The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• The Preface
• Treatise I: An Essay On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions
• Section I: A General Account of Our Several Senses and Desires, Selfish Or Publick
• Section II: Of the Affections and Passions: the Natural Laws of Pure Affection: the Confused Sensations of the Passions, With Their Final Causes
• Section III: Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions.
• Section IV: How Far Our Several Affections and Passions Are Under Our Power, Either to Govern Them When Raised, Or to Prevent Their Arising: With Some General Observations About Their Objects.
• Section V: A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the Several Senses, As to Intenseness and Duration.
• Section VI: Some General Conclusions Concerning the Best Management of Our Desires. With Some Principles Necessary to Happiness.
• Treatise II: Illustrations Uponthe Moral Sense
• Section I Concerning the Character of Virtue, Agreeable to Truth Or Reason.
• Section II: Concerning That Character of Virtue and Vice, the Fitness Or Unfitness of Actions.
• Section III: Mr. Woolaston’s Significancy of Truth, As the Idea of Virtue Considered
• Section IV: Shewing the Use of Reason Concerning Virtue and Vice, Upon Supposition That We Receive These Ideas By a Moral Sense.
• Section V: Shewing That Virtue May Have Whatever Is Meant By Merit; and Be Rewardable Upon the Supposition, That It Is Perceived By a Sense, and Elected From Affection Or Instinct.
• Section VI: How Far a Regard to the Deity Is Necessary to Make an Action Virtuous

treatise i

An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions

section i

A general Account of our several Senses and Desires, Selfish or Publick

[1/1] The Nature of human Actions cannot be sufficiently understood without considering the Affections and Passions; or those Modifications, or Actions of the Mind consequent upon the Apprehension of certain Objects or Events, in which the Mind generally conceives Good or Evil. [2] In this Inquiry we need little Reasoning, or Argument, since Certainty is only [2] attainable by distinct Attention to what we are conscious happens in our Minds.

Art. I. “Objects, Actions, or Events obtain the Name of Good, or Evil, according as they are the Causes, or Occasions, mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful Perception to some sensitive Nature.” To understand therefore the several Kinds of Good, or Evil, we must apprehend the several Senses natural to us.

There seems to be some Sense or other suited to every sort of Objects which occurs to us, by which we receive either Pleasure, or Pain from a great part of them, as well as some Image, or Apprehension of them: Nay, sometimes our only Idea is a Perception of Pleasure, or Pain. The Pleasures or Pains perceived, are sometimes simple, without any other previous Idea, or any Image, or other concomitant Ideas, save those of Extension, or of Duration; one of which accompanies every Perception, whether of Sense, or inward Consciousness. Other Pleasures arise only upon some previous Idea, or Assemblage, or Comparison of Ideas. These Pleasures, presupposing previous Ideas, were called Perceptions of an internal [3] Sense, in a former [3] Treatise.* Thus Regularity and Uniformity in Figures, are no less grateful than Tastes, or Smells; the Harmony of Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds.† In [4] like manner, Affections, Tempers, [4] Sentiments, or Actions, reflected upon in our selves, or observed in others, are the constant Occasions of agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, which we call Approbation, or Dislike. These Moral Perceptions arise in us as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can we alter, or stop them, while our previous Opinion or Apprehension of the Affection, Temper, or Intention of the Agent continues the same; any more than we can make the Taste of Wormwood sweet, or that of Honey bitter.

If we may call every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain,a Sense, we shall find many other Senses beside those commonly explained. Tho it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will [5] shew that there are such Natural [5] Powers in the human Mind, in whatever Order we place them. In the 1st Class are the External Senses, universally known. In the 2d, the Pleasant Perceptions arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects; as also from Grandeur and Novelty. These we may call, after Mr. Addison, the Pleasures of the Imagination; 12 or we may call the Power of receiving them, an Internal Sense. Whoever dislikes this Name may substitute another. 3. The next Class of Perceptions we may call a Publick Sense, viz. “our Determination to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their Misery.” This is found in some degree in all Men, and was sometimes called Ḱοινονοημοσύνη or Sensus Communis13 by some of the Antients. 4. The fourth Class we may call the Moral [6] Sense, by which “we perceive Virtue, or Vice in our selves, or others.” This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon Virtue, or Vice in themselves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in Natural Affection, Compassion, Friendship, or even general Benevolence to Mankind, which connect our Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth [6] Class is a Sense of Honour, “which makes the Approbation, or Gratitude of others, for any good Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of Pleasure; and their Dislike, Condemnation, or Resentment of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called Shame, even when we fear no further evil from them.”

There are perhaps other Perceptions distinct from all these Classes, such as some Ideas “of Decency, Dignity, Suitableness to human Nature in certain Actions and Circumstances; and of an Indecency, Meanness, and Unworthiness, in the contrary Actions or Circumstances, even without any conception of Moral Good, or Evil.” Thus the Pleasures of Sight, and Hearing, are more esteemed than those of Taste or [7] Touch: The Pursuits of the Pleasures of the Imagination, are more approved than those of simple external Sensations. Plato* accounts for this difference from a constant Opinion of Innocence in this sort of Pleasures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon their Innocence, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another Class of Sensations.

A like Division of our Desires.[7] II. Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our selves or others the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. 1. The Desire of sensual Pleasure, (by which we mean that of the external Senses); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the Pleasures of Imagination or Internal Sense,† and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the Pleasures arising from Publick Happiness, and Aversion to the Pains arising [8] from the Misery of others. 4. Desires of Virtue, and Aversion to Vice, according to the Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of Honour, and Aversion to Shame.*

The third Class of Publick Desires contains many very different sorts of Affections, all those which tend toward the Happiness of others, or the removal of Misery; such as those of Gratitude, Compassion, [8] Natural Affection, Friendship, or the more extensive calm Desire of the universal Good of all sensitive Natures, which our moral Sense approves as the Perfection of Virtue, even when it limits, and counteracts the narrower Attachments of Love.

Secondary Desires of Wealth and Power.Now since we are capable of Reflection, Memory, Observation, and Reasoning about the distant Tendencies of Objects and Actions, and not confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our original Desires, “secondary Desires of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary Desires, with strength proportioned to the several original Desires, and the imagined Usefulness, or Necessity, of the advantageous Object.” Hence it is that as soon as we come to apprehend the Use of Wealth or Power to gratify any of our original Desires, we must also desire them. Hence arises the Universality of these Desires of Wealth and Power, since they are the Means of gratifying all other Desires. “How foolish then is the Inference, some would make, from the universal Prevalence of these Desires, that human Nature is wholly selfish, or that each one is only studious of his own Advantage; since Wealth or Power are as naturally fit to [9] gratify our Publick Desires, or to serve virtuous Purposes, as the selfish ones?”

[9] “How weak also are the Reasonings of some recluse Moralists, who condemn in general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power, as below a perfectly virtuous Character: since Wealth and Power are the most effectual Means, and the most powerful Instruments, even of the greatest Virtues, and most generous Actions?” The Pursuit of them is laudable, when the Intention is virtuous; and the neglect of them, when honourable Opportunities offer, is really a Weakness. This justifies the Poet’s Sentiments:

• ——— Hic onus horret,
• Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus:
• Hic subit & perfert: aut virtus nomen inane est,
• Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.

Hor.Epist. 17.14

“Further, the Laws or Customs of a Country, the Humour of our Company may have made strange Associations of Ideas, so that some Objects, which of themselves are indifferent to any Sense, by reason of some additional grateful Idea, may become very desirable; or by like Addition of an ungrateful Idea may raise the strongest Aversion.” Thus many a Trifle, when once it is made a Badge of Honour, an Evidence of some generous Disposition, a Monument of [9] some great Action, may be impatiently pursued, [10] from our Desire of Honour. When any Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture is constituted as a Mark of Infamy, it may become in like manner the Object of Aversion, tho in itself most inoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of Living, of receiving Company, of shewing Courtesy, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of this may be made uneasy at their Condition, tho much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional Ideas.* Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations in their own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they must comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the publick Esteem, which is generally necessary to enable Men to serve the Publick.

The Uses of these Associations.Should any one be surprized at this Disposition in our Nature to associate any Ideas together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly, considering what [11] great Evils, and how much Corruption [11] of Affections is owing to it, it may help to account for this Part of our Constitution, to consider “that all our Language and much of our Memory depends upon it:” So that were there no such Associations made, we must lose the use of Words, and a great part of our Power of recollecting past Events; beside many other valuable Powers and Arts which depend upon them. Let it also be considered that it is much in our power by a vigorous Attention either to prevent these Associations, or by Abstraction to separate Ideas when it may be useful for us to do so.

Concerning our Pursuit of Honour, ’tis to be observ’d, that “since our Minds are incapable of retaining a great Diversity of Objects, the Novelty, or Singularity of any Object is enough to raise a particular Attention to it among many of equal Merit:” And therefore were Virtue universal among Men, yet, ’tis probable, the Attention of Observers would be turned chiefly toward those who distinguished themselves by some singular Ability, or by some Circumstance, which, however trifling in its own Nature, yet had some honourable Ideas commonly joined to it, such as Magnificence, Generosity, or the like. We should perhaps, when we considered sedately the [12] common Virtues of others, [12] equally love and esteem them:* And yet probably our Attention would be generally fixed to those who thus were distinguishedfrom the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us a Desire of Distinction, either by higher Degrees of Virtue; or, if we cannot easily or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any Circumstance, which, thro’ a Confusion of Ideas, is reputed honourable.

This Desire of Distinction has great Influence on the Pleasures and Pains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very Rarity, Difficulty, or Expence; by a confused Imagination that they evidence Generosity, Ability, or a finer Taste than ordinary; nay, often the merest Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A Form of Dress, a foreign Dish, a Title, a Place, a Jewel; an useless Problem, a Criticism on an obsolete Word, the Origin of a Poetic Fable, the Situation of a razed Town, may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour:

• Sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
• Subruit aut reficit.

—Hor.15

Desires, selfish and publick.[13/13] Art. III. There is another Division of our Desires taken from the Persons for whose Advantage we pursue or shun any Object. “The Desires in which one intends or pursues what he apprehends advantageous to himself, we may call Selfish; and those in which we pursue what we apprehend advantageous to others, and do not apprehend advantageous to our selves, or do not pursue with this view, we may call Publick or Benevolent Desires.” If there be a just Foundation for this Division, it is more extensive than the former Division, since each of the former Classes may come under either Member of this Division, according as we are desiring any of the five sorts of Pleasures for our selves, or desiring them for others. The former Division may therefore be conceived as a Subdivision of the latter.

This Division has been disputed since Epicurus; who with his old Followers, and some of late, who detest other parts of his Scheme,16 maintain, “that all our Desires are selfish: or, that what every one intends or designs ultimately, in each Action, is the obtaining Pleasure to himself, or the avoiding his own private Pain.”*

[14/14] It requires a good deal of Subtilty to defend this Scheme, so seemingly opposite to Natural Affection, Friendship, Love of a Country, or Community, which many find very strong in their Breasts. The Defences and Schemes commonly offered, can scarce free the Sustainers of this Cause from manifest Absurdity and Affectation. But some do† acknowledge a publick Sense in many Instances; especially in natural Affection, and Compassion; by which “the Observation of the Happiness of others is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their Misery the Occasion of Pain to the Observer.” That this Sympathy with others is the Effect of the Constitution of our Nature, and not brought upon our selves by any Choice, with view to any selfish Advantage, they must own: whatever Advantage there may be in Sympathy with the Fortunate, none can be alledged in Sympathy with the Distressed: And every one feels that this publick Sense will not leave his Heart, upon a change of the Fortunes of his Child or Friend; nor does it depend upon a Man’s Choice, whether he will be affected with their Fortunes or not. But supposing this publick Sense, they insist, “That by means [15] of it there is a Conjunction of Interest: the [15] Happiness of others becomes the Means of private Pleasure to the Observer; and for this Reason, or with a View to this private Pleasure, he desires the Happiness of another.” Others deduce our Desire of the Happiness of others from Self‐love, in a less specious manner.

If a publick Sense be acknowledged in Men, by which the Happiness of one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his Choice, this is indeed a strong Evidence of the Goodness of the Author of our Nature. But whether this Scheme does truly account for our Love of others, or for generous Offices, may be determined from the following Considerations; which being matters of internal Consciousness, every one can best satisfy himself by Attention, concerning their Truth and Certainty.

Let it be premised, that Desire is generally uneasy, or attended with an uneasy Sensation, which is something distinct from that uneasy Sensation arising from some Event or Object, the Prevention or Removal of which Sensation we are intending when the Object is apprehended as Evil; as this uneasy Sensation of Desire is obviously different from the pleasant Sensation, expected from the Object or Event [16 ] which we apprehend as Good. Then it is plain,

1. “That no Desire of any Event is excited by any view of removing the uneasy Sensation attending this Desire itself. ” Sensations which are previous to a Desire, or not connected with it, may excite Desire of any Event, apprehended necessary to procure or continue the Sensation if it be pleasant, or to remove it if it be uneasy: But the uneasy Sensation, accompanying and connected with the Desire itself, cannot be a Motive to that Desire which it presupposes. The Sensation accompanying Desire is generally uneasy, and consequently our Desire is never raised with a view to obtain or continue it; nor is the Desire raised with a view to remove this uneasy Sensation, for the Desire is raised previously to it. This holds concerning all Desire publick or private.

There is also a pleasant Sensation of Joy, attending the Gratification of any Desire, beside the Sensation received from the Object itself, which we directly intended. “But Desire does never arise from a View of obtaining that Sensation of Joy, connected with the Success or Gratification of Desire; [17] otherwise the strongest Desires might arise toward any Trifle, or an Event in all respects indifferent: [17] Since, if Desire arose from this View, the stronger the Desire were, the higher would be the Pleasure of Gratification; and therefore we might desire the turning of a Straw as violently as we do Wealth or Power.” This Expectation of the Pleasure of gratifiedDesire, would equally excite us to desire the Misery of others as their Happiness; since the Pleasure of Gratification might be obtained from both Events alike.

2. It is certain that, “that Desire of the Happiness of others which we account virtuous, is not directly excited by prospects of any secular Advantage, Wealth, Power, Pleasure of the external Senses, Reward from the Deity, or future Pleasures of Self‐Approbation.” To prove this let us consider, “That no Desire of any Event can arise immediately or directly from an Opinion in the Agent, that his having such a Desire will be the Means of private Good.” This Opinion would make us wish or desire to have that advantageous Desire or Affection; and would incline us to use any means in our power to raise that Affection: but no Affection or Desire is raised in us, directly by our volition or desiring it. That alone which raises in us from Self‐Love [18] the Desire of any Event, is an Opinion that that Event is the Means [18] of private Good. As soon as we form this Opinion, a Desire of the Event immediately arises: But if having the Desire or Affection be imagined the Means of private Good, and not the Existence of the Event desired, then from Self‐Love we should only desire or wish to have the Desire of that Event, and should not desire the Event itself, since the Event is not conceived as the Means of Good.

For instance, suppose God revealed to us that he would confer Happiness on us, if our Country were happy; then from Self‐Love we should have immediately the subordinate Desire of our Country’s Happiness, as the Means of our own. But were we assured that, whether our Country were happy or not, it should not affect our future Happiness; but that we should be rewarded, provided we desired the Happiness of our Country; our Self‐Love could never make us now desire the Happiness of our Country, since it is not now conceived as the Means of our Happiness, but is perfectly indifferent to it. The Means of our Happiness is the having a Desire of our Country’s Happiness; we should therefore from Self‐Love only wish to have this Desire.

[19] ’Tis true indeed in fact, that, because Benevolence is natural to us, a little Attention [19] to other Natures will raise in us good‐will towards them, whenever by any Opinions we are persuaded that there is no real Opposition of Interest. But had we no Affection distinct from Self‐Love, nothing could raise our Desire of the Happiness of others, but conceiving their Happiness as the Means of ours. An Opinion that our having kind Affections would be the Means of our private Happiness, would only make us desire to have those Affections. Now that Affections do not arise upon our wishing to have them, or our volition of raising them; as conceiving the Affections themselves to be the Means of private Good; is plain from this, that if they did thus arise, then a Bribe might raise any Desire toward any Event, or any Affection toward the most improper Object. We might be hired to love or hate any sort of Persons, to be angry, jealous, or compassionate, as we can be engaged into external Actions; which we all see to be absurd. Now those who alledg, that our Benevolence may arise from prospect of secular Advantage, Honour, Self‐Approbation, or future Rewards, must own, that these are either Motives only to external Actions, or Considerations, shewing, that having the Desire of the Happiness of others, would be the Means of private Good; [20] while the Event supposed to be desired, viz. the Happiness of others, is not [20] supposed the Means of any private Good. But the best Defenders of this part of the Scheme of Epicurus, acknowledge that “Desires are not raised by Volition.”

This Distinction Defended3. “There are in Men Desires of the Happiness of others, when they do not conceive this Happiness as the Means of obtaining any sort of Happiness to themselves.” Self‐Approbation, or Rewards from the Deity, might be the Ends, for obtaining which we might possibly desire or will from Self‐Love, to raise in our selves kind Affections; but we could not from Self‐Love desire the Happiness of others, but as conceiving it the Means of our own. Now ’tis certain that sometimes we may have this subordinate Desire of the Happiness of others, conceived as the Means of our own; as suppose one had laid a Wager upon the Happiness of a Person of such Veracity, that he would own sincerely whether he were happy or not; when Men are Partners in Stock, and share in Profit or Loss; when one hopes to succeed to, or some way to share in the Prosperity of another; or if the Deity had given such Threatnings, as they tell us Telamon gave his Sons when they went to War,17 that he would reward or punish one according as others were [21] happy or miserable: In such cases one might have this subordinate Desire [21] of another’s Happiness from Self‐Love. But as we are sure the Deity has not given such Comminations, so we often are conscious of the Desire of the Happiness of others, without any such Conception of it as the Means of our own; and are sensible that this subordinate Desire is not that virtuous Affection which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence must be an ultimate Desire, which would subsist without view to private Good. Such ultimate publick Desires we often feel, without any subordinate Desire of the same Event, as the Means of private Good. The subordinate may sometimes, nay often does concur with the ultimate; and then indeed the whole Moment of these conspiring Desires may be greater than that of either alone: But the subordinate alone is not that Affection which we approve as virtuous.

Benevolence is not the Desire of the Pleasures of the publick Sense.Art. IV. This will clear our way to answer the chief Difficulty: “May not our Benevolence be at least a Desire of the Happiness of others, as the Means of obtaining the Pleasures of the publick Sense, from the Contemplation of their Happiness? ” If it were so, it is very unaccountable that we should approve this subordinate Desire as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Desire upon a Wager, or other Considerations of Interest. [22] Both Desires proceed from Self‐Love in the same [22] manner: In the latter case the Desires might be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager so capriciously; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, the Motive of Interest might, with many Tempers, be made stronger than that from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.

Don’t we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without any such selfish Intention? How few have thought upon this part of our Constitution which we call a Publick Sense? Were it our only View, in Compassion to free our selves from the Pain of the publick Sense; should the Deity propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Person in Distress, but to continue him in Misery, or on the other hand to relieve him from it; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter? Should the Deity assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that we should be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserable; should we not upon this Scheme be intirely indifferent? Or, if we should even desire the [23] pleasant Thought of their Happiness, in our last Moment, would not this Desire be the faintest imaginable?

[23] ’Tis true, our Publick Sense might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man’s Taste of Meat or Drink might be as lively the instant before his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as strong Desires of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with a View to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any Desire of the Means of private Pleasure can be as strong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, ’tis certain, any good Man would as strongly desire at his Exit the Happiness of others, as in any part of his Life. We do not therefore desire it as the Means of private Pleasure.

Should any alledge, that this Desire of the Happiness of others, after our Exit, is from some confused Association of Ideas; as a Miser, who loves no body, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a Prey to Dogs after Death: [24] let any honest Heart try if the deepest Reflection will break this Association (if there be any) which is supposed to raise the Desire. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthen it. [24] How would any Spectator like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure Happiness to Posterity? Would we esteem it refined Wisdom, or a Perfection of Mind, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? ’Tis plain then we feel this ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others to be a most natural Instinct, which we also expect in others, and not the Effect of any confused Ideas.

The Occasion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving distinterested Desires, has probably been attempting to define this simple Idea, Desire. It is called an uneasy Sensation in the absence ofGood.* Whereas Desire is as distinct from any Sensation, as the Will is from the Understanding or Senses. This every one must acknowledge, who speaks of desiring to remove Uneasiness or Pain.

We may perhaps find, that our Desires are so far from tending always toward private Good, that they are oftner employ’d about the State of others. Nay further, we may have a Propensity toward an Event, which we neither apprehend as the Means of private Good, or publick. Thus an Epicurean who denies a future State; or, one to [25] whom God revealed that he should be annihilated, might at his very Exit desire a future Fame, from which he expected no Pleasure to himself, nor intended any to others. Such Desires indeed no selfish Being, who had the modelling of his own Nature, would chuse to implant in itself. But since we have not this power, we must be content to be thus “befooled into a publick Interest against our Will;” as an ingenious Author expresses it.18

The Prospect of any Interest may be a Motive to us, to desire whatever we apprehend as the Means of obtaining it. Particularly, “if Rewards of any kind are proposed to those who have virtuous Affections, this would raise in us the Desire of having these Affections, and would incline us to use all means to raise them in our selves; particularly to turn our Attention to all those Qualities in the Deity, or our Fellows, which are naturally apt to raise the virtuous Affections.” Thus it is, that Interest of any kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, and Rewards particularly may over‐ballance all Motives to Vice.

[26] This may let us see, that “the Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments, as proposed in the Gospel, are not rendered [26] useless or unnecessary, by supposing the virtuous Affection to be disinterested;” since such Motives of Interest, proposed and attended to, must incline every Person to desire to have virtuous Affections, and to turn his Attention to every thing which is naturally apt to raise them; and must overballance every other Motive of Interest, opposite to these Affections, which could incline Men to suppress or counteract them.

section ii

Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes

Proper Affections are Desire and Aversion.[27/27] I. After the general account of Sensations, we may consider other Modifications of our Minds, consequent upon these Perceptions, whether grateful, or uneasy. The first which occur to any one are Desire of the grateful Perceptions, and Aversion to the uneasy, either for our selves or others. If we would confine the word Affection to these two, which are entirely distinct from all Sensation, and directly incline the Mind to Action or Volition of Motion, we should have no Debate about the Number or Division of Affections. But since, by universal Custom, this Name is applied to other Modifications of the Mind, such as Joy, Sorrow, Despair, we may consider what universal Distinction can be assigned between these Modifications, and the several Sensations abovementioned; and we shall scarce find any other than this, that we call “the direct immediate Perception of Pleasure or Pain from [28] the present [28] Object or Event, the Sensation:”Affection distinct from Passion. But we denote by the Affection or Passion some other “Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain, not directly raised by the Presence or Operation of the Event or Object, but by our Reflection upon, or Apprehension of their present or certainly future Existence; so that we are sure that the Object or Event will raise the direct Sensations in us.” In beholding a regular Building we have the Sensation of Beauty; but upon our apprehending our selves possessed of it, or that we can procure this pleasant Sensation when we please, we feel the Affection of Joy. When a Man has a Fit of the Gout, he has the painful Sensation; when he is not at present pained, yet apprehends a sudden return of it, he has the Affection of Sorrow, which might in some sense also be called a Sensation.

When the word Passion is imagined to denote any thing different from the Affections, it includes, beside the Desire or Aversion, beside the calm Joy upon apprehended Possession of Good, or Sorrow from the Loss of it, or from impending Evil, “a*confused Sensation either of Pleasure [29/29] or Pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions, which keeps the Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusion of every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens the Affection sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent all deliberate Reasoning about our Conduct.”

General Desires, and particular Affections or Passions.II. We have little reason to imagine, that all other Agents have such confused Sensations accompanying their Desires as we often have. Let us abstract from them, and consider in what manner we should act upon the several Occasions which now excite our Passions, if we had none of these Sensations whence our Desires become passionate.

There is a Distinction to be observed on this Subject, between “the calm Desire of Good, and Aversion to Evil, either selfish or publick, as it appears to our Reason or Reflection; and the particular Passions towards Objects immediately presented to some Sense.” Thus nothing can be more distinct than the general calm Desire of private Good of any kind, which alone would incline us to pursue whatever Objects were apprehended as the Means of Good, and the particular selfish Passions, such as Ambition, Covetousness, Hunger, Lust, Revenge, Anger, [30] as they arise upon particular Occasions. [30] In like manner, our publick Desires may be distinguished into the general calm Desire of the Happiness of others, or Aversion to their Misery upon Reflection; and the particular Affections or Passions of Love, Congratulation, Compassion, natural Affection. These particular Affections are found in many Tempers, where, thro’ want of Reflection, the general calm Desires are not found: Nay, the former may be opposite to the latter, where they are found in the same Temper. We obtain Commandover the particular Passions, principally by strengthning the general Desires thro frequent Reflection, and making them habitual, so as to obtain Strength superior to the particular Passions.*

[31] Again, the calm public Desires may be considered as “they either regard the Good of particular Persons or Societies presented to our Senses; or that of some more abstracted or general Community, such as a Species or System.” This latter sort we may call universal calm Benevolence. Now ’tis plain, that not only particular kind Passions, but even calm particular Benevolence do not always arise from, or necessarily presuppose, the universal Benevolence; both the former may be found in Persons of little Reflection, where the latter is wanting: And the former two may [31] be opposite to the other, where they meet together in one Temper. So the universal Benevolence might be where there was neither of the former; as in any superior Nature or Angel, who had no particular Intercourse with any part of Mankind.

[32] Our moral Sense, tho it approves all particular kind Affection or Passion, as well as calm particular Benevolence abstractedly considered; yet it also approves the Restraint or Limitation of all particular Affections or Passions, by the calm universal Benevolence. To make this Desire prevalent above all particular Affections, is the only sure way to obtain constant Self‐Approbation.

The calm selfish Desires would determine any Agent to pursue every Object or Event, known either by Reason or prior Experience to be good to itself. We need not imagine any innate Idea of Good in general, of infinite Good, or of the greatest Aggregate: Much less need we suppose any actual Inclination toward any of these, as the Cause or Spring of all particular Desires. ’Tis enough to allow, “that we are capable by enlarging, or by Abstraction, of coming to these Ideas: That we must, by the Constitution of our Nature, desire any apprehended Good which occurs a‐part from any Evil: [32] That of two Objects inconsistent with each other, we shall desire that which seems to contain the greatest Moment of Good.” So that it cannot be pronounced concerning any finite Good, that it shall necessarily engage our Pursuit; since the Agent may possibly [33] have the Idea of a Greater, or see this to be inconsistent with some more valuable Object, or that it may bring upon him some prepollent Evil. The certain Knowledge of any of these Things, or probable Presumption of them, may stop the Pursuit of any finite Good. If this be any sort of Liberty, it must be allowed to be in Men, even by those who maintain “the Desire or Will to be necessarily determined by the prepollent Motive;” since this very Presumption may be a prepollent Motive, especially to those, who by frequent Attention make the Idea of the greatest Goodalways present to themselves on all important Occasions.

The same may easily be applied to our Aversion to finite Evils.

There seems to be this Degree of Liberty about the Understanding, that tho the highest Certainty or Demonstration does necessarily engage our Assent, yet we can suspend any absolute Conclusion from probable Arguments, until we examine whether this [33] apparent Probability be not opposite to Demonstration, or superior Probability on the other side.

This may let us see, that tho it were acknowledged that “Men are necessarily determined to pursue their own Happiness, and to be influenced by whatever Motive [34] appears to be prepollent;” yet they might be proper Subjects of a Law; since the very Sanctions of the Law, if they attend to them, may suggest a Motive prepollent to all others. In like manner, “Errors may be criminal,* where there are sufficient Data or Objective Evidence for the Truth;” since no Demonstration can lead to Error, and we can suspend our Assent to probable Arguments, till we have examined both Sides. Yet human Penalties concerning Opinions must be of little consequence, since no Penalty can supply the place of Argument, or Probability to engage our Assent, however they may as Motives determine our Election.

In the calm publick Desires, in like manner, where there are no opposite Desires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to the less: And in the calm [34] universal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the Moment of the Good, and the Number of those who shall enjoy it.

When the publick Desires are opposite to the private, or seem to be so, that kind prevails which is stronger or more intense.

Definitions.[35] III. The following Definitions of certain Words used on this Subject, may shorten our Expressions; and the Axioms subjoined may shew the manner of acting from calm Desire, with Analogy to the Laws of Motion.

• 1. NaturalGoodis Pleasure: Natural Evil is Pain.
• 2. Naturalgood Objects are those which are apt, either mediately or immediately to give Pleasure; the former are called Advantageous. Natural Evil Objects are such as, in like manner, give Pain.

• Absolute.

  3. AbsoluteGoodis that which, considered with all its Concomitants and Consequences, contains more Good than what compensates all its Evils.
• 4. AbsoluteEvil, on the contrary, contains Evil which outweighs all its Good.

• Relative.

  [35] 5.RelativeGood or Evil, is any particular Good or Evil, which does not thus compensate its contrary Concomitants or Consequences. This Distinction would have been more exactly expressed by the Bonum simpliciter, and secundum quidof the Schoolmen.Cor. RelativeGoodmay be Absolute Evil; thus often sensual Pleasures are in the whole pernicious: And Absolute Goodmay be Relative Evil; thus an unpleasant Potion may recover Health.Good and Evil, according to the Persons whom they affect, may be divided into Universal, Particular and Private.

• Universal.

  6. UniversalGood, is what tends to the Happiness of the whole System of sensitive Beings; and Universal Evil is the contrary.

• Particular.

  7. ParticularGoodis what tends to the Happiness of a Part of this System: Particular Evil is the contrary.

• Private.

  8.PrivateGood or Evil is that of the Person acting. Each of these three Members may be either Absolute or Relative.[36] Cor. I. Particularor private Goodmay possibly be universal Evil: And universal Goodmay be particular or private Evil. The Punishment of a Criminal is an Instance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps, there are no real Instances in the whole Administration of Nature: but there [37] are some apparent Instances; such as the Success of an unjust War; or the Escape of an unrelenting Criminal.Cor. 2. Whenparticular or private Goods are entirely innocent toward others, they are universal Good.

• Compound.

  9. Compoundgood Objects or Events, are such as contain the Powers of several Goods at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleasant and healthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleasures of the Moral Sense and of Honour. The same is easily applicable to compound Evil.

• Mixed.

  10. A mixedObject is what contains at once the Powers of Good and Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the Pleasures of the Moral Sense, and Pains of the external Senses. Execution of Justice may give the Pleasures of the publick Sense, and the Pains of Compassion toward the Sufferer.

• Greatest Good.

  [37] 11. Thegreatest or most perfect Goodis that whole Series, or Scheme of Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happiness in the whole, or more absolute universal Good, than any other possible Scheme, after subtracting all the Evils connected with each of them.

• Moral Good.

  [38] 12. An Action is good, in a moral Sense, when it flows from benevolent Affection, or Intention of absolute Good to others. Men of much Reflection may actually intend universal absolute Good; but with the common rate of Men their Virtue consists in intending and pursuing particular absolute Good, not inconsistent with universal Good.

• Moral Evil.

  13. An Action is morally evil, either from Intention of absolute Evil, universal, or particular, (* which is seldom the case with Men, except in sudden Passions;) or from pursuit of private or particular relative Good, which they might have known did tend to universal absolute Evil. For even the want of a† just Degree of Benevolence renders an Action evil.

• Compound.

  [38] 14. Compoundmoral Goodness is that to which different moral Species concur: Thus the same Action may evidence Love to our Fellows, and Gratitude to God. We may in like manner understand compound moral Evil. We cannot suppose mixed moral Actions.*
• [39] 15. Agents are denominated morally good or evil, from their Affections and Actions, or Attempts of Action.

Axioms, or general Laws.IV. Axioms, or natural Laws of calm Desire.

• 1. SelfishDesires pursue ultimately only the private Good of the Agent.
• 2. Benevolent or publick Desires pursue the Good of others, according to the several Systems to which we extend our Attention, but with different Degrees of Strength.
• 3. TheStrength either of the private or publick Desire of any Event, is proportioned to the imagined Quantity of Good, which will arise from it to the Agent, or the Person beloved.
• [39] 4. MixedObjects are pursued or shunned with Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the apprehended Excess of Good or Evil.
• 5. EqualMixtures of Good and Evil stop all Desire or Aversion.
• 6. A compoundgood or evil Object, is prosecuted or shunned with a Degree of [40] Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the Sum of Good, or of Evil.
• 7. In computing the Quantities of Good or Evil, which we pursue or shun, either for our selves or others, when the Durations are equal, the Moment is as the Intenseness: and when the Intenseness of Pleasure is the same, or equal, the Moment is as the Duration.
• 8. Hence the Moment of Good in any Object, is in a compound Proportion of the Duration and Intenseness.
• 9. TheTrouble, Pain, or Danger, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring or retaining any Good, is to be subtracted from the Sum of the Good. So the Pleasures which attend or flow from the means of prepollent Evil, are to be subtracted, to find the absolute Quantity.
• [40] 10.The Ratio of the Hazardof acquiring or retaining any Good must be multiplied into the Moment of the Good; so also the Hazardof avoiding any Evil is to be multiplied into the Moment of it, to find its comparative value.Cor. Hence it is, that the smallest certain Good may raise stronger Desire than the [41] greatest Good, if the Uncertainty of the latter surpass that of the former, in a greater Ratio than that of the greater to the less. Thus Men content themselves in all Affairs with smaller, but more probably successful Pursuits, quitting those of greater Moment but less Probability.
• 11. To an immortal Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Sense be equally acute in all parts of its Existence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The same may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.
• 12. But if the Duration of the Good be infinite, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment, as finite added to infinite, surpasses infinite alone.
• [41] 13. To Beings of limited certain Duration, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the Duration of the Good would not surpass the Existence of the Possessor, after the Time of its Commencement.
• 14. To Beings of limited uncertain Duration, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment of any Good, according [42] to the Hazard of the Possessor’s Duration. This may, perhaps, account for what some alledg to be a natural Disposition of our Minds, even previous to any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, viz. that we are so constituted, as to desire more ardently the nearer Enjoyments than the more distant, tho of equal Moment in themselves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.
• 15.TheRemoval of Pain has always the Notion of Good, and sollicits us more importunately: Its Moment is the same way computed by Intenseness and Duration, and affected by the Hazardand by the Uncertainty of our Existence.These are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in any Object or Event, whether we are pursuing our own private Good from selfish Desires, or [42] the Good of others from publick Affections. Concerning these latter we may observe,
• 16. That our Desires toward publick Goodare, when other Circumstances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themselves.
• 17. Our publick Desires of any Events, are proportioned to the Number of Persons to whom the good Event shall extend, when [43] the Moments and other Circumstances are equal.
• 18. When the Moments themselves, and Numbers of Enjoyers are equal, our Desire is proportioned to the Strength or Nearness of the Ties or Attachments to the Persons.
• 19. When all other Circumstances are equal, our Desires are proportional to the apprehended Moral Excellence of the Persons.
• 20.In general, the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the Quantity of the Good itself, and the Number, Attachment, and Dignity of the Persons.These seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise. Our [43] Senses constitute Objects, Events or Actions good; and “we have Power to reason, reflect and compare the several Goods, and to find out the proper and effectual Means of obtaining the greatest for our selves or others, so as not to be led aside by every Appearance of relative or particular Good.”

Action from pure Desire or Affection.V. If it be granted, that we have implanted in our Nature the several Desires above‐mentioned, let us next inquire “into [44] what State we would incline to bring our selves, upon the several Accidents which now raise our Passions; supposing that we had the Choice of our own State entirely, and were not, by the Frame of our Nature, subjected to certain Sensations, independently of our Volition.”

If it seems too rash to assert a Distinction between Affections and Passions, or that Desire may subsist without any uneasiness, since perhaps we are never conscious of any Desire absolutely free from all uneasiness; “let it be considered, that the simple Idea of Desire is different from that of Pain of any kind, or from any Sensation whatsoever: Nor is there any other Argument for their Identity than this, that they occur to us at once: But this Argument is inconclusive, otherwise [44] it would prove Colour and Figure to be the same, or Incision and Pain.”

There is a middle State of our Minds, when we are not in the pursuit of any important Good, nor know of any great Indigence of those we love. In this State, when any smaller positive Good to our selves or our Friend is apprehended to be in our power, we may resolutely desire and pursue it, without any considerable Sensation of Pain or Uneasiness. Some Tempers seem [45] to have as strong Desires as any, by the Constancy and Vigor of their Pursuits, either of publick or private Good; and yet give small Evidence of any uneasy Sensation. This is observable in some sedate Men, who seem no way inferior in Strength of Desire to others: Nay, if we consult our selves, and not the common Systems, we shall perhaps find, that “the noblest Desire in our Nature, that of universal Happiness, is generally calm, and wholly free from any confused uneasy Sensation:” except in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively Imagination, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise something of Passion even toward universal Nature.* Yea, further, Desire may be as strong as possible toward a certainly future [45] Event, the fixed Time of its Existence being also known, and yet we are not conscious of any Pain attending such Desires. But tho this should not be granted to be Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Desire and Pain, may give sufficient ground for abstracting them; and for our making the Supposition of their being separated.

Upon this Supposition then, when any Object was desired, if we found it difficult or uncertain to be obtained, but worthy of all the Labour it would cost; we would set [46] about it with Diligence, but would never chuse to bring upon our selves any painful Sensation accompanying our Desire, nor to increase our Toil by Anxiety. Whatever Satisfaction we had in our State before the Prospect of this additional Good, we should continue to enjoy it while this Good was in suspense; and if we found it unattainable, we should be just as we were before: And we should never [46 ] chuse to bring upon our selves those Frettings which now commonly arise from Disappointments. Upon Opinion of any impending Evil, we should desire and use all means to prevent it, but should never voluntarily bring upon our selves the uneasy Sensation of Fear, which now naturally anticipates our Misery, and gives us a Foretaste of it, more ungrateful sometimes than the Suffering itself. If the Evil did befal us, we should never chuse to increase it, by the Sensations of Sorrow or Despair; we should consider what was the Sum of Good remaining in our State, after subtracting this Evil; and should enjoy our selves as well as a Being, who had never known greater Good, nor enjoyed greater Pleasure, than the absolute Goodyet remaining with us; or perhaps we should pursue some other attainable Good. In the like manner, did our State and the Modifications of our Mind depend upon our Choice, should we be affected upon the apprehended Approach of Good or [47] Evil, to those whom we love; we should have desires of obtaining the one for them, and of defending them from the other, accompanied with no uneasy Sensations. We do indeed find in fact, that our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with uneasy Sensations; but these Sensations do not seem the necessary Result of the Desire itself: They depend upon the present Constitution of our Nature, which might possibly have been otherwise ordered. And in fact we find a considerable Diversity of Tempers in this matter; some sedate Tempers equally desiring either publick or private Good with the more passionate Tempers; but without that Degree of Ferment, Confusion, and Pain, which attend the same Desires in the Passionate.

[47] According to the present Constitution of our Nature, we find that the Modifications or Passions of our Mind, are very different from those which we would chuse to bring upon our selves, upon their several Occasions. The Prospect of any considerable Good for our selves, or those we love, raises Desire; and this Desire is accompanied with uneasy confused Sensations, which often occasion Fretfulness, Anxiety, and Impatience. We find violent Motions in our Bodies; and are often made unfit for serious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining [48] the Good desired. When it is first obtained, we find violent confused Sensations of Joy, beyond the Proportion of the Good itself, or its Moment to our Happiness. If we are disappointed, we feel a Sensation of Sorrow and Dejection, which is often entirely useless to our present State. Foreseen Evils are antedated by painful Sensations of Fear; and Reflection, attended with Sensations of Sorrow, gives a tedious Existence to transitory Misfortunes. Our publick Desires are in the same manner accompanied with painful Sensations. The Presence or Suspence of Good or Evil to others, is made the Occasion of the like confused Sensations. A little Reflection will shew, that none of these Sensations depend upon our Choice, but arise from the very Frame [48 ] of our Nature, however we may regulate or moderate them.

The Necessity for these Sensations.VI. Let us then examine “for what Purpose our Nature was so constituted, that Sensations do thus necessarily arise in us.” Would not those first sorts of Sensations, by which we apprehend Good and Evil in the Objects themselves, have been sufficient, along with our Reason and pure Desires, without those Sensations attending the very Desires themselves, for which they are called Passions, or those Sensations which [49] attend our Reflection upon the Presence, Absence, or Approach of Good or Evil?

The common Answer, that “they are given to us as useful Incitements or Spurs to Action, by which we are roused more effectually to promote our private Good, or that of the Publick,” is too general and undetermined. What need is there for rousing us to Action, more than a calm pure Desire of Good, and Aversion to Evil would do, without these confused Sensations? Say they, “we are averse to Labour; we are apt to be hurried away by Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth; we are often so indolent and averse to the vigorous Use of our Powers, that we should neglect our true Interest without these solliciting [49] Sensations.” But may it not be answered, that if Labour and vigorous Use of our Powers be attended with Uneasiness or Pain, why should not this be brought into the Account? The Pursuit of a small Good by great Toil is really foolish; violent Labour may be as pernicious as any thing else: Why should we be excited to any uneasy Labour, except for prepollent Good? And, when the Good is prepollent, what need of any further Incitement than the calm Desire of it? The same may be said of the Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth; if their absolute Pleasures be greater than [50] that of the good from which they divert us, why should we not be diverted from it? If not, then the real Moment of the Good proposed is sufficient to engage our Pursuit of it, in Opposition to our Curiosity or Mirth.

If indeed our Aversion to Labour, or our Propensity to Mirth be accompanied with these Sensations, then it was necessary that other Desires should be attended with like Sensations, that so a Ballance might be preserved. So if we have confused Sensation strengthning and fixing our private Desires, the like Sensation joined to publick Affections is necessary, lest the former Desires should wholly engross our Minds: If weight be cast into one Scale, as much must be put into the other to preserve [50] an Equilibrium. But the first Question is, “whence arose the Necessity of such additional Incitements on either side?”

It must be very difficult for Beings of such imperfect Knowledge as we are, to answer such Questions: we know very little of the Constitution of Nature, or what may be necessary for the Perfection of the whole. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings, whose Desires are not attended with confused Sensations, raising them into Passions like to ours. There is probably an infinite Variety of Beings, of all possible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happiness exceeds that of Misery. We know that our State is absolutely Good, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil. The Goodness of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the inferior Natures, provided their State in the whole be absolutely Good: Since we may probably conclude,* that there are in the Universe as many Species of superior Natures, as was consistent with the most perfect State of the whole. This is the Thought so much insisted upon by Simplicius, that the universal [51] Cause must produce τα μέσα, as well as τα πρω̑τα, και τα ἔσχατα. We know not if this Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of Natures superior to ours: If not, it must certainly be in the whole better that it should have its imperfect [52] Inhabitants, whose State is absolutely Good, than that it should be desolate.

All then which we can expect to do in this Matter, is only to shew, that “these confused Sensations are necessary to such Natures as we are in other respects: Particularly that Beings of such Degrees of Understanding, and such Avenues to Knowledge as we have, must need these additional Forces, which we call Passions, beside the first Sensations by which Objects are constituted Good or Evil, and the pure Desire or Aversion arising from Opinion or Apprehension of Good or Evil.”

From the Imperfection of our Understanding, which required Sensations of Appetite. Now our Reason, or Knowledge of the Relations of external Things to our Bodies, is so inconsiderable, that it is generally some pleasant Sensation which teaches us what tends to their Preservation; and some painful Sensation which shews what is pernicious. Nor is this Instruction sufficient; we need also to be directed when our Bodies want supplies of Nourishment; to this our Reason could not extend: Here then [52] appears the first Necessity of uneasy Sensation, preceding Desire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raised.

[53] Again, our Bodies could not be preserved without a Sense of Pain, connected with Incisions, Bruises, or violent Labour, or whatever else tends to destroy any part of their Mechanism; since our Knowledge does not extend so far, as to judge in time what would be pernicious to it: And yet, without a great deal of human Labour, and many Dangers, this Earth could not support the tenth Part of its Inhabitants. Our Nature therefore required a Sensation, accompanying its Desires of the Means of Preservation, capable to surmount the Uneasiness of Labour: this we have in the Pains or Uneasiness accompanying the Desires of Food.

In like manner, the Propagation of Animals is a Mystery to their Reason, but easy to their Instinct. An Offspring of such Creatures as Men are, could not be preserved without perpetual Labour and Care; which we find could not be expected from the more general Ties of Benevolence. Here then again appears the Necessity of strengthning the Στοργὴ, or natural Affection, with strong Sensations, or Pains of Desire, sufficient to counter‐ballance the Pains of Labour, and the Sensations of the [53] selfish Appetites; since Parents must often check and [54] disappoint their own Appetites, to gratify those of their Children.

“When a Necessity of joining strong Sensations to one Class of Desires appears, there must appear a like Necessity of strengthning the rest by like Sensations, to keep a just Ballance.” We know, for instance, that the Pleasures of the Imagination tend much to the Happiness of Mankind: the Desires of them therefore must have the like Sensations assisting them, to prevent our indulging a nasty solitary Luxury. The Happiness of human Life cannot be promoted without Society and mutual Aid, even beyond a Family; our publick Affections must therefore be strengthned as well as the private, to keep a Ballance; so must also our Desires of Virtue and Honour. Anger, which some have thought an useless Passion, is really as necessary as the rest; since Men’s Interests often seem to interfere with each other; and they are thereby led from Self‐Love to do the worst Injuries to their Fellows. There could not therefore be a wiser Contrivance to restrain Injuries, than to make every mortal some way formidable to an unjust Invader, by such a violent Passion. We need not have recourse to a Prometheus in this matter, with the old Poets: [54] they might have ascribed it to their Optimus Maximus.19

• [52]—Insani Leonis,
• Vim Stomacho apposuisse nostro.20

A Ballance may be still preserved.VII. With this Ballance of publick Passions against the private, with our Passions toward Honour and Virtue, we find that human Nature may be as really amiable in its low Sphere, as superior Natures endowed with higher Reason, and influenced only by pure Desires; provided we vigorously exercise the Powers we have in keeping this Ballance of Affections, and checking any Passion which grows so violent, as to be inconsistent with the publick Good. If we have selfish Passions for our own Preservation, we have also publick Passions, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to Offspring, Friends, Communities, Countries. Compassion will engage us to succour the distressed, even with our private Loss or Danger. An Abhorrence of the injurious, and Love toward the injured, with a Sense of Virtue, and Honour, can make us despise Labour, Expence, Wounds and Death.

The Sensations of Joy or Sorrow, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit, either publick or private, have directly the Effect of Rewards or Punishments, [55] to excite us to act with the utmost Vigor, either for our own Advantage, or that of [56] others, for the future, and to punish past Negligence. The Moment of every Event is thereby increased: as much as the Sensations of Sorrow add to our Misery, so much those of Joy add to our Happiness. Nay, since we have some considerable Power over our Desires, as shall be explained hereafter, we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent Pleasures of Joy upon our Success, than Pains of Sorrow upon Disappointment.

A just Balance very rare.’Tis true indeed, that there are few Tempers to be found, wherein these Sensations of the several Passions are in such a Ballance, as in all cases to leave the Mind in a proper State, for considering the Importance of every Action or Event. The Sensations of Anger in some Tempers are violent above their proportion; those of Ambition, Avarice, desire of sensual Pleasure, and even of natural Affection, in several Dispositions, possess the Mind too much, and make it incapable of attending to any thing else. Scarce any one Temper is always constant and uniform in its Passions. The best State of human Nature possible might require a Diversity of Passions and Inclinations, for the different Occupations necessary for the whole: But the Disorder seems to be much greater than is [56] requisite for this End. Custom, Education, Habits, and Company, may [57] often contribute much to this Disorder, however its Original may be ascribed to some more universal Cause. But it is not so great, but that human Life is still a desireable State, having a superiority of Goodness and Happiness. Nor, if we apply our selves to it, does it hinder us from discerning that just Ballance and Oeconomy, which would constitute the most happy State of each Person, and promote the greatest Good in the whole.

Dispositions to some particular Passions.Let Physicians or Anatomists explain the several Motions in the Fluids or Solids of the Body, which accompany any Passion; or the Temperaments of Body which either make Men prone to any Passion, or are brought upon us by the long Continuance, or frequent Returns of it. ’Tis only to our Purpose in general to observe, “that probably certain Motions in the Body do accompany every Passion by a fixed Law of Nature; and alternately, that Temperament which is apt to receive or prolong these Motions in the Body, does influence our Passions to heighten or prolong them.” Thus a certain Temperament may be brought upon the Body, by its being frequently put into Motion by the Passions of Anger, Joy, Love, or Sorrow; and the Continuance of this Temperament shall make Men prone to the several [57] Passions for the future. We find [58] our selves after a long Fit of Anger or Sorrow, in an uneasy State, even when we are not reflecting on the particular Occasion of our Passion. During this State, every trifle shall be apt to provoke or deject us. On the contrary, after good Success, after strong friendly Passions, or a State of Mirth, some considerable Injuries or Losses, which at other times would have affected us very much, shall be overlooked, or meekly received, or at most but slightly resented; perhaps because our Bodies are not fit easily to receive these Motions which are constituted the Occasion of the uneasy Sensations of Anger. This Diversity of Temper every one has felt, who reflects on himself at different Times. In some Tempers it will appear like Madness. Whether the only Seat of these Habits, or the Occasion rather of these Dispositions, be in the Body; or whether the Soul itself does not, by frequent Returns of any Passion acquire some greater Disposition to receive and retain it again, let those determine, who sufficiently understand the Nature of either the one or the other.

section iii

Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions.

[58/59] I. The Nature of any Language has considerable Influence upon Men’s Reasonings on all Subjects, making them often take all those Ideas which are denoted by the same Word to be the same; and on the other hand, to look upon different Words as denoting different Ideas. We shall find that this Identity of Names has occasioned much confusion in Treatises of the Passions; while some have made larger, and some smaller Collections of Names, and have given the Explications of them as an Account of the Passions.

The Division of the Stoicks.Cicero, in the Fourth Book of Tusculan Questions,21 gives from the Stoicks, this general Division of the Passions: First, into Love and Hatred, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each, according as the Object is present or expected. About Good we have these two, Libido & Latitia, Desire and Joy: About Evil we have likewise two, Metus & Ægritudo, Fear and Sorrow. To this general Division he [60] subjoins many [59] Subdivisions of each of these four Passions; according as in the Latin Tongue they had different Names for the several Degrees of these Passions, or for the same Passion employed upon different Objects. A Writer of Lexicons would probably get the most precise Meanings of the Latin Names in that Book; nor would it be useless in considering the Nature of them.

The Schoolmen, as their Fund of Language was much smaller, have not so full Enumerations of them, going no further than their admired Aristotle.

II.

’Tis strange that the thoughtful Malebranche did not consider, that “Desire and Aversion are obviously different from the other Modifications called Passions; that these two directly lead to Action, or the Volition of Motion, and are wholly distinct from all sort of Sensation.” Whereas Joy and Sorrow are only a sort of Sensations; and other Affections differ from Sensations only, by including Desire or Aversion, or their correspondent Propensities: So that Desire and Aversion are the only pure Affections in the strictest Sense.

Sensation and Affection distinct.If, indeed, we confine the Word Sensation to the “immediate Perceptions of [61] Pleasure and Pain, upon the very Presence [60] or Operation of any Object or Event, which are occasioned by some Impression on our Bodies;” then we may denote by the Word Affection, those Pleasures or Pains not thus excited, but “resulting from some Reflection upon, or Opinion of our Possession of any Advantage, or from a certain Prospect of future pleasant Sensations on the one hand, or from a like Reflection or Prospect of evil or painful Sensations on the other, either to our selves or others.”*

Passion.When more violent confused Sensations arise with the Affection, and are attended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by the Name of Passion, especially when accompanied with some natural Propensities, to be hereafter explained.

Division by Malebranche.If this use of these Words be allowed, the Division of Malebranche is very natural. Good Objects excite Love; evil Objects Hatred: each of these is subdivided, as the Object is present and certain, or doubtfully expected, or certainly removed. To these three Circumstances correspond three Modifications of the original Affections; viz. Joy, Desire and Sorrow. Good present, raises Joy of Love, or Love of Joy: Good in suspense, [62] the Love of Desire; Good lost, Love of Sorrow. Evil [61] present, raises Aversion of Sorrow; Evil expected, Aversion or Hatred of Desire; and Evil removed, Aversion of Joy. The Joy of Love, and the Joy of Hatred, will possibly be found nearly the same sort of Sensations, tho upon different Occasions; the same may be said of the Sorrow of Aversion: and thus this Division will amount to the same with that of the Stoicks.22

Desire and Aversion. Joy and Sorrow.Perhaps it may be more easy to conceive our Affections and Passions in this manner. The Apprehension of Good, either to our selves or others, as attainable, raises Desire: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises Aversion, or Desire of removing or preventing it. These two are the proper Affections, distinct from all Sensation: We may call both Desires if we please. The Reflection upon the Presence or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the Sensation of Joy, which is distinct from those immediate Sensations which arise from the Object itself.* A like Sensation is raised, when we reflect upon the Removal or Prevention of Evil which once threatned our selves or others. The Reflection upon the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect [63] of it, or of the Loss of Good, is the Occasion of the Sensation of Sorrow, distinct from [62] those immediate Sensations arising from the Objects or Events themselves.

Affections may be distinguished from Passions.These Affections, viz. Desire, Aversion, Joy and Sorrow, we may, after Malebranche, call spiritual or pure Affections; because the purest Spirit, were it subject to any Evil, might be capable of them. But beside these Affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational Apprehension of Good or Evil, there are in our Nature violent confused Sensations, connected with bodily Motions, from which our Affections are denominated Passions.

Affections attended with undesigning Propensities. Anger.We may further observe something in our Nature, determining us very frequently to Action, distinct both from Sensation and Desire; if by Desire we mean a distinct Inclination to something apprehended as Good either publick or private, or as the Means of avoiding Evil: viz. a certain Propensity of Instinct to Objects and Actions, without any Conception of them as Good, or as the Means of preventing Evil. These Objects or Actions are generally, tho not always, in effect the Means of some Good; but we are determined to them even without this Conception of them. Thus, as we [64] observed above,† the Propensity to Fame [63] may continue after one has lost all notion of Good, either publick or private, which could be the Object of a distinct Desire. Our particular Affections have generally some of these Propensities accompanying them; but these Propensities are sometimes without the Affections or distinct Desires, and have a stronger Influence upon the Generality of Men, than the Affections could have alone. Thus in Anger, beside the Intention of removing the uneasy Sensation from the Injury received; beside the Desire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and Security for the future, which are some sort of Goods intended by Men when they are calm, as well as during the Passion, there is in the passionate Person a Propensity to occasion Misery to the Offender, a Determination to Violence, even where there is no Intention of any Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by this Violence. And ’tis principally this Propensity which we denote by the Name Anger, tho other Desires often accompany it.

So also our Presence with the distressed is generally necessary to their relief; and yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention of relieving them, we shall find a Propensity to [65] run to such Spectacles of Pity. Thus also, beside the calm Desire of the Happiness of a Person beloved, we have a strong Propensity to their Company, to the very [64] Sight of them, without any Consideration of it as a Happiness either to our selves or to the Person beloved. The sudden Appearance of great Danger, determines us to shriek out or fly, before we can have any distinct Desires, or any Consideration that a Shriek or Flight are proper means of Relief. These Propensities, along with the Sensations above-mentioned, when they occur without rational Desire, we may call Passions, and when they happen along with Desires, denominate them passionate. This part of our Constitution is as intelligible as many others universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that Danger of falling makes us stretch out our Arms; noise makes us wink; that a Child is determined to suck; many other Animals to rise up and walk; some to run into Water, before they can have any Notion of Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by these means.

Love and Hatred. Envy.It may perhaps be convenient to confine Love and Hatredto our Sentiments toward Moral Agents; Love denoting “Desire of the Happiness of another, generally attended with some Approbation of him as innocent at least, or being of a mixed [66] Character, where Good is generally prevalent:” And Hatred“denoting Disapprobation by our Sense, with the Absence of Desire of their [65] Happiness.” Benevolence may denote only “the Desire of another’s Happiness;” and Malice, “the Desire of their Misery,” abstractly from any Approbation or Condemnation by our Moral Sense. This sort of Malice is never found in our Nature, when we are not transported with Passion. The Propensities of Anger and Envy have some Resemblance of it; yet Envy is not an ultimate Desire of another’s Misery, but only a subordinate Desire of it, as the Means of advancing our selves, or some Person more beloved than the Person envied.

Fear. Hope.Fear, as far as it is an Affection, and not an undesigning Propensity, is “a Mixture of Sorrow and Aversion, when we apprehend the Probability of Evil, or the Loss of Good befalling our selves, or those we love:” There is more or less of Sorrow, according to the apprehended Degrees of Probability. Hope, if it be any way an Affection, and not an Opinion, is “a Mixture of Desire and Joy, upon the probability of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil.” Both these Passions may have some Propensities and Sensations attending them, distinct from those of the other Affections.

Confused Use of Names,[67] The confused Use of the Names, Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, Delight, has made [66 ] some of the most important Distinctions of our Affections and Passions, to be overlooked. No Modifications of Mind can be more different from each other, than a private Desire, and a publick; yet both are called Love. The Love of Money, for Instance, the Love of a generous Character, or a Friend: The Love of a fine Seat, and the Love of a Child. In like manner, what can be more different than the Sorrow for a Loss befallen our selves, and Sorrow for the Death of a Friend? Of this Men must convince themselves by Reflection.

There is also a considerable Difference even among the selfish Passions, which bear the same general Name, according to the different Senses which constitute the Objects good or evil. Thus the Desire of Honour, and the Desire of Wealth, are certainly very different sorts of Affections, and accompanied with different Sensations: The Sorrow in like manner for our Loss by a Shipwreck, and our Sorrow for having done a base Action, or Remorse: Sorrow for our being subject to the Gout or Stone, and Sorrow for our being despisedand condemned, or Shame: Sorrow for the Damage done by a Fire, and that Sorrow which arises upon an [68] apprehended Injury from a Partner, or any other of our Fellows, which we call Anger. Where we [67] get some special distinct Names, we more easily acknowledge a Difference, as it may appear in Shame and Anger; but had we other Names, appropriated in the same manner, we should imagine, with good ground, as many distinct Passions. The like Confusion is observable about our Senses.*

To say that the Sensation accompanying all sorts of Joy is pleasant, and that accompanying Sorrow uneasy, will not argue that there is no farther Diversity. Pains have many differences among themselves, and so have Pleasures, according to the different Senses by which they are perceived. To enumerate all these Diversities, would be difficult and tedious. But some Men have piqued themselves so much upon representing “all our Affections as selfish; as if each Person were in his whole Frame only a seperate System from his Fellows, so that there was nothing in his Constitution leading him to a publick Interest, further than he apprehended it subservient to his own private Interest; and this Interest made nothing else, than the gratifying our external Senses and Imagination, or obtaining the Means of it:” that thereby the Wisdom [69] and Goodness of [68] the Author of our Nature is traduced, as if he had given us the strongest Dispositions toward what he had in his Laws prohibited; and directed us, by the Frame of our Nature, to the meanest and most contemptible Pursuits; as if what all good Men have represented as the Excellence of our Nature, were a Force or Constraint put upon it by Art or Authority. It may be useful to consider our Affections and Passions more particularly, as “they are excited by something in our Frame different from Self‐Love, and tend to something else than the private Pleasures of the external Senses or Imagination.” This we may do under the following Heads, by shewing

• 1. How our Passions arise from the Moral Sense, and Sense of Honour.
• 2.How our Passions tend toward the State of others, abstractly from any Consideration of their Moral Qualities.
• 3. How the publick Passions are diversified by the Moral Qualities of the Agents, when they appear to our Moral Sense as virtuous or vicious.
• 4. How the publick Passions are diversified by the Relations of several Agents to each other, when we consider at once their State, as to Happiness or Misery, and [69] their past as well as present Actions towards each other.

• False Representations of our Nature rectified.

  5. How all these Passions may be complicated with the selfish. Under each of these Heads we may find the six Passions of Malebranche, or [70] the four of Zeno; with many other Combinations of them.

III.

1. Passions about our own Actions. The Passion of Heroism in Castle building. Moral Joy or Self Approbation. Remorse.1. The Passions about our own Actions occasioned by the Moral Sense. When we form the Idea of a morally good Action, or see it represented in the Drama, or read it in Epicks or Romance, we feel a Desire arising of doing the like. This leads most Tempers into an imagined Series of Adventures, in which they are still acting the generous and virtuous Part, like to the Idea they have received. If we have executed any good Design, we feel inward Triumph of Joy: If we are disappointed thro our own Negligence, or have been diverted from it by some selfish View, we shall feel a Sorrow called Remorse.

Reluctance.When the Idea is in like manner formed of any morally evil Action, which we might possibly accomplish, if we reflect upon the Cruelty or pernicious Tendency of it, there arises Reluctance, or Aversion: If we have committed such a Crime, upon like Reflection we feel the Sorrow called Remorse: If we have resisted the Temptation, [70] we feel a secret Joy and Self‐Approbation, for which there is no special Name.

Modesty. Shame.We might enumerate six other Passions from the Sense of Honour, according as we [71] apprehend our Actions, or any other Circumstances, shall affect the Opinions which others form concerning us. When any Action or Circumstance occurs, from which we imagine Honour would arise, we feel Desire; when we attain it, Joy; when we are disappointed, Sorrow. When we first apprehend any Action or Circumstance as dishonourable, we feel Aversion arising; if we apprehend our selves involved in it, or in danger of being tempted to it, we feel a Passion we may call Modesty or Shame; when we escape or resist such Temptations, or avoid what is dishonourable, we feel a Joy, for which there is no special Name.

Ambition. Pride.We give the Name Ambition to a violent Desire of Honour, but generally in a bad Sense, when it would lead the Agent into immoral Means to gratify it. The same Word often denotes the Desire of Power. Pride denotes sometimes the same Desires of Honour and Power, with Aversion to their contraries; sometimes Pride denotes Joy upon any apprehended Right or Claim to Honour; generally it is taken in a bad Sense, when one claims that to which he has no Right.

Shame for others.[71] Men may feel the Passion of Shame for the dishonourable Actions of others, when any part of the Dishonour falls upon themselves; [72] as when the Person dishonoured is one of their Club, or Party, or Family. The general Relation of human Nature may produce some uneasiness upon the Dishonour of another, tho this is more owing to our publick Sense.

IV.

2. Publick Passions abstractly. Goodwill. Compassion. Pity. Congratulation.2. The second Class are the publick Passions about the State of others, as to Happiness or Misery, abstractly from their Moral Qualities. These Affections or Passions extend to all perceptive Natures, when there is no real or imagined Opposition of Interest. We naturally desire the absent Happiness of others; rejoice in it when obtained, and sorrow for it when lost. We have Aversion to any impending Misery; we are sorrowful when it befals any Person, and rejoice when it is removed. This Aversion and Sorrow we often call Pity or Compassion; the Joy we may call Congratulation.

Since our Moral Sense represents Virtue as the greatest Happiness to the Person possessed of it, our publick Affections will naturally make us desire the Virtue of others. When the Opportunity of a great Action occurs to any Person against whom we are [72] no way prejudiced, we wish he would attempt it, and desire his good Success. If he succeeds, we feel Joy; if he is disappointed, [73] or quits the Attempt, we feel Sorrow. Upon like Opportunity of, or Temptation to a base Action, we have Aversion to the Event: If he resists the Temptation, we feel Joy; if he yields to it, Sorrow. Our Affections toward the Person arise jointly with our Passions about this Event, according as he acquits himself virtuously or basely.

V.

3. Publick Passions with moral Perceptions. Regret.3. The Passions of the third Class are our publick Affections, jointly with moral Perceptions of the Virtue or Vice of the Agents. When Good appears attainable by a Person of Moral Dignity, our Desire of his Happiness, founded upon Esteem or Approbation, is much stronger than that supposed in the former Class. The Misfortune of such a Person raises stronger Sorrow, Pity, or Regret, and Dissatisfaction with the Administration of the World, upon a light View of it, with a Suspicion of the real Advantage of Virtue. The Success of such a Character raises all the contrary Affections of Joy and Satisfaction with Providence, and Security in Virtue. When Evil threatens such a Character, we have strong Aversion to it, with Love toward the Person: His escaping the Evil raises Joy, Confidence in [73] Providence, with Security in Virtue. If the Evil befals him, we feel the contrary Passions, Sorrow, Dissatisfaction with Providence, [74] and Suspicion of the Reality of Virtue.

Which of them fit for the Drama.Hence we see how unfit such Representations are in Tragedy, as make the perfectly Virtuous miserable in the highest degree. They can only lead the Spectators into Distrust of Providence, Diffidence of Virtue; and into such Sentiments, as some Authors, who probably mistake his meaning, tell us Brutus express’d at his Death, “That the Virtue he had pursued as a solid Good, proved but an empty Name.” But we must here remember, that, notwithstanding all the frightful Ideas we have inculcated upon us of the King of Terrors, yet an honourable Death is far from appearing to a generous Mind, as the greatest of Evils. The Ruin of a Free State, the Slavery of a generous Spirit, a Life upon shameful Terms, still appear vastly greater Evils; beside many other exquisite Distresses of a more private nature, in comparison of which, an honourable Death befalling a favourite Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance.

Passions toward moral evil Agents. No disinterested or ultimate Malice in Men. Anger.Under this Class are also included the Passions employed about the Fortunes of Characters, apprehended as morally Evil. Such Characters do raise Dislike in any [74] Observer, who has a moral Sense: But Malice, or the ultimate Desire of their Misery, does [75] not necessarily arise toward them. Perhaps our Nature is not capable of desiring the Misery of any Being calmly, farther than it may be necessary to the Safety of the innocent: We may find, perhaps, that there is no Quality in any Object which would excite in us pure disinterested Malice, or calm Desire of Misery for its own sake.* When we apprehend any Person as injurious to our selves, or to any innocent Person, especially to a Person beloved, the Passion of Anger arises toward the Agent. By Anger is generally meant “a Propensity to occasion Evil to another, arising upon apprehension of an Injury done by him:” This violent Propensity is attended generally, when the Injury is not very sudden, with Sorrow for the Injury sustained, or threatned, and Desire of repelling it, and making the Author of it repent of his Attempt, or repair the Damage.

Its Effects.This Passion is attended with the most violent uneasy Sensations, and produces as great Changes in our Bodies as any whatsoever. We are precipitantly led by this Passion, to apprehend the injurious as [75] directly malicious, and designing the Misery of others without farther Intention. While the Heat of this Passion continues, we seem naturally to pursue the Misery [76] of the injurious, until they relent, and convince us of their better Intentions, by expressing their Sense of the Injury, and offering Reparation of Damage, with Security against future Offences.

Now as it is plainly necessary, in a System of Agents capable of injuring each other, that every one should be made formidable to an Invader, by such a violent Passion, till the Invader shews his Reformation of Temper, as above, and no longer; so we find it is thus ordered in our Constitution. Upon these Evidences of Reformation in the Invader, our Passion naturally abates; or if in any perverse Temper it does not, the Sense of Mankindturns against him, and he is looked upon as cruel and inhumane.

In considering more fully the Passions about the Fortunes of evil Characters, distinct from Anger, which arises upon a fresh Injury, we may first consider the evil Agents, such as a sudden View sometimes represents them, directly evil and malicious; and then make proper Abatements, for what the worst of Men come short of this compleatly evil Temper. As Mathematicians [76] suppose perfect Hardness in some Bodies, and Elasticity in others, and then make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees in natural Bodies.

Joy of Hatred. Sorrow of Hatred.[77] The Prospect of Good to a Person apprehended as entirely malicious, raises Aversion in the Observer, or Desire of his Disappointment; at least, when his Success would confirm him in any evil Intention. His Disappointment raises