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• Foreword
• Preface to the Liberty Fund Edition
• Preface to the First Edition
• Part I: Tocqueville’s Second Voyage to America, 1832–1840
• Chapter 1: The Writing of the First Part of the Democracy
• Chapter 2: An Expanding Task Resumed
• Part II: How to Account For America? Tocqueville Looks At Some Particular Causes Physiques
• Chapter 3: An Hypothesis Weighed and Rejected
• Chapter 4: Further Considerations of Environment
• Chapter 5: Was Race a Sufficient Explanation of the American Character?
• Chapter 6: The Transformation of a Continent
• Part III: Tocqueville and the Union: the Nature and Future of American Federalism
• Chapter 7: The Bond Between the States and the Central Government
• Chapter 8: A Prophet In Error
• Chapter 9: How Large Might a Republic Be?
• Part IV: Democracy, Centralization, and Democratic Despotisms
• Chapter 10: Centralization and Local Liberties
• Chapter 11: Where Would Power Accumulate?
• Chapter 12: Administrative Centralization and Some Remedies
• Chapter 13: Tocqueville’s Changing Visions of Democratic Despotism
• Part V: Democracy, the Individual, and the Masses
• Chapter 14: The Tyranny of the Majority
• Chapter 15: The Tyranny of the Majority: Some Paradoxes
• Chapter 16: Would Démocratie Usher In a New Dark Ages?
• Chapter 17: Démocratie and Egoïsme
• Chapter 18: From Egoïsme to Individualisme
• Part VI: What Tocqueville Meant By Démocratie
• Chapter 19: Some Meanings of Démocratie
• Chapter 20: Tocqueville’s Return to America
• Epilogue How Many Democracies ?
• Selected Bibliography

CHAPTER 8

A Prophet in Error

In March 1831, when Tocqueville and Beaumont climbed aboard the Havre and prepared to leave France, they carried with them an elementary history of the United States, perhaps Arnold Scheffer’s short Histoire des Etats-Unis de l’Amérique septentrionale which had appeared in Paris in 1825.1 Scheffer, in fewer than three hundred pages, ambitiously surveyed events in America from the voyages of discovery to 1824 and even found room for occasional interpretive comments. Near the end of his work, after citing census statistics and noting the rapid admission and growing influence of new states, he speculated about the future of the American republic. “One day the immense extent of territory contained in the United States ... will have reached the full limit of its population; it is probable that North America will then number two or several republics.”2 Was his prediction correct? Would the American Union ultimately dissolve into several smaller nations?3

While still on shipboard, Tocqueville asked Peter Schermerhorn, wealthy New Yorker and fellow passenger, what he thought. “When I spoke to Mr. Schermerhorn of the possible division which might take place between the united provinces [states], he did not seem to believe that it was the least in the world to be feared in the near future.” But the merchant did think that “it would come someday, by and by.”4

Other Americans, including a man recently President of the United States, also supported Scheffer’s contention. “I then spoke to [John Quincy Adams] about the more immediate dangers to the Union and the causes which might lead to its dissolution. [He] did not answer at all, but it was easy to see that in this matter he felt no more confidence than I did in the future.”5

Another citizen more willingly gave words to his fears. According to Timothy Walker, controversies over the tariff, the public lands, and other matters; the rapidly shifting balance between the North and South; and state suspicion and resentment of the central government dangerously weakened the federal bonds.6

Joel Poinsett, in partial dissent, later denied that the “nullificators,” spawned by the tariff affair, threatened the Union, but he too worried aloud about the relative decline of the South and the increasing bitterness of sectional disputes. The South Carolinian readily agreed with Tocqueville’s observation that “It is impossible that this state of affairs should not create a state of jealousy and suspicion in the South. The weak do not generally believe in the fairness of the strong.”7

Yet curiously, the Americans often mixed a vigorous distrust of the central government with their uncertainty about the duration of the Union. Mr. Clay, for example, evinced a common fear by warning Tocqueville about one great flaw in the French democracy, the preponderance of Paris.8 “The Americans,” Tocqueville observed not long afterwards, “have ... a fear of centralization and of the power of capitals.”9

Later, while drafting his work and reflecting upon his experiences in America, he would recall: “More than once in the United States I had the occasion to notice ... a strange preoccupation:... the idea of the consolidation of sovereignty in the hands of the central government constantly torments the imagination of statesmen as well as that of the people.”10

Which future was the more likely, disunion or consolidation? His hosts appeared mired in indecision, but by the end of his visit to America, a prediction of disintegration began to take shape in Tocqueville’s mind. On 31 January 1832, under the heading “Future of the Union,” he observed:

Walker and Poinsett had left their marks on his thinking.

While leading his monk’s existence in Paris and at Baugy and working on the early chapters of the Democracy, Tocqueville can hardly have failed to notice a thesis in the Federalist which seemed almost designed to confirm his doubts about the durability of the United States. Turning away from statistical or political considerations, Hamilton had offered an argument based upon the very structure of the American Union. Federations, he had declared, verged naturally toward disintegration. “In every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common center.”12

A later paper had elaborated the same point. “Several important considerations ...,” Madison had argued in Number 45, “discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale. We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments.” He had even admitted that the Constitution did not grant the American republic total immunity to this historical disease. “Although, in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain under the proposed Constitution a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded.”13

As the 1835 Democracy took form, Tocqueville made “Publius’s” premise his own, and, in a draft entitled “What must be understood by the word sovereignty and the words ‘rights of sovereignty,’” theorized that sovereign nations could be formed by the union either of individuals or of small independent societies. “When the sovereign is composed of individuals [there is] a tendency to gather the exercise of all principal acts into the same hands.... When [the sovereign is] composed of nations, [there is] a contrary tendency.14

“So the way in which the sovereign is formed,” he continued, “exercises a great influence over the division that it makes of its authority. That is a point de départ about which one hardly thinks....15

“... The natural tendency of a people ... is indefinitely to concentrate social forces until one reaches pure administrative despotism. The natural tendency of confederations is indefinitely to divide these forces until one reaches dismemberment.”16

So the very nature of the American federation apparently condemned it to a brief existence. Lacking the strength needed to check this natural centrifugal impulse, the Union would continue to exist only on the pleasure of the states,17 and, although material and certain nonmaterial interests urged the states to adhere to the federation,18 various other forces weakened their attachment to the national government.19

In remarks reminiscent of the anxiety expressed in the travel notes of December 1831 and January 1832, Tocqueville wrote in his working manuscript: “What most compromises the fate of the Union is its very prosperity, is the rapid increase of some of its parts.”20 The Americans, he declared, were “an entire people who travel.”21 They prided themselves on their headlong rush westward, but Tocqueville noted with misgivings that “there is something revolutionary in such progress.”22

Both faults of structure and uncontrolled growth thus made the conclusion inescapable, and, in a margin of the manuscript, Tocqueville summarized his argument. “So the existence of the Union, a risk. Its dismemberment, something always possible. Something certain in time.”23

In 1835, various passages would hint at the misfortune ahead, but nowhere in the published text would the author quite so boldly proclaim the inevitable dissolution of the American nation.24

A prediction of disunion did not end the inquiry, however, for Tocqueville realized that the Union’s demise could result from a gradual decrease in national vigor as well as from the sudden withdrawal of jealous and unruly states. “Among the causes which can hasten the dismemberment of the Union is found, in the first rank, the condition of weakness and inertia into which the federal government might fall. If, in this way, the central power arrived at such a degree of feebleness that it could no longer serve as arbiter among the different provincial interests and could not effectively defend the confederation against foreigners, its usefulness would become doubtful and the Union would no longer exist except on paper.”25

“Publius” had theorized that the states would constantly sap the strength of the Union, but, to discover whether the national government was, in fact, becoming impotent, Tocqueville turned once again to Kent, Story, and Conseil, to a variety of official and unofficial papers, and to three additional volumes: Joseph Blunt’s A Historical Sketch of the Formation of the Confederacy,26 William Alexander Duer’s Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States,27 and Thomas Sergeant’s Constitutional Law: Being a View of Practice and Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States and of the Constitutional Points Decided.28

Sergeant’s work, which Tocqueville described as “an excellent commentary on the Constitution of the United States,”29 was the first to use court decisions30 to advance the thesis that many of the federal government’s legitimate and once-acknowledged prerogatives had been lost through timidity. Citing cases on every page, Sergeant asserted that under the powers to establish post offices and post roads, to regulate commerce, and to provide for the general welfare the national government had clear authority to undertake internal improvements, and that until Monroe’s veto of 1817, it had freely done so.31 He declared, in addition, that the “necessary and proper” clause granted the federal government the right to establish a national bank.32 Only executive vetoes and national inaction had allowed the states to question these long-established federal responsibilities.

Joseph Blunt’s volume preached a similar message, but directed it toward two other problems; the full title read: A Historical Sketch of the Formation of the Confederacy Particularly with Reference to the Provincial Limits and the Jurisdiction of the General Government over the Indian Tribes and the Public Territory. Like many of his fellow citizens in 1825, Blunt was alarmed by the frequent charges of usurpation made against the national government because of its Indian and land policies, and, in the hope of answering these accusations, he undertook a detailed study of both issues. “In this imperfect volume,” his introductory dedication stated, “I venture to present to the public the result of my examination.... If it be correct, it not only vindicates the federal government from all charges of undue attention, but shows that in its desire to conciliate the good will of the state authorities, it has conceded more than they could have reasonably demanded.”33

Tocqueville received a copy of the Outlines from the author34 and discovered that Duer also presented a strongly nationalist viewpoint, based, according to his preface, upon the Federalist; the writings of Kent, Story, and Rawle35 ; the speeches of Daniel Webster; and the opinions of Chief Justice John Marshall.36

These three volumes addressed themselves to most of the principal issues of the Jacksonian period, but for the details of the tariff and nullification controversy, Tocqueville was forced to undertake his own research; a list of some of the papers which he consulted appeared in a draft:

• 1. Legislative documents. 22nd Congress. 2nd session. no. 30.
• 2. Report made to the convention of South Carolina....
• 3. Ordinance of Nullification of November 24, 1832.
• 4. Proclamation of Governor Hamilton [sic] of November 27, 1832.
• 5. December 13, 1832. Proclamation of Gov. Ham. [sic].
• 6. ...37 Laws of December 20, 1832.38

From these and other sources, he concluded that in several of the key areas of conflict between the states and the Union—“Nullification, Indians, Internal Improvements, Lands, Bank”39 —the federal government had ignominiously retreated. It seemed, moreover, that the government in Washington actually possessed fewer recognized prerogatives in the 1830s than it had in 1789. Still somewhat incredulous about such a loss of authority, Tocqueville advised himself to see “in Story all the matters which have concerned the federal government and those which still concern it in order to know if its power[?]40 increases or decreases.”41

Evidently the Justice stilled any doubts, for, in another draft, Tocqueville summarized his findings: “Weakness of the Union proved by the progress of events.... All the amendments to the Constitution have been made to restrict the federal power. The federal government has abandoned in practice certain of its prerogatives and has not acquired a single new one. Every time that a State has resolutely stood up to the Union, [the State] has more or less obtained what it desired.”42

“The real force,” he concluded briefly, “has remained with the States. This proved by events.... For forty years the central bond has constantly loosened. The Union loses constantly and does not recover.”43 In 1835, the Democracy would contend that “a careful study of the history of the United States over the last forty-five years readily convinces one that federal power is decreasing.”44

Certain that the Union would break apart in one way or another, Tocqueville dealt harshly in his drafts with Americans haunted by what he termed the “absurd” specter of consolidation.45 Perhaps Story’s Commentaries, written largely in reaction to John C. Calhoun’s doctrine of nullification,46 reinforced his skepticism. In the firm belief that the power of the states was the real threat to the Union, the Justice scoffed at those who worried about federal ambitions. “Hitherto our experience has demonstrated the entire safety of the states, under the benign operation of the constitution. No man will venture to affirm, that their power, relative to that of the Union, has been diminished.”47 “As for me,” Tocqueville avowed in agreement, “... I search in vain for what is real and perceptible in such a terror.” The 1835 Democracy would offer a somewhat more diplomatic version of the same sentiment.48

Only one of Tocqueville’s major authorities, Thomas Jefferson, clearly disagreed with this view. In several letters contained in Conseil’s two volumes the Virginian claimed that the central government gained rather than lost power, and that the independence of the states diminished steadily.49 In 1825, for example, he had lamented to William B. Giles:

Jefferson had proceeded to explain in some detail how the national government used the power to regulate commerce, the general welfare clause, and other tools to subjugate the states. Unfortunately for Tocqueville’s reputation as a prophet, he failed to heed the great democrat’s dissent.

The 1835 Democracy would only vaguely date the beginning of the Union’s decline as when “America again took her due place among the nations, peace returned to her frontiers, and confidence in public credit was restored; a settled state of affairs followed the confusion, and each man’s industry could find its natural outlet and develop in freedom.”51

The drafts and manuscript, however, indicated a much more precise time for the onset of the nation’s infirmity, and even assigned responsibility to one particular American statesman. “Reveal how the various Presidents since Jefferson have successively despoiled the federal government of its attributes,” Tocqueville resolved in one early outline.52

In a margin of the working manuscript, he ventured a more straightforward opinion: “I believe, but it is to be verified, that the entry of the Republicans to federal power was the first step, a step indirect but real, on this path.”53

“The federal government,” he explained, “was from then on in a very critical situation; its enemies had popular favor, and it was by promising to weaken the federal government that they obtained the right to direct it. Since that period, it is easy to trace, in events, the successive symptoms of this weakening of the central power. The reaction against the central power began around 1800. It continues today.”54

But before he sent his manuscript to the printer, the author cautiously deleted both the marginal comment and the specific reference to 1800; the published text of the Democracy would blame no man for the Union’s advancing weakness.55

So once again during the writing process, Tocqueville decided to moderate one of his views concerning the fate of the Union. The text of 1835 would refrain from any assertion of inevitable dissolution, any scornful rejection of American fears of consolidation, or any condemnation of Jefferson. Several possible explanations for this retreat come to mind. The author of the Democracy undoubtedly labored to avoid unnecessarily offending the Americans, and so probably thought better of his transparent contempt for a common American torment and of his attack on the Republican hero. He was also extremely suspicious of men who claimed to see into the future, and, after the excitement of composition had passed, probably decided to back away from some of his bolder projections. Writing of events which might stop, slow, or hasten the Union’s weakness, he ultimately concluded: “That is hidden in the future, and I cannot pretend to be able to lift the veil.”56

That he might have been persuaded toward moderation by one or more of his American friends is another possible explanation. Perhaps prodding by Sedgwick, Lippitt, Edward Livingston, or others caused him to reassess his estimation of Jefferson’s role. As early as the summer of 1833, for example, long before the first part of the Democracy appeared, Tocqueville had received strong indications from America that his ideas about “l’affaiblissement de l’Union” were mistaken.

On 30 August 1833, Jared Sparks had devoted part of a letter to a description of recent events.

Less than a month later a similar letter from H. D. Gilpin had indicated that Sparks’s view was not merely idiosyncratic. “The difficulties in the South are we trust at an end, and if so it is a matter of no small congratulation that what threatened us so seriously should have passed off with results calculated rather to strengthen than to weaken the union.”58

Although in 1835 Tocqueville would not give much credit to these optimistic assessments of the Union’s durability, we have already noted that in 1838 he would finally recognize and decide to admit his error about the decline of the American federation. “It will be necessary to show how recent events justify the greater part of the things that I said,” he would write at that time; but he would cryptically add: “The weakening of the federal bond ... admit my error.”59 A belated recognition was better than none at all, but in 1833, by ignoring these letters from America, Tocqueville had missed a second opportunity to enhance his standing as a seer.

Tocqueville thus superseded his readings and conversations to invent an original name for the new creation which he understood the American Union to be: un gouvernement national incomplet. His view of this strange government, perceptive and largely accurate, was also, however, profoundly pessimistic in many significant ways, for he saw it as powerful only within a severely limited sphere of authority, as totally dependent on the consent of aggressive and preponderant states, as suffering from a progressive and shameful senility, and as certainly doomed to ultimate dissolution. “So the existence of the Union, a risk. Its dismemberment, something always possible. Something certain in time.”

Paradoxically, this bleak aspect of his description of the nature and destiny of the American Union,60 except for his anomalous contention about secession, largely reflected the writings of “Publius,” Story, and other ardent nationalists. Tocqueville never fully considered the implications of the fact that these men wrote with a dread of anarchy and a desire to calm the anxieties of fellow citizens always fearful of a strong central government. Consequently, he never awoke to the strong possibility that his experts, in order to meet a pervasive distrust of central authority, might have underplayed the vigor, the powers, and the activities of the federal government and exaggerated the strength, the rights, and the ambitions of the states. Here, if anywhere, was the basic error of Tocqueville’s exposition of the nature and future of the American federation.

[1. ]Hereafter cited as Scheffer, Histoire. This history is the only one published in Paris during the few years previous to Tocqueville’s journey to America and also cited by him in his lists of sources. See Pierson, Toc. and Bt., p. 46.

[2. ]Scheffer, Histoire, p. 284; my translation. In the Commentaries, p. 718, Story expressed a similar opinion. Compare Tocqueville’s own text, Democracy (Mayer), p. 364.

[3. ]In the 1835 Democracy Tocqueville would carefully distinguish between the future of the Union as a nation and its future as a republic; Democracy (Mayer), pp. 395–400. This chapter considers only the first of these two questions. (For an identical distinction between federal and republican destinies, see Conseil’s introductory essay to the Mélanges, 1:112–14. Did Tocqueville borrow this concept from Conseil’s volume?)

[4. ]“Division de l’empire américaine,” April 1831, Shipboard Conversations, Yale, BIIb. Translated by Pierson and quoted from his Toc. and Bt., pp. 49–50. (Consult Pierson’s account of the conversation.) Neither the original French nor the English translation of the O.C. (Mayer) edition of Tocqueville’s travel diaries contains any of his shipboard notes.

[5. ]Conversation with John Quincy Adams, Boston, 1 October 1831, Non-Alphabetic Notebooks 2 and 3, Mayer, Journey, pp. 60–63.

[6. ]Second conversation with Mr. Walker, 3 December 1831, Non-Alphabetic Notebooks 2 and 3, ibid., p. 96.

[7. ]Conversation with Mr. Poinsett, 12–17 January 1832, Non-Alphabetic Notebooks 2 and 3, ibid., pp. 113–15. Compare Democracy (Mayer), p. 381.

[8. ]Conversation with Mr. Clay, 2 October 1831, Non-Alphabetic Notebooks 2 and 3, Mayer, Journey, pp. 65–66.

[9. ]“Centralization,” 25 October 1831, Alphabetic Notebook 2, ibid., p. 216.

[10. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 2, pp. 48–49. Compare Democracy (Mayer), p. 384.

[11. ]31 January 1832, Notebook E, Mayer, Journey, pp. 235–36.

[12. ]Number 15, Federalist (Mentor), p. 111.

[13. ]Number 45, ibid., pp. 289–90.

[14. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 1, p. 76.

[15. ]In this exposition, Tocqueville once again displayed his eagerness to discover and employ a point de départ, one of his favorite mental tools.

[16. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 1, p. 78. Cf. Democracy (Mayer), pp. 364–66.

[17. ]See Democracy (Mayer), pp. 368–70, 383–84.

[18. ]Democracy (Mayer), pp. 370–74, 384–86. Tocqueville would cite as material interests: various geographic circumstances, the presence of the slaves in the South, and the bonds of commerce, transportation, and communication. As nonmaterial factors, he would include: common opinions, beliefs, and sentiments, and a growing sense of nationhood.

[19. ]Ibid., pp. 374–83. According to the 1835 text, the most important of these contrary forces would be the one we have already noted, the shifting balance of wealth and influence among the states and sections as the Union expanded. But Tocqueville would also mention the incompatible passions and character traits created by slavery.

[20. ]The following brief excerpts are from the section entitled “What Are the Chances that the American Union Will Last,” Original Working Ms., Yale, CVIa, tome 2. Initially the sentence ended: “of all of its parts.” But Tocqueville deleted “all” and substituted the word “some.”

[21. ]Original Working Ms., Yale, CVIa, tome 2.

[22. ]Ibid. Compare these phrases with the Democracy (Mayer), p. 383.

[23. ]Original Working Ms., Yale, CVIa, tome 2; my emphasis.

[24. ]Consult the section of the 1835 Democracy entitled “What Are the Chances that the American Union Will Last? What Dangers Threaten It?” Democracy (Mayer), pp. 363–95. (Also consult pp. 166–70.) Only once, significantly while discussing the results of the Union’s growth, would Tocqueville approach so direct a statement; see ibid., p. 378.

[25. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 1, pp. 80–81. Compare Democracy (Mayer), pp. 383–84.

[26. ]Hereafter cited as Blunt, Historical Sketch.

[27. ]Hereafter cited as Duer, Outlines.

[28. ]Second revised edition; hereafter cited as Sergeant, Constitutional Law.

[29. ]“Sources. Nature des livres où je puis puiser—Livres de droit.” Reading Lists, Yale, CIIa.

[30. ]Bauer, Commentaries, pp. 27, 39, and notes.

[31. ]Sergeant, Constitutional Law, pp. 324–28 and notes. Compare Tocqueville’s discussion of the issue, Democracy (Mayer), pp. 386–87.

[32. ]Sergeant, Constitutional Law, pp. 353–54. Concerning the debate on the bank, Tocqueville also cited in his drafts two issues of the National Intelligencer, “6 February 1834” and “5 [sic: 4] March 1834.” The first contained a speech by Daniel Webster; the second, one by Henry Clay. See Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 5, pp. 10–12. Also consult the Democracy (Mayer), pp. 388–89.

[33. ]Blunt, Historical Sketch, pp. 5–6. Compare Tocqueville’s analysis of the controversy over the Indians, Democracy (Mayer), pp. 387–88, and over the public lands, p. 388.

[34. ]Bauer, Commentaries, p. 101; also Pierson, Toc. and Bt., p. 729 note.

[35. ]Duer specifically disagreed, however, with what he called Rawle’s “restricted views” on “the perpetual obligation of the Federal Constitution.”

[36. ]Duer, Outlines, preface, pp. v–xviii. According to Bauer, Commentaries, p. 28, Duer wrote his book as a reply to nullification doctrines.

[37. ]According to the copyist, Bonnel, the first word in this phrase was illegible.

[38. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 2, pp. 61–64. The governor during the crisis was Robert Y. Hayne. Perhaps Tocqueville was thinking of James Hamilton, Jr., a prominent nullifier. Consult the footnotes in the Democracy (Mayer), pp. 389–92, where other documents are cited, especially the compromise tariff of 1833. Note that nowhere did Tocqueville indicate that he had read President Jackson’s Proclamation of December 1832.

[39. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 2, p. 52.

[40. ]Bonnel indicated that the word following “its” was illegible, but similar passages in the draft make possible the educated guess: “power.”

[41. ]Drafts, Yale, Paquet 3, cahier 2, p. 66.

[42. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 2, pp. 80–81.

[43. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 2, pp. 52–53.

[44. ]Democracy (Mayer), p. 386; see also pp. 384–85, 394–95. Note Tocqueville’s recognition of several circumstances which could reverse the decline of the federal government: “a change of opinion, an internal crisis, or a war could all at once restore the vigor it needs” (p. 394).

[45. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 1, p. 76.

[46. ]Bauer, Commentaries, pp. 21, 28.

[47. ]Story, Commentaries, p. 193; not specifically cited by Tocqueville. Compare Democracy (Mayer), pp. 394–95.

[48. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 2, pp. 48–49. For the softened version, see Democracy (Mayer), p. 384.

[49. ]Conseil, Mélanges, 1:84–85, 232–34; 2:310–16, 420–21. Tocqueville’s papers give no indication that he noticed any of these letters.

[50. ]Conseil, Mélanges, 2:420–21. For the original English version, see Jefferson to William B. Giles, Monticello, 26 December 1825, Jefferson, Memorial Ed., 16:146–47.

[51. ]Democracy (Mayer), p. 386.

[52. ]Drafts, Yale, CVh, Paquet 3, cahier 1, p. 25.

[53. ]This and the following excerpt are from the section “What Are the Chances that the American Union Will Last,” Original Working Ms., Yale, CVIa, tome 2; this sentence is crossed out.

[54. ]Original Working Ms., Yale, CVIa, tome 2; the final three sentences in this paragraph are crossed out in the manuscript. Compare this timetable to Arnold Scheffer’s, Histoire, p. 246; see also pp. 251, 252.

[55. ]Cf. Democracy (Mayer), p. 387.

[56. ]Ibid., p. 395.

[57. ]Letter from Sparks to Tocqueville, Boston, 30 August 1833, Relations with Americans, 1832–40, Yale, CId; Bonnel copy.

[58. ]Letter from H. D. Gilpin to Tocqueville, Philadelphia, 24 September 1833, Relations with Americans, 1832–40, Yale, CId; original from Madame de Larminat.

[59. ]For elaboration, see chapter 2 above.

[60. ]It should be emphasized that his description also obviously had its optimistic elements: the nation’s dominance of North America, its future commercial greatness, its apparently boundless wealth, and others.