The Online Library of Liberty

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• An Eulogium On President Montesquieu, By Monsieur D’alembert.
• Preface.
• The Spirit of Laws.
• Book I.: Of Laws In General.
• Chap. I.: Of the Relation of Laws to Different Beings.
• Chap. II.: Of the Laws of Nature.
• Chap. III.: Of Positive Laws.
• Book II.: Of Laws Directly Derived From the Nature of Government.
• Chap. I.: Of the Nature of Three Different Governments.
• Chap. II.: Of the Republican Government, and the Laws Relative to Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of the Laws Relative to the Nature of Aristocracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government.
• Chap. V.: Of the Laws Relative to the Nature of a Despotic Government.
• Book III.: Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government.
• Chap. I.: Difference Between the Nature and Principle of Government.
• Chap. II.: Of the Principle of Different Governments.
• Chap. III.: Of the Principle of Democracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Principle of Aristocracy.
• Chap. V.: That Virtue Is Not the Principle of a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. VI.: In What Manner Virtue Is Supplied In a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Principle of Monarchy.
• Chap. VIII.: That Honour Is Not the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. X.: Difference of Obedience In Moderate and Despotic Governments.
• Chap. XI.: Reflections On the Preceding Chapters.
• Book IV.: That the Laws of Education Ought to Be Relative to the Principles of Government.
• Chap. I.: Of the Laws of Education.
• Chap. II.: Of Education In Monarchies.
• Chap. III.: Of Education In a Despotic Government.
• Chap. IV.: Difference Between the Effects of Ancient and Modern Education.
• Chap. V.: Of Education In a Republican Government.
• Chap. VI.: Of Some Institutions Among the Greeks.
• Chap. VII.: In What Case These Singular Institutions May Be of Service.
• Chap. VIII.: Explication of a Paradox of the Ancients, In Respect to Manners.
• Book V.: That the Laws, Given By the Legislator, Ought to Be Relative to the Principle of Government.
• Chap. I.: Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: What Is Meant By Virtue In a Political State.
• Chap. III.: What Is Meant By a Love of the Republic, In a Democracy.
• Chap. IV.: In What Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality Is Inspired.
• Chap. V.: In What Manner the Laws Establish Equality In a Democracy.
• Chap. VI.: In What Manner the Laws Ought to Maintain Frugality In a Democracy.
• Chap. VII.: Other Methods of Favouring the Principle of Democracy.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the Laws Ought to Be Relative to the Principle of Government In an Aristocracy.
• Chap. IX.: In What Manner the Laws Are Relative to Their Principle In Monarchies.
• Chap. X.: Of the Expedition Peculiar to the Executive Power In Monarchies.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. XII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XIII.: An Idea of Despotic Power.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Manner the Laws Are Relative to the Principles of Despotic Government.
• Chap. XV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Communication of Power.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Presents.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Rewards Conferred By the Sovereign.
• Chap. XIX.: New Consequences of the Principles of the Three Governments.
• Book VI.: Consequences of the Principles of Different Governments With Respect to the Simplicity of Civil and Criminal Laws, the Form of Judgements, and the Inflicting of Punishments.
• Chap. I.: Of the Simplicity of Civil Laws In Different Governments.
• Chap. II.: Of the Simplicity of Criminal Laws In Different Governments.
• Chap. III.: In What Governments, and In What Cases, the Judges Ought to Determine According to the Express Letter of the Law.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Manner of Passing Judgement.
• Chap. V.: In What Governments the Sovereign May Be Judge.
• Chap. VI.: That, In Monarchies, Ministers Ought Not to Sit As Judges.
• Chap. VII.: Of a Single Magistrate.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Accusation In Different Governments.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Severity of Punishments In Different Governments.
• Chap. X.: Of the Ancient French Laws.
• Chap. XI.: That, When People Are Virtuous, Few Punishments Are Necessary.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Power of Punishments.
• Chap. XIII.: Insufficiency of the Laws of Japan.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Spirit of the Roman Senate.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Roman Laws In Respect to Punishments.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Just Proportion Betwixt Punishments and Crimes.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Rack.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Pecuniary and Corporal Punishments.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Law of Retaliation.
• Chap. XX.: Of the Punishment of Fathers For the Crimes of Their Children.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Clemency of the Prince.
• Book VII.: Consequences of the Different Principles of the Three Governments, With Respect to Sumptuary Laws, Luxury, and the Condition of Women.
• Chap. I.: Of Luxury.
• Chap. II.: Of Sumptuary Laws In a Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of Sumptuary Laws In an Aristocracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of Sumptuary Laws In a Monarchy.
• Chap. V.: In What Cases Sumptuary Laws Are Useful In a Monarchy.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Luxury of China.
• Chap. VII.: Fatal Consequences of Luxury In China.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Public Continency.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Condition Or State of Women In Different Governments.
• Chap. X.: Of the Domestic Tribunal Among the Romans.
• Chap. XI.: In What Manner the Institutions Changed At Rome Together With the Government.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Guardianship of Women Among the Romans.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Punishments Decreed By Emperors Against the Incontinency of Women.
• Chap. XIV.: Sumptuary Laws Among the Romans.
• Chap. XV.: Of Dowries and Nuptial Advantages In Different Constitutions.
• Chap. XVI.: An Excellent Custom of the Samnites.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Female-administration.
• Book VIII.: Of the Corruption of the Principles of the Three Governments.
• Chap. I.: General Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: Of the Corruption of the Principles of Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of the Spirit of Extreme Equality.
• Chap. IV.: Particular Cause of the Corruption of the People.
• Chap. V.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Aristocracy.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchy.
• Chap. VII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VIII.: Danger of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchical Government.
• Chap. IX.: How Ready the Nobility Are to Defend the Throne.
• Chap. X.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. XI.: Natural Effects of the Goodness and Corruption of the Principles of Government.
• Chap. XII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XIII.: The Effect of an Oath Among Virtuous People.
• Chap. XIV.: How the Smallest Change of the Constitution Is Attended With the Ruin of Its Principles.
• Chap. XV.: Sure Methods of Preserving the Three Principles.
• Chap. XVI.: Distinctive Properties of a Republic.
• Chap. XVII.: Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy.
• Chap. XVIII.: Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy.
• Chap. XIX.: Distinctive Properties of a Despotic Government.
• Chap. XX.: Consequence of the Preceding Chapters.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Empire of China.
• Book IX.: Of Laws, In the Relation They Bear to a Defensive Force.
• Chap. I.: In What Manner Republics Provide For Their Safety.
• Chap. II.: That a Confederate Government Ought to Be Composed of States of the Same Nature, Especially of the Republican Kind.
• Chap. III.: Other Requisites In a Confederate Republic.
• Chap. IV.: In What Manner Despotic Governments Provide For Their Security.
• Chap. V.: In What Manner a Monarchical Government Provides For Its Security.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Defensive Force of States In General.
• Chap. VII.: A Reflexion.
• Chap. VIII.: A Particular Case, In Which the Defensive Force of a State Is Inferior to the Offensive.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Relative Force of States.
• Chap. X.: Of the Weakness of Neighbouring States.
• Book X.: Of Laws, In the Relation They Bear to Offensive Force.
• Chap. I.: Of Offensive Force.
• Chap. II.: Of War.
• Chap. III.: Of the Right of Conquest.
• Chap. IV.: Some Advantages of a Conquered People.
• Chap. V.: Gelon, King of Syracuse.
• Chap. VI.: Of Conquests Made By a Republic.
• Chap. VII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: Of Conquests Made By a Monarchy.
• Chap. X.: Of One Monarchy That Subdues Another.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Manners of a Conquered People.
• Chap. XII.: Of a Law of Cyrus.
• Chap. XIII.: Charles XII.
• Chap. XIV.: Alexander.
• Chap. XV.: New Methods of Preserving a Conquest.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Conquests Made By a Despotic Prince.
• Chap. XVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XI.: Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty, With Regard to the Constitution.
• Chap. I.: A General Idea.
• Chap. II.: Different Significations of the Word, Liberty.
• Chap. III.: In What Liberty Consists.
• Chap. IV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. V.: Of the End Or View of Different Governments.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Constitution of England.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Monarchies We Are Acquainted With.
• Chap. VIII.: Why the Ancients Had Not a Clear Idea of Monarchy.
• Chap. IX.: Aristotle’s Manner of Thinking.
• Chap. X.: What Other Politicians Thought.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Kings of the Heroic Times of Greece.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Government of the Kings of Rome, and In What Manner the Three Powers Were There Distributed.
• Chap. XIII.: General Reflections On the State of Rome After the Expulsion of Its Kings.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Manner the Distribution of the Three Powers Began to Change, After the Expulsion of the Kings.
• Chap. XV.: In What Manner Rome, In the Flourishing State of That Republic, Suddenly Lost Its Liberty.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Legislative Power In the Roman Republic.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Executive Power In the Same Republic.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Judiciary Power In the Roman Government.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Government of the Roman Provinces.
• Chap. XX.: The End of This Book.
• Book XII.: Of the Laws That Form Political Liberty, As Relative to the Subject.
• Chap. I.: Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: Of the Liberty of the Subject.
• Chap. III.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IV.: That Liberty Is Favoured By the Nature and Proportion of Punishments.
• Chap. V.: Of Certain Accusations That Require Particular Moderation and Prudence.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Crime Against Nature.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Bad Application of the Name of Sacrilege and High-treason.
• Chap. IX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. X.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XI.: Of Thoughts.
• Chap. XII.: Of Indiscreet Speeches.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Writings.
• Chap. XIV.: Breach of Modesty In Punishing Crimes.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Infranchisement of Slaves, In Order to Accuse Their Master.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Calumny, With Regard to the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Revealing of Conspiracies.
• Chap. XVIII.: How Dangerous It Is, In Republics, to Be Too Severe In Punishing the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. XIX.: In What Manner the Use of Liberty Is Suspended In a Republic.
• Chap. XX.: Of Laws Favourable to the Liberty of the Subject In a Republic.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Cruelty of Laws, In Respect to Debtors, In a Republic.
• Chap. XXII.: Of Things That Strike At Liberty In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of Spies In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXIV.: Of Anonymous Letters.
• Chap. XXV.: Of the Manner of Governing In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXVI.: That, In a Monarchy, the Prince Ought to Be of Easy Access.
• Chap. XXVII.: Of the Manners of a Monarch.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Of the Regard Which Monarchs Owe to Their Subjects.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of the Civil Laws Proper For Mixing Some Portion of Liberty In a Despotic Government.
• Chap. XXX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XIII.: Of the Relation Which the Levying of Taxes and the Greatness of the Public Revenues Have to Liberty.
• Chap. I.: Of the Public Revenues.
• Chap. II.: That It Is Bad Reasoning to Say That the Greatness of Taxes Is Good In Its Own Nature.
• Chap. III.: Of Taxes In Countries Where Part of the People Are Villains Or Bondmen.
• Chap. IV.: Of a Republic In the Like Case.
• Chap. V.: Of a Monarchy In the Like Case.
• Chap. VI.: Of a Despotic Government In the Like Case.
• Chap. VII.: Of Taxes In Countries Where Villainage Is Not Established.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the Deception Is Preserved.
• Chap. IX.: Of a Bad Kind of Impost.
• Chap. X.: That the Greatness of Taxes Depends On the Nature of the Government.
• Chap. XI.: Of Confiscations.
• Chap. XII.: Relation Between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty.
• Chap. XIII.: In What Government Taxes Are Capable of Increase.
• Chap. XIV.: That the Nature of the Taxes Is Relative to the Government.
• Chap. XV.: Abuse of Liberty.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Conquests of the Mahometans.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Augmentation of Troops.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of an Exemption From Taxes.
• Chap. XIX.: Which Is Most Suitable to the Prince and to the People, the Farming the Revenues, Or Managing Them By Commission?
• Chap. XX.: Of the Farmers of the Revenues.
• Book XIV.: Of Laws As Relative to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: General Idea.
• Chap. II.: Of the Difference of Men In Different Climates.
• Chap. III.: Contradiction In the Tempers of Some Southern Nations.
• Chap. IV.: Cause of the Immutability of Religion, Manners, Customs, and Laws, In the Eastern Countries.
• Chap. V.: That Those Are Bad Legislators Who Favour the Vices of the Climate, and Good Legislators Who Oppose Those Vices.
• Chap. VI.: Of Agriculture In Warm Climates.
• Chap. VII.: Of Monkery.
• Chap. VIII.: An Excellent Custom of China.
• Chap. IX.: Means of Encouraging Industry.
• Chap. X.: Of the Laws Relative to the Sobriety of the People.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Laws Relative to the Distempers of the Climate.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Laws Against Suicides.
• Chap. XIII.: Effects Arising From the Climate of England.
• Chap. XIV.: Other Effects of the Climate.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Different Confidence Which the Laws Have In the People, According to the Difference of Climates.
• Book XV.: In What Manner the Laws of Civil Slavery Are Relative to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Civil Slavery.
• Chap. II.: Origin of the Right of Slavery Among the Roman Civilians.
• Chap. III.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. IV.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. V.: Of the Slavery of the Negroes.
• Chap. VI.: The True Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. VII.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. VIII.: Inutility of Slavery Among Us.
• Chap. IX.: Several Kinds of Slavery.
• Chap. X.: Regulations Necessary In Respect to Slavery.
• Chap. XI.: Abuses of Slavery.
• Chap. XII.: Danger From the Multitude of Slaves.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Armed Slaves.
• Chap. XIV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XV.: Precautions to Be Used In Moderate Governments.
• Chap. XVI.: Regulations Between Masters and Slaves.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Infranchisements.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Freed-men and Eunuchs.
• Book XVI.: How the Laws of Domestic Slavery Have a Relation to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Domestic Servitude.
• Chap. II.: That, In the Countries of the South, There Is a Natural Inequality Between the Two Sexes.
• Chap. III.: That a Plurality of Wives Greatly Depends On the Means of Supporting Them.
• Chap. IV.: That the Law of Polygamy Is an Affair That Depends On Calculation.
• Chap. V.: The Reason of a Law of Malabar.
• Chap. VI.: Of Polygamy Considered In Itself.
• Chap. VII.: Of an Equality of Treatment In Case of Many Wives.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Separation of Women From Men.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Connexion Between Domestic and Political Government.
• Chap. X.: The Principle On Which the Morals of the East Are Founded.
• Chap. XI.: Of Domestic Slavery Independently of Polygamy.
• Chap. XII.: Of Natural Modesty.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Jealousy.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Eastern Manner of Domestic Government.
• Chap. XV.: Of Divorce and Repudiation.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Repudiation and Divorce Amongst the Romans.
• Book XVII.: How the Laws of Political Servitude Have a Relation to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Political Servitude.
• Chap. II.: The Difference Between Nations In Point of Courage.
• Chap. III.: Of the Climate of Asia.
• Chap. IV.: The Consequences Resulting From This.
• Chap. V.: That, When the People In the North of Asia and Those of the North of Europe Made Conquests, the Effects of the Conquest Were Not the Same.
• Chap. VI.: A New Physical Cause of the Slavery of Asia and of the Liberty of Europe.
• Chap. VII.: Of Africa and America.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Capital of the Empire.
• Book XVIII.: Of Laws In the Relation They Bear to the Nature of the Soil.
• Chap. I.: How the Nature of the Soil Has an Influence On the Laws.
• Chap. II.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. III.: What Countries Are Best Cultivated.
• Chap. IV.: New Effects of the Barrenness and Fertility of Countries.
• Chap. V.: Of the Inhabitants of Islands.
• Chap. VI.: Of Countries Raised By the Industry of Man.
• Chap. VII.: Of Human Industry.
• Chap. VIII.: The General Relation of Laws.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Soil of America.
• Chap. X.: Of Population, In the Relation It Bears to the Manner of Procuring Subsistence.
• Chap. XI.: Of Savage and Barbarous Nations.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Law of Nations Among People Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Civil Law of Those Nations Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Political State of the People Who Do Not Cultivate the Land.
• Chap. XV.: Of People Who Know the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Civil Laws Among People Who Know Not the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Political Laws Amongst Nations Who Have Not the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Power of Superstition.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Liberty of the Arabs and the Servitude of the Tartars.
• Chap. XX.: Of the Law of Nations As Practised By the Tartars.
• Chap. XXI.: The Civil Law of the Tartars.
• Chap. XXII.: Of a Civil Law of the German Nations.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of the Regal Ornaments Among the Franks.
• Chap. XXIV.: Of the Marriages of the Kings of the Franks.
• Chap. XXV.: Childeric.
• Chap. XXVI.: Of the Time When the Kings of the Franks Became of Age.
• Chap. XXVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Of Adoption Among the Germans.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of the Sanguinary Temper of the Kings of the Franks.
• Chap. XXX.: Of the National Assemblies of the Franks.
• Chap. XXXI.: Of the Authority of the Clergy Under the First Race.
• Book XIX.: Of Laws, In Relation to the Principles Which Form the General Spirit, the Morals, and Customs, of a Nation.
• Chap. I.: Of the Subject of This Book.
• Chap. II.: That It Is Necessary People’s Minds Should Be Prepared For the Reception of the Best Laws.
• Chap. III.: Of Tyranny.
• Chap. IV.: Of the General Spirit of Mankind.
• Chap. V.: How Far We Should Be Attentive Lest the General Spirit of a Nation Be Changed.
• Chap. VI.: That Every Thing Ought Not to Be Corrected.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.
• Chap. VIII.: Effects of a Sociable Temper.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Vanity and Pride of Nations.
• Chap. X.: Of the Character of the Spaniards and Chinese.
• Chap. XI.: A Reflection.
• Chap. XII.: Of Custom and Manners In a Despotic State.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Behaviour of the Chinese.
• Chap. XIV.: What Are the Natural Means of Changing the Manners and Customs of a Nation.
• Chap. XV.: The Influence of Domestic Government On the Political.
• Chap. XVI.: How Some Legislators Have Confounded the Principles Which Govern Mankind.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Peculiar Quality of the Chinese Government.
• Chap. XVIII.: A Consequence Drawn From the Preceding Chapter.
• Chap. XIX.: How This Union of Religion, Laws, Manners, and Customs, Among the Chinese, Was Effected.
• Chap. XX.: Explication of a Paradox Relating to the Chinese.
• Chap. XXI.: How the Laws Ought to Have a Relation to Manners and Customs.
• Chap. XXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXIII.: How the Laws Are Founded On the Manners of a People.
• Chap. XXIV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVII.: How the Laws Contribute to Form the Manners, Customs, and Character, of a Nation.

BOOK V.

THAT THE LAWS, GIVEN BY THE LEGISLATOR, OUGHT TO BE RELATIVE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNMENT.

CHAP. I.

Idea of this Book.

THAT the laws of education ought to be relative to the principle of each government has been shewn in the preceding book. Now, the same may be said of those which the legislator gives to the whole society. The relation of laws to this principle strengthens the several springs of government; and this principle derives from thence, in its turn, a new degree of vigour. And thus it is, in mechanics, that action is always followed by re-action.

Our design is, to examine this relation in each government, beginning with the republican state, whose principle is virtue.

CHAP. II.

What is meant by Virtue in a political State.

VIRTUE in a republic is a most simple thing; it is a love of the republic; it is a sensation, and not a consequence of acquired knowledge; a sensation that may be felt by the meanest as well as by the highest person in the state. When the common people adopt good maxims, they adhere to them steadier than those we call gentlemen. It is very rare that corruption commences with the former: nay, they frequently derive from their imperfect light a stronger attachment to the established laws and customs.

The love of our country is conducive to a purity of morals, and the latter is again conducive to the former. The less we are able to satisfy our private passions, the more we abandon ourselves to those of a general nature. How comes it that monks are so fond of their order? It is owing to the very cause that renders the order insupportable. Their rule debars them of all those things by which the ordinary passions are fed; there remains, therefore, only this passion for the very rule that torments them: the more austere it is, that is, the more it curbs their inclinations, the more force it gives to the only passion left them.

CHAP. III.

What is meant by a Love of the Republic, in a Democracy.

A love of the republic, in a democracy, is a love of the democracy; as the latter is that of equality.

A love of the democracy is, likewise, that of frugality. Since every individual ought here to enjoy the same happiness and the same advantages, they should, consequently, taste the same pleasures and form the same hopes; which cannot be expected but from a general frugality.

The love of equality, in a democracy, limits ambition to the sole desire, to the sole happiness, of doing greater services to our country than the rest of our fellow-citizens. They cannot all render her equal services, but they all ought to serve her with equal alacrity. At our coming into the world, we contract an immense debt to our country, which we can never discharge.

Hence distinctions here arise from the principle of equality, even when it seems to be removed by signal services or superior abilities.

The love of frugality limits the desire of having, to the study of procuring, necessaries to our family, and superfluities to our country. Riches give a power which a citizen cannot use for himself, for then he would be no longer equal. They likewise procure pleasures which he ought not to enjoy, because these would be also repugnant to the equality.

Thus well-regulated democracies, by establishing domestic frugality, made way, at the same time, for public expences; as was the case at Rome and Athens, when magnificence and profusion arose from the very fund of frugality. And, as religion commands us to have pure and unspotted hands, when we make our offerings to the gods, the laws required a frugality of life, to enable them to be liberal to our country.

The good sense and happiness of individuals depend greatly on the mediocrity of their abilities and fortunes. Therefore, as a republic, where the laws have placed many in a middling station, is composed of wise men, it will be wisely governed; as it is composed of happy men, it will be extremely happy.

CHAP. IV.

In what Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality is inspired.

THE love of equality and of a frugal œconomy is greatly excited by equality and frugality themselves, in societies, where both these virtues are established by law.

In monarchies and despotic governments, no body aims at equality; this does not so much as enter their thoughts; they all aspire to superiority. People of the very lowest condition desire to emerge from their obscurity, only to lord it over their fellow-subjects.

It is the same with respect to frugality. To love it, we must practise and enjoy it. It is not those who are enervated with pleasure that are fond of a frugal life: were this natural and common, Alcibiades would never have been the admiration of the universe. Neither is it those who envy or admire the luxury of the great: people, that have present to their view none but rich men, or men miserable like themselves, detest their wretched condition, without loving or knowing the real term or point of misery.

A true maxim it is, therefore, that, in order to love equality and frugality in a republic, these virtues must have been previously established by law.

CHAP. V.

In what Manner the Laws establish Equality in a Democracy.

SOME ancient legislators, as Lycurgus and Romulus, made an equal division of lands. A settlement of this kind can never take place but upon the foundation of a new republic, or when the old one is so corrupt, and the minds of the people are so disposed, that the poor think themselves obliged to demand, and the rich obliged to consent to, a remedy of this nature.

If the legislator, in making a division of this kind, does not enact laws, at the same time, to support it, he forms only a temporary constitution; inequality will break in where the laws have not precluded it, and the republic will be utterly undone.

Hence, for the preservation of this equality, it is absolutely necessary there should be some regulation in respect to womens dowries, donations, successions, testamentary settlements, and all other forms of contracting. For, were it once allowed to dispose of our property to whom and how we pleased, the will of each individual would disturb the order of the fundamental law.

Solon, by permitting the Athenians, upon failure of issue* , to leave their estates to whom they pleased, acted contrary to the ancient laws, by which the estates were ordered to continue in the family of the testator† , and even contrary to his own laws; for, by abolishing debts, he had aimed at equality.

The law, which prohibited people’s having two inheritances§ , was extremely well adapted for a democracy: it derived its origin from the equal distribution of lands and portions made to each citizen. The law would not permit a single man to possess more than a single portion.

From the same source arose those laws by which the next relation was ordered to marry the heiress. This law was given to the Jews after the like distribution. Plato¶ , who grounds his laws on this division, made the same regulation which had been received as a law by the Athenians.

At Athens, there was a law, whose spirit, in my opinion, has not been hitherto rightly understood. It was lawful to marry a sister only by the father’s side, but it was not permitted to espouse a sister by the same venter* . This custom was originally owing to republics, whose spirit would not permit that two portions of land, and consequently two inheritances, should devolve on the same person. A man, who married his sister only by the father’s side, could inherit but one estate, namely, that of his father; but, by espousing his sister by the same venter, it might happen, that his sister’s father, having no male issue, might leave her his estate, and, consequently, the brother, who married her, might be possessed of two.

Little will it avail to object what Philo says‡ , that, although the Athenians were allowed to marry a sister by the father’s side, and not by the mother’s, yet the contrary practice prevailed among the Lacedæmonians, who were permitted to espouse a sister by the mother’s side, and not by the father’s. For I find, in Strabo† , that, at Sparta, whenever a woman was married to her brother, she had half his portion for her dowry. Plain it is, that this second law was made in order to prevent the bad consequences of the former. That the estate belonging to the sister’s family might not devolve on the brother’s, they gave half the brother’s estate to the sister for her dowry.

Seneca,∥ speaking of Silanus, who had married his sister, says, that the permission was limited at Athens, but general at Alexandria. In a monarchical government there was very little concern about any such thing as a division of estates.

Excellent was that law, which, in order to maintain this division of lands in a democracy, ordained, that a father, who had several children, should pitch upon one of them to inherit his portion,§ and leave the others to be adopted, to the end that the number of citizens might always be kept upon an equality with that of the divisions.

Phaleas of Chalcedon‡ contrived a very extraordinary method of rendering all fortunes equal, in a republic where there was the greatest inequality. This was, that the rich should give fortunes with their daughters to the poor, but receive none themselves; and that the poor should receive money for their daughters, instead of giving them fortunes. But I do not remember that a regulation of this kind ever took place in any republic. It lays the citizens under such hard and oppressive conditions, as would make them detest the very equality which they designed to establish. It is proper sometimes that the laws should not seem to tend so directly to the end they propose.

Though real equality be the very soul of a democracy, it is so difficult to establish, that an extreme exactness in this respect would not be always convenient. Sufficient it is to establish a census,* which should reduce or fix the differences to a certain point: it is afterwards the business of particular laws to level, as it were, the inequalities, by the duties laid upon the rich, and by the ease afforded to the poor. It is moderate riches alone that can give or suffer this sort of compensations; for, as to men of over-grown estates, every thing which does not contribute to advance their power and honour is considered by them as an injury.

All inequality in democracies ought to be derived from the nature of the government, and even from the principle of equality. For example, it may be apprehended that people, who are obliged to live by their labour, would be too much impoverished by a public employment, or neglect the duties attending it; that artisans would grow insolent; and that too great a number of freemen would overpower the ancient citizens. In this case the equality† in a democracy may be suppressed, for the good of the state. But this is only an apparent equality: for a man ruined by a public employment would be in a worse condition than his fellow-citizens; and this same man, being obliged to neglect his duty, would reduce the rest to a worse condition than himself; and so on.

CHAP. VI.

In what Manner the Laws ought to maintain Frugality in a Democracy.

IT is not sufficient, in a well-regulated democracy, that the divisions of land be equal; they ought also to be small, as was customary among the Romans. “God forbid,” said Curius to his soldiers,‡ “that a citizen should look upon that as a small piece of land which is sufficient to maintain him.”

As equality of fortunes supports frugality, so the latter maintains the former. These things, though in themselves different, are of such a nature as to be unable to subsist separately: they reciprocally act upon each other: if one withdraws itself from a democracy, the other surely follows it.

True it is, that, when a democracy is founded in commerce, private people may acquire vast riches without a corruption of morals. This is because the spirit of commerce is naturally attended with that of frugality, œconomy, moderation, labour, prudence, tranquility, order, and rule. So long as this spirit subsists, the riches it produces have no bad effect. The mischief is when excessive wealth destroys the spirit of commerce: then it is that the inconveniences of inequality begin to be felt.

In order to support this spirit, commerce should be carried on by the principal citizens: this should be their sole aim and study; this the chief object of the laws: and these very laws, by dividing the estates of individuals in proportion to the increase of commerce, should set every poor citizen so far at his ease, as to be able to work like the rest; and every wealthy citizen in such a mediocrity, as to be obliged to take some pains either in preserving or acquiring a fortune.

It is an excellent law, in a trading republic, to make an equal division of the paternal estate among the children. The consequence of this is, that, how great soever a fortune the father has made, his children, being not so rich as he, are induced to avoid luxury, and to work as he had done. I speak here only of trading republics; for, as to those that have no commerce, the legislator must pursue quite different measures.*

In Greece there were two sorts of republics; the one military, like Sparta; the other commercial, as Athens. In the former, the citizens were obliged to be idle; in the latter, endeavours were used to inspire them with the love of industry and labour. Solon made idleness a crime, and insisted that each citizen should give an account of his manner of getting a livelihood. And indeed, in a well-regulated democracy, where people’s expences should extend only to what is necessary, every one ought to have it; for how should their wants be otherwise supplied?

CHAP. VII.

Other Methods of favouring the Principle of Democracy.

AN equal division of lands cannot be established in all democracies. There are some circumstances in which a regulation of this nature would be impracticable, dangerous, and even subversive of the constitution. We are not always obliged to proceed to extremes. If it appears that this division of lands, which was designed to preserve the people’s morals, does not suit with the democracy, recourse must be had to other methods.

If a permanent body be established, to serve as a rule and pattern of manners; a senate, to which years, virtue, gravity, and eminent services, procure admittance; the senators, by being exposed to public view like the statues of the gods, must naturally inspire every family with sentiments of virtue.

Above all, this senate must steadily adhere to the ancient institutions, and mind that the people and the magistrates never swerve from them.

The preservation of the ancient customs is a very considerable point in respect to manners. Since a corrupt people seldom perform any memorable actions, seldom establish societies, build cities, or enact laws: on the contrary, since most institutions are derived from people whose manners are plain and simple, to keep up the ancient custom is the way to preserve the original purity of morals.

Besides, if, by some revolution, the state has happened to assume a new form, this seldom can be effected without infinite pains and labour, and hardly ever by idle and debauched persons. Even those who had been the instruments of the revolution were desirous it should be relished; which is difficult to compass without good laws. Hence it is that ancient institutions generally tend to reform the people’s manners, and those of modern date to corrupt them. In the course of a long administration the descent to vice is insensible; but there is no reascending to virtue without making the most generous efforts.

It has been questioned, whether the members of the senate we are speaking of ought to be for life, or only chosen for a time. Doubtless they ought to be for life, as was the custom at Rome,* at Sparta,† and even at Athens: for we must not confound the senate at Athens, which was a body that changed every three months, with the Areopagus, whose members, as standing patterns, were established for life.

Let this be therefore a general maxim; that, in a senate designed to be a rule and the depositary, as it were, of manners, the members ought to be chosen for life; in a senate intended for the administration of affairs the members may be changed.

The spirit, says Aristotle, waxes old, as well as the body. This reflection holds good only in regard to a single magistrate, but cannot be applied to a senatorian assembly.

At Athens, beside the Areopagus, there were guardians of the public morals, as well as of the laws.‡ At Sparta all the old men were censors. At Rome the censorship was committed to two particular magistrates. As the senate watched over the people, the censors were to have an eye over the people and the senate. Their office was to reform the corruptions of the republic, to stigmatize indolence, to censure neglects, and to correct mistakes: as to flagrant crimes, these were left to the punishment of the laws.

That Roman law, which required the accusations in cases of adultery to be public, was admirably well calculated for preserving the purity of morals; it intimidated married women, as well as those who were to watch over their conduct.

Nothing contributes more to the preservation of morals than an extreme subordination of the young to the old. Thus they are both restrained, the former by their respect for those of advanced age, and the latter by their regard for themselves.

Nothing gives a greater force to the laws than a perfect subordination between the citizens and the magistrate. “The great difference which Lycurgus established between Sparta and the other cities (says Xenophon* ) consists chiefly in the obedience the citizens shew to the laws: they run when the magistrate calls them. But, at Athens, a rich man would be highly displeased to be thought dependent on the magistrate.”

Paternal authority is likewise of great use towards the preservation of morals. We have already observed, that, in a republic, there is not so coercive a force as in other governments. The laws must therefore endeavour to supply this defect by some means or other; and this is done by paternal authority.

Fathers, at Rome, had the power of life and death over their children.† At Sparta every father had a right to correct another man’s child.

Paternal authority ended, at Rome, together with the republic. In monarchies, where such a purity of morals is not required, they are controuled by no other authority than that of the magistrates.

The Roman laws, which accustomed young people to dependence, established a long minority. Perhaps we are mistaken in conforming to this custom: there is no necessity for so much constraint in monarchies.

This very subordination in a republic might make it necessary for the father to continue in the possession of his children’s fortune during life, as was the custom at Rome. But this is not agreeable to the spirit of monarchy.

CHAP. VIII.

In what Manner the Laws ought to be relative to the Principle of Government in an Aristocracy.

IF the people are virtuous in an aristocracy, they enjoy very near the same happiness as in a popular government, and the state grows powerful. But, as a great share of virtue is very rare where mens fortunes are so unequal, the laws must tend as much as possible to infuse a spirit of moderation, and endeavour to re-establish that equality which was necessarily removed by the constitution.

The spirit of moderation is what we call virtue in an aristocracy; it supplies the place of the spirit of equality in a popular state.

As the pomp and splendor, with which kings are surrounded, form a part of their power, so modesty and simplicity of manners constitute the strength of an aristocratic nobility* . When they affect no distinction, when they mix with the people, dress like them, and with them share all their pleasures, the people are apt to forget their subjection and weakness.

Every government has its nature and principle. An aristocracy must not, therefore, assume the nature and principle of monarchy; which would be the case, were the nobles to be invested with personal privileges distinct from those of their body. Privileges ought to be for the senate, and simple respect for the senators.

In aristocratical governments, there are two principal sources of disorder: excessive inequality between the governors and the governed; and the same inequality between the different members of the body that governs. From these two inequalities hatreds and jealousies arise, which the laws ought ever to prevent or repress.

The first inequality is, chiefly, when the privileges of the nobility are honourable only as they are ignominious to the people. Such was the law, at Rome, by which the patricians were forbidden to marry plebeians* ; a law that had no other effect than to render the patricians, on the one side, more haughty, and, on the other, more odious. The reader may see what advantages the tribunes derived from thence in their harangues.

This inequality occurs, likewise, when the condition of the citizens differs with regard to taxes: which may happen four different ways; when the nobles assume the privilege of paying none; when they commit frauds to exempt themselves† ; when they engross the public money, under pretence of rewards or appointments for their respective employments; in fine, when they render the common people tributary, and divide among their own body the profits arising from the several subsidies. This last case is very rare; an aristocracy so instituted would be the most intolerable of all governments.

While Rome inclined towards an aristocracy, she avoided all these inconveniences. The magistrates never received any emoluments from their office: the chief men of the republic were taxed like the rest, nay, heavier; and sometimes the taxes fell upon them alone. In fine, far from sharing among themselves the revenues of the state, all they could draw from the public treasure, and all the wealth that fortune flung into their laps, they bestowed freely on the people, to be excused from accepting public honours∥ .

It is a fundamental maxim, that largesses are pernicious to the people in a democracy, but salutary in an aristocratical government. The former make them forget they are citizens, the latter bring them to a sense of it.

If the revenues of the state are not distributed amongst the people, they must be convinced, at least, of their being well administered: to feast their eyes with the public treasure is, with them, the same thing almost as enjoying it. The golden chain displayed at Venice, the riches exhibited at Rome in public triumphs, the treasures preserved in the temple of Saturn, were, in reality, the wealth of the people.

It is a very essential point, in an aristocracy, that the nobles themselves should not levy the taxes. The first order of the state, in Rome, never concerned themselves with it; the levying of taxes was committed to the second; and even this, in process of time, was attended with great inconveniences. In an aristocracy of this kind, where the nobles levied the taxes, the private people would be all at the discretion of persons in public employments, and there would be no such thing as a superior tribunal to check their power. The members, appointed to remove the abuses, would rather enjoy them: the nobles would be like the princes of despotic governments, who confiscate whatever estates they please.

Soon would the profits, hence arising, be considered as a patrimony, which avarice would enlarge at pleasure. The farms would be lowered, and the public revenues reduced to nothing. This is the reason that some governments, without having ever received any remarkable shock, have dwindled away to such a degree, as not only their neighbours, but even their own subjects, have been surprized at it.

The laws should likewise forbid the nobles all kind of commerce: merchants of such unbounded credit would monopolize all to themselves. Commerce is a profession of people who are upon an equality; hence, among despotic states, the most miserable are those in which the prince applies himself to trade.

The laws of Venice debar‡ the nobles from commerce, by which they might, even innocently, acquire exorbitant wealth.

The laws ought to employ the most effectual means for making the nobles do justice to the people. If they have not established a tribune, they ought to be a tribune themselves.

Every sort of asylum, in opposition to the execution of the laws, destroys aristocracy, and is soon succeeded by tyranny.

They ought always to mortify the lust of dominion. There should be either a temporary or perpetual magistrate to keep the nobles in awe; as the Ephori at Sparta, and the State-Inquistors at Venice, magistrates subject to no formalities. This sort of government stands in need of the strongest springs: thus a mouth of stone§ is open to every informer at Venice; a mouth to which one would be apt to give the appellation of tyranny.

These arbitrary magistrates in an aristocracy bear some analogy to the censorship in democracies, which, of its own nature, is equally independent. And, indeed, the censors ought to be subject to no enquiry in relation to their conduct during their office; they should meet with a thorough confidence, and never be discouraged. In this respect, the practice of the Romans deserved admiration; magistrates of all denominations were accountable for their administration¶ , except the censors* .

There are two very pernicious things in an aristocracy; excess either of poverty or of wealth in the nobility. To prevent their poverty, it is necessary, above all things, to oblige them to pay their debts in time. To moderate the excess of wealth, prudent and gradual regulations should be made; but no confiscations, no agrarian laws, no expunging of debts; these are productive of infinite mischief.

The laws ought to abolish the right of primogeniture among the nobles† , to the end, that, by a continual division of the inheritances, their fortunes may be always upon a level.

There should be no substitutions, no powers of redemption, no rights of majorasgo, or adoption. The contrivances, for perpetuating the grandeur of families, in monarchical governments, ought never to be employed in aristocracies‡ .

When the laws have compassed the equality of families, the next thing is to preserve a proper harmony and union amongst them. The quarrels of the nobility ought to be quickly decided; otherwise the contests of individuals become those of families. Arbiters may terminate, or even prevent the rise of, disputes.

In fine, the laws must not favour the distinctions raised by vanity among families, under pretence that they are more noble or ancient than others: pretences of this nature ought to be ranked among the weaknesses of private persons.

We have only to cast an eye on Sparta; there we may see how the Ephori contrived to check the foibles of the kings, as well as those of the nobility and common people.

CHAP. IX.

In what Manner the Laws are relative to their Principle in Monarchies.

AS honour is the principle of a monarchical government, the laws ought to be relative to this principle.

They should endeavour to support the nobility; in respect to whom, honour may be, in some measure, deemed both child and parent.

They should render the nobility hereditary; not as a boundary between the power of the prince and the weakness of the people, but as the link which connects them both.

In this government, substitutions, which preserve the estates of families undivided, are extremely useful, though in others not so proper.

Here the power of redemption is of service, as it restores to noble families the lands that had been alienated by the prodigality of a parent.

The lands of the nobility ought to have privileges as well as their persons. The monarch’s dignity is inseparable from that of his kingdom, and the dignity of the nobleman from that of his fief.

All these privileges must be particular to the nobility and incommunicable to the people, unless we intend to act contrary to the principle of government, and to diminish the power of the nobles together with that of the people.

Substitutions are a restraint to commerce; the power of redemption produces an infinite number of processes; every estate in land, that is sold throughout the kingdom, is, in some measure, without an owner for the space of a year. Privileges annexed to fiefs give a power very burthensome to those governments which tolerate them. These are the inconveniences of nobility; inconveniences, however, that vanish when confronted with its general utility. But, when these privileges are communicated to the people, every principle of government is wantonly violated.

In monarchies, a person may leave the bulk of his estate to one of his children; a permission improper in any other government.

The laws ought to favour all kind of commerce∥ consistent with the constitution, to the end that the subjects may, without ruining themselves, be able to satisfy the continual cravings of the prince and his court.

They should establish some regulation, that the manner of collecting the taxes may not be more burthensome than the taxes themselves.

The weight of duties produces labour, labour weariness, and weariness the spirit of indolence.

CHAP. X.

Of the Expedition peculiar to the executive Power in Monarchies.

GREAT is the advantage which a monarchical government has over a republic. As the state is conducted by a single person, the executive power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition: but, as this expedition may degenerate into rapidity, the laws should use some contrivance to slacken it: they ought not only to favour the nature of each constitution, but likewise to remedy the abuses that might result from this very nature.

Cardinal Richelieu§ advises monarchs to permit no such things as societies or communities that raise difficulties upon every trifle. If this man’s heart had not been bewitched with the love of despotic power, still these arbitrary notions would have filled his head.

The bodies, intrusted with the depositum of the laws, are never more obedient than when they proceed slowly, and use that reflection in the prince’s affairs which can scarcely be expected from the ignorance of a court, or from the precipitation of its councils¶ .

What would have become of the finest monarchy in the world, if the magistrates, by their delays, their complaints, and entreaties, had not checked the rapidity even of their princes virtues, when these monarchs, consulting only the generous impulse of their minds, would fain have given a boundless reward to services performed with an unlimited courage and fidelity?

CHAP. XI.

Of the Excellence of a monarchical government.

MONARCHY has a great advantage over a despotic government. As it naturally requires there should be several orders or ranks of subjects, the state is more permanent, the constitution more steady, and the person of him who governs more secure.

Cicero* is of opinion, that the establishing of the tribunes preserved the republic. “And, indeed, (says he,) the violence of a headless people is more terrible. A chief, or head, is sensible that