The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Foreword
• A Note On This Edition
• A Treatise of the Laws of Nature
• To His Excellency, John, Lord Carteret, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland . 1
• The Translator’s Preface
• Names of Subscribers
• Two Introductory Essays
• Essay I: Of the City, Or Kingdom, of God In the Rational World, and the Defects In Heathen Deism
• Essay II: Concerning the Imperfectness of the Heathen Morality
• The Introduction
• A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Laws of Nature , &c. and a Confutation of the Elements of Mr. Hobbes ’s Philosophy .
• Chapter I: Of the Nature of Things .
• Chapter II: Of Human Nature, and Right Reason .
• Chapter III: Of Natural Good .
• Chapter IV: Of the Practical Dictates of Reason .
• Chapter V: Of the Law of Nature, and Its Obligation.
• Chapter VI: Of Those Things Which Are Contain’d In the General Law of Nature.
• Chapter VII: Of the Original of Dominion, and the Moral Virtues.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Moral Virtues In Particular .
• Chapter IX: Corollaries.
• Editor’s Note
• Appendices
• Appendix I: A Summary of the Controversy Between Dr . Samuel Clark and an Anonymous Author, Concerning the Immateriality of Thinking Substance .
• Appendix II: A Treatise Concerning the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance of the Law of Nature
• Appendix 1. Richard Cumberland’s Original Dedication to De Legibus Naturae
• Appendix 2: Hezekiah Burton’s “address to the Reader”

ESSAY II

Concerning the Imperfectness of the Heathen Morality

The Rules of Piety among the Stoicks.I. To begin with the Stoicks, whose pretentions ran highest in this way, and who acknowledg’d Virtue to be the only Good. Their Principles shall be extracted from Epictetus, M. Antoninus, Seneca, and Plutarch; and, to do them Justice, we shall begin with what is excellent in their Doctrine.

The State of Life which they propose to themselves, is that of Jupiter’s Subjects, Friends, Ministers, Soldiers, Citizens, Sons; to be, and to be intitul’d, Θεῖοι Divine. The Law of their Subjection to Jupiter they consider as an Obligation, both to active and passive Obedience, discarding all Externals, the Body, Riches, Fame, Empire; they made it their Business to be, and to do, what was agreeable to Nature, to our proper Nature, which is Rational, Social, Human; to the Will of the governing Nature of the Universe; to the governing right Reason of Jove, which is a Law; and being Philosophers, they were the Interpreters of Nature, and of the Will of God. They thought themselves unconcern’d in the Applause, or Contumelies, in the Approbation, or Reprehensions, of Men, as having no Power to do them Good, or Hurt. As good and dutiful Subjects, they profess themselves Friends to God in the first Place, chiefly to regard his Eye over them, whom they ought to please; to concern themselves about this only, how to fulfil their own Province orderly and obediently to God; to understand and mind his Commands and Interdicts, and to be conversant in his Affairs; in all their Actions to have respect to him; to desire to seem fair to him, and to be pure with themselves and with God; in all Circumstances to enquire, what God would have them to do, and to divine (if it be possible) what his Will is; to imitate him in Faithfulness, Beneficence, Liberality, Magnanimity; continually to praise and celebrate, and to give Thanks to, the Divinity; to give Thanks for all Things, especially for their virtuous Living without their former Vices and Crimes; for the Sustenance of Life, but especially for the Faculty of understanding and using Things; to submit their Minds to the Governor of all Things, as good Citizens to the Laws of the City; not only to obey, but to approve and praise his Administration of Things; to will the Things that happen in the World, the Estate, or Usage, that is allotted them, because God willeth them; to will nothing, but what God willeth; to be devoted to his Commands; so to eat, as to please the Gods; to confide in the Governor of all; to live in mindfulness of him; to worship the Gods, and to invocate them in all Affairs; for Man is made to worship the Gods. To them that ask, where hast thou seen the Gods, or whence is thine Assurance of their Existence whom thou worshippest? From those Things that are Indications of the Power of the Gods, I am assured of their Existence, and therefore worship them. These are their Rules of Piety; their Rules of Duty to themselves, and of Humanity follow.

Their Rules of Duty to themselves.§II. What (say the Stoicks) doth the divine Law command? To keep the Things that are our own, and not to challenge to our-selves the Things of others; but, if granted to us, to use them; if not granted to us, not to desire them; when taken away, to restore them cheerfully, and to be thankful for the Time that we have had the Use of them. Hast thou not a Commandment from Jupiter? Hath he not given thee thine own Things, exempt from Prohibition and Impediment, the other Things, which are not thine own, liable to Prohibition and Impediment? What Commandment therefore, what Prescript hast thou brought from him? The Things that are thine own, keep by all means, desire not the Things that belong to others. Faithfulness is thine own, who can take away such Things as these, who shall hinder thee from using them beside thy-self? When thou mindest the Things that are not thine own, thou hast lost the Things that are thine own. Man must do what his Reason and Mind enjoyneth, which is a Decerption from Jupiter, and which Jupiter (a severe Exacter of Virtue) hath given him to be his Leader and Prefect.

Their Rules of Humanity.From the same Principle (the Laws of Subjection to the Governor of the World) the Stoicks infer various Rules of Duty to Mankind. For (say they) Man is not absolute and unbound, but a Part of a certain Whole, a Member of the one universal System of rational Agents, a Citizen of the World, and, therefore, he is an intellectual social Animal, in conjunction with his Fellow-Rationals, that are of the same Nature and Kind, of one Tribe, or Alliance, his Kinsmen, Fellows, Associates, Neighbours, Brothers, (not as deriving their Origin from the same Blood, or Seed, but from the same parental Mind, of which their Minds are so many Branches pluck’d off,) Fellow-Members of one Body, that are born to be Fellow-Workers, (as the Feet, the Hands, the Eye-Lids, the Rows of the upper and under Teeth,) and by Nature Friends. Let this be laid down in the first place; I am a Part of the Whole, which is govern’d by Nature. In the next place, I am nearly allied to those other Parts, that are of the same Kind. The Mind of the Universe1 is Social; wherefore the principal thing intended in the Constitution of Men, is the social Design, which is the End and Good, and ought to be the Scope, of Man; and whatever Practice of his hath not reference (immediately, or remotely) to the social Design, destroyeth the Uniformity of Life, and is Seditious; as a factious Person, among the People, divideth his own Party from the common Consent. We ought not to be hurried away by such Motions, as are unsocial, but to pass from one social Practice to another, with mindfulness of God; to treat Men socially, according to the natural Law of Fellowship, kindly and justly. What do I care for more than this, that my present Action be the proper Action of one that is Rational, one that is Social, and that is govern’d by the same Law of right Reason with God?

To Man that is rational and social, it is proper to do nothing, but what the Reason of his regial and legislative part suggests for the Good of Men. He ought to love them truly and from the heart, to take care of the Welfare of all Men, to worship and praise the Gods, and to do good to Men, to bear with them, forbearing to injure them, to do them good unweariedly, persisting in an uninterrupted Series of good Actions, accounting Beneficence to others, his own Emolument and (because they are Members of the same Body) a doing good to himself. The Joy of a Man is to do what properly belongeth to a Man; and it properly belongeth to a Man, to be kindly affected to those of the same Tribe, or Kindred. It is proper and agreeable to a Man, to love those that off end against him, (for by Nature they are his Friends and Kinsmen;) to bear good-Will to them that hate and disparage him; not to be angry with the Stupid and Ungrateful, but to take care of them; to be friendly and benevolent to every Man: Men are made for one another; teach them better, or bear with them. A Branch, cut off from Continuity with its Neighbour-Branch, is necessarily cut off from the whole Tree; a Man divideth himself from his Neighbour, hating him, and having an Aversion from him, yet knoweth not, that at the same Time he divideth himself from the whole Body. As a Citizen of the World, and a part of the whole, Man is oblig’d to have no private Self-Interest, or Advantage, to consult about nothing, as unbound; but, as the Hand, or Feet, if they had Reason and Understanding of the natural Order, should have no Motions, nor desire any Thing, but with respect to the whole; to direct his whole Endeavour to the common Good, and to abstain from the contrary; for the whole is of greater regard than a part, and a City than a Citizen. He that is unjust to any, is impious; for the Nature of the Universe having made all rational Animals one for another, that they should benefit one another, according to every one’s Worth, but in no wise hurt one another; he that transgresseth this her Will, is manifestly guilty of Impiety towards the most antient and venerable of the Gods.

But their Institution is, in great Measure, unpopular and irreligious, subverting Religion, 1. By discarding future Rewards and Punishments.§III. So far excellently well, and the bright Side of Stoicism; but now follows its dark Side, which, in consequence at least, destroyeth its better part. For one great Article of natural Religion is, the Immortality of human Souls; that after this Life they exist in a happy, or calamitous, State; and that Mankind ought to be govern’d by hope of Reward, or fear of Punishment; the two chief Pillars of all Society, whether civil, or religious; of which, amongst others, Lucretius and the Epicureans were very sensible.

But these grand Articles of natural Religion, the Stoicks discard as vulgar Errors, designing to rid themselves of the Passions, to rescue themselves intirely from all Bondage of Mind, and to enjoy perfect Liberty and Tranquility; designing to institute a Philosopher, (a whimsical Kind of Virtuoso, by them call’d a Wise-Man, and his Institution, Wisdom,) they undermine the Fundamentals of Religion; they conspire with the Epicureans, in razing and demolishing the principal Pillars of it; and make their own Laws, the Law of Subjection to the Governor of the World, not Law, but an extravagant Hypothesis. They suppose, “That an imperial Head presideth over an Universe of rational Agents, which must be govern’d by Law, but without the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments; That the Virtuous must hope for no other Reward, the Vicious need to fear no other Punishment, but their being such; That no thing must be thought our Good or Evil, save only the things that are in the Power of our own Will, lest we curse the Gods, when they seem to neglect, or cross us.” Upon which Terms there can be no dutiful Submission to divine Chastisements and Punishments, no pious Addresses for preventing, or removing, them, and for promoting the external Blessings of this, or a better, Life. According to them, “It is of no concern, for how long you shall Practice virtuously; three Hours are sufficient. Prorogation of Life conduceth nothing to Felicity; a blessed Life that is short, is no less desirable than that which is long; both are alike; Happiness is not encreas’d by length, nor diminish’d by shortness, of Time; Time is of no Moment to happiness; there is no difference between a Day and an Age; Life by that is made longer, but not happier.” An Institution, which, at this rate, affronteth the common-Reason of Mankind, corrupteth their natural Notions, quencheth their innate Desires and noble Breathings after Immortality, to which an Institution of Virtue ought to conduct Men, and is doubtless, in great Measure, no Institution of serious Virtue, but of unpopular and irreligious Humour.

The Stoicks are also extremely Irreligious, in depriving the supreme Governor of distributive Justice; in ascribing to him an extravagant indulgent Goodness, destructive to the true Use of Sacrifices, methods of Atonement, penitential Sorrow, and the pious Fear of a Deity. For, altho’ they sometimes acknowledge, that the Governor of the World inflicteth castigatory Punishments in this Life, yet they do not suppose, that he inflicteth any properly penal Evils. Hence it is with them a Maxim, “The State of absolute Liberty, is, neither to fear Men, nor God.”2 So, according to Zeno, one thing requisite in an happy Man, is, “Not to fear the Gods.” The Platonists agree with the Stoicks, in attributing an irreligious Kind of Goodness to the Deity, yet they suppose castigatory Punishments in a future Life. The Gods themselves, all the subordinate Deities, are suppos’d by the Stoicks, to be Mortal and Corruptible, and they are all to be swallow’d up in the universal Conflagration: Nor is their Jupiter absolutely indissoluble, indiscerpible, and incorruptible, being nothing better than a corporeal fiery Nature.

2. By ridiculing the Fear of Death,§IV. Secondly, they ridicule the Fear of Death, explode the laudable Usage of Burying the Dead, and of Mourning for them; all which is absurdly unpopular and irreligious. Nor could the World be govern’d, if all Men entertain’d a persuasion, That Death, and, consequently, the Execution of Criminals, is no penal Evil, no Evil at all, as the Stoicks suppose. According to them, “All ways of dying are alike,” and so there is no difference between the easiest natural Death, and Death aggravated by horrible Tortures, Modes, and Circumstances, of Dying. Plato also and Socrates affirm, “That Death is good, and better than Living with the Body, not to some only, but simply unto all.”3

And allowing, nay, in some Cases, enjoyning Self-murder.If the Wise-Man be in tragical Circumstances, and weary of Life, their Philosophy alloweth and enjoyneth “an Exit agreeable to Reason (that is, Self-Murder.) The Gate is open, none hath Reason to complain of Life, for none is forc’d to live against his Will; if he liveth miserably, it is his own Fault; doth it please you? Live; doth it not please you? You may return whence you came.” This Doctrine was practis’d by several of the Philosophick Pagans, and the School of Plato became somewhat infected with it, notwithstanding he himself has reason’d so well against it; but the Popular Pagans, following Nature, were of better Principles.

3. By their denying Pain to be an Evil.§V. The Stoical Doctrine of Pain, Sickness, & c. is so far from being Wisdom, that it is an unpopular irreligious and paradoxical Humour, or Madness, shall I rather call it? Their magnificent Pretentions are, “That Pain and Torture of Body are not Evil; or, if it be Evil, it is another’s Evil, not ours, the Body being no part of us, but our Organ only. Socrates affirm’d, that Pain remain’d in the Foot, it doth not affect the Mind with Evil. They can live in great hilarity of Mind, altho’ the wild Beasts pull in sunder their bodily Members. Men of Learning are furnish’d with Fortitude against things Painful and Dolorous, which suffereth them not to pass within the Porch of the Soul, but, considering them as apropos’d Exercise, beareth them without Grief and Affliction. Doth sensitive Pain, or Pleasure, touch thee? Let Sense look to it, let the Body and bodily Members make it their care, if they can, that they suffer not; and when they suffer, let them complain, if they can, and judge that Pain is Evil. The Soul may keep her proper Tranquillity and Serenity, and not suppose it Evil. Not Fire, nor Iron, nor a Tyrant, nor contumelious Language, can touch the Mind.” Noble Rant this! But, if they really can abstract the Mind from all sympathizing with the Body, and from uneasiness by the Pains of it, whence is it, that they cannot keep her from Disturbance by the Humours of the Body? For they acknowledge themselves as liable as other Mortals to Fevers, Ravings, and Madness. Whence is it, that, upon account of extremity of Pain, they think it decent, to take away their own Lives? And why do they talk of Pain intolerable, and make use of the Epicurean Consolation, “If Pain be intolerable, it is not long; if it be long, it is not intolerable?” Such Philosophy does little more for the Cure of human Evils, than to make Men wranglers about Names and Terms, as if changing the Names chang’d the Natures of Things.

Externals, and whatever Things do not depend upon our own Will, they will not have call’d human Goods, but Things indifferent; but, “altho’ the Things be indifferent, the Use of them is not indifferent: As Children, when they play with Shells, their Sollicitude is, not about the Shells, but to play with them dextrously.” Upon which Terms there may be Well-doing, but no such Thing as doing Good to others, in the Use of Externals; yet the Stoicks pretend to Beneficence, and write Books concerningBenefits: Altho’ they are like a Physitian, whose Care and Concern is, not the Life and Welfare of his Patient, but only, that his own Management may be according to Art. They most inconsistently exhort Mankind to be Thankful for their Life, and the Helps of Life, the Fruits of the Earth, when they are at the same Time instituting them to an indifference as to “Life and Death, Health and Sickness, bodily Pain, or Pleasure, Honour, or Ignominy, Plenty, or Penury, Wife, Children, Country, Fame, Possessions, Friends, and their own Bodies.” “If a Tyrant threatneth me with Bonds,” (saith Epictetus4 ) “I say, he threatneth the Hands and the Feet: If to cut of my Head, I say, he threatneth the Neck: If to Imprison me, the Body. Doth he therefore threaten nothing to me? If I look upon these Things as nothing to me, he threatneth nothing to me. But, if I fear any of them, he threatneth me. Is thy Son dead? What hath happen’d? Thy Son is dead. Is that all? That is all. That Ill hath happen’d, is thine own additional. If thine Hearing he incommoded, what is that to thee? No ill News can come to thee from Rome, for what Evil can befal thee there, where thou art not? Banishment is but to be elsewhere. Dost thou want Bread? The Door is open, thou may’st go out of a smoaky House.” (But, if these Things be no Evils, what meaneth that sovereign Antidote against them, To die readily?) “But is not Life a Good? No. May we not desire Health? No, by no means, nor any Thing else of the Aliena,5from which the Appetite must be far remov’d; or else thou submittest thy Neck to Servitude, to the Things first, and next to the Men, who have the Disposal of them. Health is not Good, nor Sickness Evil; the Good is, to be Healthful as you ought: In like Manner, be Sick as you ought, and Sickness becometh Good and Profitable. The right Use of the Externals which present themselves, is a MERCURY’s Rod, which turneth every Thing that it toucheth into Gold. Sickness, Death, Penury, Contumely, capital Sentence, touch them with the Rod of MERCURY, and they all become Profitable. Why then should we seek our Good and Evil in Externals, seeing it is in our own Power, to make all Externals Good?” But, in order to rectify their Philosophy of Good and Evil, it ought to be consider’d, That good Things are of two Kinds. For some Things are Good, as constituent Parts of our true Perfection and Happiness of Life, and these we call the End. Other Things are Good, as conducive thereto, and these are call’d the Means. In the first Notion, the good Things, commonly so reputed, (Life, Health, Honour, Plenty, &c.) cannot be Evils, consider’d in the Nature of an End; and the Evils, commonly so reputed, (Death, Sickness, Infamy, Penury, &c.) cannot be Good. In the second Notion of Means, the Evils, commonly so reputed, may be Good, and the good Things, commonly so reputed, may be Evils; and usually are, not helps, but hindrances, to our true Perfection and Happiness in a future State.

Their regal and happy Estate, and Self-sufficiency.§VI. The Stoick’s Wise-Man, according to their Institution, is Noble, Brave, Rich, Prosperous, free from Servitude and Misery; but quite out of the Road, both of civil and religious Society. For they suppose, “That nothing but our intelligent Nature is our-self, and that those Things only, which properly belong thereto, and fall within the Power of our own Wills, do concern us, or are our Good and Evil Things. Discarding, therefore, the many Things, they place their one Thing, and their All, in cultivating their intelligent free-agent Nature; in its being Virtuous, and such as the proper Nature of Man requireth; thus attaining a State of Felicity without Impediment, or danger of Misfortune, never failing of what they desire, nor falling into what they have an Aversion to; living, therefore, in a State of perfect Liberty, which they account the greatest Good. Being obnoxious to no superior Power, they are all Kings. Having dismiss’d the desire and fear of Externals, none can hurt them, they inhabit an impregnable City, none can have access to their Riches, they have no Enemy, they complain of none, criminate no Body. Hearken to me,” (saith Epictetus,) “and you shall never live in Envy, nor be in Anger, Grief, or Fear, never be prohibited, or hinder’d, nor ever Flatter any. To me” (continueth he) “no Evil can happen, to me there is no Thief” (he that stole his Lamp was no Thief to him) “nor any Earthquake; but all Things are full of Peace and Undisturbance. I seek Good and Evil within, only in mine own Things, (i.e. in judging aright of Things, in having my Desires and Aversions right, and in the right Use of Externals,) not giving the Name of Good, or Evil, of Utility, or Damage, or any thing of that Nature, to Things not in my own Power.” Such are the Principles of the Stoicks in their Schools, which they relinquish, or dissemble, when they betake themselves to the management of publick Affairs. For these they manage, (as Plutarch well observes,) as if they accounted Externals (Health, Riches, and Glory,) good Things; for how can they be throughly concern’d, to avert publick Calamities, if they suppose them no Evils, or not their Concern?

“The Body” (saith the Stoick) “is nothing to me; the Parts of it are nothing to me; Death is nothing to me. This is the State and Character of a Philosopher, he looketh for all his Utility and Damage from himself. If another can hurt me, then I do nothing: If I expect that another help me, then I am nothing. The Mind devoid of Passions is inexpugnable, collected into it self, it is self-content, a Cittadel; a stronger Place, where-unto to make his Refuge, and so to become Impregnable, and better fortify’d than this, hath no Man. So that” (as Plutarch has observ’d) “if he be Imprison’d, he suffereth no Prohibition; if thrown down a Precipice, he suffereth no Constraint; if Tortur’d, he is not Tormented; if Bound, he is not Hurt; if he falleth in Wrestling, yet he cannot be Vanquish’d; if encompass’d by a Wall, yet he cannot be Besieged; and if he be sold by Enemies, yet he cannot be Captivated; he hath Riches and a Kingdom, and is Fortunate and Prosperous, Unindigent and Self-sufficient, without a Penny in his Purse. The Wise-Man” (saith the Stoick) “hath created Peace to himself, by fearing nothing, and Riches, by not desiring any Thing: Altho’ without City, House, or Harbour, yet he wanteth nothing. He can be happy by himself in a State of Solitude, as being happy and sufficient from himself,” without the innumerable and inestimable Benefits of Society. And, because he liveth in the Perfection of Virtue and Happiness, neither publick nor private Calamities do at all diminish the Wise-Man’s Happiness. Not publick Calamities, for “the overturning and ruin of his City, will he count it any great Thing? If he supposeth it a grand Evil, or any Evil at all, he will be ridiculous, and no more Virtuous, accounting Wood and Stone, and the Death of Mortals, some great Matters. Wars, Sedition, the Death of Multitudes of Men, the Overturning and Burning of Cities, are no great Things: As the Death of Multitudes of Cattle, the Overturning and Burning of Birds nests, are no great Matters. Not private Calamities, that befall himself, or his Relations. For, without any title to a future Happiness, the Wise-Man is happy in the midst of Torments; his Happiness receives no addition from Health, Ease, and Pleasures, nor any diminution from their opposites.” Is such an Institution as this fit for human Minds?

Apathy.§VII. Not less extravagant is their Doctrine of Apathy, or being free from animal Affections and Passions, which at once discards all things external, whether Good or Evil, both of this and another World, substituting certain mental Operations, instead of the Passions of the lower or animal Soul; “Will, instead of the Passion of Desire; mental Joy, instead of the Passion of Joy; Caution, instead of the Passion of Fear; but, instead of Grief, or Sorrow, they substitute nothing, because they deny any such Thing in a Wise-Man.” If Ulysses (said Epictetus) in truth lamented for his Wife, was he not unhappy? “But what good Man is unfortunate, or unhappy? Therefore, if he cri’d and lamented, he was not a good Man.” Sorrow for the Death of Friends, they account a very bad Thing, their Philosophy being a contrivance to live in perfect Indolence: Nor alloweth it Sorrow for our Sins and Vices, as Plutarch charges them. But, if this be Philosophy, the old Man had great Reason to tell his Son, “Hear me, my Son! you must Philosophize, but you must have Brains too: These are egregious Fooleries.” As likewise are these their Maxims. “The Wise-Man is never mov’d by Grace, or Favour; never pardoneth the Crimes of any. None commiserate, but the Vain and Foolish. It is not the Property of a Man, to be exorable, or placable.”

But, doubtless, it would be better for Mankind to be left to the Sentiments of Nature, than to be instituted to such a harden’d Virtue, that is neither possible, nor tolerable, being absolutely Destructive, both of Good-Nature, and of the Exercise of divine and gracious Affections and Passions. For Fear and Desire are truly said to be divine Virtues, if their Objects be Things divine; and to sympathize with others in their Joys and Sorrows, is inseparable from true Benevolence. But the Stoicks admit of no sympathizing Sorrow, but in political Appearance. “If you see a Man” (saith Epictetus) “lamenting his Misfortunes, you may in Words accommodate your-self to him, and, if you be so dispos’d, lament with him: But take care, that you do not internally lament.”

Arrogance, with respect to the Gods, as well as Men.§VIII. The Pagans charg’d the Stoicks with Arrogance, and not without great Reason; for it was but a natural Consequence of their extravagant Liberty, Security, Tranquillity, Self-Sufficiency, Wisdom, Royalty, and Apathy; insomuch that their Wise-Man is no less than one of Jove’s Peers, that liveth as well as the Gods live. “And, as it is agreeable to Jove” (saith Chrysippus) “to elate himself upon account of his Life, to think great, and (if I may so speak) to lift up his Head, to glory, and magnify himself, living worthy of a magnifying Elation: So these Things agree to all good Men, that in nothing come behind Jove. As to the Body,” (saith Epictetus,) “thou art a small part of the Universe. But in respect of the Mind, or Reason, not worse, nor less, than the Gods; for the greatness of the Mind is not to be judg’d of by Longitude, nor Altitude, but by decretory Sentiments.” In this Philosophy, one of the fundamental Maxims is, “That all the Wise and Good are Equal,” being all of them happy to the height of Bliss. For Virtue, the true and the sole cause of Happiness, is equal in them all; it is not capable of increase, nor diminution, and as for Externals, which are of no consideration, they make no disparity. Time also maketh no disparity. Whence it follows, “That Jupiter and Dio, being both Wise, are equals. In Virtue Jupiter doth not transcend Dio. In Felicity God doth not transcend the Wise-Man, although he surmounteth him in Age,” which maketh no disparity. But is not Jupiter the more Powerful and Opulent? “Sextius was wont to equalize Jupiter and the good Man; Jupiter indeed hath more, and can do more for Mankind: But between two that are Good, the Richer is not the Better. Do you inquire of the difference between a Wise-Man and the Gods? The Gods will exist a longer Time. But it is a great Artifice, to inclose the whole in a little Room,”6i.e. for a Wise-Man to have the whole in his Age, which God hath in a long Succession of Ages. In this and some other respects, the Wise-Man transcendeth Jupiter, and he admireth himself above him. “There is something whereinthe Wise-Man may have the Precedence of God: He is one of the Wise, by the Benefit of Nature, not by his own Efficiency, as the Wise-Man is. The Wise-Man seeeth and contemneth all Things which others possess, with as equal a Mind as Jupiter: And upon this Account more admireth himself; Jupiter cannot make use of them, the Wise-Man will not.”7 Very modest and pious Doctrines! If this be not rampant Luciferian Pride, I know not what is.

“The Wise-Man” (say they) “is always alike, and of the same Countenance, as Socrates was, in all Circumstances. He doth not assent to any Opinion, is ignorant of nothing, never deceiv’d, never unsuccessful, never repenteth of any Undertaking, wondereth at nothing, nothing befalleth him contrary to Opinion. The good Man is perfect, sinneth in nothing, is impeccable, suffereth no Injury, is not mad, altho’ maniacal, is inebriated, yet not drunk. All Things are the Stoical Wise-Man’s, he is the only King and Freeman; he alone is rich, beauteous, noble, the only Citizen, Magistrate, Judge, Orator, Poet, Priest, Prophet.” Fine Prerogatives! The Popular Pagans fell so far short of Stoical Wisdom, as to acknowledge their good Endowments the Gift of God: But the Stoicks say of their Wisdom, “Every one that hath it, oweth it to himself.” Sometimes they huff at praying for the divine Aid. “What need is there of Prayers? make thy-self Happy.”8 In a better Humour they assert the Concurrence of divine Assistance with human Endeavours; they exhort us to pray for Virtue, a good Mind, and the divine Aid. “But so, that the Effect is properly to be ascrib’d to our own Power, because it is a Thing which properly belongeth to our own Power.” For this Philosophy distinguishes Things that properly belong to our own Power, from the Things that do not properly belong to our own Power: The Works of Providence are not the Things that properly belong to our own Power; they are properly to be ascrib’d to the Gods: But the Stoicks Virtue, and its consequent Felicity, are Things that properly belong to our own Power; according to that of Cotta in Cicero, “All Mankind ascribe the Commodity and Prosperityof Life to the Gods, but none ever ascrib’d his Virtue to the Diety.”9 So the Poet, speaking the Sense of the Stoical Philosopher, ascribeth Life and Riches to Jove, but not a virtuous Mind; for that is an Effect, which properly belongeth to his own Power. “Let him give Life and Riches, I will get to my-self a good Mind.”10 But as Riches are the Gift of Providence, yet not exclusively to human Endeavours, so the Virtue of our Mind belongeth to our own Power, yet not exclusively to divine Assistance; “for who hath told thee” (saith M. Antoninus,) “that the Gods do not help us even to those Things, that they have put in our own Power?” Whence an appearing inconsistency in another Poet, who also speaketh the Sense of the Stoical Philosopher, is easily reconcileable.

• Orandum est, ut sit Mens sana in corpore sano,
• Monstro quod tibi ipsi possis dare.

Juvenal.11

Because the Gods help us in those Things that properly belong to our own Power, therefore the Poet saith, “Pray for a virtuous Mind”: Yet, because the Virtues of the Mind are Things that properly belong to our own Power, and must be ascrib’d thereto, therefore the Poet saith, “I tell thee of that which thou mayst bestow upon thy-self.” For the help of the Gods is not requisite in any great Degree, nor otherwise than as a less Principal, and adjuvant Cause: Nor is Man suppos’d to be impotent for Virtue and Happiness in any great Degree. Thus the Spirit of Stoicism is that of a criminal Self-sufficiency, Self-confidence, Self-dependence, and Boasting. “He thanketh the Gods, but with audacious Gloriation.”12 His Joy is an elation of Mind, “trusting to his own Possessions and Abilities.” “He knoweth his own Strength, and that no Burden is too much for him.” “The Agency of his Free-will, Jupiter cannot vanquish.”

Their haughty Temper appears, not only in their Demeanour towards Jupiter, but in their carriage to their Civil Governors. For they suppos’d, That no Man had Dominion over them, being Jupiter’s Sons and Subjects, set at liberty by him from all Servitude and Constraint. And having discarded all regard to Rewards and Punishments, whereby Societies are govern’d, they discarded therewith their due Subjection and Reverence to the Civil Power, which was very unbecoming the Citizens of the Universe, as they call’d themselves. “How do I (saith the Cynick) treat those as Slaves, whom you fear and admire? Who is there, that when he seeth me, doth not suppose, that he seeth his Lord and King? What is Caesar to a Cynick, or the Proconsul, or any other, save only Jupiter, that sent him down, and whom he serveth?”

Of their Transcendentals and passive Obedience to the divine Will.§IX. Instead of sober Morality, they deal much in superlative Extravagancies; for such is their superlative Strictness, “not to move a Finger, unless Reason dictateth,”

• (Ni tibi concessit Ratio, digitum exere, peccas.)

Their Severity of Temper, “never speaking any thing for pleasure, nor admitting any thing of that kind spoken by others,” which is Sowrness and supercilious Gravity. Their enjoyning “silence for the most part, and speaking seldom,” is an Excess; also their conformity to the Pharisees in a supercilious Contempt of the Vulgar. The Patience, which they prescribe, is nothing better than a haughty sullen Insensibility, for he “must seem to the Vulgar, devoid of Sense and a Stone.” Their invariable Constancy of Temper was no Virtue, but an inconsistency with true Virtue, which exerciseth various Affections and Passions upon various Occasions, Anger, Mildness, Boldness, Fearfulness, Joy, Sorrow. But the Stoical Wise-Man is criminally uniform of Countenance; none ever saw Socrates more joyous, or more sad; agreeably to the Conceit of Aristo Chius, That the final Good is, “To live in an absolute indifferency of Mind, without any Variation, or Motion either way, carrying ones self with the same equal Tenour always.”13“The Wise-Man” (saith Epictetus) “must be always alike, in acute Pains, in the loss of Children, in Chronical Diseases.” Their Passive Obedience also, and Conformity of Will to the divine Will, is a superlative Extravagance. “How” (saith Epictetus) “shall I become of free-Estate? For he is a Free-Man, to whom all Things happen according to his Mind, and none can be his hindrance; naturally I would have all Things to happen, as I please; but to be learned, is to learn to will all Things to be as they are. Will nothing but what God willeth, and none can hinder thee; none can force thee, no more than Jupiter. I was never hindred in my Desires, nor necessitated in my Aversions, because I have render’d my Appetite accommodate to God. Is it his Will, that I should be in a Fever? It is my Will. Is it his Will, that I should obtain any Thing? It is my Will. Is it not his Will? It is not mine. Who can now hinder me, or force me against mine own Mind? Seek not, that Events should be as thou willest; but will them to be as they are, and thou canst not fail to be prosperous.”14

How Specious soever such a conformity of Will to the Divine may seem, it will be found, if examin’d, far from Pious. For it is not pious to pray with the dying Stoick, “Place me in what Region thou pleasest. Take me and throw me where thou wilt, I am indifferent.” It is not pious, to entertain all afflictive Providences with a Stoical Indifference. It is not pious in him, notwithstanding all his own Sins and Sufferings, the Sins and Miseries of Mankind, “to be devoid of Sorrow, Fear, Passion, Perturbation, nor to Grieve upon any one’s Account.” It cannot be thought a due Conformity to the divine Will, to discard the humbling Methods of Piety, for the Cure, or Removal, of the disastrous Events of Providence, such as afflicting the Soul, Deprecation, Intercession, and to substitute in their stead that magnanimous Voice, “With God I affect and pursue, with him I desire, my Volitions are simply and absolutely coincident with the supreme Volitions.” For these settled Maxims of the Stoick are irreligious Errors, “That the divine Nature cannot be angry, and that the Events of Providence are Fatalities.” Beside; they that will all Things to be as they are, must necessarily will the State of Things in the World to as bad as it is, which is repugnant to all true Virtue, to the use of Prayer, and to the Stoicks Desires and Endeavours for the amendment of Mankind. Their Passive Obedience teaches them, indeed, to suffer Afflictions, but not to act in a becoming Manner in such a State, in which the grand Duties of Piety are, the humbling our-selves under the divine Hand, searching and trying our Ways, practice of Repentance, and improving in Devotion. Their Passive Obedience is of a spurious Kind, the insolent Boldness of an affected Liberty, (which rivals Jove,) and the Stoutness of a Bravo. “Look” (saith Epictetus) “at the Powers which thou art furnish’d with, and, having view’d them, say, Bring upon me, O Jupiter, what Hardship thou wilt, I am sufficiently furnish’d by what thou hast given me, to make whatever happeneth Ornamental to me. At length erect thy Neck, as one out of Servitude, fearing nothing that can happen: Dare to lift up thine Eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest, I am of the same Mind with thee, I am equal to any Thing.” Their running the Pit and slinking out of harm’s Way, by taking away their Lives in bad Circumstances, is Heroism and Passive Valour of the illegitimate Kind. Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates himself, should have consider’d, that there may be such a Conformity to the divine Will of Events, as may clash with the divine Will of Duty and Precept. Their Passive Obedience is founded upon bad Principles. “Dost thou call that a Mischance to a Man, which is no Mischance to the proper Nature of Men? Let that part which judgeth of Things be at rest, altho’ the Body, which is next the Thing, be cut, or burn’d, suffer Corruption, or Putrefaction. That which maketh not the Man worse, which doth not involve him in any Crime, doth not make his Life the worse, nor can it hurt him. All Things that befall Men, are allotted them by that Whole, or Universe, whereof they are a part; and that is good for every one, which the Nature of the whole bringeth upon every one. Whatever shall come to pass, the World loveth to have it so: I say therefore to the World, I concur with thee in Affection, and love to have it so.” Which cannot be thought a very virtuous Saying; for what Virtue is there in deifying this Region of Sin and Mortality, and Misery, the Laws of whose Administration are manifestly Penal and Calamitous?

Altho’ the Stoicks pretended to follow Nature, and altho’ they call their Philosophy Moral, yet their Morality is extremely different from the institution of Nature, being that of unpopular Humorists, of abstract Mentalists, and Enthusiasts. “Shew me a Man” (saith the Stoick) “that desireth to be made a God of a Man, and in this mortal Body to have consortship with Jove?” The Religion, therefore, and Piety of Stoicism, is not Natural Religion, but a jumble of Self-sufficiency, Independency, Liberty, Apathy, Prosperity, and undisturb’d Tranquillity. It is not hard to determine, which were the better sort of Religionists; whither the Popular Pagans, who complain’d, when they were hurt, (provided they abstain’d from cursing their Deities,) were touch’d with their Afflictions, and looked upon mournful Spectacles with the Eyes of Mourners: Or the strutting Philosophers, who took a Pride in trusting to their own Strength and invincible Maxims, deriding all Events; that were to live at the rate of Pagan Deities, who are above Passion, in Human Flesh. Agreeably to their Hypothesis, “That the Perfection of Felicity is attainable in this Life,” they contriv’d a method of arriving at so transcendent a condition; which was by placing all their good in their own things only, that are in the disposal of their own Wills, contemning all that belong not to their own Free-agent Nature. Being thus instituted to live in Safety, Liberty, Independence upon Others, not liable to be constrain’d, hurt, or hindred by any, never failing of prosperous Success, never being unfortunate, nor conflicting with any Adversity; they could bear whatever happen’d without Humiliation, or brokenness of Mind. They assumed to themselves a greatness of Mind, (as supposing that nothing could hurt them, and that they were beyond the power of Evil,) and were able to make this resignation to Providence from their whole Soul, “Carry me, O Jupiter! and thou, O Fate! whithersoever I am destin’d by you.”

Such is the Stoicks Passive Obedience, neither Natural, nor Christian. And, if we agree not with the Stoicks touching Passive Obedience, (which is the top flower of their Philosophy,) nor think it safe to rely upon the Maxims of the Heathen Philosophers, (both because they are Heathens and Philosophers, i.e. Teachers of unpopular Doctrines,) we are not likely to entertain a late Conceit, That all the Agenda in Christianity, the two Sacraments excepted, are nothing but what was taught before by the Moral Philosophers. For, altho’ of all things in our Religion, there are Affinities and Resemblances in their Religion and Institutions of Learning and Virtue; yet the best of them must be thought bad Teachers of Duty and Virtue, all of them being Aliens from true Piety, and some of them extremely deficient in Philosophizing.

Their monstrously absurd Conceits.§X. For, as to their Natural Philosophy, the Sun, Moon and Stars are nourish’d by Vapours; and when these fail, there will be a Conflagration of the Universe, a resolution of the Gods (Jupiter only excepted) and of Men into their first Elements, God and Matter; after which there will be a Restauration of the same World, and the same Men, and so in endless Rounds. The Night, Day, Evening, Morning, our Arts, Memories, Fancies, Assents, Passions, Virtues, Vices, Wisdom also and Good, are all Bodies; nay, and Animals too. An Imagination so wild could never have enter’d into the Head of any Man, but a Philosopher, or a Rabbi. “Virtue is nothing else but the Mind modified, therefore it is an Animal,” saith Seneca.15 Agreeably to their Notion of the Soul of the World, who, in this Philosophy, is a subtle fiery Body, the Mind of Man is a Body, “a part of God, and a God too.” And this deified Mind of Man is that, which they mean by their Holy or Divine Spirit in Man. “Reason in Men” (saith Seneca) “is nothing else but a part of the Divine Spirit immers’d in a Human Body.” At the same rate the Pythagoreans and Platonists deify the Human Nature, forbidding Man to pollute, by corporeal Passions, their Domestick God.16 The Platonists suppos’d the Souls of all Animals to be parts of the Divine Substance; the Stoicks, the Minds of Men only; the more tolerable Hypothesis of the two; yet, because it supposes a Separation of the parts of the Deity, and that the parts of God may be miserable, it is to be rejected with Indignation.

A like intermixture of absurd Fancies has overspread their Moral Philosophy; “That all Sins are equal; That all, who are not of the Wise of the first Form, are equally foolish, bad, vicious, morbid, miserable, mad.” This earthly Region is visibly a Region of Sin and Suffering; But in Stoicism, which is a sullen and surly contempt of Human Calamities, the State of the World is a Festival Solemnity. Death is the Nature of Man, not Punishment; and the serious Calamities of Mankind, “Deaths, Rapines, the slaughtering Men and sacking Cities, are to be contemplated as the scenical Shiftings on the Theatres; the Tears of Mourners as shews of Lamentations, and (the affairs of Life being a Play) as Childrens crying.” They are not troubled for their own Vices, “for who hindreth them from rectifying their own Principles?” Nor are they troubled at the Impieties of others, or angry and offended at their Sins and Injuries. “If any one hath sinn’d” (saith the Stoick) “the hurt is only his own. Wickedness doth not at all hurt the World. Jupiter hath so dispos’d things, that there should be Summer and Winter, Fruitfulness and Barrenness, Virtue and Wickedness, and all such contrarieties, for the good and symphony of the Universe. The worst of Men do but act according to their own Opinion, and are to be rectify’d, not destroy’d. All that offend, it is against their Will. All Men miss of the Truth against their Will. Nothing is hurtful to a part, which is for the good of the whole. What is not hurtful to the City, hurteth not a Citizen. Bad Men are neither affected with Benefits, nor have they any Benefactors, nor are they guilty of neglecting their Benefactors.”

Their gross Immoralities.§XI. The great Imperfection of the Stoical Institution (applicable also to the other Pagan Institutions) appears from the gross Immoralities wherein they liv’d; for they were not well disciplin’d against the foul Vices of Drunkenness, Uncleanness, and irreligious Swearing. Seneca pleadeth for Drunkenness, Zeno liv’d in it, and Chrysippus died by it.17 The great Hercules, celebrated for a great Drinker, (his Cup also is celebrated,) is a Divine Man in the Style of Epictetus’s Dissertations; and Cato, a Stoical Wise-Man of the first Form, is of the same Character: But No-Body must call his Drunkenness a Crime; “for it is easier” (saith Seneca) “to make it no Crime, than Cato a Criminal.” But, as a Stoick is extravagant in his Supposition, “That he remaineth safe and unhurt in Drink and in Melancholy; that his Body may be in Drink as to all its Senses and Powers, yet his Mind remain unprejudic’d,” (which is the meaning of that Maxim, The Wise-Man is liable to be inebriated, but not drunk;) so it is a wild kind of Virtue, that is consistent with so great a Vice, which is indeed all Vices in one, and the Mother of all Wickedness. But these impure Heathens suppos’d, “That there is a right and prudent use of Drunkenness, which contributeth to Virtue, and that it ought not to be extirpated from a well-govern’d City.” “Plato forbiddeth Children to drink any Wine, before they be 18, and to be drunk before they come to 40. But such he is content to pardon, if they chance to delight themselves with it, and alloweth them somewhat largely, to blend the influence ofBacchusin their Banquets, that good God who bestoweth cheerfulness upon Men, and Youth unto aged Men, who allayeth and asswageth the Passions of the Mind, (even as Iron is made flexible by the Fire;) and, in his profitable Laws, drinking-Meetings are look’d upon as necessary and commendable, (always provided there be a chief Leader among them, to contain and order them;) Drunkenness being a good and certain Tryal of every Man’s Nature, and therewithal proper to give aged Men the courage to make merry in Dancing and in Musick, things allowable and profitable, and such as they dare not undertake being sober and settled.”18Anacharsis was addicted to Drunkenness, as Plutarch informs us; and the Prince of Philosophical Heathen Saints, even Socrates himself, “tho’ he was not forward to drink at Banquets” (as we are inform’d by one of his Scholars,) “when he was compell’d, master’d all; and, which is most to be wondred at, no Man ever saw Socrates drunk.” We are told, that he spent whole Nights in drinking, and that the Greeks praise him exceedingly, that having spent a whole long Night, drinking for Victory with Aristophanes, he was able at Day-break, to delineate and demonstrate a subtil geometrical Problem, thereby shewing, that the Wine had no noxious Effect upon him.19

Socrates was a great Lover; and it was in his Time so genteel for Men to be Lovers of Boys, that it was forbidden to Slaves; tho’ at Athens the Laws prohibited the Practice universally, but ineffectually. Socratici Cinaedi were proverbial. Both the Popular and Philosophical Pagans were addicted to this Vice. Such Love of Boys as was at Thebes, Elis, and in Crete, is condemn’d by Plutarch in his Treatise of Education, who alloweth that which was at Lacedaemon and Athens; yet we are assured, that it prevail’d criminally in all parts of Greece, but at Athens most. Euripides, being invited to a Banquet by King Archelaus, became Drunk, and in that Mood kiss’d the Poet Agatho (who sat next him) being then 40 Years old. Whereupon the King ask’d him, if his Paramour were yet delectable? To which Euripides answer’d, That not only the Spring, but the Autumn of the Fair, is delectable. It is certain, That Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Cebes, Cicero, approv’d the Masculine Amours, which among the Philosophers was without Disgrace, or Reprehension.20 It was they which wrote Love-Dialogues and Discourses, which the Coelestial Venus never inspired. Socrates and Cato communicated their Wives to their Friends. “All manner of Incest, Adultery, and Masculine Mixtures, some of the famous antient Philosophers accounted Things indifferent.”21 Some of the Stoicks befriended Chastity at an extraordinary Rate, commending chast Eyes, forbidding obscene Speech, advising Men to be Pure, as much as may be, from Things Venereal before Marriage;22 yet most of them agreeing with the Popular Pagans, amongst whom the Harlotry of simple Fornication was accounted no Crime, and which almost all the great Philosophers are known to have liv’d in.23 But the generality of that Sect are prodigiously Paradoxical in their Unchastities; Teaching the Father to commit Incest with the Daughter, the Son with the Mother, and the Brother with the Sister; Men and Women to wear the same Garments; that no Speeches are obscene, and that every Thing should be call’d by its own Name, themselves not scrupling the most immodest Actions.24Zeno (as Laertius informs us) was a lover of Boys, made use of both Sexes, and sware by a He-Goat, a lascivious Animal. As for Socrates, he has had the Happiness of eloquent Apologists. As for Plato, he is charg’d with Unchastity by some of his greatest Admirers, who own’d, that the subject Matter of his Convivium is not the Love of Men and Women, but the Love of Men towards Boys, and that not merely as a Platonick Lover. When it was objected to Apuleius, that his Love-Verses were not suitable to a Platonick Philosopher, he justifies himself by Plato’s Practice, who had no Verses extant, but Love-Verses upon the Boys After, Alexis, Phadrus, and Dion: And Ficinus (in Argum. in Charmid.) changeth and omitteth part of the amatorious Things in Plato’s Charmides, as offensive to chast Ears.25Plato will have young Soldiers that behave themselves Valiantly, gratify’d in their Amours, whether Masculine, or Feminine. Following Lycurgus’s Institution, he will have Women expos’d Naked to the Eyes of Men. Transcending Lycurgus’s Institution, and the Impieties of the Popular Pagans, he abolisheth Marriage, and instituteth the Community of Women; which was likewise the Doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus, the Founders of Stoicism. Such are the unpopular and irreligious Institutions of the Heathen Philosophers; which are partly to be attributed to the Spirit of Uncleanness, predominant in the Philosophick Pagans, (insomuch that Lais once laughed, to see more of the Philosophers with her, than of any other sort of Men;) and partly to their cross-grain’d unpopular Humour, express’d by Diogenes, who entering into the Theater opposite to the People that were coming out, was ask’d, why he did so. “This,” said he, “I study to do thro’ my whole Life”; as Laertius relates in his Life.26 But, altho’ the Philosophers had a great Affectation, to distinguish themselves from the Popular Pagans, yet they transcend them in the absurdity of their Institutes; and the Popular Pagan Doctors may at least vie with them for sound Morality, whence Horace prefers Homer before them.

• Qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
• Plenius & Melius Chrysippo & Crantore dicit.27

Christianity forbiddeth common and customary Swearing, whether by Creatures, or by the Deity; and all irreligious Swearing. But no Moral Philosophers ever prohibited Swearing by the Creatures. Socrates ordinarily practis’d it, (doubtless out of Reverence to the Gods,) sometimes Swearing by Animals, a Dog, a Goose, a Goat, and sometimes by Plants, an Oak, or a Plane-Tree. Nor is this the only Defect in their Discipline touching Oaths; for being Separatists from the Popular Pagans, whom they contemn’d at a great Rate, and no great Friends to their Civil Government, they were shy of solemn judicial Oaths, which are of all other the most allowable and needful, but made no scruple of idle criminal Swearing. Clinias the Pythagorean, in a Suit depending before the Judge, might have freed himself from a Fine of three Talents, by taking a true and just Oath: But he chose rather to pay the Mulct, than to take the Oath; so great a respect had these Pythagoreans for their own Philosophical Institution, and so little for Civil Government. For it is well known, that they were not so shy of Swearing by the Master of their Institution, as Religionists Swear by their God: And Hierocles, who hath given many wise Cautions touching the Use of Oaths, with respect to the Honour of the Gods, justifieth their Practice. Touching a solemn judicial Oath Epictetus saith, Refuse it altogether, if it be possible: If not, “as much as may be”; yet himself ordinarily swears in his Dissertations, “I swear to you” (saith he) “by all the Gods.”

The Epicurean Tenets of Morality.§XII. So much for the Stoicks, who “plac’d Happiness in Virtue only.” The Epicurean Scheme, which makes the whole Man to be only a corporeal Engine, may be dispatch’d (from Bp. Parker) in a few Words.28 For Epicurus, consistently with that Principle, “plac’d all Happiness in the Pleasure of the Body alone,” which Doctrine at once destroys all Obligations to Virtue and Honesty, and to Religion, which he trampled under Foot. Epicurus himself plac’d all Happiness in the Enjoyments of the Palate, and such like. Metrodorus, his favourite Disciple, made the Belly, the only Seat of Happiness. In freedom from Pain, in sensual Enjoyments, and in Reflexions upon them, he plac’d the whole of Happiness. Indolence is the Happiness of Stones, and Sensual Pleasures, of Swine, in as great perfection as Epicurus himself enjoy’d them, forought we know. So that all the boasted Happiness of the Epicureans, without a future State, was equally vain and insecure, which at once effectually overthrows it; shocking us, even in the Enjoyment of what is mean and low, with the Fears of losing even that. And then, to comfort us under all the Miseries of Life, they throw out a parcel of Falshoods and Subtleties. As that Length of Time doth not increase Happiness; as if either Happiness, or Misery, for 2 Hours were not twice as great as Happiness, or Misery, for one Hour. That Pain is short, if great; light, if long, which will afford but very little Relief to a Man under those Chronical Diseases of great Torture, Gout and Stone. That we must lop off the Fear of future Evils, and the Remembrance of those which are past. Easily said! The Difficulty lies in the Application. That we are to resist Pain with all our Power; for, if we fly, we shall be conquer’d, if we stand our Ground, we shall gain the Victory. As if we could either fly from, or resist, Pain, as a Man does his Enemy.

Of a piece with these, are their Consolations against the Fear of Death; against which nothing is a solid Comfort, in the midst of our present Enjoyments, but the well-grounded Hopes of a happy Immortality. How ridiculous an Antidote is it against that which takes away all our Enjoyments, to tell us, That, when that comes, it cannot hurt us, because when that is, we are not? Self-Love and the Fear of Annihilation are Instincts too powerful to be baffled by such a subtlety. Just (as Plutarch well observes) as if you should tell a Man in a Storm at Sea, that your Ship has no Pilot, and that there is no hope of allaying the Tempest; but yet, however, be not afraid, for in a little Time the Ship shall split and sink, and, when you are drown’d, the Storm will trouble you no longer. According to this Scheme, if we have all the Enjoyment in Life we can expect, we lose Happiness in a little Time after we come to know what it is, of which too we are in continual Apprehensions; but the Wretched come into the World, only to lament and leave it; than which how much better would it be, not to have been born. But, say they, we ought to bear with Patience what we cannot avoid. But the Fear of it, upon their Scheme of Annihilation, is as Death it-self is, tho’ the Philosopher should take ever so much Pains to expose it as foolish; whose Rules cannot take away what is Natural, and, consequently, not in our Power. “In the next Place,” say they, “we are already Dead to so much of our Life as is past and gone; so that so much as we live, we die, and that which we call Death, is but our last Death; and, therefore, as we fear not our Death that is past, why should we that which is to come?” But, if we have been dying ever since we were born, that is it which grieves us, that we cannot be doing so for ever. Such was the Reasoning of the Epicurean Old Man, who reconcil’d himself to his approaching Death, because “it is as absurd to fear Death as old Age, which yet all desire, in that as old Age follows Youth, so Death follows old Age.” For old Age is desirable, not because it follows Youth, but because it defers Death. “Such is that other Reasoning, that, whereas we now count our-selves Happy, if we live to an hundred Years, yet, if the natural Course of our Lives were as much shorter, we should be as much satisfy’d with twenty; and, if our natural Course reach’d to a thousand Years, we should then be as much troubled to die at 600, as now at 60, and so forward.” Which proves nothing, but that there is no Time, in which an Epicurean can be content to die. No better is that Device of Gassendus, “though a Man’s Life may be short in it-self, yet may he make it equal with the Duration of the whole World, because he may converse with the Transactions of all former Times, and be as well acquainted with them, as if himself had then actually liv’d. And, as for the Time to come, he, knowing that nothing shall be but what has been, understands all future Events as if present; so that a wise Man, partly by Memory, partly by Foresight, may extend his short Life to all Ages of the World.”29 But, if he could, unless he could make himself Immortal too, the Objection would still be as strong as ever. His other Arguments, to persuade us to be content with our Condition, are as ineffectual. As first, that “otherwise we forget our mortal Nature expos’d to Misery,” that is, that a Man must be content with his Condition, because he knows his Condition to be miserable. And, secondly, that “it is some Comfort, that, when all Men are expos’d to Misery, you are less miserable than others,” that is, that, tho’ I endure most of the Calamities of human Life, yet I am happy, if I think one more miserable; according to which there can be no Misery, but the greatest.

Secondly, The Epicureans destroy all Virtue, by making it wholly subservient to sensual Pleasure, making Virtue the Means, and Sensuality the End; so that what we now call Vice would be Virtue, if it promoted the Delights of the Body the more effectually of the two. A hopeful Foundation of Morality!

If Epicurus liv’d soberly and abstemiously, on coarse Bread and Water, and sometimes Sallet, it was more owing to the Weakness of his Stomach and Constitution, than to the Strength of his Principles, which were as much in contradiction to that method of living, as his denying Providence, with his pretending, that he had left Devotion; his teaching, that all Friendship is for Self-interest, and yet that Men are bound to undergo even Death for the sake of Friends. If sensual Pleasures be the chief Good, he must be happiest, that enjoys them most, and wisest, that procures them most; and then Apicius will be a happier and wiser Man than Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato.

As for Justice, it is no farther a Virtue, upon the Epicurean Scheme, which turns to ridicule the Ties and Checks of Conscience, than as it promotes bodily Pleasures; that is, we are not oblig’d to act according to Justice, when we can promote them by any Action, which we are cunning enough to conceal, or powerful enough to support. All Virtue, according to them, any farther than it promotes their own sensual Pleasure, is owing only to Custom, popular Opinion, and the Prejudices of Education, which a wise Man, say they, must comply with, in order to promote his own Ends. If this were the Case, the Encouragement to Virtue, and Restraints upon Vice, are not sufficient.

And, if there be no obligation to Justice, there can be no place for Fortitude, which is only in defence of an honest and a just Cause, separated from which it is Folly, and in opposition to it, Oppression. But, upon the Epicurean Scheme, every thing ought to be sacrific’d to the preservation of Life, and the enjoyment of sensual Pleasure, which it would, therefore, be folly to hazard, and madness to sacrifice, in defence of either Friends, or Country; for Religion is with them out of the Question.

It may justly be question’d, Whether the Heathen Philosophers, in the whole, were of Service to the Cause of Virtue.§XIII. The Philosophers, amongst the Greeks, succeeded the Poets in the profession of teaching Virtue; and they certainly made improvements in moral Discipline, they reduc’d it into the form of an Art, enrich’d it with variety of Arguments, fortified its Precepts with great Reasons, propos’d many wise Considerations for subduing exorbitant Affections and Passions; they set forth the praises of Virtue, its excellency and importance, with great Vigour and Eloquence; and, in several instances, excellently declaim’d against Vice with great Wit and Judgment; they disparag’d the Vanities of the World, and the Follies of human Life. There is amongst them an unpopular kind of Virtue, which, altho’ greatly distant from the holy Life, yet, in several respects, does resemble it. Their Discipline and Institution had a considerable effect upon some of themselves; some of the Philosophers were great Examples of the Virtue which they taught, and they made some few Converts from Debauchery to Philosophy; and some few Commonwealths have had their Laws from Philosophers. The Philosophers, therefore, may seem to have done a great deal of Service to the Interest of Virtue; but, if their Disservices be set against their Services; if their Ignorance, Vice, and Extravagance, be compar’d with their Virtue; it may justly be doubted, upon a full Comparison, whether they have done any real Service at all to the Cause of Virtue and Goodness. The mighty Prejudices, which they have done to the Interests of it, clearly enough appear in the accounts already given; for the further setting of which in a clear Light, we will here take a brief Survey, both of their moral Learning and of their Life.

As appears, from a Consideration of the Divine Virtue of the Philosophick Pagans;1. The sublimer sort of them distributed the Virtues into three Kinds, the Ethical, Political, and Divine. The Ethical and Political Virtue may be called the common Morality, which constitutes a good Man; but the Divine Virtue is suppos’d to be his Assimilation to God, and his Deification. This Divine Virtueis Philosophic-Pagan, the Popular-Pagans having no concern in it, and was the invention of Philosophy, but was not for the Interest of Virtue, but was rather to its Prejudice and Disservice; for it is not truly Divine Moral Virtue, constituting a divinely-good Man, but an Imposture, unpopular Humour, Fancy; and a wicked sort of Bravery is made the End, the Chief Good, the Divine Virtue, and the Happiness, of Man, his Assimilation to God, and his Deification. Apollonius ask’d the Brachmans, “What they were”? Jarchas, the Prince of them, answer’d, “They thought themselves Gods.” Apathy they thought a great and a Divine Thing, “To live in the Body, as the Soul of the World in the World, which cannot be struck, or impress’d upon, from without. Heis devoid of Grief; is not a compound of Soul and Body; accounteth not the Death of Mortals, or the Ruin of his Country, any great Matter; he is above the Fear of any thing; trusteth to himself, that he shall have nothing of Evil, so he shall be fearless of any thing,” saith Plotinus.30 Thus they oppose the sufficiency of Virtue against all Externals. But to be thus unapprehensive of Danger, is Folly and Fool-hardiness; it is as unnatural, as it is irreligious, and ruinous to all true Virtue and Goodness. They thus impiously deified themselves, and their Virtue, by their self-Sufficiency, self-Security, and Confidence. “They that are furnish’d with the Virtues, living in greatness and celsitude of Mind, are always in Happiness. Philosophy setteth them intirely in the Fortress of Virtue, above Grief and Fear.”31

And from the excessive Pride of the Stoicks.2. There is much of Pride and Arrogance, complicated with other Vices, in the Philosophick Pagans rampant Affectation of Divinity. They were as highly conceited of their own Merits, as Diogenes was, who fancied, that he merited his Alms. In Aristotle’s Composition of Magnanimity32 there is a large Dose of Pride, and Celsus’s Generosity33 is of the same Character. Much of the Stoical Philosophy is a rant and huff of Pride; the greatness and height of Mind, to which they pretend, is bloated and unsound; and the Constancy of their Wise-Man is a System of such Maxims, as are the very Quintessence of Pride. “The Wise-Man is not obnoxious to any Injury. The Wise-Man can suffer no Evil. An Injury detracteth and diminisheth, whereas nothing can be taken from the Wise-Man,” who hath all in himself. “Wickedness is not so strong as Virtue, therefore the Wise-Man is not hurt by Malice. None can benefit the Wise-Man,” who wanteth nothing, “therefore none can hurt him. An Injury is from Hope, or Fear; the Wise-Man is touch’d with neither. None receiveth an Injury unmov’d, the Wise-Man is not mov’d. A Contumely is a Contempt, and thence hath its Name; which the Wise-Man doth not look upon as belonging to him, who knows his own Greatness. He thinketh also, thatall others are so much inferiour, that they have not boldness to despise Things so high above them. If he once debaseth himself, so as to be mov’d with Injury, or Contumely, he can never be secure; whereas Security is the proper Good of the Wise-Man.”34 If Pride and Stomachfulness had not been one of the Stoicks Cardinal Virtues, they could not have applauded Cato’s barbarous Self-Murder, “who scorn’d to be a Petitioner to any, either for his Death, or his Life, and was a contemner of all Powers.”35 They call themselves great Men, and accordingly found their Happiness, not upon the Favours of God and true Piety, but upon their Greatness of Spirit, the Greatness and Stoutness of an high invincible Mind;36 whence their Virtue becomes a sort of Self-magnifying and Self-deifying, which is but an illegitimate kind of Bravery of Spirit, incongruous to their Condition as Creatures, much more incongruous to frail miserable Men, and most of all incongruous to wicked miserable Sinners. Nor is there any Thing more distastful to a truly pious Mind, than the haughty Pharisaical Humour of these Philosophick-Pagan Magnificoes swaggering with their Virtue, their Magnitude, their Celsitude, their Altitude, their Fortitude, their Beatitude. Pride suggested that Stoical Maxim of Heraclitus. “The Wise need not any Friends.” Whence all the wonderful Provision, which Divine Grace has made for a World of wicked Sinners, was lost upon these Philosophers; for they that need no Friend, need no Saviour, or Salvation. They were able to live of themselves, and had an imaginary Happiness of their own making, wherein they took Satisfaction and Content; they look’d upon their Philosophy as the Perfection of Wisdom and Virtue, in it-self and to them; and thought, both themselves and their Institution, far Superiour to Popular Mankind; and, therefore, it was but agreeable to their Philosophick Grandeur and Magnificence, to contemn Christianity, which is a popular Institution, design’d for, and adapted to, the Salvation of miserable Sinners; whereas they were rais’d to a Superiority above Sin and Misery, and suppos’d themselves nothing less than Divine Men, and Kings, Jupiter’s Sons and Peers, and petty Deities. “It must be something Super-Human, Celestial, and Magnificent, that constituteth the Wise-Man. If thou ask, What that is? As God and his Beatitude is Constituted, so is the Wise-Man.”37Chrysippus affirmed, “That the Happiness of Jove is in no respect more Eligible, nor more Fair, nor more Venerable, than that of the Wise-Man.” Virtues are thought to be true and genuine, when they are lov’d and desir’d for their own sake; but it appears, from the Stoicks Elation of Mind, that when Virtues are desir’d for their own sake, in a way of Separation from God, and without any Relation to him, they are proud and tumid, and are rather Vice than Virtue. Plato is much more modest in his Accounts of Virtue, than the strutting Stoicks; yet some of the Stoick’s principal Maxims, which nothing but Pride inspir’d, particularly that eminent One, “The Wise-Man is self-sufficient,” are derived from Socrates and Plato. Pride made Plato an envious Man, Socrates an ireful Man, the Cynick a Boaster in his great Atchievements in the Conquest of Vice. The best of these Masters alloweth us μεγαλοϕρονἕιν, “to be proud of the Conquest of any Vice.”38 And, “We rightly glory in our Virtue,” saith Cicero, a great Wit, but a very vain-glorious Man, who also complaineth to his Wife, “Neither the Gods, whom thou hast most chastly serv’d, nor Men, whom I have constantly sav’d, have requited us.”39

These Philosophers have been justly call’d, what they certainly were to a Crime, Animals of Glory, and Traffickers for Fame; yet so, as to be great Adversaries to the Appetite of Vain-Glory, as appeareth from the Tenor of their Philosophy. They despis’d the Popular Pagans, their Judgment, Fame, Pomp, Acclamations, and Applause, at a great Rate; they expatiate upon the Emptiness of Fame, as also, how narrow, inconstant, and devoid of Judgment it is; and the Folly and Iniquity of those who affect it; that we ought to consider the Quality of Persons that praise, or dispraise; that Fame is one of those Things, which are not in our power, which others give and take away at pleasure; and therefore, say they, they are Fools who affect it, that desire to be esteem’d Beneficent for doing Good; who suppose, that the Applause of such is of great Moment, that know not themselves, and would be had in Admiration by those, who themselves call Mad: That Fame and Honour is not worth the while, being but a mere noise and clattering of Tongues, some Body telling these Things to some Body; they that praise another, soon dispraising him, and both being quickly buried in Oblivion: Good is not the better for being prais’d; we should be indifferent whether we do our Duty, disprais’d, or prais’d: The Lovers of Good practise it, as Lovers enjoy one another, secretly, without desiring any Hearers, or Spectators, to praise them: That we ought not to accept the Praise and Approbation of ill Men, nor guide our Life by the Opinion of the Injudicious, nor place our Happiness in the Minds and Thoughts of others, nor so much as take into our Thoughts what others say, or think, of us. Some that were not Stoicks40 count themselves mean Proficients, except a Reproach be as welcome to them, as a Mark of hearty Approbation. The Stoicks exercise themselves to an indifferency as to Praise and Dispraise; and, notwithstanding their Pharisaical Humour in other respects, in all Things to avoid Ostentation, and to do nothing for Opinion. They are urgent with Men, to chuse that which is Good, because it is Good, and not for popular Opinion; and some of them will not stretch out a Finger for a good Fame.41 They deride the Ambitious and Vain Glorious, ridicule their Folly, who are puffed up with Honour, neither admire, nor desire Greatness, (some thinking Riches and Principalities inconsistent with virtuous Living,42 ) hugely disparage a great Name and Fame after Death; forewarn all that will be Philosophers, to expect Derision and Reproaches at their Entrance upon the Philosophick Life; teach them to bear Reproaches well, with great Equanimity and Benevolence; to do well, tho’ it expose them to Disgrace, and not to desist from good Practice, nor to fear Contempt, but to contemn Infamy. In this their Doctrine they were much more severe, than those who suppose, “Ambition to be of use in correcting the other vicious Affections, but must itself be put off in the last Place, as Plato hath call’d it the last Coat.”43 But their Pride and Arrogance was of an unpopular Kind, mix’d with a vicious Affectation of Vain-Glory; for the Greek Philosophers usually reproach’d one another with their Vain-Glory;44 thus Antisthenes, Crates, Diogenes, Plato, Pyrrho, were reproach’d by their Fellow-Philosophers; Socrates espied it thro’ the Holes of Antisthenes’s Cloak; and of Socrates himself, perhaps, Cardan has made a right Judgment, “That he was extremely desirous of Glory, altho’ he most of all dissembled this.”45 They glory’d in their contempt of Glory, supposing that a contempt of Glory was the best way to obtain it. Therefore, tho’ they may justly be accounted Animals of popular Glory, yet their Philosophy was a great Adversary to the Appetite of it, and they reproach’d one another with it, as a vicious Affection.

The Stoicks, in consequence of their excessive Pride, were too stout to humble themselves under the afflicting hand of Providence. The Platonists will not always allow this Supposition, “That Calamities are from a divine Hand,” or, “That God is the Dispenser, both of Things Good and Evil to us.”46 But the Popular Pagans were not too high to be humbled; they looked upon their Calamities, as the Effects of the Anger of their Gods, acknowledg’d their Dependence upon them, and, in any great Distress of their Affairs, betook themselves to their most humble Supplications, in order to atone their Displeasure, and gain their Favour.

One of the bravest Exploits, which the Philosophick Pagans constantly celebrate, is the killing of Tyrants, and delivering Cities and Nations from them. The Practice of this applauded Virtue occasion’d the Torture of Zeno Eleates, who is said, to have kept the Doctrine of Parmeendes inviolate as Gold in the Fire, “And by his Deeds he shew’d, that a great Man feareth nothing but to be base; that it is Children and Women, andMen, who have the Souls of Women, that are afraid of Pain.”47 From which Idea of a great Man it appeareth, that the Fortitude of the Heathen Philosophers is of no better Kind than the common Military Fortitude, or the Fortitude of those celebrated Popular Pagans, Mutius and Regulus, of Cleopatra and Asdrubals Wife, who threw herself and her Children into the Fire; or of that famous Harlot at Athens, who, knowing of a Conspiracy against the Life of the Tyrant there, with great Bravery suffer’d her-self to be tortur’d to Death, rather than she would discover the Conspirators, and, biting off a piece of her Tongue, spit it out into the Tyrant’s Face.

Philosophy cannot boast of many great Examples of Patience; the Grandees of the Stoical Family, Cato and Brutus, falling into Troubles fell into transports of Rage and Impatience. So Hierocles, according to Saidas, being whipp’d at Byzantium ’till the Blood came, took the Blood in the Hollow of his Hand, and threw it upon the Judge, saying, “Cyclops, there is Wine for you, seeing you have eaten Man’s Flesh.” Some, indeed, of the Philosophick Pagans have express’d an admirable Constancy of Mind in shaking Circumstances. As Cleanthes, who stood unmov’d without changing Countenance, when he was publickly reproach’d in the Theatre by the Poet Sositheus.48 And Polemo did not so much as wax Pale, when his Leg was torn by mad Dogs. Yet, because this Philosophick Firmness was but of the same Kind with Epicurus’s in his Strangury, or the Sceptick Pyrrho’s, who endur’d cuttings and burnings with great constancy of Mind; or that of well disciplin’d Gladiators, and the Spartan Boys, who were whipp’d at the Altar, ’till the Blood gush’d out of their Bowels, without whimpering; therefore some have rightly pronounc’d concerning that Patience which Philosophy professeth, that it is Spurious, only a proud Sullenness; so much the more Spurious, as it is the more Proud. Lipsius therefore, otherwise an extravagant Admirer of Stoicism, lying upon his Sick-Bed, and strugling with grievous Pain, discarded the Stoical Patience, and having our Saviour’s Picture hanging near his Bed, he pointed to it, and gave his Patience its due Character, “That is the true Patience.”49

Several of the Philosophers have discours’d against Revenge, or retaliating Injuries, for the bearing them with Meekness, and for universal Benevolence;50 and there are several Instances of these Virtues amongst the Greek Philosophers.51 But their Practice of them looks more like unpopular Humour, than serious Goodness; in laying the Foundation of them, they intermix much of Pride, and Paradoxical Stoical Conceit, That the Wise-Man can suffer no Injury: And the most considerable Instances of these mighty Virtues are Aristides and Phocion, who may justly be reckon’d among the Popular Pagans. Aristides, after great Services, being banish’d by his Citizens unjustly, at his Departure pray’d the Gods, that the Athenians might never, by any Trouble, or Distress, be forc’d to recal him. And Phocion, being unjustly condemn’d, charg’d his Son Phocas, that he should never revenge his Death. But these Resemblances of Christian Virtue in Heathen good Men, did not issue from a divine Kind of Charity, but were Branches of their Human-Social Virtue, and issued from a mighty Love to their Country, which is most eminent in Heathens. The Virtue of these Popular Pagans pretendeth not to be Divine, nor do they, therefore, deserve to be celebrated as divine Men upon account of it: But the Philosophick Pagans, by far lesser Matters than these, got the Reputation of divine Men. One of their principal Virtues was their abandoning the Superfluities of Life. Whence Diogenes, seeing one take Water out of a River with his Hand, and drinking it out of his Hand, threw away his Dish, which he us’d to carry about him to drink Water in, resolving thence forth to drink it out of the hollow of his Hand; and for this Freak, with others of like Nature, this unpopular Humourist is celebrated by his Fellow-Philosophers as a “Divine Man.”

The Philosophick Pagans were like the Popular, in not discerning what is truly Divine and Holy, from what is Atheous and Unholy. Altho’ they liv’d in gross Crimes, beside their Pagan Religion, yet they did not discern between Sin and Holiness. They were Self-justifiers at the Rate of the Pharisees, and, therefore, perfectly indispos’d for such a Religion, that is a Religion for Sinners; and they were too high for Repentance, which the Popular Pagans were not, who had a Sense of Sin, and of their need of Pardon, which they often express’d at Death: But Apuleius52 pretends, “That he always accounted all Sin a Thing detestable”; Xenophon saith, “No one ever saw Socrates do, or heard him speak, any Thing that was Impious and Irreligious”: Socrates himself had no Sense of Sin at his Death, nor express’d any Repentance; nor is there any Appearance of either in Epictetus’s Preparatives for Death.53 Such mistaken Teachers of Virtue were these Sages of this World, that they thought themselves made Gods by such a Virtue, that could not make them the People of God, which was a very gross Mistake, and speaketh their Philosophy to be no better, than a worldly Kind of Wisdom, and their Virtue could be of no better a Character than their Philosophy. By their introducing their Philosophy, true Religion was much more prejudic’d, than it was before by their Pagan Religion, they made an additional Prejudice to it, they rais’d up a new Enemy, they introduc’d a Mountebank, who pretendeth to do all Cures, that a divine Physician might be thought needless.

3. The Spuriousness of the divine Virtues of the Platonists.3. The Super-Ethical, as they are called, or the Divine Virtues of the Platonists are of the spurious and illegitimate kind, and so blended with what is fanciful, or bad, that, in the whole, they signify little or nothing to the constituting a Divinely-good Man. This is the Character, not only of the Stoicks, but of the Platonists Divine Virtue, in all these Parts of it.

Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is their intellectual Form of Life, contemplative of the Platonick Intelligibles, and visionary of their T’Agathon,54 which cannot be discern’d but by a boniform Light, which is beyond all that is intellectual.

Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is Theurgick;55 for they pretend by a converse with the Gods in Theurgy, to be freed from Passion, to partake of Divine Perfections, and to have, what in their Dialect they call, a Deifick Union; which one Party of them pretendeth to in the Mystick-Metaphysical Way. And these say, “The End and Scope is, not to be without Sin, but to be a God.”56

Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is the Platonick Faith and Love; for this Love is only an Amatorious Madness. “When the Mind becometh Unmental” (or Mad) “being drunk with Nectar, this is the Mind, that is in Love.”57 Much of this sort of Divine Virtue there is in Platonism; an Ignorance, that is better than Knowledge; a Madness, that is better than Sobriety of Mind, a Divine Madness.

Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is the Virtue of the Mysticks and Quietists, “Who being seated in the Bay of super-essential Goodness, enjoy a super-natural Quietism”;58 to which Isidore the Platonist pretended. He said, “That his Soul itself, in sacred Prayers, became wholly a Divine Sea, having in the first Place collected her-self from the Body into her-self, having in the next place” (extatically) “parted with her own Morals, and be taken herself from rational Notions to those that are Congenial to Intellect; and in the third place being possess’d with Divine Afflation, and chang’d into an extraordinary Serenity, deiform, not human.

Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is an Aversation from Terrestrial, Material, and Mortal, Nature, and an Affectation of being wholly incorporeal and immaterial; for this Affectation of Immaterial Intellectual Nature, and to be mere intellectual Souls, is an irreligious Philosophick Vanity and Extravagance, not intirely free from Magick. For, in order to the Purity of the Soul, Pythagoras prescrib’d strict Abstinence from several sorts of Meats.

The Platonists agree, that, according to Plato in his Theaetetus, Virtue is a Similitude to God, or the Gods; “which Assimilation” (saith Plato) “consisteth in becoming Holy and Just with Prudence.” But to what God, or Gods, this divine Similitude relateth, in this they do not agree, nor wherein this Similitude consisteth. For some say, That this divine Similitude relateth to the Pagan Deities in general; others say, That it relateth to the Platonists divine Intellect; and others are of Opinion, That it relateth to their T’Agathon. Some place this divine Similitude in the speculative Virtue, and intellectual Form of Life; others place it in the practick Virtue, (Ethical and Political,) which seemeth to be the Sense of Plato; for Prudence, Holiness, and Justice, are practical Virtues. In his Fourth of Laws, he placeth the divine Similitude in Temperance, and in his Phaedo, he placeth it in Temperance and Justice; thus saying, “Are not they most Happy and Blessed, and such as go to the best Place, that have exercis’d the popular and political Virtues, which we call Temperance and Justice?” Plato, therefore, seemeth to place the divine Similitude in the Popular Pagans Holiness and Justice; which the generality of his Followers will not admit, counting the Civil Virtues only the Way to get the divine Similitude, and that this was the Sense of Plato. But, whatever may be thought of his Sense, his Account of Virtue, and of the divine Similitude, is an Instance, that the Philosophick-Pagans may in Words agree with our Religion, when in Sense there is an extreme Disagreement. For Plato’s divine Similitude, however it may be interpreted by his Followers, is extremely alien from, and opposite to, that truly divine Similitude, which is Wisdom, Righteousness, and true Holiness, wherewith he had no Acquaintance. For, had he been acquainted with that truly divine Kind of Justice, which is Righteousness, he could not have been a Pagan-Religionist; nor could he have instituted a Community of Women and of Goods in his Republick; nor would he have taken care to regulate the Drinking in the Feasts of Bacchus, without endeavouring to abolish them; nor could he so grosly have mistaken himself, as in a Book of Justice (his Fifth de Republicà,) to discourse in this manner touching the Greeks and Barbarians. “All Greeks are near of Kin, but extraneous and different from Barbarians. When the Grecians and Barbarians Fight with one another, this is properly called Fighting, for they are Enemies by Nature, and such a Feud must be called a War: But, if Grecians, that are Friends by Nature, quarrel with Grecians, this is an unnatural Distemper, and Greece must be said to be troubled with Sedition, and such a Feud must not be called a War, but a Sedition.”59 The Greeks had their Philosophy from the Barbarians, as they call’d them, and yet they commonly reproach’d them, and, usually, were so uncivil and unjust towards them, that they look’d upon them as “Enemies by Nature and wild Beasts.”60Plato follow’d the Popular Pagans in their Injustice, as well as in their irreligious Religion. So Plutarch, in the Life of Lycurgus, can find no Injustice in the Lacedamonians Common wealth, which was instituted for War, and fighting, not for Peace, as Aristotle observeth and blameth;61 the Spartan Virtue was the Love of Glory; they were train’d up and exercis’d to be expert Thieves; exposed and murder’d their weak and deform’d Infants, and even this horrible Injustice Plutarch approveth. Aristotle, also, is known to teach, “To expose Children that are maimed, and Women to cause Abortions, that they may not exceed their Number”;62 and he agrees with Plato in supposing, “That War is a natural Thing between the Greeks and Barbarians.”63Plato is justly chargeable with Injustice, in patronizing Lying, where in he follows the general Sense of the Heathens, which was, that a Lye is not bad, if it be expedient, and not pernicious in the Affairs of Men. So, in his Third and Fifth de Republicà, Plato would have Governours, “To make use of frequent Lying and Deceit for the Benefit of the Subjects; this must be granted to publick Governours, but not be touch’d by private Men.” If the Platonists human Justice is so bad, it is reasonable to suppose, that in their Divine, or super-human Virtue, they were not very good.

Aristotle pretended not to an Institution of Divine Virtue.4. Aristotle pretendeth not to an Institution of Divine Virtue, or to institute a Divine-Good Man. For, altho’ he acknowledges a Divine Virtue, yet it is in so slender a Degree, that he denies, that there can be any Friendship between God and Man; the Happiness that he insisteth on, is but the Civil; as the Virtue that he insisteth on, is but the Civil and Military;64 his Ethicks are but a Branch of worldly Politicks; his active Virtue consisteth in that Mean, which the worldly Man’s Prudence determineth; and what can living well signify, in a Civil Worldly Mans Institution of Virtue, but to live without Vice, or Crime, in the Notion of the Civil World? Therefore it is not to be wonder’d at, that Aristotle, differently from the Sense of other Philosophers, patronizeth Revenge;65 or that Cicero agrees with him in this Point, (for this must be acknowledg’d, notwithstanding what a learned Bishop hath said to the contrary;66 ) for the former of these did not pretend to be a Religionist, and the latter of them, altho’ a Philosopher, yet was not of any Philosophick Institution, and was so uncertain an Admirer of Philosophy, that sometimes he preferreth that one little Book of the XII Tables, before the Libraries of all the Philosophers, both for Utility and weight of Authority. The Lawyers, not without Reason, prefer their Institution to their Civil Virtue, before the Philosopher’s Institutions to their Divine Virtue; which yet must be acknowledg’d, to have a limited agreeableness to the truly Divine moral Virtue; but so that, in the whole, the Disagreement is far greater than the Agreement.

The Agenda of Christianity not agreeable to the Reason of the Philosophick Pagans.5. Whence we may make a Judgment of this Saying of the same learned Bishop; “All the Agenda of Christianity are so far from being opposite, that they are most agreeable to Human Reason, as ’tis cultivated and heighten’d to its utmost Improvement by Philosophy.”67 If this Saying be converted thus, All the Philosophers improv’d Reason (which is their Divine Virtue) is so far from being opposite, that it is most agreeable to the Agenda of Christianity, it will be a monstrous Proposition. For nothing can be more opposite to the Agenda of Christianity, than a great part of the Philosophers Divine Virtue; therefore the Agenda of Christianity are not so suitable to the Philosophers Reason, as is pretended. That this Saying may have any Appearance of Truth, it must be limited to the particular Agenda of Christianity; for these general Agenda of Christianity (which are also in part the general Agenda of Judaism) are directly and expressly opposite to the Philosophers improv’d Reason. “To have no other Gods but me; to worship the Lord thy God, and to serve him alone; to seek the Kingdom of God and his Righteousness; to take the Kingdom, enter into it, and buy it at any rate; to put off the Heathen Old Man, and to put on the New Man, in the (Christian) New Birth, in the New Covenant; to come out of the mundane Society, and the state of Sin and of Death, to pass into the state of Life, to incorporate with the Divine Family, and become a Citizen of the Holy Empire; not to adhere to, but to abandon the Kingdom of Darkness, and to manage an Holy War against its Powers, Interest, and Adherents; to live to him that died for us and rose again; to live for God and his Service, and to make it our daily Care and Prayer, that his Name may be hallow’d, and his Kingdom come.” All which Fundamental Agenda of the Christian Institution, and such like, are altogether alien from, and opposite to, the Philosophick Pagans Sentiments, as they are Pagans; nor is that plain Principle and summary of Piety, the Fear of God, suitable to their Reason; for they destroy’d it, which the Popular Pagans did not, by their Maxims, “Ira Deorum nulla est,”68The Gods are never angry, yet a learned Man saith, “He knows not any Evangelical Precept or Duty belonging to a Christian’s Practice, which natural Men of best Account” (the Philosophers) “by the mere Strength of Human Reason have not taught and taken upon them to maintain as Just and Reasonable.”69 But it would be far better to say; there are not any of the particular Agenda of Christianity, the Reasonableness where of may not be illustrated, by what they have suppos’d to be Just and Reasonable: So the Christian Martyrs Contempt of Death may be shew’d to be reasonable, which yet was so unsuitable to their improv’d Reason, that it is call’d by one of them70“mere Obstinacy”; and another of them imputeth it to “Madness and Custom.”71 The Agreement, therefore, between Christian