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Neven completed a doctorate in the history of ideas at Oxford University. His dissertation investigates the international and multidisciplinary context of Adam Smith’s moral philosophy. He teaches in the History Department and the Department of International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa.
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Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004). Chapter: SECTION VII: A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, from this moral Sense.
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I. To conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence‖1 . It remains to be explain’d, how we acquire more particular Ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstracting‖ from any Law, Human, or Divine.
If any one ask, Can we have any Sense of Obligation, abstracting from the Laws of a Superior? We must answer according to the various Senses of the word Obligation. If by Obligation we understand a Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination shall also make us displeas’d with our selves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to it; in this meaning of the word Obligation,  there is naturally an Obligation upon all Men to Benevolence; and they are still under its Influence, even when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of their Actions, this moral Sense leads them to Evil; unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken’d. For it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same purpose, this internal Sense, and Instinct ‖2 toward‖ Benevolence, will either influence our Actions, or else make us very uneasy and dissatisfy’d; and we shall be conscious that we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any Law whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impending from its Sanctions. And further, there are still such Indications given us of what is in the whole ‖3 benevolent‖, and what not; as may probably discover to us the true Tendency of every Action, and let us see, some time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear’d ‖4 benevolent‖: ‖5 or if we have no Friends so faithful as to admonish us, the Persons injur’d will not fail to upbraid us.‖ So that no Mortal can secure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a serious Inquiry into the Tendency of his Actions, and a perpetual Study of universal Good‖6 , according to the justest Notions of it‖. 
But if by Obligation, we understand a Motive from Self-interest, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely, to a certain Course of Actions; we may have a Sense of such an Obligation, by reflecting on this Determination of our Nature to approve Virtue, to be pleas’d and happy when we reflect upon our having done virtuous Actions, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of Virtue to any other Enjoyment.* We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of Obligation, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Course of benevolent and social Actions, to be the most probable means of promoting the natural Good of every Individual; as Cumberland and Puffendorf have prov’d: And all this without Relation to a Law.
But further, if our moral Sense be suppos’d exceedingly weaken’d, and the selfish Passions grown strong, either thro some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our Understanding be weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry’d by our Passions into precipitate and rash  Judgments, that malicious Actions shall promote our Advantage more than Beneficence; in such a Case, if it be inquir’d what is necessary to engage Men to beneficent Actions, or induce a steady Sense of an Obligation to act for the publick Good; then, no doubt, “A Law with Sanctions, given by a superior Being, of sufficient Power to make us happy or miserable, must be necessary to counter-ballance those apparent Motives of Interest, to calm our Passions, and give room for the recovery of our moral Sense, or at least for a just View of our Interest.”
How far Virtue can be taught.
II. Now the principal Business of the moral Philosopher is to shew, from solid Reasons, “That universal Benevolence tends to the Happiness of the Benevolent, either from the Pleasures of Reflection, Honour, natural Tendency to engage the good Offices of Men, upon whose Aid we must depend for our Happiness in this World; or from the Sanctions of divine Laws discover’d to us by the Constitution of the Universe;” that so no apparent Views of Interest may counteract this natural Inclination: but not to attempt proving, “That Prospects of our own Advantage of any kind, can raise in us ‖7 real Love to‖ others.” Let the Obstacles from Self-love be only remov’d, and Nature it self will incline us to Be-nevolence. Let the Misery of excessive Selfishness, and all its Passions, be but once explain’d, that so Self-love may cease to counteract our natural Propensity to Benevolence, and when this noble Disposition gets loose from these Bonds of Ignorance, and false Views of Interest, it shall be assisted even by Self-love, and grow strong enough to make a noble virtuous Character. Then he is to enquire, by Reflection upon human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the universal Good, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ’d, and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters, so as to admit Exceptions; that so our good Inclinations may be directed by Reason, and a just Knowledge of the Interests of Mankind. But Virtue it self, or good Dispositions of Mind, are not directly taught, or produc’d by Instruction; ‖8 they must be originally implanted in our Nature, by its great Author; and afterwards strengthen’d and confirm’d by our own Cultivation.‖
‖9a III. We are often told, “That there is no need of supposing such a Sense of Morality given to Men, since Reflection, and Instruction would recommend the same Actions from Arguments of Self-Interest, and engage us, from the acknowledg’d Principle of Self-love,  to the Practice of them, without this unintelligible Determination to Benevolence, or the occult Quality of a moral Sense.”
Moral Sense, not from Reflection.
It is perhaps true, that Reflection and Reason might lead us to approve the same Actions as advantageous. But would not the same Reflection and Reason likewise, generally recommend the same Meats to us which our Taste represents as pleasant? And shall we thence conclude that we have no Sense of Tasting? Or that such a Sense is useless? No: The use is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the mighty Reason we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the external Senses, or to ‖10b directb‖ our Actions for the Good of the Whole, without this moral Sense. Nor could we be so strongly determin’d at all times to what ‖11c isc‖ most conducive to either of these Ends, without these expeditious Monitors, and importunate Sollicitors; nor so nobly rewarded, when we act vigorously in pursuit of these Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of Self-Interest, as by those delightful Sensations.
This natural Determination to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is no doubt an occult Quality. But  is it any way more mysterious that the Idea of an Action should raise Esteem, or Contempt, than that the motion, or tearing of Flesh should give Pleasure, or Pain; or the Act of Volition should move Flesh and Bones? In the latter Case, we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the Indian’s Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one step further, and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and equally a Mystery with this Determination to love and approve, or ‖12d hated‖ and despise Actions and Agents, without any Views of Interest, as they appear benevolent, or the ‖13e contrary.e‖
When they offer it as a Presumption that there can be no such Sense, antecedent to all Prospect of Interest, “That these Actions for the most part are really advantageous, one way or other, to the Actor, the Approver, or Mankind in general, by whose Happiness our own State may be some way made better;” may we not ask, supposing the Deity intended to impress such a Sense of something amiable in Actions, (which is no impossible Supposition) what sort of Actions would a good God determine ‖14f usf‖ to approve? Must we deny the possibility of such a Determination, if it did not lead us to admire Actions of no Advantage to Man-kind, or to love Agents for their being eminent Triflers? If then the Actions which a wise and good God must determine us to approve, if he give us any such Sense at all, must be Actions useful to the Publick, this Advantage can never be a Reason against the Sense it self. After the same manner, we should deny all Revelation which taught us good Sense, Humanity, Justice, and a rational Worship, because Reason and Interest confirm and recommend such Principles, and Services; and should greedily embrace every Contradiction, Foppery, and Pageantry, as a truly divine Institution, without any thing humane, or useful to Mankind.
Moral Sense judges of Laws.
IV. The Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of Good and Evil from the private Advantage of the Actor, or from Relation to a Law and its Sanctions, either known from Reason, or Revelation, are perpetually recurring to this moral Sense which they deny; not only in calling the Laws of the Deity just and good, and alledging Justice and Right in the Deity to govern us; but by using a set of Words which import something different from what they will allow to be their only meaning. Obligation, with them, is ‖15g onlyg‖ such a Constitution, either of Nature, or some governing Power, as makes it advantageous for the Agent to  act in a certain manner. Let this Definition be substituted, wherever we meet with the words, ought, should, must, in a moral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; as that the Deity must act rationally, must not, or ought not to punish the Innocent, must make the state of the Virtuous better than that of the Wicked, must observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words, must, ought, should, would make these Sentences either ridiculous, or very disputable.a‖
16 V. But that our first Ideas of moral Good depend not on Laws, may plainly appear from our constant Inquirys into the Justice of Laws themselves; and that not only of human Laws, but of the divine. What else can be the meaning of that universal Opinion, “That the Laws of God are just, and holy, and good?” Human Laws may be call’d good, because of their Conformity to the Divine. But to call the Laws of the supreme Deity good, or holy, or just, if all Goodness, Holiness, and Justice be constituted by Laws, or the Will of a Superior any way reveal’d, must be an insignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, “That God wills what he wills.”17
18 It must then first be suppos’d, that there is something in Actions which is apprehend-ed absolutely good; and this is Benevolence, or ‖19 a Tendency to‖ the publick natural happiness of rational Agents; and that our moral Sense perceives this Excellence. And then we call the Laws of the Deity good, when we imagine that they are contriv’d to promote the publick Good in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the Deity is call’d ‖20 good‖, in a moral Sense, when we apprehend that his whole Providence tends to the universal Happiness of his Creatures; whence we conclude his Benevolence, and ‖21 Delight‖ in their Happiness.
Some tell us, “That the Goodness of the divine Laws, consists in their Conformity to some essential Rectitude of his Nature.”i But they must excuse us from assenting to this, till they make us understand the meaning of this Metaphor, essential Rectitude, and till we discern whether any thing more is meant by it than a perfectly wise, uniform, impartial Benevolence.
Difference between Constraint, and Obligation.
Hence we may see the Difference between Constraint, and Obligation. There is indeed no Difference between Constraint, and the second Sense of the word Obligation, viz. a Constitution which makes an Action eligible from Self-Interest, if we only mean external Interest, distinct from  the delightful Consciousness which arises from the moral Sense. The Reader need scarcely be told, that by Constraint, we do not understand an external Force moving our Limbs without our Consent, for in that Case we are not Agents at all; but that Constraint which arises from the threatening and presenting some Evil, in order to make us act in a certain manner. And yet there seems a universally acknowledg’d Difference between even this sort of Constraint, and Obligation. We never say we are oblig’d to do an Action which we count base, but we may be constrain’d to it; we never say that the divine Laws, by their Sanctions, constrain us, but oblige us; nor do we call Obedience to the Deity Constraint, unless by a Metaphor, ‖22 tho‖ many own they are influenc’d by fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an almighty evil Being should require, under grievous Penaltys, Treachery, Cruelty, Ingratitude, we would call this Constraint. The difference is plainly this. When any Sanctions co-operate with our moral Sense, in exciting us to Actions which we count morally good, we say we are oblig’d; but when Sanctions of Rewards or Punishments oppose our moral Sense, then we say we are brib’d or constrain’d. In the former Case we call the Lawgiver good, as designing the publick Happiness; in the latter we call him evil, or unjust, for the suppos’d contrary  Intention. But were all our Ideas of moral Good or Evil, deriv’d solely from opinions of private Advantage or Loss in Actions, I see no possible difference which could be made in the meaning of these words.
23 VI. From this Sense too we derive our Ideas of Rights. Whenever it appears to us, that a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow’d in certain Circumstances, would in the whole tend to the general Good, we say that ‖24 any Person‖ in such Circumstances, has a Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing. And according as this Tendency to the publick Good is greater or less, the Right is greater or less.
The Rights call’d perfect, are of such necessity to the publick Good, that the universal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable; and it actually makes those miserable, whose Rights are thus violated. On the contrary, to fulfil these Rights in every Instance, tends to the publick Good, either directly, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a Part. Hence it plainly follows, “That to allow a violent Defence, or Prosecution of such Rights, before Civil Government be constituted, cannot in any particular Case be more detrimental to the Publick, than the Violation of them with Impunity.”  And as to the general Consequences, the universal use of Force in a ‖25 State of Nature‖, in pursuance of perfect Rights, seems exceedingly advantageous to the Whole, by making every one dread any Attempts against the perfect Rights of others.
Right of War, and Punishment.
26 This is the moral Effect which attends proper Injury, or a Violation of the perfect Rights of others, viz. A Right to War, and all Violence which is necessary to oblige the Injurious to repair the Damage, and give Security against such Offences for the future. ‖27a This is the sole Foundation of the Rights of punishing Criminals, and of violent Prosecutions of our Rights, in a ‖28b State of Natureb‖. And these Rights, ‖29c belonging originally to the Persons injur’d, or their voluntary, or invited Assistants,c‖ according to the Judgment of indifferent Arbitrators, ‖30d in a State of Nature,d‖ being by the Consent of the Persons injur’d, transferr’d to the Magistrate in a Civil State, are the true Foundation of his Right of Punishment.a‖ Instances of perfect Rights are those to our Lives; to the Fruits of our Labours; to demand Performance of Contracts upon valuable Considerations, from Men capable of performing them; to direct our own Actions either for publick, or innocent private Good, before we have submitted them to the Direction of others in any measure: and many others of like nature. 
Imperfect Rights are such as, when universally violated, would not necessarily make Men miserable. These Rights tend to the improvement and increase of positive Good in any Society, but are not absolutely necessary to prevent universal Misery. The Violation of them, only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any Good which they had before. From this Description it appears, “That a violent Prosecution of such Rights, would generally occasion greater Evil than the Violation of them.” Besides, the allowing of Force in such Cases, would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in Actions of Kindness, Humanity, Gratitude; which would cease to appear amiable, when Men could be constrain’d to perform them. Instances of imperfect Rights are those which the poor have to the Charity of the Wealthy; which all Men have to Offices of no trouble or expence to the Performer; which Benefactors have to returns of Gratitude, and such like.
31 The Violation of imperfect Rights, only argues a Man to have such weak Benevolence, as not to study advancing the positive Good of others, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of per-fect Rights, argues the injurious Person to be positively evil or cruel; or at least so immoderately selfish, as to be indifferent about the positive Misery and Ruin of others, when he imagines he can find his Interest in it. In violating the former, we shew a weak Desire of publick Happiness, which every small View of private Interest over-ballances; but in violating the latter, we shew our selves so entirely negligent of the Misery of others, that Views of increasing our own Good, overcome all our Compassion toward their Sufferings. Now as the absence of Good, is more easily born than the presence of Misery; so our good Wishes toward the positive Good of others, are weaker than our Compassion toward their Misery. He then who violates imperfect Rights, shews that his Self-love overcomes only the Desire of positive good to others; but he who violates perfect Rights, betrays such a selfish Desire of advancing his own positive Good, as overcomes all ‖32 Compassion‖ toward the Misery of others.
Beside these two sorts of Rights, there is a third call’d External; as when the doing, possessing, or demanding of any thing is really detrimental to the Publick in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another; but yet the universally denying Men this Faculty  of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils to be fear’d from the Use of this Faculty. And hence it appears, “That there can be no Right to use Force in opposition even to external Rights, since it tends to the universal Good to allow Force in pursuance of them.”
Civil Societys substitute Actions in Law, instead of the Force allow’d in the State of Nature.
Instances of external Rights are these; that of a wealthy Miser to recal his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a Covenant too burdensome on one side; the Right of a wealthy Heir to refuse Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking advantage of a positive Law, contrary to what was Equity antecedent to that Law; as when a register’d Deed takes place of one not register’d, altho prior to it, and known to be so before the second Contract.
What Rights, can be opposite.
Now whereas no action, Demand, or Possession, can at once be either necessary to the publick Good, or conducive to it, and  at the same time its contrary be either necessary or conducive to the same end; it follows, “That there can be no Opposition of perfect Rights among themselves, of imperfect among themselves, or between perfect and imperfect Rights.” But it may often tend to the publick Good, to allow a Right of doing, possessing, or demanding, and of using Force in pursuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more humane and kind in any Person to have acted otherwise, and not have claim’d his Right. But yet a violent Opposition to these Rights, would have been vastly more pernicious than all the Inhumanity in the use of them. And therefore, tho external Rights cannot be opposite among themselves; yet they may be opposite to imperfect Rights, but imperfect Rights, tho violated, give no Right to Force. Hence it appears, “That there can never be a Right to Force on both Sides, or a ‖33 just War on both Sides‖ at the same time.”
Rights alienable, and unalienable.
34 VII. There is another important Difference of Rights, according as they are Alienable, or Unalienable. To determine what Rights are alienable, and what not, we must take these two Marks:
By the first Mark it appears, “That the Right of private Judgment, or of our inward Sentiments, is unalienable;” since we cannot command ourselves to think what either we our selves, or any other Person pleases. So are also our internal Affections, which necessarily arise according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the second Mark it appears, “That our Right of serving God, in the manner which we think acceptable, is not alienable;” because it can never serve any valuable purpose, to make Men worship him in a way which seems to them displeasing to him. The same way, a direct Right over our Lives or Limbs, is not alienable to any Person; so that he might at Pleasure put us to death, or maim us. We have indeed a Right to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of importance to the Publick; and it may often serve a most valuable end, to subject the direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in pursuing a publick Good; as Soldiers do to their General, or to a Council of War: and so far this Right is alienable. These may serve as  Instances to shew the use of the two Marks of alienable Rights, which must both concur to make them so, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Cases.
The Foundation of Property.
36 VIII. That we may see the Foundation of some of the more important Rights of Mankind, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their Labour and Industry; and consequently, ‖37 when once Men become so numerous, that the natural Product of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a necessity arises, for the support of the increasing System, that such a Tenour of Conduct be observ’d, as shall most effectually promote Industry; and that Men‖ abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary effect. It is well known, that general Benevolence alone, is not a Motive strong enough to Industry, to bear Labour and Toil, and many other Difficultys which we are averse to from Self-love. For the strengthning therefore our Motives to Industry, we have the strongest Attractions of Blood, of Friendship, of Gratitude, and the additional Motives of Honour, and even of external Interest. Self-love is really as necessary to the Good of the Whole, as Benevolence; as that Attraction which causes the Cohesion of the Parts, is as necessary to the regular  State of the Whole, as Gravitation. Without these additional Motives, Self-love would generally oppose the Motions of Benevolence, and concur with Malice, or influence us to the same Actions which Malice would. “‖38 That‖ Tenour of Action then, which would take away the stronger Ties of Benevolence, or the additional Motives of Honour and Advantage, from our Minds, and so hinder us from pursuing industriously that Course which really increases the Good of the Whole, is evil; and we are oblig’d to shun it.”
First then, the depriving any Person of the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes away all Motives ‖39 to Industry from Self-love, or the nearer Ties; and leaves us no other Motive than general Benevolence:‖ nay, it exposes the Industrious as a constant Prey to the Slothful, and sets Self-love against Industry. This is the Ground of our Right of Dominion and Property in the Fruits of our Labours; without which Right, we could scarce hope for any Industry, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature. Industry will be confin’d to our present Necessitys, and cease when they are provided for; at least it will only continue from the weak Motive of general Benevolence, if we are not allow’d to store up beyond present Necessity, and to dispose of what is above our Necessitys,  either in Barter for other kinds of Necessarys, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the Right which Men have to lay up for the future, the Goods which will not be spoil’d by it; of alienating them in Trade; of Donation to Friends, Children, Relations: otherwise we deprive Industry of all the Motives of Self-love, Friendship, Gratitude, ‖40 and‖ natural Affection. The same Foundation there is for the Right of Disposition by Testament. The Presumption of ‖41 this‖ Disposition, is the Ground of the Right of Succession to the Intestate.
The external Right of the Miser to his useless Hoards, is founded also on this, that allowing Persons by Violence, or without Consent of the Acquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage Industry, and take away all the Pleasures of Generosity, Honour, Charity, which cease when Men can be forc’d to these Actions. Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a Miser, and who is not.
Right of Marriage.
Marriage must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherwise we take away from the Males one of the strongest Motives to publick Good, viz. natural Affection; and discourage Industry, as has been shewn above. 
The Labour of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessarys, tho it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one sort: Hence the Right of Commerce, and alienating our Goods; and also the Rights from Contracts and Promises, either to the Goods acquir’d by others, or to their Labours.
Right of Civil Government.
‖42 The great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprejudic’d Arbitrators, impower’d to decide the Controversys which ordinarily arise, thro the partiality of Self-love, among Neighbours; as also from prudent Directors, who should not only instruct the Multitude in the best Methods of promoting the publick Good, and of defending themselves against mutual or foreign Injurys; but also be arm’d with Force sufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at home, and the Society formidable abroad: these Advantages, I say, sufficiently shew the Right Men have to constitute Civil Government, and to subject their alienable Rights to the Disposal of their Governours, under such Limitations as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People have subjected their Rights, so far their Governours have an external Right at least, to dispose of them, as their Prudence shall direct, for attaining the Ends of their Institution; and no further.‖ 
Corollarys for comparing the degrees of Virtue and Vice in Actions.
43 IX. These Instances may shew how our moral Sense, by a little Reflection upon the tendencys of actions, may adjust the Rights of Mankind. Let us now apply the general ‖44 Canon‖ laid down above,* for comparing the Degrees of Virtue and Vice in Actions, in a few Corollarys besides that one already deduc’d.†
The Original of Government.
‖62a X. From Art. vii. it follows, “That all human Power, or Authority, must consist in a Right transferr’d to any Person or Council, to dispose of the alienable Rights of others; and that consequently, there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even an external Right to do or command every thing.” For wherever any Invasion is made upon unalienable Rights, there must arise either a perfect, or external Right to Resistance.  The only Restraints of a moral Kind upon Subjects in such cases, are, when they foresee that, thro their want of Force, they shall probably by Resistance occasion greater Evils to the Publick, than those they attempt to remove; or when they find that Governours, in the main very useful to the Publick, have by some unadvised Passion, done an Injury too small to overbalance the Advantages of their Administration, or the Evils which Resistance would in all likelihood occasion; especially when the Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent to the ruin of others. Unalienable Rights are essential Limitations in all Governments.
But by absolute Government, either in Prince, or Council, or in both jointly, we understand a Right to dispose of the natural Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally alienable, according to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of both jointly, for the publick Good of the State, or whole People; without any Reservation as to the Quantity of the Goods, manner of Levying, or the proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they shall demand. But in all States this tacit Trust is presuppos’d, “that the Power conferr’d shall be employ’d according to the best Judgment of the Rulers for the publick Good.” So that  whenever the Governours openly profess a Design of destroying the State, or act in such a manner as will necessarily do it; the essential Trust suppos’d in all conveyance of Civil Power, is violated, and the Grant thereby made void.
A Prince, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously Limited; either when the consent of the one may be necessary to the validity of the Acts of the other; or when, in the very Constitution of this supreme Power, certain Affairs are expresly exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Prince, or Council, or both jointly: as when several independent States uniting, form a general Council, from whose Cognizance they expresly reserve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or when in the very Constitution of any State, a certain Method of Election of the Person of the Prince, or of the Members of the supreme Council is determin’d, and the Intention of their Assembling declar’d. In all such cases, it is not in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the very Form of Government, or to take away that Right which the People have to be govern’d in such a manner, by a Prince, or Council thus elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who have subjected themselves to this Form of  Government. So that there may be a very regular State, where there is no universal absolute Power, lodg’d either in one Person, or Council, or in any other Assembly beside that of the whole People associated into that State. To say, that upon a Change attempted in the very Form of the Government, by the supreme Power, the People have no Remedy according to the Constitution itself, will not prove that the supreme Power has such a Right; unless we confound all Ideas of Right with those of external Force. The only Remedy indeed in that Case, is an universal Insurrection against such perfidious Trustees.
The nature of despotick Power.
Despotick Power, is that which Persons injur’d may acquire over those Criminals, whose Lives, consistently with the publick Safety, they may prolong, that by their Labours they may repair the Damages they have done; or over those who stand oblig’d to a greater Value, than all their Goods and Labours can possibly amount to. This Power itself, is limited to the Goods and Labours only of the Criminals or Debtors; and includes no Right to Tortures, Prostitution, or any Rights of the Governed which are naturally Unalienable; or to any thing which is not of some Moment toward Repair of Damage, Payment of Debt, or Security against future Offences. The Characteristick of de-spotick Power, is this, “that it is solely intended for the good of the Governours, without any tacit Trust of consulting the good of the Governed.” Despotick Government, in this Sense, is directly inconsistent with the Notion of Civil Government.
From the Idea of Right, as above explain’d, we must necessarily conclude, “that there can be no Right, or Limitation of Right, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good.” And therefore in Cases of extreme Necessity, when the State cannot otherwise be preserv’d from Ruin, it must certainly be Just and Good in limited Governours, or in any other Persons who can do it, to use the Force of the State for its own preservation, beyond the Limits fix’d by the Constitution, in some transitory acts, which are not to be made Precedents. And on the other hand, when an equal Necessity to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg’d in their Governours, or may counteract them. This Privilege of flagrant Necessity, we all allow in defence of the most perfect private Rights: And if publick Rights are of more extensive Importance, so are also publick Necessitys. These Necessitys must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they can never over-ballance the Evils of vio-lating a tolerable Constitution, by an arbitrary act of Power, on the one hand; or by an Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other. No Person, or State can be happy, where they do not think their important Rights are ‖63b secur’db‖ from the Cruelty, Avarice, Ambition, or Caprice of their Governours. Nor can any Magistracy be safe, or effectual for the ends of its Institution, where there are frequent Terrors of Insurrections. Whatever temporary acts therefore may be allow’d in extraordinary Cases; whatever may be lawful in the transitory act of a bold Legislator, who without previous Consent should rescue a slavish Nation, and place their Affairs so in the Hands of a Person, or Council, elected, or limited by themselves, that they should soon have confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wisdom of the Administration; yet, as to the fixed State which should ordinarily obtain in all Communitys, since no ‖64c Assumerc‖ of Government, can so demonstrate his superior Wisdom or Goodness to the satisfaction and security of the Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness; this must follow, “That except when Men, for their own Interest, or out of ‖65d publick Loved‖, have by Consent subjected their Actions, or their Goods within certain Limits to the Disposal of others; no Mortal can have a Right from his superior Wisdom, or  Goodness, or any other Quality, to give Laws to others without their Consent, express or tacit; or to dispose of the Fruits of their Labours, or of any other Right whatsoever.” And therefore superior Wisdom, or Goodness, gives no Right to Men to govern others.a‖
Divine Government founded on Wisdom and Goodness.
But then with relation to the Deity, suppos’d omniscient and benevolent, and secure from Indigence, the ordinary Cause of Injurys toward others; it must be amiable in such a Being, to assume the Government of weak, inconstant Creatures, often misled by Selfishness; and to give them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal should submit from publick Love, as being contriv’d for the Good of the Whole, and for the greatest private Good consistent with it; and ‖66 every one may be sure, that he shall be better directed how to attain these Ends by the Divine Laws, than by his own greatest Prudence and‖ Circumspection. Hence we imagine, “That a good and wise God must have a perfect Right to govern the Universe; and that all Mortals are oblig’d to universal Obedience.”
Divine Justice what.
The Justice of the Deity is only a Conception of his universal impartial Benevolence, as it shall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the universal Good, and inforce them with the  most effectual Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments.
Creation not the Ground of God’s Dominion.
67 XI. Some imagine that the Property the Creator has in all his Works, must be the true Foundation of his Right to govern.ii Among Men indeed, we find it necessary for the publick Good, that none should arbitrarily dispose of the Goods, acquir’d by the Labour of another, which we call his Property; and hence we imagine that Creation is the only Foundation of God’s Dominion. But if the Reason* of establishing the Rights of Property does not hold against a perfectly wise and benevolent Being, I see no Reason why Property should be necessary to his Dominion. Now the Reason does not hold: For an infinitely wise and good Being, could never ‖68 employ his assumed Authority to‖ counteract the universal Good. The tie of Gratitude is stronger indeed than bare Benevolence; and therefore supposing two equally wise and good Beings, the one our Creator, and the other not, we should think our selves more oblig’d to obey our Creator. But supposing our Creator malicious,69 and a good Being condescending to rescue us, or govern us better, with sufficient Power to accomplish his kind Intentions; his Right to govern would be perfectly good. But  this is rather matter of curious Speculation than Use; since both Titles of Benevolence and Property concur in the one only true Deity, as far as we can know, join’d with infinite Wisdom and Power.
Our Moral Sense the Effect of the Divine Goodness.
70 XII. If it be here enquir’d, “Could not the Deity have given us a different or contrary determination of Mind, viz. to approve Actions upon another Foundation than Benevolence?” ‖71 It is certain, there is‖ nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the Deity. But as in the first Treatise,* we resolv’d the Constitution of our present Sense of Beauty into the divine Goodness, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our moral Sense to his Goodness. For if the Deity be really benevolent, ‖72 or delights in‖ the Happiness of others, he could not rationally act otherwise, or give us a moral Sense upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own benevolent Intentions. For, even upon the Supposition of a contrary Sense, every rational Being must still have been solicitous in some degree about his own external Happiness: Reflection on the Circumstances of Mankind in this World would have suggested, that universal Benevolence and a social Temper, or a ‖73 certain Course of external‖ Actions,  would most effectually promote the external Good of every one, according to the Reasonings of Cumberland and Puffendorf; while at the same time this perverted Sense of Morality would have made us uneasy in such a Course, and inclin’d us to the quite contrary, viz. Barbarity, Cruelty, and Fraud; and universal War, according to Mr. Hobbs,iii would really have been our natural State; so that in every Action we must have been distracted by two contrary Principles, and perpetually miserable, and dissatisfy’d when we follow’d the Directions of either.
Whence this universal Opinion of the Divine Goodness.
74 XIII. It has often been taken for granted in these Papers, “That the Deity is morally good;” tho the Reasoning is not at all built upon this Supposition. If we enquire into the Reason of the great Agreement of Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps find no demonstrative Arguments à priori, from the Idea of an Independent Being, to prove his Goodness. But there is abundant Probability, deduc’d from the whole Frame of Nature, which seems, as far as we know, plainly contriv’d for the Good of the Whole; and the casual Evils seem the necessary Concomitants of some Mechanism design’d for ‖75 vastly‖ prepollent Good. ‖76 Nay‖, this very moral Sense, implanted in rational Agents, to ‖77 delight in‖, and admire whatever Actions flow from a  Study of the Good of others, is one of the strongest Evidences of Goodness in the Author of Nature.
78 But these Reflections are ‖79 no way‖ so universal as the Opinion, nor are they often inculcated by any one. What then more probably leads Mankind into that Opinion, is this. The obvious Frame of the World gives us Ideas of boundless Wisdom and Power in its Author. Such a Being we cannot conceive indigent, and must conclude happy, and in the best State possible, since he can still gratify himself. The best State of rational Agents, and their greatest and most worthy Happiness, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in universal efficacious Benevolence: and hence we conclude the Deity benevolent in the most universal impartial manner. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of Perfection ‖80 but‖ Benevolence, and those Capacitys or Abilitys which are necessary to make it effectual; such as Wisdom, and Power: at least we can have no ‖81 other valuable‖ Conception of it.
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[* ]See above, Sect. vi. Art. 1, 2.
[i ]See Samuel Clarke, Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion (1706), chapter 1, §§ 3, 4, 6, in D. D. Raphael, British Moralists 1650–1800, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, pp. 199–214.
[* ]See Sect. iii. Art. 11, 12.
[† ]See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 3.
[ii ]Compare John Locke’s criticism of Robert Filmer in Two Treatises of Government, Treatise 1, chapter 3.
[* ]See Art. 10. Par. 6. of this Section.
[* ]Sect. viii. Art. 2. Prop. 5.
[iii ]Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 1, chapters 13, 14, 15; Part 2, chapter 17.
D: relative or comparative
A (p. 95): singular
A (p. 249): ; and that we have Ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstractly
D (p. 268): of
C (p. 268), D (p. 268): beneficent
C (p. 268), D (p. 268): good
Not in A (p. 250).
Not in A (p. 250).
C (p. 270), D (p. 270): virtuous Benevolence toward
A (p. 253): but are the Effect of the great Author of all things, who forms our Nature for them.
In A (p. 253) §§ III and IV appear instead at the end of Section 6, numbered VIII and IX (pp. 244–48).
C (p. 272), D (p. 272): influence
A (p. 245): were
D (p. 273): condemn
D [Corrigenda, pp. 308–9]: contrary. Some also object, That according to this Account, Brutes may be capable of Virtue; and this is thought a great Absurdity. But ’tis manifest, that, 1. Brutes are not capable of that, in which this Scheme places the highest Virtue, to wit, the calm Motions of the Will toward the Good of others; if our common Accounts of Brutes are true, that they are merely led by particular Passions toward present Objects of Sense. Again, ’tis plain there is something in  certain Tempers of Brutes,* which engages our Liking, and some lower Good-will and Esteem, tho’ we do not usually call it Virtue, nor do we call the sweeter Dispositions of Children Virtue; and yet they are so very like the lower Kinds of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling them Virtues. What if there are low Virtues in Creatures void of Reflection, incapable of knowing Laws, or of being moved by their Sanctions, or by Example of Rewards or Punishments? Such Creatures cannot be brought to a proper Trial or Judgment: Laws, Rewards, or Punishments won’t have these Effects upon them, which they may have upon rational Agents. Perhaps they are no farther rewarded or punished than by the immediate Pleasure or Pain of their Actions, or what Men immediately inflict upon them. Where is the Harm of all this, That there are lower Virtues, and lower Vices, the Rewarding or Punishing of which, in Creatures void of Reason and Reflection, can answer no wise End of Government?
[*]Cicero is not ashamed to say of some Brutes, Videmus indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, desideria,—secreta à voluptate humanarum simulacra virtutum. De Finib. Lib. II. c. 33. [today: II, 110]. [Translation: “(in a certain class of birds) we see some traces of affection, and also recognition and recollection; and (in many we even notice) regret for a lost friend. (If animals therefore possess some) semblance of the human virtues unconnected with pleasure.” (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, with an English translation by H. Rackham, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 202.)]
Omitted in C (p. 273), D (p. 273).
A (p. 248): nothing else but
A (p. 253): wrongly numbered II (instead of III).
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Or that his Will is conformable to his Will.
No new paragraph in A (p. 253).
C (p. 275), D (p. 275): Desire of
D [Corrigenda p. 311]: morally good [an apparently incomplete correction]
D (p. 276): Desire
A (p. 255): altho
A (p. 256): numbered IV.
C (p. 277), D (p. 277): one
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Natural Liberty
No new paragraph in A (p. 257).
Not in A (p. 257).
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Natural Liberty
C (p. 279), D (p. 279): naturally residing in the Persons injur’d, or their voluntary, or invited Assistants, to use force
Omitted in D (p. 279).
No new paragraph in A (p. 258).
A (p. 259): the Power of Compassion
A (p. 261): War on both Sides just
A (p. 261): numbered V.
A (p. 261): a Power to transfer
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: the Power of transferring
A (p. 262): numbered VI.
A (p. 262–63): all  Men are oblig’d to observe such a Tenour of Action as shall most effectually promote Industry; and to
A (p. 263): Whatever
A (p. 263): of Self-Love from Industry, and leaves Benevolence alone;
Not in A (p. 264).
Omitted in D (p. 286).
Not in A (p. 265).
A (p. 265): numbered VII.
D (p. 288): Rules
Omitted in D (p. 288).
Omitted in D (p. 288).
A (p. 266): in as far
Omitted in D (p. 289).
Omitted in D (p. 289).
D (p. 290): the Motives of private Interest are greater.
D (p. 290): selfish Motives from
D (p. 291): no new
Omitted in D (p. 291).
D (p. 291): natural Liberty, or the Penalties of Law in Civil Society.
D (p. 291): A stronger and less extensive Tie of Benevolence, in equal Abilitys, must produce a greater Moment of Good to the Object of it, in equally good Characters, than the weaker Ties. Thus, natural Affection, Gratitude, Friendship, have greater Effects than general Benevolence: Or, we do more Good to Friends, Children, Benefactors, than to Persons under no special Relation.
D (p. 292): Benevolence alone
D (p. 292): more extensive, but less passionate
D (p. 292): more violent, or passionate
C (p. 292), D (p. 292): more. The general Benevolence appears of itself a more amiable Principle, according to the Constitution of our moral Sense
D (p. 292) adds: , than any particular Passion. [and adds a footnote after “Sense”]: *See Sect. 3. Art. ix. The Author all along supposes, that no Man acts without some Desire, or Instinct, or Affection, or Appetite; that of these Attachments of the Will, some are calm and unpassionate, others are passionate; some are extensive, and others confined to one, or to a few. The former Sort in each of these Divisions, manifestly appears more amiable; and consequently, caeteris paribus, the Virtue is less, in any given Quantity, of Good done from the violent, passionate, and narrow Attachment. A certain Remarker thence argues, “That then the Virtue is highest, when there is no Desire, Affection, or Attachment at all; or when we act solely from Reason, without any Affection to any Thing.” One may retort this Reasoning in a like Case. In any given Momentum of Bodies, there the Velocity is greater, where there is least Matter; consequently, it is there greatest, where there is no Matter at all.
D (p. 293): which
Not in A (270).
The following five paragraphs are not in A (p. 270–72); instead: VIII. Let us not imagine, that from the above Idea of Right it will follow,  that the wise and benevolent have a perfect Right to dispose of the Labours or Goods of the weak or foolish, because perhaps they would better employ them for the publick Good than the unskilful Possessors can; for tho in some particular Cases this might happen to do good, as when a good-natur’d Octavius assum’d the Government of a distracted Commonwealth; yet what would be the Consequence of allowing this universally, while there is no acknowledg’d Standard, or Judge of superior Wisdom or Benevolence, which every one would be too apt to claim? And as each Man is more nearly engag’d for his own Good by Self-love, than another is by mere Benevolence, he will scarcely be brought to believe, that another understands his Interest, or pursues it, better than he could himself. And what Happiness can remain to the Govern’d, while there is any Suspicion of either the Benevolence or Wisdom of the Governor? Especially when there are too great Presumptions, that Governors may be sway’d by Self-love against the publick Good. From this Consideration, as well as the natural Love of Liberty, and Inclination both to act and judge for our selves, we justly conclude, “That except when Men, for their own Interest, or out of publick Love, have by consent subjected their Actions, or their Goods within certain Limits to the Pleasure of others; no  Mortal can have a Right from his superior Wisdom, or Goodness, or any other Quality, to give Laws to others without their Consent, express or tacit; or to dispose of the Fruits of their Labours, or of any other Right whatsoever.”
D (p. 298): secure
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: violent Usurper
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: regard to a publick Good
A (p. 272): we should be better guided by them than by our own utmost
A (p. 273): numbered IX.
A (p. 273): (by his assuming Authority)
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: as some ancient Hereticks did,
A (p. 273): numbered X.
C (p. 302), D (p. 302): There seems
C (p. 302), D (p. 302): and desires
A (p. 274): Course of such external
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: with a suitable Course of
A (p. 275): numbered XI.
Omitted in C (p. 303), D (p. 303).
A (p. 275): Yea
C (p. 303), D (p. 303): approve
No new paragraph in A (p. 275).
C (p. 303), D (p. 303): not
D (p. 304): more than
C (p. 304), D (p. 304): more lovely
This section is Hutcheson’s response to Mandeville’s account of social psychology.
Everyone should read this section, and then choose one of the two following.
Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004). Chapter: SECTION I: Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others.
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/858/65992 on 2010-01-14
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
Different Ideas of Moral and Natural Good.
I. That the Perceptions of moral Good and Evil, are perfectly different from those of natural Good, or Advantage, every one must convince himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himself affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no Sense of Good distinct from the Advantage or Interest arising from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony; ‖1 our Admiration and Love‖ toward a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation, would be much the same with what we have toward a generous Friend, or any noble Character; for both are, or may be advantageous to us: And we should no more admire any Action, or love any Person in a distant Country, or Age, whose Influence could not extend to us, than we love the Mountains of Peru, while we are unconcern’d in the Spanish Trade. We should have the same Sentiments and Affections  toward inanimate Beings, which we have toward rational Agents; which yet every one knows to be false. Upon Comparison, we say, “Why should we ‖2 admire or love with Esteem‖ inanimate Beings? They have no Intention of Good to ‖3 us‖; their Nature makes them fit for our Uses, which they neither know nor study to serve. But it is not so with rational Agents: ‖4 they study our Interest, and delight in our Happiness, and are Benevolent toward us.‖”
We are all then conscious of the Difference between that ‖5 Love and Esteem‖, or Perception of moral Excellence, which Benevolence excites toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of natural Goodness, which only raises Desire of Possession toward the good Object. Now “what should make this Difference, if all Approbation, or Sense of Good be from Prospect of Advantage? Do not inanimate Objects promote our Advantage, as well as Benevolent Persons who do us Offices of Kindness, and Friendship? Should we not then have the same endearing ‖6 Sentiments‖ of both? or only the same cold Opinion of Advantage in both?” The Reason why it is not so, must be this, “That we have a distinct Perception of Beauty, or Excellence in the kind Affec-tions of rational Agents; whence we are determin’d to admire and love such Characters and Persons.”
In Actions done to our selves.
Suppose we reap the same Advantage from two Men, one of whom serves us ‖7 from Delight in our Happiness, and Love toward us;‖ the other from Views of Self-Interest, or by Constraint: both are in this Case equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of moral Actions than those of Advantage: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call’d a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, ‖8 independent‖ on our Will.*
Of Evil, Moral and Natural.
This perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of Evil, done to us designedly by a rational Agent. Our Senses of natural Good and Evil would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an Assault, a Buffet, an Affront from a Neighbour, a Cheat from a Partner, or Trustee, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a Beam, a Tile, or a Tempest; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments ‖9 of both‖. Villany, Treachery,  Cruelty, would be as meekly resented as a Blast, or Mildew, or an overflowing Stream. But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho there may be equal natural Evil in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental, may occasion the strongest Anger, and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred, or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of moral Ideas may prevent our ‖10 Hatred‖ of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest natural Evil. Thus the Opinion of Justice in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of moral Evil in the Execution, or Hatred toward the Magistrate, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.
In Actions toward others.
II. In our Sentiments of Actions which affect our selves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of natural and moral Good, which require some Attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the Actions which affect other Persons only, we may observe the moral Ideas unmix’d with those of natural Good, or Evil. For let it be here observ’d, that those Senses by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they are constituted Advantageous, could never raise in us any Desire of publick Good, but only of what was good to our selves  in particular. Nor could they ever make us approve an Action ‖11 because‖ of its promoting the Happiness of others. And yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study of the good of others, and ‖12 a Delight in‖ their Happiness, altho it were in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing ‖13 from Hatred, Delight in the Misery of others‖, or Ingratitude, raises Abhorrence and Aversion.
It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally imagin’d to tend to the natural Good of Mankind, or ‖14 of‖ some Parts of it. But whence this secret Chain between each Person and Mankind? How is my Interest connected with the most distant Parts of it? And yet I must admire ‖15 Actions which are beneficial to them‖, and love the Author. Whence this Love, Compassion, Indignation and Hatred toward even feign’d Characters, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear Kind, Faithful, Compassionate, or of the opposite Dispositions, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no moral Sense, ‖16 which makes rational Actions appear Beautiful,  or Deform’d‖; if all Approbation be from the Interest of the Approver,
Moral Ideas not from Interest.
III. Some refin’d Explainers of Self-Love may tell us, “That we ‖17 hate, or love‖ Characters, according as we apprehend we should have been supported, or injur’d by them, had we liv’d in their Days.” But how obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of moral Good in Humanity, Mercy, Faithfulness, why should not Self-Love, ‖18 and our Sense of natural Good‖ engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the successful Tyrant, or Traitor? Why do not we love Sinon, Pyrrhus, in the Aeneid? for had we been Greeks, these two would have been very advantageous Characters. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of Priamus, Polites, Choroebus or Aeneas?ii19 It is plain we have some secret Sense which determines our Approbation without regard to Self-Interest; otherwise we should always favour the fortunate Side without regard to Virtue ‖20 , and suppose our selves engaged with that Party‖.21 
Suppose any great Destruction occasion’d by mere Accident, without any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of it: This Action might have been as disadvantageous to us as design’d Cruelty, or Malice; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the ‖22 Agents?‖ “Whence then this Difference?”
And further, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even disadvantageous Actions, and perceive moral Good in them. A few ingenious Artisans, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct us in Manufactures which support Millions of Poor, increase the Wealth of almost every Person in the State, and make us formidable to our Neighbours. In a Nation not far distant from us, some resolute Burgomasters, full of Love to their Country, and Compassion toward their Fellow-Citizens, opprest in Body and Soul by a Tyrant, and Inquisition, with indefatigable Diligence, public Spirit, and Courage, support a tedious perilous War against the Tyrant and form an industrious Republick, which rivals us in Trade, and almost in Power.iii All the World sees whether the former or the latter have been more ad-vantageous to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of? whether of the useful Refugee, or the public-spirited Burgomaster, by whose Love to his own Country, we have often suffer’d in our Interests? And I am confident he will find some other Foundation of Esteem than Advantage, and will see a just Reason, why the Memory of our Artisans is so obscure among us, and yet that of our Rivals is immortal.
Self-Love not the Ground of Approbation.
IV. Some Moralists,iv who will rather twist Self-Love into a thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than Interest, may tell us, “That whatever profits one Part without detriment to another, profits the Whole, and then some small Share will redound to each Individual; that those Actions which tend to the Good of the Whole, if universally perform’d, would most effectually secure to each Individual his own Happiness; and that consequently, we may approve such Actions, from the Opinion of their tending ultimately to our own Advantage.”
23 We need not trouble these Gentlemen to shew by their nice Train of Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in particular Instances, that  we in this Age reap any Advantage from Orestes’s killing the treacherous Aegysthus, or from the Actions of Codrus or Decius.v Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove, that after long Reflection, and Reasoning, we may find out some ground, ‖24 even from Views of Interest, to approve the same Actions‖ which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too under a quite different Conception.
25 Should any of our Travellers find some old Grecian Treasure, the Miser who hid it, certainly perform’d an Action more to the Traveller’s Advantage than Codrus or Orestes; for he must have but a small Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers’d, and lost in various Ages, and Nations: Surely then this Miser must appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in Virtue! For Self-Interest will ‖26 make us only esteem Men‖ according to the Good they do to our Selves, and not give us high Ideas of public Good, but in proportion to our Share of it. But must a Man have the Reflection of Cumberland, or Puffendorf,vi to admire Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude? Or reason so nicely to apprehend the Evil in Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude? Do not the former excite our Admiration, and Love,  and Study of Imitation, wherever we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection; and the latter, our ‖27 Hatred‖, Contempt and Abhorrence? Unhappy would it be for Mankind, if a Sense of Virtue was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for such Metaphysicks.
Our Moral Sense cannot be brib’d.
V. This moral Sense, either of our own Actions, or of those of others, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of Virtue may be counterballanc’d by Interest, our Sentiment or Perception of its Beauty cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of Advantage. Let us consider this both as to our own Actions and those of others.
In judging of our own Actions.
A Covetous Man shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an Aversion from Interest. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the same way with our Sense of moral Actions? Should any one advise us to wrong a Minor, or Orphan, or to do an ungrateful Action toward a Benefactor; we at first View abhor it: Assure us that it will be very advantageous to us, propose even a Reward;  our Sense of the Action is not alter’d. It is true, these Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Physician’s Advice has to make a nauseous Potion pleasant to the Taste, when we perhaps force our selves to take it for the Recovery of Health.
28 Had we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their Advantage, or Disadvantage, could we ever chuse an Action as Advantageous, which we are conscious is still Evil? as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of such high Bribes to prevail with Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin’d Party, or of Tortures to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is probably more advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are overpersuaded by Advantage, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their own Sense of it, as well as in that of others, to whom the base Action was profitable? 
If any one becomes satisfy’d with his own Conduct in such a Case, upon what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his private Advantage, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into the moral Principles of his new Party; for no Party is without them. And thus Men become pleas’d with their Actions under some Appearance of moral Good, distinct from Advantage.
Our Moral Sense not founded on Religion.
It may perhaps be alledg’d, “That in those Actions of our own which we call Good, there is this constant Advantage, superior to all others, which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them from Self-love, viz. That we suppose the Deity will reward them.” This will be more fully consider’d* ‖29 afterwards‖: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice, who have scarce ‖30 any Opinions about the Deity, or any Thoughts of future Rewards‖; and abhor any thing which is Treacherous, Cruel, or Unjust, without any regard to future Punishments. 
31 But further, tho these Rewards, and Punishments, may make my own Actions appear advantageous to me, ‖32 and make me approve them from Self-Love,‖ yet they would never make me approve, and love another Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed to me. Those Actions are advantageous indeed to the Agent; but his Advantage is not my Advantage: and Self-Love could never ‖33 influence me to approve‖ Actions as advantageous to others, or ‖34 to love‖ the Authors of them on that account.
Our Moral Sense of the Actions of others, not to be brib’d.
This is the second thing to be consider’d, “Whether our Sense of the moral Good or Evil, in the Actions of others, can be over-ballanc’d, or brib’d by Views of Interest.” Now I may indeed easily be capable of wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as morally Evil, if it were very Advantageous to me: Interest in that Case may overballance my Desire of Virtue in another. But no Interest ‖35 to my self‖ will make me approve an Action as ‖36 morally‖ Good, which, without that Interest to my self, would have appear’d morally Evil‖37 ; if, upon computing its whole Effects, it appears to produce as great a Moment of Good in the Whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as it did before when it was. In our Sense of moral Good or  Evil, our own private Advantage or Loss is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Loss of a third Person, to make an Action appear Good or Evil. This Sense therefore cannot be over-ballanc’d by Interest.‖ How ridiculous an Attempt wou’d it be, to engage a Man by Rewards, or ‖38 to threaten him‖ into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his moral Notions? We may procure Dissimulation by such means, and that is all.
Not occasion’d by Praise.
VI. A late witty Author* says, “That the Leaders of Mankind do not really admire such Actions as those of Regulus, or Decius, but only observe, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defence of any State; and therefore by Panegyricks, and Statues, they encourage such Tempers in others, as the most tractable, and useful.”vii Here first let us consider, If a Traitor, who would sell his own Country to us, may not often be as advantageous to us, as a Hero who defends us: And yet we can love the Treason, and hate the Traitor. We can at the same time praise a gallant Enemy, who is very pernicious to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of Advantage? 
39 Again, upon this Scheme what could a Statue or Panegyrick effect?—Men love Praise—They will do the Actions which they observe to be praised—Praise, with Men who have no other Idea of Good but Self-Interest, is the Opinion which a Nation or Party have of a Man as useful to them—Regulus, or Cato, or Decius,viii had no Advantage by the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themselves could not admire them, however the Persons who reap’d the Advantage might praise such Actions.—Regulus or Cato could not possibly praise or love another Hero for a virtuous Action; for this would not gain them the Advantage of Honour; and their own Actions they must have look’d upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be purchas’d, without any thing amiable in them, which they could contemplate or reflect upon with ‖40 Pleasure.‖—Now how unlike is this to what the least Observation would teach a Man concerning such Characters?
But says* he, “These wondrous cunning Governours made Men believe, by their Statues and Panegyricks, that there was publick Spirit, and that this was in  it self Excellent; and hence Men are led to admire it in others, and to imitate it in themselves, forgetting the Pursuit of their own Advantage.” So easy a matter it seems to him, to quit judging of others by what we feel in our selves!—for a Person who is wholly selfish, to imagine others to be publick-spirited!—for one who has no Ideas of Good but in his own Advantage, to be led, by the Persuasions of others, into a Conception of Goodness in what is avowedly detrimental to himself, and profitable to others; nay so entirely, as not to approve the Action thorowly, but so far as he was conscious that it proceeded from a disinterested Study of the Good of others!—Yet this it seems Statues and Panegyricks can accomplish!
It is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own Hearts must decide the Matter, “Whether some moral Actions do not at first View appear amiable, even to those who are unconcern’d in their Influence? ‖41a Whether we do not ‖42b sincerelyb‖ love a generous kind Friend, or Patriot, whose  Actions procure Honour to him only without any Advantage to our selves?a‖” It is true, that the Actions which we approve, are useful to Mankind; but not always to the Approver. It would perhaps be useful to the Whole, that all Men agreed in performing such Actions; and then every one would have his Share of the Advantage: But this only proves, that Reason and calm Reflection may recommend to us, from Self-Interest, those Actions, which at first View our moral Sense determines us to admire, without considering this Interest. Nay, our Sense shall operate even where the Advantage to our selves does not hold. We can approve the Justice of a Sentence against our selves: A condemn’d Traitor may approve the Vigilance of a Cicero in discovering conspiracies, tho it had been for the Traitor’s Advantage, that there never had been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he may still approve such Conduct as tending to the publick Good, is a Jest from one whose only Idea of Good is Self-Interest. Such a Person has no ‖43 Desire‖ of publick Good further than it tends to his own Advantage, which it does not at all in the present Case.
Nor Custom, Education, &c.
VII. If what is said makes it appear, that we have some other amiable Idea of Actions than that of Advantageous to our selves, we may conclude, “That this  Perception of moral Good is not deriv’d from Custom, Education, Example, or Study.” These give us no new Ideas: They might make us see ‖44 Advantage to our selves‖ in Actions whose Usefulness did not at first appear; or give us Opinions of some Tendency of Actions to our Detriment, by some nice Deductions of Reason, or by a rash Prejudice, when upon the first View of the Action we should have observ’d no such thing: but they never could have made us apprehend Actions as amiable or odious, without any Consideration of our own Advantage.
VIII. It remains then, “That as the Author of Nature has determin’d us to receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receive from uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an Argument to us of his Goodness, as the Uniformity it self proves his Existence, whether we had a Sense of Beauty in Uniformity or not: in the same manner he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still nobler Pleasures; so that while we are only intending the Good of others, we  undesignedly promote our own greatest private Good.”
This Moral Sense does not infer innate Ideas or Propositions.
We are not to imagine, that this moral Sense, more than the other Senses, supposes any innate Ideas, Knowledge, or practical Proposition: We mean by it only a Determination of our Minds to receive ‖45a amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when ‖46b theyb‖ occur to our Observationa‖, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to redound to our selves from them; even as we are pleas’d with a regular Form, or an harmonious Composition, without having any Knowledge of Mathematicks, or seeing any Advantage in that Form, or Composition, different from the immediate ‖47 Pleasure.‖ 
[* ]See the Preface, Page 7.
[* ]Tragedy of Hamlet.
[i ]Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, act 2, scene 2, verse 562: “What’s Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba. . . ?”
[ii ]According to Virgil (Aeneid 2, 57) Sinon used deceit to make the Trojans take the wooden horse into the City. Pyrrhos I, King of Epirus, 306–302 and 297–277 , defeated the Romans in 280/279 but lost most of his own troops, hence the phrase Pyrrhic victory. Priam, King of Troy and grieving father of Hector, who was slain by Achilles in the Trojan War. Choroebos (Greek: Korroibos) liberated Argos from a disaster sent by Apollo; as punishment Choroebos had to carry a holy tripod and to found a city where he dropped it (see Pausanias, Description of Greece, 4.17.4). According to legend, Aeneas escaped the conquered Troy and, after a long odyssey, founded Rome.
[iii ]Hutcheson refers to the Dutch struggle for freedom from Spain.
[iv ]For example, Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, chapter 1, and Bernard Mandeville, Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue (in the second edition of The Fable of the Bees of 1723).
[v ]Orestes, according to legend, son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, killed his mother and her lover Aegisthus to avenge their assassination of Agamemnon (Aeschylus, Oresteia, especially The Libation Bearers; Euripides, Electra; Sophocles, Electra). Codrus, the last King of Athens, gave his life fighting against Sparta, in order to free Athens (Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, V, 62). Publius Decius Mus (Roman Consul, 340 ) supposedly was killed in the war against the Latins (340–338 ) near Capua (see Cicero, De Finibus, II, 61; see note viii below).
[vi ]Richard Cumberland (1632–1718) criticized Hobbes in the work De Legibus Naturae Disquisitio Philosophica, London, 1672 (translation: A Treatise of the Law of Nature, London, 1727). Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) was the leading author on natural law in the Enlightenment, see De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Lund, 1672 (translation: The Law of Nature and Nations, London, 1703), and De officio hominis et civis, Lund, 1673 (translation: The Whole Duty of Man, London, 1691).
[* ]See Sect. ii. Art. 7.
[* ]See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d Edition.
[vii ]Hutcheson used the third edition of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, London, 1724 (ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols., Oxford, 1924, vol. 2, p. 393); the text is not a quotation but a paraphrase of Mandeville.
[viii ]Marcus Atilius Regulus (consul 267 and 256 ) was a prisoner of the Carthagenians during the First Punic War and was later (?249 ) sent back to Rome in order to negotiate an exchange of prisoners; he advised against it, went back to Carthage, and was murdered cruelly. M. Porcius Cato Uticensis (94–45 ) was an educated stoic and politician. As a republican he was a firm adversary of Caesar; he committed suicide after the battle near Thapsus in Utica (see Cicero’s Cato). According to Livy (8, 6–11) P. Decius Mus sacrificed himself in the war against the Latins in 340 near Capua; see note v above.
[* ]See the same Author in the Same Place.
[† ]Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.
[ix ]Translation: “The olive has no hardness within, the nut has none without.” (Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, with an English translation by H. Rushton Fairclough, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 398.) The correct location of the text is not Ep. 1. Lib. 2, but Ep. 2. Lib. 1. v. 31.
C (p. 110), D (p. 111): the Sensations and Affections
D (p. 112): approve or love
D (p. 112): us, or to any other Person
C (p. 111), D (p. 112): they study the Interest, and desire the Happiness of other Beings with whom they converse. [In A the text following this passage is not an independent paragraph.]
A (p. 108): Esteem
C (p. 111), D (p. 112): Approbation
C (p. 111), D (p. 112): Approbation
C (p. 112), D (p. 113): from an ultimate Desire of our Happiness, or Good-will toward us;
A (p. 109): independently
C (p. 112), D (p. 113): on both Occasions
D (p. 114): Condemnation
C (p. 113), D (p. 114): merely because
C (p. 114), D (p. 115): an ultimate Desire of
C (p. 114), D (p. 115): from Ill-will, Desire of the Misery of others without view to any prevalent Good to the Publick
A (p. 111): that of
A (p. 111): beneficent Actions toward them C (p. 114), D (p. 115): Actions which shew Good-will toward them
C (p. 114), D (p. 115): which makes benevolent Actions appear Beautiful
C (p. 115), D (p. 116): approve or condemn
Not in A (p. 112).
Inserted here in C (p. 115), D (p. 116): Would not the Parsimony of a Miser be as advantageous to his Heir, as the Generosity of a worthy Man is to his Friend? And cannot we as easily imagine ourselves Heirs to Misers, as the Favourites of Heroes? Why don’t we then approve both alike?
Not in A (p. 112).
D [Corrigenda, p. 306] adds: As Mr. Hobbes explains all the Sensations of Pity by our Fear of the like Evils [Editor’s note: Leviathan, part 1, chapter 6], when by Imagination we place ourselves in the Case of the Sufferers; so others explain all Approbation and Condemnation of Actions in distant Ages or Nations, by a like Effort of Imagination: We place ourselves in the Case of others, and then discern an imaginary private Advantage or Disadvantage in these Actions. But as his Account of Pity will never explain how the Sensation increases, according to the apprehended Worth of the Sufferer, or according to the Affection we formerly had to him; since the Sufferings of any Stranger may suggest the same Possibility of our Suffering the like: So this Explication will ne[v]er account for our high Approbation of brave unsuccessful Attempts, which we see prove detr[i]mental both to the Agent, and to those for whose Service they were intended; here there is no private Advantage to be imagined. Nor will it account for our Abhorrence of such Injuries as we are incapable of suffering. Sure, when a Man abhors the Attempt of the young Tarquin, he does not imagine that he has chang’d his Sex like Caeneus. And then, when one corrects his Imagination, by remembring his own Situation, and Circumstances, we find the moral Approbation and Condemnation continues as lively as it was before, tho’ the Imagination of Advantage is gone. [Editor’s note: According to legend, Sextus, son of Tarquinius Superbus, raped Lucretia, sparking off the popular uprising that ended the Roman monarchy and ushered in the Roman republic. Caeneus, a mythical figure, was originally a woman and given a change of sex by Poseidon.]
C (p. 116), D (p. 117): Agents? Thus also an easy, indolent Simplicity, which exposes a Man of Wealth as a prey to others, may be as advantageous a Disposition as the most prudent Generosity, to those he converses with; and yet our Sentiments of this latter Temper are far nobler than of the former.
No new paragraph in A (p. 114).
C (p. 118), D (p. 119): to judge certain Actions advantageous to us
No new paragraph in A (p. 115).
D3 (p. 119): recommend Men to us only
Omitted in C (p. 119), D (p. 120).
No new paragraph in A (p. 116).
C (p. 121), D (p. 122): hereafter
D [Corrigenda, p. 310]: any Dispositions of Piety, or Thoughts of future Rewards
No new paragraph in A (p. 118).
Omitted in C (p. 122), D (p. 123).
C (p. 122), D (p. 123): recommend to me
C (p. 122), D (p. 123): make me like
Not in A (p. 119).
Not in A (p. 119).
A (p. 119): The Sense of the moral Good, or Evil, cannot be over-ballanced by Interest.
C (p. 123), D (p. 124): Threatnings
No new paragraph in A (p. 120).
C (p. 124), D (p. 125): Pleasure. Nay, what should excite a Cato or a Decius to desire Praise, if it is only the cold Opinion of others that they were useful to the State, without any Perception of Excellence in such Conduct?
Not in A (p. 122).
C (p. 126), D (p. 127): sincerely approve and
C (p. 126), D (p. 127): Approbation of publick Spirit, nor Desire
C (p. 127), D (p. 128): private advantage
C (p. 128), D (p. 129): the simple Ideas of Approbation or Condemnation, from Actions observed
A (p. 124): they shall
C (pp. 128–30), D (pp. 129–31): Pleasure. That we may discern more distinctly the Difference between moral Perceptions and others, let us consider, when we taste a pleasant Fruit, we are conscious of Pleasure; when another tastes it, we only conclude or form an Opinion that he enjoys Pleasure; and, abstracting from some previous Good-Will or Anger, his enjoying this Pleasure is to us a matter wholly indifferent, raising no new Sentiment or Affection. But when we are under the Influence of a virtuous Temper, and thereby engaged in  virtuous Actions, we are not always conscious of any Pleasure, nor are we only pursuing private Pleasures, as will appear hereafter: ’tis only by reflex Acts upon our Temper and Conduct that we enjoy the Delights of Virtue [D (Corrigenda, p. 310): “that Virtue never fails to give Pleasure” substitutes for “that we enjoy the Delights of Virtue”]. When also we judge the Temper of another to be virtuous, we do not necessarily imagine him then to enjoy Pleasure, tho’ we know Reflection will give it to him: And farther, our Apprehension of his virtuous Temper raises Sentiments of Approbation, Esteem or Admiration, and the Affection of Good-will toward him. The Quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside in the Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him: Approbation of another’s Virtue is not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, tho’ ’tis attended with some small Pleasure. Virtue is then called Amiable or Lovely, from its raising Good-will or Love in Spectators toward the Agent; and not from the Agent’s perceiving the virtuous Temper to be advantageous to him, or desiring to obtain it under that View. A virtuous Temper is called Good or Beatifick, not that it is always attended with Pleasure in the Agent; much less that some small Pleasure attends the Contemplation of it in the Approver: but from this, that every Spectator is persuaded that the reflex Acts of the virtuous Agent upon his own Temper will give him the highest Pleasures. The admired Qua-lity is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the Pleasure either in the Agent or the Approver; tho’ ’tis a sure source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho’ attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of external Forms is attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this Pleasure. This may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject.
Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004). Chapter: SECTION V: A further Confirmation that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature; with a further Explication ‖ 1 of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees‖; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame an
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Degrees of Benevolence.
I. We have already endeavour’d to prove, “That there is a universal Determination to Benevolence in Mankind, even toward the most distant parts of the Species:” But we are not to imagine that ‖2 this Benevolence is equal, or in the same degree toward all.‖ There are ‖3 some‖ nearer and stronger Degrees of Benevolence, when the Objects stand in some nearer relations to our selves, which have obtain’d distinct Names; such as natural Affection, ‖4 and‖ Gratitude, ‖5aor when Benevolence is increas’d by greater ‖6b Love of ab‖ Esteem.
One Species of natural Affection, viz. That in Parents towards their Children, has  been consider’d already;* we ‖7 shall only observe further‖, That there is the same kind of Affection among collateral Relations, tho in a weaker degree; which is universally observable where no Opposition of Interest produces contrary Actions, or counterballances the Power of this natural Affection.
Not founded on Merit, or Acquaintance.
8 We may also observe, that as to the Affection of Parents, it cannot be entirely founded on Merit ‖9 or‖ Acquaintance; not only because it is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occasion the ‖10 Love of‖ Esteem; but because it operates where Acquaintance would produce Hatred, even toward Children apprehended to be vitious. And this Affection is further confirm’d to be from Nature, because it is always observ’d to descend‖11 , and not ascend‖ from Children to Parents mutually. Nature, who seems sometimes frugal in her Operations, has strongly determin’d Parents to the Care of their Children, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support from them; but has left it‖12 ‖ to Reflection, and a Sense of Gratitude, to produce Returns of Love in Children, toward such tender kind Benefactors, who very seldom stand in such absolute need of Support from their Posterity, as their Chil-dren did from them. Now did Acquaintance, or Merit produce natural Affection, we surely should find it strongest in Children, on whom all the Obligations are laid by a thousand good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin’d to Mankind, but extends to other Animals, where yet we scarcely ever suppose any Ideas of Merit; and is observ’d to continue in them no longer than the Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any service to the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their Dams. But as it is otherwise with rational Agents, so their Affections are of longer continuance, even during their whole lives.
II. But nothing will give us a juster Idea of the wise Order in which human Nature is form’d for universal Love, and mutual good Offices, than considering that strong attraction of Benevolence, which we call Gratitude. Every one knows that Beneficence toward our selves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises Gratitude, or a stronger Love toward the Benefactor, than equal Beneficence toward a third Person.* Now because of the ‖13 vast‖ Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habi-tations, and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful to ‖14 vast‖ Multitudes; that our Benevolence might not be quite distracted with a multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our regard; or ‖15a become useless, by being equally extended to Multitudes ‖16b at vast distancesb‖, whose Interest we could not understanda‖, nor be capable of promoting, having no Intercourse of Offices with them; Nature has ‖17a more powerfully determin’d us to admire, and love the moral Qualitys of others which affect our selves, and has given us more powerful Impressions of Good-will toward those who are beneficent to our ‖18b selvesa‖. This we call Gratitude. And thus a Foundation is laidb‖ for joyful Associations in all kinds of Business, and virtuous Friendships.
By this Constitution also the Benefactor is more encourag’d in his Beneficence, and better secur’d of an increase of Happiness by grateful Returns,* than if his Virtue were only to be honour’d by the colder general Sentiments of Persons unconcern’d, who could not know his Necessitys, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when they would all be equally determin’d to love innumerable Multitudes, whose equal Virtues would have the same Pretensions to their Love‖19 , were there not  an increase of Love, according as the Object is more nearly attach’d to us, or our Friends, by good Offices which affect our selves, or them‖.
‖20 This‖ universal Benevolence toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of Gravitation, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the Universe; but‖21 , like the Love of Benevolence,‖ increases as the Distance is diminish’d, and is strongest when Bodys come to touch each other. Now this increase ‖22 of Attraction‖ upon nearer Approach, is as necessary ‖23 to the Frame of the Universe,‖ as that there should be any Attraction at all. For a general Attraction, equal in all Distances, would by the Contrariety of such multitudes of equal Forces, put an end to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it ‖24 altogether.‖
‖25 This increase of Love toward the Benevolent,‖ according to their nearer Approaches to our selves by their Benefits, is observable in the high degree of Love, which Heroes and Law-givers universally obtain in their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those who are not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong Ties of Friendship, Acquaintance, Neighbourhood, Partnership; which are exceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of human Society. 
Love of Honour.
III. From considering that ‖26 strong Determination in our Nature to‖ Gratitude, and Love toward our Benefactors, which was already shewn to be disinterested;* we are easily led to consider another Determination of our Minds, equally natural with the former, which is to ‖27 delight‖ in the good Opinion and Love of others, even when we expect no other Advantage from them, except what flows from this Constitution, whereby Honour is made an immediate Good. This Desire of Honour I would call Ambition, had not Custom join’d some evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote such a violent desire of Honour, and of Power also, as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On the other hand, we are by Nature subjected to a grievous Sensation of Misery, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no other Evil from them. This we call Shame; which in the same manner ‖28 is constituted an immediate Evil, as we said Honour was an immediate Good.‖
Now were there no moral Sense, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as advantageous or hurtful, I see no reason why we should be delighted with Honour, or sub-jected to the uneasiness of Shame; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment for any Action, should ever be uneasy at its being known to all the World. The World may have ‖29 the worse Opinion of him for it; but what subjects my Ease to the Opinion of the World? Why, perhaps, we‖ shall not be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this be the only reason of Shame, and it has no immediate Evil, or Pain in it, distinct from Fear of Loss; then wherever we expose our selves to Loss, we should be asham’d, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and yet it is quite otherwise.
A Merchant, for instance, ‖30 lest it should impair his Credit‖, conceals a Shipwrack, or a very bad Market, which he has sent his Goods to. But is this the same with the Passion of Shame? Has he that Anguish, that Dejection of Mind, and Self-condemnation, which one shall have whose Treachery is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin’d morally good, tho they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant’s Sense; that is, the Opinion of their Wealth, or fitness for Business? Was any Man ever asham’d of impoverishing himself to serve his Country, or his Friend? 
The Foundation of Morals not the Opinions of our Country.
IV. The Opinions of our Country are by some made the first Standard of Virtue. They alledge, “That by comparing Actions to them, we first distinguish between moral Good, and Evil: And then, say they, Ambition, or the Love of Honour, is our chief Motive.” But what is Honour? It is not the being universally known, no matter how. A covetous Man is not honour’d by being universally known as covetous; nor a weak, selfish, or luxurious Man, when he is known to be so: Much less can a treacherous, cruel, or ungrateful Man, be said to be honour’d for his being known as such. A Posture-master, a Fire-eater, or Practiser of Leger-de-main, is not honour’d for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of Admiration and Surprize to Multitudes. Honour then is the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum’d to be apply’d that way; for Abilitys constantly apply’d to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now, it is certain, that Ambition‖31 , or Love of Honour is really selfish‖; but then this Determination to love Honour, presupposes a Sense of moral Virtue, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it. 
32 And let it be observ’d, that if we knew an Agent had no other Motive of Action ‖33 than‖ Ambition, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his most useful Actions, since they flow’d not from any Love to others, or Desire ‖34 of‖ their Happiness. When Honour is thus constituted by Nature pleasant to us, it may be an additional Motive to Virtue, as we said above,* the Pleasure arising from Reflection on our Benevolence was: but the Person whom we imagine perfectly virtuous, acts immediately from the Love of others; however these refin’d Interests may be joint Motives to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every kind Inclination, and to despise every contrary Interest, as giving a smaller Happiness than Reflection on his own Virtue, and Consciousness of the Esteem of others.
Shame is in the same manner constituted an immediate Evil, and influences us the same way to abstain from moral Evil; not that any Action or Omission would appear virtuous, where the sole Motive was Fear of Shame.
Opinions flow from the Moral Sense.
V. But to enquire further, how far the Opinions of our Company can raise a Sense of moral Good or Evil. If any Opinion  be universal in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an Action be believ’d to be advantageous to the Agent, we may be led to believe so too, and then Self-Love may make us undertake it; or may, the same way, make us shun an Action reputed pernicious to the Agent. If an Action pass for advantageous to the Publick, we may believe so too; and what next? If we have no disinterested Benevolence, what shall move us to undertake it? “Why, we love Honour; and to obtain this Pleasure, we will undertake the Action from Self-Interest.” Now, is Honour only the Opinion of our Country that an Action is advantageous to the Publick? No: we see no Honour paid to the useful Treachery of an Enemy whom we have brib’d to our Side, to casual undesign’d Services, or to the most useful Effects of Compulsion on Cowards; and yet we see Honour paid to unsuccessful Attempts to serve the Publick from sincere Love to it. Honour then presupposes a Sense of something amiable besides Advantage, ‖35 viz.‖ a Sense of Excellence in a publick Spirit; and therefore the first Sense of moral Good must be antecedent to Honour, for Honour is founded upon it.36 The Company we keep may lead us, without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the publick Good; but that our Company honours such Actions, and loves the Agent, must flow from a Sense of some  Excellence in this Love of the Publick, and serving its Interests.
“We therefore, say they again, pretend to love the Publick, altho we only desire the Pleasure of Honour; and we will applaud all who seem to act in that manner, either that we may reap Advantage from their Actions, or that others may believe we really love the Publick.” But shall any Man ever ‖37 really love the Publick, or study the Good of others in his heart, if Self-love be‖ the only spring of his Actions? No: that is impossible. Or, shall we ever really love Men who appear to love the Publick, without a moral Sense? ‖38 No: we could form no Idea of such a Temper; and as for these Pretenders to publick Love, we should hate‖ them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now this is all which could be effected by the Opinions of our Country, even supposing they had a moral Sense, provided we had none our selves: They never could make us admire Virtue, or virtuous Characters in others; but could only give us Opinions of Advantage, or Disadvantage in Actions, according as they tended ‖39 procure to‖ us the Pleasures of Honour, or the Pain of Shame.
But if we suppose that Men have, by Nature, a moral Sense of Goodness in  Actions, and that they are capable of disinterested Love; all is easy. The Opinions of our Company may make us rashly conclude, that certain Actions tend to the universal Detriment, and are morally Evil, when perhaps they are not so; and then our Sense may determine us to have an Aversion to them, and their Authors; or we may, the same way, be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Actions as good; and then our desire of Honour may co-operate with Benevolence, to move us to such Actions: but had we no Sense of moral Qualitys in Actions, nor any Conceptions of them, except as advantageous or hurtful, we never could have honour’d or lov’d Agents for publick Love, or had any regard to their Actions, further than they affected our selves in particular. We might have form’d the metaphysical Idea of publick Good, but we had never desir’d it,40 further than it tended to our own private Interest, without a Principle of Benevolence; nor admir’d and lov’d those who ‖41 were‖ studious of it, without a moral Sense. So far is Virtue from being (in the Language of a late*i Author) the Offspring of Flattery, begot upon Pride; that Pride, in the bad meaning of that Word, is the spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense, and Flattery only an Engine, which the  Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-love in the Flatterer.
Moral Sense, not from Love of Honour.
VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of Honour. Suppose a State or Prince, observing the Money which is drawn out of England by Italian Musicians, should decree Honours, Statues, Titles, for great Musicians: This would certainly excite all who had hopes of Success, to the Study of Musick; and ‖42 Men of a good Ear would approve of‖ the good Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But would this give all Men a good Ear, or make them delight in Harmony? Or could it ever make us really love a Musician, who study’d nothing but his own Gain, in the same manner we do a Patriot, or a generous Friend? I doubt not. And yet Friendship, without the Assistance of Statues, or Honours, can make Persons appear exceedingly amiable.
Let us take another Instance. Suppose Statues, and triumphal Arches were decreed, as well as a large Sum of Money, to the Discoverer of the Longitude, or any other useful Invention in Mathematicks: This would raise a universal Desire of such Knowledge from Self-Love; but would Men therefore love a Mathematician as they do a virtuous Man? Would a Mathema-tician love every Person who had attain’d Perfection in that Knowledge, wherever he observ’d it, altho he knew that it was not accompany’d with any Love to Mankind, or Study of their Good, but with Ill-nature, Pride, Covetousness? In short, let us honour other Qualitys by external Shew as much as we please, if we do not discern a benevolent Intention in the Application, or presume upon it; we may look upon these Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise advantageous to any one who is possess’d of them; but they shall never meet with those endearing Sentiments of Esteem and Love, which our nature determines us to appropriate to Benevolence, or Virtue.
Love of Honour, and Aversion to Shame, may often move us to do Actions for which others profess to honour us, even tho we see no Good in them our selves: And Compliance with the Inclinations of others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the Agent, from Spectators who see no moral Good in the Action it self. But without some Sense of Good in the Actions, Men shall never be fond of such Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practising them in Solitude; and much less shall they be dissatisfy’d with themselves when they act otherwise in Solitude. Now this is the case with us, as to Virtue; and therefore we must  have, by Nature, a moral Sense of it antecedent to Honour.
This will shew us with what Judgment a late*ii Author compares the Original of our Ideas of Virtue, and Approbation of it, to the manner of regulating the Behaviour of aukard Children by Commendation. It shall appear ‖43 afterward‖,† that our Approbation of some Gestures, and what we call Decency in Motion, depends upon some moral Ideas in People of advanc’d Years. But before Children come to observe this Relation, it is only good Nature, an Inclination to please, and Love of Praise, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are desir’d; and not any Perception of Excellence in this Behaviour. Hence they are not sollicitous about Gestures when alone, unless with a View to please when they return to Company; ‖44 nor do they ever‖ love or approve others for ‖45 any‖ Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they either discern the Connexion between Gestures, and moral Qualitys; or reflect on the good Nature, which is evidenc’d by such a Compliance with the desire of the Company. 
VII. The considering Honour in the manner above explain’d, may shew us the reason, why Men are often asham’d for things which are not vitious, and honour’d for what is not virtuous. For, if any Action only appears vitious to any Persons or Company, altho it be not so, they will have a bad Idea of the Agent; and then he may be asham’d, or suffer Uneasiness in being thought morally Evil. The same way, those who look upon an Action as morally good, will honour the Agent, and he may be pleas’d with the Honour, altho he does not himself perceive any moral Good in what has procur’d it.
Moral Incapacity, matter of Shame.
Again, we shall be asham’d of every Evidence of moral Incapacity, or Want of Ability; and with good ground, when this Want is occasion’d by our own Negligence. Nay further, if any Circumstance be look’d upon as indecent in any Country, offensive to others, or deform’d; we shall, out of our ‖46 Love to‖ the good Opinions of others, be asham’d to be found in such Circumstances, even when we are sensible that this Indecency or Offence is not founded on Nature, but is merely the Effect of Custom. Thus being observ’d in those Functions of Nature which are counted indecent and offensive, will make us uneasy, altho we are sensible that they really do  not argue any Vice or Weakness. But on the contrary, since moral Abilitys of any kind, upon the general Presumption of a good Application,47 procure the Esteem of others, we shall value our selves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be asham’d of any Discovery of our want of such Abilitys. This is the reason that Wealth and Power, the great Engines of Virtue, when presum’d to be intended for benevolent Purposes, either toward our Friends or our Country, procure Honour from others, and are apt to beget Pride in the Possessor; which, as it is a general Passion which may be either good or evil, according as it is grounded, we may describe to be the Joy which arises from the real or imagin’d Possession of Honour, or Claim to it. ‖48 The‖ same are the Effects of Knowledge, Sagacity, Strength; and hence it is that Men are apt to boast of them.
But whenever it appears that Men have only their private Advantage in view, in the application of these Abilitys, or natural Advantages, the Honour ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond of displaying them; and much more when there is any Suspicion of an ill-natur’d Application. Thus some Misers are asham’d of their Wealth, and study to conceal it; as the malicious or selfish do their Power: Nay, this is very often done where there is  no positive evil Intention; because the diminishing their Abilitys, increases the moral Good of any little kind Action, which they can find in their hearts to perform.
In short, we always see Actions which flow from publick Love, accompany’d with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only malicious, but even selfish ones, the matter of Shame and Confusion; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of private Pleasure is the ordinary occasion of Vice; and when Men have got any lively Notions of Virtue, they generally begin to be asham’d of every thing which betrays Selfishness, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much set on private Pleasure; and hence we shall find such Enjoyments, in most polite Nations, conceal’d from those who do not partake with us. Such are venereal Pleasures between Persons marry’d, and even eating and drinking alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks; whereas a hospitable Table is rather matter of boasting; and so are all other kind, generous Offices between marry’d Persons, where there is no Suspicion of Self-love in the Agent; but he is imagin’d as acting from Love to his Associate. This, ‖49 I fancy, first introduc’d Ideas of Modesty in polite Nations, and Custom has strengthen’d  them wonderfully‖; so that we are now asham’d of many things, upon some confus’d implicit Opinions of moral Evil, tho we know not upon what account.
Honour and Shame, often from some Associations of Ideas.
Here too we may see the reason, why we are not asham’d of any of the Methods of Grandeur, or high-Living. There is such a Mixture of moral Ideas, of Benevolence, of Abilitys kindly employ’d; so many Dependants supported, so many Friends entertain’d, assisted, protected; such a Capacity imagin’d for great and amiable Actions, that we are never asham’d, but rather boast of such things: We never affect Obscurity or Concealment, but rather desire that our State and Magnificence should be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of moral Ideas, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of State, or abstain from laughing at those who did. Could any Man be pleas’d with a Company of Statues surrounding his Table, so artfully contriv’d as to consume his various Courses, and inspir’d by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling Returns in praise of their Fare? Or with so many Machines to perform the Cringes and Whispers of a Levee?
The Shame we suffer from the Meanness of Dress, Table, Equipage, is entirely owing to the same reason. This Meanness is often imagin’d to argue Avarice, Meanness  of Spirit, want of Capacity, or Conduct in Life, of Industry, or moral Abilitys of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare, when it was occasion’d by a good Action. How many would be asham’d to be surpriz’d at a Dinner of cold Meat, who will boast of their having fed upon Dogs and Horses at the Siege of Derry?iii And they will all tell you that they were not, nor are asham’d of it.
This ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between external Grandeur, Regularity in Dress, Equipage, Retinue, Badges of Honour, and some moral Abilitys greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more consequence in the World than some recluse Philosophers apprehend, who pique themselves upon despising these external Shews. This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count miraculous, viz. That Civil Governors of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by some inexpressible Awe, and Authority, quell the Spirits of the Vulgar, and keep them in subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be conquer’d by those Associations ‖50 which might be rais’d among‖ the Disaffected, or Factious of any State; who are daring enough among their Equals, and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an Enterprize. 
‖51 Hence also we may‖ discover the reason, why the gratifying our superior Senses of Beauty and Harmony, or the Enjoyment of the ‖52 Pleasures‖ of Knowledge, never occasions any Shame or Confusion, tho our Enjoyment were known to all the World. The Objects which furnish this Pleasure, are of such a nature, as to afford the same Delights to multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that altho we pursue these Enjoyments from Self-love, yet‖53 , since‖ our Enjoyment cannot be prejudicial to others, no Man is imagin’d any way inhumanly selfish, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible. The same Regularity or Harmony which delights me, may at the same time delight multitudes; the same Theorem shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain’d thousands. ‖54 Men therefore are not‖ asham’d of such Pursuits, since they never, of themselves, seduce us into any thing malicious, envious, or ill-natur’d; nor does any one apprehend another too selfish, from his pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure.55
This View of Honour and Shame may also let us see the reason, why most Men are uneasy at being prais’d, when they themselves are present. Every one is delighted  with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are unwilling others should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which is really selfish; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or influenc’d by hopes of it in our good Actions: and therefore we chuse Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures, in which others do not share with us.
Compassion a motive to Virtue.
VIII. Let us next consider another Determination of our Mind, which strongly proves Benevolence to be natural to us, and that is Compassion; by which we are dispos’d to study the Interest of others, without any Views of private Advantage. This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv’d in, unless the Person be imagin’d ‖56 evil‖, in a moral Sense: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov’d, even in that Case. Advantage may make us do a cruel Action, or may overcome Pity; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion of Hatred or Anger may represent a Person as absolutely evil, and so extinguish Pity; but when the Passion is over, it often returns. Another disinterested View may even in cold blood overcome Pity; such as Love to our Country, or Zeal for Religion. Persecution is generally occasion’d by Love of Virtue, and  a Desire of the eternal Happiness of Mankind, altho our Folly makes us chuse absurd Means ‖57 to promote it‖; and is often accompany’d with Pity enough to make the Persecutor uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he chuses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the Heretick as absolutely and entirely evil.
We may here observe how wonderfully the Constitution of human Nature is adapted to move Compassion. Our Misery or Distress immediately appears in our Countenance, if we do not study to prevent it, and propagates some Pain to all Spectators; who from Observation, universally understand the meaning of those dismal Airs. We mechanically send forth Shrieks and Groans upon any surprizing Apprehension of Evil; so that no regard to Decency can sometimes restrain them‖58 . This is the Voice of Nature, understood by all Nations, by which‖ all who are present are rous’d to our Assistance, and sometimes our injurious Enemy is made to relent.
We observ’d above,* that we are not immediately excited by Compassion to desire the Removal of our own Pain: we think it just to be so affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so. But we  are excited directly to desire the Relief of the Miserable; ‖59 without any imagination that this Relief is a private Good to our selves: And‖ if we see this impossible, we may by Reflection discern it to be vain for us to indulge our Compassion any further; and then Self-love prompts us to retire from the Object which occasions our Pain, and to ‖60 endeavour‖ to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no such Reflection, People are hurry’d by a natural, kind Instinct, to see Objects of Compassion, and expose themselves to this Pain when they can give no reason for it; as in the Instance of publick Executions.
This same Principle leads men to Tragedys; only we are to observe, that another strong reason of this, is the moral Beauty of the Characters and Actions which we love to behold. For I doubt, whether any Audience would be pleas’d to see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept strangers to the moral Qualitys of the Sufferers, or their Characters and Action. As in such a case, there would be no Beauty to raise Desire of seeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose our selves to Pain alone, from Misery which we knew to be fictitious.
It was the same Cause which crouded the Roman Theatres to see Gladiators. There  the People had frequent Instances of great Courage, and Contempt of Death, two great moral Abilitys, if not Virtues. Hence Cicero looks upon them as great Instructions in Fortitude. The Antagonist Gladiator bore all the blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the courageous and artful one, really obtain’d a Reputation of Virtue, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity of Self-defence. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding to such Sights, and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their natural Instinct to Compassion, was the true occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults which they were sorry for.
What Sentiments can we imagine a Candidate would have rais’d of himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of Misery; had he drain’d Hospitals and Infirmarys of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many Slaves, and without61 any Resistance, butcher’d them with his own Hands? I should very much question the Success of his Election, (however Compassion62 might cause his Shews still to be frequented) if his Antagonist chose a Diversion apparently  more virtuous, or with a Mixture of Scenes of Virtue.
How independent this Disposition to Compassion is on Custom, Education, or Instruction, will appear from the Prevalence of it in Women and Children, who are less influenc’d by these. That Children delight in some Actions which are cruel and tormenting to Animals which they have in their Power, flows not from Malice, or want of Compassion, but from their Ignorance of those signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a Curiosity to see the various Contortions of their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted with these Creatures, or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their Compassion often becomes too strong for their Reason; as it generally does in beholding Executions, where as soon as they observe the evidences of Distress, or Pain in the Malefactor, they are apt to condemn this necessary Method of Self-defence in the ‖63 State.‖ 
[* ]See above, Sect. ii. Art. 9. Par. 2, 3.
[* ]See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6. Par. 3.
[* ]See above, Sect. iii. Art. 2. Par. 2.
[* ]See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6.
[* ]See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 2.
[* ]Author of the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 37. 3d Ed.
[i ]Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 51.
[ii ]Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 52.
[* ]See the Fable of the Bees, Page 38. 3d. Ed.
[† ]See Sect. vi. Art. 4.
[iii ]Overcrowded with some thirty thousand Protestant refugees, Londonderry (or Derry) withstood a siege by the dethroned King James II from April to July 1689.
[* ]See Sect. ii. Art. 8. Par. 2.
D (p. 218): of our Benevolent Instincts of various Kinds
D (p. 218): all benevolent Affections are of one Kind, or alike strong.
Omitted in D (p. 218).
Omitted in D (p. 218).
Omitted in D (p. 218).
Omitted in D (p. 218).
A (p. 195): may only further observe
No new paragraph in A (p. 196).
D (p. 219): and
Omitted in C (p. 219), D (p. 219).
D [Corrigenda, p. 310]: more strongly and constantly than it ascends
D [Corrigenda, p. 310]: more
C (p. 220), D (p. 220): great
C (p. 220), D (p. 220): great
A (p. 197): be made useless towards multitudes, whose Interests, at vast distances, we could not understand
D (p. 221): become useless, by being equally extended to Multitudes, whose Interest we could not understand
Omitted in D (p. 221).
C (p. 221), D (p. 221): so well ordered it, that as our Attention is more raised by those good Offices which are done to our selves or our Friends, so they cause a stronger Sense of Approbation in us, and produce a stronger Benevolence toward the Authors of them
A (p. 198): selves; which we call Gratitude; and thus has laid a Foundation
Omitted in D (p. 221).
D (p. 221): The
Omitted in D (p. 222).
Omitted in D (p. 222).
Omitted in D (p. 222).
D (p. 222): altogether. Beside this general Attraction, the Learned in these Subjects shew us a great many other Attractions among several Sorts of Bodys, answering to some particular Sorts of Passions, from some special Causes. And that Attraction or Force by which the Parts of each Body cohere, may represent the Self-Love of each Individual.
D (p. 222): These different Sorts of Love to Persons
D (p. 222): natural
D (p. 223): desire and delight
A (p. 200): as Honour, is constituted an immediate Evil.
C (pp. 223–24), D (pp. 223–24): an Opinion  of him as pernicious to his Neighbours; but what subjects his Ease to this Opinion of the World? Why, perhaps, he
A (p. 201): from Interest
A (p. 202): is founded on Self-Love
No new paragraph in A (p. 202).
A (p. 202): but
D (p. 225): to
Not in A (p. 204).
New footnote in C (p. 227), D (p. 227): *This should be considered by those who talk much of Praise, high Opinion, or Value, Esteem, Glory, as Things much desired; while yet they allow no moral Sense.
C (p. 228), D (p. 228): be heartily approved and admired, when we know that Self-Love is
D [Corrigenda, p. 310]: No; we should distrust all Pretenders to such a Temper, and hate
B [Errata]: to procure
D (p. 228): to procure to
A (p. 206): any
D (p. 229): are
C (p. 230), D (p. 230): all Men would look upon
C (p. 232), D (p. 232): hereafter
A (p. 209): and they never
Not in A (p. 209).
C (p. 233), D (p. 233): Desire of
C (p. 233), D (p. 233) add: and of having been acquired by Virtue,
A (p. 211): And the
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: strengthens the natural Modesty in civiliz’d Nations, as Habits and Education improve it
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: of
A (p. 214): We may also hence
D (p. 237): Pleasure
A (p. 214): as
A (p. 214): And therefore none are
New footnote in C (p. 238), D (p. 238): *See another Reason of this, perhaps more probably true, in the Essay on the Passions, p. 6.
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: morally evil [an apparently incomplete correction]
Not in A (p. 216).
A (p. 217): : Thus
A (p. 217): and
A (p. 217): study
A (p. 219): meeting with
D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: or Curiosity
D [Corrigenda, p. 308]: State. Some have alleged, That “however the Sight of another’s Misery some way or other gives us Pain, yet the very feeling of Compassion is also attended with Pleasure: This Pleasure is superior to the Pain of Sympathy, and hence we desire to raise Compassion in ourselves, and incline to indulge it.” Were this truly the Case, the Continuation of the Suffering would be the natural Desire of the Compassionate, in order to continue this State, not of pure Pleasure indeed, but of Pleasure superior to all Pains.
Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, 2 vols. With a Commentary Critical, Historical, and Explanatory by F.B. Kaye (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988). Vol. 1. Chapter: The Grumbling Hive: o r, Knaves turn’d Honest. a
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/846/66863 on 2010-01-14
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
[a]: or, Knavesturn’d Honest] om. in heading, although present on title-page, 05
[a](A.), (B.), etc.] No reference letters in 05
Without money. A cross was a small coin.
Cf. Butler’s posthumous Upon the Weakness and Misery of Man:
Had Mandeville perhaps seen a MS. of Butler’s poem (published 1759)? The poem, incidentally, stated,
[a]Sailors:] Sailors, 32
Cf. Livy i. 26: ‘infelici arbori reste suspendito’; also Cicero, Pro C. Rabirio iv. 13.
[b]Harmony,] Harmony 25–32
[c]agree;] agree, 32
[b](N.) om. 14
Of these lines and their elaboration in Remark P, I note two anticipations (not necessarily sources): ‘. . . a king of a large and fruitful territory there [America] feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England’ (Locke, Of Civil Government 11. v. 41); and ‘. . . a King of India is not so well lodg’d, and fed, and cloath’d, as a Day-labourer of England’ (Considerations on the East-India Trade, in Select Collection of Early English Tracts on Commerce, ed. Political Economy Club, 1856, p. 594).
‘Jack Ketch’ had become a generic term for executioners.
Probably the sword of justice, although a note in the French translation explains it differently (ed. 1750, i. 21): ‘On ne se sert dans les executions en Angleterre que de la hache pour trancher la tête, jamais de l’Epée. C’est pour cela qu’il donne le nom d’imaginaire à cette Epée qu’on attribue au Bourreau.’
‘Journeyman parson’ was a slang term for a curate.
[a]Cares,] Cares; 24–32
A footnote in the French translation (ed. 1750, i. 27) says: ‘L’Auteur veut parler des bâtimens élevés pour l’Opera & la Comèdie. Amphion, après avoir chassé Cadmus & sa Femme du lieu de leur demeure, y bâtit la Ville de Thèbes, en y attirant les pierres avec ordre & mesure, par l’harmonie merveilleuse de son divin Luth.’ It is possible, however, that Mandeville intended a pun on ‘Play’ as meaning both music and gambling.
[a]to expire] t’expire 05–25
[c](T.) om 14
Compare Locke’s reflection: ‘When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in—which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness—what industry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? … And thus we see our all-wise Maker, suitably to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger: and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their seasons, to move and determine their wills, for the preservation of themselves, and the continuation of their species’ (Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Fraser, 1894, 11. xxi. 34).
[d]shabby crooked] crooked, shabby 05
In its use of feminine endings the Grumbling Hive is less Hudibrastic than is Mandeville’s other verse, containing only some seven per cent of these endings as against the twenty per cent of Mandeville’s verse as a whole and the thirty-five per cent of his translations from Scarron in Typhon (1704) and Wishes to a Godson (1712). Perhaps Mandeville consciously imitated this feature of Hudibras, a poem which he twice quoted (Treatise, ed. 1711, p. 94, and Origin of Honour, p. 134) and whose author he called ‘the incomparable Butler’ (Treatise, p. 94).