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• To the Right Honourable Sir William Cavendish, Knight of the Bath, Baron of Hardwick, and Earl of Devonshire.
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• Of the Life and History of Thucydides.
• The First Book of the History of Thucydides.
• The Second Book of the History of Thucydides.
• The Third Book of the History of Thucydides.
• The Fourth Book of the History of Thucydides.
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THE FIRST BOOK of the HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

The estate of Greece, derived from the remotest known antiquity thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.—The occasion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of the Athenians with the Corinthians concerning Corcyra and Potidæa.—The Lacedæmonians, instigated by the confederates, undertake the war; not so much at their instigation, as of envy to the greatness of the Athenian dominion.—The degrees by which that dominion was acquired.—The war generally decreed by the confederates at Sparta.—The demands of the Lacedæmonians.—The obstinacy of the Athenians; and their answer by the advice of Pericles.

To make it appear that this war was greater than any before it, the author showeth the imbecility of former times; describing three periods: 1. From the beginning of the Grecian memory to the war of Troy. 2. The war itself. 3. The time from thence to the present war which he writeth.

1. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as1 they warred against each other, beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot; with expectation it should prove a great one, and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it: conjecturing so much, both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner of provision; and also because he saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction, some then presently and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, reaching also to part of the barbarians1 , and, as a man may say, to most nations. For the actions that preceded this, and those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means clearly be discovered; yet for any argument that, looking into times far past, I have yet light on to persuade me, I do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.

The state of Greece before the Trojan war.

2. For it is evident that that which now is called Hellas2 , was not of old constantly inhabited; but that at first there were often removals, every one easily leaving the place of his abode to the violence always of some greater number. For whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse but with fear, neither by sea nor land; and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live upon it, without any stock of riches3 , and planted nothing; (because it was uncertain when another should invade them and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls); but made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day: they made little difficulty to change their habitations. And for this cause they were of no ability at all, either for greatness of cities or other provision. But the fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessalia, and Bœotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus, except Arcadia; and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men, both caused seditions, whereby they were ruined at home; and withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers. From hence it is that Attica1 , from great antiquity for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the same people2 . And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said, that Greece3 , by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like augmentation. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves to Athens; where receiving the freedom of the city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, as Attica, being incapable of them itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.

The original of the name of Hellas.The name of Hellenes not given to all the Grecians in the time that Homer wrote his poems.The Trojan war was the first enterprise where the Grecians combined their forces.

3. And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. For before the Trojan war nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in common; nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum1 (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis, and called in for their aid into other cities; these cities, because of their conversing with them, began more particularly to be called Hellenes: and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer. For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not anywhere that name in general; nor indeed to any but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis, and were the first so called: but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achæans. Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; because the Grecians2 , as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them. The Grecians3 then, neither as they had that name in particular by mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for want of strength and correspondence, enter into any action with their forces joined. And to that expedition they came together by the means of navigation, which the most part1 of Greece had now received.

Minos, king of Creta, the first that had a navy.

4. For Minos was the most ancient of all that by report we know to have built a navy. And he made himself master of the now Grecian Sea2 ; and both commanded the isles called Cyclades, and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians and constituting his own sons there for governors; and also freed the seas of pirates as much as he could, for the better coming in, as is likely, of his own revenue.

A digression touching the piracies and robberies of old time; with other notes of savageness.Robbing had in honour.

5. For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent lived near unto the sea, or else inhabited the islands, after once they began to3 cross over one to another in ships, became thieves, and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves and to fetch in maintenance for the weak; and falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly4 inhabited, rifled them, and made this the best means of their living; being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace, but rather carrying with it something of glory. This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. The same also is proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce men questioning1 of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether they be thieves or not; as a thing neither scorned by such as were asked, nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know. They also robbed one another within the main land. And much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians called Ozolæ2 , the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent from their old trade of thieving.

Continual wearing of armour in fashion.The Athenians grew first civil.

6. For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed, because their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe; and accustomed themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. Amongst whom, the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour, and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were anything stepped into years, laid away upon the same3 delicacy, not long after, the fashion of wearing linen coats and golden grasshoppers1 , which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair. From whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. But the moderate2 kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of these times, was first taken up by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons. The same were also the first, that when they were to contend in the Olympic games3 , stripped themselves naked4 and anointed their bodies with ointment: whereas in ancient times, the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches; nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the exercise. It may likewise by5 many other things be demonstrated, that the old Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the barbarians of the present age.

The cities of Greece, how seated, and for what causes.

7. As for cities, such as are of late foundation and since the increase of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since more plenty of riches, have been walled about and built upon the shore; and have taken up isthmi, [that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea], both for merchandise and for the better strength against confiners. But the old cities, men having been1 in those times for the most part infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well in the islands as in the continent. For others2 also that dwelt on the sea–side, though not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies. And even to these times, those people are planted up high in the country.

The Carians and Phœnicians were those that committed the most robberies.

8. But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phœnicians. For by them were the greatest part of the islands3 inhabited; a testimony whereof is this. The Athenians, when in this present war4 they hallowed the isle of Delos and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead, found that more than half of them were Carians5 ; known so to be, both by the armour buried with them, and also by their manner of burial at this day. And1 when Minos his navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more free. For he expelled the malefactors out of the islands, and in the most of them planted colonies of his own. By which means they who inhabited the sea–coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; of whom some, grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it came to pass, that rising to power they proceeded afterward to the war against Troy.

The action of Troy.Peloponnesus, so called from Pelops.The increase of the power of the Pelopians.Atreus king of Mycenæ after the death of Pelops.

9. And to me it seemeth that Agamemnon2 got together that fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors3 of Helena, bound thereto by oath to Tindareus, as for this, that he exceeded the rest in power. For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts4 of the Peloponnesians, say that first Pelops, by the abundance of his wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, obtained such power amongst them, as, though he were a stranger, yet the country was called1 after his name; and that this power was also increased by his posterity. For Euristheus being slain in Attica by the Heracleides2 , Atreus, that was his uncle3 by the mother, and was then abiding4 with him as an exiled person for fear of his father for the death of Chrysippus5 , and to whom Euristheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Euristheus came not back, (the Mycenians being willing to it for fear of the Heracleides, and because he was an able man and made much of the common people), obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ, and of whatsoever else was under Euristheus, for himself; and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the Perseides6 . To which greatness Agamemnon7 succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much upon favour as by fear. For it is clear, that he himself both conferred most ships to that action, and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer, (if any think his testimony sufficient); who, at the delivery of the sceptre unto him, calleth him1 , “of many isles and of all Argos King.” Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such2 as were adjacent, which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition we are to estimate what were those of the ages before it.

Mycenæ, though no great city, yet was of great power.The city of Sparta less, and the city of Athens greater, than for the proportion of their power.A survey of the fleetsent to Troy.

10. Now seeing Mycenæ was3 but a small city, or if any other of that age seem but of light regard, let not any man for that cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have said, and fame reported it to be4 . For if the city of Lacedæmon were now desolate, and nothing of it left but the temples and floors of the buildings, I think it would breed much unbelief in posterity long hence of their power in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts5 of Peloponnesus it possess two6 , and hath the leading of the rest, and also of many confederates without; yet the city being not close built, and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because1 it is but scatteringly inhabited after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture, by the sight of their city, that their power were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous [concerning the forces that went to Troy], nor have in regard so much the external show of a city as the power: but we are to think, that that expedition was indeed greater than those that went before it, but yet inferior to those of the present age; if in this also2 we may credit the poetry of Homer, who being a poet was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet even thus it cometh short. For he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels; those that were of Bœotians carrying one hundred and twenty men a–piece, and those which came with Philoctetes fifty: setting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort and the least; and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest, he maketh in his catalogue no mention at all: but declareth that they who were3 in the vessels of Philoctetes, served both as mariners and soldiers; for he writes, that they who were at the oar, were all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along, except kings1 and such as were in chief authority; especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion. So then, if by the greatest and least one estimate the mean of their shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men considered as sent jointly from all Greece, were not very many.

The poverty of the Greeks was the cause why the Trojans could so long hold out.

11. And the cause hereof was not so much want of men, as of wealth. For, for want of victual they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped2 might both follow the war and also maintain itself. When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight, (which is manifest; for else they could not have fortified their camp), it appears that from that time forward they employed not there their whole power, but that for want of victual they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus, and part to fetch in booties; whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years resistance, as being ever a match for so many as remained at the siege. Whereas1 , if they had gone furnished with store of provision, and with all their forces, eased of boot–haling and tillage, since they were masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they strove not with their whole power, but only with such a portion of their army as at the several occasions chanced to be present; when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place both in less time and with less labour. But through want of money, not only they were weak matters, all that preceded this enterprise; but also this, which is of greater name than any before it, appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame and report, which by means of the poets now goeth of it.

The state of Greece after the Trojan war.A. C. 1124. A. 1m. Ol. 347.Bœotia, more anciently Cadmeis.A. C. 1104. A. 1m. Ol. 327.The Ionians were the colonies of the Athenians.

12. For also after the Trojan war the Grecians continued still their shiftings and transplantations; insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power. For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused not a little innovation; and in most of the cities there arose seditions; and those which were driven out, built2 cities for themselves in other places. For those that are now called Bœotians, in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves in that country, which now Bœotia, was then called Cadmeis. (But there was in the same country a certain portion of that nation before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy). And in the eightieth year, the Dorians1 together with the Heracleides seized on Peloponnesus. And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest; and shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians most of Italy1 and Sicily, and also certain parts of the rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.

The difference between tyranny and regal authority.At Corinth were made the first triremes, or gallies of three tire of oars one above another.A. C. 704. Olymp. 19. 1.A. C. 667. Olymp. 28. 2.The means of the wealth of Corinth.Corinth surnamed the rich.The Ionians had a navy in Cyrus’ time.Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, had a navy in the time of Cambyses.About A. C. 600. Olymp. 45.

13. But when the power of Greece was now improved, and2 the desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities there were erected tyrannies: (for before that time, kingdoms with honours limited were hereditary): and the Grecians built navies, and became more seriously addicted to the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping3 into the nearest to that which is now in use; and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first4 gallies of all Greece. Now5 it is well known that Aminocles, the ship–wright of Corinth, built four ships at Samos: and from the time that Aminocles went to Samos until the end6 of this present war, are at the most but three hundred years. And the most ancient naval battle that we know of, was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyræans7 ; and from that battle to the same time, are but two hundred and sixty years. For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic; (because the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to another but through the Corinthians’ territory); and was also wealthy in money, as appears by the1 poets, who have surnamed this town the rich. And after the Grecians had2 commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates; and affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money. After this, the Ionians, in the times of Cyrus first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy; and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast. Also Polycrates3 , who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had a strong navy, wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; and amongst the rest having won Rhenea4 , he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The5 Phocæans likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians6 in a fight at sea.

The shipping of Greece very mean before this war.A. C. 493. Ol. 71. 4.

14. These were the greatest navies extant. And yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels1 of fifty oars and with long boats, as well as those of former times. And it was but a little before the Medan war2 and death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyræans had of galleys any number. For these3 last were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece, before the invasion of the Medes. And the people of Ægina and the Athenians4 had but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oars a–piece; and that so lately5 , as but from the time that the Athenians making war on Ægina, and withal expecting the coming of the barbarian, at the persuasion of Themistocles built those ships which they used in that war. And these also not all had decks.

The causes why the Grecians never joined their forces in any great action.

15. Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money and in dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient land, where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the islands. But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by, there was none at all: and such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home; because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the great ones, as subjects, nor concurred as equals in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other hand to hand. For the war of old between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians1 was it wherein the rest of Greece was most divided and in league with either party.

The Ionians kept down by the Persians.

16. As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also the Ionians by this: that the Persian affairs prospering, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, after the defeat of Crœsus, made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to the sea–side, and so subdued all the cities which they possessed in the continent: and Darius afterward, when he had overcome2 the Phœnician fleet, did the like unto them in the islands.

A. C. 548. Ol. 58. 1.

17. And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who forecasted only for themselves, how with as much safety as was possible to look to their own persons and their own families, they resided for the most part in the cities1 and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours. For as for the tyrants of Sicily2 , they were already arrived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time3 hindered, that neither jointly it could do anything remarkable, nor the cities singly be adventurous.

The Lacedæmonians put down the tyrants through all Greece.A. C. 510. Ol. 67. 2.A. C. 804.A. C. 490. Ol. 72. 3.Olymp. 75. 1.All Greece divided into two leagues; the Lacedæmonians and their league, and the Athenians and their league.

18. But after that the tyrants, both of Athens4 and of the rest of Greece where tyrannies5 were, were the most and last of them, excepting those of Sicily, put down by the Lacedæmonians; (for Lacedæmon, after that it was built by the Dorians that inhabited6 the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions7 than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free8 from tyrants: for it is unto the end of this war four hundred years and something more, that the Lacedæmonians have used one and the same government, and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs in the other cities); I say, after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon. And in the tenth year again after that, came the barbarian with the great fleet1 into Greece, to subdue it. And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that leagued in that war was given to the Lacedæmonians, as to the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before and already stowed2 their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes went a ship–board3 and became seamen. When they had jointly beaten back the barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athenians and the other with the Lacedæmonians; these two cities appearing to be the mightiest; for this had the power by land, and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but awhile: for afterwards the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, being at variance4 , warred each on other together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. In so much, that from the war of the Medes to this present war being continually [exercised] somtimees in peace sometimes in war, either one against the other or against revolted confederates, they arrived at this war, both well furnished with military provisions and also expert; because their practice was with danger.

The manner how the Lacedæmonians dealt with their confederates.The manner how the Athenians handled their confederates.

19. The Lacedæmonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries, but only drew them by fair means to embrace the oligarchy, convenient to their own policy. But the Athenians, having with time taken into their hands the galleys of all those that stood out, (except the Chians and Lesbians), reigned1 over them, and ordained every of them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means, their own particular provision was greater in the beginning of this war, than when2 in their flourishing time, the league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was at the most.

20. Such then I find to have been the state of things past; hard to be believed3 , though one produce proof for every particular thereof. For1 men receive the report of things, though of their own country, if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination.

Digression to show how negligently men receive the fame of things past, by the example of their error touching the story of Hippias the son of Pisistratus: which it seems he willingly mentions, both here and hereafter, on light occasion.A. C. 514. Ol. 46. 2.

For the vulgar sort of Athenians think that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton: and know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren; and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their complices had that day, and at that instant2 , discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias as a man forewarned; and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus slew him near the temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the Panathenaical3 show. And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other Grecians; as that the kings of Lacedæmon, in giving their suffrages, had not single4 , but double votes: and5 that Pitanate was a band of soldiers so called there; whereas there was never any such. So impatient of labour are the most men in search of truth, and embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.

21. Now he1 , that by the arguments here adduced, shall frame a judgment of the things past, and not believe rather that they were such as the poets have sung, or prose–writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be disproved, and by length of time turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit; but shall think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity; he, I say, shall not err. And though men always judge the present war wherein they live to be greatest, and when it is past, admire more those that were before it; yet if they consider of this war by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned2 .

The diligence of the author in the inquiry of the truth of what he wrote: both touching the orations and the actions.

22. What particular persons have spoken1 when they were about to enter into the war or when they were in it, were hard2 for me to remember exactly; whether they were speeches which I have heard myself, or have received at the second hand. But as any man seemed to me, that knew what was nearest to the sum3 of the truth of all that had been uttered, to speak most agreeably to the matter still in hand, so I have made it spoken here. But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write all that I heard from all authors, nor such as I myself did but think to be true; but only those whereat I was myself present, and those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry. And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty; because such as were present at every action, spake not all after the same manner; but as they were affected to the parts, or as they could remember.

The use of this history.

To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful. But he that desires to look into the truth of things done, and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at least their like, he shall find4 enough herein to make him think it profitable. And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession1 , than to be rehearsed for a prize.

The greatness of the present war.Earthquakes, eclipses, famine, pestilence, concomitants of this war.A. C. 415. Ol. 83. 3. The causes of the war.Fear necessitates the war in the Lacedæmonians.

23. The greatest action before this was that against the Medes2 ; and yet that, by two battles by sea and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long, and the harm it did to Greece was such, as the like in the like space had never been seen before. For neither had there ever been so many cities expugned and made desolate, what by the barbarians3 and what by the Greeks warring on one another4 ; (and some cities there were, that when they were taken changed their inhabitants5 ); nor so much banishing and slaughter, some by the war some by sedition6 , as was in this. And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world, and most violent withal: eclipses of the sun, oftener than is reported of any former time: great droughts in some places, and thereby famine: and that which did none of the least hurt, but destroyed also its part7 , the plague. All8 these evils entered together with this war: which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league, which immediately after the conquest of Eubœa had been concluded between them for thirty years. The causes why they brake the same, and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel1 , though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedæmonians into fear necessitated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league publicly voiced, were these.

The first pretext.A. C. 627. Ol. 38. 2.

24. Epidamnus2 is a city situate on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian Gulf. Bordering upon it are the Taulantii, barbarians, a people of Illyris3 . This was planted by the Corcyræans4 ; but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and, according to an5 ancient custom, called to this charge out of the metropolitan city. Besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians, and others1 of the Doric nation. In process of time the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; and2 having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining barbarians, brought low and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But that which was the last accident before this war, was, that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the barbarians, and both by land and sea robbed those that remained within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, sent their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother city, praying the Corcyræans not to see them perish, but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth, and to put an end to the barbarian war. And this they entreated in the form of suppliants3 , sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.

The Epidamnians neglected by their mother city Corcyra, procure the protection of the Corinthians.A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1.A. C. 436. Ol. 85. 4./86. 1.

25. The Epidamnians now despairing of relief from the Corcyræans, and at a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Delphi enquired at the oracle, whether it were not best to deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians as of their founders, and make trial what aid they should obtain from thence. And when the oracle had answered, that they should deliver it and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the oracle gave their city1 to them, and declared2 how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them, entreating their help, and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. And the Corinthians undertook their defence, not only for the equity of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the Corcyræans’ colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyræans; who being their colony yet contemned them, and allowed3 them not their due honour in public meetings, nor in the distribution of the sacrifice began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies; but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time for store of money, and1 strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in shipping; and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phæaces2 , who flourished in glory of naval affairs: which was also the cause why they the rather provided themselves of a navy. And they were indeed not without power that way; for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.

The Corinthians send inhabitants to Epidamnus.A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1.The Corcyræans angry at the aids sent by the Corinthians, make war on Epidamnus.A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1. The Corcyræans besiege Epidamnus.

26. The Corinthians therefore having all these criminations against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever would to go and dwell there, but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens. Which succours, for fear the Corcyræans should have hindered their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia1 . The Corcyræans, understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same; and sailing presently thither with twenty–five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent2 manner commanded them both to recall those whom they had banished, (for these banished3 men of Epidamnus had been now at Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulcres of their ancestors and claiming kindred, had entreated the Corcyræans to restore them), and to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments. Whereupon the Corcyræans with forty galleys, together with the banished men, (whom they pretended to reduce), and with the Illyrians, whom they had joined to their part, warred upon them; and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the city in on every side.

The Corinthians send an army to relieve it.

27. The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready their army: and at the same time caused a proclamation to be made for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go should have equal and like privileges1 with those that were there before: and that such as desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind. And they were very many, both that went and that laid down their silver. Moreover they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyræans, to aid2 them with some galleys: who accordingly furnished out eight; the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia, four. They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them five: the citizens of Hermione, one: the Trœzenians, two: the Leucadians, ten: the Ambraciots, eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money: of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys. And of the Corinthians themselves, there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms3 .

A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corcyræans offer to stand to arbitrement.The Corinthians unwilling to accept it, and not without cause.

28. The Corcyræans, advertised of this preparation, went to Corinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians and of the Sicyonians, whom they took with them; and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to do; or if they had anything to1 allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on; and they then should hold the colony, to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also, that they were content to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi: that war they would make none; but if they must needs have it, they should, by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence to seek out better2 friends than those whom they already had. To this the Corinthians answered, that if they would put off with their fleet and dismiss the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then consult of the matter: for before they could not honestly do it; because whilst they should be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a siege. The Corcyræans replied to this, that if they would call back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and3 to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.

A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corinthian fleet.A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corcyræan fleet.The Corcyræans have the victory at sea, and on the same day take the city.

29. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since1 their galleys were manned and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy–five galleys and two thousand2 men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyræans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes: and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come as far as Actium, in the territory of Anactorium, (which is a temple of Apollo, and ground consecrated unto him), in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyræans sent a herald to them at3 Actium, to forbid their coming on; and in the meantime manned out their fleet; and having repaired4 and made fit for service their old galleys, and furnished5 the rest with things necessary, shipped their munition and went aboard6 . The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to peace, but having1 their galleys already manned and furnished to the number of eighty sail, (for forty2 attended always the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea, and arranging themselves came to a battle: in which the Corcyræans were clearly victors; and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen galleys. And the same day it happened likewise, that they that besieged Epidamnus had the same3 rendered unto them, with conditions, that the strangers therein found should be4 ransomed, and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as they should be otherwise disposed of.

A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.The Corcyræans masters of the sea.A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.

30. The battle being ended, the Corcyræans, after they had set up their trophy5 in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners, but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the Corinthians6 with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyræans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, went first and wasted the territory of Leucas7 , a Corinthian colony; and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal of the Eleans, and burnt it, because they had both with money and shipping given aid to the Corinthians. And they were masters of those seas, and infested the confederates of Corinth, for the most part of that year; till such time as in the beginning of the summer1 following the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers unto Actium, the which, for the more safe keeping of Leucas and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis2 : and the Corcyræans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay over against them in Leucimna. But neither part stirred against the other; but after they had lyen quietly opposite all the1 summer, they retired in winter both the one side and the other to their cities.

A. C. 434. 3. Ol. 86. 3. 4. The Corinthians prepare a greater navy.Both Corcyræans and Corinthians send their ambassadors to Athens.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

31. All this year, as well before as after the battle2 , the Corinthians, being vexed3 at the war with the Corcyræans, applied themselves to the building of galleys and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest4 they were able to make, and to procure mariners5 out of Peloponnesus and all other parts of Greece. The Corcyræans having intelligence of their preparations, began to fear; and (because they had never6 been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates either of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians) thought it best now to send to Athens7 , to see if they could procure any aid from thence. This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyræans might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. And the assembly at Athens being met, they came to plead against each other; and the Corcyræans spake to this effect.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4. oration of the ambassadors of corcyra.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

32. “Men of Athens, it is but justice that such as come to implore the aid of their neighbours, (as now do1 we), and cannot pretend by any great benefit or league some precedent merit, should, before they go any farther, make it appear, principally, that what they seek conferreth profit, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least to those that are to grant it: and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same: and if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill though their suit be rejected. And the Corcyræans being fully persuaded that they can make all this appear on their own parts, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to ascribe them to the number of your confederates. Now so it is, that we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you, and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. For having ever till now been unwilling to admit others into league with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others, but also left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Corinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with others into league, because we would not at the discretion of others enter into danger, we now find to have been our weakness and imprudence. Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and seeing with our own single power we are not able to go1 through; and since also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great to all Greece: it is necessary that we seek the succours both of you and of whomsoever else we can; and we are also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from malice, but error of judgment.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

33. “Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence2 on our part of need will on your part be honourable, for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have suffered, and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so place3 your benefit as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible. Besides this, the greatest navy but your own, is ours. Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies, can befal you, than that that power, which you would have prized above any money or other requital, should come voluntarily, and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands; bringing with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not1 happened at once to many. And few there be of those that sue for league, that come not rather to receive strength and reputation, than to confer it. If any here think, that the war wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error, and seeth not how the Lacedæmonians, through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprize2 , assault us now in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand3 , either to weaken us, or to strengthen their own estate. It must therefore be your4 part, we offering and you accepting the league, to begin with them, and to anticipate plotting rather than to counterplot against them.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

34. “If they object injustice, in that you receive their colony, henceforth let them learn that all colonies, so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. That they have done us the injury, is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. Now let that which they have done unto us, who are their kindred, serve you for some argument, not to be seduced1 by their demands, and made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives most secure, that hath fewest benefits bestowed upon him by his enemies to repent of.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

35. “As for the articles between you and the Lacedæmonians, they are not broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. For there2 it is said, that whosoever is confederate of neither party, may have access lawfully to either. And sure it were very unreasonable, that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and3 out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places4 in your dominion; and we be denied both the league now propounded, and also all other help from whencesoever. And5 if they impute it to you as a fault, that you grant our request; we shall take it for a greater, that you grant it not. For therein you shall reject us that are invaded, and be none of your enemies; and them, who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not oppose, but also suffer to raise unlawful1 forces in your dominions. Whereas you ought in truth, either not to suffer them to take up mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also, in such manner as you shall think good yourselves; but especially by taking us into your league, and so aiding us. Many commodities2 , as we said in the beginning, we show unto you, but this for the greatest; that whereas they are your enemies, (which is manifest enough), and not weak ones, but able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial league; and the want of one of these is not as the want of the other. Nay rather, your principal aim, if it could be done, should be to let none at all have shipping but yourselves; or at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends as are best furnished therewith.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

36. “If any man now think thus, that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken: let that man consider, that his fear joined with strength will make his enemies fear, and his confidence, having (if he reject us) so much the less strength, will so much the less be1 feared. Let him also remember, that he is now in consultation no less concerning Athens than Corcyra; wherein he forecasteth none of the best, (considering the present state of affairs), that makes a question, whether against a war at hand and only not already on foot, he should join unto it or not that city, which with most important advantages or disadvantages will be2 friend or enemy. For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily, that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus from thence, and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus3 thither: and is also for divers other uses most commodious. And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be abandoned or not, by this. For Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time both against the Corcyræans and the Peloponnesians; whereas by making league with us, you shall, with your1 fleet augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians alone.”

Thus spake the Corcyræans: and after them the Corinthians, thus.

oration of the ambassadors of corinth.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

37. “The Corcyræans in their oration having made mention not only of your taking them into league, but also that they are wronged and unjustly warred on; it is also necessary for us first to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the rest of what we have to say: to the end you may foreknow2 that ours are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you may upon reason reject the needy3 estate of those others. Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other cities, that the same hath proceeded from modesty, the truth is, that they took up that custom, not from any virtue, but mere wickedness; as4 being unwilling to have any confederate for a witness of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides, their city being by the situation sufficient within itself, giveth them this point; that when they do any man a wrong, they themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent. For going seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such as by necessity are driven into their harbour. And in this consisteth1 their goodly pretext for not admitting confederates, not because they would not be content to accompany others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone; that where they were too strong, they might oppress; and when there should be none to observe them, the less of the profit might be shared from them; and that they might escape the shame, when they took any thing. But if they had been honest men, (as they themselves say they are), by how much the less they are obnoxious2 to accusation, so much the more means they have, by giving and taking what is3 due, to make their honesty appear. 38. But they are not such, neither towards others nor towards us. For being our colony, they have not only been ever in revolt; but now they also make war upon us, and say they were not sent out to be injured by us. But we say again, that we did not send them forth to be scorned by them, but to have the leading of them, and to be regarded by them as is fit. For4 our other colonies both honour and love us much: which is an argument, seeing the rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just cause to be offended alone; and that without some manifest wrong, we should not have had colour1 to war against them. But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in them to have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have insulted over their modesty. But through pride and wealth they have done wrong, both in many other things, and also in this; that Epidamnus being ours, which whilst it was vexed with wars they never claimed, as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them, and so holden.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

39. “They say2 now, that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment. But you are not to think that such a one will stand to judgment, as hath advantage and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for; but rather he, that before the trial will admit equality in the matter itself as well as in the pleading. Whereas contrarily, these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial, before they had besieged the city, but after, when they saw we meant not to put it3 up. And now hither they be come, not content to have been faulty in that business themselves, but to get in you; into their confederacy? no; but into their conspiracy; and to receive them in this name, that they are enemies to us. But they should have come to you then, when they were most in safety; not now, when we have the wrong, and they the danger; and when you, that never1 partaked of their power, must2 impart unto them of your aid, and having been free from their faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should3 communicate their power before hand, that mean to make common the issue of the same; and they that share not in the crimes, ought also to have no part in the sequel of them.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.

40. “Thus it appears, that we come for our parts with arguments of equity and right; whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall show you likewise, that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For although it be in the articles4 , that the cities written with neither of the parties may come in to whether of them they please; yet it holds not for such as do so to the detriment of either; but only for those, that having revolted1 from neither part, want protection, and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise2 ) that receive them. For3 you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these; but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows, they4 must defend themselves not without you. You should do most uprightly, to stand out of both our ways; and if not that, then to take our parts against the Corcyræans; (for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyræans you never had so much as a truce); and not to constitute a new law, of receiving one another’s rebels. For neither did we give our votes against you, when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion5 ; but plainly alleged, that it was reason, that every one should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates. And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be seen that they will come over as fast from you to us; and you shall set up a law, not so much against us, as against yourselves.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.A. C. 491. Ol. 72. 2.

41. “These are the points of justice we had to show you, conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice, and claim of favour; which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you, nor such friends as to surcharge you) we say, ought in the present occasion to be granted us by way of requital. For when you had want of long barks against the Æginetæ, a little before the Medan war, you had twenty lent unto you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians, when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory1 against the Æginetæ, and of the punishment of the Samians. And these things were done for you in a season, when men, going to fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but2 of victory. For3 even a man’s domestic affairs are ordered the worse, through eagerness of present contention.

A. C. 433. Ol.86.3.4.

42. “Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased to defend4 us now in the like manner. And have not this thought: that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet, if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. For utility followeth those actions most, wherein we do the least wrong; besides that the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyræans frighting you go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure, and not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians; but it were rather fit for you, indeed, to take away our former jealousies1 concerning the Megareans. For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service by this league. For to do no injury to our equals, is a firmer power, than that addition of strength, which, puffed up2 with present shows, men are to acquire with danger.

43. “And since we be come to this, which once before we said at Lacedæmon, that every one ought to proceed as he shall think good against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now of you; and that you that have been helped by our votes, will not hurt us now by yours, but render like for like; remembering, that now is that occasion, wherein he that aideth us is our greatest friend, and he that opposeth us our greatest enemy: and that you will not receive3 these Corcyræans into league against our wills, nor defend them in their injuries. These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit, and also advise the best for the good of your own affairs.”

This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.

A. C. 433. Ol.86.3.4. A league defensive made between the Athenians and Corcyræans.

44. Both sides having been heard, and the Athenian people twice assembled; in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyræans. But in the latter they changed their minds; not so as to make a league with the Corcyræans both offensive and defensive, that the friends and enemies of the one should be so of the other; (for then, if the Corcyræans should have required them to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians); but made it only defensive, that if any one should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they were then mutually to assist one another. For they expected that even thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians, and were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, to fall into the hands of the Corinthians; but rather, as much as in them lay, desired to break them one against another; that if need required, they might have to do with the Corinthians, and others that had shipping, when they should be weakened to their hands. And the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.

They aid Corcyra with ten galleys.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

45. With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcyræans into league; and when the Corinthians were gone, sent ten galleys not long after to their aid. The commanders of them were Lacedæmonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles; and1 had order not to fight with the Corinthians, unless they invaded Corcyra, or offered to land there or in some other place of theirs: which, if they did, then with all their might to oppose them. This1 they forbad, because they would not break the peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys arrived at Corcyra.

The Corinthian fleet.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

46. The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Corcyra with one hundred and fifty sail; of the Eleans ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots twenty–seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their own. The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several cities, for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in; and over those of Corinth was Xenocleides the son of Euthicles, with four others. After they were all come2 together upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas, and came to Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis. In3 this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the city of Ephyra, in that part of Thesprotis which is called Elæatis; and near unto it disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron, from which it taketh the name. Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divideth Thesprotis from Cestrine4 ; betwixt which two rivers ariseth this promontory of Chimerium. To this part of the continent came1 the Corinthians, and encamped.

The Corcyræan fleet.

47. The Corcyræans understanding that they made against them, having ready one hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called Sybota: and the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. But their land forces stayed in the promontory of Leucimna, and with them one thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many barbarians, which in those quarters have2 been evermore their friends.

The Corinthians set forward.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

48. The Corinthians, after they were ready and had taken aboard three days’ provision of victual, put off by night from Chimerium with purpose to fight; and about break of day, as they were sailing, descried the galleys of the Corcyræans, which were also put off from Sybota and coming on to fight with the Corinthians3 . As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of battle. In the right wing4 of the Corcyræans were placed the galleys of Athens; and the rest being their own5 , were divided into three commands, under the three commanders, one under one. This was the order of the Corcyræans. The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara and of Ambracia; in the middle, other their confederates in order; and opposite to the Athenians and right wing of the Corcyræans they were themselves placed, with such galleys as were best of sail, in the left.

The battle.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.The Corinthians have the better.The Athenians and Corinthians fight.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

49. The standard1 being on either side lift up, they joined battle; having on both parts2 both many men of arms and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed. The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought; near unto the manner of a fight at land. For after they had once3 run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men of arms, who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages4 through each other they made none, but fought it out with courage and strength, rather than with skill. Insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder: in which the Athenian galleys, being always, where the Corcyræans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but yet began no assault, because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress; for the Corcyræans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs, and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned tents and took away their baggage. So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyræans had the victory. But in the left wing, where the Corinthians were themselves, they were far superior; because the Corcyræans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyræans were in distress, now aided them manifestly1 ; whereas before, they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright, and that the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then every one fell to the business without making difference any longer: and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athenians.

Sybota of the continent, a haven.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.A supply of twenty sail from Athens.

50. The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, staid not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk1 unto their own galleys, that so they might tow them after; but made after the men, rowing up and down, to kill rather than to take alive; and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors, and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle, for number of ships, that ever had been before of Grecians against Grecians. When2 the Corinthians had chased the Corcyræans to the shore, they returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead; which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota, where also lay the land–forces of the barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they reunited themselves, and made again to the Corcyræans. And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea remaining3 of the former battle, together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent, and the song1 which they used to sing when they came to charge, was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern: for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys2 , sent from Athens to second the former ten; for fear lest the Corcyræans (as it also fell out) should be overcome, and those ten galleys of theirs be too few3 to defend them.

The Corinthians fall off.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

51. When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these galleys, suspecting that they were of Athens and more in number than they were, by little and little they fell off. But the Corcyræans (because the course of these galleys was unto them more out of sight4 ) descried them not, but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern; till at last some that saw them, said they were enemies5 ; and then retired also the Corcyræans. For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their galleys and dissolved themselves. And thus were they parted, and the battle ended1 in night. The Corcyræans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys, under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcases and wrecks, soon after they were descried arrived at the camp of the Corcyræans in Leucimna. The Corcyræans at first (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they2 anchored there.

The Corcyræans offer battle again.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Corinthians expostulate with the Athenians, to sound their purpose.The answer of the Athenians.

52. The next day, both the thirty galleys of Athens and as many of Corcyra as were fit for service, went to the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land and arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle; both for that they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens, and for many difficulties that happened to them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard, and also for that being in a desert place their galleys were not yet3 repaired; but took thought rather how to go home, for fear lest the Athenians, having the peace for already broken in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart. 53. They therefore thought good to send1 afore unto the Athenians certain men without privilege of heralds, for to sound them, and to say in this manner: “Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the war and violate the articles: for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, you stand in our way and bear arms against us: if therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against Corcyra or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve2 the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies.” Thus said they: and the Corcyræans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them. But the Athenians made answer thus: “Men of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war nor break the peace; but we bring aid to these our confederates, the Corcyræans: if you please therefore to go any whither else, we hinder you not; but if against Corcyra, or any place belonging unto it, we will not3 suffer you.”

The Corinthians go home.Both the Corcyræans and Corinthians challenge the victory, and both set up trophies.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

54. When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Corinthians made ready to go home, and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyræans also both took up the wreck and bodies of the dead, which carried every way by the waves and the winds that arose the night before, came driving to their hands; and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota the island. The victory was thus challenged on both sides upon these grounds. The Corinthians did set up a trophy, because in the battle they had the better all day, having1 gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies than the other, and taken no less than a thousand prisoners, and sunk about seventy of the enemies’ galleys. And the Corcyræans set up a trophy, because they had sunk thirty2 galleys of the Corinthians, and had, after the arrival of the Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by reason of the wind; and because the day before, upon sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern and went away from them: and lastly, for that when they3 went to Sybota, the Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed victory.

The Corinthians in their way home, take Anactorium, and keep two hundred and fifty of the best men prisoners, being Corcyræans, and use them well.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

55. The Corinthians in their way homeward took in Anactorium, a town seated in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, by deceit; (this town was common to them and to the Corcyræans); and having put into it Corinthians only4 , departed and went home. Of the Corcyræans, eight hundred that were servants5 , they sold; and kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with very much favour, that they might be a means, at their return, to bring Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians; the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. And thus was Corcyra delivered1 of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian galleys went from them. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians: namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyræans in a battle by sea against the Corinthians, with whom they were comprised in the same articles of peace.

The second pretext of the war:Potidæa suspected.Potidæa commanded to give hostages, and to pull down part of their wall.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 2.

56. Presently after this, it came to pass that other differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, to induce the war. For whilst the Corinthians studied2 to be revenged, the Athenians, who had their hatred in jealousy, commanded the citizens of Potidæa, a city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene3 , a colony of the Corinthians, but confede