The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Editor’s Preface.
• Book I: Of the Understanding
• Introduction.
• Part I.: Of Ideas, Their Origin, Composition, Connexion, Abstraction, &c.
• Section I.: Of the Origin of Our Ideas.
• Section II.: Division of the Subject.
• Section III.: Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination.
• Section IV.: Of the Connexion Or Association of Ideas.
• Section V.: Of Relations.
• Section VI.: Of Modes and Substances.
• Section VII.: Of Abstract Ideas.
• Part II.: Of the Ideas of Space and Time.
• Section I.: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Our Ideas of Space and Time.
• Section II.: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Space and Time.
• Section III.: Of the Other Qualities of Our Ideas of Space and Time.
• Section IV.: Objections Answer’d.
• Section V.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
• Section VI.: Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence.
• Part III.: Of Knowledge and Probability.
• Section I.: Of Knowledge.
• Section II.: Of Probability; and of the Idea of Cause and Effect.
• Section III.: Why a Cause Is Always Necessary.
• Section IV.: Of the Component Parts of Our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect.
• Section. V.: Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory.
• Section VI.: Of the Inference From the Impression to the Idea.
• Section VII.: Of the Nature of the Idea Or Belief.
• Section VIII.: Of the Causes of Belief.
• Section IX.: Of the Effects of Other Relations and Other Habits.
• Section X.: Of the Influence of Belief.
• Section XI.: Of the Probability of Chances.
• Section XII.: Of the Probability of Causes.
• Section XIII.: Of Unphilosophical Probability.
• Section XIV.: Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion.
• Section XV.: Rules By Which to Judge of Causes and Effects.
• Section XVI.: Of the Reason of Animals.
• Part IV.: Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy.
• Section I.: Of Scepticism With Regard to Reason.
• Section II.: Of Scepticism With Regard to the Senses.
• Section III.: Of the Antient Philosophy.
• Section IV.: Of the Modern Philosophy.
• Section V.: Of the Immateriality of the Soul.
• Section VI.: Of Personal Identity.
• Section VII.: Conclusion of This Book.
• Book II: Of the Passions
• Part I.: Of Pride and Humility.
• Section I.: Division of the Subject.
• Section II.: Of Pride and Humility; Their Objects and Causes.
• Section III.: Whence These Objects and Causes Are Deriv’d.
• Section IV.: Of the Relations of Impressions and Ideas.
• Section V.: Of the Influence of These Relations On Pride and Humility.
• Section VI.: Limitations of This System.
• Section VII.: Of Vice and Virtue.
• Section VIII.: Of Beauty and Deformity.
• Section IX.: Of External Advantages and Disadvantages.
• Section X.: Of Property and Riches.
• Section XI.: Of the Love of Fame.
• Section XII.: Of the Pride and Humility of Animals.
• Part II.: Of Love and Hatred.
• Section I.: Of the Objects and Causes of Love and Hatred.
• Section II.: Experiments to Confirm This System.
• Section III.: Difficulties Solv’d.
• Section IV.: Of the Love of Relations.
• Section V.: Of Our Esteem For the Rich and Powerful.
• Section VI.: Of Benevolence and Anger.
• Section VII.: Of Compassion.
• Section VIII.: Of Malice and Envy.
• Section IX.: Of the Mixture of Benevolence and Anger With Compassion and Malice.
• Section X.: Of Respect and Contempt.
• Section XI.: Of the Amorous Passion, Or Love Betwixt the Sexes.
• Section XII.: Of the Love and Hatred of Animals.
• Part III.: Of the Will and Direct Passions.
• Section I.: Of Liberty and Necessity.
• Section II.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
• Section III.: Of the Influencing Motives of the Will.
• Section IV.: Of the Causes of the Violent Passions.
• Section V.: Of the Effects of Custom.
• Section VI.: Of the Influence of the Imagination On the Passions.
• Section VII.: Of Contiguity, and Distance In Space and Time.
• Section VIII.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
• Section IX.: Of the Direct Passions.
• Section X.: Of Curiosity, Or the Love of Truth.
• Book III: Of Morals
• Part I.: Of Virtue and Vice In General.
• Section I.: Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason.
• Section II.: Moral Distinctions Deriv’d From a Moral Sense.
• Part II.: Of Justice and Injustice.
• Section I.: Justice, Whether a Natural Or Artificial Virtue?
• Section II.: Of the Origin of Justice and Property.
• Section III.: Of the Rules, Which Determine Property.
• Section IV.: Of the Transference of Property By Consent.
• Section V.: Of the Obligation of Promises.
• Section VI.: Some Farther Reflexions Concerning Justice and Injustice.
• Section VII.: Of the Origin of Government.
• Section VIII.: Of the Source of Allegiance.
• Section IX.: Of the Measures of Allegiance.
• Section X.: Of the Objects of Allegiance.
• Section XI.: Of the Laws of Nations.
• Section XII.: Of Chastity and Modesty.
• Part III.: Of the Other Virtues and Vices.
• Section I.: Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices.
• Section II.: Of Greatness of Mind.
• Section III.: Of Goodness and Benevolence.
• Section IV.: Of Natural Abilities.
• Section V.: Some Farther Reflexions Concerning the Natural Virtues.
• Section VI.: Conclusion of This Book.
• Appendix.

SECTION III.

Of the ideas of the memory and imagination.

We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the Memory, and the other the Imagination. ’Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ’d by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv’d by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. But of this more fully hereafter1 .

There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident, namely that tho’ neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrain’d to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty’d down in that respect, without any power of variation.

’Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty. An historian may, perhaps, for the more convenient carrying on of his narration, relate an event before another, to which it was in fact posterior; but then he takes notice of this disorder, if he be exact; and by that means replaces the idea in its due position. ’Tis the same case in our recollection of those places and persons, with which we were formerly acquainted. The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. In short, this principle is supported by such a number of common and vulgar phænomena, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of insisting on it any farther.

The same evidence follows us in our second principle, of the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas. The fables we meet with in poems and romances put this entirely out of question. Nature there is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned but winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants. Nor will this liberty of the fancy appear strange, when we consider, that all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions, and that there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable. Not to mention, that this is an evident consequence of the division of ideas into simple and complex. Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation.

[1 ]Part III. sect. 5.