of security. The main critics were Charles Coquelin who began the discussion, then Frédéric Bastiat, and finally Charles Dunoyer. It was the latter who summed up the view of the economists that Molinari had been “swept away by delusions of logic.”[1041] His forebodings in Les Soirées were correct. None of his colleagues came to his defense on the issue of the production of security and he was left alone to work on this topic for the rest of his long life.

The third kind of dreamer was the free market economist who wanted to have his voice heard by both those on the right who were in favor of tariff protection and subsidies for industry and agriculture, and by the left who wanted to create a form of welfare state in France with government guaranteed jobs, unemployment relief, and other measures. This was the point in writing Les Soirées in the first place and in editing the compendium of economic knowledge, the DEP. However, as he was forced to admit in late 1852 “Malheureusement, on n'écoute guère les économistes” (Unfortunately, hardly anyone listens to the economists.)[1042]

Finally, one should also note that Molinari’s older friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat had his moments of wishful dreaming. For example, he wrote a thinly disguised account of a Prime Minister (“The Utopian”)[1043] who was appointed out of the blue to head a new government which could enact radical liberal reforms (described as his “fantasies”). After gleefully listing in some detail what he planned to do in order to drastically deregulate and privatize the French economy and drastically reduce the power of the state he steps back at the last minute and refuses to carry out his program. He suddenly realizes that reform imposed from the top down on an unwilling and poorly informed people was a utopian dream and was doomed to failure. Without widespread understanding of free market economic ideas such reforms would be counterproductive.

2. Entrepreneurs: Markets in Everything and Entrepreneurs for Everything

One of Molinari’s great innovations in Les Soirées (1849) and the Cours d’économie politique (1855, 1863) was to apply economic analysis to everything, even things which had never been treated in this way before such as the provision of security, the family, and the Catholic Church.[1044] This was a direct consequence of his view that the natural laws of political economy were all pervasive and universally applicable. A further consequence of this way of thinking was to view every branch of human activity as a potential “industry” in which “entrepreneurs” would spontaneously emerge to organize the “production” of whatever good or service was relevant to that industry in order to satisfy the demands of “consumers” of that good or service.[1045] These entrepreneurs would compete in an open market for business by providing the highest quality good or service at the lowest price in order to attract consumers and make profits. In other words, Molinari believed in the idea of “markets in everything” and “entrepreneurs for everything.”

Of course, some of these producers and entrepreneurs would seek to avoid open competition by approaching the government to provide them individually or their industry as a whole with various forms of “protectionism” such as legal privileges, subsidies, monopolies, and other benefits paid for at taxpayer or consumer expense. However, he believed that the natural laws of political economy would continue to operate and eventually the harmful effects of these subsidies and monopolies would be felt and there would emerge political pressure to have them removed in the form of “associations” which would demand “liberty of trading” in that industry. The prime example example of this for the Economists in the late 1840s was the success of Richard Cobden’s Anti-Corn Law League in having the protectionist Corn Laws repealed in 1846.

In his understanding of the important role the entrepreneur has in the economy[1046] Molinari is building upon the earlier work of Richard Cantillon, Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, and Charles Dunoyer. The origin of the term “entrepreneur," meaning the individual who organizes all aspects of an enterprise and is responsible for its overall running and management, has its origins in the writings of the Irish-French banker and economic theorist Richard Cantillon (1680-1734), Essai sur la nature du commerce en général (circa 1730).[1047] The idea was taken up in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) where he uses the English word "undertaker,” and further developed and given a much more central role in the economy by Jean-Baptiste Say in his Traité d'économie politique (1803). The American translator of Say in 1820 uses the unfortunate English word "adventurer” in order to translate "entrepreneur." It has now of course entered into the English language and requires no translation. Charles Dunoyer had his own take on the important role played by the entrepreneur in industrial activity. In his Liberté du travail (1845) he refers to the "génie des affaires” (the guiding spirit (or the mastermind) of the business):

Among the different kinds of abilities (forces) which human beings have, what strikes me first, the one which is the most essential for the success of all kinds of enterprises and for the smooth operation of all the technical skills (arts), is the mastermind of the business, a mastermind in which I see mixed several faculties which are quite distinct, such as the following: the capacity to judge the state of (market) demand or to recognize the needs of society; that of judging the state of supply or to appreciate the means by which these needs can be satisfied; that of administering with skill the enterprises which have been conceived in wisdom; finally, that of checking the forecasts of their speculation by keeping regular and intelligently kept accounts.[1048]

What is unique in Les Soirées is the much more expanded role Molinari envisaged for the entrepreneur in the many regulated or monopolized industries which he wanted to open up to free competition. He uses this word 37 times in Les Soirées most (17) in a generic sense such as “entrepreneurs d'industrie” (industrial or manufacturing entrepreneurs), “entrepreneurs de production” (manufacturing entrepreneurs), or “entrepreneurs ou directeurs d’industrie” (entrepreneurs or directors of industrial enterprises). However, what is more interesting is that he also uses the word “entrepreneur” in some very specific cases where a previously highly regulated or monopolized industry is deregulated and opened up to free competition thus attracting completely new kinds of entrepreneurs into that industry for the first time. In S1 he provides a list of the occupations he would like to see opened up to competition:

The Economist: I am sure of it. Let property owners freely go about their business. Let property circulate and everything will work out for the best.
In fact, property owners have never been left to go freely about their business and property has never been allowed to circulate freely.
Judge for yourself.
Is it a matter of the property rights of the individual man; of the right he has to use his abilities freely, insofar as he causes no damage to the property of others? In the present society, the highest posts and the most lucrative professions are not open; one cannot practice freely as a solicitor, a priest, a judge, bailiff, money-changer, broker, doctor, lawyer or professor. Nor can one straightforwardly be a printer, a butcher, baker or entrepreneur in the funeral business. We are not free to set up a commercial organization, a bank, an insurance company, or a large transport company, nor free to build a road or establish a charity, nor to sell tobacco or gunpowder, or saltpeter, nor to carry [p.40] mail, or print money, nor to meet freely with other workers to establish the price of labor. The property a man holds in himself, his internal property, is in every detail shackled.[1049]

As he works through the examples of these regulated industries in the various chapters of Les Soirées he adds to his list the new kind of entrepreneur who would emerge in this specialized area of economic activity, such as in the transport industry - “entrepreneurs de roulage” (entrepreneurs in the haulage business) [393] and “entrepreneurs de diligences” (entrepreneurs in the coach or cab business) [pp. 000]; the funeral business - “entrepreneur de pompes funèbres” (entrepreneurs in the funeral business) [pp. 000]; and private schools - “entrepreneurs d’education" (entrepreneurs in the education business) [pp. 000]. What is a bit more unusual is his idea that the small family farm would eventually have to give way to larger farms run on a more commercial basis. This of course would require entrepreneurs who could run a farm like a business - “entrepreneurs d'industrie agricole” (entrepreneurs in the agriculture industry) [pp. 000], which in some circles in France was an heretical idea. Even more unusual was his call for the complete deregulation of prostitution, which he also regarded as a business, and the right of women to set up their own brothels whenever and however they wished without government regulation or supervision.[1050] In order to do this of course there would have to be women who were prepared to act as “entrepreneurs de prostitution” (entrepreneurs in the prostitution business) [pp. 000]. The new entrepreneurs would not all come from the wealthier and and better educated classes but also from the ranks of the working class. Molinari also envisaged the rise of the “self-made” entrepreneur, “le laborieux entrepreneur, naguère ouvrier” (entrepreneur who has emerged from the working class) [pp. 000], who rises out of the working class to run and own their own business enterprise.

We will now turn briefly to two areas mentioned at the beginning of this section where Molinari made original contributions with the application of economic ideas and especially the role of the entrepreneur to the study of the provision of security and the operation of the family.

Surprisingly Molinari does not use the word entrepreneur in S11 to describe the individuals who would organize the “security industry." He used the word entrepreneur in his article “The Production of Security” in the JDE in February 1849, but not in Les Soirées for some reason. In “The Production of Security” Molinari refers to the “producteur de sécurité” (producer of security) who might be “un simple entrepreneur” (a simple entrepreneur) in a small town but who would face competition from “un nouvel entrepreneur, ou à l'entrepreneur voisin” (a new entrepreneur or an entrepreneur from a neighboring town if he failed to provide a a satisfactory service at a reasonable price.[1051] In S11 he prefers to talk about insurance companies rather than individual entrepreneurs who would provide consumers with security services. He did however return to using the word entrepreneur in the Cours d’économie politique a few years later.[1052] The reason for this change of terminology is not clear but it seems to be related to the fact that he now has a much more generalized theory of the role of the entrepreneur who is involved in all aspects of economic activity. He now refers to “l’entrepreneur d’industrie” and to the “entrepreneurs de production” instead of any specific industry related entrepreneurs, and security, along with all other public goods, has just become one more industry like any other.

Also in the Cours d’économie politique (1855) he treats the family as an economic unit, “l’association conjugale” (the conjugale business or partnership) [413], where the parents needed to act like entrepreneurs and make economic calculations about the costs and benefits of having a family and plan for the future of their family like any other commercial entity, by making sure they had sufficient funds to house, feed, clothe, and educate any children they might bring into the world.[1053] The entrepreneur parents had to amass sufficient capital in order to look after their children and their capital “investment” would pay off in the form of the “human capital” of their children who would eventually become productive workers in their own right. Molinari’s theory of the rights of children was that parents had a moral, legal, and economic duty to raise their children and if they did not then they incurred a debt to their children which society was obliged to enforce on their children’s behalf.

Molinari thought one of the starkest examples of “les entrepreneurs de population” (entrepreneurs in the population industry) who are engaged in “la production des hommes” (the production of human beings) were the slave owners in the American South who ruthlessly planned the size and composition of their slave workforce. This only went to show that even organizations based upon coercion like slave plantations and governments could sometimes benefit by operating like entrepreneurs in order to keep their costs down and maximise economic returns, but this of course was not something Molinari advocated. Quite the contrary. He wanted parents to be aware of the real costs of having children and caring for them so they could become free, responsible, and useful human beings in the future.

In the meantime, until the final stage of economic development had been reached with the regime of competition in all things, when “la concurrence politique servira de complément à la concurrence agricole, industrielle et commerciale” (political competition will serve as a complement to agricultural, industrial, and commercial competition),[1054] so long as the government still offered some services to taxpayers, the government itself should try to operate more entrepreneurially in order to keep costs down and to provide better services to their “consumers”:

… Like any entrepreneur the government must do one thing and one only, or risk doing what it does very badly. All governments have as their main function the production of security. Let them confine themselves to that.[1055]

However, Molinari was not convinced that governments could in fact behave entrepreneurially and provide their services to consumers “à bon marché” (at a good price) because of the very way they were constructed. He drew up a list of four reasons why governments were institutionally incapable of being run in an economic or “entrepreneurial” fashion like any other business in a free market. In fact he argued that government operations were essentially “anti-economic” in their behavior because they violated the following economic laws which all successfully entrepreneurs had to adhere to in order to survive: “les lois de l’unité des opérations et de la division du travail” (the law of the unity of operations and the division of labor), “la loi des limites naturelles” (the law of natural limits to their size), “la loi de la concurrence” (the law of competition), “les principes de la spécialité et de la liberté des échanges” (the principles of specialization and free trade).[1056] By these he meant the following: that firms had a natural size limit beyond which they could not operate profitably and effectively (and government operations were always too big), that government tried to do too many things at once instead of specializing in one thing they could do well, because they were not subject to competition from rival firms governments had no interest in keeping their prices low and in providing a good service to the customers, and because they did not have to satisfy the needs of customers who might go elsewhere if the service provided was not satisfactory, governments tended to provide either “a one size fits all” product or produced too little or too much.

In addition to these economic failings of government there was always the political problem of the state being captured by powerful vested interest groups and being turned to satisfying their needs rather than the needs of ordinary people. Molinari discussed the history of this problem in great detail in his two books on political sociology which he wrote in the 1880s, L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle: théorie du progrès (1880) and L'évolution politique et la Révolution (1884).

3. Grocer: The Story of the Monopolist Grocer

The story of the grocer with a monopoly is one Molinari returned to several times in the Soirées and the Cours.[1057] His purpose was to show that engrained habits of thinking and behavior prevented individuals from seeing the new possibilities opened up by free competition in a market economy.

His first use of the story is in S11 where he has the Economist state that

“Grant a grocer the exclusive right to supply a particular part of town, forbid the inhabitants of that district to buy any commodities from neighboring grocers or even to provide themselves with their own groceries, and you will see what trash the privileged grocer will end up selling and at what price. You will see how he lines his pockets at the expense of the unfortunate consumers, what regal splendor he will display for the greater glory of the neighborhood ...  Well, what is true for the smallest services is no less true for the greatest ones. A monopoly government is certainly worth more than that of a grocery shop.” (Above, pp. 000.)

And a bit later:

“At the time when the regulatory regime kept industry prisoner within its communal boundaries, and when each privileged corporation had exclusive control of the communal market, people said that society was threatened, each time some audacious innovator strove to attack that monopoly. If anyone had come and said at that time that instead of the feeble and stunted industries of the privileged corporations, liberty would one day build immense factories turning out cheaper and superior products, this dreamer would have been very smartly put in his place. The conservatives of that time would have sworn by all the gods that such a thing was inconceivable.” (Above, pp. 000.)

He returned to the story in his treatise Cours, vol. 2, pp. 510-14 where towards the end he tells the story in more detail about a grocer who enjoyed a monopoly in his village at a time when the economy as a whole was moving towards open and free competition in all areas of business activity, including the grocery business. Most of the villagers, and the grocer too of course, believed in “quelque antique superstition” (some ancient superstition) that groceries could only be supplied by a monopoly and that their supply of groceries would break down if the business were to be opened up to competition. Molinari then proceeds to show how the villagers are mistaken, how free and open competition by grocers would lead to greater variety in the choice of food, lower prices, and even more work for people in the grocery business. He asks the reader to “poursuivons jusqu’au bout notre hypothèse” (follow us to the (very) end of our hypothesis” and reaches the following conclusions about the benefits of competition in all things:

“One will discover, not without some surprise, that it is not true, as the monopolists have attempted to make us believe and as they themselves moreover believe, that monopoly is the necessary and god-given form for the grocery business. Consequently, instead of pursuing the impossible task of finding a better “organisation” of this monopoly we will work to destroy it, by progressively making the different branches of the (grocery) business which have been amalgamated together pass into the domain of free competition. Once this unnatural amalgamation has been dissolved, once each branch has become free, it will be able to develop under its normal conditions, in proportion to the needs of the market, and once society has got rid of a monopoly which was holding it back and exhausting it, it will grow more rapidly in number and in size.
There (in a nutshell) is the history of governments since society began to pass from the era of monopoly to that of competition.”[1058]

Molinari did not believe it was the economist’s job here or in any other area of economic activity to specify in advance exactly how goods and services would be provided at some time in the future, how many companies might be set up to supply these services, at what prices these goods and services would be traded, and so on. The only things an economist needed to know is whether or not there is a demand for a good or service, whether or not there are people willing to supply this good or service at a given price, and if there are no legal impediments to these two parties coming together to trade with each other; then the economist can say with some certainty that markets will evolve to satisfy this demand. As he also stated in S11 when the Conservative asks him how security in the future might be provided:

“That (the specifics) does not concern the Economists. Political economy can say: if such a need exists , it will be satisfied and done better in a regime of full freedom than under any other. There is no exception to this rule. As to how this industry will be organized, what its technical procedures will be, that is something which political economy cannot tell us.
Thus I can affirm that if the need for food is plainly visible in society, this need will be satisfied, and satisfied all the better, when each person remains as free as possible to produce food or to buy from whomever he thinks fit.”

This is of course a true statement about many if not most economic activities. As he was writing these very lines Molinari was witnessing the dramatic transformation of shopping in Paris with the emergence of the department store. No economist could have imagined how this new invention of the competitive market for the sale of consumer goods would transform cities like Paris. An entrepreneur named Aristide Boucicaut founded the first department store named appropriately enough, “Le Bon Marché” (the cheap or low cost market),[1059] in Paris in 1838 which was rapidly evolving into its modern form in the late 1840s and early 1850s with its individual “departments” (or shops within a shop) selling a vast range of goods under one roof, at fixed prices, and offering the customer exchanges or refunds for unwanted purchases. Just as this new phenomenon had emerged unplanned and unanticipated out of the competitive market place for consumer goods, so Molinari imagined a similar new market would emerge for the buying and selling of security services in ways unimagined by economists.

4. Labor Unions, Labor Exchanges, and Labor Merchants

Molinari took a great interest in labor matters when he was a young journalist in the mid-1840s. He thought the legal persecution of workers who tried to set up their own labor unions was unjust and he was inspired by the example of Stock Exchanges which he thought could be applied to the creation of Labor Exchanges to help workers find the best paying jobs.

Molinari supported the right of workers to form unions partly because he saw them as just another example of a voluntary association between free individuals to achieve shared goals, and partly because he objected to the unequal punishment meted out to labor unions vis-à-vis employers associations. Both were banned under the Civil Code but punishments were heavier and more often enforced against labor unions than employer associations.[1060]

French workers were regulated in two main areas. The first was the requirement to carry “livrets d’ouvriers” or workbooks which were inspected by the police, and the second was the ban on forming labor unions. The “livrets d’ouvriers” or workbooks were documents used by the police to regulate or “domesticate the nomadism” of workers.[1061] Workers had to have them signed by the police or the mayor of the towns in which they worked and their employment details filled out by their employer. If they were found without the workbooks in their possession, workers could be imprisoned for vagrancy. The workbooks were introduced in 1781, were abolished during the Revolution, and then reinstated under Napoleon in 1803. Although they were often ignored in practice they were a significant regulation of labor and were not abolished until 1890.

The ban on forming labor unions dates back to the Chapelier Law of 1791 which became the basis for articles 414 and 415 of the Penal Code. The revolutionary lawyer and politician Jean Le Chapelier (1754-1794) introduced the “Le Chapelier Law” which was enacted on 14 June, 1791. The Assembly had abolished the privileged corporations of masters and occupations of the old regime in March and the Le Chapelier Law was designed to do the same thing to organizations of both entrepreneurs and their workers. The law effectively banned guilds and trade unions (as well as the right to strike) until the law was altered in 1864. Article 2 of the Le Chapelier Law stated that: “Citizens of the same occupation or profession, entrepreneurs, those who maintain open shop, workers, and journeymen of any craft whatsoever may not, when they are together, name either president, secretaries, or trustees, keep accounts, pass decrees or resolutions, or draft regulations concerning their alleged common interests.”[1062] Similar restrictions became part of the Civil Code, most notably articles 414 and 415 which stated:[1063]

Art.414. Any coalition between those who give the workers employment, which is aimed at forcing down wages, unjustly and improperly, followed by an attempt at carrying this out or actually beginning to do so, will be punished by an imprisonment of from six days to a month, and a fine ranging from two hundred to three thousand francs.
Art.415. Any coalition, either attempted or initiated, on the part of the workers, which is aimed at bringing all work to a halt simultaneously, forbidding activity in a workshop, preventing people going there or staying there before or after certain hours, and in general, stopping, preventing or making production more expensive, will be punished by an imprisonment of at least one month and no more than three months. The ringleaders or instigators will be punished with an imprisonment of two to five years.

Some of Molinari’s earliest journalism concerned the problem of workers. In 1843 he wrote an article for La Nation on “Des Moyens d’améliorer le sort des classes laborieuses” (Means of improving the condition of the working classes) which stirred enough interest to be published in February 1844 as a separate pamphlet.[1064] This was followed in October and November with a series of articles on workers in the Courrier français. Molinari was attracted to “the condition of the working classes” because he thought that the Civil Code played favorites on the issue of legal associations of individuals. The law, based upon the Le Chapelier Law of June 1791 and Articles 414 and 415 of the French Penal Code, turned a blind eye to business owners associating in order to improve their economic situation but cracked down severely on workers who did the same thing. Molinari, on the other hand, saw unions as just another example of a voluntary association between free individuals to achieve common goals (see S6). This view was also shared by Bastiat who gave a speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 17 November, 1849 defending unions on these very grounds and that they should be protected under the law.[1065] In 1849 the law was slightly amended regarding articles 414, 415, and 416 in order to make them somewhat less unequal, but the civil penalties still remained in force.[1066]

Molinari covered a test case in the courts for the Courrier français and followed it quite closely. He tells us some 52 years later that he had assisted the Parisian Carpenters Union in their trial in 1845. He does not say how he assisted them but he states that “in spite of the eloquent plea made on their behalf by M. Berryer the leaders of the union were condemned to 5 years in prison” for asking for a wage increase. He sadly notes that the crack down by the government on the workers and their unions provoked a reaction against the government and the principle of individual liberty:

We had the opportunity to assist in 1845 in a court case against some Prisian carpenters who formed a union to obtain an increase in their wages. In spite of the eloquent plea made on their behalf by M. Berryer the leaders of the union were condemned to 5 years in prison. This being achieved, the employer, even though not entitled to by law, was protected by the natural and artificial barriers which limited the market of the workers, and furthermore, by the laws prohibiting strikes, and continued to determine with authority the level of workers’ wages, just as he had done previously. Because of this there was a reaction against the new regime which was even accused of worsening the condition of the working class by removing the guarantees which they had under the old regime. The socialists blamed liberty for the evils which arose precisely from the obstacles which their exercise of liberty encountered and they bent over backwards to invent new theories of social reorganization which, upon closer examination, were nothing more than a retrogression to the ancient regime of servitude.[1067]

As a result of the unsuccessful court case of the Parisian carpenters Molinari published in the Courrier français in 1846 “An Address to Parisian workers”[1068] in which he suggested that they establish a “Bulletin du travail” (Labor Market Report) which would provide information to workers on prices and availability of jobs much like the “Bulletin de la Bourse” (Stock Market Report) provided prices and availability of stocks and bonds to investors. Molinari pointed out that business owners and investors exchanged information and prices on the stock market (‘bourse”) which was subsequently reported in the business press or transmitted across the country via the telegraph, but no similar exchange existed for workers who also had a need to know what jobs were available, where they were located, and at what prices. The electric telegraph had been introduced in France in 1845 for government and military use only and in 1851 it was opened up for public use but the possibilities it might open up for business were obvious. Molinari’s scheme for a “labor exchange” was to apply the same principles of a stock exchange to labor markets where prospective workers and their employers could consult the boards to see the latest prices and offers and thus provide a better way to clear the market. He called this “la publicité du travail” (dissemination of information, or “advertising,” about labor) and he thought this would even up the balance of power between employees and employers.

In his arguments to the workers he wanted them to see that there were many parallels between them and their employers. One of course was the need for quick and accurate information about prices which would be satisfied by their respective Bourses. Another was the “goods/commodities” (denrée) which they were interested in buying and selling in their respective markets. He argued that workers were also “capitalists” in the sense that they owned and put to use their “capitaux personnels” (the capital which they had or owned in themselves as individuals) - in other words they were “self-owners” which was a concept dear to Molinari’s theory of the right to property.[1069] They were also “merchants” (marchand) but instead of trading in wheat or iron they traded in labor. They were in Molinari’s words “un marchand de travail” (a labor merchant or trader) who operated in various “labor markets” (marchés de travail):

His physical strength and intelligence are his capital. It is by using this personal capital, in putting it to work, and in exchanging their work for the products which come from of other workers like him, that he is able to live.
Work is a product of physical force and intelligence. It is the worker’s good. The worker is a merchant of labor and, as such, we say again, he is interested in being conversant with the markets which exist for his good and in knowing about the situation in the various markets for labor.[1070]

Part of the “Appeal to the Workers” appears in a long footnote in S6 but for some reason he left out the opening two paragraphs which is quite revealing of his thinking at this time and which we reproduce below:

Address to the Workers
Among the criticisms which are made of the school of the Economists, to which we have the honor of belonging and whose doctrines we promote, the gravest is the criticism of being uncaring towards the working classes. It is even claimed that the application of the doctrines of this school would harm the mass of the workers; it is claimed that there is in liberty who knows what kind of fatal seed of inequality and privilege; it is claimed that if the reign of unlimited liberty should ever come one day it will be marked by the enslavement of the class who lives by the labor of its mind and its hands, by the class who lives from the product of its land holdings or its accumulated capital; to be honest, it is claimed that this noble reign of liberty would inevitably create an unbearable oppression and terrifying anarchy.
More than once already we have endeavored to combat these sad sophisms of the opponents of the liberal school; more than once we have proven to our opponents that the sufferings of the working classes do not at all come from the liberty of working, from free competition, as they seem to think, but from the shackles of all kinds which are applied to this productive form of liberty. We have proven to them that liberty brings about neither inequality nor anarchy, but brings in its wake equality and order as inevitable consequences.[1071]

During the 1848 Revolution there were some attempts to set up a version of the Labor Exchanges. The Provisional Government issued a decree (9-10 March 1848) calling for the establishment of a "bureau de placement” (bureau for labor, or job placement office) in each town in France. There was strong opposition by labor groups who saw the bureaux as an opportunity for lower priced competitors from outside to undercut their place in the labor market. Political pressure was brought to bear and the police arrested many who were involved in the formation of the bureaux. The plan thus never went any further. A second attempt was made by the National Assembly in February 1851 when it proposed a law to create a "Bourse des Travailleurs," but this too went no further than the planning stages. It is not known if Molinari had any personal involvement in these schemes or not.

After the the coup d’état of Louis Napoleon in December 1851 Molinari returned to his native Belgium to teach economics and to work further on his Labor Exchange ideas. He started a magazine with his brother Eugène to promote the idea, La Bourse du Travail, which only lasted for a short period between 17 January to 20 June 1857. It was aimed primarily at ordinary workers but the employers and workers they approached were indifferent or hostile to the scheme and so the magazine soon folded. The brothers also organized a petition with a thousand signatures to lobby the Belgian Chamber of Representatives to change the labor laws in which they denounced the “deplorable inequality” which these regulations created between workers and their employers. They also reminded the legislators that:

But if you accept the idea that the regime of the liberty of labor is beneficial, it is on the condition that this liberty is a real one; that it is on the condition that the same rights which are granted to industrial entrepreneurs vis-à-vis the workers are also granted to the workers vis-à-vis the entrepreneurs.[1072]

Neither the magazine, the fledgling Bourse, nor their political lobbying efforts had any long lasting impact and they eventually disappeared from sight.

However, twenty years later the French government again showed some interest in setting up Labor Exchanges. In the Third Republic steps were taken to create a government Office of Labor with associated exchanges throughout France. Discussions began in 1875 but it was not until February 1887 that one was formally launched, in spite of organized opposition by unions. Union opposition had been successful in 1848 but in the more conservative Third Republic their opposition was ignored. A central Bourse was created in Paris in May 1887 and many others throughout France appeared shortly afterwards. Molinari received some attention in the late 1880s for his early work in promoting the idea of labor exchanges and he wrote a book summarizing his ideas and efforts in 1893, Les Bourses du Travail (Labor Exchanges).[1073]

As with his efforts at popularizing economic ideas with his books of conversations and soirées, his efforts at encouraging the setting up of labor exchanges to assist workers in finding the best paying jobs continued over many decades with the same minimal result. The German historian of economic thought Raymund de Waha correctly described Molinari as “unentwegt” (tireless, indefatigable, relentless) but he did not mean this as a complement when he wrote this in 1910.[1074]

5. Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family

Molinari believed that Malthus’ “law of population growth," in a slightly modified form, was one of the natural laws of political economy.

The original version of Malthus’s Law states:

I said that population, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical ratio; and subsistence for man in an arithmetical ratio ...  This ratio of increase, though short of the utmost power of population, yet as the result of actual experience, we will take as our rule; and say, That population, when unchecked, goes on doubling itself every twenty-five years or increases in a geometrical ratio… It may be fairly said, therefore, that the means of subsistence increase in an arithmetical ratio. Let us now bring the effects of these two ratios together… No limits whatever are placed to the productions of the earth; they may increase for ever and be greater than any assignable quantity; yet still the power of population being a power of a superior order, the increase of the human species can only be kept commensurate to the increase of the means of subsistence, by the constant operation of the strong law of necessity acting as a check upon the greater power.[1075]

In an elaboration of what this law meant in practice which Malthus included in the second revised edition of 1803 (but removed in later editions) was the following harsh statement about who could or could not be admitted to a seat at “nature's mighty feast”:

A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society do not want his labor, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. She tells him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he does not work upon the compassion of some of her guests.[1076]

The economists who were orthodox Malthusians were harshly criticized by socialists like Proudhon for being “sans entrailles” (heartless) in the willingness to condemn the poor for the hardship they suffered as a result of having large families. This infamous passage from Malthus is mentioned by the Socialist in S10 [308 Pages]. One of the leading French Malthusians, Joseph Garnier, explained this away as a piece of unfortunately chosen rhetoric on Malthus’ part and tried to mollify it by arguing that, although the poor had no just claim to the property of others, they could appeal to the good nature and sense of charity, voluntarily given, of others who were better off. A few years after he wrote Les Soirées Molinari rethought his position on Malthus and became very critical as will be discussed below, although he still maintained that Malthus had pointed out an important general truth about human existence.

The most outspoken defender of orthodox Malthusianism in France was Joseph Garnier (1813-1881) who was editor of the JDE from 1845 to 1855. He edited and annotated the Guillaumin edition of Malthus's book which appeared in 1845 as well as a second edition in 1852 with a long Foreword defending Malthus against his critics. Garnier wrote the biographical article on “Malthus” and a long entry on “Population” (which was an extended defense of Malthusianism) for the DEP (1852-53). He also published a condensed version of Malthus' On the Principle of Population in 1857 with copious commentaries and many appendices.[1077] A second edition of Garnier's epitome was published and edited by Molinari in 1885 following shortly after Garnier's death in 1881.[1078]

Molinari began as an ardent Malthusian under the influence of Joseph Garnier but he later softened his views as he came to believe that individuals could learn “self-government” and exercise “moral restraint," foresight, and responsibly live within their means without being a burden on taxpayers for support and thus rationally plan the size of their families. Perhaps under the influence of Bastiat who rejected orthodox Malthusianism, Molinari realized that Malthus had underestimated the ability of the free market, free trade, and industrialization to increase output at a faster pace than population growth. One of Bastiat’s criticisms of Malthusianism was that it did not distinguish between unthinking plants and animals, which were subject to Malthusian population traps, and thinking, reasoning, and acting human beings who could adapt their behavior to changing circumstances. The question whether mankind's reproductive behavior was like that of a plant or a creature capable of reason was crucial in Bastiat's rethinking of Malthus's theory in the period between 1846, when he wrote an article on “On Population” for the JDE[1079] and 1850 when the Economic Harmonies appeared. Bastiat came to believe that, unlike plants and animals, humans were thinking and reasoning creatures who could change their behavior according to circumstances:

FEE: Thus, for both plants and animals, the limiting force seems to take only one form, that of destruction. But man is endowed with reason, with foresight; and this new factor alters the manner in which this force affects him.[1080]
LF: LF trans.: Thus, for plants as for animals, the limiting force appears to show itself in one single form only, destruction. But man is endowed with reason and foresight, and this new element modifies and even changes the way this force acts with regard to him.

He also came to the conclusion that there was a significant difference between the “means of subsistence” and the “means of existence” - the former being fixed physiologically speaking (either one had sufficient food to live or one did not) and the latter, which might also be translated as “standard of living,” being an infinitely flexible and expanding notion which depended upon the level of technology and the extent of the free market.[1081] Malthus focused on the former, whilst Bastiat (and Say) and later Molinari focused on the latter. Under the influence of Bastiat and Dunoyer[1082] Molinari gradually came around to this way of thinking.

In his treatise on political economy published shortly after Les Soirées he was still a fairly strong Malthusian but by the time the second revised and enlarged edition appeared in 1863 he had moderated his views considerably as a result of a critical review by Charles Dunoyer.[1083] He now supported what he called “self-government” by individuals who would exercise moral restraint “sainement appliquée” (correctly applied). By this he meant that individuals should enjoy “la liberté de la reproduction” (the freedom to reproduce) and that any restraint to be exercised would be “la contrainte libre” (restraint exercised voluntarily by individuals) and not “la contrainte imposée” (constraint or force imposed by the government). He was still enough of a Malthusian in the 1880s to edit the second edition of Garnier's epitome of Malthus' Principle of Population (1885) and published his own condensed edition for Guillaumin's “Petite Bibliothèque Économique” (Small Library of Economics) with a long introduction defending as well as criticizing Malthus' views:[1084]

In the same spirit with which he approached the economic analysis of the production of security in 1849 Molinari rethought the problem of population growth in the Cours in 1863 in a way which seems to anticipate some of the work on the economics of families done by the Nobel Prize winning Chicago economist Gary Becker. He thought there was “un marché de la population” (a population market) (p. 405), in which “la reproduction de la population” (the reproduction of the population) or even “la production des hommes” (the production of human beings) (p. 409) was influenced by the same things which influenced other markets, namely “les frais de production et de l’offre et la demande, régis par la loi des quantités et des prix” (the costs of production, and the law of supply and demand, as regulated by the law of supply and of prices) (p. 392). This reproduction of the population required the coming together of three main factors: “1° un agent naturel, la force reproductive de l’homme; 2° du travail; 3° du capital” (an appropriate natural resource such as the reproductive powers of humankind, labor, and capital) (p. 394). As in any other industry “entrepreneurs” (les entrepreneurs de population) (p. 409) would emerge who would engage in “concurrence libre” (free competition). Molinari thought that human beings were in fact a human form of capital which required investment in order to become fruitful and productive participants in the economy. This investment included such things such as looking after the foetus in the womb, the activity of doctors and nurses at the birth, the costs of rearing and educating the child, the costs of training the child for productive work, and so on. The economic aspects of investing in human capital was most obvious Molinari thought in an earlier stage of society when coercion was more prevalent, such as in the activities of the slave owner who rationally planned the size and composition of his slave work force, but the same principles also applied to the way men and women went about planning the size of their own families in a fully free society. These choices about the size and composition of the family were becoming easier as societies became freer and the market for labor became more “général et ouvert” (widespread and open) (p. 407). Gradually individuals would increase their “la connaissance du marché” (knowledge of the (population) market) (p. 408) as they went about forming the “capital de l’association conjugale” (the capital of the conjugal association or business) (p. 413) which is what the family would need to reproduce itself. Just like any other business, the producers or entrepreneurs of the family would have to be responsible for their actions and ensure that they had the capital and the expertise required to bring into the world and raise “un homme utile” (a useful (and productive) person) (p. 400) and to be able to compensate any third party who might be harmed by their actions.

It is necessary that a man who brings an additional human being into the world should consider with some maturity the consequences of this act: that is to say that he should first assess the situation of the population market, that he then calculate the amount of labor and capital which his current situation and resources allow him to devote to the rearing and education of his children, and that he as the father of his family does not undertake more natural obligations than he is capable of fulfilling, exactly as if he were undertaking commercial obligations. In other words, it is necessary that a man who is inclined to start a family put himself in the position of his future children and act in their interests as he would do in his own: finally, that he bring into the world only as many children as he is able to provide with the strength and physical, intellectual, and moral aptitudes necessary to make them useful human beings, and also to place them in a situation where these strengths and aptitudes could find a market.[1085]

The members of the “conjugal association” would exercise their “la liberté de la reproduction” (freedom to reproduce) (p. 428) just like any other industry and attempts by the government to regulate it would have the same harmful effects as, say, the regulation of the grain trade had on food production. The temptation to “overproduce” would be restricted by a combination of personal and familial self-interest (such as moral restraint) and the institutions and customs of the society in which they lived. Any restraint which would be exercised would be “la contrainte libre” (restraint exercised voluntarily by individuals) and not “la contrainte imposée” (constraint or force imposed by the government). One of the most important restrictions which Molinari had in mind was a legal system which would enforce the obligation of parents to look after any children they brought into the world (pp. 429-30). He thought that if a parent did not feed, clothe, or educate their child to some minimal level then they should be legally liable for causing that child “harm” (nuisances). Similarly, if a husband abandoned his wife with a child to look after, he should be forced by the courts to pay for support to this “third party” for whom he was equally responsible because of his actions. In many ways, Molinari regarded these parental or paternal responsibilities (“des obligations de la paternité”) as a kind of debt which needed to be repaid, and just as one could not just walk away from a debt one had incurred in a business activity, so too one could not just walk away from one’s wife or child who were also members of the conjugal association.

After having laid out his economic theory of the family and its reproduction, Molinari then turned to a thorough critique of Malthus. Although he still paid homage to his essential humanity and his economic insights, the effect of his critique was to largely demolish the whole body of Malthusian doctrine. His first major criticism was that Malthus had focused on only one of the three factors which influenced the size of population, the reproductive capacity of human beings, while ignoring the factors of labor and capital. As discussed above, Molinari believed that individuals adjusted their rate of marriage and the creation of families as “le marché de la population” (the population market) changed and as the level of wages and the cost of capital went up or down. As the market became more extensive, as the division of labor made economic activity more productive, as free trade in food made famines and food shortage less common, fluctuations or “perturbations” in the population market would become fewer and less disruptive. The historical example he thought was definitive in this respect was the previous 60 years of population growth in the United States (p. 439). Thus, he concluded that:

Therefore, populations have no natural or potential tendency, as Malthus argues, to grow more rapidly than their means of subsistance, or, which amounts to the same thing, to flood the market which is available to them, to the level of the remuneration which is necessary to maintain and renew it.[1086]

His second criticism of Malthus was that there was no need at all for “misery and vice” to control the size of a nation’s population. Moral restraint combined with a proper understanding of the productive power of free economies was all that was necessary to ensure, not a fixed population size, but a steadily growing and wealthier population. All the other things which Malthus claimed were necessary to put a check on population growth such as the misery of disease, starvation, and war, also destroyed the capital which was “investi dans le matériel ou dans le personnel de la production" (invested in the stock or the personnel of production) which an economy needed to grow and prosper (p. 444).

Molinari also had a witty and clever reply to Malthus’ harsh comments about the poor person who tried to get a seat at “nature's mighty feast." Firstly he pointed out that “la table est immense, le nombre des couverts n’est point limité” (the table is immense and the number of place settings is not at all limited) (pp. 445-46) Economic growth and gradual improvements in productivity will mean that there will always be enough food which can be brought to the table at a given price and that another few guests can always be squeezed in around the table. Secondly, that “le grand ordonnateur du banquet” (the great organizer of the banquet) should insist that the guests must pay for their own meals, and if they invite others to join them at the table, then they have to pay for their friends’ travel costs in advance, which will encourage them not to issue invitations frivolously. Whereas Malthus thought there was only a fixed or perhaps diminishing number of place settings around the table, Molinari believes that his proposed “l’exercice judicieux de la contrainte morale” (the judicious/wise exercise of moral restraint) would result in a steady increase in the number of guests who could be seated at the table of the “great feast of life."

The Idea of “Moral Restraint”

The charge of “immorality” against Malthusian thought was a common one, on the grounds that “moral restraint” exercised in order not to have children in marriage was counter to the teachings of the Church. Some of the more extreme Malthusians went so far as to suggest that population could only be limited by measures such as abortion, infanticide (asphyxiation, exposure of new borns), sterilization (castration, hysterectomies), prostitution, or polygamy.[1087] There is little mention at this time in France of contraception which some liberals and radicals in England had promoted. One should note that a young John Stuart Mill very much influenced by the Benthamite school was arrested and spent three nights in jail in 1823 for handing out leaflets on the street with information about contraceptive methods.[1088] Some utopian socialists like Fourier believed in less extreme but still rather strange schemes to limit population growth by means of vegetarian diet or strenuous exercise for women. Some more liberal minded Malthusians like John Stuart Mill some 36 years after his arrest even contemplated state regulation of marriage to ensure that couples could not marry unless they had the means to support their children:

And in a country either overpeopled, or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labor by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labor. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State…[1089]

However, these more radical ideas were rejected by the mainstream Malthusians like J. Garnier who thought Malthus' ideas were in keeping with Church doctrine so long as they were confined to such practices as delaying getting married and using “foresight” and “restraint” within marriage to limit the number of births. Yet this did not stop the Catholic Church from regarding the Economists and their DEP (1852-53) as grossly immoral and having it listed on the Index of Banned Books on 12 June 1856 for “religious reasons.” Molinari comments wryly on this in his fortnightly newsletter[1090] l’Économiste belge where he notes that a local Brussels newspaper, the Journal de Bruxelles, called the DEP a “tissue d'immoralités” (a tissue of immorality) and even used the criticisms of the Economists in the writings of the socialist anarchist Proudhon as part of their attack on the DEP. Molinari amusingly points out that this was an odd thing for Catholics to do as Proudhon was famous for coining the slogans “la propriété c'est le vol” (property is theft) and “Dieu c'est le mal” (God is evil). They probably didn't know that the Church had already put the collected works of Proudhon on the Index in 1852.[1091] Molinari also wanted to know why the Church which had for so long supported state imposed moral restraint now objected to the voluntary exercise of moral restraint which was more suitable to the new economic stage of free markets which the modern world was now entering:

Let us make this clear, in all periods the Church has sanctioned and strengthened moral constraint by means of its institutions and teachings, which was codified in the matter of population by the “preventative regime." Today, as the preventative regime collapses, as the reproduction of the human race is no longer governed by a state, a master, or a seigneur, as it is left to the self-government of each individual, must the Church conduct itself as if the preventative regime were still in place? Shouldn’t it strengthen with its sanction and teachings the voluntary rules which each person is required to follow in order to solve properly the population problem, just as it previously strengthened with its sanction and teachings the rules which were imposed on each person for the same end? Why, after having lent its support to compulsory moral restraint, does it refuse its support for voluntary moral restraint? By doing this, isn’t it showing itself to be particularly illogical and, what is even worse, actually creating obstacles to fulfilling the command “go forth and multiply”?[1092]

6. The Natural Laws of Political Economy

The book Les Soirées is based upon the idea that the world is governed by natural economic laws which have been identified by the classical political economists. These laws operate independently of human will and if they are ignored or violated by government policies the laws will still continue to operate and will produce bad consequences for those who attempt to do this. The first task of Les Soirées was to state what these unavoidable economic laws were and what would happen if they were flouted or ignored.

Molinari begins his book with a quotation about natural law on the title page.

It is necessary to refrain from attributing to the physical laws which have been instituted in order to produce good, the harms which are the just and inevitable punishment for the violation of this very order of laws.[1093]

It comes from the Physiocrat economist François Quesnay's (1694-1774) essay “Le droit naturel” (Natural Law) (1765) which had been republished by the Guillaumin firm in their series Collection des principaux économistes in 1846. The Economists of the 1840s were very conscious of their intellectual roots in the Physiocratic movement of the 18th century. When the Guillaumin publishing firm published their monumental history of economic thought in 15 volumes under the editorship of Eugène Daire four of the volumes were devoted to the writings of the Physiocrats - two volumes by Turgot in 1844 and a collection of miscellaneous writings by Quesnay and others in 1846. These volumes were appearing just as Molinari was entering the Guillaumin network of free market economists and he was soon enlisted to assist Daire with the final two volumes of the series which appeared in 1847 and 1848, also on 18th century authors.[1094] Thus the work of the Physiocrats was very much in the air as Molinari was forming his economic views. Molinari’s friend Joseph Garnier also used a quotation from Quesnay on the title page of his economics textbook, Éléments de l’économie politique. Exposé des notions fondamentales de cette science (1846)[1095] which comes from Quesnay’s “General Maxims of Economical Government” (1758) (The Second Maxim: Instruction): “Que la nation soit instruite des lois générales de l’ordre naturel qui constituent évidemment les sociétés.” (That the nation should be taught about the general laws of the natural order which so evidently make up societies.)[1096]

In 1849 when he was writing the Soirées Molinari was only beginning to think through the details of his theory of natural economic laws and how they governed the operation of the market. We can reconstruct the outlines of his theory from scattered remarks he or “The Economist” made in the course of Les Soirées. However, such was his interest in the topic that he returned to it 40 years later soon after he had been appointed editor of the Journal des Économistes, in a book entitled Les Lois naturelles de l'économie politique (The Natural Laws of Political Economy) (1887) and which was the first of a series of books in which he elaborated his ideas on this subject.[1097] Very early on in the Preface to Les Soirées (Molinari) and in the S1 (the Economist) it is stated that “il y a des lois économiques qui gouvernent la société, comme il y a des lois physiques qui gouvernent le monde matériel” (there are economic laws which govern society as there are physical laws which govern the material world)[1098]; that these laws are “universelles et permanentes” (universal and permanent)[1099]; that “La loi fondamentale sur laquelle repose toute l’organisation sociale, et de laquelle découlent toutes les autres lois économiques, c’est la propriété” (the fundamental law upon which all social organization lies and from which flow all other economic laws, is property)[1100]; and that “l’économie politique n’est autre chose que la démonstration des lois naturelles qui ont la propriété pour base” (political economy is nothing more than the demonstration of the natural laws which have property as their basis).[1101] These brief statements show clearly how the right to property and the idea of natural laws which governed the operation of the economy were interconnected in Molinari’s thinking.

Further analysis of Les Soirées and his later writings on the subject shows that Molinari believed that there were three different sets of natural laws which could be observed in operation. The first were the laws of the physical world such as the laws of gravity or Newton’s laws of motion. These governed the operation of inanimate, unthinking matter and could be observed and described with great precision. The second set governed the economic world which consisted of large numbers of producers and consumers whose economic activity gave rise to patterns of behavior which could be observed in an empirical fashion by economists who could gather economic statistics and study economic history. From this study they concluded that the regularities of behavior they observed were akin to physical laws. For some of the economists, such as the orthodox Malthusians, they were regarded as being as absolute as any physical law such as gravitation. The third set of natural laws were those which could be “discovered” by the human mind either through observation of how human societies operated or by introspection into the nature of the human being itself. These are laws or principles which enabled individuals to cooperate together peacefully, to pursue their goals, and to flourish in society. These included things like property rights, the respect for laws (such as contracts), and the absence of coercion or violence in the relationships between individuals. Molinari came to believe that the latter had not been as well developed by the Economists as they should have been, and had not been incorporated into the very foundations of economic theory. This he attempted to do much later in his life in a pair of books Les Lois naturelles de l'économie politique (1887) and La Morale économique (Economic Moral Philosophy) (1888).

In summary, Molinari thought that there were six basic “natural laws of economics” which governed the operation of the economy and which could not be ignored with impunity by individuals or by governments. They were:

1.    “la loi naturelle de l’économie des forces ou du moindre effort” (the natural law of the economizing of forces, or the law of the least effort) - by this he meant that individuals attempted to gain the most that they could with the least amount of effort.

2.    “la loi naturelle de la concurrence” (the natural law of competition) which he also expressed as“la loi de libre concurrence” (the law of free competition) and “la loi du laissez-faire” (the law of laissez-faire)[1102] - Molinari thought that there was a Darwinian struggle for survival by all living creatures. In the case of human beings, this competition could be either “productive competition” in the case of industrial or economic activity, or “destructive competition” in the case of war or politics.

3.    “la loi naturelle de la valeur” (the natural law of value) or sometimes also as “la loi de progression des valeurs” (the law of the progress or increase of values) - by this Molinari meant that in a free market the quantity of valuable things will steadily increase and that the prices of these valuable things will gradually fall as a result of competition to their “natural value” or cost of production.

4.    “la loi de l’offre et de la demande” (the law of supply and demand) which he also sometimes called “la loi des quantités et des prix” (the law of supply and prices) - this was short hand for saying that prices vary according to their supply and demand in the market place and that both consumers and producers alter their behavior as a result. In S12 Molinari phrased this law in very Malthusian terms as arithmetic and geometric changes in price: “When supply exceeds demand in arithmetic progression, the price falls in geometric progression, and, likewise, when demand exceeds supply in arithmetic progression, the price rises in geometric progression.”[1103]

5.    “la loi de l’équilibre” (the law of economic equilibrium) - which is Molinari’s version of Bastiat’s theory of Harmony,[1104] that if markets are left free to function they will tend to produce order not chaos, and there will arise a balance between the demand for products by consumers and the supply of those products by producers. For this to occur, producers need to have “la connaissance du marché” (knowledge about the market) which they get either by personal experience or by means of “la publicité industrielle et commerciale” (the dissemination of industrial and commercial information) by means of price information.[1105]

6.    “Malthus’ law of population growth” - Molinari accepted in Les Soirées the orthodox Malthusian view as expressed by its greatest advocate in France, Joseph Garnier, “that populations everywhere and always have a tendency to grow beyond the means of subsistence; and that if men are not able to counter-balance this law through their prudence, the inevitable result will be death, preceded by vice and misery.”[1106] He would later revise this view after he had accepted Bastiat’s and Dunoyer’s criticism that Malthus had seriously underestimated the productive capacity of the market and the ability of free people to plan the size of their families.

Molinari will refer to these natural laws repeatedly throughout Les Soirées in his arguments with the Conservative and the Socialist in an effort to show them that their desires to regulate and redirect the free market towards outcomes they and their supporters would prefer will be frustrated and counter-productive. In his concluding remarks at the end of S12 the Economist argues that governments today, as they were during the Old Regime and the Revolution, are faced with a stark policy choice depending upon whether they do or do not accept the existence of natural laws which govern the operation of the economy.

7. The Production of Security

Molinari first began toying with the idea of the private production of security in a short article he wrote on electoral or voting reform for the Courrier français in July 1846.[1107] Under the July Monarchy only the 250,000 richest taxpayers (whom Bastiat termed “la classe électorale” or the voting class) which was less than 1% of the total population of France were allowed to vote. Molinari thought this was unfair because the vast bulk of the French taxpayers were excluded from any say in how much taxation could be imposed upon them or how this money would be spent.

One of the arguments he used in arguing for an expansion of the franchise was the idea that the main reason for having a government in the first place was to provide all citizens with a guarantee of security of their persons and property. Using the metaphor of an insurance company, he likened the state, perhaps for the first time, to “une grande compagnie d'assurances mutuelles” (a large mutual insurance company), taxes to “charges de l’association” (membership dues),[1108] and the taxpayers to “un actionnaire de la société” (a shareholder in the company).[1109] There were two ways in which a state acting like a large insurance company might be run: the largest shareholders have a monopoly in running the state, as in France, or the right to vote by shareholders is “universalized and made uniform” as in the United States (“Le second système consiste à universaliser et à uniformiser le droit électoral”), which runs the risk of seeing the democratic masses imposing a higher tax burden on the wealthiest groups in society.[1110]

The problem was to find a system which would avoid the weakness of both systems, the aristocratic and the democratic. Molinari thought this could be achieved by having a universal right to vote as in America (where all shareholders could participate in choosing the management of the company) but making the payment of member’s dues (taxes) limited to a fixed proportion of the value of the property which they wanted to protect (such as a flat rate of taxation on income or the value of property). This was to prevent a democratic majority of voters voting for confiscatory taxes on the property and income of the rich, which Molinari thought was a major weakness in the American system of government.[1111]

Molinari was not the only person to think of society as an “insurance company” providing security services to the people and the taxpayers as “share holders” in this company. Among his contemporaries the former minister Adolphe Thiers and the wealthy publisher Émile de Girardin expressed similar views, but from a very different non-market perspective.[1112] Two years after his article on electoral reform appeared, the conservative politician Adolphe Thiers gave a series of speeches in the Chamber attacking socialism and defending property rights[1113] which he turned into a book in September 1848 which sold many copies and went through several editions. Molinari thought Theirs had provided a very poor defense of property rights which is one reason why Molinari would write Les Soirées the following year in order to rectify this problem. He also reviewed the book very critically in the JDE in January 1849.[1114] However, what is of interest here is Thiers’ use of the same metaphor, of society being like a large insurance company, which Molinari also noted and commented upon positively in his review. Surprisingly for a conservative, Thiers also likened society to an insurance company which had shareholders or citizens who should pay according to the risk they bore and the amount of property which they wished to insure.[1115] Thiers’ solution was for the government to impose a flat rate of 10% on all income and the value of all property owned in an attempt to mimic the activity of an insurance company.

Also appearing in 1849 just as Molinari’s book was hitting the bookshops, was a long essay on “Socialism and Taxation” written by the wealthy owner of La Presse magazine, Émile de Girardin, which expressed very similar ideas but from a non-free market perspective. It began as a seven part article which appeared in late September and early October before being printed in book form which went through many editions during the Second Republic.[1116] Like Thiers, Girardin wanted a flat rate of tax but in his case levied upon capital at a rate of 1%. But unlike Thiers, Girardin thought the government should be actually reorganized as a real insurance company, albeit with a monopoly and with police powers to enforce the payment of “premiums.” In his view taxes were levied on income and were based upon coercion (“forcé”), whereas insurance premiums were levied on the value of one’s insured capital and were therefore somehow “voluntary” (voluntaire).

So it was alongside this rather odd mixture of conservative thinking about the metaphor of government being “like” an insurance company and a flat rate of tax being “like” an insurance premium, and more radical thinking about literally turning society into a giant monopoly insurance company which would transform taxes imposed on all incomes earned into premiums levied on the value of all property owned, that Molinari developed his own classical liberal vision of competitive, private insurance companies run by entrepreneurs who would “produce” security services and sell them to willing customers for a fee. This he would would do in an article he published in the JDE in February 1840 called “De la production de la sécurité” (On the Production of Security).[1117] The intellectual leap he made was to stop thinking of this similarity between societies, governments, and insurance companies  providing services to their citizens as purely a metaphor and to see it as an actual possibility that real insurance companies could sell premiums to willing customers for specific services which could be agreed upon contractually in advance and provided competitively on the free market. This article was his first attempt to explore the possibilities which this new way of thinking about government opened up; the second would be S11 in this book, and the third would be a lengthy section on “La Consommation publique” (Public Consumption) in the Cours d’économie politique which was published six years after Les Soirées.[1118]

How this might work he sketched out briefly in Section 10 of the article and added some interesting twists to this in S11. Some inspiration no doubt came from a passage in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations where he talks about competing courts in England where litigants could shop around for a court which best suited their needs and which would charge fees according to the type of case involved.[1119] This was a clear example of how legal services could be provided on the free market between competing institutions for profit. Given the powerful need for protection of person and property felt by consumers (“les consommateurs de sécurité”), and the fact that there were individuals who had the knowledge and skill to provide protection services for a fee (“les producteurs de sécurité”), it was inevitable that an individual or association of individuals would emerge as a producer of security or as “un entrepreneur de sécurité” (an entrepreneur in the security industry - although Molinari did not use this exact term himself, but came very close) to do just that. This was in fact exactly how the market operated for everything else. In smaller localities like a canton “un simple entrepreneur” (a simple entrepreneur) would emerge to satisfy the needs of the local community. In larger localities with several towns it would be a “une compagnie” or more formally organized corporation which would emerge to provide these services. Prices would be kept low and services would improve under the stimulus of competition since consumers would have the option of giving their business to “un nouvel entrepreneur, ou à l'entrepreneur voisin” (a new entrepreneur or a neighboring entrepreneur).

A twist which he adds in S11 is that he introduces the radically new idea that an actual insurance company might be the type of private company best suited to providing security services for person and property. In “The Production of Security” article he does not specify exactly what kind of company he had in mind other than general references to small, local, single entrepreneurs, or larger, regional companies based in towns. In S11 he now talks about much larger companies ("vastes compagnies”) - perhaps national in scope - and even “ces compagnies d’assurances sur la propriété” (these property insurance companies) and how they would have an economic incentive to cooperate with each other in settling disputes between their consumers and compensating them for lost property or violations of their liberty. He gives as an example how they might set up “facilités mutuelles” (joint or shared offices) in order to keep their costs down. It is at this moment that society as a great mutual insurance company stops being metaphorical and, and least in Molinari’s mind, becomes a literal possibility to solve the problem of government.

Molinari’s ideas caused a furore in the Political Economy Society when he published “The Production of Security” (later Guillaumin published it as a separate pamphlet to give it greater circulation)[1120] and Les Soirées. Charles Coquelin wrote a critical review of the book in the November issue of the JDE[1121] and the Political Economy Society devoted three of their meetings (October, 1849, and Jan. and Feb. 1850) to discussing the issues he raised about the proper size and functions of the state.[1122] Coquelin led off the October discussion with the observation that in the absence of a “supreme authority” such as the state, justice would have no sanction and thus the beneficial effects of competition could not be felt throughout the economy. Bastiat followed Coquelin to argue that a state which was strictly limited to guaranteeing justice and security required force to accomplish this, and since force could only be the attribute of a supreme power, he could not understand how a society could function if supreme power was split among numerous groups which were all equal to each other. Dunoyer wrapped up the discussion on the function of the state by observing that to allow competition between private companies providing government services would lead to “des luttes violentes” (violent battles). He concluded that therefore it would be better to leave the exercise of force where history had placed it, namely in the hands of the state. There was, he argued, already “véritable concurrence” (genuine competition) in politics in the form of the jostling for power by groups or parties who sought control of the government by offering their services to voters who exercised “real choice” (qui choisit bien réellement) every time they voted. Dunoyer summed up the views of the Society by arguing that Molinari “s’est laissé égarer par des illusions de logique” (has allowed himself to be carried away by delusions of logic).

In spite of his colleagues’ criticism and his intellectual isolation on this topic, Molinari continued to work on these ideas for at least the next 30 years. He developed them much more fully in two later works which should be briefly mentioned at this point, the treatise based upon his lectures at the Athénée royal in Paris, the Cours d’économie politique, which he began in late 1847 and completed after he had moved to Brussels in 1852 and was teaching again, this time at the Musée royale de l'industrie belge; and the second volume of his work on the historical sociology and economics of the state which appeared in 1884, L’Évolution politique et la Révolution after Molinari had returned to Paris and had taken up the post of editor of the Journal des Économistes in 1881. In the Cours d’économie politique he included a long section on the provision of “Public Goods” and the uneconomic nature of all government monopolies, including that of security. He concluded that the government’s monopoly of “the production of security” was an excellent example of the tendency of government monopolies to overproduce goods or services beyond the needs of the consumers (what he called “ce développement parasite” (this parasitical development)) because, in the absence of prices and freely negotiated contracts, the government monopoly did not know how much production is optimal.

Some 35 years after the appearance of the original article “De la production de la sécurité” in February 1849 Molinari was still defending this idea in 1884, although occasionally putting the phrase in quotation marks as if to distance himself a little bit from it. He still talks about producers and consumers of security, about the greater economic efficiency and lower costs of free market alternatives to government, and the need for governments to obey the economic principles which govern all enterprises, especially living within its means and paying its debts. Only then, Molinari thought, could governments avoid becoming what J.B. Say described as “les ulcères des nations” (the ulcers of nations) or “l’administrative gangrène’ (administrative gangrene).[1123] The changes he introduced in this later work were the following: he changed the name of the final end which he was seeking to achieve to “la liberté de gouvernement” (the liberty of government)[1124] which made a clear reference to the early movement for “la liberté des échanges” (free trade); a new discussion on how law might evolve and change to meet the needs of a growing economy; and a very interesting discussion prompted by the American Civil War (or what he called the War of Secession) on the right to secession by states or the right of an individual to opt out of government provided security services if he thought that they were unsatisfactory or “abusif” (excessive, unfair) in some way.[1125]

Molinari’s ideas about the private provision of security would not be taken up again until they were rediscovered in the modern era by the American economist Murray Rothbard who circulated it among his circle in New York (called fittingly enough the “Cercle Bastiat” (Bastiat Circle)) during the 1950s. Molinari’s ideas, especially the argument that insurance companies would have an economic interest in reducing crime against property and the costs of settling disputes, became central to Rothbard’s own theory of anarcho-capitalism which he was developing during the 1950s (when writing Man, Economy, and State (1962)) and the 1960s (when he was writing Power and Market (1970)).[1126] A translation of the article “On the Production of Security” was done by J. Huston McCulloch for the Center for Libertarian Studies in 1977[1127] and S11 was translated by David M. Hart in 1979,[1128] which made two important works by Molinari available to a English audience for he first time.

8. Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership

Molinari’s own views on property rights were evolving at the time he was writing Les Soirées over the summer of 1849, thus one should see his thoughts here as the first step towards what would become a much more detailed theory of property which he developed in his Cours d’économie politique (1855, 1863) and then in a series of later works.[1129]

Molinari probably started out as a fairly orthodox Smithian or Sayist regarding property rights but he was gradually moving towards a more natural rights position as he worked on the Collection des Principaux Économistes project edited by Eugène Daire. This brought the work of Quesnay and the other Physiocrats to the attention of the younger economists, perhaps for the first time. Another factor was his discovery of the writings of the philosopher Victor Cousin via an essay by an ex-editor of the JDE Louis Leclerc in October 1848 entitled “Simple observation sur le droit de propriété” (A Simple Observation on the Right to Property).[1130] Here Leclerc took up some ideas expressed by Cousin in his book Justice et Charité (Justice and Charity) (1848). Leclerc was struck by one idea in particular by Cousin, “Le moi, voilà la propriété primordiale et originelle” (Me (the self), there is the primordial and original property). Molinari too was very taken with the idea with its implication that lead to him thinking about “self-ownership” as literally and theoretically being the first kind of property, followed by other forms of “internal property,” and then finally what he called “external property” which is an extension of the body and the mind and is made up of the physical things outside the body which the individual creates through his or her labor (the subject of S3).

The Self and Internal Property Rights

In his essay on property published in October 1848 Leclerc gave a most poetic and moving defense of self-ownership and other property rights based upon Cousin’s insight which obviously struck a chord with Molinari:

This “thing” which is my life and my power is lost without recovery (as I work and age). I will never be able to recover it. There it lies, the result of all my efforts. It alone therefore represents what I had legitimately possessed and what I (will) no longer have. I did not only use up my natural right(s) in maintaining what has been lost, I was obeying the instinct of self-preservation, I submitted to the most imperious of necessities: my right to property is right here! Labor is therefore the certain foundation, the pure source, the holy origin of the right to property. Otherwise I (le moi) am not the primordial and original property, otherwise my ability to extend myself, and the organs which I have at my disposal, do not belong to me, which would be indefensible. … Therefore I am perfectly within my rights to use my own powers foolishly or wisely, productively or unproductively, and, because I also know that this power belongs to me, because I retain without any penalty the exclusive and potential right to the useful results of this inevitable loss, when it has been laboriously and fruitfully been accomplished.[1131]

Three months later in January 1849 when Molinari was no doubt planning or beginning to write Les Soirées he wrote a book review of Thiers’ On Property and recalled how much he was indebted to Leclerc’s theory of property. He commended Leclerc for having recognized Cousin’s insight that “la propriété n'est autre chose que l'expansion, le prolongement du moi” (property nothing more than the expansion or the extension of “le moi” (or the self)) and then for having gone far beyond Cousin and the other economists in seeing that property had to be defended on the grounds of both utility and justice. He summed up his view of property in the following paragraph:

In the small book cited above M. Cousin clearly establishes the difference between the two schools of thought which are at present busy with the question of property. I am speaking of the Economists and the old Legal Philosophers (Jurisconsultes) who have been copied by Rousseau and his school. According to the Economists property is a primordial vehicle for the production and distribution of wealth, one of the essential organs of social life. They say that one cannot touch this organ without harming the organism, and that governments, which have been instituted with the view of guarding general welfare, fail completely in their mission when they cause harm to property. To this rule there is no exception! In the eyes of true economists, as with true philosophers, THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IS NOTHING OR IT IS ABSOLUTE. According to the legal philosophers of the old school, on the other hand, property is essentially movable, variable, and human. It does not come from nature; it is the result of a agreement (convention) made at the birth of society; it is born from a social contract, and according to what the contractors judge necessary, they can, by modifying the original agreement, impose rules and establish limits to property. This necessarily implies that they do not consider it (property) as essentially just or as essentially useful.
Between the two schools of thought, I don’t need to say that the distance between them is immense and unmeasurable. The first school comprises all of political economy; the second all of socialism.[1132]

From Cousin and Leclerc Molinari concludes that man "owns himself," that "he is master of his own person and may use as he chooses all the potential attributes constituting his person, whether they remain part of him, or he has in fact separated himself from them."[1133] It is from this idea that Molinari derives his distinction between "internal" and "external" property rights and it is by working through the implications of this distinction that provides the structure for the book.

By “la propriété intérieure” (internal or personal property rights) he means the right every individual has to “self-ownership” or "the property (right) a man has in himself" (S1). In remarks scattered throughout S1, S2, and S8 we can glean some more details about what he meant. For example, “the right of a free and acting being to undertake work of his own choosing” (S1); “the property right a man has in himself (le droit de propriété de l’homme sur lui-même); of the right he has to use his abilities freely, insofar as he causes no damage to the property of others (en tant qu’il ne cause aucun dommage à la propriété d’autrui) (S1); and "the property of man in his person, in his faculties, in his powers" (S8).

He also defines this kind of property right negatively, as in the following, “internal property is violated when an an acting and free being is forced to undertake work he would not personally (have chosen to) undertake, or is forcibly barred from engaging in certain kinds of work” (S1). The first he would argue is a form of slavery; the second an infringement on a person’s freedom of action.

Interestingly, in modern terminology, he frames some regulations concerning what kind of work one can or cannot do, as a kind of “victimless crime”[1134] as in the following imaginary conversation put into the mouth of the Economist:

Internal property is violated when a man is forbidden to use his faculties as he sees fit, when he is told:
“You will not work in such and such an industry or, if you do, you will be subject to certain constraints; you will be required to observe certain regulations. The natural right you possess to use your faculties in the way most useful to you and yours will be diminished or regulated. -- By what right? -- By virtue of the superior rights of society.”
“But what if I do not put my abilities to any harmful use?”
“Society is convinced that you could not work freely in some industries without harming it.”
“But what if society is wrong? What if in using my abilities in this or that branch of production I do not cause society any harm?”
“In that case so much the worse for you. Society cannot be wrong.” (the opening to S8, pp. 000)

This has the obvious implication that if an individual causes no harm to another, nobody, including the state, has the right to prevent that person from engaging in that activity.

Concerning his second type of property,“la propriété extérieure” (external property rights) Molinari means the right to own the property which lies outside or is external to one's body and which he has created by his labor and effort. For example, "man’s property right to the fruits of his labor" (La propriété de l’homme sur les fruits de son travail) (S1); “the right to own the part of his powers which he separates from himself by working (i.e. the products of his own labor), (and) the right to dispose of them (as he sees fit)” (S1). Molinari here is articulating a Lockean notion of how property legitimately becomes one's property by "mixing one's labor" with them, or in Molinari’s case when we

“apply some portion of our resources and faculties to the things which nature has put freely at our disposal; at the moment when we complete the work of nature by giving these things a new aspect; at the moment when we add to the natural value which inheres in them, an artificial value.”[1135]

As with the right to internal property, there is a proviso attached to the right to external property, namely that a man has "the right to use his abilities freely, insofar as he causes no damage to the property of others" (le droit qu’il possède d’utiliser librement ses facultés, en tant qu’il ne cause aucun dommage à la propriété d’autrui). (S1, pp. 000).

However, the majority of the economists rejected this absolutist view of individual property rights and did not think that it was the economist’s job to delve too deeply into the foundations of property rights and its relationship to political economy. The majority viewpoint was the one summarized by Léon Faucher in the article on “Property” he wrote for the DEP:[1136]

I. Right of Property. Political economy inquires into the principles which preside over the formation and distribution of wealth. It takes for granted the existence of property, which is its starting point; it considers it as one of those primary truths which manifest themselves at the origin of society, which are everywhere found impressed with the seal of universal consent, and are accepted as necessities of the civil order and of human nature, without even dreaming of discussing them.
Read the fathers of economic science: they are almost uniformly silent on this great question. …
(Quoting J.B. Say) "It is not necessary, in order to study the nature and progress of social wealth, to know the origin of property or its legitimateness. Whether the actual possessor of landed property, or the person by whom it was transmitted to him, obtained it by occupation, by violence, or by fraud, the result, as regards the revenue accruing from that property, is the same." At the time when J. B. Say wrote, the problem which absorbed and agitated men's minds was the production of wealth. The European world felt itself poor; it began to understand the productiveness of labor, and craved wealth. Credit extended its operation; commerce spread in spite of war; and manufacturing industry, developing rapidly, presaged already the marvels which have since marked its course. Production in its different forms was the great business of the time. This rising tide carried all with it, population, labor, resources. All had a clear road to travel with their goal before their eyes, nor did they stop to revert to their own situation or that of others. Property seemed then a sort of common stock from which all, with a little effort, might draw in abundance, and which would reproduce itself unceasingly. No one dreamed of calling the right to it in question. The silence of economists is but a translation of the rational indifference of public opinion on the subject.

It seems that the economists were divided on this question as one can identify a small group who were influenced by Victor Cousin such as Leclerc, Molinari, and Bastiat, but also Louis Wolowski and Émile Levasseur who co-wrote the article on property in Block’s Dictionnaire générale de la politique which appeared in 1863.[1137] The article began with a very Cousinian defense of private property as an extension of “le moi” (the self). Although this was a minority position, there were some economists who believed that “political” economy should also be a kind of “moral” economy.

The Right of Property. If man acquires rights over things, it is because he is at once active, intelligent and free; by his activity he spreads over external nature; by his intelligence he governs it, and bends it to his use; by his liberty, he establishes between himself and it the relation of cause and effect and makes it his own. …
This property is legitimate; it constitutes a right as sacred for man as is the free exercise of his faculties. It is his because it has come entirely from himself. and in no way anything but an emanation from his being. Before him, there was scarcely anything but matter; since him, and by him, there is interchangeable wealth, that is to say, articles having acquired a value by some industry, by manufacture, by handling, by extraction, or simply by transportation. From the picture of a great master, which is perhaps of all material productions that in which matter plays the smallest part, to the pail of water which the carrier draws from the river and takes to the consumer, wealth, whatever it may be, acquires its value only by communicated qualities, and these qualities are part of human activity, intelligence, strength. The producer has left a fragment of his own person in the thing which has thus become valuable, and may hence be regarded as a prolongation of the faculties of man acting upon external nature. As a free being be belongs to himself; now, the cause, that is to say, the productive force, is himself; the effect, that is to say, the wealth produced, is still himself. Who shall dare contest his title of ownership so clearly marked by the seal of his personality?

Property Rights in Land

Given the fact that agriculture was the dominant form of economic activity in the mid-nineteenth century and that land ownership in France and elsewhere was so contested, the right to own land was of special importance for the Economists and their socialist critics. The standard account for the Economists of the original and just acquisition of private property in land out of a state of communal tribal ownership was provided by Charles Comte in his Traité de la propriété (1834).[1138] Comte believes it was a near universal phenomenon that communally owned land eventually was transformed into private ownership as soon as an individual was able through the self denial of immediate consumption to save enough to survive long enough to engage in the more protracted process of cultivating a plot of land until the next harvest. This resulted in dramatically higher output than hunting and gathering or other communal activities. Comte believes this process of privatization was a just one for two reasons: firstly, the private farmer needed much less land than previously in order to create a greater output and the land he no longer needed was left for the other members of the tribe to use; secondly, by creating a more productive resource he unintentionally increased the value of the surrounding land and thereby gave to the community much more than he had taken in privatizing his parcel of land. Thus, Comte concludes, no “usurpation” was committed in this original act of privatization of the land (pp. 150-51). Although neither Molinari nor Comte mentions John Locke by name there is an obvious parallel here to the Lockean proviso concerning the end of the state of nature - that “enough, and as good, left in common for others.”[1139]

A similar set of arguments in defense of the legitimacy of the first user of a piece of land to having ownership of that land can be found in Pierre-Louis Roederer's “Lectures on the Right of property” which he gave to the Lycée in December 1800.[1140] It is quite likely that Roederer, Comte, and Molinari also knew of the 18th century natural law writings of the Swiss natural law theorist Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748) who has a similar notion of a Lockean Proviso in Élémens du droit naturel (1774) where he argues that "in taking part of this (commonly owned) land, one should not deprive others of anything; (that) there remain enough for all (il en restait assez pour tous).”[1141]

9. Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property

The connection between liberty and property in Molinari’s mind was a close one, so close in fact that one might say that they were the two sides of the same coin. An individual’s liberty consisted in the unfettered right to use one’s own body and to act in the world (self-ownership or “internal property”), and the right to use or exchange the things one created by one’s labor or mental effort (external property). As restrictions imposed by the state, church, or privileged interests were progressively lifted on the use of one’s property, so did one’s liberty increase. Molinari called this “l’affranchissement de la propriété” (the emancipation or liberation of property). Thus, “l’affranchissement complet, absolu de la propriété” (the complete and absolute emancipation of property) would lead to “Liberty” with a capital “L”.[1142]

The kind of future society Molinari had in mind would be based upon a full recognition of each individual’s right to liberty and property. He used a number of terms to describe this type of society, such as “un régime de pleine liberté” (a society of complete liberty),[1143] “une système d’absolue propriété et de pleine liberté économique” (a system of absolute property rights and complete economic liberty),[1144] “la société à la propriété pure” (the society based upon pure property rights).[1145] He summarized this ideal society as “un milieu libre” (a liberal milieu) where:

It is in a free milieu, in a milieu in which the property rights of each person with respect to his faculties and the results of his labor are fully respected, that production develops to the maximum, and that the distribution of wealth is proportioned inevitably according to the efforts and sacrifices each person has made.[1146]

If these milieux and régimes described the big picture for Molinari, they were also made up of several components, or different types of particular liberties. He listed nine different kinds of liberty which he wished to defend in Les Soirées. These were:

•     “la liberté de l’héritage” (the liberty of inheritance) or the freedom to make a will (see S4)

•     “la liberté des communications” (the liberty of communications) or the  freedom of speech, or the freedom of movement of both information and goods (S6)

•     “la liberté de mouvement” (the liberty of movement) or the freedom of movement of both people and goods (S6)

•     “la liberté du travail” (the liberty of working) (S11)

•     “la liberté des échanges” (the liberty of trade) or the freedom to trade or exchange goods and services (S7)

•     “la liberté de l’enseignement” (the liberty of education) or the freedom of education or setting up schools (S8)

•     “la liberté des banques” (the liberty of banking) or competitive, free banking (S8)

•     “la liberté de gouvernement” (the liberty of government) or the competitive provision of security in the free market (S11)

•     “la liberté du commerce” (the liberty of commerce) or another way of saying free trade (S12)

Molinari returned to the problem of the connection between “property” and “liberty” after his departure from Paris at the end of 1852 when he began work on his treatise on economics while teaching at the Musée royale de l'industrie belge, the number of specific liberties that concerned him had expanded significantly. By the time his treatise on economics had got to the revised second edition in 1863 the list had grown to include the following types of liberties (from 9 to 15 types):

•     “la liberté du marché” (the liberty of markets - free markets

•     “la liberté de se gouverner” (the liberty of governing oneself)

•     “la liberté de la reproduction” (the liberty of reproducing - reproductive rights)

•     “la liberté des contrats” (the liberty of contracts - free of contract)

•     “la liberté du mesurage” (the liberty of measurements - the freedom to agree upon what weights and measures will be used in economic transactions)

•     “la liberté du crédit” (the liberty of credit - free banking)

•     “la liberté du monnayage” (the liberty of minting coins - free banking)

•     “la liberté des poids et mesure” (the liberty of weights and measures)

•     “la liberté des cultes” (the liberty of religion - religious freedom)

•     “la liberté de commerce absolue” (the absolute liberty of commerce - laissez-faire in economic matters)

•     “la liberté du gouvernement” (the liberty of government - competing companies which offer police and defense services)

•     “la liberté d’user ou de disposer des valeurs” (the liberty to use or dispose of things of value)

•     “la liberté de l’enseignement” (the liberty of education)

•     “la liberté de la charité” (the liberty of charity - private voluntary charity)

•     “la liberté du prêt sur gages” (the liberty of lending to wage earners - freedom to offer payday loans)

Perhaps realizing that this list had become too cumbersome to be very useful, in the second edition of the Cours he added a new chapter on "La valeur et la propriété" (Value and Property) in which he attempted to codify the various types of liberty and the type of property to which they specifically applied. He developed a simpler and more general taxonomy of six different types of property each of which had its own distinctive form of liberty which corresponded to it:[1147]

•     “la liberté de consommation” (the liberty of consumption)

•     “la liberté de l’industrie et des professions” (the liberty of industry and the professions)

•     “la liberté d’association” (the liberty of association)

•     “la liberté des échanges” (the liberty of trade” - free trade)

•     “la liberté du crédit” (the liberty of credit)

•     “la liberté des dons et legs” (the liberty of gifting or bequesting)

The passage where he explains this is the following:

A man who possesses things of value is endowed with the natural right to use and dispose of them as he sees fit. The things of value so possessed can be destroyed or preserved, transferred by means of exchange, gift, or bequest. To each of these modes of use, employment, or disposition of property, corresponds a (particular kind of) liberty.
Let us list these liberties which the right of property is divided:
The liberty of directly using created or acquired things of value for the satisfaction of the needs of whomever possesses them, that is "the liberty of consumption."
The liberty of employing them (things of value) to produce other things of value, that is "the liberty of industry and the professions.”
The liberty of combining them to the things of value belonging to another person in order to create a more efficient instrument of production, that is "the liberty of association.”
The liberty of exchanging them across space and time, that is to say in a place and at a time when one believes that this exchange will be the most useful, that is "the liberty of trade” (free trade).
The liberty of lending them, that is to say to transmit (pass on, hand over?) to another person the enjoyment of some capital under conditions which have been freely negotiated, that is "the liberty of credit."
The liberty of giving or bequeathing them, that is to say to transmit freely to another person the things of value which one possesses, that is "the liberty of gifting or bequesting."
These are the main types of liberties, or what amounts to the same thing, these are the particular rights into which the general right of property is divided.[1148]

Molinari’s theory of liberty was different from that of Charles Dunoyer’s as articulated in his influential book De la liberté du travail (1845). Perhaps as a result of his frustrations resulting from the failure of the liberals to develop a coherent and effective theory of limited government in the Restoration period, Dunoyer had given up the attempt to derive liberty abstractly from first principles. He dismisses this as the work of “ces philosophes dogmatiques qui ne parlent que de droits et de devoirs” (dogmatic philosophers who only speak about rights and duties).[1149] He, on the other hand, wanted to focus instead on “comment arrive-t-il qu'ils le soient? à quelles conditions peuvent-ils l'être? par quelle réunion de connaissances et de bonnes habitudes morales parviennent-ils à exercer librement telle industrie privée? comment s'élèvent-ils à l'activité politique?” (how it happens that men are free, under what conditions can they be free, what combination of knowledge and sound moral habits make it possible for men to carry out private industry, how do they raise themselves up to the point where they can engage in political activity).[1150] Liberty for Dunoyer was not a matter of rights but of the historically evolving capacity to do more and more things. As he defined it:

What I call liberty in this book is this power acquired by man to use his forces more easily to the degree that this power is freed from the obstacles which originally got in the way of its exercise. I say that he is all the more free as he is increasingly released from the things which prevented him from making use of them, as he moves further away from these things, as he increases the size and unblocks the sphere of his activity.[1151]

Molinari on the other hand saw liberty as the absence of coercion within social relationships, where each person’s natural right to self-ownership and the products of their labor are respected, with the sole proviso that they respect the same rights of others. As the Economist expressed it in S6:

When people say unlimited freedom, they mean equal freedom for everybody, equal respect for the rights of one and all. Now when a worker prevents another worker from working, by intimidation or violence, he is infringes a right, he is violating property, he is a tyrant and a plunderer and ought to be sternly punished as such.[1152]

Another example comes from the “Introduction” to his collection of essays he published in 1861 which brought together his major essays and reviews from the previous fifteen years and was as summation of his thinking about liberty and property during this time, he states in a passionate “credo” of his beliefs:

Liberty encompasses in effect the entire sphere within which human activity is deployed. It is the right to believe, to think, and to act without any preventative hindrance, on the simple condition that the rights of others are not harmed. To recognize the natural limits of the rights of each person, and to prevent harms which are caused others, by making the penalty proportional to the damage caused by this infringement of the rights of another, this is the task which belongs to legislation and justice, and its only task.
Property is only, as it were, the condensation of human activity which reveals itself as liberty in the moral, intellectual, and material order. Likewise, one has to acknowledge its (the government) limits by burdening it (property) only with the costs necessary to guarantee it.[1153]

This view placed Molinari in an entirely different tradition to that of Dunoyer; the absence of coercion was a moral perspective based upon natural rights, whereas the physical capacity to do certain things was a physical or historical perspective based upon a more utilitarian view of political economy. The latter was particularly appealing to the orthodox classical economists and it was the view endorsed by the editors of the DEP who published Joseph Garnier’s article on “Liberté du travail” which drew heavily on Dunoyer’s work.[1154] This only confirmed Molinari’s fear that political economy had taken a wrong turn by embracing utilitarianism and turning its back on natural rights defenses of liberty and property. It was something Molinari hoped to rectify in Les Soirées. It was not just directed against socialists who rejected the right of property itself but also against the political economists who rejected the notion of a natural right to liberty and property in everything unconditionally. The other economists sensed this was the case in their discussion of Les Soirées in October 1849 at one of their monthly meetings of the SEP.[1155] There were two arguments by Molinari to which they objected. The first obviously was his argument in favor of the private provision of security. The second was their opposition to his natural rights based rejection of the right of the state to seize or expropriate property in the name of the public interest for things like public works. They believed the state had such a right and could not imagine how important public works could be undertaken without such powers of confiscation.

The Economist’s last words with which he concludes Les Soirées make this very clear, that the reader must choose between two different social systems, one based upon state control of property (“communism”) or one based upon private property. The current “régime bâtard” (bastard or hybrid regime) of part-property and part-communism he believed was unsustainable in the long run both practically and morally.

10. Religious Protectionism and Religious Contraband

Unlike the Conservative, Molinari was probably not a strict practicing Catholic. He uses the word “Dieu” (God) 28 times in the book but most of these are exclamations like “God forbid!” or similar expressions; the word “Providence” 10 times, and the word “Créateur” (Creator) 8 times. Since he does not mention the sacraments or any doctrinal matter it is most likely that he was a deist of some kind who believed that an “ordonnateur des choses” (the organizer of things) created the world and the laws which governed its operation and who then stood back to let it operate on its own - a kind of theological “laissez-faire.”[1156] However, Molinari did believe in the afterlife and thought it was an essential incentive to forgo immediate pleasures in this life in order to achieve greater pleasures in the next. This was especially important when it came to the issue of controlling the size of one’s family. Molinari thought the solution to the Malthusian population growth problem was the voluntary exercise of “moral restraint” (he uses the English phrase) in a society where complete “liberty of reproduction” existed. What made moral restraint possible was a moral code where religious values played a role. In the Introduction to the Cours d'économie politique (2nd ed. 1863), vol. 1 Molinari states that:

Therefore, political economy is an essentially religious science in that it shows more than any other the intelligence and the goodness of Providence at work in the superior government of human affairs. Political economy is an essentially moral science in that it shows that what is useful is always in accord in fact with what is just. Political economy is an essentially conservative science in that it exposes the inanity and folly of those theories which tend to overturn social organization in order to create an imaginary one. But the beneficial influence of political economy doesn't stop there. Political economy does not only come to the aid of the religion, the morality, or the political conservation of societies, but it acts even more directly to improve the situation of the human race. [1157]

Nevertheless, Molinari was very critical of organized religion, especially the monopoly of religion which had emerged in Europe, the political privileges of religious corporations, and any form of state subsidies to any particular religion.[1158] He shared the views of his friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat who argued that “theocratic plunder” had been one of the main forms of political and economic injustice before the Revolution.[1159] Molinari distinguished between what he called “the French system” of religion, where the state intervenes by recognizing and funding certain religious denominations, and “the American system,” where no denomination is favored or subsidized and where “la liberté des cultes” (the liberty of religion) prevails.[1160]

Another interesting example of his application of economic analysis to human institutions is the Catholic Church. His Swiss colleague Antoine-Elisée Cherbuliez (1797-1869) beat him in getting to this matter with his article on “Cultes religieuse” (Religions) in the DEP in which he borrowed Molinari’s method of analysis by regarding the Church as being in the business of “la production religieuse” (the production of religion) and that it was “un seul entrepreneur” (a single entrepreneur) or a monopolist supplier which had the protection of the state. He wanted to see this monopoly supplier of religious services exposed to “le régime de la libre concurrence” (the regime of free competition) which would do for the supply and consumption of religion what it would also do the the supply and consumption of grain and manufactured goods.[1161] Molinari took the same approach in an article on "Les Églises libres dans l'État libre” (Free Churches in a Free State) which he published in his magazine l’Économiste belge in December 1867. He saw the signing of Concordats between the Catholic Church and a state like France as a form of a protectionist trade treaty which gave a monopoly to one favored producer (the Church) which meant that the state had to clamp down on the import of “la contrebande religieuse” (religious contraband or heresies), and confiscate and burn the contraband goods, or as Molinari bitterly noted, often in the past this meant that:

The religious contraband of heresies was vigorously proscribed, and to repress it exactly the same methods were used as those used in combatting the importation of prohibited merchandise; but in this case even more rigor was used; thus they weren’t content to send the ordinary smugglers to the galley ships and to burn their contraband, when it came to religious goods they burned the smugglers along with the contraband.[1162]

He was confident that just as free trade was sweeping the world following the repeal of the Corn-Laws and the Anglo-French Free Trade Treaty of 1860 which lead to the breaking up of commercial and industrial monopolies, so too would the sentiment of free trade spread to religious ideas and institutions and the major Catholic “protectionist regimes” in Rome, France, and Belgium, would not survive long when faced with competition in the free market of ideas. This proved not to be the case and Molinari returned to the issue of religion 40 years later in a book length historical and sociological analysis of the overall benefits of religion to human progress so long as it remained outside of the jurisdiction of the state.[1163]

11. Rent, Disrupting Factors, and Equilibrium

Rent

The classical theory of rent was based upon David Ricardo’s work On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) which was translated into French by F.S. Constancio with notes by J.B. Say in (1818) and reprinted with additions from the 3rd London edition of 1821 by Alcide Fonteyraud in a collection of his Complete Works published by Guillaumin in 1847 as volume XIII of the series Collections des principal économistes.[1164] The economists were all staunch Ricardians when it came to the matter of rent, except for Bastiat and Molinari who had developed their own quite different theories of rent over which they clashed during 1849. Ricardo defined rent as:

that portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil. It is often, however, confounded with the interest and profit of capital, and, in popular language, the term is applied to whatever is annually paid by a farmer to his landlord. If, of two adjoining farms of the same extent, and of the same natural fertility, one had all the conveniences of farming buildings, and, besides, were properly drained and manured, and advantageously divided by hedges, fences and walls, while the other had none of these advantages, more remuneration would naturally be paid for the use of one, than for the use of the other; yet in both cases this remuneration would be called rent. But it is evident, that a portion only of the money annually to be paid for the improved farm, would be given for the original and indestructible powers of the soil; the other portion would be paid for the use of the capital which had been employed in ameliorating the quality of the land, and in erecting such buildings as were necessary to secure and preserve the produce.[1165]

However some economists like J.B. Say had reservations about a person being rewarded for the productive power of a natural resource, and it was reservations like this that opened the door for criticism by the socialists in the 1840s. In his Treatise on Political Economy Say remarked rather unconvincingly that land was an exception:

Land, as we have above remarked, is not the only natural agent possessing productive properties; but it is the only one, or almost the only one, which man has been able to appropriate, and turn to his own peculiar and exclusive benefit. The water of rivers and of the ocean has the power of giving motion to machinery, affords a means of navigation, and supply of fish; it is, therefore, undoubtedly possessed of productive power. The wind turns our mill; even the heat of the sun co-operates with human industry; but happily no man has yet been able to say, the wind and the sun’s rays are mine, and I will be paid for their productive services. I would not be understood to insinuate, that land should be no more the object of property, than the rays of the sun, or blast of the wind. There is an essential difference between these sources of production; the power of the latter is inexhaustible; the benefit derived from them by one man does not hinder another from deriving equal advantage. The sea and the wind can at the same time convey my neighbour’s vessel and my own. With land it is otherwise.[1166]

The economists came under attack during the 1840s by socialists such as Proudhon, Louis Blanc, and Victor Considerant who exposed a major weakness in the classical theory of rent which was that, if workers and owners of property should be paid only for the work they did in creating some good, then any return which came from something other than their own work, such as “the original and indestructible powers of the soil,” was “unearned” and hence unjust. The socialists’ argument was that if Ricardo’s theory was correct then the payment of rent by farmers to their landlords was unjust and should be stopped immediately.

The response of many economists, as we have seen above, was rather uneasy as they sensed that this might be true. The consensus view seemed to be that land ownership and rent were somewhat anomalous compared to other forms of property, that economists should leave the justification of property rights to the philosophers and just assume it as a given, the defense of the existing distribution of property titles should be left to the politicians and judges, and in general that landownership and rent was so useful to the functioning of the economy that any anomalies could just be overlooked. This situation was completely unacceptable to both Bastiat and Molinari who wanted to ground political economy on an unassailable natural rights foundation which the socialists could not overthrow either politically or theoretically. However, they approached the problem of rent from quite different theoretical perspectives, Molinari approaching it from the perspective of his theory of equilibrium and the factors which disturbed or prevented this equilibrium from being reached; and Bastiat who was developing this theory that all exchanges in the free market were the mutual exchange of services, or what he termed “service for service."[1167]

Throughout 1849 Bastiat had taken time away from completing his treatise on economics, the Economic Harmonies, in order to write a stream of pamphlets replying to the socialists’ critique of property, profit, interest, and rent. He had already published “Capitale et rente” (Capital and Rent) (February 1849), “Le capital” (Capital) (possibly early 1849), and was about to launch into a long correspondence with Proudhon between October 1949 and March 1850 which was published as a book “Gratuité du crédit” (Free Credit) in March 1850.[1168] When time permitted he was also getting ready for publication a long chapter on rent which would be published in the first edition of Economic Harmonies which appeared in January 1850. In his new theory of rent he argued that rent was justified because it was just another example of the mutual exchange of “a service for a service” and that there was nothing special about the productivity of land or the “les services agricoles” (farming services) which brought the products of the land to the consumer:

The sole fact that free land exists somewhere is an invincible obstacle to any privileged status, and we find ourselves back with the preceding set of arrangements. Farming services are subject to the law of universal competition, and it is fundamentally impossible to have them accepted at a higher price than they are worth. I add that they are worth no more (coeteris paribus)[1169] than services of any other nature. Just as manufacturers, once they have been paid for their time, their care, the trouble, and risk they have taken, their advance payments, and their skill (all things that make up human service and are represented by value), cannot claim anything for the law of gravity and the expandability of the steam that assists them, Jonathan can include in the value of his wheat only the total amount of his personal service, whether present or past, and not the assistance he has obtained from the laws governing plant physiology. The equilibrium between services is not changed as long as these services are exchanged freely for one another at the negotiated price, and the gifts of God transmitted by these services, as it were into the bargain, and given on both sides, remain in the domain of the community.[1170]

Also during 1849 Molinari had been replying to critiques of property, interest, and rent in articles in the JDE such as his review of Thiers’ book De la propriété in January and a letter to the editor in June in which he criticized both Proudhon and Bastiat.[1171] He may have seen a draft of Bastiat’s forthcoming chapter on rent in Economic Harmonies which appeared in the first half of 1850 and which might have been the immediate trigger to his digression on rent which was inserted rather awkwardly in S12. Molinari thought that rent was a temporary abnormal increase in returns caused by a “perturbation” or “circonstances artificielles” (artificial circumstances) (such as a bad harvest or a government subsidy) which would eventually disappear as economic equilibrium was re-established. In S12 he argues that most people have things back to front when they try to explain the origin of rent. The farmer does not, in his view “sell his wheat at a higher price because he pays a rent; he pays a rent because he sells his wheat at a higher price. Rent does not act as a cause in the formation of prices; it is only a result.” From this he concludes that “rent represents no work completed nor any compensation for losses undergone or to be undergone” which is in direct opposition to Bastiat’s theory of compensation for a service rendered:

If rent is not included in the costs of production, the implication is:
1. That it (rent) represents no work completed nor any compensation for losses undergone or to be undergone.
2. That it is the result of artificial circumstances, which are bound to disappear along with the causes which gave rise to them.[1172]

Natural Equilibrium and Artificial Disruptions

The changed circumstances or perturbations which cause a rent to be charged can be divided into two kinds, natural and artificial circumstances. Natural disruptions occur if there is a crop failure or a flood which reduce the supply of food. These are temporary disruptions which will be overcome by importing food from elsewhere until the local farmers can return to normal production. Artificial disruptions to the equilibrium of the market are the result of monopolies and privileges which some producers can get from the state which reduces the supply of food which gets to the market and thus raises its price for consumers. These disturbances can last for considerable time as the history of France’s protectionist policies attested. They are a disruption because they prevent the market from reaching its equilibrium price which is the “natural price” which would exist if there were free and open competition. With his idea of artificial disruptions to equilibrium Molinari seems to come close to the 20th century idea of a “political rent” or “rent-seeking” developed by the Public Choice school of economics.

Molinari concludes that as competitive market forces begin to operate, the “rent” premium is gradually reduced until prices again approach their “natural” level:

After what has just been said, one will understand why the word rent is the completely wrong word to use if one means the part (of the return) pertaining to the natural resources which have been appropriated or to the soil. Rather one should use the word rent only to mean that part which is the return due to land in production and to limit it to this usage, or it is necessary to use another term such as profit from the land, land rent, or loyer (rent) to express the part which comes from the land, and as I have taken care to do, keep the word rent to refer to the supplementary part or the premium which is added to the natural price of any productive agent which is relatively less than the others. This supplementary part or premium is, as I have sought to demonstrate, always a result of a rupture in the economic equilibrium, but it also always causes the re-establishment of this just and necessary equilibrium by provoking an increase in the quantity, beginning with the supply of productive resources to which is is connected.[1173]

The relationship between the natural equilibrium of the free market and the disruptions caused by government intervention is a major theme in Les Soirées and is something which he pursued in much more detail in the Cours d’économie politique a few years later. In Cours d'économie politique (1855), Molinari devoted two chapters in vol. 1 to a discussion of land and rent [Treizième leçon. La part de la terre,” pp. 312-37 and Quatorzième leçon. La part de la terre (suite), pp. 338-74. He presents his theory by starting with the long definition by Ricardo (above), briefly mentions and rejects the criticism of Ricardo by Carey and Fontenay (without mentioning Bastiat), and then considers several gaps in Ricardo's theory which need to be addressed. He concludes that the word “rent” is confusing and rather “inappropriate” to use when referring to the return due to “the original and indestructible powers of the soil." Molinari prefers the term “profit foncier” (profit from the land). He has a more general theory of “rent” which applies to any additional amount or premium which is paid over the “natural price” of any productive agent as a result of “a rupture in economic equilibrium” which is usually of a temporary nature until equilibrium can be reestablished. These “ruptures in equilibrium” can be the result of natural factors, such as a flood or a crop failure, or they can be the result of lobbying for political favors, such as a tariff or a subsidy. With the latter, Molinari is here toying with the 20th century idea of a “political rent” or “rent-seeking” developed by the Public Choice school of economics. Molinari concludes that as competitive market forces begin to operate, the “rent” premium is gradually reduced until prices again approach their “natural” level (Cours, vol. 1, pp. 373-74).

Artificial Perturbations

In addition to the natural disasters and crises which cause natural “perturbations” or disruptions and give rise to rents, Molinari also has a list of things which give rise to “artificial” or made-man perturbations.[1174] These include things like protection and subsidies given to favored industries, wars which disrupt trade, price controls which prevent prices being set at the correct market level, government banks which have a monopoly on the issuing of currency and which abuse that privilege, government funded charity, and curiously, certain behaviors or beliefs which distort the choice of marriage partners.

For example, markets can be disturbed or disrupted by obvious things like an international war such as the wars of the French Revolution or the Napoleonic Wars. In the latter Napoléon had deliberately imposed a massive disruption to European trade by imposing the Continental Blockade in an attempt to deprive England of its European markets. The distortions caused by this included things like entire industries with their workforce being created in places where they wouldn’t normally have been built due to higher relative costs.[1175] Once the war ended and international trade resumed, the natural equilibrium of the market would reassert itself and there would be cost pressures imposed to encourage the relocation of the industries and their workforces to cheaper places. These readjustments might take years to be realized. Molinari attributed this period of post-war dislocation and readjustment to the hardships described by Sismondi (see S7, pp. 000) in his book Nouveaux principes d'économie politique (1819). He has the Economist say:

M. Sismondi, who was the first to explain in eloquent terms this universal cry, did not know that he should go back to the source of so many disastrous disturbances. The Socialists who succeeded him did worse still. They attributed the harm to apparent causes which were precisely opposite to the real ones. They imputed to property, harm which arose precisely from violations of people’s freedom to use or dispose of their property as they wish.[1176]

Another interesting example concerns the privilege of the state bank to issue money, to overissue that currency, to suspend its redemption upon demand for gold, and to charge high rates of interest. This in Molinari’s mind was a very serious form of economic disruption which had a flow-on effect to the entire economy. In S9 (pp. 000) he declared that “la cherté de l’escompte et les perturbations désastreuses de notre circulation monétaire proviennent du privilége et non de la liberté.” (the high rate of interest and the disastrous disruptions to our money in circulation is a result of (political) privilege not of liberty.)

In fact, the regulation by the state of all economic activities causes disruptions which reverberate throughout the economy. A regulation might begin at a single point but it has consequences which last a long time and spread throughout the entire economy: “La perturbation venue d’un point isolé, se prolonge successivement sur toute la surface du monde industriel.” (S7, pp. 000). In the case of restricting entry into certain occupations such as bakeries, butchers, printing, and so on, the results are “disastrous” since they lead to “diminution et altération de la production d’une part, perturbation, iniquité de la répartition de l’autre” (the reduction and distortion of production on the one hand, and disruption, injustice, and reallocation (of resources) on the other.) (S9, pp. 000).

Molinari thought this point was so important that he has the Economist end with this description of the eventual disappearance of these economic perturbations before he begins his resumé of the entire book:

Just let these disturbing factors disappear, however, and you will soon see the natural order of society re-establishing itself, as one sees the natural course of water re-establishing itself after the destruction of a dam; you will see production concentrated in the areas where it can operate most advantageously and consumption reassume its normal proportions; you will see as a consequence large fluctuations in the market price and the natural price growing smaller and smaller, becoming almost undetectable and finally disappearing, taking rent with them. Then you will see production operating with the maximum abundance and distribution working in conformity with the laws of justice.[1177]

12. Theater: Liberty and the Theater

Molinari must have been a great fan of the theater as he mentions it quite frequently in his writings. In addition to whatever aesthetic reasons he had for this he was also very keen to apply an economic analysis to the theater’s regulation and subsidy by the state. Music, art, theater, and other forms of fine art were heavily regulated by the French state.[1178] They could be subsidized, granted a monopoly of performance, the number of venues and prices of tickets were regulated, and they were censored and often shut down for overstepping the bounds of political acceptability. Each time revolution broke out in France censorship collapsed in its wake, the number of theaters proliferated, and the subject matter naturally turned to political topics which had previously been outlawed. Molinari would have witnessed this first hand in Paris in the first half of 1848.

For example, the Comédie-Français (also known as the Théâtre-Français) was founded in 1680 by Louis XIV who also founded the Opéra de Paris in 1669. The privileges enjoyed by these two bodies were abolished during the Revolution (the law of 13 January 1791) and was replaced by what Molinari calls “la liberté des théâtres” which saw a proliferation of theater companies in Paris. This experiment in freedom came to an end in 1806 when Napoleon reintroduced censorship and limited the number of theater companies to 8. Another decree issued by Napoleon in 1812 (when he was busy marching on Moscow) created the charter which still governed the operation of the Comédie-Français when Molinari was writing.

In the 1848 budget the relatively small amount of fr. 2.6 million (out of a total budget of fr. 1.45 billion) was spent in the category of “Beaux-Arts” (within the Ministry of the Interior) which included art, historical monuments, ticket subsidies, payments to authors and composers, and subsidies to the royal theaters and the Conservatory of Music.[1179] Additional statistics about theaters were published in the JDE from a government enquiry into theaters which was undertaken in 1849.[1180] The article is unsigned but is probably by Molinari. It provides the following information: there were 21 theaters in Paris each of which was given an expiration date of their government privileges after which it had to be renewed; directors had to pay the state caution money in case they violated the censorship laws, with the Opéra and Théâtre-François both paying the considerable amount of 250,000 fr.; the annual total amount of government subsidies in 1849 was 1,284,000 fr.; 57 theaters had gone bankrupt between 1806 and 1849, with 11 occurring since the start of the February 1848 Revolution; and the number of seats each theater had (the Opéra seated 1,811 and the Théâtre-François seated 1,560).

Molinari followed the ups and downs of the theater industry in a series of 3 articles for the JDE between May 1849 and May 1850[1181] so he was very well informed when he came to write the section on theaters in Les Soirées. This was summarized in a very angry and sarcastic article on “Théâtres” which he wrote for DEP, vol. 2, pp. 731-33 in which he denounced the censorship and regulation of the theater industry as “tyrannical” and the regulators as “the most fanatical partisans of the principle of authority.” In a footnote of his in S8 Molinari also notes that the entertainments of the poor were taxed in order to subsidize those of the rich which offended both his sense of justice and his economic principles:

In the départements and in the Paris suburbs, on the other hand, the directors of plays levy a duty of a fifth of gross takings on the performances of circus entertainers, conjurers, etc. These pleasures of the poor man are taxed to the advantage of the rich man. There is what the (July) monarchy has done for us.[1182]

We know that it was the habit of some of the economists to draw upon French literature in their attempts to popularize economics for the general reader. The most adept of them was Bastiat who constantly drew upon the poet Béranger, the playwright Molière, and the fabulist La Fontaine in his “economic sophisms.” The younger economist and gifted orator Fonteyraud was also renowned for doing this ex tempore in his public speeches at the “Club de la liberté du travail”. In the case of Molinari he seems less comfortable in doing this openly but he does make reference to some of Béranger’s poems and there are some hints at some political plays he might have seen while he was in Paris. For example, he mentions in Les Soirées the republican politician and playwright Edgar Quinet and the historical figure Spartacus which might provide some clues. He also might have known the radical playwright Étienne Arago who was an old school mate of Bastiat and who became the Minister for the Post Office in the Provisional Government.

Edgar Quinet (1803-1875) was a republican politician, professor of languages, and playwright who was elected twice to the National Assembly during the 1848 Revolution. As a keen theater goer Molinari might have seen his play “Prometheus” which was written in 1838 but may have been revived in 1848 because of its strong political implications. Quinet has Prometheus explain why he brought fire to mankind:

I blew on the cinders and made them feel the spirit: Obscure books, burning questions, Written during the night on the brow of nations, The enigma of death, the enigma of life, Liberty, the one idol which I sacrifice to, Who then, if it is not me, will bring these things from the heavens?[1183]

Quinet also wrote a play called “Les Esclaves” (The Slaves) in 1853 in which Spartacus plays a major role and which Molinari might also have seen. Another play about Spartacus which might have been doing the rounds in early 1848 was by Bernard Joseph Saurin which premiered at the Comédie-française in 1760 and was revived in 1818. Crassus offers his daughter Emilie in marriage to Spartacus in order to cement a possible peace treaty between them, which Spartacus rejects in the following words:

In order to be worthy of marrying her in Rome, I would have to renounce and not just sacrifice the liberty of the world for the interest of a man: I will not not buy my happiness at such a price.[1184]

The interest in Spartacus at this time was not just verbal but also visual. A statue of “Spartacus breaking his chains” by the neoclassical sculptor Denis Foyatier (1793-1863) was erected in the Tuilleries Gardens in 1831. Molinari might well have seen this in his travels around Paris.

Plays and statues about Spartacus who led a slave uprising against the Romans are relevant to what Molinari was attempting to do in Les Soirées as he himself must have sensed by choosing to mention Spartacus in the rousing finale to S12 where he states:

For long centuries, humanity groaned in the limbo of servitude. From one age to another, however, the somber clamor of distress and anger echoed in the hearts of the enslaved and exploited masses. The slaves rose up against their masters, demanding liberty.
Liberty! That was the cry of the captives of Egypt, the slaves of Spartacus, the peasants of the Middle Ages, and more recently of the bourgeoisie oppressed by the nobility and religious corporations, of the workers oppressed by masters and guilds. Liberty! That was the cry of all those who found their property confiscated by monopoly and privilege. Liberty! That was the burning aspiration of all those whose natural rights had been forcibly repressed.[1185]

The other radical playwright whose work Molinari probably knew was Étienne Arago[1186] who may well have been introduced to Molinari by Bastiat who had gone to school with Arago when he was growing up in the south of France, or possibly in Hippolyte Castille’s Soirée at his home on the rue Saint-Lazare. Arago had made a name for himself in the 1820s and 1830s by writing dozens of vaudeville plays but it was a radical and explicit attack on the French aristocracy in a play in 1847, Les Aristocraties (The Aristocracies), which brought him to the attention of the growing republican and democratic movement on the eve of the February Revolution. He had trouble having it produced before the revolution but it is typical of the radical plays that would have emerged once censorship collapsed in February and March 1848 and Molinari might well have seen it then. The conclusion of the play fits nicely with the Economists’ notion of only productive labor being rewarded, Molinari’s idea of turning large landed estates into agricultural factories, and his theory that natural laws govern all the operations of the economy. Arago ends with the hero Valentin announcing that the estate of “Franville” (Free Town) will henceforth operate upon the radical idea of putting all the aristocrats to work:

But this country is poor and today Franville
By efficient work will become the foundation for a new way of life
Where everyone from the ground up will put their hands to work
As in a ship where everybody takes turns at the prow, on the poop deck, at the masts, and at the tiller
Isn’t the law of the universe that of work?[1187]

13. Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government

Molinari uses the word “plaie” (wound, sore, or plague) in Les Soirées to describe the government and its actions. He goes a step further in his article “Nation” in DEP where he describes governments which overstep the boundaries of their proper sphere of activity as “ulcerous” and the economist as the surgeon who must cut out the dead or cancerous flesh from the social body in order to save its life;[1188]  and in the article “Ville” he describes high-taxing and spending city governments as “cette peste économique” (this economic plague).[1189] This marked a break in the thinking of the radical economists like Bastiat who had up until then more often described the state as a “plunderer” who took the property of the taxpayers against their will in order to transfer it to the privileged elites who controlled the state.[1190] By the end of the 1840s the vocabulary used by economists to describe the state’s actions was well established and centered around the concept of “spoliation” (plunder), the best known exponent of which was Bastiat in his Economic Sophisms. One might describe Bastiat’s view of the state as a “criminal theory of the state” and the colorful and varied language he used to describe its operations reflect this perspective: rape, pillage, theft, and plunder.

The liberal theory of plunder[1191] was based upon the idea that to deprive a person of their justly acquired property, for whatever reason and by whatever person or institution, even (or especially) the state, was a violation of their natural rights and was therefore unjust and an act of theft. One can trace this tradition of thinking back to the writings of J.B. Say in the 1810s and that of Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer in the 1810s and 1820s. When Bastiat published the second series of Economic Sophisms in January 1848 he more than any one else had developed this theory to the point where he was planning to write an entire book on “The History of Plunder” the outlines of which he announced in the Introductory chapters.[1192] Even though he had rejected Malthus’s population theory he willingly adapted it to explain the inevitable limits to the expansion in the power of the state along Malthusian lines. His “Malthusian Law of the State” asserted that a state would continue to grow as long as there were resources which have been created by the productive classes which it can plunder for its own benefit. When these surpluses are “over harvested” or if the producers resist their exploitation by fighting back, the state will be forced to limit its growth or even cut back on its size, just like Malthus argued the size of populations are limited by the amount of food which is produced.[1193]

Although Bastiat died before he could complete his treatise on economics, let alone his planned future book on plunder, his ideas were taken up by Ambroise Clément who wrote an article on “legal plunder” (that is organized plunder by the state as defined by Bastiat) for the JDE in July 1848.[1194] Clément sketched out a historical taxonomy of legal plunder or “vols” (thefts) as he called it, which went from aristocratic theft, to monarchical theft, theft under the regulatory state (i.e. protectionism), industrial theft (i.e. subsidies and monopoly privileges to favored industries), theft under philanthropic pretensions (i.e the incipient welfare state), and theft under the administrative state (i.e. the regulation of nearly all aspects of economic activity under the modern bureaucratic state). Unfortunately, none of his economist colleagues took up the challenge and this precocious initial effort went no further.

In Les Soirées Molinari seemed to have partly absorbed Bastiat’s criminal theory of the state and he uses the term “spoliation” (plunder) or its variants 19 times in the book. He gives a very concise summary of this perspective in the following passage:

This quite unwarranted usurpation by the strong of the property of the weak, however, has been successively repeated. From the very beginnings of society an endless struggle has existed between the oppressors and the oppressed, the plunderers and the plundered; from the very beginning of societies, the human race has constantly sought the emancipation of property. History abounds with this struggle. On the one hand you see the oppressors defending the privileges they have allotted themselves on the basis of the property of others; on the other we see the oppressed, demanding the abolition of these unjust and dreadful privileges.[1195]

Alongside this criminal theory of the state Molinari was also developing what one might call a “pathological or medical theory of the state” as the evolution of his vocabulary between 1849 and 1857 suggests. In Les Soirées there are references to the state and its activities as “une plaie” (a wound or a plague). In S3 the Conservative admits that the administration is a “grande plaie” (great running sore) with which the Economist agrees, suggesting that the only cure was “de moins administrer” (to administer the economy less).[1196] Other pathological descriptions of the state which followed soon after Les Soirées included the words “parasitical," “ulcerous,” “leprous," as well as the idea of the state as a voracious “eater” or “consumer” of taxes. The change in vocabulary suggests a change in perspective about what the state was and how it affected the economy. The Bastiat criminal theory of the state saw the state transferring the justly acquired resources of the producers to a privileged class of beneficiaries in an act of criminal behavior. The pathological theory of the state which Molinari was developing saw the state as an intrusive and harmful entity which destroyed the healthy tissue of the economy and society which would die unless the pathogen could be stopped or eliminated. The pathogens Molinari had in mind included such things as a parasitic bureaucratic class; a military which killed people, destroyed property, and disrupted trade; and a legislature which passed laws prohibiting or regulating productive economic activity.

The first statement of his idea that government was an ulcer on society comes in the article he wrote for the DEP on “Nations” in 1852 where he describes governments which overstep the boundaries of their proper sphere of activity as “ulcerous” and the economist as the surgeon who must cut out the cancerous flesh from the social body in order to save it. He states that J.-B. Say was the first economist to come up with “this picturesque expression of ulcerous government (gouvernement-ulcère)” and he quotes other passages from the Traité d’Économie politique in this context but does not identify the actual passage where this phrase occurs. Here is Molinari’s description:

With the sang froid of the expert surgeon who cuts out the cancerous flesh, J.B. Say has shown us at what point a government which has not been strictly limited to fulfilling its natural functions can plunge the entire economy of the social body into trouble, corruption, and sickness, and he has stated that in his eyes this kind of government is a veritable ulcer.
“Ulcerous government,” this colorful expression used by the illustrious economist to describe all governments which intervene inappropriately in the sphere of private activity, has been frequently blamed on the economy itself by socialist and pro-regulation authors.[1197]

Molinari was not the only economist to use the phrase “ulcerous government." Michel Chevalier believed that the "théorie du gouvernement-ulcère”emerged as a reaction to the authoritarian polices of the restored monarchy after 1815. He thought that many members of the Chamber of Deputies responsible for the 1830 overthrow of the monarchy were adherents of this view of the corrupting effects of government.[1198] On the other side of the political spectrum the socialist Alphonse Toussenel denounced the free market ideas coming out of England during the 1840s as dangerous because they viewed the state as a “gouvernement-ulcère” and that these negative views of the government were being taken up by the French economists to justifying their theories of laissez-faire.[1199] He need not have worried because there was already a long tradition of thinking this way about the state in French liberal thought which went back to Say, Comte, and Dunoyer.

Another example comes from the Cours d’économie politique where he argues that it is the “anti-economic” nature of government which enables it to suck resources out of the productive part of the economy and destroy them for no apparent benefit. Another analogy he uses is that of a “la pompe aspirante des impôts et des emprunts” (the suction pump of taxes and debt) which pumps the “vital energy” out of an economy by means of taxes and debt. The only cure in his view to the ulcer which is eating away at the economy’s flesh is to drastically cut the functions of government and to make sure that what few functions it continued to perform were as cheap (à bon marché) and economically run as possible:

Thus, by the very fact of their anti-economic constitution, governments have become the ulcers of societies, to use the strong expression coined by J.B. Say. As population and wealth increase, thanks to the progressive development of competitive industries, a growing mass of vital energy is sucked out of society by the suction pump which are taxes and debts, in order to subsidize the costs of production of public services, or to put it in a better way, to subsidize the support and easy enrichment of the particular class which controls the monopoly of the production of these services. Not only that, but governments every day make us pay more for the necessary functions which they have cornered. And furthermore, they engage in harmful enterprises on a more and more colossal scale such as wars, at a time when war has ceased to have any raison d’être and has become the most barbarous and odious of anachronisms.
As progress has given rise to the vital forces of society, what is the cure for this ulcer which devours them?
If, as I have tried to demonstrate, the problem comes from the anti-economic constitution of governments, the cure obviously consists in making this constitution conform to the essential principles which it does not understand, namely to make it economic.[1200]

In Molinari’s colorful anti-statist vocabulary he had two more additional phrases which he used to describe the behavior of the state. One was another pathological term he used in 1902, this time of “la lèpre de l’Étatisme” (the leprosy of Statism) which destroyed the healthy flesh of the economy as “des classes gouvernantes et légiférantes” (the governing and legislating classes) spread the intervention of the state further into the economy:

Furthermore, while the development of the spirit of enterprise and free association henceforth allowed pubic works and services to be left to the free initiative of individuals, we have seen the state encroach more each day onto the domain of private activity and to replace the fruitful emulation (by the public sector) of industries which are competitively provided with the burdensome routine of monopolies. The less that state intervention became useful, the more the leprosy of Statism has spread! Finally, while the astonishing multiplication and improvements in the means of transportation of the factors and materials of production have made the situation of industry everywhere more equal, and as consumer markets which had previously been isolated have been put into constant communication with each other and have removed the original raison d’être of the protectionist regime, the spirit of monopoly of the governing and legislating classes raise and multiply protectionist barriers.[1201]

Another colorful phrase was the idea that the state was turning into a carnivorous animal where the classes which benefited from government subsidies or government jobs in the bureaucracy had become “des mangeurs de taxes” (tax-eaters) who lived parasitically off the “des payeurs de taxes” (tax-payers). This was a perspective which he first developed in 1852 in his book about the 1848 Revolution and the rise of Louis Napoléon, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel (Revolutions and Despotism seen from the Perspective of Material Interests).[1202] A few years later this had turned into the expression “la classe budgétivore” (the budget eating class) which he continued to use for the rest of the century as part of his class analysis of the modern French state in various articles in the JDE, culminating in his important pair of articles summing up the achievements of the 19th century and his pessimistic prognosis for the fate of liberty in the statist 20th century.[1203]

Thirty years after writing Les Soirées Molinari moved back towards the Bastiat inspired criminal or plunder theory of the state which is what he used in his two long books on the historical sociology of the state which he published in in 1880 and 1884. But at the time he wrote Les Soirées he was torn between the two theories and was tending towards the pathological over the criminal in the immediate future.

14. Value: Molinari and Bastiat on the Theory of Value

The Classical School economists tied themselves into knots trying to sort out the confusion over key concepts such as value, utility, price, and wealth which they had inherited from Adam Smith and David Ricardo.[1204] According to the orthodox view, a commodity which was produced by labor had some element of that labor “embodied” within it which is what gave it value. Hence the name which this theory was given, the “labor theory of value." J.B. Say sensed that there was a problem with this approach and that more things were bought and sold on the market than physical things which embodied some objective quantity of labor. His solution was to point out that “non-material” things (such as services in education, medicine, policing, and entertainment) were an important sector of the market and that these services were valued somewhat differently than commodities like grain or iron. Unfortunately he did not provide a full solution to the problem of value.

When Molinari was writing Les Soirées the problem had become acute because socialists (and soon the Marxists) had taken Ricardo's labor theory of value and made it the cornerstone of their critique of the justice of profit, interest, and rent, namely that manual workers were exploited because they did not receive the full “value” of their “labor." From this they concluded that the state should step in to rectify the situation either by a policy of regulation and redistribution (in the case of the "parliamentary socialists") or the violent overthrow of the state and the erection of a "workers' state” (in the case of the revolutionary socialists).

A handful of Economists like Bastiat and Molinari on the other hand were trying to rework their theories during the 1840s and 1850s without complete success. It not be until the early 1870s when the theorists of the "subjectivist” or "marginalist” school of William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Léon Walras turned economic theory on its head and pushed it in an entirely different direction, at least as far as the theory of value and exchange was concerned. Menger was the founder of what later become known as the "Austrian School” of economics which included Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek.

Bastiat went the furthest in the direction of the subjectivist theory of value. In the long chapter 5 “On Value” in the Economic Harmonies (1850) he put forward the idea that in a mutually agreed upon voluntary transaction the two parties involved exchanged one “service” for another, or as Bastiat put it “se rendre service pour service” (to give or offer one service for another).[1205] This idea became a cornerstone of his treatise on economics, the Economic Harmonies. The idea was innovative because it made the theory of exchange much more general and abstract than it had been under the classical school of Smith and Ricardo. Instead of there being an exchange of equal quantities of labor, utility, or value (or the physical goods which supposedly “embodied” them) only a more general “service” of some kind was exchanged. Under the notion of service Bastiat included not only the standard material “goods” like grain or wine, but also the “non-material” goods, like the services provided by doctors and teachers and opera singers,[1206] which had been part of J.B. Say’s theory. Bastiat took Say one step further by arguing that a capitalist who loaned money, or a land owner who rented land, or an entrepreneurial factory owner who made profits, all provided “services” for which they were justly rewarded by interest, rent, and profit respectively. For example, a banker provided the borrower with the money now when it was more urgently needed and not later, thus providing the borrower with a much needed service for which he was willing to pay. Molinari dismissed this formulation of Bastiat’s as merely playing with words.[1207]

Another innovative aspect of Bastiat’s theory of exchange was his idea that each party to the exchange made an “evaluation” of the costs and benefits to him or her personally and had the expectation that the exchange would be of overall benefit. As he stated in the Economic Harmonies, “les échanges de services sont déterminés et évalués par l’intérêt personnel” (exchanges of services are determined and evaluated according to (one’s) personal interest). The expected benefit was calculated by a process in which the things to be exchanged were “comparés, appréciés, évalués” (compared, appraised, and evaluated).

(T)he word Value … is based on the outward expressions of our actions, our efforts, and the mutual services that are exchanged, because it is possible to compare them, appreciate them, and evaluate them, and they are capable of evaluation precisely because they are exchanged.[1208]
It follows from this that the transaction is made on terms advantageous to one of the contracting parties, with the full consent of the other. That is all. In general, exchanges of services are determined and evaluated in the light of personal interest. However, thank God, sometimes this occurs in the light of the principle of fellow-feeling.[1209]

With this idea of personal evaluation of goods and services Bastiat was very close to an Austrian theory of subjective value. He did not go the entire way because he still believed that services would only be exchanged if they were equal or “equivalent” in some way. He explicitly rejected the theory developed by Condillac and Henri Storch that individuals valued the things they were exchanging differently and could thus both profit from an exchange, thereby producing “deux gains” (two benefits or profits) or a “double et empirique profit” (double and measurable profit).[1210]

In his writings, Bastiat used a variety of expressions to convey the idea of the exchange of “service for service." These included “la mutualité des services” (the mutual exchange of services), “les services réciproques” (reciprocal services), “service contre service” (service for service), “les services équivalent” (equivalent services), and “se rendre réciproquement service” (to offer or supply reciprocal services).

Bastiat’s ideas on value were not well received by his colleagues in the Political Economy Society who discussed them at one of their meetings. They were not willing to listen to such a radical challenge to one of the main planks of the Smithian-Ricardian orthodoxy. Molinari was caught in the middle of this intellectual battle when he wrote Les Soirées but he seems to have taken some of Bastiat’s ideas to heart. In the first edition of his treatise, the Cours d'économie politique (1855, 1863), he developed a new twist to the theory of value which was different to Bastiat's in many respects but similar in that it was an attempt to break out of the Smithian straight jacket.[1211] In Molinari's view "value is composed of two quite distinct elements - utility and scarcity ("rareté")” (p. 84). In contrast to the Smithian tradition neither of these elements were fixed amounts but were "essentiellement diverse et variable” (in essence diverse and variable) (p. 86), thus making Molinari also an interesting precursor to the "subjectivist” revolution of the 1870s. Concerning utility, Molinari argued that each individual has "une échelle des besoins” (a unique ladder or hierarchy of needs and wants” (p. 85) based upon their different “goût” (tastes) (p. 85) and the degree of urgency each feels in satisfying the need at different times and circumstances ("fluctuations”) (p. 85). Concerning scarcity, that too is variable and diverse because, on the one hand, technological change and economic progress will steadily reduce scarcity, while on the other hand, any natural or artificial increase in the difficulties of production will increase scarcity (by "artificial” Molinari means government intervention and regulation). Thus like Bastiat, on the issue of value Molinari moved away from focusing on any intrinsic quality of the object being traded to a more subjective and individualist approach where the fluctuating hierarchy of an individual's needs determines the value of a good or service being exchanged.


15. Appendix 2: The French State and Economic Policies

Chamber of Deputies and Voting

During the Restoration (1815-1830) and the July Monarchy (1830-1848) France was ruled by a King, an upper house of Lords (Chamber of Peers), and a lower house of elected representatives (Chamber of Deputies). The Revolution of February 1848 overthrew the Monarchy and suspended the Chamber of Peers replacing them with a republic (the Second Republic) with a single elected body called the National Assembly which for the first year (4 May 1848 - 27 May 1849) was known as the Constituent Assembly as a new constitution was being developed, and then the Legislative Assembly which lasted until Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état of December 1851.

Elections to the Chamber of Deputies between 1815 and 1848 were by limited manhood suffrage. Voters were drawn from a small number of people who were at least 30 years old and who paid at least fr. 300 in direct taxes (land tax, door and window tax, tax on businesses) [these requirements were lowered in 1830 to 25 years and fr. 200]. Men could not stand for election unless they were at least 40 years old and paid at least fr. 1,000 in direct taxes [these requirements were lowered in 1830 to 30 years and fr. 500]. These property and tax requirements limited the electorate to a small group of wealthy individuals which numbered only 89,000 in the Restoration, 180,000 in 1831, and about 241,000 in 1846, or about 5% out of a total population of about 36 million people.

In addition, the “Law of the Double Vote” was introduced on 29 June 1820 to benefit the ultra-monarchists who were under threat after the assassination of the Duke de Berry in February 1820. The law was designed to give the wealthiest voters two votes each so they could dominate the Chamber of Deputies with their supporters. Between 1820 and 1848, 258 deputies were elected by a small group of individuals who qualified to vote because they paid more than 2-300 francs in direct taxes (this figure varied over time from 90,000 to 240,000). One quarter of the electors, those who paid the largest amount of taxes, elected another 172 deputies (an additional 2 deputies per département). Therefore, those wealthier electors enjoyed the privilege of a double vote. Bastiat referred to this small group as “la classe électorale" (the electoral class).[1212]

Deputies were elected to a term of 5 years, one fifth of whom would be elected each year, and were not paid a salary, which meant that only government civil servants (who could sit in the Chamber concurrently with their government job)[1213] or the wealthy were able to afford to run for office. Deputies could not initiate legislation which was a prerogative of the King. The Chamber consisted of 258 Deputies in 1816, 430 in 1820, 459 in 1831, and 460 in 1839. General elections were held in July 1831, June 1834, November 1837, March 1839, July 1842, and August 1846.

The following is a summary of the elections held between 1839 and 1846:

•     the 5th legislature of the July Monarchy was elected in stages on 2 March and 6 July 1839. The Republican and so-called “third party” coalition won with 240 seats; the Conservative block got 199; and the Legitimists won only 20. King Louis-Philippe lacked a majority and dissolved the government on 16 June 1842.

•     the 6th legislature of the July Monarchy was elected on 9 July 1842. The Conservatives won with 266 seats; and the “Opposition” won 193. King Louis-Philippe dissolved the government on 16 July 1846.

•     the 7th legislature of the July Monarchy was elected on 1 August 1846. The Conservatives won with 290 seats; and the Opposition won 168. The government was dissolved when the Revolution of February 1848 broke out.

The February Revolution of 1848 introduced universal manhood suffrage (21 years or older), the Constituent Assembly had 900 members (minimum age of 25). Over 9 million men were eligible to vote and 7.8 million men voted (84% of registered voters) in an election held on 23 and 24 April 1848. The largest block of Deputies were monarchists (290), followed by moderate republicans (230), and extreme republicans and socialists (55). The remainder were unaligned.

In the first and only presidential election held on 10-11 December 1848 under the new constitution, 7.4 million people voted making Napoleon Bonaparte’s nephew, Louis Napoleon the President of the Second Republic. General Cavaignac, received 1.4 million votes (19%) to Louis Napoleon’s 5.5 million votes (74%).

In the election of 13-14 May 1849 for the new Legislative Assembly 6.7 million men voted (out of 9.9 million registered voters) for a total of 705 seats. The largest block in the Legislative Assembly was “the party of Order” (which consisted of monarchists (both Legitimists and Orleanists) and Bonapartists) led by Odilon Barrot with 450 seats (64%), the extreme left of radical republicans and socialists (known as the “Montagnards” or democratic socialists) led by Ledru-Rollin with 180 seats (26%), and the moderate republicans led by Adolphe Thiers with 75 seats (11%).

Education

The French educational system was placed under the administrative control of the national University by a series of decrees issued by Napoleon in May 1806 and March 1808. These granted the University the power to set the number of schools, the level at which private schools were taxed, the curriculum for entry into professional schools (the Baccalaureate examination), pay rates for teachers and inspectors, and so on. Important revisions to the law were the Guizot Law of 1833 and the Falloux Law of 1850.[1214] Battles were fought in the 1830s and 1840s over the right of Catholic schools to operate independently of the state and the right to establish additional private schools, the so-called struggle for “liberty of education." The Guizot Law required every commune to set up an elementary school for boys, created a corps of school inspectors, and set a minimum salary for teachers. It did not make attendance compulsory (this was enacted in 1882 by Jules Ferry). The Falloux Law of 1850 permitted a considerable expansion of Catholic schools and created a two tier system of state funded government schools run by the communes, departments or the central government, and private “free” schools."

The French liberals were split on the question of education as were their English counterparts. Some like the free trader Richard Cobden believed that the state should provide universal free education. In France Molinari and Frédéric Passy debated the matter in the pages of L’Économiste belge in 1857-58 in which Passy advocated no state intervention in education whatsoever, while Molinari believed that education was so important that the state should force parents to send their children to schools, in other words he supported a form of compulsory education as part of the “tutelary” function of the state. However, he believed that the schools should be provided only by the free market not by the state.[1215] This is one of the few areas where Molinari was less radically liberal than his colleagues. Nevertheless, he thought that education was an “industry” in which there would be “la production de l’enseignement” (the production of education) and where “entrepreneurs d’education" (entrepreneurs in the education business) will emerge to establish schools and sell education services to fee paying consumers.

The Fortifications of Paris

In 1840 the President of the Council of Ministers, Adolphe Thiers was concerned that Britain’s opposition to French policy to support the Pascha of Egypt might lead to another war. To deter this possibility, he planned to build a massive military wall 33 km (21 miles) in circumference around the city of Paris with 16 star-shaped forts laid out in an outer perimeter beyond the wall.[1216] All people and goods entering or leaving the city had to pass through one of the 17 large entry gates built into the wall. This project was budgeted to cost fr. 150 million and was completed in 1844. The total expenditure would have been much higher if the state had not used the labor of thousands of army conscripts to dig the ditches and build the wall. “Theirs’ Wall,” as it was known, was strongly opposed by liberals such as the astronomer François Arago and the economist Michel Chevalier, who objected to its construction because it was so expensive, that military technology would soon make it obsolete, and that the wall would one day be used to “imprison” the citizens of Paris if they ever rose up in rebellion to demand much needed political and economic reforms (which they did of course in February 1848, and were duly put down by troops stationed in the forts around Paris). In other words, the wall would result in the “embastillisation” of Paris (the Bastillisation of Paris).[1217]

Intellectual Property (Copyright, Trade Marks, and Patents)

Under the old regime copyright (le droit de copie) existed in perpetuity but it was enjoyed at the pleasure of the sovereign and not by legal right. This right was lost if an author granted the copyright to a publisher.[1218] The author then only had copyright until his death, after which the book entered the public domain. During the Revolution copyright was protected under the law and it could be transferred without restriction but it was limited in duration. According to the law of 19 July 1793 copyright was granted to the author for life and to his/her heirs for 10 years after their death; the Decree of 5 February 1810 extended the right of heirs to 20 years. These laws remained in effect up until the mid-19th century, with only a slight modification with the law of 3 August 1844.[1219]

Molinari had a strong interest in intellectual property rights as his participation in Castille’s journal Le travail intellectuel, journal des intérêts scientifiques, littéraires et artistiques (Intellectual Work: a Journal about Scientific, Literary, and Artistic Interests) in 1847-48 indicates. He makes a distinction between restrictions on literary property which take place through time and those that take place through geographical space.[1220] Time limits placed by legislation on the length of copyright ownership vary from country to country so that countries with longer periods of exclusive authorial rights (like England (42 years plus 7) and Prussia (life plus 30 years)) are at an advantage compared to countries with a more limited period (like France (life plus 20) and Belgium (French law applied after 1817). Copyright is also limited across geographical space when a state allows counterfeiting within its borders of books which originate in other countries. Molinari denounced this as “international communism” which was only slowly being reduced as states like Prussia and England (1838) began to introduce reciprocal recognition of international copyright.

There was a discussion in the Chamber between April 1845 and July 1847 on “marques de fabrique” (brands or trade marks) when an official Report by M. Drouyn de Lhoys was tabled.[1221] Before the official report was tabled the government seemed to favor a free market solution whereby producers and merchants would use a voluntary system for establishing and enforcing trade marks (“la marque facultative” (voluntary or discretionary trade marks)) but the official Report came down in favor of a government funded and policed system of “la marque obligatoire” (compulsory trade marks and brands). The economists thought this was a serious setback for the freedom of consumers to decide for themselves and would prove to be a heavy burden on taxpayers.

The Economists were divided on the question of patents.[1222] Charles Coquelin strenuously objected to Molinari's view that inventors should have their inventions (“brevets d'invention” or patents) protected forever as perpetual property rights. He describes Molinari and Jobard as “zealous partisans” of this view which is nothing but “puerile eccentricities." Coquelin argues that inventions are not a right of property but rather “a right of priority” which the state recognized but only for a limited period of time. Under the old regime inventors had no rights under French law until the Revolution introduced the Law of 7 January 1791 sponsored by de Bouffiers who took a very favorable view of the property rights of inventors. The Law of 5 July 1844 defined what could and could not be protected by patents. The former were new industrial products and new methods of producing industrial products. What were not protected by government patent were pharmaceutical products and financial and credit instruments, in order to prevent the practice of “charlatanism” in these industries.

Political Parties

The main political groups in the late 1840s are the following:

The Doctrinaires were moderate royalists who supported the Charter of 1815 and Louis XVIII. François Guizot was their leading spokesman.

The Legitimists were supporters of the descendants of Charles X. They were spectacularly successful in the May 1849 elections as the "Party of Order" winning 2/3 of the seats. One of their leading advocates was Odilon Barrot.

The Republicans were relatively weak in spite of the fact that France became a republic three times in less than a century, in 1792, 1848, and 1870. General Lafayette was an important figure during the 1820s but its supporters fractured into socialist and liberal groups who had little else in common. Bastiat and the other Economists were "moderate republicans" during the Second Republic and usually sat with the left in the Chamber.

The Montagnards were radical socialists who modeled themselves on the Mountain faction during the first French Revolution. They were “the Mountain” because they sat as a group in the highest seats at the side or the back of the Chamber. Ledru-Rollin was one of their leading advocates.

The Orléanists were supporters of the overthrown King Louis Philippe.

The Bonapartists were supporters of Napoleon, both the Emperor Napoleon I and then his nephew Louis Napoleon who was elected President of the Second Republic in December 1848 before he seized power in a coup d'état in December 1851 and then proclaimed himself Emperor Napoleon III in December 1852.

The "Comité de la rue de Poitiers” (later known as the "Party of Order") was a group of conservative politicians who came together in May 1848 on the rue de Poitiers following an unsuccessful demonstration of radical supporters of Louis Blanc in the National Assembly. The group (between 200 and 400) met weekly and were made up of a broad coalition of conservative, legitimist, Bonapartist, and liberal groups. They supported General Cavaignac's suppression of the riots in June 1848 and then Louis Napoleon's run for president of the Republic in December. Towards the end of 1848 the group began to be called the "Party of Order” and it became increasingly monarchical and conservative. In the national election of May 1849 the Party of Order's slogan was "Order, Property, Religion” and it fought bitterly against the party of the left (The Mountain and the Social Democrats). The Party of Order won a majority of seats (450) to the Left's 180. Moderate republicans won 75.

All of the political groups were protectionist to one degree or the other, and the socialists were both protectionist and extremely interventionist as well. The free traders and the Economists were very much in the minority and could draw upon only a few luke-warm supporters in the Doctrinaire and Bonapartist groups.

Prostitution

Prostitution was legal in France until 1946 although heavily regulated. A “maison de tolérance” (brothel) could be established with the permission of the police and health authorities on condition that the “femmes publiques” (prostitutes) undergo regular health inspections (at least once every two weeks) and carry at all times an identity card which they had to present to police upon demand. Males could not own brothels so they were run by a manageress (“directrice” or madam) who had silent partners (usually men) who would put up the capital for the business. As setting up a “maison” fully furnished was expensive many women preferred to freelance (“prostitution interlope”) by renting cheap rooms (“hôtel garni” or “maison garnie”) and working from there, thus avoiding surveillance by the health inspectors as well as the madam. This was illegal under a police ordinance of 6 November 1778 which was revived in the Law of 30 September 1828. Boarding house owners who rented such rooms were liable to a 500 livres fine. Molinari calls the individuals who run brothels “entrepreneurs de prostitution” (entrepreneurs in the prostitution business) which suggests that he thinks they are running a business much like many others which provided a voluntary service to customers but which were heavily regulated by the government, with unfortunate consequences. Molinari also uses the phrase “la prostitution interlope” (pirate or freelance prostitution) to describe women who operated on their own outside of the law as “black market” or “underground” prostitutes. See the Glossary entry on “Interlopers and Pirates." Parent-Duchâtelet published a copy of an ID card issued to prostitutes with a long list of “Obligations and Prohibitions."[1223]

Public Works

During the 1840s the July Monarchy undertook a series of expensive public works projects which concerned the Economists. Traditionally the French state spent money on roads, bridges, canals, rivers, ports, monuments and public buildings, but these expenditures were overtaken by two new spending projects, namely the construction of the fortifications of Paris (1841-44) and the government’s participation in building the railroads after 1842. In the French government’s budget for 1848 a sum of fr. 111 million was allocated for civilian public works, which did not include public works paid for by the army or navy (such as in Algeria).[1224] The economist Michel Chevalier provides a useful summary of expenditure on public works during the July Monarchy between 1831 and 1845.[1225] He records the following totals: bridges (fr. 15 million), monuments and public buildings (fr. 80 million), rivers (fr. 152 million), ports (fr. 176 million), canals (fr. 234 million), roads (fr. 233 m), and railways (fr. 741 million). - for a total of fr. 1.614 billion.

The first new spending initiative undertaken at this time was the creation of Adolphe Thiers who organized the building of a huge military wall around the city of Paris between 184 and 1844— the so-called “Fortifications of Paris” (See the separate glossary entry on this).

The second major public works program was the building of the railways after 1842. (See the separate glossary entry on this.) Government spending on railways rapidly expanded after the law of 11 June 1842 authorized the French state to partner with private companies in the building of five railroad networks spreading out from Paris. (see the Glossary on “French Railways”). According to Chevalier, annual direct out-of-pocket expenses (not counting loan guarantees to railway companies) doubled from about fr. 6 million in 1840, to about fr. 12 million in 1842, and then increased by a factor of seven to fr. 86 million by 1845. According to Lobet, between 1842 and the end of 1847 the state had spent about fr. 420 million in subsidies, loan guarantees, and construction costs.[1226]

The Railways

The first French railway was opened in 1828 and was built to facilitate the transport of coal to nearby rivers. The first common-carrier train for both passengers and freight was opened in 1837 between Paris and LePecq. In 1842 the government decided to encourage the building of a national network. Under the Railway Law of 11 June 1842 the government ruled that five main railways would be built radiating out of Paris which would be built in cooperation with private industry. The government would build and own the right of way, bridges, tunnels and railway stations, while private industry would lay the tracks, and build and maintain the rolling stock and the lines. The government would also set rates and regulate safety. The first railway concessions were issued by the government in 1844-45 triggering a wave of speculation and attempts to secure concessions. Between 1846 and 1851 the following major railway networks were inaugurated:

•       chemin de fer du Nord (June 1846)

•       chemin de fer d'Amiens à Boulogne (May 1848)

•       chemin de fer de Compiègne à Noyon (March1849)

•       chemin de fer de Paris à Strasbourg (July 1849)

•       chemin de fer de Tours à Angers (August 1849)

•       chemin de fer d'Argenteuil (April 1851)

The Saint-Lazare railroad station was built in 1837 on land once owned by the religious order of Saint Lazarus and it was the first major railroad station in Paris. It was enlarged and expanded between 1842 and 1853 and soon became the most important railway station in Paris. Another enlargement took place in 1865 and was the subject of a series of famous paintings by Claude Monet, "La Gare Saint-Lazare” which he painted in 1877. One of these adorns the cover of this book???

French railway companies were hamstrung by the fact that one of their biggest costs, the purchase of steel rails, remained high because of high tariffs which kept cheaper foreign steel out of the French market. In the 1850s smaller unprofitable concessions were amalgamated into six main railway companies which enjoyed a monopoly within their geographic area, and in 1859 the government guaranteed the interest on all loans made by railway companies to investors. In 1908 the government purchased the Ouest railway company and in 1937 nationalized all the others into one government railway system the "Société nationale des chemins de fer français" (SNCF).

In a lengthy article Michel Chevalier captures the excitement which was stimulated by the construction of railways, both concerning the new technology and the possibilities of drastic reductions in the cost of transport. Buried among the mass of technical information are a number of matters of concern to the economists: that the cost of building the network was increased by tariffs on imported iron rails; that the lowered costs of shipping goods across international borders strengthened the peaceful economic bonds between people, but also made it easier for States to move troops to the border; that railways provided much needed competition with the canal system, which some considered to be a “natural monopoly”; that attempts by the government to impose lower rates on railways was “a very serious attack on the spirit of association ...  [and] the freedom of industry” ; and that economic liberty had within itself the means to correct any excesses or abuses in pricing or investment.[1227]

Tariff Policy

A good summary of the history of French customs and tariff policy can be found in Horace Say's entry “Douane” (Customs) in the DEP.[1228] Say divides his history into three main periods: the abolition of internal French customs and the rationalization of external duties in the earliest phase of the French Revolution (November 1790); the turmoil of the Napoleonic period culminating in the Continental Blockade of 1806 which attempted to ban the entry of British goods into Europe; and the rivalry between the landowning aristocrats of the Restoration period (who wanted protection for grain production and wood products) and the growing manufacturing interests, which resulted in the high tariffs of 1822. Say describes the post-1830 period as one which saw the formation of “a veritable pact of resistance by a coalition of the great landowners, and the protected iron producers and manufacturers”[1229] which witnessed two periods of active consolidation of tariff policy with additional legislation passed in 1833-35 and 1847.

Tariff policy during the Revolution had been a chaotic affair. In a decree of 30-31 October 1790 the Constituent Assembly abolished all internal tariffs and duties were abolished thus creating for the first time a largely free internal market in France. External tariffs were cut to a maximum 20% by value although some goods were prohibited entry into the French market. Molinari described the tariff reforms of the Constituent Assembly as a kind of customs union which involved all the provinces of France. Tariffs were completely reorganized by a law of August 1791 which abolished most prohibitions on imported material, abolished tariffs on primary products used by French manufacturers and food stuffs for consumers, and reduced tariffs on manufactured goods gradually down to 20-25% by value of the goods imported. The decree of 1 March 1793 annulled all foreign trade treaties and prohibited the importation of a large number of goods, such as textiles, metal goods, and pottery. The decree of 29 September 1793 introduced the notorious "Maximum" or price control legislation which threw the internal French economy into considerable disarray. A decree of 31 January 1795 declared that the tariff of 1791 would be cut by 50 to 90% on many articles. This was reversed by a law of 23 November 1796 in order to increase revenue for the state.

This on-again-off-again tariff regime was changed by the tariff law of 21 November 1806 (the Berlin Decree) which introduced Napoleon's Continental Blockade which was designed to deny British goods access to the European market. Thus, the debate about tariff policy had completely shifted away from any concern with protection of domestic industry and revenue raising and had become an instrument of economic warfare against the British. In some instances tariffs were raised to absurd levels, such as fr. 300 per kilo on imported sugar. During the Restoration in 1816 tariffs on imported cotton, for example, were set at fr. 22 per 100 kilos. In 1821-22 there was a review of tariffs which served to create a protectionist regime around the interests of large land owners and favored manufacturers.

This process continued under the July Monarchy. The government inquiry into French tariff policy held in October 1834 raised hopes that there might be a reduction in the level of tariffs as the Minister of Commerce, Thiers, was in favor. However, the Inquiry concluded that France should continue its protectionism of industry. The Inquiry resulted in a detailed three volume report issued by the Superior Council of Commerce in 1835 based upon the findings of its inquiry held in October 1834. The list of members of the inquiry read like a "who's who" of the protectionists Bastiat mentions and criticizes throughout the Economic Sophisms. See Enquête relative à diverses prohibitions établies à l'entrée des produits étrangers (1835). It was 1,459 pages in length and was printed by the government printing office at taxpayers’ expense. The English free trader and key figure in the Anti-Corn Law League Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783-1869) wrote a critique of the French inquiry which was translated and published as Contre-Enquête: par l’Homme aux Quarante Ecus (1834).

The 1835 Report consolidated the protectionist regime and set tariff rates which would last until the 1848 Revolution. French tariffs on manufactured goods such as textiles were very complex. In the case of textiles many goods were prohibited outright in order to protect French manufacturers (“le régime prohibitionniste”). Some products used to manufacture other goods, such as cotton thread used to make lace or tulle, were allowed entry upon payment of a tariff of fr. 7-8 per kilogramme. Most finished goods had prohibitive duties imposed upon them such as fr. 50-100 per piece in the case of cashmere scarves and fr. 550 per 100 kilogramme for wool carpets (this was called “le régime protectionniste”). According to the Budget Papers of 1848 the French state raised fr. 202.1 million from tariffs and import duties out of total receipts of fr. 1,391 million, or 14.5%.[1230]

The free traders in France were inspired by the success of Richard Cobden’s Anti-Corn Law League which was founded in 1838 and which had achieved its aim of abolishing protection for agricultural products by mid-1846. The French “Association pour la liberté des échanges” (Free Trade Association) was founded in February 1846 in Bordeaux with Bastiat as the secretary of the Board and editor of their journal Le Libre-Échange (November 1846 - April 1848). A push by Bastiat and other free traders to have the French chamber pass similar legislation in 1847 failed. Léon Faucher states that the attempt by the free traders in the Chamber to revise French tariff policy in a more liberal direction failed because they were out-manoeuvred by the protectionists in Committee. The opportunity arose when a bill came before the Chamber on 31 March 1847 but the Committee assigned by the Chamber to write a report was stacked with protectionists and the lobbying by the Association for the Defense of National Employment was very effective. France did not begin to loosen its policy of protectionism until the Anglo-France Trade Treaty of 1860 which was signed by Richard Cobden for the British government and Michel Chevalier for the French government.

In Molinari’s day a veritable “army” of public servants worked for the Customs Service. According to Horace Say there were 27,727 individuals (1852 figures) employed, composed of two “divisions” - one of administrative personnel (2,536) and the other of “agents on active service” (24,727).[1231] According to the Budget papers for 1848 the Customs Service collected fr. 202 million in customs duties and salt taxes and their administrative and collection costs totaled fr. 26.4 million or 13% of the amount collected.[1232]

Assessing the average rate of tariffs in different countries is very difficult given the huge variety of products, the manner in which they were taxed (by weight, volume, or price), and whether the tariff was for "fiscal" purposes (to raise revenue for the state) or protectionist purposes (to favor domestic producers at the expense of foreign producers). A useful comparative study of tariff rates in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain in the 19th century is provided by Antonio Tena Jungito who compares average tariff rates of all goods taxed as well as average tariff rates on only protected items (leaving out the usually low rates on items taxed for fiscal purposes only).[1233] From his data we can conclude the following: British aggregate tariff rates (excluding fiscal goods) peaked at about 15% in 1836 and began dropping in 1840 reaching a low point of about 6% in 1847 (the abolition of the Corn Laws was announced in January 1846 and was to come into full effect in 1849), and continuing to drop steadily throughout the rest of the century reaching a plateau of less than 1% between 1880 and 1903, which was the golden age of free trade in Europe. France had an average rate of about 12% in 1836 and it was still around 11% in 1848 before it began to drop steadily reaching 5% in 1857, then spiking briefly to 7.5% in 1858, and dropping steadily again to about 1.5% in 1870 (the Anglo-French Free Trade Treaty was signed in 1860), before again moving steadily upwards to about 8% in 1893. In 1849 the rates were about 6% in Britain and 10% in France. As a point of comparison, in the United States tariff rates fluctuated wildly as the protectionist North and the free trade South fought for control of the Federal government before the Civil War.[1234] In 1832 the Protectionist Tariff imposed an average rate of 33%; the Compromise Tariff of 1833 intended to lower rates to a flat 20%; and the 1846 Tariff created four tariff schedules for goods which imposed 100%, 40%, 30%, or 20% depending upon the particular kind of good. The average rate in the U.S. in 1849 was about 23% which is definitely a "protectionist" tariff and not a "fiscal" tariff according to Bastiat's definition (5%).

Taxation

The following are the different taxes levied by the French Government:[1235] the wine and spirits tax; the octroi or tax leveed on goods brought into a town, the gabelle or tax on salt; the "taxe de quarante-cinq centimes" or the 45 centimes tax which was introduced on March 16, 1848 and which increased direct taxes on things such as land, moveable goods, doors and windows, and trading licenses, by 45%; the “Droits réunis” or combined indirect taxes; the forced labor obligations or "corvées” which were later converted into a direct money payment known as a “prestation.”

Wine and Spirits Tax.

The wine and spirits tax was eliminated by the revolutionary parliament of 1789 but progressively reinstated during the empire. It comprised four components: (1) a consumption tax (10 percent of the sale price); (2) a license fee paid by the vendor, depending on the number of inhabitants; (3) a tax on circulation, which depended on the département; and (4) an entry duty for the towns of more than four hundred inhabitants, depending on the sale price and the number of inhabitants. This tax raised fr. 104 million in 1848.

Octroi

The "octroi" or the tax on goods brought into a town or city was imposed on consumer goods such as wine, beer, food (except for flour, fruit, milk), firewood, animal fodder, and construction materials. All of these products had to pass through tollgates which had been built on the outskirts of the town or city where they could be inspected and taxed. For example, King Louis XVI had 57 "barrières d'octroi" (tollgates) built around the outskirts of the city of Paris for this purpose. In 1841 it was estimated that 1,420 communes throughout France imposed the octroi tax upon entry into their cities and towns, raising some fr. 75 million in revenue.[1236] The money was used to pay for the maintenance of roads, drains, lighting, and other public infrastructure. Although the Economists accepted the need for towns and cities to charge for these services they objected to the octroi because it was not uniform across the nation, that it fell more heavily of poorer consumers, that it was very costly to collect, and perhaps most importantly, it divided France into hundreds of separate internal customs barriers which interfered with internal free trade. Not surprisingly, the octroi were much disliked and in the early days of the French Revolution in July 1789 the tollgates of Paris were attacked and many burned to the ground. The Constituent Assembly abolished the octroi in January 1791, but they were re-established by the Directory in October 1798. Horace Say (1794-1860), the businessman son of the economist Jean-Baptiste Say fought unsuccessfully to have the octroi abolished during the 1840s.[1237] They were not abolished until 1943.

According to Parieu, in 1850 1,436 cities and towns levied the octrois tax which raised a total of 95 million francs. The city of Paris raised 37 million francs which made up 4/5 of the city’s revenue.[1238] In 1845 the city of Paris imposed an octroi (entry tax) on all goods which entered the city which raised fr. 49 million. Of this fr. 26.1 million were levied on wine and other alcoholic drinks which comprised 53% of the total. The tax on wine was the heaviest as a proportion of total value and the most unequally applied. Cheap table wine was taxed at the rate of 80-100% by value whilst superior quality wine was taxed at the rate of 5-6% by value.

Gabelle

The tax on salt, or "gabelle" as it was known under the old regime was a much hated tax on an item essential for preserving and flavoring food. It was abolished during the Revolution but revived during the Restoration. In 1816 it was set at 30 centimes per kilogramme and in 1847 it raised fr. 70.4 million. During the Revolution of 1848 it was reduced to 10 centimes per kilogramme. According to the Budget Papers of 1848 the French state raised fr. 58.2 million from tariffs on imported salt and fr. 13.4 million from the salt tax on internal sales.

"Taxe de quarante-cinq centimes" (the 45 centimes tax)

In the immediate aftermath of the February Revolution the government faced a budget crisis brought on by the decline in tax revenues and by the increased demands being placed upon it by new political groups. Louis-Antoine Pagès (Garnier-Pagès) (1803-1878), a member of the Provisional Government and soon afterwards Mayor of Paris, was able to pass a new "temporary" tax law on March 16, 1848 which increased direct taxes on things such as land, moveable goods, doors and windows, and trading licenses, by 45%. It was known as the "taxe de quarante-cinq centimes" (the 45 centimes tax) and was deeply unpopular, prompting revolts and protests in the south west of France.

Indirect Taxes and the “Droits réunis” (combined taxes)

Many indirect taxes on consumer goods were abolished in the early years of the Revolution only to be reintroduced by Napoleon who centralized their collection in 1804 by a single administrative body under the name of "droits réunis" (combined duties). In the Restoration the Charter of 1814 promised to abolish both the "droits réunis" and conscription but these promises were not kept. The old indirect taxes were just renamed as "contributions indirectes" (indirect taxes or “contributions”) although they were imposed at a slightly reduced rate. In 1848 the state received fr. 307.9 million in indirect "contributions" (taxes) out of a total of fr. 1.391 billion, or 22% of all revenue. These taxes were levied on drink, salt, sugar, tobacco, gun powder, and other goods.

The “Prestation” and the “Corvée”

Under the old regime the most hated of the taxes imposed on the peasantry were the forced labor obligations or "corvées” which required local farmers to work a certain number of days every year (8) for their local lord or on various local and national road works. These were repealed and reinstated repeatedly over a period of about 60 years beginning with Turgot's ordinances of March 1776. Forced labor obligations were reintroduced by Napoleon in 1802 under a new name "prestations” and were limited to work on local not national roads. They were abolished again in 1818 only to be reintroduced in 1824 (2 days per year) and increased to 3 days per year in 1836 with the further refinement that some individuals were able to buy their way out of service for a money payment. Courcelle Seneuil described them as "vicious” and "like the old debris from feudal times, like the last vestige of barbarism and of the forced communal organization of labor."[1239]

Wage Rates

Paris was a large city of just over 1 million people (London had 1.9 million) and was the major industrial area in the country. Paris-based industry (mostly located on the right bank of the Seine river) had about 65,000 businesses which employed a total of 343,000 people on an average wage of 3 fr. 80 c. per day. About one third were women (112,891) and about 6% (19,000) were young apprentices. A few years after the revolution Horace Say collected data on the average daily wages of 13 groups of workers in the Paris area, including unskilled labourers who earned 2.50 to 3 fr per day; printers 3.50 fr.; tailors 4 fr.; metal workers 4.25 fr.; textile factory workers 4.30 fr.; and stone masons 5 fr. A young printer, for example, might earn less than 3 fr. per day (probably being being paid on a daily basis), and worked 6 days a week for 10-12 hours per day. After a few years he might move onto a yearly agreement with the possibility of eventually earning the industry average in the printing industry of 4 fr. 18 c. which was quite high compared to the lowest rates which were earned in the textile industry of 3 fr. 34 c. per day.[1240]

Welfare Office (Bureau de bienfaisance)

Under the Old Regime the Catholic Church had a monopoly on the organisation of public welfare. This was taken away during the Revolution and the Law of 1796 created in its place a system of Welfare Offices (Bureaux de bienfaisance) whose function was to distribute assistance to the poor, orphaned children, and the sick. Money from a tax on the sale of tickets to various forms of entertainment was used to fund the Offices. In 1847 there were 9,336 Welfare Offices in communes across France covering about 16.5 million inhabitants out of a total population of 36 million people. Money raised for distribution to the poor was about 15 million francs per annum for the period 1843-1847. The bulk of the money was used to buy food. Smaller amounts were used to buy cloths and fuel for heating. In 1847 1,185,632 individual were given assistances amounting to 14fr. 20c. on average.[1241]


16. Appendix 3: French Government’s Budgets for Fiscal Years 1848 and 1849

Overview of the Growth of the French State in the 19th Century

To get the French Government Budget figures for 1848-49 in perspective we to have some idea of how large the total French economy was at the time and what proportion of it went through the hands of the French state (central, departmental, and communal). Exact figures are hard to come by and most historians use the data collected by J.C. Toutain in his 1987 monograph "Le Produit Intérieur Brut de la France de 1789 à 1982" (revised slightly in 1990). We have supplemented that with additional data provided by Bonney in “The Apogee and Fall of the French Rentier Regime, 1801-1914” (2010).[1242]

These modern figures are comparable to the figures provided by the economists working in the 1840s from official government budget papers which we list below. I believe the discrepancies come from the fact that the economists were using budget figures for the central government and did not take into account local government and city tax collection such as the octroi tolls. What the modern figures provide which these older ones do not is some rough idea of how large the French economy was (GDP) and what the share of total output was provided by agriculture, industry, and other sectors (such as services).

In summary, total government expenditure at this time was about 1,287 million francs which constituted about 9.46% of French GDP (which was about 13,605 million francs).[1243] Of this total output, about 39% came from agriculture, 38% from industry, and 24% from other activities such as services.[1244] According to OECD figures for 2015 general government spending as a percentage of GDP for France was 56.6%.[1245]

Over the course of the 19th century the share of the total economy of government expenditure ranged from a high of about 12% after the fall of Napoleon's Empire in 1815 and settled at between 9-10% for the next 50 years until it doubled after 1870 (to about 18%) as a result of the Paris Commune and the Franco-Prussian War. In the thirty year period between 1880 and 1914 government expenditure remained fairly steady at the higher rate of about 16-14% (it was falling slightly). Taking the 1850 level as a benchmark (1,200 m. or 9.4%) government expenditure had tripled to about 3,600 m. by 1894, and quadrupled to 4,800 m. by 1913/14 on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War. During the same period the population of France had increased from 36 m. in 1846 to 41.6 m. in 1914, or an increase of 15.5%. However, between 1850 and 1913/14 government spending had increased by 370%.

Sources

The bulk of the information for 1848 comes from M. de Colmont, “Philosophie de budget,” pp. 76-109 and “Budget rectifiée de l’exercice 1848,” pp. 110-20 in AEPS pour 1849 (1849); “Budget de 1848,” pp. 29-51 in AEPS pour 1848 (1848).

For 1849 it comes from Alphonse Courtois, “Le budget de 1849” in AEPS pour 1850 (1850), pp. 18-28. The 1849 Budget report lacks some details which are available in the 1848 Budget report so we have added these were necessary. Additional material comes from Charles Coquelin’s article on the “Budget” in the DEP (1852) and the Dictionnaire des Finances, ed. Léon Say (1894).

A. Bernard, “Résumé des Budgets de la France de 1814 à 1847” in the Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1849. 6e Année (Guillaumin, 1848), pp. 67-76.

Dictionnaire des Finances, publié sous la direction de M. Léon Say, par MM. Louis Foyot et A. Lanjalley (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1889, 1894). 2 vols. Tome I. -A-D. Tome II. -E-Z. See especially the article on “Budget général de l’État," section 13 “Monarchie de Juillet (1830-1848)," vol. 1, pp. 572-77, and section 14 “Seconde République (1848-1852), pp. 577-79.

Charles Coquelin, “Budget,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 224-35. Coquelin provides information for the years 1850 and 1851 for France, and information about the budgets for Britain, USA, Austria, Prussia, and Belgium.

List of Tables:

•    Table 1. Summary of Expenditure and Income.

•    Table 2. Summary of Expenditure.

•    Table 3. Details of Expenditure.

•    Table 4. Summary of Revenue.

•    Table 5. Details of Revenue.

•    Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services.

•    Table 7. Expenditure by the Ministry of the Interior in 1848.

•    Table 8. Details of Expenditure for Section IV: Costs of Administering and Collecting Taxes and Duties.

Table 1. Summary of Expenditure and Income.

[All amounts are in Francs.]

 

1848

1849

Expenditure

1,446,210,170

1,572,571,069

Income

1,391,276,510

1,411,732,007

Deficit

54,933,660

160,839,062

Data were taken from the following articles and corrected where necessary:

“Budget de 1848,” AEPS pour 1848, pp. 29-51.

“Budget de 1849,” in AEPS pour 1850, pp. 18-28.

Table 2. Summary of Expenditure.

 

1848

1849

I. Public Debt

384,346,191

455,143,796

II. Grants to Government Bodies

14,922,150

9,608,288

III. Ministerial Services*

731,335,104

882,057,325

IV. Administrative Costs*

136,892,495

155,265,320

V. Reimbursements, Subsidies

74,185,730

70,496,340

VI. Extraordinary Items

84,528,500

 

Total

1,426,210,170

1,572,571,069

“Budget de 1848” in AEPS pour 1848, p. 41.

“Budget de 1849” in AEPS pour 1850, p. 18.

Table 3. Details of Expenditure .

 

1848

1849

I. Public Debt

384,346,191

455,143,796

Consolidated debt

291,287,951

300,789,006

Other

 

63,795,490

Loans for canals and other works

9,110,300

 

Floating debt interest

 

23,000,000

Other interest payments

29,000,000

8,960,300

For pensions

54,947,940

58,599,000

II. Grants to Nat. Assembly, Executive Office

14,922,150

9,608,288

Civil List

13,300,000

 

Chamber of Peers

790,000

 

Chamber of Deputies

832,150

 

National Assembly

 

8,362,688

Executive

 

1,245,600

III. Ministerial Services*

731,335,104

882,057,325

Justice

26,739,095

26,460,230

Religion

39,564,833

41,066,393

Foreign Affairs

8,885,422

7,241,367

Public Education

18,038,033

21,751,820

Interior

116,564,738

128,951,534

Agriculture and Commerce

14,384,500

17,385,823

Public Works

110,922,050

157,746,633

War

322,010,382

346,319,558

Navy and Colonies

138,540,895

119,206,857

Finance

17,753,136

15,927,110

(Less supplemental expenditure from previous years)

82,067,980

 

IV. Administrative Costs*

136,892,495

155,265,320

V. Reimbursements, Subsidies

74,185,730

70,496,340

VI. Extraordinary Items

84,528,500

 

Total

1,426,210,170

1,572,571,069

“Budget de 1848” in AEPS pour 1848, p. 29-41.

“Budget de 1849” in AEPS pour 1850, pp. 18-23.

Table 4. Summary of Revenue.

 

1848

1849

I. Direct Taxes *

420,669,956

426,040,014

II. Registrations, Stamp Duty, Public Property *

263,359,490

234,098,296

III. Forests and Fisheries

38,395,700

27,072,100

IV. Customs, Salt Monopoly *

202,112,000

156,823,000

V. Indirect Taxes *

307,962,000

287,696,000

VI. Post Office *

51,738,000

49,876,000

VII. Diverse Revenue

47,053,466

42,869,234

VIII. Diverse Products

19,463,398

28,423,000

IX. Extraordinary Resources *

20,298,500

158,834,363

(adjustment for discrepancy in totals)

20,224,000

 

Total

1,391,276,510

1,411,732,007

“Budget de 1848” in AEPS pour 1848, p. 41.

“Budget de 1849” in AEPS pour 1850, p. 18.

Table 5. Details of Revenue .

Source of Income

1848

1849

General Total Revenue (including debt reserve)

1,371,052,010

1,411,732,007

Total Income from Taxes and Charges (my calculation differs from that in the Annuaire by 20,224,000)

1,350,754,010

 

I. Direct Taxes

420,669,956

426,040,014

Land Tax

279,456,080

281,274,204

Personal & Property Tax

59,313,060

60,113,740

Door & Window Tax

34,796,826

35,655,470

Trading Licences

46,310,100

48,190,340

Other Items

793,890

806,260

II. Registrations, Stamp Duty, Public Property

263,359,490

234,098,296

Registrations, fees, levies

216,324,000

179,424,000

Stamp duty

40,556,000

29,206,000

Sale of land

3,282,300

3,091,316

Sale of other property

2,123,500

2,236,500

Other

1,073,690

911,480

Additional stamp duty

 

19,229,000

III. Forests and Fishery

38,395,700

27,072,100

Sale of wood

33,548,500

16,770,100

Fishing rights

3,069,200

3,092,400

Fees for forrest administration

1,778,000

1,000,000

Other

 

1,209,600

Additional wood sales

 

5,000,000

IV.  Customs, Salt Monopoly

202,112,000

156,823,000

Import Duty

105,888,000

91,313,000

Import Duty Colonial Sugar

38,458,000

35,000,000

Import Duty Foreign Sugar

11,270,000

1,570,000

Export duties

1,919,000

2,066,000

Navigation rights

3,591,000

2,847,000

Other duties

2,833,000

2,874,000

Imported Salt Tax

38,153,000

21,153,000

V.  Indirect Taxes

307,962,000

287,696,000

Alcohol Tax

103,603,000

90,000,000

Additional salt duties

13,346,000

4,657,000

Domestic Sugar Tax

20,840,000

29,168,000

Other duties

43,310,000

36,500,000

Tobacco Sales

120,000,000

120,000,000

Sale of gunpowder

6,863,000

7,371,000

VI.  Post Office

51,738,000

49,876,000

Letter Tax

46,542,000

44,829,000

Money orders

673,000

1,000,000

Fees for transporting gold and silver

214,000

210,000

Mail coach fees

2,059,000

1,700,000

Packet boat fees

1,096,000

1,102,000

Foreign transit fees

1,108,000

1,000,000

Other fees

46,000

35,000

VII. Diverse Revenue

47,053,466

42,869,234

VIII.    Various Products from the Budget

19,463,398

28,423,000

IX.   Extraordinary Resources

20,298,000

158,834,363

Supplement

20,298,000

20,000,000

Debt reserve

 

138,834,363

Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services.

Ministry

1848

1849

I. Justice

26,739,095

26,460,230

II. Foreign Affairs

8,885,422

7,241,367

III.   Public Education and Religion

   

Public Education

18,038,033

21,751,820

University

 

17,910,452

Sciences and Letters

 

3,343,676

Admin, etc.

 

497,692

Religion

39,564,833

41,066,393

Catholic

 

38,917,983

Non-Catholic

 

1,389,584

Admin

 

229,295

In Algeria

 

529,531

IV.  Interior

a.       [this section is not itemized in 1849 Budget but is in the 1848 Budget. See Table below for details.]

116,564,738

128,951,534

V. Agriculture and Commerce

14,384,500

17,385,823

VI. Public Works

110,922,050

157,746,633

Roads and Bridges

 

37,265,000

Navigation

 

31,100,750

Railways

 

74,788,750

Admin

 

8,936,540

Mines

 

40,000

Civil Buildings

 

5,130,593

Other

 

485,000

VII. War

322,010,382

346,319,558

VIII. Navy and Colonies

138,540,895

119,206,857

Navy

 

98,893,647

Colonies

 

20,313,210

IX. Finance

17,765,136

15,927,110

(less roll-over funds from previous year)

-82,079,980

 

Total

731,335,104

882,057,325

“Budget de 1848” in AEPS pour 1848, pp. 30-39.

“Budget de 1849” in AEPS pour 1850, pp. 19-21.

Table 7. Expenditure by the Ministry of the Interior in 1848.

Ministry of the Interior

1848

Central Administration

1,328,000

Diverse Services (telegraph, National Guard)

2,278,500

Fine Arts

2,614,900

Welfare & Subsidies

3,440,500

Administration of the Departments

8,527,200

Prisons

7,200,000

Royal Court

565,548

Ordinary Departmental Expenditure

32,843,040

Optional Departmental Expenditure

13,131,710

Extraordinary & Special Departmental Expenditure

43,633,300

Other

1,002,040

Total

116,564,738

“Budget de 1848” in AEPS pour 1848, pp. 32-34.

Table 8. Details of Expenditure for Section IV: Costs of Administering and Collecting Taxes and Duties.

Item

1848

1849

I. Direct Taxes

17,323,210

17,018,362

II. Registrations, Stamp Duty, Public Property

11,344,700

11,359,100

III. Forests

5,433,500

6,673,900

III. Customs

26,353,650

25,790,720

IV. Indirect Taxes, Gunpowder, Tobacco

61,937,258

60,331,130

V. Post Office

34,500,177

34,092,108

Total

156,892,495

155,265,320

“Budget de 1848” in AEPS pour 1848, pp. 39-40.

“Budget de 1849” in AEPS pour 1850, pp. 22-23.


17. Appendix 4: A Brief Chronology of the 1848 Revolution and the Second Republic

This chronology of the main events of the Revolution and Second Republic is most detailed for the years 1848 and 1849 when Molinari and the economists were most active in politics. This is also the period when Les Soirées were conceived, written, published, and discussed by his colleagues.

1848

January

•     publication of Bastiat’s second series of Economic Sophisms

•     14 Jan. - a political banquet scheduled for this date is forbidden by PM Guizot

February

•     21 Feb. - the banquet was rescheduled for 22 Feb. (to mark George Washington’s birthday) to be accompanied by demonstrations. It is called off after pressure from the government.

•     22-24 Feb. - the Three Revolutionary Days which overthrew the July Monarchy of Louis Philippe and the government of Guizot.

•     22 Feb. - crowds of protesters gather and march on the Place de la Concorde where they are met by troops. The National Guard is called out but they are sympathetic to the demonstrators and call for the resignation of Guizot.

•     23 Feb. - demonstrations continue throughout the day and Prime Minister Guizot resigns in the afternoon sparking a popular protest which was put down by the army with about 50 deaths

•     24 Feb.- barricades spring up in the streets of Paris. There are further resignations by members of the government and reform-minded politicians like Adolphe Thiers refuse to accept positions in the government. Around midday the Tuileries Palace is attacked by demonstrators forcing Louis Philippe to abdicate in favour of his 9 year old grandson. Some of the insurgents and reform-minded politicians declare the formation of a provisional government and the royal family flees the city. Insurgents seize the Hôtel de Ville and form a provisional government which consisted of 12 men, Dupont de l'Eure, Lamartine, Crémieux, Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, "Albert," Marie, Arago, Marrast, Flocon, Garnier-Pagès, Pyat.

•     25 Feb. - declaration of the Second Republic by Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin. Formation of an armed guard of 24,000 unemployed workers; declaration of “the right to work."

•     26 February - Early legislation included a declaration of “the right to work,” the formation of the National Workshops, the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes, amnesty for violations of the censorship laws, the abolition of noble titles, confiscation of the property of the monarch.

•     26 Feb. - 28 March - Gustave de Molinari (with Frédéric Bastiat, and Hippolyte Castille) founds the revolutionary magazine La République française which they hand out on street corners and post on walls in Paris.

•     28 Feb. - creation of the “Commission du gouvernement pour les travailleurs” (Luxembourg Commission) headed by Louis Blanc which will organize the National Workshops

March

•     at its monthly meeting the French Free Trade Association decides to wrap up its affairs and to concentrate on opposing socialism. Their journal Libre-Échange closes.

•     2 March - the working day is reduced to 10 hours in Paris and 11 hours elsewhere; declaration of universal manhood suffrage in elections.

•     4 March - laws guaranteeing freedom of the press and association

•     5 March - the formation of a Constituent Assembly is announced to draw up a new constitution; elections for 9 April by universal manhood suffrage are announced. Bastiat begins campaigning for the seat representing the département of Les Landes.

•     6 March - the creation of the National Workshops

•     9 March - abolition of prison for debtors

•     12 March - abolition of corporal punishment

•     15 March - the central Bank suspends specie payments; the government creates new 100 Franc notes to ease the financial crisis and increases indirect taxes by 45% (the so-called 45 centimes tax)

•     15 March - the editors of the JDE (Garnier and Guillaumin) stated their support for the new Republic and vowed to continue lobbying for economic liberalization under the new regime. Bastiat wrote the opening article “Funestes illusions” (Disastrous Illusions) in which he warned about the false hopes the revolutionaries inspired in the people that the government could solve all their problems. The JDE would appear twice a month between April and November so that political events could be covered more quickly by the journal. Molinari takes an active part in writing these fortnightly “Chroniques.”

•     17 March - following demonstrations the government agrees to postpone the elections until 23 April so Blanqui and his supporters have more time to appeal to the voters

•     18-24 March - outbreak of revolutions in Berlin, Venice, Milan, and Piedmont

•     31 March - first meeting of the “Club Lib” (Club de la liberté du travail) to debate socialists about the merits of “the right to work” legislation, which Molinari attends.

April

•     the new minister of Education gets the economist Michel Chevalier sacked from his teaching position. The Political Economy Society lobbies intensively to get him re-instated.

•     16 April - the last issue of the French Free Trade Association’s journal Libre-Échange appears. At this time it was being edited by Charles Coquelin as Bastiat had left to focus on running for election in Les Landes.

•     21 April - abolition of the salt tax

•     23-24 April - elections for the Constituent Assembly by universal manhood suffrage (about 9 million voters). Success of moderate republicans and poor showing by the radical socialist republicans like Blanqui and Cabet. A number of economists and their supporters get elected: Bastiat (Les Landes), Léon Faucher (Marne), Louis Wolowski (La Seine), Béranger, Gustave de Beaumont (La Somme), Prosper de Hauranne, Louis Reybaud, Alexis de Tocqueville. Bastiat gets appointed vice-president of the Assembly’s Finance Committee.

•     27 April - abolition of slavery signed by Victor Schoelcher

May

•     4 May - Constituent Assembly meets and the Second Republic is formally proclaimed

•     9-10 May - the Const. Ass. elects an Executive Commission made up of Arago, Garnier-Pagès, Marie, Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin to replace the provisional government. Ministers are appointed on 11 May.

•     15 May - Blanqui and other radicals attempt to seize control of the Const. Ass. but are defeated by the National Guard and are arrested. The right is encouraged to begin dismantling the National Workshops.

•     15 May - Bastiat writes one his many anti-socialist pamphlets for the JDE - “Propriété et loi” (Property and Law) directed against the ideas of Louis Blanc

•     16 May - the Luxembourg Commission is closed down.

•     17 May - A Constitutional Committee of 18 members is created by the Constit. Ass (including Lamennais and Tocqueville) to draw up a new constitution. It meets between 9 May and 17 June. Gen. Cavaignac is appointed Minster of War.

June

•     Bastiat writes “Individualisme et fraternité” (Individualism and Fraternity) - directed against Louis Blanc.

•     2 June - the law exiling Louis Bonaparte is repealed allowing him to return to France

•     4-5 June - supplementary elections see Thiers, Proudhon, Hugo and Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte elected

•     11 June - 13 July - Gustave de Molinari (with Frédéric Bastiat, Charles Coquelin, Alcide Fonteyraud, and Joseph Garnier) founds journal Jacques Bonhomme to oppose socialism and defend free markets and limited government on the streets of Paris

•     15 June - Molinari publishes anonymously (“Un Rêveur”) in the JDE an appeal to socialists to join forces with the economists and liberals in pursuing common goals of reform.

•     15 June - Bastiat writes one his many anti-socialist pamphlets for the JDE - “Justice et fraternité" (Justice and Fraternity) directed against the ideas of Leroux.

•     21 June - abolition of the National Workshops program

•     23-26 June - the “June Days” riots in Paris which are suppressed by General Cavaignac with loss of thousands of lives; 24 June declaration of “state of siege” (martial law) which lasts until 19 October.

•     28 June - Cavaignac takes over functions of the Executive Commission, the Minister of War is named president of the Council; suspension of freedom of the press, closure of the political clubs.

July

•     11 July - reintroduction of “caution money” (bond) for newspapers

•     24 July - Bastiat writes an article “Propriété et spoliation” (Property and Plunder) in the Journal des débats - directed against Considerant and against critics of ownership of land and rent.

•      

•     28 July - regulations introduced to limit the activity of political clubs and other public meetings

August

•     15 Aug. - Molinari writes an article in JDE criticizing two speeches in the Assembly given by Proudhon and Theirs in July on the morality of interest and rent.

•     25 Aug. - Constit. Ass. votes 493-292 to arrest and try Louis Blanc for his revolutionary activities. Hugo and Bastiat vote against this.

•     28 Aug. - postal reform with the introduction of postage stamps

•     29 Aug. - the Constitutional Commission agrees to remove the phrase “le droit au travail” from the new constitution

September

•     publication in the JDD of Bastiat’s essay “The State”

•     4 Sept. to 1 Nov. - intensive discussion in the Const. Ass. of the final draft of the new constitution

•     9 Sept. - re-introduction of the 12 hour working day

•     13 Sept. - important speech given in the Assembly by Thiers on the right to work and property rights, which was later published as a book. Molinari criticizes Thiers’ defense of property in the JDE (Jan. 1849) as inadequate

•     17 Sept. - in a bi-election Louis Napoléon is elected in 5 Départements

October

•     19 October - ending of the state of siege (Martial law)

November

•     2-4 November - final reading of the new Constitution which is passed 739 to 30, promulgated 12 November. An amendment to include in the new constitution a clause defending “the right to work” is defeated. President is elected for 4 years by universal suffrage and has right to name and sack ministers. One Assembly is elected for 3 years and can pass legislation.

•     Garnier publishes a collection of the main speeches in the Assembly on the right to work legislation for Guillaumin.

•     15 Nov. - assassination of Rossi (an economist) who was French ambassador to Rome.

•     20 Nov. Louis Napoleon publishes his electoral manifesto

December

•     10 December - election of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte of the “Party of Order” as president of the Republic; 5.4 million votes to Cavaignac’s 1.4 million votes.

•     15 Dec. - Molinari (anonymously) writes an assessment of the first year of the revolution in the JDE from the perspective of the economists. He blames the partial success of the socialists on the woeful knowledge of economics held by most French people which could only be overcome by a concerted education program.

1849

January

•     Bastiat writes one his many anti-socialist pamphlets - Protectionnisme et communisme directed at the protectionist Mimerel committee

•     4 Jan. - commission under Falloux to study education issues

•     15 Jan. - Molinari critically reviews Thiers book on property for the JDE. Argues that his defense of property is inadequate and favors the unjust status quo. Molinari argues that considerable reform of French society is still needed if the legitimate grievances of the workers are to be met.

February

•     Bastiat writes one his many anti-socialist pamphlets - Capital et Rente directed against the ideas of Proudhon - and another Paix et Liberté, ou le Budget républicain - directed at critics of his proposed budget cuts

•     15 Feb. - publication in JDE of Molinari’s “De la production de la sécurité” which was to become S11 in Sept. 1849

March

•     Bastiat writes a pamphlet - Incompatibilités parlementaires directed at bureaucrats and civil servants who wanted to continue working for the state if they were elected to the Assembly

•     3 March - beginning of an cholera epidemic which lasts until Sept killing 16,000 people including the young economist Fonteyraud in August.

•     28 March - trial and imprisonment for three years of Proudhon for his writings critical of Louis Napoleon

April

•     Bastiat publishes one of his anti-socialist pamphlets, “Damn Money!” (April 1849) - directed at general misperceptions about the nature of money

•     3 April - the revolutionaries Albert and Auguste Blanqui are sentenced to deportation and 10 years imprisonment respectively.

•     15 April - Molinari favorably reviews Harriet Martineau’s book of economic popularization for the JDE, perhaps giving Molinari the idea to write Les Soirées.

•     16 April - money is voted in the Constituent Assembly to send French troops to defend republicans in Rome against the Pope supported by Austrian forces.

May

•     the DEP project was announced in the May 1849 catalog of the Guillaumin publishing firm

•     13 May - elections for the National Assembly are held. The party of Order win 450 seats and the radical socialists 180. Bastiat is reelected to represent Les Landes.

•     28 May - first sitting of the Legislative Assembly

June

•     2 June - Tocqueville is appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new ministry

•     13 June - violent protests take place in Paris organized by the radical left (Les Montagnards) against the French government’s decision to support the Pope against republicans like Mazzini in Italy. Paris and Lyon are put under marital law. The rioters are suppressed by the army with minimal loss of life (8).

•     15 June - crackdown on presses which publish republican newspapers

•     15 June - Molinari writes an article in the JDE critical of Proudhon’s and Bastiat’s theory of rent

•     18 June - a new education law is presented to the Assembly

•     19 June - the right of assembly is limited. The government can suspend any political club or group for a year.

July

•     27 July - additional laws limiting the press are passed, such as the need for pre-approval before printing.

August

•     15 Aug. - Molinari reviews Dunoyer’s book on the 1848 revolution and the rise of despotism for the JDE in which he explores in more detail his developing theory of class. He also writes an article on the political economy of French theaters concerning their subsidy and censorship by the state (with a second in November).

•     21 Aug. - opening of the International Peace Congress in Paris. It lasts until 24 Aug. Hugo is the President, Bastiat gives an important speech, the event is covered by Molinari and Garnier for the economists.

September

•     Les Soirées is most probably published in Sept. It was announced as being for sale for in the Guillaumin catalog for October for 3 francs 50 centimes, which is nearly a day’s wage for a skilled worker

•     15 Sept. - Molinari writes a long review for the JDE on the Peace Congress which he had attended in Paris as the official representative of the SEC.

•     17 Sept. - Hugo presents a proposal to the Council of State on the liberty of the French theatre

October

•     beginning of a long exchange of letters in Proudhon’s journal between him and Bastiat on the nature of interest and credit which lasts until Feb. 1850 and is published as a book “Gratuité du crédit. Discussion entre M. Fr. Bastiat et M. Proudhon” (Free Credit. A Discussion between M. Fr. Bastiat and M. Proudhon)

•     10 Oct. - in its October meeting the SEP critically discusses Molinari’s ideas rejecting his absolute opposition to the state expropriating private property for public works and his ideas on the private production of security.

•     31 Oct. - Louis Napoléon dissolves the ministry and stacks it with his own supporters. Catholics are excluded.

November

•     15 Nov. - Charles Coquelin critically reviews Molinari’s book Les Soirées for the JDE

•     27 Nov. - a law banning strikes is re-introduced

1850-52

1850

•     31 May - law passed restricting the size of the franchise by about 1/3 (from 9.6 million to 6.8 million)

•     16 July - law passed restricting the press

•     summer - Louis Napoléon campaigns to have the limit of one term lifted so he can stand again for President of the Republic

1851

•     10 January - Louis Napoléon replaces key generals in the Army and the National Guard with his own appointees

•     24 January - Louis Napoléon forms a new government with a smaller number of ministers which does not include the President of the Council

•     19 July - the Assembly refuses to change the law restricting the President to one term in office

•     20 August - Louis Napoléon begins planning a coup d’état

•     4 October - Louis Napoléon proposes to change the electoral law of 31 May restricting the size of the franchise

•     13 November - Assembly refuses to change the 31 May electoral law

•     2 December - coup d’état of Louis Napoléon, the Legislative Assembly is dissolved, 300 hundred Deputies who opposed Louis Napoléon’s actions are arrested (they are released on Dec. 5)

•     8 Dec. - state of siege (martial law) is declared

•     21 Dec. - a plebiscite (referendum) ratifies the coup d’état with 92% in favour.

1852

•     11 Jan. - dissolution of the National Guard which has republican sympathies

•     14 Jan. - proclamation of a new Constitution, the re-establishment of universal manhood suffrage, executive power and proposing laws is placed in the hands of the elected president for a period of 10 years

•     29 Feb. - elections to the Legislative Body are controlled by the President and his Prefects resulting in overwhelming victory for the official candidates

•     12 Aug. - death of Charles Coquelin the editor of the DEP; he had completed work on vol. 1 which appeared sometime in 1852, but had not finished work on vol. 2 which appeared in 1853.

•     7 Nov. - the Senate votes to re-establish the Empire

•     21-22 Nov. - a plebiscite approves the reestablishment of the Empire

•     2 Dec. - Proclamation of the Second Empire with Louis Napoleon declared to be Napoleon III.


18. Glossary of Persons

Arago, Étienne Vincent (1802-1892)

Étienne Arago was the youngest of four Arago brothers. His oldest brother,  François Arago (1786-1853) was a famous astronomer and physicist, a politician who in February 1848 became Minister of War, the Navy and Colonies and played an important role in the abolition of slavery in the French colonies, and an author who edited the works of Condorcet between 1847 and 1849; Jean Arago (1788-1836) was a general in the French Army who saw service in Mexico; and Jacques Arago (1790-1855) who was a writer and an explorer. Étienne attended a Benedictine school in Sorèze in the south of France at the same time Bastiat was there, so Molinari may well have met him in Paris through Bastiat. In the 1820s Étienne was active in the Carbonari republican movement and began writing vaudeville plays which were quite successful in Paris. He took part in the 1830 Revolution which saw the overthrow of the Bourbon monarch King Charles X. He acquired some notoriety for his anti-aristocrat play Les Aristocraties (The Aristocracies) (1847) which appeared the year before the 1848 revolution and he was active in the “political banquets” campaign of late 1847. When the Revolution broke out in February he became part of the Provisional Government under Lamartine, rising to become the Minister of the Post Office from which he introduced the penny-post system in France. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly in April 1848 along with his brother François. Because of his participation in the leftist revolt in May 1849 and his opposition to the “Prince-President” Louis Napoléon he was sentenced to exile and did not return to France until an amnesty was issued in 1859. He served briefly as Mayor of Paris during the 1870 Revolution but resigned and spent the rest of his life writing and working as a curator at the Museum of the Luxembourg Palace.

Arago, François (1786-1853)

François Arago was the eldest of four successful brothers, Jean Arago (1788-1836) a General who saw service in Mexico, Jacques Arago (1790-1855) a writer and explorer, and Étienne Arago (1802-1892) who was a playwright and republican politician (who attended a Benedictine school in Sorèze at the same time Bastiat was there). François was a famous astronomer and physicist whose work was noticed by Laplace who got him the position of secretary and librarian at the Paris Observatory. At the young age of 23 he was appointed to the Academy of Sciences (1809) and in 1812 he became a professor of analytical geometry at the l'École polytechnique. François was also active in republican politics during the July Monarchy where he was an elected Deputy for its entire duration. After 1841 he became a vocal critique of Adolphe Thiers’ plans to build a fortified wall around the entire city of Paris. After the outbreak of the Revolution in February 1848 he became Minister of War, the Navy and Colonies and played an important role in the abolition of slavery in the French colonies. Refusing to swear an oath to Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, he resigned his position and was sent into exile. In addition to his theoretical scientific works, he wrote popular science books and edited the collected works of Condorcet which appeared in a multi-volume collection in 1847. See Oeuvres de Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat de Condorcet, ed. A. Condorect O'Connor and François Arago (1847, 1849).

Bastiat, Frédéric (1801-1850)

Bastiat was a pivotal figure in French classical liberalism in the mid-19th century. He suddenly emerged from the south west province of Les Landes to assume leadership of the fledgling French free trade movement in 1846 which he modeled on that of Richard Cobden’s Anti-Corn Law League in England. Bastiat then turned to a brilliant career as an economic journalist, debunking the myths and misconceptions people held on protectionism in particular and government intervention in general, which he called “sophisms”or “fallacies”[Economic Sophisms. Part I (1846), Economic Sophisms. Part II (1848)]. When revolution broke out in February 1848 Bastiat was elected twice to the Chamber of Deputies where he served on the powerful Finance Committee where he struggled to bring government expenditure under control. He confounded his political opponents with his consistent libertarianism: on the one hand he denounced the socialists for their economic policies, but took to the streets to prevent the military from shooting them during the riots which broke out in June 1848. In the meantime he was suffering from a debilitating throat condition which severely weakened him and led to his early death on Christmas Eve in 1850. Knowing he was dying, Bastiat attempted to complete his magnum opus on economic theory, his Economic Harmonies (1850). In this work he showed the very great depth of his economic thinking and made advances which heralded the Austrian school of economics which emerged later in the century. Bastiat to the end was an indefatigable foe of political privilege, unaccountable monarchical power, the newly emergent socialist movement, and above all, the vested interests who benefited from economic protectionism. He was a giant of 19th century classical liberalism. Other important works include Cobden and the League (1845), Property and Plunder (1848), The State (1848), Damn Money! (1849), What is Seen and What is Not Seen (1850), and The Law (1850).

Bastiat was the oldest member of a group of four young men from the provinces which Gérard Minart has called the “Four Musketeers” of French political economy. [1246] They went to Paris between 1819 and 1845 and transformed French political economy with their new ideas and organizing abilities. The four musketeers were the publisher and organizer Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin (1801-1864), the free trade activist, journalist, politician, and economist Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850), the industrialist, economist and editor Charles Coquelin (1802-1852), and Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912).

Baudrillart, Henri (1821-1892)

Baudrillart was a professor of political economy at the Collège de France (where he worked with Michel Chevalier), the editor of the Journal des Économiste between 1855 and 1864, was elected to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1863, and then appointed professor of political economy at the École nationale des ponts et chaussées in 1881. His major works include Manuel d’économie politique (1857) and Études de philosophie morale et de l’économie politique, 2 vols. (1858). In addition to writing articles for the Journal des Économistes, he wrote for the Constitutionnel, the Journal des Débats, and the Revue des Deux Mondes. He also contributed articles to the Dictionnaire de l’Économie Politique (1852), the Nouveau Dictionnaire d’Économie Politique (1891), and the Dictionnaire général de la Politique (1873). His scholarly interests ranged broadly over the history of economic thought, the relationship between economics and moral philosophy, educational issues, and the history and economics of French agriculture.

Bazard, Saint-Armand (1791-1832)

Bazard was one of the founders of the liberal anti-Bourbon secret society, the Carbonari, in the 1820s before becoming associated with the Saint-Simonian school. He became the editor of the school's journal le Producteur (1825-1826) and the Globe (1831-32). Bazard published a book on the Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition. Première année. 1828-1829, (1831) and translated Jeremy Bentham's Defense of Usury (1787) in 1828.

Beaumont, Gustave de (1802-1866)

Beaumont was a magistrate in Verseilles and then Paris during the Restoration but was able to keep his post after the July Revolution of 1830. He accompanied Alexis de Tocqueville on a nine month trip to America in 1831 to observe the American prison system for the new French government which resulted in the book The Prison System of the United States (1833). Along the way they observed and collected material which would later produce Tocqueville’s book Democracy in America (1835, 1840) and Beaumont’s book Marie , or Slavery in the United States (1835). In 1836 he married the grand daughter of the marquis de Lafayette, Clémentine, and the following year he travelled with her to Ireland which resulted in L'Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse (1839). During the 1840s he was a member of the Chamber of Deputies and continued in office after the 1848 Revolution as vice-president of the Constituent Assembly where he supported the moderate constitutional republicans. During the Second Republic he also served as ambassador to London and Vienna. He was briefly arrested along with Tocqueville for opposing the coup d’état of Louis Napoleon in December 1852. He retied soon afterwards. One of his last tasks was to edit the collected works of Tocqueville (who died in 1859) which began to appear in print in 1864. He died before he could complete the project, which was continued by Clémentine.

Béranger, Pierre-Jean de (1780-1857)

Béranger was a poet and songwriter who rose to prominence during the Restoration period with his funny and clever criticisms of the monarchy and the church, which got him into trouble with the censors who imprisoned him for brief periods in the 1820s. Béranger came from a humble background and was apprenticed to a printer at the age of 14. Through the help and patronage of Napoleon’s brother Lucien, Béranger secured a job in the offices of the Imperial University of France and began writing his songs for purely private use, many of which circulated in manuscript form thereby creating an appreciative audience. The satire of Napoleon “Le Roi d’Yvetot” [The King of Yvetot] (1813) was particularly popular. He shot to fame with his first published collection of songs and poems in 1815 (Chansons morales et autres) and two more followed in 1821 and 1825.

His material was much in demand in the singing societies or “goguettes” which sprang up during the Restoration and the July Monarchy as a way of circumventing the censorship laws and the bans on political parties. After the appearance of his second volume in 1821 he was tried and convicted to 3 months imprisonment in Sainte-Pélagie. Another bout of imprisonment (this time 9 months in La Force) followed in 1828 when his 4th volume was published. Many of the figures who came to power after the July Revolution of 1830 were friends or acquaintances of Béranger and it was assumed he would be granted a sinecure in recognition of his critiques of the old monarchy, but he refused all government appointments in a stinging poem which he wrote in late 1830 called “Le Refus” (The Refusal).

Guillaumin had one of his earliest publishing successes with a 3 volume edition of Béranger’s poems in 1829 which sold very well after which Béranger and he became close friends. Béranger visited the offices of the Guillaumin firm frequently and that is where Molinari probably met him. He was sympathetic to free trade, wrote a poem about the heroism of smugglers "Les Contrebandiers” (1829), and even joined Bastiat’s Free Trade Association. Bastiat quoted his work frequently in the Economic Sophisms as Béranger’s songs were well-known to the audience Bastiat was trying to reach. Molinari also quotes an anti-monarchical poem by him at the end of Les Soirées, “La sainte Alliance des peuples” (The Holy Alliance of the People) (1818) and his poem “Les quatre âges historiques” (The Four Ages of History) in his article on “Paix-Guerre” (War and Peace) in the DEP.

At the age of 68 Béranger was overwhelmingly elected to the Constituent Assembly in April 1848 in which he sat for a brief period before resigning. He began writing as a firm supporter of Napoleon but later evolved into a more mainstream classical liberal in the 1840s.

Blaise, Adolphe Gustave (1811-86)

Blaise was a regular contributor to the Journal des économistes and other periodicals. With Joseph Garnier he edited a series of lectures given by Blanqui, Cours d’économie industrielle (1837-39), which he had given at the Conservatoire des arts et métiers. Blaise was one of the founders of Political Economy Society in 1842.

Blanc, Louis (1811-82)

Louis Blanc was a journalist and historian who was active in the socialist movement. Blanc founded the journal Revue du progrès and published therein articles that later became the influential pamphlet l’Organisation du travail (1839). In 1841 he published a very popular critique of the July Monarchy, Histoire de dix ans, 1830-1840 which went through many editions during the 1840s. During the 1848 revolution he became a member of the provisional government, headed the National Workshops, and debated Adolphe Thiers on the merits of the right to work in Le socialisme; droit au travail, réponse à M. Thiers (1848). In 1847 Blanc began work on a multi-volume history of the French Revolution, Histoire de la révolution française, two volumes of which had appeared when the February revolution of 1848 broke out. A second edition, of fifteen volumes, appeared in 1878. When his supporters invaded the Chamber of Deputies in May 1848 to begin a coup d’état in order to save the National Workshops from closing, they carried around the room on their shoulders. He was arrested, lost his parliamentary immunity, and was forced into exile in England.

Blanqui, Jérôme Adolphe (1798-1854)

Blanqui was a liberal economist; brother of the revolutionary socialist Auguste Blanqui. He became director of the prestigious École supérieure de commerce de Paris, succeeded Jean-Baptiste Say to the chair of political economy at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, and was the editor of the Journal des Économistes between 1842 and 1843 and often wrote articles under the nom de plume of “Adolphus." He was elected deputy representing the Gironde from 1846 to 1848. Among his many works on political economy and sociology are the Encyclopédie du commerçant (1839-41), Précis élementaire d’économie politique (1842), and Les classes ouvrières en France (1848).

Block, Maurice (1816-1901)

Block was born in Berlin and studied at the Universities of Bonn, Heidelberg, and Tübingen from which he received his doctorate. He moved to France in the mid-1840s in order to take up a position as a statistician in the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works (1844-1853) and then in the General Statistical Service (1853-1861). Block wrote mainly on agriculture, finance, and public administration during the 1860s and 1870s, before turning to the criticism of socialism in the 1890s. He was a prolific author of articles for magazines and journals such as the Revue des Deux Mondes, the Journal des Économistes, and the Journal des Débats and edited several important dictionaries and series such as the Annuaire de l’Économie politique et de la Statistique (1859-1879), the Dictionnaire de l’administration française (1856), the Dictionnaire générale de la politique (1st edition 1862-64, 2nd edition 1873), and the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique (1852-53). For the latter, Block wrote a huge number of biographies and bibliographical articles revealing his extraordinarily broad learning in political and economic matters across a number of languages. Block was elected to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in April 1880.

Bonald, Louis Gabriel Ambroise, Vicomte de (1754–1840)

Louis de Bonald (Louis Gabriel Ambroise, Vicomte de Bonald (1754–1840) was a conservative royalist politician and theocratic philosopher (believing in the divine right of kings and the inerrant word of God) . He was elected to the Estates General in 1789 but went into exile in Heidelberg rather than live in France during the revolution as it was passing laws dispossessing the Church of its political and economic power. While in exile he wrote Théorie du Pouvoir Politique et Religieux dans la Société Civile (1796). He retuned to France after Napoleon declared himself emperor and made piece with the Church with the Concordat of 1801. During the Restoration he was a Deputy in the Chamber of Deputies were he voted for stricter censorship and the death penalty for sacrilege against the Church. In 1823 he was made a Peer but resigned from public life when Louis Philippe came to the throne in the Revolution of 1830.

Bonaparte, Louis-Napoléon (1808-73)

Nephew of Napoléon Bonaparte, he was raised in Italy and became active in liberal Carbonari circles. Louis-Napoléon returned to France in 1836 and 1840 to head the Bonapartist groups seeking to install him on the throne. On both occasions he was unsuccessful. In December 1848 he was elected president of the Second Republic. Bastiat voted for his opponent the republican general Cavaignac and predicted in a letter written in January 1849 that Louis-Napoléon would seek to seize power in a coup d’état. In December 1851 he dissolved the Assembly and seized power in a coup d’état, following which he imposed strict censorship and the repression of his political opponents. The following year he drew up a new constitution which centralized power in his own hands and won a plebiscite that made him emperor of the Second Empire in December 1852. Louis-Napoléon was popular for his economic reforms, which were a mixture of popularism, Saint-Simonism, and liberalism. A free-trade treaty with England was signed in 1860 during his reign by Cobden and Chevalier. A disastrous war with Prussia in 1870 led to the ignominious collapse of his regime and a socialist uprising in Paris in March-May 1871. Molinari refused to live under President and then Emperor Napoléon so he went into voluntary exile in Brussels in 1852, not returning to Paris until the regime began to liberalize in the late 1860s. He wrote two books on Louis Napoléon, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel (1852) and Napoleon III publiciste (1861).

Bossuet, Jacques Bénigne (1627-1704)

Bossuet was Bishop of Meaux, a historian, court priest to King Louis XIV, and tutor to the dauphin (son of Louis XIV). He was a noted orator and writer whose sermons and orations were widely studied as models of French style by generations of French schoolchildren. In politics he was an intransigent Gallican Catholic, an opponent of Protestantism, and a supporter of the idea of the divine right of kings. He wrote a multi-volume universal history: Discours sur l'histoire universelle (1681).

Bourrienne, Louis-Antoine Fauvelet de (1769-1834)

Bourrienne was a school mate of Napoleon who later became Napoleon's personal secretary and wrote a 10 volume Memoir of his relationship with the Emperor. During the Restoration he supported the Bourbon monarchy, was a Deputy representing l'Yonne, became a Minister in 1822, and was a member of the official commission examining the law on customs, for which he wrote the official report, Rapport sur le projet de loi des douanes (1822). He was an ardent protectionist.

Bowring, Sir John (1792-1872)

Sir John Bowring (1792-1872) was an English businessman, Member of Parliament (Bolton 1841-49), political economist, translator, and the fourth Governor of Hong Kong (1854-59). He was a contributor to the Westminster Review during the 1820s in which he argued strongly for free trade and was also involved in many campaigns for political reform such as parliamentary and electoral reform, Catholic emancipation (he was a Unitarian), reform of the Poor Laws, open borders, abolition of the death penalty, an end to flogging in the British Army, and the introduction of decimal currency. As a friend of Bentham, he was asked by him to be his literary executor and edited a large 11 volume collection of Bentham’s works in 1843. During the 1830s and 1840s he wrote several Reports for the British government on the economic conditions in France, Italy, Prussia, Switzerland, Egypt and Syria. He also attended the important Congress of Economists held in Brussels in 1847 at which he met Molinari and possibly Karl Marx.

Cabet, Étienne (1788-1856)

Cabet was a lawyer and utopian socialist who coined the word “communism.” Between 1831 and 1834 he was a deputy in the Chamber, until he was forced into exile to Britain, where he came into contact with Robert Owen. Cabet advocated a society in which the elected representatives controlled all property that was owned in common by the community. He promoted his views in a journal called Le Populaire and in a book about a fictitious communist community called Icarie, Voyage et aventures de lord William Carisdall en Icarie (1840). In 1848 Cabet left France in order to create such a community in Texas and then at Nauvoo, Illinois, but these efforts ended in failure. The naming of his utopian community after the figure from Greek mythology, Icarus, who failed in his attempt to flee the island of Crete by flying with wax wings too close to the sun, was perhaps unfortunate.

Carey, Henry C. (1793-1879)

Henry Carey was an American economist who argued that national economic development should be promoted by extensive government subsidies and high tariff protection. There were several topics on which he was close to the French economists, most notably his idea that economies are governed by the operation of natural laws which are observable by men, and that there is no inherent reason why the interests of economic actors are not "harmonious” in a free society. On the latter topic he clashed with Frédéric Bastiat whom he charged with plagiarizing his book The Harmony of Interests, Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Commercial (1851). Bastiat's book Economic Harmonies appeared in print in a shortened form in mid-1850 and a more complete form in mid 1851. Carey accused him of plagiarism and a bitter debate in the Journal des économistes ensued. He later withdrew the accusation. Carey’s major works are The Harmony of Interests, Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Commercial (1851); Principles of political economy (1837-1840), 3 vols.; Principles of social science (1858-1860), 3 vols.

Castille, Hippolyte (1820-1886)

Castille was born in Montreuil-sur-Mer (département de Pas-de-Calais) and was a prolific French author who wrote popular works on the History of the Second French Republic (4 vols. 1854-56) and a multi-volume series of Portraits politiques au dix-neuvième siècle (1857-1862) which included several small volumes on classical liberal figures such as Mme de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Béranger, Lafayette, Garibaldi, Cavour, Mazzini, as well as many other individuals. He founded in 1847 a short-lived journal devoted to the importance of intellectual property, Le travail intellectuel, journal des intérêts scientifiques, littéraires et artistiques, for which Molinari wrote a number of articles. Molinari is mentioned as a “collaborator”and other leading economists were listed as “supporters” (Frédéric Bastiat, Charles Dunoyer, Horace Say, Michel Chevalier, Joseph Garnier). The journal was monthly and lasted 7 months before closing in 1848. Castille’s home on the rue Saint-Lazare (the old residence of Cardinal Fesch) was the meeting place for a small group of liberals (which included Bastiat, Molinari, Garnier, Fonteyraud, and Coquelin) which met regularly between 1844 and early 1848 to discuss political and economic matters. It was Castille’s home which supplied the name for Molinari’s book, Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare (1849). Castille was also one of the founders of Bastiat’s revolutionary journal La République française in February 1848, along with Gustave de Molinari. In mid-1848 Castille gradually drifted apart from his economist friends and eventually worked on the Jacobin republican magazine La révolution démocratique et sociale edited by Charles Delescluze (1809-1871).

Chaix d'Est-Ange, Gustave Louis (1800-1876)

Chaix d'Est-Ange was a lawyer and politician. He took on a number of high profile trials during the July Monarchy (1830-1848) often in defense of liberal causes. During the July Monarchy he was elected a member of the Chamber of Deputies and during the Second Empire he served in the Council of State and then the Senate.

Chateaubriand, François René, vicomte de (1768-1848)

Chateaubriand was a novelist, philosopher, and supporter of Charles X. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 1822 to June 1824. He was a defender of the freedom of the press and Greek independence from Turkey. He refused to take the oath of allegiance to King Louis-Philippe after he came to power in 1830. He spent his retirement writing Mémoires d’outre-tombe (Memoirs from Beyond the Grave) (1849-50) which was published posthumously. He died the previous July (1848).

Cherbuliez, Antoine-Elisée (1797-1869)

Cherbuliez was a Swiss lawyer, judge, and professor of law and political economy at the Académie de Genève. He was elected to the Cantonal Legislature in 1831 and then to the Constituent Assembly in 1842. In 1848 he moved to Paris and became active in the Economists' circle, writing for the JDE and participating in the pamphlet war of 1848 on socialism. He returned to academic life in Switzerland five years later. His books include Riche ou pauvre exposition succincte des causes et des effets de la distribution actuelle des richesses sociales (1840); De la démocratie en Suisse, 2 vols. (1843); Simples Notions de l'ordre social à l'usage de tout le monde (1848); Le potage à la tortue: entretiens populaires sur les questions sociales (1849); Etudes sur les causes de la misère tant morale que physique et sur les moyens d'y porter remède (1853); Précis de la science économique et de ses principales applications, 2 vols. (1862).

Cheuvreux, Casimir (1797-1881) and Hortense (née Girard) (1808-93)

Casimir Cheuvreux was a wealthy textile merchant who was active in liberal circles in Paris, helping to fund their activities. His wife Hortense (née Girard) ran an important salon from their Paris home. People like the scientist Jean-Jacques Ampère and the politician and historian Alexis de Tocqueville attended, as did Bastiat. Casimir’s sister, Anne Cheuvreux, had married Horace Say, the son of the economist Jean-Baptiste Say, who was also a wealthy businessman who helped fund liberal activities. Like Hortense, Anne Say ran a liberal salon. Thus the two women and the Cheuvreux-Say families played an important role in liberal circles in Paris during the 1840s.

Chevalier, Michel (1806-1887)

Chevalier was a liberal economist and alumnus of the École polytechnique and a Minister under Napoleon III. Initially a Saint-Simonist, he was imprisoned for two years (1832-33). After a trip to the United States, he published Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord (1836), Histoire et description des voies de communications aux Etats-Unis et des travaux d’art qui en dependent (1840-41), and Cours d’économie politique (1845–55). He was appointed to the chair of political economy at the Collège de France in 1840 and was sacked from his position in the early days of the February Revolution for his free market views. His dismissal from his teaching post during the 1848 Revolution was strongly resisted by the Political Economy Society which was able to eventually get him reinstated a few months later. He became close to Napoleon III during the Second Empire and was appointed a senator in 1860. He was an ardent free trader and was an admirer of Bastiat and Cobden and played a decisive role in the free trade treaty signed between France and England in 1860 (Chevalier was the signatory for France, while Cobden was the signatory for England).

Clément, Ambroise (1805-86)

Clément was an economist and secretary to the mayor of Saint-Étienne for many years. Clément was able to travel to Paris frequently to participate in political economy circles. In the mid 1840s he began writing on economic matters and so impressed Guillaumin that the latter asked him to assume the task of directing the publication of the important and influential Dictionnaire de l’économie politique, in 1849, which he edited briefly before he had to withdraw because of his business commitments (he was replaced by Charles Coquelin). Clément was a member of the Société d’économie politique from 1848, a regular writer and reviewer for the Journal des économistes, and was made a corresponding member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1872. He wrote the following works: Recherches sur les causes de l’indigence (1846); Des nouvelles Idées de réforme industrielle et en particulier du projet d’organisation du travail de M. Louis Blanc (1846); La crise économique et sociale en France et en Europe (1886); as well as an early review of Bastiat’s Economic Harmonies for the Journal des économistes (1850), in which he praised Bastiat’s style but criticized his position on population and the theory of value. Two works which deserve special note are the article on “spoliation” (plunder), “De la spoliation légale,”Journal des économistes, vol. 20, no. 83, 1er juillet 1848, which he wrote in the heat of the June Days uprising in Paris, and the two volume work on social theory which has numerous “Austrian” insights, Essai sur la science sociale. Économie politique - morale expérimentale - politique théorique (1867), 2 vols.

Cobden, Richard (1804-65)

Cobden was the founder of the Anti-Corn Law League. Born of a poor farmer’s family, he was trained by an uncle to become a clerk in his warehouse. At twenty-one, he became a travelling salesman, and was so successful that he was able to set up his own business by acquiring a factory making printed cloth. Thanks to his vision of the market and his sense of organization, his company became very prosperous. Nevertheless, at the age of thirty, he left the management of the company to his brother in order to travel. He wrote some remarkable articles in which he defended two great causes: pacifism, in the form of non intervention in foreign affairs, and free exchange. From 1839, he devoted himself exclusively to the Anti-Corn Law League and was elected as MP for Stockport in 1841. Cobden’s speeches in the House of Commons between 1841 and 1846 were instrumental in winning many MPs over to the cause of free trade, which led to the repeal of the protectionist Corn Laws in January 1846. He began corresponding with Bastiat in 1844 and became a close friend and confidant as Bastiat’s letters to him reveal. He and Bastiat gave important speeches at the Paris Friends of Peace Congress in August 1849 and it is quite likely that he and Bastiat met secretly in November 1849 on a possible disarmament treaty between France and England, which came to nothing. He was less successful in opposing British participation in the Crimean War against Russia (1854-56). His strong anti-war stand led to him losing his seat temporarily. Toward the end of the 1850s, he was asked by the government to negotiate a free trade treaty with France. His French counterpart was Michel Chevalier, a minister of Napoleon III and a friend and admirer of Molinari and Bastiat. The treaty was signed by Cobden and Chevalier in 1860.

Colbert, Jean-Baptiste (1619-83).

Colbert was the Comptroller-General of Finance under King Louis XIV from 1665 to 1683. He epitomized the policy of state intervention in trade and industry known as “mercantilism” whereby the state subsidized or established domestic industry in order to replace foreign imports, imposed high tariffs in order to reduce foreign imported goods, spent taxpayers’ money on lavish public works, and expanded France’s empire overseas.

Comte, François-Louis-Charles (1782-1837)

Charles Comte was a lawyer, a critic of the repressive policies of Napoleon and then the restored monarchy, and the son-in-law of the economist Jean-Baptiste Say. He founded, with Charles Dunoyer, the journal Le Censeur in 1814 and Le Censeur européen in 1817 and was prosecuted many times for challenging the press censorship laws and criticizing the government. He came across the economic ideas of Say in 1817 and discussed them at length in Le Censeur européen. After the government passed new censorship laws in 1820, it closed closed down the magazine and convicted and sentenced Comte to two years in prison.  He went into exile in Switzerland, living in Geneva for 15 months, before accepting a position in Lausanne teaching law. In 1822 Ferdinand VII of Spain (a Bourbon) appealed to the Holy Alliance to restore him to the throne after the liberal Cortez had pushed him aside. His fellow Bourbon Louis XVIII of France sent 95,000 troops into Spain in 1823 in order to assist Ferdinand. An occupying force of 45,000 soldiers remained in Spain until they were withdrawn in 1828. Comte believed that the Ultra conservatives in France would put pressure on other countries like Switzerland who gave shelter to liberal exiles and critics of the government. Therefore, he resigned his teaching position after two years in Lausanne and went to England in 1824 where he spent another two years and became acquainted with Jeremy Bentham and other English liberals, including James and John Stuart Mill. He was able to return to France in 1825 where he worked on Lafayette’s journal La Revue Américaine. In 1827 he published the first part of his magnum opus, the four-volume Traité de législation, which very much influenced the thought of Bastiat, and the second part, Traité de la propriété which followed in 1834. Comte was appointed to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques when it was re-established by King Louis Philippe in 1832, and was its permanent secretary. After the 1830 revolution he was also elected a deputy representing La Sarthe. Molinari wrote the entry on Comte in the DEP, T. 1, pp. 446-47.

Considerant, Victor Prosper (1808-93)

Considerant was a follower of the socialist Charles Fourier and edited the most successful Fourierist magazine La Démocratie pacifiste (1843-1851). He was elected Deputy to represent Loiret in April 1848 and Paris in May 1849. The Fourierists advocated a utopian, communistic system for the reorganization of society. The population was to be grouped in "phalansteries”of about 1,800 persons, who would live together as one family and hold property and work in common. Considerant on a couple of occasions tried to set up state funded experimental communities based upon Fourierist principles but was unsuccessful. He was also an advocate of the “right to work” (the right to a job), an idea which the Economists opposed. Considerant wrote Principes du socialisme. Manifeste de la démocratie au XIXe siècle (1847) and Théorie du droit de propriété et du droit au travail (1845).

Coquelin, Charles (1802-1852)

Coquelin was one of the leading figures in the Political Economy movement in Paris before his untimely death. He was selected by the publisher Guillaumin to edit the prestigious and voluminous Dictionnaire de l’économie politique (1852) because of his erudition and near photographic memory. He also wrote dozens of articles for the Dictionnaire before his sudden death in August 1852 having just completed editing volume 1. Coquelin was born in Dunkirk and went to Paris in order to study law but he spent considerable time reading the classic works of political economy, developing a keen interest in business cycles after the depression of 1825-26. In 1827 he began a journal, Les Annales du Commerce (1827-28) in which he wrote on banking matters. In the early 1830s he turned to banking policy in the United States, especially in New England where there were liberal laws governing the creation of banks. Financial concerns in 1839 forced him to seek employment in the textile industry on which he wrote a number of works. In the early 1840s he wrote a series of articles for La Revue des Deux-Mondes on banking in which he toyed with the idea of the competitive issue of currencies by banks competing for business in the market. These ideas were further developed in his major book on the subject, Du Crédit et des Banques which appeared in 1848.

Coquelin was also very active in the free trade movement, becoming secretary of the Association and writing articles for Bastiat’s journal Le libre-échange and later taking over the editor’s role when Bastiat had to resign because of ill health. He also wrote dozens of articles and book reviews for the Journal des économistes. During the 1848 Revolution Coquelin was active in forming a debating club, the Club de la Liberté du Travail (the Club for the Freedom of Working) which took on the socialists before it was violently broken up by opponents. He, along with Bastiat, Fonteyraud, Garnier, and Molinari, started a small revolutionary magazine written to appeal to ordinary people, Jacques Bonhomme, which lasted only a few weeks in June before it too was forced to close. Coquelin wrote on transport, the linen industry, the law governing corporations, money, credit, and banking (especially free banking of which he was probably the first serious advocate).

Coquelin was a member of the group which Gérard Minart has called the “Four Musketeers” of French political economy. This term was coined by Gérard Minart in his biography of Molinari[1247] to describe the four young men from the provinces who went to Paris between 1819 and 1845 (Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin in 1819 aged 18, Charles Coquelin also in 1819 aged 17, Gustave de Molinari in 1840 aged 21, and Frédéric Bastiat in 1845 aged 44) and transformed the French school of political economy with their organizational skills and their new ideas.

Courcelle-Seneuil, Jean-Gustave (1813-1892)

Courcelle-Seneuil studied law, worked in the metallurgy business, was an editor of the Journal des Économistes, served briefly as the Director of Education in Duclerc’s government during the 1848 revolution, before seeking a kind of voluntary exile after 1851 by accepting a professorship in political economy in Santiago, Chile from 1852-1862. He returned to France in 1863, became a Conseiller d’État in 1879, and worked at the École normale supérieure de Paris from 1881-1883. In 1882 was was elected to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. His scholarly interests included banking and credit, numerous works on economic theory, a constitutional investigation of the impact of the French Revolution, and the translation into French of works by J.S. Mill, William Graham Sumner, and Adam Smith. See especially the Traité théorique et practique d’économie politique, 2 vols. (1856), Études sur la science sociale (1862).

Cousin, Victor (1792-1867)

Cousin was a philosopher who taught very popular courses at the École normale and then later at the Sorbonne. He was influenced by the Scottish Common Sense school of realism and by John Locke. Politically, he supported the Doctrinaires during the 1820s and temporarily lost his teaching post for his opposition to the monarchy. During the July Monarchy he was restored to full honours by being appointed to the Sorbonne, the Council of State, and was made a peer. He was also instrumental in advising the government in its reform of primary education in the early 1830s. Cousin wrote many books including Du vrai, du beau et du bien (1836), Cours d'histoire de la philosophie morale au XVIIIe siècle, 5 vols. (1840-41). He also developed a theory of the self which had some influence among the political economists, on which see Justice et Charité (1848).

Curtius, or Philippe Mathé-Curtz (“Curtius”) (1737-1794)

Philippe Mathé-Curtz (“Curtius”) was a Swiss doctor and sculptor who created wax figures for anatomical study. He later began creating portraits of famous people after he moved to Paris in 1765, when his figure of Madame du Barry (the mistress of King Louis XV) caused a sensation. Curtius opened a museum to the public in 1770 which was moved to the Palais-Royal in 1776. In the late 1770s he made figures of people like Voltaire, Rousseau, and Benjamin Franklin. In 1794 he bequeathed his collection of wax figures to the daughter of his housekeeper, Marie, who in 1795 married M. Tussaud.

Daire, Eugene (1798-1847)

Daire was of all things a tax collector who revived interest in the heritage of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century free-market economics. He came to Paris in 1839, met Guillaumin, discovered the works of Jean-Baptiste Say, and began editing the fifteen-volume work, Collection des principaux Économistes (1840-48). It included works on eighteenth-century finance, the physiocrats, Turgot, Adam Smith, Malthus, Jean-Baptiste Say, and Ricardo. He was a founding member of the Political Economy Society. Molinari edited the last two volumes in the Collection on miscellaneous economic writings from the 18th century.

Descartes, René (1596-1650)

Descartes was a French philosopher and mathematician who lived much of his life in the Dutch republic. His best known works are Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) and Discourse on Method (1637) which laid the foundation for modern rationalism.

Dunoyer, Barthélémy-Pierre-Joseph-Charles (1786-1862)

Dunoyer was a journalist, an economist, a politician, the author of numerous works on politics, political economy, and history, a founding member and President of the Société d’économie politique (1842) and its President between 1845 and 1862, and a key figure in the French classical liberal movement of the first half of the nineteenth century, along with Jean-Baptiste Say, Benjamin Constant, Charles Comte, Augustin Thierry, and Alexis de Tocqueville. Dunoyer studied law in Paris where he met Charles Comte (around 1807) with whom he was to edit the liberal periodical Le Censeur (1814-15) and its successor Le Censeur européen (1817-19). He became politically active during the last years of Napoleon's Empire and the early years of the Bourbon Restoration when he strenuously opposed authoritarian rule (whether Napoleonic or monarchical), especially censorship of the press, militarism, the slave trade, and the extensive restrictions placed on trade and industry. Dunoyer (and Comte) combined the political liberalism of Constant (constitutional limits on the power of the state, representative government); the economic liberalism of Say (laissez-faire, free trade); and the sociological approach to history of Thierry, Constant, and Say (class analysis and a theory of historical evolution of society through stages culminating in the laissez-faire market society of “industry”) into a new and rich form of classical liberal thought which had a profound impact in France, especially on people like Bastiat.

He is best known for a series of works on industry and labor published between 1825 and 1845, L’Industrie et la morale considérées dans leurs rapports avec la liberté (1825), Nouveau traité d’économie sociale (1830), and his three-volume magnum opus De la liberté du travail (1845). After the revolution of 1830 Dunoyer was appointed a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1832, worked as a government official (he was prefect of L’Allier and La Somme), and eventually became a member of the Council of State in 1837. He resigned his government posts in protest against the coup d’état of Louis-Napoléon in 1851. He died while writing a critique of the authoritarian Second Empire; the work was completed and published by his son Anatole in 1864.

Dupin, Charles (1784-1873)

Dupin was a naval engineer who attended the École Polytechnique and later became Minister of the Navy. He taught mathematics at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers and also ran courses for ordinary working people. He is one of the founders of mathematical economics and of the statistical office of France. In 1828 he was elected deputy for Tarn, was made a Peer in 1830, and served in the Constituent and then the National Assemblies during the Second Republic. Charles Dupin, Le petit producteur français, in 7 vols. (1827).

Dupuit, Jules (1804-1866)

Dupuit was an engineer and a political economist who wrote on the economics of public works. He trained at the École polytéchnique (1822) and rose to become the chief engineer of the Corps des ponts et chaussées (the Bridges and Roads Department) where he worked on the design and building of roads and the sewers of Paris. He wrote a number of books on the cost of maintaining roads, the role of tolls in financing roads, the railway monopoly, and the measurement of public utility. Dupuit also wrote several articles in the DEP, vol. 2 on "Péages” (Tolls), pp. 339-44; "Routes et chemins” (Highways and Roads), pp. 555-60; "Voies de communication” (Communication Routes), pp. 846-54. See also, Jules Dupuit, De l'influence des péages sur l'utilité des voies de communication (1849). In the article on "Péages” he comes close to developing the idea of the "Laffer Curve” where he argues that lowering the cost of the toll on a public highway would lead to an eventual increase in the overall revenue raised as a result of the increased traffic which resulted.

Dussard, Hyppolite (1791-1879)

Dussard was a journalist, a businessman involved in the Paris-Rouen railway, and an economist. He was the editor of Le Journal des économistes from 1843 to 1845, a contributor to the Revue encyclopédique, and a co-editor with Eugène Daire of the Works of Turgot for the Collection des Principaux Économistes published by Guillaumin (1844). During the Second Republic he was appointed the prefect of la Seine-Inférieure and was elected to the Council of State.

Faucher, Léon (1803-1854)

Faucher was a journalist, writer, and deputy for the Marne (1847-1851). He became an journalist during the July Monarchy writing for Le Constitutionnel, and Le Courrier français, for which Molinari and Bastiat wrote, and was one of the editors of the Revue des deux mondes and the Journal des économistes. Faucher was appointed to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1849 and was active in L’Association pour la liberté des échanges. During the Second Republic he was Minister of Public Works (1848) and Minister of the Interior (1848-49). Under President Louis Napoléon he was de facto head of the government (April-October 1851) but resigned rather than serve under him after his coup d’état of 2 December 1851. He wrote on prison reform, gold and silver currency, socialism, and taxation. One of his better-known works was Études sur l’Angleterre (1856).

Ferrier, François Louis Auguste (1777-1861)

Ferrier was an advocate for protectionism and served as director general of the Customs Administration during the Empire and was a member of the Chamber of Peers during the July monarchy. His major works include Du gouvernement considéré dans ses rapports avec le commerce (1804).

Flocon, Ferdinand (1800-1866)

Flocon was a liberal republican journalist, author, and politician. He was active in the radical Carbonari movement which opposed the restored Bourbon monarchy during the early 1820s. He wrote for the liberal Courrier français and then the left republican journal La Réforme where he was editor (1843-1848) and published works by Proudhon and Marx. During the 1848 Revolution he was part of the Provisional Government and was named minister of agriculture and commerce. During the June Days riots of 1848 he supported the repressive policies of Cavaignac. After Louis Napoleon came to power he was exiled from France and lived in Lausanne, Switzerland.

Fonfrède, Henri Jean Étienne Boyer (1788-1841)

Fonfrède (1788-1841) was a liberal journalist who lived in Bordeaux. He and his uncle started a shipping business in Bordeaux in 1816 before he became interested in liberal politics. He edited the journal La Tribune before founding the Indicateur de Bordeaux (1826) and the Courrier de Bordeaux (1837) in which he promoted his ideas. He published several books on constitutional government and in 1846 the Guillaumin firm published a collection of his writings on free trade. See Henri Fonfrède, Du gouvernement du roi, et des limites constitutionnelles de la prérogative parlementaire (1839), Du système prohibitif (1846).

Fontaine, Jean de La (1621-1695)

Fontaine was a French writer of Fables and a poet. He trained as a lawyer and was active in the late 17th century which is the classic period of French literature. The Fables (1668-1694) were well known to French people as they were a staple of childhood reading. He turned what appeared to be simple children's tales about animals into witty and insightful stories about the human condition. His works were much quoted by Bastiat in his Economic Sophisms.

Fonteyraud, Henri Alcide (1822-49)

Fonteyraud was born in Mauritius and became professor of history, geography, and political economy at the École supérieure de commerce de Paris. He was a member of the Société d’économie politique and one of the founders of the Association pour la liberté des échanges. Because of his knowledge of English he went to England in 1845 to study at first hand the progress of the Anti-Corn-Law League. During the 1848 revolution he campaigned against socialist ideas with his activity in Le Club de la liberté du travail and, along with Bastiat, Coquelin, and Molinari, by writing and handing out in the streets of Paris copies of the broadside pamphlet Jacques Bonhomme. Sadly, he died very young during the cholera epidemic of 1849. He wrote articles in La Revue britannique and Le Journal des économistes, and he edited and annotated the works of Ricardo in the multivolume Collection des principaux économistes. His collected works were published posthumously as Mélanges d’économie politique, edited by J. Garnier (1853).

Fossin, Jean Baptiste (1786-1848)

Jean Baptiste Fossin and his son Jules (1808-1869) owned the most fashionable jewelers in Paris during the July Monarchy with clientele drawn from the ruling elite. Business slowed dramatically after the 1848 Revolution but picked up again during the Second Empire (after 1852). The Fossin jewelers was in business from 1815 to 1862 when it was taken over by Prosper Morel who ran the business until 1885.

Fourier, François-Marie Charles (1772-1837)

Fourier was a socialist and founder of the so-called “phalansterian school” (or “Fourierism”). Fourierism advocated a utopian, communistic system for the reorganization of society. The population was to be grouped in “phalansteries” (or “phalanxes”) of about 1,800 persons, who would live together as one family and hold property and work in common. Fourier’s main works include Le Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire (1829) and La Fausse industrie morcelée répugnante et mensongère et l'antidote, l'industrie naturelle, combinée, attrayante, véridique donnant quadruple produit (1835-36). Many of Fourier’s ideas appeared in his journal, Phalanstère, ou la réforme industrielle, which ran from 1832 to 1834.

Fox, William Johnson (1786-1864).

Fox was a Member of Parliament, a journalist and renowned orator, and one of the founders of the Westminster Review. He became one of the most popular speakers of the Anti-Corn Law League and delivered courses to the workers on Sunday evenings. He served in Parliament from 1847 to 1863. He was famous for a speech he gave on behalf of the Anti-Corn Law League at Rochdale on November 25, 1843 on how dependent England already had become on international trade.[1248] The friend and editor of Bastiat's Collected Works, Prosper Paillottet translated one of his works on religion into French: Des Idées religieuses (1877).

Fulton, Robert (1765-1815)

Fulton was an American engineer and inventor who was involved in developing the first commercially successful steamboat.

Garnier, Joseph (1813-1881)

Garnier was a professor, journalist, politician, and activist for free trade and peace. He came to Paris in 1830 and came under the influence of Adolphe Blanqui, who introduced him to economics and eventually became his father-in-law. Garnier was a pupil, professor, and then director of the École supérieure de commerce de Paris, before being appointed the first professor of political economy at the École des ponts et chaussées in 1846. Garnier played a central role in the burgeoning free-market school of thought in the 1840s in Paris and was one of the leading exponents of Malthusian population theory. He was one of the founders of l’Association pour la liberté des échanges and one of the editors of its journal, Libre échange; he was active in the Congrès de la paix; he was one of the founders along with Guillaumin of the Journal des économistes, of which he became chief editor in 1846; he was one of the founders of the Société d’Économie politique in 1842 and was its perpetual secretary; and he was one of the founders (with Bastiat) of the 1848 liberal broadsheet Jacques Bonhomme. Garnier was acknowledged for his considerable achievements by being nominated to join the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1873 and to become a senator in 1876. He was author of numerous books and articles, among which include Introduction à l’étude de l’Économie politique (1843); Traité d’Économie politique (1845), Richard Cobden, les ligueurs et la ligue (1846); and Congrès des amis de la paix universelle réunis à Paris en 1849 (1850). He edited Malthus’s Essai sur le principe de population (1845); Du principe de population (1857).

Girardin, Emile de (1806-1881)

Girardin was the first successful press baron of the mid-19th century in France. He began in 1836 with the popular mass circulation La Presse which had sales of over 20,000 by 1845. One reason for his success was the introduction of serial novels which proved very popular with readers. Girardin gradually turned against the July Monarchy on the grounds it was corrupt. In the 1848 Revolution he played a significant role in advising Louis Philippe to abdicate in February and then opposing General Cavaignac's repressive actions during the June Days riots. For the latter Girardin was imprisoned and his journal shut down. During the election campaign for the presidency he supported Louis Napoleon but ran afoul of him soon afterwards, selling his shares in La Presse in 1856. In his book, Le socialisme et l’impôt (1849) he argued that the state should be regarded as one big insurance company which insured the security and the property of the taxpayers and charged them a “premium” based on their wealth.

Guillaumin, Gilbert-Urbain (1801-1864) 

Guillaumin was a mid-19th century French classical liberal publisher who founded a publishing dynasty which lasted from 1835 to around 1910 and became the focal point for the classical liberal movement in France. Guillaumin was orphaned at the age of five and was brought up by his uncle. He came to Paris in 1819 and worked in a bookstore before eventually founding his own publishing firm in 1835. He became active in liberal politics during the 1830 revolution and made contact with the economists Adolphe Blanqui and Joseph Garnier. He became a publisher in 1835 in order to popularize and promote classical liberal economic ideas, and the firm of Guillaumin eventually became the major publishing house for liberal ideas in the mid nineteenth century. Guillaumin helped found the Journal des économistes in 1841 with Horace Say (Jean-Baptiste’s son) and Joseph Garnier. The following year he helped found the Société d’économie politique which became the main organization which brought like-minded classical liberals together for discussion and debate.

His firm published scores of books on economic issues, making its catalog a virtual who’s who of the liberal movement in France. The Guillaumin firm published 2,356 titles during its nearly 50 year history between its founding in 1837 and its take-over by Félix Alcan in 1906 at an average rate of 31.8 titles per year.[1249] In the last years of the July Monarchy 1837-1847 it published 156 books and pamphlets at a rate of 14 p.a.; during the Second Republic 1848-52 it published 204 titles at a rate of 41 p.a. Its peak year was 1848, the year of Revolution, during which it published 67 titles. By 1866 their catalog listed 166 separate book titles, not counting journals and other periodicals. For example, he published the works of Jean-Baptiste Say, Charles Dunoyer, Frédéric Bastiat, Gustave de Molinari and many others, including translations of works by Hugo Grotius, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Charles Darwin. By the mid-1840s Guillaumin's home and business had become the focal point of the classical liberal lobby in Paris which debated and published material opposed to a number of causes which they believed threatened liberty in France: statism, protectionism, socialism, militarism, and colonialism. After his death in 1864 the firm’s activities were continued by his oldest daughter Félicité, and after her death it was handed over to his youngest daughter Pauline. The firm of Guillaumin continued in one form or another from 1835 to 1910 when it was merged with the publisher Félix Alcan. The business was located in the Rue Richelieu, no. 14, in a very central part of Paris not far from the River Seine, the Tuileries Gardens, the Louvre Museum, the Palais Royal, the Comédie Française theater, and the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.

Guillaumin was a member of the group which Gérard Minart has called the “Four Musketeers” of French political economy. This term was coined by Gérard Minart in his biography of Molinari[1250] to describe the four young men from the provinces who went to Paris between 1819 and 1845 (Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin in 1819 aged 18, Charles Coquelin also in 1819 aged 17, Gustave de Molinari in 1840 aged 21, and Frédéric Bastiat in 1845 aged 44) and transformed the French school of political economy with their organizational skills and their new ideas.

Guillaumin also published the following key journals, collections, and encyclopedias: Journal des économistes (1842–1940), L’Annuaire de l'économie politique (1844–99), the multivolume Collection des principaux économistes (1840–48), Bibliothèques des sciences morales et politiques (1857–), Dictionnaire d’économie politique (1852) (co-edited with Charles Coquelin), and Dictionnaire universel théorique et practique du commerce et de la navigation (1859-61).

Guizot, François (1787-1874)

Guizot was a successful academic and politician whose career spanned many decades. He was born to a Protestant family in Nîmes. His father was guillotined during the Terror. As a law student in Paris, the young Guizot was a vocal opponent of the Napoleonic empire. After the restoration of the monarchy Guizot was part of the “doctrinaires,” a group of conservative and moderate liberals. He was professor of history at the Sorbonne from 1812 to 1830, publishing Essai sur l’histoire de France (1824), Histoire de la revolution d’Angleterre (1826-27), Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe (1828), and Histoire de la civilisation en France (1829-32). In 1829 he was elected deputy and became very active in French politics after the 1830 revolution, supporting constitutional monarchy and a limited franchise. He served as minister of the interior, minister of education (1832-37), ambassador to England in 1840, and then foreign minister and prime minister, becoming in practice the leader of the government from 1840 to 1848. He promoted peace abroad and liberal conservatism at home, but his regime, weakened by corruption and economic difficulties, collapsed with the monarchy in 1848. He retired to Normandy to spend the rest of his days writing history and his memoirs such as Histoire parlementaire de France (1863-64) and Histoire des origines du gouvernement représentif en Europe (1851).

Harcourt, François-Eugène, duc d’ (1786-1865)

Harcourt served briefly in the military in the early years of the Restoration before resigning in order to support the Greek struggle for independence from Turkey. He was elected to represent Seine-et-Marne in 1827 and supported the liberal opposition to Charles X. Under the July Monarchy he was appointed ambassador to Madrid, was active in the reform of secondary education, and was a supporter of free trade. Because of his speeches on behalf of free trade in the Chamber and because of his social and political contacts he was appointed president of the Free Trade Association when it was founded in 1846. During the Second Republic he was appointed ambassador to Rome by Lamartine. See François Eugène Gabriel duc d’Harcourt, Discours en faveur de la liberté du commerce, prononcés à la Chambre des Pairs et à la Chambre des Députés (1846).

Hauranne, Prosper Duvergier de (1798-1881)

Hauranne was a liberal journalist and politician who supported the idea of a constitutional monarchy. During the 1820s he mixed in literary circles getting to know Stendhal and Victory Hugo and tried writing comedies but did not have much success. After a brief stay in England he became a supporter of British style constitutional and liberal monarchism which he advocated in journals like the Globe and la Revue française in the late 1820s. When the July Monarchy came to power he was elected to represent Cher in 1831 and spoke in favor of free trade in the Chamber during the tariff review of 1831-33. During the Second Republic he was part of the anti-republican right and an opponent of Louis Napoleon. After Napoléon’s coup d’état on 2 December 1851 he was arrested and exiled for a short period. After his return he worked on a 10 volume history of parliamentary government in France, Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en France, 1814-1848 (1857-1871). See also, Prosper Duvergier de Hauranne, Discours sur les céréales (1832).

Huskisson, William (1770-1830)

Huskisson was a British Member of Parliament who served from 1796 to 1830. He rose to the post of secretary to the treasury 1804-09 and later president of the Board of Trade (1823-27). Huskisson introduced a number of liberal reforms, including the reformation of the Navigation Act, a reduction in duties on manufactured goods, and the repeal some quarantine duties. As president of the Board of Trade he played an important role in persuading British merchants to support a policy of free trade.

Jacquard, Joseph Marie (1752-1834)

Jacquard was a French inventor who developed the first programmable loom for weaving complex patterns (the so-called “Jacquard loom”).

Jobard, Marcellin (1792-1861)

Jobard was a Belgian lithographer, photographer, and inventor. From 1841 to 1861 he was the director of the Royal Belgian Museum of Industry in Brussels where Molinari taught after he left Paris in 1852. He was a prolific inventor (with 75 patents) and took up the cause of defending the property rights of inventors. He wrote dozens of pamphlets expressing his views in a very idiosyncratic manner. Molinari was sympathetic to his position in favor of absolute property rights in literary and artistic material but objected to his critique of economic liberty in the broader sense. Jobard wrote Nouvelle économie sociale, ou monautopole industriel, artistique, commercial et littéraire (1844) and Organon de la propriété intellectuelle (1851). Joseph Garnier described his ideas as a mixture of “a bit of plausibility, a bit of nonsense, a bit of science, and a bit of ignorance.” There is a lengthy, critical, though respectful discussion of Jobard’s ideas by Charles Coquelin, “Brevets d’invention’ (Patents) in JDE, vol. 1, pp. 209-23.

Jonnès, Alexandre Moreau de (1770-1870)

Jonnès served in the French Navy under Napoleon. During the Restoration he worked as a statistician and made a name for himself gathering statistics on mortality during a cholera epidemic which swept through the Middle East in 1817-1823 and again between 1832-35 when cholera swept through Provence killing 100,000 people. He worked in the Ministry of Commerce in the Statistics Department compiling data on French agriculture and industry. In 1840 the French Bureau of Statistics was established and Jonnès served as its director until 1851. The Guillaumin firm published his Statistique de l’Agriculture de France (1848).

Laborde, Alexandre-Louis Joseph, comte de (1773-1842)

Laborde came from a wealthy financial family which gave him the means to travel widely and write about his experiences. After serving in the Italian army in the late 1790s he entered politics and was appointed to the Legion of Honour by Louis XVIII. A trip to England led to an interest in English parliamentary government which he believed should be controlled by liberal minded aristocrats like himself, which resulted in a book Des Aristocrates représentatives (1814). He was elected to represent la Seine in 1822 and served in various capacities until 1841. He advocated a range of liberal reforms such as prison reform, the abolition of slavery, educational reform, and agricultural improvement.

Lamartine, Alphonse Marie Louis de (1790–1869)

Lamartine was a poet and statesman and as an immensely popular romantic poet, he used his talent to promote liberal ideas. Lamartine was elected Deputy representing Nord (1833-37), Saône et Loire (1837-Feb. 1848), Bouches-du-Rhône (April 1848-May 1849), and Saône et Loire (July 1849- Dec. 1851). During the campaign for free trade organized by the French Free Trade Association between 1846 and 1847 Lamartine often spoke at their large public meetings and was a big draw card. He was a member of the Provisional Government in February 1848 (offering Bastiat a position in the government, which he declined) and Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 1848. After he lost the presidential elections of December 1848 against Louis-Napoléon, he gradually retired from political life and went back to writing. Molinari first book was on Lamartine which was first published in la Revue générale biographique, politique et littéraire and then as a book in 1843.

Lavoisier, Antoine (1743-1794)

Lavoisier was a chemist who made important discoveries in the chemical analysis of oxygen and hydrogen (showing how the former was essential to combustion, thus debunking the phlogiston theory). He was a pioneer in the scientific measurement and weighing of chemicals in order to better understand their reactions in the laboratory. He came from an aristocratic family, studied law, and pursued a successful and lucrative career as a tax farmer. Tax farming was a kind of privatized system of tax collection under the old regime which was reserved for well connected members of the aristocracy. Lavoisier met his death in 1794 when he and most of the other tax farmers, as hated representatives of the old regime, were rounded up and guillotined. However, Lavoisier did have some liberal and reformist tendencies. His knowledge of taxation and accounting led to him advise the crown on reforming the tax system, his skill at scientific measurement resulted in his contribution to the development of the metric system (defining the exact weight of the standard kilogramme), and his understanding of chemistry led to his involvement with Turgot in reforming the salt-peter industry and in schemes to improve animal nutrition and thus the productivity of food production. During the revolution he wrote a couple of reports analyzing the standard of living of ordinary French people which came to the attention of the Economists in the 1840s who included his writings in one of the volumes of the Collection of Principal Economists. The volume with Lavoisier's material was edited by Molinari. His main works are Traité élémentaire de chimie (1789) and De la Richesse territorial du Royaume de France (1791), and Essai sur la population de la ville de Paris, sur sa richesse et ses consommations. (no date).

Le Chapelier, Jean (1754-1794)

Le Chapelier was a lawyer and politician during the early phase of the French Revolution. He was elected to the Estates General in 1789 and was a founder of the radical Jacobin Club. He is most famous for introducing the "Le Chapelier Law” which was enacted on 14 June, 1791. The Assembly had abolished the privileged corporations of masters and occupations of the old regime in March and the Le Chapelier Law was designed to do the same thing to organizations of both entrepreneurs and their workers. The law effectively banned guilds and trade unions (as well as the right to strike) until the law was altered in 1864.

Leclerc, Louis (1799-1854)

Leclerc was a founding member of the Free Trade Association, a member of the Société d'Économie Politique, and briefly an editor of the Journal des Économistes and the Journal d’agriculture, the director of a independent private school called "l'école néopédique” between 1836 and 1848, secretary of the Chamber of Commerce of Paris, and a member of the jury at the London Trade Exhibition in 1851. Leclerc had a special interest in agricultural economics (wine and silk production) on which he wrote many articles for the Journal des Économistes. His article in 1848 on Victor Cousin’s idea of “the self” and property rights had a big impact on Molinari.[1251]

Leroux, Pierre (1798-1871)

Leroux was a prominent member of the Saint-Simonian group of socialists and founder of Le Globe, a review of the Saint-Simonists. He was a journalist during the 1840s and was elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1848 and to the Legislative Assembly in 1849. Leroux based his social theory on groups of three (triads), borrowing from the Pythagorean philosophy of numbers. In "Doctrine de l’humanité" he has an elaborate social structure based upon various "trinities" such as "property, family, city," "liberty, fraternity, equality," and "citizens, associates, and functionaries." See Pierre Leroux, De l'égalité (1848) p. 15 ff.. His most developed exposition of his ideas can be found in De l’Humanité (1840) and also in De la ploutocratie, ou, Du gouvernement des riches (1848)

Lestiboudois, Thémistocle (1797–1876)

Lestiboudois was a deputy who represented Lille in the Département du Nord. He was also a physician and an economist. In the latter capacity he argued with the liberals in 1844 in supporting the ending of the stamp tax on periodicals but against them in supporting protectionism. In 1847 he published the pro-tariff book Économie politique des nations (1847).

Maistre, Joseph de (1753-1821)

De Maistre was a magistrate in Savoy and began his writing career as a supporter of the French Revolution but turned against it when the King was executed and the property of Church confiscated. He then became one of the leading conservative defenders of the Old Regime and the idea of “throne and altar." It is possible that Maistre’s 1821 book Les Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg, ou Entretiens sur le gouvernement temporel de la Providence was the inspiration for Molinari’s title. It is a work in defense of the established church, the power of the Pope and the monarchy, and very hostile to liberal notions of individual liberty and free markets. There are also three participants to the “dialogues”: “Le Comte” (The Count), “Le Chevalier” (The Knight), and “Le Sénateur” (The Senator).

Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766-1858)

Malthus is best known for his writings on population, in which he asserted that population growth (increasing at a geometric rate) would outstrip the growth in food production (growing at a slower arithmetic rate). Malthus studied at Jesus College, Cambridge, before becoming a professor of political economy at the East India Company College (Haileybury). His ideas were very influential among nineteenth-century political economists. His principal works were An Essay on the Principle of Population (1st ed., 1798; 2nd revised and enlarged ed. 1803; 6th ed., 1826); Principles of Political Economy (1820); Definitions in Political Economy (1827). Around the time of the publication of the Soirées there were 4 French language editions of Malthus' Principles of Population translated by P. Prevost: Geneva 1809, Geneva 1824, Guillaumin in Paris 1845 with editorial matter by Pellegrino Rossi, Charles Comte and Joseph Garnier, and a second Guillaumin edition of 1852 with additional editorial matter by Garnier in defense of Malthus against his critics. Bastiat became an important critic of Malthusian orthodoxy rejecting his pessimism about the capacity of the free market and free trade to expand the production of food. Molinari extended his economic analysis to include the family which he thought could be rationally and economically planned by parents.

Mandrin, Louis (1725-55)

Mandrin was a famous 18th century brigand and highwayman who challenged the privileges of the Farm General (la Ferme générale - or "Tax Farmers") by smuggling goods across the French border which were the monopoly of the Farm General. The Farm General was reorganized in 1726 to include a group of 40 (later 90) politically well connected individuals (the Farmers General - "les Fermiers généraux) who were given exclusive contracts by the king (via the Minister of Finance who received his cut in the form of bribes, or "pots-de-vin") to sell and thereby collect taxes on such items as salt, tobacco products, wine, and to enforce compulsory work on public goods such as roads (the corvée). This was an early version of "contracting out” or "privatizing” the collection of customs and taxes and was much hated by ordinary people in the 18th century. When the Farmers General were abolished in 1791 28 of the members were arrested and executed, including the mathematician Antoine Lavoisier. Mandrin was under contract with the Farm General to supply mules to the French army but when most of them died in transit the Farm General refused to pay him. After several run ins with the law resulting in Mandrin being condemned to death in 1753 and after his younger brother was executed for counterfeiting, Mandrin "declared war” on the Farmers General and began smuggling untaxed goods across the Swiss border and selling them in France. He became a popular hero for resisting the tax collecting Farmers General, which he did for the following 2 years before he was finally arrested and executed. Mandrin became a folk hero about whom popular songs were written and in the 20th century even films and a TV show were made about his exploits. A local Grenoble dark beer was also named after him in 2002.

Marcet, Jane Haldimand (1769-1858)

Marcet was the daughter of a Swiss businessman who lived in London and married a Swiss doctor who had come to know her through her writings. She wrote introductory works on science and political economy which were designed to be accessible to ordinary working people. The works on political economy were highly regarded by J.B. Say, who acknowledged that she was the first women to have written on economic matters and in many respects better than some men, and MacCulloch, who regarded her works as excellent introductions to the study of economics. Two of her works were translated into French and were thus quite likely known by Molinari: Conversations on Political Economy (1817, trans. 1817) and John Hopkin’s Notions on Political Economy (1833).

Martineau, Harriet (1802-1876)

Martineau was an English writer who was born in Norwich to a family of French Huguenots who had fled religious persecution after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Her father was a textile manufacturer and her poor health (she suffered from deafness) turned her towards reading widely and writing. She was unusual for becoming a professional full-time writer at a time when few women were able to pursue such a career. She was a translator, novelist, speech writer, and journalist who wrote a popular defense of the free market, pioneering travel writing about a trip to America, and on the woman question. She first became interested in writing about economic matters after reading about machine-breaking riots in Manchester and then reading the Conversations on Political Economy (1816) by Jane Marcet. Her educational tales or Illustrations of Political Economy appeared in 9 volumes and provided an introduction to economic principles written in narrative form. They were published between 1832 and 1834, sold well and were quickly translated into French. Gustave de Molinari reviewed an edition published by the classical liberal publishing firm Guillaumin for the Journal des économistes in April 1849. In this review, Molinari said about her that “[s]he deserves her double reputation for being an ingenious story teller and a learned professor of political economy.” He later edited a second edition of her Tales in French in 1881.

McCulloch, John Ramsay (1789-1864)

McCulloch was the leader of the Ricardian school following the death of Ricardo. He was a pioneer in the collection of economic statistics, editing classical works in the history of economic thought, and was the first professor of political economy at the University of London in 1828. He wrote The Principles of Political Economy (1825) and A Treatise on the Succession to Property vacant by Death (1848).

Mimerel de Roubaix, Auguste Pierre (1786-1872)

Mimerel de Roubaix was a textile manufacturer and politician from Roubaix who was a vigorous advocate of protectionism. Mimerel was the president of the Conseil général des manufacturiers which advised the government on economic policy. In 1824 he headed a textile group in Lille known as the “Comité des fileurs de Lille”; in 1842 he founded a pro-tariff "Comité de l'industrie" (Committee of Industry) in his home town Roubaix to lobby the government for protection and subsidies against a proposed Franco-Belgian trade treaty which was under discussion; and in October 1846 he was instrumental in organizing the regional committees to form a national body based in Paris known as the "Association pour la défense du travail national" (Association for the Defense of National Employment) in order to better counter the growing interest in Bastiat's Free Trade Association which had also been established in that year. Mimerel and Antoine Odier (1766-1853) sat on the Association's Central Committee, serving as vice-president and president respectively, which was commonly referred to as the "Mimerel Committee” or the "Odier Committee." The Mimerel Committee was a focus for Bastiat’s criticisms of protectionism and it was the Mimerel Committee that called for the firing of free-market professors of political economy and for the abolition of their chairs. The committee later moderated its demands and called for the equal teaching of protectionist and free-trade views. Mimerel was elected deputy in 1849; appointed by Napoléon III to the Advisory Council and to the General Council of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade; and named senator in 1852.

Mirabeau, Victor Riqueti, comte de (1715-1789)

Victor Riquetti was an economist and father of Honoré-Gabriel Riqueti de Mirabeau (1749-1791) who was an political important figure during the French Revolution. Victor was born in Provence, served as a soldier, and as a large land owner experimented with ways to improve agricultural output. He became a member of the physiocratic school of political economy and wrote L’Ami des hommes ou Traité sur la population (1756), Théorie de l’Impôt (1760), Lettres sur le commerce des grains (1768), and most importantly Philosophie rurale ou économie générale et politique de l’agriculture, réduite à l’ordre immuable des lois physiques et morales qui assurent la prospérité des empires (1763). He was also one of the editors of the influential journal Éphémérides du citoyen (1765-68). Although he was not a original theorist his writings on economics reached a wide audience and helped to spread the ideas of the Physiocrats.

Mirabeau, Gabriel Honoré Riqueti, comte de (1749-91)

Honoré Riqueti was the eldest son of the economist Victor Riqueti. He was a soldier as well as a diplomat, journalist, and author who spent time in prison or in exile. During the French Revolution he became a noted orator and was elected to the estates-general in 1789 representing Aix and Marseilles. In his political views he was an advocate of constitutional monarchy along the lines of Great Britain. He is noted for his Essai sur le despotisme (1776) and several works on banking and foreign exchange.

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de (1689–1755)

Montesquieu was one of the most influential legal theorists and political philosophers of the eighteenth century. He trained as a lawyer and practiced in Bordeaux before going to Paris, where he attended an important enlightened salon. His ideas about the separation of powers and checks on the power of the executive had a profound impact on the architects of the American constitution. His most influential works are L’Esprit des lois (1748), Les Lettres persanes (1721), and Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence (1732).

Morelly, Étienne-Gabriel (c. 1717-1778)

Morelly was a novelist and political philosopher. In his Code de la nature, ou le véritable esprit des lois, de tout temps négligé ou méconnu (1755), he advocated a form of utopianism where society was ruled by an enlightened despot, private property had been abolished, and where marriage and police were no longer required in a state of absolute equality. He influenced the thinking of Babeuf, Saint-Simon, and Marx.

Necker, Jacques (1732-1804)

Necker was a Swiss-born banker and politician who served as the minister of finance under Louis XVI just before the French Revolution broke out. His private financial activities were intertwined with the French state when he served as a director of the monopolistic French East India Company and made loans to the French state. In 1775 he wrote a critique of Turgot’s free-trade policies in l’Essai sur la législation et le commerce des grain. In 1776 he was appointed director general of French finances until his dismissal in 1781. He served again in this position from 1788 to 1790. As minister of finance he tried to reform the French taxation system by broadening its base and removing some of its worst inequalities. Needless to say, in this he largely failed. His daughter, Germaine Necker (de Staël), became a famous novelist and historian of the French Revolution. Molinari wrote the entry on Necker in the DEP, T.2, pp. 272-74.

O’Connell, Daniel (1775-1847)

Daniel O'Connell was a liberal Irish politician who campaigned for Catholic Emancipation and independence from Britain. A French language edition of O'Connell's Mémoire sur l'Irlande indigène et saxonne (1843) appeared in 1843 so Molinari was probably aware of his thoughts on Irish independence. The Act of Union creating the “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland” was passed in 1800 and the French liberals were very interested in how Britain ruled Ireland, especially how the protectionist Corn Laws affected Irish agriculture during the potato blight and subsequent famine. Tocqueville’s travelling companion to America, Gustave de Beaumont (1802-1866), wrote a very critical book on the power of the Irish aristocracy which was influential in liberal circles: L'Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse (1839). Molinari was struck by the power of a speech O'Connell gave in Dublin in 1843 on “The Repeal of the Union” where O'Connell quotes at length what the Irish Lord Chancellor and Member of Parliament William Conyngham Plunket, 1st Baron Plunket (1764-1854) said in the House of Commons:

“I, in the most express terms, deny the competence of Parliament to do this Act. I warn you, do not dare to lay your hands upon the constitution. I tell you that if, circumstanced as you are, you pass this Act it will be a nullity, and no man in Ireland will be bound to obey it. I make this assertion deliberately, and call on any man who hears me to take down my words. You have not been elected for this purpose. You have been appointed to make laws, not legislatures. You are appointed to act under the constitution, not to destroy it. You are appointed to exercise the functions of legislators, not to transfer them; and, if you do so, your Act is a dissolution to the Government, and no man in the land is bound to obey you.”

After quoting this passage O'Connell states categorically “The eloquence of that passage is only equalled by its truth.” Early in this same speech O'Connell states:

“I feel, I trust, not an ungenerous pity for those who are to be this day the advocates of the degradation and provincialism of their native land. I unfeignedly pity those who are this day to tell me that the Irish, of all the people of the earth, are unfair for self-government; or to tell me that there is something so mean, low, despicable in the Irish character that we are unfit to do what every other nation on the face of the earth is fit to do - namely to govern themselves.”[1252]

O'Connor, Arthur Condorcet (1763-1852)

Arthur O'Connor (later Arthur Condorcet O'Connor) was an Irish politician, general, and advocate of Irish independence from Britain. He was elected to the Irish lower house of parliament in 1789 until 1796. He was arrested and imprisoned several times for his political activities, especially seeking to forge an alliance with the French for their military assistance in the liberation of Ireland. He was forced to seek exile in France where he served as a General in Napoleon's Irish Brigade. He married the daughter of the philosopher Nicolas de Condorcet in 1807 and took her name. During the July Monarchy he was elected Mayor of Bignon. He and Arago edited a multi-volume collection of his father-in-law's works, Oeuvres de Condorcet (1847-49), 12 vols. Shortly before his death he wrote a 3 volume work on Le Monopole cause de tous les maux (1849-50).

Odier, Antoine (1766-1853)

Odier was a Swiss-born banker and textile manufacturer who came to Paris to play a part in the French Revolution, siding with the liberal Girondin group. He was a deputy (1827-37) and eventually a peer of France (1837). Odier was also president of the Chamber of Commerce of Paris and a leading member of the protectionist "Association pour la défense du travail national" (Association for the Defense of National Employment). He was a member of its “Central comité” (Central Committee) so the organization was sometimes referred to as “the Odier Committee” for short (also known as the Mimerel Committee).

Pareto, Vilfredo (1848-1923)

Pareto was an Italian engineer, economist, and sociologist. His parents had left Italy for political reasons to take up residence in Paris where Pareto was born in 1848. He studied engineering in Turin and spent the first part of his career working in the Italian railways and as a manager in the iron industry. Pareto was an ardent supporter of the free market, and an opponent of socialism, militarism, and protectionism. He was much influenced by the work of Bastiat and Molinari whom he greatly admired and he was one of the few academic economists who quoted from their work in the late 19th century. He switched careers in 1886 when he became a professor of economics and management at the University of Florence and then was appointed to the Chair of Political Economy at the university of Lausanne in Switzerland in 1893. Pareto began writing regularly for the JDE in 1887 when Molinari was editor. In addition to supporting free trade Pareto also used many of Molinari's insights into the political and economic evolution of society which he incorporated into his own theory of sociology, most notably his theory of elites and their circulation. His major works include Cours d'économie politique (1896–97); Les systèmes socialistes (1902-03); Manuel d'économie politique (1909); Trattato Di Sociologia Generale (1916); "Un'applicazione di teorie sociologiche," (The Circulation of Elites) (1900).

Pascal, Blaise (1623-62)

Pascal was a French mathematician and philosopher whose best-known work, Pensées (Thoughts), appeared posthumously. His Provincial Letters (1656) was a controversial work which attacked the casuistry of the Jesuit school.

Passy, Frédéric (1822-1913)

Frédéric Passy was a politician, peace activist, and economist who served as the president of the Political Economy Society for 70 years. He was a supporter of the free trade ideas of Richard Cobden and Frédéric Bastiat and taught economics at the University of Montpellier. He was elected twice to the Chamber of Deputies (1881, 1885) where he opposed the colonial policies of Jules Ferry, the death penalty, and the legal discrimination against women. Passy was also active in the French peace movement, helping to found the Ligue internationale et permanente de la paix in 1868, and in various efforts to establish organisations to encourage international arbitration such as the Société d'arbitrage entre les Nations (1889) and the the Inter-Parliamentary Union. For his efforts he received the first Nobel Peace Prize (1901, with Henri Dunant, one of the founders of the Red Cross). Passy wrote many books on economics and peace, including langes Économiques (1857), an important debate with Molinari on compulsory education, De l'enseignement obligatoire (1857), De la propriété intellectuelle (1859), Notice biographique sur Frédéric Bastiat (1857), and Pour la paix: notes et documents (1909).

Passy, Hippolyte Philibert (1793-1880)

Hippolyte Passy was a cavalry officer in Napoleon’s army and after the restoration of the monarchy took a trip to the United States, during which he discovered the works of Adam Smith. After his return to France he wrote for several opposition papers, such as the liberal National (with Thiers and Mignet), and published a book, De l’aristocracie considérée dans ses rapports avec les progrès de la civilization (1826). Passy was elected as a deputy from 1830, serving as minister of finance in 1834, 1839-40, and 1848-49. In 1838 he became a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, in which he served for some forty years and was particularly active in developing political economy. He criticized the colonization of Algeria and was an advocate of free trade. He was cofounder of the Société d’économie politique (1842) and wrote numerous articles in the Journal des économistes and several books, among which included Des systèmes de culture et de leur influence sur l'économie sociale (1846) and Des causes de l'inégalité des richesses (1848).

Peel, Sir Robert (1788-1850)

Peel was the leader of the Tories, served as Home Secretary under the Duke of Wellington (1822–27) and was prime minister twice (1834–35, 1841–46). He is best known for creating the Metropolitan Police Force in London, the Factory Act of 1844 which regulated the working hours of women and children in the factories, and the repeal of the Corn Laws in May 1846. The latter inspired Bastiat to lobby for similar economic reforms in France. When he was Prime Minister in 1841 the economy was in severe recession and to solve his budgetary problems he introduced an income tax in 1842 (not used since the Napoleonic Wars) which also permitted him to cut the level of tariffs on many goods such as sugar. He was sympathetic to the agitation to repeal the protectionist Corn Laws which he successfully manoeuvred through Parliament on 26 May 1846. The Tory Party, however, was irreparably divided, and on that same evening, he lost a vote of confidence on his Irish policy and had to resign. Molinari wrote the entry on Peel in the DEP, T.2, pp. 351-54.

Poquelin (Molière), Jean-Baptiste (1622-1673)

Jean-Baptiste Poquelin is better known by his stage name Molière. He was a brilliant playwright who made a name for himself with witty comedies which explored the foibles of the French bourgeoisie. He wrote Le Misanthrope (The Misanthrope) (1666), L'Avare (The Miser) (1668), Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (The Bourgeois Gentleman) (1670), and Le Malade imaginaire (The Imaginary Invalid) (1673). He was well known to the Economists as Bastiat refers to his plays repeatedly in the Economic Sophisms, and as a keen theater goer Molinari would have known his plays very well.

Prometheus

Prometheus was a Greek Titan who supposedly stole fire from Zeus in order to give it to mankind. Fire represented not only warmth and cooking, but also knowledge of technology in general. Prometheus was punished by Zeus by being tied to a rock and having his liver eaten every day by an eagle. Every night his liver would grow back and his ordeal would be repeated the next day. During the revolution and Second Republic plays about pro-freedom rebels like Prometheus and Spartacus would have been popular and as a regular theater goer Molinari may well have seen the plays by the republican politician Edgar Quinet (1803-1875) who wrote a play “Prométhée” (Prometheus) (1838). Quinet has Prometheus explain why he brought fire to mankind:

I blew on the cinders and made them feel the spirit: Obscure books, burning questions, Written during the night on the brow of nations, The enigma of death, the enigma of life, Liberty, the one idol which I sacrifice to, Who then, if it is not me, will bring these things from the heavens?

Quinet also wrote a play called “Les Esclaves” (The Slaves) (1853) in which Spartacus plays a major role and which Molinari might also have seen (see Glossary entry on Spartacus).

Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809-65)

Proudhon was a political theorist whom many people consider to be the father of anarchism. Proudhon spent many years as a printer and published several pamphlets on social and economic issues, often running afoul of the censors. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1848 representing La Seine. In 1848 he became editor in chief of a number of periodicals, such as Le Peuple and La Voix du peuple, which got him into trouble again with the censors and for which he spent three years in prison, between 1849 and 1852. He is best known for Qu’est-ce que la propriété? (1841) (Proudhon answered his own question with the statement that “property is theft”), Système des contradictions économiques (1846) (surprisingly published by the Guillaumin firm), and several articles published in the Journal des économistes. His controversy with Bastiat on the subject or interest and rent appears in in the form of letters between Bastiat and Proudhon, “Gratuité du crédit” (1850). Molinari had a high regard for Proudhon as an economist, as did others in the Guillaumin network, except for his position on the charging of interest. Proudhon’s efforts to get the Legislative Assembly to set up a “Peoples’ Bank” in 1848 to charge workers low interests met with failure and was strongly opposed by Molinari and Bastiat. Molinari reviewed several of his works in the JDE.

Quesnay, François (1694-1774)

Quesnay was both a surgeon and an economist. He taught at the Paris School of Surgery and was the personal doctor to Madame Pompadour. As an economist he is best known as one of the founders of the physiocratic school, writing the articles on “Fermiers” and “Grains” for Diderot’s Encylopédie (1756) and also Le Tableau économique (1762) and Physiocratie, ou constitution naturelle de gouvernement le plus avantageux au genre humain (1768). Molinari used a quote from Quesnay’s essay “Le droit naturel” (Natural Law) (1765) on the title page of Les Soirées to sums up the book’s main thesis: “It is necessary to refrain from attributing to the physical laws which have been instituted in order to produce good, the evils which are the just and inevitable punishment for the violation of this very order of laws.” His major works were republished by the Guillaumin firm as vol. 2 of the Collection des principaux économistes (1840-48) edited by Eugène Daire.

Quinet, Edgar (1803-1875)

Quinet was a republican politician, professor of languages, and playwright who was elected twice to the National Assembly during the 1848 Revolution. He wrote the plays “Prometheus” (1838 )[1253] and “Les Esclaves” (The Slaves) in 1853 in which Spartacus plays a major role.

Racine, Jean-Baptiste (1639-1699)

Racine was a French dramatist who wrote tragedies based upon ancient Greek themes and stories, such as Alexandre le Grand (1665), Andromaque (1667), Britannicus (1669), Mithridate (1673), Iphigénie (1674), and Phèdre (1677).

Renouard, Augustin-Charles (1794-1878)

Renouard was a lawyer with an interest in elementary school education. He was secretary general of the minister of justice and an elected deputy. He also was vice-president of the Société d’économie politique and wrote or edited a number of works on economic and educational matters. He was particularly interested in the issue of trade marks and intellectual property taking issue with Molinari’s view that an author’s right to intellectual property was absolute and perpetual. Some of his works include a selection of Benjamin Franklin’s writings, Mélanges de morale, d’économie et de politique (1824), Traité des brevets d'invention, de perfectionnement et d'importation (1825), and “L’éducation doit-elle être libre?”in Revue encyclopédique (1828).

Reybaud, Louis (1798-1879)

Reybaud was a businessman, journalist, novelist, fervent anti-socialist, politician, and writer on economic and social issues. In 1846 he was elected deputy representing Marseilles but his strong opposition to Napoleon III and the empire forced him to retire to devote himself to political economy. He became a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1850. His writings include the prize-winning critique of socialists, Études sur les réformateurs et socialistes modernes: Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen (1840), the satirical novel Jérôme Paturot à la recherché d’une position sociale (1843), and Économistes contemporains (1862). Reybaud also wrote many articles for the Journal des économistes and the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique (1852).

Ricardo, David (1772-1823)

Ricardo was born in London of Dutch-Jewish parents. He joined his father’s stockbroking business and made a considerable fortune on the London Stock Exchange. In 1799 he read Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) and developed an interest in economic theory. He met James Mill and the Philosophic Radicals in 1807, was elected to Parliament in 1819, and was active politically in trying to widen the franchise and to abolish the restrictive corn laws. He wrote a number of works, including The High Price of Bullion (1810), on the bullion controversy, and his treatise On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). Liberty Fund has reprinted his collected works, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (2004). Ricardo's On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) was translated into French by F. S. Constancio with notes by J. B. Say in (1818). It was reprinted with additions from the 3rd London edition of 1821 by Alcide Fonteyraud in a collection of his Complete Works published by Guillaumin in 1847 as volume XIII of the series Collections des principal économistes in which Molinari was also involved as an editor. Most of the Economists, except for Bastiat and Molinari, were orthodox Ricardians on the question of rent. See “Molinari and Bastiat on the Theory of Value,” in Further Aspects,” below, pp. 000.

Roederer, Pierre-Louis (1754-1835)

Roederer was born in Metz and was active as a lawyer, historian and politician. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly in October 1789 representing the Department of la Seine until 1792. Under Napoleon he was appointed minister charged with negotiations with the United States, then director of public education in 1802, and minister of finance for Naples in 1806. He became a Peer and was elected to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1832 under the July Monarchy. He was influenced by Adam Smith whose ideas he popularized in France teaching a course on political economy at the Athénée in Paris in 1800. He wrote a great deal which was mainly published in journals such as the Journal de Paris, and the Journal de’Économie publique. See Pierre-Louis Roederer, Du gouvernement (1795); l’esprit de la révolution de 1789 (1831); Discours sur le droit de propriété, lus au Lycée les 9 décembre 1800 et 18 janvier 1801 (1801); De la propriété considérée dans ses rapports avec les droits politiques (1819).

Rossi, Pellegrino (1787-1848)

Rossi was born in Italy and lived in Geneva, Paris, and Rome. He was a professor of law and political economy, wrote poetry, and ended his days as a diplomat for the French government. He moved to Switzerland after the defeat of Napoleon, where he met Germaine de Staël and the duc de Broglie. He founded with Sismondi and Etienne Dumont the Annales de législation et des jurisprudences. After the death of Jean-Baptiste Say, Rossi was appointed professor of political economy at the Collège de France in 1833, and in 1836 he became a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. In 1847 he was appointed ambassador of France to the Vatican but was assassinated in 1848 in Rome. He wrote Cours d’économie politique (1840) and numerous articles in the Journal des économistes.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712-78)

Rousseau was a Swiss philosopher and novelist who was an important figure in the Enlightenment. In his novels and discourses he claimed that civilization had weakened the natural liberty of mankind and that a truly free society would be the expression of the “general will” of all members of that society. He influenced later thinkers on both ends of the political spectrum. Bastiat often criticized Rousseau as he thought he was the inspiration behind much of the interventionist legislation introduction by the revolutionaries during the 1790s (especially Robespierre) and then later in the 1849 Revolution. He is best known for his book Du Contrat Social (The Social Contract) (1761); he was also the author of, among other works, the Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes (Discourse on Inequality) (1755), the autobiographical Les Confessions (1783), and the novels Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse (1761) and Emile, ou l’education (1762).

Rubichon, Maurice (1766-1849)

Maurice Rubichon and his nephew L. Mounier wrote a series of books comparing the standard of living of British and French workers (especially agricultural workers) using official reports of government inquiries. They examined patterns of land ownership, inheritance laws, food consumption, and the role of the land-owning nobility. Rubichon was born in Grenoble and entered the family merchant business before fleeing to England after the Revolution. The family’s sympathies lay with the Bourbons and the aristocrats and Rubichon used his money and connections to assist émigré nobles. His first book was on the idea that British liberty was based upon the strength of its feudal institutions such as the nobility, the crown, and the church and in his later writings, such as De l'action de la nobles (1848), he took pains to show the positive role that the nobility continued to play in providing a pattern of land ownership which contributed to the superior standard of living of British farmers over their continental counterparts, namely large, consolidated land holdings which could be worked productively over longer periods of time. Molinari found his ideas on the church and the nobility “idiosyncratic”and out of date, but appreciated the amount of work he and Mounier did in collecting large amounts of data on the condition of workers and famers, and his ideas on the importance of large-scale landholdings in improving agricultural productivity. His solution, however, was not to urge a return to feudal notions of the nobility and the clergy but to advocate treating farming like any other large-scale business which would benefit from being run by joint stock companies which could spread risk and make long range plans for future improvements. See De l'Action du clergé dans les sociétés modernes (1829), Des manufactures et de la condition des ouvriers employés hors de l'agriculture dans la Grande-Bretagne et en Irlande (1843), De l'Agriculture en France, d'après les documents officiels (1846), and De l'action de la nobles et des classes supérieures dans les sociétés modernes (1848).

Saint-Chamans, Auguste, vicomte de (1777-1860)

Saint-Chamans was a deputy (1824-27) and a Councillor of State. He advocated protectionism and a mercantilist theory of the balance of trade. He is author of Du système d’impôt fondé sur les principes de l’économie politique (1820). Other works include Nouvel essai sur la richesse des nations (1821) and Traité d’économie publique, suivi d’un aperçu sur les finances de France (1852).

Saint-Pierre, Abbé de (1658-1743)

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre was a French cleric and reformer who was a staunch critic of King Louis XIV. He is best known for his plan to create a pan-European tribunal to adjudicate international disputes instead of waging war: Projet pour render la paid perpétuelle en Europe (1713-17). His ideas sprang from his role as a negotiator at the Treaty of Utrecht (1712-13) which ended the War of Spanish Succession. After his death his writings were given to Jean-Jacques Rousseau to edit and publish. Molinari published in 1857 (the year after the Crimean War in which and England were involved came to an end) a detailed study of Saint-Pierre's work which also included a critique of de Maistre's view expressed in the Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg that war was inevitable and divinely ordained. See Molinari, L'abbé de Saint-Pierre, membre exclu de l'Académie française, sa vie et ses oeuvres (1857) and Molinari, “Saint-Pierre” in the DEP.

Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de (1760-1825)

Saint-Simon came from a distinguished aristocratic family and initially planned a career in the military, serving under George Washington during the American Revolution. During the 1780s he gave up his military career to become a writer and social reformer. When the French Revolution broke out, in 1789, he renounced his noble status and took the simple name of Henri Saint-Simon. Between 1817 and 1822 Saint-Simon wrote a number of books that laid the foundation for his theory of “industry” (see the glossary entry on “Industry”), by which he meant that the old regime of war, privilege, and monopoly would gradually be replaced by peace and a new elite of creators, producers, and industrialists. His disciples, such as Auguste Comte and Olinde Rodrigues, carried on his work with the Saint-Simonian school of thought. Saint-Simon’s views developed in parallel to the more liberal ideas about “industry” espoused by Augustin Thierry, Charles Comte, and Charles Dunoyer during the same period (see entries for Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer). What distinguished the two schools of thought was that Saint-Simonians advocated rule by a technocratic elite and state-supported “industry,” which verged on being a form of socialism, while the liberal school around Comte and Dunoyer advocated a completely free market without any state intervention whatsoever, which would thus allow the entrepreneurial and “industrial” classes to rise to a predominant position without coercion. Saint-Simon’s best-known works include Réorganisation de la société européenne (1814), l’Industrie (1817), l’Organisateur (1819); and Du système industriel (1821).

Say, Horace Émile (1794-1860)

The Say family played a very important role in liberal political economy circles in France for nearly 100 years. It began with Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), then his son Horace Émile Say (1794-1860), and his grandson Léon Say (1826-96).

Horace Say was the son of Jean-Baptiste Say. He married Anne Cheuvreux, sister of Casimir Cheuvreux, whose family were friends of Bastiat. Say was a businessman and traveled in 1813 to the United States and Brazil. A result of his trip was Historie des relations commerciales entre la France et le Brésil (1839). He became president of the Chamber of Commerce of Paris in 1834, became a councillor of state (1849-51), and headed an important inquiry into the state of industry in the Paris region (1848-51). Say was also very active in liberal circles, participating in the foundation of the Société d’économie politique, the Guillaumin publishing firm, the Journal des économistes, the Journal du commerce; and was an important collaborator in the creation of the Dictionnaire de l’économe politique and the Dictionnaire du commerce et des marchandises. In 1857 he was nominated to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques but died before he could join it formally. He also wrote two important works, Paris, son octroi et ses emprunts (1847) which was analysis and critique of the octroi tax on imported goods into the city of Paris, and on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of Paris a detailed analysis of the state of industry in the city,  Statistique de l’Industrie à Paris résultant de l’enquête. Faite par la Chambre de commerce pour les années 1847-1848 (1851).

Say, Jean-Baptiste (1767-1832)

Jean-Baptiste Say was the leading French political economist in the first third of the nineteenth century. Before becoming an academic political economist quite late in life, Say apprenticed in a commercial office, working for a life insurance company; he also worked as a journalist, soldier, politician, cotton manufacturer, and writer. During the revolution he worked on the journal of the idéologues, La Décade philosophique, littéraire, et politique, for which he wrote articles on political economy from 1794 to 1799. In 1814 he was asked by the government to travel to England on a fact-finding mission to discover the secret of English economic growth and to report on the impact of the revolutionary wars on the British economy. His book De l'Angleterre et des Anglais (1815) was the result. After the defeat of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, Say was appointed to teach economics in Paris, first at the Athénée, then as a chair in "industrial economics” at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, and finally the first chair in political economy at the Collège de France. Say is best known for his Traité d'économie politique (1803), which went through many editions (and revisions) during his lifetime. One of his last major works, the Cours complet d'économie politique pratique (1828-33), was an attempt to broaden the scope of political economy, away from the preoccupation with the production of wealth, by examining the moral, political, and sociological requirements of a free society and how they interrelated with the study of political economy.

Senior, Nassau William (1790–1864)

Senior was a British economist who became a professor of political economy at Oxford University in 1826. In 1832 he was asked to investigate the condition of the poor and, with Edwin Chadwick, wrote the Poor Law Commissioners’ Report of 1834. In 1843 he was appointed a corresponding member of the Institut de France, In 1847 he returned to Oxford University. During his life he wrote many articles for the review journals, such as the Quarterly Review, the Edinburgh Review, and the London Review. His books include Lectures on Political Economy (1826) and Outline of the Science of Political Economy (1834).

Sismondi, Jean Charles Léonard Simonde de (1773-1842)

Sismondi was a Swiss historian and economist. He was an early theorist of the periodic economic crises which afflicted industrial societies. His major works include De la richesse commerciale (1803); Nouveaux principes d'économie politique (1819); Études sur l'économie politique (1837-8) which is a collection of his essays and other writings; and a typical example of his concern for workers, Du sort des ouvriers dans les manufactures (1834). A collection of his essays and extracts have been translated. See Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government (1847).

Smith, Adam (1723-1790)

Smith was a leading figure in the Scottish enlightenment and one of the founders of modern economic thought with his work The Wealth of Nations (1776). He studied at the University of Glasgow and had as one of his teachers the philosopher Francis Hutcheson. In the late 1740s Smith lectured at the University of Edinburgh on rhetoric, belles-lettres, and jurisprudence which are available to us because of detailed notes taken by one of his students. In 1751 he moved to Glasgow, where he was a professor of logic and then moral philosophy. His Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759, translated into French in 1774) was a product of this period of his life. Between 1764 and 1766 he traveled to France as the tutor to the duke of Buccleuch. While in France Smith met many of the physiocrats and visited Voltaire in Geneva. As a result of a generous pension from the duke, Smith was able to retire to Kirkaldy to work on his magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations, which appeared in 1776 (French edition in 1788). Smith was appointed in 1778 as commissioner of customs and was based in Edinburgh, where he spent the remainder of his life. An important French edition of the Wealth of Nations was published by Guillaumin with notes and commentary by leading French economists such as Blanqui, Garnier, Sismondi, and Say and appeared in 1843.[1254]

Spartacus (109-71 BC)

Spartacus was a Thracian slave who was forced to fight as a gladiator in Rome before leading a rebellion of slaves against the Roman Empire. He and his fellow slaves were defeated and brutally crucified as a warning to other slaves. As a keen theater goer Molinari might well have seen the play "Spartacus” by Bernard Joseph Saurin which premiered at the Comédie-Française in 1760 and was revived in 1818. Crassus offers his daughter Emilie in marriage to Spartacus in order to cement a possible peace treaty between them, which Spartacus rejects in the following words (p. 107): "Pour être digne d'elle il faut y renoncer, Et ne point immoler, en m'unissant à Rome, La liberté du monde à l'intérêt d'un homme: Je n'achèterai point mon bonheur à ce prix” (In order to be worthy of marrying her in Rome, I would have to renounce and not just sacrifice the liberty of the world for the interest of a man: I will not not buy my happiness at such a price). A statue of "Spartacus breaking his chains” by the neoclassical sculptor Denis Foyatier (1793-1863) was erected in the Tuilleries Gardens in 1831. Molinari might well have seen this as well.[1255]

Thierry, Jacques-Nicolas Augustin (1795-1856)

Thierry was a pioneering historian who is famous for his classical liberal class analysis of history and his extensive use of archival records in researching and writing this history. He began as the personal assistant to Saint-Simon (1814-1817) before joining Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer on their journal Le Censeur européen. It was here that he learned to analyze history using the social and economic theories developed by Comte and Dunoyer which was based upon the work of Jean-Baptiste Say. Thierry became interested in the ruling elites which governed nations, how they came to power (often through conquest as the Normans did of Saxon England), and the gradual emergence of free institutions such as the medieval communes and the Third Estate. He was favored by Guizot and other political leaders of the July Monarchy who encouraged his archival research with an appointment to the Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres (1830) and the editorship of a massive collection of documents published as Recueil des monuments inédits de l’histoire du Tiers état (1850-1870). His collected writings from Le Censeur européen were later published as Dix ans d’études historiques (1834). His other works include Histoire de la conquête de l’Angleterre par les Normands (1825), Lettres sur l’histoire de France (1827), and Essai sur l’histoire de la formation et des progrès du Tiers état (1850).

Thiers, Adolphe (1797-1877)

Thiers was a lawyer, historian, politician, and journalist. While he was a lawyer he contributed articles to the liberal journal Le Constitutionnel and published one of his most famous works, the ten-volume Histoire de la révolution française (1823-27). He was instrumental in supporting Louis-Philippe in July 1830 and was the main opponent of Guizot. Thiers defended the idea of a constitutional monarchy in such journals as Le National. After 1813 he became successively a deputy, undersecretary of state, minister of agriculture, and minister of the interior. He was briefly prime minister and minster of foreign affairs in 1836 and 1840, when he resisted democratization and promoted some restrictions on the freedom of the press. He was also instrumental is planning the building of a huge system of military forts and a wall around Paris, known as “Thiers’ wall or enclosure," which was constructed between 1841-44 at a cost of fr. 150 million. During the 1840s he worked on the twenty-volume Histoire de consulat et de l’empire, which appeared between 1845 and 1862. After the 1848 revolution and the creation of the Second Empire he was elected deputy representing Rouen in the Constituent Assembly. Thiers was a strong opponent of Napoleon III’s foreign policies and after his defeat was appointed head of the provisional government by the National Assembly and then became president of the Third Republic until 1873. Thiers wrote some essays on economic matters for the Journal des économistes, but his protectionist sympathies did not endear him to the economists. He also wrote a book on property, De la propriété (1848) which Molinari critically reviewed in the JDE in January 1849.

Thompson, Thomas Perronet (1783-1869)

Thompson had a colorful career as a soldier, politician, polymath writer, and pamphleteer and agitator for the Anti-Corn Law League. He was a member of the Philosophical Radicals who were inspired by utilitarian and reformist ideas of Jeremy Bentham. Thompson was active in urging Catholic emancipation, the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the abolition of slavery, and played a leading role in managing the reformist journal the Westminster Review. His most significant works include The True Theory of Rent (1829), Catechism on the Corn Laws; with a List of Fallacies and Answers (1827), Contre-Enquête: par l’Homme aux Quarante Ecus (1834) a defense of free trade written in response to a French government inquiry into tariff policy. He published a collection of his essays as Exercises, Political and Others (1842).

Toussenel, Alphonse (1803-1885)

Toussenel was a journalist who was a utopian socialist and follower of Fourier. He was the editor of the journal La Paix. His views were anglophobic, anti-semitic, and very hostile to the free market economists. He used the phrase "gouvernement-ulcère”to describe the dangerous free market ideas coming out of England which we being promoted by the French economists to justifying their theories of laissez-faire.[1256]

Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, baron de Laulne (1727-81)

Turgot was an economist of the physiocratic school, a politician, a reformist bureaucrat, and a writer. During the mid 1750s Turgot came into contact with the physiocrats, such as Quesnay, Dupont de Nemours, and Vincent de Gournay (who was the free-market intendant for commerce). Turgot had two opportunities to put free-market reforms into practice: when he was appointed Intendant of Limoges in 1761-74; and when Louis XVI made him minister of finance between 1774 and 1776, at which time Turgot issued his six edicts to reduce regulations and taxation. His works include Eloge de Gournay (1759), Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses (1766), and Lettres sur la liberté du commerce des grains (1770). His works were republished by the Guillaumin firm as vols. 3 and 4 of the Collection des principaux économistes (1840-48) edited by Eugène Daire.

Villiers, George, 1st Duke of Buckingham (1592–1628)

Villiers became a favorite of King James I (possibly also his lover) who bestowed on him an enormous rank and fortune. After 1616 he began to exert a large influence in Irish affairs, becoming the leading tax farmer in 1618, profiting from the sale of Irish titles, and the acquisition of large tracts of land for himself and his family. In the 1620s Buckingham accompanied the King (Charles I) to Spain to negotiate a marriage contract and became involved in a failed scheme to burn the Spanish fleet harbored at Cadiz. Buckingham also was involved in French affairs in negotiating with Prime Minister Cardinal Richelieu for British naval assistance in suppressing French protestants. He died at the hands of an assassin in 1628. What might have brought him to Molinari's attention was the fact the Buckingham was a character in Alexandre Dumas novel Les Trois Mousquetaires (The Three Musketeers) which was serialized in a French newspaper Le Siècle (March-July 1844). In Dumas's novel Buckingham is depicted as the Queen's lover and as somewhat of a rake. See Alexandre Dumas, Les Trois mousquetaires (1849).

Watt, James (1736-1819)

Watt was a Scottish engineer whose innovations and improvements in the technology of steam engines was a major contributing factor in the spread of the industrial revolution in Britain.

Wilson, James (1805-1860)

Wilson was born in Scotland. He became an economic journalist working for the Manchester Guardian, was a supporter of free trade, founded the magazine The Economist in 1843, and was elected to parliament in 1847. He was an advocate of laissez-faire economic policies in England and supported the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. His books include Influence of the Corn Laws (1839) and Capital, Currency, and Banking (1847), which was a collection of his articles from the Economist.

Wolowski, Louis (1810-76)

Wolowski was a lawyer, politician, and economist of Polish origin. His interests lay in industrial and labor economics, free trade, and bimetallism. He was a professor of industrial law at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques from 1855, serving as its president in 1866-67, and a member and president of the Société d’économie politique. His political career started in 1848, when he represented La Seine in the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies. During the 1848 Revolution he was an ardent opponent of the socialist Louis Blanc and his plans for labor organization. Wolowski continued his career as a politician in the Third Republic, where he served as a member of the Assembly and took an interest in budgetary matters. He edited the Revue de droit français et étranger and wrote articles for the Journal des économistes. Among his books are Cours de législation industrielle. De l’organisation du travail (1844) and Études d’économie politique et de statistique (1848), La question des banques (1864), La Banque d’Angleterre et les banques d’Ecosse (1867), La liberté commerciale et les résultats du traité de commerce de 1860 (1869), and l’or et l’argent (1870).


19. Glossary of Places

The Luxembourg Palace

The Luxembourg Palace in the 6th arrondissement of Paris was a 17th century palace which was seized as "national property" during the Revolution (1791) and was used as a prison for a period during the Terror. In 1799 it became the seat of the French Senate and after 1814 housed the Chamber of Peers.

One of the first acts of the Provisional Government after February 1848 was the establishment of a “Commission du gouvernement pour les travailleurs” (Government Commission for the Workers) which was housed in the Luxembourg Palace (hence it was also known as the Luxembourg Commission) which oversaw the National Workshops program under the direction of the socialist Louis Blanc (1811-1882). The National Workshops were created on February 27, 1848 to create government funded jobs for unemployed workers. The Workshops were regarded by socialists as a key part of the revolution and as a model for the future reform of French society. Following an attempted coup by Blanc on 15 May, 1848 the Luxembourg Commission was closed down. After violent demonstrations in the streets of Paris 23-26 June the National Workshops were shut down as well.

The Saint-Gothard Railway Tunnel

The first tunnel under the Swiss Alps was the railway tunnel of Saint-Gothard. It was 15 km in length and was opened to traffic in June 1882. Construction began in 1872 and saw the use of new technology such as pneumatic drills and dynamite. The engineer for the project Louis Favre died in the tunnel from an aneurism brought on by stress and 307 workers lost their lives a result of accidents and the working conditions. The engineers had underestimated the difficulty of the project. The amount of water which came out of the rock face and the hardness of the granite made it possible to only make progress of 7-9 meters per day.

Rue Saint-Lazare (Saint Lazarus Street) and its Railway Station

Saint Lazarus Street in Paris got its name from the religious order of Saint Lazarus which ran a leprosy hospital before the Revolution. It later became the site for one of the major railway stations in Paris.

The hospitals or hospices known as a “lazaret” (or “lazaretto” in Italian) were established to care for people with communicable diseases, such as leprosy, or a quarantine station for sailors who also might bring diseases back from their travels. It got its name from the Military and Hospitaller Order of St. Lazarus of Jerusalem which established a leprosy hospital for its members during the Crusades in the mid-12th century. The Order built a leprosy hospital in Paris in the 18th century where the Saint Lazarus Street is located. The Order is a very good example of the voluntary provision of medical services to a severely disadvantaged group of people.

The home of the young liberal journalist Hippolyte Castille (1820-1886) was on the rue Saint-Lazare. It had been at one stage the official residence of Cardinal Fesch (1763-1839) but was now the meeting place for a small group of liberals, which included Frédéric Bastiat, Gustave de Molinari, Joseph Garnier, Alcide Fonteyraud, and Charles Coquelin, and other radicals, who met regularly between 1844 and early 1848 to discuss political and economic matters. It was thus Castille’s home which supplied the name for Molinari’s book, Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare (1849).[1257]

The Saint-Lazare railroad station was built in 1837 and it was the first major railroad station in Paris. It was enlarged and expanded between 1842 and 1853 and soon became the most important railway station in Paris. Another enlargement took place in 1865 and was the subject of a series of 12 famous paintings by Claude Monet, "La Gare Saint-Lazare” which he created in 1877.


20. Glossary of Newspapers and Journals

Le Courrier français (1819-1846)

Le Courrier français (1820-1846) was a liberal and anti-clerical newspaper founded by the constitutional monarchist Auguste-Hilarion, comte de Kératry (1769-1859). It was suspended and threatened with legal action several times during the 1820s for its stand against the French intervention in Spain and for criticizing the established church. The banker Jacques Lafitte (1767-1844) supported it financially. It was more popular during the July Monarchy but still remained a small circulation paper and was forced to close in 1846. Hippolyte Castille was a regular contributor. Both Bastiat and Molinari also wrote for it on occasion.

Dictionnaire de l’Économie Politique (1852-53)

The DEP is a two volume, 1,854 page, double-columned, nearly two million word encyclopedia of political economy which was published in 1852-53. It is unquestionably one of the most important publishing events in the history of mid-century French classical liberal thought and is unequalled in its scope and comprehensiveness. The project was undertaken by the publisher Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin (1801-1864) with the assistance of Charles Coquelin (1802-1852) as chief editor who died suddenly from a heart attack in August 1852 after having finished work on volume one. The aim was to assemble a compendium of the state of knowledge of liberal political economy with articles written by leading economists on key topics, biographies of important historical figures, annotated bibliographies of the most important books in the field, and tables of economic and political statistics. The Economists believed that the events of the 1848 Revolution had shown how poorly understood the principles of economics were among the French public, especially its political and intellectual elites. One of the tasks of the DEP was to rectify this situation with an easily accessible summary of the discipline. In keeping with their habit of calling themselves “The Economists” the editors and publisher of the Dictionary called it the “Dictionary of THE Political Economy."

Molinari was a major contributor, writing 25 principle articles (most notably the important articles on “Free Trade” and “Tariffs”, and six of which were more substantial bibliographical articles) and 5 biographical articles (see the bibliography for a complete list). We have included seven of these articles which were translated for Lalor’s Cyclopedia in 1881 in the Addendum. In the acknowledgements he was mentioned as one of the five key collaborators on the project. Other major contributors included the editor Coquelin (with 70 major articles), Horace Say (29), Joseph Garnier (28), Ambroise Clément (22), and Courcelle-Seneuil (21). Maurice Block wrote most of the biographical entries.

A massive undertaking like this would have taken several years to plan, write, and edit so it must have been at least in the planning stage when Molinari was writing Les Soirées over the summer of 1849 and many of the topics he discusses in that work also appeared as entries in the DEP. It was announced in the Guillaumin catalog of May 1849 as being “in preparation,” and it was made available in subscription form in August 1849, and would eventually sell in book form for the rather large sum of 50 fr. There were four editions published during the nineteenth century (1852-53, 1854, 1864, 1873). A second and largely rewritten version of the DEP appeared in 1891-92 called the Nouveau Dictionnaire d’Économie Politique edited by Léon Say the grandson of Jean-Baptiste Say.

We have made considerable use of the DEP in editing this translation as it provides a great deal of information about French government policy, economic data on a broad range of topics, contemporary literature on economic thought, and most importantly, the state of mind of the French political economists in the mid-19th century.

Molinari provided considerable background information about the DEP project in an article he wrote for the at the end of 1853 and which has been included in the Addendum.[1258]

L’Économiste belge (1855-1868)

While Molinari was in Brussels teaching at the Musée royal de l'industrie belge he also edited his own journal called the Économiste belge (The Belgian Economist). In the pages of this short journal, which was more like a newsletter than anything else as it was only 12 pages long and appeared bi-weekly and then weekly, he promoted the causes of free trade, administrative reform, his idea of labor exchanges, and other matters which came to his attention. The journal appeared between January 1855 and December 1868 when his wife died and he decided to move back to Paris to work as a journalist with the Journal des débats. He described himself as the “Directeur-gérant” (proprietor-publisher) which suggests he saw it as a business operation as well as an ideological weapon in his struggle for free trade and deregulation. The subtitle of the journal changed over the years which suggests his changing attitudes: it began as “Journal des réformes économiques et administratives” (journal of economic and administrative reform) (1855-58), “Organe des intérêts de l'industrie et du commerce” (Organ for the interests of Industry and Commerce) (1859-62), and “Organe des intérêts politiques et économiques des consommateurs” (Organ for the political and economic interests of Consumers) (1863-68).

Press (Liberal and Republican)

Liberal journals included Le Commerce (1837-1848) edited by Arnold Scheffer and others; Le Courrier français (1820-1846) supported by the banker Jacques Lafitte and for which Bastiat and Molinari occasionally wrote; Le Constitutionnel (1815-) had been the main opposition paper of the Restoration but became a supporter of the Orléanist regime during the July Monarchy; Le Temps (1829-1842) was a liberal daily newspaper founded by François Guizot and Jacques Coste which was very critical of the regime before the 1830 Revolution and less so afterwards; the main Economist journal Le Journal des Économistes (1842-) to which Molinari was a frequent contributor; Le National (1830-1851) founded by Adolphe Thiers, François-Auguste Mignet, and Armand Carrel; La Presse (1836-) founded by Émile de Girardin; the journal which Bastiat founded and wrote for: Le Libre-Échange (1846-1848), and the two founded by Molinari and other liberal colleagues, La République française (February - March 1848), and Jacques Bonhomme (June 1848).

Republican journals include Le Journal du peuple (1834-1842) which had Lafayette as one of its founders but which later became left-leaning in supporting the interests of workers; La Reforme (1843-50) edited by Ferdinand Flocon and Eugène Baune whose staff filled many positions in the Provisional Government after February 1848; La République (1848-1850) was a radical republican daily newspaper edited by Eugène Bareste - its prior existence was probably the reason why Bastiat and Molinari had to change the name of their revolutionary paper to La République française as their first choice had already been taken.

Press (Conservative)

Conservative and legitimist journals include Le Quotidienne (1814-1847) which was an ultra-royalist journal founded by Joseph Michaud; the monarchist and legitimist newspaper L'Union monarchique was created in 1847 when 3 small newspapers were amalgamated: L'Echo française (1829-1847), La Quotidienne (1814-1847) (the leading ultra-royalist newspaper of the Restoration), and La France (1834-1847) (its subtitle was "Organ of the Monarchical and Religious Interests of Europe"). L'Union monarchique changed its name to L'Union in 1848.The Journal des Débats (1789-1944) edited by Chateaubriand, was one of the most prestigious journals in France which was able to survive the vicissitudes of French political change - it should be noted that Gustave de Molinari became an editor in the 1870s; L’Echo français (1829-1847) was a legitimist newspaper which eventually merged with 2 other journals due to falling subscriptions; La France (1834-1847) was a daily legitimist newspaper; La Gazette de France was a very long lived legitimist newspaper; La Nation (1843-1845) was a moderate newspaper which supported the July Monarchy; La Revue des deux mondes (1829-1944) was a liberal Orléanist journal which appeared fortnightly and became the most important literary review of the 19th century - Economists such as Michel Chevalier and Léon Faucher published articles in this review.

The official newspaper of the French government was Le Moniteur.

Press (Socialist)

The main schools of French socialism all had journals and newspapers: the Saint-Simonians published Le Producteur, journal philosophique de l'industrie, de la science et des beaux arts (1825-26, 5 vols.); Le Globe, journal de la religion saint-simonienne (1830-32); L'Organisateur (1830-32). The followers of Fourier published La Réforme industrielle ou le phalanstère (1832-33); La Phalange; La Démocratie pacifique (1843-1851); Le Nouveau-Monde (1839-). The "humanitarian socialists” (Pierre Leroux) published Revue social, ou Solution pacifique du problème du prolétariat (1845-47) and La Revue independante (1841-1848). Philippe Buchez published a worker written and produced journal L’Atelier (1840-1850). Le Populaire (1833-1835, 1841-1851) was a socialist and utopian newspaper which supported the ideas of Étienne Cabet. La Ruche populaire (1839-1849) founded by the Vinçard brothers was the first weekly journal produced and edited by workers for workers.

Jacques Bonhomme (the Magazine) (11 June - 13 July, 1848)

Molinari was involved in two short-lived revolutionary magazines in 1848. The first appeared two days after the revolution broke out in February and was called La République française and the second appeared in June and July and was called Jacques Bonhomme. Undaunted at the failure of their first effort in February, Molinari and Frédéric Bastiat launched another journal, this time directed squarely at working people, to be called Jacques Bonhomme, which comes from the nickname given to the average working Frenchman. They were joined by Charles Coquelin, Alcide Fonteyraud, and Joseph Garnier. The journal appeared biweekly and was handed out on the streets of Paris but only lasted for four issues between 11 June and 13 July. Shortly after the first issue appeared the June Days uprising (23-26 June) took place. One of the more noteworthy articles to appear in the journal was a draft version of Bastiat’s essay on “The State” in the 11 June issue.[1259] On June 21 the government decided to close the National Workshops, which were a government program to provide state subsidized employment to unemployed workers, because of out of control expenses. This was promptly followed by a mass uprising in Paris to protest the decision and troops were called in to suppress the protesters causing considerable loss of life. While this was happening Bastiat sent Molinari and the editorial committee an article he had written entitled "Dissolve the National Workshops!”which appeared on the front page of the very last issue of Jacques Bonhomme. Shortly afterwards they closed down the magazine for reasons of safety. See also the glossary entry on “Jacques Bonhomme (The Historical Figure).”

Le Journal des débats (1789-1944)

Journal founded in 1789 by the Bertin family and managed for almost forty years by Louis-François Bertin. The journal went through several title changes and after 1814 became Le Journal des débats politiques et littéraires. The journal likewise underwent several changes of political positions: it was against Napoléon during the First Empire; under the second restoration it became conservative rather than reactionary; and under Charles X it supported the liberal stance espoused by the Doctrinaires. It should be noted that Bastiat published the longer version of his famous essay “The State” in the 25 September 1848 issue of the JDD. Gustave de Molinari was an editor in the 1870s. It ceased publication in 1944.

The Journal des Économistes (1842-1940)

The Journal des économistes: revue mensuelle de l'économie politique, des questions agricoles, manufacturières et commerciales was the journal of the Société d’économie politique (Political Economy Society) and appeared from December 1841 and then roughly every month until it was forced to close following the occupation of Paris by the Nazis in 1940. It was published by the firm of Guillaumin, which also published the writings of most of the liberals of the period. The Journal des économistes was the leading journal of the free-market economists (known as “les économistes”) in France in the second half of the nineteenth century. The editors of the JDE were as follows: the founding editor and publisher Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin (1801-64) editor from December 1841 to 1842; Adolphe Blanqui (1798-1854) editor 1842-43; Hippolyte Dussard (1798-1876) editor 1843-45; Joseph Garnier (1813-1881) editor 1845-55; Henri Baudrillart (1821-1892) editor 1855-65; Joseph Garnier (1813-1881) editor (1866-81); Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) editor October 1881-1909; and Yves Guyot (1843-1928) editor from 1910.

The pattern the editors settled upon was to publish a numbered monthly issue of about 120 pages and then bind the issues into a quarterly volume or tome which was consecutively numbered with about 500 pages. Every so often a volume would include an analytical index of the previous years issues, the most useful being the analytical index for the first two series (1841-1853, and 1854-1865) which was published separately in 1883.[1260] Another useful index was published in 1891 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the JDE. It is a summary listing of the major authors, articles by topic, topics discussed at the monthly meetings of the Société d'économie politique, and key obituaries.

Molinari first came to the attention of the editor, Joseph Garnier, in May 1846 when he reviewed Molinari’s book Études économiques very positively and described him as “un jeune économiste de la plus belle espérance” (a young economist of the greatest promise).[1261] Molinari’s first article came soon afterwards in January 1847 on English agriculture.[1262] He wrote 4 articles and book reviews in 1847, 4 articles and book reviews in 1848; 7 articles and book reviews in 1849, and 9 articles and book reviews in 1850-51.

After the Revolution broke out in February 1848 the JDE changed its publishing schedule from once of month (usually appearing on the 15th of each month) to twice a month so that the editors could report more frequently on what was happening, especially on the flood of books and pamphlets which were appearing about the economic policies of the Provisional Government and then the Constituent Assembly. During this period Molinari wrote many of the unsigned “Chronicle” reports which kept readers up to date with what was happening during the Revolution. It resumed its normal publishing schedule in December of 1848.[1263]

Le Libre-Échange (1846-1848)

The weekly journal of the Association pour la liberté des échanges. It began in 1846 as Le Libre-échange: Journal du travail agricole, industriel et commercial but changed its name to the simpler Le Libre échange at the start of its second year of publication. After appearing for 72 issues it closed on 16 April 1848 as a result of the revolution when the advisory board decided to redirect their resources to fighting the rise of socialism. The first sixty-four issues were edited by Bastiat, the editor in chief, and Joseph Garnier (the last one edited by Bastiat appeared on 13 February, 1848); the last eight issues were edited by Charles Coquelin. The journal’s editorial board included Anisson-Dupéron (pair de France), Bastiat, Adolphe Blanqui, Gustave Brunet (assistant to the mayor of Bordeaux), Campan (secretary of the Chamber of Commerce of Bordeaux), Michel Chevalier, Charles Coquelin, Charles Dunoyer, Léon Faucher, Alcide Fonteyraud, Joseph Garnier, Louis Leclerc, Gustave de Molinari, Prosper Paillottet, Horace Say, and Louis Wolowski. The first fifty-two issues were published as a book by the Guillaumin publishing firm under the title Le Libre-échange, journal de l’association pour la liberté des échanges (1847).

La République française (26 February - 28 March 1848)

Molinari was involved in two short-lived revolutionary magazines in 1848. The first appeared two days after the revolution broke out in February and was called La République française and the second appeared in June and July and was called Jacques Bonhomme. La République française appeared daily and was edited by Frédéric Bastiat, Hippolyte Castille, and Gustave de Molinari. It appeared in 30 issues between 26 February and 28 March. The format of the magazine was only one or two pages which could be handed out on street corners or pasted to walls so that passers by could read them.

Molinari has some interesting reminiscences about how the magazine came into existence.[1264] A translation of the journal’s principles which appeared in the first issue can be found in an Appendix to volume three of Liberty Fund’s edition of Bastiat’s Collected Works, "Quelques mots d'abord sur le titre de notre journal: La République française" (A Few Words about the Title of Our Journal: The French Republic) [26 February 1848] in which Bastiat and Molinari make clear their strong republican and free market principles.

Le Travail intellectuel (15 Aug. 1847 and 15 Feb. 1848)

Hippolyte Castille (1820-1886) founded in August 1847 a short-lived journal which appeared between 15 Aug. 1847 and 15 Feb. 1848 and was devoted to the importance of intellectual property, Le travail intellectuel, journal des intérêts scientifiques, littéraires et artistiques. Molinari is mentioned as a “collaborator” and other leading economists were listed as “supporters” (Frédéric Bastiat, Charles Dunoyer, Horace Say, Michel Chevalier, Joseph Garnier). The journal was monthly and lasted 7 months before closing in February 1848.


21. Glossary of Subjects and Terms

The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences

The Académie des sciences morales et politiques (the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences) is a French learned society and one of the five academies which comprise the Institute of France. The Academy was founded in 1795 as part of a restructuring of the pre-revolutionary Royal Academies. It was abolished in a restructuring made by Napoleon in 1803 in order to remove the many members who had opposed his rule. It was reconstituted by King Louis-Philippe in October 1832 on the advice of François Guizot and Pierre-Louis Roederer as the Académie Royale des Sciences Morales et Politiques (Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences). There are 50 members of the Academy who are elected by their peers. There are also additional "corresponding” members. In 1832 there were 5 sections: philosophy, moral science, law and jurisprudence, political economy, and history. In January 1847 the membership of the 2nd section (Morale) included Dunoyer (1832), Droz (1832), Lucas (1836), Tocqueville (1838), Beaumont (1841), and Alban de Villeneuve (1845). The 4th section (Économie politique et Statistique) had as full members - Dupin (1832), Villermé (1832), Rossi (1836), Blanqui (1838), Passy (1838), and Duchatel (1842). Bastiat was made a “corresponding” (or junior) member of the 4th section on 24 January, 1846 when he was elected with 20 votes (out of a possible 21) by the other full members of the Academy.[1265] Dunoyer had promoted Bastiat’s candidature by presenting copies of Bastiat’s two books which had appeared since his arrival in Paris: his book on Cobden and the League (1845) and the first series of the Economic Harmonies (January 1846). Bastiat was very proud of this position and included it as part of his credentials on the cover of the books and pamphlets he published. For example, L'État. Maudit argent, par M. Frédéric Bastiat, Représentant du peuple, Membre correspondant de l’Institut, et du Conseil général des Landes. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849). His younger friend and colleague, Gustave de Molinari also never became a full member of the Academy - he too was elected a corresponding member on 28 March, 1874.[1266]

To become a full member one had to wait for an existing member to die after which an election by the other sitting members would be held to fill the empty “chair”. After Pellegrino Rossi's assassination in Rome, his chair was filled by Léon Faucher in 1849, which was the only possibility Bastiat might have had for promotion within the Academy. Michel Chevalier was elected in 1851 to replace Louis Villermé and Louis Wolowski was elected in 1855 to replace Adolphe Blanqui. Bastiat's friend and colleague Joseph Garnier had to wait until 1873 before he was elected to replace Charles Dupin.

Many of the Economists and other classical liberals were members of the Academy, such as the following (with the year they were elected): Charles Dunoyer (1832); Joseph Droz (1832); Charles Comte (1832); Pellegrino Rossi (1836); Alexis de Tocqueville (1838); Hippolyte Passy (1838); Adolphe Blanqui (1838); Gustave de Beaumont (1841); Léon Faucher (1849); Louis Reybaud (1850); Michel Chevalier (1851); Louis Wolowski (1855); Horace Say (1857); Augustin-Charles Renouard (1861); Henri Baudrillart (1866); Joseph Garnier (1873); Frédéric Passy (1877); Léon Say (1881).[1267]

Anti-Corn Law League

The Anti-Corn Law League (also known as the “Corn League”or “League”) was founded in 1838 by Richard Cobden and John Bright in Manchester. Their initial aim was to repeal the law restricting the import of grain (“corn laws”), but they soon called for the unilateral ending of all agricultural and industrial restrictions on the free movement of goods between Britain and the rest of the world. For seven years they organized rallies, meetings, public lectures, and debates from one end of Britain to the other and managed to have proponents of free trade elected to Parliament. The Tory government resisted for many years but eventually yielded in 1846. The abolition was announced by Peel in January, the House passed the legislation in May and the House of Lords agreed on 25 June 1846, when unilateral free trade became the law of Great Britain. The repeal was to take effect gradually over a period of 3 years. The League was the model for the French Free Trade Association of which Molinari was a member.

Association and Organization

The Socialists and the Economists had a very different understanding of the words “association” and “organization.” When Molinari is using these words in the liberal sense they are not capitalized; when he uses them in the socialist sense he often capitalizes them. These words were two of the key slogans used by the socialists in the February Revolution of 1848 when the National Workshops were being constructed to relieve unemployment in February and March 1848 under the direction of Louis Blanc in the Luxembourg Commission.[1268] Blanc promoted his ideas about socialist organization in an influential book l’Organisation du travail (1839) which went through many editions during the 1840s. “L’Organisation" meant to them the organisation of labor and industry by the state for the benefit of the workers; and “l’Association” meant cooperative living and working arrangements as opposed to private property and exchange on the free market. Socialists like Charles Fourier and Louis Blanc believed that the exploitation of workers caused by the market and by wage labor would only come to an end when workers, with the assistance of the state, created “associations” or “organizations” of workers which would own workshops or industries cooperatively or with the help of the state and pay the workers a guaranteed wage which would cover the full amount of their contribution to production. The profit of the owner or the capitalist would be dispensed with and workers would therefore get a “just” wage. Molinari often capitalizes the words to show that he is using them in this socialist sense.

What the classical liberal economists found very frustrating was the fact that supporters of the free market were also firm believers in “organization” and “association” but only if they resulted from voluntary actions by individuals and were not the result of government coercion and legislation. This covered nearly every association created in the free market, such as factories, workshops, banks, retail shops, and so on. A. Clément distinguishes between associations which arise in the market, associations organized by voluntary communities such as the Fourierists, and state organized associations like an army as advocated by Louis Blanc.[1269] As the size of the association increases Clément argues that economic exchanges and competition within the association are reduced, thus making them less and less efficient.

Banking, Free

Several, but not all, economists like Molinari advocated “la liberté des banques” (free banking) which refers to the theory developed by Charles Coquelin in the mid 1840s that private banks in a completely free market would compete to provide banking services even in such things as the issuing of money, which would no longer be a government monopoly. Larry White states that “Proponents of free banking have traditionally pointed to the relatively unrestricted monetary systems of Scotland (1716–1844), New England (1820–1860), and Canada (1817–1914) as models. Other episodes of the competitive provision of banknotes took place in Sweden, Switzerland, France, Ireland, Spain, parts of China, and Australia. In total, more than sixty episodes of competitive note issue are known, with varying amounts of legal restrictions. In all such episodes, the countries were on a gold or silver standard (except China, which used copper).”[1270] Charles Coquelin wrote a series of articles on free banking in the early 1840s for La Revue des Deux-Mondes and these ideas were further developed in his major book on the subject, Du Crédit et des Banques (1848).[1271] Several, but not all, of the economists advocated free banking, most notably Molinari and Bastiat.

Bastiat’s Anti-socialist “Petits Pamphlets”

Between May 1848 and July 1850 Bastiat wrote a series of 12 anti-socialist pamphlets, or what the Guillaumin publishing firm marketed in their Catalog as the “Petits pamphlets de M. Bastiat” (Mister Bastiat’s Little Pamphlets), which included several for which Bastiat has become justly famous such as “The State” (Sept. 1848), “The Law” (July 1850), and “What is Seen and What is Not Seen” (July 1850). The pamphlets sold well for Guillaumin and they were reprinted several times and even marketed as a set which could be purchased for 7 fr. for the complete set of 12. Some originally appeared in journals such as the JDE, while others were written as stand alone pamphlets. In two of his Electoral Manifestos in 1849[1272] he identifies the particular socialists he was attacking in each one of them. Bastiat also wrote other anti-socialist essays and articles which are also listed below.

The “Small Pamphlets” included the following titles. The order of publication is provided by his editor Prosper Paillottet in the Oeuvres complètes , vol. 4, p. 274. We have added the price for each pamphlet from an advertisement we found in one of the Guillaumin books. The Paris Chamber of Commerce estimated that average wage per day for an ordinary worker in Paris at the time was about 3 fr. 80 c.,[1273] so the cost for a worker who purchased the pamphlet Damn Money! and the State for 40 c. was nearly 11% of their daily wage.

1.     Propriété et Loi, suivi de Justice et Fraternité (40 c.) - “Propriété et loi” (Property and Law), JDE, 15 May 1848 (CW2, pp. 43-59), and “Justice et fraternité" (Justice and Fraternity) JDE, 15 June 1848 (CW2, pp. 60-81). “Propriété et loi” was directed at Louis Blanc and critiques of property in general. “Justice et fraternité" was directed against Pierre Leroux.

2.     Protectionisme et Communisme. Lettre à M. Thiers (35 c.) - Protectionnisme et communisme (Protectionism and Communism. A Letter to M. Thiers) (Jan. 1849) (CW2, pp. 235-65), was directed at the conservative and protectionist Mimerel committee whom Bastiat accused of adopting communist ideas

3.     Capital et Rente (35 c.) - (Capital and Rent) (Feb. 1849), in CW4, below, pp 000, was directed at Proudhon.

4.     Paix et Liberté, ou le Budget républicain (60 c.) - (Peace and Liberty, or the Repubican Budget) (February 1849. n.p.) (CW2, pp. 282-327), was directed at critics of his proposed budget cuts

5.     Incompatibilités parlementaires (40 c.) - (Parliamentary Conflicts of Interest (March 1850) (CW2, pp. 366-400), was directed at bureaucrats and civil servants.

6.     Maudit argent! - L’État (40 c.) - “Maudit argent!” (Damn Money!) 15 Avril 1849, in CW4, below, pp. 000, was directed at general misperceptions about the nature of money and “L’État” (The State) (JDD, 25 Sept. 1848) (CW2, pp. 93-104), was against the radical “Montagnard” socialist faction in the Assembly.

7.     Gratuité du Crédit. Correspondence entrer MM. F. Bastiat et Proudhon (1 fr. 75 c.) - (Free Credit. Correspondence between Bastiat and Proudhon) (Oct. 1849 - Feb. 1850), in CW4, below, pp. 000, was directed again at Proudhon

8.     Baccalauréat et Socialisme (60 c.) - (Baccalaureate and Socialism) (early 1850) (CW2, pp. 185-234), was written to oppose a bill before the Chamber in early 1850 on education reform which was supported by the conservative Adolphe Thiers

9.     Spoliation et Loi (40 c.) - in Spoliation et loi. - Mélanges. “Spoliation et loi” (Plunder and Law), JDE, 15 May 1850 (CW2, pp. 266-76), was written against Louis Blanc and the Luxembourg Commission

10.  La Loi (60 c.) - “La Loi” (The Law) (Mugron, July 1850) (CW2, pp. 107-46), was written against Louis Blanc and his 18th century predecessors including most notably Rousseau

11.  Ce qu’on voit et ce qu’on ne voit pas, ou l’Économie politique en une leçon (60 c.) -(What is Seen and What is Not Seen, or Political Economy in One Lesson) (July 1850), in CW3, pp. 401-52, was directed against all those who misunderstood the operation of the free market

Other anti-socialist essays he wrote during this period include:

•     “Individualisme et fraternité” (Individualism and Fraternity) (c. June 1848) (CW2, pp. 82-92), was directed against Louis Blanc.

•     “Propriété et spoliation” (Property and Plunder), (Journal des débats, 24 July 1848) (CW2, pp. 147-184), was directed against Victor Considérant and against critics of ownership of land and the charging of rent.

•     Chap. VIII. “Propriété, Communauté” (Private Property and Communal Property) in Harmonies économiques (written mid 1849 and published in first edition of EH in Jan. 1850), in CW5 (forthcoming), was a direct appeal to socialists by Bastiat, explicitly mentions Proudhon’s maxim “propriété, c’est le vol” (property is theft)

•     “Le capital” (Capital), Almanach Républicain pour 1849 (Paris: Pagnerre, 1849)., in CW4, below, pp. 000, was written to appeal to ordinary people who were influenced by the ideas of Proudhon and Blanc concerning capital and the charging of interest on loans.

Centralization

The Economists condemned the bureaucratic or administrative centralization which had made France the most centralized state in the world, as Coquelin phrased it: “In no other time nor in any other country has the system of centralization been as rigorously established as that which exists today in France.”[1274] The French state exercised a monopoly in dozens of industries, it claimed title to all mineral resources under the surface of the land, and it exercised the right to inspect and license nearly all businesses. In addition to these interventions in economic activity the central state also regulated and supervised to a large extent the activities of the administrative bodies at the local level, such as provinces, départements, and communes, which may have once exercised some autonomy, but which now were subject to stifling regulation and “the perpetual tutelage of the state."[1275] For many of the Economists the ideal was the political decentralization described by Tocqueville in America which Coquelin regarded as “the most most decentralized country in the world” (p. 300). Dunoyer went so far as to advocate the radical break up of the centralized bureaucratic state into much smaller jurisdictions, or what he called “the municipalisation of the world."[1276] Molinari wanted to see a thorough-going decentralization of the French state which would be brought about by exposing government monopolies to free competition in every field.

Le Club de la Liberté du Travail (Club for the Liberty of Working, or “Club Lib”)

At the first public meeting of the Free Trade Association held after the outbreak of the revolution, in the Montesquieu Hall on 15 March, a motion was discussed to form a political club to combat socialist ideas about the “right to work” which had become popular with the creation of the National Workshops which Louis Blanc had set up on 26 February. This was the inspiration for Charles Coquelin to set up “le Club de la liberté du travail” (the Club for the Liberty of Working, or “Club Lib” for short). Its first meeting was held on March 31 to discuss the question of “The Organization of Labor” with 3 socialists defending Louis Blanc’s proposals and attacking free trade, and Coquelin, Fonteyraud, and Garnier defending the free market position of the “Liberty of Working."[1277] One of the Club’s best public speakers was Alcide Fonteyraud (1822-1849) who died in the cholera epidemic which swept France in mid 1849. He was famous for his florid and witty style of speaking and his ability to mix references to the classics of French literature with the classics of political economy.

Molinari was very well informed about the club’s activities but there is no record of him giving a speech. However, one could imagine him and his friends visiting many of the political clubs to hear first hand what was being discussed and engaging the speakers in debate. He must have heard many socialist arguments in the clubs and may have used them as models for “The Socialist” in Les Soirées. In his obituary of Joseph Garnier Molinari talks about how after a few weeks the club was forced to close because of violence and intimidation by socialist street thugs (Molinari called them “a gang or a herd of communists”) and his regret that the economists had been too easily intimidated and had given up this attempt at spreading free market ideas too easily.[1278]

Molinari was again in Paris when the regime collapsed and revolution broke out in 1870-71. When the Paris Commune controlled Paris between March and May 1871 political clubs flourished again and Molinari was a keen observer for the second time. He covered the activities of “les clubs rouges” (the red or socialist clubs) for the Journal des Débats and produced two books, Les Clubs rouges pendant le siège de Paris (1871) and Le Mouvement socialiste et les réunions publiques (1872) which are very interesting first hand accounts of their activities.

Clubs (Political)

The trigger for the collapse of the July Monarchy 22-24 February was the result of the regime’s attempts to prevent a political banquet from taking place on 22 February. Throughout the second half of 1847 numerous public banquets, often numbering over a 1,000 people, were organized to protest against restrictions on the freedom of association and to demand an increase in the number of people who were allowed to vote in elections. The banqueters were addressed by leading public figures and patriotic music was played. When the Prime Minister François Guizot banned a banquet scheduled to be held on 14 January it was postponed until 22 February. When it was banned a second time a public protest march was organized resulting in the death of one of the protesters at the hands of the National Guard. The protest escalated resulting in demands for the resignation of Guizot (which came on the afternoon of the 23rd), the killing of dozens of protesters whose bodies were carried through the streets of Paris in further protest, the erection of barricades throughout the city, and the eventual abdication of King Louis Philippe on the 24th. Later that evening Lamartine, Louis Blanc, and 10 other politicians and activists formed a Provisional Government and the Second Republic was declared the following day (25 February).

Several hundred political clubs were set up in Paris in the weeks following the collapse of the regime in February 1848. As censorship collapsed there was nothing to stop any group from advocating their views in public. On the very day the Republic was announced the revolutionary socialist Auguste Blanqui started his “Le club de la société républicaine centrale” (Club of the Central Republican Society, also know as Club Blanqui) which was the perhaps the first of hundreds which sprang up in Paris between February and their suppression at the end of June 1848. Every shade of political opinion was represented with its own club, every suburb and district had its meeting halls and cafés where men and women gathered to discuss politics, and every magazine and journal had an affiliated club often headed by the editor. The larger clubs were able to mobilize their members to demonstrate in the streets in order to put pressure on the government to get their favored legislation passed. Other important socialist clubs included Étienne Cabet’s “La société fraternelle centrale” (the Central Fraternal Society), “Le club des travailleurs libres” (the Club of Free Workers), Alphonse Esquiros’s “Le club de la montagne” (the Club of the Mountain), and Armand Barbès’s “Le club de la révolution” (the Revolution Club).

The socialists were not the only ones to set up political clubs to discuss radical ideas. The classical liberal economists also had a Club, “le club de la liberté du travail” (the Club for the Freedom of Working) which was set up by Charles Coquelin on 31 March 1848 specifically to combat socialist ideas about the “right to work.” One of its best public speakers was Alcide Fonteyraud (1822-1849) who died in the cholera epidemic which swept France in 1849. Molinari visited many of the political clubs with Coquelin to hear first hand what was being discussed and possibly also to engage the speakers in open debate. He did exactly the same thing during the Revolution of 1870 which resulted in a vivid account of “les Clubs rouges” (the socialist Clubs).[1279]

The political clubs reached their pinnacle of power on the eve of the 23 April elections for the Constituent Assembly. Fearful of their influence the National Guard began to disrupt their meetings and after the elections moderate republicans in the Assembly began to call for the clubs’ power to be curbed. Many leaders of the most left-leaning clubs were arrested following a demonstration on 15 May in support of uprisings in Poland during which a group of Blanc’s supporters invaded the National Assembly. Following the June Days (23-26) rioting the Assembly voted to close them completely on 28 June. Under a new law restricting the right of assembly which was passed on 2 August the clubs could only operate under strict police supervision.

Congrès des Économistes (The Congress of Economists)

The Congrès des Économistes was founded by the Belgian Free Trade Association and organised by Le Hardy de Beaulieu and Charles de Brouckère. A European-wide congress was held in Brussels in September 1847 which was attended by 170 people who were a "who's who" of the leading advocates of liberal political economy in Europe. It was attended by a large contingent from France, including Horace Say, Charles Dunoyer, Guillaumin, Joseph Garnier, Alcide Fonteyraud, the Duke d’Harcourt, Adolphe Blanqui, Louis Wolowski, and Gustave de Molinari.[1280]

The Congress was also attended by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels but it is not known if they interacted with any of the French political economists. Marx was listed on the program as a speaker but according to the editors of the Marx Engels Collected Works, his session was cancelled by the organizers after the speaker before Marx, Georg Weerth (also a socialist), had offended them.[1281] It was published later as “The Protectionists, the Free Traders and the Working Class” (16 and 18 September 1847).[1282] Given the wild ad hominem attacks in the draft of Marx's speech printed in the MECW it is perhaps not surprising. We have no information about this incident from the economists' perspective.

The Corn Laws

The Corn Laws were introduced by Parliament in the seventeenth century to maintain a high price for corn (in the British context this meant grain, especially wheat) by preventing the importation of cheaper foreign grain altogether or by imposing a duty on it in order to protect domestic producers from competition. The laws were revised in 1815 following the collapse of wheat prices at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The artificially high prices which resulted led to rioting in London and Manchester. The laws were again amended in 1828 and 1842 to introduce a more flexible sliding scale of duties which would be imposed when the domestic price of wheat fell below a set amount. The high price caused by protection led to the formation of opposition groups, such as the Anti-Corn Law League in 1838, and to the founding of the Economist magazine in 1843. Pressure for repeal came from within Parliament by members of Parliament, such as Richard Cobden (elected in 1841), and from without by a number of factors: the well-organized public campaigning by the Anti-Corn Law League; the writings of classical economists who were nearly universally in favor of free trade; the writings of popular authors such as Harriet Martineau, Jane Marcet, Thomas Perronet Thompson, and Thomas Hodgskin; and the pressure of crop failures in Ireland in 1845. The Conservative prime minister Sir Robert Peel announced the repeal of the Corn Laws on 27 January 1846, to take effect on 1 February 1849 after a period of gradual reduction in the level of the duty. The act was passed by the House of Commons on 15 May and approved by the House of Lords on 25 June, thus bringing to an end centuries of agricultural protection in England.

The Economists (les Économistes)

The liberal, free-trade political economists referred to themselves, perhaps somewhat arrogantly, as "the” economists. They believed that, because their doctrine was founded on natural law and a scientific study of the way markets and economies worked in reality, there could be only one school of economics (just as there could be only one school of mechanics or optics). On the other hand, the opponents of free markets (such as the followers of Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, Etienne Cabet, Louis Blanc, Pierre Proudhon, and Pierre Leroux) had as many schools of socialist thought as they could imagine different ways in which society might be restructured or reorganized according to their utopian visions. The term “the economists” was also applied to the 18th century founders of political economy, such as the Physiocrats and Adam Smith, as well as to the free market political economists of the 1840s. The latter can be identified from their membership of or contributions to the following organizations: the Political Economy Society (founded 1841), the Journal des Économistes (founded 1842), and the Guillaumin publishing firm. Some of the leading figures in this group include the following: Charles Dunoyer (1786-1862), Pellegrino Rossi (1787-1848), Hippolyte Dussard (1791-1879), Hippolyte Passy (1793-1880), Horace Say (1794-1860), Eugène Daire (1798-1847), Louis Reybaud (1798-1879), Adolphe Blanqui (1798-1854), Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850), Gilbert Guillaumin (1801-1864), Charles Coquelin (1802-1852), Léon Faucher (1803-1854), Ambroise Clément (1805-1886), Michel Chevalier (1806-87), Louis Wolowski (1810-76), Adolphe Blaise (1811-1886), Joseph Garnier (1813-1881), Jean-Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil (1813-1892), Maurice Block (1816-1901), Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912), Henri Baudrillart (1821-1892).

Entail, The Law of, and the Right of Inheritance

The traditional law of inheritance, especially for aristocratic property, under the Old Regime was that of entail, whereby it was required by law to keep the family property intact by passing it down the line of male succession. The male who inherited the property was prevented from selling or otherwise alienating it. The aim of course was to preserve the family landholding intact over the generations. The French term for entail is “la substitution."

In order to reduce the power of the landed aristocracy during the French Revolution, landed estates were confiscated by the revolutionary state and sold off. They were also used as collateral for a new paper currency, the Assignats, which did not last long before they were debased through over-issue and hyperinflation. The Revolutionary government also changed the law of inheritance to one of “compulsory succession” (1791) whereby a land owner was obliged to divide his property equally among his children (“the law of equal division”) so that all would have a future means of income and support.[1283] The sentiment behind this change was to “democratize” French society by making it difficult for the aristocracy to recreate its social and economic base in the countryside as well as to create a new class of peasant proprietors.

The Economists approached this problem from two directions: one was the moral and the other was economic. The moral issue was the state’s interference in the right of a property owner to dispose of his or her property in whatever way they thought fit. Compulsory entail or compulsory equal division were equally objectionable to them. Molinari therefore distinguishes between the “droit à l’héritage” (right to an inheritance) and “droit de l’héritage” (the right of a property owner to grant an inheritance). He puts the former expression in italics in order to question its legitimacy. This distinction is very similar to the one the Economists made in their debates with the socialists between the “right to work” (‘le droit au travail”- or right to a job provided at taxpayer expense) and the "right of working” (la liberté du travail), by which they meant the right of any individual to pursue an occupation or activity without any restraints imposed upon him by the state. Other terms used by the Economists include “le droit de tester” (the right to bequeath), “la liberté absolue du testateur” (the absolute freedom of the beqeather). The Economists preferred the “droit de l’héritage” (the right of a property owner to grant an inheritance).

The other issue that concerned them was an economic one: what was the economic consequence of the “morcellement,”or the constant splitting of property into ever smaller pieces.[1284] Some economists thought that small-scale ownership boosted economic productivity because of the strong personal incentive of the land owner to improve their properties. Others, such as Molinari, argued that the reverse was the case, that only large-scale farms could spread the risk and raise the capital to improve agricultural output.

The Four Musketeers” of French Political Economy

[Also see tthe entry for “The Seven (4 + 3) Musketeers of French Political Economy,” in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.]

The term “The Four Musketeers” was coined by Gérard Minart in his biography of Molinari[1285] to describe the four men from the provinces who went to Paris between 1819 and 1845 (Guillaumin in 1819 aged 18, Coquelin also in 1819 aged 17, Molinari in 1840 aged 21, and Bastiat in 1845 aged 44) and transformed the French school of political economy with their organizational skills and their new ideas. As ambitious, young immigrants and outsiders they brought a new perspective to thinking about political economy. The four musketeers were Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin (1801-1864), Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850), Charles Coquelin (1802-1852), and Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912). Minart probably coined the term because Alexandre Dumas novel Les Trois Mousquetaires (The Three Musketeers) which was serialized in a French newspaper Le Siècle (March-July 1844) just before the 4 Economists reached the peak of the influence.

Guillaumin (1801-1864) was a book seller, publisher, and organizer of the political economy movement in Paris whose publishing firm located in the rue Richelieu provided a focal point for the Political Economy Society and the key journal of the movement, the Journal des Économistes. He came from Moulins which was the main city in the département de l'Allier in the Auvergne region. He came to Paris in 1819.

Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) was a local magistrate, free trade activist, journalist, politician, and economist. He is best known for his brilliant economic journalism which was collected and published as the Economic Sophisms (1846, 1848), his activity as the vice-president of the Finance Committee of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic, and his unfinished magnum opus on economic theory, Economic Harmonies (1850, 1851). He was born in Bayonne which was a coastal city in the département des Pyrénées-Atlantiques in région of Aquitaine (Pays basque français). He lived for most of his life in the small town of Mugron in the département des Landes in the région of Aquitaine (Gascogny). He went to Paris in 1845.

Charles Coquelin (1802-1852) was an industrialist, economist, and editor. He is best known for his pioneering work on free banking, Du Crédit et des Banques (1848) and his editorship of the flag-ship publication of mid-19th century French political economy, the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique (1852). He came from the town of Dunkerque which was a coastal city in the département du Nord in the région of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. He went to Paris in to study law (possibly as early as 1819-20) but settled there permanently in 1832.

Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) was an economic journalist, economist, prolific author, and editor of the Journal des Économistes (1883-1909). He is best known for his collections of conversations about economic liberty, Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare (1849), his essay on the private production of security (1849), his writings on the sociology and the history of the state, and his life-long opposition to protectionism, socialism, militarism, colonialism, and statism in all its forms. He was born in Liège which was the capital of the province de Liège in the Région wallonne which had been part of France before becoming the independent nation of Belgium in 1830. He moved to Paris in 1840.

Free Trade Association (Association pour la liberté des échanges)

The French Free Trade Association was modeled on the English Anti-Corn Law League which was founded in 1838 in Manchester by Richard Cobden and John Bright and which was successful in having the Corn Laws repealed in June 1846 (the House of Commons passed the first act of repeal in January 1846). A group of French free traders founded a Free Trade Association in the port city of Bordeaux on 23 February 1846 and then a national association in Paris on 1 July 1846 to which Molinari was appointed deputy secretary. Frédéric Bastiat was the secretary of the Board, presided over by François d’Harcourt and having among its members Michel Chevalier, Auguste Blanqui, Joseph Garnier, Gustave de Molinari, and Horace Say. The first public meeting of the Paris Association for Free Trade was held in Montesquieu Hall on August 28, 1846. The journal of the Association was called Le Libre-Échange and was edited and largely written by Bastiat. The first issue appeared on 29 November 1846 and it closed on 16 April 1848 after 72 issues. The last issue edited by Bastiat appeared on 13 February 1848. Subsequent issues were edited by Charles Coquelin as Bastiat became increasingly busy during the revolution, editing and distributing the little magazine La République française and then standing for the April elections to the Constituent Assembly (which he won representing his home district of Les Landes).

The year after the founding of the Association Molinari published one of his earliest books, a 2 volume history of tariffs in France: Histoire du tarif (1847). Molinari also wrote the long bibliographical entry on “Liberté du commerce” (Free Trade), the article on the Association “Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)," and the article on “Tarifs de douane” (Tariffs) in the DEP.[1286]

The Great Exhibition (London, May-October 1851)

The “Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations” (also known as “The Great Exhibition” was held in Hyde Park, London, between 1 May and 15 October 1851. It was the first in a series of  so-called “World’s Fairs” which became popular in Europe and America in the 19th century to showcase a countries economic development, industry, and culture. It was organized by the inventor Henry Cole and Prince Albert , the husband of the reigning monarch of the United Kingdom, Queen Victoria. See the almost rapturous article on “Expositions des produits de l’industrie” by Blanqui in DEP, vol. 1, pp. 46-51, on how strongly the economists thought such expositions could end national rivalries and promote peace.

Industry

A number of classical liberal theorists who were active during Napoleon’s Empire and the Restoration, most notably the economist Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), and the lawyers and journalists Charles Comte (1782-1837) and Charles Dunoyer (1786-1862) developed an “industrialist theory of history” in which the class of “industriels” played an important role.[1287] According to this school of thought there were only two means of acquiring wealth, by productive activity and voluntary exchanges in the free market (“industrie”—which included agriculture, trade, factory production, services, etc.) or by coercive means (conquest, theft, taxation, subsidies, protection, transfer payments, slavery). Anybody who acquired wealth through voluntary exchange and productive activities belonged to a class of people collectively called “les industrieux”; in contrast to those individuals or groups who acquired their wealth by force, coercion, conquest, slavery, government privileges, all of which were considered to be forms of “spoliation” (plunder). The latter group were seen as a ruling class or as “parasites” who lived at the expense of “les industrieux.” Molinari gives a very good summary of the industrialist theory of history in S1:

From the very beginnings of society an endless struggle has obtained between the oppressors and the oppressed, the plunderers and the plundered; from the very beginning of societies, the human race has constantly sought the emancipation of property. History abounds with this struggle. On the one hand you see the oppressors defending the privileges they have allotted themselves on the basis of the property of others; on the other we see the oppressed, demanding the abolition of these iniquitous and odious privileges. [above, pp. 000]

One of Say's important contributions to economic theory was to expand the notion of what productive labor was, from that labor which produced material goods such as grain or textiles, to include that labor which produced non-material goods (or what we today would call services) such as police, medical, legal, artistic, or educational services. Charles Dunoyer further developed Say's ideas because Say argued that material goods were of long lasting or even permanent value, whereas non-material services were valuable only for a brief period of time during which they were consumed and then evaporated. Dunoyer disagreed with this view and argued instead that non-material goods were of lasting value (hence just as "valuable to the consumer as material goods) because they were ongoing (the need for protection continued for the life of an individual), or they resulted in permanent memories of the service provided (artistic performances), or they changed people's characters permanently (education). Dunoyer concluded that these services were productive and that they helped build up a fund of social or human capital which any free and developing society needed (Nouveau traité, vol. 2, p. 58 ff.)

Charles Dunoyer published two works on this question which had a significant impact on the thinking of the Economists. The first, Nouveau traité d'économie sociale, appeared in 1830 and then an expanded version, Du la liberté du travail appeared in 1845. Here Dunoyer argued that the true industrial society (la véritable société industrielle) would include "l'ensemble de toutes les professions utiles… celle du dernier artisan jusqu'à celle du premier magistrat” (the collection of all the useful professions, … from that of the lowliest worker up to that of the leading magistrate) (Nouveau traité, vol. 2, p. 36). He called these productive and useful people a number of things. Using "industriel” or "productif” as adjectives, we have "un travailleur productif” (a productive worker) (p. 32) or "les professions industrielles” (the industrial professions) (p. 32). Using "industrieux” or "producteur” as a noun we have "un industrieux” (an industrious person) (p. 35) or "un producteur” (a productive person) (p.35). Dunoyer's preferred term seemed to be "industrieux” and he thus described the society and economy in which these productive and "industrious” people worked as a system of "industrialism."

The problem, even for the Economists, was to find the right term to describe all the activities which contributed to satisfying consumer needs and increasing the amount of wealth in society. Charles Coquelin noted in 1852 that the term "industrie” (industry) had previously been restricted to describing only manufacturing industry in contrast to agriculture or commerce but since both commerce and agriculture satisfied consumer demand and created wealth, they too should be included in a broader understanding of what "industry” was.[1288] The same could be said about "les travaux des savants” (intellectual work) such as the artist, lawyer, doctor, or public servant. Hence Coquelin thought that the commonly accepted distinction between narrowly defined "les arts industrial” (industrial skills) and the liberal professions was "a vain or false” one (p. 916). He concluded that economic theory now taught that one should "understand by the general term "industry” (industrie) the group of activities, whatever kind they may be, which contribute directly or indirectly to the satisfaction of human needs."

A parallel group of thinkers who shared many of these views developed around the socialist Henri Saint-Simon, who advocated rule by a technocratic elite rather than the operations of the free market as did Say, Comte, Dunoyer, and Molinari.

Interlopers and Pirates

Molinari uses the word “interlope” three times in Les Soirées. It is defined in the 1835 edition of the official dictionary of the Académie française as a merchant ship which broke the monopoly trading rights of a state privileged trading company, usually in the colonies.[1289] In other words it was a trading vessel which broke the law in order to engage in private trade. By analogy, Molinari is using it to describe economic activity which breaks the restrictive laws banning or regulating certain trading activities. He sees this in a positive light and thus it has no negative connotations. It might be translated as “illicit,” “black market,” “bootleg,” or “underground” trade. In order to retain the nautical analogy we have also used the word “interloper” or “pirate."

The specific examples of individuals selling goods or services in industries which were highly regulated by the state where he uses this expression are: “les prêteurs interlopes” (interloping or pirate money lenders), “le transport interlope des correspondances” (interlope or pirate mail delivery), and “prostitution interlope” (interloping or freelance prostitution).

Irish Famine of 1845-1852

The Great Irish Famine of 1845-1852 was caused by a disease which affected the potato crop (potato blight) and resulted in the deaths of 1 to 1.5 million people from famine and the emigration of a further million people out of a population of around 7 million. In addition to the failure of the potato crop there were other serious problems which were of concern, including the situation of tenant farmers unable to pay their rents, the continued export of food from Ireland during the famine, and restrictions on the free import of food from elsewhere in Europe. The latter issue was taken up by members of the Anti-Corn Law League in England when campaigning for the abolition of tariff restrictions on grain, which they achieved in 1846. When revolution swept Europe in 1848 Ireland was not unaffected. In July 1848 the Young Irelander Rebellion broke out in County Tipperary but was soon suppressed by the police.

Jacques Bonhomme (the Historical & Literary Figure)

“Jacques Bonhomme” (literally Jack Goodfellow) is the name used by the French to refer to “everyman,” sometimes with the connotation that he is the archetype of the wise French peasant. In England at this time the phrase used to refer to the average Englishman was “John Bull”; in the late 19th and early 20th century English judges used to refer to “the man on the Clapham Omnibus” to refer to the average British citizen with common sense; a more colloquial contemporary American expression for the average man would be “Joe Six Pack." It should be noted that the name “Jacques Bonhomme” was given to the small magazine that Bastiat and Molinari published and handed out on the street corners of Paris in June and July during the Revolution of 1848. They were forced to close it down following the bloody riots in Paris known as the “June Days." See the glossary entry on “Jacques Bonhomme (the journal).”

Frédéric Bastiat liked to use the figure of Jacques Bonhomme in his economic sophisms (mainly in the Second Series which were written during 1847) in order to present his economic ideas to a popular audience.[1290] Jacques Bonhomme was sometimes a carpenter ("like Jesus") or some other tradesman who had doubts about the justice and economic rationality of protectionism and government regulation. The source for Bastiat's "Jacques Bonhomme” is probably Benjamin Franklin's "Poor Richard” which was translated in French as "Bonhomme Richard." Franklin's work was popular in France and circulated in several editions. An edition of 1824[1291] had been edited by Augustin-Charles Renouard (1794-1878) who was a lawyer with an interest in elementary school education and later became secretary general of the minister of justice and an elected deputy. He also was vice-president of the Société d’économie politique and probably would have known Molinari and Bastiat quite well in the 1840s.

Molinari also had a connection with Franklin's “Bonhomme Richard." He and Eugène Daire edited a collection of shorter economic writings, Melanges d'économie politique I, in 1847 for the Guillaumin publishers which included a selection of Franklin's writings, including "Le Science de Bonhomme Richard."[1292] Interestingly, 18 months after Les Soirées appeared in print there appeared a booklet by Ludovic Hamon which reprinted a series of articles from the journal Le Progrès (January-February 1851) with the intriguing title of "Les Soirées de Jacques Bonhomme.”[1293] It was not an economic tract but a religiously based appeal to the workers of France to exercise "abstention” in their daily lives.

The “June Days” 23-26 June 1848

The increasing financial burden of the National Workshops led the Constituent Assembly to dissolve them on June 21, prompting some of the workers to riot in the streets of Paris during the so-called “June Days” of 23-26 June. The army under General Cavaignac was used to suppress the rioting resulting in the death of about 1,500 people and the arrest of 15,000 (over 4,000 of whom were sentenced to transportation). The Assembly immediately declared a state of siege (martial law) in Paris and gave Cavaignac full executive power which lasted until October. Molinari and Bastiat published their second revolutionary magazine, Jacques Bonhomme, during the June Days (it appeared between 11 June and 13 July). In it appeared a draft of what was to become Bastiat’s pamphlet “The State” and in the last issue he published an article called "Dissolve the National Workshops!” The magazine was forced to close because of the violence in the streets and the imposition of martial law. At the height of the June Days rioting, Molinari had written but not put his name to an open letter to socialists appealing to them to agree that liberals and socialists shared the common goals of prosperity and justice but differed on the correct way to achieve them. The article was signed “Le Rêveur” (the Dreamer) and it appeared in the June issue of the JDE, but Molinari did not admit that he was the author until 50 years later. In a letter written to Julie Marsan on 29 June Bastiat states that he became involved in the street fighting in order to attempt to disarm the fighters and to rescue some of the insurgents from being killed by the army.[1294] In the crack down which followed Bastiat opposed the arrest and trial of the socialist Louis Blanc for his participation in an earlier uprising in May and for being a figure head of the June revolt.

Laissez-faire

In English the phrase “laissez-faire”has come to mean the economic system in which there is no regulation of economic activity by the state. Other terms have also been used to mean the same thing, such as the “Manchester School” or “Cobdenism,” thus linking this policy prescription to the ideas of Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn Law League. The origins of the term “laissez-faire”are not clear. One account attributes the origin to the merchant and Physiocrat Vincent de Gournay (1712-59), who used a slightly longer version of the phrase, “laissez faire, laissez passer” (let us do as we wish, let us pass unrestricted), to describe his preferred government economic policy. Another Physiocrat, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-81), attributes the phrase “laissez-nous faire” (let us do as we wish), to the seventeenth-century merchant Legendre, who used the phrase in an argument with the French minister of finance Colbert about the proper role of government in the economy. Yet a third Physiocrat, François Quesnay (1694-1774), combined the term with another phrase: “Laissez-nous faire. Ne pas trop gouverner” (Let us do as we wish. Do not govern us too much) to make the same point. A contemporary of Molinari, Joseph Garnier in the entry for “laissez faire, laissez passer”in the DEP (1853) explained “laissez-faire” to mean “laissez travailler” (leave us free to work as we wish) and “laissez passer” to mean “laissez échanger” (leave us free to trade as we wish).[1295]

Molinari uses the phrase "laissez faire” in several ways in Les Soirées. Firstly, there is reference to the general doctrine of “laisser-faire” as an economic policy where the government does not interfere in the operation of the free market (as discussed above). In this meaning of the phrase The Economist (i.e. Molinari) sees this “régime du laisser-faire” (pp. 000) as a positive thing. There are six instances of this usage, four of which are italicized to add extra emphasis. There are other occasions in Les Soirées when the Economist uses the phrase with respect to very specific areas where he would like to see the government end its intervention and regulation, such as the following:

•     “laissez faire les propriétaires, laissez passer les propriétés” (let property owners freely go about their business. Let property circulate and everything will work out for the best. (pp. 000));

•     “laissez faire l’industrie privée” (let private industry be free to go about its business. (pp. 000));

•     “laissez faire les travailleurs, laissez passer le travail” (let the workers be free to go about their business, allow the free movement of labor. (pp. 000)); and

•     “laissez faire la charité privée” (let private charity freely go about its business. (pp. 000)).

Molinari’s general advice is for the government is “laissez-la faire” (pp. 000), which might be translated as “Leave it alone” or “let it be.”

On the other hand, the Socialist and the Conservative, not surprisingly, oppose the doctrine of laisser-faire and denounce it in very harsh terms during the course of the discussion. They refer to it occasionally as “un régime de laisser-faire absolu”  (Socialist) (pp. 000) or “votre système de laisser faire” (Conservative)  (pp. 000) but also as a term of abuse as the following colorful examples indicate:

•     "cette doctrine anarchique et immorale du laisser-faire” (this anarchical and immoral doctrine of laisser-faire) (Conservative) (pp. 000)

•     "cette doctrine bancocratique et malthusienne du laisser-faire” (this “bankocratic”and Malthusian doctrine of laisser-faire) (Socialist) (pp. 000)

•     "ce laisser-faire inique et sauvage” (this evil and savage (doctrine of) laissez-faire) (Socialist) (pp. 000)

Material and Non-Material Goods (Services)

The distinction between “produits matériels” (material or physical products, or goods) and “produits immatériels” (non-material products, or services) was one first developed at length by Jean-Baptiste Say in the Traité d'économie politique (1803, 1817) and Cours complet (1828) and then by Charles Dunoyer in La Liberté du travail (1845).[1296] This was one of Say's most important contributions to economic theory in an attempt to move beyond the limitations of Smithian orthodoxy which emphasized the production and exchange of physical goods which were durable and embodied quantities of labor which gave them value. Say argued that agricultural and manufactured goods were not the only source of wealth and that the activities which produced them were not the only “productive” economic activities that people could engage in. Say placed special emphasis on a new sector of the economy, the service sector, which he believed also created economic value and thus contributed to industrial growth. “Immaterial” goods, as Say called them, were goods provided by the provision of services or the transmission of information such as education, creative writing, musical performances, legal, medical, or even religious services in order to satisfy the needs of consumers. By their very nature they were not of a physical kind, but they were equally the product of human “industry” and equally useful and productive as the material goods traditionally discussed by the political economists. Molinari was to go much farther than Say and most of the other Economists in his exploration of the possibilities of the market provision of non-material products, such as public goods like police services, and even national defense (see Soirée 11). The exception was Bastiat who developed a whole new theory of exchange based on the idea that exchange was “the mutual exchanges of services” which could be in either material or non-material form. See “Service for Service,” in appendix 1 (CW4).

Mineral Resources, Property Rights in

The economists were seriously split on who owned minerals and other resources under the ground.[1297] Molinari sets out the divergent opinions as followers:

Three opinions emerged on the issue of this kind of property. Some said that underground property was simply attached to surface property [Dunoyer]; according to others it belonged to the whole community [Mirabeau and Comte]; according to a third group it reverted to the finders [Turgot and Molinari]. In this last view, the only equitable one, the only one consistent with law, the owners of the land could demand only a simple indemnity for those parts of the surface of the land which were necessary for exploiting the mineral deposits, and the government likewise could not demand anything save a tax for the legal protection granted to the miners. [S3, pp. 000]

One of the first detailed discussions of the issue was by Turgot when he was Intendant of Limoges in the 1760s and early 1770s. In an undated “Memoir on Mines and Quarries” Turgot argues in favor of the following: that ownership of land on the surface does not bestow ownership of mineral resources below the surface; that ownership of mineral resources falls to the first user or occupier; and the Crown has no claim to ownership of these resources. As the editor of the Guillaumin edition of Turgot’s writings (1844), Eugène Daire notes, the Crown’s claim to ownership of all minerals and hence the right to license the right to mine them to whomever he pleased was cloaked in arguments about national security (metals were needed to forge cannons and saltpeter was needed to make explosives).[1298]

During the Revolution a claim to the ownership of mineral resources below ground was made by the National Assembly (the Law of 12 July 1791). Mirabeau argued that the nation had the right to claim ownership of underground resources and to tax, regulate, or license access rights according to its interests. This view was challenged by Charles Dunoyer who argued that the Nation was merely replacing the old claims of the Crown. The same moral, legal, and economic arguments against Crown ownership would also apply to similar claims made by the nation (or its representatives).[1299] Charles Comte took a view that was similar to Mirabeau’s, namely that mineral resources were in the public domain and that it was the state’s obligation to sell access to them to the highest bidder.[1300] Thus we see Molinari taking the side of Turgot in urging a vigorous defense of the idea that first use bestows ownership on a resource.

Money and Banking

The orthodox view of money held by the political economists was expressed by Michel Chevalier in the entry on “Monnaie” in the DEP, vol. 2, pp. 200-219, where he stated that money was either gold or silver of a defined weight and purity which was issued by a state mint or other government regulated body. In S8 Molinari adopts the opposing view of his friend and colleague Charles Coquelin (1803-1852) who, in a series of articles and a book called Du crédit et des banques (1848), defended the view known as “Free Banking,” that private banks should be allowed to competitively issue their own currency which could be redeemed for gold upon demand.[1301] The irony is that when Coquelin reviewed Molinari's book Les Soirées in the JDE he criticized Molinari for making it appear to be the orthodox Economist opinion that security services could be provided privately and competitively in S11 when in fact this wasn't the case. In this chapter Molinari is again appearing to make it appear that the orthodox Economist view was that of free banking and competitive currency issue, but in this case it is Coquelin's and Molinari's view not the mainstream economists' position.

Whether the economists believed in government or competitively provided money, they were in agreement about the dangers of paper money unbacked by gold or silver. They were very wary of paper money ever since the early days of the 1789 Revolution when the government began issuing the paper currency known as the “Assignats.” Assignat was the name given to the paper currency issued by the National Assembly between 1789 and 1796. They were originally issued as bonds based upon the value of the land confiscated from the church (“biens national”) and were intended to pay off the national debt. Later they became legal tender in 1791. Overissue led to a spectacular hyperinflation which wiped out their value in a few years. The initial number issued in April 1790 was 400 million; in September 1792 2.7 billion were in circulation; and by the beginning of 1796 when they were abandoned there were perhaps 45 billion in circulation.[1302] In an effort to control the rise in prices caused by this inflation various attempts were unsuccessfully made to regulate prices such as the “Maximum” in 1793. As a result of this experience Napoleon returned the country to a gold backed currency, the franc, in 1803.

Even when the government bank issued money backed by gold there were times when it suspended its convertibility upon demand. The suspension of specie payment (gold) upon demand by holders of paper money is called “cours forcé” in French.[1303] The Bank of England suspended specie payments for notes between 1797 and 1819. It was during this period that David Ricardo published his The High Price of Bullion (1810) which attributed the inflationary price rises to the over issue of paper money during the suspension of spice by the bank.[1304] The Bank of France was modeled on the Bank of England and was founded as a private bank in 1800 with Napoleon as one of the shareholders. It was granted a monopoly in issuing currency in 1803. Payment in specie upon demand was suspended twice in the 19th century, both times during revolutions - 1848-1850 and 1870-1875.

Another kind of “bank” was the government system of subsidized credit for ordinary working men and women known as the “monts-de piété."[1305] For many working men and women a common source of small loans was the government monopoly pawn shops or “monts-de piété." The name is a corruption of the Italian “monte di pietà” or “mercy loan” which were bodies established in the 15th century to provide loans to the poor. The monts-de piété were formerly established in France in 1777 as a state privileged institution with a monopoly of the pawn broking business which could lend at 10% interest. During the inflation of the early part of the French Revolution the monts-de piété were forced to close in 1795, only to reopen in 1797, and were re-regulated under the Empire in year XII. In 1844 the monts-de piété of Paris lent fr. 25.6 million. By 1847 there were 45 monts-de piété across France which loaned a total of fr. 48.9 million. Horace Say described them as “ne sont autre chose que des banques privilégiées de prêts sur gages” (nothing more than state privileged banks in the pawn broking business).

The Monkey Economists and Free Trade

Molinari saw a French translation of a British pamphlet which was first published in the Westminster Review in January 1830. "The Article on Free Trade” was written by Col. Thomas Perronet Thompson who was very active in the free trade movement and whose work on the Corn Law Fallacies influenced Frédéric Bastiat.[1306] (See the glossary on “Perronet Thompson.”) The essay was accompanied by a cartoon drawn by Thomas Landseer (1795-1880) who had made a name for himself by publishing a series of caricatures of humans as monkeys, Monkey-ana, or Men in Miniature (1827). Molinari was so taken with Landseer's drawing that he mentioned it twice: once in Les Soirées and again in his article on "Liberté du commerce”in the DEP. Thompson began his article with this description of the cartoon:

The monkeys in Exeter Change used to be confined in a row of narrow cages, each of which had a pan in the centre of its front for the tenant's food. When all the monkeys were supplied with their messes, it was observable that scarcely any one of them ate of his own pan. Each thrust his arm through the bars, and robbed his right or left hand neighbor. Half what was so seized was split and lost in the conveyance; and while one monkey was so unprofitably engaged in plundering, his own pan was exposed to similar depredation. The mingled knavery and absurdity was shockingly human.[1307]

This "beggar thy neighbor”policy is very similar to the views expressed by Huskisson in 1826 also quoted by Molinari. A version of this cartoon also appeared in America in 1831 by E.W. Clay entitled "The Monkey System or 'Every one for himself at the expense of his neighbor'!!!!!!!!." Above the monkeys' cages is written "Home, Consumption, Internal Improvements,” and a figure states "Walk in! Walk in! and see the new improved grand original American system.” The American System as it was called was based upon high tariffs and extensive government funded infrastructure projects.

Montagnards

The Montagnards in 1848 were radical socialists and republicans who modeled themselves on “the Mountain” faction during the first French Revolution, the leader of which had been the lawyer Maximilien de Robespierre (1758-94). They were called “the Mountain” because they sat as a group in the highest seats at the side or the back of the Chamber.

During 1848-49 the Montagnard group were also known as the “démoc-socs” (democratic socialists) and were led by Alexandre Ledru-Rollin. In the Second Republic the Montagnards did not do well in the first election for the Constituant Assembly held on 23-24 April 1848. In the 880 seat Chamber the moderate republicans had 600 deputies (68%), the monarchist group had 200 (23%), radical republicans and socialists had 80 (9%) of which 6% were Montagnards. In the election for President of the Republic held on 10-11 December1848 the Montagnard candidate Ledru-Rollin came third with 5% of the vote, behind Louis Napoléon with 74% and General Cavaignac with 20%. The Montagnards’ best showing was in the election for the new Legislative Assemble held on 13-14 May 1849. In the 705 seat Chamber they quintupled their vote to win 180 (26% of the seats), behind “The Party of Order” which was a composite group of anti-republican monarchists and Bonapartists which won 450 seats (64%), while the moderate republicans were reduced to 75 seats (11%).

In the first major clash with the new government the Montagnards vigorously opposed Louis Napoléon’s decision to send French troops to Rome to assist Pope Pius IX in his struggle agains the Italian republicans led by Mazzini. On 13 June 1849 they organized a demonstration in which about 6,000 people participated. It was put down by troops led by General Nicolas Changarnier. Ledru-Rollin and about 30 Montagnards Deputies then attempted to form a new provisional government which was quickly broken up with the arrest or the going into hiding of the participants. Thirty seven Montagnard deputies were stripped of their office, some were tried and imprisoned or deported, and many (like Ledru-Rollin) went into voluntary exile for 20 years in London. Louis Napoléon used the demonstration to close down Montagnard newspapers and political clubs and to impose other limits on freedom speech and association.

The manifesto of the Montagnards can be found in Ledru-Rollin’s campaign literature for the Presidential election of December 1849: Candidature du citoyen Ledru-Rollin. Le Comité électoral démocratique du Jura. Aux Républicains démocrates de ce département. (no date), pp. 3-8.

Morcellement (The Division of Agricultural Land)

A significant problem for French farmers in the 19th century was the retention of farm size which would have enabled them to remain economically viable. The change in inheritance laws during the Revolution was designed to end the old regime practice of primogeniture (passing the entire estate to the eldest son) but it over-reacted by requiring an equal division among all the children, even if the farmer wanted to leave his land to one of his children in order to continue the family business. This gradually led to the problem of "morcellement" or the division of the land into smaller and smaller plots which hampered the growth of more productive agriculture.[1308] The economists were divided over the pros and cons of large-scale versus small-scale farming. The Physiocrats and Adam Smith believed that small-scale farming was more profitable because the farmer had a very direct and close personal interest in making it so. In the 19th century Sismondi shared this view based upon his study of the Italian peasantry. On the other hand the English traveler Arthur Young thought that the poverty in rural France on the eve of the French Revolution was due to the excessive subdivision of farms which made them unprofitable to run. This view was also shared by Thomas Malthus. McCulloch believed that the greater productivity of British agriculture could be explained by its inheritance laws which encouraged the preservation of larger estates.

National Guard

The National Guard was founded in 1789 as a national armed citizens' militia in Paris and soon spread to other cities and towns in France. Its function was to maintain local order, protect private property, and defend the principles of the Revolution. The Guard consisted of 16 legions of 60,000 men and was under command of the Marquis de Lafayette. It was a volunteer organization and members had to satisfy a minimum tax-paying requirement and had to purchase their own uniform and equipment. They were not paid for service, thus limiting its membership to the more prosperous members of the community. The Guard was closed down in 1827 for its opposition to King Charles X but was reconstituted after the 1830 Revolution and played an important role during the July Monarchy in support of the constitutional monarchy. Membership was expanded or “democratized” in a reform of 1837 and opened to all males in 1848 tripling its size to about 190,000. Since many members of the Guard supported the revolutionaries in June 1848 they refused to join the army in suppressing the rioting. This is what Molinari is probably referring to in his comment that it had become “communist." The Guard gradually began to lose what cohesion it had and further reforms in 1851 and 1852 forced it to abandon its practice of electing its officers and to give up much of its autonomy. Because of its active participation in the 1871 Paris Commune many of its members were massacred in the post-revolutionary reprisals and it was closed down in August 1871.[1309]

The National Workshops (Ateliers Nationaux)

Louis Blanc was appointed by the Provisional Government to be the president of the “Commission du gouvernement pour les travailleurs” (Government Commission for the Workers) (also known as the Luxembourg Commission) which oversaw the National Workshops program and met in the Luxembourg Palace, the old meeting place for the Chamber of Peers (see “Luxembourg Palace”). The National Workshops were created on February 27, 1848, in one of the very first legislative acts of the Provisional government, to create government funded jobs for unemployed workers. They were engaged in a variety of public works schemes and workers got 2 francs a day, which was soon reduced to 1 franc because of the tremendous increase in their numbers (29,000 on March 5; 118,000 on June 15). Workshops were set up in a number of regional centres but the main Workshop was in Paris. The Workshops were regarded by socialists as a key part of the revolution and as a model for the future reform of French society and much of the inspiration came from the writings of the socialist Louis Blanc whose book Organisation du travail (1839) discussed the need for “ateliers sociaux” (social workshops) which would guarantee employment for all workers. The first director of the National Workshops was a young engineer Emile Thomas and Louis Blanc was appointed head of the Luxembourg Commission which had been set up to study the problems of labor and which gradually became a focal point for labor organizations and activity.

Liberals regarded the Workshops as expensive interventions by the government into the operation of the free market which were doomed to failure. In May 1848 the Constituent Assembly formed a committee to discuss the matter as the burden of paying for the National Workshops scheme was becoming too much for the government to bear. On May 15 supporters of Louis Blanc broke into the Chamber and tried to seize control of the podium in order to execute a coup d’état and replace the leadership of the government with people more sympathetic to the National Workshop program. The increasing financial burden of the National Workshops and the threat of further violence led the Assembly to dissolve them on June 21, prompting some of the workers to riot in the streets of Paris during the so-called “June Days” of 23-26 June. The army under General Cavaignac was used to suppress the rioting resulting in the death of about 1,500 people and the arrest of 15,000 (over 4,000 of whom were sentenced to transportation). The Assembly immediately declared a state of siege (martial law) in Paris and gave Cavaignac full executive power which lasted until October. Bastiat and Molinari published their second revolutionary magazine, Jacques Bonhomme, during the June Days (it appeared between 11 June and 13 July). The magazine was forced to close because of the violence in the streets and the imposition of martial law.

The Navigation Acts

The Navigation Acts were the lynch pin of the British policy of mercantilism from its introduction in 1651 to its abolition in 1849. The Navigation Act Bill was passed by Oliver Cromwell's government to prevent merchandise from being imported into Britain if it was not transported by British ships or ships from the producer countries. The first act applied to commerce within Europe and generated a war with Holland (1652-1654). It was extended to the colonies in 1660 and in 1663 it generated a second war with Holland (1665-1667). The Molasses Act of 1733 was designed to force the American colonists to buy more expensive sugar from the British West Indies and discourage trade with the French West Indies. The renewal of this act in 1764 as the Sugar Act was a major source of conflict which led to the American Revolution. The repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849 was part of a concerted effect to introduce a policy of free trade in Britain and its empire during the 1840s. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 was the other major platform of this effort.

Peace Congress, Paris (August 1849)

The first International Peace Congress was held in London in 1843 on the initiative of the American Peace Society and Joseph Sturge. Some 340 delegates attended, the bulk of which were British. The second was organized by Elihu Burritt and chaired by the Belgian lawyer Auguste Visschers and took place in Brussels in September 1848. The third Congress was held in Paris in August 1849 (22-24th) chaired by the novelist Victor Hugo and where Bastiat gave an important speech. The 4th was held in Frankfurt in August (22-24th) 1850 with 600 delegates, the 5th in London in July 1851, the 6th in Manchester in 1852, and the 7th in Edinburgh in 1853. The Congresses came to an end with outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854.

The Paris Congress of 1849 was well attended by the economists. Molinari and Coquelin formally represented the Political Economy Society at the Congress and Bastiat gave a speech on "Disarmament, Taxes, and the Influence of Political Economy on the Peace Movement" (our title); Molinari wrote a detailed report on its proceedings for the JDE, and Joseph Garnier edited the proceedings which were published by Guillaumin.[1310] In his speech Bastiat called for the simultaneous disarmament of all nations and a corresponding reduction of taxation. Émile de Girardin summarized the resolutions of the 1849 Paris Peace Congress as follows: "reduction of armies to 1/200th of the size of the population of each state, the abolition of compulsory military service, the freedom of (choosing one's) vocation, the reduction of taxes, and balanced budgets." Since France's population in 1849 was about 36 million this would mean a maximum size of the French armed forces of 180,000. It was then made up of 389,967 men and 95,687 horses for the Armée de terre, and 69,490 men and 2,051 horses for the Navy and the armed forces in the colonies, for a combined total of 459,457 men and 97,738 horses. Thus, Bastiat and the other attendees at the Peace Congress were calling for a cut of 279,457 or 61% in the size of the French armed forces. Molinari wrote the articles on “Peace” and the “Peace Congress” for the DEP.[1311]

Phalanstery

A “Phalanstery” (or “Phalanx”) was a self-sustaining community of the followers of the utopian socialist Charles Fourier. He envisaged that new communities of people would spring up in order to escape the injustices of free-market societies and industrialism. He called his new self-supporting communities “phalanxes,” which would consist of about 1,600 people who would live in a specially designed building called a “phalanstère,”or “phalanstery.” A number of communities modeled on his ideas were set up in North America—in Texas, Ohio, New Jersey, and New York. Fourier’s ideas had some influence in French politics during the revolution of 1848 through the activities of Victor Considerant and his “right to work” movement.

Phrenology

Phrenology was a pseudoscience which was popular in the first half of the 19th century.[1312] Phrenologists believed that mental faculties resided in different parts of the brain and that the shape of the skull above those regions gave a physical clue to the strength or power of that particular faculty. Thus phrenologist were notorious for feeling the bumps on people's head in order to understand their character or mental capacity. Proudhon was reported to have rejected Fourier’s socialist ideas partly on the grounds that the bumps on his head suggested that his analysis could not be trusted. We have not been able to locate Molinari's reference to Charles Place's Cours. There is a Dr. Charles Place who wrote a couple of short pamphlets in the 1840s: Discours prononcé sur la tombe de Casimir Broussais, ancien secrétaire général, vice-président et président de la Société phrénologique de Paris (1847); De l'Art dramatique au point de vue de la phrénologie (1843). During the 1820s the German phrenologist Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) had among his clientele a number of liberals such as Benjamin Constant and Stendhal as well as Saint-Simon.

The Physiocrats

The Physiocrats, also known as “les Économistes” (the Economists), were a group of 18th century French economists and reform minded bureaucrats who came to prominence in the 1760s and who believed that the economy was guided by natural laws and that the state should not interfere in its operation. The word “Physiocracy” was coined by Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours (1739-1817) to give a name to this movement. It is composed of two Greek words “physis” (nature) and “kratein” (to rule or govern) and thus means “the rule of nature." Their school consisted of the following individuals: François Quesnay (1694-1774), Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-17811), Mercier de la Rivière (1720-1794), Vincent de Gournay (1712-1759), the Marquis de Mirabeau (Victor Riqueti) (1715-1789), and Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours (1739-1817). They coined the expression “laissez-faire” to describe their preferred government policy. They believed that agricultural production was the source of wealth and that all barriers to its expansion and improvement (such as internal tariffs, government regulation, and high taxes) should be removed. The strategy of the Physiocrats was to educate others through their scholarly and journalistic writings as well as to influence  monarchs to adopt rational economic policies via a process of so-called “enlightened despotism." This strategy met with very mixed results, as Turgot’s failed effort to deregulate the French grain trade in the 1770s attests. The group of free market classical liberal political economists of which Molinari was a member also referred to themselves as “the Economists” and we have kept that practice in this book. Thus, the term “the Economists” can either refer to the 18th century Physiocrats or to the group of 19th century free market who followed in their footsteps.

The Economists of the 1840s were very conscious of their intellectual roots in the Physiocratic movement of the 18th century. When the Guillaumin publishing firm published their monumental history of economic thought in 15 volumes under the editorship of Eugène Daire four of the volumes were devoted to the writings of the Physiocrats - two volumes by Turgot in 1844 and a collection of miscellaneous writings by Quesnay and others in 1846.[1313]

Molinari takes as the quotation on the title page of Les Soirées a passage from the Physiocrat economist François Quesnay's (1694-1774) essay “Le droit naturel” (Natural Law) (1765) which sums up this view: “It is necessary to refrain from attributing to the physical laws which have been instituted in order to produce good, the evils which are the just and inevitable punishment for the violation of this very order of laws.” Molinari’s friend Joseph Garnier also used a quotation from Quesnay on the title page of his economics textbook, Éléments de l’économie politique (1846) which comes from his “General Maxims of Economical Government” (1758): “Que la nation soit instruite des lois générales de l’ordre naturel qui constituent évidemment les sociétés.” (That the nation should be taught about the general laws of the natural order which so evidently make up societies.)[1314]

Poor Law or Poor Rate

The model for a dedicated tax to fund welfare for the poor was the English Poor Rate which had been created during the Tudor period. The Act for the Relief of the Poor of 1601 created a system of poor relief in England and Wales which was administered by local parishes. Those who were unable to work were cared for “indoors” in an alms house; those who could work were forced to work “outdoors” in a house of industry; while vagrants and idlers were sent to a house of correction or prison. It was funded by the collection of “poor rates” on local property owners and tenants. A Royal Commission was set up in 1832 to inquire into reforming the Poor Laws which resulted in the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834. The official Report was written by the economist Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick: Poor Law Commissioners’ Report of 1834.

In France, during the Revolution “mendicité” (begging) was harshly dealt with, even criminalized. The law of May 1790 insisted that beggars strong enough to work should be made to work and those too weak to work would be sent to a hospice and foreign born beggars should be expelled from the country. The criminalization of begging went further during the 1790s with some hard core beggars being condemned to transportation. During the Empire (decree of July 1808) it was recognized that the government should provide beggars with offers of work before punishment was imposed. Each department was ordered to establish a work house (“dépots de mendicité”) to be funded by local tax payers, but the cost of this became prohibitive and the work houses were either closed down or farmed out to contractors. In his article “Mendicité” (Begging) in the JDE, Ambroise Clément concluded that, like prostitution, the problem of begging could not be solved by coercive government action but by the gradual improvement in general prosperity brought about by the free market and industrialization. He notes that a new kind of begging had appeared in recent years in France with “the tendency for one person to live at the expense of another as a result of government jobs, privileges, favors which were extracted by intrigue or by soliciting the government and which constituted a kind of begging just as shameful and far more damaging than begging in the streets.” See A. Clément, “Mendicité,” DEP, vol. 2, pp. 153-54.

State charity was part of the expenditure of the Ministry of the Interior. In the 1848 Budget only fr. 3.4 million was set aside for specifically itemized assistance and grants to the needy out of a total budget for the Ministry of fr. 116.6 million (2.9%).[1315] The rest came out of block grants to the Départements which also funded their own activities. More detail is provided by Baron de Watteville who was the inspector general of Charities in the City of Paris, in Essai statistique sur les établissements de bienfaisance. Deuxième édition revue, corrigée et considérablement augmentée (Paris: Guillaumin, 1847). Using figures from 1844 he states that across the entire country there were 9,242 various charitable bodies which spent a total of fr. 115.4 million [93]. These were comprised of 1,338 hospitals or hospices which spent fr. 53.6 million; 7,599 Welfare Offices which spent fr. 13.6 million; and 64 state funded pawn shops which made low interest rate loans to the poor which spent fr. 42.2 million.

The French economists followed very closely the British attempts to reform the Poor Laws. A Royal Commission was set up in 1832 to inquire into reforming the Poor Laws which resulted in the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834. The official Report was written by the economist Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick: Poor Law Commissioners’ Report of 1834. A version of the Poor Laws was enacted for Ireland in July 1838.

The French economists distinguished between “la charité légale” (state charity), of which they disapproved, and “la charité privée” (private charity), of which they approved. According to Cherbuliez there were several kinds of welfare or charity:: “bienfaisance publique” (public welfare) which is welfare provided by or with the assistance of any government body (such as the central state or a commune), “la charité légale” (state charity) which is a government guaranteed right to charity of all or some group of citizens, “la charité officielle” (official charity) where a government body assists in the distribution of charity, and “la charité privée” (private charity) which was voluntarily funded and distributed by private groups. Molinari and the economists were especially interested in “la charité légale” which became an issue with the promulgation of the constitution of the Second Republic on 4 November 1848 which stated that all citizens had a right to government supplied (i.e. taxpayer funded) welfare (see the Preamble, section VII and Article XIII). It was closely tied in their minds to the idea of the “droit au travail” (right to a job) which was another policy pursued by the socialists in the Second Republic. See A.E. Cherbuliez, “Bienfaisance publique,” DEP, vol. 1, pp. 163-77.

Property Rights

The intellectual context in which classical liberals in the 1840s operated can be found in the writings of an earlier generation of liberals such as Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), Charles Comte (1782-1837), and Charles Dunoyer (1786-1862). Molinari’s ideas on liberty, property, and the free market were grounded in works such as Say’s Traité d’Économie politique (1803, but especially the reworked 3rd edition of 1817) and the Cours complet d'économie politique pratique (1828-33), Comte’s Traité de la propriété (1834), and Dunoyer’s De la liberté du travail (1845).[1316] One of the reasons for writing Les Soirées was Molinari’s concern that the right to property had not been properly defended by the liberal economists and political theorists which had opened them to attack by socialists in the late 1840s and in the Revolution. Either they had just assumed the existence of property (as Say did), or argued that it was the creation of the state (as Benjamin Constant did), or that the current distribution of property rights in 1848 was a just one which did not need to be changed (which is what Adolphe Thiers argued). In Les Soirées he sketched out his theory of property which was based upon natural law but did not go into much detail. He returned to the topic several years later when he wrote a much longer treatment of his ideas in Lesson 4 “Value and Property” in the second and revised edition of the Cours d'économie politique (1863), pp. 107-31. There he categorizes property into 6 major types, each of which has its own corresponding kind of liberty. Molinari was also influenced by his colleague Louis Leclerc, a fellow member of the Free Trade Association, who wrote an essay on Victor Cousin’s theory of “le Moi” (the Self) which Molinari quotes at some length in S1.[1317]

One of the key beliefs which distinguishes the French school of political economy from the English school is the grounds they had for believing in property. The English were strongly utilitarian in that they thought the institution of property was generally beneficial to human progress and prosperity but that the government might be justified in sometimes limiting property “rights” of individuals for the benefit of the broader society. The French Economists believed in property rights on the grounds of natural law and were more doctrinaire in defending individual property rights against encroachments by the state.

The standard account for the Economists of the original and just acquisition of private property in land out of a state of communal tribal ownership is provided by Charles Comte in Traité de la propriété (1834).[1318] Comte believes it was a near universal phenomenon that communally owned land eventually was transformed into private ownership as soon as an individual was able through the self denial of immediate consumption to save enough to survive long enough to engage in the more protracted process of cultivating a plot of land until the harvest. This resulted in dramatically higher output than hunting and gathering or other communal activities. Comte believes this process of privatization was a just one for two reasons: firstly, the private farmer needed much less land than previously in order to create a greater output and the land he no longer needed was left for the other members of the tribe to use; secondly, by creating a more productive resource he unintentionally increased the value of the surrounding land and thereby gave to the community much more than he had taken in privatizing his parcel of land. Thus, Comte concludes, no “usurpation” was committed in this original act of privatization of the land (pp. 150-51).

Although neither Molinari nor Comte mentions John Locke by name there is an obvious parallel here to the Lockean proviso concerning the end of the state of nature - that “enough, and as good, left in common for others.”[1319] A similar set of arguments in defense of the legitimacy of the first user of a piece of land to having ownership of that land can be found in Pierre-Louis Roederer's “Lectures on the Right of property” which he gave to the Lycée in December 1800.[1320]

It is quite likely that Roederer, Comte and Molinari knew of the 18th century natural law writings of theorists like Burlamaqui. The Swiss natural law theorist Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748) has a similar notion of a Lockean Proviso in Élémens du droit naturel (1774) which is: .". in taking part of this (commonly owned) land, one should not deprive others of anything; (that) there remain enough for all (il en restait assez pour tous).”[1321]

Bastiat too was very much influenced by Charles Comte and he had a well-developed theory of property rights based on the notion of self-ownership. On Molinari’s theory of property rights see, “Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership,” in Appendix 1; and on Bastiat’s see “Self-Ownership and the Right to Property,” in Appendix 1, in CW5 (forthcoming).

Public Goods

The Economists were divided into four camps on the issue of the private provision of public goods such as roads and bridges. Adam Smith had argued that the principle of “user pays” should prevail in most cases and that the government should only step in when no individual or firm would undertake the work privately.[1322] J.B. Say, on the other hand, thought that the state should play a bigger role because the benefits to individuals might be small but when diffused over the entire economy would add up to a considerable sum.[1323] A third school (e.g. J. Dupuit, Chief Engineer of the Bridges and Highways department) thought that Smith's idea of user pays could be taken even further as technology now made it possible for private firms to make money providing the means of transport (such as engines) as long as the state provided some of the basic infrastructure such as roads, which was in fact the policy adopted by the French government in its railroad legislation of the 1840s.[1324] Molinari comprised the fourth group which thought that every public good, not just transport, could and should be provided privately and competitively.

Race, Eugenics, and Tutelage

Molinari occasionally slips into the racial stereotyping which was all too common in the mid-19th century, although he stresses racial differences rather than racial hierarchies. In the early 19th century efforts were being made to make the study of the different races a more “scientific” one with a comparative study of aspects such as skin color, facial features, the shape of the skull,[1325] and social theorists of both a liberal and socialist bent seized upon these theories in their writings. For example, Augustin Thierry drew upon a race-based theory of conquest in order to explain the class structure of post-Norman society in England; Charles Dunoyer thought that racial differences explained the varying levels of civilization achieved by different societies and that this could be used to predict how different cultures would evolve towards a state of liberty in the future; Molinari in his sociological writings in the 1880s would base his ideas on the necessity of “tutelage” (“la tutelle” or guardianship) by the more advanced civilizations over the less developed ones in order to assist them in the transition towards full liberty. Saint-Simonians were also susceptible to this perspective as the work of Victor Courtet de l'Isle shows.[1326]

In 1893 Molinari coined the term “viriculture” (the cultivation of men)[1327] to describe how the quality of the human population might be improved by the operation of a number of processes: a modified and corrected understanding of Malthus' laws of population, the impact of technology and industrial production on improving the quality of life of ordinary people, a growing sense of individual responsibility which would make individual “self-government” work, and international competition between different cultures and civilizations. He also took an idea he had developed in 1863 in his Cours d'économie politique, namely “la liberté de la reproduction” (the freedom of reproducing), and added the new idea that families were like freely contracted unions or “des enterprises de reproduction” (enterprises for reproduction) (p. 409).

In S10 when the question of improving the human race comes up, it is interesting that the Conservative leaps to the conclusion that what Molinari is arguing for are “stud farms” (le haras) where better human beings can be artificially bred. Then the Socialist argues that the state should “direct and organize” any project to improve the human race. Molinari’s advice is the same as it is for everything else, that the state should remove any legal obstacles to people voluntarily going about their own business; in this case in choosing whom to marry and possibly also enjoying unhampered migration across state borders.

Revolution of 1848 (also “February Revolution”)

The Revolution of 1848 is also known as the “February Revolution."[1328] Because France went through so many revolutions between 1789 and 1870, they are often distinguished by reference to the month in which they occurred. Thus we have the “July Monarchy” (of 1830), when the restored Bourbon monarchy of 1815 was overthrown in July and August 1830 in order to create a more liberal and constitutional monarchy under Louis-Philippe; the “February Revolution” (of 1848), when the July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe was in turn overthrown and the Second Republic was formed; the “June Days” (of 1848), when a rebellion by some workers in Paris who were protesting the closure of the government-subsidized National Workshops work-relief program was bloodily put down by General Cavaignac; the “18th Brumaire of Louis-Napoléon,” which refers to the coup d’état that brought Louis-Napoléon (Napoléon Bonaparte’s nephew) to power on 2 December 1851 and that ushered in the creation of the Second Empire—the phrase was coined by Karl Marx and refers to another date, 18 Brumaire in the revolutionary calendar, or 9 November 1799, when Napoléon Bonaparte declared himself dictator in another coup d’état.

There were three man episodes of violence when protesters in the streets were confronted by troops from the Army or members of the National Guard: the events of the Three Revolutionary Days (22-24 February, 1848) which overthrew the July Monarchy of Louis Philippe and the government of Guizot; the June Days riots (3-26 June) which were suppressed by 40-50,000 troops under General Cavaignac with 1,500 dead and 15,000 arrests, of which 4,248 were sentenced to transportation (on 24 June there was a declaration of “state of siege” (martial law) which lasted until 19 October); and the demonstrations of June 1849 which were on a smaller scale with 6,000 protesters and 600 National Guardsmen (there were no deaths but 67 were tried of whom 36 were sentenced to transportation).

Many of the liberal economists took an active part in the Revolution of 1848: several stood successfully for election to the Constituent Assembly on 23 April 1848 and to the Legislative Assembly on 13 May 1849 (in the elections of 23 April 1848 a number of economists were successful such as Bastiat (Les Landes), Léon Faucher (Marne), Louis Wolowski (La Seine) as well as some supporters of economic deregulation such as Béranger, Gustave de Beaumont (La Somme), Prosper de Hauranne, Louis Reybaud, and Alexis de Tocqueville); Molinari, Bastiat, and several of their friends published revolutionary journals which they handed out on the streets of Paris in February-March and June-July 1848; others formed a political club, “The Club for the Freedom of Working” to debate socialists in March 1848; they all took part in various ways in the vigorous pamphlet war which broke out between them and the conservative and socialist opponents during 1848 and 1849.

See the “Brief Chronology of the 1848 Revolution and the Second Republic,” in Appendix 4.

The Right to Work (Le Droit au Travail)

The “right to work” (le droit au travail, which one might translate in English as the “right to a job” using “travail” as a noun) had been a catch phrase of the socialists throughout the 1840s. What they meant by this term was that the state had the duty to provide work for all men who demanded it. In contrast, the classical liberal economists called for the “right of working,” or the “freedom to work” (la liberté du travail, or le droit de travailler using “travail” as a verb), by which they meant the right of any individual to pursue an occupation or activity without any restraints imposed upon him by the state. The latter point of view was articulated by Charles Dunoyer in his De la liberté du travail (1845) and the socialist perspective was provided by Louis Blanc in l’Organisation du travail (1839) and Le Socialisme, droit au travail (1848) and by Victor Considerant in La Théorie du droit de propriété et du droit au travail (1848).

The socialists claimed that it was the duty of the government to provide every able-bodied Frenchman with a job and the job creation program initiated by the Provisional Government in the first days of the revolution, called the National Workshops, was designed to carry this out. The Economists fiercely opposed this scheme and Bastiat used his position in the Finance Committee to argue strenuously against it. Matters came to a head in May 1848, when a committee of the Constituent Assembly was formed to discuss the issue of “the right to work” just prior to the closing of the state-run National Workshops, which prompted widespread rioting in Paris. In a veritable “who’s who” of the socialist and liberal movements of the day, a debate took place in the Assembly and was duly published by the classical liberal publishing firm of Guillaumin later in the year along with suitable commentary by such leading liberal economists as Léon Faucher, Louis Wolowski, Joseph Garnier, and Bastiat.[1329] Here is the beginning of the “opinion” Bastiat wrote for the volume, in which he distinguished between the right to work (droit au travail, where “work” is used as a noun and thus might be rendered as the “right to a job”) and the “right to work” (droit de travailler, where “work” is used as a verb):

If one understands by the phrase “right to a job” (droit au travail) the right to work (droit de travailler) (which implies the right to enjoy the fruit of one’s labor), then one can have no doubt on the matter. As far as I’m concerned, I have never written two lines that did not have as their purpose the defense of this notion.
But if one means by the “right to a job” that an individual has the right to demand of the state that it take care of him, provide him with a job and a wage by force, then under no circumstances does this bizarre thesis bear close inspection.[1330]

In spite of his and the other Economists’ opposition Chapter 2, Article 13, of the Constitution of November 4, 1848 explicitly stated that “The Constitution guarantees citizens the liberty of work and industry. Society favors and encourages the development of work by means of free primary education, professional education, equality of relations between employers and workers, institutions of insurance and credit, agricultural institutions, voluntary associations, and the establishment by the state, the departments and the communes of public works suitable for employing idle hands; it provides assistance to abandoned children, to the sick and the old without means, which their families cannot help.”

This article raises the problem which concerned the Economists deeply of the difference between the free market idea of “the liberty of work and industry” (la liberté du travail et de l’industrie) and the socialist idea of the “right to a job” (la liberte au travail) which increasingly became an issue during the Revolution. The Constitution of November 1848 specifically refers to the former but also seems to advocate the latter with the phrase “public works suitable for reemploying the unemployed.”

The Seven (4 + 3) Musketeers of French Political Economy[1331]

There were in fact three other young men who fit Minart’s definition of a “musketeer”: This younger cohort of newcomers to Paris were born between 1813 and 1822, were close friends of Molinari, and also made significant contributions to the French classical liberal movement. This second cohort of Musketeers includes the economist and journalist Joseph Garnier (1813-1881) who came from the south eastern town of Beuil, Alpes-Maritimes near Nice and came to Paris in 1830 (aged 17); the journalist and author of popular works on French history Hippolyte Castille (1820-1886) who was born in the sea-side town of Montreuil-sur-Mer, Pas-de-Calais, and came to Paris in 1839 (aged 19); and the economist and free trade activist Alcide Fonteyraud (1822-1849) who had the most exotic origin having been born in Mauritius, was brought up with English as a second language taught to him by an old English soldier after his mother died, and who came to Paris 1830 (aged 8).

They joined up with the older, first cohort made up of Bastiat, Guillaumin, and Coquelin who had been born around 1800. Thus in total we have “4 + 3” or “Seven Musketeers” whose lives and work must be taken into account in order to understand the milieu in which Molinari was working.

The 6 other members of the group provided Molinari with a network of organisations and social relationships which helps us understand the context in which Molinari wrote Les Soirées in 1849 and the intellectual currents which were swirling around him. In rough chronological order, the network of friends and organizations with whom Molinari was active in the period between 1844 and 1852 are, Hippolyte Castille’s network of friends who participated in his soirées at his home on the rue Saint-Lazare (1844-1848), attendance at which no doubt gave Molinari the inspiration for the title of this book; Frédéric Bastiat’s free trade network within the French Free Trade Association (1846-1848); the Guillaumin publishing network (1835-1852) which included the Journal des économistes, the Société d’Économie politique, and the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique; the group of friends who started two small revolutionary magazines which were handed out on the streets of Paris in February and June 1848; Coquelin’s and Fonteyraud’s network of debaters and public speakers in the Club de la liberté du travail (Club Lib) in March 1848; and Garnier’s Friends of Peace peace network (1848-50) who were active in organizing a Peace Conference in Paris in 1849. Molinari’s friendship with individuals from all of the groups meant that he participated in a dense network of social and political activities within the liberal movement in the later 1840s and early 1850s.

Slavery

France had a tumultuous path on the road towards the abolition of slavery. It was first abolished by the Convention with the law of 4 February, 1794. Napoleon reintroduced it with the law of 20 May 1802 and send a naval force to Haiti in order to enforce it, thus triggering the Haitian revolution and its eventual independence in 1804. Slavery was abolished in France a second time during the Second republic with the law of 27 April, 1848 written by Victor Schoelcher the under-secretary for the Navy and Colonies. In the British Empire the first step towards abolition came with the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1808. After a slave revolt in Jamaica in 1831 Parliament passed the Slavery Abolition Act on 28 August 1833. This was not an immediate emancipation as the slaves were forcibly apprenticed to their former owners. The apprentice system ended in two stages, the first on 1 August 1838 and the second on 1 August 1840.

The French classical liberal economists like Molinari were fascinated by the institution of slavery because it was a violation of their deeply held views about natural rights and individual liberty and also because it was a glaring example of how a powerful vested interest could use the power of the state to their own advantage. In France slavery had been opposed by enlightened thinkers such as the Abbé Grégoire and Brissot who were members of the “Société des Amis des Noirs” (Society of the friends of the Blacks) which campaigned for its amelioration if not outright abolition. In the early restoration period writers like J.B. Say wrote on the moral evils of slavery and its economic inefficiency, believing that only the existence of government protection for colonial sugar and the French navy made slave produced sugar profitable. Molinari had been a vocal opponent of slavery, writing a several articles and books on the topic such as Études économiques (1846) with a long section on slavery and the article on “Esclavage” (Slavery) in DEP, vol. 1, pp. 712-31.[1332]

The Social Question (Problem)

The "Social Question" ("la question sociale" in France and "die soziale Frage" in the German states), or “the social problem," concerned the condition of the working class (to borrow the title of Friedrich Engel's best known work) in the newly industrializing cities of Europe in the 1830s and 1840s. It embraced working conditions in the factories, child labor, the length of the working day, poverty, public health, wage rates, and so on. Three classic works on "the social question" were the Poor Law Commissioners’ Report of 1834 (1905); Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemont, Économie politique chrétienne, ou Recherches sur la nature et les causes du paupérisme en France et en Europe, et sur les moyens de le soulager et de le prévenir (1834.; and Friedrich Engels, Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England (1845).

The Socialist School

The rise of socialist ideas in the twenty odd years before the 1848 Revolution is one of the targets of Molinari’s book. Some of the leading figures of the French socialist school are the Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Charles Fourier (1772-1837), Étienne Cabet (1788-1856), Pierre Leroux (1798-1871), Victor Prosper Considerant (1808-93), Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-65), and Louis Blanc (1811-82).[1333] Proudhon and Blanc were of particular interest to Molinari. During the 1840s the work of Proudhon on property was a serious challenge to the economists [Qu’est-ce que la propriété? (1841)] as was the writings and political activities of Louis Blanc on “the right to work” and the National Workshops. Other issues which were challenged by the socialists included the morality of profits, interest, and rent; the private ownership of property (versus communal ownership); and the justice of the current system of land ownership.

Molinari had two ways of categorizing socialists. One way was according to their degree of radicalism. Firstly, there were the “socialistes avancés” (the hard core socialists) like Blanc and Albert who wanted a real revolution in labor relations in France along the lines of the National Workshops. Secondly, there were the “socialistes en retard” (the socialist fellow travelers) like Garnier-Pagès, Ledru-Rollin, Flocon, Lamartine, and even Thiers himself who wanted extensive government involvement in regulating wages and working conditions and providing public works jobs and other forms of assistance for the poor and unemployed, but who were not revolutionaries.[1334] In many ways Molinari thought the latter were more dangerous than the advanced socialists because of their political influence within the government and their apparently moderate stance. Their form of socialism was not the revolutionary version but an institutional version, whereby they planned to use the existing government bureaucracies like the department of public works and the central Bank to use the power of the state to regulate the French economy and thereby reform society. A third form of socialism was more acceptable to Molinari, which was the voluntary socialism of Proudhon who did not believe in imposing socialist practices on the economy either through violent revolution or by state compulsion. Molinari did not think that this form of socialism would work but he didn’t want to stop anybody from experimenting with it on a voluntary basis.

Another way he categorized them was more polemical in that he, like Bastiat, wanted to show the conservative elites who controlled the French state that their policies of tariff protection and subsidies for industry and agriculture were a form of “socialism” (or “communism” as he often called it in Les Soirées) which was similar to the demands of Blanc and others for subsidies for the employed and the working class. The former he called “socialisme d’en haut” (socialism from above) because the conservative elites wanted to use the power of the state to benefit themselves and their allies; the latter he called “socialisme d’en bas” (socialism from below) because Louis Blanc and the agitators in the socialist Clubs wanted to use the power of the state to benefit themselves and their allies.[1335]

After 1851 Molinari regarded the regime of Louis Napoleon as an example of a new hybrid form of socialism which was part “socialisme en retard” and part “socialisme d’en haut” who introduced socialist-inspired controls on the economy via the bureaucracies he controlled. He coined a new word to describe this phenomenon - “interventionism.”[1336]

See the glossary entries on these individuals for further information, and the entry on “Utopias."

Société d’économie politique (Political Economy Society)

The Société d’économie politique (Political Economy Society) was founded in 1842 by the Comte d’Esterno and Pellegrino Rossi with the name “Réunion des économistes.”[1337] It failed to attract members because of its academic tone and folded after a few meetings. Later in the year, another attempt at forming a society was made by Adolphe Blaise, Joseph Garnier, and Guillaumin which began meeting regularly from 15 November 1842. It attracted considerably more members because of its more relaxed and open format (Garnier estimates about 60 by its second meeting) where the members would meet every month for a meal in a restaurant before beginning a more formal discussion of topics selected by the committee. Its membership was drawn from members of the Institute, ex-parliamentarians, educators, journalists, judges, and several active in commerce and industry. The meetings were held in the Maison-Dorée restaurant which was located at 20, Boulevard des Italiens in the 9th arrondissement of Paris. It opened in 1839 and had a reputation for excellent food and wine (it boasted a wine cellar of 80,000 bottles) and attracted regular customers such as Honoré de Balzac and Alexandre Dumas.

The Society’s first president was Charles Dunoyer, who served from 1845 to 1862, and Joseph Garnier was made permanent secretary in 1849. Its membership in 1847 was about fifty and grew to about eighty at the end of 1849. It is not known when Molinari joined the society, but he moved to Paris in 1840 so it is possible he became a member very early on. A summary of its monthly meetings was published in Le Journal des économistes. During the late 1840s some particularly controversial topics were discussed including the proper role of the state (stimulated by Molinari’s article in the JDE on “The Production of Security”), the nature of land rent (stimulated by Bastiat’s writings on the subject), and of course the rise of socialism during the 1848 Revolution. The Society was managed by 2 presidents (Charles Dunoyer and Hippolyte Passy), 2 vice-presidents (Horace Say and Charles Renouard), a permanent secretary (Joseph Garnier), and a treasurer (Guillaumin). Summaries of the meetings were published by Joseph Garnier, the permanent secretary and vice president of the society, in the Journal des économistes. In 1889 summaries of the Society’s meetings were published by Guillaumin: Annales de la Société d’Économie politique (1889).

Soirées

“Soirée” might be translated as an “evening” or a sophisticated “party.” It suggests a group of people who have high social status or considerable wealth who gather for drink, food, and conversation on various topics. The reviewer of the book in the Journal des Économistes (a journal very sympathetic to Molinari’s free market views) was puzzled by the title and suggested that “entretiens” (or “discussions”) would have been a better description of the book’s contents. Towards the end of the book Molinari himself describes the “Soirées as “causeries” (discussions). A possible inspiration for Molinari’s book is Joseph de Maistre’s Les Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg, ou Entretiens sur le gouvernement temporel de la Providence (1821). This is a work in defense of the established church, the power of the Pope, and the monarchy, and was very hostile to liberal notions of individual liberty and free markets. There are also three participants to the “dialogues”: “Le Comte” (The Count), “Le Chevalier” (The Knight), and “Le Sénateur” (The Senator). Richard Lebrun translates the title as the “Saint Petersburg Dialogues." Following this example we could have entitled Molinari’s book “The Saint Lazarus Dialogues.”

There were at least three “soirées” within the Economists’ social circle in Paris during the late 1840s which Molinari would have been familiar with, and perhaps attended. The wives of the two leading financial supporters of the Guillaumin group, Anna Say (née Cheuvreux and the wife of the businessman Horace Say) and Hortense Cheuvreux (the wife of the manufacturer Casimir Cheuvreux) ran sophisticated salons or soirées for the liberal élite and we know from Bastiat’s letters that he attended several times. We have no extant letters from Molinari to tell us about his social life, but as an active member of the Guillaumin network he would likely have attended from time to time. A third soirée which we know Molinari and Bastiat attended was the one run by the radical republican Hippolyte Castille at his stately home on Saint Lazarus street. This soirée was active between and 1846 and the outbreak of the Revolution in February 1848. It was very different to those run by Anna Say and Hortense Cheuvreux as it included the radical republican friends of Castille as well as some of the more radical economists. No doubt Molinari met socialists there and probably debated them much as “The Economist” does in the book.

There are several other possible sources which might have inspired Molinari in his choice of the title “Les Soirées.” In terms of structure, that is using a dialogue between individuals with opposing points of view, we have the example of the economic dialogues of Harriet Martineau and Frédéric Bastiat in Conversations on Political Economy (1816) and the Economic Sophisms (1846-48) respectively. Molinari wrote another work shortly after Les Soirées where he used the form of constructed dialogues between adversaries, this time on the issue of tariffs and protectionism: Conservations familières sur le commerce des grains (1855) later expanded and republished as Conversations sur le commerce des grains et la protection de l'agriculture (1886). In terms of the name itself “Soirées” was commonly used in book titles with some moral or religious instructional purpose. Titles which had some political content and which might have inspired Molinari include two from the revolutionary period, Anon., Les soirées du village, ou Entretiens d'un maire & d'un procureur de commune (1792); Ducray-Duminil, Les Soirées de la chaumière, ou les Leçons du vieux père (1794, reprinted 1845); Despréaux de La Condamine , Soirées de Ferney, ou Confidences de Voltaire (1802); Joseph de Maistre, Les Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg, ou Entretiens sur le gouvernement temporel de la Providence (1821); Exauvillez, Les soirées politiques, ou Simples conversations sur les principes libéraux (1829), and one which was too late to have influenced Molinari but which is striking, Hamon, Les Soirées de Jacques Bonhomme (1851) - this is because Molinari published a small magazine in June 1848 called Jacques Bonhomme with Bastiat and other radical liberals which was designed to appeal to ordinary working people during the revolution.

Utopias

An important part of the classical liberal critique of socialism was its analysis of the utopian vision many socialists, such as Fénelon, Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen, had of a future community where their ideals of common ownership of property, the equality of economic conditions, state-planned and state-funded education, and strictly regulated economic activity for the "common good” were practiced. Hippolyte Passy summed up the thinking of the liberal political economists on this topic when he stated that Bastiat had provided the key insight into the differences between the socialists' and the economists' vision of the future of society: the socialist vision was a "factice,” or artificial one, with an order imposed by a ruling elite, party, or priesthood; while the liberal vision was a "natural,”or spontaneous, one that flowed "harmoniously” from the voluntary actions of individuals in the marketplace. [1338]

Given the harshness of the economists' rejection of socialist utopian schemes, it is rather ironic that the classical liberals also had their utopian moments. One could mention Condorcet's idea of the "Tenth Epoch” (1795), Charles Comte's and Charles Dunoyer's idea of the "industrial stage” of economic development (1820s), Bastiat’s idea of “The Utopian” politician who dreams of dismantling the state in a matter of hours,[1339] and Gustave de Molinari's vision of a fully privatized society where there was no role left for the state (“The Production of Security” and the 11th Soirée). Furthermore, in June the previous year, at the height of the June Days rioting, he had written but not put his name to an open letter to socialists appealing to them to agree that liberals and socialists shared the common goals of prosperity and justice but differed on the correct way to achieve them. The article was signed “Le Rêveur” (the Dreamer) but Molinari did not admit that he was the author until 50 years later.[1340]

Les Soirées was reviewed positively by Charles Coquelin the October 1849 issue of the JDE except for some of Molinari's more radical ideas about police and defense. At the monthly meeting of the Société d'Économie Politique on 10 October of that year not one of those present came to Molinari's defense on these matters.[1341] The main critics were Charles Coquelin who began the discussion, then Frédéric Bastiat, and finally Charles Dunoyer. It was the latter who summed up the view of the Economists that Molinari had been "swept away by delusions of logic."


22. Bibliography

Primary Sources

Works by Molinari

Note to editor: is “X” a Number or letter??:

"Le XIXe siècle," JDE, S.5, T.45, no. 1, janvier 1901, pp. 5-19.

"Le XXe siècle," JDE, T. 49, no. 1, janvier 1902, pp. 5-14.

L'abbé de Saint-Pierre, membre exclu de l'Académie française, sa vie et ses oeuvres, prÉcédées d'une appréciation et d'un précis historique de l'idée de la paix perpétuelle, suivies du jugement de Rousseau sur le projet de paix perpétuelle et la polysynodie ainsi que du projet attribué à Henri IV, et du plan d'Emmanuel Kant pour rendre la paix universelle, etc., etc. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1857).

"De l’action de la noblesse et des classes supérieures dans les sociétés modernes, par M.L. Mounier, avec des remarques par M. Rubichon,” JDE, T22, N° 93, 15 décembre 1848, p. 39-50.

"De l’agriculture en Angleterre," JDE, T. 16, N° 62, Janvier 1847, pp. 114-26.

“Appel aux ouvriers” 20 juilllet, 1846, Le Courrier français, reprinted in Questions d'économie politique, vol. I (1861), pp. 183-94 and Les bourses du travail (1893), p. 126-37.

“Beaux-arts,” DEP (1852), T. 1, pp. 149-57.

Biographe politique de M. A. de Lamartine. Extrait de la Revue générale biographique, politique et littéraire, publiée sous la direction de M. E. Pascallet. Deuxième Edition. (Paris: Madame de Lacombe, 1843).

“La bonne association et la mauvaise,” l'Économiste belge, no. 17, 3 sept. 1855, pp. 2-3. Reprinted in Questions d’économie politique, vol. 1, p. 233-36.

Les Bourses du Travail (Paris: Guillaumin, 1893).

Au Canada et aux montagnes Rocheuses, en Russie, en Corse, à l'Exposition universelle d'Anvers. Lettres adressées au Journal des débats (Paris: C. Reinwald, 1886).

“Céréales,” DEP (1852), T. 1, pp. 301-26.

“Charles Coquelin,” JDE, T. 33, Nos. 137 and 138, septembre et octobre 1852, pp. 167-76.

Charleston - la situation politique de la caroline du sud (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1876).

“Chronique,” JDE, T. 19, no. 70, mars 1848, pp. 406-18.

“Chronique,” JDE,T. 20, no. 77, 1 avril 1848, pp. 55-56.

“Civilisation,” DEP (1852), T. 1, pp. 370-77. Les Clubs rouges pendant le siège de Paris (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1871).

“Les Coalitions des ouvriers,” Bourse du travail, 14 March, 1857. Reprinted in Questions d'économie politique, vol. I (1861), pp. 199-205.

“Colonies,” DEP (1852), T. 1, pp. 393-403.

“Colonies agricoles,” DEP (1852), T. 1, pp. 403-5.

“Colonies militaires,” DEP (1852), T. 1, p. 405.

Comment se résoudra la question sociale (Paris: Guillaumin, 1896).

“Le commerce des grains. Dialogue entre un émeutier, un économiste, un prohibitioniste, etc.,” JDE, S.2, T. 4, no. 11, 15 November 1854, pp. 186-204.

“Comte (Charles),” DEP (1852), T. 1, pp. 446-47.

Des compagnies religieuses et de la publicité de l’instruction publique (F. Prévot, 1845).

“Le Congrès de la paix, à Paris. — Résolutions du Congrès. — Discours de MM. Victor Hugo, Cobden, Henry Vincent, etc. — Compte-rendu par M. M (Molinari),” JDE, T. 24, N° 102, 15 septembre 1849, pp. 152-73.

“Conversations familières sur le commerce des grains. - La prohibition à la sorite,” JDE, T. 6, N° 4, 15 Avril 1855, pp. 52-64.

Conservations familières sur le commerce des grains. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1855).

Conversations sur le commerce des grains et la protection de l'agriculture (Nouvelle édition) (Paris: Guillaumin, 1886).

[CR] “Contes sur l’économie politique, par miss Harriet Martineau,” JDE, T. 23, N° 97, 15 avril 1849, pp. 77-82.

Cours d'économie politique, professé au Musée royal de l'industrie belge, 2 vols. (Bruxelles: Librairie polytechnique d'Aug. Decq, 1855). 2nd revised and enlarged edition (Bruxelles et Leipzig: A Lacroix, Ver Broeckoven; Paris: Guillaumin, 1863).

La crise agricole ses causes et ses remèdes. (1896).

“Dictionnaire de l’économie politique,” JDE, T. 37, N° 152. 15 Décembre 1853, pp. 420-32.

“Documents extraits de l'enquête sur les théâtres," JDE, T. 26, no. 112, July 1850, pp. 409-12;

“Le droit électorale” Courrier français, 23 juillet 1846. Reprinted in Questions d'économie politique et de droit public (1861), vol. 2, pp. 271-73.

Économie de l'histoire: Théorie de l'Évolution (Paris: F. Alcan, 1908).

L’Économiste belge (1855-68) (Bruxelles: Imprimerie de Korn. Verbruggen) (1855-1858); Ch. Vanderauwera, 1859-1862; A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven, 1863-1868).

"Les Églises libres dans l'État libre," Économiste belge, 14 décembre 1867, no. 25, pp. 289-90.

“Émigration,” DEP (1852), T. 1, pp. 675-83.

“L’enquête sue les théâtres,” JDE, T. 26, no. 110, 15 Mai 1850, pp. 130-44.

Molinari, Gustave de and Passy, Frédéric. De l'enseignement obligatoire. Discussion entre G. de Molinari et Frédéric Passy. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1859).

“Esclavage,” DEP (1852), T. 1, pp. 712-31.

Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la Société future (Paris: Guillaumin, 1899).

[Molinari and Thomas R. Malthus] Essai sur le principe de population Introduction par G. de Molinari (Paris: Guillaumin, 1889; Paris: Alcan, 1907).

Études économiques. L'Organisation de la liberté industrielle et l'abolition de l'esclavage (Paris: Capelle, 1846.)

[CR] “Etudes sur les deux systèmes opposés du libre échange et de la protection, par M. Roederer, ancien pair de France,” JDE, T. 30, N° 125, 15 septembre 1851, pp. 31-39. [reprinted in Questions, pp. 106-20].

L'évolution du protectionnisme. (1903).

“L’Évolution économique du XIXe siècle," JDE, T. 45, N° 133. Janvier 1877, pp. 11-32. Part 1 of a series.

L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle: théorie du progrès (Paris: C. Reinwald 1880).

“L’Évolution politique et la Révolution,” JDE, T. 15, N° 44, Août 1881, pp. 165-81. Part 1 of a series.

L'évolution politique et la Révolution (Paris: C. Reinwald, 1884).

[CR] “Frédéric Bastiat: Lettre d’un habitant des Landes," JDE S.4. T. 3, no. 7, July 1878, pp. 60-70.

Grandeur et decadence de la guerre (Paris: Guillaumin, 1898).

Histoire du tarif (Paris: Guillaumin, 1847). Vol. 1: Les fers et les houilles; vol. 2: Les céréales.

“L'industrie des théâtres, à props de la crises actuelle,” JDE, T. 24, no. 101, 15 août 1849, pp. 12-29.

“Introduction à la huitième année,” JDE, T. 22, No. 93, 15 dec. 1848, pp. 1-6. L'Irlande, le Canada, Jersey. Lettres adressées au "Journal débats” (Paris: E. Dentu, 1881).

“Lettre sur le prêt à intérêt,” JDE, T. 23, N° 99, 15 juin 1849, p. 231-41.

Lettres sur la Russie (Paris: Guillaumin, 1861); Nouvelle édition entièrement refondue (Paris: E. Dentu, 1877).

Lettres sur les États-Unis et le Canada addressés au Journal des débats à l'occasion de l'Exposition Universelle de Philadelphie (Paris: Hachette, 1876).

“La liberté de l'intervention gouvernementale en matière des cultes. - Système français et système américain,” Économiste belge, 1 June 1857, pp. 2-4. Reprinted in Questions d'économique politique et de droit public (1861), vol. 1 pp. 351-61.

“Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)” DEP (1853), vol. 2, p. 45-49.

“La liberté des théâtres à propos de deux projets de loi soumis au Conseil d’Etat,“ JDE, T. 24, N° 104, 15 novembre 1849, p. 342-51.

“Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 49-63.

Les Lois naturelles de l'économie politique (Paris: Guillaumin, 1887).

“La mobilisation du travail,” La Réforme (9 juin 1845).

“Monuments publics,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 237-8.

La Morale économique (Paris: Guillaumin, 1888).

Le Mouvement socialiste et les réunions publiques avant la révolution du 4 septembre 1870 (Paris: Garnier Freres, 1872).

“Des Moyens d’améliorer le sort des classes laborieuses," La Nation, 23rd July, 1843. Published later as the pamphlet Des Moyens d’améliorer le sort des classes laborieuses (février 1844, éditions Amyot).

Napoleon III publiciste; sa pensée cherchée dans ses écrits; analyze et appréciation de ses oeuvres (Bruxelles: A. Lacroix, Van Meenen, 1861).

“Nations,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 259-62.

“Necker,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 272-74.

“Nécrologie. — Bastiat, Frédéric. notice sur sa vie et ses écrits,” JDE, T. 28, N° 118, 15 février 1851, pp. 180-96.

[Nécrologie] “Charles Coquelin," JDE, T. 33, nos. 137-38, Set.-Oct 1852, pp. 167-76.

[Nécrologie] “Miss Harriet Martineau ,” JDE, T. 11, N° 31, Juillet 1880, pp. 54-64. “A nos lecteurs,” JDE, T. 19, no. 70, mars 1848, pp. 321-22.

[Nécrologie] “Garnier, Joseph.” JDE, Sér.4. T. 16. No. 46, Oct. 1881, pp. 5-13.

“Necrologie] “Castille, Hippolyte.” JDE, T. 36, No. 10, October 1886, pp. 116-18.

Notions fondamentales économie politique et programme économique. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1891).

“De l’organisation de la liberté industrielle,” in Études économiques (Paris: Capelle, 1846), pp. 5-127.

“Paix, Guerre,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 307-14.

“Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix),” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 314-15.

A Panama: l'Isthme de Panama - la Martinique - Haïti; Lettres adressées au Journal des débats (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1887).

“Peel (Robert),” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 351-54.

CR] “Le potage à la tortue, entretiens populaires sur les questions sociales, par A.-E. Cherbuliez,” JDE, T. 22, N° 96, 15 mars 1849, p. 443-44.

Précis d'économie politique et de morale. (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1893).

[Molinari and Garnier, Joseph.] Du principe de population. 2. éd. prÉcédée d'une introduction et d'une notice par M. G. de Molinari, augmenté de nouvelles notes contenant les faits statistiques récents et les débats relatifs à la question de la population. Avec un portrait de l'Auteur (Paris: Guillaumin, 1885)

Les Problèmes du XXe siècle (Paris: Guillaumin, 1901).

"De la production de la sécurité,” JDE, T. 22, no. 95, 15 February 1849, pp. 277-90.

De la Production de la sÉcurité, par M. G. de Molinari. Extrait du n° 95 du “Journal des Économistes," 15 février 1849. (Paris : Guillaumin, 1849). In-8° , 16 p.

The Production of Security, trans. J. Huston McCulloch, Occasional Papers Series #2 (Richard M. Ebeling, Editor), New York: The Center for Libertarian Studies, May 1977.

“La production et le commerce du travail,” JDE, T. 48, no. 2, November 1901, pp. 161-81. Reprinted in Questions économiques à l'ordre du jour (Paris: Guillaumin, 1906), pp. 37-184.

”Projet d'association pour l'établissement d'une ligue des neutres," the Times (July 28, 1887). Reprinted in La Morale économique, p. 438.

“Propriété littéraire et artistique,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 473-78.

"Protestation de la Société d'économie politique contre la suppression de l'enseignement de l'économie politique," JDE, T. 20, no. 79, 1 mai 1848, pp. 113-28.

”M. Proudhon et M. Thiers," JDE, N° 86, 15 août 1848, pp. 57-73.

Questions économiques à l'ordre du jour (Paris: Guillaumin, 1906).

Questions d'économie politique et de droit public (Paris: Guillaumin; Brussels: Lacroix, 1861), 2 vols.

Religion. (Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, 1892).

Religion, translated from the second (enlarged) edition with the author's sanction by Walter K. Firminger (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1894).

La République tempérée. (Paris: Garnier, 1873).

Le retour au protectionnisme ce qu'il coutera aux consommateurs français, ce qu'il rapportera aux producteurs étrangers. (Paris: Union pour la Franchise des Matières Premières, 1891).

Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel; prÉcédé d'une lettre à M. le Comte J. Arrivabene, sur les dangers de la situation présente, par M. G. de Molinari, professeur d'économie politique (Brussels: Meline, Cans et Cie, 1852).

CR “La Révolution de 1848, par M. Dunoyer," JDE, T. 24, N° 101, 15 août 1849, p. 112-14.

Salis Schwabe, J. Richard Cobden. Notes sur ses voyages, correspondences, et souvenirs. Recueillés par Mme Salis Schwabe, avec une préface de M. G. de Molinari. Paris: Guillaumin, 1879.

“Saint-Pierre (abbé de),” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 565-66.

Science et religion (Paris: Guillaumin, 1894).

“Servage,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 610-13.

The Society of Tomorrow: A Forecast of its Political and Economic Organization, ed. Hodgson Pratt and Frederic Passy, trans. P.H. Lee Warner (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904).

Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare; entretiens sur les lois économiques et défense de la propriété (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849). Online version: </titles/1344>.

“Sully (duc de),” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 684-85.

“II. La suppression des douanes, Letter II (Courrier français, 21 et 27 septembre 1846), in Questions d’économie politique (1861), vol. 2, pp. 159-72.

"Suppression de la chaire d'économie politique," JDE, T. 20, no. 78, 15 avril 1848, pp. 57-67.

[CR] "Système des contradictions économiques, ou Philosophie de la misère, par J.-P. Proudhon," JDE, T. 18, N° 72, Novembre 1847, pp. 383-98.

“Tarifs de douane,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 712-16.

“Théâtres,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 731-33.

[CR] Thiers “De la propriété," JDE, T. 22, N° 94. 15 janvier 1849, pp. 162-77.

“M. Thiers," An essay on Thiers’ “Discours sur le régime commercial de France prononcé à l’Assemblée nationale des 27 et 28 juin 1851” in La Patrie, 2 juillet 1851 [reprinted in Questions, (1861), pp. 81-91].

[CR] “Traité d'économie publique: suivi d'un aperçu sur les finances de la France by Saint-Chamans,” JDE, T. 36, no. 147, 15 juillet 1853, pp. 58-68. [reprinted Questions, pp. 130-46].

“Travail” (Labor) DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 761-64.

“Union douanière” (Customs Union), DEP (1853), vol. 2, p. 788-89.

“Usure,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 790-95.

[CR] “Utilité de la protection aux Etats-Unis, selon M. Carey,” JDE, T. 30, N° 127, 15 novembre 1851, pp. 233-39. [reprinted Questions, pp. 92-105].

Ultima Verba: Mon dernier ouvrage (Paris: V. Girard et E. Briere, 1911).

“L’utopie de la liberté (lettre aux socialistes), par un Rêveur," JDE, T. 20 N° 82, 15 juin 1848, pp. 328-32.

“Villes,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 833-38.

“Voyages,” DEP (1853), T. 2, pp. 858-60.

La Viriculture. Ralentissemnt du movement de la population. Dégénérescence - Causes et remèdes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1897).

Works by Other Authors cited in the Text, Notes, and Glossaries

Actes officiels du gouvernement provisoire dans leur ordre chronologique, arrêtès, décrets, proclamations, etc., etc: Revue des faits les plus remarquables précédés du récit des événements qui se sont accomplis les 22, 23 et 24 février 1848 (Paris: Barba, Garnot, 1848).

Annales de la Société d’Économie politique, publiées sous la direction de Alphonse Courtois fils, secrétaire perpétuel (Paris: Guillaumin, 1889), vol. 1846-1853.

Annuaire de l'économie politique et de la statistique, par les rédacteurs du Journal des économistes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1844-1899). Especially Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1849, par MM. Joseph Garnier et Guillaumin (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849); Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1848, par MM. Joseph Garnier et Guillaumin (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848).

[Anon.] Les soirées du village, ou Entretiens d'un maire & d'un procureur de commune (Paris: Guerbart, 1792).

[Anon.] Enquête sur les fers. Commission formée avec l'approbation du roi, sous la présidence du ministre du commerce et des manufactures, pour l'examen de certaines questions de législation commerciale (Paris, Imprimerie royale, 1828).

[Anon.] Congrès des Économistes réunis à Bruxelles, par les soins de l’Association belge pour la liberté commercial. Session de 1847. Séances des 16, 17 et 18 septembre. (Bruxelles: Imprimerie de Deltombe, 1847).

[Anon.] Plus de conscription! (Signé: Allyre Bureau, l'un des rédacteurs de "la Démocratie pacifique") (Paris: Impr. de Lange Lévy, 1848).

[Anon.] “Bibliographie (on socialism)’, in Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1849, par MM. Joseph Garnier et Guillaumin (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849), pp. 419-31.

[Anon.] Report of the Proceedings of the Second General Peace Congress, held in Paris, on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th of August, 1849. Compiled from Authentic Documents, under the Superintendence of the Peace Congress Committee. (London: Charles Gilpin, 5, Bishopsgate Street Without, 1849).

[Anon.] Reports of a discussion “On the Proper Limits to the Power of the State”:  Part 1 in “Chronique,” JDE, T. 24, no. 103, Oct. 1849, pp. 315-16; Part 2 in “Chronique,” JDE, 15 Jan. 1850, T. XXV, pp. 202-205; and Part 3 in “Chronique,” JDE, T. XXV, no. 107, 15 fev., 1850, pp. 202-5.

[Anon.] “Note sur le choléra asiatique à Paris en 1849,” Annuaire d’en. pol. (1851), p. 249.

[Anon.] Les murailles révolutionnaires: Collection complète des Professions de foi, Affiches, Décrets, Bulletins de la République, Facsimile de signatures. (Paris et les Départements). Illustrées des portraits des membres du Gouvernement provisoire, des principaux chefs des Clubs, des Rédacteurs et Gérants des premiers journaux de la Révolution (Paris:Chez J. Bry (ainé), Édit., 1852). 1856 ed. 2 vols.

[Anon.] “Prix du pain, à Paris,” Annuaire d’éc.pol. (1856), p. 301-2.

Aeschylus. Théâtre d'Aeschyle, traduit en françois, avec des notes philologiques et deux discours critiques, ed. La Porte Du Theil (Paris: Imprimerie de la République, 1795).

Amé, Léon, Étude économique sur les douanes. Deuxième édition. Revue et augmentée (Paris: Guillaumin, 1860).

Arcq, Philippe-Auguste de Sainte-Foix La noblesse militaire, opposée à la noblesse commerçante ou le patriote françois (Amsterdam: 1756).

Arago, Étienne. Les Aristocraties, Comédie en cinq actes et en vers (Velhagen & Klasing, 1848).

Arago, François. Sur les Fortifications de Paris (Paris: Bachelier, 1841).

———. Études sur les fortifications de Paris, considérées politiquement et militairement (Paris: Pagnerre, 1845).

Association pour la défense du travail national , Examen des théories du libre-échange et des résultats du système protecteur (Imprimerie de A. Guyot, 1847).

Barnhill, John Basil ed. The American Anti-Socialist: An Organ of Jeffersonian Democracy published in Washington. D.C. Volume 1, April, 1912, no. 2, p. 29.

Barthélemy, Jean-Jacques. Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce dans le milieu du quatrième siècle avant l’ère vulgaire. 2 vols. (Paris: Didier, 1843).

Basnage (sieur de Beauval), Jacques. Annales des Provinces-Unies: depuis les négociations pour la paix de Munster. Avec la description historique de leur gouvernement (La Haye: Charles le Vier, 1719).

Bastiat, Frédéric. Capitale et rente (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849).

———. Cobden et la ligue, ou l’Agitation anglaise pour la liberté du commerce (Paris: Guillaumin, 1845).

———. The Collected Works of Bastiat, Frédéric. Jacques de Guenin, General Editor. David M. Hart, Academic Editor. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010-).

Vol. 1: The Man and the Statesman: The Correspondence and Articles of Politics. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010).

Vol. 2: “The Law,” “The State,” and Other Political Writings, 1843–1850. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012).

Vol. 3: The Economic Sophisms and “What is Seen and What is Not Seen” (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2017).

———. "Comments at a Meeting of the Political Economy Society on the Peace Congress and State support for an Experimental Socialist Community” (10 May 1849), JDE, May 1849, in CW4 (forthcoming).

———. "Declaration of Principles of the Free Trade Association,” Libre-Échange, 10 May, 1846, in CW6 (forthcoming).

———. "A Disastrous Remedy" (République française, 14 March 1848) (CW3, pp. 379-80).

———. "Disastrous Illusions" (JDE, March, 1848) (CW3, pp. 384-99).

———. Economic Harmonies, trans by W. Hayden Boyers, ed. George B. de Huszar, introduction by Dean Russell (Irvington-on-Hudson: Foundation for Economic Education, 1996).

———. Gratuité du crédit. Discussion entre M. Fr. Bastiat et M. Proudhon (Paris: Guillaumin, 1850).

———. Harmonies économiques. Par M. Fr. Bastiat. Membre correspondant de l’Institut, Représentant du Peuple à l’Assemblée Législative. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1850). First incomplete edition of the first 10 chapters.

———. Harmonies économiques. 2me édition. Augmentée des manuscrits laissés par l’auteur. Publiée par la Société des amis de Bastiat (Paris: Guillaumin, 1851). An expanded edition of 25 chapters edited by Prosper Paillottet and Roger de Fontenay.

———. "The Immediate Relief of the People" (République française, 12 March 1848), pp.377-79.

———. "Letter from an Economist to M. de Lamartine. On the occasion of his article entitled:"The Right to a Job,” Jan. 1845, JDE, in CW4 (forthcoming).

———."A Letter from Mr. Considérant and a Reply,” Libre-Échange, 25 December 1847, in CW6 (forthcoming).

———. "Letter to a Group of Supporters” (1849) (CW1, pp. 387-90).

———. Lettres d’un habitant des Landes, Frédéric Bastiat. Edited by Mme Cheuvreux (Paris: A. Quantin, 1877).

———. "Letters to Madame Marsan," CW 1, 93. Letter to Mme Marsan, 27 February 1848, p. 142; CW 1, 104. Letter to Mme Marsan, 29 June 1848, pp. 156-7.

———. "The Mayor of Énios" (Libre-Échange, 6 Feb. 1848) (CW3, pp. 355-65).

———. Oeuvres complètes de mises en ordre, revues et annotées d’après les manuscrits de l’auteur. Deuxième Édition. Ed. Prosper Paillottet and with a "Notice sur la vie et les écrits de Frédéric Bastiat" by Roger de Fontenay. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1862-64).

———. "On Communism,” Libre-Échange, 27 June 1847, in CW6 (forthcoming).

———. "On the Redistribution of Wealth by M. Vidal,” JDE, June 1846, in CW4 (forthcoming).

———. "Organisation and Liberty,” JDE, January 1847, in CW6 (forthcoming).

———. "Our Products Are Weighed Down with Taxes" (JDE, July 1845) (CW3, pp. 39-44).

———. "Petition from an Economist” (République française, 2 March 1848) (CW1, pp. 426-29).

———. "The Physiology of Plunder" (c. 1847) (CW3, pp. 113-30).

———. "Political Manifestos of April 1849” (CW1, pp. 390-95).

———. "On Population,” JDE, October 1846, in CW4 (forthcoming).

———. propriété et Loi. Justice et fraternité (Guillaumin, 1848).

———. "Protection, or the Three Municipal Magistrates” (c. 1847) (CW3, pp. 214-26).

———. "The Repression of Industrial Unions" (17 Nov. 1849), Speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 17 November, 1849 (CW2, pp. 348-61).

———. "Salt, the Mail, and the Customs Service" (JDE, May 1846) (CW3, pp. 198-214).

———. "The Scramble for Office” (République française, 5 March 1848) (CW1, pp. 431-32).

———. Sophismes économiques (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846).

———. Sophismes économiques. 2e série (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848).

———. "The State (draft)" (Jacques Bonhomme, 11 June 1848) (CW2, pp.105-6).

———. "The State" (JDD, 25 Sept. 1848) (CW2, pp. 93-104).

———. "The Tax Collector" (c. 1847) (CW3, pp. 179-87).

———."There Are No Absolute Principles" (c. 1845) (CW3, ES1 18, pp. 83-85)

———. "Theft by Subsidy" (JDE,Jan. 1846) (CW3, pp. 170-79).

———. "A Toast offered at the banquet in Honor of Richard Cobden by the Free Traders of Paris,” Courrier français, 19 August 1846, in CW6 (forthcoming).

———. "The Two Axes” (c. 1847) (CW3, pp. 138-42).

———. "The Utopian" (Libre-Échange, 17 Jan., 1847) (CW3, pp. 187-98).

Baudrillart, Henri. Éloge de Turgot. Discours qui a remporté le prix d'éloquence, décerné par l'Académie français, dans la séance publique annuelle du 10 septembre 1846 (n.p. 1846).

———. “Bourgeoisie,” DEP, T. 1, pp. 200-6.

———. “Colbert,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 390-92.

———. J. Bodin et son temps: tableau des théories politiques et des idées économiques au seizième siècle (Paris: Guillaumin, 1853).

———. Manuel d’économie politique (1857)

———. Études de philosophie morale et de l’économie politique, 2 vols. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1858).

———. Des rapports de la morale et de l'économie politique. Cours professé au Collége de France (Paris: Guillaumin, 1860).

Bazard, Saint-Armand. Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition. Première année. 1828-1829, (Paris: Bureau de l’Organisateur, 1831).

Beaumont, Gustave de. L'Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse (Paris: C. Gosselin, 1839). 2 vols.

Belloc, Alexis. Les Postes françaises. Recherches historiques sur leur origine, leur développement, leur législation (Paris: Firman-Didot, 1886).

Bazard, Saint-Armand, Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition. Première année. 1828-1829, (Paris: Bureau de l’Organisateur, 1831).

Belle, A. Bouchié de. Bastiat et le Libre-Échange (Paris: Guillaumin, 1878).

Bentham, Jeremy. Défense de l'usure ou Lettres sur les inconvénients des lois qui fixent le taux de l'intérêt de l'argent, par Jérémie Bentham, traduit de l'Anglais sur la 4e édition; suivi d'un Mémoire sur les prêts d'argents, par Turgot, et précédé d'une introduction contenant une dissertation sur le prêt à l'intérêt (Paris: Mahler, 1828). Trans. Saint-Armand Bazard.

———. The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols.

———. “Lettres sur la Défense de l'usure” in T. XV. Mélanges d'économie politique II. Necker, Sur la législation et de commerce des grains. Galiani, Dialogues sur le commerce des blés. Montyon, Quelle influence ont les diverses espèces d'impots sur la moralitè, l'activité et l'industrie des peuples. J. Bentham, Lettres sur la Défense de l'usure. Précédés de notice historique sur chaque auteur, et accompagnés de commentaires et de notes explicatives par M. Gust. de Molinari (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848).

Bérenger, Pierre Jean de. Chansons de P. J. de Béranger, précédées d'une notice sur l'auteur et d'un essai sur ses poésies par M. P. F. Tissot (Paris: Perrotin, Guillaumin, Bigot, 1829). 3 vols.

———. Oeuvres complètes de P.-J. de Béranger. Nouvelle édition revue par l’auteur. Illustrée de cinquante-deux belles gravures sur acier entièrement in édites, d’après les dessins de MM. Charlet, A. de Lemud, Johannot, Daubigny, Pauquet, Jacques, J. Lange, Pinguilly, de Rudder, Raffet (Paris: Perrotin, 1847). 2 volumes.

———. Oeuvres complètes de P.J. de Béranger contenant les dix chanson nouvelles, avec un Portrait gravé sur bois d’après Charlet (Paris: Perrotin, 1855).

———. Béranger’s Songs of the Empire, the Peace, and the Restoration. Translated into English verse by Robert B. Clough (London: Addey and Co., 1856).

Bernard, “Résumé des Budgets de la France de 1814 à 1847” in the Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1849. 6e Année (Guillaumin, 1848), pp. 67-76.

Bidet, François. Frédéric Bastiat. L'homme, l'économiste (Paris: V. Giard et E. Brière, 1906).

Blanc, Louis. Organisation du travail. Paris: Prévot, 1840.

———. Organisation du travail. Association universelle. Ouvriers. - Chefs d’ateliers. - Hommes de lettres. (Paris: Administration de librairie, 1841. First edition 1839).

———. Organisation du travail. IVe édition. Considérablement augmentée, précédée d’une Introduction, et suivie d’un compte-rendu de la maison Leclaire. La première édition a parus en 1839. (Paris: Cauville frères, 1845).

———. Organisation du travail (5ème édition), revue, corrigée et augmentée d'une polémique entre M. Michel Chevalier et l'auteur, ainsi que d'un appendice indiquant ce qui pourrait être tenté dès à présent (Paris: au bureau de la Société de l'industrie fraternelle,1847).

———. Organisation du travail (5ème édition), revue, corrigée et augmentée d'une polémique entre M. Michel Chevalier et l'auteur, ainsi que d'un appendice indiquant ce qui pourrait être tenté dès à présent (Paris: au bureau de la Société de l'industrie fraternelle, 1847).

———. Histoire de la révolution française. Paris: Langlois et Leelereq, 1847-69.

———. Le Socialisme; droit au travail, réponse à M. Thiers. Paris: M. Levy, 1848.

———. Le Socialisme. Droit au travail, réponse à M. Thiers (Paris: Lelong et Cie, 1848).

———. La Révolution de Février au Luxembourg (Paris: Lévy, 1849).

Blanqui, Jérôme Adolphe. Précis élémentaire d'économie politique, suivi du résumé de L'histoire du commerce et de l'industrie (Paris: Guillaumin). 1st ed. 1826; 2nd ed. 1842; 3rd ed. 1857.

———. Histoire d'économie politique en Europe, depuis les anciens jusqu'à nos jours; suivie d'une bibliographie raisonnée des principaux ouvrages d'économie politique (Paris: Guillaumin, 1837-38), 2 vols. 1st ed. 1837. 2nd ed. 1842, 3rd. 1845, 4th revised ed. 1860.

———. Cours d'économie industrielle (1838-39). Recueilli et annoté par Ad. Blaise et Joseph Garnier (Paris: L. Mathias, 1838).

———. Encyclopédie du commerçant. Paris: Guillaumin, 1839-41.

———. “Nécrologie. Fonteyraud, Alcide.” JDE, T. 24. No. 102, 15 Sept. 1849, pp. 182-84.

———. Des classes ouvrières en France pendant l'année 1848 (Paris: Pagnerre, 1849).

———. “Système national d’économie politique, par Frédéric List.” (Compte-rendu par M. BLANQUI, de l’Institut) JDE, T. 32, nos. 133-34, Mai-Juin 1852, pp. 78-82.

———. “Expositions des produits de l’industrie,” DEP, vol. 1, pp. 46-51.

Block, Maurice. Dictionnaire de l’administration française (Paris: Veuve Berger-Levrault et fils, 1856).

———. Dictionnaire générale de la politique par Maurice Block avec la collaboration d’hommes d’état, de publicistes et d’écrivains de tous les pays (Paris: O. Lorenz. 1st ed. 1863-64), 2 vols. [2nd ed. 1873].

———. Statistique de la France, comparée avec les autres états de l’Europe. 2 vols. (Paris: D’Amyot, 1860).

———. ed. Dictionnaire général de la politique, par Maurice Block avec la collaboration d’hommes d’état, de publicistes et d’écrivains de tous les pays. Nouvelle édition entièrement refondue et mise à jour. 2 vols. (Paris: O. Lorenz, 1873).

———. Les progrès de la science économique depuis Adam Smith. Revision des doctrines économiques, 2 vols. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1890).

Bonaparte, Napoléon, Mémoires de Napoléon Bonaparte: manuscrit venu de Sainte-Hélène (Paris: Baudouin, 1821).

———. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France, sous Napoleon, écrits à Saint-Hélène, par les généraux qui ont partagé sa captivité, et publiés sur les manuscrits entièrement corrigés de la main du Napoléon. 8 vols., ed. Baron Gaspard Gourgaud and Charles-Tristan Montholon (comte de) (Paris: Firmin Didot, père et fils, 1823).

Bonaparte, Napoléon-Louis. Extinction du Paupérisme (Paris: Pagnerre, 1844).

———. Napoleonic Ideas. Des Idées Napoléoniennes, par le Prince Napoléon-Louis Bonaparte. Brussels: 1839. Translated by James A. Dorr (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1859).

Bondurant, Édouard. Économie politique. Frédéric Bastiat (Paris: Guillaumin, 1879).

Boulainvilliers, Henri comte de. Essais sur la noblesse de France: contenans une dissertation sur son origine & abaissement (Amsterdam: 1732).

Bourgat,  Jean-François .Code des douanes, ou Recueil des lois et règlements sur les douanes en vigueur au 1er janvier 1848, par M. Bourgat. 2e édition (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848).

[British Parliamentary inquiry into revenue from Crown Lands in late 1847 and 1848]. Report, Evidence, and Appendix, on the Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues of the Crown, Reports from Committees: Eighteen Volumes. Session 18 November 1847 - 5 September 1848. Vol. XXIV. Parts I and II (1847-8).

Brouckère, Charles de. “Traités de commerce,” DEP, T. 2, 759-60.

Brunel, Charles. Bastiat et la réaction contre le pessimisme économique (Paris: A. Pedone, 1901).

Burlamaqui, Jean-Jacques. Elémens du droit naturel, par Burlamaqui; et Devoirs de l'homme et du citoyen, tels qu'ilsw lui sont prescits par la loi naturelle; traduits du latin de Pufendorf par Barbeyrac, avec les notes du traducteur et le jugement de Leibnitz. Nouvelle édition (Paris: Janet et Cotelle, 1820).

Bourrienne, Louis-Antoine Fauvelet de, Chambre des députés. Rapport fait au nom de la commission des douanes, par M. de Bourrienne, ministre d'État, député du département de l'Yonne, sur le projet de loi de douanes, présenté le 11 juin 1822. Séance du 19 juin 1822 (Hacquart, imprimeur de la Chambre des députés, rue Gît-le-Coeur, n° 8. S. 1822).

Cabet, Étienne. Voyage et aventures de lord William Carisdall en Icarie (Paris : H. Souverain, 1840).

Cantillon, Richard. Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en General, edited with an English translation and other material by Henry Higgs, C.B. (London: Reissued for The Royal Economic Society by Frank Cass and Co., LTD., 1959).

———. Essay on the Nature of Trade in General. Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction by Antoin E. Murphy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2015).

Carey, Henry Charles. Principles of political economy (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1837-1840), 3 vols.

———. The Credit System in France, Great Britain and the United States (Philadelphia, Carey, Lea, & Blanchard, 1838.

———. Answers to the questions: What constitutes currency? What are the causes of unsteadiness of the currency? and What is the remedy? (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1840).

———. The Harmony of Interests agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial (Philadelphia: J. S. Skinner, 1851).

———. Principles of social science (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & co., 1858-1860), 3 vols.

Castille, Hippolyte ed. Le Travail intellectuel. Journal des intérêts scientifiques, littéraires et artistiques (Paris: 1847-48)

———. Le dernier banquet de la bourgeoisie par Job, le socialiste, (à la librairie rue Saint-André-des-Arts, 39, 1849).

———. Les hommes et les moeurs en France sous le règne de Louis-Philippe (Paris: Paul Henneton, 1853, 2nd edition).

———. Histoire de la seconde République Française, 4 vols. (Paris: Victor Lecou, 1854).

———. Portraits historiques au dix-neuvième siècle, Issues 1-50 (Ferdinand Sartorius, 1856).

———. Lettres de Paris, écrites par Alceste (Hippolyte Castille) dans "l'Universel" (Paris : A. Le Chevalier, 1869).

———. Les massacres de juin 1848 (Chez les principaux libraires, 1869).

Centennaire de la naissance de Bastiat (Paris: Guillaumin, 1901).

Charton, Edouard. L'Illustration (Paris: 1843-).

Chambre des Députés. Séance du 15 juillet 1847 Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l'examen du projet de loi sur les marques de fabrique et de commerce, par M. Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys (Chambre des députés (1847).

Chapuy et al., Cathédrales françaises: dessinées d’après nature et lithographiées par Chapuy; avec un texte historique et descriptif (Paris: Leblanc, 1823-41), 2 vols. By Joseph Chapuy, Théodore de Jolimont, and Jean-Geoffroy Schweighaeuser.

Chateaubriand, François René, vicomte de. Mémoires d’Outre-tombe, 12 vols. (Paris: Eugène et Victor Penaud, 1850).

Cherbuliez, Antoine-Elisée. Riche ou pauvre exposition succincte des causes et des effets de la distribution actuelle des richesses sociales (Paris: Librairie d'Ab. Cherbuliez, 1840).

———. De la démocratie en Suisse, 2 vols. (Paris: Ab. Cherbuliez, 1843).

———. Simples Notions de l'ordre social à l'usage de tout le monde (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848).

———. Le potage à la tortue: entretiens populaires sur les questions sociales (Paris: Joel Cherbuliez, Guillaumin, 1849).

———. “Bienfaisance publique,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 163-77.

———. “Coalitions,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, p. 382.

———. “Cultes religieuse,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 534-39.

———. “Paupérisme,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 333-39.

———. “Taxes des pauvres,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 716-21.

———. Etudes sur les causes de la misère tant morale que physique et sur les moyens d'y porter remède (Paris: Guillaumin, 1853).

———. Précis de la science économique et de ses principales applications, 2 vols. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1862).

Chevalier, Michel. Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord (Société belge de librairie, 1837).

———. Histoire et description des voies de communication aux États Unis et des travaux d'art qui en dépendent (Paris: C. Gosselin, 1841), 2 vols.

———. Les fortifications de Paris, lettre à M. Le Comte Molé (Paris: Charles Gosselin, 1841)

———. Cours d’économie politique fait au Collége de France. Deuxième année, 1842-43 (Paris: Capelle, 1844). 3 vols.

———. Lettres sur l’Organisation du travail, ou études sur les principales causes de la misère et sur les moyens proposées pour y remédier (Paris: Capelle, 1848).

———. Question des travailleurs : l'amélioration du sort des ouvriers, les salaires, l'organisation du travail (Paris: Hachette, 1848).

———. De la liberté aux États-Unis (Paris: Capelle, 1849).

———. L'économie politique et le socialisme: discours prononcé au Collège de France, le 28 février 1849, pour la réouverture du Cours d'économie politique (Paris: Capelle, 1849).

———. “Statistique des travaux public, sous le Gouvernement de Juillet,” Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1849, par MM. Joseph Garnier et Guillaumin (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849), pp. 209-37.

———. Les Questions politiques et socials. Paris: Bureau de la Revue des Deux Mondes, 1850.

———. Cours d’Économie politique fait au Collège de France par Michel Chevalier. (Bruxelles: Meline, Cans, 1851).

———. Examen du système commercial connu sus le nom de système protecteur (Paris: Guillaumin, 1852).

———. “Canaux de navigation,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 264-72.

———. “Chemins de fer,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 337-362.

———. “Monnaie” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 200-219.

Clément, Ambroise. Recherches sur les causes de l’indigence (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846)

———. Des nouvelles Idées de réforme industrielle et en particulier du projet d’organisation du travail de M. Louis Blanc (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846)

———. "De la spoliation légale," JDE, 1e juillet 1848, Tome 20, no. 83, pp. 363-74.

———. Economic Harmonies book review. In Le Journal des économistes 26 (June 15, 1850): 235.

———. “Des attributions rationnelles de l’autorité publique,” Journal des économistes, T. 25, no. 107, February 1850, 228-250.

———. “Association,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 78-85.

———. and Charles Coquelin. “Balance du commerce,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 101-06.

———. “Mendicité,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 153-54.

———. “Monopole” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 219-25.

———. “Produits immatériels,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 450-52.

Clément, Pierre. Histoire de la vie et de l’administration de Colbert: contrôleur général des finances, ministre secrétaire d’état de la marine, des manufactures et du commerce, surintendant des bâtiments (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846).

———. Histoire du système protecteur en France depuis le ministère de Colbert jusqu’à la Révolution de 1848, suivie de pièces, mémoires et documents justificatifs (Paris: Guillaumin, 1854).

Clément, Ambroise. Essai sur la science sociale. Économie politique - morale expérimentale - politique théorique (Paris: Guillaumin, 1867), 2 vols.

———. La crise économique et sociale en France et en Europe (Paris : Guillaumin, 1886).

Cobden, Richard. England, Ireland and America, by a Manchester Manufacturer (London, 1835).

———. The Political Writings of Richard Cobden, with a Preface by Lord Welby, Introductions by Sir Louis Mallet, C.B., and William Cullen Bryant, Notes by F.W. Chesson and a Bibliography, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903). 2 vols.

Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens et avis du Conseil d'État: de 1788 à 1824 inclusivemen, par ordre chronologique: suivie d'une table analytique et raisonné des matières, ed. J.B. Duvergier (Paris: A. Guyot et scribe, 1824).

Colmont, M. de. “Budget de 1848,” pp. 29-51 in Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1848, par MM. Joseph Garnier et Guillaumin (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848).

———. “Philosophie de budget,” pp. 76- 109 and “Budget rectifiée de l’exercice 1848,” pp. 110-20 in Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1849, par MM. Joseph Garnier et Guillaumin (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849).

Compte rendu des séances de l’Assemblée Nationale Constituante (4 May 1848 - 27 May 1849). 10 vols. Compte rendu des séances de l’Assemblée Nationale. Exposés des motifs et projets de lois présentés par le gouvernement; rapports de Mm. les Représentants (Paris: Imprimerie de l’Assemblée national, 1848-1850). Henceforth CRANC.

Compte rendu des séances de l’Assemblée Nationale Législative (28 May 1849 - 2 December 1852). 17 vols. (28 Mai 1849 - 1 Déc. 1851). Compte rendu des séances de l’Assemblée Nationale Législative. Exposés des motifs et projets de lois présentés par le gouvernement; rapports de Mm. les Représentants (Paris: Imprimerie de l’Assemblée national, 1849-1852). Henceforth CRANL.

Comte, Charles. Traité de législation, ou exposition des lois générales suivant lesquelles les peuples prospèrent, dépérissent ou restent stationnaire. 4 vols. Paris: A. Sautelet, 1827; Paris, Chamerot, Ducollet, 1835 (2d ed.); Brussels: Hauman, Cattoir, 1837 (3rd ed.).

———. Histoire complète de la Garde national, depuis l'époque de sa foundation jusqu'à sa réorganisation définitive et la nomination de see officers, en vertu de la loi du 22 mars 1831, divisée en six époques; les cinqs prière par Charles Comte; et la sixième par Horace Raisson (Paris: Philippe, Juillet 1831).

———. Traité de la propriété. 2 vols. Paris: Chamerot, Ducollet, 1834. [Brussels edition, H. Tarlier, 1835. A second, revised edition was published in 1835 by Chamerot, Ducollet of Paris in 4 vols. to coincide with the publication of its sequel, Traité de la propriété. A revised and corrected third edition was published in 1837 by Hauman, Cattoir of Brussels.

Condamine, Simien Despréaux de La. Soirées de Ferney, ou Confidences de Voltaire, recueillies par un ami de ce grand homme (Paris: Dentu, 1802).

Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de. Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind, being a posthumous work of the late M. de Condorcet. (Translated from the French.) (Philadelphia: M. Carey, 1796).

———. Oeuvres de Condorcet, publiées par A. Condorcet O'Connor et M. F. Arago (Paris: Didot 1847-49), 12 vols.

[Conseil d’Etat.] Enquête et documents officiels sur les théâtres. Conseil d'Etat. Commission chargée de préparer la loi sur les théâtres (Impr. nationale, 1849).

Considérant, Victor Prosper. Contre M. Arago: réclamation adressée à la Chambre des députés par les rédacteurs du feuilleton de la Phalange : suivi de la théorie du droit de propriété (Paris: Au bureau de la Phalange, 1840).

———. Principes du socialisme. Manifeste de la démocratie au XIXe siècle. 2d ed. Paris: Librairie Phalanstérienne, 1847.

———. Théorie du droit de propriété et du droit au travail (1st ed.1845; Paris: Librairie phalanstérienne, 1848. 3rd ed.).

———. Le socialisme devant le vieux monde ou Le vivant devant les morts (Pais: Librairie Phalanstérienne, 1848).

———. Droit de propriété et du droit au travail (Paris: Librairie phalanstérienne, 1848).

Constant, Benjamin. Principes de politique applicables à tous les gouvernements représentatifs et particulièrement à la Constitution actuelle de la France (Paris: Alexis Eymery, Mai 1815).

———. Collection complète des ouvrages. Publiés sur le Gouvernement représentatif et la Constitution actuelle de la France, formant une espèce de Cours de Politique constitutionnelle; par M. Benjamin Constant. Premier volume. Premier partie (Paris: P. Plancher, 1818).

———. Commentaire sur l’ouvrage de Filangieri (Paris: P. Dufart, 1822).

———. Commentary on Filangieri’s Work. Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction by Alan S. Kahan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2015).

The Constitution of 4 November 1848. Full text at Wikisource <http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_du_4_novembre_1848#Chapitre_deux_.E2.80.94_Droits_des_citoyens_garantis_par_la_constitution>.

Coquelin, Charles. “Les Sociétés commerciales en France et en Angleterre” (Commercial companies in France and England), Revue des Deux Mondes, August, 1843.

———. Du Crédit et des Banques (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848, 1st edition).

———. Du Crédit et des Banques. 2e Édition, revue, annotée, augmentée d'une Introduction par J.-G. Courcelle-Seneuil. Et une Notice Biographique par M. G. de Molinari (Paris: Guillaumin, 1859). [3rd edition 1876].

———. [CR] “Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare, Entretiens sur les lois économiques et défense de la propriété, par M. G. de Molinari,” JDE, T. 24, No. 104, 15 novembre 1849, pp. 364-72.

———. and Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin, eds. Dictionnaire de l’économie politique, contenant l’exposition des principes de la science, l’opinion des écrivains qui ont le plus contribué à sa fondation et à ses progrès, la bibliographie générale de l’économie politique par noms d’auteurs et par ordre de matières, avec des notices biographiques et une appréciation raisonnée des principaux ouvrages, publié sur la direction de MM Charles Coquelin et Guillaumin. Paris: Librairie de Guillaumin et Cie., 1852–53. 2 vols. 2nd ed., 1854; 3rd ed., 1864; 4th ed., 1873.

———. “Assignats” , DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 77-78.

———. “Balance du commerce,” DEP, T. 1,  pp. 101-6.

———. “Banques” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 107-45.

———. “Brevets d'invention,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 209-23.

———. “Centralisation” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 291-301.

———. “Cours forcé” DEP (1852), vol. 1, p. 493.

———. “Crises commerciales,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 526-34.

———. “Échange,” DEP, vol. 1, pp. 637-40.

———. “Harmonie industrielle,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 851-55.

Courcelle-Seneuil, Jean Gustave. “Fourier” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 802-07.

———. “Prestations,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 428-30.

———. Traité théorique et pratique des opérations de banque, (Paris: Guillaumin, 1853).

———. Traité théorique et pratique des enterprises industrielles, commerciales & agricoles, ou Manuel des affaires. Deuxième édition, revue et augmentée (Pris: Guillaumin, 1857).

———. Études sur la science sociale (Paris: Guillaumin, 1862).

———. La Banque libre, exposé des fonctions du commerce de banque et de son application à l'agriculture, suivi de divers écrits de controverse sur la liberté des banques (Paris: Guillaumin, 1867).

Courier, Paul-Louis. Pamphlets politiques et littéraires de P.-L. Courier: suivis d’un choix de ses lettres: prÉcédés d’un essai sur la vie et les Écrits de l’auteur, 2 Volumes. (Paris: P. Masgana, 1839).

Courtois, Alphonse. “Le budget de 1848” which was published in the Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1848. 5e Année (Guillaumin, 1848), pp. 29-51.

———. “Le budget de 1849” in Annuaire de l’économie politique et de la statistique pour 1850 par MM. Joseph Garnier. 7e année (Paris: Guillaumin, 1850), pp. 18-28.

Cousin, Victor. "Du vrai, du beau et du bien " in Cours de philosophie professé pendant l'année 1818, sur le fondement des idées absolues du vrai, du beau et du bien; publié avec son autorisation et d'après les meilleurs rédactions de ce cours, par M. Adolphe Garnier (Paris: Hachette, 1836).

———. Cours d'histoire de la philosophie morale au XVIIIe siècle, 5 vols. (Paris: Ladrange, 1846).

———. Justice et Charité. Petits traités publiés par l’Académie des sciences morales et politiques (Paris: Pagnerre, 1848).

Coyer, Gabriel François abbé. La noblesse commerçante (Paris: chez Duchesne, 1756).

———. Développement et défense du système de la noblesse commerçante (Amsterdam: Chez Duchesne, 1757).

“C.S.” “Imprimerie,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 414-15.

———. “Livrets d’ouvriers” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 83-84.

———. “Postes” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 421-24.

Daire, Eugène ed. Collection des principaux économistes, Avec Commentaires, Notes, et Notices; par MM. Blanqui et Rossi (de l'Institut), Eugène Daire, H. Dussard, J. Garnier, M. Monjean, H. Say. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1840-48), 15 vols.

Destutt de Tracy, Antoine. Éléments d’idéologie. 4 vols. Paris: Didot l’aîné, et al., 1801-15.

———. Commentaire sur l’esprit des lois de Montesquieu; suivi d’observations inédites de Condorcet sur le vingt-neuvième livre du même ouvrage. Édition entièrement conforme à celle publiée à Liége en 1817. Paris: Delaunay, 1819.

———. Traité d’économie politique. Paris: Bouguet et Lévi, 1823.

Dictionnaire de l'Académie française (Paris: Didot frères, 1835. 6e édition). Online at The ARTFL Project. Dictionnaires d'autrefois. <https://portail.atilf.fr/dictionnaires/onelook.htm>.

Dombasle, Christophe Joseph Alexandre Mathieu de. Des impôts dans leurs rapports avec la production agricole. Paris: Huzard, 1829.

———. Du sucre indigène, de la situation actuelle de cette industrie en France, de son avenir et du droit dont on se propose de la charger (Paris: Huzard, 1837).

———. De l’impôt sur le sucre indigène: Nouvelles considérations. Paris: Huzard, 1837.

———. Oeuvres diverses. Écon omie politique. Instruction publique, Haras et remonte. Paris: Bruchard, Huzard, Audot, 1843.

Dryden, John. The Works of John Dryden, now first collected in eighteen volumes. Illustrated with notes, historical, critical, and explanatory, and a life of the author, by Walter Scott, esq. Vol. vii (London: William Miller, 1808).

Duchâtel, Charles Marie Tanneguy. De la charité dans ses rapports avec l'état moral et le bien-être des classes inférieures de la société (Paris: Mesnier, 1829).

———. Enquête relative à diverses prohibitions établies à l'entrée des produits étrangers commencée le 8 octobre 1834 sous la présidence de M. T. Duchatel ministre du Commerce (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1835).

———. Considérations d'économie politique sur la bienfaisance, ou De la charité dans ses rapports avec l'état moral et le bienêtre des classes inférieures de la société (Paris: Guiraudet et Jouaust, 1836).

Ducray-Duminil, François-Guillaume. Les Soirées de la chaumière, ou les Leçons du vieux père (Paris: Leprieur, 1794).

Dumas, Alexandre. Les Trois mousquetaires (Paris: J.-B. Fellens et L.-P. Dufour, 1849). It was serialized in a French newspaper Le Siècle (March-July 1844).

Dumersan. Chansons nationales, populaires et militaires, de 1789 à 1848, avec des notices historiques (Paris: Garnier frères, 1848).

Dunoyer, Charles. L’Industrie et la morale considérées dans leurs rapport avec la liberté. Paris: A. Sautelet, 1825.

———. Nouveau traité d’Économie sociale. Paris: A. Sautelet, 1830.

———. “Nouvelle nomenclature des arts qui agissent sur le monde matériel, suivie de remarques sur la nature, l’influence et les moyens des industries extractives,” Journal des économistes, T. 3, 1842, pp. 1-18.

———. “Des industries extractives; de leur nature, de leur influence et de leurs moyens,” Journal des économistes, T. 3, 1842, pp. 113-153.

———. “Influence du régime prohibitif sur les relations sociales et sur le développement des diverses industries," JDE, volume 6, 1843, p. 113–138.

———. De la liberté du travail, ou simple exposé des conditions dans lesquelles les force humaines s’exercent avec le plus de puissance. 3 vols. Paris: Guillaumin, 1845.

———. “De l’agitation anglaise pour la liberté commerciale," JDE, volume 12, 1845, p. 1–24

———. La Révolution du 24 février (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849).

———. “Les limites de l’économie politique et des fonctions du gouvernement,” JDE, T. 33, no. 139, December, 1852, pp. 217-231.

———. “Gouvernement” DEP (1852-53), vol 1, pp. 835-841.

———. “Production,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 439-50.

———. ‘Les limites de l’économie politique et la nature des richesses’. Journal des économistes, T. 34, no. 142, February, 1853, pp. 223-237.

———. Le Second Empire et une nouvelle restauration, 2 vols (London: W. Jeffs, 1864, 1865), ed. by his son Anatole Dunoyer. Second edition 1871.

Dupin, Charles. Le petit producteur français, in 7 vols. (Paris: Bachelier, 1827).

Dupuit, Jules. De l'influence des péages sur l'utilité des voies de communication (Paris: Guillaumin et Cie., 1849).

———. “Eau,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 629-37.

———. “Péages," DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 339-44.

———. “Routes et chemins” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 555-60;

———. “Voies de communication” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 846-54.

Dupuynode, Gustave. “De la centralisation,” JDE, 15 July 1848, T. 20, pp. 409-18 and JDE, 1 August 1848, T. 21, pp. 16-24.

Editions d'Histoire Sociale. Les révolutions du XIXe siècle : 1848, la révolution démocratique et sociale. (Paris: EDHIS, 1984). 10 vols.

d’Esterno, Ferdinand-Charles-Philippe. De la Misère, de ses causes, de ses remèdes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1842).

Exauvillez, Philippe-Irénée Boistel d’. Les soirées politiques, ou simples conversations sur les principes libéraux: par l'auteur du "Bon curé," du "Bon paysan" (Gaume frères, 1829).

Faucher, Léon. Études sur l'Angleterre (Paris: Guillaumin, 1845, 2nd ed. 1856), 2 vols.

———. Du droit au travail (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848).

———. “Du projet de loi sur les douanes,” JDE, no. 75 February 1848, vol. XIX, pp. 254-65.

———. Du système de M. Louis Blanc ou le travail, l'association et l’impôt (Paris: Gerdès, 1848).

———. “Intérêt” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 953-70.

———. “Propriété,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 460-73.

———. “Salaires,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 570-86.

Ferrier, François Louis Auguste. Du gouvernement considéré dans ses rapports avec le commerce, ou de l’administration commerciale opposée aux économistes du dix-neuvième siècle. Paris: Pélicier, 1804; 2d edition, 1821; 3rd edition, 1822.

Fix, Théodore ed. Revue mensuelle d'économie politique (Paris: Renard, 1833-36).

———. Observations sur l’état des classes ouvrières. Paris: Guillaumin, 1846.

Fonfrède, Henri. Du gouvernement du roi, et des limites constitutionnelles de la prérogative parlementaire (Paris: H. Delloye, 1839)

———. Du système prohibitif (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846).

———. "Du système prohibitif” in Oeuvres de Fonfrède, Henri. recueillies et mises en ordre par Ch.-Al. Campa, con collaborateur (Paris: Ledoyen, 1846). Vol. 7.

Fontaine, Jean de La. Oeuvres complètes de La Fontaine. Nouvelle édition très soigneusement revue sur les textes originaux, avec un travail de critique et d'érudition, aperçus d'histoire littéraire, vie de l'auteur, notes et commentaires, bibliographie, etc., par M. Louis Moland  (Paris: Garnier frères, 1872-1876). 7 vols.

Fontenay, Roger de. “De la théorie de la rente foncière selon Ricardo,” JDE, T. 30, N° 126, 15 octobre 1851, pp. 93-114; and N° 127, 15 novembre 1851, pp. 206-22.

———. Du revenu foncier (Paris: Guillaumin, 1854).

———. "Notice sur la vie et les écrits de Bastiat, Frédéric." in vol. 1 of the Oeuvres complètes de Frédéric Bastiat (2nd ed. 1862) with extracts from Prosper Paillottet's diary, pp. ix-lii.

Fonteyraud, Henri Alcide. “La ligue anglaise” in Revue britannique (Jan. 1846). Reprinted in Fonteyraud, Mélanges d’économie politique. Mis en ordre et augmentés d’une Notice sur l’auteur, ed, Joseph Garnier (Paris: Guillaumin, 1853).

———. [CR] Études sur l’Angleterre, par M. Léon Faucher in JDE, T. 13, N° 50, Janvier 1846, pp. 175-87.

———. “Discussion des lois sur les céréales au parlement,” in JDE, T. 13, N° 52, Mars 1846, pp. 411-18.

———. “Discussion sur la réforme économique au Parlement anglais, deuxième lecture (suite),” JDE, T. 14, N° 53, Avril 1846, pp. 34-41.

———. “Du nouveau projet de loi relatif aux chemins de fer en Angleterre,” JDE, T. 14, N° 54, Mai 1846, pp. 153-60.

———. “Discussion au Parlement anglais sur le bill des céréales, troisième lecture (suite),” JDE, T. 14, N° 54, Mai 1846, pp. 161-64.

———. “Abolition des lois sur les céréales. Dissolution de la Ligue,” JDE, T. 14, N° 56, Juillet 1846, pp. 354-60.

———. “La vérité sur l’économie politique,” JDE, T. 21. N° 85, 1 août 1848, pp. 1-15; and “La vérité sur l’économie politique (suite et fin),” JDE, N° 89, 1 octobre 1848, pp. 225-48. Reprinted in Mélanges d'économie politique de Fonteyraud (1853), pp. 111-61.

———. [CR] “Le droit au travail à l’Assemblée nationale, collection de tous les discours et de divers autres écrits, avec une introduction par M. Jos. Garnier," JDE, T. 22, N° 95, 15 février 1849, pp. 333-37.

———. and Louis Wolowski No. 92, “Principes d’économie politique,” in Instruction pour le People: Cents traités sur les connaissance les plus indispensables; ouvrage entièrement neuf, avec des gravures intercalées dans le text. Tome second. Traités 51 à 100. (Paris: Paulin et Lechevalier, 1850), pp., 2913-3976.

———. Mélanges d’économie politique. La Ligue anglaise pour la liberté du commerce. Notice historique sur la vie et les travaux de Ricardo. Edited by J. Garnier. Paris: Guillaumin, 1853.

Fourier, François-Marie Charles. Le Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire ou invention du procédé d'industrie attrayante et naturelle, distribuée en séries passionnées. Paris: Bossange père, 1829.

———. La Fausse industrie morcelée répugnante et mensongère et l'antidote, l'industrie naturelle, combinée, attrayante, véridique donnant quadruple produit. 2 Vols. Paris: Bossange père, 1835-36.

———. Le Nouveau monde industriel (Bruxelles: Société belge de librairie, Hauman et cie, 1841).

———. Œuvres complètes de Ch Fourier. Tome sixième. Le Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire (Paris: La Société pour la propagation et pour la réalisation de la théorie de Fourier, 1841).

———. Manuscrits de Fourier, “Des séries mesurées” in La Phalange: revue de la science sociale, XIVe année, Deuxième semestre 1845 (Paris: Bureau de la Phalange, 1845).

———. Oeuvres complètes de Charles Fourier, tome 1. Théorie des quatres mouvements, 3rd ed. (Paris: La Librairie Sociétaire, 1846).

Fox, William Johnson. Memorial Edition of the Collected Works of W.J. Fox (London: Charles Fox and Trübner & Co., 1866). Vol. IV: Anti-Corn Law Speeches, chiefly Reprinted from the "League" Newspaper; and Occasional Speeches.

———. Des Idées religieuses, par William Johnson Fox, 15 conférences. Traduit par P. Paillottet (Paris: G. Baillière, 1877).

Franklin, Benjamin. Mélanges de morale, d’économie et de politique. Précédés d’une Notice sur Franklin par A.-Ch. Renouard. Edited by Augustin-Charles Renouard. 2 vols. Paris: Renouard, 1824.

———. ”Le Science de Bonhomme Richard” in Collection des principaux économistes, vol. XIV, Mélanges d'économie politique I., MM. Eugène Daire et G. de Molinari (Paris: Guillaumin, 1847). See above for details.

Franqueville, Amable Charles comte de. Le premier siècle de l'Institut de France, 25 octobre, 1795-25 octobre, 1895: Notices sur les membres libres, les associés étrangers et les correspondants. Fondations et prix décernés. Personnel des anciennes académies. Two vols. (Paris: J. Rothschild, 1896).

Galignani’s New Paris Guide, containing an Accurate Statistical and Historical Description of all the Institutions, Public Edifices, Curiosities, etc., of the Capital … (Paris: A. and W. Galignani and Co., 1848).

Garnier, Joseph. Introduction à l'étude de l'économie politique, avec des considérations sur la statistique, la liberté du commerce et l'organisation du travail. Ouverture du cours d'économie politique à l'Athénée, le 4 janvier 1843 (Paris: Guillaumin, 1843).

———. Traité d'Économie politique, exposé didactique des principes et des applications de cette science et de l'organisation économique de la société. Adopté dans plusieurs écoles ou universités. Quatrième édition, considérablement augmentée (Paris: Guillaumin, 1860). 1st edition 1845. 10th edition 1907.

———. [CR] “Études économiques, par M. Molinari, Gustave de.” JDE, Sér 1, T. 14, N° 54, Mai 1846, pp. 192-95.

———. Richard Cobden, les ligueurs et la ligue, précis de l’histoire de la dernière révolution économique et financière en Angleterre (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846).

———. Éléments de l'économie politique, exposé des notions fondamentales de cette science (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846).

———. “Review of Molinari’s Études économiques (1846),” JDE, no. 54, Mai 1846, vol. XIV, pp. 192-95.

———. Sur l'association, l'économie politique et la misère, position du problème de la misère, ou Considérations sur les moyens généraux d'élever les classes pauvres à une meilleure condition matérielle et morale (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846).

———. ed. Le droit au travail à l'Assemblée nationale. Recueil complet de tous les discours prononcés dans cette mémorable discussion par MM. Fresneau, Hubert Delisle, Cazalès, Gaulthier de Rumiily, Pelletier, A. de Tocqueville, Ledru-Rolin, Duvergier de Hauranne, Crémieux, M. Barthe, Gaslonde, de Luppé, Arnaud (de l'Ariège), Thiers, Considerant, Bouhier de l'Ecluse, Martin-Bernard, Billault, Dufaure, Goudchaux, et Lagrange (texts revue par les orateurs), suivis de l'opinion de MM. Marrast, Proudhon, Blanc, Louis. Ed. Laboulaye et Cormenin; avec des observations inédites par MM. Faucher, Léon. Wolowski, Fréd. Bastiat, de Parieu, et une introduction et des notes par M. Joseph Garnier (Paris : Guillaumin, 1848).

———. ed. Congrès des amis de la paix universelle Réuni à Paris en 1849. Compte-rendu, séances des 22, 23, 24 Aout; - Résolutions adoptées; discours de Mm. Victor Hugo, Visschers, Rév. John Burnett; Rév. Asa Mahan, de l'Ohio; Henri Vincent, de Londres; Ath. Coquerel; Suringar, d'Amsterdam; Francisque Bouvet, Émile de Girardin; Ewart, membre du Parlement; Frédéric Bastiat; Richard Cobden, Elihu Burritt, Deguerry; Amasa Walker, de Massachussets; Ch. Hindley, membre du Parlement, etc., etc.; Compte-rendu d'une visite au Président de la République, de trois meetings en Angleterre; statistique des membres du congrès, etc.; Précédé d'une Note historique sur le mouvement en faveur de la paix, par M. Joseph Garnier. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1850).

———. “Boulangerie,” DEP (1852), vol. 1 pp. 124-200.

———. “Cobden," DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 388-89.

———. "Entrepreneurs d'industrie,” DEP (1852), vol. 1, pp. 707-8.

———. “Liberté du travail," DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 63-66.

———. “Ligue anglaise” (Anti-Corn Law League), DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 67-73.

———. “Laissez faire, laissez passer,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, p. 19.

———. “List (Frédéric),” DEP, T. 2, pp. 76-82.

———. “Malthus,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 126-29.

———. "O'Connor (le général Arthur)" DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 283-84.

———. “Population,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 382-402.

———. “Ricardo” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 530-33.

———. “Système mercantile,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 691-92.

———. "Tabac," DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 698-700.

———. “Notice sur Alcide Fonteyraud” in Fonteyraud, Alcide. Mélanges d’économie politique. Mis en ordre et augmentés d’une Notice sur l’auteur, ed. Joseph Garnier (Paris: Guillaumin, 1853), pp. iii-xvi.

———. ed. Malthus, Du principe de population (Paris: Guillaumin, 1857).

———. Traité d'économie politique: exposé didactique des principes et des applications de cette science et de l'organisation économique de la société (Paris: Guillaumin, 1860).

———. Premières notions d'économie politique ou sociale, contenant la Science du Bonhomme Richard par Benjamin Franklin, L’Économie politique en une leçon par Bastiat, Frédéric. Abrégé des Éléments de l’économie politique, et Vocabulaire de la langue français (Paris: Guillaumin, 1864). 2nd ed.

———. “Guillaumin. Ses funérailles, - sa vie et son oeuvre.” JDE. Sér. 2. T.45 (Jan-Mars 1865). No. 133. Jan. 1865, pp. 108-21.

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———. De l'Agriculture en France, d'après les documents officiels (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846). 2 vols.

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———. Oeuvres diverses de J.-B. Say, contenant Catéchisme d'économie politique, Fragments et opuscules inédits, Correspondance générale, Olbie, Petit volume, Mélanges de morale et de littérature. Précédées d'une notice historique sur la vie et les travaux de l'auteur, avec des notes, par Ch. Comte, E. Daire et Horace Say (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848). Part of the Collection des principaux économistes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1840-48) vol. XII.

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———. Recherches sur la nature et les causes de la richesse des nations, par Adam Smith, traduction du Comte Germain Garnier entièrement revue et corrigée, et précédé d'une notice biographique par M. Blanqui, avec les commentaires de Buchanan, G. Garnier, Mac Culloch, Malthus, J. Mill, Ricardo, Sismondi; Augmentée de notes inédites de Jean-Baptiste Say, et d'éclaircissements historiques par M. Blanqui (Paris: Guillaumin, 1843). Part of the Collection des principaux économistes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1840-48) vols. V and VI.

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———. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, edited with an Introduction, Notes, Marginal Summary and an Enlarged Index by Edwin Cannan (London: Methuen, 1904). 2 vols.

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Table analytique par ordre alphabétique de matières et de noms de personnes du Compte rendu des séances de l'Assemblée nationale constituante (4 mai 1848 - 27 mai 1849) et des documents imprimés par son ordre. Rédigée aux Archives de l'Assemblée nationale (Paris: Henri et Charles Noblet, Imprimeurs de l'Assemblée nationale, 1850).

Table analytique par ordre alphabétique de matières et de noms de personnes du Compte rendu des séances de l'Assemblée nationale législative (28 mai 1849 - 2 décembre 1851) et des documents imprimés par son ordre. Rédigée aux Archives du Corps législatifs (Paris: Henri et Charles Noblet, Imprimeurs de l'Assemblée nationale, 1852).

Table alphabétique générale des matières contenues dans les deux premières séries (Années 1841-1865) du Journal des Économistes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1883).

Tapiès, Le Cher. F. de. La France et l’Angleterre ou statistique morale et physique de la France comparée à celle de l’Angleterre, sur tous les points analogiques; par Le Cher. F. de Tapiès (Paris: Guillaumin, 1845).

Taussig, Frank. The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1914. 6th ed.).

Tegoborski, Luwik de. Etudes sur les forces productives de la Russie (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1852). 4 vols.

Teyssèdre. Guide-Conducteur de l’étranger dans Paris, avec plans des fortifications et de Paris (Paris, 1847).

Thierry, Augustin. Histoire de la conquête de l’Angleterre par les Normands (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1825). 2 vols.

———. Lettres sur l’histoire de France pour servir d’introduction à l’étude de cette histoire (Paris: Sautelet, 1827).

———. Dix ans d’études historiques (Paris : J. Tessier, 1835).

———. Histoire de la Conquête de l’Angleterre par les Normands: De ses causes et de ses suites jusqu’à nos jours en Angleterre, en Ecosse, en Irlande et sur le continent (Paris: Alexander Mesnier, 1835). 2 vols.

———. History of the Conquest of England by the Normans (London: Whittaker, 1841).

———. Essai sur l’histoire de la formation et des progrès du Tiers État suivi de deux fragments du recueil des monuments inédits de cette histoire (Paris: Furne et Ce, 1853).

———. The Formation and Progress of the Tiers Etat, or Third Estate in France. Translated from the French, by the Rev. Francis B. Wells (London: T. Bosworth, 1855).

———. History of the Conquest of England by the Normans; Its Causes, and its Consequences, in England, Scotland, Ireland, & on the Continent, translated from the seventh Paris edition, by William Hazlitt (London: H.G. Bohn, 1856). In 2 volumes.

Thiers, Adolphe. Histoire de la Révolution française (Paris: Lecointre et Durey, 1823-27) in 10 volumes. Also a 1845 8th edition: (Bruxelles: Melines, 1845).

———. Histoire de consulat et de l’empire. 20 vols. Paris: Paulin, 1845-62.

———. Discours prononcé à l'Assemblée Nationale sur le droit au travail (Paris: Lévy, 1848).

———. De la propriété (Paris: Paulin, Lheureux et Cie, 1848).

———. De la Propriété. Édition populaire à un franc. Publiée sous les auspices du Comité central de l’Association pour la défense du travail national (Paris: Paulin, Lheureux, 1848).

———. De la propriété, par M. Thiers. Paris, Paulin, 1849, 1 vol. in-8. Réimprimé en partie, en 2 petits vol. in-16, dans la collection des Petits traités publiés par l'Académie da sciences morales et politiques.

———. Discours de M. Thiers sur le régime commercial de la France: prononcés à l'Assemblée nationale les 27 et 28 juin 1851 (Paris:Paulin, Lheureux et cie, 1851).

———. Discours parlementaires de M. Thiers, publiés par M. Marc Antoine Calmon (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1880), vol. 7 (Jan. 1846 - Feb. 1848); vol. 8 (July 1848 - Feb. 1850).

———. Discours parlementaires de M. Thiers. Publiés par M. Calmon. Troisième Partie (1850-1864) (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1880). 16 vols.

Thompson, Thomas Perronet. Catechism on the Corn Laws; With a List of Fallacies and the Answers. Eighteenth Edition (London: Robert Heward for the Westminster Review, 1834). 1st edition 1827.

———. The Article on Free Trade, from the Westminster Review, no. XXIII. For January, 1830. To which is added a Collection of Objections and the Answers (London: Robert Heward, 1831).

———. Les Singes économistes, ou qu'est-ce que la liberté du commerce? extrait de la "Revue de Westminster", traduit de l'anglais par Benjamin Laroche (Paris: Goetschy fils, 1832).

———. Contre-enquête par l’homme aux quarante écus (Paris: Charpentier, 1834).

———. Contre-enquête par l'homme aux quarante écus: examen de l'enquête commerciale de 1834 (Association belge pour la réforme douanière, 1835).

———. Letters of a representative to his constituents, during the session of 1836. To which is added, A running commentary on anti-commercial fallacies, reprinted from the Spectator of 1834. With additions and corrections. (London: Effingham Wilson, 1836).

———. Corn-law Fallacies, with the Answers. Reprinted from The Sun Newspaper.) With a Dedication to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. By the author of the Catechism on the Corn Laws. Second Edition. (1839).

———. Exercises, Political and Others. In Six volumes. (London: Effingham Wilson, 1842).

———. A Catechism on the Currency, by the author of the "Catechism on the corn laws." 3rd edition (London: Effingham Wilson, 1848).

Tocqueville, Alexis de. "Mémoire sur le paupérisme" in Mémoires de la Société royale académique de Cherbourg (Cherbourg: Boulanger, Beaufort, et Compagnie, 1835).

———. The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, edited by the Comte de Tocqueville and now first translated into English by Alexander Teixeira de Mattos. With a portrait in Heliogravure (New York: Macmillan, 1896).

Toussenel, Alphonse. Les Juifs, rois de l'époque : histoire de la féodalité financière (Paris: Librarie d l'École sociétaire, 1845).

Turgot, Mémoires sur le prêt à intérêt et sur le commerce des fers, (Paris: Froullé, 1789).

———. Oeuvres de M. Turgot, précédées et accompagnées de mémoires et de notes sur sa vie, son administration et ses ouvrages. Ed. Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours. (Paris: A. Belin, 1808-1811). 9 vols.

———. Œuvres de Turgot. Nouvelle édition, classée par ordre de matière. Les notes de Dupont de Nemours, augmentée de lettres inédites, des Questions sur le commerce, et d'observations et de notes nouvelles, par MM. Eugène Daire et Hippolyte Dussard, et précédée d'une notice sur la vie et les ouvrages de Turgot, par M. Eugène Daire (Paris: Guillaumin, 1844). Part of the Collection des principaux économistes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1840-48) vols. III and IV.

Vauban et al. Économistes financiers du XVIIIe siècle. Vauban, Projet d'une dîme royale. Boisguillebert, Détail de la France, Factum de la France, et opuscules divers. Jean Law, Considérations sur le numéraire et le commerce. Mémoires et lettres sur les banques, opuscules divers. Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce. Dutot, Réflexions politiques sur le commerce et les finances. Précédés de notices historiques sur chaque auteur, et accompagnés de commentaires et de notes explicatives, par M. Eugène Daire (Paris: Guillaumin, 1843). 2nd edition 1851. Part of the Collection des principaux économistes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1840-48) vol. I.

“Vée," “Hôpitaux, Hospices,” DEP (1853), vol. 2, pp. 864-78.

Vidal, François. De la répartition des richesses, ou De la justice distributive en économie sociale: ouvrage contenant: l'examen critique des théories exposées soit par les économistes, soit par les socialistes (Paris: Capelle, 1846).

Villefort, Alfred. De la propriété littéraire et artistique au point de vue international. Aperçu sur les législations étrangères et sur les traités relatifs à la répression de la contrefaçon (Paris: De Cosse, 1851).

Villermé, Louis René. Tableau de l’état physique et moral des ouvriers employés dans les manufactures de coton, de laine, et de soie. Paris: Jules Renouard, 1840.

———. Les douanes et la contrabande (Paris: Guillaumin, 1851).

Vivéro, Don Rodrigo de. Memorials of the Empire of Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, edited with notes by Thomas Rundall. (London: Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1850).

Vivien, Auguste F.A. Études administratives. 3rd ed. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1859). 2 vols. 1st ed. 1845, 2nd ed. 1852.

Vuitry, Adolphe Études sur le regime financier de la France avant la Révolution de 1789 (Paris: Guillaumin, 1878-1883), 3 vols.

Wade, John. The Extraordinary Black Book: An Exposition of Abuses in Church and State, Courts of Law, Representation, Municipal and Corporate Bodies; with a Précis of the House of Commons, Past, present, and to come. A New Edition, greatly enlarged and corrected to the present time. By the Original Editor. (London: Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange, 1832).

Walker, R.-J. “Lettre écrite à M. Horace Say, vice-président de la Société d'Économie politique, par M. R.-J. Walker,” JDE, Aug. 1852, T. XXXII, p. 409-11.

Watteville, Baron de. Essai statistique sur les établissements de bienfaisance. Deuxième édition revue, corrigée et considérablement augmentée (Paris: Guillaumin, 1847).

Wilson, James. Influences of the Corn laws: as affecting all classes of the community, and particularly the landed interests (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1839).

———. Capital, currency, and banking: being a collection of a series of articles pub. in the Economist in 1845, on the principles of the Bank act of 1844, and in 1847, on the recent monetarial and commercial crisis; concluding with a plan for a secure and economical currency (London: The office of the Economist, 1847).

Wolowski, Louis. Cours de législation industrielle. 6e année. 1re leçon, 27 novembre 1844. De l'organisation du travail (Paris: au bureau de la "Revue de législation et de jurisprudence," 1844).

———. Études d'économie politique et de statistique (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848).

———. and Alcide Fonteyraud, No. 92, “Principes d’économie politique,” in Instruction pour le People: Cents traités sur les connaissance les plus indispensables; ouvrage entièrement neuf, avec des gravures intercalées dans le text. Tome second. Traités 51 à 100. (Paris: Paulin et Lechevalier, 1850), pp. 2913-3976.

———. “Crédit foncier,” DEP (1852), vol., 1, pp. 497-508.

———. La Question des banques. Paris: Guillaumin, 1864.

———. La Banque d'Angleterre et les banques d'Ecosse (Paris: Guillaumin, 1867).

———. La liberté commerciale: et les résultats du traité de commerce de 1860 (Paris: Guillaumin, 1869).

———. L'or et l'argent (Paris: Guillaumin, 1870).

———. and Émile Levasseur. “Propriété’, Dictionnaire générale de la politique par Maurice Block ave la collaboration d’hommes d’état, de publicistes et d’écrivains de tous les pays. Nouvelle édition refondue et mises à jour (Paris: O. Lorenz. 1st ed. 1863-64, 2nd revised ed. 1873), 1st. ed., vol. 2, pp. 682-93.

———. “Property” (1863)” in French Liberalism in the 19th Century: An Anthology, ed. Robert Leroux and David M. Hart (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 243-54.

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Endnotes

[1] Red., "Molinari, Gustave de", Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (1900). Volume 5, p. 850. The editors state that he"studierte in Brüssel Medizin und in Paris Nationalökonomie" (studied medicine in Brussels and political economy in Paris).

[2] "La mobilisation du travail," La Réforme (9 juin 1845). In a footnote it states that "A period lasting six years spent in a factory (possibly cotton) has allowed the author to collect these various observations." He also referred to this part of his life in a long footnote in his book L'Évolution économique (1880), p. 300, where he quotes a letter he wrote to the editor of a newspaper in New Orleans in August 1877 on trade unions and strikes and uses his work experience in a factory to justify his observations.

[3] Molinari, Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare (Institut Coppet, 2014).

[4] Molinari, Obituary of Joseph Garnier, JDE (October 1881), p. 10. Although he was referring to the life of his friend Joseph Garnier in the obituary his comments applied equally to himself, which may have been part of his intention.

[5] The first biography of Molinari only appeared in 2012 for the 100th anniversary of his death: Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) (2012). A shorter biographical sketch is by David M. Hart, "Molinari, Gustave de (1819-1912)," The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism (2008), pp. 336-37; and Jean-Michel Poughon, "Gustave de Molinari: une approche de la démocratie économique," in Aux sources du modèle libéral français (1997), pp. 169-86. The older obituary by Yves Guyot is still useful: "M. G. de Molinari," JDE (Février 1912), pp. 177-96. On his political thought see, David M. Hart, "Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition" Journal of Libertarian Studies in three parts (Summer 1981, Fall 1981, and Winter 1982).

[6] See David M. Hart, "The Paris School of Liberal Political Economy, 1803-1853" in A History of French Thought, ed. Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[7] See the "Chronology of the Life and Works of Molinari," below pp. 000.

[8] See the Bibliography for a large but still incomplete list of his writings.

[9] We include a representative sample of seven of these articles in the Addendum.

[10] Molinari, Biographe politique de M. A. de Lamartine (1843).

[11] Molinari, Cours d'économie politique, 2 vols. (1855).

[12] It is possible that he studied medicine like his father before he left for Paris. See Redacteur, "Molinari, Gustave de", Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften. Zweite Auflage (1900). Volume 5, p. 850. The editors state that he"studierte in Brüssel Medizin und in Paris Nationalökonomie" (studied medicine in Brussels and political economy in Paris).

[13] La Revue générale biographique, politique et littéraire edited by E. Pascallet, for which Molinari wrote a regular monthly "Chronique" or report on politics during 1842 as well as several biographical articles.

[14] See for example, "Des Moyens d'améliorer le sort des classes laborieuses", La Nation, 23rd July, 1843. Published later as the pamphlet Des Moyens d'améliorer le sort des classes laborieuses (1844); his third book Études économiques. L'Organisation de la liberté industrielle et l'abolition de l'esclavage (1846); and three articles he wrote for Le Courrier français on workers' rights, the right to vote, and two open letters to Bastiat on abolishing tariffs, which were republished in Questions d'économie politique et de droit public (1861), vol. 2.

[15] His first article published in the JDE in January 1847 was on agriculture in England, "De l'agriculture en Angleterre," JDE (January 1847).

[16] Molinari edited two large volumes in the 15 volume Collection des principaux économistes (1840-48) edited by Eugène Daire. His were the last two volumes in the series and they appeared in late 1847 and early 1848 and dealt with a grab bag of authors, hence the title Mélanges d'économie politique. They included works by David Hume, Forbonnais, Condillac, Condorcet, Lavoisier, Benjamin Franklin, Necker, Galiani, Montyon, and Jeremy Bentham.

[17] Molinari, Histoire du tarif (1847).

[18] He would continue these lectures when he moved to Brussels in 1852 and they would become his only treatise on economics, the Cours d'économie politique (1st ed. 1855, 2nd. 1863).

[19] La République française (26 February - 28 March, 1848) and Jacques Bonhomme (11 June - 13 July 1848).

[20] Molinari, "Obituary of Joseph Garnier," JDE (October 1881), pp. 5-13. Molinari tells a similar story in his obituary of Coquelin with the added detail that the economists chose not to fight back and so let the communists win by not throwing a single punch to defend themselves: Molinari, "[Nécr.] Charles Coquelin," JDE (September and October 1852), p. 172.

[21] Molinari, "L'utopie de la liberté (lettre aux socialistes), par un Rêveur", JDE (15 June 1848).

[22] ["M."], "Introduction à la huitième année," JDE (December 1848), pp. 1-6.

[23] Molinari, [CR] "Contes sur l'économie politique, par miss Harriet Martineau," JDE (15 avril 1849).

[24] The DEP was a two volume, 1,854 page, double-columned, nearly two million word encyclopedia of political economy which was published in 1852-53. It is unquestionably one of the most important publishing events in the history of mid-century French classical liberal thought and is unequalled in its scope and comprehensiveness. It contained about 252 main articles; 1,352 biographical articles; and 51 significant bibliographical articles. Unfortunately, it has never been fully translated into English. One hundred of these articles were translated for Lalor's Cyclopedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States, (1881-84), including seven by Molinari.

[25] He used economics to anlayze all these topics in new and original ways in his articles for the DEP. The articles on fine arts, fashion, nations, and towns can be found in the Addendum.

[26] The minutes of these three meetings were published in the JDE and a translation can be found in the Addendum. See Part 1 in "Chronique," JDE (Oct. 1849), pp. 315-16; Part 2 in "Chronique," JDE (15 Jan. 1850), pp. 202-205; and Part 3 in "Chronique," JDE (15 Feb. 1850), pp. 202-5.

[27] On the classical liberal theory of class analysis see the collection Social Class and State Power: Exploring an Alternative Radical Tradition (2018), in which Molinari's DEP article on "Nobility" is included as a typical example.

[28] Molinari, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel (October 1852), pp. 116, 134-35.

[29] Molinari wrote the articles on "War and Peace" and Saint Pierre for the DEP: "Paix. Guerre," T. 2, pp. 307-14 and "Saint Pierre," T. 2, pp. 565-66.

[30] Molinari wrote the articles on "Slavery" and "Serfdom" for the DEP: "Esclavage," T. 1, pp. 712-31 and "Servage," T. 2, pp. 610-13; and a major piece on "The Abolition of Slavery" in Études économiques. L'Organisation de la liberté industrielle et l'abolition de l'esclavage (1846), pp. 60-127.

[31] Molinari, Lettres sur la Russie (1861).

[32] Molinari, Lettres sur les États-Unis et le Canada (1876). Several more followed about his trips to Ireland (1881), Canada and Russia (1886), and Panama and Haiti (1887).

[33] A French translation of The Principles of Sociology appeared between 1874 and 1887 by G. Baillière.

[34] Molinari, La Morale économique (1888).

[35] He published a heavily annotated second edition of Garnier's edition of Malthus' Du principe de population (1885).

[36] Molinari, Religion (1892) and Science et religion (1894).

[37] Molinari, Les Bourses du Travail (1893).

[38] Molinari, Grandeur et decadence de la guerre (1898).

[39] Molinari, "Le XIXe siècle," JDE (Jan. 1901), "Le XXe siècle," JDE (Jan. 1902), and the book Les Problèmes du XXe siècle (1901).

[40] Molinari, "XXe Siècle", JDE (Jan. 1902), p. 13.

[41] Molinari, Théorie de l'évolution (1908), p. 237.

[42] Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-192), p. 244.

[43] Molinari, Histoire du tarif, vol. 2, pp. 74-5.

[44] Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912), p. 18.

[45] Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912), p. 381.

[46] Alexandre Dumas novel Les Trois Mousquetaires (The Three Musketeers) was serialized in a French newspaper Le Siècle (March-July 1844).

[47] Patricia O'Brien, "L'Embastillement de Paris: The Fortification of Paris during the July Monarchy," French Historical Studies (Spring, 1975). See "The Fortifications of Paris," in Appendix 2.

[48] François Arago, Sur les Fortifications de Paris (1841); and Études sur les fortifications de Paris, considérées politiquement et militairement (1845).

[49] Miche Chevalier, Les fortifications de Paris, lettre à M. Le Comte Molé (1841). And Cours d'Économie politique fait au Collège de France (1851). Vol. 2, "Douzième leçon. Concours de l'armée française aux travaux des fortifications de Paris," pp. 183-96. First ed. 1844.

[50] Molinari, "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)," DEP, vol. 2, p. 48.

[51] Bastiat, "The People and the Bourgeoisie" (LE, 23 May 1847), in CW3, p. 286. See also "Bastiat's Theory of Class: The Plunderers vs. the Plundered" in Appendix 1 (CW3, pp. 473-85).

[52] Molinari, "De l'agriculture en Angleterre," JDE (Jan. 1847) and Histoire du tarif (1847). He would also write the major articles on "Grain," "Free Trade Associations," "Free Trade," "Tariffs," and "Customs Unions" for the DEP: "Céréales," T. 1, pp. 301-26; "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)," T. 2, p. 45-49; "Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges," T. 2, pp. 49-63; "Tarifs de douane," T. 2, pp. 712-16; "Union douanière," T. 2, p. 788-89.

[53] See Molinari's two open letters addressed to Bastiat, "II. La suppression des douanes, Letter II (Courrier français, 21 et 27 septembre 1846), republished in Questions d'économie politique (1861), vol. 2, pp. 159-72.

[54] Chevalier, Lettres sur l'Organisation du travail, ou études sur les principales causes de la misère et sur les moyens proposées pour y remédier (1848).

[55] Quesnay, "It is necessary to refrain from attributing to the physical laws which have been instituted in order to produce good, the evils which are the just and inevitable punishment for the violation of this very order of laws." In "Le droit naturel" (Natural Law) (1765).

[56] Dunoyer, LdT, vol. 1, Chap. X. "Post-scriptum sur les objections qu'on a soulevées, dans ces derniers temps, contre le régime de la libre concurrence," p. 413.

[57] Bastiat, "Letter from an Economist to M. de Lamartine. On the occasion of his article entitled: The Right to a Job," JDE (Feb. 1845), in CW4 (forthcoming).

[58] Bastiat, "On the Redistribution of Wealth by M. Vidal," JDE (15 June 1846) and "Organization and Liberty," JDE (January 1847). both in CW4 (forthcoming).

[59] Bastiat, "Natural and Artificial Organisation," JDE (Jan 1848), in CW4 (forthcoming). This was republished as Chap. 1 in Bastiat, Economic Harmonies (1850, 1851).

[60] See the entry for "Bastiat's Anti-socialist 'Petits Pamphlets'," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[61] See "Petition from an Economist," La République française (Thursday 2 March, 1848) (CW1, pp. 426-29).

[62] June 1849 can be seen as the end of the organized socialist movement. The socialists were routed in the national election of April 1849 which led to the rise to power of the so-called "Party of Order" which was a coalition of conservatives, monarchists, and Bonapartists. They quickly moved to eliminate the socialist and radical republican movement in a crackdown on the political clubs and the arrest of many activists in June 1849.

[63] Molinari, "Obituary of Joseph Garnier" (JDE, Oct. 1881), p. 9.

[64] See "Bastiat's Anti-Socialist Pamphlets," in appendix 1, CW4 (forthcoming).

[65] Guillaumin catalog at the end of Hippolyte Passy, Des systèmes de culture et de leur influence sur l'économie sociale (1846), p. 225.

[66] Two of these, Beaux-arts (Fine Arts) and Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges (Free Trade), can be found in the Addendum.

[67] Molinari, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel (October 1852), pp. 79, 116, 151.

[68] See David M. Hart, "Broken Windows and House-Owning Dogs: The French Connection and the Popularization of Economics from Bastiat to Jasay," Symposium on Anthony de Jasay, The Independent Review (Summer 2015).

[69] Marcet, Conversations on Political Economy (1816) and John Hopkins's Notions on Political Economy (1833).

[70] Martineau, Illustrations of Political Economy in 9 vols. (3rd ed. 1832).

[71] See David M. Hart, "Bastiat's Rhetoric of Liberty: Satire and the 'Sting of Ridicule'," in the Introduction (CW3, pp. lviii-lxiv).

[72] Cherbuliez had a promising start with his second book with its amusing title Le potage à la tortue: entretiens populaires sur les questions sociales (Turtle Soup: some popular discussions on social questions) but unfortunately the main part of the book did not live up to this promise. Antoine-Elisée Cherbuliez, Simples Notions de l'ordre social à l'usage de tout le monde (1848), and Le potage à la tortue: entretiens populaires sur les questions sociales (1849).

[73] Instruction pour le People: Cents traités sur les connaissance les plus indispensables (1850). Louis Wolowski and Alcide Fonteyraud, No. 92, "Principes d'économie politique," 2913-3976.

[74] [Unsigned], Compte-rendu par M. Ch. C. [Coquelin], "Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare, Entretiens sur les lois économiques et défense de la propriété, JDE (15 Nov. 1849), pp. 364-72.

[75] [Anon.], Les soirées du village, ou Entretiens d'un maire & d'un procureur de commune (1792); Ducray-Duminil, Les Soirées de la chaumière, ou les Leçons du vieux père (1794); La Condamine, Soirées de Ferney, ou Confidences de Voltaire, recueillies par un ami de ce grand homme (1802).

[76] Joseph de Maistre, Les Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg, ou Entretiens sur le gouvernement temporel, de la Providence suivi d'un Traité sur les sacrifices (1821), 2 vols.

[77] Mme Cheuvreux makes a reference to seeing Bastiat at the Say family salon in a letter (CW1, p. xxix, originally in Lettres d'un habitant des Landes, pp. 3-4). In a letter to Mme Cheuvreux Bastiat makes a reference to looking forward to attending her next salon: 135. Letter to Mme Cheuvreux (Paris, 3 May 1849) (CW1, p. 197).

[78] Calculations are based upon the French language version of the book. The total number of words (minus Preface and footnotes) is 76,450. The Economist's share is 59,702 (78.1%); the Socialist's share is 9,330 (12.2%), and the Conservative's share is 7,418 (9.7%). The combined share of the Socialist and the Conservative is 16,748 (21.9%).

[79] Molinari had a couple of opportunities to meet Marx but we have no evidence that they ever did. The first was at the Congrès des Économistes in Brussels in September 1847 which Marx also attended. He was supposed to give a paper but was denied the opportunity to do so. See the list of attendees in Congrès des Économistes réunis à Bruxelles (1847), pp. 5-9. See also Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works, vol. 6 (2010): Frederick Engels, "The Economic Congress", pp. 274-78, Karl Marx, "The Protectionists, the Free Traders and the Working Class," pp. 279-81, Frederick Engels, "The Free Trade Congress at Brussels," pp. 282-90. The second was in March 1848 after Marx's return to Paris in order to set up a "club des Travailleurs allemands" (German Workers Club) at which he distributed copies of the newly published Communist Manifesto. Molinari tells us that the Economists' Club for the Liberty of Working was broken up violently by a "gang of communists" but he does not say whether they were German speaking or French. So there is the possibility that he did meet some German communists, perhaps even Karl Marx.

[80] See "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership," in appendix 1.

[81] For a more detailed discussion of this, see "Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property," in appendix 1.

[82] His most detailed treatment of this would come nearly 40 years later in Les Lois naturelles de l'économie politique (1887). See "The Natural Laws of Political Economy," in appendix 1.

[83] "Markets in Everything and Entrepreneurs for Everything," in appendix 1.

[84] Wilhelm von Humboldt's Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen appeared in part in 1792 but a complete German edition was not published until 1851. A French translation appeared in 1867. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics (1851) was never translated into French. A French translation of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (1859) appeared the following year by Guillaumin: John Stuart Mill, La liberté. Traduit et augmenté d'une Introduction par Dupont-White (1860).

[85] In "The Utopian" (Jan. 1847) Bastiat discusses the problems faced by a free market reform-minded Minister who is unexpectedly put in charge of the country by the King. He would slash taxes (salt, letters, wine) and tariffs (textiles, wheat, meat, coal), cut government expenditure (abolish the standing army and replace it with local militias, end subsidies to religious groups and state schools), and allow complete freedom of speech, religion, and education. See, "The Utopian," Libre-échange, 17 Jan. 1847, in CW3, pp. 187-98.

[86] Molinari uses the expression "un marchand de travail" (a labour merchant or trader) in "Appel aux ouvriers" 20 juilllet, 1846, Le Courrier français, reprinted in Les bourses du travail (1893), p. 129.

[87] This article is included in the Addendum.

[88] De la Production de la sécurité, par M. G. de Molinari. Extrait du n° 95 du "Journal des économistes," 15 février 1849. (Paris : Guillaumin, 1849).

[89] The Prime Minister Jules Méline (1838-1925) introduced the protectionist Méline tariff in 1892 marking the end of the free trade period in France. The average level of tariffs increased from 8.2% to 11.4% between 1889-1895, while on imported food the protective tariffs increased from 3.3% to 21.3% between 1888-1910.

[90] Molinari, Conversations sur le commerce des grains et la protection de l'agriculture (1886), pp. 305-6.

[91] David M. Hart, "For Whom the Bell Tolls: The School of Liberty and the Rise of Interventionism in French Political Economy in the Late 19thC," and Passy, "The School of Liberty" in Journal of Markets and Morality (Fall 2017).

[92] In his Cours d'économie politique (1896) Pareto described Molinari's Cours d'économie politique as "cet excellent ouvrage" (this excellent work), and in Les Systèmes socialistes (1902) he described Molinari himself as "un des plus profonds penseurs de notre temps" (one of the most profound thinkers of our time).

[93] Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (1974), p. 841.

[94] The editions published by R.C. Hoiles in 1944 came with very bright red covers and included Protection and Communism, The Law, Harmonies of Political Economy, and Social fallacies. The latter is particularly noteworthy for having a foreword by Rose Wilder Lane.

[95] The project began with a condensed and illustrated version of The Law sometime in the late 1940s, a complete edition of The Law in 1950, the 1st and 2nd series of the Economic Harmonies in 1964, Selected Essays on Political Economy (1964), Economic Harmonies (1964), and Dean Russell's biography in 1969.

[96] A member of the Circle Bastiat, the historian Leonard Liggio would write a PhD thesis on the thought of Dunoyer and an important article which appeared in the Journal of Libertarian Studies: Leonard P. Liggio, "Dunoyer and the Bourbon Restoration of 1814". (unfinished PhD dissertation, Date unknown, probably done while he was at Fordham University in New York City); "Charles Dunoyer and French Classical Liberalism," Journal of Libertarian Studies (1977).

[97] Rabah Benkemoune, "Gustave de Molinari's Bourse Network Theory: A Liberal Response to Sismondi's Informational Problem," History of Political Economy (2008); Fred Celimèn et André Legris, "Gustave de Molinari et son voyage à Panama. Une étude de l'économie martiniquaise en 1886," Economie et société (2009); Pierre Dockès, "Une terrible démangeaison de Molinari : de l'esclavage à la mise en tutelle," Economie et Société (2009).

[98] Bruce L.Benson, "The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law" Southern Economic Journal (1989); Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics (1990).

[99] David Friedman, "Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case" Journal of Legal Studies (1979).

[100] Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, The Not So Wild, Wild West (2004).

[101] Peter T. Leeson, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (2011).

[102] Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) (2012).

[103] See in particular, Yves Breton et Michel Lutfalla, L'économie politique en France au XIXème siècle, (1991); Jean-Michel Poughon, "Gustave de Molinari: une approche de la démocratie économique," in Aux sources du modèle libéral français 1997), pp. 169-86; Philippe Nemo et Jean Petitot ed., Histoire de libéralisme en Europe (2006); and Les penseurs libéraux, eds. Alain Laurent et Vincent Valentin (2012).

[104] Frédéric Bastiat, Oeuvres complètes. édition en 7 volumes, sous la direction de Jacques de Guenin. (2009-).

[105] J.B. Say, Œuvres complètes. Edited by André Tiran et al. (2006). With a companion volume on Say, Poitier, Jean-Pierre and André Tiran, eds. Jean-Baptiste Say: Nouveau regards sur son oeuvre (2003).

[106] Jacques Bonhomme : L'éphémère journal de F. Bastiat et G. de Molinari, ed. Benoît Malbranque (Paris: Institut Coppet, 2014). <http://editions.institutcoppet.org/produit/jacques-bonhomme-lephemere-journal-de-f-bastiat-et-g-de-molinari/>.

[107] Institut Économique Molinari <https://www.institutmolinari.org>.

[108] Molinari, Conversations sur le commerce des grains (1886), p. 310.

[109] François Quesnay, "Le droit naturel" (1765), CPE, vol. 1, p.46.

[110]See "The Natural Laws of Political Economy," in appendix 1.

[111]See "Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property," in appendix 1.

[112] The words "Organization" and "Association" were slogans used by the socialists during the 1840s which was resented by the Economists as they too believed in a different kind of "organization" and "association." For the differences, see the entry for "Association and Organization," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[113] He lists them by generation, the first being François Quesnay, Turgot, Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and J.B. Say; and their 19th century followers John Ramsay MacCulloch, Nassau Senior, James Wilson, Charles Dunoyer, Michel Chevalier, Frédéric Bastiat, and Joseph Garnier.

[114] See Coquelin's review in JDE (November 1849) and the minutes of the meeting of the October meeting of the Société d'Économie Politique in JDE (October 1849) which can be found in the Addendum. Dunoyer's comment is on p. 316. See "The Dreamer (le Rêveur) of Radical Liberal Reforms," in appendix 1.

[115] We have retained the original page numbering of the book for citation purposes.

[116] The "Economists" of the 18th century were the economists and reform minded bureaucrats known as the Physiocrats, which included François Quesnay (1694-1774), Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-17811), among others. The group of free market classical liberal political economists of which Molinari was a member also referred to themselves as "the Economists"

[117] Molinari's theory of property drew heavily upon the work of J.B. Say, Charles Comte, Charles Dunoyer, and Louis Leclerc. See the entry for "Property Rights," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms and "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership," in appendix 1.

[118] Molinari has in mind here the book by Adolphe Thiers De la Propriété which was published in September 1848 and which he reviewed very critically in JDE in January 1849.

[119] In his book review, Molinari criticized Thiers for his reluctance to introduce any more reforms in France as the revolutionaries had done on the night of August 4, 1789. Molinari on the other hand thought France needed several more "nights of August 4" to be fully free.

[120] Molinari uses the phrase "l'affranchissement pur et simple de la propriété" and other similar phrases several times in the Soirées. See "Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property," in appendix 1.

[121] Molinari is probably referring to James Wilson (1805-60) who is the only journalist in this list of economists. He founded The Economist in 1839 and was was an ardent supporter of free trade in Britain during the 1840s.

[122] The "Social Question" ("la question sociale" in France and "die soziale Frage" in the German states), or "the social problem," concerned the condition of the working class (to borrow the title of Friedrich Engel's best known work) in the newly industrializing cities of Europe in the 1830s and 1840s. See the entry for "The Social Question (Problem)," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[123] See "The Natural Laws of Political Economy," in appendix 1.

[124] See the Editor's "Introduction" for a list of these speeches, above, pp. 000.

[125] See "Bastiat's Invention of 'Crusoe Economics'," in the Introduction (CW3, pp. lxiv-lxvii).

[126] Napoleon's Commercial Code of 1807 strictly limited the kinds of business organizations which could be set up. This is discussed in more detail below.

[127] See Études économiques. L'Organisation de la liberté industrielle et l'abolition de l'esclavage (1846).

[128] Molinari, Lettres sur la Russie (1861).

[129] This is the only time in the book GdM uses this term.

[130] Molinari was criticized by the reviewer of his book in the JDE for misrepresenting the views of the mainstream Economists by using the name "The Economist" to express views which were those of Molinari alone, especially his ideas on the private "production of security" in S11 and his opposition to the compulsory acquisition of property by the state in S3, although this may well have been the young and radical Molinari's provocative implication (he was 30 when the book was published). Yet, it can be seen here that Molinari lists the speakers as "a" conservative, "a" socialist, and "an" economist" and thus it might be argued that he did not necessarily mean "all" socialists or "all" economists.

[131] By "Utopian" Molinari hand in mind socialist utopian thinkers such as Fourier or Cabet. Ironically, Molinari was also accused by his economist colleagues of "utopianism" especially over his ideas of the private "production of security" which he advocated in an article in the JDE and in S11 in this book. He seems to anticipate this in his remarks in the preface. Also note that he referred to himself as "le rêveur" (the dreamer) in an anonymous article published in the JDE on the eve of the June Days uprising in Paris in 1848 in which he appealed to socialists to support each other since they shared some ideas on exploitation and injustice.

[132] Molinari also believed that part of society was "gangrenous" or "ulcerous," namely the government itself. He developed a whole pathology to describe what he called "ulcerous" and "leprous" government. See "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government," in appendix 1.

[133] Unlike the Conservative, Molinari was probably not a practicing Catholic but more likely a deist of some kind who believed that an "ordonnateur des choses" (the organizer of things) created the world and the laws which governed its operation (see note 000, p. 000 in S10). See "Religious Protectionism and Religious Contraband," in appendix 1.

[134] Molinari's close friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat regarded the argument that free market ideas were correct in theory but impractical to apply, and that there were no "absolute principles" which should guide government policies, as one of the major fallacies he had to refute in his collection of Economic Sophisms which he wrote between 1845 and 1850. See in particular ES1 18 "There Are No Absolute Principles" (CW3, pp. 83-85).

[135] Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) was a conservative political thinker who supported the Old Regime notion of "throne and altar."

[136] "The Constitution of 1795, like all the previous ones, was made for man. Now, there is no man in the world. In my lifetime I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, and so on; I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be Persian. But as for man, I declare not to have met one in my life. If he exists, it is certainly unknown to me." In Oeuvres du comte J. de Maistre (1851), vol. 1, p. 88.

[137] A reference to Montesquieu's chapter "Of laws as relative to the Nature of the Climate" in Spirit of the Laws (1748).

[138] "That is droll justice which is bounded by a stream! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on that." "Of Justice, Customs and Prejudices" in The Thoughts of Blaise Pascal (1901), p. 61.

[139] Ironically, in an often heated debate between Bastiat and the left anarchist Proudhon at the end of 1849, Proudhon made very similar arguments about the justice and necessity of charging interest for foreign trade during the middle ages coming to an end in the modern era when conditions had changed. See "Free Credit," in Bastiat, CW4 (forthcoming).

[140] Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn Law League were successful in getting the British Parliament to repeal the protectionist Corn Laws in January 1846 and the Navigation Act followed in 1849.

[141] Molinari discusses intellectual property at greater length in S2 below.

[142] The Law of 7 July 1833 (and amended by the Law of 6 May 1841) created special juries of local landowners which would determine the level of compensation for confiscated land. This had become an issue with the building of the new national railway network after 1842 and the massive fortifications of Paris planned by Thiers which took place between 1841 and 1844. See Legoyt, "Expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique."

[143] In the 1849 Budget a total of fr. 41 million was set aside for expenditure by the state on religion. Of this 39 million went to the Catholic Church, 1.4 million went to Protestant churches, and 122,883 went to Jewish groups. See "Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services," in appendix 3.

[144] Molinari uses the phrase "réorganisateurs de la société" and has in mind the arguments of the socialists Louis Blanc, Charles Fourier, and their followers.

[145] A biblical word used for weeds. See "the parable of the tares of the field" in Matthew 13: 36.

[146] The Conservative is referring to the declaration of a state of siege (martial law) on 24 June 1848 under General Cavaignac following the attempted coup on 15 May by Louis Blanc and other left wing Deputies and the rioting of protesters during the June Days in protest at the closure of the National Workshops. Many hundreds of rioters were killed by the troops (dozens were summarily executed) and some 15,000 were arrested, of which about 4,000 were transported to Algeria. The Political Clubs of Paris and the radical press were also shut down.

[147] Molinari discusses this in more detail in his article on "War and Peace" in the DEP: "Paix, Guerre," T. 2, pp. 307-14.

[148] But Molinari had. He wrote an article on the early 18th century peace advocate "Saint-Pierre" for the DEP, and a book on Saint-Pierre's ideas during the Crimean War, L'abbé de Saint-Pierre (1857).

[149] In the chapter "Reflections on War" in his two volume work On the Pope (1819) de Maistre argued that the popes had the same right as every other temporal leader to wage war, that war had become necessary in the current period, but Popes had waged war less frequently, more justly, and more humanely than other political leaders had. See Joseph de Maistre Du Pape (1830), vol. 2, chap. XIII "Réflexions sur les guerres," pp. 75-76.

[150] See Molinari's impassioned plea for liberty in the closing paragraphs of S12 where he contrasts liberty and the oppressed such as the slaves of Spartacus. The issue of slavery and serfdom was one to which Molinari gave considerable attention in the 1840s as can be seen in his entries on "Slavery" and "Serfdom" in the DEP: "Esclavage," T. 1, pp. 712-31 and "Servage," T. 2, pp. 610-13.

[151] Several hundred political clubs were set up in Paris in the weeks following the collapse of the regime in February 1848. A group of the economists were also quick to establish their own Club, "le Club de la liberté du travail" (Club for the Liberty of Working), which was set up by Charles Coquelin on 31 March 1848 specifically to combat socialist ideas about the "right to work." See the entry for "Clubs (Political)," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[152] See the entries for "Press (Liberal and Republican)," "Press (Conservative)," and "Press (Socialist)," in the Glossary of Newspapers and Journals.

[153] Molinari discusses this in more detail in his entries on "Cities and Towns" and "Civilization" in the DEP: "Villes," T. 2, pp. 833-38 and "Civilisation," T. 1, pp. 370-77. Both have been translation and can be found in the Addendum.

[154] The capital of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople, was besieged for 4 days as part of the 4th Crusade in 1204. After the city fell it was looted by the Christian Crusaders. Among many other things, the great Imperial Library was destroyed.

[155] The Socialist is making fun of the fact that the Economists had only the Political Economy Society, the JDE, and the Guillaumin publishing firm which were all organized by the same small number of individuals. Whereas the socialists had many organisations and journals which had emerged during the 1830s and 1840s.

[156] Henri Saint-Simon (1760-1825) developed a theory of social and economic organization in the late 1810s and 1820s which advocated rule by a technocratic elite of "industrialists" and managers.

[157] The socialist Charles Fourier (1772-1837) believed that a more just and productive society would be one which was based on the common ownership of property and the communal organization of all productive activity. The organizational base of his new society was the "Phalanstery" or "Phalanx" which was the name of the specially designed building which would house 1,600 people. Some utopian communities based on his idea were established in North America.

[158] The Socialist probably has in mind Fourier's views on marriage. Charles Fourier believed that marriage was a form of oppression for women and advocated an end to "le mariage exclusif" (marriage to one person) and "le mariage permanent" (indissoluble marriage) in favor of either no marriage at all or what he referred to as "la corporation amoureux" which today might mean something like an open marriage. See Oeuvres complètes de Charles Fourier (1846), vol. 1, p. 89.

[159] Étienne Cabet was a lawyer and utopian socialist who coined the word "communism." He advocated a society in which the elected representatives controlled all property that was owned in common by the community. In 1848 Cabet left France in order to create such a community (called "Icarie") in Texas and then at Nauvoo, Illinois, but these efforts ended in failure.

[160] Philippe Mathé-Curtz ("Curtius") (1737-1794) was a Swiss doctor and sculptor who created wax figures for anatomical study. His collection became the basis for M. Tussaud's museum.

[161] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) was a political theorist considered to be the father of anarchism.

[162] Proudhon opposed the charging of interest and advocated a system of Exchange Banks or People's Banks which would offer low interest rate loans to workers. After the February Revolution of 1848 broke out Proudhon attempted to set up such a bank. He applied for an act of incorporation in January 1849 but was not able to raise the capital of fr. 50,000 it needed. Proudhon and Bastiat had a famous debate on "Free Credit" in October 1849 to March 1850. See Bastiat, CW4 (forthcoming) and Gratuité du crédit (1850). See the entry for "Money and Banking," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[163] It is curious that Molinari leaves out the name of one of the most important socialists of his day, Louis Blanc, who wrote the influential book l'Organisation du travail (1839) and was the President of the Committee of the Workers under the Provisional Government and the driving force behind the National Workshops program between March and June 1848. The numerous times "The Socialist" uses the term "organize" in the discussion strongly suggests that he was modeled on a typical supporter of Blanc, or even perhaps Blanc himself. It is possible Molinari met Blanc at one of Hippolyte Castille's soirées in his home on the rue Saint-Lazare.

[164] See the long and very detailed entry by Reybaud, "Socialistes, Socialisme." He provides a comprehensive examination of the different schools of French socialist thought and an excellent bibliography of their writings. Reybaud also wrote a two volume work on modern socialism which first appeared in 1840 and was in its 6th edition by 1849. See Louis Reybaud, Études sur les réformateurs ou socialistes modernes (1849).

[165] Molinari is referring to the February Revolution of 1848 which overthrew the July Monarchy of Louis Philippe and introduced the Second Republic. See the entry for "Revolution of 1848 (also "February Revolution")," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms and appendix 4 on "A Brief Chronology of the 1848 Revolution and the Second Republic."

[166] See "The Natural Laws of Political Economy," in appendix 1.

[167] This is the second and last time Molinari uses the expression "des êtres actifs et libres" (free and acting beings).

[168]  See the entry for "Property Rights," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms, and "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership," in appendix 1.

[169] Here begins the Economist's first of six set pieces or "speeches" in the book, where he gives a mini-lecture on what he believes. This one is his "man as an economic actor" speech and is about 2,000 words in length with only a few nominal interjections by the Socialist and the Conservative. He discusses "acting man," the nature of self-interest, and property rights. See the Editor's "Introduction" for a list and description of these speeches, above, pp. 000.

[170] "Ce mobile, ce pivot se nomme l'Intérêt." Bastiat also had a theory about "self-interest" being the "mobile" or driving force behind human behavior. He developed it into a quite complex idea of "le méchanisme sociale" (the social mechanism" which operated like a clock with "les rouages," (the cogs and wheels) ,"les ressorts," (the springs or mainspring), and "les mobiles" (the movement or driving force). See "The Social Mechanism and its Driving Force," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[171] Molinari discusses this at grater length in the opening section of his entry on "Freedom of Commerce and Free Trade in the DEP: "Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges," T. 2, pp. 49-63.

[172] In the original French Molinari uses exactly the same phrasing as the title to Proudhon's book, Qu'est-ce que la propriété? (What is Property?) (1841), but of course comes to the opposite position in his answer.

[173] [Note to editor: Molinari inserts here a very long footnote on Leclerc which I have placed at the end of the chapter.]

[174] Molinari discusses this at greater length in his entry on "Nations" in the DEP: "Nations," T. 2, pp. 259-62. See the Addendum.

[175] Molinari gives here a good summary of the French classical liberal theory of class and exploitation which had been developed by J.B Say, Charles Comte, Charles Dunoyer, and Augustin Thierry in the 1810s and 1820s. It is also known as the "industrialist theory of history" as the productive class (or "industriels") who produce and exchange with others on a voluntary basis are exploited (or "plundered") by a parasitic, non-productive class who use violence to take the property of others. These early formulations were taken up by Bastiat in the mid-1840s who was planning "A History of Plunder" before he died in 1850. Molinari would do something very similar in a pair of books he wrote in the 1880s: L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle (1880) and L'évolution politique et la Révolution (1884). See the entry for "Industry," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[176] Molinari is putting the words of Adolphe Thiers into the mouth of the Conservative here. In his book De la propriété (1848) he argued that one "night of the 4th of August" (1789) had been sufficient to reform France. Molinari strongly rejected this in his review of Theirs' book in which he argued France needed a few more nights like that one to get the job of reform done properly. Here he produces a long list of reforms below.

[177] Molinari might have in mind the definition of the state his colleague Frédéric Bastiat developed during the June Days of the 1848 Revolution when they co-edited a small magazine called Jacques Bonhomme. Early drafts were gradually turned into the pamphlet The State which was published in September 1848. Here Bastiat defined the state as "THE STATE is the great fiction by which EVERYONE endeavors to live at the expense of EVERYONE ELSE." See "The State" in (CW2, p. 97). See the entry for "Jacques Bonhomme (the Magazine) (11 June - 13 July, 1848)," in the Glossary of Newspapers and Journals.

[178] Molinari uses here the phrases "laissez faire" and "laissez passer" which have special significance for the Economists: "Laissez faire les propriétaires, laissez passer les propriétés" (let property owners freely go about their business. Let property circulate and everything will work out for the best). Molinari uses the phrase "laissez faire" in a general sense many times in Les Soirées both as the recommended government policy (from the mouth of the Economist) and as a term of abuse by the Socialist and the Conservative. He also uses the expression to recommend the deregulation of specific areas of activity and we will indicate it when he does so. See Garnier, "Laissez faire, laissez passer."

[179] These were all highly regulated professions and trades which required a government license in order to practice them. Later in Les Soirées he talks about the benefits to society of deregulating these professions. Molinari also suggests that he would like to see all these professions be run by entrepreneurs rather than as licensees of the state. See "Markets in Everything and Entrepreneurs for Everything," in appendix 1.

[180] Napoleon's Commercial Code of 1807 strictly limited the kinds of business organizations which could be set up. This is discussed in more detail below.

[181] The manufacture and sale of tobacco, gunpowder, saltpeter, mail delivery, and the coining of money were all government monopolies.

[182] Article 2 of the Le Chapelier Law of June 1791 states that: "Citizens of the same occupation or profession, entrepreneurs, those who maintain open shop, workers, and journeymen of any craft whatsoever may not, when they are together, name either president, secretaries, or trustees, keep accounts, pass decrees or resolutions, or draft regulations concerning their alleged common interests." In the early 1840s Molinari took a special interest in the right of workers to form unions. See "The "Chapelier" Law. 14 June, 1791" in Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, pp. 165-66. In French: Collection complète des lois, dÉcrets, ordonnances, vol. 3, (1824), pp. 25-26. See the discussion of this in S6 and and "Labour Unions, Labour Exchanges, and Labour Merchants," in appendix 1.

[183] These are called "eminent domain" laws in the United States.

[184] Louis Leclerc (1799-?) was a founding member of the Free Trade Association, a member of the Société d'Économie Politique, and briefly an editor of the JDE. He was also secretary of the Chamber of Commerce of Paris.

[185] Leclerc uses the word "le Moi" (Me, or the self) which he borrowed from Victor Cousin's discussion of "Le moi, voilà la propriété primordiale et originelle" (Me, there is the primordial and original property) in Justice et Charité (1848), pp. 31-32.

[186] Leclerc, "Simple observation sur le droit de propriété," JDE (15 October 1848), pp. 304-305.

[187] Molinari wrote the article on "Propriété littéraire" (intellectual property) for the DEP, vol. 2 pp. 473-78 in which he gives a brief history of copyright legislation in France and its contemporary critics. See "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership," in appendix 1, and "Intellectual Property (Copyright, Trade Marks, and Patents)" in appendix 2.

[188] Louis Blanc, Organisation du travail. IVe édition. (1845), pp. 188, 204, 207.

[189] See Renouard, "Marques de fabrique"; Du droit industriel (1860), Livre Troisième "Du domaine privilégié", Chap. IV "Marques de fabrique et de commerce," pp. 370-405; and the government Report of 1847: Chambre des Députés. Séance du 15 juillet 1847 Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l'examen du projet de loi sur les marques de fabrique et de commerce (1847).

[190] See Clément, "Produits immatériels"and Dunoyer, "Production."

[191] Wolowski and Levasseur, "Propriété." See especially the section "Propriété littéraire et artistique" pp. 691 ff. where Wolowski talks about the debate within political economy over intellectual property.

[192] See Coquelin, "Brevets d'invention" and Charles Renouard, Traité des brevets d'invention (1844).

[193] See Édouard Romberg, Compte rendu des travaux du Congrès de la propriété littéraire et artistique (1859), 2 vols. "France. - Notice historique sur la propriété littéraire," pp. 161-67; Législation, pp. 168 ff.; Alfred Villefort, De la propriété littéraire et artistique au point de vue international (1851), "La France," pp. 1-9; and Molinari, "Propriété littéraire et artistique."

[194] This is the idea behind the motto on the book cover by Quesnay.

[195] See "Molinari and Bastiat on the Theory of Value," in appendix 1.

[196] Molinari is here building upon the work done by J.-B. Say in the Traité d'économie politique (1803, 1817) and Cours complet (1828) and Charles Dunoyer in La Liberté du travail (1845) on the difference between "produits matériels" (material or physical products, or goods) and "produits immatériels" (non-material products, or services).

[197] Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704) was a French bishop and court priest to King Louis XIV.

[198] Blaise Pascal (1623-62) was a French mathematician and philosopher whose best-known work, Pensées (Thoughts), appeared posthumously.

[199] Jean-Baptiste Poquelin (1622-1673) is better known by his stage name Molière. He was a brilliant playwright who made a name for himself with witty comedies which explored the foibles of the French bourgeoisie.

[200] See "Key Terms" for Molinari's use of the word "communism." Bastiat also used the tactic of calling conservative supporters of trade protection "communists" in his pamphlet Protectionism and Communism (Jan. 1849) (CW2, pp. 235-65).

[201] Molinari wrote the article on "Propriété littéraire" for the DEP in which he gives a brief history of copyright legislation in France and directs considerable criticism towards Louis Blanc and the socialists who wished to end the ownership of intellectual property for good. He concludes optimistically (1852) that "it is therefore hoped that, although it will no doubt displease M. Louis Blanc and his school, literary and artistic property will sooner or later be fully recognized and guaranteed within its natural limits," p. 478.

[202] Molinari uses the term "l'auteur propriétaire" which we have translated as author-owner.

[203] Jean de La Fontaine (1621-1695) was a French writer of fables and a poet.

[204] Jean-Baptiste Racine (1639-1699) was a French dramatist who wrote tragedies based upon ancient Greek themes and stories.

[205] Molinari sees Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Morelly (1717-?) as precursors of the modern socialist school and the Physiocrats Quesnay (1694-1774) and Turgot (1727-1781) as precursors of the modern Economists.

[206] Montesquieu, The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (1777), vol. 1. Bk. V, Chapter XIII.: An Idea of despotic Power, p. 73-74.

[207] Molinari uses the phrase "Le Temps ne respecte que ce qu'il a fondé" which may come from Aeschylus (525-456 BC) Prometheus Bound, Line 981 - variously translated as "Time waxing old can many a lesson teach," "Time as he grows old teaches all things," "Time brings all things to pass."

[208] René Descartes (1596-1650) was a French philosopher and mathematician who lived much of his life in the Dutch republic. His best known work is Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).

[209] Blaise Pascal's Provincial Letters were a series of 18 letters written between 1656-57 in which he wittily criticized Jesuit casuistry which so offended King Louis XIV that he ordered the book burnt in 1660. Blaise Pascal, Les provinciales, ou Les lettres écrites par Louis de Montalte (1844).

[210] Molinari exaggerates slightly here. Adam Smith published the Wealth of Nations in 1776. He dealt with many economic matters in his unpublished Lectures on Jurisprudence which were given between 1762 and 1766. His book Theory of Moral Sentiments which addresses many related themes appeared in 1759. Supposing he spent 5 years researching the book, one could at best say that Smith "pondered the economic problems of society" for 25 years. See Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (1995), chapter 11 "The Making of The Theory of Moral Sentiments," pp. 157-76.

[211] According to figures from the 1848 Budget the French government spent a total of fr. 3,343,676 on "Science and Letters" controlled by the Ministry of Public Education and Religion in 1848. Of this, fr. 584,800 went to the Institute (to which many Economists belonged), fr. 558,823 went to the Bibliothèque royal (renamed the Bibliothèque national after the 1848 Revolution), and fr. 170,233 on other public libraries. See "Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services," in appendix 3. For specific budget items see "Budget de 1848" p. 31 in AEPS (1848).

[212] Molinari continues and expands this discussion to include other forms of the "Fine Arts" in the DEP: "Beaux-arts," T. 1, pp. 149-57.

[213] In his article on "Literary Property" in DEP Molinari makes the following distinction between restrictions on literary property which take place through time and those that take place through geographical space. Time limits placed by legislation on the length of copyright ownership vary from country to country so that countries with longer periods of exclusive authorial rights (like England (42 years plus 7) and Prussia (life plus 30 years)) are at an advantage compared to countries with a more limited period (like France (life plus 20) and Belgium (French law applied after 1817). Copyright is also limited across geographical space when a state allows counterfeiting within its borders of books which originate in other countries. Molinari denounced this as "international communism" which was only slowly being reduced as states like Prussia and England (1838) began to introduce reciprocal recognition of international copyright. See "Propriété littéraire," pp. 475-76.

[214] In its 1854 catalog the Guillaumin publishers listed the following prices of some of its books: Molinari's 367 page Les Soirées for 3fr. 50; Bastiat's 575 page 2nd ed. of Harmonies économiques for 3fr. 50; and the very large 2 volume, 2,000 page DEP for 50fr. Note that a skilled worker like a printer might earn 3-4 francs per day.

[215] Gustave Louis Chaix d'Est-Ange (1800-1876) was a lawyer and politician.

[216] Here Molinari uses the same term, "la propriété artistique" (artistic property), for both works of art (like paintings and statues) and industrial creations (like industrial designs and technical drawings) which is confusing. When he is referring to industrial property we will use the term "designer" or "craftsman" instead of "artist."

[217] See Molinari's entry on "Public Monuments" in the DEP: "Monuments publics," T. 2, pp. 237-8.

[218] Molinari uses the portmanteau word "monsieur le conservateur-communiste" which we have translated as "Mister Communist-Conservative."

[219] See the discussion by Renouard, "Marques de fabrique."

[220] The Socialist is referring to the violence and political crackdown which followed the street protests and riots of the June Days (23-26) in 1848 and the demonstrations of June 13 in 1849. The latter took place while Molinari was working on Les Soirées over the summer of 1849. The June Days riots were suppressed by 40-50,000 troops with 1,500 dead and 15,000 arrests, of which 4,248 were sentenced to transportation. The demonstrations of June 1849 were on a smaller scale with 6,000 protesters and 600 National Guardsmen. There were no deaths but 67 were tried of whom 36 were sentenced to transportation. Both events led to the closure of the political clubs, the suppression of opposition newspapers, and the introduction of periods of military law. See the entry for "The "June Days" 23-26 June 1848," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[221] On the Economists' understanding of the original and just acquisition of land which they got from Charles Comte, see the entry for "Property Rights," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[222] Here the Socialist is drawing upon the work of Louis Blanc and Victor Considerant on land ownership which appeared during the 1840s and were reprinted many times, especially after 1848.

[223] "Le régime de la propriété illimitée."

[224] Adam Smith has a classic statement in his Lectures On Jurisprudence on how the division of labor and the use of machines increase the productivity of workers such as the ploughman. He notes that specializing in one task, such as ploughing, concentrates the mind and encourages the invention of new devices or improvements in existing ones. See Adam Smith, Lectures On Jurisprudence, vol. V of the Glasgow Edition (1982). Early Draft of Part of The Wealth of Nations, Chapter 2.: Of the nature and causes of public opulence, p. 569.

[225] James Watt (1736-1819) was a Scottish engineer whose innovations and improvements in the technology of steam engines was a major contributing factor in the spread of the industrial revolution in Britain.

[226] Joseph Marie Jacquard (1752-1834) was a French inventor who developed the first programmable loom for weaving complex patterns (the so-called "Jacquard loom").

[227] Robert Fulton (1765-1815) was an American engineer and inventor who was involved in developing the first commercially successful steamboat.

[228] Molinari uses the English word "Backwoodsmen."

[229] (Molinari's note) Intellectual property, as regrettably misunderstood as it is by today's property owners, found a witty and dedicated defender in Mr. Jobard, Director of the Brussels Museum. In Paris, a distinguished novelist, Mr. Hippolyte Castille, founded a journal in 1847 in order to defend the cause which is of interest to so many workers. Unfortunately, Mr. Castille's enterprise did not achieve the success that it so well deserved. After a few months the journal Travail intellectuel (Intellectual Work or Labor) ceased appearing. I have limited myself here to summarizing several articles I published in this journal edited by one of the most dedicated defenders of intellectual property.

[230] See Patricia O'Brien, "L'Embastillement de Paris: The Fortification of Paris during the July Monarchy" (1975) and "The Fortifications of Paris," in appendix 2.

[231] See Legoyt, "Expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique" and "The Railways" and "Public Works" in appendix 2.

[232] Lobet, "Chemins de fer," AEPS (1848), pp. 289-311. Data on p. 294.

[233] See the article by Legoyt on "Expropriation pour cause d'utility publique" and the entry for "Mineral Resources, Property Rights," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[234] In the discussion of Molinari's book by the Political Economy Society in October 1849 Molinari's opposition to the compulsory acquisition of private property by the state and his idea of "the production of security," which he argued for in an article in February in the JDE and in S11, were the two things the other economists most disagreed with him about. See Anon., Reports of a discussion "On the Proper Limits to the Power of the State," in JDE (October 1849) which has been translated in Bastiat's CW4, pp. 000. Both the article "The Production fo Security" and the debates in the PES appear in the Addendum.

[235] See Legoyt, "Mines, minières et carrières."

[236] Molinari, Lettres sur les États-Unis et le Canada (1876).

[237] See Legoyt, "Domaine public."

[238] Clément, "Monopole."

[239] See "Markets in Everything and Entrepreneurs for Everything," in appendix 1.

[240] Charles Comte, Traité de la Propriété (1834), vol. 1, chap. X "De la conversion du territoire national en propriétés privées," pp. 139-61.

[241] A summary of the discussions can be found in the JDE: [Anon.] Reports of a discussion "On the Proper Limits to the Power of the State." All three can be found in the Addendum.

[242] Coquelin, "Harmonie industrielle."

[243] See Molinari, Cours, vol. 1, Préface, p. vi. See also the entire "Sixième Leçon. L'équilibre de la production et de la consommation," Cours, vol. 1, pp. 158-76.

[244] La Sologne is a heavily forested region in central France between the Loire and Cher rivers.

[245] Molinari uses the word "aristos" in the original. It is short for "aristocrats" and has a negative connotation.

[246] The "jurys d'expropriation" (expropriation and compensation juries, or boards)) decided how property owners would be compensated for property taken from them by the state.

[247] Throughout this conversation Molinari uses the word "viol" which means rape. In this sentence he continues to use the language of rape to describe other kinds of violations of private property. Thus, here we have translated "ravir" (ravish) and "viol" (rape) as "rob" and "serious crime."

[248] Molinari uses the Latin phrase "Suum cuique" which was used by many authors in the ancient world. It is most commonly associated with the jurist Ulpian who contributed to Justinian's codification of Roman law (c. 530). In 1.1.10 there is "Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi" and "Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere" which can be translated as "Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render to every man his due" and "The principles of the law are these: to live honorably, to harm no one, to give to each his own" respectively. See Institutes de l'empereur Justinien (1838), vol. 1, p. 11.

[249] Molinari is referring to a key aspect of Bastiat's economic thinking here, namely the idea of "the harmony of interests." Molinari was working on a similar idea with his theory of equilibrium which he thought was one of the several natural laws of political economy.

[250] The Law of 21 April, 1810 regulated the mining industry in France. See Legoyt, "Mines, minières et carrières."

[251] He says "sa charte d'affranchissement" (its charter of emancipation). On his idea of "emancipation of all things" see"Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property," in appendix 1.

[252] This topic is discussed in S2.

[253] Gabriel Honoré Riqueti, comte deMirabeau (1749-91) was a journalist and politician who made a name for himself as one of the leading orators during the French Revolution. He was a supporter of constitutional monarchy and wrote on economics and banking. He should not be confused with his father Victor Riqueti (1715-1789) who was also an economist and member of the Physiocratic school. See the entries for "Mirabeau, Victor Riqueti, comte de" and "Mirabeau, Gabriel Honoré Riqueti, comte de," in the Glossary of Persons.

[254] Mirabeau, Speech in the National Assembly, 21 March, 1791 "Sur la question de savoir si les mines pouveaient être considérées comme propriété publiques." Honoré-Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau, Oeuvres de Mirabeau (1834), vol. 3. Discours et opinions, p. 110.

[255] "Le communisme souterrain."

[256] Mines could not be owned as private property but could only be licensed from the state for fixed periods upon an annual payment of royalties to the state. See the discussion of the changing laws concerning mining in Legoyt, "Mines, minières et carrières," - the Law of 12 July 1791, the Law of 21 April 1810, and the Law of 27 April 1838.

[257] Mining was administered by the Ministry of the Interior. The number of new mining licences issued between 1811 and 1848 was 760 which returned to the Treasury royalties of fr. 227,652 in 1835, fr. 533,391 in 1847, and fr. 397,202 in 1848 which were very low amounts compared to other sectors of the economy. See "Statistique de l'industrie minérale," in AEPS (1850), pp. 170-71.

[258] In the entry on "Nobility" in the DEP Molinari refers to the Hoy Land where the Christian Crusaders went to fight as "cette Californie religieuses du moyen âge" (that religious California of the middle ages). See Addendum, p. abc.

[259] The Economist gives a more detailed answer to this question in S11.

[260] The Conservative lists the industries in which the French state either ran government owned factories or had an outright monopoly. Ambroise Clément lists under the category of "privileged" or "legal monopolies" the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, gunpowder, the delivery of mail, the issuing of money, education, and public works. He also lists numerous areas of economic activity which can only be practiced with a government issued license such as mines, legal notaries, lawyers, bailiffs, money changers, brokers, printers, book sellers, bakers, butchers, and porters. Clément, "Monopole."

[261] Molinari uses the word "entrepreneur" throughout Les Soirées (37 times) and identifies 12 specific kinds of entrepreneurial activity. See "Markets in Everything and Entrepreneurs for Everything," in appendix 1.

[262] Molinari uses the expression "la production de la sécurité" (the production of security) for the first time in the book here. The other two occurrences are in S11. Molinari caused a furore in the Political Economy Society when he published an article using this very phrase as its title on the private provision of security services in the February 1849 issue of the JDE. See "The Production of Security," in appendix 1. We have included the minutes of the Political Economy Society and a translation of this important article in the Addendum.

[263] The British Parliament held an inquiry into revenue from Crown Lands in late 1847 and 1848 which issued a Report: Report, Evidence, and Appendix, on the Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues of the Crown. Vol. XXIV. Parts I and II (1847-8).

[264] New Forest is in Hampshire, England and was created as a royal forest by William I in 1071; Walham is north of Gloucester near the River Severn; Whittlewood Forest is in Northamptonshire; Wychwood Forest is is Oxfordshire.

[265] The English Radical John Wade has a section in his Extraordinary Black Book (1832) on crown land and those who benefited from privileged access to them (what he called "jobbing the crown-lands," p. 196 ff. The body to administer Crown Forests was created in 1810 called The Commissioners of Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues.

[266] Dupuit in his article on "Voies de communication" argues that there are three alternatives when it comes to the provision of communication routes (railways, roads, canals): there is either a private monopoly, a state monopoly, or competition between private companies. He dismisses the first two categories on the grounds of justice and economic incentive problems and supports the third on the grounds that "unlimited competition" and "complete liberty" will overcome the disadvantages of the first two.

[267] The Département des Landes (des Gascognes) is in South West France and is the birthplace of Molinari's friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat.

[268] Although Adam Smith believed roads were a public good which should be provided by the state because it was not in the interest of any particular individual or group to build and maintain them, he believed that they should not be paid for out of general revenue but by those who used the roads via a toll: Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chap. 1, Part C, paragraphs 1 & 2. This view was challenged by J.-B. Say in the Cours complet (1828) who thought that roads were so vital to a nation's economy that they should be paid for out of general revenue and not tolls on users: Cours complet (1840), vol. 2, Chap. XXIII "Dépense des voies de communication, et particulièrement des routes," pp. 306-8. By 1852 most of the Economists had returned to Smith's view that it was "just and rational" that users of roads be charged according to how much they made use of them. See Dupuit, "Routes et chemins."

[269] Michel Chevalier notes that the privately owned canals in Britain are more efficiently built and run than the state owned canals in France. Concerning the latter he states "State owned canals are poorly maintained; and furthermore, for the most part, they have not even finished building them, and God knows when they will be; and the administration of them is well below mediocre." The state owned or licensed canals in America, on the other hand, were more quickly and efficiently built than in France, but the process of getting their construction approved and funded were highly politicized and the strong political incentives which existed sometimes meant too many licences were granted. See Chevalier, "Canaux de navigation," "Statistique des travaux public, sous le Gouvernement de Juillet," ASEP 1849, pp. 209-37; and Deuxième Leçon, "De l'intervention du gouvernement dans les travaux publics," pp. 57-73 and the following two chapters, in Cours d'économie politique fait au Collége de France. Deuxième année, 1842-43 (1844).

[270] Molinari discusses how free competition forces the cost of production to fall in S5, S6, and S7.

[271] Molinari uses the phrase "le régime de libre concurrence" (the regime of free competition) several times in Les Soirées but this is the only time he has a double emphasis on the word freedom: "le libre régime de la libre concurrence" (the free regime of free competition).

[272] There is a discussion of the private provision of water in cities like London and Paris by Dupuit in "Eau." Dupuit contrasts the free and competitive provision of water (and gas) in London with the government monopoly in Paris. Although he has some qualms about rival companies tearing up the streets to service their different sets of customers, he is impressed with the better quality of filtered London water and the more rational method of pricing. The low government fixed price of water in Paris was only "apparently free" as the costs of supplying it had to be borne by somebody and there was no incentive for the providers of water to innovate or for the consumers of water to economize on their use of it.

[273] This is the only time Molinari uses the word "plaie" (wound or sore) in Les Soirées to describe the government and its actions. He goes a step further in his article "Nations" in the DEP where he describes governments which overstep the boundaries of their proper sphere of activity as "ulcerous" and the economist as the surgeon who must cut out the cancerous flesh from the social body; and in the article "Ville" (Towns) he describes high-taxing and spending city governments as "cette peste économique" (this economic plague). See "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government," in appendix 1. See "Cities and Towns" and "Nations" in the Addendum.

[274] See the entry for "The Right to Work (Le Droit au Travail)," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[275] Charles Comte, Traité de la Propriété, vol. 2, Chap. LIV "Des idées rétrogrades contre la propriété. Conclusion," pp. 470, 478-79.

[276] See the entries for "Morcellement (The Division of Agricultural Land)" and "Entail, The Law of, and the Right of Inheritance," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[277] Legoyt, "Morcellement."

[278] See McCulloch, A Treatise on the Succession to Property vacant by Death (1848) and Parieu, "Succession."

[279] The economist Ambroise Clément distinguishes between associations which arise in the market, associations organized by voluntary communities such as the Fourierists, and state organized associations like an army. As the size of the association increases Clément argues that economic exchanges and competition within the association are reduced, thus making them less and less efficient. See Clément, "Association."

[280] Note to Editor: See Molinari's long footnote on the inheritance laws as defined by the Civil Code at the end of the chapter.

[281] See Charles Comte, Traité de la Propriété, vol. 2, Chap. LIV "Des idées rétrogrades contre la propriété. Conclusion, pp. 470, 478-79.

[282] Molinari distinguishes between the "droit à l'héritage" (right to an inheritance) and "droit de l'héritage" (the right of a property owner to grant an inheritance).

[283] The monarchist and legitimist newspaper L'Union monarchique was created in 1847 when three small newspapers were amalgamated: L'Echo française (1829-1847), La Quotidienne (1814-1847) (the leading ultra-royalist newspaper of the Restoration), and La France (1834-1847) (its subtitle was "Organ of the Monarchical and Religious Interests of Europe"). L'Union monarchique changed its name to L'Union in 1848. It should not be confused with the Saint-Simonian newspaper of the same name. See the entry for "Press (Conservative)," in the Glossary of Newspapers and Journals.

[284] See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Liberty Fund, 2010), vol. 1, Part I, Chapter 3: "Social State of the Anglo-Americans." Section: "That the Salient Point of the Social State of the Anglo-Americans Is to Be Essentially Democratic," along with the relevant Note G, p. 76.

[285] In Greek mythology a "Harpy" (or "snatcher") was a winged being which stole food from Phineas, the King of Thrace.

[286] The technical terms Molinari uses here are "le droit d'aînesse" (primogeniture or the right of inheritance of the oldest son) and "la substitution" (entail, or the division of inherited property which is fixed by law).

[287] The French word is "la morcellement." See the entry for "Morcellement (The Division of Agricultural Land)," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[288] Molinari capitalizes the word "Association" here because of its socialist connotations.

[289] Wolowski argues that the annual return on agricultural land was at best 3% but the interest paid on new capital for investment in farming activities was 6-8%. This led to calls for the state to provide subsidized loans for small farmers which was discussed in the Constituent Assembly of the new Second Republic in October 1848. Liberal opponents of the scheme like Léon Faucher and Adolphe Thiers warned the Assembly of the inflationary dangers of such a scheme and reminded them of previous efforts such as Law's investment bubble and the revolutionary currency, the assignats, which was based upon the sale of confiscated land for its value. Wolowski noted that state subsidized agricultural credit would lead to a "monstrous issuing of paper money" which was only "the sterile multiplication of the sign of wealth." See Wolowski, "Crédit foncier."

[290] The Helots were the subject agricultural workers who supported the Spartans. They were little more than slaves and could be killed with impunity by Spartans.

[291] Prometheus was a Greek Titan who supposedly stole fire from Zeus in order to give it to mankind. As a keen theater goer Molinari might have seen Edgar Quinet's play "Prométhée" (Prometheus) which was written in 1838. Quinet has Prometheus explain why he brought fire to mankind, "Liberty, the one idol which I sacrifice to." See "Liberty and the Theatre," in appendix 1.

[292] Bastiat was also very critical of the English aristocracy, which he described as an "oligarchy," in a similar way as the Socialist here. In his first book, Cobden and the League (1845), Bastiat has a long introduction in which he rails against the oligarchic and aristocratic landowners in England which benefitted from the protectionist Corn Laws at the expense of ordinary English working people. See "Introduction," CW6 (forthcoming).

[293] Maurice Rubichon (1766-1849) and his nephew L. Mounier wrote a series of books comparing the standard of living of British and French workers (especially agricultural workers) using official reports of government inquiries. Molinari conflates two of them in his first reference: De l'Agriculture en France, d'après les documents officiels (1846) and Des manufactures et de la condition des ouvriers employés hors de l'agriculture dans la Grande-Bretagne et en Irlande (1840-43). The second book he refers to is De l'action de la nobles et des classes supérieures dans les sociétés modernes (1848). The latter was reviewed by Molinari in the the JDE:[CR] "De l'action de la noblesse et des classes supérieures dans les sociétés modernes" (December 1848).

[294] Molinari is quoting from Rubichon, l'Action de la noblesse (1848), chap. II "De la récolte en Angleterre," pp. 28-30.

[295] The Isle of Thanet is no longer an island as the channel which separated it from the mainland has silted up. It is the most easterly point in Kent, England.

[296] A hectolitre = 100 litres = 22 U.S. gallons.

[297] Molinari is referring here to a commonly held view among French classical liberals that the origin of the class structure in England had its origins in the Norman Conquest by means of which the French Normans seized land once owned by the native Saxons and exploited them ruthlessly. This view was put forward by Augustin Thierry in books such as Histoire de la conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands (1825).

[298] Molinari uses the English word "landlords."

[299] Sir Robert Peel, under pressure brought to bear on the British Parliament by Richard Cobden's Anti-Corn Law League, abolished most protective tariffs on the importation of corn (wheat) in 1846. Bastiat and the French Economists were inspired by this example to do something similar in France.

[300] Molinari here is making a play on words. He wants to make the point that industry became more productive by replacing the small artisan workshop with large-scale factory production, and that the same should be done to agriculture. He thus he argues that farms run like a "petit atelier" (small worksop) should be replaced by farms which will be operated like "la manufacture agricole" ( an agricultural factory). He uses this terminology again at the end of the chapter.

[301] A very different view of aristocracy was put forward by Gustave de Beaumont. He viewed the Irish aristocracy as rapacious and called for its abolition in L'Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse (1839).

[302] The chemist Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794) was a wealthy tax farmer or collector (for which he was executed during the Terror) and a pioneer in collecting information about the diets and standard of living of ordinary French people.

[303] (Molinari's note) Speech delivered by M. Guizot in the discussion of the Commercial Treaty with Sardinia. Session of the 31st March, 1845. [Molinari correctly quotes the speech by Guizot. See Procès-verbaux des séances de la Chambre des Députés. Session 1845. Tome III. Du 11 au 31 mars 1845. Annexes no. 37 à 59 (1845), pp. 271-72.

[304] Molinari uses the term "la liberté de l'héritage" (the right to bestow an inheritance) not "la liberté à l'héritage" (the right to an inheritance) here.

[305] See the discussion on Scottish inheritance law in McCulloch, Chap. III "Origin of Entails," pp. 43-79 in A Treatise on the Succession to Property vacant by Death (1848).

[306] See his discussion of the benefits of a limited liability company in running farms as proper businesses in S9, p. abc. ["limited company would solve the twin problem of the fragmentation of landed property"]

[307] Molinari uses the word "capitalistes" in the sense of investors with capital to lend.

[308] "Entrepreneurs d'industrie agricole" (entrepreneurs in the agriculture industry).

[309] Molinari wrote the entry on "Usure" (usury) in the DEP which he describes as "a more or less imaginary offense."

[310] Throughout 1848 several socialist groups called for the Provisional Government to establish state-supported banks to provide low interest rate loans to workers and farmers. The best known of these was Proudhon's scheme for a "Peoples' Bank." These proposals were vigorously opposed by the political economists, like Bastiat, in the Chamber of Deputies.

[311] Molinari uses the expression "divisée en actions" suggesting that the companies that own agricultural land will be joint stock companies with shares that can be bought and sold.

[312] Molinari uses the phrase "la société anonyme perpétuelle."

[313] Molinari is again teasing the Socialist who uses the word "Association" in the previous paragraph to mean the common ownership and communal production of farming. Molinari responds by saying he too is in favor of "associations agricoles" which we have translated as "farming companies" as both the French words "association" and "société" can be translated as "company."See an earlier footnote on this difference of meaning of "Association" for the Socialist and the Economist.

[314] Molinari uses the word "atelier" which means a small workshop in contrast to a large "factory."

[315] The Jacquerie was a peasant revolt which took place in northern France during the Hundred Years War in the summer of 1358. It got its name from the fact that the peasants were dismissively referred to as "Jacques Bonhomme" (or "John Everyman" or John Goodfellow"). The peasants revolted against the imposition of new taxes and forced labor by the nobility to help pay for the war. After some weeks of uprising the peasants were brutally repressed and thousands were killed. It should be noted that a small, short-lived magazine which Bastiat and Molinari started during the uprising in Paris of June 1848 was called "Jacques Bonhomme." See the entries for "Jacques Bonhomme (the Historical & Literary Figure) ," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms, and "Jacques Bonhomme (the Magazine) (11 June - 13 July, 1848)," in the Glossary of Newspapers and Journals.

[316] Molinari uses the expression "les sociétés industrielles" which we have translated as industrial companies but one should keep in mind the special meaning which the Economists gave to the word "industry" and "industrial" especially in the work of Charles Dunoyer. See the entry for "Industry," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[317] The so-called "Great Irish Famine" (also known as the Irish Potato Famine) took place between 1845 and 1852 as a result of a disease of the potato (potato blight) which caused the crop to fail, leading to the death of nearly 1 million people and the emigration of another million or so.

[318] The economists were very interested in what Alexis de Tocqueville had to say about inheritance laws in America. McCulloch used a quote from Democracy in America, vol. 1 (1830) to open his Treatise of the Succession to Property (1848) and which Parieu also quoted and continued at greater length in his article in the DEP. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Liberty Fund, 2010), vol. 1, Part I, Chapter 3: "Social State of the Anglo-Americans." Section:  "That the Salient Point of the Social State of the Anglo-Americans Is to Be Essentially Democratic," along with the relevant Note G. See also Parieu, "Succession."

[319] See l'Organisation du crédit et de la circulation (1848), sumé de la question sociale. Banque d'échange (1848), Banque du peuple: déclaration (1849), which are reprinted in Oeuvres complètes de P.-J. Proudhon, Tome VI. (1868).

[320] Molinari critically reviewed several of Proudhon's books for the JDE, including [CR] "Système des contradictions économiques, ou Philosophie de la misère, par J.-P. Proudhon," (November 1847); "M. Proudhon et M. Thiers," JDE (August 1848); "Lettre sur le prêt à intérêt," JDE (June 1849). Molinari quite liked Proudhon except for his ideas on the injustice of charging interest on loans. If it were not for that, Molinari thought he could become one of the Economists. See the entry for "Money and Banking," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[321] Bastiat, Capitale et rente (1849); "Maudit argent!" April 1849); "Le capital," in Almanach Républicain pour 1849 (1849); Bastiat and Proudhon, Gratuité du crédit. Discussion entre M. Fr. Bastiat et M. Proudhon (1850) which consisted of an exchange of letters between 22 October 1849 and 7 March 1850 which appeared in Proudhon's magazine La Voix du peuple. All four pieces can be found in Bastiat's CW4 (forthcoming).

[322] Turgot, Mémoires sur le prêt à intérêt et sur le commerce des fers (1789), in Daire, CPE, vol. 3, Œuvres de Turgot, vol. 1, pp. 103-54.

[323] Horace Say, "Monts-de piété," DEP, vol. 2, pp. 229-35.

[324] There is a suggestion here that Molinari had some idea of the importance of what would later be called "time preference."

[325] Molinari, "Lettre sur le prêt à intérêt," JDE (June 1849).

[326] See "Service for Service," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[327] See Bastiat's discussion in Economic Harmonies the first part of which was published in early 1850, chap. 5 "On Value," pp. 103 ff. (FEE edition); CW5 (forthcoming).

[328] Dictionnaire de l'Académie française (1835. 6e édition). <https://portail.atilf.fr/dictionnaires/ACADEMIE/SIXIEME/sixieme.fr.html>.

[329] "Interlope" might be translated as "illicit," "black market," "bootleg," or "underground" trade. In order to retain the nautical analogy we have also used the word "interloper" or "pirate." See the entry for "Interlopers and Pirates," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[330] Molinari wrote the article on "Usure" (Usury) for the DEP; the main article on "Intérêt" (Interest) was written by Léon Faucher.

[331] Molinari, Cours d'économie (1855, 1863) vol. 2 chap. 8 "Le crédit. Notions générale," pp. 275-318; chap. 9 "Les intermédiaires du crédit," pp. 319-91; and chap. 10 "Les intermédiaires du crédit (suite et fin)," pp. 392-424.

[332] "Un usurier maudit." Molinari no doubt has in mind the essay and later pamphlet by Bastiat called "Maudit l'argent" (Damned Money) which first appeared in the JDE (April, 1849) only a few months before this chapter was written. It is a discussion between "Economist F*" who served on the Chamber's Finance Committee (so possibly Bastiat) and a friend about the economist's frustration that so many people confuse wealth with money, which is only the medium of exchange. It can be found in CW4 (forthcoming).

[333] Prostitutes or "lorettes" frequented the quartier Bréda in the 9th arrondissement in Paris during the July Monarchy. They got their name from the church, the "Notre-Dame-de-Lorette" which was located there. Molinari uses "Breda-Street" in the original. Molinari discusses prostitution in more detail in S9.

[334] Molinari puts the made-up word "bancocratique" into the mouth of the Socialist. It means "rule by the bankers." Later Molinari has the Economist criticize the privileged central bank as "une véritable aristocratie financière" (a veritable financial aristocracy," S9, below pp. 000.

[335] The Socialist uses the expression "l'exploitation capitaliste" (capitalist exploitation) which has become the standard expression to describe their theory that workers do not receive the full value of their labor in the form of wages, and are thus "exploited" by the capitalist, which was a view becoming more widespread during the 1840s. Socialists also believe that workers are also exploited by other forms of "unearned income" in the form of interest and rent. The Economists, on the other hand, also had a theory of "exploitation" (although they did not call it that). They believed that an individual's property was unjustly taken from them in the form of taxes, tithes, and tariffs and other interventions by the state. They called this "legal plunder" (la spoliation légale) to use the terminology developed by Frédéric Bastiat. See "Bastiat's Theory of Class: The Plunderers vs. the Plundered" in appendix 1 (CW3, pp. 473-85).

[336] The most notorious "lois de maximum" was enacted in 1793 by the Convention to prevent price rises of food caused by war shortages, a failed harvest, and inflation caused by the issuing of the Assignat paper currency. See the classic work by White, Fiat Money Inflation in (1896). See also Coquelin, "Assignats."

[337] In the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, Book I, chap. VII. "Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities," Adam Smith states that "The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold is called its market price. It may either be above, or below, or exactly the same with its natural price. The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole value of the rent, labor, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither." Glasgow ed. vol. 1, p. 73.

[338] Molinari has an extended discussion of the tendency of market prices to approach the natural price in S12 where he discusses his theory of rent.

[339] "Les entrepreneurs d'industrie" (industrial or manufacturing entrepreneurs).

[340] In S7 Molinari does talk about the "self-made" entrepreneur, "le laborieux entrepreneur, naguère ouvrier" (the hardworking entrepreneur who has emerged from the working class), who rises out of the working class to run and own their own business enterprise. See below, pp. 000.

[341] "Entrepreneurs de production" (manufacturing entrepreneurs).

[342] Molinari makes a distinction here between a "manufacturier" (manufacturer) and an "entrepreneur de production" which we have translated as "manufacturing entrepreneur."

[343] "Non-entrepreneurs" is the original French which requires no translation.

[344] The "marché des Innocents" was a vegetable market established in 1789 in central Paris on the site of the Cemetery of the Innocents. It was expanded under Napoleon in 1808 and eventually became the central food market for Paris (Les Halles). When Molinari was writing, an architectural competition was underway in order to design a much larger structure to house the markets. Construction began in 1852.

[345] Molinari uses the word "loyer" which might be translated as "house rent" in order to distinguish it from the more general theory of rent which he and Bastiat were developing at this time. Bastiat argued that rent from land was not due to any special kind of productivity inherent in the land itself, while Molinari saw rent as a temporary higher rate of return to any asset which was the result of some "natural" or "artificial" disturbance in market equilibrium. For some unexplained reason Molinari inserts a 10 page digression on rent in S12 when it would have been more appropriate to discuss it here. See "Rent, Disrupting Factors, and Equilibrium," in appendix 1.

[346]See the article on "Banque" by Charles Coquelin in DEP, especially section 4 "Revue historique - Les banques de dépôt: Venise, Gênes, Amsterdam, Hambourg," pp. 120 ff. See also the entry for "Banking, Free," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[347] The expression Molinari puts into the mouth of the Socialist is "en organisant le crédit" (by organizing credit), that is by having the state provide credit at a subsidized level, which was the idea behind Proudhon's scheme to set up "Peoples' Banks" during 1848-49.

[348] Saint-Armand Bazard (1791-1832) was a member of the Carbonari liberal group and later of the Saint-Simonian school of socialism.

[349] Bentham, Défense de l'usure (1828). Introduction by Bazard, p. 33.

[350] (Molinari's note) Preface to the Défence de usure by Jeremy Bentham. Mélanges d'Économie politique, T. II, p. 518, Édition Guillaumin. [Molinari edited this text by Bentham for the Guillaumin firm. It appeared in vol. XV of the Collections des principaux économistes which was published in 1848.]

[351] "La mutualité."

[352] Molinari has his own theory of rent which he presents in the final S12 and in his Cours d'économie politique in 1855.

[353] This is the first hint by Molinari that time might be a factor in the price of interest but he does not develop it further. The idea of "time preference," that one places a higher value on goods or money at the present time than one does on the same goods or money at some future time, was an insight of the Austrian school later in the 19th century. He is still trying to explain interest with reference primarily to labor costs, although he has also introduced Turgot's ideas of opportunity cost and risk as additional factors in determining the amount of interest charged.

[354]See the discussion in S9 below.

[355] Molinari uses the familiar "tu" form when talking to the banker and the merchant.

[356] 1 sou = 5 centimes.

[357] Molinari is arguing that the young men who expect to inherit as a right ("le droit à l'héritage") can go to lenders who would be willing to lend them money in anticipation of their inheriting their father's estate, but only at a high interest rate or "discount." See the previous footnote on the difference between "le droit à l'héritage" (the right to an inheritance) and "le droit de l'héritage" (the right to bequeath one's estate to whomever one chooses).

[358] "Les prêteurs interlopes" (interloper or pirate money lenders).

[359] Molinari uses the expression "l'intérêt légal" which we have translated as "state controlled interest rates." Elsewhere he talks about "la charité légale" (state charity) which is a government guaranteed right to charity paid for at taxpayer expense, which the Economists contrasted with"charité privée" (private charity) which was provided voluntarily. He probably has a similar distinction in mind here.

[360] Charles Dunoyer, De la liberté du travail (1845), 3 vols.

[361] Dunoyer, LdT, vol. 1, p. 24.

[362] Molinari had a different theory of liberty which he got from Victor Cousin that liberty was the absence of coercion by others on an individual's activity. See "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership" and "Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property," in appendix 1.

[363] See the more detailed discussion in "Labour Unions, Labour Exchanges, and Labour Merchants," in appendix 1.

[364] Bastiat shared Molinari's view and gave a speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 17 November, 1849 defending unions on the grounds that they were just another form of voluntary association which should be protected under the law. See CW2, pp. 348-61. In 1849 the law was slightly amended regarding articles 414, 415, and 416 in order to make them somewhat less unequal, but the civil penalties still remained in force. See Cherbuliez, "Coalitions."

[365] The address "Aux Ouvriers" was published in the Courrier français on 20 July 1846 and reprinted in Questions d'économie politique (1861), vol. 1, pp. 183-94.

[366] "Les Coalitions des ourvriers" originally published in the Bourse du travail, 14 March, 1857 and reprinted in Questions d'économie politique, (1861), vol. 1, pp. 199-205. Quote on p. 201.

[367] See S10 for his discussion of population and Malthus.

[368] Also at this time Bastiat was developing his theory of "disturbing factors" (les causes perturbatrices) which were very similar to Molinari's idea of "les obstacles artificiels" (artificial obstacles). Among these Bastiat included war, slavery, theocratic plunder, high and unequal taxes, government regulations, economic privileges, industrial subsidies, and tariffs. See "Disturbing and Restorative Factors," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[369] The "livrets d'ouvriers" or workbooks were documents used by the police to regulate or "domesticate the nomadism" of workers. Workers had to have them signed by the police or the mayor of the towns in which they worked and their employment details filled out by their employer. If they were found without the workbooks in their possession, workers could be imprisoned for vagrancy. The workbooks were introduced in 1781, were abolished during the Revolution, and then reinstated under Napoleon in 1803. Although they were often ignored in practice they were a significant regulation of labor and were not abolished until 1890. See "C.S.", "Livrets d'ouvriers.

[370] Charles Coquelin (1802-1852) was the editor of the DEP (1852-53). See Du Crédit et des Banques (1848), and the articles "Banque" and "Crises commerciales" in the DEP.

[371] He discusses industrial crises in more detail in his article "Freedom of Commerce and Free Trade" in DEP which is included in the Addendum.

[372] In the DEPMolinari wrote the article "Travail" (Labor) and Joseph Garnier wrote the article on "Liberté du travail" (Freedom of working).

[373] Molinari, Cours d'économie politique (1855, 1863). Part II, chap. 8 "La part du travail," pp. 201-23; cap. 9 "La part du travail (suite)," pp. 224-48; chap. 10 "La part du travail (fin)," pp. 249-80.

[374] Molinari uses the French word "coalition" which we have translated as "union;" "ouvrier" as "worker;" "maître" as "employer;" "salariat" as "wage earner;" however "entrepreneur" remains "entrepreneur" and not "adventurer" as the American translator of Say's Treatise of Political Economy,C. R. Prinsep, translated it in 1821.

[375] Free traders like Molinari and Bastiat thought that engaging in trade with others was a natural right of all human beings. Molinari explores this in the opening section "Its Foundation in Nature" of his article "Freedom of Commerce and Free Trade" in the DEP (also in the Addendum) and Bastiat opened with this statement in the Declaration of Principles of the FFTA (May, 1846): "Trade is a natural right, just as property is," in CW6 (forthcoming).

[376] The Socialist actually uses here the word "aliéné" (alienate, or give up). The Economist uses the word "séparé" which we have translated as "separate". To translate the former as "alienate" would be anachronistic as this become part of the Marxist vocabulary some time later.

[377] Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, I.viii.11 "Of the Wages of Labor." Glasgow ed. p. 84.

[378] François René, vicomte de Chateaubriand (1768-1848) was a novelist, philosopher, and minister of foreign affairs from December 28, 1822 to June 6, 1824. This reference is most likely to the concluding section of Chateaubriand's Mémoires d'Outre-tombe from the chapter entitled "Saint-Simoniens (etc)" where he discusses workers associations, wage labor, and "absolute equality," warning that "this equality will lead to not only servitude of the body but to slavery of the spirit" (p. 476). A few sentences later he states that "Absolute equality, which presupposes the complete submission to this equality, would reproduce the harshest form of slavery; it would turn the human individual into a beast of burden which was subject to the power which restrains it and forced to walk without end along the same path." Mémoires d'Outre-tombe, vol. 11 (1850), p. 477.

[379] Molinari accurately quotes Articles 414 and 415 of the French Penal Code. See Rogron, Code pénal expliqué (1838), pp. 108-9.

[380] In 1849 the law was slightly amended regarding articles 414, 415, and 416 in order to make them somewhat less unequal, but the civil penalties still remained in force. See Cherbuliez, "Coalitions," DEP, vol. 1, p. 382.

[381] It is not clear which economist the Socialist has in mind.

[382] The average daily wage of a worker in Paris was 3 fr. 80 c. The industry average in the printing industry was 4 fr. 18 c. which was quite high compared to the lowest rates which were earned in the textile industry of 3 fr. 34 c. per day.

[383] The phrase "chambre syndicale" (Chamber of Syndics) is chosen by the Socialist to refer to the association of privileged members of the highly regulated "Corporations" in the old regime which strictly regulated working conditions, entry into the industry, and pay levels. The phrase "chambre de perfectionnement" is a play on words by the Socialist who sarcastically suggests that the Syndics were more interested in controlling wage levels of their employees than improving their industry as a "Bureau of Better Business" today might try to do.

[384] See also: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary." Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (Glasgow ed.). Vol. 1, Book I, Chap. X. "Of Wages and Profit in the different Employments of Labor and Stock, Part II, "Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe," p. 145.

[385] Jean Le Chapelier (1754-1794).

[386] Article 2 of the Le Chapelier Law of June 1791 states that: "Citizens of the same occupation or profession, entrepreneurs, those who maintain open shop, workers, and journeymen of any craft whatsoever may not, when they are together, name either president, secretaries, or trustees, keep accounts, pass decrees or resolutions, or draft regulations concerning their alleged common interests." See "The "Chapelier" Law. 14 June, 1791" in Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, pp. 165-66. In French: Collection complète des lois, dÉcrets, ordonnances (1824), vol. 3, pp. 25-26.

[387] Molinari has the Economist use the term "industriels" which we have translated as "producers."

[388] Where???

[389] The "organization of labor" was another phrase used by the socialists to describe their plan for non-market alternatives to wage labor.

[390] Jean Baptiste Fossin (1786-1848) and his son Jules (1808-1869) owned the most fashionable jewelers in Paris during the July Monarchy with clientele drawn from the ruling elite.

[391] The word used here is "le bénéfice naturel."

[392] This is one of Molinari's natural laws of political economy, namely "la loi de l'offre et de la demande" (the law of supply and demand). See also "Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family," in appendix 1.

[393] Molinari is here grappling with the notion of the "elasticity of demand" which is defined by David Henderson as follows: "The elasticity of demand is the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage change in price. The greater the absolute value of this ratio, the greater is the elasticity of demand." The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Demand.html>.

[394] The average price of wheat in France was 18 fr. 93 c. per hectolitre in 1845; which rose to 23 fr. 84 c. in 1846 (which had a poor harvest). Prices were even higher in the last half of 1846 and the first half of 1847 when the shortage was most acutely felt. In December 1846 it rose to 28 fr. 41 c. and reached a maximum of 37 fr. 98 c. in May 1847. The average price for the period 1832-1846 had been 19 fr. 5 c. per hectolitre. The lowest average price reached between 1800 and 1846 was 14 fr. 72 c. in 1834. See AEPS pour 1848 (1848), pp. 179-80; and the large amount of data in Molinari's article on "Céréales," in the DEP.

[395] Molinari wrote the article on "Céréales," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 301-26 and a 2 vol. History of tariffs (1847) , volume 2 of which was about grain or "cereals."

[396] Moreau de Jonnès gives the total production of wheat in France in 1848 as 69.7 million hectolitres (p. 161) which compares to 39.1 million in the U.K., 29.4 million in Austria, 17.8 million in Spain, and 7.4 million in Prussia (p. 173) in AEPS (1848).

[397] The following statistics about French agriculture come from the work of Alexandre Moreau de Jonnès (1770-1870) who was appointed head of the General Statistics Office of the French government in 1840, and reports published in the AEPS. The average price of wheat in France in 1844 was 19 fr. 73 c.; in 1845 - 19 fr. 75 c.; in 1846 - 24 fr. 03 c; in 1847 - 29 fr. 01 c.; in 1848 - 16 fr. 63 c.; in 1849 - 14 fr. 13. The years when prices were highest were (in descending order of price) 1817 (36.46 fr.), 1812 (34.34), 1816 (28.31), 1811 (26.13), 1818 (24.65), 1801 (24.39), 1802 (24.16), 1846 (24.03). The poor harvest and high prices in 1846 were thus the worst since the Napoleonic Wars and their immediate aftermath. See Alexandre Moreau de Jonnès, Statistique de l'agriculture de la France (1848), Part I, Chap. I "Céréales en masse," pp. 1-74; Molinari, "Céréales"; Moreau de Jonnès, "Statistique de l'agriculture de la France (extraits)," AEPS. 1848., pp. 158-79; AEPS. 1851, "Prix moyen du blé en France, de 1772-1848, pp. 186-87.

[398] I have not been able to locate an account of this story by Charles Fourier in his own words. There is a version published in the Fourier magazine La Phalange (21 November 1841, Series 3, vol. IV, p.579) by one of his followers. The story was taken up and repeated by many, such as Courcelle Seneuil's article on "Fourier" in the DEP.

[399] Here begins the Economist's second of six set pieces or "speeches" in the book, where he gives a mini-lecture on what he believes. This one is his "law of supply and demand" speech and is about 900 words in length.

[400] "Un régime de plein liberté économique." This is what the free traders in England and France wanted to set up with their tariff reforms. The Economists, especially Frédéric Bastiat, watched with great interest as Richard Cobden organized a successful popular movement to abolish restrictions on the grain trade in England with his Anti-Corn Law League. The abolition of the Corn Laws in June 1846 inspired Bastiat to try to replicate that effort with a Free Trade Association in France, but his efforts were not successful when the free traders were defeated in the Chamber in 1847 by a better organized protectionist lobby group.

[401] Molinari uses the broader expression "liberté des communications" instead of "liberté de l'échange" (free trade, or freedom of exchange) which might have been expected in this context. Thus, he seems to be suggesting that both the free flow of goods and information about prices are necessary for this equilibrium to be re-established.

[402] In the British Empire the first step towards abolition came with the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1808. After a slave revolt in Jamaica in 1831 Parliament passed the Slavery Abolition Act on 28 August 1833. This was not an immediate emancipation as the slaves were forcibly apprenticed to their former owners. The apprentice system ended in two stages, the first on 1 August 1838 and the second on 1 August 1840.

[403] Molinari had been a vocal opponent of slavery, writing several articles and books on the topic such as Études économiques. L'Organisation de la liberté industrielle et l'abolition de l'esclavage (Paris: Capelle, 1846) and the long article on "Esclavage" (Slavery) in DEP.

[404] (Molinari's note) Report given by M. Jules Lechevalier to M. le duc de Broglie on colonial questions. Jules Lechevalier Saint-André, Rapport sur les questions coloniales adressé à M. le duc de Broglie président de la Commission coloniale à la suite d'un voyage fait aux Antilles et aux Guyanes pendant les années 1838 et 1839 (Imprimerie royale, 1843).

[405] In S10 Molinari discusses his theory of population and how this influences the level of wages.

[406] Molinari is hinting here about the idea of workers using "moral restraint" in the planning of the size of their families. See the discussion on moral restraint in "Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family," in appendix 1.

[407] Smith, Wealth of Nations, I.viii.31, Glasgow ed. p. 93.

[408] "Ce commerce de travail."

[409]"Laissez faire l'industrie privée" (let private industry be free to go about its business).

[410]"Laissez faire les travailleurs, laissez passer le travail" (let the workers be free to go about their business, allow the free movement of labor).

[411] "Bourse du travail." Molinari was to develop this idea at greater length much later in his life in Les Bourses du Travail (1893) for which he received some international attention.

[412] See "Des Moyens d'améliorer le sort des classes laborieuses" in the journal La Nation, 23rd July, 1843, later published as a pamphleet in February 1844.

[413] This is a heavily truncated version of theAppeal which takes up 12 pages in Les Bourses du travail (1893), pp. 126-37.

[414] Ferdinand Flocon (1800-1866) was a liberal republican journalist, author, and politician.

[415] Emile de Girardin (1806-1881) was the first successful press baron of the mid-19th century in France.

[416] Molinari is suggesting that the workers should consider themselves to be "marchands de travail" (merchants or traders of labor) not just wage earners.

[417] See Part 4 of "De l'organisation de la liberté industrielle," in Études économiques (1846), pp. 56-59.

[418]See "Tariff Policy" in appendix 2.

[419] See the entry for "Free Trade Association (Association pour la liberté des échanges)," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[420] See the Introduction, ,above, pp. 000.

[421] Horace Say, the son of Jean-Baptiste Say, describes the post-1830 period as one which saw the formation of "a veritable pact of resistance by a coalition of the great landowners, and the protected iron producers and manufacturers," "Douane," DEP, vol. 1, p. 586.

[422] Bourrienne, Rapport sur le projet de loi des douanes (1822).

[423] See "Table 5. Details of Revenue," in appendix 3.

[424] Frédéric Bastiat, ES2 11 "The Utopian" (CW3, pp. 192-93). See also "Bastiat's Policy on Tariffs," appendix 1 (CW3, p. 455) and "Limited Government," in appendix 1 CW4 (forthcoming).

[425] Molinari, "Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges" (Freedom of Commerce and Free Trade), DEP, vol. 2, pp. 49-63;"Tarifs de douane" (Tariffs), DEP, vol. 2, pp. 712-716; "Céréales," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 301-26; "Union douanière" (Customs Union), DEP, vol. 2, p. 788-89. ; "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)" (Free Trade Associations) in the DEP, vol. 2, pp. 45-49. A translation of "Freedom of Commerce and Free Trade" can be found in the Addendum.

[426] The "octroi" or the tax on goods brought into a town or city was imposed on consumer goods such as wine, beer, food (except for flour, fruit, milk), firewood, animal fodder, and construction materials. In 1850 1,436 cities and towns levied the octroi tax which raised a total of 95 million francs. The city of Paris raised 37 million francs which made up 4/5 of the city's revenue. See Parieu, "Octrois," DEP, vol. 2, p. 287; and "Taxation" in appendix 2.

[427] We have not been able to find the source of this quotation.

[428] There are many examples of Bastiat's witty criticisms of trade protection. Here is one that might fit Molinari's description which comes from the "The Effects of Protectionism: The Report from the Blacksmiths" in ES2 4 "The Lower Council of Labor" (c. 1847) (CW4, p. 145):

1.     The protectionist regime inflicts on us a tax, which does not go to the Treasury, each time we eat, drink, heat ourselves, or dress ourselves; None

2.     It inflicts a similar tax on our fellow citizens, who are not blacksmiths, and since they are poorer by this amount most of them make wooden nails and door latches from string, which deprives us of work;

3.     It keeps iron at such a high price that in the countryside no one uses it in carts, grills, or balconies, and our trade, which is capable of providing work for so many people who have none, is lacking work for us ourselves;

4.     What the tax authorities fail to raise on goods that are not imported is taken on our salt and letters.

[429] See, Bastiat, "The Balance of Trade" (29 March 1850) in CW4 (forthcoming) and Clément and Coquelin, "Balance du commerce."

[430] For a brief summary of the economists' position and the important part played by the Physiocrats and Adam Smith in refuting the theory, see Garnier, "Système mercantile," DEP, vol. 2, pp. 691-92.

[431] Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) was the Comptroller-General of Finance under King Louis XIV from 1665 to 1683. He epitomized the policy of state intervention in trade and industry known as "mercantilism." See Baudrillart, "Colbert."

[432] See the previous Soirée for Molinari's exposition of this "law," above, pp. 000.

[433] (Molinari's note) Sometimes, however, protection was due to manoeuvres one could not criticize too strongly. Here, for example, is a curious piece of information which I take from the Enquête sur les houilles (Inquiry on Coal) (1832), on the question of the protection given to the mines of Anzin.

The subsidy granted to the Anzin company, on the price per hectoliter of coal from the mine at Mons (Belgium) is 75 centimes, or 7 francs 50 centimes per ton. The Company obtained this subsidy after the completion of the Condé Canal, as a result of the duties and tolls which had been established and as a result of the geographic position of their establishments.

The Company had previously received a subsidy in 1813, by means of an upper limit it had contrived to impose on the price of coal freight on the river Haine by order of the Two Consuls on the 13 prairial in Year XI. At that time, Cambecérès, Second Consul, Talleyrand-Perigord, Lecouteulx de Canteleu and several other notable and very influential personages were shareholders of the Anzin Mining Company."

[Editor: emphasis added by Molinari. See Ministère du commerce et des travaux publics. Conseil supérieur de commerce. Houiles. Enquête pour la recherche et la constatation des faits (1833), pp. 410-11.]

[434] Bastiat insisted that the Economists should use blunt and harsh language, like "theft," "plunder," and "fraud" in order to expose what the protectionists were really doing. In early 1846 Bastiat decided that it was time to use "brutal" (brutal, violent, rough, harsh) language instead of euphemisms in the battle against the protectionists. He used the word "theft" to describe the policy of giving subsidies to industry at taxpayer expence. See ES2 9 "Theft by Subsidy" (JDE, January 1846) in (CW3, p. 170).

[435] The word "sophisms" recalls Bastiat's brilliant criticism of protectionism in his two collections of Economic Sophisms (1846, 1848). Also available in CW3.

[436] Molinari explores these in greater depth in his DEP entry: "Freedom of Commerce and Free Trade" which is also in the Addendum.

[437] See S8 for a discussion of money.

[438] Molinari asserts that "products are bought with other products" which is a variant of "Say's Law" applied to foreign trade, namely that "supply creates its own demand." This claim caused some controversy among the economists concerning its validity over a short or long term. Say did not come up with this exact terminology, but James Mill (the father of John Stuart) came close with "a sufficient market is always provided at home, for all the corn which the land, with the utmost: exertions of the farmer, can ever be made to produce; that the demand will always be proportioned to the supply, however great that supply may be." See James Mill, An Essay of the Impolicy of a Bounty on the Exportation of Grain (1804). Chapter II.: Influence of the principle of Population upon the Corn Trade, p. 24.

[439] Molinari discusses the large increase in imported wheat and other grain into England after 1844 in his article on "Céréales" in the DEP, vol. 1, p. 323.

[440] Note to Editor: See "Molinari's Long Footnote on William J. Fox, the Anti-Corn Law League, and Dependency on Foreign Markets" below.

[441] The spread of machinery in the cotton industry after the post-Napoleonic slump ended in 1819 revolutionized the production of British cotton goods. which resulted in increased exports to places like India. By 1831 Bengal cotton manufacturers and merchants were petitioning  the British government to lower the existing duties on Indian textiles exported to Britain (10% on coton goods and 24 % on silks) perhaps as low as the rate Bengal imposed in imported cotton goods (2 1/2%). Ellison notes the irony of this fact when he observed that "Only forty years previously to this a similar memorial had been sent up from Manchester praying for protection against the "highly injurious" and "unfair and dangerous competition" of "the muslins and cotton goods imported from the East Indies," whereby the British manufactures were "exposed to continued danger and immense losses;" and which memorial was drawn up by a committee including Sir Richard Arkwright, Mr. Robert Peel, and the leading manufacturers of Lancashire, Cheshire, and Derbyshire! So that within the short space of a single generation the character of the trade in cotton goods between England and India had been almost completely revolutionised." Thomas Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain (1886), p. 62.

[442] Molinari was a staunch Malthusian and gives the standard Malthusian answer to the problem of overpopulation. The most recent famine Molinari might have had in mind was the Agra Famine of 1837-38 when an estimated 800,000 people died.

[443] Michel de Montaigne, Essais de Montaigne (1862), Tome 1, chapter XXI "Le profit d'un et dommage de l'autre," pp. 130-31. Bastiat wrote an essay exposing this popularly held "sophism" which he termed the stock root of all sophisms. See ES3 15 "One Man's gain is another Man's Loss" (CW3, pp. 341-43).

[444] Genesis 1:28 (KJV): And God blessed them. And God said to them, "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moves on the earth."

[445] Huskisson, William (1770-1830) was a British Member of Parliament president of the Board of Trade (1823-27) where he played an important role in persuading British merchants to support a policy of free trade.

[446] This is a contraction and paraphrase of a long and important speech Huskisson gave in the House of Commons on May 12, 1826, "An Exposition of the State of Navigation of the United Kingdom." The Speeches of the Right Honourable William Huskisson (1831), vol. III, pp.1-55. Huskisson began as a protectionist but had come to support freer trade by 1826. In his speech he warns of the dangers of "the system of discriminating Duties" (p. 29) if other other countries were to adopt the same policies as Britain which would create a "system of Custom-house warfare, and reciprocal restriction" (p. 30) and engage in "this warfare of Counter-acting Duties" (p. 32) designed to protect "the pretensions of a particular class" (p. 34). The paragraph with Molinari focused on was "Let them seriously consider, whether a system of discriminating duties, - now that the exclusive patent by which we held that system is expired, - is not the expedient of such a country as I have described, rather than the resource of one which already possesses the largest commercial marine in the world. They will then see that it may possibly be wise policy to divert such countries from that system, rather than goad them on, or even leave them a pretext for going into it" (p. 32). Molinari quoted this speech and told the story of the "monkey economists" also in his DEP entry on "The Freedom of Commerce" which suggests they were written at much the same time.

[447] Molinari uses the very strong words "ravir" and "ravisseur" in this sentence which can mean to kidnap or to ravage. We have translated it as "to destroy" or "a destroyer."

[448] Molinari is referring to the cartoon which accompanied the French translation of T. Perronet Thompson, Les Singes économistes, ou qu'est-ce que la liberté du commerce? (The Monkey Economists, or what is free trade?) (1832). See the entry for "The Monkey Economists and Free Trade," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[449] These cartoons remind one of Bastiat's famous definition of the state which he came up with in 1848 during the violent uprisings of the June Days: "THE STATE is the great fiction by which EVERYONE endeavors to live at the expense of EVERYONE ELSE." The monkeys are like the mass of the people all trying to live at the expense of everybody else. Molinari would have known this as he co-edited with Bastiat the journal Jacques Bonhomme in which the first draft of this essay first appeared and helped Bastiat hand them out on the street corners of Paris. See Frédéric Bastiat, "The State"  (CW2, p. 97).

[450] Molinari is borrowing from Bastiat's idea of "la spoliation légale" (legal plunder) and "la spoliation mutuelle" (mutual or reciprocal plunder). See "Theory of Plunder," in CW5 (forthcoming).

[451] The original French has the phrase "le système producteur" (the system of producers or the industrial system" but this makes so sense given the previous discussion of "le système protecteur" (the protectionist system). This error occurs three times quite close together and seems to be a typesetter's error in the original.We have thus inserted "le système protecteur" (the protectionist system) here.

[452] An "ell" is an ancient unit of measurement, approximating the length of a man's arm.

[453] Another government inquiry into French tariff policy was held in 1834. There was some hope that it might lead to a reduction in the level of tariffs as the Minister of Commerce, Thiers, was in favor. However, the Inquiry concluded that France should continue its protectionism of industry. The English free trader and key figure in the Anti-Corn Law League Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783-1869) wrote a critique of the French inquiry which was translated and published as Contre-Enquête: par l'Homme aux Quarante Ecus (1834). See also the brief account by the free trade economic journalist Henri Fonfrède, "Du système prohibitif" in Oeuvres de Henri Fonfrède (1846), Vol. 7, pp. 285, 319, 344.

[454] The variability and uncertainty of tariff policy was, in Molinari's view, the prime cause of the periodic industrial crises which afflicted the European economies. He discusses this a greater length in his DEP entry on "The Freedom of Commerce and Free Trade" (see Addendum below).

[455] Molinari here is making similar arguments to those put forward by Bastiat in his theory of the "ricochet effect" which he used to describe the flow on effects of bad government policies, and his theory of "disturbing factors" which disrupted the natural harmony of the free market. See "The Sophism Bastiat never wrote: The Sophism of the Ricochet Effect" in appendix 1 (CW3, pp. 457-61) and "Disturbing and Restorative Factors" in appendix 1 (CW4, pp. 000).

[456] The expression Molinari uses here is "le laborieux entrepreneur, naguère ouvrier" (the hardworking entrepreneur who has emerged from the working class). One might also translate it as "the self-made entrepreneur." This is one of several new kinds of entrepreneur which Molinari discusses in Les Soirées.

[457] Molinari uses the word "meurtrir" (to hurt, wound) here. He says something similar in his DEP entry on "The Freedom of Commerce" were he talks about the economic crises "qui ont meurtri l'existence des travailleurs" (which have hurt the lives of the workers).

[458] A reference to Sismondi's critical work Nouveaux principes d'économie politique (1819).

[459] (Molinari's note) We know that it is mainly to the efforts of the Anti Corn Law League, led by Mr Cobden, that England owes the victory of commercial liberty. See for the history of this admirable association the book by M. Bastiat. Cobden ou la Ligue et l'Association anglaise; M. Léon Faucher's Études sur l'Angleterre; M. Joseph Garnier's Richard Cobden ou les Ligueurs; and above all the vivid and colorful sketches by our excellent friend , the late M. A. Fonteyraud in the Revue britannique, and in l'Annuaire de l'Economie politique. [Editor: Molinari got Bastiat's title incorrect: Cobden et la Ligue, ou l'agitation anglaise pour le liberté du commerce (1845).]

[460] Here he calls for "la suppression de toute espèce de tarifs, à la pleine liberté des échanges, au respect absolu du droit d'échanger" (the suppression of every kind of tariff, full liberty of exchange and absolute respect for the right to trade.) Molinari here shows himself to be a more radical free trader than either Frédéric Bastiat or Richard Cobden who believed in the necessity of low fiscal tariffs to fund what they regarded as essential government activities. Molinari preferred fee for service or the complete privatisation of government activities. Molinari's rhetoric here matches that in the conclusion of his History of Tariffs and his criticism of the rather moderate proposals of the French Free Trade Association (such as a lengthy transition period before full free trade would take effect) which he published in two open letters to Bastiat in Le Courrier français in September 1846. He repeated the criticisms in his article on the Free Trade Association in the DEP. See Molinari, Questions d'économie politique (1861), vol. 2, pp. 159-72; "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)" in DEP, vol. 2, pp. 47-48; and Histoire du tarif, vol. 2, pp. 74-5.

[461] Bastiat, Cobden et la Ligue, , pp. 182-83.

[462] Fox, Collected Works, vol. IV: Anti-Corn Law Speeches, pp. 42-43.

[463] Fox, Collected Works, vol. IV: Anti-Corn Law Speeches, pp. 62-63.

[464] Note to editor: keep both??

[465] Molinari also quoted this in his DEP entry on "The Freedom of Commerce."

[466] W.J. Fox, speech given at the Covent Garden Theater on January 25, 1844, Collected Works, vol. IV: Anti-Corn Law Speeches, pp. 62-63.

[467] (Molinari's note) F. Bastiat 'Meeting of the 26th January 1844' Cobden et la Ligue (Cobden and the League), p.182.

[468] Molinari, Cours, vol. 2, p. 522. See "The Production of Security," in appendix 1.

[469] Chevalier, "Monnaie."

[470] See Coquelin, "Banque." Molinari's intellectual debt to Coquelin is expressed in the obituary he wrote of him: [Obit.] "Charles Coquelin" in JDE (Sept-Dec 1852).

[471] See his three articles for the JDE: "L'industrie des théâtres, à props de la crises actuelle," JDE (May 1849), "La liberté des théâtres, à props de deux nouveaux projects de lois soumis au Conseil d'État" (November, 1849), and "L'enquête sue les théâtres" (May 1850). He was responding to an official inquiry into the state of the industry: Enquête et documents officiels sur les théâtres (1849). He also wrote the entry on "Theatres" for the DEP: "Théâtres," T. 2, pp. 731-33. See "Liberty and the Theatre," in appendix 1.

[472] See "Education" in appendix 2, "The French State and Economic Policies."

[473] See De l'Enseignement obligatoire. Discussion entre M. G. de Molinari et M. Frédéric Passy (1859).

[474] See the earlier discussion on intellectual property (artistic and literary property) in S2.

[475] Molinari uses the familiar "tu" form.

[476] Molinari calls these regimes "ces régimes bâtards" (these bastard or hybrid régimes). He will do so again below.

[477] Molinari is referring to Adam Smith's famous story of the pin factory which he used to illustrate the benefits of the division of labor in expanding output. J.B. Say thought a better example was provided by the more complex operation of manufacturing playing cards ("les cartes à jouer"). His son Horace Say summarizes Smith's and Say's arguments but chastises them for not taking their analysis further to include all the other parties which had to cooperate to get the metal to the pin factory before the production of pins could begin. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. I (Glasgow ed. 1981), Chapter: [I.i] Of the Division of Labor, p. 14; J.B. Say, Cours complet d'économie politique pratique (1840), vol. 1 Chapitre XV. De la Division du travail, pp. 165-166; and Horace Say, "Division du travail." in DEP.

[478] In the article "Papier-monnaie" in the DEP Courcelle Seneuil makes a distinction between "papier-monnaie" (paper money) and "monnaie de papier" (money in paper form). The former is the creation of a political power, is imposed on users through legal tender laws, and is fraudulent; the latter is a product of voluntary contracts between banks and their customers, and are promises to pay gold or silver upon demand.

[479] Molinari is hinting at the famous line from Juvenal's Satires "sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes" (but who guards the guards themselves?). This same question was raised by one of Molinari's late 19th century followers, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) in the very same context. In a discussion of the Italian government officials who regulated the banks which issued currency he asks "sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" Given the banking crisis that had engulfed Italy in 1898, Pareto concludes that "The Argus (Panoptes) of fable was not able to guard very well the chastity of the priestess Io. The Argus of the government has not been able to guard the honesty of the money issuing banks any better …" Closer to Molinari's own time the son-in-law of Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794), the Irish-Frenchman Arthur Condorcet O'Connor (1763-1852), wrote a three volume work on "the evils of monopoly" (1849) in which he argued that banking services could be provided "infinitely better" privately and that when they were provided by governments or "privileged factions" the problem of the "guarding the guardian" emerged: "It is a question of discovering the "quis custodiet ipsos custodes," who is it who can prevent the shepherd and his dogs devouring the sheep?" See Pareto, La Liberté économique et les événements d'Italie 1898), pp. 89-90; Arthur Condorcet O'Connor, Le Monopole cause de tous les maux (1849-50), vol.1, pp. 221-25.

[480] Molinari is making a play on words which in the French are "gratis, gratuit, gratuité."

[481] According the Budget Papers for 1848 it cost the French state 156.9 million fr. to collect total revenue of 1,391.3 million which is just over 11%. See "Table 8. Details of Expenditure for Section IV: Costs of Administering and Collecting Taxes and Duties," in appendix 3.

[482] Molinari uses the word "coalition" here which we have previously translated as "unions."

[483] Molinari discusses the "sophism" of a country running out of money in his DEP article on "Freedom of Commerce."

[484] Ambroise Clément in his article on "Monopole" in DEP laments the fact that because transportation is so controlled and regulated by the central government in France there has been very little innovation by French engineers and businessmen over the past 50 years. Most of the technological innovation in such things as the macadamization of road surfaces, railway locomotives, suspension bridges, and steam ships has taken place in the freer economies of Great Britain and America: "The result of this regime is that the spirit of enterprise is completely discouraged (in this area of activity), and that nothing or almost nothing is accomplished outside of the impetus of the corps of engineers, an impetus which for reasons we have already indicated in the article "Fonctionnaires" (Public Servants), is incomparably less powerful and less fertile than that of free industry" (p. 224).

[485] The phrase he uses is "ces gouvernements au petit pied."

[486] See Courcelle Seneuil, "Prestations." Courcelle Seneuil described them as "vicious" and "like the old debris from feudal times, like the last vestige of barbarism and of the forced communal organization of labor." Under the old regime the most hated of the taxes imposed on the peasantry were the forced labour obligations or "corvées" which required local farmers to work a certain number of days every year (8) for their local lord or on various local and national road works. These were repealed and reinstated repeatedly over a period of about 60 years beginning with Turgot's ordinances of March 1776. See also the section on "Corvée" in the glossary on "Taxation."

[487] Alexis Belloc, a deputy bureau chief in the Ministry of Post and Telegraph, has a detailed history of the French Post Office which contains most of the legislation concerning its operation. In 1672 the postal service was "farmed out" to private interests which returned 1,200,00 livres to the state. By 1788 this amount had risen to 12 million. See Alexis Belloc, Les Postes françaises 1886). See also, "C.S." "Postes."

[488] According to the Budget of 1849 the Post Office brought in a total 49.9 million francs to the French government and the operating costs were 34 million francs. See Tables 4 and 8 in the Appendix on French Government Finances 1848-49.

[489] The word Molinari uses is "affermé" or farmed out, which is a reference to how many activities of the state under the Ancien Régime were handled by being "contracted out" to privileged private interests. For a fixed annual sum, the state would permit the "farmers" to charge what they could get for services and keep the difference as profit. The most notorious example were the "tax farmers" (fermiers généraux) who collected taxes on behalf of the state. Necker states that in 1786 the cost to the state of raising certain direct taxes was about 6% of the total collected 209 million livres); the tax farmers who raised the rest took a cut of 22%. The chemist Lavoisier was a successful tax farmer and for this he was executed during the Revolution, such was the animosity felt towards this group. See Puynode, "Fermiers généraux."

[490] Molinari uses a couple of colorful expressions to describe the system of state corruption. Here he uses the expression "distribuer à propos des pots-de-vins" (handing out bottles of wine) with regard to the postal farmers; in S11 he quotes Saint-Amant on corruption in the French law courts, where "Lady Justice set her palace on fire by eating too much spice" - 'spice' being a term for bribes.

[491] "Cabinet Noir" (the Black Room) was the name given in France to the office where the letters of suspected persons were opened and read by public officials before being forwarded to their destination. The practice of opening suspect letters was begun by Louis XI (1423-1483) who founded the government postal service and Cardinal Richelieu regularized this practice by setting up the "cabinet noirs." During the Revolution (August 1790) the Constituent Assembly declared the inviolability of the mail but this was overturned by Napoleon and then reinstated by Charles X during the Restoration.

[492] Molinari uses the phrase "le transport interlope des correspondances" (black market or "pirate" mail delivery) which has a special meaning. Molinari uses the word "interlope" three times in Les Soirées.

[493] By "communist" Molinari means "state-run." See "Key Terms" for Molinari's use of the word "communist."

[494] Before the 1848 Revolution users paid a rate which varied according to the distance the letter was carried. Reform of the mail system occurred first in Britain with the introduction of the flat rate "penny post" in 1842 under the guidance of the reformer Rowland Hill and this was followed in France with the the decree of 24 August, 1848 which imposed a flat rate of 20 centimes. In 1847 the government Post Office carried 125 million letters; in 1849 when the stamp rate was fixed at 20 centimes 136 million letters were carried; and in 1852 with the rate at 25 centimes 168 million letters were carried. There was an explosive growth in mail carried in Britain during this period. In 1842, the year of the reform, 208 million letters were carried; by 1851 some 360 million letters were being carried. See "C.S." "Postes" in DEP, vol. 2, p. 423.

[495] Bastiat was one of the leading advocates for postal reform in France at this time. He wrote many articles on it as early as 1844 and gave a speech on it in the National Assembly during the revolution: "Speech in the Assembly on Postal Reform" (24 August 1848). See CW4 (forthcoming). His also mocked the complexity of the state run system in ES2 12 "Salt, the Mail, and the Customs Service" (JDE, May 1846) (CW3, pp. 198-214).

[496] Robert Lovelace was the heir to an earldom who pursued the young Clarissa Harlowe in Samuel Richardson's novel Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady (1748). Before abducting her, Lovelace wrote many love letters to her trying to persuade her to elope with him. Monsieur Turcaret is a successful financier and married man who has fallen in love with a widowed aristocrat in a play written by Alain-René Lesage (1668-1747), Turcaret ou le Financier (1709). It is interesting to note that in both works the stories hinge around nouveau riche individuals who wish to break into aristocratic society.

[497] The Royal Post was established by Louis XI (1423-1483) by an edict of 1464 for his exclusive use only. Any other unauthorized use of the post was punished by death and post masters were authorized to read the mail in order to ensure that it was not "contrary to service to the King." Louis also created 230 "maistres de postes" (post masters) also known as "Chevaucheurs" (relay post riders) who kept sufficient horses at each stage to carry the royal mail from one station to the next. The only competition in mail carrying at this time came from the state monopoly University which had a license to carry messages on official university business. See Belloc, Les Postes françaises, pp. 16-23ff.

[498] The law of 15 Ventôse an XIII (6 March 1805) is summarized and discussed by Belloc, pp. 389-91. Violators of this law were subject to a fine of 500 francs. In spite of these subsidies and anti-competitive measures the post masters and relay post riders went into economic decline as travelers and mail services avoided traveling on the main roads and went on side roads instead in order to avoid having to pay the official post masters.

[499] Molinari uses the expression "entrepreneurs de diligences" (entrepreneurs in the coach or cab business). The "droit du 10e sur les places" (travelers seat tax) was another economic distortion government policy caused. When traveling by road coach companies had to pay 1/10 of the cost of the ticket as a tax to the government to help defray the cost of road maintenance. When railways began to enter service in 1838 they too had to pay the seat tax but it was calculated in a way which favored the rail companies. This resulted in a subsidy to the rail companies as it cost 25 centimes per 100 kilometers per rail customer in tax but the same distance traveled by road cost 1 franc in tax. Furthermore, road coaches had to pay their own capital costs while the railroads enjoyed considerable government subsidies in their capital costs. The travelers seat tax raised 8.8 million francs in 1847. See Dupuit, "Routes et chemins."

[500] (Molinari's note) See the 6th Conversation. [Editor: This is a reference to his discussion of the law of supply and demand. (p. 254 "When supply exceeds demand in arithmetical progression").]

[501] France had a well developed system of optical telegraphy, the Chappe telegraph, which had emerged in the late 18th century for the use of the French government and military. The American Samuel Morse invented the electric telegraph in 1832 thus making all previous optical systems redundant. The first electric telegraph in France sent messages from Paris to Rouen in 1845 but was still reserved for the exclusive use of the government. In March 1851 the use of the electric telegraph was opened up to the public for the first time. Also in that year the first submarine cable was laid between England and France.

[502] See his entry on "Beaux-Arts" in the DEP which is translated as "Fine Arts" in the Addendum.

[503] The Comédie-Français (also known as the Théâtre-Français) was founded in 1680 by Louis XIV. He also founded the Opéra de Paris in 1669.

[504] The Ministry of the Interior spent fr. 2,614,900 on "Fine Arts" in 1848. See Table 7 in Appendix 3 "French Government Budgets."

[505] Here the Socialist uses the French word "exploitation" rather than "spoliation" (plunder) which was used by Molinari throughout the book.

[506] The Palace of Versailles was constructed between the 1660s and 1700 at a cost of over 100 million Livres. Molinari provides some details of this expenditure in his DEP entry on "Fine Arts" See Addendum.

[507] "Des rentes" which suggests unearned income.

[508] The Café Tortoni was a famous café in Paris which was founded in 1798 and closed in 1898. It was known for its "glace napolitaine" ice-cream and was frequented by artists like Édouard Monet and politicians like Adolphe Thiers.

[509] A special tax was levied on the sale of theatre tickets to help pay for the government Welfare Offices (Bureaux de bienfaisance) whose function was to distribute assistance to the poor, orphaned children, and the sick.

[510] (Molinari's note) In the départements and in the Paris suburbs, on the other hand, the directors of plays levy a duty of a fifth of gross takings on the performances of circus entertainers, conjurers, etc. These pleasures of the poor man are taxed to the advantage of the rich man. There is what the (July) monarchy has done for us.

[511] For example, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France began as the royal library of Charles V (1364-1380). It later became known as the Bibliothèque nationale de la République francaise. Its collection of digitized books, known as Gallica, was crucial in researching this translation of Molinari's book. The Mazarin Library (Bibliothèque Mazarine) is the oldest public library in France and is based upon the large personal collection of Cardinal Mazarin (1602-1661).

[512] Molinari gives the figure of "more than a million." In the 1848 Budget the following amounts were set aside for funding the libraries. These seem to be operating costs and not building costs and there may be other libraries which are part of the University, the Institute, various museums, and other scientific societies, the expenses of which are not listed separately in the budget figures: the Bibliothèque royal (renamed the Bibliothèque nationale during the Second Republic after 1848) F. 283,600 (ordinary expenses) and F. 105,000 (extraordinary expenses) for a total of F. 388,600; and for public libraries such as the Mazarin F. 170,223. Thus funding for libraries totaled F. 558,823 out of a total budget for "Sciences and Letters" of F. 1,854,477. The combined total of expenditure in the Ministry of Public Instruction (which included funding for the University, and Science and Letters) was F 18,038,033. See "Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services," in appendix 3.

[513] "Le vaste communisme de l'État."

[514] Molinari is probably speaking from personal experience here. In the mid 1840s he worked on one of the Guillaumin publishing firm's biggest research projects, the Collection des Principaux Économistes (The Collection of the Principal Economists) two volumes of which he edited and which appeared in 1847 and 1848. Molinari would have done his research on late 18th and early 19th century economic thought in the big government run libraries in Paris and Guillaumin would have subsidized his research during this period.

[515] Molinari again uses the rather strong expression "le régime bâtard" which might also be translated as "bastard," "hybrid," or "mongrel" regime. We have translated it as "hybrid" regime.

[516] In an article on "Les Églises libres dans l'État libre" (Free Churches in a Free State) which he published in his magazine l'Économiste belge in December 1867 he described the signing of Concordats between the Catholic Church and a state like France as a form of a protectionist trade treaty which gave a monopoly to one favored producer (the Church) which meant that the state had to clamp down on the import of "la contrebande religieuse" (religious contraband or heresies), and confiscate and burn the contraband goods. See "Religious Protectionism and Religious Contraband," in appendix 1.

[517] (Molinari's note) There are four recognized religions, namely: Roman Catholicism, Protestantism (Augsburg Confession), Lutheranism and Judaism. [Editor: In the 1848 Budget a total of 39.6 million Francs was set aside for expenditure by the state on religion. Of this 38 million went to the Catholic Church, 1.3 million went to Protestant churches, and 122,883 went to Jewish groups. See "Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services," in appendix 3.]

[518] Cherbuliez argued that the Catholic Church was in the business of "la production religieuse" (the production of religion) and that it was "un seul entrepreneur" (a single entrepreneur) or a monopolist supplier which had the protection of the state. He wanted to see this monopoly supplier of religious services exposed to "le régime de la libre concurrence" (the regime of free competition) which would do for the supply and consumption of religion what it would also do the the supply and consumption of grain and manufactured goods. See Cherbuliez, "Cultes religieuse," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 536 and 538.

[519] Molinari distinguished between what he called "the French system" of religion, where the state intervenes by recognizing and funding certain religious denominations, and "the American system," where no denomination is favored or subsidized and where "la liberté des cultes" (the liberty of religion) prevails. See "La liberté de l'intervention gouvernementale en matière des cultes. - Système français et système américain" which was first published in Économiste belge, 1 June 1857 and reprinted in Questions d'économique politique et de droit public (1861), vol. 1 pp. 351-61.

[520] The Ministry of Public Eduction and Religion had a budget of 62.8 million Francs in 1849, of which 21.7 million went to Public Education. The University received 17.9 million and this is what Molinari has in mind here. It oversaw the running of the public schools (see note below). See "Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services," in appendix 3.

[521] This idea was also central to Bastiat's theory of education that children not be taught the dead languages of Greek and Latin because he thought the texts which the students were required to study embodied the moral values of slave owners, warriors, and plunders. He favored the study of modern languages, music, and business studies.

[522] The Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers was founded by the Abbé Grégoire in 1794 in order to improve training for those who wished to work in French industry and manufacturing. It had a museum of scientific and technical equipment, a library, and ran courses to train engineers and technicians.

[523] Patouillet was an eighteenth century Jesuit scholar who attacked the work of the Benedictine historian Charles Clémencet on the grounds of its alleged Jansenism. Claude-Adrien Nonnotte (1711-1793) was a Jesuit priest who attacked the work of Voltaire, especially Les erreurs de Voltaire (1762).

[524] Bastiat was even harsher than Molinari in his condemnation of the teaching of the Classics to French children. See especially his pamphlet "Baccalaureate and Socialism" (early 1850) (CW2, pp. 185-234).

[525] Molinari uses the phrase "la production de l'enseignement" (the production of education). He uses this expression only twice in the entire book to refer to services, here with reference to the private provision of schools, and again in S11 where he discusses "la production de la sécurité" (the production of security) in reference to the private provision of police and defense services. As an industry which produces things for the market, education will have "entrepreneurs d'education" (entrepreneurs in the education business) who will establish schools and sell education services to consumers.

[526] See White, Fiat Money Inflation in France (1896) and Coquelin, "Assignats."

[527] As the editor of the Dictionnaire de l'économie politique (1852-53) Coquelin wrote a large number of articles (all of which are in vol. 1 as he died before it could be completed), many of which are on banking and money. See "Assignats," "Banque,," "Billet de banque," "Crédit," and "Crises commerciales."

[528] Lawrence H. White, "Competing Money Supplies" The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CompetingMoneySupplies.html>. Other episodes of the competitive provision of banknotes took place in Sweden, Switzerland, France, Ireland, Spain, parts of China, and Australia. In total, more than sixty episodes of competitive note issue are known, with varying amounts of legal restrictions. In all such episodes, the countries were on a gold or silver standard (except China, which used copper)."

[529] Coquelin provides a history of banking a defense of his ideas in the article "Banque" in DEP. See also, J.-E. Horn, La liberté des banques (1866).

[530] See the references to "bankocrats" and "bankocracy" in S5, above, pp. 000.

[531] Parent-Duchâtelet has published a copy of an ID card issued to prostitutes with a long list of "Obligations and Prohibitions") in De la prostitution dans la ville de Paris (1857), vol. 1, p. 686. See "Prostitution" in appendix 2.

[532] See the entry for "Interlopers and Pirates," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[533] His articles on "Fine Arts," "Fashion," the origin of the state ("Nations"), and "Cities and Towns" can be found in the Addendum.

[534] See "Markets in Everything and Entrepreneurs for Everything," in Further Aspects, below, pp. 000.

[535] Charles Coquelin argues that even though formally abolished by the legislation of the Revolution the privileged corporations reappeared in the 19th century in a different form, "Corporations privilégiées." See also Renouard's "Etat de l'ancienne législation française sur les communautés de marchands et d'artisans, sur les réglemens de fabrication…," Traité des brevets d'invention (1825), pp. 56-124.

[536] In a number of later works Molinari was to develop his ideas about the evolution of societies through stages at much greater length. In the Cours d'économie politique (1863) he argued that societies evolved through three "regimes" or "phases" which began with "le régime communautaire" (the communitarian phase), "le régime du monopole" (the phase of monopoly) and "le régime de la concurrence" (the phase of free competition). These latter categories were based upon who owned, controlled, and ran the major industries or economic activities, which might be the community or village; the king and a small group of aristocrats, and other favored elites; and then widely dispersed private owners who competed for business in the market place. He returned to this topic in two companion volumes, L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle (1880) and L'Évolution politique et la Révolution (1884) which was his most complete treatment of the matter, works which in many ways made him the French equivalent of Herbert Spencer. This should be compared with Bastiat's similar idea of society moving through different historical stages of plunder: war, slavery, theocracy, mercantilism, and government regulation or socialism. See "History of Plunder," in appendix 1 in CW5 (forthcoming).

[537] In his review of Theirs' book De la propriété (1848) Molinari objected to his claim that all the reforms France required had already been made in August, 1789. Molinari gave a long list of further reforms he thought France needed and called for another "night of the 4th of August" to complete the job. He listed some of these reforms again at the conclusion to S1. See "Review of Thiers De la propriété," (JDE, 15 Jan. 1849).

[538] On the night of August 4, 1789 the National Constituent Assembly voted to abolish the seigneurial rights of the Nobility and the Church. See"4, 6, 7, 8 et 11 Août," in Collection complète des lois, dÉcrets, ordonnances (1824), vol. 1, pp. 39-41; "15. The August 4th Decrees (4-11 August, 1789) in A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (1964), pp. 106-110. For a discussion of the legal implications of the decree see Laferrière, Essai sur l'histoire du droit français depuis les temps anciens jusqu'à nos jour (1859), vol. 2, Chap. III deals with the decree of August 4 and other legislation abolishing feudalism.

[539] Thiers describes the August 4 legislation in his Histoire de la Révolution française (1845), vol. 1, Book II, pp. 145-6

[540] Ambroise Clément lists under the category of "privileged" or "legal monopolies" the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, gunpowder, the delivery of mail, the issuing of money, education, and public works. He also lists numerous areas of economic activity which can only be practiced with a government issued license such as mines, legal notaries, lawyers, bailiffs, money changers, brokers, printers, book sellers, bakers, butchers, and porters. Clément, "Monopole."

[541] Molinari capitalizes the word "Association" perhaps to mock his Socialist friend who believed that all economic activities should be conducted by means of voluntary cooperatives or associations. The Economists clearly distinguished between those activities which would be better handled by voluntary associations at the level of the family or the commune, or for some specific purposes such as religion, charity, savings cooperatives, and so on, and those activities which could be better handled by firms competing in the free market for customers. See Clément, "Association."

[542] The Conservative is quoting Article 8 of Chapter 2 of the Constitution of 4 November 1848. He leaves out the final sentence concerning freedom of the press and censorship. See the full text at Wikisource <http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_du_4_novembre_1848#Chapitre_deux_.E2.80.94_Droits_des_citoyens_garantis_par_la_constitution>.

[543] Molinari uses the terms "la société en nom collectif, la société en commandite et la société anonyme" which we have translated as "partnerships; limited partnerships; and public limited companies" respectively. These three types of business associations are discussed by Renouard, "Sociétés commercials." See also Coquelin, "Les Sociétés commerciales en France et en Angleterre" in the Revue des Deux Mondes (August, 1843) which Molinari quotes at length in a long footnote below, pp. 000.

[544] The French "Code de Commerce" (Commercial Code) was enacted in 1807 by Napoleon. The creation of "sociétés composées uniquement d'actionnaires" (or limited liability companies) required specific government authorization until the law was changed in 1867. The creation of joint stock companies was made much easier in England with the passage of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and 1856.

[545] Molinari in this passage is describing something like Hayek's theory of the importance of prices in conveying information to individuals about the highest value use to which resources can be put. See F.A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society" (1945).

[546] See Molinari's earlier discussion of the fragmentation of landed property caused by French inheritance law in S4.

[547] See Molinari's proposal for French farming to be undertaken by anonymous limited companies in S4, pp. 000. ["joint stock companies in agriculture"]

[548] Molinari uses the expression "conseillers langueyeurs de porcs" which refers to health inspectors who examined the mouths of pigs to see if they were infected with tapeworms which caused small cysts in the mouth.

[549] Note to Editor: See "Molinari's Long Footnote on Coquelin on Legislation concerning Commercial Organizations" at the end of the chapter.

[550] Henry C. Carey (1793-1879) was an American economist who argued that national economic development should be promoted by extensive government subsidies and high tariff protection.

[551] (Molinari's note) The Credit system in France, Great Britain and the United States, Philadelphia, 1838. What is Currency? by J. C. Carey. Du Crédit et des Banques by Charles Coquelin. Paris, 1848. Chez Guillaumin et Compagnie. Henry Charles Carey, The Credit System in France, Great Britain, and the United States (London: John Miller, 1838). Henry Charles Carey, Answers to the questions: What constitutes currency? What are the causes of unsteadiness of the currency? and What is the remedy? (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1840).

[552] This is obviously a reference to Molinari's own precarious life as a free lance journalist in the early 1840s. It is not exactly clear when Molinari arrived in Paris from Liège but it could be as early as 1841. One of his first journalist jobs was writing biographical articles in 1842 for Le biographe universel, edited by E. Pascallet, before securing a more regular job writing for Le Courrier française around 1845-46. One of these early biographical articles on the poet and politician Lamartine was published as a separate pamphlet in 1843 thus bringing Molinari to the attention of a broader audience. Once he had entered the orbit of the Guillaumin publishing firm Molinari was probably working as a full-time author writing for the JDE and researching the two volumes he edited of the CPE which were published in 1847 and early 1848.

[553] Molinari uses a bewildering array of terms for "money" in this and the next paragraph. We have translated them in the following manner: "monnaie de papier" (paper money), "espèce" (cash in the form of silver or gold coins), "numéraire" (cash in the form of silver or gold coins), "billets" (notes), "argent" (a general term for "money" of any kind), "monnaie" (another general term for "money"), "billets à l'échéance" and "billets à terme" (promissory notes), "sommes d'or et d'argent" (sums of gold and silver).

[554] "Omnibus" is Latin for "for all."

[555] Molinari is here grappling with the idea of "time preference," which is defined in the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: "people are willing to pay positive interest rates to get access to resources in the present, and they insist on being paid interest if they are to give up such access." See <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/BohmBawerk.html>.

[556] Molinari uses the term "la fausse monnaie" (false money) which can also be translated as counterfeit or fake money.

[557] See Oskari Juurikkala, "The 1866 False-Money Debate in the Journal des Économistes: déjà vu for Austrians?" (2002). The economists were divided into the "Free Bankers" who Courcelle-Seneuil, Puynode, and Mannequin who believed the banks could decide themselves how much gold they kept in reserve to redeem claims by users of their notes, and the "100% reservists" such as Victor Modeste, who like Murray Rothbard in the 20th century believed the banks should keep their notes fully covered in order to avoid the charge of fraud. Here, Molinari is clearly siding with the free bankers.

[558] Molinari is using the language of "dupes" who are being "duped" by the unscrupulous, which was a key aspect in Bastiat's theory of plunder. The purpose of his series of "economic sophisms" was to enlighten the "dupes" (the ordinary taxpayers and consumers) that they were being plundered either by the state itself or by powerful groups who had access to state power to get privileges, subsidies, and tariff protection for their own benefit. See "Bastiat on Enlightening the 'Dupes' about the Nature of Plunder," in the Introduction (CW3, pp. lv-lviii).

[559] Molinari is referring here to the notion of "fractional reserve banking" whereby only a fraction of the banks assets are at hand at any given time to be redeemed upon request by depositors.

[560] Molinari bases his analysis on the theory of commercial and banking crises developed by Charles Coquelin in "Crises commerciales" in the DEP and Le crédit et les banques (1848 and 1859). According to Coquelin the root cause of such crises is the existence of "une banque publique privilégiée" (a government privileged public bank) which is able to lend out more paper money than it has backed by cash and thus offer lower interest rates on loans to favored groups thus distorting economic activity. The historical examples Coquelin studies are the crisis of 1825, 1837, and 1846.

[561] (Molinari's note) At the Bank of France the days for discounting have been fixed for Monday, Wednesday, and Friday of each week, and on the last three days of each month, whatever days of the week these may be. To be allowed to discount and to have a current account at the Bank, it is necessary to make a request in writing for these to the Governor, and accompany this with a certificate signed by three persons declaring knowledge of the signature of the applicant and attesting to his trustworthiness in matters of business. (Dictionnaire du commerce et des marchandises), article on Banks). [Editor: Molinari has the quote correct but not the title. It should be Dictionnaire universal du commerce, de la banques et des manufactures (1850), 4th edition, vol. 1, p. 182.]

[562] Molinari uses the phrase "une véritable aristocratie financière" which recalls the expression used by the Socialist in S5 who denounces the doctrine of laissez-faire as "this bankocratic and Malthusian doctrine of laisser-faire." S5, pp. 000.

[563] The suspension of specie payment (gold) upon demand by holders of paper money is called "cours forcé" in French. The Bank of England suspended specie payments for notes between 1797 and 1819. It was during this period that David Ricardo published his The High Price of Bullion (1810) which attributed the inflationary price rises to the over issue of paper money during the suspension of specie by the bank. See Coquelin, "Cours forcé"and the entry for "Money and Banking," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[564] Note to Editor: See "Molinari's Long Footnote on Say on the Bank of France" at the end of the chapter.

[565] In other words, "the high rate of interest."

[566] Molinari uses the expression "féodalité financière" which we have translated as "finance feudalism," which seems appropriate coming from the mouth of the Socialist since the term "finance capitalism" was coined by late 19th century Marxist critics of the capitalist system, e.g. Rudolf Hilferding, Das Finanzkapitialismus (1910).

[567] Joseph Garnier discusses the regulation of the bakery business in "Boulangerie" in the DEP. Although this industry was substantially deregulated as part of the sweeping reforms of March 1791 it was quickly re-regulated out of fear of rising bread prices. All regimes since the Revolution continued to regulate bakeries by limiting the number who could enter the trade, the amount of emergency reserves of flour they had to keep on hand, the level of taxation of bread, and regulations concerning home-baking and baking for the needs of the military. The result according to Garnier was an industry that was "as abusive and barbarous as during the time of the corporations (under the old regime)."

[568] The printing industry was deregulated by the law of March 1791 but was re-regulated under Napoleon in 1810 who limited the number of printers to 80. The main method of controlling the industry was to limit severely the number of those who could enter the field and to impose high levels of money deposits which had to be lodged with the government in case they infringed the censorship laws. The standard fine for infringing the law was 125 fr. Therefore, many printers set up their business outside the city limits, e.g. in Batignolles, in order to escape police supervision.

[569] Molinari uses two important phrases here. The first is "entrepreneurs de prostitution" (entrepreneurs in the prostitution business) and "la prostitution interlope" (interloper or freelance prostitution).

[570] By the Decree of 18 May 1806 funerals were made a monopoly of the Church (Fabriques et Consistoires). In the late 1830s criticism of the cost and the way services were carried out led to the municipal government of the city of Paris taking this power away from the church and granting it to a private citizen in 1838, a M. Baudouin. One of the charges against the church was that in the case of the death of children, parents were changed for a single service but several children were placed in the same carriage at the same time. This did not stop the complaints as others who wanted the right to conduct funerals, such as Vafflard and Pector, challenged Baudouin's business practices during the early 1840s (such as using only two bearers when the law required four) and were eventually able to replace him. See Alfred Des Cilleuls, Histoire de l'administration parisienne au XIXe siècle (1900), vol. 2, pp. 472-74.

[571] "Un cimetière libre."

[572] The Père-Lachaise cemetery is the largest cemetery in Paris and has the tombs of many famous French people. An expansion in 1850 more than doubled its size and made room for over 70,000 graves. It is named after Père La Chaise who was the confessor to King Louis XIV. The land which had once been owned by the Jesuit order was turned into a public cemetery under Napoleon in 1804. This is the cemetery where Molinari was finally laid to rest in 1912.

[573] "Les entrepreneurs d'éducation."

[574] In Bastiat's "Theft by Subsidy" he parodies a parody by Molière in Le Malade imaginaire (The Imaginary Invalid) concerning the practices of 17th century doctors. It is supposed to be part of the ceremony granting a degree of Doctor of medicine and hence the right to practice. See ES2 9 "Theft by Subsidy" (CW3, pp. 170-79).

[575] Note to Editor: See "Molinari's Long Footnote on Chevalier on the Right to enter Professions in America" at the end of the chapter.

[576] Recueil général des lois et des arrêts (1833). "Loi sur l'expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique." Titre premier. - Dispositions préliminaires. Article 3, p. 349-50.

[577] During Napoleon's Empire the French legal system went through major changes, first with the introduction of the "Code civile" (the Civil or Napoleonic Code) in 1804, in which Napoleon took a personal interest, and secondly with the "Code de commerce" (Commercial Code) in 1807. The Commercial Code regulated everything from the conduct of merchants, contracts, the structure of businesses, banks, insurance, bankruptcy, and credit. See Paul Pradier-Fodéré, Précis de Droit Commercial (1866).

[578] Bearer bills are banknotes or other exchangeable notes requiring only delivery to become the exchangeable property of whoever receives them. They do not have to be endorsed.

[579] Jean-Baptiste Say, Oeuvres diverses (1848), vol. 12 of the CPE, pp. 516-19.

[580] Michel Chevalier, De la liberté aux États-Unis (1849), chap. V. "La liberté des professions ... ," pp. 30-32.

[581] Molinari, La viriculture (1897).

[582] Molinari, Cours d'économie politique (2nd ed.), vol. 1, p. 409.

[583] The passage comes from Book IV, Chapter VI "Effects of the Knowledge of the Principal Cause of Poverty On Civil Liberty" in Malthus, An essay on the principle of population (1803, 2nd revised ed.), p. 531.

[584] The most outspoken defender of orthodox Malthusianism in France was Joseph Garnier (1813-1881) who was editor of the JDE from 1845 to 1855. He edited and annotated the Guillaumin edition of Malthus's book which appeared in 1845 as well as a second edition in 1852 with a long Foreword defending Malthus against his critics. Garnier wrote the biographical article on "Malthus" and a long entry on "Population" (which was an extended defense of Malthusianism) for the DEP (1852-53).

[585]Bastiat wrote an encyclopedia article "On Population" in early 1846 which he republished nearly unchanged in the JDE in October 1846. He then made substantial changes to it and it later appeared as chapter 16 in the 2nd, posthumous edition of Economic Harmonies (1851). The 1846 versions can be found in CW4 (forthcoming).

[586] Molinari, Cours d'économie politique (1855, 1863). Vol. 1. La Production et la distribution des richesses. 15th and 16th Leçon. Théorie de la population. 15th Leçon, pp. 391-418; 16th Leçon, pp. 419-60.

[587] The French economists distinguished between "la charité légale" (state charity), of which they disapproved, and "la charité privée" (private charity), of which they approved. See Cherbuliez, "Bienfaisance publique" and the entry for "Poor Law or Poor Rate," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[588] Crispinus is a character from Juvenal's Fourth satire, a man seemingly with no good features, greedy, merciless, and self-indulgent. Decimus Iunius Iuvenalis, (Juvenal) was a Roman poet who wrote in the late 1st and early 2nd century A.D., most notably his Satires. The reference is to the opening four lines of the 4th Satire which states "Crispinus once again! a man whom I shall often have to call on to the scene, a prodigy of wickedness without one redeeming virtue; a sickly libertine, strong only in his lusts, which scorn none save the unwedded." See the G.G. Ramsay translation 1918 (Loeb Classical Library).

[589] "Taxe des pauvres" (the poor tax or the Poor Rate, to give it its English name). The model for a dedicated tax to fund welfare for the poor was the English Poor Rate which had been created during the Tudor period. A version of the Poor Laws was enacted for Ireland in July 1838.

[590] The infamous passage from Malthus' Principle of Population which so incensed socialists like Proudhon and our Socialist here only appeared in the 2nd revised edition of 1803. It was removed in later editions. The Economists like Garnier explained this away as a piece of unfortunately chosen rhetoric on Malthus' part and the idea that the poor had no just claim to the property of others, but could appeal to their good nature and sense of charity, voluntarily given. See "Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family," in appendix 1, for a discussion of this passage.

[591] Louis Mandrin (1725-55) was a famous 18th century brigand and highwayman who challenged the privileges of the Farm General ("la Ferme générale" or "Tax Farmers") by smuggling goods across the French border which were the monopoly of the Farm General.

[592] Le Constitutionnel was the main liberal opposition newspaper during the Restoration period.

[593] Proudhon quotes this infamous passage from Malthus in Système des contradictions économiques, ou philosophy de la misère (1846), vol. 1, chap. 1, p. 24. It is interesting and curious that Proudhon's book was published by Guillaumin the publisher of most of the books written by the Economists. Molinari reviewed the book for the JDE. See Molinari, review of "Système des contradictions économiques, ou Philosophie de la misère, par J.-P. Proudhon" in JDE (November 1847). Molinari actually quite liked Proudhon, calling him "almost an economist" because of his support for voluntary economic activity. He fell short in Molinari's eyes because of his opposition to the charging of interest on loans.

[594] The socialist Charles Fourier (1772-1837) believed that in the new socialist world the world's population level would stabilize at about 5 billion people (p. 160). He believed the population crisis would be reached in 150 years time and this gave the socialists time to put their two part solution into practice. First, he had a scheme to melt the polar ice caps in order to provide the water required to expand agricultural output (he does not go into details in this part of the book). Secondly, the creation of a society based upon socialist theory ("la théorie sociétaire") would lead to lower levels of fertility among the female population ("les stériles") for the following reasons: the increased physical strength or "vigor" of socialist women; a strict vegetarian diet; the practice of free love; and the practice of a comprehensive physical exercise program which would delay the onset of puberty. The net result of these four things would be a decline in total world population to the desired and sustainable level. See "Complément: L'équilibre de population," in Le Nouveau monde industriel (1841), vol. II, pp. 158-67.

[595] According to the entry on "World Population" on Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_population> [accessed April 17, 2012] the population of the world reached 1 billion in 1804 and was estimated at 1.262 billion in 1850.

[596] Molinari uses the phrase "l'ordonnateur des choses" (the organizer of things) without using any capital letters so we have translated it as "the organizer of everything" rather than "the Creator" which has a religious sense which Molinari does not intend here. Elsewhere in the book he does use the word "Créateur" with this religious sense (3 times) as well as the more more frequently used word "Providence." The phrase "le grand ordonnateur" was also used by Louis Reybaud in a critical review of Pellegrino Rossi's Cours d'économie politique which Reybaud thought was excessively Malthusian. See Reybaud, "Coup d'oeil sur le Cours d'économie politique," JDE, vol. 1, 1842, p. 191.

[597] A few years before this was written Bastiat had come to the conclusion that there was a significant difference between the "means of subsistence" and the "means of existence" - the former being fixed physiologically speaking (either one had sufficient food to live or one did not) and the latter being an infinitely flexible and expanding notion which depended upon the level of technology and the extent of the free market. See Economic Harmonies, FEE trans., pp. 431 ff..  [LF version to come.] Malthus focused on the former, whilst Bastiat (and Say) and later Molinari were focused on the latter. See the Bastiat's Chapter 16 on Population in the 1851 edition of Economic Harmonies and the editor Roger de Fontenay's Addendum, pp. 454-64. Under the influence of Bastiat and Dunoyer Molinari gradually came around to this way of thinking. See Dunoyer's Report of the 1st edition of Molinari's Cours d'économie politique (1855) to the Academy reprinted in the 2nd ed. of 1863, Appendix, pp. 461-74.

[598] The question whether mankind's reproductive behavior was like that of a plant or an animal was crucial in Bastiat's rethinking of Malthus's theory in the period between 1846, when he wrote an article on "Population" for the JDE, vol. 15, October 1846, pp. 217-34, and 1850 when the Economic Harmonies appeared. Bastiat came to believe that, unlike plants and animals, humans were thinking, reasoning, and acting beings who could change their behavior according to circumstances: "Thus, for both plants and animals, the limiting force seems to take only one form, that of destruction. But man is endowed with reason, with foresight; and this new factor alters the manner in which this force affects him" [FEE translation, p. 426; LF version to come]. Molinari also came to this position.

[599] "Moral restraint" is in English in the original. See the discussion of "moral constraint" in "Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family," in appendix 1.

[600] Another example of his use of the phrase "l'affranchissement complet de la propriété" (the complete emancipation of property).

[601] (Molinari's note) I am borrowing this part of my argument from the learned and wise author of "Notes on Malthus" by M. Joseph Garnier. See Essai sur le principe de population (Guillaumin, 1845).

[602] The DEP was put on the index of banned books because of articles like Garnier's on "Malthus" and "Population." See "Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family," in appendix 1, for a discussion of this.

[603] The Académie des sciences morales et politiques (the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences) is a French learned society and one of the five academies which comprise the Institute of France. There were five sections dealing with philosophy, moral science, law and jurisprudence, political economy, and history. Molinari was made a Corresponding Member in 1874.

[604] In 1839 Gustave de Beaumont, the travelling companion of Alexis de Tocqueville, published an analysis of the poverty in Ireland and blamed the rapacious Irish aristocracy, calling for its abolition: Beaumont, L'Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse (1839).

[605] This is a factual error on Molinari's part: the conquerors were not Saxon but Anglo-Norman. Molinari is using "Saxon" as shorthand for the "English" conquerors of Ireland.

[606] A Royal Commission was set up in 1832 to inquire into reforming the Poor Laws and this resulted in the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834. The official Report was written by the economist Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick: Poor Law Commissioners' Report of 1834. A version of the Poor Laws was then enacted for Ireland in July 1838.

[607] Daniel O'Connell (1775-1847) was a liberal Irish politician who campaigned for Catholic Emancipation and independence from Britain.

[608] The Whiteboys (Irish: Buachaillí Bána) were a secret Irish agrarian organization in 18th century Ireland which used violent tactics to defend tenant farmer land rights for subsistence farming. Molinari uses the English term in the original.

[609] The Faubourg Saint-Honoré in the VIIIth arrondissement in Paris is one of the most exclusive suburbs in the city. Today it is the location of the Élysée Palace (the official residence of the president of the Republic) and many embassies and luxury shops. The West End of London is located in the City of Westminster, near the House of Parliament, and was (and remains) one of the most desirable places to live and work in the city of London.

[610] Drogheda is a port town north of Dublin on the east coast of Ireland. In 1649 it was taken by Cromwell's forces as part of his invasion of Ireland. The resisters were massacred by Cromwell's troops. Wexford is at the south eastern tip of Ireland and was also sacked during Cromwell's invasion. It also had the dubious honor of being a center of the 1798 uprising against English rule, for which many rebels were hanged on the main bridge in the town centre.

[611] On the voluntary provision of medical services to the disadvantaged see Vée, "Hôpitaux, Hospices."

[612] "Laissez faire la charité privée" (let private charity freely go about its business).

[613] State charity was part of the expenditure of the Ministry of the Interior. In the 1848 Budget only fr. 3.4 million was set aside for specifically itemized assistance and grants to the needy out of a total budget for the Ministry of fr. 116.6 million (2.9%). The rest came out of block grants to the Départements which also funded their own activities. More detail is provided by Baron de Watteville, using figures from 1844. He states that across the entire country there were 9,242 various charitable bodies which spent a total of fr. 115.4 million [93]. See "Table 7. Expenditure by the Ministry of the Interior in 1848," in appendix 3,  "French Government's Budgets for Fiscal Years 1848–49" and the entry for "Poor Law or Poor Rate," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[614] A. Clément describes how during the Revolution "mendicité" (begging) was harshly dealt with, even criminalized in France. The law of May 1790 insisted that beggars strong enough to work should be made to work and those too weak to work would be sent to a hospice and foreign born beggars should be expelled from the country. The criminalization of begging went further during the 1790s with some persistent beggars being condemned to transportation. See Clément, "Mendicité."

[615] Molinari says here "laissez-la faire!" (which might also be translated as "let it be!")

[616] For details of Molinari's idea of "viriculture" (the cultivation of men) to describe how the quality of the human population might be improved see the entry for "Race, Eugenics, and Tutelage," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[617] Molinari here slips into the racial stereotyping which was all too common in the mid-19th century, although he stresses racial differences rather than racial hierarchies in this passage. In his sociological writings in the 1880s he would base his ideas on the necessity of "tutelage" ("la tutelle" or guardianship) by the more advanced civilizations over the less developed ones in order to assist them in the transition towards full liberty.

[618] (Molinari's note) See Cours de Phrénologie by Dr Ch. Place. [Editor: Phrenology was a pseudoscience which was popular in the first half of the 19th century. Phrenologists believed that mental faculties resided in different parts of the brain and that the shape of the skull above those regions gave a physical clue to the strength or power of that particular faculty. See the glossary entry on "Phrenology."]

[619] It is interesting that the Conservative leaps to the conclusion that what Molinari is arguing for are "stud farms" (le haras) where better human beings can be artificially bred. Below, the Socialist argues that the state should "direct and oraganize" any project to improve the human race. Molinari's advice is the same as it is for everything else, that the state should remove any legal obstacles to people voluntarily going about their own business; in this case in choosing whom to marry and possibly also unhampered migration across state borders.

[620] On Molinari's theory of the economics of the family see "Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family," in appendix 1.

[621] Very little is known about Molinari's own family as he was a very private person and there are no extant family letters. We know he had a brother Eugène who was a lawyer, a wife named Edmée died at the age of 50 on October 30, 1868, and two sons Edmond who was an engineer and Maurice who was a scientist or agricultural expert. See Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912), p. 244.

[622] A reference to George Villiers, 1st Duke of Buckingham (1592–1628) who became a favorite of King James I (possibly also his lover) who bestowed on him an enormous rank and fortune. What might have brought him to Molinari's attention was the fact the Buckingham was a character in Alexandre Dumas novel Les Trois Mousquetaires (The Three Musketeers) which was serialized in a French newspaper Le Siècle (March-July 1844). In Dumas's novel Buckingham is depicted as the Queen's lover and as somewhat of a rake. See Alexandre Dumas, Les Trois mousquetaires (1849).

[623] For Molinari's thoughts on the nobility see his entry in the DEP: "Noblesse," T. 2, pp. 259-62; also in the Addendum.

[624] See Molinari's discussion of the right to inheritance in S4.

[625] Eurotas was the mythical king of southern Greece whose daughter, Sparta, gave her name to the city which was founded there. Eurotas drained the surrounding swamp land by cutting a channel to the sea. The river which formed there was called the Eurotas after him. Molinari is referring here to the practice of infanticide in ancient Sparta either by drowning or by exposure.

[626] See Molinari's extracts from essays he wrote on Labor Exchanges in S6 as well as "Labour Unions, Labour Exchanges, and Labour Merchants," in appendix 1.

[627] The "pay" given to the last King, Louis Philippe d'Orleans, is hard to determine. In addition to his family's wealth French taxpayers paid 13.3 million fr. for the Civil List according to the Budget for 1848. This money was used to pay for the upkeep of the royal residences and the royal households for the King and Queen, the Duchess of Orléans, the Count of Paris, as well as several other Dukes, princes, and Princesses. See "Table 3. Details of Expenditure," in appendix 3,  "French Government's Budgets for Fiscal Years 1848–49" and Galignani's New Paris Guide (1848), pp. 43-44. As Molinari was writing Les Soirées during the spring and summer of 1849 there was a debate in the Chamber concerning the pay the newly elected President of the Second Republic, Louis Napoléon, should get.

[628] Gustave de Molinari, "De la production de la sécurité," in JDE (February, 1849). See "The Production of Security," in appendix 1. A translation of this article can be found in the Addendum.

[629] When these key terms and phrases appear in the text it will be indicated in the footnotes.

[630] "De la production de la sécurité," p. 288.

[631] See below, pp. 000 and pp. 000.

[632]  Coquelin's review, [CR] "Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare," JDE (October 1849).

[633] The minutes of the the October meeting of the Société d'Économie Politique in JDE, [Anon.] Reports of a discussion "On the Proper Limits to the Power of the State" (October 1849). Dunoyer's comment is on p. 316. They have been translated in Bastiat's CW4, pp. 000; and are also included in the Addendum.

[634] The second was held on January 10, 1850 and the third on February 10, 1850. See CW4 (forthcoming).

[635] (Molinari's note) For a long time, economists have refused to concern themselves not only with government, but also with all purely non-material activities. Jean-Baptiste Say was the first to insist on including production of this kind within the domain of political economy, by his applying to all its contents the category non-material products. He thereby rendered economic science a more substantial service than might readily be supposed: "The work of a doctor, he says, and if we want to add to the examples, the work of anyone engaged in administering public matters, of a lawyer or a judge, who belong to the same category, meet such fundamental needs, that without their contributions, no society could survive. Are not the fruits of these labors real? They are sufficiently real that people procure them in exchange for material products, and that by means of repeated exchanges their producers acquire fortunes. – It is therefore quite wrong for the Comte de Verri to claim that the work of princes, of magistrates, soldiers, and priests, does not fall immediately into the sphere of those objects with which political economy is concerned." (Jean-Baptiste Say, Traité d'Économie politique, T. 1, chap.XIII.) [Editor: See Jean Baptiste Say, A Treatise on Political Economy (Biddle edition 1855), Book 1, chapter 13 "Immaterial Products."

[636] This is the only place in the book where Molinari uses the phrase "la liberté de gouvernement" (the liberty of government) by which he means the private, competitive provision of security. He does not take it up in earnest until L'Évolution politique (1884) when there is an entire section devoted to the idea in "Chap. X. Les gouvernements de l'avenir." He also uses the similar phrase "les gouvernements libres" in a couple of places in Les Soirées.

[637] The expression used is "l'État-gendarme" or the "nightwatchman state." Say provides the most detailed discussion of his views on the proper function of government in the Cours complet (1828), vol. 2, part VII, chaps XIV to XXXII. He essentially follows Adam Smith's plan that there are only three proper duties of a government: to provide national defense, internal police, and some public goods such as roads and bridges. See his quoting Smith approvingly on pp. 261-62 of the 1840 revised edition. However, there is some evidence from an unpublished Traité de Politique pratique (written 1803-1815) and lectures he gave at the Athénée in Paris in 1819 that suggest that his anti-statism went much further than this and that he did toy with the idea of the competitive, non-government provision of police services along the lines developed at more length here by Molinari. See Leçons d'économie politique, vol. 4 of Œuvres complètes, ed. Gilles Jacoud and Philippe Steiner (2003).

[638] Molinari uses the phrase "les gouvernements libres" (free governments) which he defines below as "governments whose services I may accept or refuse according to my own free will."

[639] The idea that monarchs had a "divine right" to rule was an essential part of the ancien régime which was overturned by the French Revolution of 1789. "Legitimists" in the Restoration period attempted to revive this view with mixed success and it was severely weakened by the Revolution of 1848 and the creation of the Second Republic. However, legitimists continued continued to press their claims throughout the 19th century.

[640] Molinari uses the socialist expression "la liberté au travail" (right to a job) in order to provoke the Conservative. See the entry for "The Right to Work (Le Droit au Travail)," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[641] Maistre, Considérations sur la France (1796) and Principe générateur des Constitutions politiques (1809) in Oeuvres du comte J. de Maistre (1851), vol. 1. This quote was also used in the article "The Production of Security" (Feb. 1849) (see the Addendum).

[642] (Molinari's note) Du Principe générateur des Constitutions politiques. – Preface. Oeuvres, p. 109-10.

[643] The story of the grocer with a monopoly is one Molinari returned to several times in the Soirées and the Cours. See "The Story of the Monopolist Grocer," in appendix 1.

[644] "La production de la sécurité."

[645] Molinari presents in more detail his ideas about war and peace in the entry on "Paix, Guerre" and "Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix)," DEP, pp. 307-15.

[646] "Les producteurs de sécurité."

[647] The revolutions which broke across Europe in 1848 began with an uprising in Sicily in January 1848, spread to Paris in February, and then the southern and western German states, Vienna and Budapest in March. As a result of political divisions among the revolutionaries the forces of counter-revolution led by Field Marshall Radetzky of Austria, with the assistance of the Russian army, were able to crush the uprisings in central and eastern Europe during 1849. In France the Revolution led to the formation of the Second Republic and eventually the coming to power of Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire in 1852. The number of people killed during the uprisings and their suppression are hard to estimate but they are in the order of many thousands.

[648] The Holy Alliance was a coalition between Russia, Austria, and Prussia organized by Tsar Alexander I of Russia during the meeting of the Congress of Vienna following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The purpose was to defend the principles of monarchical government, aristocracy, and the Catholic Church against the forces of liberalism, democracy, and secular enlightenment which had been unleashed by the French Enlightenment and Revolution. See the note below which describes Molinari's interest in the poet Béranger's poem about the need for the people to form their own Holy Alliance, "The Holy Alliance of the People" (1818).

[649] "Les consommateurs de sécurité."

[650] Here begins the Economist's third of six set pieces or "speeches" in the book, where he gives a mini-lecture on what he believes. This one is his "individual sovereignty vs. communism" speech and is about 2,000 words in length.

[651] "Il possède le droit de libre défense" (He possesses the right to freely defend himself).

[652] French administrative regions in descending order of size from largest to smallest: regions were départements, arrondissements (districts"), cantons ("municipalities" or "counties"), and communes ("villages" or "towns").

[653] Molinari uses the term "la ruse" here which was a key term used by Bastiat in his theory of "sophisms." Bastiat thought that vested interests who wished to get privileges from the state cloaked their naked self interest by using deception, trickery, or fraud ("la ruse") in order to confuse and distract the people at whose expense these privileges were granted.

[654] Molinari uses the word "la police" which had a complex meaning in the ancien regime. On the one hand, it meant more narrowly the protection of life and property of the inhabitants from attack, in other words what we would understand as modern police and defense activities. On the other hand, it also had a much broader meaning concerning the entire "civil administration" of the commune, such as ensuring the provision of public goods like lighting and water, the enforcement of censorship of dissenting political and religious views, the control of public gatherings to prevent protests getting out of hand, the collection of taxes and the supervision of compulsory labor; in other words, the complex mechanism of public control which had evolved during the ancien regime. Since Molinari is talking about security matters in this chapter we have chosen to use the word "police" or "policing" in this context.

[655] (Molinari's note) See Studies on England by Léon Faucher. [Editor: Léon Faucher, Études sur l'Angleterre (1845, 2nd ed. 1856). The anecdote Molinari refers to can be found in vol. 1, p. 47. Faucher relates how one rundown district in London known as "Little Ireland" had become off limits to the police. Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) was Prime Minister of Britain twice (1834-35 and 1841-46) and during his second stint he successfully repealed the protectionist Corn Laws in 1846. When he was Home Secretary (1822-29) he reformed the police force of London by creating the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829 which became the model for all modern urban police forces.]

[656] The Economists condemned the bureaucratic or administrative centralization which had made France the most centralized state in the world, as Coquelin phrased it: "In no other time nor in any other country has the system of centralization been as rigorously established as that which exists today in France" (p. 291). See Charles Coquelin, "Centralisation" and the entry for "Centralization," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[657] These were the "octrois" tolls which certain cities and town levied on consumer goods which were brought into the town.

[658] Bastiat has an amusing "economic sophism" on this very idea. The mayor of a small town wants to "stimulate" local industry in the same way as the nation "stimulates" national industry with high tariffs on goods being brought into his town. His great plans are shot down by the local Prefect who tells him that he believes in free trade within the nation but is a protectionist when it comes to trading with other nations. The mayor cannot understand the difference. Surely what is good for French industry must also be good for the industry in his commune. ES3 18 "The Mayor of Énios" (CW3, pp. 355-65).

[659] The word "éspices" (spices) was a slang word for bribes paid to officials.

[660] The Palais de Justice (Law Courts) of Paris were burned to the ground in 1618. The satirical and libertine poet Marc-Antoine Girard de Saint-Amant (1594-1661) wrote this verse to suggest that it might have been in revenge by Lady Justice for the corruption that went on within the building. See Oeuvres complètes de Saint-Amant (1855), vol. 1, "Epigramme," p. 185.

[661] Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Glasgow ed. vol. II, V.i.b, part ii: Of the Expense of Justice, pp. 720-21. Molinari also quoted a slightly shorter version of this passage in his article "The Production of Security" (Feb. 1849) (see the Addendum).

[662] According to the budget for 1848 the Ministry of Justice spent a total of fr. 26.7 million out of total expenditure of fr. 1.45 billion (or 1.85%). The government spent a total of fr. 156.9 million in administrative and collection costs, the proportional share of the Ministry of Justice was therefore fr. 29 million, which is more than was spent in providing justice. See Tables 3 and 8 in appendix 3.

[663] This maxim from Vergil's Aeneid, Book II, line 65, means "From one thing, learn about everything."

[664] The National Guard was founded in 1789 as a national armed citizens' militia in Paris and soon spread to other cities and towns in France. Its function was to maintain local order, protect private property, and defend the principles of the Revolution. Membership was expanded or "democratized" in a reform of 1837 and opened to all males in 1848 tripling its size to about 190,000. Since many members of the Guard supported the revolutionaries in June 1848 they refused to join the army in suppressing the rioting. This is what Molinari is probably referring to in his comment that it had become "communist."

[665] This is another example of Molinari's interest in the theater. See "Liberty and the Theatre," in appendix 1.

[666] Here begins the Economist's fourth of six set pieces or "speeches" in the book, where he gives a mini-lecture on what he believes. This one is his "tyranny of the majority" speech and is about 800 words in length.

[667] "L'industrie qui pouvoit à la défense intérieure et extérieure."

[668] According to the budget for 1848 the Ministry of War spent a total of fr. 322 million out of total expenditure of fr. 1.45 billion (or 22.2%). The government spent a total of fr. 156.9 million in administrative and collection costs, the proportional share of the Ministry of War was therefore fr. 34.8 million, which is 10.8% of the cost of providing defense. See Tables 3 and 8 in appendix 3.

[669] Bastiat called the very limited number of individuals who were allowed to vote during the July Monarchy the "classe électorale" (the electoral or voting class). Suffrage was limited to those who paid an annual tax of fr. 200 and were over the age of 25; and only those who paid fr. 500 in tax and were over the age of 30 could stand for election. By the end of the Restoration (1830) only 89,000 tax payers were eligible to vote. Under the July Monarchy this number rose to 166,000 and by 1846 this had risen again to 241,000. The February Revolution of 1848 introduced universal manhood suffrage (21 years or older) and the Constituent Assembly (April 1848) had 900 members (minimum age of 25).

[670] According to the budget for 1848 the government raised fr. 202.1 million from customs and salt taxes, as well as another fr. 204.4 million in indirect taxes on drink, sugar, tobacco, and other items, making a total of fr. 406.5 million. Total receipts from taxes and other charges was fr. 1.39 billion. The share of indirect taxes was thus 29.2% of the the total. See "Table 5. Details of Revenue," in appendix 3.

[671] Molinari made this argument for the first time in his article on "The Electoral Law" (Courrier français, 23 July, 1846) which can be found in the Addendum.

[672] Opposition to slavery and the economics of the slave system were some of the earliest topics the young journalist Molinari wrote on when he came to Paris, see "De l'abolition de l'esclavage," in pp.60-Études économiques (1846.), pp. 60-127; and on which he also wrote some key entires for the DEP: "Esclavage," T. 1, pp. 712-31, and "Servage," T. 2, pp. 610-13.

[673] Molinari is referring to the socialist supporters of Louis Blanc, Pierre Leroux, and Auguste Blanqui who made up a sizable faction in the National Assembly during the Second Republic and who organized numerous political clubs during 1848-49, and participated in acts of violence such as the June Days of 1848 and in April 1849. See "Chamber of Deputies and Voting" in appendix 2.

[674] The irony of this passage is that Molinari has earlier pointed out the class based structure and injustice of the U.S. slave system and the stresses which this creates, and then argued that the smaller size of the U.S. government means that these tensions would be reduced. It should be pointed out that the Civil War broke out in 1861 only 12 years after the Soirées was published.

[675] The "Maison royal de Charenton," also known as the "Hôpital Esquirol," was a psychiatric hospital which was founded in 1641. One of its most famous inmates was the Marquis de Sade in the late 18th century.

[676] Molinari is hinting here that he is "Le Rêveur" (the Dreamer), the radical liberal, who wrote but did not sign the essay "L'Utopie de la liberté. Lettres aux socialistes" in the JDE (15 June, 1848). This is an appeal written just prior to the June Days insurrection of 1848 for liberals and socialists to admit that they shared the common goals of prosperity and justice but differed on the correct way to achieve these goals. Molinari reveals that he was in fact the author in an appendix he included with Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la société future (1899), p. 237, written 50 years later. See "The Dreamer (le Rêveur) of Radical Liberal Reforms," in appendix 1.

[677] Molinari actually uses the phrase "laissez faire" here: "de laissez faire les uns et les autres."

[678] This is an argument Molinari would make several times, especially in his stories about the monopolist grocer. He did not believe it was the economist's job here or in any other area of economic activity to specify in advance exactly how goods and services would be provided at some time in the future, how many companies might be set up to supply these services, at what prices these goods and services would be traded, and so on. See "The Story of the Monopolist Grocer," in appendix 1.

[679] "Des entreprises de gouvernement" (businesses which provide government services).

[680] "Compagnies d'assurances sur la propriété." Molinari first referred to the state as being "une grande compagnie d'assurances mutuelles" (a big mutual insurance company) in his essay on "The Right to Vote" (July 1846) (see the Addendum). He would return to this idea of society as a large insurance company providing services to "consumers," that is citizens, in his article "The Production of Security" in the JDE (February 1849) and then again here. Later in the DEP entry on "Civilization" he would refer to "ces sociétés de protection mutuelle" (these mutual protection companies), Addendum, below, p. abc. On others who thought in a similar way, like Louis Graslin and Émile de Girardin, see Faccarello, "Bold Ideas. French liberal economists and the state" (2010).

[681] Molinari uses the word "s'abonner" which usually refers to taking out a subscription to a magazine or newspaper. Below he uses a different expression "prime" (premium) which is more usually associated with a payment for an insurance policy.

[682] "Le prix de la sécurité."

[683] See the earlier footnote on the Holy Alliance in 1815 which was designed to protect the monarchies of Prussia, Austria, and Russia against the threats of liberalism and democracy.

[684] Pierre-Jean de Béranger (1780-1857) was a poet and songwriter who rose to prominence during the Restoration period with his funny and clever criticisms of the monarchy and the church, which got him into trouble with the censors who imprisoned him for brief periods in the 1820s. The quotation is the refrain in Béranger's anti-monarchical and pro-French poem, "La sainte Alliance des peuples" (The Holy Alliance of the People) (1818) in Oeuvres complètes de P.J. de Béranger (1855), vol. 1, pp. 294-96. The two lines quoted by Molinari here were used as one of the three slogans on the banner of the magazine, Jacques Bonhomme, which he, Bastiat, Charles Coquelin, Alcide Fonteyraud, and Joseph Garnier published and handed out on the streets of Paris during the June Days uprising in 1848.

[685] This is in fact the Economist speaking. It is listed as the Socialist in the French original.

[686] "Un supplément de prime."

[687] "Un régime de libre gouvernement."

[688] "Les actionnaires." Molinari first began talking about taxpayers being "shareholders" in society in which the state acted as a "large mutual insurance company" in his article "The Right to Vote" (July 1846) (see Addendum). Here he envisages private insurance companies with shareholders which are in the security business.

[689] Molinari repeats here the list of conditions which he first set out in his article "De la production de la sécurité" in JDE, February 1849, p. 288. There are however some significant changes, such as changing the word "le producteur" (the producer) to "les compagnies d'assurances" (insurance companies) and "les consommateurs" (consumers) to "les assurés" (the insured). The word "prime" (premium) remained the same.

[690] Total debt held by the French government in 1848 amounted to fr. 5.2 billion which required annual payments of fr. 384 million to service. Since total annual income for the government in 1848 was fr. 1.4 billion the outstanding debt was 3.7 times receipts and debt repayments took up 27.6% of annual government income. See Puynode, "Crédit public" and "Table 2. Summary of Expenditure," in appendix 3.

[691] On Molinari's theory of the nation, see his entry on "Nations" in the DEP (translated in the Addendum).

[692] The phrase "the nature of things" was one commonly used by J.B. Say to describe the natural laws which governed political economy. See the many references throughout Cours complet (1840), vol. 1 "Considérations générales," pp. 1-64, especially p. 17.

[693]  See "Rent, Disrupting Factors, and Equilibrium," in appendix 1.

[694] "Le capital," in Almanach Républicain pour 1849 (1849); Capitale et rente (1849); and Gratuité du crédit. Discussion entre M. Fr. Bastiat et M. Proudhon (1850). All of which are in CW4 (forthcoming).

[695] Molinari, [CR] "De la propriété, par M. Thiers," JDE (January 1849); Molinari, "Lettre sur le prêt à intérêt," JDE (June 1849).

[696] Compare with Bastiat's very similar theory of "les causes perturbatrices" (disturbing factors) in "Disturbing and Restorative Factors," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[697] On his theory of emancipation and the end state of "le milieu libre" see "Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property," in appendix 1.

[698] On his idea of a conquest theory of history see Molinari's entry in the DEP on "Nobility" in the Addendum.

[699] See the discussion of Say in "Rent, Disrupting Factors, and Equilibrium," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[700] See David Ricardo, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (2005). Vol. 1 Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Chapter II: On Rent.

[701] Molinari here is grappling with the notion of "political rent" or "rent seeking." The public choice economist Gordon Tullock invented idea of rent seeking in 1967. David Henderson defines it as follows: "People are said to seek rents when they try to obtain benefits for themselves through the political arena. They typically do so by getting a subsidy for a good they produce or for being in a particular class of people, by getting a tariff on a good they produce, or by getting a special regulation that hampers their competitors." See David Henderson, "Rent seeking," The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentSeeking.html>.

[702] Molinari is grappling here with the idea of diminishing marginal returns of the additional areas of land which are brought into production.

[703] Molinari uses the phrase "ces causes de perturbation" (these disturbing factors) which is very similar to Bastiat's theory of "causes perturbatrices" (disturbing factors) which hindered the full productive powers of the free market from being realized. Bastiat was woking on this idea in the final chapters of Economic Harmonies (1850) before he died. See especially Chap. XVIII. It is likely that he spoke to Molinari about this while he was writing Les Soirées in 1849.

[704] Here Molinari returns to summing up the main ideas in his book after this long digression on rent. The Economist gives his fifth of six set pieces or "speeches" in the book, where he gives a mini-lecture on what he believes. This one is his "summation" speech and is about 2,000 words in length.

[705] This is a reference to the famous story by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations about the pin factory which he uses to show how much greater output is possible if a group of workers cooperate and specialize in producing only a small part of the finished output (the division of labor). See Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Glasgow edition, Vol. I, Chapter I: Of the Division of Labor, pp. 14-15.

[706] "Les entrepreneurs de roulage."

[707] The phrase is "un milieu libre" which could be translated as in "a free world, environment, or situation." This important phrase of Molinari's was taken as part of the subtitle to the only biography of Molinari, Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912), pour un gouvernement à bon marché dans un milieu libre (2012).

[708] Note to Editor: See "Molinari's Long Quotation from Adam Smith on Market and Natural Prices" at the end of the chapter.

[709] Here begins the Economist's final of six set pieces or "speeches" in the book, where he gives a mini-lecture on what he believes. This one is his "Spartacus" speech and is about 1,500 words in length. He concludes the book with an impassioned plea for liberty and a description of how its full implementation has been prevented throughout history.

[710] Spartacus (109-71 BC) was a Thracian slave who was forced to fight as a gladiator in Rome before leading a rebellion of slaves against the Roman Empire. See the entry for "Spartacus (109-71 BC)," in the Glossary of Persons for a discussion of Molinari's interest in Spartacus.

[711] Molinari uses the word "états" which in the context of his discussion of the 18th century might refer to "Estates" (as in the Third Estate) or "states".

[712] Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-17811).

[713] Molinari coins an interesting neologism here, "néo-réglementaires," which we have translated as "neo-regulators."

[714] Jacques Necker (1732-1804).

[715] The National Constituent Assembly met from July 1789 until September 1791. It issued the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen" on 27 August, 1789. See A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (1964), pp. 113-115. The National Convention met from 20 September 1792 to 26 October 1795. Among its members were Maximilien Robespierre and Georges Danton. Between 1793 and 1794 executive power was exercised by the Convention's Committee of Public Safety which operated "The Terror" policy of imprisonment and execution of "enemies of the revolution." The Convention's "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen" was issued on 24 June, 1793. See A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (1964), pp. 454-58.

[716] Throughout this passage Molinari uses the word "communautaire" to describe the statist policies of Napoleon's government. In the present this word is used to described anything pertaining to the European Community so a word like "communitarian" or "community" would be wrong to use here. There is no recorded use of the word "communautaire" in the 1835 dictionary of the Académie française but there is one in the 1872-77 edition which defines it as anything "pertaining to communism." "Communistic" might be used if it were not so colored by events in the 20th century. "Communal" is also a possibility but this word is best used to describe things pertaining to the Communes which were an important part of French regional government. So, we have decided to use the word "communalist" in order to avoid these other associated meanings.

[717] The French educational system was placed under the administrative control of the national University by a series of decrees issued by Napoleon in May 1806 and March 1808. These granted the University the power to set the number of schools, the level at which private schools were taxed, the curriculum for entry into professional schools (the Baccalaureate examination), pay rates for teachers and inspectors, and so on.

[718] (Molinari's note) The production of tobacco, deregulated by the Constituent Assembly, was put under state control by a decree of 29th of December 1810. [Editor'd note: Under the old regime the production and sale of tobacco products was farmed out to monopoly providers who paid the state about fr. 30 million per year on the eve of the Revolution. The production and sale of tobacco was completely deregulated in 1791 but the tax benefits were so great that a state monopoly was reintroduced on 29 December 1810 and in the years immediately following supplied the treasury with an average of fr. 23.3 million per annum. This rose to an average of fr. 83 million per annum on the eve of the 1848 Revolution. The government monopoly on tobacco sales raised 120 million Francs according to the Budget of 1848 which was 8.6% of the entire amount of revenue raised (1.4 billion). Net costs, it supplied the Treasury with fr. 85.8 million. It was the same in 1849. See Joseph Garnier, "Tabac" and "Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services," in appendix 3.]

[719] See for example Note XXVI in his Memoirs where Napoléon talks about his "vaste idée" to recreate in France a "national nobility": "This huge idea would change the plan of a nobility which was only feudal and would build upon its ruins an historical nobility (une noblesse historique) founded upon interest in one's homeland (patrie) and the services which one has rendered to the people and to the sovereigns. This idea, like that of the Legion of Honor, like that of the University, was eminently liberal and it would be suitable at the same time in consolidating the social order and destroying the vain pride of the nobility. It would destroy the claims of the oligarchy and would maintain the unity of the dignity and equality of man." In, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France (1823), vol. 2, pp. 200-201.

[720] The "vénalité des charges" or the "vénalité des offices" was the sale of offices in government institutions such as the army or the bureaucracy.

[721] This is a reference to the government funded unemployment relief program known as the National Workshops which were a favorite of socialist politicians in the early months of the 1848 Revolution. They closed in June 1848 after running massively over budget, triggering rioting in the streets of Paris known as the June Days.

[722] This is a reference to the Conservatives who called out the troops to restore order in Paris during the June Days of 1848. Some 800 soldiers were killed and an unknown number of rioters were also killed (perhaps 1,500 to 3,000).

[723] Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877).

[724] The "Comité de la rue de Poitiers" (later known as the "Party of Order") was a group of conservative politicians who came together in May 1848 on the rue de Poitiers following the invasion of the National Assembly by supporters of Louis Blanc in an unsuccessful attempt to stage a coup d'état and get more socialist Deputies to take over the government. The group (between 200 and 400) met weekly and were made up of a broad coalition of conservative, legitimist, Bonapartist, and liberal groups. See "Political Parties" in appendix 2.

[725] He says "ramener la société à la propriété pure" (to bring society back to a situation of pure property rights).

[726] Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Glasgow ed., vol. 1chapter VII: Of the natural and market Price of Commodities, pp. 73-75.

[727] Molinari, "Dictionnaire de l'économie politique," (JDE, 15 Décembre 1853), p. 426.

[728] "Une grande compagnie d'assurances mutuelles."

[729] "Un actionnaire de la société." Since the word "la société" can mean both "society" and a "business" or "firm" this phrase has the double meaning of "a shareholder in a private firm" or "a shareholder in the broader society." Other people who argued along similar lines to Molinari at this time was Thiers and Girardin. See Faccarello, "Bold Ideas. French liberal economists and the state" (2010).

[730] In France at this time those who paid a certain high amount of direct taxes on their property and other assets, knows as "le cens," were entitled to vote in elections. This who paid even more were entitled to stand for election. This limited the number of voters in the July Monarchy to about 240,000 individuals, a group which Bastiat referred to as "classe électorale" (the voting class) and Molinari as "la classe censitaire." See "Chamber of Deputies and Voting," in Appendix 2.

[731] Most taxes at this time were indirect taxes on food, alcohol, and other items, and so the total each person might pay in a year would be very hard to determine.

[732] It is not clear where Molinari gets this figure. It is estimated that French GDP in the 1840s was about Fr. 13 billion and that total government expenditure per annum was about Fr. 1.3 billion. See the overview to Appendix 3 "French Government Budgets for Fiscal Year 1848 and 1849."

[733] (Note by Joseph Garnier, editor-in-chief of the Journal des Economistes, 1849.) Although this article may appear utopian in its conclusions, we nevertheless believe that we should publish it in order to attract the attention of economists and journalists to a question which has hitherto been treated in only a desultory manner and which should, nevertheless, in our day and age, be approached with greater precision. So many people exaggerate the nature and prerogatives of government that it has become useful to formulate strictly the boundaries outside of which the intervention of authority becomes anarchical and tyrannical rather than protective and profitable. [Editor's Note: see "The Production of Security" in Appendix 1.]

[734] See Molinari's theory of "The Natural Laws of Political economy," in appendix 1.

[735] This article and S11 in Molinari's book provoked a debate within the PES between October 1849 and February 1850 on this very topic. Also in the Addendum, below, pp. 000.

[736] On the difference between the "natural organisation" of society by voluntary, market means and the "artificial organisation" of society by coercive socialist means, see the glossary entry on "Association and Organization."

[737] This law was one of Molinari's six "natural laws of political economy." See"Natural Laws of Political Economy," in appendix 1.

[738] "Les consommateurs de sécurité."

[739] (Molinari's note.) In his remarkable book De la liberté du travail (On the Freedom of Labor), Vol. III, p. 253. (Published by Guillaumin.) [Editor's Note: See, Dunoyer, LdT (1845), Vol. III, Livre IX. Application of the Same Means by which Liberty in the Arts and Sciences act on Mankind, Chapitre VII. Continuation of the Arts which work towards the Formation of Moral Habits - On Government. "In addition, there is an infallible way of determining what they (governments) should do, and what lies outside of their proper functions; this is because the functions which are proper for them to do have the special characteristic that they would never fall into the domain of private economic activity, while private economic activity will always take over to a greater or lesser degree those activities which have been taken away from them."

[740] "L'industrie de la sécurité."

[741] Molinari is using the term "natural price" as Smith did in Wealth of Nations. He quotes Smith on this in S12 in a discussion of the difference between the market price, the cost of production, and the natural price.

[742] The salt industry was highly regulated in France. In some places there was a government monopoly, in other places privileged corporations had a license to produce salt. Because of the high price of salt and the great consumer need for salt for the preservation and flavouring of food, there was considerable smuggling of salt across France. See the discussion on"Gabelle," in "Taxation" in appendix 2.

[743] Elsewhere Molinari liked to use the example of the local town monopoly grocer. See "The Story of the Monopolist Grocer," in appendix 1.

[744] The grain trade was also very heavily regulated by the French government because of the constant fear of riots when shortages occurred and the price of bread rose. France was divided into zones each of which had its own government run grain storage facilities and the trade of grain between zones was heavily regulated concerning price and quantities which could be trade across the zones. The economists and the French Free Trade Association (of which Molinari was a founding member) wanted to free both the internal and external trade in grain. See the discussion of this in the Introduction, pp. 000.

[745] "Les producteurs de sécurité."

[746] "Le monopole de la sécurité."

[747] "Des monopoleurs de la sécurité."

[748] Molinari uses the term "l'octroi" here to mean a tax or duty in general. The Octroi was the entry tax cities charged on certain consumer goods which were brought into the city which they used to pay for streets, lighting, and other municipal services.

[749] Molinari is referring to the theory of the "Norman Conquest" which historians like Augustin Thierry discussed in their theory of class.

[750] "Le régime du bon plaisir."

[751] "Le prix de la sécurité."

[752] The English Civil Wars and Revolution circa 1640 and then the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660.

[753] "Un directeur d'exploitation."

[754] "L'administration de la sécurité."

[755] The 1832 Reform Act expanded the franchise in England and gave the vote to the middle class for the first time.

[756] The Revolution of February 1848 which saw the collapse of King Louis Philippe's regime and the coming to power of the Second Republic.

[757] "La production commune."

[758] "Comme actionnaires."

[759] "Le communisme de la sécurité."

[760] At the conclusion of S12 the Economist present a similar set of options to the reader.

[761] In this paragraph he uses the expressions "les gouvernements de monopole" and "les gouvernements communistes."

[762] He uses the expression "des gouvernements libres" (free governments) here and in S11 he uses the slightly different expression "la liberté de gouvernement" (the liberty of governments) both of which have the meaning of governments competing to get business from consumers of security.

[763] Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) was a magistrate who became one of the leading conservative defenders of the old regime and the idea of "throne and altar."

[764] (Molinari's note.) Du principe générateur des constitutions politiques. Preface. [Editor: In Considérations sur la France suivi de l'Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques et des Lettres à un gentilhomme russe sur l'Inquisition espagnole, Volume 7 of Oeuvres de Joseph de Maistre (Bruxelles: La Société nationale, 1838), Préface to l'Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques, pp. x, x1. [Editor's Note: This quote was also used in S11.]

[765] Plutarch: "for, as the body is the organ of the soul, so the soul is an instrument in the hand of God. Now as the body has many motions of its own proceeding from itself, but the best and most from the soul, so the soul acts some things by its own power, but in most things it is subordinate to the will and power of God, whose glorious instrument it is." In Plutarch, "The Banquet of the Seven Wise Men, Diocles to Nicarchus," Plutarch's Morals (1878). vol. 2, p. 39.

[766] In the first and only presidential election held on 10-11 December 1848 under the new constitution, 7.4 million people voted making Napoleon Bonaparte's nephew, Louis Napoleon the President of the Second Republic. General Cavaignac, received 1.4 million votes (19%) to Louis Napoleon's 5.5 million votes (74%). In the election held soon after this article was published, that of 13-14 May 1849 for the Legislative Assembly, 6.7 million men voted (out of 9.9 million registered voters). The largest block in the Legislative Assembly was "the party of Order" (monarchists and Bonapartists) (500), the extreme left ("Montagnards" or democratic socialists) (200), and the moderate republicans (80). See"Chamber of Deputies and Voting," in appendix 2.

[767] Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-65) was an anarchist socialist who was elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1848 representing La Seine. Molinari is referring to a speech Proudhon gave in the Assembly in July 1848 in which he advocated a tax on income of one third which would have raised 3 billion francs for the government. See "Discours prononcé à l'Assemblée Nationale le 31 juillet 1848," Œuvres complètes de P.-J. Proudhon (1868), vol. 7, pp.276-77.

[768] The economist who developed the idea of "la spoliation légale" (legal plunder) in the most detail was Frédéric Bastiat. See "Bastiat's Theory of Class: The Plunderers vs. the Plundered" in appendix 1 (CW3, pp. 473-85), and also the article by Ambroise Clément "De la spoliation légale" which was published in the JDE as Molinari was writing Les Soirées: Clément.

[769] Molinari may have in mind Maistre's book Considérations sur la France (1796) where there are some very bloodthirsty remarks about the need to execute and torture those who committed crimes of "lèse-majesté" (harming his majesty) against the King during the Revolution: "great crimes unfortunately demand great torture; and in this matter it is easy to exceed the limits when it is a question of crimes of "lèse-majesté", and when the hangman is held in adulation." In Maistre, Chap. II "Conjectures sur les voies de la Providence dans la Révolution française," Considérations sur la France suivi de l'Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques, in Oeuvres de Joseph de Maistre (1838), vol. 7, pp. 27-28.

[770] "Ce producteur de sécurité."

[771] Molinari uses the term "la prime" here in a different sense. Elsewhere it refers to the "premium" the insured consumer pays to the insurance company for the protection of his person or property. However here, "la prime" refers to the payout by the insurance company for losses suffered by the insured consumer.

[772] "Une certaine prime."

[773] Molinari revised these three conditions slightly in the later version in S11 where he replaced the terms "le producteur" (the producer of security) with "les compagnies d'assurances" (insurance companies) and "les consommateurs" (consumers) with "les assurés" (the insured). The word "prime" (premium) remained the same in both cases.

[774] "D'entretenir une police" (to provide or maintain police services).

[775] "Le siège de leur industrie" (the seat, headquarters, location or their industrie or business).

[776] This is the first time Molinari refers to entrepreneurs in the security industry: "à un nouvel entrepreneur, ou à l'entrepreneur voisin."

[777] "Une constante émulation entre tous les producteurs."

[778] "L'attrait du bon marché."

[779] (Molinari's note) Adam Smith, whose remarkable spirit of observation extends to all subjects, remarks that the administration of justice gained much, in England, from the competition between the different courts of law: "The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognizance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. The court of king's bench instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognizance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanor. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognizance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging that he could not pay the king, because the defendant would not pay him. In consequence of such fictions it came, in many case, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would chuse to have their cause tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure, formed by this emulation, which anciently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy, which the law would admit, for every sort of injustice. [Editor's Note: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Cannan ed.), vol. 2, p. 212. A slightly longer version of this quote also appeared in S11.]

[780] "D'acheter de la sécurité où bon lui semble" (to buy security services wherever he thinks it is good to do so).

[781] "Le prix de la sécurité."

[782] He does not call them "producers of security" here but uses a more specific term "les assureurs" (those who provide insurance, or the insurers).

[783] Again he uses a very specific term to describe what consumers are doing, they are buying policies "assurer leurs personnes et leurs propriétés" (to insure their persons and property).

[784] "Les consommateurs libres."

[785] "Un simple entrepreneur."

[786] The linked pair of phrases Molinari uses are "la liberté de gouvernement" (free government, or freely competing governments) and "la liberté du commerce" (the liberty of commerce, or free trade as it was better known as). The groups agitating for the latter were the English Anti-Corn Law League and the French Free Trade Association. perhaps Molinari hoped one day to see a "French Free Government Association" to lobby for the former.

[787] See the discussion in "The Production of Security," in Appendix 1. ("Coquelin led off the October discussion.")

[788] On Bastiat's "ultra-minimalist" theory of the state see "Limited Government," in Appendix 1 (CW4).

[789] Charles Coquelin, "Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare, Entretiens sur les lois économiques et défense de la propriété," (JDE, Nov. 1849).

[790] Clément, Ambroise. "Des attributions rationnelles de l'autorité publique" (JDE, 15 February, 1850).

[791] Dunoyer, "Les limites de l'économie politique et des fonctions du gouvernement," (JDE, December, 1852) and "Gouvernement," DEP (1852-53), vol 1, pp. 835-841.

[792] Discussed in S3.

[793] Towards the end of S11 the Socialist raises the question of what happens to nationality in Molinari's future society. The Economist's answer is "I do not see national unity in these shapeless agglomerations of people, formed out of violence, which violence alone maintains, for the most part. … A nation is one when the individuals who compose it have the same customs, the same language, the same civilisation; when they constitute a distinct and original variety of the human race. Whether this nation has two governments or only one, matters very little …"

[794] The former meeting place for the Chamber of Peers which was taken over by Louis Blanc in the first weeks of the February Revolution in order to organize the National Workshops program.

[795] The establish of state-supported "Peoples' Banks" was a pet scheme of Proudhon who tried to set up one through voluntary subscriptions (which failed) and then with government, i.e. tax-payer funded support.

[796] Say uses the expression "les agents d'une association générale" (agents or officers of a general association).

[797] In the previous discussion on the limits to state action (10 October, 1849).

[798] Ambroise Clément, "De la spoliation légale" (JDE, July 1848).

[799] In English in the original.

[800] The main opposition to the French Free Trade Association was the protectionist "Association pour la défense du travail national" (Association for the Defense of National Employment) established in 1846 by the textile manufacturer Pierre Mimerel de Roubaix and Antoine Odier.

[801] In English in the original.

[802] Estimating the number of people employed by the French state at this time is almost impossible given the lack of accurate figures. Auguste Vivien attempted to do this in his Études administratives (1852) and came up with a figure of 250,000 employed by the central government, not counting those employed by local government or the armed forces (vol. 1 pp. 177-78). Ambroise Clément wrote in his article on "Fonctionnaires" (Public Servants) in the DEP, building upon Vivien's figures he estimated that there were 500,000 to 600,000 pubic servants plus another 500,000 officers and soldiers in the military for a total of 1.1 million. A proportion of 1/16 (6.25%) in a total population of about 36 million would mean there were 2.5 million people who worked for the French state which seems far too many according to these figures.

[803] London had been hit by cholera outbreaks in 1832 and 1849 (one had swept through Paris in 1849 as well killing the young economist Alcide Fonteyraud). The latter killing over 14,000 people. The Broad Street outbreak of 1854 led to the pioneering work of John Snow who traced the cause back to contaminated water supplies.

[804] Jacques Cujas (1522-159) was a French humanist legal theorist who wrote on Roman law, especially Justinian, and the evolution of law through history. He found it difficult to get a job in established universities because of the controversial nature of his thinking. After much travelling about he was finally offered a position in the Faculty of Law in Bourges where he taught from 1555-57 and 1559-66.

[805] See the entry "Dictionnaire de l'Économie Politique," in the Glossary of abc.

[806] "Se faire de la centralisation et du communism." Molinari is using the word "communism" in the sense of community or government control instead of private and voluntary activities. He is not using it in the sense given to the word in the late 19th century to mean government ownership and control of "the means of production" as argued by Karl Marx and his followers.

[807] (Molinari's note.) Treatise on Political Economy, by J. B. Say, Book II, chap. 11. [Editor's Note: Guillaumin 1841 ed., p. 433. This translation was made E. J. Leonard for the Lalor edition.]

[808] (Molinari's note.) "When the industries are destined to provide for daily consumption," we read in the Enquête, "they are located within reach of the consumers; when they contribute their products to commerce, they are situated with especial consideration of the means of production. The industries which supply food are almost all of the former class; those which are devoted to the manufacturer of articles known in trade as "articles de Paris" (Parisian luxury goods) are in the second. Among the furniture industries there are also certain ones whose work is offered directly to the consumers, and others which are more particularly devoted to manufacture. Consequently we find upholsterers in all parts of the city, while the manufacture of furniture is situated, on the contrary, almost exclusively in the eighth arrondissement, as the making of bronze wares is located in the sixth and seventh. Of 1,915 cabinet makers, doing a business of 27,982,950 francs, 1,093, with 19,679,835 francs, are in the eighth arrondissement. And of 257 makers of chairs, doing a business of 5,061,540 francs, 197, with 3,373,950 francs, are also in the eighth arrondissement. To the same arrondissement belongs also the preparation of pelts and leather. The tanneries and the places for dressing leather are nearly all situated in the quarter of the Gobelins, on the banks of the little river which takes this name, on entering Paris. Chemical products are not manufactured much in the heart of Paris, but those which are made there and which require space, water, and air, come from the eighth and twelfth arrondissements. Of this number are starch, candles of wax, spermaceti, and tallow. The manufacture of pottery is also found there. Work in metals and in the construction of machinery is found especially in the eighth, sixth, and fifth arrondissements. As to the manufacture of what are generally known as "articles de Paris," it extends through the whole of an important part of the city, on the right bank of the Seine, to the north of the streets of Francs-Bourgeois and Saint Merry, and in the belt comprised between the streets Montorgueil and Poissonnière on the west, and the Place des Voges and Roquette street on the east. It is there that are made articles of gold and silver, fine jewelry as well as imitation; there are manufactured the work boxes, drawstring bags, brushes, toys, artificial flowers, umbrellas and parasols, fans, fancy stationery, combs, portfolios, pocket books, and all the multitude of various small articles." Introduction, pp. 43-44. Undertaken by Horace Say for the Chamber of Commerce of Paris,Statistique de l'Industrie à Paris (1851).

[809] (Molinari's note.) Vivéro, Memorials of the Empire of Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (1850), p. 176.

[810] (Molinari's note.) This progress has not yet been realized everywhere. The Calabrian peasants, for example, instead of dwelling in the open country, are obliged to remain in the towns, to be safe from the bandits who infest the country. We select the following fact from the correspondence of Paul-Louis Courier: "In Calabria at present," he says, "there are woods of orange trees, forests of olive, hedges of lemon. All these are on the coast and only near towns. Not one village, not one house in the country: it is uninhabitable, for lack of government and laws. But how do they cultivate it, you will ask? The peasant lodges in the city and tills the suburbs; setting out late in the morning, and returning before evening. How could anyone venture to sleep in a house in the country? He would be slain the first night." In Paul-Louis Courier, Pamphlets politiques et littéraires de P.-L. Courier (1839), vol. 2, "Letter to M. de Sainte-Croix" (Sept. 12, 1806), pp. 199-200.

[811] The following two sentences were cut from the Lalor translation.

[812] (Molinari's note.) Tegoborski, Etudes sur les forces productives de la Russie (1852), vol. 1, pp. 139-41.

[813] (Molinari's note.) Alf. Legoyt, "Mouvement de la population de la France pendant l'année 1850" and "Dénombrement de la population de 1836 à 1851," in Annuaire de l'Economie politique et de la statistique pour 1853 (1853), p. 20.

[814] (Molinari's note.) Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1904). Vol. 1, book III, chap. 4 "How the commerce of the towns contributed to the improvement of the country," pp. 382-83.

[815] (Molinari's note.) The following are the statistics in regard to this matter, of the administration of justice in France, from 1826 to 1850: "More than three-fifth of those charged with offenses had a place of residence; 612 in 1,000 resided in the rural communes; 388 dwelt in the town communes. In the entire population, the percentage of the inhabitants of towns is not exactly known; but approximate estimates put it at only one-fifth of the total population. The preceding proportions differ according to the nature of the crimes. Of 1,000 charged with offenses against individuals one counts in an average year 706 inhabitants of the countryside and 294 inhabitants of towns. Of 1,000 charged with crimes against property there are now only 566 inhabitants of rural communes and 434 inhabitants of towns. If one goes down the list of the various types of crimes one finds even greater variations than this. Among those charged with arson, the highest number, relatively, is found to be from the inhabitants of the rural districts; next come those charged with poisoning, infanticide, false testimony, parricide, and obtaining titles and signatures by compulsion. These are probably the only crimes in which the country people have a larger share than they should have, considering their total number in the whole population. The proportion of country people charged with political crimes, abortion, robbery, forgery, counterfeiting money, violation of the person and criminal outrages upon children, is, on the contrary, very small. In "Report of the minister of justice," Annuaire de l'Economie politique et de la statistique pour 1853, pp. 108-9.

[816] Molinari says "abandonner à la concurrence des particuliers" (left to competition between individuals). Of course, Molinari had spent considerable time in Les Soirées showing how he thought most, if not all, government supplied public goods and other services could be better supplied privately on the free market.

[817] See the examples of how public goods could be provided privately and competitively in Les Soirées, such as in S3 (forests, canals, waterways), S8 (private banks and money, mail delivery), S9 (bakers, butchers, printers etc.), and S11 (security, police, and defence).

[818] Molinari was struck by an expression used by J.-B. Say to describe government activities as "ulcerous" and referred to it in his DEP article on "Nations," namely "le gouvernement-ulcère" (see below p. abc). See also "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government," in appendix 1.

[819] On the economic motives which drove some people to emigrate, see his entry on "Émigration," DEP, T. 1, pp. 765-83.

[820] "Des biens naturels, soit internes, soit externes." Molinari is close to having an idea of human capital which is related to his idea of "internal property" which he discusses in S8 and S9. He got the idea of "internal" and "external" natural goods from the Russian economist Henri Storch, who developed the former idea into a theory of "human capital." See footnote below in "Fine Arts" for more details.

[821] The Botocudo were a native tribe which lived in eastern Brazil, named after their custom of wearing wooden disks or "boutique" (Portuguese for "plug") inserted in their lips and ears.

[822] "Ce capital naturel."

[823] Jean Bodin (1530-1596) was a lawyer and political theorist, and a member of the Parlement of Paris. He is best known for his theory of the sovereignty of the state.

[824] Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755).

[825] Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) was a German philosopher, poet, theologian, literary critic, and historian. Molinari is referring to Herder's unfinished Outline of a Philosophical History of Humanity (1784-91) which was one of the founding texts of German historicism.

[826] New Zealand had been circumnavigated by the British explorer James Cook in 1769 and was occupied and made a separate colony in 1841 following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi with the Maori tribes. The colony of New Zealand was granted a representative government in 1852 when this article was probably being written.

[827] Molinari discusses the barriers to free entry into many professions in S8 and S9.

[828] See "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership" and "Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property," in appendix 1.

[829] Molinari wrote the entries on "Esclavage"(Slavery) and "Servage" (Serfdom) for the DEP: T1, pp. 712-31and T.2, pp. 610-13.

[830] Molinari does not use the term "the state of nature" here but something very similar: "à peine sortis des mains de la nature" (scarcely having left the hands of nature).

[831] "L'action pacificatrice de ces sociétés de protection mutuelle." Another reference to Molinari's idea that security could be provided by private and competing private companies, although here, since he is referring to an early stage in the formation of societies, the word "association" might be better than "company" or "firm." See the discussion of "des compagnies d'assurances sur la propriété" (property insurance companies) in S11, p. abc.

[832] "Le respect systématisé et organisé de la liberté et de la propriété."

[833] See his entry on "Paix. Guerre" in the DEP, T. 2 , pp. 307-14.

[834] "Des capitaux matériels et immatériels." A reference to J.B. Say's idea of the importance of "non-material" things of value which we call today "services." Molinari expanded J.B. Say's idea of "non-material goods" or services to include not just the productive economic activities of lawyers, doctors, teachers, and judges but also those of theater directors and actors and producers of security.

[835] Shortly after this article was probably written (1851-52) Molinari gave a lecture at his new home in Brussels at the Musée royal de l'industrie belge where he had a teaching position, on Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel. In this work he argued that it was the job of the economist to be "les teneurs de livres de la politique" (the bookkeepers of history) (p. 116) who should weigh up the profits and losses of events such as the French Revolution, the wars of Napoleon, and the 1848 Revolution. In all cases, he thought, the losses far outweighed the profits and thus war and revolution should be avoided. Here he is attempting to do this for the barbarian invasions of Europe.

[836] To explore this progress was the task Molinari set himself in his large volume work on the historical sociology of the state and the emergence of free political and economic institutions which he published some thirty years later. See, L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle: théorie du progrès (1880) and L'évolution politique et la Révolution (1884).

[837] "L'industrie militaire." One of Molinari's innovations was to view nearly every human activity as an "industry" of some kind, with producers and consumers, prices, profits and losses, and "entrepreneurs" who would be able to bring all these things together in a "market."

[838] Molinari uses the English word "machinery" here.

[839] (Molinari's note.) "… Force will probably be found in the future on the side of civilization and enlightenment; for civilized nations are the only ones which can have enough wealth to maintain an imposing military force. This fact removes, so far as the future is concerned, the probability of the recurrence of those great upheavals of which history is full, and in which civilized nations became the victims of barbarians." J. B. Say, Traite d'Economie Politique, liv. 3, ch. 7. Guillaumin ed., p. 484.

[840] However, this invention also gave rise to the problem of copyright and intellectual property which he discusses in S2.

[841] He explores the problem of the proper size of nations and how they can get on well with other by means of free trade and communication in the entry in the DEP on "Nations" a translation of which can be found below.

[842] The English philosopher Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who was an early advocate of the scientific method.

[843] "Les arts matériels."

[844] The habit of wealthy aristocrats of opposing international free trade while at the same time enjoying the benefits of access to foreign luxury goods was mocked by free traders like William Fox whose famous 1844 speech on the need to be independent of foreigners was quoted by Molinari and Bastiat. See Molinari's entry in the DEP on "Freedom of Commerce" (below)  and his long quotation of him in S7.

[845] See his discussion of this and other arguments for protectionism in "Freedom of Commerce" (below).

[846] By this Molinari had in mind the socialists who had emerged during the 1848 Revolution. In his mind, there were two kinds of socialists and socialism, "le socialisme d'en haut" (socialism from above) and "le socialisme d'en bas" (socialism from below) which the Economists had to oppose. The latter came from the streets and were led by people like Louis Blanc and Victor Considerant; the former were the wealthy protectionist landowners and manufacturers, and the government interventionists led by Louis Napoléon. His book Les Soirées was designed to counter the socialists from below, while the DEP was designed to oppose the socialists from above.

[847] "Une classe dominante."

[848] Molinari probably has in mind thinkers like the conservative Chateaubriand whose posthumous Memoirs from Beyond the Tomb were published by in 1850. In the conclusion to the Memoirs Chateaubriand states "Material conditions are improving, intellectual progress is increasing and nations, instead of benefiting, are regressing. … This is the explanation for the decline in society and the progress made by individuals. If moral sense developed along with the development of the mind, there would be a counter-weight and the human race would grow free of danger. But exactly the opposite happens. The perception of good and evil is dimmed as the mind becomes enlightened, conscience shrinks as ideas expand." Mémoires d'outre-tombe (1850). T.11, Conclusion "Chute des monarchies. Dépérissement de la société et progrès de l'individu," pp. 462, 464.

[849] Molinari discusses the positive impact of religion on moral and economic development in two later works, Religion (1892, trans. into English 1894) and Science et religion (1894). He believed that only an institution like the Church can encourage people to take a longer term view of their life (i.e. to have longer time preferences) by promising them rewards and punishments in the after-life in exchange for changing their behaviour in the present.

[850] Saint Dominic of Caleruega (1170-1221) founded the order which bears his name in 1215. Tomás de Torquemada (1420–1498) was a Dominican friar who became the first Grand Inquisitor of the Holy Office of the Inquisition (established 1478) which later became known as the "Spanish Inquisition." His task was to purge the church and Spain of heretics and people of other religions who refused to convert to Catholicism (such as Jews and Muslims). Jews were ultimately dispossessed of their property and expelled from Spain in 1492.

[851] He discusses the problem of population growth in S10. See also "Malthusiansim and the Political Economy of the Family," in appendix 1.

[852] Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) was a mathematician, liberal philosophe and politician during the French Revolution.

[853] (Molinari's note.) Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain, in Condorcet, Oeuvres de Condorcet (1847), vol. 6, "Xe Époque," pp. 257-58.

[854] Molinari's colleague Bastiat was one of the foremost advocates of the possibility of human advancement or "perfectibility" if freedom existed. The idea pervades his unfinished treatise Economic Harmonies (1850, 1851) for which he had planned an entire chapter on the topic (chap. 24).

[855] Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was an Italian political philosopher, historian, and jurist, whose Scienza Nuova (1725) was an attempt to organize the entire field of the humanities into a coherent science in which history could be explained as a series of cycles of the rise and fall of societies.

[856] See, "Second discours sur les progrès successifs de l'esprit humain, prononcé le 11 décembre 1750 (en Sorbonne)" and "Idées générales sur la géographie politique" (1751), in Oeuvres de M. Turgot (1808-1811). vol. 2, pp. 52-92 and pp. 166-208.

[857] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Possibly a reference to "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784) or "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795).

[858] Johann Gottfried Herder, Outline of a Philosophical History of Humanity (1784-91).

[859] The German Russian economists Henri-Frédéric Storch (1766-1835). Possibly a reference to his Cours d'économie politique, ou exposition des principes qui déterminent la prospérité des nations (1815).

[860] The conservative French historian and politician François Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787-1874) who gave lectures on and turned into books: Histoire générale de la civilization en Europe (1828), and Historie de la civilization en France (1829-32). See Liberty Fund's edition: François Guizot, The History of Civilization in Europe (2013).

[861] (Molinari's note.) On the origins of the idea of civilization, see A. Javary, De l'idée de progrès (1851).

[862] A reminder that a major purpose in publishing the DEP was to oppose the spread of socialist ideas.

[863] Molinari discusses trade marks and the ownership of technical designs in his broader discussion of intellectual property in S2.

[864] A cross-reference to the entry by Molinari, "Propriété littéraire et artistique," DEP, T. 2, pp. 473-78.

[865] (Molinari's note.) Essai sur le principe de la population, liv. III, chap. XIII, p. 445 (Guillaumin ed.). [Editor's Note: Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1826). 6th ed. Book III, Chapter XIII: "Of increasing Wealth, as it affects the Condition of the Poor," p. 222.]

[866] (Molinari's note.) Principes d'économie politique. Traduction de M. Augustin Planche, T. II, p. 82. [Editor's Note: John Ramsay McCulloch, The Principles of Political Economy. 5th ed. (1864). p. 370.]

[867] A cross-reference to the entries by Léon Faucher, "Salaires," DEP, T. 2, pp. 570-86, and A.E. Cherbuliez, "Taxes des pauvres," DEP, T. 2, pp. 716-21.

[868] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'économie politique, liv. III, chap. IV. Guillaumin 1841 ed., p. 449. [Editor's Note: Molinari has condensed the passage somewhat.]

[869] Molinari says "de la papillonne" (in the manner of a butterfly). Molinari is using a term used by the socialist Charles Fourier in his bizarre theory of harmony: "papillonner" (to flit or move from one object or one extreme to another). This was one of the many terms adopted by Fourier to describe harmonious human behavior in his utopian society which would be harmonious literally and figuratively. See Manuscrits de Fourier, "Des séries mesurées" in La Phalange (1845). pp. 368, 372, 376.

[870] Molinari misquotes John Dryden. The line is "This is the porcelain clay of humankind" from the play Don Sebastian, King Of Portugal (1690). The full quotation is "M. Mol. Ay; these look like the workmanship of heaven; This is the porcelain clay of human kind, And therefore cast into these noble moulds." The Works of John Dryden (1808), vol. 7, p. 315.

[871] (Molinari's note.) Brochure in 8. Londres, 1835. [Editor's Note: Richard Cobden, England, Ireland and America, by a Manchester Manufacturer (1835).]

[872] Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (1903). Vol. 1, England, Ireland, and America, Part III America, pp. 98-100.

[873] From the French "la pomade" which was a greasy or waxy product which was applied to the hair as a gel to shape or stiffen it. It was often made of bear fat, lard, or beeswax.

[874] A reference to a public statement of bankruptcy.

[875] "Une société affairée."

[876] (Molinari's note.) Dictionnaire de Millin: Article "Beaux-Arts." [Editor's Note: Aubin-Louis Millin, Dictionnaire des Beaux-Arts (1806). 3 vols.]

[877] (Molinari's note.) Essai sur la nature de l'imitation dans les arts imitatifs, Oeuvres posthumes, T. II, p. 84. [Editor's Note: Molinari has the title of the book wrong. It was in Essais philosophiques; par feu Adam Smith, prÉcédés d'un précis de sa vie et de ses écrits; par Dugald Stewart . Traduits de l'anglais par P. Prevost (1797), T. 2, p. 84. [An English version can be found in Adam Smith, Essays On, I. Moral Sentiments: II. Astronomical Inquiries; III. Formation of Languages; etc. (1869), pp. 415-16.

[878] Charles Dunoyer (1786-1862).

[879] (Molinari's note.) J.-B. Say, Traité d'économie politique, liv. I, chap. XIII. Guillaumin 1841 ed, p.124.

[880] (Molinari's note.) J. B. Say, Traité d'économie politique, Liv. I, chap. xiii. Guillaumin ed. p. 125.

[881] Molinari is toying with the idea of "human capital" but neither he nor Henri Storch actually use this expression. Storch comes very close with his distinction between "le capital matériel" and "le capital immatériel" (material and non-material capital); "le travail matériel" and "le travail immatériel" (material and non-material work); and "les biens matériels" and "les biens immatériel" (material and non-material goods). Molinari seems to prefer the terms "le capital extérieur" and "le capital intérieur" (exterior and interior capital) which he uses here. According to Storch "non-material capital" is made up of "les biens internes" (internal goods) which in turn are made up of things like "de santé, de dextérité, de lumières, de goût, de mœurs et de sentimens religieux" (health, dexterity, enlightenment, tastes, morals, and religions feelings) as well as "les hommes éclairés, les livres, les idées, les institutions utiles" (enlightened men, books, ideas, and useful institutions." All these he thought could be accumulated over time and reproduced as they were needed. See, Storch, Cours d'économie politique (1823), vol. III, chap. VIII "Du capital immatériel, et de la consommation des biens internes," pp. 300-7.

[882] (Molinari's note.) See the treatise De la Liberté du travail (1845), vol. 1, pp. 349-50.

[883] On the other hand, in S8 Molinari discusses the waste caused by state subsidies to theatres and libraries in France.

[884] Possibly a reference to Angelica Catalani (1780–1849) the Italian soprano opera singer who was the greatest bravura singer of her day.

[885] The Italian mezzo-soprano opera singer Giuditta Angiola Maria Costanza Pasta (1797-1865). Donizetti and Bellini wrote title roles especially for her: Donizetti in "Anna Bolena" (1830); and Bellini in "La somnambula" (1831) and "Norma" (1831).

[886] The Swedish opera singer Johanna Maria "Jenny" Lind (1820-1887) was one of the most highly regarded singers of the 19th century. She was in great demand during the 1840s and decided to retire at the age of 29 in 1849. On several occasions Bastiat uses her and other famous singers of his day (Maria Galibran, Rachel, Rubini) as examples of the kind of non-material services which are voluntarily traded in a free market. See Economic Harmonies, chap. V "On Value.".

[887] On Molinari's theory of rent see "Rent, Disrupting Factors, and Equilibrium," in appendix 1.

[888] The Dutch landscape painter Meindert Hobbema (1638–1709) who was a pupil of the master Jacob van Ruisdael.

[889] The Dutch Baroque painter Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640).

[890] The French neo-classical painter Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1780-1867).

[891] The French painter of famous military battles, Émile Jean-Horace Vernet (1789-1863).

[892] (Molinari's note.) Jean-Jacques Barthélemy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce dans le milieu du quatrième siècle avant l'ère vulgaire (1843), vol. 1, p. 457.

[893] (Molinari's note.) Barthélémy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis, vol. 1, p. 331.

[894] A saying attributed to Emperor Augustus that "I found Rome a city of bricks and left it a city of marble."

[895] Saint Euverte or Euverte of Orléans was the fourth bishop of Orléans during the 4th century.

[896] Fulbert de Chartres (970-1028) became Bishop of Chartres in 1006. The Cathedral in Chartres burnt down in 1020.

[897] Some sentences in the rest of this paragraph were left out of the Lalor version for some reason, perhaps because of Molinari's slightly mocking tone..

[898] The following paragraph was cut from the Lalor version perhaps because of Molinari's slightly mocking tone.

[899] (Molinari's note.) Les cathédrales de France, par Chapuy et Jolimont. [Editor's Note: A reference to Cathédrales françaises: dessinées d'après nature et lithographiées par Chapuy (1823-41).]

[900] Molinari's friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat developed a theory of "theocratic fraud" and "theocratic plunder" in his Economic Sophisms and elsewhere.

[901] Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) was the Comptroller-General of Finance under King Louis XIV from 1665 to 1683. He epitomized the policy of state intervention in trade and industry known as "mercantilism."

[902] Molinari is using its more modern name the "Academy of Fine Arts" which was founded in 1816. In its earlier incarnation it was comprised of three instituions, the Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture (founded 1648), of Music ((1669), and Architecture (1671).

[903] (Molinari's note.) Pierre Clément, Histoire de la vie et de l'administration de Colbert (1846), pp. 200-1.

[904] (Molinari's note.) Pierre Clément, Histoire de la vie et de l'administration de Colbert, p. 201.

[905] The French Baroque painter Jean-Antoine Watteau (1684-1721); the French Rococo style painter François Boucher (1703–1770); possibly a reference to the most famous member of the Van Loo family of painters, Charles-André van Loo (1705-1765); and the Neo-classical style French painter Jacques-Louis David (1748-1825).

[906] The following section on French government spending on the fine arts was cut from the Lalor article probably because it was so specific to France. It continues with the paragraph beginning "It is a common opinion …"

[907] For more details on French government expenditure in 1848-49 see Appendix 3 "French Government's Budgets for Fiscal Years 1848 and 1849." The following discussion is very similar to that in S8.

[908] On government spending on the arts see Table 7 "Expenditure by the Ministry of the Interior in 1848," in appendix 3.

[909] (Molinari's note.) The costs of construction of the Stock Exchange have been covered by means of a special tax levied on commercial activities in Paris.

[910] Mécène Marié de l'Isle (22 May 1811 – 14 August 1879) was a French musician and opera singer, who used the stage name Marié.

[911] Molinari puns on the words bureaucratic "savoir faire" and artistic knowledge ("le savoir").

[912] (Molinari's note.) Horace Say, Études sur l'administration de la ville de Paris et du département de la Seine (1846), pp. 295-97.

[913] The Lalor translation continues with Molinari's text from here.

[914] I.e., technology.

[915] Molinari no doubt has in mind the spectacular class and steel pavilion known as the "Christal Palace" in London for the 1851 Great Exhibition. He would also have witnessed the building of some of large railway stations in Paris in the early and mid-1840s, especially that of La Gare de Saint-Lazare which would be the subject of several paintings by Claude Monet in 1877.

[916] The fellow Belgian Adolphe Sax, for example, patented his design for a new musical instrument known as the "Saxophone" in 1846.

[917] Molinari deals with free trade in S7. He also wrote a two volume history of tariffs in 1847 and the key entries for the DEP on "Céréales" (Grain), T. 1, pp. 301-26; "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)" (Free Trade Associations), T. 2, p. 45-49; "Tarifs de douane" (Tariffs), T. 2, pp. 712-16; "Union douanière" (Customs Union), vol. 2, p. 788-89. He would go on to write two more collections of "conversations" about free trade in 1855 and 1885.

[918] New Holland was the name given to the continent of Australia by the first European explorers, such as the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman in 1644. After the establishment of the British colony in Sydney in 1788 the eastern part of the continent was called New South Wales and the western part retained the name of New Holland. This name remained in popular usage until the 1850s even though the western colony of Swan River (Perth) (founded in 1828) had been renamed "Western Australia" in 1832.

[919] Molinari has inserted a cross reference to another article in the DEP: Charles Coquelin, "Échange," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 637-40.

[920] Horace Say, "Division du travail," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 567-69.

[921] Molinari sometimes uses the terms protectionism (and protectionist) and prohibition (and prohibitory) interchangeably, but there was a significant difference between the two. Under "prohibition" goods from another country were banned entry to the home market; under "protectionism" foreign goods would be allowed in but only after tariffs (i.e. taxes) had been paid at the point of entry.

[922] A castellany was a medieval district which was administered by a castellan. The term originated from the Latin for castle "castellum" and the castellan was the appointed administrator of the feudal domain around the castle.

[923] Horace Say, "Douane," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 578-604.

[924] A reference to the tax and tariff reforms introduced by Colbert, the Minister of Finance under King Louis XIV, in 1664.

[925] Tariffs were completely reorganized by a law of August 1791 which abolished most prohibitions on imported material, abolished tariffs on primary products used by French manufacturers and food stuffs for consumers, and reduced tariffs on manufactured goods gradually down to 20-25% by value of the goods imported. See "Tariff Policy," in appendix 2.

[926] The octroi was a tax imposed on certain goods entering a town to pay for various thingsw such as streets and lighting. See the section of "Octroi" in "Taxation," in appendix 2.

[927] Hippolyte Passy, "Impôt," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 898-914.

[928] Molinari wrote the article on "Colonies - Colonisation - Système colonial," DEP, T. 1, pp. 393-403; as well as "Colonies agricoles" and "Colonies militaires," DEP, T. 1, pp. 403-5.

[929] Molinari uses the English word.

[930] Horace Say, "Primes et drawbacks," DEP, T. 2, pp. 433-34.

[931] C. de Brouckère, "Traités de commerce," DEP, T. 2, 759-60.

[932] Molinari puts the word "ravir" in quote marks.

[933] Frédéric Bastiat also noted the militaristic language used by protectionists in ES1 22 "Metaphors" (c. 1845) (CW3, pp. 100-03).

[934] (Molinari's note). Les singes Économistes. Brochure in-8, anonyme, traduit par Benjamin Laroche. [Editor's Note: It was published by one of the leading English defenders of free trade Col. Thomas Perronet Thompson as "The Article on Free Trade," Westminster Review (January 1830) with a cartoon drawn by Thomas Landseer. Molinari also refers to this cartoon and pamphlet in S7. See "The Monkey Economists and Free Trade," in the glossary.]

[935] Molinari probably got the idea of "un inventeur à rebours" (an inventor in reverse) from his friend and colleague Bastiat who denounced on several occasions the arguments of the protectionists and the socialists as "l'économie politique à rebours" (backwards political economy) which "prendre le moyen pour le but, l'obstacle pour la cause, alpha pour oméga" (mistakes the means for the end, the obstacle for the cause, and the alpha for the omega). See EH VI "Wealth" (CW5) and "Damn Money!" (CW4).

[936] (Molinari's note.) Richesses des nations, liv. I, chap. III, pp. 107-8 (Guillaumin ed.). [Editor's Note: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1904), vol. 1, Book I, chap. III "That the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market," pp. 19-20.]

[937] Say, "Primes et drawbacks."

[938] The following two sentences were cut from the Lalor version of the article.

[939] Clos de Vougeot is a famous wine producing "château" in Burgundy. Cistercian monks grew pinot noir grapes there in the early 12th century. The "close" was created when the monks built a wall around the abbey in 1330 and the chateau was constructed in 1551. When land owned by the clergy was confiscated during the revolution the banker Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard acquired the Clos de Vougeot.

[940] Château Lafite is a famous vineyard in the commune of Pauillac near Bordeaux on land originally owned by the La Fite family. The first vines were grown in the late 17th century by Jacques de Ségur. The chateau and vineyards were bought by the wealthy banker James de Rothschild in 1868.

[941] "Dupes" is a term much used by Bastiat to describe the people who have been fooled by the "sophisms" or false arguments of the protectionists. "Bastiat on Enlightening the 'Dupes' about the Nature of Plunder," in the Introduction (CW3, pp. lv-lviii).

[942] See his entries in the DEP on "Paix, Guerre," T. 2, pp. 307-14, and "Nations" (below).

[943] The theory of "le déplacement" (displacement) and "des causes perturbatrices" (disturbing factors was also an important part of Bastiat's economic theory. See, "Theory of Displacement" and "Disturbing and Restorative Factors," in Appendix 1, in CW3.

[944] "Ces industries de guerre."

[945] The wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars disrupted trade significantly between 1793 and 1815, especially Napoleon's policy of the "continental blockade" (1806) which was designed to prevent English goods being sold in occupied Europe.

[946] Say, "Douane."

[947] In 1826 Huskisson stated in Parliament that "This was our state, though in a far less degree than at present, when America became independent. She started by applying towards us the system, which we had applied towards Holland. She was then poor, with a very small commercial marine, without manufactures, having corn and raw materials to export;—and we know what her shipping now is. Let Gentlemen reflect on these circumstances, before they decide that it is necessarily wise to enter upon a similar contest with other poor and unmanufacturing countries. Let them seriously consider, whether a system of discriminating duties, now that the exclusive patent by which we held that system is expired,—is not the expedient of such a country as I have described, rather than the resource of one which already possesses the largest commercial marine in the world. They will then see, that it may possibly be a wise policy to divert such countries from that system, rather than to goad them on, or even leave them a pretext for going into it." "Exposition of the State of the Navigation of the United Kingdom" (May 12, 1826) in The Speeches of the Right Honorable William Huskisson (1831), vol. 3, p. 34.

[948] William Huskisson(1770-1830) was a British Member of Parliament who served from 1796 to 1830. He rose to the post of secretary to the treasury 1804-09 and later president of the Board of Trade (1823-27). Huskisson introduced a number of liberal reforms, including the reformation of the Navigation Act. This was eventually abolished in 1849. See "Navigation Acts" in the glossary.

[949] "La machine à fabriquer les primes." This is similar to Bastiat's idea of "la grande fabrique des lois" (the great law factory) which he used to describe the Chamber of Deputies which "manufactured laws" in order to create economic privileges for some at the expense of others. See, WSWNS 7 "Trade Restrictions" (CW3, pp. 427-32).

[950] The major theorists of "legal plunder" was Molinari's friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat, especially in his pamphlet The Law (June 1850). See "Theory of Plunder," in Appendix 1 (CW5, forthcoming).

[951] "La clientèle confisquée" Since earlier Molinari used the word "ravir" (kidnap) to describe how one country "stole" another country's markets by means of tariffs, it seemed fitting here to talk about their customers in a similar way as "confiscated or abducted" clients or customers.

[952] He means most of the Economists in the Guillaumin network who believed in the natural right to own and dispose of one's property without government interference.

[953] Bastiat made a similar argument about how protectionists opposed free traders by saying that there were "no absolute principles" which should be applied in all cases, that everything was "flexible" and negotiable except them giving up protectionist policies. See, ES1 18 "There Are No Absolute Principles" (c. 1845) (CW3, pp. 83-85).

[954] The master of writing short articles to debunk the "economic sophisms " of the protectionists was Frédéric Bastiat, who Molinari will acknowledge at the end of this section. He wrote about 72 of them, many of which he published in two collections published in 1846 and 1848. The remainder can be found in CW3, "Economic Sophisms "Third Series"," pp. 257-399.

[955] Molinari uses the English word "free traders" here. He means Richard Cobden who helped organize the Anti-Corn Law League which successfully lobbied the British government to end protectionism in 1846.

[956] William Johnson Fox (1786-1864) was a Member of Parliament, a journalist and renowned orator, and became one of the most popular speakers of the Anti-Corn Law League.

[957] (Molinari's note.) Speech given at a Meeting of 26 January 1844. Quoted by Bastiat in Cobden and the League, 1st ed., p. 182. [Editor's Note: Molinari also quoted this speech in S11. He uses a translation by Bastiat which differs slightly from the original version. This is retranslation of Bastiat's version. For the original English version see above, p. abc. W.J. Fox, speech given at the Covent Garden Theatre on January 25, 1844, Collected Works (1866), vol. 4, pp. 62-63.]

[958] These two sentences were cut from the Lalor version.

[959] Charles Coquelin, "Balance du commerce," DEP, T. 1,  pp. 101-6.

[960] The Zollverein was the German customs union that emerged in 1834 when the southwestern German states of Baden and Württemberg joined the Prussian customs union.

[961] Charles Coquelin, "Balance du commerce," DEP, T. 1, pp. 101-6.

[962] Or in modern parlance, "to create a level playing field."

[963] The following sentence was cut from the Lalor versions.

[964] A long foot note here was cut from the Lalor versions. See Long footnote 1 at the end.

[965] Molinari, "Émigration," DEP, T. 1, pp. 675-83.

[966] A.E. Cherbuliez, "Paupérisme," DEP, T. 2, pp. 333-39.

[967] Friedrich List's book Das nationale System der  politischen Ökonomie (The National System of Political Economy) was published in German in 1841 and translated into French in 1851. It was very critically reviewed by Adolphe Blanqui in the JDE in May 1852, who called him "un véritable transfuge, un renégat de la liberté commerciale" (a veritable defector and renegade from commercial liberty) (p. 78). See also Joseph Garnier, "List (Frédéric)," DEP, T. 2, pp. 76-82. Friedrich List, Système national d'économie politique (1851); "Système national d'économie politique, par Frédéric List." (Compte-rendu par M. BLANQUI) (JDE, 1852), pp. 78-82. In English, see, Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (1909).

[968] The following sentence was cut from the Lalor version.

[969] Sir John Bowring (1792-1872) was an English businessman, Member of Parliament (Bolton 1841-49), political economist, translator, and the fourth Governor of Hong Kong (1854-59).

[970] The Congrès des Économistes was founded by the Belgian Free Trade Association. A European-wide congress was held in Brussels in September 1847 which was attended by 170 people who were a "who's who" of the leading advocates of liberal political economy in Europe. It was at this conference that Molinari may have met Karl Marx who also attended.

[971] (Molinari's note.) Congrès des Économistes réuni à Bruxelles en 1847, p. 135-36.

[972] The "Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations" (also known as "The Great Exhibition" was held in Hyde Park, London, between 1 May and 15 October 1851.

[973] (Molinari's note.) Examen du système commercial connu sous le nom de système protecteur. — Appendice, p. 280. [Editor's note: See the second edition, Michel Chevalier, Examen du système commercial connu sous le nom de système protecteu (1853), "Lettres sur l'avancement comparé de l'industrie française et de l'industrie étrangère," I. "L'Europe," pp. 326-27.]

[974] (Molinari's note.) Discours de M. Thiers sur le régime commercial de la France, prononcé à l'Assemblée Legislative, le 27 juin 1851. [Editor's note: Thiers gave two speeches: CLXVII. "Discours sur le régime commercial de la France, discussion de la proposition de M. Sainte-Beuve, prononcé le 27 juin 1851, à la Chambre des députés," pp. 135-244; and CLXVIII. "Discours sur le régime commercial de la France, discussion de la proposition de M. Sainte-Beuve, prononcé le 28 juin 1851, à la Chambre des députés," pp. 245-75. In Adolphe Thiers, Discours parlementaires de M. Thiers (1880), vol. IX.

[975] (Molinari's note.) Examen du système commercial connu sous le nom de système protecteur. Pièces justificatives, deuxième lettre de M. Jean Dolfus, p. 354.[Editor's note: Second ed.: "Pièces justificatives, Lettre de M. J. Dolfus de Mulhouse," pp. 381-88. Seconde lettre du même," pp. 388-400.]

[976] Auguste Pierre Mimerel de Roubaix (1786-1872) was a textile manufacturer and politician from Roubaix who was a vigorous advocate of protectionism. He co-founded the protectionist "Association pour la défense du travail national" (Association for the Defense of National Employment) in October 1846 to counter the the French Free Trade Association for which Molinari and Bastiat worked.

[977] The Conservative prime minister Sir Robert Peel announced the repeal of the Corn Laws on 27 January 1846, to take effect on 1 February 1849 after a period of gradual reduction in the level of the duty. The act was passed by the House of Commons on 15 May and approved by the House of Lords on 25 June, thus bringing to an end centuries of agricultural protection in England.

[978] The following quotation was omitted from the Lalor version. (Note by Molianri.) "Lettre communiquée par M. Natalis Rondot à la Société d'Économie politique de Paris," (JDE, avril 1852), p. 192.

[979] Jérôme Adolphe Blanqui (1798-1854) was a liberal economist and brother of the revolutionary socialist Auguste Blanqui.

[980] Bastiat published his first collection of Economic Sophisms in January 1846 and his second in January 1848. They can be found, along with a third collection in CW3.

[981] Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) was the leader of the Tories, served as Home Secretary under the Duke of Wellington (1822–27) and was prime minister twice (1834–35, 1841–46). Molinari wrote the entry on Peel for the DEP: "Peel (Robert)," T. 2, pp. 351-54.

[982] (Molinari's note.) "My expectations concerning the tariff of 1846," wrote recently M. R.J. Walker, ex-minister of finance in the United States, "my expectations have been surpassed: customs revenue, which had been $26 million in that year under the tariff of 1842, in 1851 under the lower tariff regime were $50 million, and at the same time our exports doubled. Upon request by the Senate, I examined the matter in 1847 and the official report which I produced for them demonstrated that, taking into account the foreign market price, the increase in the price of imported goods, after the introduction of the tariff of 1842, the situation was that, in addition to the taxes levied and paid to the government, there was still a rise in prices which was equivalent to an additional tax imposed on the American consumers, the total cost of which could be estimated at $80 million. This enormous sum represents the cost of protection which resulted from too high a tariff. However," added M. Walker, " our tariff of 1842 was a lot less than your French tariff and it contained no protectionist component. It was clear to me that if your customs duties were cut back to just the amount necessary for fiscal purposes, imports alone would triple the amount of customs and would at the same time take a weight off commerce and even industry." "Lettre écrite à M. Horace Say, vice-président de la Société d'Économie politique, par M. R.-J. Walker" (JDE, Aug. 1852), p. 409.

[983] What follows is a long bibliography of works on trade and commerce which we do not include here for reasons of space. See, DEP, T. 1, pp. 61-63.

[984] (Molinari's note.) Enquête sur les fers, p. 70. [Editor's note: Enquête sur les fers. Commission formée avec l'approbation du roi (1828). Molinari also discusses this government inquiry and quotes this passage in his Histoire du tarif (1847), vol. 1, pp. 25 ff, 37 ff.

[985] (Molinari's note.) Enquête sur les fers, p. 70.

[986] Molinari uses the terms "fractionner" and "le fractionnement" throughout this entry. We have translated these as "to divide, break up, or fragment" and "division, breaking up, or fragmentation) accordingly.

[987] "Le fractionnement."

[988] Here Molinari uses the word "la morcellement" which was commonly used to describe the breaking or splitting up of holdings of land into smaller and smaller pieces as a result of French inheritance laws. he discusses this problem for French agriculture in S4.

[989] "Un principe d'émulation" might also be translated as "a principle of competition."

[990] The "Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations" (also known as "The Great Exhibition" was held in Hyde Park, London, between 1 May and 15 October 1851. It was the first in a series of so-called "World's Fairs" which became popular in Europe and America in the 19th century to showcase a country's economic development, industry, and culture. It was organized by the inventor Henry Cole and Prince Albert , the husband of the reigning monarch of the United Kingdom, Queen Victoria. See the almost rapturous article on "Expositions des produits de l'industrie" by Blanqui in DEP, vol. 1, pp. 46-51, on how strongly the economists thought such expositions could end national rivalries and promote peace.

[991] "Le fractionnement des sociétés."

[992] Molinari had personal experience of this, having been born in Liège in 1818 which was then part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and which would become part of the new Kingdom of Belgium in 1830. The rivalry between Dutch (Flemish) speakers and French speakers continues to this day.

[993] The Revolution of July 1830 in Paris which saw the overthrow of the Bourbon King Charles X and his replacement by Louis Philippe, sparked an uprising in Brussels and the French-speaking southern provinces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This lead to the secession of these provinces and the formation of the new Kingdom of Belgium.

[994] A reference to Say's Law of Markets, which states that "supply creates its own demand" or "goods are exchanged for others goods." See footnote on p. 476 ["that "products are bought with other products" which is a variant of "Say's Law" applied to foreign trade, namely that "supply creates its own demand."]

[995] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'Économie politique, liv. I, chap. XV, p. 145 (Guillaumin 1841 ed.)

[996] (Molinari's note.) Idem., liv. II, chap. IX. [Editor's note: The quote comes from a footnote added to the 6th edition of the Traité, vol. 2, p. 225. See 1841 Guillaumin ed. p. 408. This footnote does not appear to have been translated in the Biddle edition.]

[997] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'Économie politique, liv. I, chap. IX, p. 106 Guillaumin 1841 ed.

[998] Molinari uses the colourful expression "réunir toutes les nations en un seul troupeau gouverné par un berger omniarcal." Bastiat had a similar set of colorful terms to describe the would-be socialist planners of society, such as "the great mechanic," or social "gardeners." See "The Social Mechanism and its Driving Force," in Appendix 1 CW4 (forthcoming).

[999] (Molinari's note.) By Alphonse de Lamartine (Saint-Point, 28 mai 1841) in Revue des Deux mondes. [Editor's note: Alphonse de Lamartine, Œuvres complètes de Lamartine (1860), vol. 5, "la Marseillaise de la paix" p. 97.

[1000] Literally "sans être humanitaires ou unitéistes" (without being humanitarians or 'unitarians' (or "unity-ists")).

[1001] Molinari wrote the entry on "Paix. Guerre," DEP, T. 2, pp. 307-14.

[1002] As he argued in S11.

[1003] See "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government," in appendix 1.

[1004] "Le gouvernement-ulcère." Molinari discusses this idea at greater length in Cours, vol. 2, p. 530.

[1005] In S11 he argues not that government will be abolished by replaced by private, competing insurance companies, but that its "monopoly" over providing that service will be abolished. He also discusses the issue of nationalism under such a system of "la liberté du gouvernement."

[1006] In S11 Molinari argues that in fact the feeling of "nationality" would be stronger in a free society as national boundaries would be "natural" (i.e. not formed coercively).

[1007] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'Économie politique, liv. I, chap. XIV. Guillaumin 1841 ed. p. 133.

[1008] Here Molinari appears to be backtracking somewhat from his stronger claims made in S11 when speaking as "The Economist." He was criticised for doing this by Charles Coquelin in his review of Les Soirées in the JDE. Perhaps here, in writing this entry for the DEP, he was obliged to speak on behalf of all the economists, not just himself, and so took a more moderate position.

[1009] In his treatise the first edition of which appeared three years after this was written, Molinari listed all the ways in which governments "sin" (pécher) against the laws of political economy in their provision of goods and services, such as ignoring the division of labour, growing too large to best be able to satisfy the needs of consumers, prohibiting competition and free trade which keep prices down, and preventing the development of specialisation. See Cours, vol. 2, p. pp. 522-26.

[1010] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'Économie politique, liv. III, chap. VI, p. 477( Guillaumin 1841 ed.).

[1011] The words "cancerous" and "ulcerous" played an important part is Molinari's theory of the state. See "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government," in appendix 1. Also Molinari's entry on "Esclavage," DEP, T. 1, pp. 712-31.

[1012] Molinari dealt with the issue of the injustice of eminent domain in S3. There he took a much more radical position opposing the coercive acquisition of private property by the state on the grounds that it violated the rights of property owners. He was criticized for this position in at the October 1849 meeting of the Political Economy Society. See above, p. abc. Here, he seems to have backtracked by taking a more utilitarian approach to the problem, perhaps because he felt obliged to speak on behalf of all the Economists this time, instead of just himself as he did in S3.

[1013] (Molinari's note.) Henri comte de Boulainvilliers, Essais sur la noblesse de France (1732), pp. 4-5.

[1014] Perhaps a reference to Jacques Basnage (sieur de Beauval), Annales des Provinces-Unies (1719), pp. 94-99.

[1015] Sir Walter Scott's novel Ivanhoe: A Romance (1819). A French translation appeared in 1831.

[1016] To editor: See long footnote 1 at the end of this chapter.

[1017] (Molinari's note.) Histoire de la Conquête de L'Angleterre par les Normands, T. II, p. 31. [Editor's note: Molinari cites the 5th edition of 1835. In Hazlitt's translation the quoted passage reads: "This natural and general nobility of all the conquerors at large, increased in proportion to the personal authority or importance of individuals. After the nobility of the Norman king, came that of the provincial governor, who assumed the title of count or earl; after the nobility of the count came that of his lieutenant, called vice-count or viscount; and then that of the warriors, according to their grade, barons, chevaliers, ecuyers, or sergents, not equally noble, but all nobles by right of their common victory and their foreign birth. Vol. 1, p. 198.

[1018] Bastiat used the terms "la spoliation transitoire" (transitory or temporary plunder) and "la spoliation permanente" (permanent or institutionalised plunder). Mancur Olson would use a similar set of terms to describe the formation of early states, from "roving bandits" to "stationary bandits." See, Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (2000).

[1019] The Scottish historian William Robertson (1721–1793) who wrote History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V, with a View of the Progress of Society in Europe (1769) (4 vols.).

[1020] Note to Editor: See long footnote 2 at the end.

[1021] Molinari uses a very colorful expression here: "cette Californie religieuses du moyen âge." it should be noted that the California Gold Rush had begun in 1849 while Molinari was probably writing these lines. Molinari also referred to California and its mining laws in S3. He has the Conservative exclaim "Property! That is the real California. Long live property!" See above, pp. abc.

[1022] Henri Baudrillart, "Bourgeoisie," DEP, T. 1, pp. 200-6.

[1023] Note to Editor: See long footnote 3 at the end.

[1024] (Molinari's note.) La France avant la révolution, par Raudot, p. 103. [Editor's note: Claude Marie Raudot, La France avant la révolution (1841), pp. 75-76. On "la corvée" see the section on "Taxation," in Appendix 2.]

[1025] Comte Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Q'uest-ce que le tiers-état? (1839), pp. 75-77.

[1026] (Molinari's note.) See, on the subject of this policy of monopoly and of war of the British aristocracy, the introduction to Cobden et la Ligue, ou l'Agitation anglaise pour la liberté du commerce, by Fred. Bastiat. [Editor's note: Bastiat's Introduction will appear in CW6 (forthcoming).]

[1027] See his comments about the the copying by the bourgeoisie and then the gradual disappearance of aristocratic styles of dress in his entry "Fashion" (below).

[1028] Note to editor: See long footnote 4 at the end.

[1029] (Molinari's note.) Montesquieu, chap. VIII "In what Manner the allodial Estates were changed into Fiefs." [Editor's note: Montesquieu, The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (1777), vol. 2, p. 440.]

[1030] (Molinari's note.) De l'esprit des lois, book xxxi., chap. 8. [Editor's note: The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (1777), vol. 2, pp. 441-42.]

[1031] Gabriel François abbé Coyer, La noblesse commerçante (1756).

[1032] (Molinari's note.) Philippe-Auguste de Sainte-Foix Arcq, La noblesse militaire (1756), pp. 73, 87-8.

[1033] (Molinari's note.) La noblesse militaire, etc., p. 98. [Editor's note: 1756 ed., pp. 101-2.]

[1034] (Molinari's note.) Coyer, Développement et défense du système de la noblesse commerçante (1757).

[1035] Friedrich Melchior baron Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique (1813). 2 vols.

[1036] (Molinari's note.) Bentham, Théorie des récompenses et des peines, liv. II, chap. 5. Raisons pour l'économie des récompenses. Guillaumin ed. pp. 142-43.

[1037] A slightly different version of this was published in English as The Rationale of Reward (1790s). See The Works of Jeremy Bentham (1838-1843), vol. 2. The Rationale of Reward (1790s), Chapter V.: "Matter of Reward—Reasons for Husbanding," pp. 201 ff.

[1038] See also the entry for "Utopias," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[1039] Molinari, "L'utopie de la liberté (lettre aux socialistes) par un Rêveur."

[1040] Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la société future (1899), p. 237.

[1041] Coquelin's review of his book in JDE (November 1849) and the minutes of the meeting of the October meeting of the Société d'Économie Politique in JDE, [Anon.] Reports of a discussion "On the Proper Limits to the Power of the State." Dunoyer's comment is on p. 316. The minutes of these meetings can be found in the Addendum.

[1042] Molinari, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel (1852), p. 151.

[1043] Bastiat, ES2 11 "The Utopian" (CW3, pp. 187-98).

[1044] See "The Production of Security," "Malthusianism and the Political Economy of the Family," and "Religious Protectionism and Religious Contraband," in appendix 1. He continued to this in many of the entries he wrote for the DEP, such as the economics of fine arts, fashion, public monuments, towns, and travel. See the Addendum.

[1045] In the translation we have taken care to use Molinari's economic terminology whenever he does to describe the economic aspects of all these phenomena.

[1046] For the state of opinion when Molinari was working on this see Joseph Garnier, "Entrepreneurs d'industrie."

[1047] Richard Cantillon, Essay on the Nature of Trade in General (2015).

[1048] Dunoyer, LdT, vol. 2, p. 47.

[1049] S1 pp. 000.

[1050] Molinari discusses this in S9. See "Prostitution" in appendix 2.

[1051] Molinari, "PdS," pp. 289-90. Also in the Addendum, below, pp. abc.

[1052] Molinari, Cours, "Douzième leçon. Les consommations publiques," vol. 2, pp. 480-534.

[1053] Molinari, Cours, vol. 1, pp. 409-10.

[1054] Molinari, Cours, vol. 2, p. 532.

[1055] S3, pp. 000.

[1056] Molinari, Cours, vol. 2, pp. 520-26.

[1057] In S11 he refers to "un épicier (avec) la fourniture exclusive d'un quartier" (a grocer the exclusive right to supply a particular part of town) and "l'épicier privilégié" (the legally privileged grocer). In the Cours he refers to "l'épicier monopoleur" (the monopolist grocer) (p. 512).

[1058] Molinari, Cours, vol. 2, pp. 510-14.

[1059] The phrase "un gouvernement à bon marché" (a cheap or bargain priced government) was later adopted by Molinari to describe the kind of government he wanted to see. The phrase is used in S11, pp. 000 and dozens of times in Cours d'économie politique in relation to government services.

[1060] Molinari discusses this in S6.

[1061] See "C.S.", "Livrets d'ouvriers."

[1062] See "The "Chapelier" Law. 14 June, 1791" in Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, pp. 165-66. In French: Collection complète des lois, dÉcrets, ordonnances (1824), vol. 3, pp. 25-26. See the glossary on "Le Chapelier."

[1063] A.J. Rogron, Code pénal expliqué (1838), pp. 108-9.

[1064] Molinari, "Des Moyens d'améliorer le sort des classes laborieuses" in the journal La Nation, 23rd July, 1843. Then later as a pamphlet in 1844.

[1065] See Bastiat, "The Repression of Industrial Unions" (CW2, pp. 348-61).

[1066] Cherbuliez, "Coalitions," DEP, vol. 1, p. 382.

[1067] Molinari, Questions économiques à l'ordre du jour (1906), pp. 63-4.

[1068] The address "Aux Ouvriers" was published in the Courrier français on 20 July 1846 and reprinted in Questions d'économie politique, vol. I (1861), pp. 183-94.

[1069] See "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership," in appendix 1, for a discussion of Victor Cousin's theory of property and "le moi" (the Me, the Self) which Molinari later found very appealing.

[1070] Molinari, "Aux Ouvriers" p. 129.

[1071] Molinari, "Appel aux ouvriers" 20 juilllet, 1846, Le Courrier français, reprinted in Les bourses du travail (1893), p. 126-37. Quote, p. 126.

[1072] Molinari, "Les Coalitions des ouvriers" originally published in the Bourse du travail, 14 March, 1857 and reprinted in Questions d'économie politique, vol. I (1861), pp. 199-205. Quote on p. 201.

[1073] See the extracts from two early essays from 1843 and 1846 which Molinari includes as an Appendix to S6 in this volume. He summarizes his work in another appendix called "Historique de l'idée des Bourses du Travail" in Les Bourses du Travail (1893), pp. 256-77.

[1074] Raymund de Waha, Die Nationalökonomie in Frankreich (1910)."Die Gruppe der Unentwegten," pp. 72-96.

[1075] Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798). 1st edition. Chapter II, pp. 18-26.

[1076] The passage comes from Book IV, Chapter VI "Effects of the Knowledge of the Principal Cause of Poverty On Civil Liberty" in Malthus, An essay on the principle of population (1803, 2nd revised ed.), p. 531.

[1077] Malthus, Du Principe de population, ed. Joseph Garnier (1857).

[1078] Malthus' Du principe de population … prÉcédé d'une introduction et d'une notice, par M. G. de Molinari (1885).

[1079] Bastiat, "De la population" JDE, T. 15, no. 59, October 1846, pp. 217-34.

[1080] Bastiat, Economic Harmonies, (FEE ed.), p. 426.

[1081] See Bastiat's Chapter 16 on Population in the 1851 edition of Economic Harmonies and the editor Roger de Fontenay's Addendum, pp. 454-64. FEE trans., pp. 431 ff.

[1082] See Dunoyer's Report on the 1st edition of Molinari's Cours d'économie politique (1855) to the Academy reprinted in the 2nd ed. of 1863, Appendix, pp. 461-74.

[1083] Molinari, Cours d'économie politique (1855, 1863). Vol. 1. La Production et la distribution des richesses. 15th and 16th Leçon. Théorie de la population. 15th Leçon, pp. 391-418; 16th Leçon, pp. 419-60.

[1084] Malthus: Essai sur le principe de population, ed. G. de Molinari (1889).

[1085] Molinari, Cours, vol. 1, pp. 411-12.

[1086] Molinari, Cours, vol. 1, p. 439.

[1087] See Garnier, "Population."

[1088] Patricia James, Population Malthus (1979), pp. 386-87.

[1089] Mill, On Liberty (1859), chap. 5, Robson ed., p. 304.

[1090] L'Économiste belge, Supplément to the edition of 20 November, 1856, p. 5.

[1091] See the "Beacon for Freedom of Expression" database of banned books and the entry for the DEP <<http://search.beaconforfreedom.org/search/censored_publications/publication.html?id=9709582>.

[1092] Molinari, Cours, vol. 1, pp. 459-60.

[1093] Quesnay, "Le droit naturel" (1765), chap. III. "De l'inégalité du droit naturel des hommes," in Collection des principaux économistes, T. II. Physiocrates. (1846), vol. 1, p.46. Originally published in the Journal d'agriculture, September 1765.

[1094] Molinari edited vols. XIV andXV of Collection des principaux économistes: Mélanges d'économie politique I. D. Hume, etc. (1847) and Mélanges d'économie politique II. Necker, etc. (1848).

[1095] Joseph Garnier, Éléments de l'économie politique (1846).

[1096] Quesnay, "Maximes générales du gouvernement économique d'un royaume agricole" in Collection des principaux économistes, T. II. Physiocrates. (1846), vol. 1, p. 81.

[1097] Gustave de Molinari, Les Lois naturelles de l'économie politique (1887), Première partie: Les lois naturelles, pp. 1-31; La Morale économique (1888), Livre I chap. IV "Les lois naturelles qui régissent les phénomènes économiques de la production, de la distribution et de la consommation," pp. 10-19; Notions fondamentales économie politique et programme économique. (1891), Introduction Section I, pp. 2-11; Section I, chap. 1 "Les lois naturelles," pp. 55-70; Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la Société future (1899), Introduction-Les lois naturelles, pp. i-xxvii.

[1098] Above, pp. 000.

[1099] Above, pp. 000.

[1100] Above, pp. 000.

[1101] Above, pp. 000.

[1102] Molinari also called this "la loi du laissez-faire" (the law of laissez-faire) in "L'Utopie de la liberté" JDE (June 1848).

[1103] Above, pp. 000.

[1104] See "Harmony and Disharmony," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[1105] This very Hayekian notion of prices acting as a means of communicating information to consumers and producers can be found in "Septième leçon. L'équilibre de la production et de la consommation," Cours d'économie politique (1855 ed.), vol. 1, pp. 144-65.

[1106] Garnier, Éléments de l'économie politique (1846), pp. 63-64.

[1107] Molinari, "Le droit électorale" Courrier français, 23 juillet 1846. Reprinted in Questions d'économie politique et de droit public (1861), vol. 2, pp. 271-73. A translation of this can be found in the Addendum. [give pages numbers???]

[1108] Molinari, "Le droit électorale," p. 272.

[1109] Molinari, "Le droit électorale," p. 272.

[1110] Molinari, "Le droit électoral," p. 273.

[1111] These ideas have some similarity to the constitutional proposals Molinari would put forward in 1873 when the new constitution for the Third Republic was being discussed. Here Molinari proposed two chambers, an upper house elected by the largest tax payers, and a lower chamber elected by universal suffrage, with an executive with very limited powers elected by both chambers. See La République tempérée (1873).

[1112] See the discussion in Faccarello,"Bold Ideas. French liberal economists and the state: Say to Leroy-Beaulieu" European Journal of the History of Economic Thought (2010).

[1113] These are collected in Adolphe Thiers, Discours parlementaires de M. Thiers (1880), vol. 7 (Jan. 1846 - Feb. 1848); vol. 8 (July 1848 - Feb. 1850).

[1114] Molinari, review [CR] of Thiers' "De la propriété," JDE (January1849).

[1115] He referred to "une Compagnie d'actionnaires" (a company owned by shareholders) (p. 355), "une Compagnie d'assurance" (an insurance company) (p. 318), and "une Compagnie d'assurance mutuelle" (a mutual insurance company) (p. 353). All references to Thiers, De la propriété (1848).

[1116] Émile de Girardin, "Le Socialisme et l'impôt," La Presse, 25-30 Sept. and 1-2 Oct. 1849. This was republished as Les 52. XIII. Le socialisme et l'impôt (1849) and then expanded into a more substantial work on the history of taxation and Girardin's proposals for reform, L'impôt (1852. 6th edition).

[1117] A translation can be found in the Addendum.

[1118] Molinari, Cours, Douzième leçon, "Les consommations publiques," pp. 480-534.

[1119] Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Glasgow ed. vol. II, V.i.b, part ii: Of the Expense of Justice, pp. 720-21. This was quoted in "De la production de la sécurité," Section 6, p. 287; as well as S11, pp. 000.

[1120] De la Production de la sÉcurité, par M. G. de Molinari. Extrait du n° 95 du "Journal des Économistes," 15 février 1849. (1849).

[1121] Coquelin, "Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare, Entretiens sur les lois économiques et défense de la propriété," (JDE, Nov. 1849).

[1122] See [Anon.] Reports of a discussion "On the Proper Limits to the Power of the State." The minutes of these meetings have been translated and will appear in CW4 (forthcoming)  and also in the Addendum.

[1123] Molinari, Evolution politique, Chap. X "Les Gouvernements de l'avenir," p. 363. This is discussed in more detail in "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government," in Appendix 1.

[1124] It is in fact a return to an expression used in the subheading of S11 where he lists "la liberté de gouvernement" (the liberty of government) as one of the topics to be covered but which he never uses again in the book.

[1125] Molinari, Evolution politique, Chap. X "Les Gouvernements de l'avenir," pp. 376-77.

[1126] Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles, with Power and Market: Government and the Economy.Scholar's Edition (2009).

[1127] Gustave de Molinari, The Production of Security, trans. J. Huston McCulloch (1977).

[1128] David M. Hart, "Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-Statist Liberal Tradition," Journal of Libertarian Studies, (Summer 1981, Fall 1981, Winter 1982), pp. 83-104. A translation of Molinari's "Eleventh Soirée" was included as an Appendix in the latter volume, pp. 89-102.

[1129] Molinari, Cours d'économie politique (1855, 2nd ed. 1863), Part I, Quatrième leçon. "La valeur et la propriété," pp. 107-31. Molinari, La Morale économique (1888). Livre II. La matière de la morale. Le droit. Chap. I. "Définition du droit. Liberté et la propriété," p. 33 (and following chaps). Molinari, Notions fondamentales économie politique et programme économique. (1891), I. Lois et phénomène économiques. Chap XI. La propriété et la liberté. Accord de l'économie politique avec la morale," pp. 232-46.

[1130] Louis Leclerc, "Simple observation sur le droit de propriété," JDE (October 1848).

[1131] Leclerc, "Simple observation sur le droit de propriété," p. 304.

[1132] Molinari, [CR] Thiers, JDE (January 1849), pp. 166-67.

[1133] Above, pp. 000. Bastiat had a very similar view. See "Self-Ownership and the Right to Property," in Appendix 1 (CW5) (forthcoming).

[1134] Bastiat was more explicit in his defence of so-called "victimless crimes." See "Victimless Crimes," in Appendix 1 in CW5 (forthcoming).

[1135] Above, pp. 000.

[1136] Faucher, "Propriété" DEP; also in English: L. Faucher, "Property" in John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy (1899), vol 3, pp. 383-91.

[1137] Wolowski and Levasseur, "Propriété', Dictionnaire générale de la politique par Maurice Block (1863-64), vol. 2, pp. 682-93. For an English translation see "Louis Wolowski and Émile Levasseur on "Property" (1863)" in French Liberalism in the 19th Century: An Anthology, ed. Robert Leroux and David M. Hart (2012), pp. 243-54.

[1138] Charles Comte, Traité de la Propriété (1834), vol. 1, chap. X "De la conversion du territoire national en propriétés privées," pp. 139-61.

[1139] See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1965). "Of Civil Government," Chap. V. (para. 27) Of Property, p. 329.

[1140] See Pierre-Louis Roederer, Discours sur le droit de propriété, lus aux Lycée, les 9 décembre 1800 et 18 janvier 1801 (1839). "Premiere discours sur let droit du propriété, lu au Lycée, le 9 décembre 1800," pp. 7-24. An English translation can be found in Leroux and Hart (2012), pp. 11-19.

[1141] See Jacques Burlamaqui, Part III, chap. VIII "De l'origine et de la nature de la propriété," pp. 135 in Elémens du droit naturel (1820).

[1142] Other variations of this include the following: "l'affranchissement de la propriété" (the emancipation or liberation of property) is used seven times, "l'affranchissement pur et simple de la propriété" (the pure and simple emancipation of property) (Molinari's "Preface," pp. 000), "l'affranchissement complet, absolu de la propriété" (the complete and absolute emancipation of property) (Molinari's "Preface" (last paragraph), pp. 000), and "le complet affranchissement de la propriété" (the complete emancipation of property) (S1, (towards the end) pp. 000).

[1143] S6, pp. 000.

[1144] S11, (opening para), pp. 000.

[1145] S12 (near very end), pp. 000. Other expressions include: "un régime d'entière liberté" ( a regime of complete liberty), "un régime de pleine liberté économique" (a regime of complete economic liberty), "un régime de la propriété illimitée" (a regime of unlimited property rights), "un régime de liberté véritable" (a regime of real liberty), "ce régime de propriété individuelle" (this regime based upon individual property rights), "un régime de laisser-faire absolu" (a regime of absolute laissez-faire), "un régime de libre concurrence" (a regime based upon free competition), "un régime de libre gouvernement" (a regime of free or competing governments), "la société à la propriété pure" (a society based upon pure property rights).

[1146] S12, pp. 000.

[1147] Molinari, Cours d'Économie politique (1863 ed.), vol. 1, 4e Leçon "La valeur et la propriété"

[1148] Molinari, Cours, vol. 1, pp. 121-22.

[1149] Dunoyer, LdT, vol. 1, p. 17.

[1150] Dunoyer, LdT, vol. 1, p. 17.

[1151] Dunoyer, LdT, vol. 1, p. 24.

[1152] S1, pp. 000.

[1153] "Introduction" to Questions d'économie politique, vol. 1 (1861), pp. vi-vii.

[1154] Garnier, "Liberté du travail."

[1155] These can be found in the Addendum.

[1156] See note 305, p. ??? in S10).

[1157] Molinari, Cours d'Economie Politique (1863), vol. 1, "Introduction," pp. 23-24.

[1158] The amounts the state paid to each religion can be found in Table 6 of the "French Government's Budgets for 1848-49," in Appendix 3.

[1159] See Bastiat, ES2 1 "The Physiology of Plunder" (CW3, pp. 121 ff) and also "Theocratic Plunder," in Appendix 1 (CW5)

[1160]Molinari, "La liberté de l'intervention gouvernementale en matière des cultes. - Système français et système américain" which was first published in Économiste belge, 1 June 1857 and reprinted in Questions d'économique politique et de droit public (1861), vol. 1 pp. 351-6.

[1161] Cherbuliez, "Cultes religieuse," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 536 and 538.

[1162] Molinari, "Les Églises libres dans l'État libre," Économiste belge, 14 décembre 1867, no. 25, pp. 289-90.

[1163] See Molinari, Religion (1892) which was translated into English in 1894. Two years later he wrote another on Science et religion (1894).

[1164] Ricardo, Oeuvres complètes de David Ricardo (1847), vol. XIII of the Collection des principaux économistes.

[1165] See David Ricardo, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (2005). vol. 1 Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Chapter II: On Rent, p. 67.

[1166] Jean Baptiste Say, A Treatise on Political Economy (Biddle ed. 1855), Book II, chapter IX: Of the Revenue of Land," p. 360.

[1167] See "Service for Service," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[1168] All these essays and pamphlets appear in CW4 (forthcoming).

[1169] On Bastiat's early use of this expression see "Ceteris Paribus," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[1170] New Liberty Fund trans: Economic Harmonies, Chap. IX "Landed Property," p. 381 (draft). Otherwise FEE ed.: p. 261.

[1171] Molinari, [CR] "De la propriété, par M. Thiers" and "Lettre sur le prêt à intérêt."

[1172] S12, above, pp. 000.

[1173] Molinari, Cours d'économie politique (1st ed. 1855, revised 2nd ed. 1863). In vol. 1 there is a discussion of land and rent in "Treizième leçon. La part de la terre," pp. 338-61 and "Quatorzième leçon. La part de la terre (suite)," pp. 362-90. Quote from pp. 373-74.

[1174] Once again, Molinari's thinking on this matter is very similar to that of Bastiat. See "Disturbing and Restorative Factors," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[1175] Bastiat developed a very similar theory of "le déplacement" (displacement) caused by tariffs and other government interventions in the economy. See "Theory of Displacement," in Appendix 1, in CW5 (forthcoming).

[1176] S7, pp. 000.

[1177] S12, pp. 000.

[1178] He discusses this in greater length in his entry on "Fine Arts" in the DEP, which is in the Addendum.

[1179] See Molinari, "Documents extraits de l'enquête sur les théâtres," JDE (July 1850) and "Table 7. Expenditure by the Ministry of the Interior in 1848," in appendix 3.

[1180] [Conseil d'Etat.] Enquête et documents officiels sur les théâtres. Conseil d'Etat. Commission chargée de préparer la loi sur les théâtres (1849).

[1181] Molinari, "L'industrie des théâtres, à props de la crises actuelle," JDE (May 1849),"La liberté des théâtres, à props de deux nouveaux projects de lois soumis au Conseil d'État," (November 1849), and "L'enquête sue les théâtres," (May, 1850).

[1182] S8, pp. 000.

[1183] See Edgar Quinet, Œuvres complètes (1857), vol. 8, p. 112.

[1184] See Bernard Joseph Saurin, Spartacus (1830), pp. 35-136. Quote from p. 107.

[1185] S12, pp. 000.

[1186] See the entry for "Arago, Étienne" in the Glossary of Persons.

[1187] Étienne Arago, Les Aristocraties (1847), p. 130.

[1188] Molinari, "Nations." Also in the Addendum.

[1189] Molinari, "Ville." Also in the Addendum.

[1190] On Bastiat's theory of "le spoliateur" (the plunder) and "les spoliées" (the plundered) see "Bastiat's Theory of Class: The Plunderers vs. the Plundered" in Appendix 1 (CW3, pp. 473-85) and "Theory of Plunder," in Appendix 1 (CW5).

[1191] This lesser known tradition of thinking about class is explored in the Introduction to Social Class and State Power: Exploring an Alternative Radical Tradition, ed. David M. Hart, Gary Chartier, Ross Miller Kenyon, and Roderick T. Long (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

[1192] On his plans for a multi-volume work on "harmonies" (free economies) and 'disharmonies" (war and plunder) see "The Writing of the Harmonies," in Appendix 1 in CW5 (forthcoming).

[1193] Bastiat, ES2 1 "The Physiology of Plunder" (CW3, p. 125).

[1194] Ambroise Clément, "De la spoliation légale," JDE (July 1848).

[1195] S1, p.36.

[1196] S3, p.??? last page.

[1197] Molinari, "Nations," JDE, vol. 2, p. 261.

[1198] Michel Chevalier, Lettres sue l'Amérique du nord (1836), vol. 2, Chap. XXIX "Amélioration social," pp. 296-97.

[1199] Alphonse Toussenel, Les Juifs, rois de l'époque : histoire de la féodalité financière (1845), pp. 26ff.

[1200] Molinari, Cours, vol. 2, Douzième leçon. "Les consommations publiques," pp., 530-31.

[1201] Molinari, "XXe Siècle," JDE (January 1902), p. 6.

[1202] Molinari, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel. (1852), pp. 134-35.

[1203] The idea of "la classe budgétivore" (the budget eating class) first appeared in De l'enseignement obligatoire (1857), p. 332; then in the Économiste belge No. 45, 10 Novembre 1860, p. 2; in "Chronique" JDE T. XXX, 15 June 1885, p. 465; "Chronique" JDE T. XXXVII, 1887, p. 478; and then used to great effect in "Le XXe siècle," JDE (1902), p. 8.

[1204] For background see in the DEP, H. Passy, "Utilité" and "Valeur."

[1205] See "Service for Service," in appendix 1 (CW4).

[1206] Bastiat used the example of the Swedish diva, Jenny Lind, who was popular in England and France at the time and whose voice provided "services" of a non-material kind to patrons who bought tickets to attend her concerts.

[1207] Molinari's Obituary of Bastiat, "Nécrologie. — Bastiat, Frédéric." JDE (February 1851), p. 193.

[1208] Bastiat, Economic Harmonies, chap. V "On Value, new LF trans, p. 191; FEE ed., p. 102.

[1209] Bastiat, Economic Harmonies, chap. V "On Value, new LF trans, pp. 210-11; FEE ed., p. 121.

[1210] Economic Harmonies, Condillac is discussed in Chap. IV "Exchange," new LF trans, p. 80; FEE ed., p. 66; Storch is discussed in Chap. V "On Vale," new LF trans., p. 149; FEE ed., pp. 142-43.

[1211]Molinari, Cours d'économie politique (1st ed. 1855), vol.1, Third Lesson "La valeur, et le prix" pp. 80-106. The following quotations come from pp. 84-86.

[1212] In ES3 6 "The People and the Bourgeoisie" (CW3, p. 286).

[1213] Bastiat campaigned to ban civil servants from also sitting in the Chamber. See "Parliamentary Conflicts of Interest" (March 1843) (CW1, pp. 452-57).

[1214] Patrick J. Harrigan, "Pubic Instruction," in Historical Dictionary of France from the 1815 Restoration to the Second Empire. Vol. 2, pp. 841-847.

[1215] De l'Enseignement obligatoire. Discussion entre M. G. de Molinari et M. Frédéric Passy (1859).

[1216] Patricia O'Brien, "L'Embastillement de Paris: The Fortification of Paris during the July Monarchy," French Historical Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 63-82.

[1217] François Arago, Sur les Fortifications de Paris (1841) and Études sur les fortifications de Paris (1845). Michel Chevalier, Les fortifications de Paris, lettre à M. Le Comte Molé (1841) and Cours d'Économie politique fait au Collège de France (1851, 1st ed. 1844), vol. 2, "Douzième leçon. Concours de l'armée française aux travaux des fortifications de Paris," pp. 183-96.

[1218] Édouard Romberg, Compte rendu des travaux du Congrès de la propriété littéraire et artistique (1859), 2 vols. "France. - Notice historique sur la propriété littéraire," pp. 161-67; Législation, pp. 168 ff.

[1219] Alfred Villefort, De la propriété littéraire et artistique au point de vue international (1851), "La France," pp. 1-9.

[1220] Molinari, "Propriété littéraire et artistique."

[1221] Renouard, "Marques de fabrique" in the DEP and Du droit industriel dans ses rapports avec les principes du droit civil sur les personnes et sur les choses (1860), Livre Troisième "Du domaine privilégié," Chap. IV "Marques de fabrique et de commerce" , pp. 370-405. The government Report of 1847: Chambre des Députés. Séance du 15 juillet 1847 Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l'examen du projet de loi sur les marques de fabrique et de commerce (1847).

[1222] Charles Coquelin, "Brevets d'invention" and Renouard, Traité des brevets d'invention (1st ed. 1825, 1844).

[1223] Parent-Duchâtelet, De la prostitution dans la ville de Paris (1857), vol. 1, p. 686.

[1224] See "Table 6. Details of Expenditure for Section III: Ministerial Services," in appendix 3.

[1225] Michel Chevalier, "Statistique des travaux publics, sous le Gouvernement de Juillet," AEPS (1849), pp. 209-37.

[1226] Lobet, "Chemins de fer," in AEPS (1848), p. 294.

[1227] Michel Chevalier, "Chemins de fer."

[1228] Horace Say, "Douane," DEP, vol. 1, p. 597. Additional information can be found in Molinari, "Union douanière," DEP, vol. 2, p. 788; Pierre Clément, Histoire du système protécteur en France (1854); Henri Fonfrède, "Du système prohibitif" in Oeuvres de Henri Fonfrède (1846), Vol. 7, pp. 285, 319, 344; Léon Faucher, "Du projet de loi sur les douanes," JDE (February 1848).

[1229] Horace Say, "Douane," p. 586.

[1230] See Horace Say, "Douanes" and "Table 5. Details of Revenue," in appendix 3.

[1231] See Horace Say, "Douanes," p. 597.

[1232] See "Table 8. Details of Expenditure for Section IV: Costs of Administering and Collecting Taxes and Duties," in appendix 3.

[1233] Antonio Tena Jungito, "Assessing the protectionist intensity of tariffs in nineteenth-century European trade policy," in Classical Trade Protectionism 1815-1914 (2005), pp. 99-120.

[1234] Frank Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (1914), pp. 110-115.

[1235] See "Table 5. Details of Revenue," in appendix 3,  "French Government's Budgets for Fiscal Years 1848–49" for details.

[1236] Parieu, "Octrois," DEP, vol. 2, p. 287.

[1237] Horace Say, Paris, son octroi et ses emprunts (1847) and Parieu, "Octrois."

[1238] Parieu, "Octrois," p. 287.

[1239] Courcelle Seneuil, "Prestations."

[1240] For a summary of wage rates in Paris see Chambre de Commerce de Paris [Horace Say], Statistique de l'Industrie a Paris résultant de l'enquête (1851); Summarized by H. Say in AEPS (1852), pp. 217–30; and revised in Horace Say, "Du taux des salaires à Paris," JDE, 2nd. série, T. VII, no. 7, 15 Juillet 1855, pp. 17-27.

[1241] See, Maurice Block, Statistique de la France (1860). Vol. 1, Chap. VII Bienfaisance, section on "Bureaux de bienfaisance," pp. 291-95.

[1242] See Richard Bonney, "The Apogee and Fall of the French Rentier Regime, 1801-1914," in Paying for the Liberal State: The Rise of Public Finance in Nineteenth-Century Europe (2010), pp. 81-102; J.C. Toutain, Le Produit Intérieur Brut de la France de 1789 à 1982 (1987); J.C. Toutain, "Le Produit Intérieur Brut de la France de 1789 à 1990," ISMEA, Histoire et Sociétés, histoire économique et quantitative, 1, no. 11, 1997, pp. 5-136; and Toutain Jean-Claude, "Comparaison entre les différentes évaluations du produit intérieur brut de la France de 1815 à 1938 ou L'histoire économique quantitative a-t-elle un sens?" Revue économique, volume 47, n°4, 1996. pp. 893-919.

[1243] The conservative politician Adolphe Thiers, who had served as Prime Minister and Minister of the Agriculture and the Interior during the July Monarchy, gave an estimate of the gross domestic product of France in 1848 of about 12 billion francs in his book De la propriété (1848) which is very similar to this. See pp. 352-53.

[1244] See Toutain "Comparaison entre les différentes évaluations du produit intérieur brut de la France," Table 8, p. 912. These figures come from 1860 and are the earliest we have. I believe those for 1850 would be similar.

[1245] "General Government Spending," OECD, 2016. <https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm>. Spending by the U.S. government was 37.7%.

[1246] Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912), p. 381. See the entry for "'The Four Musketeers' of French Political Economy," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[1247] Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) (2012), p. 381. See the entry for "'The Four Musketeers' of French Political Economy," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[1248] W.J. Fox, speech given at the Covent Garden Theater on January 25, 1844, Collected Works, vol. IV: Anti-Corn Law Speeches, pp. 62-63.

[1249] See the full list of publications compiled by Benoît Malbranque, "Liste complète des titres publiés par Guillaumin (1837-1910)" (2017).

[1250] Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) (2012), p. 381. See the entry for "'The Four Musketeers' of French Political Economy," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms,  and Levan-Lemesle, A. L.. "Guillaumin, éditeur d'économie politique, 1801-1864)," Revue d'économie politique, vol. 95, no. 2, 1985, pp. 134-49.

[1251] Louis Leclerc, "Simple observation sur le droit de propriété," JDE (October 1848).

[1252] See A full and revised report of the three days' discussion in the Corporation of Dublin on the repeal of the Union (1843), pp. 11, 36.

[1253] See Edgar Quinet, Œuvres complètes (1857), vol. 8, p. 112.

[1254] The most complete edition of Smith's works is the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, originally published by Oxford University Press (1960) and later by published by Liberty Fund in paperback (1982–87).

[1255] See Bernard Joseph Saurin, Spartacus (1830), pp. 35-136.

[1256] See Les Juifs, rois de l'époque : histoire de la féodalité financière (1845), pp. 26ff.

[1257] Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) (2012), p. 80.

[1258] G. de Molinari, "Dictionnaire de l'économie politique," JDE (December 1853).

[1259] Bastiat, "The State (draft)" (Jacques Bonhomme, 11 June 1848), pp.105-6.

[1260] The articles and book reviews by Molinari which appeared in the JDE between 1841 and 1865 can be found listed in Table alphabétique générale des matières contenues dans les deux premières séries (Années 1841-1865) du Journal des Économistes (1883), "Molinari," pp. 127-29.

[1261] Joseph Garnier, "Review of Molinari's Études économiques (1846)," JDE (May1846).

[1262] Gustave de Molinari, "De l'Agriculture en Angleterre," JDE (January 1847).

[1263] For a history of the JDE See Lutfalla, Michel. "Aux origines du libéralisme économique en France: Le 'Journal; des économistes'" (1972).

[1264] Molinari, [CR] "Frédéric Bastiat: Lettre d'un habitant des Landes," JDE (July 1878). See also "The Law Abiding Revolutionary" in "Bastiat's Political Writings: Anecdotes and Reflections" (CW2, pp. 401-3).

[1265] [Mignet], Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques (1846), vol. 9, pp. 5, 8, 84.

[1266] Amable Charles comte de Franqueville, Le premier siècle de l'Institut de France (1896). On Bastiat, vol. 2, pp. 233-34; on Molinari, vol. 2, p. 293.

[1267] See the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences website <http://www.asmp.fr/sommaire.htm>.

[1268] See the entry for "The National Workshops (Ateliers Nationaux)," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[1269] Clément, "Association."

[1270] Lawrence H. White, "Competing Money Supplies" The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics

[1271] Coquelin provides a history of banking and a defense of his ideas in the article "Banque" in DEP. See also, J.-E. Horn, La liberté des banques (1866).

[1272] "Statement of Electoral Principles in April 1849" and "Statement of Electoral Principles in 1849. To MM. Tonnelier, etc." (CW1, pp. 390-95).

[1273][Horace Say], Statistique de l'Industrie a Paris résultant de l'enquête (1851), "Chap. XXII. 13e Groupe - Imprimerie, Gravure, Papeterie," pp. 187-94.

[1274] Coquelin, "Centralisation," DEP, vol. 1, p. 292.

[1275] Dupuynode, "De la centralisation," JDE (July 1848), p. 417.

[1276] Charles Dunoyer, L'Industrie et la Morale considérées dans leurs rapports avec la liberté (1825), p. 366.

[1277] [Molinari], "Chronique," JDE (1 April 1848).

[1278] Molinari Obituary of Joseph Garnier, [Nécrologie] "Garnier, Joseph." JDE (October 1881). Molinari tells a similar story in his obituary of Coquelin with the added detail that the economists chose not to fight back and so let the communists win by not throwing a single punch to defend themselves: Molinari, "[Nécrologie] "Charles Coquelin," JDE (September and October 1852), p. 172.

[1279] Molinari's account of the 1848 Revolution and the coming to power of Napoleon can be found in Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel (1852). See also Molinari, Les Clubs rouges pendant le siège de Paris (1871) and, Le Mouvement socialiste et les réunions publiques avant la révolution du 4 septembre 1870 (1872). See Minart, p. 74.

[1280] See, Congrès des Économistes réunis à Bruxelles, par les soins de l'Association belge pour la liberté commercial. Session de 1847. Séances des 16, 17 et 18 septembre. (Bruxelles: Imprimerie de Deltombe, 1847). Attendee list pp. 5-9.

[1281] See MECW Volume 38, footnote on p. 162.

[1282] Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works, vol. 6. Marx Engels 1845-48 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2010). See, Frederick Engels, "The Economic Congress," pp. 274-78; Karl Marx, "The Protectionists, the Free Traders and the Working Class," pp. 279-81; and Frederick Engels, "The Free Trade Congress at Brussels," pp. 282-90.

[1283] Parieu, "Succession."

[1284] Legoyt, "Morcellement" and J. R. McCulloch, A Treatise on the Succession to Property vacant by Death (1848).

[1285] Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) (2012), p. 381.

[1286] Molinari's articles in the DEP:  "Liberté du commerce," "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)," and "Tarifs de douane."

[1287] See Dunoyer's L'Industrie et la morale considérées dans leurs rapports avec la liberté (1825).

[1288] Coquelin, "Industrie."

[1289] Dictionnaire de l'Académie française (1835. 6e édition). <https://portail.atilf.fr/dictionnaires/ACADEMIE/SIXIEME/sixieme.fr.html>.

[1290] See Bastiat, ES2 3 "The Two Axes" (CW3, pp. 138-42), which was subtitled "A petition from Jacques Bonhomme, Carpenter, to Mr. Cunin-Gridaine, Minister of Trade."

[1291] Benjamin Franklin, Mélanges de morale, d'économie et de politique (1824).

[1292] Melanges d'économie politique I, ed. Eugène Daire and G. de Molinari (1847), vol. XIV of CPE.

[1293] Ludovic Hamon, Les Soirées de Jacques Bonhomme (1851).

[1294] Bastiat, CW1, pp. 156-57.

[1295] Garnier, "Laissez faire, laissez passer," DEP, vol. 2, p. 19.

[1296] See Clément, "Produits immatériels" and Charles Dunoyer, "Production. Say's discussion of immaterial goods and the productivity of the industrial entrepreneur can be found in "Analogie des produits immatériels, avec tous les autres" and "De quoi se composent les travaux de l'industrie" chapters V and VI of Part One of the Cours complet d'économie politique pratique (1840), vol. 1, pp. 89-102.

[1297] See Legoyt, "Mines, minières et carrières."

[1298] See Turgot, "Mémoir sur les mines et carrières," in Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. Eugène Daire et Hyppolyte Dussard, vols. III and IV of CPE (1844), 2 volumes. "Memoir," vol. 2, pp. 130-165. See the note on p. 132.

[1299] See his discussion in LdT (1845), vol. 2, Bk. VIII, Chap. 2 "De la liberté des industries extractives," pp. 116-90 and in two articles in the JDE, T. 3, 1842: "Nouvelle nomenclature des arts qui agissent sur le monde matériel, suivie de remarques sur la nature, l'influence et les moyens des industries extractives," pp. 1-18 and "Des industries extractives; de leur nature, de leur influence et de leurs moyens," pp. 113-153.

[1300] See Comte, Traité de la propriété, vol. 1, chap. XXII "De la propriété des richesses minérales, et des limites qui en résultent pour les propriétés de la surface," pp. 408-30.

[1301] See Coquelin, "Banque," Du crédit et des banques (1848). And Molinari, [Nécrologie] "Charles Coquelin," JDE, (Sept-Oct. 1852).

[1302] See White, Fiat Money Inflation in France (1896) and Charles Coquelin, "Assignats."

[1303] Coquelin, "Cours forcé."

[1304] David Ricardo, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, vol. 3 Pamphlets and Papers 1809-1811. "High Price of Bullion."

[1305] Horace Say, "Monts-de piété."29-35.

[1306] Thomas Perronet Thompson, The Article on Free Trade, from the Westminster Review (1831).

[1307] Thomas Perronet Thompson, Les Singes économistes (1832).

[1308] See Legoyt, "Morcellement" and Parieu, "Succession." See also Molinari's discussion of this in "The Fourth Evening" in Les Soirées (1849). His solution was to turn the family farm into a business run by an entrepreneur and to expand the size of farms to lower costs.

[1309] See the history of the National Garde by Charles Comte, Histoire complète de la Garde national (1831).

[1310] Molinari, "Le Congrès de la paix, à Paris," JDE (September 1849). See also Joseph Garnier, Congrès des amis de la paix universelle réuni à Paris en 1849 (1850) and the English language version, Report of the Proceedings of the Second General Peace Congress, held in Paris, on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th of August, 1849 (1849).

[1311] Molinari's articles in the DEP:  "Paix, Guerre" and "Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix)."

[1312] See William B. Cohen, Français et Africains: Les Noirs dans le regard des Blancs 1530-1880 (1980), "Le racisme scientifique," p. 311.

[1313] Collection des principaux économistes, T. II. Physiocrates, par Eugène Daire (1846). 2 vols.; and T. III and IV. Œuvres de Turgot, par M. Eugène Daire (1844).

[1314] "Le droit naturel" (1765) in CPE, T. II. Physiocrates. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846), vol. 1, p.46; and "Maximes générales du gouvernement économique" in ibid. p. 81.

[1315] See "Table 7. Expenditure by the Ministry of the Interior in 1848," in appendix 3.

[1316] Léon Faucher, "Property."

[1317] See "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership" and  "Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property," in appendix 1.

[1318] Charles Comte, Traité de la Propriété (1834), vol. 1, chap. X "De la conversion du territoire national en propriétés privées," pp. 139-61.

[1319] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1965). "Of Civil Government," Chap. V. (para. 27) Of Property, p. 329.

[1320] Pierre-Louis Roederer, Discours sur le droit de propriété (1839). "Premiere discours sur let droit du propriété, lu au Lycée, le 9 décembre 1800," pp. 7-24.

[1321] Burlamaqui, Elémens du droit naturel (1820), Part III, chap. VIII "De l'origine et de la nature de la propriété," pp. 135.

[1322] Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (Glasgow ed.), vol. 2. Book V. Chapter 1, PART III: Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions, p. 724.

[1323] J.B. Say, Cours complet d'économie politique pratique (1840), vol. II, Part 7, chap. XXIII "Dépense des routes," pp. 306-7.

[1324] Jules Dupuit, De l'influence des péages sur l'utilité des voies de communication (1849); articles in DEP, "Péages," "Routes et chemins," "Voies de communication."

[1325] See the entry for "Phrenology," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[1326] Victor Courtet de l'Isle, La Science politique fondée sur la science de l'homme (1838); and Tableau ethnolographique du genre humain (1849). The Science politique (1838) has an interesting analysis of the racial ideas of Benjamin Constant, Charles Dunoyer, and Charles Comte (Pt. I, chap. VIII, pp. 102ff.)

[1327] Molinari, La Viriculture (1897).

[1328] See also Appendix 4: A Brief Chronology of the 1848 Revolution and the Second Republic.

[1329] See Garnier, Le Droit au travail à l'Assemblée Nationale (1848) andFaucher, "Droit au travail."

[1330] Le Droit au travail à l' Assemblée Nationale, pp. 373–74.

[1331] See also the entry for "'The Four Musketeers' of French Political Economy," in the Glossary of Subjects and Terms.

[1332] Molinari, Études économiques. L'Organisation de la liberté industrielle et l'abolition de l'esclavage (1846) and"Esclavage" in the DEP.

[1333] See the lengthy bibliographical essay on "Socialistes, Socialisme"by Louis Reybaud in the DEP.

[1334] ["M."], "Introduction à la huitième année," JDE (December 1849), p. 2.

[1335] Molinari, [Nécrologie] "Garnier, Joseph," JDE (October 1881), p. 9.

[1336] Molinari, Questions d'économie politique et de droit public (1861), "Préface," vol. 1, p. ix.

[1337] A history of the Society can be found in Breton, Yves. "The Société d'économie politique of Paris (1842–1914)," in The Spread of Political Economy and the Professionalisation of Economists (2001).

[1338] Hippolyte Passy, "Utopie."

[1339] Bastiat, ES2 11 "The Utopian" (January 1847) (CW3, pp. 187-98).

[1340] [Molinari],"L'Utopie de la liberté. Lettres aux socialistes," JDE (June 1848). Molinari admits to being the author in the appendix to Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la société future (1899), p. 237

[1341] Coquelin's review in JDE (November 1849) and the minutes of the meeting of the October meeting of the Société d'Économie Politique in JDE (October 1849). Dunoyer's comment is on p. 316.