The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury; Now First Collected and Edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., (London: Bohn, 1839-45). 11 vols. Vol. 8. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/771,
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Vol. 1 of Hobbes’ translation. Thucydides was one of the greatest of the ancient Greek historians because of his attention to accurate research. His account of the 5th century BC struggle between Athens and Sparta is one of the first works of history to combine political and ethical reflections with history writing.
The text is in the public domain.
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The estate of Greece, derived from the remotest known antiquity thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.—The occasion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of the Athenians with the Corinthians concerning Corcyra and Potidæa.—The Lacedæmonians, instigated by the confederates, undertake the war; not so much at their instigation, as of envy to the greatness of the Athenian dominion.—The degrees by which that dominion was acquired.—The war generally decreed by the confederates at Sparta.—The demands of the Lacedæmonians.—The obstinacy of the Athenians; and their answer by the advice of Pericles.
1. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as1 they warred against each other, beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot; with expectation it should prove a great one, and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it: conjecturing so much, both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner of provision; and also because he Edition: current; Page: saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction, some then presently and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, reaching also to part of the barbarians1, and, as a man may say, to most nations. For the actions that preceded this, and those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means clearly be discovered; yet for any argument that, looking into times far past, I have yet light on to persuade me, I do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.
2. For it is evident that that which now is called Hellas2, was not of old constantly inhabited; but that at first there were often removals, every one easily leaving the place of his abode to the violence always of some greater number. For whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse but with fear, neither by sea nor land; and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live upon it, without any stock of riches3, and planted nothing; (because it was uncertain when another should invade them and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls); but made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day: they made little difficulty to change their habitations. And for this cause they were of no ability at all, either for greatness of cities or other provision. But the Edition: current; Page: fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessalia, and Bœotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus, except Arcadia; and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men, both caused seditions, whereby they were ruined at home; and withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers. From hence it is that Attica1, from great antiquity for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the same people2. And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said, that Greece3, by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like augmentation. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves to Athens; where receiving the freedom of the city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, as Attica, being incapable of them itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.
3. And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. For before the Trojan war nothing Edition: current; Page: appeareth to have been done by Greece in common; nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum1 (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis, and called in for their aid into other cities; these cities, because of their conversing with them, began more particularly to be called Hellenes: and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer. For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not anywhere that name in general; nor indeed to any but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis, and were the first so called: but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achæans. Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; because the Grecians2, as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them. The Grecians3 then, neither as they had that name in particular by mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for want of strength and correspondence, enter into any action with their forces joined. And to that Edition: current; Page: expedition they came together by the means of navigation, which the most part1 of Greece had now received.
4. For Minos was the most ancient of all that by report we know to have built a navy. And he made himself master of the now Grecian Sea2; and both commanded the isles called Cyclades, and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians and constituting his own sons there for governors; and also freed the seas of pirates as much as he could, for the better coming in, as is likely, of his own revenue.
5. For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent lived near unto the sea, or else inhabited the islands, after once they began to3 cross over one to another in ships, became thieves, and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves and to fetch in maintenance for the weak; and falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly4 inhabited, Edition: current; Page: rifled them, and made this the best means of their living; being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace, but rather carrying with it something of glory. This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. The same also is proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce men questioning1 of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether they be thieves or not; as a thing neither scorned by such as were asked, nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know. They also robbed one another within the main land. And much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians called Ozolæ2, the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent from their old trade of thieving.
6. For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed, because their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe; and accustomed themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. Amongst whom, the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour, and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were anything stepped into years, laid away upon the same3 delicacy, not long after, the fashion Edition: current; Page: of wearing linen coats and golden grasshoppers1, which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair. From whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. But the moderate2 kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of these times, was first taken up by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons. The same were also the first, that when they were to contend in the Olympic games3, stripped themselves naked4 and anointed their bodies with ointment: whereas in ancient times, the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches; nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the exercise. It may likewise by5 many other things be Edition: current; Page: demonstrated, that the old Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the barbarians of the present age.
7. As for cities, such as are of late foundation and since the increase of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since more plenty of riches, have been walled about and built upon the shore; and have taken up isthmi, [that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea], both for merchandise and for the better strength against confiners. But the old cities, men having been1 in those times for the most part infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well in the islands as in the continent. For others2 also that dwelt on the sea–side, though not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies. And even to these times, those people are planted up high in the country.
8. But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phœnicians. For by them were the greatest part of the islands3 inhabited; a testimony whereof is this. The Athenians, when in this present war4 they hallowed the isle of Delos and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead, found that more than half of them were Carians5; known so to be, both Edition: current; Page: by the armour buried with them, and also by their manner of burial at this day. And1 when Minos his navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more free. For he expelled the malefactors out of the islands, and in the most of them planted colonies of his own. By which means they who inhabited the sea–coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; of whom some, grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it came to pass, that rising to power they proceeded afterward to the war against Troy.
9. And to me it seemeth that Agamemnon2 got together that fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors3 of Helena, bound thereto by oath to Tindareus, as for this, that he exceeded the rest in power. For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts4 of Edition: current; Page: the Peloponnesians, say that first Pelops, by the abundance of his wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, obtained such power amongst them, as, though he were a stranger, yet the country was called1 after his name; and that this power was also increased by his posterity. For Euristheus being slain in Attica by the Heracleides2, Atreus, that was his uncle3 by the mother, and was then abiding4 with him as an exiled person for fear of his father for the death of Chrysippus5, and to whom Euristheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Euristheus came not back, (the Mycenians being willing to it for fear of the Heracleides, and because he was an able man and made much of the common people), obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ, and of whatsoever else was under Euristheus, for himself; and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the Perseides6. To which greatness Agamemnon7 succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and assembled the said Edition: current; Page: forces, not so much upon favour as by fear. For it is clear, that he himself both conferred most ships to that action, and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer, (if any think his testimony sufficient); who, at the delivery of the sceptre unto him, calleth him1, “of many isles and of all Argos King.” Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such2 as were adjacent, which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition we are to estimate what were those of the ages before it.
10. Now seeing Mycenæ was3 but a small city, or if any other of that age seem but of light regard, let not any man for that cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have said, and fame reported it to be4. For if the city of Lacedæmon were now desolate, and nothing of it left but the temples and floors of the buildings, I think it would breed much unbelief in posterity long hence of their power in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts5 of Peloponnesus it possess two6, and hath the leading of the rest, and also of many confederates Edition: current; Page: without; yet the city being not close built, and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because1 it is but scatteringly inhabited after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture, by the sight of their city, that their power were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous [concerning the forces that went to Troy], nor have in regard so much the external show of a city as the power: but we are to think, that that expedition was indeed greater than those that went before it, but yet inferior to those of the present age; if in this also2 we may credit the poetry of Homer, who being a poet was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet even thus it cometh short. For he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels; those that were of Bœotians carrying one hundred and twenty men a–piece, and those which came with Philoctetes fifty: setting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort and the least; and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest, he maketh in his catalogue no mention at all: but declareth that they who were3 in the vessels of Philoctetes, served both as mariners and soldiers; Edition: current; Page: for he writes, that they who were at the oar, were all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along, except kings1 and such as were in chief authority; especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion. So then, if by the greatest and least one estimate the mean of their shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men considered as sent jointly from all Greece, were not very many.
11. And the cause hereof was not so much want of men, as of wealth. For, for want of victual they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped2 might both follow the war and also maintain itself. When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight, (which is manifest; for else they could not have fortified their camp), it appears that from that time forward they employed not there their whole power, but that for want of victual they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus, and part to fetch in booties; whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years resistance, as being ever a match for so many as Edition: current; Page: remained at the siege. Whereas1, if they had gone furnished with store of provision, and with all their forces, eased of boot–haling and tillage, since they were masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they strove not with their whole power, but only with such a portion of their army as at the several occasions chanced to be present; when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place both in less time and with less labour. But through want of money, not only they were weak matters, all that preceded this enterprise; but also this, which is of greater name than any before it, appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame and report, which by means of the poets now goeth of it.
12. For also after the Trojan war the Grecians continued still their shiftings and transplantations; insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power. For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused not a little innovation; and in most of the cities there arose seditions; and those which were driven out, built2 cities for themselves in other places. For those that are now called Bœotians, in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves in that country, which now Bœotia, was then called Cadmeis. (But there was in the Edition: current; Page: same country a certain portion of that nation before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy). And in the eightieth year, the Dorians1 together with the Heracleides seized on Peloponnesus. And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest; and shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the Edition: current; Page: islands; and the Peloponnesians most of Italy1 and Sicily, and also certain parts of the rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.
13. But when the power of Greece was now improved, and2 the desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities there were erected tyrannies: (for before that time, kingdoms with honours limited were hereditary): and the Grecians built navies, and became more seriously addicted to the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping3 into the nearest to that which is now in use; and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first4 gallies of all Greece. Now5 it is well known that Aminocles, the ship–wright of Corinth, built four ships at Samos: and from the time that Aminocles went to Samos until the end6 of this present war, are at the most but three hundred years. And the most ancient naval battle that we know of, was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyræans7; and from that battle to the same time, are but two Edition: current; Page: hundred and sixty years. For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic; (because the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to another but through the Corinthians’ territory); and was also wealthy in money, as appears by the1 poets, who have surnamed this town the rich. And after the Grecians had2 commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates; and affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money. After this, the Ionians, in the times of Cyrus first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy; and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast. Also Polycrates3, who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had a strong navy, wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; and amongst the rest having won Rhenea4, he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The5 Phocæans likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians6 in a fight at sea.Edition: current; Page: 
14. These were the greatest navies extant. And yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels1 of fifty oars and with long boats, as well as those of former times. And it was but a little before the Medan war2 and death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyræans had of galleys any number. For these3 last were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece, before the invasion of the Medes. And the people of Ægina and the Athenians4 had but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oars a–piece; and that so lately5, as but from the time that the Athenians making war on Ægina, and withal expecting the coming of the barbarian, at the persuasion of Themistocles built those ships which they used in that war. And these also not all had decks.
15. Such were then the navies of the Greeks, Edition: current; Page: both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money and in dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient land, where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the islands. But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by, there was none at all: and such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home; because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the great ones, as subjects, nor concurred as equals in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other hand to hand. For the war of old between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians1 was it wherein the rest of Greece was most divided and in league with either party.
16. As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also the Ionians by this: that the Persian affairs prospering, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, after the defeat of Crœsus, made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to the sea–side, and so subdued all the cities which they possessed in the continent: and Darius afterward, when he had overcome2 the Phœnician fleet, did the like unto them in the islands.
17. And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who forecasted only for themselves, how with as much safety as was possible to look Edition: current; Page: to their own persons and their own families, they resided for the most part in the cities1 and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours. For as for the tyrants of Sicily2, they were already arrived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time3 hindered, that neither jointly it could do anything remarkable, nor the cities singly be adventurous.
18. But after that the tyrants, both of Athens4 and of the rest of Greece where tyrannies5 were, were the most and last of them, excepting those of Sicily, put down by the Lacedæmonians; (for Lacedæmon, after that it was built by the Dorians that inhabited6 the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions7 than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free8 from tyrants: for it is unto the end of this war four hundred years and something more, that the Lacedæmonians have used one and the same government, and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs in the other cities); I say, after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Edition: current; Page: Athenians in the fields of Marathon. And in the tenth year again after that, came the barbarian with the great fleet1 into Greece, to subdue it. And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that leagued in that war was given to the Lacedæmonians, as to the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before and already stowed2 their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes went a ship–board3 and became seamen. When they had jointly beaten back the barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athenians and the other with the Lacedæmonians; these two cities appearing to be the mightiest; for this had the power by land, and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but awhile: for afterwards the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, being at variance4, warred each on other together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. In so much, that from the war of the Medes to this present war being continually [exercised] somtimees in peace Edition: current; Page: sometimes in war, either one against the other or against revolted confederates, they arrived at this war, both well furnished with military provisions and also expert; because their practice was with danger.
19. The Lacedæmonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries, but only drew them by fair means to embrace the oligarchy, convenient to their own policy. But the Athenians, having with time taken into their hands the galleys of all those that stood out, (except the Chians and Lesbians), reigned1 over them, and ordained every of them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means, their own particular provision was greater in the beginning of this war, than when2 in their flourishing time, the league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was at the most.
20. Such then I find to have been the state of things past; hard to be believed3, though one produce Edition: current; Page: proof for every particular thereof. For1 men receive the report of things, though of their own country, if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination.
For the vulgar sort of Athenians think that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton: and know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren; and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their complices had that day, and at that instant2, discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias as a man forewarned; and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus slew him near the temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the Panathenaical3 show. And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other Grecians; as that the kings of Lacedæmon, in giving their suffrages, had not single4, but double votes: and5 that Edition: current; Page: Pitanate was a band of soldiers so called there; whereas there was never any such. So impatient of labour are the most men in search of truth, and embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.
21. Now he1, that by the arguments here adduced, shall frame a judgment of the things past, and not believe rather that they were such as the poets have sung, or prose–writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be disproved, and by length of time turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit; but shall think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity; he, I say, shall not err. And though men always judge the present war wherein they live to be greatest, and when it is past, admire more those that were before it; yet if they consider of this war by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned2.Edition: current; Page: 
22. What particular persons have spoken1 when they were about to enter into the war or when they were in it, were hard2 for me to remember exactly; whether they were speeches which I have heard myself, or have received at the second hand. But as any man seemed to me, that knew what was nearest to the sum3 of the truth of all that had been uttered, to speak most agreeably to the matter still in hand, so I have made it spoken here. But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write all that I heard from all authors, nor such as I myself did but think to be true; but only those whereat I was myself present, and those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry. And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty; because such as were present at every action, spake not all after the same manner; but as they were affected to the parts, or as they could remember.
To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful. But he that desires to look into the truth of things done, and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at least their like, he shall find4 enough herein to make Edition: current; Page: him think it profitable. And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession1, than to be rehearsed for a prize.
23. The greatest action before this was that against the Medes2; and yet that, by two battles by sea and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long, and the harm it did to Greece was such, as the like in the like space had never been seen before. For neither had there ever been so many cities expugned and made desolate, what by the barbarians3 and what by the Greeks warring on one another4; (and some cities there were, that when they were taken changed their inhabitants5); nor so much banishing and slaughter, some by the war some by sedition6, as was in this. And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world, and most violent withal: eclipses of the sun, oftener than is reported of any former time: great droughts in some places, and thereby famine: and that which did none of the least hurt, but destroyed also its part7, the plague. All8 these Edition: current; Page: evils entered together with this war: which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league, which immediately after the conquest of Eubœa had been concluded between them for thirty years. The causes why they brake the same, and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel1, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedæmonians into fear necessitated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league publicly voiced, were these.
24. Epidamnus2 is a city situate on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian Gulf. Bordering upon it are the Taulantii, barbarians, a people of Illyris3. This was planted by the Corcyræans4; but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and, according to an5 ancient Edition: current; Page: custom, called to this charge out of the metropolitan city. Besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians, and others1 of the Doric nation. In process of time the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; and2 having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining barbarians, brought low and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But that which was the last accident before this war, was, that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the barbarians, and both by land and sea robbed those that remained within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, sent their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother city, praying the Corcyræans not to see them perish, but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth, and to put an end to the barbarian war. And this they entreated in the form of suppliants3, sitting down in the temple Edition: current; Page: of Juno. But the Corcyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.
25. The Epidamnians now despairing of relief from the Corcyræans, and at a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Delphi enquired at the oracle, whether it were not best to deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians as of their founders, and make trial what aid they should obtain from thence. And when the oracle had answered, that they should deliver it and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the oracle gave their city1 to them, and declared2 how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them, entreating their help, and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. And the Corinthians undertook their defence, not only for the equity of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the Corcyræans’ colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyræans; who being their colony yet contemned them, and allowed3 them not their Edition: current; Page: due honour in public meetings, nor in the distribution of the sacrifice began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies; but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time for store of money, and1 strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in shipping; and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phæaces2, who flourished in glory of naval affairs: which was also the cause why they the rather provided themselves of a navy. And they were indeed not without power that way; for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.
26. The Corinthians therefore having all these criminations against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever Edition: current; Page: would to go and dwell there, but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens. Which succours, for fear the Corcyræans should have hindered their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia1. The Corcyræans, understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same; and sailing presently thither with twenty–five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent2 manner commanded them both to recall those whom they had banished, (for these banished3 men of Epidamnus had been now at Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulcres of their ancestors and claiming kindred, had entreated the Corcyræans to restore them), and to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments. Whereupon the Corcyræans with forty galleys, together with the banished men, (whom they pretended to reduce), and with the Illyrians, whom they had joined to their part, warred upon them; and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation, Edition: current; Page: that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the city in on every side.
27. The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready their army: and at the same time caused a proclamation to be made for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go should have equal and like privileges1 with those that were there before: and that such as desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind. And they were very many, both that went and that laid down their silver. Moreover they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyræans, to aid2 them with some galleys: who accordingly furnished out eight; the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia, four. They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them five: the citizens of Hermione, one: the Trœzenians, two: the Leucadians, ten: the Ambraciots, eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money: of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys. And of the Corinthians themselves, there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms3.
28. The Corcyræans, advertised of this preparation, Edition: current; Page: went to Corinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians and of the Sicyonians, whom they took with them; and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to do; or if they had anything to1 allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on; and they then should hold the colony, to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also, that they were content to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi: that war they would make none; but if they must needs have it, they should, by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence to seek out better2 friends than those whom they already had. To this the Corinthians answered, that if they would put off with their fleet and dismiss the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then consult of the matter: for before they could not honestly do it; because whilst they should be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a siege. The Corcyræans replied to this, that if they would call back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and3 to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.Edition: current; Page: 
29. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since1 their galleys were manned and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy–five galleys and two thousand2 men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyræans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes: and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come as far as Actium, in the territory of Anactorium, (which is a temple of Apollo, and ground consecrated unto him), in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyræans sent a herald to them at3 Actium, to forbid their coming on; and in the meantime manned out their fleet; and having repaired4 and made fit for service their old galleys, and furnished5 the rest with things necessary, shipped their munition and went aboard6. The herald Edition: current; Page: was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to peace, but having1 their galleys already manned and furnished to the number of eighty sail, (for forty2 attended always the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea, and arranging themselves came to a battle: in which the Corcyræans were clearly victors; and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen galleys. And the same day it happened likewise, that they that besieged Epidamnus had the same3 rendered unto them, with conditions, that the strangers therein found should be4 ransomed, and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as they should be otherwise disposed of.
30. The battle being ended, the Corcyræans, after they had set up their trophy5 in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners, but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the Corinthians6 with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyræans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, went first and wasted the territory of Leucas7, a Corinthian Edition: current; Page: colony; and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal of the Eleans, and burnt it, because they had both with money and shipping given aid to the Corinthians. And they were masters of those seas, and infested the confederates of Corinth, for the most part of that year; till such time as in the beginning of the summer1 following the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers unto Actium, the which, for the more safe keeping of Leucas and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis2: and the Corcyræans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay Edition: current; Page: over against them in Leucimna. But neither part stirred against the other; but after they had lyen quietly opposite all the1 summer, they retired in winter both the one side and the other to their cities.
31. All this year, as well before as after the battle2, the Corinthians, being vexed3 at the war with the Corcyræans, applied themselves to the building of galleys and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest4 they were able to make, and to procure mariners5 out of Peloponnesus and all other parts of Greece. The Corcyræans having intelligence of their preparations, began to fear; and (because they had never6 been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates either of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians) thought it best now to send to Athens7, to see if they could procure any aid from thence. This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyræans might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. And the assembly at Athens being met, they came to plead against each other; and the Corcyræans spake to this effect.Edition: current; Page: 
32. “Men of Athens, it is but justice that such as come to implore the aid of their neighbours, (as now do1 we), and cannot pretend by any great benefit or league some precedent merit, should, before they go any farther, make it appear, principally, that what they seek conferreth profit, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least to those that are to grant it: and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same: and if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill though their suit be rejected. And the Corcyræans being fully persuaded that they can make all this appear on their own parts, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to ascribe them to the number of your confederates. Now so it is, that we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you, and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. For having ever till now been unwilling to admit others into league with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others, but also left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Corinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with others into league, because we would not at the discretion of others enter into danger, we now find to have been our weakness and imprudence. Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians in Edition: current; Page: the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and seeing with our own single power we are not able to go1 through; and since also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great to all Greece: it is necessary that we seek the succours both of you and of whomsoever else we can; and we are also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from malice, but error of judgment.
33. “Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence2 on our part of need will on your part be honourable, for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have suffered, and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so place3 your benefit as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible. Besides this, the greatest navy but your own, is ours. Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies, can befal you, than that that power, which you would have prized above any money or other requital, should come voluntarily, and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands; bringing with it reputation Edition: current; Page: amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not1 happened at once to many. And few there be of those that sue for league, that come not rather to receive strength and reputation, than to confer it. If any here think, that the war wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error, and seeth not how the Lacedæmonians, through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprize2, assault us now in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand3, either to weaken us, or to strengthen their own estate. It must therefore be your4 part, we offering and you accepting the league, to begin with them, and to anticipate plotting rather than to counterplot against them.
34. “If they object injustice, in that you receive their colony, henceforth let them learn that all colonies, so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. Edition: current; Page: That they have done us the injury, is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. Now let that which they have done unto us, who are their kindred, serve you for some argument, not to be seduced1 by their demands, and made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives most secure, that hath fewest benefits bestowed upon him by his enemies to repent of.
35. “As for the articles between you and the Lacedæmonians, they are not broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. For there2 it is said, that whosoever is confederate of neither party, may have access lawfully to either. And sure it were very unreasonable, that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and3 out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places4 in your dominion; and we be denied both the league now propounded, and also all other help from whencesoever. And5 if they impute it to you as a fault, that you grant our request; we shall take it for a Edition: current; Page: greater, that you grant it not. For therein you shall reject us that are invaded, and be none of your enemies; and them, who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not oppose, but also suffer to raise unlawful1 forces in your dominions. Whereas you ought in truth, either not to suffer them to take up mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also, in such manner as you shall think good yourselves; but especially by taking us into your league, and so aiding us. Many commodities2, as we said in the beginning, we show unto you, but this for the greatest; that whereas they are your enemies, (which is manifest enough), and not weak ones, but able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial league; and the want of one of these is not as the want of the other. Nay rather, your principal aim, if it could be done, should be to let none at all have shipping but Edition: current; Page: yourselves; or at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends as are best furnished therewith.
36. “If any man now think thus, that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken: let that man consider, that his fear joined with strength will make his enemies fear, and his confidence, having (if he reject us) so much the less strength, will so much the less be1 feared. Let him also remember, that he is now in consultation no less concerning Athens than Corcyra; wherein he forecasteth none of the best, (considering the present state of affairs), that makes a question, whether against a war at hand and only not already on foot, he should join unto it or not that city, which with most important advantages or disadvantages will be2 friend or enemy. For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily, that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus from thence, and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus3 thither: and is also for divers other uses most commodious. And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be abandoned or not, by this. For Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time Edition: current; Page: both against the Corcyræans and the Peloponnesians; whereas by making league with us, you shall, with your1 fleet augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians alone.”
Thus spake the Corcyræans: and after them the Corinthians, thus.
37. “The Corcyræans in their oration having made mention not only of your taking them into league, but also that they are wronged and unjustly warred on; it is also necessary for us first to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the rest of what we have to say: to the end you may foreknow2 that ours are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you may upon reason reject the needy3 estate of those others. Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other cities, that the same hath proceeded from modesty, the truth is, that they took up that custom, not from any virtue, but mere wickedness; as4 being unwilling to have any confederate for a witness of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides, their city being by the situation sufficient within itself, giveth them this point; that when they do Edition: current; Page: any man a wrong, they themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent. For going seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such as by necessity are driven into their harbour. And in this consisteth1 their goodly pretext for not admitting confederates, not because they would not be content to accompany others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone; that where they were too strong, they might oppress; and when there should be none to observe them, the less of the profit might be shared from them; and that they might escape the shame, when they took any thing. But if they had been honest men, (as they themselves say they are), by how much the less they are obnoxious2 to accusation, so much the more means they have, by giving and taking what is3 due, to make their honesty appear. 38. But they are not such, neither towards others nor towards us. For being our colony, they have not only been ever in revolt; but now they also make war upon us, and say they were not sent out to be injured by us. But we say again, that we did not send them forth to be scorned by them, but to have the leading of them, and to be regarded by them as is fit. For4 our other colonies both honour Edition: current; Page: and love us much: which is an argument, seeing the rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just cause to be offended alone; and that without some manifest wrong, we should not have had colour1 to war against them. But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in them to have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have insulted over their modesty. But through pride and wealth they have done wrong, both in many other things, and also in this; that Epidamnus being ours, which whilst it was vexed with wars they never claimed, as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them, and so holden.
39. “They say2 now, that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment. But you are not to think that such a one will stand to judgment, as hath advantage and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for; but rather he, that before the trial will admit equality in the matter itself as well as in the pleading. Whereas contrarily, these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial, before they had besieged the city, but after, when they saw we meant not to put it3 up. And now hither they Edition: current; Page: be come, not content to have been faulty in that business themselves, but to get in you; into their confederacy? no; but into their conspiracy; and to receive them in this name, that they are enemies to us. But they should have come to you then, when they were most in safety; not now, when we have the wrong, and they the danger; and when you, that never1 partaked of their power, must2 impart unto them of your aid, and having been free from their faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should3 communicate their power before hand, that mean to make common the issue of the same; and they that share not in the crimes, ought also to have no part in the sequel of them.
40. “Thus it appears, that we come for our parts with arguments of equity and right; whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall show you likewise, that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For although it be in the articles4, that the cities written with neither of the parties may come in to whether of them they please; yet it holds not for such as do so to the detriment of Edition: current; Page: either; but only for those, that having revolted1 from neither part, want protection, and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise2) that receive them. For3 you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these; but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows, they4 must defend themselves not without you. You should do most uprightly, to stand out of both our ways; and if not that, then to take our parts against the Corcyræans; (for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyræans you never had so much as a truce); and not to constitute a new law, of receiving one another’s rebels. For neither did we give our votes against you, when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion5; but plainly alleged, that it was reason, that every one should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates. And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be seen that they will come over as fast from you to us; and you shall set up a law, not so much against us, as against yourselves.
41. “These are the points of justice we had to Edition: current; Page: show you, conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice, and claim of favour; which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you, nor such friends as to surcharge you) we say, ought in the present occasion to be granted us by way of requital. For when you had want of long barks against the Æginetæ, a little before the Medan war, you had twenty lent unto you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians, when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory1 against the Æginetæ, and of the punishment of the Samians. And these things were done for you in a season, when men, going to fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but2 of victory. For3 even a man’s domestic affairs are ordered the worse, through eagerness of present contention.
42. “Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased to defend4 us now in the like manner. And have not this thought: that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet, if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. For utility followeth those actions Edition: current; Page: most, wherein we do the least wrong; besides that the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyræans frighting you go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure, and not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians; but it were rather fit for you, indeed, to take away our former jealousies1 concerning the Megareans. For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service by this league. For to do no injury to our equals, is a firmer power, than that addition of strength, which, puffed up2 with present shows, men are to acquire with danger.
43. “And since we be come to this, which once before we said at Lacedæmon, that every one ought to proceed as he shall think good against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now of you; and that you that have been helped by our votes, will not hurt us now by yours, but render like for like; remembering, that now is that occasion, wherein he that aideth us is our greatest friend, and he that opposeth us our greatest enemy: and that you will not receive3 these Corcyræans into league against our wills, nor defend them in their injuries. These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit, and also advise the best for the good of your own affairs.”Edition: current; Page: 
This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.
44. Both sides having been heard, and the Athenian people twice assembled; in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyræans. But in the latter they changed their minds; not so as to make a league with the Corcyræans both offensive and defensive, that the friends and enemies of the one should be so of the other; (for then, if the Corcyræans should have required them to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians); but made it only defensive, that if any one should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they were then mutually to assist one another. For they expected that even thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians, and were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, to fall into the hands of the Corinthians; but rather, as much as in them lay, desired to break them one against another; that if need required, they might have to do with the Corinthians, and others that had shipping, when they should be weakened to their hands. And the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.
45. With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcyræans into league; and when the Corinthians were gone, sent ten galleys not long after to their aid. The commanders of them were Lacedæmonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles; and1 had order not to fight with the Corinthians, Edition: current; Page: unless they invaded Corcyra, or offered to land there or in some other place of theirs: which, if they did, then with all their might to oppose them. This1 they forbad, because they would not break the peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys arrived at Corcyra.
46. The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Corcyra with one hundred and fifty sail; of the Eleans ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots twenty–seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their own. The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several cities, for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in; and over those of Corinth was Xenocleides the son of Euthicles, with four others. After they were all come2 together upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas, and came to Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis. In3 this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the city of Ephyra, in that part of Thesprotis which is called Elæatis; and near unto it disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron, from which it taketh the name. Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divideth Thesprotis from Cestrine4; betwixt which Edition: current; Page: two rivers ariseth this promontory of Chimerium. To this part of the continent came1 the Corinthians, and encamped.
47. The Corcyræans understanding that they made against them, having ready one hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called Sybota: and the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. But their land forces stayed in the promontory of Leucimna, and with them one thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many barbarians, which in those quarters have2 been evermore their friends.
48. The Corinthians, after they were ready and had taken aboard three days’ provision of victual, put off by night from Chimerium with purpose to fight; and about break of day, as they were sailing, descried the galleys of the Corcyræans, which were also put off from Sybota and coming on to fight with the Corinthians3. As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of battle. In the right wing4 of the Corcyræans were placed the galleys of Athens; and the rest being their own5, were divided Edition: current; Page: into three commands, under the three commanders, one under one. This was the order of the Corcyræans. The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara and of Ambracia; in the middle, other their confederates in order; and opposite to the Athenians and right wing of the Corcyræans they were themselves placed, with such galleys as were best of sail, in the left.
49. The standard1 being on either side lift up, they joined battle; having on both parts2 both many men of arms and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed. The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought; near unto the manner of a fight at land. For after they had once3 run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men of arms, who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages4 through each other they Edition: current; Page: made none, but fought it out with courage and strength, rather than with skill. Insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder: in which the Athenian galleys, being always, where the Corcyræans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but yet began no assault, because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress; for the Corcyræans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs, and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned tents and took away their baggage. So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyræans had the victory. But in the left wing, where the Corinthians were themselves, they were far superior; because the Corcyræans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyræans were in distress, now aided them manifestly1; whereas before, they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright, and that the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then every one fell to the business Edition: current; Page: without making difference any longer: and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athenians.
50. The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, staid not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk1 unto their own galleys, that so they might tow them after; but made after the men, rowing up and down, to kill rather than to take alive; and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors, and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle, for number of ships, that ever had been before of Grecians against Grecians. When2 the Corinthians had chased the Corcyræans to the shore, they returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead; which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota, where also lay the land–forces of the barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they reunited themselves, and made again to the Corcyræans. And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea remaining3 of the former battle, Edition: current; Page: together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent, and the song1 which they used to sing when they came to charge, was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern: for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys2, sent from Athens to second the former ten; for fear lest the Corcyræans (as it also fell out) should be overcome, and those ten galleys of theirs be too few3 to defend them.
51. When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these galleys, suspecting that they were of Athens and more in number than they were, by little and little they fell off. But the Corcyræans (because the course of these galleys was unto them more out of sight4) descried them not, but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern; till at last some that saw them, said they were enemies5; and then retired also the Corcyræans. For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their galleys and dissolved themselves. Edition: current; Page: And thus were they parted, and the battle ended1 in night. The Corcyræans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys, under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcases and wrecks, soon after they were descried arrived at the camp of the Corcyræans in Leucimna. The Corcyræans at first (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they2 anchored there.
52. The next day, both the thirty galleys of Athens and as many of Corcyra as were fit for service, went to the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land and arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle; both for that they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens, and for many difficulties that happened to them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard, and also for that being in a desert place their galleys were not yet3 repaired; but took thought rather how to go home, for fear lest the Athenians, having the peace for already broken in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart. Edition: current; Page: 53. They therefore thought good to send1 afore unto the Athenians certain men without privilege of heralds, for to sound them, and to say in this manner: “Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the war and violate the articles: for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, you stand in our way and bear arms against us: if therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against Corcyra or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve2 the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies.” Thus said they: and the Corcyræans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them. But the Athenians made answer thus: “Men of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war nor break the peace; but we bring aid to these our confederates, the Corcyræans: if you please therefore to go any whither else, we hinder you not; but if against Corcyra, or any place belonging unto it, we will not3 suffer you.”
54. When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Corinthians made ready to go home, and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyræans also both took up the wreck and bodies of the dead, which carried every way by the waves and the winds that arose the night before, came driving to their hands; and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota the island. The victory was thus challenged on both sides Edition: current; Page: upon these grounds. The Corinthians did set up a trophy, because in the battle they had the better all day, having1 gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies than the other, and taken no less than a thousand prisoners, and sunk about seventy of the enemies’ galleys. And the Corcyræans set up a trophy, because they had sunk thirty2 galleys of the Corinthians, and had, after the arrival of the Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by reason of the wind; and because the day before, upon sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern and went away from them: and lastly, for that when they3 went to Sybota, the Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed victory.
55. The Corinthians in their way homeward took in Anactorium, a town seated in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, by deceit; (this town was common to them and to the Corcyræans); and having put into it Corinthians only4, departed and went home. Of the Corcyræans, eight hundred that were servants5, they sold; and kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with very much Edition: current; Page: favour, that they might be a means, at their return, to bring Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians; the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. And thus was Corcyra delivered1 of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian galleys went from them. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians: namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyræans in a battle by sea against the Corinthians, with whom they were comprised in the same articles of peace.
56. Presently after this, it came to pass that other differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, to induce the war. For whilst the Corinthians studied2 to be revenged, the Athenians, who had their hatred in jealousy, commanded the citizens of Potidæa, a city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene3, a colony of the Corinthians, but confederate and tributary to the Athenians, to pull down that part of the wall of their city that stood towards4 Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to send away and no more receive the Epidemiurgi5, (magistrates so called), Edition: current; Page: which were sent unto them year by year from Corinth; fearing lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas1 and of the Corinthians they should revolt, and draw to revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace2.
57. These things against the Potidæans, the Athenians had precontrived presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra. For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, now warred3 upon them. And the cause why he did so was, that when his brother Philip and Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league with them. And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedæmon to negotiate the Peloponnesian war, and also reconciled himself to the Corinthians the better to procure the revolt of Potidæa. And likewise he practised with the Chalcideans of Thrace, and with the Bottiæans, to revolt with them: for if he could make these confining cities his confederates, with the help of them he thought his war would be the easier. Which the Athenians perceiving, and intending to prevent the revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet, (for they were now sending thirty galleys with a thousand men of arms, under the command of Archestratus Edition: current; Page: the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas), both to receive hostages of the Potidæans, and to demolish their walls1; and also to have an eye to the neighbouring cities, that they revolted not.
58. The Potidæans having sent ambassadors to Athens, to try if they could persuade the people not to make any alteration amongst them; by other ambassadors, whom they sent along with the ambassadors of Corinth to Lacedæmon, dealt2 with the Lacedæmonians at the same time, if need required, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. When after long solicitation at Athens and no good done, the fleet was sent away against them no less than against Macedonia: and when the magistrates of Lacedæmon had promised them, if the Athenians went to Potidæa, to invade Attica: then at last they revolted, and together with them the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. For3 Perdiccas had also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their maritime towns, and to go up and dwell at Olynthus, and that one city to make strong: and unto those that removed, gave part of his own, and part4 of the territory of Mygdonia, Edition: current; Page: about the lake Bolbe, to live on, so long as the war against the Athenians should continue. So when1 they had demolished their cities, and were gone up higher into the country, they prepared themselves to the war.
59. The Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, found Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. And the commanders of the fleet conceiving it to be impossible, with their present forces, to make war both against Perdiccas and the towns revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had been at first sent out; and there staying, joined with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, that had invaded the country from above.
60. In the meantime after Potidæa was revolted, and whilst the Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing what might become of the city, and making the danger their own, sent unto it, both of their own city2, and of other Peloponnesians which they hired, to the number of sixteen hundred men of arms and four hundred light3 armed. The charge of these was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus, for whose sake4 most of the volunteers of Corinth went the voyage: for he had been ever a great favourer of Edition: current; Page: the Potidæans. And they arrived in Thrace after the revolt of Potidæa forty days.
61. The news of the revolt of these cities was likewise quickly brought to the Athenian people; who hearing withal of the forces sent unto them under Aristeus, sent forth against the places revolted two thousand men of arms and forty galleys, under the conduct of Callias the son of Calliades1. These coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand, who by this time had taken Therme2, and were now besieging the city of Pydna; and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. But shortly after they took composition; and having made a necessary3 league with Perdiccas, (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidæa, and the arrival there of Aristeus), departed from Macedonia. Thence coming to Berrhœa4, they attempted to take it: but when they could not do it, they turned back, and marched towards Potidæa by land. They were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides many of their confederates; and of Macedonians that had served with Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen. And their galleys, seventy in number, sailing by them along the coast5, by moderate journeys came in three days to Gigonus, and there encamped.Edition: current; Page: 
62. The Potidæans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near unto1 Olynthus, and had the market kept for them without2 the city. And the leading of the foot the confederates had assigned to Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdiccas: for he fell off again presently from the Athenians, and having left Iolaus governor in his place, took part with the Potidæans. The purpose of Aristeus was, to have the body of the army with himself within the isthmus3, and therewith to attend the coming on of the Athenians; and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates without the isthmus, and also the two hundred horse under Perdiccas, to stay in Olynthus, and when the Athenians were4 passed by, to come on their backs and to inclose the enemy betwixt them. But Callias the Athenian general, and the rest that were in commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen and some few of their confederates to Olynthus, to stop those within from making any sally from the town; and then dislodging marched on towards Potidæa. When they were come on as far as the isthmus, and saw the enemy make ready to fight, they also did the like; and not long after they Edition: current; Page: joined battle. That wing wherein was Aristeus himself, with the chosen men of the Corinthians and others, put to flight that part of their enemies that stood opposite unto them, and followed execution a great way. But the rest of the army of the Potidæans and Peloponnesians were by the Athenians defeated, and fled into the city. 63. And Aristeus, when he came back from the execution1, was in doubt what way to take, to Olynthus or to Potidæa. In the end he resolved of the shortest2 way, and with his soldiers about him ran as hard as he was able into Potidæa; and with much ado got in at the pier3 through the sea, cruelly shot at, and with the loss of a few, but the safety of the greatest part of his company. As soon as the battle began4, they that should have seconded the Potidæans from Olynthus, (for it is at most but sixty furlongs5 off, and in sight), advanced a little way to have aided them; and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves likewise in order of battle, to keep them back. But the Athenians Edition: current; Page: having quickly gotten the victory, and the standards being taken1 down, they retired again; they of Olynthus into that city, and the Macedonian horsemen into the army of the Athenians. So2 that neither side had their cavalry at the battle. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave truce to the Potidæans for the taking up of the bodies of their dead. Of the Potidæans and their friends there died somewhat less than three hundred; and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, with Callias one of their commanders.
64. Presently upon this, the Athenians raised a wall before the city on the part towards3 the isthmus, which they kept with a garrison; but the part to Pallene–ward they left unwalled. For they thought themselves too small a number, both to keep a guard in the isthmus, and withal to go over and fortify in Pallene; fearing lest the Potidæans and their confederates should assault them when divided. When the people of Athens understood that Potidæa was unwalled on the part toward Pallene, not long after they sent thither sixteen hundred men of arms under the conduct of Phormio the son of Asopius: who arriving in Pallene, left4 his galleys at Aphytis, and marching easily to Potidæa wasted the territory as he passed through. And when none came out to give him battle, he raised a wall before the city on that part Edition: current; Page: also that looketh towards Pallene. Thus was Potidæa on both sides strongly besieged; and also from the sea by the Athenian galleys, that came up and rode before it.
65. Aristeus, seeing the city enclosed on every side, and without hope of safety save what might come from Peloponnesus or some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea, that the provision might the longer hold out for the rest; and of them that should remain within offered himself to be one. But when his counsel took not place, being desirous to settle their business1, and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by sea unseen of the Athenian guard; and staying amongst the Chalcideans, amongst other actions of the war2, laid an ambush before Sermylius and slew many of that city, and solicited the sending of aid from Peloponnesus. And Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidæa, having with him his sixteen hundred men of arms, wasted the territory of the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, and some small towns he took in.
66. These were3 the quarrels between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. The Corinthians quarrelled the Athenians, for besieging Potidæa, and in it the men of Corinth and Peloponnesus. The Athenians quarrelled the Peloponnesians, for Edition: current; Page: causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt; and for that they had come thither, and openly fought against them in the behalf of Potidæa. Nevertheless the war brake not openly forth as yet, and they yet abstained from arms; for this was but a particular action of the Corinthians. 67. But when Potidæa was once besieged, both for their men’s sakes that were within, and also for fear to lose the place, they could no longer hold. But out of hand, they procured1 of their confederates to go to Lacedæmon; and thither also they went themselves with clamours and accusations against the Athenians, that they had broken the league and wronged the Peloponnesians. The Æginetæ, though not openly by ambassadors for fear of the Athenians, yet privily instigated them to the war as much as any; alledging that they were not permitted to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the articles2 they ought to have been. So the Lacedæmonians having called together the confederates, and whosoever else had any injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians, in the ordinary council3 of their own state commanded them to speak. Then presented every one Edition: current; Page: his accusation; and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other their great differences, laid open this especially, that contrary to the articles they were forbidden the Athenian markets and havens1. Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered the Lacedæmonians to be incensed first by the rest, came in and said as followeth.
68. “Men of Lacedæmon, your own fidelity, both in matter of estate and conversation, maketh you the less apt to believe us, when we accuse others of the contrary2. And hereby you gain indeed a reputation of equity3, but you have less experience in the affairs of foreign states. For although we have oftentimes foretold you, that the Athenians would do us a mischief; yet from time to time when we told it you, you never would take information of it; but have suspected rather, that what we spake hath proceeded from our own private differences. And you have therefore called hither these confederates, not before we had suffered, but now when the evil is already upon us. Edition: current; Page: Before whom our speech must be so much the longer, by how much our objections are the greater, in that we have both by the Athenians been injured, and by you neglected. If the Athenians lurking in some obscure place, had done these wrongs unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same before you as to men that knew it not. But now what cause have we to use long discourse, when you see already that some1 are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving the like against others2, and especially against our confederates; and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long since prepared for it? For else they would never have taken Corcyra, and holden it from us by force, nor have besieged Potidæa; whereof the one was most commodious for any action against Thrace3, and the other had brought unto the Peloponnesians a most fair navy.
69. “And of all this you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered them upon the end of the Persian war to fortify their city, and again afterwards to raise their long walls; whereby you have hitherto deprived of their liberty, not only the states by them already subdued, but also your own confederates. For not he that bringeth into slavery, but he that being able to hinder it neglects the same, is most truly said to do it; especially if they assume the honour to be esteemed the deliverers Edition: current; Page: of Greece [as you do]. And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet with any certain resolution what to do. For the question1 should not have been put, whether or not we have received injury, but rather in what manner we are to repair it. For they2 that do the wrong, having consulted upon it beforehand, use no delay at all, but come upon them whom they mean to oppress, whilst they be yet irresolute. And we know, not only3 that the Athenians have incroached upon their neighbours, but also by what ways they have done it. And as long as they think they carry it closely through your blindness, they are the less bold: but when they shall perceive that you see, and will not see, they will then press us strongly indeed. For, Lacedæmonians, you are the only men of all Greece, that sitting still defend others, not with your forces, but with promises4; and you are also the only men, that love to pull down the power of the enemy, not when it beginneth, but when it is doubled. You have indeed a report5 to be sure; but yet it is more in fame that, than in fact. For we ourselves know, that the Persian came against6 Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of the earth, before you encountered him as Edition: current; Page: became your state. And also now you connive at the Athenians, who are not as the Medes, far off, but hard at hand; choosing rather to defend yourselves from their invasion, than to invade them; and by having to do with them when their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of fortune. And yet we1 know that the barbarian’s own error, and in our war against the Athenians, their own oversights, more than your assistance, was the thing that gave us victory. For the hope of your aid hath been the destruction of some, that relying on you, made no preparation for themselves by other means. Yet let not any man think that we speak this out of malice, but only by way of expostulation: for expostulation is with friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have done an injury.
70. “Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobate his neighbour, we think ourselves may best do it; especially on so great quarrels as these, whereof you neither seem2 to have any feeling, nor to consider what manner of men, and how different from you in every kind the Athenians be, that you are to contend withal. For they love innovation, and are swift to devise, and also to execute what they resolve on. But you on the contrary are only apt to save your own; not devise any thing new, nor scarce3 to attain what is necessary. They again are bold beyond their strength, adventurous above their own reason, and in danger hope still the best. Whereas your actions are ever beneath your power, Edition: current; Page: and you distrust even what your judgment1 assures; and being in a danger, never think to be delivered. They are stirrers, you studiers; they love to be abroad, and you at home the most of any. For they make account by being abroad to add to their estate; you, if you should go forth against the state of another, would think to impair your2 own. They, when they overcome their enemies advance the farthest, and when they are overcome by their enemies, fall off the least; and as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the commonwealth as if they were none of their own; but their minds, when they would serve the state, are right their own. Unless they take in hand3 what they have once advised on, they account so much lost of their own. And when they take it in hand, if they obtain any thing, they think lightly of it in respect of what they look to win by their prosecution. If they fail in any attempt, they do what is necessary for the present, and enter presently into other hopes.4 For they alone both have and hope for at once whatsoever they conceive, through their celerity in execution of what they once resolve on. And in this manner they labour and toil all the days of their lives. What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy, for continual getting of more: nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter profitable; nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment than laborious business. So that, in a word, to say they are men born neither to rest Edition: current; Page: themselves, nor suffer others, is to say the truth. 71. Now notwithstanding, men of Lacedæmon, that this city, your adversary, be such as we have said, yet you still delay time; not knowing, that those only are they to whom it may suffice for the most part of their time to sit still1, who, though they use not their power to do injustice, yet bewray a mind unlikely to swallow injuries; but placing equity belike in this, that you neither do any harm to others, nor receive it in defending of yourselves. But this is a thing you hardly could attain, though the states about you were of the same2 condition. But, as we have before declared, your customs are in respect of theirs antiquated; and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new ones will prevail. True it is, that for a city living for the most part in peace, unchanged customs are the best; but for such as be constrained to undergo many matters, many devices will be needful. Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs, through much experience, are more new to you than yours are to them3. Here therefore give a period to your slackness; and4 by a speedy invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidæa and the rest: lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred5 to their cruelest enemies; and lest we and6 others be driven through despair to seek out some other Edition: current; Page: league. Which to do were no injustice, neither against the Gods, judges of men’s oaths, nor against men, the hearers1 of them. For not they break the league, who being abandoned have recourse to others; but they that yield not their assistance to whom they have sworn it. But if you mean to follow the business seriously, we will stay; for else we should do irreligiously, neither should we find any other more conformable to our manners, than yourselves. Therefore deliberate well of these points; and take such a course, that Peloponnesus may not by your leading fall into worse estate, than it was left unto you by your progenitors.”
72. Thus spake the Corinthians. The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be residing at Lacedæmon upon their2 business, when they heard of this oration, thought fit to present themselves before the Lacedæmonians, not to make apology for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to show in general3, that it was not fit for them in this case to take any sudden resolution, but farther time to consider. Also they desired to lay open the power of their city; to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what they knew already, and to the younger, for an information of what they knew not: supposing, that when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness rather than to war. And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedæmonians, saying, that they Edition: current; Page: also, if they might have leave, desired to speak in the assembly; who willed them to come in. And the Athenians went into the assembly and spake to this effect.
73. “Though our embassage was not to this end, that we should argue against our1 confederates, but about such other affairs as the city was pleased to employ us in; yet having heard of the great exclamation against us, we came into the court, not to make answer to the criminations of the cities, (for to plead before you here, were not to plead before the judges either of them or us), but to the end you may not be drawn away to take the worse resolution at the persuasion of the confederates, in matters of so great importance: and withal, touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform you that what we possess, we have it justly, and that our city deserveth reputation. But what need we now to speak of matters long past, confirmed more by hearsay, than by the eyes of those that are to hear us relate them? But our actions against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know as well as we, those, though it be tedious2 to hear them ever objected, we must of necessity recite. For when we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as you had your parts in the substance3, so must we have Edition: current; Page: ours (if that be any benefit) in the commemoration. And we shall make recital of them, not by way of deprecation, but of protestation1 and declaration of what a city, in case you take ill advice, you have to enter the list withal. We therefore say, that we not only first and alone hazarded battle against the barbarian in the fields of Marathon, but also afterwards, when he came again, being unable to resist him by land, embarked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave him battle amongst the rest by sea at Salamis; which was the cause that kept him back from sailing to Peloponnesus, and laying it waste city after city: for against so many galleys you were not able to give each other mutual succour. And the greatest proof of this is the Persian himself; who when his fleet was overcome, and that he had2 no more such forces, went away in haste with the greatest part of his army.
74. “Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same3 the three things of most advantage; namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than two–thirds; and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait4, whereby he clearly saved the whole Edition: current; Page: business, and whom, though a stranger, you your selves have honoured for it more than any man that came unto you. And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other, in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods; and even in that estate, not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them; and that without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in the like manner. So that we may say, that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited, and to the end you might still keep them so; and when you were afraid, not of our danger, but your own. Whereas1 we, coming from a city no more being2, and putting ourselves into danger for a city3 hopeless ever to be again, saved both you in4 part, and ourselves. But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to have our territories wasted; or afterwards, as Edition: current; Page: men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea, because your fleet had been too small; but his affairs had1 succeeded as he would himself.
75. “Therefore, men of Lacedæmon, we deserve not so great envy of the Grecians2, for our courage at that time and for our prudence, and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo. Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the command of their own accord. So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is, out of the nature of the thing itself; as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit. For when we had the envy of many, and had reconquered some that had already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been, but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe course, laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger3. For the revolts from us, would all have been made to you. Now it is no fault for men in danger, to order their affairs to the best. 76. For you also4, men of Lacedæmon, have command over the cities of Peloponnesus, and order Edition: current; Page: them to your best advantage. And had you, when the time was1, by staying it out, been envied in your command, as we know well, you would have been no less heavy to the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule imperiously, or to have fallen into danger. So that, though overcome by three the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed, for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the government upon us as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same; and of you also so esteemed, till having computed the commodity, you now fall to allegation of equity; a thing which no man that had the occasion to achieve anything by strength, ever so far preferred as to divert him from his profit. Those men are worthy of commendation, who following the natural inclination of man in desiring2 rule over others, are juster than for their own power they need. And therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make appear our own moderation; and yet our moderation hath undeservedly incurred contempt3 rather than commendation. Edition: current; Page: 77. For1 though in pleas of covenants with our confederates, when in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us, we have then nevertheless been reputed contentious. None of them considering that2 others, who in other places have dominion and are toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never upbraided for it. For they that have the power to compel, need not at all to go to law. And yet3 these men having been used to converse with us upon equal terms, if they lose anything which they think they should not, either by sentence or by the power of our government, they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little they forego, than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence. For in this kind also4 they Edition: current; Page: themselves cannot deny, but the weaker must give way to the stronger. And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice, than for violence. For that, coming as from an equal, seemeth rapine; and the other, because from one stronger, but necessity. Therefore when they suffered worse things under the Medes’ dominion, they bore it; but think ours to be rigorous. And good reason; for to men in subjection, the present is ever the worst estate. Insomuch as you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, you would soon find a change of the love which they bear you now for fear of us, if you should do again as you did1 for a while, when you were their commanders against the Medes. For not only your own institutions are different2 from those of others, but also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge], he neither useth those of yours, nor yet those of the rest of Greece. 78. Deliberate therefore of this a great while, as of a matter of great importance; and do not upon the opinions and criminations of others procure your own trouble. Consider before you enter, how unexpected the chances of war be. For a long war for the most Edition: current; Page: part endeth in calamity, from which we are equally far off; and whether part it will light on, is to be tried with uncertainty. And men, when they go to war, use many times to fall first to action, the which ought to come behind; and when they have taken harm, then they fall to reasoning. But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor do find that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace nor violate your oaths; but according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness, that if you begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same way that you shall walk in before us.”
79. Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedæmonians had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians, and the Athenians’ answer, they put them every one out of the court1, and consulted of the business amongst themselves. And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this; that the Athenians had done unjustly, and ought speedily to be warred on. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.
80. “Men of Lacedæmon, both I myself have the experience of many wars, and I see you of the same age with me to have the like; insomuch as you2 cannot desire this war either through inexperience, as many do, nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe. And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate of, Edition: current; Page: will find it to be no small one. For though in respect of the Peloponnesians and our neighbour states we have equal1 strength, and can quickly be upon them; yet against men whose territory is remote, and are also expert seamen, and with all other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece besides; and that have many confederates paying them tribute: against such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the war? And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying should we make such haste to it? On our navy? But therein we are too weak: and if we will provide2 and prepare against them, it will require time. On our money? But therein also we are more too weak3; for neither hath the state any, nor will private men readily contribute. 81. But it may be, some rely on this; that we exceed them in arms and multitude of soldiers, so that we may waste their territories with incursions. But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of. Again, if we essay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them with shipping, because the most of them are islanders. What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we have the better of them in shipping, or take from them their revenue, whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to ourselves. And in this case to let fall the war again, will be no honour for us, when we are Edition: current; Page: chiefly thought to have begun it. As1 for the hope, that if we waste their country, the war will soon be at an end; let that never lift us up: for I fear we shall transmit it rather to our children. For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to their earth; nor as men without experience, to be astonished at the war. 82. And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer our confederates to be wronged, and not apprehend the Athenians in their plots against them; but only not yet to take up arms, but to send and expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of sufferance: and in the mean time to make our provision, and make friends both of Greeks and barbarians, such as in any place we can get of power either in shipping or money; (nor are they to be blamed, that being laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto them not Grecians only, but also barbarians for their safety); and withal to set forth2 our own. If they listen to our ambassadors, best of all; if not, then two or three years passing over our heads, being better appointed, we may war3 upon them if we will. And when they see our preparation4, and hear words that import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner; especially having their grounds unhurt, and consulting upon commodities extant and not yet spoiled. For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much the more, by how much the better husbanded. Edition: current; Page: The which we ought therefore to spare as long as we may; lest making them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugn. For if unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the confederates we waste their territory; consider if1 in so doing we do not make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians, and also more difficult. For though accusations, as well against2 cities as private men, may be cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some taken up by all, the success whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly with honour be letten fall again. 83. Now let no man think it cowardice, that being many cities3, we go not presently and invade that one city. For of confederates that bring them in money, they have more than we; and war is not so much war of arms as war of money, by means whereof arms are useful; especially when it is a war of land–men against sea–men. And therefore let us first provide ourselves of money, and not first raise the war upon the persuasion of the confederates. For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad, have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them. 84. As for the slackness and procrastination wherewith5 we are reproached by the confederates, be never ashamed of it; for the more haste you make to the war, you will4 be the longer before you end it, for that you go to it unprovided. Besides, our city hath been ever free and well thought of: and Edition: current; Page: this which they object, is rather to be called a modesty proceeding upon judgment. For by that it is, that we alone are neither arrogant upon good success, nor shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are we, when men provoke us to it with praise, through the delight thereof moved to undergo danger more than we think fit ourselves; nor when they sharpen us with reprehension, doth the smart thereof a jot the more prevail upon us. And this modesty of ours maketh us both good soldiers, and good counsellors: good soldiers, because shame begetteth1 modesty, and valour is most sensible of shame: good counsellors, in this, that we are brought up more simply than to disesteem the laws, and by severity more modestly than to disobey them: and also in that, we do not, like men exceeding wise in things needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the enemy and in effect not assault him accordingly; but do think our neighbour’s cogitations like our own, and that the events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech2; and do therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy, as against men well advised. For we are not to build our hopes upon the oversights of them, but upon the safe foresight of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much difference between man and man; but him only to be the best, that hath been brought up amongst the most difficulties3. 85. Let us not Edition: current; Page: therefore cast aside the institutions1 of our ancestors, which we have so long retained to our profit; nor let us of many men’s lives, of much money, of many cities, and much honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day, but at leisure; the which we have better commodity than any other to do, by reason of our power. Send to the Athenians about the matter of Potidæa; send about that wherein the confederates say they are injured; and the rather, because they be content to refer the cause to judgment; and one that offereth himself to judgment, may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury, before the judgment be given. And prepare withal for the war. So shall you take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy.”
Thus spake Archidamus. But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all and spake to the Lacedæmonians in this manner:
86. “For my part, I understand not the many words used by the Athenians; for though they have been much in their own praises, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury to our confederates and to Peloponnesus. And if they carried themselves well against the Medes, when time was, and now ill against us, they deserve a double punishment; because they are not good as they were, and because they are evil as they were not. Now are we the same we were2; and mean not (if we be wise) either to connive at the wrongs done to our Edition: current; Page: confederates, or defer to repair them; for the harm they suffer, is not deferred. Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; and we have good confederates, not to be betrayed to the Athenians, nor to be defended with words1, (for they are not hurt in words), but to be aided with all our power and with speed. Let no man tell me, that after we have once received the injury we ought to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to spend time in consultation. Wherefore, men of Lancedæmon, decree the war, as becometh the dignity of Sparta; and let not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our confederates, but in the name of the Gods proceed against the doers of injustice.”
87. Having thus spoken, being himself Ephor, he put it to the question in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians; and saying afterwards, that he could not discern whether was the greater cry, (for they used there to give their votes viva voce, and not with balls2), and desiring that it might be evident Edition: current; Page: that their minds were inclined most to the war1, he put it unto them again, and said, “to whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is broken and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go yonder,” and withal he showed them a certain place: “and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the other side”. So they arose and the room was divided; wherein far the greater number were those that held the peace to be broken.
Then calling in the confederates, they told them, that for their own parts their sentence was that the Athenians had done them wrong: but yet they desired to have all their confederates called together, and then to put it to the question again; that if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent2. This done, their confederates went home: and so did also afterwards the Athenians, when they had dispatched the business they came about. This decree of the assembly that the peace was broken, was made in the fourteenth year of those thirty years, for which a peace had Edition: current; Page: been formerly concluded after the actions past in Eubœa.
88. The Lacedæmonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates, as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands.
89. Now the manner how the Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which they so raised themselves, was this. After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land, were departed, and such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale1 were there also utterly overthrown; Leotychides king of the Lacedæmonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus went home. But the Athenians with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as many as were already revolted from the king, staid behind and besieged Sestus, holden then by the Medes; and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it abandoned by the barbarians2. And after this they set sail from the Hellespont, every one to his own city. And the body3 of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear of the barbarians, went home also, and fetched thither their wives and Edition: current; Page: children, and such goods as they had, from the places where they had been put out to keep; and went about the reparation1 of their city and walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall, and likewise a few houses (though the most were down) which the principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.
90. The Lacedæmonians hearing what they went about, sent thither their ambassadors, partly because they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other had had walls; but principally as incited thereto by their confederates, who feared not only the greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also their courage showed against the Persians: and entreated them not to build their walls, but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing: not discovering their meaning, and the jealousy they had of the Athenians; but pretending this, that if the barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war, as he did2 of Thebes: and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire, and from whence to withstand the war. But the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, when the Lacedæmonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with this answer; that they would presently send ambassadors about the Edition: current; Page: business they spake of to Lacedæmon. Now Themistocles willed them to send himself to Lacedæmon for one, and that as speedily as they could; but such as were chosen ambassadors with him, not to send away presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised as to fight upon them from a sufficient height1; and that all the men in the city, in the mean time, both they and their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice that might advance the work, but pulling all down whatsoever, should help to raise it. When he had thus instructed them, adding that he would himself do the rest at Lacedæmon, he took his journey. And when he came to Lacedæmon he went not to the state2, but delaying the time excused himself; and when any of those that were in office, asked him why he did not present himself to the state, answered, “that he stayed for his fellow–ambassadors, who upon some business that fell out were left behind, but he expected them very shortly and wondered they were not come already”. 91. Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles for the love they bore him; but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall went up, and that it was come to good height already, they could not then choose but believe it. Themistocles, when he saw this, wished them not to be led by reports, but rather to send thither some of their own, such as were honest men, and having informed themselves would relate the truth: which they also did. And Themistocles Edition: current; Page: sendeth privily to the Athenians about the same men, to take order for their stay with as little appearance of it as they could, and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were returned: (for by this time were arrived those that were joined with him, namely, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, and brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient height): for he feared lest the Lacedæmonians, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors, according as it was written to them to do. Themistocles coming now to his audience before the Lacedæmonians, said plainly, “that the city of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of those within: and that if it shall please the Lacedæmonians1 upon any occasion to send ambassadors unto them, they were to send thenceforward as to men that understood what conduced both to their own, and also to the common good of all Greece. For when they thought it best to quit their city and put themselves into their galleys, he2 said, they were bold to do it without asking the advice of them: and in common counsel, the advice of the Athenians was as good as the advice of them. And now at this time their opinion is, that it will be best, both for themselves in particular and for all the confederates in common, that their city should Edition: current; Page: be walled. For that in strength1 unequal, men cannot alike and equally advise for the common benefit of Greece. Therefore, said he, either must all the confederate cities be unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by us.” The Lacedæmonians when they heard him, though they made no show of being angry with the Athenians; (for they had not sent their ambassadors to forbid them, but by way of advice, to admonish them not to build the wall2; besides they bare them affection then, for their courage shown against the Medes); yet they were inwardly offended, because they missed of their will. And the ambassadors returned home of either side without complaint.
93. Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls; the structure itself making manifest3 the haste used in the building. For the foundation consisteth of stones of all sorts; and those in some places unwrought, and as they were brought to the place. Many pillars also taken from sepulchres4, and polished stones were piled together amongst the rest. For the circuit of the city was set every way farther out, and therefore hastening they took alike whatsoever came next to hand. Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Piræus5; for it was begun in the year that himself Edition: current; Page: was archon of Athens; as conceiving the place both1 beautiful, in that it had three natural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the enlargement of their power. For he was indeed the first man that durst tell them, that they ought to take upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently helped them in the obtaining it. By his counsel also it was, that they built the wall of that breadth about Piræus which is now to be seen. For two carts carrying stones2 met and passed upon it one by another. And yet within it there was neither rubbish nor mortar [to fill it up], but it was made all of great stones, cut square3 and bound together with iron and lead. But for height, it was raised but to the half, at the most, of what he had intended. For he would have had it able to hold out the enemy both by the height and breadth; and that a few and the less serviceable men might have sufficed to defend it, and the rest have served in the navy. For principally he was addicted to the sea, because, as I think, he had observed that the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea than by land; and thought that Piræus was more profitable than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians, that in case they were oppressed4 by land, they should go Edition: current; Page: down thither, and with their galleys make resistance against what enemy soever. Thus the Athenians built their walls, and fitted themselves in other kinds, immediately upon the departure of the Persians.
94. In the meantime was Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, sent from Lacedæmon commander of the Grecians with twenty galleys out of Peloponnesus; with which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates; and making war on Cyprus, subdued the greatest part of the same: and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium1, which they besieged and won. 95. But Pausanias being now grown insolent, both the rest of the Grecians, and especially the Ionians, who2 had newly recovered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came unto the Athenians, and requested them for consanguinity’s3 sake to become their leaders, and to protect them from the violence of Pausanias. The Athenians accepting the motion, applied themselves both to the defence of these, and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs there in such sort as it should seem best unto themselves. In the mean time the Lacedæmonians sent for Pausanias home, to examine him of such things as they had heard against him. For great crimes had been laid to his charge by the Grecians that came from thence; and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny, than a command in war. And it was his hap to be called home at the same time that the Edition: current; Page: confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to him had turned to the Athenians. When he came to Lacedæmon, though he were censured1 for some wrongs done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquit; especially2 of Medising, the which seemed to be the most evident of all. Him therefore they sent general no more; but Dorcis, and some others with him, with no great army; whose command the confederates refused; and they finding that, went their ways likewise. And after that the Lacedæmonians sent no more; because they feared lest such as went out, would prove the worse for the state, as they had seen by Pausanias; and also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient leaders and at that time their friends.
96. When the Athenians had thus gotten the command, by the confederates’ own accord for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then set down an order, which cities should contribute money for this war against the barbarians, and which galleys. For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered, by laying waste the territories of the king. And then first came up amongst the Athenians the office of Treasurers of Greece, who were receivers of the tribute3; for so they called this money contributed. And the first tribute that was taxed, came to four hundred and sixty talents4. The Edition: current; Page: treasury was at Delos1, and their meetings were kept there in the temple.
97. Now using their authority, at first, in such manner as that the confederates lived under their own laws, and were admitted to common council; by [the] war and administration of the common affairs of Greece from the Persian war to this, what against the barbarians, what against their own innovating confederates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as chanced always in every war to fall in, they effected those great matters following. Which also I have therefore written, both because this place hath been pretermitted by all that have written before me: (for they have either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians, or that invasion only; of which number is Hellanicus, who hath also touched them in his Attic History, but briefly, and without exact mention of the times): and also because they carry with them a demonstration of how the Athenian empire grew up2.
98. And first, under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades they took Eion3 upon the river Edition: current; Page: Strymon from the Medes by siege, and carried away1 the inhabitants captives. Then the isle Scyros, in the Ægean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, the inhabitants whereof they also carried away captives, and planted therein a colony of their own. Likewise they made war on the Carystians alone without the rest of the Eubœans; and those also after a time came in by composition. After this they warred on the revolted Naxians, and brought them in by siege. And this was the first confederate city, which contrary to the ordinance2 they deprived of their free estate; though afterwards, as it came to any of their turns, they did the like by the rest.
99. Amongst other causes of revolts, the principal was their failing to bring in their tribute and galleys, and their refusing (when they did so) to follow the wars3. For the Athenians exacted strictly, and were grievous to them, by imposing a necessity of toil which they were neither accustomed nor willing to undergo. They were also otherwise not so gentle in their government as they had been, nor followed the war upon equal terms; and could easily bring back to their subjection such as should revolt. And of this the confederates themselves were the causes. For4 through this Edition: current; Page: refusal to accompany the army, the most of them, to the end they might stay at home, were ordered to excuse their galleys with money, as much as it came to: by which means the navy of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates; and themselves unprovided and without means to make war, in case they should revolt.
100. After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes, both by land and by water, upon the river of Eurymedon in Pamphilia; and in one and the same day the Athenians had victory in both1; and took or sunk all the Phœnician fleet, to the number of two hundred galleys. After this again happened the revolt of Thasos, upon a difference about the places of trade and about the mines they possessed in the opposite parts of Thrace2. And the Athenians going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at sea, and landed in the island. But having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates’ people unto the river of Strymon, for a colony to be planted in a place called then the Nine–ways, now Amphipolis; they won the said Nine–ways, which was held by the Eidonians; but advancing farther towards the heart of the country of Thrace, they were defeated3 at Drabescus, a city of the Edition: current; Page: Eidonians, by the whole power of the Thracians, that were enemies to this new–built town of the Nine–ways. 101. The Thasians in the meantime, being overcome in divers battles and besieged, sought aid of the Lacedæmonians, and entreated them to divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica: which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and also had done it, but by an earthquake that then happened they were hindered. In which earthquake their Helots1, and of neighbouring towns2 the Thuriatæ and Æthæans, revolted and seized on Ithome. Most of these Helots were the posterity of the ancient Messenians, brought into servitude in former3 times; whereby also it came to pass that they were called all Messenians. Against these had the Lacedæmonians now a war at Ithome. The4 Thasians in the third year of the siege rendered Edition: current; Page: themselves to the Athenians, upon condition to raze their walls; to deliver up their galleys; to pay both the money behind and for the future, as much as they were wont; and to quit both the mines and the continent. 102. The Lacedæmonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long, amongst other their confederates sent for aid to the Athenians; who also came with no small forces under the command of Cimon. They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege seeming to require men of ability in that kind; whereby they might perhaps have gotten the place by force1. And upon this journey, grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. For the Lacedæmonians, when they could not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating humour of the Athenians, whom withal they esteemed of a contrary race2, might, at the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some alteration if they staid, dismissed them alone of all the confederates; not discovering their jealousy, but alleging that they had no farther need of their service. But the Athenians perceiving that they were not sent away upon good3 cause, but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter; and conceiving that they had better deserved at the Lacedæmonians’ hands, as soon as Edition: current; Page: they were gone1, left the league which they had made with the Lacedæmonians against the Persian, and became confederates with their enemies the Argives; and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath and made the same league with the Thessalians.
103. Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out, in the tenth year of the siege rendered the place to the Lacedæmonians, upon condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus, and that they should no more return; and whosoever should be taken returning, to be the slave of him that should take him. For the Lacedæmonians had before been warned by a certain answer of the Pythian oracle, to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes. So they came forth, they and their wives and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore2 to the Lacedæmonians, received them and put them into Naupactus; which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolæ. The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedæmonians and came to the league of the Athenians, because they were holden down by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians; who built for the Megareans the long walls from the city to Nisæa, and maintained them with a garrison of their own. And from hence it was chiefly, that the vehement hatred grew of the Corinthians against the Athenians.Edition: current; Page: 
104. Moreover Inarus, the son of Psammetticus, an African1, king of the Africans that confine on Egypt, making war from Mareia above Pharus, caused the greatest part of Egypt to rebel against the king Artaxerxes; and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athenians to assist him; who chancing to be then warring on Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their confederates, left Cyprus and went to him. And going from the sea up the river of Nilus, after they had made themselves masters of the river and of two parts of the city of Memphis, assaulted the third part, called the White–Wall. Within were of the Medes and Persians, such as had escaped, and of the Egyptians, such as had not revolted amongst the rest. 105. The Athenians came also with a fleet to Halias, and landing their soldiers fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians fought by sea against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Cecryphaleia, and the Athenians had the victory. After this again, the war being on foot of the Athenians against the Æginetæ, a great battle was fought between them by sea upon the coast of Ægina, the confederates of both sides being at the same, in which the Athenians had the victory; and having taken seventy galleys landed their army and besieged the city, under the conduct of Leocrates the son of Strœbus. After this, the Peloponnesians desiring to aid the Æginetæ, sent over into Ægina itself three hundred men of Edition: current; Page: arms, of the same that had before aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and with other forces1 seized on the top of Geraneia. And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence into the territory of Megara; supposing that the Athenians, having much of their army absent in Ægina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid the Megareans, or if they did, would be forced to rise from before Ægina. But the Athenians stirred not from Ægina, but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the conduct of Myronides went to Megara; and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted asunder again, with an opinion on both sides not to have had the worse in the action. And the Athenians, who notwithstanding had rather the better, when the Corinthians were gone away erected a trophy. But the Corinthians having been reviled at their return by the ancient men of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had been theirs. Hereupon the Athenians sallying out of Megara with a huge shout2, both slew those that were setting up the trophy, and charging the rest got the victory. 106. The Corinthians being overcome, Edition: current; Page: went their way; but a good part of them, being hard followed and missing their way, lighted into the enclosed ground of a private man, which fenced with a great ditch had no passage through. Which the Athenians perceiving, opposed them1 at the place by which they entered with their men of arms, and encompassing the ground with their light armed soldiers killed those that were entered with stones. This was a great loss to the Corinthians; but the rest2 of their army got home again.
107. About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls, from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called Phaleron, the other to Peiræus. The Phoceans also making war upon Bœum, Cytinium, and Erineus, towns that belonged to the Dorians3, of whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedæmonians, under the conduct of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus, in the place of Pleistoanactes son of king Pausanias, who was yet in his minority, sent unto the aid of the Dorians fifteen hundred men of arms of their own, and of their confederates ten thousand. And when they had forced the Phoceans upon composition to surrender the town they had taken, they went Edition: current; Page: their ways again. Now if they would go home by sea through the Crisæan Gulf, the Athenians going1 about with their fleet would be ready to stop them; and to pass over Geraneia they thought unsafe, because the Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegæ. For Geraneia was not only a difficult passage of itself, but was also always guarded by the Athenians2. They thought good therefore to stay amongst the Bœotians, and to consider which way they might most safely go through. Whilst3 they were there, there wanted not some Athenians, that privily solicited them to come to the city, hoping to have put the people out of government, and to have demolished the long walls then building. But the Athenians, with the whole power of their city, and a thousand Argives, and other confederates as they could be gotten together, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them: for4 there was suspicion that they came thither to depose the democracy. There also came to the Athenians5 certain horsemen out of Thessaly, which in the battle turned to the Lacedæmonians. 108. They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the Lacedæmonians had the victory; but the slaughter was great on both sides. Then the Lacedæmonians entering into the territories of Edition: current; Page: Megara, and cutting down the woods before them, returned home by the way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. Upon the two–and–sixtieth day after this battle, the Athenians, under the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against the Bœotians and overthrew them at Œnophyta, and brought the territories of Bœotia and Phocis under their obedience; and withal razed the walls of Tanagra, and took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus a hundred hostages; and finished also at the same time their long walls at home. After this, Ægina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions: that they should have their walls pulled down, and should deliver up their galleys, and pay their taxed tribute for the time to come. Also the Athenians made a voyage about Peloponnesus1 wherein they burnt the arsenal of the Lacedæmonians’ navy, took Chalcis2 a city of the Corinthians, and landing their forces in Sicyonia overcame in the fight those that made head against them.
109. All this while the Athenians stayed still in Egypt3, and saw much variety of war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt: and the king of Persia sent one Megabazus, a Persian, with money to Lacedæmon, to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt. But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned with the money he had left Edition: current; Page: into Asia. And1 then was Megabazus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt with great forces, and coming in by land overthrew the Egyptians and their confederates in a battle, drave the Grecians out of Memphis, and finally inclosed them in the isle of Prosopis2. There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as having drained the channel and turned the water another way, he made their galleys lie aground and the island for the most part continent, and so came over and won the island with land soldiers. 110. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost after six years’ war; and few of many passing through Africa saved themselves in Cyrene: but the most perished. So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king, except only Amyrtæus, that reigned in the fens. For him they could not bring in, both because the fens are great, and the people of the fens3 of all the Egyptians the most warlike. But Inarus, king of the Africans, and author of all this stir in Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified. The Athenians moreover had sent fifty galleys more into Egypt, for a supply of those that were there already; which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of Nilus, knew nothing of what had happened to the rest: and being assaulted from the land by the army, and from the sea by the Phœnician fleet, lost the greatest part of their galleys, and escaped Edition: current; Page: home again with the lesser part. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into Egypt.
111. Also Orestes the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And the Athenians, taking with them the Bœotians and Phoceans1, their confederates, made war against Pharsalus2, a city of Thessaly; and were masters of the field as far as they strayed not from the army3, (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling); but could not win the city nor yet perform anything else of what they came for, but came back again without effect, and brought Orestes with them. Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the gallies that lay at Pegæ, (for Pegæ was in the hands of the Athenians), under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicyonia4, and landing put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made head; and then presently took up forces in Achaia; and putting over made war on Œnias5, a city of Acarnania, which they besieged. Nevertheless they took it not, but returned home.
112. Three years after this6, was a truce made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. And the Athenians gave over the Grecian war; and with two hundred galleys, part their own, Edition: current; Page: and part confederates, under the conduct of Cimon, made war on Cyprus. Of these there went sixty sail into Egypt, sent for by Amyrtæus that reigned in the fens; and the rest lay at the siege of Citium. But Cimon there dying and a famine arising in the army1, they left Citium; and when they had passed Salamis2 in Cyprus, fought at once both by sea and land against the Phœnicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, and having gotten victory in both returned home, and with them the rest of their fleet, now come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedæmonians took in hand the war called the holy war; and having won the temple at Delphi, delivered the possession thereof to the Delphians3. But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedæmonians were gone, came with their army, and regaining it, delivered the possession to the Phoceans. 113. Some space of time after this, the outlaws of Bœotia being seized of Orchomenus and Chæroneia and certain other places of Bœotia, the Athenians made war upon those places, being their enemies, with a thousand men of arms of their own and as many of their confederates as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas the son of Tolmæus. And when they had taken Chæroneia, they carried away the inhabitants4 captives, and Edition: current; Page: leaving a garrison in the city departed. In their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, together with the Locrians of Opus, and the Eubœan outlaws, and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coroneia1, and overcoming the Athenians in battle some they slew and some they took alive. Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Bœotia, and made peace with condition to have their prisoners released. So the outlaws and the rest2 returned, and lived again under their own laws. 114. Not long after revolted Eubœa from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already passed over into it with the Athenian army, there was brought him news that Megara was likewise revolted, and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica; and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except only such as fled into Nisæa. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Eubœa; and the Lacedæmonians afterward brake into Attica, and wasted the country about Eleusine and3 Thriasium, Edition: current; Page: under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, and came no farther on, but so went away. After which the Athenians passed again into Eubœa1, and totally subdued it: the Hestiæans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own hands; but ordered the rest of Eubœa according to composition made. 115. Being returned from Eubœa, within a while after they made a peace with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates for thirty years; and rendered Nisæa, Achaia2, Pegæ, and Trœzene, (for these places the Athenians held of theirs), to the Peloponnesians. In the sixth year of this peace fell out the war between the Samians and Milesians, concerning Priene; and the Milesians being put to the worse, came to Athens and exclaimed against the Samians. Wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians, out of desire to alter the form of government. Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys, and set up the democracy there, and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages; which when they had put into Lemnos, and set a guard upon Edition: current; Page: them1, they came home. But certain of the Samians (for some of them not enduring the popular government were fled into the continent) entering into a league with the mightiest of them in Samos, and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, who then was governor of Sardis, and levying about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over into Samos in the evening, and first set upon the popular faction, and brought most of them into their power; and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted, and delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there2 into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines. 116. The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use; (for some of them went into Caria to observe the fleet of the Phœnicians, and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos); but with the forty–four that remained, under the command of Pericles and nine others, fought3 with seventy galleys of the Samians, (whereof twenty were such as served for the transport of soldiers), as they were coming altogether from Miletus; and the Athenians had the victory. After this came a supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty–five. With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle, and besieged the city; which they inclosed with a triple wall4, and shut it up by sea with their galleys. But Pericles Edition: current; Page: taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria, upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phœnician fleet. For Stesagoras with five galleys was already gone out of Samos, and others out of other places, to meet the Phœnicians. 117. In the mean time, the Samians coming suddenly forth with their fleet and falling upon the harbour1 of the Athenians, which was unfortified, sunk the galleys that kept watch before it, and overcame the rest2 in fight; insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they pleased. But Pericles returning shut them up again with his galleys. And after this, there came to him from Athens a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides3, Agnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos thirty more. And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege they rendered the city upon composition: namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver Edition: current; Page: up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war at days appointed. And the Byzantines also yielded, with condition to remain subject to them in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.
118. Now not many years after this happened the matters before related, of the Corcyræans and the Potidæans, and whatsoever other intervenient1 pretext of this war. These things done by the Grecians one against another or against the barbarians, came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this present war. In which time, the Athenians both assured their government over the confederates, and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. This the Lacedæmonians saw, and opposed not, save now and then a little; but, as men that had ever before been slow to war without necessity, and also for that they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them: till now at last, when the power of the Athenians was advanced manifestly indeed, and that they had done injury to their confederates, they could forbear no longer; but thought it necessary to go in hand with the war with all diligence, and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose it was2 by the Lacedæmonians themselves decreed, that the peace was broken and that the Athenians had done unjustly: and also having sent to Delphi, Edition: current; Page: and enquired of Apollo, whether they should have the better in the war or not; they received, as it is reported, this answer: “That if they warred with their whole power, they should have victory, and that himself would be on their side, both called and uncalled”. 119. Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they were to put it to the question amongst them, “whether they should make war or not”. And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in, and the council set, as well the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury, and desiring the war; as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities every one severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidæa should be lost before help came, being then present spake last of all to this effect.
120. “Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedæmonians, they having both decreed the war themselves1, and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also (administering their private affairs equally with others) to consider before the rest of the common business. And though as many of us as have already had our Edition: current; Page: turns with the Athenians, need not be taught to beware of them: yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we, in places of traffic on the sea side, to know, that unless they defend those below, they shall with a great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea the commodities of the seasons, and again more hardly receive the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to mistake1 what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not; but to make account, that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach to themselves; and that this consultation concerneth them no less than us; and therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet, unless they have wrong; yet it is the part of valiant men, when they receive injury, to pass from peace into war, and after success, from war to come again to composition: and neither to swell with the good success of war, nor to suffer injury through pleasure taken in the ease of peace. For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is made proud by success, observeth not that his pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence. For though many things ill advised, come to good effect against enemies worse advised; yet more, thought well advised, have fallen but badly out against well advised enemies2. For no man comes to execute a Edition: current; Page: thing with the same confidence he premeditates it. For we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear. 121. As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also in due time lay it down. And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory: first, because we exceed them in number1; and next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one fashion2. And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength of the Athenians, we shall provide it, both out of every one’s particular wealth, and with the money at Delphi and Olympia. For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their foreign mariners by offer of greater wages. For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic: whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money. And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto by teaching; but the experience which they exceed us in, that must we attain unto by industry. And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, it must Edition: current; Page: be all our parts to contribute. For else it were a hard case, that the confederates of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their own servitude; and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies and for our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from us and even with that do us mischief. 122. We have also many other ways of war; as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue1; the building of forts in their territory2; and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the occasion. Wherein he that complies with it with most temper, standeth the firmest; and he that is most passionate, oftenest miscarries. Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory with an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly, and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know, that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it) brings with it no less than manifest3 servitude: which but to mention as a doubt, as if so many Edition: current; Page: cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear, and so appear degenerate from our ancestors. For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored: whereas we for our part assure not so much as our own; but claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us. Wherein we know not how we can avoid1 one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of foolishness.
123 “But to what end should we object matters past, more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by helping the present, labour for the future2: for it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour. And though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must not therefore change the custom: for there is no reason that what was gotten in want, should be lost by wealth. But we should confidently go in hand with the war, as for many other causes so also for this, that both the God Edition: current; Page: hath by his oracle advised us thereto and promised to be with us himself: and also for that the rest of Greece, some for fear and some for profit1, are ready to take our parts. Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the God, inasmuch as he doth encourage us to the war, judgeth violated by them2; but you fight rather in defence of the same. For not he breaketh the peace that taketh revenge, but he that is the first invader.
124. “So that seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since in common we persuade the same; and seeing also that both to the cities and to private men it will be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidæans; who are Dorians, and besieged (which was wont to be contrary) by Ionians; nor the recovery of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. For it is a case that admitteth not delay, when they are some of them already oppressed, and others (after it shall be known we met and durst not right ourselves) shall shortly after undergo the like. But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity, and that this is the best advice: and therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger, but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. For though by war groweth the confirmation of peace; yet for love of ease to refuse the war, doth not likewise avoid the danger. But making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece, is set up alike over all, and reigneth over Edition: current; Page: some already, and the rest in intention, we shall bring it again into order by the war1; and not only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves, but also deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of servitude.” Thus said the Corinthians.
125. The Lacedæmonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all, brought the balls to all the confederates present in order, from the greatest state to the least: and the greatest part gave their votes for the war. Now after the war was decreed, though it were impossible for them to go in hand with it presently, because they were unprovided, and every state thought good without delay severally to furnish themselves of what was necessary; yet there passed not fully a year in this preparation before Attica was invaded, and the war openly on foot.
126. In the mean time they sent ambassadors to the Athenians with certain criminations, to the end that if they would give ear to nothing, they might have all the pretext that could be for raising of the war. And first the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, required them to banish such as were under curse of the goddess Minerva for pollution of sanctuary2. Which polution was thus. There had been one Cylon an Athenian, a man that had been victor in the Olympian exercises, of much nobility and power amongst those of old time, and that had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, in those Edition: current; Page: days tyrant of Megara. To this Cylon, asking counsel at Delphi, the God answered, that on the greatest festival day1 he should seize the citadel of Athens. He therefore having gotten forces of Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to the enterprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the Olympic holidays in Peloponnesus, with intention to take upon him the tyranny: esteeming the feast of Jupiter2 to be the greatest, and to touch withal on his particular, in that he had been victor in the Olympian exercises. But whether the feast spoken of were meant to be the greatest in Attica, or in some other place, neither did he himself consider, nor the oracle make manifest3. For there is also amongst the Athenians the Diasia, which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius, and is celebrated without the city; wherein in the confluence of the whole people many men offered sacrifices, not of living creatures, but such as was the fashion of the natives of the place4. But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to the enterprise. And when the Athenians heard of it, they came with all their forces out of the fields, and lying before the citadel besieged it. But the Edition: current; Page: time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege, went most of them away; and left both the guard of the citadel and the whole business to the nine archontes, with absolute authority to order the same as to them it should seem good. For at that time, most of the affairs of the commonweal were administered by those nine archontes1. Now those that were besieged with Cylon, were for want of both victual and water in very evil Edition: current; Page: estate; and therefore Cylon and a brother of his fled privily out; but the rest, when they were pressed and some of them dead with famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar that is in the citadel. And the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place, raising them upon promise to do them no harm, put them all to the sword. Also they had put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at the altars of the severe Goddesses, as they were going away1. And from this the Athenians, both themselves and their posterity, were called accursed and sacrilegious persons. Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were under the curse: and Cleomenes, a Lacedæmonian, together with the Athenians in a sedition2, banished them afterwards again: and not only so, but disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such of them as were dead. Nevertheless there returned of them afterwards again; and there are of their race in the city unto this day.
127. This pollution therefore the Lacedæmonians required them to purge their city of: principally forsooth, as taking part with the gods; but knowing withal, that Pericles the son of Xantippus, was by the mother’s side3 one of that race. Edition: current; Page:  For they thought if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more easily be brought to yield to their desire. Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be banished, as to bring him into the envy of the city; as if the misfortune of him were in part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his time, and having the sway of the state, he was in all things opposite to the Lacedæmonians; not suffering the Athenians to give them the least way, but inciting them to the war.
128. Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedæmonians to banish such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Tænarus. For the Lacedæmonians, when they had caused their Helots, suppliants in the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, to forsake sanctuary, slew them: for which cause they themselves think it was, that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta. Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalciœca; which was thus. After that Pausanias the Lacedæmonian was1 recalled by the Spartans from his charge in Hellespont, and having been called in question by them was absolved, though he was no more sent abroad by the state, yet he went again into Hellespont in a galley of Hermione as a private man, without leave of the Lacedæmonians; to Edition: current; Page: the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in truth to negociate with the king, as he had before begun, aspiring to the principality of Greece. Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business, was at first from this. When after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium; when he was there the first time, (which being holden by the Medes, there were taken in it some near to the king, and of his kindred), unknown to the rest of the confederates he sent unto the king those near ones of his which he had taken, and gave out they were run away. This he practised with one Gongylus, an Eretrian, to whose charge he had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. Also he sent letters unto him, which Gongylus carried, wherein, as was afterwards known, was thus written: “Pausanias, General of the Spartans, being desirous to do thee a courtesy, sendeth back unto thee these men, whom he hath by arms taken prisoners. And I have a purpose, if the same seem also good unto thee, to take thy daughter in marriage, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece into thy subjection. These things I account myself able to bring to pass, if I may communicate my counsels with thee. If therefore any of these things do like thee, send some trusty man to the sea–side, by whose mediation we may confer together.”
129. These were the contents of the writing. Xerxes being pleased with the letter, sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the sea–side, with commandment to take the government of Edition: current; Page: the province of Dascylis1, and to dismiss Megabates, that was governor there before: and withal, gives him a letter to Pausanias, which he commanded him to send over to him with speed to Byzantium, and to show him the seal, and well and faithfully to perform whatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be appointed to do. Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other things done as he was commanded, sent over the letter; wherein was written this answer: “Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias: For the men which thou hast saved and sent over the sea unto me from Byzantium, thy benefit is laid up in our house indelibly registered2 for ever: and I like also of what thou hast propounded. And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the performance of what thou hast promised unto me. Neither be thou hindered by the expense of gold and silver, or multitude of soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be needful to have them come3. But with Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent unto thee, do boldly both mine and thine own business, as shall be most fit for the dignity and honour of us both.”
130. Pausanias having received these letters, whereas he was before in great authority4 for his conduct at Platæa, became now many degrees more elevated; and endured no more to live after the accustomed manner of his country, but went apparelled Edition: current; Page: at Byzantium1 after the fashion of Persia; and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and Egyptians, and his table likewise after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to conceal his purpose; but in trifles made apparent beforehand the greater matters he had conceived of the future. He became moreover difficult of access; and would be in such choleric2 passions toward all men indifferently, that no man might endure to approach him; which was also none of the least causes why the confederates turned from him to the Athenians.
131 When the Lacedæmonians heard of it, they called him home the first time. And when being gone out the second time without their command in a galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same practices; and after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege of the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came that he had seated himself at Colonæ in the country of Troy, practising still with the barbarians, and making his abode there for no good purpose: then the ephori forebore no longer, but sent unto him a public officer with the scytale3, commanding him not to Edition: current; Page: depart from the officer; and in case he refused, denounced war against him. But he, desiring as much as he could to decline suspicion, and believing that with money he should be able to discharge himself of his accusations, returned unto Sparta the second time. And first he was by the ephori committed to ward; (for the ephori1 have power to do this to their king); but afterwards procuring his enlargement, he came forth, and exhibited himself to justice against such as had any thing to allege against him. 132. And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies nor the whole city, whereupon to proceed to the punishment of a man both of the race of their kings, and at that present in great authority: (for Plistarchus the son of Leonidas, being king and as yet in minority, Pausanias, who was his cousin–german, had the tuition of him yet): by his licentious behaviour, and affectation of the barbarian customs, he gave much cause of suspicion that he meant not to live in the equality of the present state2. They considered also that he differed in manner of life from the discipline established: amongst other things by this, that upon the tripode at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had caused Edition: current; Page: to be inscribed of himself in particular this elegiac verse1:
But the Lacedæmonians then presently defaced that inscription of the tripode, and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated it so2. This therefore was numbered amongst the offences of Pausanias, and was thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather for the condition he was now in3. They had information farther, that he had in hand some practice with the Helots. And so he had: for he promised them, not only manumission, but also freedom of the city, if they would rise with him and co–operate in the whole business. But neither thus, upon some appeachment of the Helots, would they proceed against him, but kept the custom which they have in their own cases, not hastily to give a peremptory sentence against a Spartan without unquestionable proof. Till at length (as it is reported) purposing to send over to Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was bewrayed unto them by a man of Argilus, in time past his minion4 and most faithful to Edition: current; Page: him: who being terrified with the cogitation, that not any of those which had been formerly sent had ever returned, got him a seal like to the seal of Pausanias, (to the end that if his jealousy were false, or that he should need to alter anything in the letter, it might not be discovered), and opened the letter; wherein (as he had suspected the addition of some such clause) he found himself also written down to be murdered. 133. The ephori, when these letters were by him shown unto them, though they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias his own mouth; the man being upon design1 gone to Tænarus into sanctuary, and having there built him a little room with a partition in which he hid the ephori, and Pausanias coming to him and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated with him for what he had written about him, and from point to point discovered all the practice: saying2, that though he had never boasted unto him these and these services concerning the king, he must yet have the honour as well as many other of his servants to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things, and also bade the man not to be troubled at what was past, and gave him assurance to leave sanctuary, intreating him to go on in his Edition: current; Page: journey with all speed, and not to frustrate the business in hand.
134. Now the ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time went their way; and knowing now the certain truth, intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said, that when he was to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the countenance of one of the ephori coming towards him, what they came for: and when another of them had by a secret beck signified the matter for good will, he ran into the close of the temple1 of Pallas Chalciœca, and got in before they overtook him; (now the temple itself was hard by); and entering into a house belonging to the temple, to avoid the injury of the open air, there staid. They that pursued him, could not then overtake him: but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of the house, and watching a time when he was Edition: current; Page: within, beset the house and mured him up, and leaving a guard there famished him. When they perceived him about to give up the ghost, they carried him, as he was1, out of the house, yet breathing; and being out he died immediately. After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Cæada2, where they use to cast in malefactors: yet afterwards they thought good to bury him in some place thereabouts. But the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedæmonians afterward, both to remove the sepulchre from the place where he died3; (so that he lies now in the entry4 of the temple, as is evident by the inscription of the pillar); and also (as having been a pollution of the sanctuary) to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalciœca for that one. Whereupon they set up two brazen statues, and dedicated the same unto her for Pausanias. 135. Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution of sanctuary, required the Lacedæmonians to banish out of their city such as were touched with the same.
At the same time that Pausanias came to his Edition: current; Page: end, the Lacedæmonians by their ambassadors to the Athenians accused Themistocles, for that he also had Medised together with Pausanias, having discovered it by proofs against1 Pausanias; and desired that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him. Whereunto consenting, (for he was at this time in banishment by ostracism2, and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and fro in other places of Peloponnesus), they sent certain men in company of the Lacedæmonians, who were willing to pursue him, with command to bring him in wheresoever they could find him. 136. But Themistocles, having had notice of it beforehand, flieth out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra; to the people of which city he had formerly been beneficial. But the Corcyræans, alleging that they durst not keep him there, for fear of displeasing both the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, convey him into the opposite continent: and being pursued by the men thereto appointed, asking continually which way he went, he was compelled at a strait to turn in unto Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy. The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his wife; and by her was instructed to take their son with him, and sit down at the altar of the house. When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him, and desired him, that though he had opposed him in Edition: current; Page: some suit in Athens, not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight: saying, that being now the weaker, he must needs suffer under the stronger; whereas noble revenge is of equals upon equal terms: and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not of life; whereas, if he delivered him up, (telling him withal, for what and by whom he was followed), he deprived him of all means of saving his life. Admetus having heard him bade him arise, together with his son whom he held as he sat: which is the most submiss supplication that is1.
137. Not long after came the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians: and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him not, but sent him away by land to Pydna upon the other sea, (a city belonging to Alexander), because his purpose was to go to the king: where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he embarked, and was carried by foul weather upon the fleet2 of the Athenians that besieged Naxos. Being afraid, he discovered to the master (for he was unknown) who he was, and for what he fled; and said, that unless he would save him, he meant to say that he had hired him to carry him away for money; and that to save him, there needed no more but this, to let none go out of the ship till the weather served to be gone; to which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according to his merit. The master did so; and having lain a day and a night at sea upon the fleet3 of the Athenians, he arrived afterwards Edition: current; Page: at Ephesus. And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money, (for he received there both what was sent him from his friends at Athens, and also what he had put out at Argos), he took his journey upwards in company of a certain Persian of the low countries, and sent letters to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, newly come to the kingdom, wherein was written to this purpose: “I, Themistocles, am coming unto thee, who, of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that invaded me, have done your house the maniest damages; yet the benefits I did him were more, after once I with safety, he with danger was to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due unto me”, (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians’ departure1 out of Salamis, and ascribing the then not breaking of the bridge falsely unto himself), “and2 at this time to do thee many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship’s sake. But I desire to have a year’s respite, that I may declare unto thee the cause of my coming myself.”
138. The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be, and commanded him to do as he had said. In this time of respite he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the place. And a year after coming to the court, he was great with the king more than ever Edition: current; Page: had been any Grecian before; both for his former dignity, and the hope of Greece, which he promised to bring into his subjection; but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy admiration different from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary matters1 upon short deliberation the best discerner, and also of what for the most part would be their issue the best conjecturer. What he was perfect in, he was able also to explicate: and what he was unpractised in, he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And (to say all in few words) this man, by the natural goodness of his wit, and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men to tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick he ended his life: some say, he died voluntarily by poison, because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king. His monument is in Magnesia2 in Asia, in the market–place: for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia, which yielded him fifty talents by the year, for his bread; and Lampsacus for his wine, (for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine3); and the city of Myus for his Edition: current; Page: meat1. His bones are said by his kindred, to have been brought home by his own appointment, and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians: for it was not lawful to bury one there, that had fled for treason. These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian; the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.
After this they sent ambassadors again to Athens, commanding them to levy the siege from before Potidæa and to suffer Ægina to be free; but principally and most plainly telling them, that the war should not be made in case they would abrogate the act concerning the Megareans: by which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica, and all ports within the Athenian dominion. But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their commands nor in the abrogation of that act: but recriminated the Megareans for having tilled holy ground and unset out with bounds2; Edition: current; Page: and for receiving of their slaves1 that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedæmon were arrived, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont, but only this, that “the Lacedæmonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws”: the Athenians called an assembly, and propounding their opinions amongst themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. And many stood forth and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war, and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace, but to be abrogated. And Pericles the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens, and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as followeth.
140. “Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion, not to give way to the Peloponnessians; (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself, which they have when they are incited to it, but change their opinions with the events); but also I see, that I must now advise the same things, or very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place, that if we miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common consent; or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with the events of actions, Edition: current; Page: no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty: which is also the cause, that when any thing happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use to lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedæmonians, both formerly and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief, is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [in the articles], that in our mutual controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the meantime either side hold what they possess; they never yet sought any such trial themselves, nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will clear themselves of their accusations by war, rather than by words: and come hither no more now to expostulate, but to command. For they command us to arise from before Potidæa, and to restore the Æginetæ to the liberty of their own laws, and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. And they that come last1, command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle, by not abrogating the act concerning Megara; (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay); nor retain2 a scruple in your minds, as if a small matter moved you to the war. For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your resolution. Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter, as men that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial, you shall teach them plainly to come to you hereafter Edition: current; Page: on terms of more equality. 141. Resolve therefore from this1 occasion, either to yield them obedience before you receive damage; or if we must have war, (which for my part I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way, nor keep what we possess in fear. For a great and a little claim, imposed by equals upon their neighbours before judgment by way of command, hath one and the same virtue, to make subject. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour2, without money either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience; for that the wars which they have had one against another, have been but short through poverty. And such men can neither man their fleets, nor yet send out their armies by land very often; because they must be far from their own wealth, and yet by that be maintained3, and be besides barred the use of the sea. It must be Edition: current; Page: a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars; and such as live by their labour, are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent1; especially if the war (as it is likely) should last. So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races2, every one will press his particular interest; whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy, and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business, and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And every one supposeth, that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt, and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good3: not observing how by these thoughts of every one in several, the common business is jointly ruined. 142. But their greatest hindrance of all, will be their want of money; which being Edition: current; Page: raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay; which the occasions of war will not endure. As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of peace to fortify in that manner; much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them1. And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory: yet would not that be enough both to besiege us, and also to hinder us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with our fleet; which is the thing wherein our strength lieth. For we have more experience in land–service by use of the sea, than they have in sea–service by use of the land. Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily. For yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian war, yet have not attained it fully. How then should husbandmen, not seamen, Edition: current; Page: whom also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it by lying continually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter of value? Indeed, if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might adventure, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of men: but awed by many, they will not stir that way; and not applying themselves to it, will be yet more unskilful, and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other, and not to be attended at idle times and on the by; but requiring rather, that whilst it is a–learning, nothing else should be done on the by. 143. But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi, and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers employed in our fleet; this indeed, if going aboard both ourselves and those that dwell amongst us1, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this, and (which is the principal thing) we have steersmen and other necessary men for the service of a ship, both more and better of our own citizens, than are in all the rest of Greece. Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial2 would be found content to fly his own country, and withal upon less hope of victory, for a few days’ increase of wages, take part with the other side.
“In this manner, or like to this, seemeth unto me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians: whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and hath many great advantages besides. Edition: current; Page:  If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus, and they all Attica; yet shall theirs be the greater loss. For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of that we shall destroy: whereas for us, there is other land both in the islands and continent. For the dominion of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this. If we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable? We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages1; and not for the loss of them, out of passion, give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in number than ourselves. For though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as many more: and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength; for when we cannot war upon them, they will revolt. Nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses, but of men’s bodies: for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out and destroy them yourselves; and show the Peloponnesians, that you will never the sooner obey them for such things as these.
144. “ There be many other things that give hope of victory, in case you do not2, whilst you Edition: current; Page: are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion, and undergo other voluntary dangers; (for I am afraid of our own errors, more than of their designs); but they shall be spoken of at another time, in prosecution of the war itself. For the present, let us send away these men with this answer: ‘that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports, if the Lacedæmonians will also make no banishment of us nor of our confederates as of strangers’: for neither our act concerning Megara, nor their banishment of strangers, is forbidden in the articles1: ‘also, that we will let the Grecian cities be free, if they were so when the peace was made; and if the Lacedæmonians will also give leave unto their confederates to use their freedom, not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedæmonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good: also that we will stand to judgment according to the articles, and will not begin the war, but be revenged on those that shall’. For this is both just, and for the dignity of the city to answer. Nevertheless you must know, that of necessity war there will be; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall have our enemies; and that out of the greatest dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the Edition: current; Page: greatest honours. For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes, did from less beginnings, nay abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the barbarian and advance this state to the height it now is at. Of whom we ought not now to come short, but rather to revenge us by all means upon our enemies; and do our best to deliver the state unimpaired by us to posterity.”
145. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians liking best of his advice, decreed as he would have them; answering the Lacedæmonians according to his direction, both in particulars as he had spoken, and generally, “that they would do nothing on command, but were ready1 to answer their accusations upon equal terms by way of arbitrement”. So the ambassadors went home; and after these there came no more.
146. These were the quarrels and differences on either side, before the war: which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but2 the confusion of the articles, and matter of the war to follow.
The entry of the Theban soldiers into Platæa by the treason of some within.—Their repulse and slaughter.—The irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica.—The wasting of the coast of Peloponnesus by the Athenian fleet.—The public funeral of the first slain.—The second invasion of Attica.—The pestilence in the city of Athens.—The Ambraciotes war against the Amphilochi.—Platæa assaulted: besieged.—The Peloponnesian fleet beaten by Phormio before the strait of the Gulf of Crissa.—The same fleet repaired and reinforced; and beaten again by Phormio before Naupactus.—The attempt of the Peloponnesians on Salamis.—The fruitless expedition of the Thracians against the Macedonians. This in the first three years of the war.
1. The war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians beginneth now from the time1 they had no longer commerce one with another without a herald, and that having once begun it they warred without intermission. And it is written in order by summers and winters, according as from time to time the several matters came to pass.
2. The peace, which after the winning of Eubœa, Edition: current; Page: was concluded for thirty years, lasted fourteen years. But in the fifteenth year, being the forty–eighth of the priesthood of Chrysis1 in Argos: Ænesias being then ephor at Sparta, and Pythadorus, archon of Athens, having then two months of his government to come: in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa and in the beginning of the spring, three hundred and odd2 Thebans, led by Pythangelus the son of Phyleides, and Diemporus the son of Onetoridas, Bœotian rulers3, about the first watch of the night entered with their arms into Edition: current; Page: Platæa, a city of Bœotia and confederate of the Athenians. They were brought in, and the gates opened unto them, by Naucleides and his complices, men of Platæa, that for their own private ambition intended both the destruction of such citizens as were their enemies, and the putting of the whole city under the subjection of the Thebans. This they negotiated with one Eurymachus the son of Leontiadas, one of the most potent men of Thebes. For the Thebans foreseeing the war, desired to preoccupate Platæa, which was always at variance with them, whilst there was yet peace and the war not openly on foot. By which means they more easily entered undiscovered, there being no order taken before for a watch. And making a stand in their arms1 in the market–place, they did not, as they that gave them entrance would have had them, fall presently to the business, and enter the houses of their adversaries; but resolved rather to make favourable proclamation, and to induce the city to composition and friendship. And the herald proclaimed, “that if any man, according to the ancient custom of all the Bœotians, would enter into the same league of war with them, he should come and bring his arms to theirs”: supposing the city by this means would easily be drawn to their side.
3. The Platæans, when they perceived that the Thebans were already entered and had surprised the city, through fear, and opinion that more Edition: current; Page: were entered than indeed were, (for they could not see them in the night), came to composition, and accepting the condition rested quiet; and the rather, for that they had yet done no man harm1. But whilst that these things were treating, they observed that the Thebans were not many; and thought that if they should set upon them, they might easily have the victory. For the Platæan commons were not willing to have revolted from the Athenians. Wherefore it was thought fit to undertake the matter; and they united themselves by digging through the common walls between house and house, that they might not be discovered as they passed the streets. They also placed carts in the streets without the cattle that drew them, to serve them instead of a wall; and every other thing they put in readiness, as they severally seemed necessary for the present enterprise. When all things according to their means were ready, they marched from their houses towards the enemies; taking their time whilst it was yet night, and a little before break of day; because they would not have to charge them when they should be emboldened by the light and on equal terms, but when they should by night be terrified, and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city. So they forthwith set upon them, and came quickly up to hand strokes. 4. And the Thebans seeing this, and finding they were deceived, cast themselves into a round figure, and beat2 them back in that part where the assault was made: and twice Edition: current; Page: or thrice they repulsed them. But at last, when both the Platæans themselves charged them with a great clamour, and their wives also and families shouted and screeched from the houses, and withal threw stones and tiles amongst them; the night having been also very wet; they were afraid, and turned their backs and fled here and there about the city; ignorant for the most part, in the dark and dirt, of the ways out by which they should have been saved; (for this accident fell out upon the change of the moon); and pursued by such as were well acquainted with the ways to keep them in: insomuch as the greatest1 part of them perished. The gate by which they entered, and which only was left open, a certain Platæan shut up again with the head2 of a javelin, which he thrust into the staple instead of a bolt: so that this way also their passage was stopped. As they were chased up and down the city, some climbed the walls and cast themselves out, and for the most part died. Some came to a desert gate of the city, and with a hatchet given them by a woman cut the staple3, and got forth unseen: but these were not many; for the thing was soon discovered. Edition: current; Page:  Others again were slain dispersed in several parts of the city. But the greatest part, and those especially who had cast themselves before into a ring, happened into a great edifice adjoining to the wall1; the doors whereof, being open, they thought had been the gates of the city, and that there had been a direct way through to the other side. The Platæans seeing them now pent up, consulted whether they should burn them as they were, by firing the house, or else resolve of some other punishment. At length both these, and all the rest of the Thebans that were straggling in the city, agreed to yield themselves and their arms to the Platæans at discretion. And this success had2 they that entered into Platæa.
5. But the rest of the Thebans, that should with their whole power have been there before day, for fear the surprise should not succeed with those that were in, came so late with their aid that they heard the news of what was done by the way3. Now Platæa is from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched the slower for the rain which had fallen the same night. For the river Asopus was swollen so high, that it was not easily passable. So that what by the foulness of the way, and what by the difficulty of passing the river, they arrived not till Edition: current; Page: their men were already some slain and some taken prisoners. When the Thebans understood how things had gone, they lay in wait for such of the Platæans as were without: (for there were abroad in the villages both men and household stuff, as was not unlikely, the evil happening unexpectedly and in time of peace): desiring, if they could take any prisoners, to keep them for exchange for those of theirs within, which (if any were so) were saved alive. This was the Thebans’ purpose. But the Platæans, whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that some such thing would be done, and fearing their case without, sent a herald unto the Thebans: whom they commanded to say, that what they had already done, attempting to surprise their city in time of peace, was done wickedly; and to forbid them to do any injury to those without, and that otherwise they would kill all those men of theirs that they had alive; which, if they would withdraw their forces out of their territory, they would again restore unto them. Thus the Thebans say; and that the Platæans did swear it. But the Platæans confess not that they promised to deliver them presently, but upon treaty if they should agree; and deny that they swore it. Upon this the Thebans went out of their territory1; and the Platæans, when they had speedily taken in whatsoever they had in the country, immediately slew their prisoners. They that were taken were one hundred and eighty; and Eurymachus2, with whom the traitors had practised, was one. 6. When they had done they sent a messenger to Athens, and Edition: current; Page: gave truce to the Thebans to fetch away the bodies of their dead; and ordered the city as was thought convenient for the present occasion.
The news of what was done coming straightway to Athens, they instantly laid hands on all the Bœotians then in Attica; and sent an officer to Platæa, to forbid their farther proceeding with their Theban prisoners, till such time as they also should have advised of the matter: for they were not yet advertised of their putting to death. For the first messenger was sent away when the Thebans first entered the town; and the second, when1 they were overcome and taken prisoners: but of what followed after they knew nothing. So that the Athenians when they sent, knew not what was done; and the officer arriving found that the men were already slain. After this, the Athenians sending an army to Platæa, victualled it and left a garrison in it; and took thence both the women and children, and also such men as were unserviceable for the war.
7. This action falling out at Platæa, and the peace now clearly dissolved, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; so also did the Lacedæmonians and their confederates; intending on either part to send ambassadors to the king, and to other barbarians, wheresoever they had hope of succours; and contracting leagues with such cities as were not under their own command. The Lacedæmonians2 besides those galleys which they had in Italy and Sicily, of the cities that took part Edition: current; Page: with them there, were ordered to furnish, proportionably to the greatness of their several cities, so many more as the whole number might amount to five hundred sail, and to provide a sum of money assessed; and in other things not to stir farther, but to receive the Athenians coming but with one galley at once, till such time as the same should be ready. The Athenians, on the other side, surveyed their present confederates, and sent ambassadors to those places1 that lay about Peloponnesus, as Corcyra, Cephalonia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus; knowing that as long as these were their friends, they might with the more security2 make war round about upon the coast of Peloponnesus. 8. Neither side conceived small matters, but put their whole strength to the war: and not without reason3. For all men in the beginnings of enterprises are the most eager. Besides, there were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in Athens, who for want of experience not unwillingly undertook the war. And not only the rest of Greece stood at gaze to behold the two principal states in combat; but many prophecies were told, and many sung by the priests of the oracles, both in the cities about to war and in others. There was also a little Edition: current; Page: before this an earthquake in Delos, which in the memory of the Grecians never shook before1; and was interpreted for, and seemed to be a sign of what was to come afterwards to pass. And whatsoever thing then chanced of the same nature, it was all sure to be inquired after.
But men’s affections for the most part went with the Lacedæmonians; and the rather, for that they gave out they would recover the Grecians’ liberty. And every man, both private and public person2, endeavoured as much as in them lay both in word and deed to assist them; and thought the business so much hindered, as himself was not present at it. In such passion were most men against the Athenians; some for desire to be delivered from under their government, and others for fear of falling into it. And these were the preparations and affections brought unto the war.Edition: current; Page: 
9. But the confederates of either party, which they had when they began it, were these. The Lacedæmonians had all Peloponnesus within the isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans: (for these were in amity with both, save that the Pellenians at first, only of all Achaia, took their part; but afterwards all the rest did so likewise): and without Peloponnesus, the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phoceans, Ambraciotes, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of which the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians found shipping: the Bœotians, Phoceans, and Locrians, horsemen: and the rest of the cities footmen. And these were the confederates of the Lacedæmonians. The Athenian confederates were these. The Chians, Lesbians, Platæans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, Corcyræans, Zacynthians, and other cities their tributaries amongst those nations1; also that part of Caria which is on the sea–coast, and the Dorians adjoining to them; Ionia, Hellespont, the cities bordering on Thrace2; all the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east, and all the rest of the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera3. Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyræans found galleys; the rest footmen and money. These were their confederates and the preparation for the war on both sides.
10. The Lacedæmonians, after the business of Platæa, sent messengers presently up and down Peloponnesus, and to their confederates without, to Edition: current; Page: have in readiness their forces, and such things as should be necessary for a foreign expedition, as intending the invasion of Attica. And when they were all ready, they came to the rendezvous in the isthmus at a day appointed, two–thirds of the forces of every city1. When the whole army was gotten together, Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, general of the expedition, called together the commanders of the several cities, and such as were in authority and most worthy to be present; and spake unto them as followeth:
11. “Men of Peloponnesus and confederates, not only our fathers have had many wars, both within and without Peloponnesus, but we ourselves also, such as are anything in years, have been sufficiently acquainted therewith; yet did we never before set forth with so great a preparation as at this present. And now, not only we are a numerous and puissant army, that invade; but the state also is puissant2 that is invaded by us. We have reason therefore to show ourselves neither worse than our fathers, nor short of the opinion conceived of ourselves. Edition: current; Page:  For all Greece is up at this commotion, observing us: and through their hatred to the Athenians, do wish that we may accomplish whatsoever we intend. And therefore, though we seem to invade them with a great army, and to have much assurance that they will not come out against us to battle, yet we ought not for this to march the less carefully prepared; but of every city as well the captain as the soldier, to expect always some danger or other in that part wherein he himself is placed. For the accidents of war are uncertain; and for the most part the onset begins from the lesser number1 and upon passion. And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid, hath beaten back the greater with the more ease; for that through contempt they have gone unprepared. And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought always to have bold hearts, yet for action, they ought to make their preparations as if they were afraid. For that will give them both more courage to go upon the enemy, and more safety in fighting with him2. But we invade not now a city that cannot defend itself, but a city every way well appointed. So that we must by all means expect to be fought withal, though not now, because we be not yet there, yet hereafter, when they shall see us in their country wasting and destroying their possessions. For all men, when in their own sight and on a sudden they receive any extraordinary hurt, fall presently into choler; and the less they consider, with the more stomach they assault. And this is likely to hold in the Athenians somewhat Edition: current; Page: more than in the others; for they think themselves worthy to have the command of others, and to invade and waste the territories of their neighbours, rather than to see their neighbours waste theirs. Wherefore, as being to war against a great city, and to procure both to your ancestors and yourselves a great fame, either good or bad as shall be the event; follow your leaders in such sort, as above all things you esteem of order and watchfulness1. For there is nothing in the world more comely nor more safe, than when many men are seen to observe one and the same order.”
12. Archidamus, having thus spoken and dismissed the council, first sent Melesippus the son of Diacritus, a man of Sparta, to Athens, to try if the Athenians, seeing them now on their journey, would yet in some degree remit of their obstinacy. But the Athenians neither received him into their city, nor presented him to the state: for the opinion of Pericles had already taken place, not to receive from the Lacedæmonians neither herald nor ambassador, as long as their army was abroad. Therefore they sent him back without audience, with commandment to be out of their borders the self–same day; and that hereafter if they would any thing with them, they should return every one to his home, and send their ambassadors from thence. They sent with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the country, to the end that no man should confer with him; who, when he came to the limits and was to be dismissed, uttered these words: “This day is the beginning of much Edition: current; Page: evil unto the Grecians”; and so departed. When he returned to the camp, Archidamus perceiving that they would not relent, dislodged1 and marched on with his army into their territory. The Bœotians with their appointed part and with horsemen aided the Peloponnesians; but with the rest of their forces went and wasted the territory of Platæa.
13. Whilst the Peloponnesians were coming together in the isthmus, and when they were on their march, before they brake into Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others was general of the Athenians, when he saw they were about to break in, suspecting that Archidamus, either of private courtesy or by command of the Lacedæmonians to bring him into jealousy, (as they had before for his sake commanded the excommunication), might oftentimes2 leave his lands untouched, told the Athenians beforehand in an assembly, “that though Archidamus had been his guest, it was for no ill to the state; and howsoever, if the enemy did not waste his lands and houses as well as the rest, that then he gave them to the commonwealth”; and therefore desired “that for this he might not be suspected”. Also he advised them concerning the business in hand the same things he had done before; “that they should make preparations for the war, and receive their goods into the city; that they should not go out to battle, but come into the city and guard it; that they should also furnish out their navy, wherein consisted their power, and hold a careful hand over their confederates”: Edition: current; Page: telling them, “how that in the money that came from these lay their strength, and that the victory in war consisted wholly1 in counsel and store of money”. Farther he bade them be confident, “in that there was yearly coming into the state from the confederates for tribute, besides other revenue2, six hundred talents; and remaining yet then in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coin:” (for the greatest sum there had been, was ten thousand talents wanting three hundred: out of which was taken that which had been expended upon the gate–houses3 of the citadel, and upon other buildings, and for the charges of Potidæa): “besides the uncoined gold and silver of private and public offerings; and all the dedicated vessels belonging to the shows and games, and the spoils of the Persian, and other things of that nature, which amounted to no less than five hundred talents”. He added farther, that “much money might be Edition: current; Page: had out of other temples1 without the city, which they might use; and if they were barred the use of all these2, they might yet use the ornaments of gold about the goddess herself;” and said that “the image had about it the weight of forty talents of most pure gold, and which might all be taken off; but having made use of it for their safety”, he said, “they were to make restitution of the like quantity again”. Thus he encouraged them touching matter of money. “Men of arms”, he said, “they had thirteen thousand; besides the sixteen thousand that were employed for the guard of the city and upon the walls.” For so many at the first kept watch at the coming in of the enemy3, young and old together, and strangers that dwelt amongst them as many as could bear arms. For the length of the Phalerian wall, to that part of the circumference of the wall of the city where it joined, was thirty–five furlongs; and that part of the circumference which was guarded, (for some of it was not kept with a watch, namely, the part between the long wall and the Phalerian), was forty–three furlongs. And the length of the long walls down to Piræus, (of which there was a watch only on the outmost4), was forty Edition: current; Page: furlongs. And the whole compass of Piræus together with Munychia, was sixty furlongs; whereof that part that was watched, was but half. He said farther, “they had of horsemen, accounting archers on horseback, twelve hundred; and sixteen hundred archers; and of galleys fit for the sea, three hundred.” All this and no less had the Athenians, when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first in hand, and when the war began. These and other words spake Pericles, as he used to do, for demonstration that they were likely to outlast this war.
14. When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his words; and fetched into the city their wives and children, and the furniture of their houses, pulling down the very timber of the houses themselves. Their sheep and oxen they sent over into Eubœa, and into the islands over against them. Nevertheless this removal, in respect they had most of them been accustomed to the country life, grieved1 them very much.
15. This custom was from great antiquity more familiar with the Athenians, than any other of the rest of Greece. For in the time of Cecrops and the first kings, down to Theseus, the inhabitants of Attica had their several boroughs, and therein their common halls2 and their governors; and, unless Edition: current; Page: they were in fear of some danger, went not to the king1 for advice, but every city administered their own affairs and deliberated by themselves. And some of them had also their particular wars; as the Eleusinians, who joined with Eumolpus against Erectheus. But after Theseus came to the kingdom, one who besides his wisdom was also a man of very great power, he not only set good order in the country in other respects, but also dissolved the councils and magistracies of the rest of the towns; and assigning them all one hall and one council–house, brought them all to cohabit2 in the city that now is; and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use this one for their city, which (now when they all paid their duties to it) grew great, and was by Theseus so delivered to posterity. And from that time to this day, the Athenians keep a holiday at the public charge to the goddess, and call it Synœcia. That which is now the citadel, and the part which is to the south of the citadel, was before this time the city. An Edition: current; Page: argument whereof is this; that the temples of the gods are all set either in the citadel itself; or if without, yet in that quarter: as that of Jupiter Olympius, and of Apollo Pythius1, and of Tellus, and of Bacchus2 in Limnæ; (in honour of whom the old Bacchanals were3 celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Athesterion, according as the Ionians who are derived from Athens, do still observe them); besides other ancient temples situate in the same part. Moreover, they served themselves with water for the best uses of the fountain, which, now the Nine–pipes, built so by the tyrants4, was formerly, when the springs were open, called Callirhoe, and was near. And from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites they ordain the use of the same water to this day. And the citadel, from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the Athenians still called the city.
16. The Athenians therefore had lived a long time governed by laws of their own country towns; and after they were brought into one, were nevertheless (both for the custom which most had, as well of the ancient time as since till the Persian5 war, to live in the country with their whole families; and also especially for that since the Edition: current; Page: Persian war they had already1 repaired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove. It pressed them likewise, and was heavily taken, besides their houses to leave the things that pertained to their religion, (which, since their old form of government, were become patrial), and to change their manner of life, and to be no better than banished every man his city. 17. After they came into Athens, there was habitation for a few, and place of retire, with some friends or kindred. But the greatest part seated themselves in the empty places of the city, and in temples and in all the chapels of the heroes; saving in such as were in the citadel, and the Eleusinium, and other places strongly shut up. The Pelasgicum2 also under the citadel, though it were a thing accursed to dwell in it, and forbidden by the end of a verse in a Pythian oracle, in these words: Best is the Pelasgicum empty3: was nevertheless for the present necessity inhabited. And in my opinion, this prophecy now fell out contrary to what was looked for. For the unlawful dwelling there caused not the calamities that befell the city, but the war caused the necessity of dwelling there: which war the oracle not naming, foretold Edition: current; Page: only that it should one day be inhabited unfortunately.
Many also furnished the turrets of the walls, and whatsoever other place they could any of them get. For when they were come in, the city had not place for them all: but afterwards they had1 the long walls divided amongst them, and inhabited there, and in most parts of Piræus. Withal they applied themselves to the business of the war, levying their confederates, and making ready a hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus. Thus were the Athenians preparing.
18. The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward, came first to Œnoe, a town of Attica, the place where they intended to break in; and encamping before it, prepared with engines and by other means to assault the wall. For Œnoe lying on the confines between Attica and Bœotia, was walled about; and the Athenians kept a garrison in it, for defence of the country when at any time there should be war. For which cause they made preparation for the assault of it; and also spent much time about it otherwise.
And Archidamus for this was not a little taxed, as thought to have been both slow in gathering together the forces for the war, and also to have favoured the Athenians in that he encouraged not the army to a forwardness in it. And afterwards likewise2 his stay in the isthmus and his slowness in the whole journey was laid to his charge, but especially his delay at Œnoe. For in this time the Edition: current; Page: Athenians retired into the city: whereas it was thought, that the Peloponnesians marching speedily, might but for this delay have taken them all without. So passionate was the army of Archidamus for his stay before Œnoe. But expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet unhurt, would relent and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause (as it is reported) he held his hand. 19. But after, when they had assaulted Œnoe, and tried all means, but could not take it; and seeing the Athenians sent no herald to them; then at length arising from thence, about eighty days after that which happened to the Thebans that entered Platæa, the summer and corn being now at the highest1, they fell into Attica, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. And when they had pitched their camp, they fell to wasting of the country, first about Eleusis, and then in the plain of Thriasia; and put to flight a few Athenian horsemen at the brooks called Rheiti2. After this, leaving the Ægaleon on the right hand, they passed through Cecropia3, till they came unto Acharnas, which is the greatest Edition: current; Page: town in all Attica of those that are called Demoi1; and pitching there, both fortified their camp, and staid a great while wasting the country thereabout.
20. Archidamus was said to have staid so long at Acharnas with his army in battle array, and not to have come down all the time of his invasion into the champaign, with this intention. He hoped that the Athenians, flourishing in number of young men, and better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps have come forth against him, and not endured to see their fields cut down and wasted; and therefore seeing they met him not in Thriasia2, he thought good to try if they would come out against him lying now at Acharnas. Besides3, the place seemed unto him commodious for the army to lie in; and it was thought also that the Acharnans being a great piece of the city, (for they were three thousand men of arms), would not have suffered the spoiling of their lands, but rather have urged the rest to go out and fight. And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter more boldly both waste the champaign country, and come down even to the walls of the city. For the Acharnans, after they should have lost their Edition: current; Page: own, would not be so forward to hazard themselves for the goods of other men: but there would be the thoughts of sedition in one towards another in the city. These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay at Acharnas.
21. The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about Eleusis and the fields of Thrius, and as long as they had any hope1 it would come on no farther, remembering that also Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, when fourteen years before this war he entered Attica with an army of the Peloponnesians as far as Eleusis and Thriasia, retired again and came no farther; (for which he was also banished Sparta, as thought to have gone back for money); they stirred not. But when they saw the army now at Acharnas but sixty furlongs from the city, then they thought it no longer to be endured; and when their fields were wasted (as it was likely2) in their sight: which the younger sort had never seen before, nor the elder but in the Persian war; it was taken for a horrible matter, and thought fit by all, especially by the youth, to go out and not endure it any longer. And holding councils apart one from another, they were at much contention, some to make a sally, and some to hinder it. And the priests of the oracles giving out prophecies of all kinds, every one made the interpretation according to the sway of his own affection. But the Acharnians, conceiving themselves to be Edition: current; Page: no small part of the Athenians1, were they that, whilst their own lands were wasting, most of all urged their going out. Insomuch as the city was every way in tumult, and in choler against Pericles, remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished them; but reviled him, for that being their general he refused to lead them into the field, and imputing unto him the cause of all their evil. 22. But Pericles, seeing them in passion for their present loss and ill advised, and being confident he was in the right touching not sallying, assembled them not nor called any council, for fear lest being together they might upon passion rather than judgment commit some error: but looked to the guarding of the city, and as much as he could to keep it in quiet. Nevertheless he continually sent out horsemen, to keep the scouts of the army from entering upon and doing hurt to the fields near the city. And there happened at Phrygii a small skirmish between one troop2 of horse of the Athenians, with whom were also the Thessalians, and the horsemen of the Bœotians. Wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the worse, till such time as the Bœotians were aided by the coming in of their men of arms; and then they were put to flight, and a few of the Athenians and Thessalians slain; whose bodies, notwithstanding, they fetched off the same day without leave of the enemy. And the Peloponnesians the next3 day erected a trophy. This aid of the Thessalians was Edition: current; Page: upon an1 ancient league with the Athenians, and consisted of Larissæans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, Pheræans. The leaders of the Larissæans were Polymedes and Aristonus, men of contrary factions in their city: of the Pharsalians, Meno: and of the rest, out of the several cities several commanders.
23. The Peloponnesians seeing the Athenians would not come out to fight, dislodging from Acharnas, wasted certain other villages2 between the hills Parnethus and Brelissus. Whilst these were in Attica, the Athenians sent the hundred galleys which they had provided, and in them one thousand men of arms and four hundred archers, about Peloponnesus; the commanders whereof were Charcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteus the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes; who thus furnished, weighed anchor and went their way. The Peloponnesians, when they had stayed in Attica as long as their provision lasted, went home through Bœotia, not the way they came in; but passing by Oropus, wasted the country called Peiraice3, which is of the tillage of Edition: current; Page: the Oropians, subjects to the people of Athens. And when they were come back into Peloponnesus, they disbanded and went every man to his own city.
24. When they were gone, the Athenians ordained watches both by sea and land, such as were to continue to the end of the war: and made a decree, to take out a thousand talents of the money in the citadel and set it by, so as it might not be spent, but the charges of the war be borne out of other moneys; and made it capital for any man to move or give his vote1 for the stirring of this money for any other use, but only if the enemy should come with an army by sea to invade the city, for necessity of that defence. Together with this money they likewise set apart one hundred galleys, and those to be every year the best, and captains to be appointed over them; which were to be employed for no other use than the money was, and for the same danger, if need should require.
25. The Athenians that were with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, and with them the Corcyræans with the aid of fifty sail more, and certain Edition: current; Page: others of the confederates thereabout, amongst other places which they infested in their course landed at Methone, a town of Laconia1; and assaulted it, as being but weak and few2 men within. But it chanced that Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had a garrison in those parts; and hearing of it, succoured those of the town with one hundred men of arms. Wherewith running through the Athenian army, dispersed in the fields, directly towards the town3, he put himself into Methone; and with the loss of few of his men in the passage he saved the place, and for this adventure was the first that was praised at Sparta in this war. The Athenians putting off from thence sailed along the coast, and put in at Pheia of Elis, where they spent two days in wasting the country, and in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the Lower Elis4, together with other Eleians thereabouts, that came forth to defend it. But the wind arising, and their galleys being tossed by the weather in a harbourless place, the most of them embarked, and sailed about the promontory called Icthys into the Edition: current; Page: haven of Pheia. But1 the Messenians, and certain others that could not get aboard, went by land to the town of Pheia and rifled it2. And when they had done, the galleys, that now were come about, took them in, and leaving Pheia put forth to sea again. By which time a great army of Eleians was come to succour it; but the Athenians were now gone away, and wasting some other territory.
26. About the same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys about Locris; which were to serve also for a watch about Eubœa. Of these, Cleopompus the son of Clinias had the conduct; and landing his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some places of the sea coast, and won the town of Thronium, of which he took hostages: and overcame in fight at Alope the Locrians that came out to aid it.
27. The same summer, the Athenians put the Æginetæ, man, woman and child, out of Ægina; laying to their charge that they were the principal cause of the present war. And it was also thought the safer course to hold Ægina, being adjacent to Peloponnesus, with a colony of their own people; and not long after they sent inhabitants into the same. When the Æginetæ were thus banished, the Lacedæmonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in3, and the occupation of the lands belonging unto it Edition: current; Page: to live on: both upon hatred to the Athenians, and for the benefits received at the hands of the Æginetæ in the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helotes. This territory of Thyrea is in the border between Argolica and Laconica, and reacheth to the sea–side. So some of them were placed there: and the rest dispersed into other parts of Greece1.
28. Also the same summer, on the first day of the month according to the moon, (at which time it seems only possible), in the afternoon happened an eclipse of the sun. The which, after it had appeared in the form of a crescent, and withal some stars had been discerned, came afterwards again to the former brightness.
29. The same summer also the Athenians made Nymphodorus the son of Pythos, of the city of Abdera, (whose sister was married to Sitalces, and that was of great power with him), their host2, though before they took him for an enemy; and sent for him to Athens, hoping by his means to bring Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, into their league. This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first that advanced the kingdom of the Odrysians above the power of the rest of Thrace3. For much of Thrace consisteth of free states. And Tereus that took to wife out of Athens Procne the daughter of Pandion, was no Edition: current; Page: kin to this Teres, nor of the same part1 of Thrace. But that Tereus was of the city of Daulia in the country now called Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. And the fact of the women concerning Itys, was done there; and by the poets, where they mention the nightingale, that bird is also called Daulias. And it is more likely that Pandion matched his daughter to this man, for vicinity and mutual succour, than with the other, that was so many days’ journey off as Odrysæ. And Teres (which is also another name) was the first that seized on the kingdom of Odrysæ2. Now Sitalces, this man’s son, the Athenians got into their league, that they might have the towns lying on Thrace and Perdiccas to be of their party3. Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league between them and Sitalces, and caused Sadocus the son of Sitalces, to be made free of Athens; and also undertook to end the war in Thrace. For he would persuade Sitalces to send unto the Athenians a Thracian army of horsemen and targettiers. He likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured of4 him the restitution of Therme. And Perdiccas presently aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war against the Chalcideans. Thus were Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, made confederates with the Athenians.Edition: current; Page: 
30. The Athenians being yet with their hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Corinthians, and put the Palærenses only, of all the Acarnanians, into the possession both of the town and territory. Having also by force taken Astacus from the tyrant Euarchus, they drave him thence, and joined the place to their league. From thence they sailed to Cephalonia, and subdued it without battle: (this Cephalonia is an island lying over against Acarnania and Leucas; and hath in it these four cities, the Pallenses, Cranii, Samæi, and Pronæi1:) and not long after returned with their fleet to Athens.
31. About the end of the autumn of this summer, the Athenians, both themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them2, with the whole power Edition: current; Page: of the city, under the conduct of Pericles the son Xantippus, invaded the territory of Megara. And those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, in their return, being now at Ægina, hearing that the whole power of the city was gone into Megaris, went and joined them. And this was the greatest army that ever the Athenians had together in one place before1; the city being now in her strength, and the plague not yet amongst them. For the Athenians themselves were no less than ten thousand men of arms, besides the three thousand at Potidæa: and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, and accompanied them in this invasion, were no fewer that three thousand men of arms more; besides other great numbers of light–armed soldiers. And when they had wasted the greatest part of the country, they went back to Athens. And afterwards, year after year during this war, the Athenians often2 invaded Megaris, sometimes with their horsemen and sometimes with their whole army, until such time as they had won Nisæa.
32. Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalante, an island lying upon the Locrians of Opus, desolate till then; for a garrison against thieves, which passing over from Opus and other Edition: current; Page: parts of Locris might annoy Eubœa. These were the things done this summer after the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.
33. The winter following, Euarchus of Acarnania, desirous to return to Astacus, prevaileth with the Corinthians to go thither with forty galleys and fifteen hundred men of arms, to re–establish him; to which he hired also certain other mercenaries for the same purpose. The commanders of this army were Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenes the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis. When they had re–established him, they endeavoured to draw to their party some other places on the sea–coast of Acarnania; but missing their purpose, they set sail homeward. As they passed by the coast of Cephalonia, they disbarked in the territory of the Cranii; where, under colour of composition, they were deceived, and lost some part of their forces1. For the assault made upon them by the Cranii being unexpected, they got off with much ado, and went home.
34. The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient custom, solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war, in this manner. Having set up a tent, they put into it2 the bones of the dead three days before the funeral: and every one Edition: current; Page: bringeth whatsoever he thinks good to his own. When the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress1 coffins are carried along in carts, for every tribe one, in which are the bones of the men of every tribe by themselves. There is likewise borne an empty hearse covered over, for such as appear not, nor were found amongst the rest when they were taken up. The funeral is accompanied by any that will2, whether citizen or stranger; and the women of their kindred are also by at the burial, lamenting and mourning. Then they put them into a3 public monument, which standeth in the fairest suburbs of the city; in which place they have ever interred all that died in the wars, except those that were slain in the field of Marathon; who, because their virtue was thought extraordinary, were therefore buried thereright. And when the earth is thrown over them, some one thought to exceed the rest in wisdom and dignity, chosen by the city, maketh an oration, wherein he giveth them such praises as are fit: which done, the company depart. And this is the form of that burial: and for the whole time of the war, whensoever there was occasion, they observed the same4. For these first, the man chosen to Edition: current; Page: make the oration was Pericles the son of Xantippus: who when the time served, going out of the place of burial into a high pulpit, to be heard the farther off by the multitude about him, spake unto them in this manner:
35. “Though most that have spoken formerly in this place, have commended the man that added this oration to the law, as honourable for those that die in the wars; yet to me it seemeth sufficient, that they who have showed their valour by action, should also by an action have their honour1, as now you see they have, in this their sepulture performed by the state; and not to have the virtue of many hazarded on one, to be believed as that one shall make a good or bad oration. For to speak of men in a just measure, is a hard matter: and though one do so, yet he shall hardly get the truth firmly believed2. The favourable hearer, and he that knows what was done, will perhaps think what is spoken short of what he would have it, and what it was3: and he that is ignorant, will find somewhat on the other side which he will think too much extolled; especially if he hear aught above the pitch of his own nature. For to hear another man praised finds patience so long only, as each man shall think he could himself have done somewhat of that he hears. And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently through envy thinks it false. But since our ancestors have so thought good, I also, following Edition: current; Page: the same ordinance, must endeavour to be answerable to the desires and opinions of every one of you, as far forth as I can.
36. “I will begin at our ancestors: being a thing both just and honest1, that to them first be given the honour of remembrance in this kind. For they, having been always the inhabitants of this region2, by their valour have delivered the same to succession of posterity, hitherto in the state of liberty. For which they deserve commendation, but our fathers deserve yet more: for that besides what descended on them, not without great labour of their own they have purchased this our present dominion, and delivered the same over to us that now are. Which in a great part also we ourselves, that are yet in the strength of our age here present, have enlarged; and so furnished the city with every thing, both for peace and war, as it is now all–sufficient in itself. The actions of war whereby all this was attained, and the deeds of arms both of ourselves and our fathers in valiant opposition to the barbarians or Grecians in their wars against us, amongst you that are well acquainted with the sum, to avoid prolixity I will pass over. But by what3 institutions we arrived at this, by what form of government and by what means we have advanced the state to this greatness, when I shall have laid open this, I shall then descend to these men’s praises. For I think they are things both fit for the purpose in hand, and profitable to the whole Edition: current; Page: company, both of citizens and strangers, to hear related. 37. We have a form of government, not fetched by imitation from the laws of our neighbouring states; (nay, we are rather a pattern to others, than they to us); which, because in the administration it hath respect not to a few, but to the multitude, is called a democracy. Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in point of law for their private controversies; yet1 in conferring of dignities one man is preferred before another to public charge, and that according to the reputation, not of his house, but of his virtue; and is not put back through poverty for the obscurity of his person, as long as he can do good service to the commonwealth. And we live not only free in the administration of the state, but also one with another void of jealousy touching each other’s daily course of life2; not offended at any man for following his own humour, nor casting on any man censorious looks, which though they be no punishment, yet they grieve. So that conversing one with another for the private without offence, we stand chiefly in fear to transgress against the public; and are obedient always to those that govern and to the laws, and principally to such laws as are written for protection against injury, and such unwritten, as bring undeniable shame to the transgressors. 38. We have also found out many ways to give our minds recreation from labour, by public institution Edition: current; Page: of games and sacrifices for all the days of the year, with a decent pomp and furniture of the same by private men; by the daily delight whereof we expel sadness. We have this farther by the greatness of our city, that all things from all parts of the earth are imported hither; whereby we no less familiarly enjoy the commodities of all other nations, than our own. 39. Then in the studies of war, we excel1 our enemies in this. We leave our city open to all men; nor was it ever seen, that by banishing of strangers2 we denied them the learning or sight of any of those things, which, if not hidden, an enemy might reap advantage by; not relying on secret preparation and deceit, but upon our own courage in the action. They, in their discipline, hunt after valour presently from their youth with laborious exercise3; and yet we that Edition: current; Page: live remissly, undertake as great dangers as they. For example; the Lacedæmonians invade not our dominion by themselves alone, but with the aid of all the rest. But when we invade our neighbours, though we fight in hostile ground, against such as in their own ground fight in defence of their own substance, yet for the most part we get the victory1. Never enemy yet fell into the hands of our whole forces at once; both because we apply ourselves much to navigation, and by land also send many of our men into divers countries abroad2. But when fighting with a part of it, they chance to get the better, they boast they have beaten the whole; and when they get the worse, they say they are beaten by the whole. And yet when from ease rather than studious labour, and upon natural rather than doctrinal valour, we come to undertake any danger, we have this odds by it, that we shall3 not faint beforehand with the meditation of future trouble, and in the action we shall appear no less confident than they Edition: current; Page: that are ever toiling; 40. procuring admiration to our city as well in this as in divers other things. For we also give ourselves to bravery1, and yet with thrift; and to philosophy, and yet without mollification of the mind. And we use riches rather for opportunities of action, than for verbal ostentation: and hold it not a shame to confess poverty, but not to have avoided it. Moreover there is in the same men, a care both of their own and the public affairs; and a sufficient knowledge of state matters2, even in those that labour with their hands. For we only think one that is utterly ignorant therein, to be a man, not that meddles with nothing, but that is good for nothing. We3 likewise weigh what we undertake, and apprehend it perfectly in our minds; not accounting words for a hindrance of action, but that it is rather a hindrance to action to come to it without instruction of words before. For also in this we excel4 others; daring to undertake as much as any, and yet examining what we undertake; whereas with other men, ignorance makes them dare, and consideration dastards. And they are most rightly reputed valiant, who though they perfectly apprehend both what is dangerous and what is easy, are never the more thereby diverted from adventuring. Again, we are contrary to most men in matter of bounty. For we purchase our friends, Edition: current; Page: not by receiving, but by bestowing benefits. And he that bestoweth a good turn, is ever the most constant friend; because1 he will not lose the thanks due unto him from him whom he bestowed it on. Whereas the friendship of him that oweth a benefit, is dull and flat, as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour, but for a debt. So that we only do good to others, not upon computation of profit, but freeness of trust2.
41. “In sum it may be said, both that the city is in general a school of the Grecians, and that the men here have, every one in particular, his person disposed to most diversity of actions, and yet all with grace and decency3. And that this is not now rather a bravery of words upon the occasion, than real truth, this power of the city, which by these institutions4 we have obtained, maketh evident. For it is the only power now, found greater in proof than fame; and the only power, that neither grieveth the invader, when he miscarries, with the quality of those he was hurt by, nor giveth cause to the subjected states to murmur, as being in subjection to men unworthy. For both with present and future ages we shall be in admiration, for a power not without testimony, but made evident by great arguments; and which needeth not either a Homer to praise it, or any other such, whose poems may indeed for the present Edition: current; Page: bring delight, but the truth will afterwards confute the opinion conceived of the actions. For we have opened unto us by our courage all seas and lands, and set up eternal monuments on all sides, both of the evil we have done to our enemies, and the good we have done to our friends.
“Such is the city for which these men, thinking it no reason to lose it, valiantly fighting have died. And it is fit that every man of you that be left, should be like minded to undergo any travail for the same. 42. And I have therefore spoken so much concerning the city in general, as well to show you that the stakes between us and them, whose city is not such, are not equal; as also to make known by effects, the worth of these men I am to speak of; the greatest part of their praises being therein already delivered. For what I have spoken of the city, hath by these, and such as these, been achieved. Neither would praises and actions appear so levelly concurrent in many other of the Grecians, as they do in these: the present revolution1 of these men’s lives seeming unto me an argument of their virtues, noted in the first act thereof, and in the last confirmed. For even such of them as were worse than the rest, do nevertheless deserve, that for their valour shown in the wars for defence of their country they should be preferred before the rest2. For having by their Edition: current; Page: good actions abolished the memory of their evil, they have profited the state thereby more than they have hurt it by their private behaviour. Yet there was none of these, that preferring the further fruition of his wealth, was thereby grown cowardly; or that for hope to overcome his poverty at length and to attain to riches, did for that cause withdraw himself from the danger. For1 their principal desire was not wealth, but revenge on their enemies; which esteeming the most honourable cause of danger, they made account through it both to accomplish their revenge and to purchase wealth withal; putting the uncertainty of success to the account of their hope; but for that which was before their eyes, relying upon themselves in the action; and therein choosing rather to fight and die, than to shrink and be saved, they fled from shame, but with their bodies they stood out the battle; and so in a moment, whilst fortune inclineth neither way, left their lives not in fear, but in opinion of victory.
43. “Such were these men, worthy of their country. And for you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune, but you ought not to be less venturously minded against the enemy; not weighing the profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying, may recount, to you that know as well as he, the many commodities that arise by fighting Edition: current; Page: valiantly against your enemies; but contemplating the power of the city in the actions of the same from day to day performed1, and thereby becoming enamoured of it. And when this power of the city shall seem great to you, consider then, that the same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that knew their duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonour when they were in fight; and by such men, as though they failed of their attempt, yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue, but made unto it a most honourable contribution. For2 having every one given his body to the commonwealth, they receive in place thereof an undecaying commendation and a most remarkable sepulchre; not wherein they are buried so much, as wherein their glory is laid up, upon all occasions both of speech and action to be remembered for ever. For to famous men all the earth is a sepulchre: and their virtues shall be testified, not only by the inscription in stone at home, but3 by an unwritten record of the mind, which more than of any monument will remain with every one for ever. In imitation therefore of these men, and placing happiness in liberty, and liberty in valour, be forward to encounter the dangers of war. For the miserable and desperate men, are not they that have the most reason to be prodigal Edition: current; Page: of their lives; but rather such men, as if they live, may expect a change of fortune, and whose losses are greatest if they miscarry in aught. For to a man of any spirit, death, which is without sense, arriving whilst he is in vigour and common hope, is nothing so bitter as after a tender life to be brought into misery1.
44. “Wherefore I will not so much bewail, as comfort you, the parents, that are present, of these men. For you know that whilst they lived, they were obnoxious to manifold calamities. Whereas whilst you are in grief, they only are happy that die honourably, as these have done2: and to whom it hath been granted, not only to live in prosperity, but to die in it. Though it be a hard matter to dissuade you from sorrow for the loss of that, which the happiness of others, wherein you also when time was rejoiced yourselves, shall so often bring into your remembrance; (for sorrow is not for the want of a good never tasted, but for the privation of a good we have been used to); yet such of you as are of the age to have children, may bear the loss of these in the hope of more. For the later children will both draw on with some the oblivion of those that are slain, and also doubly conduce to the good of the city, by population and strength. For it is not likely that they should equally give good counsel to the state, that have not children to be equally exposed to danger in it. As for you that are past having of children3, Edition: current; Page: you are to put the former and greater part of your life1 to the account of your gain; and supposing the remainder of it will be but short, you shall have the glory of these for a consolation of the same. For the love of honour never groweth old: nor doth that unprofitable part of our life take delight (as some have said) in gathering of wealth, so much as it doth in being honoured. 45. As for you that are the children or brethren of these men, I see you shall have a difficult task of emulation. For every man useth to praise the dead; so that with odds of virtue you will hardly get an equal reputation, but still be thought a little short. For men envy their competitors in glory, while they live; but to stand out of their way, is a thing honoured with an affection free from opposition2. And since I must say somewhat also of feminine virtue, for you that are now widows, I shall express it in this short admonition. It will be much for your honour not to recede from your sex3: and to give as little occasion of rumour amongst the men, whether of good or evil, as you can.
46. “Thus4 also have I, according to the prescript of the law, delivered in word what was expedient; and those that are here interred, have in fact been already honoured; and further, their children5 Edition: current; Page: shall be maintained till they be at man’s estate at the charge of the city; which hath therein propounded both to these, and them that live, a profitable garland in their matches of valour1. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there live the worthiest men. So now having lamented every one his own, you may be gone.”
47. Such was the funeral made this winter; which ending, ended the first year of this war.
In the very beginning of summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, with two thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica under the conduct of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamas, king of Lacedæmon: and after they had encamped themselves, wasted the country about them. They had not been many days in Attica, when the plague first began amongst the Athenians, said also to have seized2 formerly on divers other parts, as about Lemnos and elsewhere; but so great a Edition: current; Page: plague and mortality of men was never remembered to have happened in any place before. For at first neither were the physicians able to cure it, through ignorance of what it was1, but died fastest themselves, as being the men that most approached the sick; nor any other art of man availed whatsoever. All supplications to the gods, and enquiries of oracles, and whatsoever other means they used of that kind, proved all unprofitable; insomuch as subdued with the greatness of the evil, they gave them all over. 48. It began, by report, first in that part of Æthiopia that lieth upon Egypt; and thence fell down into Egypt and Africa, and into the greatest part of the territories of the king. It invaded Athens on a sudden; and touched first upon those that dwelt in Peiræus; insomuch as they reported that the Peloponnesians had cast poison into their wells2; (for springs there were not any in that place). But afterwards it came up into the high city, and then they died a great deal faster. Now let every man, physician or other, concerning the ground of this sickness, whence it sprung, and what causes he thinks able to produce so great an alteration, speak according Edition: current; Page: to his own knowledge. For my own part, I will deliver but the manner of it, and lay open only such things, as one may take his mark by to discover the same, if it come again; having been both sick of it myself, and seen others sick of the same.
49. This year, by confession of all men, was of all other, for other diseases, most free and healthful. If any man were sick before, his disease turned to this1; if not, yet suddenly, without any apparent cause preceding and being in perfect health, they were taken first with an extreme ache2 in their heads, redness and inflammation of the eyes; and then inwardly, their throats and tongues grew presently bloody, and their breath noisome and unsavoury. Upon this followed a sneezing and hoarseness, and not long after the pain, together with a mighty cough, came down into the breast. And when once it was settled in the stomach, it caused vomit3, and with great torment came up all manner of bilious purgation that physicians ever named. Most of them had also the hickyexe4, which brought with it a strong convulsion, and in some ceased quickly, but in others was long before it gave over. Their bodies outwardly to the touch were neither very hot nor Edition: current; Page: pale; but reddish, livid, and beflowered with little pimples and whelks1; but so burned inwardly, as not to endure any the lightest clothes or linen garment to be upon them, nor anything but mere nakedness; but rather most willingly to have cast themselves into the cold water. And2 many of them that were not looked to, possessed with insatiate thirst, ran unto the wells; and to drink much or little was indifferent, being still from ease and power to sleep as far as ever. As long as the disease was at its height, their bodies wasted not, but resisted the torment beyond all expectation; insomuch as the most of them either died of their inward burning3 in nine or seven days, whilst they had yet strength; or if they escaped that, then the disease falling down into their bellies, and causing there great exulcerations and immoderate4 looseness, they died many of them afterwards through weakness. For the disease, which took first the head, began above, and came down and passed through the whole body; and he that overcame Edition: current; Page: the worst of it, was yet marked with the loss of his extreme parts1; for breaking out both at their privy members, and at their fingers and toes, many with the loss of these escaped: there were also some that lost their eyes. And many, that presently upon their recovery were taken with such an oblivion of all things whatsoever, as they neither knew themselves nor their acquaintance. 50. For this was a kind of sickness which far surmounted all expression of words, and both exceeded human nature in the cruelty wherewith it handled each one; and appeared also otherwise to be none of those diseases that are bred amongst us, and that especially by this. For all, both birds and beasts, that use to feed on human flesh, though many men lay abroad unburied, either came not at them, or tasting perished2. An argument whereof as touching the birds, is the manifest defect of such fowl; which were not then seen, neither about the carcases or any where else. But by the dogs, because they are familiar with men, this effect was seen much clearer.
51. So that this disease, (to pass over many strange particulars of the accidents that some had differently from others), was in general such as I have shown3; and for other usual sicknesses, at Edition: current; Page: that time no man was troubled with any1. Now they died, some for want of attendance, and some again with all the care and physic that could be used. Nor was there any, to say certain medicine, that applied must have helped them2; for if it did good to one, it did harm to another. Nor any difference of body, for strength or weakness, that was able to resist it; but it carried all away, what physic soever was administered. But the greatest misery of all, was the dejection of mind in such as found themselves beginning to be sick: (for they grew presently desperate, and gave themselves over without making any resistance): as also their dying thus like sheep, infected by mutual visitation; for the greatest mortality proceeded that way. For if men forebore to visit them for fear, then they died forlorn; whereby many families became empty, for want of such as should take care of them. If they forbore not, then they died themselves, and principally the honestest3 men. For out of shame they would not spare themselves, but went in unto their friends; especially after it was come to this pass, that even their domestics, wearied with the lamentations of them that died, and overcome with the greatness of the calamity, were no longer moved therewith. But those that were recovered, had much4 compassion both on them that died, and Edition: current; Page: on them that lay sick; as having both known the misery themselves, and now no more subject to the danger. For this disease never took any man the second time, so as to be mortal. And these men were both by others counted happy; and they also themselves, through excess of present joy, conceived a kind of light hope never to die of any other sickness hereafter.
52. Besides the present affliction, the reception of the country people and of their substance into the city, oppressed both them, and much more the people themselves that so came in. For having no houses, but dwelling at that time1 of the year in stifling booths, the mortality was now without all form; and dying2 men lay tumbling one upon another in the streets, and men half–dead about every conduit through desire of water. The temples also where they dwelt in tents, were all full of the dead that died within them. For oppressed with the violence of the calamity, and not knowing what to do, men grew careless both of holy and profane things alike. And the laws which they formerly used touching funerals, were all now broken; every one burying where he could find room3. And many Edition: current; Page: for want of things necessary, after so many deaths before, were forced to become impudent in the funerals of their friends. For when one had made a funeral pile, another getting before him would throw on his dead, and give it fire. And when one was in burning, another would come, and having cast thereon him whom he carried, go his way again. 53. And the great licentiousness, which also in other kinds was1 used in the city, began at first from this disease. For that which a man before would dissemble, and not acknowledge to be done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely; seeing before his eyes such quick revolution, of the rich2 dying, and men worth nothing inheriting their estates. Insomuch as they justified a speedy fruition of their goods, even3 for their pleasure; as men that thought they held their lives but by the day. As for pains, no man was forward in any action of honour to take any; because they thought it uncertain whether they should die or not before they achieved it. But what any man knew to be delightful, and to be profitable to pleasure4, that was made both profitable and honourable. Neither the fear of the gods, nor laws of men, awed any man: not the former, because they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship, from seeing that alike they all perished: nor the latter, because no man expected that lives would last till he received punishment of his crimes by judgment. But they thought, there was now over their heads Edition: current; Page: some far greater judgment decreed against them; before which fell, they thought to enjoy some little part of their lives.
54. Such was the misery, into which the Athenians being fallen were much oppressed; having not only their men killed by the disease within, but the enemy also laying waste their fields and villages without. In this sickness also, (as it was not unlikely they would), they called to mind this verse, said also of the elder sort to have been uttered of old:
Now were men at variance about the word, some saying it was not λοιμός that was by the ancients mentioned in that verse, but λιμός. But upon the present occasion the word λοιμός deservedly obtained. For as men suffered, so they made the verse to say. And I think, if after this there shall ever come another Doric war, and with it a famine, they are like to recite the verse accordingly. There was also reported by such as knew, a certain2 answer given by the oracle to the Lacedæmonians, when they inquired whether they should make this war or not: that if they warred with all their power, they should have the victory; and that the God3 himself would take their parts. And thereupon Edition: current; Page: they thought the present misery to be a fulfilling of that prophecy. The Peloponnesians were no sooner entered Attica, but the sickness presently began; and never came into Peloponnesus, to speak of, but reigned principally in Athens, and in such other places afterwards as were most populous. And thus much of this disease.
55. After the Peloponnesians had wasted the champagne country, they fell upon the territory called Paralos1, as far as to the mountain Laurius, where the Athenians had silver mines; and first wasted that part of it which looketh towards Peloponnesus, and then that also which lieth toward Andros and Eubœa. And Pericles, who was also then general, was still of the same mind he was of in the former invasion, that the Athenians ought not to go out against them to battle. 56. Whilst2 they were yet in the plain, and before they entered into the maritime country, he furnished a hundred galleys to go about Peloponnesus, and as soon as they were ready, put to sea. In these galleys he had four thousand men of arms; and in vessels then purposely first made to carry horses3, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and Lesbians joined likewise with him with fifty galleys. Edition: current; Page:  This fleet of the Athenians, when it set forth, left the Peloponnesians still in Paralia; and coming before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus1, they wasted much of the country thereabout, and assaulting the city had a hope to take it, though it succeeded not. Leaving Epidaurus, they wasted the territories about of Trœzene, Halias, and Hermione, places all on the sea–coast of Peloponnesus. Putting off from hence, they came to Prasiæ, a small maritime city of Laconia; and both wasted the territory about it, and took and razed2 the town itself. And having done this, came home, and found the Peloponnesians not now in Attica, but gone back.
57. All the while the Peloponnesians were in the territory of the Athenians, and the Athenians abroad with their fleet, the sickness, both in the army and city, destroyed many; insomuch as it was said that the Peloponnesians fearing the sickness, (which they knew to be in the city, both by fugitives and by seeing the Athenians burying3 their dead), went the sooner away out of the country. And yet they stayed there longer in this invasion than they had done any time before4; and wasted even the whole territory: for they continued in Attica almost forty days.
58. The same summer Agnon the son of Nicias, and Cleopompus the son of Clinias, who were joint Edition: current; Page: commanders with Pericles, with that army which he had employed before, went presently and made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace, and against Potidæa, which was yet besieged. Arriving, they presently applied engines, and tried all means possible to take it; but neither the taking of the city, nor any thing else, succeeded worthy so great preparation. For the sickness coming amongst them, afflicted them mightily indeed, and even devoured the army. And the Athenian soldiers which were there before and in health, catched the sickness from those that came with Agnon. As for Phormio and his sixteen hundred, they were not now amongst the Chalcideans. And Agnon therefore came back with his fleet, having of four thousand men in less than forty days lost one thousand and fifty of the plague. But the soldiers that were there before, stayed upon the place and continued the siege of Potidæa.
59. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians having their fields now the second time wasted, and both the sickness and war falling upon them at once, changed their minds, and accused Pericles1 as if by his means they had been brought into these calamities, and desired earnestly to compound with the Lacedæmonians; to whom also they sent certain ambassadors, but they returned without effect. And being then at their wits’ end, they kept a stir at Pericles. And he seeing them vexed with their present calamity and doing all those things which he had before expected, called an assembly (for he was yet general1) Edition: current; Page: with intention to put them again into heart, and assuaging their passion, to reduce their minds to a more calm and less dismayed temper. And standing forth, he spake unto them in this manner:
60. “Your anger towards me cometh not unlooked for; for the cause of it I know. And I have called this assembly therefore, to remember you, and reprehend you for those things wherein you have either been angry with me, or given way to your adversity, without reason. For I am of this opinion, that the public prosperity of the city is better for private men, than if the private men themselves were in prosperity and the public wealth in decay. For a private man, though in good estate, if his country come to ruin, must of necessity be ruined with it; whereas he that miscarrieth in a flourishing commonwealth, shall much more easily be preserved. Since then the commonwealth is able to bear the calamities of private men, and every one2 cannot support the calamities of the commonwealth, why should not every one strive to defend it: and not, as you now, astonished with domestic misfortune, forsake the common safety, and fall a censuring both me that counselled the war, and yourselves that decreed the same as well as I? And it is I you are angry withal: one, as I think myself, inferior to none, Edition: current; Page: either in knowing what is requisite, or in expressing what I know, and a lover of my country and superior to money. For he that hath good thoughts and cannot clearly express them, were as good to have thought nothing at all. He that can do both, and is ill affected to his country, will likewise1 not give it faithful counsel. And he that will do that too, yet if he be superable by money, will for that alone set all the rest to sale. Now if you followed my advice in making this war, as esteeming these virtues to be in me somewhat above the rest, there is sure no reason that I should now be accused of doing you wrong. 61. For though to such as have it in their own election, (being otherwise in good estate), it were madness to make choice of war; yet when we must of necessity either give way, and so without more ado be subject to our neighbours, or else save ourselves from it by danger; he is more to be condemned that declineth the danger, than he that standeth to it. For mine own part, I am the man I was, and of the mind I was; but you are changed, won to the war when you were entire, but repenting it upon the damage, and condemning my counsel in the weakness of your own judgment. The reason of this is, because you feel already every one in particular that which afflicts you; but the evidence of the profit to accrue to the city in general, you see not yet. And your minds dejected with the great and sudden alteration, cannot constantly2 maintain what you have before resolved. For that which is Edition: current; Page: sudden and unexpected, and contrary to what one hath deliberated, enslaveth the spirit; which by this disease principally, in the neck of the other incommodities, is now come to pass in you. But you that are born in a great city, and with education suitable, how great soever the affliction be, ought not to shrink at it and eclipse your reputation; (for men do no less condemn those that through cowardice lose the glory they have, than hate those that through impudence arrogate the glory they have not); but to set aside the grief of your private losses, and lay your hands to the common safety.
62. “As for the toil of the war, that it may perhaps be long and we in the end never the nearer to victory, though that may suffice which I have demonstrated1 at other times touching your causeless suspicion that way; yet this I will tell you moreover, touching the greatness of your means for dominion, which neither you yourselves seem ever to have thought on, nor I touched in my former orations; nor would I also have spoken it now2, but that I see your minds dejected more than there is cause for. That though you take your dominion to extend only to your confederates, I affirm that of the two parts of the world of manifest use, the land and the sea, you are of one of them entire masters; both of as much of it as you make use of, and also of as much more as you shall think fit yourselves. Neither is there any king or nation whatsoever of those that now Edition: current; Page: are, that can impeach your navigation with the fleet and strength you now go1. So that you must not put the use of houses and lands, wherein now you think yourselves deprived of a mighty matter, into the balance with such a power as this, nor take the loss of these things heavily in respect of it; but rather set little by them, as but a light ornament and embellishment of wealth; and think that our liberty as long as we hold fast that, will easily recover unto us these things again; whereas subjected once to others, even that which we possess besides will be diminished. Show not yourselves both ways inferior to your ancestors; who not only held this, (gotten by their own labours, not left them), but have also preserved and delivered the same unto us: (for2 it is more dishonour to lose what one possesseth, than to miscarry in the acquisition of it): and encounter the enemy not only with magnanimity, but also with disdain. For a coward may have a high mind upon a prosperous ignorance; but he that is confident upon judgment to be superior to his enemy, doth also disdain him; which is now our case. And3 courage, in equal fortune, is the safer for our disdain of the enemy, where a man knows what he doth: for he trusteth less to hope, which is of force only in uncertainties, and more to judgment upon certainties, Edition: current; Page: wherein there is a more sure foresight. 63. You have reason besides to maintain the dignity the city hath gotten for1 her dominion, in which you all triumph: and either not decline the pains, or not also pursue the honour. And you must not think the question is now of your liberty and servitude only. Besides the loss of your rule over others, you must stand the danger you have contracted by offence given in the administration of it. Nor can you now give it over: (if any fearing at this present that that may come to pass, encourage himself with the intention of not to meddle hereafter2): for already your government is in the nature of a tyranny, which is both unjust for you to take up and unsafe to lay down. And such men as these, if they could persuade others to it, or lived in a free city by themselves, would quickly overthrow it. For the quiet life can never be preserved, if it be not ranged with the active life: nor is it a life conducible to a city that reigneth, but to a subject city, that it may safely serve. 64. Be not therefore seduced by this sort of men, nor angry with me, together with whom yourselves did decree this war, because the enemy invading you hath done what was likely he would, if you obeyed him not. And as for the sickness, the only thing that exceeded the imagination of all men, it was unlooked for: and I know you hate me somewhat the more for that; but unjustly, unless when anything falleth out above your expectation fortunate, you will also dedicate unto Edition: current; Page: me that. Evils that come from heaven, you must bear necessarily; and such as proceed from your enemies, valiantly; for so it hath been the custom of this city to do heretofore, which custom let it not be your part to reverse. Knowing that this city hath a great name amongst all people for not yielding to adversity, and for the mighty power it yet hath after the expense of so many lives and so much labour in the war1: the memory whereof, though we should now at length miscarry, (for all things are made with this law, to decay again), will remain with posterity for ever. How that being Grecians, most of the Grecians were our subjects; that we have abidden the greatest wars against them, both universally and singly, and have inhabited the greatest and wealthiest city. Now this, he with the quiet life will condemn; the active man will emulate; and they that have not attained to the like, will envy. But to be hated and to displease, is a thing that happeneth for the time to whosoever he be that hath the command of others; and he does well, that undergoeth hatred for matters of great consequence. For the hatred lasteth not; and is recompensed both with a present splendour and an immortal glory hereafter. Seeing then you foresee2 both what is honourable for the future, and not dishonourable for the present, procure both the one and the other by your courage now. Send no more heralds to Edition: current; Page: the Lacedæmonians, nor let them know the evil present does any way afflict you; for they whose minds least feel, and whose actions most oppose a calamity, both among states and private persons are the best.”
65. In this speech did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of the Athenians towards himself, and withal to withdraw their thoughts from the present affliction. But they, though for the state in general they were won, and sent to the Lacedæmonians no more, but rather1 inclined to the war; yet they were every one in particular grieved for their several losses: the poor, because entering the war with little, they lost that little; and the rich, because they had lost fair possessions, together with goodly houses and costly furniture in them, in the country; but the greatest matter of all was, that they had war instead of peace. And altogether, they deposed not their anger till they had first fined him in a sum of money. Nevertheless, not long after (as is the fashion of the multitude) they made him general again, and committed the whole state to his administration2. For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled; and for the need of the commonwealth, they prized him more than any other whatsoever. For as long as he was in authority in the city in time of peace3, he governed the same with moderation, and was a faithful watchman of it; and in his time it was at the Edition: current; Page: greatest. And after the war was on foot, it is manifest that he therein also foresaw what it could do. He lived after the war began two years and six months. And his foresight in the war was best known after his death1. For he told them, that if they would be quiet, and look to their navy, and during this war seek no further dominion, nor hazard the city itself, they should then have the upper hand. But they did contrary in all: and in such other things besides as seemed not to concern the war2, managed the state, according to their private ambition and covetousness, perniciously both for themselves and their confederates. What succeeded well, the honour and profit of it came most to private men; and what miscarried, was to the city’s detriment in the war. The reason whereof was this: that being a man of great power both for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most incorrupt, he freely controled the multitude; and was not so much led by them, as he led them. Because, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humour them in his speeches, but out of his Edition: current; Page: authority durst anger them with contradiction. Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he would with his orations put them into a fear; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them. It was in name, a state democratical; but in fact, a government of the principal man. But they that came after, being more equal amongst themselves, and affecting every one to be the chief, applied themselves to the people and let go the care of the commonwealth1. From whence amongst many other errors, as was likely in a great and dominant city, proceeded also the voyage into Sicily; which2 was not so much upon mistaking those whom they went against, as for want of knowledge in the senders of what was necessary for those that went the voyage. For through private quarrels about who should bear the greatest sway with the people, they both abated the vigour of the army, and then also first troubled the state at home with division. Being overthrown in Sicily, and having lost, besides other ammunition, the greatest part of their navy, and the city being then in sedition; yet they held out three years3, both against their first Edition: current; Page: enemies and the Sicilians with them, and against most of their revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards against Cyrus the king’s son, who took part with, and sent money to the Peloponnesians to maintain their fleet; and never shrunk till they had overthrown themselves with private dissensions. So much was in Pericles above other men at that time, that he could foresee by what means the city might easily have outlasted the Peloponnesians in this war1.
66. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates made war the same summer with one hundred galleys against Zacynthus, an island laying over against Elis. The inhabitants whereof were a colony of Achæans of Peloponnesus, but confederates of the people of Athens. There went in this fleet a thousand men of arms, and Cnemus a Spartan for admiral; who landing, wasted the greatest part of the territory. But they of the island not yielding, they put off again and went home.
67. In the end of the same summer, Aristeus of Corinth, and Aneristus, Nicolaus, Stratodemus, and Timagorus of Tegea, ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, and Pollis of Argos, a private man2, as they were travelling into Asia to the king, to get money of him and to draw him into their league, took Thrace in their way, and came unto Sitalces Edition: current; Page: the son of Teres, with a desire to get him also, if they could, to forsake the league with Athens, and to send his forces to Potidæa, which the Athenian army now besieged, and not to aid the Athenians any longer1: and withal to get leave to pass through his country to the other side of the Hellespont, to go, as they intended, to Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, who would convoy them to the king. But the ambassadors of Athens, Learchus the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, then resident with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus the son of Sitalces, who was now a citizen of Athens, to put them into their hands, that they might not go to the king, and do hurt to the city whereof he himself was now a member2. Whereunto condescending, as they journeyed through Thrace to take ship to cross the Hellespont, he apprehended them3 before they got to the ship by such others as he sent along with Learchus and Ameiniades, with command to deliver them into their hands. And they, when they had them, sent them away to Athens. When they came thither, the Athenians, fearing Aristeus, lest escaping he should do them further mischief, (for he was manifestly the author4 of all the business of Potidæa and about Thrace), the same day put Edition: current; Page: them all to death, unjudged and desirous to have spoken, and threw them into the pits; thinking it but just to take revenge of the Lacedæmonians that began it, and had slain and thrown into pits the merchants of the Athenians and their confederates, whom they took sailing in merchant–ships1 about the coast of Peloponnesus. For in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians slew as enemies whomsoever they took at sea, whether confederates of the Athenians or neutral, all alike.
68. About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambraciotes2, both they themselves and divers barbarian nations by them raised, made war against Argos of Amphilochia, and against the rest of that territory. The quarrel between them and the Argives, arose first from hence. This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia was planted by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaraus, after the Trojan war; who at his return, misliking the then state Edition: current; Page: of Argos, built this city in the Gulf of Ambracia, and called it Argos, after the name of his own country. And it was the greatest city, and had the most wealthy inhabitants of all Amphilochia. But many generations after, being fallen into misery, they communicated their city with the Ambraciotes, bordering upon Amphilochia: and then they first learned the Greek language now used from the Ambraciotes that lived among them. For the rest of the Amphilochians were barbarians1. Now the Ambraciotes in process of time drave out the Argives, and held the city by themselves. Whereupon the Amphilochians submitted themselves to the Acarnanians, and both together called in the Athenians; who sent thirty galleys to their aid, and Phormio for general. Phormio being arrived, took Argos by assault, and making slaves of the Ambraciotes, put the town into the joint possessions of the Amphilochians and Acarnanians2. And this was the beginning of the league between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciotes therefore, deriving their hatred to the Argives from this their captivity, came in with an army, partly of their own, and partly raised amongst the Chaonians and other neighbouring barbarians, now in this war. And coming to Argos, were masters of the field; but when they could not take the city by assault, they returned, and disbanding went every nation to his own. These were the acts of the summer.Edition: current; Page: 
69. In the beginning of the winter, the Athenians sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus under the command of Phormio; who coming to lie at Naupactus1, guarded the passage, that none might go in or out from Corinth and the Crisæan gulf. And other six galleys under the conduct of Melesander, they sent into Caria and Lycia; as well to gather tribute in those parts, as also to hinder the Peloponnesian pirates, lying on those coasts2, from molesting the navigation of such merchant–ships as they expected to come to them from Phaselis, Phœnicia, and that part of the continent. But Melesander, landing in Lycia with such forces of the Athenians and their confederates as he had aboard, was overcome in battle and slain, with the loss of a part of his army.
70. The same winter, the Potidæans unable any longer to endure the siege, seeing the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians could not make them rise, and seeing their victual failed, and that they were forced, amongst divers other things done by them for necessity of food, to eat one another, propounded at length to Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleidas, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus, the Athenian commanders that lay before the city, to give the same into their hands. And they, seeing both that the army was already afflicted by laying in that cold Edition: current; Page: place, and that the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege, accepted of it. The conditions agreed on were these: “to depart, they and their wives and children, and their auxiliar soldiers, every man with one suit of clothes1, and every woman with two; and to take with them every one a certain sum of money for his charges by the way.” Hereupon a truce was granted them to depart; and they went, some to the Chalcideans, and others to other places, as they could get to. But the people of Athens called the commanders in question for compounding without them; conceiving that they might have gotten the city to discretion: and sent afterwards a colony to Potidæa of their own citizens. These were the things done in this winter. And so ended the second year of this war, written by Thucydides.
71. The next summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates came not into Attica, but turned their arms against Platæa, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; who having pitched his camp, was about to waste the territory thereof. But the Platæans sent ambassadors presently unto him, with words to this effect: “Archidamus, and you Lacedæmonians, you do neither justly, nor worthy yourselves and ancestors, in making war upon Platæa. For Pausanias of Lacedæmon, the son of Cleombrotus, having, together with such Grecians as were content to undergo the danger of the battle that was fought in this our territory, delivered all Greece Edition: current; Page: from the slavery of the Persians, when he offered sacrifice in the market–place of Platæa to Jupiter the deliverer, called together all the confederates, and granted to the Platæans this privilege: that their city and territory should be free1: that none should make any unjust war against them, nor go about to subject them: and if any did, the confederates then present should to their utmost ability revenge their quarrel. These privileges your fathers granted us for our valour and zeal in those dangers. But now do you the clean contrary; for you join with our greatest enemies, the Thebans, to bring us into subjection. Therefore calling to witness the gods then sworn by, and the gods both of your and our country2, we require you, that you do no damage to the territory of Platæa, nor violate those oaths; but that you suffer us to enjoy our liberty in such sort as was allowed us by Pausanias.” 72. The Platæans having thus said, Archidamus replied and said thus: “Men of Platæa, if you Edition: current; Page: would do as ye say, you say what is just. For as Pausanias hath granted to you, so also be you free; and help to set free the rest, who having been partakers of the same dangers then, and being comprised in the same oath with yourselves, are now brought into subjection by the Athenians. And this so great preparation and war, is only for the deliverance of them and others; of which if you will especially participate, keep your oaths; at least (as we have also advised you formerly) be quiet, and enjoy your own in neutrality; receiving both sides in the way of friendship, neither side in the way of faction1.” Thus said Archidamus. And the ambassadors of Platæa, when they had heard him, returned to the city: and having communicated his answer to the people, brought word again to Archidamus: “that what he had advised, was impossible for them to perform without leave of the Athenians, in whose keeping were their wives and children; and that they feared also for the whole city, lest when the Lacedæmonians were gone, the Athenians should come and take the custody of it out of their hands2; or that the Thebans, comprehended in the oath of receiving both sides, should again attempt to surprise it.” But Archidamus to encourage them, made this answer: “Deliver you unto us Lacedæmonians your city and your houses, show us the bounds of your territory, give us your trees by tale, and whatsoever else can be numbered: and depart yourselves whither you shall think good, as long as the war Edition: current; Page: lasteth: and when it shall be ended, we will deliver it all unto you again. In the mean time we will keep them as deposited, and will cultivate your ground, and pay you rent for it, as much as shall suffice for your maintenance.” 73. Hereupon the ambassadors went again into the city, and having consulted with the people, made answer “that they would first acquaint the Athenians with it, and if they would consent, they would then accept the conditions: till then, they desired a suspension of arms, and not to have their territory wasted.” Upon this he granted them so many days truce, as was requisite for their return: and for so long forebore to waste their territory. When the Platæan ambassadors were arrived at Athens, and had advised on the matter with the Athenians, they returned to the city with this answer: “The Athenians say thus: that neither in former times, since we were their confederates, did they ever abandon us to the injuries of any; nor will they now neglect us, but give us their utmost assistance. And they conjure us by the oath of our fathers, not to make any alienation1 touching the league.” 74. When the ambassadors had made this report, the Platæans resolved in their councils not to betray the Athenians; but rather to endure, if it must be, the wasting of their territory before their eyes, and Edition: current; Page: to suffer whatsoever misery could befall them; and no more to go forth, but from the walls to make this answer: “that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedæmonians had required.” When they had answered so, Archidamus, the king, first made a protestation to the gods and heros of the country, saying thus: “All ye Gods and Heros, protectors of Platæis1, be witnesses, that we neither invade this territory (wherein our fathers after their vows unto you overcame the Medes, and which you made propitious for the Grecians to fight in) unjustly now in the beginning; because they have first broken the league they had sworn: nor what we shall further do, will be any injury; because, though we have offered many and reasonable conditions, they have yet been all refused: assent ye also to the punishment of the beginners of injury, and to the revenge of those that bear lawful arms.” 75. Having made this protestation to the gods, he made ready his army for the war.
And first having felled trees, he therewith made a palisado about the town, that none might go out. That done, he raised a mount against the wall2, hoping with so great an army all at work at once, to have quickly taken it. And having cut down wood in the hill Cithæron, they built a frame of timber, and wattled it about on either side, to serve instead of walls, to keep the earth from falling too much away3; and cast into it stones, and Edition: current; Page: earth, and whatsoever else would serve to fill it up. Seventy days and nights continually they poured on, dividing the work between them for rest in such manner, as some might be carrying, whilst others took their sleep and food. And they were urged to labour by the Lacedæmonians that commanded the mercenaries of the several cities1, and had the charge of the work. The Platæans seeing the mount to rise, made the frame of a wall with wood, which having placed on the wall of the city in the place where the mount touched2, they built it within full of bricks, taken from the adjoining houses, for that purpose demolished; the timber serving to bind them together, that the building might not be weakened by the height. The same was also covered with hides and quilts3, both to keep the timber from shot of wildfire, and those that wrought from danger. So that the height of the wall was great on one side, and the mount went up as fast on the other. The Platæans used also this device; they brake a hole in their own wall where the mount joined4, and drew the earth Edition: current; Page: from it into the city. 76. But the Peloponnesians, when they found it out, took clay, and therewith daubing hurdles of reeds, cast the same into the chink; which mouldering not, as did the earth, they could not draw it away1. The Platæans excluded here, gave over that plot; and digging a secret mine, which they carried under the mount from within the city by conjecture, fetched away the earth again; and were a long time undiscovered; so that still casting on, the mount grew still less, the earth being drawn away below and settling over the part where it was voided. The Platæans nevertheless, fearing that they should not be able even thus to hold out, being few against many, devised this further. They gave over working at the high wall against the mount, and beginning at both ends of it where the wall was low2, built another wall in form of a crescent, inward to the city; that if the great wall were taken, this might resist, and put the enemy to make another mount; and by coming further in, to be at double pains, and withal more encompassable with shot. The Peloponnesians, together with the rising of their mount, brought to the city their engines of battery. One of which, by the help of the mount, they applied to the high wall; wherewith they much3 shook it, and put the Platæans into great fear. And others to other parts of the wall; which the Platæans partly turned aside by casting ropes Edition: current; Page: about them; and partly with great beams, which, being hung in long iron chains by either end upon two other great beams, jetting over and inclining from above the wall like two horns, they drew up to them athwart, and where the engine was about to light, slacking the chains and letting their hands go, they let fall with violence, to break the beak of it. 77. After this the Peloponnesians, seeing their engines availed not, and thinking it hard to take the city by any present violence, prepared themselves to besiege it1. But first they thought fit to attempt it by fire, being no great city, and when the wind should rise, if they could, to burn it: for there was no way they did not think on, to have gained it without expense and long siege. Having therefore brought faggots, they cast them from the mount into the space between it and their new wall, which by so many hands was quickly filled; and then into as much of the rest of the city, as at that distance they could reach2: and throwing amongst them fire, together with brimstone and pitch, kindled the wood, and raised such a flame, as the like was never seen before made by the hand of man. For as for the woods in the mountains, the trees have indeed taken fire, but it hath been by mutual attrition, and have flamed out of their own accord. But this fire was a great one; and the Platæans that had escaped other mischiefs, Edition: current; Page: wanted little of being consumed by this. For1 near the wall they could not get by a great way: and if the wind had been with it, (as the enemy hoped it might), they could never have escaped. It is also reported, that there fell much rain then with great thunder, and that the flame was extinguished, and the danger ceased by that.
78. The Peloponnesians, when they failed likewise of this, retaining a part of their army, and dismissing the rest2, enclosed the city about with a wall; dividing the circumference thereof to the charge of the several cities. There was a ditch both within and without it, out of which they made their bricks; and after it was finished, which was about the rising of Arcturus, they left a guard for one half of the wall; (for the other was guarded by the Bœotians); and departed with the rest of their army, and were dissolved according to their cities. The Platæans had before this sent their wives and children, and all their unserviceable men, to Athens. The rest were besieged, being in number, of the Platæans themselves four hundred, of Athenians eighty, and a hundred and ten women to dress their meat3. These were all, when the siege was first laid; and not one more, neither free Edition: current; Page: nor bond, in the city. In this manner was the city besieged.
79. The same summer, at the same time that this journey was made against Platæa, the Athenians with two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horsemen, made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans, when the corn was at the highest, under the conduct of Xenophon the son of Euripides, and two others. These coming before Spartolus in Bottiæa, destroyed the corn; and expected that the town should have been rendered by the practice of some within. But such as would not have it so having sent for aid to Olynthus before1, there came into the city for safeguard thereof a supply both of men of arms and other soldiers from thence. And these issuing forth of Spartolus, the Athenians put themselves into order of battle2 under the town itself. The men of arms of the Chalcideans, and certain auxiliaries with them, were overcome by the Athenians, and retired within Spartolus. And the horsemen of the Chalcideans and their light–armed soldiers, overcame the horsemen and light–armed of the Athenians; but they had some few targettiers besides of the territory called Crusis3. When the battle was now begun4, came a supply Edition: current; Page: of other targettiers from Olynthus. Which the light–armed soldiers of Spartolus perceiving, emboldened both by this addition of strength, and also as having had the better1 before, with the Chalcidean horse and this new supply charged the Athenians afresh. The Athenians hereupon retired to two companies they had left with the carriages2. And as oft as the Athenians charged, the Chalcideans retired; and when the Athenians retired, the Chalcideans charged them with their shot. Especially the Chalcidean horsemen rode up, and charging them where they thought fit, forced the Athenians in extreme affright to turn their backs; and chased them a great way. The Athenians fled to Potidæa; and having afterwards fetched away the bodies of their dead upon truce, returned with the remainder of their army to Athens. Four hundred and thirty men they lost, and their chief commanders all three. And the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, when they had set up a trophy and taken up their dead bodies, disbanded and went every one to his city.
80. Not long after this the same summer, the Ambraciotes and Chaonians, desiring to subdue all Acarnania and to make it revolt from the Athenians, persuaded the Lacedæmonians to make ready a fleet out of the confederate cities, and to send a thousand men of arms into Acarnania; saying, that if they aided them both with a fleet and a land army at once, the Acarnanians of the sea–coast being thereby disabled to assist the rest, having Edition: current; Page: easily gained Acarnania they might be masters afterward both of Zacynthus and Cephalonia, and the Athenians hereafter less able to make their voyages about Peloponnesus; and that there was a hope beside to take Naupactus. The Peloponnesians assenting, sent thither Cnemus, who was yet1 admiral, with his men of arms in a few galleys immediately; and withal sent word to the cities about, as soon as their galleys were ready, to sail with all speed to Leucas. Now the Corinthians were very zealous in the behalf of the Ambraciotes, as being their own colony. And the galleys which were to go from Corinth, Sicyonia, and that part of the coast, were now making ready; and those of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciotes, were arrived before, and stayed at Leucas for their coming. Cnemus and his thousand men of arms, when they had crossed the sea undescried of Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, presently prepared for the war by land. He had in his army, of Grecians, the Ambraciotes, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him; and of barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king, but were led by Photius and Nicanor, which two being of the families eligible had now the annual government2. With the Chaonians Edition: current; Page: came also the Thesprotians, they also without a king. The Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, protector of Tharups their king, who was yet in minority. The Parauæans were led by their king Orœdus; and under Orœdus served likewise, by permission of Antiochus their king, a thousand Orestians. Also Perdiccas sent thither, unknown to the Athenians, a thousand Macedonians; but these last were not yet1 arrived. With this army began Cnemus to march, without staying for the fleet from Corinth. And passing through Argeia, they destroyed2 Limnæa, a town unwalled. From thence they marched towards Stratus, the greatest city of Acarnania; conceiving that if they could take this first, the rest would come easily in.
81. The Acarnanians seeing a great army by land was entered their country already, and expecting the enemy also by sea, joined not to succour Stratus, but guarded every one his own, and sent for aid to Phormio. But he answered them, that since there was a fleet to be set forth from Corinth, he could not leave Naupactus without a guard. The Peloponnesians and their confederates, with their army divided into three, marched on towards the city of the Stratians, to the end that being encamped near it, if they yielded not on parley, they might presently assault the walls. So they went on, the Chaonians and other barbarians in the middle; the Leucadians and Anactorians, and such others as were with these, on the right hand; and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians Edition: current; Page: and Ambraciotes on the left; each army at great distance, and sometimes out of sight of one another. The Grecians in their march kept their order; and went warily on, till they had gotten a convenient place to encamp in. But the Chaonians confident of themselves, and by the inhabitants of that continent accounted most warlike, had not the patience to take in any ground for a camp; but carried furiously on together with the rest of the barbarians, thought to have taken the town by their clamour1, and to have the action ascribed only to themselves. But they of Stratus, aware of this whilst they were yet in their way2, and imagining, if they could overcome these thus divided from the other two armies, that the Grecians also would be the less forward to come on, placed divers ambushes not far from the city; and when the enemies approached, fell upon them both from the city and from the ambushes at once; and putting them into affright, slew many of the Chaonians upon the place: and the rest of the barbarians seeing these to shrink, stayed no longer, but fled outright. Neither of the Grecian armies had knowledge of this skirmish, because they were gone so far before to choose (as they then thought) a commodious place to pitch in. But when the barbarians came back upon them running, they received them, and joining both camps together stirred no more for that day. And the Stratians assaulted them not, for want of the aid of the rest of the Acarnanians; but used their slings against Edition: current; Page: them1, and troubled them much that way: (for without their men of arms2 there was no stirring for them): and in this kind the Acarnanians are held excellent. 82. When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army3 to the river Anapus, from Stratus eighty furlongs, and fetched off the dead bodies upon truce the next day. And whereas the city Œniadæ was come in of itself, he made his retreat thither before the Acarnanians should assemble with their succours; and from thence went every one home. And the Stratians set up a trophy of the skirmish against the barbarians.
83. In the meantime the fleet of Corinth and the other confederates, that was to set out from the Crisæan gulf and to join with Cnemus, to hinder the lower Acarnanians from aiding the upper, came not at all; but were compelled to fight with Phormio and those twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, about the same time that the skirmish was at Stratus. For as they sailed along the shore, Phormio waited on them till they were out of the strait, intending to set upon them in the open sea. And the Corinthians and their confederates went not as to fight by sea, but furnished rather for the land–service in Acarnania; and never thought that the Athenians with their twenty galleys durst fight with theirs, that were seven–and–forty. Nevertheless, when they saw that the Athenians, as themselves sailed by one shore, kept over against them on the other; and that now when they went off from Patræ in Achaia to go over to Acarnania in the opposite continent, the Athenians Edition: current; Page: came towards them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and also knew that they had come to anchor there the night before1: they found they were then to fight of necessity directly against the mouth of the strait. The commanders of the fleet, were such as the cities that set it forth had severally appointed; but of the Corinthians, these; Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ordered their fleet in such manner as they made thereof a circle, as great as, without leaving the spaces so wide as for the Athenians to pass through, they were possibly able, with the stems of their galleys outward, and sterns inward; and into the midst thereof received such small vessels as came with them, and also five of their swiftest galleys; the which were at narrow passages2 to come forth in whatsoever part the enemy should charge. 84. But the Athenians with their galleys ordered one after one in file, went round them and shrunk them up together, by wiping them ever as they past and putting them in expectation of present fight. But Phormio had before forbidden them to fight, till he himself had given them the signal. For he hoped3 that this order of theirs would not last long, as in an army on land; but that the galleys would fall foul of one another, and be troubled also with the smaller vessels in the middest. And if the wind should also blow out of the gulf, in expectation Edition: current; Page: whereof he so went round them, and which usually blew there every morning, he made account they would then instantly be disordered. As for giving the onset, because his galleys were more agile than the galleys of the enemy, he thought it was in his own election, and would be most opportune on that occasion. When this wind was up, and the galleys of the Peloponnesians, being already contracted into a narrow compass, were both ways troubled, by the wind, and withal by their own lesser vessels that encumbered them; and when one galley fell foul of another, and the mariners laboured to set them clear with their poles, and through the noise they made, keeping off and reviling each other, heard nothing neither of their charge nor of the galleys’ direction1; and through want of skill unable to keep up their oars in a troubled sea, rendered the galley untractable to him that sat at the helm: then and with this opportunity he gave the signal. And the Athenians charging, drowned first one of the admiral–galleys, and2 divers others after it in the several parts they assaulted; and brought them to that pass at length, that not one applying himself to the fight they fled all towards Patræ and Dyme, cities3 of Achaia. The Athenians, after they had chased Edition: current; Page: them, and taken twelve galleys, and slain1 most of the men that were in them, fell off and went to Molycreium; and when they had there set up a trophy, and consecrated one galley to Neptune, they returned with the rest to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians with the remainder of their fleet, went presently along the coast2 of Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleians; and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cnemus from Leucas, and with him those galleys that were there3, and with which this other fleet should have been joined.
85. After this the Lacedæmonians sent unto Cnemus to the fleet, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to be of his council4, with command to prepare for another better fight, and not to suffer a few galleys to deprive them of the use of the sea. For they thought this accident (especially being their first proof by sea) very much against reason5; and that it was not so much a defect of the fleet, as of their courage: never comparing the long practice of the Athenians with their own short study in these businesses. And therefore they sent these men thither in passion. Who being arrived with Cnemus6, intimated to the cities about to provide their galleys, and caused those they had before to be repaired. Phormio likewise sent to Athens, to make known both the enemy’s preparation and Edition: current; Page: his own former victory; and withal to will them to send speedily unto him as many galleys as they could make ready; because they were every day in expectation of a new fight. Hereupon they sent him twenty galleys; but commanded him that had the charge of them, to go first into Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyna, the public host of the Athenians, had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia; telling them they might take it in, being now their enemy1: which he did to gratify the Polichnitæ, that bordered upon the Cydonians. Edition: current; Page:  Therefore with these galleys he sailed into Crete, and together with the Polichnitæ wasted the territory of the Cydonians; where also, by reason of the winds and weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted not a little of his time.
86. In the meantime, whilst these Athenians were wind–bound in Crete, the Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene, in order of battle1 sailed along the coast of Panormus of Achaia, to which also were their land–forces come to aid them. Phormio likewise sailed by the shore to Rhium Molycricum, and anchored without it with twenty galleys, the same he had used in the former battle. Now this Rhium was of the Athenians’ side, and the other Rhium in Peloponnesus lies on the opposite shore, distant from it at the most but seven furlongs of sea; and these two make the mouth of the Crisæan gulf. The Peloponnesians therefore came to an anchor at Rhium of Achaia with seventy–seven galleys, not far from Panormus where they left their land forces. After they saw the Athenians, and had lain six or seven days one against the other, meditating and providing for the battle2, the Peloponnesians not intending to put off without Rhium into the wide sea, for fear of what they had suffered by it before; nor the other to enter the strait, because to fight within3 they thought to be the enemy’s advantage. At last Cnemus, Brasidas, Edition: current; Page: and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily before a new supply should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers together; and seeing the most of them to be fearful through their former defeat, and not forward to fight again, encouraged them first with words to this effect:
87. “Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid of the battle at hand for the success of the battle past, his fear is without ground. For you know, we were inferior to them then in preparation; and set not forth as to a fight at sea, but rather to an expedition by land. Fortune likewise crossed us in many things; and somewhat we miscarried by unskilfulness1. So as the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice: nor is it just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force, but have somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should be dejected for the calamity of the event: but we must think, that though fortune may fail men, yet the courage of a valiant man can never fail, and not that we may justify cowardice in any thing by pretending want of skill, and yet be truly valiant2. And yet you are not so much short of their skill, as you exceed them in valour. And though this knowledge of theirs, which you so much fear, joined with courage, will not be without Edition: current; Page: a memory also, to put what they know in execution; yet without courage no art in the world is of any force in the time of danger. For fear confoundeth the memory, and skill without courage availeth nothing. To their odds therefore of skill, oppose your odds of valour; and to the fear caused by your overthrow, oppose your being then unprovided. You have further now a greater fleet, and to fight on your own shore with your aids at hand of men of arms: and for the most part, the greatest number and best provided get the victory. So that we can neither see any one cause in particular, why we should miscarry; and whatsoever were our wants1 in the former battle, supplied in this, will now turn to our instruction. With courage therefore, both masters and mariners, follow every man in his order2, not forsaking the place assigned him. And for us, we shall order the battle as well as3 the former commanders; and leave no excuse to any man of his cowardice. And if any will needs be a coward, he shall receive condign punishment; and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their merit.”
88. Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians. And Phormio, he likewise doubting that his soldiers were but faint–hearted, and observing they had consultations apart and were afraid of the multitude of the enemy’s galleys, thought good, having called them together, to encourage and admonish them upon the present occasion. For though he had always before told Edition: current; Page: them, and predisposed their minds to an opinion, that there was no number of galleys so great, which setting upon them they ought not to undertake; and [also] most of the soldiers had of long time assumed a conceit of themselves, that being1 Athenians they ought not to decline any number of galleys whatsoever of the Peloponnesians: yet when he saw that the sight of the enemy present had dejected them, he thought fit to revive2 their courage, and having assembled the Athenians, said thus:
89. “Soldiers, having observed your fear of he enemy’s number, I have called you together, not enduring to see you terrified with things that are not terrible. For first, they have prepared this great number and odds of galleys, for that they were overcome before, and because they are even in their own opinions too weak for us. And next, their present boldness proceeds only from their knowledge in land service, in confidence whereof (as if to be valiant were peculiar unto them) they are now come up: wherein having for the most part prospered, they think to do the same in service by sea3. But in reason the odds must be ours in this, as well as it is theirs in the other kind. For in courage they exceed us not: and as touching the advantage of either side, we may better be4 bold Edition: current; Page: now than they. And the Lacedæmonians, who are the leaders of the confederates, bring them to fight for the greatest part (in respect of the opinion they have of us1) against their wills. For else they would never have undertaken a new battle, after they were once so clearly overthrown. Fear not therefore any great boldness on their part. But the fear which they have of you, is far both greater and more certain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but also for this, that they would never believe you would go about to resist, unless you had some notable thing to put in practice upon them2. For when the enemy is the greater number, as these are now, they invade chiefly upon confidence of their strength: but they that are much the fewer, must have some great and sure design when they dare fight unconstrained3. Wherewith these men now amazed4, fear us more for our unlikely preparation, than they would if it were more proportionable. Besides, many great armies have been overcome by the lesser through unskilfulness, and some also by timorousness; both which we ourselves5 are free from. As for the battle, I will not willingly fight it in the gulf, nor go in thither: seeing that to a few galleys with nimbleness Edition: current; Page: and art against many without art, straitness of room is disadvantage. For neither can one charge with the beak of the galley as is fit, unless he have sight of the enemy afar off; or if he be himself over–pressed, again get clear. Nor is there any getting through them or turning to and fro at one’s pleasure1, which are all the works of such galleys as have their advantage in agility; but the sea–fight would of necessity be the same with a battle by land, wherein the greater number must have the better. But of this, I shall myself take the best care I am able. In the meantime, keep you your order well in the galleys, and every man receive his charge readily; and the rather because the enemy is at anchor so near us2. In the fight, have in great estimation order and silence, as things of great force in most military actions, especially in a fight by sea; and charge these your enemies according to the worth of your former acts. You are to fight for a great wager, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesian navies, or to bring the fear of3 the sea nearer home to the Athenians. Again, let me tell you, you have beaten them once already; and men once overcome, will not come again to the danger so well resolved as before.”
90. Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Edition: current; Page: Athenians would not enter the gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills, weighed anchor, and betime in the morning having arranged their galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed along1 their own coast within the gulf; leading the way in the same order as they had lain at anchor, with their right wing. In this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys, to the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus, should for safeguard of the town sail along his own coast2 likewise within the strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of theirs and avoid the impression, but be inclosed by their galleys on both sides. Phormio fearing (as they expected) what might become of the town now without guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his will and in extreme haste went aboard and sailed along the shore, with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him. The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore (which they most desired), upon one sign given turned suddenly3 every one as fast as he could, upon the Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every galley. But of those the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing and the turn made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea4. The rest they intercepted, and driving them to the shore, sunk5 them. Edition: current; Page:  The men, as many as swam not out, they slew; and the galleys, some they tied to their own, and towed them away empty, and one with the men and all in her they had already1 taken. But the Messenian2 succours on land, entering the sea with their arms, got aboard of some of them; and fighting from the decks recovered them again, after they were already towing away.
91. And in this part the Peloponnesians had the victory, and overcame the galleys of the Athenians. Now the twenty galleys that were their right wing, gave chase to those eleven Athenian galleys, which had avoided them when they turned, and were gotten into the open sea3. These flying toward Naupactus, arrived there before the enemies, all save one; and when they came under the temple of Apollo, turned their beak–heads and put themselves in readiness for defence, in case the enemy should follow them to the land. But the Peloponnesians, as they came after, were pæanising as if they had already had the victory; and one galley which was of Leucas, being far before the rest, gave chase to one4 Athenian galley that was behind the rest of the Athenians. Now it chanced that there lay out into the sea a certain ship at anchor, to which the Athenian galley first coming fetched a compass about her, and came back full butt against5 the Leucadian galley that gave her chase, and sunk her. Upon this unexpected and unlikely Edition: current; Page: accident they began to fear; and having also followed the chase, as being victors, disorderly, some of them let down their oars into the water and hindered the way of their galleys, (a matter of very ill consequence, seeing the enemy1 was so near), and staid for more company: and some of them, through ignorance of the coast, ran upon the shelves. 92. The Athenians seeing this took heart again, and together with one clamour2 set upon them; who resisted not long, because of their present errors committed and their disarray; but turned, and fled to Panormus from whence at first they set forth. The Athenians followed, and took from them six galleys that were hindmost, and recovered their own which the Peloponnesians had sunk by the shore and tied astern of theirs. Of the men, some they slew, and some also they took alive. In the Leucadian galley that was sunk near the ship, was Timocrates, a3 Lacedæmonian, who, when the galley was lost, ran himself through with his sword; and his body drave into the haven of Naupactus. The Athenians falling off, erected a trophy in the place from whence they set forth to this victory; and took up their dead and the wreck, as much as was on their own shore, and gave truce to the enemy to do the like. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy, as if they also had had the victory, in respect of the flight of those galleys which they sunk by the shore; and the galley which they had taken they consecrated to Neptune in Rhium4 of Achaia, hard by their trophy. Edition: current; Page:  After this, fearing the supply which was expected from Athens, they sailed by night into the Crisæan gulf and to Corinth, all but the Leucadians. And those Athenians with twenty galleys out of Crete, that should have been with Phormio before the battle, not long after the going away of the galleys of Peloponnesus arrived at Naupactus. And the summer ended.
93. But before the fleet, gone into the Crisæan gulf and to Corinth, was dispersed, Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the commanders of the Peloponnesians in the beginning of winter, instructed by the Megareans, thought good to make1 an attempt upon Peiræus, the haven of the Athenians. Now it was without guard or bar; and that upon very good cause, considering how much they exceeded others in the power of their navy. And it was resolved that every mariner with his oar2, his cushion, and one thong for his oar to turn in, should take his way by land from Corinth to the other sea that lieth to Athens; and going with all speed to Megara, launch forty galleys out of Nisæa, the arsenal of the Megareans, which then were there, and sail presently into Peiræus. For at that time there neither stood any galleys for a watch before it, nor was there any imagination that the Edition: current; Page: enemies would on such a sudden come upon them: for they durst not have attempted it openly, though with leisure; nor if they had had any such intention, could it but have been discovered1. As soon as it was resolved on, they set presently forward; and arriving by night, launched the said galleys of Nisæa, and set sail; not now towards Peiræus, as they intended, fearing the danger, (and a wind was also said to have risen that hindered them), but toward a2 promontory of Salamis, lying out towards Megara. Now there was in it a little fort, and underneath in the sea lay three galleys, that kept watch to hinder the importation and exportation of any thing to or from the Megareans. This fort they assaulted, and the galleys they towed empty away after them: and being come upon the Salaminians unawares, wasted also other parts of the island. 94. By this time the fires signifying the coming of enemies3, were lifted up towards Athens; and affrighted them more than any thing that had happened in all this war. For they in the city, thought the enemies had been already in Peiræus: and they in Peiræus, thought the city of Edition: current; Page: the Salaminians had been already taken, and that the enemy would instantly come into Peiræus; which, had they not been afraid1, nor been hindered by the wind, they might also easily have done. But the Athenians, as soon as it was day, came with the whole strength of the city into Peiræus, and launched their galleys, and embarking in haste and tumult set sail toward Salamis, leaving for the guard of Peiræus an army of foot. The Peloponnesians upon notice of these succours, having now overrun most of Salamis, and taken many prisoners and much other booty, besides the three galleys from the fort of Budorus, went back in all haste to Nisæa. And somewhat they feared the more, for that their galleys had lain long in the water2, and were subject to leaking. And when they came to Megara, they went thence to Corinth again by land. The Athenians likewise, when they found not the enemy at Salamis, went home; and from that time forward looked better to Peiræus, both for the shutting of the ports and for their diligence otherwise.
95. About the same time in the beginning of the same winter, Sitalces an3 Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and upon the Chalcideans bordering on Thrace; upon two promises; one of which he required to be performed to him, and the other he was to perform himself. For Perdiccas had promised somewhat Edition: current; Page: unto him, for reconciling him to the Athenians, who had formerly oppressed him with war; and for not restoring his brother Philip to the kingdom, that was his enemy: which he never paid him1. And Sitalces himself had covenanted with the Athenians, when he made league with them, that he would end the war which they had against the Chalcideans of Thrace. For these causes therefore he made this expedition; and took with him both Amyntas the son of Philip, (with purpose to make him king of Macedonia), and also the Athenian ambassadors then with him for that business, and Agnon the Athenian commander. For the Athenians ought also to have joined with him against the Chalcideans, both with a fleet, and with as great land forces as they could provide.
96. Beginning therefore with the Odrysians, he levied first those Thracians that inhabit on this side2 the mountains Hæmus and Rhodope, as many as were of his own dominion, down to the shore of the Euxine Sea and the Hellespont. Then beyond Hæmus he levied the Getes, and all the nations between Ister and the Euxine Sea3. The Getes and the people of those parts, are borderers upon the Scythians, and furnished as the Scythians are; all archers on horseback. He also drew forth many of those Scythians4 that inhabit the mountains and are free states, all sword–men, and are called Dii; Edition: current; Page: the greatest part of which are on the mountain Rhodope; whereof some he hired, and some went as voluntaries. He levied also the Agrianes and Lææans, and all other the nations of Pæonia in his own dominion. These are the utmost bounds of his dominion, extending to the Graæans and Lææans, nations of Pæonia, and to the river Strymon; which rising out of the mountain Scomius passeth through the territories of the Graæans and Lææans, who make the bounds of his kingdom toward Pæonia, and are subject only to their own laws1. But on the part that lieth to the Triballians, who are also a free people, the Treres make the bound of his dominion, and the Tilatæans. These dwell on the north side of the mountain Scomius, and reach westward as far as to the river Oscius; which cometh out of the same hill Nestus and Hebrus doth; a great and desert hill, adjoining to Rhodope.
97. The dimensions of the dominion of the Edition: current; Page: Odrysians by the sea–side, is from the city of the Abderites to the mouth of Ister in the Euxine Sea; and is, the nearest way, four days’ and as many nights’ sail for a round ship1, with a continual fore wind2. By land likewise the nearest way, it is from the city Abdera to the mouth of Ister eleven days’ journey for an expedite footman. Thus it lay in respect of the sea. Now for the continent; from Byzantium to the Lææans and to the river Strymon, (for it reacheth this way farthest into the main land), it is for the like footman thirteen days’ journey. The tribute they received from all the barbarian nations and from the cities of Greece, in the reign of Seuthes, (who reigned after Sitalces, and made the most of it), was in gold and silver, by estimation, four hundred talents by year3. And presents of gold and silver came to as much more: besides vestures, both wrought and plain, and other furniture, presented not only to him, but also to all the men of authority4 and Odrysian nobility about him. For they had a custom, which also was general to all Thrace, contrary to that of the kingdom of Persia, to receive rather than to give: and it was there a greater shame to be asked and deny, than to ask and go without. Nevertheless they Edition: current; Page: held this custom long, by reason of their power1: for without gifts, there was nothing to be gotten done amongst them. So that this kingdom arrived thereby to great power. For of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was, for revenue of money and other wealth, the mightiest; though indeed for strength of an army and multitudes of soldiers, the same be far short of the Scythians. For there is no nation, not to say of Europe, but neither of Asia, that are comparable to this, or that as long as they agree, are able, one nation to one, to stand against the Scythians. And yet in matter of counsel and wisdom in the present occasions of life, they are not like2 to other men.
98. Sitalces therefore, king of this great country, prepared his army, and when all was ready, set forward and marched towards Macedonia: first, through his own dominion; then over Cercine, a desert mountain dividing the Sintians from the Pæonians, over which he marched the same way himself had formerly made with timber3, when he made war against the Pæonians. Passing this mountain out of the country of the Odrysians, they had on their right hand the Pæonians, and on the left the Sintians and Medes; and beyond it they came to the city of Doberus in Pæonia. His army, as he marched, diminished not any way, except by sickness; but increased by the accession of many free nations of Thrace, that came in uncalled in hope of booty. Edition: current; Page:  Insomuch as the whole number is said to have amounted to no less than a hundred and fifty thousand men: whereof the most were foot; the horse being a third part, or thereabouts. And of the horse, the greatest part were the Odrysians themselves; and the next most, the Getes. And of the foot, those sword–men, a1 free nation that came down to him out of the mountain Rhodope, were the most warlike. The rest of the promiscuous multitude were formidable only for their number.
99. Being all together at Doberus, they made ready to fall in from the hill’s side into the lower Macedonia, the dominion of Perdiccas. For2 there are in Macedonia, the Lyncestians and the Elimeiotæ, and other highland nations, who though they be confederates and in subjection to the other, yet have their several kingdoms by themselves. But of that part of the now Macedonia which lieth toward the sea, Alexander, the father of this Perdiccas, and his ancestors the Temenidæ, who came out of Edition: current; Page: Argos, were the first possessors and reigned in the same; having first driven out of Pieria the Pierians, which afterwards seated themselves in Phagres, and other towns beyond Strymon, at the foot of Pangæum; (from which cause that country is called the Gulf1 of Pieria to this day, which lieth at the foot of Pangæum and bendeth toward the sea); and out of that which is called Bottia, the Bottiæans, that now border upon the Chalcideans. They possessed besides a certain narrow portion of Pæonia near unto the river Axius, reaching from above down to Pella and to the sea. Beyond Axius, they possess the country called Mygdonia as far as to Strymon, from whence they have driven out the Edonians. Furthermore, they drave the Eordians out of the territory now called Eordia; (of whom the greatest part perished, but there dwell a few of them yet about Physca); and the Almopians out of Almopia. The same Macedonians subdued also other nations, and hold them yet; as Anthemus, Crestonia, and Bisaltia, and a great part of the Macedonians themselves. But the whole is called Macedonia; and was the kingdom of Perdiccas the son of Alexander, when Sitalces came to invade it.
100. The2 Macedonians unable to stand in the field against so huge an army, retired all within their strongholds and walled towns, as many as the country afforded: which were not many then; but3 were built afterwards by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, when he came to the kingdom, who then also laid out the highways straight, and took order both for matter of war, as horses and arms Edition: current; Page: and for other provision, better than all the other eight kings that were before him. The Thracian army arising from Doberus, invaded that territory first which had been the principality of Philip, and took Eidomene by force; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other towns he had yielded to him for the love of Amyntas the son of Philip, who was then in the army. They also assaulted1 Europus, but could not take it. Then they went on further into Macedonia, on the part that lies on the right hand of Pella2 and Cyrrhus; but within these, into Bottiæa and Pieria they entered not, but wasted Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. Now the Macedonians had never any intention to make head against them with their foot, but sending out their horsemen, which they had procured from their allies of the higher Macedonia, they assaulted the Thracian army in such places where, few against many, they thought they might do it with most convenience. And where they charged, none was able to resist them, being both good horsemen and well armed with breastplates; but enclosed by the multitude of the enemies, they fought against manifest odds of number: so that in the end they gave it over, esteeming themselves too weak to hazard battle against so many.
101. After this, Sitalces gave way to a conference Edition: current; Page: with Perdiccas, touching the motives of this war. And forasmuch as the Athenians were not arrived with their fleet, (for they thought not that Sitalces would have made the journey, but had sent ambassadors to him with presents), he sent a part of his army against the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, wherewith having compelled them within their walled towns, he wasted and destroyed their territory. Whilst he stayed in these parts, the Thessalians southward, and the Magnetians, and the rest of the nations subject to the Thessalians1, and all the Grecians as far as to Thermopylæ, were afraid he would have turned his forces upon them; Edition: current; Page: and stood upon their guard. And northward, those Thracians that inhabit the champaign country beyond Strymon, namely the Panæans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersæans, all of them free states, were afraid of the same. He gave occasion also to a rumour, that he meant to lead his army against all those Grecians that were enemies to the Athenians, as called in by them to that purpose by virtue of their league. But whilst he stayed, he wasted the Chalcidean, Bottiæan, and Macedonian territories; and when he could not effect what he came for, and his army both wanted victual, and was afflicted with the coldness of the season, Seuthes the son of Spardocus, his cousin–german, and of greatest authority next himself, persuaded him to make haste away. Now Perdiccas had dealt secretly with Seuthes, and promised him his sister in marriage, and money with her: and Sitalces at the persuasion of him, after the stay of full thirty days, whereof he spent eight in Chalcidea, retired with his army with all speed into his own kingdom. And Perdiccas shortly after gave to Seuthes his sister Stratonica in marriage, as he had promised. This was the issue of this expedition of Sitalces.
102. The same winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians was dissolved, the Athenians that were at Naupactus, under the conduct of Phormio, sailed along the coast to Astacus, and disbarking marched into the inner parts of Acarnania. He had in his army four hundred men of arms that he brought with him in his galleys, and four hundred more Messenians. With these he put out of Stratus, Coronta, and other places, all those whose fidelity he thought doubtful. And when he had restored Edition: current; Page: Cynes the son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their galleys. For they thought they should not be able to make war against the Œniades (who only of all Acarnania are1 the Athenians’ enemies) in respect of the winter. For the river Achelöus, springing out of the mountain Pindus, and running through Dolopia, and through the territories of the Agræans and the Amphilochians, and through most part of the champaign of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and falling into the sea by the city of the Œniades, which also it moateth about with fens, by the abundance of water maketh it hard lying there for an army in time of winter. Also most of the islands Echinades lie just over against Œnia2, hard by the mouth of Achelöus. And the river, being a great one, continually heapeth together the gravel, insomuch that some of those islands are become continent already, and the like in short time is expected by the rest3. For not only the stream of the river is swift, broad, and turbidous, but also the islands themselves stand thick, and because4 the gravel cannot pass, are joined one to another; lying in and out, not in a direct line, nor so much as to give the water his course directly forward into the sea. These islands are all desert, and but small ones. It is reported that Apollo by his oracle did assign this place for an habitation to Alcmæon the son of Amphiareus, at such time as he wandered up and down for the killing of his Edition: current; Page: mother; telling him, “that he should never be free from the terrors that haunted him, till he had found out and seated himself in such a land, as when he slew his mother, the sun had never seen nor was then land, because all other lands were polluted by him.” Hereupon being at a nonplus, as they say, with much ado he observed this ground congested by the river Achelöus, and thought there was enough cast up to serve1 his turn, already, since the time of the slaughter of his mother, after which it was now a long time that he had been a wanderer. Therefore seating himself in the places about the Œniades, he reigned there, and named the country after the name of his son Acarnas. Thus goes the report, as we have heard it concerning Alcmæon.
103. But Phormio and the Athenians leaving Acarnania, and returning to Naupactus, in the very beginning of the spring came back to Athens; and brought with them such galleys as they had taken, and the freemen they had taken prisoners in their fights at sea, who were again set at liberty by exchange of man for man. So ended that2 winter, and the third year of the war written by Thucydides.
Attica invaded by the Peloponnesians.—The Mytilenæans revolt, and are received by the Peloponnesians at Olympia into their league.—The Athenians send Paches to Mytilene, to besiege it.—Part of the besieged Platæans escape through the fortifications of the enemy.—The commons of Mytilene armed by the nobility for a sally on the enemy, deliver the town to the Athenians.—The residue of the Platæans yield to the besiegers, and are put to the sword.—The proceedings upon the Mytilenæans, and their punishment.—The sedition in Corcyra.—Laches is sent by the Athens into Sicily: and Nicias into Melos.—Demosthenes fighteth against the Ætolians unfortunately; and afterwards against the Ambraciotes fortuately.—Pythadorus is sent into Sicily, to receive the fleet from Laches.—This in other three years of this war.
1. The summer following, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, at the time when corn was at the highest, entered with their army into Attica under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; and there set them down and wasted the territory about. And the Athenian horsemen, as they were wont, fell upon the enemy where they thought fit1, and kept back the multitude of light–armed soldiers Edition: current; Page: from going out before the men of arms1, and infesting the places near the city. And when they had stayed as long as their victual lasted, they returned; and were dissolved according to their cities.
2. After the Peloponnesians were entered Attica, Lesbos immediately, all but Methymne, revolted from the Athenians; which though they would have done before the war, and2 the Lacedæmonians would not then receive them, yet even now they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended to do. For they stayed to have first straitened the mouth of their haven with dams of earth, to have finished their walls and their galleys then in building, and to have gotten in all that was to come out of Pontus, as archers, and victual, and whatsoever else they had sent for. But the Tenedians, with whom they were at odds, and the Methymnæans, and of the Mytilenæans themselves certain particular men upon faction, being hosts to the Athenians, made known unto them that the Lesbians were forced to go all into Mytilene3; that by the help of the Lacedæmonians and their kindred4 the Edition: current; Page: Bœotians, they hastened all manner of provision necessary for a revolt; and that unless it were presently prevented, all Lesbos would be lost.
3. The Athenians, afflicted with the disease, and with the war now on foot and at the hottest, thought it a dangerous matter that Lesbos, which had a navy and was of strength entire, should thus be added to the rest of their enemies; and at first received not the accusations, holding them therefore the rather feigned because they would not have them true. But after, when they had sent ambassadors to Mytilene, and could not persuade them to dissolve themselves and undo their preparation, they then feared the worst, and would have prevented them: and to that purpose suddenly sent out the forty1 galleys made ready for Peloponnesus, with Cleïppedes and two other commanders. For they had been advertised that there was a holiday of Apollo Maloeis to be kept without the city, and that to the celebration thereof the Mytilenæans were accustomed to come all out of the town; and they hoped, making haste, to take them there unawares. And if the attempt succeeded, it was well; if not, they might2 command the Mytilenæans to deliver up their galleys, and to demolish their walls; or they might make war against them, Edition: current; Page: if they refused. So these galleys went their way. And ten galleys of Mytilene which then chanced to be at Athens, by virtue of their league, to aid them, the Athenians stayed; and cast into prison the men that were in them. In the meantime a certain man went from Athens into Eubœa by sea, and then by land to Geræstus; and finding there a ship ready to put off, having the wind favourable, arrived in Mytilene three days after he set forth from Athens, and gave them notice of the coming of the fleet. Hereupon they not only went not out to Maloeis1, as was expected, but also stopped the gaps of their walls and ports, where they were left unfinished, and placed guards to defend them.
4. When the Athenians not long after arrived and saw this, the commanders of the fleet delivered to the Mytilenæans what they had in charge: which not hearkened unto, they presently fell to the war. The Mytilenæans, unprovided and compelled to a war on such a sudden, put out some few galleys before the haven to fight: but being driven in again by the galleys of Athens, they called to the Athenian commanders to parley; desiring, if they could upon reasonable conditions, to get the galleys for the present sent away. And the Athenian commander allowed the conditions2, he also fearing they should be too weak to make war against the whole island.
When a cessation of arms was granted, the Mytilenæans amongst others sent to Athens one of those that had given intelligence there of their design, and had repented him after of the same, to Edition: current; Page: try if they could persuade them to withdraw their fleet from them, as not intending any innovation. Withal they sent ambassadors at the same time to Lacedæmon, undiscovered of the fleet of the Athenians, which was riding at anchor in Malea1 to the north of the city; being without any confidence of their success at Athens. And these men, after an ill voyage through the wide sea, arriving at Lacedæmon, negotiated the sending of aid from thence. 5. But when their ambassadors were come back from Athens without effect, the Mytilenæans and the rest of Lesbos, save only Methymne, (for these together with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and some few other their confederates, aided the Athenians), prepared themselves for the war. And the Mytilenæans with the whole strength of the city made a sally upon the Athenian camp, and came to a battle: wherein though the Mytilenæans had not the worse, yet they lay not that night without the walls, nor durst trust to their strength; but retiring into the town, lay quiet there, expecting to try their fortune with the accession of such forces, as (if any came) they were to have from Peloponnesus. For there were now come into the city one Meleas a Laconian and Hermiondas a Theban, who having been sent out before the revolt, but unable to arrive before the coming of the Athenian fleet, secretly after the end of the battle entered the haven in a Edition: current; Page: galley, and persuaded them to send another galley along with them, with other ambassadors to Sparta; which they did. 6. But the Athenians much confirmed by this the Mytilenæans’ cessation, called in their confederates: (who, because they saw no assurance on the part of the Lesbians, came much sooner in than was thought they would have done1): and riding at anchor to the south of the city, fortified two camps, on either side one, and brought their galleys before both the ports, and so quite excluded the Mytilenæans from the use of the sea2. As for the land, the Athenians held so much only as lay near their camps, which was not much; and the Mytilenæans and other Lesbians, that were now come to aid them, were masters of the rest. For Malea served the Athenians for a station only for their galleys, and to keep their market in. And thus proceeded the war before Mytilene.
7. About the same time of the same summer, the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys into Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Asopius the son of Phormio. For the Acarnanians had desired them to send some son or kinsman of Phormio, for general, into those parts. These, as they sailed by, wasted the maritime country of Laconia; and then sending back the greatest part of his fleet to Athens, Asopius himself with twelve galleys went on to Naupactus. And afterwards having raised the whole power of Acarnania, he made war upon the Edition: current; Page: Œniades, and both entered with his galleys into1 the river of Achelöus, and with his land forces wasted the territory. But when the Œniades would not yield, he disbanded his land forces, and sailed with his galleys to Leucas, and landed his soldiers of the territory of Neritum2; but in going off was by those of the country that came out to defend it, and by some few of the garrison soldiers there, both himself and part of his company slain. And having upon truce received from the Leucadians their dead bodies, they went their ways3.
8. Now the ambassadors of the Mytilenæans, that went out in the first galley, having been referred by the Lacedæmonians to the general meeting of the Grecians at Olympia, to the end they might determine of them together with the rest of the confederates4, went to Olympia accordingly. Edition: current; Page:  It was that Olympiad wherein Dorieus of Rhodes was the second time victor. And when after the solemnity they were set in council, the ambassadors spake unto them in this manner:
9. “Men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we know the received custom of the Grecians. For they that take into league such as revolt in the wars and relinquish a former league, though they like them as long as they have profit by them, yet accounting them but traitors to their former friends, they esteem the worse of them in their judgment. And to say the truth, this judgment is not without good reason, when they that revolt, and they from whom the revolt is made, are mutually like–minded and affected, and equal in provision and strength, and no just cause of their revolt given. But now between us and the Athenians it is not so. Nor let any man think the worse of us, for that having been honoured by them in time of peace, we have now revolted in time of danger. 10. For the first point of our speech, especially now we seek to come into league with you, shall be to make good the justice and honesty of our revolt1. For we know there can be neither firm friendship between man and man, nor any communion between city and city to any purpose whatsoever, without a mutual opinion of each other’s honesty, and also a similitude of customs otherwise: for in the difference of minds is grounded the diversity of actions.Edition: current; Page: 
“As for our league with the Athenians, it was first made when you gave over the Medan war, and they remained to prosecute the relics of that business. Yet we entered not such a league, as to be their helpers in bringing the Grecians into the servitude of the Athenians, but to set free the Grecians from the servitude of the Medes1. And as long as they led us as equals, we followed them with much zeal: but when we saw they remitted their enmity against the Medes, and led us2 to the subjugation of the confederates, we could not then but be afraid. And the confederates, through the multitude of distinct counsels unable to unite themselves for resistance, fell all but ourselves and the Chians into their subjection. And we having still our own laws, and being in name a free state, followed them to the wars; but so, as by the examples of their former actions, we held them not any longer for faithful leaders. For it was not probable, when they had subdued those whom together with us they took into league, but that, when they should be able, they would do the like also by the rest. 11. It is true that if we were Edition: current; Page: now in liberty all, we might be the better assured that they would forbear to innovate; but since they have under them the greatest part already, in all likelihood they will take it ill, to deal on equal terms with us alone, and the rest yielding, to let us only stand up as their equals. Especially when by how much they are become stronger by the subjection of their confederates, by so much the more are we become desolate. But the equality of mutual fear is the only band of faith in leagues. For he that hath the will to transgress, yet when he hath not the odds of strength, will abstain from coming on. Now the reason why they have left us yet free, is no other, but that1 they may have a fair colour to lay upon their domination over the rest; and because it hath seemed unto them more expedient to take us in by policy, than by force. For therein they made use of us for an argument, that having equal vote with them we would never have followed them to the wars, if those against whom they led us, had not done the injury: and thereby also they brought the stronger against the weaker, and reserving the strongest to the last, made them the weaker by removing the rest. Whereas if they had begun with us, when the confederates had had both their own strength and a side to adhere to, they had never subdued them so easily. Likewise our navy kept them in some fear; lest united and added to yours or to any other, it Edition: current; Page: might have created them some danger. Partly also we escaped by our observance toward their commons, and most eminent men from time to time. But yet we still1 thought we could not do so long, considering the examples they have showed us in the rest, if this war should not have fallen out. 12. What friendship then or assurance of liberty was this, when we received each other with alienated affections: when whilst they had wars, they for fear courted us; and when they had peace, we for fear courted them: and whereas in others good will assureth loyalty, in us it was the effect of fear? So2 it was more for fear than love, that we remained their confederates; and whomsoever security should first embolden, he was first likely by one means or other to break the league. Now if any man think we did unjustly, to revolt upon the expectation of evil intended without staying to be certain whether they would do it or not, he weigheth not the matter aright. For if we were as able to contrive evil against them, and again to defer it, as they can against us, being thus equal, what needed us to be at their discretion? But seeing it is in their hands to invade at pleasure, it ought to be in ours to anticipate.
13. Upon these pretensions therefore and causes, Men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we have revolted; the which are both clear enough for the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for it, and weighty enough to affright, and compel us to Edition: current; Page: take some course for our own safety: which we would have done before, when before the war we sent ambassadors to you about our revolt, but could not, because you would not then admit us into your league. And now when the Bœotians1 invited us to it, we presently obeyed. Wherein we thought we made a double revolt2 one from the Grecians, in ceasing to do them mischief with the Athenians, and helping to set them free; and another from the Athenians, in breaking first, and not staying to be destroyed by them hereafter. But this revolt of ours hath been sooner than was fit, and before we were provided for it. For which cause also the confederates ought so much the sooner to admit us into the league, and send us the speedier aid; thereby the better3, at once both to defend those you ought to defend, and to annoy your enemies. Whereof there was never better opportunity than at present. For the Athenians being both with the sickness and their great expenses consumed, and their navy divided, part upon your own coasts and part upon ours; it is not likely they should have many galleys spare, in case you again4 this summer invade them both by sea and land; but that they should either be unable to resist the invasion of your fleet, or be forced to come off from both our coasts. And let not any man conceive, that you shall herein at your Edition: current; Page: own danger defend the territory of another. For though Lesbos seem remote, the profit of it will be near you. For the war will not be, as a man would think, in Attica; but there, from whence cometh the profit to Attica. This profit is the revenue they have from the confederates; which if they subdue us, will still be greater. For neither will any other revolt; and all that is ours will accrue unto them; and we shall be worse handled besides, than those that were under them before. But aiding us with diligence, you shall both add to your league a city that hath a great navy, the thing you most stand in need of; and also easily1 overthrow the Athenians by subduction of their confederates, because every one will then be more confident to come in, and you shall avoid the imputation2 of not assisting such as revolt unto you. And if it appear that your endeavour is to make them free, your strength in this war will be much the more confirmed. In reverence therefore of the hopes which the Grecians have reposed in you, and of the presence of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple here we are in a manner suppliants to you, receive the Mytilenæans into league, and aid us. And do not cast us off, who (though, as to the exposing of our persons, the danger be our own) shall bring a common profit to all Greece, if we prosper, and a more common detriment to all the Grecians, if through your inflexibleness we miscarry. Be you therefore men such as the Grecians esteem you, and our fears require you to be.”
15. In this manner spake the Mytilenæans. And Edition: current; Page: the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, when they had heard and allowed their reasons, decreed not only a league with the Lesbians, but also again to make an invasion into Attica. And to that purpose, the Lacedæmonians appointed their confederates there present, to make as much speed as they could with two parts of their forces into the isthmus; and they themselves being first there, prepared engines in the isthmus for the drawing up of galleys, with intention to carry the navy from Corinth to the other sea that lieth towards Athens, and to set upon them both by sea and land. And these things diligently did they. But the rest of the confederates assembled but slowly, being busied in the gathering in of their fruits, and weary of warfare.
16. The Athenians perceiving all this preparation to be made upon an opinion of their weakness, and desirous to let them see they were deceived, as being able, without stirring the fleet at Lesbos, easily to master the fleet that should come against them out of Peloponnesus, manned out a hundred galleys, and embarked therein generally, both citizens (except those of the degree of Pentacosiomedimni and Horsemen1) and also strangers that dwelt Edition: current; Page: amongst them: and sailing to the isthmus, made a show of their strength, and landed their soldiers in such parts of Peloponnesus as they thought fit. When the Lacedæmonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought it false which was spoken by the Lesbian ambassadors; and esteeming the action difficult, seeing their confederates were not arrived, and that news was brought of the wasting of the territory near their city1 by the thirty galleys formerly sent about Edition: current; Page: Peloponnesus by the Athenians, went home again; and afterwards prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos, and intimated to the cities rateably to furnish forty galleys, and appointed Alcidas, who was to go thither with them, for admiral. And the Athenians, when they saw the Peloponnesians gone, went likewise home with their hundred galleys.
17. About1 the time that this fleet was out, they had surely the most galleys (besides the beauty of them) together in action in these employments; yet in the beginning of the war, they had both as good, and more in number. For a hundred attended the guard of Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis; and another hundred were about Peloponnesus; besides those that were at Potidæa and other places: so that in one summer, they had in all two hundred and fifty sail. And this, together with Potidæa, was it that most exhausted their treasure. For the men of arms that besieged the city, had each of them two drachmes a day, one for himself and another for his man: and were three thousand in number that were sent thither at first and remained to the end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred more, that went with Phormio and came away before the town was won. And the galleys had all the same pay. In this manner was their money consumed2, and so many galleys employed, Edition: current; Page: the most indeed that ever they had manned at once.
18. About the same time that the Lacedæmonians were in the isthmus, the Mytilenæans marched by land, both they and their auxiliaries, against Methymne, in hope to have had it betrayed unto them: and having assaulted the city, when it succeeded not the way they looked for, they went thence to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eressus: and after they had settled1 the affairs of those places, and made strong their walls, returned speedily home. When these were gone, the Methymnæans likewise made war upon Antissa; but beaten2 by the Antisæans and some auxiliaries that were with them, they made haste again to Methymne, with the loss of many of their soldiers. But the Athenians being advertised hereof, and understanding that the Mytilenæans were masters of the land, and that their own soldiers there were not enough to keep them in, sent thither, about the beginning of autumn, Paches, the son of Epicurus, with a thousand men of arms of their own city: who, supplying the place of rowers themselves, arrived at Mytilene, and ingirt it with a single wall: save3 that in some Edition: current; Page: places, stronger by nature than the rest, they only built turrets, and placed guards in them. So that the city was every way strongly besieged, both by sea and land; and the winter began.
19. The Athenians standing in need of money for the siege, both contributed themselves, and sent thither1 two hundred talents of this their first contribution, and also dispatched Lysicles and four others with twelve galleys, to levy money amongst the confederates. But Lysicles, after he had been to and fro and gathered money in divers places, as he was going up from Myus through the plains of Mæander in Caria as far as to the hill Sandius, was set upon there by the Carians and Anæitans2; and himself with a great part of his soldiers slain.
20. The same winter the Platæans, (for they were besieged by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians), pressed now with want of victual and hopeless of relief from Athens, and no other means of safety appearing, took counsel, both they and the Athenians that were besieged with them, at first all to go out, and if they could, to pass over the wall of the enemy by force. The authors of this attempt, were Theænetus the son of Tolmidas, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas the son of Daïmachus, one of their commanders. But half of them afterwards, by one means or other, for the greatness of the danger shrunk from it again: but two hundred and twenty Edition: current; Page: or thereabouts voluntarily persisted to go out in this manner. They made them ladders, fit for the height of the enemy’s wall; the wall they measured by the lays of brick, on the part toward the town where it was not plastered over; and divers men at once numbered the lays of bricks, whereof though some missed, yet the greatest part took the reckoning just; especially, numbering them so often, and at no great distance, but where they might easily see the part to which their ladders were to be applied; and so by guess1 of the thickness of one brick, took the measure of their ladders. 21. As for the wall of the Peloponnesians, it was thus built. It consisted of a double circle, one towards Platæa, and another outward, in case of an assault from Athens. These two walls were distant one from the other about sixteen foot: and that sixteen foot of space which was betwixt them, was disposed and built into cabins for the watchmen, which were so joined and continued one to another, that the whole appeared to be one thick wall with battlements on either side. At every ten battlements stood a great tower, of a just breadth to comprehend both walls, and reach from the outmost to the inmost front of the whole; so that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but through the midst of it. And such nights as there happened any storm2 of rain, they used to quit the battlements of the wall, and to watch under the towers: as being not far asunder, and covered beside overhead. Such was the form of the wall Edition: current; Page: wherein1 the Peloponnesians kept their watch. 22. The Platæans, after they were ready, and had attended a tempestuous2 night, and withal moonless, went out of the city; and were conducted by the same men that were the authors of the attempt. And first they passed the ditch that was about the town, and then came up close to the wall of the enemy3, who, because it was dark, could not see them coming; and the noise they made as they went4 could not be heard for the blustering of the wind. And they came on besides at a good distance one from the other, that they might not be betrayed by the clashing of their arms; and were but lightly armed, and not shod but on the left foot, for the more steadiness in the wet5. They came thus to the battlements in one of the spaces between tower and tower, knowing that there was now no watch kept there. And first came they that carried the ladders, and placed them to the wall: then twelve lightly armed, only with a dagger and a breastplate, went up, led by Ammeas the son of Corœbus, who was the first that mounted; and they that followed him, went up into either tower six. To these succeeded others lightly armed, that carried the6 darts, for whom they that came after carried targets at their backs, that they might be the more expedite to get up; which targets they were to deliver to them, when they came to the enemy. At length, when most7 of them were ascended, they were heard Edition: current; Page: by the watchmen that were in the towers. For one of the Platæans taking hold of the battlements, threw down a tile, which made a noise in the fall. And presently there was an alarm; and the army ran to the wall. For in the dark and stormy night, they knew not what the danger was; and the Platæans that were left in the city, came forth withal, and assaulted the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite side to that where their men went over1. So that though they were all in a tumult in their several places, yet not any of them that watched durst stir to the aid of the rest, nor were able to conjecture what had happened. But those three hundred that were appointed to assist the watch upon all occasions of need, went without the wall and made towards the place of the clamour. They also held up the fires by which they used to make known the approach of enemies, towards Thebes. But then the Platæans likewise held out many other fires from the wall of the city, which for that purpose they had before prepared, to render the fires of the enemy insignificant; and that the Thebans apprehending the matter otherwise than it was, might forbear to send help till their men were over and had recovered some place of safety. 23. In the meantime those Platæans, which having scaled the wall first and slain the watch were now masters of both the towers, not only guarded the passages by standing themselves in the entries, but also applying ladders from the wall to the towers, and conveying many men to the top, kept the enemies off with shot both from above and below. Edition: current; Page:  In the mean space, the greatest number of them having reared to the wall many ladders at once, and beaten down the battlements, passed quite over between the towers. And ever as any of them got to the other side, they stood still upon the brink of the ditch without, and with arrows and darts kept off those that came by the outside1 of the wall to hinder their passage. And when the rest were over, then last of all2, and with much ado, came they also down to the ditch which were in the two towers. And by this time, the three hundred that were to assist the watch, came and set upon them, and had lights with them; by which means the Platæans that were on the further brink of the ditch, discerned them the better from out of the dark, and aimed their arrows and darts at their most disarmed parts: for3 standing in the dark, the lights of the enemy made the Platæans the less discernible; insomuch as these last passed the ditch, though with difficulty and force. For the water in it was frozen over, though not so hard as to bear, but watery, and such as when the wind is at east rather than at north. And the snow which fell that night, together with so great a wind as that was, had very much increased the water; which they waded through with scarce their heads above. But yet the greatness of the storm was the principal means of their escape.
24. From the ditch the Platæans in troop took the way towards Thebes, leaving on the left hand Edition: current; Page: the temple of Juno1 built by Androcrates, both for that they supposed they would least suspect the way that led to their enemies, and also because they saw the Peloponnesians with their lights pursue that way, which by Mount Cithæron and the Oak–heads2 led to Athens, The Platæans, when they had gone six or seven furlongs, forsook the Theban way, and turned into that which led towards the mountain to Erythræ and Hysiæ; and having gotten the hills, escaped through to Athens, being two hundred and twelve persons of a greater number. For some of them returned into the city before the rest went over; and one of their archers was taken upon the ditch without. And so the Peloponnesians gave over the pursuit, and returned to their places. But the Platæans that were within the city, knowing nothing of the event, and those that turned back having told them that not a man escaped, as soon as it was day sent a herald to entreat a truce for the taking up of their dead bodies; but when they knew the truth, they gave it over. And thus these men of Platæa passed through the fortification of their enemies, and were saved.
25. About the end of the same winter Salæthus, a Lacedæmonian, was sent in a galley to Mytilene; and coming first to Pyrrha, and thence going to Mytilene by land, entered the city by the dry channel of a certain torrent which had a passage through the wall of the Athenians, undiscovered. Edition: current; Page:  And he told the magistrates that Attica should again be invaded, and that the forty galleys which were to aid them were coming; and that himself was sent afore, both to let them know it, and withal to give order in the rest of their affairs. Hereupon the Mytilenæans grew confident, and hearkened less to composition with the Athenians. And the winter ended, and the fourth year of this war written by Thucydides.
26. In the beginning of the summer, after they had sent Alcidas away with the forty–two1 galleys, whereof he was admiral, unto Mytilene, both they and their confederates invaded Attica; to the end that the Athenians, troubled on both sides, might the less send supply against the fleet now gone to Mytilene. In this expedition Cleomenes was general instead of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who being king was yet in minority2, and Cleomenes was his uncle by the father. And they now cut down both what they had before wasted and began to grow again, and also whatsoever else they had before pretermitted: and this was the sharpest invasion of all but the second. For whilst they stayed to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos, which by this time they supposed to have been arrived, they went abroad and destroyed most part of the country. But when nothing succeeded according to their hopes, and seeing their corn failed, they retired again, and were dissolved according to their cities.
27. The Mytilenæans in the meantime, seeing Edition: current; Page: the fleet came not from Peloponnesus, but delayed the time, and their victuals failed, were constrained to make their composition with the Athenians upon this occasion. Salæthus, when he also expected these galleys no longer, armed the commons of the city, who were before unarmed1, with intention to have made a sally upon the Athenians. But they, as soon as they had gotten arms, no longer obeyed the magistrates; but holding assemblies by themselves, required the rich men2 either to bring their corn to light and divide it amongst them all, or else, they said, they would make their composition by delivering up the city to the Athenians. 28. Those that managed the state perceiving this and unable to hinder it, knowing also their own danger in case they were excluded out of the composition, they all jointly agreed to yield the city to Paches and his army with these conditions: “to be proceeded withal at the pleasure of the people of Athens, and to receive the army into the city; and that the Mytilenæans should send ambassadors to Athens about their own business: and that Paches, till their return, should neither put in bonds, nor make slave of, nor slay any Mytilenæan”. This was the effect of that composition. But such of the Mytilenæans as had principally practised with the Lacedæmonians, being3 afraid of themselves, when the army was entered the city durst not trust to the conditions agreed on, but took sanctuary at the altars. But Paches having raised them upon promise to do them no injury, Edition: current; Page: sent them to Tenedos, to be in custody there till the people of Athens should have resolved what to do. After this he sent some galleys to Antissa, and took in that town; and ordered the affairs of his army as he thought convenient.
29. In the meantime those forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which should have made all possible haste, trifled away the time about Peloponnesus; and making small speed in the rest of their navigation, arrived at Delos unknown to the Athenians at Athens. From thence sailing to Icarus and Myconus, they got first intelligence of the loss of Mytilene. But to know the truth more certainly, they went thence to Embatus1 in Erythræa. It was about the seventh day after the taking of Mytilene, that they arrived at Embatus; where understanding the certainty, they went to council about what they were to do upon the present occasion; and Teutiaplus, an Eleian, delivered his opinion to this effect: 30. “Alcidas, and the rest that have command of the Peloponnesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my opinion, to go to Mytilene as we are, before advice be given of our arrival. For in all probability we shall find the city, in respect they have but lately won it, very weakly guarded, and to the sea (where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong) not guarded at all. It is also likely that their land soldiers are dispersed, some in one house and some in another, carelessly as victors. Therefore if we fall upon them suddenly and by night, I think, with the help of those within, if any be left there that will take our part, we may Edition: current; Page: be able to possess ourselves of the city. And we shall never fear the danger, if we but think this: that all stratagems1 of war whatsoever are no more but such occasions as this, which if a commander avoid in himself, and take the advantage of them in the enemy, he shall for the most part have good success.” 31. Thus said he; but prevailed not with Alcidas. And some others, fugitives of Ionia and those Lesbians that were with him in the fleet, gave him counsel, that seeing he feared the danger of this, he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cume in Æolia; that having some town for the seat of the war, they might from thence force Ionia to revolt; whereof there was hope, because the Ionians would not be unwilling to see him there: and if2 they could withdraw from the Athenians this their great revenue, and withal put them to maintain a fleet against them, it would be a great exhausting of their treasure. They said besides, that they thought they should be able to get Pissuthnes to join with them in the war. But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to this opinion, that since they were come too late to Mytilene, they were best to return speedily into Peloponnesus. 32. Whereupon putting off from Embatus, he sailed by the shore to Myonnesus of the Teians, and there slew most of the prisoners he had taken by the way. After this he put in at Ephesus: and thither came ambassadors to him from the Samians of Anæa3, and told him that it was but an ill manner of setting the Grecians at liberty, to kill such as had not Edition: current; Page: lift up their hands against him, nor were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians, but confederates to the Athenians by constraint; and that unless he gave over that course, he would make few of the enemies his friends, but many now friends to become his enemies. Wherefore upon these words of the ambassadors he set the Chians and some others, all that he had left alive, at liberty1. For when men saw their fleet, they never fled from it, but came unto them as to Athenians; little imagining that the Athenians being masters of the sea, the Peloponnesians durst have put over to Ionia. 33. From Ephesus Alcidas went away in haste, indeed fled; for he had been descried by the Salaminia and the Paralus2, (which by chance were then in their course for Athens), whilst he lay at anchor about Claros; and fearing to be chased, kept the wide sea; meaning by his good will to touch no land till he came into Peloponnesus. But the news of them came to Paches from divers places3, especially from Erythræa. For the cities of Ionia being unwalled, were afraid extremely lest the Peloponnesians sailing by, without intention to stay, should have pillaged them as they passed. But the Salaminia and the Paralus having seen him at Claros, Edition: current; Page: brought the news themselves1. And Paches thereupon made great haste after, and followed him as far as Latmos2 the island. But when he saw he could not reach him, he came back again; and thought he had a good turn, seeing he could not overtake those galleys upon the wide sea, that the same were not compelled, by being taken in some place near land, to fortify themselves, and so to give him occasion with guards and galleys to attend them.
34. As he came by in his return, he put in at Notium, a city of the Colophonians, into which the Colophonians came and inhabited, after the town above, through their own3 sedition, was taken by Itamanes and the barbarians. (This town was taken at the time when Attica was the second time invaded by the Peloponnesians). They then that came down and dwelt in Notium, falling again into sedition, the one part having procured some forces, Arcadians4 and barbarians, of Pissuthnes, kept them in a part of the town which they had severed from the rest with a wall; and there, with such of the Colophonians of the high town as being of the Medan faction entered with them, they governed Edition: current; Page: the city at their pleasure1: and the other part, which went out from these and were the fugitives, brought in Paches. He, when he had called out Hippias, captain of the Arcadians that were within the said wall, with promise, if they should not agree, to set him safe and sound within the wall again; and Hippias was thereupon come to him: committed him to custody, but without bonds; and withal assaulting the wall on a sudden, when they expected not, took it, and slew as many of the Arcadians and barbarians as were within: and when he had done, brought Hippias in again, according as he had promised; but after he had him there, laid hold on him and caused him to be shot to death: and restored Notium to the Colophonians, excluding only such as had medized. Afterwards the Athenians sent governors2 to Notium of their own; and having gathered together the Colophonians out of all cities whatsoever, seated them there under the law of the Athenians.
35. Paches, when he came back to Mytilene, took in Pyrrha and Eressus: and having found Salæthus the Lacedæmonian hidden in Mytilene, apprehended him, and sent him, together with those men he had put in custody at Tenedos, and whomsoever else he thought author of the revolt, to Athens. He likewise sent away the greatest part of his army; and with the rest stayed and settled the state of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, as he thought convenient. 36. These men, and Salæthus with them, being arrived at Athens, the Edition: current; Page: Athenians slew Salæthus presently; though he made them many offers, and amongst other, to get the army of the Peloponnesians to rise from before Platæa; for it was yet besieged. But upon the rest they went to council; and in their passion decreed to put them to death, not only those men there present, but also all the men of Mytilene that were of age; and to make slaves of the women and children: laying to their charge the revolt itself, in that they revolted not being in subjection as others were: and withal the Peloponnesian fleet, which durst enter into Ionia to their aid, had not a little aggravated that commotion1. For by that it seemed that the revolt was not made without much premeditation. They therefore sent a galley to inform Paches of their decree, with command to put the Mytilenæans presently to death. But the next day they felt a kind of repentance in themselves; and began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was, that not the authors only, but the whole city should be destroyed. Which when the ambassadors of the Mytilenæans that were there present, and such Athenians as favoured them, understood, they wrought with those that bare office2, to bring the matter again into debate; wherein they easily prevailed, forasmuch as to them also it was well known, that the most of the city were desirous to have Edition: current; Page: means to consult of the same anew. The assembly being presently met, amongst the opinions of divers others Cleon also, the son of Cleænetus, who in the former assembly had won to have them killed, being of all the citizens most violent and with the people at that time far the most powerful, stood forth and said in this manner:
37. “I have often on other occasions thought a democracy uncapable of dominion over others; but most of all now for this your repentance concerning the Mytilenæans. For through your own mutual security and openness, you imagine the same also in your confederates; and consider not, that when at their persuasion you commit an error or relent upon compassion, you are softened thus to the danger of the commonwealth, not to the winning of the affections of your confederates: nor do you consider, that your government is a tyranny, and those that be subject to it are against their wills so, and are plotting continually against you; and obey you not for any good turn, which to your own detriment you shall do them, but only for that you exceed them in strength, and for no good will. But the worst mischief of all is this1, that nothing we decree shall stand firm, and that we will not know, that a city with the worse laws, if immoveable, is better than one with good laws, when they be not binding; and that a plain wit accompanied with modesty, is more profitable to the state than dexterity with arrogance; and that the more ignorant2 sort of men do, for the most part, better regulate a commonwealth than they that are wiser. Edition: current; Page:  For these love to appear wiser than the laws, and1 in all public debatings to carry the victory, as the worthiest things wherein to show their wisdom; from whence most commonly proceedeth the ruin of the states they live in. Whereas the other sort, mistrusting their own wits, are content to be esteemed not so wise as the laws, and not able to carp at what is well spoken by another: and so making themselves equal judges rather than contenders for mastery, govern a state for the most part well. We therefore should do the like; and not be carried away with combats of eloquence and wit, to give such counsel to your multitude as in our own judgments we think not good.
38. “For my own part, I am of the opinion I was before; and I wonder at these men that have brought this matter of the Mytilenæans in question again, and thereby caused delay, which is the advantage only of them that do the injury. For the sufferer by this means comes upon the doer with his anger dulled; whereas revenge2, the opposite of injury, is then greatest when it follows presently. I do wonder also, what he is that shall stand up now to contradict me, and shall think to prove that the injuries done us by the Mytilenæans are good for us, or that our calamities are any damage to our confederates. For certainly he must either trust in his eloquence, to make you believe that that which was decreed, was not decreed; or moved with lucre, must with some Edition: current; Page: elaborate speech endeavour to seduce you. Now of such matches [of eloquence] as these, the city giveth the prizes to others; but the danger that hence proceedeth, she herself sustaineth. And of all this you yourselves are the cause, by the evil institution of these matches, in that you use to be spectators of words, and hearers of actions; beholding future actions in the words of them that speak well, as possible to come to pass; and actions already past in the orations of such as make the most of them, and that with such assurance, as if what you saw with your eyes were not more certain than what you hear related1. You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech of a new strain, but backward to follow any tried advice; slaves to strange things, contemners of things usual. You2 would every one chiefly give the best advice, but if you cannot, then you will contradict those that do. You would not be thought to come after with your opinion; but rather if any thing be acutely spoken, to applaud it first, and to appear ready apprehenders of what is spoken, even before it be out; but slow to preconceive the sequel of the same. You would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our life is conversant in; and yet you sufficiently understand not that that is before your eyes. And to speak plainly, overcome with Edition: current; Page: the delight of the ear, you are rather like unto spectators sitting to hear the contentions of sophisters, than to men that deliberate of the state of a commonwealth. 39. To put you out of this humour, I say unto you, that the Mytilenæans have done us more injury than ever did any one city. For those that have revolted through the over–hard pressure of our government, or that have been compelled to it by the enemy, I pardon them. But they that were islanders and had their city walled, so as they needed not fear our enemies but only by sea; in which case also they were armed for them with sufficient provision of galleys; and they that were permitted to have their own laws and whom we principally honoured, and yet have done thus; what have they done but conspired against us, and rather warred upon us than revolted from us, (for a revolt is only of such as suffer violence), and joined with our bitterest enemies to destroy us? This is far worse than if they had warred against us for increasing of their own power1. But these men would neither take example by their neighbour’s calamity, who are, all that revolted, already subdued by us; nor could their own present felicity make them afraid of changing it into misery: but being bold against future events, and aiming at matters above their strength, though below their desires, have taken arms against us, and preferred force before justice. For no sooner they thought they might get the victory, but immediately, though without injury done them, they rose against us. But with cities that come to great and unexpected Edition: current; Page: prosperity, it is usual to turn insolent: whereas most commonly that prosperity which is attained according to the course of reason, is more firm than that which cometh unhoped for; and such cities1, as one may say, do more easily keep off an adverse, than maintain a happy fortune. Indeed we should not formerly have done any honour more to the Mytilenæans than to the rest of our confederates; for then they had never come to this degree of insolence. For it is natural to men to contemn those that observe them, and to have in admiration such as will not give them way. Now therefore let them be punished according to their wicked dealing; and let not the fault be laid upon a few, and the people be absolved. For2 they have all alike taken arms against us: and the commons, if they had been constrained to it, might have fled hither, and have recovered their city afterwards again. But they, esteeming it the safer adventure to join with the few, are alike with them culpable of the revolt. Have also in consideration your confederates: and if you inflict the same punishment on them that revolt upon compulsion of the enemy, that you do on them that revolt of their own accord, who, think you, will not revolt, though on light pretence; seeing that speeding they win their liberty, and failing their case is not incurable? Besides, that against every city we must be at a new hazard, both of our persons and fortunes. Wherein with the best success, we recover but an exhausted city, and lose that wherein our strength Edition: current; Page: lieth, the revenue of it; but miscarrying, we add these enemies to our former, and must spend that time in warring against our own confederates, which we needed to employ against the enemies we have already.
40. “We must not therefore give our confederates hope of pardon, either impetrable by words or purchaseable by money, as if1 their errors were but such as are commonly incident to humanity. For these did us not an injury unwillingly, but wittingly conspired against us; whereas it ought to be involuntary whatsoever is pardonable. Therefore both then at first, and now again I maintain, that you ought not to alter your former decree, nor to offend in any of these three most disadvantageous things to empire, pity, delight in plausible speeches, and lenity. As for pity, it is just to show it on them that are like us, and will have pity again; but not upon such as not only would not have had pity upon us, but must also of necessity have been2 our enemies for ever hereafter. And for the rhetoricians that delight you with their orations, let them play their prizes in matters of less weight, and not in such wherein the city for a little pleasure must suffer a great damage, but they for their well speaking must well have3. Lastly for lenity, it is to be used towards those that will be our friends hereafter, rather than towards such, as4 being Edition: current; Page: suffered to live, will still be as they are, not a jot the less our enemies. In sum I say only this, that if you follow my advice, you shall do that which is both just in respect of the Mytilenæans, and profitable for yourselves: whereas if you decree otherwise, you do not gratify them, but condemn yourselves. For if these have justly revolted, you must unjustly have had dominion over them. Nay1 though your dominion be against reason, yet if you resolve to hold it, you must also, as a matter conducing thereunto, against reason punish them; or else you must give your dominion over, that you may be good without danger. But if you consider what was likely they would have done to you, if they had prevailed, you cannot but think them worthy the same punishment; nor be less sensible, you that have escaped, than they that have conspired; especially they having done the injury first. For such as do an injury without precedent cause, persecute most, and even to the death, him they have done it to; as jealous of the danger his remaining enemy may create him: for he that is wronged without cause, and escapeth, will commonly be more cruel than if it were against any enemy on equal quarrel. Let us not therefore betray ourselves, but in contemplation2 of what you were near suffering, and how you once prized above all things else to have them in your power, requite them now accordingly. Be not softened at the sight of their present estate, nor forget the danger that hung over our own heads so lately. Edition: current; Page:  Give not only unto these their deserved punishment, but also unto the rest of our confederates a clear example, that death is their sentence whensoever they shall rebel. Which when they know, you shall the less often have occasion to neglect your enemies, and fight against your own confederates.”
41. To this purpose spake Cleon. After him Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who also in the former assembly opposed most the putting of the Mytilenæans to death, stood forth and spake as followeth.
42. “I will neither blame those who have propounded the business of the Mytilenæans to be again debated, nor commend those that find fault with often consulting in affairs of great importance. But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good counsel as these two, haste and anger: whereof the one is ever accompanied with madness, and the other with want of judgment1. And whosoever maintaineth that words are not instructors to deeds, either he is not wise, or doth it upon some private interest of his own. Not wise, if he think that future, and not apparent things, may be demonstrated otherwise than by words: interested, if desiring to carry an ill matter, and knowing that a bad cause will not bear a good speech, he go about to deter his opposers and hearers by a good calumniation. But they of all others are most intolerable, that2 when men give public advice, will accuse them also of bribery. For if they charged a man with no more but ignorance, Edition: current; Page: when he had spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the opinion of1 a fool. But when they impute corruption also, if his counsel take place he is still suspected; and if it do not take place, he shall be held not only a fool, but also void of honesty. The commonwealth gets no good by such courses: for through fear hereof it will want counsellors. And the state would do their business for the most part well, if this kind of citizens were they that had least ability in speaking; for they should then persuade the city to the fewer errors. For a good statesman should not go about to terrify those that contradict him, but2 rather to make good his counsel upon liberty of speech. And a wise state ought not either to add unto, or on the other side, to derogate from the honour of him that giveth good advice; nor3 yet punish, nay nor disgrace the man whose counsel they receive not. And then, neither would he that lighteth on good advice4, deliver anything against his own conscience, out of ambition of further honour and to please the auditory; nor he that doth not, covet thereupon, by gratifying the people some way or other, that he also may endear them5. 43. But we do here the contrary: and besides, if any man be suspected of corruption, though he give the best counsel that can be given, yet through envy, for this uncertain opinion of his gain, we lose a Edition: current; Page: certain benefit to the commonwealth. And our custom is to hold good counsel, given1 suddenly, no less suspect then bad: by which means, as he that gives the most dangerous counsel, must get the same received by fraud; so also he that gives the most sound advice, is forced by lying to get himself believed. So that the commonwealth is it alone, which by reason of these suspicious2 imaginations, no man can possibly benefit by the plain and open way without artifice. For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the commonwealth, he shall presently be suspected of some secret gain unto himself in particular. We therefore, that in the most important affairs and amidst3 these jealousies do give our advice, have need to foresee further than you, that look not far; and the rather, because we stand accountable for our counsel4, and you are to render no account of your hearing it. For if the persuader and the persuaded had equal harm, you would be the more moderate Edition: current; Page: judges. But now, according to the passion that takes you, when at any time your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that one only that gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own that were in fault as well as his.
44. “For my own part, I stood not forth with any purpose of contradiction in the business of the Mytilenæans, nor to accuse any man. For we contend not now, if we be wise, about the injury done by them, but about the wisest counsel for ourselves. For how great soever be their fault, yet I would never advise to have them put to death, unless it be for our profit; [nor yet would I pardon them1,] though they were pardonable, unless it be good for the commonwealth. And in my opinion, our deliberation now is of the future, rather than of the present. And whereas Cleon2 contendeth, that it will be profitable for the future, to put them to death, in that it will keep the rest from rebelling: I contending likewise for the future3, affirm the contrary. And I desire you not to reject the profit of my advice for the fair pretexts of his; which4 agreeing more with your present anger against the Mytilenæans, may quickly perhaps win your consent. We plead not judicially with the Mytilenæans so as to need arguments of equity, but we consult of them, which way we may serve ourselves of them to our Edition: current; Page: most advantage hereafter. 45. I say therefore, that death hath been in states ordained for a punishment of many offences, and those not so great, but far less than this. Yet encouraged by hope, men hazard themselves: nor did any man ever yet enter into a practice, which he knew he could not go through with. And a city when it revolteth, supposeth itself to be better furnished, either of themselves or by their confederates, than it is, or else it would never take the enterprise in hand. They have it by nature, both men and cities, to commit offences; nor is there any law that can prevent it. For men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augmenting1 them still, in hope to be less annoyed by malefactors. And it is likely that gentler punishments were inflicted of old, even upon the most heinous crimes; but that in tract of time, men continuing to transgress, they were extended afterwards to the taking away of life; and yet they still transgress. And therefore either some greater terror than death must be devised, or death will not be enough for coercion. For poverty will always add boldness to necessity; and wealth, covetousness to pride and contempt. And the other [middle] fortunes, they also through human passion, according as they are severally subject to some insuperable one or other, impel men to danger. But hope and desire2 work this effect in all estates. And this as the leader, that Edition: current; Page: as the companion; this contriving the enterprize, that suggesting the success, are the cause of most crimes that are committed: and being least discerned, are more mischievous than evils seen. Besides these two, fortune also puts men forward as much as anything else1. For presenting herself sometimes unlooked for, she provoketh some to adventure, though not provided as they ought for the purpose; and specially cities, because they venture for the greatest matters, as liberty and dominion over others; and amongst a generality, every one, though without reason, somewhat the more magnifies himself in particular2. In a word, it is a thing impossible, and of great simplicity to believe, when human nature is earnestly bent to do a thing, that by force of law or any other danger it can be diverted.
46. “We must not therefore, relying on the security of capital punishment, decree the worst3 against them, nor make them desperate, as if there were no place to repent, and as soon as they can, to cancel their offence. For observe: if a city revolted should know it could not hold out, it would now compound, whilst it were able both to pay us our charges for the present and our tribute for the time to come. But the way that Cleon prescribeth, what city, think you, would not provide itself better than this did; and endure the siege to the very last, if to compound late and soon be all one? And how can it be but detriment Edition: current; Page: to us, to be at charge of long sieges through their obstinacy, and when we have taken a city, to find it exhausted, and to lose the revenue of it for the future? And this revenue is the only strength we have against our enemies. We are not then to be1 exact judges in the punition of offenders, but to look rather how by their moderate punishment we may have our confederate cities, such as they may be able to pay us tribute; and not think to keep them in awe by the rigour of laws, but by the providence of our own actions. But we to the contrary, when we recover a city, which having been free and held under our obedience by force hath revolted justly2, think now that we ought to inflict some cruel punishment upon them. Whereas we ought rather, not mightily to punish a free city revolted, but mightily to look to it before it revolt, and to prevent the intention of it; but3 when we have overcome them, to lay the fault upon as few as we can. 47. Consider also, if you follow the advice of Cleon, how much you shall offend likewise in this other point. For in all your4 cities the commonalty are now your friends, and either revolt not with the few, or if they be compelled to it by force, they presently turn enemies to them that caused the revolt: whereby when you go to war, you have the commons of the adverse city on your side. But if you shall destroy the commonalty of the Mytilenæans, which did neither partake of the revolt, and as soon as they were armed presently delivered Edition: current; Page: the city into your hands: you shall first do unjustly, to kill such as have done you service; and you shall effect a work besides, which the great men do everywhere most desire. For when they have made a city to revolt, they shall have the people presently on their side; you having foreshewn them by the example, that both the guilty and not guilty must undergo the same punishment. Whereas indeed though they were guilty, yet we ought to dissemble it; to the end that the only party now our friend, may not become our enemy. And for the assuring of our dominion, I think it far more profitable voluntarily to put up an injury, than justly to destroy such as we should not. And that same both justice and profit of revenge, alleged by Cleon, can never possibly be found together in the1 same thing.
48. “You therefore, upon knowledge that this is the best course, not upon compassion or lenity, (for neither would I have you won by that), but upon consideration of what hath been advised, be ruled by me, and proceed to judgment at your own leisure against those whom Paches hath sent hither as guilty, and suffer the rest to enjoy their city. For that will be both good for the future, and also of present terror to the enemy. For he that consulteth wisely, is a sorer enemy than he that assaulteth with the strength of action unadvisedly.”
49. Thus spake Diodotus. After these two opinions were delivered, the one most opposite to the other, the Athenians were2 at contention which Edition: current; Page: they should decree; and at the holding up of hands they were both sides almost equal: but yet the sentence of Diodotus prevailed. Whereupon they presently in haste sent away another galley, lest not arriving before the former1 they should find the city already destroyed. The first galley set forth before the second a day and a night. But the Mytilenæan ambassadors having furnished this latter with wine and barley cakes, and promised them great rewards if they overtook the other galley, they rowed diligently, at one and the same time both plying their oars, and taking their refection of the said barley cakes steeped in wine and oil; and by turns part of them slept2, and the other part rowed. It happened also that there blew no wind against them; and the former galley making no great haste, as going on so sad an errand, whereas the former proceeded3 in the manner before mentioned, arrived indeed first, but only so much as Paches had read the sentence, and prepared4 to execute what they had decreed. But presently after came in the other galley, and saved the city from being destroyed. So near were the Mytilenæans to the danger.
50. But those whom Paches had sent home as most culpable of the revolt, the Athenians, as Cleon had advised, put to death; being in number somewhat above a thousand. They also razed the walls of Mytilene, and took from them all their Edition: current; Page: galleys. After which they imposed on the Lesbians no more tribute, but having divided their land (all but that of the Methymnæans) into three thousand parts, three hundred of those parts [of the choicest land] they consecrated to the gods1. And for the rest, they sent men by lot out of their own city to possess it; of whom the Lesbians at the rent of two minæ of silver yearly upon a lot, had the land again to be husbanded by themselves. The Athenians took in all such towns2 also, as the Mytilenæans were masters of in the continent; which were afterwards made subjects to the people of Athens. Thus ended the business touching Lesbos.
51. The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made war on Minoa, an island adjacent to Megara. For the Megareans had built a tower in it, and served themselves of the island for a place of garrison. But Nicias desired that the Athenians might keep their watch upon Megara in that island, as being nearer, and Edition: current; Page: no more at Budorum and Salamis; to the end that the Peloponnesians might not go out thence with their galleys undescried, nor send out pirates, as they had formerly done, and to prohibit the importation of all things to the Megareans by sea. Wherefore when he had first taken two towers that stood out from Nisæa1, with engines applied from the sea, and so made a free entrance for his galleys between the island and the firm land, he took it in with a wall also from the continent, in that part where it might receive aid by a bridge over the marshes; for it was not far distant from the main land. And, that being in few days finished, he built a fort in the island itself, and leaving there a garrison, carried the rest of his army back.
52. It happened also about the same time of this summer, that the Platæans, having spent their victual and being unable longer to hold out, yielded their city in this manner to the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but they within were unable to fight. Whereupon the Lacedæmonian commander, perceiving their weakness, would not take the place by force; (for he had command to that purpose from Lacedæmon, to the end that if they should ever make peace with the Athenians, with conditions of mutual restitution Edition: current; Page: of such cities as on either side had been taken by war, Platæa, as having come in of its own accord, might not be thereby recoverable); but sent a herald to them, who demanded1 whether or no they would give up their city voluntarily into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, and take them for their judges, with power to punish the offenders, but none without form of justice. So said the herald: and they (for they were now at the weakest) delivered up the city accordingly. So the Peloponnesians gave the Platæans food for certain days, till the judges, which were five, should arrive2 from Lacedæmon. And when they were come, no accusation was exhibited; but calling them man by man, they asked of every one only this question: whether they had done to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in this war any good service. But the Platæans having sued to make their answer more at large, and having appointed Astymachus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon3 the son of Aeimnestus (who had been heretofore the host of the Lacedæmonians) for their speakers, said as followeth:
53. “Men of Lacedæmon, relying upon you we Edition: current; Page: yielded up our city, not expecting to undergo this, but some more legal manner of proceeding; and we agreed not to stand to the judgment of others, (as now we do1), but of yourselves only; conceiving we should so obtain the better justice. But now we fear we have been deceived in both. For we have reason to suspect, both that the trial is capital, and you the judges partial: gathering so much both from that, that there hath not been presented any accusation to which we might answer2; and also from this, that the interrogatory is short, and such, as if we answer to it with truth, we shall speak against ourselves, and be easily convinced, if we lie. But since we are on all hands in a strait, we are forced (and it seems our safest way) to try3 what we can obtain by pleading. For, for men in our case, the speech not spoken may give occasion to some to think, that spoken it had preserved us. But besides other inconveniences, the means also of persuasion go ill on our side. For if we had not known one another, we might have helped ourselves by producing testimony in things you knew not. Whereas now, all that we shall say, will be before men that know already what it is. And we fear, not that you mean, because you know us inferior in virtue to yourselves4, to make that a crime; but lest you bring Edition: current; Page: us to a judgment already judged, to gratify somebody else. 54. Nevertheless, we will produce our reasons of equity against the quarrel of the Thebans, and withal make mention of our services done both to you and to the rest of Greece; and make trial, if by any means we can persuade you. As to that short interrogatory, whether we have any way done good in this present war to the Lacedæmonians aud their confederates, or not: if you ask us as enemies, we say, that if we have done them no good, we have also done them no wrong: if you ask us as friends, then we say, that they rather have done us the injury, in that they made war upon us1. But in the time of the peace, and in the war against the Medes, we behaved ourselves well: for the one we brake2 not first, and in the other, we were the only Bœotians that joined with you for the delivery of Greece. For though we dwell up in the land, yet we fought by sea at Artemisium; and in the battle fought in this our own territory, we were with you3; and whatsoever dangers the Grecians in those times underwent, we were partakers of all, even beyond our strength. And unto you, Lacedæmonians, in particular, when Sparta was in greatest affright after the earthquake, Edition: current; Page: upon the rebellion of the Helotes and seizing of Ithome1, we sent the third part of our power to assist you; which you have no reason to forget. 55. Such then we showed ourselves in those ancient and most important affairs. It is true, we have been your enemies since; but for that, you are to blame yourselves. For when oppressed by the Thebans we sought league of you, you rejected us; and bade us go to the Athenians that were nearer hand, yourselves being far off2. Nevertheless, you neither have in this war, nor were to have suffered at our hands any thing that misbecame us. And if we denied to revolt from the Athenians when you bade us, we did you no injury in it. For they both aided us against the Thebans, when you shrunk from us; and it was now no more any honesty to betray them; especially having been well used by them, and we ourselves having sought their league, and being made denizens3 also of their city. Nay, Edition: current; Page: we ought rather to have followed them in all their commands with alacrity. When you or the Athenians have the leading of the confederates, if evil be done, not they that follow are culpable, but you that lead to the evil.
56. “The Thebans have done us many other injuries; but this last, which is the cause of what we now suffer, you yourselves know what it was. For we avenged us but justly of those that in time of peace, and upon the day of our novilunial sacrifice, had surprised our city; and by the law of all nations it is lawful to repel an assailing enemy; and therefore there is no reason you should punish us now for them. For if you shall measure justice by your and their present benefit in the war1, it will Edition: current; Page: manifestly appear, that you are not judges of the truth, but respecters only of your profit. And yet if the Thebans seem profitable to you now, we and the rest of the Grecians were more1 profitable to you then, when you were in greater danger. For though the Thebans are now on your side, when you invade others; yet at that time when the barbarian came in to impose servitude on all, they were on his. It is but justice, that with our present offence (if we have committed any) you compare our forwardness then; which you will find both greater than our fault, and augmented also by the circumstance of such a season, when it was rare to find any Grecian that durst oppose his valour to Xerxes’ power; and when they were most commended, not that with safety helped to further his invasion2, but that adventured to do what was most honest, though with danger. But we being of that number, and honoured for it amongst the first, are afraid lest the same shall be now a cause of our destruction; as having chosen rather to follow the Athenians justly, than you profitably. But you should ever have the same opinion in the same case; and think this only to be profitable, that doing what is useful for the present occasion, you reserve withal a constant acknowledgment of the virtue of your good confederates. 57. Consider also, that you are an example of honest dealing to the most of the Grecians. Now if you shall decree otherwise than is just, (for3 this judgment of yours Edition: current; Page: is conspicuous, you that be praised, against us that be not blamed), take heed that they do not dislike that good men should undergo an unjust sentence, though at the hands of better men; or that the spoil of us that have done the Grecians service, should be dedicated in their temples. For it will be thought a horrible matter, that Platæa should be destroyed by Lacedæmonians; and that you, whereas your fathers in honour of our valour inscribed the name of our city on the tripod at Delphi, should now blot it out1 of all Greece, to gratify the Thebans. For we have proceeded to such a degree of calamity, that if the Medes had prevailed, we must have2 perished then; and now the Thebans have overcome us again in you, who were before our greatest friends; and have put us to two great hazards, one before, of famishing if we yielded not, and another now, of a capital sentence. And we Platæans, who even beyond our strength have been zealous in the defence of the Grecians, are now abandoned and left unrelieved by them all. 58. But3 we beseech you for those gods’ sakes, in whose names once we made mutual league, and for our valour’s sake shown in the behalf of the Grecians, to be moved towards us; and, if at the persuasion of the Thebans you have determined aught against us, to change your minds, and reciprocally Edition: current; Page: to require at the hands of the Thebans this courtesy, that whom you ought to spare, they would be contented not to kill, and so receive an honest benefit in recompense of a wicked one; and not to bestow pleasure upon others, and receive wickedness1 upon yourselves in exchange. For though to take away our lives be a matter quickly done, yet to make the infamy of it cease will be work enough. For being none of your enemies, but well–willers, and such as have entered into the war upon constraint, you cannot put us to death with justice. Therefore if you will judge uncorruptly, you ought to secure our persons; and to remember that you received us by our own voluntary submission, and with hands upheld, (and it is the law among Grecians, not to put such to death), besides that we have from time to time2 been beneficial to you. For look upon the sepulchres of your fathers, whom, slain by the Medes and buried in this territory of ours, we have yearly honoured at the public charge both with vestments3 and other rites, and of such things as our land hath produced, we have offered unto them the first fruits of it all, as friends in an amicable land, and confederates, use to do to those that have formerly been their fellows in arms. But now by a wrong sentence, you shall do the contrary of this. For consider this. Pausanias, as he thought, interred these men in amicable ground, and amongst their friends. But you, if you slay us, and of Platæis make Thebais, what do you but leave your Edition: current; Page: fathers and kindred, deprived of the honours they now have, in an hostile territory and amongst the very men that slew them? And moreover, put into servitude that soil whereon the Grecians were put into liberty? And make desolate the temples wherein they prayed when they prevailed against the Medes? And destroy the patrial sacrifices which were instituted by the builders and founders of the same?
59. “These things are not for your glory, men of Lacedæmon; nor to violate the common institutions of Greece and wrong your progenitors, nor to destroy us that have done you service for the hatred of another, when you have received no injury from us yourselves: but to spare our lives, to relent, to have a moderate compassion, in contemplation not only of the greatness of the punishment, but also of who we are that must suffer, and of the uncertainty where calamity may light, and that undeservedly. Which we1, as becometh us and our need compelleth us to do, cry aloud unto the common gods of Greece to persuade you unto; producing the oath sworn by your fathers, to put you in mind; and also we become here sanctuary men at the sepulchres of your fathers, crying out upon the dead, not to suffer themselves to be in the power of the Thebans, nor to let their greatest friends be Edition: current; Page: betrayed into the hands of their greatest enemies; remembering them of that day, upon which though we have done glorious acts in their company, yet we are in danger at this day of most miserable suffering. But to make an end of speaking, (which is, as necessary, so most bitter to men in our case, because the hazard of our lives cometh so soon after), for a conclusion we say, that it was not to the Thebans that we rendered our city, (for we would rather have died of famine, the most base perdition of all other), but we came out on trust in you. And it is but justice, that if we cannot persuade you, you should set us again in the estate we were in, and let us undergo the danger at our own election. Also we require1 you, men of Lacedæmon, not only not to deliver us Platæans, who have been most zealous in the service of the Grecians, especially being sanctuary men, out of your own hands and your own trust into the hands of our most mortal enemies the Thebans, but also to be our saviours, and not to destroy us utterly, you that set at liberty all other Grecians.”
60. Thus spake the Platæans. But the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedæmonians might relent at their oration, stood forth and said, that since the Platæans had had the liberty of a longer speech, (which they thought they should not), than for answer to the question was necessary, they also desired to speak; and being commanded to say on, spake to this effect:
61. “If these men had answered briefly to the question, and not both turned against us with an Edition: current; Page: accusation, and also out of the purpose, and wherein they were not charged, made much apology and commendation of themselves in things unquestioned, we had never asked leave to speak. But as it is, we are to the one point to answer, and to confute the other, that neither the fault of us, nor their own reputation may do them good; but your sentence may be guided by hearing of the truth of both. The quarrel between us and them arose at first from this; that when we had built Platæa last1 of all the cities of Bœotia, together with some other places which, having driven out the promiscuous nations, we had then in our dominion, they would not (as was ordained at first) allow us to be their leaders, but being the only men of all the Bœotians that transgressed the common ordinance of the country2, when they should have been compelled to their duty they turned unto the Athenians, and Edition: current; Page: together with them did us many evils; for which they likewise suffered as many from us. 62. But when the barbarian invaded Greece, then, say they, that they of all the Bœotians only also medized not. And this is the thing wherein they both glory most themselves, and most detract from us. Now we confess they medized not; because also the Athenians did not. Nevertheless, when the Athenians afterwards invaded the rest of the Grecians, in the same kind then of all the Bœotians they only Atticized. But take now into your consideration withal, what form of government we were in both the one and the other, when we did this. For then had we our city governed, neither by an oligarchy with laws common to all, nor by a democracy; but the state was managed by a few with authority absolute, than which there is nothing more contrary to laws and moderation, nor more approaching unto tyranny. And these few, hoping yet further, if the Medes prevailed, to increase their own power, kept the people under and furthered the coming in of the barbarian. And so did the whole city, but it was not then master of itself; nor doth it deserve to be upbraided with what it did when they had no laws [but were at the will of others]. But when the Medes were gone and our city had laws1, consider now, when the Athenians attempted to subdue all Greece, and this territory of ours with the rest, wherein through sedition they had gotten many Edition: current; Page: places already, whether by giving them battle at Coroneia and defeating them, we delivered not Bœotia from servitude then, and do not also now with much zeal assist you in the asserting of the rest, and find not more horses and more provision of war than any of the confederates besides. And so much be spoken by way of apology to our medizing.
63. “And we will endeavour to prove now, that the Grecians have been rather wronged by you, and that you are more worthy of all manner of punishment. You became, you say, confederates and denizens of Athens, for to be righted against us. Against1 us then only the Athenians should have come with you, and not you with them have gone to the invasion of the rest; especially when if the Athenians would have led you whither you would not, you had the league of the Lacedæmonians made with you against the Medes, which you so often object, to have resorted unto; which was sufficient not only to have protected you from us, but, which is the main matter, to have secured you to take what course you had pleased. But voluntarily, and without constraint, you rather chose to follow the Athenians. And you say, it had been a dishonest thing to have betrayed your benefactors. But it is more dishonest, and more unjust by far, to betray the Grecians universally, to2 whom you have sworn, than to betray the Athenians alone; especially when these go about to deliver Greece from subjection, and the other to subdue it. Edition: current; Page: Besides, the requital you make the Athenians is not proportionable, nor free from dishonesty. For you, as you say yourselves, brought in the Athenians to right you against injuries; and you cooperate with them in injuring others. And howsoever, it is not so dishonest to leave a benefit unrequited, as to make such a requital, as though justly due cannot be justly done1. 64. But you have made it apparent, that even then it was not for the Grecians’ sake that you alone of all the Bœotians medized not, but because the Athenians did not; yet now you that would do as the Athenians did, and contrary to what the Grecians did, claim favour of these, for what you did for the others’ sake2. But there is no reason for that: but as you have chosen the Athenians, so let them help you in this trial. And produce not the oath3 of the former league, as if that should save you now. For you have relinquished it: and contrary to the same, have rather helped the Athenians to subdue the Æginetæ and others4, than hindered them from it. And this you not only did voluntarily, and having laws the same you have now, and none forcing you to it, as there did us; but also rejected our last invitation, a little before the shutting up of your city, to quietness and neutrality. Edition: current; Page:  Who can therefore more deservedly be hated of the Grecians in general, than you, that pretend honesty1 to their ruin? And those acts wherein formerly, as you say, you have been beneficial to the Grecians, you have now made apparent to be none of yours, and made true proof of what your own nature inclines you to. For with Athenians you have walked in the way of injustice. And thus much we have laid open touching our involuntary medizing, and your voluntary atticizing.
65. “And for this last injury you charge us with, namely, the unlawful invading of your city in time of peace and of your new–moon2 sacrifice, we do not think, no not in this action, that we have offended so much as you yourselves. For though we had done unjustly, if we had assaulted your city or wasted your territory as enemies, of our own accord; yet when the prime men of your own city, both for wealth and nobility, willing to discharge you of foreign league, and conform you to the common institutions3 of all Bœotia, did of their own accord call us in, wherein lieth the injury then? For they that lead transgress, rather than they that follow. But as we conceive, neither they nor we have transgressed at all. But being citizens as well as you, and having more to hazard, they opened their own gates and took us into the city as friends, not as enemies, with intention to keep the ill–affected Edition: current; Page: from being worse, and to do right to the good: taking upon them to be moderators of your councils; and not to deprive the city of your persons, but to reduce you into one body with the rest of your kindred; and not to engage you in hostility with any, but to settle you in peace with all. 66. And for an argument that we did not this as enemies; we did harm to no man, but proclaimed, that if any man were willing to have the city governed after the1 common form of all Bœotia, he should come to us. And you came willingly at first, and were quiet2. But afterwards, when you knew we were but few, though we might seem to have done somewhat more than was fit to do without the consent of your multitude, you did not by us as we did by you, first innovate nothing in fact, and then with words persuade us to go forth again; but contrary to the composition, assaulted us. And for those men you slew in the affray, we grieve not so much; for they suffered by a kind of law. But to kill those that held up their hands for mercy, whom taken alive you afterwards had promised to spare, was not this a horrible cruelty3? You committed in this business three crimes, one in the neck of another; first the breach of the composition, then the death that followed of our men, and thirdly the falsifying of your promise to save them, if we did no hurt to any thing of yours in the fields. And yet you say that we are the transgressors; and that you for your parts deserve not to undergo a judgment. But it is otherwise. And Edition: current; Page: if these men judge aright, you shall be punished now for all your1 crimes at once.
67. “We have herein, men of Lacedæmon, been thus large both for your sakes and ours: for yours, to let you see, that if you condemn them, it will be no injustice; for ours, that the equity of our revenge may the better appear. Be2 not moved with the recital of their virtues of old, if any they had; which though they ought to help the wronged, should double the punishment of such as commit wickedness, because their offence doth not become them. Nor let them fare ever the better for their lamentation or your compassion, when they cry out upon your fathers’ sepulchres and their own want of friends. For we on the other side affirm, that the youth of our city suffered harder measure from them: and their fathers, partly slain at Coroneia in bringing Bœotia to your confederation, and partly alive and now old and deprived of their children, make far juster supplication to you for revenge. And pity belongeth to such as suffer undeservedly; but on the contrary, when men are worthily punished, as these are, it is to be rejoiced at. And for their present want of friends, they may thank themselves. For of their own accord they rejected the better confederates. And the law hath been broken by them, without precedent wrong from us, in that they condemned our men spitefully rather than judicially; in which point we shall now come short of requiting them: for they shall suffer legally, and not, as they say they do, Edition: current; Page: with hands upheld from battle, but as men that have put themselves upon trial by consent. Maintain therefore, ye Lacedæmonians, the law of the Grecians against these men that have transgressed it; and give unto us, that have suffered contrary to the law, the just recompense of our alacrity in your service. And let not the words of these give us a repulse from you; but set up an example to the Grecians, by1 presenting [unto these men] a trial, not of words, but of facts; which, if they be good, a short narration of them will serve the turn; if ill, compt orations do but veil them. But if such as have the authority, as you have now, would collect the matter to a head, and according as any man should make answer thereunto, so proceed to sentence2, men would be less in the search of fair speeches, wherewith to excuse the foulness of their actions.”
68. Thus spake the Thebans. And the Lacedæmonian judges, conceiving their interrogatory to stand well, namely, whether they had received any benefit by them or not, in this present war: for they had indeed3 intreated them both at other times, according to the ancient league of Pausanias after the Medan war, to stand neutral; and also a little before the siege the Platæans had rejected their proposition, of being common friends to both sides according to the same league: taking themselves4, in respect of these their just offers, to be Edition: current; Page: now discharged of the league, and to have received evil at their hands, caused them one by one to be brought forth, and having asked them again the same question, whether they had any way benefited the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in this present war or not; as they answered Not, led them aside and slew them, not exempting any. Of the Platæans themselves they slew no less than two hundred; of the Athenians who were besieged with them, twenty–five. The women they made slaves; and the Thebans assigned the city for a year, or thereabouts, for a habitation to such Megareans as in sedition had been driven from their own, and to all those Platæans which, living, were of the Theban faction. But afterwards, pulling it all down to the very foundation, they built a hospital1 in the place, near the temple of Juno, of two hundred foot diameter, with chambers on every side in circle both above and below; using therein the roofs and doors of the Platæans’ buildings. And of the rest of the stuff that was in the city–wall, as brass and iron, they made bedsteads, and dedicated them to Juno; to whom also they built a stone chapel of a hundred foot over. The land they confiscated, and set it to farm afterwards for ten years to the Thebans. So far were the Lacedæmonians alienated from the Platæans, especially, or rather altogether for the Thebans’ sake2, whom they Edition: current; Page: thought useful to them in the war now on foot. So ended the business at Platæa, in the fourscore and thirteenth year after their league made with the Athenians.Edition: current; Page: 
69. The forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which having been sent to aid the Lesbians fled, as hath been related, through the wide sea, chased by the Athenians and tossed by storms on the coast of Crete, came thence dispersed into Peloponnesus: and found thirteen galleys, Leucadians and Ambraciotes, in the haven of Cyllene, with Brasidas the son of Tellis, come hither to be of council with Alcidas. For the Lacedæmonians, seeing they failed of Lesbos, determined with their fleet augmented to sail to Corcyra, which was in sedition; (there being but twelve Athenian galleys about Naupactus); to the end they might be there before the supply of a greater fleet should come from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas employed themselves in that.
70. The sedition in Corcyra began upon the coming home of those captives, which were taken in the battles by sea at Epidamnus, and released afterwards by the Corinthians, at the ransom, as was voiced, of eighty talents1, for which they had given security to their hosts; but in fact, for that they had persuaded the Corinthians, that they would put Corcyra into their power. These men Edition: current; Page: going from man to man, solicited1 the city to revolt from the Athenians. And two galleys being now come in, one of Athens, another of Corinth, with ambassadors from both those states, the Corcyræans upon audience of them both, decreed to hold the Athenians for their confederates on2 articles agreed on; but withal to remain friends to the Peloponnesians, as they had formerly been. There was one Peithias, voluntary host3 of the Athenians, and that had been principal magistrate of the people. Him these men called into judgment, and laid to his charge a practice to bring the city into the servitude of the Athenians. He again, being acquit, called in question five of the wealthiest of the same men, saying, they had cut certain stakes4 in the ground belonging to the temples both of Jupiter and of Alcinus; upon every of Edition: current; Page: which there lay a penalty of a stater1. And the cause going against them, they took sanctuary in the temples, to the end, the sum being great, they might pay it by portions [as they should be taxed]. But Peithias (for he was also of the senate) obtained that the law should proceed. These five being by the law excluded the senate2, and understanding that Peithias, as long as he was a senator, would cause the people to hold for friends and foes the same that were so to the Athenians, conspired with the rest3, and armed with daggers suddenly brake into the senate–house, and slew both Peithias and others, as well private men as senators, to the number of about sixty persons; only a few of those of Peithias his faction, escaped in the Athenian galley that lay yet in the harbour. 71. When they had done this, and called the Corcyræans to an assembly, they told them, that what they had done was for the best, and that they should not be now in bondage to the Athenians: and for the future they advised them to be in quiet, and to receive neither party with more than one galley at once, and to take them for enemies if they were more. And when they had spoken, forced them to decree it accordingly. They also presently sent ambassadors to Athens, both to show that it was fit for them to do4 what they had done, and also to dissuade such Corcyræans as were fled thither of the Edition: current; Page: other faction, from doing any thing to their prejudice, for fear the matter should fall into a relapse.
72. When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the ambassadors themselves, as seditious persons, and also all those Corcyræans whom they had there prevailed with; and sent them to custody in Ægina. In the meantime, upon the coming in of a galley of Corinth with ambassadors from Lacedæmon, those that managed the state assailed the commons, and overcame them in fight. And night coming on, the commons fled into the citadel and the higher parts of the city; where they rallied themselves and encamped, and made themselves masters of the haven called the Hillaique haven. But the nobility seized on the marketplace, (where also the most of them dwelt), and on the haven on the side toward the continent1. 73. The next day they skirmished a little with shot; and both parts sent abroad into the villages2 to solicit the slaves with promise of liberty, to take their parts. And the greatest part of the slaves took part with the commons; and the other side had an aid of eight hundred men from the continent. 74. The next day but one they fought again, and the people had the victory, having the odds both in strength of places and in number of men. And the women also manfully assisted them, throwing tiles from the houses, and enduring the tumult even beyond the condition of their sex. The few began to fly about twilight3, and fearing lest the people Edition: current; Page: should even with their shout1 take the arsenal, and so come on and put them to the sword, to stop their passage set fire on the houses in circle about the market–place and upon others near it. Much goods of merchants was hereby burnt, and the whole city, if the wind had risen and carried the flame that way, had been in danger to have been destroyed. When the people had gotten the victory, the Corinthian galley stole away; and most of the auxiliaries gat over privily into the continent.
75. The next day Nicostratus, the son of Diitrephes, an Athenian commander, came in with twelve galleys and five hundred Messenian men of arms from Naupactus; and both negociated a reconciliation, and induced them (to the end they might agree) to condemn ten of the principal authors of the sedition, (who presently fled), and to let the rest alone, with articles both between themselves and with the Athenians, to esteem friends and enemies the same the Athenians did. When he had done this, he would have been gone; but the2 people persuaded him before he went, to leave behind him five of his galleys, the better to keep their adversaries from stirring, and to take as many of Edition: current; Page: theirs, which they would man with Corcyræans and send with him. To this he agreed; and they made a list of those that should embark, consisting altogether of their enemies1. But these, fearing to be sent to Athens, took sanctuary in the temple of Castor and Pollux. But Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them, and spake to them to put them into courage2. But when he could not prevail, the people, arming themselves, on pretence that their diffidence to go along with Nicostratus proceeded from some evil intention, took away their arms out of their houses; and would also have killed some of them such as they chanced on, if Nicostratus had not hindered them. Others also when they saw this, took sanctuary in the temple of Juno; and they were in all above four hundred. But the people fearing some innovation, got them by persuasion to rise: and conveying them into the island that lieth over against the temple of Juno, sent them their necessaries thither.
76. The sedition standing in these terms, the fourth or fifth day after the putting over of these men into the island arrived the Peloponnesian fleet from Cyllene, where since their voyage of Ionia they had lain at anchor, to the number of three and fifty sail. Alcidas had the command of these, as before; and Brasidas came with him as a counsellor. And having first put in at Sybota, a haven of the continent, they came on the next morning by break of day toward Corcyra. 77. The Corcyræans, being in great tumult and fear both of the seditious Edition: current; Page: within and of the invasion without, made ready threescore galleys; and still as any of them were manned, sent them out against the enemy: whereas the Athenians had advised them to give leave to them to go forth first, and then the Corcyræans to follow after with the whole fleet together. When their galleys came forth thus thin, two of them presently turned to the enemy; and in others, they that were aboard were together by the ears amongst themselves: and nothing was done in due order. The Peloponnesians seeing their confusion, opposed themselves to the Corcyræans with twenty galleys only; the rest they set in array against the twelve galleys of Athens, whereof the Salaminia and the Paralus were two. 78. The Corcyræans having come disorderly up, and by few at once, were on their1 part in much distress; but the Athenians, fearing the enemy’s number, and doubting to be environed, would never come up to charge the enemy where they stood thick, nor would set upon the galleys that were placed in the midst, but charged one end of them, and drowned one of their galleys. And when the Peloponnesians afterwards had put their fleet into a circular figure, they then went about and about it, endeavouring to put them into disorder. Which they that were fighting against the Corcyræans perceiving, and fearing such another chance as befel them formerly at Naupactus, went to their aid; and uniting themselves, came upon the Athenians all together. But they retiring rowed astern, intending that the Edition: current; Page: Corcyræans should take that time to escape in; they themselves in the meantime going as leisurely back as was possible, and keeping the enemy still a–head. Such was this battle, and it ended about sunset.
79. The Corcyræans, fearing lest the enemy in pursuit of their victory should have come directly against the city, or take aboard the men which they had put over into the island, or do them some other mischief, fetched back the men into the temple of Juno again, and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the battle, yet durst not invade the city; but having taken thirteen of the Corcyræan galleys, went back into the continent from whence they had set forth. The next day they came not unto the city, no more than before, although it was in great tumult and affright, and though also Brasidas (as it is reported) advised Alcidas to it, but had not equal authority; but only landed soldiers at the promontory of Leucimna, and wasted their territory.
80. In the meantime the people of Corcyra, fearing extremely lest those galleys should come against the city, not only conferred with those in sanctuary and with the rest, about how the city might be preserved, but also induced some of them to go aboard. For notwithstanding the sedition they manned thirty galleys, in expectation that the fleet of the enemy should have entered1. But the Peloponnesians, having been wasting of their fields till it was about noon, went their ways again. Within2 Edition: current; Page: night the Corcyræans had notice by fires of threescore Athenian galleys coming toward them from Leucas; which the Athenians, upon intelligence of the sedition and of the fleet to go to Corcyra under Alcidas, had sent to aid them, under the conduct of Eurymedon the son of Thucles. 81. The Peloponnesians therefore, as soon as night came, sailed speedily home, keeping still the shore, and causing their galleys to be carried over at the isthmus of Leucas1, that they might not come in sight as they went about. But the people of Corcyra hearing of the Attic galleys coming in, and the going off of the Peloponnesians, brought into the city those Messenians2 which before were without, and appointing the galleys which they had furnished, to come about into the Hillaique haven, whilst accordingly they went about, slew all the contrary faction they could lay hands on; and also afterwards threw overboard, out of the same galleys, all those they had before persuaded to embark, and so went thence3. And coming to the temple of Juno, they persuaded fifty of those that had taken sanctuary, to refer themselves to a legal trial; all which they condemned to die. But the most of the sanctuary men, that is, all those that were not induced to stand to trial by law, when they saw what was Edition: current; Page: done, killed one another there–right in the temple; some hanged themselves on trees, every one as he had means made himself away1. And for seven days together that Eurymedon stayed there with his sixty galleys, the Corcyræans did nothing but kill such of their city as they took to be their enemies; laying2 to their charge a practice to have everted the popular government. Amongst whom, some were slain upon private hatred, and some by their debtors, for the money which they had lent them. All forms of death were then seen; and (as in such cases it usually falls out) whatsoever had happened at any time, happened also then, and more3. For the father slew his son; men were dragged out of the temples, and then slain hard by; and some immured in the temple of Bacchus, died within it. So cruel was this sedition; and seemed so the more, because it was of these the first. 82. For afterwards all Greece, as a man may say, was in commotion; and quarrels arose everywhere between the patrons of the commons, that sought to bring in the Athenians, and the few, that desired to bring in the Lacedæmonians. Now in time of peace, they could have had no pretence, nor would have been so forward to call them in; but being war, and confederates to be had for either Edition: current; Page: party, both to hurt their enemies and strengthen themselves, such as desired alteration easily got them to come in1. And many and heinous things happened in the cities through this sedition, which though they have been before, and shall be ever as long as human nature is the same, yet2 they are more calm, and of different kinds, according to the several conjunctures. For in peace and prosperity, as well cities as private men are better minded, because they be not plunged into necessity of doing any thing against their will. But war, taking away the affluence of daily necessaries, is a most violent master, and conformeth most men’s passions to the present occasion. The cities therefore being3 now in sedition, and those that fell into it later having heard what had been done in the former, they far exceeded the same in newness of conceit, both for the art of assailing and for the strangeness of their revenges. The received value of names imposed for signification of things, was changed into arbitrary4. For inconsiderate boldness, was counted true–hearted5 manliness: provident deliberation, a handsome fear: modesty, the cloak of cowardice: to be wise in every thing, to be lazy in every thing. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. To re–advise for the better security, was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation. He Edition: current; Page: that was1 fierce, was always trusty; and he that contraried such a one, was suspected. He that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; but he that could smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous2 man than he. But he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other, was said to be a dissolver of society3, and one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it, was commended. To be kin to another, was not to be so near as to be of his society: because these were ready to undertake any thing, and not to dispute it. For these societies were not made upon prescribed laws of profit, but for rapine4, contrary to the laws established. And as for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by divine law, as by the communication of guilt. And what was well advised of their adversaries, they received with an eye to their actions, to see whether they were too strong for them or not, and not ingenuously5. To be revenged was in more request than never to have received injury. And for oaths (when any were) of reconcilement, being administered in the present for necessity, were of force to such as had otherwise no power; but upon opportunity, he that first durst6 thought his revenge Edition: current; Page: sweeter by the trust, than if he had taken the open way. For they did not only put to account the safeness of that course, but having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to themselves withal a mastery in point of wit. And dishonest men for the most part are sooner called able, than simple men honest1: and men are ashamed of this title, but take a pride in the other.
The cause of all this is2 desire of rule, out of avarice and ambition; and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding. For such as were of authority in the cities, both of the one and the other faction, preferring under decent titles, one the political equality of the multitude, the other the moderate aristocracy; though in words they seemed to be servants of the public, they made it in effect but the prize of their contention: and striving by whatsoever means to overcome, both ventured on most horrible outrages, and3 prosecuted their revenges still farther, without any regard of justice or the public good, but limiting them, each faction, by their own appetite: and stood ready, whether by unjust sentence, or with their own hands, when they should get power, to satisfy their present spite. So that neither side made account to have any thing the sooner done for religion [of an oath], but he was most commended, that could pass a business against the hair with a fair oration4. The neutrals of the city were Edition: current; Page: destroyed by both factions; partly because they would not side with them, and partly for envy that they should so escape.
83. Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind throughout all Greece by the occasion of their sedition. Sincerity1 (whereof there is much in a generous nature) was laughed down: and it was far the best course, to stand diffidently against each other, with their thoughts in battle array, which no speech was so powerful, nor oath terrible enough to disband. And being all of them, the more they considered, the more desperate of assurance, they rather contrived how to avoid a mischief than were able to rely on any man’s faith. And for the most part, such as had the least wit had the best success: for2 both their own defect, and the subtlety of their adversaries, putting them into a great fear to be overcome in words, or at least in pre–insidiation, by their enemies’ great craft, they therefore went roundly to work with them with deeds. Whereas the other, not caring though they were perceived, and thinking they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were thereby unprovided, and so the more easily slain3.Edition: current; Page: 
84. In1 Corcyra then were these evils for the most part committed first; and so were all other, which either such men as have been governed with pride rather than modesty by those on whom they take revenge, were like to commit in taking it; or which such men as stand upon their delivery from long poverty, out of covetousness, chiefly to have their neighbours’ goods, would contrary to justice give their voices to: or which men, not for covetousness, but assailing each other on equal terms, carried away with the unruliness of their anger Edition: current; Page: would cruelly and inexorably execute. And the common course of life being at that time confounded in the city, the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil, gotten now above the law, showed itself with delight to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice, and enemy to all superiority. Else they would never have preferred revenge before innocence, nor lucre (whensoever the envy of it was without power to do them hurt) before justice. And for the laws common to all men in such cases, (which, as long as they be in force, give hope to all that suffer injury), men desire not to leave them standing against the need a man in danger may have of them, but by their revenges on others to be beforehand in subverting them.
85. Such were the passions of the Corcyræans, first of all other Grecians, towards one another in the city: and Eurymedon and the Athenians departed with their galleys. Afterwards, such of the Corcyræans as had fled, (for there escaped about five hundred of them), having seized on the forts in the continent, impatronized themselves of their own territory on the other side, and from thence came over and robbed the islanders and did them much hurt; and there grew a great famine in the city. They likewise sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Corinth, concerning their reduction1; and when they could get nothing done, having gotten boats and some auxiliary soldiers, they passed, awhile after, to the number of about six hundred into the island. Where when they had set fire on their boats, that they might trust to nothing Edition: current; Page: but to make themselves masters of the field, they went up into the hill Istone; and having there fortified themselves with a wall, infested those within1, and were masters of the territory.
86. In the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty galleys into Sicily, under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus, and Charœadas the son of Euphiletus: for the Syracusians and the Leontines were now warring against each other. The2 confederates of the Syracusians were all the Doric cities, except the Camarinæans; which also in the beginning of this war were reckoned in the league of the Lacedæmonians, but had not yet aided them in the war. The confederates of the Leontines, were the Chalcidique cities together with Camarina. And in Italy, the Locrians were with the Syracusians; but the Rhegians, according to their consanguinity, took part with the Leontines. Now the confederates3 of the Leontines, in respect of their ancient alliance with the Athenians, as also for that they were Ionians, obtained of the Athenians to send them galleys; for that the Leontines were deprived by the Syracusians of the use Edition: current; Page: both of the land and sea. And so the people of Athens sent aid unto them, pretending propinquity, but intending both to hinder the transportation of corn from thence into Peloponnesus, and also to test the possibility of taking the states of Sicily into their own hands. These arriving at Rhegium in Italy, joined with the confederates and began the war. And so ended this summer.
88. The next winter, the sickness fell upon the Athenians again, (having indeed never totally left the city, though there was some intermission); and continued above a year after; but the former lasted two years: insomuch as nothing afflicted the Athenians, or impaired their strength more than it. For the number that died of it, of men of arms enrolled1 were no less than four thousand four hundred; and horsemen, three hundred; of the other multitude, innumerable. There happened also at the same time many earthquakes, both in Athens and Eubœa, and also amongst the Bœotians; and in Bœotia2, chiefly at Orchomenus.
88. The Athenians and Rhegians that were now in Sicily, made war the same winter on the islands called the islands of Æolus, with thirty galleys. For in summer, it was impossible to war upon them for the shallowness3 of the water. These islands Edition: current; Page: are inhabited by the Liparæans, who are a colony of the Cnidians, and dwell in one of the same islands, no great one, called Lipara; and thence they go forth and husband the rest, which are Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. The inhabitants of those places have an opinion, that in Hiera Vulcan exerciseth the craft of a smith. For it is seen to send forth abundance of fire in the day time, and of smoke in the night1. These islands are adjacent to the territory of the Siculi and Messanians, but were confederates of the Syracusians. When the Athenians had wasted their fields, and saw they would not come in, they put off again and went to Rhegium. And so ended this winter, and the fifth year of this war written by Thucydides.
89. The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates came as far as the isthmus, under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus, intending to have invaded Attica; but by reason of the many earthquakes that then happened they turned back, and the invasion proceeded not. About the same time, (Eubœa being then troubled with earthquakes), the sea came in at Orobiæ on the part which then was land, and being impetuous withal, overflowed most part of the city, whereof part it covered, and part it washed down, and made lower in the return2; so that it is now sea which before Edition: current; Page: was land. And the people, as many as could not prevent it by running up into the higher ground, perished. Another inundation like unto this happened in the isle of Atalanta, on the coast of Locris of the Opuntians, and carried away part of the Athenians’ fort there; and of two galleys that lay on dry land, it brake one in pieces. Also there happened at Peparethus a certain rising1 of the water, but it brake not in: and a part of the wall, the town–house, and some few houses besides, were overthrown by the earthquakes2. The cause of such inundation, for my part, I take to be this: that the earthquake, where it was very great, did there send off the sea; and the sea returning on a sudden, caused the water to come on with greater violence. And it seemeth unto me, that without an earthquake such an accident could never happen.
90. The same summer divers others, as they had several occasions, made war in Sicily: so also did the Sicilians amongst themselves, and the Athenians with their confederates. But I will make mention only of such most memorable things, as were done either by the confederates there with the Athenians, or against the Athenians by the enemy.
Charœades the Athenian general being slain by the Syracusians, Laches, who was now sole commander of the fleet, together with the confederates made war on Mylæ, a town belonging to Messana. There were in Mylæ two companies3 of Messanians in garrison, the which also laid a certain ambush for those that came up from the fleet. But the Edition: current; Page: Athenians and their confederates both put to flight those that were in ambush, with the slaughter of the most of them; and also assaulting their fortification, forced them on composition both to render the citadel, and to go along with them against Messana. After this, upon the approach of the Athenians and their confederates, the Messanians compounded likewise; and gave them hostages, and such other security as was requisite.
91. The same summer the Athenians sent thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, under the command of Demosthenes the son of Alkisthenes, and Proclus the son of Theodorus; and sixty galleys more with two thousand men of arms, commanded by Nicias the son of Niceratus, into Melos. For the Athenians, in respect that the Melians were islanders, and yet would neither be their subjects nor of their league, intended to subdue them. But when upon the wasting of their fields they still stood out, they departed from Melos, and sailed to Oropus in the opposite continent1. Being there arrived within night, the men of arms left the galleys, and marched presently by land to Tanagra in Bœotia. To which place, upon a sign given, the Athenians that were in the city of Athens came also forth with their whole forces, led by Hipponnicus the son of Callias, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, and joined with them; and pitching their camp, spent the day in wasting the territory of Tanagra, and lay there the night following. The next day, they defeated in battle such of the Tanagrians as came out against them, and also certain succours sent Edition: current; Page: them from Thebes; and when they had taken up the arms of those that were slain and erected a trophy, they returned back; the one part to Athens, the other to their fleet. And Nicias with his sixty galleys, having first sailed along the coast of Locris and wasted it, came home likewise.
92. About the same time, the Peloponnesians erected the colony of Heracleia in Trachinia, with this intention. The Melians in the whole contain these three parts: Paralians, Hierans, and Trachinians1. Of these the Trachinians being afflicted with war from the Œtæans their borderers, thought at first to have joined themselves to the Athenians; but fearing that they would not be faithful unto them, they sent to Lacedæmon; choosing for their ambassador Tisamenus. And the Dorians, who are the mother nation to the Lacedæmonians, sent their ambassadors likewise with him with the same requests: for they also were infested with war from the same Œtæans. Upon audience of these ambassadors the Lacedæmonians concluded to send out a colony, both intending the reparation of the injuries done to the Trachinians and to the Dorians; and conceiving withal, that the town would stand very commodiously for their war with the Athenians; inasmuch as they might thereby have a navy Edition: current; Page: ready, where the passage was but short, against Eubœa; and it would much further their conveyance of soldiers into Thrace. And they had their mind wholly bent to the building of the place.
First therefore they asked counsel of the oracle in Delphi1. And the oracle having bidden them do it, they sent inhabitants thither, both of their own people and of the neighbours about them2; and gave leave also to any that would, to go thither, out of the rest of Greece, save only to the Ionians, Achæans, and some few other nations. The conductors of the colony were three Lacedæmonians; Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. Who taking it in hand, built the city which is now called Heracleia, from the very foundation3; being distant from Thermopylæ forty furlongs, and from the sea twenty. Also they made houses for galleys to lie under4, beginning close to Thermopylæ against the very strait, to the end to have them the more defensible.
93. The Athenians, when5 this city was peopled, were at first afraid, and thought it to be set up especially against Eubœa; because from thence to Cenæum, a promontory of Eubœa, the passage is but short. But it fell out afterwards otherwise than they imagined; for they had no great harm by it: the reason whereof was this. That the Thessalians who had the towns of those parts in their power, and upon whose ground it was built6, Edition: current; Page: afflicted these new planters with a continual war, till they had worn them out: though they were many indeed in the beginning. For being the foundation of the Lacedæmonians, every one went thither boldly, conceiving the city to be an assured one. And1 chiefly the governors themselves sent hither from Lacedæmon, undid the business, and dispeopled the city by frighting most men away; for that they governed severely, and sometimes also unjustly: by which means their neighbours more easily prevailed against them.
94. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians stayed in Melos, those other Athenians that were in the thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, slew first certain garrison–soldiers in Ellomenus, a place of Leucadia, by ambushment. But afterwards with a greater fleet, and with the whole power of the Acarnanians; who followed the army, all (but the Œniades) that could bear arms; and with the Zacynthians, and Cephalonians, and fifteen galleys of the Corcyræans, made war against the city itself of Leucas. The Leucadians, though they saw their territory wasted by them, both without the isthmus and within, where the city of Leucas standeth and the temple of Apollo; yet they durst not stir, because the number of the enemy was so great. And the Acarnanians entreated Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to wall them up, conceiving that they might easily be expugned by a siege, and desiring to be rid of a city their continual enemy. But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians, that seeing so Edition: current; Page: great an army was together, it would be honourable for him to invade the Ætolians; principally, as being enemies to Naupactus: and that if these were subdued, the rest of the continent thereabouts would easily be added to the Athenian dominion. For they alleged, that though the nation of the Ætolians were great and warlike, yet their habitation was in villages unwalled, and those at great distances; and were but light–armed, and might therefore, with no great difficulty, be all subdued before they could unite themselves for defence. And they advised him to take in hand first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after them the Eurytanians; (which are the greatest part of Ætolia, of a most strange language, and that are reported to eat raw flesh1); for these being subdued, the rest would easily follow. 95. But he, induced by the Messenians, whom he favoured, but especially because he thought, without the forces Edition: current; Page: of the people of Athens, with the confederates1 only of the continent and with the Ætolians to invade Bœotia by land, going first through the Locri Ozolæ, and so to Cytinium of Doris, having Parnassus on the right hand till the descent thereof into the territory of the Phoceans; which people, for the friendship they ever bore to the Athenians, would, he thought, be willing to follow his army, and if not, might be forced; and upon the Phoceans bordereth Bœotia: putting off therefore with his whole army, against the minds of the Acarnanians, from Leucas, he sailed unto Solium by the shore. And there having communicated his conceit with the Acarnanians, when they would not approve of it because of his refusal to besiege Leucas, he himself with the rest of his army, Cephalonians2, Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenians the soldiers3 of his own fleet, (for the fifteen galleys of Corcyra were now gone away) warred on the Ætolians; having Œneon, a city of Locris, for the seat of his war. Now these Locrians called Ozolæ, were confederates of the Athenians; and were to Edition: current; Page: meet them with their whole power in the heart of the country. For being confiners on the Ætolians, and using the same manner of arming, it was thought it would be a matter of great utility in the war to have them in their army; for that they knew their manner of fight, and were acquainted with the country.
96. Having lain the night with his whole army in the temple of Jupiter Nemeius, (wherein the poet Hesiodus is reported by them that dwell thereabout to have died, foretold by an oracle, that he should die in Nemea), in the morning betimes he dislodged, and marched into Ætolia. The first day he took Potidania; the second day, Crocyleium; the third, Teichium. There he stayed, and sent the booty he had gotten to Eupalium in Locris. For he purposed, when he had subdued the rest, to invade the Ophionians afterwards (if they submitted not) in his return to Naupactus. But the Ætolians knew of this preparation when it was first resolved on. And afterwards, when the army was entered, they were1 united into a mighty army to make head: insomuch as that the farthest off of the Ophionians, that reach out to the Melian Gulf, the Bomians and Callians, came in with their aids.
97. The Messenians gave the same advice to Demosthenes that they had done before; and alleging that the conquest of the Ætolians would be but easy, willed him to march with all speed against Edition: current; Page: them, village after village, and not to stay till they were all united and in order of battle against him, but to attempt always the place which was next to hand. He, persuaded by them and confident of his fortune, because nothing had crossed him hitherto, without tarrying for the Locrians that should have come in with their aids, (for his greatest want was of darters light–armed), marched to Ægitium: which approaching1 he won by force, the men having fled secretly out, and encamped themselves on the hills above it: for it stood in a mountainous place, and about eighty furlongs from the sea. But the Ætolians (for by this time they were come with their forces to Ægitium) charged the Athenians and their confederates; and running down upon them, some one way and some another, from the hills, plied them with their darts. And when the army of the Athenians assaulted them, they retired; and when it retired, they assaulted. So that the fight, for a good while, was nothing but alternate chase and retreat; and the Athenians had the worst in both.
98. Nevertheless, as long as their archers had arrows, and were able to use them, (for the Ætolians, by reason they were not armed2, were put back still with the shot), they held out. But when upon the death of their captain the archers were dispersed, and the3 rest were also wearied, having a long time continued the said labour of pursuing and retiring, and the Ætolians continually afflicting them with their darts, they were forced at Edition: current; Page: length to fly; and lighting into hollows without issue, and into places they were not acquainted withal, were destroyed. For Chromon a Messenian, who was their guide for the ways, was slain. And the Ætolians pursuing them still with darts, slew many of them quickly whilst they fled, being swift of foot and without armour. But the most of them missing their way and entering into a wood which had no passage through, the Ætolians set it on fire and burnt it about them. All kinds of shifts to fly, and all kinds of destruction were that day in the army of the Athenians. Such as remained, with much ado got to the sea and to Œneon, a city of Locris, from whence they first set forth. There died very many of the confederates, and a hundred and twenty men of arms of the Athenians; that was their number, and all of them able men1: these men of the very best died in this war. Procles also was there slain, one of the generals. When they had received the bodies of their dead from the Ætolians under truce, and were gotten again to Naupactus, they returned with the fleet to Athens. But they left Demosthenes about Naupactus and those parts; because he was afraid of the Athenian people for the loss that had happened.
99. About the same time, the Athenians that were on the coast of Sicily, sailed unto Locris, and landing overcame such as made head; and took in Peripolium2, situate on the river Halex.
100. The same summer, the Ætolians having3 Edition: current; Page: sent their ambassadors, Tolophus an Ophionian, Boryades an Eurytanian, and Tisander an Apodotian, to Corinth and Lacedæmon, persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus: for that it harboured the Athenians against them. And the Lacedæmonians, towards the end of autumn, sent them three thousand men of arms of their confederates; of which five hundred were of Heracleia, the new–built city of Trachinia. The general of the army was Eurylochus a Spartan; with whom Macarius and Menedæus went also along, Spartans likewise. 101. When the army was assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locrians of Ozolæ, both because their way lay through them to Naupactus, and also because he desired to make them revolt from the Athenians. Of all the Locrians, the Amphissians co–operated with him most, as standing most in fear for the enmity of the Phoceans. And they first giving hostages, induced others who likewise were afraid of the coming in of the army, to do the like: the Myoneans first, being their neighbours; for this way is Locris of most difficult access: then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritæans, Chalæans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and the Œantheans. All these went with them to the war. The Olpæans gave them hostages, but followed not the army. But the Hyæans would give them no hostages, till they had taken a village of theirs called Polis.
102. When every thing was ready, and he had sent the hostages away to Cytinium in Doris, he marched with his army towards Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians. And as he marched, he took Œneon, a town of theirs, and Eupalium; Edition: current; Page: because they refused to yield unto him. When they were come into the territory of Naupactus, the Ætolians being there already to join with them, they wasted the fields about; and took the suburbs of the city, being unfortified. Then they went to Molycreium, a colony of the Corinthians, but subject to the people of Athens, and took that. Now Demosthenes the Athenian, (for ever since the Ætolian business he abode about Naupactus), having been pre–advertised of this army and being afraid to lose the city, went amongst the Acarnanians, and with much ado, because of his departure from before Leucas, persuaded them to relieve Naupactus; and they sent along with him in his galleys a thousand men of arms. Which entering, were the preservation of the city; for there was danger, the walls being of a great compass and the defendants few, that else they should not have been able to make them good1. Eurylochus and those that were with him, when they perceived that those forces were entered and that it was impossible to take the city by assault, departed thence, not into Peloponnesus, but to Æolis, now called Calydon, and to Pleuron2 and other places thereabouts, and also to Proschion in Ætolia. For the Ambraciotes coming to them, persuaded them to undertake, together with themselves, the enterprise against Argos and the rest of Amphilochia, and Acarnania; saying withal, that if they could overcome these, the rest of that continent would enter into the Edition: current; Page: league of the Lacedæmonians. Whereunto Eurylochus assented; and dismissing the Ætolians lay quiet in those parts with his army, till such time as the Ambraciotes being come with their forces before Argos he should have need to aid them. And so this summer ended.
103. The Athenians that were in Sicily, in the beginning of winter, together with the Grecians of their league, and as many of the Siculi, as having obeyed the Syracusans by force, or1 being their confederates before, had now revolted, warred jointly against Nessa, a town of Sicily, the citadel whereof was in the hands of the Syracusans. And they assaulted the same; but when they could not win it, they retired. In the retreat, the Syracusans that were in the citadel, sallied out upon the confederates that retired later than the Athenians; and charging, put a part of the army to flight, and killed not a few. After this, Laches and the Athenians landed2 some time at Locris; and overcame in battle by the river Caicinus about three hundred Locrians, who with Proxenus the son of Capaton came out to make resistance; and when they had stripped them of their arms, departed.
104. The same winter also the Athenians hallowed the isle of Delos, by the admonition indeed of a certain oracle. For Pisistratus also, the tyrant, hallowed the same before; not all, but only so much as was within the prospect of the temple. Edition: current; Page: But now they hallowed it all over in this manner. They took away all sepulchres whatsoever of such as had died there before; and for the future, made an edict that none should be suffered to die, nor any woman to bring forth child in the island; but [when they were near the time, either of the one or the other] they should be carried over into Rheneia. This Rheneia is so little a way distant from Delos, that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, who was once of great power by sea and had the dominion of the other islands, when he won Rheneia dedicated the same to Apollo of Delos, tying it unto Delos with a chain1. And now after the hallowing of it, the Athenians instituted the keeping, every fifth year, of the Delian games.
There had also in old time been great concourse in Delos, both of Ionians and of the islanders round about2. For they then came to see the games, with their wives and children, as the Ionians do now the games at Ephesus. There were likewise matches set of bodily exercise and of music; and the cities did severally set forth dances. Which things to have been so, is principally declared by Homer in these verses of his hymn to Apollo:
That there were also matches of music, and that men resorted thither to contend therein, he again maketh manifest in these verses of the same hymn. For after he hath spoken of the Delian dance of the women, he endeth their praise with these verses, wherein also he maketh mention of himself:
So much hath Homer witnessed touching the great meeting and solemnity celebrated of old in the isle of Delos. And the islanders and the Athenians, since that time, have continued still to send dancers along with their sacrificers2; but the games and Edition: current; Page: things of that kind were worn out, as is likely, by adversity: till now that the Athenians restored the games, and added the horse race, which was not before.
105. The same winter the Ambraciotes, according to their promise made to Eurylochus when they retained his army, made war upon Argos in Amphilochia with three thousand men of arms: and invading Argeia they took Olpæ, a strong fort on a hill by the sea–side, which the Acarnanians had fortified and used for the place of their common meetings for matters of justice, and is distant from the city of Argos, which stands also on the sea–side, about twenty–five furlongs. The Acarnanians, with part of their forces, came to relieve Argos; and with the rest they encamped in that part of Edition: current; Page: Amphilochia which is called Crenæ, to watch the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, that they might not pass through to the Ambraciotes without their knowledge; and sent to Demosthenes, who had been leader of the Athenians in the expedition against the Ætolians, to come to them and be their general. They sent also to the twenty Athenian galleys, that chanced to be then on the coast of Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Aristoteles the son of Timocrates, and Hierophon the son of Antimnestus. In like manner the Ambraciotes that were at Olpæ sent a messenger to the city of Ambracia, willing them to come to their aid with their whole power; as fearing that those with Eurylochus would not be able to pass by the Acarnanians, and so they should be either forced to fight Edition: current; Page: alone, or else have an unsafe retreat. 106. But the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, as soon as they understood that the Ambraciotes were come to Olpæ, dislodging from Proschion went with all speed to assist them: and passing over the river Achelöus, marched through Acarnania, which, by reason of the aids sent to Argos, was now disfurnished. On their right hand they had the city of Stratus, and that garrison; on the left, the rest of Acarnania. Having passed the territory of the Stratians, they marched through Phytia, and again by the utmost limits of Medeon; then through Limnæa; then they went into the territory of the Agræans, which are out of Acarnania, and their friends: and getting to the hill Thiamus, which is a desert hill, they marched over it, and came down into Argeia Edition: current; Page: when it was now night; and passing between the city of the Argives and the Arcarnanians that kept watch at [the] Wells, came unseen and joined with the Ambraciotes at Olpæ. 107. When they were altogether, they sat down about break of day at a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. And the Athenians not long after with their twenty galleys arrived in the Ambracian gulf, to the aid of the Argives: to whom also came Demosthenes, with two hundred Messenian men of arms and threescore Athenian archers. The galleys lay at sea, before the hill upon which the fort of Olpæ standeth. But the Acarnanians, and those few Amphilochians (for the greatest part of them the Ambraciotes kept back by force) that were come already together at Argos1, prepared themselves to give the enemy battle; and chose Demosthenes, with their own commanders, for general of the whole league. He, when he had brought them up near unto Olpæ, there encamped. There was between them a great hollow. And for five days together they stirred not; but the sixth day both sides put themselves into array for the battle. The army of the Peloponnesians reached a great way beyond the other, for indeed it was much greater2; but Demosthenes, fearing to be encompassed, placed an ambush in a certain hollow way and3 fit for such a purpose, of armed and unarmed soldiers, in all to the number of four hundred; which, in that Edition: current; Page: part where the number of the enemies overreached, should in the heat of the battle rise out of ambush and charge them on their backs. When the battles were in order on either side, they came to blows. Demosthenes, with the Messenians and those few Athenians that were there, stood in the right wing; and the Acarnanians (as they could one after another be put in order) and those Amphilochian darters which were present, made up the other1. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes were ranged promiscuously, except only the Mantineans, who stood together most of them2 in the left wing, but not in the utmost part of it; for Eurylochus and those that were with him made the extremity of the left wing, against Demosthenes and the Messenians. 108. When they were in fight, and that the Peloponnesians with that wing overreached and had encircled the right wing of their enemies, those Acarnanians that lay in ambush coming in at their backs, charged them and put them to flight: in such sort as they endured not the first brunt; and besides, caused the greatest part of the army through affright to run away3. For when they saw that part of it defeated which was with Eurylochus, which was the best of their army, they were a great deal the more afraid. And the Messenians that were in that part of the army with Demosthenes, pursuing them, dispatched the greatest part of the execution. But the Ambraciotes4 that Edition: current; Page: were in the right wing, on that part had the victory, and chased the enemy unto the city of Argos. But in their retreat, when they saw that the greatest part of the army was vanquished, the rest of the Acarnanians setting upon them, they had much ado to recover Olpæ in safety. And many of them were slain, whilst they ran into it out of array and in disorder; save only the Mantineans: for these made a more orderly retreat than any part of the army. And so this battle ended, having lasted till the evening.
109. The next day, Menedaius (Eurylochus and Macarius being now slain) taking the command upon him, and1 not finding how, if he stayed, he should be able to sustain a siege, wherein he should both be shut up by land and also with those Attic galleys by sea, or if he should depart, how he might do it safely, had speech with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian captains, both about a truce for his departure and for the receiving of the bodies of the slain. And they delivered unto them their dead; and having erected a trophy took up their own dead, which were about three hundred. But for their departure they would make no truce openly [nor] to all: but secretly Demosthenes with his Acarnanian fellow–commanders made a truce with the Mantineans, and with Menedaius and the rest of the Peloponnesian captains and men of most worth, to be gone as speedily as they could; with purpose to disguard the Ambraciotes and multitude of mercenary strangers, and withal Edition: current; Page: to use this as a means to bring the Peloponnesians into hatred with the Grecians of those parts, as men that had treacherously advanced their particular interest. Accordingly they took up their dead, and buried them as fast as they could1; and such as had leave, consulted secretly touching how to be gone.
110. Demosthenes and the Acarnanians had now intelligence that the Ambraciotes from the city of Ambracia, according to the message sent to them before from Olpæ [which was that they should bring their whole power through Amphilochia to their aid], were already on their march2 (ignorant of what had passed here) to join with those at Olpæ. And hereupon he sent a part of his army presently forth, to beset the ways with ambushment, and to pre–occupate all places of strength; and prepared withal to encounter3 with the rest of his army.
111. In the meantime, the Mantineans and such as had part in the truce, going out on pretence to gather potherbs and firewood, stole away by small numbers: and as they went, did indeed gather such things as they pretended to go forth for; but when they were gotten far from Olpæ, they went faster away. But the Ambraciotes and others that came forth in the same manner, but in greater troops4, seeing the others go quite away, were eager to be gone likewise, and ran outright, as desiring to overtake those that were gone before. The Acarnanians at first thought they had gone all without a truce Edition: current; Page: alike, and pursued the Peloponnesians: and threw darts at their own captains for forbidding them and for saying that they went away under truce, as thinking themselves betrayed. But at last they let go the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew the Ambraciotes only. And there was much contention and ignorance, of which was an Ambraciote and which a Peloponnesian. So they slew about two hundred of them; and the rest escaped into Agraïs, a bordering territory, where Salynthius, king of the Agræans and their friend, received them.
112. The Ambraciotes out of the city of Ambracia were come as far as Idomene. Idomene are two high hills; to the greater whereof, came first undiscovered that night they whom Demosthenes had sent afore from the camp, and seized it: but the Ambraciotes got first to the lesser, and there encamped the same night. Demosthenes after supper, in the twilight, marched forward with the rest of the army, one half whereof himself took with him for the assault of the camp, and the other half he sent about through the mountains of Amphilochia1. And the next morning before day, he invaded the Ambraciotes whilst they were yet in their lodgings and knew not what was the matter, but thought rather that they had been some of their own company. For Demosthenes had placed the Messenians on purpose in the foremost ranks, and Edition: current; Page: commanded them to speak unto them as they went in the Doric dialect, and to make the sentinels secure; especially, seeing their faces could not be discerned, for it was yet night. Wherefore they put the army of the Ambraciotes to flight at the first onset, and slew many upon the place: the rest fled as fast as they could towards the mountains. But the ways being beset, and the Amphilochians being well acquainted with their own territory and armed but lightly, against men in armour unacquainted and utterly ignorant which way to take; they lit into hollow ways and to the places forelaid with ambushes, and perished. And having been put to all manner of shifts for their lives, some fled towards the sea1; and when they saw the galleys of Athens sailing by the shore, (this accident concurring with their defeat), swam to them, and chose rather in their present fear, to be killed2 of those in the galleys, than by the barbarians and their most mortal enemies the Amphilochians. The Ambraciotes with this loss came home, a few of many, in safety to their city. And the Acarnanians, having taken the spoil of the dead and erected their trophies, returned unto Argos.
113. The next day there came a herald from those Ambraciotes which fled from Olpæ into Agraïs, to demand leave to carry away the bodies of those dead which were slain after the first battle, when without truce they went away together with the Mantineans, and with those that had truce. But when the herald saw the armours of those Ambraciotes that came from the city, he wondered Edition: current; Page: at the number: for he knew nothing of this last blow, but thought they had been armours of those with them. Then one asked him, what he wondered at, and how many he thought were slain: for he that asked him the question, thought, on the other side, that he had been a herald sent from those at Idomene. And he answered, about two hundred. Then he that asked, replied and said: “then these are not the armours of them1; but of above a thousand”.—“Then,” said he again, “they belong not to them that were in battle with us”. The other answered: “yes, if you fought yesterday in Idomene.”—“But we fought not yesterday at all, but the other day in our retreat.”—“But we yet fought yesterday with those Ambraciotes that came from the city to aid the rest.” When the herald heard that, and knew that the aid from the city was defeated, he burst out into Aimees: and astonished with the greatness of the present loss, forthwith went his way without his errand, and required the dead bodies no farther. For this loss was greater than, in the like number of days, happened to any one city of Greece in all this war. I have not written the number of the slain; because it was said to be such as is incredible for the quantity of the city. But this I know: that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, as Demosthenes and the Athenians would have had them, would have subdued Ambracia, they might have done it even with the shout of their voices. But they feared now, that if the Athenians possessed it, they would Edition: current; Page: prove more troublesome neighbours unto them than the other.
114. After this, having bestowed the third part of the spoils upon the Athenians, they distributed the other two parts according to the cities. The Athenians’ part was lost by sea. For those three hundred complete armours which are dedicated in the temples in Attica, were picked out for Demosthenes [himself]; and he brought them away with him. His return was withal the safer for this action, after his defeat in Ætolia. And the Athenians that were in the twenty galleys returned to Naupactus.
The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, when the Athenians and Demosthenes were gone, granted truce at the city of the Œniades to those Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians that were fled to Salynthius and the Agræans, to retire; the Œniades being gone over to Salynthius, and the Agræans likewise1. And for the future, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a league with the Ambraciotes for a hundred years, upon these conditions: “That neither the Ambraciotes with the Acarnanians should make war against the Peloponnesians; nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciotes against the Athenians: that they should give mutual aid to one another’s country: that the Ambraciotes should restore whatsoever towns or bordering fields2 they held of the Amphilochians: and that Edition: current; Page: they should at no time aid Anactorium, which was in hostility with the Acarnanians”. And upon this composition, the war ended. After this, the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hundred men of arms of their own city to Ambracia, under the conduct of Xenocleides the son of Euthycles; who with much difficulty passing through Epirus, at length arrived. Thus passed the business in Ambracia.
115. The same winter the Athenians that were in Sicily, invaded Himeræa by sea, aided by the Sicilians1 that invaded the skirts of the same by2 land. They sailed also to the islands of Æolus. Returning afterwards to Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, [with certain galleys], come to receive charge of the fleet commanded by Laches. For the Sicilian confederates had sent to Athens, and persuaded the people to assist them with a greater fleet. For though the Syracusans were masters by land, yet seeing they hindered them but with few galleys from the liberty of the sea, they3 made preparation, and were gathering together a fleet with intention to resist them. And the Athenians furnished out forty galleys to send into Sicily, conceiving that the war there would the sooner be at an end, and desiring withal to train their men in naval exercise. Therefore Pythodorus, one of the commanders, they sent presently away with a few of those galleys, and intended to send Sophocles the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, with the Edition: current; Page: greatest number afterwards. But Pythodorus having now the command of Laches his fleet, sailed in the end of winter unto a certain1 garrison of the Locrians which Laches had formerly taken; and overthrown in a battle there by the Locrians, retired.
116. The same spring, there issued a great stream of fire out of the mountain Ætna, as it had also done in former times; and burned part of the territory of the Catanæans, that dwell at the foot of Ætna, which is the highest mountain of all Sicily. From the last time that the fire brake out before, to this time, it is said to be fifty years. And2 it hath now broken out thrice in all, since Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. These were the things that came to pass this winter. And so ended the sixth year of this war written by Thucydides.
The Athenians take and fortify Pylus in Messenia.—The Lacedæmonians, to recover it, put over four hundred of their best men into the island Sphacteria: whom the Athenians, having overcome the Lacedæmonian fleet, do there besiege.—The Athenians and Syracusans fight in the Strait of Messana.—Cleon engageth himself rashly to take or kill the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria within twenty days: and by good fortune performeth it.—The sedition ceaseth in Corcyra.—Nicias invadeth Peloponnesus.—The Sicilians agreeing, take from the Athenians their pretence of sailing upon that coast with their fleet.—The Athenians take Nisæa, but fail of Megara.—The overthrow of the Athenians at Delium.—The cities on the confines of Thrace, upon the coming of Brasidas, revolt to the Lacedæmonians.—Truce for a year.—And this in three years more of the same war.
1. The spring following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten galleys of Syracuse and as many of Locris went to Messana in Sicily, called in by the citizens themselves, and took it; and Messana revolted from the Athenians. This was done by the practice chiefly of the Syracusans, that saw the place to be commodious for invasion1 of Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians, some time or other Edition: current; Page: hereafter making it the seat of their war, might come with greater forces into Sicily and invade them from thence; but partly also of the Locrians, as being in hostility with the Rhegians and desirous to make war upon them on both sides1. The Locrians had now also entered the lands of the Rhegians with their whole power; both because they would hinder them from assisting the Messanians, and because they were solicited thereunto by the banished men of Rhegium that were with them. For they of Rhegium had been long in sedition, and were unable for the present to2 give them battle: for which cause they the rather also now invaded them. And after they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their landforces; but their galleys lay still at the guard of Messana, and more were setting forth, to lie in the same harbour, to make the war on that side.
2. About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, invaded Attica; and there lay and wasted the country about. And the Athenians sent forty galleys into Sicily, the same which they had provided before for that purpose; and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived in Sicily before. To these they gave commandment also to take order, as they went by, for the state of those Corcyræans that were in the city, Edition: current; Page: and were pillaged by the outlaws in the mountain; and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take part with those in the mountain; who because there was a great famine in the city, thought they might easily be masters of that state. To Demosthenes also, who ever since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately, they gave authority, at his own request, to make use of the same galleys, if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.
3. As they sailed by the coast of Laconia, and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles hasted1 to Corcyra; but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylus, and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a tempest that then arose by chance. And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, alleging that he came with them for no other purpose, and showing how there was great store of timber and stone, and that the place itself was naturally strong, and desert, both it and a great deal of the country about. For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs, in the territory that, belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the Lacedæmonians Coryphasion. But they answered him, that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them in. But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other Edition: current; Page: places; because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same language the Lacedæmonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions thence, and be also faithful guardians of the place. 4. When he could not prevail, neither with the generals nor with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains1 of companies, he2 gave it over; till at last, the weather not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying idle a desire, occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of their own accord. And falling in hand with the work, they performed it, not with iron tools to hew stone, but picked out such stones as they thought good, and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. And for mortar, where it needed, for want of vessels they carried it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling; making all possible haste to prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to finish the most assailable parts before they came to succour it. For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature, and needed no fortifying at all.Edition: current; Page: 
5. The Lacedæmonians were [that day] celebrating a certain holiday, and when they heard the news, did set lightly by it; conceiving, that whensoever it should please them to go thither, they should find them either already gone, or easily take the place by force. Somewhat also they were retarded, by reason that their army was in Attica. The Athenians having in six days finished the wall to the land and in the places where was most need, left Demosthenes with five galleys to defend it, and with the rest hastened on in their course for Corcyra and Sicily. 6. The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were advertised of the taking of Pylus, returned speedily home: for the Lacedæmonians and Agis their king took this accident of Pylus to concern their own particular. And the invasion was withal so early, corn being yet green, that the most of them were scanted with victual. The army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder than for the season. So as for many reasons it fell out, that they returned sooner now than at other times they had done, and this invasion was the shortest: for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.
7. About the same time, Simonides an Athenian commander, having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons and a number of the confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendæans, that was their enemy, by treason: but was presently again driven out by the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, that came to succour it: and lost many of his soldiers.
8. When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta, and of other Edition: current; Page: the neighbouring towns1, went presently to the aid of Pylus; but [the rest of] the Lacedæmonians came slowlier on, as being newly come from the former expedition. Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of the Peloponnesus, to require their assistance with all speed at Pylus; and also to their threescore galleys that were at Corcyra: which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas2, arrived at Pylus unseen of the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus. And by this time their army of foot was also there. Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylus, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, in all haste3, to tell them that they must come presently to him, for as much as the place was in danger to be lost. And according as Demosthenes his message imported, so the fleet made haste. The Lacedæmonians in the mean time prepared themselves to assault the fort both Edition: current; Page: by sea and land; hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste and not many men within it. And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour1. For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe, and the entries straight; one of them, nearest to Pylus and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys in front; and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood and untrodden; in bigness, about fifteen furlongs over. Therefore they determined with their galleys thick set, and with the beak–heads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven. And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians [putting men into it] should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same, and placed others likewise along the shore of the continent. For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylus itself without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows: and they in all probability might by siege, without battle by sea or other danger, win the place; seeing there was no provision of victual within it, and that the enemy took it but on short preparation. Having thus resolved, they put over Edition: current; Page: into the island their men of arms, out of every band by lot. Some also had been sent over before by turns: but they which went over now last and were left1 there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helotes that were with them. And their captain was Epitadas the son of Molobrus.
9. Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedæmonians bent to assault him both from their galleys and with their army by land, prepared also to defend the place. And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, unto the land, he placed them athwart the fort2; and armed the mariners that belonged to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves of arms. Those they had3, they took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars and a light–horseman of the Messenians, which came by chance. And the men of arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use of amongst the rest. The greatest part therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed on the parts of the wall toward the land which were of most strength4, and commanded them to make good the place against the landforces, if they assaulted it. And he himself, with sixty men of arms chosen out of the whole number, and a few archers, came forth of the fort to the Edition: current; Page: sea–side, in that part where he most expected their landing; which part was of troublesome access, and stony, and lay to the wide sea. But because their wall was there the weakest, he thought they would be drawn to adventure for that. For neither did the Athenians think they should ever have been mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place [to the seaward] the less strong; and1 if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, they made no other account but the place would be lost. Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in order his men of arms2; and encouraged them with words to this effect:
10. “You that participate with me in the present danger, let not any of you in this extremity go about to seem wise, and reckon every peril that now besetteth us; but let him rather come up to the enemy with little circumspection and much hope, and3 look for his safety by that. For things that are come once to a pinch, as these are, admit not debate, but a speedy hazard. And [yet] if we stand it out, and betray not our advantages with fear of the number of the enemy, I see well enough that most things are with us. For I make account, the4 difficulty of their landing makes for us: which, as long as we abide ourselves, will help us: but if we retire, though the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impeach them they will land well enough5. For whilst they are in their galleys, Edition: current; Page: they are most easy to be fought withal; and in their disbarking being but on equal terms, their number is not greatly to be feared; for though they be many, yet they must fight but by few, for want of room to fight in. And for an army to have odds by land, is another matter than when they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need of so many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. So that I think their great difficulties do but set them even with our small number. And for you, that be Athenians, and by experience of disbarking against others know, that if a man stand it out, and do not for fear of the sowsing of a wave or the menacing approach of a galley give back of himself, he can never be put back by violence; I expect that you should keep your ground, and by fighting it out upon the very edge of the water preserve both yourselves and the fort.”
11. Upon this exhortation of Demosthenes the Athenians took better heart, and went down and arranged themselves close by the sea. And the Lacedæmonians came and assaulted the fort, both with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of three–and–forty galleys; in which was admiral Thrasymelidas the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he made his approach where Edition: current; Page: Demosthenes had before expected him. So the Athenians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and by land. The Peloponnesians dividing their galleys into small numbers, because they could not come near with many at once, and resting between, assailed them by turns; using all possible valour and mutual encouragement, to put the Athenians back and gain the fort. Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas. For having the command of a galley, and seeing other captains of galleys and steersmen, (the place being hard of access), when there appeared sometimes possibility of putting ashore, to be afraid and tender of breaking their galleys; he would cry out unto them, saying, “they did not well, for sparing of wood to let the enemy fortify in their country”: and [to the Lacedæmonians] he gave advice to force landing with the breaking of their galleys; and prayed the confederates, that in requital of many benefits they would not stick to bestow their galleys at this time upon the Lacedæmonians, and running them ashore to use any means whatsoever to land, and to get into their hands both the men [in the isle] and the fort. 12. Thus he urged others; and having compelled the steersman of his own galley to run her ashore, he came to the ladders, but attempting to get down was by the Athenians put1 back; and after he had received many wounds, swooned; and falling upon the ledges2 of the galley, his buckler tumbled over into the sea. Which brought to land, the Athenians took up, and used afterwards in the Edition: current; Page: trophy which they set up for this assault. Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come aland; but the place being ill to land in, and the Athenians not budging, they could not do it. So that at this time fortune came so much about, that the Athenians fought from the land, Laconique land, against the Lacedæmonians in galleys; and the Lacedæmonians from their galleys fought against the Athenians, to get landing in their own now hostile territory. For at that time there was an opinion far spread, that these were rather landmen and expert in a battle of foot; and that in maritime and naval actions the other excelled1.
13. This day then and a part of the next, they made sundry assaults; and after that gave over. And the third day they sent out some galleys to Asine, for timber wherewith to make engines: hoping with engines to take that part of the wall that looketh into the haven; which, though it were higher, yet the landing to it was easier. In the meantime arrive the forty2 Athenian galleys from Zacynthus; for there were joined with them certain galleys of the garrison of Naupactus, and four of Chios. And when they saw both the continent and the island full of men of arms, and that the galleys that were in the haven would not come forth; not knowing where to cast anchor they sailed for the present to the isle Prote, being near and desert; and there lay for that night. The next Edition: current; Page: day, after they had put themselves in order, they put to sea again with purpose to offer them battle, if the other would come forth into the wide sea against them; if not, to enter the haven upon them. But the Peloponnesians neither came out against them, nor had stopped up the entries of the haven, as they had before determined; but lying still on the shore manned out their galleys, and prepared to fight, if any entered, in the haven itself, which was no small one. 14. The Athenians understanding this, came in violently upon them at both the mouths of the haven, and most of the Lacedæmonian galleys, which were already set out and opposed them, they charged and put to flight: and in following the chase, which was but short, they brake many of them, and took five, whereof one with all her men in her: and they fell in also with them that fled to the shore1. And the galleys which were but in manning out, were torn and rent before they could put off from the land. Others they tied to their own galleys, and towed them away empty2. Which the Lacedæmonians perceiving, and extremely grieved with the loss, because their fellows were hereby intercepted in the island, came in with their aid [from the land]; and entering armed into the sea took hold of the galleys with their hands, to have pulled them back again: every one conceiving the business to proceed the worse, wherein himself was not present. So there arose a great affray about the galleys, and Edition: current; Page: such as was contrary to the manner of them both. For the Lacedæmonians, out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as one may say) nothing else but make a sea–fight from the land; and the Athenians, who had the victory and desired to extend their present fortune to the utmost, made a land–fight from their galleys. But at length, having wearied and wounded each other, they fell asunder; and the Lacedæmonians recovered all1 their galleys, save only those which were taken at the first onset. When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the Athenians erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead, and possessed the wreck; and immediately went round the island with their galleys, keeping watch upon it as having intercepted the men within it. The Peloponnesians in the meantime, that were in the continent and were by this time assembled there with their succours from all parts of Peloponnesus, remained upon the place at Pylus.
15. As soon as the news of what had passed2 was related at Sparta, they thought fit, in respect the loss was great, to send the magistrates down to the camp, to determine, upon view of the state of their present affairs there, what they thought requisite to be done3. These, when they saw there was no possibility to relieve their men, and were not willing to put them to the danger either of suffering by famine or of being forced by multitude, concluded amongst themselves to take truce with the Athenian commanders, as far as concerned the Edition: current; Page: particulars of Pylus, if they also would be content; and to send ambassadors to Athens about agreement, and to endeavour to fetch off their men as soon as they could. 16. The Athenian commanders accepting the proposition, the truce was made in this manner:
That the Lacedæmonians should deliver up, not only those galleys wherein they fought, but also bring to Pylus and put into the Athenians’ hands whatsoever vessels of the long form of building were anywhere else in Laconia: that they should not make any assault upon the fort, neither by sea nor land.—That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmonians that were in the continent, to send over to those in the island a portion of ground corn agreed on, to wit, to every one two Attic chœnickes of meal1, and two cotyles of wine, and a piece of flesh; and to every of their servants, half that quantity: that they should send this the Athenians looking on; and not send over any vessel by stealth.—That the Athenians should nevertheless continue guarding of the island, provided2 that they landed not in it; and should not invade the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor sea.—That if either side transgressed in any part3 thereof, Edition: current; Page: the truce was then immediately to be void; otherwise to hold good till the return of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors from Athens. — That the Athenians should convoy them in a galley unto Athens and back.—That at their return the truce should end, and the Athenians should restore them their galleys in as good estate as they had received them.
Thus was the truce made, and the galleys were delivered to the Athenians, to the number of about three score: and the ambassadors were sent away; who arriving at Athens, said as followeth:
17. “Men of Athens, the Lacedæmonians have sent us hither concerning our men in the island, to see if we can persuade you to such a course, as being most profitable for you, may, in this misfortune, be the most honourable for us that our present condition is capable of. We will not be longer in discourse than standeth with our custom, being the fashion with us, where few words suffice, there indeed not to use many; but yet to use more, when the occasion requireth that by words we should make plain that which is to be done in actions of importance1. But the words we shall use, we pray you to receive not with the mind of an enemy, nor as if we went about to instruct you as men ignorant; but for a remembrance to you of what you know, that you may deliberate wisely therein. It is now in your power to assure your Edition: current; Page: present good fortune with reputation, holding what you have, with the addition of honour and glory besides: and to avoid that which befalleth men upon extraordinary success; who through hope aspire1 to greater fortune, because the fortune they have already came unhoped for. Whereas they that have felt many changes of both fortunes, ought indeed to be most suspicious of the good. So ought your city, and ours especially, upon experience in all reason to be. 18. Know it, by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us; who being of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that, which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give2. And yet we are not brought to this through weakness, nor through insolence upon addition of strength; but3 because it succeeded not with the power we had as we thought it should; which may as well happen to any other as to ourselves. So that you have no reason to conceive, that for your power and purchases4, fortune also must be therefore always yours. Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of things doubtful, do most wisely also address themselves towards adversity; and not think that war will so far follow and no further, as one shall please more or less to take it in hand, but rather so far as fortune shall lead it. Such men also seldom miscarrying, because they be not puffed up with the confidence of success, choose Edition: current; Page: then principally to give over, when they are in their better fortune. And so it will be good for you, men of Athens, to do with us; and not, if rejecting our advice you chance to miscarry, (as many ways you may), to have it thought hereafter that all your present successes were but mere fortune: whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands without danger1 to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.
19. “The Lacedæmonians call you to a peace and end of the war; giving you peace, and alliance, and much other friendship and mutual familiarity; requiring for the same [only] those their men that are in the island; though2 also we think it better for both sides, not to try the chance of war, whether it fall out that by some occasion of safety offered they escape by force, or being expugned by siege should be more in your power than they be3. For we are of this mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled, not when one that having beaten his enemy and gotten much the better in the war, brings him through necessity to take an oath, and to make peace on unequal terms; but when having it in his power lawfully so to do if he please, he overcome him likewise in goodness, and, contrary to what he expects, be reconciled to him on moderate conditions4. For in this case, his enemy being obliged, not to seek revenge as one that had been forced, but to requite his goodness, will, for shame, Edition: current; Page: be the more inclined to the conditions agreed on. And1 naturally, to those that relent of their own accord, men give way reciprocally with content; but against the arrogant, they will hazard all, even when in their own judgments they be too weak. 20. But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is surely so at this present, and before any irreparable accident be interposed. Whereby we should be compelled, besides the common, to bear you a particular2 eternal hatred; and you be deprived of the commodities we now offer you. Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have gained reputation and our friendship, and we not suffered dishonour, and but indifferent loss. And we shall3 not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians; who will acknowledge it rather from you, than us. For they make war, not knowing whether side begun; but if an end be made, which is now for the most part in your own hands, the thanks will be yours. And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedæmonians your sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it, and are therein not forced, but gratified. Wherein consider how many commodities are like to ensue. For if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, Edition: current; Page: being inferior to us, will honour us in the highest degree1.”
21. Thus spake the Lacedæmonians; thinking that in times past the Athenians had coveted peace, and been hindered of it by them; and that being now offered, they would gladly accept of it. But they, having these men intercepted in the island, thought they might compound at pleasure, and aspired to greater matters. To this they were set on for the most part by Cleon the son of Cleænetus, a popular man at that time, and of greatest sway with the multitude. He persuaded them to give this answer: “That they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms, and come themselves to Athens; and when they should be there, if the Lacedæmonians would make restitution of Nisæa, and Pegæ, and Trœzen, and Achaia”,—the which they had not won in war, but had received by former treaty, when the Athenians2 being in distress, Edition: current; Page: and at that time in more need of peace than now [yielded them up into their hands]—“then they should have their men again, and peace should be made for as long as they both should think good”.
22. To this answer they replied nothing; but desired that commissioners might be chosen to treat with them, who by alternate speaking and hearing, might quietly make such an agreement as they could persuade each other unto. But then Cleon came mightily upon them, saying, he knew before that they had no honest purpose; and that the same was now manifest, in that they refused to speak before the people, but sought to sit in consultation only with a few: and willed them, if they had aught to say that was real, to speak it before them all. But the Lacedæmonians finding that although they had a mind to make peace with them upon this occasion of adversity, yet it would not be fit to speak in it before the multitude, lest speaking and not obtaining they should incur calumny with their confederates; and seeing withal that the Athenians would not grant what they sued for upon reasonable conditions, they went back again without effect.
23. Upon their return, presently the truce at Pylus was at an end; and the Lacedæmonians, according to agreement, demanded restitution of their galleys. But the Athenians, laying to their charge an assault made upon the fort, contrary to the articles, and other matters of no great importance, refused to render them: standing upon this, that it was said that the accord should be void upon whatsoever the least transgression of the Edition: current; Page: same. But the Lacedæmonians denying it, and protesting this detention of their galleys for an injury, went their ways and betook themselves to the war. So the war at Pylus was on both sides renewed with all their power: the Athenians went every day about the island with two galleys, one going one way, another another way, and lay at anchor about it every night with their whole fleet, except on that part which lieth to the open sea; and that, only when it was windy; (from Athens also there came a supply of thirty galleys more, to guard the island; so that they were in the whole threescore and ten): and the Lacedæmonians1 made assaults upon the fort, and watched every opportunity that should present itself to save their men in the island.
24. Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confederates in Sicily, adding to those galleys that lay in garrison at Messana the rest of the fleet which they had prepared, made war out of Messana; instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians, as enemies to the Rhegians, whose territory they had also invaded with their whole forces by land: and seeing the Athenians had but a few galleys present, and hearing that the greater number which were to come to them were employed in the siege of the island, desired to try with them a battle by sea. For if they could get the better with their navy, they hoped, lying before Rhegium both with their land–forces on the field side and with their fleet by sea, easily to take it into their hands, and thereby strengthen their affairs. For Rhegium a promontory Edition: current; Page: of Italy, and Messana in Sicily lying near together, they might both hinder the Athenians from lying at anchor there against them, and make themselves masters of the strait1. This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where Sicily is nearest to the continent; and is that which is called Charybdis, where Ulysses is said to have passed through. Which, for that it is very narrow, and because the sea falleth in there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and is rough, hath therefore not without good cause been esteemed dangerous.
25. In this strait then the Syracusians and their confederates, with somewhat more than thirty galleys, were constrained in the latter end of the day to come to a sea–fight, having been drawn forth about the passage of a certain boat to undertake sixteen galleys of Athens and eight of Rhegium: and being overcome by the Athenians, fell off with the loss of one galley, and went speedily each2 [side] to their own camp at Messana and Rhegium; and the night overtook them in the action. After this the Locrians departed out of the territory of the Rhegians; and the fleet of the Syracusians and their Edition: current; Page: confederates came together to an anchor at Peloris1, and had their land–forces by them. But the Athenians and Rhegians came up to them, and finding their galleys empty of men fell in amongst them; and by means of a grapnel cast into one of their galleys they2 lost that galley, but the men swam out. Upon this the Syracusians went aboard, and whilst they were towed along the shore towards Messana, the Athenians came up to them again; and the Syracusians opening3 themselves, charged first and sunk another of their galleys. So the Syracusians passed on to the port of Messana, having had the better in their passage by the shore and in the sea–fight, which were both together in such manner as is declared.
The Athenians, upon news that Camarina should by Archias and his complices be betrayed to the Syracusians, went thither. In the meantime the Messanians, with their whole power by land and also with their fleet, warred on Naxos, a Chalcidique city and their borderer. The first day having forced the Naxians to retire within their walls, they spoiled their fields; the next day they sent their fleet about into the river Acesine, which spoiled the country [as it went up the river]; and with their landforces assaulted4 the city. In the meantime many of the Siculi, mountaineers, came down to their Edition: current; Page: assistance against the Messanians: which when they of Naxos perceived, they took heart, and encouraging themselves with an opinion that the Leontines, and all the rest of the Grecians their confederates, had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the city and charged upon the Messanians, and put them to flight with the slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers; and the rest hardly escaping home. For the barbarians fell upon them, and slew the most part of them in the highways. And the galleys that lay at1 Messana, not long after divided themselves, and went to their several homes. Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together with the Athenians, marched presently against Messana, as being now weakened; and assaulted it, the Athenians with their fleet by the haven, and the land–forces at2 the wall to the field. But the Messanians, and certain Locrians with Demoteles, who after this loss had been left there in garrison, issuing forth and falling suddenly upon them, put a great part of the Leontines’ army to flight, and slew many. But the Athenians seeing that, disbarked and relieved them; and coming upon the Messanians now in disorder, chased them again into the city. Then they erected a trophy, and put over to Rhegium. After this, the Grecians of Sicily warred one upon another without the Athenians.
26. All this while the Athenians at Pylus besieged the Lacedæmonians in the island; and the army of the Peloponnesians in the continent remained still upon the place. This keeping of watch Edition: current; Page: was exceedingly painful to the Athenians, in respect of the want they had both of corn and water: for there was no well but one, and that was in the fort itself of Pylus, and no great one. And the greatest number turned up the gravel1, and drank such water as they were like to find there. They were also scanted of room for their camp; and their galleys not having place to ride in, they were forced by turns, some to stay ashore, and others to take their victual and lie off at anchor2. But their greatest discouragement was, the time which they had stayed there longer than they had thought to have done; for they thought to have famished them out in a few days, being in a desert island and having nothing to drink but salt water. The cause hereof were the Lacedæmonians, who had proclaimed that any man that would, should carry in meal, wine, cheese, and all other esculents necessary for a siege, into the island, appointing for the same a great reward of silver: and if any Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him liberty. Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual; but especially the Helotes, who putting off from all parts of Peloponnessus, wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of the island that lay to the wide sea. But they had a care above all to take such a time as to be brought in with the wind. For when it blew from the sea, they could escape the watch of the galleys easily3: for they could not then lie round about the island Edition: current; Page: at anchor. And the Helotes were nothing tender in putting ashore; for they ran their galleys on ground, valued at a price in money: and the men of arms also watched at all the landing places of the island. But as many as made attempt when the weather was calm, were intercepted. There were also such as could dive, that swam over into the island through the haven, drawing after them in a string bottles1 filled with poppy tempered with honey, and pounded linseed: whereof some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards watched. So that on either part they used all possible art: one side to send over food, the other to apprehend those that carried it.
27. The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported into the island, knew not what they should do to it, and feared lest winter should overtake them in their siege; fearing2 not only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert place withal, would be a thing impossible, but also that they should be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, though it were summer; and again, that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no place to lie at anchor in against them; Edition: current; Page: but that the watch there ceasing of itself, the men would by that means escape, or in some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that brought them meat. But that which they feared most was, that the Lacedæmonians seemed to have some assurance of them already1, because they sent no more to negotiate about them. And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. But Cleon knowing himself to be the man suspected for hindering the agreement, said, that they who brought the news reported not the truth. Whereupon, they that came thence advising them, if they would not believe it, to send to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by the Athenians to view it. But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said whom he before calumniated, or saying the contrary be proved a liar: he advised the Athenians, seeing2 them inclined of themselves to send thither greater forces than they had before thought to do, that it was not fit to send to view the place, nor to lose their opportunity by delay; but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a voyage against those men: and glanced at Nicias the son of Niceratus, then general, upon malice and with language of reproach: saying it was easy, if the leaders3 were men, to go and take them there in the island; and that himself, if he had the command, would do it. 28. But Nicias, seeing the Edition: current; Page: Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against Cleon, for that when he thought it so easy a matter he did not presently put it in practice; and seeing also he had upbraided him, willed him to take what strength he would that1 they could give him, and undertake it. Cleon supposing at first that he gave him this leave but in words, was ready to accept it; but when he knew he would give him the authority in good earnest, then he shrunk back; and said, that not he, but Nicias was general; being now indeed afraid, and hoping that he durst not have given over the office to him. But then Nicias again bade him do it, and gave over2 his command [to him] for so much as concerned Pylus; and called the Athenians to witness it. They, (as is the fashion of the multitude), the more Cleon declined the voyage and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much the more to resign his power to him, and cried out upon Cleon to go. Insomuch as not knowing how to disengage himself of his word, he undertook the voyage; and stood forth, saying, that he feared not the Lacedæmonians, and that he would not carry any man with him out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present, and those targettiers that were come to them from Ænus, and four hundred archers out of other places: and with these he said, added to the soldiers that were at Pylus already, he would within twenty days either fetch away the Lacedæmonians alive, or kill them upon the place. This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laughter, and3 Edition: current; Page: was heard with great content of the wiser sort. For of two benefits, the one must needs fall out; either to be rid of Cleon, (which was their greatest hope), or if they were deceived in that, then to get those Lacedæmonians into their hands.
29. Now when he had dispatched with the assembly, and the Athenians had by their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined unto himself Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylus, and presently put to sea1. He made choice of Demosthenes for his companion, because he heard that he also of himself and a purpose to set his soldiers aland in the isle. For the army having suffered much by the straitness of the place, and being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to put the matter to the hazard of a battle: confirmed2 therein the more, for that the island had been burnt. For having been for the most part wood, and (by reason it had lain ever desert) without path, they3 were before [the more] afraid, and thought it the advantage of the enemy; for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army that should offer to come aland. For their errors being in the wood, and their preparation could not so well have been discerned4: whereas all the faults of their own army should have been in sight: so that the enemy might have set upon them suddenly, in what part soever they had pleased; because the onset had been in their own election. Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the Lacedæmonians Edition: current; Page: at hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought, would be too hard for the many and unskilful. Besides, their own army being great it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it; because they could not see where it was needful to relieve one another. 30. These things came into his head especially from the loss he received in Ætolia; which in part1 also happened by occasion of the woods. But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at the outside of the island to dress their dinners with a watch before them, and one of them having2 set fire on the wood, [it burnt on by little and little], and the wind afterwards rising, the most of it was burnt before they were aware. By this accident, Demosthenes the better discerning that the Lacedæmonians were more than he had imagined, having3 before by victual sent unto them thought them not so many, did now prepare himself for the enterprise, as a matter deserving the Athenians’ utmost care, and as having better commodity of landing in the island than before he had; and both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near, and put in readiness every other needful thing. And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came himself also with those forces which he had required unto Pylus.Edition: current; Page: 
When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in the continent, to know if they would command those in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without battle, to be held with easy imprisonment till some agreement were made touching the main war. 31. Which when they refused, the Athenians for one day held their hands; but the next day, having put aboard upon a few galleys all their men of arms, they put off in the night, and landed a little before day on both sides of the island, both from the main and from the haven, to the number of about eight hundred men of arms; and marched upon high speed towards the foremost watch of the island. For thus the Lacedæmonians lay quartered. In this foremost watch, were about thirty men of arms: the middest and evenest part of the island, and about the water1, was kept by Epitadas their captain with the greatest part of the whole number: and another part of them, which were not many, kept the last guard towards Pylus, which place to the seaward was on a cliff, and least assailable by land. For there was2 also a certain fort which was old, and made of chosen [not of hewn] stones; which they thought would stand them in stead in case of violent retreat. Thus they were quartered.
32. Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard, which they so ran to, in their cabins, and as they were taking arms. For3 they Edition: current; Page: knew not of their landing; but thought those galleys had come thither to anchor in the night according to custom, as they had been wont to do. As soon as it was morning, the rest of the army also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he had, being all [that rowed] except only the Thalamii1; eight hundred archers; targetiers as many; all the Messenians that came to aid them; and as many of them besides as held any place about Pylus, except only the garrison of the fort itself. Demosthenes then disposing his army by two hundred and more in a company, and in some less, [at certain distances], seized on all the higher grounds; to the end that the enemies, compassed about on every side, might the less know what to do, or against what part to set themselves in battle, and be subject to the shot of the multitude from every part; and when they should make head against those that fronted them, be charged behind; and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be charged at once both behind and before. And which way soever they marched, the light–armed and such as were meanliest provided of arms followed2 them at the back with arrows, darts, stones, and slings; who have courage enough afar Edition: current; Page: off, and could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the enemies when they should retire. With this design Demosthenes both intended his landing at first, and afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action. 33. Those that were about Epitadas, who were the greatest part of those in the island, when they saw that the foremost guard was slain and that the army marched towards them, put themselves in array, and went towards the men of arms of the Athenians with intent to charge them: for these were opposed to them in front, and the light–armed soldiers on their flanks and at their backs. But they could neither come to join with them, nor any way make use of their skill. For both the light–armed soldiers kept them off with shot from either side, and1 the men of arms advanced not. Where the light–armed soldiers approached nearest, they were driven back; but returning, they charged them afresh, being men armed lightly, and that easily got out of their reach by running, especially the ground being uneasy and rough by having been formerly desert; so that the Lacedæmonians in their armour could not follow them.
34. Thus for a little while they skirmished one against another afar off. But when the Lacedæmonians were no longer able to run out after them where they charged, these light–armed soldiers seeing them less earnest in chasing them, and taking courage chiefly from their sight, as being many times their number, and having also been used to them so much as not to think them now so dangerous Edition: current; Page: as they had done, for that they had not received so much hurt at their hands as their subdued minds, because they were to fight against the Lacedæmonians, had at their first landing prejudged, contemned them; and with a great cry ran all at once upon them, casting stones, arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand. Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not accustomed to such kind of fight; and withal a great dust of the woods lately burnt mounted into the air; so that by reason of the arrows and stones, that together with the dust flew from such a multitude of men, they could hardly see before them. Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedæmonians’ side: for their jacks1 now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were thrown stuck broken in them; so as they could not handle themselves, as neither seeing before them, nor hearing any direction given them for the greater noise of the enemy; but danger being on all sides, were hopeless to save themselves upon any side by fighting. 35. In the end, many of them being now wounded, for that they could not shift their ground, they made their retreat in close order to the2 last guard of the island, and to the watch that was there. When they once gave ground, then were the light–armed soldiers much more confident than before, and pressed upon them with a mighty noise: and as many of the Lacedæmonians as they could intercept Edition: current; Page: in their retreat, they slew; but the most of them recovered the fort, and together with the watch of the same put themselves in order to defend it in all parts that were subject to assault. The Athenians following could not now encompass and hem them in, for the strong situation of the place; but assaulting them in the face, sought only how to put them from the wall. And thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, either side tired with the fight, and with thirst, and with the sun: one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the top, the other to keep their ground. And the Lacedæmonians defended themselves easilier now than before, because they were not now encompassed upon their flanks. 36. When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians said unto Cleon and Demosthenes, that they spent their labour there in vain: and that if they would deliver unto him a part of the archers and light–armed soldiers, to get up by such a way as he himself should find out, and come behind upon their backs, he thought the entrance might be forced. And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lacedæmonians, that he might not be discovered; making his approach under the cliffs of the island, where they were continual1; in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they kept no watch; and with much labour and hardly unseen, came behind them: and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not, and much confirmed the Athenians with the Edition: current; Page: sight of what they expected. And the Lacedæmonians, being now charged with their shot both before and behind, were in the same case (to compare small matters with great) that they were in at Thermopylæ. For then they were slain by the Persians, shut up on both sides in a narrow path1: and these now being charged on both sides, could make good the place no longer; but fighting few against many, and being weak withal for want of food, were at last forced to give ground: and the Athenians by this time were also masters of all the entrances.
37. But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that the more they gave back, the faster they would be killed by their army2, staid the fight and held in the soldiers: with desire to carry them alive to Athens, in case their spirits were so much broken and their courage abated by this misery, as upon proclamation made they would be content to deliver up their arms. So they proclaimed, that they3 should deliver up their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be disposed of as to them should seem good. 38. Upon hearing hereof the most of them threw down their bucklers, and shook their hands above their heads; signifying their acceptation of what was proclaimed. Whereupon a truce was made, and they came to treat, Cleon and Demosthenes of one side, and Styphon the son of Pharax on the other side. For of them that had command there4, Epitadas, who was the first, was Edition: current; Page: slain; and Hippagretes1, who was chosen to succeed him, lay amongst the dead, though yet alive; and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the law, in case the others should miscarry. Styphon, and those that were with him, said they would send over to the Lacedæmonians in the continent, to know what they there would advise them to. But the Athenians letting none go thence, called for heralds out of the continent: and the question having been twice or thrice asked, the last of the Lacedæmonians that came over from the continent brought them this answer: The Lacedæmonians bid you take advice touching yourselves, such as you shall think good; provided you do nothing dishonourably. Whereupon having consulted, they yielded up themselves and their arms. And the Athenians attended them that day and the night following with a watch: but the next day, after they had set up their trophy in the island, they prepared to be gone; and committed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the galleys. And the Lacedæmonians sent over a herald, and took up the bodies of their dead. The number of them that were slain and taken alive in the island, was thus. There went over into the island in all, four hundred and twenty men of arms; of these were sent away alive, three hundred wanting eight; and the rest slain. Of those that lived, there were of the city Edition: current; Page: itself of Sparta1, one hundred and twenty. Of the Athenians there died not many; for it was no standing fight.
39. The whole time of the siege of these men in the island, from the fight of the galleys to the fight in the island, was seventy–two days; of which for twenty days victual was allowed to be carried to them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassadors were away that went about the peace; in the rest, they were fed by such only as put in2 thither by stealth; and yet there was both corn and other food left in the island. For their captain Epitadas had distributed it more sparingly than he needed to have done. So the Athenians and the Peloponnesians departed from Pylus, and went home both of them with their armies. And the promise of Cleon, as senseless as it was, took effect: for within twenty days he brought home the men as he had undertaken.
40. Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. For they expected that the Lacedæmonians should never, neither by famine nor whatsoever other necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands, fighting as long as they had been able: and would not believe that those that yielded, were like to those that were slain. And when one afterwards of the Athenian confederates asked one of the prisoners, by way of insulting, if they which were slain were valiant men3: he answered, that a spindle Edition: current; Page: (meaning an arrow) deserved to be valued at a high rate, if it could know what was a good man; signifying that the slain were such as the stones and arrows chanced to light on.
41. After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they should be kept in bonds till there should be made some agreement; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, then to bring them forth and kill them. They took order also [in the same assembly] for the settling of the garrison at Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native country; (for Pylus is in that country which belonged once to the Messenians1); infested Laconia Edition: current; Page: with robberies, and did them much other mischief, as being of the same language. The Lacedæmonians, not having in times past been acquainted with robberies and such war as that, and because their Helotes ran over to the enemy, fearing also some greater innovation in the country, took the matter much to heart; and though they would not be known of it to the Athenians, yet they sent ambassadors, and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the fort of Pylus and of their men. But the Athenians aspired to greater matters; and the ambassadors, though they came often about it, yet were always sent away without effect. These were the proceedings at Pylus.
42. Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians with eighty galleys, two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horse in boats built for transportation of horses, made war upon the territory of Corinth. There went also with them Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, of their confederates. The general of the whole army was Nicias the son of Niceratus, with two others in commission with him. Betimes1 in a morning they put in at a place between Chersonesus and Rheitus, on that shore above which standeth the Edition: current; Page: hill Solygeius, whereon the Dorians in old time sat down to make war on the Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were then Æolians, and upon which there standeth now a village, called also Solygeia. From the shore where the galleys came in, this village is distant twenty1 furlongs, and the city of Corinth sixty, and the isthmus twenty. The Corinthians, having long before from Argos had intelligence that an army of the Athenians was coming against them, came all of them with their forces to the isthmus, save only such as dwelt without the isthmus and five hundred garrison soldiers absent in Ambracia and Leucadia: all the rest of military age came forth to attend the Athenians, where they should put in. But when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unseen, and that advertisement Edition: current; Page: thereof was given them by signs put up into the air, they left the one half of their forces in Cenchreia, lest the Athenians should go against Crommyon: and with the other half made haste to meet them. 43. Battus, one of their commanders, (for there were two of them present at the battle), with one squadron went toward the village of Solygeia, being an open one, to defend it; and Lycophron with the rest charged the enemy. And first they gave the onset on the right wing of the Athenians, which was but newly1 landed, before Chersonesus: and afterwards they charged likewise the rest of the army. The battle was hot, and at hand–strokes. And the right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for of these consisted their utmost files) sustained the charge of the Corinthians: and with much ado Edition: current; Page: drave them back. But as they retired they came up (for the place was all rising ground) to a dry wall, and from thence, being on the upper ground, threw down stones at them; and after having sung the Pæan, came again close to them1; whom when the Athenians abode, the battle was again at handstrokes. But a certain band of Corinthians that came in to the aid of their own left wing, put the right wing of the Athenians to flight, and chased them to the sea–side: but then from their galleys they turned head again, both the Athenians and the Carystians. The other part of their army continued fighting on both sides, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron fought against the left wing of the Athenians: for they expected that the Athenians would attempt to go to Solygeia. 44. So they held each other to it a long time, neither side giving ground. But in the end (for that the Athenians had horsemen2, which did them great service, seeing the other had none) the Corinthians were put to flight, and retired to the hill: where they laid down their arms and descended no more, but there rested. In this retreat, the greatest part of their right wing was slain3, and amongst others Lycophron, one of the generals. But the rest of the army being in this manner neither much urged, nor retiring in much haste, when they could do no other, made their retreat up the hill and there sat down. The Athenians Edition: current; Page: seeing them come no more down to battle, rifled the dead bodies of the enemy, and took up their own; and presently erected a trophy on the place. That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cenchreia, to watch the Athenians that they went not against Crommyon, saw not this battle for the hill Oneius; but when they saw the dust, and so knew what was in hand, they went presently to their aid. So did also the old men of Corinth from the city, when they understood how the matter had succeeded. The Athenians, when all these were coming upon them together, imagining them to have been the succours of the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their galleys; carrying with them the booty, and the bodies of their dead; all save two, which not finding they left. Being aboard, they crossed over to the islands on the other side: and from thence sent a herald, and fetched away those two dead bodies which they left behind1. There were slain in this battle, Corinthians, two hundred and twelve; and Athenians, somewhat under fifty.
45. The Athenians putting off from the islands, sailed the same day to Crommyon in the territory of Corinth, distant from the city a hundred and twenty furlongs: where anchoring, they wasted the fields and stayed all that night. The next day they sailed along the shore, first to the territory of Epidaurus, whereinto they made some little incursion Edition: current; Page: from their galleys: and then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Trœzen; and there took in the isthmus of Chersonesus1 with a wall, and placed a garrison in it, which afterwards exercised robberies in the territories of Trœzen, Halias, and Epidaurus. And when they had fortified this place, they returned home with their fleet.
46. About the same time that these things were in doing, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after their departure from Pylus with the Athenian fleet towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined with those of the city, and made war upon those Corcyræans which lay encamped upon the hill Istone, and which after the sedition had come over, and both made themselves masters of the field and much annoyed the city: and having assaulted their fortification, took it. But the men all in one troop escaped to a certain high ground, and thence made their composition; which was this: that they should deliver up the strangers that aided them; and that they themselves, having rendered their arms, should stand to the judgment of the people of Athens. Hereupon the generals granted them truce, and transported them to the island of Ptychia, to be there in custody till the Athenians should send for them; with this condition, that if any one of them should be taken running away, then the truce to be broken for them all. But the patrons of the commons of Corcyra, fearing lest the Athenians would not kill them when they came thither, devise against them this plot. To some few of those in the island they secretly send their friends, and instruct them Edition: current; Page: to say, as if forsooth it were for good will, that it was their best course with all speed to get away; and withal, to offer to provide them of a boat; for that the Athenian commanders intended verily to deliver them to the Corcyræan people. 47. When they were persuaded to do so, and that a boat was treacherously prepared, as they rowed away they were taken; and the truce being now broken, were all given up into the hands of the Corcyræans. It did much further this plot, that to make the pretext seem more serious and the agents in it less fearful, the Athenian generals gave out that they were nothing pleased1 that the men should be carried home by others, whilst they themselves were to go into Sicily, and the honour of it be ascribed to those that should convoy them. The Corcyræans having received them into their hands, imprisoned them in a certain edifice: from whence afterwards they took them out by twenty at a time, and made them pass through a lane of men of arms, bound together and receiving strokes and thrusts from those on either side, according as any one espied his enemy. And to hasten the pace of those that went slowliest on, others were set to follow them with whips. 48. They had taken out of the room in this manner, and slain, to the number of three–score, before they that remained knew it; who thought they were but removed, and carried to some other place. But when they knew the truth, some or other having told them, they then cried out to the Athenians, and said, that if they would themselves kill them they should do it; and refused Edition: current; Page: any more to go out of the room: nor would suffer, they said, as long as they were able, any man to come in. But neither had the Corcyræans any purpose to force entrance by the door: but getting up to the top of the house unco