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A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, translated, with Introduction and Appendix, by John Maxwell (1727), edited and with a Foreword by Jon Parkin (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005).
A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, originally titled De Legibus Naturae, first appeared in 1672 as a theoretical response to a range of issues that came together during the late 1660s. It conveyed a conviction that science might offer an effective means of demonstrating both the contents and the obligatory force of the law of nature. At a time when Hobbes’s work appeared to suggest that the application of science undermined rather than supported the idea of obligatory natural law, Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae provided a scientific explanation of the natural necessity of altruism.
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The seventeenth century witnessed what has been called the “heroic” period in the development of modern natural law theory. Beginning with Hugo Grotius, Protestant thinkers began to experiment with scholastic natural law ideas to produce a distinctive and highly successful tradition of natural jurisprudence that would come to dominate European political thought. Viewed from the eighteenth century, the success of the tradition could be, and often was, taken for granted, but such retrospective views could often conceal the extent to which the early pioneers faced real challenges in their attempts to reconcile natural law ideas with the rigors of Protestant theology. In this context, Richard Cumberland is perhaps one of the great unsung heroes of the natural law tradition. Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae constituted a critical intervention in the early debate over the role of natural jurisprudence at a moment when the natural law project was widely suspected of heterodoxy and incoherence.
Hugo Grotius’s work undoubtedly generated a great deal of interest among Protestant thinkers, but it also occasioned a critical response that threatened to undermine the whole project. The most dangerous writer in this respect was Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes simultaneously adapted and subverted the new jurisprudence, producing a theory that would become notorious for its apparent atheism and absolutism. As a result, early natural law writers were dogged by accusations of Hobbism, the charge that behind their attempts to forge a new tradition lay the reduction of moral and political obligation to self-interest alone. Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae, with its sustained assault on Hobbes’s ideas, constituted one of the most important and influential responses to this damaging accusation. Cumberland not only produced one of the most effective critiques of Hobbes’s ideas, but he also used the opportunity to propose a new and distinctively scientific approach to questions of moral and political obligation. Cumberland’s achievement was to provide a much-needed defense of the natural jurisprudential project while laying important theoretical foundations for the work of such later writers as Clarke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson.
Cumberland was born in London, the son of a Salisbury Court tailor. He attended St. Paul’s School, and in June 1649, barely five months after the execution of Charles I, he entered Magdalene College, Cambridge. At Magdalene, Cumberland supplemented his regular studies with a rich diet of natural philosophy, developing the scientific knowledge that informs almost every page of the De Legibus. Cumberland’s interest in the new science was crucial to his natural law theory; the union of natural philosophy and natural theology created the basis for his science of morality and his logical demonstration of divine obligation.
Cumberland left Cambridge after receiving his master of arts in 1656, becoming rector of the small Northamptonshire parish of Brampton Ash in 1658. This rural posting might have marked the end of Cumberland’s significance, but in 1667 he became a client of, and possibly domestic chaplain to, Sir Orlando Bridgeman, formerly lord chief justice of the Common Pleas and now in 1667 newly appointed lord keeper of the Great Seal. An ex-Magdalene man himself, Bridgeman employed a number of Cumberland’s colleagues, including Cumberland’s friend Hezekiah Burton. It is likely that Burton’s recommendation secured Cumberland’s new and politically important patronage.
The connection with Bridgeman placed Cumberland at the center of English politics in the later 1660s and led directly to the publication of De Legibus Naturae. During this period, Bridgeman sponsored Hezekiah Burton and another of Cumberland’s friends, John Wilkins, in their attempts to construct a religious compromise with Presbyterian nonconformists. Although the negotiations ultimately failed, the discussion of the role of natural law in such a settlement formed the immediate political context to Cumberland’s work on the subject. In 1670, Bridgeman established the newly married Cumberland in comparatively affluent livings in Stamford, enabling him to complete De Legibus Naturae. Burton supervised the publication of the work, which was dedicated to Bridgeman. The book was published in the spring of 1672.
The same year would see Bridgeman resign in protest at Charles II’s decision to issue the Declaration of Indulgence, suspending the penal laws against Catholic and Protestant dissenters. Cumberland appears to have survived his patron’s fall, devoting himself to his parochial duties. In 1680 he proceeded to a doctorate at Cambridge University. His thesis maintained (against the Roman Catholic position) that St. Peter had no jurisdiction over the other apostles and (against the nonconformist position) that separation from the Anglican Church was schismatic. In the 1680s, Cumberland produced two works. The first was a pamphlet dedicated to his school friend Samuel Pepys, by this time president of the Royal Society, entitled An Essay Towards the Recovery of Jewish Measures and Weights (1686). The Essay, originally designed as an appendix to a new edition of the Bible, was widely respected for its scholarship. During the same time, Cumberland also produced Sanchoniatho’s Phoenician History in manuscript. This work claimed to find the sources of Roman Catholic idolatry in the Phoenician corruption of sacred history. The anti-Catholic bias of the work was such that, on the eve of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Cumberland’s publisher felt that the manuscript was too inflammatory to be released. The book appeared posthumously, in 1720.
In the wake of the revolution, Cumberland was called upon to replace the nonjuring bishop of Peterborough, Thomas White. Cumberland was consecrated in July 1691, at age fifty-nine. From this time until his death, Cumberland administered his diocese diligently but with declining efficiency as old age took its toll. He attended the House of Lords regularly until 1716, a loyal Whig supporter of Archbishop Tenison. Intellectually, Cumberland busied himself with studies in ancient chronology. He died after suffering a stroke on October 9, 1718.
De Legibus Naturae was a theoretical response to a range of issues that came together during the later 1660s. The immediate political circumstances were English debates over the toleration of religious dissent. Cumberland’s Latitudinarian friends sought to reach an accommodation with moderate nonconformists based upon an appeal to natural law ideas. If the nonconformists could accept that the magistrate had a natural right to regulate adiaphora (religious ritual not prescribed by Scripture), intractable theological disputes might be avoided, which would open the way for accommodation within the church. The negotiations failed, resulting in the rise of more strident demands from dissenters for a pluralist, toleration-based settlement. For some Latitudinarian Anglicans, notably Samuel Parker, such demands were unacceptable. For Parker, natural law required nonconformists to submit to the legal requirements imposed by the sovereign for the common good. Parker’s illiberal use of the natural law argument soon attracted accusations that he was following the arguments of Thomas Hobbes. Notoriously, Hobbes’s political theory had appeared to pay lip service to the obligations imposed by natural law, whereas in practice vesting all practical authority in the hands of an arbitrary and absolute sovereign. Although Parker and others attempted to demonstrate that they were not Hobbists, their attempt to justify extensive sovereign power appeared to undermine their avowed commitment to natural obligation. By the time Cumberland began to write De Legibus Naturae, there was a clear need to separate the Anglican use of the natural law argument from Hobbes’s account. Such a project required a decisive attack upon Hobbes’s subversive natural law theory, but it also provided an opportunity to demonstrate the character of the obligation to natural law. Cumberland sought to do both in De Legibus Naturae.
The question of moral obligation lies at the heart of Cumberland’s treatise, and it was a question that created profound difficulties for Protestant natural law theorists. Protestant thinkers were skeptical about Grotius’s appropriation of scholastic ideas. John Selden in particular was scathing about the Dutchman’s apparent assumption that conclusions of reason alone could have the force of law. A law was properly the command of a superior, in this case God. How, then, could it be shown naturally that the conclusions of reason or empirically observed norms were the will of God and thus properly obligatory laws? Hobbes made the same criticism: If the laws of nature are simply rational theorems, then they are not properly laws at all and need the command of a superior to give them obligatory force. Hobbes’s deeply skeptical answer was that providing such obligatory force was the role of the sovereign, a position that potentially ruled out the possibility of divine moral obligation altogether.
Cumberland accepted the force of this critique but rejected Hobbes’s destructive conclusion, turning instead to a solution in dicated by Selden. Selden preferred to sidestep the problem by arguing that God had spoken directly to Adam and Noah; the natural law precepts delivered were handed down within the rabbinical tradition. His second, rather underdeveloped, suggestion was that individuals might be capable of apprehending God’s will more directly, but he was understandably reluctant to develop a theory that blurred the distinction between reason and command. Like many readers of Selden, Cumberland was less convinced by the first solution, but he saw the potential in the second argument.
Cumberland’s optimism about Selden’s hint derived from two related sources. The first was the revaluation of man’s rational capacity encouraged by such Cambridge thinkers as Benjamin Whichcote and Nathaniel Culverwell, both of whom sought an enhanced role for reason and empirical observation in Protestant natural law discourse. The second major influence was Cumberland’s conviction that science might offer a more effective means of demonstrating both the contents and the obligatory force of the law of nature. At a time when Hobbes’s work appeared to suggest that the appliance of science undermined rather than supported the idea of obligatory natural law, Cumberland’s De Legibus would recover a godly role for natural philosophy.
To this end, Cumberland deployed the latest scientific evidence to reject Hobbes’s narrow emphasis upon self-preservation as the beginning and end of natural obligation. Cumberland used evidence from “the nature of things” to show that an awareness of self-preservation is merely the starting point in developing an awareness of the natural duty of sociability. The logical consequence of such evidence is to reinforce the idea that individuals are bound, both by their limitations and their potentiality, to a common social good. Given that the pursuit of the common good results in a greater fulfillment of human nature than the narrow pursuit of individual self-interest, the pursuit of the common good presents itself as the logical priority for individuals, given that their own interests will be best served as a result. Such a proposition offered the prospect of a handy summary of the law of nature in one universal formula: Man’s proper action should be an endeavor to promote the common good of the whole system of rational agents.
Although Cumberland had derived this practical proposition from a scientific examination of the nature of things, he still needed to demonstrate that such a proposition could be considered the will of God. His solution to this problem, discussed at length in chapter 5 of De Legibus, is Cumberland’s most distinctive theoretical move. Cumberland argued that it was possible to identify the sanctions attached to the law of nature, namely the structures of reward and punishment that God had ordained for the observance and dereliction of the law of nature. Punishments take various forms, ranging from the traditional scourges of conscience through to the state of war, a natural punishment for unreasonable, Hobbesian behavior. Rewards include simple happiness through to the benefits of peace, prosperity, and security. Cumberland stressed that such sanctions are not in themselves the causes of moral obligation. They are merely clues indicating that the practical proposition concerning the common good is indeed the basic principle of God’s justice. The knowledge that such a proposition is God’s will gives the proposition the force of law. Cumberland’s theory of obligation risked the suggestion that God himself is bound by the laws of nature, but Cumberland avoided the implication by arguing that an essentially free God binds himself to the observance of the regularities in his creation. Although not an unproblematic solution, Cumberland’s scheme allowed a reconciliation between natural law and the requirements of Protestant theology, one of the many reasons for Cumberland’s profound in fluence upon later writers in the tradition.
The practical implications of Cumberland’s solution are scattered throughout the book but particularly in chapter 9, where the political implications of his argument are made clear. Having clarified the differences between Hobbes’s natural law theory and his own, Cumberland attempted to show that his position sustains a more durable account of sovereignty justified by the common good. The magistrate’s competence extends “universally to things divine and human, of foreigners and fellow-subjects, of peace and war.” Cumberland’s sovereign possesses extensive civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, all warranted by divinely ordained natural law. Paradoxically, one of Cumberland’s majorachievements was to demonstrate that an almost Hobbesian sovereignty could be part of an orthodox natural law theory.
The reception of De Legibus gives some indication of its impact upon the natural law tradition. Cumberland’s thesis was particularly important for Samuel Pufendorf, whose De Jure Naturae et Gentium was published in the same year. Pufendorf was accused of Hobbism and in response deployed Cumberland’s arguments in his own defense. The second edition of De Jure Naturae (1684) included no fewer than forty references to De Legibus, reinforcing Pufendorf’s anti-Hobbesian credentials but also adding weight to his theory of obligation. In England it is perhaps no surprise to find Samuel Parker freely adapting the central argument of De Legibus in his Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature (1681). James Tyrrell, who had urged John Locke to publish something similar, produced an English abridgement of the work (with Cumberland’s approval) under the title A Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature (1692). Cumberland’s combination of positive theory and anti-Hobbesian critique ensured that the work would continue to find an audience until the early eighteenth century. After that time, Cumberland’s ideas were developed by writers like Samuel Clarke; Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury; and Francis Hutcheson; but the waning of the Hobbesian threat and Cumberland’s outmoded science made the book itself less urgent and rather dated to an audience that had become used to more sophisticated treatments of natural law.
The original Latin edition was published by the Little Britain bookseller Nathaneal Hooke and seen through the press by Hezekiah Burton; but as Burton admitted in his address to the reader, the job was not well done. The text is littered with transcription errors allegedly perpetrated by an unnamed youth who did the typesetting. The first edition was licensed by Samuel Parker on July 25, 1671, and the work was advertised in the term catalogues in February 1671/72. As Linda Kirk has established, there are two variants of this edition, with slightly different definitions of the law of nature at the beginning of chapter 5. The possible significance of these differences is discussed in this edition in the notes to that chapter. A second edition of the Latin text was published in Lϋbeck and Frankfurt a.d.O. by Samuel Otto and Johann Wiedermeyer in 1683, followed by a third in the same places in 1694. A fourth edition of the Latin text, based upon the 1672 edition, was published in 1720 by James Carson in Dublin.
In terms of translations, Cumberland’s text was, as we have seen, adapted by Samuel Parker and James Tyrrell, whose Brief Disquisition went into a second edition in 1701. Cumberland’s work would have to wait until 1727 for a full translation into English, by John Maxwell, the text used in this edition. Maxwell was prebendary of Connor and chaplain to Lord Carteret, then lord lieutenant of Ireland. Maxwell’s preface makes it clear that his intention was to produce a full translation for the first time, given that Cumberland’s original Latin text was both difficult to acquire and complicated to read. Cumberland’s anti-Hobbism may have appealed at a time when Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1714, 1723) appeared to revive central Hobbesian arguments. Maxwell’s project was probably also occasioned by discussions of natural law inspired by Francis Hutcheson’s work. Hutcheson headed a private academy in Dublin during the early 1720s and developed his own natural law position in his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), a work critical of some aspects of Cumberland’s project but with clear debts to the argument of De Legibus. Maxwell was familiar with Hutcheson’s work and saw the latter’s project as a supplement to Cumberland’s own.
Whatever the gains Maxwell hoped for, his Treatise of the Laws of Nature also registers considerable anxieties about the text. The translation comes with two introductory essays and lengthy appendixes by Maxwell, all of which are designed to head off wayward readings of Cumberland’s work. The opening essays, in particular, qualify Cumberland’s use of pagan philosophy, both by rejecting deist assumptions that might flow from such sources but also by asserting the importance of revelation in guiding the use of natural reason. The appendices carry out the same task with lengthy extracts from Samuel Clarke’s defenses of the immateriality of a thinking substance and Maxwell’s own essay on obligation, which reinforces the orthodox character of Cumberland’s theory of obligation. Cumberland’s work, so advanced for its own time, contained rather too many hostages to fortune to be published on its own in the very different world of the 1720s.
The next major translation of Cumberland’s work produced what is undoubtedly the best edition of De Legibus, Jean Barbeyrac’s Traité Philosophique des Loix Naturelles, published in Amsterdam in 1744. Barbeyrac was able to obtain a transcript of Cumberland’s manuscript alterations, together with Richard Bentley’s corrections, and these were incorporated into extensive notes, together with commentaries on the text and even on Maxwell’s English translation. As a critical edition, Barbeyrac’s work is an astonishing feat of scholarship, an essential starting point for a modern editor.
The last edition of Cumberland’s work was produced in Dublin in 1750 by John Towers. Towers produced a new but rather wayward translation and annotation inferior to Maxwell’s earlier attempt. Towers also included considerable ancillary material, including translations of prefatory addresses that Maxwell had left out. These pieces have been included in appendixes 1 and 2 of this edition.
The current edition reproduces Maxwell’s complete text, together with additional material taken from Cumberland’s copy of De Legibus, Barbeyrac’s Traité Philosophique, and Towers’s Philosophical Enquiry. The only substantial changes to Maxwell’s text are to the footnotes. Maxwell’s footnotes use a variety of conventions, but they are unnumbered and in the introductory essays and appendixes consist usually of very general abbreviated references that provide hardly any guidance for a nonspecialist modern reader.
For ease of reference, Maxwell’s footnote callouts (normally as terisks) in the text have been silently deleted and replaced by arabic-numbered footnotes for each essay or chapter. In some instances multiple references occurring close together have been rationalized into one note. In Maxwell’s supplementary essays, the notes have been expanded to include the full title of the work referred to and, where it can be identified, the edition used. Book, chapter, page, and section numbers have been left in the form of the original note. In his supplementary essays, Maxwell often both loosely paraphrases his source and quotes it verbatim in the original Greek or Latin; in those cases, the quotation is left out and only the reference is retained.
In the translation of Cumberland’s text, Maxwell supplemented Cumberland’s brief textual references (mostly to Hobbes’s works) with notes of his own. Maxwell’s comments are identified in the notes to this edition, as is material taken from Barbeyrac’s notes and Cumberland’s manuscript. Additional information is the work of the current editor. In order to facilitate comparison, references to appropriate modern editions of Hobbes’s major works have been used.
a
TREATISE
of the
LAWS of NATURE.
By the Right Reverend Father in God, Richard Cumberland, Lord Bishop of Peterborough.
Made English from the Latin by John Maxwell, M.A. Prebendary of Connor, and Chaplain to his Excellency the Lord Carteret, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.
To which is prefix’d,
An Introduction concerning the mistaken Notions which the Heathens had of the DEITY, and the Defects in their Morality, whence the Usefulness of Revelation may appear.
At the End is subjoin’d,
An Appendix, containing two Discourses, 1. Concerning the Immateriality of Thinking Substance. 2. Concerning the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance, of the LAW of NATURE, by the Translator.
LONDON:
Printed by R. Phillips; and Sold by J. Knapton, in St. Paul’s Church-Yard, J. Senex, over against St. Dunstan’s Church, in Fleet-Street, F. Fayram, at the South-Entrance of the Royal-Exchange, J. Osborne, and T. Longman, in Pater-Noster-Row, and T. Osborne, by Gray’s-Inn-Walks. 1727.
May it please your Excellency,
When I was to publish the following Sheets, I knew not under the Authority of what great Name so properly to introduce them to the Publick as your Excellency’s, and that for several Reasons.
The Design of the Work, is, to enforce the Obligation of the Dictates of Reason, and the Necessity of Revelation, the Practice of Virtue and Religion, to Mankind; which could, with no Propriety, be address’d to a Person of an exceptionable Character.
How I have succeeded in my Performance, no one is a better Judge than your Excellency, who have made the Authors of Antiquity, which I have made use of in the following Work, the Diversion and Improvement of your retir’d Hours.
The Relation also, which you bear to my native Country, which is happy under your Excellency’s Administration, was another Inducement to my taking the Liberty of this Address, to which I was the more embolden’d, by having had the Honour of being receiv’d into your Excellency’s Service.
That your Country may long enjoy the Advantage of your Example and your Counsels; that you and your Family may be long Happy in one another; and that, after a long and prosperous Life here, you may receive an eternal Reward of all your Labours hereafter, is the sincere Prayer of him, who is, with the profoundest respect,
London March 8th, 1726–7.
John Maxwell.
The Original ofMoral Obligation, and the fundamental Principles ofLawsDivine and Human, ofSociety, ofVirtue, and ofReligion, are Points, which, in my Opinion, best deserve our Consideration, of any, which the Mind of Man can contemplate. ’Tis to these we chiefly owe all the Happiness we enjoy here, or hope for hereafter. ’Tis from Enquiries of this kind, that we learn our Duties of every sort, to God, our Creator and supreme Governor, our Fellow-creatures, and Ourselves; that we learn that unerring Rule and Standard of right Reason, by pursuing whose Dictates we regulate our Passions, and preserve them in a due Subordination. Whilst we preserve them under the Conduct of that governing Principle in the Mind of Man, which they were form’d to obey, they are our chief Instruments of Happiness; as, when they grow exorbitant, headstrong, and irregular, they are the Causes of all our Misery.
For these Reasons, being led as much by Inclination, as in pursuance of the Profession which I have undertaken, I was willing to inquire into what those Authors had offer’d, who had treated upon this Subject, among whom BishopCumberlandseems to me, to have handled it in the most masterly and rational Manner, and to have gone farthest in the Argument, of any I have had the good Fortune to meet with. But at the same time that I own myself an Admirer of his Reasoning in the main, I cannot but acknowledge, that his Periods are very perplex’d and intricate, and that his Language is too Scholastick and Philosophical; which have deterr’d many from reading him, and have been the Occasion of his valuable Work’s not being so universally known as it deserv’d. His Book labour’d also under another Dis-advantage; his Manuscript was transcrib’d for the Press (as he himself says) by a Person unskillful in such Matters, whose Performance was, in consequence, very incorrect;and the Author, living in the Country at a distance from London, where the Book was printed, left the Care of the Edition to a Friend, who was not at sufficient Pains, to see that it came out correctly,as whoever examines the Original with attention, will perceiveinevery Sheet of the Book, in which many of the Errata are more than literal Mistakes, or Mispointings, and disturb the Sense extremely, which are a great Hinderance to the Reader, especially in an Argument otherwise intricate. This Fault has not been corrected in the subsequent Editions, but in the last greatly increas’d.His Paragraphs also, in many places, are not divided in such a manner as to give the most Light to his Argument, sometimes joining them where they should be divided, and dividing them where the Reasoning requires that they should be join’d. All these Circumstances conspire to make the Reading of his valuable Work, a laborious Task, which, therefore, few Readers will be at the Pains to do. This I thought well deserv’d a helping Hand, to which I have, therefore, contributed what lay in my power.
In order to remedy these Inconveniences, I thought it would be no disservice to the Publick, to publish his Work in English; Morality and the Law of Nature being Subjects, which many, who don’t understand Latin, would willingly inquire into; and the Poison, which Mr. Hobbes and other Writers of his Stamp, have spread far and wide, subversive of the Principles of all Morality and all Religion, having strongly infected many, who don’t understand that Language; beside, that many, who are conversant in other Latin Authors, don’t care to be at the Pains of readingCumberland.
In my Translation I have us’d my utmost Endeavours, throughout, religiously to preserve my Author’s Sense, and at the same time to free him from as many of his Scholastick Terms as I could, without hurting the Sense, explaining such of the restasseem’d most to require it, altering and increasing the Breaks into Paragraphs, where it seem’d necessary, and giving the Heads of each Section at the Beginning of it, in order to render more clear the Connexion of the Author’s Reasoning, and his Transitions; for which purpose I have likewise frequently made use of “inverted Commas” and a difference of Character, adding at the End a particular Analysis of the whole Work, and a copious Index. In the Notes at the Bottom of the Page, I have endeavour’d, either to explain, illustrate, or confirm, what the Author has advanc’d, and in some places where I differ’d from him, to give my Reasons for it, which are submitted to the Judgment of the Reader, with all due deference to the Character of so Judicious and Learned a Writer. I have added, likewise, at the End of most of the Chapters general Remarks, with the same View.
The Appendix which I have added, consists of two Parts. The Author, in the Beginning of his second Chapter, which is concerning the Nature of Man, where he comes to touch upon the Distinctness of the Soul from the Body, refers, for the Proof of it, to Several Authors, Des-Cartes, More, Digby, andWard, whom the Reader may, perhaps, not have at hand, nor Leisure and Inclination to consult ’em, if he had:And, as that is a most important Point in the present Inquiry, and has, in my Opinion, been set in a clearer and stronger Light by Dr. Clark, than by any other Writer I have met with, I have reduc’d into as narrow a Compass as I could, the Substance of his Controversy upon that Head, with an Anonymous Adversary; as to which, I dare venture to appeal to both the Gentlemen themselves, whether or no I have not fairly represented their Arguments.The second Part of the Appendix is a Discourse concerning the Promulgation, Obligation, and Observance of the Law of Nature, in which I have endeavour’d to supply what seem’d to me wanting inCumberland’s Scheme, in order to render it more compleat.
Inquiries of the present kind and upon the present Argument, are such as can be made concerning the Will of God, as discoverable by the Light of Nature; but yet, tho’, by the help of Reason only, we may discover many and important Truths, with respect to our moral and religious Conduct, Human Reason alone and unassisted is not sufficient to inform us of all those Truths, which it greatly concerns us to know, with such a degree of Certainty, as that the Mind of Man can acquiesce therein with Satisfaction; and, consequently, a farther Light, the Light of Revelation I mean, must be added to crown our Inquiries, without which we do but still grope in the Dark, as I have endeavour’d clearly to make out in my Introduction; for I would lay no greater stress upon any thing, no, not even upon Reason itself, than I think it can bear. If we strain the String too high, it will crack, and then it is of no farther Service. In order to discover the true Foundation of all Religion and Piety, and what our Duty to God is, we must first know who he is; that is to say, we must first learn so to distinguish him from all other Beings, whether Real or Imaginary, as not to give his Glory to another. The Heathens, indeed, plainly discover’d, what it was impossible they should avoid discovering, that there was a God, a wise, powerful, and good Governor of the World, but yet they did not discover the one true God; for their supreme God was only the Imperial Head of their Polity of Gods, whom they set at the Head of their Heathen Religion; so that their supreme God was as different from the true God, as their Heathen Religion was from the true Religion. And the better Sects of the Heathen Philosophers, such as thePythagoreans, Platonists, andStoicks, made God no better than the Soul of the World, so deifying the World as a part of God, and his Body; and this Notion introduc’d the Worship of the Universe, and of the Heavenly Bodies among them. And as forAristotle, he made no more of Religion, than a mere Civil or Political Institution. Thus the true God and the true Religion were Strangers among them all. As for their Morality, I have likewise shewn how imperfect that was. Thus were their Notions defective, with respect to God, Religion, and Morality; and without the Knowledge of the true God it is as impossible to form a true Religion, as it is impossible for a blind Man to take a true Aim, or for an Architect to raise a firm Building without a Foundation. This, therefore, is the Scope of my Introduction; for, as great a value as I set upon Reason, I would not over-rate her: Where she convinces me, that she is a sufficient Guide, I will follow her Directions; but where she owns herself at a loss, and that another Guide is necessary, I will follow her Directions in the Choice of that Guide, among the Pretenders, and in explaining the Directions and Institutions given me by that Guide. Thus is Reason justly subservient to, and consistent with, Religion; and thus, if our Practice be suitable, we make a right Use of both.
There is only one thing more, with which I think it proper to acquaint the Reader, and I have done. In the last Page but one of the Introduction I affirm, “That the Knowledge of the Being and Attributes of God are previously necessary to the Belief of a Revelation;” and I have before in the same Introduction prov’d, “That the Heathens were ignorant of the true God;” my Meaning, which is perfectly consistent, is this. It is plain, that they may believe in a God, who are ignorant of the true God, as was the Case of the Heathens. All that is necessary for me to know, in order to give a firm Assent to a Revelation, is, to be convinc’d that the Revelation comes from one, who neither can be deceiv’d himself, nor will deceive me; for, otherwise, how can I give a firm Assent to any thing upon his Testimony, if either He himself may be mistaken, or He be willing to misguide me? But more than this is not necessary, in order to the Belief of a Revelation. And so far the Heathens might and did know without the help of Revelation, by the Light of Nature only, tho’ at the same time they were ignorant of the true God. For tho’ they believ’d in a wise, powerful, and good Governor of the World, in consequence of which they must believe, that his Wisdom could not be deceiv’d, and that his Goodness would not suffer him to deceive; and tho’ all this was a true Notion of God, yet it was not a Notion of the true God, because they tack’d to it one or both of these Notions, “That he was the Soul of the World;” and, “That he was the supreme of their Heathen Deities;” both which, being equally false, could be no parts of the Notion of the true God. If then this wise and good Governor of the World, in whom they before believ’d without a Revelation, thought fit to give proper Credentials to any Missionaries, as coming from him, by whom they were inform’d, that this Governor of the World was the supreme God (contrary to whatPlatotaught,) and that he was the only God (contrary to what was taught by thePlatonistsandStoicks,) and that he was the Creator of the World, not the Soul of it (contrary to what was taught by thePlatonists, Pythagoreans, andStoicks;) and if these Missionaries should likewise inform them, that Religion was not a merely Civil and Political Institution (asAristotlemade it;) would not they, in Reason and Duty, be bound to believe all this, and to practice accordingly? Yes undoubtedly. And thus both parts of my Assertion are very consistent.
I know not, whether it be worth while to take notice here of a Passage in Page 12th of the Introduction,where I say, “That the Canaanites, among whom the Patriarchs sojourn’d ’till their Descent into Aegypt, were all of them Idolatrous Nations;” I do not mean, that all the Canaanites were then Idolaters, but only all the Canaanites, among whom the Patriarchs sojourn’d; because it is certain, that Melchizedek, and probably his People, were no Idolaters then; but then we have no Account that the Patriarchs ever sojourn’d in Salem.
Those mark’d with * are for large Paper.
I. Concerning the City, or Kingdom, of GOD in the Rational World, and the Defects in Heathen Deism.
II. Concerning the Imperfectness of the Heathen Morality; from both which, the Usefulness of Revelation may appear.
LONDON:
Printed in the YEAR, MDCCXXVII.
Man consider’d in his various Capacities.“Know thy-self,” was certainly the Wisest of the Sayings of the seven Wise-Men of Greece; that Knowledge being the greatest Wisdom, as being the only Method, by which we are enabled to discharge those Duties and Obligations we lie under, and to obtain Happiness.
Man is consider’d, in a double Capacity, Natural and Political.
Man, in his natural Capacity, is compos’d of two Parts, Body and Mind.
His Body is consider’d, by the Anatomist, as it is an Organiz’d Body; and by the Physician, and Surgeon, as it is a Body liable to Distempers, that may be prevented, or remedied.
The Natural Philosopher, commonly so call’d, considers the Nature of the human Mind, and of its Faculties; of which the two Principal are the Understanding and the Will, the Object of the former being Truth; and of the latter, Good. Logick conducts our Understanding in the Search after, and Delivery of, Truth.Morality and Religion conduct our Will in the Pursuit of Good.
Man Political is consider’d, as a Member of Society.
The Societies are various, of which a Man may at the same Time be a Member, who may, therefore, be considered in as many various Political Lights.
Oeconomics regulate his Conduct, as Member of a Family; the Laws of his Country, as Member of the Common-Wealth; the Laws of Nature, as he is a Member of Human Society; and Religion, as he is a Member of a holy Society of rational Agents, with God at their Head, which constitute what we call a Church.
The Denyers of Providence, Atheists.§II. Whoever does not consider himself, as Member of a Society, at whose Head God is, seems to me, to be truly an Atheist. For, whoever pretends to acknowledge a God, or universal Mind, considering him only Naturally, as the Soul of the World, and not Politically, as the supreme Governor there of, and so not acknowledging a Providence, (a particular Providence, for, without that, a general Providence is an unintelligible Notion;) as he cannot prove the Being of such a God, so neither does the Acknowledging him influence our Conduct, or answer any valuable Purpose in Life. If God were the Soul of the World, and not its supreme Governor, it would be impossible for us to prove his Being, which we can discover, only from the Effects of his Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, in Forming and Governing the World. If you take away these, you may as well call him by the empty Names of Chance, or Fate, or Nature, or any Thing else, as well as God: Nor could the Acknowledgment of such a God influence our Conduct, any more than the Gods of Epicurus did his.
Future Rewards, and Punishments, prov’d.§III. Now every Wise, Good, and Powerful Governor, must be a Law-Giver; for, without Laws, there is no Government: Such a Law-Giver must therefore have promulg’d his Laws, which God has done by Reason only, to those, to whom he has not afforded Revelation; and they can oblige no farther, than they have been promulg’d. Such a Law-Giver must also have fenc’d his Laws, with the Sanction of sufficient Rewards and Punishments, otherwise his Laws were in vain; but a wise Being does nothing in vain. Right Reason, from Experience, pronounces, “That the Rewards, and Punishments, naturally connected with the Observance, or Non-Observance, of the Laws of Nature, are not a sufficient Sanction.” Human Wisdom has, therefore, every where guarded such of the Laws of Nature as could properly fall within their Cognizance, with the additional Sanction of positive Rewards, and Punishments; which, however, tho’ they pretty well support Civil Society, are by no Means a sufficient Fence to the Law of Nature, and that upon several Accounts, 1. Many of the Laws of Nature are of such a Kind, as not properly to fall within the Design of human Laws, such as those, which enjoyn Gratitude, Veracity, in many Cases, Temperance, Liberality, Courtesy, &c.2. Other Crimes, of which human Laws can take Notice, are sometimes committed so secretly, as to escape the Knowledge of those, who should put the Laws in Execution. 3. Others, sometimes, escape unpunish’d, for want of a sufficient Power to enforce the Laws; the Crimes of some being of such a Kind, as, in their own Nature, tend to enable the Criminal to trample upon the Power of the Laws, as the unjust Acquisition of Arbitrary Power. 4. Human Wisdom cannot proportion Punishments to Crimes, because that depends upon such a through Knowledge, both of Things and Circumstances, as none but God has; the Pillory, being a far greater Punishment to some, than the Gallows is to others. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the supreme Law-Giver, and Governor of the World, as he would effectually Vindicate the Honour of his Laws, and promote the publick Happiness, to let no Crime pass unpunish’d; but that a super-added Punishment should await Criminals after this Life, of what Kind soever these Punishments may be; whether such as are naturally Connected with evil Habits, and the evil Company of the Wicked, with one another, or by the farther Addition of Punishments positively inflicted, as the Nature of the Case and of Things requires. All Crimes fall properly within his Cognizance; no Privacy excludes him; no Power can resist him; no Prejudice can byass him; and he, and he only, knows how to proportion Punishments to the Crimes, and to the Nature of the Sufferer, and to what the greatest Good of the Whole requires, which seems to be the Measure of the Intensenes sand Duration of Punishments.
If it be objected, “That future Rewards and Punishments, super-added to those of this Life, are not sufficient, if by the Word [Sufficient] be meant, what fully prevents the Transgression of the Law, in all the Members of the Society. But that if by [Sufficient] be meant, that which renders the Observance of the Law more eligible, than the Breach, to a well-inform’d Mind; the natural Consequences of Action, without any future Rewards, or Punishments, super-added, are, in this Sense, Sufficient.” I answer, “That, according to this Reasoning, all civil Sanctions, super-added to those of Nature, would be unnecessary, Minds well-inform’d not needing such Motives, and wicked Men, not being restrain’d by these Sanctions super-added to those of Nature; yet we see, that Civil Laws and Sanctions, are of great Use, notwithstanding the Appearance of this Reasoning to the contrary, many being mov’d by both Sanctions, that would not be mov’d by one only, as also others by the treble Sanction of natural Rewards and Punishments, positive Rewards and Punishments, inflicted by Men, and by the super-added Rewards and Punishments of another Life, who would not be influenc’d by the former Two.”
Without such a State of future Rewards and Punishments, no End can be assign’d, why such a Maker and Governor of the World should have placed us here, such as we are. Upon that Supposition, the Shortness and Uncertainty of human Life is unaccountable, and our Reason is often a disadvantage; the Bulk of Mankind losing Life, before they come to the full and true Exercise of their Reason; and when we do, to what purpose is this Mind possess’d of it, and of so many exalted and capacious Faculties, but, “like the Soul of a Swine,” (as our Author well observes,) “in-stead of Salt to preserve the Body from Putrefaction”; which, without that Reason, and those Faculties, it might support much longer than it does; several Brutes, without them, living longer than Man, and many Vegetables, without even a Sensitive Soul, much more without a Rational One, longer than either. Could such a Creator and Governor of the World, have given us Reason and Reflexion, with unbounded Prospects and Desires, with respect to Futurity and Eternity, with Anxieties and Doubts from thence arising innumerable, at the End of a short Farce to shut up the Scene in Death? A Farce, where the Wicked often thrive by their Vice, and the Good suffer, even on account of their Virtue. And Wisdom, united with Goodness, would rather have so ordered it, that we should neither have fear’d to die, nor desir’d to live beyond the Time appointed by Nature, as it is with the Beasts of the Field, often the Happier of the Two, if that were the Case, neither knowing, nor caring, whence they come, or whither they go. The many and grievous Calamities, (beyond what the Brutes are subject to,) lengthen’d out by the Memory of what is past, and the Fears of what is to come, can fairly be accounted for, if this Life be a State of Probation, and there be a Retribution afterwards, otherwise not, under the Conduct of a Wise and Good Governor of the World, and he would have made us satisfy’d with, and acquiesce under, our present Lot, whatever it were, like the Brute Creation, who when they suffer, do not redouble the Force of it by Reflexion; and if we were like them in the one Circumstance, why not in the other so? Why were we so made, that the Remembrance of certain past Actions creates in us Grief, Fear, and Horror, from which neither the Tyrant, nor the Polititian, can free himself, if our Maker had not design’d us for accountable Creatures, in giving us such an Idea of Guilt, and Punishment, even for the most secret Crimes?
But I would not be mis-understood here, as if I thought, “That human Affairs were so disorderly, as not clearly to shew plain Marks of a governing Providence.” To say, “That the present moral Appearances are all regular and good,” is false. But, “That there is no moral Order visible in the Constitution of Nature,” is equally false. The Truth seems this, “Moral Order is prevalent in Nature; Virtue is constituted, at present, the supreme Happiness, and the Virtuous generally have the happiest Share of Life.” The few Disorders, which are exceptions to this general Proposition, are probably left to us as Evidences, or Arguments, for a future State. This Argument has been finely touch’d upon by Lord Shaftsbury, in his Rhapsody, thus. “If Virtue be to it-self no small Reward, and Vice, in a great Measure, its own Punishment, we have a solid Ground to go upon. The plain Foundations of a distributive Justice, and due Order in this World, may lead us to conceive a further Building. We apprehend a larger Scheme, and easily resolve ourselves, why Things were not compleated in this State; but their Accomplishments reserv’d rather to some further Period. For, had the Good and Virtuous of Mankind been wholly prosperous in this Life; had Goodness never met with Opposition, nor Merit ever lain under a Cloud; where had been the Trial, Victory, or Crown of Virtue? Where had the Virtues had their Theater, or whence their Names? Where had been Temperance, or Self-denial? Where Patience, Meekness, Magnanimity? Whence have these their Being? What Merit, except from Hardship? What Virtue without a Conflict, and the Encounter of such Enemies as arise both within, and from abroad?
“But as many as are the Difficulties which Virtue has to encounter in this World, her Force is yet superior. Expos’d as she is here, she is not however abandon’d, or left miserable. She has enough to raise her above Pity, tho’ not above our Wishes: And as happy as we see her here, we have room for further Hopes in her behalf. Her present Portion is sufficient to shew Providence already ingag’d on her side. And since there is such Provision for her here, such Happiness, and such Advantages, even in this Life; how probable must it appear, that this providential Care is yet extended further to a succeeding Life and perfected Hereafter?”
Antient, Current, and Famous, were the Notices in Paganism, touching the Soul’s Immortality, the Rewards and Punishments of another Life, touching Hades, Elysium, the Isles of the Blessed, Orcus, Erebus, Tartarus, Mercury the Soul-Carrier, the Judges of Hell, which the Stoicks laugh’d at, as vulgar Errors, because they were the Doctrines of vulgar Paganism. But without them Natural Religion would be but Matter of Ridicule. And, accordingly, it is an Article of natural Religion, which is antecedent to any Institution of Paganism, Judaism, or Christianity. And the Christian Doctrine, touching the Rewards and Punishments of a future Life, is so con-natural to the Mind of Man, (which hath the Conscience of Good and Evil,) so agreeable to his Reason, and his Notions of a God and Providence, that it has met with a general Reception, and Approbation. Agreeably to these Sentiments, the generality of Pagan Religionists stiled the Soul Divine, of Kin to the Gods, a Part and Particle of God, deducing it from Heaven, and reducing it thither again, worshipping their Heroes and Benefactors. All which imply’d, that their Religion had this generous Sentiment in it, which Cicero (de Leg. 2.) accounteth one of its Principles, “That Virtue and Piety are Things which raise Men unto Heaven.” The Egyptians are particularly fam’d for their Doctrine of the Soul’s Immortality, and the Rewards of the Pious in another Life, as is most conspicuous, from a Funeral Rite of theirs recorded by Porphyry, and which deserveth to be everlastingly remember’d. When they embalm’d one of their Nobles, they took out the Belly, (which it is hence plain, they did not make a God of,) and put it into a Chest, which they held up to the Sun, one of the Embalmers making this Oration for the Dead Man. Porphyry de abst. L. 4. §. 10
“O LORD the Sun, and all ye Gods that give Life to Men, receive me, and transmit me into Consortship with the eternal Gods; for so long as I liv’d in the World, I piously worshipp’d the Gods, whom my Parents shewed me; those that generated my Body I always honoured; I neither kill’d any Man, nor defrauded any of what was committed to my Trust; nor have I done any Thing else of an atrocious Nature. If, in my Life-Time, I committed any Offence in Eating and Drinking what was not Lawful, the Offence was not done by my-self, but by those,” pointing at, or shewing, the Chest, wherein the Belly was. And having so said, he threw it into the River. The Rest of the Body was embalm’d apart, as Pure.
The Immortality of the Soul, agreeable to the Notions we naturally Form of the Deity.§IV. It is evident, that his making us capable of Happiness, was the Effect of his Goodness. It will therefore, from thence, and from the Immutability of his Nature, necessarily follow, “That he, who will’d us once into Being, will always Will the Continuance of our Being, and that too in a happy State, except where the Vindication of the Honour of his Laws, and the Common Good requires the contrary.”
It is the Will of God, that we should practise Religion.§V. God, the Author of Nature, has imprinted Characters of his independent Power, Wisdom, Goodness, Providence, & c. upon his Works; he has given us Reason, by which we cannot but discover, if we attend, these his Attributes, and the Relation we bear to him. It is, therefore, his Will, that we should know, and, knowing, acknowledge these his Perfections, and the Relation He and We, his dependent Creatures, bear to one another; that is, that we should pursue and promote, to our Power, those beneficent Ends, which he had in creating us, and other Beings like our-selves, capable of Happiness, and give him the Honour due to him, that is, that we should practise Virtue and Religion, which are, therefore, his Laws to us.
A View of the Pagan System of the Rational World.II. Let us, in the next Place, consider the several Parts of that Society of Rational Agents, of which God is at the Head; first, according to the Notion of the Pagans, and next, according to the Idea we have of it, by Revelation, and the Scriptures; for Truth, and Error, like all other Opposites, will best illustrate each other. For we can no otherwise come to the Knowledge of our-selves, in the political Sense, of our Duty, and the Obligations we lie under, without considering the Relation we stand in to the Kingdom of God, that great and holy Society, of which we are a Part; and to any other Society, if such there be, with which we may have to do; for it is impossible, to understand a Duty which is Relative, without first understanding the Terms of the Relation, (to make use of a Logical Expression.) To begin then with the Pagan System.
In which they consider’d, 1. One intellectual Head of the Universe.The Heathen Philosophers, who acknowledg’d a Deity, acknowledg’d but one single intellectual Head of the Universe, (whom they call’d Jupiter, Zeus, Baal, &c.) and but one Universe; not such a One as the Epicureans imagin’d, who incoherently talk’d of infinite incoherent Worlds in infinite Space, but one total universal System, made up of several coherent subordinate Systems.
This one Universe is capable of being consider’d Politically and Naturally: Politically, the Heathens consider’d it as a Universe of Rational Agents.
Whom they suppos’d also the Soul of the World.The Universe was Politically considered by the Heathen Theologers; for they suppos’d it to be a Political System, or Monarchy, having the foremention’d intellectual Head presiding in and over it. But they consider’d it also Naturally, supposing it to be an Animated System, or Mundan Animal, with the foremention’d intellectual Head, as the Soul thereof; yet so, as to be also the imperial Head of the Monarchy of the Universe.
Representing the Universe of rational Agents as but one political System, which is a fundamental Mistake.§II. The Heathen Theologers, who do not acknowledge any such Society as the Church of God, represented the Universe of Rational Agents, as but one Political System, which is their prime fundamental Mistake. For, in this Scheme, God and the Creature are not sufficiently distinguish’d, but criminally confounded by deifying Creatures. The Kingdoms of Good and Bad Angels (or Demons) are not distinguish’d. The Church and the World are not distinguish’d, but confounded, or rather, the Church is shut out of Being, for which there is no Place in the Heathen System. Heaven, Earth, and Hell, are not duly distinguish’d, but confounded into one Political Society, under one Monarch; and they are suppos’d, as friendly conspiring together, whence they thought themselves secure from any Disaster after Death. And, because they thought themselves by Nature, the Citizens of God’s Kingdom already, they could not be prevail’d with, to enter into the real Kingdom of God, when the Gospel was preach’d, which they oppos’d, as opposite to their System. Upon this fundamental Error, was grounded their whole Morality; and upon this Notion, That they were Fellow-Citizens with the Gods, their Practice was, doubtless, grounded of making new Gods, as it were by a right of Suffrage in Heaven it-self.
§III. Some Christian Writers have, in great Measure, adopted these Sentiments, not discerning the Difference between a Holy Divine Republick, and a Heathen Mundan System, heedlesly entertaining false Notions of the State of the Universe, and speaking the Language of Heathen Philosophers, which is irreconcileable with the Jewish, and Christian Religion.
The Worshippers of the true God indeed are, in a large Sense, Citizens of this lower World; they have a Duty to discharge as such, and must not fail of a dutiful and virtuous Correspondence with Nature, and common Providence; but the proper Design, and Effect of God’s reveal’d Laws, was not to instate men Citizens of the World at large, nor was it the proper Law of that Estate of Life, nor was it the Law of Nature governing all Things as such, but it was the Law of that King, who governeth all Things as Law-Giver of his Church.
From which our Author is not free.The foregoing Language of the Heathen Philosophers, our Author usually speaketh, “The most ample Society of all rational Agents, the City of God. The System of all rational Agents, or the whole natural City of God. The whole Aggregate of rational Beings, or the whole City, the Head where of is God. The System of all rational Agents, the Kingdom of God. God, the Head and Father of all rational Beings, and other rational Agents, as his Sons. All men, altho’ they are not under the same human imperial Power, yet are in the most ample City of God. In the City of God, or in the Universe, they are Subjects, that in a human City are Supreme. This Law of Nature, Care of the publick Good, is the natural Law, uniting all rational Beings. The Summary of the Laws of rational Nature, or of the City of God, which is the Aggregate of Mankind, subordinate to God the Rector, his City constituted by the Nature of it. The whole System of rational Beings, that City, the Head of which is God; the Members, all his Subjects.” Such Christian Doctrines, in their Scheme, agree with the Heathens, in making the Universe of rational Agents a Kingdom; in making it one Kingdom; in making common Reason, which directeth to common Good, to be the common Law, which uniteth the Universe of rational Agents into one Kingdom; and in making degenerate Mankind to be by Nature, in the State of Society with God, the Citizens of the City of God, and the Subjects of his Kingdom. But in these Respects they differ. The Heathens deify’d subordinate rational Agents, which these Christian Divines do not; as the Heathens were much more Curious than the Christians, in distinguishing several Orders in their Kingdom of rational Beings, which they generally divided into 6 Classes.
The Heathens divided their system of rational Agents into 6 Classes, 1. The supreme God. 2. Subordinate Gods Invisible. 3. Visible. 4. Demons. 5. Heroes. 6. Men. The Word God, taken by the Heathens in a larger, and more refrained Sense.§IV. 1. The supreme God. 2. Subordinate Gods Invisible. 3. Visible, such as the 12 Dij majorum Gentium, namely, the 7 Planets, the 4 Elements, and the Earth, and such like. 4. Demons. 5. Heroes, or Souls of illustrious Men deify’d. 6. Men.
In a large Sense they call’d every Thing Superior to Man, a God, as in Ovid, “Deus & melior Natura,” are the same; and Cicero argueth, “There is something Superior to Man, therefore there is a God.” But in their classing, or distinguishing, the System of rational Agents, they took the Word God in a restrain’d Sense.
§V. These several Orders of rational Beings, the Heroes only excepted, belong to the original Constitution of the Universe, in the Heathen Scheme. The middle Order of Demons does not proceed from any fall of Angels, as Revelation informs us, but is suppos’d originally necessary to the Polity of the Universe. 1. That all the Regions of the Universe may be replenished with proper Animals, and rational Inhabitants. 2. That there may be due Order amongst rational Agents, which requires some First, some Last, and some Middle, according to the usual Method of Nature, which gradually ascends. 3. That the Gods might not be polluted, as it were, nor descend beneath their Majesty, in managing human Affairs by themselves.Of the Order of Demons. 4. For the Management of the Affairs of their Religion and Virtue, and rendering their Souls more Happy, presiding over Oracles, and managing the Affairs of Prophecy and Divination. Hence that Prayer in the Golden Verses of Pythagoras, as they are call’d.
“Jupiter Father, either do thou thy-self loose all Men from those manifold Evils, or shew them all what Demon is to be made use of for that Purpose.” 5. For carrying on an Intercourse between Gods and Men, and to be Mediators between them. 6. To manage (in subserviency to the Gods) Nature, Providence, and human Affairs.
The Universe of rational Agents, being thus united into one friendly and harmonious System, constitutes one Monarchy thereof, which is a fundamental Pagan Mistake.
Of Demons Good and Evil, and a Good and Evil Principle.III. These Demons, the Heathens distributed into Good and Evil, (call’d Vejoves.) the former worshipp’d in hopes of their Help, the latter, lest they should Hurt. At the Head of the Good Demons, some set a Good Principle, at the Head of the Evil, an Evil. This Doctrine was embrac’d by the antient Persians, of which Prideaux giveth the following Account. “Zoroastres did not found a new Religion, but only took upon him to revive and reform an old one, that of the Magians, which had been, for many Ages past,The Doctrine of the Magi reform’d by Zoroastres. the antient national Religion of the Medes as well as of the Persians.—The chief Reformation which he made in the Magian Religion, was in the first Principle of it. For, whereas before they held the Being of two first Causes, the First, Light, or the good God, who was the Author of all Good; and the other, Darkness, or the evil God, who was the Author of all Evil; and that of the Mixture of these two, as they were in a continual Struggle with each other, all Things were made; he introduc’d a Principle superior to them both, one supreme God, who created both Light and Darkness, and out of these two, according to the alone Pleasure of his own Will, made all Things else that are.——But to avoid making God the Author of Evil, his Doctrine was, that God originally and directly created only Light, or Good, and that Darkness, or Evil, follow’d it by Consequence, as the Shadow doth the Person; that Light, or Good, hath only a real Production from God, and the other afterwards resulted from it, as the Defect thereof. ——That, in the Struggle between them, where the Angel of Light prevails, there the most is Good, and where the Angel of Darkness prevails, there the most is Evil: That this Struggle shall continue to the End of the World: That there shall be a general Resurrection, and a Day of Judgment, wherein just Retribution shall be rendered to all, according to their Works. After which the Angel of Darkness, and his Disciples, shall go into a World of their own, where they shall receive the Punishments of their evil Deeds. And the Angel of Light, and his Disciples, shall go into a World of their own, where theyshall receive, in everlasting Light, the Reward due unto their good Deeds; and that after this they shall remain separated for ever, and Light, and Darkness, be no more annex’d together to all Eternity. And all this, the Remainder of that Sect, which is in India and Persia, do, without any variation, after so many Ages, still hold even to this Day,” as is affirm’d by Ovington, in his Travels, Lord in his Discovery of the Sects of the Banians, and Persees, and other Travellers. The good Principle they call’d Oromasdes, the evil Principle, Arimanius; to both which Zoroastres taught them to Sacrifice, as Plutarch relates. This Doctrine of two Principles was introduc’d, in order to account for the Evil observ’d in the World, and as it stood before Zoroastres reform’d it as above, was the most evident Ditheism, or acknowledgment of two supreme co-ordinate independent Deities, that ever was, or that can be imagin’d; in whom there was not so much as an Unity of Will, their Wills being always in direct Opposition to one another. Upon this Occasion, I cannot but take Notice of a remarkable Passage, in A Discourse of the GroundsA mistake of the Author of the Grounds, &c. corrected.and Reasons of the Christian Religion, P. 139, 140. “It is to be observ’d, that the Jews, who were greatly departed from the Law of Moses, and especially from the Doctrine of the Unity of God, went Idolaters into Captivity; that they went into Chaldea, a Country, where one God had from remote Antiquity been believ’d and worshipp’d; that the religious Books of that Nation give a Relation of Matters from the Creation to the Time of Abraham, so little different from that contain’d in the Pentateuch, that one of the Accounts must, in all probability, be borrow’d from the other. That particular Care was taken among the Chaldees, to instruct the Jewish Youths of Quality and Parts, in the Chaldean Discipline and Learning; that the Jews came out at different Times from Chaldea, such firm Believers and Worshippers of one God, and that under the high Patronage and Protection of the Kings of Chaldea, ordaining such Belief and Worship among them, that they have continu’d in that Belief and Worship ever since; that it seems more Natural for a Body of Slaves and Captives to be form’d by their Masters and Conquerors, than that the Conquerors should be form’d by them; and that the Slave should rather receive Histories, and Antiquities, from the Master, than the Master from the Slave; that, particularly, it seems improbable, that the Jews, who chang’d their own idolatrous Notions and Practices for those of the Chaldeans, should have so much Credit with the Chaldeans, as to introduce new History and Antiquities among them; and that it seems more probable, that the Jews, who became compleat Converts to the Notion of one God, receiv’d among the Chaldeans, and were, in many Respects, form’d and disciplin’d by them, should receive their History and Antiquities from the Chaldeans.” Thus far the Author of the Grounds, &c. Let us now examine upon what Authority he has advanc’d this Assertion. “That the Chaldeans were, from remote Antiquity, Worshippers of one God only,” he advances upon the Authorities of Hyde, in his Account of the Religion of the antient Persians; of Prideaux, in his Connexion, Vol. 1. of Lord, in his Account of the Religion of the Persees; of Pocock, in his Specimen of the History of the Arabians, P. 148.
Now all these Authors speak there only of the Religion of the Persians, but not a Syllable of the Religion of the Chaldeans, or Babylonians, concerning which is the present Question.
That those different Nations did not profess the same Religion, we shall see presently, the Persians being Magians, and the Chaldeans, or Babylonians, Sabians. But, if the Babylonians, to whom the Jews were Captives, had been of the same Religion with the Persians of that Time, I do not see how it would prove the Babylonians, Worshippers of one God only, at that Time; for the Persians were then Magians, and Ditheists; Zoroastres not having reform’d Magianism ’till after the Babylonian Captivity, as above.
Therefore it does not appear, that even the Persians believ’d in one first Cause, and supreme Governor of the World, ’till after the Babylonian Captivity; asserting two first and independent Principles, the one Good, and the other Evil, as above, ’till Zoroastres reform’d Magianism, and establish’d one first and good Principle, which, according to Dr. Prideaux, and Sir Isaac Newton was not ’till the Days of Darius Hystaspes, about 492 Years before Christ. Now Cyrus put an End to the 70 Years Captivity of the Jews, in, or about, the Year before Christ 536, that is, 44 Years before the first Appearance of Zoroastres at the Persian Court.
Now it does not appear, that the Babylonians were ever of the Magian Sect; but that, from the earliest Times we have any Account of them, they were Polytheists, and Idolaters; and, more particularly, during the Time of the Jewish Captivity under them; how then could the Jews imbibe their Notion of the Unity of God, and aversion to Idolatry, from those who were themselves Polytheists, and Idolaters?
The Chaldeans, from among whom God call’d Abraham, were an Idolatrous Nation. Joshua (24. 2) thus accosteth the Children of Israel, “Your Fathers dwelt on the other Side of the Flood (i.e. of the River Euphrates) in old Time, even Terah, the Father of Abraham, and the Father of Nahor, and they serv’d other Gods.” The Canaanites, among whom the Patriarchs sojourn’d, ’till their Descent into Egypt, were all of them Idolatrous Nations, as were the Egyptians, to whom they were so long in Bondage. Rachel Stole the Gods of her Father Laban the Syrian. And, as for the Babylonians particularly, it is so far from being true, that the Jews ow’d their Belief of the Unity of God, and Detestation of Images, to them; that we have undoubted Proof, of their being an Idolatrous Nation at that Time. When the ten Tribes were carried away Captive by the King of Assyria, he planted Samaria with Colonies from his other Dominions. We are told (2 Kings 17. 28.) that these Colonies did not “Fear the Lord,” that is, the one God; but that, when they settled in Samaria, they set up and worshipp’d their own Idols. “The Men of Babylon made Succoth-Benoth, the Men of Cuth made Nergal, &c. 2 Kings 17.30.” which Images, we are told v. 41. that their Fathers before them had worshipp’d. We find likewise Sennacherib, King of Assyria, “Worshipping in the House of Nisroch, his God, 2 Kings 19. 37.” We are likewise told by Ezra, (1. 7.) That “Cyrus the King brought forth the Vessels of the House of the Lord, which Nebuchadnezzar had brought forth out of Jerusalem, and had put them in the House of his Gods.” Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, set up a Golden Image, in the Plain of Dura, to be worshipp’d by all his Subjects, under Pain of Death, for refusing to comply with which, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego, were cast into the Fiery Furnace, Dan. Chap. 3. which, I think, is a pretty plain Proof, that the Jews did not learn their Aversion to Idolatry from the Babylonians, their Masters. Belshazzar, the Son of Nebuchadnezzar, and his Princes, in a remarkable Feast, “Drank Wine, and prais’d the Gods of Gold, and of Silver, of Brass, of Iron, of Wood, and of Stone,” Dan. 5. 4. Upon which Occasion, Daniel delivers himself thus to Belshazzar, (23.) “Thou hast prais’d the Gods of Silver, and Gold, of Brass, Iron, Wood, and Stone, which see not, nor hear, nor know; and the God in whose Hand thy Breath is, and whose are all thy Ways, hast thou not glorify’d.” Great Marks of the Babylonians attachment to the Belief of the Unity of God, and Aversion to Idolatry! The Occasion also of Daniel ’s being thrown into the Lyons Den, is another Proof of the like Kind. “Babylon is fallen, is fallen, and all the graven Images of her Gods he hath broken unto the Ground.” Is. 21.9. “Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth, their Idols were upon the Beasts, and upon the Cattle,” saith Isaiah (46. 1.) speaking of the Idols of Babylon. “Babylon is taken, Bell is confounded, Merodach is broken in Pieces, her Idols are confounded, her Images are broken in Pieces.” Jer. 50. 2. “A Sword is upon the Chaldeans, saith the Lord, and upon the Inhabitants of Babylon, and upon her Princes, and upon her Wise-Men:—A Drought is upon her Waters, and they shall be dry’d up; for it is the Land of graven Images, and they are mad upon their Idols.” Jer. 50. 35–38. “I will do Judgment upon the graven Images of Babylon.” Jer. 51. 47. 52.
Thus, therefore, I think it evident, “That the Author of the Grounds, &c. has not given a probable Account, how the Jews came out of the Babylonian Captivity, more firm Believers of the Unity of God, and more averse to Idolatry, than they were, when they went into Captivity; Dr. Prideaux, in his Connexion, seems to me, to have given amuchmore probable Solution of that Affair.
As for what the Author of the Grounds, &c. affirms, (from Berosus in Josephus, against Apion, Book 1.) That “the religious Books of the Chaldeans give a Relation of MattersFrom the Creation, to the Time of Abraham, so little different from that contain’d in the Pentateuch, that one of the Accounts must, in all probability, be borrowed from the other.”Josephus is here quoted, for what he does not say, who expresses himself only thus. “Berosus, after the Manner of the most antient Historians, treats of theDeluge, and the Destruction of Mankind, just as Moses reports it; and of theArkalso; and how the first Father of our Race was preserv’d in it a-float upon the Mountains of Armenia. He runs thro’ the Genealogy likewise of the Sons of Noah, their Names, and their Ages; and so carries on the Train, from Noah himself to Nabulassar.” Now an Account from the Creation, and from the Deluge, are two very different Things; nor do I see any Reason, which makes it probable, that Moses borrow’d his Account of the Origin of Things from the Chaldeans, as this Author would insinuate; Moses having had no intercourse, that we know of, with the Chaldeans; nor the Jewish Nation, indeed, ’till after the Building of Solomon’ s Temple, to which, both their Civil and Religious Establishments, and, consequently, their Accounts of Things, were long prior. The Chaldean Account, from the Flood downward, agreeing with the Mosaick, is, indeed, a very good Proof of the Truth of the Chaldean Accounts of those Affairs; but no Proof at all, that Moses, who had no intercourse with the Chaldeans, borrow’d his Accounts of the Creation and downwards, from them. Besides, Josephus affirms, “That most antient Historians agreed with the Mosaick Account of the Deluge”; which is no more a Proof, that Moses borrow’d his Account from the Chaldeans, than from the Aegyptians, or Phoenicians, with whom Moses, and the Jews, had then much more intercourse. All that we can fairly infer from the Passage quoted, I think, is this, “That most antient Historians agreeing with the Mosaick Account of the Deluge, shews, that the Tradition of that Affair was pretty General, and, consequently, that it is very probable, that it was true”; which is a great Confirmation of the Truth of the Mosaick Account of Things. But so much for this Digression, which I hope the Reader will pardon.
The Egyptian TyphonThe Aegyptian Typhon seems to have been of the same Stamp with the Persian Arimanius. And Plutarch says, That “Typhon begat two Sons, Hierosolymus, and Judaeus”; which is a small Sample of the Kindness the Aegyptians had for the Hebrews: He also Interprets the antient Stories of Giants, and Titans, concerning evil Demons; for he, with some other Grecian Philosophers, acknowledg’d such, which the Stoicks, as well as Epicureans, utterly deny’d, deriding the Punishments of another Life.
The Doctrine of Evil Demons, according to the Heathens.§II. Plutarch acknowledges powerful and surly evil Demons, who were the Authors of unlucky Days, who were worshipp’d by Beating, Lamentations, and Fasting, obscene Words, and contumelious Speeches, by which their Fury was appeas’d, contrary to the Nature of the good Demons. These Demons, they conceiv’d to have Bodies, and some of them so gross, that they might be wounded with a Sword, whence Spencer explains a Magical Rite, mention’d Ezek. 33. 26. Ye stand upon your Swords. For they had their Swords in readiness drawn and glittering, to keep the Ghosts and Demons in awe, whom they had conjur’d up. Which is not a more unphilosophical Notion, than that of several of the Hebrew Doctors, “That the Aerial Demons, Eat, and Drink, Generate, and Die, as Men.” Nor than that Conceit of several of the Fathers, “That the Fall of Angels, was their falling in Love with Women, and having impure Commerce with them,” whence the Giants were begotten, as some of them say; Demons, as others. Most of the Fathers believ’d, “That they had Bodies of apurer Kind.” The Heathens generally believ’d, “That the Demons were pleas’d and allur’d by the Scent and Fumes of the Sacrifices they offer’d to them, and which they thought a Sort of Food to them”; whence it was customary for the Sacrificers, to pour the Blood upon the Ground, or into a Ditch, to entice the Demons to come, themselves Banquetting, about the Blood, upon the Sacrifice, that so they might gain the Friendship and Society of the Demons, and the Faculty of Divination. Whence the Jews were commanded to bring the Animals, which they sacrific’d, unto the Door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and their Blood was to be sprinkled upon the Altar, that the Children of Israel might no more offer their Sacrifices to Devils, Sehirim, to hairy, or Goat-like Demons. Lev. 17. 7. This Kind of Idolatry, amongst others, the Israelites learn’d from the Aegyptians, who had a mighty Veneration for the Goat, which they religiously abstain’d from killing; and the Mendesians (a People of Aegypt) thought it an Honour to bear the Name of Mendes, a Goat in their Language, which they deify’d, and to which they built Temples.
§III. A second Class of Evil Demons, or Genij, is acknowledg’d by some later Heathen Writers, (who, probably, took the Hint from the Christians, whose Doctrines were then well known;) these were said to be vitious in their Nature, and to tempt Men to vice. “There are differences of Virtue and Vice among Demons, as among Men,” says Plutarch. The same Author, in the Life of Galba, relates the Speech of an Officer to his Soldiers, then about to revolt, wherein he represents the Fickleness of their Temper, “That chang’d so often in so short a Time, not upon any rational Consideration, but by the impulse of some Demon, that hurried them from one Treason to another.” As the former Class of Evil Demons were suppos’d to bring upon Men Natural Evils, so the latter were suppos’d to tempt them to Moral Evil.
Now this Doctrine of the Pagans, concerning Evil Demons, must, of necessity, fall in, either with the Manichean, or with the Christian, Scheme; with the Manichean, if they were originally constituted Evil; with the Christian, if they became such by an abuse of their own Liberty.
Petavius saith, that several of the Fathers suppose, “That, when the World was made, the several Parts of it were committed to several Orders of Angels, that he who is now the Devil, was the Chief of the Terrestrial Order, and that his Sin was this, that, He envy’d and could not brook the Dignity bestow’d upon Man.” Which Conceit of theirs, That Envy was the Devil’s Sin, has been entertain’d by many.
Of Nemesis and the Furies, Ministers of divine Vengeance.§IV. A third Class of Evil Demons, but not so reputed upon account of their vitious Nature, are the Ministers of divine Vengeance, call’d Furies, Dirae, Erynnyes, Alastores, Dii impii, Hecate, Proserpina, with Nemesis at their Head. So, according to some Expositors, the Evil Angels, mention’d Psal. 78. 49. were not morally Evil, but are denominated Evil, as being Angels of Punishment. Such were those, which Atteius invok’d by Name, when he curs’d Crassus, as Plutarch relates in his Life. Some of these they suppos’d, to go about and punish enormous Crimes in this World, (which seem to be no more than the Stings of Conscience,) supposing it inconsistent with the Nature of the Gods, to be themselves the Punishers of wicked Men; but not so, to appoint these their Executioners upon such Occasions. For Plutarch, enquiring the Reason, why the Romans cloath’d their Lares, or domestick Gods, with Dog-Skins, makes this Conjecture. “As Chrysippus supposeth, that certain evil Genij go about, which the Gods make use of, to do the Work of Executioners upon impious and unjust Men; so the Lares may be thought certain direful and punitive Genij.” In this Author’s Description of the Punishments of another Life, certain Lakes are said to be there, “and certain Demons stand by, which plunge Souls in, and draw them out.” As in the famous Apologue of Er in Plato, there are “Men ferine and of igneous Aspect,” the Tormentors of Souls. This Sort of Evil Demons is acknowledg’d by Plato; and one of his School (who acknowledgeth no Demons morally Evil, yet) affirmeth, “That there are Demons, which punish Souls; that the Sins of Men make the Gods their Enemies, not that the Gods are angry, but they separate them from the Gods, and joyn them to the punitive Demons; that the Souls of the Flagitious, after their departure from the Body, are tormented by them, and that there are, for separate Souls, expiatory Gods and Demons, who purge them from their Sins.” It was this Sort of Demons, which the Pagans suppos’d maleficent Magicians to hold Correspondence with.
Of the Sentiments of the Jews concerning evil Demons.§V. The Jews are said by Hulsius and others, to acknowledge Angels of 3 Classes, 1. Separate Intelligences, who appear not in a corporeal Form, nor can be comprehended by bodily Senses, but only by prophetick Vision, and incompass the Throne of the Divine Majesty, such as Michael, Gabriel, Raphael. 2. Angels of Ministry, created by God for the Welfare and Ministry of Men. 3. Angels of Punishment, or Torment, Destruction, Mischief, and Death; possessing the Sublunary and Infernal Mansions, whose Head is Samael, the Angel of Death, as the Jews call him, who is suppos’d to kill Mankind, and other Animals. But these Angels of Punishment, are consider’d by the Jews, not as Tormentors only, but as morally Evil, and Tempters also of Mankind. For they affirm, “That Mankind Sin by the Seduction of the Serpent; That Samael rode upon the Serpent, for bigness like a Camel, when he tempted Eve; That Satan has his Name from הטש (Satah,) for he it is that causeth Man toDeclinefrom the Way of Truth.” Asmodeus, whom the Jews suppose the King of the Tempters, is by Graves suppos’d probably to be deriv’d from the Persian Word Azmoud, he tempted, or solicited to Evil, and therefore signifieth the Tempters.Moses in Deut. 32. 17. saith of the Israelites, that they sacrific’d unto Devils, םידש (Sheddim,) which Fagius upon the Place saith, that the Jews suppose to be evil Spirits, that come out of the Waters, and are said to have their Name from דדש (Shadad) Vastavit because they devastate a good Mind with bad Opinions and Affections. There are several Passages cited by Windet, Spencer, and Hoornbeck, from the Hebrew Doctors, insinuating, or acknowledging, the Fall of Angels; such as these of Rabbi Eleazar, “The evil Angels were driven out of Heaven by a fiery Scepter. Samael and his Armies, God cast them out of Heaven. Aza and Azael were the two Angels that accus’d their Lord, and God cast them Head-long out of the Holy Place.” The Book Zohar says, “God threw Aza and Azael down Head-long, bound and chain’d.” And, in another antient Book (of the Death of Moses,) it is said of them, “Descending from Heaven, they corrupted their Way.” So in Jonathan’s Targum, Samcha, Zai, and Uziel, (the same with Aza, and Azael,) are said to have fallen from Heaven, and are suppos’d to have begotten Giants. Also the Rabbinical Name of their Prince דודמ (Marod) signifieth an Apostate, who is call’d by several other Rabbinical Names, which likewise imply the Fall of Angels, such as, “The Prince of Gehennah, the Head of the Satanae.” The common Name, among the Jews in our Saviour’s Time, for the Prince of the Devils, was Beelzebub, or Beelzebul, which may signify Lord of Matter, that is, the presidentiary Ruler of the material World; for לובז (Zebul) is the same with κόπρος which, in the Orphic Verses, signifieth the Matter;
Jupiter, most Illustrious, the greatest of the Gods, involv’d in Dung, or the Matter.
Empedocles’s Doctrine of Demons, which fell from Heaven, and are agitated by the Gods.As among the Jewish Doctors, so among the Heathen Philosophers, a fall of Demons, or Angels from Heaven, is, in some Measure, acknowledg’d; for some of them discourse of a Sort of evil Genij, passively and penally such, which are called by Plutarch, “The Demons of Empedocles, who are agitated by the Gods, and have fallen from Heaven,” whom Empedocles thus describes;
The Heaven-Fallen Demons of Empedocles, pursu’d by the Vengeance of the Gods, altho’ they are an approach to the Christian Doctrine, cannot reasonably be thought a Tradition from the Jews, who themselves then talked not so clearly upon this Head.1. This Doctrine of Empedocles greatly befriends the common Hypothesis of the Lapse of Angels from Heaven, which must be call’d the Christian Hypothesis, tho’ it has been weakly oppos’d by some Christian Writers, who have asserted the Evil Angels, to be, originally, the Inhabitants of the Air and Earth, and never to have been in Heaven, and enjoy’d the Beatifick Vision there. For their height of Felicity might be so far from securing them from a Fall, that it might occasion it, thro’ Pride, Self-Admiration, and Self-Love; and, in consequence, affecting a Dominion over Subjects withdrawn from the Subjection of God, agreeably to the Heads of Empire, which Satan usually setteth up in the World, that usually affect an unbounded Liberty. And that himself, in Consort with his Fellow-Rebels, should be like-minded, and therefore should chuse to make a total Revolt from God and their Duty, was not incompatible with their coelestial Condition; nor is it at all incredible, the like prodigiously-frantick Enormities being no Rarities amongst intelligent Agents. Wherefore the usual Doctrine is unexceptionable, which is clearly enough express’d in H. Scriptures, which represent the Holy Angels, as originally the Inhabitants of Heaven. Matt. 22. 30. Luc. 20. 36. Heb. 12. 22. And the laps’d Angels, originally, of the Number of the Holy Angels, 2 Pet. 2. 5. Jud. 6. 2. 2. The Heathen Doctrine of Demons befriends the Christian Hypothesis of a Kingdom of evil Angels. For the Heathen Demonologists suppos’d, “That the Evil Demons have an imperial Head over them.” Therefore, in consistence with themselves, they ought to have suppos’d, “That there is a distinct Kingdom, or Polity, of Evil Demons,” as Christianity asserteth. But they have so qualify’d this Doctrine of Evil Demons, as to make it no Contradiction to their Doctrine of the Unity of the Monarchy of the Universe, or their City of God; for they were Gods themselves, and Part of the common Polity of their Gods, which is monstrously, both Absurd and Impious. For whoever has any Veneration for God, will not count it a small Matter, to deify Evil Demons, and to pay them religious Worship. Yet this Worship of Demons was the Religion of popular Societies amongst the Heathens, as Plutarch plainly acknowledges, there by giving a great Attestation to the Truth of Christianity, (which chargeth upon Paganism, the Sacrificing unto, and having Fellowship with, Devils;) and to the peculiar Excellency of the Christian Learning, which alone, to the Purpose, discovereth Satan. For both Jews and Pagans (notwithstanding their slender Notice of Evil Angels) are far from knowing him as they ought, and so far as is needful to the Purpose of Piety and Sanctity. 3. The Heathen Doctrine of Demons greatly befriends the Christian, by asserting and ascertaining (in Consort with it) the Existence of Evil Demons. They were assured of their Existence from their Operations and Effects; and, from this Hypothesis, Plutarch gives an Account of the Apparitions to Brutus and Dio, upon which, after his Manner, he reflects finely. “If Brutus and Dio,” (saith he,) “Philosophical Men, of great Strength of Mind, and not apt to fancy horrible Appearances, were put into such Commotion by Apparitions, that they solicitously related them to their Friends; perhaps we may be forc’d to embrace that (seemingly) most absurd Opinion of the Antients, That there are Evil and Envious Demons, that, envying good Men, and withstanding their Actions, raise Fears and Troubles to them, to shake and overthrow their Virtue; lest, if they should persist stedfast and uncorrupted in Good, they should, after their Decease, enjoy a better Condition than theirs.” The Laws of the XII Tables, in condemning and punishing hurtful Magick, acknowledge the Being of evil Demons. And who can doubt, but that those Learned Heathen Philosophers were in the Right, who suppose the antick and barbarous Rites of their Religion, to be the Worship of powerful evil Demons. For the Pagan Religion is a Demonstration of the Being of evil Demons, because it cannot be suppos’d, that any Power, but a Diabolical, could have subjected the World, for so many Ages, to such an Institution as Paganism is. The Heathens justly argued for the Existence of Aerial Demons, in this Manner, “Would Nature, that has replenish’d all other Regions with Inhabitants, suffer the spacious Air to be an uninhabited Waste?” With whom, in this, both Jewish and Christian Divines agree, whence the Chief of them is call’d by the Apostle, the Prince of the Power of the Air, and the Rulers of his Empire are call’d Spiritual Wickedness (ὀν τοῖςἐπουρανίοις) in Heavenly, or Aerial, Places. But yet these Aerial Demons are sometimes under penal Confinement in the Subterraneous Regions, as that Petition of theirs implies, Luk. 8. 31. They besought him, that he would not command them to go out into the Deep, or Abyss, the same with the bottomless Pit, mention’d Rev. 20. 3. where Satan was chain’d.
In this Doctrine then of Evil Spirits, Pagans, Jews, Mahometans, and Christians, agree, the common Sense of Mankind concurring with Revelation.
Of Genij, or Guardian Angels.IV. The Pagans agreed, “That Good Demons are Guardian-Genij, which, tho’ Servants to the supreme God, or subordinate Deities, are Patrons of particular Persons, Nations, or Societies; of Things, and of Places.” So Servius, “The Genius, according to the Sense of the Antients, is the natural God of every Place, or Thing, or Person.” And this was a common antient Inscription, “To Jupiter the Best and Greatest, and to the Genius of the Place.” The Genius of the Roman People, (distinct from the tutelar God of the City, whose Name was kept secret,) was call’d the Publick Genius, and is usual in antient Coins. So the Trojan Palladium was not a Thing that fell from Heaven, but a Telesm, or Image, made by a Philosopher and Astrologer, under a most fortunate Horoscope, and enclosing the Genius, or Fortune, of the City, by Virtue of Astrological Magick. So the Lares were look’d upon, as the proper Guardian-Genij of their Houses, whence they were call’d Prestites, and, as Plutarch tells us, cloath’d with Dog-Skins. Among the personal Guardian-Genij, that of the Prince was thought by far the most August, whence arose a Custom among the Romans, of swearing by Caesar’s Genius, which if any did forswear by in a Suit, he was Bastinadoed, but Perjury, by the Name of God, was not punish’d, they supposing that God would sufficiently avenge the Abuse of his own Deity. It was a receiv’d Opinion “That every Nation had a Tutelar-Deity, with subordinate Demons.” The Nomes, or Prefectures of Aegypt, had each their distinct God, whilst Isis and Osiris were worshipp’d over the Whole, see Sir Is. Newton’s Chronology.
With respect to this Doctrine, the Heathens were divided in their Sentiments, some allowing a good-Genius, only to every Man, others a good and a bad to each, which Doctrine Mahomet has adopted. Many Christians, especially they of the Church of Rome, have embrac’d the Doctrine of good-Genij, converting them into Guardian-Angels. The determining every Man’s Genius at his Birth, those who gave into the Astrological Scheme, ascrib’d to the Stars, and to every Man’s Horoscope at his Birth.
Heathenism, a Religion of Patron-Deities, and their Clients.§II. This Doctrine of Genij, the Heathens ow’d to their Notion of the Polity of the Universe; every thing superior to Man, and subordinate to the supreme Deity, being with them a Genius, each other Being, nay, and Mode of Being, having their Genius. Jupiter was the President, or Genius, of Heaven, Neptune of the Sea, Pluto of the Infernal Regions, a Triumvirate. The Planets had each their Genius, the Elements theirs: Nations, Societies, and individual Persons, had theirs. Venus was Goddess of the Passion of Love; Mars and Bellona were Patrons of the State of War; Janus of Peace; Terminus of Bounds; Mercury, Apollo, and the Muses, of the Professions of Eloquence, Poetry, and several Parts of Learning; Esculapius, of Physick; Vulcan, of Smiths; and Minerva, of the Faculty of Prudence.
With which the Church of Rome greatly Symbolizes.Hence it appears, “That the Religion of the Heathens is a Religion of Patron-Deities and of their Clients, in subordination to the supreme God.” Herein consisted their Polytheism: How much, in this respect, Christian-Rome has borrow’d from Heathen-Rome, is but too obvious; pursuant to which the Romanists pray to one Saint in Child-Bed; to another, in the Tooth-Ach; to a third, when they are Travelling by Land; to a fourth, by Water: as if the Providence of the one God, supreme over All, did not extend over All, and equally over All: as if he were not the God, both of Land and Sea, Hills and Valleys; and as if he had not appointed one Mediator and Intercessor, sufficient for All; who has requir’d these Things at their Hands?
Different Senses of the Word, Demon.The Word Demon is sometimes taken in a larger, sometimes in a stricter, Sense; sometimes as extensively as God in the largest Sense: So Homer calls his Gods, Demons; and the Pagans say of St. Paul, Act. 17.18. He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange Demons, that is, Gods. Sometimes it is taken in a stricter Sense, for a class of Beings between Gods and Heroes. Thus, according to the Heathens, were all things full, not of God, but of Gods; and they were guilty of the Worship of Demons, in both Senses of the Word, from which neither the Platonists, nor Pythagoreans, were free; but were great Promoters of it.
The Jewish Notion of the Government of the Universe, falls in with that of the Heathens, in great Measure;§III. The Jews fell into the Heathen Notion of the Government of the World, believing, “That their Nation had a Guardian-Angel, who could transact nothing without leave of the Divine Providence”; supposing, “That all other Nations were committed to the care of their Angels, who were to them as Gods”; believing also “Bread, the Water, the Fire, the Hail, the Winds, &c. had each their Angel-President over them.” They assign “Seven President-Angels to the seven Days of the Week, twelve to the twelve Months, and four to the four Seasons;Arch-Angels to the 7 Planets; every Nation, the Israelites excepted, being subject to its particular Planet.” Also, with allusion to the Government of the Nations by Angels in Stars and Constellations, and not by immediate Divine Providence, the Jews, in their Liturgy, give to God the Name of the King of Kings, that is, the King of those Angelical Powers, who rule over the Potentates of the Earth. They are also of Opinion, “That the Number of Nations and Languages upon Earth is 70, having 70 President-Angels, by whom the Division of Languages was made at Babel.” This their Opinion is visible in the Septuagint-Translation of Deut. 32. 8. “When the most High divided the Nations, when he separated the Sons of Adam, he set the Bounds of the People, according to the Number” [not of the Children of Israel, as the Hebrew hath it, but] “of the Angels of God”; which they say are 70, and whom they call the Sanhedrim above.
As does that of many Christian Divines.§IV. This Notion, which transforms the Universe into a Paganlike Republick, and the holy Angels into Pagan Gods and Demons, has been embrac’d by many of the Christian Fathers, modern Divines, and Philosophers; allowing, among other Parts of their Scheme, each of the heavenly Bodies their Intelligence, as they call it. Upon this Plan has Idolatry principally prevail’d, both among Heathens and Christians: Upon this Plan also, the Devil, with his Angels under him, was suppos’d by some to have been President of our Earth, and never to have been an Inhabitant above, the Disagreement of which with Scripture is above shewn. The above-mention’d Mistranslation of the Septuagint seems, to have been a leading Cause of Error, in this Point, to the Fathers, who generally did not understand Hebrew, but made use of that Translation. This Notion was at last enlarg’d by many, even to the Assigning a Guardian-Angel to every individual of Mankind, which is nothing but the Heathen Doctrine of Demon-Genij with a new Name, and must have given the Heathens a great Advantage against those Christians, when they charg’d the Heathens with the Worshipping of many Gods and of Demons.
The Scripture-Notion of the Holy Angels, who have no Prefecture, nor Magistracy, in the Government of the World; nor are employ’d, as Guardian-Angels to particular Persons.§V. The Scriptures, indeed, do acknowledge the holy Angels as a sort of Potentates superior to Man, and as occasionally subservient to the Divine Providence in the Government of the World; but not as sublunary Prefects of various Faculties, Offices, Places, Stations, and Persons, residing upon their several Charges. A misunderstanding of Dan. 4. 17. “This Matter” (the Judgment upon Nebuchadnezzar) “is by the Decree of the Watchers, and the Demand” (or Ordinance) “by the Word of the holy Ones,” seems to have led many into various and gross Mistakes upon this Head. This Text seems to be rightly thus explain’d. This Matter is by more than human Appointment, it is nothing less than the Decree of the most High. For thus the Prophet, in his Interpretation of the Dream, interpreteth the Angels saying v. 24. This is the Decree of the most High, which is come upon my Lord the King. Therefore the Angels saying is a Mode of expressing the Decree of the most High. For the Decree of the Watchers, and the Word of the holy Ones, are not their own Decree and Word, but God’s, whose Agents they are. This remarkable Scripture is, therefore, no Foundation for that Jewish Notion of God’s consulting with his Sanhedrim above, or that the President-Angels of the Babylonian Monarchy decreed the Matter, at the Petition of the Tutelar-Angels of the several Provinces, who complain’d of Nebuchadnezzar’s Tyranny; or that the greater Angels made this Decree, at the Request of the inferior Angels. But here is a clear express Testimony for the Superintendence of the Holy Angels, in subordination to the divine Providence. So the Elect Angels are consider’d by the Apostle, as the Spectators of our Actions, along with God and Christ, 1 Tim. 5. 21. “I charge thee before God and the Lord Jesus, and theelect Angels.” And, agreeably to the Name of Watchers in Daniel, we read, in the Revelations, of the “7 Lamps of Fire burning before the Throne of God, which are the 7 Spirits of God”; of “seven Angels, which are and stand before the Throne”; of “the 7 Horns, and the 7 Eyes of the Lamb, which are the 7 Spirits of God, sent forth into all the Earth”; so, in the Prophet Zechariah, (as Interpreters have observ’d, ) 7 Angels are represented by the Candlestick of 7 Lamps, which burn’d continually in the Temple; and those seven Angels (because appointed to exercise, both in Heaven and in this World, an inspection and superintendence over us and our Affairs) are styled “the 7 Eyes of the Lord, which run to and fro, through the whole Earth.” The Scripture, therefore, describeth the Court of Heaven conformably to the Persian Court, where there were 7 Princes, who saw the King’s Face, and sat first in the Kingdom, (to be Officers of the Presence, such as see the King’s Face, denoteth the principal Persons at Court, Jer. 52. 25.) who are sometimes styled the King’s seven Counsellors. And, because these 7 Angels in the Court of Heaven are plainly Analogical, or Correspondent, to the 7 Princes in the Persian Court; because we read of Angelical chief Princes; therefore some of the Holy Angels are consider’d as a sort of Heavenly Potentates, agreeably to the Style of the New-Testament.
For, in the New-Testament, some of the Holy Angels are usually intituled Authorities, Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers, with Christ, who created them, at their head; between which the Difference is no greater than this, that the Apostle considers them, as the several general Names and Notions of the most Eminent created Potentates in the Universe. So the highest Rank of Potentates, in Satan’s Kingdom, are call’d Principalities and Powers. Wherefore it seems a great Mistake of many, to suppose, “That the Apostle maketh a distribution of the Holy Angels into four or five subordinate Ranks, Orders, and Classes, which are signify’d by so many Names,” whereas he means, only in general, “Whatever is high and eminent in Government.” Had the Apostle made a distribution of human, or angelical, Authority, into several subordinate ranks, he must have noted them by proper Names of Distinction, which these are evidently not, according to any Rules of Criticism, any Model of Government, or any Titles of Honour. There is, however, a Subordination of Angels, for we read of Michael, and his Angels, Apoc. 12. 7.
“In Scripture the holy Angels are represented as the occasional Missionary Ministers of God’s governing Providence, and the Works there of are represented as done by their Ministry”; which their very Name denotes, and the many Instances of their being employ’d, in God’s Appearances, in making Revelations, and bringing Messages to Mankind; in guiding, succouring, and defending, the Just; in opposing the Enmity and Malice of evil Spirits; in dispensing Benefits to, and executing Judgments upon, the World, at the End of which they are to be the Reapers. But this their occasional Ministry, at the immediate and particular Command of God upon every Occasion, is far from vesting them with such a Magistracy in the Government of the World, as the Heathens ascrib’d to their Deities; the Church of Rome, to the Virgin Mary, St. Peter, St. Paul, &c. nor does infer a Guardian-Angel, as will appear from a View of the Texts quoted for that purpose.
So Act. 12. 15. where the Christians at Jerusalem say of Peter knocking at the Gate, “It is his Angel,” Dr. Hammond renders the Word Messenger, or one that came from him, or made use of his Name; because the Faithful cannot be suppos’d so ignorant as to think, that an Angel would not come in without knocking, or having the Door open’d. Others suppose, That it is St. Peter’s Guardian-Angel, in the usual Sense, which they meant. But 1. It does not appear, That the Jews then embrac’d that Notion; nor 2. Will it follow, That the Notion was true, if they did believe it. But 3. What need was there, that an Angel should be sent to deliver St. Peter out of Prison, or St. Paul from Shipwreck, or to strengthen our Lord in his Agony, if an Angel-Guardian were their inseparable Attendant? Beside, 4. If they did not believe it a Messenger, but an Angel, they might have suppos’d it an Angelical Appearance, in his Likeness, and Personating him, whom they might have styled his Angel, as Lightfoot supposes. To as little Purpose do they quote Matt. 18. 10. “Take heed” (saith Christ) “that ye despise not one of these little Ones; for I say unto you, that, in Heaven, their Angels do always behold the Face of my Father, which is in Heaven.” Our Saviour sheweth, That the Sin and Danger of despising his little Ones, is not little; because, tho’ they be little in the eye of the World, yet really they are of so great Quality and Value, that their Angels, (that is, not their Guardian-Angels, but the Spirits that Minister unto them, which is the Apostles Notion of Angels, Heb. 1. 13.) always behold the Face of his Father in Heaven. This Place also speaketh not of inferior Angels, but of the Angels of Presence, which correspond to those in Power next to the Prince, who have always the Privilege to see the King’s Face. But it cannot be thought, that every pious Person hath an Arch-Angel for his Guardian; therefore our Saviour speaketh not of such Guardian-Angels.
The Angel of the Name and Presence of God.From Jacob’s Prayer, Gen. 48. 16. The Angel, which redeem’d me from all Evil, bless the Lads. And from Eccles. 5. 6. Neither say thou before the Angel, that it was an Error; wherefore should God be angry at thy Voice, and destroy the Work of thine Hands? Some infer a Guardian-Angel, but not justly. For the Angel, which the Preacher speaketh of, is the Angel of the Name and Presence of God; the Difference between whom and a mere Angel, is visible in the Israelites Case, who, before their Idolatry of the Calf, had an Angel to conduct them, of whom God saith, Exo. 23. 21. “My Name is in him.” But, after that Idolatry of theirs, God threateneth, That he “will send an Angel before them, but himself will not go up in the Midst of them.” As the Angel of the Name of God, so the Angel of his Presence, transcendeth a mere Angel; for Moses would not be satisfy’d with the Guardianship of a mere Angel, but petitioneth for the Continuance of God’s Presence,The Angel of his Presence, which is manifestly the same with the Angel of God’s Name. Such an Angel, because God’s Name is in him, is more than a mere Creature; and therefore great charge is given to the Israelites, to revere and obey him. By such an Angel God exhibited his own Presence, and a Declaration of his Mind by the Angel’s Voice, who bears the Name, and sustains the Person of God, speaketh and is spoken to as God, as appears from many Instances in the Old-Testament. For this Reason, this Angel is to be look’d upon, as God exhibiting himself by an Angel; therefore the Name of God is in him; and God may be fitly styled the Angel, which may therefore be one of the Names of God, not simply, but as exhibiting himself by an Angel; and thus it is to be understood in the two Texts now under consideration. And that this is the Preacher’s Sense, appears from the Context, “Neither say thou before the Angel, that it was an Error; wherefore should God be angry at thy Voice?” The 70 also render that which is in the Hebrew, “Before the Angel” [πρὸ προσώπου τοῦ θέου] in the Sight of God. Agreeably hereunto, when Jehovah, or the Lord, is said to do any Thing, the Arabick Version saith, the Angel of the Lord did such a Thing; see Walton’s Polyglot.
Some Prophetick Parts of holy Writ are alledg’d, in favour of a sublunary Magistracy of the holy Angels. In Zech. 6. 1. There is a four-fold Division of the Angelick Host, concern’d in the Affairs of the World, into 4 Chariots, as in antient Times their Hosts consisted of Chariots. These are said, to “Come out from between two Mountains, to go forth from standing before the Lord of the whole Earth, into the four Quarters of the World, to execute God’s Judgments,” v. 1–5. Of these 4 Chariots the Prophet enquireth, “What are these, my Lord?” The Angel answereth, “These are the four Spirits” (or Winds) “of Heaven”; like that of the Apocalypse 7. 1. where there is mention of 4 Angels at the 4 Corners of the Earth, holding the four Winds of the Earth, that they should not blow on the Earth, nor Sea. The Name of Winds, given to the Angels, denoteth their Subtilty and Agility, according to the Psalmists Description of them,“Who maketh his Angels” (Messengers) “Spirits” (Winds,) “his Ministers a flaming Fire.” It denoteth also their Activity, in the Commotions and Changes of human Affairs, in raising new Empires, and demolishing the old; for that the great things, in the Vicissitude of Kingdoms and Empires, are done by the Angels, is an Hypothesis, that both Daniel and the Revelations plainly suppose.
This plain Hypothesis will enable us to form a true Notion of the Princes of Persia and Grecia, which are Parties in the Conflict of the Angelical Powers, which are spoken of in Daniel 10. 13, 20, 21. As Michael there, the Jews Prince, is an Angel, so, doubtless, the Princes of Persia and Grecia are Angels also, not evil, but good, Angels (v. 21. There is none that holdeth with me in these things, but Michael your Prince.) And these Angels conflict with each other, as opposite Parties at Court, that have an Interest there. Here is therefore an Appearance, “That the Court of Heaven resembleth the Court of Rome, where several Nations have their several Cardinal-Protectors, as their Patrons and Tutelar-Angels.” And, because Michael is usually thought the Presidentiary-Angel of the Jewish Nation, and, because the Prince of the Kingdom of Persia is certainly an Angel; hence some infer, It is plain, that there are Presidentiary-Angels of all Kingdoms, Nations, and Countries, which are suppos’d to have a settled Prefecture over them. Whereas it is plainly incongruous to suppose, “That the Nations of Greece, usually at War with one another, and not united into one Estate, are the Prefecture of one Angel; and that the holy Angels bandy against, and conflict with, each other, in behalf of their several Nations and Countries”; which is as unlikely, as that they should fight with each other, when those Nations fight.
It is incongruous also to suppose, “That two great Pagan Nations have two angelical Princes, or chieftain Angels, for their Prefects, unless all such other Pagan Nations have the like”; and to suppose, “holy Angels the Prefects of unholy Pagan Nations,” is incongruous; and it is much more incongruous, to infer this from the Names of Persia and Grecia, in the Prophecy, which do not signify two Nations, but two great Monarchies, wherein the fate of God’s People was involv’d. The Princes of Grecia and Persia, (understood according to the Hypothesis above-mention’d,) are the angelical Agents of raising those two Empires, (as the Arch-Angel Michael is, by divine Appointment, the Agent of the Jews deliverance out of captivity, and of re-erecting their Government;) which imperial Administration of theirs, maketh them adverse and punitive to the Jews; for the Prince of the Kingdom of Persia withstandeth the Jews Deliverance out of Captivity, (probably pleading the demerit of their Crimes,) and withstandeth the Angel, that spake to Daniel 21 Days. To this Account of these Princes, it may be proper to add; That as “The seven Arch-Angels, or 7 Eyes of the Lord, Zech. 4. 10. are usually employ’d in the affairs of the several parts of the World, (inspecting, superintending, administring them, Zech. 1. 10) as occasional Missionaries of Providence only, without being constituted the Presidentiary-Angels of any parts of the World”; and as “The Angel Gabriel is usually employ’d in the Affairs of Prophecy, and of the Prophets, as an occasional Missionary of Providence only, without being constituted the Presidentiary-Angel of Prophecy, or Prophets, like Mercury the Heathen President of Eloquence”; so we may reasonably suppose, “That the Prince of Persia and his Angels, (which are thought to have the Name of Kings, Dan. 10. 13.) were usually employ’d in the Affairs of Persia: That Michael and his Angels were usually employ’d in the Affairs of the Jews, without being constituted the Presidents, or Prefects, over Persia and the Jewish Nation.” They were no more, than occasional Missionaries of Providence, God’s Messengers and Ministers, that do nothing but by his Command, Angels employ’d in such animperial, national, Administration.
Arguments against their subordinate mundan Magistracy, and the Doctrine of the Guardian-Angel.§VI. The holy Angels belong not to the Polity of this World, of which they are, therefore, no Magistrates; which if they were, this World would be the City of God, and his Republick: Nor are they Guardian-Angels, inseparably attending upon Men all their Days. But they are occasional Missionaries (“Ministring Spirits sent forth,” Heb. 1. 14.) they are the “Angels of God in Heaven,” they are the Courtiers and Citizens of Heaven; and such are the Guardian-Angels, which our Saviour speaketh of, that “always” (save only when they are sent abroad) “behold his Father’s Face in Heaven,” and have their abode and dwelling there.
In Ezek. Chap. 1, and 10. the holy Angels (which are signify’d by the hieroglyphical figures of Cherubims) are represented, as the imperial Chariot of the God of Israel; which importeth, “That he is the supreme Governor in Power Imperial, thro’ their ministerial Power, flying, as it were, upon their Wings”; agreeably to which, the God of Israel is usually describ’d, as “sitting upon the Cherubims, dwelling between the Cherubims,” and the holy Angels are represented as his regial Seat, or Throne; the Posture of the Cherubims, in the Tabernacle and Temple, was standing; they were furnish’d with Wings, and their Faces were towards the Mercy-Seat; all which Notices of the holy Angels (and many more) represent them, as Ministers of, and constant Attendants upon, the Divine Majesty, not as Magistrates of this World, attending upon their Charges.
As God has appointed, by Nature, all Men to live in civil Society; so hath he ordain’d, by Grace, that his holy People should live in holy Society, under the Guidance of publick Officers, which Body-Politick is the Church. Agreeably whereunto, the invisible World is constituted; for the holy Angels are Sons of the divine Family, and live in Society as other Families do. They are Members of the Church-Triumphant, and live in Communion with it as Church-Members. They are Citizens of the heavenly-Jerusalem, there bearing Offices, and enjoying Honours. How else can they constitute a Family, a City, a Church? They are the Host of Heaven, and therefore live in angelical Society, residing in Heaven; which is inconsistent with their sublunary Magistracy in this World, (which was a fundamental Error of Paganism, embrac’d by many Jews and Christians,) and with the Hypothesis of the Guardian-Angel, for such an Angel liveth out of angelical Society.
The Angels, which minister to the welfare of the Just, usually go forth by Troops and Bands. And, agreeably to the Platonick Notion,Christianity allotteth a Convoy of Angels for the departing Soul of one pious Man, Lazarus, to conduct him to Paradise; which Office the Heathen Poets assign’d to Mercury; which is also agreeable to the Notion of the Jews. But, if they convey single departed Souls in Troops, they, doubtless, minister to their welfare in this Life, in Troops also. Numbers of them associate with us in our religious Assemblies, and are inspectors of our Behaviour there. When the Jews were the holy People, the holy Angels, in some sort, resided among them; to which some, reasonably enough, refer that Voice, which was heard in the Temple, immediately before its Destruction, “Let us go hence”; those Angels of the Shechinah, or Divine Majestick Presence, then leaving the Jews naked and expos’d to all Calamities.
The company and custody of the holy Angels is, according to the Scriptures, a principal Privilege of God’s People, and a Privilege is an uncommon Right. This Principle, therefore, destroys the Heathenish sublunary Magistracy of the holy Angels, and of the Angel-Guardian, common to all Mankind. Yet we must acknowledge the holy Angels general Guardianship of Mankind in general. The evil Demons are under Laws and Government; God is the Founder and supreme Governor of the World; as he hath an universal Dominion, so he exercises that Right in a Superintendence of all, as the Sovereign Disposer of the private and publick Affairs of Men. In which Administration of Things, the holy Angels are employ’d in defence of Mankind in general, of publick Persons, and publick Societies of Men, which are not wholly abandon’d to the will of Satan and his Partisans, unless sometimes for their Punishment.
If we suppose the holy Angels to be sublunary Rectors and Magistrates, Lords and Rulers of this World, in their several Provinces, to whom Mankind are rightfully subjected; if our good and evil Things, our Welfare and Punishment, are in their Hands to dispense: This is that Notion, which the Pagan-Theology supposeth, a delegated Providence, whereby the World is govern’d. Whereas the Providence, which the Scripture-Theology supposeth and teacheth, is God’s own undelegated Exercise of Providence, in his divine Decrees, and the Execution of them. The Scripture-Theology representeth God, as the universal Inspector, (to the meanest Sparrow,) Protector, and Benefactor; the sole Arbiter of our Fate, upon whose Pleasure our well, or ill, being intirely depends. Pious Men submit to Afflictions, as to God’s Hand, give him Thanks for Mercies, as his Gifts, in Wants and Dangers, they trust to his Aid, and in all their Ways and Enterprizes, the Eye of their Observance and Regard is upon him alone, and their Service is to this their sole Lord. The holy Angels, indeed, are sent to execute his Commands. Psa. 103. 20, 21.
If the holy Angels are sublunary Magistrates and Rectors, they are, to Mankind, governing authoritative Powers; they must resemble Kings and civil Governors, God’s Vicegerents, but excelling them in Dignity; there must be Societies, consisting of the holy Angels, as Regents, and of Mankind, as Subjects; and the Societies of the World must be such Societies, more than human, or civil, Power and Authority belonging to such Rectors. But of such Political Societies, the Scriptures know nothing, unless we suppose them in the Kingdom of Darkness, which consisteth of Heathen Mankind, and of the Rulers of the Darkness of this World; nor are these Political Societies consistent with true Religion, for they manifestly imply and introduce Idolatry, and Demonolatry, by appropriating to them divine Honours, and subjecting themselves to them, taking them from their immediate Dependence upon, and Addresses to, God.
§VII. To bring what I have been laying down to a point. From what I have said, and, from a through Consideration of the Pagan Religion, it appears, “That the Kingdom of God does not consist of all rational Agents, as of one political System, with God at their Head”; there being a Kingdom of Darkness too, and a divided State of rational Beings: And it also appears, “That the Heathens were so far ignorant of the true God, that he is not to be found amongst their Deities,” notwithstanding what has been advanc’d by many Christian Divines to the contrary.
1. The supreme Deity, in the Heathen Religion, is the supreme among Heathen Deities. The Heathens acknowledg’d a supreme God, but not the true kind of supreme God. “This is Life Eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent,” Joh. 27. 3. They Atheistically explain’d away the true Deity of God, into a Jupiter of the Heroe-kind, sometimes into a mystical first Nature, sometimes into the Soul of the World, and sometimes into infinite Matter. “It is much more easy, to deviate from the true God, than from the true” [partial] “Notion of the Deity; for the Gentiles, how good soever their Notion of the Divinity was, which they had in their Mind, yet in this they seem to have miscarried in the first Place, they did not attribute it to him, to whom it belong’d.” Many of the Heathens had a true Notion of the Deity; they suppos’d him to be the great Father of Nature, the Former and Governor of the Universe; yet every imaginary Deity, that has these Attributes, is not the true God, nor is the Heathen Deity such.
2. The true God was not the Deity of Religion amongst the Heathens. Among the Romans, Capitoline Jove was the supreme Deity of their Religion, with Augurs for his Prophets, and Juno and Minerva for his Coassessors; attended by a Nurse too, so confounding Cretan and Cosmical Jupiter. Capitoline Jove was the same with Babylonian Bel, threaten’d by God, Jer. 51. 44. The same with Jupiter Olympius, whom Antiochus Epiphanes endeavour’d to substitute instead of the true God, and to have the Temple in Jerusalem, call’d the Temple of Jupiter Olympius, who is therefore call’d the Abomination that maketh desolate. The same with Baal and Moloch, which are Names too that signify a supreme God, but extremely different from the true God. Summanus (Summus deorum Manium) was the proper Name of Jupiter Capitolinus himself; and denoteth what he was in the best Notion of him, only the chief of the Heathen Gods. Accordingly, in Scripture, the Gentiles are said to worship Idols, but never to be God’s Worshippers; the Assyrian Colonies, in their Heathenism, “feared not the Lord”; all the Deities of Religion amongst them, are constantly intitul’d no-Gods, Idols, other Gods, strange Gods. The Apostle saith, “When they knew God,” (had natural Notices of the true God of Religion,) “they glorify’d him not as God,” (they did not acknowledge him for their God, the Object of their religious Worship,) worshipping the Creature instead of the Creator. This the Apostle affirms of them, v. 25. ἐσεβάσησαν καί ἐλάτρευσαν τη̣̂ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which our Translation thus renders, They worshipp’d and serv’d the Creature, more than the Creator. The Words are also capable of this other rendering; They worshipp’d and serv’d the Creature besides the Creator. And, according to either of these Versions, as some observe, “It is suppos’d, that the Pagans did worship the true God, though they worshipped the Creature also besides him, or perhaps in some sense above him, and more than him also.” But the Words are capable of a third rendering, which is probably the true, for παρὰ is here render’d in the vulgar Latin, potius quam, rather than, as it usually signifieth, and, in this Version, there will be no difficulty, if the Word [Creature] be understood to signify [that which is not the Creator;] and then the Words will run thus, “They worshipp’d and serv’d that which is not the Creator, rather than the Creator”; which is perfectly agreeable to the following Words, v. 28. “They did not like to retain God in their knowledge.” Therefore they chose to worship the Creature, rather than the Creator.
3. The supreme Deity, among the Heathens, is the Deity of a Heathen Religion; which the true God is not. Accordingly, the Apostle argueth, that the religious Service of the Heathens was a false religious Service: “God, that made the World and all the Things therein, seeing that he is Lord of Heaven and Earth, dwelleth not in Temples made with Hands. Neither is worshipp’d with Mens Hands, as though he needed any Thing, seeing he giveth to all Life, and Breath, and all Things. For as much then as we are the Offspring of God, we ought not to think, that the God-head is like unto Gold, or Silver, or Stone, graven by Art, or Man’s Device.” In which the Drift of the Apostles Discourse is, to persuade the Athenians to change the great Object of their Worship, not their corrupt Manner of Worshipping him; otherwise the Apostle would not have preach’d to them in such a style as he does, telling them of their profound Ignorance of God, that his design was to declare God to them, and exhorting them to seek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him and find him.
4. The true God is intituled the unknown God at Athens; unknown, as when we say, a Thing is Foreign, Alien, and not of our acquaintance; not in such an honourary Sense, as when the Platonists call their first Deity, altogether unknown; or as if the Athenians design’d it to signify, the Deity invisible and incomprehensible by Mortals. “Most learn’d Expositors probably think that Altar, which St. Paul found at Athens, had been erected upon occasion of some famous Victory, whose procurement the Athenians not knowing, by any Circumstance, unto what known God it might be ascrib’d; and hence fearing, left by attributing it to any of those Gods whom they worshipp’d, the true Author of it might be wrong’d, or neglected, they ascrib’d it to an unknown God.” Whence will follow,
First, “That the true God was not one of the Athenian Deities”; for all these were sufficiently well known to themselves. All the Deities of the Athenian Religion were to them well known; therefore the true God, whom St. Paul intitul’d the unknown God at Athens, could not be one of them.
Secondly, “That the unknown God at Athens was not the same with Zeus, or Jupiter,” as some imagine. The Apostle citing Aratus, “for we are his Offspring,” is by them said to interpret it of the true God; which is suppos’d to be a plain Scripture-acknowledgment, that by the Zeus of the Greekish Pagans was, sometimes at least, meant the true God. But, if Jupiter is the true God, he is necessarily the same with the unknown God at Athens, and it follows, “That the Athenians were in profound Ignorance of their own Jupiter; that they worshipp’d him, not knowing him; that they ought to have grop’d after him, and that St. Paul ’s Business at Athens was to preach up the Pagan Jupiter, to those too, that knew him at least as well as himself; and that the Pagan Jupiter is the very same Deity, who set up an Anti-Pagan Religion in Judaism and Christianity; that the great Crime of the Gentiles was, they knew not their own Jupiter, nor glorify’d him as God, nor made him their God, whose Oracles, therefore, Priests, and Temples, were the Oracles, Priests, and Temples, of the true God.” Fine Consequences! The Apostle discourseth of the Deity, from an Heathen Author, to Heathen Auditors; citeth the Saying of a Poet touching the Deity, as a true Notice of him, that is of kind and quality the true God, (which is ill apply’d to, and understood of, an Heathen kind of Deity, but is rightly apply’d to, and interpreted of, him that is the true God,) representeth him according to their own Notices; but doth not affirm, or intend to say, that by God, the supreme God, Zeus, Jupiter, or Dios, the Poet meaneth determinately him that is the true God, or that an Anima Mundi (which is Jupiter in the best Notion of him) is God blessed for evermore.
5. The Difference between the Heathen and the true Theology, is a Dispute between two pretending Wholes, the Church and the World. Both Theologies have the same Notion of a City, Polity, and Kingdom; both agree touching the Rules and Measures of Duty to the Whole; and both agree, that there is a System, which is the City and Kingdom of God. But these Attributes the Pagan Theology attributeth to the World; the Christian, to the Church. The Dispute between these two Theologies, is a Dispute to which of these two Catholick Systems the true supreme God belongeth. Both Theologies agree, that he cannot belong to both these Catholick Systems, which are manifestly inconsistent. The Pagan Catholick System shutteth out of Being that holy Society, the Church of God. And the Hypothesis of this holy Society is of a ruinous Nature to their Whole, to the supreme Deity of their Religion, to their native State of Mankind, which they suppose to be by Nature that of Fellow-Citizens with, Domesticks and Sons of, God; which is built upon a false imaginary State of the Universe.
6. “The Heathens, therefore, knew not God,” in the truly religious Sense of knowing him, in which consists the whole of true Piety, in order to recover Mankind out of which unenlighten’d State, the Revelation, contain’d in the holy Scriptures, which God has been pleas’d to make of himself to Mankind, has been a favour of the highest Kind, as it is of the utmost Importance.
The Rules of Piety among the Stoicks.I. To begin with the Stoicks, whose pretentions ran highest in this way, and who acknowledg’d Virtue to be the only Good. Their Principles shall be extracted from Epictetus, M. Antoninus, Seneca, and Plutarch; and, to do them Justice, we shall begin with what is excellent in their Doctrine.
The State of Life which they propose to themselves, is that of Jupiter’s Subjects, Friends, Ministers, Soldiers, Citizens, Sons; to be, and to be intitul’d, Θεῖοι Divine. The Law of their Subjection to Jupiter they consider as an Obligation, both to active and passive Obedience, discarding all Externals, the Body, Riches, Fame, Empire; they made it their Business to be, and to do, what was agreeable to Nature, to our proper Nature, which is Rational, Social, Human; to the Will of the governing Nature of the Universe; to the governing right Reason of Jove, which is a Law; and being Philosophers, they were the Interpreters of Nature, and of the Will of God. They thought themselves unconcern’d in the Applause, or Contumelies, in the Approbation, or Reprehensions, of Men, as having no Power to do them Good, or Hurt. As good and dutiful Subjects, they profess themselves Friends to God in the first Place, chiefly to regard his Eye over them, whom they ought to please; to concern themselves about this only, how to fulfil their own Province orderly and obediently to God; to understand and mind his Commands and Interdicts, and to be conversant in his Affairs; in all their Actions to have respect to him; to desire to seem fair to him, and to be pure with themselves and with God; in all Circumstances to enquire, what God would have them to do, and to divine (if it be possible) what his Will is; to imitate him in Faithfulness, Beneficence, Liberality, Magnanimity; continually to praise and celebrate, and to give Thanks to, the Divinity; to give Thanks for all Things, especially for their virtuous Living without their former Vices and Crimes; for the Sustenance of Life, but especially for the Faculty of understanding and using Things; to submit their Minds to the Governor of all Things, as good Citizens to the Laws of the City; not only to obey, but to approve and praise his Administration of Things; to will the Things that happen in the World, the Estate, or Usage, that is allotted them, because God willeth them; to will nothing, but what God willeth; to be devoted to his Commands; so to eat, as to please the Gods; to confide in the Governor of all; to live in mindfulness of him; to worship the Gods, and to invocate them in all Affairs; for Man is made to worship the Gods. To them that ask, where hast thou seen the Gods, or whence is thine Assurance of their Existence whom thou worshippest? From those Things that are Indications of the Power of the Gods, I am assured of their Existence, and therefore worship them. These are their Rules of Piety; their Rules of Duty to themselves, and of Humanity follow.
Their Rules of Duty to themselves.§II. What (say the Stoicks) doth the divine Law command? To keep the Things that are our own, and not to challenge to our-selves the Things of others; but, if granted to us, to use them; if not granted to us, not to desire them; when taken away, to restore them cheerfully, and to be thankful for the Time that we have had the Use of them. Hast thou not a Commandment from Jupiter? Hath he not given thee thine own Things, exempt from Prohibition and Impediment, the other Things, which are not thine own, liable to Prohibition and Impediment? What Commandment therefore, what Prescript hast thou brought from him? The Things that are thine own, keep by all means, desire not the Things that belong to others. Faithfulness is thine own, who can take away such Things as these, who shall hinder thee from using them beside thy-self? When thou mindest the Things that are not thine own, thou hast lost the Things that are thine own. Man must do what his Reason and Mind enjoyneth, which is a Decerption from Jupiter, and which Jupiter (a severe Exacter of Virtue) hath given him to be his Leader and Prefect.
Their Rules of Humanity.From the same Principle (the Laws of Subjection to the Governor of the World) the Stoicks infer various Rules of Duty to Mankind. For (say they) Man is not absolute and unbound, but a Part of a certain Whole, a Member of the one universal System of rational Agents, a Citizen of the World, and, therefore, he is an intellectual social Animal, in conjunction with his Fellow-Rationals, that are of the same Nature and Kind, of one Tribe, or Alliance, his Kinsmen, Fellows, Associates, Neighbours, Brothers, (not as deriving their Origin from the same Blood, or Seed, but from the same parental Mind, of which their Minds are so many Branches pluck’d off,) Fellow-Members of one Body, that are born to be Fellow-Workers, (as the Feet, the Hands, the Eye-Lids, the Rows of the upper and under Teeth,) and by Nature Friends. Let this be laid down in the first place; I am a Part of the Whole, which is govern’d by Nature. In the next place, I am nearly allied to those other Parts, that are of the same Kind. The Mind of the Universe is Social; wherefore the principal thing intended in the Constitution of Men, is the social Design, which is the End and Good, and ought to be the Scope, of Man; and whatever Practice of his hath not reference (immediately, or remotely) to the social Design, destroyeth the Uniformity of Life, and is Seditious; as a factious Person, among the People, divideth his own Party from the common Consent. We ought not to be hurried away by such Motions, as are unsocial, but to pass from one social Practice to another, with mindfulness of God; to treat Men socially, according to the natural Law of Fellowship, kindly and justly. What do I care for more than this, that my present Action be the proper Action of one that is Rational, one that is Social, and that is govern’d by the same Law of right Reason with God?
To Man that is rational and social, it is proper to do nothing, but what the Reason of his regial and legislative part suggests for the Good of Men. He ought to love them truly and from the heart, to take care of the Welfare of all Men, to worship and praise the Gods, and to do good to Men, to bear with them, forbearing to injure them, to do them good unweariedly, persisting in an uninterrupted Series of good Actions, accounting Beneficence to others, his own Emolument and (because they are Members of the same Body) a doing good to himself. The Joy of a Man is to do what properly belongeth to a Man; and it properly belongeth to a Man, to be kindly affected to those of the same Tribe, or Kindred. It is proper and agreeable to a Man, to love those that off end against him, (for by Nature they are his Friends and Kinsmen;) to bear good-Will to them that hate and disparage him; not to be angry with the Stupid and Ungrateful, but to take care of them; to be friendly and benevolent to every Man: Men are made for one another; teach them better, or bear with them. A Branch, cut off from Continuity with its Neighbour-Branch, is necessarily cut off from the whole Tree; a Man divideth himself from his Neighbour, hating him, and having an Aversion from him, yet knoweth not, that at the same Time he divideth himself from the whole Body. As a Citizen of the World, and a part of the whole, Man is oblig’d to have no private Self-Interest, or Advantage, to consult about nothing, as unbound; but, as the Hand, or Feet, if they had Reason and Understanding of the natural Order, should have no Motions, nor desire any Thing, but with respect to the whole; to direct his whole Endeavour to the common Good, and to abstain from the contrary; for the whole is of greater regard than a part, and a City than a Citizen. He that is unjust to any, is impious; for the Nature of the Universe having made all rational Animals one for another, that they should benefit one another, according to every one’s Worth, but in no wise hurt one another; he that transgresseth this her Will, is manifestly guilty of Impiety towards the most antient and venerable of the Gods.
But their Institution is, in great Measure, unpopular and irreligious, subverting Religion, 1. By discarding future Rewards and Punishments.§III. So far excellently well, and the bright Side of Stoicism; but now follows its dark Side, which, in consequence at least, destroyeth its better part. For one great Article of natural Religion is, the Immortality of human Souls; that after this Life they exist in a happy, or calamitous, State; and that Mankind ought to be govern’d by hope of Reward, or fear of Punishment; the two chief Pillars of all Society, whether civil, or religious; of which, amongst others, Lucretius and the Epicureans were very sensible.
But these grand Articles of natural Religion, the Stoicks discard as vulgar Errors, designing to rid themselves of the Passions, to rescue themselves intirely from all Bondage of Mind, and to enjoy perfect Liberty and Tranquility; designing to institute a Philosopher, (a whimsical Kind of Virtuoso, by them call’d a Wise-Man, and his Institution, Wisdom,) they undermine the Fundamentals of Religion; they conspire with the Epicureans, in razing and demolishing the principal Pillars of it; and make their own Laws, the Law of Subjection to the Governor of the World, not Law, but an extravagant Hypothesis. They suppose, “That an imperial Head presideth over an Universe of rational Agents, which must be govern’d by Law, but without the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments; That the Virtuous must hope for no other Reward, the Vicious need to fear no other Punishment, but their being such; That no thing must be thought our Good or Evil, save only the things that are in the Power of our own Will, lest we curse the Gods, when they seem to neglect, or cross us.” Upon which Terms there can be no dutiful Submission to divine Chastisements and Punishments, no pious Addresses for preventing, or removing, them, and for promoting the external Blessings of this, or a better, Life. According to them, “It is of no concern, for how long you shall Practice virtuously; three Hours are sufficient. Prorogation of Life conduceth nothing to Felicity; a blessed Life that is short, is no less desirable than that which is long; both are alike; Happiness is not encreas’d by length, nor diminish’d by shortness, of Time; Time is of no Moment to happiness; there is no difference between a Day and an Age; Life by that is made longer, but not happier.” An Institution, which, at this rate, affronteth the common-Reason of Mankind, corrupteth their natural Notions, quencheth their innate Desires and noble Breathings after Immortality, to which an Institution of Virtue ought to conduct Men, and is doubtless, in great Measure, no Institution of serious Virtue, but of unpopular and irreligious Humour.
The Stoicks are also extremely Irreligious, in depriving the supreme Governor of distributive Justice; in ascribing to him an extravagant indulgent Goodness, destructive to the true Use of Sacrifices, methods of Atonement, penitential Sorrow, and the pious Fear of a Deity. For, altho’ they sometimes acknowledge, that the Governor of the World inflicteth castigatory Punishments in this Life, yet they do not suppose, that he inflicteth any properly penal Evils. Hence it is with them a Maxim, “The State of absolute Liberty, is, neither to fear Men, nor God.” So, according to Zeno, one thing requisite in an happy Man, is, “Not to fear the Gods.” The Platonists agree with the Stoicks, in attributing an irreligious Kind of Goodness to the Deity, yet they suppose castigatory Punishments in a future Life. The Gods themselves, all the subordinate Deities, are suppos’d by the Stoicks, to be Mortal and Corruptible, and they are all to be swallow’d up in the universal Conflagration: Nor is their Jupiter absolutely indissoluble, indiscerpible, and incorruptible, being nothing better than a corporeal fiery Nature.
2. By ridiculing the Fear of Death,§IV. Secondly, they ridicule the Fear of Death, explode the laudable Usage of Burying the Dead, and of Mourning for them; all which is absurdly unpopular and irreligious. Nor could the World be govern’d, if all Men entertain’d a persuasion, That Death, and, consequently, the Execution of Criminals, is no penal Evil, no Evil at all, as the Stoicks suppose. According to them, “All ways of dying are alike,” and so there is no difference between the easiest natural Death, and Death aggravated by horrible Tortures, Modes, and Circumstances, of Dying. Plato also and Socrates affirm, “That Death is good, and better than Living with the Body, not to some only, but simply unto all.”
And allowing, nay, in some Cases, enjoyning Self-murder.If the Wise-Man be in tragical Circumstances, and weary of Life, their Philosophy alloweth and enjoyneth “an Exit agreeable to Reason (that is, Self-Murder.) The Gate is open, none hath Reason to complain of Life, for none is forc’d to live against his Will; if he liveth miserably, it is his own Fault; doth it please you? Live; doth it not please you? You may return whence you came.” This Doctrine was practis’d by several of the Philosophick Pagans, and the School of Plato became somewhat infected with it, notwithstanding he himself has reason’d so well against it; but the Popular Pagans, following Nature, were of better Principles.
3. By their denying Pain to be an Evil.§V. The Stoical Doctrine of Pain, Sickness, & c. is so far from being Wisdom, that it is an unpopular irreligious and paradoxical Humour, or Madness, shall I rather call it? Their magnificent Pretentions are, “That Pain and Torture of Body are not Evil; or, if it be Evil, it is another’s Evil, not ours, the Body being no part of us, but our Organ only. Socrates affirm’d, that Pain remain’d in the Foot, it doth not affect the Mind with Evil. They can live in great hilarity of Mind, altho’ the wild Beasts pull in sunder their bodily Members. Men of Learning are furnish’d with Fortitude against things Painful and Dolorous, which suffereth them not to pass within the Porch of the Soul, but, considering them as apropos’d Exercise, beareth them without Grief and Affliction. Doth sensitive Pain, or Pleasure, touch thee? Let Sense look to it, let the Body and bodily Members make it their care, if they can, that they suffer not; and when they suffer, let them complain, if they can, and judge that Pain is Evil. The Soul may keep her proper Tranquillity and Serenity, and not suppose it Evil. Not Fire, nor Iron, nor a Tyrant, nor contumelious Language, can touch the Mind.” Noble Rant this! But, if they really can abstract the Mind from all sympathizing with the Body, and from uneasiness by the Pains of it, whence is it, that they cannot keep her from Disturbance by the Humours of the Body? For they acknowledge themselves as liable as other Mortals to Fevers, Ravings, and Madness. Whence is it, that, upon account of extremity of Pain, they think it decent, to take away their own Lives? And why do they talk of Pain intolerable, and make use of the Epicurean Consolation, “If Pain be intolerable, it is not long; if it be long, it is not intolerable?” Such Philosophy does little more for the Cure of human Evils, than to make Men wranglers about Names and Terms, as if changing the Names chang’d the Natures of Things.
Externals, and whatever Things do not depend upon our own Will, they will not have call’d human Goods, but Things indifferent; but, “altho’ the Things be indifferent, the Use of them is not indifferent: As Children, when they play with Shells, their Sollicitude is, not about the Shells, but to play with them dextrously.” Upon which Terms there may be Well-doing, but no such Thing as doing Good to others, in the Use of Externals; yet the Stoicks pretend to Beneficence, and write Books concerningBenefits: Altho’ they are like a Physitian, whose Care and Concern is, not the Life and Welfare of his Patient, but only, that his own Management may be according to Art. They most inconsistently exhort Mankind to be Thankful for their Life, and the Helps of Life, the Fruits of the Earth, when they are at the same Time instituting them to an indifference as to “Life and Death, Health and Sickness, bodily Pain, or Pleasure, Honour, or Ignominy, Plenty, or Penury, Wife, Children, Country, Fame, Possessions, Friends, and their own Bodies.” “If a Tyrant threatneth me with Bonds,” (saith Epictetus ) “I say, he threatneth the Hands and the Feet: If to cut of my Head, I say, he threatneth the Neck: If to Imprison me, the Body. Doth he therefore threaten nothing to me? If I look upon these Things as nothing to me, he threatneth nothing to me. But, if I fear any of them, he threatneth me. Is thy Son dead? What hath happen’d? Thy Son is dead. Is that all? That is all. That Ill hath happen’d, is thine own additional. If thine Hearing he incommoded, what is that to thee? No ill News can come to thee from Rome, for what Evil can befal thee there, where thou art not? Banishment is but to be elsewhere. Dost thou want Bread? The Door is open, thou may’st go out of a smoaky House.” (But, if these Things be no Evils, what meaneth that sovereign Antidote against them, To die readily?) “But is not Life a Good? No. May we not desire Health? No, by no means, nor any Thing else of the Aliena,from which the Appetite must be far remov’d; or else thou submittest thy Neck to Servitude, to the Things first, and next to the Men, who have the Disposal of them. Health is not Good, nor Sickness Evil; the Good is, to be Healthful as you ought: In like Manner, be Sick as you ought, and Sickness becometh Good and Profitable. The right Use of the Externals which present themselves, is a MERCURY’s Rod, which turneth every Thing that it toucheth into Gold. Sickness, Death, Penury, Contumely, capital Sentence, touch them with the Rod of MERCURY, and they all become Profitable. Why then should we seek our Good and Evil in Externals, seeing it is in our own Power, to make all Externals Good?” But, in order to rectify their Philosophy of Good and Evil, it ought to be consider’d, That good Things are of two Kinds. For some Things are Good, as constituent Parts of our true Perfection and Happiness of Life, and these we call the End. Other Things are Good, as conducive thereto, and these are call’d the Means. In the first Notion, the good Things, commonly so reputed, (Life, Health, Honour, Plenty, &c.) cannot be Evils, consider’d in the Nature of an End; and the Evils, commonly so reputed, (Death, Sickness, Infamy, Penury, &c.) cannot be Good. In the second Notion of Means, the Evils, commonly so reputed, may be Good, and the good Things, commonly so reputed, may be Evils; and usually are, not helps, but hindrances, to our true Perfection and Happiness in a future State.
Their regal and happy Estate, and Self-sufficiency.§VI. The Stoick’s Wise-Man, according to their Institution, is Noble, Brave, Rich, Prosperous, free from Servitude and Misery; but quite out of the Road, both of civil and religious Society. For they suppose, “That nothing but our intelligent Nature is our-self, and that those Things only, which properly belong thereto, and fall within the Power of our own Wills, do concern us, or are our Good and Evil Things. Discarding, therefore, the many Things, they place their one Thing, and their All, in cultivating their intelligent free-agent Nature; in its being Virtuous, and such as the proper Nature of Man requireth; thus attaining a State of Felicity without Impediment, or danger of Misfortune, never failing of what they desire, nor falling into what they have an Aversion to; living, therefore, in a State of perfect Liberty, which they account the greatest Good. Being obnoxious to no superior Power, they are all Kings. Having dismiss’d the desire and fear of Externals, none can hurt them, they inhabit an impregnable City, none can have access to their Riches, they have no Enemy, they complain of none, criminate no Body. Hearken to me,” (saith Epictetus,) “and you shall never live in Envy, nor be in Anger, Grief, or Fear, never be prohibited, or hinder’d, nor ever Flatter any. To me” (continueth he) “no Evil can happen, to me there is no Thief” (he that stole his Lamp was no Thief to him) “nor any Earthquake; but all Things are full of Peace and Undisturbance. I seek Good and Evil within, only in mine own Things, (i.e. in judging aright of Things, in having my Desires and Aversions right, and in the right Use of Externals,) not giving the Name of Good, or Evil, of Utility, or Damage, or any thing of that Nature, to Things not in my own Power.” Such are the Principles of the Stoicks in their Schools, which they relinquish, or dissemble, when they betake themselves to the management of publick Affairs. For these they manage, (as Plutarch well observes,) as if they accounted Externals (Health, Riches, and Glory,) good Things; for how can they be throughly concern’d, to avert publick Calamities, if they suppose them no Evils, or not their Concern?
“The Body” (saith the Stoick) “is nothing to me; the Parts of it are nothing to me; Death is nothing to me. This is the State and Character of a Philosopher, he looketh for all his Utility and Damage from himself. If another can hurt me, then I do nothing: If I expect that another help me, then I am nothing. The Mind devoid of Passions is inexpugnable, collected into it self, it is self-content, a Cittadel; a stronger Place, where-unto to make his Refuge, and so to become Impregnable, and better fortify’d than this, hath no Man. So that” (as Plutarch has observ’d) “if he be Imprison’d, he suffereth no Prohibition; if thrown down a Precipice, he suffereth no Constraint; if Tortur’d, he is not Tormented; if Bound, he is not Hurt; if he falleth in Wrestling, yet he cannot be Vanquish’d; if encompass’d by a Wall, yet he cannot be Besieged; and if he be sold by Enemies, yet he cannot be Captivated; he hath Riches and a Kingdom, and is Fortunate and Prosperous, Unindigent and Self-sufficient, without a Penny in his Purse. The Wise-Man” (saith the Stoick) “hath created Peace to himself, by fearing nothing, and Riches, by not desiring any Thing: Altho’ without City, House, or Harbour, yet he wanteth nothing. He can be happy by himself in a State of Solitude, as being happy and sufficient from himself,” without the innumerable and inestimable Benefits of Society. And, because he liveth in the Perfection of Virtue and Happiness, neither publick nor private Calamities do at all diminish the Wise-Man’s Happiness. Not publick Calamities, for “the overturning and ruin of his City, will he count it any great Thing? If he supposeth it a grand Evil, or any Evil at all, he will be ridiculous, and no more Virtuous, accounting Wood and Stone, and the Death of Mortals, some great Matters. Wars, Sedition, the Death of Multitudes of Men, the Overturning and Burning of Cities, are no great Things: As the Death of Multitudes of Cattle, the Overturning and Burning of Birds nests, are no great Matters. Not private Calamities, that befall himself, or his Relations. For, without any title to a future Happiness, the Wise-Man is happy in the midst of Torments; his Happiness receives no addition from Health, Ease, and Pleasures, nor any diminution from their opposites.” Is such an Institution as this fit for human Minds?
Apathy.§VII. Not less extravagant is their Doctrine of Apathy, or being free from animal Affections and Passions, which at once discards all things external, whether Good or Evil, both of this and another World, substituting certain mental Operations, instead of the Passions of the lower or animal Soul; “Will, instead of the Passion of Desire; mental Joy, instead of the Passion of Joy; Caution, instead of the Passion of Fear; but, instead of Grief, or Sorrow, they substitute nothing, because they deny any such Thing in a Wise-Man.” If Ulysses (said Epictetus) in truth lamented for his Wife, was he not unhappy? “But what good Man is unfortunate, or unhappy? Therefore, if he cri’d and lamented, he was not a good Man.” Sorrow for the Death of Friends, they account a very bad Thing, their Philosophy being a contrivance to live in perfect Indolence: Nor alloweth it Sorrow for our Sins and Vices, as Plutarch charges them. But, if this be Philosophy, the old Man had great Reason to tell his Son, “Hear me, my Son! you must Philosophize, but you must have Brains too: These are egregious Fooleries.” As likewise are these their Maxims. “The Wise-Man is never mov’d by Grace, or Favour; never pardoneth the Crimes of any. None commiserate, but the Vain and Foolish. It is not the Property of a Man, to be exorable, or placable.”
But, doubtless, it would be better for Mankind to be left to the Sentiments of Nature, than to be instituted to such a harden’d Virtue, that is neither possible, nor tolerable, being absolutely Destructive, both of Good-Nature, and of the Exercise of divine and gracious Affections and Passions. For Fear and Desire are truly said to be divine Virtues, if their Objects be Things divine; and to sympathize with others in their Joys and Sorrows, is inseparable from true Benevolence. But the Stoicks admit of no sympathizing Sorrow, but in political Appearance. “If you see a Man” (saith Epictetus) “lamenting his Misfortunes, you may in Words accommodate your-self to him, and, if you be so dispos’d, lament with him: But take care, that you do not internally lament.”
Arrogance, with respect to the Gods, as well as Men.§VIII. The Pagans charg’d the Stoicks with Arrogance, and not without great Reason; for it was but a natural Consequence of their extravagant Liberty, Security, Tranquillity, Self-Sufficiency, Wisdom, Royalty, and Apathy; insomuch that their Wise-Man is no less than one of Jove’s Peers, that liveth as well as the Gods live. “And, as it is agreeable to Jove” (saith Chrysippus) “to elate himself upon account of his Life, to think great, and (if I may so speak) to lift up his Head, to glory, and magnify himself, living worthy of a magnifying Elation: So these Things agree to all good Men, that in nothing come behind Jove. As to the Body,” (saith Epictetus,) “thou art a small part of the Universe. But in respect of the Mind, or Reason, not worse, nor less, than the Gods; for the greatness of the Mind is not to be judg’d of by Longitude, nor Altitude, but by decretory Sentiments.” In this Philosophy, one of the fundamental Maxims is, “That all the Wise and Good are Equal,” being all of them happy to the height of Bliss. For Virtue, the true and the sole cause of Happiness, is equal in them all; it is not capable of increase, nor diminution, and as for Externals, which are of no consideration, they make no disparity. Time also maketh no disparity. Whence it follows, “That Jupiter and Dio, being both Wise, are equals. In Virtue Jupiter doth not transcend Dio. In Felicity God doth not transcend the Wise-Man, although he surmounteth him in Age,” which maketh no disparity. But is not Jupiter the more Powerful and Opulent? “Sextius was wont to equalize Jupiter and the good Man; Jupiter indeed hath more, and can do more for Mankind: But between two that are Good, the Richer is not the Better. Do you inquire of the difference between a Wise-Man and the Gods? The Gods will exist a longer Time. But it is a great Artifice, to inclose the whole in a little Room,”i.e. for a Wise-Man to have the whole in his Age, which God hath in a long Succession of Ages. In this and some other respects, the Wise-Man transcendeth Jupiter, and he admireth himself above him. “There is something whereinthe Wise-Man may have the Precedence of God: He is one of the Wise, by the Benefit of Nature, not by his own Efficiency, as the Wise-Man is. The Wise-Man seeeth and contemneth all Things which others possess, with as equal a Mind as Jupiter: And upon this Account more admireth himself; Jupiter cannot make use of them, the Wise-Man will not.” Very modest and pious Doctrines! If this be not rampant Luciferian Pride, I know not what is.
“The Wise-Man” (say they) “is always alike, and of the same Countenance, as Socrates was, in all Circumstances. He doth not assent to any Opinion, is ignorant of nothing, never deceiv’d, never unsuccessful, never repenteth of any Undertaking, wondereth at nothing, nothing befalleth him contrary to Opinion. The good Man is perfect, sinneth in nothing, is impeccable, suffereth no Injury, is not mad, altho’ maniacal, is inebriated, yet not drunk. All Things are the Stoical Wise-Man’s, he is the only King and Freeman; he alone is rich, beauteous, noble, the only Citizen, Magistrate, Judge, Orator, Poet, Priest, Prophet.” Fine Prerogatives! The Popular Pagans fell so far short of Stoical Wisdom, as to acknowledge their good Endowments the Gift of God: But the Stoicks say of their Wisdom, “Every one that hath it, oweth it to himself.” Sometimes they huff at praying for the divine Aid. “What need is there of Prayers? make thy-self Happy.” In a better Humour they assert the Concurrence of divine Assistance with human Endeavours; they exhort us to pray for Virtue, a good Mind, and the divine Aid. “But so, that the Effect is properly to be ascrib’d to our own Power, because it is a Thing which properly belongeth to our own Power.” For this Philosophy distinguishes Things that properly belong to our own Power, from the Things that do not properly belong to our own Power: The Works of Providence are not the Things that properly belong to our own Power; they are properly to be ascrib’d to the Gods: But the Stoicks Virtue, and its consequent Felicity, are Things that properly belong to our own Power; according to that of Cotta in Cicero, “All Mankind ascribe the Commodity and Prosperityof Life to the Gods, but none ever ascrib’d his Virtue to the Diety.” So the Poet, speaking the Sense of the Stoical Philosopher, ascribeth Life and Riches to Jove, but not a virtuous Mind; for that is an Effect, which properly belongeth to his own Power. “Let him give Life and Riches, I will get to my-self a good Mind.” But as Riches are the Gift of Providence, yet not exclusively to human Endeavours, so the Virtue of our Mind belongeth to our own Power, yet not exclusively to divine Assistance; “for who hath told thee” (saith M. Antoninus,) “that the Gods do not help us even to those Things, that they have put in our own Power?” Whence an appearing inconsistency in another Poet, who also speaketh the Sense of the Stoical Philosopher, is easily reconcileable.
Juvenal.
Because the Gods help us in those Things that properly belong to our own Power, therefore the Poet saith, “Pray for a virtuous Mind”: Yet, because the Virtues of the Mind are Things that properly belong to our own Power, and must be ascrib’d thereto, therefore the Poet saith, “I tell thee of that which thou mayst bestow upon thy-self.” For the help of the Gods is not requisite in any great Degree, nor otherwise than as a less Principal, and adjuvant Cause: Nor is Man suppos’d to be impotent for Virtue and Happiness in any great Degree. Thus the Spirit of Stoicism is that of a criminal Self-sufficiency, Self-confidence, Self-dependence, and Boasting. “He thanketh the Gods, but with audacious Gloriation.” His Joy is an elation of Mind, “trusting to his own Possessions and Abilities.” “He knoweth his own Strength, and that no Burden is too much for him.” “The Agency of his Free-will, Jupiter cannot vanquish.”
Their haughty Temper appears, not only in their Demeanour towards Jupiter, but in their carriage to their Civil Governors. For they suppos’d, That no Man had Dominion over them, being Jupiter’s Sons and Subjects, set at liberty by him from all Servitude and Constraint. And having discarded all regard to Rewards and Punishments, whereby Societies are govern’d, they discarded therewith their due Subjection and Reverence to the Civil Power, which was very unbecoming the Citizens of the Universe, as they call’d themselves. “How do I (saith the Cynick) treat those as Slaves, whom you fear and admire? Who is there, that when he seeth me, doth not suppose, that he seeth his Lord and King? What is Caesar to a Cynick, or the Proconsul, or any other, save only Jupiter, that sent him down, and whom he serveth?”
Of their Transcendentals and passive Obedience to the divine Will.§IX. Instead of sober Morality, they deal much in superlative Extravagancies; for such is their superlative Strictness, “not to move a Finger, unless Reason dictateth,”
Their Severity of Temper, “never speaking any thing for pleasure, nor admitting any thing of that kind spoken by others,” which is Sowrness and supercilious Gravity. Their enjoyning “silence for the most part, and speaking seldom,” is an Excess; also their conformity to the Pharisees in a supercilious Contempt of the Vulgar. The Patience, which they prescribe, is nothing better than a haughty sullen Insensibility, for he “must seem to the Vulgar, devoid of Sense and a Stone.” Their invariable Constancy of Temper was no Virtue, but an inconsistency with true Virtue, which exerciseth various Affections and Passions upon various Occasions, Anger, Mildness, Boldness, Fearfulness, Joy, Sorrow. But the Stoical Wise-Man is criminally uniform of Countenance; none ever saw Socrates more joyous, or more sad; agreeably to the Conceit of Aristo Chius, That the final Good is, “To live in an absolute indifferency of Mind, without any Variation, or Motion either way, carrying ones self with the same equal Tenour always.”“The Wise-Man” (saith Epictetus) “must be always alike, in acute Pains, in the loss of Children, in Chronical Diseases.” Their Passive Obedience also, and Conformity of Will to the divine Will, is a superlative Extravagance. “How” (saith Epictetus) “shall I become of free-Estate? For he is a Free-Man, to whom all Things happen according to his Mind, and none can be his hindrance; naturally I would have all Things to happen, as I please; but to be learned, is to learn to will all Things to be as they are. Will nothing but what God willeth, and none can hinder thee; none can force thee, no more than Jupiter. I was never hindred in my Desires, nor necessitated in my Aversions, because I have render’d my Appetite accommodate to God. Is it his Will, that I should be in a Fever? It is my Will. Is it his Will, that I should obtain any Thing? It is my Will. Is it not his Will? It is not mine. Who can now hinder me, or force me against mine own Mind? Seek not, that Events should be as thou willest; but will them to be as they are, and thou canst not fail to be prosperous.”
How Specious soever such a conformity of Will to the Divine may seem, it will be found, if examin’d, far from Pious. For it is not pious to pray with the dying Stoick, “Place me in what Region thou pleasest. Take me and throw me where thou wilt, I am indifferent.” It is not pious, to entertain all afflictive Providences with a Stoical Indifference. It is not pious in him, notwithstanding all his own Sins and Sufferings, the Sins and Miseries of Mankind, “to be devoid of Sorrow, Fear, Passion, Perturbation, nor to Grieve upon any one’s Account.” It cannot be thought a due Conformity to the divine Will, to discard the humbling Methods of Piety, for the Cure, or Removal, of the disastrous Events of Providence, such as afflicting the Soul, Deprecation, Intercession, and to substitute in their stead that magnanimous Voice, “With God I affect and pursue, with him I desire, my Volitions are simply and absolutely coincident with the supreme Volitions.” For these settled Maxims of the Stoick are irreligious Errors, “That the divine Nature cannot be angry, and that the Events of Providence are Fatalities.” Beside; they that will all Things to be as they are, must necessarily will the State of Things in the World to as bad as it is, which is repugnant to all true Virtue, to the use of Prayer, and to the Stoicks Desires and Endeavours for the amendment of Mankind. Their Passive Obedience teaches them, indeed, to suffer Afflictions, but not to act in a becoming Manner in such a State, in which the grand Duties of Piety are, the humbling our-selves under the divine Hand, searching and trying our Ways, practice of Repentance, and improving in Devotion. Their Passive Obedience is of a spurious Kind, the insolent Boldness of an affected Liberty, (which rivals Jove,) and the Stoutness of a Bravo. “Look” (saith Epictetus) “at the Powers which thou art furnish’d with, and, having view’d them, say, Bring upon me, O Jupiter, what Hardship thou wilt, I am sufficiently furnish’d by what thou hast given me, to make whatever happeneth Ornamental to me. At length erect thy Neck, as one out of Servitude, fearing nothing that can happen: Dare to lift up thine Eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest, I am of the same Mind with thee, I am equal to any Thing.” Their running the Pit and slinking out of harm’s Way, by taking away their Lives in bad Circumstances, is Heroism and Passive Valour of the illegitimate Kind. Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates himself, should have consider’d, that there may be such a Conformity to the divine Will of Events, as may clash with the divine Will of Duty and Precept. Their Passive Obedience is founded upon bad Principles. “Dost thou call that a Mischance to a Man, which is no Mischance to the proper Nature of Men? Let that part which judgeth of Things be at rest, altho’ the Body, which is next the Thing, be cut, or burn’d, suffer Corruption, or Putrefaction. That which maketh not the Man worse, which doth not involve him in any Crime, doth not make his Life the worse, nor can it hurt him. All Things that befall Men, are allotted them by that Whole, or Universe, whereof they are a part; and that is good for every one, which the Nature of the whole bringeth upon every one. Whatever shall come to pass, the World loveth to have it so: I say therefore to the World, I concur with thee in Affection, and love to have it so.” Which cannot be thought a very virtuous Saying; for what Virtue is there in deifying this Region of Sin and Mortality, and Misery, the Laws of whose Administration are manifestly Penal and Calamitous?
Altho’ the Stoicks pretended to follow Nature, and altho’ they call their Philosophy Moral, yet their Morality is extremely different from the institution of Nature, being that of unpopular Humorists, of abstract Mentalists, and Enthusiasts. “Shew me a Man” (saith the Stoick) “that desireth to be made a God of a Man, and in this mortal Body to have consortship with Jove?” The Religion, therefore, and Piety of Stoicism, is not Natural Religion, but a jumble of Self-sufficiency, Independency, Liberty, Apathy, Prosperity, and undisturb’d Tranquillity. It is not hard to determine, which were the better sort of Religionists; whither the Popular Pagans, who complain’d, when they were hurt, (provided they abstain’d from cursing their Deities,) were touch’d with their Afflictions, and looked upon mournful Spectacles with the Eyes of Mourners: Or the strutting Philosophers, who took a Pride in trusting to their own Strength and invincible Maxims, deriding all Events; that were to live at the rate of Pagan Deities, who are above Passion, in Human Flesh. Agreeably to their Hypothesis, “That the Perfection of Felicity is attainable in this Life,” they contriv’d a method of arriving at so transcendent a condition; which was by placing all their good in their own things only, that are in the disposal of their own Wills, contemning all that belong not to their own Free-agent Nature. Being thus instituted to live in Safety, Liberty, Independence upon Others, not liable to be constrain’d, hurt, or hindred by any, never failing of prosperous Success, never being unfortunate, nor conflicting with any Adversity; they could bear whatever happen’d without Humiliation, or brokenness of Mind. They assumed to themselves a greatness of Mind, (as supposing that nothing could hurt them, and that they were beyond the power of Evil,) and were able to make this resignation to Providence from their whole Soul, “Carry me, O Jupiter! and thou, O Fate! whithersoever I am destin’d by you.”
Such is the Stoicks Passive Obedience, neither Natural, nor Christian. And, if we agree not with the Stoicks touching Passive Obedience, (which is the top flower of their Philosophy,) nor think it safe to rely upon the Maxims of the Heathen Philosophers, (both because they are Heathens and Philosophers, i.e. Teachers of unpopular Doctrines,) we are not likely to entertain a late Conceit, That all the Agenda in Christianity, the two Sacraments excepted, are nothing but what was taught before by the Moral Philosophers. For, altho’ of all things in our Religion, there are Affinities and Resemblances in their Religion and Institutions of Learning and Virtue; yet the best of them must be thought bad Teachers of Duty and Virtue, all of them being Aliens from true Piety, and some of them extremely deficient in Philosophizing.
Their monstrously absurd Conceits.§X. For, as to their Natural Philosophy, the Sun, Moon and Stars are nourish’d by Vapours; and when these fail, there will be a Conflagration of the Universe, a resolution of the Gods (Jupiter only excepted) and of Men into their first Elements, God and Matter; after which there will be a Restauration of the same World, and the same Men, and so in endless Rounds. The Night, Day, Evening, Morning, our Arts, Memories, Fancies, Assents, Passions, Virtues, Vices, Wisdom also and Good, are all Bodies; nay, and Animals too. An Imagination so wild could never have enter’d into the Head of any Man, but a Philosopher, or a Rabbi. “Virtue is nothing else but the Mind modified, therefore it is an Animal,” saith Seneca. Agreeably to their Notion of the Soul of the World, who, in this Philosophy, is a subtle fiery Body, the Mind of Man is a Body, “a part of God, and a God too.” And this deified Mind of Man is that, which they mean by their Holy or Divine Spirit in Man. “Reason in Men” (saith Seneca) “is nothing else but a part of the Divine Spirit immers’d in a Human Body.” At the same rate the Pythagoreans and Platonists deify the Human Nature, forbidding Man to pollute, by corporeal Passions, their Domestick God. The Platonists suppos’d the Souls of all Animals to be parts of the Divine Substance; the Stoicks, the Minds of Men only; the more tolerable Hypothesis of the two; yet, because it supposes a Separation of the parts of the Deity, and that the parts of God may be miserable, it is to be rejected with Indignation.
A like intermixture of absurd Fancies has overspread their Moral Philosophy; “That all Sins are equal; That all, who are not of the Wise of the first Form, are equally foolish, bad, vicious, morbid, miserable, mad.” This earthly Region is visibly a Region of Sin and Suffering; But in Stoicism, which is a sullen and surly contempt of Human Calamities, the State of the World is a Festival Solemnity. Death is the Nature of Man, not Punishment; and the serious Calamities of Mankind, “Deaths, Rapines, the slaughtering Men and sacking Cities, are to be contemplated as the scenical Shiftings on the Theatres; the Tears of Mourners as shews of Lamentations, and (the affairs of Life being a Play) as Childrens crying.” They are not troubled for their own Vices, “for who hindreth them from rectifying their own Principles?” Nor are they troubled at the Impieties of others, or angry and offended at their Sins and Injuries. “If any one hath sinn’d” (saith the Stoick) “the hurt is only his own. Wickedness doth not at all hurt the World. Jupiter hath so dispos’d things, that there should be Summer and Winter, Fruitfulness and Barrenness, Virtue and Wickedness, and all such contrarieties, for the good and symphony of the Universe. The worst of Men do but act according to their own Opinion, and are to be rectify’d, not destroy’d. All that offend, it is against their Will. All Men miss of the Truth against their Will. Nothing is hurtful to a part, which is for the good of the whole. What is not hurtful to the City, hurteth not a Citizen. Bad Men are neither affected with Benefits, nor have they any Benefactors, nor are they guilty of neglecting their Benefactors.”
Their gross Immoralities.§XI. The great Imperfection of the Stoical Institution (applicable also to the other Pagan Institutions) appears from the gross Immoralities wherein they liv’d; for they were not well disciplin’d against the foul Vices of Drunkenness, Uncleanness, and irreligious Swearing. Seneca pleadeth for Drunkenness, Zeno liv’d in it, and Chrysippus died by it. The great Hercules, celebrated for a great Drinker, (his Cup also is celebrated,) is a Divine Man in the Style of Epictetus’s Dissertations; and Cato, a Stoical Wise-Man of the first Form, is of the same Character: But No-Body must call his Drunkenness a Crime; “for it is easier” (saith Seneca) “to make it no Crime, than Cato a Criminal.” But, as a Stoick is extravagant in his Supposition, “That he remaineth safe and unhurt in Drink and in Melancholy; that his Body may be in Drink as to all its Senses and Powers, yet his Mind remain unprejudic’d,” (which is the meaning of that Maxim, The Wise-Man is liable to be inebriated, but not drunk;) so it is a wild kind of Virtue, that is consistent with so great a Vice, which is indeed all Vices in one, and the Mother of all Wickedness. But these impure Heathens suppos’d, “That there is a right and prudent use of Drunkenness, which contributeth to Virtue, and that it ought not to be extirpated from a well-govern’d City.” “Plato forbiddeth Children to drink any Wine, before they be 18, and to be drunk before they come to 40. But such he is content to pardon, if they chance to delight themselves with it, and alloweth them somewhat largely, to blend the influence ofBacchusin their Banquets, that good God who bestoweth cheerfulness upon Men, and Youth unto aged Men, who allayeth and asswageth the Passions of the Mind, (even as Iron is made flexible by the Fire;) and, in his profitable Laws, drinking-Meetings are look’d upon as necessary and commendable, (always provided there be a chief Leader among them, to contain and order them;) Drunkenness being a good and certain Tryal of every Man’s Nature, and therewithal proper to give aged Men the courage to make merry in Dancing and in Musick, things allowable and profitable, and such as they dare not undertake being sober and settled.”Anacharsis was addicted to Drunkenness, as Plutarch informs us; and the Prince of Philosophical Heathen Saints, even Socrates himself, “tho’ he was not forward to drink at Banquets” (as we are inform’d by one of his Scholars,) “when he was compell’d, master’d all; and, which is most to be wondred at, no Man ever saw Socrates drunk.” We are told, that he spent whole Nights in drinking, and that the Greeks praise him exceedingly, that having spent a whole long Night, drinking for Victory with Aristophanes, he was able at Day-break, to delineate and demonstrate a subtil geometrical Problem, thereby shewing, that the Wine had no noxious Effect upon him.
Socrates was a great Lover; and it was in his Time so genteel for Men to be Lovers of Boys, that it was forbidden to Slaves; tho’ at Athens the Laws prohibited the Practice universally, but ineffectually. Socratici Cinaedi were proverbial. Both the Popular and Philosophical Pagans were addicted to this Vice. Such Love of Boys as was at Thebes, Elis, and in Crete, is condemn’d by Plutarch in his Treatise of Education, who alloweth that which was at Lacedaemon and Athens; yet we are assured, that it prevail’d criminally in all parts of Greece, but at Athens most. Euripides, being invited to a Banquet by King Archelaus, became Drunk, and in that Mood kiss’d the Poet Agatho (who sat next him) being then 40 Years old. Whereupon the King ask’d him, if his Paramour were yet delectable? To which Euripides answer’d, That not only the Spring, but the Autumn of the Fair, is delectable. It is certain, That Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Cebes, Cicero, approv’d the Masculine Amours, which among the Philosophers was without Disgrace, or Reprehension. It was they which wrote Love-Dialogues and Discourses, which the Coelestial Venus never inspired. Socrates and Cato communicated their Wives to their Friends. “All manner of Incest, Adultery, and Masculine Mixtures, some of the famous antient Philosophers accounted Things indifferent.” Some of the Stoicks befriended Chastity at an extraordinary Rate, commending chast Eyes, forbidding obscene Speech, advising Men to be Pure, as much as may be, from Things Venereal before Marriage; yet most of them agreeing with the Popular Pagans, amongst whom the Harlotry of simple Fornication was accounted no Crime, and which almost all the great Philosophers are known to have liv’d in. But the generality of that Sect are prodigiously Paradoxical in their Unchastities; Teaching the Father to commit Incest with the Daughter, the Son with the Mother, and the Brother with the Sister; Men and Women to wear the same Garments; that no Speeches are obscene, and that every Thing should be call’d by its own Name, themselves not scrupling the most immodest Actions.Zeno (as Laertius informs us) was a lover of Boys, made use of both Sexes, and sware by a He-Goat, a lascivious Animal. As for Socrates, he has had the Happiness of eloquent Apologists. As for Plato, he is charg’d with Unchastity by some of his greatest Admirers, who own’d, that the subject Matter of his Convivium is not the Love of Men and Women, but the Love of Men towards Boys, and that not merely as a Platonick Lover. When it was objected to Apuleius, that his Love-Verses were not suitable to a Platonick Philosopher, he justifies himself by Plato’s Practice, who had no Verses extant, but Love-Verses upon the Boys After, Alexis, Phadrus, and Dion: And Ficinus (in Argum. in Charmid.) changeth and omitteth part of the amatorious Things in Plato’s Charmides, as offensive to chast Ears.Plato will have young Soldiers that behave themselves Valiantly, gratify’d in their Amours, whether Masculine, or Feminine. Following Lycurgus’s Institution, he will have Women expos’d Naked to the Eyes of Men. Transcending Lycurgus’s Institution, and the Impieties of the Popular Pagans, he abolisheth Marriage, and instituteth the Community of Women; which was likewise the Doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus, the Founders of Stoicism. Such are the unpopular and irreligious Institutions of the Heathen Philosophers; which are partly to be attributed to the Spirit of Uncleanness, predominant in the Philosophick Pagans, (insomuch that Lais once laughed, to see more of the Philosophers with her, than of any other sort of Men;) and partly to their cross-grain’d unpopular Humour, express’d by Diogenes, who entering into the Theater opposite to the People that were coming out, was ask’d, why he did so. “This,” said he, “I study to do thro’ my whole Life”; as Laertius relates in his Life. But, altho’ the Philosophers had a great Affectation, to distinguish themselves from the Popular Pagans, yet they transcend them in the absurdity of their Institutes; and the Popular Pagan Doctors may at least vie with them for sound Morality, whence Horace prefers Homer before them.
Christianity forbiddeth common and customary Swearing, whether by Creatures, or by the Deity; and all irreligious Swearing. But no Moral Philosophers ever prohibited Swearing by the Creatures. Socrates ordinarily practis’d it, (doubtless out of Reverence to the Gods,) sometimes Swearing by Animals, a Dog, a Goose, a Goat, and sometimes by Plants, an Oak, or a Plane-Tree. Nor is this the only Defect in their Discipline touching Oaths; for being Separatists from the Popular Pagans, whom they contemn’d at a great Rate, and no great Friends to their Civil Government, they were shy of solemn judicial Oaths, which are of all other the most allowable and needful, but made no scruple of idle criminal Swearing. Clinias the Pythagorean, in a Suit depending before the Judge, might have freed himself from a Fine of three Talents, by taking a true and just Oath: But he chose rather to pay the Mulct, than to take the Oath; so great a respect had these Pythagoreans for their own Philosophical Institution, and so little for Civil Government. For it is well known, that they were not so shy of Swearing by the Master of their Institution, as Religionists Swear by their God: And Hierocles, who hath given many wise Cautions touching the Use of Oaths, with respect to the Honour of the Gods, justifieth their Practice. Touching a solemn judicial Oath Epictetus saith, Refuse it altogether, if it be possible: If not, “as much as may be”; yet himself ordinarily swears in his Dissertations, “I swear to you” (saith he) “by all the Gods.”
The Epicurean Tenets of Morality.§XII. So much for the Stoicks, who “plac’d Happiness in Virtue only.” The Epicurean Scheme, which makes the whole Man to be only a corporeal Engine, may be dispatch’d (from Bp. Parker) in a few Words. For Epicurus, consistently with that Principle, “plac’d all Happiness in the Pleasure of the Body alone,” which Doctrine at once destroys all Obligations to Virtue and Honesty, and to Religion, which he trampled under Foot. Epicurus himself plac’d all Happiness in the Enjoyments of the Palate, and such like. Metrodorus, his favourite Disciple, made the Belly, the only Seat of Happiness. In freedom from Pain, in sensual Enjoyments, and in Reflexions upon them, he plac’d the whole of Happiness. Indolence is the Happiness of Stones, and Sensual Pleasures, of Swine, in as great perfection as Epicurus himself enjoy’d them, forought we know. So that all the boasted Happiness of the Epicureans, without a future State, was equally vain and insecure, which at once effectually overthrows it; shocking us, even in the Enjoyment of what is mean and low, with the Fears of losing even that. And then, to comfort us under all the Miseries of Life, they throw out a parcel of Falshoods and Subtleties. As that Length of Time doth not increase Happiness; as if either Happiness, or Misery, for 2 Hours were not twice as great as Happiness, or Misery, for one Hour. That Pain is short, if great; light, if long, which will afford but very little Relief to a Man under those Chronical Diseases of great Torture, Gout and Stone. That we must lop off the Fear of future Evils, and the Remembrance of those which are past. Easily said! The Difficulty lies in the Application. That we are to resist Pain with all our Power; for, if we fly, we shall be conquer’d, if we stand our Ground, we shall gain the Victory. As if we could either fly from, or resist, Pain, as a Man does his Enemy.
Of a piece with these, are their Consolations against the Fear of Death; against which nothing is a solid Comfort, in the midst of our present Enjoyments, but the well-grounded Hopes of a happy Immortality. How ridiculous an Antidote is it against that which takes away all our Enjoyments, to tell us, That, when that comes, it cannot hurt us, because when that is, we are not? Self-Love and the Fear of Annihilation are Instincts too powerful to be baffled by such a subtlety. Just (as Plutarch well observes) as if you should tell a Man in a Storm at Sea, that your Ship has no Pilot, and that there is no hope of allaying the Tempest; but yet, however, be not afraid, for in a little Time the Ship shall split and sink, and, when you are drown’d, the Storm will trouble you no longer. According to this Scheme, if we have all the Enjoyment in Life we can expect, we lose Happiness in a little Time after we come to know what it is, of which too we are in continual Apprehensions; but the Wretched come into the World, only to lament and leave it; than which how much better would it be, not to have been born. But, say they, we ought to bear with Patience what we cannot avoid. But the Fear of it, upon their Scheme of Annihilation, is as Death it-self is, tho’ the Philosopher should take ever so much Pains to expose it as foolish; whose Rules cannot take away what is Natural, and, consequently, not in our Power. “In the next Place,” say they, “we are already Dead to so much of our Life as is past and gone; so that so much as we live, we die, and that which we call Death, is but our last Death; and, therefore, as we fear not our Death that is past, why should we that which is to come?” But, if we have been dying ever since we were born, that is it which grieves us, that we cannot be doing so for ever. Such was the Reasoning of the Epicurean Old Man, who reconcil’d himself to his approaching Death, because “it is as absurd to fear Death as old Age, which yet all desire, in that as old Age follows Youth, so Death follows old Age.” For old Age is desirable, not because it follows Youth, but because it defers Death. “Such is that other Reasoning, that, whereas we now count our-selves Happy, if we live to an hundred Years, yet, if the natural Course of our Lives were as much shorter, we should be as much satisfy’d with twenty; and, if our natural Course reach’d to a thousand Years, we should then be as much troubled to die at 600, as now at 60, and so forward.” Which proves nothing, but that there is no Time, in which an Epicurean can be content to die. No better is that Device of Gassendus, “though a Man’s Life may be short in it-self, yet may he make it equal with the Duration of the whole World, because he may converse with the Transactions of all former Times, and be as well acquainted with them, as if himself had then actually liv’d. And, as for the Time to come, he, knowing that nothing shall be but what has been, understands all future Events as if present; so that a wise Man, partly by Memory, partly by Foresight, may extend his short Life to all Ages of the World.” But, if he could, unless he could make himself Immortal too, the Objection would still be as strong as ever. His other Arguments, to persuade us to be content with our Condition, are as ineffectual. As first, that “otherwise we forget our mortal Nature expos’d to Misery,” that is, that a Man must be content with his Condition, because he knows his Condition to be miserable. And, secondly, that “it is some Comfort, that, when all Men are expos’d to Misery, you are less miserable than others,” that is, that, tho’ I endure most of the Calamities of human Life, yet I am happy, if I think one more miserable; according to which there can be no Misery, but the greatest.
Secondly, The Epicureans destroy all Virtue, by making it wholly subservient to sensual Pleasure, making Virtue the Means, and Sensuality the End; so that what we now call Vice would be Virtue, if it promoted the Delights of the Body the more effectually of the two. A hopeful Foundation of Morality!
If Epicurus liv’d soberly and abstemiously, on coarse Bread and Water, and sometimes Sallet, it was more owing to the Weakness of his Stomach and Constitution, than to the Strength of his Principles, which were as much in contradiction to that method of living, as his denying Providence, with his pretending, that he had left Devotion; his teaching, that all Friendship is for Self-interest, and yet that Men are bound to undergo even Death for the sake of Friends. If sensual Pleasures be the chief Good, he must be happiest, that enjoys them most, and wisest, that procures them most; and then Apicius will be a happier and wiser Man than Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato.
As for Justice, it is no farther a Virtue, upon the Epicurean Scheme, which turns to ridicule the Ties and Checks of Conscience, than as it promotes bodily Pleasures; that is, we are not oblig’d to act according to Justice, when we can promote them by any Action, which we are cunning enough to conceal, or powerful enough to support. All Virtue, according to them, any farther than it promotes their own sensual Pleasure, is owing only to Custom, popular Opinion, and the Prejudices of Education, which a wise Man, say they, must comply with, in order to promote his own Ends. If this were the Case, the Encouragement to Virtue, and Restraints upon Vice, are not sufficient.
And, if there be no obligation to Justice, there can be no place for Fortitude, which is only in defence of an honest and a just Cause, separated from which it is Folly, and in opposition to it, Oppression. But, upon the Epicurean Scheme, every thing ought to be sacrific’d to the preservation of Life, and the enjoyment of sensual Pleasure, which it would, therefore, be folly to hazard, and madness to sacrifice, in defence of either Friends, or Country; for Religion is with them out of the Question.
It may justly be question’d, Whether the Heathen Philosophers, in the whole, were of Service to the Cause of Virtue.§XIII. The Philosophers, amongst the Greeks, succeeded the Poets in the profession of teaching Virtue; and they certainly made improvements in moral Discipline, they reduc’d it into the form of an Art, enrich’d it with variety of Arguments, fortified its Precepts with great Reasons, propos’d many wise Considerations for subduing exorbitant Affections and Passions; they set forth the praises of Virtue, its excellency and importance, with great Vigour and Eloquence; and, in several instances, excellently declaim’d against Vice with great Wit and Judgment; they disparag’d the Vanities of the World, and the Follies of human Life. There is amongst them an unpopular kind of Virtue, which, altho’ greatly distant from the holy Life, yet, in several respects, does resemble it. Their Discipline and Institution had a considerable effect upon some of themselves; some of the Philosophers were great Examples of the Virtue which they taught, and they made some few Converts from Debauchery to Philosophy; and some few Commonwealths have had their Laws from Philosophers. The Philosophers, therefore, may seem to have done a great deal of Service to the Interest of Virtue; but, if their Disservices be set against their Services; if their Ignorance, Vice, and Extravagance, be compar’d with their Virtue; it may justly be doubted, upon a full Comparison, whether they have done any real Service at all to the Cause of Virtue and Goodness. The mighty Prejudices, which they have done to the Interests of it, clearly enough appear in the accounts already given; for the further setting of which in a clear Light, we will here take a brief Survey, both of their moral Learning and of their Life.
As appears, from a Consideration of the Divine Virtue of the Philosophick Pagans;1. The sublimer sort of them distributed the Virtues into three Kinds, the Ethical, Political, and Divine. The Ethical and Political Virtue may be called the common Morality, which constitutes a good Man; but the Divine Virtue is suppos’d to be his Assimilation to God, and his Deification. This Divine Virtueis Philosophic-Pagan, the Popular-Pagans having no concern in it, and was the invention of Philosophy, but was not for the Interest of Virtue, but was rather to its Prejudice and Disservice; for it is not truly Divine Moral Virtue, constituting a divinely-good Man, but an Imposture, unpopular Humour, Fancy; and a wicked sort of Bravery is made the End, the Chief Good, the Divine Virtue, and the Happiness, of Man, his Assimilation to God, and his Deification. Apollonius ask’d the Brachmans, “What they were”? Jarchas, the Prince of them, answer’d, “They thought themselves Gods.” Apathy they thought a great and a Divine Thing, “To live in the Body, as the Soul of the World in the World, which cannot be struck, or impress’d upon, from without. Heis devoid of Grief; is not a compound of Soul and Body; accounteth not the Death of Mortals, or the Ruin of his Country, any great Matter; he is above the Fear of any thing; trusteth to himself, that he shall have nothing of Evil, so he shall be fearless of any thing,” saith Plotinus. Thus they oppose the sufficiency of Virtue against all Externals. But to be thus unapprehensive of Danger, is Folly and Fool-hardiness; it is as unnatural, as it is irreligious, and ruinous to all true Virtue and Goodness. They thus impiously deified themselves, and their Virtue, by their self-Sufficiency, self-Security, and Confidence. “They that are furnish’d with the Virtues, living in greatness and celsitude of Mind, are always in Happiness. Philosophy setteth them intirely in the Fortress of Virtue, above Grief and Fear.”
And from the excessive Pride of the Stoicks.2. There is much of Pride and Arrogance, complicated with other Vices, in the Philosophick Pagans rampant Affectation of Divinity. They were as highly conceited of their own Merits, as Diogenes was, who fancied, that he merited his Alms. In Aristotle’s Composition of Magnanimity there is a large Dose of Pride, and Celsus’s Generosity is of the same Character. Much of the Stoical Philosophy is a rant and huff of Pride; the greatness and height of Mind, to which they pretend, is bloated and unsound; and the Constancy of their Wise-Man is a System of such Maxims, as are the very Quintessence of Pride. “The Wise-Man is not obnoxious to any Injury. The Wise-Man can suffer no Evil. An Injury detracteth and diminisheth, whereas nothing can be taken from the Wise-Man,” who hath all in himself. “Wickedness is not so strong as Virtue, therefore the Wise-Man is not hurt by Malice. None can benefit the Wise-Man,” who wanteth nothing, “therefore none can hurt him. An Injury is from Hope, or Fear; the Wise-Man is touch’d with neither. None receiveth an Injury unmov’d, the Wise-Man is not mov’d. A Contumely is a Contempt, and thence hath its Name; which the Wise-Man doth not look upon as belonging to him, who knows his own Greatness. He thinketh also, thatall others are so much inferiour, that they have not boldness to despise Things so high above them. If he once debaseth himself, so as to be mov’d with Injury, or Contumely, he can never be secure; whereas Security is the proper Good of the Wise-Man.” If Pride and Stomachfulness had not been one of the Stoicks Cardinal Virtues, they could not have applauded Cato’s barbarous Self-Murder, “who scorn’d to be a Petitioner to any, either for his Death, or his Life, and was a contemner of all Powers.” They call themselves great Men, and accordingly found their Happiness, not upon the Favours of God and true Piety, but upon their Greatness of Spirit, the Greatness and Stoutness of an high invincible Mind; whence their Virtue becomes a sort of Self-magnifying and Self-deifying, which is but an illegitimate kind of Bravery of Spirit, incongruous to their Condition as Creatures, much more incongruous to frail miserable Men, and most of all incongruous to wicked miserable Sinners. Nor is there any Thing more distastful to a truly pious Mind, than the haughty Pharisaical Humour of these Philosophick-Pagan Magnificoes swaggering with their Virtue, their Magnitude, their Celsitude, their Altitude, their Fortitude, their Beatitude. Pride suggested that Stoical Maxim of Heraclitus. “The Wise need not any Friends.” Whence all the wonderful Provision, which Divine Grace has made for a World of wicked Sinners, was lost upon these Philosophers; for they that need no Friend, need no Saviour, or Salvation. They were able to live of themselves, and had an imaginary Happiness of their own making, wherein they took Satisfaction and Content; they look’d upon their Philosophy as the Perfection of Wisdom and Virtue, in it-self and to them; and thought, both themselves and their Institution, far Superiour to Popular Mankind; and, therefore, it was but agreeable to their Philosophick Grandeur and Magnificence, to contemn Christianity, which is a popular Institution, design’d for, and adapted to, the Salvation of miserable Sinners; whereas they were rais’d to a Superiority above Sin and Misery, and suppos’d themselves nothing less than Divine Men, and Kings, Jupiter’s Sons and Peers, and petty Deities. “It must be something Super-Human, Celestial, and Magnificent, that constituteth the Wise-Man. If thou ask, What that is? As God and his Beatitude is Constituted, so is the Wise-Man.”Chrysippus affirmed, “That the Happiness of Jove is in no respect more Eligible, nor more Fair, nor more Venerable, than that of the Wise-Man.” Virtues are thought to be true and genuine, when they are lov’d and desir’d for their own sake; but it appears, from the Stoicks Elation of Mind, that when Virtues are desir’d for their own sake, in a way of Separation from God, and without any Relation to him, they are proud and tumid, and are rather Vice than Virtue. Plato is much more modest in his Accounts of Virtue, than the strutting Stoicks; yet some of the Stoick’s principal Maxims, which nothing but Pride inspir’d, particularly that eminent One, “The Wise-Man is self-sufficient,” are derived from Socrates and Plato. Pride made Plato an envious Man, Socrates an ireful Man, the Cynick a Boaster in his great Atchievements in the Conquest of Vice. The best of these Masters alloweth us μεγαλοϕρονἕιν, “to be proud of the Conquest of any Vice.” And, “We rightly glory in our Virtue,” saith Cicero, a great Wit, but a very vain-glorious Man, who also complaineth to his Wife, “Neither the Gods, whom thou hast most chastly serv’d, nor Men, whom I have constantly sav’d, have requited us.”
These Philosophers have been justly call’d, what they certainly were to a Crime, Animals of Glory, and Traffickers for Fame; yet so, as to be great Adversaries to the Appetite of Vain-Glory, as appeareth from the Tenor of their Philosophy. They despis’d the Popular Pagans, their Judgment, Fame, Pomp, Acclamations, and Applause, at a great Rate; they expatiate upon the Emptiness of Fame, as also, how narrow, inconstant, and devoid of Judgment it is; and the Folly and Iniquity of those who affect it; that we ought to consider the Quality of Persons that praise, or dispraise; that Fame is one of those Things, which are not in our power, which others give and take away at pleasure; and therefore, say they, they are Fools who affect it, that desire to be esteem’d Beneficent for doing Good; who suppose, that the Applause of such is of great Moment, that know not themselves, and would be had in Admiration by those, who themselves call Mad: That Fame and Honour is not worth the while, being but a mere noise and clattering of Tongues, some Body telling these Things to some Body; they that praise another, soon dispraising him, and both being quickly buried in Oblivion: Good is not the better for being prais’d; we should be indifferent whether we do our Duty, disprais’d, or prais’d: The Lovers of Good practise it, as Lovers enjoy one another, secretly, without desiring any Hearers, or Spectators, to praise them: That we ought not to accept the Praise and Approbation of ill Men, nor guide our Life by the Opinion of the Injudicious, nor place our Happiness in the Minds and Thoughts of others, nor so much as take into our Thoughts what others say, or think, of us. Some that were not Stoicks count themselves mean Proficients, except a Reproach be as welcome to them, as a Mark of hearty Approbation. The Stoicks exercise themselves to an indifferency as to Praise and Dispraise; and, notwithstanding their Pharisaical Humour in other respects, in all Things to avoid Ostentation, and to do nothing for Opinion. They are urgent with Men, to chuse that which is Good, because it is Good, and not for popular Opinion; and some of them will not stretch out a Finger for a good Fame. They deride the Ambitious and Vain Glorious, ridicule their Folly, who are puffed up with Honour, neither admire, nor desire Greatness, (some thinking Riches and Principalities inconsistent with virtuous Living, ) hugely disparage a great Name and Fame after Death; forewarn all that will be Philosophers, to expect Derision and Reproaches at their Entrance upon the Philosophick Life; teach them to bear Reproaches well, with great Equanimity and Benevolence; to do well, tho’ it expose them to Disgrace, and not to desist from good Practice, nor to fear Contempt, but to contemn Infamy. In this their Doctrine they were much more severe, than those who suppose, “Ambition to be of use in correcting the other vicious Affections, but must itself be put off in the last Place, as Plato hath call’d it the last Coat.” But their Pride and Arrogance was of an unpopular Kind, mix’d with a vicious Affectation of Vain-Glory; for the Greek Philosophers usually reproach’d one another with their Vain-Glory; thus Antisthenes, Crates, Diogenes, Plato, Pyrrho, were reproach’d by their Fellow-Philosophers; Socrates espied it thro’ the Holes of Antisthenes’s Cloak; and of Socrates himself, perhaps, Cardan has made a right Judgment, “That he was extremely desirous of Glory, altho’ he most of all dissembled this.” They glory’d in their contempt of Glory, supposing that a contempt of Glory was the best way to obtain it. Therefore, tho’ they may justly be accounted Animals of popular Glory, yet their Philosophy was a great Adversary to the Appetite of it, and they reproach’d one another with it, as a vicious Affection.
The Stoicks, in consequence of their excessive Pride, were too stout to humble themselves under the afflicting hand of Providence. The Platonists will not always allow this Supposition, “That Calamities are from a divine Hand,” or, “That God is the Dispenser, both of Things Good and Evil to us.” But the Popular Pagans were not too high to be humbled; they looked upon their Calamities, as the Effects of the Anger of their Gods, acknowledg’d their Dependence upon them, and, in any great Distress of their Affairs, betook themselves to their most humble Supplications, in order to atone their Displeasure, and gain their Favour.
One of the bravest Exploits, which the Philosophick Pagans constantly celebrate, is the killing of Tyrants, and delivering Cities and Nations from them. The Practice of this applauded Virtue occasion’d the Torture of Zeno Eleates, who is said, to have kept the Doctrine of Parmeendes inviolate as Gold in the Fire, “And by his Deeds he shew’d, that a great Man feareth nothing but to be base; that it is Children and Women, andMen, who have the Souls of Women, that are afraid of Pain.” From which Idea of a great Man it appeareth, that the Fortitude of the Heathen Philosophers is of no better Kind than the common Military Fortitude, or the Fortitude of those celebrated Popular Pagans, Mutius and Regulus, of Cleopatra and Asdrubals Wife, who threw herself and her Children into the Fire; or of that famous Harlot at Athens, who, knowing of a Conspiracy against the Life of the Tyrant there, with great Bravery suffer’d her-self to be tortur’d to Death, rather than she would discover the Conspirators, and, biting off a piece of her Tongue, spit it out into the Tyrant’s Face.
Philosophy cannot boast of many great Examples of Patience; the Grandees of the Stoical Family, Cato and Brutus, falling into Troubles fell into transports of Rage and Impatience. So Hierocles, according to Saidas, being whipp’d at Byzantium ’till the Blood came, took the Blood in the Hollow of his Hand, and threw it upon the Judge, saying, “Cyclops, there is Wine for you, seeing you have eaten Man’s Flesh.” Some, indeed, of the Philosophick Pagans have express’d an admirable Constancy of Mind in shaking Circumstances. As Cleanthes, who stood unmov’d without changing Countenance, when he was publickly reproach’d in the Theatre by the Poet Sositheus. And Polemo did not so much as wax Pale, when his Leg was torn by mad Dogs. Yet, because this Philosophick Firmness was but of the same Kind with Epicurus’s in his Strangury, or the Sceptick Pyrrho’s, who endur’d cuttings and burnings with great constancy of Mind; or that of well disciplin’d Gladiators, and the Spartan Boys, who were whipp’d at the Altar, ’till the Blood gush’d out of their Bowels, without whimpering; therefore some have rightly pronounc’d concerning that Patience which Philosophy professeth, that it is Spurious, only a proud Sullenness; so much the more Spurious, as it is the more Proud. Lipsius therefore, otherwise an extravagant Admirer of Stoicism, lying upon his Sick-Bed, and strugling with grievous Pain, discarded the Stoical Patience, and having our Saviour’s Picture hanging near his Bed, he pointed to it, and gave his Patience its due Character, “That is the true Patience.”
Several of the Philosophers have discours’d against Revenge, or retaliating Injuries, for the bearing them with Meekness, and for universal Benevolence; and there are several Instances of these Virtues amongst the Greek Philosophers. But their Practice of them looks more like unpopular Humour, than serious Goodness; in laying the Foundation of them, they intermix much of Pride, and Paradoxical Stoical Conceit, That the Wise-Man can suffer no Injury: And the most considerable Instances of these mighty Virtues are Aristides and Phocion, who may justly be reckon’d among the Popular Pagans. Aristides, after great Services, being banish’d by his Citizens unjustly, at his Departure pray’d the Gods, that the Athenians might never, by any Trouble, or Distress, be forc’d to recal him. And Phocion, being unjustly condemn’d, charg’d his Son Phocas, that he should never revenge his Death. But these Resemblances of Christian Virtue in Heathen good Men, did not issue from a divine Kind of Charity, but were Branches of their Human-Social Virtue, and issued from a mighty Love to their Country, which is most eminent in Heathens. The Virtue of these Popular Pagans pretendeth not to be Divine, nor do they, therefore, deserve to be celebrated as divine Men upon account of it: But the Philosophick Pagans, by far lesser Matters than these, got the Reputation of divine Men. One of their principal Virtues was their abandoning the Superfluities of Life. Whence Diogenes, seeing one take Water out of a River with his Hand, and drinking it out of his Hand, threw away his Dish, which he us’d to carry about him to drink Water in, resolving thence forth to drink it out of the hollow of his Hand; and for this Freak, with others of like Nature, this unpopular Humourist is celebrated by his Fellow-Philosophers as a “Divine Man.”
The Philosophick Pagans were like the Popular, in not discerning what is truly Divine and Holy, from what is Atheous and Unholy. Altho’ they liv’d in gross Crimes, beside their Pagan Religion, yet they did not discern between Sin and Holiness. They were Self-justifiers at the Rate of the Pharisees, and, therefore, perfectly indispos’d for such a Religion, that is a Religion for Sinners; and they were too high for Repentance, which the Popular Pagans were not, who had a Sense of Sin, and of their need of Pardon, which they often express’d at Death: But Apuleius pretends, “That he always accounted all Sin a Thing detestable”; Xenophon saith, “No one ever saw Socrates do, or heard him speak, any Thing that was Impious and Irreligious”: Socrates himself had no Sense of Sin at his Death, nor express’d any Repentance; nor is there any Appearance of either in Epictetus’s Preparatives for Death. Such mistaken Teachers of Virtue were these Sages of this World, that they thought themselves made Gods by such a Virtue, that could not make them the People of God, which was a very gross Mistake, and speaketh their Philosophy to be no better, than a worldly Kind of Wisdom, and their Virtue could be of no better a Character than their Philosophy. By their introducing their Philosophy, true Religion was much more prejudic’d, than it was before by their Pagan Religion, they made an additional Prejudice to it, they rais’d up a new Enemy, they introduc’d a Mountebank, who pretendeth to do all Cures, that a divine Physician might be thought needless.
3. The Spuriousness of the divine Virtues of the Platonists.3. The Super-Ethical, as they are called, or the Divine Virtues of the Platonists are of the spurious and illegitimate kind, and so blended with what is fanciful, or bad, that, in the whole, they signify little or nothing to the constituting a Divinely-good Man. This is the Character, not only of the Stoicks, but of the Platonists Divine Virtue, in all these Parts of it.
Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is their intellectual Form of Life, contemplative of the Platonick Intelligibles, and visionary of their T’Agathon, which cannot be discern’d but by a boniform Light, which is beyond all that is intellectual.
Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is Theurgick; for they pretend by a converse with the Gods in Theurgy, to be freed from Passion, to partake of Divine Perfections, and to have, what in their Dialect they call, a Deifick Union; which one Party of them pretendeth to in the Mystick-Metaphysical Way. And these say, “The End and Scope is, not to be without Sin, but to be a God.”
Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is the Platonick Faith and Love; for this Love is only an Amatorious Madness. “When the Mind becometh Unmental” (or Mad) “being drunk with Nectar, this is the Mind, that is in Love.” Much of this sort of Divine Virtue there is in Platonism; an Ignorance, that is better than Knowledge; a Madness, that is better than Sobriety of Mind, a Divine Madness.
Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is the Virtue of the Mysticks and Quietists, “Who being seated in the Bay of super-essential Goodness, enjoy a super-natural Quietism”; to which Isidore the Platonist pretended. He said, “That his Soul itself, in sacred Prayers, became wholly a Divine Sea, having in the first Place collected her-self from the Body into her-self, having in the next place” (extatically) “parted with her own Morals, and be taken herself from rational Notions to those that are Congenial to Intellect; and in the third place being possess’d with Divine Afflation, and chang’d into an extraordinary Serenity, deiform, not human.
Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is an Aversation from Terrestrial, Material, and Mortal, Nature, and an Affectation of being wholly incorporeal and immaterial; for this Affectation of Immaterial Intellectual Nature, and to be mere intellectual Souls, is an irreligious Philosophick Vanity and Extravagance, not intirely free from Magick. For, in order to the Purity of the Soul, Pythagoras prescrib’d strict Abstinence from several sorts of Meats.
The Platonists agree, that, according to Plato in his Theaetetus, Virtue is a Similitude to God, or the Gods; “which Assimilation” (saith Plato) “consisteth in becoming Holy and Just with Prudence.” But to what God, or Gods, this divine Similitude relateth, in this they do not agree, nor wherein this Similitude consisteth. For some say, That this divine Similitude relateth to the Pagan Deities in general; others say, That it relateth to the Platonists divine Intellect; and others are of Opinion, That it relateth to their T’Agathon. Some place this divine Similitude in the speculative Virtue, and intellectual Form of Life; others place it in the practick Virtue, (Ethical and Political,) which seemeth to be the Sense of Plato; for Prudence, Holiness, and Justice, are practical Virtues. In his Fourth of Laws, he placeth the divine Similitude in Temperance, and in his Phaedo, he placeth it in Temperance and Justice; thus saying, “Are not they most Happy and Blessed, and such as go to the best Place, that have exercis’d the popular and political Virtues, which we call Temperance and Justice?” Plato, therefore, seemeth to place the divine Similitude in the Popular Pagans Holiness and Justice; which the generality of his Followers will not admit, counting the Civil Virtues only the Way to get the divine Similitude, and that this was the Sense of Plato. But, whatever may be thought of his Sense, his Account of Virtue, and of the divine Similitude, is an Instance, that the Philosophick-Pagans may in Words agree with our Religion, when in Sense there is an extreme Disagreement. For Plato’s divine Similitude, however it may be interpreted by his Followers, is extremely alien from, and opposite to, that truly divine Similitude, which is Wisdom, Righteousness, and true Holiness, wherewith he had no Acquaintance. For, had he been acquainted with that truly divine Kind of Justice, which is Righteousness, he could not have been a Pagan-Religionist; nor could he have instituted a Community of Women and of Goods in his Republick; nor would he have taken care to regulate the Drinking in the Feasts of Bacchus, without endeavouring to abolish them; nor could he so grosly have mistaken himself, as in a Book of Justice (his Fifth de Republicà,) to discourse in this manner touching the Greeks and Barbarians. “All Greeks are near of Kin, but extraneous and different from Barbarians. When the Grecians and Barbarians Fight with one another, this is properly called Fighting, for they are Enemies by Nature, and such a Feud must be called a War: But, if Grecians, that are Friends by Nature, quarrel with Grecians, this is an unnatural Distemper, and Greece must be said to be troubled with Sedition, and such a Feud must not be called a War, but a Sedition.” The Greeks had their Philosophy from the Barbarians, as they call’d them, and yet they commonly reproach’d them, and, usually, were so uncivil and unjust towards them, that they look’d upon them as “Enemies by Nature and wild Beasts.”Plato follow’d the Popular Pagans in their Injustice, as well as in their irreligious Religion. So Plutarch, in the Life of Lycurgus, can find no Injustice in the Lacedamonians Common wealth, which was instituted for War, and fighting, not for Peace, as Aristotle observeth and blameth; the Spartan Virtue was the Love of Glory; they were train’d up and exercis’d to be expert Thieves; exposed and murder’d their weak and deform’d Infants, and even this horrible Injustice Plutarch approveth. Aristotle, also, is known to teach, “To expose Children that are maimed, and Women to cause Abortions, that they may not exceed their Number”; and he agrees with Plato in supposing, “That War is a natural Thing between the Greeks and Barbarians.”Plato is justly chargeable with Injustice, in patronizing Lying, where in he follows the general Sense of the Heathens, which was, that a Lye is not bad, if it be expedient, and not pernicious in the Affairs of Men. So, in his Third and Fifth de Republicà, Plato would have Governours, “To make use of frequent Lying and Deceit for the Benefit of the Subjects; this must be granted to publick Governours, but not be touch’d by private Men.” If the Platonists human Justice is so bad, it is reasonable to suppose, that in their Divine, or super-human Virtue, they were not very good.
Aristotle pretended not to an Institution of Divine Virtue.4. Aristotle pretendeth not to an Institution of Divine Virtue, or to institute a Divine-Good Man. For, altho’ he acknowledges a Divine Virtue, yet it is in so slender a Degree, that he denies, that there can be any Friendship between God and Man; the Happiness that he insisteth on, is but the Civil; as the Virtue that he insisteth on, is but the Civil and Military; his Ethicks are but a Branch of worldly Politicks; his active Virtue consisteth in that Mean, which the worldly Man’s Prudence determineth; and what can living well signify, in a Civil Worldly Mans Institution of Virtue, but to live without Vice, or Crime, in the Notion of the Civil World? Therefore it is not to be wonder’d at, that Aristotle, differently from the Sense of other Philosophers, patronizeth Revenge; or that Cicero agrees with him in this Point, (for this must be acknowledg’d, notwithstanding what a learned Bishop hath said to the contrary; ) for the former of these did not pretend to be a Religionist, and the latter of them, altho’ a Philosopher, yet was not of any Philosophick Institution, and was so uncertain an Admirer of Philosophy, that sometimes he preferreth that one little Book of the XII Tables, before the Libraries of all the Philosophers, both for Utility and weight of Authority. The Lawyers, not without Reason, prefer their Institution to their Civil Virtue, before the Philosopher’s Institutions to their Divine Virtue; which yet must be acknowledg’d, to have a limited agreeableness to the truly Divine moral Virtue; but so that, in the whole, the Disagreement is far greater than the Agreement.
The Agenda of Christianity not agreeable to the Reason of the Philosophick Pagans.5. Whence we may make a Judgment of this Saying of the same learned Bishop; “All the Agenda of Christianity are so far from being opposite, that they are most agreeable to Human Reason, as ’tis cultivated and heighten’d to its utmost Improvement by Philosophy.” If this Saying be converted thus, All the Philosophers improv’d Reason (which is their Divine Virtue) is so far from being opposite, that it is most agreeable to the Agenda of Christianity, it will be a monstrous Proposition. For nothing can be more opposite to the Agenda of Christianity, than a great part of the Philosophers Divine Virtue; therefore the Agenda of Christianity are not so suitable to the Philosophers Reason, as is pretended. That this Saying may have any Appearance of Truth, it must be limited to the particular Agenda of Christianity; for these general Agenda of Christianity (which are also in part the general Agenda of Judaism) are directly and expressly opposite to the Philosophers improv’d Reason. “To have no other Gods but me; to worship the Lord thy God, and to serve him alone; to seek the Kingdom of God and his Righteousness; to take the Kingdom, enter into it, and buy it at any rate; to put off the Heathen Old Man, and to put on the New Man, in the (Christian) New Birth, in the New Covenant; to come out of the mundane Society, and the state of Sin and of Death, to pass into the state of Life, to incorporate with the Divine Family, and become a Citizen of the Holy Empire; not to adhere to, but to abandon the Kingdom of Darkness, and to manage an Holy War against its Powers, Interest, and Adherents; to live to him that died for us and rose again; to live for God and his Service, and to make it our daily Care and Prayer, that his Name may be hallow’d, and his Kingdom come.” All which Fundamental Agenda of the Christian Institution, and such like, are altogether alien from, and opposite to, the Philosophick Pagans Sentiments, as they are Pagans; nor is that plain Principle and summary of Piety, the Fear of God, suitable to their Reason; for they destroy’d it, which the Popular Pagans did not, by their Maxims, “Ira Deorum nulla est,”The Gods are never angry, yet a learned Man saith, “He knows not any Evangelical Precept or Duty belonging to a Christian’s Practice, which natural Men of best Account” (the Philosophers) “by the mere Strength of Human Reason have not taught and taken upon them to maintain as Just and Reasonable.” But it would be far better to say; there are not any of the particular Agenda of Christianity, the Reasonableness where of may not be illustrated, by what they have suppos’d to be Just and Reasonable: So the Christian Martyrs Contempt of Death may be shew’d to be reasonable, which yet was so unsuitable to their improv’d Reason, that it is call’d by one of them“mere Obstinacy”; and another of them imputeth it to “Madness and Custom.” The Agreement, therefore, between Christianity and Philosophy touching this Virtue, the Contempt of Death, is complicated with such Disagreement, that the Christians Virtue, of that Name, Philosophy discardeth as Vice and Folly; and the Philosophers Virtue, of that Name, Christians discard as Self-Murder, or profane Bravery.
There is, therefore, a want of Judgment and Piety in many of our Modern Elogies of the Christian Religion, and Vindications of its Morality, as in this following. “Christ Jesus taught Morality, viz. the Way of living like Men, and the fifth Chapter of Matthew is an excellent Lecture of this Kind.” To live like Men is a general ambiguous Expression, and to make it of a determinate Signification, it must be understood, to signify in a Sense of Disparagement, To live as mere Men; or in a Sense of Excellency, To live as more than mere Men. If in the former Sense our Saviour hath taught us, To live like Men; he was a Teacher of Morality, at the same rate with Homer, of whom Cicero complaineth, “He maketh the Gods to live like Men, whereas he ought to make Men live like the Gods.” So our Saviour is suppos’d, to teach Christians to live like Men; whereas his Business was, to teach Men to live like Christians. Things more Vulgar, and accommodate to the human Size, have the Name of Man call’d upon them in Scripture; but they are Things great and extraordinary, that have the Name of God call’d upon them, Job 1. 6. Psal.65. 9. 104. 16. Isa. 8. 1. Gal. 1. 7, 11. To live like Men, therefore, is far from being expressive of the Christian Godliness, which is a living according to God, and to sink it into such a Morality, is a debasing the Divinity of the Christian Religion. Whose holy Laws are Christianity, which cannot be of one Piece with the Moralities of Jews and Heathens, and, therefore, must not be call’d Morality, merely such, but the Divine, or Christian Kind of Morality, which ought to be contradistinguish’d to mere Heathen Morality. And what can be more apparent, than that our Saviour’s Beatitudes, “Blessed are the Poor in Spirit, blessed are they that Mourn,” are not Rules of mere Morality, teaching to live like Men, but are Rules initiative into the Christian Sanctity, which is the Life of the regenerate Children of God? So the following Precepts, “Ye are the Salt of the Earth, the Light of the World, let your Light shine before Men, that they may glorify your Father which is in Heaven,” are not Precepts of Morality, enjoining nothing more than to live like mere Men. And, in the Progress of a Sinner’s Conversion to Godliness, such Difficulties and Conflicts usually occur, that speak it a sort of Virtue, greatly distant from, and transcendent to, ordinary Moral Virtue, which is so remote from it, that it may indispose Men to the Acquisition of it. “For Men, never much affrighted with the Danger, wherein all by Nature stand, nor inflam’d with the Love of a better Country than they enjoy, cannot address themselves to any resolute, or speedy Departure out of the Territories of Civil Moralities, within which, if Satan hold us, he maketh full reckoning of us, as of his Civil, or Natural, Subjects.” Therefore, to the way of removing out of Satan’s Territories to the Territories of Godliness, the Civil Moralities may, by Accident, be a great Impediment. For the Way is a duly humbling Repentance. The high and brave Spirit of Man must be broken; it must be Poor, that he may be Rich; empty, that he may be filled; have nothing, that he may possess all Things; be Condemn’d, that he may be Pardon’d; be a Fool, that he may be Wise; and Die, that he may be made Alive. All Virtue, which is not the Christian, is but that of the Will of Man, of Mind and Quality, the Human. Inter Ethnicam Philosophiam & Christianam tantum interest, quantum a divino Spiritu humanum a best ingenium.
The Virtue and Religion of the Heathen Philosophers, were of so spurious a kind, as, in part, to cause the unjust Persecution of the Primitive Christians.The Sufferings of the Primitive Christians may reasonably be thought an Effect, not only of the Popular Pagan’s Vice and Folly, but of the Philosophick Pagans Wisdom and Virtue; for their truly great and generous Maxims of Virtue, in their Sense and Application, lead to the Persecution of the Christian Church and Religion, and make it Virtue and Duty. Their most noble and generous Maxims of Virtue, are touching the social Duty of Man, Duty to the Publick, to the Whole, to the Universe of rational Beings. For they suppos’d, “That every particular Man is a Member of the Publick, and of the Whole consisting of Heathen Gods and Men, a Part of that Whole; and that, as a Part, he is for the Whole intirely, (for himself, only as a Part of the Whole,) for its Being and Well-being, to Constitute and Preserve it, and to be Useful and Subservient to its Interest. But the Physician cutteth off distemper’d Parts of the Body, for the Safety and Welfare of the Whole. As particular Men, and lesser Systems, must suffer for the Whole; so they are design’d and oblig’d, faithfully to take care of, and co-operate to, the Welfare of the Whole, of their Fellow-Members and Fellow-Citizens, wherein their own Welfare is involv’d, as a Part in the Whole. The Publick and Universal Good, is the great Good. As Cato was minded,”
Non sibi, sed toto genitum se credere Mundo.
Lucan.
“He believ’d, That he was not born for his own private Advantage, but for that of the whole World. And, on the contrary, base Selfishness is the Sum of all Evil. Because I am of Kin (saith Marcus Antoninus) to those Parts of the Universe, that are of the same kind, I will Practise nothing unsocial: But rather, I will take care of those that are my Kindred, and incline my whole Man to the common Utility, and avoid the contrary; often say to thy-self, I am a Member of the System of Rational Beings. But, if thou say, I am a distinct Part of that System, thou dost not love Men from the Heart, nor considerest thy-self as comprehended in the Whole. And he that is not thus affected, is not naturally affected, is not well, nor justly, nor charitably, nor sociably, nor honourably, nor humanly, affected; he hath put off the Man, as the Philosophers suppose.”
But, altho’ these Notions and Maxims of theirs touching Virtue and Duty to the Whole, are, all of them, extremely Solid and truly Generous, if applied and determin’d to a genuine and legitimate Whole, or Universe; yet, in their Pagan Application and Determination of them to their Whole, Universe, or Catholick System, consisting of Heathen Gods and Men, they are extremely false and wicked, and manifestly lead them to Persecute the Christian Church and Religion. For the Christians were a People separated or broken off from their Whole, or Universe; and, consequently, were such as Marcus Antoninus calls Apostems of the World. Therefore it was but to their own mundane Tribe, that the Popular and Philosophick Pagans were charitably and sociably Affected; the World will love its own; the Christians that were Aliens, and who profess’d, that Jerusalem was their Country, they treated as those, who were no longer Men. The Philosophers thought themselves oblig’d, to have regard for rational Beings who were Congenial and Cognate to them; and, accordingly, they thought themselves oblig’d, to take care of their Gods and Demons; for these they look’d upon as Congenial and Cognate. But Christ and Christians erected and constituted a Whole, or Universe, opposite and destructive to their Whole Universe, or Catholick System, which if they look’d upon themselves oblig’d to take care of and uphold, they must necessarily think themselves oblig’d to destroy Christianity. Every Man must strenuously endeavour to maintain the old Religion of their Ancestors, succour the ruinous Empire of the Gods, which Christianity came to demolish, and to restore it to its Grandeur and Magnificence.
The supreme God, who was the chief Object of the religious Worship of the Heathens, was the Soul of the World.6. In the Pagan System of the Universe, one of their supreme Deities, altho’ it was not absolutely their supreme Deity, may be justly called the supreme Deity of their Religion and Laws. This Name, a supreme Deity, is ambiguous, with respect to Heathens and Christians. For, if it be understood in a general and indeterminate Notion, it is Matter of Agreement between them both; but, when once it comes to a particular Determination, it is not Matter of Agreement, but of Difference between the Pagan and Christian Theists; and, in some sort, among the Pagan Theists themselves, they understanding the supreme Deity in various Notions, and, so far, making various supreme Deities. But, as the Name, Prince of Philosophers, in the Schools of the Aristotelians, must be understood of their Prince of Philosophers, reputed such, the Platonists and Epicureans have another Prince of Philosophers: So this Name, the supreme Deity, amongst the Pagan Theists, and the several sorts of Pagan Theists, must be understood of their supreme Deity, reputed such, several sorts of Pagan Theists having several sorts of supreme Deities. So that the Epithet, which they gave to the Jews supreme Deity, properly belongs to their own.
The supreme Deity, among the Pagans, is of this particular Determination, not merely, a Deity Supreme, but the supreme of their Pagan Deities, Summus Deorum. A usual Form of Invocation amongst them was, O Jove, and the Gods, understanding by Jove, the God of the Gods. Their Prayers were made to Jupiter the King, and to the other Gods. He is usually styl’d in Homer, Virgil, and the other Poets, the Father and King of the Gods. By the Gods they understand the supreme Deity and the other Deities, and, for that Reason, they speak of God and the Gods promiscuously, because they consider them as one System. They consider’d their Deities collectively, celebrated a Festival of them all in common, called θεοξενία, and consecrated Altars to all the Gods and Goddesses. They are his Associates, Collegues, and Allies, and he is the Head of the Family of Pagan Deities. It is the Title of a Chapter in Eugubinus,“That Aristotle affirmeth with Homer, that the supreme God is the Father of the Gods and of Men, of the same Kind, Kindred, and Family with them,” as Sons and Father.
Homer, therefore, and Aristotle, the Poets and the Philosophers, the Popular and the Philosophick Pagans, agree in the Acknowledgment of a supreme Deity, in the Way of Polytheism, and with Relation to sub-ordinate Deities. They agree, therefore, in the Acknowledgment of a supreme Deity, in the Sense of their Religion and Laws, but not in the Sense of their Schools. When the Philosophers speak of the supreme Deity, in the peculiar Sense of their Schools, they mean one supreme Deity; and when they speak of the supreme Deity popularly, in the Sense of their Religion and Laws, they mean another.
The Pagans Theism being their Polytheism, and the supreme Deity being a Term of their Polytheism, it is manifestly inconsistent with the Acknowledgment of the true God, to whose Supremacy and Sovereignty it belongeth, to subsist in the Quality and Condition of God alone. The Atheism charg’d upon Anaxagoras, (for which the Athenians banish’d him, fin’d him five Talents, and had put him to Death, if his Scholar Pericles had not interpos’d,) was only a denying the Deity of the Earth, the Sun, the Moon, the Stars, shutting out of Being the Soul of the World, destroying the Deity of the World, and the Parts thereof, making them inanimate and unintelligent, calling the Moon an Earth, and the Sun a Mass of Fire; whilst at the same time he acknowledg’d a single supreme Deity existing separately, whilst he discarded the Soul of the World, which deified all the Parts thereof, which was no less than a Subversion of the main of the Pagan Theism; for which Plato charges him with Atheism. And Ficinus affirms, “That Plato in his Book of Laws asserts the Coelestial Gods only, because the Contemplation of the higher Deities is very foreign to the matter of Laws.” Which is an Insinuation, that those higher Deities in Platonism are properly Gods of Philosophical Speculation only, no Deities of Religion and Laws. Nor could the Platonists suppose their first Principle a Deity of Religion and Laws; for they look upon it, as quite above all external Adoration; and such was Numa’s Deity, to whom he would neither allow Image, nor material Sacrifice. “Plato” (saith Eugubinus ) “did not so clearly propose the greatest God as an Object of Worship, because he could not be worshipp’d; what he is, and how to be worshipp’d, cannot be describ’d, or declar’d. In three Places he calleth him undeclarable, in the Timaeus, difficult for Thought, undeclarable by Speech, or Word. According to Philo also he is unconceivable, unthinkable, undeclarable; being thus unspeakable and inexplicable, and such as the old Theologers call innominable, some invisible, others to be worshipp’d in silence, others uninvestigable; therefore Plato hath said nothing of him in his Book of Laws, nor set down any Thing concerning his Worship, because he could not, this Deity being unknowable, both as to Name and Nature.” If Plato’s supreme Deity is of no Religion; if all Understanding, Conception, Name, Word, Speech, be utterly incompetible and unapplicable to this first Principle; if there be no Doctrine, no Learning, no Discipline, or Institution, touching such a Deity, and, consequently, no Religion; this is not discoursing, nor reasoning, but dreaming of such a Deity; for there can be no Proof of the Being of such a Deity, neither à Priori, nor à Posteriori, no more than could be given of such Gods as Epicurus suppos’d, who did nothing, and who could not be known, either directly, or by their Works.
However, the Followers of Plato thought this supreme Deity was to be worshipp’d, but by Silence, pure Cogitation, and As similation to him, which is the Sacrificing our Life to him. But such a kind of Deity and his Worship being foreign from matter of Law, and altogether unsuitable to the generality of Mankind, Plato thought it a Solecism to mention him in his Book of Laws. “He taketh care that the Matters of his Acroamatical Theology, his Acroamatical Deity, do not fall into the Hands of unskilful Men; for scarce any Thing, as I suppose, would be Matter of more Derision amongst the common People. From Plato, therefore, you have the true Cause, why we may not speak of the first Deity amongst the Vulgar, why it is not lawful to publish to the Vulgar the Parent of the Universe: For, not understanding the Things that are said of him, they deride them, being Things remote from popular Custom, and gross Ears; therefore, treating of Laws which ought to be publish’d to the People, he spake nothing of that great uninvestigable Deity, proposing only the Worship of Heaven to the People, to whom he must speak only of that, which they thought certain Religion.”
The Platonists, therefore, tho’ they had higher Deities in their School, do yet agree, That the supreme Deity of their Religion and Laws, is the Soul of the World, or the Mundane System as animated by a governing Mind, which Deifies it, the supreme Deity of the Popular Pagans, and the same with Zeus, or Jupiter. Speusippus, also, agreeable to Plato, is said by Cicero to have held “a certain Force, or Power, whereby all Things are govern’d, and that Animal.” Such also was Pythagoras’s Notion of the Deity, as others, and Cicero also in the same Treatise relates; “Pythagoras also acknowledg’d one God, an incorporeal Mind, diffus’d thro’ the whole Nature of Things, the Origin of vital Sense to all Animals.” In like manner Onatus the Pythagorean defines “God, the Mind and Soul, and Ruler of the whole World.” The Jove of the Orphick Theology is the mundane Soul and System.
“A Spirit that pervadeth the whole World,” was one of the Aegyptian Notices of God. The Supreme Deity of the Peruvians was of the same kind, as appeareth from his Name Pachacamac, which signifieth the Soul, or Life, of the World. The Stoicks usually intitle the Supreme Deity, The Mind and Understanding of the Whole, the common, or universal, Mundane Nature, and the common Reason of Nature, the ruling Principle of the World; and, as Zeno defin’d God, a Spirit pervading the whole World. And the Indians, according to Megasthenes, suppos’d, That the God, who is the Maker and Governour of the World, pervadeth the Whole of it. Agreeably to these Sentiments, the Romans styled Capitoline Jove, “the Mind and Spirit, the Guardian and Governour of the Universe, the Artificer and Lord of this Mundane Fabrick, to whom every Name, Fate, Providence, Nature, the World, is agreeable.” So true is that of Macrobius; “Jupiter among the Theologers is the Soul of the World.” The Soul moveth and governeth the Body, which it presideth over, saith Cicero, “As that chief God governeth the World.” St. Austin saith thus of Varro; “When Varro elsewhere calleth the rational Soul of every one a Genius, and affirmeth such a Mind, or Soul, of the whole World to be God; he plainly implieth that God is the Universal Genius of the World, and that this is he, whom they call Jove. Those only seem to Varro to have understood what God is, who thought him a Soul governing the World by Motion and Reason.” Such a Soul of the World the Stoicks call’d, The artificial Fire orderly proceeding to the Generation of the Things of the World.
Many Christian Writers have grossly symboliz’d with the aforesaid Doctrine of the Pagans; and, particularly, all those Christian Divines, who account the Platonists Triad the same with the Christian Trinity, if they are consistent with themselves, suppose the H. Ghost, to be the same with the Platonists Soul of the World, which is the Pagan Jove, thus perverting the Scriptures, confounding Things Sacred and Profane, Human and Divine, God and the World, God and Belial, the Kingdom of Darkness and of Light, Paganizing Christianity. It is one Thing to say, That mundane, animative, intelligent Nature is God, as being somewhat, that he inclusively is; and another Thing to say, That mundane, animative, intelligent Nature, form’d by the Pagans into a Jove, is, as such, God. The former Assertion is legitimate Theism, the latter is Heathenism.
This Jupiter of the Popular Pagans, the Soul of the World, may justly be thought the best sort of Jupiter in the Pagan Theology. But the Heathenism of the Notion will, in great Measure, appear from the Original of it. For the Heathens were carried to this Notion of the Supreme Deity, partly by the first Original Theism of their Institution, and partly by their Method of proving the Existence of a Deity against Atheism. The first Original Theism of their Institution, or their eldest Idolatry, was the deifying the visible Heaven, or World, as the Supreme universal Deity, or chief God. As amongst the Chinese, “Some suppose, that the Sun, Moon and Stars, and chiefly Heaven itself, whence the Earth deriveth all her Advantages, must be worshipp’d with all possible Devotion.”
This Pagan Idea of a Supreme Deity, was also a Consequent of their Method of proving the Existence of a Deity against Atheism; which, tho’ it hath much of true Reason and sound Philosophy in it, does also involve the Deity of the World; which is of the same Importance in the Pagan Religion, with the Existence of a Deity. Plato’s Theism, which he asserts in his Book of Laws, we have already seen to be only an asserting a Soul of the World. So Cicero disputeth. “There is assuredly a Caelestial Force, or Power Divine. An animative Principle of Life and Sense, which is in our Bodies and in our Meanness, is not wanting in the Greatness of universal Nature, and the illustrious Motion thereof; unless, perchance, they think there is no such Thing, because it is not visible, nor sensible: As if our Mind, whereby we are Wise and Provident, whereby we do and say these very Things, was Visible, or Discernible by Sense.” The Philosophick Emperour and others argue, “Can there be Order in Thee, and none in the World? It is absurd to say, that the Heaven, or visible World is without a Soul, seeing we, that have but a part of the Body of the Universe, have a Soul. For how could a Part have Soul, if the Universe was devoid of it?” Socrates’s Discourse with Aristodemus, against Atheism, is thus represented by Cicero. “The Humour, and Heat, and Breath, and Earth, which is in our Body, if any one asketh, whence we have them? It is manifest, that we took one of them from the Earth, another of them from the Water, the other from the Fire and Air. But that which surmounteth all these, Reason, Mind, Counsel, Cogitation, Prudence, where found we it? Whence took we it? Whence hath Man snatch’d to himself such a Thing as this? So Zeno, the Father of the Stoicks, discourseth against Atheism. “What is devoid of Soul and Reason, cannot generate an Animal and a Rational. But the World generateth Animals and Rationals. Therefore the World is an Animal and Rational. That which is Rational, is better than that which is not Rational: But nothing is better than the World. Therefore the World is Rational. In like manner we may infer, that the World is Wise, that the World is Blessed, that the World is Eternal.” So Balbus, in Cicero, discourseth for the Theism of the Pagans (the Worshippers of the mundane System) against Atheism; “From that Ardor, or Vital Heat, which is in the World” (the mundane Soul of the Stoicks) “all Motion ariseth: Which, because it is self-moving, is necessarily a Mind; whence it followeth, that the World is an Animal. Hence also we may infer, that it is intelligent, because the World is certainly better than any particular Nature, which is but part of the World. The World, because it comprehendeth all Things, nor is there any Thing which is not in it, is every way perfect: Nothing can be wanting to what is the best: There is nothing better than Mind and Reason: These, therefore, cannot be wanting to the World; wherefore it is Wise and Good.” At this rate these Heathen Philosophers deified the World in their Disputes against Atheism, the main Scope of which is to prove the Being of an Animative Mind of the World; the acknowledgment where of constituted a Pagan Theist, and distinguish’d him from an Atheist. “Allothers” (saith Plutarch) “affirm, that the World is animated and administred by Providence: But Democritus and Epicurus, and so many as introduce Atoms and Vacuum, do neither acknowledge the World to be animated, nor to be govern’d by Providence; but by an irrational Nature.”
In their Disputes against Atheism the Pagan Theists design to establish their own Theism, which is their Religion of worshipping the Universe, Heaven, and the Stars. For their governing Mind and Soul of the World, for whose Existence they dispute is Universal, Mundane, Animative Nature, Animative of the World, (as the Soul of Man is of his Body,) involv’d in the World, and deifying the World. In the Stoicks Account of the Mundane System, there are various Complications of Jupiter and the World; and they are so complicated, that each communicateth to the other his Name and his Properties. For the Deity is called the World. “If you call the Deity the World, you are not mistaken in so doing,” saith Seneca. And as the Deity is call’d the World, both the Whole and the Parts of it, is call’d God, according to that of Manilius;
The Doctrine of the Soul of the World inforceth the Unity of the Universe, and that all Things are one, one animated mundane System. “The chief Philosophers have declared, That all is one.” So Linus;
The Unity of the Universe, which is a fundamental Mistake, and very pernicious to true Religion, is a principal Maxim among the Stoicks. “This whole” (saith Seneca ) “in which we are contain’d, is both one Thing and God. This All, the Comprehension of divine and human Things, is one Thing. We are the Members of one great Body.” The Universe is suppos’d to be one Body, because of its informing Soul, which connecteth and holdeth the Parts of it together. So Sextus Empiricus represents the Sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italick Philosophers. “We Men have not only a Conjunction amongst our-selves, with one another, and with the Gods above us, but also with the Brutes below us: Because there is one Spirit, which, as a Soul, pervadeth the whole World, and uniteth together all the Parts of it.”
This vital Constitution of the Universe is the Origin of Natural Magick, which is a vital Sympathy and Antipathy, between several Things in the World. But, under the pretence of Natural Magick, Arts Magical, in the foulest Sense, were introduc’d. The Heathens thought, that there was a Sympathy and Consent amongst the Parts of the Universe, as being Parts of one Whole; such, as is amongst the Parts of the human Body, or the Strings of a Musical Instrument. Into this they resolv’d the Efficacy of Charms and Fascinations, Mystick Ceremonies, Symbols, and Sacrifices, and Prayers to the Sun and Stars, attracting Influences from them, in the same manner as when the lower Part of a Chord that is stretch’d, is put into Motion, the upper Part is put into Motion also. This one animated Mundane System is necessarily One Mundane Animal, upon which Account they attribute a Magical Constitution to the Universe. For they suppose, That this Universe is one, and one Animal, so that nothing is so remote, as not to be near, because of the Sympathy and Consent of Motion, which is between the Parts of one Animal. Now an Animal Fabrick must have Distinction of Parts. So the Stoicks say, That God is the Mind of the Universe, the Body of it is his Body, and the Sun, Moon, and Stars, are the Eyes of this great Mundane Animal, which was thought of the Hermaphrodite Kind, because it was believ’d to be a generative Animal, and therefore both Sexes are attributed to it in Jarchas the Brachman’s answer to Apollonius. “The World is an Animal; for it generateth all Things, being of both Natures, Male and Female, and doing the Part, both of Father and Mother, for Generation.” Because the World consists of active and passive Principles, and, because the Virtue of Generating and Conceiving, the Masculine and Feminine Virtue, are united in universal Nature, it is not unfitly intituled αρρενοθηλυς, Male and Female. The Orphick Doctrine concerning the Deity, of which the following Lines are a remarkable Compend, assert the same Notion; ascribing both Sexes to the All-generating Deity.
The Popular Pagans call their Deities sometimes by Masculine, sometimes by Feminine Names, not pretending to know their Sexes; or judging it matter indifferent, which of their Sexes they ascrib’d to their Deities; or, perhaps, supposing them Hermaphrodites. In the Septuagint, also, Baal is sometimes of the Masculine, and sometimes of the Feminine Gender.
The one animate Mundane System is also one Deity, some say the first God, others the Second, and some call it the Third God. In the Stoicks Theology the World is the supreme God. The Platonists usually call it the third God: But Origen saith, that they call it the second. Which is very agreeable to what Plato saith in his Timeus, according to Cicero’s Version of it, “Deus ille aeternus hunc perfectè beatum Deum procreavit,” The eternal God procreated this perfectly happy God. The visible, sensible, fabricated World, being thus confronted to an invisible, intelligible, parental, eternal Deity, in this Antithesis, it falleth to the World’s Share, to be called the second God. So Celsus the Platonist and others have intituled the animated World, the Son of God. And, consequently, there is in Platonism a twofold Son of God; the one is the Metaphysical Intellect of the Mundane System, the other is the intelligent Mundane Animal, the only-begotten sensible Son of God.
The one Mundane System is also intituled one Temple, House, or Habitation, which Appellations denote such an Unity and undivided State of the Universe as perfectly disagrees with Christianity. The Habitation of the Immortal God, is one of the usual Names of the World. One Philosopher calleth it, The Temple of the Father; another calleth it, Amost Holy and God-becoming Temple; another styleth it, The Fire-refulgent House of Jove. By Cicero it is intituled, The Caelestial and Divine House; and by the Aegyptians, The Kingly House of the Deity. “Is God shut up within the Walls of Temples?” said Heraclitus. “The whole World variously adorn’d with Animals, and Plants, and Stars, is his Temple.” The Stoicks say, “The whole World is the Temple of the Gods, and the only Temple becoming their Amplitude and Magnificence.” Whence the Persians and the Magi condemn’d all artificial Temples; and Xerxes, by the Persuasion of the Magi, burnt the Temples of the Greeks, themselves doing their religious Worship to the Gods under the open Heaven; to whom they supps’d, that all Things should be open, and that this whole World is their Temple and Habitation. Zeno, the Father of the Stoicks, is likewise said, to have disallow’d the Building of Temples; and Plato, as some will have it, privately prohibited the having Statues of the Gods, as knowing, “That the World is the Temple of God.” The World is call’d by Plato, The House of the Gods, and, The made Image of the Eternal Gods. Agreeably to this Notion of the Philosophick Pagans, the Apocryphal Book of Baruch (3. 24.) looks upon the visible Universe as “The House of God.” But no such Language ever occurreth in the Holy Bible; which should have taught Christian Writers so much Discretion, as not to speak the Sense and Language of the Heathen Philosophers, which they frequently do.
In the Stoicks Philosophy, the one Mundane System Jove is All Things, and All Things are Him, as his Parts and Members. Particularly Souls are Parts of God, and Avulsions from Him. Visible and Corporeal Things are the Parts of his Body. Thus is he One and All Things. Their Deity is so intimate, complicate, united, and connected with all Things, as to constitute with them One Mundane Intelligent Animal; therefore the whole animated World, and all the Things thereof are Jove, and Jove is the animated World, and the Things thereof.
The eldest Idolatry was the Worship of Heaven, the World, and the Stars, as appeareth from the Jove of the eldest Times, and of all Nations. Of the Persians, Herodotus reporteth, “That they did not, like the Greeks, think the Gods of human Birth and Original; but their way was, ascending to the Tops of the Mountains, they Sacrific’d to Jove, calling the whole Circle of the Heaven, Jove.”Strabo saith of them, “They Sacrifice in an high Place, thinking the Heaven, Jove.” So Plutarch says of the Aegyptians, “They take the first God, and the Universe, for the same Thing.” Universal Mundane Nature, the Aegyptians deified under the Name of Isis, which was their supreme Deity, as the Inscription before her Temple at Sais sheweth; “I am all that hath been, is, and shall be; and my Veil no Mortal hath ever yet uncover’d: And that other Inscription on the Altar at Capua (“Tibi una. Quae es omnia. Dea Isis.”) which maketh her one, and all Things. The Aegyptian Serapis, another Name of their supreme Deity, is the World, for, “Serapis being ask’d by Nicocreon” (King of the Cypriots) “what God he was? Made answer, I am a God, such as I describe myself. The Starry Heaven is my Head, the Sea is my Belly, the Earth is my Feet, mine Ears are in the Aether, and mine Eye is the bright Lamp of the Universe, the Sun.” The Orphic Theology makes a like Description of Jupiter. So Cicero hath shew’d from Ennius and Euripides, (who is called the scenical Philosopher,) That the Heaven, or circumambient Aether is the European Pagans Jove, the supreme universal Deity. So in the Poet Aeschylus, Jupiter is Universal Mundane Nature. “Jupiter is Aether, and Earth, and Heaven, and all Things. And, if there be any Thing above these, Jupiter is it.” “The Naturalists” (saith Macrobius ) “called the Sun” ( Διόνυσον διὸς νοῦν) “Dionysus, the Mind of Jove, because the Mind of the World. The World is called Heaven, which they call Jove. Whence Aratus, being to speak of Heaven, saith, Let us take our rise from Jove.” So in an antient Inscription, the visible Heaven is intituled, Eternal, the best and greatest, Jupiter. Agreeably to which Sense of the antient Pagans, that Tradition of theirs, reported by Aristotle, is to be understood touching the Divinity of the Heavens. “It hath been delivered to us by those of very antient Times, both that the Stars are Gods, and that the Divinity containeth the whole of Nature.”
This Notion was so familiar with the Pagans, that Strabo, writing of Moses, could not but suppose the Gods of his Religion to be of this Nature and Notion; “That which containeth us all, and the Earth, and the Sea, which we call Heaven, and the World, and the Nature of the whole,” Universal Mundane Nature. So Juvenal describes the God of the Jews.
So Diodorus Siculus reporteth Moses to have been of Opinion, “That the Heaven which surroundeth the Earth, is the only God and Lord of all.” These Pagans did not imagine, that the Jews could Worship any other God than their supreme Jove, the Heaven, which, in the larger Sense of the Word, signifieth the whole corporeal World.
Pliny thus; “The World, or the Heavenly Canopy, must, in Reason, be thought a Deity.” Such a Deity was the European-Pagans Jove, and such a Deity was the Asiatick Bel, or Baal; for that Name, as Selden informs us, means the Heaven, the Comprehension of the Aether, and the Stars; and the Heaven was called Bel by the Chaldeans, as Eustathius reporteth from the Antients; and Philo saith of the Chaldeans, “They suppos’d the visible World, or Heaven, the Supreme Deity.” The Proclivitie of Heathen Mankind to such a Notion of the supreme Deity is visible in a late Writer of the Affairs of China. “A mighty Nation of the Tartars, though they are not, by what appeareth, of any particular Religion, but in differently receive all Religions, which they are acquainted with, and conform themselves to all, not knowing, or caring to know, what it is they adore, and they have no Knowledge of the Idols, or Deities, which the Antients ador’d; nor doth it appear, that they receive, or retain those first Notions which the Instinct of Nature, without the Assistance of any supernatural Light, impresseth upon the very Breast of every Man; yet they Worship the Heavens, and to these they pay their greatest Adoration; and this maketh the greatest Impression upon the Minds of the People.” Of the barbarous Nation of the Gallans, bordering Habissina, we have this Account. “They have no Idols, and but very little Divine Worship. If you ask them concerning God, or any supreme Deity, or who it is that governeth the Earth with so much Order and Constancy? They answer, Heaven, which embraceth in their View all the rest.” A great Nation on the North of Japan, are said to have no other Religion, save only the Worship of Heaven; and the supreme Deity of the Chinese is said to be the Heaven, which they suppose increate, without Beginning, unbodily, and a Spirit.
According to the Testimony of the Scriptures, and of Heathen Authors the consent of all the Christian, and the best of the Hebrew Writers, the first and earliest Idolatry of the Heathen, was the Worship of the Lights of Heaven, which inferreth the Antiquity of the Worship of Heaven, and that the first Original Pagan Theism, was the deifying the Mundane System. Vossius indeed affirmeth, (agreeably to their Opinion, who suppose the Sun to have been the Pagans Supreme Deity,) that their Worship of the Coelestial Lights was antecedent to the Worship of the Aether, Heaven, or the World; which is a supposition altogether as groundless, and unreasonable, as if he should suppose them the Worshippers of Mountains and Rivers, before they were the Worshippers of their great Goddess, the Earth.Plato supposes, that the Worship of the Heaven and the Stars was the eldest Religion of the Pagans; and that the Worship of the Heaven was contemporary with that of the Stars, both amongst the Greeks and Barbarians. The Greeks receiv’d Astronomy, and the Knowledge of those Coelestial Deities, the Stars, from the Barbarians, those antient Pagan Nations, which were the Inventors of Astronomy, and which, in Aegypt and Syria, had great Advantage for the Knowledge of the Stars, because of the Serenity of their Country. The Theology, therefore, of those antient Pagan Nations may be understood from the Greek Theology of the elder Times, which Plato, in his Cratylas, thus representeth. “The first Inhabitants of Greece seem, as many of the Barbarians now, to have thought, that the Sun, and the Moon, and the Earth, and the Stars, and the Heaven, were the only Gods. When they beheld these running round perpetually, they call’d them Θεοὺς from Θέω which signifieth, to run. Afterwards taking Notice, that there were other Gods, they called them also by the same Name.” As the first Inhabitants of Greece deified, not only the Sun, Moon, and Stars, but the Heaven above them: So, when Diodorus saith of the Men of antient Times, “That, beholding the World and universal Mundane Nature, being struck with Admiration, they thought the prime eternal Gods were the Sun and Moon, calling the one Osiris, and the other Isis”; this is not to be understood, as if they deified the Sun and Moon, exclusively of the rest of the World above them: But, beholding the World and universal Mundane Nature, and being struck with Admiration, they deified it, and such illustrious Parts of it, as the Sun and Moon. So, when Maimonides saith of the Zabii, that their Tenet was, “There is no other God but the Stars”; this is not to be understood exclusively of the Heaven, as if the Zabii did not suppose it the Supreme Deity; for the same Author saith of them; “All the Zabaists held the Eternity of the World; for the Heavens, according to them, are the Deity.” So Philo saith of the Chaldeans, “They suppose the Stars to be Gods, and the Heaven and the World” (which must consequently be the Supreme) “to which they refer the Fates of Men, acknowledging no Cause of Things abstract from Sensibles.” If the first Heathen deified the Lights of Heaven, because of their Amplitude, Pulchritude, Utility, and Residence in Heaven, they could not fail, upon the same Account, to deify the illustrious Canopy of Heaven.
The one Mundane System Jove is, in some sort, the multitude and variety of the Pagans Gods and Goddesses; and there is a certain Polytheism of theirs, which is nothing more than a Polyonymy of this one Supreme God, or a calling him by various Names. For it is not unusual with the Pagan Theologers, to reduce the Multitude and Variety of their Deities to one Jupiter, in various Senses, and upon various Accounts. Sometimes they consider the Mundane System Jove, as Originally and Comprehensively the All of their Deities, as Valerius Soranus representeth them.
Thus Jupiter is all the Gods; not as if there was no Polity of Gods; but as the Founder, the Father and Mother, of the Polity, and a Deity comprehensive of all the Deities; for Jupiter is the same with Pan, universal mundane Nature, whom, in the Certamina at Athens, they look’d upon as a Pantheon, the comprehension of all the Gods. So the Author of the Orphick Verses, “having suppos’d the World a great Animal, and having call’d this Mundane Animal Jupiter,” placeth Heaven, the Earth, the Sea, and the Whole of the Universe in Jupiter’s Womb,
The Rabble of Deities contain’d in him, are necessarily his Parts and Members, both as he is Politically Imperial, and as he is Animatively Vital, in a Political, and in a Physiological Sense; they are the Members of his Body Politick, and of his living Animal-Body; as Seneca saith of Mankind, “Et socii ejus sumus & Membra,” “We are his Associates” (the Members of his Body Politick) “and the Members of his Animal-Body.” Both these Notions are glanc’d at by the Poet introducing Jupiter, thus speaking to the other Gods;
The Gods, to whom Jupiter allotteth Diversity of Offices, are not mere Names, or Virtues, but so many Substantial Beings, distinct Personal Deities; yet these, being contain’d in him, are, in some sort, reducible to him; but there is another sort of Deities, which the Stoicks suppose to be nothing more than so many several Names, Notions, and particular Considerations of the one Supreme Jupiter; or, only so many several Powers, Virtues, Functions and Agencies of his, fictitiously personated and deified, which explaineth an eminent Mode of their Idolatry. Pervading, acting, and ruling in the Air, he may be call’d Juno; in the Earth, Pluto; in the inferior Parts of it, Proserpina; in the Sea, Neptune; in the lower Part of it, Salacia; in the Vineyards, Liber; in the Smith’s Forges, Vulcan; and in the domestick Hearths, Vesta; as he bestows Corn, he may be called Ceres; Wine, Bacchus; Health, Aesculapius; as he governeth the Wars, Mars; and the Winds, Aeolus. “The Names that denote a certain Force or Effect of Things Coelestial are, any of them, properly applicable to him. His Appellations may be as many as his Gifts, or Functions.” Which Polyonymy of the one Supreme God inferreth, that the Pagans Polytheism was, in part, and so far, not real, but apparent only. Thus, as the Mythical Theology personateth and deifieth the Parts and Powers of Mundane corporeal Matter; so the Philosophick Theology personateth and deifieth the several Powers, Virtues, and Agencies, of the one Supreme God. By this Mythical Plea, they defended their Worship of the several Parts of the Corporeal World. For their Polyonymy of the one Supreme God, was not design’d to deprive the Parts of the World of their Godship, but to give a plausible Account and Reason of their Worship.
The Reason of this Stoical Polyonymy was double; partly, because of a Fancy which they had, to apply, to the Supreme Deity, the proper Names of other Deities; and partly, because they discarded the Deities, which they called Mythical and Commentitious, which are Things Physical represented by Fictitious Deities; which having discarded, they substituted in their stead the various Powers, Virtues, Effects, and Agencies, of the Mundane System Jove; “Calling him Minerva, because his Rule is extended in the Aether; Juno, as pervading the Air; Vulcan, Neptune, Ceres, as pervading and acting in the Artificer’s Fire, in the Sea and the Earth.” So Balbus in Cicero, having rejected the Deities, which he calleth the Mythical, substituteth in their Room, “God passing thro’ the Nature of every Thing.” Agreeably to which Stoical Notion, it is most reasonable to understand the saying of Antisthenes the Cynick, “Populares Deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens,” that is, one natural God ought to be substituted in the stead of those many Popular Deities, which the Stoicks, and their Brethren, the Cynicks, rejected as Mythical and Commentitious.
It is, however, here to be observ’d, that the Stoicks Polyonymy is so far from destroying the Pagans Polytheism, that it maketh no considerable Abatement in the Multitude of their Deities. For they deified the Parts of the Corporeal World, as living Members of the Mundane Animal, Residences of the Powers and Virtues of the Supreme God, Sections of the Soul of the World. Both Varro and Balbus plainly affirm, That the Stars are animated with intelligent Souls,(they might as well say the same of the Earth;) and, consequently, they are so many distinct Personal Deities. And, accordingly, Plutarch representeth the Stoical Polyonymists as the most extravagant Polytheists in all the Pack, “That filled the Air, Heaven, Earth, Sea, with Gods.” Wherefore their Reduction of Deities to the Polyonymy of one Supreme God, signifieth nothing to the Prejudice, or Diminution of their Polity of Gods. When they call Jove by the proper Names of several other Deities, they must not be thought to deny the Existence of those Synonymous Genial Deities of the vulgar Theology, Liber Pater, Mercury, and the like; for in their various Allegorizings, Interpretations, Accommodations, and the various honourary Appellatives which they bestow upon Jove, they do not speak privatively with respect to their Genial Deities, but Accumulatively; not with intention to destroy them, but to super-add to them the Polyonymy of their Supreme God. And, if this is the true Account of the Stoicks Polyonymy, as certainly it is, there is no Reason imaginable, why they should condemn the vulgar Polytheism, as a learned Writer supposes they would have done, if fear of disturbing the Commonwealth, and creating a Socrates-like Danger to themselves, had not restrain’d them. For the Sense of the Stoicks, and of all the genuine Pagan Theologers, must be thus represented. The Constitution of the Universe being Politically consider’d, and Jupiter, as Politically Imperial, they conceiv’d (as they usually say) all full of Gods and Demons: But withal, the Constitution of the Universe being Physiologically consider’d, and Jupiter, as Vital and Animative of the Whole, they conceiv’d Jovis omnia plena, all full of Jove, his various Virtues, Powers and Effects.
The Mundane System Jove must be consider’d, both as Animatively, or Physiologically, and as Politically-Imperial to the World. For, being he Mundane Soul, he is Animatively-Regent and Imperial, as the Soul of Man is. “That is a God, which is Vigent, Sentient, Reminiscent, Provident, which ruleth, and governeth, and moveth, that Body, whose Prefect it is, as the chieftain God does this World.”“As we have a Soul that is an Animative Regent: So the Government of the World is by a Soul, that containeth and keepeth it in Consistence, which is call’d Zeus.” Who, as an Animative Regent, is suppos’d, regularly to agitate the Mundane Matter, to form all Things Coelestial and Terrestrial, to figurate his own Animal Body, and to generate all sorts of Animals, as the Poet Philosophizeth,
By Physical Motion, and as Animatively-Regent, the Mundane System Jove steereth the World,“As a Pilot doth a Ship, or as a Charioteer doth a Chariot, circumvolving the Heavens, keeping the Earth in Consistence, ruling the Sea.” (So Apuleius saith of the Goddess Isis, “Thou whirlest about the World, lightenest the Sun, rulest the World;”) and variously influencing the Minds of Men, according to that of Homer,
Because the System-Jove is Animatively the Regent of the World, he ought to have his Regent part seated in some principal Part of the World, (agreeably to the Soul of Man, whose rational Faculty is seated in the Head;) either in the Aether, as some; in the Heaven, as others; or in the Sun, as Cleanthes suppos’d; which latter, doubtless, was the Sense of the Pythagoreans in those illustrious Epithets, which they gave the Sun, styling him
But the System-Jove is also Politically the Regent of the World, the Universe being suppos’d one Imperial Polity, one common City of Gods and Men; for such a governing Power the Pagan Philosophers disputed with great Reason and Strength of Argument. “Without Political Government, neither any House, nor City, nor Nation, nor Mankind in general, can subsist, nor the whole Nature of Things, nor the World itself.”“Seeing a City, or a House, cannot continue for the least time without a Governour and Curator, how is it possible, that so great and illustrious a Structure as the World, should be so orderly administred fortuitously and by chance?”“The Knowledge and Contemplation of Things Coelestial, the beholding how great Moderation and Order there is among the Gods, begetteth Modesty; and the beholding the Works and Facts of the Gods, causeth a Greatness of Mind; and Justice also, when you understand the Supreme Rector and Lord, what his Will and Counsell is,” (in the Constitution, Government, and Administration of this Universe of Things,) “Reason suited to his Nature, being call’d by Philosophers the true and Supreme Law.” As politically-Imperial, the supreme Rector appointeth to the subordinate Deities their Lots and Prefectures, and their Function and Employment is to execute his Appointments. “For the Sun, as also the other Gods, was made for some Work, or Function.”
But, in order to form a just Notion of the Pagan Polytheism, it is requisite to distinguish the various Acceptations of Saturn, Jupiter, and other Deities, in the Gentile Theology. Sometimes they are taken Cosmically; as when Jupiter is said to be the whole World, or the Soul of it, and Saturn is confounded with Uranus, or Heaven. Sometimes they are taken Astrally; as when by Jupiter is meant the Sun, or the Planet so called: So the highest of the Planets is a Saturn. Sometimes they are taken Physically; as when by Saturn is meant Time, and by Jupiter some Elementary Nature. So Empedocles calleth the igneous Nature, or Aether, Jupiter; the Air, Juno; the Earth, Pluto; the Water, Nestis. Sometimes the Names of the Pagan Deities signify Historically, or of the Hero-Kind, in which Notion there are many Joves, and not a few Saturns.
The Mundane-System Jove is Order, Law, Providence, Fate, and Fortune, amongst the Heathens.7. Jove, the Rector of the Universe, is Order, Law, Fate, Fortune, Providence. “Either this Universe is a mere Hotch-Potch and casual Implication of Things, which may be dis-joyn’d and dissipated; or there is in it Union, Order, and a Providence.” But it could not be κόσμος, a regular and comely Piece, without Order; and this Order, and the Law that is visible in the Universe infer a Providence, “whereby the World, and all the Parts of it, were at first constituted, and are at all Times administred.The equable Motion and Circumvolution of the Heaven, the Sun, Moon, and all the Stars, their Distinction, Variety, and Pulchritude, Order; the Sight of these Things sufficiently sheweth, that they are not by Chance,” but “by an eternal Law, or Prescript, a Law of the World,” which the Stoicks call Fate.
But, as the governing Mind, or Reason, which constituted and administreth the corporeal World, is Law to it: So all Things that befal Mankind are of his Pre-Ordination and Appointment, as the Stoicks suppose; and, therefore, they derive all Things from a Law of Fate. “All Things proceed by a fix’d sempiternal Law; Fatality leadeth us; by a long Series and Concatenation of Causes all Things necessarily emerge; your joyous and mournful Occurrences were appointed long ago.” A wise Man will understand, “That whatever happens is a Law of” (universal) Nature. “It was ordinated to him, and he to it.Whatever happens to thee, it is that which from Eternity was predestinated unto thee; thy subsistence and such an Accident are, by an implex’d Series of natural Causes from Eternity, fatally connected, or spun together.” Fatality, by this Hypothesis, is screw’d up to a high pitch of Extravagance; especially, as this their Dogma, That all Things come to pass fatally, is understood by the antient Stoicks, for they subvert, as appeareth, all contingency and human Liberty of Agency, and, consequently, all Humanity and Divinity. In the Constitution of the World, they suppos’d Jupiter hamper’d by material Necessity, (that, because of the in obsequiousness of the Matter, some Men are unavoidably made of an evil Disposition, and good Men are obnoxious to external Evils;) and not being able to do what he would, he is willing to do what he can. In his Administration of the World and Sovereign Disposal of Things, he can alter nothing of his own Fatal Decrees;Scripsit fata, sed sequitur, having once written the Fates, he always obeys them; (some suppose, that the three Fates wrote his Decrees;) and, consequently, the supreme Deity, with respect to his Administration of Things, is nothing but Intelligent Fate in himself, and to the World; (as Plastick Natures are nothing else but blind Unintelligent Fate in themselves, and to the World;) and unchangeable and inexorable Fate is the supreme Deity.
But, altho’ their rigid Genius hath introduc’d much of extravagant Fatality, yet some of the antient Stoicks attempted to mollify the rigor of Fate, to accommodate it to human Liberty. They refuse not the Name of Fortune; for they advise Men to commit Externals τω δαιμονίῳ, τῇτύχῃ, To the Divinity, to Fortune, understanding there by the Disposal of Things by Providence. Notwithstanding their rigid Genius, they are no Friends to that rigid Doctrine of absolute Reprobation; “for God” (as they suppose) “hath made all Men to Felicity and good Estate of Mind, and hath given them what is requisite thereunto.If the Gods have consulted concerning me, and those Things that ought to happen to me, they have well consulted; for a God devoid of Counsel is scarce conceivable: But to do me a Mischief, what should impel them? For what Emolument would accrue from thence, either to them, or to the Publick, which they chiefly take care of?” Inexorable Fate, according to their generally receiv’d Maxims, is their sovereign Deity, yet some of them are prone to think, that there is a placable and flexible Providence; and others of them tell us, that they had better Notices of the supreme Jupiter. “They call Jupiter placid, being such to them who change from Injustice; for he is not irreconcileable to them, Whence their Altars to Jupiter placid to suppliants.” They allow not God, or Man, to be properly angry with Criminals; yet suppose, that the Rector of the Universe is just and good Government to the Whole. “That he hath made the Parts for the Use of the Whole,and ordereth all Things, as is most conducive to the Good of the Whole.Good Men are his Witnesses, that he existeth; and governeth the Universe of Things well, and neglecteth not human Affairs, and that nothing Evil shall happen to a good Man, either alive, or dead.” He disposeth all to a good Use, as is most necessary for the Good of the World. “For he, the Governour of the Universe, will not fail to put thee to a good Use.Neither willingly, nor unwillingly, doth he commit any Error.His Government is Paternal, as a Father taking care of all, that his Citizens may be happy like himself.Making a distribution of Things as it is fit and just”; (whence they style him νομος, from νέμα, to distribute;) the better Men have the better Part, and the Good are not afflicted without great Reason, and for wise and good Ends.
The Doctrine of the Antients, concerning Fate, being somewhat intricate and perplex’d; and the Reverend Mr. John Jackson having, in my Opinion, set that Matter in a clear Light in his Defence of Human Liberty P. 150, &c. I believe it will not be unacceptable to the Reader, to lay it before him in Mr. Jackson’s Words, as follows.
“That there is such a Thing as Fate, and that many Events are effected by it, was the general Opinion of all Philosophers, Anaxagoras amongst the Gentiles, and the Sadducees among the Jews, only excepted; who were both of Opinion, that nothing was the Effect of Fate, and that it was a mere empty Name. And as these wholly deny’d Fate in every Sense, so it must be confess’d, that there were some others, who carried the Notion of it as far in the other Extreme, and taught, that every Thing, all Events, and even human Actions, were effected by the impulsive Necessity of it. I shall, therefore, shew the Reader, who those were, who really held the Sentiments of the Fatalists; and then set forth distinctly and particularly that Notion of Fate, or Necessity, which was the concurrent receiv’d Opinion of all Sects of Philosophers.
“Plutarch tells us, that Parmenides and Democritus held, ‘That all Things came to pass by Necessity; and that this Necessity was Fate, and Justice, and Providence, and the Maker of the World.’Heraclitus was of the same Opinion. To these Cicero joyns Empedocles, and, by mistake, Aristotle. That this was a mistake of Cicero’s, appears from Plutarch, in his Treatise of the Opinions of the Antient Philosophers, where he remarks no such Thing concerning Aristotle, tho’ he does observe, that Democritus and Heraclitus, to whom he adds Parmenides, were of that Opinion, which Cicero ascribes to them; and had Aristotle, who was so much more eminent than the others, been of the same Opinion, he could hardly have neglected to have taken notice of it. But farther; Hierocles expressly says, that Aristotle’s Philosophy agreed with Plato’s, and that the most learned Ammonius, who perfectly understood the Philosophy of both of them, shew’d that they agreed together. The concurrence of the Platonick and Aristotelian Philosophy he again insists on; and speaks with contempt of those who pretended they disagreed; and in particular declares, that they were of the same Opinion in the Notion of Fate, and that he himself agreed with them. ‘That it was not the senseless Necessity of the Fortune-tellers; nor the Stoical Compulsion—but that it was the judicial Operation of the divine Power, effecting Events according to the Laws of Providence, and determining the Order and Series of our Circumstances in the World, according to the free Purposes of our voluntary Actions.’ And Aristotle himself expressly asserts and explains at large the Freedom of human Actions. He lays the Foundation of Praise and Dispraise in Mens voluntary Actions. He proves Freedom from Deliberation and Desire, which he makes to be the same with Choice. He expressly declares, that our Actions are Voluntary and by Choice; that the Practice of Virtue and Vice is in our own Power: And that this is evidently the Opinion, not only of all private Persons, but of Legislators themselves, who punish those who commit Evil, if they do it not through Compulsion, or involuntary Ignorance; and reward those who do well. And the learned Alexander Aphrodisius and Ammonius Hermias have wrote each a Treatise, to shew the Agreement of Aristotle with the Platonick Notion of Fate and human Liberty. It appears also from Cicero, that the antient Diodorus was a Fatalist, maintaining, that all Truths in Futurity, as well as those which are actual, are necessarily such, and cannot but be.
“These are the principal Asserters of the Doctrine of absolute Fatality that we know of; and they who follow’d their Opinion, all founded the Arguments and Reasons of it in the Supposition of the Truth of the Material System, or that nothing existed but Body and Matter.
“First; Those of the Atomical Sect, who follow’d the Opinion of Democritus, alledg’d, that all Things, even human Actions, were effected by the eternal necessary Motion, and perpendicular Impulse, of self-existent corporeal Atoms, by whose fortuitous Concourse and Union all Things were form’d.
“Secondly; Those amongst the Stoicks, who adher’d to the Doctrine of Heraclitus, were of three several Opinions.
“‘Some derived all Things from the first Cause of the Universe, which they said pervaded all Things, and not only gave Motion to, but was the Efficient Cause of, every Thing; styling it Fate, and the Supreme Cause, and supposing it to be itself all Things; and that, not only all other Things which exist, but even the inward Purposes of our Minds also, proceeded from the efficient Power of it, as the Members of an Animal are not mov’d of themselves, but by that governing Principle, which is in every Animal.’ This was making no Agent in the World, but God only, and human Actions to be nothing but the Operations of God in Men, actuating them and every Thing else, as the Soul does the Body.
“Thirdly; The Astrological Notion of Fate was this; ‘That the Circumvolution of the Universe effected all Things by its Motion, and by the Position and Appearances of the Planets and fix’d Stars with respect to each other; and, founding upon these the Art of Prognostication, would have it, that every Thing came to pass thereby.’ This is but another way of ascribing every Thing we do, our Purposes and Passions, our Wickedness and Appetites, to the Universe, or to God.
“Fourthly; Another Notion of Fatality was founded on the Supposition of ‘a mutual eternal Concatenation and Chain of Causes, whereby Things posterior always follow those which are antecedent, and are resolv’d into them, as existing by them; and are necessarily consequent to those which precede them: This was another way of effecting an absolute Fatality.’ And this was the most plausible, and most insisted on by the Maintainers of Necessity; and was grounded on the Supposition, that every Motion was caus’d by an external impulse of Matter, and that there was no internal Principle, or Cause of Motion, or Action, in the Mind at all.
“These are the several Opinions of the antient Fatalists, which resolv’d into two; the one made every Thing the necessary Effect of the eternal Motion and Concourse of Atoms; the absurdity of which, as supposing an eternal Chain of Effects, without any original Cause, or Agent at all, evidently appears; and which, by inferring the Necessity of human Actions, and thereby taking away the Foundation and Distinction of Virtue and Vice, and the consequent Praise and Dispraise due unto them, was rejected by Epicurus himself on this very Account. The other made no Agent in the World but God, who was suppos’d to be infus’d, like a Soul, thro’ the whole Universe, and to act in every Thing by an eternal Chain of Causes, necessarily connected with each other; and all deriv’d from God (who was called Fate) as the original, or supreme Cause of all.
“This latter, tho’ more plausible than the former, yet so plainly inferr’d such a Fate as made Mens Actions necessary, (as both Plotinus and Cicero observe, ) whereby the Nature of Virtue and Vice, of Rewards and Punishments, were so wholly destroy’d, that it made the Notion it-self intolerable, as Cicero calls it; insomuch that the Defenders of it were forc’d to allow notwithstanding, (tho’ inconsistently with themselves,) that there was a Power of Action, or Free-Agency in Mens Minds; and durst not affirm, that human Actions were necessary: And the opposite Party was so averse to it on this Account, as to recur to the other Extreme, and maintain that the voluntary Motion, or Exertion of the Mind was not at all influenc’d by Fate, or antecedent Causes. These two rigid opposite Tenents, as they were thought, made the famous Chrysippus, and the most Reasonable and Learned of the Antients of all Sects, step in as Moderators between these two Opinions, and come to an Agreement on all Sides, that on the one Hand Necessity was to be excluded from human Actions, that so the Distinction of Virtue and Vice, and the Rewards and Punishments, both of divine and human Laws, founded upon them, might be preserv’d inviolated; so on the other Hand Fate, even with respect to human Actions, (as well as to external Events consequent upon them, in which it was absolute and uncontroulable,) was so far to be restrain’d, as that it was to be allow’d, that antecedent Causes were the Motives of acting, or influenc’d the Mind to act, tho’ the principal and efficient Cause of Action was a natural Power and free Exertion of the Mind itself.
“This Distinction of Fate and Necessity, and middle Opinion founded upon it, prevail’d amongst all sorts of Philosophers, Stoicks as well as Platonicks, &c. (excepting the ignorant Astrologers and Fortune-tellers amongst the Stoicks;) accordingly, we learn from Plutarch, that Plato (the great Assertor of the Freedom of the Mind) ‘admitted Fate with respect to the human Soul and Life; but adds withal, that the Cause (of Action) is in ourselves. The Stoicks, in agreement with Plato, say, that Necessity is an invincible and compulsive Cause; but that Fate is the determin’d Connection of Causes, in which Connection our Power of Action is contain’d: So that some Things are destin’d, and others not.’
“And Austin says, ‘That the Stoicks distinguish’d the Causes of Things (into antecedent and efficient, as hath been before observ’d) that they might exempt some from Necessity, and subject others to it: And amongst those which they allow’d, not to be under Necessity, they plac’d our Wills; lest otherwise, if subjected to Necessity, they should not be free.’
“Hence it appears, that there is no real Difference betwixt the Platonical and Stoical Philosophy, in the Opinion of Fate, and the Freedom of human Actions; and that which hath led Men, thro’ Mistake, to think, that it was the constant and settled Doctrine of the Stoicks, that human Actions were subject to an absolute Fatality, or Necessity, is their asserting in general Terms, that all Things were originally fix’d and determin’d by the Laws, or Decrees of Fate, and are carried on and effected by an immutable Connection and Chain of Causes; whereas this Fatality, or Necessity, with respect to Men, was only understood of external providential Events, which were appointed consequential to the Nature of their Actions, presuppos’d to be free and in their own Power. For the most eminent and rigid Stoicks plainly assert the Freedom of human Actions, as hath been prov’d above; and the Platonicks, who are known to be most zealous for the Cause of Liberty, do yet with the Stoicks constantly maintain Fate, and a determined Order and Series of antecedent Causes.
“From the preceding Observations, then, we learn what was the true Opinion, in general, both of the Platonicks and Stoicks concerning Fate; namely, that it was no other than the Laws of divine Providence, whereby all Things are govern’d, according to their several Natures; and therefore, particularly in respect of Men, it was understood to be the Rules and Decrees of divine Providence, determining the Events of human Life, and dispensing Rewards and Punishments, according to the Nature of Mens voluntary Actions.
“They thought, that God govern’d the World by his sovereign Will, which they call’d Providence, by which he made fix’d and unalterable Laws for the Administration of the whole Universe; and that he determin’d Mens Conditions, and their Happiness, or Misery, whether here, or hereafter, according as their Actions freely chosen, and done voluntarily, should be. So that Fate, in reality, was no other than Providence, or the immutable Law and Rule of God’s Government of the World; and which was call’d Necessity, (not as being suppos’d to effect necessarily, or to be the necessary efficient Cause of human Actions, but) because it was the necessary Law of all Nature; and the external Effects of it, or the Events produc’d by it, by a Series of antecedent Causes, in consequence of Mens voluntary Actions, were unavoidable and necessary.
“That this is the true antient Notion of Fate and Necessity, I shall further distinctly prove, by a brief and indisputable Deduction of Particulars.
“Zeno, the Father of the Stoicks, in his Letter to King Antigonus tells him, ‘It is manifest, that you are not only by Nature inclin’d to Greatness of Mind, but by Choice also.’ Again; ‘That which is Good is Eligible, as being that which is most worthy to be chosen.’
“Cicero tells us, concerning Chrysippus, (who was a rigid Stoick, and whom his Adversaries charg’d as holding the Necessity of human Actions in consequence of his Assertion, that all Things proceeded from Fate, or a Chain of antecedent Causes) that in order ‘to assail the Argument from whence Necessity was inferred, holding at the same time, that nothing happened without a preceding Cause, he distinguish’d the Kinds of Causes, that he might avoid Necessity, and still hold Fate. Of Causes, saith he, some are perfect and principal,’ (efficient) ‘Causes, others are assistant, and immediately precedent. Wherefore, when we say, that all Things come to pass by the Fatality of antecedent Causes, we do not understand this Fatality to belong to the perfect and principal ’(efficient) ‘Causes, but only to the immediately-precedent assistant Causes; upon which Distinction he thus reasons; If all Things come to pass by Fatality, it doth indeed follow, that they come to pass with antecedent Causes, but these are not the perfect and principal ’ (efficient) ‘Causes of the Event, but only the assistant Causes, which are nearest to the other; which assistant Causes, altho’ they are not in our Power, it does not thence follow, that our Affections are not in our Power; but this would follow, if the perfect and principal Causes were not in our Power.’
“Cicero acknowledgeth this Reasoning of Chrysippus to be very much labour’d and obscure; but what he meant, he endeavoured ingeniously to explain by the rolling of a Cylinder and Whipping of a Top, which, tho’ they could not begin to move without being impelled by an external Force, yet, after Motion was given to them, they would continue to move, as it were, of themselves, by the Internal Power of their own Volubility, which belongs to their Nature, and was not given to them by that which was the first and immediate external Cause of their Motion. So in like manner he suppos’d, that external impulsive Causes, which were Subject to Fate, or out of our Power, were the antecedent and first Causes, or Occasions, of the internal Motion of the Mind, i.e. that they set the Mind on Work; but yet, that our Inclinations, Purposes and Actions following, were in our Power, and under the Direction and Government of the Will. From which Explanation it appears, that Chrysippus meant, by the perfect and principal Cause of Action, the internal efficient Cause, or the voluntary Motion or Exertion of the Mind itself into Action; and by the Assistant precedent Cause, he meant the external Cause, or Motive, of Action; and so his Reasoning is just and right.
“And that Chrysippus really meant, that Mens Actions were in their own Power, (tho’ external Causes out of their Power, which he call’d Fate, concurr’d to the Production of them,) and that they were the Effects of voluntary Choice; Gellius informs us from his own express Words: ‘Wherefore (says Chrysippus in Gellius) it is a Saying of the Pythagoreans; you may know that Men bring Evils voluntarily upon themselves: Mens Calamities proceeding from their own selves; and their Sins and Vices resulting from their own Appetites, Intentions, and Purposes. Wherefore, says Chrysippus, we ought not to endure or hear those wicked, slothful, pernicious and audacious Men, who, when they are convicted of a Fault, or of an Offence, fly to a necessary Fatality for refuge, and attribute their wicked Actions, not to their own Temerity, but to Fate.’
“From this Explanation of the Notion of Chrysippus it will appear further, that the Dispute betwixt him and his learned Scholar Carneades and others (who deny’d there were any antecedent Causes, or Fatality, of Mens Actions, and affirmed, that the Motion, or Exertion, of the Mind was purely voluntary ) was only a Dispute about Words; each of them understanding the Word Cause in a different Sense. His Reasoning, which the Epicureans urg’d against Chrysippus, Cicero sets forth thus, viz.
“‘When they’ (the Epicureans) ‘had admitted, that there was no Motion without a Cause, they needed not’ (Carneades taught them) ‘grant, that all Events came to pass by antecedent Causes: For that there was no external and antecedent Cause of our Will; therefore the common Custom of saying, that any one will, or will not, do a Thing without a Cause, is an Abuse of Speech; for, when we say, without a Cause, we mean only, without an external and antecedent Cause, not without any Cause at all.—An external Cause is not requisite to the voluntary Motion of the Mind; for voluntary Motion, in the Nature of the Thing, is in our own Power and Choice; and that not without Cause; for the Cause of it is the Nature of the Mind itself.’ Presently after he shews (which was the Point of the Dispute) what is truly and properly the Cause of a Thing, viz.
“‘That is the Cause, which effects that, of which it is the Cause; as a Wound causeth Death; ill Digestion, a Disease; Fire causeth Heat. Therefore Cause is not so to be understood, as if that which is antecedent merely to a Thing was the Cause of it; but that only is the Cause, which is the antecedent efficient Cause.’
“Whence it is evident, as Cicero observes upon the matter, that they, who thought the voluntary Motions of the Mind were not affected by any Fatality; and Chrysippus, who held a Fate to belong even to human Actions, tho’ he allow’d them to be voluntary, and not effected by Necessity, really meant the same Thing; only those external Motives, which Chrysippus styl’d antecedent Causes and Fate (expressly declaring his meaning at the same time, that they were not the perfect and principal, i.e. efficient, Causes of Action) Carneades, and others, the Academicks, wou’d not allow to be properly Causes at all; insisting, that the efficient Cause, only, was the true Cause of Action; ‘and that in what Things soever the antecedent Causes were such, that it was not in our Power, that the Things should be otherwise, these Things were properly effected by Fate; but those Things, the effecting of which are in our own Power, are wholly exempt from Fate.’ Understanding Fate, which they excluded from Mens Actions, in the Sense of a necessary impulsive Cause; whilst Chrysippus understood the Fate which he ascrib’d to them, in the Sense of a concurrent Cause, or Motive, of Action only: Which shew’d, there was no real Difference in their Opinions; and that both agreed, that Mens Actions were in their principal, perfect or efficient Cause truly voluntary.
“And hence we may observe, That when Plutarch charges Chrysippus with holding, ‘That not the least Thing, either rests, or moves, otherwise than according to the Appointment of God, whom he makes the same with Fate—and that he makes Fate (which he calls Necessity, &c.) an invincible and uncontroulable and immutable Cause;’ He either mistakes, or strains Chrysippus’s Notion too far; or else Chrysippus is only speaking of the Fatality, or Necessity, of external Providential Events, and not of human Actions; from which Fatality, or Necessity, Plutarch himself implies, that he exempts them; owning that, with respect to Mens Actions, he (Chrysippus) ‘made Fate, not the perfect ’ (i.e. the efficient, as hath been above observed from Cicero) ‘but only the precedent (i.e.) the concurrent Cause only.’
“Again; Cicero himself answers the Argument against Liberty, which is here made, in these Words; viz.
“‘Altho’ some are more inclin’d to some Things than others are, thro’ natural antecedent Causes, it does not thence follow, that there are natural antecedent (efficient) Causes of our Wills and Desires: For, if so, nothing would be in our own Power. But now we readily own, that to be acute, or dull, of strong, or of weak, Constitutions, is not in our Power: But he that thinks it thence follows, that even to sit, or to walk, is not Matter of Will and Choice, does not perceive the Tendency of that Consequence. For, altho’ there are antecedent Causes of Men’s being born with quick, or slow, Capacities, with robust, or infirm, Constitutions; Yet it does not follow, that our sitting and walking, and doing any Action, is determined and appointed by these Causes.’ He adds presently;
“‘Vices’ (he means vicious Inclinations, as his preceding Instances shew) ‘may grow from natural Causes; but to extirpate and eradicate them, so as that he who hath these vicious Propensities may be wholly freed from them, is not in the Power of natural Causes, but is effected by the Will, by Study and Discipline.’ Than which Reasoning nothing can be more truly and strongly offer’d.
“To the same Argument the learned Alexander Aphrodisius thus replies; ‘Those Things which proceed from a Cause, do not always proceed from an external Cause; on which account something is in our own Power, of which we ourselves are the proper Cause, and not any external Cause. Wherefore those Things which in this respect are without Cause, have yet a Cause from ourselves. For Man himself is the original and Cause of those Actions which are done by him, and this is properly to be a Man, to have a Principle of Action within himself, as it is the Property of a Globe to be roll’d down a steep Place. Wherefore other Things are impelled by external Causes, but Man is not; because it is essential to him, to have a Principle and Cause (of Action) within himself, so as not to be impell’d by exterior Causes. If we had one View in our judging about Actions, it might with Reason be said, that our Judgments about the same Things was always the same: But since it is not so, (for those Things we make choice of, we choose sometimes for the Goodness, sometimes for the Pleasure, sometimes for the Profit of them, and these do not produce the same Effects;) it happens, that we sometimes prefer the Motives to that which is good, before all others; again, at other times our Judgment leads us to prefer that which is pleasant, or profitable. For, as we seek for no other Cause, why the Earth is carried downward according to its Gravity, and why Animals act, as they do, by Appetite, than that each of these has, of itself, an efficient Cause derived from its Nature; so neither is there any other Cause to be sought of those different Actions, which we do at different Times, in different Circumstances, but only the Man himself. For this is to be a Man, namely, to be the Original and Cause of those Actions, which are done by him.’
“To which, on the same Argument, I shall add the Opinions of the two most learned Christian Philosophers, Eusebius and Origen.
“Eusebius says; ‘Altho’ a thousand external fortuitous Obstacles oppose the Temper of our Bodies, and the voluntary Desires of our Minds, yet the freely-exerted Virtue of the Soul is able to withstand them all; demonstrating, that the Power, which we have within us, of choosing that which is good, is unmatchable and invincible.’
“Origen’s Observation is as follows, viz.
“‘We confess (saith he) that many Things which are not in our Power, are Causes of many Things that are in our Power; without which, namely, those Things which are not in our Power, other Things, which are in our Power, would not be done. But those Things which are in our Power, and are done consequentially to antecedent Things, which are not in our Power, are done so as that, notwithstanding these antecedent Things, we might have done otherwise. But, if any one would have it, that our Free-will is wholly independent of every Thing in the World, so as that we do not choose to do some Things by reason of certain (precedent) Accidents, he forgets, that he is a Part of the World, and comprehended within human Society, and the circumambient Air.’
“It is evident, that after Reasons, or Motives, not in Mens Power, are offered to them to act, and they cannot help thinking it right to act upon them, and are in their last Judgment determined to act upon them, (and the Event shews that they do act upon them;) they can yet deliberate with themselves before they act, and can suspend the Action without any external Motive whatsoever; which clearly shews, that the Action proceeds from Will and Choice, and is voluntary, not necessary.
“My Adversary himself allows, That Choice and Preference imply Doubt and Deliberation; which tho’ not true, as I have shewn; yet, on the other side, it is true, that Deliberation and Suspension imply Will and Choice: For it is, I think, Demonstration, that, if the Motives of acting are such as impell the Mind necessarily to act, i.e. to act, not by Will, but by Necessity, then there can be no Suspension of Action; but the Moment that the Mind is impelled, it must act, just as a Balance moves the Instant that the Weight is hung upon it: Necessity has no Regard to Time, but, if it acts at all, acts equally in every Moment of Time; and, if it is the immediate efficient Cause, or Power of Action, must act as soon as it takes place, or impells the Mind; and I would desire to be told, what Power of the Mind it is, (if it is not that which we call Will,) which is able perpetually to resist, without the Assistance of any external Motive, the Operations of Necessity by Suspension of Actions. That this Suspension is caus’d by the Will, and, consequently, that the Action following is voluntary, may farther appear by there being no Suspension, or Deliberation, where the Actions, or Effects, are not voluntary, as whether the Pulse, or Heart, should beat, and in the case of the Actions of Madmen, of Men in a Fever, or under a violent Surprise, or Passion; the more of Necessity there is, there is always the less of Deliberation and Suspension; and, if the Motive necessarily produces the Action, it produces it also instant aneously. This Argument may be worth Consideration; and to it I shall subjoin the Opinion of the great Aristotle; who thus argues;
“‘Deliberation and Choice is one and the same Thing; for that which was deliberated upon is the Matter of Choice.—Now the elective Faculty, being deliberative, and that which desires those Things which are in our Power, the Choice itself is the deliberative Desire of those Things which are in our Power: For, judging upon Deliberation, we afterwards desire what we deliberated upon.’
“And the learned Alexander Aphrodisius says;
“‘Certainly Man hath not the Power of Deliberation in vain, as it must be, if he acts by Necessity. But it plainly appears, that Man alone hath, by Nature, this Power above the rest of Animals, that he is not like them led merely by Sense, but is endued with Reason, whereby to judge of Objects. By which Reason examining the Objects of Sense, if he finds them to be really what at first they appear’d to be, he assents to the Evidence of his Senses, and pursues the Objects of them. But, if he finds them different from what they appeared, he does not continue in his Conception of them, being convinc’d by Reason, upon Consideration, of the Falsity of them. Wherefore we deliberate only about such Things, as are in our Power to do, or not: And, when we act without Deliberation, we often repent and blame our-selves for our Inconsideration. Also, if we see others act unadvisedly, we reprehend them as guilty of a Fault, and the Ground of our Consultation with others is, that Things are in our own Power.’
“Let us proceed, farther to explain the Doctrine of Chrysippus and the Stoicks, whose Notions, concerning Human Liberty, have been much mistaken and misrepresented.
“Chrysippus says, ‘Fate is the Reason of the World, or the Law of Providence, by which all Things in the World are govern’d.’ And Gellius tells us, that Chrysippus held, that the ‘Order and Reason and Necessity of Fate was a Motive of Action, to the general and efficient Causes of it; but that every one’s own Will and Dispositions directed the Exertion of our Minds and Purposes, and the Actions of them.’ And Diogenianus the Peripatetic, writing against Chrysippus, says, ‘It is manifest, from the Distinction which he (Chrysippus) makes, that the Cause (of Action) which is in us, is exempt from Fate.’ And he cites Chrysippus as declaring, ‘That it is evident, that many Things are done by our own Power, but yet, nevertheless, that these Things are connected with Fate, by which the Universe is govern’d.’
“Whence it appears, that the learned Dr. Cudworth is mistaken, when he says, that the antient Stoicks, Zeno and Chrysippus, asserted, that God acted necessarily in the general Frame of Things in the World; from whence, by a Series of Causes (they thought) doth unavoidably result whatsoever is done in it. Which Fate is a Concatenation of Causes, all in themselves necessary.
“For which Opinion, concerning these two most eminent Stoicks, the learned Doctor produceth not the least Evidence. That which deceived him, and hath also deceived others, both antients (as Cicero and Gellius observe) and moderns, is, their Notion of a Series and Concatenation of Causes; which Causes, tho’ they were supposed necessarily to produce each other, yet they were not supposed, to proceed necessarily from God, the original and first Cause, but to be derived from the perfect Wisdom of his Nature, and his Will, as Seneca, the Stoick, has informed us: And were not thought to be the efficient Causes of human Actions, (which they expressly exempted from the Coercion of them,) but were only understood, to be Motives, or secondary Causes; whilst they placed the principal and efficient Cause of Action within the Mind itself: So that the Necessity of this Stoical Chain of Causes was only supposed, to operate in the Production of external providential Events, consequential to Mens Actions, which were taught to be voluntary and in their own Power. And it plainly appears, from the Words of Balbus, the Stoick, mention’d by Cicero (de nat. Deor. L. 2.) that the antient Stoicks agreed with the Platonicks, in asserting the free and voluntary Motion, Exertion, or Agency, of the human Mind. To proceed therefore;
“Cicero, in the Person of Velleius, represents the Stoical Notion of Fate to be, ‘That all Events proceed from the eternal Truth and Connection of Causes.’Diogenes Laertius says it was their Opinion, ‘That Fate is the Connection of the Causes of Things, or that Reason, by which the World is govern’d.’
“Seneca (the Stoick) says; ‘Fate is nothing else, but the Connection of Causes.’
“Marcus Antoninus the Emperor, and Stoical Philosopher, frequently expresses his Notion of Fate in like manner. But that in this Fate, or Chain of Causes, the Power of Action in Men was contain’d, and was (υπὲρ μὸρον) exempt from the Necessity of Fate, we are assur’d (from Plutarch ) was the common Opinion of Stoicks and Platonists. And Tacitus, speaking of the Stoicks, says, ‘They attribute, indeed, a Fatality unto Things, but not as proceeding from the Motion of the Planets, (which was the Astrological Notion only,) but from the Principle and Connection of natural Causes: And yet they leave the Conduct of our Life to our own Choice, which being chosen, a certain Order of Events (they think) follows.’
“Alcinous sets forth Plato’s Opinion of Fate, in the following Manner: ‘He understands Fate to be this; That, if any Person chooseth such a sort of Life, and will do such and such Actions, such and such Consequences will follow. Wherefore the Soul is unrestrain’d, and hath it in its own Power to act, or not, and in this respect (of any particular Action) is not compelled: But the Consequence of it’s Action will be effected by Fate: As for Example, if Paris will carry away Helen, which it is in his Power to do, or not, the Event will be, that the Grecians will make War against the Trojans for her.’
“Hierocles teacheth, that ‘Fate is the judicial Operation of the Deity, effecting Events according to the Laws of Providence, and directing human Affairs in the Order and Course that is suitable to their free Purposes and voluntary Actions.’ The precedent Arguments, upon which he builds his Notion, are, viz.
“‘If (says he) bodily and external Events fall out fortuitously and by Chance, what becomes of the Superintendency of God, to judge and recompense every one according to his Deserts? For we will not suppose these Things to happen without Appointment, and say, that our just Purposes, and our Judgments and Desires, proceed from an overruling Necessity: For, if so, we should not impute Virtue and Vice to ourselves, but to that Necessity. Nor is it reasonable to suppose all Things to be the necessary Effects of them, I mean the Actions of the Soul, as well as the Things that are without us, and concern the Body. Nor ought we to ascribe all Things to the unintelligent and undirected Circumvolution of the Universe; there being a Mind, that presides over all Things, and a God, who is the Author of the World. That which necessarily remains, therefore, is, that the Choice we make is in our own Power, and that a righteous Recompense is awarded, according thereto, by coelestial Beings and Judges appointed by God, and who have the Care of us committed to them.—And the Supposition of a Recompence, according to our Merit, immediately infers a Providence and Fate, as the consequent of it; and judicial Providence, which orders the Events of human Affairs, according to Right and Equity, depends upon the Principle of our Will and Choice: So that Fate is a Part of universal Providence, and the Rule of Judgment upon the Souls of Men.’
“To which he adds presently after; ‘To choose, is in the Power of the Mind; but the Events following the Choice, are determined by a judicial Providence, recompensing the Purposes of the Soul, according to its Desert: And thence we are said, both to choose our Condition of Life, and to have it destin’d to us. For the Recompense, ordain’d to follow our Works, both manifests the free Motion (or Operation) of our Mind, and the divine Superintendency over us. So that it is evident, that the Motions (or Operations) of our Minds, from Beginning to End, are free—and that the Recompence of our Deserts is not without Appointment,—as neither is Fate, which is the Chain and Connection of the human Will, with the divine Judgment: So that we choose what we will, thro’ an unrestrain’d Liberty, but often suffer against our Will, thro’ the unavoidable Power of Providence.’
“Chalcidius expresseth the Platonick Notion of Fate in like manner; viz. ‘Such, (says he) in my Opinion, is that heavenly Law, which is call’d Fate, commanding Men that which is right, and forbidding the contrary; but to obey, is in our own Power, and free from the Coercion of Fate. To praise him that does well, is both agreeable to this Law, and to the common Judgment of all.—Moreover, to live ill, is in the Power of Man, and, therefore, Punishment proceeds from a fatal Necessity, in consequence of the Law. All these Things relate to the Mind of Man, which is free, and acts by its own Choice.’
“Again; ‘Fate is the Decree of Providence, comprehending our voluntary Actions, as the precedent Grounds of it; comprehending, also, the Recompence of our Deserts. Punishment and Approbation, which are by Fatality, and all those Things which happen fortuitously, or by Chance, are the Consequents of it.’
“But, in order to understand more fully and distinctly the antient philosophical, or theological, Notion of Fate, or Necessity, we are to observe, that it was distinguished into two Senses, (tho’ in Reality amounting to the same,) in the one of which it was understood, substantially to mean that intelligent divine Being, or Substance, which govern’d the World by the Administration of the Laws of Providence; in the other it was taken abstractedly, or virtually, for the Laws, or Decrees themselves, of the divine Government of the World.
“‘Fate (says the great Philosopher Chalcidius) was understood by Plato in a two-fold Sense, the one relating to its Substance, the other to its Energy and Power.’
“Thus also Plutarch represents it;
“Fate, in the Sense of Operation, or Power, is call’d by Plato, ‘in his Phaedrus, an unavoidable Decree; in his Timaeus, the Laws, which God endited to coelestial Beings concerning the Nature of the Universe.’ The Sense of which he immediately explains; viz.
“‘By unavoidable Decree, we may understand an irrepealable Law, proceeding from an irresistible Cause, (viz. the supreme God,) and by the Laws which God endited to (coelestial) Beings concerning the Nature of the Universe, the Law which is consequential to the Nature of the World, and by which the Universe is governed.
“‘Fate, in the Sense of Substance (he proceeds to tell us) is the Soul of the World.’ Which Plutarch also informs us it was.
“It was call’d Lachesis, or (ἀνάγνινι) Necessity; both as being supposed to be necessarily-existent, and the necessary Substratum for the Formation of rational Beings; as also, because the Laws of it were fix’d and immutable, and to which they supposed God had subjected all Beings, and even bound himself under an irreversible and necessary Obligation.
“Chalcidius styles this Lachesis, or Necessity, ‘the divine Law,’ by which Things future are connected with Things past and present.
“And it is, with respect to the immutable Laws of Providence, that Plotinus calls God ‘the Necessity and Law of all Things.’
“Cicero in like manner (speaking of the Platonick Philosophy) observes, that this Fate, or Soul of the World, by whose providential Wisdom all Things, both in Heaven and Earth, are governed, is call’d Necessity; because nothing can happen otherwise than according to the Laws of it, whereby the eternal Order of the Universe is immutably preserved by Fatality.
“The Stoϊcks express their Notion of Fate (substantially) in Agreement with the Platonists.
“‘Heraclitus styles the Substance of Fate, that Reason which pervades the Substance of the Universe; the same (he adds) is an aethereal Body, the generating Seed of the Universe.’
“Euripides expresses the Stoical Sense; ‘Jupiter, or the Necessity of Nature, or the Reason of Men. For Necessity and Mind is the (substantial) Power, which diffuseth itself thro’ the Universe.’
“Velleius, in Cicero, represents the Opinion of the Stoick Chrysippus; ‘That he says; that the Power of that perpetual and eternal Law, which is, as it were, the Guide of our Life, and Director of our Duty, is Jupiter; the same he also calls Fate and Necessity.’ Again; ‘The Stoicks held a Necessity, which they called Fate.’
“Again; Diogenes Laertius tells us it was the Stoical Notion, ‘That God, and Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, were one and the same, to which they gave many other Names also.’
“Alexander Aphrodisius says; ‘They (the Stoicks) say that Fate, and Nature, and Reason, by which the Universe is governed, is God.’
“Lastly, Seneca the Stoick says; ‘What else is Nature but God, and the divine Reason, which is infused into the whole World and the Parts of it?—And, if you call the same Fate, you will not be mistaken.’
“There was no other Difference betwixt the Platonick and Stoick Notion of Fate, but only, that the Stoicks thought that Fate considered (Substantia, or κατ’ οὐσίαν) as a substantial divine Being, which was the Soul of the World, was the (πρῶτος θεὸς) supreme God, whom they styled ‘The first Cause of the Universe;’ and ‘Fate and the Necessity (or necessary Cause) of Things:’ Whereas the Platonicks made Fate (δεύτερον θεὸν, ἕτερον νοῦν, secundam Mentem) a second God, a second Mind, inferior and subservient to the supreme God.
“The preceeding Observations will explain the Meaning of the strong poetical Expressions of the Gods, or even of Jupiter himself, the supreme God, being subject to Fate; by which, agreeably to the Platonical and Stoical Philosophy, was understood, that all subordinate Beings, how divine soever, were subject to the immutable Laws of Providence, which were the Will and Command of the supreme God; and, according to which, God himself was determined invariably to act, and so was said to be bound by, and to obey, his own Laws, as being most wise and perfect.
“With respect to the Subjection of the inferior Deities to Fate, Chalcidius gives us Plato’s Opinion;
“‘The Command of God, which the subordinate Gods obey, is, I think, that Reason, call’d Fate, which contains the eternal Government of Things, and is deriv’d from Providence.’
“To the same purpose Plato himself cites Pindar saying, ‘That the Law (of Providence) rules over all, both mortal Men, and the immortal Gods.’
“And Simonides; ‘The Gods themselves do not resist Necessity,’ i.e. the uncontrouble Laws of divine Providence.
“And Seneca; ‘Whatsoever it is that commands us thus to live, or die, it binds the Gods also under the same Necessity: An irrevocable Course (of Providence) carries on, both human and divine Things; the very Maker and Governor of all Things wrote indeed the Fates, but also follows them; commanded once for all, and himself always observes what he commanded.’
“Lucan expresses the same Notion in a lively and poetical Manner.
“With respect to God’s being unalterably determined to act according to the fixed Laws of his Providence, and so to be, as it were, bound by them; Seneca styles God his own Necessity.
“And Cicero interprets a Greek Poet, as saying; ‘That the supreme Jupiter cannot prevent that which is decreed to come to pass.’
“And Herodotus; ‘It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destin’d Fate.’ And again; ‘God himself is a Servant of Necessity.’
“Which Passages do not mean, as if there was thought to be any Fate, or Necessity, distinct from, and really superior to, the supreme God; but only, that the Laws of divine Providence, as being the Result of infinite and perfect Wisdom, were the immutable Rule, by which God was determined to order the Event of Things, and to act in the Government of the World. To proceed therefore:
“Fate (κατ’ ὀνέργειαν) in the abstract Sense, as implying Energy, Power, or Operation, ‘is the Laws’ (of Providence) ‘with which the Soul of the World is invested, for the good Government of the Universe.’ Hence we see the Reason, why the Soul of the World is call’d Fate, viz. As containing in it those Laws of Providence, which are that which is call’d Fate.
“Again; ‘It is a Decree, existent Order, and an all-comprehending Law, which derives its precedent Causes from our Deserts, as the Grounds’ (of the Events) ‘of it; and the Events, which proceed necessarily from it, are the consequential Effects of our precedent Merits, and of the Necessity’ (or immutable Sanction) ‘of that Law.’
“Chalcidius goes on; ‘The Foundation therefore of the divine Law, that is, of Fate, is Providence: But it is call’d Fate, because it contains, as in a Decree, the Duty of Obedience, and the Contumacy of our Disobedience to it. And Punishments and Rewards proceed from it, according to our precedent Deserts. But our precedent Deserts, whether good, or bad, are the Motion of our own Minds; and the Judgment, Consent, Desire, and Aversion of them, which are in our own Power; because the Choice of these and their contraries is in our own Power.—Therefore the Soul of the World is Fate, as it signifies a substantial Being; and that Law also, with which it is instructed for the well Governing of all Things, is that Fate, which consists in Operation and Act, and the Order and Consequence of it is; if we do this, that will follow: Therefore, the precedent Action is in our Power; the Event that follows it, is the Decree of Fate; which is otherwise call’d Fatal, and differs very much from Fate. So that there are three Things, viz. that which is in our own Power; and Fate,’ (or the Law of Providence,) ‘and the Recompence of our Deserts according to the Law of Fate.’
“Chalcidius concludes the Platonick Notion of Fate, from many foregoing Arguments in these Words, viz.
“‘That some Things are effected by Fate, is true; and that some Things are in our own Power, has been prov’d to be true also. Wherefore, they who ascribe all Things to Fate, are justly found fault with by those, who prove, that some Things are in our own Power. Again; they who place every Thing in our Power, and attribute nothing to Fate, are plainly mistaken. For who knows not, that something is effected by Fate, and is not in our Power? Therefore, that Reasoning alone is true, and that Opinion firm and solid, which teacheth, that some Things happen by Fate, and other Things proceed from the Choice and Will of Men.’
“Thus, I think, it is clearly and indisputably prov’d, that the Freedom of human Actions was the general and prevailing, and almost unanimous Doctrine, of the most eminent and numerous Sects of Philosophers, particularly, the Five great Sects amongst the Heathens, which comprehended all the Philosophy of Greece and Rome, namely, the Epicureans, Stoicks, Platonicks, Aristotelians, and Academicks; and that the Opposers of this Doctrine were chiefly Leucippus, Empedocles, and Democritus, the first Founders of the Epicurean Sect, but oppos’d herein by Epicurus and his Followers; Heraclitus, Diodorus, and some Astrologers and Fortune-tellers amongst the Stoicks, which were greatly despised and condemned by the most learned of that Sect also. And I have also shewn distinctly, and at large, that the antient Platonick and Stoical Notion of Fate and Necessity agreed with each other, and was declar’d to be consistent with the Liberty of Mens Actions; and was not understood to be a necessary efficient Cause of human Actions at all, but only to be the determinate Will and Decrees of God, or the Laws of his Providence, by which the Universe was govern’d, and Good and Evil was dispensed unto Men, according to the free and voluntary Actions, and Conduct, of their Life.
“And, from the preceeding Proofs of the Freedom of human Actions, as being the Sense and Opinion of the most Wise and Learned, as well as greatest Part of Mankind in all Ages, I beg leave to make one Observation, namely, that upon the Supposition of the Necessity of Mens Actions, it must appear very extraordinary and directly absurd, that the Light of natural Reason should necessarily lead Mankind at all Times to conclude their Actions to be in their own Power and Choice, and to be voluntary and free, if they are indeed necessary: That Necessity should form Mens Minds and Notions so opposite to its own Operations, and make them necessarily think their Actions are not necessary but voluntary. To which Purpose, the learned Ammonius Hermias argues; ‘Does this Reason, which’ (as they teach) ‘necessarily effects all Things, make it necessary for Men to affirm, either that all Things are necessary, or that some Things are in our Power? If the latter is true, then all Things are not necessary; but, if the former, how come many to think the contrary, viz. that many Things are in our Power? For it is altogether absurd to suppose, that Nature, which’ (they say) ‘necessarily effects all Things, should move us against Nature, to contradict the Truth of its own Operations.’”
So much for the Sentiments of the Antients concerning Fate, Necessity, Liberty, and Providence, from the Reverend Mr. John Jackson.
That the Heathens knew not the true God.8. From what has been already laid down, and from what follows, it is apparent, “That the Heathens knew not the true God,” which is their distinguishing Character, differencing them from the true People of God. The not knowing God, is distinguishable into several Sorts and Kinds; that which is Unprophetick, that which is Unphilosophick, and that which is Irreligious. That which is Unprophetick, relates only to Matters of Intercourse between God and his Prophets, and his Method of manifesting himself to them, 1 Sam. 3.7. “Samuel did not yet know the Lord, neither was the Word of the Lord yet reveal’d unto him.” That which is Unphilosophick, relates only to Philosophick Disquisition and Comprehension, Job 36. 26. “God is great and we know him not, neither can the number of his years be searched out.” That which is Irreligious, is the Opposite to such knowing God, which belongeth to Religionists as such, and constitutes the true Theists of Religion. 2 Thess. 1. 7, 8. “The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels, in flaming Fire, taking Vengeance on them that know not God.” A truly religious knowing God, a knowing him so as to be truly religious towards him, is the Essence and Summary of true Religion, the Whole of Piety. Therefore some judicious Interpreters expound the Knowledge of God by Piety, or Godliness, others by the Fear of God, which comes to the same Thing. Hos. 4. 1. “There is no Truth, nor Mercy, nor Knowledge of God in the Land.” Jer. 9.6. “They refuse to know me, saith the Lord.” Jer. 22. 16. “Was this to know me? saith the Lord.” In this Sense the Knowledge of God is preferr’d before Burnt Offerings. Hos. 6. 6. and this Knowledge of God will make holy and happy Times, Isa. 11. 9. “They shall not hurt, nor destroy in all my holy Mountain; for the Earth shall be full of the Knowledge of the Lord.” When God foretelleth by the Prophet, Jer. 24. 7. “I will give them a Heart to know me, that I am the Lord”; the Meaning is, they shall be true Pietists towards him; and by another Prophet, Hos. 2. 20. “Thou shalt know the Lord”; it is to signify, that he, on his part, would enter into a League of Amity with them, and make himself known to them at a more than ordinary Rate; and they, on their Part, shall be true Pietists. But the Sons of Eli were monstrous Impietists, and their being such was a “not knowing the Lord.” 1 Sam. 2. 22. They knew not the Lord, as David chargeth his Son Solomon, “Know the Lord God of thy Father, and serve him with a perfect Heart,” 1 Chron. 28. 9.
Sometimes the knowing God must be explain’d by Wisdom in Divine Matters. Thus it is to be understood, Col. 1. 10. “Increasing in the Knowledge of God.” And God foretelleth by the Prophet, that the meanest Christian shall be Wise in Divine Matters. Jer. 31. 34. “They shall teach no more every Man his Neighbour, and every Man his Brother, saying, Know the Lord, for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them.” i.e. They shall all comprehend what ought to be known of God, in conjunction with Piety.
Sometimes the Phrase of knowing God must be explain’d by what we commonly call Acquaintance, in which Sense also the Wicked are called Aliens. 1 John 4. 7, 8. “Every one that loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is Love.” 1. John 2. 4. “He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his Commandments, is a Liar,” and 3. 6. “Whosoever Sinneth,” (habitually,) “hath not seen him, neither knoweth him.” In the same Sense of knowing, the Prophet saith of crooked Paths, (Isa. 59. 8.) “Whosoever goeth therein shall not know Peace,” (so as to have any Dealings therewith;) “the Way of Peace havethey not known”; (Rom. 3. 17.) The Apostle saith of Christ, (2 Cor. 5. 21.) “He knew no Sin,” so as to have any intercourse with it; and our Saviour will say to some, as being none of his Acquaintance, “I never knew you.” Matth. 7. 23.
Sometimes the Phrase of knowing God is best explain’d by that due Discernment and Understanding of God, which constitutes Men of the Divine Family, Subjects of his Kingdom, he being to them a God, they being to him a chosen People, which is the true Light, Wisdom and Knowledge of Believers. 1 John 5. 20. “The Son of God is come, and hath given us an Understanding that we may know him that is True,” and 2. 12. “I write unto you, Little Children, because ye have known the Father,” and John 16. 3. “These Things will they do unto you, because they have not known the Father, nor me.” The World is in such an Atheistical Ignorance of God. “O righteous Father, the World hath not known thee.” John 17. 25. In the same Sense the Psalmist saith (9. 10.) “They that know thy Name, will put their trust in Thee.” When our Saviour saith, John 17. 3. “This is Life Eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God,” the Meaning is, that to know God, as one of his Pietists, as wise in Divine Matters, as of his Acquaintance, as Children of his Family, and Subjects of his Kingdom, is Life eternal to a Man.
But sometimes the Phrase of knowing God must be explain’d by Understanding of God and his Matters, (speaking of God in such Sense as we speak of Kings and Governments,) as our Saviour saith, Matth. 11.27. “No Man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any Man the Father, save the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him.” As to that great and saving Revelation of himself, the Christian Religion, God did not make himself known to any mere Man, “The only-begotten Son, which is in the Bosom of the Father,” (highly beloved by him, and most intimate with him,) he only hath declar’d him.
And sometimes Mens knowing God must be explain’d, of his being barely notic’d to them, which is consistent with the greatest Atheism of Religion and Condition, as when the Apostle saith of the Gentiles, Rom. 1. 28. “They knew God, but did not like to retain God in their Knowledge,” or to make an acknowledgment of Him, which is a religious knowing God. But thus the Gentiles knew him not; for, as the acknowledg’d Deity of Religion and People, “There is no God in all the Earth, but in Israel.” 2 Kin. 5. 15.
How far the Gentiles did know God.The Gentiles, therefore, in a certain Sense knew God, but so as not to know him in the more usual, or religious, Sense. Rom. 1. 19, 20. “That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for, God hath shewn it unto them; for the invisible Things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the Things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead.” And, accordingly, it is generally acknowledg’d, “That God is knowable by Natural Light, and is actually known by all Nations.” But this must be understood with due Distinctions and Limitations, touching the Bounds and Measures of the Gentiles knowledge of God, such as these following.
1. The Heathen World knew God, as understood without specifick and individual Determination. They were not so ignorant, but that they acknowledg’d one Cause, or Principle, whence all Things have their Origin. This is so conspicuous in Nature, that natural Light cannot miss of him; nor is this his Existence matter of Faith, so much as of common Reason, and Proof by Argument. “The Pulchritude of the World, and the Order of the Coelestial Bodies, forceth an acknowledgment, that there is a certain excellent and eternal Nature, which is to be honour’d and ador’d by Mankind.” The Pagan Theologers, in Terms, agree with the Christian, that the visible World proclaimeth the invisible God, and speaketh audibly, with a Voice that is gone out through all the Earth, that God made me. One that was no under-graduate in Atheism, yet in a lucid interval, saith; “If any Man shall view throughly all the Organs, both of Generation and Nutrition, and doth not perceive them to have been made and order’d to their respective Offices by some Mind, he is to be reputed himself void of Mind.” To suppose, therefore, that the Existence of God is not discoverable by mere Reason, or natural Light, is a great Extravagance in Socinus, and some others.
2. God, as of the true Specifick and individual Determination, (being plainly notic’d unto them in the Nature of the Thing,) was in Nature fairly notic’d to the Heathen World. For, as in the Old-Testament, a Messiah is notic’d and reveal’d to the Jews, not without, but with, true Specifick and individual Determination, (the true Messiah, the true kind of Messiah, is there in good Degree reveal’d:) So, in Nature, God is fairly notic’d to the Gentiles, not without, but with true, Specifick and individual Determination. They are blind and unintelligent in the Nature of Things, that do not discern, in case of Competition, which is the true God. The Jews mundan Kind of Christ, is an Anti-Christ Kind of Christ. So the Gentiles Pagan Kind of God, their Jove; being in one Part merely mundan, and in the other, diabolical and wicked; and being the Deity of a Religion, that is in one Part merely mundan, and in the other diabolical and wicked, is an Anti-God kind of God. All these Matters are so plain in the Nature of the Thing, that it must be said, a Christ is in Scripture so notic’d to the Jews, as that the true Christ, the true Kind of Christ, is fairly notic’d unto them: A God is in Nature so notic’d to all Mankind, as that the true God, the true Kind of God, is fairly notic’d unto them. “A Philosopher is no other than a true Philosopher; but, because some counterfeit Philosophy, therefore the Epithet of true was added.” So Christ is no other than the true Christ, God is no other than the true God: If God, therefore, (or a God,) was in Nature made known to the Gentiles, the true God must necessarily be notic’d unto them. And some learned Men somewhat mistake the Case, when they say. “As Oedipus knew himself to have a Father, yet did not know that Laius was he: So the Gentiles, by the Light of Nature, might reach so far as to know, there is one God, and that he is the Fountain of all Good, without knowing who was this God, as suppose the God of Israel.” For, in the Case of Oedipus, there was no Competition, there was no Competition between two pretending Fathers; whereas, in the Gentiles Case, there was a Competition between two pretending Gods. And Laius, (being but a particular Man) could not be known but by an individual Determination: Whereas, in Case of Competition, the true God is distinctly and certainly notic’d by a mere Specifick Determination. For as the Divine-kind of Messiah is the true Messiah: So the Divine-kind of God, (and the Deity of such a kind of Religion) is the true God; but the Ungodly-kind of God (and the Deity of such a Religion) is the false God. It is not a Divine Being, nor a Supreme Being, nor a Supreme God, but the Divine-kind of God, which Specifick Determination is plainly notic’d in the Nature of the Thing; and therefore God, as of true Specifick Determination, is in Nature, fairly notic’d to the Reason of all Men. For suppose, that Oedipus could not know, that the Man Laius was his Father; yet, in the Nature of the Thing, this was plainly notic’d, That one of Mankind was his Father: So, in the Nature of the Thing, and therefore in Nature, this is plainly notic’d to the Reason of all the World, that God is not an unholy, or ungodly, but a Divine-kind of, God. If this God, the Deity of true Holiness and Godliness, was not, as such, fairly notic’d to the Heathen World; if they had not much of the Knowledge of him and of his Truth, (touching his Truth, their Duty and their Sin, his Rewards and Punishments,) this Knowledge could not be said, to be manifest in them, because God hath shew’d it unto them: Nor could they be said, to hold the Truth (stifled, smother’d, and imprison’d) in Unrighteousness. This being their great Crime, from thence it appeareth, that the true God was so far notic’d to them, as that they were under an Obligation, to erect an Holy Empire, imperfectly such, by being in common his Religionists.
3. As the Jews reject the true Divine-Kind of Messiah, which is notic’d unto them, such not being grateful and agreeable unto them, nor what they like and love; they are for a Messiah of another Kind: So the Gentiles did not like that of the true Divine-Kind of God, his Truth, and his Service, which was notic’d unto them, they were for another Kind of supreme God, which was more grateful to them, because of their own Kind and Quality; and so far (in setting up their Jove of several Notions jumbled and confounded together) they transform’d the Godhead into their own Similitude. According to that of Xenophanes the Colophonian; “If Horses and Oxen could draw Pictures, they would paint the Gods like Horses and Oxen, as of their own Form and Family.” The same Philosopher observeth, “That the Aethiopians paint the Gods Black, and Flat Nos’d;the Thracians paint them Reddish and Ceruleous; the Barbarians suppose them Wild and Ferine; the Greeks suppose them more Gentle and Placid.”
4. The Heathens having form’d their Polity of Gods, and set up Jove as Chieftain of their Deities, the true God was hid from the Eyes of their Mind; and, altho he was notic’d to them, and known by them, yet no otherwise than as a Stranger-Deity (foreign to the Polity of their Gods) as they were Aliens from knowing him. For such a Degree of knowing, is knowing, not knowing, as the Apostle saith, Rom. 10. 19. “Did not Israel know?” They knew, but so as not to know. The Heathens knowing, not knowing, constituted them the Heathen People. To such a Degree the Athenians knew God, when they erected an Altar to the unknown God. To such a Degree the Kings of the Amorites and the Canaanites knew God, whose Hearts melted, “When they heard that the Lord had dried up the Waters of Jordan from before the Children of Israel.” Josh. 5. 1. And the God of Israel saith of himself, Mal. 1. 14. “My Name is dreadful among the Heathen.” To such a Degree those Pagan Magicians knew God, who made use of his Name, The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in their Inchantments.
In what Sense they did not know God.That extraneous People the Gentiles knew not God, as a People know their God; who is the imperial Estate of their Religion, and who are none of the Strangers, Foreigners, and Aliens from his Theology and Religion. In such Sense the Gentiles Character signifieth in the Scripture, wherein the Gentiles, that knew not God, are oppos’d to God’s People; and in such Sense the God of Israel saith to Cyrus, Isa. 45. 5. “I girded thee, though thou hast not known me.” So in Ecclesiastical Writers, the Conversion of a Pagan to be one of God’s People, is express’d by a Transition from the Heathenism of the World to the Acknowledgment of the true God. And the Heathens usual Quere to the Primitive Christians, “Who is that God, which ought alone to be worshipp’d?” shews their prodigious Alienation from the Knowledge of God, and that the true God was no Deity of their Theology. Cicero hath remark’d the wild Conceits of the Stoicks concerning the Ruler of the World, or the Godhead. “Zeno and the generality of the Stoicks suppose, that the Aether is the supreme God, having a Mind whereby all Things are govern’d. Cleanthes, a Prime Stoick, andScholar of Zeno, thinketh the Sun hath the Dominion, or is Lord of us, and all, and swayeth all. Therefore, by the Dissension of the Wise, we are necessitated to be Ignorant, who is the Lord over us; for we know not, whether to pay our Service to the Sun, or Aether.” The Philosophers had the true Knowledge of God, as some say; but the Apostle ranketh their Knowledge of God, with the Popular-Pagan. 1 Cor. 1. 21. “Seeing that in the Wisdom of God” (that instructive Wisdom which God furnisheth in Nature) “the World by Wisdom knew not God,” (by Philosophy, they did not attain to the Knowledge of God,) “it pleas’d God by the Foolishness of Preaching to save them that Believe.”
This Idea the King, or he that Reigneth over us, may be understood and taken, either without, or with that individual Person, who is King, or doth Reign. He that knoweth and honoureth the King only in general and indefinitely, (to use a Logical Term,) knoweth and honoureth the King according to the true Idea of a King, without any true, or determinate Knowledge of the Individual, who is King, whom he may unwittingly oppose. Many are for Truth, for Justice, Virtue, and Piety, according to some true general Notion which they have of them, that are Adversaries to that, in particular Cases, which is really and materially the Truth, Justice, Virtue, and Piety. Thus the Heathen are said to know and honour God, by having this, or the like, honourary Idea of Him in their Mind, The King of the World; The Lord of All; but with this honourary Idea some of them invested a Star; others, an Hero; others, a Demon; and others, a Platonick Idea. Some applied it to the visible Universe, being Pan-Theists; others were altogether uncertain, to what definite specifick individual Nature, it ought to be applied, and, therefore, were Theists at random, not determin’d to any one Thing; “Thou Jupiter, whether thou be the Heaven, or the Aether, or the Earth,” saith one in the Poet: Such Theists, altho’ they have a true Notion of God in their Mind, The Lord of the World, The Lord of All, or the like; yet, because they apply it not to him to whom it belongeth, they are not Theists truly such, they do not know, or acknowledge, him, who is Lord of the World, or Lord of All.
It is not possible, that God’s Religionists should have the same Deity of a Religion in common with the Gentiles that know not God, which being their genuin and usual Character, we may infer from it, by way of Consectary, these five Branches of their Heathenism, and of ours too, so far as we symbolize with them. 1. Their Atheous Darkness, as to matter of Understanding. 2. Their Atheousness and Flagitiousness of Life. 3. The Agreeableness of Heathenism of Religion to them. 4. The Badness of their Virtue and Goodness. 5. The Deadliness of their State and Condition. For all these are our criminal not knowing God.
Heathenism is the State of Atheous Ignorance.Consect. 1. Heathenism is the State of Atheous Ignorance. Agreeably to Platonism, the Christian Theology contra distinguisheth two opposite States and Conditions, and two opposite Kinds of People, Parties, and Families, the one Divine and of Light, the other Atheous and of Darkness. Matt.5. 14. Luk. 4. 18. Job 9. 6. and 12. 46. &c. The Apostle of the Gentiles was sent upon this Errand, “to turn them from Darkness to Light,” (Act. 26.18.) from Heathenism to Theism and Christianism of Condition, which was “a calling them out of Darkness into marvellous Light.” (1 Pet. 2. 9.) Heathenism is the Darkness of this World, of which the infernal Powers are the Rulers, Ephe. 6. 12. and therefore the Apostle saith (Ephe. 5. 8) “Ye were sometimes Darkness, but now are ye Light in the Lord.” And, because of the direct Opposition of these two States, therefore the Apostle asketh, “What Communion hath Light with Darkness?” 2 Cor. 6. 14. The Region of outer Darkness has been well explain’d by the Blindness of the Wicked; a Region of Blindness, or not-discerning, as well as of Darkness; and the Inhabitants of it are the Fools and Blind,the Blind Leaders of the Blind, the blind People that have Eyes and see not, the Wretched and Miserable, Poor and Blind. He that lacketh these Things (Divine Graces) is Blind, living in a State of Gracelessness and Wickedness, they had need to have their Eyes open’d. Act. 26. 18. They were blind and unintelligent, to a prodigy, in the matters of Holiness and Salvation (Ephe. 4. 18.) “walking in the” (Heathenish, or Atheous) “Vanity of their Mind, having the Understanding darken’d,” (having obliterated, or at least obscured, their natural Notices of the matters of God and Godliness,) “being alienated from the Life of God, through the” (Atheous kind of) “Ignorance, that was in them, because of the Blindness of their Heart.” Their Wise Men (Rom. 1. 21, 22.) “professing themselves to be Wise, became Fools,” (unwise and unintelligent in the matters of God,) “and becoming vain in their Imaginations,” (full of Heathenish and Idolatrous Conceits, which are Atheous,) “their foolish Heart was darken’d.” The Words of Philo are lively expressive of the sad benighted Estate of the Heathen World; “The Region of the Wicked, where there is no Sun, but depth of the Night, endless Darkness, and vast Multitude of Shades, Ghosts, and Spectres, and Dreams.” These are always stirring in the night-time of sottish Superstition, (the Day-Light banisheth them,) they are the Issue and resembling Progeny of the dark Region of Paganism, wherein Mankind seem “to have been fetter’d by a long Night, as Prisoners of Darkness,” Wisd. 17. 2. Had the Aegyptians Eyes, who deified that blind Animal Mus Araneus, μυγαλήν, because they suppos’d Darkness elder than Light? Or the generality of the Pagans, were they not as blind as that Aegyptian Deity, who affix’d all manner of Infamy and Villainy to their Gods, yet thought themselves Pious? They had a Notion of Piety, Purity, Sanctity, and Justice towards their Deity; but their Sanctity was Sin; their Piety was Villainy; their Purity, Pollution; their Laver was their Stain, and their Righteousness, the highest Wickedness; they counted Evil Good, and Good Evil; Darkness Light, and Light Darkness.
All Mankind, therefore, natively and originally, want their Eye-Sight, and must be denoted such as are born Blind, an effect of Man’s Fall. There would be no need of a divine Physician, to heal and open the Eyes of Men; nor of divine Illumination, nor of a new Birth, whereby we are born into the Region of Light, if Mankind were not in some degree born Blind: No Account can be given of that more-than-Cimmerian Darkness, which for many Ages involv’d the World of Mankind, but from this Hypothesis, that they are born without their Eye-Sight; as without the Life, so without the Light, Spiritual; as in some degree Heathen ungodly Sinners, so Heathen Sons of Darkness. Upon the loss of the divine Image, which is the Soul’s Life and Light, an opposite Darkness succeedeth; for such is the Reign of the Animal-Sensitive Nature, the Flesh, which is blind and foolish, unintelligent and unreasonable, the occasion of Blindness, Error, and Folly, to the Mind; as suggesting atheous Conceits, (vain and heathenish Imaginations, Rom. 1. 21.) as being full of vile and corrupt Affections; as being productive of all Vice and Wickedness, (“their own Wickedness hath blinded them,” Wisd. 2. 27.) and the Mind, concurring therewith, becometh a fleshly Mind. For, being moulded after the Flesh, she becometh carnally Minded, affected, and addicted; of an atheous, carnal, and mundan Genius and Disposition; which is an Indisposition of the Soul to unite itself to God in any respect (in her Discernments, Apprehensions, and Conceits, Opinion and Judgment, Sentiment and Estimation of Things, as also in her Designs, Elections, and Pursuits;) and a Propension to the blind and carnal Conceits of mundan Religionists, and to the various sorts of Atheous Error and Folly. Such an Atheous and Heathen-kind of Genius, in some degree native to Mankind, is by degrees increas’d, as vitious Affections grow to greater Height, and as Sinning against God becomes their Trade and Practice. Bad Education also, Converse and Company, Example, prevailing Custom, publick reigning Error and Vice, bad Government and Laws, beget, confirm, and encrease, Atheousness of Mind. From these concurrent Causes, all, or many of them, the antient Times of the Heathen were “the Times of Ignorance.” (Act. 17. 30.) And thence it is, that the generality of Mankind, in all Times, are criminally involv’d in Atheous Darkness, Error, Ignorance, and Foolishness, touching Matters of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, Virtue and Vice, Nobility and Baseness, Sanctity and Sin, God and his Service, and the divine Kind of Things, the World also and its sensitive Good and Evil, touching themselves, their Interest, and their Happiness, their Souls and their future State, they prodigiously deceive themselves through Pride and Self-Love; and touching their present State, and their Ways, “not knowing what they do, nor whither they are going, because the Darkness hath blinded their Eyes.” (Luk. 23. 34. 1 Joh. 2. 11.)
The principal and summary Reason of the Heathens Blindness was, They did not emerge out of the State of Gracelessness and Wickedness; and, therefore, they were in the State of Atheous Ignorance. From whence it follows, that all Men, who are in the same State of Gracelessness and Wickedness, are in the State of Atheous Ignorance, and want their Eye-Sight, as well as they. Flashes of Light, and some Convictions of Mind, are consistent with this Estate; and there may be in it a superficial and ineffectual knowing the matters of Religion; yet, because all that are in it have a Veil upon their Minds, they are necessarily in the State of Atheous Ignorance. As was the Case of those false Religionists, the carnal Jews; who, if they had had their Eyes, must have discern’d the Light of the World shining in their View; could not have mistaken God for the Devil; or thought themselves Virtuous, when they were Vile; or Wise, when they were Fools; or Safe, when they were in their Sins; nor could they have made their Religion, their Sin and Delusion. Both Jews and Gentiles shew, what Man is in his Unregenerate State; that this being the State of reigning Wickedness and Ungodliness, is the State of reigning Atheous Ignorance, Error and Folly.
Atheous Mankind being themselves, in great degree, unreasonable, the things of the Holy Spirit seem to them absurd, foolish, and unreasonable, 1 Cor. 2. 14. “The natural Man receiveth not the Things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him; neither can he know them, because they are Spiritually discern’d.” The Matters of the Holy Christian Life, have always seem’d ridiculous and foolish to Men of the Atheous, Mundan, and Prophane Genius, which so prevaileth in Nations, call’d Christian, that serious Piety is not matter of Honour and Estimation, but of Disparagement with the most and greatest; and to be a Christian indeed, is to be Vile in their Eyes; if not to have the Usage, which such as departed from Iniquity in antient Times had, Laughter and Derision. Christians, so call’d, suppose, that they may be Leud, Sensual, and Worldly, yet genuine Christians; that Sin is a very small Matter, and, accordingly, their Life is the Sinning Trade; that God is the God and Patron of the Ungodly; that it is needless, ridiculous, and a sneaking Thing, to be Religious; that Heathenish Perfunctoriness, and outside Modishness, in God’s Service, is good Devotion; that high Profaneness is Gallantry; that a Life of Flesh-pleasing Vanity is better than an Holy; that the Worlds delusive Phantasms are the great and goodly Things; that the Concerns of this Animal-sensitive Life, are chiefly to be minded; and that it is Madness to bear the Cross, and suffer for Righteousness sake.
In Christendom, in reform’d Christendom, such Atheous Ignorance, Error and Folly prevaileth, so high a Degree of Unreasonableness, as to be perfect Madness and Phrenzy. It is Madness for Men to dream of a worldly-happy Estate, and a sensual Felicity, and to make it their chief End and Good; to be the World’s Admirers and Lovers, that are deluded by Shadows, and idolize momentary fantastick Nothings, neglecting and losing the true inestimable Possessions of the Kingdom of God and the Soul; to chuse the Evil, and refuse the Good, running counter to their own Intention, designing to be Honourable and Happy, yet making themselves Vile and Miserable to Extremity; in a State of present Danger, wherein they are surrounded with Enemies, to be regardless of their Safety; and as regardless of the future over-whelming Calamities, which few forecast to prevent; to be merry and jovial in a mournful State, and fearless and careless in a fearful Case; to lose their Salvation for want of a little Care and Pains, and to spend their Care and Time about that which is not worth the while; to part with their All for Nothing; for a momentary Folly to plunge themselves into Miseries endless; to be deluded and befool’d in the plainest Things, and in all their great Concerns, not knowing what is good for Themselves, but sporting Themselves in their own Deceiving.
In Heathenism we lead the Atheous Life.Consectary 2. In Heathenism we live the Atheous Life. Atheism of Life and Practice is connected with Atheism of Understanding, both as an Antecedent Cause, a Concomitant, and a Consequent thereof. For the Atheous kind of Life, and Practice, causeth the Atheous kind of Ignorance, Error, and Folly, as Steams and gross Exhalations from the Earth cause a dark Air. Sins and Vices, Lusts and Passions, are to the Mind, what a Suffusion is to the Eye, or Rust to Metal; an Atheous Temper, and Disposition, is prone to Atheous Conceits, and affecteth Atheous Opinions; carnal Affections so powerfully blind the Understanding, and byass the Judgment, that evil Men must be suppos’d to have bad Notions of God. All Men judge as they are affected; he that hateth any Man, is prone to believe and judge all manner of Evil of him; and when he is otherwise affected toward him, he will be apt to believe and judge the contrary: Therefore the Lovers of the World magnify the Things of the World, and form to themselves a worldly kind of Religion: So the Lovers of fleshly Pleasures are averse from believing a Resurrection and future Judgment; and (as Chaucer saith of the People of England) “what they not like, they never understand”; the Truth is against the Wicked, and they are, therefore, against the Truth.
Ignorance is connected with Vice and Wickedness, as a Concomitant inseparable; for it is impossible to be Wise and Wicked at the same time. The being Wicked is to be a Fool, the greatest of Fools; reigning Wickedness is, therefore, necessarily connected with the greatest Ignorance, Error, and Folly: Nor do any commit a sinful Fact, preferring the Evil before the Good; but, upon their Repentance, they acknowledge themselves to have been deceiv’d, in making a false Valuation of some apparent Good connected with great Evil. The grosly ignorant in matters of true Religion, do not know them, nor decline the opposite Evils. Their sinful Ignorance, therefore, is, both in itself, and in its Consequences, manifest Wickedness. The whole of true Religion, Virtue, and Duty, is Matter of Wisdom and Knowledge; for they must be Men of good Understanding, that know the Divine Empire, and the Laws thereof, and understand the matters of Divine Learning and Philosophy; that know the great Things, which alone are worthy to be known, and understand the true Nature, Worth and Use of Things; that discern between Truth and Falshood, the true and false Religion, between Good and Evil, (chusing the one, and refusing the other,) between Realities and Resemblances, and are not impos’d upon by Shews and Appearances; that escape Error, Deceit, and Delusion, (in their Opinions, Elections, Hopes and Confidences,) and the many tempting Baits of Sin; that understand the true Rates of Things, and estimate them aright; that know their Bounds, and observe them; their Dangers, and avoid them; their Enemies, and how to vanquish them; their Diseases, and how to cure them; that conduct themselves by wise Maxims, and do well and wisely; that know how to demean Themselves aright in all Cases and Circumstances, and do their Business and Office well; that are not foolishly and viciously affected, but agreeably to the Nature of Things,(contemning what is Contemptible, fearing what is really Formidable, loving what is Amiable in due Degree and Measure,) that govern themselves well, and are well advis’d in their doings, foreseeing and preventing the great Evils, making sure of their true Happiness, and so successfully managing their Affairs, that they are eternally safe and secure. But they that lack Understanding, know not their Sin, fear not their Danger, regard not their great Interests, discern not the Things that differ, mistake Trash for Treasure, and Fables for Truth and Wisdom; their Designs and Elections are ignorant and unwise; they run upon their Evils, which, in general, they would desire to avoid, for they wish well to themselves; their Atheous Life engendreth Atheous Opinions and Errors, and their Atheous Opinions and Errors, necessarily lead to Atheous Life and Practice.
Not that we are to imagine, with some, “That Mankind do not sin by Will, but only by weakness of Judgment and Ignorance; that really we would not do Evil, nor do we chuse it, but through Ignorance we judge that Good, which really is Evil.” For this is an extravagant Conceit; nothing being more apparent, than that Men usually Will and Chuse, Intend and Design (which is a perverse Appetite and Will) the Evil of manifest Injustice, for carnal Self-gratification and Advantage; therefore a Conceit, which supposeth all their Sins, “to be Sins of excusable Ignorance,” is it-self a Branch of Ignorance inexcusable: Yet, because there is Ignorance in every actual Sin, and it is in part the Principle of it, the Maxim is true, “All Sin hath its rise from Ignorance.”
In Heathenism, the atheous Life of profane Drunkards, Swearers, Whoremongers, and Worldlings, mainly intent upon the concerns of this Animal-Sensitive Life, was the Pagan Popular Life, (notwithstanding the Institutions of Virtue and Philosophy, and the arcane Institutions of Religion, that were in Paganism;) their brutish Appetites concurr’d with the ignorant Conceits of their Minds, touching a sensitive Felicity, to instigate them to unclean Practices; and being past feeling (having lost the Sight and Sense of the Turpitude and Sinfulness of their Practices, which should have restrain’d them, adimit nox atra colorem ) they gave themselves over unto Lasciviousness, to work all Uncleanness with greediness. The Sins of Uncleanness were the Pagans eminent Vice; for, altho’ there are among them Instances and Institutions of Continence, yet so generally and outrageously were those Heathen Sons of Darkness addicted to the Sins of Unchastity of all sorts, (some of which were not only thought allowable, but genteel and creditable,) that the Pagan World may justly be thought nothing better than a Brothel-House of Uncleanness. The principal Corruption in the World, was thro’ this sort of Lust; and, because of these Things principally, “the Wrath of God came upon” (these enormous Sinners) “the Children of Disobedience.” The Gentiles are characteriz’d by the Lust of Concupiscence, as a Consequent of their Ignorance, and not knowing God. And the New-Testament, in its black Catalogues of atrocious Sins, commonly joyneth the Sins of Uncleanness with Heathen Idolatry, and eating Things offer’d to Idols with committing Fornication (which in a large sense signifies all Whoredom;) and the Gentile Converts are by a special Decree forbid Fornication, as a Rite of gross symbolizing with the Gentiles, who are usually call’d by the holy Writers ÿoi porno’i, Fornicators, the Heathen World being a World of impure Fornicators. Their Doctrine did not condemn Fornication and Stews; and both Sexes were prostituted in their Stews, which were every where allow’d, and paid their Tribute. The Persians, Aegpytians, and Athenians, are infamous for their infamous Marriages, the Stoicks and Chrysippus, for allowing them; they are infamous also for unnatural Lusts, their Wise-Man is not averse from Love; Community of Women was practis’d in several Pagan Nations; some are superlative Instances of Masculine Amours; the Lacedaemonians are noted for lending their Wives; Plato, for countenancing Perjury in Love-Matters; Plato and Lycurgus banish’d Modesty from their Commonwealth, for they will have Men Spectators of naked Women; Plutarch was shameless, when he wrote his Amatorius; the Greek Philosophers are remark’d for their impure Masculine Amours, to which, not only the Athenians, but the Roman Senators, were addicted, and the Oracle of Apollo alloweth it. The Apostle hath remark’d their monstrous Uncleanness, (Rom. 1. 28) which he looketh upon as the Consequence of a reprobate Mind. But these soul Carnalities, the Sins of Uncleanness, are only one eminent Limb, or Member, of the Heathen Old-Man, that “hath his Conversation in the Lusts of the Flesh, fulfilling the Desires of the Flesh, and of the Mind, walketh according to the Course of this World, according to the Prince of the Power of the Air, in Lasciviousness, Lusts, excess of Wine, Revelling, Banquettings, and abominable Lewdnesses,” Ephes. 2. 2, 3. which were so fashionable in the Heathen World, that it was a Thing wonder’d at, that the Christians, who seem’d an odd out-of-the-way People, (1 Pet. 4. 3, 4.) “Did not run with them into the same Excess of Riot. Being fill’d” (Rom. 1. 29, &c.) “with all Unrighteousness, Fornication, Wickedness, Covetousness, Maliciousness, full of Envy, Murder,” (Homicide was the Gladiators Discipline, and matter of Glory, they slew their Slaves at pleasure, usually expos’d their Children, Romulus made a Law, that Children born deform’d, should be expos’d and stifled), “Debate, Deceit, Malignity, Whisperers, Back-Biters, Haters of God, Despiteful, Proud, Boasters, Inventors of evil Things, Disobedient to Parents, without Understanding, Covenant-Breakers, without natural Affection, Implacable, Unmerciful.” Such were the worse and the greater part of them; and of all them it must be said, that by several degrees of Wickedness, they constituted a World of flagitious People, “an evil World,” (a World of evil Men, and a World of Evils,) “a World of the Lust of the Flesh, and the Lust of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life, which are not of the Father, but are of the World.” 1 Joh. 2. 15.
Of Original Sin.This degenerate Condition of the World of Mankind, is an uncontroulable Evidence of Original Sin in some Significations of it. For, in the first place, Original Sin may signify, That Mankind, antecedently to their being Holy, (which prior Condition may be called their Original Condition,) are ungodly Sinners. Of this Original sinful State, the current of Scripture, the frame of Christianity and Judaism, the frame of Man, the degenerate Condition of the World, the Order and Course of Things in it, are an uncontroulable Evidence. For Darkness is now before Light, antecedently to Sanctification we are Unholy, and the Proselytes were first Aliens; in Christianity, Unregeneracy is before Regeneracy, the Old is before the New Man, Servitude is before Freedom, all the Holy People were of the World before their coming out of the World, their Original Condition is that of mere Mundan Heathen People. The Religion also of a Saviour-King, of Redemption, and an Expiatory Sacrifice, of Saving Faith, Repentance and Conversion to God, of a new Covenant, and a new Kingdom of God, of Regeneration and Remission of Sins, of Justification and Sanctification, proclaimeth this Original sinful State, which inferreth the Existence of Original Sin in another Notion. For,
In the second place, Original Sin may signify, that Mankind are now natively and originally ungodly Sinners, in a degree of prevalent Tendency that way: or, that the Original of Sin is in such Degree originally in Man. If Mankind are now the Flesh-Born, and Mundan People in all respects; both privatively, being born without the Life of Grace, or the Divine Love; and positively, a vicious carnal selfishness of Nature, being now our Nature, which is called Concupiscence: If this Original of Sin is now natively Original to Mankind, this vicious Tendency must be counted an Original Sin. And an Original Sin of this Nature and Notion, must be look’d upon, not as the Whole, but as a Branch of the Article of Original Sin, and is certainly a Branch of the Christian Religion, John 3. 6, 7. “That which is born of the Flesh, is Flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit, is Spirit. Marvel not, that I said unto thee, ye must be born again, or born from above.” Our Saviour plainly affirmeth, (as the New-Testament ordinarily doth throughout,) that there are two opposite Families of Men: The one, those that are born of the Spirit, the Heaven-born; the other, those that are born of the Flesh only, the Earth-born. That, by natural Generation, none are of the Spirit-born, or Heaven-born, but all are of the Flesh born, or Earth-born, Family. Man is therefore natively so constituted, as to be one of the Animal-vital, not one of the Spiritual-vital, Family. And, of Man so constituted, impartial, Christian Reason cannot but pronounce, “That he is natively a carnal and mundan Kind of Man, and Liver, in a Degree of prevalent Tendency that way. Agreeably to our Saviour, the Apostles establish the same Distinction of two opposite Families, Gal. 4. 29. Rom. 9. 8. Joh. 1. 13. Hence appeareth, that Infants, by their first Birth, belong to that Family, which is opposite to the Spiritual and Divine Family, (both as Natural and Carnal is oppos’d to Spiritual,) they belong to the Family of those that are in the Flesh devoid of the Holy Spirit. At the time of their Conception and Nativity, thus far they are of this Family; they are then the carnal andmundan Kind of Livers, in a degree of prevalent Tendency that Way. And in such Sense the Psalmists Words may commodiously be interpreted, 51. 5. “Behold! I was shapen in Iniquity, and in Sin did my Mother conceive me.” The Animal Nature in Brutes, is wicked and carnal; and the Animal Nature in Mankind, is manifestly the same. Infants are therefore such, in the way of prevalent Tendency that way, and, consequently, they are, in such Degree, by Nature the Children of Wrath. Which is not so to be understood, as if Mankind committed Sin, not through the Fault of their Will; for all the Servants of Sin are more, or less, Volunteers; the Sins which they commit, at the time of their Commission, are their Will and Choice, altho’ at other times (usually in their sober retired Thoughts) they are otherwise minded. But Man’s Nature is full of Inclinations to that which is Evil; all sort of Wickedness issueth from the Heart or inward Man, and Man is warn’d to take heed of walking “in the Ways of his Heart, and in the Sight of his Eyes.” If in fact all Men, in their unregenerate State, live in that which is Carnality and Wickedness, if they are under the Power of the Flesh, of Sin and Vice; this is a Demonstration, that Infants, at their Birth, are the Servants of Sin, in a degree of prevalent Tendency that Way.
All the Wickedness that is in the Animal Nature, involveth in it an inordinate Self-Love, whence it ariseth. Self-Love is unquestionably innate in all, and a vicious carnal Self-Love is innate in all, in a degree of prevalent Tendency that Way, for it is a Root of Bitterness in all Men; therefore, in that Degree, the sourse and summary of Wickedness is innate in all Men; and so are the reigning Lusts, and Passions of the Flesh, which are nothing else but its prevalent impetuous Propensions and Tendencies. Hence Conflicts between the upper and lower Soul, between Reason, and the Motions of irrational Nature; and hence it is, that there is in him originally a Body of Sin and Death.
Agreeably whereunto, as some of the Learned suppose, the Pythagoreans, and Platonists, discourse of a Strife innate in Man, an alien Animal of Kin to us from Generation, which some call, the many-headedBeast; others call it, a moral Species of Life. They suppose, that every Man, from his Birth, hath a bad Genius, inclining him to Evil, that a Purgation is necessary for Human Souls; that they have lost their Wings, are estrang’d from God, obnoxious to inordinate Passions; and Archytas, the Pythagorean, said, “We cannot arrive at the top of true Good, because of a bad Nature.” So the Hebrew Doctors ordinarily speak of the Ferment which is in the Mass (evil Concupiscence,) and the evil Formation, or Figment, of which they say, “The evil Figment is born with a Man, and goeth about with him all his Days, as ’tis said, The Imagination of Man’s Heart is Evil from his Youth”: Which Character of Mankind speaketh a powerful Proclivity in Man’s Nature, to that which is Evil, which implyeth both an Aversion and Impotence to that which is Good. Agreeably where unto the Apostle saith, “The Law was weak through the Flesh,” Rom. 8. 3. therefore the Flesh was more powerful to make Men Sinners, than the Law was to reform them. And, if they are Sinners thro’ the Flesh, then they are “Carnal, sold under Sin, not doing what they like, the Good they would, but what they hate, the Evil that they would not, a Law in their Members warring against the Law of their Mind, and bringing them into Captivity to the Law of Sin, which is in their Members.” Rom. 7. 14, 15, 19, 23. Against their Knowledge and Convictions of Mind, against the Dictates of Prudence and of Conscience, against their own Resolutions and Vows, Mankind, in their Unregeneracy, are frequently carried away captive to perpetrate Wickedness; Convictions of the Mind, against the Flesh, is an unequal Contest. Servitude under Sin, therefore, with all the other Evils of an unregenerate condition, is, as it were, our Inheritance, by our first Birth, without which Hypothesis, no tolerable Sense can be made of the Christian Religion, no tolerable Account can be given of the World’s Wickedness. For what is this lower World, but a Sink of Impurity, a Sea of Wickedness, a Stie of Sensualists, a Sodom of Uncleanness, a Den of the Sons of Darkness, a Shop of Frauds, a Cock-pit of Contention, an Aegypt for Oppression, a Bedlam of Distractions, an Amphitheatre of Gladiators, a Wilderness of noxious Animals; insomuch, that one had reason to style it “very near to Hell.” Mankind, universally, in all times and places, are degenerate into Vice and Wickedness; it operateth early, usually it beareth down all Obstacles, frustrateth all Remedies, it floweth in upon the World, with so high a tide, and so strong a torrent, that in all Ages, not only Vice and Wickedness, but Prodigies and Outrages of Vice and Wickedness, have been current Practices. The Age of Youth is rude, unskilful, and unwise, (without governing Prudence, of little insight into Things, and less foresighted) incautious, careless and inconsiderate, rash, heady and fearless, full of Confidence and foolish Hopes, hardly governable, or manageable by the greatest Wisdom, or capable of good Counsel; of vehement and fervid Desires, Pursuits and Passions, of flagrant Lusts, enormously addicted to sensual Mirth and Pleasure, of gay and wanton Humour, averse from Seriousness, (as apt to contemn and deride serious Piety, as Dangers,) extremely Proud, and apt to take a Pride in pranks of Lewdness and Injuriousness, (nor is there any sort of Wickedness, to which untam’d Youth is not apt to be carried by Pride,) full of disorderly Motions and Appetites, and abounding with Vice, as fat and rank Grounds with Weeds. As the Age of Manhood succeedeth that of Youth, so the manly Vices succeed the Youthful; and so gross and palpable Vice gradually ariseth in the Nature and Life of Man, commencing its Reign from his Birth. Several particular Temperaments are strongly inclin’d to several Vices; some are naturally of a bad Temper, and some are observ’d to be of a natural Malignity; which common Observations befriend the Hypothesis of Original Sin.
Against this Name the Pelagians object, (their principal Objections reach not to the Thing, but the Name only,) “That no defect in Infants, without the use of Reason and Understanding, can be truly and properly Sin, for nothing can be Sin, which is not voluntary. Sin is also that, which is the Transgression of a Law; where no Law is, there is no Transgression; but Laws are not given to mere Infants, that are not capable of Obligation, or, as the Jews say, they are not Sons of the Precept, no more than Brutes; for Laws are not given to Infants, or those who have lost their Understanding.” These Objections may be thus answer’d.
1. The inordinate Concupiscence, of which our Animal Nature is full, may be contemplated in Brutes; for in them there is a Pravity of Nature, which, being predominant, constitutes many of them Evil Beasts; as in Mankind there is a Pravity of Nature, which being prevalent in them, constituteth them Evil Men. In Brutes we may contemplate the very Nature and Idea of the several branches of Vice and Wickedness, of inordinate Self-Love, Lust, Pride, Wrath, Cruelty, and such like; for there the very Face and Form of them appeareth. The Morals of degenerate Mankind, that live after the Flesh, have the same origin with those of Brutes, which they lively resemble; some being Wolves, others Foxes, others Serpents, others Neighing Horses, others Dogs and Swine.
2. The inordinate Concupiscence, of which our Animal Nature is full, is Sin in a limited sense. It is the very Nature of that which is Sin, Vice, and Wickedness, so far imputable to us, as it is in any degree Voluntary, and no farther. As it is in the Animal Nature of Brutes, it is the very Nature of that which is Sin, Vice, and Wickedness; the Pride and Selfishness which we contemplate there, is the very Nature of the Sins of Pride and Selfishness, and sheweth the odious face of them: These, therefore, have in Brutes, the materiality of Sin, without the formality, (as the Logicians use to distinguish;) for they are not imputable to them as Sin, nor do they constitute them in a proper Sense, Sinners. But, in Man, inordinate Concupiscence is imputable as Sin, Fault and Crime, so far as it is in any degree Voluntary. This the Apostle sometimes calleth, “Sin that dwelleth in me,” Rom. 7. 17. and sometimes “Sin in the Flesh” (8. 3.) that is, in the Animal Nature.
3. This Branch of Original Sin, which we have under Consideration, does not infer, that in ordinate Concupiscence is actually in mere Infants; much less, that it is imputable to them, as their Crime, or that they offend against any Law of God, or commanded Duty. It only supposes, that by a Fall, or Lapse, inordinate Concupiscence, and the Reign of it, is in them in a Degree of prevalent Tendency that Way. So that, if Grace does not interpose, the Infant will be like the rest of unregenerate Mankind, an Alien and an Enemy, living and loving the carnal and worldly kind of Life, and its Gratifications; having a Soul destitute of its true Pulchritude, Health, and Vigour; Naked, Deformed, Diseased, Weak, and Languishing.
Mundan Mankind are of a Disposition so Atheous, that Heathenism of Religion is to them agreeable.Consectary 3. Mundan Mankind are of a Disposition so Atheous, that Heathenism of Religion is to them agreeable. Such as Mens State, Life, and Genius is, such is their Religion, which is a plain Demonstration of Original Sin; for it shews, that Mankind are born the Heathen-Kind of Religionists, in a Degree of mighty tendency that Way. All Mankind, without a preternatural adventitious Institution of Religion, would be of the Heathen Religion, or none at all; for other Religions were introduc’d by extraordinary supernatural methods of Providence; under the Oeconomy of mere Nature and general Providence, Heathenism was universal. This appeareth also from the continued History of the Jewish Church, the Rise and the Progress of it; for the Progeny of Noah, the Offspring of Shem, even in the Family of Heber (the Father of the Hebrews) while Noah, Shem, and Heber were yet alive, fell to Heathen Idolatry, Josh. 24.2. Abraham was doubtless bred an Heathen; the God of Nabor is thought an Heathen Deity, Gen. 31. 53. Laban’s Images, call’d his Gods, shew, that he was not clear of Heathen Idolatry, and Jacob’s House was infected with it, Gen. 31. 30. and 35. 2. When the Children of Israel went into Aegypt, they conform’d themselves to the Aegyptian Idolatry, and when they came out of Aegypt, they did not leave it behind them, as they were charg’d, witness the Golden-Calf, their worshipping the Host of Heaven, their joyning themselves to Baal-Peor, and sacrificing to Sehirim. When God had brought them out of the Wilderness into Canaan, and cast out the Heathen Nations for their Idolatries and Impieties, and warn’d the Israelites to take heed of their Abominations, and of doing as they had done, yet they “forsook the Lord God of their Fathers, served Baalim and the Groves” (Idols in the Groves,) and succeeded the Heathen Nations in their Morals, as well as in their Lands. Such was their Religion, during the time that they were govern’d by Judges; their Heathen Idolatry brought them into heavy Calamities, and no sooner were they deliver’d, but they relaps’d to their old Trade again. For this was the State of Things in Samuel ’s Days. Solomon, the wisest of their Kings, tho’ the Lord appeared unto him thrice, and warn’d him against the Idolatry of the Heathen, yet fell to this foul Impiety. After his days, the ten Tribes fell to the Idolatry of Jeroboam, complicated with that of Baal, out of which they never emerg’d. Nor were things much better in the Tribe of Judah, that adher’d to the House of David; for, altho’ Rehoboam, had lost the greatest part of his Kingdom for the Heathenism of his Father, yet he, together with Maacah his Wife, trod in his Father’s Steps, as Abijam his Son did in his. Out of this State Judah could never perfectly recover. For, after Asa’s and Jehosaphat’s imperfect Reformation, Jehoram ( Jehosaphat’s Son) and Amaziah his Son, symboliz’d with the House of Ahab, the latter of them having Athaliah his Counsellor to do wickedly. Joash, who succeeded her in the Government, was courted out of his Religion by the Princes of Judah. Amaziah ( Joash’s Successor) after some time of reigning laps’d into Heathen Idolatry at a great rate. Uzziah and Jotham succeeding Amaziah, the affairs of Religion were in a tolerable good Posture; but Ahaz ( Jotham’s Son and Successor) was mad after his Idols. In the days of Hezekiah, true Religion recover’d its Lustre, (which had suffer’d a sad Eclipse in the Days of Ahaz,) and a considerable Reformation was made; but no sooner was Hezekiah dead, but all things ran to ruin again, in the days of Manasseh, whom Amon his Son imitated in his outrageous Heathenism. Josiah made a great Reformation, but his Reformation was a striving against the Stream; for the People still retain’d their affection for their old Heathenism, and those Heathenish Practices were in his days, which God menaceth by the Prophet, Zeph. 1. 4, 5. “I will cut off the Remnant of Baal from this place” (Jerusalem) “and the Name of the Chemarims with the Priests; and them that worship the Host of Heaven upon the House-tops; and them that worship and swear by the Lord, and that swear by Malcham.” After the Death of Josiah, God began to do unto Judah, as he had done to the Tribes of Israel, they being alike obstinate in their idolatrous Disposition. No Persuasions, no Menaces, no Warnings, no Punishments, or Disasters, which befel them, avail’d to reclaim them. The succeeding Kings of Israel took no warning by their Predecessors Calamities; the Tribe of Judah took no warning by the ten Tribes; they would not desist from their Heathenism of Religion, when they were upon the brink of Ruin; they went on in their old Track, even in the very Times of the Babylonian Captivity, and those of them that went into Aegypt, after their City and Temple was ruin’d, were resolved Heathen Idolaters. Jer. 44. 17. The prevalency of this Religion amongst God’s antient People, speaketh it a darling to Animal Nature. It is from this Nature, that Mankind are not Theists, Religionists, or Pietists, but the Atheous Kind of Theists, the irreligious Kind of Religionists, and the impious Kind of Pietists; they bestow their devotional Esteem, Affection, and Service upon what Animal Sensitive Nature liketh, and accounteth fine Things. By an Idolatrous Kind of Superstition, the adulterous Kind of Devotion, their devotional Propension is gratified, and the way of doing it is pleasing to sensitive Nature, which they follow.
As from the History of the Jewish, so from the History of the Christian Church, the proneness of Mankind to a Religion of Idolatry is apparent; for, altho’ in the three first Centuries, and some time after, there is no appearance of a lapse of the Church into Idolatry; yet the time was not long, before “the holy City was trodden under Foot by the Gentiles”; when the World was come into the Church, then she began, by degrees, to model Religion after the old Heathen manner, and degenerated at such a rate into Paganism, that the Religion of unreform’d Christendom hath been, for many Ages, an Imitation of the Rites and Vices of that Idolatrous Religion. It is manifestly a Parallel for old Heathenism in Atheous Blindness, Darkness, and Ignorance, in its Ghosts, Spectres, and Dreams; in blind heathenish superstitious Conceits and Opinions; in the heathenish Life, and all the Limbs and Branches of the Old-Man; in Swearing, Revelling, Drunkenness, Debauchery; in Fornication, Harlotry, Incest, Sodomy, Stews, Curtesans, Carnavals, and in making the World a Brothel-House, or Sodom of Uncleanness; in Encouragements, as well as Practices of Looseness and Lewdness of Life, and the old heathen Profanenesses; in heathenish Pretensions to Antiquity, Duration, Universality, Unity; in heathenish Worldliness, Pride, and Ambition, State, and Grandeur; in heathenish Infidelity, and traditional Kind of Faith; in heathenish Vice, and an heathenish kind of Virtue; in numerous Festivals celebrated at the heathen rate; in unclean Institutions of Continence and Virginity; in a pharisaical kind of Monasticks and Asceticks, the Institution whereof is originally Pagan; in the Theology and Devotion of the Mysticks; in lying Stories and Legends; in processionary Pomps and Jubilees, which answer to the antient Ludi seculares; in slight methods of obtaining Pardon for Sin; in the extravagant Pomps of their Religious Service, the Consecration of their Altars and of their Temples, and Celebrations of the Dedication of them; in their holy Water and enjoyned Celibacy; in their Whippings and monstrous Barbarity and Cruelty; in their Purgatory and Funeral Rites; in their Reliques and Theurgical Consecrations of Agnus Dei’s and other Trinkets; in the external Perfunctoriness of their Religious Service; in substituting silly exterior Rituality instead of true Religion, and antick instead of true Devotion; ( for such are their numerous turnings, bowings, crossings, changes of Posture, mutterings, droppings of Beads, kissing the Pix, praying in an unknown Tongue, praying for Souls in Purgatory, saying so many Masses, offering Sacrifice for the Quick and Dead, repeating the name Jesus so many Times in a breath, translating Reliques, making Pilgrimages and Shrines, and making Oblations to them; holy Vestments, holy Scapularies, holy Oil, Anointings, holy Salt and Candles, &c.) In their Incense, lighted Candles in their Temples, Procession with burning Candles in their Hands on Candlemas-Day, consecrated Bells and baptismal Spittle; in the Canonizations, Patronage, and Offices, of the Tutelar Saints, or Deities; in consecrating the Pantheon at Rome to them, and the seven Hills of the City to so many Saints; in ascribing miraculous Feats to them, making magnificent Presents and Oblations to them, swearing profanely by their Names, as the Heathens did by their Gods; in consecrating, adorning, adoring their Images, carrying them in Procession, and concealing them in Lent, as the Heathens, for some time, conceal’d their Idols from the People; in having impure and profane Images in many of their Churches, like the Heathen; in the whole Affair of Church-Demonolatry, the Design of it, and Method of introducing it, where Idolatry recover’d its deadly Wound, and Paganism liv’d again. A principal Method of introducing Paganism; in several Branches of it, was by counterfeit Visions, Apparitions, Revelations, Miracles; and by the same Artifices Demonolatry was introduc’d, and Christianity was chang’d into Heathenism. So that the Christian Church hath imitated the antient Jewish Church in her lapse into a Religion of Idolatry, and hitherto she continueth to imitate her Obstinacy and Irreclaimableness.
But Heathen Mankind, most properly such, are those that are without the Pale of the visible Church; the Universality of Mankind in antient Times were such; whose addictedness thereto appeareth from the Antiquity of it, its wide spreading, the long uninterrupted Duration of it, the World’s resolv’d and firm Adherence to it, (for the Heathen World resolv’d not to change the Religion of their Ancestors,) the Laws that were made in favour of it, and against the introducing of any new Religion, (which was thought a Thing not to be endur’d, according to Mecaenas’s Advice to Augustus,) the many violent Persecutions, which Christianity suffer’d in its attempts to undermine and ruin it. Nor was it only the Popular-Pagans, that were so vehemently addicted to their Heathenism of Religion; for the Philosophick-Pagans were, for the main, of the same Mind in Religion with the Popular; their Rule was, “To worship the Divinity according to the Law and Rites of their Country, and the Custom of their Ancestors.” Some few Branches of this Heathen-Popular Religion were disliked by the Philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Plutarch, Cicero, Seneca, Porphyry, Varro, and the Stoicks;) but themselves were in good earnest Pagan-Religionists, Pagan-Theologers, Pagan-Saints, and Champions for Paganism. They were far from designing a change of Religion, as Plato affirmeth in his Apology for Socrates; Plutarch styleth it the “Pious Faith deriv’d from their Ancestors”; and again, “The divine Dignity of Piety receiv’d from their Ancestors.” He supposeth it a plain Case, that their Deities were truly such, and their Religion of right Catholick; “That the Sun and Moon are Animals, whom all Men sacrifice, pray to, and worship.” Other of them style their Pagan Devotion, “The pure Worship of the Divinity.” They affect an higher strain of Devotion towards their Deities, than the Popular Pagans; and it was thought a grand Incongruity in a Philosopher, to violate their Religious Rites; whence Stilpo, the Philosopher, sleeping in the Chappel of the Mother of the Gods contrary to Law, was thus reprimanded by the Goddess in a Dream; “Art thou a Philosopher, and dost thou Violate the sacredLaws?”Philosophers were, least of any, addicted to change their Religion; yet Plutarch, who maketh such high Elogies of his Heathen-Popular Religion, sometimes saith of it: “The ridiculous Practices and Passions of Superstition, and Speeches, and Gestures, and Inchantments, and magical Tricks, and Running about, and Drummings, and impure Lustrations, and sordid Purifications, and barbarous and absurd Castigations in the Temples, and contumelious Usages, give occasion unto some, to say, That it is better there were no Gods at all than such Deities, that accept, and are pleas’d with, such Things as these, of so petulant, so mean, so peevish an humour: Were it not better for the Gauls and Scythians, to have no Notion at all, no Imagination, no History, of Gods, than to suppose, That there are Gods which delight in the Blood of sacrific’d Men, and account that the most perfect Sacrifice and religious Service? Had it not been better for the Carthaginians at the first, to have taken Critias, or Diagoras, for their Lawgiver, to suppose, that there is neither God nor Demon, rather than to make such Sacrifices as they do to Saturn?It is not easy to judge, which of these two extremes is most conducive to Mankind, some have no respect for any Gods, the God-service of others is shameful.”
Such was the Heathen Idolatry, and their manner of serving their fictitious Deities was extremely Shameful and Abominable, as it is visible in their Lupercalia, Floralia, Bacchanalia, the usual Drunkenness of the Women amongst the Romans, when they sacrific’d to Bona Dea; the infamous Drunkenness, Madness, and antick Gestures of Cybele’s Priests, Priapus’s Sacra, their Worship of the Goddess Venus, their nasty Eleusinian Mysteries, their unclean Fables touching their Deities, and their Images of them, which sometimes represented the Painters Harlots, (and usually in their Houses they set up the representations of monstrous Lust,) the obscene Spectacles and Speeches usual in their Sacra, (of which their Theologers say, that they were design’d to cure them of their filthy Affections, by gratifying them,) their perpetrations of Uncleanness, and Sodomy, in honour of their Deities, and under pretext of Holiness and Religion in many Places, the Memoirs in Scripture, of “Sodomites doing according to the Abominations of the Nations,” and the conjoining of Idols with Sodomites, 1 Kin. 14. 24. and 15. 12. and 2 Kin.23. 7. Uncleanness, Drunkenness, Revelling and Debauchery, were not only the Sins of their Lives, but of their Religion. The Histories of their impure Deities instigated them to the practices of Uncleanness, their shady Groves were an Invitation to them to perpetrate them, they perpetrated them in their Sacred Places, Fornication was annex’d to their revelling Idol-Feasts. As it is a false Religion, it is like the Oriental Languages, and must be read backward; for its Holiness, in many Parts of it, is the grossest Lewdness and Profaneness; its Deities are abominably Profane, as is also their Service, and their Sacra; it maketh the Divinity a Drama, Heaven a Scene, and Religion a Stage-Play; it venerateth its Deities in the Temples, and exposeth them to Derision upon the Theatre. Their Religion was, in the main, devoid of Religion, Truth and Righteousness, made up of Lies, Folly, Madness, and consummate Wickedness. Yet, this their Religion (Religio Deorum immortalium) the Pagans counted their Glory; not themselves, but the Christians, they counted Nefarious, and most Flagitious; they furiously persecuted them, calling them the Impious, supposing themselves the Pious. O unparallell’d Darkness!
The Pagans Religion, as bad as it was, was hugely agreeable to their Genius and Humour; which proveth the World of Mankind, a blind and wicked Generation, extremely Atheous, sunk, and degenerate from God, and such as Seneca calls the Herd of Pagan-Religionists, “insanientium turba,” a mad Rabble. For the Pagan Writers themselves usually impute Madness to the Aegyptians, (a learned Nation, but a Fountain and Store-house of Idolatry, as well as Grain,) because of their monstrous Worship of Animals. And what were Hercules’s Sacra at Lindus, but height of Madness, which were celebrated with Evil-speakings and Cursings; and, if any one, by chance, let fall a good Word, it was thought a violation of them? In this wild Religion, there was a great mixture of profane Frolick and Jovialty, which rendred it hugely agreeable to the Humour of the Popular-Pagans. Whence it is generally reported of Gregory Thaumaturgus, (who, in this, was far from imitating the Apostles,) that he, observing that corporeal Delights and Pleasures allur’d the Vulgar, and caus’d them to persist in their Idolatry, permitted them, in lieu of their former Jollities, to jovialize in memory of the Holy Martyrs. The Heathens had their numerous Festivals (celebrated after the Israelites Mode, who “sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play,” Exod. 32. 6.) with Sports, Dancings, Shews, Musick, Banquets, Drunkenness, Lasciviousness. Their Gods gave them no Precepts of good Life, but licens’d Wickedness, authoriz’d Vice, encourag’d Lewdness, (their Oracles patroniz’d it,) and therefore it was a Flesh-pleasing Kind of Religion. Which also had the Glories of Antiquity, Universality, uninterrupted Duration and Succession, and Shews of Sanctimony. It abounded with Inspirations, Visions, Revelations, Oracles, Miracles, Prophets, Saints, and, which is extremely taking and desireable, the Pagans had their Gods nigh unto them, to speak to them, to converse with them, to consult them in Difficulties, to have present Access to them, and their Help at hand; by visible Signs, their Gods testified their Presence, they saw them in their Effigies, and often had Appearances of the Gods themselves. Their Religion was a Temple-kind of Religion, the Religion of a Temple-state and Stateliness, ritual and external, Pompous and Splendid, which is a Religion, after the manner that unregenerate Mankind affecteth. Their Temples, Altars, Images, (gross and visible Objects of Worship, which sensitive Souls dote upon,) their Priests, Sacrifices, Feasts, Aspersions, Lustrations (easy Methods of cleansing themselves from Sin) belong to their Temple-State of Religion. They had their splendid and magnificent Temples, their Idols sumptuously adorn’d, their mode of God’s Service Stately, with Lights, Musick, Odours, Vessels shining with Pearl, and the Priests Garments shining with pretious-Stones, the processionary Pomps of their Gods also, their Triumphs, Games, and Sights, (Sword-fightings, Scenical Plays, and Ludi seculares, which were in honour of their Gods,) were part of the Pomps and Vanities of this World, which are hugely taking to a carnal Mind. As themselves were a mundan-kind of People, so the principal Design of the Heathen-Popular Religion, was a mundan Felicity. The Idolatry, both of Rome-Heathen, and Heathen-Christian is, in the design of it, a worldly Religion, (it designeth to swim in worldly Felicity, and the Enjoyments of this present Life,) both have been attended with secular Pomp and Grandeur, Plenty, and Prosperity.
The badness of the Heathen Virtue and Goodness.Consectary 4. The fourth Consectary, concerning the badness of the Heathen Virtue and Goodness, hath been already consider’d, in the first Part of this Essay; after which, it may not be improper here to consider that branch of the Pelagian Controversy, “Whether the seeming Virtues and good Works of the Gentiles are true or false, Sins and Vices, or Virtues and Well-doings, in what sense, and how far they are so?” If we say, “That all their Virtues, and good Works, are in no sense true,” we contradict the Apostle, Rom. 2. 14. “The Gentiles do, by Nature, the Things contain’d in the Law.” But, if we say, “That the true Virtues, and good Works, are found in the Gentile World,” we destroy the Necessity of Christianity, confound Nature and Grace, Gentilism and Christianism, the Atheous World with the City of God; we contradict the Nature of Things, by supposing, that Men do what is truly Holy and Pious, antecedently to the first Principles of true Piety and Sanctity; we contradict the scriptural Account of the Heathen State and Life, the whole Stream of the sacred Penmen, who affirm, That “without Faith it is impossible to please God,” Hebr. 11. 6. Which must not be understood of such a Faith as is common to Infidels, as some understand it; but of the Faith, which constituteth Divine Believers, and God’s Religionists that come unto God. The Gentiles “have their Hearts purified by Faith.” The Mind and Practice of Unbelievers is “defiled, impure, and unholy. The Carnal Mind is no keeper of the Law of God; they, that are in the Flesh, cannot please God. Ye are married to another” (saith the Apostle) “to have your Fruit unto Holiness, and to bring forth Fruit unto God. We are created in Christ unto good Works.” The genuine kind of Virtues are, “The Fruits of the Holy Spirit, a corrupt Tree cannot bring forth good Fruit, of Thorns Men do not gather Figs, nor of a Bramble-Bush gather they Grapes. When ye were the Servants of Sin, ye were free from Righteousness,” the Practice whereof is “a Walking, not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit. Every one that doth Righteousness, is born of God.” The true and genuine Kind of Virtue, Goodness, and Righteousness, is that which is of the Kingdom of God, of the Divine Image, and the New-Man that is renewed in Knowledge, (which is inconsistent with a State of Atheous Ignorance,) whichis of a new Creature, a new and divine Birth unto Righteousness, of the new Covenant and Dispensation of Things, of the true Vine, and of a Divine Charity, which is the Essence, and Summary, of the truly Divine Moral Virtue, and the genuine kind of good Works. “Though I bestow all my Goods to feed the Poor, and give my Body to be burn’d, and have not Charity, it profiteth nothing.” The Natural Man’s Kind of Virtue, Goodness, and Righteousness, therefore is, according to these Notices of Scripture, on this side that, which is the true and genuine Kind of Virtue, Goodness, and Righteousness; nor can the true Virtues, Goodness, and Justice, exist without being truly Virtuous, Just, and Good, as to God, which is true Piety, Sanctity; nor can that be the true Kind of Virtue, Goodness, and Justice, which cannot constitute Men of the truly Good and Virtuous Kind, God’s Kind of Virtuous, Good, and Just Men, whose Judgment is according to Truth. But, as there is a secular and mundan Kind of Wisdom and Prudence, in itself laudable, ornamental and useful, (such is the common Jurisprudence,) yet originally it is Base and Vile, being but Earth-born, not Divine, and Heaven-born; objectively it is Base and Vile, not being conversant about Divine Things; of Kind and Quality, it is also Base and Vile, being of Kind common, Graceless, and Unholy; and effectively it is not Wisdom, for it cannot constitute any Man truly Wise, nor Wise as to the main, but it continueth him where it found him, in the State of Atheous Ignorance, Error and Folly: So there is a secular and mundan Kind of Virtue and Goodness, which, in its own Nature, is Laudable, Ornamental, and Useful at a great rate; yet Originally, Objectively, and also of Kind and Quality, it is but Base and Vile, and effectively it is not Virtue, Justice, and Goodness; for it cannot constitute any Man Virtuous, Just, and Good; not Virtuous, Just, and Good, as to the main, but it continues him where it found him, in the State of reigning Sin and Unrighteousness. His Works are not “wrought in God,” as our Saviour says, Joh. 3. 21. by which he certainly means Theism of Religion and Condition. The Heathens are not truly Holy and Religious towards God in any thing, but are Atheous, Graceless, and Unholy, not only in their indifferent Actions, and their Evil-doings (materially such,) but in their Religious Actions, in their Virtue, Goodness, and Well-doing (materially such;) these are not of Kind, and for the main, the truly good and holy Kind of Virtues, Duties, and good Works. Their manner of doing what is materially Good, partakes not of the truly Good and Holy in the main Principle, Motive, End, and formal Object. They are not right in those grand Ingredients, which are essential to every one of the truly good Actions; for they live not to the true God, as his Servants, in the Exercise of all Divine Virtues; they, therefore, so sin in practicing their Virtue, as to be inconsistent with Sanctity; and, therefore, they are Wicked and Ungodly in all their Virtuous Practice, and Well-doing.
With this account of the Virtues and good Works of the Gentiles, the general Sense of Christians agreeth. “It is a plain and granted Truth among all that are truly Pious, that without true Piety, that is, the true Worship of the true God, no Man can have the true” (kind of) “Virtue.” The Pagan Theologers themselves say, that Piety is μή τηρ τών ἀρετών, the Mother of the Virtues; their Virtues, therefore, could not be of the holy and godly Kind, if their Religion and Piety was of a contrary Kind and Family. Warm have been the Disputes among Christians, “Whether all the Actions of Infidels be Sins, or not?” But the greater Number seem to be of Opinion, That all the Works of the Unregenerate have the Nature of Sins (as the Church of England determineth) and are not good Works (wanting some Essentials thereto) but Sins in the sight of God, altho’ they be materially Good.
It is not reasonable to attempt a Reconcilement of all the jarring Accounts of the Pagans Virtues and good Works, for none can reconcile Contradictions; but the most of them may commodiously be reconcil’d, by considering their Ethical and Political Virtue, (which may be call’d the Human Moral, or Human-Social Virtue,) and representing the true Character thereof. This sort of Virtue (which separate from the true Divine-Moral Virtue is manifestly competible to Heathen Mankind) is an Atheous and unholy Kind of Virtue, and, therefore, is of Character a virtue-less Kind of Virtue, and a bad Kind of Goodness. But, amongst the sinful Kinds of doing Duty, (the evil manner of doing what is materially Good,) there is this remarkable Difference; in some of them, that which is materially Good, is done in so criminal a Manner, and out of Ends and Principles so Vitious, that the Nature of Virtue is intirely lost out of the Action, and it becomes (like Pharisaical Holiness) Vice simply so called; but it is otherwise in this alien Kind of Virtue and Well doing, which is a different evil Kind of doing what is materially Good, for the Nature of Virtue and Well-doing is in part really preserv’d and retain’d in it, as the Nature of an Olive is in the Wild-Olive. The Virtues of the Gentiles, therefore, are Sin in one sense, but not in another. He that saith, They are Sin, Vice and Crime, not Righteousness and true Holiness, saith true; but he that saith, They are not any sort of Virtue, saith false. They are not so Vice, as not to be an unholy Virtue and Well-doing. They are not simply, either Vice, or Virtue; for they are not the true and genuine, but the spurious and illegitimate, Kind of good Works. The case is the same, if we consider them with respect to the Law, or Rule of Virtue and Duty. For, as the holy kind of Virtues are of kind and for the main, according to the Law of our Piety and Holiness towards God, who is the formal Object of our Obedience, whom we ought to obey out of dutiful Affection to him, and to make the pleasing him, his Honour and Service the chief End of our Doings and Business of our Lives: So the Atheous unholy kind of Duties, Virtues, and good Works, are, of kind and for the main, against the Law of our Piety and Holiness towards God, and, therefore, have the Nature of Sins; they are against the Law of our Piety and Holiness, both by way of privation and opposition; for the not living unto God, is an undeifying him (as far as is in our power,) a being an Enemy to him, and a living to ourselves; the not regarding and affecting him dutifully, is a disregarding him, and a disaffecting him, and a regarding and affecting somewhat else above him and against him, and therefore the natural Man, by his unholy Kind of Virtue, is no otherwise Virtuous, than so as to be an Impietist towards God. Yet it has so much in it of the Nature of Virtue, that the Apostle styleth it “a doing the Things contain’d in the Law”; God himself hath so much respect to it, that he rewardeth it several ways: No Man, upon his Conversion, so repenteth of it, as he doth of his Sins simply so called. It is not only a doing what is materially Good (which is of good Example to others, and may be of great advantage to the Publick:) But in its Principle, impulsive Cause, and End, there is so much Good as serveth to constitute it a spurious and degenerate kind of Virtue and Well-doing, as will appear from the Heathens Principles of laudable Practice, which may be reduc’d to these Four. 1. Good-Nature and natural Instinct.2. Human-Socialness. 3. An unholy Kind of respect for Worth and Virtue, Honesty and Duty, Justice and Equity, Reason and Ingenuity, Civility, Decency, and Order, and a like respect for himself, his own Perfection and Felicity. 4. Religion on this side true Religion.
Of the Principles of laudable Practice amongst the Heathens.In the first place, Animal Temper and the kindly Instincts, which are in Animal Nature, may be call’d Good-Nature, which is a Principle of laudable Practice; for Mankind have this in common with the Brutes, of whom some are tame, tractable, placid; others are fierce and savage, and have the Name of Evil Beasts, which Name implyeth, that there are good-natur’d Beasts. Cato was of a good Nature, if, as Cicero says of him, “Nature had fram’d him to Gravity and Temperance”; or, if, as Velleius Paterculus saith, “He was therefore Virtuous, because he could not be otherwise.” Some are by natural Temper and Constitution averse from certain Vices, (Sordidness, Cruelty, Impudence;) and disposed to the contrary Virtues, (Generosity, Clemency, Modesty;) so amongst the Romans some Virtues are observ’d to have been Hereditary in certain Families in continued Succession, and great Vices, (Fury, Luxury, Libidinousness,) in others; “I am of Opinion” (saith Quintilian Declam. 260) “That the Morals of all are born with them, and the proper Virtues of every Nature.” Plato (in his Tenth of Laws) speaketh of a sort of good-natur’d Atheists, “who think that there are no Gods at all, yet are by Nature of a just Disposition, hating bad Men and Injustice, they will do no such Practices themselves, and those Men that are not just they shun, and love them that are just.” Altho’ Instances of Ferity and Barbarity are no Rarities amongst Men, yet a certain Goodness, Kindness, Benignity, and Tenderness, is part of our natural Constitution, and an effect of our bodily Temper, which so far prevaileth in the World of Mankind, that it commonly beareth the Name of Humanity, as Cruelty is call’d Inhumanity, and the Rod of Mansuetude, “the Rod of Men,” 2 Sam. 7. 14. As bodily Temper, so the kindly Instincts which are in Animal Nature, are Principles of laudable Practices. Such as natural Affection towards Children and near Kindred, Commiseration for the Afflicted, a natural Sympathy, Gratitude, and Kindness, for our Friends and Benefactors (remarkable in Dogs, Lions, and even Birds,) common Sociableness and Friendliness, particular Friendship, a Propension to please and oblige others, a natural Benignity and Generosity, desire of our own Welfare and Happiness, care of our Reputation, aversion from Infamy, Misery, and Death.
A Second Principle of laudable Practices is a Human-Social Disposition, (which is a goodness of Nature, and in great degree an innate Instinct in Man;) for all the Human-Social and Human-Moral Virtue and Duty, commonly call’d the Political and Ethical, is compriz’d in, and may be inferr’d from, this one Principle. For all political Virtue and Duty towards Mankind in general, towards our Country, all Civil-Social Charity and Justice, the common Offices of Humanity and Civil Neighbourhood, the oeconomical Duties, Duties of near Relations and of Friendship, belong to Man as Social, as Human-Social, and he is not Man without the Human-Morals. In this great Law, great Virtue and Duty, of Man’s being Human-Social, Civil-Social (not Anti-Social) is manifestly compriz’d “a Civil-Social kind of universal Benevolence to ourselves and all Mankind, which affecteth and endeavoureth the Good of the Publick, and is opposite to what is hurtful;” from which Benevolence Universal (“Caritas humani Generis” Cicero calls it) all Mundan Political Virtue is deduceable. As it is also from another great Principle compriz’d in the Pagan Human-Social Disposition; “The Subordination and Relation of all Men, and lesser Societies of Men, to the great Body of Mankind, as of Parts to the Whole, and of Citizens to the Mundan City.” From these Principles both the Popular and Philosophick Pagans practis’d Civil Virtue, as the Bees do in some sort, that have political Order and Government amongst them: And this their Practice of political Virtue constituted and denominated a good and just Man of their Idea. One Antenor, who wrote the Cretan History, was nam’d Δέλτα (amongst the Cretans δέλτος signified Good,) διὰ τὸ ὰγαθὸς ἐἵ καὶ ϕιλόπολις, “becausehe was good and a lover of his City;To live well” (saith Plutarch) “is to live Sociably and Friendly, and Temperately and Justly.” The generality of the Pagans suppos’d, that the observance of their political Laws constituted them just Men.
A Third Principle of laudable Practices is a respect for Worth and Virtue, Honesty and Duty, Justice and Equity, Reason and Ingenuity, Civility, Decency, and Order; and a like respect for ourselves, our own Perfection and Felicity, without any regard to God, or Holiness. For, as there is a Human-Social Virtue, which is on this side the Holy-Social, so there is a regard for Worth and Virtue, Honesty, Reason, and Justice, which is on this side true Holiness and Godliness. The Pagans practis’d the Virtue which they teach, “fugiendae turpitudinis causa, to shun that which is base and shameful,” τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα because it was Just and Good, Virtuous, or Honest.” Their Maxim was “Honestum per se expetendum, that which is Virtuous, is Self-desirable”; and some of them have said, “A Feast is nothing else but the doing one’s Duty.” Out of regard to Decency and Order, they practis’d the small Morals, (that may well be defin’d, as the Stoicks define Modesty, the Science of decent Motion,) which are the opposites to Rudeness, Rusticity, and Impoliteness of Behaviour. And for their great Morals, (altho’ their practice of them was without any regard to God, or Holiness,) their Notions were so high and generous, that they profess’d a contempt of Life, and “to throw the Body into the Fire, when Reason, when Dignity, when Fidelity, requireth it,A virtuous Man will die for his Friends and Country, he will throw away his Money and Honours, and all the Goods that Men contest about ϖριποιούμρυος ἒαυτῳ τὸ καλὸν, acquiring, or preserving to himself that which is Beautiful in matter of Life and Practice.”Miltiades taught the Athenians, “to acknowledge no Lord but the Laws, and to be afraid of nothing more than that which is Evil andUnjust”; and of Themistocles the Orator saith, “That willingly he would not set any Thing before Virtue and his Duty.To be Virtuous is a great Accomplishment, and every Virtue is an Accomplishment.” The Philosophick Pagans, therefore, (at least the better sort of them,) betook themselves to the Study and Exercise of Virtue out of regard to their Perfection and Felicity, which they suppos’d to consist in their Virtue, which in many Instances was (in some respect) very laudable and imitable. Such was the Platonists disaffecting ta’tni’de, the Things that are here, the not desiring or using them any farther, than so far as there is need; and the Stoicks gacnr kekolasménh, restrain’d Belly, or narrow-bounded Appetite. The Pagans, both Popular and Philosophick, had also a regard to Self-approbation and the Tranquillity of their own Mind. “There is no greater Theatre” (saith Cicero ) “for Virtue, than our own Mind, approving and applauding.” They had also a Self-reverence, or regard to their own Dignity of Person.—Πάντων δὲ μάλις’ ἀιοχύνεο σαυτὸν, Above all others reverence thy-self. ”
A fourth Principle of laudable Practices is Religion on this side true Religion; for it was from a Principle of Religion, and out of regard to a Deity, that Heathens thought themselves oblig’d, to do nothing against their Consciences, but to keep them unspotted; that they look’d upon the Dictates of their practical Reason as Laws; that they had Hopes and Fears, Peace and Perplexity, Joys and Anxieties, from their Consciences, That they look’d upon themselves as bound to Innocence, to Gratitude, to keep Faith, to take care of their Children and Parents, to have a special Kindness for their near Kindred, to do the Offices of Humanity towards Mankind in general, and acts of Heroical Virtue for the publick Benefit; that they thought Men criminal and punishable, not only for Facts of Wickedness (such as Adultery, Theft, Homicide,) but for the Will of Evil-doing; that they shun’d the perpetration of Wickedness in secret, dreaded Perjury, rever’d an Oath; that they accounted Injustice towards Men, and all vicious Errors in Life and Practice,(which they called ἁμαρτνίματα, Sins,) nothing less than Impieties; that the Philosophick-Pagan Religionists thought themselves oblig’d to practise all the Virtues which were in their Institution, and to shun all the Vices; that they propos’d to themselves an Imitation of the Deity, and suppos’d, that nothing could be well done, “without having respect to the Things Divine”; and therefore (as some of themselves say) “they had an Eye to the Deity in every thing great and little”; and lastly, that they look’d upon themselves as bound to an intire Subjection to the Governor of the World, and to all the Branches of active and passive Obedience to him, real, or imaginary. The natural Man, therefore, in a considerable degree, hath Notices of what is Good and Bad, Virtuous and Vicious, Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust (towards the Deity, as well as towards Men,) of what is Worthy and Unworthy, that some things are very Vile and Dishonourable, others are Becoming, Excellent and Honourable; and, altho’ he is an Impietist, yet he hath his Virtues and Well doings, “that are from Conscience, not Vain-Glory.” The Heathen joineth Religion and Justice towards Men; as Nicias, (of whom Thucydides saith, “He was the Man of all the Grecians of my time, that least deserv’d to be brought to so great a degree of Misery, ) who, falling into a great Calamity in Syracuse, told his afflicted Army, “I have worshipp’d the Godsfrequently according to the Laws, and liv’d justly and unblameably towards Men.” The Heathen will be just, because, in his way, he is religious. “He that is unjust is impious. For the Nature of the Universe having made all rational Beings for one another, so as to benefit one another, as they are worthy, but in no wise to hurt; he that transgresseth the Will hereof, is manifestly impious towards the most antient of the Gods.”
The Virtue of the Heathens was an unholy and degenerate kind of Virtue.It is one thing, to say, that a Man is an ungodly Heathen; and another thing, to say, he is an ungodly virtuous Heathen: And it is one thing, to say, of an Action of his, it is an ungodly Action; and another thing, to say, it is an ungodly virtuous Action. When the natural Man doth that which is materially good, it may be done, for the main, from such good Principles, and for such good Ends, as are competible to the mere natural Man. An Heathen may venture into the Fire, to pull his Child our, partly from a Principle of Good-Nature, and natural Instinct, partly for the conservation of Human Society, partly out of an unholy respect to Fortitude, and partly from Religion on this side true Religion; and this Action of his, in venturing into the Fire for his Child, is of an opposite Nature, both to the Sin of exposing his Child, and also to the Sin of venturing into the Fire (like the Indians) for Vain-Glory. Both the Actions of this latter sort are Sin, simply so call’d: But to declaim against the former as such, is the Voice of a Barbarian, not of a Christian. This Maxim, therefore, needeth a limitation, That the same Action cannot be both morally Good and Evil. For, altho’ the same Action cannot be a true and genuine kind of morally good Action, and a morally evil Action; yet one of the Heathen Man’s kind of good Works is therefore Sin, because it is opposite unto Holiness, and it is so far Sin (and therefore morally Evil,) as it is opposite unto Holiness, (which is not a true and genuine kind of morally good Action;) yet this hindereth it not from being a spurious and degenerate kind of morally good Action.
On the other hand, altho’ it is of kind, and for the main, a sort of Virtue and Well-doing; yet no carnal, wicked, unholy kind of Man (remaining such) doth any thing that is, of kind and for the main, Righteousnessand true Holiness, no holy kind of Duty, or good Work: But, when he doth that which is materially good, out of his kind of virtuous Principles, and for his kind of virtuous Ends, yet he is carnal, wicked, and unholy-virtuous in those his Doings; and they are like himself, of kind and for the main wicked, carnal, and unholy kind of virtuous Doings; or they are the carnal, wicked and unholy Man’s kind of Doings, not simply so; but they are the carnal, wicked, unholy Man’s kind of virtuous Doings. His kind of living is an Atheous kind of living; his virtuous kind of living is the Atheous-virtuous kind of living, which is not the living unto the true God as his Servant, but opposite thereto, an ungodly kind of virtuous living. Let us suppose, that Hercules undertakes immense Labours, to save Mankind from Monsters and Tyrants, out of no better Principle than Good-Nature, natural Instinct of kindness for his Relations, regard to the preservation of human Society, a regard to an unholy kind of Fortitude, and from something of Religion on this side true Religion, (suppose an imitation of Jove, called his Father,) this the Pagans accounted Heroical Virtue. But Hercules’s kind of virtuous living was an Atheous kind of virtuous living, it was devoid of true Piety and Holiness, and repugnant to it. The Character, therefore, of the ungodly Man’s virtuous Actions, or Well-doings, consisteth of two parts: For every one of them, being consider’d as a part of his whole living, appeareth to be, both depriv’d of, and opposite to, Holiness and Godliness, and so complicated with Sin, as to be only a spurious and illegitimate kind of Virtue, rather Vice than Virtue; because, in reference to God, it is not Virtue. And, if those virtuous Doings of the Pagans are so vicious, which issu’d from Principles, that ought to be conjoin’d with, and subordinate to, true Piety and Holiness, (Good-Nature, natural Instinct, and a human-social Disposition,) what foul Crimes are the greater part of their virtuous Doings, which manifestly issued from, and were subordinated to, one of the foulest of Vices, the inordinate Appetite of Vain-Glory? For so the Orator Isocrates (whom Dionysius Halicarnasseus preferreth before the Philosophers as a Teacher of Morality,) who calleth himself a Philosopher, and a great acquaintance and admirer of Socrates, professedly maketh Vain-glory the Principle, End, and Rule of all his Actions, and of other Mens.
As for the Fact of the Aegyptian Mid-Wives,(which is all eg’d to prove, that mere Heathens do good Deeds, that are not, of kind and for the main, sinful,) it is not difficult to answer such Allegations. For, either the Aegyptians were the Religionists of the true God, or they were not. If they were God’s Religionists, (imperfectly, or more perfectly,) their case is no parallel for mere Heathens. If they were not, then their Fact was, for the main and of kind, sinful; yet being, of kind and for the main, spurious and degenerate Virtue and Well-doing, it was rewarded with Temporal Blessings. It is commonly said, That God does not so much regard what we do, as why we do it: But we ought rather to say, The thing that God regardeth is, of what kind our Doings are. For, unless we ourselves be holy and godly Persons, of kind and for the main such, and unless our Doings be of the same sort, neither we, nor they, otherwise than in a limited improper sense, can be pleasing and acceptable in God’s Eyes. The Heathen Philosophers were not holy, or godly kind of Persons, their divine Virtue was not the holy and godly kind of Virtue, it was not a faithful serving and pleasing the true God; but a self-serving, self-pleasing, self-adorning, self-excellence, self-beatitude, separate from, and contrary to, the life of true Piety and Holiness. Therefore no other Virtue is competible to unregenerate Mankind, than such as is consistent with the reign of the inordinate carnal Self-love, (which is the Essence and Summary of all Wickedness, which reigneth in all that are void of the divine Love, which is the Essence and Summary of all divine vital Virtue;) the Atheousness of their Virtue and Well-doings is imputable to the inordinate carnal Self-love, which causeth the want of the love of God; and, because they are devoid of the Love of God, and are none of his Servants, therefore their Virtues and Well-doings (from whatever Principle they issue) are a certain self-serving, and self-pleasing, not a serving and pleasing God. Therefore their specious Well-doings symbolize with the rest of the specious Things of this World, they are not what at first sight they seem to be.
Of the Deadliness of our Heathen State.The fifth consectary is touching the Deadliness of our Heathen State; for the Scripture looketh upon us, antecedently to the Life and State of true and saving Religion, as deadly Criminals, as dead, and as the Subjects of Satan’s Kingdom: As deadly Criminals, our Character consisteth of two branches, which imply and infer one another; for, in our Heathen State, we are aliens from the Life of Righteousness, deadly Sinners in Life and Practice; and we are not Faithful Friends to God and Holiness.
1. Mankind are, in Scripture, divided into two opposite Parties and Families (that are contrary kind of People, of a contrary Genius and Temper, that walk in contrary Ways, belonging to contrary Societies,) which are known by the Names of the Righteous and the Wicked, the Just and the Unjust, the Godly and the Ungodly, the Pious and the Impious, the Holy and the Unholy, the Good and the Evil, the Saints of God and Sinners that are not Saints, the Children of Light and the Children of the World, the Children of God and the Children of the Devil, the Carnal and the Spiritual; all which Distinctions and Descriptions of two opposite Parties denote their different Life and Practice. The one are the Servants of Sin, not the Servants of God and of Righteousness; the other are the Servants of God and of Righteousness, not the Servants of Sin. Rom. 6. 18, 20, 22. The one are the Workers of Iniquity, not the Practisers of Righteousness; the other are the Practisers of Righteousness, not the Workers of Iniquity. Psal. 14. 4. and 15. 2. Of this Kind, Quality, and Character, are all that are in the State and Life of the true and saving Religion; notwithstanding that they are guilty of Weaknesses, Sins of Ignorance and Surprize, altho’ they have inter mixtures of blemish in their Souls, and of blame in their Lives; yet their Life is not the wicked, sinning, unrighteous kind of Life, but the contrary; their tenor, course, and way of living is the Way of Righteousness, not only in some particular Acts, but of kind, and for the main. They perpetrate no heinous Iniquity, no deadly atrocious Sin; so far they are faultless, perfect, and undefiled. They keep no Favourite Sin, allow of no Sin, nor allow themselves in any, nor can they dispense with sinning against God; and, therefore, they are not, in any respect, Children of Disobedience, nor Rebels against God. They are also the Doers of Righteousness, both towards God and Man; and the Righteousness which they practise, is not the counterfeit and illegitimate, but the true and saving kind of Righteousness, contra distinguish’d from the Righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees. The Wicked, in several degrees, are such as the Old-Test a ment characterizeth and complaineth of; that are estrang’d and are far from God, that forsake him, and live in forgetfulness and contempt of God, and have not the Fear of God before their Eyes, that are altogether become Filthy and do abominable Works, that are far from Righteousness, and desire not the knowledge of God’s Ways, presumptuous Sinners that Sin with a high hand, and make a Mock of Sin, Sons of Belial that know not the Lord, lewd Debauchees, revelling voluptuous Sensualists, Unclean, Evil-speakers, Lyars, Slanderers, Falsifiers of Trusts, Oaths and Contracts, unjust Dealers, the Children of Pride, Sons of Violence and of Blood, disobedient to Parents, perpetrating the horrid Sins against God (Atheism, Idolatry, Blasphemy, Magick,) the horrid Sins against Nature (Sodomy, Bestiality, Incest,) the horrid Sins against human Society (Robbery, Rapine, Murder,) the heinous Violaters of the Duties of both Tables, the Duties of Piety, Charity, Justice, Sobriety. They are not those that walk with God in the Duties of religious Society, that have clean Hands and a pure Heart.
In the New-Testament, all Mankind, antecedently to the State and Life of true and saving Religion, are represented as deadly “Sinners, the Ungodly, all under Sin” (as deadly criminal Livers are under it,) “a guilty World” (subjected to Condemnation) “before God; for all have” (deadly) “sinned, and come short of the Glory of God” (as to the having with him Glory.) As we were carnal, “those that are after the Flesh,” so we liv’d after it, and brought forth the Fruits of it, “fulfilling the Desires of the Flesh, and of the Mind,” Eph. 2. 3. As we were those that are “of the World,” so we lived “after the course of it,” not living a Life of doing God Service, but of serving Sin (the Flesh) and “diverse Lusts, the Lust of the Flesh, the Lust of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life,” Tit. 3. 3. which live and reign in unregenerate Mankind, whose Life is a serving and pleasing them as a Law. They are not of a Divine Kind of Nature, but Aliens, and at Enmity with God, by doing evil Works, Col. 1. 21. not the Lovers of God, and of their Brother, but of the World, that have not “the Love of God in them, Man-haters, Man-slayers,” 1 Joh. 3. 13–17. and “have not eternal Life abiding in them.” And, because they are of the evil kind, (“Dogs, Swine, Serpents, Vipers,” Rev. 22. 15. Mat. 7. 6. and 3. 7. and 23. 33.) they are necessarily the Children of the Evil-one, and his resembling Off-spring, making a worldly-happy Estate, or a carnal selfish Interest of Credit, Prosperity, and sensual Delight, their chief Good, End, and Business, and preferring it before the Favour of God, the Interest of his Service and Kingdom, and their everlasting Happiness. Themselves, their Virtue and Religion, (for all Men pretend to Virtue, and almost all to Religion,) have their Character from the three grand Enemies of Christianity and Godliness, the Devil, the Flesh, and the World; for they are the wicked, carnal, and worldly kind of Men, of virtuous Men, and of Religionists. Their Virtue, Righteousness, and Religion, is of Kind illegitimate, and continueth them in their Wickedness, Carnality, and mundan Alliance.
2. Mankind, antecedently to the State and Life of true and saving Religion, are deadly Criminals also, upon account of a second branch of their Character; for, whether they be open Aliens and Enemies, or pretenders to God and Holiness, they are not the faithful Friends of God and Holiness. In all Relations of Friendship, Unfaithfulness is the summary of all Vice and Crime, and Faithfulness is the summary of all Virtue and Duty; for Unfaithfulness is a failure of Duty, in Mind, Will, and Meaning; Faithfulness, the contrary. God’s People are without Guile, and, therefore, the Righteous and Uncondemnable in the judgment of Equity, no Guilt is imputable to them; they are absolutely Sinless, as in the future State, or at least unchargeable with Wickedness. “Blessed is the Man, unto whom the Lord imputeth no Iniquity, and in whose Spirit there is no Guile.” Of this truly noble Character, is every faithful Adherent to God and Righteousness, such as “Abraham was, whose Heart was faithful before God.” He forsaketh Iniquity, in Will and Affection, universally and unreservedly, so that he is not dead in Sin, nor in the State of reigning Sin, and his course of Life is the Holy and Sinless. Wittingly and willingly he doth no Iniquity (therefore is no Rebel, no Traitor,) practiseth no heinous deadly Sinning. His Bent, Mind, and Will, is not partially and dividedly (which is a traiterous with-holding our Love and Affection,) but fully and intirely for God and Righteousness, which have sincerely his utmost Esteem and Affection, being his chief Good, (as Sin the chief Evil;) nothing being so dear to him, but what he will part with for them, whom he serves with his Best, and with his All, notwithstanding all Difficulties and Discouragements. And, as a Sovereign and a Master cannot repute such Men that ought to be his Subjects and Servants, Upright, Honest, Sincere, and Faithful, that are not dutifully affected and dispos’d towards Him and his Service: So God cannot repute any Man Upright in Heart, Honest, Sincere, and Faithful, that is not dutifully, uprightly, sincerely, and faithfully affected and dispos’d towards him and his Service. Therefore we ought to consider who they are, that may be denominated simply, and without addition, the faithful Friends of God and Holiness; for all others are such, that are devoid of this intire Integrity and Faithfulness, (which alone is constitutive of the truly Righteous,) notwithstanding a partial, or limited, Integrity and Faithfulness which they have. They are so far from being dutifully and rightly Affected, that they are the Disaffected; so far from being faithful Friends to God and Righteousness, that they are Enemies (usually deadly Enemies, and such as may be called faithful Enemies,) their Mind, Will, and Meaning is in excusably amiss, because they are not, simply, and without addition, The faithful Friends of God and Righteousness, and the faithful Enemies of Sin and Wickedness.
Many are loyal and faithful to a secular Master, or Sovereign, that are not God’s faithful Servants. Robbers (some of them) will be faithful to those of their own Gang. Many Men, of Civil-social Virtue only, will be faithful in matters of ordinary Justice, and, in some particular affair, faithful Messengers, Servants, Soldiers. If we suppose Abimelech an evil Man, as some will have him; yet, as to the business of Abraham’s Wife (Gen. 20. 6.) there was no Iniquity, no Pravity in his Mind, Will, or Meaning; he meant no Wrong to Abraham, whose Wife she was (to him altogether unknown,) and, therefore, in that particular affair, he was “Upright, Right, and without Iniquity.”
There is a Faithfulness in Judaism, as well as in Christianity; for when any one will change his Religion, and become a Proselyte of Justice, the Jews require, “that he do it, not for the Vanity of the World,” (any secular Advantage,) “but out of Love, and from the whole Heart.” Such a Faithfulness and Integrity in adhering to their God, in opposition to Idols and false Gods, was requir’d of the Jews, in the antient times of their Commonwealth, as the Condition of their temporal Blessings. A Faithfulness to their Institution, as it was carnal Judaism, those Jews had, who thought, they did God good Service in killing Christians, Joh. 16. 2. And thus the Apostle, when he outrageously persecuted the Christians, was Faithful to his Institution, he never wilfully violated the Rules of Well-doing according to carnal Judaism, and, therefore, had the carnal Judaical Man’s good Conscience, as he professeth, Acts 26. 9. “I have lived in all good Conscience before God until this Day.”
There is a Faithfulness in Paganism, as well as in Judaism. For Numa consecrated a Temple to Faithfulness. Regulus is a known Instance of Faithfulness. Pyrrhus said of Fabritius, that it was harder to turn him out of the way of Justice, than the Sun out of his Course.Papinianus, the Lawyer, being commanded to defend the wicked Fact of the Emperor Caracalla, who had barbarously killed his Brother Geta, he chose rather to dye than to do it. In China, there is a Temple of Chastity, erected in commemoration of five Virgins, who, being taken by Thieves, took away their own Lives, to avoid being ravish’d. Several of the Heathens were sofar faithful and uprightly dispos’d, that, in several particular Actions, neither Shame, Torment, Exile, or Death, could prevail with them to violate the Dictates of their Minds; and several of them were true and faithful Worshippers of false Gods; they were Faithful to their Institution of Heathenism, and these may be said, to have The Heathen Man’s good Conscience.
Yet, in the unsound Profession of Christianity, in carnal Judaism, and in Heathenism, there are no such Persons as the Upright, the Sincere and Faithful; and, consequently, there is no such thing as the Uprightness of the Upright, the Sincerity of the Sincere, the Faithfulness of the Faithful. For, in these Regions, all are the Wicked and the Ungodly; whereas, if any of them were the Upright and the Faithful, these must necessarily be the Righteous, and in the State of justified Persons. Wherefore the Natural and Heathen Man’s Uprightness, Sincerity, and Faithfulness, is of the same Nature and Character with the rest of his Virtue, it is of a spurious and degenerate Kind, (as being on this side Holiness and Godliness,) not the intire Integrity, not the right Kind of Uprightness, not the holy and godly Kind of Sincerity, 2 Cor. 1. 12.) but a faithless Kind of Faithfulness. And this is what is meant by “a natural and moral Integrity.” Which sort of Integrity is competible to Rebel-Sinners, to such as are revolted from God and his Kingdom, and from true Righteousness and Holiness, in whom it is necessarily complicated with the most heinous Disloyalty and Unfaithfulness; from which none can be excus’d, who are not, as his Liege-Subjects and Servants, loyally affected unto God and unsinning Righteousness towards him: The Ignorance of the Jews and Gentiles did not excuse them, because they might have known better, and would have known better, if they had been, so far as they might have been, the faithful Friends of God and Righteousness, and the faithful Enemies of Sin and Wickedness. With this Limitation the Philosopher’s Rule ought to be propos’d, which otherwise is not, universally, a safe Rule of Practice. “That which appeareth to thee” (as a faithful Adherent to God and Righteousness) “to be the best, let that be to thee a Law inviolable.”
It is, however, to be observ’d, that some, who are not properly and formally the Upright and Faithful, are such in aptness of Disposition, and in an initial degree; being such as mean well towards God and Righteousness, who are out of the State and Life of true and saving Religion, but with abatement of sense. These are they, that are denominated “Christ’s Sheep,” Joh. 10. 4, 10. those that “are of the Truth,” Joh. 18. 37. and Luk. 8. 15. those that have “an honest and good Heart”; which is a degree of that Integrity, which constituteth the Faithful and Upright in Heart, simply so called. The Phrase denoteth an honest and good Heart, in respect of the Word of true and saving Religion, and the receiving thereof, (an honest and good Heart so far;) by receiving which Honestly, Sincerely, and Faithfully (that is, without Vice, or Crime, as to Mind, Will, or Meaning) the Receiver becomes one of the Faithful and Upright in Heart, in a plenary Sense, whereas at first he is only so initially, and by way of preparatory Disposition. The Faithful and Upright, in aplenary sense, are Religionists of several Degrees. For many holy and good Men, under the Mosaical Oeconomy, were the faithful Lovers of God and of Righteousness; yet were very imperfect Religionists, agreeably to that Oeconomy. Our Saviour’s Disciples, while he was on Earth, that betray a great deal of Ignorance, Weakness, and many Imperfections at every turn, were the faithful and sincere Lovers of God and of Righteousness, but so as to be Religionists of a very mean Rank. And it seemeth reasonable to suppose, touching Cornelius, a Gentile, and a Proselyte, (and such like,) that God, from the Beginning of the World, having made Provision in Christ, that his and Christ’s Religionists should be in the State of Remission of Sins, Cornelius was imperfectly in this Divine Condition, before Conversion to Christianity: But, after the Gospel-settlement was made, his Conversion to Christianity was necessary, both for the continuance of what he had, and the completion of what he wanted.
3. The Scripture looketh upon Mankind, antecedently to the State and Life of true and saving Religion, not as alive, but as dead, or in the State of the Dead. So in the Oriental Philosophy they call’d those Men dead, “that are fallen from their Dogmata, are become Aliens from the discipline of Truth and Virtue, whence the Soul hath her Life, and have subjected their Mind to the Animal Passions.” As, when any one was ejected out of the Pythagoreans Society, they set up an empty Coffin in his Place, to signify, that he ought to be look’d upon as Dead. And the Platonists say, “That the Death of a rational Substance is, to be devoid of God and of Mind.” The Mahometans use the same way of speaking. The Hebrews also use this Symbolical way of expressing the Condition of the Wicked. Our Saviour also useth the same Mode of Expression, when he saith, Matth. 8. 22. “Let the dead bury their dead,” i.e. leave it to them, who are in a deadly State of Sin, to busy themselves about burying the Carcases of the Dead. And, as the Jews will not allow the Gentiles, to be reckon’d amongst the Living, so the Apostle looketh upon the World of Heathen Sinners, as in the State of the Dead. 1 Pet. 4. 6. “The Gospel was preach’d to them that are dead, that they might be judg’d according to Men in the Flesh,” i.e. suffer Death, the Death of Mortification, to which they are sentenc’d by the Gospel, that they who are dead in their Carnality, by the Death of it might live Spiritually. And this plain Notion of the Dead sufficiently explaineth a very obscure Phrase, which this Apostle useth, speaking of Christ, 1 Pet. 3. 18, 19, 20. “Being put to Death in the Flesh, but quicken’d by the Spirit. By which also he preach’d to the Spirits in Prison, which sometimes were Disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the Days of Noah.” If, instead of this Phrase, the Spirits in Prison, the Apostle had made use of this Expression, those that are in the State of the Dead, there had been no difficulty in his Words; every Interpreter would have said, those who are in the State of the Dead, is a Phrase expressive of the sadly-degenerate Condition of Mankind, who are dead in a moral Sense; that this Generation, those that are in the State of the Dead, was sometimes disobedient to the preaching of Noah, (degenerate Mankind were then incredulous, and now are so;) and that Christ by the Spirit, after his Resurrection, going preach’d to them, not in his own Person, but by his Apostles, in which sense St. Paul saith, he came and preach’d, Ephes. 2. 17. If there had been no difficulty in the Apostle’s Words, supposing that he had made use of this Phrase, those that are in the State of the Dead; the difficulty in them must not be thought great, altho’ the Apostle useth this Phrase, the Spirits in Prison, (which is of more affinity with the Spirit that he was speaking of, than the other;) because the Spirits in Prison, and those that are in the State of the Dead (vitiously Dead) are plainly equivalent Expressions. Now, if the Apostle had said, that, by the Spirit, Christ preach’d to those that are in the State of the Dead, every one would have said, the Apostle is his own Interpreter, he meaneth nothing but what himself saith in the compass of a few Verses (1 Pet. 4. 6.) that the Gospel was preach’d to the Dead; therefore, when the Apostle saith, that, by the Spirit, Christ preach’d to the Spirits in Prison, every one ought to Interpret his Meaning, by what himself saith a few Verses after, that the Gospel was preach’d, toi˜c nekroi’c, to them that are in the State of the Dead. The Spirits in Prison, in a literal Meaning, are the Dead in a literal Meaning; the Spirits in Prison, in a moral Meaning, are the Dead in a moral Meaning.
The Heathen, the Wicked, tho’ they live the Animal, the Human, and Human-Social, Life; tho’ they are alive unto Sin, and to their worldly and fleshly Interests and Concerns; tho’ they are not without their happy Life, and are alive in their own Conceit; yet they are dead 1. with respect to God and the Life of living to him. Thus the Prodigal Son was dead to his Father, who gave him over for lost. And, as they are departed from God, and, therefore, are dead to him; so God is departed from them, upon which account also they are dead, as the Body is dead, when the Soul is departed. They are dead, as to the proper Life of the Soul, the diviner Part, the only truly valuable Life, Excellency and Happiness. 2. The Wicked, in several Respects, resemble the Dead. They are in a Spiritual and Atheous kind of Darkness. “Weep for the Dead, for he hath lost the Light; and weep for the Fool, for he wanteth Understanding,” Eccles.22. 11. They have a lively Sense of their secular Interests, but have no perception of those Things, which are truly Good, or Evil. An holy vital Warmth and Fervour, Liveliness and Vigour is extinct in them; in Matters of true Religion, Virtue and Piety, they are torpid and inactive; their Virtue and Religion is but the Carcass of good Works. They are Vile, Worthless, Useless. “A living Dog is better than a dead Lyon.” Degenerate Mankind, in this respect also, resemble the Dead, they are impure and unclean. 3. They are surrounded by, and are subject to, those Evils, which are Death to the Soul, deadly Enemies, deadly Sins, deadly Sentence, and deadly Punishment. The State of the Wicked is a privation of true Light, Life, Truth, Wisdom, Health, Beauty, Order, Beatitude, Liberty, Nobility, Vigour, Power, Ease, Rest, Peace, Serenity, Delight, Pleasures, Goodness, Worth, Usefulness, Innocence, Purity, the Divinity, and Beatitude of the Soul; and a position of all the contrary Evils. This is a State of deadly criminal Evils; for which reason they fall into a deadly penal State, a penal privation of Remission of Sins, Peace and Reconcilement, Grace and Favour, of divine Alliance and Acceptance, of Election and Adoption, of the Inheritance, of Freedom and Citizenship in the Kingdom of God; and a position of the contrary.
In our Heathen State, we were related to God as Aliens and Enemies, and, therefore, we could have no Rights in the holy City, nor to the holy Deity thereof. Nor was it possible, that God should look upon us as his Allies, Subjects, Servants, or Liege-People; but our Estate was that of Apostates from, Traytors and open Rebels against, our Sovereign Liege-Lord, which is a State of Death. If any of the Heathen, remaining such, might be saved, it must be by a Deity; but there is no Deity, whereby they can be saved, who are not the People of the true God. The true God, being the Deity of true Religion and Godliness, will certainly punish the Atheous and Ungodly. And, if it be by a Deity, that Mankind must be saved, then they must be sav’d by being truly Religious. Therefore both the Popular and Philosophick-Pagans, that acknowledg’d a future Happiness, foully mistook the Way thither; for they rely’d upon their Mystick-Metaphysical Sanctity, their Teletae and the Hieratick Way, their Theurgick Method of the Souls Purgation, Liberation, Reduction; they promis’d themselves a future Happiness, from an Initiation into their Mystick-Religious Institutions, their Heathen Piety, and Civil-Social Virtue, of which their Love of their Country was a principal Branch. But the Virtue of the Heathens is far from being saving; something of it is found in all Men, for all are in some sort, in some degree, Virtuous, Honest, Sincere; if, therefore, it was saving to any, all Men would be saved. The Religion of the Heathen, which should have been saving to them, was of a contrary Nature, constituting them A-Theists and Anti Theists, the main Branches of it being so many mortal Sins. But from this Hypothesis (without which the necessity of Christianity is not maintainable, nor can the Grace of God towards us Christianiz’d Gentiles be duly illustrated without it) a terrible Conclusion will be inferr’d, That all, who are in the Heathen State, are finally lost; which seemeth to be a grand Difficulty in Providence, and they that think it so, if they be Wise and Religious, ought to be allow’d great Liberty of Thought, to salve the Phaenomenon. We will content ourselves to observe, that this Dispute, touching the Heathens Salvation, is partly concerning Matter of Fact, and partly concerning Matter of Right.
Of the Dispute touching the Salvation of the HeathensIf the Salvation of any be call’d in question as Heathens, the Matter of Fact ought to be debated in the first place, whether they were Heathens in this definitive Notion, The Theists, that do not acknowledge the true God? Usually, they that plead for the Salvation of Heathens, make them No-Heathens in Religion and Morality, making them God’s Religionists, and as good as Christians, and yet suppose, that they plead for the Salvation of Heathens, whereas they alter the Subject of the Question, and contradict themselves, as well as apparent Matter of Fact. But some, also, of great Learning and Piety, and not guilty of the Folly of Christianizing gross Heathens, yet have thought the Condition of some of the better sort of Pagans not desperate, but that their future Happiness is hopeful upon account of their Heathen Virtue; and some doubt not of the Happiness of all of them, who were sincere. Touching which Opinion, which carrieth a great shew of Charity and Goodness, I will only say; That our Heathen State is certainly the state of Death; that all the better Sort of Pagans are saveable, if any be so; that mere Heathen Virtue is not available to Salvation; that the Pagans Sincerity is of no better quality, than the rest of their Virtues; that we are apt to have an extravagant Esteem for their Virtue, and every one hopeth well touching his particular Favourite; but we are incapable of pronouncing any Thing touching their future Happiness, save only, That, in respect of us and our Notices, their Condition is not at all hopeful; yet, not knowing, what Transactions there may be between God and their Souls, who, in external appearance, dye gross Heathens; not knowing, whether Death rendreth every one’s Condition, and particularly theirs who were never tried with the Gospel, as remediless and desperate, as it doth theirs, who have been tried with it, and frustrated that Remedy; not knowing, but that all Ages of the World, as well as that wherein the Apostles preach’d (Act. 18. 10.) have afforded many Souls prepar’d for Christianity, touching whom we may doubt, whether they will finally perish, or not; not knowing, what their Condemnation will amount to, who have been, in all Ages, invincibly Ignorant of Christianity, and are, therefore, unconcern’d in the Condemnation, which it denounceth against Hypocrites and Unbelievers; we ought not to be dogmatical in such abstruse Points, or pretend to fathom the Depths of Providence.
In order to reconcile the Dispute about the Heathens Salvation, as it is Matter of Right, so far as the different Opinions about it are reconcileable, it is to be consider’d, That all true and genuine Theists may be call’d Christians in a large sense, as being the Christian-kind of Theists and Religionists. In this large sense it must be acknowledg’d, that the Earth and Heavens, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, the Works of Nature, and of Providence, have always preach’d Christianity to the World of Heathens; that, from the Beginning of the World, Christianity hath been the only way to Righteousness and Salvation; for Mankind could never attain them otherwise, than by being God’s Believers and Religionists, the Men of Faith, and Faithful Religionists, which is to be, in great degree, Christ’s Believers and Religionists, and thus it may be express’d. The way to Righteousness and Salvation, from the Beginning of the World, was, to be Christ’s Believers and Religionists, so far as the being God’s Believers and Religionists importeth. If, therefore, the World of Mankind which was Heathen, had been God’s Believers and Religionists, (such as the Apostle speaketh of, Heb. 11. 6.) they could not have fail’d of a State of Alliance and Favour, of Righteousness and Salvation, more, or less perfect; for God, in providing Christ, had made Provision, that his Divine Believers should be in that Divine Condition. And, as that Divine Condition, which Divine Believers, in the antient Times, enjoy’d, was founded upon Christ; so the coming of Christ was reveal’d to these Divine Believers, and they had Prophetick Notices of it. But those Prophetick Notices cannot be called the way to Remission of Sins and Salvation, they were not propos’d as the Condition of a Treaty, or Covenant, nor was the Knowledge of them requir’d of those, to whom they were not at all reveal’d; but different Obligations arise from different Revelations. The generality of Mankind in these elder Times of the World, antecedently to any Revelation of the Messias to them, were no farther oblig’d, to be God’s Believers and Religionists, than according to natural Revelation. And, because they were not so far his Believers and Religionists, the Apostle looketh upon them as inexcusable, Rom. 1. 20. for nothing hindred them from being such, but their own Wickedness, wicked Unwillingness, or Averseness from Godliness, nor could they pretend any other Impotency but the Moral Impotency, which is not an Excuse, but an Aggravation. “Else how shall God Judge the World?” Rom. 3. 6. If the Existence of the one true God be fairly notic’d to all Mankind; if they do, or may easily, know, that his being God consisteth, in having the Rights and Dues of his God-head, (as the being King consisteth in having his Rights and Dues, which to bereave him of, is a making him no King;) if they are oblig’d to be Virtuous, Good, Just, and Grateful; and cannot but know, that of Right, and by Obligation, they are his Liege-People, Subjects, and Servants: Mankind must necessarily be in excusable, if they do not serve and glorify him as God, and, if they become not his Believers and Religionists, which is a relinquishing their Heathenism. The Heathen could not plead that they were so destitute of Means, that it was naturally impossible, for them to be God’s Believers and Religionists, of that their becoming such would be in vain; for his Parental Providence towards them demonstrated, that he had not abandon’d all Care and Concern for their Welfare. Act. 14. 16, 17. “In times past he suffer’d all Nations to walk in their own Ways. Nevertheless he left not himself without witness,” (a Testimony of his Care for their Welfare, and that he had not abandoned all Concern for it, altho’ he suffer’d all Nations to walk in their own Ways,) “in that he did Good, and gave us Rain from Heaven, and fruitful Seasons, filling our Hearts with Food and Gladness.” and 1 Tim. 9. 10. “He is the Saviour of all Men,” (taketh care of their Welfare,) “especially of those that believe.” Rom. 2. 4. His Goodness and Patience, toward the World of Mankind, hath a mighty Tendency to their Repentance, and is design’d to induce them to it; which is an Assurance, that their Repentance, if not illegitimate, shall not be ineffectual; and, if God commandeth them the Practice of the Duties of Religion in order to that End, that so they may obtain a future Happiness, they are bound to believe, that such Practice will not be in vain. Act. 17. 26, 27. “They are planted on the Face of the Earth, that they should seek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him and find him.” Which demonstrateth God’s Will and Intention to be found of them, if they did faithfully seek him, and his Willingness to be a God to them: Nor is it possible, that God should disown and damn any, that is a faithful Religionist towards him; “But in every Nation he that feareth him and worketh Righteousness, is accepted with him.” (Act. 10. 35.) “Glory, Honour, and Peace to every Man that worketh Good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile.” Rom. 2. 10. That is such Gentiles, as Melchizedeck, Job, the Ninevites and Cornelius. Touching the Salvation of the Heathens, and the Method of obtaining it, I will only add a wise and good Saying of a Divine of our own. “If any amongst Heathens had done what he could, in seeking and serving God, he should either for Christ’s Sake have been accepted with that little Knowledge he could attain; or else, as Calvin saith in his Comment on Acts 8. 13. Rather than he should have perish’d, God would have sent an Angel to reveal further Things to him.”
In our Heathen State we were Subjects of Satan’s Kingdom.A principal Branch of the Deadliness of our Heathen State, is, our being the Subjects of Satan’s Kingdom; which implieth, that the Heathen World of Mankind were under the Imperial Rule and Domination of Satan, (several ways the Subjects of the Kingdom of Darkness,) constituting his Mundan Empire. His usual Names denote him an Imperial Potentate; for he is styled “the God of this World, the Prince of this World.” Himself and his Angels are called ἀρχαὶ καὶ ’δξουσίαι, which Names denote them, Principalities and Powers of a mundan Empire, κοσμοκράτορες the Rulers of this World. Being fallen from Heaven, their Residence is now in the Air, where they constitute amongst themselves a Kingdom, or Empire, consisting of lower and higher Orders, some being of inferior, and others of superior, Rank and Condition; but all of them subjected to, and united in, one Imperial Head, their great Lord and Master, “the Prince of Devils, the Prince of the Power” (or Powers) “of the Air.” The Wisdom and Justice of Providence, by banishing them out of Heaven, hath placed them in the Air, in a Region of Vicinity to, and a Station of Superiority above, Mankind; and, accordingly, maketh use of them, to do the work of Publick Officers, in the Polity of our System. But this Power, which the Evil Demons exercise over Mankind, (by divine Concession, by a probational, or penal Tradition of Men into their Hands, and sometimes by divine Mandate and Appointment,) is rather Ministerial than Imperial. 2 Chron. 18. 20, 21. Job 1. 12. and 2. 6. Psal. 78. 49. Matt. 5. 25. and 18. 34. Luk. 22. 31. 1 Cor. 5. 5. and 10. 10. 1 Tim. 1. 20. Rev. 12. 10. Besides this Power of mere Officers and Executioners, they have acquir’d a Power of Empire and Sovereignty over Mankind; which Power is, morally speaking, in great degree unavoidable, supposing their evil Neighbourhood to degenerate Mankind. For, as these Aerial Powers are, in Place and Station, superior to Mankind; so their Spiritual Nature, Angelical Order, Policy, and Strength, is superior to the Human; (spiritual unbody’d Wickedness is paramount to weak Flesh and Blood, Ephes. 6. 12. they are also vastly numerous and closely united amongst themselves, which addeth to their Power; and, therefore, if not confin’d by a higher Power, they can domineer and lord it over Mankind; and, doubtless, they want not Will to do it, seeing Empire and Dominion is their great Interest, Design, and Business; Strength with them is the Law of Justice, and, therefore, as amongst the Brute-Animals, the Stronger beareth Rule over the Weaker, so the Stronger Wicked Angels will have the Mastery, and bear Rule, over the Weaker Wicked Men. They are, also, the most accomplish’d Tempters imaginable, and have the greatest Advantages to make Men Wicked, (of themselves prevalently prone to be Wicked;) for they are not wanting in depth of Malice, in great intellectual Abilities, in knowledge of us and our Affairs, in large Experience, Cunning, and Dexterity, Activity and assiduous Diligence, Hypocrisy, Imposture, Closeness, and Secrecy, in variety of Methods and Artifices; they are furnish’d with all sorts of Agents and Instruments, assisted with the World’s tempting Objects, and with the many and great Weaknesses and vicious Inclinations of Man’s Nature; in their Temptations they are mighty in Operation, (“working efficaciously, with strong Delusions, carrying Captive,” Ephes. 2.2. 2 Thess. 2. 11. 2 Tim. 3. 26.) sometimes acting the Fox, and sometimes the roaring Lion, sometimes the old Serpent, and sometimes the bloody red Dragon; upon all which accounts, what can be reasonably imagin’d, but that they will inveigle and vanquish the World of Mankind, and subject them to live under their Domination? As the Holy Ghost saith, Rev. 12. 9. “The old Serpent, called the Devil and Satan, deceiveth the whole World.” The Heathen World, therefore, must be considered, as Satan’s mundan Empire, which he reigneth over as an Imperial Potentate, and which was subject to his Rule and Domination; whence it is plain, that his magnificent Pretension to our Saviour, was not al together groundless, or devoid of Truth, “That the Kingdoms of the World, the Power and Glory of them was his, and at his disposal.” Luke 4. 5, 6. The Devil and his Angels are styled, Ephes. 6. 12. “The Rulers of the Darkness of this World,” to signify, that they are the Rulers of that Darkness which Heathenism is, and, consequently, of the dark benighted Heathen World. Agreeably whereunto, the Doctor of the Gentiles is sent to them upon this Errand, “to open their Eyes, and to turn them from Darkness to Light, and from the Power of Satan unto God,” Act. 26. 18. So the Converts to Christianity, that were translated into the Kingdom of God’s Son, are said to “be deliver’d from the Power of Darkness,” to which they were Subject, Col. 1. 13. But this subjection to the Power of Darkness, is not to be confin’d to Heathens, commonly so called, it is the common Condition of Mankind in general, antecedently to the State and Life of true and saving Religion, as will appear from an Enumeration of the several Ways, whereby Mankind are subject to Satan’s Kingdom and Domination, which are these three. 1. By way of Penal Subjection. 2. By way of criminal Subjection. 3. By way of criminal-religious Subjection.
1. All Mankind, antecedently to their being in a State of true Religion, belong to Satan’s Kingdom, and are under his Domination, by way of Penal Subjection. For the Apostle, Hebr. 2. 14. expressly attributeth to the Devil, the Power, or Empire of Death (τὸ κράτος) as his Empire. Which is an Empire agreeable to his name Apollyon, and to those Names which the Jews give him, the Destroyer, the Angel of Death. This Empire of Death, which the Apostle attributeth to the Devil, Christ died to destroy, therefore it must not be understood of temporal Calamities, and bodily Death only: But, principally, of the penal Death of the Soul, which is Death everlasting. And, because he had this Branch of his Imperial Power by the Law, therefore a principal Branch of his Empire was not by mere Usurpation, but by a legal Settlement of the penal State of Death upon unrepenting Sinners, by which he had an Authority to detain them under his Power after Death; and even in their Life-time, so long as they continued ungodly Sinners, and, if God, in Christ, had not made Provision for their Freedom: This being the State of Death, to belong to his Kingdom, and to be under his Domination and Power. If, without being freed by the Redemption of Christ, Mankind would have remain’d in the State of Death, then, without this Redemption, they would have remain’d under Satan’s Domination and Power by Law. So far as Christ hath redeem’d them from being in the State of Death, so far he hath redeem’d them from being under Satan’s Domination and Power by Law, either in this Life, or after their Death. From which plain and intelligible Explication of a principal Branch of the State of Death, the Collect for Easter-Day in the Common-Prayer-Book, becometh plain and intelligible: Almighty God, who, through thine only-begotten Son Jesus Christ, hast overcome Death, and open’d unto us the Gate of everlasting Life. The Apostles Account of Christ’s Victory upon the Cross, becometh easy and intelligible, which otherwise is unintelligible, Col. 2. 15. “Having spoil’d Principalities and Powers, he made a shew of them openly, triumphing over them in it.”
Not only the Souls of Men, but their Bodies also, are penally subjected to Satan’s Domination and Power, as appeareth from unquestionable Instances of diabolical Possessions and Infestations of the Body, which have great Analogy and Agreement with Temptations of the Soul. For, as all Temptations are not from the Devil; so Bodily Diseases ordinarily are from Natural Causes. The Evil Demonsare of various Kinds, adapted to various Imployments, and as their Temptations are various, so are the Impressions which they make, and the Diseases which they produce in a Human Body. As some, by their Wickedness of Nature, tempt the Tempter, invite and draw wicked Spirits to associate with them: So some are of such a Disposition of Mind and Body, that Evil Demons as naturally enter into and inhabit them, as in Pestilential times, People, that are pre-dispos’d, catch the Contagion. Sometimes it is not discernible, whether a Temptation, be merely Natural, or in part Diabolical: So, in some Cases, it is not by us discernible, whether a Disease of Mind and Body be merely Natural, or in part Diabolical; and, therefore, Diabolical Possession and Infestation is a matter liable, both to wilful Imposture and innocent Mistake. But, as some Temptations are manifestly Satan’s Suggestions, and have the Marks and Characters of a Diabolical Original: So, in some that are Distemper’d in Mind and Body, there are evident Marks and Characters of a Diabolical Original and Infestation; as when they tell People their Secrets, discover such Things done at a distance, and Things to come, as are beyond human reach; or when they are oppress’d, afflicted, abus’d, in measure and manner beyond the reach of Natural Causes; or when from the Nature, Symptoms, Causes, and Circumstances of a Distemper, it plainly appears to be nothing better than a Diabolical Possession and Infestation. By these Indications Demoniacks and Persons acted by an evil Spirit, are discernible by us, who have no extraordinary Faculty of discerning them. Ignorance, Atheism, Fanaticism, and Witchcraft (with other Vices and Diseases) abound much more in some times than others; so do Diabolical Possessions and Infestations, which Providence might permit to abound about our Saviour’s Time, to give occasion for his glorious Miracles. If they had not abounded in those Times, it is not reasonable to believe, that they would have abounded then so much in the Trade of Exorcists, and that the Jews should generally have entertain’d this Opinion, that their more grievous Diseases were from the Operation of evil Demons or complicated with them. “Indeed in this Distemper” (the Epilepsy) “there appear so obscure Footsteps, or rather none at all, of a morbifick Matter, that we may deservedly suspect here the Afflatus of a maleficent Spirit.” The much greater part and most eminent sort of Demoniacks, which our Saviour had to do with, (tho’ not the only,) were Epileptical, Melancholical, Lunatic, and Maniacal Persons, (as appeareth from the Gospel,) whose horrible Distempers were either originally caus’d by, or complicated with, evil Demons. He gave a Demonstration, both of his Divine Goodness and Power in giving them relief from their hideous Calamities, rescuing them from under the Domination and Power of those infernal Spirits, and therefore the Apostles celebrate him for this God-like Atchievement. Act. 10. 38. “He went about doing Good, and healing all that were oppress’d of the Devil.” His Disciples experimented the Divinity of his Power, and that his Empire was superior to the Diabolical; and, therefore, after he had sent them abroad, they return’d to him with Exultation and Triumph, Luk. 10. 17. “Lord, even the Devils are subject to us thro’ thy Name.”
2. All Mankind, antecedently to their being in a State of true Religion, belong to Satan’s Kingdom, and are under his Domination and Rule, by way of criminal Subjection. The Devil’s usual Name, “the Wicked and Evil One,” (Matth. 13. 19. 1 John 2. 13.) denoteth him the Prince of all Wicked and Evil Ones; he the Leader, and they the Followers, “that are turn’d aside after Satan,” Tim. 5. 15. He ruleth them in making them Atheous and Wicked; and, when they become such, their Life is an obeying, pleasing him, doing him Service, and “his Servants they are, to whom they obey.” His Rule and Empire, therefore, is commensurate to the Reign of Sin. They walk “according to the Prince of the Power of the Air,” which Prince and Power taken collectively are “a Spirit mightily operative in the Sons of Disobedience,” by way of Inspiration, Afflatus, internal Motion, Persuasion and Suggestion, Eph. 2. 2, 3. They are animated by the Agency of that great one that is in the World, 1 John 4. 4. who influences them, not only by tempting Objects, and external Means, but by internal Operation, “blinding the Mind, putting into the Heart, filling the Heart”(2 Cor. 4. 4. John 13. 2. Act. 5. 3.) Like a mighty Pharaoh he commandeth them, and putteth upon them the vilest Practices, the basest and most painful Drudgeries, and they serve and obey, not considering what a Master they serve, usually designing only to serve their own Lusts, in the Fury whereof he hurrieth them like the Swine to Perdition. He is the Father of their Family, they are a Serpentine Brood and Race, and Devils incarnate; agreeably to which our Saviour saith of a Miscreant among his Disciples, “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a Devil?” Joh. 6. 70. such is a Son of Belial (for Belial is one of Satan’s Names, 2 Cor. 6. 15.) and such are the Children of the Wicked One in various degrees, and all that belong to the Synagogue of Satan, who are necessarily under his Domination, by way of criminal Subjection.
3. Almost the whole World of Mankind were some time under Satan’s Domination and Power by way of criminal-religious Subjection, as being the Religionists of his Institution, and his religious Worshippers. One sort of these Diabolical Religionists are Witches and Magicians, whose Existence has been so well attested by Experience and by Persons of unquestionable Learning and Veracity, so acknowledg’d by Heathens, by all wise Laws and Governments, and by the Holy Scriptures, is of Theory so unexceptionably Rational, and the Objections against it so inconsiderable, that, notwithstanding the many Impostures and false Stories of this kind, he that would reject them all, must be a superlative Believer. Another Instance of Diabolical Religionists are the Heretical-Pagan-Gnosticks, that infested the Primitive Church, who invented a Theology and Religion, which was a mixture of Magick and Demonolatry; upon which account, some part of them were called Ophitae, Serpent-Worshippers, others Sataniani, Satan’s Religionists; which is the heavy Character of the whole World of Heathen Religionists, as appeareth from the Historical Accounts of Heathen Countries, from their Theology and Religion, from the Nature of Christianity, and the Sense of all Christians, and from this Testimony of the Holy Scripture, which is also the Acknowledgment of several learn’d Pagans, That what the Gentiles and Gentilizing Israelites sacrific’d, they sacrific’d to Devils, not to God. The Christians usually call’d their Doctrines, Doctrines of Devils; their Altars, the Devil’s Altars; their Priests, the Devil’s Priests; their Religion, the Devil’s Institution; their Inspirations, Afflatus’s, and Methods of Divination, Diabolical; their Sacrifices, the Delight of Devils; their Gods, unclean Demons. Agreeably whereto, the Renunciation of Heathenism at Christian Baptism was compos’d. The Apostle opposeth “the Cup and Table of the Lord to the Cup and Table of Devils,” in the Heathen Idol-Feasts, 1 Cor. 10. 21. So the Heathen-Roman Empire is said to be “subjected to Satan the Chieftain, and to his Angels the Demons, by way of Religious Subjection”; by the Holy Ghost it is represented as a Demonarchy, (Satan and his Angels were in reigning Condition, whilst Paganism flourish’d, but Christianity threw them down, Revel. 12. 8.) And all that Empire’s Idol-worship is styled the Worship of Devils, Revel. 9. 20. Christianity therefore supposeth, that the World of Heathens, thro’ their own Weakness and Wickedness, and the Artifices of Satan (Visions, Prodigies, Oracles, Vaticinations, Healings, and moving the Images) were seduc’d into an Opinion, that the Evil Demons were Gods, that they prostituted their Souls to be corrupted by them, were enslav’d by them, and subjected to their Domination and Power, as the Religionists of Satan, who had at Rome, and in other Places, as it were, his Imperial Seat and Throne, Rev. 2. 13 and 13. 2. They invited these Evil Demons to be the Inmates and Inhabitants of their Souls; these they deputed to be the Guardians of their Life; to these they attributed a mundane Presidency, pay’d divine Honours and a Religious Subjection, managing both their Civil and Religious Affairs by their Conduct. The learn’d Writers of the Gentiles do not only inform us, That they worshipp’d Arimanius, Cacodaemones, Vejoves, whom they knew to be evil Spirits; but some of their learn’d Theologers were of Opinion, that a considerable part of their Religion was the Religion of Evil Demons, whom the generality of Pagans ignorantly worshipp’d.Porphyry discourseth at large of Evil Demons, of their Religious Worship amongst the Pagans, and of their Delight in bloody Sacrifices.Plutarch discourseth, that the Order of Demons is obnoxious to Passions and brutal Affections, which are Properties, “of which there are Footsteps and Marks in their Sacrifices and Mysteries.” And, having enumerated several Rites of their Religion, “the tearing and devouring raw Flesh, and other Discerptions, Howlings, obscene Speeches in their Sacra, Madnesses excited with noise and tossing of the Neck,” he saith of them, “They are not the Worship of any of the Gods, but are instituted to sweeten and appease Evil Demons.” These Acknowledgments of learned Heathens are great approaches to the Christian Hypothesis, that the Heathen World were Satan’s Religionists, of the Truth whereof we have so many authentick Proofs.
The great usefulness of Revelation is evident from the foregoing Consideration of the State of the Heathen World.This, therefore, seems to have been the State of the Heathen World. Abraham was educated in Idolatry, as appears from Jos. 24. 2. When Abraham was call’d out of Ur of the Chaldeas, the only Country, in which we have any account that the true Religion was profess’d, was Salem, afterwards call’d Jerusalem, of which Melchizedek was King and also Priest of the most high God.Job also and his Friends worshipp’d the one true God; which appears likewise to have been the legal Establishment in the Country where he liv’d; for, speaking of worshipping the Sun and Moon, which he disclaims the ever having been guilty of, he says, “That were an Iniquity to be punish’d by the Judges,” Job 31. 28. It seems also pretty plain, from another Passage ( Job 23. 11, 12.) that Job had something more than the mere Light of Nature to walk by, and that he was no Stranger to supernatural Revelation; for he saith there of himself, “My Foot hath held his Steps, his Way have I kept, and not declin’d, neither have I gone back from the Commandments of his Lips; I have esteem’d the Words of his Mouth more than my necessary Food.” Which Words some will have to be meant of the Light and Law of Nature, merely as such, which seems an extremely absurd Construction of the Place, which is plainly meant of some Law or Doctrine, that was God’s Word by his Prophets, of which Number Job himself seems to have been One. He must also have been no Stranger to the 7 Precepts of the Sons of Noah, as they are called, and to the Revelations made by God to Abraham, if that Opinion be true, which is generally embrac’d by the most learn’d and judicious Commentators, that Job was a descendent of Abraham, probably an Edomite, the Land of Uz being part of Idumea; and that he liv’d before the giving of the Law to Moses. But the first Mention we find made of the Religion of the Inhabitants of Jerusalem, after the Children of Israel’s coming into the Land of Canaan, is that they were Idolaters; as were also the Children of Edom, where we first find their Religion mention’d, after the Israelites began to have any Intercourse with them; which was also the Case of all the other Nations descended of Abraham, and of the several People inhabiting Arabia and Canaan. So that, when God gave his Laws to the Israelites, we know not of any one Nation in the World, where the Worship of the one true God was profess’d, the Israelites excepted. As for Zoroastres, who set up the Worship of the one true God in Persia, that was not ’till the Days of Darius Hystaspes, after the Babylonian Captivity: And that Zoroastres learn’d that Truth from the Jews, has been render’d highly probable by several who have treated of that Subject.
It appears from what hath been said, that the Heathens look’d upon the whole Universe of Rational Agents, consisting of Gods, Demons, (Good and Bad), Heroes, and Men, as but one Political System; and that the current Doctrine of the best Sects among them, was Polytheism and the Worship of Demons. These their Practices were in great measure owing to their believing God to be the Soul of the World, which prevail’d universally among the better sort of them; for they could never think it a Crime to worship what they thought Parts of the Deity. From this Opinion of God’s being the Soul of the World, even Socrates himself was not free, and some modern Deists have endeavour’d to revive it.
From what has been said it appears, that the Heathens were universally ignorant of the one true God, who was an unknown God at Athens. The best Sects of their Philosophers, as they were Ignorant of many important Truths, so they taught many gross Errors, as well with respect to Religion, as Morality; so that it may justly be question’d, whether the Heathen Philosophers, in the Main, were of any real Service to the Cause of Religion and Virtue. The Bulk of Mankind have been always very careless and inconsiderate, so as not to be at the Pains of discovering those important Truths, which they might have discover’d by the Light of Nature; and from the same Causes they were not sufficiently influenc’d by those Truths, which they did come to the Knowledge of, the strong Impressions of sensual and present Objects greatly weakening or destroying the Force of more remote ones, tho’ of much greater Consequence. The Prejudices of Education, as it were imbib’d with their Mother’s Milk, were also so great and so many, and the perverse Customs and Opinions of those about them influenc’d them so strongly, as greatly to obscure and give a wrong Biass to that Natural Reason, which, if it had been left to itself, would have made a much greater and clearer Discovery of the Law of Nature. The Affairs of the World, the Pursuits of Ambition, the Baits of Pleasure, and the Desire of Riches, employ so much of Mens Thoughts and Time, that they cannot attend to the still and calm Voice of Reason, which is seldom heard in so tempestuous a Sea. And when once, by such means as these, evil Habits had taken deep Root in the Minds of Men, to which by an innate Concupiscence, they had a prevalent Tendency, their Foolish Heart became darken’d, and they were given up to a reprobate Mind, by which the Light of Nature was, in great measure, extinguish’d, the Blindness of their Hearts darkening their Understandings, and blunting the Stings of Conscience. Amidst so great Corruptions, arising from such Causes, both within and without, which had, to so great a Degree as we have seen, benighted the Heathen World, what Wonder is it, if those few Heathen Philosophers, who gave themselves up to search after Truth, and to practice the Truths they discover’d, made so small a Progress as we find they did, in reforming so degenerate and corrupt a World? Polytheism, Demonolatry, and Idolatry, we have seen how universally they prevailed; and that, with respect to the one true God, the whole Heathen World lay in a State of Atheous Ignorance, not excepting even the greatest of the Philosophers themselves, who were also defective, with respect to many of the Branches of Morality, as hath likewise been shewn. Of Justice, indeed, as it is a Virtue necessary to the support of Civil Society, they seem to have had very just Notions; but such Justice is only a Political, not a truly Religious Virtue, a mere Civil Institution. From what hath been said, I think it plainly appears, that all their Virtues were of the spurious and illegitimate Kind; and that for want of the true and solid Foundation of all Virtue and all Religion, The Knowledge of the true God and his Attributes.
Most of those who call’d themselves Philosophers, were never in earnest in their pretended Researches after Virtue; they made it matter of mere Ostentation, and to shew their Parts, and an Affair of as great Indifference, as Problems in Mathematicks, or Natural Philosophy; thinking it sufficient, if they could but amuse the Vulgar, and dispute learnedly about it; and accordingly in by far the greatest Number of those who affected to distinguish themselves by that glorious Title, it reach’d no farther than the Head, not to the Heart, as is plain from the profligate Manners of many of them from the Accounts of their Contemporaries. And how should Mankind be reform’d by such Instructors? They who were influenc’d by the Truth they taught appear, upon Examination, to be much fewer than is generally imagin’d. And even those very few, we have seen that they grossly err’d in most important Points, as well with respect to God, as the Cause and Cure of the present corrupt Condition of Mankind, and the End for which our great Creator intended us. No less Men among them than Plato, Cicero, and Epictetus advise Men to comply, each with the establish’d Religion of his Country; but was that the way to enlighten and reform a benighted and idolatrous World? The Wisest of them have profess’d their Ignorance, how the Deity was to be worshipp’d, and how those who had done amiss were to be reconcil’d to him; of which Plato represents Socrates so sensible, as to introduce him in one of his Dialogues, declaring his Ignorance upon these Heads, and wishing for the Guidance of a Divine Revelation in such Matters, for which our wiser modern Deists think there was no occasion. Those also among the Heathen Philosophers, who have upon some occasions argued the most strenuously for the Soul’s Immortality, sometimes express themselves doubtfully upon the Matter. ’Tis the Christian Religion only, which hath clearly brought Life and Immortality to Light. The refin’d Reasonings and long Deductions of acute and speculative Philosophers upon this and other important Points, the Attributes of God, and the Obligations to Virtue, were too fine-spun, and required too long and close an Application, to influence the generality of Mankind. None of them was able to form any thing like a tolerable Scheme with respect to Providence, the Forming and the Governing the World, the Dignity and the Corruption of human Nature, whence the Obligation to Virtue originally arises, and to what it ultimately tends, and the happy Immortality of the Righteous. All of them were Ignorant of some of these Truths, and the imperfect Truth they did discover, lies so scatered and blended with Error, that the greatest Genius among them was never able to collect them into one Body; and there is so strict a Dependence of one of these Truths upon another, that it is like breaking a Link in a Chain, or taking a Corner-Stone from the Foundation of a Building, to separate one of them from the rest; so close is their Connexion. What is more; whilst the Hearers of the Philosophers consider’d that these Instructors were but Men like themselves, the Truths they were able to discover and support by plain Reason, were able to make but a weak Impression upon them, for want of sufficient Weight, and because they were not enforc’d by a Divine Authority. It awakens and rouses the Attention and Consideration of Men at another sort of a rate, not only to have it laid before them, that such a Practice is agreeable to the Dictates of Right Reason, that it is Beautiful, Honourable, and Decorous, that we ought to do it, and that such Advantages will naturally and necessarily attend it; but also to have it clearly made out to ’em, that it is moreover the Will and positive Command of the Creator and supreme Governor of the World, to whom they owe what they are and what they have, and at whose hands they expect all they hope for; which makes a much deeper Impression upon them, than barely to have the fitness of the Practice propos’d to ’em, without the Interposition of the Authority of a competent Legislator, to whom they are under the greatest Obligations in point of Gratitude, and who will certainly vindicate the Honour of his Laws.
After all these Considerations, let any impartial Man judge, whether a Revelation was useful or necessary for the Reformation of Mankind. No, says the modern Deist; for the Light and Law of Nature, Natural Religion, and Morality are sufficient, as they have been laid down by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, M. Antoninus, and others among the Antients; by Grotius, Puffendorf, Crellius, Sharrock, Wilkins, Cumberland, Clark, Wollaston, and others among the Moderns. In answer to this, I desire that it may be observ’d, That there is a great Difference between mere natural Reason, and Reason assisted by Revelation, and super natural Help. Our Reason assents to many Things, when propos’d to us, which it could never have found out. The greatest Genius’s among the Heathen Philosophers, seem to have been extremely sensible of the Weakness, the Short-sightedness, and the Uncertainty of their Reasonings about most important Truths. Let us hear what they themselves say upon the Point, “Nature gives many Indications of her Will; but we” (saith Cicero ) “are deaf, I know not how, nor hear her Voice.” “Nature hath afforded us some small Sparks, which we so quickly extinguish by evil Habits and false Opinions, that the Light of Nature no where appears.”“We seem not only blind with respect to Wisdom, but dull and stupid with respect to those very Things, which in some measure we seem to see.”“Our Minds” (saith Aristotle) “with respect to those Things which are naturally the most plain of all, are like the Eyes of Bats in Day-light.”“Truly” (saith Cicero) “the so great Dissention of the most learned Men in an Affair of the utmost Importance [the Nature of the Gods] will stagger even those, who before thought that they had arriv’d at Certainty in the Point.” And “I wish” (saith Cicero in the same Discourse) “that I could as easily find out the Truth, as confute Error.” Even Socrates express’d himself with doubt concerning a Future State, tho’ he seem’d strongly to incline to the Belief of it, and tho’ he brought the best Arguments in support of it, as they are represented to us by Plato, that we meet with offered by any Heathen Philosopher. Cicero, in his Tusculan Questions, is still more doubtful upon that Head, tho’ inclining to the same side with Socrates. Seneca look’d upon it as a point more desirable, than probable.“If (says Cicero ) in the Opinion of all Philosophers, no-one has attain’d Wisdom, we, for whose welfare you pretend the Immortal Gods have made the best Provision, are in a most wretched State; for, as there is no material Difference, whether no Man does enjoy his Health, or no Man can enjoy it; so I do not see that it is of any consequence, whether no Man is or can be made wise.” What wonder then is it, if the best and wisest of the Philosophers, thus sensible of their own Ignorance, and of the Weakness of human Reason, with respect to matters of the utmost Importance, (such as the Nature of the Deity, how he would be worshipp’d, and a future State; as also the Original of Evil, and of the present corrupt Condition of Mankind, of which they were as sensible, as they were ignorant of the Cause,) should be sensible of the Want of a Divine Revelation, and earnestly long for it, as has been already mention’d? Now, whoever would go about rationally to make a comparative Judgment of assisted and unassisted Reason, let him compare the Schemes of Natural Religion and of Morality, left us by the Heathens, with those which have been publish’d by Christians. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Epictetus, and M. Antoninus, are clearly the greatest Heathen Writers upon these Subjects. How defective these are all, I have already, in great measure, laid before the Reader, some of them making no more of Virtue and of Religion, than mere Civil and Political Institutions; all of them conforming to the Idolatrous Establishments of their several Countries, and advising others to do the like; Polytheism and the Worship of Demons being essential Parts of the Platonick and Stoick Theology, as Magick and the Worship of Demons were of the Pythagorean; and yet these have been reputed the best Sects, and to have produc’d the greatest Moral Philosophers, which Heathen Antiquity could boast of. I have already observ’d, that what Truths lay scatter’d among them, no-one of them had discernment enough to separate from the Errors, tho’ that be a point which that great Genius, Cicero, seems particularly to have labour’d. Now any one with half an Eye may see, how much the Systems of Natural Religion and of Morality, deliver’d by the above-mention’d Christian Writers and others, exceed those of the foregoing Heathen Philosophers, some of whom seem to have been greater Genius’s than any of those Christian Writers I have now mention’d. To what then must the Advantage of the Christian Writers upon these Subjects over the Heathen Philosophers be owing? To the Assistance of Revelation certainly, which has evidently improv’d our Notices, even of Natural Religion and Morality, as from what I have already advanc’d, but much more by comparing the above-mention’d two Sets of Writers, will abundantly appear. Therefore, when modern Deists, in order to prove, that there was no Necessity or even Usefulness of a Revelation, alledge, that Natural Religion and Morality are sufficient, let them confine themselves to any Scheme they please among the Heathen Philosophers, among whom the latest seem plainly to have much improv’d from Hints they had from the Christian Religion, to which they were no Strangers. When once we become assur’d of the Truth of any Doctrine, tho’ merely from Testimony, it naturally puts us upon the Inquiry, to find out Arguments from Reason, in order to prove that Doctrine; and in such a way, and by such means, it is evident, that the great Truths of Natural Religion, and the Fundamentals of Morality, have been more throughly discover’d, and establishd upon better Principles, than was ever perform’d by the greatest Genius’s of the Heathen World, tho’ they were in themselves, perhaps, the greatest the World ever produc’d. If there had never been any Revelation, with what Vanity can any of our Modern Deists pretend, that they would have had better Notions of Religion, of God, and of Morality, than Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, &c.? And in how many important Points, with respect to these, were they ignorant, and of how many more were they very doubtful? Nay, I will venture to go one step farther, and to affirm, that I think it highly probable, That our Inquiries, into the very Frame of Nature and the Material System of the World, would not have been so successful as they have been, were it not for the Hints we have receiv’d from a Divine Revelation, and more particularly this, That the World is the Creature of God; which is a most important Truth, that the Heathen Philosophers were not very well acquainted with; of which as great a Philosophical Genius, and as successful an Inquirer into Nature, as this Age and Nation, or, perhaps, any other, has produc’d, has made no inconsiderable Use. All our Knowledge of Natural Religion and Morality, is ultimately resolv’d into our Knowledge of the Frame of Nature; as our Belief of Reveal’d Religion is founded upon the pre-suppos’d Truth of that which is Natural. “He that cometh to God, must first believe, that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” “That which may be known of God, is manifest in them; for God hath shew’d it unto them. For the Invisible Things of him are clearly seen from the Creation of the World, being understood by the Things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead; so that they are without Excuse.”
To conclude; there seems to me, to be two opposite Extremes, into which Men have run. Some cry up Reason, and the Light of Nature, at such a rate, as to think them alone sufficient Guides, in consequence of which they think all Revelation useless and unnecessary; whose Mistake I have at large endeavour’d to shew, and that they who wanted Revelation, were sensible of their being at a loss in most important Points, for want of it. Others, with a mistaken View of magnifying Revelation and Faith, undervalue and vilify Reason and the Light of Nature most immoderately, as if they were no proper Guides at all, nor fit to be trusted, in Divine Matters and the Truths of God. But, if that were the Case, how should we ever come to the Knowledge of God at all? So it is plain St. Paul thought, by the Passages just now quoted from him. The Belief of a Revelation is grounded upon the Veracity of God the Revealer, and we must first be convinc’d by Reason of the Veracity of God, (that he is Omniscient, and cannot be deceiv’d, that he is perfectly Good, and cannot deceive,) before we can give a firm Assent to a Revelation, as coming from him. So the Knowledge of the Being and Attributes of God, are previously necessary to the Belief of a Revelation. Socinus indeed held, that we can no otherwise come to the Knowledge of God, but by Revelation; but those who have follow’d him in other Matters, have been wise enough to drop him upon that Head. Beside; without making use of Reason in Divine Matters, how should we be able to judge of a Revelation, or a Miracle, and distinguish the True from the False? Or how should we judge of the Meaning of a Revelation, when we have it? Without applying our Reason to the Discussion of Matters reveal’d, how should we come to know, that these Words, “This is my Body,” are not to be taken in a literal Sense, or those other Words, “If thine Eye offend thee, pluck it out?” We must, therefore, either use our Reason in the Study of the Scriptures, or we have no Reason to study them at all; nor need we fear any evil Consequences from such a Practice: For all the Doctrines of Revelation, when freed from the Errors of the mistaken, and the Imposition of the designing, Part of its Votaries, and taken as they stand in the Scriptures themselves, free from all human Figments and unwarrantable Deductions, will stand the test of Reason. Nor do I know a more disadvantageous Idea, that can be given of the Christian Religion, than to decry the use of Reason in matters belonging thereto; for does not that plainly seem to imply, that it is an unreasonable Scheme, as being what will not stand the test of Reason? several Points, indeed, there are in it, which we cannot comprehend, which yet, that they are so, we have very good Reason to believe, tho’ we cannot solve all Difficulties, or answers all Objections, that may be started about them; no more than we can explain all the Difficulties that occur about Self-existence, Eternity and Immensity, which yet, we are very certain, are Attributes that belong to some Being that really exists. Such are the Difficulties about the infinite Divisibility of Space, which yet is demonstrated, and those about Liberty, of which however we have the same Proof, that we have of our own Consciousness. The Distinction, therefore, is very just and well-grounded, between Matters above our Reason, and contrary to Reason. Propositions of the former Kind, we may give an unshaken Assent to, as well in Religion as Philosophy; but Propositions of the latter Kind are equally unintelligible, incredible, and impossible. Reason, therefore, and Revelation reflect a mutual Light upon one another; Natural and Reveal’d Religion communicate such Strength and Firmness of Parts to each other, as do the several Parts of an Arch, out of which a Stone taken at the Top weakens the whole Frame, as much as one at the Bottom. Without Natural Religion, Reveal’d Religion is a Building founded upon the Sand; but by the help of it, it is a House founded upon a Rock, against which we know who has told us, That the Gates of Hell shall not prevail; notwithstanding all the Assaults of those, who have taken a great deal of Pains, racking their Brains for Arguments, and ransacking all Antiquity for Testimonies, in order to invalidate and depretiate that, which if we wanted, we should, with all their boast’d Light of Nature, be like a Ship at Sea out of sight of Land, and without Chart or Compass. And so much for the System of Rational Agents, the Kingdom of God in the rational World, and the mistaken Notions of the Heathens, about these Matters, in order to shew, not only the Usefulness of Revelation, but the Necessity of it, in order to the Reformation of Mankind, and their Increase of Happiness in this Life, but principally in that which is to come.
a philosophical
INQUIRY
into the
LAWS of NATURE,
In which their Form, chief Heads, Order, Promulgation, and Obligation, are deduced from the Nature of Things: Also the Elements of Mr. Hobbes’s Philosophy, as well Moral as Civil, are consider’d and refuted.
Love is the Fulfilling of the Law.
—Rom. 13. 10.
Thou shalt love the LORD thy GOD with all thy Heart, and with all thy Soul, and with all thy Mind. This is the first Commandment; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self. On these two Commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets.
—Matt. 22. 37–40.
LONDON:
Printed in the YEAR MDCCXXVII.
The Design of this Treatise.§I. It concerns us both, friendly Reader, “That you should be briefly acquainted with the Design and Method of this Treatise”; for thence you will immedately perceive, “What I have perform’d, or, at least, attempted; and what is further to be supply’d from your own Understanding, or the Writings of others.” The Laws of Nature are the Foundations of all moral and civil Knowledge, as in the following Work will at large appear. But these, as all other Conclusions, discoverable by the Light of Nature, may be deduc’d two ways; either from those manifest EffectsTwo ways of deducing the Laws of Nature.1. From their Effects. which flow from them, or from the Causes whence they them selvesarise. I have endeavour’d to discover them in this latter Method, by arguing from the Cause to the Effect. To the former Method of proving their Obligation, (by arguing from the Effect to the Cause,) belongs what has been written by Hugo Grotius, and by his Brother, in his Posthumous Work, and by our Countryman Sharrock, who establish them from the approv’d Sentiments of various Authors of different Nations and Ages,This insisted on by Grotius, Sharrock, &c. as also from a Harmony in the Manners and Laws, if not of all, at least of the politer, Nations. Hitherto also is to be referr’d that Work of Selden’s, concerning the Laws of Nature and Nations, according to the Sentiments of the Hebrews. And, in my Opinion, all these Authors have deserv’d well of Mankind. But especially the Work of Hugo Grotius, which was the first of the kind, I think worthy, both of the Author, and of Immortality. For a few Slips, and those in Matters, in which the Customs of his Country seem to have biass’d that great Man, will easily obtain Pardon from a candid Reader.
Useful, tho objected against.§II. Nor, truly, are the Objections, which are usually brought against this method of proving the Laws of Nature, (by arguing from the Effect to the Cause, as Grotius does,) of so great weight, as to prove it altogether fallacious and useless; altho I readily acknowledge, that they may so far prevail with candid Inquirers after Truth, as to convince them, That it would be more useful and safe, to find out a fuller Proof, by searching into the Causes, which produce in the Mind of Man the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature. This, however, will more plainly appear, if we briefly propose those Objections, with the Answers to them.
First Objection from insufficient Induction.In the first place it is objected, “That the Induction is weak, which infers, from the Writings or Manners of a few Men, or Nations, the Opinion or Judgment of all.” Now there is scarce any Person so well acquainted with the Laws and Customs of any one State, that can ever have a perfect Knowledge of them all; much less that can attain to such a Knowledge of the Laws of all States, still less, of the inward Sentiments of each Individual, as may enable him, upon a just Comparison, to conclude, what those Notions are, in which all agree.
To this it is answer’d, “That the Judgments made by different Nations concerning matters of daily publick Practice, (such are Religion, or some sort of divine Worship in general, and a degree of Humanity, sufficient to prohibit Murder, Theft, and Adultery,) may with ease be every where observ’d by any Man, without so profound a Knowledge of their Laws”: and such Judgments sufficiently declare that they agree in the Laws of Nature; for that which we know by Experience, to be, as it were, naturally acknowledg’d good by many Nations, we presume, upon account of the likeness of human Nature, to be likewise acknowledg’d good by the rest; especially when our Adversaries cannot produce one undoubted Instance, to prove any Nation to be of different Sentiments. To me, truly, those Narratives of some few barbarous Americans, and the Hottentots, “That they have no religious Worship,” seem, not suspected only but, false; for such a negative Assertion is hardly capable of ever being prov’d by Testimony. Therefore Acosta and some others seem rashly to have form’d a Judgment concerning those, with whose Language, Manners, and Sentiments they could not thorowly acquaint themselves in so short a time. For we read, that both Jews and Christians were sometimes falsly accus’d by many, of the greatest Impieties, tho their Religion was more holy than that of other Nations. But, be that as it will, it is manifest, “That those Truths are with sufficient Clearness propos’d to all, which are readily acknowledg’d by almost every one, altho the same should be either overlook’d, or even oppos’d, by some few.” But this Observation will be the most proper, and of greatest use, when it appears manifestly from other Proofs than Testimony and Custom, “That these Propositions teach the true Means to the best End, and that all are indispensably oblig’d to pursue that End by those Means”; which may be best prov’d by a consideration of the Causes, which suggest such conclusions of Reason to our Minds.
Obj. 2. That they want a sufficient enacting Authority.§III. A second Objection is, “That, altho certain Conclusions of Reason are approv’d of by our own Judgment, and the Practice of many others, yet the Authority of a known Law-giver is wanting, to give them the force of Laws to all Men; for otherwise,”(say they,)“who ever holds them in contempt, has the same Right to reject the Judgment of any others whomsoever, that they exercise in condemning his Opinion by their Words and Actions.” To this purpose, both Hobbes and Selden object, (beside the Antients,) but with very different Views.
According to Hobbes,For, as we shall shew in the following Treatise, the Point Mr. Hobbes aims at, is, “That none should believe themselves oblig’d by the Conclusions of Reason, with respect to their outward Actions, before a civil Magistrate is appointed; and that all his Appointments should be look’d upon, as the perfectly obligatory Judgments of right Reason.” It is to this purpose that he affirms, that “The Laws of Nature, altho they are laid down in the Writings of Philosophers, are no more, for that Reason, to be look’d upon as written Laws, than the Opinions of Lawyers are Laws, and that for want of a sovereign Authority.” He would not indeed deny them the Name of Laws, which he had before vouchsafed to give them, (tho improperly, as he elsewhere confesses;) he was willing however to insinuate, that they were not promulg’d by a sufficient Authority, tho Philosophers learn them from the Nature of Things, and thence transcribe them into their Writings. It is nevertheless manifest, if they be already truly Laws made by the Author of Nature, that they need no new Authority, after they are set down in writing by any one, to make them become written Laws.
And Selden, but with different Virtues.But Mr. Selden denies, “That the Conclusions of Reason, consider’d barely in themselves, have the Authority of Laws,” upon no other account, than, in order to shew “the Necessity of having recourse to the Legislative Power of God, and of proving that God has commanded our Obedience to them, and, by making them known to us, has proclaim’d them his Laws.” And indeed he has judiciously, as far as I can judge, given this Hint to the moral Philosophers, who are wont to consider the Conclusions of their own Reason as Laws, without due Proof, that they have the necessary Form of a Law, or that they are establish’d by God. But when he is to shew the Manner wherein God might manifest to Mankind, these to be his Laws, he proposes two ways. 1. That God himself pronounc’d them with his sacred Voice to Adam and Noah, in joining them perpetual Obedience; whence these Precepts of the Sons of Noah were handed down to all their Posterity by Tradition only. 2. That God has endow’d rational Minds with a Faculty able, by Application of their Understanding, to discover those Laws, and to distinguish them, when discover’d, from all positive Institutions.
He only transiently hints, in such general Terms, this latter Method, which however to me seems to want much Explanation and Proof; but he betakes himself wholly to the former, and endeavours to prove, from the Traditions of some Jewish Rabbins, “That God gave seven Precepts to the Sons of Noah, in the observance whereof all Justice amongst Men should consist.” And truly he has abundantly prov’d, “That the Jews thought that all Nations, altho they did not receive the Laws of Moses, were nevertheless oblig’d by some divine Laws, whose chief Heads they look’d upon the Precepts of the Sons of Noah to be.” And this proves at least, “That, in the Opinion of that Nation, which was not inconsiderable either for Numbers or Learning, there are Laws, not made by any State, that bind all Mankind.”Not sufficiently answer’d by the latter. It is likewise to be own’d, that this learned Man chiefly aim’d at this Point, and that with good Success; and that the Knowledge of this Matter is of considerable use in Christian Divinity. Selden, however, has not sufficiently answer’d his own Objection, which we before mention’d. For, altho these Jewish Traditions were thorowly known, and perhaps firmly believ’d, by him, they were not however manifested to all Mankind; and those things which that Nation looks upon as the greatest Mysteries of Religion, are by many ridicul’d. And to me truly it seems self-evident, “That an unwritten Tradition of the learned Men of one Nation, is not a sufficient Promulgation of a Law of Nature, which is to oblige all Nations.”
To answer this Objection, the Author chuses the second Method of deducing the Laws of Nature from their Causes, by their divine-Promulgation and Sanction.§IV. Wherefore, that the Conclusions of Reason in moral Matters might more evidently appear to be Laws, Laws of God, I have thought it proper to make a philosophical Inquiry into their Causes, as well Internal as External, the nearer and the more remote; for by this Method we shall at last arrive at their first Author, or efficient Cause, from whose essential Perfections, and internal Sanction of them by Rewards and Punishments, we have shewn that their Authority arises. Most others have been satisfy’d with saying in general Terms, “That these Conclusions, or Actions conformable to them, are taught by Nature”; but to me it seems necessary, especially at this time, to trace more distinctly, after what manner the Powers of things, as well without as within us, conspire to imprint these Conclusions upon our Minds, and to give a Sanction to them. Our Countryman, the Lord Verulam, has reckon’d such an Inquiry among the things which are wanting. This, if solidly perform’d, will therefore be of very great use; because thence will appear, both how our Mind is, by the Light of Nature, let into the Knowledge of the Will or Laws of God, so as that it cannot be free from the warning of Conscience; and what that Rule is, whereby the Justice and Rectitude of the Laws of particular States is to be measured, and their Injustice and Imperfection to be corrected and amended by the supreme Authority if they have at any time deviated from the best and greatest End. Hence also, (that it may appear, that Morality is not the Artifice of Ecclesiastics or Politicians,) is further shewn, “That there is something in the Nature of God, of other Men, and of our selves, which in good Actions affords present Comfort and Joy, and a well-grounded Expectation of future Rewards.” On the other hand, “That there are Causes which must naturally produce the most violent Grief and Fear, after evil Actions; so that the Sentence of Conscience may be justly look’d upon as armed with Scourges against Impiety.”
Without insisting on innate Ideas of them.§V. The Platonists, indeed, clear up this Difficulty in an easier manner, by the Supposition of innate Ideas, as well of the Laws of Nature themselves, as of those Matters about which they are conversant; but, truly, I have not been so happy as to learn the Laws of Nature in so short a way. Nor seems it to me well advised, to build the Doctrine of natural Religion and Morality upon an Hypothesis, which has been rejected by the generality of Philosophers, as well Heathen as Christian, and can neverbe prov’d against the Epicureans, with whom is our chief Controversy. I was resolv’d, however, not to oppose this Opinion, because it is my earnest desire, that whatever looks with a friendly Aspect upon Piety and Morality, might have its due weight; (and I look upon these Platonists to be favourers of their Cause;) and because it is not impossible, that such Ideas might be both born with us, and afterwards impress’d upon us from without.
Or supposing, without Proof, their eternal Existence in the divine Mind.§VI. Moreover, the same Reasons, which hinder’d us from supposing innate Ideas of the Laws of Nature in our Minds, hinder us likewise from supposing, without Proof, that these Laws have existed from Eternity in the divine Mind. I have therefore thought it necessary to remove the Difficulty, and assert and prove the Authority and eternal Existence of these Conclusions in the divine Mind, in the following Method; assuming those Notices which we have from Sense and daily Experience, I demonstrate, “That the Nature of things, which subsists,Their Promulgation and Obligation, and eternal Existence in, or agreeableness to, the divine Mind, prov’d. and is continually govern’d, by its first Cause, does necessarily imprint on our Minds some practical Propositions, (which must be always true, and cannot without a Contradiction be suppos’d otherwise,) concerning the Study of promoting the joint Felicity of all Rationals: And that the Terms of these Propositions do immediately and directly signify, that the first Cause, in his original Constitution of Things, has annex’d the greatest Rewards and Punishments to the observance and neglect of these Truths.” Whence it manifestly follows, “That they are Laws,” Laws being nothing but practical Propositions, with Rewards and Punishments annex’d, promulg’d by competent Authority. Having hence shewn, “That the Knowledge and Practice of these Laws, is the natural Perfection or most happy State of our rational Nature,” I infer, “That there must be in the first Cause, (from whom proceed both this our Perfection, and that most wise Disposition which we see, every Day, of Effects without us, for the common Preservation and Perfection of the whole System,) a Perfection correspondent, but infinitely superior, to this Knowledge and Practice of the Laws of Nature.” For I look upon it as most evident, “That we must first know what Justice is, and from whence those Laws are deriv’d, in the observance whereof it wholly consists, before we can distinctly know, that Justice is to be attributed to God, and that we ought to propose his Justice as our Example.” For we come not at the Knowledge of God by immediate Intuition of his Perfections, but from his Effects first known by Sense and Experience; nor can we safely ascribe to him Attributes, which from other Considerations we do not sufficiently comprehend.
The chief Heads of the following Book.§VII. Having hitherto shewn, in general, the Difference between our Method and that of others, I think it proper, to shew briefly here the chief things which are more at large and dispersedly deliver’d in the following Discourse. Having undertaken only, “to deliver the Precepts of moral Philosophy, and to deduce them from some little Knowledge of Nature presuppos’d”; what natural Philosophers, especially those who reason upon mathematical Principles, have often demonstrated, I assume, as sufficiently prov’d.The Effects of corporeal Motions, Effects of the divine Will. But my principal Supposition is, “That all Effects of corporeal Motions, which are necessary, according to the common Course of Nature, and depend not upon the Will of Man, are produc’d by the Will of the first Cause”: for this comes to no more than saying, “That all Motions are begun by the Impression of a first Mover, and are by the same Impression continued, and perpetually determin’d, according to certain Laws.” For I thought it superfluous to prove that which had been already prov’d by most natural Philosophers, and is plainly acknowledg’d by Hobbes himself, whose Doctrine I am now examining. Leviath. Chap. 12. After he has assign’d the Cause of Religion, among Men, to their anxious Concern about Futurity, he adds thus, (whether insidiously or no, let others judge;) “The acknowledging of one God Eternal, Infinite and Omnipotent, may more easily be deriv’d from the Desire Men have to know the Causes of natural Bodies, and their several Virtues and Operations, than from the fear of what was to befal them in time to come: for he that from any Effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate Cause thereof, and from thence to the Cause of that Cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of Causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confess’d) one first Mover; that is, a first and eternal Cause of all things, which is that which Men mean by the Name of God.” But if it be granted, “That every natural Effect points out God as its Author,” no Man can deny, “That all such Effects are determin’d by his Will,” unless he is inconsistent enough to acknowledge God the Cause of those Effects, and at the same time to contend, that he is not a voluntary Agent.
Apprehending, comparing, judging, the natural Effects of such Motions, and consequently of the divine Will.§VIII. Moreover, “Every Motion impress’d upon our Organs of Sense,” (such Motions are by the Peripateticks call’d sensible Qualities, ) “by which the Mind is led to apprehend Objects, and to form Judgments concerning them, is an Effect plainly natural, and therefore, whatever second Causes intervene, owes its Original to the first.” And thence it follows, “That God, by these Motions, as by a Pencil, delineates the Ideas or Images in our Minds of all sorts of things, especially of Causes and their Effects. And, by imprinting on us, from the same Object, various Notions imperfectly representing it, he excites us to bring them together, and to compare them among themselves; and, consequently, determines us to form true Propositions concerning things understood by us.” So, because an Object is sometimes expos’d to sight whole, and at once, and at other times is view’d narrowly, and by parts; and the Mind perceives that the Idea of the Whole plainly represents the same thing, with all the Ideas of the single Parts taken together, it is obliged to form a Proposition concerning the Sameness of the Whole and all the Parts; or to affirm, “That the Causes which preserve the Whole, preserve also all its essential Parts.”
All particular Laws of Nature reduc’d to one Proposition.§IX. Lastly, upon a diligent Consideration of all those Propositions which deserve to be rank’d amongst the general Laws of Nature, I have observ’d they may be reduc’d to one universal one, from the just Explication whereof all the particular Laws may be both duly limited and illustrated. This general Proposition may be thus express’d. “The Endeavour, to the utmost of our power, of promoting the common Good of the whole System of rational Agents, conduces, as far as in us lies, to the good of every Part, in which our own Happiness, as that of a Part, is contain’d. But contrary Actions produce contrary Effects, and consequently our own Misery, among that of others.” Wherefore the whole of this Treatise is employ’d upon these Heads, which regard either,(1.) the Matter of this Proposition; that is, the Knowledge of its Terms, to be drawn from the Nature of Things; or (2.) its Form, that is, the joining these Terms in such a practical Proposition as may deserve the Name of a Law, upon account of the Rewards and Punishments annex’d by the Author of Nature; or (3.) lastly, The Deduction and natural Limitation of the other Laws of Nature, by their Respect to the common Good or happiest State of the whole Body.
Its Matter, that is, the Terms, explain’d.§X. To the Knowledge of the Terms belongs all that we have said in general of the Nature of Things, especially of Man, as also of the common Good. But I must ask the Reader’s pardon for sometimes as cribing Reason to God, and ranking him amongst rational Beings; and that we are sometimes said to bear a good Will towards God, or to desire something agreeable to his Nature, that is, Good. For in the beginning we declare, that these Expressions are not properly, and in the same Sense said of God, in which we use them, when we speak of Men. For we suppose in him absolute Omniscience and Wisdom, which Cicero himself could not better express, than by the Name of “Reason in its Perfection.” Nor do we imagine, “That we can testify our Love of God, by adding any thing to his Perfections, which from Eternity were infinite.” Yet it is not to be doubted, but that in our Actions, Obedience, and Imitation of his Care of the common Good of Mankind, whose Being is continued from Day to Day by his Favours; and also in our Words, and Thoughts, and Affections, Honour, Worship, and Love, are more agreeable to his beneficent Nature, and more acceptable to him, than Neglect or Hatred, or direct and wilful Opposition. For, if we abstractedly compare two rational Natures between themselves, we must acknowledge a better Agreement when they consent and co-operate, than when they dissent, and the End propos’d by one of them, is oppos’d by the other. Nor do I see that it alters the Case, tho one of these rational Natures should be suppos’d to be God, and the other, Man. Therefore, as we know by the help of our Senses, “That it is more acceptable to any Man to be lov’d and honour’d, than to be hated and despis’d”; so it is evident to Reason, by a manifest Correspondence, “That it is more grateful to the supreme Rational, God, to be lov’d and honour’d by the Obedience of Men, than to be the Object of Hatred and Contempt.” For, as it is certain, that to desire to be belov’d, implies no Imperfection in Man; in God, it is so far from carrying any Suspicion of Imperfection, that, on the contrary, it is an Argument of the Benignity of his Nature, because Men arrive at their greatest Perfection, by loving him: which being manifest, both by Reason and Experience, it thence evidently follows, “That God has inseparably annex’d the greatest Reward to the Love of himself”; which he never would have done, if it were not agreeable to his Will to be belov’d.
But the Reader, in perusing the three Chapters of this Treatise, whose Titles I have just now mention’d, will see, that while we explain the Terms (to use a School-Phrase) of the foregoing Proposition, we are not busy’d about the Interpretation of Words, but about Ideas, and the Nature of those Things whence they arise, as far as it is necessary to our present purpose: And at the same time he will observe, that I directly and immediately explain the Consequences and Necessity of those human Actions, which are either necessary to the common Happiness of all, or to the private Happiness of Individuals: Altho it seem’d advisable to use words so general, that they might in a sound Sense be ascrib’d to the divine Majesty; and that to this very purpose, that by the help of Analogy, or Correspondence, prudently apply’d, not only our Obligation to Piety, but the Nature of the divine Justice and Dominion, might thence be understood.
Its Form consider’d, Practical, declaring the Cause of the best Effect.§XI. As to the Form of the Proposition, (to make use of a logical Term,) it is manifest, that it is practical, as pronouncing concerning the Consequences of human Action.
It is, however, to be observ’d, that the Proposition (altho the Word [conduces] be used in the present Tense, because the Observation is collected from things present) is not limited to the present time, but is equally to be understood of what is future; and, because its Truth chiefly depends upon “the Whole’s being the same with all its Parts,” is as manifestly true of the future, (which from other Arguments we prove in this Treatise,) and with respect to Futurity, it is always by us made use of.
Moreover, this Proposition is the better fitted to our purpose, that it builds upon no Hypothesis. For it does not suppose Men born either in, or out of, civil Society. It does not suppose a Relation between all Men as born of the same common Parents, which the Scriptures teach us; (for the Obligation of the Laws of Nature is to be demonstrated to those who acknowledge not the sacred Scripture:) Nor, on the contrary, does it suppose, as does Mr. Hobbes, that “the Earth produc’d suddenly, like Mushrooms, the Bulk of Mankind at their full Growth.” But our Proposition, and all the Deductions from thence, might be both understood and acknowledg’d, even by our first Parents, considering themselves in the Relation they stood in to God, and to the Posterity which might be born of them; nor is it less easy to be understood by all those Nations, who are unacquainted with the History of our first Parents.
And, consequently, the Means to the best End.§XII. Nor shall I think it improper here to take notice, “That the foregoing Proposition, in the same words it declares the Cause of the greatest and best Effect, declares the Means to obtain the best End”: for the Effect of a rational Agent, after he has consider’d it in his Mind, and has resolv’d to produce it, is call’d his End; and the Actions or Causes, by whose Power he endeavours to effect it, are called the Means. So also in geometrical Problems, the Causes of the geometrical Effects are the prescrib’d Drawings of Lines: But if such Effect is consider’d as a Problem, whose Solution is requir’d, or is propos’d to us as an End, then the words of the Problem suggest to the Geometrician, the proper Means to obtain his End. From this Observation the Method is shewn, “How to reduce whatsoever the Moralists have said concerning the Means of obtaining the best End, into Theorems concerning the Power of human Actions in producing the Effects propos’d”; in which Form they may more easily be examin’d, and if they be true, more evidently demonstrated. In like manner we hence learn, “How easily all Knowledge concerning the Power of Causes, (which we can any way make subservient to our Purposes,) suggests the Means to attain the End known, and so may be apply’d to Practice, as occasion requires.” Lastly, it is also hence evident, “That the Proposition we are treating of, does in this respect, at least, partake of the Nature of a Law, that it respects an End truly worthy of a Law, the common Good of all Beings,” or the Honour of God, in conjunction with the Happiness of all Mankind.
Proceeding from a competent Author, God.§XIII. But, at first view, perhaps, these two necessary Requisites to enforce a Law may not be perceiv’d in that Proposition, viz. a competent Author, and a sufficient Sanction by Rewards and Punishments. But if it be more closely examin’d, we shall perceive, “That upon this very account, that the nature of things impresses it upon our Minds, it necessarily points out its Author, the firstCause, as of all Things, so of all Truths arising from them”; among the principal of which Truths is to be reputed this true Proposition, which we affirm to contain the fundamental Law of Nature. Nor can any one in reason desire, that it should be more evidently prov’d, “That God is the Author of this Proposition,” than it is prov’d, “That he is the Author of the Nature of Things, whence the Truth of this Proposition arises.” Wherefore, having come to the Knowledge of its Author, it only remains that we should shew, “That there is a sufficient Sanction annex’d by the same Author, and that it is clearly contain’d in the said Proposition.”
Confirm’d by a sufficient Sanction.§XIV. I am not ignorant that a Sanction, in the strictest Sense of the Word, is call’d by Cicero and Papinian, that Part of the Law, which inflicts a certain Punishment upon those who have not obey’d what the Law enjoins. But I have thought it proper to use the Word in a more extensive Sense, so as to take in the Rewards which the Law promises to the Obedient; for by these also are the Laws guarded against the Injury of Men, and thence are styled [Sanctae] Sacred, according to Marcian’s looser Definition of the Word Sacred: “That is sacred, which is defended and guarded against the Injury of Men.” In which Sense it is, that, upon account of the Rewards and Punishments wherewith they are confirm’d, Ulpian, in the following Law, affirms them to be sacred. Nevertheless, if any one is unwilling to depart from the stricter Signification of the Word, there is no occasion to dispute about it, provided we agree in the Thing. I have added therefore, upon their account, this Proposition, “Such Actions as are contrary to a Care of the publick Good, whether by a Neglect or Violation thereof, bring Evil upon each part of the System of Rationals, but the greatest upon the Evil-doers themselves”; and this plainly expresses Punishment, without any mention of Reward. But we have almost wholly employ’d our selves in the Proof of the former Part of the Proposition, which relates to the Rewards included in Happiness, because hence the latter is evidently demonstrated; and because the Nature of Punishment includes Evil, that is, a Privation of those good things which our Nature makes necessary to our Happiness; but these Privations cannot be understood, unless those good things be first apprehended, to which they are oppos’d. Finally, the Nature of Things (whose Footsteps were by us most carefully to be traced in this Treatise) lays it self out almost wholly, in letting in upon our Minds the positive Notion of Causes and their Effects by our outward Senses, which cannot receive Negations and Privations; and we are more early affected with the love of present, and hope of future Good, than with the hatred or fear of Evil: for no Man therefore loves Life, Health, or such grateful Motions to the Nerves and Spirits as we call corporeal Pleasures, or desires their Causes, that he may avoid Death, Diseases, and Pain; but because of their intrinsic Goodness, or positive Agreement (to borrow a Phrase from the Schools) with the Nature of our Body. In like manner, no Man therefore desires the Perfections of the Mind, (such as a more extensive and distinct Knowledge of the noblest Objects in all respects most agreeably consonant to it self, and the most grateful Perception of Benevolence, of a well-grounded Hope, and of a Joy in the Prosperity of all Rationals;) barely that he may avoid the Uneasinesses of Ignorance, Ill-will, Envy and Commiseration; but because of that superlative Pleasure which we experimentally find in such Acts and Habits, which is the Reason that to be depriv’d of them is most ungrateful, and that the Causes of such Privations are themselves irksome. Hence therefore it is manifest, that even Civil Laws, when they receive the Sanction of Punishments, Death, for example, or Forfeiture of Goods, if we closely examine the Matter, do oblige Men to Obedience from a Love of Life, or of that Wealth, which the Laws shew us, how to preserve thereby. For an Aversion to Death and Poverty, is nothing but a Love of Life and Riches; as he that by two Negatives says, “That he would not want (that is, not have) Life,” says but the same thing as if he affirm’d, “That he would enjoy Life.” To which also this may be added, that Civil Laws themselves seem to me to be much more establish’d from the End, which as well their Enactors as the best Subjects regard, viz. the publick Good of the Society; part whereof falls to the Share of every good Subject, and therefore naturally brings along with it the Reward of Obedience; much more, I say, than by those Punishments which they threaten; the Fear whereof moves but a few, and those the worst.
And, being promulg’d, is therefore a Law.§XV. That the Summary of all the Precepts and Sanctions of the Law of Nature, is contain’d in our Proposition, and its Corollary concerning the opposite Behaviour, I thus briefly shew. The Subject (to borrow a School-Term) of the Proposition is, an Endeavour, according to our Ability, to promote the common Good of the whole System of Rationals. This includes our Love of God, and of all Mankind, who are the Parts of this System. God, indeed, is the principal Part; Men, the Subordinate: A Benevolence toward both includes Piety and Humanity, that is, both Tables of the Law of Nature. The Predicate of the Proposition (to borrow another Phrase from the Schools) is, conducing to the good of every Part, in which our own Happiness, as of a Part, is contain’d. In which, as all those good Things we can procure to all, are said to be the Effect of this Endeavour, so among the rest is not omitted that Collection of good Things, whence our own Happiness arises, which is the greatest Reward of Obedience; as Misery, arising from Actions of a contrary kind, is the greatest Punishment of Wickedness. But the natural Connexion of the Predicate with the Subject, is both the Foundation of the Truth of the Proposition, and the Proof of the natural Connexion between Obedience and Rewards, Transgression and Punishments.
Hence the Reader will easily observe the true Reason, why this practical Proposition, and all those which may be deduc’d from thence, oblige all rational Beings who understand them; whilst other practical Propositions, (suppose Geometrical ones,) equally impress’d by Nature, and consequently by God, upon the Mind of Man, do not oblige him to conform his Practice to them; but may safely be neglected by most, to whom the Practice of Geometry is not necessary: Which is wholly owing to the Nature of the Effects, arising from the one and the other Practice. The Effects of the Practice of Geometry are such as most People may want without Prejudice. But the Effects of a care of the common Good, do so nearly concern all, of whom we our selves are a part, and upon whose Pleasure the Happiness of each Individual does in some measure depend, that such care cannot be rejected, without the hazard of losing that Happiness, or the Hope thereof: and this God has manifested to us, by the very Nature of Things, and thereby he has sufficiently promulg’d, that he himself is the Author of the Connexion of Rewards and Punishments with our Actions; whence this Proposition, and all others which flow from thence, commence Laws by his Authority.
Actions agreeable thereto, good.§XVI. From the very Terms of our Proposition, it is manifest, “That the adequate and immediate Effect of that Practice which this Law establishes, is, that which is acceptable to God, and beneficial to all Men; which is the natural Good of the whole System of Rationals, even the greatest of all those good things which can be procur’d for them, as being greater than the like Good of any part of the same System.” Moreover, it sufficiently implies, “That the happiness of each Individual”(from the Prospect of enjoying which, or being depriv’d of it, the whole Sanction is taken) “is deriv’d from the best State of the whole System,” as the nourishment of each Member of an Animal depends upon the nourishment of the whole Mass of Blood diffus’d thro’ the whole.
Hence it is manifest, “That this greatest Effect” (not any small Portion thereof, the private Happiness, suppose, of any single Person) “is the principal end of the Lawgiver, and of every one who truly obeys his Will.” It is likewise hence evident, “That those human Actions, which, from their own natural Force or Efficacy, are apt to promote the common Good, are call’d naturally Good, and indeed better than those Actions which are subservient to the private Good of any Individual, in proportion, as the publick Good is greater than a private.”
Right.In like manner, “Such Actions as take the shortest way to this Effect, as to their End, are naturally Right, because of their natural resemblance to a right Line, which is the shortest that can be drawn between any two given Points.” Nevertheless, the same Actions, afterward, when they are compar’d with the Law, whether natural or positive, which is the Rule of Morality, and they are found conformable to it; are call’d morally Good, as also Right, that is, agreeing with the Rule: but the Rule itself is call’d right, as pointing out the shortest way to the End.
Beautiful.So also, because that State of all Men, which most abounds with all the natural Goods, both of Mind and Body, fitly proportion’d among themselves, and appointed to the best End, is naturally the most beautiful, (as plainly agreeing with the Definition of Beauty, taken from the Figure and Symmetry of the Parts;) it is manifest, “That those Actions which have a natural Tendency to produce or preserve such a State, may justly be call’d Beautiful or Decent.” And hence may be explain’d the τὸ καλον and τὸ πρέπον, the Beauty and Decency, which Philosophers so often celebrate in virtuous Actions.
Amiable.Lastly, seeing in the Chapter concerning Good it is largely shewn, “That it may be distinctly understood, without any regard to our selves,” the Reader cannot doubt but that we must acknowledge, “That the Good is in itself Amiable, which contains in it every particular Good of each Individual.” Therefore it is very absurd, that it should be made subordinate to the Happiness of any one Man, which is so small a part of so great a Good.
Honourable.By a like Reasoning it is manifest, “That Actions conducive to this End, as being the best and most beautiful, are in themselves amiable, and highly to be commended by all rational Beings, and therefore, upon account of that high Honour, to which their beneficent Nature in titles them, deservedly call’d Honest or Honourable.”
These Observations I thought the more necessary, lest any one should erroneously imagine, that I did not sufficiently acknowledge the intrinsic Perfections of Piety and Charity, because I have deduc’d the Sanctions of the Laws of Nature, by which such Actions are enjoin’d, from the happiness or misery of Individuals, consequent upon their Obedience, or Disobedience to the said Laws. Even in Civil Laws, the Sanctions of the Laws are sufficiently distinguish’d from the End and adequate Effect, viz. The publick Good; part, however, of the Effect of a Civil Law, is the infliction of Punishments, or the conferring of Rewards, by which the Law is guarded.
The Evil often happens to the observers of the general Law of Nature, and Good to those who violate it; the Sanction mention’d prov’d sufficient, by a general Proof.§XVII. But because the Connexion of Rewards and Punishments with such Actions as promote the public Good, or the contrary, is some what obscur’d by those evil Things which happen to the Good, and those good Things which happen to the Evil; it seems necessary to our purpose, more carefully to shew, “That (notwithstanding these) that Connexion is sufficiently constant and manifest in human Nature, so that then cemay, with certainty, be inferr’d the Sanction of the Law of Nature, commanding these Actions, and forbidding those.”
We suppose, 1. That Punishment, or that Reward, a sufficient Sanction, whose Value, all things rightly consider’d, exceeds the Advantage arising from the breach of the Law.
2. In comparing the Effects of good and evil Actions, those good or evil Things, which can neither be procur’d, nor avoided, by human Industry, are not to be taken into the Account. Such are those which happen by natural Necessity, or by mere Chance, from external Causes: for these both may, and do, happen alike both to good and bad. We shall therefore here consider those only, which can be taken care of by human Reason, as in some measure depending upon our Actions.
Having thus premis’d a general Proof, deduc’d from this Consideration, “That the particular Persons who promote or oppose the common Good, are parts of that Whole, which their Actions either befriend or prejudice, and therefore necessarily partake of the Advantage or Disadvantage thence arising”: We come to particular Proofs taken, partly from the Causes of such Actions, which are treated of in the Chapter concerning human Nature; partly from their Effects and Consequences, which are consider’d more at large in the Chapter concerning the Obligation of the Law of Nature. But that Chapter is more prolix, and less clear, than the rest, because therein I have been frequently forc’d to follow my Antagonist, into that most confus’d State which he supposes, in order to confute him from his own Concessions; and have been oblig’d to answer many Objections, not only of his, but also of some other better Philosophers. Wherefore I shall here briefly lay before the Reader, both what I there aim’d at, and the manner how all these things make to our purpose, lest he should suspect, that I had lost my way in so great a variety of Matter.
By particular Proofs taken from the Causes of human Actions.§XVIII. The Causes of human Actions are the Powers of the Mind and Body of Man. Wherefore, because I have observ’d it to be manifest, “That Happiness, or the highest Reward, is necessarily connected with the most full and constant exercise of all our Powers, about the best and greatest Objects and Effects, which are adequate and proportionable to them”; I hence collect, “That Men endow’d with these Faculties, are naturally bound, under the Penalty of forfeiting their Happiness, to employ or exercise them about the noblest Objects in Nature,” viz. God, and Man his Image. Nor can it be long a Question, “Whether our Faculties may be more properly employ’d in cultivating Friendship or Enmity with these, in engaging with them in a State of Peace or War.” For it is plain, “That there can be no neutral State, in which God and Men shall be neither lov’d, nor hated and irritated; or in which we shall act neither acceptably nor unacceptably to either, especially when we make use of things without us.” For of necessity, we must either take care, not to deprive others of things necessary to their Happiness, which, without Benevolence, cannot be suppos’d; or we shall, willingly, take them away, which is a sure indication of a malicious Mind. But if it be acknowledg’d, “That there is an evident Necessity, in order to Happiness, of cultivating friendship with God and Man,” the Sanction of that most general Law of Nature, which alone we are here tracing, is of course granted. For that alone establishes, both all natural Religion, and every thing that is necessary to the happiness of Mankind. Such are, beside Piety, (1.) A peaceful Commerce among different Nations, which is the Subject of the Law of Nations: (2.) The Establishment and Preservation of civil Society, which is the Scope of civil Laws: (3.) The Firmness of domestic Affection and of Friendship, which are establish’d, both by those general Rules which settle the Peace of Nations, and by the more particular Laws of Oeconomics. We have therefore collected very many things in the Chapter concerning human Nature, by which Individuals, in some measure, become capable of so great a Society, and are, remotely atleast, dispos’d toward it. And here we in treat the Reader, “That he would not consider these Observations, apart only, but together, that from them all united may result one Argument,” proving the Sanction of this most general Law from this, “That Men must necessarily fall short of their greatest Happiness, which consists in Action, or the proper and adequate use of their Faculties, unless they exercise them in cultivating a Friendship with God and Men”: to produce this Effect they were most especially fitted by Nature, which truly leaves the Transgressors of the Law without excuse.
From the Effects of human Actions.§XIX. From the Effects of human Actions, with respect to the common Good of rational Beings, we thus shew, “That a Sanction by Rewards and Punishments is annexed to them.” It is manifest, “That by the above mention’d Endeavour, in the first place, God, as being in the highest degree both wise and beneficent to all rational Beings, is lov’d and honour’d; the Life and all other Possessions of Men of all Nations, are safely preserv’d, according to the measure of our Ability; civil Government is readily constituted, where it is wanting, and as readily preserv’d, where it is found; and all Advantages, consistent with the good of the Whole, are procur’d to each, and, consequently, to our selves also; and nothing done to any one, which a regard to the Whole does not permit.” In Man, nothing but a Propension toward the good of all, guided by the Conduct of a prudent Understanding, can produce so great Advantages; nor, if such an Endeavour be not wanting in us, can any thing be desir’d to obtain this End, which we are not willing, to the utmost of our power, to perform. Wherefore, since these Effects may be certainly foreseen to follow from this Endeavour, no one can be ignorant, that in them are contain’d the present Comfort and Joys of Religion, which in all places are ever join’d with the hope of a happy Immortality; that moreover to this Study and Endeavour are annex’d as Rewards, the many Advantages of peaceful Commerce with Foreigners, of civil and domestic Government, and of Friendship; and that these Advantages cannot be obtain’d by any other Method in our power: And consequently, that whoever rejects the care of the common Good, does so far reject the Causes of his own Happiness, and embrace the immediate Causes of his Misery and Punishment.
To be brief; seeing it is manifest from the Nature of Things, “That the chief Happiness which we can procure to our selves, arises jointly from promoting Piety and Peace, mutual Commerce among Nations, civil and domestic Government, and also firm Friendship; and that the care of all these things together is to be found only in his Mind, who studies the common Good of all rational Beings”; it follows, “That the greatest Reward which Man can procure, is the natural Consequence of this Endeavour, as the want thereof, or Punishment, is the necessary result of Actions of a contrary kind”: The former of these, “Which as signs the Causes of that Happiness, which single Persons are wont or able to obtain,” we have prov’d from Effects confirm’d by Experience; the latter, “That Piety and universal Benevolence toward all Men, are contain’d in the care of the common Good,” we have shewn from its Definition and Parts in the Corollaries, Chap. 9. But a Conclusion drawn from such Premises, is known by the Light of Nature.
The contingent.§XX. I acknowledge, however, “That all these Effects are not entirely in our Power, but that many of them depend upon the Benevolence of other rational Beings.” But since we know from their Nature, as being analogous, or like, to our own, “That the common Good is the best and greatest End, which they can propose to themselves; and that the Perfection of their Nature requires, both that they should act for an End, and for this, rather than for any other not so good”; and since moreover we know from experience, “That such Effects of universal Benevolence may generally be procur’d from others by our Actions”: It is but reasonable, “That they should be reckon’d and esteem’d among the Effects of our Actions, or such Consequences of them, as for the most part happen.” Because every one is thought to be able to do, whatsoever he can perform by the help of his Friends. The whole Reward, which is annex’d to good Actions by the natural Constitution of the Universe, may not unfitly be compar’d to the Treasury or public Stock, which does not arise only from certain Payments, but also from various contingent Taxes: Suppose the Tolls paid upon account of Harbours, High-ways, and publick Bridges, whose Value is great, tho not certainly and distinctly known, yet often farm’d out at a determin’d Price. In like manner, in computing the Value of this Reward, there ought to be taken into the Account, not only those Parts of it, which necessarily accompany good Actions, (such as that formal Happiness, as it is call’d, which consists in the Knowledge and Love of God, and perhaps of those Men whose Wills conspire with his, the absolute Government of all our Passions, a most pleasant Harmony and Agreement of all our Principles of Action with all the Parts of our Life, the Favour of God, and the well-grounded Hope of a happy Immortality,) but there ought also to be taken into the Account, the contingent Advantages of good Actions; such are all those Blessings, which either accrue to us from the religious Disposition of other Men, or flow from civil Society, the good Correspondence of different Nations among one another, or from private Friendship: the Interests of all these several States, being as much taken care of, and promoted, by our good Actions, as in us lies. By a like Reasoning we understand, of what Parts the whole Punishment consists, which is the Consequence of Actions hurtful to the Publick; the Law prohibiting them, receives its proper Sanctions from all those Consequences, which are opposite to those just now mention’d.
Because they may be sufficiently estimated.§XXI. We all of us learn, from the Necessity of that Condition to which we are born, and in which we live, how to estimate contingent Advantages, that is, such Causes as will probably benefit us; and by the hope of such we are inclin’d to Action. For the Air itself, to the breathing of which we are forc’d by an impulse which is natural, is not always an Advantage to our Blood and Spirits, but is sometimes infected with a deadly Contagion; Meat, Drink, and Exercise, don’t always preserve Life; even they are often the Causes of Diseases. Husbandry sometimes rewards our Labours with Loss, instead of Gain; yet we are naturally inclin’d to such Actions from the hope of Good thence probably arising; as naturally, by a like hope of probable Good, are we mov’d to cultivate the common Interest: which Hope, nevertheless, is of itself neither the only, nor the principal Cause impelling, but as it conspires with those other Rewards already mention’d, which are naturally inseparable.
But with how great Probability we hope, from all other Men jointly consider’d, for a return which may repay our Labours laid out upon the common Good; we shall hence form the best judgment, if we consider what both the Experience of the present Time, and the History of the past, witness concerning the Practice of all Nations hitherto nown, with regard to this End. Among every one of them we may openly observe some reverence of one Deity, at least, by which when they have taken an Oath, they are deterr’d from Perjury: You may every where observe an advantageous Commerce carried on between such Nations as are mutually known to one another, unless it be interrupted by a formal War: Civil Government, and a distinction of Property depending thereon, is every where preserv’d: The Ties of Blood and Friendship are generally every where observ’d. But because the whole Endeavour to promote the common Good, means nothing more than the Worship of a Deity, a Care of Commerce and Peace among Nations, of civil and domestic Government, and also of Friendship, as its Parts jointly consider’d; it is manifest, “That the care of that Good is in some measure every where to be found among Men”; whence many Advantages of Peace and mutual Aid necessarily accrue to Individuals.
Nay, it seems to me manifest, “That each one who has reach’d Man’s Estate, owes his past Years much more to the Pains of others, than to any care of his own,” which in his Childhood is little or nothing. For we then wholly depend on that Obedience, which others yield to those Laws, whereby the Affairs of Families, of the State; and of Religion are govern’d; all which flow from a Care of the common Good. Hence it comes to pass, “That, if afterwards we hazard, nay lose, our Lives for the publick Good, we part with less for its sake, than we had already receiv’d from it”: for we lose only an uncertain Hope of future Joys, if we should live, nay, not that; for it is rather certain, that scarce any Hope can remain to particular Persons, where the common Good is trampled under foot. But we had before receiv’d from it the real Advantages of Life, and all those Perfections which adorn’d us.
Nor doubt I, but that the greatest Advantages we experience from mutual Assistance in a social State, might have been foreseen from the Nature of Man, by our first Parents, if we suppose them to have deliberated, “Whether they should more effectually promote the true Happiness of their Children, by persuading them to the exercise of Piety towards God and their Parents, and of mutual Benevolence among Brethren,” (which is the Summary of Religion, and of civil Government, which was first exercis’d in a single Family, as well as of the Law of Nations,) “than by initiating them in the Mysteries of Atheism, and exhorting each to claim every thing to himself, and so immediately to commence Robbers and Murderers of one another.” But the good and bad Consequences (thus naturally known from the Nature of Things) of such human Actions, because they are fore shewn by God, to Men deliberating concerning their Actions, in order to incline them to, or deter them from, Action, are intirely in the Nature of Rewards and Punishments, by which a Law receives its Sanction.
And that Estimate is farther confirm’d, by the natural Manner of nourishing and preserving Animals.§XXII. These Observations seem to me most evidently just, because they shew a Method of preserving the several Members of the rational System, extremely like that whereby Nature instructs all Animals to preserve the Health and Strength of the several Members of their Bodies. Nature obliges them, in order to this End, to take Nourishment, and breathe the Air, which, tho by reason of internal Diseases, or external Hurts, (Bruises, Wounds, and Fractures) they do not always give the Members the intended Strength, do yet most commonly immediately preserve that Temper of the Blood, which is necessary to the Life of the whole Body. She teaches us in the same manner, that by Actions immediately promoting the common Good, the various Perfections of Individuals,(who are Members of the rational System,) are ordinarily to be expected, as being not less naturally deriv’d from thence, than the Strength of our Hands from a just Temper in the Mass of Blood. We must confess, however, that many things may happen, by means whereof this general Care of the Whole may not always produce the propos’d Happiness of Individuals, without allay; as breathing and eating, however necessary to the whole Body, do not ward off all Diseases and Accidents. For, as well by an irregular Behaviour of our Fellow-Citizens, like an indisposition in the Bowels, as by foreign Invasion, good Men may be depriv’d of some of the Rewards of their good Actions, and may suffer Evils from without. But because such Evils are generally warded off by the force of Concord and Government, (which always flow from a care of the publick Good,) and are often, after short suffering, remov’d by our own Strength, and the Aid of the civil Power, as Diseases retire upon Nature’s taking a healthful turn; and are often also compensated with greater Advantages, partly by the Virtues of others, but chiefly by means of civil Government, and of foreign Leagues: hence it comes to pass, “That the Race of Men has in no Age been extinguish’d, and that most Societys have lasted longer than particular Men, or even the most long-liv’d Animals.”
From these Considerations it is evident, “That the wicked Dispositions of some Men, and those Motions of the Affections, which sometimes arise in all Men, contrary to the common Good, do no more hinder us from acknowledging, That the more powerful Inclinations of all Mankind, jointly consider’d, are carried towards that which we daily see procur’d thereby, the preservation and further perfection of the whole; than Diseases sometimes arising in the Parts of Animals, hinder our confessing, That the whole frame of the human Body, and the natural Functions of the Parts, are adapted to preserve Life, propagate the Species, and preserve the vigour of each Member for it susual Term of Duration.” For from hence are not only first constituted Societies, Embassies, and foreign Leagues; but also, if at any time a League with any Nation be broken, even the breaker of the League immediately betakes himself to the Faith of other Nations, by Engagements enter’d into with them, and so by his own Action condemns himself: And if at any time one Religion is suppress’d in a Nation, another is immediately replac’d, in order to procure the Favour of the Deity: So when any Commonwealth is dissolv’d by Sedition or War, another is immediately thence form’d or enlarg’d. Now these Observations make it manifest, “That the whole System of Rationals, is as much, or more, form’d for its own Preservation, and the subordinate one of its Members, than the universal corporeal System is form’d for its Preservation: whilst the Generation of one Body follows from the Corruption of another; and, in the Generation of single Animals, they are form’d with Organs, by which they for some time preserve themselves, and propagate their kind.”
The Author’s Method of deducing the Sanction of the Laws of Nature, confirm’d by universal Consent.§XXIII. I have thus briefly laid down the Method, by which I have deduc’d the Sanction of the Laws of Nature; in which I have consider’d the Happiness which naturally flows from good Actions, as the Reward annex’d to them by the Author of Nature; and the loss thereof as a Punishment, not less naturally connected with evil Actions. For whatever Good or Evil is the necessary Consequence of human Actions, must necessarily be contain’d in such practical Propositions, as truly declare the Consequences of those Actions. And God himself is suppos’d to declare those practical Propositions, which are necessarily suggested to our Minds by the Nature, as well of our own Actions, as of those of other rational Beings, and which truly foretel what Consequences will follow. But those “Advantages and Disadvantages, which God himself pronounces annex’d to human Actions, and by which we are admonish’d to pursue those, and avoid these,” are really and truly Rewards and Punishments.
In these things, however, I agree, as well with those who say, “That Virtue contains Happiness in itself, and so is its own Reward: as also with those others, who beside look for other Advantages, whether of Mind or Body; from God, their own Conscience, their Family, or their Friends, from their own Country, or from foreign Nations; whether we enjoy them in this Life, or with reason hope for them in one here after.” And our Method seems much to be confirm’d by this, that all, of how different Sentiments soever in Morality, yet agree in this, “That good Actions ought by all means to be honour’d with suitable Rewards, and that they are actually so honour’d; and that evil Actions ought necessarily to be restrain’d by Punishments, and that they are so restrain’d.” In these Points, Philosophers, however otherwise differing, agree, as do the Founders of all Religions, and all Lawgivers.
Even they, who would seem to neglect Rewards, and would deduce all the Virtues from Gratitude, must needs own, “That Gratitude flows from the Remembrance of Benefits receiv’d.” But it argues as much Self-love, to be excited to good Actions from Benefits already receiv’d, as to do them for the sake of the Hopes of such; nay, even he seems to act somewhat the more generously of the two, who is mov’d by the Hope only of Good, because there is somewhat of uncertainty for the most part mix’d with Hope, than he who does as much for equal Benefits, which he already enjoys. But besides, the Memory of past Benefits affects the Mind with a certain Pleasure, which is a part of Happiness, and consequently of a Reward, which we therefore acknowledge to be a proper motive to good Actions. Nor seems it possible, that the Consent of all Men in these Matters should be so unanimous, unless the common Nature and Reason of all dictated this one and the same thing to them all, “That the chief End, the common Good of all, could not otherwise be preserv’d unviolated, than by Rewards and Punishments; and that it is therefore every where guarded by them.”
The reduction of the Laws of Nature to one, useful.§XXIV. Moreover, this Method, by which I have reduc’d all the Precepts of the Law of Nature to one, seems useful; because the Proof of this one Proposition is more easy and expeditious, than that of those many, which are usually propos’d by Philosophers; and the ease of the Memory is better consulted, to which daily calling to mind a single Sentence, is not a Burden: and, (which is the greatest Advantage of all,) from the very Nature of the common Good, which in this Proposition we are directed to promote, a certain Rule or Measure is afforded to the prudent Man’s Judgment, by the help whereof he may ascertain that just Measure in his Actions and Affections, in which Virtue consists. This Task Aristotle has assign’d to the Judgment of the Prudent, in his Definition of Virtue, but has not pointed out the Rule by which such Judgment is to be form’d. Our Proposition shews, “That the Rule is to be taken from the Nature of the best and greatest End, respect being had to all the Parts of the whole System of Rationals, or of that Society of which God is the Head, the Members, all God’s Subjects.” For hence we shall be directed to such Acts of Piety towards God, as are perfectly consistent with that Peace and Commerce, which is to be preserv’d among all Nations, with the Establishment of civil Government, and with that Obedience which is to be paid to it; as also with the more private care of the Happiness of Individuals: And we shall likewise be directed to such Acts of the most diffusive Humanity, as shall be perfectly subordinate to true Piety: And universally, “Each of our Affections and Actions will bear that Proportion to the whole of our Strength, and to one another; which that Good, to the procuring which each of these Actions is subservient, bears to the greatest Good of the Whole, which in the whole Course of our Lives, we are able to effect”: Whence we shall certainly take care, “Not to be diligent about Matters of smaller Moment, and remiss about those of more Importance; not slothful about Matters of publick Concern, and earnest about those of private; but shall, in our Affections and Endeavours, take our Measures from the Value of that which is to be effected.”
Lastly, from this Fountain is to be deriv’d that Order among the particular Laws of Nature, according to which a former, in some measure, limits a latter; which the learned Dr. Sharrock has very judiciously and solidly observ’d in his Book of Offices, especially in the tenth Chapter: so that greater Regard ought to be had to the not in vading another’s Property, than to the keeping our Promise; to keeping a lawful Promise, than requiting a Benefit, &c. The reason of which is to be deduc’d from our Principle, “Because it conduces more to the common Good, that the principal special Law of Nature, concerning dividing and preserving Property, should not be violated by the Invasion of another’s Right, than that any one should stand to such a Promise, as could not be perform’d, without invading another’s Right.” And the Reason is alike in comparing the other Laws, which I hereafter rank according to the Order of their Dignity. He that desires more upon this Head, let him consult the Author now cited; it is sufficient for my Purpose, to have deduc’d the Reason of the Order that is among the Laws of Nature, from our Principle. Unless perhaps it may seem necessary here to add, That it ought not to seem strange to any, that I have said, “That no Right whatsoever, no Virtue, can be fully explain’d, without respect had to the State of all rational Beings, or of the whole intellectual System.” For we see in Natural Philosophy, “That those Accidents of Bodies which are daily obvious to our Senses, such as the communication of Motion, Gravitation, the Action of Light and Heat, Firmness and Fluidity, Rarefaction and Condensation, cannot be clearly explain’d, without having a respect to the whole material System, and to that Motion which is to be preserv’d therein.” It is likewise manifest in Mechanics, “That no Effect of any Motion, connected with others, and subordinate to them in a continued Series, can be exactly deduc’d, except all their Motions, and that according to the Order in which they depend upon one another, be calculated and compar’d.”
Further, from this Order among the Laws of Nature, (by which all particular ones are subordinate to the general Law, and among particular ones, the latter to the former,) we may best, in my Opinion, demonstrate, “That God never dispens’d with any of them; but that in such Cases, in which the Obligation of the latter might seem taken away, the matter was so chang’d, as that only the prior Laws took place”: so it is evident, “That the Law establishing a division of Property, and prohibiting to invade what is another’s, was not dispens’d with, when God gave permission to the Israelites to invade the Land of the Canaanites, who had transgress’d his Laws.” For that same Law determines, “That it is necessary for the public Good, that God should have a Dominion paramount over all, as well Things as Persons, in right of which (when soever he shall judge it conducive to the common Good) he may take away any Creature’s Property in his own Life or Goods, and transfer it to another, by a proper Signification of his Will,” as we read was done in the Case propos’d; whence it appears, that the Israelites only claim’d their own, and were not authoriz’d to invade what was another’s. In like manner also, the Law is not dispens’d with, which, for the common Good, prohibits the hurting Innocents, if at any time an innocent Person is commanded (when the common Good requires it) to expose him self to Danger, or undergo even Death, if God clearly enough reveals his Will in the Affair: for by this means God, the Lord of All, receives his due Honour; and in the properest manner, because the chief End is provided for, according to his Judgment. Therefore in this Case, the Safety of a single Person is neither a Part nor a Cause of the common Good; but on the contrary, his Detriment is suppos’d to be the Means necessary to that End. This will be yet clearer, if we consider, that the Truth of this generalProposition, “The Cause, to its power, preserving the Whole, to its power preserves all the Parts,” is not chang’d in any particular Case; altho sometimes it should happen, that a sound Hand expos’d to danger, in defence of the Head, should be cut off by outward Violence: for we have already shewn, that the perpetual Obligation of these Laws is founded on the Truth of a practical Proposition, which is founded on this, and is therefore in no case changeable.
More, useful, Inferences may be deduced from this general Law, than our Author has drawn.§XXV. I shall here say nothing concerning the Corollaries, which I have drawn in the Close of the following Treatise, because I know of nothing, by which I might render their Proof more concise, or more clear. I will take upon me, nevertheless, to affirm, “That I have not pointed out all those useful Deductions, which naturally flow from our Principles”;nor truly can I enumerate the mall. For in these are contain’d the most general Rules of Equity, which both Magistrates and private Persons may apply to all the new Cases that daily happen. From these, Magistrates may understand what civil Laws are equitable, and, consequently, fit to be retain’d; and what want to be corrected by Equity. They may likewise thence perceive, what Conditions of Leagues, and what Causes of foreign War, are just, what unjust. Hence also private Persons will learn always to obey the Laws, whether Divine or Human, which thence derive their Authority; and in those Cases, in which by these Laws they are left at liberty, (of which innumerable daily happen,) they will be directed to regard always the best End, and be restrain’d from all unlawful Methods of pursuing their private Happiness. Both will perceive, that they are oblig’d to make daily a greater Progress in Virtue, and that in such proportion, as their Skill and Strength to promote the publick Good be come greater by Experience, and as the publick Happiness becomes capable of any farther increase.
His Account of the Origin of Societies, and Duties of Humanity, agreeable to the Scriptures.§XXVI. The Origin of civil Societies I have deduc’d from two Laws of Nature, which are therefore to be consider’d together: (1.) From that which commands the Settlement of Property, as well in Things as in human Labour, where it is not found already established; but, where it is found, the Preservation of the same inviolably, as a Means principally necessary to the common Good. And, (2.) From that which enjoins a peculiar Benevolence of Parents towards their Children; for, in consequence of that Benevolence, our first Parents must have granted to their Children, when of Age, both a Patrimony of their own, out of that full Dominion, which they had over all things by the former of these Laws, and also a paternal Power over their own Offspring. Hence it might easily happen, when Families were increased, that some Heads of Families, either in their own Life time, or by their Testaments at their Death, might divide their Dominion among many Sons, by giving to each an absolute Command over his own Family, or over many; whence many Monarchies might arise:Other Heads of Families might also elsewhere settle Aristocracies, others, Democracies; but among all these sovereign Powers, the Obligation would still continue, “To promote the common Good, and to observe those Precepts thence necessarily arising, concerning the settlement and preservation of Property, keeping Promises, requiting Benefits, a limited Care of themselves and of their Off-spring, and an universal Humanity”; which are the principal Heads of the Law of Nations. But this is only an account of a possible and rightful Constitution of different Commonwealths, which also exhibits all their general Properties; nor does true Philosophy search for other Hypotheses. The Question concerning their actual Formation, is wholly concerning a Matter of Fact, depending on free Agents, and therefore is not demonstrable from Principles of Reason; the Proof here is to be taken from Testimony only. Facts, within the Memory of Persons now living, are to be prov’d from the personal Testimony of Witnesses: But Matters more antient, the Wit of Man cannot hand down otherwise to Posterity, than either by oral Tradition, (such as is no where to be found worthy of Credit in this Affair,) or by Writings compos’d on purpose to preserve their Memory; such are the Monuments preserv’d in the Archives of States, and Histories.
Seeing therefore it is manifest, “That the Original of all States that we know, exceeds the Memory of all Men now living,” the only way we have left to form a Judgment concerning their Origin and Constitution, is from the antient Laws and other Records of each State, publickly preserv’d and approv’d of; or, if we would inquire farther, we must have recourse to the most authentic and credible Histories; but, amongst these, we find none of equal Antiquity and Credit with that of Moses, which acknowledges no antienter Authority, under God, over Things and Persons, than is that of Fathers of Families over their Wives and Children, and, after them, of their eldest Sons. We do not read there, “That Adam and Eve had such a Right to all things, as made it lawful for them,” (if they had thro’ a mistake imagin’d it conducive to their own Preservation,) “to wage War with God, and with one another, without the Provocation of an Injury; and so mutually deprive one another of Food and Life.” On the contrary, there are Intimations, “That they knew, and acknowledg’d, the Obligation of all those things, that were then requisite to the common Good of the Kingdom of God in its yet Infant-state.” The Exercise of the divine Dominion in giving Laws, and the Derivation of human Property from the Gift of God, both there spoken of, oblige us to acknowledge such a Division of Property, as we have affirm’d to be necessary. Nay, without violating the Donation of God, neither of our first Parents could rob the other of the Necessaries of Life, much less of Life it self. Yet farther, they were so far from entring into a State of Enmity, that we read, “They contracted a Friendship at first sight,” which could not subsist without Fidelity and Gratitude, limiting their Self-love; and presently follows, “A Desire of propagating their Species, and consequently of preserving it.” But seeing, according to this History, our first Parents had only themselves and their Children, to consider as Parts of human Kind, it is manifest, “That in this singular friendly Intercourse between themselves as Husband and Wife, and natural Affection toward the Children to be born of them, is contain’d Humanity towards all, as the less is contain’d in the greater.” From hence it is evident, “That our Philosophy does perfectly agree with the sacred History.”
The Author abstains from Theological Disputes.§XXVII. Nevertheless, I have, in the following Treatise, purposely contain’d myself wholly within the Bounds of Philosophy, and have therefore altogether abstained from Theological Questions, concerning the Right of the divine Dominion in the Affair of Predestination, or of the Satisfaction made by Christ; nor have I consider’d, how much the Faculties of Mankind have been impair’d by the Transgression of our first Parents, concerning which we ought to form our Judgment from the Testimony of Scripture; but I have endeavour’d to prove the Law of Nature, only from that Reason we find ourselves at present possess’d of, and from Experience. We are however certain, “That nothing contradictory to the just Conclusions of our Reason, could ever be revealed by God.” And we therefore believe the sacred Scriptures to be the Word of God, the Author of Nature, because they every where illustrate, confirm, and promote the Law of Nature.
It is in consequence of this Purpose of abstaining from all Theological Controversies, that I would not dispute with Mr. Hobbes about the Sense of Scripture; which moreover seem’d therefore to me principally needless, because I cannot bring my self to believe, that he is seriously mov’d by its Authority, as being what he looks upon to be wholly deriv’d from the Will of particular States; and has in consequence taught, that it is changeable at their Pleasure; here, of Force, and elsewhere, of none.
The Laws of Nature eternally, because necessarily, true.§XXVIII. I have said little or nothing of the Eternity of the Laws of Nature; to which, however, I have with the greatest Diligence every where had an Eye, whilst I endeavour to demonstrate the unchangeable Truth of those Propositions, by a natural Connexion between their Terms; for their Eternity entirely depends upon their necessary Truth. For there is no doubt, but that “Propositions which are necessarily true, are true when soever they can be thought of”; and it is equally evident, “That the Truth of such was from Eternity known to the divine Mind.” Such an Eternity, none, that I know of, denies to mathematical Propositions, even newly invented or known among Men. To this purpose I think it proper only further to observe, “That the Connexion is no less necessary between human Actions, however free, whenever they are perform’d, and their Effects, than between the Actions or Motions of mere Bodies, and the Effects thence demonstrated.” Three Right Lines, for example, freely drawn by a Man, according to the Direction of the first of Euclid’s Elements, do not less necessarily form a Triangle, than if they were drawn by necessary Causes. In like manner, “Love towards God, and all Men, altho most freely exerted, after it is exerted, necessarily makes any Person as happy as his Power can make him,” as I have at large explain’d. Nor is it less manifest, “That a Consent to the Division of Property in Things themselves, and in human Labour, or to preserve the Division when made, by Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, a limited Care of our selves, and of our Off-spring, and Humanity exercis’d towards all, are Parts of that universal Love, and therefore proportionably conducive to the Happiness, as of the Whole, so of Individuals, especially his, in whom they are found”; than, “That Quadrants, or other lesser Arches, or Sectors, are Parts of a Circle.” Therefore the Eternity is equal, as well of Propositions of the one Kind, as of the other.
The Author’s Manner of handling his Subject.§XXIX. So much may suffice, by way of Preface, as to the Matter treated of; as to the Manner of treating it, I shall add but little. There are many things in our Style, candid Reader, which will greatly stand in need of your favourable Construction; being extremely sollicitous about the Matter, I was but too negligent of its Dress. It was written by Starts at Intervals, such as an uncertain State of Health, and the weighty Cares of my holy Function, would permit.
I have illustrated my Subject with Comparisons now and then taken from Mathematicks, because they, with whom I dispute, reject almost all the other Sciences. Moreover, it seem’d worth while to shew, “That the Foundations of Piety and moral Philosophy were not shaken,” (as some would insinuate,) “but strengthen’d, by Mathematicks, and Natural Philosophy, that depends thereon; and that therefore those natural Philosophers, who endeavour to overturn the Precepts of Morality, by Weapons drawn from Matter and Motion, may by their own Weapons be both oppos’d and confuted.”
I have designedly abstain’d from any physical Hypothesis concerning the System of the World, as upon other Accounts, so upon this chiefly, because the Reader may, without prejudice to our Reasoning, assume any Hypothesis he pleases; provided it be but such a one, as, from the Order among the natural Causes of Phaenomena, leads us to the first Cause. I have sometimes however had respect to the mechanical Hypothesis, a Specimen whereof the most ingenious Des-Cartes has given us, (other Hypotheses, according to the Laws of Matter and Motion, nevertheless, may and ought to be invented, if the Appearances of things so require;) because it leads us the shortest way to the first Mover, and is receiv’d by most of our Adversaries.
I would make this further request to the Reader, that he would not pass a severe Censure upon this Work, before he has thorowly read the Whole, and compar’d all its Parts together; because certainly, if there be either Strength or Beauty, in this Off-spring of our Brain, it chiefly arises from the firm Connexion of all the Parts, and the apt Proportion of each of them, as well to attain their own, as the common End. Its Face is not painted with the florid Colours of Rhetorick, nor are its Eyes sparkling and sportive, the Signs of a light Wit; it wholly applies it self, as it were, with the Composure and Sedateness of an old Man, to the Study of natural Knowledge, to gravity of Manners, and to the cultivating of severer Learning.
Conclusion.§XXX. Lastly, my chief aim in writing, was to promote the publick Good, by plainly proposing to the Minds of Men, the Standard of Virtue and Society, taken from the Nature of all Things; for I did not think it worth while to spend the whole Book, or the greatest Part of it, in confuting Hobbes’s Errors, tho I judg’d it necessary to be at some Pains in refuting his Mistakes, which had so grosly perverted so many. I thought it sufficient for this Purpose, thorowly to demolish the Foundations of his Doctrine, which are laid down, as well in his Treatise de Cive, as in his Leviathan; and openly to shew, “That they are diametrically opposite, not to Religion only, but to all civil Society.” These being plainly overthrown, all the wicked Doctrines, which Hobbes has rais’d upon them, fall at once to the Ground. But what we have in reality perform’d, we leave to the Reader’s Judgment. As to the Confutation which I have given, I am not very sollicitous; nor in treat I the Reader’s Favour, let him censure it as strictly as he pleases. But in the Confirmation of my Opinion, (because I know, that I neither do distinctly understand all, that the Nature of Things suggests toward our Institution in Virtue; nor could recollect in time all those things, which I had once distinctly consider’d, and which I was willing to have express’d in this Treatise;) I must intreat the Reader, not only to consider my Words, but to enquire strictly into the Nature of God and Men, and diligently to examine his own Breast; for thus he will daily make innumerable Observations, which will more perfectly direct him thro’ the Paths of Virtue to the same End. Moreover, because I know, that I differ from the Sentiments of some very learned Men, as to the Causes which imprint the Laws of Nature upon our Minds, I thought fit to add, that it is never the less reasonable, that we should love one another, and so fulfil that Law, which we both acknowledge God has written in our Hearts. As for my own part, I never would have committed my Thoughts upon this Subject to writing, much less would I have made them publick, unless the Importunity of some Friends at Cambridge, (with whom I used to converse with pleasure upon this Subject,) had extorted it from me. They, who first sollicited, and have principally influenced me to this, were Dr. Hezekiah Burton, and Dr. John Hollings, two very excellent and learned Men, my worthy Friends, with whom, to my great Advantage and Satisfaction, I have cultivated a most intimate Friendship these twenty Years. I pay so great a Deference to their Judgment, and owe so much to their Friendship, that I thought it a Crime, any longer to resist their Importunity. Do you, courteous Reader, make use of these our Endeavours, for the Benefit of others; enjoy them to your own, and may all Happiness attend you.
The Laws of Nature, defined. Altho’ the Scepticks and Epicureans of old denied, and others of like Principles still persist in denying, that there are any Laws of Nature; we are, nevertheless, on both sides agreed, what is intended by that Name; for we both understand thereby, certain Propositions of unchangeable Truth, which direct our voluntary Actions, about chusing Good and refusing Evil; and impose an Obligation to external Actions, even without Civil Laws, and laying aside all Consideration of those Compacts, which constitute Civil Government. “That some such Truths are, from the Nature of Things and of Men, necessarily suggested to the Minds of Men, and by them understood and remember’d, (whilst the Faculties of their Minds continue unhurt,) and that therefore they really exist there”; This is what we affirm, and our said Adversaries as expressly deny.
The Author’s Method of Inquiry, concerning their Existence.Wherefore, that the Nature of these Propositions may more plainly appear, it is necessary, that we first examine the Nature of Things universally, then, of Men, and lastly, of Good, as far as they relate to this Question. We must afterwards shew, what sort of Propositions direct Mens Actions, and naturally carry along with them the Force and Obligation of Laws, as pointing out what is necessary to be done, in order to obtain that End, which Nature has determin’d Men to pursue. Lastly, that there are such Laws, will sufficiently appear from the certainty and necessary influence of those Causes which produce them.
The Consideration of the Nature of Things, necessary in this Question;§II. Nor ought it to seem strange to any, that I said, “That the Nature of Things in the Universe ought first to be consider’d”; because the extensive Faculties of Man, which need many Things for their Preservation and Improvement, and are excited by all to Action, can’t be otherwise understood: For how can any one understand, what is most agreeable, or most hurtful, to the human Mind or Body, unless he considers (as far as he is able) all those Causes, as well remote, as near, which form’d, and now preserve, Man, and may hereafter support, or destroy, him? Nor is it possible to know, what is the best Thing a Man can do, in the present Case, unless the Effects, as well remote as near, which may proceed from him, in all variety of Circumstances, be foreseen and compar’d among themselves. But the Consideration of the Causes, upon which Men depend, and of those Effects, which may be produc’d by the Concurrence of their Powers, will necessarily lead every Man to consider, not only other Men, where soever dispers’d, and himself, as a small part of Mankind, but also this whole Frame of Nature, and God, its first Founder, and supreme Governor. These things being consider’d, in the best manner we are able, our Mind may by some general Conclusions pronounce, “What sort of human Actions chiefly promote the Common Good of all Beings, especially such as are Rational,” wherein each Man’s proper Happiness is contain’d. And we shall hereafter see, that in such Conclusions, provided they be true and necessary, the Law of Nature is contain’d.
Because all moral Philosophy is finally resolved into the Knowledge of Nature.§III. Yet the Nature of our Undertaking does not require, that we should take a particular View of all kinds of Beings. We congratulate, indeed, the happy Genius of this learned Age, that the intellectual Part of the World has been much illustrated by that great Accession of Light, which former Proofs of the Being of God, and the Immortality of the Soul have receiv’d from the daily increasing Knowledge of the inferior Part of Nature. We also congratulate, both the present Age and Posterity, that, now at length, the material Part of the Universe begins to be explain’d by introducing Mathematicks into the Study of Nature. It is truly a vast Undertaking, “To resolve the visible World into its most simple Principles, Matter, variously figur’d, and Motion, differently compounded, and after the Geometrical Investigation of the Properties of Figures, and of compounded Motions, from Phaenomena faithfully observ’d, to shew the History of the whole corporeal System exactly conspiring with the Laws of Matter and Motion”; but that is an Undertaking, not only unequal to the Abilities of any one Man, but of an Age. It is, nevertheless, worthy of the united Endeavours, and unwearied Industry of those great Genius’s of which the Royal Society is compos’d: Worthy of his most excellent Majesty, King Charles its Founder, Patron and Example. We may therefore safely commit so important and difficult an Affair to so faithful and skilful Hands. It is sufficient for us, in the beginning of this Undertaking, to have admonish’d the Reader, “That the Whole of moral Philosophy, and of the Laws of Nature, is ultimately resolv’d into natural Observations known by the Experience of all Men, or into Conclusions of true Natural Philosophy.” But Natural Philosophy, in the large Sense I now use it, does not only comprehend all those Appearances of natural Bodies, which we know from Experiment, but also inquires into the Nature of our Souls, from Observations made upon their Actions and distinguishing Perfections, and at length leads Men, by the Chain of natural Causes, to the Knowledge of the first Mover, and acknowledges him to be the Cause of all necessary Effects. For the Nature, as well of the Creatures, as of the Creator, suggests all those Ideas, of which the Laws of Nature are form’d, and discovers the Truth of those Laws, as practical Propositions; but their full Authority is deriv’d from the Knowledge of the Creator. And these things require to be a little farther explain’d in this Place.
The Natures of Things consider’d only as necessary to explain one general Law of Nature, whence all particular Laws of Nature may be deduc’d.§IV. But altho there are innumerable things, which, in the Knowledge of the Universe, may be made use of for the Matter of particular Propositions, which are to form our Manners; I have, nevertheless, thought proper to select only a few, and those the most general, which might, in some measure, explain that general Description of the Laws of Nature, which I at first propos’d, and are a little more manifestly contain’d in one Proposition, the Fountain of all Nature’s Laws. Which general Proposition is this, The greatest Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all, forms the happiest State of every, and of all the Benevolent, as far as is in their Power; and is necessarily requisite to the happiest State which they can attain, and therefore the common Good is the supreme Law.
The Method observ’d in treating of this general Law.The Sense of this is first rightly to be explain’d. Secondly, We are to shew, how it may be learned from the Nature of Things. Lastly, I hope it will plainly appear, from what follows in this Treatise, that it has the Force of a Law, and that all the Laws of Nature flow from it.
Its Parts explain’d, Benevolence.The Reader is to observe, that I no where understand by the Name of Benevolence, that languid and lifeless Volition of theirs, which effects nothing of what they are said to desire; but that only, by force whereof we execute, as speedily and thorowly as we are able, what we heartily desire. We may likewise also comprehend in this Word, that Affection, by which we desire things grateful to our Superiors, which is particularly distinguish’d by the Name of Piety, towards God, our Country, and our Parents; and therefore I chose to make use of the Word [Benevolence] rather than [Love], because, in virtue of its Composition, it implies an Act of our Will, join’d with its most general Object, and is never taken in a bad Sense, as the Word [Love] sometime is.The greatest Benevolence of all I here use the Words, the [greatest] Benevolence, because I would express the intire or adequate Cause of the greatest Happiness. We shall elsewhere shew, how those Scruples which some object here, may be easily solv’d. By the Word[All] I understand that whole System which consists of the Individuals consider’d together, in order to one End, which It here mention by the Name of [the happiest State.] By the Name of [Rationals] I beg leave to understand, as well God as Man; and I do it upon the Authority of Cicero, whom I think I may safely take for a Guide, as to the Propriety of a Latin Word.Rationals, For he acknowledges Reason, common both to God and Men, and has taught, That “Wisdom” (which all ascribe to God) is nothing else but “Reason in Perfection.”Forms the happiest State of all, I have us’d the Word [Forms] to intimate, that Benevolence is both the intrinsic Cause of present, and the efficient Cause of future Happiness, and is necessarily requisite in respect of both. I have added [as far as is in their Power] to insinuate, that the Assistance of things external, is often not in our Power, altho they are requisite to the Happiness of the animal Life;As far as is in their Power. and that no other Assistance to a happy Life is to be expected from the Laws of Nature and moral Philosophy, than Precepts about our Actions, and those Objects of Actions, which are in our own Power. And altho it happens, that different Men, according to their different Abilities of Mind and Body, nay, that the same Men, in different Circumstances, are not equally able to promote the public Good; nevertheless, the Law of Nature is sufficiently observ’d, and its End obtain’d, if every one performs what he is able, according to his present Circumstances. But of this there will be a fuller Explanation in what follows.
How we come to the Knowledge of the Terms of the foregoing Proposition.§V. I must now shew, “Both how the Ideas contain’d in the foregoing Proposition, necessarily enter into the Minds of Men, and that when they are there, they are necessarily connected, that is, that they make a true Proposition”; which we shall afterwards prove to be practical, and to have the force of a Law. Seeing therefore it is well known by the Experience of all Men, that those Ideas or Thoughts, which the Logicians call simple Apprehensions, are two ways excited in the Mind of Man; (1.) By the immediate Presence and Operation of the Object upon the Mind; after which manner the Mind is conscious of its own Actions, and also of the Motions of the Imagination, or of the Ideas its Objects; and by Analogy to these, we judge of the Minds of other rational Beings, God and Men. (2.) By the Means of our external Senses, Nerves, and Membranes, in which manner we perceive other Men, and the rest of the Parts of this visible World; it presently appears, that the Terms of our Proposition become known, partly by internal, partly by external, Sensation. For what Benevolence is, and what are its Degrees, and, consequently, what is any ones greatest Benevolence, we do not otherwise understand, than by the Mind’s reflecting upon itself; nor needs there other help; for such is the Frame of the Mind, that it cannot but be thorowly sensible of its own Actions and Affections, as being what are intimately united with it self. I acknowledge, however, “That it is to the Assistance of our outward Senses, we owe the Knowledge of external Advantages, which Benevolence distributes amongst all,” of which hereafter. In the same manner we come to the Knowledge of Reason, by our inward Sense thereof; and we apprehend what are rational Agents, mention’d in the Subject of the Proposition. “That there are others besides our selves who have the use of Reason,” we collect by Observations made by our outward Senses. We come at the Knowledge of the Causes constituting any thing, whether intrinsically, or in the way of an Efficient, generally by the Assistance of our outward Senses, and by Reasoning founded on Appearances. The inward Nature of our Mind, and its active Powers by which it determines the voluntary Motions of our Bodies in pursuit of apparent Good, the Mind it self perceives, partly by reflecting upon it self, partly by the Aid of the Senses observing the Effects consequent upon the Command of our Will. Lastly, we come to the Knowledge of the State of Men, and of their Happiness, by the same Means, by which we hinted, that their Nature, and those good Things, in the Enjoyment whereof their Happiness consists, were known; for the State of Things adds nothing to their Nature, besides the Notion of some Duration, or Continuance. And a State is called Happy, from the Possession of good Things, very many, and very great.
And of the Connexion of these Terms, or its Truth.§VI. As to the Connexion of the Terms of this Proposition, in which its necessary Truth consists, it seems to me sufficiently plain; for it signifies the same as if we should say as follows; That the Willing, or Prosecution, of all good Things situated in our Power, which is most effectual to the Enjoyment of them by our selves and other Rationals, is the most that Men can effect, that they themselves, and others, may most happily enjoy them. Or, There is no Power in Men greater, by which they may procure to themselves and others a Collection of all good Things, than a Will to pursue every one his own Happiness, together with the Happiness of others.
In which words, what is first obvious, is, “That there is no Power in Men greater to effect any thing, than a Will determin’d to exert its utmost Force.”
In the next place, it is also most evident, “That the Happiness of single Persons, for example, of Socrates and Plato, and other Individuals,” (mention’d in the Predicate) “cannot singly be separated from the Happiness of all,” (whose Cause is contain’d in the Subject,) because the Whole does not differ from all the Parts taken together. This universal Proposition, pronouncing concerning the Benevolence of all, may be observ’d to agree with Laws from this, that it declares, “Not what any one Person, or a few, ought to do to procure their own Happiness, without any regard to that of others, but what both all unitedly can do, in order to be happy, and what each separately, without any Repugnancy amongst themselves, (for that is not consistent with Reason, of which all are Partakers,) may do, in order to obtain the common Happiness of All, in which the greatest Happiness possible to Individuals is contain’d, and most effectually promoted.” It is first and better known, as flowing from the common and essential Attributes of human Nature, “What all in general can, or cannot, do, conducing to the common Good,” than, “What any particular Person can do in determinate Circumstances,” for these are infinite, and, consequently, impossible to be known by any Man. As, several Armies being brought into the Field, it is better known, that they cannot all get the Victory, than which Army shall overcome.
Thirdly, in the last place, “One or a few particular Persons can neither enjoy a present Happiness, or with probability hope for it hereafter, by acting without any regard, or in opposition, to the Happiness of all other rational Beings”; for to a Mind so affected, an essential Part of its Happiness is wanting, “That inward Peace, which arises from an uniform Wisdom, always agreeing with it self,” for it is inconsistent with it self, when it determines to act after one manner in relation to itself, and after another manner in relation to others, that partake of the same Nature: That “great Joy” is also wanting, “which arises in a benevolent Mind, from a Sense of the Felicity of others.” Not to say any thing at present of Envy, Pride, and those Legions of other Vices, which besiege the Malevolent, and necessarily render him miserable, as labouring under the worst Distempers of the Mind.
Beside, “No Person, in such an Attempt, can have a well-grounded Hope of Happiness,” because in it he neglects, nay provokes to his Destruction, other external rational Causes, God and Men, upon whose Aid that Hope necessarily depends. “There is therefore no other way, which can lead any particular Person to his Happiness, than that which is to lead all to the common Happiness.” Let it suffice, briefly to have hinted these things in this place, which I have done only with this View, that I might shew from such Observations as are most obvious by common Experience, that the Truth of the aforesaid Proposition is very evident; but these things we shall deduce more at large hereafter.
Which kind of Truths are as necessary as Mathematical ones.§VII. However, I acknowledge, that this Proposition cannot be effectual, to the forming any Man’s Manners, before he has propos’d to himself as his End, the Effect here discoursed of, “His own Happiness in Conjunction with that of others,” and has taken “those various Actions into which Benevolence is branched,” for the Means. The Proposition, however, and all just Inferences from it,(such as those less general ones, which declare the Power of Fidelity, Gratitude, natural Affection, and the other particular Virtues, towards obtaining any part of human Happiness,) may, before such Proposal, be prov’d necessarily true. For the whole Truth, as well of that general Proposition, as of those which are thence deduced, depends upon the natural and necessary Efficacy of such Actions, as Causes, to produce such Effects. For they do not suppose, that there are such Actions, which, indeed, depend upon the Agency of free Causes. And it is sufficient to evidence this Truth, “That, when soever there are such Causes, Effects of such a kind shall thence follow.” It is an undisputed Point in the Solution of all kind of Mathematical Problems, in relation to which no one questions, but that we come at true Science. All know, “That to draw Lines, and to compare them, in Geometrical Calculation, depends upon the Will of Men. We freely add, subtract, &c. and yet whoever performs these Operations, according to the Rules prescribed, necessarily finds out the true Sum, which is equal to all the Parts added.” The like may be said of the Remainder in Subtraction, the Product in Multiplication, the Quotient in Division, and the Root in Extractions: And in general, in every Question, whose Solution is possible from what is given, the Answer is necessarily found from the Operations duly perform’d. The Connexion is necessary, between the Effect desired, and its Causes assigned by this Science. According to this Pattern are other practical Arts to be modell’d, and this we have endeavour’d to attain, in delivering the Principles of Morality, by reducing to one general Name [Benevolence], all those voluntary Actions, which fall under the Direction of Moral Philosophy, by inquiring into its Branches; and lastly, by shewing the Connexion between this Act and the End design’d.
All those Actions which fall under the Consideration of Moral Philosophy, are comprehended in Benevolence.§VIII. But seeing only voluntary Actions can be govern’d by human Reason, and those only which regard intelligent Beings, are consider’d in Morality; and seeing the Object of the Will is Good, (for Evil is rated from the Privation of Good;) it is evident, “That a more general Notion of such Actions cannot be form’d, than what falls under the Name of Benevolence,” because it comprehends the Desire of all kinds of goodThings, and consequently the avoiding all kinds of Evils. But beside, the force of Benevolence extends it self to all the free Acts of the Understanding, (whether we consider or compare good Things among themselves, or enquire concerning the Means of obtaining them;) and of our bodily Faculties, which are directed by our Will in the pursuit of Good. But it is universally true, “That the motion of a Point does not more certainly produce a Line, or the Addition of Numbers a Sum, than that Benevolence produces a good Effect (to the Person to whom we wish well) proportion’d to the Power and Affection of the Agent, in the given Circumstances.” It is also certain, “That keeping Faith, Gratitude, natural Affection, &c. are either Parts or Modes of a most effectual Benevolence towards all, accommodated to particular Circumstances; and that they must certainly produce their good Effect, after the same manner, as it is certain, that Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division, are Parts or Modes of Calculation; and that a right Line, Circle, Parabola, and other Curves, do express the various Effects, which Geometry produces by the motion of a Point.”
General Mathematical Theorems, necessary to the Construction of Problems, are freed from the uncertainties of such Guesses as are made concerning future Contingencies, “By not affirming that such Constructions shall be, only demonstrating their Properties and Effects, if ever such Constructions are produc’d”; I have thought fit to proceed in the same Method, and “To deliver some evident Principles, concerning the natural Effects, the Parts, and the various respects of universal Love, without affirming that there is such Love”; being, however, certain, because such Benevolence is possible, that many Consequences may be thence drawn, which may direct us in the Practice of Morality, “which is what Theorems perform in the possible Construction of Problems.” I confess, notwithstanding, that whilst we, with the greatest Prudence, endeavour some things which require the concurrence of others, we may sometimes not succeed according to our wish; but this does not prove any error in the Rules. The Trial shews, “That the Effect was not in our Power,” or, as the Mathematicians speak, “That the propos’d Problem could not be solved, or thorowly determin’d, from what was given”; and as they acquiesce in such Discovery, so in like Cases may prudent Minds very justly enjoy Tranquillity. But the Experience of past Events, and the Observation of our own Strength, will quickly enable us to form a Judgment, “whether any Effect propos’d, be in the given Circumstance in our power, or no”; and that, for the most part, without the trouble of making an Experiment. And Reason requires, that such Judgment should be made; because he can hardly avoid the Imputation of Folly, “Who greatly labours the gaining a Point, which he did not know, that his Strength, together with the Assistance he had reason to expect, might obtain.” This, at least, is necessary, that he be certain, “That the probable Hope of obtaining his End, is of greater Value, than any Effect his Endeavours could produce in the same time.” For I hereafter shew, “That some Propositions of unchangeable Truth, can be form’d concerning the Value of contingent Advantages.”
Which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature.§IX. Moreover, the Nature of Things instructs us, “That we must first distinctly know, what is the best Effect in our Power, before we can distinctly know the chief End we ought to regard.” For the Answer to the former Question consists of more simple Terms, and consequently, of more certain Signification. The Answer to the latter, as it ought to contain all that is in the former, so it moreover denotes, “That the rational Agent has determin’d within himself, to use the means proper to produce that Effect.” But because from this Consideration, “That many Effects tending to the common Good are in our Power; and that they, by the Will of the first Cause, are made necessary to the Attainment of our own Happiness,” there arises, both an Obligation to intend the producing those Effects, and the actual Intention it self also, whenever it is found in Men: We must of necessity lay the Foundation of the Laws of Nature, in those manifest Observations on the Powers of Men, by which duly regulated they are enabled to make each other happy, nay will certainly do so. But these Laws are all summ’d up in [Benevolence] or [Universal Love.]
I have observ’d, “That Mathematicians, in laying down the Principles of their Science, make no mention of the End, which the Doctrine by them deliver’d respects”; altho the more eminent of them most diligently pursue a most noble End. For they propose to investigate the Proportions of all kinds of Bodies and Motions, whence arise all the Phaenomena of Nature we are wont to admire, and the most useful Effects in common Life. The Mathesis universalis, (such as Des Cartes and his Commentators have deliver’d in their Geometry) is however content in the beginning briefly to suggest, towards the establishment of its Theorems, “That all kind of Proportions may be exhibited, by the help of such right Lines as we can draw,” and “That those which are unknown, may without great difficulty be investigated, by Geometrical Calculation, from those that are more easily known.” But it especially admonishes, “That, in order to the Preparation of those Lines whose knowledge is inquir’d after, nothing else is to be done, than that some Lines should be added together, subtracted, multiplied, or divided,” and “That the Extraction of Roots, which is of principal use, should be look’d upon as a kind of Division.” It uses no long Exhortation to induce you, “To investigate an accurate knowledge of all kinds of Things, from a mutual Comparison of their Proportions,” altho that be its principal End; but it supposes, “That it is desirable for its own sake, and of the greatest use in Life.” It thinks that it has sufficiently discharg’d it self, if it has briefly hinted, “How such Operations may be applied to the solution of all kinds of Problems.” Nor does it think it any diminution, either of its Truth or Dignity, “Tho most Men should, thro’ Unskilfulness or Sloth, neglect, or even oppose, its Rules.” Just so it is with the Doctrine of Morality, which is contain’d in the Laws of Nature. For it is wholly conversant, “In computing the several Proportions of human Powers, which at all contribute to the common Good of rational Beings,” which indeed are different in all Variety of possible Cases; and it may justly be said to have perform’d its Part, if, having in the Beginning, in general, hinted, “That all those Powers are comprehended in universal Benevolence,” it afterwards particularly shews, “That a Division of all Things, Fidelity, Gratitude, a care of our selves and of our Off-spring, is herein contain’d,” and, “In what cases they are to be made use of”; and, “After what manner thence necessarily proceed, Virtue, Religion, Society, and every thing else which contributes to the Happiness of Life.” For in this consists the Solution of that most useful Problem, whose investigation moralPhilosophy teaches. Nor is the Truth and Authority of its Precepts in any measure diminish’d, “Because many will not obey, or will oppose them”; this only thence follows, “That they will make shipwrack of their own Happiness, and perhaps, in some measure, involve others in the same Calamity.” Nevertheless, after it is made manifest, “That so excellent an Effect may certainly be produc’d, by Actions within the compass of their own Power”; it is not to be doubted, but that Men may more easily be persuaded, “To propose this Effect, so far as it is in their Power, as their End; and to take those Actions, from which, as from its Causes, it is produc’d, as the necessary means.” As Men are excited to the making Parabolic Specula, or Hyperbolic Telescopes, for the sake of the Effects which Mathematicians have demonstrated, will thence follow.
Of which Laws, God is the Author.§X. Here I shall only add, “That this Truth” (as all others equally evident, but especially those which are hence necessarily deriv’d) “does proceed from God, and has annex’d to its Observance Reward; to its Transgression, Punishment; and is, in its own Nature, a proper Rule to direct our Manners.” The case being such, I see not what is wanting, to give it the Force of a Law: However, I shall add, in the Conclusion of this Work, “That in this Proposition is contain’d, both Piety towards God, and Charity towards Men.” In which the Sum of both Tables of the Divine Law, as well Mosaical as Evangelical, is contain’d. I shall at the same time shew, “That from hence all moral Virtues, and the Laws of Nations, in respect both of Peace and War, may be deduc’d.” That a Truth so evident, is impress’d by God as its Author, is very readily shewn from that natural Philosophy, which shews, that all Impressions upon our Senses are made, according to the natural Laws (as they are call’d) of Motion; and that Motion was first impress’d upon this corporeal System by God, and is by him preserv’d unchang’d. By this Method, which to me seems most certain, and is wholly built upon Demonstration, all necessary Effects are immediately resolv’d into the first Mover. But the Impression of the Terms of this Proposition (at least as far as it proceeds from Matter and Motion) is a natural Effect; and the Perception of the Identity, or Coherence of these Terms, as they are in the Imagination, is nothing else than a Perception, that each Term is an Impression made upon us by the same Cause. But the Perception of the Mind, by which it apprehends the Terms, as they lie in the Imagination, and perceives their Connexion, and is sensible of its own Strength and Actions, so naturally and necessarily follows their Presence in the Imagination, and that internal, natural, and unblameable Propension of the Mind, to the Observation of those things which are plac’d before it, that they cannot but be ascribed to the Mind’s efficient Cause, that is, to God, by him who acknowledges God to be the Creator of all Things, or the first Mover. But all other Methods of explaining Nature, how much soever they differ from the foregoing, or amongst themselves, agree in this, that they acknowledge God the first Cause of such necessary Effects: Altho many seem not to have remark’d sufficiently, that the simple Apprehension of Ideas, and their Composition, when they plainly agree, (whence arises a necessary Proposition,) are to be reckon’d amongst necessary Effects, that is, such as (first supposing the natural Impressions of Motion, and an intelligent Nature, to which they are clearly and distinctly propos’d) cannot but exist: which however conduces much to our Purpose, because God being acknowledg’d the Author of these necessary practical Truths, which point out Actions necessary to that End, which Nature has determin’d us to pursue, it gives them the Authority of Laws.
(Hobbes contradicts himself, with respect to the Existence of God.§XI. But what Mr. Hobbes thinks of the resolving such necessary Effects into God as their first Cause, and of the Authority of Laws thence arising, is not easy to affirm; for his Writings seem in some Places to acknowledge thus much, and yet there are many other Passages in him, which contradict, as well the Existence of God, (which is prov’d by this very Argument,) as the Authority of the Laws of Nature, which is establish’d by the same Reasoning. As to the first, it is certain, that the following Syllogism is plainly Atheistical, “Whatsoever is not Body, or an Accident thereof, does not exist. But God is neither Body, nor an Accident thereof. Therefore,” &c. But altho Hobbes has in many Places very sollicitously inculcated both the Premises, yet he denies the wicked Conclusion, and affirms it to be only “a Sin of Imprudence,” either to assert it, or any otherwise to blaspheme God. The Sense of the foregoing Syllogism, he does but too openly advance, where he contends, that “Incorporeal Substance are Words, which, when join’d together, mutually destroy one another, as if any one should say, A bodiless Body”; and that, “there is no real Part of the Universe, which is not Body.” And “what any one shall affirm to be mov’d, or produc’d, by an incorporeal Substance, is affirm’d without Grounds.” But the Minor, that “God is not Body,” he seems plainly enough to advance, where he denies, “That God has any Properties of Body; such as Figure, Place, Motion or Rest.” It is true, indeed, that, in the Appendix to his Leviathan lately publish’d, he openly declares, “God to be a Body,” in the beginning of the Third Chapter; and he endeavours to prove it; for getting in the mean time, that in the First Chapter of the same Appendix (near the end) he had promised not to deny the First Article of the Church of England, in which it is expresly said, that “God is without Body, and without Parts.” But if that Authority, which is the only one for which he seems to contend, is of less weight with him, let him hearken to himself, Lib. de Cive c. 15. § 14. where he teaches, “That those Philosophers spoke unworthily of God, who said, that he was either the World itself, or the Soul (that is, a Part) of the World; for they do not attribute any thing to him, but wholly deny his Being.” But does not Hobbes affirm him to be “Part of the World,” or “the Whole,” when he says that he is Body? For it is very certain that he has asserted, Leviath. c. 34. “That the Universe is an Aggregate of all Bodies, and that it has no Part, which is not it self Body; and that nothing can be properly called Body, which is not some Part of the whole Universe.” But that the World and the Universe, with him signify the same thing, any one will easily perceive, who reads these his Words of the Universe and Stars, Every Object is “either a Part of the Universal World, or an aggregate of the Parts; &c.” I am afraid therefore, that he is convicted by his own Authority; “Of denying the Being of God.” But it is not to my purpose, to insist any longer upon these things. I do not however doubt, but that the Properties of Body (such are, to be capable of being measured, and to be divided into Parts, to undergo all the Changes of Generation and Corruption, and to exclude all other Bodies out of its Place) are so well known now-a-days, both to Mr. Hobbes and all others, not to be consistent with the divine Perfections, that it would be easier for him to persuade most Men, “That God did not at all exist,” than, “That he was Corporeal.” This however we are pleased with, that, in contradiction to his own Principles, he professes to believe the Being of God, and acknowledges the Force of the Argument, by which we discover it; for he grants, “That there necessarily exists one first and eternal Cause of all Things.” Leviath. c. 12. § 6.
And the Authority of the Laws of Nature.But as to the Authority of the Conclusions of Reason flowing from these Principles, (which, tho immediately discover’d by Reason, yet, by the Intervention of that, must appear to proceed from God, who is the Author of that natural Necessity, by which our Reason is determin’d to acknowledge them;) Hobbes is neither consistent with himself, nor with Truth. Leviath. c. 26. § 7. “The Laws (saith he) of Nature, which consist in Equity, &c. in a State of mere Nature, are not properly Laws, but Qualities disposing Men to Peace and Obedience.” He gives a Reason for this, “Because a Law, accurately and properly speaking, is the Speech of one, who with Right commands others, to do or for bear any thing.” Hence in the same Place he infers, that, “As they proceed from Nature, they are not Laws.”As if “God were not properly included in the Name of Nature”; or, as if “a Proposition, the Scope of which consists in declaring to us, what things are to be done, or omitted, under the Reward or Punishment of having our Happiness either increas’d or diminish’d, and which is form’d in the Mind of Man by the Necessity of that Nature which he has receiv’d at the hands of God, were not a sufficient Signification of the divine Will”; or as if “it were not properly enough called, the Speech of him who has a Right to command.” For what else does he who “commands in plain words,” than “make us most assuredly understand, that he has so determin’d concerning our Affairs, that if we act thus, Punishment, if otherwise, Reward is to be the Consequence; and that, in right of the Dominion which he has over us?” In the same place he contends, “That they are not otherwise the Laws of God, than as they are declar’d in Scripture.” But if any one inquires, how it appears, “That the Scriptures are the Word of God,” or, “That ever there was at all any Prophet, who either receiv’d them or any other Revelation from God”; in answer to this Question put by himself, he roundly affirms, “That it is plainly impossible, that any Person can be certain of a Revelation made to another, without a Revelation particularly given to himself; no, not even by Miracles.” Leviath. Part 2. c. 26. § 40. of the English Edition. Yet he affirms in the same place, “That it is essential to a Law, that the Person to be oblig’d by it be certain of the Authority of the Legislator”: And this renders what he says, in the Passage just cited, and in the last Paragraph of the Fifteenth Chapter of his Leviathan, wholly ineffectual. Wherefore, if we will believe him in both places, we shall deny them to be Laws, both as they are from Nature, and as they are revealed in Scripture, because we cannot be certain that those things were revealed; but there ought rather to be no Credit given to what he says, who contradicts himself: For the same Person, (as if he had done it on purpose, that his Readers might conjecture, that one Part of the Contradiction was advanced, out of respect to the Christian Magistrate, the other, from his own real Sentiments,) in the same Treatise de Cive, § next following, and cap. 4. § 1. professes, that “The Law, usually called Natural and Moral, is not unjustly called a divine Law; both because Reason, which is it self the Law of Nature, is immediately given by God, to every one for the Rule of his Actions; and because the Precepts of Life which are thence derived, are the same which were deliver’d from the divine Majesty, for the Laws of the Kingdom of Heaven, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the holy Prophets and Apostles.” Here truly, (perhaps that his Reader might see how much he can comply with the Manners of those among whom he lives,) he acknowledges “Those Conclusions, not unjustly to be called Laws,” which but a little before he denied, “To be Laws, properly and accurately speaking.” As if, “When he, who is by right a Sovereign, gives immediately to his Subject, a Rule of his Actions with Rewards and Punishments annex’d,” he did not “properly command him, that something should be done or forborn,” or “ordain a Law.”
Nevertheless, his real Sentiments may be discover’d, which, in such Cases, are always on the impious side of the Contradiction.)§XII. But I will insist no longer on shewing these Contradictions; I will only give the Reader this Hint, (which may be every where useful, to his more certain Discovery of this Author’s real Sentiments;) That these latter Passages in favour of moral Rules have this Mark, by which one may guess they were affirm’d for fear of others, he does not offer any Reason to support what he seems to grant. That “Reason was given by God for a Rule of Action,” That “its Conclusions are promulg’d by Revelation,” he elsewhere endeavours, as I have shewn, to disprove by reasoning, tho here he seems to assert it: But to the contrary Positions he has added a Reason, such as it is, from his Definition of a Law; that you might know his real Sentiment to be, “That the Conclusions of Reason, which direct us to Equity, Modesty, and other Virtues, are not” (as they are wont to be esteem’d) “Laws of Nature properly so called.” He here seems to have done, what he says cautious Men do, in another Affair relating to Religion; they speak of God agreeably to the Sentiments of others, “not dogmatically but piously.” Leviath. c. 12. § 7.
Who (viz. God) has guarded these his Laws, by the double Sanction of Rewards, Internal or Essential, and External or Adventitious.What I propos’d to my self to prove, was only this, “That as the Being of the first Cause, so the Authority, or full Power of Obligation, which the Laws of Nature derive from their Author, may be made appear from the Consideration of the Universe; from whence the first Cause of all is found out.” In the mean time, I take notice also, “That the Laws of Nature have an intrinsecal and essential Proof of their Obligation, taken from the Rewards or Increase of Happiness which attends the benevolent Person from the natural efficacy of his Actions, and follows the Man who studiously observes these Laws; and from the Punishments, or Degrees of Misery, which, whether they will or no, they call upon themselves, who either do not obey, or do oppose, the Conclusions of right Reason.” For the Connexion of these Rewards with Benevolence, which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature, is plainly express’d in the above-mention’d Proposition, by the most happy State of all; and so the want thereof, and Misery, its Opposite, is sufficiently shewn to be the Consequence of the Malevolence of all towards all.
The Terms of the foregoing Proposition, and their Connexion (i.e. Truth,)§XIII. These things being suppos’d, which I have briefly premis’d concerning God, the Author of natural Effects, and, in consequence, of the Laws of Nature; (they being by the Supposition we have just hinted at, in the present State of Things necessarily introduced into the Minds of Men, as soon at least as they come to Years of Discretion;) I shall now proceed to the Distinction and Explanation of the simple Ideas, of which this Proposition and its Corollaries consist; and also of the complex Truth, which arises from the Composition of those Terms. Its Subject is the greatest Benevolence towards all Rationals, which, it is evident, does consist in a constant Volition of the greatest Good towards all, so far as the Condition of our Nature, and of other Things, makes it practicable. In this place it seems proper to consider, how, together with a Knowledge of the visible World, (of which our Body is a part,) is let in upon our Senses and Minds, the Knowledge, (1.) of good Things; (2.) and, more particularly, of those which are common to many; (3.) amongst which one is often greater than another; (and that we call the greatest, than which we can perceive no greater;) (4.) of which we easily perceive that some are daily in our Power, and therefore practicable; some, in certain Circumstances, exceed the narrow Limits of our Faculties.
Become known two ways, to the Vulgar, more confusedly; to Philosophers, more distinctly.But seeing we come at the Knowledge of the Nature of these Things, two ways, (1.) More confusedly, by obvious Experience and daily Observation; (2.) More distinctly, by Contemplation and Philosophical Enquiries, founded upon Experiments cautiously made, and diligently compar’d amongst themselves: By both these Methods we receive some Knowledge of the Laws of Nature. Hence it comes to pass, that they become known, even to the Vulgar, but confusedly and imperfectly, according to the Degree of Knowledge which they have of Nature: But Philosophers must more accurately observe, both the Connexion of the most general Notions, (of which they are composed,) with the universal Causes and Principles of Things, and the Train of Consequences, by which particular Precepts are deduced from the general Fountain of them all; as also their mutual Relation and Rank, according to which one gives place to another; when, in the same case, the Observance of several of them together seems impossible. The former Manner of coming at the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature, I thought not fit to be intirely slighted, because it is that by which almost all Men learn them; and because the Principles, into which Nature is to be philosophically resolved, are so much disputed, that there might be some danger, if I built the Doctrine of Morality upon those physical Principles alone, which I embrace, that many would reject it, for that very Reason, as not agreeing with me in their Natural Philosophy. I shall therefore call to mind the common Phaenomena, in which almost all agree; and from them I shall shew briefly in this Chapter, that the Simple Knowledge of the Terms of the aforesaid Proposition, and their Connexion by which they are form’d into a true Proposition, may be deduced.
The former Method.§XIV. All daily behold, “That the Enjoyment of very many Things,” (produc’d upon the Surface of this Earth, and compriz’d under the Name of Victuals, Clothing and Houses,) “and the mutual Assistance of one Man to another, contribute naturally to the Life, Preservation, Strength, Comfort and Tranquillity of Man.” Such kind of Effects we conceive to have this in common, that they agree with that Nature for whose sake they are; that is, we esteem them Good; and so we come to represent that Affection of Man, whence the external Acts, productive of these Effects, proceed, under the Notion of Benevolence. Again, all are sensible, “That this their Benevolence may profit, not themselves only, or a few, but very many, partly by Counsel, partly by Strength and Industry”; and whereas they see others altogether like themselves, they cannot but think “them able to make like Returns,” and consequently, see “much Good and Advantage to each Man, arising from mutual Aid and Assistance, which all must want, and in their stead suffer innumerable Dangers, with extreme Poverty, if each, regarding himself only, were always malevolent to others.” But such Endeavours, profitable to many rational Beings, necessarily produce in the Mind a Notion of common Good, which, from the obvious Likeness of Rationals among themselves, may easily alike regard all, whom we have ever an Opportunity of coming to the knowledge of. To which this also may be added, that it is most obvious, by constant Experience, “That we have it more in our power to assist Men, than other Animals,” to say nothing of the inanimate Kind: for the Nature of Man (and consequently, his Good and Evil) is most known to us, from that Knowledge of ourselves which we cannot avoid; and is also capable of enjoying more good Things, to the Attainment whereof we can lend our Aid; and liable to greater Calamities, in guarding against which, our Power may most usefully be employ’d. Besides, we may procure innumerable Advantages to Men, by our Prudence and Counsel communicated by proper Signs, of which other Animals are wholly incapable.
Moreover, because of the Likeness of the Nature of other rational Agents. “To will such things to them, as we are naturally inclin’d to desire for ourselves, Reason cannot but judge more agreeable to our inward Principles of Action,” (whatever they may be,) “than to desire the like to Beings widely different.” Further, as we perceive our selves more willing to benefit others who are like our selves, we may with reason hope, “That they whom we benefit, will be mov’d with our Benefits, to return us the like, or greater, that they may likewise oblige us.”
Lastly, it is well known by the Experience of all, “That there is no more valuable Possession upon Earth, no greater Ornament or Safeguard, than is the sincere Benevolence of all towards all”; (which is very consistent with a particular Friendship for a few select Persons;) because Men, if they are malevolent, may easily force from others, as all other things, so Life it self. Nor is there a more effectual Method to procure either of these, than “by our Actions to shew the same Affection towards others, that we desire from them,” that is, Benevolence, as occasion offers, towards all, but a more particular Regard and Kindness toward chosen Friends. But if (as is meet, and as is every where the Practice, even of the Vulgar;) we take care “to sollicit the Aid of the first Cause, to the Establishment of human Happiness,” we shall find nothing in ourselves more Divine, by which we may please the Deity, than that sincere and most extensive Love, (of which we have been hitherto discoursing,) which reaches even God himself, as the Head and Father of rational Beings, and all other rational Agents, as his Children, more like to himself than the rest of his Creatures are; and, in consequence, the most dear to him: “For we are his Offspring.” is the Saying of Aratus the Cilician, approv’d by the Athenians, when Heathens. I could easily quote innumerable Testimonies to the same purpose, but ’tis folly to light a Candle to the Sun.
Which is as certain and clear, as Mathematical Reasoning.§XV. The things now propos’d concerning human Happiness, appear so plain by common Experience, or obvious Reasoning, that I know nothing belonging to human Nature more evident; and they have the same Respect to the Direction of our Practice in Morality, which the Postulates of Geometricians have to the Construction of Problems; such are for plain Problems, that we can draw a Right Line from any one Point to any other; or that we can describe a Circle with any Center and Radius: And other more difficult ones, for the Construction of solid and linear Problems. In all these Cases are suppos’d Actions, depending upon the free Powers of Men; yet Geometry does not become uncertain, by any Disputes arising from the Explanation of Freewill. The like may be said of Arithmetical Operations; for it is sufficient for the Truth of these Sciences, that the Connexion is inseparable between such Acts (which it supposes may be done, and which we find placed in our power, when we go about the Practice of Geometry,) and the Effects desir’d. And either the Pleasure arising from such Contemplations, or the manifold Uses in Life, are sufficient to invite Men to search after such Effects. By a like Reasoning, the Truth of Moral Philosophy is founded in the necessary Connexion between the greatest Happiness human Powers can reach, and those Acts of universal Benevolence, or of Love towards God and Men, which is branch’d out into all the moral Virtues. But in the mean time these things are suppos’d as Postulates, “That the greatest Happiness they can attain, is sought by Men”; and, “That they can exercise Love, not only towards themselves, but also towards God, and Men, partaking of the same rational Nature with themselves.”
I will here only add, “That the same Experience which proves that the Benevolence of each towards all, is the most effectual Cause of the Happiness of the Benevolent, does most necessarily prove, by a Parity of Reason, that the Love of any Number, towards any Number, has an Effect in proportion; and that likewise Malevolence towards all, brings most certain Destruction upon particular Persons, how much soever they may love themselves.” For “what takes away the necessary Causes of Happiness, and places in their stead the Causes of all kinds of Calamities, threatens nothing short of extreme Misery.”
(Hobbes himself allowing the Principles, tho he over-looks their natural Consequence.)§XVI. The justness of this Consequence is every where acknowledg’d by Mr. Hobbes, whilst from his Supposition, “That every one naturally provides for his own Life only, and arrogates to himself a Right over all Things and Persons,” he infers, “A War of all against all,” and then proclaims, “That from thence all kinds of Miseries, even Death it self, hang over the Heads of all.” Nay, he supposes, “That all Men are sensible of this, before they consent to enter into Compacts of Society with others.” The Man is very sharp-sighted, in the Causes of Evil, and of Fear; but he is perfectly blind, with respect to the Causes of Good, and the Hopes of Happiness altho these latter are certainly equally obvious, nay first in the Order of distinct Knowledge, because the Causes constituting and preserving the Natures of Things, (which are Good,) come first to be discovered, before the Causes corrupting and dissolving the same, which are call’d Evils. I cannot therefore doubt, but that it is manifest, even to Hobbes himself, that the Study and Pursuit of the common Good, under the prudent Conduct of Reason, avails as much toward the Security and Happiness of all, as the Neglect thereof can toward the Destruction of all, whilst every one is intent upon his own particular Advantage: But, whatever he may think, it is certain, that from ourselves this Truth may be learn’d by every Man of common Sense, that is come to Years of Discretion. For from their Experience, “That the Activity of their Will in procuring Good, is, at proper times, both sufficient to benefit themselves and others,” they cannot but understand, “That a like Will in other Men is neither less effectual, nor less necessary, to the obtaining the same end.” But ’tis tedious to inculcate with many Words a thing so plain; yet I would not pass it over in silence, because all that follows is deduc’d from thence, as presupposed.
But seeing the Deduction of the particular Laws of Nature from this general one, is Matter of philosophical Enquiry, and does therefore belong to the second Method of deducing them, it seem’d proper to premise some Considerations drawn from Natural Philosophy, in order to make it appear, “That a philosophical Contemplation of Nature does very much assist the Minds of Men, in forming a more distinct Notion of that general Law.”
How, in pursuance of the second Method, the Mind comes to form universal ideas,§XVII. In the first place, I think it proper to take notice, “That those more general Notions, whose use very frequently occurs in all the Laws of Nature, are observ’d in Things corporeal, and that the Mind may therefore perceive them, even by the assistance of their Senses”: Such are those universal Ideas, of Cause and Effect, and of their connexion; of Number, compos’d of Units, and consequently of Summ, (whence all collective Notions,) of Difference, &c. of Order, of Duration, &c. But, altho I think this Observation conduces much to our present purpose, because such Notions are essential Parts of the Laws of Nature, yet because this is no matter of Debate between us and our Adversaries, and is obvious to all, there is no occasion farther to enlarge upon this Point.
As also, of natural Good and Evil.2dly, Natural Philosophy does very distinctly explain, “What Things, or Powers and Motions of Things, are to others either Good or Evil”; and, “How necessarily and unchangeably this is brought about.” For seeing it is the only Scope of this Science, “To discover the Causes of Generation, Duration, and Corruption,” (all which we behold daily to happen to most Bodies, but especially to Men,) and “To demonstrate the necessary Connexion of such Effects with their Causes”; and seeing it is certain, “That the Causes generating and preserving Man, for example, by Efficacy of which he continues for some time, and flourishes with Faculties, as well of Body as Mind, enlarg’d, and determin’d to their proper Functions, are call’d Good to him,” but “That the Causes of Corruption, Grief, and Troubles, are to him naturally Evil”; it evidently follows, “That Natural Philosophy explains what things are to him naturally Good and Evil, and demonstrates that they are necessarily such.”
I esteem as Parts of natural Science, the Knowledge of all those things, which Nature produces for the Food, Cloathing, Habitation, and Medicine of Man. We may also refer to natural Science, the Knowledge of all human Operations and Effects, of use in human Life: for, altho the voluntary Actions of Men, whose Effects are external, do not take their Rise in the same manner with Motions merely natural, from the impulse of other Bodies, but are determin’d by our Reason and Free-will; nevertheless, since they are true Motions produc’d by, and receive their Measure or Proportion from, the Powers of our Body, which are of the same Nature with the Powers of other natural Bodies, they must, after once they exist, by a like Necessity and altogether in the same manner, as other natural Motions, produce their Effects according to the Laws of Motion. This is most clearly and universally evident, in the Operations of the simple mechanical Powers, (such are the Lever, the Pully, and the Wedge, into which all the rest may be resolv’d,) which (as is well known to all) produce the same Effects, when they are enforc’d by human Strength, as, when, instead thereof, the Weight of inanimate Bodies is apply’d.
Which are such necessarily, and invariably.§XVIII. It is likewise commonly known, “That the Industry of Man, by the Motions of his Body,” (which the Philosopher easily resolves into the mechanic Powers,) “is both able and wont to be subservient to the Preservation of himself and others, in preparing and preserving Victuals, Medicine, Apparel, Houses, and Ships.” Upon these Effects is laid out the whole Power of Man, exerted in Agriculture, Architecture, Ship-building, Merchandizing, and other handycraft Trades, of Smiths, Carpenters, and Weavers. Even the Propagation of the Species, the Suckling and Nourishment of Infants, may be resolv’d into the same Principles, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, to which he has my Concurrence. Nor are those other more liberal Arts, in which, by the help of sensible Signs, articulate Sounds, Letters, and Numbers, the Minds of Men are enrich’d with Sciences, or directed to various Operations, wholly exempt from these Laws of Motion; the natural Powers of our Hands and Mouths, are our Instruments, for Writing, or Speaking, in the making Contracts, in the Distribution, Conveyance, and Preservation of Rights; in which, Justice, the principal Effect of Ethicks and Politicks, almost wholly consists. For, to say nothing of Action, the Power of Words and Letters, which are perform’d wholly by bodily Organs, is not inconsiderable, either in the Instruction of the Mind, or in the Government of the Passions, altho both the first Institution of Words as Signs, and their Choice and Composition, be entirely the Work of the Mind, directing the Imagination and the Tongue; and altho, after Men have heard Sermons, and perused the Laws, they are still left to the free Determination of their own Will. Let us consider, for Example, after what manner Laws written, or spoken, operate. How great soever the Force of these Laws is, it consists entirely in these two Things, the Promulgation, and foreseen Execution of them by the Distribution of the Punishments and Rewards therein express’d: but both these become known to Men, by the help of the Senses, which are affected by corporeal Motions necessarily producing their genuine Effect; which I therefore thought proper here to remark, because, seeing the Promulgation and Execution of Laws are good, that is, conducing, as efficient Causes, to the Happiness of all rational Beings; it may be hence prov’d, “That there are things which are good, necessarily and naturally”; and this could be certainly known, before any Laws at all were made by Men: for these Signs conduce to the formation of Mens Manners, after the like manner, as the North-Star, the Observation of the Motion of the other Stars, the Mariners Compass, Sea-Charts, and other Mathematical Instruments, are of use to the Safety of Ships, altho they may thro’ Carelessness be neglected. But the Operation and Concurrence of the Mind with the bodily Powers, to produce these Effects, may be compar’d with the Action of the Steersman, plac’d at the Ship’s Helm, and of the Merchant carried in that Ship, estimating the Prices and Uses of the Lading; who can do nothing without the help of an Interpreter, and of Signs; without the Conveniences of Ports and Winds; and unless the Ship be tight in the Seams, and furnish’d with Sails and Rigging; unless also different Countries produce such Merchandizes, as may relieve mutual Wants, which yet, every one must own, depend upon necessary Causes.
Altho it cannot be imagin’d, “That such Arts had arriv’d to their present Perfection, or even their Improvement and bringing to Perfection could be distinctly foreseen, before Men enter’d into Societies”; yet Mr. Hobbes himself must acknowledge, “That all were appriz’d, mutual Assistance would prove very advantageous”; and “That all were able, sufficiently to make known their Inclinations to others by Signs”: Because he founds Societies upon Compacts, enter’d into for that very Purpose.
By Parity of Reason, all Actions and Motions contrary to these, are naturally and necessarily Evil; such are those, by which human Bodies are brought to decay, either by withdrawing what is necessary to Life and Strength, as Food, Raiment, and Houses; or by introducing hurtful things in their stead: as also those Motions, by which the Minds of Men are debarr’d from Knowledge and Virtue; or, in their stead, Errors and unbridled Affections, which stand in opposition to the common Good, are introduc’d.
And may be common to many.§XIX. When we treat of Good or Evil, with relation to the Laws of Nature, we regard not the Body or Mind of any particular Man, or of a few, (because the Suffering or Punishment of these may sometimes contribute to the public Good;) but the collective Body of all Mankind, as naturally subordinate to God their Governour, which will afterwards be more clearly explain’d. But the Good of the collective Body is no other, than the greatest which accrues to all, or to the major Part of the Whole.
But these things, which I have here enlarg’d upon, concerning the natural Efficacy of many human Actions, to the preserving or assisting others, I have mention’d only for this Purpose, that we might distinctly consider, “How Men, from the Observation of the Faculties of others, may naturally come to the knowledge of Things naturally good, and those both great and necessary; and so be induc’d to do what they have in their power, for the Benefit of the Bodies and Minds of other Men.” It will not now be difficult to shew, “That these Faculties and Actions are not so limited, as to profit one only, but that their Force and Benefit extends to many; so that the Knowledge, Art, and Industry, the Benevolence, Fidelity, or Gratitude of one Man, may gratify very many; and being themselves good and common to many, may naturally imprint upon the Minds of the Observers, an Idea of common Good.” What is more, by means of the Union of the Mind with the human Body, the Power of Man reaches farther, and performs greater Things, than the much greater bodily Force of other Animals. For that Power has invented the Art of Navigation, knows how to enter into and observe Compacts with others at a great Distance, hath shewn us how, by the benefit of Letters and Numbers, to maintain Commerce with the East and West-Indies; and at so great a Distance, can treat of Peace, or wage War: But, of necessity, innumerable Motions must hence be determin’d. Nevertheless, it is not unusual in other Causes, whose Force is only Mechanical, to observe an evident Efficacy, productive of Advantage or Disadvantage to many. This is acknowledg’d, even by the Peripatetic Philosophy, and by common Experience, which shews, “That the Rays of the Sun convey vital Nourishment, to innumerable Vegetables over the whole Earth, and necessary Heat to the Blood of all Animals.” But a more accurate Inquiry into Nature, does upon several Occasions demonstrate, “That every Motion of every corporeal Particle does very widely extend its Force, and consequently, in some measure, however little, necessarily concur with many other Causes, to produce many Effects.” The Proof of this Assertion is easy, nor at all foreign to the matter before us: But because it depends upon Principles which are partly Physical and partly Mathematical, which to most would seem too remote from the Doctrines of Morality, and because it will be readily allow’d, even by our Adversaries, I chose to omit what I had prepar’d upon this Head.
(It is therefore a Mistake in Hobbes, to assert the variable Nature of Good and Evil, even upon his own Principles.)§XX. This, however, I have here thought fit to take notice of, “That Hobbes, in this matter, seems to grant more than sufficient,” when in the last Paragraph but one, of his Treatise De Corpore, he expressly asserts, “That there can be no Motion in a Medium admitting of no Vacuity, unless the next part of the Medium give way, and so on infinitely, so that the particular Motions of every particular Body contribute somewhat to every Effect.” Mean-while he is not aware, that this will thence follow, “That any human Action may, by its own Nature, contribute somewhat to this Effect, viz. The Preservation and Perfection of many, who do not desire it,” that is, may be naturally Good to many. Otherwise, he would not so crudely assert, “That Good respects only him who desires it”; and hence infer, “That the Nature of Good and Evil is variable, at the pleasure of single Persons in the State of Nature, and at the pleasure of the Government in every civil State.” Which are the fundamental Principles of Hobbes’s Ethicks and Politicks, as I shall shew in the Chapter concerning Good.
I propos’d in this Place only to shew, “That certain Motions, Powers, and Actions of all Things whatsoever, and consequently also of Men, whence we perceive that something is done tending to the Preservation or more flourishing Condition of others, do naturally imprint upon us the notion of a Good common to many”; and because the Nature of Things will not permit us, to think all kinds of Motions or Actions equally conducive to this End, that therefore Nature does sufficiently instruct us. “That there is a difference between Things good and evil, whether they relate to many, or to Individuals.” Yet further, seeing the Generation, Preservation, and Perfection of natural Bodies, (Men for Instance,) and on the contrary, their Destruction and Corruption, are nothing else than certain Motions, variously complicated, of those Particles whereof they consist, and that all these Motions are produc’d by their Causes, according to the Laws of certain Theorems geometrically demonstrated; it is clearly manifest, “That all things are generated, preserv’d and perfected by their Causes with the same necessity, that these Theorems are geometrically demonstrated to be true.” But the constituting, preserving, and perfecting Causes of Things or Men, are those Things which we call good, and the contrary to these, evil, whether their Efficacy reaches one only, many, or all. Wherefore, supposing “such Motions and Actions, of some Men in relation to others, as we now see tend to their Preservation,” they produce this Effect with the same necessity, that the geometrical Theorems concerning such Motions are true; and therefore they are naturally Good, altho no Laws were yet suppos’d, by which they are commanded.
Therefore Hobbes’s Fiction, “That Good and Evil are changeable,” is perfectly inconsistent with the necessary and immutable Causes, which he every where asserts, of the Being and Preservation of Man. Nor can he come off this by saying, (which yet he often inculcates,) “That before civil Laws there is no measure of Them”; for there is the same measure of Good and Evil, that there is of Truth and Falshood, in those Propositions which relate to the Efficacy of those Motions, that tend to the Preservation or Corruption of other Things, namely, the Nature of Things; and whatsoever Proposition points out the true Cause of Preservation, does at the same time shew, what is true Good.
From the limited Powers of all Finite Beings, appears,§XXI. We have now briefly seen, “How the Nature of Things imprints on us as certain and firm a Knowledge of Good and Evil, even of that which is common to many, as is that by which we know the Causes of Generation and Corruption.” I now proceed to consider, “That the Matter and Motion, in which the Powers of a human Body, as of all other parts of the visible World, do consist, have a finite Quantity, and certain Limits, beyond which they cannot extend themselves.” Whence flow these most evident Axioms concerning all natural Bodies: That the same Bodies cannot at the same time be in more Places than one: That the same Bodies cannot at the same time be mov’d toward several Places, (especially if contrary,) so as to be subservient to the opposite Wills of several Men; but that they are so limited, that they can be determin’d by the Will of one only, unless several conspire to one and the same Effect or Use. Nor is this peculiar to Bodies only, but common to the Minds of Men, and to all created Beings, as being Finite.
1. The Justness and Usefulness of that Distinction of the Stoicks, between Things in our Power, and, out of our PowerFrom hence I would infer two Things, of great Consequence to our Purpose. (1.) That from the Knowledge of Nature, especially that of ourselves, we learn that celebrated Distinction of the Stoicks, between those things which are in our Power, (such are the Actions of our Mind, and some bodily Motions, both which, by the Effects we daily perceive, are obedient to the Will, and thence, by a parity of Reason, we may easily collect, what we shall be able to do hereafter;) and those things which are not in our Power: Such are by far the greatest, and the most, of those Motions which we daily perceive in the Universe, which we (little Animals) cannot obstruct, and by whose Force all things are in a perpetual Change, and which are the continual Sources, even to Men themselves, of the Vicissitudes of Adversity and Prosperity, Birth, Maturity, and Death.
Which is a great help to Prudence,This Distinction, constantly attended to, is of great use in forming our Manners, and regulating our Affections and Endeavours. For hence we are taught, “Not to seek any other Happiness to alleviate our Labours, than that which arises from a prudent Management of our Faculties, and from those Aids, which we know the Providence of God, in the Administration of the Universe, will afford us.”
And to the Government of our Passions.By this means we are freed from those fruitless Labours, to which vain Hopes sollicit most Men; nor shall we ever disturb our selves upon account of those Evils, which, without our Fault, have hitherto happen’d to us, or may hereafter happen; and so a great part of the Troubles, which usually arise from those restless Affections, Grief, Anger, and Fear, will be prevented. Nor shall we be hence only directed how to avoid Evils, but we shall also be shewn the most compendious Way, by which we may by degrees proceed to the best Things, which are possible to be obtain’d by us, namely, the cultivating our Mind, and the Dominion over our Affections. But I have no purpose to prosecute any farther, this Subject, in this Place.
2. The Necessity of Benevolence, in order to our Happiness.I will only make this Observation, which is to our present Purpose, that it is well known by the Experience of all Men, “That the Powers of any single Person, in respect of that Happiness, of which from without he is both capable and stands in need, are so small, that he wants the Assistance, both of many Things and Persons, to lead his Life happily; but that every one can nevertheless afford many Things for the use of others, which himself does not at all need, and which therefore can be of no use to him.” But seeing we are certain, from the known limits of our Powers, “That we cannot compel all those whose Aid we want, (God and Men,) to co-operate with us in the procuring our Happiness”; the only Method we have left to obtain this End, is, “To procure their Good will, by making a tender to them of our Service, and by a faithful Performance.” But, altho that greatest Benevolence, (mention’d in our foregoing general Proposition) consists in a hearty, constant, universal Inclination so to act; and therefore also in Cases, where often no Retaliation is expected, nay, where we know there will be no return of reciprocal Affection: Yet it does not hinder us, from cultivating Friendship chiefly with them, from whom Reason persuades us to hope for the grateful return of a mutual Benevolence.
This is the first Conclusion which I draw from the finite Nature of all Things, of our selves especially. It thence follows,
3. The Necessity of limiting the uses of certain Things, and of human Services, to particular Persons for a limited time.§XXII. Secondly. If Men, or other Things, do, or afford, any thing for the use of Men; such Service or Benefit is naturally and necessarily limited to certain Persons, Times, and Places. Therefore, if right Reason enjoins, “That the Use of Things, or the Services of Men, should be useful to all Men,” it necessarily enjoins, “That, for a certain Time and Place, that use of Things and of human Services should be limited to certain Persons.” The Consequence is manifest, because “That is right Reason in commanding, which commands that to be done, which is possible to be done, according to the Nature of Things.” The Consequence tends to prove, “That a Division of Things, and of human Services, at least for the time they may be of use to others, is necessary for the Advantage of all.”
(Which over-throws Hobbes’s fundamental Principle, of every Man’s Right to every Thing.)And, certainly, that necessary Limitation of the use of one Thing to one Man for the time it benefits any Person, is a natural Division, that is, Separation from the use of any other Person for the same time. It is manifest, that I here call those things one, that are necessarily wholly employ’d, in one use at one time. For other things are likewise call’d one, which at the same time may be of use to many, as one Island, one Wood, &c. concerning whose Division I have yet affirm’d nothing. From the above-mention’d natural Division of Things, and its necessity to the Preservation of all, is deriv’d that primitive Right to Things by first Occupancy, (which is so frequently mention’d by Philosophers and Lawyers, and which they teach is to take place, supposing all things common;) for Right is the Liberty of acting any thing, granted by a Law: But in that suppos’d State there is no other Law, but the Conclusions of right Reason, concerning Actions necessary to the common Good, promulgated by God. Therefore, because right Reason grants, as necessary to the common Good, to every Man the use of Things and human Services, for so long time as such Use is beneficial to him, by that Grant a Right is given him (the first Occupant) to the use of that Thing or Person, for that time. The Will or Benevolence conformable to this Conclusion, is as truly Justice, as that which gives every one his Rights afterwards arising in civil Society. And the same Benevolence, as far as it permits such Rights to every one, and restrains those Affections which have a contrary Tendency, is laudable Innocence. But it is most evident, that no one can in any measure promote the publick Good, except he preserve his Life, Health, and Strength, by the use of Things, and of human Labour; and that therefore such Occupancy of Necessaries is a means plainly necessary to that End. For the Preservation of a Whole, consisting of mutually divided Parts, (such as Mankind is,) consists in the Preservation of the divided Parts, (not to mention any thing now of the Order to be preserv’d among them:) But the Preservation of the divided Parts, that is, of particular Men, requires the divided use of Things and of human Labour; therefore that is necessary to the Preservation of the Whole. Such Division, which is a kind of Property, after things are occupied and applied to uses truly necessary, is very consistent with some Community, like that in Feasts and Theatres; such as several of the antient Philosophers have suppos’d, not contrary to Reason indeed, but not very consistent with the sacred History; and directly inconsistent with that Right of all to all, which Hobbes has feign’d, in order to prove, “That, before the Institution of civil Government, preceded a State of universal War, of every Man against every Man; and that then a License of doing any thing against any Man, was both just and necessary.”
Here may be collected, by the way, “How every Man comes to have a right to preserve his own Life and Limbs,” from this, that these are his most certain Means of serving God and Men, in which consists that common Good, I have been treating of. It is also plain, that the Right of every one is under these Restrictions: (1.) That if Religion, or the publick Welfare of Men, requires it, we be ready to part with the last drop of our Blood: And, (2.) That no innocent Person is to be hurt, to procure to our selves any Advantage.
This is most clearly deduc’d from the Principles which I have here briefly touch’d upon, and overthrows Hobbes’s whole Doctrine of the Laws of Nature and Empire. For the whole of that does first suppose (not prove, nor limit) “A right to preserve this mortal Life, as the Foundation of all natural Laws, and of Society”; and then is intirely employ’d, “In applying to that End some Means, which are often most enormous.” Lib. de Cive, c. i. §. 7. and elsewhere.
And this is what we must assert, concerning the Original of Meum and Tuum, of Property and Dominion, (in the large Sense of the Words,) without taking into consideration what is reveal’d in the Mosaic History, as those Philosophers necessarily did, who had not receiv’d that Account. But this Example of introducing a Division being given by Nature, it is easy, and agreeable to the Genius of a human Mind, by a parity of Reason, from observing those Inconveniences, which every Man experiences, of holding all things in common, to proceed (for the benefit of all) to a further Division of Things and human Services, and to introduce amore complete Dominion or Property in both, that might be in some respect perpetual.
Whence also is deduc’d the Origin of Property and Dominion.§XXIII. The Reader, I believe, will not expect, “That I should recite all the most grievous Mischiefs, that would arise from a Parity introduc’d amongst all, or from having in common, Wives, Children, and all other Goods,” for of these Mischiefs, others have abundantly treated. See Aristotle, in the second Book of his Politicks, and his Commentators. For what he had said of a particular Society, may be easily applied to the general Society, made up of Mankind, the Subjects, and God, the Governour. It is sufficient, that the common Experience of the World teaches us, “That, where any thing is yet left in common, that thing generally comes to a Division, to avoid needless Contentions”: And “That it is a natural Vice, to neglect that which is possess’d in common, and to think he has nothing, that has not the Whole.” For the Dangers of Contentions, and Want, the Effect of neglecting to cultivate the Earth, would (especially after Mankind grew numerous, and Vices, arising from Ignorance and a neglect of Discipline, became prevalent) reduce human Affairs to such a State, “That all must see it equally necessary to their common Happiness, to make a Distribution of Things and the Services of Men, which shall be fix’d and valid for the time to come, as to permit the present enjoyment of them to him, who first gets them into his Possession.”
From whence it follows, “That as Nature” (according to what we have above shewn) “confers the right of using Necessaries present, so she does, in the same manner, grant the right of a stated and durable Division of Things, and Offices, which is call’d direct Dominion.” For nothing is more evident, “Than that the future use of Things, or of human Labour, has the same relation to future Life or Health, which the present Enjoyment has to present Life”; there is in both the relation of a necessary Cause. Wherefore the Case is almost the same in this, as in Geometrical Propositions, where from three given Terms a fourth is found; and we may justly think, that Mankind, in a State of Nature, (which Hobbes himself supposes,) may thus reason: As a right to the Life of this Day, proves a right to its necessary preserving Causes, viz. A limited and divided use of Things and of human Labour, whilst they are now at hand; so also a right to Life for the time to come, shews a right to limit the use of Things and Persons for the future. There is no occasion here for artificial Multiplication and Division, which are requisite to find out a fourth Proportional in large Numbers; for such reasoning is obvious to every Man in his Senses, and is daily practis’d by all, even whilst they are not aware of it, nor distinctly dispose the Terms into such an order. I have shewn, that the two first Terms are given by Nature. And it is evident, that the third Term also is given, because it contains nothing that is not known by all. For all Men provide for the future, and suppose it probable, that themselves and other Men, or even their own Posterity, and that of others, shall hereafter continue some time upon the Earth, and have a right of preserving their Life. Nay, to foresee Things future at a great Distance, to be very sollicitous about them, and to inquire into the Causes of such Things as present themselves to his Thoughts, is peculiar to Man above other Animals. They will therefore come at the above-mention’d fourth Proportional, which is the certain and limited Causes of preserving their Life for the future, which are no other, than “The divided use of Things, and of human Labour, to be ratify’d and ascertain’d by common Consent for the future,” avoiding all the Hazards of Contention, and banishing that Scarcity, which we suppose Experience taught them to have taken its Rise from a Neglect of the Cultivation of Things.
But such Reasoning from an exact Similitude of Cases is so strong, that in evidence it rivals Euclid ’s Method (Elem. 6.) of finding a fourth Proportional, by drawing a Parallel to a Line given, and in easiness exceeds it; which yet no one will deny to be suggested by natural Reason.
From this Example of a further Division, appears first, “How from a Change of Circumstances,” (or from a Consideration of some Things, which, not being essential, are not contain’d in the primary and universal Notion of Mankind;) “human Actions of a new kind may become necessary to the publick Good”: And secondly, “After what manner, from such Necessity, arises a Right,” (antecedent to the Institution of Civil Government,) “to perform such Actions.”
And of a Right to self-preservation, and self-defence.Nor upon these Suppositions, will there be any Right to do any thing, except what right Reason declares to be necessary to the common Good, or at least consistent with it; of which the first is therefore commanded by Reason, the last permitted, which I shall explain more at large in the Chapter of the Law of Nature. This, however, I thought proper here carefully to inculcate, “That all Right, even to the Use of those Things, which are absolutely necessary to every one’s Preservation,” (as it is distinguish’d from the mere force of seizing those Things, in which Sense only its Original is here inquir’d into,) “is founded in the Command, or at least in the Permission, of the Law of Nature,” that is, of right Reason, pronouncing concerning those things which are necessary to the common Good, according to the Nature of Things; and that therefore it cannot be known, “That any one has a Right to preserve himself, unless it be known, ‘That this will contribute to the common Good,’ or That it is at least consistent with it.” But, if this be the Rise of our Right to our own Preservation, our Powers will be hereby so limited, that we may not invade the equal Rights of others, nor break forth into a War against all; that is, make an Attempt towards the Destruction of all.
In short, I affirm first, “That a Right,” (distinguish’d from mere Power,) “even to Self-defence, cannot be understood without Respect had to the Concessions of the Law of Nature, which consults the Good of all”; and that all solid Arguments, “by which any one can claim any Right to himself,” do prove, “That there is such a Law, and that it is at the same time of equal Force to the Protection of others.” But secondly, since the Right to the making such a Division can only be deduc’d from a Care of the common Good, it manifestly follows, that the Dominion of God over all Things is preserv’d unviolated; and that, from this Principle, no Right of Dominion can accrue to any Man over others, which will license him to take from the Innocent their Necessaries; but on the contrary, that the Right of Empire is therefore given to them, that the Rights of all may be protected from the Evils of Contention, and may be encreased, as far as the Nature of Things, assisted by human Industry, will permit.
A brief Deduction of the principal particular Laws of Nature.§XXIV. Having already briefly deduced, from the Law which commands an Endeavour to promote the common Good, the Property of particular rational Beings, at least in things necessary, some Right is granted, which every one may justly call his own; and, by the same Law, all others will be obliged to yield that to him, which is usually included in the Definition of Justice.
Justice;It seems moreover proper, more distinctly to shew, “what kind of Actions have a natural Tendency to promote the publick Happiness”; for thence will appear, both what Actions are commanded, and what permitted to Individuals.
Abstaining from,It is manifest, First, That to abstain from hurting any innocent Person, is necessary: For the Damage of any Part is a detriment to the Whole, unless it be inflicted as a Punishment, for some Crime committed against the publick Welfare. Hence all Invasion of another’s Property, is prohibited; for all Damage done to the Mind, Body, Goods, or good Name of any Person, is a Loss to the Publick.
And repairing, Injuries;Hence also the same natural Law, which requires to give every one his own, must, for the publick Good, command Reparation of Injuries.
Secondly, It is manifest, that this greatest and noblest End cannot be obtain’d by a bare Abstaining from doing Evil; but it is necessary, that every one contribute his Share, by a true, certain, and constant Application, as well of Things external, as of his Powers, towards the gaining this Point. For, otherwise, neither will the publick Happiness, nor our own, be the greatest we can effect. It is upon this account a natural Precept, that if at any time, (the Nature of the chief End so requiring it,) we should transfer to another some Right of ours, either by Gift, at present, or by Promise, or Compact, afterwards to be perform’d; we make that Transfer validly and faithfully, and not with an Intention to deceive;Liberality; making, and faithfully performing Promises and Compacts; for it is only such a firm transferring of any Thing, or of our Services, to the Use of another, as I have mention’d, which can at all conduce to the End commanded us. Hence arises the obligation to make and keep promises; but our Pains is most wisely and happily laid out, in the prosecution of the common Good of all rational Beings, if we observe the following Order in our Actions.
Piety, Loyalty, Gratitude to Parents, Benefactors, and Ambassadors;We should, first, perform what is acceptable to the intelligent Agents, who are Causes of the common Good, and, consequently, of our own; that is, every one should take care to make himself acceptable to God, to Princes, and the whole Body of the State, (upon supposition that there are such in being,) to Parents, to Benefactors; but especially to Negotiators of Peace, or Ambassadors.
Self-Preservation and Improvement;Secondly, Every one should study his own Preservation, and further Perfection; but always preserving the Rights of others, by that Innocence which I have already shewn to be commanded. Hither I refer our being oblig’d to study the Improvement of our Minds, with all useful Knowledge and Virtue, and to preserve the Life, Health, and Chastity of our Bodies.
Natural Affection;Thirdly, Men should provide for their Families and Offspring, because (to omit, that they are the Substance of their Parents, form’d into the same Species with them, whence they may justly claim to themselves the Rights of human Nature) they are the only Prop of the approaching old Age of the present Set of Men, and by them only we can hope to raise a succeeding Generation. To this Care of our Offspring, I refer Love towards our Kindred, (who are the Offspring of our Parents,) and towards our whole Posterity.
And Humanity, towards All;Fourthly, Every one should study to make himself acceptable to all others, by good Offices, and to benefit others, without the detriment of any, by all Acts of Humanity, as they are called, such as, to shew the way, to raise the Fallen, &c. in proof whereof there is no Occasion to add any thing farther, than that, in order to the preservation of any aggregate Body, whose Parts are transient, (as is the Case of all Mankind,) it is necessary, “That the Causes of its Corruption, especially those which happen to its inward Parts, be taken away; that there be a certain Communication of Motion between its Parts; that its Causes of Preservation, and all its essential Parts, be cherish’d, not only those which are at present, but also those which shall hereafter be produc’d, by the Motion which is intrinsick to that aggregate Body; and that its Parts and Motions, which have a less Proportion to the Whole, give way to those which have a greater Proportion to the same.” For scarce any thing can be prov’d more plainly, than this general Proposition, which immediately flows from the Definitions of Things preservative and destructive, of Whole and Part, of Cause and Effect; and yet in all things suits with those Particulars, which, in the foregoing Section, I affirm’d to be necessary to the Preservation of Mankind.
This illustrated by various Examples from Nature, of the Contrivance of its Author, for the Preservation of the whole, with respect, 1. To Individuals;§XXV. But, lest any thing should be wanting, which might suggest such Thoughts to the Minds of Men, and might demonstrate their necessary Connexion among themselves, Nature lays before us a sufficient Number of Examples, in Beings of various Kinds. Let the Nature of any Animal be consider’d, as an Aggregate made up of Parts very different, that defends it self, for the time appointed by universal Nature, by the Methods already mention’d; (1.) By expelling, according to its Power, those Things which are hurtful, which it diligently separates from the vital Nourishment; (2.) by circulating the Blood, and perhaps other useful Fluids, as the Lymph, the Bile, and the nervous Juices; (3.) by repairing what is wasted, by a new Succession of like Parts; (4.) and by the mutual good Offices of every Part, perform’d according to the general Laws of Motion, which nevertheless hinder not, but that each may take to themselves what is sufficient for their proper Nourishment and Strength.
2. To Animals of the same Species;If we turn our Eyes to the mutual Behaviour of different Animals, but of the same Kind; it is evident, that they continue their Species, by a certain kind of Innocence, Retaliation of Benefits, limited Self-Love, and a most powerful Love of their Offspring.
Juv. Sat. 15.
i.e. Wild Beasts of the same Kind do not fight with one another.
3. To the Frame of the visible World.Lastly, If we consider this visible World, with Des-Cartes and others, as a most exquisite Machine, we may perceive, that this our Vortex is no otherwise daily preserv’d, than by resisting some contrary Motions of the neighbouring Vortices; by changing or removing Bodies of Figures or Motions less agreeable; by a circular Motion of the Parts; by propagating the different Species of Things, by such kind of Motions, as those by which it has produc’d the Individuals which now are; and by causing its Parts to yield to one another, according to the Proportion which their Dimensions and Motions have to one another, and to the Whole. But I am determin’d, not to insist upon such Hypotheses, altho I know, that we may fairly reason from them, provided the natural Laws of Motion be exactly observ’d in them; and I dare affirm, that has been perform’d by Des-Cartes, with great Care and Exactness, in most Parts of his Hypothesis. Howbeit, whatsoever Hypothesis be assum’d, in order to explain the Phaenomena of Nature, such Laws of Motion must of necessity be allow’d, as, amidst all natural Changes, preserve the State of the System of the World, by such Methods as I have mention’d. Such being the Case, it is manifested by a most illustrious Example, what things are necessary to the Preservation of the greatest and most beautiful aggregate Body; the Consideration whereof cannot but most certainly convince Men, “That human Actions, not unlike these, may be the no less proper Causes of preserving the whole System of Mankind, and making them happy.” Upon which account I am of opinion, that it would not be unprofitable to consider the special Laws of Motion, from the necessary Observance whereof the above-mention’d general Effects arise: But because this is too remote from my present chief Aim, the Philosophical Reader is referr’d, either to his own Experience, or to Galileus, Des-Cartes, Wallis, Wren, and Huygens, all celebrated Writers. But all these Theorems, or Laws of Motion, may be deduced from this Supposition, “That Motion is not annihilated, after it has been impress’d upon Matter by the first Cause”: And for this very Reason. “That it exists in a World that admits no Vacuum, it is necessarily still further propagated, till it return into it self”: And, on the contrary, the Truth of this Supposition is demonstrated, by all the Theorems of Motion observ’d in Nature, by the help of the Senses. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that, in what State soever Men are suppos’d to exist, the Power of doing those things which I have mention’d is plainly necessary to be permitted them, that the collective Body or Race of Men may be preserv’d; and that the Will to do so is no less necessary to the actual Happiness of Men: And to these Heads may be reduc’d whatever is necessary to this Effect.
How it appears to be the Will of God, that we should promote the publick Good, i.e. be Virtuous.§XXVI. What I have hitherto said, concerning the necessary Connexion between the aforesaid Actions and the common Good, is advanc’d with this View, “To fix unchangeably, by their Relation to this Effect, the Nature of those human Actions, wherein Piety, Probity, and every Virtue consists”; for the Relation between entire adequate Causes (that is, Causes consider’d in all their Circumstances requisite to Action) and their Effects, is wholly immutable. In every State, as well of holding Things in common, as of divided Property, such a Course of Life, as deceives no Man by Lyes or Perfidiousness, as injures no Man in his Life, Reputation, or Chastity, as makes Returns of Gratitude to Benefactors, and provides for himself or his Posterity, without hurting another, always has been, and will be, a Cause of the common Good, and is therefore to be distinguish’d by the Name of Virtue. This is only to be taken care of, that we have in view an Effect great enough, that is, that some Advantage accrue to the Whole, or, at least, that it suffer no Damage, whilst we endeavour to gratify a Part; whatsoever is acted otherwise, is to be look’d upon as Vice. And because the Nature of Things makes known to Men, “That by such Actions the common Good” (in which their own proper Happiness is contain’d) “may be obtain’d, and that in the highest degree, that is to them singly possible; but that contrary Actions do likewise make Men miserable; and that these things are so, because of the Connexion made by the Will of the First Cause, between such Actions and their Effects”; it evidently follows, “That Men are oblig’d, by the same Will of the First Cause, to exercise Virtue, and Shun Vice; under the Penalty of losing Happiness, or for the Hope of acquiring it.”
1. From the Evils necessarily connected with a vicious Action.Innumerable Evils, to the Doer himself, naturally attend every Action injurious to others; for he himself, because he contradicts better practical Principles, (which are known to himself,) sets his own Mind at variance with itself, so as to be Self-condemn’d; and he that but once delivers himself up to the Conduct of Rashness and of blind Affections, rather than to the Counsel of his own Reason, will, for the future, be more easily hurried away by them, whence he will at last with ease procure his own Ruin: He sets others also an Example, which may be highly prejudicial to himself: He increases Suspicion and the Causes of Distrust, the Inconveniencies of which he will some time or other experience. Nay, further, every vicious Action may be said to contain all that Punishment, to inflict which, it will excite any rational Agents, out of their regard to publick or private Good, in order to restrain Malefactors.
2. From the Punishments inflicted, for evil Actions, by other rational Beings,Now this Influence of Actions, to excite Observers to inflict Punishment, tho it extends only to rational Natures, God and Men, yet is of great moment, and ought always to be consider’d, before we undertake any Action, lest we should thereby, even unwillingly, draw Destruction upon our own heads; because our whole Hope depends upon God and Men, who judge of the Merit or Demerit of our Actions, by their Relation to the common Good.
Whether God,“That God is privy to, and punishes, the most concealed Wickedness,” perhaps I should seem impertinent, if I went about to prove, after so many Philosophers, antient and modern, and also so many Christian Fathers; especially since he, whose Opinions I am now examining, does no where, that I know of, deny it. Nevertheless, the manner, by which we naturally come to the Knowledge of this, I shew afterwards, where I more fully set forth my Opinion, concerning the Obligation of the Laws of Nature.
or Men.Besides, the Author of no Villany can be secure; because Men (whose Interest it is universally, that a most extensive Benevolence, and that Justice should take place) may come to the Knowledge of, and punish, the most secret Crimes, which may be discover’d a thousand ways, that no one can avoid. Wicked Persons have often betray’d themselves in their Dreams, in their Ravings, in their Cups, or in a sudden Fit of Passion. And this even Epicurus and his Followers have confess’d; they, who have used great Endeavours to shake off the Fears of a divine Providence, have yet frequently own’d, that the Fear of Man cannot be shook off: The Reader may have recourse to the fundamental Maxims of Epicurus, with Gassendus’s Notes. I will add only this, that, beside the divine Vengeance, which the Conscience of almost all wicked Men dread, as the Avenger of the most secret Crimes, among Men, consider’d even out of a State of civil Government, Revenge generally follows any Act of Wickedness, after it has been discover’d. For seeing it is the Interest of all, “That Crimes should be punish’d,” any Person, that is able, has a Right to exact those Punishments, which a regard to the publick Good requires should be taken by some body. For, by the Supposition, all Inequality among Men being taken away, that Saying of the Latin Poet takes place, I am a Man, and therefore no Calamity that befals Mankind seems to me indifferent.
(Hobbes is inconsistent with himself, in denying the foregoing Obligation of the Laws of Nature, in a State of Nature;)Nor certainly can Hobbes, who says, “That every Man has in that State a Right of warring against all,” justly deny him the Sword of Justice to punish Crimes. Nor do I see any just Reason why he (who teaches, that the obligatory Force of Civil Laws proceeds from the Punishments annex’d, and the Fear thence arising) should not allow some Obligation to accrue to the Laws of Nature, even to external Actions, either from the Punishments which Conscience foresees will be inflicted by God; or even from the Punishments which any Man, in a State of Nature, has a Right to exact from the Transgressor of Nature’s Laws. Truly, the hands of so many Avengers were to be fear’d, and it were strange, if none of them were sufficiently furnish’d with Strength and Courage, so as to be both able and willing to revenge a Contempt of the common Good. But even Hobbes himself does elsewhere (Leviathan, Chap. 31. near the End) acknowledge, that we may observe such natural Punishments; and asserts, that they follow Crimes not by positive Appointment, but by Nature. “There is (saith he) no Action of Man in this Life, that is not the beginning of so long a Chain of Consequences, as no human Providence is high enough to give a Man a Prospect to the End. And in this Chain, there are link’d together, both pleasing and unpleasing Events, in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his Pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the Pains annex’d to it; and these Pains are the natural Punishments of those Actions, which are the beginning of more harm than good. And hereby it comes topass, that Intemperance is naturally punish’d with Diseases, Rashness with Mischances, Injustice with the Violence of Enemies, Pride with Ruin, Cowardice with Oppression, negligent Government of Princes with Rebellion, and Rebellion with Slaughter; for seeing Punishments are consequent to the Breach of Laws, natural Punishments must be naturally consequent to the Breach of the Law of Nature, and therefore follow them, as their natural, not arbitrary, Effects.” But this same Philosopher of Malmsbury, altho he asserts a War of all against all in that State, hath entirely overlook’d this Cause of War, that they might punish Crimes against the publick Good, or defend it against Invaders; yet he sets all a fighting, to take from others what they are either justly possess’d of, or lay claim to. And whereas the immediate effect of the Right to punish, for example, an Invader, be an Obligation to abstain from that Crime, Hobbes does indeed acknowledge the Cause, viz. that all have a Right to punish, by acknowledging their Right to War, but does not see the Effect, viz. the Obligation thence arising, or rather discover’d. He acknowledges almost all Virtues to be necessary to Peace and mutual Defence, and that Men do agree, that this State of Peace is good, and that War (in which is included the Right of punishing Offences) has a natural Connexion with the neglect of moral Virtues; and yet he does not see, that Men are obliged, for fear of that War as of a Punishment, to the outward Acts of those same Virtues, whose inward Acts only will not preserve Peace and mutual Defence, which Nature dictates are to be pursued. Compare Chap. 3. § 27. with § 31.
Upon a mistaken Notion, of all Mens Right to all Things, which is here examin’d;§XXVII. But because, from this general consideration of all things, I have briefly shewn, “That it is necessary to the common Good, that all Rationals should constantly desire, that the use of Things and the mutual Services of Men, at least for the time in which they may be of advantage to particular Persons, should be divided or look’d upon as their Property”; and also, “That this Dictate of Reason declares Rewards to those who observe it, and Punishments to those who violate it; and that the same is necessarily impress’d upon the Minds of Men, and has therefore God, the Author of all natural Effects, for its Author and Enforcer,” in which the whole Power of a Law is contain’d; it will not be improper to examine likewise briefly Hobbes’s Assertion, concerning the Right of all Men to all Things: for as we think, that the Foundation of universal Justice, and consequently of all Virtue, is establish’d by our Doctrine; so we are of opinion, that the same is entirely overthrown (as far as in him lies) by these his contrary Notions. Hobbes affirms, That “in a natural State” (that is, without the civil Authority) “every one has a Right to all Things”; which he thus explains, that “every one has a Right to do whatsoever, and against whomsoever, he pleases,” or “to have and to do all things,” as he says in the Conclusion of that Article. That this monstrous License is necessarily contain’d in the Law of Nature, he in the same place endeavours to prove, from what he had advanc’d in the ninth Article, and in the rest, from the seventh to the end of the Annotation subjoin’d to the tenth; which because I think not worth while to transcribe word for word, the Reader is desir’d attentively to consider, whether I have not justly reduc’d their whole force into this Syllogism. In a State of Nature every one has a Right to, or may lawfully have, all things, and do all things against all, which he himself shall judge necessary to his own Preservation. But every one will judge it necessary to his own preservation, to have all things, and to do all things against all. Therefore every one has a Right to, or may lawfully, do thus.
But lest any one, perhaps, should not have Hobbes’s Treatise at hand, and to avoid Suspicion, that I have not fairly stated his Argument, I will transcribe the Abridgment of this Reasoning of Hobbes’s, which he himself has set down in these words, in his Annotation upon c. 1. §. 10. “Every one has a right to preserve himself, by Art. 7. Therefore he has a right to make use of all the means necessary to that End, by Art. 8. But the Means necessary are those, which he shall judge such,” by Art. 9. Therefore he has a Right to do, and to possess all things, which he himself shall judge to be necessary to his own Preservation. “It is therefore by the Judgment of the Doer, that what is done, is either rightfully or wrongfully done; it is therefore rightfully done. Therefore it is true (which I propos’d) that in a State of Nature every one has a right to do all things against all, &c.” From that last Consequence, “Every one has a right to do and to possess all things, which he himself shall judge necessary, &c. therefore every one has a right to possess and to do all things against all”; it is manifest, that this Minor Proposition is to be understood: But to possess all things, and to do all things against all, every one will judge necessary to his own Preservation; for otherwise the Conclusion would not follow from the given Major. But both the Premises of that Syllogism are false; and, in the first place, that Minor which is understood, which he seems to presume to be so evident, that he does not so much as mention, much less prove it; unless perhaps he thinks it sufficiently prov’d, from what he had said in the 7th §, That “every one is carry’d to the Desire of that which is good to himself, and that by a natural Necessity, not less than that by which a Stone is carry’d downwards”; for I do not see, even tho this be granted, “Why every one should judge every Good to be necessary to himself.” Certainly Hobbes himself elsewhere (c. 1. § 4.) grants concerning some, that they think otherwise, in these words; “For another, according to natural Equality, permits to the rest all those things which he claims to himself, which is the Part of a modest Man, and one who rightly estimates his own Strength.” Certainly, if he judges according to right Reason, who permits to others like things with himself, whosoever will arrogate all things to himself, as necessary to his own Preservation, can acquire no right to himself by such his irrational Judgment; for Hobbes himself has defin’d “Right to be a Liberty of using our natural Faculties according to right Reason.” Therefore no one will have a Right to disturb that natural Equality, which he had but just before confess’d that right Reason dictates. But if Individuals judg’d according to right Reason, at the same time that they determin’d, “That a plenary Disposition, Use, and Enjoyment, of all Things and Persons, according to their several Wills, tho perfectly contrary to one another, was necessary to the preservation of each particular Person”; it might be concluded, “That the matter were so”; for the matter is always as right Reason pronounces it. But, on the contrary, the Nature, both of all Bodies and of Motion, and common Experience, testify, “That it is impossible that any body” (much less that all) “should at once be subject to so many contrary Motions, as there would be contrary Wills of Men, concerning its Use; and therefore that that is, in the Nature of Things, impossible, which Hobbes supposes each particular Person to judge, according to right Reason, necessary.”
And which he endeavours to support by a groundless Supposition, That every Man has a Right to what he himself shall judge necessary to the Preservation of his Life,§XXVIII. My Readers now, I suppose, perceive the Reason, why I rank’d that common Observation, that the Powers and Uses of things are limited, amongst the Notions chiefly necessary to the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature: for hence both a fundamental Error of Hobbes is detected, and a most useful Truth is inferr’d, “That both the Uses of Things, and Services of Men, are necessarily to be divided, or to be determin’d to one Person for one time, if we design they should effect any thing at all; and consequently, if we would promote the publick Good”: Hence also, when many have a like Right to Things to be enjoy’d in common, the first Occupant has always the Preference.
And so much may suffice concerning the Minor of the foregoing Syllogism, that it contradicts the most general Notions upon which Laws are founded; but the Major of that Syllogism is more diligently defended by Hobbes, and is by us therefore more at large to be confuted. But it cannot be done here so pertinently, because the Nature of this Right cannot be so distinctly understood, unless the Knowledge of the Law of Nature be first suppos’d. Wherefore Hobbes seems to have transgress’d the Rules of Method; who, altho he openly acknowledges, that by the Name of “Right,” he understands a “Liberty left by the Laws”; yet supposes it in Men, and sets forth to them its vast extent, before he explains even Natural Laws: and yet it is certain, that, without respect had to them as prior, what Right is cannot be understood; which very thing has given occasion to many of his Errors. But that Hobbes has thus transgress’d, may be understood from his Definition, who has defin’d “Right” to be “A liberty of using the natural Faculties according to right Reason”; which is the very Law of Nature, by him not yet explain’d, c. 1.§7. Notwithstanding, because this Syllogism is before us, we will briefly consider how he proves the Major, in order to make the Falshood of it more evidently appear. His Proof of it, reduc’d by me into the Form of a Syllogism, stands thus: Every one has a Right to possess all Things, and to do against all what the Judge shall have judg’d necessary to the Preservation of every one’s Life: But what he himself shall judge necessary, that the Judge judges necessary to his Preservation; for he himself is the Judge of those things which are necessary to his own Preservation, Art. 9. Therefore, &c. The Sense of the major Proposition is contain’d in these words, which are found Art. 10. “But we suppose himself Judge, whether these things conduce to his Preservation or no; so that those things are to be look’d upon as necessary, which he himself judges to be such. And by Art. 7. Those things are, and are esteemed to be, according to the Law of Nature, which necessarily conduce to the defense of a Man’s proper Life and Limbs.”
Which ought to be parted with for a greater Good;But I affirm that Major to be false, (I.) Because Life it self is to be parted with for a greater good, such as the Salvation of a Man’s Soul, the Glory of God, and the common Good of Men. These are not to be given up, altho it were necessary to the Preservation of Life. (2.) Because a Judge may in the State of Nature falsly affirm those things to be necessary, which really are not necessary.Nor does his mistaken Judgment of the Means necessary to that End, alter the unalterable Nature of Things. Nor can any Reason be given, “Why in a State of Nature the Sentence of a Judge should have power to confer a Right upon any one, if that Sentence disagrees with the Rule according to which Judgment ought to be given.” But the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Things, whence they are drawn, are the Rule of Judgment in that State; so that it will come to the same thing, which of these two we take for the Standard of Judgment. No State can be imagin’d, in which there is either no Rule of Judgment, or wherein things immediately become such, as the Mind shall rashly determine. The usefulness of things to the preservation of human Life, much more their Necessity to that End, depends upon the natural Powers of things, nor can be chang’d at the Pleasure of Men. If any one, in a State of Nature, should have judg’d Wolfsbane to be a wholesom Herb, or even necessary to the Nourishment of his Body, and should therefore have gorg’d himself with its Juice, it will not therefore become wholesom Nourishment, but will kill him, notwithstanding the Opinion of the Judge to the contrary. Nor is the Efficacy of those things less determin’d, which are good or evil to the whole collective Body of Men, whether they be voluntary human Actions, (concerning which the Laws of Nature, or moral Philosophy pronounces,) or whether they be the natural Powers of Meats and Drugs, (in which Medicine instructs us;) nor are they chang’d by the Opinions of Men, however they may be Judges, from whom no Appeal is permitted. According to the same unalterable Laws of Motion act all those universal Causes, which at once profit or hurt many, as doth any particularCause, Wolfsbane for instance, when it takes away the Life of one only.
The Rise of Hobbes’s Error, “That a mistaken Judgment, in a State of Nature, confers a Right,” proceeds from the obligatory Force of even the unjust Sentence of a civil Judge, for Reasons which will not hold in a State of Nature.§XXIX. But this Error of Hobbes, concerning the Force of that Sentence (which falsly pronounces a Dominion over all Things and Persons to be necessary to Self-preservation) to give any Persons such a prodigious Right, has arisen hence, that in civil Society he observ’d, “That the Sentence of the supreme Judge bound the Subjects, however it may have been given contrary to what the Nature of the Case requir’d.” But this (which is supported only by a probable Foundation) has been introduc’d by the Consent of Parties, to put an End to Contentions in civil States. Nor is the Sentence of a Prince of so great efficacy, as to make things in their own Nature impossible, or not necessary to the Preservation of the Life of any Person, become necessary to that end. It does indeed transfer Property, which Subjects are oblig’d not to resist; for all Subjects are oblig’d to acknowledge the supreme Judge (whenever there is occasion) as an equal Arbitrator to all, and in Law-suits are understood to have subjected themselves to his Arbitration. This Judge is supposed to be chosen out of the most skilful Lawyers, so as to be able, and to be under the Obligation of an Oath, so as to be willing, to give Sentence according to the known Laws, the Allegations, and the Evidence.
But all think with themselves, “That this conduces more to the common Happiness, That a few should suffer that Evil, which may follow from an unjust Sentence, (which will sometimes happen, notwithstanding the above-mention’d Precautions,) than that Strifes should never be ended, but by Wars.” So that a greater care of the publick Good, than of the Life of any particular Person, may be suppos’d as the Foundation of this Prerogative granted to the ruling Powers in States. But in a Stateof Nature, (which Hobbes supposes and defines to be the Condition of Men out of civil Society,) it is manifest, that these Considerations can have no place: for where every one is a Judge, there no Skill or Probity can be suppos’d, by which the Judge excels others; no Power of citing Witnesses, and of doing those other things which are requisite to come at the exact Knowledge of a Cause; as is the Case of civil Judgments. There is no Agreement of all in the State of Nature to be suppos’d, by which particular Persons should trust both themselves, and such things as are necessary to them, to the publick determination and integrity of supreme Powers. Nor is there at all any Reason, why this great Privilege of the chief Magistrates should be indulg’d to particular Persons in a State of Nature, however ignorant and wicked. On the contrary it is evident, that the State of Nature affords no other final Determination of any doubtful Case, except that Evidence which arises from Things themselves, or from Testimony, by which the Mind of Man is freed from all Scruples, and is fully satisfy’d that it is not deceiv’d; and that there could be no end of a Dispute among several, unless one Part willingly came into the Opinion of the other, being thereunto moved, either by the weight of Reason, or thro’ an Opinion of the other’s Knowledge and Veracity: for this is evident from the Nature of Judgment, (of which we are every one of us conscious within our own Breasts,) that its Doubts cannot be clear’d by any coercive Power, but by Arguments only, and that they are all deduc’d from the Nature of Things, or from the Authority of the Teacher, which the Learner receives as authentick. Nature acknowledges a Distinction between true and false Judgment, right Reason, and that which is corrupted; and Truth and right Reason have this Privilege, that Man has a natural Right to do those things which they command; for the very Definition of Right declares it to be nothing else but a Liberty of using our natural Faculties according to right Reason: But Error, or a false Judgment of the Mind, whether it be concerning things necessary to support Life, or other matter of Practice, gives no one a Right of doing that which he falsly thinks necessary to be done, in order to preserve his Life: for the Reason of him who is in an Error, is not right; nor can any one use his Faculties according to right Reason, (which is to act by Right,) whilst he acts according to Error, which contradicts it. It is therefore a gross Error of Hobbes, when he teaches, “That all things are to be look’d on as necessary to any Man’s Preservation in a natural State, which he himself judges necessary; and that therefore every one has a Right to all things, and to do any thing against every Man.” But it was particularly a shame for Hobbes to commit such a Mistake in this Matter, or in this Place:
First, Because it was absurd to ascribe to any Man in a State of Nature, that which is the peculiar Privilege of a civil State, even there where he pretends to treat with the greatest accuracy of the difference of these two States:
Secondly, Because he boasts to have demonstrated that to be necessary, which is naturally impossible, That the same Body should be mov’d towards parts diametrically opposite, according to the opposite Wills of Men; for that Conclusion will justly cause the truth of the Premisses to be suspected:
Thirdly, Because every thing that is particular to Hobbes in Politicks falls to the ground, when this Foundation is taken away; for that State of War vanishes, whose necessary Connexion with a State of Nature he hath hence inferr’d, Art. 12. where he hath rashly concluded, “That every one, from his own arbitrary Opinion, has a Right to invade all others; and that likewise every one has a Right of resisting, whence War ariseth.” All the rest likewise fall to the ground, which he thinks he has demonstrated from these Principles: but there will be a more convenient Opportunity for refuting these, when I shall have more fully propos’d better, Principles, whence both the Laws of Nature take their Rise, and a Liberty is left within the Bounds prescribed by them.
By means of which Error, Hobbes proposes Means that are impossible, as necessary to obtain an End, which is too narrow.I will only mention this by the way, “That Hobbes has propos’d too narrow an End on this first Head now under examination, viz. the mere Preservation of Life and Limbs”; for Men may be very miserable, tho these were safe. “The Means by him requir’d are likewise too narrow, viz. only Necessaries, c. 1. § 8.” For this World, whose Inhabitants we are born, and which first offers it self to our Consideration, supplies us with things innumerable, which solicit the Mind to the acknowledging and honouring its first Cause; and which, with regard to our selves, are subservient to the Perfections of the Mind, and do not only preserve the Life of the Body, but also contribute sufficiently to its Health, Strength, Activity, Beauty, and Ornament. All these, as well as the Necessaries of Life, do afford both Matter to the Laws of Nature, directing us in their Use, and Room for the exercise of Liberty, according to right Reason. But seeing these are manifest, from so superficial an Observation, that Hobbes could not be ignorant of them, any one may easily conjecture, for what cause he assign’d no larger Bounds to Right and the Laws of Nature, than the Preservation of this frail Life; as if Men, like Swine, had Souls given them only, instead of Salt, to preserve the Body from Putrefaction; and in the mean time, to obtain so diminutive an End, has given every one all things as means necessary; so that here he has been as faulty in excess, as there in defect: nor can any one more shamefully transgress the Rules of right Reason, than by neglecting the best End, and by looking on things impossible as means necessary.
Nor can such a Right of all Men to all things be prov’d, from an original holding all things in common;§XXX. Vain is Mr. Hobbes’s Attempt to maintain or prove this absurd Right of all Men to all Things, from that primitive holding things in common, which some Philosophers suppose, and some Histories have affirm’d: For besides that Mr. Selden hath taught, and prov’d from the divine Donation, Gen. i. 28. “That private Dominion was a most acknowledg’d Right from the days of Adam,” as you may see in his MareClausum, l. 8. c. 4. it is certain, that both Philosophers and Historians thought, “That the use of such an universal Right had so much in it of the nature of Property, that what any one had seiz’d for himself, it were an Injury in another to force from him.” This may be explain’d by an Example us’d by Cicero. Altho the Theatre be common, it may justly be said, that the Place which any one has taken possession of, is his.
Nor from the Power of Individuals.But no Mortal, before Hobbes, ventur’d to assert such a Right of every one to all things; which, if you will believe him, contains in it self a Right of reigning over all, coeval with their very Nature; that is, from their Infancy; altho, according to the same Person, it be founded in Power: Which destroys all Property in another, so that it is impossible to invade that which is another’s, and lawful to claim every thing to himself:Which makes it lawful to lie with every Woman, to break the Faith pledg’d to another: Which makes it lawful to wage War against all, and therefore to kill any Person, even the most innocent: Which leaves every Determination of disputed Cases, to every Man’s proper arbitrary Judgment, and Children at liberty to honour their Parents or not. He in the mean time forgot, that he had said elsewhere, “That it cannot be understood, that a Son can exist in the State of Nature”; and that, therefore, neither has the Right proper to this State any place in Sons. Of a-piece with this, is what he has added in the end of c. 14. § 9. That “there is no occasion to give Testimony, whether true or false, in a State of Nature, because there are there no publick Courts”; as if a private Judge had no occasion for Testimony, in order to give his Award, where he hath been chosen Umpire between Persons at Variance; or, as if a false Testimony in such a Case were not criminal, (as contrary to the common Good,) altho there were yet no Civil Laws; such as he there contends the Precepts of the second Table of the Decalogue to be. Here may be added that of Hobbes, which he sometimes expresly acknowledges, That “all Violation of the Laws of Nature consists in the false Reasoning, or in the Folly of Men who do not see,” (and why not as well, of Men who do not observe?) “their Duties toward other Men, necessary to their own Preservation.” And he acknowledges that the Laws of Nature, in the State of Nature, do oblige in the inward Court, or that of Conscience; therefore they at least oblige to pass a true Judgment, that all Things, and a Dominion over all Persons, are not necessarily requir’d to the Preservation of every one. But if every one is under an Obligation so to judge, vain will be the Judgment of him whose Sentiments are contrary; nor can that prodigious Right over all things accrue to him from so gross an Error. To be brief, there can be no Right of acting contrary to the Law of Nature, or the Dictates of right Reason, because Right is defin’d to be a Liberty of acting according thereto. But right Reason, as I have shewn, points out the necessity of coming to a division of Things; and, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, forbids the retaining a Right to all Things, c. 2.§3.
Another Error of Hobbes, by which he endeavours to support a Right of every Man to every thing in a State of Nature, is, “That Right and Wrong depend upon human Laws.”§XXXI. Let us therefore proceed to examine, what other Arguments Hobbes has brought to establish this his wild Doctrine: He suggests, “That what any one does in a State merely natural, cannot be injurious to any Man; because Injustice toward Men supposes human Laws, such as in that State are not.” Yet he grants that even then, Men may sin against God and the Laws of Nature; but he in vain and without proof assumes what is most false, “That an Injury against Man supposes human Laws.” For from the Dictates of right Reason, altho they be the natural Laws of God only, accrues to Man a Right to those things, which Reason has dictated to be granted to him by God: As for example, “The innocent Person has a Right to his Life, to preserve his Limbs entire, and to necessary Sustenance, without which it is well known, that he cannot be subservient to the common Good.” Therefore an Injury is done him, if any one, upon Hobbes’s Principles, shall maim or kill him, in pursuit of his Claim of all things: for every Opposition to, or Violation of, another’s Right, is an Injury, by what Law soever that Right accrued to the other; but much more, if that Right was yielded him by the divine Laws, than if by any human Law or Compact. Hobbes indeed supposes, “That no one can injure another, but after he has transferr’d by compact his own Right of doing what he pleases.” But this supposes that it has been prov’d, “That a Right of doing what he pleases belongs to every one”; which I have prov’d to be impossible. Therefore in vain he seeks a Support to his tottering Foundation, from this Consequence, which wholly depends upon the Supposition (which I have overthrown) of every Man’s Right to all Things. Even Hobbes himself, altho he asserts here, and more openly c. 3.§4. “That no Injury can be done to any one, with whom we have not enter’d into compact”; yet elsewhere more justly, and as the Truth it self requires, he has most expresly taught, “That it is injuriously done, whatsoever is done contrary to right Reason.” Seeing all grant, “That to be rightfully done, which is not done against right Reason”; we ought to think, “That injuriously done, which is contrary to right Reason”; and so he there acknowledges, That to be a Law. You observe he does not here require a transferring our Right to another, before an Injury can be done. Now seeing he acknowledges these Dictates of Reason to be divine Laws, I desire that he will shew, “What hinders, but that these may confer upon every one such a Right to Life, as without Injury cannot be taken away, or how any one can have a Right to oppose and violate another’s Right”: For every Man’s Right is a Liberty granted by right Reason, which can never allow, that Men speaking or acting by its Prescription, can contradict or oppose one another. It will be in vain for him to say, that the Injury is done to God only, seeing only his Laws are violated; unless he shew, that these Laws of God cannot confer on Men a Right to their Life and its Necessaries, nor prohibit others to violate the Right so granted.
This however I here thought fit to add by the by, “That if an Injury consists only in the Violation of Compacts transferring Right, then no Injury could possibly be done to God, according to Hobbes’s Principles, altho his natural Laws, both concerning the Cultivation of Peace amongst Men, and concerning the Worship which ought to be paid himself, should be violated by Crimes of the deepest Dye, and even by Blasphemy it self”: for Man is suppos’d, “Not to have enter’d into a Compact with God, to yield Obedience to his Laws”; nay, he openly declares, c. 2. § 12, 13. “That a Compact cannot be enter’d into with God, except as he has thought fit, by the sacred Scriptures, to substitute in his Place certain Men, with an Authority to consider and accept of such Compacts.” God therefore and Men are in such a State, according to Hobbes, that without Injury Men may be Enemies to God, and have a Right (as the Giants are fabled to have done) to make war upon him, and to hate him. God indeed will have a Right (according to Hobbes’s Principles) to kill such, which he might with equal Justice have done, tho they had not sinn’d. But they, who so reject all Reverence towards God, as not to submit to his Precepts, nor fear his Threats, are not look’d upon as his Subjects, but his Enemies, or as living without the Limits of the Kingdom of God, whom he may at pleasure invade, as he hints,c. 15. § 2. But, in my Opinion, even Atheists and Epicureans, who deny a Providence, are oblig’d by the Law of Nature, (which is sufficiently promulg’d, altho by them neglected and deny’d,) to obey God; and they are Subjects by Birth, not Compact, and may therefore be punish’d by God for their Crimes as rebellious Subjects, and not invaded only, as Persons born without his Jurisdiction. But this by the by.
Nor does War, as Hobbes supposes, necessarily arise from the Passions.§XXXII. Let us now consider, if you please, what the same Author has advanc’d in his Leviathan, towards the establishing this Right of every one to all Things; for he there endeavours to infer it from different Principles. However, I cannot but observe, that Hobbes is no less inconsistent with himself, than with all others in this Point, which is the Foundation both of his Morality and Politicks. For, in his Treatise de Cive, he deduces the War of every Man against every Man, from this Right of every Man to every Thing, as from a Cause, which made it both lawful and necessary. Whereas, in his Leviathan, he first affirms the State of Nature to be a State of War; and thence infers a Licence to do every thing in that State, as will appear from considering the Thirteenth Chapter, and comparing the former part thereof with this in the Close. “To this War” (saith he) “of every Man against every Man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust; the Notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force and Fraud are in War the two cardinal Virtues, &c.”There he affirm’d, that the Invasion of the one Party, and the Resistance of the other, were both just, whence a War must needs arise just on both sides. But here he refers the Original of this War to the Nature of the human Passions, little sollicitous about the Right of commencing it; and, War once suppos’d, he affirms (without proof) that it will follow, That there is nothing unjust, That there is no Property, &c. This Reasoning in the Leviathan is more popular, but less conclusive; for it is acknowledg’d by all judicious Writers, that a War must first be prov’d just, before it can justify any Proceedings against the Enemy; nor are all things lawful, even in the justest War. The Law of Nature must therefore first be acknowledg’d; whence we may determine, whether the War to be undertaken be just, or at least permitted by right Reason, before we can infer the lawfulness of those things, which are necessary in the carrying on such War. And this is so evident, that even Hobbes himself, tho in the latter part of this Chapter he contends, that, in a State of Nature, there is no Distinction between Just and Unjust; yet in the former Part of it he endeavours to prove, “That this Power of waging War ought to be allow’d to every Man in that State, as necessary to Self-defense”; which is equivalent to saying, “That such a War is just or lawful.” Wherefore he is inconsistent with himself, even in the same Chapter; for whatever Argument proves, that any thing is Just and Lawful in a State of Nature, proves that there is a Distinction between Lawful and Unlawful in that State, and supposes the Obligation of some Law, by whose Permission, at least, that War may be licens’d: which is the chief Point I would establish, and which Hobbes (as we have seen) expresly denies, when he affirms nothing to be Just, or Unjust.
Let us examine by what Arguments he would prove a War of all against all to be necessary or lawful. In his Leviathan, he has not that close and compact way of Reasoning, which he aims at in his Treatise de Cive. However, he refers the Original of War to three principal Causes, Competition, Defense, and Glory. And he affirms, that it must necessarily take its Rise from these Passions. War from Competition arises from the Hope of Gain: A defensive War, in which we prevent others by Force or Fraud, proceeds from Fear, lest others should usurp a Dominion over us; and we wage War to acquire Fame, from a Desire of Glory.
But I care not to transcribe all his unconclusive Reasonings, in order, from these Affections, to persuade the necessity of a State of universal War; he that pleases may turn to them in the Author himself. I think it sufficient to give this general Answer: “That Men are not necessarily led or compell’d by these Passions, but that both these, and all other Passions may be temper’d and guided by Reason and Counsel; so that it is false, that they hurry Men by a natural and irresistible Force to such a War; and the Reasoning is weak, which thence concludes it lawful.” Inhuman Passions, what is produc’d in Man by a Necessity arising from the Impulse of external Objects, cannot be forbid by any Law of Nature, because Laws direct only such Actions as are in our power. But those Passions, whence Hobbes would infer the Necessity, and consequently the Lawfulness, of War, are of such a kind, (because they look into Futurity, and that often at a great distance,) as depend upon the Reason and Counsel of Men, and consequently may by these be govern’d. Even Hobbes himself elsewhere openly owns, That “those who cannot agree concerning the present” (because of their contrary Appetites) “may yet agree concerning the future, which is the Work of Reason; for Things present are perceiv’d by the Senses, Things future by Reason only.” And hence he acknowledges the Agreement of Mankind in this, (which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature,) that Peace is to be sought after. He is therefore inconsistent with himself, when in the Leviathan he sets them at War from those Affections, which depend upon Reason taking a prospect of Futurity, thro’ the whole Course of Life.
What is more, in the Close of this very Thirteenth Chapter, he acknowledges Men to have those Passions which have a peaceable Tendency, which are, Fear, especially of a violent Death, the Desire of the Necessaries and Comforts of Life, and the Hope of obtaining them by Industry. These Passions, if narrowly examin’d, are certainly the same with those, of which he had but just before affirm’d that they compell’d Men to War. This is the same Fear with that before-mention’d, lest others should lord it over us at pleasure, and should, in consequence, rob us of Life, whenever they so thought fit; by which Fear he had before affirm’d them to be prompted, to secure themselves by preventing and invading others. The like may be said of the Desire of Glory, which may be reckon’d among the Necessaries of Life, and also of the Hope of Gain. And thus Peace and War, according to Hobbes, are Effects of the same Causes. Certainly, if any thing in these Affections be absolutely necessary, it ought carefully to be examin’d on both sides, in order to find out, whether they more powerfully incline human Nature to Peace or War; which Hobbes has no where in his Writings done. Yet it is no less absurd to affirm any thing concerning the State of Man, and his natural Inclination to future Actions, from the sole Consideration of those things which incline him to War, without examining those things which persuade him rather to Peace, than it would be to affirm, which way a Balance would incline, from the knowledge of the Weight thrown into one Scale only. But when I have compar’d, as diligently as I can, the Causes of these Effects, and the Forces of the Powers on each side, both as they are natural Motions arising from the Impulse of external Objects, and (in some measure) depending upon the Constitution and Frame of a human Body; and also, which is of much greater Consequence, as they are excited and govern’d by Reason, taking a prospect of Man’s whole future Existence: They seem more powerfully to persuade universal Benevolence, and that Peace, which may reasonably be expected from the Exercise thereof, than that War of all against all; in which, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, is “continual Danger of violent Death, and a Life solitary, poor, brutish, and short”; in which therefore no Safety can with Reason be expected.
Hobbes’s Objection, That perfect Security of all possible Happiness is not, by the practice of Benevolence, to be obtain’d, Answer’d, by proving it the most effectual means of Happiness in our power, and therefore to be chosen.§XXXIII. The only Appearance of Difficulty in this Question, is, “That a perfect Security of procuring to our selves all kinds of Happiness is not to be obtain’d, tho we should promote the common Good and Peace, by the Exercise of universal Benevolence; and that, because of the unbridled Passions of some others, who, thro’ Folly and Rashness, will not propose to themselves the same End.” But this will appear no Difficulty, if we consider, “That we can do nothing with respect to Men, which will more effectually secure our Happiness”; or, (which comes to the same thing,) “That it is evidently impossible to obtain that perfect Security from all Misfortunes, proceeding from the unbounded Desires of Men; and that it is therefore necessary that we should be content to do that, among all those things which are in our power, which will be most effectual to the procuring this End.” That is, that, by constantly promoting the Happiness of all, we should first bring them over to some degree of Friendship, and then to civil or religious Society, as effectually as we can; and that afterwards, by the same Benevolence, we should continue them in that State. Whatever is short of, or contrary to, this Endeavour, is so far short of, or contrary to, our utmost Endeavours to promote our own and the common Happiness of all, by those means which, by the Light of Nature, we know to be the most effectual. By this Method we sollicit to our Aid and Defence all rational Beings, whose joint Happiness is that common Good we are in pursuit of, who will therefore concur with us in the same Views, except they be blinded by some Passion, and have so far divested themselves of their Reason. If, thro’ any Inconstancy of Mind, we neglect this End, or hurt any one innocent Person, it is evident, that all are, in some measure, neglected and provok’d; for every one will have just reason to fear the same Evil at our hands, which we have done to the Innocent. And this Hobbes himself was aware of, in his Explanation of Compassion upon his own Principles, in his Treatise of Human Nature. In short, the Force of these Passions, Hope, Fear, &c. which may incline Men either to Peace or War, is to be estimated from the Force of those Causes, which excite those Passions in Men; for, since these Causes are Things good or evil, which our Reason judges possible or certain, in consequence of the Actions of other rational Agents, we can no otherwise know the Force of those Causes, than by considering the Nature of those Agents. Wherefore the present Question, when we are in search after a Rule of Action pointed out by Nature, is brought to this short Issue, whether, (without any regard to Civil Government,) it be manifest to Men, from such Knowledge of the Nature of God and other Men as is easily attainable, that they shall better consult the Happiness and Security of all, and of themselves in particular, by universal Benevolence, (which includes Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and all the other Virtues,) than by Hobbes’s “Anticipation” (explain’d by him in this Chapter) as “The most reasonable way for any Man to secure himself in this Diffidence of one another; that is, by Force or Wiles to master the Persons of all Men he can, so long, till he see no other Power great enough to endanger him?” I affirm it to be evident, that whoever best consults both his own Happiness, and that of others, will compose and settle all those Passions, which may stir up needless Quarrels and Disturbances, such as vain Hopes, Fears, &c. Nor is it less evident, that rational Agents are the principal Causes of such Happiness. Wherefore he takes the best Measures to obtain this End, who most effectually reconciles these Causes to himself, which he does, who accommodates himself to their most prevailing and natural Principles of Action, viz. the Power and the Will of acting according to Reason, by pursuing that Happiness only, which is connected with, and subservient to, the Happiness of All. Hence all may conspire and co-operate with us to the same end, securely, and without prejudice to their rational Desire of obtaining their own Happiness.
No one can rationally desire or expect, from external Causes, greater degrees of Happiness, than what may proceed from the nature of other rational Causes, (between whom and him the dependence is mutual,) and which is therefore consistent with that Happiness of them all, which they all naturally desire. But it is manifest, that this common Good of all is greater than the Good of any one, or of a few, as the Whole is greater than a Part; and that the like Sentiments in all other rational Beings, are the necessary result of the nature of Things.
Upon these Principles, those rational Beings, who have so far cultivated their own Understanding, as to know certainly that this common Good is the greatest, and that the adequate Causes thereof will effect the greatest Happiness of each Individual which is possible in Nature, will most assuredly pursue the same End with us, and will therefore be ready to assist us. Nor are these Principles of living happily so difficult to know, but that we may reasonably presume them, both understood and approv’d of, by almost all other rational Beings; or, at least; that they may be all instructed to believe these Principles, except it appear evidently, that they have entirely given themselves up to the Conduct of unreasonable Passions. These Propositions seem to me to have the greatest Evidence, little different from that of mathematical Axioms. “The good of the Whole, is greater than the good of a Part. The Causes, which most effectually preserve and perfect a Whole, or Aggregate, whose Parts mutually require one another’s Assistance, do in like manner preserve and perfect the Parts thereof.” The Aid of those, who do not acknowledge such first Principles of acting rationally, is either not to be sought after; or, if necessary, it is to be procur’d by the Assistance of those who do acknowledge them. On the contrary, Hobbes’s Anticipation endeavours to compel all others to things evidently impossible to be done, which they would therefore be as unwilling to undertake, as unable to execute; for, upon that Principle, every particular Person would endeavour to force all, to obey him only as his sovereign Lord. But since such Dominion of every particular Person is in direct opposition to the like Dominion of all others, it is no less impossible, that several such Dominions should at once take place, than that the Motion of the same Body should at once have a thousand contrary Directions. It is equally absurd to suppose, that Men should attempt such Impossibilities, after they clearly understand them to be such, as it is that they should effect them. These Observations, drawn from the nature of rational Beings, and from the practical Principles of a right Judgment, (which all rational Beings, as such, are endow’d with,) prove, that universal Benevolence is a more effectual means of Happiness, than Hobbes’s Method of Anticipation. I shall offer more that may be reduc’d to this Head, where I designedly treat of Human Nature.
Likewise, universal Experience confirms Men’s general Tendency, rather to Acts of Benevolence, than Malevolence.§XXXIV. I shall confirm what I have said, by the addition of only two Observations, confirm’d by the concurring Experience of all Ages.
First, Bordering States enjoy a greater Security and sweeter Fruits of Peace, by means of Alliances, which subsist only by Fidelity and some degree of mutual Benevolence, than when they are at open War, and practising upon one another by Force or Fraud.
Secondly, Even in civil Society there are numberless Cases, in which the Authority and coercive Power of the State cannot exert themselves, in which, however, we frequently observe, that Men mutually obey the Laws of Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and all the other Virtues, and much less frequently presume upon a liberty of hurting others, than is usual in a State of War. No one has greater Security, that his Life or Possessions shall not be wrested from him by the Perjury and false Testimonies of his Fellow-Subjects, than what arises from the Fidelity of Men, the Violation whereof the civil Magistrate can rarely detect or punish. But it is needless to add more in answer to what Hobbes has advanc’d, of the necessity or lawfulness of warring against all, from the nature of the Passions.
In pursuit of the same Point he advances a new Argument in these words: “The Desires and other Passions of Men are in themselves no Sin: No more are the Actions that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which, till Laws be made, they cannot know; nor can any Law be made till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.” I answer, that Actions forbid by right Reason, (which is the natural Law of God,) are Sins; tho Men do not see this Legislator, nor make him their Governor; provided it sufficiently appear to them, that he has a Right of Dominion over all, and that he has enacted those Laws. Both which Hobbes elsewhere often acknowledges. Altho here he affirms, that Men are not bound by Laws, to which they themselves have not given their consent. Certainly, since Sin is the Transgression of a Law, if it be prov’d that there are Laws of Nature, the Transgression of them will be truly a Sin, tho none had consented to the Authority of God enacting them. But because I have before prov’d this in a summary way, and shall do it more at large hereafter, there is no occasion to insist upon it here.
Which Hobbes offers to disprove; by pointing out what the Dictates of Reason are, from the practice of Animals void of Reason;However, I will not dismiss this Article of his Thirteenth Chapter, before I have advertis’d the Reader, by how strenuous an Argument Hobbes has confirm’d this his Position, of the Right of War of all against allout of the Bounds of civil Society; which, in the last Edition, he has added to the rest, near the Close, in these words. “But why am I at the pains to demonstrate to Men of Learning, what even Dogs themselves are not ignorant of, who bark at those who approach them, by Day at Strangers only, but by Night at all?” Notably argu’d! The Rights of Nature (that is, the Power granted by right Reason) are to be learn’d from the Example of Dogs void of Reason; they bark at all that approach them in the dark; therefore it is lawful for Men, in a State of Nature, to murder all, even their familiar Friends, whom they meet with by Day. Let Hobbists rather learn to warn others, by their harmless barking, to be upon their guard; but let them not, as he has instructed them, attack the unguarded by Force or Wiles: Let them learn to watch before their own Doors; but let them not invade the Rights of others. But it is time to dismiss such Levities.
And by falsly asserting, “That Justice cannot be the Quality of a man existing alone in the worldWhat he afterwards adds to the same purpose, has more of Subtilty in it. “Justice and Injustice are none of the Faculties either of the Body or Mind: If they were, they might be in a Man that were alone in the World, as well as his Senses and Passions: They are Qualities that relate to Men in Society, not in Solitude.” But what he would insinuate is false, if it be understood of a Society form’d by human Compact. I own indeed, that external Acts of Justice for the most part respect others, (tho it is possible for a Man to be injurious to himself;) but the Propension or Will, to give every one his own, (in which the Nature of Justice consists,) both may and ought to be in a Man in Solitude. Were there but one Man in the World, he might be dispos’d to allow others, whenever they should be created, equal Rights to those he claim’d to himself. Nor is there any reason, why such an Inclination should not be call’d natural, tho it could not produce external Acts, in a Man existing Single. As Hobbes himself (I believe) will not deny Man’s Propension to propagate his Species to be natural, as he is an Animal, tho he were suppos’d alone, as Adam was before the Creation of Eve.
Lastly, Hobbes, in order to support his Hypotheses, gives absurd Definitions of Right, and of Right Reason.§XXXV. Lastly, because Hobbes’s whole Hypothesis is built upon this one Principle; and (as I believe) he perceiv’d, that this Right of every Man’s warring against all, and of arrogating every thing to himself, was not very consistent with the true Definition of Right, which he himself had given in the Passage above quoted, therefore in the beginning of his Fourteenth Chapter of the Leviathan, he has given a different Definition of natural Right, thus: “The Right of Nature is the Liberty each Man hath to use his own Power as he will himself, for the Preservation of his own Nature.”Now truly, by the Name of Right, is to be understood, not the Liberty of acting according to right Reason, or any Law of Nature; but of acting any thing, as he will himself.
But lest Hobbes should seem too inconsistent, in order to reconcile him to himself, I will discover the truth of this Affair, which is, that by the Name of “right Reason,” he before understood, in his Treatise de Cive, “every Man’s own Opinion,” (as appears from his Note on c. 2. § 1.) not excepting what is most absurd, and contradictory to the Judgment of the same Person at another time, as well as to that of all others; and in this Sense, indeed, right Reason is consistent with every Man’s own Will: But neither right Reason, nor Right, are thus pliable to every Man’s pleasure. These are as inflexible as the Beam of the Balance is suppos’d to be; for right Reason consists in a rigid conformity with Things themselves, whose Natures are invariable, as I shall hereafter prove at large; and Right extends it self no farther than right Reason permits, or pronounces to be consistent with that End, which it proposes to all rational Agents. It is in vain, and without example, to affirm that any one has a Right to do those things, which are neither allow’d nor permitted by any Law. There is no doubt, but that Man has a natural Power, or Will, which he himself may determine to act which way he pleases. But when we are enquiring into the Right of Acting, the Question is, “Which, among those Actions which are in our power, are lawful?” Any Answer to this Question, without respect had to some Law, at least that of Nature, is absurd. Any one can either hang, or throw down a Precipice, either himself, or any other innocent Person; yet no one will affirm, that any one has a Right to do these things, because Right and right Reason which directs it, respect a good or true End, namely, that Happiness which is attainable consistently with the Rights of others, and the Means subservient to that End. But the Will of Man may rashly depart from both these. All others, if at any time they call Liberty by the name of Natural Right, understand a Liberty allow’d and guarded by the Laws of Nature. But if Hobbes pretends that he has a Licence to call such a Liberty of acting any thing at pleasure for Self-preservation, by the name of Right, (tho no one beside himself ever used that Word in this Sense,) because Philosophers are at liberty to limit the Significations of Words according to their own Definitions; this will be a sufficient Answer: Allowing his confining that Word to that Sense, in which he alone uses it, (for others are not oblig’d to make use of that Word in the same Sense;) it is incumbent upon him to prove, “That such a liberty of acting whatever he thinks fit for his own Preservation, does, or ever did, exist in that State”; or, “That there is nothing to forbid, and, consequently, to hinder Men so to act, laying aside the Consideration of Civil Laws.” I affirm, “That, even in that State, there are certain Dictates of right Reason, which God suggests, by the Nature of Things, to the Minds of Men, which denounce most grievous Punishments attending them, who attempt any thing, tho for their own Preservation, contrary to the common Good.” Nor is this a bare Assertion, I prove it undeniably.
Hobbes no otherwise proves, that such a Liberty, as what he calls Right, is granted us, than by affirming, that we cannot will to act otherwise; which is contrary to every Man’s manifest Experience. For my own part, I profess, that I can will to act otherwise, and believe, that great Numbers have willingly laid down their Lives for the common Good. So weak is this Foundation, which supports all the rest of his Morality and Politicks; so that all those Arguments, which I offer, in order to establish the Law of Nature, as it respects the Good of others, will prove that, even before the erecting Civil Government, it was not lawful for any one to preserve himself by the Violation of that Law: And they render ineffectual and ridiculous that unbounded Right asserted by Hobbes, which it will never be lawful to use, except when a Man’s Will is conformable to the Law, and consequently limited.
But to what purpose take I so much pains to prove this Right of acting arbitrarily against all, vain? since even Hobbes, tho in contradiction to himself, acknowledges almost as much; for he allows (c. 1. § 11.) “That this Right is unprofitable.” He himself, who had concluded the immediate foregoing Article with affirming, “That Profit is the Measure of Right,” does yet here immediately affirm, “That this Right,” which he had taken so much pains to establish, “is unprofitable.” Nay the very words, Right (as he himself has defin’d it) and unprofitable, (which he has join’d to Right in the Margin of that Article,) are inconsistent; for in both places he defines “Right” by “An Use of Liberty”: but he affirms, upon the same Subject, that no Use of Liberty consists in what is “unprofitable.” But right Reason does not use to tack together such contradictory Notions, nor is so regardless of Futurity, as to affirm that War to be necessary to every one’s Preservation, which it will immediately perceive to be destructive to all: Therefore Hobbes’s Reason, by which he endeavours to establish these Opinions, is not right.
I think our Author is abundantly too general in this Chapter of the Nature of Things; and that he should either here, or in his Chapter concerning Human Nature, or in that concerning Good, have shewn more particularly, “How the most of our Enjoyments are general or extensive in their Use,” and, “That publick and private Happiness are so interwoven, that the very Actions which promote the private Interest of any particular Person, do in all, at least in all common Cases, necessarily tend to the Advantage of the Publick: That our Possessions of all Kinds, our Lands, our Houses, our Money, are all enjoy’d by many”: And, “That it is not possible to confine them to the Use of one.” The very Clothes we wear are, in some measure, common in their Use: Nay, the very Food we eat is not confin’d to one, but returns to its Parent Earth, and there contributes to the growth of those Vegetables, which may, perhaps, serve for the Nourishment of the Inhabitants of the most distant Countries. Nay, the very individual Particles of Air we breathe, are not our Property, but perform the same kindly Office to Thousands. Our bodily Labour too is always general in its Use: We can’t so much as plant a Tree, or manure a Field, but Thousands reap the Fruit of our Labours; and tho our Labour be most extensive in its Use, yet we are utterly unable, without Assistance, to provide for our selves the most simple Necessaries of Life. The most ingenious Mechanick would not, perhaps, be able of his own proper Labour, to furnish himself out so much as a commodious Garment. Who, that but reflects upon the Number of Hands that one single Garment must pass thro’, before it becomes fit for Use, and upon the Number of curious Arts that contribute to its Perfection, (a competent Knowledge in none of which can be attained without the Industry of some Years:) Who, I say, that yields but the least Attention to these things, can doubt of our Dependence, nay, of the Necessity of our Dependence, on one another?
These things, which I but hint at, are, I think, worthy of the most serious Contemplation; and were they but fully laid open to our View, we should have a clearer insight into the Beauties of the moral World, and be at once fill’d with Love and Admiration of its Author.
The Force of the Reasoning, that is built upon the Observations that are above hinted at, may be thus express’d. It appears, from those Observations, “That the publick Good is, in the greater Number of Cases, most plainly connected with private Advantage. Therefore we have reason to believe, from the Uniformity of Nature, that there is the like Connexion in those other Cases, wherein, from our Short-sightedness into the Consequences of Action, we can’t perceive it with so great Evidence.”
Man defin’d, By the Word [Man], I understand an Animal endow’d with a Mind; and Hobbes himself, in his Treatise of Human Nature, acknowledges the Mind to be one of the principal Parts of Man. Natural Philosophers, both antient and modern, Des-Cartes, Digby, More, but especially Seth Ward, in opposition to Hobbes himself, have sufficiently proved the distinctness of the Mind from the Body, under which all the Animal Faculties are compriz’d; so that I should but light a Candle to the Sun at Noonday, in offering to add to their Arguments. However, I cannot but take notice, that Hobbes has unluckily stumbled at the Threshold of his Treatise de Cive, in reducing the Faculties of human Nature to four Kinds, bodily Force, Experience, Reason, and the Passions: For beside, that the first of these, bodily Force, contains all the rest, in his Opinion, who acknowledges no other Force, but that of Body; it is contrary to all Use of Words, to call Experience a Faculty of our Nature; whereas it is properly to be reckon’d among those things, which are accidental to our Senses, both internal and external, of which Memory is sometimes the Effect, tho it is not it self Memory, as it is by him defin’d, in his Treatise of Human Nature, Page 36. Nay further, it is well known, that things we have experienc’d, do sometimes slip out of our Memory: But, if by the word Experience, he understands a Habit acquir’d by Experiments, it is a mistake to reckon it among the Faculties; except he would reckon Geometry, a Knowledge of the Law; and other Sciences, both Theoretical and Practical, amongst our Faculties, because they are Habits. But this is not a Matter of sufficient importance to dwell longer upon: Let us rather a while consider the foregoing Definition of Man.
As Animal.By the word [Animal] I understand, what the Philosophers agree is to be found in Brutes, the Powers of receiving Increase by Nourishment, of beginning Motion, and of propagating their Species; and I also willingly so far allow them a sensitive Power, as we may bestow the Name of Sensation (in which I see no Absurdity) on the Motions impress’d on the Organs by the Objects, and thence transmitted, by the Nerves appropriated to the Senses, into the Brain, and sometimes thence communicated to the Muscles, where they excite Motion, or to the Heart or Lungs, and perhaps to other Intestines, by means whereof various Affections are excited. However, I suppose the Power of observing or distinctly perceiving these Motions to be peculiar to the Mind, so as freely to contemplate what in them, for example, determines the Figure of the Object, what, a Situation in the Object, different from that which is in the Retina; what, its Magnitude, what, its Motion; what in the Surface thereof, or what Refraction in the Medium, does so diversify the Motions of Light, as to exhibit all the various Phaenomena of Colours: for I do not see, what in the corporeal substance of the Brain can separate from one another all these (crowding at once into the Eyes, by means of the same percussion of the Rays of Light;) compare them with one another, and distinguish them; or what should hinder them from appearing always confused, as they are perceiv’d in the Camera Obscura, or in the bottom of the Eye of an Animal, whence they naturally rush at once into the Thalami of the Optick Nerves, which penetrate the inward substance of the Brain. But these are Matters of physical Consideration.
To the Mind we ascribe Understanding and Will; to the Understanding we reduce Apprehending, Comparing, Judging, Reasoning, a methodical Disposition, and the Memory of all these things, and of the Objects about which they are conversant: To the Will we ascribe, both the simple Acts of chusing and refusing, and that Vehemence of those Actions which discovers it self in the Passions, over and above that emotion or disturbance of the Body, which is visible in them.
Endow’d with Mind.In the Memory of Propositions, Theoretical and Practical, consist Habits, as well Theoretical, which are distinguish’d by the Name of Sciences, as Practical, which are called Arts. Here Ethicks, which is the Art of Living, or of directing the whole of all human Actions to the best End, comes under Consideration.
(Whence variety of Manners proceeds. See ch. 5. § 9.)§II. Here it may be proper to take some notice of the various Manners of particular Nations; nay, and of most Men too: for various Habits are acquir’d, partly from diversity of Disposition or natural Genius, more prone to Habits of some sorts than others; partly from the Temper of the Body, Climate, Soil, Education, Religion, Fortune, and kind of Business about which Men are employ’d. From Manners, thus procur’d, arises to Men as it were a second Nature; they are therefore to be consider’d in the framing Laws, and that so far, that very antient Laws, tho not in all respects, if consider’d in themselves, the best, ought nevertheless to be retained, were it but upon this account, that Men long accustom’d to them would not readily suffer better to be substituted in their stead, without publick Commotions, and, consequently, greatly endangering the Rights of all.
Man (notwithstanding Hobbes’s Assertion to the contrary) is rational, and fitted for Society, by Nature.I thought it also proper to observe here by the way, that I, (as all other Philosophers do,) in the following enquiry into the Laws necessarily connected and agreeing with human Nature, always understand or suppose human Nature as it is in adult Persons, who have a sound Mind in a sound Body; so far, at least, as is necessary to the exercise of Reason and Virtue: for Laws are not framed for Infants, Ideots, or mad Men; nor of such do we form Societies; nor therefore ought we, from their irregular Appetites and Actions, to form a Judgment of the Rights and Inclinations of human Nature. Tho, I think, what ever we perceive in them (after Maturity) agreeable, whether to the animal or rational Nature, that we may look upon as a Proof, that such Actions are very natural to Men; so in them we may perceive, both an expectation of Compassion from Men, and a Sympathy to be accounted for upon Principles which I shall afterwards explain, by which they rejoice with those that rejoice, and weep with those that weep. In vain therefore does Hobbes, (explaining the Reason why, in opposition to the Opinion of most Philosophers, he affirm’d Man not to be Ζωον πολιτικὸν, which he translates, “An Animal form’d by Nature for Society,”) bring this Proof for his Opinion, that since “civil Societies are Leagues, whose Obligation Infants and the unlearned are ignorant of; and whose Usefulness is not understood by those” (whom he afterwards affirms to be “very many, perhaps the Majority, thro’ distemper of Mind, or want of Discipline) who have not experienc’d the Damage arising from want of Society: Whence it comes, that those cannot, and these care not to enter into Society; yet these, both Infants and Adult Persons, partake of human Nature, therefore Man is not made apt for Societyby Nature, but by Discipline.” This is the Substance of Hobbes’s Annotation, these the words, tho somewhat contracted for brevity’s sake. I at present pass by his false Supposition, “That Societies are Leagues”; and that he sets Discipline, which entirely accommodates it self, and is subservient, to Nature, in opposition to Nature; for whatever we learn from others; they draw from their own Nature and that of the Universe. I here also affirm, “That Experience it self (for want whereof he accuses the Generality as unfit for Society) is resolv’d into Nature, which, without doubt, teaches whatsoever Experience testifies to be true.” Altho many acquire most of their Knowledge by words of arbitrary Appointment, yet the Ideas or Sense affix’d to these words, and Connexion of these Ideas, in which all Truth consists, are from Nature; whence they are the same every where, tho Languages differ. Hobbes, it seems, forgets here, where he sets Experience in opposition to human Nature, that he had before made it one of its Faculties. I would only observe, “That all Philosophers and Writers of Politicks, tho they were neither ignorant nor forgetful, how unqualify’d, Infants, and adult Persons of distemper’d Minds, were for forming Leagues, or doing the Duties of Society, have thought Man form’d by Nature for that, which, when come to years of Maturity, he was prompted to by Nature, except something preternatural, such as all Distempers of the Mind are, interpos’d.” The Observation of Juvenal is well known,
And Aristotle (Politic. 1. c. 2.) affirms, that “we ought to judge of Nature from her Intention or perfect State”; and it is certainly a childish Inference, favouring more of the Grammarian than the moral Philosopher; “Men are born Infants, therefore they are born unfit for Society.” This is much of a-piece with Hobbes’s accounting (in his Physicks) for the Noise of Thunder from the breaking of Ice, which, in spite of Staticks, he suspends in the Air in the middle of Summer. Altho the word Nature be deriv’d from Nascor [to be born,] yet it is well known, that by human Nature we mean that Force of Reason, whose first Rudiments only are to be found in new born Infants. So Man is by Nature fitted for propagating his Species, which yet neither an Infant, nor one whom Distemper hath render’d impotent, is capable of, nor any Person without the help of a Woman. So likewise, we call the Powers of Plants and Fruits to afford us both Nourishment and Medicine, natural, which yet are not to be found in them, upon their first Appearance out of the Earth or Trees, but then only, when the Sun and Rain have brought them to Perfection, and they have escap’d the Malignity of blasting Winds: but that Reason, nay right Reason, is a Faculty of human Nature, and therefore natural to us, Hobbes himself acknowledges in these words, “Right Reason therefore is a kind of Law, which may be call’d natural, since it is no less a part of human Nature, than any other faculty or affection of the Mind.” Yet the same Hobbes elsewhere denies this very thing; Leviath. c. 5. p. 21. where he says, “Reason is not, as Sense and Memory, born with us, nor gotten by Experience only, as Prudence is, but attained by Industry.” Let him free himself, if he can, from Contradiction. I will not therefore waste my time in proving what is self-evident; especially when I had before affirm’d expressly, that I consider’d the Nature of Man come now to Maturity, at which time Nature usually confers upon him the use of Reason.
Which suggests the Law of Nature in the same manner as it does the Art of Numbering;§III. I shall think that I sufficiently prove my Point, when I have made it appear, “That human Nature suggests certain Rules of Life, in the same manner that it suggests the Skill of Numbering.” All Men, when come to Maturity, except they labour under some Distemper of Mind, of their own accord reckon things by Numbers, adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing them, if the Numbers be small, without any Rules of Art. The Sentiments of all Nations are necessarily the same, concerning the Sum of two Numbers found by Addition, and concerning their difference by Subtraction, how much soever they may differ in the Names and Characters by which they express the Numbers, which every Nation fixes for it self arbitrarily. It seems to me, that all, in the same manner, under the same conduct of Nature, necessarily acknowledge, (1.) That the Good of all rational Beings is greater than the like Good of any part of that aggregate Body; that is, That it is truly the greatest Good: and (2.) That in promoting the Good of this whole Aggregate, the Good of Individuals is contain’d and promoted: Also, (3.) That the Good of every particular Part requires the introducing and settling of distinct Property in such Things, and such Services of rational Agents, as contribute to the common Happiness; that is, such as are necessary to testify the Honour we pay to God, or to preserve the Life, Health, and Faculties of every particular Man. In these three Propositions we shall find the Seeds and Force of all the Laws of Nature to be contain’d. Skill in Numbering is much assisted by Industry, by artificial Characters, and by their Places: but these very Helps we owe to Nature, as to their Original; nor can they ever cause that, which without Art we know to be true and of necessary use in Life, to become false or useless. “Whatever Assistance we may procure from Art, the whole Effect is to be ascrib’d rather to Nature than to Art.” Just as, after the Art of Cookery has fitted Meat for Nourishment, no one will deny, that we are nourish’d by the Power of Nature, otherwise Life it self were not natural.
The Mind is necessarily determin’d, in forming simple Apprehensions, in chusing Good, and refusing Evil in general.This I think proper to premise as a Postulatum, which, I believe, no one will think unreasonable, “That the Mind of Man, and every Faculty thereof, especially the Intellectual, is prone to such Actions as are proper thereto, as often as Occasion is offer’d, and Matter suggested, either from without, or from the Body united to it. ” It is confirm’d by continual Experience, “That the Mind (whenever Light, Colour, or Sound, is presented to it thro’ the Senses, the Eyes, for example, or the Ears) is immediately apt to observe what is offer’d.” And the Case is the same, in observing painful or pleasant Sensations, taking their rise from the inward State of the Body. Simple Apprehensions, the more obvious Comparisons of Ideas among themselves, and certain Judgments or Propositions thence form’d, are in some sort necessary; the evident Connexion between Causes and Effects does also lead Men to form Propositions affirming that Connexion; and they involuntarily return upon the Mind, when any occasion is offer’d from the inward force or vigor of the Memory; nor can the Will at all put a stop to such Actions, tho it may indeed promote them. For we can excite our selves to recollect those things which had almost slipt out of the Memory, and attentively to consider what our Senses had observ’d, and diligently to form Comparisons and Propositions from Ideas compar’d among themselves, to form Syllogisms from Propositions compar’d, and from these to infer new Conclusions. Every one come to maturity, in proportion to the natural vigor of his Mind, is by the same Nature spontaneously carry’d on to such Operations, at once with the greatest pleasure, and with absolute necessity. Into this natural Impulse, I would resolve most of those Propositions, which I call the natural Dictates of Reason, (namely, the primary and self-evident ones;) as also those Acts of the Will, which are conversant, either about Happiness in general, that is, about the whole sum of all possible good Things; (for there is in this Case no occasion for the Judgment to deliberate and compare, because Happiness is, as defin’d by Cicero, “A Collection of all good Things”;) or about those several parts of our Happiness, which are desirable for their own sakes; such are Wisdom, Health, the seeing a Light not too strong, and such other agreeable Sensations as come in our way. Nor do I suppose that Hobbes, the great Patron of all kind of Necessity, will contradict me here, who hath affirm’d, that all “Conceptions are nothing really but Motion in some internal substance of the Head; which Motion proceeding to the Heart, if it help the vital Motion, is called Delight, Contentment, or Pleasure; and, with reference to the Object, Love. But when such Motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital Motion, then it is called Pain; and in relation to that which causeth it, Hatred, which the Latins express some times by Odium, and some times by Taedium; and that this Motion is also a Sollicitation, or Provocation, either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, and is then called Appetite, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth, and is then called Aversion.” Human Nature, p. 69, 70. I do not indeed perceive any such Power of the material World over our Minds, that necessarily determines them by mechanical Principles; yet I concur with all Philosophers, that I know of, in affirming, “That the first Apprehensions of Things, and the desire of Good and aversion from Evil in general, are necessary”: for the innate Activity of the divine Nature of the Mind, permits it not to be perfectly idle; nor can it do any thing else than (as occasion offers) understand, chuse, refuse, and determine certain Motions of the Body, in order to obtain what it has chosen.
A distinct enumeration of those Powers of the human Mind, (which has greater Powers than what are necessary to preserve the Life of the Body,) which dispose Men, beyond other Animals, to enter into Society with God, and other Men;§IV. But because the Laws of Nature enjoin those things only, which proceed from innate Principles of Action, it is therefore proper to take a thorow view of the State and Power, both of the Mind and Body, separately and jointly, that it may thence appear, for what kind of Action Man is fitted by his inward Frame.
There are most evident Indications, that the Mind has much greater Powers, and is created for much nobler Purposes, than only to preserve the Life of one inconsiderable Animal; which I shall now endeavour to explain.
And here, in the first place, I must not omit its spiritual, incorporeal, and God-like Nature, which is capable of a better Employment than that of the Soul of a Swine, instead of Salt, to preserve a Carcass from Rottenness: For it may and ought to be observ’d in general, “That Powers of the Mind, far inferior to those which we find in Man, are sufficient to preserve Life for a long time”; which is evident in long-liv’d Brutes, nay, and in Trees, as the Oak, whose long continuance in a flourishing State is even without Sense, much more without Reason: Nay, “That the Sagacity of our Mind does not consist in discovering what kinds of Nourishment, Medicines, Exercise, &c. are most conducive to our long continuance in this State,” for even the best Physicians are strangely at a loss in these Particulars; but, “That it rather excels in those Qualities, which relate to the Knowledge and Worship of a Deity, and to Acts moral and civil.” But Dr. Ward, now Bishop of Salisbury, hath excellently manag’d this Argument, beyond any other, whether antient or modern, Philosopher, and vindicated it from the Objections of Mr. Hobbes.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to lay before the Reader some Powers and Actions of the Mind, whence it may appear, “That it is naturally fitted to become a Member of the greatest Society, (consisting of all rational Beings with God at their head,) and that it neglects its principal use, and loses the best Fruits of its natural Disposition, if it do not enter therein”; and that for a better Reason, than we affirm that the Earth (which here spontaneously produces Ears of Corn, and there Fruit-Trees) is naturally fit to encourage and reward the Industry of the Tiller; for Soils have their different natural Dispositions. The human Faculties are so fitted for Society, that it appears, (1.) “That all Men can both know and observe the Laws of Nature, which must in the first place be evident, because otherwise both the Admonitions of others, and our own Endeavours would be vain: (2.) That the Observance of those Laws is in it self pleasant and grateful; that the Precepts which point out to us such a Method of Action, for this very reason that they lead us to things naturally pleasant, promise a Reward to Obedience; and that a suitable Practice brings along with it no inconsiderable Advantage, namely, that Pleasure or part of our Happiness, which is necessarily contain’d in such natural employment of the human Faculties, as leads to the best End we can propose in Life, and to the fittest Means to attain it”: for all exercise of natural Powers, especially of the highest Order, in which we neither miss our aim, nor turn out of the direct Road, is naturally pleasant; nor can we conceive any other pleasure in Action, except what arises from Actions of this kind.Freedom from Evil, and from Uneasiness, and grateful Impressions of some kinds, may be effected in us by external Objects; but no other Pleasure can take its rise from within our selves, than what either immediately or mediately depends upon such kind of Actions as I have now been describing. This is the only Happiness to which moral Philosophy directs us; nor can we be instructed how to obtain that, which in no sort depends upon our own Actions and Faculties. Hence it follows, “That the more things there are in the human Faculties, fitted for the knowledge and observance of the Laws of Nature, and consequently for the Practice of Virtue, so much greater are the Rewards annex’d to such Actions of the Mind, or, a Happiness so much the greater and more peculiar to Man, may be obtain’d by acting virtuously”: For each Faculty is render’d happy, by those Actions tending to promote the publick Good, to the exercise whereof it is fitted by Nature; for I shall shew hereafter, “That Happiness’s proceeding necessarily from such Actions as take their rise from Nature, is a most evident natural Proof, that it is the Will of the first Cause to oblige Men to such Actions, or that he enjoins them by his Law.”
Which Powers are, 1. Right Reason. 2. The Power of forming universal Ideas, Judgments from them, and consequent Volitions, and of representing these Ideas by arbitrary Signs, i.e. Words.I have selected as fittest for my purpose,
First, Right Reason, and the Standard of its Rectitude;
Secondly, Universal Ideas, (such, for example, as that of human Nature in general,) and the Judgments or Propositions thence arising concerning the Properties agreeing or disagreeing with those Ideas, and general or undetermined Acts of the Will agreeable to, and consequent upon, such Judgments. Hither also is to be referr’d the power of appointing arbitrarySigns, such as words spoken or written, accommodated to such universal Ideas, Propositions and Volitions. For Speech, because it is a help to the Memory and Reason, is rather subservient to Virtue, than Vice; to Society, than Sedition. Hence arises the power of forming general Rules of Life or Action, from Ideas of Actions agreeing in their general Nature with the Idea of human Nature: But such Propositions are more easily remember’d, if they be express’d in Words accommodated to this purpose, and to the Ideas of the generality of Mankind, and be applied by common Consent to express them. Thence are form’d Rules common to many, or publick Laws, which, as the State of Affairs happens to require, may be enacted, abrogated, or alter’d: As a Physician may justly prescribe to the same Patient, at different times, sometimes a slenderer, sometimes a more plentiful, Diet, now Restoratives, and then evacuating Medicines.
3. The Knowledge of Number, Measure, and Weights.Thirdly, The knowledge of Number, Measure, and Weights, and consequently the power of collecting many Particulars (lesser good Things, for example) into one Sum, and comparing the same with one another, according to their Difference and mutual Proportion. Hence Man can discover the chief Good, that is, the Collection of all good Things, and a comparative Good, perceiving one Good to be greater or less than another; and can subtract some from others; and is able to estimate the Proportion between things equally and unequally Good. To direct such Actions in such manner, as that they may best promote the best End, is the business of all the Laws of Nature.
4. The Power of observing and establishing Order.Fourthly, The Power (nearly related to this) of either observing Order already established, or of establishing it, in the Conduct of our Affairs, and of knowing of how great moment it is in uniting several Powers, in order to produce the same Effect, especially the common Good, as we may observe in modelling an Army or Common-Wealth. Whilst I was more attentively considering this Subject, I imagin’d, “That the best way of distinctly knowing the Nature and Force of Order, was to consider it in the most simple Matter, that shews its most simple Effect.” But I no where meet with Order in a more simple Matter, nor a more simple Effect thence demonstrable, than that Geometrical Order of right Lines and compounded Motions, whence Descartes has demonstrated (Geom. 1. 2.) that his Geometrical Curves might be generated. For he has there prov’d from Analytical Principles, “That the Nature and Properties of a Line describ’d by compounded Motions, is not subject to accurate Calculation or Demonstration, unless all the other Motions, in subordination to one another, be regulated by one.” What he has observ’d concerning a Line, the most simple Effect of compounded Motions, holds equally true in all Effects, depending upon the Concurrence of many Causes; namely, that it is necessary, that, among such Causes, some should be regulated by others in a certain Order, and all by one supreme Power; otherwise it will be uncertain, what Effect will follow from their Concurrence; and so either no End will be procured by the common Assistance of them all, or by Means which we know not, whether they be proper or no. By means of this Knowledge, and from the Train of subordinate Causes, which we perceive by our Senses, the Mind comes to a more distinct Knowledge of a first Cause, which is God the Governor of the World, who is able to foresee, what will be the Effects of the power of all rational Agents, placed and acting in a known Subordination; both which Considerations will have a natural Tendency to persuade Men, to consider themselves, both in their Thoughts and Actions, as subordinate Members of the most enlarg’d Society, in which all are contain’d, as it were in the Kingdom of God.
5. The Power of the Mind, to raise, stop, and moderate the Passions.Fifthly, From these arises that exalted Privilege belonging to the Mind of Man, of great force to establish and preserve this Society, namely, the Power of the Mind, to raise, stop, and moderate the Passions, and to direct them to desire greater Good, and to avoid greater Evil, than what any other Animal is capable of knowing; because we comprehend good Things, both more in number, and universal as to extent, their Sums, and their orderly Series; and we are conscious, that we can divert our Minds from such Thoughts and Affections as respect only our own private Good, and fix them upon the Care of the Publick Good, in which Liberty principally consists. I will not meddle with the Disputes about Liberty, which have been handled by others. This seems to be beyond all Controversy, “That the Nature of Man has so much Liberty, that he is determin’d to nothing (in external Actions, such as are Contracts, their Observation and Violation) without using his own Judgment, in forming which he may call in the Aid, not of the Senses only, but of the Memory; and to consider, Is this which I am going to do, consistent with the publick Good, which except it be preserv’d unviolated, the Happiness of particular Persons cannot be secur’d? Is this consistent with the well-grounded Motives of Virtue? &c.” I have observ’d that even Hobbes’s Politicks do, and that justly, suppose this Postulatum, “That Men may agree among themselves, or covenant, to transfer their Rights to another Person, for the common Good, (c. 5. §. 6.)” tho elsewhere he contends, “That they can regard nothing but their own private Good.” But since there is naturally in Men so large and noble a Faculty, which can both comprehend and pursue that vast Good, the greatest united Happiness of all rational Agents, the Reader will easily judge, whether the greatest Happiness of every particular Person does not consist in the perpetual vigorous Exercise of that Faculty. I do not contend that this Faculty is any thing distinct from the Powers of the Understanding and the Will: It is sufficient, if from the Concurrence of them the Power I have mention’d, arises. Every one sees, how immediately this Power of the Mind disposes or qualifies Men to restrain themselves from any sudden Sally of Passion, and to conform their Manners to the Laws, first of Nature, then of the Society; and, consequently, to establish at once the greatest and strictest Society of all rational Beings. Concerning right Reason and universal Ideas, I think proper to treat more at large; it will be sufficient to handle the rest briefly.
Of right Reason, (which consists, as well of selfevident Truths, as of Conclusions thence deduced, and stored up in the Memory;)§V. We must treat of right Reason the more particularly, both because what is right discovers both it self and what is crooked; it holding the same Rank in Morality, that Health does in Physick, the knowledge whereof is prior and more distinct in the Order of Nature, than the Theory of Diseases: and because Hobbes agrees with other Philosophers, that it is the Rule of human Actions, even before Civil Laws are fram’d; (See de Cive, c. 2. §. 1. and the Annotation.) And, if he will be consistent with himself, we shall not differ much with him about its Definition. For c. 2. §. 1. in a Parenthesis (which he seems to place there for a Definition) he hints, that it is “Truth inferr’d from true Principles by right Reasoning.” But I think that, in this Argument, the notion of right Reason is somewhat more extensive; for it comprehends, as well first Principles, or self-evident Truths, as Conclusions thence form’d. The Etymology of the Word [Ratio] favours this Sense, which implies only a Proposition, that is rata, i.e. certain, unchangeable, and agreeable to the Nature of Things, whether it be self-evident, or prov’d by the help of an inference. Custom also, which is the Rule of Language, favours the same Sense of the Word; for all acknowledge the most evident Propositions, (such as “It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to beat the same time”) for the Dictates of Reason, no less than those which require proof. Nor do I believe that Hobbes himself will oppose this larger Sense of the Words. I agree, however, with him, that by right Reason is not to be understood an infallible Faculty, (as he affirms many, but I know not who, to understand it;) but yet by it is to be understood a Faculty, not false in these Acts of judging. Nor is it properly understood to be an Act of Reasoning, (as he too rashly asserts,) but an Effect of the Judgment; that is, true Propositions treasur’d up in the Memory, whether they be Premisses or Conclusions, of which some that are practical are called Laws; for Actions are compar’d with these, in order to examine their Goodness, not with those Acts of Reasoning which discover them; yet I willingly allow, that these Acts of Reasoning are also included in the Notion of right Reason.
Of which, not every Man’s proper Reason, but the Nature of Things, is the Standard.But that which he immediately adds in the Annotation, (in order to give a Reason, why, in his Definition of right Reason, he lays down “every Man’s proper Reasoning as the Standard ”) is most false. “Out of civil Society, where no one can distinguish right Reason from wrong, except by making a Comparison with his own, every Man’s proper Reason is to be esteem’d, not only the Standard of his own Actions, which he does at his own peril, but also the measure of other Mens Reason with respect to his Affairs.” For, out of civil Society, any one may distinguish right Reason, without making a Comparison with his own. Because there is a common Standard, by which every Man’s own Reason (or Opinion) and that of others, is to be try’d, namely, the Nature of Things, as it lies before us, carefully to be observ’d and examin’d by all our Faculties. That is the Rule with which all, both Premisses and Conclusions, are to be compared, whether form’d by me or by any other Man, or by the Commonwealth it self, after it is form’d. For it is most certain, “That the Truth or Rectitude of Propositions concerning Things and Actions, present or future, consists in their Conformity with the Things themselves, concerning which they are form’d.” For since all our Ideas, or simple Apprehensions of Things, are the Images of those Things, (and the Truth and whole Perfection of Images consist in their exact Correspondence to the Objects they are design’d to represent;) and since true Propositions are the joining, by Affirmation, of Apprehensions impress’d upon the Mind by the same Objects, or the separating, by Negation, of Notions representing different Objects; it is necessary, that their Truth and Rectitude should entirely depend upon their Conformity with the Things themselves; as all agree, that the Truth of simple Apprehensions is to be deduced from that Standard.
This therefore is beyond Controversy, “That the Man who judges of Things otherwise than they are, does not judge according to right Reason, or does not make a right use of his Judgment; but that he pronounces according to right Reason, who affirms or denies, as Things really are.”
Wherefore such Propositions only are true, as agree with the Nature of Things.§VI. Nor is it material in this case, “Who it is that judges otherwise than the Thing really is, whether a sovereign, or a subordinate, Judge”; because the Truth, or Rectitude, of a Proposition in no respect depends upon the Order established amongst Men, but only upon the Agreement there of with the Things, concerning which a Judgment is made. Nor is it any Proof of the contrary, that there are some Mathematical Propositions, and others of like kind might be invented, which may be called true, tho there be nothing in Nature, to which they are conformable. For such conditional Propositions, because they pronounce nothing concerning Things without the Mind, are not to be compar’d with them; for their Truth consists only in an Agreement among the Terms, of which they are compos’d; and that is all which is to be look’d for in this Case. But these are of no use in human Life, except we find something external done, or possible to be done, which differs in nothing considerable from our Ideas. If their Subject, or something extremely like it, cannot exist, the Propositions are trifling, and are only equivocally called true. For the Truth of Propositions, which consists only in the Agreement of the Terms, if the Terms themselves cannot exist, is not of the same nature with that, which affirms the Agreement of Terms, possible, at least, if not present or future. The former kind of Truth is perfectly useless. However, let this Point be determin’d as it will, this is clear, “That a Proposition, whose Subject does or will exist, that is, whose Subject is conformable to Things without the Mind, which either now are, or hereafter shall be, does require, that what is affirm’d of that Subject should be conformable to the same things; and that therefore the whole ought to agree with the Nature of Things without us”; which is the principal Point I at present contend for.
It is also certain, “That every particular Man, and his Right over Things and Persons, whatever it may be, is not something merely chimerical and fictitious, but to be consider’d as something real, and existing without the Imagination”: because the Rights of particular Persons relate to the use of Things, and to Effects grateful to Men; and therefore the Truth of Propositions, or of the Dictates of Reason, concerning them, does necessarily consist in their Conformity to the State of Things; which is what I would lay as a Ground-work, in order to overthrow Hobbes’s Fundamentals: for it hence immediately follows, “That contradictory Propositions, concerning the Right of any two to the same Things or Persons, cannot be the Dictates of right Reason”; which is the Foundation of Hobbes’s Scheme.
An Explanation of practical right Reason, which points out the end, and the means thereto;§VII. I think it proper to observe here, by the way, “That by the Dictates of practical Reason, I understand Propositions, which point out either the end, or the means thereto, in every man’s power”; for all Practice is resolv’d into these: and, “That practical Reason is then called Right, when it determines truly, or as the thing is in it self, in Propositions declaring what is every man’s best and most necessary End, and what are the most proper Means of obtaining it”; or (which comes to the same thing) which pronounces, according to Truth, what Effects of our own Counsel and Will will render our selves and others happy, and how we shall, with the greatest certainty, produce them; just as in Geometry, that speculative Reason is right, which affirms a Quantity, which is really in its own Nature greater, to be greater, than another. And that practical Proposition is right, which teaches that method of constructing Problems, which if we pursue, we shall really produce the effect propos’d. Nor is an Opinion, or Proposition of this kind, truer, when affirm’d by a King, than when by a Subject. Since then all right Reason is conformable to those things, about which we have form’d a Judgment, since each thing is, in its nature, but one, and uniform with it self; it follows, “That right Reason in one cannot dictate that, which contradicts right Reason, concerning the same things, in any other Person.”
And is uniform and consistent,From this Principle follows that Precept of universal use, concerning the Actions of all Men, That human Actions ought to be uniform and consistent with themselves, thro’ the whole course of every Man’s Life; and that he cannot act always agreeably to right Reason, who, as Horace expresses it,
It is included in the Notion of a true Proposition, (a practical one, for instance,) and is consequently a necessary Perfection of a Man forming a right Judgment in that Affair; that it should agree with other true Propositions framed about a like Subject, tho that like Case should happen at another time, or belong to another Man: And therefore, if any one judge, “That his Act of taking to himself the Necessaries of Life, not yet possess’d by any other, would promote the common Happiness”; it is necessary that the Judgment, “That the like Action of another in like Circumstances, would equally conduce to the same End,” must be undoubtedly right.Forming like Judgments in like Cases, whether our own, or those of other Men. Whoever therefore judges truly, must judge the same things, which he thinks truly are lawful to himself, to be lawful to others in a like Case. In the same manner, whatever Assistance any Man rightly and truly believes, he may or ought to demand according to right Reason, it is equitable, and consequently a Dictate of right Reason, that he should think, that any other in like Circumstances justly may or ought to demand the like help from him.
The reason of Hobbes’s making so gross a Blunder in this Argument, was, because he did not observe, “That there was the same Standard to all, by which the Reason of every one is to be tried, whether it be right or no”; namely, the Nature of Things, especially, of the End necessary to all rational Beings, and of the Means naturally leading thereto.
(To which sight Reason, and consequently to God, its Author, Hobbes imputes Contradictions;§VIII. We may observe here, by the way, how honourable Hobbes’s Sentiments are concerning God, ruling naturally by the Dictates of Reason; that is, that God, instructing Men in the Laws of Nature by the Dictates of right Reason, does enjoin Contradictions; that he first tells us, “We must fight against all, and so engages Men in a War, in which all that fall, are unjustly murder’d on both sides, because they claim only their own Rights”; that afterwards, “By the same right Reason he forbids War, and commands us to relinquish those very things, which yet he affirms are justly to be retain’d, and defended by the Sword, because they are Rights”: For he must necessarily ascribe to God all those Contradictions, which he imputes to the right Reason (as he calls it) of Men, contradicting one another with relation to the Necessaries of Life; for he affirms, that “God rules by this Reason, as by a Law,” and consequently, that he permits all those things which Reason permits; and teaches that all those things may be done consistently with his Laws, which right Reason has taught may be done, by natural Right. For Hobbes himself does not extend “Right” (where he purposely defines it) beyond “the Liberty of using our Faculties according to right Reason.”
It is hence evident, “That God, according to Hobbes, first gives a Right to invade the Properties of all others, that his right Reason includes a Licence to commit any Crimes, and then involves all Men in the Miseries of a destructive War.” But after he has render’d Men miserable by the Evils of Wickedness and War, he points out a somewhat better road to Justice, such at least as may be sufficient to avoid the Punishment of the civil Power; and then at last endeavours to bring over wretched Mortals to such a Peace, as that Justice would establish.
Whereas right Reason judges alike in all.)That Reason, which I acknowledge as Right, first examines all the Parts, both of our own and others Happiness, and foresees, at a great distance, the Causes thereof that are lodg’d in our own Power; then, perceiving them in their own Nature so interwoven, that a prudent care of our own Happiness cannot be separated from the pursuit of the Happiness of others, that is, of the common Society of all rational Beings, it determines, that the strictest Justice is to be cultivated, with respect both to God and Men, and presages, that the Fruit there of shall be a most happy Tranquillity. By the same Reasoning it foresees, that the Actions of Men, who arrogate each all things to himself, or are guilty of such Practices, will involve all in War and extreme Calamities; and that so evidently, that there need not for Information be made so rash and fatal an Experiment. Therefore it will never allow a Right to act in such a manner; but, on the contrary, it will command Men to contract Friendships, to establish civil Government where it is wanting, and to preserve it when establish’d; that not only those Miseries of War, which it forsees may arise from the Folly of some Men, may be avoided, but the greatest Assistances to the most perfect Virtue and Happiness be procur’d. Hobbes therefore thought that this would be done, (and that necessarily too,) because he did not observe, “That there was the same Rule (the Nature of Things) for all, by which the Reason of all ought to be tried, whether it be right or no.”
Here, I think, the fundamental Corner-Stone of the Temple of Concord is laid by Nature; for hence is deriv’d that Law of Nature uniting all rational, or wise, Beings (for Reason in perfection is Wisdom) among themselves, and with God as the wisest; which is thus express’d, Whoever determines his Judgment and his Will by right Reason, must agree with all others, who judge according to right Reason in the same Matter. Whence it also follows conditionally, (which I shall afterwards prove from proper Principles,) “If any right Reasoner, any wise Person, shall assign to each his proper Office, in order to the publick Good, all others who judge rightly, shall approve of the Distribution.” But of this more hereafter.
How to prevent false Reasoning.§IX. I shall hereafter observe, “That, in order to preserve our Reason right, we ought not only to avoid false Deductions, but especially the rash Admission of any thing as self-evident, without proof.” And we ought to take care, in the first place, “That our simple Ideas be both clear, from strong and frequent Impressions of the same thing known in various Circumstances; and distinct, by a separate Observation of the Parts singly; and adequate also (as far as we can) by the Assistance of the Memory and Understanding, added to the Discoveries of Sense.” It is to be observ’d, “That in these external Impressions there can be no Falshood, properly so called.” The Unwary, indeed, take occasion of judging falsly, from the Distance, the Refraction, or the tinging of the Rays of Light in the Eyes of Persons infected with the Jaundice: but if all things in the Medium between the Organ of Sense and its Object be consider’d, as they ought, before we pass a Judgment, (to this Head is to be referr’d the Temper of the Blood, that of the Animal Spirits, and the Brain;) we may avoid falling into Error. In the Medium are the partial Causes of the Impressions made, and they are therefore necessarily to be consider’d. What is more, before we determine any thing concerning the Sameness, and Connexion, or the Diversity, and Opposition of the Terms, they are most carefully to be compar’d with one another; and we ought to take care, especial care, when we contemplate the first and most universal Truths, not to give our Assent to any Proposition, without the strongest and most inevitable Necessity; for Truth depends not on our Will, but upon the Connexion of Things, and of those distinct Ideas, which are impress’d upon us by Things; but what we perceive, we necessarily perceive, whenever the Faculty is attentive, altho that Attention generally depends upon our own Will: and upon this Rule depends the main Point now in dispute. For since the whole Truth of affirmative Propositions consists in the Connexion of two Terms; and since these are naturally connected, because both Terms are imprinted upon the Mind by the same thing, and are evidently Representatives of one and the same Thing under different Respects; it is evident, “That Truths depend, not upon the Will of Men imposing and connecting Names arbitrarily, but upon the Natures of Things delineating their own Representations upon the Mind. But whatever Motions are impress’d upon us by the Nature of Things, are necessary, and proceed from the first Mover, the Author of Nature; so, consequently, do all those Ideas, which, impress’d upon the Senses and Imagination by a Motion evidently natural, represent practical Truth to the Mind, concerning Actions most conducive to the common Good. Truths of this kind are natural Laws, as I shall hereafter prove; and their Impression upon the Mind is the Inscription and Promulgation of Laws; and they may for the same reason be affirm’d to be by the first Mover imprinted upon us, (by means of the Nature of Things;) that speculative Axioms (such as, “Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference of the same Circle are equal”) may be truly affirm’d to be necessarily planted in our Minds by the First, thro’ the intervention of Second, Causes. Justly therefore may we ascribe to the Law of Nature the words of Demosthenes, which Marcian, in the Pandects, has inserted into his general Description of Laws, that it is “The Invention and Gift of God.” They, who do not acknowledge the Proof of a Deity from the Necessity of a first Mover, (which Hobbes however acknowledges,) take away the most antient, and, in my Opinion, the strongest, Prop of Religion. Nevertheless, if they own the Proof of a God from that Order which is visible in the World, the mutual Relations of Things, and the Beauty thence arising, or from this, that they perceive so many of them design’d by Nature for our Use, as their final Cause, they will be oblig’d, by this our Argument, to acknowledge God as the Author of all necessary Impressions.
To which we are never necessarily determin’d, Judging, Willing, or Acting, wrong, being owing only to an Abuse of Liberty;§X. This Observation, concerning the Truth of simple Apprehensions, or of all natural Impressions, seems to me of so great importance, that I will venture thence to conclude, that “Neither does our own Nature, nor that of Things without us, ever necessarily or unavoidably determine us to form a false Judgment, nor, consequently, to chuse or act amiss”; which always proceeds from the Uncertainty or Error of the Understanding Whatever, at any time, we judge, chuse, or act, contrary to those Notices, which a thorow Examination into the Nature of Things affords; that I think wholly owing to a hasty, rash, and unseasonable Use of Liberty, which is generally deluded thro’ the Sollicitation of a present Advantage, and incites the Judgment to determine Points not yet sufficiently clear’d up. “All Truths, (even in Morality,) which are unchangeable and never deceive, are owing to Nature, and to a Necessity of assenting to things evident. And to Nature they only (exclusive of Errors) are to be ascrib’d, if we would not be injurious, to our own Faculties, no one of which ever necessarily determines us to embrace a Falshood; to natural external Agents, that cannot deceive; and, to God himself, to whose Nature it is a Contradiction to suppose him willing to deceive us.” We thus determine upon these Points, on better Authority, than Physicians, who call only those Motions of the Humors, for instance, Natural, which tend to the Preservation and Health of the Individual, calling the rest, which tend to Disease and Death, Preternatural; and with Reason, because by Nature here they understand the Nature of the Individual, whose Preservation is the End of their Art: Yet they will not deny the most fatal Alterations of the Humours, to be according to the universal Laws of Nature. But, in Man, the Error of the Judgment, and Perverseness of the Will, are neither agreeable to the Nature of the Individual endeavouring its own Perfection, nor proceed from any necessary influence of things external upon him; but first from mere Inadvertency and Rashness, afterwards from Habits or Example, the Imitation of himself or others. Hobbes is therefore very unfair, who proposes whatever Transaction he has observ’d among Cabals of Villains, as a momentous Discovery in human Nature, and a Foundation of a new Set of Politicks.
And human Judgment acting most agreeably to Nature, whom it approaches nearest to Necessity.I am of Opinion, that not only speculative Axioms, but the first Principles of moral Habits are thus necessary. It is sufficient, indeed, that those Dictates which determine many particular Actions, as they are circumstanc’d, are supported by probable Reasons, such as the Weakness of our Mind, which cannot examine all things present, much less foresee all the Consequences of the present Action, can attain, whilst urg’d by an immediate Necessity of Acting. Those things which proceed from Examination and cautious Deliberation, from Experience, and the faithful Testimony of competent Witnesses, such are Civil Laws and Precedents, or Cases adjudg’d in Courts of Judicature, make the nearest Approaches to Necessity. We ought therefore to form a Judgment of the Inclination of human Nature from these, rather than from the rash Actions of Men. For Deliberation, Experience, and all the other helps to discover Truth, do continually bring us nearer to that State of Mind, by which, because of the Influence of Things upon it, it cannot think otherwise than it does think, which is the Case, when it judges from the Evidence of Sense, or clear Demonstration: And thus the more necessary and unavoidable any Judgment is, so much the more natural, or approaching to what is natural, it is to beesteem’d. Hobbes, on the contrary, forms a mistaken Judgment of human Nature, from rash Actions, as absurdly, as if we were to judge of the Nature of a Tree, from the fungous or mossy Excrescencies sometimes growing to its Bark.
2. Of universal Ideas,§XI. 2. Next comes under Consideration, that peculiar Power of the human Mind, by which it forms universal Ideas, omitting those Accidents, by which particular things are distinguish’d. Hence arises a great help to the Memory, and consequently to Prudence thence arising; nay, to every Virtue, as connected therewith, and to every Action and Habit, which ministers Steadiness, Beauty, and Happiness, to human Life. For the Mind can easily apply to innumerable Individuals and their various Circumstances, Properties agreeing to one or a few Natures consider’d in themselves, whether those Properties respect their inward Frame, or their Causes and Effects: Hence all Sciences take their rise, as compos’d of Universals. By the help of these, Abstracts, and the chief Heads, of Natural History are easily collected; whence (to omit other Advantages) we readily learn what things are necessary, to preserve and perfect, both our own Nature and that of others. In like manner the Precepts of Arts, since they too are universal, compendiously instruct, by what means any Persons, whose Faculties are capable of them, shall or may attain the Ends by them propos’d. So Logick, Physick, Ethicks, (or the Art of Morality,) the Arts of Navigation and Architecture, do not instruct one particular Person only, how Aristotle, for example, shall direct his Reason, in one Affair, to the Discovery of Truth; or Hippocrates preserve, or recover, his own Health; or Palinurus reach one Port only; but they instruct all Artists without distinction: They consider the End, and, consequently, the propos’d Good of every Man in general, chusing, and prescribing the use of, Means as general; and, therefore, both they who teach, and they who learn, these Arts, first contemplate these general Precepts. Which proves, by the way, that Men not only can, but that in all Arts it is their universal Practice, to respect a general Good, earlier than their own: Altho nothing hinders, but that Hippocrates, applying his general Precepts to a particular Case, may preserve his own Health, for instance, as well as that of others; and Vitruvius may build himself a House, as he had done before for others. It is of this further Advantage to observe these universal Ideas and Propositions, both Speculative and Practical, which are naturally form’d by the Mind of Man, because from such universal Notions are form’d Unchangeable, and consequently in some Sense Eternal, Rules of human Action. In the following Sheets, I shall lay before the Reader many such Propositions or Rules, whence he may distinctly perceive, what those universal Notions are, of which they are form’d; and how peculiar they are to the Mind of Man; and how much they promote Religion, civil Government, and the Peace and Commerce of different Nations.
And Speech, which is compos’d of Words, which are the arbitrary Signs of universal Ideas.But first I must make a few Observations on the Power and Inclination of the Mind of Man to form Words, spoken or written, and other arbitrary Signs, by help of which it may either recollect, or communicate to others, its Notions, both universal and particular. This remarkable Difference, between Men and other Animals, contributes much both to the forming and preserving Societies: The great Agreement observable among Men, in the use of such Signs, will easily be accounted for, if we consider (as becomes Christians) what the sacred History informs us, “That all Mankind have sprung from one Original,” so that Eve might, without Difficulty, have used words in the same Sense that Adam first appointed them, and their Posterity might suck in their Signification with their Mother’s Milk. But if Hobbes would rather consider them in his State of Nature, as suddenly sprung out of the Earth (like Mushrooms) of full Growth, and without any Relation to one another; even in that Case Reason would persuade them, that many, (namely, all those who wanted to maintain a mutual Intercourse,) might agree in the same words, or other Signs, to express the same things. Nor was it at all of any Consequence, who first express’d this Idea or Thing by that Sign; but it would greatly concern them all, to agree among themselves in some common Marks of their Ideas, by help whereof each particular thing might be made known to all. Hereby each Person, by communicating his Observations to others, is enabled to “Improve their Minds with a further Degree of Knowledge”; so that the Experience and Endeavours of the present Age may point out to the succeeding ones a shorter way to Prudence and Happiness, and by a more easy Method produce in them all kinds of Virtue; hereby Men are inabled to “Debate concerning Covenants, and Laws, to be made,” to “Promulgate such as have been agreed upon,” to “Examine, whether they have been observ’d”; to“Produce and receive Testimonies”; and to “Give Judgment according to the Proofs.” Hobbes himself will not deny, both that these things are peculiar to human Nature, and that they fit Man for Society.
Of the Reflex Acts of the Mind, and of Conscience.§XII. Shall I not reckon among the Perfections of the human Understanding, that it can reflect upon it self? Consider its Habits, as Dispositions arising from past Actions? Remember and recollect its own Dictates, and compare them with its Actions? Judge which way the Mind inclines? And direct it self to the Pursuit of what seems fittest to be done? Our Mind is conscious to it self of all its own Actions, and both can, and often does, observe what Counsels produced them; it naturally fits a Judge upon its own Actions, and thence procures to it self either Tranquillity and Joy, or Anxiety and Sorrow. In this Power of the Mind, and the Actions thence arising, consists the whole force of Conscience, by which it proposes Laws to it self, examines its past, and regulates its future Conduct. Nor appear any Traces, in other Animals, of sonoblea Faculty. Great are the Powers of this Principle, both to the Formation and Increase of Virtue, to the erecting and preserving Civil Societies, both among those who are not subject to the same Civil Power, and among Fellow-Subjects. And, indeed, the principal Design of this Treatise is to shew, “How this Power of our Mind, either of it self, or excited by external Objects, forms certain universal practical Propositions, which give us a more distinct Idea of the utmost possible Happiness of Mankind, and pronounce by what Actions of ours, in all Variety of Circumstances, that Happiness may most effectually be obtain’d.” For these are the Rules of Action, these are the Laws of Nature.
I will here add nothing to what I have already mention’d of the Knowledge of Number, Measure, Order, Free-Will, &c. altho these be both peculiar to Man, and are very material in the present Argument.
Indications enforcing universal Benevolence, from a Survey of the human Body, considr’d.§XIII. I will now apply my self to the Consideration of the Human Body, in which I meet with several things worthy of Observation for my present Purpose, which are usually neglected, or at least omitted, by others who have handled this Argument.
For, since the Life, Health, and most perfect State, of the human Body, which can be acquir’d, (every thing else being regarded according to its Value or Dignity,) is part of that End which right Reason proposes to its self, and its Powers and various Uses are Means highly useful to the whole Man, both to procure the Improvement of the Minds of Individuals, and to promote the common Good; it is impossible, but that the Consideration thereof must suggest somewhat useful to direct us in the Choice of the supreme End, and in the Application of the Means; but in Dictates concerning that End, and the Means conducing thereto, does the whole of the Law of Nature, whose original and principal Parts I here propose to enquire into, consist.
In the first place, I think that this may be affirm’d universally, That whatever (1.) demonstrates, from the divinely-contriv’d Make of our Body, “That the whole possible Happiness of Man depends upon many Causes, the chief whereof are Rational; and that, therefore, it cannot reasonably be expected but in conjunction with the common Happiness”; whatever (2.) proves further, “That every one can, by the proper Power of his own Body, effect somewhat, by which this common End may be promoted, and the Assistance of others procur’d, and that, by his Endeavours of this kind, every Man will procure to himself the greatest Happiness in his Power”: That demonstrates certainly, “That the Nature of the human Body affords a sufficient Indication of our Obligation to such Endeavours.” And this will appear plainly, from the Consideration of natural Obligation, and of Law, which I shall afterwards explain.
Further, the more evidently and constantly the Manner and Method is pointed out, according to which it is necessary, in order to our own Happiness, that we should co-operate with others to procure the common Happiness; and the greater any one’s Powers are, or the stronger his Inclination to such Actions; so much the easier it is to pay this Debt due to the Publick, and the Crime the greater, which is committed by the Breach of the Commandment; and from hence our clearer and stronger Obligation to such Actions may with the utmost Certainty be inferr’d: For these Reasons I thought it proper to propose some Indications of this kind, taken from the human Body. The Observation and Sagacity of others will add more, or will pursue these Hints further.
In the human Body are to be consider’d, (1.) What belongs to it as Body; (2.) What it has, as a Body endow’d with Life and Sense, like other Animals; (3.) What are peculiar to it self.
I. As a Body in General, I. It has these things in common with all other Bodies.
1. Having its Motions, necessary for its Preservation, dependent upon, and limited by, the Motions of other Bodies, especially those of other Men.1. That all its Motions, and consequently those which preserve its Life, Health and Strength, (whose Preservation each Person proposes to himself as a principal part of his End,) proceed from the first Mover, and are necessarily complicated with, and in some measure depend upon, innumerable Motions of other corporeal Parts of the same System. Among these are chiefly to be consider’d the Bodies of other Men, and their Motions which can limit ours, and are govern’d by Reason, which we have just ground to hope may be brought to concur with our Reason.
2. That its Motion (as that of all other Bodies) is propagated far and wide, and does not perish, but concurs with other Motions to perpetuate the Successions of Things, or to preserve the Whole.2. Being equally able to promote those Motions in other human Bodies, which are equally necessary for their Preservation. And as the first Observation instructs us, “That our private Good depends upon common Powers”; so this second Observation proves, “That the Powers of particular Persons may be of publick and most extensive Advantage.” The former forbids, “To hope for the Happiness of particular Persons separately from the Good of the Whole,” and consequently points out “The common Good” as “The fruitful Cause of private Happiness”: the latter shews, “That the Pursuit of the common Good will not be in vain, because it conspires with the Endeavours of the whole Universe.” In both these complicated Motions, namely, that, by which almost all Things concur in some measure to the Preservation of any particular Body for some time, and that, by which any particular Body concurs with others to the Preservation of the whole System, a certain Order is preserv’d, by which some Motions are determin’d by others in a continued Series, and all are govern’d by the continued circular Motion of the whole System. I need not any particular Hypothesis concerning the System of the World, to prove what I have advanc’d concerning the necessary Order, and the Powers of complicated Motions; for these are demonstrated from geometrical Principles, which no Hypothesis can hurt. Tho a Contemplation of this kind may at first seem merely speculative, yet it is not without its Use in human Affairs; for hence we know distinctly, and from general Principles, “How necessary a certain Order among Causes which act by a corporeal Force, is, that many of them should conspire to produce any Effect foreknown and design’d in the Mind.” It further shews, “How we may judge with Certainty, which Cause has contributed more, which less, to the Effect design’d.” Whence the value and worth of Causes, with respect to any Effect, is fix’d and determin’d by their proper and natural Force; and, consequently, we are instructed by the very Nature of Things, both, “Which Causes are more highly to be valued, upon account of what they have already effected,” and, “The Aid of what Causes we ought chiefly to sollicit, in order to procure what we farther desire.” We thus come to know, “That those Causes, which Philosophers call Universal, (such as the Motion of the Aetherial Fluid, & c.) but chiefly the first of them, God, are the principal Sources of the common Good, which we either all enjoy, or which we expect from the Nature of Things.” We thus also know, “That Motions of Bodies ever so little subject to the Determination and Direction of the human Will,(too mit the Consideration of those which are exempted from it,) when govern’d by the universal Benevolence of all rational Beings towards all, are the principal Causes of the publick Happiness of all, whence is deriv’d the private Happiness of each.” For universal Benevolence is the Spring and Source of every Act of Innocence and Fidelity, of Humanity and Gratitude, and, indeed, of all the Virtues by which Property and Commerce are maintain’d. They are govern’d by it, as particular Motions are determin’d by the universal Motion in the System of the World; or as all the Functions of the Spirits, Bowels, Vessels, and Limbs, in the Body of an Animal, proceed from the general Motion of the Blood. If we embrace this Opinion, from a thorow Examination of the Nature of Things, it will doubtless oblige us to pay Obedience to all the Laws of Nature, and to take diligent care, that the same be paid by others: This is the utmost we can do, to make our selves, as well as others, happy; nor can Reason propose to any one a greater End.
Knowledge, and the Use of Signs, in Mankind, consider’d as a corporeal System, supplying the want of Contiguity in communicating Motion.§XIV. However, in this Comparison of the Aggregate of Mankind, as they act by a corporeal Force, with the natural System of Bodies, I am not ignorant of this wide Difference between them, “That the Effects of Systems merely corporeal, are perform’d, not without Contiguity between the Bodies moving and moved, for the most part without Sense, but always without the interposition of Counsel and Liberty; whereas Men act often at a considerable distance, and make much use of their Reason and Liberty.” It is, nevertheless, likewise evident, (1.) “That the corporeal Force of all Men, when it is exerted, is subject to the same Laws of Motion with other Bodies”; and, (2.) “That the force and necessity of Subordination between the Motions arising from Man, is the same with that which is among those of any other Bodies”; whenever many Men co-operate to any Effect which relates to others, (which they daily practise more than any one can “be well aware of”:) with respect to these two Points only, I propos’d the foregoing Comparison; which, therefore, was made and apply’d justly. I will, upon this occasion, venture to go farther and affirm, “That, because Men have frequent Opportunities of meeting, by which they mutually profit or hurt one another, and many ways of doing, by Words or Actions, good or harm to Persons at a great distance, especially, if Men form Schemes for the Conduct of their Lives, (which it is certain every one naturally and constantly does, because every one desires that all his future Existence should be happy”;) I will venture to affirm, I say, “That the whole Race of Mankind ought to be consider’d as one System of Bodies, so that nothing of any Moment can be done by any Man, relating to the Life, Fortune, or Posterity of any one, which may not some way affect those things which are alike dear to others; as the Motion of every Body, in the System of the World, communicates its Motion to many others, especially neighbouring ones.” For that vast Privilege of extensive Knowledge, with which Men are endow’d, supplies the want of Contiguity, which is requisite in other Bodies, to the Communication of Motion; for Men are excited to Motion by the least Signals, whether Natural or Arbitrary, by which they quickly perceive what has been, or ought to be, done by other Men at the greatest distance. What is more, they retain a Memory of those things, done either to themselves or those who are dear to them, and by it are excited to take the first Opportunity of Retaliation; they are also naturally provident, and presage, from what has been done to others, what is to be expected by themselves, and those they love; and this induces them to many things, with a view to prevent Evils, and to create a probable Prospect of very remote future Advantages. This Remembrance of Things past, and Foresight of Things to come, are the Reason why Men, at a distance, are more mov’d by what is done to others, than inanimate Bodies are by the Motion of neighbouring ones, which act nothing, except they be present: for from these they immediately and justly conclude, “That being like in Nature and Condition, with respect to Necessaries, they also are to expect like things.” Thus they cannot but be affected with those Actions of any towards others, which, if often repeated, or copied after by others, naturally work a considerable Change (either for the better or the worse) in the Condition of Men in general.
I own, however, that all are not equally affected with such Actions, but some more, some less, according to their different degrees of Sagacity, in apprehending the Causes or Hindrances of the common Good. Nor is the Influence communicated from some Men to others, by such Actions as respect the common End of all, for that Reason less natural, than that between Bodies of the same System with respect to natural Motions, which are communicated to more subtle and fluid Matter in a greater, to grosser Matter in a less, degree. It is sufficient, that “To perceive in Men a Likeness of Nature and Condition with respect to Necessaries,” and “To infer from what is done to others, what we are to hope or fear will be done to our selves,” are Acts, Natural and Universal, and not of less Efficacy to influence Men, than mutual Contact between Bodies moving and moved, is to communicate Motion among the Parts of a corporeal System. I will infer no more from hence, than what is otherwise evident, and seems to be naturally accounted for upon these Principles, that all Men may hence learn, “That their Security from Evils, and their whole Prospect of Assistance from others, in their pursuit of Happiness, necessarily depend upon the voluntary Assistance of many, who do not less stand in need of many others, that it may be well with them.” Whence we are immediately oblig’d to acknowledge, “That the mutual good Offices of all are useful to all.” Just as natural Bodies in the same System cannot perform their Motions, unless other Bodies concur with, and give place to, them.
From the Necessity of mutual Offices it follows necessarily, “That he that would, to the utmost of his Power, provide for his own Happiness, must, according to the measure of his Ability, procure to himself the Benevolence and Assistance of all others.” Every one may easily know, that he has Power to confer upon others Assistance and innumerable good Offices, and to conspire with the whole System of rational Beings to the same End, and in pursuit of the common Good: but, on the contrary, that he can no more compel so many Causes, which are singly of force nearly equal with himself, to lend him their Assistance, and at the same time to relinquish and neglect all natural Endeavours to promote such things as are necessary for themselves, than one Pound Weight can, in a just Balance, raise a Weight of some thousand Pounds in the opposite Scale. For all Struggles between Men, by force merely corporeal, are perpetually determin’d according to the natural Laws of Motion; all which Laws Wren and Huygens have shewn how to exhibit by the Beam of a Balance, suspended either upon a single Center, or upon two Centers at equal distance from the Center of Gravity. Nor is the Cunning or Craft of any one above all the rest, of so great Powers as to force the Beam, which is depress’d by the real Necessities, Powers, and Counsels of a great Number, toward the common Good, to incline to the contrary Part, that is, to the private Advantage of any particular Person. Wherefore it cannot but appear evident, from the general Nature of human Power, “That we can more surely procure its Assistance, by promoting the common Good, than by Force and Fraud, or a savage Rapaciousness”; to which, according to Hobbes’s Doctrine, (in the Epistle dedicatory to his Treatise de Cive,) even good Men must have recourse in a State of Nature; and their natural Right resto perve themselves, makes it no Vice.
Which is illustrated from the known Laws of Matter and Motion.§XV. Our Opinion seems to be much illustrated by the general Principles of Mechanical Philosophy, (the only Principles Hobbes himself seems to me to agree to,) which inculcate this principally, as necessary in every Hypothesis, “That the Motion of the corporeal World, dispersed thro’ the several Parts thereof, is preserv’d by that mutual Communication, Cession, Acceleration, or Retardation, of all Motions, which the Powers and Impulses of every particular Body, reduced to an exact Calculation, require: yet so, That the Motion of the whole System about the common Center, (which is compos’d as a whole, of the Motions of every particular Body added together,) is preserv’d always without In terruption or Alteration, and determines and adjusts the Motion of all its Parts.” All Bodies have the same Power and Necessity to continue in Motion, which is in each proportionable to their Quantity of Matter, or their Bulk and Solidity compar’d together: but even this Force is subordinate, in every particular Body, to the Motion of the whole System; and is therefore it self, as well as the whole, preserv’d by that which determines it. Thus the Motions of particular Bodies agree with the general Motion of the Whole, and are subservient thereto; and that general Motion of the System governs and preserves the Powers of all particular Bodies, in the most effectual manner, by the Nature of things consider’d, either together, or each by it self; which Nature consists in perpetual Motion and Change. All things are so order’d, “That not the smallest Quantity of Matter nor Motion may be lost,” which is demonstrated from Mechanical Principles; and universal Experience, and the most authentick Histories of past Times, witness, “That the same Kinds of Animals are perpetuated, and their Numbers rather increas’d than diminish’d, notwithstanding the fierce Passions of some few Animals.” In this Perpetuity of Matter and Motion, and of the Kinds of all things continued by a Succession of Individuals, consists the Preservation, or natural Good, of the material Universe, which is promoted, according to the unchangeable Laws of Motion. Nor can any sufficient Reason be assign’d, “Why the Preservation of Mankind should not be look’d upon as establish’d and continued by the force of Causes equally certain and natural, as the Successions of any other Animals, which entirely depend upon the unchangeable Nature of the material World, and the necessary Laws of Motion, since they perfectly agree in all that is essential to an Animal.” Certainly the Conjunction of the Mind with the Body, very often makes its Condition better than that of Brutes, but never worse; which will be evident to any one who considers, what Advantages the Body receives from the Conduct of Reason, which abundantly compensate some Mischiefs, which happen to the Body thro’ the Error of the Mind: nay, it is certain, that the Errors of the Mind about Food, Pleasure, and other things which relate to the care of the Body, proceed from hence, that the Mind, regardless of the Admonitions of its own Reason, gives way to the Appetite, and the corporeal or animal Affections.
Whence it appears, that the common Good is the noblest Effect possible, and inseparable from that of particular Persons.These Observations, concerning the necessary Causes of the Preservation of the corporeal Universe, and (to omit other things) of the several Kinds of Animals, and consequently of Mankind, make such Impressions upon the Minds of Men, as these which follow, and conduce much to our present purpose, viz.
1. That the Preservation (or common Good) of Mankind is a matter not only possible, but that it depends upon so many Causes, so certainly determin’d, that we have the greatest reason to believe, that it will undoubtedly be perpetuated, notwithstanding the malevolent Endeavours of any to the contrary.
2. That this Effect is both in its own nature the most noble, and most closely united with the Preservation, and possible Happiness, of every Individual.
3. That the Matter and Motion of all particular Bodies, and, consequently, of Men themselves, is, in some measure, naturally and necessarily subservient, whether they will or no, to the Preservation of the corporeal Universe, (which includes human Bodies,) namely, as every particular Body is determin’d in its own Motion, by the general Motion of the whole System, by which it is perpetuated.
Does not the Nature of Things, and consequently God its Author, powerfully persuade and command an Endeavour to promote the common Good of Mankind, by every Indication they give, that it is both a possible Effect, and the greatest; and also more closely united with the private Happiness of every one, than any other Effect which we can foresee as possible, and by making us in some degree to promote it necessarily, even then when we give way to our natural Affections, and oppose it to the utmost of our Power? Is it not evident, that he acts most agreeably to practical Reason, and to the imprinted Ideas of the Causes of both publick and private Good, who promotes the first Attempts of corporeal Nature, and exalts them to a greater height, by the additional Force of the human Mind?
Which is effected by the Subordination and balancing of Powers.But this seems to be sufficiently evident to all, especially because the whole Operation of the Mind, necessary to compleat human Happiness, may be deduced from what I have said concerning the manner in which the corporeal World is preserv’d; for it consists in these two Things, (1.) That the Endeavours of all particular Persons toward their own Preservation be made subordinate to such Endeavours or Actions as are evidently necessary to the Preservation of the Whole. (2.) That by this Method those Powers of all Individuals, necessary for Self-defence, be so pois’d, that no one can be destroy’d by any other, to the hazard and damage of the Whole. Something like these is observable in the Motions of the Mundane System, which arises from the Plenitude of the World, and the Contact of Bodies, and therefore extends it self to them all. It is the work of the Mind and Reason to observe, “That every one’s proper Happiness depends in a nobler manner upon the voluntary Actions of other rational Agents, even at a great distance”; and therefore to take care, “That all human Actions do in like manner contribute to the common Good of all rational Beings; as the Motions of all Bodies contribute to the Preservation of the corporeal System.” This we shall effect, if these two Things which I have now mention’d, be observ’d in all voluntary Actions which respect others. Thus therefore we are instructed by the Nature of things, “How to promote the common Happiness, and our own, which is necessarily included therein”: which is the same as to say, “We are taught what Actions are commanded by the Law of Nature.” And certainly all prudent Persons, in all kind of Deliberations, where Civil Laws take no place, or leave the matter to every Man’s own Determination, naturally fix their Eyes on these things, and can agree among themselves upon these things only, which serve to promote the common Good of the Parties consulting, and so to balance the Powers of all, that it may be every one’s Interest, that no one have Power to oppress another. Thus, among all neighbouring States, who are not subject to the same Government, this is the chief View in all Embassies, Covenants, and Leagues, so to balance the Powers of every particular State by mutual Assistance, that it should be difficult for them to destroy one another, but sufficiently easy to preserve, and, in some measure, enrich, themselves, which was the End of first erecting Civil States.
Which is illustrated from the Consideration of the Nature of Government,§XVI. In like manner, at the first Establishment of any Commonwealth, the Powers of all Orders and Parts are mutually balanc’d with the greatest Exactness, and are all subjected to the supreme Power, so as to be able mutually to assist, but hardly to hurt, one another. Nay, further, the Preservation of the Commonwealth, both from seditious and internal Evils, and from foreign Invasion, is only a continued Establishment of the same Balance of Power, and proceeds from Causes plainly alike. Moreover, whenever new Laws are to be enacted, or old ones to be amended, or receive an equitable Construction, all wise Men will ever have recourse to the Principles I have mention’d; and, universally, in all Cases where civil Laws are silent, or cannot bring a seasonable Relief, or where they allow a Liberty of acting, to Persons, whether in a publick or private Station, (which Cases, as Hobbes himself owns, are almost innumerable,)natural Rules of human Actions can be taken from nothing else, than from the Consideration of the common Good, as the End, and from the Advantage of preserving that Balance of Power, which either Nature hath made, or the Constitution of the Commonwealth hath establish’d.
And of the System of the World, without assuming any particular Hypothesis.Tho’ I own, that the Power of Order and of conspiring to one common End, and also the Necessity of a Balance of Power in all Parts of any System, in order to the Preservation of the Whole, both may be, and usually are, observ’d in the Frame, whether Natural or Artificial, of such things especially as are most obvious, without any Skill in Mathematicks, and the mechanical Philosophy of the System of the World; in like manner, as much is discover’d concerning the Numbers and Magnitudes of Things, without any other Arithmetick and Geometry, than what is learn’d by common Experience only, without the Help of Books: Yet I thought it proper, in this stricter Research into the Nature of Causes, where we are endeavouring to obtain an exact Knowledge of the whole Matter, sometimes to have recourse to those Sciences, in which these Notions are most distinctly explain’d, and in so general a manner, that they may, with great Advantage of Illustration, be thence easily apply’d. So it is usual to have recourse to the artificial Rules of Arithmetick and Geometry, when any Difficulty arises relating to those Things, whose Number or Measure we have guess’d at by the Help of natural Sagacity only, or when we have occasion for an exact Computation. I chose to illustrate the present Argument by the Example of the System of the World; both because some general, tho confus’d, Notion thereof is always present to the Minds of all, and imprints upon them some Idea of the greatest End, the common Good, and of mutual Assistance, as the only Means to obtain it; and because, from those general Motions of the System of the World, (of which only the Learned frame a distinct Idea,) the Powers, Orders, and Limits, of all lesser Motions, as from the most general Causes, are deduced; so that, in this Enquiry into Causes, we can never stop, till we arrive at the First Causes among those which are created, which lead us immediately to God. But let it suffice, to have hinted these things in general; from them it easily appears, “That those Powers, which, consider’d either singly or jointly with others, are very unequal, may yet be conveniently enough balanc’d among themselves in the same System, to the Preservation of the Whole.” I thought it proper, not to make use of any particular Hypothesis, with respect to the System of the World; both because the Resemblance between the Manner and Causes, by which this material World and Mankind are preserv’d, does not extend it self to all Circumstances, (which is not necessary, in order to the Mind’s learning something, which may be of publick Advantage;) and because what I have advanc’d is so manifestly true, that it must be admitted in every Hypothesis: Lastly, because to have added more, was not necessary to those who are conversant in Natural Philosophy, and to others it would be unacceptable, and seem impertinent.
II. As a Body, endow’d with Life and Sense, like other Animals.§XVII. II. That Power and that Necessity of being subservient to the Motions of innumerable other Bodies, which I have shewn, from the general Nature of Matter and Motion, to be in all Bodies, as long as they continue in Motion, are found likewise in human Bodies, and seem to persuade, and readily incline, each particular Person to lend his Assistance to Mankind. But if to these we add those things which distinguish the Nature of Animals from other Bodies, they will more strongly incline us, and will lay before us a sufficient Reason, why we should be chiefly sollicitous to assist those of our own Species, with little comparative regard to other Bodies.
Bodies Animate are distinguish’d from Inanimate, by that Temper of Parts, and Configuration of Organs, which are sufficient for Nutrition, Generation, Sensation, Imagination, Affections, and voluntary Motions; and all unanimously agree, that, by these Actions, all kind of Animals endeavour their own Preservation, and Perfection, or Happiness, for the time appointed by the universal Causes of the World. Nor is it difficult, in some measure, to explain the Power and Causes of this Endeavour, from the Observations of Anatomists and Physicians, on the Circulation of the Blood and other useful Juices, and on the spreading of the Nerves thro’ the whole Body of Animals, together with what Natural Philosophers have thence deduced, concerning the Causes of Hunger and muscular Motion; but it is not worth while to insist upon the Proof of Truths universally acknowledg’d; from these, as allow’d us by our Adversaries, it will be proper to draw some Inferences, which may make for our present Purpose. Such are,
First, “That, from the same inward Frame of Animals, which determines them to Self-Preservation, there are beside afforded manifest Indications, that their behaving themselves innocently and beneficently towards Animals of the same Species, is necessary to their own Preservation and happiest State”: and then,
Secondly, “That, from the Concurrence of the same internal Causes, Animals cannot but be sensible of, and retain in Memory, these Indications.” The former of these summarily includes the Precept and the Sanction of the Laws of Nature; the latter respects their Promulgation, or the manner by which they become known: There fore both these must be explain’d in their proper order.
Whence the first Indication to Benevolence is this, That Men, being Animals of the same kind with other Men, have therefore their Appetite of Self-preservation limited in like manner; which is therefore very consistent with a Permission to others of the same Species, to preserve themselves likewise.In the first place it offers it self to our Observation, “That the Bodies of each Animal are contain’d within very narrow Limits, and that the time of their possible Duration is but small”; which is a sufficient Indication, that each has occasion for a few things only, in order to its Welfare; or that, if some sort of concurrence of many things be necessary, it is no other, than what may at the same time be communicated to many. Hence they are by Nature induced to desire but few things for them selves separately, and to desire those things in common with others, whose Use may conveniently be common to many, such as Air and Light. The same Surface of Skin, which in every Animal limits the spreading and circulation of its Blood, by the same Power, sets Limits to those Necessities, which urge it to Self-preservation. All the Necessities of the Body are enclos’d within the Circumference of the Circle describ’d by the Blood of that Animal: Those few things which are sufficient to fan and repair this vital Fluid, are sufficient to the Preservation of Life, Health, and natural Strength. The Quantity of that Juice is very small, which, by twitching the Stomach and Throat of an Animal, excites Hunger and Thirst; and it therefore needs no great Quantity of Meat and Drink to rebate its force. Lastly, the Capacity, of those Vessels in which the Nourishment is prepar’d and fermented, of the Chyle-Vessels, and of the Veins and Arteries receiving it, is fill’d by a Quantity so determin’d and small, that I believe it evident, that no Animal, even of the Brutekind, ever fell into Hobbes’s Error, so as to think all things necessary to its own Preservation.
It is hence evident, from the inward Frame of Animals, “That it is necessary to their Preservation, that they take to themselves only a few things, to satisfy their Hunger and Thirst, and to repel the inclemency of the Weather, and leave the rest of fruitful Mother Earth’s abundant Productions to those others, to whom they may be useful.” Thus the Quantity of the Bodies of Animals, which is naturally limited, limits their Appetites, to seek only a few things necessary for themselves, leaving the rest to the use of others; whence naturally arises some kind of division of Things, among several Animals, in which is laid the Foundation of that Concord and mutual Benevolence, which we are inquiring after. For on this very account, that Self-Love, which is natural to Animals, is limited and satisfy’d in the manner I have now shewn, there is no inducement to their opposing the Preservation of others, either by debarring them from a free use of what is not necessary to themselves, or even by refusing to lend them their Labour, when it is of no further use to themselves; but they are rather, on the contrary, thence dispos’d to assist others; whether from the Pleasure, tho it were not suppos’d very great, which they receive from the Society of others, and the present Happiness thence arising; or from the Hope of their afterwards rewarding them with the like Assistance. Animals (I believe) are sensible, I am sure Men cannot be ignorant, that when once they have provided themselves with Necessaries, there remains nothing that can be of greater Advantage to them, than Tranquillity, and the Society of Animals of their own Kind, which can be procur’d or preserv’d, only by Benevolence towards them.
Secondly, That Likeness of Images, by which Animals of the same Species are represented, disposes them to Affections, like to those, by which they are inclin’d to their own Preservation.§XVIII. We may take the second Indication, from the Effects of the Senses, Imagination, and Memory, when they are employ’d about Animals of the same kind; for those Impressions, which, made upon the Senses of Animals, discover others to have a Nature very like their own, passing immediately into the Brain (where they goby the Name of Imagination) dispose them to Affections towards those of their own kind, like those they bear towards themselves, and that from the Constitution of their own Nature. Here I will industriously avoid all Controversies, concerning the Knowledge of brute Animals, of what Kind it is, and of the manner how the Affections are mov’d by the Imagination; I take this only for granted, “That the Imagination excites the Affections,” and “That a like Imagination (as such) excites like Affections.” The latter is a Consequence of the former; whence I would infer only thus much, “That a known Likeness of Natures, when discover’d, does somewhat promote Benevolence among those who are alike, except it be join’d with some unlikeness more strongly enforcing Enmity.” To this it is owing, that Animals cannot wholly forget others of the same Kind, whilst they remember themselves. For like Animals (as far as they are such) are represented under the same Image; they also cannot but know, that they are subject to like Hunger and Thirst with themselves; and that they are therefore equally urg’d by Nature, to seek Nourishment for themselves; and that therefore it is pleasing to them, when they are permitted a free use of it, or when they are assisted in procuring it. Because Animals have perpetually such Images of others of the same Kind, and some benevolent Efforts thence necessarily arising from the Condition of their Nature, it follows, “That their natural Disposition is so far thwarted, as any thing contrary to such natural Efforts proceeds either from Madness or Pleasure, or any violent Desires or Passions”: As all look upon it as a Dies temper, and praeter natural Disposition of a Dog, who, thro’ Rage or Madness, is unusually excited to bite every other Dog he meets. Nor can I see any Reason, why all kinds of Affections, which so disturb the Oeconomy of any particular Animal, as to hurry it on to Actions destructive to Animals of the same Species, (such as Malevolence, Envy, violent Fits of Anger, &c.) should not be look’d upon as certain Distempers of the Blood, and Brain perhaps, and somewhat a kin to the Rage of a mad Dog. Such Affections are attended with manifest Symptoms of Distempers, an overflowing of the bilious Juices, a dangerous Effervescence of Blood, a Jaundice Colour, Paralytick Tremblings, and other such Effects, well enough known to Physicians. Nor is raging Anger against Animals of the same Species, the only Passion which turns to a formal Disease; an excessive Fear of them is no less Praeter natural; that is, it is no less different from that Manner of all Animals, which arises from their natural and found Disposition; and, like other Distempers, it prejudices their Health by reducing them to Sadness, Solitariness, and unseasonable Watchings, with the other Symptoms of a predominant Melancholy, which hastens untimely Death; nor can any Measure or Bounds be set to this Fear, which is rooted in a false Imagination and Opinion, that all other Animals of the same Species, are naturally and necessarily inclin’d, to hurt, and fight against, them.
The Condition of such Animals, (and such Hobbes feigns all Men in a State of Nature,) is perfectly like the wretched State of those, who are seiz’d with a Hydrophobia; they are afraid of Water and all Liquids, without which, (tho they sometimes hurt accidentally,) Life cannot be supported. And as this Opinion proceeds not from the Nature of the Water, but from an Imagination disturb’d by the Bite of a mad Dog, so it proceeds from a distemper’d Brain and Imagination, that any Animal is afraid of its whole Species, when in reality there is nothing pleasanter to those whose Brain is not disturb’d. It is too well known to need Proof, “That Animals, if by any Accident they have for some time been separated from others of the same Kind, as soon as they have come within sight of one another, even at a distance, immediately rejoice, shew their Joy by Gestures, run to one another, and with Pleasure eat, drink, and play together, but very seldom fight with one another; and, if at anytime they happen to fight, that immediately after a Victory, for the most part obtain’d without any Damage, the same Animals herd again very lovingly and peaceably together.” But because it is evident, “That the Causes of their thus peaceably associating and agreeing with one another, which are essential to Brutes, are plainly necessary; nor other than those, by which their Blood, Spirits, Brain and Nerves, are preserv’d in a sound State”; it thence follows evidently, “That the Health of every one of them cannot be separated from an Inclination to associate friendly with those of the same Species, but is easily and naturally preserv’d therewith”; which was what was to be prov’d from this second Indication, which is common to all kinds of Animals, and consequently to Men.
Thirdly, The Love Animals bear to those of their own Species, is a pleasant Affection, and its Exercise therefore closely connected with that Self-love, which is common to all Animals.§XIX. Near of kin to this is the Third Indication, taken from the Pleasantness of those Affections, which are conversant about Good common to many: This is of near Affinity with the precedent, because the Rise, and all the Powers, of the Affections, depend upon the Imagination. Natural Philosophers very well know, “That the Motion of the Blood and Heart, which is necessary to Life, is befriended by Love, Desire, Hope and Joy, especially when conversant about a great Good; whence the Arteries and Veins are fill’d with better and more flowing Juices, brisker Spirits are produced, and the whole Circulation, and consequently all the animal Functions, perform’d with greater Ease.” Nor is it less evident, “That the Good, which is known to extend it self to very many, (among which the Animal it self, concerning which we speak, is comprehended,) will upon this very account appear the greatest.” Wherefore it self will necessarily be much befriended by those very Affections, by which it befriends other Animals of the same kind with it self: And for this very Reason, that it has naturally a perfect Sense of this Effect in it self, it will have a strong Propension to those benevolent Affections, as very useful to, and intimately united with, its own Preservation, and a natural Reward will follow such Affections. I affirm’d indeed, that every Animal perceives this agreeable Effect, or the Pleasure of such Passions; yet the manner how these Passions have this friendly Influence, is unknown to most Men, who are ignorant of natural Philosophy, much more is it above the Knowledge of Brutes: It is, however, sufficient, to excite the Inclinations I have mention’d, that they are sensible of the Effect. On the contrary, “In Envy, Hatred, Fear and Grief, the Motion of the Blood is retarded, and the Heart is clogg’d, so that it contracts, and expels the Blood, with difficulty; whence the Countenance of Man becomes pale, and numberless Mischiefs, in the whole Animal Oeconomy, but especially in the Functions of the Brain and Nerves, follow; such are the Distempers usually ascrib’d to the Spleen and Melancholy.” This Matter belongs properly to the Consideration of Physicians; I therefore willingly resign it to the Skilful in that Art, who are daily industrious to adorn it with noble Discoveries for the Good of Mankind. I will, however, transcribe one extraordinary Case, from Harvey’s Anatomical Exercitation concerning the Circulation of the Blood, which will be a noble Illustration of what I have advanc’d. “I knew” (says he) “a high-spirited Man, who, thro’Anger and Indignation conceiv’d for an Injury, join’d with an Affront, receiv’d at the Hands of a powerful Person, so kindled with Rage, that, Envy and Hatred continually increasing for want of Revenge, and the strong Passion which rankled in his Mind being disclos’d to no one, he fell at length into a strange kind of Distemper, and was miserably afflicted with a great Oppression and Pain, both of his Heart and Breast, so that receiving no Relief from the Advice of the most Skilful, he fell, after some Years, into a sscorbutick Habit of Body, which threw him into a Consumption, of which he died. He had some Ease, only as of ten and as long as the whole Region of his Breast was compress’d. His jugular Veins were swell’d, as thick as a Man’s Thumb, with a Pulse high and strong, as if each of them were it self the Aorta, or great descending Artery, and appear’d like two oblong Aneurisms;when I had dissected the Body, I found the Heart and Aorta so distended, and stuffed with Blood, that the Size of the Heart and Cavities of the Ventricles were as great as those of an Ox.” Whence we may observe, that such Passions obstruct the Motion of the Blood in the small Branches of the Arteries, which are dispers’d thro’ the Brain; and that vast Mischiefs arise thence to the Heart, and consequently to the whole Animal, with dire Symptoms of Distempers, whence Life it self (common to Man with other Animals) is greatly endanger’d. It is hence evident, “That the very Nature of an Animal, and of the Passions, admonishes Men, that it will be of Advantage to them, to be of a benevolent Disposition towards others, all, if possible”; since fierce Hatred against one Man brought so great Mischiefs to the Cherisher of the Passion.
Fourthly, The same is prov’d, from their natural Propension, to propagate their Species, and rear their Offspring.§XX. Next follows the fourth Indication of the same thing, which is taken from hence, “That Animals are incited to endeavour the Propagation of their own Species, by the force of the same Causes, which preserve the Life of every Individual, so that these Two are connected by Tie evidently natural.” Hence it is, that, Animals of the same Species but, different Sexes are united, by a strong Friendship, whence they perform to one another many mutual good Offices, and that Offspring is propagated, which they love and cherish as their own Blood, except something very unusual happens to change their natural Inclinations. But those things, which so rarely happen, ought not to be brought into the account, when we are taking a Survey of the ordinary and regular State of Nature. The Connexion is very close between the Propagation of the Species, and that natural Affection, which excites to an Endeavour of nourishing the young when brought forth. Preservation is only a kind of continued Generation of a thing; therefore the same natural Causes will incline an Animal to both: But it is evident, that their Offspring cannot be preserv’d, except Animals of the same Kind mutually cultivate Peace or Benevolence. Therefore they naturally desire, that this Benevolence may be of as long Continuance, as they wish to their Offspring: in such a Benevolence, which is extensive and durable, consists the Pursuit of the common Good of the whole Species, in proportion to the Capacity of the Animal, which, indeed, if Man be excepted, is but of a small reach, and not at all provident. Yet that low degree of Sagacity, which all Animals are possess’d of, is sufficient to enable them, to provide for themselves and their Young, by the exercise of some kind of Benevolence towards Animals of the same Kind. Because I hinted, “That the natural Love of their Offspring, proceeds from the same Causes, which incline Animals to propagate their Species,” I must shew, “That this Inclination is essential to Animals, whose Powers are come to their greatest Perfection, and that it flows from the same Causes, which are necessary to the Preservation and Perfection of every Individual”: Whence it follows, “That it is necessary, that Animals should, along with their own Welfare, endeavour the Continuation of their own Species, and, consequently, promote the common Good.” And this is evident, from the manner in which Animals are form’d, and nourish’d: for it is certain, (as Harvey has observ’d,) that the same Causes which, in the Womb or Egg, form the Parts requisite to the Nourishment of the Individual, (as the Stomach, Heart, &c.) do likewise form the spermatick Vessels, and difference of Sexes, in the first rough-draught of Animals. From the same Mass of nutritious Juice mingled with the Blood, part goes into Nourishment, part into Seed for propagating the Species. The whole Circulation of the Blood, and every thing instrumental thereto, as the muscular Force of the Heart, and the Contrivance of the Valves in the Veins, is at the same time subservient to the private Nourishment of the Individual, and to the publick Good by propagating the Species, whilst it sends off the Materials of the Seed to the spermatick Vessels. Lastly, whatever any of the Bowels, or other Parts of the Body, perform towards preserving the natural State of the Blood, at the same time tends to preserve the Life of the Individual, and, remotely at least, disposes to the Procreation of Offspring, which is hinder’d by every great Disorder of the Blood.
I might here expatiate very largely; but, lest I should be too prolix, I thought it proper to leave the Remainder of what be longs to this Subject, to be farther pursued by such Readers as are skilful in Natural Philosophy and Medicine, and to be apply’d, by a Parity of Reason with what I have already suggested, to the forming a Rule of Manners from the Indications of Nature, I will add only this, that it is very evident, “That Animals are in the manner above-mention’d inclin’d to the Love of the other Sex, and of their Offspring, and thus divest themselves of a contracted Selfishness, which when they have once laid aside, they are easily induc’d to proceed still further in the Love of others, till at last, upon account of their Likeness of Nature, it takes in all of the same Species”; and, consequently, that the Observation of common Experience hasits Foundation in the common Nature of Animals, “That Men are more inclin’d to Peace after begetting Children, and that their natural Propension to beget Children disposes all to the Love of Peace.”
(All our Actions cannot be resolv’d into a principle of Self-Love; and, tho they could, that would not take away the Obligations to promote the common Good.)I must here, however, take notice of that common Evasion, by which many are wont to elude this and other Indications taken from natural Inclinations, whence human Reason may learn the Law of Nature, “That, altho it often happens that, by means of these Inclinations, many are profited, yet they all proceed from the Love of our own Pleasure only, and, consequently, that all the Actions flowing from hence have no other End, and that they therefore discover no thing but mere Self-Love.”
I answer, 1. It is evident from what I have already said, that I do not take any Indication of a Law of Nature, obliging to promote the common Good, from the End which Animals propose to themselves; I affirm nothing concerning their Intentions.
2. It cannot be prov’d, that Animals, in those voluntary Actions, by which they actually promote the Good of others, as well as themselves, do not alike intend and will both. It is certainly much more probable, that both Effects are equally intended; since it is so in all those Cases, where Men act deliberately; for they intend to produce all the foreseen Effects of their Actions, tho some of them move them to Action much more strongly than others, and delight them much more, after the Action is over; yet every thing which they intend to effect, is justly call’d an End of Action.
3. Supposing, but not granting, that Animals sought their own Preservation and Happiness only, as their End, and that they exercis’d Benevolence towards other Animals of the same Kind, as the Means, naturally and perpetually necessary to that End; yet even this Supposition would prove, that there was an Indication from Nature, “That the common Good of the whole Species was to be promoted,” and thence would arise an Obligation to the use of Means so necessary, which would be no less valid than our Obligation to the End suppos’d, viz. Self-preservation. For the Obligation is the same to the necessary Means, and to the End it self. And this Obligation is equally valid, with any which can arise from the Punishments of Civil Laws, which can inflict nothing greater than Death, and which these Objectors contend, is by far the greatest, or rather the only real Obligation we lie under. For this Reason therefore, among many others, Hobbes’s Argument is vain, who (that he might take away all natural Obligation to promote the common Good) endeavours to resolve all natural Propensions tending thereto, into a Desire of preserving or of pleasing one’s self only. So, partly in his Treatise of human Nature, (Chap. 9. § 10, 15, 16, 17.) partly in that de Cive (Chap. 1. § 2.) he affirms, not only that the Love by which Animals are inclin’d to the Propagation of their Species, but also, that the natural Affection, with which they embrace and rear their Offspring, and all Charity towards others, and Compassion towards the Afflicted, arise from hence, “That Animals, by these Actions, either seek some Advantage to themselves, or, at least, that they may think magnificently of their own Powers, or have a good Opinion of themselves,” which is Hobbes’s Definition of Glory; but, beside that the inward Force of these Affections, and their Effects, by which they are much more serviceable to others, than to the Agents themselves, are an evident Proof of the contrary; and that those Animals, in which these Affections are vigorous, are sensible enough of this, and therefore cannot but intend greater Advantages to others than to themselves: If it be granted, “That these Affections are necessarily in Animals, that they may make themselves happy by certain Advantages and this imaginary Glory,” nevertheless the Obligation to Actions advantageous to others would remain, lest they should in any respect be wanting to themselves, in those things which he supposes to be naturally and necessarily, and, consequently, perpetually desir’d. For it is impossible, but that they must be influenc’d by the Hope of enjoying these Advantages, and by the Fear of losing them, if those Actions, which respect the Good of others, be neglected; and Hobbes acknowledges, that natural Obligation takes place, where human Liberty is restrain’d by Hope or Fear, de Cive, c. 15. §7. This Reasoning seems to me conclusive against Objections upon Hobbes’s Principles. In what consists the Nature of moral Obligation, I have elsewhere explain’d; I will here only add, “That in the true Rules of Morality, whence natural Obligation arises, so diminutive an End as the Preservation of one Man only, is not regarded, but the common Happiness of all rational Beings.” On the contrary, Hobbes proposes this little End as the Rule of all human Actions, with this View, that they may neglect any Actions whatsoever, and any natural benevolent Propensions, when soever they shall not seem to make for their own private Advantage, altho in reality “The Desire of the publick Good testify’d by outward Actions, is always a Means necessary to the chief Happiness of every particular Man”; which yet most, who are blinded with Self-Love, are generally ignorant of.
Lastly, Not to dwell too long upon the Solution of this Objection, it is to be consider’d, that I have drawn my Conclusion, not from voluntary Actions, whose Ends are various in different Animals, and in the same Animal at different times, but from such Actions and Inclinations as are evidently necessary, which are in Animals even not conscious of them, and sometimes opposing them; and which, as I briefly hinted, proceed from the very Frame and Temper of their Bodies; for it is not owing to their chusing and desiring to preserve themselves, but to the natural Contraction of the Heart, that the Blood is sent off to the spermatick Vessels, and the Seed thence separated and brought to Perfection, whence arise in all Animals, venereal Inclinations, and a Desire of begetting and preserving Offspring. For both Appetites are Effects of the same Cause: Just as from the same matter an Animal is at first form’d, and for some time nourish’d and grows in the Egg or Womb; yet of these things the Parents are so little conscious, that, tho they concur, as Instruments to the Production of the Effect, yet they know not before their Offspring comes into the World, whether what they have begotten be Male or Female, whether it receives its Nourishment by the Mouth or Navel, or both: Nay, whether it is at all nourish’d, or whether it lives or no. It is hence evident, “That, in the forming and nourishing the Foetus, Animals are not directed by their Knowledge foreseeing the Effect or End, much less by the Prospect of preserving their own Life by this Method, for that is rather weakened by the Propagation of the Species; but that these Actions are done by them without Deliberation, and that the Propensions to these Actions are in a high Degree necessary”: In these Actions Animals are plainly like Plants, which, tho they are void of Sense and all Prospect of an End, yet do not draw in Nourishment for themselves alone, but produce Seed for the Propagation of their Species. And as in Eggs are contain’d both the Body of the Chicken, and proper Nourishment for it, till it becomes strong enough to procure its Food elsewhere, and to digest it; so also in Seeds, beside the small Bud, (which is the rough-draught of a future Plant,) is contain’d also a fit Substance, which, after moistening, and a certain kind of Fermentation arising from a proper Heat, insinuates it self into the tender Roots of the Bud, which it nourishes till it has got Strength enough to imbibe Nourishment out of the neighbouring Earth. But afterwards, when the Foetus is born, Animals perceiving, that an Animal like themselves is form’d from their own Blood, by the Concurrence of their own natural Powers, they are inwardly dispos’d not to destroy it, by any Act or voluntary Neglect of theirs. What I have now advanc’d, is well enough known to natural Philosophers; which if any one desires to see more distinctly explain’d, he may consult Harvey and Highmore of Generation, and Needham in his learned Treatise of the Formation of the Foetus. These few Observations are sufficient to prove “That a strong Tendency, not only to propagate their Species, but to nourish it when propagated, arises from the very Frame and natural Disposition of Animals (nay, and of Plants too) which proceeds from universal and determin’d Causes.” What is more, it is well known from Experience, “That these Propensions grow stronger in Animals by Age and Practice, so that any Accident thwarting these, produces in them strong Resentments.” Hence Mankind shed those Tears, which fall in case of disappointed Love, of Barrenness, or Loss of Children. Therefore one may easily infer, from these, and innumerable other like Instances which daily happen, “That the ordinary State of Animals would, for the most part, be very disagreeable to ’em, unless (to the best of their Power) they enter, by Benevolence towards others of the same Species, into a friendly Society with them, by whose Assistance they may beget Offspring, and rear them as safely as possible.”
Fifthly, Benevolence among Animals of the same Species, prov’d from the intire Frame of Animals.Lastly, The whole Frame of Animals, (because it is the necessary Cause of their usual Functions and Actions,) plainly indicates, “That from the same internal Causes proceed both Actions in order to Self-preservation, and Affections of so great Benevolence, as are sufficient for a friendly Association with other Animals of the same Species”: for these two are generally exerted by all Kinds of Animals, altho it happens sometimes, but rarely, thro’ Ignorance or irregular Passions, that they hurt either themselves or others of the same Species. Therefore, because Concord among them is much more frequent than Discord, it follows, “That the natural and internal Causes of Concord are stronger, or that their Nature, without the Assistance of civil Society, does more strongly incline them to this Affection than to Discord”; which is the principal Point I contend for. For (unless it appear, that the Animal Nature in Men is fiercer or less inclinable to Peace than the same in Brutes) this is sufficient to prove, that in all Deliberations upon future Events (in which we can only reckon upon what happens for the most part) we may conclude in general, “That a peaceable Association with others will be more agreeable to our natural Inclinations, and that the same is more probably to be expected in others, than the contrary, tho in some Cases it may happen otherwise.” As any one may with truth affirm, that it is more agreeable to the Nature of a Die, that a Six should not be thrown at the first Cast, than that it should; because there are five possible Cases inconsistent with this Cast, and but one that favours it. That Brute Animals act, for the most part, benevolently with others of their own Kind, is easy to prove, by taking a View of all those things, which I have in the first Chapter shewn to be requisite, that any thing may be said to be subservient to the publick Good of any Species. They generally abstain from mutually hurting one another.Juvenal has long since observ’d what makes much for our present Purpose.
Juven. Satyr. 15.
English’d by Mr. Tate.
What is more, they behave more mildly toward those, with whom they have herded for some time; and the Practice of the Storks, who feed their disabled Parents, in which are to be found some Footsteps of Gratitude, is notorious. In all these is observable a limited Love, both of themselves and their Offspring, and they are inclin’d to do several mutual good Offices, not trifling ones only, as when they play together, but very considerable, as when they assist one another against a common Enemy; and they signify their Expectation thereof, by a particular kind of Voice, by which most Animals, when sensible of approaching Danger, call others to their Assistance. These things are (if you consider the Substance of the Actions) the same with those which I have affirm’d to be necessarily included in the care of the publick Good, which, indeed, are perform’d very imperfectly by Brutes, yet in proportion to that slender Knowledge, which they use about things necessary to their own Preservation.
Sixthly, Benevolence is inforc’d among Animals of the same Species, by their numerous wants, and the most probable Method of relieving them, from natural Assistance.§XXI. If we inquire into those Causes, which are so interwoven into the Frame of Animals as to become part of their Nature, and which determine them generally to such a Conduct, besides those whence I have taken the foregoing Indications, the following are peculiar to them, as they are distinguish’d from inanimate Bodies. First, their Frame, as being made up of Parts very different, needs more things for its Preservation, than Minerals or Plants do. For the Blood, and other Liquors necessary to Life, as the Lymph, Bile, Pancreatick Juice, and perhaps a Nervous Fluid, and Animal Spirits, are so perpetually subject to Change and Perspiration, that there is continual Occasion for new Recruits, and also for Exercise, Rest, Sleep, Watching, and moderate Affections, to restore to a just Temper what has been chang’d, or repair what has been spent. Hence arise very uneasy Sensations of Hunger, Thirst, and various Diseases, and these excite them to search for, and try, the most convenient Methods of acquiring Nourishment, Medicine, and other Helps, such as an Estimate of their own Powers, and a Knowledge of things about them shall suggest. But they are conver sant with nothing better known to them, than Animals of their own Species, of whole Powers and Necessities they make an easy Estimate from their Likeness to their own, and, from the same Likeness of Nature, they conceive some Hope of their Love and Assistance. The Cause of that Hope is, partly, because like Things usually beget like Images of themselves, and, consequently, like Affections (except there arise some great Impediment, such as Passion, Error, a very disagreeable unlikeness, &c.) causing them to embrace other Animals of the same Kind with themselves, with the same Love as themselves: Partly, because they foresee great and innumerable Evils arising from Discord and Contention, but that scarce any Good can be thence expected. For Equality of Strength, or many Accidents which may set a smaller Power upon a level with a greater, (such as Sleep, Weariness, Diseases, the Confederacy of several weaker Powers, various accidental Advantages arising from the Place, by means whereof the weaker may overcome the stronger,) will give them frequent Opportunities of mutually hurting or killing one another. For if contending Powers by any means become equal, they are to one another mutually, as Weights counterpoising one another, of which each can with-hold the other from the lower place, to which it tends, and neither of them can reach the Place, to which it-self tends. Such are the Mischiefs arising from the Contention of one Animal with another of equal Power, tho each were at Peace with all the rest. But if each One should wage War with all the rest, there would be so frequent Contests with Forces vastly superior, that there would remain no Hope of Life to any. To be brief, it is probable, “That, even in the Judgment of Brutes, it is better, where there is plenty of all things necessary to the Preservation of every Individual, amicably, as occasion offers, to share in the Use of Things, and assume only what is at present necessary, than to expose themselves to the Hazards of perpetual War, in order to acquire Plenty of Things not necessary.” But in the Will to allow such a Division of Things and mutual Services, and to preserve it after it is made, is contain’d the Sum of all Actions, by which the common Good of every one’s Species is procur’d; wherefore “Even Brutes themselves, in some measure, perceive the Connexion between their own Preservation, and Actions contributing to the common Good of their Species, and for this Reason act benevolently to one another”; which was to be prov’d. I will add only this, that all those things which I have observ’d in Animals, are to be consider’d jointly, as concurring to enable and incline Animals to promote the common Good of their own Species, and that so strongly and constantly, that, except Animals comply therewith, they will want a great part of their Happiness, (which consists in the gratifying of their natural Inclinations,) and will find a Grief arising from this Struggle of vain Passions, which oppose those most natural Principles of Action, whose Force depends upon no Delusion of the Imagination; and are therefore justly distinguish’d from those Passions which I call’d vain, because they proceed from a deluded Fancy. It is with this View, that I inquir’d into the Causes of this Benevolence towards Animals of the same Species, which by the help of Reason may be rais’d to a greater Degree of Pefection.
Hobbes’s Objections against the Argument, drawn from the Association of other Animals, answer’d,§XXII. Hobbes was not ignorant, that this was no way consistent with his Principles, and therefore he abounds with such Insinuations as these to the contrary: That “Men are fiercer than Bears, Wolves, and Serpents”; that “Their natural State is a State of War of All against All,” that “Among them there is no such thing as publick Good or Evil, before the Establishment of civil Government,” and that “Therefore there is no Knowledge or Desire of such Good.” I have elsewhere cited the Passages in which he has advanc’d this Doctrine; but here falls properly under Consideration a Passage in his Leviathan, Chap. 17. (which is agreeable to what he advances, de Cive, c. 5. § 5.) where he thus objects to himself, “That certain living Creatures, as Bees and Ants, live sociably one with another”; and he asks, What hinders but that Men may do the same? He reduces his Answer to six Heads; of which the Substance is this.
1. “Men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these Creatures are not.” I reply; “That civil Honours (about which Contentions sometimes arise) have no place in a State of Nature, or before the establishing civil Government among Men, and that, therefore, they cannot contend about them in a State of Nature, (concerning which is the present Question,) more than Brute Animals.” In the next place, “true Glory,” of such Honour as can be attain’d out of civil Society, according to Cicero’s Definition, is “The concurrent Praise of good Men, and the incorrupt Voice of those who form a true Judgment of eminent Virtue.” But the Pursuit of the common Good comprehends all Virtues, and thence only is procur’d the Praise of good Men. War, and that against all, is so far from being an Effect of the Desire of such Honour, that, on the contrary, Men are by this Motive excited, beyond other Animals, to the Exercise of all the Virtues, which Hobbes himself owns to be necessary Means of the common Peace. Leviath. 15.
2. He answers, 2dly. That “Among all those Creatures, the Common Good differs not from the Private, and being by Nature inclin’d to their Private, they procure thereby the Common Benefit. But Man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himself with other Men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.” To this I answer; “That we are oblig’d to Hobbes, that he has unawares acknowledg’d, that there is such a thing as the publick or common Good, out of civil Society, and that this is really procur’d by Brutes themselves.” Elsewhere he affirms the contrary; see his Treatise de Homine, c. 10. in the latter end. I am of opinion, “That the Knowledge of the publick Good, disposes Men to Peace and Virtue, as in its own Nature amiable, and the strongest Security of private Good.” Its differing (in some Cases) from the private Good of some Particulars, is not a sufficient Reason, why Men should war amongst themselves, rather than Bees or Ants, whose common Good is distinguish’d from the Private in the same manner. What he adds concerning Men, if it be taken universally, as the Words seem to import, is most false and groundless; unless, perhaps, he sends us to that general Demonstration, as he calls it, of such Matters, which he hints in the Preface to his Leviathan;Hobbes, truly, knew himself, and that with respect to his own Possessions, he relish’d nothing but what was Eminent, upon comparing himself with other Men, and thence he concludes, that all others are in the same Sentiments. But he ought to have shewn something in the Nature of Things, or of Men, that imposes a Necessity upon all Men to form such a Judgment. All who reason justly, know certainly, from their natural Wants and the Use of Things, what Judgment to pass upon their own Affairs, whether they relish them or not, and in what degree, without comparing them with those of other Men. They are foolish or envious Persons, who take pleasure only in the Excess of their own Enjoyments above those of others. But if he would have his Assertion understood, with Limitation to such Men only, he does not assign a sufficient Cause of a universal War of All against All, but only of some accidental Contention rais’d by the Foolish and Envious, which the Reason or Force of wiser Men may easily restrain from hurting All.
3. He answers, 3dly. That “These Creatures, having not (as Man) the Use of Reason, do not see, or think they see, any Fault in the Administration of their common Business: Whereas amongst Men it is otherwise: Hence War.” To which I thus answer; “That this Reason suggests nothing to hinder Men from living peaceably with one another, tho they were subject to no civil Government; in which case their natural Propensions to universal Benevolence, and all the Laws of Nature, would take place, notwithstanding any thing here alledg’d to the contrary.” Nor does he offer any thing which proves, but that such Men may agree among them selves to erect Civil Government, (for the Causes of such hindrance are what we at present inquire into;) he only objects what may hinder the Preservation of Government already establish’d by Consent alone. Let Hobbes look to it, whether or no what he here asserts concerning the Temper of the Generality of Mankind, will not as effectually unsettle the Foundation of Peace, in a Commonwealth establish’d by his fictitious UNION. “Among Men” (saith he) “There are very many that think themselves wiser, and able to govern the Publick better, than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way, and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civil War.” Do not Men, so dispos’d, usually violate the Compacts they have mutually enter’d into, and break into Civil War? It is farther to be consider’d, “That human Reason does much more effectually promote Peace and Concord, by discovering numberless Delusions of the Imagination and Passions, than Discord, by its own Fallibility, in such Things as are always necessary to the common Peace, which are but few, and very evident.” Farther, “Men don’t immediately make War, as soon as they think they see any Fault in the Administration of the Publick”; the same Reason, which discovers the Fault, also admonishes them, that many things are to be borne with for Peacesake, and suggests several Methods, by which the redressing such Grievance may be peaceably attempted. I appeal to your Judgment, candid Reader, whether Reason makes the Condition of Man worse than that of Brutes? Does not Hobbes rather form an unjust Judgment of Men, who accuses their Reason of all the Miseries arising from War and Discord, and for this Reason contends, that Men live less peaceably with one another, than irrational Brutes? But this whole Answer of Hobbes’s is nothing to the Purpose. The Question is, “Concerning the Obligation of the Precepts of right Reason, before the erecting of Government”: The Answer is, “That the Reason of many Men is so erroneous, as to dissolve Governments already erected.”
4. He asserts, 4thly. That “Men cannot live sociably with one another as Bees, &c. because those Animals want that Art of Words, by which some Men can represent to others, that which is Good in the Likeness of Evil, and Evil in the Likeness of Good, &c. discontenting Men, and troubling their Peace at their Pleasure.” Truly, because it sometimes happens, that Seditions are rais’d by the help of the false colouring of Speech; therefore Men, because they can make such use of Speech, certainly will not preserve Peace among themselves. Here is evidently no Consequence. For he ought to prove, “That Men necessarily, or at least certainly, have the Will to use, and that constantly, such seditious Speeches as tend to raise War”; especially, since there are so many Causes, both within and without them, that rather persuade them to cultivate Peace. He ought likewise to prove, “That such Speeches necessarily, or at least always, have so great an Effect upon all or most of their Hearers, as to ingage them immediately in War.” For “They may, perhaps, be too sharp-sighted, to suffer themselves to be imposed upon by rhetorical varnish.” It is possible, “That they may rather listen to the peaceable Speeches of the Prudent, supported by more solid Arguments.” It is possible, “That they may rather weigh the importance of Things, than the empty Sound of Words”; to which they certainly have a natural Tendency; for they well know, that Words will not feed or defend them from Injuries, but that Actions, proceeding from mutual Benevolence, will. What hinders, but that the Persuasion of good Men may prevail, which the Reason, both of the Speaker and Hearer, and the very nature of Things themselves, favour? Why may not the Tongue of the Ambassador of Peace prevail above that which sounds the Trumpet of War? All cautious Person regard diligently, rather what others do, than what they say; and, beside, take care, that the Power of those whom they trust be so balanc’d, that they may not be able to hurt them, without their own great Peril. But, if the Reader further considers, how great Force Words, both spoken and written, are of, to the making of all Contracts, and to the preserving the Memory of Laws, (by which two subsists all peaceable Society;) I doubt not, but that he will agree with me, “That they have a much greater Tendency to establish, than banish, Peace, and that they are, therefore, to be reckon’d among the Advantages of Mankind, and not among those things, which make Men more inhuman than Brutes themselves.”
5. Hobbes urges, “Irrational Creatures cannot distinguish between Injury and Damage, and, therefore, as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their Fellows. Whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdom, and censure the Actions of them who govern the Common wealth.” The Antithesis, or Opposition, here insinuates thus much; “That Men are of a less peaceable Disposition than Brutes, because they distinguish between Injury and Damage.” I am of a very different Opinion, “That Men more patiently bear Damage done them by other Men, provided it be not injuriously done, and that all Distinction between these two, is founded in the Knowledge of Right and Laws, which I readily acknowledge, to be proper to Man alone.” But I utterly deny, “That this Knowledge inclines Men to violate Peace, or to trample upon the Laws, and the Rights of others like their own.” I acknowledge, indeed, “That Men may violate the Rules of Justice thro’ unbridled Passions, notwithstanding this Knowledge”; but the Knowledge of the Difference between those things, which are done rightfully and injuriously, can never make Men more prone to injure others. But they will envy others, (as the Antithesis insinuates,) and will “Love to shew their Wisdom, by censuring the Actions of them who govern the Commonwealth.” It is certainly very injurious, “To impute to all Mankind the Faults of a few, and that without Proof, ” except that, perhaps, he has found such Affections in himself, and has thence concluded, that they are natural to all Men; for, in the Preface to his Leviathan, he recommends this Method of knowing Mankind, to Rulers and all others, affirming, that “There is no other Proof of such Matters”; but he admonishes us to examine, “Whether these things agree with our own Thoughts.” With mine they certainly do not agree. Provided I am happy, tho others be happier, I envy them not; I shall lose nothing by it. I believe human Nature more modest, than to delight in censuring Princes. He must be long harden’d in Wickedness, who will venture upon Rebellion, which is a Complication of innumerable Acts of Murder, Plundering, Sacrilege, and, in short, of all kinds of Villany. But Hobbes very improperly imputes that Crime to Man, in his suppos’d State of Nature, which State, according to his Hypothesis, is previous to the Establishment of Civil Government.
6. Let us now see, whether, in his last Answer, he brings any better Proof, that Mankind is less aptthan Brutes, to a mutual Agreement. “The Agreement” (says he) “of these Creatures is Natural, that of Man is by Covenant only, which is Artificial; and, therefore, it is no wonder, if there be somewhat else requir’d (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting, which is a common Power to keep them in awe, and to direct their Actions to the common Benefit.” I answer; “That the natural Causes, which are woven, as it were, in the Constitution of human Nature, as they are Animals, and which induce them to agree in the Exercise of mutual Benevolence, are plainly equal to those, which are found in any other Animals”; for instance, in Oxen, Lions, Bees; and this I have already endeavour’d briefly to prove: I will afterwards prove them to be greater.Hobbes cannot shew any thing wanting in Man, that is the Cause of such peaceful Agreement as is found in Brutes. What he adds, that it is from Covenant among Men, and therfore artificial, may perhaps deceive the Vulgar, but will easily be refuted by Philosophers. For these Covenants are form’d by the Power, both of the animal and rational Nature. Certainly, “If Men had neither enter’d into Covenants, nor made any use of their Reason, the common Nature of Animals of the same Kind, would, nevertheless, be of as great Efficacy among them, to procure their Agreement in cultivating mutual Benevolence, as far as among all Brutes of the same Species”; now such an Agreement among Brutes there is, which is acknowledg’d to be natural. What therefore hinders, but that, after Reason and the Use of Speech are added to Men, that Agreement may still continue to be natural? Reason does not destroy natural Endeavours and Propensions to Concord, nor is an Agreement which is natural, less firm or durable, because it is express’d in Words: As the desire and use of Nourishment cease not to be natural Actions in Man, tho he signify this Appetite by Words, and by his Reason appoint the Place, Time, and Kind of Food to be taken. Besides, Hobbes himself, sometimes, acknowledges Reason to be a Part of human Nature, and a natural Faculty, and all others (that I know of) constantly acknowledge the same; whence it follows, “That any further Agreement or Society, which Reason persuades to establish by Covenants, proceeds from the rational Nature of Man; and that it may therefore be justly called Natural, tho it be much firmer, and bound by more Ties, than can be met with among Brutes.” It will appear also, “That Agreement, proceeding from Reason, is therefore more properly called Natural, if we consider that practical Reason is wholly determin’d by the Nature of the best End we can propose, and of the best Means we can use”: And further, “That nothing else is effected by the whole Process of Reason, than that those Propensions to Concord with others of the same Kind, which are natural to all Animals, (but exert themselves in Brutes in a very confused and improvident manner,) are directed to their adequate Object, namely, all rational Beings; and that every Action is, under its Conduct, exerted in the best Time, Place, and other Circumstances, which can be imagin’d.” Thus that taking of Meat or Drink may justly be called most natural, which both, in general, takes its Rise from the Constitution of the Animal, and, in all particular Cases, is most perfectly directed by Reason, taking care of the Animal’s Health, without any Error in Diet. These Precepts of regulating Diet, whose Efficacy and Truth Reason observes from the Nature of Things, may also properly be called Art: For Art is a Habit directing Actions, as the Nature of the End and Means points out: Yet such a Habit may justly be called Natural to a rational Agent, as consisting of Parts or Precepts so few, and so obvious, that they may be easily learn’d from the Nature of Things, without teaching, or so much as intending it; as Brutes collect the manner of regulating themselves, with respect to their Food, from Experience only; and even Plants, without Sense, much less Art, without Error extract from the Earth agreeable Juices only, for their Nourishment. Habits, properly so call’d, are the first Principles of Arts, and indeed essential Parts of the Arts, to which they belong; so that upon this account, perhaps, they may be called Artificial; but, because they are always learn’d without Art, they are by all acknowledg’d to become known naturally; and they, who write concerning Arts, do not teach, but suppose, them. Thus the Skill of adding small Numbers, and Right Lines, together, so as to make a Sum; and a like Subtraction in little or well known Quantities, may be called a Habit, and an essential part of Arithmetick and practical Geometry; yet Teachers of Mathematicks suppose their Scholars to have acquir’d this Skill by their own natural Parts, without Instruction, and, consequently, that it is plainly natural. Euclid therefore, in those common Notions, which he calls Axioms, supposes “Equal Quantities added to, or taken from, Equals,” and that it is known, that “Their Sums, or Differences, will be equal.” The Reason of my observing which, is only to make it evident, “That some Skill of acting (adding, for instance, or subtracting) is at once an essential Part of an Art, and yet may be perfectly natural to Man, as a reasonable Creature.” Wherefore I think Hobbes has not done right, in affirming, that the Agreement among Men, which is express’d in Covenants, is Artificial, in such Sense as to be oppos’d to Natural. I do not deny, that those Words, in which Covenants are express’d, proceed from arbitrary Appointment: But that Consent of Minds, relating to mutual Offices of Benevolence, of which Words are only the Signs, is wholly Natural. But in that Consent of Minds to exchange good Of fices consists the whole Nature of a Covenant, and from thence flows all its obligatory Force. The Knowledge also, and the Will, of appointing some Signs, by which such Consent may be mutually declar’d, is so easy and obvious to Man, without Instruction, that it may justly be called Natural, tho the use of some Signs rather than others, be arbitrary, (for so I would chuse to call it, rather than artificial.) To be brief, the Agreement express’d by Covenants, (especially about the most general Acts of Benevolence, of which, only, we treat in an Inquiry in to the Laws of Nature,) ought either not to be called Artificial, or if it be so called that Term is to be taken in such Sense, as to be consistent with, not oppos’d to, what is natural, as if such Agreement were less constant or lasting, as Hobbes would have it. For the signifying a natural Agreement by Words, contriv’d by some kind of Art, does not make it less firm or durable.
It therefore remains firm, what at first I advanced, “That there are in Men, for this very reason, because they are Animals, at least such benevolent Propensions, as are to be found in other Animals, towards those of the same Species,” which, I have taken notice, do in several Cases observe the chief Heads of the Law of Nature, in proportion to their Knowledge.
And retorted.I thought it worth while, to examine separately these Answers of Hobbes’s, partly, that the Reader might see, how gross an Error he is forc’d to defend, in his Attempt to deface the Indications of the Sanction of the Laws of Nature, taken from natural Inclinations: Partly, because I have observ’d, that all these Particulars, whence Hobbes would infer, that Man is more malevolent toward his own Species, and more unsociable, than Brutes, may, with great Advantage, be retorted upon himself, as the clearest Indications, that Man is by Nature fitted for greater Benevolence toward those of his own Species, than any other kind of Animal is. For, 1. He loves Honour, which flows naturally from such Benevolence. 2. He knows more perfectly the Influence of the publick Good, towards securing his own private Happiness. 3. He has the Use of Reason, which disposes him equally, either to obey or to command, as occasion offers.4. He knows how, by proper words, to give, both an Edge and Beauty to the Force of his Reason. 5. He understands a Law, by means whereof he distinguishes an Injury, from a Damage done without Injury. 6. Lastly, to this Agreement, once made amongst Men, not Nature only imparts Constancy, but Art, the Assistant of Nature, communicates, by means of writing, many Preservatives against even less probable Accidents, and gives it a Continuance beyond the Age of Man. However, I will not insist longer upon explaining these things more particularly in this place, but leave it to the Reader’s unbyass’d Judgment, whether Hobbes’s Answers, or these Retorsions, be juster? or, whether these things, peculiar to Man, do not rather promote benevolent Inclinations, which, it is evident, are perpetually united to the Animal Nature, than extirpate or weaken them?
Lastly, Benevolence is enforced, 1. From those Particulars, which are peculiar to a human Body; such are those which assist the Fancy and Memory, and, consequently, Prudence. (This falls under the Head of the foregoing second Indication, § 18.)§XXIII. My Method requires, that I now take into Consideration some things, which are peculiar to human Bodies, in order to discover, whether these do not dispose Men, more than other Animals, to the Exercise of mutual Benevolence, and, consequently, to the forming more friendly Societies than they do? This will come more pertinently to be consider’d in this place, because even these things belong to them as Animals; and therefore they are to be consider’d, not as of any Efficacy by themselves, but as co-operating with what I have before observ’d common to them with other Animals, whence, from their united Force, we may expect an Effect of the same Kind, but greater and more certain. I, therefore, thought it proper to range these Particulars in such Order, that they may easily be referr’d to the same Heads, which we have but now perceiv’d to indicate, “That the same Formation and Structure of Parts, which inclines all Animals to preserve themselves, inclines them also to Benevolence towards others of the same Species.”
I find nothing peculiar, remarkable in a human Body, to refer to the first Indication, which is taken from the limited Quantity of its Parts; but there are many Particulars, which may be referr’d to the second, which is taken from the Powers or Effects of the Imagination and Memory, in which a human Body excells the Bodies of other Animals. To these is to be premis’d this general Observation, “That, whatever increases the Powers of the Fancy and Memory, or makes them of longer Continuance in Man, than in other Animals, that all contributes much to their learning many things, from natural and common Experience, relating to the Causes (subject to their Power) of both their own and the common Good, and therefore contributes to their greater Stock of Prudence, which will both inable and incline them to direct their Actions in pursuit, both of their own and the publick Good, which two are, from the Nature of Men, inseparably united and intervoven.” But whatsoever tends to increase this kind of Prudence, equally disposes to the Practice of all moral Virtues, that is, to the Observance of all the Laws of Nature.
This being premis’d, I will, out of Anatomical Writers, and also from my own Observations, and those of others, take notice of some things peculiar and remarkable in a human Body, which contribute to the enlarging and strengthening the Fancy and Memory in Men, which singly consider’d are of little Advantage, but if survey’d as united among them selves, and with those things which are common to Animals of all kinds, and also in Subordination to the divine Powers of the Mind, of which these parts of our Body are the proper Instruments, they seem to afford great Light to the present Argument.
The human Fancy and Memory are assisted by, 1. The Brain, which, in proportion to the Bulk of his Body, is much greater in Man, than in any other kind of Animal: 2. Greater Quantity of Blood and animal Spirits thence form’d, and their greater Purity, from the erect Posture of the Body; a greater Vigor and brisker Motion, by means of a freer Passage into the Brain, thro’ the unbranch’d Tubes of the Carotid Arteries: The longer Continuance, both of Childhood, in which great Plenty, both of Things and Words is treasur’d up, and of Manhood, in which our former, and our later, Observations are with greater Judgment rang’d under their several Heads, is of particular use to the Memory. I will enlarge a little upon each of these, to set the whole in a clearer Light.
Under this Head are consider’d, 1. The Brain, much greater in Man, than in other Animals, in proportion to the Bulk of his Body.By the Brain, I here understand all that white Substance, which is contain’d in the Membranes within the Skull, which is sometimes divided into the Brain, properly so called, and the Cerebellum, of which Bartholin writes thus. “The Bulk of the human Brain is remarkable, in proportion to the Body, as Aristotle has observ’d. And a Man has generally twice as much Brains as an Ox, to the Quantity of four or five Pounds.” Hence, I think, we may thus reason. The weight of a middle-siz’d human Body amounts not to more than a fourth Part of the weight of an Ox, and yet has a Brain twice as large, to govern so little a Body; it hence follows, that he has eight times the Quantity of Brain, to govern an equal Quantity of Body. I have found the Bodies of large Sheep, and of Hogs, to equal, in weight, a human Body; and that their Brain weighs, but about the eighth Part of the Brain of a Man. But what other Inference can we draw from so great a Disparity, in this matter, between these Animals, than that Man is so form’d by Nature, that the Influence of his Brain, on the Government of his Actions, may be much greater and more conspicuous? It is certain, (to omit other Uses of the Brain, common to Man with other Animals, upon account whereof no Reason can be assign’d for the excess of Weight,) that Man, by the help of this part, 1st. Observes sensible Objects more accurately, and examines, (besides other Effects of less Consequence,) how much all those things, which are in our Power, can bring of Good or Evil to Men singly or jointly consider’d. 2dly. Because all the Nerves take their Rise from the Brain, or from the spinal M