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Front Page Titles (by Subject) II.: Division of the Metaphysic of Morals according to Relations of Obligation. - The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right
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II.: Division of the Metaphysic of Morals according to Relations of Obligation. - Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right [1796]Edition used:The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, by Immanuel Kant, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: Clark, 1887).
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II.Division of the Metaphysic of Morals according to Relations of Obligation.As the Subjects between whom a relation of Right to Duty is apprehended—whether it actually exist or not — admit of being conceived in various juridical relations to each other, another Division may be proposed from this point of view, as follows:— DIVISION possible according to the Subjective Relation of those who bind under Obligations, and those who are bound under Obligations. 1. The juridical Relation of Man to Beings who have neither Right nor Duty. Vacat.—There is no such Relation. For such Beings are irrational, and they neither put us under Obligation, nor can we be put under Obligation by them. 2. The juridical Relation of Man to Beings who have both Rights and Duties. Adest.—There is such a Relation. For it is the Relation of Men to Men. 3. The juridical Relation of Man to Beings who have only Duties and no Rights. Vacat.—There is no such Relation. For such Beings would be Men without juridical Personality, as Slaves or Bondsmen. 4. The juridical Relation of Man to a Being who has only Rights and no Duties—(God). Vacat.—There is no such Relation in mere Philosophy, because such a Being is not an object of possible experience. A real relation between Right and Duty is therefore found, in this scheme, only in No. 2. The reason why such is not likewise found in No. 4 is, because it would constitute a transcendent Duty, that is, one to which no corresponding subject can be given that is external and capable of imposing Obligation. Consequently the Relation from the theoretical point of view is here merely ideal; that is, it is a Relation to an object of thought which we form for ourselves. But the conception of this object is not entirely empty. On the contrary, it is a fruitful conception in relation to ourselves and the maxims of our inner morality, and therefore in relation to practice generally. And it is in this bearing, that all the Duty involved and practicable for us in such a merely ideal relation lies. III.Division of the Metaphysic of Morals.![]() |

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