The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Foreword
• A Note On This Edition
• A Treatise of the Laws of Nature
• To His Excellency, John, Lord Carteret, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland . 1
• The Translator’s Preface
• Names of Subscribers
• Two Introductory Essays
• Essay I: Of the City, Or Kingdom, of God In the Rational World, and the Defects In Heathen Deism
• Essay II: Concerning the Imperfectness of the Heathen Morality
• The Introduction
• A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Laws of Nature , &c. and a Confutation of the Elements of Mr. Hobbes ’s Philosophy .
• Chapter I: Of the Nature of Things .
• Chapter II: Of Human Nature, and Right Reason .
• Chapter III: Of Natural Good .
• Chapter IV: Of the Practical Dictates of Reason .
• Chapter V: Of the Law of Nature, and Its Obligation.
• Chapter VI: Of Those Things Which Are Contain’d In the General Law of Nature.
• Chapter VII: Of the Original of Dominion, and the Moral Virtues.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Moral Virtues In Particular .
• Chapter IX: Corollaries.
• Editor’s Note
• Appendices
• Appendix I: A Summary of the Controversy Between Dr . Samuel Clark and an Anonymous Author, Concerning the Immateriality of Thinking Substance .
• Appendix II: A Treatise Concerning the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance of the Law of Nature
• Appendix 1. Richard Cumberland’s Original Dedication to De Legibus Naturae
• Appendix 2: Hezekiah Burton’s “address to the Reader”

CHAPTER II

Of Human Nature, and Right Reason.

Man defin’d, By the Word [Man], I understand an Animal endow’d with a Mind; and Hobbes himself, in his Treatise of Human Nature, acknowledges the Mind to be one of the principal Parts of Man.1 Natural Philosophers, both antient and modern, Des-Cartes, Digby, More, but especially Seth Ward, in opposition to Hobbes himself, have sufficiently proved the distinctness of the Mind from the Body, under which all the Animal Faculties are compriz’d;2 so that I should but light a Candle to the Sun at Noonday, in offering to add to their Arguments. However, I cannot but take notice, that Hobbes has unluckily stumbled at the Threshold of his Treatise de Cive, in reducing the Faculties of human Nature to four Kinds, bodily Force, Experience, Reason, and the Passions:3 For beside, that the first of these, bodily Force, contains all the rest, in his Opinion, who acknowledges no other Force, but that of Body; it is contrary to all Use of Words, to call Experience a Faculty of our Nature; whereas it is properly to be reckon’d among those things, which are accidental to our Senses, both internal and external, of which Memory is sometimes the Effect, tho it is not it self Memory, as it is by him defin’d, in his Treatise of Human Nature, Page 36.4 Nay further, it is well known, that things we have experienc’d, do sometimes slip out of our Memory: But, if by the word Experience, he understands a Habit acquir’d by Experiments, it is a mistake to reckon it among the Faculties; except he would reckon Geometry, a Knowledge of the Law; and other Sciences, both Theoretical and Practical, amongst our Faculties, because they are Habits. But this is not a Matter of sufficient importance to dwell longer upon: Let us rather a while consider the foregoing Definition of Man.

As Animal.By the word [Animal] I understand, what the Philosophers agree is to be found in Brutes, the Powers of receiving Increase by Nourishment, of beginning Motion, and of propagating their Species; and I also willingly so far allow them a sensitive Power, as we may bestow the Name of Sensation5 (in which I see no Absurdity) on the Motions impress’d on the Organs by the Objects, and thence transmitted, by the Nerves appropriated to the Senses, into the Brain, and sometimes thence communicated to the Muscles, where they excite Motion, or to the Heart or Lungs, and perhaps to other Intestines, by means whereof various Affections are excited. However, I suppose the Power of observing or distinctly perceiving these Motions to be peculiar to the Mind, so as freely to contemplate what in them, for example, determines the Figure of the Object, what, a Situation in the Object, different from that which is in the Retina; what, its Magnitude, what, its Motion; what in the Surface thereof, or what Refraction in the Medium, does so diversify the Motions of Light, as to exhibit all the various Phaenomena of Colours: for I do not see, what in the corporeal substance of the Brain can separate from one another all these (crowding at once into the Eyes, by means of the same percussion of the Rays of Light;) compare them with one another, and distinguish them; or what should hinder them from appearing always confused, as they are perceiv’d in the Camera Obscura,6 or in the bottom of the Eye of an Animal, whence they naturally rush at once into the Thalami of the Optick Nerves, which penetrate the inward substance of the Brain. But these are Matters of physical Consideration.

To the Mind we ascribe Understanding and Will; to the Understanding we reduce Apprehending, Comparing, Judging, Reasoning, a methodical Disposition, and the Memory of all these things, and of the Objects about which they are conversant: To the Will we ascribe, both the simple Acts of chusing and refusing, and that Vehemence of those Actions which discovers it self in the Passions, over and above that emotion or disturbance of the Body, which is visible in them.

Endow’d with Mind.In the Memory of Propositions, Theoretical and Practical, consist Habits, as well Theoretical, which are distinguish’d by the Name of Sciences, as Practical, which are called Arts. Here Ethicks, which is the Art of Living, or of directing the whole of all human Actions to the best End, comes under Consideration.

(Whence variety of Manners proceeds. See ch. 5. § 9.)§II. Here it may be proper to take some notice of the various Manners of particular Nations; nay, and of most Men too: for various Habits are acquir’d, partly from diversity of Disposition or natural Genius, more prone to Habits of some sorts than others; partly from the Temper of the Body, Climate, Soil, Education, Religion, Fortune, and kind of Business about which Men are employ’d. From Manners, thus procur’d, arises to Men as it were a second Nature; they are therefore to be consider’d in the framing Laws, and that so far, that very antient Laws, tho not in all respects, if consider’d in themselves, the best, ought nevertheless to be retained, were it but upon this account, that Men long accustom’d to them would not readily suffer better to be substituted in their stead, without publick Commotions, and, consequently, greatly endangering the Rights of all.

Man (notwithstanding Hobbes’s Assertion to the contrary) is rational, and fitted for Society, by Nature.I thought it also proper to observe here by the way, that I, (as all other Philosophers do,) in the following enquiry into the Laws necessarily connected and agreeing with human Nature, always understand or suppose human Nature as it is in adult Persons, who have a sound Mind in a sound Body; so far, at least, as is necessary to the exercise of Reason and Virtue: for Laws are not framed for Infants, Ideots, or mad Men; nor of such do we form Societies; nor therefore ought we, from their irregular Appetites and Actions, to form a Judgment of the Rights and Inclinations of human Nature. Tho, I think, what ever we perceive in them (after Maturity) agreeable, whether to the animal or rational Nature, that we may look upon as a Proof, that such Actions are very natural to Men; so in them we may perceive, both an expectation of Compassion from Men, and a Sympathy to be accounted for upon Principles which I shall afterwards explain, by which they rejoice with those that rejoice, and weep with those that weep. In vain therefore does Hobbes, (explaining the Reason why, in opposition to the Opinion of most Philosophers, he affirm’d Man not to be Ζωον πολιτικὸν,7 which he translates, “An Animal form’d by Nature for Society,”) bring this Proof for his Opinion, that since “civil Societies are Leagues, whose Obligation Infants and the unlearned are ignorant of; and whose Usefulness is not understood by those” (whom he afterwards affirms to be “very many, perhaps the Majority, thro’ distemper of Mind, or want of Discipline) who have not experienc’d the Damage arising from want of Society: Whence it comes, that those cannot, and these care not to enter into Society; yet these, both Infants and Adult Persons, partake of human Nature, therefore Man is not made apt for Societyby Nature, but by Discipline.”8 This is the Substance of Hobbes’s Annotation, these the words, tho somewhat contracted for brevity’s sake. I at present pass by his false Supposition, “That Societies are Leagues”; and that he sets Discipline, which entirely accommodates it self, and is subservient, to Nature, in opposition to Nature; for whatever we learn from others; they draw from their own Nature and that of the Universe. I here also affirm, “That Experience it self (for want whereof he accuses the Generality as unfit for Society) is resolv’d into Nature, which, without doubt, teaches whatsoever Experience testifies to be true.” Altho many acquire most of their Knowledge by words of arbitrary Appointment, yet the Ideas or Sense affix’d to these words, and Connexion of these Ideas, in which all Truth consists, are from Nature; whence they are the same every where, tho Languages differ. Hobbes, it seems, forgets here, where he sets Experience in opposition to human Nature, that he had before made it one of its Faculties. I would only observe, “That all Philosophers and Writers of Politicks, tho they were neither ignorant nor forgetful, how unqualify’d, Infants, and adult Persons of distemper’d Minds, were for forming Leagues, or doing the Duties of Society, have thought Man form’d by Nature for that, which, when come to years of Maturity, he was prompted to by Nature, except something preternatural, such as all Distempers of the Mind are, interpos’d.” The Observation of Juvenal is well known,

• • Nunquam aliud Natura, aliud Sapientia dicit.
• • Nature does not teach one thing, and Wisdom another.9

And Aristotle (Politic. 1. c. 2.) affirms, that “we ought to judge of Nature from her Intention or perfect State”;10 and it is certainly a childish Inference, favouring more of the Grammarian than the moral Philosopher; “Men are born Infants, therefore they are born unfit for Society.” This is much of a-piece with Hobbes’s accounting (in his Physicks) for the Noise of Thunder from the breaking of Ice, which, in spite of Staticks, he suspends in the Air in the middle of Summer.11 Altho the word Nature be deriv’d from Nascor [to be born,] yet it is well known, that by human Nature we mean that Force of Reason, whose first Rudiments only are to be found in new born Infants. So Man is by Nature fitted for propagating his Species, which yet neither an Infant, nor one whom Distemper hath render’d impotent, is capable of, nor any Person without the help of a Woman. So likewise, we call the Powers of Plants and Fruits to afford us both Nourishment and Medicine, natural, which yet are not to be found in them, upon their first Appearance out of the Earth or Trees, but then only, when the Sun and Rain have brought them to Perfection, and they have escap’d the Malignity of blasting Winds: but that Reason, nay right Reason, is a Faculty of human Nature, and therefore natural to us, Hobbes himself acknowledges in these words, “Right Reason therefore is a kind of Law, which may be call’d natural, since it is no less a part of human Nature, than any other faculty or affection of the Mind.”12 Yet the same Hobbes elsewhere denies this very thing; Leviath. c. 5. p. 21. where he says, “Reason is not, as Sense and Memory, born with us, nor gotten by Experience only, as Prudence is, but attained by Industry.”13 Let him free himself, if he can, from Contradiction. I will not therefore waste my time in proving what is self-evident; especially when I had before affirm’d expressly, that I consider’d the Nature of Man come now to Maturity, at which time Nature usually confers upon him the use of Reason.

Which suggests the Law of Nature in the same manner as it does the Art of Numbering;§III. I shall think that I sufficiently prove my Point, when I have made it appear, “That human Nature suggests certain Rules of Life, in the same manner that it suggests the Skill of Numbering.” All Men, when come to Maturity, except they labour under some Distemper of Mind, of their own accord reckon things by Numbers, adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing them, if the Numbers be small, without any Rules of Art. The Sentiments of all Nations are necessarily the same, concerning the Sum of two Numbers found by Addition, and concerning their difference by Subtraction, how much soever they may differ in the Names and Characters by which they express the Numbers, which every Nation fixes for it self arbitrarily. It seems to me, that all, in the same manner, under the same conduct of Nature, necessarily acknowledge, (1.) That the Good of all rational Beings is greater than the like Good of any part of that aggregate Body; that is, That it is truly the greatest Good: and (2.) That in promoting the Good of this whole Aggregate, the Good of Individuals is contain’d and promoted: Also, (3.) That the Good of every particular Part requires the introducing and settling of distinct Property in such Things, and such Services of rational Agents, as contribute to the common Happiness; that is, such as are necessary to testify the Honour we pay to God, or to preserve the Life, Health, and Faculties of every particular Man. In these three Propositions we shall find the Seeds and Force of all the Laws of Nature to be contain’d. Skill in Numbering is much assisted by Industry, by artificial Characters, and by their Places: but these very Helps we owe to Nature, as to their Original; nor can they ever cause that, which without Art we know to be true and of necessary use in Life, to become false or useless. “Whatever Assistance we may procure from Art, the whole Effect is to be ascrib’d rather to Nature than to Art.” Just as, after the Art of Cookery has fitted Meat for Nourishment, no one will deny, that we are nourish’d by the Power of Nature, otherwise Life it self were not natural.

The Mind is necessarily determin’d, in forming simple Apprehensions, in chusing Good, and refusing Evil in general.This I think proper to premise as a Postulatum, which, I believe, no one will think unreasonable, “That the Mind of Man, and every Faculty thereof, especially the Intellectual, is prone to such Actions as are proper thereto, as often as Occasion is offer’d, and Matter suggested, either from without, or from the Body united to it. ” It is confirm’d by continual Experience, “That the Mind (whenever Light, Colour, or Sound, is presented to it thro’ the Senses, the Eyes, for example, or the Ears) is immediately apt to observe what is offer’d.” And the Case is the same, in observing painful or pleasant Sensations, taking their rise from the inward State of the Body. Simple Apprehensions, the more obvious Comparisons of Ideas among themselves, and certain Judgments or Propositions thence form’d, are in some sort necessary; the evident Connexion between Causes and Effects does also lead Men to form Propositions affirming that Connexion; and they involuntarily return upon the Mind, when any occasion is offer’d from the inward force or vigor of the Memory; nor can the Will at all put a stop to such Actions, tho it may indeed promote them. For we can excite our selves to recollect those things which had almost slipt out of the Memory, and attentively to consider what our Senses had observ’d, and diligently to form Comparisons and Propositions from Ideas compar’d among themselves, to form Syllogisms from Propositions compar’d, and from these to infer new Conclusions. Every one come to maturity, in proportion to the natural vigor of his Mind, is by the same Nature spontaneously carry’d on to such Operations, at once with the greatest pleasure, and with absolute necessity. Into this natural Impulse, I would resolve most of those Propositions, which I call the natural Dictates of Reason, (namely, the primary and self-evident ones;) as also those Acts of the Will, which are conversant, either about Happiness in general, that is, about the whole sum of all possible good Things; (for there is in this Case no occasion for the Judgment to deliberate and compare, because Happiness is, as defin’d by Cicero, “A Collection of all good Things”;)14 or about those several parts of our Happiness, which are desirable for their own sakes; such are Wisdom, Health, the seeing a Light not too strong, and such other agreeable Sensations as come in our way. Nor do I suppose that Hobbes, the great Patron of all kind of Necessity, will contradict me here, who hath affirm’d, that all “Conceptions are nothing really but Motion in some internal substance of the Head; which Motion proceeding to the Heart, if it help the vital Motion, is called Delight, Contentment, or Pleasure; and, with reference to the Object, Love. But when such Motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital Motion, then it is called Pain; and in relation to that which causeth it, Hatred, which the Latins express some times by Odium, and some times by Taedium; and that this Motion is also a Sollicitation, or Provocation, either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, and is then called Appetite, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth, and is then called Aversion.” Human Nature, p. 69, 70.15 I do not indeed perceive any such Power of the material World over our Minds, that necessarily determines them by mechanical Principles; yet I concur with all Philosophers, that I know of, in affirming, “That the first Apprehensions of Things, and the desire of Good and aversion from Evil in general, are necessary”: for the innate Activity of the divine Nature of the Mind, permits it not to be perfectly idle; nor can it do any thing else than (as occasion offers) understand, chuse, refuse, and determine certain Motions of the Body, in order to obtain what it has chosen.

A distinct enumeration of those Powers of the human Mind, (which has greater Powers than what are necessary to preserve the Life of the Body,) which dispose Men, beyond other Animals, to enter into Society with God, and other Men;§IV. But because the Laws of Nature enjoin those things only, which proceed from innate Principles of Action, it is therefore proper to take a thorow view of the State and Power, both of the Mind and Body, separately and jointly, that it may thence appear, for what kind of Action Man is fitted by his inward Frame.

There are most evident Indications, that the Mind has much greater Powers, and is created for much nobler Purposes, than only to preserve the Life of one inconsiderable Animal; which I shall now endeavour to explain.

And here, in the first place, I must not omit its spiritual, incorporeal, and God-like Nature, which is capable of a better Employment than that of the Soul of a Swine, instead of Salt, to preserve a Carcass from Rottenness: For it may and ought to be observ’d in general, “That Powers of the Mind, far inferior to those which we find in Man, are sufficient to preserve Life for a long time”; which is evident in long-liv’d Brutes, nay, and in Trees, as the Oak, whose long continuance in a flourishing State is even without Sense, much more without Reason: Nay, “That the Sagacity of our Mind does not consist in discovering what kinds of Nourishment, Medicines, Exercise, &c. are most conducive to our long continuance in this State,” for even the best Physicians are strangely at a loss in these Particulars; but, “That it rather excels in those Qualities, which relate to the Knowledge and Worship of a Deity, and to Acts moral and civil.” But Dr. Ward, now Bishop of Salisbury, hath excellently manag’d this Argument, beyond any other, whether antient or modern, Philosopher, and vindicated it from the Objections of Mr. Hobbes.16

Nevertheless, it is necessary to lay before the Reader some Powers and Actions of the Mind, whence it may appear, “That it is naturally fitted to become a Member of the greatest Society, (consisting of all rational Beings with God at their head,) and that it neglects its principal use, and loses the best Fruits of its natural Disposition, if it do not enter therein”; and that for a better Reason, than we affirm that the Earth (which here spontaneously produces Ears of Corn, and there Fruit-Trees) is naturally fit to encourage and reward the Industry of the Tiller; for Soils have their different natural Dispositions. The human Faculties are so fitted for Society, that it appears, (1.) “That all Men can both know and observe the Laws of Nature, which must in the first place be evident, because otherwise both the Admonitions of others, and our own Endeavours would be vain: (2.) That the Observance of those Laws is in it self pleasant and grateful; that the Precepts which point out to us such a Method of Action, for this very reason that they lead us to things naturally pleasant, promise a Reward to Obedience; and that a suitable Practice brings along with it no inconsiderable Advantage, namely, that Pleasure or part of our Happiness, which is necessarily contain’d in such natural employment of the human Faculties, as leads to the best End we can propose in Life, and to the fittest Means to attain it”: for all exercise of natural Powers, especially of the highest Order, in which we neither miss our aim, nor turn out of the direct Road, is naturally pleasant; nor can we conceive any other pleasure in Action, except what arises from Actions of this kind.17Freedom from Evil, and from Uneasiness, and grateful Impressions of some kinds, may be effected in us by external Objects;18 but no other Pleasure can take its rise from within our selves, than what either immediately or mediately depends upon such kind of Actions as I have now been describing. This is the only Happiness to which moral Philosophy directs us; nor can we be instructed how to obtain that, which in no sort depends upon our own Actions and Faculties. Hence it follows, “That the more things there are in the human Faculties, fitted for the knowledge and observance of the Laws of Nature, and consequently for the Practice of Virtue, so much greater are the Rewards annex’d to such Actions of the Mind, or, a Happiness so much the greater and more peculiar to Man, may be obtain’d by acting virtuously”: For each Faculty is render’d happy, by those Actions tending to promote the publick Good, to the exercise whereof it is fitted by Nature; for I shall shew hereafter, “That Happiness’s proceeding necessarily from such Actions as take their rise from Nature, is a most evident natural Proof, that it is the Will of the first Cause to oblige Men to such Actions, or that he enjoins them by his Law.”

Which Powers are, 1. Right Reason. 2. The Power of forming universal Ideas, Judgments from them, and consequent Volitions, and of representing these Ideas by arbitrary Signs, i.e. Words.I have selected as fittest for my purpose,

First, Right Reason, and the Standard of its Rectitude;

Secondly, Universal Ideas, (such, for example, as that of human Nature in general,) and the Judgments or Propositions thence arising concerning the Properties agreeing or disagreeing with those Ideas, and general or undetermined Acts of the Will agreeable to, and consequent upon, such Judgments. Hither also is to be referr’d the power of appointing arbitrarySigns, such as words spoken or written, accommodated to such universal Ideas, Propositions and Volitions. For Speech, because it is a help to the Memory and Reason,19 is rather subservient to Virtue, than Vice; to Society, than Sedition. Hence arises the power of forming general Rules of Life or Action, from Ideas of Actions20 agreeing in their general Nature with the Idea of human Nature: But such Propositions are more easily remember’d, if they be express’d in Words accommodated to this purpose, and to the Ideas of the generality of Mankind, and be applied by common Consent to express them. Thence are form’d Rules common to many, or publick Laws, which, as the State of Affairs happens to require, may be enacted, abrogated, or alter’d: As a Physician may justly prescribe to the same Patient, at different times, sometimes a slenderer, sometimes a more plentiful, Diet, now Restoratives, and then evacuating Medicines.

3. The Knowledge of Number, Measure, and Weights.Thirdly, The knowledge of Number, Measure, and Weights, and consequently the power of collecting many Particulars (lesser good Things, for example) into one Sum, and comparing the same with one another, according to their Difference and mutual Proportion. Hence Man can discover the chief Good, that is, the Collection of all good Things, and a comparative Good, perceiving one Good to be greater or less than another; and can subtract some from others; and is able to estimate the Proportion between things equally and unequally Good. To direct such Actions in such manner, as that they may best promote the best End, is the business of all the Laws of Nature.

4. The Power of observing and establishing Order.Fourthly, The Power (nearly related to this) of either observing Order already established, or of establishing it, in the Conduct of our Affairs, and of knowing of how great moment it is in uniting several Powers, in order to produce the same Effect, especially the common Good, as we may observe in modelling an Army or Common-Wealth. Whilst I was more attentively considering this Subject, I imagin’d, “That the best way of distinctly knowing the Nature and Force of Order, was to consider it in the most simple Matter, that shews its most simple Effect.” But I no where meet with Order in a more simple Matter, nor a more simple Effect thence demonstrable, than that Geometrical Order of right Lines and compounded Motions, whence Descartes has demonstrated (Geom. 1. 2.) that his Geometrical Curves might be generated.21 For he has there prov’d from Analytical Principles, “That the Nature and Properties of a Line describ’d by compounded Motions, is not subject to accurate Calculation or Demonstration, unless all the other Motions, in subordination to one another, be regulated by one.” What he has observ’d concerning a Line, the most simple Effect of compounded Motions, holds equally true in all Effects, depending upon the Concurrence of many Causes; namely, that it is necessary, that, among such Causes, some should be regulated by others in a certain Order, and all by one supreme Power; otherwise it will be uncertain, what Effect will follow from their Concurrence; and so either no End will be procured by the common Assistance of them all, or by Means which we know not, whether they be proper or no. By means of this Knowledge, and from the Train of subordinate Causes, which we perceive by our Senses, the Mind comes to a more distinct Knowledge of a first Cause, which is God the Governor of the World, who is able to foresee, what will be the Effects of the power of all rational Agents, placed and acting in a known Subordination; both which Considerations will have a natural Tendency to persuade Men, to consider themselves, both in their Thoughts and Actions, as subordinate Members of the most enlarg’d Society, in which all are contain’d, as it were in the Kingdom of God.

5. The Power of the Mind, to raise, stop, and moderate the Passions.Fifthly, From these arises that exalted Privilege belonging to the Mind of Man, of great force to establish and preserve this Society, namely, the Power of the Mind, to raise, stop, and moderate the Passions, and to direct them to desire greater Good, and to avoid greater Evil, than what any other Animal is capable of knowing; because we comprehend good Things, both more in number, and universal as to extent, their Sums, and their orderly Series; and we are conscious, that we can divert our Minds from such Thoughts and Affections as respect only our own private Good, and fix them upon the Care of the Publick Good, in which Liberty principally consists. I will not meddle with the Disputes about Liberty, which have been handled by others. This seems to be beyond all Controversy, “That the Nature of Man has so much Liberty, that he is determin’d to nothing (in external Actions, such as are Contracts, their Observation and Violation) without using his own Judgment, in forming which he may call in the Aid, not of the Senses only, but of the Memory; and to consider, Is this which I am going to do, consistent with the publick Good, which except it be preserv’d unviolated, the Happiness of particular Persons cannot be secur’d? Is this consistent with the well-grounded Motives of Virtue? &c.” I have observ’d that even Hobbes’s Politicks do, and that justly, suppose this Postulatum, “That Men may agree among themselves, or covenant, to transfer their Rights to another Person, for the common Good, (c. 5. §. 6.)”22 tho elsewhere he contends, “That they can regard nothing but their own private Good.” But since there is naturally in Men so large and noble a Faculty, which can both comprehend and pursue that vast Good, the greatest united Happiness of all rational Agents, the Reader will easily judge, whether the greatest Happiness of every particular Person does not consist in the perpetual vigorous Exercise of that Faculty. I do not contend that this Faculty is any thing distinct from the Powers of the Understanding and the Will: It is sufficient, if from the Concurrence of them the Power I have mention’d, arises. Every one sees, how immediately this Power of the Mind disposes or qualifies Men to restrain themselves from any sudden Sally of Passion, and to conform their Manners to the Laws, first of Nature, then of the Society; and, consequently, to establish at once the greatest and strictest Society of all rational Beings. Concerning right Reason and universal Ideas, I think proper to treat more at large; it will be sufficient to handle the rest briefly.

Of right Reason, (which consists, as well of selfevident Truths, as of Conclusions thence deduced, and stored up in the Memory;)§V. We must treat of right Reason the more particularly, both because what is right discovers both it self and what is crooked; it holding the same Rank in Morality, that Health does in Physick, the knowledge whereof is prior and more distinct in the Order of Nature, than the Theory of Diseases: and because Hobbes agrees with other Philosophers, that it is the Rule of human Actions, even before Civil Laws are fram’d; (See de Cive, c. 2. §. 1. and the Annotation.) 23 And, if he will be consistent with himself, we shall not differ much with him about its Definition. For c. 2. §. 1. in a Parenthesis (which he seems to place there for a Definition) he hints, that it is “Truth inferr’d from true Principles by right Reasoning.”24 But I think that, in this Argument, the notion of right Reason is somewhat more extensive; for it comprehends, as well first Principles, or self-evident Truths, as Conclusions thence form’d. The Etymology of the Word [Ratio] favours this Sense, which implies only a Proposition, that is rata, i.e. certain, unchangeable, and agreeable to the Nature of Things, whether it be self-evident, or prov’d by the help of an inference. Custom also, which is the Rule of Language, favours the same Sense of the Word; for all acknowledge the most evident Propositions, (such as “It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to beat the same time”) for the Dictates of Reason, no less than those which require proof. Nor do I believe that Hobbes himself will oppose this larger Sense of the Words. I agree, however, with him, that by right Reason is not to be understood an infallible Faculty, (as he affirms many, but I know not who, to understand it;) but yet by it is to be understood a Faculty, not false in these Acts of judging. Nor is it properly understood to be an Act of Reasoning, (as he too rashly asserts,) but an Effect of the Judgment; that is, true Propositions treasur’d up in the Memory, whether they be Premisses or Conclusions, of which some that are practical are called Laws; for Actions are compar’d with these, in order to examine their Goodness, not with those Acts of Reasoning which discover them; yet I willingly allow, that these Acts of Reasoning are also included in the Notion of right Reason.

Of which, not every Man’s proper Reason, but the Nature of Things, is the Standard.But that which he immediately adds in the Annotation, (in order to give a Reason, why, in his Definition of right Reason, he lays down “every Man’s proper Reasoning as the Standard ”) is most false. “Out of civil Society, where no one can distinguish right Reason from wrong, except by making a Comparison with his own, every Man’s proper Reason is to be esteem’d, not only the Standard of his own Actions, which he does at his own peril, but also the measure of other Mens Reason with respect to his Affairs.”25 For, out of civil Society, any one may distinguish right Reason, without making a Comparison with his own. Because there is a common Standard, by which every Man’s own Reason (or Opinion) and that of others, is to be try’d, namely, the Nature of Things, as it lies before us, carefully to be observ’d and examin’d by all our Faculties. That is the Rule with which all, both Premisses and Conclusions, are to be compared, whether form’d by me or by any other Man, or by the Commonwealth it self, after it is form’d. For it is most certain, “That the Truth or Rectitude of Propositions concerning Things and Actions, present or future, consists in their Conformity with the Things themselves, concerning which they are form’d.” For since all our Ideas, or simple Apprehensions of Things, are the Images of those Things, (and the Truth and whole Perfection of Images consist in their exact Correspondence to the Objects they are design’d to represent;) and since true Propositions are the joining, by Affirmation, of Apprehensions impress’d upon the Mind by the same Objects, or the separating, by Negation, of Notions representing different Objects; it is necessary, that their Truth and Rectitude should entirely depend upon their Conformity with the Things themselves; as all agree, that the Truth of simple Apprehensions is to be deduced from that Standard.

This therefore is beyond Controversy, “That the Man who judges of Things otherwise than they are, does not judge according to right Reason, or does not make a right use of his Judgment; but that he pronounces according to right Reason, who affirms or denies, as Things really are.”

Wherefore such Propositions only are true, as agree with the Nature of Things.§VI. Nor is it material in this case, “Who it is that judges otherwise than the Thing really is, whether a sovereign, or a subordinate, Judge”; because the Truth, or Rectitude, of a Proposition in no respect depends upon the Order established amongst Men, but only upon the Agreement there of with the Things, concerning which a Judgment is made. Nor is it any Proof of the contrary, that there are some Mathematical Propositions,26 and others of like kind might be invented, which may be called true, tho there be nothing in Nature, to which they are conformable. For such conditional Propositions, because they pronounce nothing concerning Things without the Mind, are not to be compar’d with them; for their Truth consists only in an Agreement among the Terms, of which they are compos’d; and that is all which is to be look’d for in this Case. But these are of no use in human Life, except we find something external done, or possible to be done, which differs in nothing considerable from our Ideas.27 If their Subject, or something extremely like it, cannot exist, the Propositions are trifling, and are only equivocally called true. For the Truth of Propositions, which consists only in the Agreement of the Terms, if the Terms themselves cannot exist,28 is not of the same nature with that, which affirms the Agreement of Terms, possible, at least, if not present or future. The former kind of Truth is perfectly useless. However, let this Point be determin’d as it will, this is clear, “That a Proposition, whose Subject does or will exist, that is, whose Subject is conformable to Things without the Mind, which either now are, or hereafter shall be, does require, that what is affirm’d of that Subject should be conformable to the same things; and that therefore the whole ought to agree with the Nature of Things without us”; which is the principal Point I at present contend for.

It is also certain, “That every particular Man, and his Right over Things and Persons, whatever it may be, is not something merely chimerical and fictitious, but to be consider’d as something real, and existing without the Imagination”: because the Rights of particular Persons relate to the use of Things, and to Effects grateful to Men; and therefore the Truth of Propositions, or of the Dictates of Reason, concerning them, does necessarily consist in their Conformity to the State of Things; which is what I would lay as a Ground-work, in order to overthrow Hobbes’s Fundamentals: for it hence immediately follows, “That contradictory Propositions, concerning the Right of any two to the same Things or Persons, cannot be the Dictates of right Reason”; which is the Foundation of Hobbes’s Scheme.

An Explanation of practical right Reason, which points out the end, and the means thereto;§VII. I think it proper to observe here, by the way, “That by the Dictates of practical Reason, I understand Propositions, which point out either the end, or the means thereto, in every man’s power”; for all Practice is resolv’d into these: and, “That practical Reason is then called Right, when it determines truly, or as the thing is in it self, in Propositions declaring what is every man’s best and most necessary End, and what are the most proper Means of obtaining it”; or (which comes to the same thing) which pronounces, according to Truth, what Effects of our own Counsel and Will will render our selves and others happy, and how we shall, with the greatest certainty, produce them; just as in Geometry, that speculative Reason is right, which affirms a Quantity, which is really in its own Nature greater, to be greater, than another. And that practical Proposition is right, which teaches that method of constructing Problems, which if we pursue, we shall really produce the effect propos’d. Nor is an Opinion, or Proposition of this kind, truer, when affirm’d by a King, than when by a Subject. Since then all right Reason is conformable to those things, about which we have form’d a Judgment, since each thing is, in its nature, but one, and uniform with it self; it follows, “That right Reason in one cannot dictate that, which contradicts right Reason, concerning the same things, in any other Person.”

And is uniform and consistent,From this Principle follows that Precept of universal use, concerning the Actions of all Men, That human Actions ought to be uniform and consistent with themselves, thro’ the whole course of every Man’s Life; and that he cannot act always agreeably to right Reason, who, as Horace expresses it,

• • Aestuat, & vitae disconvenit ordine toto.
• • Fluctuates, and disagrees with himself thro’ the whole course of Life.29

It is included in the Notion of a true Proposition, (a practical one, for instance,) and is consequently a necessary Perfection of a Man forming a right Judgment in that Affair; that it should agree with other true Propositions framed about a like Subject, tho that like Case should happen at another time, or belong to another Man: And therefore, if any one judge, “That his Act of taking to himself the Necessaries of Life, not yet possess’d by any other, would promote the common Happiness”; it is necessary that the Judgment, “That the like Action of another in like Circumstances, would equally conduce to the same End,” must be undoubtedly right.Forming like Judgments in like Cases, whether our own, or those of other Men. Whoever therefore judges truly, must judge the same things, which he thinks truly are lawful to himself, to be lawful to others in a like Case. In the same manner, whatever Assistance any Man rightly and truly believes, he may or ought to demand according to right Reason, it is equitable, and consequently a Dictate of right Reason, that he should think, that any other in like Circumstances justly may or ought to demand the like help from him.

The reason of Hobbes’s making so gross a Blunder in this Argument, was, because he did not observe, “That there was the same Standard to all, by which the Reason of every one is to be tried, whether it be right or no”; namely, the Nature of Things, especially, of the End necessary to all rational Beings, and of the Means naturally leading thereto.

(To which sight Reason, and consequently to God, its Author, Hobbes imputes Contradictions;§VIII. We may observe here, by the way, how honourable Hobbes’s Sentiments are concerning God, ruling naturally by the Dictates of Reason; that is, that God, instructing Men in the Laws of Nature by the Dictates of right Reason, does enjoin Contradictions; that he first tells us, “We must fight against all, and so engages Men in a War, in which all that fall, are unjustly murder’d on both sides, because they claim only their own Rights”; that afterwards, “By the same right Reason he forbids War, and commands us to relinquish those very things, which yet he affirms are justly to be retain’d, and defended by the Sword, because they are Rights”: For he must necessarily ascribe to God all those Contradictions, which he imputes to the right Reason (as he calls it) of Men, contradicting one another with relation to the Necessaries of Life; for he affirms, that “God rules by this Reason, as by a Law,”30 and consequently, that he permits all those things which Reason permits; and teaches that all those things may be done consistently with his Laws, which right Reason has taught may be done, by natural Right. For Hobbes himself does not extend “Right” (where he purposely defines it) beyond “the Liberty of using our Faculties according to right Reason.”31

It is hence evident, “That God, according to Hobbes, first gives a Right to invade the Properties of all others, that his right Reason includes a Licence to commit any Crimes, and then involves all Men in the Miseries of a destructive War.” But after he has render’d Men miserable by the Evils of Wickedness and War, he points out a somewhat better road to Justice, such at least as may be sufficient to avoid the Punishment of the civil Power; and then at last endeavours to bring over wretched Mortals to such a Peace, as that Justice would establish.

Whereas right Reason judges alike in all.)That Reason, which I acknowledge as Right, first examines all the Parts, both of our own and others Happiness, and foresees, at a great distance, the Causes thereof that are lodg’d in our own Power; then, perceiving them in their own Nature so interwoven, that a prudent care of our own Happiness cannot be separated from the pursuit of the Happiness of others, that is, of the common Society of all rational Beings, it determines, that the strictest Justice is to be cultivated, with respect both to God and Men, and presages, that the Fruit there of shall be a most happy Tranquillity. By the same Reasoning it foresees, that the Actions of Men, who arrogate each all things to himself, or are guilty of such Practices, will involve all in War and extreme Calamities; and that so evidently, that there need not for Information be made so rash and fatal an Experiment. Therefore it will never allow a Right to act in such a manner; but, on the contrary, it will command Men to contract Friendships, to establish civil Government where it is wanting, and to preserve it when establish’d; that not only those Miseries of War, which it forsees may arise from the Folly of some Men, may be avoided, but the greatest Assistances to the most perfect Virtue and Happiness be procur’d. Hobbes therefore thought that this would be done, (and that necessarily too,) because he did not observe, “That there was the same Rule (the Nature of Things) for all, by which the Reason of all ought to be tried, whether it be right or no.”32

Here, I think, the fundamental Corner-Stone of the Temple of Concord is laid by Nature; for hence is deriv’d that Law of Nature uniting all rational, or wise, Beings (for Reason in perfection is Wisdom)33 among themselves, and with God as the wisest; which is thus express’d, Whoever determines his Judgment and his Will by right Reason, must agree with all others, who judge according to right Reason in the same Matter. Whence it also follows conditionally, (which I shall afterwards prove from proper Principles,) “If any right Reasoner, any wise Person, shall assign to each his proper Office, in order to the publick Good, all others who judge rightly, shall approve of the Distribution.” But of this more hereafter.

How to prevent false Reasoning.§IX. I shall hereafter observe, “That, in order to preserve our Reason right, we ought not only to avoid false Deductions, but especially the rash Admission of any thing as self-evident, without proof.” And we ought to take care, in the first place, “That our simple Ideas be both clear, from strong and frequent Impressions of the same thing known in various Circumstances; and distinct, by a separate Observation of the Parts singly; and adequate also (as far as we can) by the Assistance of the Memory and Understanding, added to the Discoveries of Sense.” It is to be observ’d, “That in these external Impressions there can be no Falshood, properly so called.” The Unwary, indeed, take occasion of judging falsly, from the Distance, the Refraction, or the tinging of the Rays of Light in the Eyes of Persons infected with the Jaundice: but if all things in the Medium between the Organ of Sense and its Object be consider’d, as they ought, before we pass a Judgment, (to this Head is to be referr’d the Temper of the Blood, that of the Animal Spirits, and the Brain;) we may avoid falling into Error. In the Medium are the partial Causes34 of the Impressions made, and they are therefore necessarily to be consider’d. What is more, before we determine any thing concerning the Sameness, and Connexion, or the Diversity, and Opposition of the Terms, they are most carefully to be compar’d with one another; and we ought to take care, especial care, when we contemplate the first and most universal Truths, not to give our Assent to any Proposition, without the strongest and most inevitable Necessity; for Truth depends not on our Will, but upon the Connexion of Things, and of those distinct Ideas, which are impress’d upon us by Things; but what we perceive, we necessarily perceive, whenever the Faculty is attentive, altho that Attention generally depends upon our own Will: and upon this Rule depends the main Point now in dispute. For since the whole Truth of affirmative Propositions consists in the Connexion of two Terms; and since these are naturally connected, because both Terms are imprinted upon the Mind by the same thing, and are evidently Representatives of one and the same Thing under different Respects; it is evident, “That Truths depend, not upon the Will of Men imposing and connecting Names arbitrarily, but upon the Natures of Things delineating their own Representations upon the Mind. But whatever Motions are impress’d upon us by the Nature of Things, are necessary, and proceed from the first Mover, the Author of Nature; so, consequently, do all those Ideas, which, impress’d upon the Senses and Imagination by a Motion evidently natural, represent practical Truth to the Mind, concerning Actions most conducive to the common Good. Truths of this kind are natural Laws, as I shall hereafter prove; and their Impression upon the Mind is the Inscription and Promulgation of Laws; and they may for the same reason be affirm’d to be by the first Mover imprinted upon us, (by means of the Nature of Things;) that speculative Axioms (such as, “Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference of the same Circle are equal”) may be truly affirm’d to be necessarily planted in our Minds by the First, thro’ the intervention of Second, Causes. Justly therefore may we ascribe to the Law of Nature the words of Demosthenes, which Marcian, in the Pandects, has inserted into his general Description of Laws, that it is “The Invention and Gift of God.”35 They, who do not acknowledge the Proof of a Deity from the Necessity of a first Mover, (which Hobbes however acknowledges,)36 take away the most antient, and, in my Opinion, the strongest, Prop of Religion. Nevertheless, if they own the Proof of a God from that Order which is visible in the World, the mutual Relations of Things, and the Beauty thence arising, or from this, that they perceive so many of them design’d by Nature for our Use, as their final Cause, they will be oblig’d, by this our Argument, to acknowledge God as the Author of all necessary Impressions.

To which we are never necessarily determin’d, Judging, Willing, or Acting, wrong, being owing only to an Abuse of Liberty;§X. This Observation, concerning the Truth of simple Apprehensions, or of all natural Impressions, seems to me of so great importance, that I will venture thence to conclude, that “Neither does our own Nature, nor that of Things without us, ever necessarily or unavoidably determine us to form a false Judgment, nor, consequently, to chuse or act amiss”; which always proceeds from the Uncertainty or Error of the Understanding Whatever, at any time, we judge, chuse, or act, contrary to those Notices, which a thorow Examination into the Nature of Things affords; that I think wholly owing to a hasty, rash, and unseasonable Use of Liberty, which is generally deluded thro’ the Sollicitation of a present Advantage, and incites the Judgment to determine Points not yet sufficiently clear’d up. “All Truths, (even in Morality,) which are unchangeable and never deceive, are owing to Nature, and to a Necessity of assenting to things evident. And to Nature they only (exclusive of Errors) are to be ascrib’d, if we would not be injurious, to our own Faculties, no one of which ever necessarily determines us to embrace a Falshood; to natural external Agents, that cannot deceive; and, to God himself, to whose Nature it is a Contradiction to suppose him willing to deceive us.” We thus determine upon these Points, on better Authority, than Physicians, who call only those Motions of the Humors, for instance, Natural, which tend to the Preservation and Health of the Individual, calling the rest, which tend to Disease and Death, Preternatural; and with Reason, because by Nature here they understand the Nature of the Individual, whose Preservation is the End of their Art: Yet they will not deny the most fatal Alterations of the Humours, to be according to the universal Laws of Nature. But, in Man, the Error of the Judgment, and Perverseness of the Will, are neither agreeable to the Nature of the Individual endeavouring its own Perfection, nor proceed from any necessary influence of things external upon him; but first from mere Inadvertency and Rashness, afterwards from Habits or Example, the Imitation of himself or others. Hobbes is therefore very unfair, who proposes whatever Transaction he has observ’d among Cabals of Villains, as a momentous Discovery in human Nature, and a Foundation of a new Set of Politicks.

And human Judgment acting most agreeably to Nature, whom it approaches nearest to Necessity.I am of Opinion, that not only speculative Axioms, but the first Principles of moral Habits are thus necessary. It is sufficient, indeed, that those Dictates which determine many particular Actions, as they are circumstanc’d, are supported by probable Reasons, such as the Weakness of our Mind, which cannot examine all things present, much less foresee all the Consequences of the present Action, can attain, whilst urg’d by an immediate Necessity of Acting. Those things which proceed from Examination and cautious Deliberation, from Experience, and the faithful Testimony of competent Witnesses, such are Civil Laws and Precedents, or Cases adjudg’d in Courts of Judicature, make the nearest Approaches to Necessity. We ought therefore to form a Judgment of the Inclination of human Nature from these, rather than from the rash Actions of Men. For Deliberation, Experience, and all the other helps to discover Truth, do continually bring us nearer to that State of Mind, by which, because of the Influence of Things upon it, it cannot think otherwise than it does think, which is the Case, when it judges from the Evidence of Sense, or clear Demonstration: And thus the more necessary and unavoidable any Judgment is, so much the more natural, or approaching to what is natural, it is to beesteem’d. Hobbes, on the contrary, forms a mistaken Judgment of human Nature, from rash Actions, as absurdly, as if we were to judge of the Nature of a Tree, from the fungous or mossy Excrescencies sometimes growing to its Bark.

2. Of universal Ideas,§XI. 2. Next comes under Consideration, that peculiar Power of the human Mind, by which it forms universal Ideas, omitting those Accidents, by which particular things are distinguish’d. Hence arises a great help to the Memory, and consequently to Prudence thence arising; nay, to every Virtue, as connected therewith, and to every Action and Habit, which ministers Steadiness, Beauty, and Happiness, to human Life. For the Mind can easily apply to innumerable Individuals and their various Circumstances, Properties agreeing to one or a few Natures consider’d in themselves, whether those Properties respect their inward Frame, or their Causes and Effects: Hence all Sciences take their rise, as compos’d of Universals. By the help of these, Abstracts, and the chief Heads, of Natural History are easily collected; whence (to omit other Advantages) we readily learn what things are necessary, to preserve and perfect, both our own Nature and that of others. In like manner the Precepts of Arts, since they too are universal, compendiously instruct, by what means any Persons, whose Faculties are capable of them, shall or may attain the Ends by them propos’d. So Logick, Physick, Ethicks, (or the Art of Morality,) the Arts of Navigation and Architecture, do not instruct one particular Person only, how Aristotle, for example, shall direct his Reason, in one Affair, to the Discovery of Truth; or Hippocrates preserve, or recover, his own Health; or Palinurus reach one Port only; but they instruct all Artists without distinction: They consider the End, and, consequently, the propos’d Good of every Man in general, chusing, and prescribing the use of, Means as general; and, therefore, both they who teach, and they who learn, these Arts, first contemplate these general Precepts. Which proves, by the way, that Men not only can, but that in all Arts it is their universal Practice, to respect a general Good, earlier than their own: Altho nothing hinders, but that Hippocrates, applying his general Precepts to a particular Case, may preserve his own Health, for instance, as well as that of others; and Vitruvius may build himself a House, as he had done before for others. It is of this further Advantage to observe these universal Ideas and Propositions, both Speculative and Practical, which are naturally form’d by the Mind of Man, because from such universal Notions are form’d Unchangeable, and consequently in some Sense Eternal, Rules of human Action. In the following Sheets, I shall lay before the Reader many such Propositions or Rules, whence he may distinctly perceive, what those universal Notions are, of which they are form’d; and how peculiar they are to the Mind of Man; and how much they promote Religion, civil Government, and the Peace and Commerce of different Nations.

And Speech, which is compos’d of Words, which are the arbitrary Signs of universal Ideas.But first I must make a few Observations on the Power and Inclination of the Mind of Man to form Words, spoken or written, and other arbitrary Signs, by help of which it may either recollect, or communicate to others, its Notions, both universal and particular. This remarkable Difference, between Men and other Animals, contributes much both to the forming and preserving Societies: The great Agreement observable among Men, in the use of such Signs, will easily be accounted for, if we consider (as becomes Christians) what the sacred History informs us, “That all Mankind have sprung from one Original,”37 so that Eve might, without Difficulty, have used words in the same Sense that Adam first appointed them, and their Posterity might suck in their Signification with their Mother’s Milk. But if Hobbes would rather consider them in his State of Nature, as suddenly sprung out of the Earth (like Mushrooms) of full Growth, and without any Relation to one another;38 even in that Case Reason would persuade them, that many, (namely, all those who wanted to maintain a mutual Intercourse,) might agree in the same words, or other Signs, to express the same things. Nor was it at all of any Consequence, who first express’d this Idea or Thing by that Sign; but it would greatly concern them all, to agree among themselves in some common Marks of their Ideas, by help whereof each particular thing might be made known to all. Hereby each Person, by communicating his Observations to others, is enabled to “Improve their Minds with a further Degree of Knowledge”; so that the Experience and Endeavours of the present Age may point out to the succeeding ones a shorter way to Prudence and Happiness, and by a more easy Method produce in them all kinds of Virtue; hereby Men are inabled to “Debate concerning Covenants, and Laws, to be made,” to “Promulgate such as have been agreed upon,” to “Examine, whether they have been observ’d”; to“Produce and receive Testimonies”; and to “Give Judgment according to the Proofs.” Hobbes himself will not deny, both that these things are peculiar to human Nature, and that they fit Man for Society.

Of the Reflex Acts of the Mind, and of Conscience.§XII. Shall I not reckon among the Perfections of the human Understanding, that it can reflect upon it self? Consider its Habits, as Dispositions arising from past Actions? Remember and recollect its own Dictates, and compare them with its Actions? Judge which way the Mind inclines? And direct it self to the Pursuit of what seems fittest to be done? Our Mind is conscious to it self of all its own Actions, and both can, and often does, observe what Counsels produced them; it naturally fits a Judge upon its own Actions, and thence procures to it self either Tranquillity and Joy, or Anxiety and Sorrow. In this Power of the Mind, and the Actions thence arising, consists the whole force of Conscience, by which it proposes Laws to it self, examines its past, and regulates its future Conduct. Nor appear any Traces, in other Animals, of sonoblea Faculty. Great are the Powers of this Principle, both to the Formation and Increase of Virtue, to the erecting and preserving Civil Societies, both among those who are not subject to the same Civil Power, and among Fellow-Subjects. And, indeed, the principal Design of this Treatise is to shew, “How this Power of our Mind, either of it self, or excited by external Objects, forms certain universal practical Propositions, which give us a more distinct Idea of the utmost possible Happiness of Mankind, and pronounce by what Actions of ours, in all Variety of Circumstances, that Happiness may most effectually be obtain’d.” For these are the Rules of Action, these are the Laws of Nature.

I will here add nothing to what I have already mention’d of the Knowledge of Number, Measure, Order, Free-Will, &c. altho these be both peculiar to Man, and are very material in the present Argument.

Indications enforcing universal Benevolence, from a Survey of the human Body, considr’d.§XIII. I will now apply my self to the Consideration of the Human Body, in which I meet with several things worthy of Observation for my present Purpose, which are usually neglected, or at least omitted, by others who have handled this Argument.

For, since the Life, Health, and most perfect State, of the human Body, which can be acquir’d, (every thing else being regarded according to its Value or Dignity,) is part of that End which right Reason proposes to its self, and its Powers and various Uses are Means highly useful to the whole Man, both to procure the Improvement of the Minds of Individuals, and to promote the common Good; it is impossible, but that the Consideration thereof must suggest somewhat useful to direct us in the Choice of the supreme End, and in the Application of the Means; but in Dictates concerning that End, and the Means conducing thereto, does the whole of the Law of Nature, whose original and principal Parts I here propose to enquire into, consist.

In the first place, I think that this may be affirm’d universally, That whatever (1.) demonstrates, from the divinely-contriv’d Make of our Body, “That the whole possible Happiness of Man depends upon many Causes, the chief whereof are Rational; and that, therefore, it cannot reasonably be expected but in conjunction with the common Happiness”; whatever (2.) proves further, “That every one can, by the proper Power of his own Body, effect somewhat, by which this common End may be promoted, and the Assistance of others procur’d, and that, by his Endeavours of this kind, every Man will procure to himself the greatest Happiness in his Power”: That demonstrates certainly, “That the Nature of the human Body affords a sufficient Indication of our Obligation to such Endeavours.” And this will appear plainly, from the Consideration of natural Obligation, and of Law, which I shall afterwards explain.

Further, the more evidently and constantly the Manner and Method is pointed out, according to which it is necessary, in order to our own Happiness, that we should co-operate with others to procure the common Happiness; and the greater any one’s Powers are, or the stronger his Inclination to such Actions; so much the easier it is to pay this Debt due to the Publick, and the Crime the greater, which is committed by the Breach of the Commandment; and from hence our clearer and stronger Obligation to such Actions may with the utmost Certainty be inferr’d: For these Reasons I thought it proper to propose some Indications of this kind, taken from the human Body. The Observation and Sagacity of others will add more, or will pursue these Hints further.

In the human Body are to be consider’d, (1.) What belongs to it as Body; (2.) What it has, as a Body endow’d with Life and Sense, like other Animals; (3.) What are peculiar to it self.

I. As a Body in General, I. It has these things in common with all other Bodies.

1. Having its Motions, necessary for its Preservation, dependent upon, and limited by, the Motions of other Bodies, especially those of other Men.1. That all its Motions, and consequently those which preserve its Life, Health and Strength, (whose Preservation each Person proposes to himself as a principal part of his End,) proceed from the first Mover, and are necessarily complicated with, and in some measure depend upon, innumerable Motions of other corporeal Parts of the same System. Among these are chiefly to be consider’d the Bodies of other Men, and their Motions which can limit ours, and are govern’d by Reason, which we have just ground to hope may be brought to concur with our Reason.39

2. That its Motion (as that of all other Bodies) is propagated far and wide, and does not perish, but concurs with other Motions to perpetuate the Successions of Things, or to preserve the Whole.2. Being equally able to promote those Motions in other human Bodies, which are equally necessary for their Preservation. And as the first Observation instructs us, “That our private Good depends upon common Powers”; so this second Observation proves, “That the Powers of particular Persons may be of publick and most extensive Advantage.” The former forbids, “To hope for the Happiness of particular Persons separately from the Good of the Whole,” and consequently points out “The common Good” as “The fruitful Cause of private Happiness”: the latter shews, “That the Pursuit of the common Good will not be in vain, because it conspires with the Endeavours of the whole Universe.” In both these complicated Motions, namely, that, by which almost all Things concur in some measure to the Preservation of any particular Body for some time, and that, by which any particular Body concurs with others to the Preservation of the whole System, a certain Order is preserv’d, by which some Motions are determin’d by others in a continued Series, and all are govern’d by the continued circular Motion of the whole System. I need not any particular Hypothesis concerning the System of the World, to prove what I have advanc’d concerning the necessary Order, and the Powers of complicated Motions; for these are demonstrated from geometrical Principles, which no Hypothesis can hurt. Tho a Contemplation of this kind may at first seem merely speculative, yet it is not without its Use in human Affairs; for hence we know distinctly, and from general Principles, “How necessary a certain Order among Causes which act by a corporeal Force, is, that many of them should conspire to produce any Effect foreknown and design’d in the Mind.” It further shews, “How we may judge with Certainty, which Cause has contributed more, which less, to the Effect design’d.” Whence the value and worth of Causes, with respect to any Effect, is fix’d and determin’d by their proper and natural Force; and, consequently, we are instructed by the very Nature of Things, both, “Which Causes are more highly to be valued, upon account of what they have already effected,” and, “The Aid of what Causes we ought chiefly to sollicit, in order to procure what we farther desire.” We thus come to know, “That those Causes, which Philosophers call Universal,40 (such as the Motion of the Aetherial Fluid, & c.) but chiefly the first of them, God, are the principal Sources of the common Good, which we either all enjoy, or which we expect from the Nature of Things.” We thus also know, “That Motions of Bodies ever so little subject to the Determination and Direction of the human Will,(too mit the Consideration of those which are exempted from it,) when govern’d by the universal Benevolence of all rational Beings towards all, are the principal Causes of the publick Happiness of all, whence is deriv’d the private Happiness of each.” For universal Benevolence is the Spring and Source of every Act of Innocence and Fidelity, of Humanity and Gratitude, and, indeed, of all the Virtues by which Property and Commerce are maintain’d. They are govern’d by it, as particular Motions are determin’d by the universal Motion in the System of the World; or as all the Functions of the Spirits, Bowels, Vessels, and Limbs, in the Body of an Animal, proceed from the general Motion of the Blood. If we embrace this Opinion, from a thorow Examination of the Nature of Things, it will doubtless oblige us to pay Obedience to all the Laws of Nature, and to take diligent care, that the same be paid by others: This is the utmost we can do, to make our selves, as well as others, happy; nor can Reason propose to any one a greater End.

Knowledge, and the Use of Signs, in Mankind, consider’d as a corporeal System, supplying the want of Contiguity in communicating Motion.§XIV. However, in this Comparison of the Aggregate of Mankind, as they act by a corporeal Force, with the natural System of Bodies, I am not ignorant of this wide Difference between them, “That the Effects of Systems merely corporeal, are perform’d, not without Contiguity between the Bodies moving and moved, for the most part without Sense, but always without the interposition of Counsel and Liberty; whereas Men act often at a considerable distance, and make much use of their Reason and Liberty.” It is, nevertheless, likewise evident, (1.) “That the corporeal Force of all Men, when it is exerted, is subject to the same Laws of Motion with other Bodies”; and, (2.) “That the force and necessity of Subordination between the Motions arising from Man, is the same with that which is among those of any other Bodies”; whenever many Men co-operate to any Effect which relates to others, (which they daily practise more than any one can “be well aware of”:) with respect to these two Points only, I propos’d the foregoing Comparison; which, therefore, was made and apply’d justly. I will, upon this occasion, venture to go farther and affirm, “That, because Men have frequent Opportunities of meeting, by which they mutually profit or hurt one another, and many ways of doing, by Words or Actions, good or harm to Persons at a great distance, especially, if Men form Schemes for the Conduct of their Lives, (which it is certain every one naturally and constantly does, because every one desires that all his future Existence should be happy”;) I will venture to affirm, I say, “That the whole Race of Mankind ought to be consider’d as one System of Bodies, so that nothing of any Moment can be done by any Man, relating to the Life, Fortune, or Posterity of any one, which may not some way affect those things which are alike dear to others; as the Motion of every Body, in the System of the World, communicates its Motion to many others, especially neighbouring ones.” For that vast Privilege of extensive Knowledge, with which Men are endow’d, supplies the want of Contiguity, which is requisite in other Bodies, to the Communication of Motion; for Men are excited to Motion by the least Signals, whether Natural or Arbitrary, by which they quickly perceive what has been, or ought to be, done by other Men at the greatest distance. What is more, they retain a Memory of those things, done either to themselves or those who are dear to them, and by it are excited to take the first Opportunity of Retaliation; they are also naturally provident, and presage, from what has been done to others, what is to be expected by themselves, and those they love; and this induces them to many things, with a view to prevent Evils, and to create a probable Prospect of very remote future Advantages. This Remembrance of Things past, and Foresight of Things to come, are the Reason why Men, at a distance, are more mov’d by what is done to others, than inanimate Bodies are by the Motion of neighbouring ones, which act nothing, except they be present: for from these they immediately and justly conclude, “That being like in Nature and Condition, with respect to Necessaries, they also are to expect like things.” Thus they cannot but be affected with those Actions of any towards others, which, if often repeated, or copied after by others, naturally work a considerable Change (either for the better or the worse) in the Condition of Men in general.

I own, however, that all are not equally affected with such Actions, but some more, some less, according to their different degrees of Sagacity, in apprehending the Causes or Hindrances of the common Good. Nor is the Influence communicated from some Men to others, by such Actions as respect the common End of all, for that Reason less natural, than that between Bodies of the same System with respect to natural Motions, which are communicated to more subtle and fluid Matter in a greater, to grosser Matter in a less, degree. It is sufficient, that “To perceive in Men a Likeness of Nature and Condition with respect to Necessaries,” and “To infer from what is done to others, what we are to hope or fear will be done to our selves,” are Acts, Natural and Universal, and not of less Efficacy to influence Men, than mutual Contact between Bodies moving and moved, is to communicate Motion among the Parts of a corporeal System. I will infer no more from hence, than what is otherwise evident, and seems to be naturally accounted for upon these Principles, that all Men may hence learn, “That their Security from Evils, and their whole Prospect of Assistance from others, in their pursuit of Happiness, necessarily depend upon the voluntary Assistance of many, who do not less stand in need of many others, that it may be well with them.” Whence we are immediately oblig’d to acknowledge, “That the mutual good Offices of all are useful to all.” Just as natural Bodies in the same System cannot perform their Motions, unless other Bodies concur with, and give place to, them.

From the Necessity of mutual Offices it follows necessarily, “That he that would, to the utmost of his Power, provide for his own Happiness, must, according to the measure of his Ability, procure to himself the Benevolence and Assistance of all others.” Every one may easily know, that he has Power to confer upon others Assistance and innumerable good Offices, and to conspire with the whole System of rational Beings to the same End, and in pursuit of the common Good: but, on the contrary, that he can no more compel so many Causes, which are singly of force nearly equal with himself, to lend him their Assistance, and at the same time to relinquish and neglect all natural Endeavours to promote such things as are necessary for themselves, than one Pound Weight can, in a just Balance, raise a Weight of some thousand Pounds in the opposite Scale. For all Struggles between Men, by force merely corporeal, are perpetually determin’d according to the natural Laws of Motion; all which Laws Wren and Huygens have shewn how to exhibit by the Beam of a Balance, suspended either upon a single Center, or upon two Centers at equal distance from the Center of Gravity.41 Nor is the Cunning or Craft of any one above all the rest, of so great Powers as to force the Beam, which is depress’d by the real Necessities, Powers, and Counsels of a great Number, toward the common Good, to incline to the contrary Part, that is, to the private Advantage of any particular Person. Wherefore it cannot but appear evident, from the general Nature of human Power, “That we can more surely procure its Assistance, by promoting the common Good, than by Force and Fraud, or a savage Rapaciousness”; to which, according to Hobbes’s Doctrine, (in the Epistle dedicatory to his Treatise de Cive,) even good Men must have recourse in a State of Nature;42 and their natural Right resto perve themselves, makes it no Vice.

Which is illustrated from the known Laws of Matter and Motion.§XV. Our Opinion seems to be much illustrated by the general Principles of Mechanical Philosophy, (the only Principles Hobbes himself seems to me to agree to,) which inculcate this principally, as necessary in every Hypothesis, “That the Motion of the corporeal World, dispersed thro’ the several Parts thereof, is preserv’d by that mutual Communication, Cession, Acceleration, or Retardation, of all Motions, which the Powers and Impulses of every particular Body, reduced to an exact Calculation, require: yet so, That the Motion of the whole System about the common Center, (which is compos’d as a whole, of the Motions of every particular Body added together,) is preserv’d always without In terruption or Alteration, and determines and adjusts the Motion of all its Parts.” All Bodies have the same Power and Necessity to continue in Motion, which is in each proportionable to their Quantity of Matter, or their Bulk and Solidity compar’d together: but even this Force is subordinate, in every particular Body, to the Motion of the whole System; and is therefore it self, as well as the whole, preserv’d by that which determines it. Thus the Motions of particular Bodies agree with the general Motion of the Whole, and are subservient thereto; and that general Motion of the System governs and preserves the Powers of all particular Bodies, in the most effectual manner, by the Nature of things consider’d, either together, or each by it self; which Nature consists in perpetual Motion and Change. All things are so order’d, “That not the smallest Quantity of Matter nor Motion may be lost,” which is demonstrated from Mechanical Principles; and universal Experience, and the most authentick Histories of past Times, witness, “That the same Kinds of Animals are perpetuated, and their Numbers rather increas’d than diminish’d, notwithstanding the fierce Passions of some few Animals.” In this Perpetuity of Matter and Motion, and of the Kinds of all things continued by a Succession of Individuals, consists the Preservation, or natural Good, of the material Universe, which is promoted, according to the unchangeable Laws of Motion. Nor can any sufficient Reason be assign’d, “Why the Preservation of Mankind should not be look’d upon as establish’d and continued by the force of Causes equally certain and natural, as the Successions of any other Animals, which entirely depend upon the unchangeable Nature of the material World, and the necessary Laws of Motion, since they perfectly agree in all that is essential to an Animal.” Certainly the Conjunction of the Mind with the Body, very often makes its Condition better than that of Brutes, but never worse; which will be evident to any one who considers, what Advantages the Body receives from the Conduct of Reason, which abundantly compensate some Mischiefs, which happen to the Body thro’ the Error of the Mind: nay, it is certain, that the Errors of the Mind about Food, Pleasure, and other things which relate to the care of the Body, proceed from hence, that the Mind, regardless of the Admonitions of its own Reason, gives way to the Appetite, and the corporeal or animal Affections.

Whence it appears, that the common Good is the noblest Effect possible, and inseparable from that of particular Persons.These Observations, concerning the necessary Causes of the Preservation of the corporeal Universe, and (to omit other things) of the several Kinds of Animals, and consequently of Mankind, make such Impressions upon the Minds of Men, as these which follow, and conduce much to our present purpose, viz.

1. That the Preservation (or common Good) of Mankind is a matter not only possible, but that it depends upon so many Causes, so certainly determin’d, that we have the greatest reason to believe, that it will undoubtedly be perpetuated, notwithstanding the malevolent Endeavours of any to the contrary.

2. That this Effect is both in its own nature the most noble, and most closely united with the Preservation, and possible Happiness, of every Individual.

3. That the Matter and Motion of all particular Bodies, and, consequently, of Men themselves, is, in some measure, naturally and necessarily subservient, whether they will or no, to the Preservation of the corporeal Universe, (which includes human Bodies,) namely, as every particular Body is determin’d in its own Motion, by the general Motion of the whole System, by which it is perpetuated.

Does not the Nature of Things, and consequently God its Author, powerfully persuade and command an Endeavour to promote the common Good of Mankind, by every Indication they give, that it is both a possible Effect, and the greatest; and also more closely united with the private Happiness of every one, than any other Effect which we can foresee as possible, and by making us in some degree to promote it necessarily, even then when we give way to our natural Affections, and oppose it to the utmost of our Power? Is it not evident, that he acts most agreeably to practical Reason, and to the imprinted Ideas of the Causes of both publick and private Good, who promotes the first Attempts of corporeal Nature, and exalts them to a greater height, by the additional Force of the human Mind?

Which is effected by the Subordination and balancing of Powers.But this seems to be sufficiently evident to all, especially because the whole Operation of the Mind, necessary to compleat human Happiness, may be deduced from what I have said concerning the manner in which the corporeal World is preserv’d; for it consists in these two Things, (1.) That the Endeavours of all particular Persons toward their own Preservation be made subordinate to such Endeavours or Actions as are evidently necessary to the Preservation of the Whole. (2.) That by this Method those Powers of all Individuals, necessary for Self-defence, be so pois’d, that no one can be destroy’d by any other, to the hazard and damage of the Whole. Something like these is observable in the Motions of the Mundane System, which arises from the Plenitude of the World,43 and the Contact of Bodies, and therefore extends it self to them all. It is the work of the Mind and Reason to observe, “That every one’s proper Happiness depends in a nobler manner upon the voluntary Actions of other rational Agents, even at a great distance”; and therefore to take care, “That all human Actions do in like manner contribute to the common Good of all rational Beings; as the Motions of all Bodies contribute to the Preservation of the corporeal System.” This we shall effect, if these two Things which I have now mention’d, be observ’d in all voluntary Actions which respect others. Thus therefore we are instructed by the Nature of things, “How to promote the common Happiness, and our own, which is necessarily included therein”: which is the same as to say, “We are taught what Actions are commanded by the Law of Nature.” And certainly all prudent Persons, in all kind of Deliberations, where Civil Laws take no place, or leave the matter to every Man’s own Determination, naturally fix their Eyes on these things, and can agree among themselves upon these things only, which serve to promote the common Good of the Parties consulting, and so to balance the Powers of all, that it may be every one’s Interest, that no one have Power to oppress another. Thus, among all neighbouring States, who are not subject to the same Government, this is the chief View in all Embassies, Covenants, and Leagues, so to balance the Powers of every particular State by mutual Assistance, that it should be difficult for them to destroy one another, but sufficiently easy to preserve, and, in some measure, enrich, themselves, which was the End of first erecting Civil States.

Which is illustrated from the Consideration of the Nature of Government,§XVI. In like manner, at the first Establishment of any Commonwealth, the Powers of all Orders and Parts are mutually balanc’d with the greatest Exactness, and are all subjected to the supreme Power, so as to be able mutually to assist, but hardly to hurt, one another. Nay, further, the Preservation of the Commonwealth, both from seditious and internal Evils, and from foreign Invasion, is only a continued Establishment of the same Balance of Power, and proceeds from Causes plainly alike. Moreover, whenever new Laws are to be enacted, or old ones to be amended, or receive an equitable Construction, all wise Men will ever have recourse to the Principles I have mention’d; and, universally, in all Cases where civil Laws are silent, or cannot bring a seasonable Relief, or where they allow a Liberty of acting, to Persons, whether in a publick or private Station, (which Cases, as Hobbes himself owns, are almost innumerable,)44natural Rules of human Actions can be taken from nothing else, than from the Consideration of the common Good, as the End, and from the Advantage of preserving that Balance of Power, which either Nature hath made, or the Constitution of the Commonwealth hath establish’d.

And of the System of the World, without assuming any particular Hypothesis.Tho’ I own, that the Power of Order and of conspiring to one common End, and also the Necessity of a Balance of Power in all Parts of any System, in order to the Preservation of the Whole, both may be, and usually are, observ’d in the Frame, whether Natural or Artificial, of such things especially as are most obvious, without any Skill in Mathematicks, and the mechanical Philosophy of the System of the World; in like manner, as much is discover’d concerning the Numbers and Magnitudes of Things, without any other Arithmetick and Geometry, than what is learn’d by common Experience only, without the Help of Books: Yet I thought it proper, in this stricter Research into the Nature of Causes, where we are endeavouring to obtain an exact Knowledge of the whole Matter, sometimes to have recourse to those Sciences, in which these Notions are most distinctly explain’d, and in so general a manner, that they may, with great Advantage of Illustration, be thence easily apply’d. So it is usual to have recourse to the artificial Rules of Arithmetick and Geometry, when any Difficulty arises relating to those Things, whose Number or Measure we have guess’d at by the Help of natural Sagacity only, or when we have occasion for an exact Computation. I chose to illustrate the present Argument by the Example of the System of the World; both because some general, tho confus’d, Notion thereof is always present to the Minds of all, and imprints upon them some Idea of the greatest End, the common Good, and of mutual Assistance, as the only Means to obtain it; and because, from those general Motions of the System of the World, (of which only the Learned frame a distinct Idea,) the Powers, Orders, and Limits, of all lesser Motions, as from the most general Causes, are deduced; so that, in this Enquiry into Causes, we can never stop, till we arrive at the First Causes among those which are created, which lead us immediately to God. But let it suffice, to have hinted these things in general; from them it easily appears, “That those Powers, which, consider’d either singly or jointly with others, are very unequal, may yet be conveniently enough balanc’d among themselves in the same System, to the Preservation of the Whole.” I thought it proper, not to make use of any particular Hypothesis, with respect to the System of the World; both because the Resemblance between the Manner and Causes, by which this material World and Mankind are preserv’d, does not extend it self to all Circumstances, (which is not necessary, in order to the Mind’s learning something, which may be of publick Advantage;) and because what I have advanc’d is so manifestly true, that it must be admitted in every Hypothesis: Lastly, because to have added more, was not necessary to those who are conversant in Natural Philosophy, and to others it would be unacceptable, and seem impertinent.

II. As a Body, endow’d with Life and Sense, like other Animals.§XVII. II. That Power and that Necessity of being subservient to the Motions of innumerable other Bodies, which I have shewn, from the general Nature of Matter and Motion, to be in all Bodies, as long as they continue in Motion, are found likewise in human Bodies, and seem to persuade, and readily incline, each particular Person to lend his Assistance to Mankind. But if to these we add those things which distinguish the Nature of Animals from other Bodies, they will more strongly incline us, and will lay before us a sufficient Reason, why we should be chiefly sollicitous to assist those of our own Species, with little comparative regard to other Bodies.

Bodies Animate are distinguish’d from Inanimate, by that Temper of Parts, and Configuration of Organs, which are sufficient for Nutrition, Generation, Sensation, Imagination, Affections, and voluntary Motions; and all unanimously agree, that, by these Actions, all kind of Animals endeavour their own Preservation, and Perfection, or Happiness, for the time appointed by the universal Causes of the World. Nor is it difficult, in some measure, to explain the Power and Causes of this Endeavour, from the Observations of Anatomists and Physicians, on the Circulation of the Blood and other useful Juices, and on the spreading of the Nerves thro’ the whole Body of Animals, together with what Natural Philosophers have thence deduced, concerning the Causes of Hunger and muscular Motion; but it is not worth while to insist upon the Proof of Truths universally acknowledg’d; from these, as allow’d us by our Adversaries, it will be proper to draw some Inferences, which may make for our present Purpose. Such are,

First, “That, from the same inward Frame of Animals, which determines them to Self-Preservation, there are beside afforded manifest Indications, that their behaving themselves innocently and beneficently towards Animals of the same Species, is necessary to their own Preservation and happiest State”: and then,

Secondly, “That, from the Concurrence of the same internal Causes, Animals cannot but be sensible of, and retain in Memory, these Indications.” The former of these summarily includes the Precept and the Sanction of the Laws of Nature; the latter respects their Promulgation, or the manner by which they become known: There fore both these must be explain’d in their proper order.

Whence the first Indication to Benevolence is this, That Men, being Animals of the same kind with other Men, have therefore their Appetite of Self-preservation limited in like manner; which is therefore very consistent with a Permission to others of the same Species, to preserve themselves likewise.In the first place it offers it self to our Observation, “That the Bodies of each Animal are contain’d within very narrow Limits, and that the time of their possible Duration is but small”; which is a sufficient Indication, that each has occasion for a few things only, in order to its Welfare; or that, if some sort of concurrence of many things be necessary, it is no other, than what may at the same time be communicated to many. Hence they are by Nature induced to desire but few things for them selves separately, and to desire those things in common with others, whose Use may conveniently be common to many, such as Air and Light. The same Surface of Skin, which in every Animal limits the spreading and circulation of its Blood, by the same Power, sets Limits to those Necessities, which urge it to Self-preservation. All the Necessities of the Body are enclos’d within the Circumference of the Circle describ’d by the Blood of that Animal: Those few things which are sufficient to fan and repair this vital Fluid, are sufficient to the Preservation of Life, Health, and natural Strength. The Quantity of that Juice is very small, which, by twitching the Stomach and Throat of an Animal, excites Hunger and Thirst; and it therefore needs no great Quantity of Meat and Drink to rebate its force. Lastly, the Capacity, of those Vessels in which the Nourishment is prepar’d and fermented, of the Chyle-Vessels, and of the Veins and Arteries receiving it, is fill’d by a Quantity so determin’d and small, that I believe it evident, that no Animal, even of the Brutekind, ever fell into Hobbes’s Error, so as to think all things necessary to its own Preservation.

It is hence evident, from the inward Frame of Animals, “That it is necessary to their Preservation, that they take to themselves only a few things, to satisfy their Hunger and Thirst, and to repel the inclemency of the Weather, and leave the rest of fruitful Mother Earth’s abundant Productions to those others, to whom they may be useful.” Thus the Quantity of the Bodies of Animals, which is naturally limited, limits their Appetites, to seek on