The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Advertisement to the Reader.
• To the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, Sherifs, and Common Council of London.
• The Preface.
• The Life of James Harrington.
• The Mechanics of Nature:
• The Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy Considered: and Exemplify’d In the Scotish Line, Out of Their Own Best Authors and Records.
• The Commonwealth of Oceana. to His Highness the Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.
• The Introduction, Or Order of the Work.
• Oceana.
• The Preliminarys, Shewing the Principles of Government.
• The Second Part of the Preliminarys.
• The Council of Legislators.
• Oceana: the Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana.
• Anno Dom.
• Anno Domini.
• Anno Domini.
• Epitome of the Whole Commonwealth.
• Libertas. the Proclamation of His Highness the Lord Archon of Oceana Upon Promulgation of the Model.
• The Prerogative of Popular Government.
• Epistle to the Reader.
• The First Book, Containing: a Full Answer to All Such Objections As Have Hitherto Bin Made Against Oceana.
• The Preface.
• Chap. I. Antient and Modern Prudence.
• Chap. I.: Whether Prudence Be Well Distinguish’d Into Antient and Modern.
• Chap. II.: Whether a Commonwealth Be Rightly Defin’d to Be a Government of Laws and Not of Men, and a Monarchy to Be the Government of Som Man, Or a Few Men, and Not of Laws?
• Chap. III.: Whether the Balance of Dominion In Land Be the Natural Cause of Empire?
• Chap. IV. Chap. IV.: Whether the Balance of Empire Be Well Divided Into National and Provincial; and Whether These Two, Or Any Nations That Are of Distinct Balance, Coming to Depend Upon One and the Same Head, Such a Mixture Creates a New Balance.
• Chap. V.: Whether There Be Any Common Right Or Interest of Mankind Distinct From the Parts Taken Severally; and How By the Orders of a Commonwealth It May Be Best Distinguish’d From Privat Interest.
• Chap. VI.: Whether the Senatusconsulta, Or Decrees of the Roman Senat, Had the Power of Laws?
• Chap. VII.: Whether the Ten Commandments Were Propos’d By God Or Moses, and Voted By the People of Israel.
• Chap. VIII.: Whether a Commonwealth Coming Up to the Perfection of the Kind, Coms Not Up to the Perfection of Government, and Has No Flaw In It.
• Chap. IX.: Whether Monarchy Coming Up to the Perfection of the Kind, Coms Not Short of the Perfection of Government, and Has Not Som Flaw In It. In Which Is Also Treated of the Balance of France; of the Original of a Landed Clergy; of Arms, and Their Ki
• Chap. X.: Whether a Commonwealth That Was Not First Broken By Her Self, Was Ever Conquer’d By the Arms of Any Monarch?
• Chap. XI.: Whether There Be Not an Agrarian, Or Som Law of Laws of That Nature, to Supply the Defect of It In Every Commonwealth: and Whether the Agrarian, As It Is Stated In Oceana, Be Not Equal and Satisfactory to All Interests.
• Chap. XII.: Whether Courses Or a Rotation Be Necessary to a Well-order’d Commonwealth. In Which Is Contain’d the Courses Or Parembole of Israel Before the Captivity, Together With the Epitome of Athens and Venice.
• The Second Book; Or, a Political Discourse Concerning Ordination: Against Dr. H. Hammond, Dr. L. Seaman, and the Authors They Follow.
• Advertisment to the Reader.
• Order of the Discourse.
• A Political Discourse Concerning Ordination.
• The Introduction, Or First Chapter.
• Chap. II.: That the Citys, Or Most of Them Nam’d In the Perambulation of the Apostles Paul and Barnabas, Were At That Time Under Popular Government. In Which Is Contain’d the Administration of a Roman Province.
• Chap. III.: The Deduction of the Chirotonia From Popular Government, and of the Original Right of Ordination From the Chirotonia. In Which Is Contain’d the Institution of the Sanhedrim Or Senat of Israel By Moses, and That of Rome By Romulus
• Chap. IV.: The Deduction of the Chirothesia From Monarchical Or Aristocratical Government, and of the Second Way of Ordination From the Chirothesia. In Which Is Contain’d the Commonwealth of the Jews As It Stood After the Captivity.
• Chap. V.: Whether the Chirotonia Mention’d In the Fourteenth of the Acts Be Indeed, As Is Pretended By Dr. Mammond, Dr. Seaman, and the Authors They Follow, the Same With the Chirothesia, Or a Far Different Thing. In Which Are Contain’d the
• Advertisement to the Reader, Or Direction to the Answerer.
• An Answer to Three Objections Against Popular Government, That Were Given Me After These Two Books Were Printed.
• The Art of Lawgiving: In Three Books.
• The Order of the Work.
• The First Book.
• The Second Book.
• The Third Book.
• The First Book, Shewing the Foundations and Superstructures of All Kinds of Government.
• The Preface. Considering the Principles Or Nature of Family Government.
• Chap. I.: Considering the Principles Or Balance of National Governments; With the Different Kinds of the Same.
• Chap. II.: Shewing the Variation of the English Balance.
• Chap. III.: Of Fixation of the Balance, Or of Agrarian Laws.
• Chap. IV.: Shewing the Superstructures of Governments.
• The Conclusion: Observing That the Principles of Human Prudence Being Good Without Proof of Scripture, Are Nevertheless Such As Are Provable Out of Scripture.
• The Second Book, Containing the Commonwealths of the Hebrews; Namely, Elohim, Or the Commonwealth of Israel; and Cabala, Or the Commonwealth of the Jews.
• The Preface, Shewing That There Were Commonwealths Before That of Israel.
• Chap. I.: Shewing That Israel Was a Commonwealth.
• Chap. II.: Shewing What Commonwealth Israel Was.
• Chap. III.: Shewing the Anarchy, Or State of the Israelits Under Their Judges.
• Chap. IV.: Shewing the State of the Israelits Under Their Kings, to the Captivity.
• Chap. V.: Shewing the State of the Jews In the Captivity; and After Their Return Out of It; With the Frame of the Jewish Commonwealth.
• Chap. VI.: Shewing How Ordination Was Brought Into the Christian Church, and the Divers Ways of the Same That Were At Divers Times In Use With the Apostles.
• The Conclusion: Shewing That Neither God, Nor Christ, Or the Apostles, Ever Instituted Any Government Ecclesiastical Or Civil Upon Any Other Principles Than Those Only of Human Prudence.
• The Third Book, Containing a Model of Popular Government, Practically Propos’d According to Reason, Confirm’d By the Scripture, and Agreable to the the Present Balance Or State of Property In England.
• The Preface. Containing a Model of Popular Government, Propos’d Notionally.
• Chap. I.: Containing the Civil Part of the Model, Propos’d Practicably.
• Chap. II.: Containing the Religious Part of This Model, Propos’d Practicably.
• Chap. III.: Containing the Military Part of This Model, Propos’d Practicably.
• Chap. IV.: Containing the Provincial Part of This Model, Propos’d Practicably.
• The Conclusion: Shewing How the Model Propos’d May Be Prov’d Or Examin’d; and Giving a Brief Answer to Mr. Wren’s Last Book, Intitl’d, Monarchy Asserted Against Mr. Harrington’s Oceana.
• A Word Concerning a House of Peers.
• Six Political Tracts Written On Several Occasions.
• Valerius and Publicola: Or, the True Form of a Popular Commonwealth Extracted Ex Puris Naturalibus.
• To the Reader.
• To the Parlament of the Commonwealth of England, &c. the Humble Petition, &c.
• The Petitioner to the Reader.
• A System of Politics Delineated In Short and Easy Aphorisms. Publish’d From the Author’s Own Manuscript.
• Chap. I.: Of Government.
• Chap. II.: Of the Matter of Government.
• Chap. III.: Of the Privation of Government.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Form of Government.
• Chap. V.: Of Form In the Civil Parts.
• Chap. VI.: Of Form In the Religious Part.
• Chap. VII.: Of Form In the Military Part.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Form In the Legal Part.
• Chap. IX.: Of Form In the Judicial Part.
• Chap. X.: Of the Administration of Government, Or Reason of State.
• Political Aphorisms.
• Seven Models of a Commonwealth: Or, Brief Directions Shewing How a Fit and Perfect Model of Popular Government May Be Made, Found, Or Understood.
• The First Part.
• Divers Models the First Model of Popular Government Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Israel.
• A Second Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d.
• A Third Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Sparta.
• A Fourth Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Athens.
• A Fifth Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Rome.
• A Sixth Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Venice.
• A Seventh Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Holland.
• The Second Part, Proposing a Model of a Commonwealth Fitted to the Present State of This Nation.
• Conclusion; Or, the Use of These Propositions.
• The Ways and Means Wherby an Equal and Lasting Commonwealth May Be Suddenly Introduc’d, and Perfectly Founded, With the Free Consent and Actual Confirmation of the Whole People of England.
• The Humble Petition of Divers Well Affected Persons, Deliver’d the 6th Day of July, 1659, With the Parlament’s Answer Therto.
• Appendix, Containing All the Political Tracts of James Harrington, Esq; Omitted In Mr. Toland ’s Edition of His Works.
• Pian Piano: Or, Intercourse Between H. Ferne, D. D. And J. Harrington, Esq; Upon Occasion of the Doctor’s Censure of the Commonwealth of Oceana.
• Epistle to the Reader.
• Intercourse Between H. Ferne, D. D. And James Harrington, Esq; Upon Occasion of the Doctor’s Censure of the Commonwealth of Oceana.
• The Queries I Shall Interweave With the Doctor’s Answer Unto Each of Them, Returned Unto Me With This Preamble.
• The First Query. How Much, Or In What the Author of Oceana Is Mistaken, to Think the Commonwealth of the Hebrews Appliable to His Purpose.
• The Second Query.
• The Third Query.
• The Fourth Query.
• The Fifth Query.
• The Sixth Query.
• The Seventh Query.
• The Stumbling-block of Disobedience and Rebellion, Cunningly Imputed By P. H. Unto Calvin, Remov’d, In a Letter to the Said P. H. From J. H.
• A Letter Unto Mr. Stubs, In Answer to His Oceana Weighed, &c.
• Politicaster: Or, a Comical Discourse In Answer to Mr. Wren ’s Book, Intituled, Monarchy Asserted, Against Mr. Harrington’ S Oceana.
• Pour Enclouer Le Canon.
• A Discourse Upon This Saying: the Spirit of the Nation Is Not Yet to Be Trusted With Liberty; Lest It Introduce Monarchy, Or Invade the Liberty of Conscience.
• A Discourse Shewing, That the Spirit of Parliaments, With a Council In the Intervals, Is Not to Be Trusted For a Settlement; Lest It Introduce Monarchy, and Persecution For Conscience.
• A Parallel of the Spirit of the People With the Spirit of Mr. Rogers; and an Appeal Thereupon Unto the Reader, Whether the Spirit of the People, Or the Spirit of Men Like Mr. Rogers, Be the Fitter to Be Trusted With the Government.
• A Sufficient Answer to Mr. Stubb.
• A Proposition In Order to the Proposing of a Commonwealth Or Democracy.
• The Rota: Or, a Model of a Free State, Or Equal Commonwealth.

THE FIRST BOOK, CONTAINING

The first Preliminary of Oceana, inlarg’d, interpreted, and vindicated from all such Mistakes or Slanders as have bin alleg’d against it under the Notion of Objections.

• Ἐι μὴ ϰρατίϛοις ἤρησας γελοῖ[Editor: illegible character] ὢν
• Θιγών σ’ ἐμὰς μὲν[Editor: illegible character]ϰ ἄν ωႨ ἐμίανον χείρας.

A full Answer to all such Objections as have hitherto bin made against Oceana.

NEITHER the author or authors of the considerations upon Oceana, nor any other, have yet so much as once pretended one contradiction or one inequality to be in the whole commonwealth. Now this is certain, That frame of government which is void of any contradiction, or any inequality, is void of all internal causes of dissolution, and must, for so much as it imbraces, have attain’d to full perfection. This by wholesale is a full answer to the considerations, with all other objections hitherto; and will be (with any man that comprehends the nature of government) to thousands of such books, or myriads of such tittle tattle. Nevertheless, because every man is not provided with a sum, in the following discourse I shall comply with them that must have things by retail, or somwhat for their farthing.

The PREFACE.

IT is commonly said, and not without incouragement by som who think they have Parnassus by the horns, that the university has lash’d me: so it seems I have to do with the university, and lashing is lawful; with both which I am contented. In Moorfields, while the people are busy at their sports, they often and ridiculously lose their buttons, their ribbands, and their purses, where if they light, as somtimes they do, upon the masters of that art, they fall a kicking them a while (which one may call a rude charge) and then to their work again. I know not whether I invite you to Moorfields, but (difficile est satiram non scribere) all the favor I desire at your hands is but this, that you would not so condemn one man for kicking, as in the same act to pardon another for cutting of purses. A gentleman that commits a fallacious argument to writing, or gos about to satisfy others with such reasons as he is not satisfy’d with himself, is no more a gentleman but a pickpocket; with this in my mind, I betake my self to my work, or rather to draw open the curtain, and begin the play.

ONE that has written considerations upon Oceana, speaks the prolog in this manner:Epist.I beseech you gentlemen, are not we the writers of politics somwhat a ridiculous sort of people? is it not a fine piece of folly for private men sitting in their cabinets to rack their brains about models of government? certainly our labors make a very pleasant recreation for those great personages, who, sitting at the helm of affairs, have by their large experience not only acquir’d the perfect art of ruling, but have attain’d also to the comprehension of the nature and foundation of government. In which egregious complement the considerer has lost his considering cap.

IT was in the time of Alexander, the greatest prince and commander of his age, that Aristotle, with scarce inferior applause and equal fame, being a private man, wrote that excellent piece of prudence in his cabinet, which is call’d his politics, going upon far other principles than those of Alexander’s government, which it has long outliv’d. The like did Titus Livius in the time of Augustus, Sir Thomas Moor in the time of Henry the Eighth, and Machiavel when Italy was under princes that afforded him not the ear. These works nevertheless are all of the most esteemed and applauded in this kind; nor have I found any man, whose like indeavours have bin persecuted since Plato by Dionysius. I study not without great examples, nor out of my calling; either arms or this art being the proper trade of a gentleman. A man may be intrusted with a ship, and a good pilot too, yet not understand how to make sea-charts. To say that a man may not write of government except he be a magistrat, is as absurd as to say, that a man may not make a sea-chart, unless he be a pilot. It is known that Christopher Columbus made a chart in his cabinet, that found out the Indys. The magistrat that was good at his steerage never took it ill of him that brought him a chart, seeing whether he would use it or no, was at his own choice; and if flatterers, being the worst sort of crows, did not pick out the eys of the living, the ship of government at this day throout Christendom had not struck so often as she has don.Arte della Guer. Proem.To treat of affairs, says Machiavel, which as to the conduct of ’em appertain to others, maybe thought a great boldness; but if I commit errors in writing, these may be known without danger, wheras i they commit errors in acting, such com not otherwise to be known, than in the ruin of the commonwealth. For which cause I presume to open the scene of my discourse, which is to change according to the variety of these following questions:

1. Whether prudence will be well distinguish’d into antient and modern?

2. Whether a commonwealth be rightly defin’d to be a government of laws, and not of men: and monarchy to be a government of som man, or a few men, and not of laws?

3. Whether the balance of dominion in land be the natural cause of empire?

4. Whether the balance of empire be well divided into national and provincial? and whether these two, or any nations that are of distinct balance, coming to depend upon one and the same head, such a mixture creates a new balance?

5. Whether there be any common right or interest of mankind distinct from the parts taken severally? and how by the orders of a commonwealth this may best be distinguish’d from privat interest?

6. Whether the senatusconsulta, or decrees of the Roman senat, had the power of laws?

7. Whether the ten commandments propos’d by GOD or Moses were voted by the people of Israel?

8. Whether a commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind, coms not up to the perfection of government, and has no flaw in it?

9. Whether monarchy, coming up to the perfection of the kind, coms not short of the perfection of government, and has not som flaw in it? in which is also treated of the balance of France, of the original of a landed clergy, of arms, and their kinds.

10. Whether a commonwealth that was not first broken by it self was ever conquer’d by any monarch?

11. Whether there be not an agrarian, or som law or laws of that nature to supply the defect of it, in every commonwealth? and whether the agrarian, as it is stated in Oceana, be not equal and satisfactory to all interests or partys?

12. Whether courses or a rotation be necessary to a well-order’d commonwealth? in which is contain’d the parembole or courses of Israel before the captivity; together with an epitome of the whole commonwealth of Athens, as also another of the commonwealth of Venice.

Chap. I.

Antient and Modern Prudence.

CHAP. I.

Whether Prudence be well distinguish’d into Antient and Modern.

THE considerer (where by antient prudence I understand the policy of a commonwealth, and by modern prudence that of king, lords, and commons, which introduc’d by the Goths and Vandals upon the ruin of the Roman empire, has since reign’d in these western countrys, till by the predominating of som one of the three parts, it be now almost universally extinguish’d) thinks it enough for the confutation of this distinction, to shew out of Thucydides that of monarchy to be a more antient policy than that of a commonwealth. Upon which occasion, I must begin here to discover that which, the further I go, will be the more manifest; namely, that there is a difference between quoting authors, and saying some part of them without book: this may be don by their words, but the former no otherwise than by keeping to their sense. Now the sense of Thucydides, as he is translated by Mr. Hobbs in the place alleg’d, is thus:Thu. R. 1. P. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.The manner, says he, of living in the most antient times of Greece was thieving; the stronger going abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to inrich themselves, and fetch home maintenance for the weak: for there was neither traffic, property of lands, nor constant abode, till M nosbuilt a navy, and expelling the malefactors out of the islands, planted colonys of his own, by which means they who inhabited the seacoasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings: of whom som, grown now rich, compass’d their towns about with walls For out of a desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty (thus overbalancing at home) with their wealth, brought the lesser citys (abroad) into subjection. Thus Pelops,tho he was a stranger, obtain’d such power in Peloponnesus, that the country was call’d after his name. Thus Atriusobtain’d the kingdom of Mycenæ: and thus kingdoms with honors limited came to be hereditary; and rising to power, proceeded afterwards to the war against Troy. After the war with Troy, tho with much ado, and in a long time Greece had constant rest (and land without doubt came to property) for shifting their seats no longer, at length they sent colonys abroad; the Athenians into Ionia with the islands, the Peloponnesians into Italy, Sicily, and other parts. The power of Greece thus improv’d, and the desire of mony withal, their revenues (in what? not in mony, if yet there was no usury: therefore except a man can shew that there was usury in land) being inlarg’d, in most of the citys there were erected tyrannys. Let us lay this place to the former, when out of a desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty, it caus’d hereditary kingdoms with honors limited, as happen’d also with us since the time of the Goths and Vandals. But when the people came to property in land, and their revenues were inlarg’d, such as assum’d power over them, not according to the nature of their property or balance, were tyrants: well, and what remedy?Consid. p. 4. why, then it was, says the considerer, that the Grecians out of an extreme aversion to that which was the cause of their present sufferings slipt into popular government, not that uponcalm and mature debates they found it best, but that they might put themselves at the greatest distance (which spirit usually accompanys all reformations) from that with which they were grown into dislike.Book I. Wherby he agrees exactly with his author in making out the true force and nature of the balance, working even without deliberation, and whether men will or no. For the government that is natural and easy, being in no other direction than that of the respective balance, is not of choice but of necessity. The policy of king, lords and commons, was not so much from the prudence of our ancestors, as from their necessity. If three hundred men held at this day the like overbalance to the whole people, it was not in the power of prudence to institute any other than the same kind of government, thro the same necessity. Thus the meaner sort with Thucydidessubmitting to the mighty, it came to kingdoms with hereditary honors: but the people coming to be wealthy, call’d their kings, tho they knew not why, tyrants; nay, and using them accordingly, found out means, with as little deliberation it may be as a bull takes to toss a dog, or a hern to split a hawk (that is, rather, as at the long-run they will ever do in the like cases, by instinct, than prudence or debate) to throw down that, which by the mere information of sense they could no longer bear; and which being thrown down, they found themselves eas’d. But the question yet remains, and that is, forsooth, whether of these is to be call’d antient prudence. To this end, never man made a more unlucky choice than the considerer has don for himself of this author, who, in the very beginning of his book, speaking of the Peloponnesian war, or that between the commonwealths of Athens and Lacedemon, says, that the actions which preceded this, and those again that were more antient, tho the truth of them thro length of time cannot by any means be clearly discover’d; yet for any argument that (looking into times far past) he had yet lighted on to persuade him, he dos not think they have bin very great either for matter of war, or otherwise; that is, for matter of peace or government.Mr. Hobbs in the Magire. And lest this should not be plain enough, he calls the prudence of the three periods, observ’d by Mr. Hobbs,viz. that from the beginning of the Grecian memory to the Trojan war, that of the Trojan war it self, and that from thence to the present commonwealths and wars, wherof he treats, the imbecillity of antient times.Thu. b. 1. p. 3. Wherfore certainly this prevaricator, to give him his own fees, has less discretion than a common attorny, who will be sure to examin only those witnesses that seem to make for the cause in which he is entertain’d.Consid. p. 34. Seeing that which he affirms to be antient prudence is depos’d by his own witness to have bin the imbecillity of antient times, for which I could have so many more than I have leisure to examin, that, (to take only of the most authentic) as you have heard one Greec, I shall add no more than one Roman, and that is Florus in his prolog, where (computing the ages of the Romans, in the same manner as Thucydides did those of the Greecs) he affirms the time while he liv’d under their kings, to have bin their infancy; that from the consuls till they conquer’d Italy, their youth; that from hence to their emperors, their manly age; and the rest (with a complement or Salvo to Trajan his present lord) their dotage.

These things, tho originally all government amongst the Greecs and the Romans was regal, are no more than they who have not yet past their novitiat in story, might have known.Consid. p. 2, 3. Yet, says the considerer, it seems to be a defect of experience to think that the Greec and the Roman actions are only considerable in antiquity. But is it such a defect of experience to think them only considerable, as not to think them chiefly considerable in antiquity, or that the name of antient prudence dos not belong to that prudence which was chiefest in antiquity? True, says he, it is very frequent with such as have bin conversant with Greec and Roman authors, to be led by them into a belief that the rest of the world was a rude inconsiderable people, and, which is a term they very much delight in, altogether barbarous. This should be som fine gentleman that would have universitys pull’d down; for the office of a university is no more than to preserve so much of antiquity as may keep a nation from stinking, or being barbarous; which salt grew not in monarchys, but in commonwealths: or whence has the Christian world that religion and those laws which are now common, but from the Hebrews and Romans? or from whence have we arts but from these or the Greecs? that we have a doctor of divinity, or a master of arts, we may thank popular government; or with what languages, with what things are scholars conversant that are otherwise descended? will they so plead their own cause as to tell us it is possible there should be a nation at this day in the world without universitys, or universitys without Hebrew, Greec and Latin, and not be barbarous, that is to say, rude, unlearn’d, and inconsiderable? yes, this humour even among the Greecs and Romans themselves was a servil addiction to narrow principles, and a piece of very pedantical pride. What, man! the Greecs and the Romans that of all other would not serve, servil! their principles, their learning, with whose scraps we set up for batchelors, masters, and doctors of fine things, narrow! their inimitable eloquence a piece of very pedantical pride! the world can never make sense of this any otherwise than that since heads and fellows of colleges became the only Greecs and Romans, the Greecs and Romans are become servily addicted, of narrow principles, very pedants, and prouder of those things they do not understand, than the other were of those they did: for, say they, in this question, the examples of the Babylonians, Persians and Egyptians (not to omit the antient and like modern discoverys of the queen of the Amazons, and of the king of China) cannot without gross partiality be neglected. This is pretty; they who say nothing at all to the policy of these governments, accuse me, who have fully open’d it, of negligence. The Babylonian, Persian, and, for ought appears to the contrary, the Chinese policy, is summ’d up, and far excell’d by that at this day of Turky; and in opening this latter, I have open’d them all, so far from neglect, that I every where give the Turc his due, whose policy I assert to be the best of this kind, tho not of the best kind. But they will bear me down, and but with one argument, which I beseech you mark, that it is absolutely of the best kind; for say they, it is of a more absolute form (has more of the man and less of the law in it) than is to be met with in any kingdom of Europe.

I am amaz’d! this is that kind of government which to hold barbarous, was in the Greecs and Romans pedantical pride, but would be in us, who have not the same temtation of interest, downright folly. The interest of a people is not their guide but their temtation! we that hold our land divided among us, have not the same temtation of interest that had the servil Hebrews, Greecs and Romans; but the same that had the free people of Babylon, Persia and Egypt, where not the people but the prince was sole landlord! O the arts in which these men are masters! to follow the pedantical pride of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, Romulus, were with us downright folly; but to follow humble and learned Mahomet or Ottoman, in whose only model the perfection of the Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian policy is consummated, is antient prudence! exquisit politicians! egregious divines, for the leading of a people into Egypt or Babylon! these things consider’d, whether antient prudence, as I have stated it, be downright folly, or as they have stated it, be not downright knavery, I appeal to any court of claims in the world, where the judges, I mean, have not more in their caps than in their heads, and in their sleeves than the scarlet. And wheras men love compendious works, if I gain my cause, the reader, for an answer to the Oxford book, needs look no further than this chapter. For if riches and freedom be the end of government; and these men propose nothing but slavery, beggery, and Turcism, what need more words?

CHAP. II.

Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defin’d to be a Government of Laws and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of som Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws?

THAT part of the preliminarys which the prevaricator, as is usual with him, recites in this place falsly and fraudulently, is thus: relation had to these two times (that of antient and that of modern prudence) the one, as is computed by Janotti, ending with the liberty of Rome, the other beginning with the arms of Cæsar (which extinguishing liberty, became the translation of antient into modern prudence, introduc’d in the ruin of the Roman empire by the Goths and Vandals) GOVERNMENT (to define it de jure, or according to antient prudence) is an art wherby a civil society of men is instituted and preserv’d, upon the foundation of common right or interest; or (to followAristotleandLivy) it is an empire of laws, and not of men.

AND government, to define it de facto, or according to modern prudence, is an art wherby som man, or som few men, subject a city or a nation, and rule it according to his or their privat interest; which, because laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a man, or som few familys, may be said to be an empire of men, and not of laws.

Hereby it is plain, whether in an empire of laws, and not of men, as a commonwealth; or in an empire of men, and not of laws, as monarchy: first, That law must equally procede from will, that is, either from the will of the whole people, as in a commonwealth; from the will of one man, as in an absolute, or from the will of a few men, as in a regulated monarchy.

Secondly, That will, whether of one or more, or all, is not presum’d to be, much less to act without a mover.

Thirdly, That the mover of the will is interest.

Fourthly, That interests also being of one, or more, or of all; those of one man, or of a few men, where laws are made accordingly, being more privat than coms duly up to the law, the nature wherof lys not in partiality but in justice, may be call’d the empire of men, and not of laws: and that of the whole people coming up to the public interest (which is no other than common right and justice, excluding all partiality or privat interest) may be call’d the empire of laws, and not of men. By all which put together, wheras it is demonstrable that in this division of government I do not stay at the will, which must have som motive or mover, but go to the first and remotest notion of government, in the foundation and origination ofit, in which lys the credit of this division, and the definition of the several members,Chap. II. that is to say, of interest, whether privat or public; the prevaricator tells me, that this division of government having (he knows not how) lost its credit,Confid. p. 6.the definitions of the several members of it need not be consider’d further, than that they com not at all up to the first and remotest notion of government in the foundation and origination of it, in which lys all the difficulty; and being here neglected, there is little hope the subsequent discourse can have in it the light of probable satisfaction, much less the force of infallible demonstration.

Very good! interest it should seem then is not the first and remotest notion of government, but that which he will outthrow; and at this cast, by saying, that the declaration of the will of the soverain power is call’d law:Consid. p. 8.which if it outlives the person whose will it was, it is only because the persons who succede in power are presum’d to have the same will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the abrogation of the law; so that still the government is not in the law, but in the person whose will gave a being to that law. I might as well say, the declaration to all men by these presents that a man ows mony is call’d a bond; which if it outlives the person that enter’d into that bond, it is only because the persons that succede him in his estate, are presum’d to have the same will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is, the abrogation or cancelling of the bond; so that still the debt is not in the bond, but in his will who gave a being to that bond. If it be alleg’d against this example, that it is a privat one, the case may be put between several princes, states or governments, or between several states of the same principality or government, whether it be a regulated monarchy or a commonwealth; for in the like obligation of the states (as of the king, the lords, and commons) or partys agreeing, authoritate patrum & jussu populi, till the partys that so agreed to the obligation, shall agree to repeal or cancel it, lys all law that is not merely in the will of one man, or of one state, or party, as the oligarchy. But not to dispute these things further in this place, let the government be what it will, for the prevaricator to fetch the origination of law no further than the will (while he knows very well that I fetch’d it from interest, the antecedent of will) and yet to boast that he has outthrown me, I say he is neither an honest man, nor a good bowler. No matter, he will be a better gunner; for where I said that the magistrat upon the bench is that to the law, which a gunner upon his platform is to his cannon, he gos about to take better aim, and says, If the proportion of things be accurately consider’d, it will appear that the laden cannon answers not to the laws, but to the power of the person whose will created those laws: which if som of them that the power of the person whose will created them, intended should be of as good stuff or carriage as the rest, do nevertheless according to the nature of their matter or of their charge, com short or over, and others break or recoil; sure this report of the prevaricator is not according to the bore of my gun, but according to the bore of such a gunner. Yet again, if he be not so good a gunner, he will be a better anatomist: for wheras I affirm, that to say, Aristotle and Cicero wrote not the rights or rules of their politics from the principles of nature, but transcrib’d them into their books out of the practice of their own commonwealths, is as if a man should say of famous Harvey, that he transcrib’d his circulation of the blood, not out of the principles of nature, but out of the anatomy of this or that body: he answers, that the whole force of this objection amounts but to this, that becauseHarveyin his circulation hasfollow’d the principles of nature, therfore Aristotle and Cicero have don so in their discourses of government.

Pretty! it is said in Scripture, Thy word is sweet as hony: amounts that but to this, because hony is sweet, therfore the word of God is sweet? to say that my lord protector has not conquer’d many nations, were as if one should say, Cæsar had not conquer’d many nations: amounts that but to this, because Cæsar conquer’d many nations, therfore my lord protector has conquer’d many nations? what I produce as a similitude, he calls an objection; where I say, as, he says, because: what ingenious man dos not detest such a cheat! a similitude is brought to shew how a thing is or may be, not to prove that it is so; it is us’d for illustration, not as an argument: the candle I held did not set up the post, but shew where the post was set, and yet this blind buzzard has run his head against it. Nor has he yet enough; if he be not the better naturalist, he will be the better divine, tho he should make the worse sermon. My doctrin and use upon that of Solomon,I have seen servants upon horses, and princes walking as servants upon the ground, discovers the true means wherby the principles of power and authority, the goods of the mind and of fortune, may so meet and twine in the wreath or crown of empire, that the government standing upon earth like a holy altar, and breathing perpetual incense to heaven in justice and piety, may be somthing, as it were between heaven and earth; while that only which is propos’d by the best, and resolv’d by the most, becoms law, and so the whole government an empire of laws, and not of men.Consid. p. 7. This he says is a goodby sermon; it is honest, and sense. But let any man make sense or honesty of this doctrin, which is his own; To say that laws do or can govern, is to amuse ourselves with a form of speech, as when we say time, or age, or death, dos such a thing; to which indeed the phansy of poets, and superstition of women, may adapt a person, and give a power of action; but wise men know they are only expressions of such actions or qualifications as belong to things or persons.

Speak out; is it the word of God, or the knavery and nonsense of such preachers that ought to govern? are we to hearken to that of the Talmud, there is more in the word of a scribe, than in the words of the law; or that which Christ therupon says to the Pharisees, You have made the word of God of no effect by your traditions?Mat. 15. 6. say, is the commonwealth to be govern’d in the word of a priest or a Pharisee, or by the vote of the people, and the interest of mankind?

CHAP. III.

Whether the balance of dominion in land be the natural cause of empire?

THE doctrin of the balance is that, tho he strains at it, which choaks the prevaricator; for this of all others is that principle which makes the politics, not so before the invention of the same, to be undeniable throout, and (not to meddle with the mathematics, an art I understand as little as mathematicians do this) the most demonstrable of any whatsoever.

For this cause I shall rather take pleasure than pains to look back, or tread the same path with other, and perhaps plainer steps: as thus; if a man having one hundred pounds a year may keep one servant, or have one man at his command, then having one hundred times so much, he may keep one hundred servants; and this multiply’d by a thousand, he may have one hundred thousand men at his command.Chap. III. Now that the single person, or nobility of any country in Europe, that had but half so many men at command, would be king or prince, is that which I think no man will doubt. But*no mony, no Switzers, as the French speak: if the mony be flown, so are the men also. Tho riches in general have wings, and be apt to bate; yet those in land are the most hooded, and ty’d to the perch, wheras those in mony have the least hold, and are the swiftest of flight. A bank where the mony takes not wing, but to come home seiz’d, or like a coyduck, may well be great; but the treasure of the Indys going out, and not upon returns, makes no bank. Whence a bank never paid an army; or paying an army, soon became no bank. But where a prince or a nobility has an estate in land, the revenue wherof will defray this charge, there their men are planted, have toes that are roots, and arms that bring forth what fruit you please.

Thus a single person is made, or a nobility makes a king, not with difficulty, or any greater prudence, but with ease, the rest coming home, as the ox that only knows his master’s crib, but must starve or repair to it. Nor for the same reason is government acquir’d with more ease than it is preserv’d; that is, if the foundation of property be in land: but if in mony, lightly com, lightly go. The reason why a single person, or the nobility that has one hundred thousand men, or half so many at command, will have the government, is that the estate in land, wherby they are able to maintain so many, in any European territory, must overbalance the rest that remains to the people, at least three parts in four, by which means they are no more able to dispute the government with him or them, than your servant is with you. Now for the same reason, if the people hold three parts in four of the territory, it is plain there can neither be any single person nor nobility able to dispute the government with them; in this case therfore, except force be interpos’d, they govern themselves. So by this computation of the balance of property or dominion in the land, you have according to the threefold foundation of property, the root or generation of the threefold kind of government or empire.

Oceana, p. 39.If one man be sole landlord of a territory, or overbalance the whole people, three parts in four, or thereabouts, he is Grand Signior; for so the Turc, not from his empire, but his property is call’d; and the empire in this case is absolute monarchy.

If the few, or a nobility, or a nobility with a clergy, be landlords to such a proportion as overbalances the people in the like manner, they may make whom they please king; or if they be not pleas’d with their king, down with him and set up whom they like better; a Henry the Fourth, or the Seventh, a Guise, a Montfort, a Nevil, or a Porter, should they find that best for their own ends and purposes: for as not the balance of the king, but that of the nobility in this case is the cause of the government, so not the estate or riches of the prince or captain, but his virtue or ability, or fitness for the ends of the nobility, acquires that command or office. This for aristocracy, or mix’d monarchy. But if the whole people be landlords, or hold the land so divided among them, that no one man or number of men within the compass of the few, or aristocracy overbalance them, it is a commonwealth. Such is the branch in the root, or the balance of property naturally producing empire; which not confuted, no man shall be able to batter my superstructures, and which confuted, I lay down my arms. Till then, if the cause necessarily precede the effect, property must have a being before empire, or beginning with it, must be still first in order.

Property coms to have a being before empire or government two ways, either by a natural or violent revolution. Natural revolution happens from within, or by commerce, as when a government erected upon one balance, that for example of a nobility or a clergy, thro the decay of their estates coms to alter to another balance; which alteration in the root of property, leaves all to confusion, or produces a new branch or government, according to the kind or nature of the root. Violent revolution happens from without, or by arms, as when upon conquest there follows confiscation. Confiscation again is of three kinds, when the captain taking all to himself, plants his army by way of military colonys, benefices, or timars, which was the policy of Mahomet; or when the captain has som shares, or a nobility that divides with him, which was the policy introduc’d by the Goths and Vandals; or when the captain divides the inheritance by lots, or otherwise, to the whole people; which policy was instituted by God or Moses in the commonwealth of Israel. This triple distribution, whether from natural or violent revolution, returns as to the generation of empire to the same thing, that is, to the nature of the balance already stated and demonstrated. Now let us see what the prevaricator will say, which first is this:

Consid. p. 14.THE assertion, that property producing empire consists only in land, appears too positive. A pig of my own sow; this is no more than I told him, only there is more imply’d in what I told him, than he will see; which therfore I shall now further explain. The balance in mony may be as good or better than that of land in three cases. First, where there is no property of land yet introduc’d, as in Greece during the time of her antient imbecillity; whence, as is noted by Thucydides,the meaner sort thro a desire of gain underwent the servitude of the mighty. Secondly, in citys of small territory and great trade, as Holland and Genoa, the land not being able to feed the people, who must live upon traffic, is overbalanc’d by the means of that traffic, which is mony. Thirdly, in a narrow country, where the lots are at a low scantling, as among the Israelits, if care be not had of mony in the regulation of the same, it will eat out the balance of land.Deut. 15. 6. & 23. 19. For which cause, tho an Israelit might both have mony, and put it to usury (thou shalt lend [upon usury] to many nations) yet might he not lend it upon usury to a citizen or brother: whence two things are manifest: first, that usury in itself is not unlawful: and next, that usury in Israel was no otherwise forbidden, than as it might com to overthrow the balance or foundation of the government; for where a lot as to the general amounted not perhaps to four acres, a man that should have had a thousand pounds in his purse, would not have regarded such a lot in comparison of his mony; and he that should have bin half so much in debt, would have bin quite eaten out. Usury is of such a nature, as, not forbidden in the like cases, must devour the government. The Roman people, while their territory was no bigger, and their lots, which exceeded not two acres a man, were yet scantier, were flead alive with it; and if they had not help’d themselves by their tumults, and the institution of their tribuns, it had totally ruin’d both them and their government. In a commonwealth, whose territory is very small, the balance of the government being laid upon the land, as in Lacedemon, it will not be sufficient to forbid usury, but mony itself must be forbidden. Whence Lycurgus allow’d of none, or of such only as being of old, or otherwise useless iron, was little better, or if you will, little worse than none. The prudence of which law appear’d in the neglect of it, as when Lysander, general for the Lacedemonians in the Peloponnesian war, having taken Athens, and brought home the spoil of it, occasion’d the ruin of that commonwealth in her victory. The land of Canaan compar’d with Spain or England, was at the most but a Yorkshire, and Laconia was less than Canaan. Now if we imagin Yorkshire divided, as was Canaan into six hundred thousand lots, or as was Laconia, into thirty thousand; a Yorkshire man having one thousand pounds in his purse, would, I believe, have a better estate in mony than in land; wherfore in this case, to make the land hold the balance, there is no way but either that of Israel by forbidding usury, or that of Lacedemon by forbidding mony. Where a small sum may com to overbalance a man’s estate in land, there I say usury or mony for the preservation of the balance in land, must of necessity be forbidden, or the government will rather rest upon the balance of mony, than upon that of land, as in Holland and Genoa. But in a territory of such extent as Spain, or England, the land being not to be overbalanc’d by mony, there needs no forbidding of mony or usury. In Lacedemon merchandize was forbidden, in Israel and Rome it was not exercis’d; wherfore to these usury must have bin the more destructive: but in a country where merchandize is exercis’d, it is so far from being destructive, that it is necessary; else that which might be of profit to the commonwealth would rust unprofitably in private purses, there being no man that will venture his mony but thro hope of som gain; which if it be so regulated that the borrower may gain more by it than the lender, as at four in the hundred, or therabouts, usury becoms a mighty profit to the public, and a charity to privat men; in which sense we may not be persuaded by them that do not observe these different causes, that it is against Scripture. Had usury to a brother bin permitted in Israel, that government had bin overthrown: but that such a territory as England or Spain cannot be overbalanc’d by mony, whether it be a scarce or plentiful commodity, whether it be accumulated by parsimony as in the purse of Henry the 7th, or presented by fortune, as in the revenue of the Indys, is sufficiently demonstrated, or shall be.

Consid. p. 12.First, by an argument ad hominem, one good enough for the prevaricator, who argues thus: The wisdom or the riches of another man can never give him a title to my obedience, nor oblige Mr. Harrington to give his clothes or mony to the next man he meets, wiser or richer than himself.

If he had said stronger, he had spoil’d all; for the parting with a man’s clothes or mony in that case, cannot be help’d: now the richer, as to the case in debate, is the stronger, that is, the advantage of strength remains to the balance. But well; he presumes me to have clothes and mony of my own, let him put the same case in the people, or the similitude does not hold. But if the people have clothes and mony of their own, these must either rise (for the bulk) out of property in land, or at least out of the cultivation of the land, or the revenue of industry; which if it be dependent, they must give such a part of their clothes and mony to preserve that dependence out of which the rest arises to him or them on whom they depend, as he or they shall think fit, or parting with nothing to this end, must lose all; that is, if they be tenants, they must pay their rent, or turn out. So if they have clothes or mony dependently, the balance of land is in the landlord or landlords of the people: but if they have clothes and mony independently, then the balance of land must of necessity be in the people themselves, in which case they neither would, if there were any such, nor can, because there be no such, give their mony or clothes to such as are wiser, or richer, or stronger than themselves. So it is not a man’s clothes and mony or riches, that oblige him to acknowledge the title of his obedience to him that is wiser or richer, but a man’s no clothes or mony, or his poverty, with which, if the prevaricator should come to want, he could not so finely prevaricat but he must serve som body, so he were rich, no matter if less wise than himself. Wherfore seeing the people cannot be said to have clothes and mony of their own without the balance in land, and having the balance in land, will never give their clothes, or mony, or obedience to a single person, or a nobility, tho these should be the richer in mony; the prevaricator by his own argument has evinc’d that in such a territory as England or Spain, mony can never com to overbalance land.

For a second demonstration of this truth, Henry the Seventh, tho he miss’d of the Indys, in which for my part I think him happy, was the richest in mony of English princes. Nevertheless this accession of revenue did not at all preponderat on the king’s part, nor change the balance. But while making farms of a standard he increas’d the yeomanry, and cutting off retainers he abas’d the nobility, began that breach in the balance of land, which proceding has ruin’d the nobility, and in them that government.

For a third, the monarchy of Spain since the silver of Potosi sail’d up the Guadalquivir, which in English is, since that king had the Indys, stands upon the same balance in the lands of the nobility on which it always stood.

Consid. p. 16.And so the learned conclusion of the prevaricator (That it is not to be doubted but a revenue sufficient to maintain a force able [to cry ware horns] or beat down all opposition, dos equally conduce to empire, whether it arises from rents, lands, profits of ready mony, dutys, customs, &c.) asks you no more than where you saw her premises. For unless they ascended his monti, and his banks, it is not to be imagin’d which way they went; and with these, because he is a profest zealot for monarchy, I would wish him by no means to be montebanking or meddling: for the purse of a prince never yet made a bank, nor, till spending and trading mony be all one, ever shall. The Genoese, which the king of Spain could never do with the Indys, can make you a bank out of letters of exchange, and the Hollander with herrings. Let him com no more here: where there is a bank, ten to one there is a commonwealth. A king is a soldier, or a lover, neither of which makes a good merchant, and without merchandize you will have a lean bank. It is true, the family of the Medici were both merchants and made a bank into a throne: but it was in commonwealth of merchants, in a small territory, by great purchases in land, and rather in a mere confusion than under any settl’d government; which causes, if he can give them all such another meeting, may do as much for another man. Otherwise let it be agreed and resolv’d, that in a territory of any extent, the balance of empire consists in land and not in mony; always provided that in case a prince has occasion to run away, as Henry the Third of France did out of Poland, his balance in ready mony is absolutely the most proper for the carrying on of so great and sudden an enterprize.

It is an excellent way of disputing, when a man has alleg’d no experience, no example, no reason, to conclude with no doubt. Certainly upon such occasions it is not unlawful nor unreasonable to be merry. Reasons, says one comedian, are not so common as blackberrys. For all that, says another comedian, no doubt but arevenue in taxes is as good as a revenue in feesimple; for this, in brief, is the sense of his former particular, or that part of it, which, the monti and the banks being already discharg’d, remains to be answer’d. Yet that the rents and profits of a man’s land in feesimple or property, com in naturally and easily, by common consent or concernment, that is, by virtue of the law founded upon the public interest, and therfore voluntarily establish’d by the whole people, is an apparent thing. So a man that will receive the rents and profits of other mens land, must either take them by mere force, or bring the people to make a law divesting themselves of so much of their property; which upon the matter is all one, because a people possest of the balance, cannot be brought to make such a law, further than they see necessary for their common defence, but by force, nor to keep it any longer than that force continues. It is true, there is not only such a thing in nature as health, but sickness too: nor do I deny that there is such a thing as a government against the balance. But look about, seek, find where it stood, how it was nam’d, how lik’d, or how long it lasted. Otherwise the comical proposition coms to this, it is not to be doubted but that violence may be permanent or durable, and the blackberry, for it is because nature is permanent or durable! what other construction can be made of these words? it is not to be doubted but a revenue sufficient to maintain a force able to beat down all opposition (that is, a force able to raise such a revenue) dos equally (on which word grows the blackberry) conduce to empire; that is, as much as could any natural balance of the same! he may stain mouths, as he has don som, but he shall never make a politician. The earth yields her natural increase without losing her heart; but if you com once to force her, look your force continue, or she yields you nothing: and the balance of empire consisting of earth, is of the nature of her element.

Divines are given to speak much of things which the considerer balks in this place that wou’d check them, to the end he may fly out with them in others, wherto they do not belong, as where he says, that government is founded either upon paternity, and the natural advantage the first father had over all the rest of mankind, who were his sons;Consid. p. 23.or else from the increase of strength or power in som man or men, to whose will the rest submit, that by their submission they may avoid such mischief as otherwise would be brought upon them. Which two vagarys are to be fetch’d home to this place.

For the former; if Adam had liv’d till now, he could have seen no other than his own children; and so that he must have bin king by the right of nature, was his peculiar prerogative. But whether the eldest son of his house, if the prevaricator can find him at this time of day, has the same right, is somwhat disputable; because it was early when Abraham and Lot divided territorys, became several kings: and not long after when the sons of Jacob being all patriarchs, by the appointment of God, whose right sure was not inferior to that of Adam, tho he had liv’d, came under popular government. Wherfore the advantage of a first father is for grave men a pleasant fancy; nevertheless if he had liv’d till now, I hope they understand that the whole earth would have bin his demeans, and so the balance of his property must have answer’d to his empire, as did that also of Abraham and Lot to theirs. Wherfore this way of deduction coms directly home again to the balance.De jure belli, l. 1. c. 3.Paterfamilias Latifundia possidens, & neminem alia lege in suas terras recipiens quam ut ditioni suæ, qui recipiuntur, se subjiciant, est Rex, says Grotius. Fathers of familys are of three sorts, either a sole landlord, as Adam, and then he is an absolute monarch; or a few landlords, as Lot and Abraham, with the patriarchs of those days; who if they join’d not together, were so many princes; or if they join’d made a mix’d monarchy; or, as Grotius believes, a kind of commonwealth administer’d in the land of Canaan by Melchisedec, to whom as king and priest Abraham paid tithes of all that he had. Such a magistracy was also that of Jethro, king and priest in the commonwealth of Midian. Father of familys for the third sort, as when the multitude are landlords (which happen’d in the division of the land of Canaan) make a commonwealth. And thus much, however it was out of the prevaricator’s head in the place now deduc’d, he, excepting no further against the balance than that it might consist as well in mony as in land, had confest before.

His second vagary is in his deduction of empire from increase of strength, for which we must once more round about our coalfire. The strength wherby this effect can be expected, consists not in a pair of fists, but in an army; and an army is a beast with a great belly, which subsists not without very large pastures: so if one man has sufficient pasture, he may feed such a beast; if a few have the pasture, they must feed the beast, and the beast is theirs that feed it. But if the people be the sheep of their own pastures, they are not only a flock of sheep, but an army of lions, tho by som accidents, as I confest before, they be for a season confinable to their dens. So the advantage or increase of strength depends also upon the balance. There is nothing in the world to swear this principle out of countenance, but the fame of Phalaris, Gelon, Dionysius, Agathocles, Nabis,&c. with which much good do them that like it. It is proper to a government upon the balance to take root at home, and spread outwards; and to a government against the balance to seek a root abroad, and to spread inwards. The former is sure, but the latter never successful. Agathocles for having conquer’d Africa, took not the better root in Syracusa. Parvi sunt arma foras, nisi sit consilium domi.

To conclude this chapter; the prevaricator gives me this thanks for finding out the balance of dominion (being as antient in nature as her self, and yet as new in art as my writing) that I have given the world cause to complain of a great disappointment, who, while at my hand that satisfaction in the principles of government was expected, which several great wits had in vain study’d, have in diversifying riches in words only, as property, dominion, agrarian, balance, made up no more than a new lexicon, expressing the same thing that was known before; seeing the opinion that riches are power is (as antient as the first book of Thucydides, or the politics of Aristotle, and) not omitted by Mr.Hobbs, or any other politician. Which is as if he had told Dr. Harvey, that wheras the blood is the life was an opinion as antient as Moses, and no girl ever prick’d her finger, but knew it must have a course; he had given the world cause to complain of great disappointment in not shewing a man to be made of gingerbread, and his veins to run malmsy.

Chap. IV.

CHAP. IV.

Whether the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial; and whether these two, or any Nations that are of distinct Balance, coming to depend upon one and the same Head, such a mixture creates a new Balance.

THE balance of empire that is national, as it is stated in the former chapter, stands in a regulated or mix’d monarchy upon the property or native interest of the nobility; in a commonwealth, upon the property or native interest of the people; so these are very natural. But the balance of absolute monarchy, partaking of force as well as nature, is a mix’d thing, and not much different from the balance of provincial empire, or the manner of holding a province or conquer’d country. In a province, if the native that is rich be admitted to power, the power grows up native, and overtops the foren: therfore you must either not plant your citizens in your provinces, where in time they will become native; or, so planting them, neither trust them with power nor with arms. Thus the provincial balance coms to be contrary to the national. And as where empire is native or national, the administration of it can be no otherwise than according to the national balance; so where empire is foren or provincial, the administration of it can be no otherwise than contrary to the national balance.Consid. p. 16, 17. That this may be admitted without opposition the considerer is inclining to allow, always provided he be satisfy’d in this demand, whether distinct balances under the same head or governor, as those of Castile and Arragon, the power of the king (I presume he means by the balance of a nobility) being greater in the one, and that of the people in the other, may not so poise one the other, as to produce a new balance. To which I answer, That no one government whatsoever has any more than one of two balances; that except in the cases excepted, of land which is national, or that of arms which is provincial. Wherfore if the king of Spain by his war against the commons altered the balance of Arragon, it must have bin one of two ways, either by strengthning the balance of the nobility, and governing the Arragonian people by them, in which case their balance, tho altered, remained yet national; or by holding both nobility and people by a provincial governor and an army, in which case his empire in that kingdom is provincial. There is no third way; nor, putting the case that the balance of Castile be national, and that of Arragon provincial, dos this any more create in the monarchy of Spain a third balance of empire, than did the multiplication of associations and provinces, divers for their balances, in the commonwealth of Rome. England and Scotland being united in one prince, made, if it had bin rightly us’d, an increase of strength, but not a third balance; nor do the kingdoms in Spain. Whether a soverainty has many territorys and provinces in subjection, or in league, it is all one as to this point; the stronger union or league will give the stronger balance: and the case of the present soveraintys in Europe being no other, the more nice than wise speculation of the considerer, who has not bin able to discern the balance of a league from that of empire, is a mare’s nest.

CHAP. V.

Whether there be any common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the parts taken severally; and how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may be best distinguish’d from privat Interest.

IN the next place the prevaricator dos not go about to play the man, but the unlucky boy. Where I say that the soul of man is mistress of two potent rivals, reason and passion; he dos not stand to weigh the truth of the thing, or the fitness of the comparison, either of which had been fair; but tumbles Dick upon Sis, the logic upon the rhetoric, the sense upon the figure, and scuds away in this manner:Consid. p. 19. 20.If I could be persuaded Mr.Harringtonwas so far in earnest, as to expect any man shou’d be convinc’d by the metaphorical use of two or three words, som farther consideration might be propos’d. This is to use his readers as the fox dos the dogs, when having pist upon his tail, and flapt it in their eys, he gets away. Dos not his book deserve to be gilded and carry’d in statesmen’s pokes? alas! mine are nothing? Quis leget hæc? vel duo, vel nemo: they break the stationer. And yet let me comfort myself, whose are better? the prevaricator seems to set every whit as light by those of Hooker and Grotius, at least where they favor me. The opinions ofGrotius, says he, cannot oblige us beyond the reasons wheron they are founded; and what are those? he will dispute against that which he dares not repeat: that his comment may take you by the nose, he has left out the text. The words of Grotius are of this sense:In Proleg. de jure B. ac P.Tho it be truly said that the creatures are naturally carry’d to their proper utility, this ought not to be taken in too general a sense, seeing divers of them abstain from their own profit, either in regard of those of the same kind, or at least of their young. Which words, says the prevaricator, carry a great restriction in them, and the way of producing actions in beasts is so different from the emanation of human reason (mark the impostor! the author is speaking of natural affection, and he wipes out that, and puts in human reason) that the inferences from (the natural affection of) the one, to the (degree of reason which is in the) other, must needs be very weak. Excellent! dos it therfore follow that the eminent degree of reason, wherwithal God has indu’d man, must in him deface that natural affection, and desertion in some cases of privat for common good, which is apparent even in beasts? what do reverend divines mean to cry up this infidel? nay, is not be worse than an infidel that provides not for his own family? a commonwealth is but a great family; and a family is a little commonwealth. Even beasts, in sparing out of their own mouths, and exposing themselves to danger for their young, provide for their familys; and in providing for their familys, provide for their whole commonwealth; that is, forsake in som things their privat good and safety, for the good of the public, or of the kind.Book 1. In this case it is that even stones or heavy things, says Hooker,forsake their ordinary wont or centre, and fly upwards to relieve the distress of nature in common. Wretch that he is, shall a stone upon this occasion fly upwards, and will he have a man to go downwards! yes, Mr.Hooker’sexpression, says he, is altogether figurative; and it is easier to prove from thence that things wanting sense make discourses, and act by election, than that there is such a thing as a common interestof mankind.Chap. V. This is like the rest, Hooker speaks of the necessity that is in nature, and this gentleman translates that sense into the word election. So because a stone is necessitated to comply with the common interest of nature, without discourse or election; therfore it rather follows from hence, that things wanting sense make discourses, and act by election, than that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind. His old trick. I do not say, that because it is so with the other creatures, therfore it must be so with man: but as we see it is with the creatures in this part, so we find it to be with man. And that so, and more than so, we find it to be with man (who tho he be evil, gives good things to his children, will work hard, lay up, deny himself, venture his life for his little commonwealth) is thus further demonstrated. All civil laws acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind, and all civil laws procede from the nature of man; therfore it is in the nature of man to acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind. Upon this acknowledgement of mankind, a man that steals is put to death, which certainly is none of his privat interest: nor is a man put to death for any other man’s privat interest: therfore there is a common interest of mankind distinct from the parts taken severally. But this, tho acknowleg’d in part by all governments, yet thro their natural frailty is nothing so well provided for in som as in others: for if the power be in one or a few men, one or a few men, we know, may be thieves, and the rather, because applying mony that is public, without a consideration that is public, to uses that are privat, is thieving. But such thieves will not be hang’d; in this case therfore the government gos not upon public but privat interest. In the frame of such a government as can go upon no other than the public interest, consists that whole philosophy of the soul which concerns policy: and this whole philosophy of the soul being throout the commonwealth of Oceana demonstrated; for the prevaricator to insinuat that I have omitted it, is to shew what it is that he loves more than truth. The main of this philosophy consists in deposing passion, and advancing reason to the throne of empire. I expected news in this place, that this were to promise more for the magistrat or the people than has bin perform’d by the stoics; but two girls, meaning no body any harm, have provok’d his wrath, forsooth, to such extravagancy by the way, that tho in all modesty it were forbid, as he confesses, by their cheeks, which discovering the green-sickness, shew’d that they were past the rod, he has taken them up! Tantæne animis cælestibus iræ! what he may have in school-divinity for so rude a charge, I do not know; but he shall never be able to shew any maxims for this kind of disciplin or philosophy of the soul, either in chevalry or the politics. The offence of the girls was no more, than that having a cake (by the gift of an uncle or aunt, or by purchase, or such a one perhaps as was of their own making) in common, or between them, the one had most accuratly divided, and the other was about to chuse; when in coms this rude fellow:Consid. p. 22, 23.how now, gentlemen, says he, what dividing and chusing! will no less serve your turn than the whole mystery of a well-order’d commonwealth? who has taught you to cast away passion, an’t please you, like the bran, and work up reason as pure as the flower of your cake? are you acquainted with the author of Oceana, that has seen foren countrys, convers’d with the speculativi, learn’d of the most serene ladyVenetiato work with bobbins, makes you a magistracy like a pippin py, and sells butterprints with S. P. Q. R? have don, as you dread ballads, fusty pamphlets, or the ostracism of Billingsgate. Have don, I say: will you vy that green in your cheeks with the purple of the state? must your mother, who was never there her self, seek you in the oven?com, when I live to seeMachiavelin pufpaste, a commonwealth com out of a bakehouse, where smocks were the boulters, let me be a mill-horse—But now you must know coms the best jest of all, and I need not say that it coms from Oxford; he tells them that their cake is do (let it not be lost I beseech you) and so snatching it away, eats it, for all the world as Jackpudding eats the custard. Did you ever see such a bestia?

But wheras either office, that of dividing or chusing, was communicable to either of the girls, it is not indifferent in the distribution of a commonwealth, because dividing is separating one thing, one reason, one interest, or consideration from another, which they that can so discern in privat affairs are call’d discrete, but they that can do it in public are prudent; and the way of this kind of dividing in the language of a commonwealth is debating. But they that are capable of this kind of dividing or debating are few among many, that when things are thus divided and debated, are able enough to chuse, which in the language of a commonwealth is to resolve. Hence it is that the debate of the few, because there be but few that can debate, is the wisest debate; and the result of the many (because every man has an interest what to chuse, and that choice which sutes with every man’s interest, excludes the distinct or privat interest or passion of any man, and so coms up to the common and public interest or reason) is the wisest result. To this end, God, who dos nothing in vain, has so divided mankind into the few or the natural aristocracy, and the many or the natural democracy, that there can hardly be upon any occasion a meeting of twenty men, wherin it will not be apparent, or in which you may not see all those lines which are requisite to the face of a beautiful commonwealth. For example, among any twenty men occasionally met, there will be some few, perhaps six, excelling the fourteen in greatness of parts. These six falling into discourse of business, or giving their judgment upon persons or things, tho but by way of mere conversation, will discover their abilitys; wherupon they shall be listen’d to and regarded by the fourteen; that is, the six will acquire an authority with, and imprint a reverence upon the fourteen: which action and passion in the Roman commonwealth were call’d authoritas patrum, & verecundia plebis. Nevertheless if the six indeavor to extend the authority which they find thus acquir’d, to power, that is, to bring the fourteen to terms or conditions of obedience, or such as would be advantageous to the few, but prejudicial to the many; the fourteen will soon find, that consenting, they hurt not only themselves by indamaging their own interests, but hurt the six also, who by this means com to lose their virtue, and so spoil their debate, which, while such advantages are procurable to themselves, will go no further upon the common good, but their privat benefit. Wherfore in this case they will not consent, and not consenting, they preserve not only their own liberty, but the integrity of the six also, who perceiving that they cannot impair the common interest, have no other interest left but to improve it. And neither any conversation, nor any people, how dull soever and subject by fits to be deluded, but will soon see thus much, which is enough, because what is thus propos’d by the authority of the six or of the senat, and resolv’d by the fourteen, or by the people, is enacted by the whole, and becoms that law, than which, tho mankind be not infallible, there can be nothing less fallible in mankind. Art is the imitation of nature; by observation of such lines as these in the face of nature, a politician limns his commonwealth.Consid. p. 26. But says the prevaricator, the paralogism lys in this, that the twenty men are first suppos’d to be a commonwealth, and then it is consider’dhow they would dispose of the government. What is this? art is the imitation of nature; therfore art presumes nature to be art. A picture is the representation of a face; therfore the picture-drawer presum’d the face to be a picture; and in this same, there is lying, being, or squatting, a thing call’d a paralogism. Did you ever hear such a paraketism? for to speak a word without understanding the sense of it, is like a parrat. And yet I wrong the parrat in this comparison; for she, tho she do not understand her self, is understood by others, wheras neither can this prevaricator tell what he means, nor any man else. Or riddle me, riddle me what is this?Consid. p. 27.the sense of want among men that are in equality of power may beget a desire of exchange; as let me have your horse, and you shall have my cow, which is the fountain of privat contracts: but it is not to be with reason imagin’d, that this should be enough to make a man part with a natural freedom, and put himself into the hands of a power from which he can afterwards have no shield, tho it should be us’d to his own destruction.

Most victorious nonsense! for he that says nothing, cannot be answer’d. It should seem, if the twenty men were indeed a commonwealth, or in equality of power, for so he puts the case, they might truck horses and cows, but not by any means consider, or once let it enter into their heads, how by art to make good their natural freedom: that (unless they set up a prince, as you shall see anon) were to part with their natural freedom, and put themselves into the hands of a power from which (there being no other power but themselves) they can afterwards have no shield. To read it throughly for the understanding, as is intimated in his epistle, will be more; I doubt, than his book will obtain of any reader. Yet is he, in his own conceit, as surefooted as any mule, and knows the road. But Mr. Harringtonhas not lost his way without company; his brother Grotiuscomplains, that they who treat of jus gentium, do commonly mistake som part of the Roman jus civile for it: and even so he laments (an’t please you) that while men profess to consider the principles of government, they fall upon notions which are the mere effects of government. But as an ape is the more ugly for being like a man, so this prevaricator, for making faces like Grotius. I, who am complain’d of, deriving government from the true principle of the same, in the balance or foundation, set the superstructures accordingly; and he who complains forsooth, never so much as proposes any thing like a principle or superstructure, but runs altogether upon mere notions:Consid p. 23. as where he asks me, what security will you give, that the six in their consultations shall not rather aim at their own advantage, than that of the fourteen, and so make use of the eminence of their parts to circumvent the rest? in another place he can answer himself and say, that the fourteen, or the people in this constitution, have the vote and the sword too. How then should the six circumvent them? what security has a prince, that his people will not pull him out of his throne? why, a nobility or an army: and are not the people in a commonwealth their own army? is this to mind principles? on the other side, how, says he, shall we be satisfied that the fourteen will not soon begin to think themselves wife enough to consult too, and making use of their excess in power, pull the six off their cushions? as if there were any experience public or privat, any sense or reason, that men having the whole power in their own hands, would deprive themselves of counsillors; or that ever a commonwealth depos’d the senat, or can depose the senat, and remain a commonwealth. The people of Capua being inrag’d to the full height, resolv’d and assembl’d together (the senat, if the people will, being always in their power) on purpose to cut the throats of the senators, when Pacuvius Calavius exhorted them that e’er they went upon the design, they would first make election among themselves of a new senat, which, the throats of the old being cut, might for the safety of the commonwealth immediately take their places; for, said he,*you must either have a king, which is to be abhor’d; or whatever becoms of this, you must have som other senat: for the senat is a council of such a nature as without it no free city can subsist. By which speech of Pacuvius, the people, who thought themselves, as the considerer has it, wise enough to consult, being convinc’d, fell to work for the election of a succeding senat out of themselves (the prevaricator should not tell me of notions, but learn that in a commonwealth there must be a senat, is a principle) while the people of Capua were intent upon chusing this new senat, the partys propos’d seem’d to them to be so ridiculously unfit for such an office, that by this means coming to a nearer sight of themselves, they were secretly so fill’d with the shame of their enterprize, that slin