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This collection of Key Documents of Liberty document the struggle to create free institutions from the ancient world to the modern. It is part of a series of Reading Lists which will include:
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Joyce Lee Malcom, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts, 2 vols, ed. Joyce Lee Malcolm (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 1. Chapter: Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Reports
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Sir Edward Coke, 1552-1634
The Second Part of the
REPORTS
OF
EDWARD COKE,
Her Majesty’s Attorney-General,
OF
Divers Matters in Law, with great and mature Consideration resolv’d and adjudg’d, which were never resolv’d or adjudg’d before; and the Reasons and Causes thereof; during the Reign of the most Illustrious and Renowned Queen ELIZABETH, the Fountain of all Justice, and the Life of the Law.
With References to all the BOOKS of the COMMON LAW, as well Ancient as Modern.
Videte quod non mihi soli laboravi, sed omnibus exquirentibus scientiam.
Ecclesiasticus, Cap. 24.
Lex est commune praeceptum, virorum prudentium consultum, delictorum quae sponte vel ignorantia contrahuntur, communis reipublicae sponsio.
Papian, Lib. 1. Definit’.
Lex dicitur a ligando, quia o bligat; vel dicitur a legendo, quia publice legatur.
Isiodorus.
Cum dico legem, a me dici nihil aliud intelligi volo quam imperium; sine quo domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec ho minum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura o mnis, nec ipse mundus potest.
Cic. Lib. 1. de Legibus.
Thomas Wight. 1602.
The feisty and brilliant Sir Edward Coke was probably the greatest champion of the common law. His extraordinary career spanned three reigns: he served as speaker of the House of Commons and later as attorney-general under Queen Elizabeth; as chief justice of the common pleas and chief justice of the King’s Bench under James I; and was an outspoken member of Parliament under James and Charles I. His role in a series of cases that limited the powers of the king and church courts led to his dismissal from the bench in 1616. Coke remained active in Parliament, leading the effort for passage of the Protestation of 1621 and the Petition of Right in 1628.
Coke’s renowned Reports of cases he heard argued during the reigns of Elizabeth and James began to appear in 1600 and ran to thirteen volumes, the last two published by Parliament after hisdeath. They are the most famous reports ever written on the common law and appeared in numerous editions, abridgments, and translations. The prefaces were in Latin and English, the main texts in Norman French with the pleadings in Latin. In the prefaces Coke laid out his defense of the antiquity and superiority of the common law and the high court of parliament as well as the independence of the judiciary. He exalted claims to individual liberties derived from a constitution more ancient than Magna Carta and laid a basis for both the British and American legal systems. Notwithstanding attacks on the accuracy of his versions of cases, his impact was enormous. The preface to the second volume of Reports, reprinted here, first appeared in 1602 while Coke was attorney-general. The original title page was entirely in Latin.
To the learned Reader.
There are (sayth Euripides) three vertues worthe our meditation; To honour God, our Parents who begat us, καὶ νόμους τε κοινοὺς Ἑλλάδος and these Common Lawes of Greece. The like doe I say to thee (Gentle Reader), next to thy dutie and pietie to God, and his annointed thy gracious Soveraigne, and thy honour to thy Parentes, yeeld due reverence and obedience to the Common Lawes of England: for all Lawes (I speake of human) these are most equall and most certaine, of greatest antiquitie, and least delay, and most beneficiall and easie to be observed; As if the module of a Preface would permit, I could defende against any man that is not malicious without understanding, and make manifest to any of judgement and indifferency, by proofes pregnant and demonstrative, and by Recordes and Testimonies luculent and irrefragable: Sed sunt quidam fastidiosi, qui nescio quo malo affectu oderunt Artes antequam pernoverunt. There is no Jewell in the world comparable to learning; No learning so excellent both for Prince and Subject as knowledge of Lawes; and no knowledge of any Lawes, (I speake of human) so necessarie for all estates, and for all causes, concerning goodes, landes, or life, the common Lawes of England. If the beautie of other Countries be faded and wasted with bloudie warres, thank God for the admirable peace wherein this Realme hath long flourished under the due administration of these Lawes. If thou readest of the tyranny of other Nations, wherein powerfull will and pleasure standes for Law & Reason, and where upon conceit of mislike, men are suddenly poisoned, or otherwise murthered, and never called to aunswere; Praise God for the Justice of thy gracious Soveraigne, who (to the worlde’s admiration), governeth her people by God’s goodnesse in peace and prosperity by these Lawes, and punisheth not the greatest offendor, no, though his offence be crimen laese Majestatis, Treason against her sacred person, but by the just and equall proceedings of Law.
If in other kingdomes, the Lawes seeme to governe: But the Judges had rather misconstrue the Law, and doe injustice, than Displease the King’s humour, whereof the Poet speaketh; Ad libitum Regis, sonuit sententia Legis: Blesse God for Queene Elizabeth, whose continuall charge to her Justices agreeable with her auncient Lawes, is, that for no commaundement under the great or privie Seale, writtes or letters, common right be disturbed or delayed.1 And if any such commaundement (upon untrue surmises) should come, that the Justices of her Lawes should not therefore cease to doe right in any point.2 And this agreeth with the auncient Law of England, declared by the great Charter, and spoken in the person of the king; Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus Justiciam vel Rectum.3
If the auncient Lawes of this noble Island had not excelled all others, it could not be but some of the severall Conquerors, and Governors thereof; That is to say, the Romanes, Saxons, Danes, or Normans, and specially the Romanes, who (as they justly may) doe boast of their Civill Lawes, would (as every of them might) have altered or changed the same.
For thy comfort and incouragement, cast thine eye upon the Sages of the Law, that have been before thee, and never shalt thou finde any that hath excelled in the knowledge of these Lawes, but hath sucked from the breasts of that divine knowledge, honesty, gravity, and integrity, and by the goodnes of God hath obtained, a greater blessing and ornament than any other profession, to their familie and posteritie. As by the page following, taking some for many you may perceive; for it is an undoubted truth, That the just shall flourish as the Palme tree, and spread abroad as the Cedars of Libanus.
Their example and thy profession doe require thy imitation: for hetherto I never saw any man of a loose and lawles life, attaine to any sound and perfect knowledge of the said lawes. And on the other side, I never saw any man of excellent judgement in these Lawes, but was withall (being taught by such a Master) honest, faithfull, and vertuous.
If you observe any diversities of oppinions amongest the professors of the Lawes, contende you (as it behoveth) to be learned in your profession, and you shall finde, that it is Hominis vitium, non professionis. And to say the trueth, the greatest questions arrise not upon any of the Rules of the Common Law, but sometimes uppon Conveyances and Instruments made by men unlearned; Many times upon Willes intricately, absurdly, and repugnantly set downe, by Parsons, Scriveners, and such other Imperites.4 And oftentimes upon Actes of Parliament, overladen with provisoes, and additions, and many times on a sudden penned or corrected by men of none or verie little judgement in Law.
If men would take sound advise and counsell in making of their Conveyances, Assurances, Instruments, and Willes: And Councellors would take paines to be rightly and truely informed of the true state of their Client’s case, so as their advise and counsel might be apt & agreeable to their Client’s estate: And if Acts of Parliament were after the olde fashion penned, and by such only as perfectly knew what the Common Law was before the making of any Act of Parliament concerning that matter, as also how farre forth former Statutes had provided remedie for former mischiefes and defects discovered by experience; Then should verie few questions in Law arise, and the learned should not so often and so much perplexe their heades, to make attonement and peace by construction of Law betweene insensible and disagreeing wordes, sentences, and Provisoes, as they now doe.
In all my time, I have not knowen two questions made of the right of Discents, of Escheates by the common Lawe &c. so certaine and sure the Rules thereof be: Happy were Artes if their professors would contende, and have a conscience to be learned in them, and if none but the learned would take upon them to give judgement of them.
Your kind and favorable acceptation (gentle Reader) of my former Edition, hath caused me to publish these few cases in performance of my former promise, & I wish to you all no lesse profit in reading of them, than I perswade myselfe to have reaped in observing of them. This only of the learned I desire.
[1. ]2 Edw. III, cap. 8, Statute of Northampton, 1328. This section reads “That it shall not be commanded by the great Seal nor the little Seal to disturb or delay common Right; and though such Commandments do come, the Justices shall not therefore leave to do right in any point.” See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 259.
[2. ]20 Edw. III, cap. 1, 1346, Ordinance for the Justices. In Section 1 the king proclaims that all his justices have been commanded “That they shall from henceforth do equal Law and Execution of right to all our Subjects, rich and poor, without having regard to any Person, and without omitting to do right for any Letters or Commandment which may come to them from Us, or from any other, or by any other cause.” See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 303.
20 Edw. III, cap. 2, 1346. Here the king states that in the same manner in which he commanded the justices to do right, “We have ordained in the right of the Barons of the Exchequer. . . . That they shall do right and reason to all our Subjects great and small; and that they shall deliver the People reasonably and without delay of the Business which they have to do before them, without undue tarrying as hath been done in times past.”
[3. ]Magna Carta, cap. 29. “To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice.”
[4. ]Unskillful ones.
Bruce Frohnen, The American Republic: Primary Sources, ed. Bruce Frohnen (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002). Chapter: Petition of Right 1628
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The unpopular foreign wars waged by England’s Charles I had led his Parliament to refuse to grant him increased tax monies. Charles had responded by forcing wealthy subjects to lend money to his government, quartering his troops in private homes, and arbitrarily arresting and imprisoning important figures who publicly opposed his policies. In response, Parliament, led by the famous lawyer Sir Edward Coke, drafted and sent to the king the Petition of Right. In this document, Parliament sets forth its view that long-standing law and custom established its right to consent to all taxes, and the right of the people to be free from arbitrary imprisonment, the forced quartering of soldiers, and martial law during time of peace. In return for Charles’s assent to this Petition, Parliament granted him increased subsidies.
Humbly show unto our Sovereign Lord the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, that whereas it is declared and enacted by a statute made in the time of the reign of King Edward I., commonly called Statutum de Tallagio non concedendo, that no tallage or aid shall be laid or levied by the king or his heirs in this realm, without the good will and assent of the archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other the freemen of the commonalty of this realm; and by authority of Parliament holden in the five-and-twentieth year of the reign of King Edward III., it is declared and enacted, that from thenceforth no person shall be compelled to make any loans to the king against his will, because such loans were against reason and the franchise of the land; and by other laws of this realm it is provided, that none should be charged by any charge or imposition, called a benevolence, nor by such like charge; by which the statutes before mentioned, and other the good laws and statutes of this realm, your subjects have inherited this freedom, that they should not be compelled to contribute to any tax, tallage, aid, or other like charge not set by common consent, in Parliament:
[Which Petition being read the 2nd of June, 1628, the King’s answer was thus delivered unto it.
The King willeth that right be done according to the laws and customs of the realm; and that the statutes be put in due execution, that his subjects may have no cause to complain of any wrong or oppressions, contrary to their just rights and liberties, to the preservation whereof he holds himself as well obliged as of his prerogative.
This form was unusual and was therefore thought to be an evasion; therefore on June 7 the King gave a second answer in the formula usual for approving bills: Soit droit fait comme il est désire.]
Samuel Rawson Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, selected and edited by Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906). Chapter: 27.: The Triennial Act.
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The text is in the public domain.
[February 15, 1640/1. 16 Car. I. cap. 1. Statutes of the Realm, v. 54. See Hist. of Engl. ix. 253, 262, 290.]
An Act for the preventing of inconveniences happening by the long intermission of Parliaments.
I. Whereas by the laws and statutes of this realm the Parliament ought to be holden at least once every year for the redress of grievances, but the appointment of the time and place for the holding thereof hath always belonged, as it ought, to His Majesty and his royal progenitors: and whereas it is by experience found that the not holding of Parliaments accordingly hath produced sundry and great mischiefs and inconveniences to the King’s Majesty, the Church and Commonwealth; for the prevention of the like mischiefs and inconveniences in time to come:
II. Be it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, with the consent of the Lord’s spiritual and temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, that the said laws and statutes be from henceforth duly kept and observed; and your Majesty’s loyal and obedient subjects, in this present Parliament now assembled, do humbly pray that it be enacted: and be it enacted accordingly, by the authority of this present Parliament, that in case there be not a Parliament summoned by writ under the Great Seal of England, and assembled and held before the 10th of September, which shall be in the third year next after the last day of the last meeting and sitting in this present Parliament, the beginning of the first year to be accounted from the said last day of the last meeting and sitting in Parliament; and so from time to time, and in all times hereafter, if there shall not be a Parliament assembled and held before the 10th day of September, which shall be in the third year next after the last day of the last meeting and sitting in Parliament before the time assembled and held; the beginning of the first year to be accounted from the said last day of the last meeting and sitting in Parliament; that then in every such case as aforesaid, the Parliament shall assemble and be held in the usual place at Westminster, in such manner, and by such means only, as is hereafter in this present Act declared and enacted, and not otherwise, on the second Monday, which shall be in the month of November, then next ensuing. And in case this present Parliament now assembled and held, or any other Parliament which shall at any time hereafter be assembled and held by writ under the Great Seal of England, or in case any Parliament shall be assembled and held by authority of this present Act; and such Parliaments, or any of them, shall be prorogued, or adjourned, or continued by prorogation or adjournment, until the 10th day of September, which shall be in the third year next after the last day of the last meeting and sitting in Parliament, to be accounted as aforesaid; that then in every such case, every such Parliament so prorogued or adjourned, or so continued by prorogation or adjournment, as aforesaid, shall from the said 10th day of September be thenceforth clearly and absolutely dissolved, and the Lord Chancellor of England, the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England, and every Commissioner and Commissioners, for the keeping of the Great Seal of England, for the time being, shall within six days after the said 10th day of September, in every such third year as aforesaid, in due form of law and without any further warrant or direction from His Majesty, his heirs or successors, seal, issue forth, and send abroad several and respective writs to the several and respective peers of this realm, commanding every such peer that he personally be at the Parliament to be held at Westminster on the second Monday which shall be in November next following the said 10th day of September, then and there to treat concerning the high and urgent affairs concerning His Majesty, the state and defence of the kingdom and Church of England; and shall also seal and issue forth, and send abroad several and respective writs to the several and respective sheriffs of the several and respective counties, cities and boroughs of England and Wales, and to the Constable of the Castle of Dover, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, or his lieutenant for the time being, and to the Mayor and Bailiffs of Berwick upon Tweed, and to all and every other officers and persons to whom writs have used to be directed, for the electing of the knights, citizens, barons and burgesses of and for the said Counties, Cities, Cinque Ports and Boroughs of England and Wales respectively, in the accustomed form, to appear and serve in the Parliament to be held at Westminster on the said second Monday, which shall be in November aforesaid; which said peers, after the said writs received, and which said knights, citizens, barons and burgesses chosen by virtue of the said writs, shall then and there appear and serve in Parliament accordingly. And the said Lord Chancellor, Lord Keeper, Commissioner and Commissioners aforesaid, shall respectively take a solemn oath upon the Holy Evangelists for the due issuing of writs, according to the tenor of this Act, in haec verba,—
‘You shall swear that you shall truly and faithfully issue forth, and send abroad all writs of summons to Parliament for both Houses, at such time, and in such manner, as is expressed and enjoined by an Act of Parliament, entitled, “An Act for the preventing of inconveniences happening by the long intermission of Parliaments.”’
Which oath is forthwith to be taken by the present Lord Keeper, and to be administered by the Clerk of the Crown to every Lord Chancellor, Lord Keeper, Commissioner and Commissioners aforesaid; and that none of the said officers respectively shall henceforth execute any the said offices before they have taken the said oath. And if the said Lord Chancellor, Lord Keeper, or any of the said Commissioners shall fail, or forbear so to issue out the said writs, according to the true meaning of this Act, then he or they respectively shall, beside the incurring of the grievous sin of perjury, be disabled, and become, by virtue of this Act, incapable, ipso facto, to bear his and their said offices respectively; and be further liable to such punishments as shall be inflicted upon him or them by the next, or any other ensuing Parliament. And in case the said Lord Chancellor, Lord Keeper, Commissioner or Commissioners aforesaid, shall not issue forth the said writs as aforesaid: or in case that the Parliament do not assemble and be held at the time and place before appointed, then the Parliament shall assemble and be held in the usual place at Westminster, in such manner, and by such means only, as is hereafter in this present Act declared and enacted, and not otherwise, on the third Monday which shall be in the month of January then next ensuing. And the peers of this realm shall by virtue of this Act be enabled, and are enjoined to meet in the Old Palace of Westminster, in the usual place there, on the third Monday in the said month of November: and they or any twelve or more of them, then and there assembled, shall on or before the last Monday of November next following the tenth day of September aforesaid, by virtue of this Act, without other warrant, issue out writs in the usual form, in the name of the King’s Majesty, his heirs or successors, attested under the hands and seals of twelve or more of the said peers, to the several and respective sheriffs of the several and respective counties, cities, and boroughs of England and Wales; and to the Constable of the Castle of Dover, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, or his lieutenant for the time being, and to the Mayor and Bailiffs of Berwick upon Tweed; and to all and every other the said officers and persons to whom writs have been used to be directed, for the electing of the knights, citizens, barons and burgesses, of and for the said Counties, Cities, Cinque Ports and Boroughs, to be and appear at the Parliament at Westminster aforesaid, to be held on the third Monday in January then next following: all and every which writs the Clerks of the Petty Bag, and other clerks, to whom the writing of the writs for summons to the Parliament doth and shall belong, or whom the said Lords, or twelve or more of them shall appoint, shall at the command of the said Lords so assembled, or of any twelve or more of them, make and prepare ready for the signature of the said Lords, or any twelve or more of them, under pain of the loss of their places and offices, and of such other punishment as in the next, or any other encuring Parliament, shall be inflicted on him or them: and it is enacted that the said writs so issued shall be of the same power and force to all intents and purposes, as the writs or summons to Parliament under the Great Seal of England have ever been or ought to be. And all the messengers of the Chamber or others who shall be appointed by the said Lords, or any twelve or more, are hereby required faithfully and speedily to deliver the said writs to every person and persons, sheriffs, officers, and others, to whom the same shall be directed: which if the said messengers or any of them shall fail to perform, they shall forfeit their respective places, and incur such other pains and punishments as by that or any other ensuing Parliament shall be imposed on them.
III. And it is also further enacted, that all and every the peers of this realm shall make their appearance, and shall assemble on the said third Monday in January, in such manner, and to such effect, and with such power, as if they had received every of them writs of summons to Parliament under the Great Seal of England, in the usual and accustomed manner. And in case the said Lords, or twelve or more of them, shall fail to issue forth such writs, or that the said writs do not come to the said several Counties, Cities, Cinque Ports and Boroughs, so that an election be not thereupon made; and in case there be not a Parliament assembled and held before the 23rd day of the said month of January, and so from time to time, and in all times hereafter, if there shall not be a Parliament assembled and held before the said 23rd day of January, then in every such case as aforesaid the Parliament shall assemble, and be held in the usual place at Westminster, in such manner, and by such means only, as is hereafter in this present Act declared and enacted, and not otherwise, on the second Tuesday which shall be in the month of March next after the said 23rd day of January; at which Parliament the peers of this realm shall make their appearance, and shall assemble at the time and place aforesaid, and shall each of them be liable unto such pains and censures for his and their not appearing and serving then and there in Parliament, as if he or they had been summoned by writ under the Great Seal of England, and had not appeared and served; and to such further pains and censures, as by the rest of the peers in Parliament assembled they shall be adjudged unto.
IV. And for the better assembling of the knights, citizens, barons, and burgesses to the said Parliament, as aforesaid, it is further enacted, that the several and respective sheriffs of the several and respective Counties, Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales, and the Chancellors, Masters and Scholars of both and every of the Universities, and the Mayor and Bailiffs of the borough of Berwick upon Tweed, shall at the several courts and places to be held and appointed for their respective Counties, Universities, Cities and Boroughs, next after the said 23rd day of January, cause such knight and knights, citizen and citizens, burgess and burgesses of their said Counties, Universities, Cities and Boroughs respectively, to be chosen by such persons, and in such manner, as if several and respective writs of summons to Parliament, under the Great Seal of England, had issued, and been awarded. And in case any of the several Sheriffs, or the Chancellors, Masters and Scholars of either of the Universities, or the Mayor and Bailiffs of Berwick respectively, do not before ten of the clock in the forenoon of the same day wherein the several and respective courts and places shall be held or appointed for their several and respective Counties, Universities, Cities and Boroughs as aforesaid, begin and proceed on according to the meaning of this law, in causing elections to be made of such knight and knights, citizen and citizens, burgess and burgesses, of their said Counties, Universities, Cities and Boroughs as aforesaid, then the freeholders of each County, and the Masters and Scholars of every the Universities, and the citizens and others having voices in such election respectively, in each University, City and Borough, that shall be assembled at the said courts or places to be held, or appointed, as aforesaid, shall forthwith, without further warrant or direction, proceed to the election of such knight or knights, citizen or citizens, burgess or burgesses aforesaid, in such manner as is usual in cases of writs of summons issued and awarded.
V. And it is further enacted that the several and respective sheriffs of their several and respective counties, and the Constables of the Castle of Dover, and Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, or his lieutenant for the time being respectively, shall after the said 23rd day of January, and before the 8th day of February then immediately next ensuing, award and send forth their precepts to the several and respective cities and boroughs within their several counties, and likewise unto the said Cinque Ports respectively, commanding them respectively to make choice of such citizen and citizens, barons, burgess and burgesses, to serve in the said Parliament, at the time and place aforesaid: which said Cities, Cinque Ports and Boroughs respectively, shall before the last day of the said month of February make election of such citizen and citizens, barons, burgess and burgesses, as if writs for summoning of a Parliament, under the Great Seal of England, has issued and been awarded. And in case no such precept shall come unto the said Cities, Cinque Ports and Boroughs respectively, by the time herein limited: or in case any precept shall come, and no election be made thereupon, before the said last day of February, that then the several citizens, burgesses, and other persons that ought to elect and send citizens, barons, and burgesses to the Parliament, shall on the first Tuesday in March then next ensuing the said last day of February make choice of such citizen and citizens, barons, burgess and burgesses, as if a writ of summons under the Great Seal of England had issued and been awarded, and precepts thereupon issued, to such Cities, Cinque Ports and Boroughs: which knights, citizens, barons and burgesses so chosen shall appear and serve in Parliament at the time and place aforesaid, and shall each of them be liable unto such pains and censures for his and their not appearing and serving then and there in Parliament, as if he or they had been elected and chosen by virtue of a writ under the Great Seal of England, and shall be likewise subject unto such further pains and censures for his and their not appearing and serving then and there in Parliament, as if he or they had been elected and chosen by virtue of a writ under the Great Seal of England, and shall be likewise subject to such further pains and censures as by the rest of the knights, citizens and burgesses assembled in the Commons House of Parliament, he or they shall be adjudged unto. And the sheriffs and other officers and persons to whom it appertaineth shall make returns, and accept and receive the returns of such elections in like manner as if writs of summons had issued, and been executed, as hath been used and accustomed: and in default of the sheriffs and other officers respectively, in not accepting or making return of such elections, it shall and may be lawful to and for the several freeholders, and other persons that have elected, to make returns of the knights, citizens, barons and burgesses by them elected, which shall be as good and effectual to all intents and purposes as if the sheriff or other officers had received a writ of summons for a Parliament, and had made such returns: and that such elections, precepts and returns shall be had and made at such times, by such persons, and in such manner, as before in this Act is expressed and declared, according to the true intent and meaning of this law; any writ, proclamation, edict, act, restraint, inhibition, order or warrant to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding. And in case any person or persons shall be so hardy to advise, frame, contrive, serve or put in execution any such writs, proclamation, edict, act, restraint, inhibition, order or warrant thereupon, then he or they so offending shall incur and sustain the pains, penalties and forfeitures limited, ordained and provided in and by the Statute of Provision and Premunire made in the 16th year of King Richard the Second, and shall from thenceforth be disabled, during his life, to sue and implead any person in any action real or personal, or to make any gift, grant, conveyance, or other disposition of any his lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods or chattels which he hath to his own use, either by act executed in his lifetime, or by his last will, or otherwise, or to take any gift, conveyance, or legacy to his own use: and if any Sheriff, Constable of the Castle of Dover, or Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, shall not perform his duty enjoined by this Act, then he shall lose and forfeit the sum of £1000, and every County, City, Cinque Port and Borough that shall not make election of their knights, citizens, barons and burgesses, respectively, shall incur the penalties following (that is to say) every County the sum of £1000, and every City, which is no County, £200, and every Cinque Port and Borough the sum of £100; all and every of which several forfeitures, and all other forfeitures in this Act mentioned, shall and may be recovered in any of the King’s Courts of Record at Westminster, without naming the Christian name and surname of the said Mayor for the time being, by action of debt, bill, plaint or information, wherein no essoine, protection, wager of law, aid, prayer, privilege, injunction, or order of restraint, shall be in any wise prayed, granted or allowed, nor any more than one imparlance: and if any person after notice given that the action depending is grounded and prosecuted upon or by virtue of this Statute shall cause or procure any such action to be stayed or delayed before judgment by colour or means of any order, warrant, power or authority, save only of the court wherein such action as aforesaid shall be brought or depending, or after judgment had upon such action, shall cause or procure the execution of, or upon any such judgment, to be stayed or delayed by colour or means of any order, warrant, power or authority, save only by writ of error or attaint, that then the said persons so offending shall incur and sustain all and every the pains, penalties and forfeitures, limited, ordained and provided in and by the said Statute of Provision and Premunire, made in the 16th of King Richard the Second. And if any Lord Mayor of London shall at any time hereafter commence or prefer any such suit, action or information, and shall happen to die or be removed out of his office before recovery and execution had, that yet not such action, suit or information, sued, commenced or preferred, shall by such displacing or death be abated, discontinued or ended, but that it shall and may be lawful to and for the Lord Mayor of the City of London next succeeding in that office and place, to prosecute, pursue and follow all and every such action, bill, plaint or information for the causes aforesaid, so hanging and depending in such manner and form, and to all intents and purposes, as that Lord Mayor might have done, which first commenced or preferred the same. The fifth part of all and every the forfeitures in this Act mentioned, shall go and be, to, and for the use and behoof of the City of London, and the other four parts and residue to be employed and disposed to, and for such only uses, intents and purposes as by the knights, citizens and burgesses in Parliament assembled, shall be declared, directed and appointed.
Provided that in case the freeholders of any County and inhabitants, or other persons having or claiming power to make election of any knights, citizens, barons or burgesses, shall proceed to making of election of their knights, citizens, barons and burgesses, which election shall afterwards fall out to be adjudged or declared void in law by the House of Commons, by reason of equality of voices or misdemeanour of any person whatsoever, then the said County, City, Cinque Port or Borough shall not incur the penalties in this law, so as an election de facto be made.
VI. And it is further enacted, that no Parliament henceforth to be assembled shall be dissolved or prorogued within fifty days at least after the time appointed for the meeting thereof, unless it be by assent of His Majesty, his heirs or successors, and of both Houses in Parliament assembled; and that neither the House of Peers nor the House of Commons shall be adjourned within fifty days at least after the meeting thereof, unless it be by the free consent of every the said Houses respectively.
VII. And be it further enacted and declared by authority of this present Parliament, that the Peers to be assembled at any Parliament by virtue of this Act, shall and may from time to time, at any time during such their assembly in Parliament, choose and declare such person to be Speaker for the said Peers as they shall think fit. And likewise that the said knights, citizens and burgesses to be assembled at any Parliament by virtue of this Act, shall and may from time to time, at any time during such their assembly in Parliament, choose and declare one of themselves to be Speaker for the said knights, citizens and burgesses of the House of Commons assembled in the said Parliament as they shall think fit; which said Speakers, and every of them, as well for the said Peers as for the said House of Commons respectively, shall, by virtue of this Act, be perfect and complete Speakers for the said Houses respectively, and shall have as full and large power, jurisdiction and privileges, to all intents and purposes, as any Speaker or Speakers of either of the said Houses respectively, heretofore have had or enjoyed.
VIII. And it is further enacted and declared, that all Parliaments hereafter to be assembled by authority of this Act and every member thereof shall have and enjoy all rights, privileges, jurisdictions and immunities, as any Parliament summoned by writ under the Great Seal of England, or any member thereof might or ought to have; and all and every the members that shall be elected and chosen to serve in any Parliament hereafter to be assembled by authority of this Act as aforesaid, shall assemble and meet in the Commons House of Parliament, and shall enter into the same, and have voices in such Parliament before and without the taking of the several oaths of supremacy and allegiance, or either of them, any law or statute to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding.
IX. Provided always, that if the King’s Majesty, his heirs or successors, shall at any time during any Parliament hereafter to be assembled by authority of this Act as aforesaid, award or direct any commission or commissions unto any person or persons whatsoever, thereby giving power and authority to him or them to take and receive the oath of supremacy and allegiance, of all or any the members of the Commons House of Parliament, and any the members of that House being duly required thereunto, shall refuse or neglect to take and pronounce the same, that from thenceforth such person so refusing or neglecting shall be deemed no member of that House, nor shall have any voice therein, and shall suffer such pains and penalties as if he had presumed to sit in the same House without election, return or authority.
X. And it is likewise provided and enacted, that this Statute shall be publicly read yearly at every General Sessions of the Peace, to be held next after the Epiphany, and every Assizes then next ensuing by the Clerk of the Peace and Clerk of the Assizes for the time being respectively. And if they or either of them shall neglect or fail to do the same accordingly, then such party so neglecting or failing shall forfeit the sum of one hundred pounds.
XI. And it is lastly provided and enacted, that His Majesty’s royal assent to this Bill shall not thereby determine this present Session of Parliament1 , and that all statutes and Acts of Parliament which are to have continuance unto the end of this present Session, shall be of full force after His Majesty’s assent, until this present Session be fully ended and determined; and if this present Session shall determine by dissolution of this present Parliament, then all the Acts and statutes aforesaid shall be continued until the end of the first Session of the next Parliament.
[1 ] It was at that time the custom that the royal assent was given to Bills at the end of the Session, and it was consequently argued that the assent put an end to the Session.
Samuel Rawson Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, selected and edited by Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906). Chapter: 34.: The Act for the Abolition of the Court of Star Chamber.
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/1434/194248 on 2010-02-05
The text is in the public domain.
[July 5, 1641. Statutes of the Realm, v. 110. 17 Car. I. cap. 10. See Hist. of Engl. ix. 404.]
An Act for the Regulating the Privy Council and for taking away the Court commonly called the Star Chamber.
I. Whereas by the Great Charter many times confirmed in Parliament, it is enacted that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled or otherwise destroyed, and that the King will not pass upon him or condemn him but by lawful judgment of his Peers or by the law of the land; and by another statute made in the fifth year of the reign of King Edward the Third1 , it is enacted that no man shall be attached by any accusation nor forejudged of life or limb, nor his lands, tenements, goods nor chattels seized into the King’s hands against the form of the Great Charter and the law of the land2 : and by another statute made in the five-and-twentieth year of the reign of the same King Edward the Third3 , it is accorded, asseuted and established that none shall be taken by petition or suggestion made to the King or to his Council, unless it be by indictment or presentment of good and lawful people of the same neighbourhood where such deeds be done, in due manner or by process made by writ original at the common law, and that none be put out of his franchise or freehold unless he be duly brought in to answer and forejudged of the same by the course of the law, and if anything be done against the same, it shall be redressed and holden for none: and by another statute made in the eight-and-twentieth year of the reign of the same King Edward the Third4 , it is amongst other things enacted that no man of what estate or condition soever he be shall be put out of his lands or tenements, nor taken nor imprisoned nor disinherited without being brought in to answer by due process of law: and by another statute made in the two-and-fortieth year of the reign of the said King Edward the Third5 , it is enacted that no man be put to answer without presentment before Justices or matter of record, or by due process and writ original according to the old law of the land, and if anything be done to the contrary, it shall be void in law and holden for error: and by another statute made in the six-and-thirtieth year of the same King Edward the Third6 , it is amongst other things enacted, that all pleas which shall be pleaded in any Courts before any of the King’s Justices, or in his other places or before any of his other ministers, or in the Courts and places of any other Lords within the realm, shall be entered and enrolled in Latin: and whereas by the statute made in the third year of King Henry the Seventh1 , power is given to the Chancellor, the Lord Treasurer of England for the time being, and the Keeper of the King’s Privy Seal, or two of them calling unto them a Bishop and a Temporal Lord of the King’s most honourable Council, and the two Chief Justices of the King’s Bench and Common Pleas for the time being, or other two Justices in their absence, to proceed as in that Act is expressed for the punishment of some particular offences therein mentioned: and by the statute made in the one-and-twentieth year of King Henry the Eighth2 , the President of the Council is associated to join with the Lord Chancellor and other Judges in the said statute of the third of Henry the Seventh mentioned: but the said Judges have not kept themselves to the points limited by the said statute, but have undertaken to punish where no law doth warrant, and to make decrees for things having no such authority, and to inflict heavier punishments than by any law is warranted; and forasmuch as all matters examinable or determinable before the said Judges, or in the Court commonly called the Star Chamber, may have their proper remedy and redress, and their due punishment and correction by the common law of the land, and in the ordinary course of justice elsewhere, and forasmuch as the reasons and motives inducing the erection and continuance of that Court do now cease, and the proceedings, censures and decrees of that Court have by experience been found to be an intolerable burden to the subjects, and the means to introduce an arbitrary power and government: and forasmuch as the Council Table hath of late times assumed unto itself a power to intermeddle in civil causes and matters only of private interest between party and party, and have adventured to determine of the estates and liberties of the subject contrary to the law of the land and the rights and privileges of the subject, by which great and manifold mischiefs and inconveniences have arisen and happened, and much uncertainty by means of such proceedings hath been conceived concerning men’s rights and estates: for settling whereof and preventing the like in time to come, be it ordained and enacted by the authority of this present Parliament, that the said Court commonly called the Star Chamber, and all jurisdiction, power and authority belonging unto or exercised in the same Court, or by any of the Judges, Officers or Ministers thereof be, from the first day of August in the year of our Lord God one thousand six hundred forty and one, clearly and absolutely dissolved, taken away, and determined; and that from the said first day of August neither the Lord Chancellor or Keeper of the Great Seal of England, the Lord Treasurer of England, the Keeper of the King’s Privy Seal, or President of the Council, nor any Bishop, Temporal Lord, Privy Councillor, or Judge, or Justice whatsoever, shall have any power or authority to hear, examine or determine any matter or thing whatsoever in the said Court commonly called the Star Chamber, or to make, pronounce or deliver any judgment, sentence, order or decree, or to do any judicial or ministerial act in the said Court: and that all and every Act and Acts of Parliament, and all and every article, clause, and sentence in them and every of them, by which any jurisdiction, power or authority is given, limited or appointed unto the said Court, commonly called the Star Chamber, or unto all or any the Judges, Officers or Ministers thereof, or for any proceedings to be had or made in the said Court, or for any matter or thing to be drawn into question, examined or determined, there shall, for so much as concerneth the said Court of Star Chamber, and the power and authority thereby given unto it be, from the said first day of August, repealed and absolutely revoked and made void.
II. And be it likewise enacted, that the like jurisdiction now used and exercised in the Court before the President and Council in the Marches of Wales; and also in the Court before the President and Council established in the northern parts; and also in the Court commonly called the Court of the Duchy of Lancaster, held before the Chancellor and Council of the Court; and also in the Court of Exchequer of the County Palatine of Chester, held before the Chamberlain and Council of that Court; the like jurisdiction being exercised there, shall, from the said first day of August one thousand six hundred forty and one, be also repealed and absolutely revoked and made void, any law, prescription, custom or usage; or the said statute made in the third year of King Henry the Seventh; or the statute made the one-and-twentieth of Henry the Eighth; or any Act or Acts of Parliament heretofore had or made to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding; and that from henceforth no court, council, or place of judicature shall be erected, ordained, constituted, or appointed within this realm of England or dominion of Wales, which shall have, use or exercise the same or the like jurisdiction, as is or hath been used, practised or exercised in the said Court of Star Chamber.
III. Be it likewise declared and enacted by authority of this present Parliament, that neither His Majesty nor his Privy Council have or ought to have any jurisdiction, power or authority by English bill, petition, articles, libel, or any other arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine or draw into question, determine or dispose of the lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods or chattels of any the subjects of this kingdom, but that the same ought to be tried and determined in the ordinary Courts of Justice and by the ordinary course of the law.
IV. And be it further provided and enacted, that if any Lord Chancellor or Keeper of the Great Seal of England, Lord Treasurer, Keeper of the King’s Privy Seal, President of the Council, Bishop, Temporal Lord, Privy Councillor, Judge, or Justice whatsoever, shall offend or do anything contrary to the purport, true intent and meaning of this law; then he or they shall for such offence forfeit the sum of £500 of lawful money of England unto any party grieved, his executors or administrators, who shall really prosecute for the same, and first obtain judgment thereupon to be recorded in any Court of Record at Westminster by action of debt, bill, plaint or information, wherein no essoine1 , protection, wager of law, aid, prayer, privilege, injunction or order of restraint shall be in any wise prayed, granted or allowed, nor any more than one imparlance; and if any person against whom any such judgment or recovery shall be had as aforesaid, shall after such judgment or recovery offend again in the same, then he or they for such offence shall forfeit the sum of £1000 of lawful money of England unto any party grieved, his executors or administrators, who shall really prosecute for the same, and first obtain judgment thereupon to be recorded in any Court of Record at Westminster by action of debt, bill, plaint or information, in which no essoine, protection, wager of law, aid, prayer, privilege, injunction or order of restraint shall be in any wise prayed, granted or allowed, nor any more than one imparlance. And if any person against whom any such judgment or recovery shall be had as aforesaid, shall after such judgment or recovery offend again in the same kind, and shall be thereof duly convicted by indictment, information or any other lawful way or means, that such person so convicted shall be from thenceforth disabled and become by virtue of this Act incapable ipso facto to bear his and their said office and offices respectively, and shall be likewise disabled to make any gift, grant, conveyance or other disposition of any his lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods or chattels, or to take any benefit of any gift, conveyance or legacy to his own use.
V. And every person so offending shall likewise forfeit and lose unto the party grieved, by anything done contrary to the true intent and meaning of this law, his treble damages which he shall sustain and be put unto by means or occasion of any such act or thing done, the same to be recovered in any of His Majesty’s Courts of Record at Westminster by action of debt, bill, plaint or information, wherein no essoine, protection, wager of law, aid, prayer, privilege, injunction or order of restraint, shall be in any wise prayed, granted or allowed, nor any more than one imparlance.
VI. And be it also provided and enacted, that if any person shall hereafter be committed, restrained of his liberty or suffer imprisonment [by the order or decree of any such Court of Star Chamber or other Court aforesaid, now or at any time hereafter having or pretending to have the same or like jurisdiction, power or authority to commit or imprison as aforesaid, or by the command or warrant of the King’s Majesty, his heirs or successors, in their own person or by the command or warrant of the Council Board or of any of the Lords or others of His Majesty’s Privy Council1 ], that in every such case every person so committed, restrained of his liberty, or suffering imprisonment, upon demand or motion made by his counsel or other employed by him for that purpose unto the Judges of the Court of King’s Bench or Common Pleas in open Court, shall, without delay upon any pretence whatsoever, for the ordinary fees usually paid for the same, have forthwith granted unto him a Writ of Habeas Corpus to be directed generally unto all and every sheriff’s gaoler, minister, officer or other person in whose custody the party committed or restrained shall be, and the sheriff’s gaoler, minister, officer or other person in whose custody the party so committed or restrained shall be, shall at the return of writ and according to the command thereof, upon due and convenient notice thereof given unto him [at the charge of the party who requireth or procureth such writ, and upon security by his own bond given to pay the charge of carrying back the prisoner if he shall be remanded by the Court to which he shall be brought, as in like cases hath been used, such charges of bringing up and carrying back the prisoner to be always ordered by the Court if any difference shall arise thereabout1 ], bring or cause to be brought the body of the said party so committed or restrained unto and before the Judges or Justices of the said Court from whence the same writ shall issue in open Court, and shall then likewise certify the true cause of such his detenior or imprisonment, and thereupon the Court, within three court days after such return made and delivered in open Court, shall proceed to examine and determine whether the cause of such commitment appearing upon the said return be just and legal or not, and shall thereupon do what to justice shall appertain, either by delivering, bailing or remanding the prisoner. And if anything shall be otherwise wilfully done or omitted to be done by any Judge, Justice, officer or other person aforementioned, contrary to the direction and true meaning hereof, that then such person so offending shall forfeit to the party grieved his treble damages, to be recovered by such means and in such manner as is formerly in this Act limited and appointed for the like penalty to be sued for and recovered.
VII. Provided always and be it enacted, that this Act and the several clauses therein contained shall be taken and expounded to extend only to the Court of Star Chamber, and to the said Courts holden before the President and Council in the Marches of Wales, and before the President and Council in the northern parts, and also to the Court commonly called the Court of the Duchy of Lancaster, holden before the Chancellor and Council of that Court, and also in the Court of Exchequer of the County Palatine of Chester, held before the Chamberlain and Council of that Court, and to all Courts of like jurisdiction to be hereafter erected, ordained, constituted or appointed as aforesaid, and to the warrants and directions of the Council Board, and to the commitments, restraints, and imprisonments of any person or persons made, commanded or awarded by the King’s Majesty, his heirs or successors, in their own person or by the Lords and others of the Privy Council and every one of them.
VIII. And lastly, provided and be it enacted, that no person or persons shall be sued, impleaded, molested or troubled for any offence against this present Act, unless the party supposed to have so offended shall be sued or impleaded for the same within two years at the most after such time wherein the said offence shall be committed.
[1 ] 5 E. III. c. 9.
[2 ] Magna Carta, 9 H. III. c. 29.
[3 ] 25 E. III. st. 5. c. 4.
[4 ] 28 E. III. c. 3.
[5 ] 42 E. III. c. 3.
[6 ] 36 E. III. c. 15.
[1 ] 3 H. VII. c. 1. § 1.
[2 ] 21 H. VIII. c. 20.
[1 ] Allegation of absence from lawful reasons.
[1 ] Annexed to the original Act in a separate schedule.
[1 ] Annexed to the original Act in a separate schedule.
Samuel Rawson Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, selected and edited by Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906). Chapter: 31.: The Tonnage and Poundage Act.
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/1434/194242 on 2010-02-05
The text is in the public domain.
[June 22, 1641. 17 Car. I. cap. 8. Statutes of the Realm, v. 104. See Hist. of Engl. ix. 400.]
A subsidy granted to the King, of tonnage, poundage, and other sums of money payable upon merchandise exported and imported.
1. Whereas upon examination in this present Parliament of divers of the farmers, customers, and collectors of the customs upon merchandise, and likewise upon their own confession, it appeared that they have taken divers great sums of money of His Majesty’s subjects, and likewise of merchants aliens for goods imported and exported by the names of a subsidy of tonnage and poundage, and by colour of divers other impositions laid upon merchandise, which have been taken and received against the laws of the realm, in regard the said sums of money and impositions were not granted by common consent in Parliament, and for so doing have deserved condign punishment. Be it therefore declared and enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty and the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament assembled: and it is hereby declared and enacted, That it is and hath been the ancient right of the subjects of this realm, that no subsidy, custom, impost, or other charge whatsoever ought or may be laid or imposed upon any merchandise exported or imported by subjects, denizens, or aliens without common consent in Parliament: yet nevertheless the Commons before whom those examinations were taken, taking into their consideration the great peril that might ensue to this realm by the not guarding of the seas, and the other inconveniences which might follow in case the said sums of money should upon the sudden be forborne to be paid by and with the advice and consent of the Lords in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, do give and grant to our supreme liege Lord and Sovereign one subsidy called tonnage, that is to say, of every tun of wine that is or shall come into this realm or any His Majesty’s dominions by way of merchandise the sum of three shillings, and so after that rate, and of every tun of sweet wines, as well malmsey as other, that is or shall come into this realm by any merchant alien three shillings, and so after the rate over and above the three shillings above mentioned, and of every awme of Rhenish wine that is or shall so come in twelve pence; and also one other subsidy called poundage, that is to say, of all manner of goods and merchandise of every merchant, denizen and alien carried or to be carried out of this realm, or any His Majesty’s dominions, or to be brought into the same by way of merchandise, of the value of every twenty shillings of the same goods and merchandise twelve pence, and so after the rate; and of every twenty shillings value of tin and pewter vessel carried out of this realm by every or any merchant alien, twelve pence over and above the twelve pence aforesaid, except and foreprized out of this grant of subsidy of poundage all manner of woollen cloth made or wrought, or which shall be made or wrought within this realm of England and by every or any merchant denizen, and not born alien, carried or to be carried out of this realm; and all manner of wools, woolfells, hides, and backs of leather, that is or shall be carried out of this realm; and all wines not before limited to pay subsidy or tonnage, and all manner of fresh fish and bestial coming or that shall come into this realm.
II. And further the said Commons by the advice, assent, and authority aforesaid, do give and grant unto our said liege Lord, our Sovereign for the causes aforesaid, one other subsidy, that is to say, of every merchant born denizen of and for every sack of wool thirty-three shillings four pence, and of and for every two hundred and forty woolfells thirty-three shillings four pence, and of and for every last of hides and backs three pounds six shillings eight pence, and so after the same rate for every less or greater quantity for any the same merchandise more or less; and of every merchant stranger not born denizen, of and for every sack of wool three pounds six shillings eight pence; and of and for every two hundred forty woolfells three pounds six shillings eight pence, and for every last of hides and backs three pounds thirteen shillings four pence, and so of all the said wools, woolfells, hides and backs, and of every of them after the rate, and such other sums of money as have been imposed upon any merchandise either outward or inward by pretext of any letters patents, commission under the Great Seal of England or Privy Seal, since the first year of the reign of his late Majesty King James of blessed memory, and which were continued and paid at the beginning of this present Parliament; to have, take, enjoy, and perceive the subsidies aforesaid, and other the fore-mentioned sums and every of them, and every part and parcel of them to our said liege Lord and Sovereign from the five and twentieth of May, one thousand six hundred forty-one, to the fifteenth of July next ensuing.
III. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid: that the said subsidy of tonnage, poundage, wools, and other sums of money shall be taken and employed during the time aforesaid to and for the intents and purposes, and upon and under such provisions, clauses, and limitations as are contained in one Act made in the Parliament held in the first year of the reign of his said late Majesty King James of blessed memory, entitled An Act for the granting of a Subsidy to the King, of Tonnage, Poundage, Wools, &c.
IV. And it is hereby declared that the sums of money hereby granted upon merchandise are not the rates intended to be continued, but the same to be hereafter in this present Parliament altered in such manner as shall be thought fit.
V. Provided that no penalty or forfeiture contained in this present Act or in the said Act made in the first year of King James do or shall ensue to any person or persons, unless they refuse to compound for any merchandise or goods imported or exported after notice given of this act, penalty, and forfeiture by proclamation, where the said goods are or ought to be entered.
VI. And it is further enacted that any customer or comptroller, or any other officer or person that after the determination of this grant shall take or receive or cause to be taken or received the said subsidy, sums of money or any other imposition upon merchandise whatsoever exported or imported (except the same by grant in Parliament be due, or by such grant shall become due or have been continually paid from the end of the reign of the late King Edward the Third until the beginning of the reign of the late Queen Mary), shall incur and sustain the pains, penalties, and forfeitures ordained and provided by the Statute of Provision and Premunire made in the sixteenth year of King Richard the Second, and shall also from thenceforth be disabled during his life to sue or implead any person in any action real, mixed or personal, or in any court whatsoever.
VII. Provided always that this Act shall not extend to any imposition or charge upon any sort of tobacco of English plantations, but that the said tobaccos shall be charged only with the payment of two pence in the pound and no more.
Samuel Rawson Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, selected and edited by Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906). Chapter: 35.: The Act for the Abolition of the Court of High Commission.
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/1434/194250 on 2010-02-05
The text is in the public domain.
[July 5, 1641. 17 Car. I. cap. 11. Statutes of the Realm, v. 112. See Hist. of Engl. ix. 404.]
An Act for the repeal of a branch of a Statute primo Elizabethae, concerning Commissioners for causes ecclesiastical.
I. Whereas in the Parliament holden in the first year of the reign of the late Queen Elizabeth, late Queen of England, there was an Act made and established, entitled ‘An Act restoring to the Crown the ancient jurisdiction over the State ecclesiastical and spiritual,’ and abolishing all foreign power repugnant to the same: in which Act, amongst other things, there is contained one clause, branch, article or sentence whereby it was enacted to this effect: namely, that the said late Queen’s Highness, her heirs and successors, Kings or Queens of this realm, should have full power and authority by virtue of that Act, by Letters Patents under the Great Seal of England, to assign, name and authorise when and as often as Her Highness, her heirs or successors, should think meet and convenient, and for such and so long time as should please Her Highness, her heirs or successors, such person or persons being natural born subjects to Her Highness, her heirs or successors, as Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, should think meet to exercise, use, occupy and execute under Her Highness, her heirs and successors, all manner of jurisdictions, privileges, and preeminence in any wise touching or concerning any spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction within these her realms of England and Ireland, or any other Her Highness’s dominious and countries, and to visit, reform, redress, order, correct and amend all such errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts and enormities whatsoever, which by any manner spiritual or ecclesiastical power, authority or jurisdiction can or may lawfully be reformed, ordered, redressed, corrected, restrained, or amended, to the pleasure of Almighty God, the increase of virtue and the conservation of the peace and unity of this realm. And that such person or persons so to be named, assigned, authorised and appointed by Her Highness, her heirs or successors, after the said Letters Patents to him or them made and delivered as aforesaid, should have full power and authority by virtue of that Act and of the said Letters Patents under Her Highness, her heirs or successors, to exercise, use and execute all the premises, according to the tenor and effect of the said Letters Patents, any matter or cause to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding; and whereas by colour of some words in the foresaid branch of the said Act, whereby Commissioners are authorised to execute their commission according to the tenor and effect of the King’s Letters Patents, and by Letters Patents grounded thereupon, the said Commissioners have, to the great and insufferable wrong and oppression of the King’s subjects, used to fine and imprison them, and to exercise other authority not belonging to ecclesiastical jurisdiction restored by that Act, and divers other great mischiefs and inconveniences have also ensued to the King’s subjects by occasion of the said branch and commissions issued thereupon, and the executions thereof: therefore for the repressing and preventing of the foresaid abuses, mischiefs and inconveniences in time to come, be it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty and the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that the foresaid branch, clause, article or sentence contained in the said Act, and every word, matter and thing contained in that branch, clause, article or sentence shall from henceforth be repealed, annulled, revoked, annihilated and utterly made void for ever, anything in the said Act to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding.
II. And be it also enacted by the authority aforesaid, that no Archbishop, Bishop, nor Vicar General, nor any Chancellor, Official, nor Commissary of any Archbishop, Bishop or Vicar General, nor any Ordinary whatsoever, nor any other spiritual or ecclesiastical Judge, Officer or Minister of Justice, nor any other person or persons whatsoever exercising spiritual or ecclesiastical power, authority or jurisdiction by any grant, licence or commission of the King’s Majesty, his heirs or successors, or by any power or authority derived from the King, his heirs or successors, or otherwise, shall from and after the first day of August, which shall be in the year of our Lord God one thousand six hundred forty and one, award, impose or inflict any pain, penalty, fine, amercement, imprisonment or other corporal punishment upon any of the King’s subjects for any contempt, misdemeanour, crime, offence, matter or thing whatsoever belonging to spiritual or ecclesiastical cognizance or jurisdiction, or shall ex officio, or at the instance or promotion of any other person whatsoever, urge, enforce, tender, give or minister unto any churchwarden, sidesman or other person whatsoever any corporal oath, whereby he or she shall or may be charged or obliged to make any presentment of any crime or offence, or to confess or to accuse him or herself of any crime, offence, delinquency or misdemeanour, or any neglect or thing whereby, or by reason whereof, he or she shall or may be liable or exposed to any censure, pain, penalty or punishment whatsoever, upon pain and penalty that every person who shall offend contrary to this statute shall forfeit and pay treble damages to every person thereby grieved, and the sum of £100 to him or them who shall demand and sue for the same; which said treble damages and sum of £100 shall and may be demanded and recovered by action of debt, bill or plaint in any Court of Record wherein no privilege, essoine, protection or wager of law shall be admitted or allowed to the defendant.
III. And be it further enacted, that every person who shall be once convicted of any act or offence prohibited by this statute, shall for such act or offence be from and after such conviction utterly disabled to be or continue in any office or employment in any Court of Justice whatsoever, or to exercise or execute any power, authority or jurisdiction by force of any Commission or Letters Patents of the King, his heirs or successors.
IV. And be it further enacted, that from and after the said first day of August, no new Court shall be erected, ordained or appointed within this realm of England or dominion of Wales, which shall or may have the like power, jurisdiction or authority as the said High Commission Court now hath or pretendeth to have; but that all and every such Letters Patents, Commissions and Grants made or to be made by His Majesty, his heirs or successors, and all powers and authorities granted or pretended or mentioned to be granted thereby, and all acts, sentences and decrees, to be made by virtue or colour thereof shall be utterly void and of none effect.
Joyce Lee Malcom, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts, 2 vols, ed. Joyce Lee Malcolm (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 1. Chapter: Charles I, XIX Propositions Made by Parliament
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/810/164708 on 2010-02-05
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
Charles I, 1600-1649
XIX.
PROPOSITIONS
Made
By both Houses of Parliament, to the Kings most Excellent Majestie:
With His Majesties Answer thereunto.
¶By the King.
Our expresse pleasure is, That this Our Answer be read and published throughout all Churches and Chappels of the Kingdom of England and Dominion of Wales,
By the severall Parsons, Vicars, or Curats of the same.
YORK:
Printed by Robert Barker, Printer to the Kings most Excellent Majestie: And by the Assignes of John Bill.
1642.
After Charles abandoned London in January 1642 for what he hoped would be the more loyal North, the two houses of Parliament at Westminster attempted to negotiate with him through a series of published declarations, remonstrances, answers, and open letters. These reached a constitutional climax in June with Parliament’s publication on 1 June of the Nineteen Propositions, proposals that would have sharply and permanently circumscribed the king’s powers, and Charles’s response on 18 June.
Charles’s “Answer to the Nineteen Propositions” has become even more famous than the propositions themselves. This answer has been heralded for its endorsement of England’s mixed and balanced constitution and for its reliance upon law for support. Of chief significance, however, is the king’s acceptance of the concept that he is not above the three estates assembled in Parliament but in fact is one of the three estates. The Answer was written for Charles by two of his moderate advisers, Sir John Colepeper and Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland—men who had worked in the Long Parliament the previous year to rein in the expanded royal prerogative. The passage in which the king endorses the idea of being one of three estates in Parliament—thus excluding the bishops from membership and reducing the position of the Crown to coordinate membership—was penned by Colepeper. It is unclear whether Falkland fully endorsed the Answer’s concession that the king was one of the three estates. He later pleaded inadvertence, claimed Colepeper had been misled by some lawyers, and that clergymen had misunderstood. Sir Edward Hyde, the best known of Charles’s moderate advisers, was unhappy with the concession and tried to delay publication. It is even unclear whether the king actually read the crucial passage, although he assuredly glanced at, and gave his approval to, the lengthy reply. In important respects it does not reflect views Charles espoused before or afterward.
Whatever confusion reigned among the king’s advisers, however willingly, reluctantly, or unknowingly the king complied, the Answer publicly altered the basis of royal defense and argument.
There is much of interest in the entire reply. Because historians have focused almost exclusively upon its crucial constitutional concessions, however, the answer has seldom been reprinted in its entirety. As a result its tone has been misread. The reply reprinted here was published by royal order at York and is unusual in providing the text of both the Nineteen Propositions and the king’s Answer. In earnest of the king’s desire that the Answer be widely published and read in churches throughout England and Wales, six further editions were printed in 1642. It is notable that two editions published in 1643 either omitted the reference to the three estates of Parliament or the entire section on the English constitution.
XIX. Propositions made by both Houses of Parliament, to the Kings most excellent Majestie, touching the differences between His Majestie and the said Houses.
Your Majestie’s most humble and faithfull Subjects, the Lords and Commons in Parliament, having nothing in their thoughts and desires more precious and of higher esteem (next to the Honour and immediate Service of God) than the just and faithfull performance of their Dutie to your Majestie and this Kingdom, and being very sensible of the great distractions and distempers, and of the imminent Dangers and Calamities which those Distractions and Distempers are like to bring upon your Majestie and your Subjects: All which have proceeded from the subtill Insinuations, mischievous Practises, and evill Counsels of Men disaffected to God’s true Religion, your Majestie’s Honor and Safetie, and the publike Peace and Prosperitie of your people: After a serious observation of the Causes of those Mischiefs, do in all Humilitie and Sinceritie present to your Majestie their most dutifull Petition and Advice; That out of your Princely Wisdom, for the establishing your own Honour and Safetie, and gracious tendernesse of the welfare and securitie of your Subjects and Dominions, You will be pleased to Grant and Accept these their humble Desires and Propositions, as the most necessarie effectuall means, through God’s blessing, of removing those Jealousies and Differences which have unhappily fallen betwixt You and your People, and procuring both your Majestie and them a constant course of Honour, Peace, and Happinesse.
I. That the Lords, and others of your Majestie’s Privie Councell, and such great Officers and Ministers of State, either at home or beyond the Seas, may be put from your Privie Councell, and from those Offices and Imployments, excepting such as shall be approved of by both Houses of Parliament; And that the Persons put into the Places and Imployments of those that are removed, may be approved of by both Houses of Parliament; And that all Privie Councellors shall take an Oath for the due execution of their Places, in such forme as shall be agreed upon by both Houses of Parliament.
II. That the great Affairs of the Kingdom may not be Concluded or Transacted by the Advise of private men, or by any unknown or unsworn Councellors; but that such Matters as concern the Publike, and are proper for the high Court of Parliament, which is your Majestie’s great and supreme Councell, may be Debated, Resolved, and Transacted only in Parliament, and not elsewhere. And such as shall presume to do anything to the contrary, shall be reserved to the Censure and Judgement of Parliament: And such other matters of State as are proper for your Majestie’s Privie Councell, shall be debated and concluded by such of the Nobility and Others, as shall from time to time be chosen for that place by approbation of both Houses of Parliament. That no publicke Act concerning the Affairs of the Kingdom, which are proper for your Privie Councell, may be esteemed of any validity, as proceeding from the Royall Authority, unlesse it be done by the advice and consent of the major part of your Councell, attested under their hands. And that your Councell may be limited to a certain number, not exceeding five and twenty, nor under fifteen; and if any Councellor’s place happen to be void in the Intervals of Parliament, it shall not be supplied without the Assent of the major part of the Councell; which choice shall be confirmed at the next sitting of the Parliament, or else to be void.
III. That the Lord high Steward of England, Lord high Constable, Lord Chancellour, or Lord Keeper of the great Seal, Lord Treasurer, Lord Privie Seal, the Earle Marshall, Lord Admirall, Warden of the Cinque-Ports, chief Governour of Ireland, Chancellour of the Exchequer, Master of the Wards, Secretaries of State, two chief Justices, and chief Baron, may be alwayes chosen with the approbation of both Houses of Parliament: And in the Intervals of Parliaments by assent of the major part of the Councell, in such manner as is before expressed in the choice of Councellors.
IV. That he or they unto whom the Government and education of the King’s Children shall be committed, shall be approved of by both Houses of Parliament; and in the Intervals of Parliaments, by the assent of the major part of the Councell, in such manner as is before exprest in the choice of Councellors: And that all such Servants as are now about them, against whom both Houses shall have any just exception, shall be removed.
V. That no Marriage shall be Concluded, or Treated for any of the King’s Children, with any Forraign Prince, or other Person whatsoever abroad, or at home, without the consent of Parliament, under the penalty of a Premunire unto such as shall so Conclude or Treate any Marriage as aforesaid. And that the said Penalty shall not be pardoned or dispensed with, but by the consent of both Houses of Parliament.
VI. That the Laws in force against Jesuites, Priests, and Popish Recusants, be strictly put in execution, without any Toleration or Dispensation to the contrary; and that some more effectuall Course may be Enacted, by Authoritie of Parliament, to disable them from making any disturbance in the State, or eluding the Law by Trusts, or otherwise.
VII. That the Votes of Popish Lords in the House of Peers, may be taken away, so long as they continue Papists; and that His Majestie would consent to such a Bill as shall be drawn for the Education of the Children of Papists by Protestants in the Protestant Religion.
VIII. That your Majestie will be pleased to Consent, That such a Reformation be made of the Church-Government, and Liturgie as both Houses of Parliament shall advise, wherein they intend to have Consultations with Divines, as is expressed in the Declaration to that purpose; and that your Majestie will contribute your best Assistance to them for the raising of a sufficient Maintenance for Preaching Ministers thorowout the Kingdom: And that your Majestie will be pleased to give your consent to Laws for the taking away of Innovations and Superstition, and of Pluralities, and against Scandalous Ministers.
IX. That your Majestie will be pleased to rest satisfied with that Course that the Lords and Commons have appointed for Ordering the Militia,1 untill the same shall be further setled by a Bill: And that you will recall your Declarations and Proclamations against the Ordinance made by the Lords and Commons concerning it.
X. That such Members of either House of Parliament, as have, during this present Parliament, been put out of any Place and Office,2 may either be restored to that Place and Office, or otherwise have satisfaction for the same, upon the Petition of that House, whereof he or they are Members.
XI. That all Privie Councellors and Judges may take an Oath, the form whereof to be agreed on, and setled by Act of Parliament, for the maintaining of the Petition of Right, and of certain Statutes made by this Parliament, which shall be mentioned by both Houses of Parliament: And that an enquiry of the Breaches and Violations of those Laws may be given in charge by the Justices of the King’s-Bench every Tearm, and by the Judges of Assize in their Circuits, and Justices of Peace at the Sessions, to be presented and punished according to Law.
XII. That all the Judges and all Officers placed by approbation of both Houses of Parliament, may hold their Places, Quam diu bene se gesserint.3
XIII. That the justice of Parliament may passe upon all Delinquents, whether they be within the Kingdom, or fled out of it; And that all Persons cited by either House of Parliament, may appear and abide the censure of Parliament.
XIIII. That the Generall Pardon offered by your Majestie, may be granted with such Exceptions, as shall be advised by both Houses of Parliament.
XV. That the Forts and Castles of this Kingdom, may be put under the Command and Custody of such Persons as your Majestie shall appoint, with the approbation of your Parliaments: and in the intervals of Parliament, with the approbation of the major part of the Councell, in such manner as is before expressed in the choice of Councellors.
XVI. That the extraordinary Guards, and Millitary Forces,4 now attending your Majestie, may be removed and discharged; and that for the future you will raise no such Guards or extraordinary Forces, but according to the Law, in case of actuall Rebellion or Invasion.
XVII. That your Majestie will be pleased to enter into a more strict Alliance with the States of the United Provinces, and other neighbour Princes and States of the Protestant Religion, for the defence and maintenance thereof against all Designes and Attempts of the Pope and his Adherents, to subvert and suppresse it, whereby your Majestie will obtain a great accesse of Strength and Reputation, and your Subjects be much encouraged and enabled in a Parliamentary way, for your aid and assistance in restoring your Royall Sister and her Princely Issue to those Dignities and Dominions which belong unto them,5 and relieving the other distressed Protestant Princes who have suffered in the same Cause.
XVIII. That your Majestie will be pleased, by Act of Parliament, to cleer the Lord Kimbolton, and the five Members of the House of Commons,6 in such manner that future Parliaments may be secured from the consequence of that evill precedent.
XIX. That your Majestie will be graciously pleased to passe a Bill for restraining Peers made hereafter from Sitting or Voting in Parliament; unlesse they be admitted thereunto with the consent of both Houses of Parliament.
And these our humble desires being granted by your Majestie, we shall forthwith apply ourselves to regulate your present Revenue, in such sort, as may be for your best advantage; and likewise to settle such an ordinary and constant increase of it as shall be sufficient to support your Royall Dignitie in Honour and plenty, beyond the proportion of any former Grants of the Subjects of this Kingdom to your Majestie’s Royall Predecessors. We shall likewise put the Town of Hull into such hands as your Majestie shall appoint,7 with the Consent and Approbation of Parliament; and deliver up a just accompt of all the Magazine; and cheerfully imploy the uttermost of our Power and Endeavour in the reall expression and performance of our most dutifull and loyall affections to the preserving and maintaining the Royall Honour, Greatnesse, and Safetie of your Majestie and your Posterity.
His Majesties Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament.
Before we shall give you Our Answer to your Petition and Propositions, we shall tell you, That we are now cleerly satisfied, why the Method, which we traced out to you by Our Message of the twentieth of January,8 and have since so often pressed upon you, as the proper way to compose the Distractions of this Kingdom, and render it truly happy, hath been hitherto declined, and is at length thought fit to be lookt upon. We now see plainly (and desire that you, and all other Our good Subjects, should do so too) that the Caballists of this Businesse, have, with great prudence, reserved themselves untill due preparations should be made for their designe.
If they had unseasonably vented such Propositions, as the wisdom and modesty of your Predecessors never thought fit to offer to any of Our Progenitors, nor We in honour or regard to Our Regall Authoritie (which God hath intrusted Us with for the good of Our people) could receive without just indignation, (and such many of your present Propositions are) their hopes would soon have been blasted, and those persons to whom Offices, Honours, Power and Commands were designed, by such ill-timing of their Businesse, would have failed of their expectation, not without a brand upon the attempt. Therefore, before any of this nature should appear, they have (certainly with great wisdom in the conduct of it) thought fit to remove a troublesome rub in their way, the Law. To this end (that they might undermine the very foundations of it) a new Power hath been assumed to interpret and declare Laws without Us, by extemporary Votes, without any case judicially before either house, (which is in effect the same thing as to make Laws without Us) Orders and Ordinances made only by both houses (tending to a pure Arbitrary power) were pressed upon the people, as Laws, and their obedience required to them.
Their next step was to erect an upstart Authority without Us (in whom, and only in whom, the Laws of this Realm have placed that power) to command the Militia; (very considerable to this their designe). In further Order to it, they have wrested from Us Our Magazine and Town of Hull, and bestird Sir John Hotham in his boldfaced Treason.9 They have prepared and directed to the people, unprecedented Invectives against Our Government, thereby (as much as lay in their power) to weaken Our just Authoritie and due esteem amongst them. They have as injuriously, as presumptuously (though we conceive by this time Impudence itself is ashamed of it) attempted to cast upon Us Aspersions of an unheard of nature, as if We had favoured a Rebellion in Our own bowels. They have likewise broached new Doctrine, That we are obliged to passe all Laws that shall be offered to Us by both Houses (howsoever Our own Judgement and Conscience shall be unsatisfied with them) a point of policie, as proper for their present businesse, as destructive to all Our Rights of Parliament. And so with strange shamelesnesse will forget a clause in a Law still in force, made in the second yeer of King Henry the fifth, wherein both Houses of Parliament do acknowledge, That it is of the King’s Regalitie to grant or deny such of their Petitions as pleaseth himself. They have interpreted Our necessary Guard, legally assembled for the defence of Us and Our Children’s Persons, against a Traitor in open Rebellion against Us, to be with intent to levie war against Our Parliament (the thought whereof Our very soul abhorreth) thereby to render Us odious to Our people. They have so awed Our good Subjects with Pursuivants,10 long chargeable Attendance, heavie Censures, & illegal Imprisonments, that few of them durst offer to present their tendernesse of Our sufferings, their own just grievances, and their sense of those violations of the Law (the birthright of every Subject of this Kingdom) though in an humble Petition directed to both Houses; and if any did, it was stifled in the birth, called Sedition, and burnt by the common Hangman. They have restrained the attendance of Our ordinary and necessary houshold servants, and seized upon those small sums of Money which Our credit had provided to buy Us Bread; with Injunctions, That none shall be suffered to be conveyed or returned to Us to York, or any of Our Peers or Servants with Us; so that (in effect) they have blocked Us up in that County. They have filled the ears of the people with the noise of Fears and Jealousies (though taken up upon trust) tales of Skippers, Salt Fleets, and such like, by which alarms they might prepare them to receive such impressions as might best advance this Designe, when it should be ripe. And now, it seems, they think We are sufficiently prepared for these bitter Pills. We are in a handsome posture to receive these humble desires (which probably are intended to make way for a superfetation or a (yet) higher nature (if we had not made this discovery to you) for they doe not tell Us this is all). In them We must observe, That these Contrivers (the better to advance their true ends) disguised, as much as they could their intents, with a mixture of some things really to be approved by every honest man; others, specious and popular and some which are already granted by Us. All which are cunningly twisted and mixed with those other things of their main designe of ambition and private Interest, in hope that at the first view, every eye may not so cleerly discern them in their proper colours.
We would not be understood, That We intend to fix this Designe upon both, or either House of Parliament, We utterly professe against it, being most confidenct of the Loyaltie, good Affections, and Integritie of the Intentions of that great Bodie; and knowing well, That very many of both Houses were absent, and many dissented from all those particulars We complain of. But we do beleeve, and accordingly professe to all the world, That the malignity of this Designe (as dangerous to the Laws of this Kingdom, the Peace of the same, and Liberties of all Our good Subjects, as to Ourself and Our just Prerogative) hath proceeded from the subtill Informations, mischievous Practises, and evill Counsels, of ambitious, turbulent Spirits, disaffected to God’s true Religion, and the unity of the Professors thereof, Our Honour and Safety, and the publike Peace and Prosperitie of Our people, not without a strong Influence upon the very Actions of both Houses. But how faultie soever others are, We shall (with God’s assistance) endeavour to discharge Our dutie with uprightnesse of heart. And therefore since these Propositions come to Us in the name of both Houses of Parliament, We shall take a more particular notice of every of them.
If the 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 9. 10. 15. 16. 19. Demands had been writ and printed in a tongue unknown to Us and Our people, it might have been possible We and they might have charitably beleeved the Propositions to be such, as might have been in Order to the ends pretended in the Petition, (to wit) The establishing of Our Honour and Safetie, the welfare and securitie of Our Subjects and Dominions, & the removing those Jealousies and Differences, which are said to have unhappily fallen betwixt Us and Our people, and procuring both Us and them a constant course of Honour, Peace, and Happinesse. But being read and understood by all, We cannot but assure Ourself, that this Profession joined to these Propositions, will rather appear a Mockery and a Scorn. The Demands being such, as we were unworthy of the trust reposed in Us by the Law, and of Our dessent, from so many great and famous Ancestors, if We could be brought to abandon that power which only can inable Us to perform what We are sworn to, in protecting Our people and the Laws, and so assume others into it, as to devest Ourself of it; although not only Our present condition (which it can hardly be) were more necessitous than it is, and We were both vanquisht, and a Prisoner, and in a worse condition than ever the most unfortunate of Our Predecessors have been reduced to, by the most criminall of their Subjects. And though the Bait laid to draw Us to it, and to keep Our Subjects from Indignation at the mention of it, The promises of a plentifull and unparalleled Revenue, were reduced from generalls (which signifie nothing) to clear and certain particulars, since such a Bargain would have but too great a resemblance of that of Esau’s, if we should part with such Flowers of Our Crown as are worth all the rest of the Garland, and have been transmitted to Us from so many Ancestors, and have been found so usefull and necessary for the welfare and security of Our Subjects, for any present necessitie, or for any low and sordid considerations of wealth and gain. And therefore all Men knowing that those accommodations are most easily made and most exactly observed, that are grounded upon reasonable and equall Conditions; We have great cause to beleeve, That the Contrivers of these had no intention of setling any firm Accommodation; but to increase those Jealousies, and widen that division, which (not by Our fault) is now unhappily fallen between Us and both Houses.
It is asked, That all the Lords, and others of Our Privy Councell, and such (We know now what you mean by such, but We have cause to think you mean all) great Officers and Ministers of State, either at home, or beyond the Seas, (for Care is taken to leave out no person or place, that Our dishonour may be sure not to be bounded within this Kingdom, though no subtill Insinuations at such a distance can probably be beleeved to have been the cause of Our distractions and Dangers) should be put from Our Privie Councell, and from those Offices and Imployments, unlesse they be approved by both Houses of Parliament, how faithfull soever We have found them to Us and the Publike, and how far soever they have been from offending against any Law, the only Rule they had, or any others ought to have to walk by. We therefore, to this part of this Demand, return you this Answer, That We are willing to grant that they shall take a larger Oath than you yourselves desire in your eleventh Demand, for maintaining not of any part but of the whole Law; and We have and do assure you, that We will be carefull to make election of such persons in those places of Trust, as shall have given good Testimonies of their abilities and integreities, and against whom there can be no just cause of exception, whereon reasonably to ground a diffidence, that if We have, or shall be mistaken in Our election, We have, and do assure you, That there is no man so neer to Us in place or affection, whom We will not leave to the Justice of the Law, if you shall bring a particular Charge and sufficient Proofs against him; and that We have given you (the best pledge of the effects of such a promise on Our part, and the best securitie for the performance of their duty on theirs) a Trienniall Parliament,11 the apprehension of whose Justice will, in all probability, make them wary how they provoke it, and Us wary how We chuse such, as by the discoverie of their faults may in any degree seem to discredit Our election. But that, without any shadow of a fault objected, only perhaps because they follow their conscience, and preserve the established Laws, and agree not in such Votes, or assent not to such Bills, as some persons, who have now too great an Influence even upon both Houses, judge or seem to judge, to be for the Publique good, and as are agreeable to that new Utopia of Religion and Government, into which they endevour to transform this Kingdom; (for We remember what Names, and for what Reasons you left out in the Bill offered Us concerning the Militia, which you had yourselves recommended in the Ordinance). We will never consent to the displacing of any, whom for their former merits from, and affection to Us and the publike, We have intrusted, since We conceive, That to do so, would take away both from the affection of Our Servants, the care of Our Service, and the honour of Our Justice. And We the more wonder, that it should be askt by you of Us, since it appears by the twelfth Demand, That yourselves count it reasonable, after the present turn is served, That the Judges and Officers, who are then placed, may hold their places quam diu se bene gesserint; and We are resolved to be as carefull of those We have chosen, as you are of those you would chuse, and to remove none, till they appear to Us to have otherwise behaved themselves, or shall be evicted by legall proceedings to have done so.
But this Demand (as unreasonable as it is) is but one link of a great Chain, and but the first round of that Ladder, by which Our Just, Ancient, Regall Power is endeavoured to be fetched down to the ground: For it appears plainly, That it is not with the persons now chosen, but with Our chusing, that you are displeased: For you demand, That the persons put into the places and imployments of those, who shall be removed, may be approved by both Houses; which is so far (as to some it may at first sight appear) from being lesse than the power of nomination, that of two things (of which We will never grant either). We would sooner be content, That you should nominate, and We approve, then you approve, and We nominate; the meer nomination being so far from being anything, That if We could do no more, We would never take the pains to do that, when We should only hazard those, whom We esteemed, to the scorn of a refusall, if they happened not to be agreeable, not only to the Judgement, but to the Passion, Interest, or Humour of the present major part of either House: Not to speak now of the great Factions, Animosities, and Divisions which this Power would introduce in both Houses, between both Houses, and in the severall Countreys, for the choice of persons to be sent to that place where that power was, and between the persons that were so chosen. Neither is this strange Potion prescribed to Us only for once, for the cure of a present, pressing, desperate Disease, but for a Diet to Us and Our Posteritie. It is demanded, That Our Councellors, all chief Officers both of Law and State, Commanders of Forts and Castles, and all Peers hereafter made (as to Voting, without which how little is the rest) be approved of (that is, chosen) by them from time to time; and rather than it should ever be left to the Crown (to whom it only doth and shall belong) if any place fall void in the intermission of Parliament; the major part of the approved Councell is to approve them. Neither is it only demanded, That We should quit the power and right Our Predecessors have had of appointing Persons in these places, but for Councellors, We are to be restrained as well in the number as in the persons, and a power must be annext to these places, which their Predecessors had not; and indeed if this power were past to them, it were not fit We should be trusted to chuse those who were to be trusted as much as We.
It is demanded, That such matters as concern the publike, and are proper for the high Court of Parliament (which is Our great and supream Councell) may be debated, resolved and transacted only in Parliament, and not elsewhere, and such as presume to do anything to the contrary shall be reserved to the Censure and Judgement of Parliament, and such other matters of State, as are proper of Our Privie Councell, shall be debated and concluded by such of Our Nobility (though indeed, if being made by Us, they may not Vote without the consent of both Houses, We are rather to call them Your Nobility) and others, as shall be from time to time chosen for that place, by approbation of both Houses of Parliament; and that no publike Act concerning the affairs of the Kingdom,which are proper for Our Privie Councell, may be esteemed of any validitie, as proceeding from the Royall Authority, unlesse it be done by the Advice and Consent of the major part of Our Councell, attested under their hands: Which Demands are of that Nature, that to grant them were in effect at once to depose both Ourself and Our Posteritie.
These being past, we may be waited on bare-headed; we may have Our hand kissed; The Stile of Majestie continued to Us; And the King’s Authoritie, declared by both Houses of Parliament, may be still the Stile of your Commands. We may have Swords and Maces carried before Us, and please Ourself with the sight of a Crown and Scepter, (and yet even these Twigs would not long flourish, when the Stock upon which they grew were dead) but as to true and reall Power We should remain but the outside, but the Picture, but the signe of a King. We were ever willing that Our Parliament should Debate, Resolve, & Transact such matters as are proper for them, as far as they are proper for them. And We heartily wish, that they would be as carefull not to extend their Debates and Resolutions beyond what is proper to them, that multitudes of things punishable, and causes determinable by the Ordinarie Judicatures, may not be entertained in Parliament, and to cause a long, chargeable, fruitlesse attendance of Our people, and (by degrees) draw to you as well all the causes, as all the faults of Westminster-Hall, and divert your proper businesse. That the course of Law be no wayes diverted, much lesse disturbed, as was actually done by the stop of the proceedings against a Riot in Southwark,12 by Order of the House of Commons, in a time so riotous and tumultuous, as much increased the danger of popular Insolencies, by such a countenance to Riots, and discountenance of Law. That you descend not to the leasure of recommending Lecturers to Churches, nor ascend to the Legislative power, by commanding (the Law not having yet commanded it) that they whom you recommend be received, although neither the Parson nor Bishop do approve of them; And that the Refusers (according to the course so much formerly complained of to have been used at the Councell Table) be not sent for to attend to shew cause. At least, that you would consider Conveniencie, if not Law, and recommend none, but who are well known to you to be Orthodox, Learned, and Moderate, or at least such as have taken Orders, and are not notorious depravers of the Book of Common Prayer; A care which appeareth by the Discourses, Sermons and persons of some recommended by you, not to have been hitherto taken, and it highly concerns both you in dutie, and the Common-wealth in the consequences, that it should have been taken; That neither one estate transact what is proper for two, nor two what is proper for three, and consequently, that (contrary to Our declared will) Our Forts may not be seized; Our Arms may not be removed; Our Moneys may not be stopt; Our legall Directions may not be countermanded by you, nor We desired to countermand them Ourself, nor such entrances made upon a Reall War against Us, upon pretence of all imaginarie War against you, and a Chimaera of necessitie. So far do you passe beyond your limits, whilest you seem by your Demand to be strangely straitened within them. At least We could have wisht you would have expressed, what matters you meant as fit to be transacted only in Parliament, and what you meant by only in Parliament. You have (of late) been perswaded by the new doctrines of some few, to think that proper for your debates, which hath not used to be at all debated within those walls, but been trusted wholly with Our Predecessors and Us, and to transact those things which without the Regall Authority, since there were Kings of this Kingdom, were never transacted. It therefore concerns Us the more that you speak out, and that both We and Our people may either know the bottom of your Demands, or know them to be bottomlesse. What concerns more the Publike, and is more (indeed) proper for the high Court of Parliament, than the making of Laws, which not only ought there to be transacted, but can be transacted no where else; but then you must admit Us to be a part of the Parliament, you must not (as the sence is of this part of this Demand, if it have any) deny the freedom of Our Answer, when We have as much right to reject what We think unreasonable, as you have to propose what you think convenient or necessary; nor is it possible Our Answers either to Bills, or any other Propositions should be wholly free, if We may not use the Libertie of every one of you, and of every Subject, and receive advice (without their danger who shall give it) from any person known or unknown, sworn or unsworn, in these matters in which the Manage of Our Vote is trusted by the Law, to Our own Judgement and Conscience, which how best to inform, is (and ever shall be) left likewise to Us; and most unreasonable it were that two Estates, proposing something to the Third, that Third should be bound to take no advice, whether it were fit to passe, but from those two that did propose it. We shall ever in these things which are trusted wholly to Us by the Law, not decline to hearken to the Advice of Our great Councell, and shall use to hear willingly the free debates of Our Privie Councell (whensoever We may be suffered to have them for sending for) and they shall not be terrified from that freedom, by Votes (and Brands of Malignants, and Enemies to the State, for advising what no Law forbids to advise) but We will retain Our Power of admitting no more to any Councell than the Nature of the businesse requires, and of discoursing with whom We please, of what We please, and informing Our Understanding by debate with any Persons, who may be well able to Inform and Advise Us in some particular, though their Qualities, Education or other Abilities may not make them so fit to be of Our sworn Councell, and not tie Ourself up not to hear anymore than twenty five (and those not chosen absolutely by Us) out of a Kingdom so replenished with Judicious and Experienced Persons in severall kindes. And though we shall (with the proportionable Consideration due to them) alwayes weigh the Advices both of Our Great and Privie Councell, yet We shall also look upon their Advices, as Advices, not as Commands or Impositions; upon them as Our Councellors, not as Our Tutors and Guardians, and upon Ourself as their King, not as their Pupill, or Ward. For whatsoever of Regality were by the Modesty of Interpretation left in Us in the first part of the second Demand, as to the Parliament, is taken from Us in the second part of the same, and placed in this new fangled kinde of Councellors, whose power is such, and so expressed by it, that in all publike Acts concerning the Affairs of this Kingdom, which are proper for Our Privy Councell (for whose Advice all publike Acts are sometimes proper, though never necessary) they are desired to be admitted joint Patentees with Us in the Regalitie, and it is not plainly expressed whether they mean Us so much as a single Vote in these Affairs. But it is plain they mean Us no more at most than a single Vote in them, and no more power than every one of the rest of Our Fellow Councellors; only leave to Us, out of their respect and duty, (and that only is left of all Our ancient Power) a Choice, whether these that are thus to be joined with (or rather set over) Us, shall be fifteen; or twenty five; and great care is taken that the Oath which these Men shall take, shall be such, in the framing the form of which (though sure We are not wholly unconcerned in it) We may be wholly excluded, and that wholly reserved to be agreed upon by both Houses of Parliament.
And to shew that no more Care is taken of Our safetie, than of Our Power, after so great indignities offered to Us, and countenanced by those who were most obliged to resent them: After Our Town and Fort13 kept from Us (from which, if it were no otherwise Ours than the whole Kingdom is, We can no more legally be kept out, than out of Our whole Kingdom, which sure yourselves will not deny to be Treason). Our Arms, Our Goods sent away, and Our Money stopt from Us, Our Guards (in which We have no other Intention than to hinder the end of these things from being proportionable to their beginnings) are not only desired to be dismissed before satisfaction for the Injurie, punishments of the Injurers, and care taken for Our future Securitie from the like. But it is likewise desired (and for this Law is pretended, and might as well have been for the rest, which yet with some ingenuitie are it seems acknowledged to be but Desires of Grace) that We shall not for the future raise any Guards or extraordinarie Forces, but in case of actuall Rebellion or Invasion, which if it had been Law, and so observed in the time of Our famous Predecessors, few of those Victories which have made this Nation famous in other parts, could have been legally atchieved, nor could Our blessed Predecessor Queen Elizabeth have so defended Herself in 88. And if no Forces must be levied till Rebellions and Invasions (which will not stay for the calling of Parliaments, and their consent for raising Forces) be actuall, they must undoubtedly (at least most probably) be effectuall and prevalent.
And as neither care is taken for Our Rights, Honour, nor safetie as a Prince, so Our Rights as a private Person are endeavoured to be had from Us, it being asked, that it may be unlawfull and unpunishable, not only to conclude, but even to treat of any Marriage with any Person for Our own Children, or to place Governours about them, without consent of Parliament, and in the intermission of those, without the consent of Our good Lords of the Councell, that We may not only be in a more despicable state than any of Our Predecessors, but in a meaner and viler condition than the lowest of Our Subjects, who value no libertie they have more, than that of the free Education and Marriage of their Children, from which We are asked to debar Ourself, and have the more reason to take it ill, that We are so, because for Our choice of a Governour for Our Son, and of a Husband for Our Daughter (in which the Protestant Religion was Our principall Consideration) We conceived We had reason to expect your present thanks, and the increase of your future trusts.
We suppose these Demands by this time to appear such as the Demanders cannot be supposed to have any such reall fear of Us as hath been long pretended, they are too much in the style, not only of equals, but of Conquerors, and as little to be intended for removing of Jealousies (for which end they are said to be asked, and that is not as Merchants ask at first much more than they will take, but as most necessary to effect it, which (if they be) God help this poor Kingdom, and those who are in the hands of such Persons, whose Jealousies nothing else will remove) which indeed is such a way, as if there being differences and suits between two persons, whereof one would have from the other serverall parcells of his ancient Land, he should propose to him by way of Accommodation, that he would quit to him all those in question, with the rest of his Estate, as the most necessary and effectuall means to remove all those suits and differences. But we call God to witnesse, that as for Our Subjects’ sake these Rights are vested in Us, so for their sakes, as well as for Our own, We are resolved not to quit them, nor to subvert (though in a Parliamentary way) the ancient, equall, happy, well-poised, and never-enough commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom, nor to make Ourself of a King of England a Duke of Venice, and this of a Kingdom a Republique.
There being three kindes of Government amongst men, Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy, and all these having their particular conveniencies and inconveniencies. The experience and wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these, as to give to this Kingdom (as far as human prudence can provide) the conveniencies of all three, without the inconveniencies of any one, as long as the Balance hangs even between the three Estates, and they run jointly on in their proper Chanell (begetting Verdure and Fertilitie in the Meadows on both sides) and the overflowing of either on either side raise no deluge or Inundation. The ill of absolute Monarchy is Tyrannie, the ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Division, the ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence and Licentiousnesse. The good of Monarchy is the uniting a Nation under one Head to resist Invasion from abroad, and Insurrection at home. The good of Aristocracie is the Conjuncion of Counsell in the ablest Persons of a State for the publike benefit. The good of Democracy is Liberty, and the Courage and Industrie which Libertie begets.
In this Kingdom the Laws are jointly made by a King, by a House of Peers, and by a House of Commons chosen by the People, all having free Votes and particular Priviledges. The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the King, Power of Treaties of War and Peace, of making Peers, of chusing Officers and Councellors for State, Judges for Law, Commanders for Forts and Castles, giving Commissions for raising men to make War abroad, or to prevent or provide against Invasions or Insurrections at home, benefit of Confiscations, power of pardoning, and some more of the like kinde are placed in the King. And this kinde of regulated Monarchie having this power to preserve that Authoritie, without which it would be disabled to preserve the Laws in their Force, and the Subjects in their Liberties and Proprieties, is intended to draw to him such a Respect and Relation from the great Ones, as may hinder the ills of Division and Faction, and such a Fear and Reverence from the people, as may hinder Tumults, Violence, and Licenciousnesse. Again, that the Prince may not make use of this high and perpetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it, and make use of the name of Publike Necessitie for the gain of his private Favourites and Followers, to the detriment of his People, the House of Commons (an excellent Conserver of Libertie, but never intended for any share in Government, or the chusing of them that should govern) is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Levies of Moneys (which is the sinews as well of Peace, as War) and the Impeaching of those, who for their own ends, though countenanced by any surreptitiously gotten Command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knows it) to protect, and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him, at least not to serve him in the Contrary. And the Lords being trusted with a Judicatory power, are an excellent Screen and Bank between the Prince and People, to assist each against any Incroachments of the other, and by just Judgements to preserve that Law, which ought to be the Rule of every one of the three. For the better enabling them in this, beyond the Examples of any of Our Ancestors, We were willingly contented to Oblige Ourself, both to call a Parliament every three yeers, and not to dissolve it in fiftie dayes, and for the present exigent, the better to raise Money, and avoid the pressure (no lesse grievous to Us than them) Our people must have suffered by a longer continuance of so vast a charge as two great Armies, and for their greater certaintie of having sufficient time to remedie the inconveniencies arisen during so long an absence of Parliaments, and for the punishment of the Causers and Ministers of them, We yeelded up Our Right of dissolving this Parliament, expecting an extraordinarie moderation from it in gratitude for so unexampled a Grace, and little looking that any Malignant Partie should have been encouraged or enabled to have perswaded them, first to countenance the Injustices and Indignities We have endured, and then by a new way of satisfaction for what was taken from Us, to demand of Us at once to Confirm what was so taken, and to give up almost all the rest.
Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both Houses is more than sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of Tyrannie, and without the power which is now asked from Us, we shall not be able to discharge that Trust which is the end of Monarchie, since this would be a totall Subversion of the Fundamentall Laws, and that excellent Constitution of this Kingdom, which hath made this Nation so many yeers both famous and happie to a great degree of Envie; since to the power of punishing (which is alreadie in your hands according to Law) if the power of Preferring be added, We shall have nothing left for Us, but to look on; since the incroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other, is unhappie in the effects both to them and all the rest; since this power of at most a joint Government in Us with Our Councellors (or rather Our Guardians) will return Us to the worst kinde of Minoritie, and make Us despicable both at home and abroad, and beget eternall Factions and Dissentions (as destructive to publike Happinesse as War) both in the chosen, and the Houses that chuse them, and the people who chuse the Chusers; since so new a power will undoubtedly intoxicate persons who were not born to it, & beget not only Divisions among them as equals, but in them contempt of Us as become an equall to them, and Insolence and Injustice towards Our people, as now so much their inferiors, which will be the more grievous unto them, as suffering from those who were so lately of a neerer degree to themselves, and being to have redresse only from those that placed them, and fearing they may be inclined to preserve what they have made, both out of kindnesse and policie; since all great changes are extreamly inconvenient, and almost infallibly beget yet greater changes, which beget yet greater Inconveniencies.
Since as great an one in the Church must follow this of the Kingdom; Since the second Estate would in all probabilitie follow the Fate of the first, and by some of the same turbulent spirits Jealousies would be soon raised against them, and the like Propositions for reconciliation of Differences would be then sent to them, as they now have joined to send to Us, till (all power being vested in the House of Commons, and their number making them incapable of transacting Affairs of State with the necessary Secrecie and Expedition; those being retrusted to some close Committee) at last the Common people (who in the meantime must be flattered, and to whom Licence must be given in all their wilde humours, how contrary soever to established Law, or their own reall Good) discover this Arcanum Imperii, That all this was done by them, but not for them, grow weary of Journey-work, and set up for themselves, call Parity and Independence, Liberty; devour that Estate which had devoured the rest; Destroy all Rights and Proprieties, all distinctions of Families and Merit; And by this meanes this splendid and excellently distinguished form of Government, end in a dark equall Chaos of Confusion, and the long Line of Our many noble Ancestors in a Jack Cade, or a Wat Tyler.14
For all these Reasons to all these Demands Our Answer is, Nolumus Leges Angliae mutari.15 But this We promise, that We will be as carefull of preserving the Laws in what is supposed to concern wholly Our Subjects, as in what most concerns Ourself. For indeed We professe to beleeve, that the preservation of every Law concerns Us, those of Obedience being not secure, when those of Protection are violated. And We being most of any injured in the least violation of that, by which We enjoy the highest Rights and greatest Benefits, and are therefore obliged to defend no lesse by Our Interest, than by Our Duty, and hope that no Jealousies to the contrary shall be any longer nourished in any of Our good people, by the subtill insinuations, and secret practices of men, who for private ends are disaffected to Our Honour and Safety, and the Peace and Prosperity of Our People. And to shew you, that no just indignation at so reproachfull offers shall make Us refuse to grant what is probable to conduce to the good of Our good People, because of the ill company it comes in, We will search carefully in this heap of unreasonable Demands, for so much as We may (complying with Our Conscience, and the duty of Our Trust) assent unto, and shall accordingly agree to it.
In pursuance of which Search, in the fourth Proposition, under a Demand which would take from Us that trust which God, Nature, and the Laws of the Land have placed in Us, and of which none of you could endure to be deprived, We find something to which We give this Answer, That We have committed the principall places about Our Children to persons of Qualitie, Integritie and Pietie, with speciall regard that their tender yeers might be so seasoned with the Principles of the true Protestant Religion, as (by the blessing of God upon this Our care) this whole Kingdom may in due time reap the fruit thereof. And as We have been likewise very carefull in the choice of Servants about them, that none of them may be such, as by ill Principles, or by ill Examples to crosse Our endeavours for their Pious and Vertuous Education, so if there shall be found (for all Our care to prevent it) any person about Our Children (or about Us, which is more than you ask) against whom both Houses shall make appear to Us any just exception, We shall not only remove them, but thank you for the Information. Only We shall expect, that you shall be likewise carefull that there be no underhand dealing by any to seek faults, to make room for others to succeed in their places.
For the fifth Demand, as We will not suffer any to share with Us in Our power of Treaties, which are most improper for Parliaments, and least in those Treaties in which We are neerliest concerned, not only as a King but as a Father, yet We do (such is Our desire to give all reasonable satisfaction) assure you by the word of a King, that We shall never propose or entertain any Treaty whatsoever for the marriage of any of Our Children, without due regard to the true Protestant Profession, the good of Our Kingdoms, and the Honour of Our Family.
For the sixth Demand, concerning the Laws in force against Jesuites, Priests, and Popish Recusants, We have by many of Our Messages to you, by Our voluntarie promise to you so solemnly made never to pardon any Popish Priest, by Our strict Proclamations lately published in this point, and by the publike Examples which We have made in that case since Our Residence at York, and before at London, sufficiently expressed Our Zeal herein. Why do you then ask that in which Our own Inclination hath prevented you? And if you can yet finde any more effectuall Course to disable them from Disturbing the State or eluding the Law by trusts or otherwise, We shall willingly give Our Consent to it.
For the seventh, concerning the Votes of Popish Lords, We understand that they in discretion have withdrawn themselves from the Service of the House of Peers, (and had done so when use was publikely made of their names to asperse the Votes of that House, which was then counted as Malignant as those (who are called Our Unknown and Unsworn Councellors) are now) neither do We conceive that such a positive Law against the Votes of any whose blood give them that right, is so proper in regard of the Priviledge of Parliament, but are content, that so long as they shall not be conformable to the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church of England, they shall not be admitted to sit in the House of Peers, but only to give their Proxies to such Protestant Lords as they shall chuse, who are to dispose of them as they themselves shall think fit, without any Reference at all to the Giver.
As to the desires for a Bill for the Education of the Children of Papists by Protestants in the Protestant Profession, many about Us can witnesse with Us, That We have often delivered Our Opinion, That such a Course (with God’s blessing upon it) would be the most effectuall for the rooting out of Popery out of this Kingdom. We shall therefore thank you for it, and encourage you in it, and, when it comes unto Us, do Our Dutie; and We heartily wish, for the publike good, that the time you have spent in making Ordinances without Us, had been imployed in preparing this and other good Bills for Us.
For the eighth, touching The Reformation to be made of the Church-Government and Liturgie, We had hoped, that what We had formerly declared concerning the same, had been so sufficiently understood by you and all good Subjects, that We should not need to have expressed Ourself further in it. We told you in Our Answers to your Petition presented to Us at Hampton-Court the first of December, That for any illegall Innovations which may have crept in, We should willingly concur in the removall of them. That if Our Parliament should advise Us to call a Nationall Synode, which may duely examine such Ceremonies as give just cause of Offence to any, We should take it into Consideration, and apply Ourself to give due satisfaction therein. That We were perswaded in our Conscience, That no Church could be found upon the Earth, that professeth the true Religion with more puritie of Doctrine, than the Church of England doth, nor where the Government and Discipline are jointly more beautified, and free from Superstition, than as they are here established by Law; which (by the grace of God) We will with Constancie maintain (while We live) in their Puritie and Glorie, not only against all Invasions of Poperie, but also from the Irreverence of those many Schismaticks and Separatists, wherewith of late this Kingdom and Our City of London abounds, to the great dishonour and hazard both of Church and State; For the suppression of whom We required your timely and active assistance. We told you in Our first Declaration,16 printed by the advice of Our Privie Councell, That for differences amongst ourselves for matters indifferent in their own nature concerning Religion, We should in tendernesse to any number of our loving Subjects very willingly comply with the advice of our Parliament, that some Law might be made for the exemption of tender Consciences from punishment, or Prosecution for such Ceremonies, and in such Cases, which by the judgement of most men are held to be matters indifferent, and of some to be absolutely unlawfull; Provided, that this case should be attempted and pursued with that modestie, temper, and submission, that in the meantime the peace and quiet of the Kingdom be not disturbed, the Decencie and Comelinesse of God’s Service discountenanced,nor the Pious, Sober, Devout actions of those Reverend Persons who were the first Labourers in the blessed Reformation, or of that time, be scandalled and defamed. And We heartily wish, that others, whom it concerned, had been as ready (as their duty bound them, though they had not received it from Us) to have pursued this Caution, as We were, and still are willing and ready to make good every particular of that Promise. Nor did We only appear willing to join in so good a Work, when it should be brought Us, but prest and urged you to it by Our Message of the fourteenth of February, in these words, And because His Majestie observes great and different troubles to arise in the hearts of His People, concerning the Government and Liturgie of the Church, His Majestie is willing to declare, That He will refer the whole consideration to the wisdom of his Parliament, which He desires them to enter into speedily, that the present distractions about the same may be composed: but desires not to be pressed to any single Act on His part, till the whole be so digested and setled by both Houses, that His Majesty may cleerly see what is fit to be left, as well as what is fit to be taken away. Of which We the more hoped of a good sucesse to the generall satisfaction of Our people, because you seem in this Proposition to desire but a Reformation, and not (as is daily preached for as necessary in those many Conventicles which have within these nineteene months begun to swarm; and which, though their Leaders differ from you in this opinion, yet appear to many as countenanced by you, by not being punished by you, (few else, by reason of the Order of the House of Commons of the ninth of September, daring to do it) a destruction of the present Discipline and Liturgie. And We shall most cheerfully give Our best assistance for raising a sufficient maintenance for preaching Ministers, in such course as shall be most for the encouragement and advancement of Pietie and Learning.
For the Bills you mention, and the Consultation you intimate, knowing nothing of the particular matters of the one (though We like the Titles well) nor of the manner of the other, but from an Informer (to whom We give little credit, and We wish no man did more) common Fame, We can say nothing till We see them.
For the eleventh, We would not have the Oath of all Privie Councellors and Judges straitened to particular Statutes of one or two particular Parliaments, but extend to all Statutes of all Parliaments, and the whole Law of the Land, and shall willingly consent that an enquirie of all the breaches and violations of the Law may be given in charge by the Justices of the King’s Bench every Terme, and by the Judges of Assize in their Circuits, and Justices of Peace at the Sessions to be presented and punished according to Law.
For the seventeenth, we shall ever be most ready, (and we are sorry it should be thought needfull to move us to it) not only to joine with any (particularly with the States of the united Provinces, of which We have given a late proofe in the Match of Our Daughter) for the defence and maintenance of Protestant Religion, against all designes and attempts of the Pope and his Adherents, but singly (if need were) to oppose with Our life and fortune all such Designes in all other Nations, were they joined: And that for Considerations of Conscience, far more than any temporall end of obtaining accesse of strength & reputation, or any naturall end of restoring our Royall Sister and her Princely Issue to their dignities and Dominions though these be likewise much considered by us.
For the eighteenth, It was not Our fault, that an Act was not passed to cleere the Lord Kimbolton, and the five Members of the House of Commons, but yours, who inserted such Clauses into both the Preamble and Act (perhaps perswaded to it by some who wish not that you should in anything receive satisfaction from Us) as by passing the Preamble we must have wounded Our Honour against Our Conscience, and by another Clause have admitted a Consequence, from which We could never have been secured, by declaring, That no Member of either House, upon any Accusation of Treason, could have hisPerson seized without the Consent of that House, of which he is a Member, though the known Law be, That Priviledge of Parliament extends not to Treason, and if it did, any Member (the House being for a short time adjourned, and so their Consent not being so had) how treasonable soever his Intentions were, how cleerly soever known, and how suddenly soever to be executed, must have fair leave given him to go on and pursue them, no way, how legall soever, after the passing such a Clause, being left to prevent it.
To conclude, We conjure you and all men to rest satisfied with the truth of Our Professions, and the Realitie of Our Intentions, not to ask such things as deny themselves; That you declare against Tumults, and punish the Authors; That you allow Us Our Propriety in Our Towns, Arms and Goods, and Our share in the Legislative Power, which would be counted in Us, not only breach of Priviledge, but Tyrannie and Subversion of Parliaments to deny to you. And when you shall have given Us satisfaction upon those persons who have taken away the One, and recalled those Declarations (particularly that of the six and twentieth of May) and those in the point of the Militia, (Our just Rights, wherein We will no more part with than with Our Crown, lest We inable others by them to take that from Us) which would take away the other, and declined the beginnings of a War against Us, under pretence of Our Intention of making One against you. As We have never opposed the first part of the thirteenth Demand, so We shall be ready to concur with you in the latter.
And being then confident that the Credit of those Men, who desire a generall Combustion, will be so weakened with you, that they will not be able to do this Kingdom any more harm, We shall be willing to grant Our generall Pardon, with such Exceptions as shall be thought fit, and shall receive much more joy in the hope of a full and constant Happinesse of Our People in the True Religion, and under the Protection of the Law, by a blessed Union betwen Us and Our Parliament (so much desired by Us) than in any such increase of Our Own Revenue (how much soever beyond former Grants) as (when Our Subjects were wealthiest) Our Parliament could have setled upon Us.
finis.
[1. ]Unable to obtain Charles’s agreement to transfer the command of the kingdom’s militia to Parliament, on 5 March 1642, that body passed the Militia Ordinance assuming such authority without the king’s consent.
[2. ]It is unclear which members were put out of “any Place and Office,” but the Grand Remonstrance, clause 38, charges that “judges have been put out of their places for refusing to go against their oaths and consciences.”
[3. ]During good behavior.
[4. ]Charles carefully avoided referring to his growing military force as soldiers, and preferred to call them guards.
[5. ]Charles’s sister Elizabeth had married the Protestant, Frederick V, the Elector Palatine. Frederick’s election as King of Bohemia upon the deposition of the Catholic Ferdinand immersed them both in the bitter Thirty Years’ War. Frederick became known as the winter king from the brevity of his reign. Elizabeth’s sons, princes Rupert and Maurice, were both to fight on Charles’s behalf during the civil war.
[6. ]Lord Kimbolton here referred to was Edward Montagu, Earl of Manchester, one of those accused of treason by the king on 3 January 1642. The others were John Pym, John Hampden, William Strode, Denzil Holles, and Sir Arthur Haslerigg.
[7. ]On 23 April 1642, the new parliamentary governor of Hull, Sir John Hotham, arrived just in time to refuse the king entry to the town that housed the major arsenal in the northern part of the kingdom.
[8. ]“His Majesties Message to both Houses of Parliament, January 20” (London, 1642), Wing C2450.
[9. ]For information on the incident involving Sir John Hotham and Hull, see note 7, above.
[10. ]State messengers with power to execute warrants.
[11. ]Despite his original objections to it, on 16 February 1641 Charles I had consented to the Triennial Bill mandating the summoning of a parliament at least every three years.
[12. ]A meeting in Southwark in December 1641 for the purpose of drawing up a petition against the bishops became violent when a constable was attacked and beaten. Complaint was made and the sheriff ordered to impanel a jury to examine witnesses. The House of Commons intervened and ordered the undersheriff of Surrey to stop the proceedings.
[13. ]The King is referring here to Hull.
[14. ]Jack Cade led the Kentish rebellion of 1450, and Wat Tyler led the Great Peasant Rebellion of 1381. Both men were commoners.
[15. ]We do not wish the Laws of England to be changed.
[16. ]“His Majesties Message to both Houses of Parliament: February 14, 1641” (London, 14 February 1641/2), Wing C2451.
Arthur Sutherland Pigott Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents, selected and edited with an Introduction A.S.P. Woodhouse, foreword by A.D. Lindsay (University of Chicago Press, 1951). Chapter: PART I.: THE PUTNEY DEBATES
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/2183/201028 on 2010-02-05
The text is in the public domain.
The Officers being met, first said
That the meeting was for public businesses; those that had anything to say concerning the public business, they might have liberty to speak.
Mr. Allen, Mr. Lockyer, and myself are three. They have sent two soldiers, one of your own regiment and one of Colonel Whalley’s, with two other gentlemen, Mr. Wildman and Mr. Petty.
That he had not the paper of what was done upon all of thea [matters discussed]. It was referred to the committee, that they should consider of the paper that was printed, The Case of the Army Stated,2 and to examine the particulars in it, and to represent and offer something to this Council about it. They are likewise appointed to send for those persons concerned in the paper. The committee met, according to appointment, that night. It was only then resolved on, that there should be some sent in a friendly way (not by command or summons) to invite some of those gentlemen to come in with us, I think.
I was desired by the Lieutenant-General to know the bottom of their desires. They gave us this answer, that they would willingly draw them up and represent them unto you. They are come at this time to tender them to your considerations, with their resolutions to maintain them.
We have been by Providence put upon strange things, such as the ancientest here doth scarce remember. The Army acting to these ends, Providence hath been with us, and yet we have found little [fruit] of our endeavours. The kingdom and Army calls for expedition. And really I think all here, both great and small, both officers and soldiers, we may say we have leaned on,a and gone to Egypt for help. The kingdom’s cause requires expedition, and truly our miseries (with our fellow soldiers’) cry out for present help. I think, at this time, this is your business, and I think it is in all your hearts to relieve the one and satisfy the other. You resolved if anything [reasonable] should be propounded to you, you would join and go along with us.
The cause of our misery [is] upon two things. We sought to satisfy all men, and it was well; but in going [about] to do it we have dissatisfied all men. Web have laboured to please a king, and I think, except we go about to cut all our throats, we shall not please him; and we have gone to support an house which will prove rotten studs1 —I mean the Parliament, which consists of a company of rotten members.
And therefore we beseech you that you will take these things into your consideration.
I shall speak to the Lieutenant-General and Commissary-General concerning one thing. Your credits and reputation havec been much blasted, upon these two considerations. The one is for seeking to settle this kingdom in such a way wherein we thought to have satisfied all men, and we have dissatisfied them—I mean in relation to the King. The other is in reference to a Parliamentary authority, which most here would lose their lives for—to seed those powers to which we will subject ourselves, loyally called. These two things are, as I think conscientiously, the cause of all those blemishes that have been cast upon either the one or the other. You are convinced God will have you to act on. But onlye consider how you shall act, and [take] those [ways] that will secure you and the whole kingdom. I desire you will consider those things that shall be offered to you; and, if you see anything of reason, you will join with us, that the kingdom may be eased and our fellow soldiers may be quieted in spirit.f These things I have represented as my thoughts. I desire your pardon.
I think it is good for us to proceed to our business in some order, and that will be if we consider some things that are lately past. There hath been a book printed, called The Case of the Army Stated, and that hath been taken into consideration, and there hath been somewhat drawn up by way of exception to things contained in that book. And I suppose there was an answer brought to that which was taken by way of exception, and yesterday the gentleman that brought the answer, he was dealt honestly and plainly withal, and he was told that there were new designs adriving, and nothing would be a clearer discovery of the sincerity of [their] intentions thana their willingness, that were active, to bring what they had to say to be judged of by the General Officers and by this General Council, that we might discern what the intentions were. Now it seems there be divers that are come hither to manifest those intentions, according to what was offered yesterday; and truly I think that the best way of our proceeding will be to receive what they have to offer. Only this, Mr. Sexby, you were speaking to us two—[I know not why], except you think that we have done somewhat, or acted somewhat, different from the sense and resolution of the General Council. Truly, that that you speak to, was the things that related to the King and things that related to the Parliament; and if there be a fault, I may say it (and I dare say), it hath been the fault of the General Council, and that which you do speak you speak to the General Council, I hope, though you name us two, both in relation to the one and to the other.d Therefore truly I think it sufficient for us to say, and ’tis that we say—I can speak for myself, let others speak for themselves—I dare maintain it, and I dare avow I have acted nothing but what I have done with the public consent and approbation and allowance of the General Council. That I dare say for myself, both in relation to the one and to the other. What I have acted in Parliament in the name of the Council or of the Army, I have had my warrant for it from hence. What I have spokenb in another capacity,c as a member of the House, that was free for me to do; and I am confident that I have not used the name of the Army, or interest of the Army, to anything but what I have had allowance from the General Council for, and [what they] thought it fit to move the House in. I do the rather give you this account, because I hear there are some slanderous reports going up and down upon somewhat that hath been offered to the House of Commons [by me] as being the sense and opinion of this Army, and in the name of this Army, which (I dare be confident to speak it) hath been as false and slanderous a report as could be raised of a man. And that was this: that I should say to the Parliament, and deliver it as the desire of this Army, and the sense of this Army, that there should be a second address to the King by way of propositions. I dare be confident to speak it. What I delivered there I delivered as my own sense, and what I delivered as my own sense I am not ashamed of. What I delivered as your sense, I never delivered but what I had as your sense.
For this the Lieutenant-General was pleased to speak of last, it was moved that day the propositions were brought in. That [day] it was carried for making a second address to the King, it was when both the Lieutenant-General and myself were last here;1 and whenb we broke off here, and when we came upon the bill, it was told us that the House had carried it for a second address. And therefore the Lieutenant-General must needs be clear of it. But it was urged in the House that it was the sense of the Army that it should be so.
I desire not to speak of these things, but only to put things into an orderly way, which would lead to what the occasion is that hath brought these gentlemen hither that are now called in. Yet I cannot but speak a word to that that was last touched upon.
If I had told any man so (which I know I did not), if I did, I did tell him what I thought. And if I thought otherwise of the Army, I protest I should have been ashamed of the Army and detested it; that is, if I had thought the Army had been of that mind [that] they would let those propositions sent from both kingdomsc be the things which should be [final] whether [for] peace or no, without any further offers; and when I do find it, I shall be ashamed on ’t, and detest any days’ condescension with it. And yet for that which, Mr. Sexby tells us, hath been one of the great businesses [cast] upon the Lieutenant-General and myself, I do detest and defy the thought of that thing, of any endeavour or design or purpose or desire to set up the King; and I think I have demonstrated it, and I hope I shall do still, [that] it is the interest of the kingdom that I have suffered for. And as for the Parliament, too, I think those that know the beginnings of these principles that we [set forth] in our declarations of lated for clearing and vindicating the liberties of the people, even in relation to Parliament, will have reason [to acquit me. And] whoever do know how we were led to the declaring of that point, as we have [done], as one [fundamental], will be able to acquit me that I have been far from a design of setting up the persons of these men, or of any men whatsoever, to be our law-makers. And so likewise for the King: though I am clear, as from the other, from setting up the person of one or other, yet I shall declare it again that I do not seek, or would not seek, nor will join with them that do seek, the destruction either of Parliament or King. Neither will I consent with those, or concur with them, who will not attempt all the ways that are possible to preserve both, and to make good use, and the best use that can be, of both for the kingdom. And I did not hear anything from that gentleman (Mr. Sexby) that could induce or incline me to [abandon] that resolution. To that point I stand clear, as I have expressed. But I shall not speak any more concerning myself.
The committee met at my lodgings as soon as they parted from hence. And the first thing they resolved [was this]. On hearing there was a meeting of the Agitators, though it was thought fit by the General Council here [that] they should be sent for to the regiment[s], yet it was thought fit [by the committee] to let them know what the General Council had done, and to go on in a way that might tend to unity; and [this] being resolved on, we were desired by one of those gentlemen that were desired to go, that lest they should mistake the matter they went about, it might be drawn in writing, and this is it:
That the General Council, [&c.]a
This is the substance of what was delivered. Mr. Allen, Mr. Lockyer, and Mr. Sexby were sent with it, and I think it is fit that the Council should be acquainted with the answer.
As to the answer, it was short—truly I shall give it as short. We gave them the paper, and read it amongst them, and to my best remembrance they then told us that they were not all come together whom it did concern, and so were not in a capacity at the present to return us an answer, but that they would take it into consideration, and would send it as speedily as might be. I think it was near their sense.
(The answer of the Agitators read.1 )
Whereas it was appointed by the Council, and we of the committee did accordingly desire, that these gentlemen,b being members of the Army and engaged with the Army, might have come to communicate with the General Council of the Army and those that were appointed by them for a mutual satisfaction: by this paper they seem to be of a fixed resolution—setting themselves to be a divided party or distinct council from the General Council of the Armyc —that there was nothing to be done as single persons to declare their dissatisfaction, or the grounds for informing themselves better or us better, but that they [would speak] as all the rest should concur, so thata they seemed to hold together as a formed and settled party, distinct and divided from others; and withal [they] seemed to set down these resolutions [as things] to which they expect the compliance ofn others, rather than their compliance with others to give satisfaction.
But it seems, upon something that the Lieutenant-General and some others of that committee did think fitb [to offer], the gentlemen that brought that paperc have been since induced to descend a little from the height, andd to send some of them to comee as agents particularly, or messengers from that meeting or from that council, to hear what we have to say to them, or to offer something to us relating to the matters in that paper. I believe there are gentlemen sent with them, that (though perhaps the persons of them that are members of the Army mayf give the passages in)g they may be better able to observe them. And, therefore, if you please, I move that they may proceed.
May it please your Honour: [I desired] to give you satisfaction in that there was such a willingness that we might have a conference. Whereupon I did engage that interest that was in me that I would procure some to come hither, both of the soldiers and of others for assistance. And in order thereunto, here are two soldiers sent from the Agents, and two of our friends also,h to present this to your considerations, and desirei your advice. According toj my expectations and your engagements,k you are resolved every one to purchase our inheritances which have been lost, and free this nation from the tyranny that lies upon us. I question not but that it is all your desires. And for that purpose we desire to do nothing but what we present to your consideration. And if you conceive that it must be for us to be instruments, (that we might shelter ourselves like wise men before the storm comes) we desire that all carping upon words might be laid aside, and [that you may] fall directly upon the matter presented to you.
We have [here met on purpose], according to my engagement, that whatsoever may be thought to be necessary for our satisfaction, for the right understanding one of another,m [might be done], that we might go on together. For, though our ends and aims be the same, if one thinks this way, another another way,a that way which is the best for the subject [is] that they [both] may be hearkened unto.
(The answer of the Agitators, the second time read.1 )
[For the privileges here demanded], I think it will be strange that we that are soldiers cannot have them [for] ourselves, if not for the whole kingdom; and therefore we beseech you consider of it.
These things that you have now offered, they are new to us: they are things that we have not at all (at least in this method and thus circumstantially) had any opportunity to consider of,b because they came to us but thus, as you see; this is the first time we had a view of them.
Truly this paper does contain in it very great alterations of the very government of the kingdom, alterations from that government that it hath been under, I believe I may almost say, since it was a nation—I say, I think I may almost say so. And what the consequences of such an alteration as this would be, if there were nothing else to be considered, wise men and godly men ought to consider. I say, if there were nothing else [to be considered] but the very weight and nature of the things contained in this paper.c Therefore, although the pretensions in it, and the expressions in it, are very plausible, and if we could leap out of one condition into another that had so specious things in it as this hath, I suppose there would not be much dispute—though perhaps some of these things may be very well disputed. How do we know if, whilst we are disputing these things, another company of men shall [not] gather together, andd put out a paper as plausible perhaps as this? I do not know why it might not be done by that time you have agreed upon this, or got hands to it if that be the way. And not only another, and another, but many of this kind. And if so, what do you think the consequence of that would be? Would it not be confusion? Would it not be utter confusion? Would it not make England like the Switzerland country, one canton of the Swiss against another, and one county against another? I ask you whether it be not fit for every honest man seriously to lay that upon his heart? And if so, what would that produce but an absolute desolation—an absolute desolation to the nation—and we in the meantime tell the nation: ‘It is for your liberty; ’tis for your privilege; ’tis for your good.’ (Pray God it prove, so whatsoever course we run.) But truly, I think we are not only to consider what the consequences are if there were nothing else but this paper, but we are to consider the probability of the ways and means to accomplish [the thing proposed]: that is to say, whether,a according to reason and judgment, the spirits and temper of the people of this nation are prepared to receive and to go on along with it, and [whether] those great difficulties [that] lie in our way [are] in a likelihood to be either overcome or removed. Truly, to anything that’s good, there’s no doubt on it, objections may be made and framed; but let every honest man consider whether or no there be not very real objections [to this] in point of difficulty.b I know a man may answer all difficulties with faith, and faith will answer all difficulties really where it is, butc we are very apt, all of us, to call that faith, that perhaps may be but carnal imagination, and carnal reasonings. Give me leave to say this. There will be very great mountains in the way of this, if this were the thing in present consideration; and, therefore, we ought to consider the consequences, and God hath given us our reason that we may do this. It is not enough to propose things that are good in the end,e but suppose this model were an excellent model, and fit for England and the kingdom to receive,f it is our duty as Christians and men to consider consequences, and to consider the way.
But really I shall speak to nothing but that that, as before the Lord I am persuaded in my heart, tends to uniting of us in one, [and] to that that God will manifest to us to be the thing that he would have us prosecute. And he that meets not here with that heart, and dares not say he will stand to that, I think he is a deceiver. I say it to you again, and I profess unto you, I shall offer nothing to you but that I think in my heart and conscience tends to the uniting of us, and to the begetting a right understanding among us; and therefore this is that I would insist upon, and have it cleared among us.
It is not enough for us to insist upon good things. That every one would do. There is not [one in] forty of us butg could prescribe many things exceeding plausible—and hardly anything worse than our present condition, take it with all the troubles that are upon us. It is not enough for us to propose good things, but it behoves honest men and Christians (that really will approve themselves so before God and men) to see whether or no they be in a condition—whether, taking all things into consideration, they may honestly endeavour and attempt that that is fairly and plausibly proposed. For my own part I know nothing that we are to consider first but that, before we would come to debate the evil or good of this [paper], or to add to it or subtract from it. Anda if we should come to any [such] thing,b I am confident (if your hearts be upright as ours are—and God will be judge between you and us) you do not bring this paper with peremptoriness of mind, but to receive amendments, to have anything taken from it that may be madec apparent by clear reason to be inconvenient or unhonest.
But [first of all there is the question what obligations lie upon us and how far we are engaged].d This ought to be our consideration and yours, saving [that] in this you have the advantage of us—you that are the soldiers you have not, but you that are not [soldiers]—you reckon yourselves at a loose and at a liberty, as men that have no obligation upon you. Perhaps we conceive we have; and therefore this is that I may saye —both to those that come with you, and to my fellow officers and all others that hear me: that it concerns us as we would approve ourselves before God, and before men that are able to judge of us, if we do not make good [our] engagements, if we do not make good that that the world expects we should make good. I do not speak to determine what that is; but if I be not much mistaken, we have in the time of our danger issued out declarations; we have been required by the Parliament, because our declarations were general, to declare particularly what we meant. And (having done that) how far that obliges or not obliges [us], that is by us to be considered—if we mean honestly and sincerely and tof approve ourselves to God as honest men. And therefore, having heard this paper read, this remains to us: that we again review what we have engaged in, and what we have that lies upon us.g He that departs from that that is a real engagement and a real tie upon him, I think he transgresses without faith; for faith will bear up men in every honest obligation, and God does expect from men the performance of every honest obligation. And therefore I have no more to say but this: we having received your paper, we shall amongst ourselves consider what to do; and before we take this into consideration, it is fit for us to consider how far we are obliged, and how far we are free; and I hope we shall prove ourselves honest men where we are free to tender anything to the good of the public. And this is that I thought good to offer to you upon this paper.
Being yesterday at a meeting where divers country gentlemen and soldiers and others were, and amongst the rest the Agents of the five regiments, and having weighed their papers, I must freely confess I did declare my agreement with them. Upon that, they were pleased to declare their sense in most particulars of their proceedings, to me, and desired me that I would be their mouth, and in their namesa represent their sense unto you. And upon that ground I shall speak something in answer to that which your Honour last spake.
I shall not reply anything at present, till it come to be further debated, either concerning the consequences of what is propounded, or [the contents] of this paper; but I conceive the chief weight of your Honour’s speech lay in this, that you were first to consider what obligations lay upon you, and how far you were engaged, before you could consider what was just in this paper now propounded; adding that God would protect men in keeping honest promises. To that I must only offer this. That, according to the best knowledge [I have] of their apprehensions, they do apprehend that whatever obligation is past must afterwards be considered when it is urged whether [the engagement]b were honest andc just or no; and if it were not just it doth not oblige the persons, if it be an oath itself. But if, while there is not so clear a light, any person passes an engagement, it is judged by them (and I so judge it) to be an act of honesty for that man to recede from his former judgment, and to abhor it. And therefore I conceive the first thing is to consider the honesty of what is offered; otherwise it cannot be considered of any obligation that doth prepossess. By the consideration of the justice of what is offered, that obligation shall appear whether it was just or no. If it were not just, I cannot but be confident of the searings of your consciences. And I conceive this to be their sense; and upon this account, upon a more serious review of all declarations past, they see no obligations which are just, that they contradict by proceeding in this way.
Sure this gentleman hath not been acquainted with our engagements. For he that will cry out of breach of engagement in slight and trivial things and things necessitated to—I can hardly think that man that is so tender of an engagement as to frame, or [at least] concur with, this book in their insisting upon every punctilio of [the] Engagement,1 can be of that principle that no engagement is binding further than that he thinks it just or no. For hea hints that,b if he that makes an engagement (be it what it will be) have further light that this engagement was not good or honest, then he is free from it. Truly, if the sense were put thus, that a man finds he hath entered into an engagement and thinks that it was not a just engagement, I confess something might be said that [such] a man might declare himself for his part [ready] to suffer some penaltyc upon his person or upon his party.d The question is, whether it be an engagement to another party. Now if a mani venture into an engagement from him[self] to another, and finde that engagement [not] just and honest, he must apply himself to the other party and say: ‘I cannot actively perform it; I will make you amends as near as I can.’ Upon the same ground men are not obliged [to be obedient] to any authority that is set up, though it were this authority that is proposed here—I am not engaged to be so actively to that authority. Yet if I have engaged that they shall bind me by law, though afterwardsf I find they do require me to a thing that is not just or honest,j I am bound so far to my engagement that I must submit and suffer, though I cannot act and do that which their laws do impose upon me. If that caution were put in where a performance of an engagement might be expected from another, and he could not do it because he thought it was not honest to be performed—if such a thing were put into the case, it is possible there might be some reason for it. But to take it as it is delivered in general, [that we are free to break, if it subsequently appear unjust], whatever engagement we have entered into, though it be a promise of something to another party, wherein that other party is concerned, wherein he hath a benefit if we make it good, wherein he hath a prejudice if weg make it not good: this is a principle that will take away all commonwealth[s], and will take away the fruit of this [very] engagement if it were entered into; and men of this principle would think themselves as little as may be [obliged by any law] if in their apprehensions it be not a good law. I think they would think themselves as little obliged to think of standing to that authority [that is proposed in this paper].
Truly, sir, I have little to say at the present to that matter of the paper that is tendered to us. I confess, there are plausible things in it, and there are things really good in it.h There are those things that I do with my heart desire; and there are those things, for the most part of it, [that]—I shall be so free as to say—if these gentlemen (and other gentlemen that will join with them) can obtain, I would not oppose, I should rejoice to see obtained. There are those things in it, divers [of them]. And if we were, as hath been urged now, free; if we were first free from consideration of all the dangers and miseries that we may bring upon this people, [the danger] that when we go to cry out for the liberty of it we may not leave a being [in it], free from all [those] engagements that do lie upon us, and that were honest when they were entered into: I should concur with this paper further than, as the case doth stand, I can. But truly I do account we are under engagements; and I suppose that whatsoever this gentleman that spoke last doth seem to deliver to us, holding himself absolved from all engagements if he thinks it, yet those men that came with him (that are in the case of the Army) hold themselves more obliged; and therefore that they will not persuade us to lay aside all our former engagements and declarations, if there be anything in them, and to concur in this, if there be anything in it that is contrary to those engagements which they call upon us to confirm. Therefore I do wish that we may have a consideration of our former engagements, of things which are generally the engagements of the Army. Those we are to take notice of; and sure we are not to recede from them till we are convinceda that they are unjust. And when we are convinced of them, that they are unjust, truly yet I must not fully concur with that gentleman’s principle, that presentlyb we are, as he says, absolved from them, that we are not bound to them, or we are not bound to make them good. Yet I should think, at least, if the breach of that engagement be to the prejudice of another whom we have persuaded to believe by our declaring such things, [so] that wec led them to a confidence of it, to a dependence upon it, to a disadvantage to themselves or the losing of advantages to them; [I say, I think then that] though we were convinced they were unjust, and satisfied in this gentleman’s principle, and free and disengaged from them, yet we who made that engagement should not make it our act to break it. Though we were convinced that we are not bound to perform it, yet we should not make it our act to break [it]. And sod I speak to enforce this upon the whole matter.e As forf the particulars of this Agreement, [there are other questions]: whether they have that goodness that they hold forth in show, or whether [there] are not some defects in them which are not seen, [so] that, if we should rest in this Agreement without something more, they wouldg deceive us; and whether there be not some considerations that would tend [more] to union. Buta withal [I wish] that we who are the Army and are engaged with [its] public declarations, may consider how far those public declarations, which we then thought to be just,b do oblige, thatf we may either resolve to make them good if we can in honest ways, or at least not make it our work to break them. And for this purpose I wish—unless the Council please to meet from time to time, from day to day, and to consider it themselves, to go over our papers and declarations and take the heads of them—I wish there may be some specially appointed for it; and I shall be very glad if it may be so that I myself may be none of them.
I shall crave your pardon if I may speak something freely; and I think it will be the last time I shall speak here,1 and from such a way that I never looked for. The consideration that I had in this Army and amongst honest men—not that it is an addition of honour and profit to me, but rather a detriment in both—isc the reason that I speak something by way of apology first. This paper I saw by chance, and had no resolution to have been at this Council, nor any other since I took this employment upon me, but to do my duty. I met with a letter (which truly was so strange to me that I have been a little troubled, and truly I have so many sparks of honour and honesty in me) to let me know that my regiment should be immediately disposed from me. I hope that none in the Army will say but that I have performed my duty, and that with some success, as well as others. I am loath to leave the Army,d with whom I will live and die, insomuch that rather than I will lose this regiment of mine the Parliament shall exclude me the House, [or] imprison me; for truly while I am [employed] abroad I will not be undone at home. This was it that called me hither, and not anything of this paper. But now I shall speak something of it.e
I shall speak my mind, that, whoever he be that hath done this, he hath done it with much respect to the good of his country. It is said, there are many plausible things in it. Truly, many things have engaged me, which, if I had not known they should have been nothing but good, I would not have engaged in. It hath been said, that if a man be engaged he must perform his engagements. I am wholly confident that every honest man is bound in duty to God and his conscience, let him be engaged in what he will, to decline it when [he sees it to be evil]: he is engaged, and [as] clearly convinced, to discharge his duty to God as ever he was for it. And that I shall make good out of the scripture, and clear it by that, if that be anything. There are two [further] objections are made against it.
The one is division. Truly I think we are utterly undone if we divide, but I hope that honest things have carried us on thus long, and will keep us together, and I hope that we shall not divide. Another thing is difficulties. Oh, unhappy men are we that ever began this war! If ever we [had] looked upon difficulties, I do not know that ever we should have looked an enemy in the face. Truly, I think the Parliament were very indiscreet to contest with the King if they did not consider first that they should go through difficulties; and I think there was no man that entered into this war, that did not engage [to go through difficulties]. And I shall humbly offer unto you—it may be the last time I shall offer, it may be so, but I shall discharge my conscience in it—it is this. That truly I think,a let the difficulties be round about you—have you death before you, the sea on each side of you and behind you—[and] are you convinced that the thing is just, I think you are bound in conscience to carry it on; and I think at the last day it can never be answered to God, that you did not do it. For I think it is a poor service to God and the kingdom, to take their pay and to decline the work.b I hear [it] said [that] it’s a huge alteration, it’s a bringing in of new laws, and that this kingdom hath been under this government ever since it was a kingdom. If writings be true there havec been many scufflings between the honest men of England and those that have tyrannized over them; and if it be [true what I have] read, there is none of those just and equitable laws that the people of England are born to, butd are entrenchment[s on the once enjoyed privileges of their rulers] altogether. But [even] if they were those which the people have been always under, if the people find that they are [not] suitable to freemen as they are, I know no reason [that] should deter me, either in what I must answer before God or the world, frome endeavouring by all means to gain anything that might be of more advantage to them than the government under which they live. I do not press that you should go on with this thing, for I think that every man that would speak to it will be less able till he hath some time to consider it. I do make it my motion: That two or three days’ time may be set for every man to consider, and [that] all that is to be considered is the justness of the thing—and if that be considered then all things are—[so] that there may be nothing to deter us from it, but that we may do that which is just to the people.
Truly I am very glad that this gentleman that spoke last is here, and not sorry for the occasion that brought him hither, because it argues we shall enjoy his company longer than I thought we should have done—
If I should not be kicked out—
And truly then, I think, it shall not be long enough. But truly I do not know what the meaning of that expression is, nor what the meaning of any hateful word is here. For we are all here with the same integrity to the public; and perhaps we have all of us done our parts, not affrighted with difficulties, one as well as another, and, I hope, have all purposes henceforward—through the grace of God, not resolving in our own strength—to do so still. And therefore truly I think all the consideration is that. Amongst us we are almost all soldiers; all considerations [of not fearing difficulties], or words of that kind, do wonderfully please us; all words of courage animate us to carry on our business, to do God’s business, that which is the will of God. And I say it again, I do not think that any man here wants courage to do that which becomes an honest man and an Englishman to do. But we speak as men that desire to have the fear of God before our eyes, and men that may not resolve in the power of a fleshly strength to do that which we do, but to lay this as the foundation of all our actions, to do that which is the will of God. And if any man have a false conceita —on the one hand, deceitfulness, [pretending] that which he doth not intend, or a persuasion, on the other hand, [to rely on fleshly strength]—I think he will not prosper.
But to that which was moved by Colonel Rainborough, of the objections of difficulty and danger [and] of the consequences: they are proposed not to any other end, but [as] things fitting consideration, not forged to deter from the consideration of the business.b In the consideration of the thing that is new to us, and of everything that shall be new, that is of such importance as this is, I think that he that wishes the most serious advice to be taken of such a change as this is—so evident and clear [a change]—whoever offers that there may be most serious consideration, I think he does not speak impertinently. And truly it was offered to no other end than what I speak. I shall say no more to that.
But to the other, concerning engagements and breaking of them: I do not think that it was at all offered by anybody, that though an engagement were never so unrighteous it ought to be kept. No man offered a syllable or tittle [to that purpose]. For certainly it’s an act of duty to break an unrighteous engagement; he that keeps it does a double sin, in that he made an unrighteous engagement, and [in] that he goes about to keep it. But this was only offered, that before we can consider of this [paper] (and I know not what can be more fitly [offered]) we labour to know where we are, and where we stand. Perhaps we are upon engagements that we cannot with honesty break. But let me tell you this, that he that speaks to you of engagements here, is as free from engagements to the King as any man in all the world. I know it, anda if it were otherwise, I believe my future actions would provoke some to declare it. But, I thank God, I stand upon the bottom of my own innocence in this particular; through the grace of God I fear not the face of any man, I do not. I say, we are to consider what engagements we have made; and if our engagements have been unrighteous, why should we not make it our endeavours to break them? Yet if [they be] unrighteous engagements it is not [wise to hasten] a present breach of them unless there be a consideration of circumstances. Circumstances may be such as I may not now break an unrighteous engagements, or else I may do that which I dob scandalously, [even] if the thing [itself] be good. But if that be true concerning the breaking of an unrighteous engagement, it is much more verified concerningc engagements disputabled whether they be righteous or unrighteous. If so, I am sure it is fit we should dispute [them], and if, when we have disputed them, we see the goodness of God enlightening us to see our liberties, I think we are to do what we can to give satisfaction to men.e If it were so, [it ought to appear that] as we made an engagement in judgment and knowledge, so we go off from it in judgment and knowledge. But there may be just engagements upon us, such as perhaps it will be our duty to keep; and if so, it is fit we should consider. And all that I said [was] that we should consider our engagements, and there is nothing else offered, and therefore what need [that] anybody be angry or offended? Perhaps we have made such engagements as may in the matter of them not bind us; [yet] in some circumstances they may. Our engagements are public engagements. They are to the kingdom, and to every one in the kingdom that could look upon what we did publicly declare, could read or hear it read. They are to the Parliament. And it is a very fitting thing that we do seriously consider of the things. Andf this is what I shall shortly offer. That because the kingdom is in the danger it is in, because the kingdom is in that condition it is in, and time may be ill spent in debates, and it is necessary for things to be put to an issue (if ever it was necessary in the world it is now), I should desire this may be done. That this General Council may be appointed [to meet] against a very short time, two days—Thursday—if you would against Saturday, or at furthest against Monday; that there might be a committee out of this Council appointed to debate and consider with those two gentlemen, and with any others that are not of the Army, that they shall bring, and with the Agitators of those five regiments; that so there may be a liberal and free debate had amongst us, that we may understand really, as before God, the bottom of our desires, and that we may seek God together, and see if God will give us an uniting spirit.
And give me leave to tell it you again, I am confident there sits not a man in this place that cannot so freely act with you [that], if he sees that God hath shut up his way that he cannot do any service in that way as may be good for the kingdom,a he will be glad to withdraw himself, and wish you all prosperity. And if this heart be in us, as is known to God that searches our hearts and trieth the reins, God will discover whether our hearts be not clear in this business. And therefore I shall move that we may have a committee amongst ourselves [to consider] of the engagements, and this committee to dispute things with others, and a short day [to be appointed] for the General Council. And I doubt not but, if in sincerity we are willing to submit to that light that God shall cast in among us, God will unite us, and make us of one heart and one mind.b Do the plausiblest things you can do, do that which hath the most appearance of reason in it, that tends to change: at this conjuncture of time you will find difficulties. But if God satisfy our spirits this will be a ground of confidence to every good man; and he that goes upon other grounds, he shall fall like a beast. I shall desire this: that you, or any other of the Agitators or gentlemen that can be here, will be here, that we may have free discourses amongst ourselves of things, and you will be able to satisfy each other. And really, rather than I would have this kingdom break in pieces before some company of men be united together to a settlement, I will withdraw myself from the Army to-morrow, and lay down my commission. I will perish before I hinder it.
May it please your Honour: I was desired by some of the Agents to accompany this paper,c having manifesteda my approbation of it after I had heard it read several times. And they desired that it might be offered to this Council, for the concurrence of the Council if it might be.f I find that the engagements of the Army are at present the thingse which is insisted to be considered. I confess my ignorance in those engagements; but I apprehend, at least I hope, that those engagements have given away nothing from the people that is the people’s right. It may be they have promised the King his right, or any other persons their right, but no more. If they have promised more than their right to any person or persons, and have given away anything from the people that is their right, then I conceive they are unjust. And if they are unjust [they should be broken], though I confess for my own part I am very tender of breaking an engagement when it concerns a particular person—I think that a particular person ought rather to set down and lose than to break an engagement. But if any menb have given away anything from another whose right it was to one or more whose right it was not, I conceive these men may [break that engagement]—at least many of them think themselves bound not only to break this engagement, but to [re]place [it with another] to give every one his due. I conceive that for the substance of the paper, it is the people’s due. And for the change of the government, which is so dangerous, I apprehend that there may be many dangers in it, and truly I apprehend there may be more dangers without it. For I conceive, if you keep the government as it is and bring in the King, there may be more dangers than in changing the government. But however, because (from those things that I heard of the Agents) they conceive that this conjuncture of time may almost destroy them, they have taken upon them a liberty of acting to higher things, as they hope, for the freedom of the nation, than yet this General Council have acted to. And therefore, as theirc sense is,d I must make this motion. That all those that upon a due consideration of the thing do find it to be just and honest, and do find that if they have engaged anything to the contrary of this it is unjust and giving away the people’s rights, I desire that they may, and all others [may], have a free liberty of acting to anything in this nature, or any other nature, that may be for the people’s good, by petitioning or otherwise; whereby the fundamentals for a well-ordered government [and] for the people’s rights may be established. And I shall desire that those that conceive them[selves] bound up would desist, and satisfy themselves in that, and be no hindrances in that to hinder the people in a more perfect way than hath been [yet] endeavoured.
I suppose you have not thought fit, that there should be a dispute concerning thingsb at this time.c I desire that other things may be taken into consideration, delays and debates. Delays have undone us, and it must be a great expedition that must further us; and therefore I desire that there may be a committee appointed.
I shall but humbly take the boldness to put you in mind of one thing which you moved enow. The motion is, that there might be a seeking of God in the things that now lie before us.
I shall humbly desire that that motion may not die. It may be that there ared some particular opinions among us concerning the use of ordinances and of public seeking of God. No doubt formse have been rested upon too much; but yet since there are so many of us that have had so many and so large experiences of an extraordinary manifestation of God’s presence when we have been in such extraordinary ways met together, I shall desire that those who are that way [moved] will take the present opportunity to do it. For certainly those things that are now presentedf are well accepted by most of us,g though I am not prepared to say anything either consenting or dissenting to the paper, as not thinking it wisdom to answer a matter before I have considered. Yet [I am troubled] when I do consider how much ground there is to conceive there hath been a withdrawing of the presence of God from us that have met in this placeh —I do not say a total withdrawing; I hope God is with us and amongst us. It hath been our trouble night and day, that God hath not been with us as formerly, as many within us, so without us, [have told us], men that were sent from God in an extraordinary manner to us. I mean [that though] the ministers may take too much upon them, yet there have been those that have preached to us in this place, [in] several places, we know very well that they spake to our hearts and consciences, and told us of our wanderings from God, and told us in the name of the Lord that God would be with us no longer than we were with him. We have in some things wandered from God, and as we have heard this from them in this place, so have we had it very frequently pressed upon our spirits [elsewhere], pressed upon us in the City and the country. I speak this to this end, that our hearts may be deeply and thoroughly affected with this matter. For if God be departed from us, he is somewhere else. If we have not the will of God in these counsels, God may be found among some other counsels. Therefore, I say, let us show the spirit of Christians, and let us not be ashamed to declare to all the world that our counsels and our wisdom and our ways, they are not altogether such as the world hath walked in; but that we have had a dependency upon God, and that our desires are to follow God, though never so much to our disadvantage in the world if God may have the glory by it.
And, I pray, let us consider this: God does seem evidently to be throwing down the glory of all flesh. The greatest powers in the kingdom have been shaken. God hath thrown down the glory of the King and that party; he hath thrown down a party in the City. I do not say that God will throw us down—I hope better things—but he will have the glory. Let us not stand upon our glory and reputation in the world. If we have done some things through ignorance or fear or unbelief, in the day of our straits, and could not give God that glory by believing as we ought to have done,a I hope God hath a way for to humble us for that, and to keep us as instruments in his hand still. There are two ways that God doth take upon those that walk obstinately against him: if they be obstinate and continue obstinate, he breaks them in pieces with a rod of iron; if they be his people and wander from him, he takes that glory from them and takes it to himself. (I speak it, I hope, from a divine impression.) If we wouldb continue to be instruments in his hand, let us seriously set ourselves before the Lord, and seek to him and wait upon him for conviction of spirits. It is not enough for us to say, ‘If we have offended we will leave the world, we will go and confess to the Lord what we have done amiss, but we will do no more so.’ Aaron went up to Hor and died; and Moses was favoured to see the land of Canaan—he did not voluntarily lay himself aside. I hope our strayings from God are not so great but that a conversion and true humiliation may recover us again; and I desire that we may be serious in this, and not despise any other instruments that God will use. God will have his work done; it may be, we think we are the only instruments that God hath in his hands. I shall only add these two things. First,c that we [should] be wary how we let forth anything against his people, and that which is for the whole kingdom and nation. I would move that we may not let our spirits act too freely against them till we have thoroughly weighed the matter, and considered our own ways too. The second is, to draw us up to a serious consideration of the weightiness of the work that lies before us, and seriously to set ourselves to seek the Lord; and I wish it might be considered of a way and manner that it should be conveniently done, and I think to-morrow will be the [best] day.
I know not what [hour] Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe means for to-morrow, for the time of seeking God. I think it will be requisite that we do it speedily, and do it the first thing, and that we do it as unitedly as we can, as many of us as well may meet together. I think it would be good that to-morrow morning may be spent in prayer, and the afternoon might be the time of our business. I do not know whethera these gentlemen do assent to it, that to-morrow in the afternoon might be the time?b For my part I shall lay aside all business for this business, either to convince or be convinced as God shall please.c
I think we have a great deal of business to do, and we have been doing of it these ten weeks. I say, go about what you will, for my part I shall not think anything can prosper unless God be first [publicly] sought.d It is an ordinance that God hath blessed to this end.e
If that be approved of, that to-morrow [morning] shall be a time of seeking the Lord, and that the afternoon shall be the time of business, if that doth agree with your opinion and [the] general sense, let that be first ordered.
That which Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe offered hath [made] a very great impression upon me; and indeed I must acknowledge to God, [and] tog him, that as he hath several times spoke in this place (and elsewhere) to this purpose, he hath never spoke but he hath touched my heart; and that especially in the point [of] that one thing that he hints.h In the time of our straits and difficulties, I think we none of us—I fear we none of us—I am sure I have not—walked so closely with God, and kept so close with him, [as] to trust wholly upon him, as not to be led too much with considerations of danger and difficulty, and from that consideration to waive some things, and perhaps to do some things that otherwise I should not have thought fit to have done.i Every one hath a spirit within him—especially [he] who has that communion indeed with that Spirit that is the only searcher of hearts—that can best search out and discover to him the errors of his own ways and of the workings of his own heart. And though I think that public actings [are necessary in relation to] public departings from God, [which] are the fruits of unbelief and distrust, and not honouring Goda by sanctifying himb in our ways,c and [though], if there be any such thing in the Army, that is to be looked upon with a public eye in relation to the Army;d [yet] they do more publicly engage God to vindicate his honour by a departing from them, that do so. But I think the main thing is for every one to wait upon God, for the errors, deceits, and weaknesses of his own heart; and I pray God to be present with us in that. But withal I would not have that seasonable and good motion that hath come from Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe to be neglected, of a public seeking of God, and seeking to God, as for other things so especially for the discovery of any public deserting of God, or dishonouring of him, or declining from him, that does lie as the fault and blemish upon the Army.e Therefore I wish his motion may be pursued, that the thing may be done, and for point of time as was moved by him. Only this to the way. I confess I think the best [way] is this, that it may be only taken notice of as a thing by the agreement of this Council resolved on, that to-morrow in the morning, the forenoon we do set apart, we do give up from other business, for every man to give himself up that wayf in private by himself [if he so chooses]—though not in public,g I cannot say. For the public meeting at the church, it were not amiss that it may be thus taken notice of as a time given from other employments for that purpose, andh every one as God shall incline their hearts, some in one place, and some another, to employ themselves that way.1
(Agreed for the meeting for prayer to be at Mr. Chamberlain’s.)
That they should not meet as two contrary parties, but as some desirous to satisfy or convince each other.
For my own part, I have done as to this business what was desired by the Agents that sent me hither. As for any further meeting to-morrow, or any other time, I cannot meet upon the same ground, to meet as for their sense, [but only] to give my own reason why I do assent to it.
I should be sorry that they should be so sudden to stand upon themselves.
To procure three, four, or five (more or less) to meet, for my own part I am utterly unconcerned in the business.
I have hereat this day answered the expectations which I engaged to your Honours; which was, that if we would give a meeting you should take that as a symptom, or a remarkable testimony, of our fidelity. I have discharged that trust reposed in me. I could not [absolutely] engage for them. I shall go on still in that method: I shall engage my deepest interest, for any reasonable desires, to engage them to come to this.
I hope we know God better than to make appearances of religious meetings covers for designs or for insinuation amongst you. I desire that God, that hath given us some sincerity, will own us according to his own goodness and that sincerity that he hath given us. I dare be confident to speak it, that [design] that hath been amongst us hitherto is to seek the guidance of God, and to recover that presence of God that seems to withdraw from us. And to accomplish that work which may be for the good of the kingdom is our end. Buta it seems as much to us in this as anything, we are not all of a mind.b And for our parts we do not desire or offer you to be with us in our seeking of God further than your own satisfactions lead you, but only [that] against to-morrow in the afternoon (which will be designed for the consideration of these businesses with you) you will do what you may to have so many as you shall think fit, to see what God will direct you to say to us, that whilst we are going one way, and you another, we be not both destroyed. This requires [guidance from the] Spirit. It may be too soon to say it, [yet ’t]is my present apprehension: I had rather we should devolve our strength to you than that the kingdom for our division should suffer loss. For that’s in all our hearts, to profess above anything that’s worldly, the public good of the people; and if that be in our hearts truly and nakedly, I am confident it is a principle that will stand. Perhaps God may unite us and carry us both one way. And therefore I do desire you, that against tomorrow in the afternoon, if you judge it meet, you will come to us to the Quartermaster-General’s quarters—where you will find us [at prayer] if you will come timely to join with us; at your liberty, if afterwards to speak with us.c There you will find us.
I desire to return a little to the business in hand, that was the occasion of these other motions. I could not but take some notice of something that did reflect upon the Agents of the five regiments, in which I could not but give a little satisfaction [as] to them; and I shall desire to prosecute a motion or two that hath been already made. I observed that it was said,a that these gentlemen do insist upon engagements in The Case of the Army,b and therefore it was saidc to be contrary to the principles of the Agents, that an engagement which was unjust couldd lawfully be broken.e I shall only observe this: that though an unjust engagement, when it appears unjust, may be broken; yet when two parties engage [each that] the other party may have satisfaction,j because they are mutually engaged each to other one party that apprehends they are broken [is justified] to complain of them; and so it may be their case, with which, I confess, I made my concurrence.
The other [thing I would mention] is a principle much spreading, and much to my trouble, and that is this: that when persons once be engaged, though the engagement appear to be unjust, yet the person must sit down and suffer under it; and that therefore, in case a Parliament, as a true Parliament, doth anything unjustly, if we be engaged to submit to the laws that they shall make, thoughf they make an unjust law, though they make an unrighteous law, yet we must swear obedience. I confess, to me this principleg is very dangerous, and I speak it the rather because I see it spreading abroad in the Army again—whereas it is contrary to what the Army first declared: that they stood upon such principles of right and freedom, and the Laws of Nature and Nations, whereby men were to preserve themselves though the persons to whomh authority belonged should fail in it; and they urged the example of the Scots, and [argued that] the general that would destroy the army, they might hold his hands; and therefore if anything tends to the destruction of a people, because the thing is absolutely unjust thati tends to their destruction, [they may preserve themselves by opposing it].1 I could not but speak a word to that.
The motion that I should make upon that account is this. That whereas [it is said] there must be a meeting [to examine differences and promote union], I could not find [but] that they were desirous to give all satisfaction, and they desire nothing but the union of the Army. Thus far it is their sense. [But they apprehend] that the necessity of the kingdom is such for present actings, that two or three days may lose the kingdom. I desire in the sight of God to speak—I mean plainly: there may be an agreement between the King [and the Parliament] by propositions, with a power to hinder the making of any laws that are good, and the tendering of any good [laws].a And therefore,b because none of the people’s grievances are redressed,c they do apprehend that thus a few days may be the loss of the kingdom. I know it is their sense: that they desire to be excused, that it might not be thought any arrogancy in them, but they are clearly satisfied that the way they proceed in is just, and [they] desire to be excused if they go on in it; and yet, notwithstanding, [they] will give all satisfaction. And whereas it is desired that engagements may be considered, I shall desire that only the justice of the thing that is proposed may be considered. [I would know] whether the chief thing in the Agreement,1 the intent of it, be not this, to secure the rights of the people in their Parliaments, which was declared by this Army, in the declaration of the fourteenth of June, to be absolutely insisted on. I shall make that motion to be the thing considered: Whether the thing be just, or the people’s due? And then there can be no engagement to bind from it.
Truly, sir, by what Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe moved, I confess, I was so taken off from all [other] thoughts in this business that I did not think of speaking anything more. But what this gentleman hath last said hath renewed the occasion, and indeedd if I did thinke all that he hath delivered [to] be truth and innocence—any, if I did not think that it hath venom and poison in it.—I would not speak it.
First, I cannot but speak something unto the two particulars that he holds forth as dangerous things—indeed he hath clearly yoked them together, when before I was sensible of those principles and how far they would run together; that is that principle of not being obliged, by not regardingf what engagements men have entered into, ifg in their future apprehensionsh the things they engaged to are unjust; and that principle, on the other hand, of not submitting passively to that authority we have engaged to for peace’ sake. For he does hold forth his opinion in those two points to clear their way; and I must crave leave on my part to declare [that] my opinion of thati distinction doth lie on the other way.
I am far from holding that if a man have engaged himself to a thing that is not just—to a thing that is evil, that is sin if he do it—that that man is still bound to perform what he hath promised; I am far from apprehending that. But when we talk of just, it is not so much of what is sinful before God (which depends upon many circumstances of indignation to that man and the like), but it intends of that which is just according to the foundation of justice between man and man.a And for my part I account that the great foundation of justice,b [that we should keep covenant one with another]; without which I know nothing of [justice]c betwixt man and mand —[in] particular matters I mean, nothing in particular things that can come under human engagement one way or other.e There is no other foundation of right I know, of right to [any] one thing from another man, no foundation of that [particular] justice or that [particular] righteousness, but this general justice, and this general ground of righteousness, that we should keep covenant one with another.f Covenants freely made, freely entered into, must be kept one with another. Take away that, I do not know what ground there is of anything you can call any man’s right. I would very fain know what you gentlemen, or any other, do account the right you have to anything in England—anything of estate, land or goods, that you have, what ground, what right you have to it. What right hath any man to anything if you lay not [down] that principle, that we are to keep covenant? If you will resort only to the Law of Nature, by the Law of Nature you have no more right to this land, or anything else, than I have. I have as much right to take hold of anything that is for my sustenance, [to] take hold of anything that I have a desire to for my satisfaction, as you. But here comes the foundation of all right that I understandg to beh betwixt men, as to the enjoying of one thing or not enjoying of it: we are under a contract, we are under an agreement, and that agreement is what a man has for matter of landi that hej hath received by a traduction from his ancestors, which according to the law does fall upon him to be his right. That [agreement is] that he shall enjoy, he shall have the property of, the use of, the disposing of [the land], withk submission to that general authority which is agreed upon amongst us for the preserving of peace, and for the supporting of this law. This I take to be [the foundation of all right] for matter of land. For matter of goods, that which does fence me from that [right] which another man may claim by the Law of Nature, of taking my goods, that which makes it mine really and civilly, is the law. That which makes it unlawful originally and radically is only this: because that man is in covenant with me to live together in peace one with another, and not to meddle with that which another is possessed of, but that each of us should enjoy, and make use of, and dispose of, that which by the course of law is in his possession, and [another] shall not by violence take it away from him. This is the foundation of all the right any man has to anything but to his own person. This is the general thing: that we must keep covenant one with another when we have contracted one with another.a And if any difference arise among us, it shall be thus and thus: that I shall not go with violence to prejudice another, but with submission to this way. And therefore when I hear men speak of laying aside all engagements to [consider only] that wild or vast notion of what in every man’s conception is just or unjust, I am afraid and do tremble at the boundless and endless consequences of it. What [are the principles] you apply to this paper? You say,b ‘If these things in this paper, in this engagement, be just, then’—say you—‘never talk of any [prior] engagement, for if anything in that engagement be against this, your engagement was unlawful;c consider singly this paper, whether it be just.’d In what sense do you think this is just? There is a great deal of equivocation [as to] what is just and unjust.
I suppose you take away the substance of the question. Oure [sense] was, that an unjust engagement is rather to be broken than kept. The Agents think that to delay is to dispose their enemy into such a capacity as he may destroy them.f I make a question whether any engagement can be [binding] to an unjust thing. [If] a man may promise to do that which is never so much unjust, a man may promise to break all engagements and duties. But [I say] this: we must lay aside the consideration of engagements, so as not to take in that as one ground of what is just or unjust amongst men in this case. I do apply this to the case in hand: that it might be considered whether it be unjust to bring in the King in such a way as he may be in a capacity to destroy the people. This paper may be applied to [the solution of] it.
You come to it more particularly than that paper leads. There is a great deal of equivocation (and that I am bound to declare) in the point of justice.
Mr. Wildman says,g if we tarry long,h if we stay but three days before you satisfy one another, the King will come and say who will be hanged first.
Sir, I was saying this: we shall much deceive ourselves, and be apt to deceive others, if we do not consider that there area two parts of justice. There may be a thing just that is negatively [so], it is not unjust, not unlawful—that which is not unlawful, that’s just to me to do if I be free. Again, there is another sense of just when we account such a thing to be a duty—not only a thing lawful, ‘web may do it,’ but it’s a duty, ‘you ought to do it.’ And there is a great deal of mistake if you confound these two. If I engage myself to a thing that was in this sense just, that’s a thing lawful for me to do supposing me free, then I account my engagement stands good to this. On the other hand, if I engage myself against a thing which was a duty for me to do, which I was bound to do, or if I engaged myself to a thing which was not lawful for me to do, which I was bound not to do: in this sense I do account this [engagement] unjust. If I do engage myself to what was unlawful for me to engage to, I think I am not then to make good actively this engagement. But though this be true, yet the general end and equity of engagements I must regard, and that is the preserving right betwixt men, the not doing of wrong or hurt byc men, one to another. And therefore if [in] that which I engage to, though the thing be unlawful for me to do, [yet] another man be prejudiced [by my not doing it, I may not merely renounce my engagement]. Though it be a thing which was not lawfuld for me to do, yet I did freely [engage to do it], and I did [engage] upon a consideration to me; and that man did believe me, and he suffered a prejudice by believing in case I did not perform it: [then], though Ie be not bound by my engagement to perform it,f yet I am [bound] to regard that justice that lies in the matter of engagement, so as to repair that man by some just way as far as I can. And he that doth not hold this, I doubt whether he hath any principle of justice, or doing right to any, at all in him. That is: [if] he that did not think it lawful hath made another man believe it to his [possible] prejudice and hurt, and another man be [actually] prejudiced and hurt by that, he that does not hold that he is in this case to repair [it] to that man, and free him from [the prejudice of] it, I conceive there is no justice in him. And therefore I wish we may take notice of this distinction when we talk of being bound to make good [our] engagements, or not.
This I think I can make good in a larger dispute by reason. If the things engaged to were lawful to be done, or lawful for me to engage to, then [I] by my engagement amg bound to [perform] it. On the other hand, if the thing were not lawful for me to engage, or [if it were] a duty for me to have done to the contrary, then I am not bound positively and actively to perform it. Nay, I am bound not to perform it, because it was unlawful [and] unjust by another engagement. But when I engage to another man, and he hath a prejudice by believing,a I not performing it, I am bound to repair that man as much as may be, and let the prejudice fall upon myself and not upon any other. This I desire we may take notice of, on that part, to avoid fallacy. For there is [an] extremityb to say, on the one hand, that if a man engage what is not just he may act against it so as to regard no relation or prejudice; [as] there’s an extremityc for a man to say, on the other hand, that whatsoever you engage, though it be never so unjust, you are to stand to it.
One word more to the other part which Mr. Wildman doth hold out as a dangerous principle acting amongst us, that we must be bound to active obedience to any power acting amongst men—
You repeat not the principle right—‘To think that we are bound so absolutely to personal obedience to any magistrates or personal authority, that if they work to our destruction we may not oppose them.’
That we may not deceive ourselves again [by arguments] that are fallacious in that kind, I am a little affected to speak in this, because I see that, [in] those things the Army hath declared, the abuse and misapplication of them hath led many men into a great and dangerous error and destructive to all human society. Because the Army hath declared, in those cases where the foundation of all that right and liberty of the people is (if they have any),d that in these casese they will insist upon that right, and that they will not suffer that original and fundamental right to be taken away, and because the Army, when there hath been a command of that supreme authority, the Parliament, have not obeyed it, but stood upon it to have this fundamental right settled first, and [have] required a rectification of the supreme authority of the kingdom—therefore, for a man to infer [that] upon any particular [issue] you may dispute that authority by what is commanded, whetherf [it] is just or unjust, [this would be the end of all government]. If in your apprehension [it is unjust, you are] not to obey (and so far it is well); and if it tend to your loss, [it is no doubt unjust, and you are] to oppose it!
If it tend to my destruction—that was the word I spoke.
Let us take heed that we do not maintain this principle [till it] leads to destruction. If the case were so visible as those cases the Army speaks of, of a general’s turning the cannon against the army, the bulk and body of the army, or [of] a pilot that sees a rock [and] does by the advantage of the stern1 put the ship upon’t; if you could propose cases as evident as these are, there is no man but would agree with you.2 But when men will first put in those terms of destruction, they will imagine anything a destruction if there could be anything better [for them]; and so it is very easy and demonstrable that things are counted so abhorred and destructive, whena at the utmostb a man should make it out by reason, that men would be in a better condition if it be not done, than if it be done. And though I cannot but subscribe to [it], that in such a visible way I may hold the hands of those that are in authority as I may the hands of a madman; yetc that no man shall think himself [bound] to acquiesce particularly, and to suffer for quietness’ sake, rather than to make a disturbance (or to raise a power, if he can, to make a disturbance) in the state—I do apprehend and appeal to all men whether there be not more folly or destructiveness in the spring of that principle than there can be in that other principle of holding passive obedience. Now whatsoever we have declared in the Army [declarations], it is no more but this. The Parliament hath commanded us [to do] this; we have said, no. First we have insisted upon [the] fundamental rights of the people. We have said, we desire [first] to have the constitution of the supreme authority of this kingdom reduced to that constitution which is due to the people of this kingdom, and, reducing the authority to this, we will submit to it, we will acquiesce, we will cast our share into this common bottom; and if it go ill with us at one time, it will go well at another.3 The reducing of the supreme authority to that constitution, by successived election, as near as may be,e we have insisted upon as an essential right of the kingdom; and no man can accuse the Army of disobedience, or holding forth a principle of disobedience, upon any other ground.
Let me speak a word to this business. We are now upon that business which we spake of consulting with God about,a and therefore for us to dispute the merit of those things, I judge it altogether unseasonable unless you will make it the subject of debate before you consider it among yourselves. The business of the Engagement lies upon us. They [claim that they] are free in a double respect: they made none; and if they did, then the way out is now, and [it is a way] which all the members of the Army, except they be sensible of it, [may take], and, at one jump, jump out of all [engagements]. And it is a very great jump, I will assure you. As we profess we intend to seek the Lord in the thing, the less we speak in it [now] the better, and the more we cast ourselves upon God the better.
I shall only speak two things to Mr. Wildman in order to our meeting. Methought he said, if there be delay he fears this business will be determined, the propositions will be sent from the Parliament, and the Parliament and King agree, and so those gentlemen that were in that mind to go on in their way, will be cut off in point of time to their own disadvantage. And the other thing he said was that these gentlemen who have chosen Mr. Wildman, and that other gentleman,1 to be their mouth at this meeting to deliver their minds, they are, upon the matter, engaged byb what they have resolved upon, and they come as engaged men upon their own resolution. If that be so, I think there neither needs consideration of the former [nor the latter]. For you will not be anticipated. If that be so, you [can] work accordingly. And though you meet us, yet, having that resolution in your way, you cannot be prevented by any proposition, or any such thing; [even] though we should have come hither [with propositions] and we should [not] meet to-morrow as a company of men that really would be guided by God.
[But] if any come to us to-morrow only to instruct us and teach us,c I refer to every sober-spirited man to think ofd and determine how far that will consist with the liberty of a free deliberatione or an end of satisfaction. I think it is such a pre-engagement that there is no need of talk of the thing. And I see then, if that be so, things are in such an irrevocable way—I will not call it desperate—as there is no hope of accommodation or union, except we receive the counsels—I will not call it the commands—of them that come to us. I desire that we may rightly understand this thing. If this be so, I do not understand what the end of the meeting will be. If this be not so, wef will [not] draw any meng from their engagements further than the light of God shall draw them from their engagements; and I think, according to your own principle, if you be upon any engagement you are liable to be convinced—unless you be infallible. If we may come to an honest and single debate, how we may all agree in one common way for public good; if we [may] meet so, we shall meet with a great deal the more comfort, and hopes of a good and happy issue, and understanding of the business. But if otherwise, I despair of the meeting; or at least I would have the meeting to be of another notion, a meeting that did represent the Agitators of five regiments to give rules to the Council of War. If it signify this, for my own part I shall be glad to submit to it under this notion. If it be a free debate what may be fit for us all to do, with clearness and openness before the Lord, and in that sincerity, let us understand [it], that we may come and meet so. Otherwise, I do verily believe, we shall meet with prejudice, and we shall meet to prejudice—really to the prejudice of the kingdom, and of the whole Army—if we be thusa absolutely resolved upon our way and engaged beforehand. The kingdom will see it is such a real actual division as admits of no reconciliation, and all those that are enemies to us, and friends to our enemies, will have the clearer advantage upon us to put us into inconveniency. And I desire if there be any fear of God among us, I desire that we may declare ourselves freely, that we do meet upon these terms.
I wish that the motion of Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe might have taken effect, not only to the time and place for meeting, [but without further preliminary] as he desired. But, sir, since it is gone thus far, and since I hear much of fallacy talked of, I fear it as much on the one side as the other.h It is made ab wonder of, that some gentlemen without should have principlesc to break engagements, yet [no wonder of], that some gentlemen within should so much insist upon engagements. I do not consider myself as jumping, but yet I hope when I leap I shall take so much of God with me, and so much of just and right with me, as I shall jump sure. But I am more unsatisfied against [another of] those things that have been said, and that is as to another engagement. For all that hath been said hath been [as to engagements] between party and party: if two men should make an agreement and the like, and there were no living one withd another if those engagements were not made [good]. Yet I think under favour that some engagements may be broke. No mane takes a wife but there is an engagement,f and I think that a man ought to keep it;g yet if another man that had married her before claims her, he ought to let him have her and so break the engagement. Buta whereas it is toldb [us that] this engagement is of another nature, that the party to whom we make the engagement relied upon [it], and becomes thereby prejudiced, [and so] we ought to take it rather upon ourselves than to leave it upon them—this may serve in a particular case: if any menc here will suffer they may. But if we will make ourselves a third party, and engage between King and Parliament, [it is not a particular case], and I am of that gentleman’s mind that spoke: the King’s party would have been about our ears if we had not made some concessionsd as concerning them.e Here is the consideration now: do we not engage for the Parliament and for the liberties of the people of England, and do we not engage againstf the King’s party?g We have got the better of them in the field, but they shall be masters of our houses. Never wereh engagements broken more than [as] we do [break them]. We did take up armsi with all that took part with the Parliament, and we engaged with them; [but now we are to be engaged to bring the King in]. For my part, it may be thought that I am against the King; I am against him or any power that would destroy God’s people, and I will never be destroyed till I cannot help myself. Is itj not an argument, if a pilot run his ship upon a rock, or [if] a general mount his cannon against his army, he is to be resisted? I thinkk that this [is] as clear[ly] the very case as anything in the world. For clearly the King and his party could not have come in upon those terms that he is [to] come in [on], if this very Army did not engage for him; and I verily think that the House had not made another address, if it had not been said that it was the desire of the Army and the Army were engaged to it. Therefore, I say, I hope men will have charitable opinions of other men. For my part, I think I shall never do anything against conscience, and I shall have those hopes of others. That which is dear unto me is my freedom. It is that I would enjoy, and I will enjoy if I can. For my own part, I hope there is no such distance betwixt these gentlemen [and you] as is imagined, but they will hear reason that may convince them out of it. I do verily believe they are so far from a disunion that they will be advised by this Council in general, or by any honest man of this Council in particular. I have not the same apprehensions that two or three days will undo us, but I think a very little delay will undo us; and therefore I should only desire—it may be because I have spoken some other may answer me—the less we speak, it may be the better. And as this Agitator, whom I never saw before, saysl that he will use his interest, I hope that God will do something in that for our next meeting to-morrow, that when we do meet we shall have a very happy union.
That he could break engagements in case they [were] proved unjust, and that it might [so] appeara to his conscience.b Whatsoever hopes or obligations I should be bound unto, if afterwards God should reveal himself, I would break it speedily, if it were an hundred a day; and in that sense we delivered our sense.
Provided that what is done tends to destruction, either [to] self-destruction or to [the destruction of] my neighbour especially. Unlawful engagements [are] engagements against duty, and an engagement to any person to bring him in [in] such a way as he may be enabled to engage [us to his further designs], it is that which may tend to destruction.
I thinkc you were understood to put it upon an issue where there is clearly a case of destruction, public destruction and ruin. And I think this will bring it into consideration whether or no our engagements have really in them that that hath public destruction and ruin necessarily following; or whether or no we may not give too much way to our own doubts and fears. And whether it be lawful to break a covenant upon our own doubts and fears, will be the issue. And I think [it best] if we agree to defer the debate, [and] to nominate a committee.
One word. I am of another opinion. Not that the engagements of the Army are looked upon as destructive, but the not-performance of the engagements of the Army is that which is destructive.
I think Mr. Wildman’s conclusion is, that they are destructive because they are destructive to our neighbours.
That if such an engagement were, it does not bind.
Then ifd such a meetinge were [for] a compliance, or [at least] not for a law [to us] but for [free debate, it might tend to mutual] satisfaction. Butf whereas the only ground [on] which the thing seems to me to be represented [is] that these gentlemen think that their own Agreement is so clear, so infallibly just and right, that whosoever goes about to take it from them, or whoever does not agree to it, is [about] a thing unlawful,aI do think those gentlemen have not so much ground of confidence to each part of that Agreement as it lies there.b But something may be seen in that if you come—in the debatingc of it. And therefore in that relation, and not [merely to enforce] your own principles, [I desire] that you would admit of so much conference as to question it.
I have gathered from two men’s mouths, that destruction is something near, and the cause of the destruction, as they understand, is the going of the proposals to the King. I think it were very necessary that, if it be true as is supposed, the proposals may be brought hither when they do go, that we may see what they are.
The question is whether the propositions will save us, or [whether they will] not destroy us. This discourse concludes nothing.
One party fears that the King will rise by the proposals, another that he will lose. [But] I think that most men’s eyes are open to see that they are like to prove a broken reed, and that your chariot wheels do move heavily, and that this Agreement,d which is the ground of most of your discourse,e [in] the fundamental business of it, is the desire of most of this Council.f You both desire a succession of Parliaments, to have this Parliament that it might not be perpetuated. And I thinkg that whenh this Oedipus riddle is un-opened, and this Gordian knot untied, and the enemies of the same [unmasked, it will be found that the dictates of]i the Spirit of God are the same in both, and the principles of both are the same. You have both promised to free the people, which you may do by taking off tithes and other Antichristian yokes [from] upon them, and [to] give contentj to the soldiers. And I hope that when you meet together it will be for good, and not for evil.
Whereas this gentleman that we have requested to come along with us hath declared some part ofk our resolutions with them,l and we are resolved that we will have the peace of the kingdom if we can; yet, notwithstanding, if a furtherm [guidance] for the manner of procuring of it is what God shall direct unto us, I would not have you judge that we will deny that light, till that you know what we will do. No man can judge so of any man. A man cannot be called to be [of] a peremptory will, or self-willed, and [be judged to] come resolved nolens volens, [till you know what he will do]. We desire that better thoughts may be of us.
I hope that these gentlemen of the five regiments, their ends are good, and [I] hope their hearts do tend to peace; and I shall move this: that they would willingly come to-morrow, and join with us in our counsels together. And also I shall humbly move: that, after we have sought God in the business,a God will make it out to us, to see wherein we have failed, and that their being with us [will conduce to that] and [to] our vigorous proceeding in it, and [that] these gentlemen of the five regiments, they will manifest this [same spirit] by a sweet compliance in communicating counsels.
That which this gentleman1 hath moved I like exceeding well; he hath fully declared himself concerning the freedom of their spirit as to principles. In general they aim at peace and safety, and really I am persuaded in my conscience it is their aim [to act] as may be most for the good of the people; for really if that be not the supreme good to us under God (the good of the people), our principles fall. Now if that be in your spirits and our spirits, it remains only that God show us the way, and lead us [in] the way; which I hope he will. And give me leave [to add] that there may be some prejudices upon some of your spirits, and [upon] such men that do affect your way, that they may have some jealousies and apprehensions that we are wedded and glued to forms of government; so that, whatsoever we may pretend, it is in vain for [you] to speak to us, or to hope for any agreement from us to you. And I believe some [entertain] such apprehensions as [that we are engaged to secure] some part of the legislative power of the kingdom where it may rest besides in the Commons of the kingdom. You will find that we areb far from being [so] particularly engaged to anything to the prejudice of this—further than the notorious engagement[s] that the world takes notice of—that we should not concur with you that the foundation and supremacy is in the people, radically in them, and to be set down by them in their representations. And if we do so [concur, we may also concur] how we may run to that end that we all aim at, or that that does remain [within our power], and therefore let us only name the committee.
You were pleased to say that [there was] something that gave you another occasion of the meeting (if it were only designed to lie upon you, [I would not protest]): that which should be offered by these gentlemen. I hope that you did not conceive that any such ground did lie in my breast.1 Buta I would speak this word to the quickening of us to a good hope:b I am verily persuaded if God carry us out to meet sincerely, as with free spirits to open ourselves before the Lord, we may [not] be found going on according to our will. I desire such prejudices may be laid aside.
A meeting is intended to-morrow; but that we may fully end, I would humbly offer to you: whether these gentlemen have a power to debate; and if they have not, that they may have recourse to them that sent them, to see what [powers] they will give [them], that we may offer our reasons and judgment upon the thing, and [may] act upon that principle upon which we agree.c If we unite and agree to it, it will put on other things. [When we have] formallyd made an agreement, we must be serious in it, and to that end [it is desired] that we may have a full debate in it. Otherwise it will be useless, and endless, our meeting.
That gentleman says he will do what he can to draw all or the most of them hither to be heard to-morrow; and I desire Mr. Wildman, that if they have any friends that are of a loving spirit, that would contribute to this business of a right understanding, [they would come with him]. And I say no more but this, I pray God judge between you and us when we do meet, whether we come with engaged spirits to uphold our own resolutions and opinions, or whether we shall lay down ourselves to be ruled [by God] and that which he shall communicate.
He did tell you he would improve his interest, which is as full satisfaction to what Mr. Allen says, as could be. If they shall come [though] not [with power] to do, yete I hope they will come withf full powerg to debate. I think there needs no more.2
At the meeting of the officers for calling upon God, according to the appointment of the General Council, after some discourse of Commissary [Nicholas] Cowling, Major White, and others—
We have been here, as we say, seeking of God, though truly he is not far from every one of us; and we have said in thea presence of God (as out of his presence we cannot go) that we have none in heaven in comparison of him, nor none we have even in earth in comparison of him. I wish our hearts dob not give us the lie, for truly had that been a truthc —I mean a truth in our carriages—we should not have been so lost this day. Had we given ear to the inspiring word of Christ, and had [we] not given ourselves to the false prophet within us, certainly God would have kindled that light within us, and [we] should have gone [on] and submitted to his will, and should not have been troubled or harassed, as we are, with troubles and amazements, but must have gone with God as he hath allotted to us. The cause of every evil sought after, what is the reason that we find the light and glory of God eclipsed from our eyes this day? Truly we may find this silence within us, and let us but search our own spirits with patience, and look by the lightd of God within us, and we shall find that we have submitted the Spirit of God unto the candle of reason, whereas reason should have been subservient unto the Spirit of God. We are troubled when our own reasons tell us that this is the way, and we are careless to seek the way, or that true light, Christ in us, which is the way. We are apt to say, all of us, that if we seek that first (the latter first) the lighte will not be wanting. But truly, we have sought the first last, and therefore the first is wanting. And before this light can take place again that darkness must be removed—that candle of reason, andg first within us our lust, which doth seduce and entice us to wander from God, must be eaten out of us by the Spirit of God, and when there is no place for lust, there is place enough for the Spirit of God. If we shall with resolutionf and humility of spirit not say, but do, as the children of Israel used to do many times when they were in distress—many times they cried unto the Lord; if we shall do as we profess before God this day, that is, lay down our reason, lay down our goods, lay down all we have at the feet of God, and let God work his will in us that we may be buried with God in our spirits; I doubt not but the appearances of God will be more glorious, and I doubt not but there will be that contentedness in spirit. We should desire no way, but wait which way God will lead us. I say, we should choose no way, but if the Spirit of God lead us, we should be ready to submit to the will of God.a And therefore I desire that, since this is in order to another meeting in the afternoon, we may lay down all at the feet of God, not following our own reasons, butb submitting unto that light which is lightedc in us by his Spirit.
(After this Captain Carter prayed.)
Motion for a meeting at this place, the Quartermaster-General’s quarters, to meet Monday, the council day, from 8 till 11, to seek God, &c.
That which I must now desire to express to you was partly occasioned by the thoughts that I had the last night, as being indeed kept awake with them a good while; and, hearing something that did concur with it from one that spake since we came together, I feel some weight upon my spirit to express it to you. That which was spoken enow [was] concerning the conjunction that is between Antichrist, or that mystery of iniquity in the world carried on by men that call themselves the church, thatd certainly it is with the conjunction of men in places of power or authority in the world, with kings and great men. And truly my thoughts were much upon it this night, and it appears to me very clearly from that which God hath set down in his word in the Book of the Revelations—which is that word that we are bid and commanded to study and to look into, being the word which God sent by his angel to John, to declare as things shortly to be done. Now certainly this work of Antichrist hath been a work of great standing, and, as it was well observed, it hath been mixed with the church, and men that call themselves the church, the clergy, mixed with men of authority.e It is said in the Revelation, that the kings of the earth should give up their power unto the Beast, and the kings of the earth have given up their power to the Pope. But some places that have seemed to deny the Pope’s supremacy, yet they have taken upon them that which hath been equivalent to that which the Pope himself holds forth. Truly I could bring it to this present kingdom wherein we are. ’Tis true the kings have been instruments to cast off the Pope’s supremacy, but we may see if they have not put themselves into the same state. We may see it in that title which the King hath; ‘Defender of the Faith,’ but more especially in that canonical prayer which the clergy used, ‘In all causes, and over all persons, as well ecclesiastical as civil, [supreme].’ Certainly, this is a mystery of iniquity. Now Jesus Christ his work in the last days is to destroy this mystery of iniquity; and because it is so interwoven and entwisted in the interest of states, certainly in that overthrow of the mystery of iniquity by Jesus Christ, there must be great alterations of states. Now the word doth hold out in the Revelation, that in this work of Jesus Christ he shall have a company of Saints to follow him, such as are chosen and called and faithful. Now it is a scruple among the Saints, how far they should use the sword; yet God hath made use of them in that work. Many of them have been employed these five or six years. Yet whatsoever God shall employ us in, I could wish this were laid to heart by us: whereasa we would be called the chosen and faithful that will follow Christ wheresoever he goes, let us tremble at the thoughtb that we should be standing in a direct opposition against Jesus Christ in the work that he is about. Let us not be twisted amongst such kind of compartings where there shall be a mystery of iniquityc set up by outward power, lestd we should be the instruments of giving any life or strength to that power. And I wish [we may lay this to heart]—and I believe it may somewhat tend to the work by the way—because we are to hold out the will of God for the time to come, and to be humbled for what we have done against it. Let us inquire whether some of the actions that we have done of late, some of the things that we have propounded of late, do not cross the work of God in these particulars; because in our proposing things we do endeavour to set up that power which God would not set up again—it hath been hinted already—I mean in our compliance with that party which God hath engaged us to destroy. We intended nothing but civility, but I wish they were not in some measure compliances; and, if I mistake not, there are ways which God hath laid open to us, whereby we may lay aside that compliance.
But this is not all that I would speak, because God hath called forth my spirit to unity. What we do according to the will of God will not tend to division. This I speak concerning compliance; and [since] this may be thought to reflect upon some particular persons more than other some, so on the other hand I desire to speak something that may concern some persons that may stand, or at least may seem to stand, in direct opposition to us. And truly I wish we may be very wary what we do; and let us take heed of rejecting any of the Saints of God before God rejects them. If God be pleased to show any of his servants that he hath made use of [them] as great instruments in his hand, [and to show them], as [also] those that God hath blessed in them, that God hath blessed them, and [that] this hath been the greatest instrument of the ruin of sin and corruption in this Army, let us be wary and consider what we have to do in that kind. And I spake this the rather because I was sensible of some personal reflections that did not argue the workings of God [so much] as the workings of passions in us. Now the work of the Spirit is, that we do pull down all works [that are not] of the Spirit whatsoever; and therefore I desire that, as in the presence of God, we may take heed of all things which may tend to disunion, and that we may not despise those who may have some things in their hands to contribute for the work of God.
And there is another thing. If we have lost the opportunity of appearing against [God’s] enemies, let us take heed, when we be sensible of God’s displeasure, that we do not run before he bids us go a second time. There is a place which is very remarkable, Numbers 14, where the spies were sent to the land of Canaan; and when they came back the hearts of the people were discouraged. God was displeased at this, and he discovered it in some such way as he did this day. But upon a sudden there was a party that would go up and fight against the Amalekites, and at such a time when God would not have them go up. ‘Though you did sin against the Lord in not going at first,’ says Moses, ‘yet go not now up, for the Lord is not among you, that ye be not smitten before your enemies.’ Yet they did go up unto the hilltop, and were discomfited. I think we have sinned in that we did not show our courage and faithfulness to God. Let us not now in a kind of heat run up and say, ‘We will go now’; because it may be there is a better opportunity that God will give us. And that we may a little help us by our own experiences, let us remember how God hath dealt with this Army in our late proceedings. There was some heaviness in our proceedings before the City, as was thought by some; and it was said by many, ‘Go up, go up quickly, and do our work.’ But let us remember that God found a better season for us than if we had gone at first. Let us consider whether this be the best juncture of time for us [to press on the work of God. But let us, as well, be careful not] to declare [against], and to throw off, some of our friends when that they would have it discovered whethera God goes along with us. Let this be considered, that so we may be humbled, on the one hand, and break off all unlawful compliance with the enemies of God, so, on the other hand, we may stay, and take the company one of another, or rather the presence of God, [along with us]. And so for the work of the day, I wish there may be a day of union amongst us; for it may be it is the will of God that we should wait upon him therein, to see what will be the issue of a business that is now transacted; and if we can trust God in this strait we shall see him straight before us, if we can be of one mind. I wish this may be considered, and if there be anything of God in it, it may be received.
This honourable Council hath given me great encouragement. Though I have many impediments in my speech, yet I thank you that you will hear me speak. I engaged myself yesterday to bring the men to have a debate,1 and for that purpose I have prosecuted these my promises, and I have been with them—as many as I can find; but the most of them are dispersed, so that I lost that opportunity which I would have enjoyed. But, nevertheless, I hope you will take it kindly, that those that were there are come hither, and those two friends that were with me yesterday.b Our ends are that we desire, yet once more, a compliance in those things that we propounded to you, but if it shall please God to open our eyes that we can see it, we shall comply with you. For our desires are nothing but (according to our first declaration) to follow our work, to deliver the kingdom from that burden that lies upon us. For my part I am but a poor man, and unacquainted with the affairs of the kingdom; yet this message God hath sent me to you, that there is great expectation of sudden destruction—and I would be loath to fill up that with words. We desire your joint consent to seek out some speedy way for the relief of the kingdom.
I think it would not be amiss that those gentlemen that are come would draw nigher.
I must offer this to your consideration: whether or no we, having set apart this morning to seek God, and to get such a preparedness of heart and spirit as might receive that that God was minded to have imparted to us, and this having taken up all our time all this day, and it having been so late this last night as indeed it was when we brake up, and we having appointed a committee to meet together to consider of that paper, and this committee having had no time or opportunity that I know of, not so much as a meeting; I make some scruple or doubt whether or no it is not better [to adjourn the debate. I know] that danger is imagined [near at hand], and indeed I think it is; but be the danger what it will, our agreement in the business is much more [pressing] than the pressing of any danger, so by that we do not delay too [long].a That which I have to offer [is]: whether or no we are [as] fit to take up such a consideration of these papers now as we might be to-morrow; and perhaps if these gentlemen, which are but few, and that committee should meet together, and spend their time together an hour or two the remainder of this afternoon, and all this company might meet about nine or ten o’clock at furthest, they [might] understand one another so well thatc we might be prepared for the general meeting, to have a more exact and particular consideration of things than [we can have] by a general loose debate of things which our committee, or at least manyd of us, have [not] had any, or at least not many, thoughts about.
Sir: I am sorry that the ill disposition of my body caused me to go to London last night, ande [hindered me] from coming so soon this morning as to be with you in the duty you were about. But I hope that which hath been said at this time (which I hope is a truth and sent from God) will so work upon me that I shall endeavour at least to carry myself so that I may use all that interest I have, to a right and quick understanding between us. And truly, sir, to that present motion that hath been made, I confess I have nothing against it, but only the danger that lies upon us; which truly—if we may have leave to differ one from another—may in a moment overcome [us]. I hope we shall all take [to heart] one word that was spoken to us by Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe, and I think that nothing will conduce so much [to union as] that we may have no personal reflections. I think it would have been well if the committee had met, but since all this company—or the greatest part of themf —have been here [and] have joined in that duty which was on the former part of the morning, I think there is not much inconveniency that they may spend the other part of the day with us. And if we were satisfied ourselves upon debate, and yetg there should be one party, or one sort of men, that are of a judgment [at] present contrary, or others that should come over to us, it would cost some time hereafter to know the reasons of their [contrary judgment or of their] coming over. And therefore I think it an advantage that it should be as public [as possible], and as many as may, be present at it.a The debating this thus publicly may be an advantage unto us; andb after the multitude of people that are herec have been spoken to, if we find that inconvenient, I do not doubt but the committee, when this company breaks up, may have two hours’ time together. And therefore I should desire that, since the gentlemen and you are met together to such an end and purpose, you will follow to that end.
It is not [fit], as I conceive, to dispute anything touching particularf [persons], for all, as I conceive, do seek the kingdom’s good. Much business will beg if we stand disputing the work! I desire this honourable Council—[if it] will pardon me—to make out some speedy way for the easing of us.h Let us go about the work;i no question but we shall go together. I beseech you that you will consider upon that. I believe we shall jump all in one with it, if we do not fall upon some extraordinary ways between. Some laws with us that will prick us to the heart, we must wink at them; [but] let us now [seek to reform such of them as we may], not that I desire that we should seek to ruinate any wholesome laws, but [only] such as will not stand with the wholesome peace of the kingdom.
I shall desire to second that gentleman’s motion. While we debate we do nothing. I am confident that whilst you are doing you will all agree together, for it is idleness that hath begot this rust and this gangrene amongst us.
I think it is true. Let us be doing, but let us be united in our doing. If there remain nothing else [needful] but present action,k [let us be doing]—I mean, doing in that kind, doing in that sort. I think we need not be in council here [if] such kind of action, action of that nature, [will serve].l But if we do not rightly and clearly understand one another before we come to act, if we do not lay a foundation of action before we do act, I doubt whether we shall act unanimously or no. And seriously, as before the Lord, I knew no such end of our speech the last night, and [our] appointing another meeting, but in order to a more perfect understanding of one another, what we should do, and that we might be agreed upon some principles of action. And truly if I remember rightly, upon the delivery of the paper that was yesterday, this was offered, that the things [that] are now upon usa are things of difficulty, the things are things that do deserve therefore consideration, because there might be great weight in the consequences; and it was then offered, and I hope is still so in all our hearts, that we are not troubled with the consideration of the difficulty, nor with the consideration of anything but this: that if we do difficult things, we may see that the things we do, have the will of God in them, that they are not only plausible and good things, but seasonable and honest things, fit for us to do. And therefore it was desired that we might consider, [before] we could come to these papers,i in what condition we stood in respect of former engagements,b however some may be satisfiedc that there lie none upon us, or none but such as it’s duty to break, it’s sin to keep. Therefore that was yesterday premised, [that] there may be a consideration had of them—and I may speak it as in the presence of God, that I know nothing of any engagements, but I would see liberty in any man as I would be free from bondage to anything that should hinder me from doing my duty—and therefore that was first in consideration. If our obligation be nothing, or if it be weak, I hoped we shalle receive satisfaction why it should be laid aside, [and be convinced] that the things that we speak of are not obliged. And therefore, if it please you, I think it will be good for us to frame our discourse to what we were, where we are, what we are bound to, what we are free to; and then I make no question but that this may conclude what is between [us and] these gentlemen, in one afternoon. I do not speak this to make obligations more than what they were before, but as before the Lord. You see what they are ([producing the printed volume of Army Declarations1 ]); and when we look upon them we shall see whetherf we have been in a wrong way, and I hope it will call upon us for the more double diligence.g
I shall desire a word or two before that. I did exceedingly mistake myself the last nighth upon what we say now was [then] determined. I looked upon the committee as a committee to look over this paper, to see whether it were a paper that did hold forth justice and righteousness, whether it were a paper that honest men could close with. But truly I am of opinion that if we should spend ten days’ time in going over that book, and debate what engagements we have broke, or whether we have broke any or no, or whether we have kept our engagements, it would not come to the business; neither would it prevent that evil that I think will overtake us (unless God in abundant manner prevent). Let us go the quickest way to work [and not fear lest we start] before we fall into the right way. And truly, sir, I have thought that the wounds of the kingdom, and the difficulties that we are fallen into, and our [need of] cure, is become so great that we would be willing, all of us, to heal the sore, and [not] to skin it over but leave it unwholesome and corrupt at the bottom. Therefore for my part I do [thus] conclude in my spirit—and I could give you reasons for it, which this day I have from very good hands, buta which I think [it] is notb prudent to declare so publicly as this is; for my own part I [did] say this yesterday upon another occasion: I will not say positively that we are to take the course prescribed in that paper at present, but if we do not set upon the work [of settlement presently we are undone]. Since in order to that there is a thing called an Agreement which the people [must] have subscribed, and being that is ready to our hands, I desire that you would read it and debate it, whether it be a way to deliver us yet or no; and if it be, [that you would accept it], and if not, that you would think of some other way.
I shall but offer this to you. Truly I hope that we may speak our hearts freely here; and I hope that there is not such an evil amongst us as that we could or would exercise our wits, or our cunning, to veil over any doubleness of heart that may possibly be in us. I hope, having been in such a presence as we have been [in] this day, we do not admitc such a thought as this into our hearts. And therefore if the speaking of that we did speak before—and to which I shall speak again, with submission to all that hear me; if the declining to consider this paper may have with any man a workingd upon his spirit through any jealousy that it aims at delay; truly I can speak it as before the Lord, it is not at all in my heart, but sincerely this is the ground of it. I know this paper doth contain many good things in it, but this is the only thing that doth stick with me, the desiring to know my freedom to this thing. Though this [paper] doth suggest that that may be the bottom of all our evils—and I will not say against it because I do not think against it—though this doth suggest the bottom of all our evils, yet for all to see ourselves free to this, all of us, [so] as we may unanimously join upon this, either to agree to this, or to add more to it, [or] to alter [it] as we shall agree, [that is alone needful; but, lacking it,] this impediment lies in our way, [even] if every man be satisfied with it but myself. [I repeat] that this is the first thing that is to be considered, that we should consider in what condition we stand to our former obligations, that if we be clear we may go off clear, if not we may not go on. If I be not come off [clear] with what obligations are made, if I be not free to act to whatsoever you shall agree upon, I think this is my duty: that I should not in the least study either to retard your work or hinder it, or to act against it, but wish you as much success as if I were free to act with you. I desire we may view over our obligations and engagements, that so we may be free [to act together] upon honest and clear grounds, if this be——
Rainborough (offering to speak):a My desireb ——
I have but one word to prevent you in, and that is for imminent danger. It may be possibly so [imminent] that [it] may not admit of an hour’s debate, nor nothing of delay. If that be so, I think that’s above all law and rule to us.
I would offer one word, for I think this will bring us to no issue at all. Both yesterday and to-day, and divers times, we have had cautions given us to have care of divisions. I do speak it to avoid division: that we may not at this time consider the engagements. If you, or any other gentlemen, are of opinion that you have not broke them, and then some others are of opinion that you have broke them, we may fall into contest[s] which may occasion division. But if you read this, and find it not against the Engagement,1 that will be the work. If it be not against the Engagement, you will find that in it which you will find from your engagements. And I have something to say to the particulars in it.
I shall only offer this, the necessity of expedition if the people shall consider the necessities that they and we are in. We live now upon free-quarter, and we have that against our wills. Those that know what belongs to armies well know, none are to quarter soldiers but those that are within so many miles. And if so be too that the owner of the house should refuse to open his doors, we are prevented to pay our quarters by those that might have supplied us. I have seen this paper, and upon second reading of it I set my hand to it, that we may not lie as drones to devour their families. I am ready where I am called by my superiors. If not, the Lord be merciful to me.
I should offer one word to this Council: I think it is in all our minds to deliver the kingdom; if there be particular engagements we must lay them asidea to lay down [something for the] public good.
I desire to know what the gentleman means concerning particular engagements: whetherb he means those that are in this book? If those that are in this book [they are the engagements of the Army]. But if he means engagements personal from particular persons, let every man speak for himself. I speak for myself, I disavow all, and I am free to act, free from any such——
I conceive that [if] they be such as are passed by the Representative of the Army, I think the Army is bound in conscience to go on with them.
All the engagements that have been declared for have [not] been by the Representative of the Army. And whether or no that hath not been the cause of this cloud that hangs over our heads, I think if we lay our hands over our hearts we may not much mistake it.
According to your Honours’ desire yesterday, I am comed here to give in my reasons why I do approve of this paper, this Agreement, [and] to receive reasons why it should not be agreed to.e For the particular engagements of the Army, I am ignorant of them, but if it please this Council [I would move them] to let this [paper] be read, that either the matter or manner of it may be debated; and when any of the matter shall come to touch upon any engagement [so as] to break any engagement, that then the engagement may be shown; and if that engagement shall prove just, and this unjust, this must be rejected, or if this just, and these engagements unjust, [then they must be rejected]. I desire all those that are free from it in their spirits may act farther; and those that think themselves bound up sof to acquiesce in it, that they would be pleased to rest satisfied in the actions of other men that are at liberty to act for the peace and freedom of the kingdom.
Truly I would, if I did know of any personal, particular engagements, if I were personally or particularly engaged myself, which I profess, as in the presence of God, I know not fora myself. I myself am not under any engagement in relation to that business that the great question lies upon—I need not name it—more than what all men know that have seen and read, and in the Army consented to, those things that were published. But if I were under any particular engagement, it should not at all stand in any other man’s way. If I were underb [any particular engagement], I say, that I could be convincedc was ill and unlawful for me to enter into, my engagement should not stand in any other man’s way that would do anything that I could be convinced of to be better. And till God hath brought us all to that temper of spirit that we can be contented to be nothing in our reputations, [in our] esteems, in our power—truly I may go a little higher and say, till the reputation and honour of the Army, and such things, become nothing to us, [at least] not so as to stand at all in the way, [or allow] the consideration of them to stand at all in the way, to hinder us from what we see God calling us to, or to prompt us on to what we have not a clear call from him [to undertake]—we are not brought to that temper wherein I can expect any renewing of that presence of God that we have sought. And therefore, for my part, I profess first, I desire no [particular] engagements [may be considered]. If there were particular engagements of any particular man whatsoever, I desire they may not be considered [so] as to [influence] the leading of the Army one way or other, but let that man look to himself for what justice lies upon him, and what justice will follow him. Neither do I care for the engagements of the Army so much for the engagements’d sake, but I look upon this Army as having carried with it hitherto the name of God, and having carried with it hitherto the interest of the people of God, and the interest which is God’s interest, the honour of his name, the good and freedom and safety and happiness of his people. And for my part I think that it is that that is the only thing for which God hath appeared with us, and led us, and gone before us, and honoured us, and taken delight to work by us. I say, that very thing: that we have carried the name of God (and I hope not in show, but in reality), professing to act, and to work, as we have thought,e in our judgments and consciences, God to lead us; professing to act to those ends that we have thought to be answerable and suitable to the mind of God, so far as it hath been known to us.f We have professed to endeavour to follow the counsels of God, and to have him president in our councils; and I hope it hath been so in our hearts. [We have professed] that we have been ready to follow his guidance; and I know it hath been so in many things against our own reasons, where we have seen evidently God calling us. And [I know] that we have been carried on with a confidence in him: we have made him our trust, and we have held forth his name, and we have owned his hand towards us. These are the things, I say, which God hath in some degree and measure wrought his people in this Army up to, in some degree of sincerity. And this it is (as I said before) that I account hath been [the thing] that God hath taken delight in, amongst us, to dwell with us, to be with us, and to appear with us, and [the reason why he] will manifest his presence to us. And therefore by this means, and by that appearance of God amongst us, the name and honour of God, the name and reputation of the people of God, and of that Gospel that they profess, is deeply and dearly and nearly concerned in the good or ill manage of this Army, in their good or ill carriage; and therefore, for my part I profess it, that’s the only thing to me. [It is] not to me so much as the vainest or lightest thing you can imagine, whether there be a king in England or no, whether there be lords in England or no. For whatever I find the work of God tending to, I should desire quietly to submit to. If God saw it good to destroy, not only King and Lords, but all distinctions of degrees—nay if it go further, to destroy all property, that there’s no such thing left, that there be nothing at all of civil constitution left in the kingdom—if I see the hand of God in it I hope I shall with quietness acquiesce, and submit to it, and not resist it. But still I think that God certainly will so lead those that are his, and I hope too he will so lead this Army,a that they may not incur sin, or bring scandal upon the name of God, and the name of the people of God, that are both so nearly concerned in what this Army does.b And [therefore] it is my wish, upon those grounds that I before declared, which made the consideration of this Army dear and tender to me,c [that] we may take heed, [that] we may consider first engagements,d so far as they are engagements publicly of the Army. I do not speak of particular [engagements]; I would not have them considered, if there be any. And secondly, I would have us consider of this: that our ways and workings and actings, and the actings of the Army, so far as the counsels of those prevail in it who have anything of the spirit of Jesus Christ, may appear suitable to that spirit. And [as] I would [not] have this Army in relation to those great concernments (as I said before: the honour of God, and the honour and good name of his people and of religion),e as I would not have it to incur the scandal of neglecting engagements, and laying aside all consideration of engagements, and [the scandal] of juggling, and deceiving, and deluding the world, making them believe things in times of extremity which they never meant; so I would [not] have usa give the world occasion to think that we are the disturbers of the peace of mankind. I say, I would not give them just occasion to think so; nay, I would have them have just cause to think that we seek peace with all men, andb the good of all men, and [that] we seek the destruction of none—that we can say. And in general I would wish and study, and that my heart is bent to, that the counsels of this Army may appear acted1 by that wisdom that is from above, which we know how it is charactered.2 It is first pure, and then peaceable, and then gentle, and easy to be entreated, and we find many characters of the same wisdom, and all other fruits of the same spirit, that still run clearly that way. Therefore, I say, I wish that we may have no otherwise a consideration of engagements or anything of that nature. That which makes me press it, is chiefly that consideration of the concernment of the honour of God and his people in the Army; and as I prize them so I presse [that in] all [things] whatsoever,f though we were free and had no engagements,g we do act as Christians, as men guided by the Spirit of God, as men having that wisdom [that is] from above, and [is] so characterized.
To the method of our proceeding. Having expressed what I desire may be all our cares, I cannot but think that this will be clearest, because I see it is so much pressed and insisted upon: noth to read what our engagements are, but [to] read the paper that is presented here, and consider upon it, what good and what matter of justice and righteousness there is in it, and whether there be anything of injustice or unrighteousness, either in itself or in reference to our engagements. And so far, I think our engagements ought to be taken into consideration:i that so far as we are engaged to a thing that was not unlawful to engage toj (and I should be sad to think them so), we should think ourselves bound not to act contrary to those engagements. And first that we may consider of the particulars of this paper,k whether they be good and just (that is [not ill], not unjust); and then further to consider whether they be so essentially due and right as that they should be contended for, for then that is some kind of check to less engagements,l and for such things, if we find any, light engagements [may] be cast off and not considered.m But if we find any matter in them that, though it be just, though it be goodn (that is not ill, not unjust),o is notp probable to be so beneficial and advantageous (not to few, but to many), thatq withal we may consider whether it be so much a duty, and we be so much bound to it by the thing itself, as that no engagement can take us from it. Anda if we find any thing[s] that, if they be just or good, [are] yet not so obligatory or of [such] necessity to the kingdom [but that] the kingdom may stand without them, then I think, it being [so, it is] not absolutely lawful [for us] to act for them.
I desire we may come to that end we all strive after. I humbly desire you will fall upon that which is the engagement of all, which is the rights and freedoms of the people, and let us see how far we have made sure to them a right and freedom, and if anything be tendered as to that [in this paper]. And when that engagement is gone through, then, let us consider of those [things only] that are of greater weight.
(The paper called the Agreement read. Afterwards the first article read by itself.)1
The exception that lies in it is this. It is said, they are to be distributed according to the number of the inhabitants: ‘The people of England,’ &c. And this doth make me think that the meaning is, that every man that is an inhabitant is to be equally considered, and to have an equal voice in the election of those representers, the persons that are for the general Representative; and if that be the meaning, then I have something to say against it. But if it be only that those people that by the civil constitution of this kingdom, which is original and fundamental, and beyond which I am sure no memory of record does go—
Not before the Conquest.c
But before the Conquest it was so. If it be intended that those that by that constitution that was before the Conquest, that hath been beyond memory, such persons that have been before [by] that constitution [the electors], should be [still] the electors, I have no more to say against it.
That others might have given their hands to it.
Captain Denne denied that those that were set of their regimente were their hands.
Whether those men whose hands are to it, or those that brought it, do know so much of the matter as [to know] whethera they mean that all that had a former right of election [are to be electors], or [that] those that had no right before are to come in.
In the time before the Conquest.b Since the Conquest the greatest part of the kingdom was in vassalage.
We judge that all inhabitants that have not lost their birthright should have an equal voice in elections.
I desired that those that had engaged in it [might be included]. For really I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he; and therefore truly, sir, I think it’s clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that government that he hath not had a voice to put himself under; and I am confident that, when I have heard the reasons against it,d something will be said to answer those reasons, insomuch that I should doubt whether hee was an Englishman or no, that should doubt of these things.
That’s [the meaning of] this, [‘according to the number of the inhabitants’]?
Give me leave to tell you, that if you make this the rule I think you must fly for refuge to an absolute natural right, and you must deny all civil right; and I am sure it will come to that in the consequence. This, I perceive, is pressed as that which is so essential and due: the right of the people of this kingdom, and as they are the people of this kingdom, distinct and divided from other people, andf that we must for this right lay aside all other considerations; this is so just, this is so due, this is so right to them.g And that those that they do thus choose must have such a power of binding all, and loosing all, according to those limitations, this is pressed as so due, and so just, as [it] is argued, that it is an engagement paramount [to] all others: and you must for it lay aside all others; if you have engaged any otherwise,h you must break it. [We must] so look upon these as thus held out to us; so it was held out by the gentleman that brought it yesterday. For my part, I think it is no right at all. I think that no person hath a right to an interest or share in the disposing of the affairs of the kingdom, and in determining or choosing those that shall determine what laws we shall be ruled by here—no person hath a right to this, that hath not a permanent fixed interest in this kingdom, and those persons together are properly the represented of this kingdom,a and consequently are [also] to make up the representers of this kingdom,b who taken together do comprehend whatsoever is of real or permanent interest in the kingdom. And I am surei otherwise I cannot tell whatc any man can say why a foreigner coming in amongst us—or as many as will coming in amongst us, or by force or otherwise settling themselves here, or at least by our permission having a being here—why they should not as well lay claim to it as any other. We talk of birthright. Truly [by] birthright there is thus much claim. Men may justly have by birthright, by their very being born in England, that we should not seclude them out of England, that we should not refuse to give them air and place and ground, and the freedom of the highways and other things, to live amongst us—not any man that is born here, thoughd by his birth there come nothing at all (that is part of the permanent interest of this kingdom) to him. That I think is due to a man by birth. But that by a man’s being born here he shall have a share in that power that shall dispose of the lands here, and of all things here, I do not think it a sufficient ground.e I am sure if we look upon that which is the utmost (within [any] man’s view) of what was originally the constitution of this kingdom,f upon that which is most radical and fundamental, and which if you take away, there is no man hath any land, any goods,g [or] any civil interest,h that is this: that those that choose the representers for the making of laws by which this state and kingdom are to be governed, are the persons who, taken together, do comprehend the local interest of this kingdom; that is, the persons in whom all land lies, and those in corporations in whom all trading lies. This is the most fundamental constitution of this kingdom and [that] which if you do not allow, you allow none at all. This constitution hath limited and determined it that only those shall have voices in elections. It is true, as was said by a gentleman near me, the meanest man in England ought to have [a voice in the election of the government he lives under—but only if he has some local interest]. I say this: that those that have the meanest local interest—that man that hath but forty shillings a year, he hath as great voice in the election of a knight for the shire as he that hath ten thousand a year, or more if he had never so much; and therefore there is that regard had to it. But this [local interest], still the constitution of this government hath had an eye to (and what other government hath not an eye to this?). It doth not relate to the interest of the kingdom if it do not lay the foundation of the power that’s given toa the representers, in those who have a permanent and a local interest in the kingdom, and who taken all together do comprehend the whole [interest of the kingdom]. There is all the reason and justice that can be, [in this]: if I will come to live in a kingdom, being a foreigner to it, or live in a kingdom, having no permanent interest in it, [and] if I will desire as a stranger, or claim as one freeborn here, the air, the free passage of highways, the protection of laws, and all such thingsb —if I will either desire them or claim them, [then] I (if I have no permanent interest in that kingdom) must submit to those laws and those rules [which they shall choose], who, taken together, do comprehend the whole interest of the kingdom.c And if we shall go to take away this, we shall plainly go to take away all property and interest that any man hath either in land by inheritance, or in estate by possession, or anything else—[I say], if you take away this fundamental part of the civil constitution.d
Truly, sir, I am of the same opinion I was, and am resolved to keep it till I know reason why I should not. I confess my memory is bad, and therefore I am fain to make use of my pen. I remember that, in a former speech [which] this gentleman brought before this [meeting], he was saying that in some cases he should not value whether [there were] a king or no king, whether lords or no lords, whether a property or no property. For my part I differ in that. I do very much care whether [there be] a king or no king, lords or no lords, property or no property; and I think, if we do not all take care, we shall all have none of these very shortly. But as to this present business. I do hear nothing at all that can convince me, why any man that is born in England ought not to have his voice in election of burgesses. It is said that if a man have not a permanent interest, he can have no claim; and [that] we must be no freer than the laws will let use be, and that there is no [law in any] chronicle will let us be freer than that we [now] enjoy. Something was said to this yesterday. I do think that the main cause why Almighty God gave men reason, it was that they should make use of that reason, and that they should improve it for that end and purpose that God gave it them. And truly, I think that half a loaf is better than none if a man be anhungry: [this gift of reason without other property may seem a small thing], yet I think there is nothing that God hath given a man that any [one] else can take from him. And therefore I say, that either it must be the Law of God or the law of man that must prohibit the meanest man in the kingdom to have this benefit as well as the greatest. I do not find anything in the Law of God, that a lord shall choose twenty burgesses, and a gentleman but two, or a poor man shall choose none: I find no such thing in the Law of Nature, nor in the Law of Nations. But I do find that all Englishmen must be subject to English laws, and I do verily believe that there is no man but will say that the foundation of all law lies in the people, and if [it lie] in the people, I am to seek for this exemption.
And truly I have thought something [else]: in what a miserable distressed condition would many a man that hath fought for the Parliament in this quarrel, be! I will be bound to say that many a man whose zeal and affection to God and this kingdom hath carried him forth in this cause, hath so spent his estate that, in the way the state [and] the Army are going,a he shall not hold up his head, ifb when his estate is lost, and not worth forty shillings a year, a man shall not have any interest. And there are many other ways by which [the] estatesc men have (if that be the rule which God in his providence does use) do fall to decay. A man, when he hath an estate,f hath an interest in making laws, [but] when he hath none, he hath no power in it; so that a man cannot lose that which he hath for the maintenance of his family but he must [also] lose that which God and nature hath given him! And therefore I do [think], and am still of the same opinion, that every man born in England cannot, ought not, neither by the Law of God nor the Law of Nature, to be exempted from the choice of those who are to make lawsg for him to live under, and for him, for aught I know, to lose his life under. And therefore I think there can be no great stick in this.
Truly I think that there is not this day reigning in England a greater fruit or effect of tyranny than this very thing would produce.d Truly I know nothing free but only the knight of the shire, nor do I know anything in a parliamentary way that is clear from the height and fulness of tyranny, but only [that]. As for this of corporations [which you also mentioned], it is as contrary to freedom as may be.e For, sir, what is it? The King he grants a patent under the Broad Seal of England to such a corporation to send burgesses, he grants to [such] a city to send burgesses. When a poor base corporation from the King[’s grant] shall send two burgesses, when five hundred men of estate shall not send one, when those that are to make their laws are called by the King, or cannot act [but] by such a call, truly I think that the people of England have little freedom.
I think there was nothing that I said to give you occasion to think that I did contend for this, that such a corporation [as that] should have the electing of a man to the Parliament. I think I agreed to this matter, that all should be equally distributed. But the question is, whether it should be distributed to all persons, or whether the same persons that are the electors [now] should be the electors still, and it [be] equally distributed amongst them. I do not see anybody else that makes this objection; and if nobody else be sensible of it I shall soon have done. Only I shall a little crave your leave to represent the consequences of it, and clear myself from onea thing that was misrepresented by the gentleman that sat next me. I think, if the gentleman remember himself, he cannot but remember that what I said was to this effect: that if I saw the hand of God leading so far as to destroy King, and destroy Lords, and destroy property, and [leave] no such thing at all amongst us, I should acquiesce in it; and so I did not care, if no king, no lords, or no property [should] be,b in comparison of the tender care that I have of the honour of God, and of the people of God, whose [good] name is so much concerned in this Army. This I did deliver [so], and not absolutely.
All the main thing that I speak for, is because I would have an eye to property. I hope we do not come to contend for victory—but let every man consider with himself that he do not go that way to take away all property. For here is the case of the most fundamental part of the constitution of the kingdom, which if you take away, you take away all by that. Herec men of this and this quality are determined to be the electors of men to the Parliament, and they are all those who have any permanent interest in the kingdom, and who, taken together, do comprehend the whole [permanent, local] interest of the kingdom. I mean by permanent [and] local, that [it] is not [able to be removed] anywhere else. As for instance, he that hath a freehold, and that freehold cannot be removed out of the kingdom; and so there’s a [freeman of a] corporation, a place which hath the privilege of a market and trading, which if you should allow to all places equally, I do not see how you could preserve any peace in the kingdom, and that is the reason why in the constitution we have but some few market towns. Now those people [that have freeholds]d and those [that] are the freemen of corporations,e were looked upona by the former constitutionb to comprehend the permanent interest of the kingdom. For [first], he that hath his livelihood by his trade, and by his freedom of trading in such a corporation, which he cannot exercise in another, he is tied to that place, [for] his livelihood depends upon it. And secondly, that man hath an interest, hath a permanent interest there, upon which he may live, and live a freeman without dependence. These [things the] constitutionc [of] this kingdom hath looked at. Now I wish we may all consider of what right you will challenge that all the people should have right to elections. Is it by the right of nature? If you will hold forth that as your ground, then I think you must deny all property too, and this is my reason. For thus: by that same right of nature (whatever it be) that you pretend, by which you can say, oned man hath an equal right with another to the choosing of him that shall govern him—by the same right of nature, he hath the same [equal] right in any goods he sees—meat, drink, clothes—to take and use them for his sustenance. He hath a freedom to the land, [to take] the ground, to exercise it, till it; he hath the [same] freedom to anything that any one doth account himself to have any propriety in. Why now I say then, if you,g against the most fundamental part of [the] civil constitution (which I have now declared), will plead the Law of Nature, that a man should (paramount [to] this, and contrary to this) have a power of choosing those men that shall determine what shall be law in this state, though he himself have no permanent interest in the state, [but] whatever interest he hath he may carry about with him—if this be allowed, [because by the right of nature] we are free, we are equal, one man must have as much voice as another, then show me what step or difference [there is], why [I may not] by the same right [take your property, though not] of necessity to sustain nature. It is for my better being, and [the better settlement of the kingdom]? Possibly not for it, neither: possibly I may not have so real a regard to the peace of the kingdom as that man who hath a permanent interest in it.e He thatf is here to-day, and gone to-morrow, I do not see that he hath such a permanent interest. Since you cannot plead to it by anything but the Law of Nature, [or for anything] but for the end of better being, and [since] that better being is not certain, and [what is] more, destructive to another; upon these grounds, if you do, paramount [to] all constitutions, hold up this Law of Nature, I would fain have any man show me their bounds, where you will end, and [why you should not] take away all property.
I shall now be a little more free and open with you than I was before. I wish we were all true-hearted, and that we did all carry ourselves with integrity. If I did mistrust you I would [not] use such asseverations. I think it doth go on mistrust, and things are thought too [readily] matters of reflection, that were never intended. For my part, as I think, you forgot something that was in my speech,a and you do not only yourselves believe that [some] men are inclining to anarchy, but you would make all men believe that. And, sir, to say because a man pleads that every man hath a voice [by right of nature], that therefore it destroys [by] the same [argument all property—this is to forget the Law of God]. That there’s a property, the Law of God says it; else why [hath] God made that law, Thou shalt not steal? I am a poor man, therefore I must be [op]pressed: if I have no interest in the kingdom, I must suffer by all their laws be they right or wrong. Nay thus: a gentleman lives in a country and hath three or four lordships, as some men have (God knows how they got them); and when a Parliament is called he must be a Parliamentman; and it may be he sees some poor men, they live near this man, he can crush them—I have known an invasionb to make sure he hath turned the poor menc out of doors; and I would fain know whether the potency of [rich] men do not this, and so keep them under the greatest tyranny that was [ever] thought of in the world. And therefore I think that to that it is fully answered: God hath set down that thing as to propriety with this law of his, Thou shalt not steal. And for my part I am against any such thought, and,d as for yourselves,e I wish you would not make the world believe that we are for anarchy.
I know nothing but this, that they that are the most yielding have the greatest wisdom; but really, sir, this is not right as it should be. No man says that you have a mind to anarchy, but [that] the consequence of this rule tends to anarchy, must end in anarchy; for where is there any bound or limit set if you take away this [limit], that men that have no interest but the interest of breathing [shall have no voice in elections]? Therefore I am confident on’t, we should not be so hot one with another.
I know that some particular men we debate with [believe we] are for anarchy.
I profess I must clear myself as to that point.g I would not desire,h I cannot allow myself, to lay the least scandal upon anybody. And truly, for that gentleman that did take so much offence, I do not know why he should take it so. We speak to the paper—not to persons—and to the matter of the paper. And I hope that no man is so much engaged to the matter of the paper—I hope [that] our persons, and our hearts and judgments, are not [so] pinned to papers but that we are ready to hear what good or ill consequence will flow from it.a
I have, with as much plainness and clearness of reason as I could, showed you how I did conceive the doing of this [that the paper advocates] takes away that which is the most original, the most fundamental civil constitution of this kingdom, and which is, above all, that constitution by which I have any property.b If you will take away that and set up,c as a thing paramount,d whatever a man may claim by the Law of Nature, though it be not a thing of necessity to him for the sustenance of nature; if you do make this your rule, I desire clearly to understand where then remains property.
Now thene —I would misrepresent nothing—thef answer which had anything of matter in it,g the great and main answer upon which that which hath been said against this [objection] rests, seemed to be that it will not make a breach of property,h [for this reason]: that there is a law, Thou shalt not steal. [But] the same law says, Honour thy father and [thy] mother, and that law doth likewise hold out that it doth extend to all that (in that place where we are in) are our governors; so that by that there is a forbidding of breaking a civil law when we may live quietly under it, and [that by] a divine law. Again it is said—indeed [was said] before—that there is no law, no divine law, that tells us that such a corporation must have the election of burgesses,i such a shire [of knights], or the like. Divine law extends not to particular things. And so, on the other side, if a man were to demonstrate his [right to] property by divine law, it would be very remote.j Our [right to] property descends from other things, as well as our right of sending burgesses. That divine law doth not determine particulars but generals in relation to man and man, and to property, and all things else: and we should be as far to seek if we should go to prove a property in [a thing by] divine law, as to prove that I have an interest in choosing burgesses of the Parliament by divine law. And truly, under favour, I refer it to all, whether there be anything of solution to that objection that I made, if it be understood—I submit it to any man’s judgment.
To the thing itself—property [in the franchise]. I would fain know how it comes to be the property [of some men, and not of others]. As for estates and those kind of things, and other things that belong to men, it will be granted thata they areb property; but I deny that that is a property, to a lord, to a gentleman, to any man more than another in the kingdom of England. If it be a property, it is a property by a law—neither do I think that there is very little property in this thing by the law of the land, because I think that the law of the land in that thing is the most tyrannical law under heaven. And I would fain know what we have fought for. [For our laws and liberties?] And this is the old law of England—and that which enslaves the people of England—that they should be bound by laws in which they have no voice at all!c [With respect to the divine law which says Honour thy father and thy mother] the great dispute is, who is a right father and a right mother? I am bound to know who is my father and mother; and—I take it in the same sense you do—I would have a distinction, a character whereby God commands me to honour [them]. And for my part I look upon the people of England so, that wherein they have not voices in the choosing of their [governors—their civil] fathers and mothers—they are not bound to that commandment.
I desire to add one word concerning the word property. It is for something that anarchy is so much talked of. For my own part I cannot believe in the least that it can be clearly derived from that paper. ’Tis true, that somewhat may be derived in the paper against the King, the power of the King, and somewhat against the power of the Lords; and the truth is when I shall see God going about to throw down King and Lords and property, then I shall be contented. But I hope that they may live to see the power of the King and the Lords thrown down, that yet may live to see property preserved. And for this of changing the Representative of the nation, of changing those that choose the Representative, making of them more full, taking more into the number than formerly, I had verily thought we had all agreed in it that more should have chosen—all that had desired a more equal representation than we now have. For now those only choose who have forty shillings freehold. A man may have a lease for one hundred pounds a year, a man may have a lease for three lives, [but he has no voice]. But [as] for this [argument], that it destroys all right [to property] that every Englishman that is an inhabitant of England should choose and have a voiced in the representatives, I suppose it is, [on the contrary], the only means to preserve all property. For I judge every man is naturally free; and I judge the reason whya men [chose representatives] when they wereh in so great numbers that every man could not give his voice [directly], wasb that they who were chosen might preserve property [for all]; and therefore men agreed to come into some form of government that they might preserve property, and I would fain know, if we were to begin a government, [whether you would say], ‘You have not forty shillings a year, therefore you shall not have a voice.’ Whereas before there was a government every man had such a voice,i and afterwards, and for this very cause, they did choose representatives, and put themselves into forms of government that they may preserve property, and therefore it is not to destroy it, [to give every man a voice].
I think we shall not be so apt to come to a right understanding in this business, if one man, and another man, and another man do speak their several thoughts and conceptions to the same purpose, as if we do considerc where the objection lies, and what the answer is which is made to it;d and therefore I desire we may do so. To that which this gentleman spake last. The main thing that he seemed to answer was this: that he would make it appear that the going about to establish this government, [or] such a government, is not a destruction of property, nor does not tend to the destruction of property, because the people’s falling into a government is for the preservation of property. What weight there [is in it] lies in this: since there is a falling into a government, and government is to preserve property, therefore this cannot be against property. The objection does not lie in that, the making ofe the representationf more equal, but [in] the introducing of men into an equality of interest in this government, who have no property in this kingdom, or who have no local permanent interest in it. For if I had said that I would not wish at all that we should have any enlargement of the bounds of those that are to be the electors, then you might have excepted against it. But [what I said was] that I would not go to enlarge it beyond all bounds, so that upon the same ground you may admit of so many men from foreign states as would outvote you. The objection lies still in this.g I do not mean that I would have it restrained to that proportion [that now obtains], but to restrain it still to men who have a local, a permanent interest in the kingdom, who have such an interest that they may live upon it as freeman, and who have such an interest as is fixed upon a place, and is not the same equally everywhere. If a man be an inhabitant upon a rack rent for a year, for two years, or twenty years, you cannot think that man hath any fixed or permanent interest. That man, if he pay the rent that his land is worth, anda hath no advantage but what he hath by his land,b is as good a man, may have as much interest, in another kingdom asc here. I do not speak of notd enlarging this [representation] at all, but of keeping this to the most fundamental constitution in this kingdom, that is, that no person that hath not a local and permanent interest in the kingdom should have an equal dependence in election [with those that have]. But if you go beyond this law, if you admit any man that hath a breath and being, I did show you how this will destroy property. It may come to destroy property thus. You may havee such men chosen, or at least the major part of them, [as have no local and permanent interest]. Whyf may notg those men vote against all property? [Again] you may admit strangers by this rule, if you admit them once to inhabit, and those that have interest in the land may be voted out of their land. It may destroy property that way. But here is the rule that you go by.h You infer this to be the right of the people, of every inhabitant,i becausej man hath such a right in nature, though it be not of necessity for the preserving of his being; [and] therefore you are to overthrow the most fundamental constitution for this. By the same rule, show me why you will not, by the same right of nature, make use of anything that any man hath, [though it be not] for the necessary sustenance of men.k Show me what you will stop at; wherein you will fence any man in a property by this rule.
I desire to know how this comes to be a property in some men, and not in others.
I confess [there is weight in] that objection that the Commissary-General last insisted upon; for you have five to one in this kingdom that have no permanent interest. Some men [have] ten, some twenty servants, some more, some less. If the master and servant shall be equal electors, then clearly those that have no interest in the kingdom will make it their interest to choose those that have no interest. It may happen, that the majority may by law, not in a confusion,l destroy property; there may be a law enacted, that there shall be an equality of goods and estate.1 I think that either of the extremes may be urged to inconveniency; that is, [that] men that have no interest as to estate should have no interest as to election [and that they should have an equal interest]. But there may be a more equitableg division and distribution than that he that hath nothing should have an equal voice; and certainly there may be some other way thought of, that there may be a representative of the poor as well as the rich, and not to exclude all. I remember there were many workings and revolutions, as we have heard, in the Roman Senate; and there was never a confusion that did appear (and that indeed was come to) till the state came to know this kind of distribution of election. That is howa the people’s voices were bought and sold, and that by the poor; and thence it came that he that was the richest man, and [a man] of some considerable power among the soldiers,b and one they resolved on,c made himself a perpetual dictator. And if we strain too far to avoid monarchy in kings [let us take heed] that we do not call for emperors to deliver us from more than one tyrant.
I should not have spoken again. I think it is a fine gilded pill. But there is much danger, and it may seem to some that there is some kind of remedy [possible]. I think that we are better as we are [if it can be really proved] that the poor shall choose many [and] still the people bed in the same case, be over-voted still. [But of this, and much else, I am unsatisfied], and therefore truly, sir, I should desire to go close to the business; and the [first] thing that I am unsatisfied in is how it comes about that there is such a propriety in some freeborn Englishmen, and not [in] others.
Whether the younger son have not as much right to the inheritance as the eldest.
Will you decide it by the light of nature?
Why election was [given] only [to those with freeholds of] forty shillings a year (which was [then worth] more than forty pounds a year now), the reason was: that the Commons of England were overpowered by the Lords, who had abundance of vassals, but that still they might make their laws good against encroaching prerogatives [by this means];e therefore they did exclude all slaves. Now the case is not so: all slaves have bought their freedoms, [and] they are more free that in the commonwealth are more beneficial. [Yet] there are men [of substance] in the country [with no voice in elections]. There is a tanner in Staines worth three thousand pounds, and another in Reading worth three horseskins. [The second has a voice; the first, none.]
In the beginning of your speech you seem to acknowledge [that] by law, by civil constitution, the propriety of having voices in election was fixed in certain persons. So then your exception of your argument does not prove that by civil constitution they have no such propriety, but your argument does acknowledge [that] by civil [constitution they have such] propriety. You argue against this law [only] that this law is not good.
Unless I be very much mistaken we are very much deviated from the first question.a Instead of following the first proposition to inquire what is just, I conceive we look to prophecies, and look to what may be the event, and judge of the justness of a thing by the consequence. I desire we may recall [ourselves to the question] whether it be right or no. I conceive all that hath been said against it will be reduced to this [question of consequences], and [to]b another reasonc —that it is against a fundamental law, that every person [choosing] ought to have a permanent interest, because it is not fit that those should choose Parliaments that have no lands to be disposed of by Parliament.
If you will take it by the way, it is not fit that the representees should choose [as] the representers, or the persons who shall make the law in the kingdom, [those] who have not a permanent fixed interest in the kingdom. [The reason is the same in the two cases.]
Sir, I do so take it; and I conceive that that is brought in for the same reason: that foreigners might [otherwise not only] come to have a voice in our elections as well as the native inhabitants, [but to be elected].
That is upon supposition that these [foreigners] should be all inhabitants.
I shall begin with the last first. The case is different withd the native inhabitant and [the] foreigner. If a foreigner shall be admitted to be an inhabitant in the nation,e so he will submit to that form of government as the natives do, he hath the same right as the natives but in this particular. Our case is to be considered thus, that we have been under slavery. That’s acknowledged by all. Our very laws were made by our conquerors; and whereas it’s spoken much of chronicles, I conceive there is no credit to be given to any of them; and the reason is because those that were our lords, and made us their vassals, would suffer nothing else to be chronicled. We are now engaged for our freedom. That’s the end of Parliaments: not to constitute what is already [established, but to act] according to the just rules of government. Every person in England hath as clear a right to elect his representative as the greatest person in England. I conceive that’s the undeniable maxim of government: that all government is in the free consent of the people. If [so], then upon that account there is no person that is under a just government, or hath justly his own, unless he by his own free consent be put under that government. This he cannot be unless he be consenting to it, and therefore, according to this maxim, there is never a person in England [but ought to have a voice in elections]. If [this], as that gentleman says, be true, there are no laws that in this strictness and rigour of justice [any man is bound to], that are not made by those who[m] he doth consent to. And therefore I should humbly move, that if the question be stated—which would soonest bring things to an issue—it might rather be thus: Whether any person can justly be bound by law,a who doth not give his consent that such persons shall make laws for him?
Let the question be so: Whether a man can be bound to any law that he doth not consent to? And I shall tell you, that he may and ought to be [bound to a law] that he doth not give a consent to, nor doth not choose any [to consent to]; and I will make it clear. If a foreigner come within this kingdom, if that stranger will have liberty [to dwell here] who hath no local interest here, he, asb a man, it’s true, hath air, [the passage of highways, the protection of laws,c and all] that by nature; we must not expel [him] our coasts, give him no being amongst us, nor kill him because he comes upon our land, comes up our stream, arrives at our shore. It is a piece of hospitality, of humanity, to receive that man amongst us. But if that man be received to a being amongst us, I think that man may very well be content to submit himself to the law of the land; that is, the law that is made by those people that have a property, a fixed property, in the land. I think, if any man will receive protection from this people though [neither] he nor his ancestors, not any betwixt him and Adam, did ever give concurrence to this constitution, I think this man ought to be subject to those laws, and to be bound by those laws, so long as he continues amongst them. That is my opinion. A man ought to be subject to a law, that did not give his consent, but with this reservation, that if this man do think himself unsatisfied to be subject to this law he may go into another kingdom. And so the same reason doth extend, in my understanding, [to] thata man that hath no permanent interest in the kingdom. If he hath money, his money is as good in another place as here; he hath nothing that doth locally fix him to this kingdom. If thatb man will live in this kingdom, or trade amongst us, that man ought to subject himself to the law made by the people who have the interest of this kingdom in them.c And yet I do acknowledge that which you take to be so general a maxim, that in every kingdom, within every land, the original of power of making laws, of determining what shall be law in the land, does lie in the people—[but by the people is meant those] that are possessed ofd the permanent interest in the land. But whoever is extraneous to this, that is, as good a man in another land, that man ought to give such a respect to the property of men that live in the land. They do not determine [that I shall live in this land]. Why should I have any interest ine determiningf what shall be the law of this land?
I think if it can be made to appear that it is a just and reasonable thing, and that it is for the preservation of all the [native] freeborn men, [that they should have an equal voice in election]—I think it ought to be made good unto them. And the reason is: that the chief end of this government is to preserve persons as well as estates, and if any law shall take hold of my person it is more dear than my estate.
I do very well remember that the gentleman in the window1 [said] that, if it were so, there were no propriety to be had, becauseh five partsi of [the nation], the poor people, are now excluded and would then come in. Soj one on the other side said [that], if [it were] otherwise, then rich men [only] shall be chosen. Then, I say, the one part shall make hewers of wood and drawers of water of the other five, and so the greatest part of the nation be enslaved.k Truly I think we are stilll where we were; and I do not hear any argument given but only that it is the present law of the kingdom. I say still,m what shall become of those many [men] that have laid out themselves for the Parliament of England in this present war, that have ruined themselves by fighting, by hazarding all they had? They are Englishmen. They have now nothing to say for themselves.
I should be very sorry to speak anything here that should give offence, or that may occasion personal reflection[s] that we spoke against just now. I did not urge anything so far as was represented, and I did not at all urgea that there should be a consideration [had of rich men], and that [a] man that is [poor] shall be without consideration, [or that] he deserves to be made poore[r] and not to live [in independence] at all. But all that I urged was this: that I think it worthy consideration, whether they should have an equality in their interest.b However, I think we have been a great while upon this point, and if we be as long upon all the rest, it were well if there were no greater difference than this.
I think that this [matter of the franchise] may be easily agreed on—that is, there may be a way thought of. I think you would do well to set up all night [if thereby you could effect it], but I think that three or four might be thought of in this company [to form a committee]. You will be forced [only] to put characters upon electors or elected; therefore I do suppose that if there be any here that can make up a Representative to your mind, the thing is gained.c But I would fain know whether that will answer the work of your meeting.d The question is, whether you can state any one question for [removing] the present danger of the kingdom, whether any one question or no will dispatch the work.
Sir, I desire, [if it be possible], that some question may be stated to finish the present work, to cement us [in the points] wherein lies the distance; and if the thoughts [be] of the commonwealth [and] the people’s freedom, I think that’s soon cured. I desire that all manner of plainness may be used, that we may not go on with the lapwing and carry one another off the nest. There is something elsef that must cement us where the awkwardness of our spirits lies.
For my part, I think we cannot engage one way or other in the Army if we do not think of the people’s liberties. If we can agree where the liberty and freedom of the people lies, that will do all.
I cannot consent so far.g As I said before: when I see the hand of God destroying King, and Lords, and Commons too, [or] any foundation of human constitution, when I see God hath done it, I shall, I hope, comfortably acquiesce in it. But first, I cannot give my consent to it, because it is not good. And secondly, as I desire that this Army should have regard to engagements wherever they are lawful, so I would have them have regard to this [as well]: that they should not bring that scandal upon the name of God [and the Saints], that those that call themselves by that name, those whom God hath owned and appeared with—that we shoulda represent ourselves to the world as men so far from being of that peaceable spirit which is suitable to the Gospel, as we should have bought peace of the world upon such terms—[as] we would not have peace in the world but upon such terms—as should destroy all property. If the principle upon which you move this alteration, or the ground upon which you press that we should make this alteration, do destroy all kind of property or whatsoever a man hath by human constitution, [I cannot consent to it]. The Law of God doth not give me property, nor the Law of Nature, but property is of human constitution. I have a property and this I shall enjoy. Constitution founds property. If either the thing itself that you press or the consequence [of] that you press [do destroy property], though I shall acquiesce in having no property, yet I cannot give my heart or hand to it; because it is a thing evil in itself and scandalous to the world, and I desire this Army may be free from both.
I see that though libertyb were our end,c there is a degeneration from it. We have engaged in this kingdom and ventured our lives, and it was all for this: to recover our birthrights and privileges as Englishmen; and by the arguments urged there is none. There are many thousands of us soldiers that have ventured our lives; we have had little propriety in the kingdom as to our estates, yet we have had a birthright. But it seems now, except a man hath a fixed estate in this kingdom, he hath no right in this kingdom. I wonder we were so much deceived. If we had not a right to the kingdom, we were mere mercenary soldiers. There are many in my condition, that have as good a condition [as I have]; it may be little estate they have at present, and yet they have as much a [birth]right as those two1 who are their lawgivers, as any in this place. I shall tell you in a word my resolution. I am resolved to give my birthright to none. Whatsoever may come in the way, and [whatsoever may] be thought,d I will give it to none. If this thing [be denied the poor], that with so much pressing after [they have sought, it will be the greatest scandal]. There was one thing spoken to this effect: that if the poor and those in low condition [were given their birthright it would be the destruction of this kingdom]. I think this was but a distrust of Providence. I do think the poor and meaner of this kingdom—I speak as ina relation [to the condition of soldiers], in which we are—have been the means of the preservation of this kingdom. I say, in their stations, and really I think to their utmost possibility; and their lives have not been [held] dear for purchasing the good of the kingdom.b [And now they demand the birthright for which they fought.] Those that act to this end are as free from anarchy or confusion as those that oppose it, and they have the Law of God and the law of their conscience [with them]. But truly I shall only sum up [in] this.c I desire that we may not spend so much time upon these things. We must be plain. When men come to understand these things, they will not lose that which they have contended for. That which I shall beseech you is to come to a determination of this question.
I am very sorry we are come to this point, that from reasoning one to another we should come to express our resolutions. I profess for my part, what I see is good for the kingdom, and becoming a Christian to contend for, I hope through God I shall have strength and resolution to do my part towards it. And yet I will profess direct contrary in some kind to what that gentleman said. For my part, rather than I will make a disturbance to a good constitution of a kingdom wherein I may live in godliness and honesty, and peace and quietness, I will part with a great deal of my birthright. I will part with my own property rather than I will be the man that shall make a disturbance in the kingdom for my property; and therefore if all the people in this kingdom, or [the] representative[s] of them all together, should meet and should give away my property I would submit to it, I would give it away. But that gentleman, and I think every Christian, ought to bear that spirit,d to carry that in him, that he will not make a public disturbance upon a private prejudice.
Now let us consider where our difference lies. We all agree that you should have a Representative to govern, ande this Representative to be as equal as you can [make it]. But the question is, whether this distribution can be made to all persons equally, or whether [only] amongst those equals that have the interest of England in them. That which I have declared [is] my opinion [still]. I think we ought to keep to that [constitution which we have now], both because it is a civil constitution—it is the most fundamental constitution that we have—and [because] there is so much justice and reason and prudence [in it]—as I dare confidently undertake to demonstratea —that there are many more evils that will follow in case you do alter [it] than there can [be] in the standing of it. But I say but this in the general, that I do wish that they that talk of birthrights—we any of us when we talk of birthrightsb —would consider what really our birthright is.
If a man meanc by birthright, whatsoever Id can challenge by the Law of Nature (suppose there were no constitution at all,e no civil law and [no] civil constitution), [and] that that I am to contend for against constitution; [then] you leave no property, nor no foundation for any man to enjoy anything. But if you call that your birthright which isl the most fundamental part of your constitution, then let him perish that goes about to hinder you or any man of the least part of your birthright, or will [desire to] do it. But if you will lay aside the most fundamental constitution, which is as good, for aught you can discern, as anything you can propose—at least it is a constitution,f and I will give you consequence for consequence of good upon [that] constitution as you [can give] upong your birthright [without it]h —and if you merely upon pretence of a birthright, of the right of nature, which is only true as for [your being, and not for] your better being; if you will upon that ground pretend that this constitution, the most fundamental constitution, the thing that hath reason and equity in it, shall not stand in your way, [it] is the same principle to me, say I, [as if] but for your better satisfaction you shall take hold of anything that a[nother] man calls his own.
Sir, I see that it is impossible to have liberty but all property must be taken away. If it be laid down for a rule, and if you will say it, it must be so. But I would fain know whati the soldier hathj fought for all this while? He hath fought to enslave himself, to give power to men of riches, men of estates, to make him a perpetual slave. We do find in all presses that go forth none must be pressed that are freehold men. When these gentlemen fall out among themselves they shall press the poor scrubsk to come and kill [one another for] them.
I confess I see so much right in the business that I am not easily satisfied with flourishes. If you will [not] lay the stress of the business upon the consideration of reason, or right relating to anything of human constitution, or anything of that nature, but will put it upon consequences, I will show you greater ill consequences—I see enough to say that, to my apprehensions, I can show you greater ill consequences to follow upon that alteration which you would have, by extending [voices] to all that have a being in this kingdom, than [any] that [can come] by this [present constitution], a great deal. Thata [that you urge of the present constitution] is a particular ill consequence. This [that I object against your proposal] is a general ill consequence, and thisb is as great as thatc or any [ill consequence] else [whatsoever], though I think you will see that the validity of that argument must bed that for one ill [that] lies upon that which now is,e I can show you a thousand upon this [that you propose].
Give me leave [to say] but this one word. I [will] tell you what the soldier of the kingdom hath fought for. First, the danger that we stood in was that one man’s will must be a law. The people of the kingdom must have this right at least, that they should not be concluded [but] by the Representative of those that had the interest of the kingdom. So[m]e men fought in this, because they were immediately concerned and engaged in it. Other men who had no other interest in the kingdom but this, that they should have the benefit of those laws made by the Representative, yet [fought] that they should have the benefit of this Representative. They thought it was better to be concluded by the common consent of those that were fixed men, and settled men, that had the interest of this kingdom [in them]. ‘And from that way,’ [said they], ‘I shall know a law and have a certainty.’ Every man that was born [in the country, that]f is a denizeng in it, that hath a freedom, he was capable of trading to get money, to get estates by; and therefore this man, I think, had a great deal of reason to build up such a foundation of interest to himself: that is, that the will of one man should not be a law, but that the law of this kingdom should be by a choice of persons to represent, and that choice to be made by, the generality of the kingdom. Here was a right that induced men to fight, and those men that hadh this interest, though this be not the utmost interest that other men have, yet they had some interest. Now [tell me] why we should go to plead whatsoever we can challenge by the right of nature against whatsoever any man can challenge by constitution. I do not see where that man will stop, as to point of property, [so] that he shall not use [against other property] that right he hath [claimed] by the Law of Nature against that constitution. I desire any man to show me where there is a difference. I have been answered, ‘Now we see liberty cannot stand without [destroying] property.’ Liberty may be had and property not be destroyed. First, the liberty of all those that have the permanent interest in the kingdom, that is provided for [by the constitution]. Anda [secondly, by an appeal to the Law of Nature] liberty cannot be provided for in a general sense, if property be preserved. For if property be preserved [by acknowledging a natural right in the possessor, so] that I am not to meddle with such a man’s estate, his meat, his drink, his apparel, or other goods, then the right of nature destroys liberty. By the right of nature I am to have sustenance rather than perish; yet property destroys it for a man to have [this] by the rightb of nature, [even] suppose there be no human constitution.
I do say still, under favour, there is a way to cure all this debate. I will mind you of one thing: that upon the will of one man abusing us, [we reached agreement], and if the safety of the Army be in danger [so we may again]. I hope, it is not denied by any man that any wise, discreet man that hath preserved England [is worthy of a voice] ind the government of it. So that, I profess to you, for my part I am clear the point of election should be amended [in that sense]. I think, they will desire no more liberty. If there were time to dispute it, I think theye would be satisfied, and all will be satisfied.
I confess I was most dissatisfied with that I heard Mr. Sexby speak, of any man here, because it did savour so much of will. But I desire that all of us may decline that, and if we meet here really to agree to that which isf for the safety of the kingdom, let us not spend so much time in such debates as these are, but let us apply ourselves to such things as are conclusive, and that shall be this. Everybody here would be willing that the Representative might be mended, that is, [that] it might be [made] better than it is. Perhaps it may be offered in that [other] paper1 too lamely. If the thing [there] insisted upon beg too limited, why perhaps there are a very considerable part of copyholders by inheritance that ought to have a voice; and there may be somewhat [in that paper] too [that] reflects upon the generality of the people [in denying them a voice]. I know our debates are endless if we think to bring it to an issue this way. If we may but resolve upon a committee, [things may be done]. If I cannot be satisfied to go so far as these gentlemen that bring this paper,2 I say it again [and] I profess it, I shall freely and willingly withdraw myself, and I hope to do it in such a manner that the Army shall see that I shall by my withdrawing satisfyh the interest of the Army, the public interest of the kingdom, and those ends these men aim at. And I think if you do bring this to a result it were well.
If these men must be advanced, and other men set under foot, I am not satisfied. If their rules must be observed, and other men, that are [not] in authority, [be silenced, I] do not know how this can stand together [with the idea of a free debate]. I wonder how that should be thought wilfulness in one man that is reason in another; for I confess I have not heard anything that doth satisfy me, and though I have not so much wisdom, or [so many] notions in my head,a I have so many [apprehensions] that I could tell an hundred [such] ofb the ruin of the people. I am not at all against a committee’s meeting; and as you say—and I think every Christian ought to do the same—for my part I shall be ready, if I see the way that I am going, and the thing that I would insist on, will destroy the kingdom, I shall withdraw [from] it as soon as any. And therefore, till I see that, I shall use all the means [I can], and I think it is no fault in any man [to refuse] to sell that which is his birthright.
I desire to speak a few words. I am sorry that my zeal to what I apprehend is good should be so ill resented. I am not sorry to see that which I apprehend is truth [disputed], but I am sorry the Lord hath darkened some so much as not to see it, and that is in short [this]. Do you [not] think it were a sad and miserable condition, that we have fought all this time for nothing? All here, both great and small, do think that we fought for something. I confess, many of us fought for those ends which, we since saw,c were not thosed which caused us to go through difficulties and straits [and] to venture all in the ship with you. It had been good in you to have advertised us of it, and I believe you would have [had] fewer under your command to have commanded. But if this be the business, that an estate doth make men capable—it is no matter which way they get it, they are capable—to choose those that shall represent them, I think there are many that have not estates that in honesty have as much right in the freedom [of] their choicee as any that have great estates. Truly, sir, [as for] your putting off this question and coming to some other, I dare say, and I dare appeal to all of them, that they cannot settle upon any other until this be done. It was the ground that we took up arms [on], and it is the ground which we shall maintain. Concerning my making rents and divisions in this way. Asf a particular, if I were but so, I could lie down and be trodden there; [but] truly I am sent by a regiment, [and] if I should not speak, guilt shall lie upon me, and I [should] think I were a covenant-breaker.a I do not know how we have [been] answered in our arguments, and [as for our engagements], I conceive we shall not accomplish them to the kingdom when we deny them to ourselves.b I shall be loath to make a rent and division, but, for my own part, unless I see this put to a question, I despair of an issue.
The first thing that I shouldc desire was, and is, this: that there might be a temperature and moderation of spirit within us; that we should speak with moderation, not with such reflection as was boulted one from another, but so speak and so hear as that which [is said] may be the droppings of love from one to another’s hearts. Another word I have to say is [that] the grand question of all is, whether or no it be the property of every individual person in the kingdom to have a vote in election[s]; and the ground [on which it is claimed] is the Law of Nature, which, for my part, I think to be that law which is the ground of all constitutions. Yet really properties are the foundation of constitutions, [and not constitutions of property]. For if so be there were no constitutions,d yete the Law of Nature does give a principle [for every man] to have a property of what he has, or may have, which is not another man’s. This [natural right to] property is the ground of meum and tuum. Now there may be inconveniencies on both hands, but not so great freedom [on either as is supposed—not] the greater freedom, as I conceive, that all may have whatsoever [they have a mind to]. And if it come to pass that there be a difference, and that the one [claimant] doth oppose the other, then nothing can decide it but the sword, which is the wrath of God.
I see you have a long dispute [and] that you do intend to dispute here till the tenth of March. You have brought us into a fair pass, and the kingdom into a fair pass, for if your reasons are not satisfied, and we do not fetch all our waters from your wells, you threaten to withdraw yourselves. I could wish, according to our several protestations, we might sit down quietly, and there throw down ourselves where we see reason. I could wish we might all rise, and go to our duties, and setf our work in hand. I see both [parties] at a stand; and if we dispute here, both are lost.
Really for my own part I must needs say, whilst we say we would not make reflections we do make reflections; and if I had not come hither with a free heart to do that that I was persuaded in my conscience is my duty, I should a thousand times rather have kept myself away. For I do think I had brought upon myself the greatest sin that I was [ever] guilty of, if I should have come to have stood before God in that former duty,a and if [I did retreat from] that my saying—which I did say, and shall persevere to say—that I shall not, I cannot, against my conscience do anything. They that have stood so much for liberty of conscience, if they will not grant that liberty to every man, but say it is a deserting I know not what—if that [liberty] be denied me, I think there is not that equality that isb professed to be amongst us.c Though we should be satisfied in our consciences in what we do, we are told we purpose to leave the Army, or to leave our commands, as if we took upon us to do it asd [a] matter of will. I did hear some gentlemen speak more of will than anything that was spoken this way, for more was spoken by way of will than of satisfaction, and if there be notk more equality in our minds I can but grieve for it, I must do no more.e I said this (and I say no more): that [if you would] make your businesses as well as you can, we might bring things to an understanding; [for] it was [in order] to be brought to a fair composure [that we met]. And when you have said [what you can for the paper and have heard our objections], if [then] you should put this paper to the question without any qualifications, I doubt whether it would pass so freely. If we would have no difference we ought to put it [with due qualifications]. And let me speak clearly and freely—I have heard other gentlemen do the like: I have not heard the Commissary-Generl answered, not in onef part, to my knowledge, not in a tittle. If, therefore, when I see there is an extremity of difference between you, [I move for a committee] to the end it may be brought nearer to a general satisfactiong —if this [too] be thought a deserting of that interest, [I know not] if there can be anything more sharply said; I will not give it an ill word.
I should not speak [again], but reflections do necessitate [it], do call upon us to vindicate ourselves. As if we, who have led men into engagements and services,h had divided [from them] because we did not concur with them! I will ask that gentlemani that spokej (whom I love in my heart): whether when they drew out to serve the Parliament in the beginning, whether when they engaged with the Army at Newmarket, whether then they thought of any more interest or right in the kingdom than this; whether they did think that they should have as great interest in Parliament-men as freeholders had, or whether from the beginning we did not engage for the liberty of Parliaments, and that we should be concluded by the laws that such did make. Unless somebody did make you believe before now that you should have an equal interest in the kingdom, unless somebody dida make that to be believed, there is no reason to blame men for leading [you] so far as they have done; and if any man was far enough from such an apprehension, that man hath not been deceived. And truly, I shall say but this word more for myself in this business, because the whole objection seems to be pressed to me, and maintained againstb me. I will not arrogate that I was the first man that put the Army upon the thought either of successive Parliaments or more equal Parliaments; yet there are some here that know who they were [that] put us upon that foundation of liberty of putting a period to this Parliament, [in order] that we might have successive Parliaments, and that there might be a more equal distribution of elections. There are many here that know who were the first movers of that business in the Army. I shall not arrogate that [to myself], but I can argue this with a clear conscience: that no man hath prosecuted that with more earnestness, andf will stand to that interest more than I do, of having Parliaments successive and not perpetual, and thec distribution of electionsd [more equal]. But, notwithstanding, my opinion stands good, that it ought to be a distribution amongst the fixed and settled people of this nation. It’s more prudent and safe, and more upon this ground of right for it [to be so]. Now it is the fundamental constitution of this kingdom; and that which you take away [you take away] for matter of wilfulness. Notwithstanding, [as for] this universal conclusion, that all inhabitants [shall have voices], as it stands [in the Agreement], I must declare that thoughe I cannot yet be satisfied, yet for my part I shall acquiesce. I will not make a distraction in this Army. Though I have a property in being one of those that should be an elector, though I have an interest in the birthright, yet I will rather lose that birthright and that interest than I will make it my business [to oppose them], if I see but the generality of those whom I have reason to think honest men and conscientious men and godly men, to carry them[selves] another way. I will not oppose, though I be not satisfied to join with them. And I desire [to say this]. I am agreed with you if you insist upon a more equal distribution of elections; I will agree with you, not only to dispute for it, but to fight for it and contend for it. Thus far I shall agree with you. On the other hand, [to] those who differ [in] their terms [and say], ‘I will not agree with you except you go farther,’ [I make answer], ‘Thus far I can go with you: I will go with you as far as I can.’ If you will appoint a committeea of someb [few] to consider of that, so as you preserve the equitable part of that constitution [that now is, securing a voice to those] who are like to be free men,c men not given up to the wills of others, [and thereby] keeping to the latitude which is the equity of constitutions, I will go with you as far as I can. [And where I cannot] I will sit down, I will not make any disturbance among you.
If I dod speak my soul and conscience I do think that there is not an objection made but that it hath been answered; but the speeches are so long. I am sorry for some passion and some reflections, and I could wish where it is most taken [amiss] the cause had not been given. It is a fundamental [of the] constitution of the kingdom, [that] there [be parliamentary boroughs]; I would fain know whether the choice of burgesses in corporations should not be altered. [But] the end wherefore I speak is only this. You think we shall be worse than we are, if we come to a conclusion by a [sudden] vote. If it be put to the question we shall [at least] all know one another’s mind. If it be determined, and the [common] resolutions known, we shall take such a course as to put it in execution. This gentleman says, if he cannot go he will sit still. He thinks he hath a full liberty [to do so]; we think we have not. There is a great deal of difference between us two. If a man hath all he doth desire, [he may wish to sit still]; but [if] I think I have nothing at all of what I fought for, I do not think the argument holds that I must desist as well as he.
The rich would very unwillingly be concluded by the poor. And there is as much reason that the rich should conclude the poor as the poor the riche —and indeed [that is] no reason [at all].f There should be an equal share in both. I understood your engagement was that you would use all your endeavours for the liberties of the people, that they should be secured. If there is [such] a constitution that the people are not free, that [constitution] should be annulled. That constitution which is now set up is a constitution of forty shillings a year, but this constitution doth not make [the] people free.
Here’s the mistake: [you make the whole question to be] whether that’s the better constitution in that paper, or that which [now] is. But if you will go upon such a ground as that,a although a better constitution was [really] offered for the removing of the worse, yet some gentlemen are resolved to stick to the worse [and] there might be a great deal of prejudice upon such an apprehension. I think you are by this time satisfied that it is a clear mistake; for it is a dispute whether or no this [proposed constitution] bef better—nay, whether it be not destructive to the kingdom.
I desire to speak one word to this business, because I do not know whether my occasions will suffer me to attend it any longer. The great reason that I have heard [urged] is, ‘the constitution of the kingdom, the utmost constitution of it’; and ‘if we destroy this constitution there is no property.’ I suppose that if constitutions should tie up all men in this nature it were very dangerous.
First, the thing itself were dangerous if it were settled [so as] to destroy propriety. But I say the principle that leads to this [proposed change] is destructive to property. For by the same reason that you will alter this constitution, merely thatb there’s a greater [liberty] by nature [than this] constitutionc [gives]—by the same reason, by the Law of Nature, there is a greater liberty to the use of other men’s goods, which that property bars you of. And I would fain have any man show me why I should destroy that liberty which the freeholders, and burghers in corporations, have in choosing [knights and] burgesses (that which ifd you take away, you leave no constitution), and this because there is a greater freedom due to mee by the Law of Nature—[why I should do this] more than that I should take another man’s goods because the Law of Nature does allow me.
I would grant something that the Commissary-General says. But [I would have the question stated]: Whether this be a just propriety, the propriety [that] says that forty shillings a year enables a man to elect? If it were stated to that [effect], nothing would conduce so much [to determine] whether some men do agree or no.
I conceive that, as we are met here, there are one or two things mainly to be prosecuted by us; that is especially unity, [the] preservation of unity in the Army, and so likewise to put ourselves into a capacity thereby to do good to the kingdom.a Therefore I shall desire that there may be a tender consideration had of that which is so much urged, in that of an equal, as well as of a free, Representative. I shall desire that a medium, or some thoughts of a composure, [may be had] in relation to servants or to foreigners, or such others as shall be agreed upon. I say, then, I conceive, excepting those, there may be a very equitable sense [p]resented to us from that offer in our own declarations wherein we do offer the common good of all, unless they have made any shipwreck or loss of it.
I presume that the great stick here is this: that if every one shall have his [natural] propriety [of election] it does bereave the kingdom of its principal fundamental constitution, that it [now] hath. I presume that all people, and all nations whatsoever, have a liberty and power to alter and change their constitutions if they find them to be weak and infirm. Now if the people of England shall find this weakness in their constitution, they may change it if they please. Another thing is this: [it is feared that] if the light of nature be only [followed] in this, it may destroy the propriety which every man can call his own. [But it will not, and] the reason is this, because this principle and light of nature doth give all men their own—as, for example, the clothes upon my back because they are not another man’s. [Finally] if every man hath this propriety of election to choose those who [shall make the laws], you fear [it] may beget inconveniencies. I do not conceive that anything may be so nicely and precisely done but that it may admit of inconveniency. If it be [that there is inconveniency] in that [form of the constitution] wherein it is now, there may [some of] those inconveniencies rise [from the changes, that are apprehended] from them. For my part I know nothing [of fatal consequence in the relation of men] but the want of love in it, and [then, if difference arises], the sword must decide it.
I [too] shall desire [that] before the question be stated it may be moderated as for foreigners.
In the beginning of this discourse there were overtures made of imminent danger. This way we have taken this afternoon is not the way to prevent it. I wouldc humbly move that we should put a speedy end to this business, and that not only to this main question of the paper, but also according to the Lieutenant-General’s motion, that a committee may be chosen seriously to consider the things in that paper, and compare them with divers things in our declarations and engagements, that so [we may show ourselves ready], as we have all professed, to lay down ourselves before God. If we take this course of debating upon one question a whole afternoon, [and] if the danger be so near as it is supposed, it were the ready way to bring us into it. [I desire] that things may be put into a speedy dispatch.
This was that I was [desirous of] saying. (I confess I have not spoken yet, and I was willing to be silent, having heard so many speak, that I might learn).a It is not easy for us to say when this dispute will have an end; but I think it is easy to say when the kingdom will have an end.b If we do not breathe out ourselves, we shall be kicked and spurned of all the world. I would fain know how far the question will decide it; for certainly we must not expect, while we have tabernacles here, to be all of one mind. If it be to be decided by a question, andc all parties are satisfied in that, I think the sooner you hasten to it the better. If otherwise, we shall needlessly discover our dividing opinion, which as long as it may be avoided I desire it may. Therefore I desire to have a period [put to this debate].
I chanced to speak a word or two. Truly there was more offence taken at it. For my part I spoke against every man living, not only against yourself and the Commissary, but [against] every man that would dispute till we have our throats cut,d and therefore I desire I may not lie in any prejudice before your persons.e I profess, if so be there were none but you and the Commissary-General alone to maintain that argument, I would die in any place in England, in asserting that it is the right of every free-born man to elect, according to the rule, Quod omnibus spectat, ab omnibusftractari debet, that which concerns all ought to be debated by all. [He continued: That] he knew no reason why that law should oblige [him] when he himself had no finger in appointing the law-giver.
You have met here this day to see if God would show you any way wherein you might jointly preserve the kingdom from its destruction, which you all apprehend to be at the door. God is pleased not to come in to you. There is a gentleman, Mr. Saltmarsh, did desire what he has wrote may be read to the General Council.1 If God do manifest anything by him I think it ought to be heard.
[I have declared] that you will alter that constitution from a better to a worse, from a just to a thing that is less just in my apprehension; and I will not repeat the reasons of that, but refer to what I have declared before. To me, if there were nothing but this, that there is a constitution, and that constitution which is the very last constitution, which if you take away you leave nothing of constitution, and consequently nothing of right or property, [it would be enough]. I would not go to alter this,a though a man could propound that which in some respects might be better, unless it could be demonstrated to me that this were unlawful, or that this were destructive. Truly, therefore, I say for my part, to go on a sudden to make such a limitation as that [to inhabitants] in general, [is to make no limitation at all]. If you do extend the latitude [of the constitution so far] that any man shall have a voice in election who has not that interest in this kingdom that is permanent and fixed, who hath not that interest upon which he mayb have hisc freedom in this kingdom without dependence, you will put it into the hands of men to choose, [not] of men [desirous] to preserve their liberty, [but of men] who will give it away.
d I am confident, our discontent and dissatisfactione if ever they do well, they do in this. If there be anything at all that is a foundation of liberty it is this, that those who shall choose the law-makers shall be men freed from dependence upon others.f I have a thing put into my heart which I cannot but speak. I profess I am afraid that if we, from such apprehensions as these are of an imaginable right of nature opposite to constitution, if we will contend and hazard the breaking of peace upong this business of that enlargement,h I think if we, from imaginations and conceits, will go about to hazard the peace of the kingdom, to alter the constitution in such a point, I am afraid we shall find the hand of God will follow it [and] we shall see that that liberty which we so much talk of, and [have so much] contended for, shall be nothing at all by this our contending for it, by [our] putting it into the hands of those men that will give it away when they have it.
If we should go about to alter these things, I do not think that we are bound to fight for every particular proposition. Servants, while servants, are not included. Then you agree that he that receives alms is to be excluded?
I suppose it’s concluded by all, that the choosing of representatives is a privilege; now I see no reason why anya man that is a native ought to be excluded that privilege, unless from voluntary servitude.
I conceive the reason why we would exclude apprentices, or servants, or those that take alms,b is because they depend upon the will of other men and should be afraid to displease [them]. For servants and apprentices, they are included in their masters, and so for those that receive alms from door to door; but if there be any general way taken for those that are not [so] bound [to the will of other men], it would bec well.
I being sent from the Agents of [the] five regiments with an answer unto a writing, the committee was very desirous to inquire into the depth of our intentions. Those things that they had there manifested in the paper,d and what I did understand as a particular person, I did declare.e It was the Lieutenant-General’s desire for an understanding with us,f presuming those things I did declare did tend to unity. ‘And if so,’ [said he], ‘you will let it appear by coming unto us.’ We have gone thus far: we have had two or three meetings to declare and hold forth what it is we stand upon, the principles of unity and freedom. We have declared in what we conceive these principles do lie—I shall not name them all because they are known unto you. Now in the progress of these disputes and debates we find that the time spends, and no question but our adversaries are harder at work than we are. I heardg (but I had no such testimony as I could take hold of) that there are meetings daily and contrivances against us. Now for our parts weh hope you will not say all [the desire for unity] is yours, but [will acknowledge that] we have nakedly and freely unbosomed ourselves unto you. Though those things [in the paper] have startled many at the first view, yet we find there is [still] good hopes. We have fixed our resolutions, and we are determined, and we want nothing but that only God will direct us to what is just and right. But I understand that [in] all these debates if we shall agree upon any one thing, [to say], ‘This is our freedom; this is our liberty; this liberty and freedom we are debarred of, and we are bereaved of all those comforts,’ [that even] in case we should find out half an hundred of these, yet the main business is [first] how we should find them, and [then] how we should come by them. Is there any libertyi that we find ourselves deprived of? If we have grievances let us see who are the hindrances [that oppose the best way of removing them]j when we have pitched upon that way. I conceive—I speak humbly in this one thing as a particular persona —I conceive, myself, that these delays, these disputes, will prove little encouragement.b It was told me by [one of] these gentlemen, that he had great jealousies that we would not come to the trial of our spirits and that perhaps there might happen [to be] another design in hand. I said to his Honour again, if they would not come to the light I would judge they had the works of darkness in hand. Now as they told me again on the other hand, when it was questioned by Colonel Hewson:c ‘These gentlemen,’ [said they], not naming any particular persons, ‘they will hold you in hand, and keep you in debate and dispute till you and we [shall] come all to ruin.’ Now I stood as a moderator between [the asserters of] these things. When I heard the Lieutenant-General speak I was marvellously taken up with the plainness of the carriage. I said, ‘I will bring them to you. You shall see if their hearts be so. For my part I [shall expect to] see nothing but plainness and uprightness of heart made manifest unto you.’ I will not judge, nor draw any long discourse upon, our disputes this day. We may differ in one thing: that you conceive this debating and disputationd will do the work; [while we conceive] we must [without delay] put ourselves into the former privileges which we want.
I think this gentleman hath dealt very ingenuouslye and plainly with us. I pray God we may do so too, and, for one, I will do it. I think our disputings will not do the thing. I think [we shall do well] if we do make it our resolution that we do hold it forth to all powers—Parliament or King, or whoever they are—to let them know that these are our rights, and if we have them not we must get them the best way we can.
I think you say very well; and my friend at my back, he tells me that [there] are great fears abroad; and they [that bring the paper] talk of some things such as are not only specious to take a great many people with, but real and substantial, and such as are comprehensive of that that hath the good of the kingdom in it.f Truly if there be never so much desire of carrying on these things [together], never so much desire of conjunction, yet if there be not liberty of speech to come to a right understanding of things, I think it shall be all one as if there were no desire at all to meet. I may say it with truth, that I verily believe there is as much reality and heartiness amongst us [as amongst you], to come to a right understanding, and to accord with that that hath the settlement of the kingdom in it. Though when it comes to particulars we may differ in the way, yet I know nothing but that every honest man will go as far as his conscience will let him; and he that will go farther, I think he will fall back. And I think, when that principle is written in the hearts of us, and when there is not hypocrisy in our dealings, we must all of us resolve upon this, that ’tis God that persuades the heart. If there be a doubt of sincerity, it’s the devil that created that effect; and ’tis God that gives uprightness [of heart]. And I hope thata with such an heart we have all met withal. If we have not, God find him out that came without it; for my part I do [come with] it.
I would have us fall to something that is practicable, with as little pains and dissatisfaction as may be.c [As for the distribution of representatives], when you have done this according to the number of inhabitants, do you think it is not very variable,d for the number will change every day?e I remember that in the proposals that went out in the name of the Army,1 it is propounded as a rule [for the seats] to be distributed according to the rates that the counties bear in the [burdens of the] kingdom. And remember then you have a rule, and though this be not a rule of exactness [either], yet there was something of equality in it, and it was a certain rule, where all are agreed; and therefore [by adopting it] we should come to some settling. Now I do not understand wherein the advantage does lie, [if] from a sudden [apprehension of] danger, [we should rashly fix] upon a thing that will continue so long, and will continue so uncertain as this is.
’Tis thought there’s imminent danger; I hope to God we shall be so ready to agree for the future that we shall all agree for the present to rise as one man if the danger be such, for it is an impossibility to have a remedy in this. The paper says that this [present] Parliament is to continue a year, but will the great burden of the people be ever satisfied with papers [whilst] you eat and feed upon them? I shall be glad that, [if] there be not any present danger,f you will think of some way to ease the burden, that we may take a course [to do it]; and when we have satisfied the people that we do really intend the good of the kingdom [they will believe us]. Otherwise, if the four Evangelists were here, and lay [at] free-quarter upon them, theyg would not believe them.h
That the Army might be called to a rendezvous, and things settled [as promised in its printed engagements].
We are called back to engagements. I think the engagementsa we have made and published, and all the engagements of all sorts, have been better kept by those that did not so much cry out for it than by those that do, and—if you will [have it] in plain terms—better kept than by those that have brought this paper. Give me leave to tell you, in that one point, in the engagement of the Army not to divide,1 I am sure that he that understands the engagement of the Army not to divide or disbandb [as meaning] that we are not to divide for quarters, for the ease of the country, or the satisfaction of service—he that does understand it in that sense, I am not capable of his understanding.c There was another sense in it, and that is, that we should not suffer ourselves to be torn into pieces. Such a dividing as [that] is really a disbanding, and for my part I do not know what disbanding is if not that dividing. [I say] thatd the subscribers of this paper, the authorse of that book that is called The Case of the Army, I say that they have gone the way of disbanding.f Disbanding of an army is not parting in a place, for if that be so, did we not at that night disband to several quarters? Did we not then send several regiments: Colonel Scroope’s regiment into the West—we know where it was first; Colonel Horton’s regiment into Wales for preventing of insurrection there; Colonel Lambert’s [and] Colonel Lilburne’s regiment[s] then sent down for strengthening such a place as York?g And yet the authors of that paper and the subscribers of ith —for I cannot think the authors and subscribers all onei —know, and [well] they may know it, that there is not one part of the Army is divided [in body] farther than the outcries of the authors of it [are in spirit].j [For] they go [about] to scandalize [us as breakers of] an engagement [not to disperse] or divide; [yet they know that] there’s no part of the Army is dispersed to quarters further than that [I have stated]. Whereupon [all] that outcry is [made]! But he that will go to understand this to be a dividing that we engaged against, he looks at the name, and not at the thing. That dividing which is a disbanding [is] that dividing which makes no army, andk that dissolving of that order and government which is as essential to an army as life is to a man—which if it be taken away I think that such a company are no more an army than a rotten carcass is a man; and [it is] those [who have done this] that have gone [about] to divide the Army. And what else is there in this paper [but] that we have acted so vigorously for [already? We proposed that this Parliament should end within a year at most]; they do not propose that this [present] Parliament should end till the beginning of September.a When all comes [to be considered] upon the matter, it is but a critical difference and the very substance of that we have declared [for] before.b And let it be judged whetherc this wayd we have taken ande that [way] they have taken be not the same as to the matter [of it].f For my part I profess it seriously, that we shall findg in the issue that the principle of that division [which they seek to raise on the question] of disbanding is no more than this: whether such [men] or such shall have the managing of the business.h I say plainly, the way [they have taken] hath been the way of disunion and division, andi [the dissolution] of that order and government by which we shall be enabled to act [at all]. And I shall appeal to all men: [whether] the dividing from that General Council [and from the resolution] wherein we have all engaged [that] we would be concluded by [the decisions of] that [Council], and [whether likewise] the endeavouring to draw the soldiers to run this way [with them—whether this is not the real dividing of the Army]. I shall appeal [to them]: whether there can be any breach of the Army higher than that breach we have now spoke of, [any truer sense in which] that word ‘dividing the Army’j [can be taken]; whether that dividing were not more truly and properly [such, which is] in every man’s heart, [than] this dividing [which they do accuse us of incurring], wherein we do go apart one from another [but remain united in heart], and [whether it does not follow] consequently, [that] those that have gone this way have not broke the Engagement, [but that] the other dividingk [cannot be] a keeping of the Engagement. And those that do [so] judge the one [and the other, will concur with me when I say], I do not think that we have been fairly dealt with.
I do not make any great wonder that this gentleman hath sense above all men in the world. But for these things, he is the man that hath undertaken [the drawing-up of] them all. I say, this gentleman hath the advantage of us [on the question of engagements]: he hath drawn up the most part of them; and whyl may hem not keep a sense that we do not know of? If this gentleman had declared to us at first that this was the sense of the Army in dividing, and it was meant that men should not divide in opinions! To me that is a mystery.n It is a huge reflection, a taxing of persons,o and because I will avoid further reflections, I shall say no more.
Whereas you say the Agents did it, [it was] the soldiers did put the Agents upon these meetings. It was the dissatisfactions that were in the Army which provoked, which occasioned, those meetings, which you suppose tends so much to dividing; and the reason[s] of such dissatisfactions are because those whom they had to trust to act for them were not true to them.
If this be all the effect of your meetings to agree upon this paper, there is but one thing in this that hath not been insisted upon and propounded by the Army heretofore, [in the Heads of the Proposals, and] all along. Here it is put according to the number of inhabitants;a there according to the taxes. This says a period at such a day, the last of September; the other says a period within a year at most. [The Agreement says] that these have the power of making law, and determining what is law, without the consent of another. ’Tis true the Proposals said not that [but would restore the consent of the King]. And for my part, if any man will put that to the question whether we shall concur with it, I am in the same mind [still, especially] if [by your franchise] you put it in any other hands than [of] those that are free men. But [even] if you shall put the questionb with that limitation [to free men] that hath been all along acknowledged by the Parliament, till we can acquit ourselves justly from any engagement, old or new, that we stand in, to preserve the person of the King, the persons of Lords, and their rights, so far as they are consistent with the common right [and the safety of the kingdom]—till that be done, I think there is reason [that] that exception [in their favour] should continue, [but with the proviso] which hath been all along, that is, where the safety of the kingdom is concerned. This the Proposalsc seem to hold out. I would hold to positive constitution where I [see things] would not do real mischief.d I would neither be thought to be a wrong-doer or disturber; so long as I can with safety continue a constitution I will do it.e And therefore where I find that the safety of the kingdom is not concerned, I would not for every trifling [cause] make that this shall be a law, though neither the Lords, who have a claim to it, nor the King, who hath a claim to it, will consent. But where this [safety] is concerned [I think that particular rights cannot stand]. Upon the whole matter let men but consider [whether] those that have thus gone away to divide from the Army [will not destroy the constitution upon a fancied right and advantage of the people]. Admit that this Agreement of the People be the advantage, it may be.f Shall weg [then] agree to that without any limitation? I do agree that the King is bound by his oath at his coronationa to agree to the law that the Commons shall choose without Lords or anybody else.d [But] if I can agree any further, that if the King do not confirm with his authority the laws that the people shall choose [those laws require not his authority], we know what will follow.
I had the happiness sometimes to be at the debate of the Proposals, and my opinion was then as it is now, against the King’s vote and the Lords’. But [I did] not [then] so [definitely desire the abolition of these votes] as I do [now] desire [it; for] since [that time] it hath pleased God to raise a company of men that do stand up for the power of the House of Commons, which is the Representative of the people, and deny the negative voice of King and Lords. For my part I was much unknown to any of them, bute I heard their principles; and hearingi their principles I cannot but join with them in my judgment, for I think it is reasonable that all laws are made by their1 consent [alone]. Whereas you seem to make the King and Lords so light a thing as that it may bef without prejudiceg [to keep them, though] to the destruction of the kingdom to throw them out;j for my part I cannot but think that both the power of King and Lords was ever a branch of tyranny. And if ever a people shall free themselves from tyranny, certainly it is after seven years’ war and fighting for their liberty. For my part [I think that] if the constitution of this kingdom shall be established as formerly, it might rivet tyranny into this kingdom more strongly than before. For when the people shall hear that for seven years together the people were plundered, and [that] after they had overcome the King and kept the King under restraint, at last the King comes in again,h then it will rivet the King’s interest; and so when any men shall endeavour to free themselves from tyranny we may do them mischief and no good. I think it’s most just and equal, since a number of men have declared against it, [that] they should be encouraged in it, and not discouraged. And I find by the Council that their thoughts are the same against the King and Lords, and if so be that a power may be raised to do that, it would do well.
Truly, sir, I being desired by the Agents yesterday to appear at council or committees either, at that time [in their behalf], I suppose I may be bold to make known what I know of their sense, and a little to vindicate them in their way of proceeding, and to show the necessity of this way of proceeding that they have entered upon. Truly, sir, as to breaking of engagements, the Agents do declare their principle, that whenever any engagement cannot be kept justlya they must break that engagement. Now though it’s urged they ought to condescend to what the General Council do [resolve], I conceive it’s true [only] so long as it is for their safety. I conceive [it’s] just and righteous for them to stand up for some more speedy vigorous actings. I conceive it’s no more than what the Army did when the Parliament did not only delay deliverance, but opposed it. And I conceive this way of their appearing hath not beenb in the least way anything tending to division, since they proceed to clear the rights of the people; and so long as they proceed upon those righteous principles [for which we first engaged], I suppose it cannot be laid to their charge that they are dividers. And though it be declared [that they ought to stand only as soldiers and not as Englishmen], yetc the malice of the enemies would have bereaved you of your liberties as Englishmen, [and] therefore as Englishmen they are deeply concerned to regard the due observation of their rights, [and have the same right to declare their apprehensions] as I, or any commoner, have right to propound to the kingdom my conceptions [of] what is fit for the good of the kingdom. Whereas it is objected, ‘How will it appear that their proceedings shall tend for the good of the kingdom?’ thatd matter is different [from the point of justice they would propound]. Whereas it was said before, it was propounded [in the Council, that] there must be an end to the [present] Parliament [and] an equality as to elections. I find it to be their minds [also; but] when they came there, they found many aversions from matters that they ought to stand to as soldiers ande as Englishmen, and therefore, I find, it [was discovered that there was a difference] concerning the matter of the thing, [and] I conceive it to be a very vast difference in the whole matter of [the] Proposals. [By it] the foundation of slavery was riveted more strongly than before—as where the militia is instated in the King and Lords, and not in the Commons, [and] there [too] is a foundation of a future quarrel constantly laid. However, the main thing was that the right of the militia was acknowledgedf to be in the King,g [as] they found in the Proposals propounded,h before any redress of any one of the people’s grievances [or] any one of their burdens; and [the King was] so to be brought in as with a negative voice, whereby the people and Army that have fought against him when he had propounded such things, [would be at his mercy]. And finding [this], they perceived they were, as they thought, in a sad case; for they thought, he coming in thus with a negative [voice], the Parliament are but as so many ciphers, so many round O’s, for if the King would not do it, he might choose, Sic volo, sic jubeo, &c., and so the corrupt party of the kingdom must be so settled in the King. The godly people are turned over and trampled upon already in the most places of the kingdom.a I speak but the words of the Agents,b and I find this to be their thoughts. But whereas it is said, ‘How will this paper provide for anything for that purpose?’ I shall say that this paper doth lay down the foundations of freedom for all manner of people. It doth lay the foundations of soldiers’ [freedom], whereas they found a great uncertainty in the Proposals, [which implied] that they should go to the King for an Act of Indemnity, and thus the King might command his judges to hang them up for what they did in the wars, because, the present constitution being left as it was, nothing was law but what the King signed, and not any ordinance of Parliament [without his consent]. And considering this,c they thought it should be by an Agreement with the people, whereby a rule between the Parliament and the people might be set, that so they might be destroyed neither by the King’s prerogative nor Parliament’s privileges ([including those of the Lords, for] they are not bound to be subject to the laws as other men, [and that is] why men cannot recover their estates). They thought there must be a necessity of a rule between the Parliament and the people, so that the Parliament should know what they were entrusted with,d and what they were not; and that there might be no doubt ofk the Parliament’s power, to lay foundations of future quarrels. The Parliament shall not meddle with a soldier after indemnity [if] it is [so] agreed amongst the people; whereas between a parliament and [a] king [the soldier may lose his indemnity]. If the King were not under restraint [his assent might be made to bind him. But if the present Parliament] should make an Act of Indemnity, whoe [shall say that] another Parliament cannot alter this? [An Agreement of the People would be necessary], that these foundations might be established, that there might be no dispute between Lords and Commons, andf [that], these things being settled, there should be no more disputes [at all], but that the Parliament should redress the people’s grievances. Whereas now almostg all are troubled with [the] King’s interests, if this were settled the Parliament should be free from these temptations.h And besidesi —which for my own part I do suppose to be a truthj —this very Parliament, by the King’s voice in this very Parliament, may destroy [us], whereas [then] they shall be free from temptations and the King cannot have an influence upon them [such] as he nowa hath.
Gentlemen, I think there is no man is able to give a better account of the sense of the Agents, and so readily; he hath spoke so much as they have in their book, and therefore I sayb he is very well able to give their sense.c I wish their sensed had [not only] not been prejudicial to other men’s senses, but, ase I fear it will prove, really prejudicial to the kingdom [as well], how plausiblyf soever it seems to be carried. That paper of The Case of the Armyg doth so abuse the General and General Council of the Army, [stating] that such and such things have been done that made them do thus and thus, [that I cannot leave it unanswered]. First as to the material points of the paper. You know as to the business of the Lords, the way we were then in admitted no other [course]. This gentleman that speaks here, and the other gentleman that spake before, when we were at Reading framing the Proposals [they] did not think of this way. I am sure they did not think of this way; and according to the best judgments of those that were entrusted by the General Council to draw up the Proposals, it was carried by a question clearly, that we should not [adopt such a way]. In these Proposals our business was to set forth particulars; we had set forth general declarations, which did come to as much in effect as this; the thing then proposed was that we should not take away the power of the Lords in this kingdom, and it was [so] concluded in the Proposals. But as to the King we were clear. There is not one thing in the Proposals, nor in what was declared, that doth give the King any negative [voice]. And therefore that’s part of the scandal amongst others: we do not give the King any negative voice; we do but take the King as a man with whom we have been at a difference; we propound terms of peace. We do not demand that he shall have no negative, but we do not say that he shall have any. There’s another thing: we have, as they say, gone from our engagements in our declarations in that we go in the Proposals to establish the King’s rights before [taking away] the people’s grievances. In our general declarations1 we first desire a purging of this Parliament, a period [to be set] forh this Parliament, and provision for the certainty of future Parliaments; and if the King shall agree in these things and what [things] else the Parliament shall propound, that are necessary for the safety of the kingdom, then we desire his rights may be considered so far as may consist with the rights of the people. We did so [speak] in the declarations, and you shall see what we did in the Proposals. In the Proposals, [we put first] things that are essential to peace, and it distinguishes those from the things that conduce to our better being, and things that lay foundations of an hopeful constitution in the future. When those are passed, then wei say that, ‘these things having the King’s concurrence, we desire that his right may be considered.’ There were many other grievances and particular matters [of] which we did not think [it] so necessary that they should precede the settling of a peace, [the lack of] which is the greatest grievance of the kingdom. Our way was to take away that [first]. Then we say there, [after] propounding what things we thought in our judgmentsa to be essential and necessary as to peace,b ‘Yet we desire that the Parliament would lose no time from the consideration of them.’ These gentlemen would say now [that] we have gone from our declarations, that we propose the settling of the King [first, because] it stands before those grievances. We say, those grievances are not so necessary [to be remedied] as that the remedying of them should be before the settling of the peace of the kingdom. What we thought in our consciences to be essential to the peace of the kingdom we did putj preceding to the consideration of the King’s personal right; and the concurrence of [the King to] those is a condition without which we cannot have any right at all, and without [which] there can be no peace, and [we] have named [it] beforec the consideration of the King’s rights in the settling of a peace, as a thing necessary to the constitution of a peace. That, therefore, [to say] we should prefer the King’s rights before a general good, was as unworthy and as unchristian an injury as ever was done [by any] to men that were in society with them, andd merely equivocation. But it was told you, that the General Council hath seemed to do so and so, to put the soldiers out of the way.e It is suggested that the Engagement is broken by our dividing to quarters; and whether that be broken or notf in other things,g it is said that the General Council hath broken the Engagement in this: that whereas before we were not a mercenary army, now we are. Let any man but speak what hath given the occasion of that. It hath been pressed by some men that we should [not] have subjected [our propositions] to the Parliament, and we shouldh stand to the propositions whatever they were; but the sense of the General Council was this: that, as they had sent their propositions to the Parliament,g they would see what the Parliament would do before they would conclude what themselves would do; and that there was respect [to be had] to that which we have hitherto accounted the fundamental council of the kingdom. If all the people to a man had subscribed to this [Agreement], then there would be some security to it, because no man would oppose [it]; but otherwise our concurrence amongst ourselves is no more than our saying [that] ourselves we will be indemnified.a Our indemnity must be [owed] to something that at least we will uphold, and we see we cannot hold [the Army] to be a conclusive authority of the kingdom.b For that [charge] of going to the King for indemnity, we propose[d] an Act of Oblivion only for the King’s party; we propose[d] for ourselves an Act of Indemnity and Justification. Is this the asking of a pardon?c Let us resort to the first petition of the Army, wherein we all were engaged once, which we made the basis of all our proceedings. In that we say, that [we wish] an ordinance might be passed, to which the royal assent might be desired; but we have [since] declared that, if the royal assent could not be had, we should account the authority of the Parliament valid without it. We have desired, in the General Council, that for security for arrears we might have the royal assent. And let me tell you (though I shall be content to lose my arrears to see the kingdom have its liberty —if any man can do it—unless it be by putting our liberty into the hands of those that will give it away when they have done [with it]; but I say whatf I do thinkg true in this): Whoever talks either of [arrears gained by] the endeavours of the soldiers or of any other indemnity [won] by the sword in their hands, is [for] the perpetuating of combustions; so that word cannot take place [of], and does not suppose, the settling of a peace by that authority which hath been herei the legislative power of the kingdom, and he that expects to have the arrears of the soldiers so, I think he does but deceive himself. For my own part I would give up my arrears, andj lose my arrears, if we have not [first a] settlement; no arrears [n]or [any] want of indemnity, nor anything in the world, shall satisfy me to have a peace upon any terms wherein that which is really the right of this nation is not as far provided for as can be provided for by men. I could tell you many other particulars wherein there are divers gross injuries done to the General and [the] General Council, and such a wrong [done them] as is not fit to be done among Christians, and so wrong and so false [a design imputed to them] that I cannot think that they have gone so far in it.
I do not know what reason you have to suppose I should be so well acquainted with The Case of the Army, and the things proposed [in it]. I conceive them to be very good and just. But for that which I give as their sense, which you are pleased to say are scandals cast upon the Army. The legislative power had been acknowledged [hitherto] to be in the King with [the] Lords and Commons; anda considering that, and what [indeed] you said before was a[nother] scandal [laid upon you], that you propounded to bring in the King with his negative voice, [you seem to restore him to his controlling part in the legislative power. For] I do humbly propound to your consideration [that] when you restrain the King’s negative in one particular [only], which is in [your] restraining unequal distributing,b you doc say the legislative power to be now partly in him. And [indeed you] say directly, in these very words, [that he] ‘shall be restored to his personal rights.’ And therefore I conceive (if I have any reason) [that] the King is proposed to be brought in with his negative voice. And whereas you say it is a scandal for [us to assert that you would have] the King to come in with his personal rights [before the grievances of the people are redressed, it is said in the Proposals] that, the King consenting to those things, the King [is] to be restored to all his personal rights. There’s his restoration. Not a bare consideration what his rights are before the people’s grievances [are considered], but a restoration to his personal rights, these things being done. Is the Parliament not to lose their rights [by such a provision]? And for that of [asking the King’s consent to an Act of] Indemnity, I do not say [that] it was an asking of the King[’s] pardon; [but] it is rendering us up [without promise of future security, for the King is under constraint], and therefore it is null in law.d
The Lieutenant-General first moved, that every one might speak their experiences as the issue of what God had given in, in answer to their prayers.
Captain [Francis] Allen made a speech, expressing what experiences he had received from himself and from divers other godly people: that the work that was before them was to take away the negative voice of the King and Lords.
Captain [John] Carter expressed his experiences: that he found not any inclination in his heart (as formerly) to pray for the King, that God would make him yet a blessing to the kingdom.
Cowling made a speech expressing that the sword was the only thing that had from time to time recovered our right[s], and which he ever read in the word of God had recovered the rights of the people; that our ancestors had still recovered from the Danes and Normans their liberties, by the sword, when they were under such a slavery that an Englishman was as hateful then as an Irishman is now, and what an honour those that were noblemen thought it to marry their daughters to, or to marry the daughters of, any cooks or bakers of the Normans.
That he never observed that the recovery of our liberties which we had before the Normans was the occasion of our taking up arms, or the main quarrel; and that the Norman laws werea not slavery introduced upon us, but an augmentation of our slavery before. Therefore what was by some offered, I doubt, for those reasons I have given you, was not of God.1
A report from Colonel Lambert’s regiment that two horsemen, Agitators, came and persuaded them to send new Agitators, for that the officers had broken their engagements.2
[As] to that which hath been [heretofore] moved concerning the negative vote, or things which have been delivered [on that matter], in papers and otherwise, [some] may [indeed] present a real pleasing [of the King; but] I do not say that they have all pleased; for I think [it hath been made clear] that the King is king by contract; and I shall say, as Christ said, ‘Let him that is without sin cast the first stone,’ and mind [you of] that word of bearing one with another—it was taught us to-day. If we had carried it on in the Parliament, and by our power, without any thingsb laid on [us of] that kind, so that we could say that we were without transgression, I should then say it were just to cut off transgressors; but considering that we are in our own actions failing in many particulars, I think there is much necessity of pardoning of transgressors.
For the actions that are [now] to be done, and those that must do them, I think it is their proper place to conform to the Parliament, that first gave them their being; and I think it is considerable whether they do contrive to suppress the power [of the King and his party] by that power or no, if they do continue [their endeavour] to suppress them. And [indeed] how they can take the determination of commanding men, conducting men, quartering men, keeping guards, without an authority otherwise than from themselves, I am ignorant.a And therefore I think there is much [need] in the Army to conform to those things that are within their sphere. For those things that have been done in the Army, as this of [issuing] The Case of the Army Truly Stated, there is much in it useful, and to be condescended to; but I am not satisfied how far we shall [do well to] press [it]. Either they are a Parliament or no Parliament. If they be no Parliament they are nothing, and we are nothing likewise. If they be a Parliament, we are [not to proceed without them in our plan for settlement, but] to offer it to them.b If I could see a visible presence of the people, either by subscriptions or number, [I should be satisfied with it]; for in the government of nations that which is to be looked after is the affections of the people. And that, [if] I find [it],c would satisfyd my conscience in the present thing.
[Consider the case of the Jews.] They were first [divided into] families where they lived, and had heads of families [to govern them], and they were nexte under judges, and [then] they were under kings. When they came to desire a king they had a king, first elective, and secondly by succession. In all these kinds of government they were happyf and contented.g If you make the best of it, if you should change the government to the best of it, it is but a moral thing. It is but, as Paul says, ‘dross and dung in comparison of Christ’;1 and [I ask] why we shall so far contest for temporal things, thath if we cannot have this freedom [peacefully] we will venture life and livelihood for it. When every man shall come to this condition [of mind], I think the state will come to desolation.i
Therefore the considering of what is fit for the kingdom does belong to the Parliament, [provided they be] well composed in their creation and election. How far I shall [think we ought to] leave it to the [present] Parliament to offer it, [will depend on their willingness to do so]. There may be care [had to secure a proper representation]. That the elections, or forms of [choosing the] Parliament, are very unequala [is evident], as I could name but one for a corporation to choose two. I shall desire that there may be a [common] form for the electing of Parliaments. And another thing [is]b the perpetuity of the Parliament;c that there is no assurance to the people but that it is [to be] perpetual, which does [not] satisfy the kingdom.d And for other things that are [subject] to the King’s negative vote [so] as [he thereby] may cast you off wholly, it hath been the resolution of the Parliament and of the Army [to safeguard these things]. If there be a possibility [then] of the Parliament’s offering those things unto the King, that may secure us, I think there is much may be said for the[ir] doing of it.
As for the present condition of the Army, I shall speak something of it. For the conduct of the Army, I perceive there are several declarations from the Armye calling rendezvous and otherwisef [containing] disobligations to the General’s orders. I must confess I have a commission from the General, and I understand that I am to do by it. I shall conform to him according to the rules and discipline of war, and according to those rules I ought to be conformable [to no orders but his]. And therefore I conceive it is not in the power of any particular men to call a rendezvous of a troop or regiment, or in [the] least to disoblige the Army from those commands of the General; which must be destructive to us in general or [to] everyg particular man in the Army.h This way is destructive to the Army, [I say], and to every particular man in the Army. I have been informed by some of the King’s party, that if they give us rope enough we will hang ourselves. [We shall hang ourselves] if we do not conform to the rules of war. And therefore I shall move [that] what we shall centre upon [must be the rules of war and our authority from the Parliament. We must not let go of that] if it have but the face of authority. [We are like a drowning man]: if it be but an hare swimming over the Thames, he will take hold of it rather than let it go.
That God hitherto hath been pleased to show us many mercies, [and proceeded to] the relation of God’s providence in bringing us from our march to London.
On Friday was a day for to seek God for direction in this work, and upon Saturday many were giving in their thoughts concerning what God had given in to them to speak, as to a cure for a dying kingdom. Truly amongst the rest my thoughts were at work. Providentially, my thoughts were cast upon one thing which I had often seen before, [which] yet, if prosecuted, may be the means of an happy union amongst us. That which I hint at, and which Ia would speak to, isbThe Case of the Army Stated. I do perceive that there is either a real or an apprehensive disunion amongst us, or rather a misapprehensive; and truly in my heart there was something providentially laid for a uniting, and that in that passage that those Agents—at that very time of dissenting from us, and when they were ripping up our faults to open view—in the issue came to lay us down [as] a rule, and that was [a thing] which before had been laid down as a rule, and we and they were to act according to it; but being laid down by them again, I think it is a twofold cord that cannot easily be broken. They do refer us to our three declarations,d of [the] fourteenth [of] June,1 [the] twenty-first of June, [the] eighteenth of August; and their desires are that those might be looked upon, and adhered unto; and if they be our desires, and theirs with them, and [if it be] their desiree that we should walk up to them, I think this will put the business to a very fair issue. I did look over for my part all [the] things [contained] in those three declarations. There, [I find], is [set forth] whatsoever we should persist in. And therefore I humbly desire that whatsoever [there] is in those declarations we may intend and pursue, as tending to that end we all aim at, namely the kingdom’s good.
Truly I do not know how to distinguish whether the Spirit of God lives in me or no, but by mercy, love, and peace; and on the contrary whether the spirit of Antichrist lives in me, but by envy, malice, and war. I am altogether against a war if there may be a composure [possible, so] that the Englishman may have his privileges. I have a commission ready to deliver up whensoever I shall be called.
Queries wherein Lieutenant-Colonel Jubbes desireth satisfaction for the preventing of the effusion of blood:
1. Whether or no the Parliament may yet be purged of all such members as assented to the late insurrections and treason of the City, and still continue a House?
2. If it may be purged, and an House still remaining,f whether the major part of the remainder be such persons as are desirous of giving satisfaction to our, or the kingdom’s, just desires?
3. If the second be assented unto, that they are such persons, whether then they may not satisfy our just desires, and declare the King guilty of all the bloodshed, vast expense of treasure, and ruin that hath been occasioned by all the wars both of England and Ireland, and then, for that he is the King of Scotland, and also of Ireland, as well as England, [whether they should not agree, after] that, therefore to receive him as King again for avoiding further wars?
4. Whether, if the Parliament may adjourn and dissolve when in their discretions they shall find cause (or not before), as at this present, even by law, God hath ordered it, they may not then reject the King’s Act of Oblivion, and take unto themselves that godly resolution to do that justice unto the kingdom which now they dare not do?
Rainborough moved that the papers of the committee might be read.
I think that motion which was made by the Lieutenant-General should not die, but that it should have some issue. I think it is a vain thing to seek God if we do not hearken after his answer, and something that was spoken by the Lieutenant-General moves me to speak at this time, anda upon this ground. Upon what was spoken by one here, it was concluded by the Lieutenant-General that that was not the mind of God that was spoken by him. I could wish we might be wary of such expressions. ‘There was a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahab’s prophets. He speaks falsely to us in the name of the Lord.’1 I do not speak this, that this [particular] was the mind of the Lord in anything; yet we may not break abruptly off,b [concluding] that what one spoke was [not] the mind of the Lord:c we must consider whether something was not spoken by others which may be the mind of the Lord. Truly I am very tender in this thing: if we shall wait for God, and if God shall speak to us [and we not hearken], we shall bring much evil upon ourselves. God hath spoken in several ages in sundry ways. [Of old] whend they sent to a prophet and he comes and tells them upon his bare word,e he tells them that he received such a message from the Lord. But God hath put us upon such a course which I cannot but reverence, and God does not now speak by one particular man, but in every one of our hearts; and certainly if it were a dangerous thing to refuse a message that came from one man to many,f it is a more dangerous thing to refuse what comes from God, being spoke by many to us. I shall add this: that it seems to me evident and clear that this hath been a voice from heaven to us, that we have sinned against the Lord in tampering with his enemies. And it hath so wrought with me that [though] I cannot run precipitately to work, yet I dare not open my mouth for the benefit or upholding [of] that [kingly] power.a I think that hath been the voice of God, and whatsoever was contradicted [by events] was [only] our precipitate running on, our taking hold of an opportunity before it was given. And therefore I desire we may not precipitately run on, but wait upon God, that in the issue we may not see that God hath [not] spoken to us; and if the Lord hath spoken to us I pray God keep us from that sin that we do not hearken to the voice of the Lord.
I shall not be unwilling to hear God speaking in any [man]; but I think that God may [as well] be heard speaking in that which is to be read, as otherwise.
But I shall speak a word in that which Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe said, because it seems to come as a reproof to me, and I shall be willing to receive a reproof when it shall be in love, and shall be [so] given, but [not otherwise]. That which he speaks was, that at such a meeting as this we should wait upon God, and [hearken to] the voice of God speaking in any of us. I confess it is an high duty, but when anything is spoken [as from God] I think the rule1 is, Let the rest judge!b It is left to me to judge for my own satisfaction, and the satisfaction of others, whether it be of the Lord or not, and I do no more. I do not judge conclusively, negatively, that it was not of the Lord, but I do desire to submit it to all your judgments, whether it was of the Lord or no. I did offer some reasons which did satisfy me—I know not whether theyc did others.d If in those things we do speak, and pretend to speak from God, there be mistakes of fact, if there be a mistake in the thing [or] in the reason of the thing, truly I think it is free for me to show both the one and the other, if I can. Nay, I think it is my duty to do it; for no man receives anything in the name of the Lord further than [to] the light of his conscience appears. I can say in the next place—and I can say it heartily and freely: as to the matter [of which] he speaks I must confess I have no prejudice, not the least thought of prejudice, upon that ground—I speak it truly as before the Lord. But this I think: that it is no evil advertisement, to wish us in our speeches of righteousness and justice to refer us to any engagements that are upon us, and [it is] that which I have learned1 in all [our] debates. I have still desired we shoulda consider where we are, and what engagements are upon us, and how we ought to go off as becomes Christians.b This is all that I aimed at and I do aim at. And I must confess I had a marvellous reverence and awe upon my spirit when we came to speak. [We said], let us speak one to another what God hath spoken to us; and, as I said before, I cannot say that I have received anything that I can speak as in the name of the Lord—not that I can say that anybody did speak that which was untrue in the name of the Lord, but upon this ground, that when we say we speak in the name of the Lord it is of an high nature.
Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe made an apology for what he had said before.
My desire is to see things put to an issue. Men have been declaring their thoughts, and truly I would crave liberty to declare mine. The difference between us, I think, is in the interest of King and Lords, some declaring against the name and title of King and Lords, [others preferring to retain them]. For my part [I think], clearly, according to what we have engaged we stand bound; and I think we should be looked upon as persons not fit to be called Christians, if we do not work up to them. As first, concerning the King. You say you will set up the King as far as may be consistent with, and not prejudicial to, the liberties of the kingdom; and really I am of that mind [too]. If the setting up of him be not consistent with them, and prejudicial to them, then down with him; but if he may be so set up—which I think he may—[then set him up], and it is not our judgment only, but of [all save] those that set forth The Case of the Army.
Rainborough took occasion to take notice as if what Mr. Allen spoke did reflect upon himself or some other there, as if [it were asserted that] they were against the name of King and Lords.
Truly I must be bold to offer this one word unto you.c Here was somewhat spoke of the workings and actings of God within us;d I shall speak a word of that. The Lord hath put you into a state, or at least [suffered you] to run you[rselves] into such a one, that you know not where you are. You are in a wilderness condition. Some actings among us singly and jointlye are the cause of it. Truly I would entreat you to weigh that.a We find in the word of God, ‘I would heal Babylon, but she would not be healed.’1 I think that we have gone about to heal Babylon when she would not. We have gone about to wash a blackamoor, to wash him white, which he will not. We are going about to set up that power which God will destroy: I think we are going about to set up the power of kings, some part of it, which God will destroy; and which will be but as a burdensome stone2 that whosoever shall fall upon it, it will destroy him.c I think this is the reason of the straits that are in hand.d I shall propose this to your Honours, to weigh the grounds, whether they be right, and then you shall be led in pleasant paths by still waters, and shall not be offended.f
I think we should not let go that motion which Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe made, and so I cannot but renew that caution that we should take heed what we speak in the name of the Lord.e As for what that gentleman spoke last, but [that] it was with too much confidence, I cannot conceive that he altogether meant it. I would we should all take heed of mentioning our own thoughts and conceptions with that which is of God. What this gentleman told us [was] that which [he conceived] was our great fault. He alludes to such a place of scripture: ‘We would have healed Babylon, but she would not.’ The gentleman applied it to us, as that weg had been men thath would have healed Babylon, and God would not have had her healed. Truly, though that be not the intent of that scripture, yet I think it is true that whosoever would have gone about to heal Babylon when God hath determined [to destroy her], he does fight against God, because God will not have her healed. And yet certainly in general to desire an healing, it is not evil, [though] indeed when we are convinced that it is Babylon we are going about to heal I think it’s fit we should then give over our healing.
But I shall desire to speak a word or two since I hear no man offering anythingi as a particular dictate from God [that he would] speak to us, [and] I should desire to draw to some conclusion of that expectation of ours. Truly, as Lieutenant-Colonel Goffe said, God hath in several ages used several dispensations, and yet some dispensations more eminently in one age than another. I am one of those whose heart God hath drawn out to wait for some extraordinaryj dispensations, according to those promises that he hath held forth of things to be accomplished in the later times, and I cannot but think that God is beginning of them.a Yet certainly [we do well to take heed], upon the same ground that we find in the Epistle of Peter, where he speaks of the scriptures, to which, says he, you do well to take heed [as] ‘a more sure word of prophecy’ than their testimonies were,b as a light shining in a dark place.1 If, when we want particular and extraordinary impressions, we shall either altogether sit still because we have them not, and not follow that light that we have, or shall go against, or short of, that light that we have, upon the imaginary apprehension of such divine impressions and divine discoveries in particular things—which are not so divine as to carry their evidence with them to the conviction of those that have the Spirit of God within them—I think we shall be justly under a condemnation. Truly we have heard many speaking to us; and I cannot but think that in many of those things God hath spoke to us. I cannot but think that in most that have spoke there hath been something of God laidc forth to us; and yet there haved been several contradictions in what hath been spoken. But certainly God is not the author of contradictions. The contradictions are not so much in the end as in the way. I cannot see but that we all speak to the same end, and the mistakes are only in the way. The end is to deliver this nation from oppression and slavery, to accomplish that work that God hath carried us on in, to establish our hopes of an end of justice and righteousness in it. We agree thus far. Further too: that we all apprehend danger from the person of the King and from the Lords—I think we may go thus far farther, that all that have spoke have agreed in this too, though the gentleman in the window2 [seemed to deny it] when he spoke [of] sett[ing] up, [but he], if he woulde declare it, did not mean all that that word might import. I think that seems to be general among us all, [that] there is not any intention of any in the Army, of any of us, to set up the one [or the other].f If it were free before us whether we should set up one or [the] other, I do to my best observation find an unanimity amongst us all, that we would set up neither. Thus far I find us to be agreed; and thus far as we are agreed. I think it is of God. But there are circumstances in which we differ as in relation to this. Then I must further tell you that as we do not make it our business or intention to set up the one or the other, so neither is it [our intention] to preserve the one or the other, with a visible danger and destruction to the people and the public interest. So that that part of difference that seems to be among us is whether there can be a preservation [of them with safety to the kingdom]. First of all, on the one part, there is this apprehension: that we cannot with justice and righteousness at the present destroy, or go about to destroy, or take away, or [altogether] lay aside, both, or all the interest they have in the public affairs of the kingdom; and those that do so apprehend would strain something in point of security, would rather leave some hazard—or at least, if they see that they may consist without any considerable hazard to the interest of the kingdom,a do so far [wish] to preserve them. On the other hand, those who differ from this, I do take it (in the most candid apprehension) that they seem to run thus: that there is not any safety or security to the liberty of the kingdom, and to [the] public interest, if you do retain these at all; and therefore they think this is a consideration to them paramount [to] the consideration of particular obligations of justice, or matter of right or due towards King or Lords. Truly I think it hath pleased God to lead me to a true and clear stating [of] our agreement and our difference. And if this be so, we are the better prepared to go [on]. If this be not so, I shall desire that any one that hath heard me [will] declare [it], if he do think that the thing is misstated as to our agreement or difference.b
I shall go on, only in a word or two, to conclude that we have been about. As to the dispensations of God, it was more particular in the time of the Law [of Moses than in the time of the law] written in our hearts, that word within us, the mind of Christ;1 and truly when we have no other more particular impression of the power of God going forth with us,c I think that this law and this [word] speaking [within us], which truly is in every man who hath the Spirit of God, we are to have a regard to. And this to me seems to be very clear, howd we are to judge of the apprehensione of men [as] to particular cases, whether it be of God or no. When it doth not carry its evidence with it, of the power of God to convince us clearly, our best way is to judge the conformity or disformity of [it with] the law written within us, which is the law of the Spirit of God, the mind of God, the mind of Christ. And as was well said by Lieutenant-Colonel Jubbes, for my part I do not know any outward evidence of what proceeds from the Spirit of God more clear than this, the appearance of meekness and gentleness and mercy and patience and forbearance and love, and a desire to do good to all, and to destroy none that can be saved. And for my part I say, where I do see this, where I do see men speaking according to this law which I am sure is the law of the Spirit of Life [I am satisfied. But] I cannot but take that to be contrary to this law, [which is], as he said, of the spirit of malice and envy, and things of that nature. And I think there is this radically in that heart where there is such a law as leads us against all opposition. On the other hand, I think that he that would decline the doing of justice where there is no place for mercy, and the exercise of the ways of force, for the safety of the kingdom, where there is no other way to save it, and would decline these out of the apprehensions of danger and difficulties in it, he that leads that way, on the other hand, doth [also] truly lead us from that which is the law of the Spirit of Life, the law written in our hearts. And truly having thus declared what we may apprehend of all that hath been said, I shall wish that we may go on to our business; and I shall only add several cautions on the one hand, and the other.a
I could wish that none of those whose apprehensions run on the other hand, that there can be no safety in a consistency with the person of the King or the Lords, or [in] their having the least interest in the public affairs of the kingdom—I do wishb that they will take heed of that which some men are apt to be carried away by, [namely] apprehensions that God will destroy these persons or that power; for that they may mistake in. And though [I] myself do concur with them,1 and perhaps concur with them upon some ground that God will do so, yet let us [not] make those things to be our rule which we cannot so clearly know to be the mind of God. I mean in particular things let us not make those our rules: that ‘this [is] to be done; [this] is the mind of God;c we must work to it.’ But at least [let] those to whom this is not made clear, though they dod think it probable that God will destroy them, yet let them make this [a] rule to themselves: ‘Though God have a purpose to destroy them, and though I should find a desire to destroy them—though a Christian spirit can hardly find it for itself—yet God can do it without necessitating us to do a thing which is scandalous, or sin, or which would bring a dishonour to his name.’ And therefore those that are of that mind, let them wait upon God for such a way when the thing may be done without sin, ande without scandal too. Surely what God would have us do, he does not desire we should step out of the way for it. This is the caution, on the one hand, that we do no wrong to one or other, and that we abstain from all appearance of wrong, and for that purpose avoid the bringing of a scandal to the name of God, and to his people upon whom his name is bestowed.a On the other hand, I have but this to say: that those who do apprehend obligations lying upon them—either by a general duty or particularly in relation to the things that we have declared, a duty of justice, or a duty in regard of thebEngagement—that they would clearly come to this resolution, that if they found in their judgments and consciences that those engagements led to anything which really cannot consist with the liberty and safety and public interest of this nation,c they would account the general [duty] paramount [to] the other, so far as not to oppose any other that would do better for the nation than they will do.h If we do act according to that mind and that spirit and that law which I have before spoken of, and in these particular cases dod take these two cautions, God will lead us to what shall be his way, and [first] as many of us ase shall incline their minds to [him], and the rest in their way in a due time.
I shall desire to speak one word, and that briefly.f After many inquiries in my spirit what’s the reason that we are distracted in counsel, and that we cannot, as formerly, preserve the kingdom from that dying condition in which it is, I find this answer, the answer which is [vouchsafed] to many Christians besides, amongst us. I say [it] not in respect of any particular persons, [but] I say [that the reason is] a compliance to preserve that man of blood, and those principles of tyranny, which God from heaven by his many successes [given] hath manifestly declared against, and which, I am confident, may [yet] be our destruction [if they be preserved]. I only speak this [as] what is upon my spirit, because I see you are upon inquiry what God hath given in to any one, which may tend to the preservation of the kingdom.
I observe that the work hath been to inquire what hath been the mind of God, and every one speaks what is given in to his spirit. I desire as much as is possible to reverence whatsoever hath the Spirit or Image of God upon it. Whatever another man hath received from the Spirit, that man cannot demonstrate [it] to me but by some other way than merely relating to me that which he conceives to be the mind of God. [In spiritual matters he must show its conformity with scripture, though indeed] it is beyond the power of the reason of all the men on earth to demonstrate the scriptures to be the scriptures written by the Spirit of God, anda it must be the spirit of faith [in a man himself] that must [finally] make him believe whatsoever may be spoken in spiritual matters. [The case is] yet [more difficult] in civil matters; [for] we cannot find anything in the word of God [of] what is fit to be done in civil matters. But I conceive that only is of God that does appear to be like unto God—[to practise] justice and mercy, to be meek and peaceable. I should desire therefore that we might proceed only in that way, if it please this honourable Council, to consider what is justice and what is mercy, and what is good, and I cannot but conclude that that is of God. Otherwise I cannot think that any one doth speak from God when he says what he speaks is of God.
But to the matter in hand. I am clearly of opinion with that gentleman that spake last save one, that it is not of God [to decline the doing of justice] where there is no way left of mercy; and I could much concur that it is very questionable whether there be a way left for mercy upon that person that we now insist upon. [I would know]b whether it is demonstrable by reason or justice,c [that it is right] to punish with death those that according to his command do make war, or those that do but hold compliance with them, and then [to say] that there is a way left for mercy for him who was the great actor of this, and who was the great contriver of all? But I confess because it is in civil matters I would much decline that, and rather look to what is safety, what the mind doth dictate from safety. What is [for] the safety [of the people], I know it cannot be the mind of God to go contrary to [that]. But for what particulars that gentleman speaks, of the difference[s] between us, I think they are so many as not easily to be reckoned up.d That which he instanced was that some did desire to preserve the person of the King and person[s] of the Lords, so far as it was [consistent] with [the] safety or the good of the kingdom, and other persons do conceive that the preservation of the King or Lords wase inconsistent with the people’s safety, and that law to be paramount [to] all [considerations].
Sir, I [think he] did not speak of the destroying of the King and Lords—I have not heard any man charge all the Lords so as to deserve a punishment—but [of] a reserving to them any interest at all in the public affairs of the kingdom.
Then, sir, as I conceive, you were saying the difference was this: that some persons were of opinion that [they stood engaged to] the preservation of the power of King and Lords, [while others held that the safety of the people] was paramount to all considerations, and might keep them from any giving them what was [their] due and right.
I [think it was] said that [while] some men did apprehend that there might be an interest given to them with safety to the kingdom, others do think that no part of their interest could be given without destruction to the kingdom.
For the matter of stating the thing in difference, I think that the person of King and Lords are not so joined together by any; for as yourself said, none have any exception against the persons of the Lords or name of Lords. But the difference is whether we should alter the old foundations of our government so as to give to King and Lords that which they could never claim before. Whereas it’s said that those that dissent1 look after alteration of government, I do rather think that those that do assenta do endeavour to alter the foundations of our government, and that I shall demonstrate thus. According to the King’s oath he is to grant such laws as the people shall choose,b and therefore I conceive they are called laws before they come to him. They are called laws that he must confirm, and so they are laws before they come to him.c To give the King a legislative power is contrary to his own oath at his coronation, and it is the like to give a power to the King by his negative voice to deny all laws.d And for the Lords, seeing the foundation of all justice is the election of the people, it is unjust that they should have that power. And therefore I conceive the difference only is this: whether this power should be given to the King and Lords or no.
For the later part of that noble gentleman’s words, this may be said to them: whether this consideration may [not] be paramount to all engagements, to givee the peoplef what is their due right.
The question is not, whether this should be given to King and Lords, or no; but the question is: whether that interest that they have in this (if they have any), whether it should be now positively insisted upon to be clearly taken away.
Sir, I suppose that the interest they have, if they have any—if (for that supposition is very well put in)—for (as I said before) I conceive that neither King nor Lords according to the foundation of government ever had a right—
I spake it to you, and those that are of your mind, if you were [not] satisfied not to have an exception.
Then, I say, the whole tenor of the propositions or proposals must be altered, if anything be in them [allowing the King a negative voice]. I conceive, thus not to express it, because it hath been usurped, is to confirm his usurpation of it. For many years this hath been usurped. Now, if after God hath given us the victory over them we shall not declare against them, we give no security for the people’s liberty.
You speak part to the point of justice and part to the point of safety. To the point of justice you seem to speak this: that by the fundamental constitutions of this kingdom, neither King nor Lords have rightfully a negative voice; and therefore to take it away, or to clear it that they have none, is but justice. I think that is it: that [by] the fundamental constitutiona [neither of them can claim a voice, and so it should be given to] neither of them.b
You seem to argue only from the King’s oath. And then you conclude: if, as it appears by that, they had it not before, though we all be satisfied [that] we would say nothing to give them it, yet if we do not expressly take it away—nay, if we do sendc a proposald to any of them [to know their opinion]—we do leave to them a power to assent or dissent, and give them that which we had before—
Sir,e you well remember that that which you argue of the King’s oathf —
And I know for my own part no other [evidence] than an old statute or two cited in the declaration wherein the Commons declare, [with reference to the coronation oath, the form of the King’s withholding of assent, and the custom of Parliament, the extent of their own, and the limits of his, legislative power].1
I remember I spoke it, and I speak it again, andg that thish is the intent, I do verily believe: that the original sense and intention of the oath of the King’s which is published in that declaration of the Commons was, and is, and ought to be, that the King ought to confirm those laws that the Commons choose. Now whether this King be so bound by his oath as that he breaks his oath if he do not confirm every law that they seek, I conceive that depends upon what he did verily at his coronation make his oath; but I think that in the sense and intention of the people of the kingdom,a their intention was that he should confirm all the laws that they should choose. But you must take notice that the oath doth take them [as] laws before he should make them: it calls them laws, the laws in election, quas vulgus elegerit. The King promises that he will by his authority confirm those laws that the people shall choose, so that this shows clearly what use, in the constitution of the kingdom, they made of the King in the commonwealth. The Commons are to choose the laws and the King to confirm. They had this [to] trust to: the King would confirm what they should choose, and, he confirming them, they were firm laws. I do really believe that this was the agreement that the people of England made with their Kings; that is, they would have him give his consent to what laws they should choose, and so to have that implicit use [of him]. But this is most apparent, both by the oath itself, and by all the practice sinceb —the sending of laws to the Kingc —that they had someg relation to the King and to his consentd in the making of a law.e This I am sure: if it were never so clear in the constitution that they were good laws without it, yet this is clear—if that were true in the original constitution of this kingdom this is clear—that they have [been] sent still to him to be confirmed; as the word was to be confirmed or corroborated, Leges [quas vulgus elegerit] cor[roborandas].f
And I think: if we do [take into] account all the sending of laws heretofore to be corroborated by him, and if his denying of some of them—not absolutely denying but advising—if these have not at all prejudiced [the right of] the people against his negative voice, so the sending of propositions now for his assent cannot prejudice the right of the people more than all their sending [laws to him] before. If we should put it to the King as his act, [yet] the Parliament have declared it and asserted it, that it is their right that the King ought not to deny any [laws they offer to him]; it is his oath. They have gone thus much farther, that if he did not confirm them they were laws without him. Upon this there hath been a war made. They have gone [so far as] to make all laws and ordinances that were needful for the management of the affairs of the kingdom, without the King. It is now come to a period. So that de facto it is thus they have made laws, and held them forth to the kingdom [as laws]. Now if the King by his act do confirm what the Parliament have done, and condemn all that hatha been [done] against the Parliament, [I ask] whether he do not acknowledge to all posterity, that in case of safety, when the Parliament doth adjudge the safety of the kingdom to be concerned, they are to makeb a law without him. For my part I think there can be nothing more clear than this is. For my own particular, I do apprehend that there is that general right [in the Parliament], that the laws [it shall pass] ought to be confirmed [by the King]; and that is my thought,c that without anything of the King’s declaration to that purpose,d [and] thoughe they cannot dispense with the suspending [power] of the King,f they are,g in point of safety,h a law without him. This the Parliament hath declared, and this is asserted in all the declarations that have been sent out, and [this is] the ground that I have proceeded [on] in those Proposals of the Army. Thati ‘in a case of safety’ was provided for, in those matters that I have spoke of. I account them materially and essentially provided for in those; and if I had not, for my part I should never have rested or been satisfied in that point, and in other points [where] there might have been a dispensingj with a suspending [power], notwithstanding [that] the liberty of the kingdom hath been provided for in this, that there should not be anything done, or laws made, without the consent of the people.
I think if so be that this business of the negative voice be all the dispute, we shall all agree in it; fork it appeared by what you spake the other night, that he ought to have his negative voice taken away.
The Scots have made provision that he should have no negative voice among them, and why should not we make the same provision with them?
Those things that the committee did propose, and [that] they proceeded in last night,1 will almost end us this dispute.l Whereas it was desired that we should take into considerationm the several heads to be insisted upon as fundamental laws that we must stand [to] for the establishing of the kingdom, [we were also to consider the previous declarations of the Army, how far] they are still [binding, and adequate] in relation to the security of the kingdom.
The Proposal[s of the Committe] read1 [by Ireton, with numerous interruptions by Wildman, some of which, with Ireton’s rebuke, are reported]:2
I conceive [that in] this concerning the succession of Parliaments [it] is proposed positively that it shall be as triennial Parliaments were.
[Tell me whether] you did in your way propose a certainty or not. If you did not propose it, the Act for Triennial Parliaments [which in its general purport] says the same [thing, supplies the defect. Observe] how far that which you propose is [from certainty]: the people shall meet, [but] you neither say where nor when. We say, [with such provision] for the certainty of it [as] in [the late Act made for Triennial Parliaments]; that Act tells you particularly. But because you must make a new provision for it, since you must make a new division and distribution of the kingdom and a new circuit,a therefore it says, ‘with such further provision as shall be made for reducement [of it] to a certainty.’
That he does take exception at [the proposal] that no man should be chosen [as a representative] that hath not twenty pounds a year.
Though I protest I would not widen a difference, yet I conceive the difference is as wide as ever. In what’s there provided for,c [the interest of the people] is laid aside, [and] the interest of the King and Lords, which the Lord by a judgment from heaven hath given away, [is restored].d
If Mr. Wildman think fit to [let me] go on without taking an advantage [to object] to every particular as it is read, [he may show afterwards] what [things] they are that do render these propositions so destructive and [that] give the King and Lords such an interest as they never had before—if he will take them upon his memory and [not] by the way.
I only affirm that it doth establish the King’s and Lords’ interest surer than before.
I hope Mr. Wildman will not offer such an assertion but he hath arguments to make it good.f
I would proceed to the things in hand.h
That some things in the Agreement were granted there. [He moved]: To debate whether or no, when the Commons’ Representative do declare a law, it ought not to pass without the King’s [or the Lords’] consent.
Truly this is all [that question amounts to]: whether, honour, title, estate, liberty, or life, [if] the Commons have a mind to take it away by a law, [they may do so]; so that to say you are contented to leavei King and Lordsj all, this [negative] being taken away, is as much as to say you are to allow them nothing. Consider how much of this dispute is saved [by] this that is read to you. It gives the negative voice to the people, that no laws can be made without their consent. And secondly, it takes away the negative voice of the Lords and of the King too, as to what concerns the people; for it says that the Commons of England shall be bound by what judgments and also [by] what orders, ordinances, or laws, shall be made for that purpose by theira [representatives]; and all that follows for the King or Lords is this, that the Lords or King are not bound by that law they pass, unless they consent to it for their own persons or estates, as the Commons are. Therefore what [more] is there wanting for the good or safety of the Commons of England?
If the negative voice be taken away [on these terms], then if the King or Lords were taking courses destructive, how should they be prevented?
It is further provided, if they will meddle in any other offices, asi officers of justice or ministers of state in this kingdom, then they likewise are so far subject to the judgment of the House of Commons. If they only stand as single men, their personal interest and the like [is secured], and the right of being only judged by their peers, andc their individual persons [are not bound] by any law that they do not consent to.
If the Lords should join together by their interest in the kingdom, and should act against the Commons, then the Commons had no way to help themselves.
If it comes to a breach of the peace it will come to break some law. The Lords heretofore,d [as] to the breaches of peace, have been subject to the common law; only [as] to the matter of fact, whether guilty or not guilty, they must be tried by their peers. We have stood very much for ourselves, that we should be judged by our peers,e by our fellow Commoners; I would fain know this: [since] that a Lord is subject to the common law, how we can take away that right of peers tof be for the matter of fact, whether guilty or not guilty of the breach of such a law,g tried by their peers, when that it is a point of right for the Commons to be tried by their peers.
[It seems then] that the laws that bind the Commons are exclusive ofh the Lords.
I would fain know this: whether the high sheriff in every county of the kingdom [may not apprehend a Lord who shall break the peace]. And I am sure the law hath [thereby] provided for the keeping of the peace. I know that there is no law but [that] the chief justice of the King’s Bench, nay the sheriff of a county, nay the constable of any town, may seize upon him.
If a petty constable or sheriff shall apprehend a peer of the kingdom, [I would know] whether he can answer it?
If a Lord shall be accused, and by a jury found guilty, he will expect to be tried by his peers.b
We do agree that all the Commons of England are bound [by whatever laws the House of Commons shall pass], but the King and Lords as to their persons are not bound; but if any of them be an officer or minister of state [—and the King is—] then he is to be subject [to the judgment of the House of Commons].
How does it reach the King, and not a Lord?
Every Lord is not a minister of justice [to be accountable to the Commons for his official acts], but if there be any other difference they are tried by their peers.
It is offered to make them capable of being chosen.
Every Baron, [not disqualified] by the other exception[s], may be chosen.1
Is it not so in Scotland?
In Scotland every Lord hath his place as burgess.
[I ask], why the Lords should not have the same privilege [to sit as a body with the Commons].
I should think [of] that as the directest [way to make their] interest [dangerous] to the kingdom, in the world; for that, for so many persons to be a permanent interest in the House, every two yearsd —
I was speaking to this of the negative, I do remember, on Saturday last. We were [then] at this pitch and there I did leave it, [for] it did concur with my sense—and that was this. That all the power of making laws should be in those that the people should choose; only the King and Lords should serve to this end, that laws should be presented to them, that if they would do the Commons that right as to confirm those laws, they should do it; but if they should not think fit to sign them, it should beget a review of that by the House of Commons; and if after a review the House of Commons did declare that was for the safety of the people, though neither King nor Lords did subscribe, yet it was a standing and binding law;a and therefore we shall not need to fear [and] to take [off] a shadow when they can do us [so] little hurt.b This was what I did then suppose agreed upon.
’Tis true, Saturday night we were thinking of that, but we had an eye to that of safety, that is provided for by the Commons. No money can be raised, no war raised, but by those that the Commons shall choose. And so we thought to put it to consideration, that the Commons should make so much use of the Lords in all affairs [that] they might occasion a review, but if the Commons should upon that review think it fit, it should be looked upon as a law. But instead of that the committee voted last night that (whether the Commons of England should be bound by all the laws passed in the House of Commons, or whether it should be valid, in the case of safety, [that] that which you speak of shouldc follow) if there do but continue such a thing as Lords, and they do not sit jointly with the House of Commons, then the Lords shall agree [to the laws that the Commons propose] or otherwise the Commons shall do it presently themselves.d But that which [was then proposed] was questioned in the name [of] the safety [of the Lords themselves], and [the] securing of [their] safety, [by those] that thought it fit that they should have a liberty to preserve one another.e
[Otherwise] if they be injured they have not a remedy.
That’s all that can be said. The question is, whether there be so much need of giving them a power to preserve themselves against the injuries of the Commons. They are not capable of judgment as to their persons unless it be as they are officers of state. Only the truth of it is, there is this seems to be taken away [by taking away their judicial power]: if a man do come and violently fall upon them in the court, or do any such thing, they have no power to preserve themselves, and all their way will be to complain to the House of Commons.
I conceive that whilst we thus run into such particulars there is very little probability of coming to satisfaction. The case, as there it is stated in the Agreement, is general; and it will never satisfy the godly people in the kingdom unless that all government be in the Commons, and freely. Truly, I conceive that according to what is there propounded the power of the House of Commons is much lessened—from what it is of right, not [from] what it is now by usurpation of King and Lords. Whereas it’s said that no law shall be made without the consent of the Commons, it doth suppose some other law-makers besides the Representative of the Commons. Whereas it is said that the Lords in some cases should sit as an House of Parliament to consent to laws, [this] doth give them that power which they never had before the wars; for as yourself said of the King’s oath, it says that the King shall consent to such laws as the people shall choose, but the Lords have no power.a If there be a liberty to the King to give them a title of honour, they ought to be under all laws, and so they ought to concern them as well as all others; which I conceive is diminished in those particulars. Besides, the general current of the whole offer runs that nothing shall be declared against that usurpation in the King formerly, nor in the Lords formerly, and so it remains perpetually dubious. They shall say, ‘Though it does not concern me in my private [capacity], yet it does in my politic’; and no law can be made but it must be sent to the King and Lords, and that must occasion a review; and so they must have recourse [to the King for their laws], to the unrighteous for righteousness, and so long as it is not clearly declared that he hath no power to deny it, and that they need not address themselves to him,b the kingdom cannot be in safety, but his own party may get up and do what he will.
This business is much heightened. Yetc I do not know, by all that hath been said, that the King or Lords are more fastened [on us] than before. We hear talk of laws by ancient constitution, and by usurpation, and yet I do not find that the gentleman that speaks of them doth show [any evidence] what was the ancient constitution, nor of [that] usurpation, but only [the evidence] of the King’s oath; and [from] that is drawn, as taking it for granted, that by ancient constitution there were laws without the King’s consent. For that [question of the oath], I did before clear [it] sufficiently by comparing that with other evidence; for if we could look upon that as an evidence paramount to all [other], that needed not [to] be so much insisted upon. But if this gentleman can find no law in being in this kingdom, which hath not Lords to it, and King to it, and expressly,a ‘Be it ordained by the King, Lords, and Commons’—if it always have gone so, and no interruption and no memory of any kind of proceeding to the contrary, but that all laws passed by the Commons have been sent to the Lords for their concurrence—[if] the Lords have [made amendments and] sent down [to the Commons] for their concurrence, they have had conferences, and [when they] could not agree, the Commons have let it rest and not insisted upon it: we must look upon these as evidences of what is constitution, together with that testimony of the King’s oath. [But] whereas those other things that are numerous and clear evidences doe in express terms relate to the Lords,j when I do consider the consequences of that oath, I do conclude either that the word vulgus is concludedb to comprehend all Lords and Commons; or else it is thus, that the two great powers of this kingdom are divided betwixt the Lords and Commons, and it is most probable to me that it was so: that the judicial power was in the Lords principally, and the House of Commons yet to have their concurrences, the legislative power principally in the Commons, and the Lords’ concurrences in practice to be desired. It is a clear and known thing that the House of Commonsc cannot gived an oath, by the constitution of the kingdom, but they must resort to the Lords if they will have an oath given. And then, besides, all the judges of [the] Common Law in the kingdom sit as assistants to the Lords. Upon this the practice hath been in any private cause wherein unjust sentence hath been given—it is beyond all record or memory—that [by] a writ of error that [which] hath been passed in another court may be judged here. So that these two powers, of the legislative power and the judicial, have been exercised between both Lords and Commons, and neitherf of them to exercise the one or the other without mutual consent.g I desire this gentleman, or any other that argues upon the other part [than] that we are upon—unless they will produce some kind of evidence of history upon record by law—that they will forbear arguments of that nature,h calling such things usurpationsi from constitution or from right, and [rather] insist upon things of common safety as supposing no constitution at all.
Contrary to resolution I must now speak—whether it be from the Lord or no, I know not. What foundation had the Commons of England to sitting (beinga four hundredb years in sitting)? For in King Henry the Third’s time, when Magna Charta was finished (which by computation was four hundredc years [ago]),d this was granted to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Edward, the son, was called to be a witness. But when the Lords saw that they were not strong enough to sit in that magnificence, the Commons were drawn in, and [it was contrived] that in that law [of] the King’s oath [they] should [also] come in. Now had it not been a fundamental law [before the Conquest] the Commons should not have been drawn up, but that they did drive up [now to support the Lords] is clear. And what will become of us if we drive up to no other purpose but to support a Norman prerogative? The Lord knoweth, not I.
I thought this gentleman had had some answer to this matter of history as to the Norman Conquest before, so as we should not seem to derive all our tyranny from the Norman Conquest. If subjection to a King be a tyranny, [we had a King before the Norman Conquest]; the question was between him and the Conqueror who had the right toe the crown. But I cannot but wonder at the strange inferences that are made. He tells us that there is no memory of the Commons’ having any interest in the legislative power till Edward the First’s time, and then [that] the Lords Spiritual and Temporalf found themselves not strong enough in King Henry the Third’s time, and therefore they brought them in, and yet [he] would certainly have us to believe that the Commons had all the right before [the Conquest].
In Alfred’s time, the Commons had all the power, and the King, before the Conquest, hanged forty-three [of the Lords Justices] in one year.1
[I observe] that the Commissary-General is willing to lay that of constitution aside, and that of custom aside, and [I think it well for us] to consider the equality and reasonableness of the thing, and not to stand upon [a] constitution which we have broken again and again. I do not find in all the reading that I have done—I do not know that ever the Commons made war with the King [till now, though] the Barons did. Yet,a besides the oath he found, [I would add] that one of the main articles against Richard the Second [was] that he did not concur with, and agree upon, those wholesome laws [which] were offered him by the Commons for the safety of the people. If that were so great a right as did depose him, it is in the kingdom [still], and therefore let us go to the justice of the thing. That justice and reason doth not give to the major part—
You would have us lay aside arguments of constitution, and yet you have brought the strongest that may be. I have seen the Articles of Richard the Second, and it is strange that the Parliament should not insist upon that.
That is not the thing that I would consider of.
I suppose no man will make a question that that may be justice and equity upon no constitution, which is not justice and equity upon a constitution. As for instance in the matter of a common, &c.
I wish but this, that we may have a regard to safety—safety to our persons, safety to our estates, safety to our liberty. Let’s have that as the law paramount, and then let us regard [the] positive constitution as far as it can stand with safety to these. Now therefore—thus for my part I confess it—if I should have ever given a consent in my heart to propound anything that did not consist with this, with regard to any constitution whatsoever, [I revoke it]; but for my part I cannot see that anything but safety is provided for.b Mr. Wildman says that many godly men would not be satisfied with this that we have read, which amounts to this: that the Commons have power to make laws for all the Commons of England, [and] that only the person of the King and [the] persons of the Lordsc as persons,d with their estates, are freed from them. [If this be so], I do not see [that] they are satisfied with anything without having a power over other men’s liberties.
Whereas you are pleased to say I produced no other evidence, Colonel Rainborough brought another. Because you did confess the Lords had no other power in making laws—
I never confessed it in my life, [otherwise] than [by] the recitation of that oath: ‘which the people shall choose.’
I could wish we should have recourse to principles and maxims of just government, [instead of arguments of safety] which are as loose as can be. [By these principles, government by King and Lords is seen to be unjust.]
The government of Kings,a or of Lords,b is as just as any in the world, is the justest government in the world. Volenti non fit injuria. Men cannot wrong themselves willingly, and if they will agree to make a King, and his heirs, [their ruler], there’s no injustice. They may either make it hereditary or elective. They may give him an absolute power or a limited power. Here hath been agreements of the people that have agreed with this. There hath been such an agreement when the people have fought for their liberty, and have established the King again.
’Twas their superstition, to have such an opinion of a great man.d
Any man that makes a bargain, and does find afterwards ’tis for the worse, yet is bound to stand to it.
They were cozened, as we are like to be.f
I would not have you talk of principles of just government when you hold that all governments that are set up by consent are just. [Argue instead that] such or such a way, that can consist with the liberty of the people. Then we shall go to clear reason. That’s one maxim, that all government must be for the safety of the people.
Let us keep to that business of safety. ’Tis upon the matter [of safety that the real power of making laws is vested] solely in the people [by] what hath been proposed. In that I give King and Lords [no more than an opportunity] to do me a courtesy if they will—
No courtesy.
It is only an opportunity—and [to] show themselves as willing as the Commons. Let us not fight with shadows.
We do not know what opportunity God will give us.b
If God will destroy King or Lords he can do it without our or your wrong-doing. If you [not only] take away all power from them, which this clearly does, but [do also] take away all kind of distinction of them from other men, then you do them wrong.c Their having [such] a distinction from other men cannot do us wrong. That you can do to the utmost for the[ir] safety is this: that a Lord or King may preserve his own person or estate free from the Commons. Now [I would know] whether this can be destructive to the Commons, that so few men should be distinct from a law made by the Commons, especially when we have laws made as to the preserving of the peace of the kingdom and preserving every man in his right. The King and Lords are suable, impleadable, in any court. The King may be sued, and tried by a jury, and a Lord may be sued, and tried per pares only, [as] a knight by esquires. What needs more, where there are such laws already that the King and Lords are so bound?
I conceive that the difference does not lie here, but whether the King shall so come in that the Parliament must make their addresses themselves unto him for [the confirmation of] everything they pass. Whether it be a shadow or no, I think it is a substance when nothing shall be made but by address to the King. This will be very shameful in future chronicles, that after so much blood there should be no better an issue for the Commons.
Do you think we have not laws good enough for the securing of [the] rights [of the Commons]?
I think [that] according to the letter of the law, if the King will, [he may] kill me by law.d Ask any lawyers of it: by the letter of the present law he may kill me, and forty more, and no law call him to account for it.
I think no man will think it.e When the King stands thus bound with so many lawsf about him, and all the Commons of England bound to obey what law they [by their representatives] do make, let any man guess whether the King, as he is a single person, will hazard himself to kill this, or that, or any other man.
It will be thought boldness in me [not] to agree. If God will open your hearts to provide so that the King may not do me injury, I shall be glad of it. If not, I am but a single man, I shall venture myself and [my] share in the common bottom.1
[1] i.e. the General Council of the Army, which also included representatives of the regiments.
[2] See Appendix, pp. 429-36. The committee referred to is one appointed at a meeting of the General Council of the Army on 22nd Oct.
[1] The uprights in a lath-and-plaster wall (Firth).
[1] i.e. 23rd September (Firth).
[1] Followed by blank in manuscript. The substance of the answer is probably contained in Two Letters from the Agents of the Five Regiments of Horse (28th October) and in the letters appended to the Agreement of the People (3rd November); see pp. 437-8, 445-9.
[1] A trooper whose name was at this point unknown to Clarke, but was later discovered to be Everard; i.e. Robert Everard, Agent of Cromwell’s Regiment.
[1] No blank follows in manuscript. This suggests that the answer read was the same as that read before, for which a blank was left. But the course of the debate suggests that what was here read was not an apology, but a set of proposals, probably those printed on 3rd and 4th November, as An Agreement of the People (see pp. 443-5).
[1]Solemn Engagement of the Army (pp. 401-3); see Case of the Army Truly Stated (pp. 429-32).
[1] Rainborough refers to his having been transferred to naval service.
[1] Perhaps the Agent from Whalley’s Regiment.
[1] From this point to the next long speech (by Cromwell, p. 23) the report is fragmentary. Some arguments, presumably springing from the Puritan distrust of outward forms, resulted in removing the projected prayer-meeting from the church to the Quartermaster-General’s lodgings. Probably also there were expressions of fear lest the officers should use the gathering to insinuate their own opinions in others. Cromwell protests against the spirit of antagonism, and later seems to reply to a specific charge.
[1] Wildman is paraphrasing the Representation of the Army (14th June 1647); see p. 404.
[1] By this title, a favourite with the Levellers, Wildman designates the proposals submitted in the name of the Agents.
[1] i.e., by his position there, to command and steer the ship.
[2] By citing Ireton’s own arguments from the Representation of the Army, Wildman has forced him to agree to the general validity of what he says.
[3] Cf. pp. 407-8.
[1] Maximilian Petty.
[1] i.e., Everard (Buff-Coat).
[1] Goffe’s purpose is to clear himself of the suspicion of having suggested the prayer-meeting with any ulterior object.
[2] The report of the meeting concludes with the names of the committee appointed (Cromwell, Ireton, Hammond, Deane; Colonels Rainborough, Rich, Scroope, Tomlinson, Overton, Okey, Tichborne, Sir Hardress Waller; Messrs. Sexby, Allen, Lockyer, Clarke, Stenson, Underwood), and with its terms of reference: ‘To confer with the Agitators of the five regiments, and such gentlemen as shall come with them, about the “Engagement” now brought in, and their own declarations and engagements.’ The Agitators, here mentioned, are the newly appointed Agents of the five regiments; the ‘Engagement’ is the set of proposals (otherwise referred to as the Agreement) handed in by the Agents. Here (and elsewhere) ‘Engagement’ is probably Clarke’s mistake.
[1] This identifies Everard as the ‘Buff-Coat’ of the previous debate.
[1]A Declaration of the Engagements, Remonstrances, Representations . . . of the Army, London, 1647 [Oct. 2].
[1] The Solemn Engagement of the Army, 5th June 1647; see pp. 401-3.
[1] Perhaps an error. Major Francis White had been expelled from the Council.
[1] Actuated.
[2] Characterized.
[1] See pp. 443-5.
[1] Possibly someone interrupts to object that now only the rich are chosen; see Rainborough, p. 67.
[1] Colonel Rich, p. 63.
[1] MS. too; but reference was probably to Cromwell and Ireton.
[1]Heads of the Proposals.
[2] The Agreement.
[1] See letter of John Saltmarsh, Appendix, pp. 438-9.
[1]Heads of the Proposals; see p. 422.
[1] See p. 430.
[1] i.e. the people’s.
[1] See the Representation of the Army; see also Heads of the Proposals and Wildman’s Putney Projects (pp. 403-9, 422-6, 426-9).
[1] Possibly this sentence is a detached fragment (or an echo) of an unreported speech of Cromwell’s; see Goffe, p. 100.
[2] This detached note is transposed from after Captain Allen’s speech, above. The debate then, apparently, turned to engagements, the legitimacy of the Army’s interference, and the treatment of the King.
[1] Philippians 3. 8.
[1] See Appendix, pp. 403-9.
[1] 1 Kings 22. 22; Jer. 43. 2.
[1] 1 Cor. 14. 29.
[1] i.e. taught (Firth).
[1] Jer. 51. 9; 13. 23.
[2] Zech. 12. 3; Matt. 21. 44.
[1] 2 Pet. 1. 19.
[2] Reference is to Allen (p. 102), or to someone whose speech is unrecorded.
[1] Heb. 8. 10; 1 Cor. 2. 16.
[1] I have not ventured to alter the text in a point so crucial. But the statement does not entirely harmonize with the tenor of Cromwell’s utterances in the Debates, and I suspect that what he said was: ‘And though [I] myself do concur with them, perhaps, upon some ground [of hope] that God will do so.’ The repetition of such a phrase as ‘concur with them’ is very common in the MS.
[1] Wildman has been criticizing a speech ascribed by MS. to Cromwell. Ireton evidently intervenes to explain Cromwell’s meaning. Wildman in reply addresses Cromwell, but Ireton, perhaps at a sign from Cromwell, continues to answer for him. This is the only assumption that does not make some change in the ascription of speeches necessary.
[1] i.e. to giving King and Lords a negative voice.
[1] Presumably Ireton refers to Parliament’s Third Remonstrance, 26th May 1642 (Husband’s Exact Collection of All Remonstrances, London, 1643, pp. 266 ff.). The words added pretend to be no more than a plausible completion of the sentence.
[1] There are no records of the meeting of the committee on Sunday, 31st October. Apparently it was concerned with completing the proposals now about to be read. See p. 113, note 1.
[1] Unfortunately these proposals are not copied into the report. Their nature may be fairly accurately deduced: (1) from what is said in the debate; (2) from the resolutions adopted by the committee on 2nd November, which presumably embody these proposals as modified by the debate and perhaps by subsequent discussion in the committee (see pp. 450-2). The question is complicated, however, by the fact that some of the ground covered in the resolutions reached by the committee on 30th October (see pp. 449-50) again comes up for debate here on lines different from those of the resolutions. It seems possible that the resolutions should all be recorded as of 2nd November, and that the earlier meetings were given over wholly to preparing the proposals here debated, some of which were dropped from the final resolutions owing to the opposition which they aroused. The proposals appear to have differed from the resolutions in the following points: (1) in more specifically exempting the Lords from the operation of laws to which they had not consented; (2) in the tentative proposal to make them eligible for election to the House of Commons (unless this was ‘offered’ not in the proposals, but in an unrecorded speech in the debate); (3) in adopting from the Heads of the Proposals, I. 1 (p. 422), a partial acceptance of the provisions of the Triennial Act (no word of this in Resolution 2 of 30th October, p. 449); (4) in suggesting a property qualification of £20 per annum for members of the House of Commons (absent from Resolution 5, of 30th October, pp. 449-50).
[2] The speeches, which obviously constitute a selection from the objections and replies made during the reading of the proposals, have somehow got themselves embedded in a later part of the report. The clue to their correct position is given by Ireton’s request to be allowed to proceed with the reading without interruption. For details regarding my transpositions, see ‘Notes on Text.’
[1] Lacking the proposals, one can only surmise the provision referred to. Possibly the ‘other exceptions’ are those listed as disqualifying persons to be electors or elected, in the committee’s fifth resolution (p. 450).
[1] Alfred’s hanging of forty-four justices (which has nothing to do with the Commons’ power) is cited (from Andrew Horne’s Mirror of Justice), in connection with the subject’s liberties, in Vox Plebis (1646).
[1] Report concludes: ‘Resolved, that the Council be adjourned till to-morrow, and so from day to day till the Proposals be all debated, and the same committee to meet again.’ The remaining debates are not reported in detail. The fragmentary reports are reprinted in the Appendix, where they are supplemented by the account given in A Letter from Several Agitators to their Regiments (11th November); see pp. 452-5.
[1. (a)]them.
[2. (a)]for;
[(b)] + labour’d to;
[(c)]hath;
[(d)]bee;
[(e)] + to;
[(f)] + and.
[3. (a)]as;
[(b-c)] tr Member of the House;
[(d)] + and.
[4. (a)]Rainborow (thus throughout);
[(b)]where;
[(c)] + to;
[(d)] + in relation to the Parliament.
[5. (a)] + blank;
[(b)] + might come;
[(c)] + and.
[6. (a)]as;
[(b)] + for;
[(c)] + cannott;
[(d-e)]to come some of them to send;
[(f)] + nott;
[(g)] + itt;
[(h)] + and;
[(i)]desiring;
[(j-k)]your expectations and my engement.;
[(k)] + that;
[(m)] + wee have heere Men on purpose (which gives emendation above: met on purpose);
[(n)] + any.
[7. (a)] + butt;
[(b)] + them;
[(c)] + and;
[(d)] + they shall.
[8. (a)]that;
[(b)] + and;
[(c)]and;
[(e-f)] tr consider the way;
[(g)] + wee.
[9. (a)]which;
[(a-b)] tr betweene you and us;
[(c)] + appear to bee;
[(d)] This necessary emendation is supplied by Wildman’s statement of ‘the chief weight’ of Cromwell’s speech [p. 10];
[(e)] + to the officers;
[(f)]do;
[(g)] + and.
[10. (a)] + to;
[(b)]itt;
[(c)]or.
[11. (a)]itt;
[(b)] + for;
[(c-d)]uppon their persons or uppon their ptie.;
[(e)]finding;
[(f)] + though;
[(g)]hee;
[(h)] + and;
[(i)] + may;
[(j)] + yett.
[12. (a)] + of them;
[(b)] + though;
[(c)] + made them and;
[(d-e)]uppon the whole matter I speake this to inforce;
[(f)]uppon;
[(g)] + nott.
[13. (a)]and;
[(b)] + how farre they;
[(c)] tr speake somethinge;
[(d)] + and;
[(e)] + butt;
[(f)] + att least.
[14. (a)] + that;
[(b)] + and that;
[(c)]hath;
[(d)] + that they;
[(e)]for.
[15. (a)]deceit;
[(b)] + butt.
[16. (a)] tr in all the world;
[(b)]did;
[(c-d)]a disputable Engagemt.;
[(e)] + butt;
[(f)] + that.
[17. (a)] + butt;
[(b)] + and;
[(c-18a)]manifesting.
[18. (b)]man;
[(c-d)]senses;
[(e)] + that
[(f)] + and.
[19. (a)]Awdeley (thus throughout);
[(b-c)] tr you have nott;
[(d)] + or may bee;
[(e)] + they;
[(f)] + as they are;
[(g)] + and;
[(h)] + from us.
[20. (a)] + and;
[(b)] + bee instruments;
[(c)] tr That wee.
[21. (a)]that;
[(b-c)] tr as well may meete together;
[(d-e)] tr doing of itt these ten weekes;
[(f)] MS. gives this speech to Lieut.Generall. Firth adds it to Goffe’s. Cromwell is clarifying (though perhaps also somewhat modifying) Goffe’s motion, as Ireton recognizes when he speaks of the motion as Goffe’s [p. 22];
[(g)]through;
[(h)] + is that;
[(i)] + and.
[22. (a)]him;
[(b)]God;
[(c-d)] tr that doe soe;
[(e)] + and;
[(f)] + either;
[(g)] + though;
[(h)] + that.
[23. (a)]and;
[(a-b)] tr withdraw from us;
[(c)] + and.
[24. (a-b)] tr therefore itt was said;
[(c-e)] tr that itt was said;
[(d)]should;
[(f)]if;
[(g)] + mee;
[(h)] + that;
[(i)]and;
[(j)] + yett.
[25. (a-b)] tr grievances are redrest;
[(c)] + because that;
[(d-e)]I think if;
[(f)] + neither;
[(g-h)] tr engaged to are unjust;
[(i)] + blank.
[26. (a)] + and that without which I know nothing of betwixt Man and Man. The phrase and that . . . nothing of is later repeated, where apparently the whole passage belongs [see b];
[(b)] + betweene man and man and that;
[(c-d)] tr from above [see a];
[(e)] + butt;
[(f)] + that;
[(g-h)] tr butt heere comes;
[(i-j)]what a man;
[(k)] + the.
[27. (a)] + wee must keepe Covenant with itt;
[(b)] + that;
[(c)] + or;
[(d)] + and;
[(e)]ours + blank;
[(f)] + If;
[(g)] + and;
[(g-h)] tr satisfie one another.
[28. (a)]is;
[(b)]hee;
[(c)]to;
[(d)]unlawfull;
[(e-f)]bee bound . . . nott to perform itt;
[(g)]are.
[29. (a)] + and;
[(b)]Extreamities;
[(c)] + on this hand, As;
[(d-e)]because in these cases that;
[(f)]what; Firth thinks the end of the speech ‘past amending’; but with Wildman’s reply the sense can be determined.
[30. (a)]that;
[(b)] + iff;
[(c)]butt;
[(d)]successe or;
[(e)] + which.
[31. (a)] + itt;
[(b)]in;
[(c-d)] tr or an end of satisfaction;
[(e)]liberty;
[(f)]that they. ‘The reporter changes into oratio obliqua for a moment’ (Firth);
[(g)]man.
[32. (a)] tr Army;
[(b)]noe;
[(c)] + without;
[(d)]amongst;
[(e)] + that;
[(f-g)] tr if those Engagemts. were nott made;
[(h)] + and.
[33. (a-b)] tr is of another nature;
[(c)]man;
[(d)]considerations. Firth notes that the report at this point is ‘hopelessly confused.’ I have amended it in the general sense of his paraphrase;
[(d-e)] tr is the consideration now;
[(f-g)]itt;
[(h)]was;
[(i)] + and;
[(j)]itt is;
[(k)] + clearly;
[(l)]said (inserted, another hand).
[34. (a-b)] tr proved unjust;
[(c)] + clearly;
[(d)] + that;
[(d-e)] tr were a compliance or; and substituted for itt. ‘The report [of this speech] is so fragmentary that it is difficult to follow Ireton’s argument’ (Firth);
[(f)]since.
[35. (a-b)] tr infallibly just and right that;
[(c)]Engagemt.;
[(d)]Engagemt.;
[(e-f)] tr a succession of Parliaments;
[(g-h)]when that;
[(i)] + and;
[(j)]contents;
[(k-l)]their resolutions with us;
[(m)]furtherance.
[36. (a)] + that;
[(b)] + as;
[37. (a)]and;
[(b)]hopes;
[(c)]act;
[(d)]formerly;
[(e)]butt;
[(f)]to;
[(g)] + nott.
[38. (a)] + said;
[(b)]does;
[(c)] + wee should nott have bin;
[(d)]candle;
[(e)]first;
[(f)]resolutions;
[(g)] + that.
[39. (a)] + blank;
[(b)] + by;
[(c)]lightened;
[(d)]yett;
[(e)] + and.
[40. (a)]that as;
[(b)] + of it;
[(c)] + bee;
[(d)]and that.
[42. (a)]that;
[(b)] + and.
[43. (a)] + and;
[(c)]as;
[(d)]any;
[(e)] + this morning;
[(f)] + that;
[(g)]that.
[44. (a)] + and;
[(b)] + if we finde that;
[(c)] + that;
[(f)]particulars;
[(g)] Clause tr from this point [see h-i]; + butt;
[(h-i)] tr Much businesse will bee. Firth believes that ‘Everard’s speech is extremely confused, as fragments of different sentences are mixed together’; and he adds vaguely, ‘Three clauses have been moved.’ I have reverted to the order of MS. save for the transposition of one clause;
[(k-l)] Firth omits: I mean doing in that kinde, doing in that sort and such kinde of Action, Action of that nature. I have restored the reading of MS.
[45. (a)] + the thinges;
[(b)] + which;
[(c)] + with;
[(d-e)]itt will;
[(f)]that;
[(g)] + in itt;
[(h)] + that;
[(i)] + that wee might consider.
[46. (a)]and;
[(b)] + soe;
[(c)] + of;
[(d)]Worke.
[47. (a-b)] tr if this bee.
[48. (a)]downe;
[(b)]if;
[(c)]Mr Pettus (evidently an alternative form of the name);
[(d)] + in;
[(e)] + and;
[(f)] + as.
[49. (a)] tr presence of God;
[(b)] + &c.;
[(c)] + of;
[(d)]Armies;
[(e)]thoughts;
[(f)] + that.
[50. (a-e)] Report appears to be very much confused at this point. I have adopted Firth’s reconstruction, but have recorded its departures from MS.;
[(a-b)] tr this Army deare and tender to me;
[(c)] Here a-b, + and therefore itt is that I wish;
[(d)] + (if there be any) or;
[(e)] + I would nott have this Army.
[51. (a)] + nott to;
[(b)] + wee seeke;
[(e)]prize;
[(f)]wheresoever (but apparently with whatsoever written over it);
[(g)] + that;
[(h)] + going;
[(i-j)] tr sad to thinke them soe;
[(k)] + first;
[(l-m)] tr noe Engagemt. can take us from itt;
[(n-o)] tr though itt bee just;
[(o-p)] tr matter in them that;
[(q)]yett.
[52. (a)]butt;
[(b-c)] MS. places in brackets in Ireton’s speech. Firth suggests, but does not adopt, the change;
[(d)]moved;
[(e)] + that they.
[53. (a)]that;
[(b)] + and;
[(d)] + that;
[(e)]I;
[(f)]as;
[(g)] + and those that they must thus chuse;
[(h)]others.
[54. (a)] + who taken together;
[(b)] + Are the Representors;
[(c)] + otherwise;
[(d)] + hee in Birth or;
[(e)] + butt;
[(f)] + look;
[(g)] + you take away;
[(h)] + and;
[(i)] + those is.
[55. (a)]by;
[(b)] + and;
[(c-d)] tr taken altogether doe comprehend the whole;
[(e)] + to.
[56. (a)] + this way;
[(b)]and;
[(c)] tr men have;
[(d-e)] tr a Citty to send Burgesses;
[(f)] + hee;
[(g)] + and.
[57. (a)] + misrepresentation of the;
[(b)]how;
[(c)] + are;
[(d-e)] tr the p[er]manent interest.
[58. (a-b)] tr freemen of Corporations;
[(c)]Constitutions;
[(d)]a;
[(e)] + butt;
[(f)] + hath no p[er]manent interest that;
[(g)] + will.
[59. (a)] + you forgott Somethinge in my Speech;
[(b)]evasion;
[(c)]man;
[(d-e)] tr wee are for Anarchy;
[(f)] The report of Ireton’s speech is extremely confused. I have in general adopted Firth’s rearrangement, but have recorded the departures from MS.; (g-60 a) tr answer upon which that which;
[(g-h)]I desire I would nott.
[60. (b)] + and;
[(c)] + that;
[(c-d)] tr whatever a man may claim;
[(e)] + that which;
[(f)] + great and maine; this tr to position marked g;
[(g-h)]that seem’d to bee the Answer uppon which that which hath bin said against this rests. Here follows first paragraph of speech [59 g-60 a], and MS. proceeds: Now then as I say to that which is to the maine Answer that itt will nott make the breach of propertie, Then;
[(i)] + of;
[(j)] + butt.
[61. (a-b)]itt is;
[(c)] + Soe;
[(d)]choice.
[62. (a)] + the;
[(b)]if (in error for is);
[(c-d)]what the objection is, and where the Answer lies to which itt is made;
[(e-f)]itt;
[(g)] + that;
[(h)]are;
[(i)]choice.
[63. (a)] + hee;
[(b)] + that man;
[(c)]butt;
[(d)]an;
[(e)] + a Major pte. you may have;
[(f-g)] tr those men;
[(h)] + for that by which;
[(i)] + and that;
[(j)] + this;
[(k)]mee;
[(l)] + you may.
[64. (a)]that;
[(b-c)] tr a perpetual dictator;
[(c)]one;
[(d)]are;
[(e)] + and;
[(g)]equall.
[65. (a)] + and;
[(b-c)] tr against a fundamentall Law;
[(d)]from;
[(e)] + hee may.
[66. (a)] + nott by his owne consent;
[(b)]is;
[(c)] Emendation supplied by Ireton’s speech [p. 55].
[67. (a)] + a;
[(b)]this;
[(c)]us;
[(d)]in;
[(e)]of;
[(f)] + of;
[(h-i)]a fifth pte. Emendation supplied by Rich’s speech [p. 63];
[(j)] + I say;
[(k)] + and;
[(l)] tr where wee were;
[(m)] tr what shall become.
[68. (a)] + them;
[(b)] + butt;
[(c-d)] tr there may bee a way thought of;
[(f)] + in;
[(g)] + before.
[69. (a)] + nott;
[(b)]itt;
[(c)] + I see;
[(d)] + that.
[70. (a)] + that;
[(b)] + and;
[(c)] + in alle;
[(d)] tr I thinke every Christian;
[(e)]butt.
[71. (a)] + as;
[(b)] + wee;
[(c)]men;
[(d)]hee;
[(e)] + supposing;
[(f-h)] tr lay aside the most fundamentall Constitution;
[(g)]for;
[(i-j)]all the soldiers have;
[(k)]shrubs;
[(l)]as.
[72. (a)]this;
[(b)]that;
[(c)]this;
[(d)]lie;
[(e)] + and;
[(f-g)] tr that hath a freedome;
[(h)] + nott.
[73. (a)] + in a generall sense;
[(b)]light;
[(c)] Firth thinks that ‘only the first words of some sentences are given.’ I find the sense much more complete, but the order of the sentences, and even the phrases, in unrelieved confusion. I have reduced them to a rational order, which is, of course, conjectural. MS. reads: I will minde you of one thinge, that uppon the will of one Man abusing us, and soe forth: Soe that I professe to you for my pte. I hope itt is nott denied by any man, That any wise discreete Man that hath preserved England or the Governemt. of itt, I doe say still under favour there is a way to cure all this Debate, I thinke they will desire noe more Libertie if there were time to dispute itt, I thinke hee would bee satisfied & all will be satisfied, and if the safetie of the Army bee in danger for my pte. I am cleare itt should bee amended, the point of Election should bee mended;
[(d)]or;
[(e)]hee;
[(f)]was;
[(g)] tr If the thinge;
[(h)]satisfying.
[74. (a)] + butt;
[(b)]to;
[(c-d)]was nott that;
[(e)] + as free;
[(f)] + to.
[75. (a)] + and;
[(b)] + for my pte.;
[(c)]shall;
[(d)]property;
[(e)]that;
[(f)]see.
[76. (a)] + wch. is before you;
[(b)]I;
[(c-e)] tr I will nott give itt an ill worde. ‘The remainder of this speech is simply a chaos of detached phrases from different sentences’ (Firth);
[(d)]in;
[(f)]a;
[(g)] + and;
[(h)] + that wee;
[(i-j)] tr love in my heart;
[(k)] + a.
[77. (a)]doe;
[(b)]by;
[(c-d)]distributions of itt;
[(e)] tr as itt stands;
[(f)] + that.
[78. (a-b)] tr to consider;
[(c)] + and;
[(d)] + nott;
[(e-f)] tr there is as much reason;
[(f)] + butt.
[79. (a)] + is;
[(b)]that’s;
[(c)] tr there’s a greater;
[(d)] tr you take away;
[(e)] + from some Men;
[(f)] + nott.
[80. (a)] + and;
[(b)] Speech is transposed from after Chillenden’s. I do not agree with Firth that it is ‘merely a second version of the speech [on p. 75], not a new speech.’ It is different in phrasing, though similar in argument at one or two points, and it refers to other matters, two of which have been mentioned, since Clarke’s previous speech, by Petty and Rolfe [pp. 79-80]. Since, however, ‘Waller does not answer Clarke, but Chillenden,’ the speech must have become misplaced, and it could hardly have stood before Rolfe’s since it seems to concur with that speech in its last sentence. Hence the transposition;
[(c)]should.
[81. (a)] + to butt;
[(b)] + butt;
[(c)] + that;
[(d-e)] tr noe finger in appointing the lawgiver;
[(f)]oibq.
[82. (a)]that;
[(b-c)]leave this;
[(d-f)] tr this enlargementof that businesse;
[(e)] + in that;
[(g-h)]this enlargement of that businesse.
[83. (a)]every;
[(b)] + itt;
[(c)]doe;
[(d)] + I declar’d;
[(d-e)] tr there manifested in the paper I declar’d;
[(f)] + and were;
[(g)] + that there were meetings;
[(h)]I;
[(i)]liberties;
[(j)]and.
[84. (a)] + that;
[(b)] + as;
[(c)] + on the other hand they told me, That;
[(d)]disputations;
[(e)]ingeniously;
[(f)] + and.
[85. (a)] tr with such an heart;
[(b-c)] tr thinke itt is nott very variable;
[(d-e)] tr though this be nott a rule of exactnesse;
[(f)] + if nott that;
[(g-h)]will nott believe you.
[86. (a)] + & all the Engagements.;
[(b)] + for satisfaction;
[(c)] + butt;
[(d)] + I doe nott see;
[(d-e)]the Authours of this paper the subscribers;
[(f)] + for my pte. I do nott know what disbanding is iff that;
[(g-j)] tr than the outcries of the authours of itt;
[(h)]them;
[(i)] + wee all;
[(k)] + if.
[87. (a-b)] tr endeavouring to draw the souldiers to run this way;
[(c-f)] tr have the managing of the businesse;
[(c-d)]by this or that way;
[(e)]or;
[(f-h)] tr that wee have declar’d [for] before;
[(g)] + itt;
[(i)] + that;
[(j)] + whether we will nott devide with such satisfaction;
[(k)] + whether that were a deviding;
[(l-m)]hee may;
[(n-o)] tr a sense that wee doe nott know of.
[88. (a)] + heere itt is putt according to the inhabitants;
[(b)] + and;
[(c)]they;
[(d-e)] tr that the Commons shall chuse without Lords or any body else [butt where I see thinges] [p. 89; and see 89 d];
[(f-g)]wee shall.
[89. (a)] + is bound att his Coronation;
[(d)] + butt where I see thinges + transposed sentence [88 d-e];
[(e)] + only as;
[(f-g)] tr destruction of the Kingdome to throwe them out [and];
[(h)]and;
[(i)] + of;
[(j)] + and.
[90. (a)] + butt when they cannott act justly;
[(b)]appear’d to bee;
[(c)]that;
[(d)]the;
[(e)] + nott;
[(f-g)]by the Kinge;
[(h)] + to bee.
[91. (a-b)] tr and nott any ordinance of Parliament;
[(c)]of this that;
[(d)]to;
[(e)]wheras;
[(f)]butt;
[(g)] tr troubled with the Kinges interests;
[(h-i)] tr if this were setled;
[(j)] + that;
[(k)]for.
[92. (a)] tr this very Parliament may destroy wheras;
[(b)]see;
[(c)] + and;
[(d)]senses;
[(e)] tr I feare;
[(f)]plausible;
[(g)] + that;
[(h)]of.
[93. (a)] + are;
[(b)] + and then itt says there;
[(c)] tr can bee noe peace and have;
[(d)] + as;
[(e)] + and;
[(f)] + & itt is suggested;
[(g)] + butt;
[(h)]would;
[(i)]they;
[(j)] + them.
[94. (a)] + butt;
[(b)] + and;
[(c)] + then;
[(f)]that;
[(g)] + that;
[(i)] + by;
[(j)] + for my pte.
[95. (a)] + then;
[(b)] + butt wheras;
[(c)] + now;
[(d)] + blank (4½ pp.)—perhaps left for other speeches, which were not transcribed.
[96. (a)]are;
[(b)]thinge is.
[97. (a)] + of;
[(b)]itt;
[(c-d)]which satisfies;
[(e)]first;
[(f-g)]and in all these Governemts. they were happy & Contented with itt, and;
[(h)]yett;
[(i)] + and.
[98. (a)]illegal;
[(b-c)] tr which does satisfie the Kingdome [as];
[(d)] + as, followed by the transposed phrase b-c;
[(e)] + by;
[(f)]att;
[(g)]any;
[(h)] + that;
[99. (a-b)]spoke to was;
[(d)] + that;
[(e)]desires;
[(f)] + or.
[100. (a)] + that was;
[(b)]of;
[(c)] + yett;
[(d)]then;
[(e)] + and;
[(f)] + Certainly.
[101. (a)] + and;
[(b)] + butt when any thinge is spoken;
[(c)]I;
[(d)] + butt.
[102. (a)] + still;
[(b)] + and;
[(c)] + truly;
[(d)]them;
[(e)] + that.
[103. (a)] + Truly;
[(c)] + and;
[(c-d)] tr shall nott bee offended [and];
[(e)] + butt;
[(f)] + and + transposed phrase [c-d];
[(g)]itt;
[(h)] tr had bin;
[(i)]nothing;
[(j)] + ordinary.
[104. (a)] + and;
[(b)]was + to which you do well to take heede;
[(c)]made;
[(d)]hath;
[(e)]should;
[(f)] + that.
[105. (a)] + that they;
[(b)] + and;
[(c)]itt;
[(d)]what;
[(e)]apprehensions.
[106. (a)] + and that is this (I);
[(b)] + them;
[(c)] + butt;
[(d)] + nott;
[(e)]or.
[107. (a)]call’d;
[(b)]that;
[(c)] + that;
[(d)]to;
[(e)] + hee;
[(f)] + I finde that;
[(h)] + and.
[108. (a)]butt;
[(b)] + Itt is demonstrable;
[(b-c)] tr that doe butt hold Compliance with them;
[(d)] + butt;
[(e)] + soe.
[109. (a)]dissent;
[(b-c)] tr from after c-d in its original position [see below];
[(c-d)] tr itt is unjust they should have that power, and there immediately followed by b-c;
[(e-f)]them.
[110. (a)] + blank (one line);
[(b)] + is itt;
[(c-d)]itt;
[(e)]soe;
[(e-f)] I adopt Firth’s suggestion that this is an interruption by Wildman, and correct his reading;
[(g-h)]that is that.
[111. (a)] + I thinke;
[(b)] + that;
[(c)] + by all that itt is apparent;
[(d)] + some Relation;
[(e)] + butt;
[(f)] There are spaces for completion of Latin phrase;
[(g)]the.
[112. (a)]have;
[(b)] + itt;
[(c)]thoughts;
[(d)] + that;
[(e)]where;
[(f)] + and;
[(g-h)] tr any thinge of the Kinge’s Declaration to that purpose [that];
[(i)] + blank;
[(j)]dispensation;
[(k)] + soe;
[(l-m)] tr for the Establishment of the Kingdome.
[113. (a-114 h)] tr [see p. 113, n. 2], with some alteration of order [see below], from after Ireton: [That] if a Lord shall bee accused & by a Jury found guilty hee will Expect to bee tryed by his Peeres [p. 116];
[(b)] First part of Wildman’s speech has been transposed from this position [b] to 114 g-h and 114 b-d, because it deals with a later proposal.
[114. (a)] + and;
[(b-d)] tr [see above, 113 b];
[(c-d)]the interest of the Kinge & Lords is laid aside wch. the Lord by a Judgemt. from heaven hath given away;
[(e-f)] tr will take them uppon his Memory, and by the way;
[(g-h)] tr [see above, 113 b];
[(i-j)]them.
[115. (a)]them;
[(b)] + that;
[(c)]onely;
[(d)] + have bin subject;
[(e)] + and;
[(f)]or;
[(g)] + to bee;
[(h)]to;
[(i)] + any.
[116. (a)] + that;
[(b)] Here occur the transposed speeches 113 a-114 h; + Com. Ireton before next paragraph;
[(c-d)] tr any other difference they are tryed by their peeres.
[117. (a-b)] tr I did then suppose agreed uppon;
[(c)]will;
[(d-e)] tr those that the Commons shall chuse.
[118. (a)] + butt;
[(b)] + and;
[(c)]that.
[119. (a)] tr Kinge to itt;
[(b)]included;
[(c)] + they;
[(d)]take;
[(e)]doth;
[(f)]none;
[(g)] + and;
[(h-i)] tr from Constitution or from Right [p. 120];
[(j)] + butt.
[120. (a-b)]200 (It is certainly possible that the mistake, which is repeated, is Cowling’s, but more probable that it is the reporter’s or the transcriber’s);
[(c)]200;
[(d)] + and;
[(e)]of;
[(f)] + they.
[121. (a)]That (+ blank);
[(b)] + wheras;
[(c-d)] tr with their estates.
[122. (a-b)] tr as just as any in the world;
[(c-d)] tr yett is bound to stand to itt;
[(e-f)] tr have Established the Kinge againe.
[123. (a-b)] MS. gives to Ireton as first sentence of his speech. Firth suggests (but does not adopt his own suggestion) that it is another interruption by Wildman, to which Ireton’s speech is a reply;
[(c)] + to;
[(d)] + and;
[(e)] + that;
[(f)]Lords.
Samuel Rawson Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, selected and edited by Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906). Chapter: 74.: The Agreement of the People, as presented to the Council of the Army.
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/1434/194338 on 2010-02-05
The text is in the public domain.
[An agreement of the People for a firm and present peace, &c., E. 412, 21. October 28, 1647. See Great Civil War, iii. 383-394.]
An Agreement of the People for a firm and present peace upon grounds of common right.
Having by our late labours and hazards made it appear to the world at how high a rate we value our just freedom, and God having so far owned our cause as to deliver the enemies thereof into our hands, we do now hold ourselves bound in mutual duty to each other to take the best care we can for the future to avoid both the danger of returning into a slavish condition and the chargeable remedy of another war; for, as it cannot be imagined that so many of our countrymen would have opposed us in this quarrel if they had understood their own good, so may we safely promise to ourselves that, when our common rights and liberties shall be cleared, their endeavours will be disappointed that seek to make themselves our masters. Since, therefore, our former oppressions and scarce-yet-ended troubles have been occasioned, either by want of frequent national meetings in Council, or by rendering those meetings ineffectual, we are fully agreed and resolved to provide that hereafter our representatives be neither left to an uncertainty for the time nor made useless to the ends for which they are intended. In order whereunto we declare:—
That the people of England, being at this day very unequally distributed by Counties, Cities, and Boroughs for the election of their deputies in Parliament, ought to be more indifferently proportioned according to the number of the inhabitants; the circumstances whereof for number, place, and manner are to be set down before the end of this present Parliament.
That, to prevent the many inconveniences apparently arising from the long continuance of the same persons in authority, this present Parliament be dissolved upon the last day of September which shall be in the year of our Lord 1648
That the people do, of course, choose themselves a Parliament once in two years, viz. upon the first Thursday in every 2d March1 , after the manner as shall be prescribed before the end of this Parliament, to begin to sit upon the first Thursday in April following, at Westminster or such other place as shall be appointed from time to time by the preceding Representatives, and to continue till the last day of September then next ensuing, and no longer.
That the power of this, and all future Representatives of this Nation, is inferior only to theirs who choose them, and doth extend, without the consent or concurrence of any other person or persons, to the enacting, altering, and repealing of laws, to the erecting and abolishing of offices and courts, to the appointing, removing, and calling to account magistrates and officers of all degrees, to the making war and peace, to the treating with foreign States, and, generally, to whatsoever is not expressly or impliedly reserved by the represented to themselves:
Which are as followeth.
1. That matters of religion and the ways of God’s worship are not at all entrusted by us to any human power, because therein we cannot remit or exceed a tittle of what our consciences dictate to be the mind of God without wilful sin: nevertheless the public way of instructing the nation (so it be not compulsive) is referred to their discretion.
2. That the matter of impresting and constraining any of us to serve in the wars is against our freedom; and therefore we do not allow it in our Representatives; the rather, because money (the sinews of war), being always at their disposal, they can never want numbers of men apt enough to engage in any just cause.
3. That after the dissolution of this present Parliament, no person be at any time questioned for anything said or done in reference to the late public differences, otherwise than in execution of the judgments of the present Representatives or House of Commons.
4. That in all laws made or to be made every person may be bound alike, and that no tenure, estate, charter, degree, birth, or place do confer any exemption from the ordinary course of legal proceedings whereunto others are subjected.
5. That as the laws ought to be equal, so they must be good, and not evidently destructive to the safety and well-being of the people.
These things we declare to be our native rights, and therefore are agreed and resolved to maintain them with our utmost possibilities against all opposition whatsoever; being compelled thereunto not only by the examples of our ancestors, whose blood was often spent in vain for the recovery of their freedoms, suffering themselves through fraudulent accommodations to be still deluded of the fruit of their victories, but also by our own woeful experience, who, having long expected and dearly earned the establishment of these certain rules of government, are yet made to depend for the settlement of our peace and freedom upon him that intended our bondage and brought a cruel war upon us.
[1 ] I.e. in March in every other year.
Samuel Rawson Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, selected and edited by Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906). Chapter: 81.: The Agreement of the People.
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/1434/194364 on 2010-02-05
The text is in the public domain.
[January 151 , 1648/9. Old Parliamentary History, xviii. 519. See Great Civil War, iv. 295.]
An Agreement of the People of England, and the places therewith incorporated, for a secure and present peace, upon grounds of common right, freedom and safety.
Having, by our late labours and hazards, made it appear to the world at how high a rate we value our just freedom, and God having so far owned our cause as to deliver the enemies thereof into our hands, we do now hold ourselves bound, in mutual duty to each other, to take the best care we can for the future, to avoid both the danger of returning into a slavish condition and the chargeable remedy of another war: for as it cannot be imagined that so many of our countrymen would have opposed us in this quarrel if they had understood their own good, so may we hopefully promise to ourselves, that when our common rights and liberties shall be cleared, their endeavours will be disappointed that seek to make themselves our masters. Since therefore our former oppressions and not-yet-ended troubles have been occasioned either by want of frequent national meetings in council, or by the undue or unequal constitution thereof, or by rendering those meetings ineffectual, we are fully agreed and resolved, God willing, to provide, that hereafter our Representatives be neither left to an uncertainty for times nor be unequally constituted, nor made useless to the ends for which they are intended. In order whereunto we declare and agree,
First, that, to prevent the many inconveniences apparently arising from the long continuance of the same persons in supreme authority, this present Parliament end and dissolve upon, or before, the last day of April, 1649.
Secondly, that the people of England (being at this day very unequally distributed by counties, cities, and boroughs, for the election of their Representatives) be indifferently proportioned; and, to this end, that the Representative of the whole nation shall consist of 400 persons, or not above; and in each county, and the places thereto subjoined, there shall be chosen, to make up the said Representative at all times, the several numbers here mentioned, viz.
| KENT, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder particularly named | 10 |
| Canterbury, with the Suburbs adjoining and Liberties thereof | 2 |
| Rochester, with the Parishes of Chatham and Stroud | 1 |
| The Cinque Ports in Kent and Sussex, viz. Dover, Romney, Hythe, Sandwich, Hastings, with the Towns of Rye and Winchelsea | 3 |
| SUSSEX, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Chichester | 8 |
| Chichester, with the Suburbs and Liberties thereof | 1 |
| SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder named | 8 |
| Winchester, with the Suburbs and Liberties thereof | 1 |
| Southampton Town and the County thereof | 1 |
| DORSETSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Dorchester | 7 |
| Dorchester | 1 |
| DEVONSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder particularly named | 12 |
| Exeter | 2 |
| Plymouth | 2 |
| Barnstaple | 1 |
| CORNWALL, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 8 |
| SOMERSETSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder named | 8 |
| Bristol | 3 |
| Taunton-Dean | 1 |
| WILTSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Salisbury | 7 |
| Salisbury | 1 |
| BERKSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Reading | 5 |
| Reading | 1 |
| SURREY, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Southwark | 5 |
| Southwark | 2 |
| MIDDLESEX, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder named | 4 |
| London | 8 |
| Westminster and the Duchy | 2 |
| HERTFORDSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 6 |
| BUCKINGHAMSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 6 |
| OXFORDSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder named | 4 |
| Oxford City | 2 |
| Oxford University | 2 |
| GLOUCESTERSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Gloucester | 7 |
| Gloucester | 2 |
| HEREFORDSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Hereford | 4 |
| Hereford | 1 |
| WORCESTERSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Worcester | 4 |
| Worcester | 2 |
| WARWICKSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Coventry | 5 |
| Coventry | 2 |
| NORTHAMPTONSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Northampton | 5 |
| Northampton | 1 |
| BEDFORDSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, | 4 |
| CAMBRIDGESHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder particularly named | 4 |
| Cambridge University | 2 |
| Cambridge Town | 2 |
| ESSEX, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Colchester | 11 |
| Colchester | 2 |
| SUFFOLK, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereafter named | 10 |
| Ipswich | 2 |
| St. Edmund’s Bury | 1 |
| NORFOLK, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder named | 9 |
| Norwich | 3 |
| Lynn | 1 |
| Yarmouth | 1 |
| LINCOLNSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except the City of Lincoln and the Town of Boston | 11 |
| Lincoln | 1 |
| Boston | 1 |
| RUTLANDSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 1 |
| HUNTINGDONSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 3 |
| LEICESTERSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Leicester | 5 |
| Leicester | 1 |
| NOTTINGHAMSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Nottingham | 4 |
| Nottingham | 1 |
| DERBYSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Derby | 5 |
| Derby | 1 |
| STAFFORDSHIRE, with the City of Lichfield, the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 6 |
| SHROPSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Shrewsbury | 6 |
| Shrewsbury | 1 |
| CHESHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Chester | 5 |
| Chester | 2 |
| LANCASHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Manchester | 6 |
| Manchester and the Parish | 1 |
| YORKSHIRE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereafter named | 15 |
| York City and the County thereof | 3 |
| Kingston upon Hull and the County thereof | 1 |
| Leeds Town and Parish | 1 |
| DURHAM COUNTY PALATINE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except Durham and Gateside | 3 |
| Durham City | 1 |
| NORTHUMBERLAND, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein, except such as are hereunder named | 3 |
| Newcastle upon Tyne and the County thereof, with Gateside | 2 |
| Berwick | 1 |
| CUMBERLAND, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 3 |
| WESTMORELAND, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 2 |
| ANGLESEA, with the Parishes therein | 2 |
| BRECKNOCK, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 3 |
| CARDIGAN, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 3 |
| CARMARTHEN, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 3 |
| CARNARVON, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 2 |
| DENBIGH, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 2 |
| FLINT, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 1 |
| MONMOUTH, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 4 |
| GLAMORGAN, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 4 |
| MERIONETH, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 2 |
| MONTGOMERY, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 3 |
| RADNOR, with the Boroughs and Parishes therein | 2 |
| PEMBROKE, with the Boroughs, Towns, and Parishes therein | 4 |
Provided, that the first or second Representative may, if they see cause, assign the remainder of the 400 representers, not hereby assigned, or so many of them as they shall see cause for, unto such counties as shall appear in this present distribution to have less than their due proportion. Provided also, that where any city or borough, to which one representer or more is assigned, shall be found in a due proportion not competent alone to elect a representer, or the number of representers assigned thereto, it is left to future Representatives to assign such a number of parishes or villages near adjoining to such city or borough, to be joined therewith in the elections, or may make the same proportionable.
Thirdly. That the people do, of course, choose themselves a Representative once in two years, and shall meet for that purpose upon the first Thursday in every second May, by eleven in the morning; and the Representatives so chosen to meet upon the second Thursday in the June following, at the usual place in Westminster, or such other place as, by the foregoing Representative, or the Council of State in the interval, shall be, from time to time, appointed and published to the people, at the least twenty days before the time of election: and to continue their sessions there, or elsewhere, until the second Thursday in December following, unless they shall adjourn or dissolve themselves sooner; but not to continue longer. The election of the first Representative to be on the first Thursday in May, 1649; and that, and all future elections, to be according to the rules prescribed for the same purpose in this Agreement, viz. 1. That the electors in every division shall be natives or denizens of England; not persons receiving alms, but such as are assessed ordinarily towards the relief of the poor; no servants to, and receiving wages from, any particular person; and in all elections, except for the Universities, they shall be men of twenty-one years of age, or upwards, and housekeepers, dwelling within the division for which the election is: provided, that (until the end of seven years next ensuing the time herein limited for the end of this present Parliament) no person shall be admitted to, or have any hand or voice in, such elections, who hath adhered unto or assisted the King against the Parliament in any of the late wars or insurrections; or who shall make or join in, or abet, any forcible opposition against this Agreement. 2. That such persons, and such only, may be elected to be of the Representative, who, by the rule aforesaid, are to have voice in elections in one place or other. Provided, that of those none shall be eligible for the first or second Representative, who have not voluntarily assisted the Parliament against the King, either in person before the 14th of June, 1645, or else in money, plate, horse, or arms, lent upon the Propositions, before the end of May, 1643; or who have joined in, or abetted, the treasonable engagement in London, in 1647; or who declared or engaged themselves for a cessation of arms with the Scots that invaded this nation the last summer; or for compliance with the actors in any insurrections of the same summer; or with the Prince of Wales, or his accomplices, in the revolted fleet. Provided also, that such persons as, by the rules in the preceding Article, are not capable of electing until the end of seven years, shall not be capable to be elected until the end of fourteen years next ensuing. And we desire and recommend it to all men, that, in all times, the persons to be chosen for this great trust may be men of courage, fearing God and hating covetousness; and that our Representatives would make the best provisions for that end. 3. That whoever, by the rules in the two preceding Articles, are incapable of electing, or to be elected, shall presume to vote in, or be present at, such election for the first or second Representative; or, being elected, shall presume to sit or vote in either of the said Representatives, shall incur the pain of confiscation of the moiety of his estate, to the use of the public, in case he have any visible estate to the value of £50, and if he has not such an estate, then shall incur the pain of imprisonment for three months. And if any person shall forcibly oppose, molest or hinder the people, capable of electing as aforesaid, in their quiet and free election of representers, for the first Representative, then each person so offending shall incur the penalty of confiscation of his whole estate, both real and personal; and, if he has not an estate to the value of £50, shall suffer imprisonment during one whole year without bail or mainprize. Provided, that the offender in each such case be convicted within three months next after the committing of his offence, and the first Representative is to make further provision for the avoiding of these evils in future elections. 4. That to the end all officers of state may be certainly accountable, and no faction made to maintain corrupt interests, no member of a Council of State, nor any officer of any salary-forces in army or garrison, nor any treasurer or receiver of public money, shall, while such, be elected to be of a Representative: and in case any such election shall be, the same to be void. And in case any lawyer shall be chosen into any Representative or Council of State, then he shall be incapable of practice as a lawyer during that trust. 5. For the more convenient election of Representatives, each county, wherein more than three representers are to be chosen, with the town corporate and cities, if there be any, lying within the compass thereof, to which no representers are herein assigned, shall be divided by a due proportion into so many, and such parts, as each part may elect two, and no part above three representers. For the setting forth of which divisions, and the ascertaining of other circumstances hereafter expressed, so as to make the elections less subject to confusion or mistake, in order to the next Representative, Thomas Lord Grey of Groby, Sir John Danvers, Sir Henry Holcroft, knights; Moses Wall, gentleman; Samuel Moyer, John Langley, Wm. Hawkins, Abraham Babington, Daniel Taylor, Mark Hilsley, Rd. Price, and Col. John White, citizens of London, or any five or more of them, are intrusted to nominate and appoint, under their hands and seals, three or more fit persons in each county, and in each city and borough, to which one representer or more is assigned, to be as Commissioners for the ends aforesaid, in the respective counties, cities and boroughs; and, by like writing under their hands and seals, shall certify into the Parliament Records, before the 11th of February next, the names of the Commissioners so appointed for the respective counties, cities and boroughs, which Commissioners, or any three or more of them, for the respective counties, cities and boroughs, shall before the end of February next, by writing under their hands and seals, appoint two fit and faithful persons, or more, in each hundred, lathe or wapentake, within the respective counties, and in each ward within the City of London, to take care for the orderly taking of all voluntary subscriptions to this Agreement, by fit persons to be employed for that purpose in every parish; who are to return the subscription so taken to the persons that employed them, keeping a transcript thereof to themselves; and those persons, keeping like transcripts, to return the original subscriptions to the respective Commissioners by whom they were appointed, at, or before, the 14th day of April next, to be registered and kept in the chief court within the respective cities and boroughs. And the said Commissioners, or any three or more of them, for the several counties, cities and boroughs, respectively, shall, where more than three representers are to be chosen, divide such counties, as also the City of London, into so many, and such parts as are aforementioned, and shall set forth the bounds of such divisions; and shall, in every county, city and borough, where any representers are to be chosen, and in every such division as aforesaid within the City of London, and within the several counties so divided, respectively, appoint one place certain wherein the people shall meet for the choice of the representers; and some one fit person, or more, inhabiting within each borough, city, county or division, respectively, to be present at the time and place of election, in the nature of Sheriffs, to regulate the elections; and by poll, or otherwise, clearly to distinguish and judge thereof, and to make return of the person or persons elected, as is hereafter expressed; and shall likewise, in writing under their hands and seals, make certificates of the several divisions, with the bounds thereof, by them set forth, and of the certain places of meeting, and persons, in the nature of Sheriff, appointed in them respectively as aforesaid; and cause such certificates to be returned into the Parliament Records before the end of April next; and before that time shall also cause the same to be published in every parish within the counties, cities and boroughs respectively; and shall in every such parish likewise nominate and appoint, by warrant under their hands and seals, one trusty person, or more, inhabiting therein, to make a true list of all the persons within their respective parishes, who, according to the rules aforegoing, are to have voice in the elections; and expressing who amongst them are, by the same rules, capable of being elected; and such list, with the said warrant, to bring in and return, at the time and place of election, unto the person appointed in the nature of Sheriff, as aforesaid, for that borough, city, county or division respectively; which person so appointed as Sheriff, being present at the time and place of election; or, in case of his absence, by the space of one hour after the time limited for the peoples’ meeting, then any person present that is eligible, as aforesaid, whom the people then and there assembled shall choose for that end, shall receive and keep the said lists and admit the persons therein contained, or so many of them as are present, unto a free vote in the said election; and, having first caused this Agreement to be publicly read in the audience of the people, shall proceed unto, and regulate and keep peace and order in the elections; and, by poll or otherwise, openly distinguish and judge of the same; and thereof, by certificate or writing under the hands and seals of himself, and six or more of the electors, nominating the person or persons duly elected, shall make a true return into the Parliament Records within twenty-one days after the election, under pain for default thereof, or, for making any false return, to forfeit £100 to the public use; and also cause indentures to be made, and unchangeably sealed and delivered, between himself and six or more of the said electors, on the one part, and the persons, or each person, elected severally, on the other part, expressing their election of him as a representer of them according to this Agreement, and his acceptance of that trust, and his promise accordingly to perform the same with faithfulness, to the best of his understanding and ability, for the glory of God and good of the people. This course is to hold for the first Representative, which is to provide for the ascertaining of these circumstances in order to future Representatives.
Fourthly. That 150 members at least be always present in each sitting of the Representative, at the passing of any law or doing of any act whereby the people are to be bound; saving, that the number of sixty may make a House for debates or resolutions that are preparatory thereunto.
Fifthly. That the Representative shall, within twenty days after their first meeting, appoint a Council of State for the managing of public affairs, until the tenth day after the meeting of the next Representative, unless that next Representative think fit to put an end to that trust sooner. And the same Council to act and proceed therein, according to such instructions and limitations as the Representative shall give, and not otherwise.
Sixthly. That in each interval between biennial Representatives, the Council of State, in case of imminent danger or extreme necessity, may summon a Representative to be forthwith chosen, and to meet; so as the Session thereof continue not above eighty days; and so as it dissolve at least fifty days before the appointed time for the next biennial Representative; and upon the fiftieth day so preceding it shall dissolve of course, if not otherwise dissolved sooner.
Seventhly. That no member of any Representative be made either receiver, treasurer, or other officer, during that employment, saving to be a member of the Council of State.
Eightly. That the Representatives have, and shall be understood to have, the supreme trust in order to the preservation and government of the whole; and that their power extend, without the consent or concurrence of any other person or persons, to the erecting and abolishing of Courts of Justice and public offices, and to the enacting, altering, repealing and declaring of laws, and the highest and final judgment, concerning all natural or civil things, but not concerning things spiritual or evangelical. Provided that, even in things natural and civil, these six particulars next following are, and shall be, understood to be excepted and reserved from our Representatives, viz. 1. We do not empower them to impress or constrain any person to serve in foreign war, either by sea or land, nor for any military service within the kingdom; save that they may take order for the forming, training, and exercising of the people in a military way, to be in readiness for resisting of foreign invasions, suppressing of sudden insurrections, or for assisting in execution of the laws; and may take order for the employing and conducting of them for those ends; provided, that, even in such cases, none be compellable to go out of the county he lives in, if he procure another to serve in his room. 2. That, after the time herein limited for the commencement of the first Representative, none of the people may be at any time questioned for any thing said or done in relation to the late wars or public differences, otherwise than in execution or pursuance of the determinations of the present House of Commons, against such as have adhered to the King, or his interest, against the people; and saving that accomptants for public moneys received, shall remain accountable for the same. 3. That no securities given, or to be given, by the public faith of the nation, nor any engagements of the public faith for satisfaction of debts and damages, shall be made void or invalid by the next or any future Representatives; except to such creditors as have, or shall have, justly forfeited the same: and saving, that the next Representative may confirm or make null, in part or in whole, all gifts of lands, moneys, offices, or otherwise, made by the present Parliament to any member or attendant of either House. 4. That, in any laws hereafter to be made, no person, by virtue of any tenure, grant, charter, patent, degree or birth, shall be privileged from subjection thereto, or from being bound thereby, as well as others. 5. That the Representative may not give judgment upon any man’s person or estate, where no law hath before provided; save only in calling to account and punishing public officers for abusing or failing in their trust. 6. That no Representative may in any wise render up, or give, or take away, any of the foundations of common right, liberty, and safety contained in this Agreement, nor level men’s estates, destroy property, or make all things common; and that, in all matters of such fundamental concernment, there shall be a liberty to particular members of the said Representatives to enter their dissents from the major vote.
Ninthly. Concerning religion, we agree as followeth:—1. It is intended that the Christian Religion be held forth and recommended as the public profession in this nation, which we desire may, by the grace of God, be reformed to the greatest purity in doctrine, worship and discipline, according to the Word of God; the instructing the people thereunto in a public way, so it be not compulsive; as also the maintaining of able teachers for that end, and for the confutation or discovering of heresy, error, and whatsoever is contrary to sound doctrine, is allowed to be provided for by our Representatives; the maintenance of which teachers may be out of a public treasury, and, we desire, not by tithes: provided, that Popery or Prelacy be not held forth as the public way or profession in this nation. 2. That, to the public profession so held forth, none be compelled by penalties or otherwise; but only may be endeavoured to be won by sound doctrine, and the example of a good conversation. 3. That such as profess faith in God by Jesus Christ, however differing in judgment from the doctrine, worship or discipline publicly held forth, as aforesaid, shall not be restrained from, but shall be protected in, the profession of their faith and exercise of religion, according to their consciences, in any place except such as shall be set apart for the public worship; where we provide not for them, unless they have leave, so as they abuse not this liberty to the civil injury of others, or to actual disturbance of the public peace on their parts. Nevertheless, it is not intended to be hereby provided, that this liberty shall necessarily extend to Popery or Prelacy. 4. That all laws, ordinances, statutes, and clauses in any law, statute, or ordinance to the contrary of the liberty herein provided for, in the two particulars next preceding concerning religion, be, and are hereby, repealed and made void.
Tenthly. It is agreed, that whosoever shall, by force of arms, resist the orders of the next or any future Representative (except in case where such Representative shall evidently render up, or give, or take away the foundations of common right, liberty, and safety, contained in this Agreement), he shall forthwith, after his or their such resistance, lose the benefit and protection of the laws, and shall be punishable with death, as an enemy and traitor to the nation. Of the things expressed in this Agreement: the certain ending of this Parliament, as in the first Article; the equal or proportionable distribution of the number of the representers to be elected, as in the second; the certainty of the people’s meeting to elect for Representatives biennial, and their freedom in elections; with the certainty of meeting, sitting and ending of Representatives so elected, which are provided for in the third Article; as also the qualifications of persons to elect or be elected, as in the first and second particulars under the third Article; also the certainty of a number for passing a law or preparatory debates, provided for in the fourth Article; the matter of the fifth Article, concerning the Council of State, and of the sixth, concerning the calling, sitting and ending of Representatives extraordinary; also the power of Representatives to be, as in the eighth Article, and limited, as in the six reserves next following the same: likewise the second and third Particulars under the ninth Article concerning religion, and the whole matter of the tenth Article; all these we do account and declare to be fundamental to our common right, liberty, and safety: and therefore do both agree thereunto, and resolve to maintain the same, as God shall enable us. The rest of the matters in this Agreement we account to be useful and good for the public; and the particular circumstances of numbers, times, and places, expressed in the several Articles, we account not fundamental; but we find them necessary to be here determined, for the making the Agreement certain and practicable, and do hold these most convenient that are here set down; and therefore do positively agree thereunto. By the appointment of his Excellency the Lord-General and his General Council of Officers.
John Rushworth, Sec.
[1 ] For the Agreement of the People as originally drawn up in October, 1647, see No. 74. It is here printed with the subsequent modifications, as presented to the House of Commons on January 20. The petition which accompanied it (Old Parl. Hist. xviii. 516) was dated January 15, and that may therefore be taken as the date when the Agreement received the final approbation of the Council of the Officers.
Joyce Lee Malcom, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts, 2 vols, ed. Joyce Lee Malcolm (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 1. Chapter: William Ball, Constitutio Liberi Populi
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/810/164721 on 2010-02-05
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
William Ball
Constitutio Liberi Populi.
OR,
THE RULE
OF A
Free-born People.
BY
WILLIAM BALL
Of
BARKHAM, ESQVIRE.
In Deum Omnia.
Printed, Anno Dom. 1646.
Little information has survived about William Ball of Barkham, esquire. He and his friend Sir Francis Pile, baronet, to whom he dedicated “Constitutio Liberi Populi. . . ,” were both from Berkshire. Ball was probably the William Ball, attorney of the Exchequer Court’s Office of Pleas. If so he started out writing as a royalist pamphleteer but apparently had a change of heart by 1645 when he stood for, and was elected to, the Long Parliament for Abingdon. Certainly the views expressed in this tract published the following year would have placed him among the radicals.
The preface of the present tract is dated 12 May 1646, the month Charles I surrendered. The probable publication date was 18 June 1646. The collapse of the royal cause with the surrender of the king had provoked urgent discussion about the appropriate shape of a future government. Concerns that had arisen during the first winter of civil war, when Parliament was negotiating with the king, reemerged with greater force. Again there was the danger, as radical supporters of Parliament saw it, that members of the Commons eager for a settlement might betray the cause.
Ball’s tract makes it clear, however, that he was a champion of popular, not parliamentary, sovereignty. He insists that if a people are free-born as the English are, ultimate power resides in them, not in their government. That being so if either the king or Parliament attempted to deprive them of their rights, the people were entitled to resist. In this he differs from the Levellers who looked to representative government to protect the people. When Levellers referred to appeals to the people, they meant new elections. Their goal was to make parliaments more truly representative.
“Constitutio Liberi Populi” appeared in a single edition. Other tracts by Ball would follow. In 1648 he engaged in a lively published exchange with the imprisoned royalist judge, David Jenkins, over the power of kings and the role of the people. There is uncertainty over Ball’s activities after 1648. Although he was not purged from the Long Parliament by Colonel Pride in December of that year, he did not serve in the Rump Parliament that succeeded it. Ball’s friend Pile had been elected to Parliament about the same time as Ball and, like Ball, was not excluded during Pride’s Purge but does not seem to have sat in Parliament after that event. Both men may have been so distressed by the army’s purge of Parliament that they chose to abandon their seats. Such behavior would have accorded with Ball’s views about sovereignty residing with the people. In any event Ball continued to publish during the 1650s.
Constitutio Populi Liberi. Or, the Rule of a Free-Born People.
First, Reason is Queen-Regent of Human Affaires; by the sight whereof men discern to walke in the prudent paths of Morality and Policy, even as by the Light of the Day they discerne to tread the paths of the Earth. And albeit that this interior light of understanding is in Divine things darkened, by the fall of our first Parent, yet doth the Eternall Light ever communicate to Mankind sufficiency of Reason (I intend for worldly things) thereby to direct his goings out, and comings in (according to the unnecessitating determination of God) as it were by a cloudy Daylight, though not a cleare Sunshine, whereby the Actions of men may severally be discerned.
2. Not long since I wrote a small Treatise, intituled, Tractatus de jure Regnandi, et Regni, or the Sphear of Government,1 the which albeit I conceived that I had squared it according to the Rule of Reason; yet some conceive, that it wants its true proportion, or line, and that I have too much extended the Innate liberty of the Free-born People of England: to satisfie (or otherwise convince) such, I have published this Epitome of State-Rule, or Government, desiring all men to weigh, and consider what I have written, not with the Prejudicating Eye of Affectation (which many times misleadeth apprehensive judgments) but with the Ballance of Reason to ponder every Graine, and if the weight be just, and levell to approve, and accept of it; if somewhat too light, to adde of their own understandings what is deficient.
3. It is certain, that had Man never fell from his state of Innocence, there had been a superiority, or rather priority in Nature (viz. That the Parent should have been known and reverenced as the Instrumentall cause of the Child, &c.) but there had been no soveraignty, and consequently no subjection; for had there been no sinne there had been no need of a justiciating Power, nor a Subject to which that Power could have determinated, or terminated itself; every man’s Actions would have been regulated by the Eternall Law, written in the hearts of men; So that there had been no need of Additionall, or Nationall Lawes. Wherefore (by the way) I cannot assent to the Opinion of that Gentleman (Fortescue) who said, that all Mankind should have been governed by the Lawes of England, if Adam had not sinned in Paradise; for by his favour if Adam had never sinned [in School-Reason, or Divinity] he had either always lived in Paradice, or else finished a compleat thousand years (which the Apostle Peter calls a Day with God, 2 Pet. 3.8.) and then had he either been assumed into Heaven alive, or else (if God had decreed a separation between his Soul and Body) he had yeelded himself into the hands of his Creator, sine dolore mortis, sine timore paenae, without pain of death, or fear of punishment, and had left his Earthly habitation to his posterity, who should have possessed and enjoyed the same, without any the least contention, or controversie, regulated only by the Eternal Law aforesaid. But (to return) no sooner sinne, but with it subjection entered as a curse, and therefore God said to woman, that she should not only bring forth in pain (which God would have dispenced withall if she had not sinned) but also that her desire should be subject to her Husband, and he should reign over her, Gen. 3.16. It is very probable that if she had not sinned, she should notwithstanding have tendered a reverence to her Husband as more noble in Sex and created before her in time but she should not have rendered a subjective Obedience, if disobedience had not made her subject.
4. And albeit that subjection is a scourge of sinne, yet it hath pleased the Almighty according to his divine will, to cause some Persons, and Nations, to be more subject than other some; many times enthralling, and enslaving them by Tyrannicall, or Imperious Instruments for their sinnes (as the sacred Bookes of the Judges, Kings, and Chronicles sufficiently declare) and upon their Humiliation, or for other secret causes known to his Divine wisdome, he hath mercifully released, or mitigated their yoak, as the sacred Writ yea and human Records testifie at large. And sometimes God hath done this by speciall, or miraculous meanes, as he did to the people of Israel; sometimes by ordinary wayes, as the Florentines (albeit of late enslaved) purchased their liberty of the Emperour for money, and so also did other Cities of Italy, and elsewhere in Europe, others by plain defiance and Arms, have regained their Freedome (that is, to dispose of themselves) as did the Cantons of Switzerland, the Provinces of Holland, Zeland, &c. and either of these wayes may be said to be just; for Id Iuris est, quod Nationis est, that is lawfull, or Law which a Nation generall approveth, or admitteth of; and there need no speciall Warrant from God for anything that they shall do agreeable to their Naturall, or Human Reason, anymore than it needed to the petty Kings and people of Sodom, and Gomorrah (instanced in my former Treatise) or to the Nation of the Jewes in the time of the Machebees. And albeit that a Nation in generall should approve, and admit an erroneous Law (as I know not any Nation, State, or Parliament that is infallible) yet such Law ought to be kept, and observed as a Law, because men have power to tie and oblige themselves to inconveniences (if God prevent not and prudent Reason dictate not the contrary) as to conveniences, and their Errour being Nationally generall, must either be admitted of all persons (comprehended within their Rule) as legall just, or else permitted, because it is constituted by the highest Power human, from which there is no appeale but to God, who in his good time will either mercifully illuminate their understandings or reform their Errour, or justly chastise them for their perseverance in Errour.
5. And the Rule of a Free-born People, or a People free to dispose themselves consists in that, wherein the People in generall constitute or determine themselves, not in that wherein they are constituted; or determined, tanquam ab alio agente, by some other instrumentall cause, for then are they not free. So that it is destructive to the very Essence of their Freedome not to be able to determine themselves to that which they conceive to be Bonum commune, that being their adaequate, and proper object. And this they must not be able to do sometimes only, and originally, but perpetually, otherwise, deficiunt a libertate proprie loquendo, & sunt tantum liberi secundum quid, vel denominative; they cease to speak truly, to be free, and are only free in Denomination or a kind of Titulary Freedome; for naturall Reason dictates, that everything ceases to continue, when the Form thereof, or the Originall Form ceases to be; so that if a people can Originally dispose or determine themselves, and cannot afterwards Actually do it, their Original power, or form of disposing or determining themselves ceases to be—But it is to be noted, that no People in the world (intending to be free) subditi potius quam subjecti, and who have either conserved their Originall Freedome, or Actually regained it, do, or did ever grant a Power to one, or more or constitute a Power in one, or more that should be destructive to their intended Originall Freedome; For as John Cook of Gray’s Inne Barrester, in his Epistle Dedicatory, in a Booke entituled the Vindication of the Professours, and Profession of the Law,2 hath ingeniously said; All Power and Authority is given for preservation, and edification, nothing for destruction and desolation; so that albeit a People, or Nation, to avoid disorder, do constitute a Ruler, or Rulers to conserve Order and do generally consent to direct their human Affaires according to such Rules as shall be by him, or them, or both given or prescribed; yet they ever intend that such Rules must not be directly opposite, or against the Law of Nature, or their Naturall Liberty. If they be, they may chuse whether, or no they will admit, or receive them; they constitute, or institute their Ruler or Rulers their power extensive, but not primitive, or intensive, that is to say, their innate and inseperable Freedome ever intended to dispose, or determine themselvs, In bonum commune prout omnibus visum erit, this they never part, or parted withall; for at what time soever they should do it, they cease to be Populus liber, or liberi subdita, a free People, or a People which are freely under a Law by common consent as aforesaid—And of this I shall instance a similitude in Nature: The Element of Water is not of itselfe extensively coloured, but is apt or applicable to receive any colour; yet it is intensively white (it being Nature’s Innocent Originall colour) as is sufficiently discerned, when it is converted into Snow, or congealed into Ice, or praecipitated Torrent-like, by an extraordinary fall. So People or Nations are not of themselvs extensively regulated but apt or applicable to receive any Rule, which they, whom they institute, or intrust, shall apply unto them; howsoever they are intensively free to dispose themselves (it being their Natural-Innocent-Originall Rule) as is sufficiently discerned by the severall Alterations of Government in Athens, Rome, Geneva, Switzerland, Holland, and many other places, where the people’s affections have been either congealed by their over-domineering Lords (as it were creatures of the second Region of the Aire) or (Torrent-like) have been praecipitated by an extraordinary fall, occasioned by some violent disturbers of their common Liberty (τὸ ἀνθρόπινον ἀγαθὸν) the generall benefit of Mankind. For my part, Anathema be to such, who desire to deprive a King of His just Prerogative; Anathema be to such, who desire to deprive a Parliament of their just Priviledge: but Anathema Maranatha3 be to such who should any way desire to deprive a Free-born People of their just Liberty, or Propriety.
6. Nor can I conceive, but that the English Nation, or People are (if rightly considered) one of the most freest Nations in the World; for they cause, or require their Kings to take their Oaths to conserve their Lawes and Liberties, before the Crown actually invest their Temples; thereby shewing that they reserve, and intend their generall Liberty and Propriety. And albeit, that a King of England have his Ius Regnandi, or Right of Reigning by Inheritance as I have instanced in my former Treatise; yet illud jus quamvis sit quoad potentiam, sive officium potestatis derivativum, est tamen quoad exercitium potestatis Relativum, that Right of Reigning, although it be derivative in respect of the King’s personall Authority, or rather Office for Authority, yet is it relative in respect of his Exercising, or performing that Authority; for though the people obey the King as their chiefe Ruler, or Magistrate before his Oath taken, yet it is ever with reference, or relation, that He should take His Oath for their preservation, and good in generall, and performe the same; otherwise they have recourse to their primitive, or intensive power, as in the case of Edward the second, from whom Sir William Trussell, Speaker of the Parliament, in the name of all men, or people of England, constrained, or took his Royall Office, or Authority; or to speak more truly, deprived him of it, without any former precedent, exercising the intensive power of the people; for Trussell said not to EDWARD the second, in the Name of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, or in the Names of the Commons assembled in Parliament, but in the Name of all men or people of England, &c. thereby expressing, or manifesting the People’s Primitive, or intensive Power, more than the Parliament’s secundary or extensive Authority.
7. And as the English Nation, or People cause their Kings formally to swear, or take their Oaths to conserve their Lawes, and Liberties; so they cause the Parliament (I meane the Body collective, or representative of the People, viz. the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses) to take their Oaths (if not formally) yet at the least virtually, to conserve their generall Liberty, and Propriety, to do all good they may for the places that intrust them; all which they faithfully promise at their Elections. So that the English Nation, or People never gave, or voluntarily assented, that their Kings, or Parliaments, or Both, should have an absolute Domineering, or Arbitrary power over them, but only a Discretive, or Legall Authority intended ever for their good in generall; their ever reserved, and as it were Essentiall Propriety.
8. Wherefore I cannot but marvell at such (whether Kingly Royalists, or Parliamentary Realists, in this case it makes no matter) as by a kind of Idolizing King, or Parliament, or King and Parliament, would suppose, or perswade the People that their Lives, Liberties, and Proprieties are disposable by King, and Parliament, ad Placitum; one John Cook of Graye’s Inne Barrister,4 by me already cited, hath in his Vindication of the Professours, and Profession of the Law inserted, that I have in my former Book, intituled, The Spheer of Government,5 introduced a dangerous Opinion, by putting, or stating a supposition, or rather a Praesuppositive case, that if King, and Parliament, or King, or Parliament, should make an Act that they would, and might dispose of all Subjects’ Estates in England (he should have added ad Placitum, for those are my words) that in such case the Counties, Cities, and Townes corporate might if not remedied declare, and protest against such an Act, if violated, then they might defend themselves by Armes. And to convince this my Assertion, in the next Page, he sayes, if the supream Court be not supream to all intents, it is not supream to any intent, because there is an higher above it. This is no good consequence; for a Power (and consequently a Court of Power) may bee supream to some things, yet not to all. The King of Polande, for life, is supreame to appoint what place he thinks fit within the Precincts of the Dominions of Poland for the convening or assembling the Diets, or Courts of the Peers Spirituall and Temporall of that Kingdome; and the King of Poland is also supreame to censure, or punish any of his owne Tenants, and Vassals, or Slaves; yet is he not supreame to censure, or punish any of the chiefe Nobility, but by consent of his Assembly, or Court of Peers; nor can hee meddle with any of their Tenants, Vassals, or Slaves; or determine absolutely of Peace or Warre, &c. In the Common-Wealth of Geneva (which he calls a pure Democracy) the People in generall are supreame to nominate, or elect Two Hundred which are the Grand-Councell; and those Two Hundred are supreame to nominate, or elect the Twenty five, and yet not supreame to elect the foure Syndiques, or Annuall Governours, or rather Rulers, &c. So that it is no good consequence (as afore-said) to affirme that, if the Supreame Court be not supreame to all intents, it is not supreame to any intent, because there is another above it. For in Geneva it is evident, that the Two Hundred or Grand-Councell, is the supreame Court, and yet not supream to all Intents; the People indeed, or Common-Wealth in generall, (which are the supreame Power, though not Court) are supreame to all Intents; but of that hereafter.
9. But the Gentleman sayes, that there are in the Kingdome so many thousand Acres of Land, either the Parliament may settle, and determine the Right of all their Acres (hee meant surely those Acres) or not of any one of them, for there is no medium, &c. But what is this to the purpose, of the Parliament having a power to dispose of all Subjects’ Estates ad placitum? Who knowes not, but that the Parliament can determine the Right of all Acres in England, in foro judicii, as v. g. the Parliament can determine whether White Acre belong to Right to Oakes, or Stiles, let the Title of either of them be never so difficult, or obscure, and the Parliament can determine whether or no, Oakes or Stiles have forfeited their Propriety of, or to White Acre for Delinquency, &c. Moreover the Parliament can (which no other Court can doe) applicare in necessitatem Regni, apply to, or for the necessity of the Kingdome so much of the profits of White Acre, as to them shall seeme convenient; provided that the cause, or causes thereof be made manifest, that Oakes, Stiles, and all men may (if they will) take notice thereof; and provided also, that an Accompt be given how and which way the profits of White Acre have beene for such cause, or causes applied, and disposed of; for no Free-born Englishman (much lesse the Nation in generall) ought to be deprived of any his Right, or propriety without good cause. Notwithstanding the Parliament of England cannot disponere ad Placitum, dispose at their will and pleasure barely of White Acre (no, nor of one Acre of waste in England) v. g. that whereas White Acre belongs of Right to Oakes, Stiles shall notwithstanding have it because it is their will and pleasure; this they cannot doe; for at what time they should do it (albeit I suppose it almost impossible that they should do it, as I have formerly instanced) they faile, or fall from the Protection of the People, and usurpe to themselves an absolute Arbitrary and irregular Power, destructive to the generall good of the People and consequently cease to be a Parliament, and become Tyrants and Oppressors.
10. I cannot therefore but somewhat admire, that a Lawyer, and one that seemeth unto me to have understood Logic, should be (having been as it seemes to me sometimes seasoned with Intellectuals) so unsound in his Intellectuals, as not to distinguish between Disposing at Pleasure, and Determining of Right, or setling according to Right, being things of a different species, and not magis, or minus, in the same species. But it is not amisse to take a little notice how the Gentleman opposes himself; in his Book Page 4. he sayes, it is resolved in the Earl of Leicester’s Case, that an Act of Parliament against the Law of God and Nature is void; but this must be cautiously understood (sayes he) that I speak not of secundary, or lesse principalls of Nature, &c. Pray let him tell me, whether to dispose of Oakes’, or Stiles’ white Acre ad Placitum, be not directly against the Law of God and Nature; the Decalogue sayes, Thou shalt not steale; Thou shalt not desire thy Neighbour’s house, &c. And Nature dictates, doe, as thou wouldst be done unto. Now he, or they that dispose at their owne pleasure, of their Neighbour’s Acre, or Acres, do steale, for that he, or they deprive their Neighbour, or Neighbours of their Right, and Propriety; they covet also, for that they desire, and acquire to themselves a power of disposing at pleasure; they oppose also directly the Law of Nature, for they would not have anyone to dispose of their Propriety ad Placitum, or at their own wills, and therefore ought not to doe it to another; so that if the King and Parliament should make an Act, or King, or Parliament make an Ordinance, that they might dispose of all Subjects’ Estates, ad Placitum, &c. they oppose the Law of God and Nature, and even by his own citation, and assertion, it is void. And I am sure it is also directly opposite to the Rule, frame, and constitution of a free Nation (such as are the English, being no Turkish, or Muscovian slaves) where the Rulers and Governours are but intrusted (as I in my former Treatise have instanced) for the generall good of the Nation. And the Gentleman, albeit he hath cavelled at me in the latter end of his Book, yet hath he confessed, and acknowledged as much in his Epistle Dedicatory in two severall places. The first is by me already cited, notwithstanding I will mention the words again; which are, all Power and Authority is given for Preservation, and Edification, nothing for destruction, and desolation; the others in the same page are, for by the fundamental constitutions of this Kingdom, and the very frame and series of Government, the Power is intrusted into their hands to superintend and supervise all other Courts of Justice. Now surely if Power be intrusted to the Parliament (as truly it is) then can they not go beyond their Trust to dispose of the Free People of England their Estates, ad Placitum, but only to determine of them, ad Rectum, or Ius, or to apply them ad necessitatem Regni, to or for the necessity of the Kingdome, of which necessity they are the Judges. The Gentleman sayes, that many a man marries a widow that would be gladly rid of her children. For my part, I know not whether, or no, the Gentleman be married; or whether he have married a Maid, or Widow, but I am sure (if he rightly consider it) he may be glad to be rid of his sickbrain begotten Childe [his Asserveration that the Parliament is unlimited, and consequently may dispose of all the Subjects’, or Peoples’ Estates, ad Placitum] for I verily believe, that no man found in his Intellectuals will harbour it, or give it entertainment, nor can himself sustain it.
11. I grant him that the Parliament is the highest Court extensive (viz. to conserve the Rule, Order, &c.) but the People in generall (viz. the Counties, Cities, and Towns corporate) are the highest, or greatest Power Intensive, in that they are the efficient, and finall cause under God, of the Parliament. Now the efficient and finall causes are the most noble of causes, nor are they, or can they be subject, or subordinate to their owne effects, so farre forth as they are causes of such effects; so that the Parliament can never deprive the Counties, Cities, and Towns Corporate, by an Act, or Ordinance whatsoever, of their innate, and inseparable Right and Power of Electing, or creating Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, de futuro, or for time to come, whereby a Parliament might be instituted, or assembled by any other way, than by way of free Election. No more can the Parliament deprive the free People, or Nation of England, of their Generall Liberty, and propriety, for in these things the Sphear of the Parliament’s Activity is circumscribed by the Nation’s large Bulke of Primitive, or intensive Power. Wherefore the Gentleman mistakes when he sayes page 89. It is impossible that the supreame Court in any Kingdome should be limited, &c. In these Precedents, amongst free Nations all supreame Courts are de facto, limited; as in Aragon, Geneva &c.
And for my part, I cannot find that the Parliament Practiceth an unlimited or absolute Power, for amongst other things they have instituted Committees, and Sub-Committees of Accompts, not only to vindicate themselves from the scandall imputed by some, (viz. that the Parliament should exact more from the people than the necessity of the Kingdome required, &c.) but also to give the people a generall satisfaction, how, and which way their Estates are applied, and imployed for the Necessity of the Kingdome.
12. And now I think good further to satisfie the Gentleman and such as adhere or incline to his opinion aforesaid, concerning the Primitive or Intensive power of a free People. I have already said that a free People are ever free to dispose, and determine themselves in Bonum commune, prout omnibus vissum erit, to a generall common good, as it shall seeme good to themselves: and that they never part, or parted with this power, for that at what time soever they should doe it they cease to be Populus liber, or liberi subditi, a free People &c. And to make this Assertion more conspicuous, and plaine, I instance this simile; Joint Free-holders, or Free-holders jointly, let a Lease for one thousand, or two thousand yeares, if the World endure so long, with reservation notwithstanding of a continuall acknowledgment to themselves, or otherwise the said Lease shall determine, and cease to be, and it shall be lawful for the said Free-holders, their Heires, or Successours to reenter into the said Free-hold, or Free-holds, and to dispose and settle them, at their pleasure. Even so a free Nation, or People let a Lease of their power for one thousand, two thousand, ten thousand yeares if the World so long endure, (no matter what time) to their Rulers (whom they institute and intrust) in which they give and grant power to them of Determining conserving, and applying their Liberties, Rights, and Proprieties justly, So to the particular good of every man, as may not repugne the generall good of all; so to the generall good of all men, as may not annihilate the particular good of one unjustly, or indirectly; with reservation notwithstanding of a continuallacknowledgment to, or for themselves, that they (viz. the Nation, or People) are the efficient cause of their power, by electing, and creating them; and that they are not to domineer over, or dispose of their Liberties, and Proprieties, ad placitum, but only to determine of them ad Rectum, and apply them to the generall good of the Kingdome, according to the necessity of the Kingdome, Nation, or People, as aforesaid; if otherwise their Power determines, and ceases to be; and it may be lawfull for the Nation or People to re-enter viz. to make use of their first primitive power, and to dispose and settle themselves at their pleasure, or as they shall think good. And even as the Free-holders cease not to be Free-holders, notwithstanding their long Lease, for that there is a Reservation of a continuall acknowledgment due unto them, and a power of Re-entry in case of Breach of Covenants, and the like; even so a free Nation, or people, cease not at any time to be free, notwithstanding their long Lease of Trust, for that there is a Reservation of a continuall acknowledgment belonging unto them (viz. that they are the efficient cause, de saeculo in saeculum, from Age to Age) and they have likewise a power of using their power primitive, and intensive, or power alwayes intended and reserved, in cases aforesaid. Notwithstanding, as the Free-holders cannot re-enter, but only in case of Breach of Covenant aforesaid; for if otherwise they do it, they are meere usurpers, and Oppressours; so the free Nations, or people cannot use their primitive, or intensive power, but only when the fundamental frame of their Efficient Power and their Liberties, and Proprietie are destroyed or violated ad placitum, as aforesaid, if otherwise they doe it they are meer Rebels and Anarchists, for they have intrusted all their other Judiciall Power concerning Determination, Conservation, and Application to their Rulers.
13. The Gentleman whom I have formerly cited hath said in his Book, that he never heard or read of anything more prejudiciall to the Parliament’s Authority, than my Assertion in my last Book, and in this, (viz. that the Parliament cannot dispose of the Free-people, or Subjects’ Estates here in England, ad placitum; but I must tell him that I never read of a more prejudicious, or pernicious to the Parliament, than to say that they may doe it; for what say many of the vulgar; if the Parliament may dispose of our Estates at their pleasure, how shall wee know that they will not? If any man tell them, that it is very unlikely, that so many will never consent to doe such a thing, for that they might by that means enslave their own Posterities. What say they, if they can dispose of all the Subjects’ Estates ad placitum, for ought we know they might exempt themselves, their Heires, and Successours; and likewise for ought we know they might make a Law that they will no more be Elected, or created by the Counties, Cities, and Townes Corporate, but by a perpetuall Denomination by, or from themselves. And what can be of more dangerous consequence, than that such an Opinion, or Opinions as these should once take root in the mindes of the Common People? And what can sooner cause them to take root than that they finde and reade a printed Booke allowed of to that purpose? But if one tell the vulgar, that the Parliament cannot dispose of the Subjects’ Estates ad placitum, or meerly at their pleasure, but that they can only apply in an equall way the Estates of the People to, or for the necessity of the Kingdome, of which Necessity they are the Judges; and likewise that the PARLIAMENT cannot make a Law, or Ordinance, that the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, shall, or may be appointed, or denominated by themselves (thereby to alter the frame and constitution of this NATION) but that they must perpetually from Age to Age be Elected, or created by the Counties, Cities and Towns Corporate; then they begin to harbour a better Opinion, and are more inclinable to undergoe their Ordinances. And I believe that the intent why the HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS published lately a Declaration the Seventeenth of April, 1646.6 Ordered to be read in Churches, was to undeceive the People that they never had any thought to dispose of their Estates ad placitum, and so forth; for they expresly say, and Declare, To maintain the Ancient and Fundamentall Government of this Kingdome, to preserve the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, &c. Wherefore I would not have the Gentleman, or any other to run beyond the marke; I like not Quid nimis, it hath been the cause of many Enormities in Church and Common-wealth. For my part I wish, as I have ever wished, and formerly expressed myselfe, that the King might enjoy his just Prerogative (as some call it) or Right of Reigning; and I wish, and desire as much as any other, that the Parliament might sustain their Priviledges, and Judicatory Power. But I could never suffer, nor would I if it were in my power any way to prevent it, endure that my Nation, or Fellow-Subjects should be enslaved by any Exorbitant Power (Potentate or Potencies) Forrain or Domestic; And I doubt not, but that the Ruler of Heaven and Earth will by his Divine Providence establish such Rulers and Rules in this KINGDOME, as may be a meanes to conserve this Nation from slavery and thraldome, AMEN.
Furthermore, having in my former Treatise and in this affirmed that the Parliament is the supreame Power Judicatory to censure and determine all matters doubtful, and disputable (for such hath been the constitution of this Kingdom for many Ages) I conceive therefore that the Parliament may, and have only Power to settle what form of Religion they shall think good; and albeit they should erre therein (as Parliaments may erre, and some de facto have erred) yet their Ordinances oblige Iure humano; that is, men ought either to obey such Ordinances, or if otherwise their Consciences dictate such Ordinances to be erroneous, they ought to undergoe such penalties as should be by them inflicted if they should impose or ordain any such. And as it is in the power of the Parliament to inflict penalties, so is it in their power to mitigate penalties, or inflict none at all for matter of Religion; wherefore for my part I greatly honour and reverence the care that the Parliament seemeth to take, and which the Honourable House of Commons have published in their Declaration 17. April 1646. already mentioned, That they have not as yet resolved how tender Consciences, such as differ not in Fundamentals may be provided for, so as may stand with the peace of their soules, and peace of the Kingdome; thereby intimating that they intend not to use severity, for matters of Religion meerly (a course though practiced by Pagans, befitting no men, much lesse Christians) but rather by clemency to induce men to embrace, or follow such Orders, or Ordinances touching Religion, as they shall institute. Moreover, I cannot but greatly blame such as would save men’s Consciences wrackt and enforced in disputable matters, or Tenets of Religion; such as blame Domineering in others, and yet would exercise it themselvs not considering what the Apostle Pet. hath written, I. Pet. 5.3 μηδ’ ὡς κατακυριεύοντες τῶν κλήρων ἀλλὰ τύποι γινόμενοι τοῦ ποιμνίου that Rulers should not be as over-domineering Lords or Christ’s Flock, but as Types, or examples to the flock; nor do such consideratly weigh the Apostles’ words, Gal. 6.1 Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spirituall, restore such a one in the spirit of meeknesse, considering thy selfe, least thou also be tempted. He bids them not menace, much lesse persecute for errour, nay the Apostle directly forbids it, Gal. 5.15. But if ye bite, and devour one another take heed ye be not consumed one of another, as if he had said, if ye break the Bond of Christian Charity, take heed least God give you not over to your malicious intentions and practices, by which ye may become Instruments one to destroy another. The holy Apostle likewise Rom. 14.10. forbiddeth men directly not so much as to judge a Brother for things indifferent, or for things which Christian Liberty in Christ giveth leave unto; for saith he, We shall all stand before the Judgement Seat of Christ: but it may be some will say, these, and such like Councels, or Precepts of the Apostle were spoken, or delivered by him concerning meeknesse, to be used in admonishing our Brethren, in errours meerly of Practice not of Doctrine, or in things not cleerly expressed in Scripture, not in things evident and plain in Scripture. To such I answer; what are the great matters in debate and controversie, or rather small matters in great strife, and contention now adayes agitated, but either matters meerly Practicall or exteriour Formes of Worship and Ceremonies, whether tollerable, or intollerable; or else matters obscure, or but by probable Arguments deducible out of Scripture, as Lay-Elders (a Businesse now of dayes, of no small consequence) whether they be not sufficiently warranted by this Text I Tim. 5.17. Let the Elders that rule well, be counted worthy of double honour, especially they who labour in the Word and Doctrine; the Greek hath it, οἱ κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ “labouring in Word and Doctrine,” and from hence it must be deduced forsooth, that there were some Elders that did not labour in the Word and Doctrine, and consequently that such were Laymen. Truly others that are as sound in their judgments (it may be) as those that make this Deduction, will say that the meaning of that Text is this viz. Presbyters (or Elders) that rule well be accompted worthy of double honour in respect of the younger or inferiour; but chiefly such as beside their care, and ordinary performance of their charge labour extraordinarily in Preaching, and exhorting or edifying; even as one might say, let Civill Magistrates that govern well be counted worthy of double honour, in respect of other ordinary, and inferiour Persons; but chiefly such as beside their care, and ordinary performance of their Offices, according to their Oathes, and Duties, labour extraordinarily for the Publique good, by advising, and consulting. I doe not finde that it could be deduced from this last inference, that Clergiemen were, or ought to be Civill Magistrates; nor can I finde that it can well be deduced from the Apostle’s words, that Laymen ought to be Presbyters, or Church-Elders: and yet a great deale of stirre is kept about this businesse, and such like; And some would faine have their but probable Deductions, if so much, to be Orthodoxal Expositions, and so to be held de jure Divino, that’s no presumption. But by the favor of such, I would fain know whether they are infallible, or no; if no, why would they then impose their Expositions de Jure Divino; if they are infallible, I would gladly know how they now come by such an extraordinary gift of Infallibility, and that the World (by their own acknowledgment) hath wanted it for so many Ages, as they say, in all Ages since the Apostles’ time; as I have said, that in Civill Affaires there should not be Quid nimis; so I say in Church-Affaires and wish that men (for alas what are we all but men) would not take upon them Quid nimis, especially in matters either indifferent, or else obscure, and difficult or such as may admit of severall interpretations, and Constructions. I will instance for Example sake one Text of Scripture; viz. ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος &c. In the beginning was the word, &c. All Divinity tells us that Eternity is Identicum nunc, the selfe-same now, and that it hath neither Prius or Postivius, beginning, or ending; what beginning then can the Eternall Word (or Sonne of God) have? No beginning in time, because Eternall, nor in Nature because Increate. What beginning then? Or what may the word Beginning in that place signifie? Some will have the meaning of that Text to be this; In the beginning when the World was created, the word (verbum mentis) of the Father’s understanding was, and so if that were in the Beginning, that was before all Beginning; but this is no good consequence, sayes an Arrian, for the word might bee before the World, and yet be a patre tanquam effectus a causa, be as an effect caused by God the Father, and so have some beginning (as every effect hath) though before the World and to hold this is Heresie, for that the Father is not causa filii, but only Principium filii, not the cause, but naturall beginning of the Sonne. Others will have the meaning to be thus; in that beginning, or instant (which was, and is ever, or Eternall) wherein the Father knew formally his Essence, and Attributes, he spake, or begot the word of his mind, or understanding, being a Terme of his infinite Knowledge, not produced by necessity, or will, but emanating, or flowing as it were by naturall faecundity. Others will have the meaning to be thus; in that beginning or instant aforesaid, wherein the Father knew not only formally his Essence, and attributes, but also all creatures possible and existent he spake or begot the word of his mind or understanding; for say they, the word which is the Terme of the Father’s infinite Knowledg, is a perfectissima, & plenissima cognitione ejus, from his most perfect, and fullest knowledge; and from hence arise divers Arguments pro & contra, not only between the Thomists, Scotists, and other School-men, but also amongst other sorts, or Sects of Christians; but must men for these or the like disputable differences cut one another’s throats, or persecute one another? God forbid, there is not the least warrant in the New Testament for it. In the time of our blessed Saviour’s passing his humanity on the Earth, some there were casting out Devils in his Name, whom his Disciples forbad because they followed not Christ as they did; but our Saviour rebuked them, and bade them suffer them, and let them alone, saying he, or they that are not against us, are with us, adding moreover that it was not likely that any one should doe a miracle in his Name and speak ill of him. Our Saviour said not, that such as workt miracles in his Name should confesse, and speake all that ought to be confessed, and spoken of, or to his honour; but that such as spake not ill of him should (if they confessed his Name) be permitted, or suffered in this World. And shall not we then suffer one another in matters of Religion? Shall we ambitiously compasse our Neighbour’s goods, or meanes, under pretence of Religion, thereby scandalizing Christianity. No! Let all self-ends be abolished, and Peace and Union be embraced that we of this Nation may become an Elisium of comfort of Christian Charity, and mutuall Amity, one to another, and a Precedent of them all to other Nations.
William Ball
finis.
[1. ]William Ball, “Tractatus de Jure Regnandi & Regni: or, the Sphere of Government,” (25 October) 1645. Wing B597.
[2. ]John Cook, “The Vindication of the Professors and Profession of the Law. By way of Answer to a printed Sheet intituled Advertisements of the New Election of Members for the House of Commons,” [6 February] 1646. Thomason Tracts E320 (17).
[3. ]This expression means a thing accursed.
[4. ]See reference on p. 287.
[5. ]See Ball, “Tractatus,” 13.
[6. ]“A Declaration of the Commons of their true Intentions concerning the Government of the Kingdom, the Government of the Church, the present Peace, etc.” (London), April 17, 1646. Wing E2562. Note by George Thomason states that four thousand copies were ordered to be printed, distributed throughout the “county,” and set up in every parish church.
Joyce Lee Malcom, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts, 2 vols, ed. Joyce Lee Malcolm (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 1. Chapter: Francis Rous, The Lawfulnes of Obeying the Present Government
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/810/164728 on 2010-02-05
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
[Francis Rous, the Elder, 1579-1659]
THE
LAWFULNES
Of obeying the
Present Government
Proposed
By one that loves all Presbyterian lovers of Truth and Peace, and is of their Communion.
John 7.24
Judge not according to the appearance, but judge righteous judgement.
Printed at London for John Wright, at the Kings Head in the Old Bailey. 1649.
If the attribution is correct it was at the age of seventy, after an already long career as a prominent Puritan divine, a member of Parliament, and a pamphleteer that Francis Rous wrote “The Lawfulnes of Obeying the Present Government” in defense of the new-modeled English government. He had set to work within a month of the publication of Parliament’s “Declaration,” and the tract appeared on 25 April 1649.
Rous was born in Devonshire, was educated at Oxford, and was step-brother to John Pym. In both religion and politics he was a vociferous member of the Presbyterian party. He already had published numerous religious tracts by the outbreak of the civil war. Shortly before the king’s execution he switched from the Presbyterian to the triumphant independent party.
Rous’s parliamentary career began with the first parliament of Charles I. He was to sit in every subsequent Parliament, including those of the Interregnum, until his death in 1659. In the Parliament of 1628 he was notable for his violent attack on Roger Maynwaring and “popery.” In the Long Parliament it was he who began the debate on the legality of Archbishop Laud’s new canons of 1640. He was speaker of the parliament of 1653. And in 1656 Rous was one of those selected to urge Cromwell to accept the crown.
The arguments Rous relied upon to urge obedience to the new regime were a break with the past. Rather than defending the legality of the Rump’s assumption of power, he argued that even an unlawful government could and should be obeyed. “It must not be looked at what he is that exercises the power,” he maintained, or “by what manner he does dispense it, but only if he have power.” Why? Because all power came of God. Moreover, not to obey those in power would cause chaos. In short, Rous turned to the arguments many royalists had used to insist upon obedience to the king. It was the most pragmatic sort of appeal, one Thomas Hobbes would endorse in Leviathan. “The Lawfulnes of Obeying the Present Government” was designed to win over the war-weary enemies of the regime. But despite its moderate tone, its arguments provoked a furor. Three replies were published within weeks, one of which is reprinted below. Within four months Rous brought out a second edition of the tract with additions, while a third edition was published in 1650. An expert on the pamphlets of the period judges that Rous’s was the one tract we can assume all his successors had read. The reasonable tone he adopted was one of his bequests to them. The first edition is reprinted below.
A Declaration hath been lately published,1wherein the grounds are exprest of setling the present Government, with which if any be not so far satisfied as to think that Settlement lawfull, yet even to such is this Discourse directed, which proposeth Proofes, that though the change of a Government were beleeved not to be lawfull, yet it may lawfully be obeyed.
The Apostle intreating of purpose upon the duty of submission and obedience to Authority, layes down this precept; Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God; the powers that are, are ordained of God; and hereupon infers, Wherefore ye must needs be subject not only for wrath, but for conscience’ sake. And that he speakes not in this place meerly of power or authority abstracted from persons, but of persons cloathed with that authority, appeares in that he saith; For, rulers are not a terrour to good workes. So that he speakes of persons ruling, as well as of the power by which they rule. And againe, He is the Minister of God, and they are God’s Ministers; & accordingly he directs Timothy, to pray for a blessing upon those that are in authority. Now if the Powers, Rulers, and those that were in authority in that time were ordained of God, and were to be obeyed for conscience’ sake, let us consider how lawfully they came into that power, rule, and authority. This Epistle most probably, if not certainly, was written in the time of Claudius Caesar, or Nero, the former of which banished the Jews out of Rome, upon which occasion Aquila and Priscilla came out to meet with Paul at Corinth: and by the sentence of the latter, Paul having made his appeale to Caesar finished his course, and passed unto a crowne of righteousnesse. And now, behold the lawfulnesse by which these two persons came to be invested in their power and authority.
Of Claudius Caesar the Story tells us this; After the death of Gaius Caligula, the Consuls and Senate of Rome entered into a consultation, how they might restore the Common-wealth to her ancient freedom, which by the Caesars had been taken from them. So that the taking in of an Emperour, and consequently of Claudius for Emperour, was directly against the wills and resolution of the Counsuls and Senate; yet these anciently for many hundred yeares had the chiefe power of Government. But see the way of Claudius his coming to the Empire; during the Interregnum, Claudius being frighted with the newes of Caligula’s death, and fearing himselfe might be enquired for upon suspicion withdrew, and hid himselfe behind the Hangings, or covering of a doore; where a Souldier seeing his feet, and desirous to know what he was drew him forth, and upon knowledge of him saluted him Emperour, though even then for feare falling downe low before him. This one Souldier brought him forth to his fellow Souldiers, who lifted him up as Emperour; and thus while the Senate was slow in executing their purposes, and differences grew among them, Claudius, who was sent for by the Senate to give in his councell concerning the common freedome, undertooke the Empire. Thus in one Souldier at first, and then in more, was the foundation of Claudius his Emperiall power, against the will, consultations, and endeavours of Consuls and Senate. And for Nero (his Successor) Britannicus, who was nearer of kin to Claudius, being his Son, was kept in by the cunning of Nero’s mother, and by the same craft Nero being brought forth to the Souldiery, was first saluted Emperour by them. This sentence of the Souldiers was followed with the consent of the Senate, and then it was not scrupled in the Provinces; so that the Souldiery was also the foundation of Nero’s Empire. Thus we see Rulers put by Souldiers into that power which is said by the Scripture to be ordained of God; and even to these Rulers men must be subject for conscience.
But passing from the Romane state to our owne; sure we are that in this Nation many persons have beene setled in supreame power and authority by meere force without title of inheritance, or just conquest. And it hath been observed by some that accurately have looked into our story, that not any three immediately succeeding each other, came to the Crowne by true lineall succession and order of blood. Neither is there any great difficulty in finding it, untill we come to Queene Mary, whose title being by an incestuous marriage,2 these observers say that Queene Elizabeth should have raigned in her stead. However, we are cleerly told by story, that five Kings on a row (of which the Conquer was the first) had no title at all by lineall descent and proximity of blood. The first came in by force; The second and third had an elder Brother living when they came to the Crowne; The fourth raigned when his Predecessor had a Daughter, and Heire living which was Mawd the Empresse; The fifth being the Son of that Empresse, raigned while his Mother was alive, by whom his Title came. But leaving these, and Edward the third who raigned in his Father’s lifetime, and the three Henries; fourth, fifth, and sixth, who raigned upon the Lancastrian (that is a younger Brother’s) Title, Let us more particularly consider Henry the seventh. This Henry came in with an Army, and by meere power was made King in the Army, and by the Army; so that in the very field where he got the Victory, the Crowne was set upon his head, and there he gave Knighthood to divers. And upon this foundation of military power, he got himselfe afterwards to be solemnely Crowned at Westminster. And soone after upon authority thus gotten, he called a Parliament, and in that Parliament was the Crowne entailed upon him and his Heires. Thus both his Crowne and his Parliament were founded upon power. As for any right Title, he could have none; for he came from a Bastard of John of Gaunt, which though legitimated by Parliament for common Inheritances, yet expressely was excluded from right to the Crowne. And for his wive’s Title, that came in after his Kingship, and his Parliament, which before had setled the Crowne upon him and his Heirs. And he was so farre from exercising authority in her right, that her name is not used in any Lawes as Queene Marie’s was, both before and after her marriage with the Spanish King. Now this and the rest who came in by meere power without Title of inheritance, being in their opinion who are now unsatisfied, to be held unlawfull, yet the maine body of this Nation did obey them, whilst they ruled, yea doth yield subjection to their Lawes to this very day. And the learned in the Lawes doe continually plead, judge, justify, and condemne according to these Lawes. So that herein the very voice of the Nation with one consent seemes to speake aloud; That those whose title is held unlawfull, yet being possest of authority may lawfully be obeyed.
And hereunto Divines and Casuists give their concurrence; among them one that is resolute both for Monarchy and lineall Succession, thus expresseth his judgement, both for seeking of right and justice from an usurper (whom he calleth a Tyrant, in regard of an unjust Title, not in respect of Tyranicall oppression) and for obeying his commands. First, that Subjects may lawfully seek justice of him; And secondly, that if his commands be lawfull and just, they must be obeyed. And another well esteemed in the Reformed Churches, is of the same judgement.
Pareus saith, That it matters not by what means or craft Nimrod, Jeroboam, got Kingdomes to themselves; For the power is one thing which is of God, and the getting and the use of the power is another.3 And after: The beginning of Nimrod’s power was indeed evill, as to the getting and usurping power, because abusing his strength, force, & wealth, he violently subdued others, and compelled them to obey; but not the power or force wherewith he seemed to be indeed by God, above others: And another more plainely. When a question is made whom we should obey; it must not be lookt at what he is that exerciseth the power, or by what right or wrong he hath invaded the power, or in what manner he doth dispence it, but only if he have power. For if any man doe excell in power, it is now out of doubt, that he received that power of God; wherefore without all exception thou must yield thyselfe up to him, and heartily obey him.
And indeed how can it be otherwise? For when a person or persons have gotten Supreme power, and by the same excluded all other from authority, either that authority which is thus taken by power must be obeyed, or else all authority and government must fall to the ground, & so confusion (which is worse than tituler Tyranny) be admitted into a Common-wealth; And (according to the doctrine of King James) the King being for the Common-wealth, and not the Common-wealth for the King, the end should be destroyed for the meanes, the whole for a part. If a Master’s mate had throwne the Master over Board, and by power would suffer no other to guide the Ship but himselfe; if the Marriners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the Ship, the Ship must needs perish and themselves with it. And whereas some speake of a time for setlement, they indeed do rather speak for a time of unsetlement; for they will have an unsetlement first, and a setlement after. And whereas like doth produce its like; yet they would have an unsetlement to beget a setlement. They would have confusion, distraction, destruction, to bring forth order and safety. But the former Scriptures speake not of the future, but of the present time; not of obeying those that shall be powers, and shall be in authority; but the powers that are, and those that are in authority. Neither doe the Casuists and Divines speake of obedience to those that shall be setled but those that are in actuall possession of authority. Neither did our Ancestors in the former examples defer obedience to the Kings that came in by power without Title; but gave it presently, being presently vested and possessed of authority. Besides, let it be considered whether that may not be called a setlement, how soone soever it is when there is such a way setled that men may have Justice if they will, and may enjoy that maine end of Magistracie, to live a peaceable life in godlinesse and honesty.
And indeed when one is in possession by power, and another pretends a Title, what can the maine body of a Nation, which consists of the Common-people doe in this case? They cannot judge of Titles; but they see who doth visibly and actually exercise power and authority. Yea even Learned men, and Statesmen have been found ignorant of the former observations, of the not succeeding three in order of blood since the Conquest; and then how should the Common people know it? Yet further, even Peeres, chiefe Cities, Parliaments, and all having to one in every three, thus subjected themselves upon termes of power and not of right; what can be expected but that what hath been done, may or should be done hereafter? especially when in this present age obedience is given to the Lawes and Commands of those Princes? But some say that there are Oathes that justifie disobedience to the present Government. Surely Oathes are sacred bonds and reverent obligements, and where they doe not themselves leave or make us free, we are not to cut or breake them in pieces. Yet concerning these there are faults on both hands: On the one side the slighting of an Oath, (and such is the comparing it with an Almanack) which is a light as well as an unproper comparison; except it were such an Oath as was made only for a yeare; But we finde some part of the Vow and Covenant to speake of all the dayes of our lives, which doubtlesse may lie on many of the takers for many years. True it is that the obligation of some things may end, because they can no longer be kept, as that of the King’s person; for to impossible things there is no obligation: but will any man that understands, and favours Religion and Piety, say that the clauses which concerne Religion and Piety are expired? Did we promise to God in our severall places and callings, to extirpate Profanenesse, Heresie, and Blasphemy, and to endeavour a reformed life in ourselves and ours; only till our Enemies were overcome, and then to make an end? What were this but to say unto God, If thou wilt deliver us, we will be bound to thee till we are delivered and no longer? Would this invite God to deliver us from our enemies, or rather to keep our Enemies still in strength against us? Least we being delivered from our Enemies should not serve him in righteousnesse and holinesse all our lives. Surely this is too like that course of carnall Israel, of whom it is written, When he slew them, then they sought him, and they enquired early after God; but their heart was not right with him, neither were they stedfast in his Covenant. Much more piously and faithfully a reverend and truly spirituall Divine; A well grounded covenant is a sure, a firme and an irrevocable Act. When you have such an All This (and such you have) as is here concentered in the Text, to lay into, or for the foundation of the Covenant; the superstruction (is aeternitati sacrum and) must stand forever.
But on the other side there are other faults; such are the urging of an Oath or Covenant against enemies, and not against friends in one and the same Action; and if not altogether so, yet a slight and diminishing charge of it upon one, and a vehement and aggravating charge of it upon the other. Another fault may be, a stiffe insisting on one part, and a neglect, or at least silence in another part; as likewise when by event two parts of it come to be inconsistent, to chuse and inforce the keeping of the lighter or lesse necessary part, and to give way to the losse and not keeping of the greater. There is another, in racking an Oath or Covenant, to make it speake that which it meant not. And here it were good to consider, whether there be any clause in any Oath or Covenant, which in a faire and common sence forbids obedience to the commands of the present Government and Authority, much lesse when no other can be had, and so the Common-wealth must goe to ruine. And whether it forbids obedience to the present Authority more than to Lawes that have beene formerly enacted, by those which came into Authority meerly by power? If it be said that in the Oath of Allegiance, Allegiance is sworne to the King, his Heires, and Successors, if His Heires be not His Successors, how doth that Oath binde? Either the word Successors must be superfluous, or else it must binde to Successors as well as to Heires; and if it binds not to a Successor, that is not an Heire, how can it binde to an Heire that is not a Successor? And if you will know the common and usuall sence (which should be the meaning of an Oath) of the word Successors, you need not so much aske of Lawyers and learned persons, as of men of ordinary knowledge, and demand of them, Who was the Successor of William the Conqueror, and see whether they will not say, William Rufus; and who succeeded Richard the third, and whether they will not say Henry the seventh? And yet (as it appeares before) neither of them was Heire. So it seemes in the ordinary acception, the word Successor is taken for him that actually succeeds in Government, and not for him that is actually excluded. And as in Language the ordinary acception of a word is to be taken for the meaning, so that meaning is to be understood as most proper to have been taken in an Oath.
Yet withall this Quaere may be added; While the Son is in the same posture in which the Father was, how comes this Oath at this time to stand up and plead for disobedience in regard of the Son, that was asleep and silent in regard of the Father?
Thus have I gone towards peace (as I beleeve) in the way of truth; and as farre as it is truth, and no further, I desire it may be received. I also wish that those who read and examine it, may doe it (as I professe sincerely myselfe to have endeavoured) with a calme, cleare, and peaceable spirit, without prejudice or partiship. And I doubt not but to such upright seekers of Truth, Truth will appeare in a true shape; whereas partiall and prejudiced mindes speake unto Truth what they would have her speake unto them, and doe not heare her what she saith of herselfe.
finis.
[1. ]The declaration referred to is the Declaration of Parliament of March 1648/49 reprinted above.
[2. ]This reference is, of course, to the assertion that the marriage of Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon, Mary’s parents, was incestuous because Catherine had been previously married to Henry’s brother Arthur.
[3. ]Paraeus was a celebrated sixteenth-century Calvinist divine. His Commentary on Romans, cited here, offended James I by its antimonarchical principles.
Joyce Lee Malcom, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts, 2 vols, ed. Joyce Lee Malcolm (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 1. Chapter: Parliament, A Declaration of the Parliament of England
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/810/164726 on 2010-02-05
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
a
DECLARATION
of the
PARLIAMENT
of
ENGLAND,
Expressing the Grounds of their late
PROCEEDINGS,
And of Setling the present
GOVERNMENT
In the way of
A Free State.
LONDON:
Printed for Edward Husband, Printer to the Honorable House of Commons, and are to be sold at his Shop in Fleetstreet, at the Sign of the Golden-Dragon, near the Inner-Temple. March 22, 1648.
Charles Stuart, king of England, was executed on 30 January 1649. The kingdom was left without a ruler. Members of the House of Commons turned to the urgent task of remodeling the government. The House of Lords had opposed bringing the king to trial. When the Lords now offered to assist with the rebuilding, a majority of the Commons turned their wrath on them. On 6 February a resolution stating that the House of Lords was “useless and dangerous and ought to be abolished” passed the Commons without a division. The following day, 7 February, the Commons, now calling itself the Parliament of England, passed a resolution that “the office of a king in this nation, and to have the power thereof in any single person, is unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous to the liberty, safety and public interests of the people of this nation, and therefore ought to be abolished.” This too was carried without a division.
Bold decisions. Yet it was not until 17 March and 19 March that these resolutions that abolished the House of Lords and monarchy were transformed into acts. Executive authority was entrusted to a Council of State of some forty-one members. Two days later, on 22 March, the Parliament published a declaration that publicly justified their “late proceedings.” These proceedings included the trial and execution of the king as well as the abolition of the House of Lords and the monarchy.
This short but crucial constitutional document has been strangely neglected by constitutional scholars and historians. The text printed below was taken from the single English edition published. The declaration was also published in Latin as “Parliamenti Anglia Declaratio” and, presumably looking to good foreign relations, in other languages as well. Three months later a protest from the Scots Parliament was published objecting to the trial and execution of the late king. And a little more than a year later, on 31 May 1650, an anonymous tract appeared that directly attacked Parliament’s declaration.
A Declaration of the Parliament of England, Expressing the Grounds of Their Late Proceedings, and of Setling the Present Government in the Way of a Free State.
The Parliament of England, Elected by the People whom they Represent, and by them Trusted and Authorized for the Common good, having long contended against Tyranny; and to procure the well-being of those whom they serve, and to remove Oppression, Arbitrary power, and all Opposition to the Peace and Freedom of the Nation, Do humbly and thankfully acknowledge the Blessing of Almighty God upon their weak endeavors, and the hearty Assistance of the well-affected in this Work, whereby the Enemies thereunto, both publique and secret, are become unable for the present, to hinder the perfecting thereof.
And to prevent their power to revive Tyranny, Injustice, War, and all our former Evils, the Parliament have been necessitated to the late Alterations in the Government, and to that Settlement which they judge most conducible to the honor of God, and the good of the Nation, the only end and duty of all their Labors.
And that this may appear the more clearly and generally, to the satisfaction of all who are concerned in it, they have thought fit to Declare and publish the Grounds of their Proceedings.
They suppose it will not be denied, That the first Institution of the Office of King in this Nation, was by Agreement of the People, who chose one to that Office for the protection and good of them who chose him, and for their better Government, according to such Laws as they did consent unto.
And let those who have observed our Stories, recollect how very few have performed the Trust of that Office with Righteousness, and due care of their Subjects’ good.
And how many have made it their study and labor, to satisfie their particular Ambition and Power, with high Pressures and Miseries upon their Subjects; and with what horrid prodigality of Christian blood, upon Punctilio’s of their own Honor, Personal Titles, and Distastes.
And in the whole Line of them, how far hath the late King exceeded all his Predecessors, in the destruction of those whom they were bound to preserve; and instead of spreading his Protection to all, scarce permitting any to escape the violence of his fury.
To manifest this Truth, it will not be improper to take a short view of some passages in his Reign; wherein he much further out-went all his Forefathers in evil, than any Example can be found of punishment.
In the dissolution of the Parliament the second year of his Reign, and afterwards he shewed an unnatural forgetfulness, to have the violent Death of his Father examined.1 The sad business of Rochell and the Isle of Ree,2 the poor Protestants of France do yet lament. The Loans, unlawful Imprisonments, and other Oppressions, which produced that excellent Law of the Petition of Right, were most of them again acted, presently after the Law made against them; which was most palpably broken by him almost in every part of it, very soon after his Solemn Consent given unto it. His Imprisoning and prosecution of Members of Parliament, for opposing his unlawful Will; and of divers worthy Merchants, for refusing to pay Tunnage and Poundage, because not granted by Parliament, yet exacted by him expresly against Law; and punishment of many good Patriots, for not submitting to whatsoever he pleased to demand, though never so much in breach of the known Law. The multitude of Projects and Monopolies, established by him; His Design and Charge to bring in GermanHorse to awe us into Slavery;3 and his hopes of compleating all by his Grand Project of Ship-Money, to subject every man’s Estate to whatsoever proportion he only pleased to impose upon them. The private Solicitations, promises of Reward, and Threats from him unto the Judges of Law, to cause them to do his Will, rather than equal Right, and to break his and their own Oathes. The Oppressions of the Councel-Table, Star-Chamber, High-Commission, Court-Marshal; of Wardships, Purveyances, Knighthood, Afforrestations, and many others of the like nature, need no large repetition, remaining yet in most of our Memories.
The exact Slavery forced upon those in Ireland, with the Army of Papists to maintain it, and the position of being loose and absolved from all Rules of Government, was but a patern for the intended Model here.4
The long intermission of our Parliaments, and the determination to be troubled with no more, and the great mistake in first sending the new Service-Book into Scotland, raised their opposition against him, and gave no encouragement to the English to engage against them; which with the doubtfulness of success, produced the last short Parliament, which was only considered as to serve the King’s pleasure, to cloak his breach of the pacification with Scotland; and with twelve Subsidies demanded by him to buy out his unlawful and unjust exaction of Ship-money. But failing in his expectation therein, he suddenly and wilfully, to the terror of most men, dissolved it. The Scots upon the King’s breach of his faith with them, and perceiving the discontents amongst us, came with an Army into England. The King by many unjust and unlawful means, raised and brought a great force into the North to oppose them, where being moved by worthy Petitions from several parts, and by the honorable Endeavors of many Noble Persons, but principally by perceiving the backwardness of his Subjects of both Kingdoms, at that time to engage in the destruction of one another; for which end, such numbers of gallant men were prepared by him, whose Office was to be the preserver of them. And seeing no other way, he did at last condescend to do that part of his duty to call this Parliament. Vast sums of money were required and raised of the people of England, to gratifie those by whom they had been highly damnified; and both Armies paid by them, who neither occasioned nor consented to the raising of either. But above all, the English Army was labored by the King, to be engaged against the English Parliament: A thing of that strange impiety and unnaturalness, for the King of England to solicite his Subjects of England, to sheath their Swords in one another’s bowels, that nothing can answer it, but his own, being born a forreigner; nor could it easily have purchased beliefe, but by his succeeding visible Actions in full pursuance of the same.
The first Execution of this design of Misery, fell upon our poor Brethren in Ireland, where so many stores of thousands of them were with such wonderful cruelty murthered, that scarce any bowels but are fill with compassion at it;5 and yet some of the Murtherers themselves have not forborn to affirm, They had the King’s Commission for their Actions.
His late and slender proclaiming of them Rebels; his Consent to a Cessation when the Rebels gained all advantages, and the Protestants were destroyed by it; his intercepting and taking away provisions and supplies going unto them, are no good testimonies of his clearnesse from that blood which cried loud for vengeance.
But to return to England, where appeared matter enough of mourning. Upon the King’s coming in Person to the House of Commons to seize the five Members, whither he was followed with some hundreds of unworthy debauched persons, armed with Swords and Pistols, and other Arms; and they attending at the door of the House, ready to execute whatsoever their Leader should command them.
And upon some other Grounds (whereby doubts being raised in the people, that their grievances would not be redressed, they grew into some Disorders) the King took occasion from thence to remove from London, where presently Forces appeared for him of his own Company at Kingston.
From thence, he travelled to the North, endeavoring to raise Forces there, inticed many Members of both Houses to desert the Parliament and Trust reposed in them by their Countrey, and to join with him in bringing destruction upon their Brethren, and upon themselves. Instead of doing Justice, he protected Delinquents from it. At Nottingham he set up his Standard; from Wales and the Marches, he got together a powerful Army, and gave the first Onset of Battel at Edgehill.
He possest and fortified Oxford his Head-quarter, and many other Towns and places of strength, and prosecuted a fierce and bloody War against the Body of all his own Subjects represented, and then sitting in Parliament; a thing never before attempted by any King in this Nation, and which all men have too sad cause with much grief to remember.
Their Towns and Habitations burnt, and demolished; their pleasant Seats wasted; their Inheritances given away to those that were most active in doing mischief; their Servants, Brothers, Friends, and Children murthered. Thus his own people, whom by the duty of his Office he was bound to protect from all injury, were by himself in person, pursued with fire and sword, imprisonments, tortures, death, and all the Calamities of War and Desolation.
Notwithstanding all this, and in the heat of it, many Addresses were made by the Parliament unto the King for Peace; but in none of them could an Agreement be obtained from him; when the least word of his consent, would have stopped that issue of blood, and torrent of misery, which himself had opened in all the parts of his Kingdom.
When the great God of Battel had determined very much in favor of the Parliament, and the King’s strength was almost fallen away; so that he thought it unsafe to trust himself any longer with his owne Forces, yet would he not then vouchsafe to come in unto the English, but rendered himself to his Countrey-men the Scots, giving unto them the honor both of receiving him, and parting with him again upon their own terms.
After his Restraint, yet further Addresses were made unto him by the Parliaments of both Kingdoms for Peace, with Propositions, not heightened by success. But these would not be granted, there being new and hopeful designs of his in hand, for bringing new miseries upon his people, which an Agreement upon those Propositions might easily have prevented. After this passed the Votes for no further Addresses to be made unto him.
The last Summer the effect of those designs, even whilest he was under restraint, began to break forth; a new vein of blood was opened in the King’s name; a plot laid (as the Terms of their own boasting were) as deep as Hell; the Army divided into several bodies; the fire brake forth in many parts of the Kingdom at once; and for fear lest the numbers of their English should be too small, or their Compassion to their Countrymen too great, a Malignant party in Scotland is easily invited hither. And although at first they understood the Covenant in that Sence, and prosecuted the ends thereof, in joining with the Parliament of England, and fighting against the King’s party; yet now their judgements are rectified to prosecute the same ends by joining with the King’s party, and fighting against their fellow-Covenanters, The Parliament of England. But God will not be mocked; and though this Cloud of fresh Calamities, both here and from the North, threatened the poor Nation, and in all human probability was pouring utter ruine upon us; yet the visible hand of God, as many times formerly, so now mightily and miraculously appeared for us, and led the Army (whom he was pleased to make his Instruments) with that Courage, Wisdom, and Fidelity, as amazed and subdued our enemies, and preserved (under him) all that can be dear unto us.
During these distractions (and by what means is sufficiently known, and related more fully in a late Declaration)6 and eighth Address must be made unto the King, contrived by his party, the Votes of Parliament to the contrary revoked, and Commissioners sent to the Isle of Wight.
Where, instead of yielding to their just desires, whilest they were treating with him for peace, even then was he plotting to raise a new War against them, and to draw more blood of his people. To this end his two elder Sons were in hostility, and armed with power of granting Commissions further to destroy the people committed to his charge.
Upon all these and many other unparalleled offences, upon his breach of Faith, of Oaths and Protestations, upon the cry of the blood of Ireland and of England, upon the tears of Widows and Orphanes, and Childelesse parents, and millions of persons undone by him, Let all the world of indifferent men judge, whether the Parliament had not sufficient cause to bring the King to Justice.
But it was objected (and it was the late King’s own Assertion) That those in his high place are accountable for their Actions to none but God, whose Anointed they are. From whence it must follow, That all the men of this Land were only made for the sake of that one man the King, for him to do with them what he pleaseth; as if they had been all created for no other purpose, but to satisfie the lusts, and to be a sacrifice to the perverse will of a Tyrant.
This will not easily be believed to be so ordained by God, who punisheth, but never establisheth injustice and oppression; whom we finde offended when the people demanded a King, but no expression of his displeasure at any time, because they had no King. Such an unaccountable Officer were a strange Monster to be permitted by mankinde. But this doctrine is better understood by the present age, than in former times, and requireth the less to be said in confutation of it, being enough to confute itself.
For the phrase of Anointed, no learned Divine will affirm it to be applicable to the Kings of England, as to those of Judah and Israel, or more to a King than to every other Magistrate, or Servant of God; or that the words Touch not mine anointed, were spoken of Kings, but unto Kings, who were reproved, and enjoined to do no harm to the Prophets and Saints of God, there understood to be his Anointed.
Another Objection was, That to bring a King to trial and capital punishment, is without precedent.
So were the Crimes of the late King; and certainly, the children of Israel had no known Law or Precedent to punish the Benjamites for their odious abuse of the Levite’s Wife; yet God owned the Action.
There wants not precedent of some of his Predecessors, who have been deposed by Parliaments, but were afterwards in darkness, and in corners basely murthered. This Parliament held it more agreeable to Honor and Justice, to give the King a fair and open trial, by above an hundred Gentlemen, in the most publike place of Justice, free (if he had so pleased) to make his own defence; that part of his Crime being then only objected against him, of which the Parliaments of both his Kingdoms had by their joint Declaration formerly declared him guilty.
With his Offences, were joined all along a strange obstinacy and implacableness, and incessant labour for the destruction of his People; which (with the unerring Truth (wherein is no dispensation for Kings) that No satisfaction shall be taken for the life of a Murtherer, but he shall surely be put to death; and, That the Land cannot be cleansed of the Blood that is shed therein, but by the Blood of him that shed it) brought on and effected the work of Justice upon him.
The King being dead, The next consideration fell upon his Children; from these Branches could be expected no other, than the same bitter Fruit which fell in the Reign of the Father, who had engaged Them in his own ways and quarrel; and the two Eldest so early appearing in actual Arms and Hostility against the Parliament, No more Safety or Security could be hoped for from Them, than from their Predecessor; nor in human probability, as Affairs then stood, any safe way for a sure Peace, and prevention of future Troubles, and to avoid a Succession of Misery; but by taking away the Succession of that, from whence it hath always risen, and would certainly spring again, if permitted to take new Root, the Designs and practices of Kings, their flatterers and evil Councellors.
The Objection is obvious of Injustice, to disherit those who have a Right and Title to the Crown. Surely, the elder Right is the People’s, whom they claim to Govern. If any Right or Title were in the eldest Son, the same is forfeited by the Father’s act, in other cases; even of Offices of Inheritance, which being forfeit for breach of Trust, (a Condition annexed to every Office) none will deny, but that the same excludeth the Children as well as the Officer. But here the elder Sons Leavied War against the Parliament; and it cannot be alledged, That the yonger Children were born to anything.
But the same Power and Authority which first erected a King, and made him a publique Officer for the common good, finding them perverted, to their common Calamity, it may justly be admitted at the pleasure of those whose Officer he is, whether they will continue that Officer any longer, or change that Government for a better, and instead of restoring Tyranny, to resolve into A Free State.
Herein the Parliament received encouragement, by their observation of the Blessing of God upon other States; The Romans, after their Regifugium of many hundred years together, prospered far more than under any of their kings or Emperors. The State of Venice hath flourished for One thousand three hundred years. How much do the Commons in Switzerland, and other Free States, exceed those who are not so, in Riches, Freedom, Peace, and all Happiness? Our Neighbors in the United-Provinces, since their change of Government, have wonderfully increased in Wealth, Freedom, Trade, and Strength, both by Sea and Land.
In Commonwealths, they finde Justice duly administered, the great Ones not able to oppress the poorer, and the Poor sufficiently provided for; the seeds of Civil War and Dissention, by particular Ambition, Claims of Succession, and the like (wherein this Nation hath been in many Ages grievously embroiled) wholly removed, and a just Freedome of their Consciences, Persons and Estates, enjoined by all sorts of men. On the other side, looking Generally into the Times of our Monarchs, what Injustice, Oppression and Slavery were the Common People kept under? Some great Lords scarce affording to some of their Servants, Tenants or Peasants, so good meat, or so much rest, as to their Dogs and Horses. It was long since warned in Parliament by a Privy Councellor to the late King, That we should take heed, lest by losing our Parliaments, it would be with us, as with the Common people in a Monarchy, where they are contented with Canvas clothing, and Wooden shoes, and look more like Ghosts than Men. This was intended for the fate of England, had our Monarch prevailed over us. To bring this to pass, their Beasts of Forrests must grow fat, by devouring the poor man’s Corn; for want of which, he, and his Wife and Children must make many a hungry Meal. A Tradesman furnishing a great man with most part of his Stock; or a Creditor with Money, and expecting due satisfaction and payment, is answered with ill words, or blows, and the dear-bought Learning, That Lords’ and Kings’ servants are priviledged from Arrests and Process of Law. Thus many poor Creditors and their Families, have perished in the Injustice and prodigality of their lawless Creditors.
A poor Waterman, with his Boat or Barge; a poor Countreyman with his Teem and Horses, and others of other callings, must serve the King for the King’s pay; which (if they can get) is not enough to finde themselves bread, when their wives and children have nothing, but the husbands’ labor to provide for them also.
For that one Exaction of the Court, called Purveyance (about which our Ancestors made so many good and sharp Laws; yet none of them could be kept) it hath been lately computed to cost the Countrey more in one year, than their Assessments to the Army.
These are some of those generally observed, and more publike exactions, which were obvious not to the understanding only, but to the sence of the many grieved sufferers; but if the vast expence of the Court in ways of luxury and prodigality be considered; As on the one side by a standing ill ordered diet: for a number of drones and unprofitable burthens of the Earth, by chargeable Feasts; and vainglorious Masques and Plays (their Sabbath days’ exercise or preparations) together with the other (less sinful, but no less) chargeable provisions for Sports and Recreations; for which thousands of Acres, scores of Miles, and great parts of whole Counties have been separated from a much better and publike improvement.
On the other side, by those profuse donations of yearly sallaries and pensions granted to such as were found, or might be made fit instruments and promoters of Tyranny; or else such as had relation to the King in native or personal respects. In which latter kind may be shewed accompts of above fifty thousand pounds per an. that was paid out of the Exchequer to Favorites of the Scotish Nation; besides the secret supplies from the privy purse & otherwise, best known to the Receivers (which may perhaps be one reason why they are so zealous to uphold the Kingly power in this Nation, whereof the King was their Countreyman).
He that observes so many hundreds of thousands communibus annis expended in those ways, and shall know that the legal justifiable Revenue of the Crown (besides the customs and some other perquisites charged with the maintenance of the Navy and Forts) fell short of One hundred thousand pounds, might justly wonder what secret underground supplies fed those streams of vanity and mischief; were it not as notorious, that the Projects, Monopolies, sales of Offices, Bribes, Compositions for breach of penal Laws, and the like ways of draining the people’s purses as wickedly got, so were only fit thus to be imployed. By occasion whereof, the Court arrived at that unhappy height, as to be the great nursery of luxury and intemperance, the corrupters of the maners and dispositions of many otherwise hopeful Branches, sprung from the noblest Families, and an universal perverter of Religion and goodness therein, making good the Proverb, Ex eat Aula qui vult esse pius.
In a Free State, these, and multitude of the like grievances and mischiefs will be prevented; the scituation and advantages of this Land, both for Trade abroad, and Manufactures at home, will be better understood, when the dangers of Projects, Monopolies, and obstructions thereof, are together with the Court, the Fountain of them removed, and a Free Trade, with incouragement of Manufacturies, and provision for poor be setled by the Common-wealth, whereunto the same is most agreeable; and which the former Government had never yet leasure effectually to do.
Upon all these before mentioned, and many other weighty considerations, The Representatives of the People now Assembled in Parliament, have judged it necessary to change the Government of this Nation from the former Monarchy, (unto which by many injurious incroachments it had arrived) into a Republique, and not to have any more a King to tyrannize over them.
In Order hereunto, and for the better settlement of this Commonwealth, it being found of great inconvenience, That the House of Lords (sitting in a Body by themselves, and called by Writ to treat and advise, yet) in the making of Laws, and other great Affairs, should any longer exercise a Negative Vote over the people, whom they did not at all represent; And likewise, a Judicial power over the Persons and Estates of all the Commons, whereof they are not competent Judges; and that their power and greatness did chiefly depend upon the power and absoluteness of a King, whereunto they had lately expressed a sufficient inclination.
And it being most evident, That (especially in these times of Exigency) neither the Government of Republique, nor the common safety could bear the Delays and Negatives of a House of Lords, It was therefore thought necessary, wholly to Abolish and take the same away.
Leaving nevertheless unto those Lords, who have been, and shall be faithful to the Commonwealth, the same priviledge of choosing, and being chosen Representative of the People, as other persons of Interest and good affections to the Publique have Right unto; and which is not improbable to have been the way of our Ancestors, when both Lords and Commons formerly sat together.
But an Objection is frequently made, concerning the Declaration of the Houses, of April, 1646, for Governing the Kingdom by King, Lords and Commons, and other Declarations for making him a great and happy Prince.
It was fully then their intent, being at that time confident, That the King’s ill Councel once removed from him, he would have conformed himself to the desires of his People in Parliament, and the Peers who remained with the Parliament, would have been a great cause of his so doing. But finding, after seven fruitless Addresses made unto him, that he yet both lived and died in the obstinate maintenance of his usurped Tyranny, and refused to accept of what the Parliament had declared. And to the upholding of this Tyranny, the Lords were all obliged, in regard of their own Interest in Peerage; whereby they assumed to themselves an exorbitant Power, of Exemption from paying of their just Debts, and answering Suits in Law; besides an Hereditary Judicatory over the People, tending to their Slavery and Oppression, The Commons were constrained to change their former Resolutions, finding themselves thus frustrated in their Hopes and Intentions so declared. Which change being for the good of the Commonwealth, no Commoner of England can justly repine at. Neither could the King or Lords take any advantage thereof, because they never consented thereto; and where no Contract is made, there none can be said to be broken. And no Contract is truly made, but where there is a Stipulation on both sides, and one thing to be rendered for another; which not being in this case, but refused, the Commons were no ways tied to maintain that Declaration; to the performance of which, they were not bound by any Compact or acceptance of the other part, and to the alteration whereof, so many Reasons for the preservation of the People’s Liberties did so necessarily and fully oblige them.
Another Objection is, That these great Matters ought (if at all) to be determined in a full House, and not when many Members of Parliament are by force excluded, and the Priviledge so highly broken, and those who are permitted to sit in Parliament, do but Act under a force, and upon their good behavior.
To this is answered, That every Parliament ought to Act upon their good behavior; and few have Acted, but some kinde of force hath at one time or other been upon them; and most of them under the force of Tyrannical Will, and fear of ruine by displeasure thereof; some under the force of several Factions or Titles to the Crown. Yet the Laws made, even by such Parliaments, have continued, and been received and beneficial to succeeding Ages. All which, and whatsoever hath been done by this Parliament, since some of their Members deserted them, and the late King raised Forces against them, and several Disorders and Affronts formerly offered to them (if this Objection take place) are wholly vacated.
For any breach of Priviledge of Parliament, it will not be charged upon the remaining part, or to have been within their power of prevention or reparation; or that they have not enjoyed the freedom of their own persons and Votes, and are undoubtedly by the Law of Parliaments, far exceeding that number which makes a House, authorized for the dispatch of any business whatsoever. And that which at present is called a Force upon them, is some of their best Friends, called and appointed by the Parliament for their safety, and for the guard of them against their Enemies; who by this means being disappointed of their Hopes to destroy the Parliament, would nevertheless scandalize their Actions, as done under a force, who, in truth, are no other, than their own Guards of their own Army, by themselves appointed. And when it fell into Consideration, Whether the Priviledge of Parliament, or the Safety of the Kingdom, should be preferred, it is not hard to judge which ought to sway the Ballance; And that the Parliament should pass by the breach of Priviledge (as had been formerly often done upon much smaller grounds) rather than by a sullen declining their Duty and Trust, to resign up all to the apparent hazard of Ruine and Confusion to the Nation.
There remains yet this last and weighty Objection to be fully answered, That the Courts of Justice, and the good old Laws and Customs of England, the Badges of our Freedom (the benefit whereof our Ancestors enjoyed long before the Conquest, and spent much of their blood, to have confirmed by the Great Charter of the Liberties, and other excellent Laws which have continued in all former changes, and being duly executed, are the most just, free, and equal of any other Laws in the world, will by the present alteration of Government be taken away, and lost to us and our posterities.
To this, they hope some satisfaction is already given by the shorter Declaration lately published;7 and by the Real Demonstrations to the contrary of this Objection by the earnest care of the Parliament, That the Courts of Justice at Westminster should be supplied the last Term; and all the Circuits of England this vacation, with learned and worthy Judges; that the known Laws of the Land, and the Administration of them, might appear to be continued.
They are very sensible of the excellency and equality of the Laws of England being duly executed; of their great Antiquity, even from before the time of the Norman slavery forced upon us; of the Liberty, and property, and peace of the Subject, so fully preserved by them; and (which falls out happily, and as an increase of God’s mercy to us) of the clear Consistency of them, with the present Government of a Republique, upon some easie alterations of Form only, leaving intire the Substance; the name of King being used in them for Form only, but no power of personal Administration or Judgement allowed to him in the smallest matter contended for.
They know their own Authority to be by the Law, to which the people have assented; and besides their particular Interests, (which are not inconsiderable) they more intend the Common Interest of those whom they serve, and clearly understand the same, not possible to be preserved without the Laws and Government of the Nation; and that if those should be taken away, all industry must cease, all misery, blood, and confusion would follow, and greater calamities, if possible, than fell upon us by the late King’s misgovernment, would certainly involve all persons, under which they must inevitably perish.
These Arguments are sufficient to perswade all men to be well contented to submit their lives and fortunes, to those just and long approved Rules of Law, with which they are already so fully acquainted, and not to believe, That the Parliament intends the abrogation of them.
But to continue and maintain the Laws and Government of the Nation, with the present alterations; and with such further alterations as the Parliament shall judge fit to be made, for the due Reformation thereof, for the taking away of corruptions, and abuses, delays, vexations, unnecessary travel and expences, and whatsoever shall be found really burthensome and grievous to the people.
The sum of all the Parliament’s design and endeavor in the present change of Government, from Tyranny to a Free State; and which they intend not only to declare in words, but really and speedily endeavor to bring to effect, is this;
To prevent a new War, and further expence and effusion of the Treasure and Blood of England; and to establish a firm and safe peace, and an oblivion of all Rancor, and ill will occasioned by the late troubles; to provide for the due Worship of God, according to his Word, the advancement of the true Protestant Religion, and for the liberal and certain maintenance of Godly Ministers; to procure a just Liberty for the Consciences, Persons, and Estates, of all Men, conformable to God’s Glory and their own Peace; to endeavour vigorously the Punishment of the cruel Murderers in Ireland, and the restoring of the honest Protestants, and this Commonwealth, to their Rights there, and the full Satisfaction of all Engagements for this Work; to provide for the settling and just observing of Treaties and Alliances with foreign Princes and States, for the Encouragement of Manufactures, for the Increase and Flourishing of Trades at home, and the Maintenance of the Poor in all Places of the Land; to take Care for the due Reformation and Administration of the Law and public Justice, that the Evil may be punished, and the Good rewarded; to order the Revenue in such a Way, that the public Charges may be defrayed, the Soldiers’ Pay justly and duly settled, that Free-quarter may be wholly taken away, the People be eased in their Burdens and Taxes, and the Debts of the Commonwealth be justly satisfied; to remove all Grievances and Oppressions of the People, and to establish Peace and Righteousness in the Land.
These being their only Ends, they cannot doubt of, and humbly pray to the Almighty Power for, his Assistance and Blessing upon their mean Endeavours; wherein as they have not envied or intermedled, nor do intend at all to intermedled, with the Affairs of Government of any other Kingdom or State, or to give any Offence or just Provocation to their Neighbours, with whom they desire intirely to preserve all fair Correspondence and Amity, if they please; and confine themselves to the proper Work, the managing of the Affairs, and ordering the Government of this Commonwealth, and Matters in order thereunto, with which they are intrusted and authorized by the Consent of all the People thereof, whose Representatives, by Elections, they are. So they do presume upon the like fair and equal Dealing from abroad; and that they, who are not concerned, will not interpose in the Affairs of England, who doth not interpose in theirs. And in case of any Injury, they doubt not but, by the Courage and Power of the English Nation, and the good Blessing of God, (who hath hitherto miraculously owned the Justness of their Cause, and, they hope, will continue to do the same) they shall be sufficiently enabled to make their full Defence, and to maintain their own Rights.
And they do expect from all true-hearted Englishmen, not only a Forbearance of any public or secret Plots or Endeavours, in Opposition to the present Settlement, and thereby to kindle new Flames of War and Misery amongst us, whereof themselves must have a Share; but a chearful Concurrence and acting for the Establishment of the great Work now in Hand, in such a Way, that the Name of God may be honoured, the true Protestant Religion advanced, and the People of this Land enjoy the Blessings of Peace, Freedom, and Justice to them and their Posterities.
end
[1. ]Among the charges presented to the House of Commons against the Duke of Buckingham was the allegation he had hastened the death of James I. There was even some hint that Charles himself may have been implicated in this deed.
[2. ]English military expeditions in 1627 and 1628 led by Charles’s favorite, the Duke of Buckingham, to help the Protestants of La Rochelle and the Isle of Rhé ended in disaster and humiliation.
[3. ]In 1628 Charles allocated scarce funds to levy a thousand mercenary cavalrymen in Germany and the Low Countries to be brought to England for his service. He later explained that these men were intended to be sent to help the King of Denmark. The troops were never raised but there were grave suspicions about his real aim in planning to bring the mercenaries to England.
[4. ]This apparently refers to the administration of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, which, according to S. R. Gardiner, “seemed liable to no rule, and broke in upon the ancient traditions and the fixed if disorderly habits of the population with all the caprice and violence of the powers of nature.” S. R. Gardiner, The First Two Stuarts and the Puritan Revolution (rpt., New York, 1970), 105.
[5. ]This is a reference to the Irish rebellion that began in October 1641 with the massacre, it was then believed, of some 40,000 Protestants living in Ireland.
[6. ]This is probably a reference to “A Declaration of the Commons in Parliament expressing their Reasons for the Adnulling of these ensuing Votes [i.e. the Ordinances of the 8th and 30 June 1648, abandoning the proceedings against the eleven impeached Members, and of the 17 August, ordering the negotiations for the Newport Treaty]” (London, January 1648-49), Wing E 2560.
[7. ]The declaration referred to is probably “A Declaration of the Parliament of England, in Answer to the Late Letters” (London, 22 February 1648/49), Wing E1501.
Joyce Lee Malcom, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts, 2 vols, ed. Joyce Lee Malcolm (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 1. Chapter: Sir Edward Coke, The Twelfth part of the Reports
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/810/164700 on 2010-02-05
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
Sir Edward Coke 1552-1634
The Twelfth part of the
REPORTS
OF SIR
EDWARD COKE, Kt.
OF
Divers Resolutions and Judgments given upon solemn
Arguments, and with great Deliberation and Conference with the Learned Judges in Cases of
LAW,
The most of them very Famous, being of the Kings especiall Reference, from the
COUNCIL TABLE,
Concerning the Prerogative; As for the digging of
Salt-peter, Forfeitures, Forrests, Proclamations, &c. And the Jurisdictions of the Admiralty, Common Pleas, Star-Chamber, High Commission, Court of Wards, Chancery, &c. And Expositions and Resolutions concerning Authorities, both Ecclesiasticall and Civill, within this Realme.
Also the Formes and Proceedings of Parliaments, both in
ENGLAND, & IRELAND;
With an Exposition of Poynings LAW.
Non est leges condendi authoritas; ubi non est obediendi necessitas, & é converso.
With Alphabeticall Tables, wherein may be found the Principall Matters contained in this Book.
LONDON,
Printed for Henry Twyford and Thomas Dring, and are to be sold in Vine-Court Middle Temple, and at the George in Fleet-street, neer Cliffords-Inne, 1658.
Prohibitions del Roy,” printed in part 12 of Coke’s celebrated Reports, is one of the most cited of all Coke’s cases and of clear importance to the issue of sovereignty. King James had raised the question of the king’s right to decide cases in the court of King’s Bench. This pretension, Coke informs us, he tactfully denied, pointing out that while the law was based upon reason and his majesty was well endowed with that commodity, cases were not to be decided by natural reason “but by the artificial reason and judgment of Law”—an art that required many years to master. James then cautioned that this being so the king would be under the Law “which was Treason to affirm.” Coke deftly handled this crucial point in a famous response. He quoted the great medieval jurist Henry Bracton’s pronouncement that the king was under no man, but he was under God and the law.
Writs of prohibition had been used to remove cases from ecclesiastical and admiralty courts to the common law courts on the ground the former courts lacked proper jurisdiction to try them. Coke had angered the church by repeatedly using writs of prohibition against ecclesiastical courts. A prohibition del roy denies the king’s jurisdiction.
This case occurred in 1607 while Coke was James’s chief justice of the common pleas but was not published until 1656. The edition used here is that of 1658. The manuscript version of the twelfth part of the reports in which it appeared was among Coke’s papers seized by Charles I in 1634 upon Coke’s death. Seven years later, on the petition of the House of Commons, Charles returned the manuscripts to Coke’s heir, Sir Robert Coke. Coke’s planned twelfth volume of Reports was published during the Protectorate. The mistakes in several of the legal citations are doubtless due to the fact that the work was published by those less painstaking than the author.
Michaelmas Term. 5 James I
Prohibitions del Roy.
Note, upon Sunday, the tenth of November, in this same Terme, the King, upon complaint made to him by Bancroft Arch-bishop of Canterbury, concerning Prohibitions, the King was informed, that when Question was made of what matters the Ecclesiasticall Judges have Cognizance, either upon the Exposition of the Statutes concerning Tiths, or any other thing Ecclesiasticall, or upon the Statute 1. Eliz.1 concerning the high Commission, or in any other case in which there is not expresse Authority in Law, the King himselfe may decide it in his Royall person; and that the Judges are but the Delegates of the King, and that the King may take what causes he shall please to determine, from the determination of the Judges, and may determine them himselfe. And the Archbishop said, that this was cleer in Divinity, that such Authority belongs to the King by the Word of God in the Scripture. To which it was answered by me, in the presence, and with the cleer consent of all the Justices of England and Barons of the Exchequer, that the King in his own person cannot adjudge any case, either criminall, as Treason, Felony, &c. or betwixt party and party, concerning his Inheritance, Chattels, or Goods, &c. but this ought to be determined and adjudged in some Court of Justice, according to the Law and Custome of England, and alwayes Judgements are given, Ideo consideratum est per Curiam, so that the Court gives the Judgement. And the King hath his Court, viz. in the upper House of Parliament, in which he with his Lords is the supreame Judge over all other Judges; For if Error be in the Common Pleas, that may be reversed in the King’s Bench: And if the Court of King’s Bench erre, that may be reversed in the upper house of Parliament, by the King, with the assent of the Lords Spirituall and Temporall, without the Commons: And in this respect the King is called the Chief Justice, 20 H. 7.7.2.2 by Brudnell:3 And it appears in our Books, that the King may sit in the Star-Chamber, but this was to consult with the Justices, upon certain Questions proposed to them, and not in Judicio; So in the King’s Bench he may sit, but the Court gives the Judgment. And it is commonly said in our Books, that the King is alwayes present in Court in the Judgement of Law; and upon this he cannot be non-suit:4 But the Judgements are alwayes given Per Curiam; and the Judges are sworn to execute Justice according to Law and custome of England. And it appeares by the Act of Parliament, of 2 Ed. 3. cap. 9.52. Ed. 3. cap. 1.6 That neither by the great Seale, nor by the little Seale, Justice shall be delayed; ergo, the King cannot take any cause out of any of his Courts, and give Judgment upon it himselfe, but in his owne cause he may stay it, as it doth appeare, H.4.8.7 And the Judges informed the King, that no King after the conquest assumed to himselfe to give any Judgment in any cause whatsoever, which concerned the administration of Justice within this Realme, but these were solely determined in the Courts of Justice.8 And the King cannot arrest any man, as the Book is in 1 H.7.4.9 for the party cannot have remedy against the King, so if the King give any Judgment, what remedy can the party have, vide 39 Ed. 3.14.10 One who had a Judgment reversed before the Councill of State: it was held utterly void, for that it was not a place where Judgment may be reversed, vide 1.H.7.4 Hussey chiefe Justice,11 who was Attorney to Ed. 4. reports, that Sir John Markham chief Justice said to King Edward 4 That the King cannot arrest a man for suspition of Treason or Felony, as other of his Leiges may; for that if it be a wrong to the party grieved, he can have no remedy. And it was greatly marvelled that the Arch-bishop durst informe the King, that such absolute power and authority as is aforesaid, belonged to the King by the Word of God, vide 4.H.4.cap.2212 which being translated into Latine, the effect is, Judicia in Curia Regis reddita non annihilentur, sed stet judicium in suo robore quousq; per judicium Curiae Regis tanquam erroneum,&c. vide West, 2 cap. 5.13vide le Stat. de Marbridge. cap 1.14Provisum est, concordatum, & concessum, quod tam majores quam minores justitiam habeant & recipiant in Curia Domini Regis, & vide le Stat. de Mag. Charta. cap. 29.,1525 Ed. 3. cap. 5.16 None may be taken by petition or suggestion made to our Lord the King or his Councill, unless by Judgement. And 43 Ed. 3. cap. 3.17 no man shall be put to answer without presentment before the Justices, matter of Record, or by due Processe, or by Writ Originall, according to the Ancient Law of the Land: And if anything be done against it, it shall be void in Law and held for Error, vide 28 Ed. 3. cap. 3.,1837 Ed. 3. cap. 18.,19vide 17 R. 2. ex rotulis Parliamenti in Turri act 10.20 A controversie of Land between parties was heard by the King, and sentence given, which was repealed, for this, that it did belong to the common Law. Then the King said, that he thought the Law was founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as the Judges: To which it was answered by me, that true it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent Science and great endowments of nature, but his Majesty was not learned in the Lawes of his Realm of England, and causes which concerne the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his Subjects; they are not to be decided by naturall reason, but by the artificiall reason and judgment of Law, which Law is an art which requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it; And that the Law was the golden met-wand and measure to try the Causes of the Subjects; and which protected his Majesty in safety and peace: With which the King was greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the Law, which was Treason to affirm, as he said; To which I said, that Bracton saith, Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo & Lege.21
[1. ]Eliz. cap. 1, 1558/59, An Act Restoring to the Crown the Ancient Jurisdiction over the State Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, and Abolishing All Foreign Power Repugnant to the Same. This act created the powerful Court of High Commission, an ecclesiastical court with jurisdiction over the ecclesiastical state and persons as well as issues of heresies, schisms, contempts, and enormities. See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 4, part 1, 350-55.
[2. ]This citation is incorrect and probably should read 19 Hen. VII, cap. 7, 1503-4. This statute declares that corporations shall not make or enforce any ordinances without the approbation of the chancellor, nor may any corporations restrain suits in the King’s courts. See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 2, 652-53.
[3. ]Robert Brudenell was an important justice of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries serving as chief justice from 1521 to 1531. Here Coke also cites 2.R.3.9.21. This citation is incorrect as no statutes were passed after the first year of Richard III. This should probably be 1 Ric. III, cap. 9, An Act touchinge the Marchaunts of Italy, 1483-84. See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 2, 489-93, and 490, n. 8.
[4. ]“Non-suit” is the name of a judgment against a party in a legal proceeding who has failed to appear to prosecute his action or failed to prove his case.
[5. ]This citation ought to be to 2. Edw. III, Statute of Northampton, cap. 8, 1328, which states that “it shall not be commanded by the great Seal nor the little Seal to disturb or delay common Right; and though such Commandments do come, the Justices shall not therefore leave to do right in any point.” See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 259.
[6. ]2 Edw. III, Statute of Northampton, cap. 1, 1328, confirms that Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest shall be observed in all points. See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 257.
[7. ]This appears to be an inaccurate citation as there were no laws passed in 17 Henry VI.
[8. ]1 Edw. 3, cap. 14, None shall commit Maintenance. This statute states, “Because the King desireth that common Right be administered to all Persons, as well Poor as Rich; he commandeth and defendeth, That none of his Counsellors, nor of his House, nor none other of his Ministers, nor no great Man of the Realm by himself, nor by other, by sending of Letters, nor otherwise, nor none other in this Land, great nor small, shall take upon them to maintain Quarels nor Parties in the Country, to the Let and Disturbance of the Common Law.” See Statutes at Large, vol. 1, 195.
[9. ]1. Hen. VII, cap. 4, 1485, An Act for Bishops to Punish Priests and Other Religious Men for Dishonest Life gives bishops the authority to imprison priests for incontinency.
[10. ]This citation is inaccurate as there are no statutes between the thirty-eighth and the forty-second years of Edward III. However, 37 Edw. III, cap. 18, makes the point discussed. See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 382.
[11. ]Sir William Hussey or Huse was chief justice of the King’s Bench under Henry VII from 1481 until his death in 1495. He successfully protested against the practice of the Crown consulting with judges.
[12. ]4. Hen. IV, cap. 22, 1402, repeats the statute 25 Edw. III, st. 6, cap. 3, which states that the king’s appointments to benefices will be repealed and annulled if the title is found to be unjust or the benefice already filled. In the latter instance the incumbent is entitled to due process.
[13. ]13 Edw. I, Statute of Westminster, sec. cap. 5, 1285, concerns writs for the recovery of an advowson of a church, apparently necessary because of competing claims to present. Judgments in these cases were to remain in force until reversed and remedies to cover particular circumstances are laid out.
[14. ]52 Hen. III, The Statute of Marlborough, cap. 1, 1267, entitles all persons to receive justice from the king’s courts. Those who take revenge themselves shall be punished. See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 19.
[15. ]Magna Carta, 1225, cap. 29, the version commonly referred to in the seventeenth century, is the famous linchpin of the great charter. It combines cap. 39 of the 1215 version with cap. 40, the two together usually counted as cap. 29. It reads, “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of any freehold of his or of his liberties or free customs, or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay, right or justice.”
[16. ]25 Edw. III, stat. 5, cap. 4, 1351-52, states that no one shall be taken “by Petition or Suggestion made to our Lord the King, or to his Council” without lawful presentment, or disenfranchised but by “the Course of the Law.” If anything is done to the contrary “it shall be redressed and holden for none.” See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 321.
[17. ]43 Edw. III, cap. 3, 1369, was designed to prevent extortions by the king’s butler and his lieutenants who had been taking the goods of merchants for the king’s use, in particular wine.
[18. ]28 Edw. III, cap. 3, 1354, None shall be condemned without due Process of Law. This chapter specifically protects every man “of what Estate or Condition that he be.” See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 345.
[19. ]37 Edw. III, cap. 18, 1363. The act states that men have made suggestions to the king that, contrary to Magna Carta, certain individuals be imprisoned and dispossessed without due process of law. All those that make such suggestions are henceforth to be taken before the “Chancellor, Treasurer, and his Grand Council,” must find surety to pursue their suggestion and, if it be found evil, incur the same pain “the other should have had if he were attainted.” See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, 382.
[20. ]17 Ric. II. c. 10, 1393-94, Two Lawyers shall be Commissioners of Goal Delivery. See Statutes of the Realm, vol. 2, 90.
[21. ]That the King was under no man, but under God and the Law.
John Milton, The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, edited with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary by Evert Mordecai Clark (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915). Chapter: THE READY AND EASY WAY TO ESTABLISH A FREE COMMONWEALTH
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/272/41738 on 2010-02-05
The text is in the public domain.
Although since the writing of this treatise, the face of things hath had some change , writs for new electionshave bin recall’d , and the members at first chosen, readmitted from exclusion , [to sit again in Parlament,] yet not a little rejoicing to hear declar’d, the resolution[s] of [all] those who are [now] in power , [jointly] tending to the establishment of a free Commonwealth , and to remove if it be possible, this ∥ unsound | noxious ∥humour of returning to [old] bondage , instilld of late by some [cunning] deceivers , and nourished from bad principles and fals apprehensions among too many of the people , I thought best not to suppress what I had written , ∥ hoping it may perhaps (the Parlament now sitting more full and frequent ) be now much more useful then before : yet submitting what hath reference to the state of things as they then stood , to present constitutions; and so the same end be persu’d, not insisting on this or that means to obtain it. The treatise was thus written as follows. | hoping that it may now be of much more use and concernment to be freely publishd, in the midst of our Elections to a free Parlament , or their sitting to consider freely of the Government; whom it behoves to have all things represented to them that may direct thir judgment therin; and I never read of any State, scarce of any tyrant grown so incurable as to refuse counsel from any in a time of public deliberation; much less to be offended. If thir absolute determination be to enthrall us, before so long a Lent of Servitude, they may permitt us a little Shroving-time first, wherin to speak freely , and take our leaves of Libertie. And because in the former edition through haste , many faults escap’d, and many books were suddenly dispersd, ere the note to mend them could be sent, I took the opportunitie from this occasion to revise and somwhat to enlarge the whole discourse, especially that part which argues for a perpetual Senat . The treitise thus revis’d and enlarg’d, is as follows. ∥
The Parlament of England assisted by a great number of the people who appeard and stuck to them faithfullest in [the] defence of religion and thir civil liberties, judging kingship by long experience a government ∥ burdensom, expensive, useless and dangerous , | unnecessarie, burdensom and dangerous, ∥ justly and magnanimously abolishd it ; turning regal-bondage into a free Commonwealth , to the admiration and terror of our emulous neighbours , [and the stirring up of France it self, especially in Paris and Bourdeaux, to our imitation.] They took themselves not bound by thelight of nature or religion , to any former covnant, from which the King himself by many forfeitures of a latter date or discoverie, and our own longer consideration theron had more & more unbound us, both to himself and his posteritie; as hath bin ever the justice and the prudence of all wise nations that have ejected tyrannie. They covnantedto preserve the Kings person and autoritie, in the preservation of the true religion and our liberties; not in his endeavoring to bring in upon our consciences a Popish religion , upon our liberties thraldom, upon our lives destruction, by his occasioning, if not complotting, as was after discoverd, the Irish massacre , his fomenting and arming the rebellion, his covert leaguing with the rebels against us, his refusing more then seaven times, propositions most just and necessarie to the true religion and our liberties, tenderd him by the Parlament both of England and Scotland. They made not thir covnant concerning him with no difference between a king and a god , or promisd him as Job did to the Almightie, to trust in him, though he slay us: they understood that the solemn ingagement , wherin we all forswore kingship, was no more a breach of the covant, then the covnant was of the protestation before , but a faithful and prudent going on both in the words, well weighd, and in the true sense of the covnant, without respect of persons, when we could not serve two contrary maisters , God and the king, or the king and that more supreme law , sworn in the first place to maintain, our safetie and our libertie. They knew the people of England to be a free people, themselves the representers of that freedom ; & although many were excluded , & as many fled (so they pretended ) from tumults to Oxford, yet they were left a sufficient number to act in Parlament; therefor not bound by any statute of preceding Parlaments, but by the law of nature only, which is the only law of laws truly and properly to all mankinde fundamental; the beginning and the end of all Government; to which no Parlament or people that will throughly reforme, but may and must have recourse; as they had and must yet have in church reformation (if they throughly intend it) to evangelic rules ; not to ecclesiastical canons , though never so ancient, so ratifi’d and establishd in the land by Statutes, which for the most part are meer positive laws , neither natural nor moral, & so by any Parlament for just and serious considerations, without scruple to be at any time repeal’d. If others of thir number, in these things were under force , they were not, but under free conscience; if others were excluded by a power which they could not resist , they were not therefore to leave the helm of government in no hands, to discontinue thir care of the public peace and safetie, to desert the people in anarchie and confusion ; no more then when so many of thir members left them , as made up in outward formalitie a more legal Parlament of three estates against them. The best affected also and best principl’d of the people, stood not numbring or computing on which side were most voices in Parlament, but on which side appeerd to them most reason, most safetie, when the house divided upon main matters : what was well motiond and advis’d, they examind not whether fear or perswasion carried it in the vote; neither did they measure votes and counsels by the intentions of them that voted ; knowing that intentions either are but guessd at, or not soon anough known; and although good, can neither make the deed such, nor prevent the consequence from being bad: suppose bad intentions in things otherwise welldon; what was welldon, was by them who so thought, not the less obey’d or followd in the state; since in the church, who had not rather follow Iscariot or Simon the magician , though to covetous ends, preaching, then Saul, though in the uprightness of his heart persecuting the gospell? Safer they therefor judgd what they thought the better counsels , though carried on by some perhaps to bad ends , then the wors , by others, though endevord with best intentions : and yetthey were not to learn that a greater number might be corrupt within the walls of a Parlament as well as of a citie; wherof in matters of neerest concernment all men will be judges; nor easily permitt, that the odds of voices in thir greatest councel, shall more endanger them by corrupt or credulous votes, then the odds of enemies by open assaults; judging that most voices ought not alwaies to prevail where main matters are in question; if others hence will pretend to disturb all counsels , what is that to them who pretend not, but are in real danger; not they only so judging, but a great though not the greatest, number of thir chosen Patriots, who might be more in weight, then the others in number; there being in number little vertue, but by weight and measure wisdom working all things: and the dangers on either side they seriously thus waighd: from the treatie , short fruits of long labours and seaven years warr ; securitie for twenty years , if we can hold it; reformation in the church for three years : then put to shift again with our vanquishd maister . His justice, his honour, his conscience declar’d quite contrarie to ours; which would have furnishd him with many such evasions, as in a book entitl’d an inquisition for blood , soon after were not conceald: bishops not totally remov’d , but left as it were in ambush, a reserve, with ordination in thir sole power; thir lands alreadie sold , not to be alienated, but rented, and the sale of them call’d sacrilege ; delinquents few of many brought to condigne punishment; accessories punishd ; the chief author , above pardon, though after utmost resistance, vanquish’d; not to give, but to receive laws ; yet besought, treated with, and to be thankd for his gratious concessions , to be honourd, worshipd, glorifi’d. If this we swore to do , with what righteousness in the sight of God, with what assurance that we bring not by such an oath the whole sea of blood-guiltiness upon our own heads ? If on the other side we preferr a free government, though for the present not obtaind, yet all those suggested fears and difficulties , as the event will prove, easily overcome, we remain finally secure from the exasperated regal power, and out of snares; shall retain the best part of our libertie, which is our religion, and the civil part will be from these who deferr us , much more easily recoverd, being neither so suttle nor so awefull as a King reinthron’d. Nor were ∥ our | thir ∥ actions less both at home and abroad then might become the hopes of a glorious rising Commonwealth; nor were the expressions both of [the] Army and [of the] People, whether in thir publick declarations or several writings , other then such as testifi’d a spirit in this nation no less noble and well fitted to the liberty of a Comonwealth, then in the ancient Greeks or Romans. Nor was the heroic cause unsuccesfully defended to all Christendom against the tongue of a famous and thought invincible adversarie ; nor the constancie and fortitude that so nobly vindicated our liberty, our victory at once against two the most prevailing usurpers over mankinde, superstition and tyrannie unpraisd or uncelebrated in a written monument, likely to outlive detraction , as it hath hitherto covinc’d or silenc’d not a few of our detractors , especially in parts abroad. After our liberty and Religion thus ∥ succesfully | prosperously ∥ fought for, gaind and many years possessd , except in those unhappie interruptions , which God hath remov’d, [and wonderfully now the third time brought together our old Patriots, the first Assertours of our religious and civil rights ,] now that nothing remains but in all reason the certain hopes of a speedy and immediate settlement [to this nation] for ever in a firm and free Commonwealth, for this extolld and magnifi’d nation, regardless both of honour wonn or deliverances voutsaf’t from heaven, to fall back, or rather to creep back so poorly as it seems the multitude would , to thir once abjur’d and detested thraldom of kingship, to be our selves the slanderers of our own just and religious deeds, though don by som to covetous and ambitious ends , yet not therefor to be staind with their infamie, or they to asperse the integritie of others, and yet these now by revolting from the conscience of deeds welldon both in church and state, to throw away and forsake, or rather to betray a just and noble cause for the mixture of bad men who have ill manag’d and abus’d it (which had our fathers don heretofore, and on the same pretence deserted true religion, what had long ere this become of our gospel and all protestant reformation so much intermixt with the avarice and ambition of som reformers?) and by thus relapsing, to verifie all the bitter predictions of our triumphing enemies, who will now think they wisely discernd and justly censur’d both us and all our actions as rash, rebellious, hypocritical and impious, not only argues a strange degenerate ∥ corruption | contagion ∥ suddenly spread among us, fitted and prepar’d for new slaverie, but will render us a scorn and derision to all our neighbours . And what will they at best say of us, and of the whole English name, but scoffingly as of that foolish builder mentiond by our Saviour, who began to build a Tower, and was not able to finish it: where is this goodly tower of a Common-wealth which the English boasted they would build, to overshaddow kings and be another Rome in the west ? The foundation indeed they laid gallantly, but fell into a worse confusion, not of tongues, but of factions , then those at the tower of Babel; and have left no memorial of thir work behinde them remaining, but in the common laughter of Europ. Which must needs redound the more to our shame, if we but look on our neighbours the United Provinces, to us inferiour in all outward advantages: who notwithstanding, in the midst of greater difficulties , couragiously, wisely, constantly went through with the same work, and are settl’d in all the happie injoiments of a potent and flourishing Republick to this day.
Besides this , if we return to kingship, and soon repent, as undoubtedly we shall , when we begin to finde the old incroachments coming on by little and little upon our consciences, which must necessarily proceed from king and bishop united inseparably in one interest, we may be forc’d perhaps to fight over again all that we have fought, and spend over again all that we have spent , but are never like to attain thus far as we are now advanc’d, to the recoverie of our freedom, never [likely] to have it in possession, as we now have it, never to be voutsaf’d heerafter the like mercies and signal assistances from heaven in our cause, if by our ingratefull backsliding we make these fruitless [to our selves,] ∥ all his gratious condescensions and answers |; flying now to regal concessions from his divine condescensions and gratious answers ∥ to our once importuning praiers against the tyrannie which we then groand under [to become now of no effect, by returning of our own foolish accord, nay running headlong again with full stream wilfully and obstinately into the same bondage:] making vain and viler then dirt the blood of so many thousand faithfull and valiant English men, who left us in this libertie, bought with thir lives; losing by a strange aftergame of folly, all the battels we have wonne, together with all Scotland as to our conquest, hereby lost, which never any of our kings could conquer , all the treasure we have spent, not that corruptible treasure only, but that far more precious of all our late miraculous deliverances ; treading back again with lost labour all our happie steps in the progress of reformation, and most pittifully depriving our selves the instant fruition of that free government which we have so dearly purchasd, a free Commonwealth, not only held by wisest men in all ages the noblest, the manliest, the equallest, the justest government, the most agreeable to all due libertie and proportiond equalitie , both humane, civil and Christian, most cherishing to vertue and true religion , but also (I may say it with greatest probabilitie) planely commended or rather enjoind by our Saviour himself, to all Christians, not without remarkable disallowance and the brand of Gentilism upon kingship . God in much displeasure gave a king to the Israelites, and imputed it a sin to them that they sought one: but Christ apparently forbids his disciples to admitt of any such heathenish government: the kings of the gentiles, saith he, exercise lordship over them; and they that exercise autoritie upon them, are call’d benefactors. But ye shall not be so: but he that is greatest among you, let him be as the younger; and he that is chief, as he that serveth. The occasion of these his words, was the ambitious desire of Zebede’s two sons to be exalted above their brethren in his kingdom, which they thought was to be ere long upon earth. That he speaks of civil government , is manifest by the former part of the comparison, which inferrs the other part to be alwaies in the same kinde. And what government comes neerer to this precept of Christ, then a free Commonwealth; wherin they who are greatest, are perpetual servants and drudges to the publick at thir own cost and charges , neglect thir own affairs; yet are not elevated above thir brethren, live soberly in thir families, walk the streets as other men, may be spoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration. Whereas a king must be ador’d like a Demigod, with a dissolute and haughtie court about him, of vast expence and luxurie, masks and revels , to the debaushing of our prime gentry both male and female ; not in thir passetimes only, but in earnest, by the loos imploiments of court service, which will be then thought honorable. There will be a queen also of no less charge; in most likelihood outlandish and a Papist ; besides a queen mother such alreadie ; together with both thir courts and numerous train: then a royal issue , and ere long severally thir sumptuous courts; to the multiplying of a servile crew, not of servants only, but of nobility and gentry, bred up then to the hopes not of public, but of court offices ; to be stewards, chamberlains , ushers, grooms, even of the close-stool; and the lower thir mindes debas’d with court opinions, contrarie to all vertue and reformation, the haughtier will be thir pride and profuseness: we may well remember this not long since at home; or need but look at present into the French court , where enticements and preferments daily draw away and pervert the Protestant Nobilitie. ∥ nor at his own cost, but on the publick revenue; and all this to do nothing but bestow | As to the burden of expence , to our cost we shall soon know it; for any good to us, deserving to be termd no better then the vast and lavish price of our subjection and their debausherie; which we are now so greedily cheapning , and would so fain be paying most inconsideratly to a single person; who for any thing wherin the public really needs him, will have little els to do, but to bestow ∥ the eating and drinking of excessive dainties, to set a pompous face upon the superficial actings of State, to pageant himself up and down in progress among the perpetual bowings and cringings of an abject people, on either side deifying and adoring him ∥ who for the most part deserves none of this by any good done to the people | for nothing don that can deserve it. ∥ (for what can he more then another man?) ∥ but | who ∥ even in the expression of a late court-Poet , sits only like a great cypher set to no purpose before a long row of other significant figures. Nay it is well and happy for the people if thir king be but a cypher, being oft times a mischief, a pest, a scourge of the nation, and which is worse, not to be remov’d , not to be contrould, much less accus’d or brought to punishment, without the danger of a common ruin, without the shaking and almost subversion of the whole land. Wheras in a free Commonwealth, any governour or chief counselour offending, may be remov’d and punishd, without the least commotion. Certainly then that people must needs be mad[d] or strangely infatuated , that build the chief hope of thir common happiness or safetie on a single person ; who if he happen to be good, can do no more then another man , if to be bad, hath in his hands to do more evil without check, then millions of other men. The happiness of a nation must needs be firmest and certainest in a full and free Councel of their own electing , where no single person, but reason only sway[e]s . And what madness is it, for them who might manage nobly their own affairs themselves, sluggishly and weakly to devolve all on a single person; and more like boy[e]s under age then men, to committ all to his patronage and disposal, who neither can perform what he undertakes, and yet for undertaking it, though royally paid, will not be thir servant, but thir lord? how unmanly must it needs be, to count such a one the breath of our nostrils, to hang all our felicitie on him, all our safety, our well-being, for which if we were aught els but sluggards or babies, we need depend on none but God and our own counsels, our own active vertue and industrie . Go to the Ant , thou sluggard, saith Solomon, consider her waies, and be wise; which havingno prince, ruler, or lord, provides her meat in the summer, and gathers her food in the harvest. Which evidently shews us, that they who think the nation undon without a king , though they ∥ swell and look haughtie, | look grave or haughtie, ∥ have not so much true spirit and understanding in them as a Pismire. neither are these diligent creatures hence concluded to live in lawless anarchie, or that commended, but are set the examples to imprudent and ungovernd men, of a frugal and self-governing democratie or Commonwealth; safer and more thriving in the joint providence and counsel of many industrious equals, then under the single domination of one imperious Lord. It may be well wonderd that any nation, styling themselves free, can suffer any man to pretend hereditarie right over them as thir lord ; whenas by acknowledging that right, they conclude themselves his servants and his vassals, and so renounce thir own freedom. Which how a people and thir leaders especially can do, ∥ that hath | who have ∥ fought so gloriously for libertie, how they can change thir noble words and actions heretofore so becoming the majestie of a free people, into the base necessitie of court-flatteries and prostrations, is not only strange and admirable , but lamentable to think on; that a nation should be so valorous and courageous to winne thir libertie in the field, and when they have wonn it, should be so heartless and unwise in thir counsels , as not to know how to use it, value it, what to do with it, or with themselves; but after ten or twelve years prosperous war and contestation with tyrannie, basely and besottedly to run thir necks again into the yoke which they have broken, and prostrate all the fruits of thir victorie for ∥ nothing | naught ∥ at the feet of the vanquishd, besides our loss of glorie, and such an example as kings or tyrants never yet had the like to boast of, will be an ignominie , if it befall us, that never yet befell any nation possessd of thir libertie: worthie indeed themselves, ∥ whosoever | whatsoever ∥ they be, to be for ever slaves; but that part of the nation which consents not with them , as I perswade me of a great number, far worthier then by their means to be brought into the same bondage, [and reservd, I trust, by Divine providence to a better end; since God hath yet his remnant , and hath not yet quenchd the spirit of libertie among us.] Considering these things, so plane, so rational , I cannot but yet further admire on the other side, how any man who hath the true principles of justice and religion in him, can presume or take upon him to be a king and lord over his brethren, whom he cannot but know, whether as men or Christians, to be for the most part every way equal or superiour to himself: how he can display with such vanitie and ostentation his regal splendour so supereminently above other mortal men; or, being a Christian, can assume such extraordinarie honour and worship to himself, while the kingdom of Christ, our common King and Lord, is hid to this world , and such Gentilish imitation forbid in express words by himself to all his disciples? All ∥ Protestanus | Protestants ∥ hold, that Christ in his Church hath left no vicegerent of his [kingly power,] but himself without deputy, is the only head thereof, governing it from heaven: how then can any Christian man derive his kingship from Christ, but with worse usurpation then the Pope his headship over the Church, since Christ not only hath not left the least shadow of a command for any such vicegerence from him in the State, as the Pope pretends for his in the Church, but hath expressly declar’d that such regal dominion is from the gentiles, not from him, and hath strictly charg’d us, not to imitate them therein?
I doubt not but all ingenuous and knowing men will easily agree with me , that a free Commonwealth without single person or house of lords , is by far the best goverment, if it can be had; but we have all this while, say they, bin expecting it , and cannot yet attain it. Tis true indeed, when monarchie was dissolvd, the form of a Commonwealth should have forthwith bin fram’d; and the practice therof immediatly begun; that the people might have soon bin satisfi’d and delighted with the decent order, ease, and benefit therof: we had bin then by this time firmly rooted past fear of commotions or mutations, & now flourishing: this care of timely setling a new government instead of ye old, too much neglected, hath bin our mischief. ∥ I answer, that | Yet ∥ the cause thereof may be ascrib’d with most reason to the frequent disturbances, interruptions and dissolutions which the Parlament hath had partly from the impatient or disaffected people , partly from some ambitious leaders in the armie; much contrarie, I believe, to the minde and approbation of the Armie it selfand thir other Commanders , [when they were] once undeceivd , or in thir own power. [Neither ought the small number of those remaining in Parlament, be made a by-word of reproach to them, as it is of late by the rable, whenas rather they should be therefor honourd, as the remainder of those faithfull worthies , who at first freed us from tyrannie, and have continu’d ever since through all changes constant to thir trust ; which they have declar’d , as they may most justly and truly, that no other way they can discharge, no other way secure and confirme the peoples libertie, but by setling them in a free Commonwealth. And doubtless, no Parlament will be ever able under royaltie to free the people from slavery : and when they go about it, will finde it a laborious task; and when they have don all, they can, be forc’d to leave the contest endless between prerogative and petition of right , till only dooms-day end it: And] now is the opportunitie , now the very season wherein we may obtain a free Commonwealth, and establish it forever in the land, without difficulty or much delay. [The Parlament have voted to fill up their number :] Writs are sent out for elections, and which is worth observing in the name, not of any king, but of the keepers of our libertie , to summon a free Parlament : which then only will indeed be free, and deserve the true honor of that supreme title, if they preserve us a free people. Which never Parlament was more free to do; being now call’d, not as heretofore, by the summons of a king, but by the voice of libertie: and if the people, laying aside prejudice and impatience, will seriously and calmly now consider thir own good, both religious and civil, thir own libertie and the only means therof, as shall be heer laid before them, and will elect thir Knights and Burgesses able men, and according to the just and necessarie qualifications (which for aught I hear, remain yet in force unrepeald, as they were formerly decreed in Parlament, men not addicted to a single person or house of lords, the work is don; at least the foundation [is] firmly laid of a free Commonwealth, and good part also erected of the main structure. For the ground and basis of every just and free government (since men have smarted so oft for committing all to one person) is a general Councel of ablest men , chosen by the people to consult of publick affairs from time to time for the common good. ∥ This Grand Councel must have the forces by sea and land in thir power, | In this Grand Councel must the sovrantie, not transferrd, but delegated only , and as it were deposited, reside; with this caution they must have the forces by sea and land committed to them for preservation of the common peace and libertie; ∥ must raise and mannage the Publick revenue, at least with som inspectors deputed for satisfaction of the people, how it is imploid; ∥ make lawes, as need requires, | must make or propose , as more expressly shall be said anon, civil laws; ∥ treat of commerce, peace, or war with forein nations; and for the carrying on som particular affairs [of State] with more secrecie and expedition, must elect, as they have already out of thir own number and others, a Councel of State . And although it may seem strange at first hearing, by reason that mens mindes are prepossessd with the ∥ conceit | notion ∥ of successive Parlaments , I affirm that the Grand or General Councel being well chosen, should ∥ sit | be ∥ perpetual : for so their business is, or may be, and oft times urgent; the opportunitie of affairs gaind or lost in a moment. The day of counsel cannot be set as the day of a festival; but must be readie alwaies to prevent or answer all occasions. ∥ and they will become thereby | By this continuance they will become everie way ∥ skilfullest, best provided of intelligence from abroad, best acquainted with the people at home, and the people with them. The ship of the Commonwealth is alwaies undersail; they sit at the stern; and if they stear well, what need is ther to change them; it being rather dangerous? Adde to this, that the Grand Councel is both foundation and main pillar of the whole State; and to move pillars and foundations, ∥ unless they be faultie, | not faultie, ∥ cannot be safe for the building. I see not therefore how we can be advantag’d by successive and transitorie Parlaments; but that they are much likelier continually to unsettle rather then to settle a free government, to breed commotions, changes, novelties and uncertainties; to bring neglect upon present affairs and opportunities, while all mindes are suspense with expectation of a new assemblie, and the assemblie for a good space taken up with the new setling of it self. After which, if they finde no great work to do, they will make it, by altering or repealing former acts, or making and multiplying new; that they may seem to see what thir predecessors saw not, and not to have assembld for nothing: till all law be lost in the multitude of clashing statutes. ∥ and serve only to satisfie the ambition of such men, as think themselves injur’d, and cannot stay till they be orderly chosen to have thir part in the government. If the ambition of such be at all to be regarded, | But if the ambition of such as think themselves injur’d that they also partake not of the government, and are impatient till they be chosen, cannot brook the perpetuitie of others chosen before them, or if it be feard that long continuance of power may corrupt sincerest men, ∥ the best expedient will be, and with least danger, | the known expedient is, and by som lately propounded , ∥ that ∥ everie two or three years | annually (or if the space be longer , so much perhaps the better) ∥ a hundred or some such number may go out by lot or suffrage of the rest, | the third part of Senators may go out according to the precedence of thir election, ∥ and the like number be chosen in thir places; to prevent the setling of too absolute a power , if it should be perpetual: and this they call partial rotation. [(which hath bin already thought on heer , and done in other Commonwealths :)] ∥ but in my opinion better nothing mov’d, unless by death or just accusation: | But I could wish that this wheel or partial wheel in State, if it be possible, might be avoided; as having too much affinitie with the wheel of fortune . For it appeers not how this can be don, without danger and mischance of putting out a great number of the best and ablest: in whose stead new elections may bring in as many raw, unexperienc’d and otherwise affected, to the weakning and much altering for the wors of public transactions. Neither do I think a perpetual Senat, especially chosen and entrusted by the people, much in this land to be feard, where the well-affected either in a standing armie, or in a setled militiahave thir arms in thir own hands . Safest therefor to me it seems, and of least hazard or interruption to affairs, that none of the Grànd Councel be mov’d, unless by death or just conviction of som crime : for what can be expected firm or stedfast from a floating foundation? however, I forejudge not any probable expedient, any temperament that can be found in things of this nature so disputable on either side. ∥ [and I shall make mention of another way to satisfie such as are reasonable, ere I end this discourse.] ∥ And | Yet ∥ least this which I affirme be thought my single opinion, I shall adde sufficient testimonie. Kingship it self is therefore counted the more safe and durable , because the king and for the most part, his Councel, is not changd during life: but a Commonwealth is held immortal; and therein firmest, safest and most above fortune; for [that] the death of a king, causeth oft-times many dangerous alterations; but the death now and then of a Senatour is not felt; the main body of them still continuing ∥ unchang’d | permanent ∥ in greatest and noblest Commonwealths, and as it were eternal. Therefore among the Jews, the supream Councel of seventie, call’d the Sanhedrim , founded by Moses, in Athens that of [the] Areopagus , in ∥ Lacedœmon | Sparta ∥ that of the Ancients , in Rome the Senat , consisted of members chosen for term of life; and by that means remaind as it were still the same to generations. In Venice they change indeed ofter then everie year som particular councel[s] of State, as that of six , or such others; but the ∥ full | true ∥ Senate , which upholds and sustains the government, ∥ sits immovable. | is the whole aristocracie immovable. ∥ So in the United Provinces , the States General , which are indeed but a Councel of State ∥ delegated | deputed ∥ by the whole union, are not usually the same persons for above three or six years; but the ∥ Provincial States , | States of every citie , ∥ in whom the ∥ true sovrantie is plac’d, | sovrantie hath bin plac’d time out of minde, ∥ are a standing Senate, without succession, and accounted chiefly in that regard the main prop of thir libertie. And why they should be so in everie well ordered Commonwealth, they who write of policie , give these reasons ; “That to make the [whole] Senate successive, not only impairs the dignitie and lustre of the Senate, but weakens the whole Commonwealth, and brings it into manifest danger; while by this means the secrets of State are frequently divulgd, and matters of greatest consequence committed to inexpert and novice counselors, utterly to seek in the full and intimate knowledg of affairs past.” I know not therefor what should be peculiar in England to make successive Parlaments thought safest, or convenient heer more then in [all] other nations, unlesse it be the fick’lness which is attributed to us as we are Ilanders. But good education and acquisite wisdom ought to correct the fluxible fault, if any such be, of our watrie situation. It will be objected, that in those places where they had perpetual Senats, they had also popular remedies against thir growing too imperious: as in Athens, besides Areopagus, another Senat of four or five hundred ; in Sparta,the Ephori ; in Rome,the Tribunes of the people. But the event tels us, that these remedies either little availd the people, or brought them to such a licentious and unbridl’d democratie, as in fine ruind themselves with thir own excessive power. So that the main reason urg’d why popular assemblies are to be trusted with the peoples libertie, rather then a Senat of principal men, because great men will be still endeavoring to inlarge thir power, but the common sort will be contented to maintain thir own libertie, is by experience found false; none being more immoderat and ambitious to amplifie thir power, then such popularities; which was seen in the people of Rome; who at first contented to have thir Tribunes, at length contended with the Senat that one Consul , then both; soon after, that the Censors and Prætors also should be created Plebeian, and the whole empire put into their hands; adoring lastly those, who most were advers to the Senat, till Marius by fulfilling thir inordinat desires, quite lost them all the power for which they had so long bin striving, and left them under the tyrannie of Sylla : the ballance therefor must be exactly so set, as to preserve and keep up due autoritie on either side, as well in the Senat as in the people. And this annual rotation of a Senat to consist of three hunderd, as is lately propounded , requires also another popular assembly upward of a thousand, with an answerable rotation. Which besides that it will be liable to all those inconveniencies found in the foresaid remedies, cannot but be troublesom and chargeable, both in thir motion and thir session, to the whole land; unweildie with thir own bulk, unable in so great a number to mature thir consultations as they ought, if any be allotted them, and that they meet not from so many parts remote to sit a whole year lieger in one place , only now and then to hold up a forrest of fingers , or to convey each man his bean or ballot into the box, without reason shewn or common deliberation; incontinent of secrets, if any be imparted to them, emulous and always jarring with the other Senat. The much better way doubtless will be in this wavering condition of our affairs, to deferr the changing or circumscribing of our Senat, more then may be done with ease, till the Commonwealth be throughly setl’d in peace and safetie, and they themselves give us the occasion. Militarie men hold it dangerous to change the form of battel in view of an enemie: neither did the people of Rome bandie with thir Senat while any of the Tarquins livd, the enemies of thir libertie, nor sought by creating Tribunes to defend themselves against the fear of thir Patricians , till sixteen years after the expulsion of thir kings , and in full securitie of thir state, they had or thought they had just cause given them by the Senat. Another way will be, to welqualifie and refine elections : not committing all to the noise and shouting of a rude multitude , but permitting only those of them who are rightly qualifi’d, to nominat as many as they will; and out of that number others of a better breeding, to chuse a less number more judiciously, till after a third or fourth sifting and refining of exactest choice, they only be left chosen who are the due number, and seem by most voices the worthiest. To make the people fittest to chuse, and the chosen fittest to govern, will be to mend our corrupt and faulty education , to teach the people faith not without vertue, temperance, modestie, sobrietie, parsimonie, justice; not to admire wealth or honour; to hate turbulence and ambition; to place every one his privat welfare and happiness in the public peace, libertie and safetie. They shall not then need to be much mistrustfull of thir chosen Patriots in the Grand Councel; who will be then rightly call’d the true keepers of our libertie, though the most of thir business will be in forein affairs. But to prevent all mistrust, the people then will have thir several ordinarie assemblies (which will henceforth quite annihilate the odious power and name of Committies ) in the chief towns of every countie, without the trouble, charge, or time lost of summoning and assembling from far in so great a number, and so long residing from thir own houses, or removing of thir families, to do as much at home in thir several shires, entire or subdivided, toward the securing of thir libertie, as a numerous assembly of them all formd and conven’d on purpose with the wariest rotation. Wherof I shall speak more ere the end of this discourse: for it may be referrd to time, so we be still going on by degrees to perfection . ∥ I suppose therefor that the people well weighing these things, would have no cause to fear or murmur, | The people well weighing and performing these things, I suppose would have no cause to fear, ∥ though the Parlament, abolishing that name , as originally signifying but the parlie of our Lords and Commons with thir Norman king when he pleasd to call them, should with certain limitations of thir power, ∥ perpetuate themselves, | sit perpetual ∥ if thir ends be faithfull and for a free Commonwealth, under the name of a Grand or General Councel: [nay] till this be done, I am in doubt whether our State will be ever certainlie and throughly setl’d: [and say again therefor, that if the Parlament do this, these nations will have so little cause to fear or suspect them, that they will have cause rather to gratulate and thank them: nay more, if they understand thir own good rightly, will sollicit and entreat them not to throw off the great burden from thir shoulders which none are abler to bear, and to sit perpetual;] never likely till then to see an end of ∥ thir | our ∥ troubles and continual changes, or at least never the true settlement and assurance of ∥ their | our ∥ libertie. [And the government being now in so many faithful and experienc’d hands , next under God, so able, especially filling up their number, as they intend, and abundantly sufficient so happily to govern us, why should the nation so little know thir own interest as to seek change, and deliver themselves up to meer titles and vanities, to persons untri’d , unknown, necessitous, implacable, and every way to be suspected: to whose power when we are once made subject, not all these our Patriots nor all the wisdom or force of the well affected joind with them can deliver us again from most certain miserie and thraldom. To return then to this most easie, most present and only cure of our distempers,] the Grand Councel being thus firmly constituted to perpetuitie, and still, upon the death or default of any member, suppli’d and kept in full number, ther can be no cause alleag’d why peace, justice, plentiful trade and all prosperitie should not therupon ensue throughout the whole land; with as much assurance as can be of human things, that they shall so continue (if God favour us, and our wilfull sins provoke him not) even to the coming of our true and right full and only to be expected King, only worthy as he is our only Saviour, the Messiah, the Christ, the only heir of his eternal father, the only by him anointed and ordaind, since the worke of our redemtion finishd, universal Lord of all mankind. The way propounded is plain, easie and open before us; without intricases, without the introducement of new or obsolete forms, or terms, or exotic models ; idea’s that would effect nothing, but with a number of new injunctions to manacle the native liberty of mankinde; turning all vertue into prescription, servitude, and necessitie, to the great impairing and frustrating of Christian libertie: I say again , this way lies free and smooth before us; is not tangl’d with inconveniencies; invents no new incumbrances; requires no perilous, no injurious alteration or circumscription of mens lands and proprieties; secure, that in this Commonwealth, temporal and spiritual lords remov’d , no man or number of men can attain to such wealth or vast possession, as will need the hedge of an Agrarian law (never succesful, but the cause rather of sedition , save only where it began seasonably with first possession ) to confine them from endangering our public libertie; ∥ without the mixture of inconveniencies, or any considerable objection to be made, as by some friviously ,1 that it is not practicable: | to conclude, it can have no considerable objection made against it, that it is not practicable: least it be said hereafter, that we gave up our libertie for want of a readie way or distinct form propos’d of a free Commonwealth. ∥ and this facilitie we shall have above our next neighbouring Commonwealth, (if we can keep us from the fond conceit of something like a duke of Venice , put lately into many mens heads, by som one or other suttly driving on under that [prettie] notion his own ambitious ends to lurch a crown ) that our liberty shall not be hamperd or hoverd over by any ingag’ment to such a potent family as the house of Nassaw , of whom to stand in perpetual doubt and suspicion, but we shall live the cleerest and absolutest free nation in the world. On the contrarie, if ther be a king, which the inconsiderate multitude are now so madd upon, marke how far short we are like to com of all those happinesses, which in a free State we shall immediately be possessd of. First, the Grand Councel, which, as I ∥ said | shewd ∥ before, [is both the basis and main pillar in everie government, and] should sit perpetually, (unless thir leisure give them now and then some intermissions or vacations easilie manageable by the Councel of State left sitting ) shall be call’d, by the kings good will and utmost endeavour, as seldome as may be ; [and then for his own ends: for it will soon return to that, let no man hope otherwise, whatever law or provision be made to the contrarie.] For it is only the kings right, he will say, to call a Parlament; and this he will do most commonly about his own affairs rather then the kingdom’s, as will appear planely so soon as they are call’d. For what will thir business then be and the chief expence of thir time, but an endless tugging between ∥ right of subject | petition of right ∥ and royal prerogative, especially about the negative voice, militia, or subsidies , demanded and oft-times extorted without reasonable cause appearing to the Commons, who are the only true representatives of the people ; and thir libertie, but will be then mingl’d with a court-faction ; besides which, within thir own walls, the sincere part of them who stand faithful to the people, will again have ∥ do | to ∥ deal with two troublesome counter-working adversaries from without, meer creatures of the king, ∥ temporal and spiritual lords , | spiritual, and the greater part, as is likeliest, of temporal lords ∥ [made up into one house, and] nothing concernd with the peoples libertie. If these prevail not in what they please, though never so much against the peoples interest, the Parlament shall be soon dissolvd, or sit and do nothing ; not sufferd to remedie the least greevance, or enact aught advantageous to the people. Next, the Councel of State shall not be chosen by the Parlament , but by the king, still his own creatures, courtiers and favorites; who will be sure in all thir counsels to set thir maister’s grandure and absolute power, in what they are able, far above the peoples libertie. I denie not but that there may be such a king, who may regard the common good before his own, may have no vitious favorite, may hearken only to the wisest and incorruptest of his Parlament; but this rarely happ’ns in a monarchie not elective; and it behoves not a wise nation to committ the summ of thir well-being, the whole state of thir safetie to fortune. What need they; and how absurd would it be, when as they themselves to whom his chief vertue will be but to hearken, may with much better management and dispatch, with much more commendation of thir own worth and magnanimitie govern without a maister. Can the folly be paralleld, to adore and be the slaves of a single person for doing that which it is ten thousand to one whether he can or will do, and we without him might do more easily, more effectually, more laudably our selves? Shall we never grow old anough to be wise to make seasonable use of gravest autorities, experiences, examples? Is it such an unspeakable joy to serve , such felicitie to wear a yoke? to clink our shackles, lockt on by pretended law of subjection , more intolerable and hopeless to be ever shaken off, then those which are knockt on by illegal injurie and violence? Aristotle, our chief instructer in the Universities, least this doctrine be thought Sectarian , as the royalist would have it thought, tels us in the third of his Politics , that certain men at first, for the matchless excellence of thir vertue above others, or som great public benifit, were created kings by the people; in small cities and territories, and in the scarcitie of others to be found like them: but when they abus’d thir power, and governments grew larger, and the number of prudent men increasd, that then the people soon deposing thir tyrants, betook them, in all civilest places, to the form of a free Commonwealth. And why should we thus disparage and prejudicate our own nation, as to fear a scarcitie of able and worthie men united in counsel to govern us, if we will but use diligence and impartiality to finde them out and chuse them, rather yoking our selves to a single person, the natural adversarie and oppressor of libertie, though good, yet far easier corruptible by the excess of his singular power and exaltation, or at best, not comparably sufficient to bear the weight of government, nor equally dispos’d to make us happie in the enjoyment of our libertie under him. ∥ And | But ∥ admitt, that monarchy of it self may be convenient to som nations, yet to us who have thrown it out, received back again, it cannot but prove pernicious . For [the] kings to com, never forgetting thir former ejection, will be sure to fortifie and arme themselves sufficiently for the future against all such attempts heerafter from the people: who shall be then so narrowly watch’d and kept so low , [as that besides the loss of all thir blood, and treasure spent to no purpose,] ∥ though they would never so fain and at the same rate, | that though they would never so fain and at the same rate of thir blood and treasure, ∥ they never shall be able to regain what they now have purchasd and may enjoy, or to free themselves from any yoke impos’d upon them. nor will they dare to go about it; utterly disheartn’d for the future, if these thir highest attempts prove unsuccesfull; which will be the triumph of all tyrants heerafter over any people that shall resist oppression; and thir song will then be, to others, how sped the rebellious English? to our posteritie, how sped the rebells your fathers? This is not my conjecture, but drawn from God’s known denouncement against the gentilizingIsraelites; who though they were governd in a Commonwealth of God’s own ordaining , he only thir king, they his peculiar people , yet affecting rather to resemble heathen, but pretending the misgovernment of Samuel’s sons , no more a reason to dislike thir Commonwealth, then the violence of Eli’s sons was imputable to that priesthood or religion, clamourd for a king. They had thir longing; but with this testim onie of God’s wrath; ye shall cry out in that day because of your king whom ye shall have chosen, and the Lord will not hear you in that day. Us if he shall hear now, how much less will he hear when we cry hereafter, who once deliverd by him from a king, and not without wondrous acts of his providence, insensible and unworthie of those high mercies, are returning precipitantly, if he withhold us not, back to the captivitie from whence he freed us. Yet neither shall we obtain or buy at an easie rate this new guilded yoke which thus transports us: [Besides this,] a new royal-revenue must be found; a new episcopal; for those are individual : both which being wholly dissipated or bought by private persons, or assing’d for service don, and especially to the Armie, cannot be recovered without a general detriment and confusion to men’s estates, or a heavy imposition on all men’s purses. benefit to none, but to the worst and ignoblest sort of men, whose hope is to be either the ministers of court riot and excess , or the gainers by it: But not to speak more of losses and extraordinarie levies on our estates, what will then be the [Not to speak of] revenges and offences [that will be] rememberd and returnd, not only by the chief person, but by all his adherents; accounts and reparations that will be requir’d, suites [and] inditements, inquiries, discoveries, complaints, informations, who knows against whom, or how many, though perhaps neuters , if not to utmost infliction, yet to imprisonment, fines, banishment ; or molestation; [or] if not these, yet disfavour , discountnance, disregard and contempt on all but the known royalist, or whom he favours, will be plentious; nor let the new royaliz’d presbyterians perswade themselves that thir old doings, though now recanted, will be forgotten; whatever conditions be contriv’d or trusted on. Will they not beleeve this; nor remember the pacification , how it was kept to the Scots; how other solemn promises many a time to us? Let them but now read the diabolical forerunning libells , the faces, the gestures that now appeer foremost and briskest in all public places; as the harbingers of those that are in expectation to raign over us; let them but hear the insolencies, the menaces, the insultings of our newly animated common enemies crept lately out of thir holes, thir hell , I might say, by the language of thir infernal pamphlets , the spue of every drunkard, every ribald; nameless, yet not for want of licence , but for very shame of thir own vile persons, not daring to name themselves, while they traduce others by name ; and give us to foresee that they intend to second thir wicked words, if ever they have power, with more wicked deeds. Let our zealous backsliders forethink now with themselves, how thir necks yok’d with these tigers of Bacchus , these new fanatics of not the preaching but the sweating-tub , inspir’d with nothing holier then the Venereal pox, can draw one way under monarchie to the establishing of church discipline with these new-disgorg’d atheismes: yet shall they not have the honor to yoke with these, but shall be yok’d under them; these shall plow on their backs . And do they among them who are so forward to bring in the single person, think to be by him trusted or long regarded? So trusted they shall be and so regarded, as by kings are wont reconcil’d enemies; neglected and soon after discarded, if not prosecuted for old traytors; the first inciters , beginners, and more then to the third part actors of all that followd; it will be found also, that there must be then as necessarily as now (for the contrarie part will be still feard) a standing armie ; which for certain shall not be this , but of the fiercest Cavaliers , of no less expence, and perhaps again under Rupert : but let this armie be sure they shall be soon disbanded, and likeliest without arrear or pay; and being disbanded, not be sure but they may as soon be questiond for being in arms against thir king: the same let them fear, who have contributed monie; which will amount to no small number that must then take thir turn to be made delinquents and compounders . They who past reason and recoverie are devoted to kingship, perhaps will answer, that a greater part by far of the Nation will have it so; the rest therefor must yield. Not so much to convince these, which I little hope, as to confirm them who yield not, I reply; that this greatest part have both in reason and the trial of just battel, lost the right of their election what the government shall be: of them who have not lost that right , whether they for kingship be the greater number, who can certainly determin? Suppose they be; yet of freedom they partake all alike, one main end of government: which if the greater part value not, but will degeneratly forgoe, is it just or reasonable, that most voices against the main end of government should enslave the less number that would be free? More just it is doubtless, if it com to force, that a less number compell a greater to retain, which can be no wrong to them, thir libertie, then that a greater number for the pleasure of thir baseness, compell a less most injuriously to be thir fellow slaves. They who seek nothing but thir own just libertie, have alwaies right to winn it and to keep it , when ever they have power, be the voices never so numerous that oppose it. And how much we above others are concernd to defend it from kingship, and from them who in pursuance therof so perniciously would betray us and themselves to most certain miserie and thraldom, will be needless to repeat.
Having thus far shewn with what ease we may now obtain a free Commonwealth, and by it with as much ease all the freedom, peace, justice, plentie that we can desire, on the otherside, the difficulties, troubles, uncertainties nay rather impossibilities to enjoy these things constantly under a monarch, I will now proceed to shew more particularly wherein our freedom and flourishing condition will be more ample and secure to us under a free Commonwealth then under kinship.
The whole freedom of man consists either in spiritual or civil libertie . As for spiritual, who can be at rest, who can enjoy any thing in this world with contentment, who hath not libertie to serve God and to save his own soul, according to the best light which God hath planted in him to that purpose, by the reading of his reveal’d will and the guidance of his holy spirit? That this is best pleasing to God, and that the whole Protestant Church allows no supream judge or rule in matters of religion, but the scriptures , and these to be interpreted by the scriptures themselves, which necessarily inferrs liberty of conscience, ∥ hath bin | I have ∥ heertofore prov’d at large in ∥ other treatises, | another treatise ; ∥ and might yet further by the publick declarations, confessions , and admonitions of whole Churches and States, obvious in all historie, since the Reformation . [He who cannot be content with this libertie to himself, but seeks violently to impose what he will have to be the only religion, upon other men’s consciences, let him know , bears a minde not only unchristian and irreligious, but inhuman also and barbarous. And in my judgement civil States would do much better, and remove the cause of much hindrance and disturbance in publick affairs, much ambition, much hypocrisie and contention among the people, if they would not meddle at all with Ecclesiastical matters, which are both of a quite different nature from their cognisance, and have thir proper laws fully and compleatly with such coercive power as belongs to them, ordaind by Christ himself and his apostles. If ther were no medling with Church matters in State counsels, ther would not be such faction in chusing members of Parlament, while every one strives to chuse him whom he takes to be of his religion; and everie faction hath the plea of Gods cause. Ambitious leaders of armies would then have no hypocritical pretences so ready at hand to contest with Parlaments, yea to dissolve them and make way to thir own tyrannical designs : in summ , I verily suppose ther would be then no more pretending to a fifth monarchie of the saints : but much peace and tranquillitie would follow; as the United Netherlands have found by experience: who while they persecuted the Arminians , were in much disquiet among themselves, and in danger to have broke asunder into a civil war; since they have left off persecuting, they have livd in much more concord and prosperitie. And I have heard from Polanders themselves, that they never enjoid more peace, then when religion was most at libertie among them; that then first began thir troubles, when that king by instigation of theJesuites began to force the Cossaks in matters of religion.] This libertie of conscience, which above all other things ought to be to all men dearest and most precious, no government more inclinable not ∥ only to favour | to favor only ∥ but to protect, then a free Commonwealth; as being most magnanimous, most fearless and confident of its own fair proceedings. Wheras kingship, though looking big, yet indeed most pusillanimous, full of fears, full of jealousies, startl’d at everie umbrage, as it hath bin observd of old to have ever suspected most and mistrusted them who were in most esteem for vertue and generositie of minde, so it is now known to have most in doubt and suspicion them who are most reputed to be religious. Q. Elizabeth , though her self accounted so good a Protestant , so moderate, so confident of her subjects love , would never give way so much as to Presbyterian reformation in this land, though once and again besought, as Cambden relates, but imprisond and persecuted the verie proposers therof , alleaging it as her minde and maxim unalterable, that such reformation would diminish regal authoritie . What libertie of conscience can we then expect ∥ from | of ∥ others far worse principld from the cradle , traind up and governd by Popish and Spanish counsels , and on such depending hitherto for subsistence? Especially what can this last Parlament expect, who having reviv’d lately and publishd the covnant , have reingag’d themselves, never to readmitt Episcopacie: which no son of Charls returning, but will most certainly bring back with him, if he regard the last and strictest charge of his father, to persevere in not the doctrin only,but government of the church of England; not to neglect the speedie and effectual suppressing of errors and schisms; among which he accounted Presbyterie one of the chief : or if notwithstanding that charge of his father, he submitt to the covnant, how will he keep faith to us with disobedience to him; or regard that faith given, which must be founded on the breach of that last and solemnest paternal charge, and the reluctance, I may say the antipathie which is in all kings against Presbyterian and Independent discipline? For they hear the Gospel speaking much of libertie , a word which monarchie and her bishops both fear and hate; but a free Commonwealth both favours and promotes; and not the word only, but the thing it self. But let our governors beware in time, least thir hard measure to libertie of conscience be found the rock wheron they shipwrack themselves , as others have now don before them in the cours wherin God was directing thir stearage to a free Commonwealth, and the abandoning of all those whom they call sectaries, for the detected falshood and ambition of som, be a wilfull rejection of thir own chief strength and interest in the freedom of all Protestant religion, under what abusive name soever calumniated.
The other part of our freedom consists in the civil rights and advanc’ments of every person according to his merit: the enjoiment of those never more certain, and the access to these never more open, then in a free Commonwealth. ∥ And both | Both which ∥ in my opinion may be best and soonest obtaind, if every county in the land were made a ∥ little commonwealth , | kinde of subordinate Commonaltie or Commonwealth, ∥ and ∥ thir chief town a city , if it | one chief town or more, according as the shire is in circuit, made cities, if they ∥ be not so call’d alreadie; where the nobilitie and chief gentry from a proportionable compas of territorie annexd to each citie, may build, houses or palaces, befitting their qualitie, may bear part in the government, make their own judicial lawes , or use these that are, and execute them by their own elected judicatures, and judges without appeal, in all things of civil government between man and man. So they shall have justice in thir own hands, law executed fully and finally in thir own counties and precincts, long wishd, and spoken of, but never yet obtaind; ∥ and none | they shall have none then ∥ to blame but themselves, if it be not well administerd. and fewer laws to expect or fear from the supreme autoritie; or to those that shall be made, of any great concernment to public libertie, they may without much trouble in these commonalties or in more general assemblies call’d to thir cities from the whole territorie on such occasion, declare and publish thir assent or dissent by deputies within a time limited sent to the Grand Councel : yet so as this thir judgment declar’d shal submitt to the greater number of other counties or commonalties, and not avail them to any exemption of themselves, or refusal of agreement with the rest, as it may in any of the United Provinces, being sovran within it self, oft times to the great disadvantage of that union. In these imployments they may much better then they do now exercise and fit themselves till their lot fall to be chosen into the Grand Councel, according as their worth and merit shall be taken notice of by the people. As for controversies that shall happen between men of several counties, they may repair, as they do now, to the capital citie. or any other more commodious, indifferent place and equal judges . And this I finde to have bin practisd in the old Athenian Commonwealth, reputed the first and ancientest place of civilitie in all Greece; that they had in thir several cities, a peculiar; in Athens, a common government; and thir right, as it befell them, to the administration of both. They should have heer also schools and academies at thir own choice, wherin their children may be bred up in thir own sight to all learning and noble education, not in grammar only , but in all liberal arts and exercises. This would soon spread much more knowledge and civilitie, yea religion, through all parts of the land: by communicating the natural heat of government and culture more distributively to all extreme parts, which now lie numm and neglected, [this] would soon make the whole nation more industrious, more ingenuous at home, more potent, more honourable abroad. To this a free Commonwealth will easily assent; (nay the Parlament hath had alreadie som such thing in designe) for of all governments a Commonwealth aims most to make the people flourishing, vertuous, noble and high spirited. Monarchs will never permitt: whose aim is to make the people, wealthy indeed perhaps and wel-fleec’t for thir own shearing , and [for] the supply of regal prodigalitie; but otherwise softest, basest, vitiousest, servilest, easiest to be kept under; and not only in fleece, but in minde also sheepishest; and will have all the benches of judicature annexd to the throne , as a gift of royal grace that we have justice don us; whenas nothing can be more essential to the freedom of a people, then to have the administration of justice and all publick ornaments in thir own election and within thir own bounds, without long traveling or depending on remote places to obtain thir right or any civil accomplishment; so it be not supream, but subordinate to the general power and union of the whole Republick. In which happie firmness as in the particular above mentioned, we shall also far exceed the United Provinces , by having, not as they (to the retarding and distracting oft times of thir counsels or urgentest occasions), [so] many sovranties united in one Commonwealth, but many Commonwealths under one united and entrusted sovrantie. And when we have our forces by sea and land, either of a faithful Armie or a setl’d Militia, in our own hands to the firm establishing of a free Commonwealth, publick accounts under our own inspection , general laws and taxes with thir causes in our own domestic suffrages, judicial laws, offices and ornaments at home in our own ordering and administration, all distinction of lords and commoners, that may any way divide or sever the publick interest, remov’d, what can a perpetual senat have then wherin to grow corrupt, wherin to encroach upon us or usurp; or if they do, wherin to be formidable? Yet if all this avail not to remove the fear or envie of a perpetual sitting, it may be easilie provided, to change a third part of them yearly, or every two or three years, as was above mentiond; or that it be at those times in the peoples choice, whether they will change them, or renew thir power, as they shall finde cause.
I have no more to say at present : few words will save us, well considerd; few and easie things, now seasonably don. But if the people be so affected, as to prostitute religion and libertie to the vain and groundless apprehension, that nothing but kingship can restore trade , not remembring the frequent plagues and pestilences that then wasted this cite, such as through God’s mercie, we never have ∥ left | felt ∥ since, and that trade flourishes no where more, then in the free Commonwealths of Italie, Germanie and the Low Countreys, before thir eyes at this day, yet if trade be grown so craving and importunate through the profuse living of tradsmen that nothing can support it, but the luxurious expences of a nation upon trifles or superfluities , so as if the people generally should betake themselves to frugalitie, it might prove a dangerous matter , least tradesmen should mutinie for want of trading, and that therefor we must forgoe and set to sale religion , libertie, honour, safetie, all concernments divine or human to keep up trading, if lastly, after all this light among us, the same reason shall pass for current to put our necks again under kingship, as was made use of by the Jews to return back to Egypt and to the worship of thir idol queen , because they falsly imagind that they then livd in more plenty and prosperitie, our condition is not sound but rotten, both in religion and all civil prudence; and will bring us soon, the way we are marching, to those calamities which attend alwaies and unavoidably on luxurie, [that is to say] all national judgments under forein or domestic slaverie: so far we shall be from mending our condition by monarchizing our government; what ever new conceit now possesses us. However wth all hazard I have ventur’d what I thought my dutie, to speak in season, & to forewarn my country in time: wherin I doubt not but there be many wise men in all places and degrees, but am sorrie the effects of wisdom are so little seen among us. Many circumstances and particulars I could have added in those things whereof I have spoken; but a few main matters now put speedily ∥ into | in ∥ execution, will suffice to recover us, and set all right: and ther will want at no time who are good at circumstances , but men who set thir minds on main matters and sufficiently urge them, in these most difficult times I finde not many. What I have spoken, is the language of that which is not call’d amiss the good old cause: if it seem strange to any, it will not seem more strange, I hope, then convincing to backsliders . Thus much I should perhaps have said, though I were sure I should have spoken only to trees and stones , and had none to cry to, but with the Prophet , O earth, earth, earth: to tell the verie soil it self ∥ what her perverse inhabitants are deaf to. Nay though what I have spoke, should happ’n (which Thou suffer not, who didst create mankinde free ; nor Thou next, who didst redeem us from being servants of men!) to be the last words of our expiring libertie. | what God hath determined of Coniah and his seed forever. ∥ But I trust, I shall have spoken perswasion to abundance of sensible and ingenuous men: to som perhaps, whom God may raise of these stones, to become children of reviving libertie; and ∥ may enable and unite in thir noble resolutions | may reclaim, though they seem now chusing them a captain back for Egypt, to bethink themselves a little and consider whether they are rushing ; to exhort this torrent also of the people, not to be so impetuos, but to keep thir due channell; and at length recovering and uniting thir better resolutions, now that they see alreadie how open and unbounded the insolence and rage is of our common enemies ∥ to [give a] stay [to] these [our] ruinous proceedings justly and timely fearing to what a precipice of destruction the deluge of this epidemic madness would hurrie us ∥ through the | and to this ∥ general defection of ∥ the | a ∥ misguided and abus’d multitude.
[The End]
This glossary is designed to include all obsolete, archaic, dialectical, and rare words that occur in the text. For the sake of clearness or convenience, a few current words have been admitted. The principal authorities that have been consulted are the New English Dictionary (NED.), the Century Dictionary, Skeat’s Etymological Dictionary, and Lockwood’s Lexicon.
A dagger (†) before a word or meaning indicates that the word or meaning is obsolete; an interrogation (?), that the interpretation is doubtful.
†Acquisite,a. [ad. L. acquīsīt-us pa. pple. of acquīrere.] Acquired; obtained for oneself. 25. 11.
Addicted,ppl. a. †Attached by one’s own act; given up, devoted, inclined (to a person or party). 21. 22.
Admirable,a. †To be wondered at; wonderful, surprising, marvelous. 18. 26.
Admiration,sb. Wonder, astonishment, surprise. Arch.10. 8.
Admire,v. †intr. To wonder, to marvel. 19. 13.
Affected,ppl. a. Disposed, inclined. 11. 17.
Aftergame,sb. ‘Prop. A second game played in order to reverse or improve the issues of the first; hence “The scheme which may be laid or the expedients which are practised after the original game has miscarried; methods taken after the first turn of affairs” Johnson.’ NED. 15. 4.
Anough.Obs. form of enough.11. 24.
Answerable,a. Corresponding; proportional. Absol. Arch.25. 38.
Apprehension,sb. Notion; opinion; fixed idea. 40. 1.
Assistances,sb. Assistance; succour. Arch. in pl.14. 27.
Bandy,v. intr. To contend, to strive. 26. 15.
Briskest,a. Most active; liveliest. 33. 7.
Censur’d,v. trans. †Judged to be. 13. 29.
Charges,sb. ‘Expenses: often with sense scarcely or not at all distinguishable from the sing.’ NED. Arch. in pl.16. 5.
Cheapning,v. trans. †Haggling terms about; ?endeavoring to lower the price of. 16. 32.
Circumstances,sb. ‘Subordinate matters or details: strictly, matters “appendant or relative to a fact” (Johnson), viewed as extraneous to its essence, but passing into the sense of “subordinate parts of the fact, details.’ ” NED. Obs. in pl.40. 35.
Civilest,a. †Having proper public or social order; well-ordered, orderly, well-governed. 31. 13.
Commodious,a. Convenient. Arch.38. 18.
Conceit,sb. Notion, idea. 29. 5.
Concernment,sb. †Interest. 9. 20.
Conclude,v. trans. †To prove. 18. 19.
Constantly,adv. With mental constancy or steadfastness; steadily, resolutely, faithfully. 14. 12.
Constituted,ppl. a. †Set up, established, ordained. 28. 5.
Constitutions,sb. Existing order or arrangements of government. 9. 17.
Corruption,sb. [Replaced by ‘contagion’ in 2d ed.] An infectious moral disease. 13. 31.
Cunning,a. In a bad sense: crafty; skilful at underhand methods. 9. 10.
Default,sb. †Failure in duty; misdeed. 28. 6.
Deferr,v. trans. †To delay, to put off (a person). 12. 27.
Delinquents,sb. ‘Those who assisted Charles I or Charles II, by arms, money, or personal service, in levying war, 1642-1660.’ NED. 12. 14.
†Democratie,sb. [L. democratia.] Democracy. 25. 19.
Disaffected,a. Unfriendly to the government. 20. 19.
Disallowance,sb. Disapproval. 15. 21.
Discoveries,sb. †Investigations. 32. 33.
Dooms-day,sb. [OE. dōmes dæg.] Judgment day. 21. 3.
Driving,v. intr. Moving energetically. 29. 7.
Effects,sb. †Outward signs; evidence. 40. 34.
Election,sb. †choice. 39. 10.
Endevord,v. trans. Attempted. Obs. exc. arch.11. 33.
Equal,a. †Impartial. 38. 19.
Estates,sb. Orders of society. 11. 16.
Event,sb. Final outcome. 25. 17.
Expecting,ppl. a. Awaiting. Arch.20. 7.
Face,sb. Aspect; visible condition. 9. 1.
Faces,sb. Outward shows. 33. 6.
Facilitie,sb. Freedom from difficulty. 29. 3.
Faction,sb. †Party-strife; intrigue. 35. 21.
Fain,adv. Gladly; willingly. 31. 34.
Fine,sb. End. Obsolete except in phrase in fine.25. 19.
Fond,a. Idiotic. 29. 5.
Force,sb. †Compulsion. 11. 10.
Forgoe,v. give up; renounce. 40. 14.
Frequent,a. †Of persons, an assembly, etc.: Assembled in great numbers, crowded, full. Often in full and frequent.9. 14.
Friendly,adv. In a friendly manner. 16. 8.
Fluxible,a. Inconstant; ready for change. 25. 12.
Gentilism,sb. †Heathenism. 15. 21.
Gestures,sv. Bodily movements (e. g., in drinking healths). 33. 7.
Gratulate,v. trans. To congratulate. Arch.27. 20.
Humour,sb. Groundless fancy, or inclination. Obs. with of.9. 9.
Imposition,sb. Tax. 32. 25.
Indifferent,a. †Neutral; ‘Not more advantageous to one party than to another.’ NED. 38. 19.
Inferrs,v. †Logically necessitates. 15. 35.
Ingenuous,a. †Noble in character; highminded. 38. 33; 41. 20.
Judicatures,sb. Courts of justice. 37. 34.
Judicial,adj. Secular, as opp. to moral or ceremonial. 37. 32.
Judgments,sb. Visitions of divine wrath. 40. 26.
Knockt,v. trans. Phrase knocked on = driven on by a blow. 31. 4.
Least,conj. Obs. form of lest.24. 1.
Lieger,a. Obs. form of ledger. Resident; stationary. 26. 5.
Light,sb. Instruction; advice. 40. 17.
Longing,sb. †Object of intense desire. 32. 10.
Low,a. Humble; dispirited. 31. 30.
Lurch,v. trans. †To get by stealth; to steal. 29. 8.
Magnanimously,adv. †Courageously; heroicly. 10. 6.
Magnifi’d,a. †Lauded. 13. 13.
Masks,sb. Originally the same word as masques. ‘A form of amateur histrionic entertainment, popular at Court and amongst the nobility in England during the latter part of the 16th c. and the first half of the 17th c.; originally consisting of dancing and acting in dumb show, the performers being masked and habited in character; afterwards including dialogue (usually poetical) and song.’ NED. 16. 11.
Maxim,sb. ‘A precept of morality or prudence expressed in sententious form.’ NED. 36. 24.
Minde,sb. Opinion. 36. 24.
Mischief,sb. †Misfortune, calamity. 20. 15.
Motion,sb. Moving; ? †transportation. 26. 1.
Motiond,v. trans. pp. of motion. †Proposed. 11. 20.
Neuters,sb. Those of neither side. 32. 35.
Novice,a. Inexperienced. 25. 4.
Noxious,a. Harmful. 9. 8.
Ofter,adv. comp. of oft. Archaic. Oftener. 24. 19.
Ordination,sb. Induction into the ministry. 12. 12.
Ornaments,sb. [L. ornamenta.] Distinctions; public honors. 39. 10.
Outlandish,a. Of foreign birth; un-English. Archaic.16. 15.
Pageant,v. To carry about as a show. 16. 37.
Parlie,sb. [From OF. parler, to speak.] Speech; conference. 27. 10.
Peculiar,a. †‘Belonging specially to.’ NED. 32, 6; †Individual. 38. 22.
Popularities,sb. Obs. Democracies. 25. 26.
Policie,sb. †Government; political science. 24. 33.
Precedence,sb. Order of occurrence. 23. 16.
†Prejudicate, v. Judge hastily; condemn in advance. 31. 15.
Prescription,sb. †Limitation; conformity to prescribed rules of conduct. 28. 23.
Prettie,a. Perhaps in OE. sense, †cunning; but possibly ironical. 29. 7.
Principld,ppl. a. Imbued with principles. Rare except in combination. 36. 27.
Progress,sb. †A state procession. 16. 37.
†Proprieties,sb. Properties. 28. 27.
Prostrations,sb. Attitudes expressive of servility or adoration. 18. 26.
Qualifie,v. trans. †Regulate. 26. 21.
Revels,sb. Dances given in connection with masques, but not a part of them. 16. 11.
Ribald,sb. A base person; a profligate. 33. 12.
Seek, to, †adj. phrase. Ignorant. 25. 4.
Shift, put to, Forced to devise new expedients. 12. 7.
Stay,vb. intr. Wait patiently. 23. 3.
Stay,sb. Check; halt. 41. 29.
Stearage,sb. The course steered; the path or way. 37. 14.
Suffrages,sb. Control by means of popular votes. 39. 25.
Summ, in,adv. phrase. In short. 35. 27.
†Suspence,a. Suspended; held in doubt. 22. 32.
Swell,v. intr. Strut; put on airs. 18. 8.
Temperament,sb. Compromise; adjustment of differences. Arch.23. 37.
Then.Obs. form of than.9. 15.
Thir,pron. pl. Their. Obs. or dial.15. 4.
Throughly,adv. By-form of thoroughly. Skeat, Etym. Dict.11. 3.
Timely,adv. [A. S. tīmlīce.] In good time. 41. 30.
Took,vb. Deemed; judged. 10. 11.
Umbrage,sb. Shadow; slight appearance. 36. 13.
Vassals,sb. Subjects; underlings. 18. 20.
Venereal pox.sb. Disease due to sexual profligacy. 33. 19.
Vicegerent,sb. One exercising delegated power. 19. 27.
Voice, negative,sb. Power of veto. 29. 34.
Voices,sb. Votes. 11. 18.
Weight,sb. Importance; effective influence. 12. 2.
Whenas,conj. When. Arch.20. 26.
Wonderd, be,v. †impers. Be a cause for astonishment. 18. 16.
Worthies,sb. Persons of superior eminence and worth. 20. 27.
[1 ]Frivolously.
[9. 1. since the writing.]See Introduction B. 1.
[9. 1a. the face of things.]This was a very favorite expression during the Interregnum. Thus Dr. Denton writes to Sir Ralph Verney, Aug. 10, 1659: ‘The face of things may alter in a moment’ (Verney Memoirs 3. 450).
[9. 2. some change.]Within the fortnight just past, General Monk, hitherto the defender of the Rump, had become the Rump’s dictator, and boldly restored the secluded members—now rampant Royalists. This opened the way to a certain and speedy restoration of kingship. Milton, conceding merely ‘some change,’ assumes at the outset a calmness of tone, as if determined still to hope, or at least not to communicate to others his own despair.
[9. 2a. writs for new elections.]The little handful of Rump-republicans were extremely reluctant to ‘fill up’ their numbers by new elections. Attributing the wretched state of affairs to this cause, General Monk marched into the city on Feb. 11, and flatly demanded that the House ‘should issue out Writs’ within six days (see Introd., p. xxiv, for the exact ultimatum). That stubborn and tenacious little body retaliated by disabling all sons of sequestered Royalists, but took care to comply, on their last day of grace, with the dictator’s main demand.
[9. 3. have bin recall’d.]See Introduction, pp. x-xi.
[9. 4. readmitted from exclusion.]On Dec. 6, 1648, Colonel Pride had posted his regiment at the doors of the House of Commons, and ‘terrified from sitting, near two Hundred [cf. notes on 10. 38 and 11. 21], . . . being those who had on the fifth of December before, by Vote approved of the late King’s Concessions for a Peace at the Isle of Wight’ (Baker, Chron., p. 542). During the succeeding years of the commonwealth these secluded members never ceased to demand readmission. Finally, they found an effective champion in General Monk, who ‘on the one and twentyeth day of February [1660], meeting the secluded members at Whitehall, . . . commended to their care 1. Religion, . . . 2. the state,’ and ‘told them the house was open for them to enter, and prayed for their good success. The secluded members being thus admitted, fall immediately to work where they were abruptly forced to break off in December 1648’ (Walker, Hist. Indep. 4. 93). The eagerness of the long-debarred members to get back into their seats was not without its ludicrous aspect: ‘As he went into the House W. Prynne’s long sword got between Sir W. Waller’s short legs, and threw him down, which caused laughter’ (Aubrey, Bodleian Letters 2. 509). Pepys also has a good account of their triumphal entry.
[9. 5. not a little rejoicing.]The readmission of the secluded members had changed the Parliament in an instant from a staunch republican and Independent body into a Royalist and Presbyterian stronghold. Moreover, the restored members were pledged to a speedy dissolution and the calling of a free Parliament—conditions absolutely fatal to republicanism. Of the dissolution itself Clement Walker (Hist. Ind. 4. 95) exultingly records: ‘And thus we see Independency laid in the dust, and ready to give up the ghost.’ Milton’s favorite scheme of perpetuating the Rump as a national grand council was, of course, no longer possible, if it had ever been so. Whatever rejoicing he was now capable of must have sprung, therefore, from some lingering hope of securing the main end—a commonwealth in some form instead of kingship—and a degree of faith in the vehement declarations of General Monk (see note on 9. 5a).
[9. 5a. resolutions of all those who are now in power.]Whitelock (Memorials 4. 397) mentions the engagement entered into by the Rump on Feb. 14 ‘to be true and faithful to the commonwealth of England, . . . without a king, single person or house of lords.’ The restored members, on their part, ‘declared, as to Government they intended no Alteration in it’ (Baker, Chron., p. 600). But most emphatic of all was General Monk. Early in February he declared to General Ludlow that they ‘must live and die together for a Commonwealth’ (Ludlow, Memorials 2. 227). His words of Feb. 21, addressed to the secluded members about to be restored, were still stronger (see Introduction, p. xxxiii). Clarendon is of the opinion that he ‘desired nothing but that he might see a Commonwealth established, in such a model as Holland was, where he had been bred’ (Hist. Rebellion 16. 134). Being offered ‘the Government in his own Person, he said, The Experience of Cromwell’s Fate gave him Reasons to avoid the Rock on which that Family was split’ (Baker, Chron., p. 603). Finally, a committee waited upon him for an explanation of his doings on Feb. 21, and ‘having resolved to try him to the utmost, demanded farther if he would join with them against Charles Stuart and his party: in answer to which he applied himself to Sir Arthur Haslerig, . . . and taking off his glove, and putting his hand within Sir Arthur’s, he added; “I do here protest to you in the presence of all these gentlemen, that I will oppose to the utmost the setting up of Charles Stuart, a single person, or a House of Peers” ’ (Ludlow, Memoirs 2. 237).
[9. 6. jointly tending.]The army was still thoroughly republican. The City hastened to send congratulations upon the ‘happy return of the Parliament.’ ‘Whatever mistakes have been formerly,’ said the Londoners, ‘it cannot but be a happy Day, to all but our Enemies, in that all the affections of the City and Parliament are joined together.’ These assurances, however ambiguous, together with the positive declarations (see note on 9. 5a) of Monk and the Parliament, Milton chooses to interpret in the most hopeful light possible, as ‘jointly tending to the establishment of a free Commonwealth.’
[9. 7. Commonwealth.]The term as used in this treatise is practically synonymous with ‘republic’ or ‘representative democracy.’ It had been variously used by earlier English writers—as signifying the whole body politic, any group or fraternity united by a common interest or characteristic, monarchy, absolute democracy, mixed government, etc. The term, however, was specifically applied to the form of government in England during the Interregnum, and, still more narrowly, to the republic that existed before and after the protectorate. It is usually qualified by Milton and other advocates of a republic by such expressions as ‘free and equal,’ ‘without single person or house of lords.’ Among the Royalists the term came in for much ridicule; as, for example, the following: ‘You have made us a commonwealth, that is, (as malignants say) have given us power to put a finger into every man’s purse and pocket. You have made the people supreme authority, and left them no laws’ (Hosanna: Somers Tracts 7. 55).
[9. 8. ∥ unsound | noxious. |]Note the gain in precision, force, and intensity of feeling. In these respects the two words adequately represent the quality and relationship of the two editions.
[9. 9. humour.]See Glossary; cf. Burton’s Diary (1828) 4. 423, for 1659: ‘These tymes, and the affairs transacted in them, give motion to all sorts of humours in the nation’ (New Eng. Dict.).
[9. 9a. returning.]The opening months of 1660 were characterized by an ever-rising and finally irresistible tide of enthusiasm for the king. A Letter of Advice to his Excellency Lord-General Monk states that the ‘multitudes of people, indeed (like children, who must have a baby to play with, and something to glitter in their eyes) cry for a king’ (Harleian Miscellany 8. 627). The author of England’s Confusion (Somers Tracts 6. 528) declares that ‘the poor people . . . are fain to return home and sit still in amaze’ (see notes on 9. 11 and 17. 18). Monk’s stand against the Rump on Feb. 11 was the occasion for fresh outbursts of wild joy and demonstration (see Introd., p. xxiv), which were still intensified by his restoration of the old members on Feb. 21. Pepys (Diary) observes on the following day ‘how abominably Barebone’s windows are broke again last night.’ Another writer finds it ‘difficult to describe the joy and exultation’ at the ‘prospect of peace, concord, liberty, justice’ that ‘broke forth at once, from amidst the deepest darkness in which the nation had ever been involved’ (Cobbett, Parl. Hist. 3. 1578). John Stewkeley, of Hampshire, exultingly declares: ‘We may all soon meet if the Wind blow from Flanders: wch I pray for, pro Re: pro Ecle. Ang.: pro. reg: as a Subject; as a member, as an Englishman’ (Verney Mem. 3. 460). By March 6 Pepys is able to record that ‘everybody now drink the King’s health without any fear, whereas before it was very private that a man dare do it.’ See also note on 9. 11.
[9. 9b. old bondage.]This was the common figure for kingship, not only with Milton, but with extreme Commonwealthmen in general. Thus Colonel Overton exhorted his soldiers ‘to be watchful, and guard themselves against the abandoned Interest of Charles Stuart, which was now reviving and would introduce the Bondage they had freed themselves from’ (Baker, Chron., p. 602). Speaker Lenthall informs Monk that the people were in danger ‘to have been made slaves again.’
[9. 9c. instilld of late by some cunning deceivers.]Milton’s own comment on this passage is as follows: ‘I affirmed in the Preface of a late discourse intitl’d, “The ready Way . . .,” that the humour of returning to our old bondage was instilled of late by some deceivers; and to make good, that what I then affirmed was not without just ground, one of those deceivers I present here to the people: and if I prove him not such, refuse not to be so accounted in his stead’ (Brief Notes upon a late Sermon titl’d The Fear of God and the King; Preach’d and since publish’d, by Matthew Griffith D. D.: Bohn 2. 354). Whitelock records under date of Feb. 6 that ‘divers of the King’s party came from beyond sea into England, and talked very high, and that they were sure that the King would be in England very shortly’ (Memorials 4. 393). An anonymous writer concocted the following (see Somers Tracts 6. 514):
‘The Lord Chancellor Hyde to Mr. Hancock (Broderick.) Sir,
. . . Methinks it is a very fit conjuncture for you to get some sharp pamphlets to be published and dispersed, to inform the people of their folly and madness in affecting to be governed as a commonwealth, by convincing them how far the people are from enjoying that liberty under that government, which the people of England have always done under their kings; of the tyranny to which republics are subject, . . . vast taxes, . . . standing army. . . . I pray think of this, and in it do right to the worthy persons who are the chief cherishers and supporters of that design, by giving the right characters of them to the people, and making them as odious and ridiculous as they ought to be.’ Such ‘deceivers’ were legion, and the press was pouring forth a torrent of such pamphlets as A Coffin for the Good Old Cause, and That wicked and Blasphemous Petition of Praise-God Barebone and his Sectarian Crew . . . anatomized. Milton himself was twitted in the Censure of the Rota for being a ‘cunning’ man.
[9. 11. among too many of the people.]Lord Ormond, in a letter dated Jan. 1, 1660, informs Lord Jermyn ‘that the general disposition of the people, and particularly of the city of London, seems to promise great advantages to the King; four parts of five of the whole people, besides all the nobility and gentry, being devoted to him, and ready to act as they shall be directed, and not without some difficulty restrained from some present engagement’ (quoted by Harris, Life of Charles the Second 1. 266). See also note on 9. 9a.
[9. 12. I thought best not to suppress what I had written.]Milton had written the body of the treatise before the overthrow of the Rump (see Introd., p. xiv). The readmission of the secluded members had rendered futile many of his recommendations; as, for example, perpetuating the Rump as a grand council. Moreover, it had made the restoration of Charles inevitable. Perhaps the knowledge and conviction of all this caused Milton to contemplate suppressing his pamphlet. But his was not the temper that fights only, or even best, under prospects of victory. He was contending, as it seemed to him, for sanity as opposed to madness; for freedom as opposed to absolute thraldom. And however forlorn the republican hope, it was not in Milton to retreat in the face of onrushing Royalism. Besides, he still tries to persuade himself of a hope that he ‘may perhaps . . . be much more useful then before.’
[9. 14. sitting more full and frequent.]This expression refers simply to the increased attendance after the readmission of the secluded members. It has no reference to the frequency of their sittings. See Glossary. The New English Dictionary exemplifies the usage as follows: ‘1606 Holland Sueton. 14 He in a ful and frequent assemblie . . . besought, etc. 1725 Pope Odyss. 16. 377 Apart they sate, and full and frequent, form’d a dire debate. 1746 H. Walpole Lett. to Sir H. Mann (1857) 2. 38. One hundred and thirty-nine Lords were present, and made a noble sight on their benches full and frequent.’ When the Rump resumed its sitting, Dec. 26, 1659, there were but thirty-six members present; and during the rest of its exclusive existence the attendance never exceeded fifty-three. There were seventy-three members restored on Feb. 21, and others returned later; so that there were about 150 present in the ‘full and frequent’ body to which Milton refers.
[9. 14a. be now much more useful then before.]The grounds for this hope are somewhat differently stated in the two editions. Writing in the last days of February, Milton seems to feel that it would be a noteworthy service to influence—perhaps convert—the restored Parliament of 150 members. A month later, he professes to see the still larger opportunity of influencing public opinion in the midst of a general election, and of helping to shape the policy of a free Parliament met for the express business of settlement.
[9. 15. what hath reference to the state of things as they then stood.]Passages that referred to conditions prior to the readmission of the secluded members; as: ‘Neither ought the small number of those remaining in Parlament, be made a by-word.’
[9. 17. same end.]‘A free Commonwealth without single person or house of lords.’
[9. 20. to be freely publishd.]‘This liberty of writing’ which Milton had ‘used these eighteen years on all occasions to assert the just rights and freedoms both of church and state’ (Hirelings: Bohn 3. 2) was now in grave danger of being abridged. Indeed, there was great probability that both author and publisher would be thrown into prison, and the bold pamphlet itself be suppressed. See note on 9. 28a.
[9. 21. a free Parlament.]The one insistent note that fell upon the ears of General Monk as he marched from Scotland was the cry of the people for a free Parliament. The same demand met him in the Letter of Advice. ‘And now, sir,’ said the writer, ‘can anything else save us, but an equal commonwealth? Which in truth is no more than a free and full parliament . . . more truly elected and better formed (Harl. Misc. 8. 626). Whitelock (Memorials) records (Feb. 3) ‘a tumult yesterday in London, which was for a free parliament.’
The Long Parliament, and especially its notorious remnant, through rigid qualifications, processes of exclusion, and long continuance in power, had utterly ceased to be representative of the people at large. General Monk and the restored members responded to the almost universal demand. Disabling acts, abjuration-oath, and engagement were swept aside; and for the first time in many years a Parliament assembled, April 25, 1660, which not only was the free choice of the nation, but also was free from army-intimidation, and free to proceed with the settlement of the government.
[9. 22. whom it behoves.]A similar appeal for a hearing in the Parliament is made in the Areopagitica (Bohn 2. 52): ‘I could name him who from his private house wrote that discourse to the parliament of Athens, that persuades them to change the form of democracy which was then establish’d. Such honour was done in those days to men who profest the study of wisdom and eloquence, not only in their own country, but in other lands, that cities and signiories heard them gladly, and with great respect, if they had aught in public to admonish the state.’
[9. 26. absolute determination.]Since the appearance of the first edition, the Solemn League and Covenant had been restored (March 5). Ejected ministers had, in many cases, been reinstated. Lambert, now an unyielding republican, had been sent to the Tower, and Colonel Overton had been discharged from the command of Hull. All disaffected officers had been removed by General Monk. The engagement (see note on 10. 28) had been expunged (March 13). The old qualifications (see note on 21. 20) debarring Royalists from Parliament had been rendered harmless (March 13) by the addition of a saving clause, ‘unless he or they have since manifested his or their good Affection to this Parliament.’ Finally, the council of state had been authorized (March 15) to apprehend ‘such Persons as they shall find dangerous to the Peace and Safety of the Commonwealth’ (Com. Journ.). Besides these official measures, so obviously taken to prepare the way for the coming of Charles, there were the almost universal clamor of the people for a king, and the certainty that the Parliament about to meet would be overwhelmingly Royalist. All this Milton interpreted as an ‘absolute determination to enslave.’ ‘Our liberties,’ cried he in utmost anxiety, ‘will be utterly lost in the next parliament, without some powerful course taken, of speediest prevention’ (Brief Del.: Bohn 2. 106).
[9. 27. Lent.]‘The period including 40 weekdays extending from Ash-Wednesday to Easter-eve, observed as a time of fasting and penitence, in commemoration of Our Lord’s fasting in the wilderness’ (New Eng. Dict.).
[9. 28. Shroving-time.]Shrove-tide was a period of confession preparatory to Lent. It extended from the Saturday evening before Quinquagesima Sunday to Ash-Wednesday morning. On Shrove-Tuesday Catholics were wont, after confession, to spend the rest of the day in sports, and to feast on pancakes or fritters. It is to this extra indulgence in freedom just before entering upon the forty days’ Lenten fast that Milton alludes.
[9. 28a. to speak freely.]The ‘supreme senate’ under whose ‘protection’ Milton had enjoyed ‘this liberty of writing’ (see note on 9.20) was no longer in being. The council of state had been empowered to suppress seditious pamphlets, and to call their authors to account. A warrant was issued for the arrest of Livewell Chapman, Milton’s publisher, on March 28. On April 9 Whitelock (Memorials) records that ‘the council discharged Needham [Milton’s intimate friend and fellow-journalist] from writing the weekly intelligence.’ Milton therefore had good cause in April, 1660, to bespeak a little further indulgence for his bold and contemptuous pen.
[9. 30. through haste.]The auspicious approach of the mysterious General Monk in the first days of February had inspired innumerable politicasters with a feverish desire to proffer advice. Milton, along with the rest, made all possible haste to lay before that grim sphinx the one and only way to effect a settlement. Hence the main body of the first edition was probably composed with great rapidity. The sudden change in Monk’s attitude toward the Rump, however, brought the work to a standstill. But upon Monk’s restoring the secluded members, and calling them and God to witness his intention of settling the government upon commonwealth-foundations, Milton again set busily and anxiously to work upon his pamphlet. There was a chance that it might yet accomplish much good if it could be placed in the hands of Parliament before adjournment, now only two or three weeks away. It is highly probable, therefore, that the preface was written, and the treatise completed and placed in the hands of the printer, with all possible expedition. Cf. note on 9. 30b.
[9. 30a. many faults.]See Appendix A. 4.
[9. 30b. many books were suddenly dispersd.]According to Anthony Wood, copies of the treatise were in circulation before the end of February (see Introd., p. xii), although the Thomason copy is dated March 3. The haste upon the part of Milton, the publisher, and all concerned was due to the discussion just then going on in Parliament as to the time of adjournment. On Feb. 27 ‘a Bill for dissolving this present Parliament was read the First time’ (Com. Journ.); and on March 1 it was resolved that this should occur ‘at or before the Fifteenth Day of this instant March.’
[9. 32. to revise and somwhat to enlarge.]See Appendix A. 3.
[9. 33. especially that part which argues for a perpetual Senat.]It will be observed that Milton took occasion to amplify this argument by the addition of two solid pages of matter. The causes of this extra labor were probably the tireless arguments of the Rota-men (see Introd., p. xlviii), and the appearance (March 26) of a pamphlet entitled The Censure of the Rota upon Mr. Milton’s Book (see Appendix B, p. 173).
[10. 1. great number of the people.]London (containing about one tenth of the entire population of England), and the South and East in general, were strong for the Parliament at the beginning of the war. But a far smaller proportion of the people were ready to go the length of abolishing kingship. Cf. note on 9. 11.
[10. 5. burdensom, expensive, useless and dangerous.]This is obviously Milton’s slightly inaccurate recollection of the acts of the House of Commons, Feb. 6 and 7, 1649, which declared the House of Peers ‘useless and dangerous,’ and kingship ‘unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous.’ The revised edition has it exactly right: ‘unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous.’ Cf. note on 10. 7.
[10. 7. abolishd it.]‘Resolved, etc. That it hath been found by Experience, and this House doth declare, that the Office of a King in this Nation, and to have the Power thereof in any Single Person, is unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous to the Liberty, Safety, and publick Interest of the People of this Nation; and therefore ought to be abolished: And that an Act be brought in to that Purpose’ (Com. Journ., Feb. 7, 1649). The act was finally passed March 17.
[10. 7a. free Commonwealth.]In the government that was set up after the abolishing of monarchy, the executive power was vested in a council of state, consisting of forty-one members, chosen by the House for a term of one year. There was to be no such thing as a lord president in this body, but it was soon found necessary to elevate Bradshaw to that position. All but ten of its members were chosen from the Parliament, which itself now averaged but fifty-six in attendance; so that council of state and Parliament were practically one. The judiciary and all minor offices of state remained about as they had been before.
[10. 8. admiration and terror of our neighbours.]See Glossary. Contemporaneous with the English contest between Parliament and king was a very similar struggle in France between the people and their Parliament, upon the one hand, and the court-party, as represented by the queen-mother, Anne of Austria, and her prime minister, Mazarin, upon the other. In August, 1648, the royalist side attempted to overawe Parliament by arresting two of its leaders, Broussel and Blancmesnil. But the bold move unchained a popular fury. Men, women, and children flew to arms, shouting: ‘Down with your Mazarin! Broussel! Broussel!’ The queen-regent, although vowing that she would first strangle him with her own hands, was forced to yield, and order the release of Broussel. The tumults continued, and in January, 1649, war was declared. The queen, taking with her the young king, and her court as well, fled from Paris to the castle of St. Germain on the night of Jan. 5, 1649. She absolutely refused to depose Mazarin. ‘ “I should be afraid,” she said to Madame de Motteville, “that, if I were to let him fall, the same thing would happen to me that happened to the King of England [Charles I had just been executed], and that, after he had been driven out, my turn would come” ’ (Guizot, Hist. of France 5. 361). Peace was declared in April, and the queen returned to Paris. But the rebellion spread to other parts of France. ‘Bordeaux was the focus of the insurrection; . . . riots were frequent in the town; the little king, with the queen and the cardinal, marched in person upon Bordeaux’ (ibid. 5. 365).
The rebellion of the Fronde ended in failure; but ‘the attempt had been the same in France as in England. . . . It was the same yearnings of patriotism and freedom, the same desire on the part of the country to take an active part in its own government’ (ibid. 5. 382). Mazarin himself ‘compared the Parliament to the House of Commons, and the coadjutor to Cromwell’ (ibid. 5. 365).
[10. 11. not bound . . . to any former covnant.]The Solemn League and Covenant was taken by the House of Commons September 25, 1643. The section here referred to is as follows: ‘III. We shall with the same sincerity, reality and constancy, in our several vocations, endeavour with our estates and lives mutually to preserve the rights and privileges of the Parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and to preserve and defend the King’s Majesty’s person and authority, in the preservation and defense of the true religion and liberties of the Kingdoms, that the world may bear witness with our consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts or intentions to diminish His Majesty’s just power and greatness’ (Gardiner, Const. Documents of Pur. Rev., p. 269).
[10. 11a. light of nature or religion.]The law of nature (see notes on 10. 33a and 10. 40), revealed in human consciousness, and the law of God, or divine law, as found in the revealed Word. In Milton’s opinion, these were identical.
[10. 12. many forfeitures.]See note on 10. 20.
[10. 16. They covnanted.]See note on 10. 11. This is a repetition of an argument already used against Salmasius: ‘But you omit upon what terms they promised it; to wit, if it might consist with the safety of their religion and their liberty’ (Defense: Bohn 1. 193).
[10. 18. to bring in upon our consciences a Popish religion.]It should be remembered that Charles really desired the preservation of episcopacy. But he desired even more to regain his crown and kingdom, and scrupled not to use the aid of Catholics as a means to this end. Queen Henrietta negotiated with the pope for an army of French troops, to be supported by the clergy; and Glamorgan’s treaty with the Catholics of Ireland pledged the king to such concessions as the pope’s nuncio should demand in return for 10,000 Irish troops; but this latter treaty was disavowed by the king (Camb. Hist. 4. 338). However, Milton probably refers to episcopacy itself; for in an earlier and more complete indictment we read: ‘Besides, he bore extreme hard upon the consciences of good men, and compelled them to the use of ceremonies and superstitious worship, borrowed from popery, and by him re-introduced into the church’ (Defense: Bohn 1. 200). Cf. notes on 10. 20, 16. 15, and 36. 28.
[10. 20. his occasioning . . . the Irish massacre.]Again and again Milton recurs to this charge against the late king. Charles was ‘found to have the chief hand in a most detested conspiracy against the parliament and kingdom, as by letters and examinations of Percy, Goring, and other conspirators came to light; that his intention was to rescue the Earl of Strafford, by seizing on the Tower of London; to bring up the English army out of the North, joined with eight thousand Irish papists raised by Strafford, and a French army to be landed at Portsmouth against the parliament and their friends’ (Eikonok.: Bohn 1. 334). Of the English Protestants in Ireland no fewer than ‘154,000 by their own computation’ were massacred. Charles was ‘ever friendly to the Irish papists, . . . and, like a kind of pope, sold them many indulgences for money.’ Till the ‘very burst of that rebellion,’ a committee of Irish Papists were with him and the queen in close conference, and in ‘great favour, at Whitehall’ (Eikonok.: Bohn 1. 409). He ‘gave them his peculiar right to more than five Irish counties, for the payment of an inconsiderable Rent.’ This gift Milton thinks was to the end that they might come quickly and obliterate Parliament. At all events, these very beneficiaries were soon found to be ‘the chief rebels themselves.’ From these facts, Milton concludes that ‘no understanding man could longer doubt who was “author or instigator” of that rebellion’ (ibid. 1. 411). ‘These projects not succeeding, he sent over one Dillon, a traitor, into Ireland with private instructions to the natives, to fall suddenly upon all the English that inhabited there’ (Defense: Bohn 1. 201). As to the ‘Articles of Peace made by the late king with his Irish rebels,’ Milton says: ‘He hath sold away that justice so oft demanded . . . for the blood of more than two hundred thousand of his subjects, that never hurt him, never disobeyed him, assassinated and cut in pieces by those Irish barbarians, to give the first promoting, as is more than thought, to his own tyrannical designs in England’ (Observations: Bohn 2. 183).
Milton, having been in the very centre of the terrific fury of resentment in England over these outrages, naturally exaggerates their horror and the king’s complicity. But there is at least some foundation of fact in the charges. Strafford is said to have reported to Charles: ‘You have an Army in Ireland you may employ here to reduce this Kingdom.’ It is certain that Charles refused to disband these Irish forces, and secretly commissioned the Earls of Ormonde and Antrim to swell their numbers to twenty thousand. Undoubtedly it was his game to call them in against the Parliament.
But quite distinct from all this, a long-planned, independent rebellion of the Irish was brewing; and this finally broke out over Ulster on Oct. 23, 1641. The Catholics, who longed to put an end to Laud and Strafford’s reign of ‘Thorough,’ joined the rebels, and had part in the tumults that followed. Charles’ part in it all seems to have been his attempting to manipulate the Irish forces as a weapon against Parliament (Camb. Hist. 4. 522).
[10. 23. his refusing more then seaven times, propositions.]‘Seven times over’ is the corresponding expression in Eikonoklastes. Such were the Nineteen Propositions (June 1, 1642), the Oxford Propositions (Feb. 1, 1643), the Uxbridge Propositions, presented Nov. 24, 1644, the Newcastle Propositions (July 13, 1646), upon the part of the English Parliament; numerous overtures by the Scotch Presbyterians; and the joint proposals in 1648.
It is hardly surprising that Charles refused such, for example, as the Newcastle Propositions, which demanded, in part, that he take the Covenant and permit its general enforcement; that there be national Presbyterianism; and that Parliament have not only the appointing of all important officers, but also the control of army and navy for twenty years.
[10. 26. with no difference between a king and a god.]The Covenant avoids mention or recognition of the so-called divine right of kings. It is ‘the King’s Majesty’s person and authority,’ his ‘just power and greatness,’ that are, under certain conditions, to be defended (see note on 10. 11).
[10. 28. solemn ingagement.]‘Resolved, &c. That every Member that now doth, or shall at any time hereafter, sit in this House, shall subscribe his Name to this Engagement; viz., “I do declare and promise, That I will be true and faithful to the Commonwealth of England, as the same is now established, without a King or House of Lords” (Com. Journ., Oct. 11, 1649). On Dec. 25, 1649, it was proposed ‘that it be referred to a Committee, to consider of a Declaration to be published, to satisfy the People, That the Engagement is not against the former Protestation and Covenant.’
[10. 30. the protestation before.]This was the protest of May 3, 1641, wherein the Parliament, after complaining of recent ‘Designs of Priests and Jesuits,’ of ‘Endeavors to subvert the fundamental Laws of England and Ireland, and to introduce the Exercise of an arbitrary and tyrannical Government,’ of a ‘Popish Army levied in Ireland, and Two Armies brought into the Bowels of this Kingdom, to the hazard of His Majesty’s Royal Person,’ declared as follows:
‘I A. B. do, in the Presence of Almighty God, promise, vow, and protest, to maintain and defend, as far as lawfully I may, with my Life, Power, and Estate, the true reformed Protestant Religion, expressed in the Doctrine of the Church of England, against all Popish Innovation within this Realm, contrary to said Doctrine, and according to the duty of my Allegiance, I will maintain and defend, His Majesty’s royal Person and Estate’ (Com. Journ.).
[10. 33. serve two contrary maisters.]From the Middle Ages descended the principle that allegiance to rulers is always subordinate to the higher laws of God and nature. See Introd., p. xlii, and note on 10. 33a.
[10. 33a. that more supreme law.]Milton elsewhere makes clear his meaning: ‘But if you insist to know, “by what right, by what law”; by that law, I tell you, which God and nature have enacted, viz. that whatever things are for the universal good of the whole state, are for that reason lawful and just’ (Defense: Bohn 1. 15). Cf. note on 10. 40.
[10. 35. They knew the people of England to be a free people, themselves the representers of that freedom.]Cf. Commons Journals, Jan. 4, 1649: ‘Resolved, &c. That the Commons of England, in Parliament assembled, do Declare, That the People are, under God, the Original of all just Power: and do also Declare, that the Commons of England, in Parliament assembled, being chosen by, and representing the People, have the Supreme Power in this Nation.’ Cf. note on 21. 32.
[10. 37. many were excluded.]See notes on 9. 4 and 11. 21. Milton saw fit to justify this exclusion, and in very strong language: ‘No question but it is as good and necessary to expel rotten members out of the house, as to banish delinquents out of the land: and the reason holds as well in forty as in five. And if they be yet more, the more dangerous is their number. They had no privilege to sit there, and vote home the author, the impenitent author, of all our miseries, to freedom, honour and royalty, for a few fraudulent, if not destructive, concessions’ (Observations: Bohn 2. 195).
[10. 37a. as many fled.]At the beginning of the Civil War a large part of the commons, and most of the lords, withdrew to form a Royalist Parliament at Oxford. ‘About 175 members followed the King’s flag, while nearly three hundred remained at Westminster. Rather more than thirty peers threw in their lot with the popular party, while about eighty supported the King, and about twenty took no part in the struggle’ (Firth, Cromwell, p. 69).
[10. 37b. so they pretended.]The Eikon Basilike, for example, so argues; but Milton and his party interpreted the flight as a desertion.
[10. 38. a sufficient number.]See note on 10. 37a. Besides the Royalist defection in 1642, and the exclusion of 140 (Camb. Hist. 4. 354; but cf. notes on 9. 4 and 11. 21) members by Pride’s Purge in 1648, there was a further falling away upon the execution of the king; so that the average attendance in 1649 was reduced to 56. The Barebone Parliament, which met July 4, 1653, consisted of 140 members. But this body likewise suffered a considerable reduction (Sept. 12, 1654) from Cromwell’s test on fundamentals.
[10. 40. law of nature.]Milton himself furnishes both interpretation and source: ‘For the law, says Cicero in his Philippicks, is no other than a rule of well-grounded reason, derived from God himself, enjoining whatever is just and right, and forbidding the contrary’ (Defense: Bohn 1. 71). This ‘true law . . . conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal,’ whose author is ‘God himself,’ cannot be contradicted by any other law,’ and ‘needs no other interpreter than our own conscience’ (Cicero, De Repub., tr. Barham, 3. 270). ‘I am of opinion,’ said Milton to Salmasius, ‘that the law of God does exactly agree with the law of nature’ (Def.: Bohn 1. 108). Plato (Laws 4. 713; 6. 767) and Aristotle (Politics 3. 16) show the earlier sources of this idea. The thought that God, operating in human consciousness as ‘right reason,’ is to be obeyed before every other authority, furnished a complete justification for the doctrines of resistance to tyrants, and tyrannicide, especially during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Milton’s interpretation agrees with Selden’s: ‘I cannot fancy to myself what the law of nature means, but the law of God’ (Table Talk).
[11. 4. church reformation.]Milton had hoped for much from the Presbyterian reformation; but he was disappointed, and was soon saying, ‘New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large.’ Cf. Declaration of Parliament, May 7, 1659: ‘They are resolved . . . to . . . vigorously endeavor the carrying on of Reformation so much desired; and so often declared for; to the end there may be a godly and faithful Magistracy and Ministry upheld and maintained in these Nations, to the Glory and Praise of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the reviving and making glad the Hearts of the Upright in the Land’ (Com. Journ.).
[11. 5. evangelic rules.]Those of the primitive Christian church. Milton was unalterably opposed to a state-church, and its forced maintenance by tithes—ideas which the Presbyterians were very busy in fostering at this time. Just the previous August he had published his Hirelings, a pamphlet on this very subject; but for politic reasons he here holds his resentment within bounds. Cf. Hirelings (Bohn 3. 40): ‘Heretofore in the first evangelic times, (and it were happy for Christendom if it were so again), ministers of the gospel were by nothing else distinguished from other Christians, but by their spiritual knowledge and sanctity of life, for which the church elected them to be her teachers and overseers, though not thereby to separate them from whatever calling she then found them following besides; as the example of St. Paul declares, and the first times of Christianity.’
[11. 5a. ecclesiastical canons.]‘The canon law is a body of Roman ecclesiastical law relative to such matters as that church either has, or pretends to have, the proper jurisdiction over. This is compiled from the opinions of the ancient Latin fathers, the decrees of general councils, the decretal epistles and bulls of the holy see’ (Blackstone, Comm. 1, Introd. 82). But as here applied to the Church of England, the expression refers to ‘the Constitutions and Canons Ecclesiastical’ agreed upon by Convocation, and ratified by King James I under the Great Seal in 1603.
[11. 7. positive laws.]Laws arbitrarily laid down by human authorities, as opposed to the law of nature.
[11. 9. if others of thir number, in these things were under force.]This has particular reference to the Parliament’s vote of No-Addresses (Jan. 3, 1648). Milton’s argument was called forth by L’Estrange’s Reply to Plain English, just out in April. In this pamphlet, L’Estrange directly charges that the Parliament (then Presbyterian as well as Independent) was under a force, and explains what it was: ‘They were under a Force.—Upon a Debate in the Commons House, concerning the Answer to the 4. Bills, presented to him Dec. 24, 1647 and debated Jan. 3. Commissary Ireton delivered himself after this manner: “The King hath denied safety, and protection to his People by denying the 4. Bills. . . . That it was now expected, after so long patience, they should shew their Resolution, and not desert those valiant men who had engaged for them, beyond all possibility of retreat, and would never forsake the Parliament, unless the Parliament forsook them first.”
‘From hence naturally results the menace of the Army, in case the Parliament should forsake them. . . . After some more debate Cromwell urged,—“that it was now expected, the Parliament should govern and defend the Kingdom, by their Own Power and Resolutions; and not teach the People any longer, to expect safety and Government from an Obstinate man, whose heart God had hardened, . . .—lest Despayr Teach them to seek their safety by some other means than adhearing to you; . . . how destructive such a Resolution in them will be to you all, I tremble to think and leave you to Judge.”
‘This Speech, concluded the debate; and the better to Impress his meaning, he laid his hand upon his sword, at the end of it. If this be not a Force, what is? The Power and Inclination of the Army, being the only moving Arguments to obtain the Vote. The Question was then put, and Carried for no more Addresses’ (Tracts, p. 126). See note on 11. 21.
[11. 11. a power which they could not resist.]The army (see notes on 11. 9 and 11. 21).
[11. 12. they were not therefore to leave the helm.]Milton’s fervent and unwavering support of this tenacious ‘fag end’ of a Parliament won for him the distinctive title of ‘The Goose-quill Champion of the Rump.’ He could see nothing in its actions but courage, wisdom, a high sense of duty; whereas to most people the Rump had come to stand for tyranny, love of power, greed, and personal ambition.
[11. 14. anarchie and confusion.]The phrase is a happy one, and remains the aptest description of conditions as they existed in England during the interval between the death of Cromwell and the Restoration.
[11. 15. so many of thir members left them.]See note on 10. 37a.
[11. 16. three estates.]Lords spiritual, lords temporal, and commons.
[11. 16a. The best affected.]Those most favorably disposed toward the commonwealth which the Independents instituted in January, 1649. The core of this ‘best affected’ class of the people was the army.
[11. 20. when the house divided upon main matters.]This refers to the opposite positions taken by the Presbyterians and Independents, particularly in the vote of Dec. 5, 1648, with reference to the king’s Newport concessions (see note on 11. 21) and the question of bringing him to trial.
[11. 21. fear or perswasion.]Cromwell and the army were on hand in December, 1648, to see that the Parliament brought the king to justice. On its voting (140 to 104) on Dec. 5 that Charles’ Newport concessions were satisfactory, the army at once called upon all ‘faithfull Members’ who were ‘innocent of these Votes’ to ‘acquit themselves . . . by Protestation . . . that they’ might ‘be distinguished,’ and forthwith excluded the Presbyterian majority by force. Walker characterizes the intimidated Parliament as ‘a meer Free-Schoole, where Crommel is Head-school-master,’ and ‘Ireton Usher’ (Hist. Ind. 2. 30). The account continues: ‘They seized upon 41 Members of Parliament, . . . secluded above 160, and frighted away at least 40 or 50 more, leaving only . . . 40 or 50 thriving Members sitting to unvote in a thin House under a force, what had been voted in a full and free House. To vote down the Kingly Office and House of Peers, to vote the Supreme Authority to be in the People, and in the House of Commons as their Representative’ (see note on 10. 35). These three votes occurred on Jan. 4. ‘The Diurnall tells you, there was not a Negative Voice: this shews under what a terror they sit, when in (things so apparently untrue) no man durst say, No’ (ibid. 2. 57). Cf. note on 11. 9.
[11. 23. intentions of them that voted.]During the years of the Civil War there was a widespread belief that certain leaders in Parliament were corrupt. Clement Walker, in his Mystery of the two Juntoes (1648), openly accuses the grandees of both the Independent and Presbyterian factions of conspiring together to enrich themselves from the public revenues: ‘There hath been lately given away to members openly (besides innumerable and inestimable private cheats mutually connived at) at least 300,000 l. in money, besides rich Offices, Imployments in money Committees, Sequestrations, and other advantages. . . . Most of these Grandees are reported to have, for their retreat, houses in the Low Countries, richly furnished with Sequestered Plate, Linnen, and Stuff, and great store of money in bank for their shelter. . . . This is called robbing of the Egyptians.’ Milton seems to share to some extent in this general mistrust and suspicion. Some acted ‘perhaps to bad ends.’ But nevertheless, whatever their motives, they accomplished a good work in disposing of Charles, and abolishing kingship.
[11. 26. suppose bad intentions, etc.]The meaning of this clause and the following is obscured through condensation. They may be expanded as follows: suppose the Independent leaders, in putting Charles to death, had been moved by motives of personal ambition, or desire to enrich themselves; it was a good thing they did, nevertheless; and it was supported everywhere by all people who thought it to be such, regardless of the motives of those who did it.
[11. 29. Iscariot.]Christ’s betrayer. See John 13. 3.
[11. 29a. Simon the magician.]A magician of Samaria who by his arts had acquired great reputation among the people. He was so impressed by the miracles of Philip that he asked for, and received, baptism. Afterward he offered Peter a sum of money for the power of conferring the Holy Ghost. See Acts 8. 9-24.
[11. 32. the better counsels.]That it was useless to negotiate longer with the king, and that it was not only just but necessary to bring him to trial for his misdeeds—the position of the Independents.
[11. 32a. bad ends.]See notes on 11. 23 and 20. 19.
[11. 33. the wors.]Further temporizing and conceding, with a view to saving the life of Charles and the institution of kingship.
[11. 33a. best intentions.]The Presbyterian party in the Parliament, until forcibly excluded, endeavored to thwart the inexorable determination of the Independents to bring the king to justice. Milton is not quite willing to impugn their motives in their support of kingship; indeed, he is fair enough to admit the base motives of certain leaders on the other side.
[11. 34. they were not to learn.]They knew. Cf. Camden, Hist. of Eliz., p. 377: ‘If she had any other aims, they were levell’d chiefly at these marks, the gaining the Affections of her Subjects, the Dread of her Enemies, and the Esteem of all the World: For she was not to learn, that those have a very sure and stable Foundation which are begun with Deliberation, and carry’d on with Industry and Care.’ Cf. note on 36. 22.
[11. 34a. and yet they were not to learn, etc.]The whole passage is rather obscure, and may be interpreted as follows: ‘and yet [= moreover; besides] they [‘the best affected . . . and best principl’d of the people’] were not to learn [= knew; were not ignorant] that a greater number [= the majority] might be corrupt [as were (?) the Presbyterians who were ready to vote the king back into power, and were actually conspiring to bring in a Scotch army to suppress the Independents] within the walls of a Parlament as well as of a citie [as London, whose ‘rabble’ had assaulted Westminster in the days of the Purge and were even now (1660) clamoring for a king]; wherof [= of which state of corruption] in matters of neerest concernment [that is, when it is a matter of being voted back into slavery, and—as in the case of the Independents—of personal safety, or of life itself] all men will be judges [= will have a decided opinion]; etc.
[11. 37. the odds of voices.]Milton believed in the rule of the wisest and best. ‘Nothing is more agreeable to the order of nature,’ he declared, ‘or more for the interest of mankind, than that the less should yield to the greater, not in numbers, but in wisdom and in virtue’ (Sec. Def.: Bohn 1. 265). Cf. note on 19. 7. At first a believer in kingship, he could never tolerate the opposite extreme, an ‘unbridled democracy,’ or be willing to ‘submit all to the noise and shouting of a rude multitude’ (cf. note on 26. 21). The thought seems to have been derived directly from Guicciardini, Aphorismes (1606), a book of which Milton made diligent use (see note on 15. 16a). Both writers, however, were probably influenced by Cicero’s statement, ‘the greatest number, should not have the greatest weight (ne plurimum valeant plurimi)’ (De Repub., tr. Barham, 2. 226), and by Plato’s (see note on 34. 13).
[11. 40. if others hence will pretend to disturb all counsels.]Milton is here attempting to reconcile his defense of Pride’s Purge in 1648 with his denunciation of Lambert’s similar high-handed exclusion of the Parliament in 1659. He argues that the very lives of the Independents were in danger in 1648. The expression may also contain a veiled censure of Cromwell, although Milton nowhere openly expresses any disloyalty to him.
[12. 5. the treatie.]This was the so-called treaty of Newport, which began Sept. 8, 1648, and was broken off on Oct. 27 by the Parliament’s rejection of the king’s concessions. See notes on 12. 6a and 12. 7.
[12. 6. seaven years warr.]This takes account of the first Bishops’ War (1639), the second Bishops’ War (1640), the Civil War from 1642 to 1646, and the second Civil War (1648).
[12. 6a. securitie for twenty years.]One of the king’s concessions in the treaty of Newport was that all military control should be given over to Parliament for a period of twenty years.
[12. 7. reformation in the church for three years.]During the Newport negotiations Charles was finally brought to accept Presbyterianism, but with toleration, for a term of three years.
[12. 8. our vanquishd maister.]Charles.
[12. 10. an inquisition for blood.]The full title of this pamphlet, which was published anonymously in July, 1649, is An Inquisition after Blood, to the Parliament and the Army. It was written by James Howell, author of the Epistolæ Hoelianæ. Clement Walker refers to the High Court of Justice, set up by the House of Commons Jan. 6, 1649, for the trial of the king, as a ‘Spanish Inquisition’ (Hist. Ind. 3. 42), ‘an Arbitrary, Extrajudiciall conventicle of Bloud, Cromwell’s New Slaughterhouse’ (ibid. 3. 44).
[12. 11. bishops not totally remov’d, etc.]Milton’s position is precisely that taken by Parliament at the time, and expresses the same misgivings. Cf. Commons Journals, Oct. 27, 1648: ‘Resolved, & . . . That the King’s Answer is not satisfactory. . . . 1. The King doth not utterly abolish the Function and Power of Bishops; . . . but only suspendeth the Exercise of their Function as to Ordination, for the Term of three Years, and no more. . . . 2. That, during the Term of Three Years, the King may make Bishops in the old Manner; and, at the End of Three Years, the Exercise of their Function, as to the Point of Ordination in the old Manner, is revived in such of the old Bishops as shall be then living; and in such other new Bishops as the King hath or shall make. 3. Thirdly, That the Form of Church Government, presented to the King by the Houses, is, by his Answer, limited only to the Term of Three Years; and that, at the End thereof, Provision is only made for Ordination in a Way different from what the Houses have proposed; and no certain Way settled for any other Thing concerning Ecclesiastical Discipline and Government, which will be as necessary to be provided as that of Ordination. And this, the Houses do judge, at the End of the Three Years, will expose the Kingdom to new Distractions.’ The king’s reply even as late as Nov. 23 asserts that ‘his Majesty by his former Answer hath totally suspended Episcopal Government for three years, and after the said time, limited the same in the Power of Ordination and Jurisdiction, and that the primitive Office of a Bishop only is by him endeavoured to be preserved, and that the Bishops Lands are heavily charged with Leases for 99 years, and the Deans and Chapters, and other their Dependents taken away’ (Rushworth, Hist. Coll. 7. 1334).
[12. 13. thir lands alreadie sold.]The sale of the Bishops’ lands to private individuals, especially to army-men, had been one of the chief sources of revenue during the Civil War (see note on 14. 22).
[12. 14. call’d sacrilege.]This is a reference to the king’s answer to one of the Newcastle propositions during the negotiations at Newport. It was, in part, as follows: ‘As to these particulars, his Majesty doth again clearly profess, that he cannot with a good Conscience consent to the total Abolition of the Function and Power of Bishops, nor to the intire and absolute Alienation of their Lands, as is desired, because he is yet perswaded in his Judgment that the former is of Apostolical Institution, and that to take away the latter is Sacrilege’ (Rushworth, Hist. Coll. 7. 1334). Cf. also Milton, Eikonok. (Bohn 1. 407): ‘That other, which he calls sacrilege, of taking from the clergy that superfluous wealth, which antiquity as old as Constantine, from the credit of a divine vision, counted “poison in the church,” hath been ever most opposed by men, whose righteousness in other matters hath been least observed.’ The section (xi) of the Eikon Basilike to which Milton is here replying contains the following: ‘If the straitness of my conscience will not give me leave to swallow down such camels as others do of sacrilege and injustice both to God and man, they have no more cause to quarrel with me than for this, that my throat is not so wide as theirs.’
[12. 14a. delinquents.]On March 27, 1643, the House interpreted the term as ‘any Person or Persons, Ecclesiastical or Temporal, as have raised, or shall raise, Arms against the Parliament, or have voluntarily contributed or shall contribute’ to the support of the Royalist cause. On Dec. 8, 1646, it voted thus: ‘That if any Person or Persons whatsoever, shall, from henceforth, raise Arms, or maintain Arms, against both or either of the Houses of Parliament, or their Forces, that every such Person and Persons shall die without Mercy: And that his and their whole Estates shall be confiscated’ (Commons Journals). The king, of course, was the grand delinquent. Cf. note on 33. 37.
[12. 15. accessories punishd.]The two most notable examples were Archbishop Laud and Strafford, the latter paying the extreme penalty May 12, 1641, the former, Jan. 10, 1644.
[12. 15a. the chief author.]Laud and Strafford had relentlessly and consistently carried out the policy of ‘Thorough’ in church and state respectively; but they had been merely faithful instruments. The chief member of the triumvirate was, of course, the king. Milton arraigns him, not only as the prime mover in the long series of civil and ecclesiastical oppressions, but particularly as the chief author of the rebellion in Ireland (see note on 10. 20), and of the Civil War at home. His attitude is precisely that of Cromwell’s grim three-days’ prayer-meeting at Windsor Castle in April, 1648, which adopted the ‘joint resolution’ that it was their duty, if ever the Lord brought them back again in peace, ‘to call Charles Stuart, that man of blood, to an account for that blood he had shed, and mischief he had done to his utmost, against the Lord’s cause and people in these poor nations’ (Wm. Allen, Faithful Memorial: Somers Tracts 6. 501).
[12. 17. not to give, but to receive laws.]Charles even during his trial refused to recognize the authority of the tribunal, or to answer its questions. The presiding officer, John Bradshaw, had frequently to remind the prisoner at the bar of his position. Cf. Walker, Hist. Ind. 2. 92: ‘Bradsh.—Sir, . . . your way of Answer is to interrogate the Court, which beseems not you in this condition. You have been told of it twice or thrice.’
[12. 17a. besought, treated with, . . . thankd for his gratious concessions.]This was the attitude of the Presbyterians especially. They had been very zealous in beginning and prosecuting the war, but were unwilling to follow the Independents in abolishing kingship, and executing their royal foe. They were ready at all times to submit propositions looking to the restoration of Charles to his dignities. They were willing to accept Charles’ final concessions at the Isle of Wight, and, on Dec. 6, even voted them to be a satisfactory basis for settlement, only to be thwarted and turned out of the House by the resolute Independents. ‘They had no privilege to sit there, and vote home the author, the impenitent author, of all our miseries, to freedom, honour, and royalty, for a few fraudulent, if not destructive concessions’ (Observations: Bohn 2. 195).
[12. 19. If this we swore to do.]In taking the Covenant. See note on 10. 11.
[12. 20. bring . . . the whole sea of blood-guiltiness upon our own heads.]Milton goes into the question of blood-guiltiness in the Eikonoklastes, and finds that ‘whether purposely or unaware, he [Charles] hath confessed both to God and man the blood-guiltiness of all this war to lie upon his own head’ (Bohn 1. 449). Assuming this to be true, he argues in the present treatise that any leniency, any deviation from the stern course of justice toward such a manifold murderer, would have been at the peril of bringing down upon their own heads all this blood.
[12. 23. suggested fears and difficulties.]Royalist writers kept the public ear well filled with alarming prophecies as to what could be expected under any form of commo