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Tuesday March 1st. - Adam Smith, Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence Vol. 5 Lectures On Jurisprudence [1762]

Edition used:

Lectures On Jurisprudence, ed. R.. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein, vol. V of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982).

Part of: The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, 7 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


Tuesday March 1st.

In my last lecture I endeavoured to shew you how the republican governments naturally came to lose their strength and be ruind and that, 1st, with regard to the defensive ones. Here improvement in arts and cultivation unfit the people from going to war, so that the streng<th> is greatly diminished and it falls a sacrifice to some of its neighbours. This was the case of most of the republicks of Greece. Athens in its later time could not send out the 5th part of what it formerly did. Besides this the improvement of arts also weakens the security | as, as far as we yet know, the besiegers are more capable of taking the advantage than the besieged. The art of attack can be, as far as yet has been thought of, carried higher than that of defense. Thebes we see fell a sacrifice to Alexander on this account,14 tho it was still but little advanced in the arts and could send out the greatest part of its men to war. Thus all defensive states at length fall a sacrifice to their neighbours.—I mentioned also what must naturally be the fate of a conquering republick. Of this sort we have an example in Rome. Athens too would have fournished us with an other example, had it not been for one particular constitution in which it differed from Rome. This was that the Athenians were very chary and scrupulous in admitting any one into the freedom of their city, and even when they admitted some great men and kings it was only to some of the priviledges of a citizen, as that of being free from imposts and customs at the port of Athens. Whereas the Romans were continually adding new members to the city, taking 1000s and 10000s by the slump from other countries. The reason of this was that the | citizenship of Athens was attended with some profit and made a small livelyhood to him, and for that reason was a defalcation from the fortunes of the rest of the citizens, who would therefore never consent to the admission of new members, whereas at Rome the citizenship was not attended with any emoluments, and therefore they were not so chary of admitting others to the same rights. Athens accordingly never increased in its power so as to be able greatly to extend its conquests. But Rome increased vastly in power and opulence, which at last brought the common wealth to ruin. When the armies are fighting abroad the conquering state enjoys great peace and tranquillity at home. This length of peace and quiet gives great room for the cultivation of the arts, and opulence which follows on it. Commerce too will naturally introduce itself, tho’ not, as now, particularly studied and a theory laid down. The industry of the individualls will necessarily occasion it. The wealth which this introduces, joined to that which is brought in by the conquest of other nations, naturally occasions the same diminution of strength as in a defensive republick. The better sort no longer engage in the service, and the army becomes a me<r>cenary one | and of the lowest people. These when the generall becomes dissatisfied naturally follow him as the person to whom they have been most indebted. The armies become more under the power of the generalls than of the people. This we see has been dreaded in all republicks. In the republick of Great Britain, as it was called, the Parliament soon grew jealous of their generall and leader Cromwell; they thought he ruled with too high a hand, and took measures to reduce him; they ordered him to disband his army, etc. He then applied to his army, not openly as those generalls Marius, Sulla, and Caesar, as he was a man of a much less generous temper, but in an indirect, canting way; they gave him their aid, reduced the Parliament into order, and established him protector, or monarch rather, of the republick. Of all the republicks we know, Rome alone made any extensive conquests, and became thus in danger from its armies under the victorious leaders. But the same thing was feared and must have happend at Carthage had the project of Hanniball succeded, and he made himself master of Italy. His brother was at the head of a great army in Spain, who had conquered that country | when servineq under him, and had he joined to this another victorious army from Italy, and had the party of Hanno,15 as they probably would, got him to be affronted in the Senate, these two armies would probably have enslaved their country. The scanty allowances he had plainly show how jealous they were of him, nor does it appear that they ever intended his project should succeed. Aristocraticall lords are of all others most jealous of those who are any way distinguished in the state; and perhaps they would choose rather to be conquered by a for[e]eign enemy than by one of their own body. They have no ill will at the one as they hav<e> at the other; they would be grievd to see their equall raised above them. The same jealousy the Athenians had against their generall Alcibiades. Thucidides16 indeed justifies him from having had any bad design; and so far indeed we may say of all these generalls that they had not the subversion of the government in their view at first. But the temptation when offered is such as few men would be able to resist.

We can’t pretend to determine what will be the form of government | in a defensive republick which has been over–run by its neighbours. This depends on the caprice of the conquerors, who may do as they please. It will commonly be of the same sort with that of the conquerors. Thus Athens established a democraticall government in the countries it subdued; Sparta again anr aristocracy, as that of 30 tyrants at Athens, as that which most suited their customs, and we see too that thoses <?who> the one sort favouredt of government were of the Athenian party and e contra. The Romans more politickally (as I shall shew hereafter<)>17 reduced their conquests into the form of a province.—But there is only one form of government which can take place in a republick subdued by one of its own members. The action of subduing ones country, and (the army) the instrument by which it was performed, necessarily determine it to be a military monarchy. The army which conquered the country continues to be kept up as necessary to keep the people in awe. The Roman monarchs who succeded the Repub. were distinguished by [by] the name of imperatores, which was originally a title conferred by the army on successfull generalls. The government of Rome after this was entirely a government of soldiers. The army made the emperors, the army supported him in his authority and executed his orders. The private affairs | of individualls continued to be decided in the same manner and in the same courts as before. The emperor had no interest he could obtain by altering those forms, and on the other hand the people would more readily submit to his authority when they were allowed to continue. But the whole of the executive and the far greater part of the legislative power he took into his own hands. The Senate, the praetors, and all the other magistrates became to have no authority of their own but were intirely his creatures. War and peace, taxes, tributes, etc. he determind without comptroll by the power of his army; but right and wrong were as equitably determin’d as they ever had before. In the same way we see that Cromwell by an army of about 10,000 men kept the whole country in awe and disposed of every thing as he pleased, more arbitrarily than they had ever been before, but left the course of justice betwixt man and man as before, and indeed made severall improvements. Both these here mentioned were military governments, but very different from those of Turky and the east. A system of laws had been introduced beforehand. This it was not his interest to alter. He therefore left the | disputes concerning private property to be decided by the old rules, and even made severall improvements. He 1st changedu feudall holdings into sockage lands,18 took away the Navigation Act;19 and we see accordingly that the first thing done after the Restoration of Ch. 2d was to make a statute20 in the 12th or 1st year confirming many of the regulations made by Cromwell. A new government always makes good laws, as it is their inte<r>est that the state should in its private affairs be under salutary regulations. Julius Caesar21 we are told had the same project of amending, not of altering, the laws. And justice <in> private affairs was never better administered than under the emperors, and the worst of the empe<r>ors, Nero and Domitian.22 Tho their cruelty made them often act with great barbarity, their interest lead them to improve the laws and keep up very strict discipline. The oppressions of the governors of provinces had never before been so thoroughly prevented during the republican form. Thus a military government admitts of regulations, admitts of laws, and tho the proceedings are very violent and arbitrary with regard to the election of emperors and in the punishment | of all offenders against his dignity, who were punished without any triall, or by what was worse than none, a sham trial which was a mockery of justice. But in every other thing it was his interest that justice should be well administered. And this was the case in the Roman Empire from the time of Julius Caesar to that of the ruin of the Empire. But this government, as all others, seems to have a certain and fixed end which concludes it.—For the improvement of arts necessarily takes place here; this, tho it has many great advantages, renders the people unwilling to go to war. We see that foreign mercenaries have been in use in all such rich and opulent states; the Dutch never go to war but by an army of foreign mercenaries, whose officers are all foreigners also, for their no one can be spared from his work. This was the case of the Roman Empire. The provinces were all rich and had a considerable degree of commerce, the city was rich and luxurious, and the whole people unwilling to go to war. Besides, the publick revenues would have been greatly diminished, as it, in all commercial nations, is levied by tax or excise on different manufactures. | It was then no longer the interest of the government to press its subjects to go to war. It becomes much more convenient to recruit their armys from the barbarous nations about it, both because they will accept of less pay, being poorer and not accustomed to high living as the subjects of the Empire are, and 2dly, as it is not detrimentall to industry. This therefore becomes the policy of all governments in this state. The Romans recruited there armies from Britain, Scythia, and all the northern parts of Europe. This was at first no more than recruiting, havingv got liberty for that purpose from the chief (as the Dutch had in Scotland).23 But they found it afterwards still more easy to make a slump bargain with the chief to lead out a certain number of men, which he should maintain for a certain summ paid by them, and the command of them is given to him, as he will be better able to raise a considerable number and to lead them out to battle. Whenever this chief becomes offended with the government, in the same manner as the great generalls of the Republick took possession of the command of the state and turnd it into a monarchy, so will he turn his forces against them and take possession for himself of whatever province he happens to be in. And in this manner it was that all | the Roman provinces were taken possession of by the generalls who commanded in them at different times. In this manner it was that Clovis got possession of Gaul, and the Saxons of Britain. The generallity of writers mistake the account of this story.—The case was, as we are informed by the best writers, that Aeseius,24 being pressed very hard in Gaul by the Germans and northern Scythian nations, told the Britains that they must provide for their own defence against the Scots and Picts, two nations who as we see from the poems of Ossian were much in the same state as the Americans, tho they dont appear to have had the custom of roasting men alive. The Roman army had before defended themselves by means of the wall they had built and in which they had always kept a garrison; but the army being withdrawn, the Britains or rather Roman colony, not inclining to leave the cultivation of their lands in which they had made a considerable progress, could not easily protect themselves. They generally tell us that Aeseius gave them their liberty. But this is not probable: for 1st, no government would ever give liberty to a province they could possibly maintain; nor in the | 2d place, would they have taken it as any favour, as they had been a province for about 4 or 500 years, under the protection of the Roman army. They would not therefore think it any favour to be desired to provide for their own defence, that the government could give them no farther assistance, any more than a county in England or the colonies in America would to be deserted by Britain and left to defend themselves against the savages. This was what Aeseius did; he told them they must be at the trouble to defend themselves, as the army was necessary in Gaul, a province of more importance.25 They not inclining to leave there work agree’d to bring over the Saxons, who came at first overw under Hengist and Ho Blank in MS.26 . They soon expelled the Scots and Picts (who had before made many incursions and depradations), being a much more formidable nation, but finding that they had the whole country under their power sent over for others, who soon subdued the Britains and established the Saxon Heptarchy under the different chiefs. And in the same manner all the other provinces were usurped by those who had | formerly been their defenders. The others indeed who lay more contiguous to the heart of the Roman Empire were often attacked by them; but the Saxons were never disturbed. This however was the first settlement of the severall provinces. Such was the fate of the western empire. The eastern Empire fellx by the incersions of the Turks and Arabs.

In this manner the great security, and opulence, and progress of arts and commerce which takes place in a military government of some standing makes it both difficult and prejudicial to the state for the people to go to war themselves.27 They begin therefore first to recruit amongst the barbarians, and afterwards to make a bargain with the chiefs. This was the policy of the Roman emperors from the time of Caracalla and still more from that of Dioclesian, Arcadius, and Honorius. From this time all the great men were chieftans of some barbarous nation. The patricians, which were formerly the men of old noble families, were no longer of that sort. The patricius | was no other than the emperors Prime Minister, in which office some of these barbarous chieftans served him as well as in thaty office of generall of his forces. These often would not submit to his orders, but rebelled from his authority and set up for themselves. Stilico,28 Aeseius, and all the other great defenders or betrayers of the Empire were of this sort. Stilico we know betrayed it; and Aeseias indeed is said to have been always faithfull, but was nevertheless greatly suspected and was accordingly put to death by order of Blank in MS.29 , who was himself murthered afterwards by a defender and friend of Ae<se>ias.

[14 ]In 336 b.c., having revolted on the death of Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great.

[q]Sic

[15 ]Leader of the aristocratic party at Carthage and chief adversary of the family of Hannibal.

[16 ]VI.28–9, 61.

[r]‘democracy’ deleted

[s]‘of’ deleted

[t]Numbers written above the last four words indicate that they were intended to read ‘favoured the one sort’

[17 ]99 ff. below.

[u]‘military’ deleted

[18 ]Act of 24 Feb. 1645/6 (Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum (1911), I.833) converted tenures by knight–service into common soccage. It was confirmed by Act of 27 Nov. 1656 (Acts and Ordinances, II.1043).

[19 ]Act of 9 Oct. 1651 (Acts and Ordinances, II.559).

[20 ]12 Charles II, c. 24 (1660), i.e. twelfth year from the death of his father in 1649 (and his own proclamation as king in Scotland) and first from his Restoration in 1660.

[21 ]Suetonius, Life of Julius Caesar, 44.

[22 ]Suetonius, Life of Nero, 15; Life of Domitian, 8.

[v]Reading doubtful

[23 ]Until the beginning of the Seven Years War: 29 George II, c. 17 (1756).

[24 ]Aetius, the patricius or first minister in Rome in the mid fifth century a.d.

[25 ]Hume, History, I.10.

[w]Numbers written above the last three words indicate that they were intended to read ‘over at first’

[26 ]Blank in MS. Horsa: Hume, History, I.13.

[x]‘a sacri’ deleted

[27 ]Hume, ‘Of Commerce’, Essays, I.290.

[y]Reading doubtful

[28 ]Flavius Stilicho, Roman general under the emperors Theodosius I and Honorius, was suspected by the latter of treason and was assassinated in a.d. 408.

[29 ]Blank in MS. Valentinian III, in a.d. 454.