The Online Library of Liberty

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• An Eulogium On President Montesquieu, By Monsieur D’alembert.
• Preface.
• The Spirit of Laws.
• Book I.: Of Laws In General.
• Chap. I.: Of the Relation of Laws to Different Beings.
• Chap. II.: Of the Laws of Nature.
• Chap. III.: Of Positive Laws.
• Book II.: Of Laws Directly Derived From the Nature of Government.
• Chap. I.: Of the Nature of Three Different Governments.
• Chap. II.: Of the Republican Government, and the Laws Relative to Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of the Laws Relative to the Nature of Aristocracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government.
• Chap. V.: Of the Laws Relative to the Nature of a Despotic Government.
• Book III.: Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government.
• Chap. I.: Difference Between the Nature and Principle of Government.
• Chap. II.: Of the Principle of Different Governments.
• Chap. III.: Of the Principle of Democracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Principle of Aristocracy.
• Chap. V.: That Virtue Is Not the Principle of a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. VI.: In What Manner Virtue Is Supplied In a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Principle of Monarchy.
• Chap. VIII.: That Honour Is Not the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. X.: Difference of Obedience In Moderate and Despotic Governments.
• Chap. XI.: Reflections On the Preceding Chapters.
• Book IV.: That the Laws of Education Ought to Be Relative to the Principles of Government.
• Chap. I.: Of the Laws of Education.
• Chap. II.: Of Education In Monarchies.
• Chap. III.: Of Education In a Despotic Government.
• Chap. IV.: Difference Between the Effects of Ancient and Modern Education.
• Chap. V.: Of Education In a Republican Government.
• Chap. VI.: Of Some Institutions Among the Greeks.
• Chap. VII.: In What Case These Singular Institutions May Be of Service.
• Chap. VIII.: Explication of a Paradox of the Ancients, In Respect to Manners.
• Book V.: That the Laws, Given By the Legislator, Ought to Be Relative to the Principle of Government.
• Chap. I.: Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: What Is Meant By Virtue In a Political State.
• Chap. III.: What Is Meant By a Love of the Republic, In a Democracy.
• Chap. IV.: In What Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality Is Inspired.
• Chap. V.: In What Manner the Laws Establish Equality In a Democracy.
• Chap. VI.: In What Manner the Laws Ought to Maintain Frugality In a Democracy.
• Chap. VII.: Other Methods of Favouring the Principle of Democracy.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the Laws Ought to Be Relative to the Principle of Government In an Aristocracy.
• Chap. IX.: In What Manner the Laws Are Relative to Their Principle In Monarchies.
• Chap. X.: Of the Expedition Peculiar to the Executive Power In Monarchies.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. XII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XIII.: An Idea of Despotic Power.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Manner the Laws Are Relative to the Principles of Despotic Government.
• Chap. XV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Communication of Power.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Presents.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Rewards Conferred By the Sovereign.
• Chap. XIX.: New Consequences of the Principles of the Three Governments.
• Book VI.: Consequences of the Principles of Different Governments With Respect to the Simplicity of Civil and Criminal Laws, the Form of Judgements, and the Inflicting of Punishments.
• Chap. I.: Of the Simplicity of Civil Laws In Different Governments.
• Chap. II.: Of the Simplicity of Criminal Laws In Different Governments.
• Chap. III.: In What Governments, and In What Cases, the Judges Ought to Determine According to the Express Letter of the Law.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Manner of Passing Judgement.
• Chap. V.: In What Governments the Sovereign May Be Judge.
• Chap. VI.: That, In Monarchies, Ministers Ought Not to Sit As Judges.
• Chap. VII.: Of a Single Magistrate.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Accusation In Different Governments.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Severity of Punishments In Different Governments.
• Chap. X.: Of the Ancient French Laws.
• Chap. XI.: That, When People Are Virtuous, Few Punishments Are Necessary.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Power of Punishments.
• Chap. XIII.: Insufficiency of the Laws of Japan.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Spirit of the Roman Senate.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Roman Laws In Respect to Punishments.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Just Proportion Betwixt Punishments and Crimes.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Rack.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Pecuniary and Corporal Punishments.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Law of Retaliation.
• Chap. XX.: Of the Punishment of Fathers For the Crimes of Their Children.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Clemency of the Prince.
• Book VII.: Consequences of the Different Principles of the Three Governments, With Respect to Sumptuary Laws, Luxury, and the Condition of Women.
• Chap. I.: Of Luxury.
• Chap. II.: Of Sumptuary Laws In a Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of Sumptuary Laws In an Aristocracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of Sumptuary Laws In a Monarchy.
• Chap. V.: In What Cases Sumptuary Laws Are Useful In a Monarchy.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Luxury of China.
• Chap. VII.: Fatal Consequences of Luxury In China.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Public Continency.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Condition Or State of Women In Different Governments.
• Chap. X.: Of the Domestic Tribunal Among the Romans.
• Chap. XI.: In What Manner the Institutions Changed At Rome Together With the Government.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Guardianship of Women Among the Romans.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Punishments Decreed By Emperors Against the Incontinency of Women.
• Chap. XIV.: Sumptuary Laws Among the Romans.
• Chap. XV.: Of Dowries and Nuptial Advantages In Different Constitutions.
• Chap. XVI.: An Excellent Custom of the Samnites.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Female-administration.
• Book VIII.: Of the Corruption of the Principles of the Three Governments.
• Chap. I.: General Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: Of the Corruption of the Principles of Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of the Spirit of Extreme Equality.
• Chap. IV.: Particular Cause of the Corruption of the People.
• Chap. V.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Aristocracy.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchy.
• Chap. VII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VIII.: Danger of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchical Government.
• Chap. IX.: How Ready the Nobility Are to Defend the Throne.
• Chap. X.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. XI.: Natural Effects of the Goodness and Corruption of the Principles of Government.
• Chap. XII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XIII.: The Effect of an Oath Among Virtuous People.
• Chap. XIV.: How the Smallest Change of the Constitution Is Attended With the Ruin of Its Principles.
• Chap. XV.: Sure Methods of Preserving the Three Principles.
• Chap. XVI.: Distinctive Properties of a Republic.
• Chap. XVII.: Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy.
• Chap. XVIII.: Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy.
• Chap. XIX.: Distinctive Properties of a Despotic Government.
• Chap. XX.: Consequence of the Preceding Chapters.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Empire of China.
• Book IX.: Of Laws, In the Relation They Bear to a Defensive Force.
• Chap. I.: In What Manner Republics Provide For Their Safety.
• Chap. II.: That a Confederate Government Ought to Be Composed of States of the Same Nature, Especially of the Republican Kind.
• Chap. III.: Other Requisites In a Confederate Republic.
• Chap. IV.: In What Manner Despotic Governments Provide For Their Security.
• Chap. V.: In What Manner a Monarchical Government Provides For Its Security.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Defensive Force of States In General.
• Chap. VII.: A Reflexion.
• Chap. VIII.: A Particular Case, In Which the Defensive Force of a State Is Inferior to the Offensive.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Relative Force of States.
• Chap. X.: Of the Weakness of Neighbouring States.
• Book X.: Of Laws, In the Relation They Bear to Offensive Force.
• Chap. I.: Of Offensive Force.
• Chap. II.: Of War.
• Chap. III.: Of the Right of Conquest.
• Chap. IV.: Some Advantages of a Conquered People.
• Chap. V.: Gelon, King of Syracuse.
• Chap. VI.: Of Conquests Made By a Republic.
• Chap. VII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: Of Conquests Made By a Monarchy.
• Chap. X.: Of One Monarchy That Subdues Another.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Manners of a Conquered People.
• Chap. XII.: Of a Law of Cyrus.
• Chap. XIII.: Charles XII.
• Chap. XIV.: Alexander.
• Chap. XV.: New Methods of Preserving a Conquest.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Conquests Made By a Despotic Prince.
• Chap. XVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XI.: Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty, With Regard to the Constitution.
• Chap. I.: A General Idea.
• Chap. II.: Different Significations of the Word, Liberty.
• Chap. III.: In What Liberty Consists.
• Chap. IV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. V.: Of the End Or View of Different Governments.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Constitution of England.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Monarchies We Are Acquainted With.
• Chap. VIII.: Why the Ancients Had Not a Clear Idea of Monarchy.
• Chap. IX.: Aristotle’s Manner of Thinking.
• Chap. X.: What Other Politicians Thought.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Kings of the Heroic Times of Greece.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Government of the Kings of Rome, and In What Manner the Three Powers Were There Distributed.
• Chap. XIII.: General Reflections On the State of Rome After the Expulsion of Its Kings.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Manner the Distribution of the Three Powers Began to Change, After the Expulsion of the Kings.
• Chap. XV.: In What Manner Rome, In the Flourishing State of That Republic, Suddenly Lost Its Liberty.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Legislative Power In the Roman Republic.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Executive Power In the Same Republic.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Judiciary Power In the Roman Government.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Government of the Roman Provinces.
• Chap. XX.: The End of This Book.
• Book XII.: Of the Laws That Form Political Liberty, As Relative to the Subject.
• Chap. I.: Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: Of the Liberty of the Subject.
• Chap. III.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IV.: That Liberty Is Favoured By the Nature and Proportion of Punishments.
• Chap. V.: Of Certain Accusations That Require Particular Moderation and Prudence.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Crime Against Nature.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Bad Application of the Name of Sacrilege and High-treason.
• Chap. IX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. X.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XI.: Of Thoughts.
• Chap. XII.: Of Indiscreet Speeches.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Writings.
• Chap. XIV.: Breach of Modesty In Punishing Crimes.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Infranchisement of Slaves, In Order to Accuse Their Master.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Calumny, With Regard to the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Revealing of Conspiracies.
• Chap. XVIII.: How Dangerous It Is, In Republics, to Be Too Severe In Punishing the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. XIX.: In What Manner the Use of Liberty Is Suspended In a Republic.
• Chap. XX.: Of Laws Favourable to the Liberty of the Subject In a Republic.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Cruelty of Laws, In Respect to Debtors, In a Republic.
• Chap. XXII.: Of Things That Strike At Liberty In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of Spies In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXIV.: Of Anonymous Letters.
• Chap. XXV.: Of the Manner of Governing In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXVI.: That, In a Monarchy, the Prince Ought to Be of Easy Access.
• Chap. XXVII.: Of the Manners of a Monarch.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Of the Regard Which Monarchs Owe to Their Subjects.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of the Civil Laws Proper For Mixing Some Portion of Liberty In a Despotic Government.
• Chap. XXX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XIII.: Of the Relation Which the Levying of Taxes and the Greatness of the Public Revenues Have to Liberty.
• Chap. I.: Of the Public Revenues.
• Chap. II.: That It Is Bad Reasoning to Say That the Greatness of Taxes Is Good In Its Own Nature.
• Chap. III.: Of Taxes In Countries Where Part of the People Are Villains Or Bondmen.
• Chap. IV.: Of a Republic In the Like Case.
• Chap. V.: Of a Monarchy In the Like Case.
• Chap. VI.: Of a Despotic Government In the Like Case.
• Chap. VII.: Of Taxes In Countries Where Villainage Is Not Established.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the Deception Is Preserved.
• Chap. IX.: Of a Bad Kind of Impost.
• Chap. X.: That the Greatness of Taxes Depends On the Nature of the Government.
• Chap. XI.: Of Confiscations.
• Chap. XII.: Relation Between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty.
• Chap. XIII.: In What Government Taxes Are Capable of Increase.
• Chap. XIV.: That the Nature of the Taxes Is Relative to the Government.
• Chap. XV.: Abuse of Liberty.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Conquests of the Mahometans.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Augmentation of Troops.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of an Exemption From Taxes.
• Chap. XIX.: Which Is Most Suitable to the Prince and to the People, the Farming the Revenues, Or Managing Them By Commission?
• Chap. XX.: Of the Farmers of the Revenues.
• Book XIV.: Of Laws As Relative to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: General Idea.
• Chap. II.: Of the Difference of Men In Different Climates.
• Chap. III.: Contradiction In the Tempers of Some Southern Nations.
• Chap. IV.: Cause of the Immutability of Religion, Manners, Customs, and Laws, In the Eastern Countries.
• Chap. V.: That Those Are Bad Legislators Who Favour the Vices of the Climate, and Good Legislators Who Oppose Those Vices.
• Chap. VI.: Of Agriculture In Warm Climates.
• Chap. VII.: Of Monkery.
• Chap. VIII.: An Excellent Custom of China.
• Chap. IX.: Means of Encouraging Industry.
• Chap. X.: Of the Laws Relative to the Sobriety of the People.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Laws Relative to the Distempers of the Climate.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Laws Against Suicides.
• Chap. XIII.: Effects Arising From the Climate of England.
• Chap. XIV.: Other Effects of the Climate.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Different Confidence Which the Laws Have In the People, According to the Difference of Climates.
• Book XV.: In What Manner the Laws of Civil Slavery Are Relative to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Civil Slavery.
• Chap. II.: Origin of the Right of Slavery Among the Roman Civilians.
• Chap. III.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. IV.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. V.: Of the Slavery of the Negroes.
• Chap. VI.: The True Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. VII.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. VIII.: Inutility of Slavery Among Us.
• Chap. IX.: Several Kinds of Slavery.
• Chap. X.: Regulations Necessary In Respect to Slavery.
• Chap. XI.: Abuses of Slavery.
• Chap. XII.: Danger From the Multitude of Slaves.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Armed Slaves.
• Chap. XIV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XV.: Precautions to Be Used In Moderate Governments.
• Chap. XVI.: Regulations Between Masters and Slaves.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Infranchisements.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Freed-men and Eunuchs.
• Book XVI.: How the Laws of Domestic Slavery Have a Relation to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Domestic Servitude.
• Chap. II.: That, In the Countries of the South, There Is a Natural Inequality Between the Two Sexes.
• Chap. III.: That a Plurality of Wives Greatly Depends On the Means of Supporting Them.
• Chap. IV.: That the Law of Polygamy Is an Affair That Depends On Calculation.
• Chap. V.: The Reason of a Law of Malabar.
• Chap. VI.: Of Polygamy Considered In Itself.
• Chap. VII.: Of an Equality of Treatment In Case of Many Wives.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Separation of Women From Men.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Connexion Between Domestic and Political Government.
• Chap. X.: The Principle On Which the Morals of the East Are Founded.
• Chap. XI.: Of Domestic Slavery Independently of Polygamy.
• Chap. XII.: Of Natural Modesty.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Jealousy.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Eastern Manner of Domestic Government.
• Chap. XV.: Of Divorce and Repudiation.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Repudiation and Divorce Amongst the Romans.
• Book XVII.: How the Laws of Political Servitude Have a Relation to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Political Servitude.
• Chap. II.: The Difference Between Nations In Point of Courage.
• Chap. III.: Of the Climate of Asia.
• Chap. IV.: The Consequences Resulting From This.
• Chap. V.: That, When the People In the North of Asia and Those of the North of Europe Made Conquests, the Effects of the Conquest Were Not the Same.
• Chap. VI.: A New Physical Cause of the Slavery of Asia and of the Liberty of Europe.
• Chap. VII.: Of Africa and America.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Capital of the Empire.
• Book XVIII.: Of Laws In the Relation They Bear to the Nature of the Soil.
• Chap. I.: How the Nature of the Soil Has an Influence On the Laws.
• Chap. II.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. III.: What Countries Are Best Cultivated.
• Chap. IV.: New Effects of the Barrenness and Fertility of Countries.
• Chap. V.: Of the Inhabitants of Islands.
• Chap. VI.: Of Countries Raised By the Industry of Man.
• Chap. VII.: Of Human Industry.
• Chap. VIII.: The General Relation of Laws.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Soil of America.
• Chap. X.: Of Population, In the Relation It Bears to the Manner of Procuring Subsistence.
• Chap. XI.: Of Savage and Barbarous Nations.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Law of Nations Among People Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Civil Law of Those Nations Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Political State of the People Who Do Not Cultivate the Land.
• Chap. XV.: Of People Who Know the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Civil Laws Among People Who Know Not the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Political Laws Amongst Nations Who Have Not the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Power of Superstition.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Liberty of the Arabs and the Servitude of the Tartars.
• Chap. XX.: Of the Law of Nations As Practised By the Tartars.
• Chap. XXI.: The Civil Law of the Tartars.
• Chap. XXII.: Of a Civil Law of the German Nations.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of the Regal Ornaments Among the Franks.
• Chap. XXIV.: Of the Marriages of the Kings of the Franks.
• Chap. XXV.: Childeric.
• Chap. XXVI.: Of the Time When the Kings of the Franks Became of Age.
• Chap. XXVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Of Adoption Among the Germans.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of the Sanguinary Temper of the Kings of the Franks.
• Chap. XXX.: Of the National Assemblies of the Franks.
• Chap. XXXI.: Of the Authority of the Clergy Under the First Race.
• Book XIX.: Of Laws, In Relation to the Principles Which Form the General Spirit, the Morals, and Customs, of a Nation.
• Chap. I.: Of the Subject of This Book.
• Chap. II.: That It Is Necessary People’s Minds Should Be Prepared For the Reception of the Best Laws.
• Chap. III.: Of Tyranny.
• Chap. IV.: Of the General Spirit of Mankind.
• Chap. V.: How Far We Should Be Attentive Lest the General Spirit of a Nation Be Changed.
• Chap. VI.: That Every Thing Ought Not to Be Corrected.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.
• Chap. VIII.: Effects of a Sociable Temper.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Vanity and Pride of Nations.
• Chap. X.: Of the Character of the Spaniards and Chinese.
• Chap. XI.: A Reflection.
• Chap. XII.: Of Custom and Manners In a Despotic State.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Behaviour of the Chinese.
• Chap. XIV.: What Are the Natural Means of Changing the Manners and Customs of a Nation.
• Chap. XV.: The Influence of Domestic Government On the Political.
• Chap. XVI.: How Some Legislators Have Confounded the Principles Which Govern Mankind.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Peculiar Quality of the Chinese Government.
• Chap. XVIII.: A Consequence Drawn From the Preceding Chapter.
• Chap. XIX.: How This Union of Religion, Laws, Manners, and Customs, Among the Chinese, Was Effected.
• Chap. XX.: Explication of a Paradox Relating to the Chinese.
• Chap. XXI.: How the Laws Ought to Have a Relation to Manners and Customs.
• Chap. XXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXIII.: How the Laws Are Founded On the Manners of a People.
• Chap. XXIV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVII.: How the Laws Contribute to Form the Manners, Customs, and Character, of a Nation.

CHAP. XIV.

In what Manner the Laws are relative to the Principles of despotic Government.

THE principle of despotic government is fear: but a timid, ignorant, and faint-spirited people have no occasion for a great number of laws.

Every thing ought to depend here on two or three ideas: hence there is no necessity that any new notions should be added. When we want to break a horse, we take care not to let him change his master, his lesson, or his pace. Thus an impression is made on his brain by two or three motions, and no more.

If a prince is shut up in a seraglio, he cannot leave his voluptuous abode without alarming those who keep him confined. They will not bear that his person and power should pass into other hands. He seldom, therefore, wages war in person, and hardly ventures to intrust the command to his generals.

A prince of this stamp, unaccustomed to resistance in his palace, is enraged to see his will opposed by armed force: hence he is generally governed by wrath or vengeance. Besides, he can have no notion of true glory. War, therefore, is carried on, under such a government, in its full natural fury, and less extent is given to the law of nations than in other states.

Such a prince has so many imperfections, that they are afraid to expose his natural stupidity to public view. He is concealed in his palace, and the people are ignorant of his situation. It is lucky for him that the inhabitants of those countries need only the name of a prince to govern them.

When Charles XII. was at Bender, he met with some opposition from the senate of Sweden: upon which he wrote word home that he would send one of his boots to command them. This boot would have governed like a despotic prince.

If the prince is a prisoner, he is supposed to be dead, and another mounts the throne. The treaties made by the prisoner are void; his successor will not ratify them. And, indeed, (as he is the law, the state, and the prince,) when he is no longer a prince, he is nothing: were he not, therefore, deemed to be deceased, the state would be subverted.

One thing which chiefly determined the Turks to conclude a separate peace with Peter I. was the Muscovites telling the vizir, that, in Sweden, another prince had been set upon the throne.†

The preservation of the state is only the preservation of the prince, or rather of the palace where he is confined. Whatever does not directly menace this palace, or the capital, makes no impression on ignorant, proud, and prejudiced, minds; and, as for the concatenation of events, they are unable to trace, to foresee, or even to conceive, it. Politics, with its several springs and laws, must here be very much limited; the political government is as simple as the civil.*

The whole is reduced to reconciling the political and civil administration to the domestic government, the officers of state to those of the seraglio.

Such a state is happiest when it can look upon itself as the only one in the world, when it is environed with deserts, and separated from those people whom they call barbarians. Since it cannot depend on the militia, it is proper it should destroy a part of itself.

As fear is the principle of despotic government, its end is tranquillity: but this tranquillity cannot be called a peace; no, it is only the silence of those towns which the enemy is ready to invade.

Since the strength does not lie in the state, but in the army that founded it; in order to defend the state, the army must be preserved, how formidable soever to the prince. How, then, can we reconcile the security of the government to that of the prince’s person?

Observe how industriously the Russian government endeavours to temper its arbitrary power, which it finds more burthensome than the people themselves. They have broke their numerous guards, mitigated criminal punishments, erected tribunals, entered into a knowledge of the laws, and instructed the people. But there are particular causes that will probably once more involve them in the very misery which they now endeavour to avoid.

In those states religion has more influence than any where else: it is fear added to fear. In Mahometan countries it is partly from their religion that the people derive the surprizing veneration they have for their prince.

It is religion that amends, in some measure, the Turkish constitution. The subjects, who have no attachment of honour to the glory and grandeur of the state, are connected with it by the force and principle of religion.

Of all despotic governments there is none that labours more under its own weight than that wherein the prince declares himself proprietor of all the lands, and heir to all his subjects. Hence the neglect of agriculture arises; and, if the prince intermeddles likewise in trade, all manner of industry is ruined.

Under this sort of government nothing is repaired or improved.† Houses are built only for the necessity of habitation: there is no digging of ditches, or planting of trees: every thing is drawn from, but nothing restored to, the earth: the ground lies untilled, and the whole country becomes a desert.

Is it to be imagined, that the laws, which abolish the property of land and the succession of estates, will diminish the avarice and cupidity of the great? By no means: they will rather stimulate this cupidity and avarice. The great men will be prompted to use a thousand oppressive methods, imagining they have no other property than the gold and silver which they are able to seize upon by violence or to conceal.

To prevent, therefore, the utter ruin of the state, the avidity of the prince ought to be moderated by some established custom. Thus, in Turkey, the sovereign is satisfied with the right of three per cent. on the value of inheritances.‡ But, as he gives the greatest part of the lands to his soldiery, and disposes of them as he pleases; as he seizes on all the inheritances of the officers of the empire at their decease; as he has the property of the possessions of those who die without issue, and the daughters have only the usufruct; it thence follows that the greatest part of the estates of the country are held in a precarious manner.

By the laws of Bantam* the king seizes on the whole inheritance, even wife, children, and habitation. In order to elude the cruellest part of this law, they are obliged to marry their children at eight, nine, or ten years of age, and sometimes younger, to the end that they may not be a wretched part of the father’s succession.

In countries where there are no fundamental laws the succession to the empire cannot be fixed. The crown is then elective, and the right of electing is in the prince, who names a successor either of his own or of some other family. In vain would it be to establish here the succession of the eldest son: the prince might always choose another. The successor is declared by the prince himself, or by a civil war. Hence a despotic state is, upon another account, more liable, than a monarchical government, to dissolution.

As every prince of the royal family is held equally capable of being chosen, hence it follows that the prince who ascends the throne immediately strangles his brothers, as in Turkey; or puts out their eyes, as in Persia; or bereaves them of their understanding, as in the Mogul’s country; or, if these precautions are not used, as in Morocco, the vacancy of the throne is always attended with the horrors of a civil war.

By the constitutions of Russia† the Czar may choose whom he has a mind for his successor, whether of his own or of a strange family, Such a settlement produces a thousand revolutions, and renders the throne as tottering as the succession is arbitrary. The right of succession being one of those things which are of most importance to the people to know, the best is that which most sensibly strikes them, such as a certain order of birth. A settlement of this kind puts a stop to intrigues, and stifles ambition: the mind of a weak prince is no longer enslaved, nor is he made to speak his will as he is just expiring.

When the succession is established by a fundamental law, only one prince is the successor, and his brothers have neither a real nor apparent right to dispute the crown with him. They can neither pretend to, nor take any advantage of, the will of a father. There is then no more occasion to confine or kill the king’s brother than any other subject.

But, in despotic governments, where the prince’s brothers are equally his slaves and his rivals, prudence requires that their persons be secured; especially in Mahometan countries, where religion considers victory or success as a divine decision in their favour; so that they have no such thing as a monarch de jure, but only de facto.

There is a far greater incentive to ambition in countries where the princes of the blood are sensible, that, if they do not ascend the throne, they must be either imprisoned or put to death, than amongst us, where they are placed in such a station as may satisfy, if not their ambition, at least their moderate desires.

The princes of despotic governments have ever perverted the use of marriage. They generally take a great many wives, especially in that part of the world where absolute power is in some measure naturalized; namely, Asia. Hence they come to have such a multitude of children, that they can hardly have any great affection for them, nor the children for one another.

The reigning family resembles the state: it is too weak itself, and its head too powerful: it seems very numerous and extensive, and yet is suddenly extinct. Artaxerxes‡ put all his children to death for conspiring against him. It is not at all probable that fifty children should conspire against their father, and much less that this conspiracy should be owing to his having refused to resign his concubine to his eldest son. It is more natural to believe that the whole was an intrigue of those oriental seraglios, where fraud, treachery, and deceit, reign in silence and darkness; and where an old prince, grown every day more infirm, is the first prisoner of the palace.

After what has been said, one would imagine that human nature should perpetually rise up against despotism. But, notwithstanding the love of liberty, so natural to mankind, notwithstanding their innate detestation of force and violence, most nations are subject to this very government. This is easily accounted for. To form a moderate government, it is necessary to combine the several powers; to regulate, temper, and set them in motion; to give, as it were, ballast to one, in order to enable it to counterpoise the other. This is a master-piece of legislation, rarely produced by hazard, and seldom attained by prudence. On the contrary, a despotic government offers itself, as it were, at first sight; it is uniform throughout; and, as passions only are requisite to establish it, this is what every capacity may reach.

[† ]Continuation of Puffendorf’s Introduction to the History of Europe, in the article of Sweden, ch. 10.

[* ]According to sir John Chardin, there is no council of state in Persia.

[† ]See Ricaut, State of the Ottoman Empire, p. 196.

[‡ ]See concerning the inheritances of the Turks, Ancient and Modern Sparta. See also Ricaut on the Ottoman Empire.

[* ]Collection of Voyages that contributed to the establishment of the East-India company, tom. 1. The law of Pegu is less cruel: if there happen to be children, the king succeeds only to two-thirds. Ibid. tom. 3. p. 1.

[† ]See the different constitutions, especially that of 1722.

[‡ ]See Justin.