The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface to Second Edition.
• From Preface to First Edition.
• Historical Introduction
• Part I.: Events Leading to Magna Carta.
• Part II.: Feudal Grievances and Magna Carta.
• Part III.: Magna Carta: Its Form and Contents.
• Part IV.: Historical Sequel to Magna Carta.
• Part V.: Magna Carta: Original Versions, Printed Editions and Commentaries.
• Text, Translation, and Commentary
• Preamble.1
• Chapter One.
• Chapter Two.
• Chapter Three.
• Chapter Four.
• Chapter Five.
• Chapter Six.
• Chapter Seven.
• Chapter Eight.
• Chapter Nine.
• Chapter Ten.
• Chapter Eleven.
• Chapter Twelve.
• Chapter Thirteen.
• Chapter Fourteen.
• Chapter Fifteen.
• Chapter Sixteen.
• Chapter Seventeen.
• Chapter Eighteen.
• Chapter Nineteen.
• Chapter Twenty.
• Chapter Twenty–one.
• Chapter Twenty–two.
• Chapter Twenty–three.
• Chapter Twenty–four.
• Chapter Twenty–five.
• Chapter Twenty–six.
• Chapter Twenty–seven.
• Chapter Twenty–eight.
• Chapter Twenty–nine.
• Chapter Thirty.
• Chapter Thirty–one.
• Chapter Thirty–two.
• Chapter Thirty–three.
• Chapter Thirty–four.
• Chapter Thirty–five.
• Chapter Thirty–six.
• Chapter Thirty–seven.
• Chapter Thirty–eight.
• Chapter Thirty–nine.
• Chapter Forty.
• Chapter Forty–one.
• Chapter Forty–two.
• Chapter Forty–three.
• Chapter Forty–four.
• Chapter Forty–five.
• Chapter Forty–six.
• Chapter Forty–seven.
• Chapter Forty–eight.
• Chapter Forty–nine.
• Chapter Fifty.
• Chapter Fifty–one.
• Chapter Fifty–two.
• Chapter Fifty–three.
• Chapter Fifty–four.
• Chapter Fifty–five.
• Chapter Fifty–six.
• Chapter Fifty–seven.
• Chapter Fifty–eight.
• Chapter Fifty–nine.
• Chapter Sixty.
• Chapter Sixty–one.
• Chapter Sixty–two.
• Chapter Sixty–three.
• Appendix. Documents Relative To, Or Illustrative Of, Magna Carta.
• I.: The Charter of Liberties of Henry I.1 (1100.)
• II.: The Second Or Oxford Charter of Stephen.1 (1136.)
• III.: Charter of Henry II.1 (circa 1154.)
• IV.: The So–called “unknown Charter of Liberties” of John.2 (circa 1214–1215.)
• V.: The Articles of the Barons.1 (1215.)
• VI.: Writs Supplementary of John’s Great Charter.
• VII.: The Great Charter of Henry III.2 (third Reissue, 11th February, 1225.)
• VIII.: Carta De Foresta.1 (6 November, 1217.)

CHAPTER SIXTY–ONE.

Cum autem pro Deo, et ad emendacionem regni nostri, et ad melius sopiendam discordiam inter nos et barones nostros ortam, hec omnia predicta concesserimus, volentes ea integra et firma stabilitate in perpetuum2 gaudere, facimus et concedimus eis securitatem subscriptam; videlicet quod barones eligant viginti quinque barones de regno quos voluerint, qui debeant pro totis viribus suis observare, tenere, et facere observari, pacem et libertates quas eis concessimus, et hac presenti carta nostra confirmavimus, ita scilicet quod, si nos, vel justiciarius noster, vel ballivi nostri, vel aliquis de ministris nostris, in aliquo erga aliquem deliquerimus, vel aliquem articulorum pacis aut securitatis transgressi fuerimus, et delictum ostensum fuerit quatuor baronibus de predictis viginti quinque baronibus, illi quatuor barones accedant ad nos vel ad justiciarum nostrum, si fuerimus extra regnum, proponentes nobis excessum, petent ut excessum illum sine dilacione faciamus emendari. Et si nos excessum non emendaverimus, vel, si fuerimus extra regnum justiciarius noster non emendaverit, infra tempus quadraginta dierum computandum a tempore quo monstratum fuerit nobis vel justiciario nostro si extra regnum fuerimus, predicti quatuor barones referant causam illam ad residuos de illis viginti quinque baronibus, et illi viginti quinque barones cum communa tocius terre distringent et gravabunt nos modis omnibus quibus poterunt, scilicet per capcionem castrorum, terrarum, possessionum, et aliis modis quibus poterunt, donec fuerit emendatum secundum arbitrium eorum, salva persona nostra et regine nostre et liberorum nostrorum; et cum fuerit emendatum intendent nobis sicut prius fecerunt. Et quicumque voluerit de terra juret quod ad predicta omnia exequenda parebit mandatis predictorum viginti quinque baronum, et quod gravabit nos pro posse suo cum ipsis, et nos publice et libere damus licenciam jurandi cuilibet qui jurare voluerit, et nulli umquam jurare prohibebimus. Omnes autem illos de terra qui per se et sponte sua noluerint jurare viginti quinque baronibus, de distringendo et gravando nos cum eis, faciemus jurare eosdem de mandato nostro, sicut predictum est. Et si aliquis de viginti quinque baronibus decesserit, vel a terra recesserit, vel aliquo alio modo impeditus fuerit, quominus ista predicta possent exequi, qui residui fuerint de predictis viginti quinque baronibus eligant alium loco ipsius, pro arbitrio suo, qui simili modo erit juratus quo et ceteri. In omnibus autem que istis viginti quinque baronibus committuntur exequenda, si forte ipsi viginti quinque presentes fuerint, et inter se super re aliqua discordaverint, vel aliqui ex eis summoniti nolint vel nequeant interesse, ratum habeatur et firmum quod major pars eorum qui presentes fuerint providerit, vel preceperit, ac si omnes viginti quinque in hoc consensissent; et predicti viginti quinque jurent quod omnia antedicta fideliter observabunt, et pro toto posse suo facient observari. Et nos nichil impetrabimus ab aliquo, per nos nec per alium, per quod aliqua istarum concessionum et libertatum revocetur vel minuatur; et, si aliquid tale impetratum fuerit, irritum sit et inane et numquam eo utemur per nos nec per alium.

Since, moreover, for God and the amendment of our kingdom and for the better allaying of the quarrel that has arisen between us and our barons, we have granted all these concessions, desirous that they should enjoy them in complete and firm endurance for ever, we give and grant to them the under–written security, namely, that the barons choose five–and–twenty barons of the kingdom, whomsoever they will, who shall be bound with all their might, to observe and hold, and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties we have granted and confirmed to them by this ou present Charter, so that if we, or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any one of our officers, shall in anything be at fault toward anyone, or shall have broken any one of the articles of the peace or of this security, and the offence be notified to four barons of the foresaid five–and–twenty, the said four barons shall repair to us (or our justiciar, if we are out of the realm) and, laying the transgression before us, petition to have that transgression redressed without delay. And if we shall not have corrected the transgression (or, in the event of our being out of the realm, if our justiciar shall not have corrected it) within forty days, reckoning from the time it has been intimated to us (or to our justiciar, if we should be out of the realm), the four barons aforesaid shall refer that matter to the rest of the five–and–twenty barons, and those five–and–twenty barons shall, together with the community of the whole land, distrain and distress us in all possible ways, namely, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, and in any other way they can, until redress has been obtained as they deem fit, saving harmless our own person, and the persons of our queen and children; and when redress has been obtained, they shall resume their old relations towards us. And let whoever in the country desires it, swear to obey the orders of the said five–and–twenty barons for the execution of all the aforesaid matters, and along with them, to molest us to the utmost of his power; and we publicly and freely grant leave to every one who wishes to swear, and we shall never forbid anyone to swear. All those, moreover, in the land who of themselves and of their own accord are unwilling to swear to the twenty–five to help them in constraining and molesting us, we shall by our command compel the same to swear to the effect foresaid. And if any one of the five–and–twenty barons shall have died or departed from the land, or be incapacitated in any other manner which would prevent the foresaid provisions being carried out, those of the said twenty–five barons who are left shall choose another in his place according to their own judgment, and he shall be sworn in the same way as the others. Further, in all matters, the execution of which is intrusted to these twenty–five barons, if perchance these twenty–five are present and disagree about anything, or if some of them, after being summoned, are unwilling or unable to be present, that which the majority of those present ordain or command shall be held as fixed and established, exactly as if the whole twenty–five had concurred in this; and the said twenty–five shall swear that they will faithfully observe all that is aforesaid, and cause it to be observed with all their might. And we shall procure nothing from anyone, directly or indirectly, whereby any part of these concessions and liberties might be revoked or diminished; and if any such thing has been procured, let it be void and null, and we shall never use it personally or by another.

This important chapter stands by itself, providing machinery for enforcing all that precedes it. It thus forms what modern jurisprudence would describe as the “sanction” of the whole, but what was known in the current phrase of its own day as “the form of security” (forma securitatis ad observandum pacem et libertates).1 It contains the only executive clause of the Charter, the sole constitutional machinery.2

I.

The “Security” or legal Sanction.

The procedure devised for enforcing the Charter was crude: John conferred upon twenty–five of his enemies a legal right to organize rebellion, whenever in their opinion he had broken any one of the provisions of Magna Carta. Violence might be legally used against him, until he redressed their alleged grievances “to their own satisfaction” (secundum arbitrium eorum). If it had been possible to put so violent an expedient into practice, the “sovereignty,” or supreme power in England, would have been split into two. John would have held the sceptre only until his opponents declared that he had broken the Charter, when, by his own previously–granted mandate, it would pass to the twenty–five barons forming what has been variously styled a “Committee of Remonstrance and Constraint” or a “Committee of Rebellion.”3

The procedure for redressing grievances is described in some detail; the wronged party must make known his case to four barons of the twenty–five, who would then make it known to the King, and ask redress. If John refused or unduly delayed, compulsion might be used. On the matter of undue delay, the Articles of the Barons said “within a reasonable time to be determined in the Charter.” The Charter did determine this, naming forty days. Compulsion might take any form, except violence against the person of the King, or of his wife or children.

II.

Minor details.

Although the whole expedient seems chimerical to the modern mind, the opposition leaders in 1215 evidently thought they had devised a practicable scheme of government. This is shown by the care with which they elaborated the procedure.

(1)

Appointment of the twenty–five executors.

The members of the committee were to be, in the first instance, “elected” by the “barons.” Vacancies were to be filled by the method now known as “co–optation”: the committee, once appointed, would form a close corporation; no one uncongenial to the majority could gain admission—an arrangement with a thoroughly oligarchic flavour. The provision for supplying vacancies caused by death proves that the scheme was not to be temporary.

Writs, issued to the sheriffs on 19th June, command the enforcement of the oath to the twenty–five barons, but do not mention them by name. Matthew Paris supplies the omission, and though he does not disclose the source of his information, it is unlikely that so comprehensive a list could be entirely a work of the imagination.1 They occur in the following order, the earls of Hertford, Aumâle, Gloucester, Winchester, Hereford, Norfolk, and Oxford, William Marshall the younger, Robert fitz Walter the elder, Gilbert de Clare, Eustace de Vesci, Hugh Bigod, William of Mowbray, William Hardell (Mayor of London), William de Lanvalei, Robert de Ros, John de Lacy (Constable of Chester), Richard de Perci, John fitz Robert, William Mallet, Geoffrey de Say, Roger de Mumbezon, William of Huntingfield, Richard de Muntfitchet, and William of Albini.2 There are here no churchmen and no members of the moderate party whose names appear in the preamble. All except two, or at most three, were declared enemies of John.1 It was an oligarchy of disaffected Crown tenants, whose baronial homogeneity was only broken by the presence of the Mayor of London. Such a committee was not likely to use its powers to further other interests than its own.

(2)

A majority to form a quorum.

Driven by necessity the barons devised, or stumbled upon, a peculiarly modern expedient. Unanimity would be difficult to obtain. It was provided, accordingly, that the will of the majority of those present should prevail. It would be inaccurate to say, in modern phraseology, that thirteen formed a quorum, since the quorum varied with the number of those present. No provision was made for summoning or constituting this committee, and room was thus left for packed meetings: one faction, hurriedly convened, might usurp the rights of the whole body. The precedent tentatively introduced, for allowing a majority to act for the whole, was followed only timidly and at intervals. Still, its appearance in John’s Charter marks a stage in the advance of the principle of modern politics which substitutes the “counting of heads for the breaking of them.”2

(3)

The sub–committee of four.

Four of the twenty–five executors were to act as intermediaries between aggrieved individuals and the King. Such a position involved discretionary powers; for, if the four refused to endorse the justice of any complaint, John also would be in safety to refuse.3

(4)

Local agents of the twenty–five executors.

In each county the twelve knights, whose original function was to preside at inquiries into “evil customs,” came to act as local representatives of the revolutionary committee, being armed with power to constrain the sheriff to carry out the provisions of Magna Carta, very much as the twenty–five were authorized to constrain the King. In particular, these knights were charged with enforcement of the oath of obedience to the revolutionary committee, and with confiscating the property of all who refused.1

(5)

The part to be played by the public.

John authorized his subjects to side against him, if he should violate the Charter: his general mandate was granted to the twenty–five “cum communa totius terræ,” while licence was “freely and publicly” bestowed on everyone so disposed, to swear obedience to the executors. Two aspects of this provision require attention: (a) Its relation to allegiance and treason. John solemnly authorized his subjects, in certain circumstances, to transfer their allegiance from himself to the committee of his foes. If they refused, he agreed to their compulsion; and on 27th June, 1215, writs were actually issued instructing the seizure of the lands and goods of all who would not swear to obey the twenty–five.2 (b) Communa totius terræ. The “community of the whole land” was thus to afford active help in subjecting the King to the reign of law; and the phrase has been pressed into the service of democracy by enthusiasts, who seek to magnify modern conceptions by finding their roots in the past. Few words of medieval Latin offer a more tempting field to enquirers than this communa, which, with its English and French equivalents, holds the key to many problems of constitutional origins. The appearance in Magna Carta of a body described as a “commune,” in conjunction with an oath of obedience to a revolutionary committee, suggests comparison with the form of civic constitution known in that age as “the sworn commune.”3 The “communa” referred to in chapter 61 was something widely different: to the barons at Runnymede it may have meant either the entire body of feudal tenants or only the magnates; but medieval analogies make it impossible that the word could embrace the free peasantry, still less the villeins of England. The occurrence of such a word is far from proving that the Charter rests on any broad or popular basis.

III.

Relations to Contemporary Theory.

Clumsy and impracticable as the whole scheme appears to modern eyes, it was quite in accord with medieval theory. The conception of a relation founded upon contract between lord and vassal lies at the root of feudalism. If either party glaringly broke the terms of the compact, the other was justified in repudiating the relationship, but he must observe due formalities. Diffidatio, intimated to his lord, must precede any attempt of the vassal to redress his wrongs by force. The barons at Runnymede, having complied with this preliminary, had for the moment ceased to owe fealty to John. In reserving power to appoint an Executive Committee (even if this be regarded as implying a right of legalized rebellion), as a condition precedent to a renewal of allegiance, they moved in the direction of legal restraint as opposed to revolutionary violence. The right here recognized by John, likely as it might be to lead to hostilities, was in theory and intention an honest effort to obviate war by recourse to the nearest approximation to constitutional action then available. It was, further, an attempt to substitute united action of the body of feudal tenants (communa totius terræ) for the individual vassal’s right of private judgment, claimed and sometimes exercised in that age, on the European continent, and actually confirmed in 1222 by Andreas II. of Hungary by his Bulla Aurea.1

The expedient contained in this chapter is a logical deduction from the vassal’s right of defiance as a prelude to private war against a lord who has wronged him. It was no innovation, but something found by the barons in feudal law.2 Foreign parallels have been found for it, not only in the more anarchic procedure of the Hungarian Bulla Aurea, but also in the institutions of Aragon and elsewhere.1 When the baronial leaders in 1263 performed diffidatio, they echoed the words of this chapter, “salva persona regis, reginae et liberorum suorum.”2

This chapter has been acclaimed as embodying for the first time the idea that formed “the true corner stone of the English Constitution,”3 namely, the right to compel an erring King to bow to a body of law that lies outside his will. There is much to be said for this view. It is quite consistent, however, to combine an appreciation of the value of this conception, with an admission of the defective and clumsy nature of the machinery by which a first attempt was made to realize it.4

IV.

Modern Criticism.

Until the last twenty–five years or so, commentators were wont to credit the framers of Magna Carta with anticipating most of the cardinal principles of the modern Constitution. In combating such exaggerations, it would not be unnatural to lay emphasis on the extent to which the machinery of this chapter is condemned by the standards of the nineteenth century. Yet it is well to steer a middle course, neither praising the men of 1215, nor blaming them for failing to achieve the impossible.

The faults of the scheme, whether viewed from the side of modern theory or of modern practice, are obvious. It was a violent measure, full of immediate dangers, and calculated to exercise a baneful influence on constitutional development in the future. The fact that Magna Carta provided no better sanction for its own enforcement than the right of legalized rebellion, has already been discussed as its cardinal defect.5 It is instructive to note a few of its other defects in detail.

(1) The scheme challenged hostility by its want of moderation. On every vexed political question of the day, John’s authority would have been superseded by that of twenty–five of the most hostile faction of the baronage. If the King thought himself aggrieved in anything, he would require to plead his cause before a tribunal in which his opponents sat as judges.1 The scheme was thus repugnant to loyal Englishmen, who cherished a respect for the monarchy. No King would submit tamely to remain a sovereign, whose “sovereignty” existed on sufferance of his enemies. The powers thus conferred in 1215 were more sweeping than those conferred on a similar committee in 1258, and yet the Parliament which appointed the latter has been branded as “the Mad Parliament,” because of the violence of its measures.

(2) Rebellion, even where morally justified, is necessarily illegal; to attempt to map out for it a legitimate sphere of action is to attempt the logically impossible. The barons had failed to rise to the true conception of a limited monarchy; their scheme recognized a King still absolute in some matters, but in others powerless and abject. The powers of the twenty–five, a body which received no proper organization, were those of aggression rather than of administration. Viewed in this modern light, the claims of the barons to constructive statesmanship rank low.

(3) The powers of the revolutionary committee, excessive though ill–defined, backed by the sworn obedience of all classes of the nation, would tend completely to paralyze the King. The nominal sovereign, nervous under this sword of Damocles, would lose all power of initiative, while the committee, powerful to reduce him to impotence, would be powerless to goad him into action or to act in his stead. The revolutionary committee had been planned as a drag on a bad executive, not as a good executive to take its place.

(4) Even as a drag, the efficiency of the committee would have been neutralized in either of two contingencies: if the barons composing it disagreed among themselves, or, if the King refused to surrender. Not a step to restrain the King could legally be taken, until he had received formal intimation followed by an interval of forty days, during which he might complete his preparation for war without fear of interruption.

(5) If the scheme of the barons seems ill–suited to the needs of the hour of its conception, it was fraught with even greater dangers to the future development of the English constitution. The problem it sought to solve was one of no transient or unimportant nature: the barons sought the best method of turning royal promises into laws which succeeding Kings must obey. In attempting this, Magna Carta moved along lines that were radically wrong;1 which, if not departed from in time, would have rendered any enduring progress impossible. The statesmanship which, while leaving one King on the throne, subjected him to the dictation of “five–and–twenty over–kings” was crude and ill–advised. It is true that the party of reform, throughout the long reign of Henry III., clung to the same erroneous solution; but they met with no success. After half a century of unrest, a settlement seemed as far distant as before. The dangers of schemes like those of 1215, 1244, and 1258 are clearly seen in contrast with the more tactful efforts of Edward I. towards a true solution, along lines leading in due time to complete success.

The true policy for the barons was to use the King’s own administrative machinery and the King’s own servants to control the King. The principle was slowly established that the sovereign could perform no single act of prerogative except through the agency of a particular officer or organ of the royal household; while very gradually the doctrine of ministerial responsibility grew up, compelling each officer of the Crown to obey not only the law of the land, but also the Commune Concilium, fast changing into the modern Parliament. The credit of starting the constitution on its right line of development is in great measure due to Edward 1.2

V.

Failure of the Scheme.

Almost before John’s Charter had been engrossed and sealed, the futility of its “sanction” was recognized. Each side grew suspicious and demanded new “sanctions” not contained in the Charter.

(1)

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Magna Carta, assuming apparently that perfect trust could be placed in the revolutionary committee, provided no machinery for controlling them, no guarantee that they would observe the Charter. The futility of this complacency was soon manifest. One tyrant had brought distress on the whole nation; and now he was to be superseded by five–and–twenty. Who was to restrain the new tyrants? A second committee was nominated, partly to assist and partly to control the twenty–five. Matthew Paris1 describes it as composed of thirty–eight “Obsecutores et Observatores,” including the Earl Marshal, Hubert de Burgh, the earls of Arundel and Warenne, and other prominent members of the moderate party, not unfriendly to the King. Dr. Stubbs dismisses their relations to the executors with the remark that they “swore to obey the orders of the twenty–five.”2 Miss Norgate takes what seems to be a better view, in emphasizing, as the chief reason for their appointment, the duty of compelling “both the King and the twenty–five to deal justly with one another.”3 The thirty–eight were required to constrain the twenty–five, as the twenty–five constrained the King.4

(2)

Suspicions of the barons’ good faith.

There is evidence that the King was distrustful of the barons’ good faith, and desired on his part some “sanction” that they would not again renounce allegiance. The barons’ promise to grant John security, and the written protest against their breach of faith, made by Langton and other prelates at John’s request, have already been described.5

(3)

Suspicions of John’s good faith.

The barons, on their part, soon came to the conclusion that the Committee, in spite of all its powers, formed an inadequate sanction against John. They demanded further “security.” The city of London was placed in their hands, and the Tower of London in the neutral custody of the primate, as pledges of John’s good faith, until 15th August or longer if need were. Those terms were reduced to writing in a document entitled “Conventio facta inter Regem Angliae et barones ejusdem regni,” which thus supplied a new “form of security,” supplementing, if not superseding, that contained in chapter 61.1

(4)

Precautions against papal intervention.

The Articles of the Barons afford evidence of the framers’ suspicions that John would apply to Rome for release from his bargain. They demanded that the English prelates and the papal legate should become the King’s sureties, that he would not invite the Pope to invalidate the Charter. If Pandulf, as the Pope’s accredited agent, had put seal to such a document, he would have seriously embarrassed his august master.

Two important alterations in the completed Charter were effected, however, whether at John’s instance, or at that of Pandulf, or of the English prelates, is matter of conjecture. All mention of Innocent by name was omitted, the clause being made quite general in its terms: John promised to procure a dispensation “from no one”; while the question of sureties was ignored. Innocent was left free to support John’s policy of repudiation.2

[2 ]The words “in perpetuum” are written at the foot of one of the Cottonian versions. See supra, 166 n.

[1 ]This phrase occurs in the 49th (and last) of the Articles, as the title of a clause separated from the others by a blank of the width of several lines of writing: “Haec est forma securitatis,” etc. The words are not used as a heading in the present chapter itself, but c. 52 refers to c. 61 as the clause “in securitate pacis,” and c. 62 refers to it as “super securitate ista.”

[2 ]Histoire des ducs, 150, has a commentary on this chapter: “Over and above all this they desired that 25 barons should be chosen, and by the judgment of these 25 the King should govern them in all things, and through them redress all the wrongs that he should do to them, and they also, on the other hand, would through them redress all the wrongs that they should do to him. Also they further desired, along with all this, that the King should never have power to appoint a bailiff in his land except through the 25.” Cf. supra, p. 123 and p. 177.

[3 ]Cf. S. R. Gardiner, Short History of England, 183: “a permanent organization for making war against the King.”

[1 ]R. Wendover, from whom Paris borrows so freely, gives no list.

[2 ]The list is from Matthew Paris, II. 604–5, as corrected by Blackstone, Great Charter, p. xx, after collation with a marginal note on the Harleian MS. of the charter (cf. supra, p. 168 n.). For biographical information, see Thomson, Magna Carta, 270–312.

[1 ]These three were Earl Aumâle (a title sometimes exchanged for Earl of York, see Round, Geoffrey de Mandeville, 157 n.), William of Albini, and Geoffrey de Say (see Stubbs, Const. Hist., I. 583).

[2 ]This is not the earliest reference in English law to the binding power of a majority; Liebermann, Gesetze, II. 575, points to Leges Henrici, c. 5, s. 6 (ibid., I. 549) as formulating the principle.

[3 ]An alternative explanation is possible, namely, that the function of intermediary might be exercised by any four of the twenty–five. In that view, an aggrieved individual might place pressure on the King if he persuaded any four to support his claim.

[1 ]Cf. supra, c. 48.

[2 ]See Appendix.

[3 ]It was fourteen years since London had extorted its “commune,” in this sense, from Prince John; cf. supra, c. 13.

[1 ]Hantos, Magna Carta, 149, 198. Cf. Gneist, Eng. Const., 251.

[2 ]Adams, Origin, 181 ff.

[1 ]Hantos, op. cit., 150. Adams, Origin, 181 n., suggests a parallel from the kingdom of Jerusalem. Dr. Riess, Historische Zeitschrift, 1906, p. 170, compares also the Ephors of Sparta.

[2 ]Liber de Antiquis Legibus, 53.

[3 ]Adams, Pol. Hist. Eng., II. 439.

[4 ]Cf. Adams, Origin, 276 n.

[5 ]See supra, p. 129.

[1 ]Dr. Riess, Historische Zeitschrift, 1906, p. 170, thinks this goes too far. Cf., however, Adams, Origin, 179: John “was reduced to the function of executing the judgments of a court not his own.”

[1 ]Cf. Adams, Origin, 179: “It was not finally to be the way of the constitution.”

[2 ]Cf. supra, pp. 159–164, for a sketch of Edward’s policy.

[1 ]Chron. Maj., II. 605–6.

[2 ]Const. Hist., I. 583 n.

[3 ]John Lackland, 236.

[4 ]One version of the narrative of Matthew Paris is fuller than the other. “Isti omnes juraverunt quod obsequerentur mandato viginti quinque baronum” of the first becomes “Omnes isti juraverunt cogere si opus esset ipsos xxv. barones ut rectificarent regem. Et etiam cogere ipsum si mutato animo forte recalcitraret” in the second, II. 606 n.

[5 ]See supra, p. 43, and Protest in Appendix.

[1 ]See supra, p. 43. The text is given in Appendix. Thirteen of the twenty–five executors are mentioned by name as agreeing to this new treaty; cf. Wendover, III. 319. A third sanction appears in the garbled versions of the Charter given by Wendover (III. 317) and M. Paris (II. 603): the constables of the four royal castles of Northampton, Kenilworth, Nottingham, and Scarborough were to swear to hold these strongholds under orders of the twenty–five. This clause has not been found in any known copy of any issue of Magna Carta: cf. Luard’s Preface to M. Paris, II. xxxiii to xxxvi.

[2 ]Cf. supra, p. 45.