Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge,
British Moralists, being Selections from Writers principally of the Eighteenth Century, vol. 1 
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About this Title:
Vol. 1 contains selections from the work of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Adam Smith, and Bentham.
The text is in the public domain.
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Table of Contents:
CONTENTS OF VOL. I
1.: Satire and moral philosophy.
2.: The selfish theories of satire and scepticism.
3.: The satiric criticism of morals.
4.: Mandeeilleaposs political theory of virtue.
5.: General character of British moral philosophy.
6.: The unmetaphysical character of the period.
7.: Distinction of the moral from the legal and theological provinces.
8.: The will of God as the source of moral distinctions.
9.: Positive law and moral distinctions.
10.: The law of nature.
11.: Virtue declared to be real and natural.
12.: Moral laws and natural relations.
13.: Marality and truth.
14.: The fitness of actions.
15.: 15. Are there acts which are virtuous in all relations
16.: Reason as the moral faculty.
17.: Can reason move to action?
18.: The sentimental theory of human nature.
19.: The reflex sense in human nature.
20.: Sense as a source of obligation.
21.: Butleraposs theory of obligation and punishment.
22.: The sentimental theory supplies no criterion.
23.: Is a moral sense arbitrary?
24.: Moral sense as furnishing a criterion and motive.
25.: Is moral sense itself an element in virtue?
26.: Is a moral sense necessary?
27.: Virtue as benevolence.
29.: Association of ideas.
30.: Desire and pleasure.
31.: The greatest happiness of the greatest number.
BOOK I. Part II.
BOOK I. Part III.
Book II. Part I.
HUTCHESON An Inqeiry concerning Moral Good and Evil
Sect. I.: Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others.
Sect. II.: Concerning the Immediate Motive to Virtuous Actions.
Sect. III.: The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The Manner of computing the Morality of Actions.
Sect. IV.: All mankind agree in this general foundation of their approbation of moral actions. the grounds of the different opinions about Morals.
BUTLER: sermons and dissertation upon virtue
SERMON I.: upon the social nature of man.
SERMON II, III: upon the natural supremacy of conscience.
SERMONS XI, XII.: upon the love of our neighbour.
of the nature of virtue.
adam smith the theory of moral sentiments
smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments
PART I.: of the propriety of action.
SECTION I.: Of the Sense of Protriety
Chapter I.: Of Svrapathy.
Chapter II.: Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy.
Chapter III.: Of the Manner in which we judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of other Men by their Concord or Dissonance with our own.
Chapter IV.: The same Subject continued.
Chapter V.: Of the amiable and respectable Virtues.
SECTION II.: Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety.
PART II.: of merit and demerit or, of the objects of reward and punishment.
SECTION I.: —Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit.
Chapter I.: —That whatever appears to be the proper Object of Gratitude, appears to deserve Reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of Resentment, appears to deserve Punishment.
Chapter II.: —Or the proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment.
Chapter III.: —That where there is no Approbation of the Conduct of the Person who confers the Benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratiturde of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the Person who does the Mischief, there is no sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of him who suffers it.
Chapter IV.: —Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters.
Chapter V.: —The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit.
PART III.: of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.
Chapter I.: —Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation
Chapter IV.: —Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules.
PART IV.: of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation.
Chapter I.: —Of the Beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of Art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty.
Chapter II.: —Of the Beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the Characters and Actions of Men; and how far the perception of this Beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of Approbation.
PART VII.: of systems of moral philosophy.
SECTION III.: —Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the principle of approbation.
Chapter I.: —Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-Love.
Chapter II.: —Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation.
Chapter III.: —Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation.
bentham: an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation
bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislatian
Chapter I.: —Of the Principle of Utility.
Chapter II.: —Of Principles adverse to that of Utility.
Chapter III.: —Of the four Sanctions or Sources of Pain and Pleasure.
Chapter IV.: —Value of a lot of Pleasure or Pain, how to be measured.
Chapter VIII.: —Of Intentionality.
Chapter IX.: —Of Consciousness.
Chapter X.: —Motives.
I.: Different Senses of the word Motive2
2.: No motives either constantly good, or constantly bad.
3.: Catalogue of motives corresponding to that of Pleasures and Pains.
4.: Order of pre-eminence among motives.
Chapter XI.: —Of Human Dispositions in General.
HUTCHESON: On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections
Section I.: —A general Account of our several Senses and Desires. Selfish or Publick.
SECTION II.: —Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions with their final Causes.
SECTION III.: —Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions.
Section IV.: —How far our several Affections and Passions are in our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Observations about their Objects.
Illustrations upon the Moral Sense
Section I.: —Concerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable to Truth or Reason.
Section IV.: —Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense.
Section V.: —Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit; and be rewardable upon the Supposition, that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct.
A System of Moral Philosohy
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