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chapter 4: On Method, and Logical Practice - Gershom Carmichael, Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The Writings of Gershom Carmichael [1724]

Edition used:

Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The Writings of Gershom Carmichael, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002).

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


chapter 4

On Method, and Logical Practice

1.

On the general rules of method.

To investigate the truth or expound it to others with success, we need to do more than look at individual acts taken separately, we must also arrange them in due order among themselves. We would not wish this compend to omit any of the essential parts of logic, and so we have included here the three following general laws of method. We postpone to another place a more detailed explanation of the individual methods and the rules belonging to them.

  • i.In the individual steps of our reasoning in pursuit of knowledge, we must preserve self-evidence; that is, nothing must be admitted as true which is not evidently seen to be so.
  • ii.One must not carry one’s reasoning about things beyond the point where determinate ideas of them are present to the mind.
  • iii.One must always begin from the simpler and the easier; and one must stay with them for quite a while until they may become familiar, before one passes on to the more difficult and the more complex.

2.

On logical practice, and first on the treatment of the simple theme.

The special practice of logic is the careful and precise investigation of truth, and virtually the entire discipline seeks to direct this investigation and remove obstacles to it. But what is called logical practice usually gives precepts about certain exercises which pertain to the disclosure of truth, and it has been found to be extremely useful to bring these precepts to the attention of the students of the university. We therefore include here some of the most important and useful of them.

Logicians reduce these precepts to two classes: one concerns genesis, the other analysis. They define genesis as the mode of using the tools of logic by which one forms and produces for oneself a discourse on a theme. They define themes as anything that may be put before the intellect as a subject of knowledge, and divide them into simple and complex.

A simple theme is said to be a term, whether complex or noncomplex; or rather, the thing itself so far as it is merely represented by an idea, and is signified by one or more words which denote that idea.

A complex theme is any proposition; or rather the very truth of the thing, so far as it can terminate the act of affirming or denying, and is expressed in the form of a statement or perhaps a question.

In treating a simple theme the following rules must be observed.

  • i. The origin of the word itself under which the theme is proposed must be indicated, if the derivation is not too obscure. If the word admits of different meanings, they must be distinguished; and one must also mention any other preliminary points required for accurately determining its significance. This is to be done for each and every word, if the theme is put forward in a phrase of several words.
  • ii. One must also explain by a lucid definition the present signification of the proposed term and so the essence of the thing itself, or at least its nominal essence.
  • iii. One must deduce the secondary attributes, if there are any, from the essential concept by clear and evident inference.
  • iv. One must take into consideration any accidental attributes that may pertain to a given theme, and one must show to what variations it is liable because of them.
  • v. One must investigate the origin of the theme, and if dealing with a manufactured object, one must indicate how it is produced.
  • vi. One must also think of its end; that is, one must consider whether it will utterly perish, and if it is determined to be corruptible, by what and by means of what.
  • vii. One must also observe its relations and connections with other things.
  • viii. If the theme is composed of parts, these must be examined, and inquiry made as to how they are united in the composite theme.
  • ix. Finally if a proposed term is universal, one must also survey its inferiors, especially the immediate ones.

3.

On the solo treatment of a complex theme, or on exegesis.

If a complex theme is put forward for treatment, it is handled either in a speech by one person, which is called exegesis, or by argument between two or more persons, which is called disputation.

There are three important and essential parts of exegesis. The first is called paraskeuê,1 or preparation for treating the question. The rules are as follows:

  • i. The terms of the question must be distinctly explained, if they are liable to any ambiguity of meaning.
  • ii. Then the state of the question must be clearly and lucidly settled.
  • iii. The various opinions of different authors must be briefly and faithfully expounded.

The second part is called kataskeuê, or confirmation of truth, of which the rules are these:

  • i. The true position is to be taken and established by means of arguments.
  • ii. Weight, rather than number, of arguments is the principal weapon; and one must use no argument which does not have solid force and importance.
  • iii. One must meet any objections which opponents urge to elude the force of the reasons we have given.
  • iv. Finally, if there are any famous testimonies of great authors, they should be adduced to lend further confirmation to our position.

The third part is anaskeuê, or the solution of objections; these are the rules:

  • i. Opponents’ arguments must be faithfully rehearsed, in such a way that they lose nothing of their force.
  • ii. They must be refuted firmly and clearly, and the difficulties contained in them lucidly resolved, not only by denying what is falsely alleged, but also by adding a firm ground for the denial.
  • iii. Contrary testimonies from great men are to be given due weight, and reconciled with the previously established truth, if this can be done; if not, they must be modestly rejected.

One may preface all these matters with a proparaskeuê as a proem on the importance and timeliness of the question; one may also annex to all the aforesaid parts an episkeuê as a peroration, which gives the gist of the whole dissertation in a few words, together with the corollaries that flow from it.

However, for the right treatment of any theme, whether simple or complex, no rules direct us so well as a well-formed judgment and an accurate knowledge of the subject under discussion. For the method must be suited to the different conditions of things, and the things must not have their necks twisted, so to speak, to fit the more rigid laws of method. No one therefore will expound any proposed theme more elegantly than one who has looked thoroughly into it and has set himself carefully to observe this one rule above all others, to give a simple account of what he has learned by paying serious attention to the matter for himself, with an attitude of benevolence toward others and a desire to make clear the truth, for the glory of God.

4.

On the social treatment of complex themes or on disputation.

The next subject is disputation; its laws regard either the matter or the form of disputation. Of the former there are three:

  • i. The subject of the disputation must be useful and serious, something it would be worth learning the truth about.
  • ii. It must also be suited to the capacity, condition, and studies of the disputants.
  • iii. It must be such as may be a subject of disputation without absurdity or impiety.

As for the form, since three persons are necessary to the proper organization of a formal disputation, i.e., opponent, respondent, and president, some rules are common to them all; some are peculiar to each.

The rules all three must observe are these:

  • i. No one should seek to attract vain glory by disputations, but each should seek the truth with honest sincerity.
  • ii. The state of the controversy should be clearly put forward, and kept firmly in mind through the whole disputation.
  • iii. It is useful for the disputants to agree among themselves on certain principles on which the arguments are founded. In formal disputations, however, principles are not normally adduced before the opponent comes to use them.2
  • iv. Wait patiently for the other person to finish his speech.
  • v. Strive above all for brevity and clarity; and therefore avoid pointless periphrases and digressions.
  • vi. Both sides are to abstain from all abuse and insult.
  • vii. No one should use, or allow another to use, without interpretation, any word or phrase on whose current significance the disputants are perhaps not altogether agreed. No one therefore should be ashamed to request explanations of the terms used by his adversary, and no one should neglect to interpret the terms he uses himself, until words are found whose meaning no one in frankness and candor can claim to doubt. It is not good enough to make the allegation (which is the common refuge of ignorance and idleness) that the words employed are accepted in common usage and well known to philosophers, since no words can be more ambiguous than most of the technical terms of the scholastics, or less suited to raise clear and distinct ideas in the mind.3

The rules peculiar to the opponent are these:

  • i. He must carefully examine the meaning of the thesis.
  • ii. The first argument he puts forward should explicitly contradict the thesis. We should completely banish from the schools the silly, long-winded practice that some have of taking a third or even a fourth argument to arrive at a contradiction of the thesis; which is what they should have started from.4
  • iii. The proposition denied by the respondent should be the conclusion of the next argument.
  • iv. The argument should be put forward, as far as possible, with clarity and in syllogistic form (especially among beginners in formal disputations).
  • v. As soon as a sound response has been given which destroys the force of the argument, there should be no further dispute.

The rules to be observed by the respondent are these:

  • i. After an introductory salutation of congratulations or goodwill, he must faithfully rehearse the whole argument of the opponent; and he must once again repeat how far the proposition to which the response is to be attached has been taken.
  • ii. In rehearsing the argument, he must consider, if it was the first, whether it contradicts the thesis; or if it was not the first, whether it proves the proposition which is denied. If it turns out that the opponent has not succeeded in this, he is said to be committing ignoratio elenchi.
  • iii. If the argument does contradict the thesis, or if it proves the proposition just denied, he must examine its form; and if it is not good, he must show what is wrong with it.
  • iv. If it proves what it had to, and the form is good, the proposition, if false, must be denied, or if ambiguous, analyzed.
  • v. If none of this appears, but on the contrary it becomes clear that the argument is demonstrative, the truth must be frankly acknowledged.

As for the president, he intervenes either merely to keep order (eutaxia)5 or also to give assistance to the respondent. A president of the first kind merely has the duty to admonish the disputants to follow the aforesaid rules, and to bring them back to the proper form of disputation, if they wander from the straight path. But a president of the latter sort, in addition to the duty just mentioned, which he shares with the first kind of president, must also solve a difficulty which has been advanced when the respondent fails to do so, and defend the truth of the thesis; but in such a way that he also finds out how much the respondent can do for himself, and should lead him gradually to the true solution of the argument rather than do all the work himself, which makes the respondent uninterested in the outcome of the disputation.

5.

On analysis.

The other part of logical practice is analysis. This is defined as, the mode of using the tools of logic by which we resolve a discourse which has already been made and composed into the principles from which it was made and composed. It is particularly useful in understanding other men’s writings, and since we owe to them by far the largest part of our knowledge, it is rightly considered all the more useful and necessary to have an acquaintance with analysis.

Our first concern should be to reach the real meaning of the author; to this end we must use means to guide us in understanding an ambiguous or obscure sense. These are either external or internal means.

The external means for discovering the sense of a statement are these:

  • i. One must take into account who is speaking; for individuals usually fit their discourse to their own condition, intelligence, and interests.
  • ii. One must take note of what the subject of the discourse is; for words must be understood in accordance with the subject matter.
  • iii. One must take note of the end and intention of the discourse; for we usually try to address others in order to bring them to our point of view.
  • iv. One must note the audience of the discourse; for we are bound to address others in such a way that we will be understood.
  • v. One must weigh the occasion of the discourse, whether it was premeditated or really an accidental and casual remark.
  • vi. Finally, one must take account of what went before and what comes after it and of parallel passages; for an author must be presumed to speak so as to be consistent with himself; and darker passages may be illuminated by relevant passages which are clearer.

Internal means are those which regard the discourse itself considered in itself. In this, lexicons give the meanings of individual words; grammar indicates the construction and its force; rhetoric, the figures of speech. In making out the real sense of a complete discourse, there are sometimes difficulties which cannot be removed by any of these aids. They are overcome most especially by careful attention to the subject under discussion and by previous knowledge, if not of the actual doctrine being given, then at least of the principles on which it rests (and which are assumed rather than laid out in the actual treatise).

After reaching a good understanding of the sense of the piece of writing whose resolution we are attempting, the following preliminaries are usually prefaced to the actual analysis:

  • i. An indication of the argument, or of the theme, under discussion.
  • ii. An indication of the author and of the occasion of writing.
  • iii. Something on the utility, dignity, and agreeableness of the writing itself, but in such a way that we always stay within the bounds of truth.

Analysis may be of a single proposition which has to be resolved into its subject and predicate, or of a whole discourse; whether it treats of a simple or a complex theme, we should observe the same order in taking it apart as the author followed in writing it. If the discourse consists of all or some of the parts which we assigned to the treatment of a theme above, whether simple or complex, we should note them and point them out one by one. If the author has departed from the usual rules of method, such departures should also be pointed out, and emphasized for imitation or avoidance, as they seem to deserve. In a word, the meaning of the treatise should be frankly laid bare, without trickery or deceit, and by distinguishing what is particularly pertinent from the digressions, the sequence of the thoughts and their connection with the proposed aim are to be revealed as clearly as possible.

Corollaries or conclusions deduced from the doctrine as expounded are sometimes annexed to an analysis, but one must be careful that their consequences are quite evident. It would certainly be very unfair to ascribe a conclusion to any author as his own, of which the author himself might question whether it follows from the doctrine he has taught.

part iv

Early Writings: Philosophical Theses

Philosopical Theses were presented to students as a graduation exercise to be defended (in Latin) in the presence of distinguished guests, other professors, and students. In the regenting system, in use at the University of Glasgow until 1727, this exercise took place at the end of the fourth year of study. Carmichael chose to publish the theses he assigned his students in 1699 and 1707. It will be evident that the second set of theses may be read as a sequel to the first set presented here. In both Philosophical Theses (and occasionally elsewhere) the editors have divided sections of the original text into paragraphs.

The full text of Carmichael’s

Philosophical Theses,

Which, under the Guidance of Almighty God,

Students of the renowned University of Glasgow,

Scholars and Gentlemen,

Who are Candidates for the Degree of Master,

will submit to Public Examination by Learned Men

On the 3rd. of May

Under the Presidency of Gershom Carmichael

Glasgow

Printed by Robert Sanders, Printer to the King and University,

1699

The majority of men are so careless and unreasonable that they make no distinction between the word of God and that of man when they are joined together; as a result, they fall into error by approving them together, or into impiety by indiscriminately condemning them.

(Nicolas Malebranche, The Search after Truth, bk. II, pt. 2, ch. 8)1

To the high and noble Lord,

[Basil Hamilton of Baldon,]

the most worthy Son

of illustrious and noble Parents,

Leaders of their Country in Peace and War,

Duke William and

Anne Duchess of Hamilton,

As remarkably distinguished by the splendour of their Birth

as by Virtues worthy of that Eminence,

Generous Benefactors of the Muses,

these Philosophical Theses are dedicated and devoted

in Honour of his Patron2

and in witness of his devotion and everlasting respect

by

Gershom Carmichael, President,

and

all the Candidates

who have submitted their names for examination for the

degree of Master at this time: to add the names of others,

not on the list, even though they may have completed

their course of studies, is not permitted by the

Rules of our University.

[1.] Carmichael’s use of these Greek terms indicates that he was following a version of the “preliminary exercises,” or Progymnasmata, of Aphthonius (especially chs. 5 and 6). This text was widely used in Latin translation in grammar schools in England in this period. See M. L. Clarke, Classical Education in Britain 1500–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 2, 184.

[2.] This sentence was a footnote in Carmichael’s text.

[3.] The previous two sentences were a footnote in Carmichael’s text.

[4.] This sentence was a footnote in Carmichael’s text.

[5.] Cicero discusses eutaxia at On Duties, I.142.

[1.] Nicolas Malebranche, De la recherche de la vérité où l’on traite de la nature de l’esprit de l’homme et de l’usage qu’il en doit faire pour éviter l’erreur dans la science (1674). Malebranche (1638–1715), following the purpose of the Oratorian order to which he belonged, set out to renew the study of St. Augustine, in the light of Cartesian philosophy. He was influential in Britain in the last years of the seventeenth century, as two contemporary English translations testify: Father Malebranche’s Treatise concerning the Search after Truth, translated by Thomas Taylor (Oxford, 1694), and Malebranche’s Search after Truth. … done out of French from the last edition by Richard Sault, 2 vols. (London, 1694–95). A more recent translation is now available: Nicolas Malebranche, The Search after Truth, translated from the French by Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1980); all references are to this translation. Carmichael’s 1699 Theses show the influence of Malebranche at several points; his epigraph is at Lennon and Olscamp, pp. 158–59.

[2.] See above, pp. x–xi, on the involvement of the Hamilton family in Carmichael’s appointment at the University of Glasgow.