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Ian Dunois’s Natural Law

This is my list on Natural Law in order to better understand the Catholic Faith and the free market.

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  1: Voltaire, The Works of Voltaire, Vol. 6 (Philosophical Dictionary Part 4) [1764]

  Voltaire, The Works of Voltaire. A Contemporary Version. A Critique and Biography by John Morley, notes by Tobias Smollett, trans. William F. Fleming (New York: E.R. DuMont, 1901). In 21 vols. Vol. 6.

  Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/355 on 2008-03-05

  The text is in the public domain.

  ---

  The WORKS of VOLTAIRE

  “Between two servants of Humanity, who appeared eighteen hundred years apart, there is a mysterious relation. * * * * Let us say it with a sentiment of profound respect: JESUS WEPT: VOLTAIRE SMILED. Of that divine tear and of that human smile is composed the sweetness of the present civilization.”

  VICTOR HUGO.

  

  Old Rouen.

  VOLTAIRE
  
  A PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY Vol. VI—Part I

  A PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY.

  JOSEPH.

  The history of Joseph, considering it merely as an object of curiosity and literature, is one of the most precious monuments of antiquity which has reached us. It appears to be the model of all the Oriental writers; it is more affecting than the “Odyssey”; for a hero who pardons is more touching than one who avenges.

  We regard the Arabs as the first authors of these ingenious fictions, which have passed into all languages; but I see among them no adventures comparable to those of Joseph. Almost all in it is wonderful, and the termination exacts tears of tenderness. He was a young man of sixteen years of age, of whom his brothers were jealous; he is sold by them to a caravan of Ishmaelite merchants, conducted into Egypt, and bought by a eunuch of the king. This eunuch had a wife, which is not at all extraordinary; the kislar aga, a perfect eunuch, has a seraglio at this day at Constantinople; they left him some of his senses, and nature in consequence is not altogether extinguished. No matter; the wife of Potiphar falls in love with the young Joseph, who, faithful to his master and benefactor, rejects the advances of this woman. She is irritated at it, and accuses Joseph of attempting to seduce her. Such is the history of Hippolytus and Phædra, of Bellerophon and Zenobia, of Hebrus and Damasippa, of Myrtilus and Hippodamia, etc.

  It is difficult to know which is the original of all these histories; but among the ancient Arabian authors there is a tract relating to the adventure of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife, which is very ingenious. The author supposes that Potiphar, uncertain between the assertions of his wife and Joseph, regarded not Joseph’s tunic, which his wife had torn as a proof of the young man’s outrage. There was a child in a cradle in his wife’s chamber; and Joseph said that she seized and tore his tunic in the presence of this infant. Potiphar consulted the child, whose mind was very advanced for its age. The child said to Potiphar: “See if the tunic is torn behind or before; if before, it is a proof that Joseph would embrace your wife by force, and that she defended herself; if behind, it is a proof that your wife detained Joseph.” Potiphar, thanks to the genius of the child, recognized the innocence of his slave. It is thus that this adventure is related in the Koran, after the Arabian author. It informs us not to whom the infant belonged, who judged with so much wit. If it was not a son of Potiphar, Joseph was not the first whom this woman had seduced.

  However that may be, according to Genesis, Joseph is put in prison, where he finds himself in company with the butler and baker of the king of Egypt. These two prisoners of state both dreamed one night. Joseph explains their dreams; he predicted that in three days the butler would be received again into favor, and that the baker would be hanged; which failed not to happen.

  Two years afterwards the king of Egypt also dreams, and his butler tells him that there is a young Jew in prison who is the first man in the world for the interpretation of dreams. The king causes the young man to be brought to him, who foretells seven years of abundance and seven of sterility.

  Let us here interrupt the thread of the history to remark, of what prodigious antiquity is the interpretation of dreams. Jacob saw in a dream the mysterious ladder at the top of which was God Himself. In a dream he learned a method of multiplying his flocks, a method which never succeeded with any but himself. Joseph himself had learned by a dream that he should one day govern his brethren. Abimelech, a long time before, had been warned in a dream, that Sarah was the wife of Abraham.

  To return to Joseph: after explaining the dream of Pharaoh, he was made first minister on the spot. We doubt if at present a king could be found, even in Asia, who would bestow such an office in return for an interpreted dream. Pharaoh espoused Joseph to a daughter of Potiphar. It is said that this Potiphar was high-priest of Heliopolis; he was not therefore the eunuch, his first master; or if it was the latter, he had another title besides that of high-priest; and his wife had been a mother more than once.

  However, the famine happened, as Joseph had foretold; and Joseph, to merit the good graces of his king, forced all the people to sell their land to Pharaoh, and all the nation became slaves to procure corn. This is apparently the origin of despotic power. It must be confessed, that never king made a better bargain; but the people also should no less bless the prime minister.

  Finally, the father and brothers of Joseph had also need of corn, for “the famine was sore in all lands.” It is scarcely necessary to relate here how Joseph received his brethren; how he pardoned and enriched them. In this history is found all that constitutes an interesting epic poem—exposition, plot, recognition, adventures, and the marvellous; nothing is more strongly marked with the stamp of Oriental genius.

  What the good man Jacob, the father of Joseph, answered to Pharaoh, ought to strike all those who know how to read. “How old art thou?” said the king to him. “The days of the years of my pilgrimage,” said the old man, “are an hundred and thirty years; few and evil have the days of the years of my life been.”

  JUDÆA.

  I never was in Judæa, thank God! and I never will go there. I have met with men of all nations who have returned from it, and they have all of them told me that the situation of Jerusalem is horrible; that all the land round it is stony; that the mountains are bare; that the famous river Jordan is not more than forty feet wide; that the only good spot in the country is Jericho; in short, they all spoke of it as St. Jerome did, who resided a long time in Bethlehem, and describes the country as the refuse and rubbish of nature. He says that in summer the inhabitants cannot get even water to drink. This country, however, must have appeared to the Jews luxuriant and delightful, in comparison with the deserts in which they originated. Were the wretched inhabitants of the Landes to quit them for some of the mountains of Lampourdan, how would they exult and delight in the change; and how would they hope eventually to penetrate into the fine and fruitful districts of Languedoc, which would be to them the land of promise!

  Such is precisely the history of the Jews. Jericho and Jerusalem are Toulouse and Montpellier, and the desert of Sinai is the country between Bordeaux and Bayonne.

  But if the God who conducted the Israelites wished to bestow upon them a pleasant and fruitful land; if these wretched people had in fact dwelt in Egypt, why did he not permit them to remain in Egypt? To this we are answered only in the usual language of theology.

  Judæa, it is said, was the promised land. God said to Abraham: “I will give thee all the country between the river of Egypt and the Euphrates.”

  Alas! my friends, you never have had possession of those fertile banks of the Euphrates and the Nile. You have only been duped and made fools of. You have almost always been slaves. To promise and to perform, my poor unfortunate fellows, are different things. There was an old rabbi once among you, who, when reading your shrewd and sagacious prophecies, announcing for you a land of milk and honey, remarked that you had been promised more butter than bread. Be assured that were the great Turk this very day to offer me the lordship (seigneurie) of Jerusalem, I would positively decline it.

  Frederick III., when he saw this detestable country, said, loudly enough to be distinctly heard, that Moses must have been very ill-advised to conduct his tribe of lepers to such a place as that. “Why,” says Frederick, “did he not go to Naples?” Adieu, my dear Jews; I am extremely sorry that the promised land is the lost land.

  By the Baron de Broukans.

  JULIAN.

  SECTION I.

  Justice is often done at last. Two or three authors, either venal or fanatical, eulogize the cruel and effeminate Constantine as if he had been a god, and treat as an absolute miscreant the just, the wise, and the great Julian. All other authors, copying from these, repeat both the flattery and the calumny. They become almost an article of faith. At length the age of sound criticism arrives; and at the end of fourteen hundred years, enlightened men revise the cause which had been decided by ignorance. In Constantine we see a man of successful ambition, internally scoffing at things divine as well as human. He has the insolence to pretend that God sent him a standard in the air to assure him of victory. He imbrues himself in the blood of all his relations, and is lulled to sleep in all the effeminacy of luxury; but he is a Christian—he is canonized.

  Julian is sober, chaste, disinterested, brave, and clement; but he is not a Christian—he has long been considered a monster.

  At the present day—after having compared facts, memorials and records, the writings of Julian and those of his enemies—we are compelled to acknowledge that, if he was not partial to Christianity, he was somewhat excusable in hating a sect stained with the blood of all his family; and that although he had been persecuted, imprisoned, exiled, and threatened with death by the Galileans, under the reign of the cruel and sanguinary Constantius, he never persecuted them, but on the contrary even pardoned ten Christian soldiers who had conspired against his life. His letters are read and admired: “The Galileans,” says he, “under my predecessor, suffered exile and imprisonment; and those who, according to the change of circumstances, were called heretics, were reciprocally massacred in their turn. I have called home their exiles, I have liberated their prisoners, I have restored their property to those who were proscribed, and have compelled them to live in peace; but such is the restless rage of these Galileans that they deplore their inability any longer to devour one another.” What a letter! What a sentence, dictated by philosophy, against persecuting fanaticism. Ten Christians conspiring against his life, he detects and he pardons them. How extraordinary a man! What dastardly fanatics must those be who attempt to throw disgrace on his memory!

  In short, on investigating facts with impartiality, we are obliged to admit that Julian possessed all the qualities of Trajan, with the exception of that depraved taste too long pardoned to the Greeks and Romans; all the virtues of Cato, without either his obstinacy or ill-humor; everything that deserves admiration in Julius Cæsar, and none of his vices. He possessed the continence of Scipio. Finally, he was in all respects equal to Marcus Aurelius, who was reputed the first of men.

  There are none who will now venture to repeat, after that slanderer Theodoret, that, in order to propitiate the gods, he sacrificed a woman in the temple of Carres; none who will repeat any longer the story of the death scene in which he is represented as throwing drops of blood from his hand towards heaven, calling out to Jesus Christ: “Galilean, thou hast conquered”; as if he had fought against Jesus in making war upon the Persians; as if this philosopher, who died with such perfect resignation, had with alarm and despair recognized Jesus; as if he had believed that Jesus was in the air, and that the air was heaven! These ridiculous absurdities of men, denominated fathers of the Church, are happily no longer current and respected.

  Still, however, the effect of ridicule was, it seems, to be tried against him, as it was by the light and giddy citizens of Antioch. He is reproached for his ill-combed beard and the manner of his walk. But you, Mr. Abbé de la Bletterie, never saw him walk; you have, however, read his letters and his laws, the monuments of his virtues. Of what consequence was it, comparatively, that he had a slovenly beard and an abrupt, headlong walk, while his heart was full of magnanimity and all his steps tended to virtue!

  One important fact remains to be examined at the present day. Julian is reproached with attempting to falsify the prophecy of Jesus Christ, by rebuilding the temple of Jerusalem. Fires, it is asserted, came out of the earth and prevented the continuance of the work. It is said that this was a miracle, and that this miracle did not convert Julian, nor Alypius, the superintendent of the enterprise, nor any individual of the imperial court; and upon this subject the Abbé de la Bletterie thus expresses himself: “The emperor and the philosophers of his court undoubtedly employed all their knowledge of natural philosophy to deprive the Deity of the honor of so striking and impressive a prodigy. Nature was always the favorite resource of unbelievers; but she serves the cause of religion so very seasonably, that they might surely suspect some collusion between them.”

  1. It is not true that it is said in the Gospel, that the Jewish temple should not be rebuilt. The gospel of Matthew, which was evidently written after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, prophesies, certainly, that not one stone should remain upon another of the temple of the Idumæan Herod; but no evangelist says that it shall never be rebuilt. It is perfectly false that not one stone remained upon another when Titus demolished it. All its foundations remained together, with one entire wall and the tower Antonia.

  2. Of what consequence could it be to the Supreme Being whether there was a Jewish temple, a magazine, or a mosque, on the spot where the Jews were in the habit of slaughtering bullocks and cows?

  3. It is not ascertained whether it was from within the circuit of the walls of the city, or from within that of the temple, that those fires proceeded which burned the workmen. But it is not very obvious why the Jews should burn the workmen of the emperor Julian, and not those of the caliph Omar, who long afterwards built a mosque upon the ruins of the temple; or those of the great Saladin who rebuilt the same mosque. Had Jesus any particular predilection for the mosques of the Mussulmans?

  4. Jesus, notwithstanding his having predicted that there would not remain one stone upon another in Jerusalem, did not prevent the rebuilding of that city.

  5. Jesus predicted many things which God permitted never to come to pass. He predicted the end of the world, and his coming in the clouds with great power and majesty, before or about the end of the then existing generation. The world, however, has lasted to the present moment, and in all probability will last much longer.

  6. If Julian had written an account of this miracle, I should say that he had been imposed upon by a false and ridiculous report; I should think that the Christians, his enemies, employed every artifice to oppose his enterprise, that they themselves killed the workmen, and excited and promoted the belief of their being destroyed by a miracle; but Julian does not say a single word on the subject. The war against the Persians at that time fully occupied his attention; he put off the rebuilding of the temple to some other time, and he died before he was able to commence the building.

  7. This prodigy is related by Ammianus Marcellinus, who was a Pagan. It is very possible that it may have been an interpolation of the Christians. They have been charged with committing numberless others which have been clearly proved.

  But it is not the less probable that at a time when nothing was spoken of but prodigies and stories of witchcraft, Ammianus Marcellinus may have reported this fable on the faith of some credulous narrator. From Titus Livius to de Thou, inclusively, all historians have been infected with prodigies.

  8. Contemporary authors relate that at the same period there was in Syria a great convulsion of the earth, which in many places broke out in conflagrations and swallowed up many cities. There was therefore more miracle.

  9. If Jesus performed miracles, would it be in order to prevent the rebuilding of a temple in which he had himself sacrificed, and in which he was circumcised? Or would he not rather perform miracles to convert to Christianity the various nations who at present ridicule it? Or rather still, to render more humane, more kind, Christians themselves, who, from Arius and Athanasius down to Roland and the Paladins of the Cévennes, have shed torrents of human blood, and conducted themselves nearly as might be expected from cannibals?

  Hence I conclude that “nature” is not in “collusion,” as La Bletterie expresses it, with Christianity, but that La Bletterie is in collusion with some old women’s stories, one of those persons, as Julian phrases it, “quibus cum stolidis aniculis negotium erat.”

  La Bletterie, after having done justice to some of Julian’s virtues, yet concludes the history of that great man by observing, that his death was the effect of “divine vengeance.” If that be the case, all the heroes who have died young, from Alexander to Gustavus Adolphus, have, we must infer, been punished by God. Julian died the noblest of deaths, in the pursuit of his enemies, after many victories. Jovian, who succeeded him, reigned a much shorter time than he did, and reigned in disgrace. I see no divine vengeance in the matter; and I see in La Bletterie himself nothing more than a disingenuous, dishonest declaimer. But where are the men to be found who will dare to speak out?

  Libanius the Stoic was one of these extraordinary men. He celebrated the brave and clement Julian in the presence of Theodosius, the wholesale murderer of the Thessalonians; but Le Beau and La Bletterie fear to praise him in the hearing of their own puny parish officers.

  SECTION II.

  Let any one suppose for a moment that Julian had abandoned false gods for Christianity; then examine him as a man, a philosopher, and an emperor; and let the examiner then point out the man whom he will venture to prefer to him. If he had lived only ten years longer, there is great probability that he would have given a different form to Europe from that which it bears at present.

  The Christian religion depended upon his life; the efforts which he made for its destruction rendered his name execrable to the nations who have embraced it. The Christian priests, who were his contemporaries, accuse him of almost every crime, because he had committed what in their eyes was the greatest of all—he had lowered and humiliated them. It is not long since his name was never quoted without the epithet of apostate attached to it; and it is perhaps one of the greatest achievements of reason that he has at length ceased to be mentioned under so opprobrious a designation. Who would imagine that in one of the “Mercuries of Paris,” for the year 1745, the author sharply rebukes a certain writer for failing in the common courtesies of life, by calling this emperor Julian “the apostate”? Not more than a hundred years ago the man that would not have treated him as an apostate would himself have been treated as an atheist.

  What is very singular, and at the same time perfectly true, is that if you put out of consideration the various disputes between Pagans and Christians, in which this emperor was engaged; if you follow him neither to the Christian churches nor idolatrous temples, but observe him attentively in his own household, in camp, in battle, in his manners, his conduct, and his writings, you will find him in every respect equal to Marcus Aurelius.

  Thus, the man who has been described as so abominable and execrable, is perhaps the first, or at least the second of mankind. Always sober, always temperate, indulging in no licentious pleasures, sleeping on a mere bear’s skin, devoting only a few hours, and even those with regret, to sleep; dividing his time between study and business, generous, susceptible of friendship, and an enemy to all pomp, and pride, and ostentation. Had he been merely a private individual he must have extorted universal admiration.

  If we consider him in his military character, we see him constantly at the head of his troops, establishing or restoring discipline without rigor, beloved by his soldiers and at the same time restraining their excesses, conducting his armies almost always on foot, and showing them an example of enduring every species of hardship, ever victorious in all his expeditions even to the last moments of his life, and at length dying at the glorious crisis when the Persians were routed. His death was that of a hero, and his last words were those of a philosopher: “I submit,” says he, “willingly to the eternal decrees of heaven, convinced that he who is captivated with life, when his last hour is arrived, is more weak and pusillanimous than he who would rush to voluntary death when it is his duty still to live.” He converses to the last moment on the immortality of the soul; manifests no regrets, shows no weakness, and speaks only of his submission to the decrees of Providence. Let it be remembered that this is the death of an emperor at the age of thirty-two, and let it be then decided whether his memory should be insulted.

  As an emperor, we see him refusing the title of “Dominus,” which Constantine affected; relieving his people from difficulties, diminishing taxes, encouraging the arts; reducing to the moderate amount of seventy ounces each those presents in crowns of gold, which had before been exacted from every city to the amount of three or four hundred marks; promoting the strict and general observance of the laws; restraining both his officers and ministers from oppression, and preventing as much as possible all corruption.

  Ten Christian soldiers conspire to assassinate him; they are discovered, and Julian pardons them. The people of Antioch, who united insolence to voluptuousness, offer him an insult; he revenges himself only like a man of sense; and while he might have made them feel the weight of imperial power, he merely makes them feel the superiority of his mind. Compare with this conduct the executions which Theodosius (who was very near being made a saint) exhibited in Antioch, and the ever dreadful and memorable slaughter of all the inhabitants of Thessalonica, for an offence of a somewhat similar description; and then decide between these two celebrated characters.

  Certain writers, called fathers of the Church—Gregory of Nazianzen, and Theodoret—thought it incumbent on them to calumniate him, because he had abandoned the Christian religion. They did not consider that it was the triumph of that religion to prevail over so great a man, and even over a sage, after having resisted tyrants. One of them says that he took a barbarous vengeance on Antioch and filled it with blood. How could a fact so public and atrocious escape the knowledge of all other historians? It is perfectly known that he shed no blood at Antioch but that of the victims sacrificed in the regular services of religion. Another ventures to assert that before his death he threw some of his own blood towards heaven, and exclaimed, “Galilean, thou hast conquered.” How could a tale so insipid and so improbable, even for a moment obtain credit? Was it against the Christians that he was then combating? and is such an act, are such expressions, in the slightest degree characteristic of the man?

  Minds of a somewhat superior order to those of Julian’s detractors may perhaps inquire, how it could occur that a statesman like him, a man of so much intellect, a genuine philosopher, could quit the Christian religion, in which he was educated, for Paganism, of which, it is almost impossible not to suppose, he must have felt the folly and ridicule. It might be inferred that if Julian yielded too much to the suggestions of his reason against the mysteries of the Christian religion, he ought, at least in all consistency, to have yielded more readily to the dictates of the same reason, when more correctly and decidedly condemning the fables of Paganism.

  Perhaps, by attending a little to the progress of his life, and the nature of his character, we may discover what it was that inspired him with so strong an aversion to Christianity. The emperor Constantine, his great-uncle, who had placed the new religion on the throne, was stained by the murder of his wife, his son, his brother-in-law, his nephew, and his father-in-law. The three children of Constantine began their bloody and baleful reign, with murdering their uncle and their cousins. From that time followed a series of civil wars and murders. The father, the brother, and all the relations of Julian, and even Julian himself, were marked down for destruction by Constantius, his uncle. He escaped this general massacre, but the first years of his life were passed in exile, and he at last owed the preservation of his life, his fortune, and the title of Cæsar, only to Eusebia, the wife of his uncle Constantius, who, after having had the cruelty to proscribe his infancy, had the imprudence to appoint him Cæsar, and the still further and greater imprudence of then persecuting him.

  He was, in the first instance, a witness of the insolence with which a certain bishop treated his benefactress Eusebia. He was called Leontius, and was bishop of Tripoli. He sent information to the empress, “that he would not visit her unless she would consent to receive him in a manner corresponding to his episcopal dignity—that is, that she should advance to receive him at the door, that she should receive his benediction in a bending attitude, and that she should remain standing until he granted her permission to be seated.” The Pagan pontiffs were not in the habit of treating princesses precisely in this manner, and such brutal arrogance could not but make a deep impression on the mind of a young man attached at once to philosophy and simplicity.

  If he saw that he was in a Christian family, he saw, at the same time, that he was in a family rendered distinguished by parricides; if he looked at the court bishops, he perceived that they were at once audacious and intriguing, and that all anathematized each other in turn. The hostile parties of Arius and Athanasius filled the empire with confusion and carnage; the Pagans, on the contrary, never had any religious quarrels. It is natural therefore that Julian, who had been educated, let it be remembered, by philosophic Pagans, should have strengthened by their discourses the aversion he must necessarily have felt in his heart for the Christian religion. It is not more extraordinary to see Julian quit Christianity for false gods, than to see Constantine quit false gods for Christianity. It is highly probable that both changed for motives of state policy, and that this policy was mixed up in the mind of Julian with the stern loftiness of a stoic soul.

  The Pagan priests had no dogmas; they did not compel men to believe that which was incredible; they required nothing but sacrifices, and even sacrifices were not enjoined under rigorous penalties; they did not set themselves up as the first order in the state, did not form a state within a state, and did not mix in affairs of government. These might well be considered motives to induce a man of Julian’s character to declare himself on their side; and if he had piqued himself upon being nothing besides a Stoic, he would have had against him the priests of both religions, and all the fanatics of each. The common people would not at that time have endured a prince who was content simply with the pure worship of a pure divinity and the strict observance of justice. It was necessary to side with one of the opposing parties. We must therefore believe that Julian submitted to the Pagan ceremonies, as the majority of princes and great men attend the forms of worship in the public temples. They are led thither by the people themselves, and are often obliged to appear what in fact they are not; and to be in public the first and greatest slaves of credulity. The Turkish sultan must bless the name of Omar. The Persian sophi must bless the name of Ali. Marcus Aurelius himself was initiated in the mysteries of Eleusis.

  We ought not therefore to be surprised that Julian should have debased his reason by condescending to the forms and usages of superstition; but it is impossible not to feel indignant against Theodoret, as the only historian who relates that he sacrificed a woman in the temple of the moon at Carres. This infamous story must be classed with the absurd tale of Ammianus, that the genius of the empire appeared to Julian before his death, and with the other equally ridiculous one, that when Julian attempted to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem, there came globes of fire out of the earth, and consumed all the works and workmen without distinction.

  Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.

  —Horace, book i, ep. ii, 16.

  Both Christians and Pagans equally, circulated fables concerning Julian; but the fables of the Christians, who were his enemies, were filled with calumny. Who could ever be induced to believe that a philosopher sacrificed a woman to the moon, and tore out her entrails with his own hands? Is such atrocity compatible with the character of a rigid Stoic?

  He never put any Christians to death. He granted them no favors, but he never persecuted them. He permitted them, like a just sovereign, to keep their own property; and he wrote in opposition to them like a philosopher. He forbade their teaching in the schools the profane authors, whom they endeavored to decry—this was not persecuting them; and he prevented them from tearing one another to pieces in their outrageous hatred and quarrels—this was protecting them. They had in fact therefore nothing with which they could reproach him, but with having abandoned them, and with not being of their opinion. They found means, however, of rendering execrable to posterity a prince, who, but for his change of religion, would have been admired and beloved by all the world.

  Although we have already treated of Julian, under the article on “Apostate”; although, following the example of every sage, we have deplored the dreadful calamity he experienced in not being a Christian, and have done justice elsewhere to his various excellences, we must nevertheless say something more upon the subject.

  We do this in consequence of an imposture equally absurd and atrocious, which we casually met with in one of those petty dictionaries with which France is now inundated, and which unfortunately are so easily compiled. This dictionary of theology which I am now alluding to proceeds from an ex-Jesuit, called Paulian, who repeats the story, so discredited and absurd, that the emperor Julian, after being mortally wounded in a battle with the Persians, threw some of his blood towards heaven, exclaiming, “Galilean, thou hast conquered”—a fable which destroys itself, as Julian was conqueror in the battle, and Jesus Christ certainly was not the God of the Persians.

  Paulian, notwithstanding, dares to assert that the fact is incontestable. And upon what ground does he assert it? Upon the ground of its being related by Theodoret, the author of so many distinguished lies; and even this notorious writer himself relates it only as a vague report; he uses the expression, “It is said.” This story is worthy of the calumniators who stated that Julian had sacrificed a woman to the moon, and that after his death a large chest was found among his movables filled with human heads.

  This is not the only falsehood and calumny with which this ex-Jesuit Paulian is chargeable. If these contemptible wretches knew what injury they did to our holy religion, by endeavoring to support it by imposture, and by the abominable abuse with which they assail the most respectable characters, they would be less audacious and infuriated. They care not, however, for supporting religion; what they want is to gain money by their libels; and despairing of being read by persons of sense, and taste, and fashion, they go on gathering and compiling theological trash, in hopes that their productions will be adopted in the seminaries.

  We sincerely ask pardon of our well-informed and respectable readers for introducing such names as those of the ex-Jesuits Paulian, Nonnotte, and Patouillet; but after having trampled to death serpents, we shall probably be excused for crushing fleas.

  JUST AND UNJUST.

  Who has given us the perception of just and unjust? God, who gave us a brain and a heart. But when does our reason inform us that there are such things as vice and virtue? Just at the same time it teaches us that two and two make four. There is no innate knowledge, for the same reason that there is no tree that bears leaves and fruit when it first starts above the earth. There is nothing innate, or fully developed in the first instance; but—we repeat here what we have often said—God causes us to be born with organs, which, as they grow and become unfolded, make us feel all that is necessary for our species to feel, for the conservation of that species.

  How is this continual mystery performed? Tell me, ye yellow inhabitants of the Isles of Sunda, ye black Africans, ye beardless Indians; and you—Plato, Cicero, and Epictetus. You all equally feel that it is better to give the superfluity of your bread, your rice, or your manioc, to the poor man who meekly requests it, than to kill him or scoop his eyes out. It is evident to the whole world that a benefit is more honorable to the performer than an outrage, that gentleness is preferable to fury.

  The only thing required, then, is to exercise our reason in discriminating the various shades of what is right and wrong. Good and evil are often neighbors; our passions confound them; who shall enlighten and direct us? Ourselves, when we are calm and undisturbed. Whoever has written on the subject of human duties, in all countries throughout the world, has written well, because he wrote with reason. All have said the same thing; Socrates and Epictetus, Confucius and Cicero, Marcus Antoninus and Amurath II. had the same morality.

  We would repeat every day to the whole of the human race: Morality is uniform and invariable; it comes from God: dogmas are different; they come from ourselves.

  Jesus never taught any metaphysical dogmas; He wrote no theological courses; He never said: I am consubstantial; I have two wills and two natures with only one person. He left for the Cordeliers and the Jacobins, who would appear twelve hundred years after Him, the delicate and difficult topic of argument, whether His mother was conceived in original sin. He never pronounced marriage to be the visible sign of a thing invisible; He never said a word about concomitant grace; He instituted neither monks nor inquisitors; He appointed nothing of what we see at the present day.

  God had given the knowledge of just and unjust, right and wrong, throughout all the ages which preceded Christianity. God never changed nor can change. The constitution of our souls, our principles of reason and morality, will ever be the same. How is virtue promoted by theological distinctions, by dogmas founded on those distinctions, by persecutions founded on those dogmas? Nature, terrified and horror-struck at all these barbarous inventions, calls aloud to all men: Be just, and not persecuting sophists.

  You read in the “Zend-Avesta,” which is the summary of the laws of Zoroaster, this admirable maxim: “When it is doubtful whether the action you are about to perform is just or unjust, abstain from doing it.” What legislator ever spoke better? We have not here the system of “probable opinions,” invented by people who call themselves “the Society of Jesus.”

  JUSTICE.

  That “justice” is often extremely unjust, is not an observation merely of the present day; “summum jus, summa injuria,” is one of the most ancient proverbs in existence. There are many dreadful ways of being unjust; as, for example, that of racking the innocent Calas upon equivocal evidence, and thus incurring the guilt of shedding innocent blood by a too strong reliance on vain presumptions.

  Another method of being unjust is condemning to execution a man who at most deserves only three months’ imprisonment; this species of injustice is that of tyrants, and particularly of fanatics, who always become tyrants whenever they obtain the power of doing mischief.

  We cannot more completely demonstrate this truth than by the letter of a celebrated barrister, written in 1766, to the marquis of Beccaria, one of the most celebrated professors of jurisprudence, at this time, in Europe:

  Letter to the Marquis of Beccaria, Professor of Public Law at Milan, on the subject of M. de Morangies, 1772.

  Sir:

  —You are a teacher of laws in Italy, a country from which we derive all laws except those which have been transmitted to us by our own absurd and contradictory customs, the remains of that ancient barbarism, the rust of which subsists to this day in one of the most flourishing kingdoms of the earth.

  Your book upon crimes and punishments opened the eyes of many of the lawyers of Europe who had been brought up in absurd and inhuman usages; and men began everywhere to blush at finding themselves still wearing their ancient dress of savages.

  Your opinion was requested on the dreadful execution to which two young gentlemen, just out of their childhood, had been sentenced; one of whom, having escaped the tortures he was destined to, has become a most excellent officer in the service of the great king, while the other, who had inspired the brightest hopes, died like a sage, by a horrible death, without ostentation and without pusillanimity, surrounded by no less than five executioners. These lads were accused of indecency in action and words, a fault which three months’ imprisonment would have sufficiently punished, and which would have been infallibly corrected by time. You replied, that their judges were assassins, and that all Europe was of your opinion.

  I consulted you on the cannibal sentences passed on Calas, on Sirven, and Montbailli; and you anticipated the decrees which you afterwards issued from the chief courts and officers of law in the kingdom, which justified injured innocence and re-established the honor of the nation.

  I at present consult you on a cause of a very different nature. It is at once civil and criminal. It is the case of a man of quality, a major-general in the army, who maintains alone his honor and fortune against a whole family of poor and obscure citizens, and against an immense multitude consisting of the dregs of the people, whose execrations against him are echoed through the whole of France. The poor family accuses the general officer of taking from it by fraud and violence a hundred thousand crowns.

  The general officer accuses these poor persons of trying to obtain from him a hundred thousand crowns by means equally criminal. They complain that they are not merely in danger of losing an immense property, which they never appeared to possess, but also of being oppressed, insulted, and beaten by the officers of justice, who compelled them to declare themselves guilty and consent to their own ruin and punishment. The general solemnly protests, that these imputations of fraud and violence are atrocious calumnies. The advocates of the two parties contradict each other on all the facts, on all the inductions, and even on all the reasonings; their memorials are called tissues of falsehoods; and each treats the adverse party as inconsistent and absurd,—an invariable practice in every dispute.

  When you have had the goodness, sir, to read their memorials, which I have now the honor of sending to you, you will, I trust, permit me to suggest the difficulties which I feel in this case; they are dictated by perfect impartiality. I know neither of the parties, and neither of the advocates; but having, in the course of four and twenty years, seen calumny and injustice so often triumph, I may be permitted to endeavor to penetrate the labyrinth in which these monsters unfortunately find shelter.

  Presumptions against the Verron Family.

  1. In the first place, there are four bills, payable to order, for a hundred thousand crowns, drawn with perfect regularity by an officer otherwise deeply involved in debt; they are payable for the benefit of a woman of the name of Verron, who called herself the widow of a banker. They are presented by her grandson, Du Jonquay, her heir, recently admitted a doctor of laws, although he is ignorant even of orthography. Is this enough? Yes, in an ordinary case it would be so; but if, in this very extraordinary case, there is an extreme probability, that the doctor of laws never did and never could carry the money which he pretends to have delivered in his grandmother’s name; if the grandmother, who maintained herself with difficulty in a garret, by the miserable occupation of pawnbroking, never could have been in the possession of the hundred thousand crowns; if, in short, the grandson and his mother have spontaneously confessed, and attested the written confession by their actual signatures, that they attempted to rob the general, and that he never received more than twelve hundred francs instead of three hundred thousand livres;—in this case, is not the cause sufficiently cleared up? Is not the public sufficiently able to judge from these preliminaries?

  2. I appeal to yourself, sir, whether it is probable that the poor widow of a person unknown in society, who is said to have been a petty stock-jobber, and not a banker, could be in possession of so considerable a sum to lend, at an extreme risk, to an officer notoriously in debt? The general, in short, contends, that this jobber, the husband of the woman in question, died insolvent; that even his inventory was never paid for; that this pretended banker was originally a baker’s boy in the household of the duke of Saint-Agnan, the French ambassador in Spain; that he afterwards took up the profession of a broker at Paris; and that he was compelled by M. Héraut, lieutenant of police, to restore certain promissory notes, or bills of exchange, which he had obtained from some young man by extortion;—such the fatality impending over this wretched family from bills of exchange! Should all these statements be proved, do you conceive it at all probable that this family lent a hundred thousand crowns to an involved officer with whom they were upon no terms of friendship or acquaintance?

  3. Do you consider it probable, that the jobber’s grandson, the doctor of laws, should have gone on foot no less than five leagues, have made twenty-six journeys, have mounted and descended three thousand steps, all in the space of five hours, without any stopping, to carry “secretly” twelve thousand four hundred and twenty-five louis d’or to a man, to whom, on the following day, he publicly gives twelve hundred francs? Does not such an account appear to be invented with an utter deficiency of ingenuity, and even of common sense? Do those who believe it appear to be sages? What can you think, then, of those who solemnly affirm it without believing it?

  4. Is it probable, that young Du Jonquay, the doctor of laws, and his own mother, should have made and signed a declaration, upon oath, before a superior judge, that this whole account was false, that they had never carried the gold, and that they were confessed rogues, if in fact they had not been such, and if grief and remorse had not extorted this confession of their crime? And when they afterwards say, that they had made this confession before the commissary, only because they had previously been assaulted and beaten at the house of a proctor, would such an excuse be deemed by you reasonable or absurd?

  Can anything be clearer than that, if this doctor of laws had really been assaulted and beaten in any other house on account of this cause, he should have demanded justice of the commissary for this violence, instead of freely signing, together with his mother, that they were both guilty of a crime which they had not committed?

  Would it be admissible for them to say: We signed our condemnation because we thought that the general had bought over against us all the police officers and all the chief judges?

  Can good sense listen for a moment to such arguments? Would any one have dared to suggest such even in the days of our barbarism, when we had neither laws, nor manners, nor cultivated reason?

  If I may credit the very circumstantial memorials of the general, the Verrons, when put in prison upon his accusation, at first persisted in the confession of their crime. They wrote two letters to the person whom they had made the depositary of the bills extorted from the general; they were terrified at the contemplation of their guilt, which they saw might conduct them to the galleys or to the gibbet. They afterwards gain more firmness and confidence. The persons with whom they were to divide the fruit of their villainy encourage and support them; and the attractions of the vast sum in their contemplation seduce, hurry, and urge them on to persevere in the original charge. They call in to their assistance all the dark frauds and pettifogging chicanery to which they can gain access, to clear them from a crime which they had themselves actually admitted. They avail themselves with dexterity of the distresses to which the involved officer was occasionally reduced, to give a color of probability to his attempting the re-establishment of his affairs by the robbery or theft of a hundred thousand crowns. They rouse the commiseration of the populace, which at Paris is easily stimulated and frenzied. They appeal successfully for compassion to the members of the bar, who make it a point of indispensable duty to employ their eloquence in their behalf, and to support the weak against the powerful, the people against the nobility. The clearest case becomes in time the most obscure. A simple cause, which the police magistrate would have terminated in four days, goes on increasing for more than a whole year by the mire and filth introduced into it through the numberless channels of chicanery, interest, and party spirit. You will perceive that the whole of this statement is a summary of memorials or documents that appeared in this celebrated cause.

  Presumptions in favor of the Verron Family.

  We shall consider the defence of the grandmother, the mother, and the grandson (doctor of laws), against these strong presumptions.

  1. The hundred thousand crowns (or very nearly that sum), which it is pretended the widow Verron never was possessed of, were formerly made over to her by her husband, in trust, together with the silver plate. This deposit was “secretly” brought to her six months after her husband’s death, by a man of the name of Chotard. She placed them out, and always “secretly,” with a notary called Gilet, who restored them to her, still “secretly,” in 1760. She had therefore, in fact, the hundred thousand crowns which her adversary pretends she never possessed.

  2. She died in extreme old age, while the cause was going on, protesting, after receiving the sacrament, that these hundred thousand crowns were carried in gold to the general officer by her grandson, in twenty-six journeys on foot, on Sept. 23, 1771.

  3. It is not at all probable, that an officer accustomed to borrowing, and broken down in circumstances, should have given bills payable to order for the sum of three hundred thousand livres, to a person unknown to him, unless he had actually received that sum.

  4. There are witnesses who saw counted out and ranged in order the bags filled with this gold, and who saw the doctor of laws carry it to the general on foot, under his great coat, in twenty-six journeys, occupying the space of five hours. And he made these twenty-six astonishing journeys merely to satisfy the general, who had particularly requested secrecy.

  5. The doctor of laws adds: “Our grandmother and ourselves lived, it is true, in a garret, and we lent a little money upon pledges; but we lived so merely upon a principle of judicious economy; the object was to buy for me the office of a counsellor of parliament, at a time when the magistracy was purchasable. It is true that my three sisters gain their subsistence by needle-work and embroidery; the reason of which was, that my grandmother kept all her property for me. It is true that I have kept company only with procuresses, coachmen, and lackeys: I acknowledge that I speak and that I write in their style; but I might not on that account be less worthy of becoming a magistrate, by making, after all, a good use of my time.”

  6. All worthy persons have commiserated our misfortune. M. Aubourg, a farmer-general, as respectable as any in Paris, has generously taken our side, and his voice has obtained for us that of the public.

  This defence appears in some part of it plausible. Their adversary refutes it in the following manner:

  Arguments of the Major-General against those of the Verron Family.

  1. The story of the deposit must be considered by every man of sense as equally false and ridiculous with that of the six-and-twenty journeys on foot. If the poor jobber, the husband of the old woman, had intended to give at his death so much money to his wife, he might have done it in a direct way from hand to hand, without the intervention of a third person.

  If he had been possessed of the pretended silver plate, one-half of it must have belonged to the wife, as equal owner of their united goods. She would not have remained quiet for the space of six months, in a paltry lodging of two hundred francs a year, without reclaiming her plate, and exerting her utmost efforts to obtain her right. Chotard also, the alleged friend of her husband and herself, would not have suffered her to remain for six long months in a state of such great indigence and anxiety.

  There was, in reality, a person of the name of Chotard; but he was a man ruined by debts and debauchery; a fraudulent bankrupt who embezzled forty thousand crowns from the tax office of the farmers-general in which he held a situation, and who is not likely to have given up a hundred thousand crowns to the grandmother of the doctor in laws.

  The widow Verron pretends, that she employed her money at interest, always it appears in secrecy, with a notary of the name of Gilet, but no trace of this fact can be found in the office of that notary.

  She declares, that this notary returned her the money, still secretly, in the year 1760: he was at that time dead.

  If all these facts be true, it must be admitted that the cause of Du Jonquay and the Verrons, built on a foundation of such ridiculous lies, must inevitably fall to the ground.

  2. The will of widow Verron, made half an hour before her death, with death and the name of God on her lips, is, to all appearance, in itself a respectable and even pious document. But if it be really in the number of those pious things which are every day observed to be merely instrumental to crime—if this lender upon pledges, while recommending her soul to God, manifestly lied to God, what importance or weight can the document bring with it? Is it not rather the strongest proof of imposture and villainy?

  The old woman had always been made to state, while the suit was carried on in her name, that she possessed only this sum of one hundred thousand crowns which it was intended to rob her of; that she never had more than that sum; and yet, behold! in her will she mentions five hundred thousand livres of her property! Here are two hundred thousand francs more than any one expected, and here is the widow Verron convicted out of her own mouth. Thus, in this singular cause, does the at once atrocious and ridiculous imposture of the family break out on every side, during the woman’s life, and even when she is within the grasp of death.

  3. It is probable, and it is even in evidence, that the general would not trust his bills for a hundred thousand crowns to a doctor of whom he knew little or nothing, without having an acknowledgment from him. He did, however, commit this inadvertence, which is the fault of an unsuspecting and noble heart; he was led astray by the youth, by the candor, by the apparent generosity of a man not more than twenty-seven years of age, who was on the point of being raised to the magistracy, who actually, upon an urgent occasion, lent him twelve hundred francs, and who promised in the course of a few days to obtain for him, from an opulent company, the sum of a hundred thousand crowns. Here is the knot and difficulty of the cause. We must strictly examine whether it be probable, that a man, who is admitted to have received nearly a hundred thousand crowns in gold, should on the very morning after, come in great haste, as for a most indispensable occasion, to the man who the evening before had advanced him twelve thousand four hundred and twenty-five louis d’or.

  There is not the slightest probability of his doing so. It is still less probable, as we have already observed, that a man of distinction, a general officer, and the father of a family, in return for the invaluable and almost unprecedented kindness of lending him a hundred thousand crowns, should, instead of the sincerest gratitude to his benefactor, absolutely endeavor to get him hanged; and this on the part of a man who had nothing more to do than to await quietly the distant expirations of the periods of payment; who was under no temptation, in order to gain time, to commit such a profligate and atrocious villainy, and who had never in fact committed any villainy at all. Surely it is more natural to think that the man, whose grandfather was a pettifogging, paltry jobber, and whose grandmother was a wretched lender of small sums upon the pledges of absolute misery, should have availed himself of the blind confidence of an unsuspecting soldier, to extort from him a hundred thousand crowns, and that he promised to divide this sum with the depraved and abominable accomplices of his baseness.

  4. There are witnesses who depose in favor of Du Jonquay and widow Verron. Let us consider who those witnesses are, and what they depose.

  In the first place, there is a woman of the name of Tourtera, a broker, who supported the widow in her peddling, insignificant concern of pawnbroking, and who has been five times in the hospital in consequence of the scandalous impurities of her life; which can be proved with the utmost ease.

  There is a coachman called Gilbert, who, sometimes firm, at other times trembling in his wickedness, declared to a lady of the name of Petit, in the presence of six persons, that he had been suborned by Du Jonquay. He subsequently inquired of many other persons, whether he should yet be in time to retract, and reiterated expressions of this nature before witnesses.

  Setting aside, however, what has been stated of Gilbert’s disposition to retract, it is very possible that he might be deceived, and may not be chargeable with falsehood and perjury. It is possible, that he might see money at the pawnbroker’s, and that he might be told, and might believe, that three hundred thousand livres were there. Nothing is more dangerous in many persons than a quick and heated imagination, which actually makes men think that they have seen what it was absolutely impossible for them to see.

  Then comes a man of the name of Aubriot, a godson of the procuress Tourtera, and completely under her guidance. He deposes, that he saw, in one of the streets of Paris, on Sept. 23, 1771, Doctor Du Jonquay in his great coat, carrying bags.

  Surely there is here no conclusive proof that the doctor on that day made twenty-six journeys on foot, and travelled over five leagues of ground, to deliver “secretly” twelve thousand four hundred and twenty-five louis d’or, even admitting all that this testimony states to be true. It appears clear, that Du Jonquay went this journey to the general, and that he spoke to him; and it appears probable, that he deceived him; but it is not clear that Aubriot saw him go and return thirteen times in one morning. It is still less clear, that this witness could at that time see so many circumstances occurring in the street, as he was actually laboring under a disorder which there is no necessity to name, and on that very day underwent for it the severe operation of medicine, with his legs tottering, his head swelled, and his tongue hanging half out of his mouth. This was not precisely the moment for running into the street to see sights. Would his friend Du Jonquay have said to him: Come and risk your life, to see me traverse a distance of five leagues loaded with gold: I am going to deliver the whole fortune of my family, secretly, to a man overwhelmed with debts; I wish to have, privately, as a witness, a person of your character? This is not exceedingly probable. The surgeon who applied the medicine to the witness Aubriot on this occasion, states that he was by no means in a situation to go out; and the son of the surgeon, in his interrogatory, refers the case to the academy of surgery.

  But even admitting that a man of a particularly robust constitution could have gone out and taken some turns in the street in this disgraceful and dreadful situation, what could it have signified to the point in question? Did he see Du Jonquay make twenty-six journeys between his garret and the general’s hotel? Did he see twelve thousand four hundred and twenty-five louis d’or carried by him? Was any individual whatever a witness to this prodigy well worthy the “Thousand and One Nights”? Most certainly not; no person whatever. What is the amount, then, of all his evidence on the subject?

  5. That the daughter of Mrs. Verron, in her garret, may have sometimes borrowed small sums on pledges; that Mrs. Verron may have lent them, in order to obtain and save a profit, to make her grandson a counsellor of parliament, has nothing at all to do with the substance of the case in question. In defiance of all this, it will ever be evident, that this magistrate by anticipation did not traverse the five leagues to carry to the general the hundred thousand crowns, and that the general never received them.

  6. A person named Aubourg comes forward, not merely as a witness, but as a protector and benefactor of oppressed innocence. The advocates of the Verron family extol this man as a citizen of rare and intrepid virtue. He became feelingly alive to the misfortunes of Doctor Du Jonquay, his mother, and grandmother, although he had no acquaintance with them; and offered them his credit and his purse, without any other object than that of assisting persecuted merit.

  Upon examination it is found, that this hero of disinterested benevolence is a contemptible wretch who began the world as a lackey, was then successively an upholsterer, a broker, and a bankrupt, and is now, like Mrs. Verron and Tourtera, by profession a pawnbroker. He flies to the assistance of persons of his own profession. The woman Tourtera, in the first place, gave him twenty-five louis d’or, to interest his probity and kindness in assisting a desolate family. The generous Aubourg had the greatness of soul to make an agreement with the old grandmother, almost when she was dying, by which she gives him fifteen thousand crowns, on condition of his undertaking to defray the expenses of the cause. He even takes the precaution to have this bargain noticed and confirmed in the will, dictated, or pretended to be dictated, by this old widow of the jobber on her death-bed. This respectable and venerable man then hopes one day to divide with some of the witnesses the spoils that are to be obtained from the general. It is the magnanimous heart of Aubourg that has formed this disinterested scheme; it is he who has conducted the cause which he seems to have taken up as a patrimony. He believed the bills payable to order would infallibly be paid. He is in fact a receiver who participates in the plunder effected by robbers, and who appropriates the better part to himself.

  Such are the replies of the general: I neither subtract from them nor add to them—I simply state them. I have thus explained to you, sir, the whole substance of the cause, and stated all the strongest arguments on both sides.

  I request your opinion of the sentence which ought to be pronounced, if matters should remain in the same state, if the truth cannot be irrevocably obtained from one or other of the parties, and made to appear perfectly without a cloud.

  The reasons of the general officer are thus far convincing. Natural equity is on his side. This natural equity, which God has established in the hearts of all men, is the basis of all law. Ought we to destroy this foundation of all justice, by sentencing a man to pay a hundred thousand crowns which he does not appear to owe?

  He drew bills for a hundred thousand crowns, in the vain hope that he should receive the money; he negotiated with a young man whom he did not know, just as he would have done with the banker of the king or of the empress-queen. Should his bills have more validity than his reasons? A man certainly cannot owe what he has not received. Bills, policies, bonds, always imply that the corresponding sums have been delivered and had; but if there is evidence that no money has been had and delivered, there can be no obligation to return or pay any. If there is writing against writing, document against document, the last dated cancels the former ones. But in the present case the last writing is that of Du Jonquay and his mother, and it states that the opposite party in the cause never received from them a hundred thousand crowns, and that they are cheats and impostors.

  What! because they have disavowed the truth of their confession, which they state to have been made in consequence of their having received a blow or an assault, shall another man’s property be adjudged to them?

  I will suppose for a moment (what is by no means probable), that the judges, bound down by forms, will sentence the general to pay what in fact he does not owe;—will they not in this case destroy his reputation as well as his fortune? Will not all who have sided against him in this most singular adventure, charge him with calumniously accusing his adversaries of a crime of which he is himself guilty? He will lose his honor, in their estimation, in losing his property. He will never be acquitted but in the judgments of those who examine profoundly. The number of these is always small. Where are the men to be found who have leisure, attention, capacity, impartiality, to consider anxiously every aspect and bearing of a cause in which they are not themselves interested? They judge in the same way as our ancient parliament judged of books—that is, without reading them.

  You, sir, are fully acquainted with this, and know that men generally judge of everything by prejudice, hearsay, and chance. No one reflects that the cause of a citizen ought to interest the whole body of citizens, and that we may ourselves have to endure in despair the same fate which we perceive, with eyes and feelings of indifference, falling heavily upon him. We write and comment every day upon the judgments passed by the senate of Rome and the areopagus of Athens; but we think not for a moment of what passes before our own tribunals.

  You, sir, who comprehend all Europe in your researches and decisions, will, I sincerely hope, deign to communicate to me a portion of your light. It is possible, certainly, that the formalities and chicanery connected with law proceedings, and with which I am little conversant, may occasion to the general the loss of the cause in court; but it appears to me that he must gain it at the tribunal of an enlightened public, that awful and accurate judge who pronounces after deep investigation, and who is the final disposer of character.

  KING.

  King,basileus, tyrannos, rex, dux, imperator, melch, baal, bel, pharaoh, eli, shadai, adonai, shak, sophi, padisha, bogdan, chazan, kan, krall, kong, könig, etc.—all expressions which signify the same office, but which convey very different ideas.

  In Greece, neither “basileus” nor “tyrannos” ever conveyed the idea of absolute power. He who was able obtained this power, but it was always obtained against the inclination of the people.

  It is clear, that among the Romans kings were not despotic. The last Tarquin deserved to be expelled, and was so. We have no proof that the petty chiefs of Italy were ever able, at their pleasure, to present a bowstring to the first man of the state, as is now done to a vile Turk in his seraglio, and like barbarous slaves, still more imbecile, suffer him to use it without complaint.

  There was no king on this side the Alps, and in the North, at the time we became acquainted with this large quarter of the world. The Cimbri, who marched towards Italy, and who were exterminated by Marius, were like famished wolves, who issued from those forests with their females and whelps. As to a crowned head among these animals, or orders on the part of a secretary of state, of a grand butler, of a chancellor—any notion of arbitrary taxes, commissaries, fiscal edicts, etc.—they knew no more of any of these than of the vespers and the opera.

  It is certain that gold and silver, coined and uncoined, form an admirable means of placing him who has them not, in the power of him who has found out the secret of accumulation. It is for the latter alone to possess great officers, guards, cooks, girls, women, jailers, almoners, pages, and soldiers.

  It would be very difficult to insure obedience with nothing to bestow but sheep and sheep-skins. It is also very likely, after all the revolutions of our globe, that it was the art of working metals which originally made kings, as it is the art of casting cannon which now maintains them.

  Cæsar was right when he said, that with gold we may procure men, and with men acquire gold.

  This secret had been known for ages in Asia and Egypt, where the princes and the priests shared the benefit between them.

  The prince said to the priest: Take this gold, and in return uphold my power, and prophesy in my favor; I will be anointed, and thou shalt anoint me; constitute oracles, manufacture miracles; thou shalt be well paid for thy labor, provided that I am always master. The priest, thus obtaining land and wealth, prophesies for himself, makes the oracles speak for himself, chases the sovereign from the throne, and very often takes his place. Such is the history of the shotim of Egypt, the magi of Persia, the soothsayers of Babylon, the chazin of Syria (if I mistake the name it amounts to little)—all which holy persons sought to rule. Wars between the throne and the altar have in fact existed in all countries, even among the miserable Jews.

  We, inhabitants of the temperate zone of Europe, have known this well for a dozen centuries. Our minds not being so temperate as our climate, we well know what it has cost us. Gold and silver form so entirely the primum mobile of the holy connection between sovereignty and religion, that many of our kings still send it to Rome, where it is seized and shared by priests as soon as it arrives.

  When, in this eternal conflict for dominion, leaders have become powerful, each has exhibited his pre-eminence in a mode of his own. It was a crime to spit in the presence of the king of the Medes. The earth must be stricken nine times by the forehead in the presence of the emperor of China. A king of England imagines that he cannot take a glass of beer unless it be presented on the knees. Another king will have his right foot saluted, and all will take the money of their people. In some countries the krall, or chazin, is allowed an income, as in Poland, Sweden, and Great Britain. In others, a piece of paper is sufficient for his treasury to obtain all that it requires.

  Since we write upon the rights of the people, on taxation, on customs, etc., let us endeavor, by profound reasoning, to establish the novel maxim, that a shepherd ought to shear his sheep, and not to flay them.

  As to the due limits of the prerogatives of kings, and of the liberty of the people, I recommend you to examine that question at your ease in some hotel in the town of Amsterdam.

  KISS.

  I ask pardon of young ladies and gentlemen, for they will not find here what they may possibly expect. This article is only for learned and serious people, and will suit very few of them.

  There is too much of kissing in the comedies of the time of Molière. The valets are always requesting kisses from the waiting-women, which is exceedingly flat and disagreeable, especially when the actors are ugly and must necessarily exhibit against the grain.

  If the reader is fond of kisses, let him peruse the “Pastor Fido”: there is an entire chorus which treats only of kisses, and the piece itself is founded only on a kiss which Mirtillo one day bestows on the fair Amaryllis, in a game at blindman’s buff—“un bacio molto saporito.”

  In a chapter on kissing by John de la Casa, archbishop of Benevento, he says, that people may kiss from the head to the foot. He complains, however, of long noses, and recommends ladies who possess such to have lovers with short ones.

  To kiss was the ordinary manner of salutation throughout all antiquity. Plutarch relates, that the conspirators, before they killed Cæsar, kissed his face, his hands, and his bosom. Tacitus observes, that when his father-in-law, Agricola, returned to Rome, Domitian kissed him coldly, said nothing to him, and left him disregarded in the surrounding crowd. An inferior, who could not aspire to kiss his superior, kissed his own hand, and the latter returned the salute in a similar manner, if he thought proper.

  The kiss was ever used in the worship of the gods. Job, in his parable, which is possibly the oldest of our known books, says that he had not adored the sun and moon like the other Arabs, or suffered his mouth to kiss his hand to them.

  In the West there remains of this civility only the simple and innocent practice yet taught in country places to children—that of kissing their right hands in return for a sugar-plum.

  It is horrible to betray while saluting; the assassination of Cæsar is thereby rendered much more odious. It is unnecessary to add, that the kiss of Judas has become a proverb.

  Joab, one of the captains of David, being jealous of Amasa, another captain, said to him, “Art thou in health, my brother?” and took him by the beard with his right hand to kiss him, while with the other he drew his sword and smote him so that his bowels were “shed upon the ground.”

  We know not of any kissing in the other assassinations so frequent among the Jews, except possibly the kisses given by Judith to the captain Holofernes, before she cut off his head in his bed; but no mention is made of them, and therefore the fact is only to be regarded as probable.

  In Shakespeare’s tragedy of “Othello,” the hero, who is a Moor, gives two kisses to his wife before he strangles her. This appears abominable to orderly persons, but the partisans of Shakespeare say, that it is a fine specimen of nature, especially in a Moor.

  When John Galeas Sforza was assassinated in the cathedral of Milan, on St. Stephen’s day; the two Medicis, in the church of Reparata; Admiral Coligni, the prince of Orange, Marshal d’Ancre, the brothers De Witt, and so many others, there was at least no kissing.

  Among the ancients there was something, I know not what, symbolical and sacred attached to the kiss, since the statues of the gods were kissed, as also their beards, when the sculptors represented them with beards. The initiated kissed one another in the mysteries of Ceres, in sign of concord.

  The first Christians, male and female, kissed with the mouth at their Agapæ, or love-feasts. They bestowed the holy kiss, the kiss of peace, the brotherly and sisterly kiss, “hagion philema.” This custom, lasted for four centuries, and was finally abolished in distrust of the consequences. It was this custom, these kisses of peace, these love-feasts, these appellations of brother and sister, which drew on the Christians, while little known, those imputations of debauchery bestowed upon them by the priests of Jupiter and the priestesses of Vesta. We read in Petronius and in other authors, that the dissolute called one another brother and sister; and it was thought, that among Christians the same licentiousness was intended. They innocently gave occasion for the scandal upon themselves.

  In the commencement, seventeen different Christian societies existed, as there had been nine among the Jews, including the two kinds of Samaritans. Those bodies which considered themselves the most orthodox accused the others of inconceivable impurities. The term “gnostic,” at first so honorable, and which signifies the learned, enlightened, pure, became an epithet of horror and of contempt, and a reproach of heresy. St. Epiphanius, in the third century, pretended that the males and females at first tickled each other, and at length proceeded to lascivious kisses, judging of the degree of faith in each other by the warmth of them. A Christian husband in presenting his wife to a newly-initiated member, would exhort her to receive him, as above stated, and was always obeyed.

  We dare not repeat, in our chaste language, all that Epiphanius adds in Greek. We shall simply observe, that this saint was probably a little imposed upon, that he suffered himself to be transported by his zeal, and that all the heretics were not execrable debauchees. The sect of pietists, wishing to imitate the early Christians, at present bestow on each other kisses of peace, on departing from their assemblies, and also call one another brother and sister. The ancient ceremony was a kiss with the lips, and the pietists have carefully preserved it.

  There was no other manner of saluting the ladies in France, Italy, Germany, and England. The cardinals enjoyed the privilege of kissing the lips of queens, even in Spain, though—what is singular—not in France, where the ladies have always had more liberties than elsewhere; but every country has its ceremonies, and there is no custom so general but chance may have produced an exception. It was an incivility, a rudeness, in receiving the first visit of a nobleman, if a lady did not kiss his lips—no matter about his mustaches. “It is an unpleasant custom,” says Montaigne, “and offensive to the ladies to have to offer their lips to the three valets in his suite, however repulsive.” This custom is, however, the most ancient in the world.

  If it is disagreeable to a young and pretty mouth to glue itself to one which is old and ugly, there is also great danger in the junction of fresh and vermilion lips of the age of twenty to twenty-five—a truth which has finally abolished the ceremony of kissing in mysteries and love-feasts. Hence also the seclusion of women throughout the East, who kiss only their fathers and brothers—a custom long ago introduced into Spain by the Arabs.

  Attend to the danger: there is a nerve which runs from the mouth to the heart, and thence lower still, which produces in the kiss an exquisitely dangerous sensation. Virtue may suffer from a prolonged and ardent kiss between two young pietists of the age of eighteen.

  It is remarkable that mankind, and turtles, and pigeons alone practise kissing; hence the Latin word “columbatim,” which our language cannot render.

  We cannot decorously dwell longer on this interesting subject, although Montaigne says, “It should be spoken of without reserve; we boldly speak of killing, wounding, and betraying, while on this point we dare only whisper.”

  LAUGHTER.

  That laughter is the sign of joy, as tears are of grief, is doubted by no one that ever laughed. They who seek for metaphysical causes of laughter are not mirthful, while they who are aware that laughter draws the zygomatic muscle backwards towards the ears, are doubtless very learned. Other animals have this muscle as well as ourselves, yet never laugh any more than they shed tears. The stag, to be sure, drops moisture from its eyes when in the extremity of distress, as does a dog dissected alive; but they weep not for their mistresses or friends, as we do. They break not out like us into fits of laughter at the sight of anything droll. Man is the only animal which laughs and weeps.

  As we weep only when we are afflicted, and laugh only when we are gay, certain reasoners have pretended that laughter springs from pride, and that we deem ourselves superior to that which we laugh at. It is true that man, who is a risible animal, is also a proud one; but it is not pride which produces laughter. A child who laughs heartily, is not merry because he regards himself as superior to those who excite his mirth; nor, laughing when he is tickled, is he to be held guilty of the mortal sin of pride. I was eleven years of age when I read to myself, for the first time, the “Amphitryon” of Molière, and laughed until I nearly fell backward. Was this pride? We are seldom proud when alone. Was it pride which caused the master of the golden ass to laugh when he saw the ass eat his supper? He who laughs is joyful at the moment, and is prompted by no other cause.

  It is not all joy which produces laughter: the greatest enjoyments are serious. The pleasures of love, ambition, or avarice, make nobody laugh.

  Laughter may sometimes extend to convulsions; it is even said that persons may die of laughter. I can scarcely believe it; but certainly there are more who die of grief.

  Violent emotions, which sometimes move to tears and sometimes to the appearance of laughter, no doubt distort the muscles of the mouth; this, however, is not genuine laughter, but a convulsion and a pain. The tears may sometimes be genuine, because the object is suffering, but laughter is not. It must have another name, and be called the “risus sardonicus”—sardonic smile.

  The malicious smile, the “perfidum ridens,” is another thing; being the joy which is excited by the humiliation of another. The grin, “cachinnus,” is bestowed on those who promise wonders and perform absurdities; it is nearer to hooting than to laughter. Our pride derides the vanity which would impose upon us. They hoot our friend Fréron in “The Scotchwoman,” rather than laugh at him. I love to speak of friend Fréron, as in that case I laugh unequivocally.

  LAW (NATURAL).

  B.

  What is natural law?

  A.

  The instinct by which we feel justice.

  B.

  What do you call just and unjust?

  A.

  That which appears so to the whole world.

  B.

  The world is made up of a great many heads. It is said that at Lacedæmon thieves were applauded, while at Athens they were condemned to the mines.

  A.

  That is all a mere abuse of words, mere logomachy and ambiguity. Theft was impossible at Sparta, where all property was common. What you call theft was the punishment of avarice.

  B.

  It was forbidden for a man to marry his sister at Rome. Among the Egyptians, the Athenians, and even the Jews, a man was permitted to marry his sister by the father’s side. It is not without regret that I cite the small and wretched nation of the Jews, who certainly ought never to be considered as a rule for any person, and who—setting aside religion—were never anything better than an ignorant, fanatical, and plundering horde. According to their books, however, the young Tamar, before she was violated by her brother Ammon, addressed him in these words: “I pray thee, my brother, do not so foolishly, but ask me in marriage of my father: he will not refuse thee.”

  A.

  All these cases amount to mere laws of convention, arbitrary usages, transient modes. What is essential remains ever the same. Point out to me any country where it would be deemed respectable or decent to plunder me of the fruits of my labor, to break a solemn promise, to tell an injurious lie, to slander, murder, or poison, to be ungrateful to a benefactor, or to beat a father or mother presenting food to you.

  B.

  Have you forgotten that Jean Jacques, one of the fathers of the modern Church, has said that the first person who dared to enclose and cultivate a piece of ground was an enemy of the human race; that he ought to be exterminated; and that the fruits of the earth belonged to all, and the land to none? Have we not already examined this proposition, so beautiful in itself, and so conducive to the happiness of society?

  A.

  Who is this Jean Jacques? It is certainly not John the Baptist, nor John the Evangelist, nor James the Greater, nor James the Less; he must inevitably be some witling of a Hun, to write such abominable impertinence, or some ill-conditioned, malicious “bufo magro,” who is never more happy than when sneering at what all the rest of the world deem most valuable and sacred. For, instead of damaging and spoiling the estate of a wise and industrious neighbor, he had only to imitate him, and induce every head of a family to follow his example, in order to form in a short time a most flourishing and happy village. The author of the passage quoted seems to me a thoroughly unsocial animal.

  B.

  You are of opinion, then, that by insulting and plundering the good man, for surrounding his garden and farmyard with a quick-set hedge, he has offended against natural law.

  A.

  Yes, most certainly; there is, I must repeat, a natural law; and it consists in neither doing ill to another, nor rejoicing at it, when from any cause whatsoever it befalls him.

  B.

  I conceive that man neither loves ill nor does it with any other view than to his own advantage. But so many men are urged on to obtain advantage to themselves by the injury of another; revenge is a passion of such violence; there are examples of it so terrible and fatal; and ambition, more terrible and fatal still, has so drenched the world with blood; that when I survey the frightful picture, I am tempted to confess, that a man is a being truly diabolical. I may certainly possess, deeply rooted in my heart, the notion of what is just and unjust; but an Attila, whom St. Leon extols and pays his court to; a Phocas, whom St. Gregory flatters with the most abject meanness; Alexander VI., polluted by so many incests, murders, and poisonings, and with whom the feeble Louis XII., commonly called “the Good,” enters into the most strict and base alliance; a Cromwell, whose protection Cardinal Mazarin eagerly solicits, and to gratify whom he expels from France the heirs of Charles I., cousins-german of Louis XIV.—these, and a thousand similar examples, easily to be found in the records of history, totally disturb and derange my ideas, and I no longer know what I am doing or where I am.

  A.

  Well; but should the knowledge that storms are coming prevent our enjoying the beautiful sunshine and gentle and fragrant gales of the present day? Did the earthquake that destroyed half the city of Lisbon prevent your making a very pleasant journey from Madrid? If Attila was a bandit, and Cardinal Mazarin a knave, are there not some princes and ministers respectable and amiable men? Has it not been remarked, that in the war of 1701, the Council of Louis XIV. consisted of some of the most virtuous of mankind—the duke of Beauvilliers, the Marquis de Torcy, Marshal Villars, and finally Chamillard, who was not indeed considered a very able but still an honorable man? Does not the idea of just and unjust still exist? It is in fact on this that all laws are founded. The Greeks call laws “the daughters of heaven,” which means simply, the daughters of nature. Have you no laws in your country?

  B.

  Yes; some good, and others bad.

  A.

  Where could you have taken the idea of them, but from the notions of natural law which every well-constructed mind has within itself? They must have been derived from these or nothing.

  B.

  You are right; there is a natural law, but it is still more natural to many people to forget or neglect it.

  A.

  It is natural also to be one-eyed, humpbacked, lame, deformed, and sickly; but we prefer persons well made and healthy.

  B.

  Why are there so many one-eyed and deformed minds?

  A.

  Hush! Consult, however, the article on “Omnipotence.”

  LAW (SALIC).

  He who says that the Salic law was written with a pen from the wing of a two-headed eagle, by Pharamond’s almoner, on the back of the patent containing Constantine’s donation, was not, perhaps, very much mistaken.

  It is, say the doughty lawyers, the fundamental law of the French Empire. The great Jerome Bignon, in his book on “The Excellence of France,” says that this law is derived from natural law, according to the great Aristotle, because “in families it was the father who governed, and no dower was given to daughters, as we read in relation to the father, mother, and brothers of Rebecca.”

  He asserts that the kingdom of France is so excellent that it has religiously preserved this law, recommended both by Aristotle and the Old Testament. And to prove this excellence of France, he observes also, that the emperor Julian thought the wine of Surêne admirable.

  But in order to demonstrate the excellence of the Salic law, he refers to Froissart, according to whom the twelve peers of France said that “the kingdom of France is of such high nobility that it never ought to pass in succession to a female.”

  It must be acknowledged that this decision is not a little uncivil to Spain, England, Naples, and Hungary, and more than all the rest to Russia, which has seen on its throne four empresses in succession.

  The kingdom of France is of great nobility; no doubt it is; but those of Spain, of Mexico, and Peru are also of great nobility, and there is great nobility also in Russia.

  It has been alleged that Sacred Scripture says the lilies neither toil nor spin; and thence it has been inferred that women ought not to reign in France. This certainly is another instance of powerful reasoning; but it has been forgotten that the leopards, which are—it is hard to say why—the arms of England, spin no more than the lilies which are—it is equally hard to say why—the arms of France. In a word, the circumstance that lilies have never been seen to spin does not absolutely demonstrate the exclusion of females from the throne to have been a fundamental law of the Gauls.

  Of Fundamental Laws.

  The fundamental law of every country is, that if people are desirous of having bread, they must sow corn; that if they wish for clothing, they must cultivate flax and hemp; that every owner of a field should have the uncontrolled management and dominion over it, whether that owner be male or female; that the half-barbarous Gaul should kill as many as ever he can of the wholly barbarous Franks, when they come from the banks of the Main, which they have not the skill and industry to cultivate, to carry off his harvests and flocks; without doing which the Gaul would either become a serf of the Frank, or be assassinated by him.

  It is upon this foundation that an edifice is well supported. One man builds upon a rock, and his house stands firm; another on the sands, and it falls to the ground. But a fundamental law, arising from the fluctuating inclinations of men, and yet at the same time irrevocable, is a contradiction in terms, a mere creature of imagination, a chimera, an absurdity; the power that makes the laws can change them. The Golden Bull was called “the fundamental law of the empire.” It was ordained that there should never be more than seven Teutonic electors, for the very satisfactory and decisive reason that a certain Jewish chandelier had had no more than seven branches, and that there are no more than seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. This fundamental law had the epithet “eternal” applied to it by the all-powerful authority and infallible knowledge of Charles IV. God, however, did not think fit to allow of this assumption of “eternal” in Charles’s parchments. He permitted other German emperors, out of their all-powerful authority and infallible knowledge, to add two branches to the chandelier, and two presents to the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. Accordingly the electors are now nine in number.

  It was a very fundamental law that the disciples of the Lord Jesus should possess no private property, but have all things in common. There was afterwards a law that the bishops of Rome should be rich, and that the people should choose them. The last fundamental law is, that they are sovereigns, and elected by a small number of men clothed in scarlet, and constituting a society absolutely unknown in the time of Jesus. If the emperor, king of the Romans, always august, was sovereign master of Rome in fact, as he is according to the style of his patents and heraldry, the pope would be his grand almoner, until some other law, forever irrevocable, was announced, to be destroyed in its turn by some succeeding one.

  I will suppose—what may very possibly and naturally happen—that an emperor of Germany may have no issue but an only daughter, and that he may be a quiet, worthy man, understanding nothing about war. I will suppose that if Catherine II. does not destroy the Turkish Empire, which she has severely shaken in the very year in which I am now writing my reverie (the year 1771), the Turk will come and invade this good prince, notwithstanding his being cherished and beloved by all his nine electors; that his daughter puts herself at the head of the troops with two young electors deeply enamored of her; that she beats the Ottomans, as Deborah beat General Sisera, and his three hundred thousand soldiers, and his three thousand chariots of war, in a little rocky plain at the foot of Mount Tabor; that this warlike princess drives the Mussulman even beyond Adrianople; that her father dies through joy at her success, or from any other cause; that the two lovers of the princess induce their seven colleagues to crown her empress, and that all the princes of the empire, and all the cities give their consent to it; what, in this case, becomes of the fundamental and eternal law which enacts that the holy Roman Empire cannot possibly pass from the lance to the distaff, that the two-headed eagle cannot spin, and that it is impossible to sit on the imperial throne without breeches? The old and absurd law would be derided, and the heroic empress reign at once in safety and in glory.

  How the Salic Law Came to be Established.

  We cannot contest the custom which has indeed passed into law, that decides against daughters inheriting the crown in France while there remains any male of the royal blood. This question has been long determined, and the seal of antiquity has been put to the decision. Had it been expressly brought from heaven, it could not be more revered by the French nation than it is. It certainly does not exactly correspond with the gallant courtesy of the nation; but the fact is, that it was in strict and rigorous observance before the nation was ever distinguished for its gallant courtesy.

  The president Hénault repeats, in his “Chronicle,” what had been stated at random before him, that Clovis digested the Salic law in 511, the very year in which he died. I am very well disposed to believe that he actually did digest this law, and that he knew how to read and write, just as I am to believe that he was only fifteen years old when he undertook the conquest of the Gauls; but I do sincerely wish that any one would show me in the library of St.-Germain-des-Prés, or of St. Martin, the original document of the Salic law actually signed Clovis, or Clodovic, or Hildovic; from that we should at least learn his real name, which nobody at present knows.

  We have two editions of this Salic law; one by a person by the name of Herold, the other by Francis Pithou; and these are different, which is by no means a favorable presumption. When the text of a law is given differently in two documents, it is not only evident that one of the two is false, but it is highly probable that they are both so. No custom or usage of the Franks was written in our early times, and it would be excessively strange that the law of the Salii should have been so. This law, moreover, is in Latin, and it does not seem at all probable that, in the swamps between Suabia and Batavia, Clovis, or his predecessors, should speak Latin.

  It is supposed that this law has reference to the kings of France; and yet all the learned are agreed that the Sicambri, the Franks, and the Salii, had no kings, nor indeed any hereditary chiefs.

  The title of the Salic law begins with these words: “In Christi nomine”—“In the name of Christ.” It was therefore made out of the Salic territory, as Christ was no more known by these barbarians than by the rest of Germany and all the countries of the North.

  This law is stated to have been drawn up by four distinguished lawyers of the Frank nation; these, in Herold’s edition, are called Vuisogast, Arogast, Salegast, and Vuindogast. In Pithou’s edition, the names are somewhat different. It has been unluckily discovered that these names are the old names, somewhat disguised, of certain cantons of Germany.

  In whatever period this law was framed in bad Latin, we find, in the article relating to allodial or freehold lands, “that no part of Salic land can be inherited by women.” It is clear that this pretended law was by no means followed. In the first place, it appears from the formulæ of Marculphus that a father might leave his allodial land to his daughter, renouncing “a certain Salic law which is impious and abominable.”

  Secondly, if this law be applied to fiefs, it is evident that the English kings, who were not of the Norman race, obtained all their great fiefs in France only through daughters.

  Thirdly, it is alleged to be necessary that a fief should be possessed by a man, because he was able as well as bound to fight for his lord; this itself shows that the law could not be understood to affect the rights to the throne. All feudal lords might fight just as well for a queen as for a king. A queen was not obliged to follow the practice so long in use, to put on a cuirass, and cover her limbs with armor, and set off trotting against the enemy upon a carthorse.

  It is certain, therefore, that the Salic law could have no reference to the crown, neither in connection with allodial lands, nor feudal holding and service.

  Mézeray says, “The imbecility of the sex precludes their reigning.” Mézeray speaks here like a man neither of sense nor politeness. History positively and repeatedly falsifies his assertion. Queen Anne of England, who humbled Louis XIV.; the empress-queen of Hungary, who resisted King Louis XV., Frederick the Great, the elector of Bavaria, and various other princes; Elizabeth of England, who was the strength and support of our great Henry; the empress of Russia, of whom we have spoken already; all these decidedly show that Mézeray is not more correct than he is courteous in his observation. He could scarcely help knowing that Queen Blanche was in fact the reigning monarch under the name of her son; as Anne of Brittany was under that of Louis XII.

  Velly, the last writer of the history of France, and who on that very account ought to be the best, as he possessed all the accumulated materials of his predecessors, did not, however, always know how to turn his advantages to the best account. He inveighs with bitterness against the judicious and profound Rapin de Thoyras, and attempts to prove to him that no princess ever succeeded to the crown while any males remained who were capable of succeeding. That we all know perfectly well, and Thoyras never said the contrary.

  In that long age of barbarism, when the only concern of Europe was to commit usurpations and to sustain them, it must be acknowledged that kings, being often chiefs of banditti or warriors armed against those banditti, it was not possible to be subject to the government of a woman. Whoever was in possession of a great warhorse would engage in the work of rapine and murder only under the standard of a man mounted upon a great horse like himself. A buckler of oxhide served for a throne. The caliphs governed by the Koran, the popes were deemed to govern by the Gospel. The South saw no woman reign before Joan of Naples, who was indebted for her crown entirely to the affection of the people for King Robert, her grandfather, and to their hatred of Andrew, her husband. This Andrew was in reality of royal blood, but had been born in Hungary, at that time in a state of barbarism. He disgusted the Neapolitans by his gross manners, intemperance, and drunkenness. The amiable king Robert was obliged to depart from immemorial usage, and declare Joan alone sovereign by his will, which was approved by the nation.

  In the North we see no queen reigning in her own right before Margaret of Waldemar, who governed for some months in her own name about the year 1377.

  Spain had no queen in her own right before the able Isabella in 1461. In England the cruel and bigoted Mary, daughter of Henry VIII., was the first woman who inherited the throne, as the weak and criminal Mary Stuart was in Scotland in the sixteenth century. The immense territory of Russia had no female sovereign before the widow of Peter the Great.

  The whole of Europe, and indeed I might say the whole world, was governed by warriors in the time when Philip de Valois supported his right against Edward III. This right of a male who succeeded to a male, seemed the law of all nations. “You are grandson of Philip the Fair,” said Valois to his competitor, “but as my right would be superior to that of the mother, it must be still more decidedly superior to that of the son. Your mother, in fact, could not communicate a right which she did not possess.”

  It was therefore perfectly recognized in France that a prince of the blood royal, although in the remotest possible degree, should be heir to the crown in exclusion even of the daughter of the king. It is a law on which there is now not the slightest dispute whatever. Other nations have, since the full and universal recognition of this principle among ourselves, adjudged the throne to princesses. But France has still observed its ancient usage. Time has conferred on this usage the force of the most sacred of laws. At what time the Salic law was framed or interpreted is not of the slightest consequence; it does exist, it is respectable, it is useful; and its utility has rendered it sacred.

  Examination Whether Daughters Are in all Cases Deprived of Every Species of Inheritance by This Salic Law.

  I have already bestowed the empire on a daughter in defiance of the Golden Bull. I shall have no difficulty in conferring on a daughter the kingdom of France. I have a better right to dispose of this realm than Pope Julian II., who deprived Louis XII. of it, and transferred it by his own single authority to the emperor Maximilian. I am better authorized to plead in behalf of the daughters of the house of France, than Pope Gregory XIII. and Cordelier Sextus-Quintus were to exclude from the throne our princes of the blood, under the pretence actually urged by these excellent priests, that Henry IV. and the princes of Condé were a “bastard and detestable race” of Bourbon—refined and holy words, which deserve ever to be remembered in order to keep alive the conviction of all we owe to the bishops of Rome. I may give my vote in the states-general, and no pope certainly can have any suffrage on it. I therefore give my vote without hesitation, some three or four hundred years from the present time, to a daughter of France, then the only descendant remaining in a direct line from Hugh Capet. I constitute her queen, provided she shall have been well educated, have a sound understanding, and be no bigot. I interpret in her favor that law which declares “que fille ne doit mie succéder”—that a daughter must in no case come to her succession. I understand by the words, that she must in no case succeed as long as there shall be any male. But on failure of males, I prove that the kingdom belongs to her by nature, which ordains it, and for the benefit of the nation.

  I invite all good Frenchmen to show the same respect as myself for the blood of so many kings. I consider this as the only method of preventing factions which would dismember the state. I propose that she shall reign in her own right, and that she shall be married to some amiable and respectable prince, who shall assume her name and arms, and who, in his own right, shall possess some territory which shall be annexed to France; as we have seen Maria Theresa of Hungary united in marriage to Francis, duke of Lorraine, the most excellent prince in the world.

  What Celt will refuse to acknowledge her, unless we should discover some other beautiful and accomplished princess of the issue of Charlemagne, whose family was expelled by Hugh Capet, notwithstanding the Salic law? or unless indeed we should find a princess fairer and more accomplished still, an unquestionable descendant from Clovis, whose family was before expelled by Pepin, his own domestic, notwithstanding, be it again remembered, the Salic law.

  I shall certainly find no involved and difficult intrigues necessary to obtain the consecration of my royal heroine at Rheims, or Chartres, or in the chapel of the Louvre—for either would effectually answer the purpose; or even to dispense with any consecration at all. For monarchs reign as well when not consecrated as when consecrated. The kings and queens of Spain observe no such ceremony.

  Among all the families of the king’s secretaries, no person will be found to dispute the throne with this Capetian princess. The most illustrious houses are so jealous of each other that they would infinitely prefer obeying the daughter of kings to being under the government of one of their equals.

  Recognized by the whole of France, she will receive the homage of all her subjects with a grace and majesty which will induce them to love as much as they revere her; and all the poets will compose verses in her honor.

  LAW (CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL).

  The following notes were found among the papers of a lawyer, and are perhaps deserving some consideration:

  That no ecclesiastical law should be of any force until it has received the express sanction of government. It was upon this principle that Athens and Rome were never involved in religious quarrels.

  These quarrels fall to the lot of those nations only that have never been civilized, or that have afterwards been again reduced to barbarism.

  That the magistrate alone should have authority to prohibit labor on festivals, because it does not become priests to forbid men to cultivate their fields.

  That everything relating to marriages depends solely upon the magistrate, and that the priests should be confined to the august function of blessing them.

  That lending money at interest is purely an object of the civil law, as that alone presides over commerce.

  That all ecclesiastical persons should be, in all cases whatever, under the perfect control of the government, because they are subjects of the state.

  That men should never be so disgracefully ridiculous as to pay to a foreign priest the first year’s revenue of an estate, conferred by citizens upon a priest who is their fellow-citizen.

  That no priest should possess authority to deprive a citizen even of the smallest of his privileges, under the pretence that that citizen is a sinner; because the priest, himself a sinner, ought to pray for sinners, and not to judge them.

  That magistrates, cultivators, and priests, should alike contribute to the expenses of the state, because all alike belong to the state.

  That there should be only one system of weights and measures, and usages.

  That the punishment of criminals should be rendered useful. A man that is hanged is no longer useful; but a man condemned to the public works is still serviceable to his country, and a living lecture against crime.

  That the whole law should be clear, uniform, and precise; to interpret it is almost always to corrupt it.

  That nothing should be held infamous but vice.

  That taxes should be imposed always in just proportion.

  That law should never be in contradiction to usage; for, if the usage is good, the law is worth nothing.

  LAWS.

  SECTION I.

  It is difficult to point out a single nation living under a system of good laws. This is not attributable merely to the circumstance that laws are the productions of men, for men have produced works of great utility and excellence; and those who invented and brought to perfection the various arts of life were capable of devising a respectable code of jurisprudence. But laws have proceeded, in almost every state, from the interest of the legislator, from the urgency of the moment, from ignorance, and from superstition, and have accordingly been made at random, and irregularly, just in the same manner in which cities have been built. Take a view of Paris, and observe the contrast between that quarter of it where the fish-market (Halles) is situated, the St. Pierre-aux-bœufs, the streets Brisemiche and Pet-au-diable and the beauty and splendor of the Louvre and the Tuileries. This is a correct image of our laws.

  It was only after London had been reduced to ashes that it became at all fit to be inhabited. The streets, after that catastrophe, were widened and straightened. If you are desirous of having good laws, burn those which you have at present, and make fresh ones.

  The Romans were without fixed laws for the space of three hundred years; they were obliged to go and request some from the Athenians, who gave them such bad ones that they were almost all of them soon abrogated. How could Athens itself be in possession of a judicious and complete system? That of Draco was necessarily abolished, and that of Solon soon expired.

  Our customary or common law of Paris is interpreted differently by four-and-twenty commentaries, which decidedly proves, the same number of times, that it is ill conceived. It is in contradiction to a hundred and forty other usages, all having the force of law in the same nation, and all in contradiction to each other. There are therefore, in a single department in Europe, between the Alps and the Pyrenees, more than forty distinct small populations, who call themselves fellow-countrymen, but who are in reality as much strangers to one another as Tonquin is to Cochin China.

  It is the same in all provinces of Spain. It is in Germany much worse. No one there knows what are the rights of the chief or of the members. The inhabitant of the banks of the Elbe is connected with the cultivator of Suabia only in speaking nearly the same language, which, it must be admitted, is rather an unpolished and coarse one.

  The English nation has more uniformity; but having extricated itself from servitude and barbarism only by occasional efforts, by fits and convulsive starts, and having even in its state of freedom retained many laws formerly promulgated, either by the great tyrants who contended in rivalship for the throne, or the petty tyrants who seized upon the power and honors of the prelacy, it has formed altogether a body of laws of great vigor and efficacy, but which still exhibit many bruises and wounds, very clumsily patched and plastered.

  The intellect of Europe has made greater progress within the last hundred years than the whole world had done before since the days of Brahma, Fohi, Zoroaster, and the Thaut of Egypt. What then is the cause that legislation has made so little?

  After the fifth century, we were all savages. Such are the revolutions which take place on the globe; brigands pillaging and cultivators pillaged made up the masses of mankind from the recesses of the Baltic Sea to the Strait of Gibraltar; and when the Arabs made their appearance in the South, the desolation of ravage and confusion was universal.

  In our department of Europe, the small number, being composed of daring and ignorant men, used to conquest and completely armed for battle, and the greater number, composed of ignorant, unarmed slaves, scarcely any one of either class knowing how to read or write—not even Charlemagne himself—it happened very naturally that the Roman Church, with its pen and ceremonies, obtained the guidance and government of those who passed their life on horseback with their lances couched and the morion on their heads.

  The descendants of the Sicambri, the Burgundians, the Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Lombards, Heruli, etc., felt the necessity of something in the shape of laws. They sought for them where they were to be found. The bishops of Rome knew how to make them in Latin. The barbarians received them with greater respect in consequence of not understanding them. The decretals of the popes, some genuine, others most impudently forged, became the code of the new governors, “regas”; lords, “leus”; and barons, who had appropriated the lands. They were the wolves who suffered themselves to be chained up by the foxes. They retained their ferocity, but it was subjugated by credulity and the fear which credulity naturally produces. Gradually Europe, with the exception of Greece and what still belonged to the Eastern Empire, became subjected to the dominion of Rome, and the poet’s verse might be again applied as correctly as before: Romanos rerum dominos gentemque togatam.—Æneid, i, 286.

  • The subject world shall Rome’s dominion own,
  • And prostrate shall adore the nation of the gown.

  • —Dryden.

  Almost all treaties being accompanied by the sign of the cross, and by an oath which was frequently administered over some relics, everything was thus brought within the jurisdiction of the Church. Rome, as metropolitan, was supreme judge in causes, from the Cimbrian Chersonesus to Gascony; and a thousand feudal lords, uniting their own peculiar usages with the canon law, produced in the result that monstrous jurisprudence of which there at present exist so many remains. Which would have been better—no laws at all, or such as these?

  It was beneficial to an empire of more vast extent than that of Rome to remain for a long time in a state of chaos; for, as every valuable institution was still to be formed, it was easier to build a new edifice than to repair one whose ruins were looked upon as sacred.

  The legislatrix of the North, in 1767, collected deputies from all the provinces which contained about twelve hundred thousand square leagues. There were Pagans, Mahometans of the sect of Ali, and others of the sect of Omar, and about twelve different sects of Christians. Every law was distinctly proposed to this new synod; and if it appeared conformable to the interest of all the provinces, it then received the sanction of the empress and the nation.

  The first law that was brought forward and carried, was a law of toleration, that the Greek priest might never forget that the Latin priest was his fellow-man; that the Mussulman might bear with his Pagan brother; and that the Roman Catholic might not be tempted to sacrifice his brother Presbyterian.

  The empress wrote with her own hand, in this grand council of legislation, “Among so many different creeds, the most injurious error would be intolerance.”

  It is now unanimously agreed that there is in a state only one authority; that the proper expressions to be used are, “civil power,” and “ecclesiastical discipline”; and that the allegory of the two swords is a dogma of discord.

  She began with emancipating the serfs of her own particular domain. She emancipated all those of the ecclesiastical domains. She might thus be said to have created men out of slaves.

  The prelates and monks were paid out of the public treasury. Punishments were proportioned to crimes, and the punishments were of a useful character; offenders were for the greater part condemned to labor on public works, as the dead man can be of no service to the living.

  The torture was abolished, because it punishes a man before he is known to be guilty; because the Romans never put any to the torture but their slaves; and because torture tends to saving the guilty and destroying the innocent.

  This important business had proceeded thus far, when Mustapha III., the son of Mahmoud, obliged the empress to suspend her code and proceed to fighting.

  SECTION II.

  I have attempted to discover some ray of light in the mythological times of China which precede Fohi, but I have attempted in vain.

  At the period, however, in which Fohi flourished, which was about three thousand years before the new and common era of our northwestern part of the world, I perceive wise and mild laws already established by a beneficent sovereign. The ancient books of the Five Kings, consecrated by the respect of so many ages, treat of the institution of agriculture, of pastoral economy, of domestic economy, of that simple astronomy which regulates the different seasons, and of the music which, by different modulations, summoned men to their respective occupations. Fohi flourished, beyond dispute, more than five thousand years ago. We may therefore form some judgment of the great antiquity of an immense population, thus instructed by an emperor on every topic that could contribute to their happiness. In the laws of that monarch I see nothing but what is mild, useful and amiable.

  I was afterwards induced to inspect the code of a small nation, or horde, which arrived about two thousand years after the period of which we have been speaking, from a frightful desert on the banks of the river Jordan, in a country enclosed and bristled with peaked mountains. These laws have been transmitted to ourselves, and are daily held up to us as the model of wisdom. The following are a few of them:

  “Not to eat the pelican, nor the ossifrage, nor the griffin, nor the ixion, nor the eel, nor the hare, because the hare ruminates, and has not its foot cloven.”

  “Against men sleeping with their wives during certain periodical affections, under pain of death to both of the offending parties.”

  “To exterminate without pity all the unfortunate inhabitants of the land of Canaan, who were not even acquainted with them; to slaughter the whole; to massacre all, men and women, old men, children, and animals, for the greater glory of God.”

  “To sacrifice to the Lord whatever any man shall have devoted as an anathema to the Lord, and to slay it without power of ransom.”

  “To burn widows who, not being able to be married again to their brothers-in-law, had otherwise consoled themselves on the highway or elsewhere,” etc.

  A Jesuit, who was formerly a missionary among the cannibals, at the time when Canada still belonged to the king of France, related to me that once, as he was explaining these Jewish laws to his neophytes, a little impudent Frenchman, who was present at the catechising, cried out, “They are the laws of cannibals.” One of the Indians replied to him, “You are to know, Mr. Flippant, that we are people of some decency and kindness. We never had among us any such laws; and if we had not some kindness and decency, we should treat you as an inhabitant of Canaan, in order to teach you civil language.”

  It appears upon a comparison of the code of the Chinese with that of the Hebrews, that laws naturally follow the manners of the people who make them. If vultures and doves had laws, they would undoubtedly be of a very different character.

  SECTION III.

  Sheep live in society very mildly and agreeably; their character passes for being a very gentle one, because we do not see the prodigious quantity of animals devoured by them. We may, however, conceive that they eat them very innocently and without knowing it, just as we do when we eat Sassenage cheese. The republic of sheep is a faithful image of the age of gold.

  A hen-roost exhibits the most perfect representation of monarchy. There is no king comparable to a cock. If he marches haughtily and fiercely in the midst of his people, it is not out of vanity. If the enemy is advancing, he does not content himself with issuing an order to his subjects to go and be killed for him, in virtue of his unfailing knowledge and resistless power; he goes in person himself, ranges his young troops behind him, and fights to the last gasp. If he conquers, it is himself who sings the “Te Deum.” In his civil or domestic life, there is nothing so gallant, so respectable, and so disinterested. Whether he has in his royal beak a grain of corn or a grub-worm, he bestows it on the first of his female subjects that comes within his presence. In short, Solomon in his harem was not to be compared to a cock in a farm-yard.

  If it be true that bees are governed by a queen to whom all her subjects make love, that is a more perfect government still.

  Ants are considered as constituting an excellent democracy. This is superior to every other state, as all are, in consequence of such a constitution, on terms of equality, and every individual is employed for the happiness of all. The republic of beavers is superior even to that of ants; at least, if we may judge by their performances in masonry.

  Monkeys are more like merry-andrews than a regularly governed people; they do not appear associated under fixed and fundamental laws, like the species previously noticed.

  We resemble monkeys more than any other animals in the talent of imitation, in the levity of our ideas, and in that inconstancy which has always prevented our having uniform and durable laws.

  When nature formed our species, and imparted to us a certain portion of instinct, self-love for our own preservation, benevolence for the safety and comfort of others, love which is common to every class of animal being, and the inexplicable gift of combining more ideas than all the inferior animals together—after bestowing on us this outfit she said to us: “Go, and do the best you can.”

  There is not a good code of laws in any single country. The reason is obvious: laws have been made for particular purposes, according to time, place, exigencies, and not with general and systematic views.

  When the exigencies upon which laws were founded are changed or removed, the laws themselves become ridiculous. Thus the law which forbade eating pork and drinking wine was perfectly reasonable in Arabia, where pork and wine are injurious; but at Constantinople it is absurd.

  The law which confers the whole fief or landed property on the eldest son, is a very good one in a time of general anarchy and pillage. The eldest is then the commander of the castle, which sooner or later will be attacked by brigands; the younger brothers will be his chief officers, and the laborers his soldiers. All that is to be apprehended is that the younger brother may assassinate or poison the elder, his liege lord, in order to become himself the master of the premises; but such instances are uncommon, because nature has so combined our instincts and passions, that we feel a stronger horror against assassinating our elder brother, than we feel a desire to succeed to his authority and estate. But this law, which was suitable enough to the owners of the gloomy, secluded, and turreted mansions, in the days of Chilperic, is detestable when the case relates wholly to the division of family property in a civilized and well-governed city.

  To the disgrace of mankind, the laws of play or gaming are, it is well known, the only ones that are throughout just, clear, inviolable, and carried into impartial and perfect execution. Why is the Indian who laid down the laws of a game of chess willingly and promptly obeyed all over the world, while the decretals of the popes, for example, are at present an object of horror and contempt? The reason is, that the inventor of chess combined everything with caution and exactness for the satisfaction of the players, and that the popes in their decretals looked solely to their own advantage. The Indian was desirous at once of exercising the minds of men and furnishing them with amusement; the popes were desirous of debasing and brutifying them. Accordingly, the game of chess has remained substantially the same for upwards of five thousand years, and is common to all the inhabitants of the earth; while the decretals are known only at Spoleto, Orvieto, and Loretto, and are there secretly despised even by the most shallow and contemptible of the practitioners.

  SECTION IV.

  During the reigns of Vespasian and Titus, when the Romans were disembowelling the Jews, a rich Israelite fled with all the gold he had accumulated by his occupation as a usurer, and conveyed to Ezion-Geber the whole of his family, which consisted of his wife, then far advanced in years, a son, and a daughter; he had in his train two eunuchs, one of whom acted as a cook, and the other as a laborer and vine-dresser; and a pious Essenian, who knew the Pentateuch completely by heart, acted as his almoner. All these embarked at the port of Ezion-Geber, traversed the sea commonly called Red, although it is far from being so, and entered the Persian Gulf to go in search of the land of Ophir, without knowing where it was. A dreadful tempest soon after this came on, which drove the Hebrew family towards the coast of India; and the vessel was wrecked on one of the Maldive islands now called Padrabranca, but which was at that time uninhabited.

  The old usurer and his wife were drowned; the son and daughter, the two eunuchs, and the almoner were saved. They took as much of the provisions out of the wreck as they were able; erected for themselves little cabins on the island, and lived there with considerable convenience and comfort. You are aware that the island of Padrabranca is within five degrees of the line, and that it furnishes the largest cocoanuts and the best pineapples in the world; it was pleasant to have such a lovely asylum at a time when the favorite people of God were elsewhere exposed to persecution and massacre; but the Essenian could not refrain from tears when he reflected, that perhaps those on that happy island were the only Jews remaining on the earth, and that the seed of Abraham was to be annihilated.

  “Its restoration depends entirely upon you,” said the young Jew; “marry my sister.” “I would willingly,” said the almoner, “but it is against the law. I am an Essenian; I have made a vow never to marry; the law enjoins the strictest observance of a vow; the Jewish race may come to an end, if it must be so; but I will certainly not marry your sister in order to prevent it, beautiful and amiable as I admit she is.”

  “My two eunuchs,” resumed the Jew, “can be of no service in this affair; I will therefore marry her myself, if you have no objection; and you shall bestow the usual marriage benediction.”

  “I had a hundred times rather be disembowelled by the Roman soldiers,” said the almoner, “than to be instrumental to your committing incest; were she your sister by the father’s side only, the law would allow of your marriage; but as she is your sister by the same mother, such a marriage would be abominable.”

  “I can readily admit,” returned the young man, “that it would be a crime at Jerusalem, where I might see many other young women, one of whom I might marry; but in the isle of Padrabranca, where I see nothing but cocoanuts, pineapples, and oysters, I consider the case to be very allowable.”

  The Jew accordingly married his sister, and had a daughter by her, notwithstanding all the protestations of the Essenian; and this was the only offspring of a marriage which one of them thought very legitimate, and the other absolutely abominable.

  After the expiration of fourteen years, the mother died; and the father said to the almoner, “Have you at length got rid of your old prejudices? Will you marry my daughter?” “God preserve me from it,” said the Essenian. “Then,” said the father, “I will marry her myself, come what will of it; for I cannot bear that the seed of Abraham should be totally annihilated.” The Essenian, struck with inexpressible horror, would dwell no longer with a man who thus violated and defiled the law, and fled. The new-married man loudly called after him, saying, “Stay here, my friend. I am observing the law of nature, and doing good to my country; do not abandon your friends.” The other suffered him to call, and continue to call, in vain; his head was full of the law; and he stopped not till he had reached, by swimming, another island.

  This was the large island of Attola, highly populous and civilized; as soon as he landed he was made a slave. He complained bitterly of the inhospitable manner in which he had been received; he was told that such was the law, and that, ever since the island had been very nearly surprised and taken by the inhabitants of that of Ada, it had been wisely enacted that all strangers landing at Attola should be made slaves. “It is impossible that can ever be a law,” said the Essenian, “for it is not in the Pentateuch.” He was told in reply, that it was to be found in the digest of the country; and he remained a slave: fortunately he had a kind and wealthy master, who treated him very well, and to whom he became strongly attached.

  Some murderers once came to the house in which he lived, to kill his master and carry off his treasure. They inquired of the slaves if he was at home, and had much money there. “We assure you, on our oaths,” said the slaves, “that he is not at home.” But the Essenian said: “The law does not allow lying; I swear to you that he is at home, and that he has a great deal of money.” The master was, in consequence, robbed and murdered; the slaves accused the Essenian, before the judges, of having betrayed his master. The Essenian said, that he would tell no lies, and that nothing in the world should induce him to tell one; and he was hanged.

  This history was related to me, with many similar ones, on the last voyage I made from India to France. When I arrived, I went to Versailles on business, and saw in the street a beautiful woman, followed by many others who were also beautiful. “Who is that beautiful woman?” said I to the barrister who had accompanied me; for I had a cause then depending before the Parliament of Paris about some dresses that I had had made in India, and I was desirous of having my counsel as much with me as possible. “She is the daughter of the king,” said he, “she is amiable and beneficent; it is a great pity that, in no case or circumstance whatever, such a woman as that can become queen of France.” “What!” I replied, “if we had the misfortune to lose all her relations and the princes of the blood—which God forbid—would not she, in that case, succeed to the throne of her father?” “No,” said the counsellor; “the Salic law expressly forbids it.” “And who made this Salic law?” said I to the counsellor. “I do not at all know,” said he; “but it is pretended, that among an ancient people called the Salii, who were unable either to read or write, there existed a written law, which enacted, that in the Salic territory a daughter should not inherit any freehold.” “And I,” said I to him, “I abolish that law; you assure me that this princess is amiable and beneficent; she would, therefore, should the calamity occur of her being the last existing personage of royal blood, have an incontestable right to the crown: my mother inherited from her father; and in the case supposed, I am resolved that this princess shall inherit from hers.”

  On the ensuing day, my suit was decided in one of the chambers of parliament, and I lost everything by a single vote; my counsellor told me, that in another chamber I should have gained everything by a single vote. “That is a very curious circumstance,” said I: “at that rate each chamber proceeds by a different law.” “That is just the case,” said he: “there are twenty-five commentaries on the common law of Paris: that is to say, it is proved five and twenty times over, that the common law of Paris is equivocal; and if there had been five and twenty chambers of judges, there would be just as many different systems of jurisprudence. We have a province,” continued he, “fifteen leagues distant from Paris, called Normandy, where the judgment in your cause would have been very different from what it was here.” This statement excited in me a strong desire to see Normandy; and I accordingly went thither with one of my brothers. At the first inn, we met with a young man who was almost in a state of despair. I inquired of him what was his misfortune; he told me it was having an elder brother. “Where,” said I, “can be the great calamity of having an elder brother? The brother I have is my elder, and yet we live very happily together.” “Alas! sir,” said he to me, “the law of this place gives everything to the elder brother, and of course leaves nothing for the younger ones.” “That,” said I, “is enough, indeed, to disturb and distress you; among us everything is divided equally; and yet, sometimes, brothers have no great affection for one another.”

  These little adventures occasioned me to make some observations, which of course were very ingenious and profound, upon the subject of laws; and I easily perceived that it was with them as it is with our garments: I must wear a doliman at Constantinople, and a coat at Paris.

  “If all human laws,” said I, “are matters of convention, nothing is necessary but to make a good bargain.” The citizens of Delhi and Agra say that they have made a very bad one with Tamerlane: those of London congratulate themselves on having made a very good one with King William of Orange. A citizen of London once said to me: “Laws are made by necessity, and observed through force.” I asked him if force did not also occasionally make laws, and if William, the bastard and conqueror, had not chosen simply to issue his orders without condescending to make any convention or bargain with the English at all. “True,” said he, “it was so: we were oxen at that time; William brought us under the yoke, and drove us with a goad; since that period we have been metamorphosed into men; the horns, however, remain with us still, and we use them as weapons against every man who attempts making us work for him and not for ourselves.”

  With my mind full of all these reflections, I could not help feeling a sensible gratification in thinking, that there exists a natural law entirely independent of all human conventions: The fruit of my labor ought to be my own: I am bound to honor my father and mother: I have no right over the life of my neighbor, nor has my neighbor over mine, etc. But when I considered, that from Chedorlaomer to Mentzel, colonel of hussars, every one kills and plunders his neighbor according to law, and with his patent in his pocket, I was greatly distressed.

  I was told that laws existed even among robbers, and that there were laws also in war. I asked what were the laws of war. “They are,” said some one, “to hang up a brave officer for maintaining a weak post without cannon; to hang a prisoner, if the enemy have hanged any of yours; to ravage with fire and sword those villages which shall not have delivered up their means of subsistence by an appointed day, agreeably to the commands of the gracious sovereign of the vicinage.” “Good,” said I, “that is the true spirit of laws.” After acquiring a good deal of information, I found that there existed some wise laws, by which a shepherd is condemned to nine years’ imprisonment and labor in the galleys, for having given his sheep a little foreign salt. My neighbor was ruined by a suit on account of two oaks belonging to him, which he had cut down in his wood, because he had omitted a mere form of technicality with which it was almost impossible that he should have been acquainted; his wife died, in consequence, in misery; and his son is languishing out a painful existence. I admit that these laws are just, although their execution is a little severe; but I must acknowledge I am no friend to laws which authorize a hundred thousand neighbors loyally to set about cutting one another’s throats. It appears to me that the greater part of mankind have received from nature a sufficient portion of what is called common sense for making laws, but that the whole world has not justice enough to make good laws.

  Simple and tranquil cultivators, collected from every part of the world, would easily agree that every one should be free to sell the superfluity of his own corn to his neighbor, and that every law contrary to it is both inhuman and absurd; that the value of money, being the representative of commodities, ought no more to be tampered with than the produce of the earth; that the father of a family should be master in his own house; that religion should collect men together, to unite them in kindness and friendship, and not to make them fanatics and persecutors; and that those who labor ought not to be deprived of the fruits of their labor, to endow superstition and idleness. In the course of an hour, thirty laws of this description, all of a nature beneficial to mankind, would be unanimously agreed to.

  But let Tamerlane arrive and subjugate India, and you will then see nothing but arbitrary laws. One will oppress and grind down a whole province, merely to enrich one of Tamerlane’s collectors of revenue; another will screw up to the crime of high treason, speaking contemptuously of the mistress of a rajah’s chief valet; a third will extort from the farmer a moiety of his harvest, and dispute with him the right to the remainder; in short, there will be laws by which a Tartar sergeant will be authorized to seize your children in the cradle—to make one, who is robust, a soldier—to convert another, who is weak, into a eunuch—and thus to leave the father and mother without assistance and without consolation.

  But which would be preferable, being Tamerlane’s dog or his subject? It is evident that the condition of his dog would be by far the better one.

  LAWS (SPIRIT OF).

  It would be admirable, if from all the books upon laws by Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius, Puffendorf, Montesquieu, Barbeyrac, and Burlamaqui, some general law was adopted by the whole of the tribunals of Europe upon succession, contracts, revenue offences, etc. But neither the citations of Grotius, nor those of Puffendorf, nor those of the “Spirit of Laws,” have ever led to a sentence in the Châtelet of Paris or the Old Bailey of London. We weary ourselves with Grotius, pass some agreeable moments with Montesquieu; but if process be deemed advisable, we run to our attorney.

  It has been said that the letter kills, but that in the spirit there is life. It is decidedly the contrary in the book of Montesquieu; the spirit is diffusive, and the letter teaches nothing.

  False Citations in the “Spirit of Laws,” and False Consequences Drawn from Them by the Author.

  It is observed, that “the English, to favor liberty, have abstracted all the intermediate powers which formed part of their constitution.”

  On the contrary, they have preserved the Upper House, and the greater part of the jurisdictions which stand between the crown and the people.

  “The establishment of a vizier in a despotic state is a fundamental law.”

  A judicious critic has remarked that this is as much as to say that the office of the mayors of the palace was a fundamental office. Constantine was highly despotic, yet had no grand vizier. Louis XIV. was less despotic, and had no first minister. The popes are sufficiently despotic, and yet seldom possess them.

  “The sale of employments is good in monarchical states, because it makes it the profession of persons of family to undertake employments, which they would not fulfil from disinterested motives alone.”

  Is it Montesquieu who writes these odious lines? What! because the vices of Francis I. deranged the public finances, must we sell to ignorant young men the right of deciding upon the honor, fortune, and lives of the people? What! is it good in a monarchy, that the office of magistrate should become a family provision? If this infamy was salutary, some other country would have adopted it as well as France; but there is not another monarchy on earth which has merited the opprobrium. This monstrous anomaly sprang from the prodigality of a ruined and spendthrift monarch, and the vanity of certain citizens whose fathers possessed money; and the wretched abuse has always been weakly attacked, because it was felt that reimbursement would be difficult. It would be a thousand times better, said a great jurisconsult, to sell the treasure of all the convents, and the plate of all the churches, than to sell justice. When Francis I. seized the silver grating of St. Martin, he did harm to no one; St. Martin complained not, and parted very easily with his screen; but to sell the place of judge, and at the same time make the judge swear that he has not bought it, is a base sacrilege.

  Let us complain that Montesquieu has dishonored his work by such paradoxes—but at the same time let us pardon him. His uncle purchased the office of a provincial president, and bequeathed it to him. Human nature is to be recognized in everything, and there are none of us without weakness.

  “Behold how industriously the Muscovite government seeks to emerge from despotism.”

  Is it in abolishing the patriarchate and the active militia of the strelitzes; in being the absolute master of the troops, of the revenue, and of the church, of which the functionaries are paid from the public treasury alone? or is it proved by making laws to render that power as sacred as it is mighty? It is melancholy, that in so many citations and so many maxims, the contrary of what is asserted should be almost always the truth.

  “The luxury of those who possess the necessaries of life only, will be zero; the luxury of those who possess as much again, will be equal to one; of those who possess double the means of the latter, three; and so on.”

  The latter will possess three times the excess beyond the necessaries of life; but it by no means follows that he will possess three times as many luxuries; for he may be thrice as avaricious, or may employ the superfluity in commerce, or in portions to his daughters. These propositions are not affairs of arithmetic, and such calculations are miserable quackery.

  “The Samnites had a fine custom, which must have produced admirable results. The young man declared the most worthy chose a wife where he pleased; he who had the next number of suffrages in his favor followed, and so on throughout.”

  The author has mistaken the Sunites, a people of Scythia, for the Samnites, in the neighborhood of Rome. He quotes a fragment of Nicholas de Demas, preserved by Stobæus: but is the said Nicholas a sufficient authority? This fine custom would moreover be very injurious in a well-governed country; for if the judges should be deceived in the young man declared the most worthy; if the female selected should not like him; or if he were objectionable in the eyes of the girl’s parents, very fatal results might follow.

  “On reading the admirable work of Tacitus on the manners of the Germans, it will be seen that it is from them the English drew the idea of their political government. That admirable system originated in the woods.”

  The houses of peers and of commons, and the English courts of law and equity, found in the woods! Who would have supposed it? Without doubt, the English owe their squadrons and their commerce to the manners of the Germans; and the sermons of Tillotson to those pious German sorcerers who sacrificed their prisoners, and judged of their success in war by the manner in which the blood flowed. We must believe, also, that the English are indebted for their fine manufactures to the laudable practice of the Germans, who, as Tacitus observers, preferred robbery to toil.

  “Aristotle ranked among monarchies the governments both of Persia and Lacedæmon; but who cannot perceive that the one was a despotism, the other a republic?”

  Who, on the contrary, cannot perceive that Lacedæmon had a single king for four hundred years, and two kings until the extinction of the Heraclidæ, a period of about a thousand years? We know that no king was despotic of right, not even in Persia; but every bold and dissembling prince who amasses money, becomes despotic in a little time, either in Persia or Lacedæmon; and, therefore, Aristotle distinguishes every state possessing perpetual and hereditary chiefs, from republics.

  “People of warm climates are timid, like old men; those of cold countries are courageous, like young ones.”

  We should take great care how general propositions escape us. No one has ever been able to make a Laplander or an Esquimaux warlike, while the Arabs in fourscore years conquered a territory which exceeded that of the whole Roman Empire. This maxim of M. Montesquieu is equally erroneous with all the rest on the subject of climate.

  “Louis XIII. was extremely averse to passing a law which made the negroes of the French colonies slaves; but when he was given to understand that it was the most certain way of converting them, he consented.”

  Where did the author pick up this anecdote? The first arrangement for the treatment of the negroes was made in 1673, thirty years after the death of Louis XIII. This resembles the refusal of Francis I. to listen to the project of Christopher Columbus, who had discovered the Antilles before Francis I. was born.

  “The Romans never exhibited any jealousy on the score of commerce. It was as a rival, not as a commercial nation, that they attacked Carthage.”

  It was both as a warlike and as a commercial nation, as the learned Huet proves in his “Commerce of the Ancients,” when he shows that the Romans were addicted to commerce a long time before the first Punic war.

  “The sterility of the territory of Athens established a popular government there, and the fertility of that of Lacedæmon an aristocratic one.”

  Whence this chimera? From enslaved Athens we still derive cotton, silk, rice, corn, oil, and skins; and from the country of Lacedæmon nothing. Athens was twenty times richer than Lacedæmon. With respect to the comparative fertility of the soil, it is necessary to visit those countries to appreciate it; but the form of a government is never attributed to the greater or less fertility. Venice had very little corn when her nobles governed. Genoa is assuredly not fertile, and yet is an aristocracy. Geneva is a more popular state, and has not the means of existing a fortnight upon its own productions. Sweden, which is equally poor, has for a long time submitted to the yoke of a monarchy; while fertile Poland is aristocratic. I cannot conceive how general rules can be established, which may be falsified upon the slightest appeal to experience.

  “In Europe, empires have never been able to exist.” Yet the Roman Empire existed for five hundred years, and that of the Turks has maintained itself since the year 1453.

  “The duration of the great empires of Asia is principally owing to the prevalence of vast plains.” M. Montesquieu forgets the mountains which cross Natolia and Syria, Caucasus, Taurus, Ararat, Imaus, and others, the ramifications of which extend throughout Asia.

  After thus convincing ourselves that errors abound in the “Spirit of Laws”; after everybody is satisfied that this work wants method, and possesses neither plan nor order, it is proper to inquire into that which really forms its merit, and which has led to its great reputation.

  In the first place, it is written with great wit, while the authors of all the other books on this subject are tedious. It was on this account that a lady, who possessed as much wit as Montesquieu, observed, that his book was “l’esprit sur les lois.” It can never be more correctly defined.

  A still stronger reason is that the book exhibits grand views, attacks tyranny, superstition, and grinding taxation—three things which mankind detest. The author consoles slaves in lamenting their fetters, and the slaves in return applaud him.

  One of the most bitter and absurd of his enemies, who contributed most by his rage to exalt the name of Montesquieu throughout Europe, was the journalist of the Convulsionaries. He called him a Spinozist and deist; that is to say, he accused him at the same time of not believing in God and of believing in God alone.

  He reproaches him with his esteem for Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and the Stoics; and for not loving Jansenists—the Abbé de St. Cyran and Father Quesnel. He asserts that he has committed an unpardonable crime in calling Bayle a great man.

  He pretends that the “Spirit of Laws” is one of those monstrous works with which France has been inundated since the Bull Unigenitus, which has corrupted the consciences of all people.

  This tatterdemalion from his garret, deriving at least three hundred per cent. from his ecclesiastical gazette, declaimed like a fool against interest upon money at the legal rate. He was seconded by some pedants of his own sort; and the whole concluded in their resembling the slaves placed at the foot of the statue of Louis XIV.; they are crushed, and gnaw their own flesh in revenge.

  Montesquieu was almost always in error with the learned, because he was not learned; but he was always right against the fanatics and promoters of slavery. Europe owes him eternal gratitude.

  LENT.

  SECTION I.

  Our questions on Lent will merely regard the police. It appeared useful to have a time in the year in which we should eat fewer oxen, calves, lambs, and poultry. Young fowls and pigeons are not ready in February and March, the time in which Lent falls; and it is good to cease the carnage for some weeks in countries in which pastures are not so fertile as those of England and Holland.

  The magistrates of police have very wisely ordered that meat should be a little dearer at Paris during this time, and that the profit should be given to the hospitals. It is an almost insensible tribute paid by luxury and gluttony to indigence; for it is the rich who are not able to keep Lent—the poor fast all the year.

  There are very few farming men who eat meat once a month. If they ate of it every day, there would not be enough for the most flourishing kingdom. Twenty millions of pounds of meat a day would make seven thousand three hundred millions of pounds a year. This calculation is alarming.

  The small number of the rich, financiers, prelates, principal magistrates, great lords, and great ladies who condescend to have maigre served at their tables, fast during six weeks on soles, salmon, turbots, sturgeons, etc.

  One of our most famous financiers had couriers, who for a hundred crowns brought him fresh sea fish every day to Paris. This expense supported the couriers, the dealers who sold the horses, the fishermen who furnished the fish, the makers of nets, constructors of boats, and the druggists from whom were procured the refined spices which give to a fish a taste superior to that of meat. Lucullus could not have kept Lent more voluptuously.

  It should further be remarked that fresh sea fish, in coming to Paris, pays a considerable tax. The secretaries of the rich, their valets de chambre, ladies’ maids, and stewards, partake of the dessert of Crœsus, and fast as deliciously as he.

  It is not the same with the poor; not only if for four sous they partake of a small portion of tough mutton do they commit a great sin, but they seek in vain for this miserable aliment. What do they therefore feed upon? Chestnuts, rye bread, the cheeses which they have pressed from the milk of their cows, goats or sheep, and some few of the eggs of their poultry.

  There are churches which forbid them the eggs and the milk. What then remains for them to eat? Nothing. They consent to fast; but they consent not to die. It is absolutely necessary that they should live, if it be only to cultivate the lands of the fat rectors and lazy monks.

  We therefore ask, if it belongs not to the magistrates of the police of the kingdom, charged with watching over the health of the inhabitants, to give them permission to eat the cheeses which their own hands have formed, and the eggs which their fowls have laid?

  It appears that milk, eggs, cheese, and all which can nourish the farmer, are regulated by the police, and not by a religious rule.

  We hear not that Jesus Christ forbade omelets to His apostles; He said to them: “Eat such things as are set before you.”

  The Holy Church has ordained Lent, but in quality of the Church it commands it only to the heart; it can inflict spiritual pains alone; it cannot as formerly burn a poor man, who, having only some rusty bacon, put a slice of it on a piece of black bread the day after Shrove Tuesday.

  Sometimes in the provinces the pastors go beyond their duty, and forgetting the rights of the magistracy, undertake to go among the innkeepers and cooks, to see if they have not some ounces of meat in their saucepans, some old fowls on their hooks, or some eggs in a cupboard; for eggs are forbidden in Lent. They intimidate the poor people, and proceed to violence towards the unfortunates, who know not that it belongs alone to the magistracy to interfere. It is an odious and punishable inquisition.

  The magistrates alone can be rightly informed of the more or less abundant provisions required by the poor people of the provinces. The clergy have occupations more sublime. Should it not therefore belong to the magistrates to regulate what the people eat in Lent? Who should pry into the legal consumption of a country if not the police of that country?

  SECTION II.

  Did the first who were advised to fast put themselves under this regimen by order of the physician, for indigestion? The want of appetite which we feel in grief—was it the first origin of fast-days prescribed in melancholy religions?

  Did the Jews take the custom of fasting from the Egyptians, all of whose rites they imitated, including flagellation and the scape-goat? Why fasted Jesus for forty days in the desert, where He was tempted by the devil—by the “Chathbull”? St. Matthew remarks that after this Lent He was hungry; He was therefore not hungry during the fast.

  Why, in days of abstinence, does the Roman Church consider it a crime to eat terrestrial animals, and a good work to be served with soles and salmon? The rich Papist who shall have five hundred francs’ worth of fish upon his table shall be saved, and the poor wretch dying with hunger, who shall have eaten four sous’ worth of salt pork, shall be damned.

  Why must we ask permission of the bishop to eat eggs? If a king ordered his people never to eat eggs, would he not be thought the most ridiculous of tyrants? How strange the aversion of bishops to omelets!

  Can we believe that among Papists there have been tribunals imbecile, dull, and barbarous enough to condemn to death poor citizens, who had no other crimes than that of having eaten of horseflesh in Lent? The fact is but too true; I have in my hands a sentence of this kind. What renders it still more strange is that the judges who passed such sentences believed themselves superior to the Iroquois.

  Foolish and cruel priests, to whom do you order Lent? Is it to the rich? they take good care to observe it. Is it to the poor? they keep Lent all the year. The unhappy peasant scarcely ever eats meat, and has not wherewithal to buy fish. Fools that you are, when will you correct your absurd laws?

  LEPROSY, ETC.

  This article relates to two powerful divinities, one ancient and the other modern, which have reigned in our hemisphere. The reverend father Dom Calmet, a great antiquarian, that is, a great compiler of what was said in former times and what is repeated at the present day, has confounded lues with leprosy. He maintains that it was the lues with which the worthy Job was afflicted, and he supposes, after a confident and arrogant commentator of the name of Pineida, that the lues and leprosy are precisely the same disorder. Calmet is not a physician, neither is he a reasoner, but he is a citer of authorities; and in his vocation of commentator, citations are always substituted for reasons. When Astruc, in his history of lues, quotes authorities that the disorder came in fact from San Domingo, and that the Spaniards brought it from America, his citations are somewhat more conclusive.

  There are two circumstances which, in my opinion, prove that lues originated in America; the first is, the multitude of authors, both medical and surgical, of the sixteenth century, who attest the fact; and the second is, the silence of all the physicians and all the poets of antiquity, who never were acquainted with this disease, and never had even a name for it. I here speak of the silence of physicians and of poets as equally demonstrative. The former, beginning with Hippocrates, would not have failed to describe this malady, to state its symptoms, to apply to it a name, and suggest some remedy. The poets, equally as malicious and sarcastic as physicians are studious and investigative, would have detailed in their satires, with minute particularity, all the symptoms and consequences of this dreadful disorder; you do not find, however, a single verse in Horace or Catullus, in Martial or Juvenal, which has the slightest reference to lues, although they expatiate on all the effects of debauchery with the utmost freedom and delight.

  It is very certain that smallpox was not known to the Romans before the sixth century; that the American lues was not introduced into Europe until the fifteenth century; and that leprosy is as different from those two maladies, as palsy from St. Guy’s or St. Vitus’ dance.

  Leprosy was a scabious disease of a dreadful character. The Jews were more subject to it than any other people living in hot climates, because they had neither linen, nor domestic baths. These people were so negligent of cleanliness and the decencies of life that their legislators were obliged to make a law to compel them even to wash their hands.

  All that we gained in the end by engaging in the crusades, was leprosy; and of all that we had taken, that was the only thing that remained with us. It was necessary everywhere to build lazarettos, in which to confine the unfortunate victims of a disease at once pestilential and incurable.

  Leprosy, as well as fanaticism and usury, had been a distinguishing characteristic of the Jews. These wretched people having no physicians, the priests took upon themselves the management and regulation of leprosy, and made it a concern of religion. This has occasioned some indiscreet and profane critics to remark that the Jews were no better than a nation of savages under the direction of their jugglers. Their priests in fact never cured leprosy, but they cut off from society those who were infected by it, and thus acquired a power of the greatest importance. Every man laboring under this disease was imprisoned, like a thief or a robber; and thus a woman who was desirous of getting rid of her husband had only to secure the sanction of the priest, and the unfortunate husband was shut up—it was the “lettre de cachet” of the day. The Jews and those by whom they were governed were so ignorant that they imagined the moth-holes in garments, and the mildew upon walls, to be the effects of leprosy. They actually conceived their houses and clothes to have leprosy; thus the people themselves, and their very rags and hovels, were all brought under the rod of the priesthood.

  One proof that, at the time of the first introduction of the lues, there was no connection between that disorder and leprosy, is that the few lepers that remained at the conclusion of the fifteenth century were offended at any kind of comparison between themselves and those who were affected by lues.

  Some of the persons thus affected were in the first instance sent to the hospital for lepers, but were received by them with indignation. The lepers presented a petition to be separated from them; as persons imprisoned for debt or affairs of honor claim a right not to be confounded with the common herd of criminals.

  We have already observed that the Parliament of Paris, on March 6, 1496, issued an order, by which all persons laboring under lues, unless they were citizens of Paris, were enjoined to depart within twenty-four hours, under pain of being hanged. This order was neither Christian, legal, nor judicious; but it proves that lues was regarded as a new plague which had nothing in common with leprosy; as lepers were not hanged for residing in Paris, while those afflicted by lues were so.

  Men may bring the leprosy on themselves by their uncleanliness and filth, just as is done by a species of animals to which the very lowest of the vulgar may too naturally be compared; but with respect to lues, it was a present made to America by nature. We have already reproached this same nature, at once so kind and so malicious, so sagacious and yet so blind, with defeating her own object by thus poisoning the source of life; and we still sincerely regret that we have found no solution of this dreadful difficulty.

  We have seen elsewhere that man in general, one with another, or (as it is expressed) on the average, does not live above two-and-twenty years; and during these two-and-twenty years he is liable to two-and-twenty thousand evils, many of which are incurable.

  Yet even in this dreadful state men still strut and figure on the stage of life; they make love at the hazard of destruction; and intrigue, carry on war, and form projects, just as if they were to live in luxury and delight for a thousand ages.

  LETTERS (MEN OF).

  In the barbarous times when the Franks, Germans, Bretons, Lombards, and Spanish Mozarabians knew neither how to read nor write, we instituted schools and universities almost entirely composed of ecclesiastics, who, knowing only their own jargon, taught this jargon to those who would learn it. Academies were not founded until long after; the latter have despised the follies of the schools, but they have not always dared to oppose them, because there are follies which we respect when they are attached to respectable things.

  Men of letters who have rendered the most service to the small number of thinking beings scattered over the earth are isolated scholars, true sages shut up in their closets, who have neither publicly disputed in the universities, nor said things by halves in the academies; and such have almost all been persecuted. Our miserable race is so created that those who walk in the beaten path always throw stones at those who would show them a new one.

  Montesquieu says that the Scythians put out the eyes of their slaves that they might be more attentive to the making of their butter. It is thus that the Inquisition acts, and almost every one is blinded in the countries in which this monster reigns. In England people have had two eyes for more than a hundred years. The French are beginning to open one eye—but sometimes men in place will not even permit us to be one-eyed.

  These miserable statesmen are like Doctor Balouard of the Italian comedy, who will only be served by the fool Harlequin, and who fears to have too penetrating a servant.

  Compose odes in praise of Lord Superbus Fatus, madrigals for his mistress; dedicate a book of geography to his porter, and you will be well received. Enlighten men, and you will be crushed.

  Descartes is obliged to quit his country; Gassendi is calumniated; Arnaud passes his days in exile; all the philosophers are treated as the prophets were among the Jews.

  Who would believe that in the eighteenth century, a philosopher has been dragged before the secular tribunals, and treated as impious by reasoning theologians, for having said that men could not practise the arts if they had no hands? I expect that they will soon condemn to the galleys the first who shall have the insolence to say that a man could not think if he had no head; for a learned bachelor will say to him, the soul is a pure spirit, the head is only matter; God can place the soul in the heel as well as in the brain; therefore I denounce you as a blasphemer.

  The great misfortune of a man of letters is not perhaps being the object of the jealousy of his brothers, the victim of cabals, and the contempt of the powerful of the world—it is being judged by fools. Fools sometimes go very far, particularly when fanaticism is joined to folly, and folly to the spirit of vengeance. Further, the great misfortune of a man of letters is generally to hold to nothing. A citizen buys a little situation, and is maintained by his fellow-citizens. If any injustice is done to him, he soon finds defenders. The literary man is without aid; he resembles the flying fish; if he rises a little, the birds devour him; if he dives, the fishes eat him up. Every public man pays tribute to malignity; but he is repaid in deniers and honors.

  LIBEL.

  Small, offensive books are termed libels. These books are usually small, because the authors, having few reasons to give, and usually writing not to inform, but mislead, if they are desirous of being read, must necessarily be brief. Names are rarely used on these occasions, for assassins fear being detected in the employment of forbidden weapons.

  In the time of the League and the Fronde, political libels abounded. Every dispute in England produces hundreds; and a library might be formed of those written against Louis XIV.

  We have had theological libels for sixteen hundred years; and what is worse, these are esteemed holy by the vulgar. Only see how St. Jerome treats Rufinus and Vigilantius. The latest libels are those of the Molinists and Jansenists, which amount to thousands. Of all this mass there remains only “The Provincial Letters.”

  Men of letters may dispute the number of their libels with the theologians. Boileau and Fontenelle, who attacked one another with epigrams, both said that their chambers would not contain the libels with which they had been assailed. All these disappear like the leaves in autumn. Some people have maintained that anything offensive written against a neighbor is a libel.

  According to them, the railing attacks which the prophets occasionally sang to the kings of Israel, were defamatory libels to excite the people to rise up against them. As the populace, however, read but little anywhere, it is believed that these half-disclosed satires never did any great harm. Sedition is produced by speaking to assemblies of the people, rather than by writing for them. For this reason, one of the first things done by Queen Elizabeth of England on her accession, was to order that for six months no one should preach without express permission.

  The “Anti-Cato” of Cæsar was a libel, but Cæsar did more harm to Cato by the battle of Pharsalia, than by his “Diatribes.” The “Philippics” of Cicero were libels, but the proscriptions of the Triumvirs were far more terrible libels.

  St. Cyril and St. Gregory Nazianzen compiled libels against the emperor Julian, but they were so generous as not to publish them until after his death.

  Nothing resembles libels more than certain manifestoes of sovereigns. The secretaries of the sultan Mustapha made a libel of his declaration of war. God has punished them for it; but the same spirit which animated Cæsar, Cicero, and the secretaries of Mustapha, reigns in all the reptiles who spin libels in their garrets. “Natura est semper sibi consona.” Who would believe that the souls of Garasse, Nonnotte, Paulian, Fréron, and he of Langliviet, calling himself La Beaumelle, were in this respect of the same temper as those of Cæsar, Cicero, St. Cyril, and of the secretary of the grand seignior? Nothing is, however, more certain.

  LIBERTY.

  Either I am much deceived, or Locke has very well defined liberty to be “power.” I am still further deceived, or Collins, a celebrated magistrate of London, is the only philosopher who has profoundly developed this idea, while Clarke has only answered him as a theologian. Of all that has been written in France on liberty, the following little dialogue has appeared to me the most comprehensive:

  A.

  A battery of cannon is discharged at our ears; have you the liberty to hear it, or not to hear it, as you please?

  B.

  Undoubtedly I cannot hinder myself from hearing it.

  A.

  Are you willing that these cannon shall take off your head and those of your wife and daughter who walk with you?

  B.

  What a question! I cannot, at least while I am in my right senses, wish such a thing; it is impossible.

  A.

  Good; you necessarily hear these cannon, and you necessarily wish not for the death of yourself and your family by a discharge from them. You have neither the power of not hearing it, nor the power of wishing to remain here.

  B.

  That is clear.

  A.

  You have, I perceive, advanced thirty paces to be out of the reach of the cannon; you have had the power of walking these few steps with me.

  B.

  That is also very clear.

  A.

  And if you had been paralytic, you could not have avoided being exposed to this battery; you would necessarily have heard, and received a wound from the cannon; and you would have as necessarily died.

  B.

  Nothing is more true.

  A.

  In what then consists your liberty, if not in the power that your body has acquired of performing that which from absolute necessity your will requires?

  B.

  You embarrass me. Liberty then is nothing more than the power of doing what I wish?

  A.

  Reflect; and see whether liberty can be understood otherwise.

  B.

  In this case, my hunting dog is as free as myself; he has necessarily the will to run when he sees a hare; and the power of running, if there is nothing the matter with his legs. I have therefore nothing above my dog; you reduce me to the state of the beasts.

  A.

  These are poor sophisms, and they are poor sophists who have instructed you. You are unwilling to be free like your dog. Do you not eat, sleep, and propagate like him, and nearly in the same attitudes? Would you smell otherwise than by your nose? Why would you possess liberty differently from your dog?

  B.

  But I have a soul which reasons, and my dog scarcely reasons at all. He has nothing beyond simple ideas, while I have a thousand metaphysical ideas.

  A.

  Well, you are a thousand times more free than he is; you have a thousand times more power of thinking than he has; but still you are not free in any other manner than your dog is free.

  B.

  What! am I not free to will what I like?

  A.

  What do you understand by that?

  B.

  I understand what all the world understands. Is it not every day said that the will is free?

  A.

  An adage is not a reason; explain yourself better.

  B.

  I understand that I am free to will as I please.

  A.

  With your permission, that is nonsense; see you not that it is ridiculous to say—I will will? Consequently, you necessarily will the ideas only which are presented to you. Will you be married, yes or no?

  B.

  Suppose I answer that I will neither the one nor the other.

  A.

  In that case you would answer like him who said: Some believe Cardinal Mazarin dead, others believe him living; I believe neither the one nor the other.

  B.

  Well, I will marry!

  A.

  Aye, that is an answer. Why will you marry?

  B.

  Because I am in love with a young, beautiful, sweet, well-educated, rich girl, who sings very well, whose parents are very honest people, and I flatter myself that I am beloved by her and welcome to the family.

  A.

  There is a reason. You see that you cannot will without a motive. I declare to you that you are free to marry, that is to say, that you have the power of signing the contract, keeping the wedding, and sleeping with your wife.

  B.

  How! I cannot will without a motive? Then what will become of the other proverb—“Sit pro ratione voluntas”—my will is my reason—I will because I will?

  A.

  It is an absurd one, my dear friend; you would then have an effect without a cause.

  B.

  What! when I play at odd or even, have I a reason for choosing even rather than odd?

  A.

  Undoubtedly.

  B.

  And what is the reason, if you please?

  A.

  It is, that the idea of even is presented to your mind rather than the opposite idea. It would be extraordinary if there were cases in which we will because there is a motive, and others in which we will without one. When you would marry, you evidently perceive the predominant reason for it; you perceive it not when you play at odd or even, and yet there must be one.

  B.

  Therefore, once more, I am not free.

  A.

  Your will is not free, but your actions are. You are free to act when you have the power of acting.

  B.

  But all the books that I have read on the liberty of indifference—

  A.

  What do you understand by the liberty of indifference?

  B.

  I understand spitting on the right or the left hand—sleeping on the right or left side—walking up and down four times or five.

  A.

  That would be a pleasant liberty, truly! God would have made you a fine present, much to boast of, certainly! What use to you would be a power which could only be exercised on such futile occasions? But in truth it is ridiculous to suppose the will of willing to spit on the right or left. Not only is the will of willing absurd, but it is certain that several little circumstances determine these acts which you call indifferent. You are no more free in these acts than in others. Yet you are free at all times, and in all places, when you can do what you wish to do.

  B.

  I suspect that you are right. I will think upon it.

  LIBERTY OF OPINION.

  Towards the year 1707, the time at which the English gained the battle of Saragossa, protected Portugal, and for some time gave a king to Spain, Lord Boldmind, a general officer who had been wounded, was at the waters of Barèges. He there met with Count Medroso, who having fallen from his horse behind the baggage, at a league and a half from the field of battle, also came to take the waters. He was a familiar of the Inquisition, while Lord Boldmind was only familiar in conversation. One day after their wine, he held this dialogue with Medroso:

  $

  —It is true; but I would rather be their servant than their victim, and I have preferred the unhappiness of burning my neighbor to that of being roasted myself.)

  $

  —What would you have? It is not permitted us either to write, speak, or even to think. If we speak, it is easy to misinterpret our words, and still more our writings; and as we cannot be condemned in an auto-da-fé for our secret thoughts, we are menaced with being burned eternally by the order of God himself, if we think not like the Jacobins. They have persuaded the government that if we had common sense the entire state would be in combustion, and the nation become the most miserable upon earth.)

  $

  —Who is this Tullius Cicero? I have never heard his name pronounced at St. Hermandad.)

  $

  —I know none of them; but I am told that the Catholic religion, Biscayan and Roman, is lost if we begin to think.)

  $

  —No; but it may be reduced to very little; and it is through having thought, that Sweden, Denmark, all your island, and the half of Germany groan under the frightful misfortune of not being subjects of the pope. It is even said that, if men continue to follow their false lights, they will soon have merely the simple adoration of God and of virtue. If the gates of hell ever prevail so far, what will become of the holy office?)

  $

  —I understand you not.)

  $

  —You are a man, and that is sufficient.)

  $

  —You have only to teach yourself to think; you are born with a mind, you are a bird in the cage of the Inquisition, the holy office has clipped your wings, but they will grow again. He who knows not geometry can learn it: all men can instruct themselves. Is it not shameful to put your soul into the hands of those to whom you would not intrust your money? Dare to think for yourself.)

  $

  —Quite the contrary. When we assist at a spectacle, every one freely tells his opinion of it, and the public peace is not thereby disturbed; but if some insolent protector of a poet would force all people of taste to proclaim that to be good which appears to them bad, blows would follow, and the two parties would throw apples of discord at one another’s heads, as once happened at London. Tyrants over mind have caused a part of the misfortunes of the world. We are happy in England only because every one freely enjoys the right of speaking his opinion.)

  $

  —You are tranquil, but you are not happy: it is the tranquillity of galley-slaves, who row in cadence and in silence.)

  $

  —Yes, and I would deliver it.)

  Medroso.

  —But if I find myself well at the galleys?

  Boldmind.

  —Why, then, you deserve to be there.

  LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.

  What harm can the prediction of Jean Jacques do to Russia? Any? We allow him to explain it in a mystical, typical, allegorical sense, according to custom. The nations which will destroy the Russians will possess the belles-lettres, mathematics, wit, and politeness, which degrade man and pervert nature.

  From five to six thousand pamphlets have been printed in Holland against Louis XIV., none of which contributed to make him lose the battles of Blenheim, Turin, and Ramillies.

  In general, we have as natural a right to make use of our pens as our language, at our peril, risk, and fortune. I know many books which fatigue, but I know of none which have done real evil. Theologians, or pretended politicians, cry: “Religion is destroyed, the government is lost, if you print certain truths or certain paradoxes. Never attempt to think, till you have demanded permission from a monk or an officer. It is against good order for a man to think for himself. Homer, Plato, Cicero, Virgil, Pliny, Horace, never published anything but with the approbation of the doctors of the Sorbonne and of the holy Inquisition.”

  “See into what horrible decay the liberty of the press brought England and Holland. It is true that they possess the commerce of the whole world, and that England is victorious on sea and land; but it is merely a false greatness, a false opulence: they hasten with long strides to their ruin. An enlightened people cannot exist.”

  None can reason more justly, my friends; but let us see, if you please, what state has been lost by a book. The most dangerous, the most pernicious of all, is that of Spinoza. Not only in the character of a Jew he attacks the New Testament, but in the character of a scholar he ruins the Old; his system of atheism is a thousand times better composed and reasoned than those of Straton and of Epicurus. We have need of the most profound sagacity to answer to the arguments by which he endeavors to prove that one substance cannot form another.

  Like yourself, I detest this book, which I perhaps understand better than you, and to which you have very badly replied; but have you discovered that this book has changed the face of the world? Has any preacher lost a florin of his income by the publication of the works of Spinoza? Is there a bishop whose rents have diminished? On the contrary, their revenues have doubled since his time: all the ill is reduced to a small number of peaceable readers, who have examined the arguments of Spinoza in their closets, and have written for or against them works but little known.

  For yourselves, it is of little consequence to have caused to be printed “ad usum Delphini,” the atheism of Lucretius—as you have already been reproached with doing—no trouble, no scandal, has ensued from it: so leave Spinoza to live in peace in Holland. Lucretius was left in repose at Rome.

  But if there appears among you any new book, the ideas of which shock your own—supposing you have any—or of which the author may be of a party contrary to yours—or what is worse, of which the author may not be of any party at all—then you cry out “Fire!” and let all be noise, scandal, and uproar in your small corner of the earth. There is an abominable man who has printed that if we had no hands we could not make shoes nor stockings. Devotees cry out, furred doctors assemble, alarms multiply from college to college, from house to house, and why? For five or six pages, about which there no longer will be a question at the end of three months. Does a book displease you? refute it. Does it tire you? read it not.

  Oh! say you to me, the books of Luther and Calvin have destroyed the Roman Catholic religion in one-half of Europe? Why say not also, that the books of the patriarch Photius have destroyed this Roman religion in Asia, Africa, Greece, and Russia?

  You deceive yourself very grossly, when you think that you have been ruined by books. The empire of Russia is two thousand leagues in extent, and there are not six men who are aware of the points disputed by the Greek and Latin Church. If the monk Luther, John Calvin, and the vicar Zuinglius had been content with writing, Rome would yet subjugate all the states that it has lost; but these people and their adherents ran from town to town, from house to house, exciting the women, and were maintained by princes. Fury, which tormented Amata, and which, according to Virgil, whipped her like a top, was not more turbulent. Know, that one enthusiastic, factious, ignorant, supple, vehement Capuchin, the emissary of some ambitious monks, preaching, confessing, communicating, and caballing, will much sooner overthrow a province than a hundred authors can enlighten it. It was not the Koran which caused Mahomet to succeed: it was Mahomet who caused the success of the Koran.

  No! Rome has not been vanquished by books; it has been so by having caused Europe to revolt at its rapacity; by the public sale of indulgences; for having insulted men, and wishing to govern them like domestic animals; for having abused its power to such an extent that it is astonishing a single village remains to it. Henry VIII., Elizabeth, the duke of Saxe, the landgrave of Hesse, the princes of Orange, the Condés and Colignys, have done all, and books nothing. Trumpets have never gained battles, nor caused any walls to fall except those of Jericho.

  You fear books, as certain small cantons fear violins. Let us read, and let us dance—these two amusements will never do any harm to the world.

  LIFE.

  The following passage is found in the “Système de la Nature,” London edition, page 84: “We ought to define life, before we reason concerning soul; but I hold it to be impossible to do so.”

  On the contrary, I think a definition of life quite possible. Life is organization with the faculty of sensation. Thus all animals are said to live. Life is attributed to plants, only by a species of metaphor or catachresis. They are organized and vegetate; but being incapable of sensation, do not properly possess life.

  We may, however, live without actual sensation; for we feel nothing in a complete apoplexy, in a lethargy, or in a sound sleep without dreams; but yet possess the capacity of sensation. Many persons, it is too well known, have been buried alive, like Roman vestals, and it is what happens after every battle, especially in cold countries. A soldier lies without motion, and breathless, who, if he were duly assisted, might recover; but to settle the matter speedily, they bury him.

  What is this capacity of sensation? Formerly, life and soul meant the same thing, and the one was no better understood than the other; at bottom, is it more understood at present?

  In the sacred books of the Jews, soul is always used for life.

  “Dixit etiam Deus, producant aquæ reptile animæ viventis.” (And God said, let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature which hath a living soul.)

  “Creavit Deus cete grandia, et omnem animam viventem, atque motabilem quam produxerant aquæ.” (And God created great dragons (tannitiim), and every living soul that moveth, which the waters brought forth.) It is difficult to explain the creation of these watery dragons, but such is the text, and it is for us to submit to it.

  “Producat terra animam viventem in genere suo, jumenta et reptilia.” (Let the earth produce the living soul after its kind, cattle and creeping things.)

  “Et in quibus est anima vivens, ad vescendum.” (And to everything wherein there is a living soul [every green herb], for meat.)

  “Et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ, et factus est homo in animam viventem.” (And breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.)

  “Sanguinem enim animarum vestrarum requiram de manu cunctarum betiarum, et de manu hominis,” etc. (I shall require back your souls from the hands of man and beast.)

  Souls here evidently signify lives. The sacred text certainly did not mean that beasts had swallowed the souls of men, but their blood, which is their life; and as to the hands given by this text to beasts, it signifies their claws.

  In short, more than two hundred passages may be quoted in which the soul is used for the life, both of beasts and man; but not one which explains either life or soul.

  If life be the faculty of sensation, whence this faculty? In reply to this question, all the learned quote systems, and these systems are destructive of one another. But why the anxiety to ascertain the source of sensation? It is as difficult to conceive the power which binds all things to a common centre as to conceive the cause of animal sensation. The direction of the needle towards the pole, the paths of comets, and a thousand other phenomena are equally incomprehensible.

  Properties of matter exist, the principle of which will never be known to us; and that of sensation, without which there cannot be life, is among the number.

  Is it possible to live without experiencing sensation? No. An infant which dies in a lethargy that has lasted from its birth has existed, but not lived.

  Let us imagine an idiot unable to form complex ideas, but who possesses sensation; he certainly lives without thinking, forming simple ideas from his sensations. Thought, therefore, is not necessary to life, since this idiot has lived without thinking.

  Hence, certain thinkers think that thought is not of the essence of man. They maintain that many idiots who think not, are men; and so decidedly men as to produce other men, without the power of constructing a single argument.

  The doctors who maintain the essentiality of thought, reply that these idiots have certain ideas from their sensation. Bold reasoners rejoin, that a well-taught mind possesses more consecutive ideas, and is very superior to these idiots, whence has sprung a grand dispute upon the soul, of which we shall speak—possibly at too great a length—in the article on “Soul.”

  LOVE.

  There are so many kinds of love, that in order to define it, we scarcely know which to direct our attention to. Some boldly apply the name of “love” to a caprice of a few days, a connection without attachment, passion without affection, the affectations of cicisbeism, a cold usage, a romantic fancy, a taste speedily followed by a distaste. They apply the name to a thousand chimeras.

  Should any philosophers be inclined profoundly to investigate a subject in itself so little philosophical, they may recur to the banquet of Plato, in which Socrates, the decent and honorable lover of Alcibiades and Agathon, converses with them on the metaphysics of love.

  Lucretius speaks of it more as a natural philosopher; and Virgil follows the example of Lucretius. “Amor omnibus idem.”

  It is the embroidery of imagination on the stuff of nature. If you wish to form an idea of love, look at the sparrows in your garden; behold your doves; contemplate the bull when introduced to the heifer; look at that powerful and spirited horse which two of your grooms are conducting to the mare that quietly awaits him, and is evidently pleased at his approach; observe the flashing of his eyes, notice the strength and loudness of his neighings, the boundings, the curvetings, the ears erect, the mouth opening with convulsive gaspings, the distended nostrils, the breath of fire, the raised and waving mane, and the impetuous movement with which he rushes towards the object which nature has destined for him; do not, however, be jealous of his happiness; but reflect on the advantages of the human species; they afford ample compensation in love for all those which nature has conferred on mere animals—strength, beauty, lightness, and rapidity.

  There are some classes, however, even of animals totally unacquainted with sexual association. Fishes are destitute of this enjoyment. The female deposits her millions of eggs on the slime of the waters, and the male that meets them passes over them and communicates the vital principle, never consorting with, or perhaps even perceiving the female to whom they belong.

  The greater part of those animals which copulate are sensible of the enjoyment only by a single sense; and when appetite is satisfied, the whole is over. No animal, besides man, is acquainted with embraces; his whole frame is susceptible; his lips particularly experience a delight which never wearies, and which is exclusively the portion of his species; finally, he can surrender himself at all seasons to the endearments of love, while mere animals possess only limited periods. If you reflect on these high pre-eminences, you will readily join in the earl of Rochester’s remark, that love would impel a whole nation of atheists to worship the divinity.

  As men have been endowed with the talent of perfecting whatever nature has bestowed upon them, they have accordingly perfected the gift of love. Cleanliness, personal attention, and regard to health render the frame more sensitive, and consequently increase its capacity of gratification. All the other amiable and valuable sentiments enter afterwards into that of love, like the metals which amalgamate with gold; friendship and esteem readily fly to its support; and talents both of body and of mind are new and strengthening bonds.

  • Nam facit ipsa suis interdum femina factis,
  • Morigerisque modis, et mundo corpore cultu
  • Ut facile insuescat secum vir degere vitam.

  • —Lucretius, iv, 1275.

  Self-love, above all, draws closer all these various ties. Men pride themselves in the choice they have made; and the numberless illusions that crowd around constitute the ornament of the work, of which the foundation is so firmly laid by nature.

  Such are the advantages possessed by man above the various tribes of animals. But, if he enjoys delights of which they are ignorant, howe many vexations and disgusts, on the other hand, is he exposed to, from which they are free! The most dreadful of these is occasioned by nature’s having poisoned the pleasures of love and sources of life over three-quarters of the world by a terrible disease, to which man alone is subject; nor is it with this pestilence as with various other maladies, which are the natural consequences of excess. It was not introduced into the world by debauchery. The Phrynes and Laises, the Floras and Messalinas, were never attacked by it. It originated in islands where mankind dwelt together in innocence, and has thence been spread throughout the Old World.

  If nature could in any instance be accused of despising her own work, thwarting her own plan, and counteracting her own views, it would be in this detestable scourge which has polluted the earth with horror and shame. And can this, then, be the best of all possible worlds? What! if Cæsar and Antony and Octavius never had this disease, was it not possible to prevent Francis the First from dying of it? No, it is said; things were so ordered all for the best; I am disposed to believe it; but it is unfortunate for those to whom Rabelais has dedicated his book.

  Erotic philosophers have frequently discussed the question, whether Héloïse could truly love Abelard after he became a monk and mutilated? One of these states much wronged the other.

  Be comforted, however, Abelard, you were really beloved; imagination comes in aid of the heart. Men feel a pleasure in remaining at table, although they can no longer eat. Is it love? is it simply recollection? is it friendship? It is a something compounded of all these. It is a confused feeling, resembling the fantastic passions which the dead retained in the Elysian Fields. The heroes who while living had shone in the chariot races, guided imaginary chariots after death. Héloïse lived with you on illusions and supplements. She sometimes caressed you, and with so much the more pleasure as, after vowing at Paraclet that she would love you no more, her caresses were become more precious to her in proportion as they had become more culpable. A woman can never form a passion for a eunuch, but she may retain her passion for her lover after his becoming one, if he still remains amiable.

  The case is different with respect to a lover grown old in the service; the external appearance is no longer the same; wrinkles affright, grizzly eyebrows repel, decaying teeth disgust, infirmities drive away; all that can be done or expected is to have the virtue of being a patient and kind nurse, and bearing with the man that was once beloved, all which amounts to—burying the dead.

  LOVE OF GOD.

  The disputes that have occurred about the love of God have kindled as much hatred as any theological quarrel. The Jesuits and Jansenists have been contending for a hundred years as to which party loved God in the most suitable and appropriate manner, and which should at the same time most completely harass and torment their neighbor.

  When the author of “Telemachus,” who was in high reputation at the court of Louis XIV., recommended men to love God in a manner which did not happen to coincide with that of the author of the “Funeral Orations,” the latter, who was a complete master of the weapons of controversy, declared open war against him, and procured his condemnation in the ancient city of Romulus, where God was the very object most loved, after domination, ease, luxury, pleasure, and money.

  If Madame Guyon had been acquainted with the story of the good old woman, who brought a chafingdish to burn paradise, and a pitcher of water to extinguish hell, that God might be loved for Himself alone, she would not perhaps have written so much as she did. She must inevitably have felt that she could herself never say anything better than that; but she loved God and nonsense so sincerely that she was imprisoned for four months, on account of her affectionate attachment; treatment decidedly rigorous and unjust. Why punish as a criminal a woman whose only offence was composing verse in the style of the Abbé Cotin, and prose in the taste of the popular favorite Punchinello? It is strange that the author of “Telemachus” and the frigid loves of Eucharis should have said in his “Maxims of Saints,” after the blessed Francis de Sales: “I have scarcely any desires; but, were I to be born again, I should not have any at all. If God came to me, I would also go to Him; if it were not His will to come to me, I would stay where I was, and not go to Him.”

  His whole work turns upon this proposition. Francis de Sales was not condemned, but Fénelon was. Why should that have been? the reason is, that Francis de Sales had not a bitter enemy at the court of Turin, and that Fénelon had one at Versailles.

  The most sensible thing that was written upon this mystical controversy is to be found perhaps in Boileau’s satire, “On the Love of God,” although that is certainly by no means his best work.

  • Qui fait exactement ce que, ma loi commande,
  • A pour moi, dit ce Dieu, l’amour que je demande.

  • —F.p. xii. 99.

  • Attend exactly to my law’s command,
  • Such, says this God, the worship I demand.

  If we must pass from the thorns of theology to those of philosophy, which are not so long and are less piercing, it seems clear that an object may be loved by any one without any reference to self, without any mixture of interested self-love. We cannot compare divine things to earthly ones, or the love of God to any other love. We have an infinity of steps to mount above our grovelling human inclinations before we can reach that sublime love. Since, however, we have nothing to rest upon except the earth, let us draw our comparisons from that. We view some masterpiece of art, in painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, or eloquence; we hear a piece of music that absolutely enchants our ears and souls; we admire it, we love it, without any return of the slightest advantage to ourselves from this attachment; it is a pure and refined feeling; we proceed sometimes so far as to entertain veneration or friendship for the author; and were he present should cordially embrace him.

  This is almost the only way in which we can explain our profound admiration and the impulses of our heart towards the eternal architect of the world. We survey the work with an astonishment made up of respect and a sense of our own nothingness, and our heart warms and rises as much as possible towards the divine artificer.

  But what is this feeling? A something vague and indeterminate—an impression that has no connection with our ordinary affections. A soul more susceptible than another, more withdrawn from worldly business and cares, may be so affected by the spectacle of nature as to feel the most ardent as well as pious aspirations towards the eternal Lord who formed it. Could such an amiable affection of the mind, could so powerful a charm, so strong an evidence of feeling, incur censure? Was it possible in reality to condemn the affectionate and grateful disposition of the archbishop of Cambray? Notwithstanding the expressions of St. Francis de Sales, above given, he adhered steadily to this assertion, that the author may be loved merely and simply for the beauty of his works. With what heresy could he be reproached? The extravagances of style of a lady of Montargis, and a few unguarded expressions of his own, were not a little injurious to him.

  Where was the harm that he had done? Nothing at present is known about the matter. This dispute, like numberless others, is completely annihilated. Were every dogmatist to say to himself: “A few years hence no one will care a straw for my dogmas,” there would be far less dogmatizing in the world than there is! Ah! Louis the Fourteenth! Louis the Fourteenth! when two men of genius had departed so far from the natural scope and direction of their talents, as to write the most obscure and tiresome works ever written in your dominions, how much better would it have been to have left them to their own wranglings!

  • Pour finir tous ces débats-là,
  • Tu n’avais qu’ à les laisser faire.
  • To end debates in such a tone
  • ’Twas but to leave the men alone.

  It is observable under all the articles of morality and history, by what an invisible chain, by what unknown springs, all the ideas that disturb our minds and all the events that poison our days are bound together and brought to co-operate in the formation of our destinies. Fénelon dies in exile in consequence of holding two or three mystical conversations with a pious but fanciful woman. Cardinal Bouillon, nephew of the great Turenne, is persecuted in consequence of not himself persecuting at Rome the archbishop of Cambray, his friend: he is compelled to quit France, and he also loses his whole fortune.

  By a like chain of causes and effects, the son of a solicitor at Vire detects, in a dozen of obscure phrases of a book printed at Amsterdam, what is sufficient to fill all the dungeons of France with victims; and at length, from the depth of those dungeons arises a cry for redress and vengeance, the echo of which lays prostrate on the earth an able and tyrannical society which had been established by an ignorant madman.

  LOVE (SOCRATIC LOVE).

  If the love called Socratic and Platonic is only a becoming sentiment, it is to be applauded; if an unnatural license, we must blush for Greece.

  It is as certain as the knowledge of antiquity can well be, that Socratic love was not an infamous passion. It is the word “love” which has deceived the world. Those called the lovers of a young man were precisely such as among us are called the minions of our princes—honorable youths attached to the education of a child of distinction, partaking of the same studies and the same military exercises—a warlike and correct custom, which has been perverted into nocturnal feasts and midnight orgies.

  The company of lovers instituted by Laius was an invincible troop of young warriors, bound by oath each to preserve the life of any other at the expense of his own. Ancient discipline never exhibited anything more fine.

  Sextus Empiricus and others have boldly affirmed that this vice was recommended by the laws of Persia. Let them cite the text of such a law; let them exhibit the code of the Persians; and if such an abomination be even found there, still I would disbelieve it, and maintain that the thing was not true, because it is impossible. No; it is not in human nature to make a law which contradicts and outrages nature itself—a law which would annihilate mankind, if it were literally observed. Moreover, I will show you the ancient law of the Persians as given in the “Sadder.” It says, in article or gate 9, that the greatest sin must not be committed. It is in vain that a modern writer seeks to justify Sextus Empiricus and pederasty. The laws of Zoroaster, with which he is unacquainted, incontrovertibly prove that this vice was never recommended to the Persians. It might as well be said that it is recommended to the Turks. They boldly practise it, but their laws condemn it.

  How many persons have mistaken shameful practices, which are only tolerated in a country, for its laws. Sextus Empiricus, who doubted everything, should have doubted this piece of jurisprudence. If he had lived in our days, and witnessed the proceedings of two or three young Jesuits with their pupils, would he have been justified in the assertion that such practices were permitted by the institutes of Ignatius Loyola?

  It will be permitted to me here to allude to the Socratic love of the reverend father Polycarp, a Carmelite, who was driven away from the small town of Gex in 1771, in which place he taught religion and Latin to about a dozen scholars. He was at once their confessor, tutor, and something more. Few have had more occupations, spiritual and temporal. All was discovered; and he retired into Switzerland, a country very distant from Greece.

  The monks charged with the education of youth have always exhibited a little of this tendency, which is a necessary consequence of the celibacy to which the poor men are condemned.

  This vice was so common at Rome that it was impossible to punish a crime which almost every one committed. Octavius Augustus, that murderer, debauchee, and coward, who exiled Ovid, thought it right in Virgil to sing the charms of Alexis. Horace, his other poetical favorite, constructed small odes on Ligurinus; and this same Horace, who praised Augustus for reforming manners, speak in his satires in much the same way of both boys and girls. Yet the ancient law “Scantinia,” which forbade pederasty, always existed, and was put in force by the emperor Philip, who drove away from Rome the boys who made a profession of it. If, however, Rome had witty and licentious students, like Petronius, it had also such preceptors as Quintilian; and attend to the precautions he lays down in his chapter of “The Preceptor,” in order to preserve the purity of early youth. “Cavendum non solum crimine turpitudinis, sed etiam suspicione.” We must not only beware of a shameful crime but even of the suspicion of it. To conclude, I firmly believe that no civilized nation ever existed which made formal laws against morals.

  Observations by Another Hand.

  We may be permitted to make a few additional reflections on an odious and disgusting subject, which however, unfortunately, forms a part of the history of opinions and manners.

  This offence may be traced to the remotest periods of civilization. Greek and Roman history in particular allows us not to doubt it. It was common before people formed regular societies, and were governed by written laws.

  The latter fact is the reason that the laws have treated it with so much indulgence. Severe laws cannot be proposed to a free people against a vice, whatever it may be, which is common and habitual. For a long time many of the German nations had written laws which admitted of composition and murder. Solon contented himself with forbidding these odious practices between the citizens and slaves. The Athenians might perceive the policy of this interdiction, and submit to it; especially as it operated against the slaves only, and was enacted to prevent them from corrupting the young free men. Fathers of families, however lax their morals, had no motive to oppose it.

  The severity of the manners of women in Greece, the use of public baths, and the passion for games in which men appeared altogether naked, fostered this turpitude, notwithstanding the progress of society and morals. Lycurgus, by allowing more liberty to the women, and by certain other institutions, succeeded in rendering this vice less common in Sparta than in the other towns of Greece.

  When the manners of a people become less rustic, as they improve in arts, luxury, and riches, if they retain their former vices, they at least endeavor to veil them. Christian morality, by attaching shame to connections between unmarried people, by rendering marriage indissoluble, and proscribing concubinage by ecclesiastical censures, has rendered adultery common. Every sort of voluptuousness having been equally made sinful, that species is naturally preferred which is necessarily the most secret; and thus, by a singular contradiction, absolute crimes are often made more frequent, more tolerated, and less shameful in public opinion, than simple weaknesses. When the western nations began a course of refinement, they sought to conceal adultery under the veil of what is called gallantry. Then men loudly avowed a passion in which it was presumed the women did not share. The lovers dared demand nothing; and it was only after more than ten years of pure love, of combats and victories at tournaments that a cavalier might hope to discover a moment of weakness in the object of his adoration. There remains a sufficient number of records of these times to convince us that the state of manners fostered this species of hypocrisy. It was similar among the Greeks, when they had become polished. Connections between males were not shameful; young people united themselves to each other by oaths, but it was to live and die for their country. It was usual for a person of ripe age to attach himself to a young man in a state of adolescence, ostensibly to form, instruct, and guide him; and the passion which mingled in these friendships was a sort of love—but still innocent love. Such was the veil with which public decency concealed vices which general opinion tolerated.

  In short, in the same manner as chivalric gallantry is often made a theme for eulogy in modern society, as proper to elevate the soul and inspire courage, was it common among the Greeks to eulogize that love which attached citizens to each other.

  Plato said that the Thebans acted laudably in adopting it, because it was necessary to polish their manners, supply greater energy to their souls and to their spirits, which were benumbed by the nature of their climate. We perceive by this, that a virtuous friendship alone was treated of by Plato. Thus, when a Christian prince proclaimed a tournament, at which every one appeared in the colors of his mistress, it was with the laudable intention of exciting emulation among its knights, and to soften manners; it was not adultery, but gallantry, that he would encourage within his dominions. In Athens, according to Plato, they set bounds to their toleration. In monarchical states, it was politic to prevent these attachments between men, but in republics they materially tended to prevent the double establishment of tyranny. In the sacrifice of a citizen, a tyrant knew not whose vengeance he might arm against himself, and was liable, without ceasing, to witness conspiracies grow out of the resolutions which this ambiguous affection produced among men.

  In the meantime, in spite of ideas so remote from our sentiments and manners, this practice was regarded as very shameful among the Greeks, every time it was exhibited without the excuse of friendship or political ties. When Philip of Macedon saw extended on the field of battle of Chæronea, the soldiers who composed the sacred battalion or band of friends at Thebes, all killed in the ranks in which they had combated: “I will never believe,” he exclaimed, “that such brave men have committed or suffered anything shameful.” This expression from a man himself soiled with this infamy furnishes an indisputable proof of the general opinion of Greece.

  At Rome, this opinion was still stronger. Many Greek heroes, regarded as virtuous men, have been supposed addicted to the vice; but among the Romans it was never attributed to any of those characters in whom great virtue was acknowledged. It only seems, that with these two nations no idea of crime or even dishonor was attached to it unless carried to excess, which renders even a passion for women disgraceful. Pederasty is rare among us, and would be unknown, but for the defects of public education.

  Montesquieu pretends that it prevails in certain Mahometan nations, in consequence of the facility of possessing women. In our opinion, for “facility” we should read “difficulty.”

  LUXURY.

  SECTION I.

  In a country where all the inhabitants went bare-footed, could luxury be imputed to the first man who made a pair of shoes for himself? Or rather, was he not a man of sense and industry?

  Is it not just the same with him who procured the first shirt? With respect to the man who had it washed and ironed, I consider him as an absolute genius, abundant in resources, and qualified to govern a state. Those however who were not used to wear clean shirts, considered him as a rich, effeminate coxcomb who was likely to corrupt the nation.

  “Beware of luxury,” said Cato to the Romans; “you have conquered the province of Phasis, but never eat any pheasants. You have subjugated the country in which cotton grows; still however continue to sleep on the bare ground. You have plundered the gold, and silver, and jewels of innumerable nations, but never become such fools as to use them. After taking everything, remain destitute of everything. Highway robbers should be virtuous and free.”

  Lucullus replied, “You should rather wish, my good friend, that Crassus, and Pompey, and Cæsar, and myself should spend all that we have taken in luxury. Great robbers must fight about the division of the spoil; but Rome will inevitably be enslaved, and it will be enslaved by one or other of us much more speedily, and much more securely, if we place that value upon money that you do, than if we spend it in superfluities and pleasures. Wish that Pompey and Cæsar may so far impoverish themselves as not to have money enough to pay the armies.”

  Not long since a Norwegian was upbraiding a Dutchman with luxury. “Where now,” says he, “are the happy times when a merchant, quitting Amsterdam for the great Indies, left a quarter of smoked beef in his kitchen and found it untouched on his return? Where are your wooden spoons and iron forks? Is it not shameful for a sensible Dutchman to sleep in a bed of damask?”

  “Go to Batavia,” replied the Amsterdammer; “gain, as I have done, ten tons of gold; and then see if you have not some inclination to be well clothed, well fed, and well lodged.”

  Since this conversation, twenty volumes have been written about luxury, and these books have neither increased nor diminished it.

  SECTION II.

  Luxury has been declaimed against for the space of two thousand years, both in verse and prose; and yet it has been always liked.

  What has not been said of the Romans? When, in the earlier periods of their history, these banditti ravaged and carried off their neighbor’s harvests; when, in order to augment their own wretched village, they destroyed the poor villages of the Volsci and Samnites, they were, we are told, men disinterested and virtuous. They could not as yet, be it remembered, carry away gold, and silver; and jewels, because the towns which they sacked and plundered had none; nor did their woods and swamps produce partridges or pheasants; yet people, forsooth, extol their temperance!

  When, by a succession of violences, they had pillaged and robbed every country from the recesses of the Adriatic to the Euphrates, and had sense enough to enjoy the fruit of their rapine; when they cultivated the arts, and tasted all the pleasures of life, and communicated them also to the nations which they conquered; then, we are told, they ceased to be wise and good.

  All such declamations tend just to prove this—that a robber ought not to eat the dinner he has taken, nor wear the habit he has stolen, nor ornament his finger with the ring he has plundered from another. All this, it is said, should be thrown into the river, in order to live like good people; but how much better would it be to say, never rob—it is your duty not to rob? Condemn the brigands when they plunder; but do not treat them as fools or madmen for enjoying their plunder. After a number of English sailors have obtained their prize money for the capture of Pondicherry, or Havana, can they be blamed for purchasing a little pleasure in London, in return for the labor and pain they have suffered in the uncongenial climes of Asia or America?

  The declaimers we have mentioned would wish men to bury the riches that might be accumulated by the fortune of war, or by agriculture, commerce, and industry in general. They cite Lacedæmon; why do they not also cite the republic of San Marino? What benefit did Sparta do to Greece? Had she ever a Demosthenes, a Sophocles, an Apelles, or a Phidias? The luxury of Athens formed great men of every description. Sparta had certainly some great captains, but even these in a smaller number than other cities. But allowing that a small republic like Lacedæmon may maintain its poverty, men uniformly die, whether they are in want of everything, or enjoying the various means of rendering life agreeable. The savage of Canada subsists and attains old age, as well as the English citizen who has fifty thousand guineas a year. But who will ever compare the country of the Iroquois to England?

  Let the republic of Ragusa and the canton of Zug enact sumptuary laws; they are right in so doing. The poor must not expend beyond their means; but I have somewhere read, that if partially injurious, luxury benefits a great nation upon the whole.

  • Sachez surtout que le luxe enrichit
  • Un grand état, s’il en perd un petit.

  If by luxury you mean excess, we know that excess is universally pernicious, in abstinence as well as gluttony, in parsimony or profusion. I know not how it has happened, that in my own village, where the soil is poor and meagre, the imposts heavy, and the prohibition against a man’s exporting the corn he has himself sown and reaped, intolerable, there is hardly a single cultivator who is not well clothed, and who has not an ample supply of warmth and food. Should this cultivator go to plough in his best clothes and with his hair dressed and powdered, there would in that case exist the greatest and most absurd luxury; but were a wealthy citizen of Paris or London to appear at the play in the dress of this peasant, he would exhibit the grossest and most ridiculous parsimony.

  • Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,
  • Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.

  • —Horace, i. sat. i. v. 106.

  • Some certain mean in all things may be found,
  • To mark our virtues, and our vices, bound.

  • —Francis.

  On the invention of scissors, which are certainly not of the very highest antiquity, what was not said of those who pared their nails and cut off some of their hair that was hanging down over their noses? They were undoubtedly considered as prodigals and coxcombs, who bought at an extravagant price an instrument just calculated to spoil the work of the Creator. What an enormous sin to pare the horn which God Himself made to grow at our fingers’ ends! It was absolutely an insult to the Divine Being Himself. When shirts and socks were invented, it was far worse. It is well known with what wrath and indignation the old counsellors, who had never worn socks, exclaimed against the young magistrates who encouraged so dreadful and fatal a luxury.

  MADNESS.

  What is madness? To have erroneous perceptions, and to reason correctly from them? Let the wisest man, if he would understand madness, attend to the succession of his ideas while he dreams. If he be troubled with indigestion during the night, a thousand incoherent ideas torment him; it seems as if nature punished him for having taken too much food, or for having injudiciously selected it, by supplying involuntary conceptions; for we think but little during sleep, except when annoyed by a bad digestion. Unquiet dreams are in reality a transient madness.

  Madness is a malady which necessarily hinders a man from thinking and acting like other men. Not being able to manage property, the madman is withheld from it; incapable of ideas suitable to society, he is shut out from it; if he be dangerous, he is confined altogether; and if he be furious, they bind him. Sometimes he is cured by baths, by bleeding, and by regimen.

  This man is not, however, deprived of ideas; he frequently possesses them like other men, and often when he sleeps. We might inquire how the spiritual and immortal soul, lodged in his brain, receives all its ideas correctly and distinctly, without the capacity of judgment. It perceives objects, as the souls of Aristotle, of Plato, of Locke, and of Newton, perceived them. It hears the same sounds, and possesses the same sense of feeling—how therefore, receiving impressions like the wisest, does the soul of the madman connect them extravagantly, and prove unable to disperse them?

  If this simple and eternal substance enjoys the same properties as the souls which are lodged in the sagest brains, it ought to reason like them. Why does it not? If my madman sees a thing red, while the wise men see it blue; if when my sages hear music, my madman hears the braying of an ass; if when they attend a sermon, he imagines himself to be listening to a comedy; if when they understand yes, he understands no; then I conceive clearly that his soul ought to think contrary to theirs. But my madman having the same perceptions as they have, there is no apparent reason why his soul, having received all the necessary materials, cannot make a proper use of them. It is pure, they say, and subject to no infirmity; behold it provided with all the necessary assistance; nothing which passes in the body can change its essence; yet it is shut up in a close carriage, and conveyed to Charenton.

  This reflection may lead us to suspect that the faculty of thought, bestowed by God upon man, is subject to derangement like the other senses. A madman is an invalid whose brain is diseased, while the gouty man is one who suffers in his feet and hands. People think by means of the brain, and walk on their feet, without knowing anything of the source of either this incomprehensible power of walking, or the equally incomprehensible power of thinking; besides, the gout may be in the head, instead of the feet. In short, after a thousand arguments, faith alone can convince us of the possibility of a simple and immaterial substance liable to disease.

  The learned may say to the madman: “My friend, although deprived of common sense, thy soul is as pure, as spiritual, and as immortal, as our own; but our souls are happily lodged, and thine not so. The windows of its dwelling are closed; it wants air, and is stifled.”

  The madman, in a lucid interval, will reply to them: “My friends, you beg the question, as usual. My windows are as wide open as your own, since I can perceive the same objects and listen to the same sounds. It necessarily follows that my soul makes a bad use of my senses; or that my soul is a vitiated sense, a depraved faculty. In a word, either my soul is itself diseased, or I have no soul.”

  One of the doctors may reply: “My brother, God has possibly created foolish souls, as well as wise ones.”

  The madman will answer: “If I believed what you say, I should be a still greater madman than I am. Have the kindness, you who know so much, to tell me why I am mad?”

  Supposing the doctors to retain a little sense, they would say: “We know nothing about the matter.”

  Neither are they more able to comprehend how a brain possesses regular ideas, and makes a due use of them. They call themselves sages, and are as weak as their patient.

  If the interval of reason of the madman lasts long enough, he will say to them: “Miserable mortals, who neither know the cause of my malady, nor how to cure it! Tremble, lest ye become altogether like me, or even still worse than I am! You are not of the highest rank, like Charles VI. of France, Henry VI. of England, and the German emperor Wincenslaus, who all lost their reason in the same century. You have not nearly so much wit as Blaise Pascal, James Abadie, or Jonathan Swift, who all became insane. The last of them founded a hospital for us; shall I go there and retain places for you?”

  N. B. I regret that Hippocrates should have prescribed the blood of an ass’s colt for madness; and I am still more sorry that the “Manuel des Dames” asserts that it may be cured by catching the itch. Pleasant prescriptions these, and apparently invented by those who were to take them!

  MAGIC.

  Magic is a more plausible science than astrology and the doctrine of genii. As soon as we began to think that there was in man a being quite distinct from matter, and that the understanding exists after death, we gave this understanding a fine, subtile, aerial body, resembling the body in which it was lodged. Two quite natural reasons introduced this opinion; the first is, that in all languages the soul was called spirit, breath, wind. This spirit, this breath, this wind, was therefore very fine and delicate. The second is, that if the soul of a man had not retained a form similar to that which it possessed during its life, we should not have been able after death to distinguish the soul of one man from that of another. This soul, this shade, which existed, separated from its body, might very well show itself upon occasion, revisit the place which it had inhabited, its parents and friends, speak to them and instruct them. In all this there is no incompatibility.

  As departed souls might very well teach those whom they came to visit the secret of conjuring them, they failed not to do so; and the word “Abraxa,” pronounced with some ceremonies, brought up souls with whom he who pronounced it wished to speak. I suppose an Egyptian saying to a philosopher: “I descend in a right line from the magicians of Pharaoh, who changed rods into serpents, and the waters of the Nile into blood; one of my ancestors married the witch of Endor, who conjured up the soul of Samuel at the request of Saul; she communicated her secrets to her husband, who made her the confidant of his own; I possess this inheritance from my father and mother; my genealogy is well attested; I command the spirits and elements.”

  The philosopher, in reply, will have nothing to do but to demand his protection; for if disposed to deny and dispute, the magician will shut his mouth by saying: “You cannot deny the facts; my ancestors have been incontestably great magicians, and you doubt it not; you have no reason to believe that I am inferior to them, particularly when a man of honor like myself assures you that he is a sorcerer.”

  The philosopher, to be sure, might say to him: “Do me the pleasure to conjure up a shade; allow me to speak to a soul; change this water into blood, and this rod into a serpent.”

  The magician will answer: “I work not for philosophers; but I have shown spirits to very respectable ladies, and to simple people who never dispute; you should at least believe that it is very possible for me to have these secrets, since you are forced to confess that my ancestors possessed them. What was done formerly can be done now; and you ought to believe in magic without my being obliged to exercise my art before you.”

  These reasons are so good that all nations have had sorcerers. The greatest sorcerers were paid by the state, in order to discover the future clearly in the heart and liver of an ox. Why, therefore, have others so long been punished with death? They have done more marvellous things; they should, therefore, be more honored; above all, their power should be feared. Nothing is more ridiculous than to condemn a true magician to be burned; for we should presume that he can extinguish the fire and twist the necks of his judges. All that we can do is to say to him: “My friend, we do not burn you as a true sorcerer, but as a false one; you boast of an admirable art which you possess not; we treat you as a man who utters false money; the more we love the good, the more severely we punish those who give us counterfeits; we know very well that there were formerly venerable conjurors, but we have reason to believe that you are not one, since you suffer yourself to be burned like a fool.”

  It is true, that the magician so pushed might say: “My conscience extends not so far as to extinguish a pile without water, and to kill my judges with words. I can only call up spirits, read the future, and change certain substances into others; my power is bounded; but you should not for that reason burn me at a slow fire. It is as if you caused a physician to be hanged who could cure fever, and not a paralysis.”

  The judges might, however, still reasonably observe: “Show us then some secret of your art, or consent to be burned with a good grace.”

  MALADY—MEDICINE.

  I will suppose that a fair princess who never heard speak of anatomy is ill either from having eaten or danced too much, or having done too much of what several princesses occasionally do. I suppose the following controversy takes place:

  $

  Well, sir, the king pays you to attend to all this: fail not to put all things in their place, and to make my liquids circulate so that I may be comfortable. I warn you that I will not suffer with impunity.)

  $

  What! are you a physician, and can you prescribe nothing?)

  $

  You make me tremble; I believed that physicians cured all maladies.)

  $

  What! all these secrets for purifying the blood, of which my ladies have spoken to me; this Baume de Vie of the Sieur de Lievre; these packets of the Sieur Arnauld; all these pills so much praised by femmes de chambre—)

  $

  But there are specifics?)

  $

  In what, then, consists medicine?)

  $

  There are, however, salutary things, and others hurtful?)

  $

  You puff not your merchandise. You are an honest man. When I am queen, I will make you my first physician.)

  physician.

  Let nature be your first physician. It is she who made all. Of those who have lived beyond a hundred years, none were of the faculty. The king of France has already buried forty of his physicians, as many chief physicians, besides physicians of the establishment, and others.

  princess.

  And, truly, I hope to bury you also.

  MAN.

  To know the natural philosophy of the human race, it is necessary to read works of anatomy, or rather to go through a course of anatomy.

  To be acquainted with the man we call “moral,” it is above all necessary to have lived and reflected. Are not all moral works contained in these words of Job? “Man that is born of a woman hath but a few days to live, and is full of trouble. He cometh forth like a flower, and is cut down: he fleeth as a shadow, and continueth not.”

  We have already seen that the human race has not above two-and-twenty years to live, reckoning those who die at their nurses’ breasts, and those who for a hundred years drag on the remains of a miserable and imbecile life.

  It is a fine apologue, that ancient fable of the first man who was at first destined to live twenty years at most, and who reduced it to five years by estimating one life with another. The man was in despair, and had near him a caterpillar, a butterfly, a peacock, a horse, a fox, and an ape.

  “Prolong my life,” said he to Jupiter; “I am more worthy than these animals; it is just that I and my family should live long to command all beasts.” “Willingly,” said Jupiter; “but I have only a certain number of days to divide among the whole of the beings to whom I have granted life. I can only give to thee by taking away from others; for imagine not, that because I am Jupiter, I am infinite and all-powerful; I have my nature and my limits. Now I will grant thee some years more, by taking them from these six animals, of which thou art jealous, on condition that thou shalt successively assume their manner of living. Man shall first be a caterpillar, dragging himself along in his earliest infancy. Until fifteen, he shall have the lightness of a butterfly; in his youth, the vanity of a peacock. In manhood he must undergo the labors of a horse. Towards fifty, he shall have the tricks of a fox; and in his old age, be ugly and ridiculous like an ape. This, in general, is the destiny of man.”

  Remark further, that notwithstanding these bounties of Jupiter, the animal man has still but two or three and twenty years to live, at most. Taking mankind in general, of this a third must be taken away for sleep, during which we are in a certain sense dead; thus there remain fifteen, and from these fifteen we must take at least eight for our first infancy, which is, as it has been called, the vestibule of life. The clear product will be seven years, and of these seven years the half at least is consumed in grief of all kinds. Take three years and a half for labor, fatigue, and dissatisfaction, and we shall have none remaining. Well, poor animal, will you still be proud?

  Unfortunately, in this fable Jupiter forgot to dress this animal as he clothed the ass, horse, peacock, and even the caterpillar. Man had only his bare skin, which, continually exposed to the sun, rain, and hail, became chapped, tanned, and spotted. The male in our continent was disfigured by spare hairs on his body, which rendered him frightful without covering him. His face was hidden by these hairs. His skin became a rough soil which bore a forest of stalks, the roots of which tended upwards, and the branches of which grew downwards. It was in this state and in this image, that this animal ventured to paint God, when in course of time he learned the art of description.

  The female being more weak, became still more disgusting and frightful in her old age; and, in short, without tailors, and mantua-makers, one-half of mankind would never have dared to show itself to the other. Yet, before having clothes, before even knowing how to speak, some ages must have passed away—a truth which has been proved, but which must be often repeated.

  It is a little extraordinary that we should have harassed an innocent, estimable man of our time, the good Helvetius, for having said that if men had not hands, they could not build houses and work tapestry. Apparently, those who have condemned this proposition, have discovered a secret for cutting stones and wood, and working at the needle with their feet.

  I liked the author of the work “On Mind.” This man was worth more than all his enemies together; but I never approved either the errors of his book, or the trivial truths which he so emphatically enforced. I have, however, boldly taken his part when absurd men have condemned him for these same truths.

  I have no terms to express the excess of my contempt for those who, for example’s sake, would magisterially proscribe this passage: “The Turks can only be considered deists.” How then, pedant! would you have them regarded as atheists, because they adore only one God!

  You condemn this other proposition: “The man of sense knows that men are what they must be; that all hatred against them is unjust; that a fool commits fooleries as a wild stock bears bitter fruits.”

  So, crabbed stocks of the schools, you persecute a man because he hates you not! Let us, however, leave the schools, and pursue our subject.

  Reason, industrious hands, a head capable of generalizing ideas, a language pliant enough to express them—these are great benefits granted by the Supreme Being to man, to the exclusion of other animals.

  The male in general lives rather a shorter time than the female. He is also generally larger in proportion. A man of the loftiest stature is commonly two or three inches higher than the tallest woman.

  His strength is almost always superior; he is more active; and having all his organs stronger, he is more capable of a fixed attention. All arts have been invented by him, and not by woman. We should remark, that it is not the fire of imagination, but persevering meditation and combination of ideas which have invented arts, as mechanics, gunpowder, printing, dialling, etc.

  Man alone knows that he must die, and knows it only by experience. A child brought up alone, and transported into a desert island, would dream of death no more than a plant or a cat.

  A singular man has written that the human body is a fruit, which is green until old age, and that the moment of death is that of maturity. A strange maturity, ashes and putrefaction! The head of this philosopher was not ripe. How many extravagances has the rage for telling novelties produced?

  The principal occupations of our race are the provision of food, lodging, and clothing; all the rest are nearly accessory; and it is this poor accessory which has produced so many ravages and murders.

  Different Races of Men.

  We have elsewhere seen how many different races of men this globe contains, and to what degrees the first negro and the first white who met were astonished at one another.

  It is likely enough that several weakly species of men and animals have perished. It is thus that we no longer discover any of the murex, of which the species has probably been devoured by other animals who several ages after visited the shores inhabited by this little shellfish.

  St. Jerome, in his “History of the Father of the Desert,” speaks of a centaur who had a conversation with St. Anthony the hermit. He afterwards gives an account of a much longer discourse that the same Anthony had with a satyr.

  St. Augustine, in his thirty-third sermon, addressed “To his Brothers in the Desert,” tell things as extraordinary as Jerome. “I was already bishop of Hippo, when I went into Ethiopia with some servants of Christ, there to preach the gospel. In this country we saw many men and women without heads, who had two great eyes in their breasts. In countries still more southerly, we saw a people who had but one eye in their foreheads,” etc.

  Apparently, Augustine and Jerome then spoke “with economy;” they augmented the works of creation to raise greater admiration of the works of God. They sought to astonish men by fables, to render them more submissive to the yoke of faith.

  We can be very good Christians without believing in centaurs, men without heads, or with only one eye, one leg, etc. But can we doubt that the interior structure of a negro may be different to that of a white, since the mucous netted membrane beneath the skin is white in the one, and black in the other? I have already told you so, but you are deaf.

  The Albinos and the Darians—the first originally of Africa, and the second of the middle of America—are as different from us as from the negroes. There are yellow, red, and gray races. We have already seen that all the Americans are without beards or hair on their bodies, except the head and eyebrows. All are equally men, but only as a fir, an oak, and a pear tree are equally trees; the pear tree comes not from the fir, nor the fir from the oak.

  But whence comes it, that in the midst of the Pacific Ocean, in an island named Otaheite, the men are bearded? It is to ask why we are so, while the Peruvians, Mexicans, and Canadians are not. It is to ask, why apes have tails, and why nature has refused us an ornament which, at least among us, is an extreme rarity.

  The inclinations and characters of men differ as much as their climates and governments. It has never been possible to compose a regiment of Laplanders and Samoyeds, whilst the Siberians, their neighbors, become intrepid soldiers.

  Neither can you make good grenadiers of a poor Darian or an Albino. It is not because they have partridge eyes, or that their hair and eyebrows are like the finest and whitest silk; but it is because their bodies, and consequently their courage, partake of the most extreme weakness. There is none but a blind man, and even an obstinate blind man, who can deny the existence of all these different species. It is as great and remarkable as that of apes.

  That All Races of Men Have Constantly Lived in Society.

  All the men whom we have discovered in the most uncultivated and frightful countries herd together like beavers, ants, bees, and several other species of animals.

  We have never seen countries in which they lived separate; or in which the male only joined with the female by chance, and abandoned her the moment after in disgust; or in which the mother estranged herself from her children, after having brought them up; or in which human beings lived without family and society. Some poor jesters have abused their understandings so far as to hazard the astonishing paradox, that man is originally created to live alone, and that it is society which has depraved his nature. They might as well say that herrings were created to swim alone in the sea; and that it is by an excess of corruption, that they pass in a troop from the Frozen Ocean to our shores; that formerly cranes flew in the air singly, and that, by a violation of their natural instinct, they have subsequently chosen to travel in company.

  Every animal has its instinct, and the instinct of man, fortified by reason, disposes him towards society, as towards eating and drinking. So far from the want of society having degraded man, it is estrangement from society which degrades him. Whoever lived absolutely alone, would soon lose the faculty of thinking and expressing himself; he would be a burden to himself, and it would only remain to metamorphose him into a beast. An excess of powerless pride, which rises up against the pride of others, may induce a melancholy man to fly from his fellows; but it is a species of depravity, and punishes itself. That pride is its own punishment, which frets itself into solitude and secretly resents being despised and forgotten. It is enduring the most horrible slavery, in order to be free.

  We have enlarged the bounds of ordinary folly so far as to say that it is not natural for a man to be attached to a woman during the nine months of her pregnancy. The appetite is satisfied, says the author of these paradoxes; the man has no longer any want of woman, nor the woman of man; and the latter need not have the least care, nor perhaps the least idea of the effects of the transient intercourse. They go different ways, and there is no appearance, until the end of nine months, that they have ever been known to one another. Why should he help her after her delivery? Why assist to bring up a child whom he cannot instinctively know belongs to him alone?

  All this is execrable; but happily nothing is more false. If this barbarous indifference was the true instinct of nature, mankind would always have acted thus. Instinct is unchangeable, its inconsistencies are very rare; the father would always abandon the mother, and the mother would abandon her child. There would have been much fewer men on earth than voracious animals; for the wild beasts better provided and better armed, have a more prompt instinct, more sure means of living, and a more certain nourishment than mankind.

  Our nature is very different from the frightful romance which this man, possessed of the devil, has made of it. Except some barbarous souls entirely brutish, or perhaps a philosopher more brutal still, the roughest man, by a prevailing instinct, loves the child which is not yet born, the womb which bears it; and the mother redoubles her love for him from whom she has received the germ of a being similar to himself.

  The instinct of the colliers of the Black Forest speaks to them as loudly, and animates them as strongly in favor of their children as the instinct of pigeons and nightingales induces them to feed their little ones. Time has therefore been sadly lost in writing these abominable absurdities.

  The great fault of all these paradoxical books lies in always supposing nature very different from what it is. If the satires on man and woman written by Boileau were not pleasantries, they would sin in the essential point of supposing all men fools and all women coquettes.

  The same author, an enemy to society, like the fox without a tail who would have his companions cut off theirs, thus in a magisterial style expresses himself:

  “The first who, having enclosed an estate, took upon himself to say: ‘This is mine,’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of society. What crimes, wars, murders, miseries, and horrors, might have been spared to mankind if some one, seizing the stakes, or filling up the pit, had cried to his companions: ‘Take care how you listen to this impostor; you are lost if you forget that the fruits are common to all, and that the earth belongs to nobody!’ ”

  Thus, according to this fine philosopher, a thief, a destroyer, would have been the benefactor of mankind, and we should punish an honest man who says to his children: “Let us imitate our neighbor; he has enclosed his field, the beasts will no longer ravage it, his land will become more fertile; let us work ours as he has labored his; it will aid us, and we shall improve it. Each family cultivating its own enclosure, we shall be better fed, more healthy, more peaceable, and less unhappy. We will endeavor to establish a distributive justice, which will console our unhappy race; and we shall be raised above the foxes and polecats, to whom this babbler would compare us.”

  Would not this discourse be more sensible and honest than that of the savage fool who would destroy the good man’s orchard? What philosophy therefore is that which says things that common sense disclaims from China to Canada? Is it not that of a beggar, who would have all the rich robbed by the poor, in order that fraternal union might be better established among men?

  It is true, that if all the hedges, forests, and plains were covered with wholesome and delicious fruits, it would be impossible, unjust, and ridiculous, to guard them.

  If there are any islands in which nature produces food and all necessaries without trouble, let us go and live there, far from the trash of our laws; but as soon as you have peopled them, we must return to meum and tuum, and to laws which are often very bad, but which we cannot rationally abolish.

  Is Man Born Wicked?

  Is it not demonstrated that man is not born perverse and the child of the devil? If such was his nature, he would commit enormous crimes and barbarities as soon as he could walk; he would use the first knife he could find, to wound whoever displeased him. He would necessarily resemble little wolves and foxes, who bite as soon as they can.

  On the contrary, throughout the world, he partakes of the nature of the lamb, while he is an infant. Why, therefore, and how is it, that he so often becomes a wolf and fox? Is it not that, being born neither good nor wicked, education, example, the government into which he is thrown—in short, occasion of every kind—determines him to virtue or vice?

  Perhaps human nature could not be otherwise. Man could not always have false thoughts, nor always true affections; be always sweet, or always cruel.

  It is demonstrable that woman is elevated beyond men in the scale of goodness. We see a hundred brothers enemies to each other, to one Clytemnestra.

  There are professions which necessarily render the soul pitiless—those of the soldier, the butcher, the officer of justice, and the jailer; and all trades which are founded on the annoyance of others.

  The officer, the soldier, the jailer, for example, are only happy in making others miserable. It is true, they are necessary against malefactors, and so far useful to society; but of a thousand men of the kind, there is not one who acts from the motive of the public good, or who even reflects that it is a public good.

  It is above all a curious thing to hear them speak of their prowess as they count the number of their victims; their snares to entrap them, the ills which they have made them suffer, and the money which they have got by it.

  Whoever has been able to descend to the subaltern detail of the bar; whoever has only heard lawyears reason familiarly among themselves, and applaud themselves for the miseries of their clients, must have a very poor opinion of human nature.

  There are more frightful possessions still, which are, however, canvassed for like a canonship. There are some which change an honest man into a rogue, and which accustom him to lie in spite of himself, to deceive almost without perceiving it, to put a blind before the eyes of others, to prostrate himself by the interest and vanity of his situation, and without remorse to plunge mankind into stupid blindness.

  Women, incessantly occupied with the education of their children, and shut up in their domestic cares, are excluded from all these professions, which pervert human nature and render it atrocious. They are everywhere less barbarous than men.

  Physics join with morals to prevent them from great crimes; their blood is milder; they are less addicted to strong liquors, which inspire ferocity. An evident proof is, that of a thousand victims of justice in a thousand executed assassins, we scarcely reckon four women. It is also proved elsewhere, I believe, that in Asia there are not two examples of women condemned to a public punishment. It appears, therefore, that our customs and habits have rendered the male species very wicked.

  If this truth was general and without exceptions, the species would be more horrible than spiders, wolves, and polecats are to our eyes. But happily, professions which harden the heart and fill it with odious passions, are very rare. Observe, that in a nation of twenty millions, there are at most two hundred thousand soldiers. This is but one soldier to two hundred individuals. These two hundred thousand soldiers are held in the most severe discipline, and there are among them very honest people, who return to their villages and finish their old age as good fathers and husbands.

  The number of other trades which are dangerous to manners, is but small. Laborers, artisans, and artists are too much occupied often to deliver themselves up to crime. The earth will always bear detestable wretches, and books will always exaggerate the number, which, rather than being greater, is less than we say.

  If mankind had been under the empire of the devil, there would be no longer any person upon earth. Let us console ourselves: we have seen, and we shall always see, fine minds from Pekin to la Rochelle; and whatever licentiates and bachelors may say, the Tituses, Trajans, Antoninuses, and Peter Bayles were very honest men.

  Of Man in the State of Pure Nature.

  What would man be in the state which we call that of pure nature? An animal much below the first Iroquois whom we found in the north of America. He would be very inferior to these Iroquois, since they knew how to light fires and make arrows. He would require ages to arrive at these two arts.

  Man, abandoned to pure nature, would have, for his language, only a few inarticulate sounds; the species would be reduced to a very small number, from the difficulty of getting nourishment and the want of help, at least in our harsh climates. He would have no more knowledge of God and the soul, than of mathematics; these ideas would be lost in the care of procuring food. The race of beavers would be infinitely preferable.

  Man would then be only precisely like a robust child; and we have seen many men who are not much above that state, as it is. The Laplanders, the Samoyeds, the inhabitants of Kamchatka, the Kaffirs, and Hottentots are—with respect to man in a state of pure nature—that which the courts of Cyrus and Semiramis were in comparison with the inhabitants of the Cévennes. Yet the inhabitants of Kamchatka and the Hottentots of our days, so superior to men entirely savage, are animals who live six months of the year in caverns, where they eat the vermin by which they are eaten.

  In general, mankind is not above two or three degrees more civilized than the Kamchatkans. The multitude of brute beasts called men, compared with the little number of those who think, is at least in the proportion of a hundred to one in many nations.

  It is pleasant to contemplate on one side, Father Malebranche, who treats familiarly of “the Word”; and on the other, these millions of animals similar to him, who have never heard speak of “the Word,” and who have not one metaphysical idea.

  Between men of pure instinct and men of genius floats this immense number occupied solely with subsisting.

  This subsistence costs us so much pains, that in the north of America an image of God often runs five or six leagues to get a dinner; whilst among us the image of God bedews the ground with the sweat of his brow, in order to procure bread.

  Add to this bread—or the equivalent—a hut, and a poor dress, and you will have man such as he is in general, from one end of the universe to the other: and it is only in a multitude of ages that he has been able to arrive at this high degree of attainment.

  Finally, after other ages, things got to the point at which we see them. Here we represent a tragedy in music; there we kill one another on the high seas of another hemisphere, with a thousand pieces of cannon. The opera and a ship of war of the first rank always astonish my imagination. I doubt whether they can be carried much farther in any of the globes with which the heavens are studded. More than half the habitable world, however, is still peopled with two-footed animals, who live in the horrible state approaching to pure nature, existing and clothing themselves with difficulty, scarcely enjoying the gift of speech, scarcely perceiving that they are unfortunate, and living and dying almost without knowing it.

  Examination of a Thought of Pascal on Man.

  “I can conceive a man without hands or feet, and I could even conceive him without a head, if experience taught me not that it is with the head he thinks. It is therefore thought which makes the being of man, without which we cannot conceive him.”—(Thoughts of Pascal.)

  How! conceive a man, without feet, hands, and head? This would be as different a thing from a man as a gourd.

  If all men were without heads, how could yours conceive that there are animals like yourselves, since they would have nothing of what principally constitutes your being? A head is something; the five senses are contained in it, and thought also. An animal, which from the nape of its neck downwards might resemble a man, or one of those apes which we call ourang-outang or the man of the woods, would no more be a man than an ape or a bear whose head and tail were cut off.

  It is therefore thought which makes the being of a man. In this case, thought would be his essence, as extent and solidity are the essence of matter. Man would think essentially and always, as matter is always extended and solid. He would think in a profound sleep without dreams, in a fit, in a lethargy, in the womb of his mother. I well know that I never thought in any of these states; I confess it often; and I doubt not that others are like myself.

  If thought was as essential to man as extent is to matter, it would follow that God cannot deprive this animal of understanding, since he cannot deprive matter of extent—for then it would be no longer matter. Now, if understanding be essential to man, he is a thinking being by nature, as God is God by nature.

  If desirous to define God, as such poor beings as ourselves can define Him, I should say, that thought is His being, His essence; but as to man—!

  We have the faculties of thinking, walking, talking, eating, and sleeping, but we do not always use these faculties, it is not in our nature.

  Thought, with us, is it not an attribute? and so much an attribute that it is sometimes weak, sometimes strong, sometimes reasonable, and sometimes extravagant? It hides itself, shows itself, flies, returns, is nothing, is reproduced. Essence is quite another thing; it never varies; it knows nothing of more or less.

  What, therefore, would be the animal supposed by Pascal? A being of reason. He might just as well have supposed a tree to which God might have given thought, as it is said that the gods granted voices to the trees of Dodona.

  Operation of God on Man.

  People who have founded systems on the communication of God with man have said that God acts directly physically on man in certain cases only, when God grants certain particular gifts; and they have called this action “physical premotion.” Diocles and Erophiles, those two great enthusiasts, maintain this opinion, and have partisans.

  Now we recognize a God quite as well as these people, because we cannot conceive that any one of the beings which surround us could be produced of itself. By the fact alone that something exists, the necessary Eternal Being must be necessarily the cause of all. With these reasoners, we admit the possibility of God making himself understood to some favorites; but we go farther, we believe that He makes Himself understood by all men, in all places, and in all times, since to all he gives life, motion, digestion, thought, and instinct.

  Is there in the vilest of animals, and in the most sublime philosophers, a being who can will motion, digestion, desire, love, instinct, or thought? No; but we act, we love, we have instincts; as for example, an invincible liking to certain objects, an insupportable aversion to others, a promptitude to execute the movements necessary to our preservation, as those of sucking the breasts of our nurses, swimming when we are strong and our bosoms large enough, biting our bread, drinking, stooping to avoid a blow from a stone, collecting our force to clear a ditch, etc. We accomplish a thousand such actions without thinking of them, though they are all profoundly mathematical. In short, we think and feel without knowing how.

  In good earnest, is it more difficult for God to work all within us by means of which we are ignorant, than to stir us internally sometimes, by the efficacious grace of Jupiter, of which these gentlemen talk to us unceasingly?

  Where is the man who, when he looks into himself, perceives not that he is a puppet of Providence? I think—but can I give myself a thought? Alas! if I thought of myself, I should know what ideas I might entertain the next moment—a thing which nobody knows.

  I acquire a knowledge, but I could not give it to myself. My intelligence cannot be the cause of it; for the cause must contain the effect: Now, my first acquired knowledge was not in my understanding; being the first, it was given to me by him who formed me, and who gives all, whatever it may be.

  I am astonished, when I am told that my first knowledge cannot alone give me a second; that it must contain it.

  The proof that we give ourselves no ideas is that we receive them in our dreams; and certainly, it is neither our will nor attention which makes us think in dreams. There are poets who make verses sleeping; geometricians who measure triangles. All proves to us that there is a power which acts within us without consulting us.

  All our sentiments, are they not involuntary? Hearing, taste, and sight are nothing by themselves. We feel, in spite of ourselves: we do nothing of ourselves: we are nothing without a Supreme Power which enacts all things.

  The most superstitious allow these truths, but they apply them only to people of their own class. They affirm that God acts physically on certain privileged persons. We are more religious than they; we believe that the Great Being acts on all living things, as on all matter. Is it therefore more difficult for Him to stir all men than to stir some of them? Will God be God for your little sect alone? He is equally so for me, who do not belong to it.

  A new philosopher goes further than you; it seemed to him that God alone exists. He pretends that we are all in Him; and we say that it is God who sees and acts in all that has life. “Jupiter est quodcumque vides; quodcumque moveris.”

  To proceed. Your physical premotion introduces God acting in you. What need have you then of a soul? Of what good is this little unknown and incomprehensible being? Do you give a soul to the sun, which enlightens so many globes? And if this star so great, so astonishing, and so necessary, has no soul, why should man have one? God who made us, does He not suffice for us? What, therefore, is become of the axiom? Effect not that by many, which can be accomplished by one.

  This soul, which you have imagined to be a substance, is therefore really only a faculty, granted by the Great Being, and not by a person. It is a property given to our organs, and not a substance. Man, his reason uncorrupted by metaphysics, could never imagine that he was double; that he was composed of two beings, the one mortal, visible, and palpable—the other immortal, invisible, and impalpable. Would it not require ages of controversy to arrive at this expedient of joining together two substances so dissimilar; tangible and intangible, simple and compound, invulnerable and suffering, eternal and fleeting?

  Men have only supposed a soul by the same error which made them suppose in us a being called memory, which being they afterwards made a divinity.

  They made this memory the mother of the Muses; they embodied the various talents of nature in so many goddesses, the daughters of memory. They also made a god of the secret power by which nature forms the blood of animals, and called it the god of sanguification. The Roman people indeed had similar gods for the faculties of eating and drinking, for the act of marriage, for the act of voiding excrements. They were so many particular souls, which produced in us all these actions. It was the metaphysics of the populace. This shameful and ridiculous superstition was evidently derived from that which imagined in man a small divine substance, different from man himself.

  This substance is still admitted in all the schools; and with condescension we grant to the Great Being, to the Eternal Maker, to God, the permission of joining His concurrence to the soul. Thus we suppose, that for will and deed, both God and our souls are necessary.

  But to concur signifies to aid, to participate. God therefore is only second with us; it is degrading Him; it is putting Him on a level with us, or making Him play the most inferior part. Take not from Him His rank and pre-eminence: make not of the Sovereign of Nature the mere servant of mankind.

  Two species of reasoners, well credited in the world—atheists and theologians—will oppose our doubts.

  The atheists will say, that in admitting reason in man and instinct in brutes, as properties, it is very useless to admit a God into this system; that God is still more incomprehensible than a soul; that it is unworthy a sage to believe that which he conceives not. They let fly against us all the arguments of Straton and Lucretius. We will answer them by one word only: “You exist; therefore there is a God.”

  Theologians will give us more trouble. They will first tell us: “We agree with you that God is the first cause of all; but He is not the only one.” A high priest of Minerva says expressly: “The second agent operates by virtue of the first; the first induces a second; the second involves a third; all are acting by virtue of God, and He is the cause of all actions acting.”

  We will answer, with all the respect we owe to this high priest: “There is, and there can only exist, one true cause. All the others, which are subsequent, are but instruments. I discover a spring—I make use of it to move a machine; I discovered the spring and made the machine. I am the sole cause. That is undoubted.”

  The high priest will reply: “You take liberty away from men.” I reply: “No; liberty consists in the faculty of willing, and in that of doing what you will, when nothing prevents you. God has made man upon these conditions, and he must be contented with them.”

  My priest will persist, and say, that we make God the author of sin. Then we shall answer him: “I am sorry for it; but God is made the author of sin in all systems, except in that of the atheists. For if He concurs with the actions of perverse men, as with those of the just, it is evident that to concur is to do, since He who concurs is also the creator of all.”

  If God alone permits sin, it is He who commits it; since to permit and to do is the same thing to the absolute master of all. If He foresees that men will do evil, he should not form men. We have never eluded the force of these ancient arguments; we have never weakened them. Whoever has produced all, has certainly produced good and evil. The system of absolute predestination, the doctrine of concurrence, equally plunge us into this labyrinth, from which we cannot extricate ourselves.

  All that we can say is, that evil is for us, and not for God. Nero assassinates his preceptor and his mother; another murders his relations and neighbors; a high priest poisons, strangles, and beheads twenty Roman lords, on rising from the bed of his daughter. This is of no more importance to the Being, the Universal Soul of the World, than sheep eaten by the wolves or by us, or than flies devoured by spiders. There is no evil for the Great Being; to Him it is only the play of the great machine which incessantly moves by eternal laws. If the wicked become—whether during their lives or subsequently—more unhappy than those whom they have sacrificed to their passions; if they suffer as they have made others suffer, it is still an inevitable consequence of the immutable laws by which the Great Being necessarily acts. We know but a very small part of these laws; we have but a very weak portion of understanding; we have only resignation in our power. Of all systems, is not that which makes us acquainted with our insignificance the most reasonable? Men—as all philosophers of antiquity have said—made God in their own image; which is the reason why the first Anaxagoras, as ancient as Orpheus, expresses himself thus in his verses: “If the birds figured to themselves a God, he would have wings; that of horses would run with four legs.”

  The vulgar imagine God to be a king, who holds his seat of justice in his court. Tender hearts represent him as a father who takes care of his children. The sage attributes to Him no human affection. He acknowledges a necessary eternal power which animates all nature, and resigns himself to it.

  General Reflection on Man.

  It requires twenty years to raise man from the state of a plant, in which he abides in his mother’s womb, and from the pure animal state, which is the lot of his earliest infancy, to that in which the maturity of reason begins to dawn. He has required thirty ages to become a little acquainted with his own bodily structure. He would require eternity to become acquainted with his soul. He requires but an instant to kill himself.

  MARRIAGE.

  SECTION I.

  I once met with a reasoner who said: “Induce your subjects to marry as early as possible. Let them be exempt from taxes the first year; and let their portion be assessed on those who at the same age are in a state of celibacy.

  “The more married men you have, the fewer crimes there will be. Examine the frightful columns of your criminal calendars; you will there find a hundred youths executed for one father of a family.

  “Marriage renders men more virtuous and more wise. The father of a family is not willing to blush before his children; he is afraid to make shame their inheritance.

  “Let your soldiers marry, and they will no longer desert. Bound to their families, they will be bound to their country. An unmarried soldier is frequently nothing but a vagabond, to whom it matters not whether he serves the king of Naples or the king of Morocco.”

  The Roman warriors were married: they fought for their wives and their children; and they made slaves of the wives and the children of other nations.

  A great Italian politician, who was, besides, learned in the Eastern tongues, a thing rare among our politicians, said to me in my youth: “Caro figlio,” remember that the Jews never had but one good institution—that of abhorring virginity. If that little nation of superstitious jobbers had not regarded marriage as the first of the human obligations—if there had been among them convents of nuns—they would have been inevitably lost.”

  The Marriage Contract.

  Marriage is a contract in the law of nations, of which the Roman Catholics have made a sacrament.

  But the sacrament and the contract are two very different things; with the one are connected the civil effects, with the other the graces of the church.

  So when the contract is conformable to the law of nations, it must produce every civil effect. The absence of the sacrament can operate only in the privation of spiritual graces.

  Such has been the jurisprudence of all ages, and of all nations, excepting the French. Such was the opinion of the most accredited fathers of the Church. Go through the Theodosian and Justinian codes, and you will find no law proscribing the marriages of persons of another creed, not even when contracted between them and Catholics.

  It is true, that Constantius—that son of Constantine as cruel as his father—forbade the Jews, on pain of death, to marry Christian women; and that Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius made the same prohibition, under the like penalty, to the Jewish women. But under the emperor Marcian these laws had ceased to be observed; and Justinian rejected them from his code. Besides, they were made against the Jews only; no one ever thought of applying them to the marriage of pagans or heretics with the followers of the prevailing religion.

  Consult St. Augustine, and he will tell you that in his time the marriages of believers with unbelievers were not considered illicit, because no gospel text had condemned them: “Quæ matrimonia cum in fidelibus, nostris temporibus, jam non putantur esse peccata; quoniam in Novo Testamento nihil inde preceptum est, et ideo aut licere creditum est, aut velut dubium derelictum.”

  Augustine says, moreover, that these marriages often work the conversion of the unbelieving party. He cites the example of his own father, who embraced the Christian religion because his wife, Manica, professed Christianity. Clotilda, by the conversion of Clovis, and Theolinda, by that of Agilulf, king of the Lombards, rendered greater service to the Church than if they had married orthodox princes.

  Consult the declaration of Pope Benedict XIV. of Nov. 4, 1741. You will find in it these words: “Quod vero spectat ad ea conjugia quæ, absque forma a Tridentino statuta, contrahuntur a catholicis cum hæreticis, sive catholicus vir hæriticam feminam ducat, sive catholica fæmina heretico viro nubat; si hujusmodi matrimonium sit contractum aut in posterum contracti contingat, Tridentini forma non servata, declarat Sanctitas sua, alio non concurrente impedimento, validum habendum esse, sciat conjux catholicus se istius matrimonii vinculo perpetuo ligatum.”—“With respect to such marriages as, transgressing the enactment of the Council of Trent, are contracted by Catholics with heretics; whether by a Catholic man with a heretical woman, or by a Catholic woman with a heretical man; if such matrimony already is, or hereafter shall be contracted, the rules of the council not being observed, his holiness declares, that if there be no other impediment, it shall be held valid, the Catholic man or woman understanding that he or she is by such matrimony bound until death.”

  By what astonishing contradiction is it, that the French laws in this matter are more severe than those of the Church? The first law by which this severity was established in France was the edict of Louis XIV., of November, 1680, which deserves to be repeated.

  “Louis, . . . . The canons of the councils having forbidden marriages of Catholics with heretics, as a public scandal and a profanation of the sacrament, we have deemed it the more necessary to prevent them for the future, as we have found that the toleration of such marriages exposes Catholics to the continual temptation of perverting it, etc. For these causes, . . . . it is our will and pleasure, that in future our subjects of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic religion may not, under any pretext whatsoever, contract marriage with those of the pretended reformed religion, declaring such marriages to be invalid, and the issue of them illegitimate.”

  It is singular enough, that the laws of the Church should have been made the foundation for annulling marriages which the Church never annulled. In this edict we find the sacrament confounded with the civil contract; and from this confusion have proceeded the strange laws in France concerning marriage.

  St. Augustine approved marriages of the orthodox with heretics, for he hoped that the faithful spouse would convert the other; and Louis XIV. condemns them, lest the heterodox should pervert the believer.

  In Franche-Comté there exists a yet more cruel law. This is an edict of the archduke Albert and his wife Isabella, of Dec. 20, 1599, which forbids Catholics to marry heretics, on pain of confiscation of body and goods.

  The same edict pronounces the same penalty on such as shall be convicted of eating mutton on Friday or Saturday. What laws! and what law-givers!—“A quels maîtres, grand Dieu, livrez-vous l’univers!”

  SECTION II.

  If our laws reprove marriages of Catholics with persons of a different religion, do they grant the civil effects at least to marriages of French Protestants with French persons of the same sect?

  There are now in the kingdom a million of Protestants; yet the validity of their marriage is still a question in the tribunals.

  Here again is one of those cases in which our jurisprudence is contradictory to the decisions of the Church, and also to itself.

  In the papal declaration, quoted in the foregoing section, Benedict XIV. decides that marriages of Protestants, contracted according to their rites, are no less valid than if they had been performed according to the forms established by the Council of Trent; and that a husband who turns Catholic cannot break this tie and form a new one with a person of his new religion.

  Barak Levi, by birth a Jew, and a native of Haguenan, had there married Mendel Cerf, of the same town and the same religion.

  This Jew came to Paris in 1752; and on May 13, 1754, he was baptized. He sent a summons to his wife at Haguenan to come and join him at Paris. In a second summons he consented that this wife, when she had come to join him, should continue to live in her own Jewish sect.

  To these summonses Mendel Cerf replied that she would not return with him, and that she required him to send her, according to the Jewish forms, a bill of divorce, in order that she might marry another Jew.

  Levi was not satisfied with this answer; he sent no bill of divorce; but he caused his wife to appear before the official of Strasburg, who, by a sentence of Sept. 7, 1754, declared that, in the sight of the Church, he was at liberty to marry a Catholic woman.

  Furnished with this sentence, the Christianized Jew came into the diocese of Soissons, and there made promise of marriage to a young woman of Villeneuve. The clergyman refused to publish the banns. Levi communicated to him the summonses he had sent to his wife, the sentence of the official of Strasburg, and a certificate from the secretary of the bishopric of that place, attesting, that in that diocese baptized Jews had at all times been permitted to contract new marriages with Catholics, and that this usage had constantly been recognized by the Supreme Council of Colmar. But these documents appeared to the parson of Villeneuve to be insufficient. Levi was obliged to summon him before the official of Soissons.

  This official did not think, like him of Strasburg, that the marriage of Levi with Mendel Cerf was null or dissoluble. By his sentence of Feb. 5, 1756, he declared the Jew’s claim to be inadmissible. The latter appealed from this sentence to the Parliament of Paris, where he was not only opposed by the public ministry, but, by a decree of Jan. 2, 1758, the sentence was confirmed, and Levi was again forbidden to contract any marriage during the life of Mendel Cerf.

  Here, then, a marriage contracted between French Jews, according to the Jewish rites, was declared valid by the first court in the kingdom.

  But, some years afterwards, the same question was decided differently in another parliament, on the subject of a marriage contracted between two French Protestants, who had been married in the presence of their parents by a minister of their own communion. The Protestant spouse had, like the Jew, changed his religion; and after he had concluded a second marriage with a Catholic, the Parliament of Grenoble confirmed this second marriage, and declared the first to be null.

  If we pass from jurisprudence to legislation, we shall find it as obscure on this important matter as on so many others.

  A decree of the council, of Sept. 15, 1685, says: “Protestants may marry, provided, however, that it be in the presence of the principal officer of justice, and that the publication preceding such marriages shall be made at the royal see nearest the place of abode of each of the Protestants desirous of marrying, and at the audience only.”

  This decree was not revoked by the edict which, three weeks after, suppressed the Edict of Nantes. But after the declaration of May 14, 1724, drawn up by Cardinal Fleury, the judges would no longer preside over the marriages of Protestants, nor permit their banns to be published in their audiences.

  By Article XV. of this law, the forms prescribed by the canons are to be observed in marriages, as well of new converts as of all the rest of the king’s subjects.

  This general expression, “all the rest of the king’s subjects,” has been thought to comprehend the Protestants, as well as the Catholics, and on this interpretation, such marriages of Protestants as were not solemnized according to the canonical forms have been annulled.

  Nevertheless, it seems that the marriages of Protestants having been authorized by an express law, they cannot now be admitted but by another express law carrying with it this penalty. Besides, the term “new converts,” mentioned in the declaration, appears to indicate that the term that follows relates to the Catholics only. In short, when the civil law is obscure or ambiguous, ought not the judges to decide according to the natural and the moral law?

  Does it not result from all this that laws often have need of reformation, and princes of consulting better informed counsellors, rejecting priestly ministers, and distrusting courtiers in the garb of confessors?

  MARY MAGDALEN.

  I must own that I know not where the author of the “Critical History of Jesus Christ” found that “St. Mary Magdalen had a criminal intimacy (des complaisances criminelles) with the Saviour of the world.” He says (page 130, line 11 of the note) that this is an assertion of the Albigenses. I have never read this horrible blasphemy either in the history of the Albigenses, or in their profession of faith. It is one of the great many things of which I am ignorant. I know that the Albigenses had the dire misfortune of not being Roman Catholics; but, otherwise, it seems to me, they had the most profound reverence for the person of Jesus.

  This author of the “Critical History of Jesus Christ” refers us to the “Christiade,” a sort of poem in prose—granting that there are such things as poems in prose. I have, therefore, been obliged to consult the passage of the “Christiade” in which this accusation is made. It is in the fourth book or canto, page 335, note 1; the poet of the “Christiade” cites no authority. In an epic poem, indeed, citations may be spared; but great authorities are requisite in prose, when so grave an assertion is made—one which makes every Christian’s hair stand erect.

  Whether the Albigenses advanced this impiety or not, the only result is that the author of the “Christiade” sports on the brink of criminality. He somewhat imitates the famous sermon of Menot. He introduces us to Mary Magdalen, the sister of Martha and Lazarus, brilliant with all the charms of youth and beauty, burning with every desire, and immersed in every voluptuousness. According to him, she is a lady at court, exalted in birth and in riches; her brother Lazarus was count of Bethany, and herself marchioness of Magdalet. Martha had a splendid portion, but he does not tell us where her estates lay. “She had,” says the man of the “Christiade,” “a hundred servants, and a crowd of lovers; she might have threatened the liberty of the whole world. But riches, dignities, ambitions, grandeur, never were so dear to Magdalen as the seductive error which caused her to be named the sinner. Such was the sovereign beauty of the capital when the young and divine hero arrived there from the extremities of Galilee. Her other passions yielded to the ambition of subduing the hero of whom she had heard.”

  The author of the “Christiade” then imitates Virgil. The marchioness of Magdalet conjures her portioned sister to furnish her coquettish designs upon her young hero, as Dido employed her sister Anna to gain the pious Æneas.

  She goes to hear Christ’s sermon in the temple, although he never preached there. “Her heart flies before her to the hero she adores; she awaits but one favorable look to triumph over him, to subdue this master of hearts and make him her captive.”

  She then goes to him at the house of Simon the Leper, a very rich man, who was giving him a grand supper, although the women were never admitted at these feastings, especially among the Pharisees. She pours a large pot of perfumes upon his legs, wipes them with her beautiful fair hair, and kisses them.

  I shall not inquire whether the picture which the author draws of Magdalen’s holy transports is not more worldly than devout; whether the kisses given are not expressed rather too warmly; nor whether this fine hair with which she wipes her hero’s legs, does not remind one too strongly of Trimalcion, who, at dinner, wiped his hands with the hair of a young and beautiful slave. He must himself have felt that his pictures might be fancied too glowing; for he anticipates criticism by giving some pieces from a sermon of Massillon’s on Magdalen. One passage is as follows:

  “Magdalen had sacrificed her reputation to the world. Her bashfulness and her birth at first defended her against the emotions of her passion; and it is most likely, that to the first shaft which assailed her, she opposed the barrier of her modesty and her pride; but when she had lent her ear to the serpent, and consulted her own wisdom, her heart was open to all assaults of passion. Magdalen loved the world, and thenceforward all was sacrificed to this love; neither the pride that springs from birth, nor the modesty which is the ornament of her sex, is spared in this sacrifice; nothing can withhold her; neither the railleries of worldlings, nor the infidelities of her infatuated lovers, whom she fain would please, but by whom she cannot make herself esteemed—for virtue only is estimable; nothing can make her ashamed; and like the prostitute in the “Apocalypse,” she bears on her forehead the name of mystery; that is, she was veiled, and was no longer known but in the character of the foolish passion.”

  I have sought this passage in Massillon’s sermons, but it certainly is not in the edition which I possess. I will venture to say more—it is not in his style.

  The author of the “Christiade” should have informed us where he picked up this rhapsody of Massillon’s, as he should have told us where he read that the Albigenses dared to impute to Jesus Christ an unworthy intercourse with Mary Magdalen.

  As for the marchioness, she is not again mentioned in the work. The author spares us her voyage to Marseilles with Lazarus, and the rest of her adventures.

  What could induce a man of learning, and sometimes of eloquence, as the author of the “Christiade” appears to be, to compose this pretended poem? It was, as he tells us in his preface, the example of Milton; but we well know how deceitful are examples. Milton, who—be it observed—did not hazard that weakly monstrosity, a poem in prose—Milton, who in his “Paradise Lost,” has, amid the multitude of harsh and obscure lines of which it is full, scattered some very fine blank verse—could not please any but fanatical Whigs, as the Abbé Grécourt says:

  • En chantant l’univers perdu pour une pomme,
  • Et Dieu pour le damner créant le premier homme.
  • . . . . . . . . . . . By singing
  • How God made man on purpose for hell-fire,
  • And how a stolen apple damned us all.

  He might delight the Presbyterians by making Sin cohabit with Death; by firing off twenty-four pounders in heaven; by making dryness fight with damp, and heat with cold; by cleaving angels in two, whose halves immediately joined again; by building a bridge over chaos; by representing the Messiah taking from a chest in heaven a great pair of compasses to describe the circuit of the earth, etc. Virgil and Horace would, perhaps, have thought these ideas rather strange. But if they succeeded in England by the aid of some very happy lines, the author of the “Christiade” was mistaken in expecting his romance to succeed without the assistance of fine verses, which are indeed very difficult to make.

  But, says our author, one Jerome Vida, bishop of Alba, once wrote a very powerful Christiade in Latin verse, in which he transcribes many lines from Virgil. Well, my friend, why did you write yours in French prose? Why did not you, too, imitate Virgil?

  But the late M. d’Escorbiac, of Toulouse, also wrote a Christiade. Alas! why were you so unfortunate as to become the ape of M. d’Escorbiac?

  But Milton, too, wrote his romance of the New Testament, his “Paradise Regained,” in blank verse, frequently resembling the worst prose. Leave it, then, to Milton to set Satan and Jesus constantly at war. Let it be his to cause a drove of swine to be driven along by a legion of devils; that is, by six thousand seven hundred, who take possession of these swine—there being three devils and seven-twentieths per pig—and drown them in a lake. It well becomes Milton to make the devil propose to God that they shall take a good supper together. In Milton, the devil may at his ease cover the table with ortolans, partridges, soles, sturgeons, and make Hebe and Ganymede hand wine to Jesus Christ. In Milton, the devil may take God up a little hill, from the top of which he shows him the capital, the Molucca Islands, and the Indian city; the birthplace of the beauteous Angelica, who turned Orlando’s brain; after which he may offer to God all this, provided that God will adore him. But even Milton labored in vain; people have laughed at him. They have laughed at poor brother Berruyer, the Jesuit. They have laughed at you. Bear it with patience!

  MARTYRS.

  SECTION I.

  Martyr, “witness”; martyrdom, testimony. The early Christian community at first gave the name of “martyrs” to those who announced new truths to mankind, who gave testimony to Jesus; who confessed Jesus; in the same manner as they gave the name of “saints” to the presbyters, to the supervisors of the community, and to their female benefactors; this is the reason why St. Jerome, in his letters, often calls his initiated Paul, St. Paul. All the first bishops were called saints.

  Subsequently, the name of martyrs was given only to deceased Christians, or to those who had been tortured for punishment; and the little chapels that were erected to them received afterwards the name of “martyrion.”

  It is a great question, why the Roman Empire always tolerated in its bosom the Jewish sect, even after the two horrible wars of Titus and Adrian; why it tolerated the worship of Isis at several times; and why it frequently persecuted Christianity. It is evident that the Jews, who paid dearly for their synagogues, denounced the Christians as mortal foes, and excited the people against them. It is moreover evident that the Jews, occupied with the trade of brokers and usurers, did not preach against the ancient religion of the empire, and that the Christians, who were all busy in controversy, preached against the public worship, sought to destroy it, often burned the temples, and broke the consecrated statues, as St. Theodosius did at Amasia, and St. Polyeuctus in Mitylene.

  The orthodox Christians, sure that their religion was the only true one, did not tolerate any other. In consequence, they themselves were hardly tolerated. Some of them were punished and died for the faith—and these were the martyrs.

  This name is so respectable that it should not be prodigally bestowed; it is not right to assume the name and arms of a family to which one does not belong. Very heavy penalties have been established against those who have the audacity to decorate themselves with the cross of Malta or of St. Louis, without being chevaliers of those orders.

  The learned Dodwell, the dexterous Middleton, the judicious Blondel, the exact Tillemont, the scrutinizing Launoy, and many others, all zealous for the glory of the true martyrs, have excluded from their catalogue an obscure multitude on whom this great title had been lavished. We have remarked that these learned men were sanctioned by the direct acknowledgment of Origen, who, in his “Refutation of Celsus,” confesses that there are very few martyrs, and those at a great distance of time, and that it is easy to reckon them.

  Nevertheless, the Benedictine Ruinart—who calls himself Don Ruinart, although he was no Spaniard—has contradicted all these learned persons! He has candidly given us many stories of martyrs which have appeared to the critics very suspicious. Many sensible persons have doubted various anecdotes relating to the legends recounted by Don Ruinart, from beginning to end.

  1. Of Saint Symphorosia and her Seven Children.

  Their scruples commence with St. Symphorosia and her seven children who suffered martyrdom with her; which appears, at first sight, too much imitated from the seven Maccabees. It is not known whence this legend comes; and that is at once a great cause of skepticism.

  It is therein related that the emperor Adrian himself wished to interrogate the unknown Symphorosia, to ascertain if she was a Christian. This would have been more extraordinary than if Louis XIV. had subjected a Huguenot to an interrogatory. You will further observe that Adrian, far from being a persecutor of the Christians, was their greatest protector.

  He had then a long conversation with Symphorosia, and putting himself in a passion, he said to her: “I will sacrifice you to the gods”; as if the Roman emperors sacrificed women in their devotions. In the sequel, he caused her to be thrown into the Anio—which was not a usual mode of immolation. He afterwards had one of her sons cloven in two from the top of his head to his middle; a second from side to side; a third was broken on the wheel; a fourth was only stabbed in the stomach; a fifth right to the heart; a sixth had his throat cut; the seventh died of a parcel of needles thrust into his breast. The emperor Adrian was fond of variety. He commanded that they should be buried near the temple of Hercules—although no one is ever buried in Rome, much less near the temples, which would have been a horrible profanation. The legend adds that the chief priest of the temple named the place of their interment “the Seven Biotanates.”

  If it was extraordinary that a monument should be erected at Rome to persons thus treated, it was no less so that a high priest should concern himself with the inscription; and further, that this Roman priest should make a Greek epitaph for them. But what is still more strange is that it is pretended that this word “biotanates” signifies the seven tortured. “Biotanates” is a fabricated word, which one does not meet with in any author; and this signification can only be given to it by a play upon words, falsely using the word “thenon.” There is scarcely any fable worse constructed. The writers of legends knew how to lie, but none of them knew how to lie skilfully.

  The learned Lacroze, librarian to Frederick the Great, king of Prussia, observed: “I know not whether Ruinart is sincere, but I am afraid he is silly.”

  2. Of St. Felicita and Seven More Children.

  It is from Surius that this legend is taken. This Surius is rather notorious for his absurdities. He was a monk of the sixteenth century, who writes about the martyrs of the second as if he had been present.

  He pretends that that wicked man, that tyrant, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Pius, ordered the prefect of Rome to institute a process against St. Felicita, to have her and her seven children put to death, because there was a rumor that she was a Christian.

  The prefect held his tribunal in the Campus Martius, which, however, was at that time used only for the reviewing of troops; and the first thing the prefect did was to cause a blow to be given her in full assembly.

  The long discourses of the magistrates and the accused are worthy of the historian. He finishes by putting the seven brothers to death by different punishments, like the seven children of St. Symphorosia. This is only a duplicate affair. But as for St. Felicita, he leaves her there, and does not say another word about her.

  3. Of Saint Polycarp.

  Eusebius relates that St. Polycarp, being informed in a dream that he should be burned in three days, made it known to his friends. The legend-maker adds that the lieutenant of police at Smyrna, whose name was Herodius, had him seized by his archers; that he was abandoned to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre; that the sky opened, and a heavenly voice cried to him: “Be of good courage, Polycarp”; that the hour of letting loose the lions in the amphitheatre having passed, the people went about collecting wood from all the houses to burn him with; that the saint addressed himself to the God of the “archangels”—although the word archangel was not then known—that the flames formed themselves round him into a triumphal arch without touching him; that his body had the smell of baked bread; but that, having resisted the fire, he could not preserve himself against a sabre-cut; that his blood put out the burning pile, and that there sprung from it a dove which flew straight to heaven. To which planet is not precisely known.

  4. Of Saint Ptolomais.

  We follow the order of Don Ruinart; but we have no wish to call in question the martyrdom of St. Ptolomais, which is extracted from “St. Justin’s Apology.”

  We could make some difficulties with regard to the woman who was accused by her husband of being a Christian, and who baffled him by giving him a bill of divorce. We might ask why, in this history, there is no further mention of this woman? We might make it manifest that in the time of Marcus Aurelius, women were not permitted to demand divorces of their husbands; that this permission was only granted them under the emperor Julian; and that this so much repeated story of the Christian woman who repudiated her husband—while no pagan would have dared to imagine such a thing—cannot well be other than a fable. But we do not desire to raise unpleasant disputes. As for the little probability there is in the compilation of Don Ruinart, we have too much respect for the subject he treats of to start objections.

  We have not made any to the “Letter of the Churches of Vienna and Lyons,” because there is still a great deal of obscurity connected with it; but we shall be pardoned for defending the memory of the great Marcus Aurelius, thus outraged in the life of “St. Symphorian of Autun,” who was probably a relation of St. Symphorosia.

  5. Of St. Symphorian of Autun.

  This legend, the author of which is unknown, begins thus: “The emperor Marcus Aurelius had just raised a frightful tempest against the Church, and his fulminating edicts assailed on all sides the religion of Jesus Christ, at the time when St. Symphorian lived at Autun in all the splendor that high birth and uncommon virtue can confer. He was of a Christian family, one of the most considerable of the city,” etc.

  Marcus Aurelius issued no sanguinary edicts against the Christians. It is a very criminal calumny. Tillemont himself admits that “he was the best prince the Romans ever had; that his reign was a golden age; and that he verified what he often quoted from Plato, that nations would only be happy when kings were philosophers.”

  Of all the emperors, this was the one who promulgated the best laws; he protected the wise, but persecuted no Christians, of whom he had a great many in his service.

  The writer of the legend relates that St. Symphorian having refused to adore Cybele, the city judge inquired: “Who is this man?” Now it is impossible that the judge of Autun should not have known the most considerable person in Autun.

  He was declared by the sentence to be guilty of treason, “divine and human.” The Romans never employed this formula; and that alone should deprive the pretended martyr of Autun of all credit.

  In order the better to refute this calumny against the sacred memory of Marcus Aurelius, let us bring under view the discourse of Meliton, bishop of Sardis, to this best of emperors, reported verbatim by Eusebius:

  “The continual succession of good fortune which has attended the empire, without its happiness being disturbed by a single disgrace, since our religion, which was born with it, has grown in its bosom, is an evident proof that it contributes eminently to its greatness and glory. Among all the emperors, Nero and Domitian alone, deceived by certain impostors, have spread calumnies against us, which, as usual, have found some partial credence among the people. But your pious ancestors have corrected the people’s ignorance, and by public edicts have repressed the audacity of those who attempted to treat us ill. Your grandfather Adrian wrote in our favor to Fundanus, governor of Asia, and to many other persons. The emperor, your father, during the period when you divided with him the cares of government, wrote to the inhabitants of Larissa, of Thessalonica, of Athens, and in short to all the people of Greece, to repress the seditions and tumults which have been excited against us.”

  This declaration by a most pious, learned, and veracious bishop is sufficient to confound forever all the lies and legends which may be regarded as the Arabian tales of Christianity.

  6. Of Another Saint Felicita, and of Saint Perpetua.

  If it were an object to dispute the legend of Felicita and Perpetua, it would not be difficult to show how suspicious it is. These Carthaginian martyrs are only known by a writing, without date, of the church of Salzburg. Now, it is a great way from this part of Bavaria to Goletta. We are not informed under what emperor this Felicita and this Perpetua received the crown of martyrdom. The astounding sights with which this history is filled do not discover a very profound historian. A ladder entirely of gold, bordered with lances and swords; a dragon at the top of the ladder; a large garden near the dragon; sheep from which an old man drew milk; a reservoir full of water; a bottle of water whence they drank without diminishing the liquid; St. Perpetua fighting entirely naked against a wicked Egyptian; some handsome young men, all naked, who took her part; herself at last become a man and a vigorous wrestler; these are, it appears to me, conceits which should not have place in a respectable book.

  There is one other reflection very important to make. It is that the style of all these stories of martyrdom, which took place at such different periods, is everywhere alike, everywhere equally puerile and bombastic. You find the same turns of expression, the same phrases, in the history of a martyr under Domitian and of another under Galerius. There are the same epithets, the same exaggerations. By the little we understand of style, we perceive that the same hand has compiled them all.

  I do not here pretend to make a book against Don Ruinart; and while I always respect, admire, and invoke the true martyrs with the Holy Church, I confine myself to making it perceived, by one or two striking examples, how dangerous it is to mix what is purely ridiculous with what ought to be venerated.

  7. Of Saint Theodotus of the City of Ancyra, and of the Seven Virgins; Written by Nisus, an Eye-Witness, and Extracted from Bollandus.

  Many critics, as eminent for wisdom as for true piety, have already given us to understand that the legend of St. Theodotus the Publican is a profanation and a species of impiety which ought to have been suppressed. The following is the story of Theodotus. We shall often employ the exact words of the “Genuine Acts,” compiled by Don Ruinart.

  “His trade of publican supplied him with the means of exercising his episcopal functions. Illustrious tavern! consecrated to piety instead of debauchery. . . . . Sometimes Theodotus was a physician, sometimes he furnished tit-bits to the faithful. A tavern was seen to be to the Christians what Noah’s ark was to those whom God wished to save from the deluge.”

  This publican Theodotus, walking by the river Halis with his companions towards a town adjacent to the city of Ancyra, “a fresh and soft plot of turf offered them a delicious couch; a spring which issued a few steps off, from the foot of the rock, and which by a channel crowned with flowers came running past them in order to quench their thirst, offered them clear and pure water. Trees bearing fruit, mixed with wild ones, furnished them with shade and fruits; and an assemblage of skilful nightingales, whom the grasshoppers relieved every now and then, formed a charming concert,” etc.

  The clergyman of the place, named Fronton, having arrived, and the publican having drunk with him on the grass, “the fresh green of which was relieved by the various gradations of color in the flowers, he said to the clergyman: ‘Ah, father! what a pleasure it would be to build a chapel here.’ ‘Yes,’ said Fronton, ‘but it would be necessary to have some relics to begin with.’ ‘Well, well,’ replied St. Theodotus, ‘you shall have some soon, I give you my word; here is my ring, which I give you as a pledge; build your chapel quickly.’ ”

  The publican had the gift of prophecy, and knew well what he was saying. He went away to the city of Ancyra, while the clergyman Fronton set himself about building. He found there the most horrible persecution, which lasted very long. Seven Christian virgins, of whom the youngest was seventy years old, had just been condemned, according to custom, to lose their virginity, through the agency of all the young men of the city. The youth of Ancyra, who had probably more urgent affairs, were in no hurry to execute the sentence. One only could be found obedient to justice. He applied himself to St. Thecusa, and carried her into a closet with surprising courage. Thecusa threw herself on her knees, and said to him, “For God’s sake, my son, a little shame! Behold these lacklustre eyes, this half-dead flesh, these greasy wrinkles, which seventy years have ploughed in my forehead, this face of the color of the earth; abandon thoughts so unworthy of a young man like you—Jesus Christ entreats you by my mouth. He asks it of you as a favor, and if you grant it Him, you may expect His entire gratitude.” The discourse of the old woman, and her countenance made the executioner recollect himself. The seven virgins were not deflowered.

  The irritated governor sought for another punishment; he caused them to be initiated forthwith in the mysteries of Diana and Minerva. It is true that great feasts had been instituted in honor of those divinities, but the mysteries of Diana and Minerva were not known to antiquity. St. Nil, an intimate friend of the publican Theodotus, and the author of this marvellous story, was not quite correct.

  According to him, these seven pretty lasses were placed quite naked on the car which carried the great Diana and the wise Minerva to the banks of a neighboring lake. The Thucydides St. Nil still appears to be very ill-informed here. The priestesses were always covered with veils; and the Roman magistrates never caused the goddesses of chastity and wisdom to be attended by girls who showed themselves both before and behind to the people.

  St. Nil adds that the car was preceded by two choirs of priestesses of Bacchus, who carried the thyrses in their hands. St. Nil has here mistaken the priestesses of Minerva for those of Bacchus. He was not versed in the liturgy of Ancyra.

  Entering the city, the publican saw this sad spectacle—the governor, the priestesses, the car, Minerva, and the seven maidens. He runs to throw himself on his knees in a hut, along with a nephew of St. Thecusa. He beseeches heaven that the seven ladies should be dead rather than naked. His prayer is heard; he learns that the seven damsels, instead of being deflowered, have been thrown into the lake with stones round their necks, by order of the governor. Their virginity is in safe-keeping. At this news the saint, raising himself from the ground and placing himself upon his knees, turned his eyes towards heaven; and in the midst of the various emotions he experienced of love, joy, and gratitude, he said, “I give Thee thanks, O Lord! that Thou has not rejected the prayer of Thy servant.”

  He slept; and during his sleep, St. Thecusa, the youngest of the drowned women, appeared to him. “How now, son Theodotus!” she said, “you are sleeping without thinking of us: have you forgotten so soon the care I took of your youth? Do not, dear Theodotus, suffer our bodies to be devoured by the fishes. Go to the lake, but beware of a traitor.” This traitor was, in fact, the nephew of St. Thecusa.

  I omit here a multitude of miraculous adventures that happened to the publican, in order to come to the most important. A celestial cavalier, armed cap-a-pie, preceded by a celestial flambeau, descends from the height of the empyrean, conducts the publican to the lake in the midst of storms, drives away all the soldiers who guard the shore, and gives Theodotus time to fish up the seven old women and to bury them.

  The nephew of St. Thecusa unfortunately went and told all. Theodotus was seized, and for three days all sorts of punishments were tried in vain to kill him. They could only attain their object by cleaving his skull; an operation which saints are never proof against.

  He was still to be buried. His friend the minister Fronton—to whom Theodotus, in his capacity of publican, had given two leathern bottles filled with wine—made the guards drunk, and carried off the body. Theodotus then appeared in body and spirit to the minister: “Well, my friend,” he said to him, “did I not say well, that you should have relics for your chapel?”

  Such is what is narrated by St. Nil, an eye-witness, who could neither be deceived nor deceive; such is what Don Ruinart has quoted as a genuine act. Now every man of sense, every intelligent Christian, will ask himself, whether a better mode could be adopted of dishonoring the most holy and venerated religion in the world, and of turning it into ridicule?

  I shall not speak of the Eleven Thousand Virgins; I shall not discuss the fable of the Theban legion, composed—says the author—of six thousand six hundred men, all Christians coming from the East by Mount St. Bernard, suffering martyrdom in the year 286, the period of the most profound peace as regarded the Church, and in the gorge of a mountain where it is impossible to place 300 men abreast; a fable written more than 550 years after the event; a fable in which a king of Burgundy is spoken of who never existed; a fable, in short, acknowledged to be absurd by all the learned who have not lost their reason.

  Behold what Don Ruinart narrates seriously! Let us pray to God for the good sense of Don Ruinart!

  SECTION II.

  How does it happen that, in the enlightened age in which we live, learned and useful writers are still found who nevertheless follow the stream of old errors, and who corrupt many truths by admitted fables? They reckon the era of the martyrs from the first year of the empire of Diocletian, who was then far enough from inflicting martyrdom on anybody. They forget that his wife Prisca was a Christian, that the principal officers of his household were Christians; that he protected them constantly during eighteen years; that they built at Nicomedia a church more sumptuous than his palace; and that they would never have been persecuted if they had not outraged the Cæsar Valerius.

  Is it possible that any one should still dare to assert “that Diocletian died of age, despair, and misery”; he who was seen to quit life like a philosopher, as he had quitted the empire; he who, solicited to resume the supreme power loved better to cultivate his fine gardens at Salonica, than to reign again over the whole of the then known world?

  Oh, ye compilers! will you never cease to compile? You have usefully employed your three fingers; employ still more usefully your reason.

  What! you repeat to me that St. Peter reigned over the faithful at Rome for twenty-five years, and that Nero had him put to death together with St. Paul, in order to avenge the death of Simon the Magician, whose legs they had broken by their prayers?

  To report such fables, though with the best motive, is to insult Christianity.

  The poor creatures who still repeat these absurdities are copyists who renew in octavo and duodecimo old stories that honest men no longer read, and who have never opened a book of wholesome criticism. They rake up the antiquated tales of the Church; they know nothing of either Middleton, or Dodwell, or Bruker, or Dumoulin, or Fabricius, or Grabius, or even Dupin, or of any one of those who have lately carried light into the darkness.

  SECTION III.

  We are fooled with martyrdoms that make us break out into laughter. The Tituses, the Trajans, the Marcus Aureliuses, are painted as monsters of cruelty. Fleury, abbé of Loc Dieu, has disgraced his ecclesiastical history by tales which a sensible old woman would not tell to little children.

  Can it be seriously repeated, that the Romans condemned seven virgins, each seventy years old, to pass through the hands of all the young men of the city of Ancyra—those Romans who punished the Vestals with death for the least gallantry?

  A hundred tales of this sort are found in the martyrologies. The narrators have hoped to render the ancient Romans odious, and they have rendered themselves ridiculous. Do you want good, well-authenticated barbarities—good and well-attested massacres, rivers of blood which have actually flowed—fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, infants at the breast, who have in reality had their throats cut, and been heaped on one another? Persecuting monsters! seek these truths only in your own annals: you will find them in the crusades against the Albigenses, in the massacres of Merindol and Cabrière, in the frightful day of St. Bartholomew, in the massacres of Ireland, in the valleys of the Pays de Vaud. It becomes you well, barbarians as you are, to impute extravagant cruelties to the best of emperors; you who have deluged Europe with blood, and covered it with corpses, in order to prove that the same body can be in a thousand places at once, and that the pope can sell indulgences! Cease to calumniate the Romans, your law-givers, and ask pardon of God for the abominations of your forefathers!

  It is not the torture, you say, which makes martyrdom; it is the cause. Well! I agree with you that your victims ought not to be designated by the name of martyr, which signifies witness; but what name shall we give to your executioners? Phalaris and Busiris were the gentlest of men in comparison with you. Does not your Inquisition, which still remains, make reason, nature, and religion boil with indignation! Great God! if mankind should reduce to ashes that infernal tribunal, would they be unacceptable in thy avenging eyes?

  MASS.

  The mass, in ordinary language, is the greatest and most august of the ceremonies of the Church. Different names are given to it, according to the rites practised in the various countries where it is celebrated; as the Mozarabian or Gothic mass, the Greek mass, the Latin mass. Durandus and Eckius call those masses dry, in which no consecration is made, as that which is appointed to be said in particular by aspirants to the priesthood; and Cardinal Bona relates, on the authority of William of Nangis, that St. Louis, in his voyage abroad, had it said in this manner, lest the motion of the vessel should spill the consecrated wine. He also quoted Génébrard, who says that he assisted at Turin, in 1587, at a similar mass, celebrated in a church, but after dinner and very late, for the funeral of a person of rank.

  Pierre le Chantre also speaks of the two-fold, three-fold, and even four-fold mass, in which the priest celebrated the mass of the day or the feast, as far as the offertory, then began a second, third, and sometimes a fourth, as far as the same place; after which he said as many secretas as he had begun masses; he recited the canon only once for the whole; and at the end he added as many collects as he had joined together masses.

  It was not until about the close of the fourth century that the word “mass” began to signify the celebration of the eucharist. The learned Beatus Rhenanus, in his notes on Tertullian, observes, that St. Ambrose consecrated this popular expression, “missa,” taken from the sending out of the catechumens, after the reading of the gospel.

  In the “Apostolical Constitutions,” we find a liturgy in the name of St. James, by which it appears, that instead of invoking the saints in the canon of the mass, the primitive Church prayed for them. “We also offer to Thee, O Lord,” said the celebrator, “this bread and this chalice for all the saints that have been pleasing in Thy sight from the beginning of ages: for the patriarchs, the prophets, the just, the apostles, the martyrs, the confessors, bishops, priests, deacons, subdeacons, readers, chanters, virgins, widows, laymen, and all whose names are known unto Thee.” But St. Cyril of Jerusalem, who lived in the fourth century, substituted this explanation: “After which,” says he, “we commemorate those who die before us, and first the patriarchs, apostles, and martyrs, that God may receive our prayers through their intercession.” This proves—as will be said in the article on “Relics”—that the worship of the saints was then beginning to be introduced into the Church.

  

  Ancient Rome.

  Noel Alexander cites acts of St. Andrew, in which that apostle is made to say: “I offer up every day, on the altar of the only true God, not the flesh of bulls, nor the blood of goats, but the unspotted lamb, which still remains living and entire after it is sacrificed, and all the faithful eat of its flesh”; but this learned Dominican acknowledges that this piece was unknown until the eighth century. The first who cited it was Ætherius, bishop of Osma in Spain, who wrote against Ælipard in 788.

  Abdias relates that St. John, being warned by the Lord of the termination of his career, prepared for death and recommended his Church to God. He then had bread brought to him, which he took, and lifting up his hands to heaven, blessed it, broke it, and distributed it among those who were present, saying: “Let my portion be yours, and let yours be mine.” This manner of celebrating the eucharist—which means thanksgiving—is more conformable to the institution of that ceremony.

  St. Luke indeed informs us, that Jesus, after distributing bread and wine among his apostles, who were supping with him, said to them: “Do this in memory of me.” St. Matthew and St. Mark say, moreover, that Jesus sang a hymn. St. John, who in his gospel mentions neither the distribution of the bread and wine, nor the hymn, speaks of the latter at great length in his Acts, of which we give the text, as quoted by the Second Council of Nice:

  “Before our Lord was taken by the Jews,” says this well-beloved apostle of Jesus, “He assembled us all together, and said to us: ‘Let us sing a hymn in honor of the Father, after which we will execute the design we have conceived.’ He ordered us therefore to form a circle, holding one another by the hand; then, having placed Himself in the middle of the circle, He said to us: ‘Amen; follow me.’ Then He began the canticle, and said: ‘Glory be to Thee, O Father!’ We all answered, ‘Amen.’ Jesus continued, saying, ‘Glory to the Word,’ etc. ‘Glory to the Spirit,’ etc. ‘Glory to Grace,’ etc., and the apostles constantly answered, ‘Amen.’ ”

  After some other doxologies, Jesus said, “I will save, and I will be saved, Amen. I will unbind, and I will be unbound, Amen. I will be wounded, and I will wound, Amen. I will be born, and I will beget, Amen. I will eat, and I will be consumed, Amen. I will be hearkened to, and I will hearken, Amen. I will be comprehended by the spirit, being all spirit, all understanding, Amen. I will be washed, and I will wash, Amen. Grace brings dancing; I will play on the flute; all of you dance, Amen. I will sing sorrowful airs; now all of you lament, Amen.”

  St. Augustine, who begins a part of this hymn in his “Epistle to Ceretius,” gives also the following: “I will deck, and I will be decked. I am a lamp to those who see me and know me. I am the door for all who will knock at it. Do you, who see what I do, be careful not to speak of it.”

  This dance of Jesus and the apostles is evidently imitated from that of the Egyptian Therapeutæ, who danced after supper in their assemblies, at first divided into two choirs, then united the men and the women together, as at the feast of Bacchus, after swallowing plenty of celestial wine as Philo says.

  Besides we know, that according to the Jewish tradition, after their coming out of Egypt, and passing the Red Sea, whence the solemnity of the Passover took its name, Moses and his sister assembled two musical choirs, one composed of men, the other of women, who, while dancing, sang a canticle of thanksgiving. These instruments instantaneously assembled, these choirs arranged with so much promptitude, the facility with which the songs and dances are executed, suppose a training in these two exercises much anterior to the moment of execution.

  The usage was afterwards perpetrated among the Jews. The daughters of Shiloh were dancing according to custom, at the solemn feast of the Lord, when the young men of the tribe of Benjamin, to whom they had been refused for wives, carried them off by the counsel of the old men of Israel. And at this day, in Palestine, the women, assembled near the tombs of their relatives, dance in a mournful manner, and utter cries of lamentation.

  We also know that the first Christians held among themselves agapæ, or feasts of charity, in memory of the last supper which Jesus celebrated with his apostles, from which the Pagans took occasion to bring against them the most odious charges; on which, to banish every shadow of licentiousness, the pastors forbade the kiss of peace, that concluded the ceremony to be given between persons of different sexes. But various abuses, which were even then complained of by St. Paul, and which the Council of Gangres, in the year 324, vainly undertook to reform, at length caused the agapæ to be abolished in 397, by the Third Council of Carthage, of which the forty-first canon ordained, that the holy mysteries should be celebrated fasting.

  It will not be doubted that these feastings were accompanied by dances, when it is recollected that, according to Scaliger, the bishops were called in the Latin Church “præsules,” (from præsiliendo) only because they led off the dance. Heliot, in his “History of the Monastic Orders,” says also, that during the persecutions which disturbed the peace of the first Christians, congregations were formed of men and women, who, after the manner of the Therapeutæ, retired into the deserts, where they assembled in the hamlets on Sundays and feast days, and danced piously, singing the prayers of the Church.

  In Portugal, in Spain, and in Roussillon, solemn dances are still performed in honor of the mysteries of Christianity. On every vigil of a feast of the Virgin, the young women assemble before the doors of the churches dedicated to her, and pass the night in dancing round, and singing hymns and canticles in honor of her. Cardinal Ximenes restored in his time, in the cathedral of Toledo, the ancient usage of the Mozarabian mass, during which dances are performed in the choir and the nave, with equal order and devotion. In France too, about the middle of the last century, the priests and all the people of the Limoges might be seen dancing round in the collegiate church, singing: “Sant Marcian pregas pernous et nous epingaren per bous”—that is, “St. Martian, pray for us, and we will dance for you.”

  And lastly, the Jesuit Menestrier, in the preface to his “Treatise on Ballets,” published in 1682, says, that he had himself seen the canons of some churches take the singing boys by the hand on Easter day, and dance in the choir, singing hymns of rejoicing. What has been said in the article on “Calends,” of the extravagant dances of the feast of fools, exhibits a part of the abuses which have caused dancing to be discontinued in the ceremonies of the mass, which, the greater their gravity, are the better calculated to impose on the simple.

  MASSACRES.

  It is perhaps as difficult as it is useless to ascertain whether “mazzacrium,” a word of the low Latin, is the root of “massacre,” or whether “massacre” is the root of “mazzacrium.”

  A massacre signifies a number of men killed. There was yesterday a great massacre near Warsaw—near Cracow. We never say: “There has been a massacre of a man”; yet we do say: “A man has been massacred”: in that case it is understood that he has been killed barbarously by many blows.

  Poetry makes use of the word “massacred” for killed, assassinated: “Que par ses propres mains son père massacré.”—Cinna.

  An Englishman has made a compilation of all the massacres perpetrated on account of religion since the first centuries of our vulgar era. I have been very much tempted to write against the English author; but his memoir not appearing to be exaggerated, I have restrained myself. For the future I hope there will be no more such calculations to make. But to whom shall we be indebted for that?

  MASTER.

  SECTION I.

  “How unfortunate am I to have been born!” said Ardassan Ougli, a young icoglan of the grand sultan of the Turks. “Yet if I depended only on the sultan—but I am also subject to the chief of my oda, to the cassigi bachi; and when I receive my pay, I must prostrate myself before a clerk of the teftardar, who keeps back half of it. I was not seven years old, when, in spite of myself, I was circumcised with great ceremony, and was ill for a fortnight after it. The dervish who prays to us is also my master; an iman is still more my master, and the mullah still more so than the iman. The cadi is another master, the kadeslesker a greater; the mufti a greater than all these together. The kiaia of the grand vizier with one word could cause me to be thrown into the canal; and finally, the grand vizier could have me beheaded, and the skin of my head stripped off, without any person caring about the matter.

  “Great God, how many masters! If I had as many souls and bodies as I have duties to fulfil, I could not bear it. Oh Allah! why hast thou not made me an owl? I should live free in my hole and eat mice at my ease, without masters or servants. This is assuredly the true destiny of man; there were no masters until it was perverted; no man was made to serve another continually. If things were in order, each should charitably help his neighbor. The quick-sighted would conduct the blind, the active would be crutches to the lame. This would be the paradise of Mahomet, instead of the hell which is formed precisely under the inconceivably narrow bridge.”

  Thus spoke Ardassan Ougli, after being bastinadoed by one of his masters.

  Some years afterwards, Ardassan Ougli became a pasha with three tails. He made a prodigious fortune, and firmly believed that all men except the grand Turk and the grand vizier were born to serve him, and all women to give him pleasure according to his wishes.

  SECTION II.

  How can one man become the master of another? And by what kind of incomprehensible magic has he been able to become the master of several other men? A great number of good volumes have been written on this subject, but I give the preference to an Indian fable, because it is short, and fables explain everything.

  Adimo, the father of all the Indians, had two sons and two daughters by his wife Pocriti. The eldest was a vigorous giant, the youngest was a little hunchback, the two girls were pretty. As soon as the giant was strong enough, he lay with his two sisters, and caused the little hunchback to serve him. Of his two sisters, the one was his cook, the other his gardener. When the giant would sleep, he began by chaining his little brother to a tree; and when the latter fled from him, he caught him in four strides, and gave him twenty blows with the strength of an ox.

  The dwarf submitted and became the best subject in the world. The giant, satisfied with seeing him fulfil the duties of a subject, permitted him to sleep with one of his sisters, with whom he was disgusted. The children who sprang from this marriage were not quite hunchbacks, but they were sufficiently deformed. They were brought up in the fear of God and of the giant. They received an excellent education; they were taught that their uncle was a giant by divine right, who could do what he pleased with all his family; that if he had some pretty niece or grand-niece, he should have her without difficulty, and not one should marry her unless he permitted it.

  The giant dying, his son, who was neither so strong or so great as he was, believed himself to be like his father, a giant by divine right. He pretended to make all the men work for him, and slept with all the girls. The family lagued against him: he was killed, and they became a republic.

  The Siamese pretend, that on the contrary the family commenced by being republican; and that the giant existed not until after a great many years and dissensions: but all the authors of Benares and Siam agree that men lived an infinity of ages before they had the wit to make laws, and they prove it by an unanswerable argument, which is that even at present, when all the world piques itself upon having wit, we have not yet found the means of making a score of laws passably good.

  It is still, for example, an insoluble question in India, whether republics were established before or after monarchies; if confusion has appeared more horrible to men than despotism! I am ignorant how it happened in order of time, but in that of nature we must agree that men are all born equal: violence and ability made the first masters; laws have made the present.

  MATTER.

  SECTION I.

  A Polite Dialogue Between a Demoniac and a Philosopher.

  $

  Yes, thou enemy of God and man, who believest that God is all-powerful, and is at liberty to confer the gift of thought on every being whom He shall vouchsafe to choose, I will go and denounce thee to the inquisitor; I will have thee burned. Beware, I warn thee for the last time.)

  $

  Come, I will be patient for a moment while the fagots are preparing. Answer me: What is spirit?)

  $

  What is matter?)

  $

  A thousand other qualities, traitor! I see what thou wouldst be at; thou wouldst tell me that God can animate matter, that He has given instinct to animals, that He is the Master of all.)

  $

  Which I cannot comprehend, villain!)

  $

  His power! His power! thou talkest like a true atheist.)

  $

  Go to, go to: neither God nor they shall prevent us from burning thee alive—the death inflicted on parricides and on philosophers who are not of our opinion.)

  $

  Vile wretch! darest thou to couple my name with the devil’s?

  (Here the demoniac strikes the philosopher, who returns him the blow with interest.))

  philosopher.

  Help! philosophers!

  demoniac.

  Holy brotherhood! help!

  (Here half a dozen philosophers arrive on one side, and on the other rush in a hundred Dominicans, with a hundred Familiars of the Inquisition, and a hundred alguazils. The contest is too unequal.)

  SECTION II.

  When wise men are asked what is the soul they answer that they know not. If they are asked what matter is, they make the same reply. It is true that there are professors, and particularly scholars, who know all this perfectly; and when they have repeated that matter has extent and divisibility, they think they have said all; being pressed, however, to say what this thing is which is extended, they find themselves considerably embarrassed. It is composed of parts, say they. And of what are these parts composed? Are the elements of the parts divisible? Then they are mute, or they talk a great deal; which are equally suspicious. Is this almost unknown being called matter, eternal? Such was the belief of all antiquity. Has it of itself force? Many philosophers have thought so. Have those who deny it a right to deny it? You conceive not that matter can have anything of itself; but how can you be assured that it has not of itself the properties necessary to it? You are ignorant of its nature, and you refuse it the modes which nevertheless are in its nature: for it can no sooner have been, than it has been in a certain fashion—it has had figure, and having necessarily figure, is it impossible that it should not have had other modes attached to its configuration? Matter exists, but you know it only by your sensations. Alas! of what avail have been all the subtleties of the mind since man first reasoned? Geometry has taught us many truths, metaphysics very few. We weigh matter, we measure it, we decompose it; and if we seek to advance one step beyond these gross operations, we find ourselves powerless, and before us an immeasurable abyss.

  Pray forgive all mankind who were deceived in thinking that matter existed by itself. Could they do otherwise? How are we to imagine that what is without succession has not always been? If it were not necessary for matter to exist, why should it exist? And if it were necessary that it should be, why should it not have been forever? No axiom has ever been more universally received than this: “Of nothing, nothing comes.” Indeed the contrary is incomprehensible. With every nation, chaos preceded the arrangement which a divine hand made of the whole world. The eternity of matter has with no people been injurious to the worship of the Divinity. Religion was never startled at the recognition of an eternal God as the master of an eternal matter. We of the present day are so happy as to know by faith that God brought matter out of nothing; but no nation has ever been instructed in this dogma; even the Jews were ignorant of it. The first verse of Genesis says, that the Gods—Eloïm, not Eloi—made heaven and earth. It does not say, that heaven and earth were created out of nothing.

  Philo, who lived at the only time when the Jews had any erudition, says, in his “Chapter on the Creation,” “God, being good by nature, bore no envy against substance, matter; which of itself had nothing good, having by nature only inertness, confusion, and disorder; it was bad, and He vouchsafed to make it good.”

  The idea of chaos put into order by a God, is to be found in all ancient theogonies. Hesiod repeated the opinion of the Orientals, when he said in his “Theogony,” “Chaos was that which first existed.” The whole Roman Empire spoke in these words of Ovid: “Sic ubi dispositam quisquis fuit ille Deorum Congeriem secuit.”

  Matter then, in the hands of God, was considered like clay under the potter’s wheel, if these feeble images may be used to express His divine power.

  Matter, being eternal, must have had eternal properties—as configuration, the vis inertiæ, motion, and divisibility. But this divisibility is only a consequence of motion; for without motion nothing is divided, nor separated, nor arranged. Motion therefore was regarded as essential to matter. Chaos had been a confused motion, and the arrangement of the universe was a regular motion, communicated to all bodies by the Master of the world. But how can matter have motion by itself, as it has, according to all the ancients, extent and divisibility?

  But it cannot be conceived to be without extent, and it may be conceived to be without motion. To this it was answered: It is impossible that matter should not be permeable; and being permeable, something must be continually passing through its pores. Why should there be passages, if nothing passes?

  Reply and rejoinder might thus be continued forever. The system of the eternity of matter, like all other systems, has very great difficulties. That of the formation of matter out of nothing is no less incomprehensible. We must admit it, and not flatter ourselves with accounting for it; philosophy does not account for everything. How many incomprehensible things are we not obliged to admit, even in geometry! Can any one conceive two lines constantly approaching each other, yet never meeting?

  Geometricians indeed will tell you, the properties of asymptotes are demonstrated; you cannot help admitting them—but creation is not; why then admit it? Why is it hard for you to believe, like all the ancients, in the eternity of matter? The theologian will press you on the other side, and say: “If you believe in the eternity of matter then you acknowledge two principles—God and matter; you fall into the error of Zoroaster and of Manes.”

  No answer can be given to the geometricians, for those folks know of nothing but their lines, their superficies, and their solids; but you may say to the theologians: “Wherein am I a Manichæan? Here are stones which an architect has not made, but of which he has erected an immense building. I do not admit two architects; the rough stones have obeyed power and genius.”

  Happily, whatever system a man embraces, it is in no way hurtful to morality; for what imports it whether matter is made or arranged? God is still an absolute master. Whether chaos was created out of nothing, or only reduced to order, it is still our duty to be virtuous; scarcely any of these metaphysical questions affect the conduct of life. It is with disputes as with table talk; each one forgets after dinner what he has said, and goes whithersoever his interest or his inclination calls him.

  MEETINGS (PUBLIC).

  Meeting,“assemblée,” is a general term applicable to any collection of people for secular, sacred, political, conversational, festive, or corporate purposes; in short, to all occasions on which numbers meet together.

  It is a term which prevents all verbal disputes, and all abusive and injurious implications by which men are in the habit of stigmatizing societies to which they do not themselves belong.

  The legal meeting or assembly of the Athenians was called the “church.” This word “church,” being peculiarly appropriated among us to express a convocation of Catholics in one place, we did not in the first instance apply it to the public assembly of Protestants; but used indeed the expression—“a flock of Huguenots.” Politeness however, which in time explodes all noxious terms, at length employed for the purpose the term “assembly” or “meeting,” which offends no one. In England the dominant Church applies the name of “meeting” to the churches of all the non-conformists.

  The word “assembly” is particularly suitable to a collection of persons invited to go and pass their evening at a house where the host receives them with courtesy and kindness, and where play, conversation, supper, and dancing, constitute their amusements. If the number invited be small, it is not called an “assembly,” but a “rendezvous of friends”; and friends are never very numerous.

  Assemblies are called, in Italian, “conversazione,” “ridotto.” The word “ridotto” is properly what we once signified by the word “reduit,” intrenchment; but “reduit” having sunk into a term of contempt among us, our editors translated “ridout” by “redoubt.” The papers informed us, among the important intelligence contained in them relating to Europe, that many noblemen of the highest consideration went to take chocolate at the house of the princess Borghese; and that there was a redoubt there. It was announced to Europe, in another paragraph, that there would be a redoubt on the following Tuesday at the house of her excellency the marchioness of Santafior.

  It was found, however, that in relating the events of war, it was necessary to speak of real redoubts, which in fact implied things actually redoubtable and formidable, from which cannon were discharged. The word was, therefore, in such circumstances, obviously unsuitable to the “ridotti pacifici,” the pacific redoubts of mere amusement; and the old term “assembly” was restored, which is indeed the only proper one. “Rendezvous” is occasionally used, but it is more adapted to a small company, and most of all for two individuals.

  MESSIAH.
  
  Advertisement.

  This article is by M. Polier de Bottens, of an old French family, settled for two hundred years in Switzerland. He is first pastor of Lausanne, and his knowledge is equal to his piety. He composed this article for the great “Encyclopædia,” in which it was inserted. Only those passages were suppressed which the examiners thought might be abused by the Catholics, less learned and less pious than the author. It was received with applause by all the wise.

  It was printed at the same time in another small dictionary, and was attributed in France to a man whom there was no reluctance to molest. The article was supposed to be impious, because it was supposed to be by a layman; and the work and its pretended author were violently attacked. The man thus accused contented himself with laughing at the mistake. He beheld with compassion this instance of the errors and injustices which men are every day committing in their judgments; for he had the wise and learned priest’s manuscript, written by his own hand. It is still in his possession, and will be shown to whoever may choose to examine it. In it will be found the very erasures made by this layman himself, to prevent malignant interpretations.

  Now we reprint this article in all the integrity of the original. We have contracted it only to prevent repeating what we have printed elsewhere; but we have not added a single word.

  The best of this affair is, that one of the venerable author’s brethren wrote the most ridiculous things in the world against this article of his reverend brother’s, thinking that he was writing against a common enemy. This is like fighting in the dark, when one is attacked by one’s own party.

  It has a thousand times happened that controversialists have condemned passages in St. Augustine and St. Jerome, not knowing that they were by those fathers. They would anathematize a part of the New Testament if they had not heard by whom it was written. Thus it is that men too often judge.

  Messiah, “Messias.” This word comes from the Hebrew, and is synonymous with the Greek word “Christ.” Both are terms consecrated in religion, which are now no longer given to any but the anointed by eminence—the Sovereign Deliverer whom the ancient Jewish people expected, for whose coming they still sigh, and whom the Christians find in the person of Jesus the Son of Mary, whom they consider as the anointed of the Lord, the Messiah promised to humanity. The Greeks also use the word “Elcimmeros,” meaning the same thing as “Christos.”

  In the Old Testament we see that the word “Messiah,” far from being peculiar to the Deliverer, for whose coming the people of Israel sighed, was not even so to the true and faithful servants of God, but that this name was often given to idolatrous kings and princes, who were, in the hands of the Eternal, the ministers of His vengeance, or instruments for executing the counsels of His wisdom. So the author of “Ecclesiasticus” says of Elisha: “Qui ungis reges ad penitentiam”; or, as it is rendered by the “Septuagint,” “ad vindictam”—“You anoint kings to execute the vengeance of the Lord.” Therefore He sent a prophet to anoint Jehu, king of Israel, and announced sacred unction to Hazael, king of Damascus and Syria; those two princes being the Messiahs of the Most High, to revenge the crimes and abominations of the house of Ahab.

  But in Isaiah, xlv., 1, the name of Messiah is expressly given to Cyrus: “Thus saith the Lord to Cyrus, His anointed, His Messiah, whose right hand I have holden to subdue nations before him.” etc.

  Ezekiel, in his Revelations, xxviii., 14, gives the name of Messiah to the king of Tyre, whom he also calls Cherubin, and speaks of him and his glory in terms full of an emphasis of which it is easier to feel the beauties than to catch the sense. “Son of man,” says the Eternal to the prophet, “take up a lamentation upon the king of Tyre, and say unto him, Thus saith the Lord God; thou sealest up the sun, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty. Thou hast been the Lord’s Garden of Eden”—or, according to other versions, “Thou wast all the Lord’s delight”—“every precious stone was thy covering; the sardius, topaz, and the diamond; the beryl, the onyx, and the jasper; the sapphire, the emerald, and the carbuncle and gold: the workmanship of thy tabrets and thy pipes was prepared in thee in the day that thou wast created. Thou wast a Cherubin, a Messiah, for protection, and I set thee up; thou hast been upon the holy mountain of God; thou hast walked up and down in the midst of the stones of fire. Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day that thou was created till iniquity was found in thee.”

  And the name of Messiah, in Greek, Christ, was given to the king, prophets, and high priests of the Hebrews. We read, in I. Kings, xii., 5: “The Lord is witness against you, and his Messiah is witness”; that is, the king whom he has set up. And elsewhere: “Touch not my Anointed; do no evil to my prophets. . . . .” David, animated by the Spirit of God, repeatedly gives to his father-in-law Saul, whom he had no cause to love—he gives, I say, to this reprobate king, from whom the Spirit of the Eternal was withdrawn, the name and title of Anointed, or Messiah of the Lord. “God preserve me,” says he frequently, “from laying my hand upon the Lord’s Anointed, upon God’s Messiah.”

  If the fine title of Messiah, or Anointed of the Eternal, was given to idolatrous kings, to cruel and tyrannical princes, it very often indeed, in our ancient oracles, designated the real Anointed of the Lord, the Messiah by eminence; the object of the desire and expectation of all the faithful of Israel. Thus Hannah, the mother of Samuel, concluded her canticle with these remarkable words, which cannot apply to any king, for we know that at that time the Jews had not one: “The Lord shall judge the ends of the earth; and He shall give strength unto His king, and exalt the horn of His Messiah.” We find the same word in the following oracles: Psalm ii, 2; Jeremiah, Lamentations, iv, 20; Daniel, ix, 25; Habakkuk, iii, 13.

  If we compare all these different oracles, and in general all those ordinarily applied to the Messiah, there will result contradictions, almost irreconcilable, justifying to a certain point the obstinacy of the people to whom these oracles were given.

  How indeed could these be conceived, before the event had so well justified it in the person of Jesus, Son of Mary? How, I say, could there be conceived an intelligence in some sort divine and human together; a being both great and lovely, triumphing over the devil, yet tempted and carried away by that infernal spirit, that prince of the powers of the air, and made to travel in spite of himself; at once master and servant, king and subject, sacrificer and victim, mortal and immortal, rich and poor, a glorious conqueror, whose reign shall have no end, who is to subdue all nature by prodigies, and yet a man of sorrows, without the conveniences, often without the absolute necessaries of this life, of which he calls himself king; and that he comes, covered with glory and honor, terminating a life of innocence and wretchedness, of incessant crosses and contradictions, by a death alike shameful and cruel, finding in this very humiliation, this extraordinary abasement, the source of an unparalleled elevation, which raises him to the summit of glory, power, and felicity; that is, to the rank of the first of creatures?

  All Christians agree in finding these characteristics, apparently so incompatible, in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, whom they call the “Christ”; His followers gave Him this title by eminence, not that He had been anointed in a sensible and material manner, as some kings, prophets, and sacrificers anciently were, but because the Divine Spirit had designated Him for those great offices, and He had received the spiritual unction necessary thereunto.

  We had proceeded thus far on so competent an article, when a Dutch preacher, more celebrated for this discovery than for the indifferent productions of a genius otherwise feeble and ill-formed, showed to us that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Messiah of God, was anointed at the three grand periods of His life, as our King, our Prophet, and our Sacrificer.

  At the time of His baptism, the voice of the Sovereign Master of nature declared Him to be His Son, His only, His well-beloved Son, and for that very reason His representative.

  When on Mount Tabor He was transfigured and associated with Moses and Elias, the same supernatural voice announces Him to humanity as the Son of Him who loves and who sends the prophets; as He who is to be hearkened to in preference to all others.

  In Gethsemane, an angel comes down from heaven to support Him in the extreme anguish occasioned by the approach of His torments, and strengthen Him against the terrible apprehensions of a death which He cannot avoid, and enable Him to become a sacrificer the more excellent, as Himself is the pure and innocent victim that He is about to offer.

  The judicious Dutch preacher, a disciple of the illustrious Cocceius, finds the sacramental oil of these different celestial unctions in the visible signs which the power of God caused to appear on His anointed; in His baptism, “the shadow of the dove,” representing the Holy Ghost coming down from Him; on Tabor, the “miraculous cloud,” which enveloped Him; in Gethsemane, the “bloody sweat,” which covered His whole body.

  After this, it would indeed be the height of incredulity not to recognize by these marks the Lord’s Anointed by eminence—the promised Messiah; nor doubtless could we sufficiently deplore the inconceivable blindness of the Jewish people, but that it was part of the plan of God’s infinite wisdom, and was, in His merciful views, essential to the accomplishment of His work and the salvation of humanity.

  But it must also be acknowledged, that in the state of oppression in which the Jewish people were groaning, and after all the glorious promises which the Eternal had so often made them, they must have longed for the coming of a Messiah, and looked towards it as the period of their happy deliverance; and that they are therefore to an extent excusable for not having recognized a deliverer in the person of the Lord Jesus, since it is in man’s nature to care more for the body than for the spirit, and to be more sensible to present wants than flattered by advantages “to come,” and for that very reason, always uncertain.

  It must indeed be believed that Abraham, and after him a very small number of patriarchs and prophets, were capable of forming an idea of the nature of the spiritual reign of the Messiah; but these ideas would necessarily be limited to the narrow circle of the inspired, and it is not astonishing that, being unknown to the multitude, these notions were so far altered that, when the Saviour appeared in Judæa, the people, their doctors, and even their princes, expected a monarch—a conqueror—who, by the rapidity of his conquests was to subdue the whole world. And how could these flattering ideas be reconciled with the abject and apparently miserable condition of Jesus Christ? So, feeling scandalized by His announcing Himself as the Messiah, they persecuted Him, rejected Him, and put Him to the most ignominious death. Having since then found nothing tending to the fulfilment of their oracles, and being unwilling to renounce them, they indulge in all sorts of ideas, each one more chimerical than the one preceding.

  Thus, when they beheld the triumphs of the Christian religion, and found that most of their ancient oracles might be explained spiritually, and applied to Jesus Christ, they thought proper, against the opinion of their fathers, to deny that the passages which we allege against them are to be understood of the Messiah, thus torturing our Holy Scriptures to their own loss.

  Some of them maintain that their oracles have been misunderstood; that it is in vain to long for the coming of a Messiah, since He has already come in the person of Ezechias. Such was the opinion of the famous Hillel. Others more lax, or politely yielding to times and circumstances, assert that the belief in the coming of a Messiah is not a fundamental article of faith, and that the denying of this dogma either does not injure the integrity of the law, or injures it but slightly. Thus the Jew Albo said to the pope, that “to deny the coming of the Messiah was only to cut off a branch of the tree without touching the root.”

  The celebrated rabbi, Solomon Jarchi or Raschi, who lived at the commencement of the twelfth century, says, in his “Talmudes,” that the ancient Hebrews believed the Messiah to have been born on the day of the last destruction of Jerusalem by the Roman armies. This is indeed calling in the physician when the man is dead.

  The rabbi Kimchi, who also lived in the twelfth century, announced that the Messiah, whose coming he believed to be very near, would drive the Christians out of Judæa, which was then in their possession; and it is true that the Christians lost the Holy Land; but it was Saladin who vanquished them. Had that conqueror but protected the Jews, and declared for them, it is not unlikely that in their enthusiasm they would have made him their Messiah.

  Sacred writers, and our Lord Jesus Himself, often compare the reign of the Messiah and eternal beatitude to a nuptial festival or a banquet; but the Talmudists have strangely abused these parables; according to them, the Messiah will give to his people, assembled in the land of Canaan, a repast in which the wine will be that which was made by Adam himself in the terrestrial paradise, and which is kept dry, in vast cellars, by the angels at the centre of the earth.

  At the first course will be served up the famous fish called the great Leviathan, which swallows up at once a smaller fish, which smaller fish is nevertheless three hundred leagues long; the whole mass of the waters is laid upon Leviathan. In the beginning God created a male and a female of this fish; but lest they should overturn the land, and fill the world with their kind, God killed the female, and salted her for the Messiah’s feast.

  The rabbis add, that there will also be killed for this repast the bull Behemoth, which is so large that he eats each day the hay from a thousand mountains. The female of this bull was killed in the beginning of the world, that so prodigious a species might not multiply, since this could only have injured the other creatures; but they assure us that the Eternal did not salt her, because dried cow is not so good as she-Leviathan. The Jews still put such faith in these rabbinical reveries that they often swear by their share of the bull Behemoth, as some impious Christians swear by their share of paradise.

  After such gross ideas of the coming of the Messiah, and of His reign, is it astonishing that the Jews, ancient as well as modern, and also some of the primitive Christians unhappily tinctured with all these reveries, could not elevate themselves to the idea of the divine nature of the Lord’s Anointed, and did not consider the Messiah as God? Observe how the Jews express themselves on this point in the work entitled “Judæi Lusitani Quæstiones ad Christianos”. “To acknowledge a God-man,” say they, “is to abuse your own reason, to make to yourself a monster—a centaur—the strange compound of two natures which cannot coalesce.” They add, that the prophets do not teach that the Messiah is God-man; that they expressly distinguish between God and David, declaring the former to be Master, the latter servant.

  When the Saviour appeared, the prophecies, though clear, were unfortunately obscured by the prejudices imbibed even at the mother’s breast. Jesus Christ Himself, either from deference towards or for fear of shocking, the public opinion, seems to have been very reserved concerning His divinity. “He wished,” says St. Chrysostom, “insensibly to accustom His auditors to the belief of a mystery so far above their reason. If He takes upon Him the authority of a God, by pardoning sin, this action raises up against Him all who are witnesses of it. His most evident miracles cannot even convince of His divinity those in whose favor they are worked. When, before the tribunal of the Sovereign Sacrificer, He acknowledges, by a modest intimation, that He is the Son of God, the high priest tears his robe and cries, ‘Blasphemy!’ Before the sending of the Holy Ghost, the apostles did not even suspect the divinity of their dear Master. He asks them what the people think of Him; and they answer, that some take Him for Elias, other for Jeremiah, or some other prophet. A particular revelation is necessary to make known to St. Peter, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God.”

  The Jews, revolting against the divinity of Christ, have resorted to all sorts of expedients to destroy this great mystery; they distort the meaning of their own oracles, or do not apply them to the Messiah; they assert that the name of God, “Eloï,” is not peculiar to the Divinity, but is given, even by sacred writers, to judges, to magistrates, and in general to such as are high in authority; they do, indeed, cite a great many passages of the Holy Scriptures that justify this observation, but which do not in the least affect the express terms of the ancient oracles concerning the Messiah.

  Lastly, they assert, that if the Saviour, and after Him the evangelists, the apostles, and the first Christians, call Jesus the Son of God, this august term did not in the evangelical times signify anything but the opposite of son of Belial—that is, a good man, a servant of God, in opposition to a wicked man, one without the fear of God.

  If the Jews have disputed with Jesus Christ His quality of Messiah and His divinity, they have also used every endeavor to bring Him into contempt, by casting on His birth, His life, and His death, all the ridicule and opprobrium that their criminal malevolence could imagine.

  Of all the works which the blindness of the Jews has produced, there is none more odious and more extravagant than the ancient book entitled “Sepher Toldos Jeschu,” brought to light by Wagenseil, in the second volume of his work entitled “Tela Ignea,” etc.

  In this “Sepher Toldos Jeschu,” we find a monstrous history of the life of our Saviour, forged with the utmost passion and disingenuousness. For instance, they have dared to write that one Panther, or Pandera, an inhabitant of Bethlehem, fell in love with a young woman married to Jokanam. By this impure commerce he had a son called Jesua or Jesu. The father of this child was obliged to fly, and retired to Babylon. As for young Jesu, he was not sent to the schools; but—adds our author—he had the insolence to raise his head and uncover himself before the sacrificers, instead of appearing before them with his head bent down and his face covered, as was the custom—a piece of effrontery which was warmly rebuked; this caused his birth to be inquired into, which was found to be impure, and soon exposed him to ignominy.

  This detestable book, “Sepher Toldos Jeschu,” was known in the second century: Celsus confidently cites it and Origen refutes it in his ninth chapter.

  There is another book also entitled “Toldos Jeschu,” published by Huldric in 1703, which more closely follows the “Gospel of the Infancy,” but which is full of the grossest anachronisms. It places both the birth and death of Jesus Christ in the reign of Herod the Great, stating that complaints were made of the adultery of Panther and Mary, the mother of Jesus, to that prince.

  The author, who takes the name of Jonathan, and calls himself a contemporary of Jesus Christ, living at Jerusalem, pretends that Herod consulted, in the affair of Jesus Christ, the senators of a city in the land of Cæsarea. We will not follow so absurd an author through all his contradictions.

  Yet it is under cover of all these calumnies that the Jews keep up their implacable hatred against the Christians and the gospel. They have done their utmost to alter the chronology of the Old Testament, and to raise doubts and difficulties respecting the time of our Saviour’s coming.

  Ahmed-ben-Cassum-la-Andacousy, a Moor of Granada, who lived about the close of the sixteenth century, cites an ancient Arabian manuscript, which was found, together with sixteen plates of lead engraved with Arabian characters, in a grotto near Granada. Don Pedro y Quinones, archbishop of Granada, has himself borne testimony to this fact. These leaden plates, called those of Granada, were afterwards carried to Rome, where, after several years’ investigation, they were at last condemned as apocryphal, in the pontificate of Alexander VII.; they contain only fabulous stories relating to the lives of Mary and her Son.

  The time of Messiah, coupled with the epithet “false,” is still given to those impostors who, at various times, have sought to abuse the credulity of the Jewish nation. There were some of these false Messiahs even before the coming of the true Anointed of God. The wise Gamaliel mentions one Theodas, whose history we read in Josephus’ “Jewish Antiquities,” book xx. chap. 2. He boasted of crossing the Jordan without wetting his feet; he drew many people after him; but the Romans, having fallen upon his little troop, dispersed them, cut off the head of their unfortunate chief, and exposed it in Jerusalem.

  Gamaliel also speaks of Judas the Galilean, who is doubtless the same of whom Josephus makes mention in the second chapter of the second book of the “Jewish War.” He says that this false prophet had gathered together nearly thirty thousand men; but hyperbole is the Jewish historian’s characteristic.

  In the apostolic times, there was Simon, surnamed the Magician, who contrived to bewitch the people of Samaria, so that they considered him as “the great power of God.”

  In the following century, in the years 178 and 179 of the Christian era, in the reign of Adrian, appeared the false Messiah, Barcochebas, at the head of an army. The emperor sent against them Julius Severus, who, after several encounters, enclosed them in the town of Bither; after an obstinate defence it was carried, and Barcochebas taken and put to death. Adrian thought he could not better prevent the continual revolt of the Jews than by issuing an edict, forbidding them to go to Jerusalem; he also had guards stationed at the gates of the city, to prevent the rest of the people of Israel from entering it.

  We read in Socrates, an ecclesiastical historian, that in the year 434, there appeared in the island of Candia a false Messiah calling himself Moses. He said he was the ancient deliverer of the Hebrews, raised from the dead to deliver them again.

  A century afterwards, in 530, there was in Palestine a false Messiah named Julian; he announced himself as a great conqueror, who, at the head of his nation, should destroy by arms the whole Christian people. Seduced by his promises, the armed Jews butchered many of the Christians. The emperor Justinian sent troops against him; battle was given to the false Christ; he was taken, and condemned to the most ignominious death.

  At the beginning of the eighth century, Serenus, a Spanish Jew, gave himself out as a Messiah, preached, had some disciples, and, like them, died in misery.

  Several false Messiahs arose in the twelfth century. One appeared in France in the reign of Louis the Young; he and all his adherents were hanged, without its ever being known what was the name of the master or of the disciples.

  The thirteenth century was fruitful in false Messiahs; there appeared seven or eight in Arabia, Persia, Spain, and Moravia; one of them, calling himself David el Roy, passed for a very great magician; he reduced the Jews, and was at the head of a considerable party; but this Messiah was assassinated.

  James Zeigler, of Moravia, who lived in the middle of the sixteenth century, announced the approaching manifestation of the Messiah, born, as he declared, fourteen years before; he had seen him, he said, at Strasburg, and he kept by him with great care a sword and a sceptre, to place them in his hands as soon as he should be old enough to teach. In the year 1624, another Zeigler confirmed the prediction of the former.

  In the year 1666, Sabatei Sevi, born at Aleppo, called himself the Messiah foretold by the Zeiglers. He began with preaching on the highways and in the fields, the Turks laughing at him, while his disciples admired him. It appears that he did not gain over the mass of the Jewish nation at first; for the chiefs of the synagogue of Smyrna passed sentence of death against him; but he escaped with the fear only, and with banishment.

  He contracted three marriages, of which it is asserted he did not consummate one, saying that it was beneath him so to do. He took into partnership one Nathan Levi; the latter personated the prophet Elias, who was to go before the Messiah. They repaired to Jerusalem, and Nathan there announced Sabatei Sevi as the deliverer of nations. The Jewish populace declared for them, but such as had anything to lose anathematized them.

  To avoid the storm, Sevi fled to Constantinople, and thence to Smyrna, whither Nathan Levi sent to him four ambassadors, who acknowledged and publicly saluted him as the Messiah. This embassy imposed on the people, and also on some of the doctors, who declared Sabatei Sevi to be the Messiah, and king of the Hebrews. But the synagogue of Smyrna condemned its king to be impaled.

  Sabatei put himself under the protection of the cadi of Smyrna, and soon had the whole Jewish people on his side; he had two thrones prepared, one for himself, the other for his favorite wife; he took the title of king of kings, and gave to his brother, Joseph Sevi, that of king of Judah. He promised the Jews the certain conquest of the Ottoman Empire; and even carried his insolence so far as to have the emperor’s name struck out of the Jewish liturgy, and his own substituted.

  He was thrown into prison at the Dardanelles; and the Jews gave out that his life was spared only because the Turks well knew he was immortal. The governor of the Dardanelles grew rich by the presents which the Jews lavished, in order to visit their king, their imprisoned Messiah, who, though in irons, retained all his dignity, and made them kiss his feet.

  Meanwhile the sultan, who was holding his court at Adrianople, resolved to put an end to this farce: he sent for Sevi, and told him that if he was the Messiah he must be invulnerable; to which Sevi assented. The grand signor then had him placed as a mark for the arrows of his icoglans. The Messiah confessed that he was not invulnerable, and protested that God sent him only to bear testimony to the holy Mussulman religion. Being beaten by the ministers of the law, he turned Mahometan; he lived and died equally despised by the Jews and Mussulmans; which cast such discredit on the profession of false Messiah, that Sevi was the last that appeared.

  METAMORPHOSIS.

  It may very naturally be supposed that the metamorphoses with which our earth abounds suggested the imagination to the Orientals—who have imagined everything—that the souls of men passed from one body to another. An almost imperceptible point becomes a grub, and that grub becomes a butterfly; an acorn is transformed into an oak; an egg into a bird; water becomes cloud and thunder; wood is changed into fire and ashes; everything, in short, in nature, appears to be metamorphosed. What was thus obviously and distinctly perceptible in grosser bodies was soon conceived to take place with respect to souls, which were considered slight, shadowy, and scarcely material figures. The idea of metempsychosis is perhaps the most ancient dogma of the known world, and prevails still in a great part of India and of China.

  It is highly probable, again, that the various metamorphoses which we witness in nature produced those ancient fables which Ovid has collected and embellished in his admirable work. Even the Jews had their metamorphoses. If Niobe was changed into a stone, Edith, the wife of Lot, was changed into a statue of salt. If Eurydice remained in hell for having looked behind her, it was for precisely the same indiscretion that this wife of Lot was deprived of her human nature. The village in which Baucis and Philemon resided in Phrygia is changed into a lake; the same event occurs to Sodom. The daughters of Anius converted water into oil; we have in Scripture a metamorphosis very similar, but more true and more sacred. Cadmus was changed into a serpent; the rod of Aaron becomes a serpent also.

  The gods frequently change themselves into men; the Jews never saw angels but in the form of men; angels ate with Abraham. Paul, in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, says that an angel of Satan has buffeted him: “Angelus Satanæ me colaphizet.”

  METAPHYSICS.

  “Trans naturam,”—beyond nature. But what is that which is beyond nature? By nature, it is to be presumed, is meant matter, and metaphysics relates to that which is not matter.

  For example: to your reasoning, which is neither long, nor wide, nor high, nor solid, nor pointed; your soul, to yourself unknown, which produces your reasoning.

  Spirits, which the world has always talked of, and to which mankind appropriated, for a long period, a body so attenuated and shadowy, that it could scarcely be called body; but from which, at length, they have removed every shadow of body, without knowing what it was that was left.

  The manner in which these spirits perceive, without any embarrassment, from the five senses; in which they think, without a head; and in which they communicate their thoughts, without words and signs.

  Finally, God, whom we know by His works, but whom our pride impels us to define; God, whose power we feel to be immense; God, between whom and ourselves exists the abyss of infinity, and yet whose nature we dare to attempt to fathom.

  These are the objects of metaphysics. We might further add to these the principles of pure mathematics, points without extension, lines without width, superficies without thickness, units infinitely divisible, etc.

  Bayle himself considered these objects as those which were denominated “entia rationis,” beings of reason; they are, however, in fact, only material things considered in their masses, their superficies, their simple lengths and breadths, and the extremities of these simple lengths and breadths. All measures are precise and demonstrated. Metaphysics has nothing to do with geometry.

  Thus a man may be a metaphysician without being a geometrician. Metaphysics is more entertaining; it constitutes often the romance of the mind. In geometry, on the contrary, we must calculate and measure; this is a perpetual trouble, and most minds had rather dream pleasantly than fatigue themselves with hard work.

  MIND (LIMITS OF THE HUMAN).

  Newton was one day asked why he stepped forward when he was so inclined; and from what cause his arm and his hand obeyed his will? He honestly replied, that he knew nothing about the matter. But at least, said they to him, you who are so well acquainted with the gravitation of planets, will tell us why they turn one way sooner than another? Newton still avowed his ignorance.

  Those who teach that the ocean was salted for fear it should corrupt, and that the tides were created to conduct our ships into port, were a little ashamed when told that the Mediterranean has ports and no tide. Muschembrock himself has fallen into this error.

  Who has ever been able to determine precisely how a billet of wood is changed into red-hot charcoal, and by what mechanism lime is heated by cold water?

  The first motion of the heart in animals—is that accounted for? Has it been exactly discovered how the business of generation is arranged? Has any one divined the cause of sensation, ideas, and memory? We know no more of the essence of matter than the children who touch its superficies.

  Who will instruct us in the mechanism by which the grain of corn, which we cast into the earth, disposes itself to produce a stalk surmounted with an ear; or why the sun produces an apple on one tree and a chestnut on the next to it? Many doctors have said: “What know I not?” Montaigne said: “What know I?”

  Unbending decider! pedagogue in phrases! furred reasoner! thou inquirest after the limits of the human mind—they are at the end of thy nose.

  MIRACLES.

  SECTION I.

  A miracle, according to the true meaning of the word, is something admirable; and agreeable to this, all is miracle. The stupendous order of nature, the revolution of a hundred millions of worlds around a million of suns, the activity of light, the life of animals, all are grand and perpetual miracles.

  According to common acceptation, we call a miracle the violation of these divine and eternal laws. A solar eclipse at the time of the full moon, or a dead man walking two leagues and carrying his head in his arms, we denominate a miracle.

  Many natural philosophers maintain, that in this sense there are no miracles; and advance the following arguments:

  A miracle is the violation of mathematical, divine, immutable, eternal laws. By the very exposition itself, a miracle is a contradiction in terms: a law cannot at the same time be immutable and violated. But they are asked, cannot a law, established by God Himself, be suspended by its author?

  They have the hardihood to reply that it cannot; and that it is impossible a being infinitely wise can have made laws to violate them. He could not, they say, derange the machine but with a view of making it work better; but it is evident that God, all-wise and omnipotent, originally made this immense machine, the universe, as good and perfect as He was able; if He saw that some imperfections would arise from the nature of matter, He provided for that in the beginning; and, accordingly, He will never change anything in it. Moreover, God can do nothing without reason; but what reason could induce him to disfigure for a time His own work?

  It is done, they are told, in favor of mankind. They reply: We must presume, then, that it is in favor of all mankind; for it is impossible to conceive that the divine nature should occupy itself only about a few men in particular, and not for the whole human race; and even the whole human race itself is a very small concern; it is less than a small ant-hill, in comparison with all the beings inhabiting immensity. But is it not the most absurd of all extravagances to imagine that the Infinite Supreme should, in favor of three or four hundred emmets on this little heap of earth, derange the operation of the vast machinery that moves the universe?

  But, admitting that God chose to distinguish a small number of men by particular favors, is there any necessity that, in order to accomplish this object, He should change what He established for all periods and for all places? He certainly can have no need of this inconstancy in order to bestow favors on any of His creatures: His favors consist in His laws themselves: he has foreseen all and arranged all, with a view to them. All invariably obey the force which He has impressed forever on nature.

  For what purpose would God perform a miracle? To accomplish some particular design upon living beings? He would then, in reality, be supposed to say: “I have not been able to effect by my construction of the universe, by my divine decrees, by my eternal laws, a particular object; I am now going to change my eternal ideas and immutable laws, to endeavor to accomplish what I have not been able to do by means of them.” This would be an avowal of His weakness, not of His power; it would appear in such a being an inconceivable contradiction. Accordingly, therefore, to dare to ascribe miracles to God is, if man can in reality insult God, actually offering Him that insult. It is saying to Him: “You are a weak and inconsistent Being.” It is, therefore, absurd to believe in miracles; it is, in fact, dishonoring the divinity.

  These philosophers, however, are not suffered thus to declaim without opposition. You may extol, it is replied, as much as you please, the immutability of the Supreme Being, the eternity of His laws, and the regularity of His infinitude of worlds; but our little heap of earth has, notwithstanding all that you have advanced, been completely covered over with miracles in every part and time. Histories relate as many prodigies as natural events. The daughters of the high priest Anius changed whatever they pleased to corn, wine, and oil; Athalide, the daughter of Mercury, revived again several times; Æsculapius resuscitated Hippolytus; Hercules rescued Alcestes from the hand of death; and Heres returned to the world after having passed fifteen days in hell. Romulus and Remus were the offspring of a god and a vestal. The Palladium descended from heaven on the city of Troy; the hair of Berenice was changed into a constellation; the cot of Baucis and Philemon was converted into a superb temple; the head of Orpheus delivered oracles after his death; the walls of Thebes spontaneously constructed themselves to the sound of a flute, in the presence of the Greeks; the cures effected in the temple of Æsculapius were absolutely innumerable, and we have monuments still existing containing the very names of persons who were eyewitnesses of his miracles.

  Mention to me a single nation in which the most incredible prodigies have not been performed, and especially in those periods in which the people scarcely knew how to write or read.

  The philosophers make no answer to these objections, but by slightly raising their shoulders and by a smile; but the Christian philosophers say: “We are believers in the miracles of our holy religion; we believe them by faith and not by our reason, which we are very cautious how we listen to; for when faith speaks, it is well known that reason ought to be silent. We have a firm and entire faith in the miracles of Jesus Christ and the apostles, but permit us to entertain some doubt about many others: permit us, for example, to suspend our judgment on what is related by a very simple man, although he has obtained the title of great. He assures us, that a certain monk was so much in the habit of performing miracles, that the prior at length forbade him to exercise his talent in that line. The monk obeyed; but seeing a poor tiler fall from the top of a house, he hesitated for a moment between the desire to save the unfortunate man’s life, and the sacred duty of obedience to his superior. He merely ordered the tiler to stay in the air till he should receive further instructions, and ran as fast as his legs would carry him to communicate the urgency of the circumstances to the prior. The prior absolved him from the sin he had committed in beginning the miracle without permission, and gave him leave to finish it, provided he stopped with the same, and never again repeated his fault.” The philosophers may certainly be excused for entertaining a little doubt of this legend.

  But how can you deny, they are asked, that St. Gervais and St. Protais appeared in a dream to St. Ambrose, and informed him of the spot in which were deposited their relics? that St. Ambrose had them disinterred? and that they restored sight to a man that was blind? St. Augustine was at Milan at the very time, and it is he who relates the miracle, using the expression, in the twenty-second book of his work called the “City of God,” “immenso populo teste”—in the presence of an immense number of people. Here is one of the very best attested and established miracles. The philosophers, however, say that they do not believe one word about Gervais and Protais appearing to any person whatever; that it is a matter of very little consequence to mankind where the remains of their carcasses lie; that they have no more faith in this blind man than in Vespasian’s; that it is a useless miracle, and that God does nothing that is useless; and they adhere to the principles they began with. My respect for St. Gervais and St. Protais prevents me from being of the same opinion as these philosophers: I merely state their incredulity. They lay great stress on the well-known passage of Lucian, to be found in the death of Peregrinus: “When an expert juggler turns Christian, he is sure to make his fortune.” But as Lucian is a profane author, we ought surely to set him aside as of no authority.

  These philosophers cannot even make up their minds to believe the miracles performed in the second century. Even eye-witnesses to the facts may write and attest till the day of doom, that after the bishop of Smyrna, St. Polycarp, was condemned to be burned, and actually in the midst of the flames, they heard a voice from heaven exclaiming: “Courage, Polycarp! be strong, and show yourself a man”; that, at the very instant, the flames quitted his body, and formed a pavilion of fire above his head, and from the midst of the pile there flew out a dove; when, at length, Polycarp’s enemies ended his life by cutting off his head. All these facts and attestations are in vain. For what good, say these unimpressible and incredulous men, for what good was this miracle? Why did the flames lose their nature, and the axe of the executioner retain all its power of destruction? Whence comes it that so many martyrs escaped unhurt out of boiling oil, but were unable to resist the edge of the sword? It is answered, such was the will of God. But the philosophers would wish to see and hear all this themselves, before they believe it.

  Those who strengthen their reasonings by learning will tell you that the fathers of the Church have frequently declared that miracles were in their days performed no longer. St. Chrysostom says expressly: “The extraordinary gifts of the spirit were bestowed even on the unworthy, because the Church at that time had need of miracles; but now, they are not bestowed even on the worthy, because the Church has need of them no longer.” He afterwards declares, that there is no one now who raises the dead, or even who heals the sick.

  St. Augustine himself, notwithstanding the miracles of Gervais and Protais, says, in his “City of God”: “Why are not such miracles as were wrought formerly wrought now?” and he assigns the same reason as St. Chrysostom for it.

  “Cur inquiunt, nunc illa miracula quæ prædicatis facta esse non fiunt? Possem quidem dicere necessaria prius fuisse, quam crederet mundus, ad hoc ut crederet mundus.”

  It is objected to the philosophers, that St. Augustine, notwithstanding this avowal, mentions nevertheless an old cobbler of Hippo, who, having lost his garment, went to pray in the chapel of the twenty martyrs, and on his return found a fish, in the body of which was a gold ring; and that the cook who dressed the fish said to the cobbler: “See what a present the twenty martyrs have made you!”

  To this the philosophers reply, that there is nothing in the event here related in opposition to the laws of nature; that natural philosophy is not contradicted or shocked by a fish’s swallowing a gold ring, or a cook’s delivering such ring to a cobbler; that, in short, there is no miracle at all in the case.

  If these philosophers are reminded that, according to St. Jerome, in his “Life of Paul the Hermit,” that hermit had many conversations with satyrs and fauns; that a raven carried to him every day, for thirty years together, half of a loaf for his dinner, and a whole one on the day that St. Anthony went to visit him, they might reply again, that all this is not absolutely inconsistent with natural philosophy; that satyrs and fauns may have existed; and that, at all events, whether the narrative be a recital of facts, or only a story fit for children, it has nothing at all to do with the miracles of our Lord and His apostles. Many good Christians have contested the “History of St. Simeon Stylites,” written by Theodoret; many miracles considered authentic by the Greek Church have been called in question by many Latins, just as the Latin miracles have been suspected by the Greek Church. Afterwards, the Protestants appeared on the stage, and treated the miracles of both churches certainly with very little respect or ceremony.

  A learned Jesuit, who was long a preacher in the Indies, deplores that neither his colleagues nor himself could ever perform a miracle. Xavier laments, in many of his letters, that he has not the gift of languages. He says, that among the Japanese he is merely like a dumb statue: yet the Jesuits have written that he resuscitated eight persons. That was certainly no trifling matter; but it must be recollected that he resuscitated them six thousand leagues distant. Persons have since been found, who have pretended that the abolition of the Jesuits in France is a much greater miracle than any performed by Xavier and Ignatius.

  However that may be, all Christians agree that the miracles of Jesus Christ and the apostles are incontestably true; but that we may certainly be permitted to doubt some stated to have been performed in our own times, and which have not been completely authenticated.

  It would certainly, for example, be very desirable, in order to the firm and clear establishment of a miracle, that it should be performed in the presence of the Academy of Sciences of Paris, or the Royal Society of London, and the Faculty of Medicine, assisted by a detachment of guards to keep in due order and distance the populace, who might by their rudeness or indiscretion prevent the operation of the miracle.

  A philosopher was once asked what he should say if he saw the sun stand still, that is, if the motion of the earth around that star were to cease; if all the dead were to rise again; and if the mountains were to go and throw themselves together into the sea, all in order to prove some important truth, like that, for instance, of versatile grace? “What should I say?” answered the philosopher; “I should become a Manichæan; I should say that one principle counteracted the performance of another.”

  SECTION II.

  Define your terms, you will permit me again to say, or we shall never understand one another. “Miraculum res miranda, prodigium, portentum, monstrum.”—Miracle, something admirable; prodigy, implying something astonishing; portentous, bearing with it novelty; monster, something to show (à montrer) on account of its variety. Such are the first ideas that men formed of miracles.

  As everything is refined and improved upon, such also would be the case with this definition. A miracle is said to be that which is impossible to nature. But it was not considered that this was in fact saying all miracle is absolutely impossible. For what is nature? You understand by it the eternal order of things. A miracle would therefore be impossible in such an order. In this sense God could not work a miracle.

  If you mean by miracle an effect of which you cannot perceive the cause, in that sense all is miracle. The attraction and direction of the magnet are continual miracles. A snail whose head is renewed is a miracle. The birth of every animal, the production of every vegetable, are miracles of every day.

  But we are so accustomed to these prodigies, that they have lost their name of admirable—of miraculous. The Indians are no longer astonished by cannon.

  We have therefore formed for ourselves another idea of a miracle. It is, according to the common opinion, what never has happened and never will happen. Such is the idea formed of Samson’s jawbone of an ass; of the conversation between the ass and Balaam, and that between a serpent and Eve; of the chariot with four horses that conveyed away Elijah; of the fish that kept Jonah in its belly seventy-two hours; of the ten plagues of Egypt; of the walls of Jericho, and of the sun and moon standing still at mid-day, etc.

  In order to believe a miracle, it is not enough merely to have seen it; for a man may be deceived. A fool is often called a dealer in wonders; and not merely do many excellent persons think that they have seen what they have not seen, and heard what was never said to them; not only do they thus become witnesses of miracles, but they become also subjects of miracles. They have been sometimes diseased, and sometimes cured by supernatural power; they have been changed into wolves; they have travelled through the air on broomsticks; they have become both incubi and succubi.

  It is necessary that the miracle should have been seen by a great number of very sensible people, in sound health, and perfectly disinterested in the affair. It is above all necessary, that it should have been solemnly attested by them; for if solemn forms of authentication are deemed necessary with respect to transactions of very simple character, such as the purchase of a house, a marriage contract, or a will, what particular and minute cautionary formalities must not be deemed requisite in order to verify things naturally impossible, on which the destiny of the world is to depend?

  Even when an authentic miracle is performed, it in fact proves nothing; for Scripture tells you, in a great variety of places, that impostors may perform miracles, and that if any man, after having performed them, should proclaim another God than that of the Jews, he ought to be stoned to death. It is requisite, therefore, that the doctrine should be confirmed by the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine.

  Even this, however, is not sufficient. As impostors may preach a very correct and pure morality, the better to deceive, and it is admitted that impostors, like the magicians of Pharaoh, may perform miracles; it is in addition necessary, that these miracles should have been announced by prophecies.

  In order to be convinced of the truth of these prophecies, it is necessary that they should have been heard clearly announced, and seen really accomplished. It is necessary to possess perfectly the language in which they are preserved.

  It is not sufficient, even, that you are a witness of their miraculous fulfilment; for you may be deceived by false appearances. It is necessary that the miracle and prophecy should be verified on oath by the heads of the nation; and even after all this there will be some doubters. For it is possible for a nation to be interested in the forgery of a prophecy or a miracle; and when interest mixes with the transaction, you may consider the whole affair as worth nothing. If a predicted miracle be not as public and as well verified as an eclipse that is announced in the almanac, be assured that it is nothing better than a juggler’s trick or an old woman’s tale.

  SECTION III.

  A theocracy can be founded only upon miracles. Everything in it must be divine. The Great Sovereign speaks to men only in prodigies. These are his ministers and letters patent. His orders are intimated by the ocean’s covering the earth to drown nations, or opening a way through its depths, that they may pass upon dry land.

  Accordingly you perceive, that in the Jewish history all is miracle; from the creation of Adam, and the formation of Eve, who was made of one of the ribs of Adam, to the time of the insignificant kingling Saul.

  Even in the time of this same Saul, theocracy participates in power with royalty. There are still, consequently, miracles performed from time to time; but there is no longer that splendid train of prodigies which continually astonishes and interrupts nature. The ten plagues of Egypt are not renewed; the sun and moon do not stand still at mid-day, in order to give a commander time to exterminate a few runaways, already nearly destroyed by a shower of stones from the clouds. No Samson again extirpates a thousand Philistines by the jaw-bone of an ass. Asses no longer talk rationally with men; walls no longer fall prostrate at the mere sound of trumpets; cities are not swallowed up in a lake by the fire of heaven; the race of man is not a second time destroyed by a deluge. But the finger of God is still manifested; the shade of Saul is permitted to appear at the invocation of the sorceress, and God Himself promises David that he will defeat the Philistines at Baal-perazim.

  “God gathers together His celestial army in the reign of Ahab, and asks the spirits: Who will go and deceive Ahab, and persuade him to go up to war against Ramoth Gilead? And there came forth a lying spirit and stood before the Lord and said, I will persuade him.” But the prophet Micaiah alone heard this conversation, and he received a blow on the cheek from another prophet, called Zedekiah, for having announced the ill-omened prodigy.

  Of miracles performed in the sight of the whole nation, and changing the laws of all nature, we see no more until the time of Elijah, for whom the Lord despatched a chariot of fire and horses of fire, which conveyed him rapidly from the banks of the Jordan to heaven, although no one knew where heaven was.

  From the commencement of historical times, that is, from the time of the conquests of Alexander, we see no more miracles among the Jews.

  When Pompey comes to make himself master of Jerusalem—when Crassus plunders the temple—when Pompey puts to death the king of the Jews by the hands of the executioner—when Anthony confers the kingdom of Judæa on the Arabian Herod—when Titus takes Jerusalem by assault, and when it is razed to the ground by Arian—not a single miracle is ever performed. Thus it is with every nation upon earth. They begin with theocracy; they end in a manner simply and naturally human. The greater the progress made in society and knowledge, the fewer there are of prodigies.

  We well know that the theocracy of the Jews was the only true one, and that those of other nations were false; but in all other respects, the case was precisely the same with them as with the Jews.

  In Egypt, in the time of Vulcan, and in that of Isis and Osiris, everything was out of the laws of nature; under the Ptolemies everything resumed its natural course.

  In the remote periods of Phos, Chrysos, and Ephestes, gods and mortals conversed in Chaldee with the most interesting familiarity. A god warned King Xissuter that there would be a deluge in Armenia, and that it was necessary he should, as soon as possible, build a vessel five stadii in length and two in width. Such things do not happen to the Dariuses and the Alexanders.

  The fish Oannes, in former times, came every day out of the Euphrates to preach upon its banks; but there is no preaching fish now. It is true that St. Anthony of Padua went and preached to the fishes; however, such things happen so very rarely that they are scarcely to be taken any account of.

  Numa held long conversations with the nymph Egeria; but we never read that Cæsar had any with Venus, although he was descended from her in the direct line. The world, we see, is constantly advancing a little, and refining gradually.

  But after being extricated out of one slough for a time, mankind are soon plunged into another. To ages of civilization succeed ages of barbarism; that barbarism is again expelled, and again reappears: it is the regular alternation of day and night.

  Of Those Who Have Been so Impiously Rash as to Deny the Miracles of Jesus Christ.

  Among the moderns, Thomas Woolston, a learned member of the University of Cambridge, appears to me to have been the first who ventured to interpret the Gospels merely in a typical, allegorical, and spiritual sense, and boldly maintained that not one of the miracles of Jesus was actually performed. He wrote without method or art, and in a style confused and coarse, but not destitute of vigor. His six discourses against the miracles of Jesus Christ were publicly sold at London, in his own house. In the course of two years, from 1737 to 1739, he had three editions of them printed, of twenty thousand copies each, and yet it is now very difficult to procure one from the booksellers.

  Never was Christianity so daringly assailed by any Christian. Few writers entertain less awe or respect for the public, and no priest ever declared himself more openly the enemy of priests. He even dared to justify this hatred by that of Jesus Christ against the Pharisees and Scribes; and he said that he should not, like Jesus Christ, become their victim, because he had come into the world in a more enlightened age.

  He certainly hoped to justify his rashness by his adoption of the mystical sense; but he employs expressions so contemptuous and abusive that every Christian ear is shocked at them.

  If we may believe him, when Jesus sent the devil into the herd of two thousand swine, He did neither more nor less than commit a robbery on their owners. If the story had been told of Mahomet, he would have been considered as “an abominable wizard, and a sworn slave to the devil.” And if the proprietor of the swine, and the merchants who in the outer court of the temple sold beasts for sacrifices, and whom Jesus drove out with a scourge, came to demand justice when he was apprehended, it is clear that he was deservedly condemned, as there never was a jury in England that would not have found him guilty.

  He tells her fortune to the woman of Samaria, just like a wandering Bohemian or Gypsy. This alone was sufficient to cause His banishment, which was the punishment inflicted upon fortune-tellers, or diviners, by Tiberius. “I am astonished,” says he, “that the gypsies do not proclaim themselves the genuine disciples of Jesus, as their vocation is the same. However, I am glad to see that He did not extort money from the Samaritan woman, differing in this respect from our clergy, who take care to be well paid for their divinations.”

  I follow the order of the pages in his book. The author goes on to the entrance of Jesus Christ into Jerusalem. It is not clear, he says, whether He was mounted on a male or female ass, or upon the foal of an ass, or upon all three together.

  He compares Jesus, when tempted by the devil, to St. Dunstan, who seized the devil by the nose; and he gives the preference to St. Dunstan.

  At the article of the fig-tree, which was cursed with barrenness for not producing figs out of season for them, he describes Jesus as a mere vagabond, a mendicant friar, who before He turned field-preacher was “no better than a journeyman carpenter.” It is surprising, he says, that the court of Rome has not among all its relics some little fancy-box or joint-stool of His workmanship. In a word, it is difficult to carry blasphemy further.

  After diverting himself with the probationary fish-pool of Bethesda, the waters of which were troubled or stirred once in every year by an angel, he inquires how it could well be, that neither Flavius Josephus, nor Philo should ever mention this angel; why St. John should be the sole historian of this miracle; and by what other miracle it happened that no Roman ever saw this angel, or ever even heard his name mentioned?

  The water changed into wine at the marriage of Cana, according to him, excites the laughter and contempt of all who are not imbruted by superstition.

  “What!” says he, “John expressly says that the guests were already intoxicated, ‘methus tosi’; and God comes down to earth and performs His first miracle to enable them to drink still more!”

  God, made man, commences His mission by assisting at a village wedding. “Whether Jesus and His mother were drunk, as were others of the company, is not certain. The familiarity of the lady with a soldier leads to the presumption that she was fond of her bottle; that her Son, however, was somewhat affected by the wine, appears from His answering His mother so ‘waspishly and snappishly’ as He did, when He said, ‘Woman, what have I to do with thee?’ It may be inferred from these words that Mary was not a virgin, and that Jesus was not her son; had it been otherwise, He would not have thus insulted His father and mother in violation of one of the most sacred commandments of the law. However, He complied with His mother’s request; He fills eighteen jars with water, and makes punch of it.” These are the very words of Thomas Woolston, and must fill every Christian soul with indignation.

  It is with regret, and even with trembling, that I quote these passages; but there have been sixty thousand copies of this work printed, all bearing the name of the author, and all publicly sold at his house. It can never be said that I calumniate him.

  It is to the dead raised again by Jesus Christ that he principally directs his attention. He contends that a dead man restored to life would have been an object of attention and astonishment to the universe; that all the Jewish magistracy, and more especially Pilate, would have made the most minute investigations and obtained the most authentic depositions; that Tiberius enjoined all proconsuls, prætors, and governors of provinces to inform him with exactness of every event that took place; that Lazarus, who had been dead four whole days, would have been most strictly interrogated; and that no little curiosity would have been excited to know what had become, during that time, of his soul.

  With what eager interest would Tiberius and the whole Roman senate have questioned him, and not indeed only him, but the daughter of Jairus and the son of the widow of Nain? Three dead persons restored to life would have been three attestations to the divinity of Jesus, which almost in a single moment would have made the whole world Christian. But instead of all this, the whole world, for more than two hundred years, knew nothing about these resplendent and decisive evidences. It is not till a hundred years have rolled away from the date of the events that some obscure individuals show one another the writings that contain the relation of those miracles. Eighty-nine emperors reckoning those who had only the name of “tyrants,” never hear the slightest mention of these resurrections, although they must inevitably have held all nature in amazement. Neither the Jewish historian Josephus, nor the learned Philo, nor any Greek or Roman historian at all notices these prodigies. In short, Woolston has the imprudence to say that the history of Lazarus is so brimful of absurdities that St. John, when he wrote it, had outlived his senses.

  Supposing, says Woolston, that God should in our own times send an ambassador to London to convert the hireling clergy, and that ambassador should raise the dead, what would the clergy say?

  He blasphemes the incarnation, the resurrection, and the ascension of Jesus Christ, just upon the same system; and he calls these miracles: “The most manifest and the most barefaced imposture that ever was put upon the world!”

  What is perhaps more singular still is that each of his discourses is dedicated to a bishop. His dedications are certainly not exactly in the French style. He bestows no flattery nor compliments. He upbraids them with their pride and avarice, their ambition and faction, and smiles with triumph at the thought of their being now, like every other class of citizens, in complete subjection to the laws of the state.

  At last these bishops, tired of being insulted by an undignified member of the University of Cambridge, determined upon a formal appeal to the laws. They instituted a prosecution against Woolston in the King’s Bench, and he was tried before Chief-Justice Raymond, in 1729, when he was imprisoned, condemned to pay a fine, and obliged to give security to the amount of a hundred and fifty pounds sterling. His friends furnished him with the security, and he did not in fact die in prison, as in some of our careless and ill-compiled dictionaries he is stated to have done. He died at his own house in London, after having uttered these words: “This is a pass that every man must come to.” Some time before his death, a female zealot meeting him in the street was gross enough to spit in his face; he calmly wiped his face and bowed to her. His manners were mild and pleasing. He was obstinately infatuated with the mystical meaning, and blasphemed the literal one; but let us hope that he repented on his death-bed, and that God has showed him mercy.

  About the same period there appeared in France the will of John Meslier, clergyman (curé) of But and Entrepigni, in Champagne, of whom we have already spoken, under the article on “Contradictions.”

  It was both a wonderful and a melancholy spectacle to see two priests at the same time writing against the Christian religion. Meslier is still more violent than Woolston. He ventures to treat the devil’s carrying off our Lord to the top of a mountain, the marriage of Cana, and the loaves and fishes, as absurd tales, injurious to the Supreme Being, which for three hundred years were unknown to the whole Roman Empire, and at last advanced from the dregs of the community to the throne of the emperors, when policy compelled them to adopt the nonsense of the people, in order to keep them the better in subjection. The declamations of the English priest do not approach in vehemence those of the priest of Champagne. Woolston occasionally showed discretion. Meslier never has any; he is a man so sensitively sore to the crimes to which he has been witness that he renders the Christian religion responsible for them, forgetting that it condemns them. There is not a single miracle which is not with him an object of scorn or horror; no prophecy which he does not compare with the prophecies of Nostradamus. He even goes so far as to compare Jesus Christ to Don Quixote, and St. Peter to Sancho Panza; and what is most of all to be deplored is, that he wrote these blasphemies against Jesus Christ, when he might be said to be in the very arms of death—at a moment when the most deceitful are sincere, and the most intrepid tremble. Too strongly impressed by some injuries that had been done him by his superiors in authority; too deeply affected by the great difficulties which he met with in the Scripture, he became exasperated against it more than Acosta and all the Jews; more than Porphyry, Celsus, Iamblichus, Julian, Libanius, Maximus, Simmachus, or any other whatever of the partisans of human reason against the divine incomprehensibilities of our religion. Many abridgments of his work have been printed; but happily the persons in authority suppressed them as fast as they appeared.

  A priest of Bonne-Nouvelle, near Paris, wrote also on the same subject; and it thus happened that at the very time the abbé Becheran and the rest of the Convulsionaries were performing miracles, three priests were writing against the genuine Gospel miracles.

  The most clever work that has been written against the miracles and prophecies is that of my Lord Bolingbroke. But happily it is so voluminous, so destitute of method, so verbose, and so abounding in long and sometimes complicated sentences, that it requires a great deal of patience to read him.

  There have been some minds so constituted that they have been enchanted by the miracles of Moses and Joshua, but have not entertained for those of Jesus Christ the respect to which they are entitled. Their imagination—raised by the grand spectacle of the sea opening a passage through its depths, and suspending its waves that a horde of Hebrews might safely go through; by the ten plagues of Egypt, and by the stars that stopped in their course over Gibeon and Ajalon, etc.—could not with ease and satisfaction be let down again, so as to admire the comparatively petty miracles of the water changed into wine, the withered fig-tree, and the swine drowned in the little lake of Gadara. Vaghenseil said that it was like hearing a rustic ditty after attending a grand concert.

  The Talmud pretends that there have been many Christians who, after comparing the miracles of the Old Testament with those of the New Testament, embraced Judaism; they consider it impossible that the Sovereign Lord of Nature should have wrought such stupendous prodigies for a religion He intended to annihilate. What! they exclaim, can it possibly be, that for a series of ages He should have exhibited a train of astonishing and tremendous miracles in favor of a true religion that was to become a false one? What! can it be that God Himself has recorded that this religion shall never perish, and that those who attempt to destroy it shall be stoned to death, and yet that He has nevertheless sent His own Son, Who is no other than Himself, to annihilate what He was employed so many ages in erecting?

  There is much more to be added to these remarks; this Son, they continue, this Eternal God, having made Himself a Jew, adheres to the Jewish religion during the whole of His life; He performs all the functions of it, He frequents the Jewish temple, He announces nothing contrary to the Jewish law, and all His disciples are Jews and observe the Jewish ceremonies. It most certainly is not He who established the Christian religion. It was established by the dissident Jews who united with the Platonists. There is not a single dogma of Christianity that was preached by Jesus Christ.

  Such is the reasoning of these rash men, who, with minds at once hypocritical and audacious, dare to criticise the works of God, and admit the miracles of the Old Testament for the sole purpose of rejecting those of the New Testament.

  Of this number was the unfortunate priest of Pont-à-Mousson in Lorraine, called Nicholas Anthony; he was known by no other name. After he had received what is called “the four minors” in Lorraine, the Calvinistic preacher Ferri, happening to go to Pont-à-Mousson, raised in his mind very serious scruples, and persuaded him that the four minors were the mark of the beast. Anthony, driven almost to distraction by the thought of carrying about him the mark of the beast, had it immediately effaced by Ferri, embraced the Protestant religion, and became a minister at Geneva about the year 1630.

  With a head full of rabbinical learning, he thought that if the Protestants were right in reference to the Papists, the Jews were much more so in reference to all the different sects of Christianity whatever. From the village of Divonne, where he was pastor, he went to be received as a Jew at Venice, together with a young apprentice in theology whom he had persuaded to adopt his own principles, but who afterwards abandoned him, not experiencing any call to martyrdom.

  At first the minister, Nicholas Anthony, abstained from uttering the name of Jesus Christ in his sermons and prayers; in a short time, however, becoming animated and emboldened by the example of the Jewish saints, who confidently professed Judaism before the princes of Tyre and Babylon, he travelled barefooted to Geneva, to confess before the judges and magistrates that there is only one religion upon earth, because there is only one God; that that religion is the Jewish; that it is absolutely necessary to become circumcised; and that it is a horrible crime to eat bacon and blood pudding. He pathetically exhorted all the people of Geneva, who crowded to hear him, no longer to continue children of Belial, but to become good Jews, in order to deserve the kingdom of heaven. He was apprehended, and put in chains.

  The little Council of Geneva, which at that period did nothing without consulting the council of preachers, asked their advice in this emergency. The most sensible of them recommended that poor Anthony should be bled in the cephalic vein, use the bath, and be kept upon gruel and broths; after which he might perhaps gradually be induced to pronounce the name of Jesus Christ, or at least to hear it pronounced, without grinding his teeth, as had hitherto been his practice. They added, that the laws bore with Jews; that there were eight thousand of them even in Rome itself; that many merchants are true Jews, and therefore that as Rome admitted within its walls eight thousand children of the synagogue, Geneva might well tolerate one. At the sound of “toleration” the rest of the pastors, who were the majority, gnashing their teeth still more than Anthony did at the name of Jesus Christ, and also eager to find an opportunity to burn a man, which could not be done every day, called peremptorily for the burning. They resolved that nothing could serve more to establish genuine Christianity; that the Spaniards had obtained so much reputation in the world only by burning the Jews every year, and that after all, if the Old Testament must prevail over the New Testament, God would not fail to come and extinguish the flames of the pile, as he did at Babylon for Shadrach, Meshac, and Abednego; in which case all must go back again to the Old Testament; but that, in the meantime, it was indispensable to burn Nicholas Anthony. On the breaking up of the meeting, they concluded with the observation: “We must put the wicked out of the way”—the very words they used.

  The long-headed syndics, Sarasin and Godefroi, agreed that the reasoning of the Calvinistic sanhedrim was admirable, and by the right of the strongest party, condemned Nicholas Anthony, the weakest of men, to die the same death as Calanus and the counsellor Dubourg. This sentence was carried into execution on April 20, 1632, in a very beautiful lawn or meadow, called Plain-Palais, in the presence of twenty thousand persons, who blessed the new law, and the wonderful sense of the syndics Sarasin and Godefroi.

  The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob did not renew the miracle of the furnace of Babylon in favor of poor Anthony.

  Abauzit, an author of great veracity, relates in his notes, that he died in the greatest constancy, and persisted in his opinions even at the stake on the pile; he broke out into no passionate invective against his judges when the executioner was tying him to the stake; he displayed neither pride nor pusillanimity; he neither wept nor sighed; he was resigned. Never did martyr consummate his sacrifice with a more lively faith; never did philosopher contemplate a death of horror with greater firmness. This clearly proves that his folly or madness was at all events attended with sincere conviction. Let us implore of the God of both the Old and the New Testaments that he will grant him mercy.

  I would say as much for the Jesuit Malagrida, who was still more infatuated and mad than Nicholas Anthony; as I would also for the ex-Jesuits Patouillet and Paulian, should they ever be brought to the stake.

  A great number of writers, whose misfortune it was to be philosophers rather than Christians, have been bold enough to deny the miracles of our Lord; but after the four priests already noticed, there is no necessity to enumerate other instances. Let us lament over these four unfortunate men, led astray by their own deceitful reason, and precipitated by the gloom of their feelings into an abyss so dreadful and so fatal.

  MISSION.

  It is far from our object in this article to reflect upon the zeal of our missionaries, or the truth of our religion; these are sufficiently known in Christian Europe, and duly respected.

  My object is merely to make some remarks on the very curious and edifying letters of the reverend fathers, the Jesuits, who are not equally respectable. Scarcely do they arrive in India before they commence preaching, convert millions of Indians, and perform millions of miracles. Far be it from me to contradict their assertions. We all know how easy it must be for a Biscayan, a Bergamask, or a Norman to learn the Indian language in a few days, and preach like an Indian.

  With regard to miracles, nothing is more easy than to perform them at a distance of six thousand leagues, since so many have been performed at Paris, in the parish of St. Médard. The sufficing grace of the Molinists could undoubtedly operate on the banks of the Ganges, as well as the efficacious grace of the Jansenists on those of the river of the Gobelins. We have, however, said so much already about miracles that we shall pursue the subject no further.

  A reverend father Jesuit arrived in the course of the past year at Delhi, at the court of the great Mogul. He was not a man profoundly skilled in mathematics, or highly gifted in mind, who had come to correct the calendar, or to establish his fortune, but one of those poor, honest, zealous Jesuits, one of those soldiers who are despatched on particular duty by their general, and who obey orders without reasoning about them.

  M. Andrais, my factor, asked him what his business might be at Delhi. He replied that he had orders from the reverend father Ricci to deliver the Great Mogul from the paws of the devil, and convert his whole court.

  $

  I have already baptized twenty infants in the street, without their knowing anything at all about the matter, by throwing a few drops of water upon their heads. They are now just so many angels, provided they are happy enough to die directly. I cured a poor old woman of the megrims by making the sign of the cross behind her. I hope in a short time to convert the Mahometans of the court and the Gentoos among the people. You will see in Delhi, Agra, and Benares, as many good Catholics, adorers of the Virgin Mary, as you now do idolaters, adoring the devil.)

  $

  Undoubtedly, as they are not of my religion.)

  $

  You make one pause for a moment; but nothing could happen better than that which you suggest as being so probable. The slaughtered Catholics would go to paradise—to the garden—and the Gentoos to the everlasting fire of hell created for them from all eternity, according to the great mercy of God, and for His great glory; for God is exceedingly glorious.)

  m. andrais.

  But suppose that you should be informed against, and punished at the whipping post?

  the jesuit.

  That would also be for His glory. However, I conjure you to keep my secret, and save me from the honor and happiness of martyrdom.

  

  Allegorical bust of Voltaire.

  VOLTAIRE
  
  A PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY Vol. VI — Part II

  A PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY.

  MONEY.

  A word made use of to express gold. “Sir, will you lend me a hundred louis d’or?” “Sir, I would with all my heart, but I have no money; I am out of ready money.” The Italian will say to you: “Signore, non ha di danari”—“I have no deniers.”

  Harpagon asks Maître Jacques: “Wilt thou make a good entertainment?” “Yes, if you will give me plenty of money.”

  We continually inquire which of the countries of Europe is the richest in money? By that we mean, which is the people who circulate the most metals representative of objects of commerce? In the same manner we ask, which is the poorest? and thirty contending nations present themselves—the Westphalian, Limousin, Basque, Tyrolese, Valois, Grison, Istrian, Scotch, and Irish, the Swiss of a small canton, and above all the subjects of the pope.

  In deciding which has most, we hesitate at present between France, Spain, and Holland, which had none in 1600.

  Formerly, in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, the province of the papal treasury had no doubt the most ready money, and therefore the greatest trade. How do you sell that? would be asked of a theological merchant, who replied, For as much as the people are fools enough to give me.

  All Europe then sent its money to the Roman court, who gave in change consecrated beads, agnuses, indulgences plenary and limited, dispensations, confirmations, exemptions, benedictions, and even excommunications against those whom the subscriber chose, and who had not sufficient faith in the court of Rome.

  The Venetians sold nothing of all this, but they traded with all the West by Alexandria, and it was through them only that we had pepper and cinnamon. The money which went not to the papal treasury came to them, excepting a little to the Tuscans and Genoese. All the other kingdoms of Europe were so poor in ready money that Charles VIII. was obliged to borrow the jewels of the duchess of Savoy and put them in pawn, to raise funds to conquer Naples, which he soon lost again. The Venetians supported stronger armies than his. A noble Venetian had more gold in his coffers, and more vessels of silver on his table, than the emperor Maximilian surnamed “Pochi danari.”

  Things changed when the Portuguese traded with India as conquerors, and the Spaniards subjugated Mexico and Peru with six or seven hundred men. We know that then the commerce of Venice, and the other towns of Italy all fell to the ground. Philip II., the master of Spain, Portugal, the Low Countries, the Two Sicilies, and the Milanese, of fifteen hundred leagues of coast in Asia, and mines of gold and silver in America, was the only rich, and consequently the only powerful prince in Europe. The spies whom he gained in France kissed on their knees the Catholic doubloons, and the small number of angels and caroluses which circulated in that country had not much credit. It is pretended that America and Asia brought him in nearly ten million ducats of revenue. He would have really bought Europe with his money, but for the iron of Henry IV. and the fleets of Queen Elizabeth.

  The “Dictionnaire Encyclopedique,” in the article on “Argent,” quotes the “Spirits of Laws,” in which it is said: “I have heard deplored a thousand times, the blindness of the council of Francis I., who rejected the proposal of Christopher Columbus for the discovery of the Indies—perhaps this imprudence has turned out a very wise thing.”

  We see by the enormous power of Philip that the pretended council of Francis I. could not have done such a wise thing. But let us content ourselves with remarking that Francis I. was not born when it is pretended that he refused the offers of Christopher Columbus. The Genoese captain landed in America in 1492, and Francis I. was born in 1497, and did not ascend the throne until 1515. Let us here compare the revenues of Henry III., Henry IV., and Queen Elizabeth, with those of Philip II. The ordinary income of Elizabeth was only one hundred thousand pound sterling, and with extras it was, one year with another, four hundred thousand; but she required this surplus to defend herself from Philip II. Without extreme economy she would have been lost, and England with her.

  The revenue of Henry III. indeed increased to thirty millions of livres of his time; this, to the sum that Philip drew from the Indies, was as three to ten; but not more than a third of this money entered into the coffers of Henry III., who was very prodigal, greatly robbed, and consequently very poor. We find that Philip II. in one article was ten times richer than Henry.

  As to Henry IV., it is not worth while to compare his treasures with those of Philip II. Until the Peace of Vervins, he had only what he could borrow or win at the point of his sword; and he lived as a knight-errant, until the time in which he became the first king in Europe. England had always been so poor that King Edward III. was the first king who coined money of gold.

  Would we know what became of the money which flowed continually from Mexico and Peru into Spain? It entered the pockets of the French, English and Dutch, who traded with Cadiz under Spanish names; and who sent to America the productions of their manufactories. A great part of this money goes to the East Indies to pay for spices, cotton, saltpetre, sugar, candy, tea, cloths, diamonds, and monkeys.

  We may afterwards demand, what is become of all the treasures of the Indies? I answer that Shah Thamas Kouli-Khan or Shah Nadir had carried away all those of the great Mogul, together with his jewels. You would know where those jewels are, and this money that Shah Nadir carried with him into Persia? A part was hidden in the earth during the civil wars; predatory leaders made use of the rest to raise troops against one another; for, as Cæsar very well remarks: “With money we get soldiers, and with soldiers we steal money.”

  Your curiosity is not yet satisfied; you are troubled to know what have become of the treasures of Sesostris, of Crœsus, Cyrus, Nebuchadnezzar, and above all of Solomon, who, it is said, had to his own share equal to twenty millions and more of our pounds in his coffers.

  I will tell you. It is spread all over the world. Things find their level in time. Be sure, that in the time of Cyrus, the Gauls, Germany, Denmark, Poland, and Russia, had not a crown. Besides, that which is lost in gilding, which is fooled away upon our Lady of Loretto, and other places, and which has been swallowed up by the avaricious sea must be counted.

  How did the Romans under their great Romulus, the son of Mars, and a vestal, and under the devout Numa Pompilius? They had a Jupiter of oak; rudely carved huts for palaces; a handful of hay at the end of a stick for a standard; and not a piece of money of twelve sous value in their pockets. Our coachmen have gold watches that the seven kings of Rome, the Camilluses, Manliuses, and Fabiuses, could not have paid for.

  If by chance the wife of a receiver-general of finances was to have this chapter read at her toilette by the bel-esprit of the house, she would have a strange contempt for the Romans of the three first centuries, and would not allow a Manlius, Curius, or Fabius to enter her antechamber, should he come on foot, and not have wherewithal to take his part at play.

  Their ready money was of brass. It served at once for arms and money. They fought and reckoned with brass. Three or four pounds of brass, of twelve ounces weight, paid for an ox. They bought necessaries at market, as we buy them at present; and men had, as in all times, food, clothing, and habitations. The Romans, poorer than their neighbors, conquered them, and continually augmented their territory for the space of five hundred years, before they coined silver money.

  The soldiers of Gustavus Adolphus in Sweden had nothing but copper money for their pay, before the time that they made conquests out of their own country.

  Provided we have a pledge of exchange for the necessary things of life, commerce will continually go on. It signifies not whether this pledge be of shells or paper. Gold and silver have prevailed everywhere, only because they have been the most rare.

  It was in Asia that the first manufactures of money of these two metals commenced, because Asia was the cradle of all the arts.

  There certainly was no money in the Trojan war. Gold and silver passed by weight; Agamemnon might have had a treasure, but certainly no money.

  What has made several hardy scholars suspect that the “Pentateuch” was not written until the time in which the Hebrews began to procure coins from their neighbors is that in more than one passage mention is made of shekels. It is there said that Abraham, who was a stranger and had not an inch of land in the country of Canaan, bought there a field and a cave in which to bury his wife, for four hundred shekels of silver current money. The judicious Dom Calmet values this sum at four hundred and forty-eight livres, six sous, nine deniers, according to the ancient calculation adopted at random, in which the silver mark was of six-and-twenty livres value. As the silver mark has, however, increased by half the sum, the present value would be eight hundred and ninety-six livres.

  Now, as in that time there was no coined money answering to the word “pecunia,” that would make a little difficulty, from which it is not easy to extricate ourselves.

  Another difficulty is, that in one place it is said that Abraham bought this field in Hebron, and in another at Sichem. On that point consult the venerable Bede, Raban, Maure, and Emanuel Sa.

  We will now speak of the riches which David left to Solomon in coined money. Some make it amount to twenty-one or twenty-two millions of French livres, others to five-and-twenty. There is no keeper of the royal treasure, nor tefterdan of the grand Turk’s, who can exactly compute the treasure of King Solomon; but the young bachelors of Oxford and the Sorbonne make out the amount without difficulty.

  I will not speak of the innumerable adventures which have happened to money since it has been stamped, marked, valued, altered, increased, buried, and stolen, having through all its transformations constantly remained the idol of mankind. It is so much loved that among all Christian princes there still exists an old law which is not to allow gold and silver to go out of their kingdoms. This law implies one of two things—either that these princes reign over fools who lavish their money in a foreign country for their pleasure, or that we must not pay our debts to foreigners. It is, however, clear that no person is foolish enough to give his money without reason, and that, when we are in debt to a foreigner, we should pay him either in bills of exchange, commodities, or legitimate coin. Thus this law has not been executed since we began to open our eyes—which is not long ago.

  There are many things to be said on coined money; as on the unjust and ridiculous augmentation of specie, which suddenly loses considerable sums to a state on the melting down again; on the re-stamping, with an augmentation of ideal value, which augmentation invites all your neighbors and all your enemies to re-coin your money and gain at your expense; in short, on twenty other equally ruinous expedients. Several new books are full of judicious remarks upon this subject. It is more easy to write on money than to obtain it; and those who gain it, jest much at those who only know how to write about it.

  In general, the art of government consists in taking as much money as possible from one part of the citizens to give to the other.

  It is demanded, if it be possible radically to ruin a kingdom of which the soil in general is fertile. We answer that the thing is not practicable, since from the war of 1689 till the end of 1769, in which we write, everything has continually been done which could ruin France and leave it without resource, and yet it never could be brought about. It is a sound body which has had a fever of eighty years with relapses, and which has been in the hands of quacks, but which will survive.

  MONSTERS.

  The definition of monsters is more difficult than is generally imagined. Are we to apply the term to animals of enormous size; to a fish, or a serpent fifteen feet long, for instance? There are some, however, that are twenty or even thirty feet long, in comparison with which of course the others, instead of enormous or monstrous, would appear small.

  There are monsters through defect. But, if a generally well-made and handsome man were destitute from his birth of the little toes and little fingers, would he be a monster? Teeth are more necessary to a man; I have seen a man who never had a tooth. He was in other respects pleasing in his person. Being destitute of the organs of generation, still more necessary in the system of nature, would not constitute the person thus defective a monster.

  There are monsters by excess as well as by defect. But those who have six fingers, or three testicles, or two perforations instead of one, or the spine elongated in the form of a small tail, are not considered monsters.

  The third kind consists of those which have members of other animals; as, for example, a lion with the wings of an ostrich, or a serpent with the wings of an eagle, like the griffin and ixion of the Jews. But all bats have wings, and flying fish have them, without being monsters.

  Let us, then, reserve the name for animals whose deformities strike us with horror.

  Yet the first negro, upon this idea, was a monster to white women; and the most admirable of European beauties was a monster in the eyes of negroes.

  If Polyphemus and the Cyclops had really existed, people who carried an eye on each side of the root of the nose, would, in the island of Lipari, and the neighborhood of Mount Ætna, have been pronounced monsters.

  I once saw, at a fair, a young woman with four nipples, or rather dugs, and what resembled the tail of a cow hanging down between them. She was decidedly a monster when she displayed her neck, but was rather an agreeable woman in appearance when she concealed it.

  Centaurs and Minotaurs would have been monsters, but beautiful monsters. The well-proportioned body of a horse serving as a base or support to the upper part of a man would have been a masterpiece of nature’s workmanship on earth; just as we draw the masterpieces of heaven—those spirits which we call angels, and which we paint and sculpture in our churches—adorned sometimes with two wings, sometimes with four, and sometimes even with six.

  We have already asked, with the judicious Locke, what is the boundary of distinction between the human and merely animal figure; what is the point of monstrosity at which it would be proper to take your stand against baptizing an infant, against admitting it as a member of the human species, against according to it the possession of a soul? We have seen that this boundary is as difficult to be settled as it is difficult to ascertain what a soul is; for there certainly are none who know what it is but theologians.

  Why should the satyrs which St. Jerome saw, the offspring of women and baboons, have been reputed monsters? Might it not be thought, on the contrary, that their lot was in reality happier than ours? Must they not have possessed more strength and more agility? and would they not have laughed at us as an unfortunate race, to whom nature had refused both tails and clothing? A mule, the offspring of two different species; a jumart, the offspring of a bull and a mare; a tarin, the offspring, we are told, of a canary bird and hen linnet—are not monsters.

  But how is it that mules, jumarts, and tarins, which are thus produced in nature, do not themselves reproduce? And how do the seminists, ovists, or animalculists, explain, upon their respective theories, the formation of these mongrel productions?

  I will tell you plainly, that they do not explain it at all. The seminists never discovered how it is that the ass communicates to his mule offspring a resemblance only in the ears and crupper; the ovists neither inform us, nor understand how a mare should contain in her egg anything but an animal of her own species. And the animalculists cannot perceive how a minute embryo of an ass could introduce its ears into the matrix of a mare.

  The theorist who, in a work entitled the “Philosophy of Venus,” maintained that all animals and all monsters are formed by attraction, was still less successful than those just mentioned, in accounting for phenomena so common and yet so surprising.

  Alas! my good friends! you none of you know how you originate your own offspring; you are ignorant of the secrets of nature in your own species, and yet vainly attempt to develop them in the mule!

  It may, however, be confidently presumed, in reference to a monster by defect, that the whole seminal matter did not reach its destined appropriation; or, perhaps, that the small spermatic worm had lost a portion of its substance; or, perhaps that the egg was crazed and injured. With respect to a monster by excess, you may imagine that some portions of the seminal matter superabounded; that of two spermatic worms united, one could only animate a single member of the animal, and that that member remains in supererogation; that two eggs have blended together, and that one of them has produced but a single member, which was joined to the body of the other.

  But what would you say of so many monstrosities arising from the addition of parts of animals of a totally different species? How would you explain a crab on the neck of a girl? or the tail of a rat upon the thigh? or, above all, the four dugs and tail of a cow, which was exhibited at the fair at St. Germain? You would be reduced to the supposition that the unfortunate woman’s mother belonged to the very extraordinary family of Pasiphæ.

  Let each of us boldly and honestly say, How little is it that I really know.

  MORALITY.

  Babblers, preachers, extravagant controversialists! endeavor to remember that your master never announced that the sacrament was the visible sign of an invisible thing; He has nowhere admitted four cardinal virtues, and three divine ones. He has never decided whether His mother came into the world maculate or immaculate. Cease, therefore, to repeat things which never entered into His mind. He has said, in conformity with a truth as ancient as the world—Love God and your neighbor. Abide by that precept, miserable cavillers! Preach morality and nothing more. Observe it, and let the tribunals no longer echo with your prosecutions; snatch no longer, by the claw of an attorney, their morsel of bread from the widow and the orphan. Dispute not concerning some petty benefice with the same fury as the papacy was disputed in the great schism of the West. Monks! place not to the utmost of your power, the universe under contribution, and we may then be able to believe you. I have just read these words in a piece of declamation in fourteen volumes, entitled, “The History of the Lower Empire”; “The Christians had a morality, but the Pagans had none.”

  Oh, M. Le Beau! author of these fourteen volumes, where did you pick up this absurdity? What becomes of the morality of Socrates, of Zaleucus, of Charondas, of Cicero, of Epictetus, and of Marcus Aurelius?

  There is but one morality, M. Le Beau, as there is but one geometry. But you will tell me that the greater part of mankind are ignorant of geometry. True; but if they apply a little to the study of it, all men draw the same conclusions. Agriculturists, manufacturers, artisans, do not go through a regular course of morality; they read neither the “De Finibus” of Cicero, nor the “Ethics” of Aristotle; but as soon as they reflect, they are, without knowing it, disciples of Cicero. The Indian dyer, the Tartarian shepherd, and the English seaman, are acquainted with justice and injustice. Confucius did not invent a system of morals, as men construct physical systems. He found his in the hearts of all mankind.

  This morality existed in the bosom of the prætor Festus, when the Jews pressed him to put Paul to death for having taken strangers into their temple. “Learn,” said he, “that the Romans never condemn any one unheard.”

  If the Jews were deficient in a moral sense, the Romans were not, and paid it homage.

  There is no morality in superstition; it exists not in ceremonies, and has nothing to do with dogmas. We cannot repeat too frequently that dogmas differ, but that morality is the same among all men who make use of their reason. Morality proceeds from God, like light; our superstitions are only darkness. Reflect, reader; pursue the truth, and draw the consequences.

  MOSES.

  SECTION I.

  Philosophy, of which we sometimes pass the boundaries, researches of antiquity, and the spirit of discussion and criticism, have been carried so far that several learned men have finally doubted if there ever was a Moses, and whether this man was not an imaginary being, such as were Perseus, Bacchus, Atlas, Penthesilea, Vesta, Rhea Silvia, Isis, Sammonocodom, Fo, Mercury, Trismegistus, Odin, Merlin, Francus, Robert the Devil, and so many other heroes of romance whose lives and prowess have been recorded.

  It is not very likely, say the incredulous, that a man ever existed whose life is a continual prodigy.

  It is not very likely that he worked so many stupendous miracles in Egypt, Arabia, and Syria, without their being known throughout the world.

  It is not likely that no Egyptian or Greek writer should have transmitted these miracles to posterity. They are mentioned by the Jews alone; and in the time that this history was written by them, they were not known to any nation—not indeed until towards the second century. The first author who expressly quotes the Book of Moses is Longinus, minister of Queen Zenobia, in the time of the emperor Aurelian.

  It is to be remarked that the author of the “Mercury Trismegistus,” who certainly was an Egyptian, says not a single word about this Moses.

  If a single ancient author had related a single one of these miracles, Eusebius would no doubt have triumphed in this evidence, either in his “History” or in his “Evangelical Preparation.”

  It is true, he mentions authors who have quoted his name, but none who have cited his prodigies. Before him, the Jews, Josephus and Philo, who have so much celebrated their own nation, sought all the writers in which the name of Moses is found, but there was not a single one who made the least mention of the marvellous actions attributed to him.

  In this silence of the whole world, the incredulous reason with a temerity which refutes itself.

  The Jews are the only people who possessed the Pentateuch, which they attribute to Moses. It is said, even in their books, that this Pentateuch was not known until the reign of their king Josiah, thirty-six years before the destruction and captivity of Jerusalem; and they then only possessed a single copy, which the priest Hilkiah found at the bottom of a strong box, while counting money. The priest sent it to the king by his scribe Shaphan. All this, say they, necessarily obscures the authenticity of the Pentateuch.

  In short, if the Pentateuch was known to all the Jews, would Solomon—the wise Solomon, inspired by God Himself to build a temple—have ornamented this temple with so many statues, contrary to the express order of Moses?

  All the Jewish prophets, who prophesied in the name of the Lord from the time of Moses till that of King Josiah, would they not have been supported in all their prophecies by the laws of Moses? Would they not a thousand times have quoted his own words? Would they not have commented upon them? None of them, however, quote two lines—no one follows the text of Moses—they even oppose them in several places.

  According to these unbelievers, the books attributed to Moses were only written among the Babylonians during the captivity, or immediately afterwards by Esdras. Indeed, we see only Persian and Chaldæan terminations in the Jewish writings: “Babel,” gate of God; “Phegor-beel,” or “Beel-phegor,” god of the precipices; “Zebuth-beel,” or “Beel-zebuth,” god of insects; “Bethel,” house of God; “Daniel,” judgment of God; “Gabriel,” man of God; “Jahel,” afflicted of God; “Jael,” the life of God; “Israel,” seeing God; “Oviel,” strength of God; “Raphael,” help of God; “Uriel,” fire of God.

  Thus, all is foreign in the Jewish nation, a stranger itself in Palestine; circumcision, ceremonies, sacrifices, the ark, the cherubim, the goat Hazazel, baptism of justice, simple baptism, proofs, divination, interpretation of dreams, enchantment of serpents—nothing originated among these people, nothing was invented by them.

  The celebrated Lord Bolingbroke believed not that Moses ever existed; he thought he saw in the Pentateuch a crowd of contradictions and puzzling chronological and geographical faults; names of towns not then built, precepts given to kings at a time when not only the Jews had no kings, but in which it is probable there were none, since they lived in deserts, in tents, in the manner of the Bedouin Arabs.

  What appears to him above all the most palpable contradiction is the gift of forty-eight cities with their suburbs, made to the Levites in a country in which there was not a single village; and it is principally on these forty-eight cities that he refutes Abbadie, and even has the cruelty to treat him with the aversion and contempt of a lord of the Upper Chamber, or a minister of state towards a petty foreign priest who would be so impertinent as to reason with him.

  I will take the liberty of representing to Viscount Bolingbroke, and to all those who think with him, not only that the Jewish nation has always believed in the existence of Moses, and in that of his books, but that even Jesus Christ has acknowledged him. The four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, recognize him. St. Matthew says expressly, that Moses and Elias appeared to Jesus Christ on the mountain during the night of the transfiguration, and St. Luke says the same.

  Jesus Christ declares in St. Matthew that he is not come to abolish this law, but to accomplish it. In the New Testament, we are often referred to the law of Moses and to the prophets. The whole Church has always believed the Pentateuch written by Moses; and further, of five hundred different societies, which have been so long established in Christendom, none have ever doubted the existence of this great prophet. We must, therefore, submit our reason, as so many men have done before us.

  I know very well that I shall gain nothing in the mind of the viscount, or of those of his opinion. They are too well persuaded that the Jewish books were not written until very late, and during the captivity of the two tribes which remained. But we shall possess the consolation of having the Church with us.

  SECTION II.

  If you would be instructed and amused with antiquity, read the life of Moses in the article on “Apocrypha.”

  In vain have several scholars believed that the Pentateuch could not have been written by Moses. They say that it is affirmed even by the Scripture, that the first known copy was found in the time of King Josiah, and that this single copy was brought to the king by the secretary Shaphan. Now, between the time of Moses and this adventure of the secretary Shaphan, there were one thousand one hundred and sixty-seven years, by the Hebrew computation. For God appeared to Moses in the burning bush, in the year of the world 2213, and the secretary Shaphan published the book of the law in the year of the world 3380. This book found under Josiah, was unknown until the return from the Babylonish captivity; and it is said that it was Esdras, inspired by God, who brought the Holy Scriptures to light.

  But whether it was Esdras or another who digested this book is absolutely indifferent, since it is inspired. It is not said in the Pentateuch, that Moses was the author; we might, therefore, be permitted to attribute it to the declaration of some other divine mind, if the Church had not decided that the book is by Moses.

  Some opposers add, that no prophet has quoted the books of the Pentateuch, that there is no mention of it either in the Psalms or in the books attributed to Solomon, in Jeremiah or Isaiah, or, in short, in any canonical book of the Jews. Words answering to those of Genesis, Exodus, Numbers, Leviticus, Deuteronomy, are not found in any other language recognized by them as authentic. Others, still more bold, have put the following questions:

  1. In what language could Moses have written in a savage desert? It could only be in Egyptian; for by this same book we are told that Moses and all his people were born in Egypt. It is therefore probable that they spoke no other language. The Egyptians had yet made no use of papyrus; they engraved hieroglyphics on tables of wood or marble. It is even said, that the tables of the commandments were engraved on polished stones, which required prodigious time and labor.

  2. Is it likely, that in a desert where the Jewish people had neither shoemaker nor tailor—in which the God of the universe was obliged to work a continual miracle to preserve the old dresses and shoes of the Jews—men could be found clever enough to engrave the five books of the Pentateuch on marble or wood? You will say, that they found laborers who made a golden calf in one night, and who afterwards reduced the gold into powder—an operation impracticable to common chemistry, which was not yet discovered. Who constructed the tabernacle? Who ornamented thirty columns of brass with capitals of silver? Who wove and embroidered veils of linen with hyacinth, purple, and scarlet? An account that supports the opinion of the contradictors. They answer, that it was not possible that in a desert, where they were in want of everything, for them to perform works so intricate; that they must have begun by making shoes and tunics; that those who wanted necessaries could not indulge in luxuries; and that it is an evident contradiction to say, that they had founders, engravers, and embroiderers, when they had neither clothes nor bread.

  3. If Moses had written the first chapter of Genesis, would all young people have been forbidden to read the first chapter? Would so little respect have been paid to the legislator? If it was Moses who said that God punished the iniquity of the fathers to the fourth generation, would Ezekiel have dared to say the contrary?

  4. If Moses wrote Leviticus, could he have contradicted it in Deuteronomy? Leviticus forbids a woman to marry her brother, Deuteronomy commands it.

  5. Could Moses have spoken of towns which existed not in his time? Would he have said that towns which, in regard to him, were on the east of the Jordan were on the west?

  6. Would he have assigned forty-eight cities to the Levites, in a country in which there were never ten, and in a desert in which he had always wandered without habitation?

  7. Would he have prescribed rules for the Jewish kings, when not only there were no kings among this people, but they were held in horror, and it was not probable they would ever have any? What! would Moses have given precepts for the conduct of kings who came not until five hundred years after him, and have said nothing in relation to the judges and priests who succeeded him? Does not this religion lead us to believe that the Pentateuch was composed in the time of kings, and that the ceremonies instituted by Moses were only traditional.

  8. Suppose he had said to the Jews: I have made you depart to the number of six hundred thousand combatants from the land of Egypt under the protection of your God? Would not the Jews have answered him: You must have been very timid not to lead us against Pharaoh of Egypt; he could not have opposed to us an army of two hundred thousand men. There never was such an army on foot in Egypt; we should have conquered them easily; we should have been the masters of their country. What! has the God, who talks to you, to please us slain all the first-born of Egypt, which, if there were in this country three hundred thousand families, makes three hundred thousand men destroyed in one night, simply to avenge us, and yet you have not seconded your God and given us that fertile country which nothing could withhold from us. On the contrary you have made us depart from Egypt as thieves and cowards, to perish in deserts between mountains and precipices. You might, at least, have conducted us by the direct road to this land of Canaan, to which we have no right, but which you have promised us, and on which we have not yet been able to enter.

  It was natural that, from the land of Goshen, we should march towards Tyre and Sidon, along the Mediterranean; but you made us entirely pass the Isthmus of Suez, and re-enter Egypt, proceed as far as Memphis, when we find ourselves at Beel-Sephor on the borders of the Red Sea, turning our backs on the land of Canaan, having journeyed eighty leagues in this Egypt which we wished to avoid, so as at last to nearly perish between the sea and the army of Pharaoh!

  If you had wished to deliver us to our enemies, you could not have taken a different route and other measures. God has saved us by a miracle, you say; the sea opened to let us pass; but after such a favor, should He let us die of hunger and fatigue in the horrible deserts of Kadesh-barnea, Mara, Elim, Horeb, and Sinai? All our fathers perished in these frightful solitudes; and you tell us, at the end of forty years, that God took particular care of them.

  This is what these murmuring Jews, these unjust children of the vagabonds who died in the desert, might have said to Moses, if he had read Exodus and Genesis to them. And what might they not have said and done on the article of the golden calf? What! you dare to tell us that your brother made a calf for our fathers, when you were with God on the mountain? You, who sometimes tell us that you have spoken to God face to face, and sometimes that you could only see His back! But no matter, you were with this God, and your brother cast a golden calf in one day, and gave it to us to adore it; and instead of punishing your unworthy brother, you make him our chief priest, and order your Levites to slay twenty-three thousand men of your people. Would our fathers have suffered this? Would they have allowed themselves to be sacrificed like so many victims by sanguinary priests? You tell us that, not content with this incredible butchery, you have further massacred twenty-four thousand of our poor followers because one of them slept with a Midianitish woman, whilst you yourself espoused a Midianite; and yet you add, that you are the mildest of men! A few more instances of this mildness, and not a soul would have remained.

  No; if you have been capable of all this cruelty, if you can have exercised it, you would be the most barbarous of men, and no punishment would suffice to expiate so great a crime.

  These are nearly the objections which all scholars make to those who think that Moses is the author of the Pentateuch. But we answer them, that the ways of God are not those of men; that God has proved, conducted, and abandoned His people by a wisdom which is unknown to us; that the Jews themselves, for more than two thousand years, have believed that Moses is the author of these books; that the Church, which has succeeded the synagogue, and which is equally infallible, has decided this point of controversy; and that scholars should remain silent when the Church pronounces.

  SECTION III.

  We cannot doubt that there was a Moses, a legislator of the Jews. We will here examine his history, following merely the rules of criticism; the Divine is not submitted to similar examination. We must confine ourselves to the probable; men can only judge as men. It is very natural and very probable that an Arab nation dwelt on the confines of Egypt, on the side of Arabia Deserta; that it was tributary or slave to the Egyptian kings, and that afterwards it sought to establish itself elsewhere; but that which reason alone cannot admit is, that this nation, composed of seventy persons at most in the time of Joseph, increased in two hundred and fifteen years, from Joseph to Moses, to the number of six hundred thousand combatants, according to the Book of Exodus, which six hundred thousand men capable of bearing arms imply a multitude of about two millions, counting old men, women, and children. It is not certainly in the course of nature for a colony of seventy persons, as many males as females, to produce in two centuries two millions of inhabitants. The calculations made on this progression by men very little versed in the things of this world, are falsified by the experience of all nations and all times. Children are not made by a stroke of the pen. Reflect well that at this rate a population of ten thousand persons in two hundred years would produce more inhabitants than the globe of the earth could sustain.

  Is it any more probable, that these six hundred thousand combatants, favored by the Author of nature who worked for them so many prodigies, were forced to wander in the deserts in which they died, instead of seeking to possess themselves of fertile Egypt?

  By these rules of an established and reasonable human criticism, we must agree that it is very likely that Moses conducted a small people from the confines of Egypt. There was among the Egyptians an ancient tradition, related by Plutarch in his “Treatise on Isis and Osiris,” that Tiphon, the father of Jerosselaim and Juddecus, fled from Egypt on an ass. It is clear from this passage that the ancestors of the Jews, the inhabitants of Jerusalem, were supposed to have been fugitives from Egypt. A tradition, no less ancient and more general is, that the Jews were driven from Egypt, either as a troop of unruly brigands, or a people infected with leprosy. This double accusation carries its probability even from the land of Goshen, which they had inhabited, a neighboring land of the vagabond Arabs, and where the disease of leprosy, peculiar to the Arabs, might be common. It appears even by the Scripture that this people went from Egypt against their will. The seventeenth chapter of Deuteronomy forbids kings to think of leading the Jews back to Egypt.

  The conformity of several Egyptian and Jewish customs still more strengthens the opinion that this people was an Egyptian colony, and what gives it a new degree of probability is the feast of the Passover; that is to say, of the flight or passage instituted in memory of their evasion. This feast alone would be no proof; for among all peoples there are solemnities established to celebrate fabulous and incredible events; such were most of the feasts of the Greeks and Romans; but a flight from one country to another is nothing uncommon, and calls for belief. The proof drawn from this feast of the Passover receives a still greater force by that of the Tabernacles, in memory of the time in which the Jews inhabited the desert on their departure from Egypt. These similitudes, united with so many others, prove that a colony really went from Egypt, and finally established itself for some time at Palestine.

  Almost all the rest is of a kind so marvellous that human sagacity cannot digest it. All that we can do is to seek the time in which the history of this flight—that is to say, the Book of Exodus—can have been written, and to examine the opinions which then prevailed; opinions, of which the proof is in the book itself, compared with the ancient customs of nations.

  With regard to the books attributed to Moses, the most common rules of criticism permit us not to believe that he can be the author of them.

  1. It is not likely that he spoke of the places by names which were not given to them until long afterwards. In this book mention is made of the cities of Jair, and every one agrees that they were not so named until long after the death of Moses. It also speaks of the country of Dan, and the tribe of Dan had not given its name to the country of which it was not yet the master.

  2. How could Moses have quoted the book of the wars of the Lord, when these wars and this book were after his time?

  3. How could Moses speak of the pretended defeat of a giant named Og, king of Bashan, vanquished in the desert in the last year of his government? And how could he add, that he further saw his bed of iron of nine cubits long in Rabath? This city of Rabath was the capital of the Ammonites, into whose country the Hebrews had not yet penetrated. Is it not apparent, that such a passage is the production of a posterior writer, which his inadvertence betrays? As an evidence of the victory gained over the giant, he brings forward the bed said to be still at Rabath, forgetting that it is Moses whom he makes speak, who was dead long before.

  4. How could Moses have called cities beyond the Jordan, which, with regard to him, were on this side? Is it not palpable, that the book attributed to him was written a long time after the Israelites had crossed this little river Jordan, which they never passed under his conduct?

  5. Is it likely that Moses told his people, that in the last year of his government he took, in the little province of Argob—a sterile and frightful country of Arabia Petræa—sixty great towns surrounded with high fortified walls, independent of an infinite number of open cities? Is it not much more probable that these exaggerations were afterwards written by a man who wished to flatter a stupid nation?

  6. It is still less likely, that Moses related the miracles with which this history is filled.

  It is easy to persuade a happy and victorious people that God has fought for them; but it is not in human nature that a people should believe a hundred miracles in their favor, when all these prodigies ended only in making them perish in a desert. Let us examine some of the miracles related in Exodus.

  7. It appears contradictory and injurious to the divine essence to suppose that God, having formed a people to be the sole depository of His laws, and to reign over all nations, should send a man of this people to demand of the king, their oppressor, permission to go into the desert to sacrifice to his God, that this people might escape under the pretence of this sacrifice. Our common ideas cannot forbear attaching an idea of baseness and knavery to this management, far from recognizing the majesty and power of the Supreme Being.

  When, immediately after, we read that Moses changed his rod into a serpent, before the king, and turned all the waters of the kingdom into blood; that he caused frogs to be produced which covered the surface of the earth; that he changed all the dust into lice, and filled the air with venomous winged insects; that he afflicted all the men and animals of the country with frightful ulcers; that he called hail, tempests, and thunder, to ruin all the country; that he covered it with locusts; that he plunged it in fearful darkness for three days; that, finally, an exterminating angel struck with death all the first-born of men and animals in Egypt, commencing with the son of the king; again, when we afterwards see his people walking across the Red Sea, the waves suspended in mountains to the right and left, and later falling on the army of Pharaoh, which they swallowed up—when, I say, we read all these miracles, the first idea which comes into our minds is, that this people, for whom God performed such astonishing things, no doubt became the masters of the universe. But, no! the fruit of so many wonders was, that they suffered want and hunger in arid sands; and—prodigy upon prodigy—all died without seeing the little corner of earth in which their descendants afterwards, for some years, established themselves! It is no doubt pardonable if we disbelieve this crowd of prodigies, at the least of which reason so decidedly revolts.

  This reason, left to itself, cannot be persuaded that Moses wrote such strange things. How can we make a generation believe so many miracles uselessly wrought for it, and all of which, it is said, were performed in the desert? What being, enjoying divine power, would employ it in preserving the clothes and shoes of these people, after having armed all nature in their favor?

  It is therefore very natural to think that all this prodigious history was written a long time after Moses, as the romances of Charlemagne were forged three centuries after him; and as the origins of all nations have not been written until they were out of sight, the imagination has been left at liberty to invent. The more coarse and unfortunate a people are, the more they seek to exalt their ancient history; and what people have been longer miserable, or more barbarous, than the Jews?

  It is not to be believed that, when they had not wherewithal to make shoes in their deserts, under the government of Moses, there were any cunning enough to write. We should presume, that the poor creatures born in these deserts did not receive a very brilliant education; and that the nation only began to read and write when it had some commerce with Phœnicia. It was probably in the commencement of monarchy that the Jews, feeling they had some genius, wrote the Pentateuch, and adjusted their traditions. Would they have made Moses recommend kings to read and write his law in a time in which there were no kings? Is it not probable, that the seventeenth chapter of Deuteronomy was composed to moderate the power of royalty; and that it was written by priests in the time of Saul?

  It is most likely at this epoch that we must place the digest of the Pentateuch. The frequent slaveries to which this people were subject seem badly calculated to establish literature in a nation, and to render books very common; and the more rare these books were in the commencement, the more the authors ventured to fill them with miracles.

  The Pentateuch, attributed to Moses, is, no doubt, very ancient; if it was put in order in the time of Saul and Solomon, it was about the time of the Trojan war, and is one of the most curious monuments of the manner of thinking of that time. We see that all known nations, in proportion to their ignorance, were fond of prodigies. All was then performed by celestial ministry in Egypt, Phrygia, Greece, and Asia.

  The authors of the Pentateuch give us to understand that every nation has its gods, and that these gods have all nearly an equal power.

  If Moses, in the name of God, changed his rod into a serpent, the priests of Pharaoh did as much; if he changed all the waters of Egypt into blood, even to that which was in the vases, the priests immediately performed the same prodigy, without our being able to conceive on what waters they performed this metamorphosis; at least, unless they expressly created new waters for the purpose. The Jewish writers prefer being reduced to this absurdity, rather than allow us to suspect that the gods of Egypt had not the power of changing water into blood as well as the God of Jacob.

  But when the latter fills the land of Egypt with lice, changing all the dust into them, His entire superiority appears; the magi cannot imitate it, and they make the God of the Jews speak thus: “Pharaoh shall know that nothing is equal to me.” These words put into his mouth, merely mark a being who believes himself more powerful than his rivals; he was equalled in the metamorphosis of a rod into a serpent, and in that of the waters into blood; but he gains the victory in the article of the lice and the following miracles.

  This idea of the supernatural power of priests of all countries is displayed in several places of Scripture. When Balaam, the priest of the little state of a petty king, named Balak, in the midst of deserts, is near cursing the Jews, their God appears to him to prevent him. It seems that the malediction of Balaam was much to be feared. To restrain this priest, it is not enough that God speaks to him, he sends before him an angel with a sword, and speaks Himself again by the mouth of his ass. All these precautions certainly prove the opinion which then prevailed, that the malediction of a priest, whatever it was, drew fatal consequences after it.

  This idea of a God superior to other gods, though He made heaven and earth, was so rooted in all minds, that Solomon in his last prayer cries: “Oh, my God! there is no other god like thee in earth or heaven.” It is this opinion which rendered the Jews so credulous respecting the sorceries and enchantments of other nations.

  It is this which gave rise to the story of the Witch of Endor, who had the power of invoking the shade of Saul. Every people had their prodigies and oracles, and it never even came into the minds of any nations to doubt the miracles and prophecies of others. They were contented with opposing similar arms; it seems as if the priests, in denying the prodigies of other nations, feared to discredit their own. This kind of theology prevailed a long time over all the earth.

  It is not for us to enter here on the detail of all that is written on Moses. We speak of his laws in more than one place in this work. We will here confine ourselves to remarking how much we are astonished to see a legislator inspired by God; a prophet, through whom God Himself speaks, proposing to us no future life. There is not a single word in Leviticus, which can lead us to suspect the immortality of the soul. The reply to this overwhelming difficulty is, that God proportioned Himself to the ignorance of the Jews. What a miserable answer! It was for God to elevate the Jews to necessary knowledge—not to lower Himself to them. If the soul is immortal, if there are rewards and punishments in another life, it is necessary for men to be informed of it. If God spoke, He must have informed them of this fundamental dogma. What legislator, what god but this, proposes to his people wine, oil, and milk alone! What god but this always encourages his believers, as a chief of robbers incourages his troops, with the hope of plunder only! Once more; it is very pardonable for mere human reason simply to see, in such a history, the barbarous stupidity of the first ages of a savage people. Man, whatever he does, cannot reason otherwise; but if God really is the author of the Pentateuch, we must submit without reasoning.

  MOTION.

  A philosopher, in the neighborhood of Mount Krapak, argued with me that motion is essential to matter.

  “Everything moves,” says he; “the sun continually revolves on its own axis; the planets do the same, and every planet has many different motions; everything is a sieve; everything passes through a sieve; the hardest metal is pierced with an infinity of pores, by which escapes a constant torrent of vapors that circulate in space. The universe is nothing but motion; motion, therefore, is essential to matter.”

  “But, sir,” said I to him, “might not any one say, in answer to what you have advanced: This block of marble, this cannon, this house, this motion, are not in motion; therefore motion is not essential?”

  “They do move,” he replied; “they move in space together with the earth by the common motion, and they move so incontestably—although insensibly—by their own peculiar motion, that, at the expiration of an indefinite number of centuries, there will remain not a single atom of the masses which now constitute them, from which particles are detaching themselves every passing moment.”

  “But, my good sir, I can conceive matter to be in a state of rest; motion, therefore, cannot be considered essential to it.”

  “Why, certainly, it must be of vast consequence whether you conceive it to be, or conceive it not to be, in a state of rest. I still repeat, that it is impossible for it to be so.”

  “This is a bold assertion; but what, let me ask you, will you say to chaos?”

  “Oh, chaos! If we were inclined to talk about chaos, I should tell you that all was necessarily in motion, and that ‘the breath of God moved upon the waters’; that the element of water was recognized in existence, and that the other elements existed also; that, consequently, fire existed; that there cannot be fire without motion, that motion is essential to fire. You will not succeed much with chaos.”

  “Alas! who can succeed with all these subjects of dispute? But, as you are so very fully acquainted with these things, I must request you to inform me why one body impels another: whether it is because matter is impenetrable, or because two bodies cannot be together in one place; or because, in every case of every description, the weak is driven before the strong?”

  “Your last reason is rather more facetious than philosophical. No person has hitherto been able to discover the cause of the communication of motion.”

  “That, however, does not prevent its being essential to matter. No one has ever been able to discover the cause of sensation in animals; yet this sensation is so essential to them, that, if you exclude the idea of it, you no longer have the idea of an animal.”

  “Well, I will concede to you, for a moment, that motion is essential to matter—just for a moment, let it be remembered, for I am not much inclined to embroil myself with the theologians—and now, after this admission, tell me how one ball produces motion in another?”

  “You are very curious and inquisitive; you wish me to inform you of what no philosopher ever knew.”

  “It appears rather curious, and even ludicrous, that we should know the laws of motion, and yet be profoundly ignorant of the principle of the communication of motion!”

  “It is the same with everything else; we know the laws of reasoning, but we know not what it is in us that reasons. The ducts through which our blood and other animal fluids pass are very well known to us, but we know not what forms that blood and those fluids. We are in life, but we know not in what the vital principle consists.”

  “Inform me, however, at least, whether, if motion be essential to matter, there has not always existed the same quantity of motion in the world?”

  “That is an old chimera of Epicurus revived by Descartes. I do not, for my own part, see that this equality of motion in the world is more necessary than an equality of triangles. It is essential that a triangle should have three angles and three sides, but it is not essential that the number of triangles on this globe should be always equal.”

  “But is there not always an equality of forces, as other philosophers express it?”

  “That is a similar chimera. We must, upon such a principle, suppose that there is always an equal number of men, and animals, and moving beings, which is absurd.”

  By the way, what, let me ask, is the force of a body in motion? It is the product of its quantity multiplied by its velocity in a given time. Calling the quantity of a body four, and its velocity four, the force of its impulse will be equal to sixteen. Another quantity we will assume to be two, and its velocity two; the force with which that impels is as four. This is the grand principle of mechanics. Leibnitz decidedly and pompously pronounced the principle defective. He maintained that it was necessary to measure that force, that product, by the quantity multiplied by the square of the velocity. But this was mere captious sophistry and chicanery, an ambiguity unworthy of a philosopher, founded on an abuse of the discovery of the great Galileo, that the spaces traversed with a motion uniformly accelerated were, to each other, as the squares of the times and velocities.

  Leibnitz did not consider the time which he should have considered. No English mathematician adopted his system. It was received for a while by a small number of geometricians in France. It pervaded some books, and even the philosophical institutions of a person of great celebrity. Maupertuis is very abusive of Mairan, in a little work entitled “A, B, C”; as if he thought it necessary to teach the a, b, c, of science to any man who followed the old and, in fact, the true system of calculation. Mairan was, however, in the right. He adhered to the ancient measurement, that of the quantity multiplied by the velocity. He gradually prevailed over his antagonists, and his system recovered its former station; the scandal of mathematics disappeared, and the quackery of the square of the velocity was dismissed at last to the extramundane spaces, to the limbo of vanity, together with the monads which Leibnitz supposed to constitute the concentric mirror of nature, and also with his elaborate and fanciful system of “pre-established harmony.”

  MOUNTAIN.

  The fable of the mountain which, after alarming the whole neighborhood with its outcries in labor, was ridiculed by all present when it became delivered of a mouse, is at once ancient and universal. The company, however, who thus gave way to ridicule were not a company of philosophers. Those who mocked should in reality have admired. A mountain’s being delivered of a mouse was an event as extraordinary, and as worthy of admiration, as a mouse’s being delivered of a mountain. A rock’s producing a rat is a case absolutely prodigious, and the world never beheld anything approaching to such a miracle. All the worlds in the universe could not originate a fly. Thus, in cases where the vulgar mock, the philosopher admires; and where the vulgar strain their eyes in stupid astonishment, he often smiles.

  NAIL.

  We only ask here from the censors of books, permission to transcribe from that which the Dominican missionary Labat, proveditor of the holy office, has written concerning the nails of the cross, into which it is more than probable no nails were ever driven.

  “The Italian priest who conducted us had sufficient interest to get us, among other things, a sight of the nails with which our Saviour was fastened to the cross. They appeared to me very different from those which the Benedictines show at St. Denis. Possibly those belonging to St. Denis served for the feet, and the others for the hands. It was necessary that those for the hands should be sufficiently large and strong to support all the weight of the body. However, the Jews must either have made use of more than four nails, or some of those which are shown to the faithful are not genuine. History relates that St. Helena threw one of them into the sea, to appease a furious tempest which assailed the ship in which she had embarked. Constantine made use of another, to make a bit for the bridle of his horse. One is shown entire at St. Denis in France; another also entire at the Holy Cross of Jerusalem at Rome. A very celebrated Roman author of our day asserts that the iron crown with which they crown the emperors in Italy was made out of one of these nails. We are shown at Rome and at Carpentras two bridle bits also made of these nails, not to mention more at other places. To be sure, several of them are discreet enough to say, that it is the head or point only of these nails which they exhibit.”

  The missionary speaks in the same tone of all the relics. He observes in the same passage, that when the body of the first deacon, St. Stephen, was brought from Jerusalem to Rome, in 557, and placed in the tomb of the deacon of St. Lawrence: “St. Lawrence made way of himself to give the right hand to his predecessor; an action which procured him the name of the civil Spaniard.”

  Upon this passage we venture only one reflection, which is, that if some philosopher had said as much, in the “Encyclopædia,” as the Dominican Labat, a crowd of Pantouillets, Nonnottes, Chiniacs, Chaumeix, and other knaves, would have exclaimed—Deist, atheist, and geometrician! According to circumstances things change their names.

  • Selon ce que l’on peut être
  • Les choses changent de nom.

  • —Amphytrion, Prologue.

  NATURE.

  Dialogue Between the Philosopher and Nature.

  $

  What are you, Nature? I live in you? but I have been searching for you for fifty years, and have never yet been able to find you.)

  $

  It is on that account that I apply directly to yourself. I have been able to measure some of your globes, to ascertain their courses, and to point out the laws of motion; but I have never been able to ascertain what you are yourself.

  Are you always active? Are you always passive? Do your elements arrange themselves, as water places itself over sand, oil over water, and air over oil? Have you a mind which directs all your operations—as councils are inspired as soon as they meet, although the individual members composing them are often ignorant? Explain to me, I entreat, the enigma in which you are enveloped.)

  $

  Certainly, since your great universal system knows nothing of mathematics, and yet the laws by which you are regulated are those of the most profound geometry, there must necessarily be an eternal geometrician, who directs you, and presides over your operations.)

  $

  We are curious. I should be pleased to learn how it is, that while so rough and coarse in your mountains, and deserts, and seas, you are at the same time so ingenious and finished in your animals and vegetables?)

  $

  That word deranges all my ideas. What! is it possible that nature should be nothing but art.)

  $

  It is undoubtedly true. The more I reflect on the subject, the more clearly I perceive that you are only the art of some Great Being, extremely powerful and skilful, who conceals Himself and exhibits you. All the reasoners, from the time of Thales, and probably long before him, have been playing at hide and seek with you. They have said, “I have hold of you”; and they in fact held nothing. We all resemble Ixion: he thought he embraced Juno, when he embraced only a cloud.)

  $

  My beloved mother, pray tell me a little why you exist—why anything has existed?)

  $

  Nothing itself, would it not be preferable to that multitude of existences formed to be continually dissolved; those tribes of animals born and reproduced to devour others, and devoured in their turn; those numberless beings endued with sensation, and formed to experience so many sensations of pain; and those other tribes of reasoning beings which never, or at least only rarely, listen to reason? For what purpose, Nature, was all this?)

  nature.

  Oh! pray go and inquire of Him who made me.

  NECESSARY—NECESSITY.

  $

  Do you not assert that everything is necessary?)

  $

  That is to say, it was necessary for the Divine Nature to do what it has done.)

  $

  It is, however, necessary for me to talk to you upon it.)

  $

  No; for that which is necessary to one is not always necessary to another. It is necessary for an Indian to possess rice, for an Englishman to eat animal food, as Russians must wear furs, and Africans gauze. One man believes that he has need of a dozen coach-horses, another limits himself to a pair of shoes, and a third walks gayly on his bare feet. I wish to speak to you of that which is necessary to all men.)

  $

  How happens it then that men are sometimes born who are deprived of a part of these necessary faculties?)

  $

  Are there not notions common to all men necessary to this purpose?)

  $

  These necessary things—are they necessary in all times, and in all places?)

  $

  Therefore, a new creed is not necessary to mankind. Men could live in society, and perform all their duties towards God, before they believed that Mahomet had frequent conversations with the angel Gabriel.)

  $

  But since it exists, God has permitted it.)

  $

  What do you mean by saying that God permits? Can anything happen but by His orders? To permit and to will—are they not with Him the same thing?)

  $

  To commit a crime is to act against Divine justice—to disobey God. Therefore, as God cannot disobey Himself, He cannot commit crime; but He has so made man that man commits it frequently. How does that arise?)

  $

  I thought that you would instruct me, but you teach me nothing.)

  $

  I should have cause to complain of a physician who made me acquainted with poisonous plants, without instructing me in regard to such as are salutary.)

  selim.

  I am no physician, nor are you a sick man; and it appears to me that I give you a very useful prescription, when I say to you: Distrust the inventions of charlatans; worship God; be an honest man; and believe that two and two make four.

  NEW—NOVELTIES.

  It seems as if the first words of Ovid’s “Metamorphoses”—“In nova fert animus”—were the emblem of mankind. No one is touched with the admirable spectacle of the sun which rises or seems to rise every day; but everybody runs at the smallest meteor which appears for a moment in the map of vapors which surround the earth, and which we call heaven. We despise whatever is common, or which has been long known:

  • Vilia sunt nobis quæcumque prioribus annis
  • Vidimus, et sordet quidquid spectavimus olim.

  A hawker will not burden himself with a “Virgil” or a “Horace,” but with a new book, were it ever so detestable. He draws you aside and says to you: “Sir, will you have some books from Holland?”

  From the commencement of the world, women have complained of the infidelities done to them in favor of the first new object which presents itself, and which has often this novelty for its only merit. Several ladies—we must confess it, notwithstanding the infinite respect which we have for them—have treated men as they complain that the men have treated them; and the story of Jocondo is much more ancient than Ariosto.

  Perhaps this universal taste for novelty is a benefit of nature. We are told: Content yourselves with what you have; desire nothing beyond your situation; subdue the restlessness of your mind. These are very good maxims; but if we had followed them, we should still live upon acorns and sleep under the stars, and we should have had neither Corneille, Racine, Molière, Poussin, Le Brun, Lemoine, nor Pigal.

  NUDITY.

  Why do we shut up a man or a woman whom we find naked in the streets? and why is no one offended at entirely naked statues, and with certain paintings of Jesus and of Magdalen which are to be seen in some of the churches? It is very likely that human beings existed for a considerable time without clothing. In more than one island and on the continent of America, people are still found who are ignorant of clothing.

  The most civilized of them conceal the organs of generation by leaves, by interlaced rushes or mats, and by feathers. Whence this latter modesty? Is it the instinct of nature to provoke desire by the concealment of that which we are inclined to discover? Is it true that among nations somewhat more polished than the Jews and demi-Jews, there are entire sects who, when they worship God, deprive themselves of clothing. Such have been, it is said, the Adamites and the Abelians. They assembled, naked, to sing the praises of God. St. Epiphanius and St. Augustine say this, who, it is true, were not contemporaries, and who lived very distant from their country. But after all, this folly is possible, and is not more extraordinary or insane than a hundred other follies which have made the tour of the world, one after another.

  We have seen, in the article “Emblem,” that the Mahometans still possess saints who are mad, and who go about naked as apes. It is very possible that crazy people have existed, who thought that it was more proper to present ourselves before the Deity in the state in which He has formed us, than under any disguise of our own invention. It is possible that these persons exposed themselves out of pure devotion. There are so few well-made people of either sex, that nudity may have inspired chastity, or rather disgust, instead of augmenting desire.

  It is moreover asserted that the Abelians renounced marriage. If they abounded in youthful gallants and amorous maidens, they were the less comparable with St. Adhelm and the happy Robert D’Arbriselle, who lay with the most beautiful women, only in order to prove the strength of their continence. I confess, however, that it must be pleasant to witness a hundred naked Helens and Parises singing anthems, giving one another the kiss of peace, and performing the ceremonies of the agapæ.

  All this proves that there is nothing so singular, so extravagant, or so superstitious, which has not been conceived by the head of man. Happy it is, when these follies do not trouble society, and make of it a scene of hate, of discord, and of fury. It is doubtless better to pray to God stark naked, than to soil His altars and the public places with human blood.

  NUMBER.

  Was Euclid right in defining number to be a collection of unities of the same kind? When Newton says that number is an abstract relation of one quantity to another of the same kind, does he not understand by that the use of numbers in arithmetic and geometry? Wolfe says, number is that which has the same relation with unity as one right line has with another. Is not this rather a property attributed to a number, than a definition? If I dared, I would simply define numbers the idea of several unities.

  I see white—I have a sensation, an idea of white. It signifies not whether these two things are or are not of the same species; I can reckon two ideas. I see four men and four horses—I have the idea of eight; in like manner, three stones and six trees will give me the idea of nine.

  That I add, multiply, subtract, and divide these, are operations of the faculty of thought which I have received from the master of nature; but they are not properties inherent to number. I can square three and cube it, but there is not certainly in nature any number which can be squared or cubed. I very well conceive what an odd or even number is, but I can never conceive either a perfect or an imperfect one.

  Numbers can have nothing by themselves. What properties, what virtue, can ten flints, ten trees, ten ideas, possess because they are ten? What superiority will one number divisible in three even parts have over another divisible in two?

  Pythagoras was the first, it is said, who discovered divine virtue in numbers. I doubt whether he was the first; for he had travelled in Egypt, Babylon, and India, and must have related much of their arts and knowledge. The Indians particularly, the inventors of the combined and complicated game of chess, and of ciphers, so convenient that the Arabs learned of them, through whom they have been communicated to us after so many ages—these same Indians, I say, joined strange chimeras to their sciences. The Chaldæans had still more, and the Egyptians more still. We know that self-delusion is in our nature. Happy is he who can preserve himself from it! Happy is he who, after having some access of this fever of the mind, can recover tolerable health.

  Porphyrius, in the “Life of Pythagoras,” says that the number 2 is fatal. We might say, on the contrary, that it is the most favorable of all. Woe to him that is always single! Woe to nature, if the human species and that of animals were not often two and two!

  If 2 was of bad augury, 3, by way of recompense, was admirable, and 4 was divine; but the Pythagoreans and their imitators forgot that this mysterious 4, so divine, was composed of twice that diabolical number 2! Six had its merit, because the first statuaries divided their figures into six modules. We have seen that, according to the Chaldæans, God created the world in six gahambars; but 7 was the most marvellous number; for there were at first but seven planets, each planet had its heaven, and that made seven heavens, without anyone knowing what was meant by the word heaven. All Asia reckoned seven days for a week. We divide the life of man into seven ages. How many reasons have we in favor of this number!

  The Jews in time collected some scraps of this philosophy. It passed among the first Christians of Alexandria with the dogmas of Plato. It is principally displayed in the “Apocalypse of Cerinthus,” attributed to John the Apostle.

  We see a striking example of it in the number of the beast: “That no man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name. Here is wisdom. Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast: for it is the number of a man; and his number is six hundred three score and six.”

  We know what great pains all the great scholars have taken to divine the solution of this enigma. This number, composed of three times two at each figure, does it signify three times fatal to the third power? There were two beasts, and we know not yet of which the author would speak.

  We have seen that Bossuet, less happy in arithmetic than in funeral orations, has demonstrated that Diocletian is the beast, because we find the Roman figures 666 in the letters of his name, by cutting off those which would spoil this operation. But in making use of Roman figures, he does not remember that the Apocalypse was written in Greek. An eloquent man may fall into this mistake. The power of numbers was much more respected among us when we knew nothing about them.

  You may observe, my dear reader, in the article on “Figure,” some fine allegories that Augustine, bishop of Hippo, extracted from numbers.

  This taste subsisted so long, that it triumphed at the Council of Trent. We preserve its mysteries, called “Sacraments” in the Latin church, because the Dominicans, with Soto at their head, allege that there are seven things which contribute to life, seven planets, seven virtues, seven mortal sins, six days of creation and one of repose, which make seven; further, seven plagues of Egypt, seven beatitudes; but unfortunately the fathers forget that Exodus reckons ten plagues, and that the beatitudes are to the number of eight in St. Matthew and four in St. Luke. But scholars have overcome this difficulty; by retrenching from St. Matthew the four beatitudes of St. Luke, there remain six, and add unity to these six, and you will have seven. Consult Fra Paolo Sarpi, in the second book of his history of the County of Trent.

  NUMBERING.

  SECTION I.

  The most ancient numberings that history has left us are those of the Israelites, which are indubitable, since they are extracted from the Jewish books. We believe that we must not reckon as a numbering the flight of the Israelites to the number of six hundred thousand men on foot, because the text specifies them not tribe by tribe; it adds, that an innumerable troop of people gathered together and joined them. This is only a relation.

  The first circumstantial numbering is that which we see in the book of the “Viedaber,” which we call Numbers. By the reckoning which Moses and Aaron made of the people in the desert, we find, in counting all the tribes except that of Levi, six hundred and three thousand five hundred and fifty men capable of bearing arms; and if we add the tribe of Levi, supposing it equal in number to the others, the strong with the weak, we shall have six hundred and fifty-three thousand nine hundred and thirty-five men, to which we must add an equal number of old women and children, which will compose two millions six hundred and fifteen thousand seven hundred and forty-two persons, who departed from Egypt.

  When David, after the example of Moses, ordered the numbering of all the people, he found eight hundred thousand warriors of the tribes of Israel, and five hundred thousand of that of Judah, according to the Book of Kings; but according to Chronicles they reckoned eleven hundred thousand warriors in Israel; and less than five hundred thousand in Judah.

  The Book of Kings formally excludes Levi and Benjamin, and counts them not. If therefore we join these two tribes to the others in their proportion, the total of the warriors will amount to nineteen hundred and twenty thousand. This is a great number for the little country of Judæa, the half of which is composed of frightful rocks and caverns: but it was a miracle.

  It is not for us to enter into the reasons for which the Sovereign Arbiter of kings and people punished David for an operation which he himself commanded to Moses. It still less becomes us to seek why God, being irritated against David, punished the people for being numbered. The prophet Gad ordered the king on the part of God to choose war, famine, or pestilence. David accepted the pestilence, and seventy thousand Jews died of it in three days.

  St. Ambrosius, in his book of “Repentance,” and St. Augustine in his book against Faustus, acknowledged that pride and ambition led David to make this calculation. Their opinion is of great weight, and we can certainly submit to their decision by extinguishing all the deceitful lights of our own minds.

  Scripture relates a new numbering in the time of Esdras, when the Jewish nation returned from captivity. “All this multitude (say equally Esdras and Nehemiah, being as one man) amounted to forty-two thousand three hundred and sixty persons.” They were all named by families, and they counted the number of Jews of each family, and the number of priests. But in these two authors there are not only differences between the numbers and the names of families, but we further see an error of calculation in both. By the calculation of Esdras, instead of forty-two thousand men, after computation we find but twenty-nine thousand eight hundred and eighteen; and by that of Nehemiah we find thirty-one thousand and eighty-nine.

  We must consult the commentators on this apparent mistake, particularly Dom Calmet, who adding to one of these calculations what is wanting to the other, and further adding what is wanted to both of them, solves all the difficulty. To the computations of Esdras and Nehemiah, as reckoned by Calmet, are wanting ten thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven persons; but we find them in families which could not give their genealogy; besides, if there were any fault of the copyist, it could not destroy the veracity of the divinely inspired text.

  It is to be believed that the great neighboring kings of Palestine made numberings of their people as frequently as possible. Herodotus gives us the amount of all those who followed Xerxes, without including his naval forces. He reckons seventeen hundred thousand men, and he pretends, that to arrive at this computation, they were sent in divisions of ten thousand into a place which would only hold this number of men closely crowded. This method is very faulty, for by crowding a little less, each division of ten thousand might easily contain only from eight to nine. Further, this method is not at all soldier-like, and it would have been much more easy to have counted the whole by making the soldiers march in rank and file.

  It should further be observed, how difficult it was to support seventeen hundred thousand men in the country of Greece, which they went to conquer. We may very well doubt of this number, and the manner of reckoning it; of the whipping given to the Hellespont; and of the sacrifice of a thousand oxen made to Minerva by a Persian king, who knew her not, and who adored the sun alone as the only emblem of the Divinity. Besides, the numbering of seventeen hundred thousand men is not complete, even by the confession of Herodotus, since Xerxes further carried with him all the people of Thrace and Macedonia, whom he forced, he says, to follow him, apparently the sooner to starve his army. We should therefore do here what all wise men do in reading ancient, and even modern histories—suspend our judgment and doubt much.

  The first numbering which we have of a profane nation is that made by Servius Tullius, the sixth king of Rome. He found, says Titus Livius, eighty thousand combatants, all Roman citizens: that implies three hundred and twenty thousand citizens at least, as many old people, women and children, to which we must add at least twenty thousand domestics, slaves and freemen.

  Now we may reasonably doubt whether the little Roman state contained this number. Romulus only reigned (if we may call him king) over about three thousand bandits, assembled in a little town between the mountains. This town was the worst land of Italy. The circuit of all his country was not three thousand paces. Servius was the sixth chief or king of this rising people. The rule of Newton, which is indubitable for elective kingdoms, gives twenty-one years’ reign to each king, and by that contradicts all the ancient historians, who have never observed the order of time, nor given any precise date. The five kings of Rome must have reigned about a hundred years.

  It is certainly not in the order of nature that an ungrateful soil, which was not five leagues in length or three in breadth, and which must have lost many of its inhabitants in its almost continual little wars, could be peopled with three hundred and forty thousand souls. There is not half the number in the same territory at present, when Rome is the metropolis of the Christian world; when the affluence of foreigners and the ambassadors of so many nations must serve to people the towns; when gold flows from Poland, Hungary, half of Germany, Spain, and France, by a thousand channels into the purse of the treasury, and must further facilitate population, if other causes intercept it.

  As the history of Rome was not written until more than five hundred years after its foundation, it would not be at all surprising if the historians had liberally given Servius Tullius eighty thousand warriors instead of eight thousand, through false zeal for their country. Their zeal would have been much more judicious if they had confessed the weak commencement of their republic. It is much more noble to be raised from so poor an origin to so much greatness, than to have had double the soldiers of Alexander to conquer about fifteen leagues of country in four hundred years.

  The census was never taken except of Roman citizens. It is pretended that under Augustus it amounted to four millions one hundred and thirty-seven thousand in the year 29 before our vulgar era, according to Tillemont, who is very exact, and Dion Cassius, who is no less so.

  Lawrence Echard admits but one numbering, of four millions one hundred and thirty-seven thousand men, in the year 14 of our era. The same Echard speaks of a general numbering of the empire for the first year of the same era; but he quotes no Roman author, nor specifies any calculation of the number of citizens. Tillemont does not speak in any way of this numbering.

  We have quoted Tacitus and Suetonius, but to very little purpose. The census of which Suetonius speaks is not a numbering of citizens; it is only a list of those to whom the public furnished corn. Tacitus only speaks, in book ii., of a census established among the Gauls, for the purpose of raising more tribute on each head. Augustus never made a calculation of the other subjects of his empire, because they paid not the poll-tax, which he wished to establish in Gaul.

  Tacitus says that Augustus had a memoir, written in his own hand, which contained the revenues of the empire, the fleets and contributary kingdoms. He speaks not of any numbering. Dion Cassius speaks of a census, but he specifies no number.

  Josephus, in his “Antiquities,” says that in the year 759 of Rome—the time answering to the eleventh year of our era—Cyrenius, then constituted governor of Syria, caused a list to be made of all the property of the Jews, which caused a revolt. This has no relation to a general numbering, and merely proves that this Cyrenius was not governor of Judæa—which was then a little province of Syria—until ten years after, and not at the birth of our Saviour.

  These seem to me to be all the principal passages that we can collect in profane histories, touching the numberings attributed to Augustus. If we refer to them, Jesus Christ would be born under the government of Varus, and not under that of Cyrenius; and there could have been no universal numbering. But St. Luke, whose authority should prevail over that of Josephus, Suetonius, Tacitus, Dion Cassius, and all the writers of Rome—St. Luke affirms positively that there was a universal numbering of all the earth, and that Cyrenius was governor of Judæa. We must therefore refer solely to him, without even seeking to reconcile him with Flavius Josephus, or with any other historian. As to the rest, neither the New nor the Old Testament has been given to us to enlighten points of history, but to announce salutary truths, before which all events and opinions should vanish. It is thus that we always reply to the false calculations, contradictions, absurdities, enormous faults of geography, chronology, physics, and even common sense, with which philosophers tell us the Holy Scripture is filled; we cease not to reply that there is here no question of reason, but of faith and piety.

  SECTION II.

  With regard to the numbers of the moderns, kings fear not at present that a doctor Gad should propose to them on the part of God, either famine, war, or pestilence, to punish them for wishing to know the amount of their subjects. None of them know it. We conjecture and guess, and always possibly within a few millions of men.

  I have carried the number of inhabitants which compose the empire of Russia to twenty-four millions, in the statements which have been sent to me; but I have not guaranteed this valuation, because I know very little about it. I believe that Germany possessed as many people, reckoning the Hungarians. If I am deceived by one or two millions, we know it is a trifle in such a case.

  I beg pardon of the King of Spain, if I have only awarded him seven millions of subjects in our continent. It is a very small number; but Don Ustaris, employed in the ministry, gives him no more. We reckon from about nine to ten millions of free beings in the three kingdoms of Great Britain. In France we count between sixteen and twenty millions. This is a proof that Doctor Gad has nothing wherewith to reproach the ministry of France.

  As to the capital towns, opinions are further divided. According to some calculators, Paris has seven hundred thousand inhabitants, and according to others five hundred thousand. It is thus with London, Constantinople, and Grand Cairo.

  As to the subjects of the pope, they will make a crowd in paradise, but the multitude is moderate on earth. Why so?—because they are subjects of the pope. Would Cato the Censor have ever believed the Romans would come to that pass?

  OCCULT QUALITIES.

  Occult qualities have for a very long time been much derided; it would be more proper to deride those who do not believe in them. Let us for the hundredth time repeat that every principle, every primitive source of any of the works which come from the hand of the demiourgos, is occult, and eternally hidden from mortals.

  What is the centripetal force, the force of gravitation, which acts without contact at such immense distances? What causes our hearts to beat sixty times a minute? What other power changes this grass into milk in the udder of a cow? and this bread into the flesh, blood, and bone of that child, who grows proportionally while he eats it, until he arrives at the height determined by nature, after which there is no art which can add a line to it.

  Vegetables, minerals, animals, where is your originating principle? In the hands of Him who turns the sun on its axis, and who has clothed it with light. This lead will never become silver, nor this silver gold; this gold will never become diamond, nor this straw be transformed into lemons and bananas. What corpuscular system of physics, what atoms, determine their nature? You know nothing about it, and the cause will be eternally occult to you. All that surrounds us, all within us, is an enigma which it is not in the power of man to divine.

  The furred ignoramus ought to have been aware of this truth when he said that beasts possess a vegetative and sensitive soul, and man a soul which is vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual. Poor man, kneaded up of pride, who has pronounced only words—have you ever seen a soul? Know you how it is made? We have spoken much of the soul in these inquiries, but have always confessed our ignorance. I now repeat this confession still more emphatically, since the more I read, the more I meditate, and the more I acquire, the more am I enabled to affirm that I know nothing.

  OFFENCES (LOCAL).

  If we travel throughout the whole earth, we still find that theft, murder, adultery, calumny, etc., are regarded as offences which society condemns and represses; but that which is approved in England and condemned in Italy, ought it to be punished in Italy, as if it were one of the crimes against general humanity? That which is a crime only in the precincts of some mountains, or between two rivers, demands it not from judges more indulgence than those outrages which are regarded with horror in all countries? Ought not the judge to say to himself, I should not dare to punish in Ragusa what I punish at Loretto? Should not this reflection soften his heart, and moderate the hardness which it is too apt to contract in the long exercise of his employment? The “Kermesses” of Flanders are well known; they were carried in the last century to a degree of indecency, revolting to the eyes of all persons who were not accustomed to such spectacles.

  The following is the manner in which Christmas is celebrated in some countries. In the first place appears a young man half-naked, with wings on his shoulders; he repeats the Ave Maria to a young girl, who replies “fiat,” and the angel kisses her on the mouth; after which a child, shut up in a great cock of pasteboard, imitates the crowing of the cock. “Puer natus est nobis.” A great ox bellows out “ubi”; a sheep baas out “Bethlehem”; an ass brays “hihanus,” to signify “eamus”; and a long procession, preceded by four fools with bells and baubles, brings up the rear. There still remain some traces of this popular devotion, which among a civilized and educated people would be taken for profanation. A Swiss, out of patience, and possibly more intoxicated than the performers of the ox and the ass, took the liberty of remonstrating with them at Louvain, and was rewarded with no small number of blows; they would indeed have hanged him, and he escaped with great difficulty.

  The same man had a dangerous quarrel at The Hague for violently taking the part of Barnevelt against an outrageous Gomarist. He was imprisoned at Amsterdam for saying that priests were the scourge of humanity, and the source of all our misfortunes. “How!” said he, “if we maintain that good works are necessary to salvation, we are sent to a dungeon; and if we laugh at a cock and an ass we risk hanging!” Ridiculous as this adventure was, it is sufficient to convince us that we may be criminal in one or two points in our hemisphere, and innocent in all the rest of the world.

  ONAN.

  The race of Onan exhibits great singularities. The patriarch Judah, his father, lay with his daughter-in-law, Tamar the Phœnician, in the highroad; Jacob, the father of Judah, was at the same time married to two sisters, the daughters of an idolater; and deluded both his father and father-in-law. Lot, the granduncle of Jacob, lay with his two daughters. Saleum, one of the descendants of Jacob and of Judah, espoused Rahab the Canaanite, a prostitute. Boaz, son of Saleum and Rahab, received into his bed Ruth the Midianite; and was great grandfather of David. David took away Bathsheba from the warrior Uriah, her husband, and caused him to be slain, that he might be unrestrained in his amour. Lastly, in the two genealogies of Christ, which differ in so many points, but agree in this, we discover that he descended from this tissue of fornication, adultery, and incest.

  Nothing is more proper to confound human prudence; to humble our limited minds; and to convince us that the ways of Providence are not like our ways. The reverend father Dom Calmet makes this reflection, in alluding to the incest of Judah with Tamar, and to the sin of Onan, spoken of in the 38th chapter of “Genesis”: “Scripture,” he observes, “gives us the details of a history, which on the first perusal strikes our minds as not of a nature for edification; but the hidden sense which is shut up in it is as elevated as that of the mere letter appears low to carnal eyes. It is not without good reasons that the Holy Spirit has allowed the histories of Tamar, of Rahab, of Ruth, and of Bathsheba, to form a part of the genealogy of Jesus Christ.”

  It might have been well if Dom Calmet had explained these sound reasons, by which we might have cleared up the doubts and appeased the scruples of all the honest and timorous souls who are anxious to comprehend how this Supreme Being, the Creator of worlds, could be born in a Jewish village, of a race of plunderers and of prostitutes. This mystery, which is not less inconceivable than other mysteries, was assuredly worthy the explanation of so able a commentator—but to return to our subject.

  We perfectly understand the crime of the patriarch Judah, and of the patriarchs Simeon and Levi, his brothers, at Sichem; but it is more difficult to understand the sin of Onan. Judah had married his eldest son Er to the Phœnician, Tamar. Er died in consequence of his wickedness, and the patriarch wished his second son to espouse the widow, according to an ancient law of the Egyptians and Phœnicians, their neighbors, which was called raising up seed for his brother. The first child of this second marriage bore the name of the deceased, and this Onan objected to. He hated the memory of his brother, or to produce a child to bear the name of Er; and to avoid it took the means which are detailed in the chapter of “Genesis” already mentioned, and which are practised by no species of animals but apes and human beings.

  An English physician wrote a small volume on this vice, which he called after the name of the patriarch who was guilty of it. M. Tissot, the celebrated physician of Lausanne, also wrote on this subject, in a work much more profound and methodical than the English one. These two works detail the consequences of this unhappy habit—loss of strength, impotence, weakness of the stomach and intestines, tremblings, vertigo, lethargy, and often premature death.

  M. Tissot, however, to console us for this evil, relates as many examples of the mischiefs of repletion in both sexes. There cannot be a stronger argument against rash vows of chastity. From the examples afforded, it is impossible to avoid being convinced of the enormous folly of condemning ourselves to these turpitudes in order to renounce a connection which has been expressly commanded by God Himself. In this manner think the Protestants, the Jews, the Mahometans, and many other nations; the Catholics offer other reasons in favor of converts. I shall merely say of the Catholics what Dom Calmet says of the Holy Ghost—That their reasons are doubtless good, could we understand them.

  OPINION.

  What is the opinion of all the nations of the north of America, and those which border the Straits of Sunda, on the best of governments, and best of religions; on public ecclesiastical rights; on the manner of writing history; on the nature of tragedy, comedy, opera, eclogue, epic poetry; on innate ideas, concomitant grace, and the miracles of Deacon Paris? It is clear that all these people have no opinions on things of which they have no ideas.

  They have a confused feeling of their customs, and go not beyond this instinct. Such are the people who inhabit the shores of the Frozen Sea for the space of fifteen hundred leagues. Such are the inhabitants of the three parts of Africa, and those of nearly all the isles of Asia; of twenty hordes of Tartars, and almost all men solely occupied with the painful and continual care of providing their subsistence. Such are, at two steps from us, most of the Morlachians, many of the Savoyards, and some citizens of Paris.

  When a nation begins to be civilized, it has some opinions which are quite false. It believes in spirits, sorcerers, the enchantment of serpents and their immortality; in possessions of the devil, exorcisms, and soothsayers. It is persuaded that seeds must grow rotten in the earth to spring up again, and that the quarters of the moon are the causes of accesses of fever.

  A Talapoin persuades his followers that the god Sammonocodom sojourned some time at Siam, and that he cut down all the trees in a forest which prevented him from flying his kite at his ease, which was his favorite amusement. This idea takes root in their heads; and finally, an honest man who might doubt this adventure of Sammonocodom, would run the risk of being stoned. It requires ages to destroy a popular opinion. Opinion is called the queen of the world; it is so; for when reason opposes it, it is condemned to death. It must rise twenty times from its ashes to gradually drive away the usurper.

  OPTIMISM.

  I beg of you, gentlemen, to explain to me how everything is for the best; for I do not understand it. Does it signify that everything is arranged and ordered according to the laws of the impelling power? That I comprehend and acknowledge. Do you mean that every one is well and possesses the means of living—that nobody suffers? You know that such is not the case. Are you of the opinion that the lamentable calamities which afflict the earth are good in reference to God; and that He takes pleasure in them? I credit not this horrible doctrine; neither do you.

  Have the goodness to explain how all is for the best. Plato, the dialectician, condescended to allow to God the liberty of making five worlds; because, said he, there are five regular solids in geometry, the tetrahedron, the cube, the hexahedron, the dodecahedron, and the icosahedron. But why thus restrict divine power? Why not permit the sphere, which is still more regular, and even the cone, the pyramid of many sides, the cylinder, etc.?

  God, according to Plato, necessarily chose the best of all possible worlds; and this system has been embraced by many Christian philosophers, although it appears repugnant to the doctrine of original sin. After this transgression, our globe was no more the best of all possible worlds. If it was ever so, it might be so still; but many people believe it to be the worst of worlds instead of the best.

  Leibnitz takes the part of Plato; more readers than one complain of their inability to understand either the one or the other; and for ourselves, having read both of them more than once, we avow our ignorance according to custom; and since the gospel has revealed nothing on the subject, we remain in darkness without remorse.

  Leibnitz, who speaks of everything, has treated of original sin; and as every man of systems introduces into his plan something contradictory, he imagined that the disobedience towards God, with the frightful misfortunes which followed it, were integral parts of the best of worlds, and necessary ingredients of all possible felicity: “Calla, calla, senor don Carlos; todo che se haze es por su ben.”

  What! to be chased from a delicious place, where we might have lived for ever only for the eating of an apple? What! to produce in misery wretched children, who will suffer everything, and in return produce others to suffer after them? What! to experience all maladies, feel all vexations, die in the midst of grief, and by way of recompense be burned to all eternity—is this lot the best possible? It certainly is not good for us, and in what manner can it be so for God? Leibnitz felt that nothing could be said to these objections, but nevertheless made great books, in which he did not even understand himself.

  Lucullus, in good health, partaking of a good dinner with his friends and his mistress in the hall of Apollo, may jocosely deny the existence of evil; but let him put his head out of the window and he will behold wretches in abundance; let him be seized with a fever, and he will be one himself.

  I do not like to quote; it is ordinarily a thorny proceeding. What precedes and what follows the passage quoted is too frequently neglected; and thus a thousand objections may rise. I must, notwithstanding, quote Lactantius, one of the fathers, who, in the thirteenth chapter on the anger of God, makes Epicurus speak as follows: “God can either take away evil from the world and will not; or being willing to do so, cannot; or He neither can nor will; or, lastly, He is both able and willing. If He is willing to remove evil and cannot, then is He not omnipotent. If He can, but will not remove it, then is He not benevolent; if He is neither able nor willing, then is He neither powerful nor benevolent; lastly, if both able and willing to annihilate evil, how does it exist?”

  The argument is weighty, and Lactantius replies to it very poorly by saying that God wills evil, but has given us wisdom to secure the good. It must be confessed that this answer is very weak in comparison with the objection; for it implies that God could bestow wisdom only by allowing evil—a pleasant wisdom truly! The origin of evil has always been an abyss, the depth of which no one has been able to sound. It was this difficulty which reduced so many ancient philosophers and legislators to have recourse to two principles—the one good, the other wicked. Typhon was the evil principle among the Egyptians, Arimanes among the Persians. The Manichæans, it is said, adopted this theory; but as these people have never spoken either of a good or of a bad principle, we have nothing to prove it but the assertion.

  Among the absurdities abounding in this world, and which may be placed among the number of our evils, that is not the least which presumes the existence of two all-powerful beings, combating which shall prevail most in this world, and making a treaty like the two physicians in Molière: “Allow me the emetic, and I resign to you the lancet.”

  Basilides pretended, with the platonists of the first century of the church, that God gave the making of our world to His inferior angels, and these, being inexpert, have constructed it as we perceive. This theological fable is laid prostrate by the overwhelming objection that it is not in the nature of a deity all-powerful and all-wise to intrust the construction of a world to incompetent architects.

  Simon, who felt the force of this objection, obviates it by saying that the angel who presided over the workmen is damned for having done his business so slovenly, but the roasting of this angel amends nothing. The adventure of Pandora among the Greeks scarcely meets the objection better. The box in which every evil is enclosed, and at the bottom of which remains Hope, is indeed a charming allegory; but this Pandora was made by Vulcan, only to avenge himself on Prometheus, who had stolen fire to inform a man of clay.

  The Indians have succeeded no better. God having created man, gave him a drug which would insure him permanent health of body. The man loaded his ass with the drug, and the ass being thirsty, the serpent directed him to a fountain, and while the ass was drinking, purloined the drug.

  The Syrians pretended that man and woman having been created in the fourth heaven, they resolved to eat a cake in lieu of ambrosia, their natural food. Ambrosia exhaled by the pores; but after eating cake, they were obliged to relieve themselves in the usual manner. The man and the woman requested an angel to direct them to a water-closet. Behold, said the angel, that petty globe which is almost of no size at all; it is situated about sixty millions of leagues from this place, and is the privy of the universe—go there as quickly as you can. The man and woman obeyed the angel and came here, where they have ever since remained; since which time the world has been what we now find it. The Syrians will eternally be asked why God allowed man to eat the cake and experience such a crowd of formidable ills?

  I pass with speed from the fourth heaven to Lord Bolingbroke. This writer, who doubtless was a great genius, gave to the celebrated Pope his plan of “all for the best,” as it is found word for word in the posthumous works of Lord Bolingbroke, and recorded by Lord Shaftesbury in his “Characteristics.” Read in Shaftesbury’s chapter of the “Moralists” the following passage:

  “Much may be replied to these complaints of the defects of nature—How came it so powerless and defective from the hands of a perfect Being?—But I deny that it is defective. Beauty is the result of contrast, and universal concord springs out of a perpetual conflict. . . . . It is necessary that everything be sacrificed to other things—vegetables to animals, and animals to the earth . . . . The laws of the central power of gravitation, which give to the celestial bodies their weight and motion, are not to be deranged in consideration of a pitiful animal, who, protected as he is by the same laws, will soon be reduced to dust.”

  Bolingbroke, Shaftesbury, and Pope, their working artisan, resolve their general question no better than the rest. Their “all for the best” says no more than that all is governed by immutable laws; and who did not know that? We learn nothing when we remark, after the manner of little children, that flies are created to be eaten by spiders, spiders by swallows, swallows by hawks, hawks by eagles, eagles by men, men by one another, to afford food for worms; and at last, at the rate of about a thousand to one, to be the prey of devils everlastingly.

  There is a constant and regular order established among animals of all kinds—a universal order. When a stone is formed in my bladder, the mechanical process is admirable; sandy particles pass by small degrees into my blood; they are filtered by the veins; and passing the urethra, deposit themselves in my bladder; where, uniting agreeably to the Newtonian attraction, a stone is formed, which gradually increases, and I suffer pains a thousand times worse than death by the finest arrangement in the world. A surgeon, perfect in the art of Tubal-Cain, thrusts into me a sharp instrument; and cutting into the perineum, seizes the stone with his pincers, which breaks during the endeavors, by the necessary laws of mechanism; and owing to the same mechanism, I die in frightful torments. All this is “for the best,” being the evident result of unalterable physical principles, agreeably to which I know as well as you that I perish.

  If we were insensitive, there would be nothing to say against this system of physics; but this is not the point on which we treat. We ask if there are not physical evils, and whence do they originate? There is no absolute evil, says Pope in his “Essay on Man”; or if there are particular evils, they compose a general good. It is a singular general good which is composed of the stone and the gout—of all sorts of crime and sufferings, and of death and damnation.

  The fall of man is our plaister for all these particular maladies of body and soul, which you call “the general health”; but Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke have attacked original sin. Pope says nothing about it; but it is clear that their system saps the foundations of the Christian religion, and explains nothing at all.

  In the meantime, this system has been since approved by many theologians, who willingly embrace contradictions. Be it so; we ought to leave to everybody the privilege of reasoning in their own way upon the deluge of ills which overwhelm us. It would be as reasonable to prevent incurable patients from eating what they please. “God,” says Pope, “beholds, with an equal eye, a hero perish or a sparrow fall; the destruction of an atom, or the ruin of a thousand planets; the bursting of a bubble, or the dissolution of a world.”

  This, I must confess, is a pleasant consolation. Who does not find a comfort in the declaration of Lord Shaftesbury, who asserts, “that God will not derange His general system for so miserable an animal as man?” It must be confessed at least that this pitiful creature has a right to cry out humbly, and to endeavor, while bemoaning himself, to understand why these eternal laws do not comprehend the good of every individual.

  This system of “all for the best” represents the Author of Nature as a powerful and malevolent monarch, who cares not for the destruction of four or five hundred thousand men, nor of the many more who in consequence spend the rest of their days in penury and tears, provided He succeeds in His designs.

  Far therefore from the doctrine—that this is the best of all possible worlds—being consolatory, it is a hopeless one to the philosophers who embrace it. The question of good and evil remains in irremediable chaos for those who seek to fathom it in reality. It is a mere mental sport to the disputants, who are captives that play with their chains. As to unreasoning people, they resemble the fish which are transported from a river to a reservoir, with no more suspicion that they are to be eaten during the approaching Lent, than we have ourselves of the facts which originate our destiny.

  Let us place at the end of every chapter of metaphysics the two letters used by the Roman judges when they did not understand a pleading. N. L. non liquet—it is not clear. Let us, above all, silence the knaves who, overloaded like ourselves with the weight of human calamities, add the mischief of their calumny; let us refute their execrable imposture by having recourse to faith and Providence.

  Some reasoners are of opinion that it agrees not with the nature of the Great Being of Beings for things to be otherwise than they are. It is a rough system, and I am too ignorant to venture to examine it.

  ORACLES.

  SECTION I.

  After the sect of the Pharisees among the Jews had become acquainted with the devil, some reasoners among them began to entertain the idea that the devil and his companions inspired, among all other nations, the priests and statues that delivered oracles. The Sadducees had no belief in such beings. They admitted neither angels nor demons. It appears that they were more philosophic than the Pharisees, and consequently less calculated to obtain influence and credit with the people.

  The devil was the great agent with the Jewish populace in the time of Gamaliel, John the Baptist, James Oblia, and Jesus his brother, who was our Saviour, Jesus Christ. Accordingly, we perceive that the devil transports Jesus sometimes into the wilderness, sometimes to the pinnacle of the temple, and sometimes to a neighboring hill, from which might be discovered all the kingdoms of the world; the devil takes possession, when he pleases, of the persons of boys, girls, and animals.

  The Christians, although mortal enemies of the Pharisees, adopted all that the Pharisees had imagined of the devil; as the Jews had long before introduced among themselves the customs and ceremonies of the Egyptians. Nothing is so common as to imitate the practices of enemies, and to use their weapons.

  In a short time the fathers of the church ascribed to the devil all the religions which divided the earth, all pretended prodigies, all great events, comets, plagues, epilepsies, scrofula, etc. The poor devil, who was supposed to be roasting in a hole under the earth, was perfectly astonished to find himself master of the world. His power afterwards increased wonderfully from the institution of monks.

  The motto or device of all these newcomers was, “Give me money and I will deliver you from the devil.” But both the celestial and terrestrial power of these gentry received at length a terrible check from the hand of one of their own brotherhood, Luther, who, quarreling with them about some beggarly trifle, disclosed to the world all the trick and villainy of their mysteries. Hondorf, an eye-witness, tells us that the reformed party having expelled the monks from a convent at Eisenach in Thuringia, found in it a statue of the Virgin Mary and the Infant Jesus, contrived with such art that, when offerings were placed upon the altar, the Virgin and Child bent their heads in sign of grateful acknowledgment, but turned their backs on those who presented themselves with empty hands.

  In England the case was much worse. When by order of Henry VIII., a judicial visitation took place of all the convents, half of the nuns were found in a state of pregnancy; and this, at least it may be supposed, was not by the operation of the devil. Bishop Burnet relates that in a hundred and forty-four convents the depositions taken by the king’s commissioners attested abominations which those of Sodom and Gomorrah did not even approach. In fact, the English monks might naturally be expected to be more dissolute than the inhabitants of Sodom, as they were richer. They were in possession of the best lands in the kingdom. The territory of Sodom and Gomorrah, on the contrary, produced neither grain, fruit, nor pulse; and being moreover deficient even in water fit to drink, could be neither more nor less than a frightful desert, inhabited by miserable wretches too much occupied in satisfying their absolute necessities to have much time to devote to pleasures.

  In short, these superb asylums of laziness having been suppressed by act of parliament, all the instruments of their pious frauds were exposed in the public places; the famous crucifix of Brocksley, which moved and marched like a puppet; phials of a red liquid which was passed off for blood shed by the statues of saints when they were dissatisfied with the court; candlesticks of tinned iron, in which the lighted candles were carefully placed so as to make the people believe they were the same candles that were always burning; speaking tubes—sarbacans—which communicated between the sacristy and the roof of the church, and by which celestial voices were occasionally heard by apparently devotees, who were paid for hearing them; in short, everything that was ever invented by knavery to impose upon imbecility.

  Many sensible persons who lived at this period, being perfectly convinced that the monks, and not the devils, had employed all these pious stratagems, began to entertain the idea that the case had been very similar with the religions of antiquity; that all the oracles and all the miracles so highly vaunted by ancient times had been merely the tricks of charlatans; that the devil had never had anything to do with such matters; and that the simple fact was, that the Greek, Roman, Syrian, and Egyptian priests had been still more expert than our modern monks.

  The devil, therefore, thus lost much of his credit; insomuch that at length the honest Bekker, whose article you may consult, wrote his tiresome book against the devil, and proved by a hundred arguments that he had no existence. The devil himself made no answer to him, but the ministers of the holy gospel, as you have already seen, did answer him; they punished the honest author for having divulged their secret, and took away his living; so that Bekker fell a victim to the nullity of Beelzebub.

  It was the lot of Holland to produce the most formidable enemies of the devil. The physician Van Dale—a humane philosopher, a man of profound learning, a most charitable citizen, and one whose naturally bold mind became proportionately bolder, in consequence of his intrepidity being founded on virtue—undertook at length the task of enlightening mankind, always enslaved by ancient errors, and always spreading the bandage that covers their eyes, until at last some powerful flash of light discovers to them a corner of truth of which the greater number are completely unworthy. He proved, in a work abounding in the most recondite learning, that the devils had never delivered a single oracle, had never performed a single prodigy, and had never mingled in human affairs at all; and that there never had in reality been any demons but those impostors who had deceived their fellow men. The devil should never ridicule or despise a sensible physician. Those who know something of nature are very formidable enemies to all juggling performers of prodigies. If the devil would be advised by me, he would always address himself to the faculty of theology, and never to the faculty of medicine.

  Van Dale proved, then, by numberless authorities, not merely that the Pagan oracles were mere tricks of the priests, but that these knaveries, consecrated all over the world, had not ceased at the time of John the Baptist and Jesus Christ, as was piously and generally thought to be the case. Nothing was more true, more clear, more decidedly demonstrated, than this doctrine announced by the physician Van Dale; and there is no man of education and respectability who now calls it in question.

  The work of Van Dale is not, perhaps, very methodical, but it is one of the most curious works that ever came from the press. For, from the gross forgeries of the pretended Histape and the Sibyls; from the apocryphal history of the voyage of Simon Barjonas to Rome, and the compliments which Simon the magician sent him through the medium of his dog; from the miracles of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, and especially the letter which that saint wrote to the devil, and which was safely delivered according to its address, down to the miracles of the reverend fathers, the Jesuits, and the reverend fathers, the Capuchins, nothing is forgotten. The empire of imposture and stupidity is completely developed before the eyes of all who can read; but they, alas! are only a small number.

  Far indeed was that empire, at that period, from being destroyed in Italy, France, Spain, the states of Austria, and more especially in Poland, where the Jesuits then bore absolute sway. Diabolical possessions and false miracles still inundated one-half of besotted and barbarized Europe. The following account is given by Van Dale of a singular oracle that was delivered in his time at Terni, in the States of the Pope, about the year 1650; and the narrative of which was printed at Venice by order of the government:

  A hermit of the name of Pasquale, having heard that Jacovello, a citizen of Terni, was very covetous and rich, came to Terni to offer up his devotions in the church frequented by the opulent miser, soon formed an acquaintance with him, flattered him in his ruling passion, and persuaded him that it was a service highly acceptable to God to take as much care as possible of money; it was indeed expressly enjoined in the gospel, as the negligent servant who had not put out his lord’s money to interest at five hundred per cent was thrown into outer darkness.

  In the conversations which the hermit had with Jacovello, he frequently entertained him with plausible discourses held by crucifixes and by a quantity of Italian Virgin Marys. Jacovello agreed that the statues of saints sometimes spoke to men, and told him that he should believe himself one of the elect if ever he could have the happiness to hear the image of a saint speak.

  The friendly Pasquale replied that he had some hope he might be able to give him that satisfaction in a very little time; that he expected every day from Rome a death’s head, which the pope had presented to one of his brother hermits; and that this head spoke quite as distinctly and sensibly as the trees of Dodona, or even the ass of Balaam. He showed him the identical head, in fact, four days after this conversation. He requested of Jacovello the key of a small cave and an inner chamber, that no person might possibly be a witness of the awful mystery. The hermit, having introduced a tube from this cave into the head, and made every other suitable arrangement, went to prayer with his friend Jacovello, and the head at that moment uttered the following words: “Jacovello, I will recompense thy zeal. I announce to thee a treasure of a hundred thousand crowns under a yew tree in thy garden. But thou shalt die by a sudden death if thou makest any attempt to obtain this treasure until thou hast produced before me a pot containing coin amounting to ten gold marks.”

  Jacovello ran speedily to his coffers and placed before the oracle a pot containing the ten marks. The good hermit had had the precaution to procure a similar vessel which he had filled with sand, and he dexterously substituted that for the pot of Jacovello, on his turning his back, and then left the pious miser with one death’s head more, and ten gold marks less, than he had before. Nearly such is the way in which all oracles have been delivered, beginning with those of Jupiter Ammon, and ending with that of Trophonius.

  One of the secrets of the priests of antiquity, as it is of our own, was confession in the mysteries. It was by this that they gained correct and particular information about the affairs of families, and qualified themselves in a great measure to give pertinent and suitable replies to those who came to consult them. To this subject applies the anecdote which Plutarch has rendered so celebrated. A priest once urging an initiated person to confession, that person said: “To whom should I confess?” “To God,” replied the priest. “Begone then, man,” said the desired penitent; “begone, and leave me alone with God.”

  

  The Initial Banishing of the Priest.

  It would be almost endless to recount all the interesting facts and narratives with which Van Dale has enriched his book. Fontenelle did not translate it. But he extracted from it what he thought would be most suitable to his countrymen, who love sprightly anecdote and observation better than profound knowledge. He was eagerly read by what in France is called good company; and Van Dale, who had written in Latin and Greek, had been read only by the learned. The rough diamond of Van Dale shone with exquisite brilliancy after the cutting and polish of Fontenelle: the success of the work was such that the fanatics became alarmed. Notwithstanding all Fontenelle’s endeavors to soften down the expressions of Van Dale, and his explaining himself sometimes with the license of a Norman, he was too well understood by the monks, who never like to be told that their brethren have been impostors.

  A certain Jesuit of the name of Baltus, born near Messina, one of that description of learned persons who know how to consult old books, and to falsify and cite them, although after all nothing to the purpose, took the part of the devil against Van Dale and Fontenelle. The devil could not have chosen a more tiresome and wretched advocate; his name is now known solely from the honor he had of writing against two celebrated men who advocated a good cause.

  Baltus likewise, in his capacity of Jesuit, caballed with no little perseverance and bitterness on the occasion, in union with his brethren, who at that time were as high in credit and influence as they have since been plunged deep in ignominy. The Jansenists, on their part, more impassionate and exasperated than even the Jesuits, clamored in a still louder tone than they did. In short, all the fanatics were convinced that it would be all over with the Christian religion, if the devil were not supported in his rights.

  In the course of time the books of Jansenists and Jesuits have all sunk into oblivion. That of Van Dale still remains for men of learning, and that of Fontenelle for men of wit. With respect to the devil, he resembles both Jesuits and Jansenists, and is losing credit from day to day.

  SECTION II.

  Some curious and surprising histories of oracles, which it was thought could be ascribed only to the power of genii, made the Christians think they were delivered by demons, and that they had ceased at the coming of Christ. They were thus enabled to save the time and trouble that would have been required by an investigation of the facts; and they thought to strengthen the religion which informed them of the existence of demons by referring to those beings such events.

  The histories however that were circulated on the subject of oracles are exceedingly suspicious. That of Thamus, to which Eusebius gives credit, and which Plutarch alone relates, is followed in the same history by another story so ridiculous, that that would be sufficient to throw discredit upon it; but it is, besides, incapable of any reasonable interpretation. If this great Pan were a demon, can we suppose the demons incapable of communicating the event of his death to one another without employing Thamus about it? If the great Pan were Jesus Christ, how came it that not a single Pagan was undeceived with respect to his religion, and converted to the belief that this same Pan was in fact Jesus Christ who died in Judæa, if God Himself compelled the demons to announce this death to the pagans?

  The history of Thulis, whose oracle is clear and positive on the subject of the Trinity, is related only by Suidas. This Thulis, king of Egypt, was not certainly one of the Ptolemies. What becomes of the whole oracle of Serapis, when it is ascertained that Herodotus does not speak of that god, while Tacitus relates at length how and why one of the Ptolemies brought the god Serapis from Pontus, where he had only until then been known?

  The oracle delivered to Augustus about the Hebrew infant who should be obeyed by all the gods, is absolutely inadmissible. Cedrenus quotes it from Eusebius, but it is not now to be found in him. It certainly is not impossible that Cedrenus quotes it from Eusebius, but it is not now to be found in him. It certainly is not impossible that Cedrenus may have made a false quotation, or have quoted a work falsely ascribed to Eusebius; but how is it to be accounted for, that all the early apologists for Christianity should have preserved complete silence with respect to an oracle so favorable to their religion?

  The oracles which Eusebius relates from Porphyry, who was attached to paganism, are not of a more embarrassing nature than those just noticed. He gives them to us stripped of all the accompanying circumstances that attended them in the writings of Porphyry. How do we know whether that pagan did not refute them. For the interest of his cause it would naturally have been an object for him to do so; and if he did not do it, most assuredly it was from some concealed motive, such, for instance, as presenting them to the Christians only for an occasion to prove and deride their credulity, if they should really receive them as true and rest their religion on such weak foundations.

  Besides, some of the ancient Christians reproached the pagans with being the dupes of their priests. Observe how Clement of Alexandria speaks of them: “Boast as long as you please of your childish and impertinent oracles, whether of Claros or the Pythian Apollo, of Dindymus or Amphilocus; and add to these your augurs and interpreters of dreams and prodigies. Bring forward also those clever gentry who, in the presence of the mighty Pythian Apollo, effect their divinations through the medium of meal or barley, and those also who, by a certain talent of ventriloquism, have obtained such high reputation. Let the secrets of the Egyptian temples, and the necromancy of the Etruscans, remain in darkness; all these things are most certainly nothing more than decided impostures, as completely tricks as those of a juggler with his cups and balls. The goats carefully trained for the divination, the ravens elaborately instructed to deliver the oracles, are—if we may use the expression—merely accomplices of the charlatans by whom the whole world has thus been cheated.”

  Eusebius, in his turn, displays a number of excellent reasons to prove that oracles could be nothing but impostures; and if he attributes them to demons, it is the result of deplorable prejudices or of an affected respect for general opinion. The pagans would never admit that their oracles were merely the artifices of their priests; it was imagined therefore, by rather an awkward process of reasoning, that a little was gained in the dispute by admitting the possibility, that there might be something supernatural in their oracles, and insisting at the same time, that if there were, it was the operation, not of the deity, but of demons.

  It is no longer necessary now, in order to expose the finesse and stratagems of priests, to resort to means which might themselves appear too strongly marked by those qualities. A time has already been when they were completely exhibited to the eyes of the whole world—the time, I mean when the Christian religion proudly triumphed over paganism under Christian emperors.

  Theodoret says that Theophilus, bishop of Alexandria, exhibited to the inhabitants of that city the hollow statues into which the priests entered, from secret passages, to deliver the oracles. When, by Constantine’s order, the temple of Æsculapius at Ægea, in Cilicia, was pulled down, there was driven out of it, says Eusebius in his life of that emperor, not a god, nor a demon, but the human impostor who had so long duped the credulity of nations. To this he adds the general observation that, in the statues of the gods that were thrown down, not the slightest appearance was found of gods, or demons, or even any wretched and gloomy spectres, but only hay, straw, or the bones of the dead.

  The greatest difficulty respecting oracles is surmounted, when it is ascertained and admitted, that demons had no concern with them. There is no longer any reason why they should cease precisely at the coming of Jesus Christ. And moreover, there are many proofs that oracles continued more than four hundred years after Jesus Christ, and that they were not totally silenced but by the total destruction of paganism.

  Suetonius, in the life of Nero, says the oracle of Delphi warned that emperor to be aware of seventy-three years, and that Nero concluded he was to die at that age, never thinking upon old Galba, who, at the age of seventy-three, deprived him of the empire.

  Philostratus, in his life of Apollonius of Tyana, who saw Domitian, informs us that Apollonius visited all the oracles of Greece, and that of Dodona, and that of Delphos; and that of Amphiaraus. Plutarch, who lived under Trajan, tells us that the oracles of Delphos still subsisted, although there was then only one priestess, instead of two or three. Under Adrian, Dion Chrysostom relates that he consulted the oracle of Delphos; he obtained from it an answer which appeared to him not a little perplexed, and which in fact was so.

  Under the Antonines, Lucian asserts that a priest of Tyana went to inquire of the false prophet Alexander, whether the oracles which were then delivered at Dindymus, Claros, and Delphos, were really answers of Apollo, or impostures? Alexander had some fellow-feeling for these oracles, which were of a similar description to his own, and replied to the priest, that that was not permitted to be known; but when the same wise inquirer asked what he should be after his death, he was boldly answered, “You will be a camel, then a horse, afterwards a philosopher, and at length a prophet as great as Alexander.”

  After the Antonines, three emperors contended for the empire. The oracle of Delphos was consulted, says Spartian, to ascertain which of the three the republic might expect as its head. The oracle answered in a single verse to the following purport: The black is better; the African is good; the white is the worst. By the black was understood Pescennius Niger; by the African, Severus Septimus, who was from Africa; and by the white, Claudius Albinus.

  Dion, who did not conclude his history before the eighth year of Alexander Severus, that is, the year 230, relates that in his time Amphilocus still delivered oracles in dreams. He informs us also, that there was in the city of Apollonia an oracle which declared future events by the manner in which the fire caught and consumed the incense thrown upon an altar.

  Under Aurelian, about the year 272, the people of Palmyra, having revolted, consulted an oracle of Sarpedonian Apollo in Cilicia; they again consulted that of the Aphacian Venus. Licinus, according to the account of Sozomen, designing to renew the war against Constantine, consulted the oracle of Apollo of Dindymus, and received from it in answer two verses of Homer, of which the sense is—Unhappy old man, it becomes not you to combat with the young! you have no strength, and are sinking under the weight of age.

  A certain god, scarcely if at all known, of the name of Besa, if we may credit Ammianus Marcellinus, still delivered oracles on billets at Abydos, in the extremity of the Thebais, under the reign of Constantius. Finally, Macrobius, who lived under Arcadius and Honorius, sons of Theodosius, speaks of the god of Heliopolis of Syria and his oracle, and of the fortunes of Antium, in terms which distinctly imply that they all still subsisted in his time.

  We may observe that it is not of the slightest consequence whether these histories are true or whether the oracles in fact delivered the answers attributed to them; it is completely sufficient for the purpose that false answers could be attributed only to oracles which were in fact known still to subsist; and the histories which so many authors have published clearly prove that they did not cease but with the cessation of paganism itself.

  Constantine pulled down but few temples, nor indeed could he venture to pull them down but on a pretext of crimes committed in them. It was on this ground that he ordered the demolition of those of the Aphacian Venus, and of Æsculapius which was at Ægea in Cilicia, both of them temples in which oracles were delivered. But he forbade sacrifices to the gods, and by that edict began to render temples useless.

  Many oracles still subsisted when Julian assumed the reins of empire. He re-established some that were in a state of ruin; and he was even desirous of being the prophet of that of Dindymus. Jovian, his successor, began his reign with great zeal for the destruction of paganism; but in the short space of seven months, which comprised the whole time he reigned, he was unable to make any great progress. Theodosius, in order to attain the same object, ordered all the temples of the pagans to be shut up. At last, the exercise of that religion was prohibited under pain of death by an edict of the emperors Valentinian and Marcian, in the year 451 of the vulgar era; and the destruction of paganism necessarily involved that of oracles.

  This conclusion has nothing in it surprising or extraordinary: it is the natural consequence of the establishment of a new worship. Miraculous facts, or rather what it is desired should be considered as such, diminish in a false religion, either in proportion as it becomes firmly established and has no longer occasion for them, or in proportion as it gradually becomes weaker and weaker, because they no longer obtain credit. The ardent but useless desire to pry into futurity gave birth to oracles; imposture encouraged and sanctioned them; and fanaticism set the seal; for an infallible method of making fanatics is to persuade before you instruct. The poverty of the people, who had no longer anything left them to give; the imposture detected in many oracles, and thence naturally concluded to exist in all; and finally the edicts of the Christian emperors; such are the real causes of the establishment, and of the cessation, of this species of imposture. The introduction of an opposite state of circumstances into human affairs made it completely disappear; and oracles thus became involved in the vicissitudes accompanying all human institutions.

  Some limit themselves to observing that the birth of Jesus Christ is the first epoch of the cessation of oracles. But why, on such an occasion, should some demons have fled, while others remained? Besides, ancient history proves decidedly that many oracles had been destroyed before this birth. All the distinguished oracles of Greece no longer existed, or scarcely existed, and the oracle was occasionally interrupted by the silence of an honest priest who would not consent to deceive the people. “The oracle of Delphi,” says Lucian, “remains dumb since princes have become afraid of futurity; they have prohibited the gods from speaking, and the gods have obeyed them.”

  ORDEAL.

  It might be imagined that all the absurdities which degrade human nature were destined to come to us from Asia, the source at the same time of all the sciences and arts! It was in Asia and in Egypt that mankind first dared to make the life or death of a person accused, dependent on the throw of a die, or something equally unconnected with reason and decided by chance—on cold water or hot water, on red hot iron, or a bit of barley bread. Similar superstition, we are assured by travellers, still exists in the Indies, on the coast of Malabar, and in Japan.

  This superstition passed from Egypt into Greece. There was a very celebrated temple at Trezene in which every man who perjured himself died instantly of apoplexy. Hippolytus, in the tragedy of “Phædra,” in the first scene of the fifth act, addresses the following lines to his mistress Aricia:

  • Aux portes de Trezène, et parmi ces tombeaux,
  • Des princes de ma race antiques sepultures,
  • Est un temple sacré formidable aux parjures.
  • C’est là que les mortels n’osent jurer en vain;
  • Le perfide y reçoit un chàtiment soudain;
  • Et, craignant d’y trouver la mort inévitable,
  • Le mensonge n’a point de frem plus redoubtable.
  • At Trezene’s gates, amidst the ancient tombs
  • In which repose the princes of my race,
  • A sacred temple stands, the perjurer’s dread.
  • No daring mortal there may falsely swear,
  • For swift the vengeance which pursues his crime,
  • Inevitable death his instant lot;
  • Nowhere has falsehood a more awful curb.

  The learned commentator of the great Racine makes the following remark on these Trezenian proofs or ordeals:

  “M. de la Motte has remarked that Hippolytus should have proposed to his father to come and hear his justification in this temple, where no one dared venture on swearing to a falsehood. It is certain, that in such a case Theseus could not have doubted the innocence of that young prince; but he had received too convincing evidence against the virtue of Phædra, and Hippolytus was not inclined to make the experiment. M. de la Motte would have done well to have distrusted his own good taste, when he suspected that of Racine, who appears to have foreseen the objection here made. In fact, Theseus is so prejudiced against Hippolytus that he will not even permit him to justify himself by an oath.”

  I should observe that the criticism of La Motte was originally made by the deceased marquis de Lassai. He delivered it at M. de la Faye’s, at a dinner party at which I was present together with the late M. de la Motte, who promised to make use of it; and, in fact, in his “Discourses upon Tragedy,” he gives the honor of the criticism to the marquis de Lassai. The remark appeared to me particularly judicious, as well as to M. de la Faye and to all the guests present, who—of course excepting myself—were the most able critics in Paris. But we all agreed that Aricia was the person who should have called upon Theseus to try the accused by the ordeal of the Trezenian temple; and so much the more so, as Theseus immediately after talks for a long time together to that princess, who forgets the only thing that could clear up the doubts of the father and vindicate the son. The commentator in vain objects that Theseus has declared to his son he will not believe his oaths:

  • Toujours les scelerats ont recours au parjure.

  • —Phedra. Act iv., scene 2.

  • The wicked always have recourse to oaths.

  There is a prodigious difference between an oath taken in a common apartment, and an oath taken in a temple where the perjured are punished by sudden death. Had Aricia said but a single word on the subject, Theseus could have had no excuse for not conducting Hippolytus to this temple; but, in that case, what would have become of the catastrophe?

  Hippolytus, then, should not have mentioned at all the appalling power of the temple of Trezene to his beloved Aricia; he had no need whatever to take an oath of his love to her, for of that she was already most fully persuaded. In short, his doing so is an inadvertence, a small fault, which escaped the most ingenious, elegant, and impassioned tragedian that we ever had.

  From this digression, I return to the barbarous madness of ordeals. They were not admitted in the Roman republic. We cannot consider as of one of these ordeals, the usage by which the most important enterprises were made to depend upon the manner in which the sacred pullets ate their vetches. We are here considering only ordeals applied to ascertain the guilt or innocence of men. It was never proposed to the Manliuses, Camilluses, or Scipios, to prove their innocence by plunging their hands into boiling water without its scalding them.

  These suggestions of folly and barbarism were not admitted under the emperors. But the Tartars who came to destroy the empire—for the greater part of these plunderers issued originally from Tartary—filled our quarter of the world with their ridiculous and cruel jurisprudence, which they derived from the Persians. It was not known in the Eastern Empire till the time of Justinian, notwithstanding the detestable superstition which prevailed in it. But from that time the ordeals we are speaking of were received. This manner of trying men is so ancient that we find it established among the Jews in all periods of their history.

  Korah, Dathan, and Abiram dispute the pontificate with the high priest Aaron in the wilderness; Moses commands them to bring him two hundred and fifty censors, and says to them: Let God choose between their censors and that of Aaron. Scarcely had the revolted made their appearance in order to submit to this ordeal, before they were swallowed up by the earth, and fire from heaven struck two hundred and fifty of their principal adherents; after which, the Lord destroyed fourteen thousand seven hundred more men of that party. The quarrel however for the priesthood still continued between the chiefs of Israel and Aaron. The ordeal of rods was then employed; each man presented his rod, and that of Aaron was the only one which budded.

  Although the people of God had levelled the walls of Jericho by the sound of trumpets, they were overcome by the inhabitants of Ai. This defeat did not appear at all natural to Joshua; he consulted the Lord, who answered that Israel had sinned; that some one had appropriated to his own use a part of the plunder that had been taken at Jericho, and there devoted as accursed. In fact, all ought to have been burned, together with the men and women, children and cattle, and whoever had preserved and carried off any part was to be exterminated. Joshua, in order to discover the offender, subjected all the tribes to the trial by lot. The lot first fell on the tribe of Judah, then on the family of Zarah, then on the house of Zabdi, and finally on the grandson of Zabdi, whose name was Acham.

  Scripture does not explain how it was that these wandering tribes came to have houses; neither does it inform us what kind of lots were made use of on the occasion; but it is clear from the text, that Acham, being convicted of stealing a small wedge of gold, a scarlet mantle, and two hundred shekels of silver, was burned to death in the valley of Achor, together with his sons, his sheep, his oxen, and his asses; and even his very tent was burned with him.

  The promised land was divided by lot; lots were drawn respecting the two goats of expiation which should be sacrificed to the Lord, and which should go for a scapegoat into the wilderness. When Saul was to be chosen king, lots were consulted, and the lot fell on the tribe of Benjamin, on the family of Metri belonging to that tribe, and finally on Saul, the son of Kish, in the family of Metri.

  The lot fell on Jonathan to be punished for having eaten some honey at the end of a rod. The sailors of Joppa drew lots to learn from God what was the cause of the tempest. The lot informed them that it was Jonah; and they threw him into the sea.

  All these ordeals by lot, which among other nations were merely profane superstitions, were the voice of God Himself when employed by His cherished and beloved people; and so completely and decidedly the voice of God that even the apostles filled the place of the apostle Judas by lot. The two candidates for the succession were Matthias and Barnabas. Providence declared in favor of St. Matthias.

  Pope Honorius, the third of that name, forbade by a decretal from that time forward the method of choosing bishops by lot. Deciding by lots was a very common practice, and was called by the pagans, “sortilegium.” Cato, in the “Pharsalia,” says, “Sortilegis egeant dubil. . . . .

  There were other ordeals among the Jews in the name of the Lord; as, for example, the waters of jealousy. A woman suspected of adultery was obliged to drink of that water mixed with ashes, and consecrated by the high priest. If she was guilty she instantly swelled and died. It is upon the foundation of this law that the whole Christian world in the West established oracles for persons under juridical accusation, not considering that what was ordained even by God Himself in the Old Testament was nothing more or less than an absurd superstition in the New.

  Duel by wager of battle was one of those ordeals, and lasted down to the sixteenth century. He who killed his adversary was always in the right. The most dreadful of all these curious and barbarous ordeals, was that of a man’s carrying a bar of redhot iron to the distance of nine paces without burning himself. Accordingly, the history of the middle ages, fabulous as it is, does not record any instance of this ordeal, nor of that which consisted in walking over nine burning ploughshares. All the others might be doubted, or the deceptions and tricks employed in relation to them to deceive the judges might be easily explained. It was very easy, for example, to appear to pass through the trial of boiling water without injury; a vessel might be produced half full of cold water, into which the judicial boiling water might be put; and the accused might safely plunge his arm up to the elbow in the lukewarm mixture, and take up from the bottom the sacred blessed ring that had been thrown into it for that purpose.

  Oil might be made to boil with water; the oil begins to rise and appears to boil when the water begins to simmer, and the oil at that time has acquired but a small degree of heat. In such circumstances, a man seems to plunge his hand into boiling water; but, in fact, moistens it with the harmless oil, which preserves it from contact with and injury by the water.

  A champion may easily, by degrees, harden and habituate himself to holding, for a few seconds, a ring that has been thrown into the fire, without any very striking or painful marks of burning. To pass between two fires without being scorched is no very extraordinary proof of skill or address, when the movement is made with great rapidity and the face and hands are well rubbed with ointment. It is thus that the formidable Peter Aldobrandin, or “The Fiery Peter,” as he was called, used to manage—if there is any truth in his history—when he passed between two blazing fires at Florence, in order to demonstrate, with God’s help, that his archbishop was a knave and debauchee. O, charlatans! charlatans! henceforth disappear forever from the pages of history!

  There existed a rather ludicrous ordeal, which consisted in making an accused person try to swallow a piece of barley bread, which it was believed would certainly choke him if he were guilty. I am not, however, so much diverted with this case as with the conduct of Harlequin, when the judge interrogated him concerning a robbery of which Dr. Balouard accused him. The judge was sitting at table, and drinking some excellent wine at the time, when Harlequin was brought in; perceiving which, the latter takes up the bottle, and, pouring the whole of its contents into a glass, swallows it at a draught, saying to the doctor: “If I am guilty of what you accuse me, sir, I hope this wine will prove poison to me.”

  ORDINATION.

  If a soldier, charged by the king of France with the honor of conferring the order of St. Louis upon another soldier, had not, when presenting the latter with the cross, the intention of making him a knight of that order, would the receiver of the badge be on that account the less a member of the order than if such intention had existed? Certainly not.

  How was it, then, that many priests thought it necessary to be re-ordained after the death of the celebrated Lavardin, bishop of Mans? That singular prelate, who had instituted the order of “Good Fellows” —Des Coteaux—bethought himself on his deathbed of a singular trick, in the way of revenge, on a class of persons who had much annoyed him. He was well known as one of the most daring free-thinkers of the age of Louis XIV., and had been publicly upbraided with his infidel sentiments, by many of those on whom he had conferred orders of priesthood. It is natural at the approach of death, for a sensitive and apprehensive soul to revert to the religion of its early years. Decency alone would have required of the bishop, that at least at his death he should give an example of edification to the flock to which he had given so much scandal by his life. But he was so deeply exasperated against his clergy, as to declare, that not a single individual of those whom he had himself ordained was really and truly a priest; that all their acts in the capacity of priests were null and void; and that he never entertained the intention of conferring any sacrament.

  Such reasoning seems certainly characteristic, and just such as might be expected from a drunken man; the priests of Mans might have replied to him, “It is not your intention that is of any consequence, but ours. We had an ardent and determined desire to be priests; we did all in our power to become such. We are perfectly ingenuous and sincere; if you are not so, that is nothing at all to us.” The maxim applicable to the occasion is, “quic quid accipitur ad modum recipientis accipitur,” and not “ad modum dantis.” “When our wine merchant has sold us a half a hogshead of wine, we drink it, although he might have a secret intention to hinder us from drinking it; we shall still be priests in spite of your testament.”

  Those reasons were sound and satisfactory. However, the greater number of those who had been ordained by that bishop did not consider themselves as real and authorized priests, and subjected themselves to ordination a second time. Mascaron, a man of moderate talents, but of great celebrity as a preacher, persuaded them, both by his discourses and example, to have the ceremony repeated. The affair occasioned great scandal at Mans, and Paris, and Versailles; but like everything else was soon forgotten.

  ORIGINAL SIN.

  SECTION I.

  This is a subject on which the Socinians or Unitarians take occasion to exult and triumph. They denominate this foundation of Christianity its “original sin.” It is an insult to God, they say; it is accusing Him of the most absurd barbarity to have the hardihood to assert, that He formed all the successive generations of mankind to deliver them over to eternal tortures, under the pretext of their original ancestor having eaten of a particular fruit in a garden. This sacrilegious imputation is so much the more inexcusable among Christians, as there is not a single word respecting this same invention of original sin, either in the Pentateuch, or in the prophets, or the gospels, whether apocryphal or canonical, or in any of the writers who are called the “first fathers of the Church.”

  It is not even related in the Book of Genesis that God condemned Adam to death for eating an apple. God says to him, indeed, “in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.” But the very same Book of Genesis makes Adam live nine hundred and thirty years after indulging in this criminal repast. The animals, the plants, which had not partaken of this fruit, died at the respective periods prescribed for them by nature. Man is evidently born to die, like all the rest.

  Moreover, the punishment of Adam was never, in any way, introduced into the Jewish law. Adam was no more a Jew than he was a Persian or Chaldæan. The first chapters of Genesis—at whatever period they were composed—were regarded by all the learned Jews as an allegory, and even as a fable not a little dangerous, since that book was forbidden to be read by any before they had attained the age of twenty-one.

  In a word, the Jews knew no more about original sin than they did about the Chinese ceremonies; and, although divines generally discover in the Scripture everything they wish to find there, either “totidem verbis,” or “totidem literis,” we may safely assert that no reasonable divine will ever discover in it this surprising and overwhelming mystery.

  We admit that St. Augustine was the first who brought this strange notion into credit; a notion worthy of the warm and romantic brain of an African debauchee and penitent, Manichæan and Christian, tolerant and persecuting—who passed his life in perpetual self-contradiction.

  What an abomination, exclaim the strict Unitarians, so atrociously to calumniate the Author of Nature as even to impute to Him perpetual miracles, in order that He may damn to all eternity the unhappy race of mankind, whom he introduces into the present life only for so short a span! Either He created souls from all eternity, upon which system, as they must be infinitely more ancient than the sin of Adam, they can have no possible connection with it; or these souls are formed whenever man and woman sexually associate; in which case the Supreme Being must be supposed continually watching for all the various associations of this nature that take place, to create spirits that He will render eternally miserable; or, finally, God is Himself the soul of all mankind, and upon this system damns Himself. Which of these three suppositions is the most absurd and abominable? There is no fourth. For the opinion that God waits six weeks before He creates a damned soul in a fœtus is, in fact, no other than that which creates it at the moment of sexual connection: the difference of six weeks cannot be of the slightest consequence in the argument. I have merely related the opinion of the Unitarians; but men have now attained such a degree of superstition that I can scarcely relate it without trembling.

  SECTION II.

  It must be acknowledged that we are not acquainted with any father of the Church before St. Augustine and St. Jerome, who taught the doctrine of original sin. St. Clement of Alexandria, notwithstanding his profound knowledge of antiquity, far from speaking in any one passage of his works of that corruption which has infected the whole human race, and rendered it guilty from its birth, says in express words, “What evil can a new-born infant commit? How could it possibly prevaricate? How could such a being, which has, in fact, as yet done no one thing, fall under the curse of Adam?”

  And it is worth observing that he does not employ this language in order to combat the rigid opinion of original sin, which was not at that time developed, but merely to show that the passions, which are capable of corrupting all mankind, have, as yet, taken no hold of this innocent infant. He does not say: This creature of a day would not be damned if it should now die, for no one had yet conjectured that it would be damned. St. Clement could not combat a system absolutely unknown.

  The great Origen is still more decisive than St. Clement of Alexandria. He admits, indeed, in his exposition of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, that sin entered into the world by Adam, but he maintains that it is the inclination to sin that thus entered; that it is very easy to commit evil, but that it is not on that account said, man will always commit evil, and is guilty even as soon as he is born.

  In short, original sin, in the time of Origen, consisted only in the misfortune of resembling the first man by being liable to sin like him. Baptism was a necessary ordinance; it was the seal of Christianity; it washed away all sins; but no man had yet said, that it washed away those which the subject of it had not committed. No one yet asserted that an infant would be damned, and burned in everlasting flames, in consequence of its dying within two minutes of its birth. And an unanswerable proof on this point is, that a long period passed away before the practice of baptizing infants became prevalent. Tertullian was averse to their being baptized; but, on the persuasion that original sin—of which these poor innocents could not possibly be guilty—would affect their reprobation, and expose them to suffer boundless and endless torture, for a deed of which it was impossible for them to have the slightest knowledge: to refuse them the consecrated bath of baptism, would be wilfully consigning them to eternal damnation. The souls of all the executioners in the world, condensed into the very essence of ingenious cruelty, could not have suggested a more execrable abomination. In a word, it is an incontestable fact that Christians did not for a certain period baptize their infants, and it is therefore equally incontestable that they were very far from damning them.

  This, however, is not all; Jesus Christ never said: “The infant that is not baptized will be damned.” He came on the contrary to expiate all sins, to redeem mankind by His blood; therefore, infants could not be damned. Infants would, of course, “a fortiori,” and, preferably, enjoy this privilege. Our divine Saviour never baptized any person. Paul circumcised his disciple Timothy, but is nowhere said to have baptized him.

  In a word, during the two first centuries, the baptism of infants was not customary; it was not believed, therefore, that infants would become victims of the fault of Adam. At the end of four hundred years their salvation was considered in danger, and great uncertainty and apprehension existed on the subject.

  In the fifth century appears Pelagius. He treated the opinion of original sin as monstrous. According to him, this dogma, like all others, was founded upon a mere ambiguity. God had said to Adam in the garden: “In the day in which thou shalt eat of the tree of knowledge, thou shalt die.” But, he did not die; and God pardoned him. Why, then, should He not spare His race to the thousandth generation? Why should He consign to infinite and eternal torments the innocent infants whose father He received back into forgiveness and favor?

  Pelagius considered God, not merely as an absolute master, but as a parent, who left His children at perfect liberty, and rewarded them beyond their merits, and punished them less than their faults deserved. The language used by him and his disciples was: “If all men are born objects of the eternal wrath of that Being who confers on them life; if they can possibly be guilty before they can even think, it is then a fearful and execrable offence to give them being, and marriage is the most atrocious of crimes. Marriage, on this system, is nothing more or less than an emanation from the Manichæan principle of evil; and those who engage in it, instead of adoring God, adore the devil.”

  Pelagius and his partisans propagated this doctrine in Africa, where the reputation and influence of St. Augustine were unbounded. He had been a Manichæan, and seemed to think himself called upon to enter the lists against Pelagius. The latter was ill able to resist either Augustine or Jerome; various points, however, were contested, and the dispute proceeded so far that Augustine pronounced his sentence of damnation upon all children born, or to be born, throughout the world, in the following terms: “The Catholic faith teaches that all men are born so guilty that even infants are certainly damned when they die without having been regenerated in Jesus.”

  It would be but a wretched compliment of condolence to offer to a queen of China, or Japan, or India, Scythia, or Gothia, who had just lost her infant son to say: “Be comforted, madam; his highness the prince royal is now in the clutches of five hundred devils, who turn him round and round in a great furnace to all eternity, while his body rests embalmed and in peace within the precincts of your palace.”

  The astonished and terrified queen inquires why these devils should eternally roast her dear son, the prince royal. She is answered that the reason of it is that his great-grandfather formerly ate of the fruit of knowledge, in a garden. Form an idea, if possible, of the looks and thoughts of the king, the queen, the whole council, and all the beautiful ladies of the court!

  The sentence of the African bishop appeared to some divines—for there are some good souls to be found in every place and class—rather severe, and was therefore mitigated by one Peter Chrysologus, or Peter Golden-tongue, who invented a suburb to hell, called “limbo,” where all the little boys and girls that died before baptism might be disposed of. It is a place in which these innocents vegetate without sensation; the abode of apathy; the place that has been called “The paradise of fools.” We find this very expression in Milton. He places this paradise somewhere near the moon!

  Explication of Original Sin.

  The difficulty is the same with respect to this substituted limbo as with respect to hell. Why should these poor little wretches be placed in this limbo? what had they done? how could their souls, which they had not in their possession a single day, be guilty of a gormandizing that merited a punishment of six thousand years?

  St. Augustine, who damns them, assigns as a reason, that the souls of all men being comprised in that of Adam, it is probable that they were all accomplices. But, as the Church subsequently decided that souls are not made before the bodies which they are to inhabit are originated, that system falls to the ground, notwithstanding the celebrity of its author.

  Others said that original sin was transmitted from soul to soul, in the way of emanation, and that one soul, derived from another, came into the world with all the corruption of the mother-soul. This opinion was condemned.

  After the divines had done with the question, the philosophers tried at it. Leibnitz, while sporting with his monads, amused himself with collecting together in Adam all the human monads with their little bodies of monads. This was going further than St. Augustine. But this idea, which was worthy of Cyrano de Bergerac, met with very few to adopt and defend it. Malebranche explains the matter by the influence of the imagination on mothers. Eve’s brain was so strongly inflamed with the desire of eating the fruit that her children had the same desire; just like the irresistibly authenticated case of the woman who, after having seen a man racked, was brought to bed of a dislocated infant.

  Nicole reduced the affair to “a certain inclination, a certain tendency to concupiscence, which we have derived from our mothers. This inclination is not an act; but it will one day become such.” Well said, Nicole; bravo! But, in the meantime, why am I to be damned? Nicole does not even touch the difficulty, which consists in ascertaining how our own souls, which have but recently been formed, can be fairly made responsible for the fault of another soul that lived some thousands of years ago.

  What, my good friends, ought to be said upon the subject? Nothing. Accordingly, I do not give my explication of the difficulty: I say not a single word.

  OVID.

  Scholars have not failed to write volumes to inform us exactly to what corner of the earth Ovidius Naso was banished by Octavius Cepias, surnamed Augustus. All that we know of it is, that, born at Sulmo and brought up at Rome, he passed ten years on the right shore of the Danube, in the neighborhood of the Black Sea. Though he calls this land barbarous, we must not fancy that it was a land of savages. There were verses made there; Cotis, the petty king of a part of Thrace, made Getic verses for Ovid. The Latin poet learned Getic, and also composed lines in this language. It seems as if Greek poetry should have been understood in the ancient country of Orpheus, but this country was then peopled by nations from the North, who probably spoke a Tartar dialect, a language approaching to the ancient Slavonian. Ovid seemed not destined to make Tartar verses. The country of the Tomites, to which he was banished, was a part of Mysia, a Roman province, between Mount Hemus and the Danube. It is situated in forty-four and a half degrees north latitude, like one of the finest climates of France; but the mountains which are at the south, and the winds of the north and east, which blow from the Euxine, the cold and dampness of the forests, and of the Danube, rendered this country insupportable to a man born in Italy. Thus Ovid did not live long, but died there at the age of sixty. He complains in his “Elegies” of the climate, and not of the inhabitants. “Quos ego, cum loca sim vestra perosus, amo.”

  These people crowned him with laurel, and gave him privileges, which prevented him not from regretting Rome. It was a great instance of the slavery of the Romans and of the extinction of all laws, when a man born of an equestrian family, like Octavius, exiled a man of another equestrian family, and when one citizen of Rome with one word sent another among the Scythians. Before this time, it required a “plebiscitum,” a law of the nation, to deprive a Roman of his country. Cicero, although banished by a cabal, had at least been exiled with the forms of law.

  The crime of Ovid was incontestably that of having seen something shameful in the family of Octavius:

  • Cur aliquid vidi, cur noxia lumina feci?
  • Why saw I aught, or why discover crime?

  The learned have not decided whether he had seen Augustus with a prettier boy than Mannius, whom he said he would not have because he was too ugly; whether he saw some page in the arms of the empress Livia, whom this Augustus had espoused, while pregnant by another; whether he had seen the said Augustus occupied with his daughter or granddaughter; or, finally, whether he saw him doing something still worse, “torva tu entibus hircis?” It is most probable that Ovid detected an incestuous correspondence, as an author, almost contemporary, named Minutionus Apuleius, says: “Pulsum quoque in exilium quod Augusti incestum vidisset.”

  Octavius made a pretext of the innocent book of the “Art of Love,” a book very decently written, and in which there is not an obscene word, to send a Roman knight to the Black Sea. The pretence was ridiculous. How could Augustus, of whom we have still verses filled with obscenities, banish Ovid for having several years before given to his friends some copies of the “Art of Love”? How could he impudently reproach Ovid for a work written with decorum, while he approved of Horace, who lavishes allusions and phrases on the most infamous prostitution, and who proposed girls and boys, maid servants and valets indiscriminately? It is nothing less than impudence to blame Ovid and tolerate Horace. It is clear that Octavius alleged a very insufficient reason, because he dared not allude to the real one. One proof that it related to some secret adventure of the sacred imperial family is that the goat of Caprea—Tiberius, immortalized by medals for his debaucheries; Tiberius, that monster of lust and dissimulation—did not recall Ovid, who, rather than demand the favor from the author of the proscriptions and the poisoner of Germanicus, remained on the shores of the Danube.

  If a Dutch, Polish, Swedish, English, or Venetian gentleman had by chance seen a stadtholder, or a king of Great Britain, Sweden, or Poland, or a doge of Venice, commit some great sin, even if it was not by chance that he saw it; if he had even sought the occasion, and was so indiscreet as to speak of it, this stadtholder, king, or doge could not legally banish him.

  We can reproach Ovid almost as much as Augustus and Tiberius for having praised them. The eulogiums which he lavishes on them are so extravagant that at present they would excite indignation if he had even given them to legitimate princes, his benefactors, instead of to tyrants, and to his tyrants in particular. You may be pardoned for praising a little too much a prince who caresses you; but not for treating as a god one who persecutes you. It would have been a hundred times better for him to have embarked on the Black Sea and retired into Persia by the Palus Mæotis, than to have written his “Tristia.” He would have learned Persian as easily as Getic, and might have forgotten the master of Rome near the master of Ecbatana. Some strong minds will say that there was still another part to take, which was to go secretly to Rome, address himself to some relations of Brutus and Cassius, and get up a twelfth conspiracy against Octavius; but that was not in elegiac taste.

  Poetical panegyrics are strange things! It is very clear that Ovid wished with all his heart, that some Brutus would deliver Rome from that Augustus, to whom in his verses he wished immortality. I reproach Ovid with his “Tristia” alone. Bayle forms his system on the philosophy of chaos so ably exhibited in the commencement of the “Metamorphoses”:

  • Ante mare et terras, et quod tegit omnia cœlum,
  • Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe.

  Bayle thus translates these first lines: “Before there was a heaven, an earth, and a sea, nature was all homogeneous.” In Ovid it is, “The face of nature was the same throughout the universe,” which means not that all was homogeneous, but heterogeneous—this assemblage of different things appeared the same; “unus vultus.” Bayle criticises chaos throughout. Ovid, who in his verses is only the poet of the ancient philosophy, says that things hard and soft, light and heavy, were mixed together:

  • Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus.

  • —Ovid’s Met., b. i., l. 20.

  And this is the manner in which Bayle reasons against him: “There is nothing more absurd than to suppose a chaos which had been homogeneous from all eternity, though it had the elementary qualities, at least those which we call alteratives, which are heat, cold, humidity, and dryness, as those which we call matrices, which are lightness and weight, the former the cause of upper motion, the latter of lower. Matter of this nature cannot be homogeneous, and must necessarily contain all sorts of heterogeneousness. Heat and cold, humidity and dryness, cannot exist together, unless their action and reaction temper and convert them into other qualities which assume the form of mixed bodies; and as this temperament can be made according to innumerable diversities of combinations, chaos must contain an incredible number of compound species. The only manner of conceiving matter homogeneous is by saying that the alterative qualities of the elements modify all the molecules of matter in the same degree in such a way, that throughout there is the same warmth, the same softness, the same odor, etc. But this would be to destroy with one hand that which has been built up with the other; it would be by a contradiction in terms to call chaos the most regular, the most marvellous for its symmetry, and the most admirable in its proportions that it is possible to conceive. I allow that the taste of man approves of a diversified rather than of a regular work; but our reason teaches us that the harmony of contrary qualities, uniformly preserved throughout the universe, would be as admirable a perfection as the unequal division of them which has succeeded chaos. What knowledge and power would not the diffusion of this uniform harmony throughout nature demand! It would not be sufficient to place in any compound an equal quantity of all the four ingredients; of one there must be more and of another less, according as their force is greater or less for action or resistance; for we know that philosophers bestow action and reaction in a different degree on the elementary qualities. All would amount to an opinion that the power which metamorphosed chaos has withdrawn it, not from a state of strife and confusion as is pretended, but from a state of the most admirable harmony, which by the adjustment of the equilibrium of contrary forces, retained it in a repose equivalent to peace. It is certain, therefore, that if the poets will insist on the homogeneity of chaos, they must erase all which they have added concerning the wild confusion of contrary seeds, of the undigested mass, and of the perpetual combat of conflicting principles.

  “Passing over this contradiction we shall find sufficient subject for opposing them in other particulars. Let us recommence the attack on eternity. There is nothing more absurd than to admit, for an infinite time, the mixture of the insensible particles of four elements; for as soon as you suppose in them the activity of heat, the action and reaction of the four primary qualities, and besides these, motion towards the centre in the elements of earth and water, and towards the circumference in those of fire and air, you establish a principle which necessarily separates these four kinds of bodies, the one from the other, and for which a definite period alone is necessary. Consider a little, that which is denominated ‘the vial of the four elements.’ There are put into it some small metallic particles, and then three liquids, the one much lighter than the other. Shake these well together, and you no longer discern any of these component parts singly; each is confounded with the other. But leave your vial at rest for a short time, and you will find every one of them resume its pristine situation. The metallic particles will reassemble at the bottom of the vial, the lightest liquid will rise to the top, and the others take their stations according to their respective degrees of gravity. Thus a very short time will suffice to restore them to the same relative situation which they occupied before the vial was shaken. In this vial you behold the laws which nature has given in this world to the four elements, and, comparing the universe to this vial, we may conclude, that if the earth reduced to powder had been mingled with the matter of the stars, and with that of air and of water, in such a way as that the compound exhibited none of the elements by themselves, all would have immediately operated to disengage themselves, and at the end of a certain time, the particles of earth would form one mass, those of fire another; and thus of the others in proportion to the lightness or heaviness of each of them.”

  I deny to Bayle, that the experiment of the vial infers a definite period for the duration of chaos. I inform him, that by heavy and light things, Ovid and the philosophers intended those which became so after God had placed His hand on them. I say to him: “You take for granted that nature arranged all, and bestowed weight upon herself. You must begin by proving to me that gravity is an essential quality of matter, a position which has never been proved.” Descartes, in his romance has pretended that body never became heavy until his vortices of subtle matter began to push them from the centre. Newton, in his correct philosophy, never says that gravitation or attraction is a quality essential to matter. If Ovid had been able to divine the “Principia” of Newton, he would have said: “Matter was neither heavy nor in motion in my chaos; it was God who endowed it with these properties; my chaos includes not the forces you imagine—“nec quidquam nisi pondus iners”; it was a powerless mass; “pondus” here signifies not weight but mass.

  Nothing could possess weight, before God bestowed on matter the principle of gravitation. In whatever degree one body is impelled towards the centre of another, would it be drawn or impelled by another, if the Supreme Power had not bestowed upon it this inexplicable virtue? Therefore Ovid will not only turn out a good philosopher but a passable theologian.

  You say: “A scholastic theologian will admit without difficulty, that if the four elements had existed independently of God, with all the properties which they now possess, they would have formed of themselves the machine of the world, and have maintained it in the state which we now behold. There are therefore two great faults in the doctrine of chaos; the first of which is, that it takes away from God the creation of matter, and the production of the qualities proper to air, fire, earth, and water; the other, that after taking God away, He is made to appear unnecessarily on the theatre of the world, in order to assign their places to the four elements. Our modern philosophers, who have rejected the faculties and the qualities of the peripatetician physics, will find the same defects in the description of the chaos of Ovid; for that which they call general laws of motion, mechanical principles, modifications of matter, the form, situation, and arrangement of atoms, comprehends nothing beyond the active and passive virtue of nature, which the peripatetics understand by the alterative and formative qualities of the four elements. Seeing, therefore, that, according to the doctrine of this school, these four bodies, separated according to their natural heaviness and lightness, form a principle which suffices for all generation, the Cartesians, Gassendists, and other modern philosophers, ought to maintain that the motion, situation, and form of the particles of matter, are sufficient for the production of all natural effects, without excepting even the general arrangement which has placed the earth, the air, the water, and the stars where we see them. Thus, the true cause of the world, and of the effect which it produces, is not different from the cause which has bestowed motion on particles of matter—whether at the same time that it assigned to each atom a determinate figure, as the Gassendists assert, or that it has only given to particles entirely cubic, an impulsion which, by the duration of the motion according to certain laws, makes it ultimately take all sorts of forms—which is the hypothesis of the Cartesians. Both the one and the other consequently agree, that if matter had been, before the generation of the present world, as Ovid describes, it would have been capable of withdrawing itself from chaos by its own necessary operation, without the assistance of God. Ovid may therefore be accused of two oversights—having supposed, in the first place, that without the assistance of the Divinity, matter possessed the seeds of every compound, heat, motion, etc.; and in the second, that without the same assistance it could extricate itself from confusion. This is to give at once too much and too little to both God and matter; it is to pass over assistance when most needed, and to demand it when no longer necessary.”

  Ovid may still reply: “You are wrong in supposing that my elements originally possessed all the qualities which they possess at present. They had no qualities; matter existed naked, unformed, and powerless; and when I say, that in my chaos, heat was mingled with cold, and dryness with humidity, I only employ these expressions to signify that there was neither cold, nor heat, nor wet, nor dry, which are qualities that God has placed in our sensations, and not in matter. I have not made the mistakes of which you accuse me. Your Cartesians and your Gassendists commit oversights with their atoms and their cubic particles; and their imaginations deal as little in truth as my “Metamorphoses.” I prefer Daphne changed into a laurel, and Narcissus into a flower, to subtile matter changed into suns, and denser matter transformed into earth and water. I have given you fables for fables, and your philosophers have given you fables for truth.”

  PARADISE.

  There is no word whose meaning is more remote from its etymology. It is well known that it originally meant a place planted with fruit trees; and afterwards, the name was given to gardens planted with trees for shade. Such, in distant antiquity, were those of Saana, near Eden, in Arabia Felix, known long before the hordes of the Hebrews had invaded a part of the territory of Palestine.

  This word “paradise” is not celebrated among the Jews, except in the Book of Genesis. Some Jewish canonical writers speak of gardens; but not one of them has mentioned a word about the garden denominated the “earthly paradise.” How could it happen that no Jewish writer, no Jewish prophet, or Jewish psalmodist, should have once cited that terrestrial paradise which we are talking of every day of our lives? This is almost incomprehensible. It has induced many daring critics to believe that Genesis was not written till a very late period.

  The Jews never took this orchard or plantation of trees—this garden, whether of plants or flowers—for heaven. St. Luke is the first who uses the word “paradise,” as signifying heaven, when Jesus Christ says to the good thief: “This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise.”

  The ancients gave the name of “heaven” to the clouds. That name would not have been exactly appropriate, as the clouds actually touch the earth by the vapors of which they are formed, and as heaven is a vague word signifying an immense space in which exist innumerable suns, planets, and comets, which has certainly but little resemblance to an orchard.

  St. Thomas says that there are three paradises—the terrestrial, the celestial, and the spiritual. I do not, I acknowledge, perfectly understand the difference between the spiritual and celestial. The spiritual orchard is according to him, the beatific vision. But it is precisely that which constitutes the celestial paradise, it is the enjoyment of God Himself. I do not presume to dispute against the “angel of the schools.” I merely say—Happy must he be who always resides in one of these three paradises!

  Some curious critics have thought the paradise of the Hesperides, guarded by a dragon, was an imitation of the garden of Eden, kept by a winged ox or a cherub. Others, more rash, have ventured to assert that the ox was a bad copy of the dragon, and that the Jews were always gross plagiarists; but this will be admitted to be blasphemy, and that idea is insupportable.

  Why has the name of paradise been applied to the square courts in the front of a church? Why has the third row of boxes at the theatre or opera house been called paradise? Is it because, as these places are less dear than others, it was thought they were intended for the poor, and because it is pretended that in the other paradise there are far more poor persons than rich? Is it because these boxes are so high that they have obtained a name which also signifies heaven? There is, however, some difference between ascending to heaven, and ascending to the third row of boxes. What would a stranger think on his arrival at Paris, when asked: “Are you inclined to go to paradise to see Pourceaugnac?”

  What incongruities and equivoques are to be found in all languages! How strongly is human weakness manifested in every object that is presented around us! See the article “Paradise” in the great “Encyclopædia.” It is certainly better than this. We conclude with the Abbé de St. Pierre’s favorite sentiment—“Paradise to the beneficent.”

  PASSIONS.
  
  Their Influence upon the Body, and that of the Body upon Them.

  Pray inform me, doctor—I do not mean a doctor of medicine, who really possesses some degree of knowledge, who has long examined the sinuosities of the brain, who has investigated whether there is a circulating fluid in the nerves, who has repeatedly and assiduously dissected the human matrix in vain, to discover something of the formation of thinking beings, and who, in short, knows all of our machine that can be known; alas! I mean a very different person, a doctor of theology—I adjure you, by that reason at the very name of which you shudder, tell me why it is, that in consequence of your young and handsome housekeeper saying a few loving words, and giving herself a few coquettish airs, your blood becomes instantly agitated, and your whole frame thrown into a tumult of desire, which speedily leads to pleasures, of which neither herself nor you can explain the cause, but which terminate with the introduction into the world of a thinking being encrusted all over with original sin. Inform me, I entreat you, how the action tends to or is connected with the result? You may read and re-read Sanchez and Thomas Aquinas, and Scot and Bonaventure, but you will never in consequence know an iota the more of that incomprehensible mechanism by which the eternal architect directs your ideas and your actions, and originates the little bastard of a priest predestined to damnation from all eternity.

  On the following morning, when taking your chocolate, your memory retraces the image of pleasure which you experienced the evening before, and the scene and rapture are repeated. Have you any idea, my great automaton friend, what this same memory, which you possess in common with every species of animals, really is? Do you know what fibres recall your ideas, and paint in your brain the joys of the evening by a continuous sentiment, a consciousness, a personal identity which slept with you, and awoke with you? The doctor replies, in the language of Thomas Aquinas, that all this is the work of his vegetative soul, his sensitive soul, and his intellectual soul, all three of which compose a soul which, although without extension itself, evidently acts on a body possessed of extension in course.

  I perceived by his embarrassed manner, that he has been stammering out words without a single idea; and I at length say to him: If you feel, doctor, that, however reluctantly, you must in your own mind admit that you do not know what a soul is, and that you have been talking all your life without any distinct meaning, why not acknowledge it like an honest man? Why do you not conclude the same as must be concluded from the physical promotion of Doctor Bourssier, and from certain passages of Malebranche, and, above all, from the acute and judicious Locke, so far superior to Malebranche—why do you not, I say, conclude that your soul is a faculty which God has bestowed on you without disclosing to you the secret of His process, as He has bestowed on you various others? Be assured, that many men of deep reflection maintain that, properly speaking, the unknown power of the Divine Artificer, and His unknown laws, alone perform everything in us: and that, to speak more correctly still, we shall never know in fact anything at all about the matter.

  The doctor at this becomes agitated and irritated; the blood rushes into his face; if he had been stronger than myself, and had not been restrained by a sense of decency, he would certainly have struck me. His heart swells; the systole and diastole are interrupted in their regular operation; his brain is compressed; and he falls down in a fit of apoplexy. What connection could there be between this blood, and heart, and brain, and an old opinion of the doctor contrary to my own? Does a pure intellectual spirit fall into syncope when another is of a different opinion? I have uttered certain sounds; he has uttered certain sounds; and behold! he falls down in apoplexy—he drops dead!

  I am sitting at table, “prima mensis,” in the first of the month, myself and my soul, at the Sorbonne, with five or six doctors, “socii Sorbonnici,” fellows of the institution. We are served with bad and adulterated wine; at first our souls are elevated and maddened; half an hour afterwards our souls are stupefied, and as it were annihilated; and on the ensuing morning these same worthy doctors issue a grand decree, deciding that the soul, although occupying no place, let it be remembered, and absolutely immaterial—is lodged in the “corpus callosum” of the brain, in order to pay their court to surgeon La Peyronie.

  A guest is sitting at table full of conversation and gayety. A letter is brought him that overwhelms him with astonishment, grief, and apprehension. Instantly the muscles of his abdomen contract and relax with extraordinary violence, the peristaltic motion of the intestines is augmented, the sphincter of the rectum is opened by the convulsions which agitate his frame, and the unfortunate gentleman, instead of finishing his dinner in comfort, produces a copious evacuation. Tell me, then, what secret connection nature has established between an idea and a water-closet.

  Of all those persons who have undergone the operation of trepanning, a great proportion always remain imbecile. Of course, therefore, the thinking fibres of their brain have been injured; but where are these thinking fibres? Oh, Sanchez! Oh, Masters de Grillandis, Tamponet, Riballier! Oh, Cogé-Pecus, second regent and rector of the university, do give me a clear, decisive, and satisfactory explanation of all this, if you possibly can!

  While I was writing this article at Mount Krapak for my own private improvement, a book was brought to me called “The Medicine of the Mind,” by Doctor Camus, professor of medicine in the University of Paris. I was in hopes of finding in this book a solution of all my difficulties. But what was it that I found in fact? Just nothing at all. Ah, Master Camus! you have not displayed much mind in preparing your “Medicine of the Mind.” This person strongly recommends the blood of an ass, drawn from behind the ear, as a specific against madness. “The virtue of the blood of an ass,” he says, “re-establishes the soul in its functions.” He maintains, also, that madmen are cured by giving them the itch. He asserts, likewise, that in order to gain or strengthen a memory, the meat of capons, leverets, and larks, is of eminent service, and that onions and butter ought to be avoided above all things. This was printed in 1769 with the king’s approbation and privilege; and there really were people who consigned their health to the keeping of Master Camus, professor of medicine! Why was he not made first physician to the king?

  Poor puppets of the Eternal Artificer, who know neither why nor how an invisible hand moves all the springs of our machine, and at length packs us away in our wooden box! We constantly see more and more reason for repeating, with Aristotle, “All is occult, all is secret.”

  PAUL.

  SECTION I.
  
  Questions Concerning Paul.

  Was Paul a Roman citizen, as he boasted? If he was a native of Tarsus in Cilicia, Tarsus was not a Roman colony until a hundred years after his death; upon this point all antiquaries are agreed. If he belonged to the little town or village of Gescala, as St. Jerome believed, this town was in Galilee, and certainly the Galileans were not Roman citizens.

  Is it true, that St. Paul entered into the rising society of Christians, who at that time were demi-Jews, only because Gamaliel, whose disciple he was, refused him his daughter in marriage? It appears that this accusation is to be found exclusively in the Acts of the Apostles, which are received by the Ebionites, and refuted by the Bishop Epiphanius in his thirtieth chapter.

  Is it true, that St. Thecla sought St. Paul in the disguise of a man, and are the acts of St. Thecla admissible? Tertullian, in the thirteenth chapter of his book on “Baptism,” maintains that this history was composed by a priest attached to Paul. Jerome and Cyprian, in refuting the story of the lion baptized by St. Thecla, affirm the genuineness of these acts, in which we find that singular portrait of St. Paul, which we have already recorded. “He was fat, short, and broad shouldered; his dark eyebrows united across his aquiline nose; his legs were crooked, his head bald, and he was full of the grace of the Lord.” This is pretty nearly his portrait in the “Philopatris” of Lucian, with the exception of “the grace of God,” with which Lucian unfortunately had no acquaintance.

  Is Paul to be reprehended for his reproof of the Judaizing of St. Peter, who himself Judaized for eight days together in the temple of Jerusalem? When Paul was traduced before the governor of Judæa for having introduced strangers into the temple, was it proper for him to say to the governor, that he was prosecuted on account of his teaching the resurrection of the dead, whilst of the resurrection of the dead nothing was said at all.

  Did Paul do right in circumcising his disciple Timothy, after having written to the Galatians, that if they were circumcised Jesus would not profit them? Was it well to write to the Corinthians, chap. ix.: “Have we not power to eat and drink at your expense? Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife?” etc. Was it proper to write in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, that he will pardon none of them, neither those who have sinned nor others? What should we think at present of a man who pretended to live at our expense, himself, and his wife; and to judge and to punish us, confounding the innocent with the guilty? What are we to understand by the ascension of Paul into the third heaven?—what is the third heaven? Which is the most probable—humanly speaking? Did St. Paul become a Christian in consequence of being thrown from a horse by the appearance of a great light at noon day, from which a celestial voice exclaimed: “Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me?” or was it in consequence of being irritated against the Pharisees, either by the refusal of Gamaliel to give him his daughter, or by some other cause?

  In all other history, the refusal of Gamaliel would appear more probable than the celestial voice; especially if, moreover, we were not obliged to believe in this miracle. I only ask these questions in order to be instructed; and I request all those who are willing to instruct me to speak reasonably.

  SECTION II.

  The Epistles of St. Paul are so sublime, it is often difficult to understand them. Many young bachelors demand the precise signification of the following words: “Every man praying or prophesying, having his head covered, dishonoreth his head.” What does he mean by the words: “I have learned from the Lord, that the Lord Jesus, the same night in which He was betrayed, took bread?”

  How could he learn anything from that Jesus Christ to Whom he had never spoken, and to Whom he had been a most cruel enemy, without ever having seen Him? Was it by inspiration, or by the recital of the apostles? or did he learn it when the celestial light caused him to fall from his horse? He does not inform us on this point.

  The following again: “The woman shall be saved in child-bearing.” This is certainly to encourage population: it appears not that St. Paul founded convents. He speaks of seducing spirits and doctrines of devils; of those whose consciences are seared up with a red-hot iron, who forbid to marry, and command to abstain from meats. This is very strong. It appears that he abjured monks, nuns, and fast-days. Explain this contradiction; deliver me from this cruel embarrassment.

  What is to be said of the passage in which he recommends the bishops to have one wife?—“Unius uxoris virum.” This is positive. He permits the bishops to have but one wife, whilst the Jewish pontiffs might have several. He says unequivocally, that the last judgment will happen during his own time, that Jesus will descend from on high, as described by St. Luke, and that St. Paul and the righteous inhabitants of Thessalonica will be caught up to Him in the air, etc.

  Has this occurred? or is it an allegory, a figure? Did he actually believe that he should make this journey, or that he had been caught up into the third heaven? Which is the third heaven? How will he ascend into the air? Has he been there? “That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of Glory, may give you the spirit of wisdom.” Is this acknowledging Jesus to be the same God as the Father? He has manifested His power over Jesus “when He raised Him from the dead, and set Him at His own right hand.” Does this constitute the divinity of Jesus?

  “Thou madest him (Jesus) a little lower than angels; thou crownedst him with glory.” If He is inferior to angels—is He God?

  “For if by one man’s offence death reigneth, much more they who receive of the abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one Jesus Christ.” Almost man and never God, except in a single passage contested by Erasmus, Grotius, Le Clerc, etc.

  “Children of God, and joint heirs with Jesus Christ.” Is not this constantly regarding Jesus as one of us, although superior by the grace of God? “To God, alone wise, honor and glory, through Jesus Christ.” How are we to understand these passages literally, without fearing to offend Jesus Christ; or, in a more extended sense, without the risk of offending God the Father?

  There are many more passages of this kind, which exercise the sagacity of the learned. The commentators differ, and we pretend not to possess any light which can remove the obscurity. We submit with heart and mouth to the decision of the Church. We have also taken some trouble to penetrate into the meaning of the following passages:

  “For circumcision verily profiteth, if thou keepest the law; but if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision.” “Now we know, that whatever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law; that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. Therefore, by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified; for by the law is the knowledge of sin. . . . . Seeing that it is one God which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith. Do we then make void the law, through faith? God forbid; yea, we establish the law.” “For if Abraham was justified by his works, he hath whereof to glory; but not before God.”

  We fear that even the ingenuous and profound Dom Calmet himself gives us not, upon these somewhat obscure passages, a light which dissipates all our darkness. It is without doubt our own fault that we do not understand the commentators, and are deprived of that complete conception of the text, which is given only to privileged souls. As soon, however, as an explanation shall come from the chair of truth, we shall comprehend the whole perfectly.

  SECTION III.

  Let us add this little supplement to the article “Paul.” It is better to edify ourselves with the Epistles of this apostle, than to weaken our piety by calumniating the times and persons for which they were written. The learned search in vain for the year and the day in which St. Paul assisted to stone St. Stephen, and to guard the mantles of his executioners.

  They dispute on the year in which he was thrown from his horse by a miraculous light at noonday, and on the epoch of his being borne away into the third heaven. They can agree neither upon the year in which he was conducted to Rome, nor that in which he died. They are unacquainted with the date of any of his letters. St. Jerome, in his commentary on the “Epistle to Philemon” says that Paul might signify the embouchure of a flute.

  The letters of St. Paul to Seneca, and from Seneca to St. Paul, were accounted as authentic in the primitive ages of the Church, as all the rest of the Christian writings. St. Jerome asserts their authenticity, and quotes passages from these letters in his catalogue. St. Augustine doubts them not in his 153d letter to Macedonius. We have thirty letters of these two great men, Paul and Seneca, who, it is pretended, were linked together by a strict friendship in the court of Nero. The seventh letter from Paul to Seneca is very curious. He tells him that the Jews and the Christians were often burned as incendiaries at Rome:

  “Christiani et Judæi tanquam machinatores incendii supplicio affici solent.” It is in fact probable, that the Jews and the Christians, whose mutual enmity was extremely violent, reciprocally accused each other of setting the city on fire; and that the scorn and horror felt towards the Jews, with whom the Christians were usually confounded, rendered them equally the objects of public suspicion and vengeance.

  We are obliged to acknowledge, that the epistolary correspondence of Seneca and Paul is in a ridiculous and barbarous Latin; that the subjects of these letters are as inconsistent as the style; and that at present they are regarded as forgeries. But, then, may we venture to contradict the testimony of St. Jerome and St. Augustine? If writings, attested by them, are nothing but vile impostures, how shall we be certain of the authenticity of others more respectable? Such is the important objection of many learned persons. If we are unworthily deceived, say they, in relation to the letters of Paul and Seneca on the Apostolical Institutes, and the Acts of St. Peter, why may we not be equally imposed upon by the Acts of the Apostles? The decision of the Church and faith are unequivocal answers to all these researches of science and suggestions of the understanding.

  It is not known upon what foundation Abdias, first bishop of Babylon, says, in his “History of the Apostles,” that St. Paul caused St. James the Less to be stoned by the people. Before he was converted, however, he might as readily persecute St. James as St. Stephen. He was certainly very violent, because it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, that he “breathed threatenings and slaughter.” Abdias has also taken care to observe, that the mover of the sedition in which St. James was so cruelly treated, was the same Paul whom God had since called to the apostleship.

  This book, attributed to Abdias, is not admitted into the canon; but Julius Africanus, who has translated it into Latin, believes it to be authentic. Since, however, the church has not admitted it, we must not admit it. Let us content ourselves with adoring Providence, and wishing that all persecutors were transformed into charitable and compassionate apostles.

  PERSECUTION.

  I will not call Diocletian a persecutor, for he protected the Christians for eighteen years; and if, during his latter days, he did not save them from the resentment of Galerius, he only furnished the example of a prince seduced, like many others, by intrigue and cabal, into a conduct unworthy of his character. I will still less give the name of persecutor to Trajan or Antonius. I should regard myself as uttering blasphemy.

  What is a persecutor? He whose wounded pride and fanaticism irritate princes and magistrates into fury against innocent men, whose only crime is that of being of a different opinion. Impudent man! you have worshipped God; you have preached and practised virtue; you have served and assisted man; you have protected the orphan, have succored the poor; you have changed deserts, in which slaves dragged on a miserable existence, into fertile districts peopled with happy families; but I have discovered that you despise me, and have never read my controversial work. I will, therefore, seek the confessor of the prime minister, or the magistrate; I will show them, with outstretched neck and twisted mouth, that you hold an erroneous opinion in relation to the cells in which the Septuagint was studied; that you have even spoken disrespectfully for these ten years past of Tobit’s dog, which you assert to have been a spaniel, whilst I maintain that it was a greyhound. I will denounce you as the enemy of God and man! Such is the language of the persecutor; and if these words do not precisely issue from his lips, they are engraven on his heart with the graver of fanaticism steeped in the gall of envy.

  It was thus that the Jesuit Letellier dared to persecute Cardinal de Noailles, and that Jurieu persecuted Bayle. When the persecution of the Protestants commenced in France, it was not Francis I., nor Henry II., nor Francis II., who sought out these unfortunate people, who hardened themselves against them with reflective bitterness, and who delivered them to the flames in the spirit of vengeance. Francis I. was too much engaged with the Duchess d’Étampes; Henry II., with his ancient Diana, and Francis II. was too much a child. Who, then, commenced these persecutions? Jealous priests, who enlisted in their service the prejudices of magistrates and the policy of ministers.

  If these monarchs had not been deceived, if they had foreseen that these persecutions would produce half a century of civil war, and that the two parts of the nation would mutually exterminate each other, they would have extinguished with their tears the first piles which they allowed to be lighted. Oh, God of mercy! if any man can resemble that malignant being who is described as actually employed in the destruction of Your works, is it not the persecutor?

  PETER (SAINT).

  Why have the successors of St. Peter possessed so much power in the West and none in the East? This is just the same as to ask why the bishops of Würzburg and Salzburg obtained for themselves regal prerogatives in a period of anarchy, while the Greek bishops always remained subjects. Time, opportunity, the ambition of some, and the weakness of others, have done and will do everything in the world. We always except what relates to religion. To this anarchy, must be added opinion; and opinion is the queen of mankind. Not that, in fact, they have any very clear and definite opinion of their own, but words answer the same end with them.

  “I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” The zealous partisans of the bishop of Rome contended, about the eleventh century, that whoever gives the greater gives the less; that heaven surrounded the earth; and that, as Peter had the keys of the container, he had also the keys of what was contained. If by heaven we understand all the stars and planets, it is evident, according to Tomasius, that the keys given to Simon Barjonas, surnamed Peter, were a universal passport. If we understand by heaven the clouds, the atmosphere, the ether, and the space in which the planets revolve, no smith in the world, as Meursius observes, could ever make a key for such gates as these. Railleries, however, are not reasons.

  Keys in Palestine were wooden latches with strings to them. Jesus says to Barjonas, “Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven.” The pope’s clergy concluded from these words, that the popes had received authority to bind and unbind the people’s oath of fidelity to their kings, and to dispose of kingdoms at their pleasure. This certainly was concluding magnificently. The Commons in the states-general of France, in 1302, say, in their memorial to the king, that “Boniface VIII. was a b— for believing that God bound and imprisoned in heaven what Boniface bound on earth.” A famous German Lutheran—the great Melancthon—could not endure the idea of Jesus having said to Simon Barjonas, Cepha or Cephas, “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my assembly, my church.” He could not conceive that God would use such a play of words, and that the power of the pope could have been established on a pun. Such a doubt, however, can be indulged only by a Protestant.

  Peter has been considered as having been bishop of Rome; but it is well known that, in the apostolic age, and long after, there was no particular and appropriate bishopric. The society of Christians did not assume a regular form until about the middle of the second century. It may be true that Peter went to Rome, and even that he was crucified with his head downwards, although that was not the usual mode of crucifixion; but we have no proof whatever of all this. We have a letter under his name, in which he says that he is at Babylon: acute and shrewd canonists have contended that, by Babylon, we ought to understand Rome; and on the same principle, if he had dated at Rome, we might have concluded that the letter had been written at Babylon. Men have long been in the habit of drawing such reasonable and judicious inferences as these; and it is in this manner that the world has been governed.

  There was once a clergyman who, after having been made to pay extortionately for a benefice at Rome—an offence known by the name of simony—happened to be asked, some time afterwards, whether he thought Simon Peter had ever been in that city? He replied, “I do not think that Peter was ever there, but I am sure Simon was.”

  With respect to the personal character and behavior of St. Peter, it must be acknowledged that Paul is not the only one who was scandalized at his conduct. He was often “withstood to the face,” as well as his successors. St. Paul vehemently reproached him with eating forbidden meats: that is, pork, blood-pudding, hare, eels, the ixion, and the griffin; Peter vindicated himself by saying that he had seen heaven opened about the sixth hour, and as it were a great sheet descending from the four corners of it, which was filled with creeping things, quadrupeds, and birds, while the voice of an angel called out to him, saying, “Kill and eat.” This, says Woolston, seems to have been the same voice which has called out to so many pontiffs since, “Kill everything; eat up the substance of the people.” But this reproach is much too strong.

  Casaubon cannot by any means bring himself to approve the manner in which St. Peter treated Ananias and Sapphira, his wife. “By what right,” says Casaubon, “did a Jew slave of the Romans order or permit that all those who believed in Jesus should sell their inheritance, and lay down the price paid for it at his feet?” If an Anabaptist at London was to order all the money belonging to his brethren to be brought and laid at his feet, would he not be apprehended as a seditious seducer, as a thief who would certainly be hanged at Tyburn? Was it not abominable to kill Ananias, because, after having sold his property and delivered over the bulk of the produce to Peter, he had retained for himself and his wife a few crowns for any case of necessity, without mentioning it? Scarcely, moreover, has Ananias expired, before his wife arrives. Peter, instead of warning her charitably that he had just destroyed her husband by apoplexy for having kept back a few oboli, and cautioning her therefore to look well to herself, leads her as it were intentionally into the snare. He asks her if her husband has given all his money to the saints; the poor woman replies in the affirmative, and dies instantly. This is certainly rather severe.

  Corringius asks, why Peter, who thus killed the persons that had given him alms and showed him kindness, did not rather go and destroy all the learned doctors who had brought Jesus Christ to the cross, and who more than once brought a scourging on himself. “Oh, Peter!” says Corringius, “you put to death two Christians who bestowed alms on you, and at the same time suffer those to live who crucified your God!”

  In the reigns of Henry IV., and Louis XIII., we had an advocate-general of the parliament of Provence, a man of quality, called d’Oraison de Torame, who, in a book respecting the church militant, dedicated to Henry IV., has appropriated a whole chapter to the sentences pronounced by St. Peter in criminal causes. He says, that the sentence pronounced by Peter on Ananias and Sapphira was executed by God Himself, “in the very terms and forms of spiritual jurisdiction.” His whole book is in the same strain; but Corringius, as we perceive, is of a different opinion from that of our sagacious and liberal provincial advocate. It is pretty evident that Corringius was not in the country of the Inquisition when he published his bold remarks.

  Erasmus, in relation to St. Peter, remarked a somewhat curious circumstance, which is, that the chief of the Christian religion began his apostleship with denying Jesus Christ, and that the first pontiff of the Jews commenced his ministry by making a golden calf and worshipping it.

  However that may be, Peter is described as a poor man instructing the poor. He resembles those founders of orders who lived in indigence, and whose successors have become great lords and even princes.

  The pope, the successor of Peter, has sometimes gained and sometimes lost; but there are still about fifty millions of persons in the world submitting in many points to his laws, besides his own immediate subjects.

  To obtain a master three or four hundred leagues from home; to suspend your own opinion and wait for what he puts forth as his; not to dare to give a final decision on a cause relating to certain of our fellow-citizens, but through commissioners appointed by this stranger; not to dare to take possession of certain fields and vineyards granted by our own sovereign, without paying a considerable sum to this foreign master; to violate the laws of our country, which prohibit a man’s marriage with his niece, and marry her legitimately by giving this foreign master a sum still more considerable than the former one; not to dare to cultivate one’s field on the day this stranger is inclined to celebrate the memory of some unknown person whom he has chosen to introduce into heaven by his own sole authority; such are a part only of the conveniences and comforts of admitting the jurisdiction of a pope; such, if we may believe Marsais, are the liberties of the Gallican Church.

  There are some other nations that carry their submission further. We have, in our own time, actually known a sovereign request permission of the pope to try in his own courts certain monks accused of parricide, and able neither to obtain this permission nor to venture on such trial without it!

  It is well known that, formerly, the power of the popes extended further. They were far above the gods of antiquity; for the latter were merely supposed to dispose of empires, but the popes disposed of them in fact. Sturbinus says, that we may pardon those who entertain doubts of the divinity and infallibility of the pope, when we reflect: that forty schisms have profaned the chair of St. Peter, twenty-seven of which have been marked by blood; that Stephen VII., the son of a priest, disinterred the corpse of Formosus, his predecessor, and had the head of it cut off; that Sergius III., convicted of assassinations, had a son by Marozia, who inherited the popedom; that John X., the paramour of Theodora, was strangled in her bed; that John XI., son of Sergius III., was known only by his gross intemperance; that John XII. was assassinated in the apartments of his mistress; that Benedict IX. both bought and sold the pontificate; that Gregory VII. was the author of five hundred years of civil war, carried on by his successors; that, finally, among so many ambitious, sanguinary, and debauched popes, there was an Alexander VI., whose name is pronounced with the same horror as those of Nero and Caligula.

  It is, we are told, a proof of the divinity of their character, that it has subsisted in connection with so many crimes; but according to this, if the caliphs had displayed still more atrocious and abominable conduct, they would have been still more divine. This argument, inferring their divinity from their wickedness, is urged by Dermius. He has been properly answered; but the best reply is to be found in the mitigated authority which the bishops of Rome at present exercise with discretion; in the long possession which the emperors permit them to enjoy, because in fact they are unable to deprive them of it; and in the system of the balance of power, which is watched with jealousy by every court in Europe.

  It has been contended, and very lately, that there are only two nations which could invade Italy and crush Rome. These are the Turks and Russians; but they are necessarily enemies; and, besides, I cannot distinctly anticipate misfortunes so distant.

  • Je ne sais point prévoir les malheurs de si loin.

  • —Racine,Andromache, act. i, scene 2.

  PETER THE GREAT AND J. J. ROUSSEAU.

  “The Czar Peter . . . . had not true genius—that which creates and makes all of nothing. Some things which he did were good; the greater part were misplaced. He saw that his people were barbarous; he has not seen that they were not prepared for polishing; he would civilize them when they only wanted training. He wished at once to make Germans and English when he should have commenced by making Russians. He prevented his subjects from becoming what they might be, by persuading them that they were what they are not. It is thus that a French preceptor forms his pupil to shine for a moment in his childhood, and never afterwards to be anything. The empire of Russia would subjugate Europe, and will be subjugated itself. The Tartars, its subjects or neighbors, will become its masters and ours. This revolution appears to me unavoidable: all the kings of Europe labor together to accelerate it.” (Contrat Social, livre ii. chap. viii.) These words are extracted from a pamphlet entitled the “Contrat Social,” or “unsocial,” of the very unsociable Jean Jacques Rousseau. It is not astonishing, that having performed miracles at Venice he should prophesy on Moscow; but as he well knows that the good time of miracles and prophecies has passed away, he ought to believe, that his prediction against Russia is not so infallible as it appeared to him in his first fit of divination. It is pleasant to announce the fall of great empires; it consoles us for our littleness. It will be a fine gain for philosophy, when we shall constantly behold the Nogais Tartars—who can, I believe, bring twelve thousand men into the field—coming to subjugate Russia, Germany, Italy, and France. But I flatter myself, that the Emperor of China will not suffer it; he has already acceded to perpetual peace, and as he has no more Jesuits about him, he will not trouble Europe. Jean Jacques, who possesses, as he himself believes, true genius, finds that Peter the Great had it not.

  A Russian lord, a man of much wit, who sometimes amuses himself with reading pamphlets, while reading this, remembered some lines of Molière, implying, that three miserable authors took it into their heads, that it was only necessary to be printed and bound in calf, to become important personages and dispose of empires:

  • Il semble à trois gredins, dans leur petit cerveau,
  • Que pour être imprimés et reliés en veau,
  • Les voilà dans l’état d’importantes personnes,
  • Qu’avec leur plume ils font le destin des couronnes.

  The Russians, says Jean Jacques, were never polished. I have seen some at least very polite, and who had just, delicate, agreeable, cultivated, and even logical minds, which Jean Jacques will find very extraordinary. As he is very gallant, he will not fail to say, that they are formed at the court of the empress of Russia, that her example has influenced them: but that prevents not the correctness of his prophecy—that this empire will soon be destroyed.

  This good little man assures us, in one of his modest works, that a statue should be erected to him. It will not probably be either at Moscow or St. Petersburg, that anyone will trouble himself to sculpture Jean Jacques.

  I wish, in general, that when people judge of nations from their garrets, they would be more honest and circumspect. Every poor devil can say what he pleases of the Romans, Athenians, and ancient Persians. He can deceive himself with impunity on the tribunes, comitia, and dictatorships. He can govern in idea two or three thousand leagues of country, whilst he is incapable of governing his servant girl. In a romance, he can receive “an acrid kiss” from his Julia, and advise a prince to espouse the daughter of a hangman. These are follies without consequence—there are others which may have disastrous effects.

  Court fools were very discreet; they insulted the weak alone by their buffooneries, and respected the powerful: country fools are at present more bold. It will be answered, that Diogenes and Aretin were tolerated. Granted; but a fly one day seeing a swallow wing away with a spider’s web, would do the same thing, and was taken.

  SECTION II.

  May we not say of these legislators who govern the universe at two sous the sheet, and who from their garrets give orders to all kings, what Homer said to Calchas?:

  • Os ede ta conta, taere essomena, pro theonta.
  • He knew the past, present, and future.

  It is a pity that the author of the little paragraph which we are going to quote, knew nothing of the three times of which Homer speaks. “Peter the Great,” says he, “had not the genius which makes all of nothing.” Truly, Jean Jacques, I can easily believe it; for it is said that God alone has this prerogative. “He has not seen that his people were not prepared for polishing.”

  In this case, it was admirable of the czar to prepare them. It appears to me, that it is Jean Jacques who had not seen that he must make use of the Germans and English to form Russians.

  “He has prevented his subjects from ever becoming what they might be,” etc. Yet these same Russians have become the conquerors of the Turks and Tartars, the conquerors and legislators of the Crimea, and twenty different nations. Their sovereign has given laws to nations of which even the names were unknown in Europe.

  As to the prophecy of Jean Jacques, he may have exalted his soul sufficiently to read the future. He has all the requisites of a prophet; but as to the past and the present, it must be confessed that he knows nothing about them. I doubt whether antiquity has anything comparable to the boldness of sending four squadrons from the extremity of the Baltic into the seas of Greece—of reigning at once over the Ægean and the Euxine Seas—of carrying terror into Colchis, and to the Dardanelles—of subjugating Taurida, and forcing the vizier Azem to fly from the shores of the Danube to the gates of Adrianople.

  If Jean Jacques considers so many great actions which astonished the attentive world as nothing, he must at least confess, that there was some generosity in one Count Orloff, who having taken a vessel which contained all the family and treasures of a pasha, sent him back both his family and treasures. If the Russians were not prepared for polishing in the time of Peter the Great, let us agree that they are now prepared for greatness of soul; and that Jean Jacques is not quite prepared for truth and reasoning. With regard to the future, we shall know it when we have Ezekiels, Isaiahs, Habakkuks, and Micahs; but their time has passed away; and if we dare say so much, it is to be feared that it will never return.

  I confess that these lies, printed in relation to present times, always astonish me. If these liberties are allowed in an age in which a thousand volumes, a thousand newspapers and journals, are constantly correcting each other, what faith can we have in those histories of ancient times, which collected all vague rumors without consulting any archives, which put into writing all that they had heard told by their grandmothers in their childhood, very sure that no critic would discover their errors?

  We had for a long time nine muses: wholesome criticism is the tenth, which has appeared very lately. She existed not in the time of Cecrops, of the first Bacchus, or of Sanchoniathon, Thaut, Bramah, etc. People then wrote all they liked with impunity. At present we must be a little more careful.

  PHILOSOPHER.

  SECTION I.

  Philosopher, “lover of wisdom,” that is, “of truth.” All philosophers have possessed this two-fold character; there is not one among those of antiquity who did not give examples of virtue to mankind, and lessons of moral truth. They might be mistaken, and undoubtedly were so, on subjects of natural philosophy; but that is of comparatively so little importance to the conduct of life, that philosophers had then no need of it. Ages were required to discover a part of the laws of nature. A single day is sufficient to enable a sage to become acquainted with the duties of man.

  The philosopher is no enthusiast; he does not set himself up for a prophet; he does not represent himself as inspired by the gods. I shall not therefore place in the rank of philosophers the ancient Zoroaster, or Hermes, or Orpheus, or any of those legislators in whom the countries of Chaldæa, Persia, Syria, Egypt, and Greece made their boast. Those who called themselves the sons of gods were the fathers of imposture; and if they employed falsehood to inculcate truths, they were unworthy of inculcating them; they were not philosophers; they were at best only prudent liars.

  By what fatality, disgraceful perhaps to the nations of the West, has it happened that we are obliged to travel to the extremity of the East, in order to find a sage of simple manners and character, without arrogance and without imposture, who taught men how to live happy six hundred years before our era, at a period when the whole of the North was ignorant of the use of letters, and when the Greeks had scarcely begun to distinguish themselves by wisdom? That sage is Confucius, who deemed too highly of his character as a legislator for mankind, to stoop to deceive them. What finer rule of conduct has ever been given since his time, throughout the earth?

  “Rule a state as you rule a family; a man cannot govern his family well without giving a good example; virtue should be common to the laborer and the monarch; be active in preventing crimes, that you may lessen the trouble of punishing them.

  “Under the good kings Yao and Xu, the Chinese were good; under the bad kings Kie and Chu, they were wicked.

  “Do to another as to thyself; love mankind in general, but cherish those who are good; forget injuries, but never benefits.”

  I have seen men incapable of the sciences, but never any incapable of virtue. Let us acknowledge that no legislator ever announced to the world more useful truths.

  A multitude of Greek philosophers taught afterwards a morality equally pure. Had they distinguished themselves only by their vain systems of natural philosophy, their names would be mentioned at the present day only in derision. If they are still respected, it is because they were just, and because they taught mankind to be so.

  It is impossible to read certain passages of Plato, and particularly the admirable exordium of the laws of Zaleucus, without experiencing an ardent love of honorable and generous actions. The Romans have their Cicero who alone is perhaps more valuable than all the philosophers of Greece. After him come men more respectable still, but whom we may almost despair of imitating; these are Epictetus in slavery, and the Antonines and Julian upon a throne.

  Where is the citizen to be found among us who would deprive himself, like Julian, Antoninus, and Marcus Aurelius, of all the refined accommodations of our delicate and luxurious modes of living? Who would, like them, sleep on the bare ground? Who would restrict himself to their frugal habits? Who would, like them, march bareheaded and barefooted at the head of the armies, exposed sometimes to the burning sun, and at other times to the freezing blast? Who would, like them, keep perfect mastery of all his passions? We have among us devotees, but where are the sages? where are the souls just and tolerant, serene and undaunted?

  There have been some philosophers of the closet in France; and all of them, with the exception of Montaigne, have been persecuted. It seems to me the last degree of malignity that our nature can exhibit, to attempt to oppress those who devote their best endeavors to correct and improve it.

  I can easily conceive of the fanatics of one sect slaughtering those of another sect; that the Franciscans should hate the Dominicans, and that a bad artist should cabal and intrigue for the destruction of an artist that surpasses him; but that the sage Charron should have been menaced with the loss of life; that the learned and noble-minded Ramus should have been actually assassinated; that Descartes should have been obliged to withdraw to Holland in order to escape the rage of ignorance; that Gassendi should have been often compelled to retire to Digne, far distant from the calumnies of Paris, are events that load a nation with eternal opprobrium.

  One of the philosophers who were most persecuted, was the immortal Bayle, the honor of human nature. I shall be told that the name of Jurieu, his slanderer and persecutor, is become execrable; I acknowledge that it is so; that of the Jesuit Letellier is become so likewise; but is it the less true that the great men whom he oppressed ended their days in exile and penury?

  One of the pretexts made use of for reducing Bayle to poverty, was his article on David, in his valuable dictionary. He was reproached with not praising actions which were in themselves unjust, sanguinary, atrocious, contrary to good faith, or grossly offensive to decency.

  Bayle certainly has not praised David for having, according to the Hebrew historian, collected six hundred vagabonds overwhelmed with debts and crimes; for having pillaged his countrymen at the head of these banditti; for having resolved to destroy Nabal and his whole family, because he refused paying contributions to him; for having hired out his services to King Achish, the enemy of his country; for having afterwards betrayed Achish, notwithstanding his kindness to him; for having sacked the villages in alliance with that king; for having massacred in these villages every human being, including even infants at the breast, that no one might be found on a future day to give testimony of his depredations, as if an infant could have possibly disclosed his villainy; for having destroyed all the inhabitants of some other villages under saws, and harrows, and axes, and in brick-kilns; for having wrested the throne from Ishbosheth, the son of Saul, by an act of perfidy; for having despoiled of his property and afterwards put to death Mephibosheth, the grandson of Saul, and son of his own peculiar friend and generous protector, Jonathan; or for having delivered up to the Gibeonites two other sons of Saul, and five of his grandsons who perished by the gallows.

  I do not notice the extreme incontinence of David, his numerous concubines, his adultery with Bathsheba, or his murder of Uriah.

  What then! is it possible that the enemies of Bayle should have expected or wished him to eulogize all these cruelties and crimes? Ought he to have said: Go, ye princes of the earth, and imitate the man after God’s own heart; massacre without pity the allies of your benefactor; destroy or deliver over to destruction the whole family of your king; appropriate to your own pleasures all the women, while you are pouring out the blood of the men; and you will thus exhibit models of human virtue, especially if, in addition to all the rest, you do but compose a book of psalms?

  Was not Bayle perfectly correct in his observation, that if David was the man after God’s own heart, it must have been by his penitence, and not by his crimes? Did not Bayle perform a service to the human race when he said, that God, who undoubtedly dictated the Jewish history, has not consecrated all the crimes recorded in that history?

  However, Bayle was in fact persecuted, and by whom? By the very men who had been elsewhere persecuted themselves; by refugees who in their own country would have been delivered over to the flames; and these refugees were opposed by other refugees called Jansenists, who had been driven from their own country by the Jesuits; who have at length been themselves driven from it in their turn.

  Thus all the persecutors declare against each other mortal war, while the philosopher, oppressed by them all, contents himself with pitying them.

  It is not generally known, that Fontenelle, in 1718, was on the point of losing his pensions, place, and liberty, for having published in France, twenty years before, what may be called an abridgement of the learned Van Dale’s “Treatise on Oracles,” in which he had taken particular care to retrench and modify the original work, so as to give no unnecessary offence to fanaticism. A Jesuit had written against Fontenelle, and he had not deigned to make him any reply; and that was enough to induce the Jesuit Letellier, confessor to Louis XIV., to accuse Fontenelle to the king of atheism.

  But for the fortunate mediation of M. d’Argenson, the son of a forging solicitor of Vire—a son worthy of such a father, as he was detected in forgery himself—would have proscribed, in his old age, the nephew of the great Corneille.

  It is so easy for a confessor to seduce his penitent, that we ought to bless God that Letellier did no more harm than is justly imputed to him. There are two situations in which seduction and calumny cannot easily be resisted—the bed and the confessional.

  We have always seen philosophers persecuted by fanatics. But can it be really possible, that men of letters should be seen mixed up in a business so odious; and that they should often be observed sharpening the weapons against their brethren, by which they are themselves almost universally destroyed or wounded in their turn. Unhappy men of letters, does it become you to turn informers? Did the Romans ever find a Garasse, a Chaumieux, or a Hayet, to accuse a Lucretius, a Posidonius, a Varro, or a Pliny?

  How inexpressible is the meanness of being a hypocrite! how horrible is it to be a mischievous and malignant hypocrite! There were no hypocrites in ancient Rome, which reckoned us a small portion of its innumerable subjects. There were impostors, I admit, but not religious hypocrites, which are the most profligate and cruel species of all. Why is it that we see none such in England, and whence does it arise that there still are such in France? Philosophers, you will solve this problem with ease.

  SECTION II.

  This brilliant and beautiful name has been sometimes honored, and sometimes disgraced; like that of poet, mathematician, monk, priest, and everything dependent on opinion. Domitian banished the philosophers, and Lucian derided them. But what sort of philosophers and mathematicians were they whom the monster Domitian exiled? They were jugglers with their cups and balls; the calculators of horoscopes, fortune-tellers, miserable peddling Jews, who composed philtres and talismans; gentry who had special and sovereign power over evil spirits, who evoked them from their infernal habitations, made them take possession of the bodies of men and women by certain words or signs, and dislodged them by other words or signs.

  And what were the philosophers that Lucian held up to public ridicule? They were the dregs of the human race. They were a set of profligate beggars incapable of applying to any useful profession or occupation; men perfectly resembling the “Poor Devil,” who has been described to us with so much both of truth and humor; men who are undecided whether to wear a livery, or to write the almanac of the “Annus Mirabilis,” the marvellous year; whether to work on reviews, or on roads; whether to turn soldiers or priests; who in the meantime frequent the coffee-houses, to give their opinion upon the last new piece, upon God, upon being in general, and the various modes of being; who will then borrow your money, and immediately go away and write a libel against you in conjunction with the barrister Marchand, or the creature called Chaudon, or the equally despicable wretch called Bonneval.

  It was not from such a school that the Ciceros, the Atticuses, the Epictetuses, the Trajans, Adrians, Antonines, and Julians proceeded. It was not such a school that formed a king of Prussia, who has composed as many philosophical treatises as he has gained battles, and who has levelled with the dust as many prejudices as enemies.

  A victorious empress, at whose name the Ottomans tremble, and who so gloriously rules an empire more extensive than that of Rome, would never have been a great legistratrix, had she not been a philosopher. Every northern prince is so, and the North puts the South to absolute shame. If the confederates of Poland had only a very small share of philosophy, they would not expose their country, their estates, and their houses, to pillage; they would not drench their territory in blood; they would not obstinately and wantonly reduce themselves to being the most miserable of mankind; they would listen to the voice of their philosophic king, who has given so many noble proofs and so many admirable lessons of moderation and prudence in vain.

  The great Julian was a philosopher when he wrote to his ministers and pontiffs his exquisite letters abounding in clemency and wisdom, which all men of judgment and feeling highly admire, even at the present day, however sincerely they may condemn his errors.

  Constantine was not a philosopher when he assassinated his relations, his son and his wife, and when, reeking with the blood of his family, he swore that God had sent to him the “Labarum” in the clouds. It is a long bound that carries us from Constantine to Charles IX., and Henry III., kings of one of the fifty great provinces of the Roman Empire. But if these kings had been philosophers, one would not have been guilty of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the other would not have made scandalous processions, nor have been reduced to the necessity of assassinating the duke of Guise and the cardinal, his brother, and at length have been assassinated himself by a young Jacobin, for the love of God and of the holy church.

  If Louis the Just, the thirteenth monarch of that name, had been a philosopher, he would not have permitted the virtuous de Thou and the innocent Marshal de Marillac to have been dragged to the scaffold; he would not have suffered his mother to perish with hunger at Cologne; and his reign would not have been an uninterrupted succession of intestine discords and calamities.

  Compare with those princes, thus ignorant, superstitious, cruel, and enslaved by their own passions or those of their ministers, such a man as Montaigne, or Charron, or the Chancellor de l’Hôpital, or the historian de Thou, or la Mothe Le Vayer, or a Locke, a Shaftesbury, a Sidney, or a Herbert; and say whether you would rather be governed by those sovereigns or by these sages.

  When I speak of philosophers I do not mean the coarse and brutal cynics who appear desirous of being apes of Diogenes, but the men who imitate Plato and Cicero. As for you, voluptuous courtiers, and you also, men of petty minds, invested with a petty employment which confers on you a petty authority in a petty country, who uniformly exclaim against and abuse philosophy, proceed as long as you please with your invective railing. I consider you as the Nomentanuses inveighing against Horace; and the Cotins attempting to cry down Boileau.

  SECTION III.

  The stiff Lutheran, the savage Calvinist, the proud Anglican high churchman, the fanatical Jansenist, the Jesuit always aiming at dominion, even in exile and at the very gallows, the Sorbonnist who deems himself one of the fathers of a council; these, and some imbecile beings under their respective guidance, inveigh incessantly and bitterly against philosophy. They are all different species of the canine race, snarling and howling in their peculiar ways against a beautiful horse that is pasturing in a verdant meadow, and who never enters into contest with them about any of the carrion carcasses upon which they feed, and for which they are perpetually fighting with one another.

  They every day produce from the press their trash of philosophic theology, their philosophico-theological dictionaries; their old and battered arguments, as common as the streets, which they denominate “demonstrations”; and their ten thousand times repeated and ridiculous assertions which they call “lemmas,” and “corollaries”; as false coiners cover a lead crown with a plating of silver.

  They perceive that they are despised by all persons of reflection, and that they can no longer deceive any but a few weak old women. This state is far more humiliating and mortifying than even being expelled from France and Spain and Naples. Everything can be supported except contempt. We are told that when the devil was conquered by Raphael—as it is clearly proved he was—that haughty compound of body and spirit at first easily consoled himself with the idea of the chances of war. But when he understood that Raphael laughed at him, he roundly swore that he would never forgive him. Accordingly, the Jesuits never forgave Pascal; accordingly, Jerieu went on calumniating Bayle even to the grave; and just in the same manner all the Tartuffes, all the hypocrites, in Molière’s time, inveighed against that author to his dying day. In their rage they resort to calumnies, as in their folly they publish arguments.

  One of the most determined slanderers, as well as one of the most contemptible reasoners that we have among us, is an ex-Jesuit of the name of Paulian, who published a theologico-philosophical rhapsody in the city of Avignon, formerly a papal city, and perhaps destined to be so again. This person accuses the authors of the “Encyclopædia” of having said:

  “That as man is by his nature open only to the pleasures of the senses, these pleasures are consequently the sole objects of his desires; that man in himself has neither vice nor virtue, neither good nor bad morals, neither justice nor injustice; that the pleasures of the senses produce all the virtues; that in order to be happy, men must extinguish remorse, etc.”

  In what articles of the “Encyclopædia,” of which five new editions have lately commenced, are these horrible propositions to be found? You are bound actually to produce them. Have you carried the insolence of your pride and the madness of your character to such an extent as to imagine that you will be believed on your bare word? These ridiculous absurdities may be found perhaps in the works of your own casuists, or those of the Porter of the Chartreux, but they are certainly not to be found in the articles of the “Encyclopædia” composed by M. Diderot, M. d’Alembert, the chevalier Jaucourt, or M. de Voltaire. You have never seen them in the articles of the Count de Tressan, nor in those of Messrs. Blondel, Boucher-d’Argis, Marmontel, Venel, Tronchin, d’Aubenton, d’Argenville, and various others, who generously devoted their time and labors to enrich the “Encyclopædic Dictionary,” and thereby conferred an everlasting benefit on Europe. Most assuredly, not one of them is chargeable with the abominations you impute to them. Only yourself, and Abraham Chaumieux, the vinegar merchant and crucified convulsionary, could be capable of broaching so infamous a calumny.

  You confound error with truth, because you have not sense sufficient to distinguish between them. You wish to stigmatize as impious the maxim adopted by all publicists, “That every man is free to choose his country.”

  What! you contemptible preacher of slavery, was not Queen Christina free to travel to France and reside at Rome? Were not Casimir and Stanislaus authorized to end their days in France? Was it necessary, because they were Poles, that they should die in Poland? Did Goldoni, Vanloo, and Cassini give offense to God by settling at Paris? Have all the Irish, who have established themselves in fame and fortune in France, committed by so doing a mortal sin?

  And you have the stupidity to print such extravagance and absurdity as this, and Riballier has stupidity enough to approve and sanction you; and you range in one and the same class Bayle, Montesquieu, and the madman de La Metrie; and it may be added, you have found the French nation too humane and indulgent, notwithstanding all your slander and malignity, to deliver you over to anything but scorn!

  What! do you dare to calumniate your country—if indeed a Jesuit can be said to have a country? Do you dare to assert “that philosophers alone in France attribute to chance the union and disunion of the atoms which constitute the soul of man?” “Mentiris impudentissime!” I defy you to produce a single book, published within the last thirty years, in which anything at all is attributed to chance, which is merely a word without a meaning.

  Do you dare to accuse the sagacious and judicious Locke of having said “that it is possible the soul may be a spirit, but that he is not perfectly sure it is so; and that we are unable to decide what it may be able or unable to acquire?”

  “Mentiris impudentissime!” Locke, the truly respectable and venerable Locke, says expressly, in his answer to the cavilling and sophistical Stilling-fleet, “I am strongly persuaded, although it cannot be shown, by mere reason, that the soul is immaterial, because the veracity of God is a demonstration of the truth of all that He has revealed, and the absence of another demonstration can never throw any doubt upon what is already demonstrated.”

  See, moreover, under the article “Soul,” how Locke expresses himself on the bounds of human knowledge, and the immensity of the power of the Supreme Being. The great philosopher Bolingbroke declares that the opinion opposite to Locke’s is blasphemy. All the fathers, during the first three ages of the church, regarded the soul as a light, attenuated species of matter, but did not the less, in consequence, regard it as immortal. But now, forsooth, even your college drudges consequentially put themselves forward and denounce as “atheists” those who, with the fathers of the Christian church, think that God is able to bestow and to preserve the immortality of the soul, whatever may be the substance it consists of.

  You carry your audacity so far as to discover atheism in the following words, “Who produces motion in nature? God. Who produces vegetation in plants? God. Who produces motion in animals? God. Who produces thought in man? God.”

  We cannot so properly say on this occasion, “Mentiris impudentissime”; but we should rather say you impudently blaspheme the truth. We conclude with observing that the hero of the ex-Jesuit Paulian is the ex-Jesuit Patouillet, the author of a bishop’s mandate in which all the parliaments of the kingdom are insulted. This mandate was burned by the hands of the executioner. Nothing after this was wanting but for the ex-Jesuit Paulian to elevate the ex-Jesuit Nonnotte to be a father of the church, and to canonize the Jesuits Malagrida, Guignard, Garnet, and Oldham, and all other Jesuits to whom God has granted the grace of being hanged or quartered; they were all of them great metaphysicians, great philosophico-theologians.

  SECTION IV.

  People who never think frequently inquire of those who do think, what has been the use of philosophy? To destroy in England the religious rage which brought Charles I. to the scaffold; to deprive an archbishop in Sweden of the power, with a papal bull in his hand, of shedding the blood of the nobility; to preserve in Germany religious peace, by holding up theological disputes to ridicule; finally, to extinguish in Spain the hideous and devouring flames of the Inquisition.

  Gauls! unfortunate Gauls! it prevents stormy and factious times from producing among you a second “Fronde,” and a second “Damiens.” Priests of Rome! it compels you to suppress your bull “In cœna domini,” that monument of impudence and stupidity. Nations! it humanizes your manners. Kings, it gives you instruction!

  SECTION V.

  The philosopher is the lover of wisdom and truth; to be a sage is to avoid the senseless and the depraved. The philosopher, therefore, should live only among philosophers.

  I will suppose that there are still some sages among the Jews; if one of these, when dining in company with some rabbis, should help himself to a plate of eels or hare, or if he cannot refrain from a hearty laugh at some superstitious and ridiculous observations made by them in the course of conversation, he is forever ruined in the synagogue; the like remark may be made of a Mussulman, a Gueber, or a Banian.

  I know it is contended by many that the sage should never develop his opinions to the vulgar; that he should be a madman with the mad, and foolish among fools; no one, however, has yet ventured to say that he should be a knave among knaves. But if it be required that a sage should always join in opinion with the deluders of mankind, is not this clearly the same as requiring that he should not be an honest man? Would any one require that a respectable physician should always be of the same opinion as charlatans?

  The sage is a physician of souls. He ought to bestow his remedies on those who ask them of him, and avoid the company of quacks, who will infallibly persecute him. If, therefore, a madman of Asia Minor, or a madman of India, says to the sage: My good friend, I think you do not believe in the mare Borac, or in the metamorphoses of Vishnu; I will denounce you, I will hinder you from being bostanji, I will destroy your credit; I will persecute you—the sage ought to pity him and be silent.

  If ignorant persons, but at the same time persons of good understanding and dispositions, and willing to receive instruction, should ask him: Are we bound to believe that the distance between the moon and Venus is only five hundred leagues, and that between Mercury and the sun the same, as the principal fathers of the Mussulman religion insist, in opposition to all the most learned astronomers?—the sage may reply to them that the fathers may possibly be mistaken. He should at all times inculcate upon them that a hundred abstract dogmas are not of the value of a single good action, and that it is better to relieve one individual in distress than to be profoundly acquainted with the abolishing and abolished. When a rustic sees a serpent ready to dart at him, he will kill it; when a sage perceives a bigot and a fanatic, what will he do? He will prevent them from biting.

  PHILOSOPHY.

  SECTION I.

  Write filosophy or philosophy as you please, but agree that as soon as it appears it is persecuted. Dogs to whom you present an aliment for which they have no taste, bite you. You will say that I repeat myself; but we must a hundred times remind mankind that the holy conclave condemned Galileo; and that the pedants who declared all the good citizens excommunicated who should submit to the great Henry IV., were the same who condemned the only truths which could be found in the works of Descartes.

  All the spaniels of the theological kennel bark at one another, and all together at de Thou, la Mothe, Le Vayer, and Bayle. What nonsense has been written by little Celtic scholars against the wise Locke!

  These Celts say that Cæsar, Cicero, Seneca, Pliny, and Marcus Aurelius, might be philosophers, but that philosophy is not permitted among the Celts. We answer that it is permitted and very useful among the French; that nothing has done more good to the English; and that it is time to exterminate barbarity. You reply that that will never come to pass. No; with the uninformed and foolish it will not; but with honest people the affair is soon concluded.

  SECTION II.

  One of the great misfortunes, as also one of the great follies, of mankind, is that in all countries which we call polished, except, perhaps, China, priests concern themselves with what belongs only to philosophers. These priests interfered with regulating the year; it was, they say, their right; for it was necessary that the people should know their holy days. Thus the Chaldæan, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman priests, believed themselves mathematicians and astronomers; but what mathematics and astronomy! Whoever makes a trade of quackery cannot have a just and enlightened mind. They were astrologers, and never astronomers.

  The Greek priests themselves first made the year to consist only of three hundred and sixty days. Their geometricians must have informed them that they were deceived by five days and more. They, therefore, corrected their year. Other geometricians further showed them that they were deceived by six hours. Iphitus obliged them to change their Greek almanac. They added one day in four years to their faulty year; Iphitus celebrated this change by the institution of the Olympiads.

  They were finally obliged to have recourse to the philosopher Meton, who, combining the year of the moon with that of the sun, composed his cycle of nineteen years, at the end of which the sun and moon returned to the same point within an hour and a half. This cycle was graven in gold in the public place of Athens; and it is of this famous golden number that we still make use, with the necessary corrections.

  We well know what ridiculous confusion the Roman priests introduced in their computation of the year. Their blunders were so great that their summer holidays arrived in winter. Cæsar, the universal Cæsar, was obliged to bring the philosopher Sosigenes from Alexandria to repair the enormous errors of the pontiffs. When it was necessary to correct the calendar of Julius Cæsar, under the pontificate of Gregory XIII., to whom did they address themselves? Was it to some inquisitor? It was to a philosopher and physician named Lilio.

  When the almanac was given to Professor Cogé, rector of the university, to compose, he knew not even the subject. They were obliged to apply to M. de Lalande, of the Academy of Sciences, who was burdened with this very painful task, too poorly recompensed. The rhetorician Cogé, therefore, made a great mistake when he proposed for the prize of the university this subject so strangely expressed:

  “Non magis Deo quam regibus infensa est ista quæ vocatur hodie philosophia.”—“That which we now call philosophy, is not more the enemy of God than of kings.” He would say less the enemy. He has taken magis for minus. And the poor man ought to know that our academies are not enemies either to the king or God.

  SECTION III.

  If philosophy has done so much honor to France in the “Encyclopædia,” it must also be confessed that the ignorance and envy which have dared to condemn this work would have covered France with opprobrium, if twelve or fifteen convulsionaries, who formed a cabal, could be regarded as the organs of France; they were really only the ministers of fanaticism and sedition; those who forced the king to dissolve the body which they had seduced. Their fanatical credulity for convulsions and the miserable impostures of St. Médard, was so strong, that they obliged a magistrate, elsewhere wise and respectable, to say in full parliament that the miracles of the Catholic church always existed. By these miracles, we can only understand those of convulsions, for assuredly it never performed any others; at least, if we believe not in the little children resuscitated by St. Ovid. The time of miracles is passed; the triumphant church has no longer occasion for them. Seriously, was there one of the persecutors of the “Encyclopædia” who understood one word of the articles Astronomy, Dynamics, Geometry, Metaphysics, Botany, Medicine, or Anatomy, of which this book, become so necessary, treats in every volume. What a crowd of absurd imputations and gross calumnies have they accumulated against this treasure of all the sciences! They should be reprinted at the end of the “Encyclopædia,” to eternize their shame. See what it is to judge a work which they were not even fit to study. The fools! they have exclaimed that philosophy ruined Catholicism. What, then, in twenty millions of people, has one been found who has vexed the least officer of the parish! one who has failed in respect to the churches! one who has publicly proffered against our ceremonies a single word which approached the virulence with which these railers have expressed themselves against the regal authority! Let us repeat that philosophy never did evil to the state, and that fanaticism, joined to the esprit du corps, has done much in all times.

  SECTION IV.
  
  Substance of Ancient Philosophy.

  I have consumed about forty years of my pilgrimage in two or three corners of the world, seeking the philosopher’s stone called truth. I have consulted all the adepts of antiquity, Epicurus and Augustine, Plato and Malebranche, and I still remain in ignorance. In all the crucibles of philosophers, there are perhaps two or three ounces of gold, but all the rest is caput mortuum, insipid mire, from which nothing can be extracted.

  It seems to me that the Greeks, our masters, wrote much more to show their intellect, than they made use of their intellect to instruct themselves. I see not a single author of antiquity who has a consistent, methodical, clear system, going from consequence to consequence.

  All that I have been able to obtain by comparing and combining the systems of Plato, of the tutor of Alexander, Pythagoras, and the Orientals, is this: Chance is a word void of sense; nothing can exist without a cause. The world is arranged according to mathematical laws; therefore, it is arranged by an intelligence.

  It is not an intelligent being like myself who presided at the formation of the world; for I cannot form a miserable worm; therefore, the world is the work of an intelligence prodigiously superior. Does this being, who possesses intelligence and power in so high a degree, necessarily exist? It must be so, for he must either have received being from another, or through his own nature. If he has received his being from another, which is very difficult to conceive, I must look up to this other, which will in that case be the first cause. On whichever side I turn, I must admit a first cause, powerful and intelligent, who by his own nature is necessarily so.

  Has this first cause created things out of nothing? We cannot conceive that to create out of nothing is to change nothing into something. I cannot admit such a creation, at least until I find invincible reasons which force me to admit what my mind can never comprehend. All that exists appears to exist necessarily, since it exists; for if to-day there is a reason for the existence of things, there was one yesterday; there has been one in all times; and this cause must always have had its effect, without which it would have been a useless cause during eternity.

  But how can things have always existed, being visibly under the hand of the first cause? This power must always have acted in like manner. There is no sun without light, there is no motion without a being passing from one point of space to another.

  There is, therefore, a powerful and intelligent being who has always acted; and if this being had not acted, of what use to him would have been his existence? All things are, therefore, emanations from this first cause. But how can we imagine that stone and clay may be emanations of the eternal, intelligent, and puissant being? Of two things, one must be; either that the matter of this stone and mine necessarily exists of itself, or that it exists necessarily by this first cause; there is no medium.

  Thus, therefore, there are but two parts to take; either to admit matter eternal of itself, or matter eternally proceeding from a powerful, intelligent, eternal being. But existing of its own nature, or emanating from a producing being, it exists from all eternity, because it exists; and there is no reason that it might not have always existed.

  If matter is eternally necessary, it is in consequence impossible—it is contradictory, that it should not exist; but what man can assure you that it is impossible, that it is contradictory, that this fly and this flint have not always existed? We are, however, obliged to swallow this difficulty, which more astonishes the imagination than contradicts the principles of reasoning.

  Indeed, as soon as we have conceived that all has emanated from the supreme and intelligent being; that nothing has emanated from him without reason; that this being, always existing, must always have acted; that, consequently, all things must have eternally proceeded from the bosom of his existence—we should no more be deterred from believing the matter of which this fly and flint are formed is eternal, than we are deterred from conceiving light to be an emanation of the all-powerful being.

  Since I am an extended and thinking being, my extent and thought are the necessary productions of this being. It is evident to me that I cannot give myself extent or thought. I have, therefore, received both from this necessary being.

  Can he have given me what he has not? I have intelligence; I am in space; therefore, he is intelligent and is in space. To say that the Eternal Being, the All-Powerful God, has from all time necessarily filled the universe with His productions, is not taking from Him His free-will; but on the contrary, for free-will is but the power of acting. God has always fully acted; therefore God has always used the plenitude of His liberty.

  The liberty which we call indifference is a word without an idea—an absurdity; for this would be to determine without reason; it would be an effect without a cause. Therefore God cannot have this pretended free-will, which is a contradiction in terms. He has, therefore, always acted by the same necessity which causes His existence. It is, therefore, impossible for the world to exist without God; it is impossible for God to exist without the world. This world is filled with beings who succeed each other; therefore, God has always produced beings in succession.

  These preliminary assertions are the basis of the ancient eastern philosophy, and of that of the Greeks. We must except Democritus and Epicurus, whose corpuscular philosophy has combated these dogmas. But let us remark that the Epicureans were founded on an entirely erroneous philosophy, and that the metaphysical system of all the other philosophy subsisted with all the physical systems. All nature, except the void, contradicts Epicurus, and no phenomenon contradicts the philosophy which I explain. Now, a philosophy which agrees with all which passes in nature, and which contents the most attentive mind, is it not superior to all other unrevealed systems?

  After the assertions of the most ancient philosophers, which I have approached as nearly as possible, what remains to us? A chaos of doubts and chimeras. I believe that there never was a philosopher of a system who did not confess at the end of his life that he had lost his time. It must be confessed that the inventors of the mechanical arts have been much more useful to men than the inventors of syllogisms. He who imagined a ship, towers much above him who imagined innate ideas.

  PHYSICIANS.

  Regimen is superior to medicine, especially as, from time immemorial, out of every hundred physicians, ninety-eight are charlatans. Molière was right in laughing at them; for nothing is more ridiculous than to witness an infinite number of silly women, and men no less than women, when they have eaten, drunk, sported, or abstained from repose too much, call in a physician for the headache, invoke him like a god, and request him to work the miracle of producing an alliance between health and intemperance, not omitting to fee the said god, who laughs at their folly.

  It is not, however, the less true that an able physician may preserve life on a hundred occasions, and restore to us the use of our limbs. When a man falls into an apoplexy, it is neither a captain of infantry nor a sergeant at law who will cure him. If cataracts are formed on my eyes, it is not my neighbor who will relieve me. I distinguish not between physicians and surgeons, these professions being so intimately connected.

  Men who are occupied in the restoration of health to other men, by the joint exertion of skill and humanity, are above all the great of the earth. They even partake of divinity, since to preserve and renew is almost as noble as to create. The Roman people had no physicians for more than five hundred years. This people, whose sole occupation was slaughter, in particular cultivated not the art of prolonging life. What, therefore, happened at Rome to those who had a putrid fever, a fistula, a gangrene, or an inflammation of the stomach? They died. The small number of great physicians introduced into Rome were only slaves. A physician among the great Roman patricians was a species of luxury, like a cook. Every rich man had his perfumers, his bathers, his harpers, and his physician. The celebrated Musa, the physician of Augustus, was a slave; he was freed and made a Roman knight; after which physicians became persons of consideration.

  When Christianity was so fully established as to bestow on us the felicity of possessing monks, they were expressly forbidden, by many councils, from practising medicine. They should have prescribed a precisely contrary line of conduct, if it were desirable to render them useful to mankind.

  How beneficial to society were monks obliged to study medicine and to cure our ailments for God’s sake! Having nothing to gain but heaven, they would never be charlatans; they would equally instruct themselves in our diseases and their remedies, one of the finest of occupations, and the only one forbidden them. It has been objected that they would poison the impious; but even that would be advantageous to the church. Had this been the case, Luther would never have stolen one-half of Catholic Europe from our holy father, the pope; for in the first fever which might have seized the Augustine Luther, a Dominican would have prepared his pills. You will tell me that he would not have taken them; but with a little address this might have been managed. But to proceed:

  Towards the year 1517 lived a citizen, animated with a Christian zeal, named John; I do not mean John Calvin, but John, surnamed of God, who instituted the Brothers of Charity. This body, instituted for the redemption of captives, is composed of the only useful monks, although not accounted among the orders. The Dominicans, Bernardines, Norbertins, and Benedictines, acknowledge not the Brothers of Charity. They are simply adverted to in the continuation of the “Ecclesiastical History” of Fleury. Why? Because they have performed cures instead of miracles—have been useful and not caballed—cured poor women without either directing or seducing them. Lastly, their institution being charitable, it is proper that other monks should despise them.

  Medicine, having then become a mercenary profession in the world, as the administration of justice is in many places, it has become liable to strange abuses. But nothing is more estimable than a physician who, having studied nature from his youth, knows the properties of the human body, the diseases which assail it, the remedies which will benefit it, exercises his art with caution, and pays equal attention to the rich and the poor. Such a man is very superior to the general of the Capuchins, however respectable this general may be.

  PIRATES OR BUCCANEERS.

  In the time of Cardinal Richelieu, when the Spaniards and French detested each other, because Ferdinand the Catholic laughed at Louis XII., and Francis I. was taken at the battle of Pavia by an army of Charles V.—while this hatred was so strong that the false author of the political romance, and political piece of tediousness, called the “Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu,” feared not to call the Spaniards “an insatiable nation, who rendered the Indies tributaries of hell”; when, in short, we were leagued in 1635 with Holland against Spain; when France had nothing in America, and the Spaniards covered the seas with their galleys—then buccaneers began to appear. They were at first French adventurers, whose quality was at most that of corsairs.

  One of them, named Legrande, a native of Dieppe, associated himself with fifty determined men, and went to tempt fortune in a bark which had not even a cannon. Towards the Isle of Hispaniola (St. Domingo), he perceived a galley strayed from the great Spanish fleet; he approached it as a captain wishing to sell provisions; he mounted, attended by his people; he entered the chamber of the captain, who was playing at cards, threw him down, made him prisoner with his cargo, and returned to Dieppe with his vessel laden with immense riches. This adventure was the signal for forty years’ unheard-of exploits.

  French, English, and Dutch buccaneers associated together in the caverns of St. Domingo, of the little islands of St. Christopher and Tortola. They chose a chief for each expedition, which was the first origin of kings. Agriculturists would never have wished for a king; they had no need of one to sow, thrash, and sell corn.

  When the buccaneers took a great prize, they bought with it a little vessel and cannon. One happy chance produced twenty others. If they were a hundred in number they were believed to be a thousand; it was difficult to escape them, still more so to follow them. They were birds of prey who established themselves on all sides, and who retired into inaccessible places; sometimes they ravaged from four to five hundred leagues of coast; sometimes they advanced on foot, or horseback, two hundred leagues up the countries. They surprised and pillaged the rich towns of Chagra, Maracaybo, Vera Cruz, Panama, Porto Rico, Campeachy, the island of St. Catherine, and the suburbs of Cartagena.

  One of these pirates, named Olonois, penetrated to the gates of Havana, followed by twenty men only. Having afterwards retired into his boat, the governor sent against him a ship of war with soldiers and an executioner. Olonois rendered himself master of the vessel, cut off the heads of the Spanish soldiers, whom he had taken himself, and sent back the executioner to the governor. Such astonishing actions were never performed by the Romans, or by other robbers. The warlike voyage of Admiral Anson round the world is only an agreeable promenade in comparison with the passage of the buccaneers in the South Sea, and with what they endured on terra firma.

  Had their policy been equal to their invincible courage, they would have founded a great empire in America. They wanted females; but instead of ravishing and marrying Sabines, like the Romans, they procured them from the brothels of Paris, which sufficed not to produce a second generation.

  They were more cruel towards the Spaniards than the Israelites ever were to the Canaanites. A Dutchman is spoken of, named Roc, who put several Spaniards on a spit and caused them to be eaten by his comrades. Their expeditions were tours of thieves, and never campaigns of conquerors; thus, in all the West Indies, they were never called anything but los ladrones. When they surprised and entered the house of a father of a family, they put him to the torture to discover his treasures. That sufficiently proves what we say in the article “Question,” that torture was invented by robbers.

  What rendered their exploits useless was, that they lavished in debauches, as foolish as monstrous, all that they acquired by rapine and murder. Finally, there remains nothing more of them than their name, and scarcely that. Such were the buccaneers.

  But what people in Europe have not been pirates? The Goths, Alans, Vandals, and Huns, were they anything else? What were Rollo, who established himself in Normandy, and William Fier-a-bras, but the most able pirates? Was not Clovis a pirate, who came from the borders of the Rhine into Gaul?

  PLAGIARISM.

  It is said that this word is derived from the Latin word plaga, and that it signifies the condemnation to the scourge of those who sold freemen for slaves. This has nothing in common with the plagiarism of authors, who sell not men either enslaved or free. They only for a little money occasionally sell themselves.

  When an author sells the thoughts of another man for his own, the larceny is called plagiarism. All the makers of dictionaries, all compilers who do nothing else than repeat backwards and forwards the opinions, the errors, the impostures, and the truths already printed, we may term plagiarists, but honest plagiarists, who arrogate not the merit of invention. They pretend not even to have collected from the ancients the materials which they get together; they only copy the laborious compilers of the sixteenth century. They will sell you in quarto that which already exists in folio. Call them if you please bookmakers, not authors; range them rather among second-hand dealers than plagiarists.

  The true plagiarist is he who gives the works of another for his own, who inserts in his rhapsodies long passages from a good book a little modified. The enlightened reader, seeing this patch of cloth of gold upon a blanket, soon detects the bungling purloiner.

  Ramsay, who after having been a Presbyterian in his native Scotland, an Anglican in London, then a Quaker, and who finally persuaded Fénelon that he was a Catholic, and even pretended a penchant for celestial love—Ramsay, I say, compiled the “Travels of Cyrus,” because his master made his Telemachus travel. So far he only imitated; but in these travels he copies from an old English author, who introduces a young solitary dissecting his dead goat, and arriving at a knowledge of the Deity by the process, which is very much like plagiarism. On conducting Cyrus into Egypt, in describing that singular country, he employs the same expressions as Bossuet, whom he copies word for word without citing; this is plagiarism complete. One of my friends reproached him with this one day; Ramsay replied that he was not aware of it, and that it was not surprising he should think like Fénelon and write like Bossuet. This was making out the adage, “Proud as a Scotsman.”

  The most singular of all plagiarism is possibly that of Father Barre, author of a large history of Germany in ten volumes. The history of Charles XII. had just been printed, and he inserted more than two hundred pages of it in his work; making a duke of Lorraine say precisely that which was said by Charles XII.

  He attributes to the emperor Arnold that which happened to the Swedish monarch. He relates of the emperor Rudolph that which was said of King Stanislaus. Waldemar, king of Denmark, acts precisely like Charles at Bender, etc.

  The most pleasant part of the story is, that a journalist, perceiving this extraordinary resemblance between the two works, failed not to impute the plagiarism to the author of the history of Charles XII., who had composed his work twenty years before the appearance of that of Father Barre. It is chiefly in poetry that plagiarism is allowed to pass; and certainly, of all larcenies, it is that which is least dangerous to society.

  PLATO.

  SECTION I.
  
  Of the “Timæus” of Plato and Some Other Things.

  The fathers of the Church, of the first four centuries, were all Greeks and Platonists: you find not one Roman who wrote for Christianity, or who had the slightest tincture of philosophy. I will here observe, by the way, that it is strange enough, the great Church of Rome, which contributed in nothing to this establishment, has alone reaped all the advantage. It has been with this revolution, as with all those produced by civil wars: the first who trouble a state, always unknowingly labor for others rather than for themselves.

  The school of Alexandria, founded by one named Mark, to whom succeeded Athenagoras, Clement, and Origen, was the centre of the Christian philosophy. Plato was regarded by all the Greeks of Alexandria as the master of wisdom, the interpreter of the divinity. If the first Christians had not embraced the dogmas of Plato, they would never have had any philosophers, any man of mind in their party. I set aside inspiration and grace which are above all philosophy, and speak only of the ordinary course of human events.

  It is said that it was principally in the “Timæus” of Plato that the Greek fathers were instructed. This “Timæus” passes for the most sublime work of all ancient philosophy. It is almost the only one which Dacier has not translated, and I think the reason is, because he did not understand it, and that he feared to discover to clear-sighted readers the face of this Greek divinity, who is only adored because he is veiled.

  Plato, in this fine dialogue, commences by introducing an Egyptian priest, who teaches Solon the ancient history of the city of Athens, which was preserved faithfully for nine thousand years in the archives of Egypt.

  Athens, says the priest, was once the finest city of Greece, and the most renowned in the world for the arts of war and peace. She alone resisted the warriors of the famous island Atlantis, who came in innumerable vessels to subjugate a great part of Europe and Asia. Athens had the glory of freeing so many vanquished people, and of preserving Egypt from the servitude which menaced us. But after this illustrious victory and service rendered to mankind, a frightful earthquake in twenty-four hours swallowed the territory of Athens, and all the great island of Atlantis. This island is now only a vast sea, which the ruins of this ancient world and the slime mixed with its waters rendered unnavigable.

  This is what the priest relates to Solon: and such is the manner in which Plato prepares to explain to us subsequently, the formation of the soul, the operations of the “Word,” and his trinity. It is not physically impossible that there might be an island Atlantis, which had not existed for nine thousand years, and which perished by an earthquake, like Herculaneum and so many other cities; but our priest, in adding that the sea which washes Mount Atlas is inaccessible to vessels, renders the history a little suspicious.

  It may be, after all, that since Solon—that is to say, in the course of three thousand years—vessels have dispersed the slime of the ancient island Atlantis and rendered the sea navigable; but it is still surprising that he should prepare by this island to speak of the “Word.”

  Perhaps in telling this priest’s or old woman’s story, Plato wished to insinuate something contrary to the vicissitudes which have so often changed the face of the globe. Perhaps he would merely say what Pythagoras and Timæus of Locris have said so long before him, and what our eyes tell us every day—that everything in nature perishes and is renewed. The history of Deucalion and Pyrrha, the fall of Phæthon, are fables: but inundations and conflagrations are truths.

  Plato departs from his imaginary island, to speak of things which the best of philosophers of our days would not disavow. “That which is produced has necessarily a cause, an author. It is difficult to discover the author of this world; and when he is found it is dangerous to speak of him to the people.”

  Nothing is more true, even now, than that if a sage, in passing by our Lady of Loretto, said to another sage, his friend, that our Lady of Loretto, with her little black face, governs not the entire universe, and a good woman overheard these words, and related them to other good women of the march of Ancona, the sage would be stoned like Orpheus. This is precisely the situation in which the first Christians were believed to be, who spoke not well of Cybele and Diana, which alone should attach them to Plato. The unintelligible things which he afterwards treats of, ought not to disgust us with him.

  I will not reproach Plato with saying, in his “Timæus,” that the world is an animal; for he no doubt understands that the elements in motion animate the world; and he means not, by animal, a dog or a man, who walks, feels, eats, sleeps, and engenders. An author should always be explained in the most favorable sense; and it is not while we accuse people, or when we denounce their books, that it is right to interpret malignantly and poison all their words; nor is it thus that I shall treat Plato.

  According to him there is a kind of trinity which is the soul of matter. These are his words: “From the indivisible substance, always similar to itself, and the divisible substance, a third substance is composed, which partakes of the same and of others.”

  Afterwards came the Pythagorean number, which renders the thing still more unintelligible, and consequently more respectable. What ammunition for people commencing a paper war! Friend reader, a little patience and attention, if you please: “When God had formed the soul of the world of these three substances, the soul shot itself into the midst of the universe, to the extremities of being; spreading itself everywhere, and reacting upon itself, it formed at all times a divine origin of eternal wisdom.”

  And some lines afterwards: “Thus the nature of the immense animal which we call the world, is eternal.” Plato, following the example of his predecessors, then introduces the Supreme Being, the Creator of the world, forming this world before time; so that God could not exist without the world, nor the world without God; as the sun cannot exist without shedding light into space, nor this light steal into space without the sun.

  I pass in silence many Greek, or rather Oriental ideas; as for example—that there are four sorts of animals—celestial gods, birds of the air, fishes, and terrestrial animals, to which last we have the honor to belong.

  I hasten to arrive at a second trinity: “the being engendered, the being who engenders, and the being which resembles the engendered and the engenderer.” This trinity is formal enough, and the fathers have found their account in it.

  This trinity is followed by a rather singular theory of the four elements. The earth is founded on an equilateral triangle, water on a right-angled triangle, air on a scalene, and fire on an isosceles triangle. After which he demonstratively proves that there can be but five worlds, because there are but five regular solid bodies, and yet that there is but one world which is round.

  I confess that no philosopher in Bedlam has ever reasoned so powerfully. Rouse yourself, friend reader, to hear me speak of the other famous trinity of Plato, which his commentators have so much vaunted: it is the Eternal Being, the Eternal Creator of the world; His word, intelligence, or idea; and the good which results from it. I assure you that I have sought for it diligently in this “Timæus,” and I have never found it there; it may be there totidem literis, but it is not totidem verbis, or I am much mistaken.

  After reading all Plato with great reluctance, I perceived some shadow of the trinity for which he is so much honored. It is in the sixth book of his “Chimerical Republic,” in which he says: “Let us speak of the Son, the wonderful production of good, and His perfect image.” But unfortunately he discovers this perfect image of God to be the sun. It was therefore the physical sun, which with the Word and the Father composed the platonic trinity. In the “Epinomis” of Plato there are very curious absurdities, one of which I translate as reasonably as I can, for the convenience of the reader:

  “Know that there are eight virtues in heaven: I have observed them, which is easy to all the world. The sun is one of its virtues, the moon another; the third is the assemblage of stars; and the five planets, with these three virtues, make the number eight. Be careful of thinking that these virtues, or those which they contain, and which animate them, either move of themselves or are carried in vehicles; be careful, I say, of believing that some may be gods and others not; that some may be adorable, and others such as we should neither adore or invoke. They are all brothers; each has his share; we owe them all the same honors; they fill all the situations which the Word assigned to them, when it formed the visible universe.”

  Here is the Word already found: we must now find the three persons. They are in the second letter from Plato to Dionysius, which letters assuredly are not forged; the style is the same as that of his dialogues. He often says to Dionysius and Dion things very difficult to comprehend, and which we might believe to be written in numbers, but he also tells us very clear ones, which have been found true a long time after him. For example, he expresses himself thus in his seventh letter to Dion:

  “I have been convinced that all states are very badly governed; there is scarcely any good institution or administration. We see, as it were, day after day, that all follow the path of fortune rather than that of wisdom.” After this short digression on temporal affairs, let us return to spiritual ones, to the Trinity. Plato says to Dionysius:

  “The King of the universe is surrounded by His works: all is the effect of His grace. The finest of things have their first cause in Him; the second in perfection have in Him their second cause, and He is further the third cause of works of the third degree.”

  The Trinity, such as we acknowledge, could not be recognized in this letter; but it was a great point to have in a Greek author a guaranty of the dogmas of the dawning Church. Every Greek church was therefore Platonic, as every Latin church was peripatetic, from the commencement of the third century. Thus two Greeks whom we have never understood, were the masters of our opinions until the time in which men at the end of two thousand years were obliged to think for themselves.

  SECTION II.
  
  Questions on Plato and Some Other Trifles.

  Plato, in saying to the Greeks what so many philosophers of other nations have said before him, in assuring them that there is a Supreme Intelligence which arranged the universe—did he think that this Supreme Intelligence resided in a single place, like a king of the East in his seraglio? Or rather did he believe that this Powerful Intelligence spread itself everywhere like light, or a being still more delicate, prompt, active, and penetrating than light? The God of Plato, in a word, is he in matter, or is he separated from it? Oh, you who have read Plato attentively, that is to say, seven or eight fantastical dreams hidden in some garret in Europe, if ever these questions reach you, I implore you to answer them.

  The barbarous island of Cassiterides, in which men lived in the woods in the time of Plato, has finally produced philosophers who are as much beyond him as Plato was beyond those of his contemporaries who reasoned not at all. Among these philosophers, Clarke is perhaps altogether the clearest, the most profound, the most methodical, and the strongest of all those who have spoken of the Supreme Being.

  When he gave his excellent book to the public he found a young gentleman of the county of Gloucester who candidly advanced objections as strong as his demonstrations. We can see them at the end of the first volume of Clarke; it was not on the necessary existence of the Supreme Being that he reasoned; it was on His infinity and immensity.

  It appears not indeed, that Clarke has proved that there is a being who penetrates intimately all which exists, and that this being whose properties we cannot conceive has the property of extending Himself to the greatest imaginable distance.

  The great Newton has demonstrated that there is a void in nature; but what philosopher could demonstrate to me that God is in this void; that He touches it; that He fills it? How, bounded as we are, can we attain to the knowledge of these mysteries? Does it not suffice, that it proves to us that a Supreme Master exists? It is not given to us to know what He is nor how He is.

  It seems as if Locke and Clarke had the keys of the intelligible world. Locke has opened all the apartments which can be entered; but has not Clarke wished to penetrate a little above the edifice? How could a philosopher like Samuel Clarke, after so admirable a work on the existence of God, write so pitiable a one on matters of fact?

  How could Benedict Spinoza, who had as much profundity of mind as Samuel Clarke, after raising himself to the most sublime metaphysics, how could he not perceive that a Supreme Intelligence presides over works visibly arranged with a supreme intelligence—if it is true after all that such is the system of Spinoza?

  How could Newton, the greatest of men, comment upon the Apocalypse, as we have already remarked? How could Locke, after having so well developed the human understanding, degrade his own in another work? I fancy I see eagles, who after darting into a cloud go to rest on a dunghill.

  POETS.

  A young man on leaving college deliberates whether he shall be an advocate, a physician, a theologian, or a poet—whether he shall take care of our body, our soul, or our entertainment. We have already spoken of advocates and physicians; we will now speak of the prodigious fortune which is sometimes made by the theologian.

  The theologian becomes pope, and has not only his theological valets, cooks, singers, chamberlains, physicians, surgeons, sweepers, agnus dei makers, confectioners, and preachers, but also his poet. I know not what inspired personage was the poet of Leo X., as David was for some time the poet of Saul.

  It is surely of all the employments in a great house, that which is the most useless. The kings of England, who have preserved in their island many of the ancient usages which are lost on the continent, have their official poet. He is obliged once a year to make an ode in praise of St. Cecilia, who played so marvellously on the organ or psalterium that an angel descended from the ninth heaven to listen to her more conveniently—the harmony of the psaltery, in ascending from this place to the land of angels, necessarily losing a small portion of its volume.

  Moses is the first poet that we know of; but it is thought that before him the Chaldæans, the Syrians, and the Indians practised poetry, since they possessed music. Nevertheless, the fine canticle which Moses chanted with his sister Miriam, when they came out of the Red Sea, is the most ancient poetical monument in hexameter verse that we possess. I am not of the opinion of those impious and ignorant rogues, Newton, Le Clerc, and others, who prove that all this was written about eight hundred years after the event, and who insolently maintain that Moses could not write in Hebrew, since Hebrew is only a comparatively modern dialect of the Phœnician, of which Moses could know nothing at all. I examine not with the learned Huet how Moses was able to sing so well, who stammered and could not speak.

  If we listened to many of these authors, Moses would be less ancient than Orpheus, Musæus, Homer, and Hesiod. We perceive at the first glance the absurdity of this opinion; as if a Greek could be an ancient as a Jew!

  Neither will I reply to those impertinent persons who suspect that Moses is only an imaginary personage, a fabulous imitation of the fable of the ancient Bacchus; and that all the prodigies of Bacchus, since attributed to Moses, were sung in orgies before it was known that Jews existed in the world. This idea refutes itself; it is obvious to good sense that it is impossible that Bacchus could have existed before Moses.

  We have still, however, an excellent Jewish poet undeniably anterior to Horace—King David; and we know well how infinitely superior the “Miserere,” is to the “Justum ac tenacem propositi virum.” But what is most astonishing, legislators and kings have been our earliest poets. We find even at present people so good as to become poets for kings. Virgil indeed had not the office of poet to Augustus, nor Lucan that of poet to Nero; but I confess that it would have debased the profession not a little to make gods of either the one or the other.

  It is asked, why poetry, being so unnecessary to the world, occupies so high a rank among the fine arts? The same question may be put with regard to music. Poetry is the music of the soul, and above all of great and of feeling souls. One merit of poetry few persons will deny; it says more and in fewer words than prose. Who was ever able to translate the following Latin words with the brevity with which they came from the brain of the poet: “Vive memor lethi, fugit hora, hoc quod loquor inde est?”

  I speak not of the other charms of poetry, as they are well known; but I insist upon the grand precept of Horace, “Sapere est principium et fons.” There can be no great poetry without great wisdom; but how connect this wisdom with enthusiasm, like Cæsar, who formed his plan of battle with circumspection, and fought with all possible ardor?

  There have no doubt been ignorant poets, but then they have been bad poets. A man acquainted only with dactyls and spondees, and with a head full of rhymes, is rarely a man of sense; but Virgil is endowed with superior reason.

  Lucretius, in common with all the ancients, was miserably ignorant of physical laws, a knowledge of which is not to be acquired by wit. It is a knowledge which is only to be obtained by instruments, which in his time had not been invented. Glasses are necessary—microscopes, pneumatic machines, barometers, etc., to have even a distant idea of the operations of nature.

  Descartes knew little more than Lucretius, when his keys opened the sanctuary; and an hundred times more of the path has been trodden from the time of Galileo, who was better instructed physically than Descartes, to the present day, than from the first Hermes to Lucretius.

  All ancient physics are absurd: it was not thus with the philosophy of mind, and that good sense which, assisted by strength of intellect, can acutely balance between doubts and appearances. This is the chief merit of Lucretius; his third book is a masterpiece of reasoning. He argues like Cicero, and expresses himself like Virgil; and it must be confessed that when our illustrious Polignac attacked his third book, he refuted it only like a cardinal.

  When I say, that Lucretius reasons in his third book like an able metaphysician, I do not say that he was right. We may argue very soundly, and deceive ourselves, if not instructed by revelation. Lucretius was not a Jew, and we know that Jews alone were in the right in the days of Cicero, of Posidonius, of Cæsar, and of Cato. Lastly, under Tiberius, the Jews were no longer in the right, and common sense was possessed by the Christians exclusively.

  Thus it was impossible that Lucretius, Cicero, and Cæsar could be anything but imbecile, in comparison with the Jews and ourselves; but it must be allowed that in the eyes of the rest of the world they were very great men. I allow that Lucretius killed himself, as also did Cato, Cassius, and Brutus, but they might very well kill themselves, and still reason like men of intellect during their lives.

  In every author let us distinguish the man from his works. Racine wrote like Virgil, but he became Jansenist through weakness, and he died in consequence of weakness equally great—because a man in passing through a gallery did not bestow a look upon him. I am very sorry for all this; but the part of Phædra is not therefore the less admirable.

  POISONINGS.

  Let us often repeat useful truths. There have always been fewer poisonings than have been spoken of: it is almost with them as with parricides; the accusations have been very common, and the crimes very rare. One proof is, that we have a long time taken for poison that which is not so. How many princes have got rid of those who were suspected by them by making them drink bullock’s blood! How many other princes have swallowed it themselves to avoid falling into the hands of their enemies! All ancient historians, and even Plutarch, attest it.

  I was so infatuated with these tales in my childhood that I bled one of my bulls, in the idea that his blood belonged to me, since he was born in my stable—an ancient pretension of which I will not here dispute the validity. I drank this blood, like Atreus and Mademoiselle de Vergi, and it did me no more harm than horse’s blood does to the Tartars, or pudding does to us every day, if it be not too rich.

  Why should the blood of a bull be a poison, when that of a goat is considered a remedy? The peasants of my province swallow the blood of a cow, which they call fricassée, every day; that of a bull is not more dangerous. Be sure, dear reader, that Themistocles died not of it.

  Some speculators of the court of Louis XIV. believed they discovered that his sister-in-law, Henrietta of England, was poisoned with powder of diamonds, which was put into a bowl of strawberries, instead of grated sugar; but neither the impalpable powder of glass or diamonds, nor that of any production of nature which was not in itself venomous, could be hurtful.

  They are only sharp-cutting active points which can become violent. The exact observer, Mead, a celebrated English physician, saw through a microscope the liquor shot from the gums of irritated vipers. He pretends that he has always found them strewn with these cutting, pointed blades, the immense number of which tear and pierce the internal membranes.

  The cantarella, of which it is pretended that Pope Alexander VI. and his bastard, the duke of Borgia, made great use, was, it is said, the foam of a hog rendered furious by suspending him by the feet with his head downwards, in which situation he was beaten to death; it was a poison as prompt and violent as that of the viper. A great apothecary assures me that Madame la Tofana, that celebrated poisoner of Naples, principally made use of this receipt; all which is perhaps untrue. This science is one of those of which we should be ignorant.

  Poisons which coagulate the blood, instead of tearing the membranes, are opium, hemlock, henbane, aconite, and several others. The Athenians became so refined as to cause their countrymen, condemned to death, to die by poisons reputed cold; an apothecary was the executioner of the republic. It is said that Socrates died very peacefully, and as if he slept: I can scarcely believe it.

  I made one remark on the Jewish books, which is, that among this people we see no one who was poisoned. A crowd of kings and priests perished by assassination; the history of the nation is the history of murders and robberies; but a single instance only is mentioned of a man who was poisoned, and this man was not a Jew—he was a Syrian named Lysias, general of the armies of Antiochus Epiphanes. The second Book of Maccabees says that he poisoned himself—“veneno vitam finivit”; but these Books of Maccabees are very suspicious. My dear reader, I have already desired you to believe nothing lightly.

  What astonishes me most in the history of the manners of the ancient Romans is the conspiracy of the Roman women to cause to perish by poison, not only their husbands, but the principal citizens in general. “It was,” says Titus Livius, “in the year 423 from the foundation of Rome, and therefore in the time of the most austere virtue; it was before there was any mention of divorce, though divorce was authorized; it was when women drank no wine, and scarcely ever went out of their houses, except to the temples.” How can we imagine, that they suddenly applied themselves to the knowledge of poisons; that they assembled to compose them; and, without any apparent interest, thus administered death to the first men in Rome?

  Lawrence Echard, in his abridged compilation, contents himself with saying, that “the virtue of the Roman ladies was strangely belied; that one hundred and seventy who meddled with the art of making poisons, and of reducing this art into precepts, were all at once accused, convicted, and punished.” Titus Livius assuredly does not say that they reduced this art into rules. That would signify that they held a school of poisons, that they professed it as a science; which is ridiculous. He says nothing about a hundred and seventy professors in corrosive sublimate and verdigris. Finally, he does not affirm that there were poisoners among the wives of the senators and knights.

  The people were extremely foolish, and reasoned at Rome as elsewhere. These are the words of Titus Livius: “The year 423 was of the number of unfortunate ones; there was a mortality caused by the temperature of the air or by human malice. I wish that we could affirm with some author that the corruption of the air caused this epidemic, rather than attribute the death of so many Romans to poison, as many historians have falsely written, to decry this year.”

  They have therefore written falsely, according to Titus Livius, who believes not that the ladies of Rome were poisoners: but what interest had authors in decrying this year? I know not.

  “I relate the fact,” continues he, “as it was related before me.” This is not the speech of a satisfied man; besides, the alleged fact much resembles a fable. A slave accuses about seventy women, among whom are several of the patrician rank, of causing the plague in Rome by preparing poisons. Some of the accused demand permission to swallow their drugs, and expire on the spot; and their accomplices are condemned to death without the manner of their punishment being specified.

  I suspect that this story to which Titus Livius gives no credit, deserves to be banished to the place in which the vessel is preserved which a vestal drew to shore with a girdle; where Jupiter in person stopped the flight of the Romans; where Castor and Pollux came to combat on horseback in their behalf; where a flint was cut with a razor; and where Simon Barjonas, surnamed Peter, disputed miracles with Simon the magician.

  There is scarcely any poison of which we cannot prevent the consequences by combating it immediately. There is no medicine which is not a poison when taken in too strong a dose. All indigestion is a poison. An ignorant physician, and even a learned but inattentive one, is often a poisoner. A good cook is a certain slow poisoner, if you are not temperate.

  One day the marquis d’Argenson, minister of state for the foreign department, whilst his brother was minister of war, received from London a letter from a fool—as ministers do by every post; this fool proposed an infallible means of poisoning all the inhabitants of the capital of England. “This does not concern me,” said the marquis d’Argenson to us; “it is a packet to my brother.”

  POLICY.

  The policy of man consists, at first, in endeavoring to arrive at a state equal to that of animals, whom nature has furnished with food, clothing, and shelter. To attain this state is a matter of no little time and difficulty. How to procure for himself subsistence and accommodation, and protect himself from evil, comprises the whole object and business of man.

  This evil exists everywhere; the four elements of nature conspire to form it. The barrenness of one-quarter part of the world, the numberless diseases to which we are subject, the multitude of strong and hostile animals by which we are surrounded, oblige us to be constantly on the alert in body and in mind, to guard against the various forms of evil.

  No man, by his own individual care and exertion, can secure himself from evil; he requires assistance. Society therefore is as ancient as the world. This society consists sometimes of too many, and sometimes of too few. The vicissitudes of the world have often destroyed whole races of men and other animals, in many countries, and have multiplied them in others.

  To enable a species to multiply, a tolerable climate and soil are necessary; and even with these advantages, men may be under the necessity of going unclothed, of suffering hunger, of being destitute of everything, and of perishing in misery.

  Men are not like beavers, or bees, or silk-worms; they have no sure and infallible instinct which procures for them necessaries. Among a hundred men, there is scarcely one that possesses genius; and among women, scarcely one among five hundred.

  It is only by means of genius that those arts are invented, which eventually furnish something of that accommodation which is the great object of all policy.

  To attempt these arts with success, the assistance of others is requisite; hands to aid you, and minds sufficiently acute and unprejudiced to comprehend you, and sufficiently docile to obey you. Before, however, all this can be discovered and brought together, thousands of years roll on in ignorance and barbarism; thousands of efforts for improvement terminate only in abortion. At length, the outlines of an art are formed, but thousands of ages are still requisite to carry it to perfection.

  Foreign Policy.

  When any one nation has become acquainted with metallurgy, it will certainly beat its neighbors and make slaves of them. You possess arrows and sabres, and were born in a climate that has rendered you robust. We are weak, and have only clubs and stones. You kill us, or if you permit us to live, it is that we may till your fields and build your houses. We sing some rustic ditty to dissipate your spleen or animate your languor, if we have any voice; or we blow on some pipes, in order to obtain from you clothing and bread. If our wives and daughters are handsome, you appropriate them without scruple to yourselves. The young gentleman, your son, not only takes advantage of the established policy, but adds new discoveries to this growing art. His servants proceed, by his orders, to emasculate my unfortunate boys, whom he then honors with the guardianship of his wives and mistresses. Such has been policy, the great art of making mankind contribute to individual advantage and enjoyment; and such is still policy throughout the largest portion of Asia.

  Some nations, or rather hordes, having thus by superior strength and skill brought into subjection others, begin afterwards to fight with one another for the division of the spoil. Each petty nation maintains and pays soldiers. To encourage, and at the same time to control these soldiers, each possesses its gods, its oracles, and prophecies; each maintains and pays its soothsayers and slaughtering priests. These soothsayers or augurs begin with prophesying in favor of the heads of the nation; they afterwards prophesy for themselves and obtain a share in the government. The most powerful and shrewd prevail at last over the others, after ages of carnage which excite our horror, and of impostures which excite our laughter. Such is the regular course and completion of policy.

  While these scenes of ravage and fraud are carried on in one portion of the globe, other nations, or rather clans, retire to mountain caverns, or districts surrounded by inaccessible swamps, marshes, or some verdant and solitary spot in the midst of vast deserts of burning sand, or some peninsular and consequently easily protected territory, to secure themselves against the tyrants of the continent. At length all become armed with nearly the same description of weapons; and blood flows from one extremity of the world to the other.

  Men, however, cannot forever go on killing one another; and peace is consequently made, till either party thinks itself sufficiently strong to recommence the war. Those who can write draw up these treaties of peace; and the chiefs of every nation, with a view more successfully to impose upon their enemies, invoke the gods to attest with what sincerity they bind themselves to the observance of these compacts. Oaths of the most solemn character are invented and employed, and one party engages in the name of the great Somonocodom, and the other in that of Jupiter the Avenger, to live forever in peace and amity; while in the same names of Somonocodom and Jupiter, they take the first opportunity of cutting one another’s throats.

  In times of the greatest civilization and refinement, the lion of Æsop made a treaty with three animals, who were his neighbors. The object was to divide the common spoil into four equal parts. The lion, for certain incontestable and satisfactory reasons which he did not then deem it necessary to detail, but which he would be always ready to give in due time and place, first takes three parts out of the four for himself, and then threatens instant strangulation to whoever shall dare to touch the fourth. This is the true sublime of policy.

  Internal Policy.

  The object here is to accumulate for our own country the greatest quantity of power, honor, and enjoyment possible. To attain these in any extraordinary degree, much money is indispensable. In a democracy it is very difficult to accomplish this object. Every citizen is your rival; a democracy can never subsist but in a small territory. You may have wealth almost equal to your wishes through your own mercantile dealings, or transmitted in patrimony from your industrious and opulent grandfather; your fortune will excite jealousy and envy, but will purchase little real co-operation and service. If an affluent family ever bears sway in a democracy, it is not for a long time.

  In an aristocracy, honors, pleasures, power, and money, are more easily obtainable. Great discretion, however, is necessary. If abuse is flagrant, revolution will be the consequence. Thus in a democracy all the citizens are equal. This species of government is at present rare, and appears to but little advantage, although it is in itself natural and wise. In aristocracy, inequality or superiority makes itself sensibly felt; but the less arrogant its demeanor, the more secure and successful will be its course.

  Monarchy remains to be mentioned. In this, all mankind are made for one individual: he accumulates all honors with which he chooses to decorate himself, tastes all pleasures to which he feels an inclination, and exercises a power absolutely without control; provided, let it be remembered, that he has plenty of money. If he is deficient in that, he will be unsuccessful at home as well as abroad, and will soon be left destitute of power, pleasures, honors, and perhaps even of life.

  While this personage has money, not only is he successful and happy himself, but his relations and principal servants are flourishing in full enjoyment also; and an immense multitude of hirelings labor for them the whole year round, in the vain hope that they shall themselves, some time or other, enjoy in their cottages the leisure and comfort which their sultans and pashas enjoy in their harems. Observe, however, what will probably happen.

  A jolly, full-fed farmer was formerly in possession of a vast estate, consisting of fields, meadows, vineyards, orchards, and forests. A hundred laborers worked for him, while he dined with his family, drank his wine, and went to sleep. His principal domestics, who plundered him, dined next, and ate up nearly everything. Then came the laborers, for whom there was left only a very meagre and insufficient meal. They at first murmured, then openly complained, speedily lost all patience, and at last ate up the dinner prepared for their master, and turned him out of his house. The master said they were a set of scoundrels, a pack of undutiful and rebellious children who assaulted and abused their own father. The laborers replied that they had only obeyed the sacred law of nature, which he had violated. The dispute was finally referred to a soothsayer in the neighborhood, who was thought to be actually inspired. The holy man takes the farm into his own hands, and nearly famishes both the laborers and the master; till at length their feelings counteract their superstition, and the saint is in the end expelled in his turn. This is domestic policy.

  There have been more examples than one of this description; and some consequences of this species of policy still subsist in all their strength. We may hope that in the course of ten or twelve thousand ages, when mankind become more enlightened, the great proprietors of estates, grown also more wise, will on the one hand treat their laborers rather better, and on the other take care not to be duped by soothsayers.

  POLYPUS.

  In quality of a doubter, I have a long time filled my vocation. I have doubted when they would persuade me, that the glossopetres which I have seen formed in my fields, were originally the tongues of sea-dogs, that the lime used in my barn was composed of shells only, that corals were the production of the excrement of certain little fishes, that the sea by its currents has formed Mount Cenis and Mount Taurus, and that Niobe was formerly changed into marble.

  It is not that I love not the extraordinary, the marvellous, as well as any traveller or man of system; but to believe firmly, I would see with my own eyes, touch with my own hands, and that several times. Even that is not enough; I would still be aided by the eyes and hands of others.

  Two of my companions, who, like myself, form questions on the “Encyclopædia,” have for some time amused themselves with me in studying the nature of several of the little films which grow in ditches by the side of water lentils. These light herbs, which we call polypi of soft water, have several roots, from which circumstance we have given them the name of polypi. These little parasite plants were merely plants, until the commencement of the age in which we live. Leuenhoeck raises them to the rank of animals. We know not if they have gained much by it.

  We think that, to be considered as an animal, it is necessary to be endowed with sensation. They therefore commence by showing us, that these soft water polypi have feeling, in order that we should present them with our right of citizenship.

  We have not dared to grant it the dignity of sensation, though it appeared to have the greatest pretensions to it. Why should we give it to a species of small rush? Is it because it appears to bud? This property is common to all trees growing by the water-side; to willows, poplars, aspens, etc. It is so light, that it changes place at the least motion of the drop of water which bears it; thence it has been concluded that it walked. In like manner, we may suppose that the little, floating, marshy islands of St. Omer are animals, for they often change their place.

  It is said its roots are its feet, its stalk its body, its branches are its arms; the pipe which composes its stalk is pierced at the top—it is its mouth. In this pipe there is a light white pith, of which some almost imperceptible animalcules are very greedy; they enter the hollow of this little pipe by making it bend, and eat this light paste;—it is the polypus who captures these animals with his snout, though it has not the least appearance of head, mouth, or stomach.

  We have examined this sport of nature with all the attention of which we are capable. It appeared to us that the production called polypus resembled an animal much less than a carrot or asparagus. In vain we have opposed to our eyes all the reasonings which we formerly read; the evidence of our eyes has overthrown them. It is a pity to lose an illusion. We know how pleasant it would be to have an animal which could reproduce itself by offshoots, and which, having all the appearances of a plant, could join the animal to the vegetable kingdom.

  It would be much more natural to give the rank of an animal to the newly-discovered plant of Anglo-America, to which the pleasant name of Venus’ fly-trap has been given. It is a kind of prickly sensitive-plant, the leaves of which fold of themselves; the flies are taken in these leaves and perish there more certainly than in the web of a spider. If any of our physicians would call this plant an animal, he would have partisans.

  But if you would have something more extraordinary, more worthy of the observation of philosophers, observe the snail, which lives one and two whole months after its head is cut off, and which afterwards has a second head, containing all the organs possessed by the first. This truth, to which all children can be witnesses, is more worthy than the illusion of polypi of soft water. What becomes of its sensorium, its magazine of ideas, and soul, when its head is cut off? How do all these return? A soul which is renewed is a very curious phenomenon; not that it is more strange than a soul begotten, a soul which sleeps and awakes, or a condemned soul.

  POLYTHEISM.

  The plurality of gods is the great reproach at present cast upon the Greeks and Romans: but let any man show me, if he can, a single fact in the whole of their histories, or a single word in the whole of their books, from which it may be fairly inferred that they believed in many supreme gods; and if neither that fact nor word can be found, if, on the contrary, all antiquity is full of monuments and records which attest one sovereign God, superior to all other gods, let us candidly admit that we have judged the ancients as harshly as we too often judge our contemporaries.

  We read in numberless passages that Zeus, Jupiter, is the master of gods and men. “Jovis omnia plena.”—“All things are full of Jupiter.” And St. Paul gives this testimony in favor of the ancients: “In ipso vivimus, movemur, et sumus, ut quidam vestrorum poetarum dixit.”—“In God we live, and move, and have our being, as one of your own poets has said.” After such an acknowledgment as this, how can we dare to accuse our instructors of not having recognized a supreme God?

  We have no occasion whatever to examine upon this subject, whether there was formerly a Jupiter who was king of Crete, and who may possibly have been considered and ranked as a god; or whether the Egyptians had twelve superior gods, or eight, among whom the deity called Jupiter by the Latins might be one. The single point to be investigated and ascertained here is, whether the Greeks and Romans acknowledged one celestial being as the master or sovereign of other celestial beings. They constantly tell us that they do; and we ought therefore to believe them.

  The admirable letter of the philosopher Maximus of Madaura to St. Augustine is completely to our purpose: “There is a God,” says he, “without any beginning, the common Father of all, but who never produced a being like Himself. What man is so stupid and besotted as to doubt it?” Such is the testimony of a pagan of the fourth century on behalf of all antiquity.

  Were I inclined to lift the veil that conceals the mysteries of Egypt, I should find the deity adored under the name of Knef, who produced all things and presides over all the other deities; I should discover also a Mithra among the Persians, and a Brahma among the Indians, and could perhaps show, that every civilized nation admitted one supreme being, together with a multitude of dependent divinities. I do not speak of the Chinese, whose government, more respectable than all the rest, has acknowledged one God only for a period of more than four thousand years. Let us here confine ourselves to the Greeks and Romans, who are the objects of our immediate researches. They had among them innumerable superstitions—it is impossible to doubt it; they adopted fables absolutely ridiculous—everybody knows it; and I may safely add, that they were themselves sufficiently disposed to ridicule them. After all, however, the foundation of their theology was conformable to reason.

  In the first place, with respect to the Greeks placing heroes in heaven as a reward for their virtues, it was one of the most wise and useful of religious institutions. What nobler recompense could possibly be bestowed upon them; what more animating and inspiring hope could be held out to them? Is it becoming that we, above all others, should censure such a practice—we who, enlightened by the truth, have piously consecrated the very usage which the ancients imagined? We have a far greater number of the blessed in honor of whom we have created altars, than the Greeks and Romans had of heroes and demi-gods; the difference is, that they granted the apotheosis to the most illustrious and resplendent actions, and we grant it to the most meek and retired virtues. But their deified heroes never shared the throne of Jupiter, the great architect, the eternal sovereign of the universe; they were admitted to his court and enjoyed his favors. What is there unreasonable in this? Is it not a faint shadow and resemblance of the celestial hierarchy presented to us by our religion? Nothing can be of a more salutary moral tendency than such an idea; and the reality is not physically impossible in itself. We have surely, upon this subject, no fair ground for ridiculing nations to whom we are indebted even for our alphabet.

  The second object of our reproaches, is the multitude of gods admitted to the government of the world; Neptune presiding over the sea, Juno over the air, Æolus over the winds, and Pluto or Vesta over the earth, and Mars over armies. We set aside the genealogies of all these divinities, which are as false as those which are every day fabricated and printed respecting individuals among ourselves; we pass sentence of condemnation on all their light and loose adventures, worthy of being recorded in the pages of the “Thousand and One Nights,” and which never constituted the foundation or essence of the Greek and Roman faith; but let us at the same time candidly ask, where is the folly and stupidity of having adopted beings of a secondary order, who, whatever they may be in relation to the great supreme, have at least some power over our very differently-constituted race, which, instead of belonging to the second, belongs perhaps to the hundred thousandth order of existence? Does this doctrine necessarily imply either bad metaphysics or bad natural philosophy? Have we not ourselves nine choirs of celestial spirits, more ancient than mankind? Has not each of these choirs a peculiar name? Did not the Jews take the greater number of these names from the Persians? Have not many angels their peculiar functions assigned them? There was an exterminating angel, who fought for the Jews, and the angel of travellers, who conducted Tobit. Michael was the particular angel of the Hebrews; and, according to Daniel, he fights against the angel of the Persians, and speaks to the angel of the Greeks. An angel of inferior rank gives an account to Michael, in the book of Zachariah, of the state in which he had found the country. Every nation possessed its angel; the version of the Seventy Days, in Deuteronomy, that the Lord allotted the nations according to the number of angels. St. Paul, in the Acts of the Apostles, talks to the angel of Macedonia. These celestial spirits are frequently called gods in Scripture, “Eloim.” For among all nations, the word that corresponds with that of “Theos,” “Deus,” “Dieu,” “God,” by no means universally signifies the Sovereign Lord of heaven and earth; it frequently signifies a celestial being, a being superior to man, but dependent upon the great Sovereign of Nature; and it is sometimes bestowed even on princes and judges.

  Since to us it is a matter of truth and reality, that celestial substances actually exist, who are intrusted with the care of men and empires, the people who have admitted this truth without the light of revelation are more worthy of our esteem than our contempt.

  The ridicule, therefore, does not attach to polytheism itself, but to the abuse of it; to the popular fables of superstition; to the multitude of absurd divinities which have been supposed to exist and to the number of which every individual might add at his pleasure.

  The goddess of nipples, “dea Rumilia”; the goddess of conjugal union, “dea Pertunda”; the god of the water-closet, “deus Stercutius”; the god of flatulence, “deus Crepitus”; are certainly not calculated to attract the highest degree of veneration. These ridiculous absurdities, the amusement of the old women and children of Rome, merely prove that the word “deus” had acceptations of a widely different nature. Nothing can be more certain or obvious, than that the god of flatulence, “deus Crepitus,” could never excite the same idea as “deus divûm et hominum sator,” the source of gods and men. The Roman pontiffs did not admit the little burlesque and baboon-looking deities which silly women introduced into their cabinets. The Roman religion was in fact, in its intrinsic character, both serious and austere. Oaths were inviolable; war could not be commenced before the college of heralds had declared it just; and a vestal convicted of having violated her vow of virginity, was condemned to death. These circumstances announce a people inclined to austerities, rather than a people volatile, frivolous, and addicted to ridicule.

  I confine myself here to showing that the senate did not reason absurdly in adopting polytheism. It is asked, how that senate, to two or three deputies from which we were indebted both for chains and laws, could permit so many extravagances among the people, and authorize so many fables among the pontiffs? It would be by no means difficult to answer this question. The wise have in every age made use of fools. They freely leave to the people their lupercals and their saturnalia, if they only continue loyal and obedient; and the sacred pullets that promised victory to the armies, are judiciously secured against the sacrilege of being slaughtered for the table. Let us never be surprised at seeing, that the most enlightened governments have permitted customs and fables of the most senseless character. These customs and fables existed before government was formed; and no one would pull down an immense city, however irregular in its buildings, to erect it precisely according to line and level.

  How can it arise, we are asked, that on one side we see so much philosophy and science, and on the other so much fanaticism? The reason is, that science and philosophy were scarcely born before Cicero, and that fanaticism reigned for centuries. Policy, in such circumstances, says to philosophy and fanaticism: Let us all three live together as well as we can.

  POPERY.

  $

  —His highness has within his principality Lutherans, Calvinists, Quakers, Anabaptists, and even Jews; and you wish that he would admit Unitarians?)

  $

  —I must confess that a diminution of my wages would be more disagreeable to me than the admission of these persons; but, then, they do not believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.)

  $

  —Yes, sir; but neither do they believe in eternal punishments.)

  $

  —Ah, sir! it is very hard not to be able to damn at pleasure all the heretics in the world; but the rage which the Unitarian displays for rendering everybody finally happy is not my only complaint. Know, that these monsters believe the resurrection of the body no more than the Sadducees. They say, that we are all anthropophagi, and that the particles which compose our grandfathers and great-grandfathers, having been necessarily dispersed in the atmosphere, become carrots and asparagus, and that it is possible we may have devoured a portion of our ancestors.)

  $

  —And what, sir, do you say to original sin, which they boldly deny? Are you not scandalized by their assertion, that the Pentateuch says not a word about it, that the bishop of Hippo, St. Augustine, is the first who decidedly taught this dogma, although it is evidently indicated by St. Paul?)

  Treasurer.

  —Truly, if the Pentateuch does not mention it, that is not my fault. Why not add a text or two about original sin to the Old Testament, as it is said you have added on other subjects? I know nothing of these subtleties; it is my business only to pay you your stipend, when I have the money to do so.

  POPULATION.

  SECTION I.

  There were very few caterpillars in my canton last year, and we killed nearly the whole of them. God has rendered them this year more numerous than the leaves. Is it not nearly thus with other animals, and above all with mankind? Famine, pestilence, death, and the two sister diseases which have visited us from Arabia and America, destroy the inhabitants of a province, and we are surprised at finding it abound with people a hundred years afterwards.

  I admit that it is a sacred duty to people this world, and that all animals are stimulated by pleasure to fulfil this intention of the great Demiourgos. Why this inhabiting of the earth? and to what purpose form so many beings to devour one another, and the animal man to cut the throat of his fellow, from one end of the earth to the other? I am assured that I shall one day be in the possession of this secret, and in my character of an inquisitive man I exceedingly desire it.

  It is clear that we ought to people the earth as much as we are able; even our health renders it necessary. The wise Arabians, the robbers of the desert, in the treaties which they made with travellers, always stipulated for girls. When they conquered Spain, they imposed a tribute of girls. The country of Media pays the Turks in girls. The buccaneers brought girls from Paris to the little island of which they took possession; and it is related that, at the fine spectacle with which Romulus entertained the Sabines, he stole from them three hundred girls.

  I cannot conceive why the Jews, whom moreover I revere, killed everybody in Jericho, even to the girls; and why they say in the Psalms, that it will be sweet to massacre the infants at the mother’s breast, without excepting even girls. All other people, whether Tartars, Cannibals, Teutons, or Celts, have always held girls in great request.

  Owing to this happy instinct, it seems that the earth may one day be covered with animals of our own kind. Father Petau makes the inhabitants of the earth seven hundred millions, two hundred and eighty years after the deluge. It is not, however, at the end of the “Arabian Nights” that he has printed this pleasant enumeration.

  I reckon at present on our globe about nine hundred millions of contemporaries, and an equal number of each sex. Wallace makes them a thousand millions. Am I in error, or is he? Possibly both of us; but a tenth is a small matter; the arithmetic of historians is usually much more erroneous.

  I am somewhat surprised that the arithmetician Wallace, who extends the number of people at present existing to a thousand millions, should pretend in the same page, that in the year 966, after the creation, our forefathers amounted to sixteen hundred and ten millions.

  In the first place, I wish the epoch of the creation to be clearly established; and as, in our western world, we have no less than eighty theories of this event, there will be some difficulty to hit on the correct one. In the second place, the Egyptians, the Chaldæans, the Persians, the Indians, and the Chinese, have all different calculations; and it is still more difficult to agree with them. Thirdly, why, in the nine hundred and sixty-sixth year of the world, should there be more people than there are at present?

  To explain this absurdity, we are told that matters occurred otherwise than at present; that nature, being more vigorous, was better concocted and more prolific; and, moreover, that people lived longer. Why do they not add, that the sun was warmer, and the moon more beautiful.

  We are told, that in the time of Cæsar, although men had begun to greatly degenerate, the world was like an ant’s nest of bipeds; but that at present it is a desert. Montesquieu, who always exaggerates, and who sacrifices anything to an itching desire of displaying his wit, ventures to believe, and in his “Persian Letters” would have others believe, that there were thirty times as many people in the world in the days of Cæsar as at present.

  Wallace acknowledges that this calculation made at random is too much; but for what reason? Because, before the days of Cæsar, the world possessed more inhabitants than during the most brilliant period of the Roman republic. He then ascends to the time of Semiramis, and if possible exaggerates more than Montesquieu.

  Lastly, in conformity with the taste which is always attributed to the Holy Spirit for hyperbole, they fail not to instance the eleven hundred and sixty thousand men, who marched so fiercely under the standards of the great monarch, Josophat, or Jehosophat, king of the province of Judah. Enough, enough, Mr. Wallace; the Holy Spirit cannot deceive; but its agents and copyists have badly calculated and numbered. All your Scotland would not furnish eleven hundred thousand men to attend your sermons, and the kingdom of Judah was not a twentieth part of Scotland. See, again, what St. Jerome says of this poor Holy Land, in which he so long resided. Have you well calculated the quantity of money the great King Jehosophat must have possessed, to pay, feed, clothe, and arm eleven hundred thousand chosen men? But thus is history written.

  Mr. Wallace returns from Jehosophat to Cæsar, and concludes, that since the time of this dictator of short duration, the world has visibly decreased in the number of its inhabitants. Behold, said he, the Swiss: according to the relation of Cæsar, they amounted to three hundred and sixty-eight thousand, when they so wisely quitted their country to seek their fortunes, like the Cimbri.

  I wish by this example to recall those partisans into a little due consideration, who gift the ancients with such wonders in the way of generation, at the expense of the moderns. The canton of Berne alone, according to an accurate census, possesses a greater number of inhabitants than quitted the whole of Helvetia in the time of Cæsar. The human species is, therefore, doubled in Helvetia since that expedition.

  I likewise believe, that Germany, France, and England are much better peopled now than at that time; and for this reason: I adduce the vast clearance of forests, the number of great towns built and increased during the last eight hundred years, and the number of arts which have originated in proportion. This I regard as a sufficient answer to the brazen declamation, repeated every day in books, in which truth is sacrificed to sallies, and which are rendered useless by their abundant wit.

  “L’Ami des Hommes” says, that in the time of Cæsar fifty-two millions of men were assigned to Spain, which Strabo observes has always been badly peopled, owing to the interior being so deficient in water. Strabo is apparently right, and “L’Ami des Hommes” erroneous. But they scare us by asking what has become of the prodigious quantity of Huns, Alans, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Vandals, and Lombards, who spread like a torrent over Europe in the fifth century.

  I distrust these multitudes, and suspect that twenty or thirty thousand ferocious animals, more or less, were sufficient to overwhelm with fright the whole Roman Empire, governed by a Pulcheria, by eunuchs, and by monks. It was enough for ten thousand barbarians to pass the Danube; for every parish rumor, or homily, to make them more numerous than the locusts in the plains of Egypt; and call them a scourge from God, in order to inspire penitence, and produce gifts of money to the convents. Fear seized all the inhabitants, and they fled in crowds. Behold precisely the fright which a wolf caused in the district of Gevanden in the year 1766.

  Mandarin the robber, at the head of fifty vagabonds, put an entire town under contribution. As soon as he entered at one gate, it was said at the other, that he brought with him four thousand men and artillery. If Attila, followed by fifty thousand hungry assassins, ravaged province after province, report would call them five hundred thousand.

  The millions of men who followed Xerxes, Cyrus, Tomyris, the thirty or forty-four millions of Egyptians, Thebes with her hundred gates—“Et quicquid Grecia mendax audet in historia”—resemble the five hundred thousand men of Attila, which company of pleasant travellers it would have been difficult to find on the journey.

  These Huns came from Siberia, and thence I conclude that they came in very small numbers. Siberia was certainly not more fertile than in our own days. I doubt whether in the reign of Tomyris a town existed equal to Tobolsk, or that these frightful deserts can feed a great number of inhabitants.

  India, China, Persia, and Asia Minor were thickly peopled; this I can credit without difficulty; and possibly they are not less so at present, notwithstanding the destructive prevalence of invasions and wars. Throughout, Nature has clothed them with pasturage; the bull freely unites with the heifer, the ram with the sheep, and man with woman.

  The deserts of Barca, of Arabia, and of Oreb, of Sinai, of Jerusalem, of Gobi, etc., were never peopled, are not peopled at present, and never will be peopled; at least, until some natural revolution happens to transform these plains of sand and flint into fertile land.

  The land of France is tolerably good, and it is sufficiently inhabited by consumers, since of all kinds there are more than are well supplied; since there are two hundred thousand impostors, who beg from one end of the country to the other, and sustain their despicable lives at the expense of the rich; and lastly, since France supports more than eighty thousand monks, of which not a single one assists to produce an ear of corn.

  SECTION II.

  I believe that England, Protestant Germany, and Holland are better peopled in proportion than France. The reason is evident; those countries harbor not monks who vow to God to be useless to man. In these countries, the clergy, having little else to do, occupy themselves with study and propagation. They give birth to robust children, and give them a better education than that which is bestowed on the offspring of French and Italian marquises.

  Rome, on the contrary, would be a desert without cardinals, ambassadors, and travellers. It would be only an illustrious monument, like the temple of Jupiter Ammon. In the time of the first Cæsar, it was computed that this sterile territory, rendered fertile by manure and the labor of slaves, contained some millions of men. It was an exception to the general law, that population is ordinarily in proportion to fertility of soil.

  Conquest rendered this barren country fertile and populous. A form of government as strange and contradictory as any which ever astonished mankind, has restored to the territory of Romulus its primitive character. The whole country is depopulated from Orvieto to Terracina. Rome, reduced to its own citizens, would be to London only as one to twelve; and in respect to money and commerce, would be to the towns of Amsterdam and London as one to a thousand.

  That which Rome has lost, Europe has not only regained, but the population has almost tripled since the days of Charlemagne. I say tripled, which is much; for propagation is not in geometrical progression. All the calculations made on the idea of this pretended multiplication, amount only to absurd chimeras.

  If a family of human beings or of apes multiplied in this manner, at the end of two hundred years the earth would not be able to contain them. Nature has taken care at once to preserve and restrain the various species. She resembles the fates, who spin and cut threads continually. She is occupied with birth and destruction alone.

  If she has given to man more ideas and memory than to other animals; if she has rendered him capable of generalizing his ideas and combining them; if he has the advantage of the gift of speech, she has not bestowed on him that of multiplication equal to insects. There are more ants in a square league of heath, than of men in the world, counting all that have ever existed.

  When a country possesses a great number of idlers, be sure that it is well peopled; since these idlers are lodged, clothed, fed, amused, and respected by those who labor. The principal object, however, is not to possess a superfluity of men, but to render such as we have as little unhappy as possible.

  Let us thank nature for placing us in the temperate zone, peopled almost throughout by a more than sufficient number of inhabitants, who cultivate all the arts; and let us endeavor not to lessen this advantage by our absurdities.

  SECTION III.

  It must be confessed, that we ordinarily people and depopulate the world a little at random; and everybody acts in this manner. We are little adapted to obtain an accurate notion of things; the nearly is our only guide, and it often leads us astray.

  It is still worse when we wish to calculate precisely. We go and see farces and laugh at them; but should we laugh less in our closets when we read grave authors deciding exactly how many men existed on the earth two hundred and eighty-five years after the general deluge. We find, according to Father Petau, that the family of Noah had produced one thousand two hundred and twenty-four millions seven hundred and seventeen thousand inhabitants, in three hundred years. The good priest Petau evidently knew little about getting children and rearing them, if we are to judge by this statement.

  According to Cumberland, this family increased to three thousand three hundred and thirty millions, in three hundred and forty years; and according to Whiston, about three hundred years after the Deluge, they amounted only to sixty-five millions four hundred and thirty-six.

  It is difficult to reconcile and to estimate these accounts, such is the extravagance when people seek to make things accord which are repugnant, and to explain what is inexplicable. This unhappy endeavor has deranged heads which in other pursuits might have made discoveries beneficial to society.

  The authors of the English “Universal History” observe, it is generally agreed that the present inhabitants of the earth amount to about four thousand millions. It is to be remarked, that these gentlemen do not include in this number the natives of America, which comprehends nearly half of the globe. For my own part, if, instead of a common romance, I wished to amuse myself by reckoning up the number of brethren I have on this unhappy little planet, I would proceed as follows: I would first endeavor to estimate pretty nearly the number of inhabited square leagues this earth contains on its surface; I should then say: The surface of the globe contains twenty-seven millions of square leagues; take away two-thirds at least for seas, rivers, lakes, deserts, mountains, and all that is uninhabited; this calculation, which is very moderate, leaves us nine millions of square leagues to account for.

  In France and Germany, there are said to be six hundred persons to a square league; in Spain, one hundred and fifty; in Russia, fifteen; and Tartary, ten. Take the mean number at a hundred, and you will have about nine hundred millions of brethren, including mulattoes, negroes, the brown, the copper-colored, the fair, the bearded, and the unbearded. It is not thought, indeed, that the number is so great as this; and if eunuchs continue to be made, monks to multiply, and wars to be waged on the most trifling pretexts, it is easy to perceive that we shall not very soon be able to muster the four thousand millions, with which the English authors of the “Universal History” have so liberally favored us; but, then, of what consequence is it, whether the number of men on the earth be great or small? The chief thing is to discover the means of rendering our miserable species as little unhappy as possible.

  SECTION IV.
  
  Of the Population of America.

  The discovery of America—that field of so much avarice and so much ambition—has also become an object of philosophical curiosity. A great number of writers have endeavored to prove that America was a colony of the ancient world. Some modest mathematicians, on the contrary, have said, that the same power which has caused the grass to grow in American soil, was able to place man there; but this simple and naked system has not been attended to.

  When the great Columbus suspected the existence of this new world, it was held to be impossible; and Columbus was taken for a visionary. When it was really discovered, it was then found out that it had been known long before.

  It was pretended that Martin Behem, a native of Nuremberg, quitted Flanders about the year 1460, in search of this unknown world; that he made his way even to the Straits of Magellan, of which he left unknown charts. As, however, it is certain that Martin Behem did not people America, it must certainly have been one of the later grandchildren of Noah, who took this trouble. All antiquity is then ransacked for accounts of long voyages, to which they apply the discovery of this fourth quarter of the globe. They make the ships of Solomon proceed to Mexico, and it is thence that he drew the gold of Ophir, to procure which he borrowed them from King Hiram. They find out America in Plato, give the honor of it to the Carthaginians, and quote this anecdote from a book of Aristotle which he never wrote.

  Hornius pretends to discover some conformity between the Hebrew language and that of the Caribs. Father Lafiteau, the Jesuit, has not failed to follow up so fine an opening. The Mexicans, when greatly afflicted, tore their garments; certain people of Asia formerly did the same, and of course they are the ancestors of the Mexicans. It might be added, that the natives of Languedoc are very fond of dancing; and that, as in their rejoicings the Hurons dance also, the Languedocians are descended from the Hurons, or the Hurons from the Languedocians.

  The authors of a tremendous “Universal History” pretend that all the Americans are descended from the Tartars. They assure us that this opinion is general among the learned, but they do not say whether it is so among the learned who reflect. According to them, some descendants of Noah could find nothing better to do, than to go and settle in the delicious country of Kamchatka, in the north of Siberia. This family being destitute of occupation, resolved to visit Canada either by means of ships, or by marching pleasantly across some slip of connecting land, which has not been discovered in our own times. They then began to busy themselves in propagation, until the fine country of Canada soon becoming inadequate to the support of so numerous a population, they went to people Mexico, Peru, Chile; while certain of their great-granddaughters were in due time brought to bed of giants in the Straits of Magellan.

  As ferocious animals are found in some of the warm countries of America, these authors pretend, that the Christopher Columbuses of Kamchatka took them into Canada for their amusement, and carefully confined themselves to those kinds which are no longer to be found in the ancient hemisphere.

  But the Kamchatkans have not alone peopled the new world; they have been charitably assisted by the Mantchou Tartars, by the Huns, by the Chinese, and by the inhabitants of Japan. The Mantchou Tartars are incontestably the ancestors of the Peruvians, for Mango Capac was the first inca of Peru. Mango resembles Manco; Manco sounds like Mancu; Mancu approaches Mantchu, and Mantchou is very close to the latter. Nothing can be better demonstrated. As for the Huns, they built in Hungary a town called Cunadi. Now, changing Cu into Ca, we have Canadi, from which Canada manifestly derives its name.

  A plant resembling the ginseng of the Chinese, grows in Canada, which the Chinese transplanted into the latter even before they were masters of the part of Tartary where it is indigenous. Moreover, the Chinese are such great navigators, they formerly sent fleets to America without maintaining the least correspondence with their colonies.

  With respect to the Japanese, they are the nearest neighbors of America, which, as they are distant only about twelve hundred leagues, they have doubtless visited in their time, although latterly they have neglected repeating the voyage. Thus is history written in our own days. What shall we say to these, and many other systems which resemble them? Nothing.

  POSSESSED.

  Of all those who boast of having leagues with the devil, to the possessed alone it is of no use to reply. If a man says to you, “I am possessed,” you should believe it on his word. They are not obliged to do very extraordinary things; and when they do them, it is more than can fairly be demanded. What can we answer to a man who rolls his eyes, twists his mouth, and tells you that he has the devil within him? Everyone feels what he feels; and as the world was formerly full of possessed persons, we may still meet with them. If they take measures to conquer the world, we give them property and they become more moderate; but for a poor demoniac, who is content with a few convulsions, and does no harm to anyone, it is not right to make him injurious. If you dispute with him, you will infallibly have the worst of it. He will tell you, “The devil entered me to-day under such a form; from that time I have had a supernatural colic, which all the apothecaries in the world cannot assuage.” There is certainly no other plan to be taken with this man, than to exorcise or abandon him to the devil.

  It is a great pity that there are no longer possessed magicians or astrologers. We can conceive the cause of all these mysteries. A hundred years ago all the nobility lived in their castles; the winter evenings are long, and they would have died of ennui without these noble amusements. There was scarcely a castle which a fairy did not visit on certain marked days, like the fairy Melusina at the castle of Lusignan. The great hunter, a tall black man, hunted with a pack of black dogs in the forest of Fontainebleau. The devil twisted Marshal Fabert’s neck. Every village had its sorcerer or sorceress; every prince had his astrologer; all the ladies had their fortunes told; the possessed ran about the fields; it was who had seen the devil or could see him; all these things were inexhaustible subjects of conversation which kept minds in exercise. In the present day we insipidly play at cards, and we have lost by being undeceived.

  POST.

  Formerly, if you had one friend at Constantinople and another at Moscow, you would have been obliged to wait for their return before you could obtain any intelligence concerning them. At present, without either of you leaving your apartments, you may familiarly converse through the medium of a sheet of paper. You may even despatch to them by the post, one of Arnault’s sovereign remedies for apoplexy, which would be received much more infallibly, probably, than it would cure.

  If one of your friends has occasion for a supply of money at St. Petersburg, and the other at Smyrna, the post will completely and rapidly effect your business. Your mistress is at Bordeaux, while you are with your regiment before Prague; she gives you regular accounts of the constancy of her affections; you know from her all the news of the city, except her own infidelities. In short, the post is the grand connecting link of all transactions, of all negotiations. Those who are absent, by its means become present; it is the consolation of life.

  France, where this beautiful invention was revived, even in our period of barbarism, has hereby conferred the most important service on all Europe. She has also never in any instance herself marred and tainted so valuable a benefit, and never has any minister who superintended the department of the post opened the letters of any individual, except when it was absolutely necessary that he should know their contents. It is not thus, we are told, in other countries. It is asserted, that in Germany private letters, passing through the territories of five or six different governments, have been read just that number of times, and that at last the seal has been so nearly destroyed that it became necessary to substitute a new one.

  Mr. Craggs, secretary of state in England, would never permit any person in his office to open private letters; he said that to do so was a breach of public faith, and that no man ought to possess himself of a secret that was not voluntarily confided to him; that it is often a greater crime to steal a man’s thoughts than his gold; and that such treachery is proportionally more disgraceful, as it may be committed without danger, and without even the possibility of conviction.

  To bewilder the eagerness of curiosity and defeat the vigilance of malice, a method was at first invented of writing a part of the contents of letters in ciphers; but the part written in the ordinary hand in this case sometimes served as a key to the rest. This inconvenience led to perfecting the art of ciphers, which is called “stenography.”

  Against these enigmatical productions was brought the art of deciphering; but this art was exceedingly defective and inefficient. The only advantage derived from it was exciting the belief in weak and ill-formed minds, that their letters had been deciphered, and all the pleasure it afforded consisted in giving such persons pain. According to the law of probabilities, in a well-constructed cipher there would be two, three, or even four hundred chances against one, that in each mark the decipherer would not discover the syllable of which it was the representative.

  The number of chances increases in proportion to the complication of the ciphers; and deciphering is utterly impossible when the system is arranged with any ingenuity. Those who boast that they can decipher a letter, without being at all acquainted with the subject of which it treats, and without any preliminary assistance, are greater charlatans than those who boast, if any such are to be found, of understanding a language which they never learned.

  With respect to those who in a free and easy way send you by post a tragedy, in good round hand, with blank leaves, on which you are requested kindly to make your observations, or who in the same way regale you with a first volume of metaphysical researches, to be speedily followed by a second, we may just whisper in their ear that a little more discretion would do no harm, and even that there are some countries where they would run some risk by thus informing the administration of the day that there are such things in the world as bad poets and bad metaphysicians.

  POWER—OMNIPOTENCE.

  I presume every reader of this article to be convinced that the world is formed with intelligence, and that a slight knowledge of astronomy and anatomy is sufficient to produce admiration of that universal and supreme intelligence. Once more I repeat “mens agitat molem.”

  Can the reader of himself ascertain that this intelligence is omnipotent, that is to say, infinitely powerful? Has he the slightest notion of infinity, to enable him to comprehend the meaning and extent of almighty power?

  The celebrated philosophic historian, David Hume, says, “A weight of ten ounces is raised in a balance by another weight; this other weight therefore is more than ten ounces; but no one can rationally infer that it must necessarily be a hundred weight.”

  We may fairly and judiciously apply here the same argument. You acknowledge a supreme intelligence sufficiently powerful to form yourself, to preserve you for a limited time in life, to reward you and to punish you. Are you sufficiently acquainted with it to be able to demonstrate that it can do more than this? How can you prove by your reason that a being can do more than it has actually done?

  The life of all animals is short. Could he make it longer? All animals are food for one another without exception; everything is born to be devoured. Could he form without destroying? You know not what his nature is. It is impossible, therefore, that you should know whether his nature may not have compelled him to do only the very things which he has done.

  The globe on which we live is one vast field of destruction and carnage. Either the Supreme Being was able to make of it an eternal mode of enjoyment for all beings possessed of sensation, or He was not. If He was able and yet did not do it, you will undoubtedly tremble to pronounce or consider Him a maleficent being; but if He was unable to do so, do not tremble to regard Him as a power of very great extent indeed, but nevertheless circumscribed by His nature within certain limits.

  Whether it be infinite or not, is not of any consequence to you. It is perfectly indifferent to a subject whether his sovereign possesses five hundred leagues of territory or five thousand; he is in either case neither more nor less a subject. Which would reflect most strongly on this great and ineffable Being: to say He made miserable beings because it was indispensable to do so; or that He made them merely because it was His will and pleasure?

  Many sects represent Him as cruel; others, through fear of admitting the existence of a wicked Deity, are daring enough to deny His existence at all. Would it not be far preferable to say that probably the necessity of His own nature and that of things have determined everything?

  The world is the theatre of moral and natural evil; this is too decidedly found and felt to be the case; and the “all is for the best” of Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, and Pope, is nothing but the effusion of a mind devoted to eccentricity and paradox; in short, nothing but a dull jest.

  The two principles of Zoroaster and Manes, so minutely investigated by Bayle, are a duller jest still. They are, as we have already observed, the two physicians of Molière, one of whom says to the other: “You excuse my emetics, and I will excuse your bleedings.” Manichæism is absurd; and that circumstance will account for its having had so many partisans.

  I acknowledge that I have not had my mind enlightened by all that Bayle has said about the Manichæans and Paulicians. It is all controversy; what I wanted was pure philosophy. Why speak about our mysteries to Zoroaster? As soon as ever we have the temerity to discuss the critical subject of our mysteries, we open to our view the most tremendous precipices.

  The trash of our own scholastic theology has nothing to do with the trash of Zoroaster’s reveries. Why discuss with Zoroaster the subject of original sin? That subject did not become a matter of dispute until the time of St. Augustine. Neither Zoroaster nor any other legislator of antiquity ever heard it mentioned. If you dispute with Zoroaster, lock up your Old and New Testament, with which he had not the slightest acquaintance, and which it is our duty to revere without attempting to explain.

  What I should myself have said to Zoroaster would have been this: My reason opposes the admission of two gods in conflict with each other; such an idea is allowable only in a poem in which Minerva quarrels with Mars. My weak understanding much more readily acquiesces in the notion of only one Great Being, than in that of two great beings, of whom one is constantly counteracting and spoiling the operations of the other. Your evil principle, Arimanes, has not been able to derange a single astronomical and physical law established by the good principle of Oromazes; everything proceeds, among the numberless worlds which constitute what we call the heavens, with perfect regularity and harmony; how comes it that the malignant Arimanes has power only over this little globe of earth?

  Had I been Arimanes, I should have assailed Oromazes in his immense and noble provinces, comprehending numbers of suns and stars. I should never have been content to confine the war to an insignificant and miserable village. There certainly is a great deal of misery in this same village; but how can we possibly ascertain that it is not absolutely inevitable?

  You are compelled to admit an intelligence diffused through the universe. But in the first place, do you absolutely know that this intelligence comprises a knowledge of the future? You have asserted a thousand times that it does; but you have never been able to prove it to me, or to comprehend it yourself. You cannot have any idea how any being can see what does not exist; well, the future does not exist, therefore no being can see it. You are reduced to the necessity of saying that he foresees it; but to foresee is only to conjecture.

  Now a god who, according to your system, conjectures may be mistaken. He is, on your principles, really mistaken; for if he had foreseen that his enemy would poison all his works in this lower world, he would never have produced them; he would not have been accessory to the disgrace he sustains in being perpetually vanquished.

  Secondly, is he not much more honored upon my hypothesis, which maintains that he does everything by the necessity of his own nature, than upon yours, which raises up against him an enemy, disfiguring, polluting, and destroying all his works of wisdom and kindness throughout the world!

  In the third place, it by no means implies a mean and unworthy idea of God to say that, after forming millions of worlds, in which death and evil may have no residence, it might be necessary that death and evil should reside in this.

  Fourth, it is not deprecating God to say that He could not form man without bestowing on him self-love; that this self-love could not be his guide without almost always leading him astray; that his passions are necessary, but at the same time noxious; that the continuation of the species cannot be accomplished without desires; that these desires cannot operate without exciting quarrels; and that these quarrels necessarily bring on wars, etc.

  Fifth, on observing a part of the combinations of the vegetable, animal, and mineral kingdoms, and the porous nature of the earth, in every part so minutely pierced and drilled like a sieve, and from which exhalations constantly rrise in immense profusion, what philosopher will be bold enough, what schoolman will be weak enough, decidedly to maintain that nature could possibly prevent the ravages of volcanoes, the intemperature of seasons, the rage of tempests, the poison of pestilence, or, in short, any of those scourages which afflict the world?

  Sixth, a very great degree of power and skill are required to form lions who devour bulls, and to produce men who invent arms which destroy, by a single blow, not merely the life of bulls and lions, but—melancholy as the idea is—the life of one another. Great power is necessary to produce the spiders which spread their exquisitely fine threads and net-work to catch flies; but this power amounts not to omnipotence—it is not boundless power.

  In the seventh place, if the Supreme Being had been infinitely powerful, no reason can be assigned why He should not have made creatures endowed with sensation infinitely happy; He has not in fact done so; therefore we ought to conclude that He could not do so.

  Eighth, all the different sects of philosophers have struck on the rock of physical and moral evil. The only conclusion that can be securely reached is, that God, acting always for the best, has done the best that He was able to do.

  Ninth, this necessity cuts off all difficulties and terminates all disputes. We have not the hardihood to say: “All is good”; we say: “There is no more evil than was absolutely inevitable.”

  Tenth, why do some infants die at the mother’s breast? Why are others, after experiencing the first misfortune of being born, reserved for tormentes as lasting as their lives, which are at length ended by an appalling death? Why has the source of life been poisoned throughout the world since the discovery of America? Why, since the seventh century of the Christian era, has the smallpox swept away an eighth portion of the human species? Why, in every age of the world, have human bladders been liable to be converted into stone quarries? Why pestilence, and war, and famine, and the Inquisition? Consider the subject as carefully, as profoundly, as the powers of the mind will absolutely permit, you will find no other possible solution than that all is necessary.

  I address myself here solely to philosophers, and not to divines. We know that faith is the clue to guide us through the labyrinth. We know full well that the fall of Adam and Eve, original sin, the vast power communicated to devils, the predilection entertained by the Supreme Being for the Jewish people, and the ceremony of baptism substituted for that of circumcision, are answers that clear up every difficulty. We have been here arguing only against Zoroaster, and not against the University of Coimbra, to whose decisions and doctrines, in all the articles of our work, we submit with all possible deference and faith. See the letters of Memmius to Cicero; and answer them if you can.

  POWER.
  
  The Two Powers.

  SECTION I.

  Whoever holds both the sceptre and the censer has his hands completely occupied. If he governs a people possessed of common sense he may be considered as a very able man; but if his subjects have no more mind than children or savages, he may be compared to Bernier’s coachman, who was one day suddenly surprised by his master in one of the public places of Delhi, haranguing the populace, and distributing among them his quack medicines. “What! Lapierre,” says Bernier to him, “have you turned physician?” “Yes, sir,” replied the coachman; “like people, like doctor.”

  The dairo of the Japanese, or the grand lama of Thibet, might make just the same remark. Even Numa Pompilius, with his Egeria, would have answered Bernier in the same manner. Melchizedek was probably in a similar situation, as well as the Anius whom Virgil introduces in the following two lines of the third book of his “Æneid”:

  • Rex Anius, rex idem hominum Phœbique sacerdos,
  • Vittis et sacra redimitus tempora lauro.

  • —Virgil.

  • Anius, the priest and king, with laurel crowned
  • His hoary locks with purple fillets bound.

  • —Dryden.

  This charlatan Anius was merely king of the isle of Delos, a very paltry kingdom, which, next to those of Melchizedek and Yvetot, was one of the least considerable in the world; but the worship of Apollo had conferred on it a high reputation; a single saint is enough to raise any country into credit and consequence.

  Three of the German electors are more powerful than Anius, and, like him, unite the rights of the mitre with those of the crown; although in subordination, at least apparently so, to the Roman emperor, who is no other than the emperor of Germany. But of all the countries in which the plenitude of ecclesiastical and the plenitude of royal claims combine to form the most full and complete power that can be imagined, modern Rome is the chief.

  The pope is regarded in the Catholic part of Europe as the first of kings and the first of priests. It was the same in what was called “pagan” Rome; Julius Cæsar was at once chief pontiff, dictator, warrior, and conqueror; distinguished also both for eloquence and gallantry; in every respect the first of mankind; and with whom no modern, except in a dedication, could ever be compared.

  The king of England, being the head also of the Church, possesses nearly the same dignities as the pope. The empress of Russia is likewise absolute mistress over her clergy, in the largest empire existing upon earth. The notion that two powers may exist, in opposition to each other, in the same state, is there regarded even by the clergy themselves as a chimera equally absurd and pernicious.

  In this connection I cannot help introducing a letter which the empress of Russia, Catherine II., did me the honor to write to me at Mount Krapak, on Aug. 22, 1765, and which she permitted me to make use of as I might see occasion:

  “The Capuchins who are tolerated at Moscow (for toleration is general throughout the Russian empire, and the Jesuits alone are not suffered to remain in it), having, in the course of the last winter, obstinately refused to inter a Frenchman who died suddenly, under a pretence that he had not received the sacraments, Abraham Chaumeix drew up a factum, or statement, against them, in order to prove to them that it was obligatory upon them to bury the dead. But neither this factum, nor two requisitions of the governor, could prevail on these fathers to obey. At last they were authoritatively told that they must either bury the Frenchman or remove beyond the frontiers. They actually removed accordingly; and I sent some Augustins from this place, who were somewhat more tractable, and who, perceiving that no trifling or delay would be permitted, did all that was desired on the occasion. Thus Abraham Chaumeix has in Russia become a reasonable man; he absolutely is an enemy to persecution; were he also to become a man of wit and intellect, he would make the most incredulous believe in miracles; but all the miracles in the world will not blot out the disgrace of having been the denouncer of the ‘Encyclopedia.’

  “The subjects of the Church, having suffered many, and frequently tyrannical, grievances, which the frequent change of masters very considerably increased, towards the end of the reign of the empress Elizabeth, rose in actual rebellion; and at my accession to the throne there were more than a hundred thousand men in arms. This occasioned me, in 1762, to execute the project of changing entirely the administration of the property of the clergy, and to settle on them fixed revenues. Arsenius, bishop of Rostow, strenuously opposed this, urged on by some of his brother clergy, who did not feel it perfectly convenient to put themselves forward by name. He sent in two memorials, in which he attempted to establish the absurd principle of two powers. He had made the like attempt before, in the time of the empress Elizabeth, when he had been simply enjoined silence; but his insolence and folly redoubling, he was now tried by the metropolitan of Novgorod and the whole synod, condemned as a fanatic, found guilty of attempts contrary to the orthodox faith, as well as to the supreme power, deprived of his dignity and priesthood, and delivered over to the secular arm. I acted leniently towards him; and after reducing him to the situation of a monk, extended his punishment no farther.”

  Such are the very words of the empress; and the inference from the whole case is that she well knows both how to support the Church and how to restrain it; that she respects humanity as well as religion; that she protects the laborer as well as the priest; and that all orders in the state ought both to admire and bless her.

  I shall hope to be excused for the further indiscretion of transcribing here a passage contained in another of her letters, written on November 28, 1765:

  “Toleration is established among us; it constitutes a law of the state; persecution is prohibited. We have indeed fanatics who, as they are not persecuted by others, burn themselves; but if those of other countries also did the same, no great harm could result; the world, in consequence of such a system, would have been more tranquil, and Calas would not have been racked to death.”

  Do not imagine that she writes in this style from a feeling of transient and vain enthusiasm, contradicted afterwards in her practice, nor even from a laudable desire of obtaining throughout Europe the suffrages and applause of those who think, and teach others the way to think. She lays down these principles as the basis of her government. She wrote with her own hand, in the “Council of Legislations,” the following words, which should be engraved on the gates of every city in the world:

  “In a great empire, extending its sway over as many different nations as there are different creeds among mankind, the most pernicious fault would be intolerance.”

  It is to be observed that she does not hesitate to put intolerance in the rank of faults—I had nearly said offences. Thus does an absolute empress, in the depths of the North, put an end to persecution and slavery—while in the South—.

  Judge for yourself, sir, after this, whether there will be found a man in Europe who will not be ready to sign the eulogium you propose. Not only is this princess tolerant, but she is desirous that her neighbors should be so likewise. This is the first instance in which supreme power has been exercised in establishing liberty of conscience. It constitutes the grandest epoch with which I am acquainted in modern history.

  The case of the ancient Persians forbidding the Carthaginians to offer human sacrifices is a somewhat similar instance. Would to God, that instead of the barbarians who formerly poured from the plains of Scythia, and the mountains of Imaus and Caucasus, towards the Alps and Pyrenees, carrying with them ravage and desolation, armies might be seen at the present day descending to subvert the tribunal of the Inquisition—a tribunal more horrible than even the sacrifices of human beings which constitute the eternal reproach of our forefathers.

  In short, this superior genius wishes to convince her neighbors of what Europe is now beginning to comprehend, that metaphysical unintelligible opinions, which are the daughters of absurdity, are the mothers of discord; and that the Church, instead of saying: “I come to bring, not peace, but the sword,” should exclaim aloud: “I bring peace, and not the sword.” Accordingly the empress is unwilling to draw the sword against any but those who wish to crush the dissidents.

  SECTION II.

  Conversation Between the Reverend Father Bouvet, Missionary of the Company of Jesus, and the Emperor Camhi, in the Presence of Brother Attiret, a Jesuit; Extracted from the Private Memoirs of the Mission, in 1772.

  $

  Yes, may it please your sacred majesty, as soon as you will have had the happiness of being baptized by me, which I hope will be the case, you will be relieved of one-half of the immense burden which now oppresses you. I have mentioned to you the fable of Atlas, who supported the heavens on his shoulders. Hercules relieved him and carried away the heavens. You are Atlas, and Hercules is the pope. There will be two powers in your empire. Our excellent Clement will be the first. Upon this plan you will enjoy the greatest of all advantages; those of being at leisure while you live, and of being saved when you die.)

  $

  Nothing, may it please your Imperial Majesty, can be more easy. We are his vicars apostolic, and he is the vicar of God; you will therefore be governed by God Himself.)

  $

  Our vice-god is so kind and good that in general he will not take, at most, more than a quarter, except in cases of disobedience. Our emoluments will not exceed fifty million ounces of pure silver, which is surely a trifling object in comparison with heavenly advantages.)

  $

  I cannot exactly say that is yet the case; but, with God’s help and our own, I have no doubt it will be so.)

  $

  We have no regular wages; but we are somewhat like the principal female character in a comedy written by one Count Caylus, a countryman of mine; all that I . . . . is for myself.)

  $

  No, they do not! One-half of Europe has separated from him and pays him nothing; and the other pays him no more than it is obliged to pay.)

  $

  Yes; but it produces very little to him; it lies mostly uncultivated.)

  $

  Formerly, in one of our councils—that is, in one of our assemblies of priests, which was held in a city called Constance—our holy father caused a proposition to be made for a new tax for the support of his dignity. The assembly replied that any necessity for that would be perfectly precluded by his attending to the cultivation of his own lands. This, however, he took effectual care not to do. He preferred living on the produce of those who labor in other kingdoms. He appeared to think that this manner of living had an air of greater grandeur.)

  $

  Holy Virgin! I am absolutely taken for a fool!)

  the emperor.

  Begone, this instant! I have been too indulgent.

  brother attiret to father bouvet.

  I was right, you see, when I told you that the emperor, with all his excellence of heart, had also more understanding than both of us together.

  PRAYER (PUBLIC), THANKSGIVING, ETC.

  Very few forms of public prayers used by the ancients still remain. We have only Horace’s beautiful hymn for the secular games of the ancient Romans. This prayer is in the rhythm and measure which the other Romans long after imitated in the hymn, “Ut queat laxis resonare fibris.”

  The “Pervigilium Veneris” is written in a quaint and affected taste, and seems unworthy of the noble simplicity of the reign of Augustus. It is possible that this hymn to Venus may have been chanted in the festivals celebrated in honor of that goddess; but it cannot be doubted that the poem of Horace was chanted with much greater solemnity.

  It must be allowed that this secular poem of Horace is one of the finest productions of antiquity; and that the hymn, “Ut queat laxis,” is one of the most flat and vapid pieces that appeared during the barbarous period of the decline of the Latin language. The Catholic Church in those times paid little attention to eloquence and poetry. We all know very well that God prefers bad verses recited with a pure heart, to the finest verses possible chanted by the wicked. Good verses, however, never yet did any harm, and—all other things being equal—must deserve a preference.

  Nothing among us ever approached the secular games, which were celebrated at the expiration of every hundred and ten years. Our jubilee is only a faint and feeble copy of it. Three magnificent altars were erected on the banks of the Tiber. All Rome was illuminated for three successive nights; and fifteen priests distributed the lustral water and wax tapers among the men and women of the city who were appointed to chant the prayers. A sacrifice was first offered to Jupiter as the great god, the sovereign master of the gods; and afterwards to Juno, Apollo, Latona, Diana, Pluto, Proserpine, and the Fates, as to inferior powers. All these divinities had their own peculiar hymns and ceremonies. There were two choirs, one of twenty-seven boys, and the other of twenty-seven girls, for each of the divinities. Finally, on the last day, the boys and girls, crowned with flowers, chanted the ode of Horace.

  It is true that in private houses his other odes, for Ligurinus and Liciscus and other contemptible characters, were heard at table; performances which undoubtedly were not calculated to excite the finest feelings of devotion; but there is a time for all things, “pictoribus atque poetis.” Caraccio, who drew the figures of Aretin, painted saints also; and in all our colleges we have excused in Horace what the masters of the Roman Empire excused in him without any difficulty.

  As to forms of prayer, we have only a few slight fragments of that which was recited at the mysteries of Isis. We have quoted it elsewhere, but we will repeat it here, because it is at once short and beautiful:

  “The celestial powers obey thee; hell is in subjection to thee; the universe revolves under thy moving hand; thy feet tread on Tartarus; the stars are responsive to thy voice; the seasons return at thy command; the elements are obedient to thy will.”

  We repeat also the form supposed to have been used in the worship of the ancient Orpheus, which we think superior even to the above respecting Isis:

  “Walk in the path of justice; adore the sole Master of the Universe; He is One Alone, and self-existent; all other beings owe their existence to Him; He acts both in them and by them; He sees all, but has never been Himself seen by mortal eyes.”

  It is not a little extraordinary that in the Leviticus and Deuteronomy of the Jews, there is not a single public prayer, not one single formula of public worship. It seems as if the Levites were fully employed in dividing among themselves the viands that were offered to them. We do not even see a single prayer instituted for their great festivals of the Passover, the Pentecost, the trumpets, the tabernacles, the general expiation, or the new moon.

  The learned are almost unanimously agreed that there were no regular prayers among the Jews, except when, during their captivity at Babylon, they adopted somewhat of the manners, and acquired something of the sciences, of that civilized and powerful people. They borrowed all from the Chaldaic Persians, even to their very language, characters, and numerals; and joining some new customs to their old Egyptian rites, they became a new people, so much the more superstitious than before, in consequence of their being, after the conclusion of a long captivity, still always dependent upon their neighbors.

  • . . . . . In rebus acerbis
  • Arcius advertunt animos ad religionem.

  • —Lucretius. book iii., 52, 53.

  • . . . . . The common rout,
  • When cares and dangers press, grow more devout.

  • —Creech.

  With respect to the ten other tribes who had been previously dispersed, we may reasonably believe that they were as destitute of public forms of prayer as the two others, and that they had not, even up to the period of their dispersion, any fixed and well-defined religion, as they abandoned that which they professed with so much facility, and forgot even their own name, which cannot be said of the small number of unfortunate beings who returned to rebuild Jerusalem.

  It is, therefore, at that period that the two tribes, or rather the two tribes and a half, seemed to have first attached themselves to certain invariable rites, to have written books, and used regular prayers. It is not before that time that we begin to see among them forms of prayer. Esdras ordained two prayers for every day, and added a third for the Sabbath; it is even said that he instituted eighteen prayers, that there might be room for selection, and also to afford variety in the service. The first of these begins in the following manner:

  “Blessed be Thou, O Lord God of our fathers, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; the great God, the powerful, the terrible, the most high, the liberal distributor of good things, the former and possessor of the world, who rememberest good actions, and sendest a Redeemer to their descendants for Thy name’s sake. O King, our help and Saviour, our buckler, blessed be Thou, O Lord, the buckler of our father Abraham.”

  It is asserted that Gamaliel, who lived in the time of Jesus Christ, and who had such violent quarrels with St. Paul, ordered a nineteenth prayer, which is as follows:

  “Grant peace, benefits, blessing, favor, kindness, and piety to us, and to Thy people Israel. Bless us, O our Father! bless us altogether with the light of Thy countenance; for by the light of Thy countenance Thou hast given us, O Lord our God, the law of life, love, kindness, equity, blessing, piety, and peace. May it please Thee to bless, through all time, and at every moment, Thy people Israel, by giving them peace. Blessed be Thou, O Lord, who blessest Thy people Israel by giving them peace. Amen.”

  There is one circumstance deserving of remark with regard to many prayers, which is, that every nation has prayed for the direct contrary events to those prayed for by their neighbors.

  The Jews, for example, prayed that God would exterminate the Syrians, Babylonians, and Egyptians; and these prayed that God would exterminate the Jews; and, accordingly, they may be said to have been so, with respect to the ten tribes, who have been confounded and mixed up with so many nations; and the remaining two tribes were more unfortunate still; for, as they obstinately persevered in remaining separate from all other nations in the midst of whom they dwelt, they were deprived of the grand advantages of human society.

  In our own times, in the course of the wars that we so frequently undertake for the sake of particular cities, or even perhaps villages, the Germans and Spaniards, when they happened to be the enemies of the French, prayed to the Holy Virgin, from the bottom of their hearts, that she would completely defeat the Gauls and the Gavaches, who in their turn supplicated her, with equal importunity, to destroy the Maranes and the Teutons.

  In England advocates of the red rose offered up to St. George the most ardent prayers to prevail upon him to sink all the partisans of the white rose to the bottom of the sea. The white rose was equally devout and importunate for the very opposite event. We can all of us have some idea of the embarrassment which this must have caused St. George; and if Henry VII. had not come to his assistance, St. George would never have been able to get extricated from it.

  SECTION II.

  We know of no religion without prayers; even the Jews had them, although there was no public form of prayer among them before the time when they sang their canticles in their synagogues, which did not take place until a late period.

  The people of all nations, whether actuated by desires or fears, have invoked the assistance of the Divinity. Philosophers, however, more respectful to the Supreme Being, and rising more above human weakness, have been habituated to substitute, for prayer, resignation. This, in fact, is all that appears proper and suitable between creature and Creator. But philosophy is not adapted to the great mass of mankind; it soars too high above the vulgar; it speaks a language they are unable to comprehend. To propose philosophy to them would be just as weak as to propose the study of conic sections to peasants or fish-women.

  Among the philosophers themselves, I know of no one besides Maximus Tyrius who has treated of this subject. The following is the substance of his ideas upon it: “The designs of God exist from all eternity. If the object prayed for be conformable to His immutable will, it must be perfectly useless to request of Him the very thing which He has determined to do. If He is prayed to for the reverse of what He has determined to do, He is prayed to be weak, fickle, and inconstant; such a prayer implies that this is thought to be His character, and is nothing better than ridicule or mockery of Him. You either request of Him what is just and right, in which case He ought to do it, and it will be actually done without any solicitation, which in fact shows distrust of His rectitude; or what you request is unjust, and then you insult Him. You are either worthy or unworthy of the favor you implore: if worthy, He knows it better than you do yourself; if unworthy, you commit an additional crime in requesting that which you do not merit.”

  In a word, we offer up prayers to God only because we have made Him after our own image. We treat Him like a pasha, or a sultan, who is capable of being exasperated and appeased. In short, all nations pray to God: the sage is resigned, and obeys Him. Let us pray with the people, and let us be resigned to Him with the sage.

  We have already spoken of the public prayers of many nations, and of those of the Jews. That people have had one from time immemorial, which deserves all our attention, from its resemblance to the prayer taught us by Jesus Christ Himself. This Jewish prayer is called the Kadish, and begins with these words: “O, God! let Thy name be magnified and sanctified; make Thy kingdom to prevail; let redemption flourish, and the Messiah come quickly!”

  As this Kadish is recited in Chaldee it has induced the belief that it is as ancient as the captivity, and that it was at that period that the Jews began to hope for a Messiah, a Liberator, or Redeemer, whom they have since prayed for in the seasons of their calamities.

  The circumstance of this word “Messiah” being found in this ancient prayer has occasioned much controversy on the subject of the history of this people. If the prayer originated during the Babylonish captivity, it is evident that the Jews at that time must have hoped for and expected a Redeemer. But whence does it arise, that in times more dreadfully calamitous still, after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, neither Josephus nor Philo ever mentioned any expectation of a Messiah? There are obscurities in the history of every people; but those of the Jews form an absolute and perpetual chaos. It is unfortunate for those who are desirous of information, that the Chaldæans and Egyptians have lost their archives, while the Jews have preserved theirs.

  PREJUDICE.

  Prejudice is an opinion without judgment. Thus, throughout the world, children are inspired with opinions before they can judge. There are universal and necessary prejudices, and these even constitute virtue. In all countries, children are taught to acknowledge a rewarding and punishing God; to respect and love their fathers and mothers; to regard theft as a crime, and interested lying as a vice, before they can tell what is a virtue or a vice. Prejudice may, therefore, be very useful, and such as judgment will ratify when we reason.

  Sentiment is not simply prejudice, it is something much stronger. A mother loves not her son because she is told that she must love him; she fortunately cherishes him in spite of herself. It is not through prejudice that you run to the aid of an unknown child nearly falling down a precipice, or being devoured by a beast.

  But it is through prejudice that you will respect a man dressed in certain clothes, walking gravely, and talking at the same time. Your parents have told you that you must bend to this man; you respect him before you know whether he merits your respect; you grow in age and knowledge; you perceive that this man is a quack, made up of pride, interest, and artifice; you despise that which you revered, and prejudice yields to judgment. Through prejudice, you have believed the fables with which your infancy was lulled: you are told that the Titans made war against the gods, that Venus was amorous of Adonis; at twelve years of age you take these fables for truth; at twenty, you regard them as ingenious allegories.

  Let us examine, in a few words, the different kinds of prejudices, in order to arrange our ideas. We shall perhaps be like those who, in the time of the scheme of Law, perceived that they had calculated upon imaginary riches.

  Prejudices of the Senses.

  Is it not an amusing thing, that our eyes always deceive us, even when we see very well, and that on the contrary our ears do not? When your properly-formed ear hears: “You are beautiful; I love you,” it is very certain that the words are not: “I hate you; you are ugly;” but you see a smooth mirror—it is demonstrated that you are deceived; it is a very rough surface. You see the sun about two feet in diameter; it is demonstrated that it is a million times larger than the earth.

  It seems that God has put truth into your ears, and error into your eyes; but study optics, and you will perceive that God has not deceived you, and that it was impossible for objects to appear to you otherwise than you see them in the present state of things.

  Physical Prejudices.

  The sun rises, the moon also, the earth is immovable; these are natural physical prejudices. But that crabs are good for the blood, because when boiled they are of the same color; that eels cure paralysis, because they frisk about; that the moon influences our diseases, because an invalid was one day observed to have an increase of fever during the wane of the moon: these ideas and a thousand others were the errors of ancient charlatans, who judged without reason, and who, being themselves deceived, deceived others.

  Historical Prejudices.

  The greater part of historians have believed without examining, and this confidence is a prejudice. Fabius Pictor relates, that, several ages before him, a vestal of the town of Alba, going to draw water in her pitcher, was violated, that she was delivered of Romulus and Remus, that they were nourished by a she-wolf. The Roman people believed this fable; they examined not whether at that time there were vestals in Latium; whether it was likely that the daughter of a king should go out of her convent with a pitcher, or whether it was probable that a she-wolf should suckle two children, instead of eating them: prejudice established it.

  A monk writes that Clovis, being in great danger at the battle of Tolbiac, made a vow to become a Christian if he escaped; but is it natural that he should address a strange god on such an occasion? Would not the religion in which he was born have acted the most powerfully? Where is the Christian who, in a battle against the Turks, would not rather address himself to the holy Virgin Mary, than to Mahomet? He adds, that a pigeon brought the vial in his beak to anoint Clovis, and that an angel brought the oriflamme to conduct him: the prejudiced believed all the stories of this kind. Those who are acquainted with human nature well know, that the usurper Clovis, and the usurper Rollo, or Rol, became Christians to govern the Christians more securely; as the Turkish usurpers became Mussulmans to govern the Mussulmans more securely.

  Religious Prejudices.

  If your nurse has told you, that Ceres presides over corn, or that Vishnu and Xaca became men several times, or that Sammonocodom cut down a forest, or that Odin expects you in his hall near Jutland, or that Mahomet, or some other, made a journey to heaven; finally, if your preceptor afterwards thrusts into your brain what your nurse has engraven on it, you will possess it for life. If your judgment would rise above these prejudices, your neighbors, and above all, the ladies, exclaim “impiety!” and frighten you; your dervish, fearing to see his revenue diminished, accuses you before the cadi; and this cadi, if he can, causes you to be impaled, because he would command fools, and he believes that fools obey better than others; which state of things will last until your neighbors and the dervish and cadi begin to comprehend that folly is good for nothing, and that persecution is abominable.

  PRESBYTERIAN.

  The Anglican religion is predominant only in England and Ireland; Presbyterianism is the established religion of Scotland. This Presbyterianism is nothing more than pure Calvinism, such as once existed in France, and still exists at Geneva.

  In comparison with a young and lively French bachelor in divinity, brawling during the morning in the schools of theology, and singing with the ladies in the evening, a Church-of-England divine is a Cato; but this Cato is himself a gallant in presence of the Scottish Presbyterians. The latter affect a solemn walk, a serious demeanor, a large hat, a long robe beneath a short one, and preach through the nose. All churches in which the ecclesiastics are so happy as to receive an annual income of fifty thousand livres, and to be addressed by the people as “my lord,” “your grace,” or “your eminence,” they denominate the whore of Babylon. These gentlemen have also several churches in England, where they maintain the same manners and gravity as in Scotland. It is to them chiefly that the English are indebted for the strict sanctification of Sunday throughout the three kingdoms. They are forbidden either to labor or to amuse themselves. No opera, no concert, no comedy, in London on a Sunday. Even cards are expressly forbidden; and there are only certain people of quality, who are deemed open souls, who play on that day. The rest of the nation attend sermons, taverns, and their small affairs of love.

  Although Episcopacy and Presbyterianism predominate in Great Britain, all other opinions are welcome and live tolerably well together, although the various preachers reciprocally detest one another with nearly the same cordiality as a Jansenist damns a Jesuit.

  Enter into the Royal Exchange of London, a place more respectable than many courts, in which deputies from all nations assemble for the advantage of mankind. There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian bargain with one another as if they were of the same religion, and bestow the name of infidel on bankrupts only. There the Presbyterian gives credit to the Anabaptist, and the votary of the establishment accepts the promise of the Quaker. On the separation of these free and pacific assemblies, some visit the synagogue, others repair to the tavern. Here one proceeds to baptize his son in a great tub, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; there another deprives his boy of a small portion of his foreskin, and mutters over the child some Hebrew words which he cannot understand; a third kind hasten to their chapels to wait for the inspiration of the Lord with their hats on; and all are content.

  

  John Calvin.

  Was there in London but one religion, despotism might be apprehended; if two only, they would seek to cut each other’s throats; but as there are at least thirty, they live together in peace and happiness.

  PRETENSIONS.

  There is not a single prince in Europe who does not assume the title of sovereign of a country possessed by his neighbor. This political madness is unknown in the rest of the world. The king of Boutan never called himself emperor of China; nor did the sovereign of Tartary ever assume the title of king of Egypt.

  The most splendid and comprehensive pretensions have always been those of the popes; two keys, saltier, gave them clear and decided possession of the kingdom of heaven. They bound and unbound everything on earth. This ligature made them masters of the continent; and St. Peter’s nets gave them the dominion of the seas.

  Many learned theologians thought, that when these gods were assailed by the Titans, called Lutherans, Anglicans, and Calvinists, etc., they themselves reduced some articles of their pretensions. It is certain that many of them became more modest, and that their celestial court attended more to propriety and decency; but their pretensions were renewed on every opportunity that offered. No other proof is necessary than the conduct of Aldobrandini, Clement VIII., to the great Henry IV., when it was deemed necessary to give him an absolution that he had no occasion for, on account of his being already absolved by the bishops of his own kingdom, and also on account of his being victorious.

  Aldobrandini at first resisted for a whole year, and refused to acknowledge the duke of Nemours as the ambassador of France. At last he consented to open to Henry the gate of the kingdom of heaven, on the following conditions:

  1. That Henry should ask pardon for having made the sub-porters—that is, the bishops—open the gate to him, instead of applying to the grand porter.

  2. That he should acknowledge himself to have forfeited the throne of France till Aldobrandini, by the plenitude of his power, reinstated him on it.

  3. That he should be a second time consecrated and crowned; the first coronation having been null and void, as it was performed without the express order of Aldobrandini.

  4. That he should expel all the Protestants from his kingdom; which would have been neither honorable nor possible. It would not have been honorable, because the Protestants had profusely shed their blood to establish him as king of France; and it would not have been possible, as the number of these dissidents amounted to two millions.

  5. That he should immediately make war on the Grand Turk, which would not have been more honorable or possible than the last condition, as the Grand Turk had recognized him as king of France at a time when Rome refused to do so, and as Henry had neither troops, nor money, nor ships, to engage in such an insane war with his faithful ally.

  6. That he should receive in an attitude of complete prostration the absolution of the pope’s legate, according to the usual form in which it is administered; that is in fact, that he should be actually scourged by the legate.

  7. That he should recall the Jesuits, who had been expelled from his kingdom by the parliament for the attempt made to assassinate him by Jean Châtel, their scholar.

  I omit many other minor pretensions. Henry obtained a mitigation of a number of them. In particular, he obtained the concession, although with a great deal of difficulty, that the scourging should be inflicted only by proxy, and by the hand of Aldobrandini himself.

  You will perhaps tell me, that his holiness was obliged to require those extravagant conditions by that old and inveterate demon of the South, Philip II., who was more powerful at Rome than the pope himself. You compare Aldobrandini to a contemptible poltroon of a soldier whom his colonel forces forward to the trenches by caning him.

  To this I answer, that Clement VIII. was indeed afraid of Philip II., but that he was not less attached to the rights of the tiara; and that it was so exquisite a gratification for the grandson of a banker to scourge a king of France, that Aldobrandini would not altogether have conceded this point for the world.

  You will reply, that should a pope at present renew such pretensions, should he now attempt to apply the scourge to a king of France, or Spain, or Naples, or to a duke of Parma, for having driven the reverend fathers, the Jesuits, from their dominions, he would be in imminent danger of incurring the same treatment as Clement VII. did from Charles V., and even of experiencing still greater humiliations; that it is necessary to sacrifice pretensions to interests; that men must yield to times and circumstances; and that the sheriff of Mecca must proclaim Ali Bey king of Egypt, if he is successful and firm upon the throne. To this I answer, that you are perfectly right.

  Pretensions of the Empire; extracted from Glafey and Schwedar.

  Upon Rome (none). Even Charles V., after he had taken Rome, claimed no right of actual domain.

  Upon the patrimony of St. Peter, from Viterbo to Civita Castellana, the estates of the countess Mathilda, but solemnly ceded by Rudolph of Hapsburg.

  Upon Parma and Placentia, the supreme dominion as part of Lombardy, invaded by Julius II., granted by Paul III., to his bastard Farnese: homage always paid for them to the pope from that time; the sovereignty always claimed by the seigneurs of Lombardy; the right of sovereignty completely ceded to the emperor by the treaties of Cambray and of London, at the peace of 1737.

  Upon Tuscany, right of sovereignty exercised by Charles V.; an estate of the empire, belonging now to the emperor’s brother.

  Upon the republic of Lucca, erected into a duchy by Louis of Bavaria, in 1328; the senators declared afterwards vicars of the empire by Charles IV. The Emperor Charles VI., however, in the war of 1701, exercised in it his right of sovereignty by levying upon it a large contribution.

  Upon the duchy of Milan, ceded by the Emperor Wincenslaus to Galeas Visconti, but considered as a fief of the empire.

  Upon the duchy of Mirandola, reunited to the house of Austria in 1711 by Joseph I.

  Upon the duchy of Mantua, erected into a duchy by Charles V.; reunited in like manner in 1708.

  Upon Guastalla, Novellara, Bozzolo, and Castiglione, also fiefs of the empire, detached from the duchy of Mantua.

  Upon the whole of Montferrat, of which the duke of Savoy received the investiture at Vienna in 1708.

  Upon Piedmont, the investiture of which was bestowed by the emperor Sigismund on the duke of Savoy, Amadeus VIII.

  Upon the county of Asti, bestowed by Charles V., on the house of Savoy: the dukes of Savoy always vicars in Italy from the time of the emperor Sigismund.

  Upon Genoa, formerly part of the domain of the Lombard kings. Frederick Barbarossa granted to it in fief the coast from Monaco to Portovenere; it is free under Charles V., in 1529; but the words of the instrument are “In civitate nostra Genoa, et salvis Romani imperii juribus.”

  Upon the fiefs of Langues, of which the dukes of Savoy have the direct domain.

  Upon Padua, Vicenza, and Verona, rights fallen into neglect.

  Upon Naples and Sicily, rights still more fallen into neglect. Almost all the states of Italy are or have been in vassalage to the empire.

  Upon Pomerania and Mecklenburg, the fiefs of which were granted by Frederick Barbarossa.

  Upon Denmark, formerly a fief of the empire; Otho I. granted the investiture of it.

  Upon Poland, for the territory on the banks of the Vistula.

  Upon Bohemia and Silesia, united to the empire by Charles IV., in 1355.

  Upon Prussia, from the time of Henry VII.; the grand master of Prussia acknowledged a member of the empire in 1500.

  Upon Livonia, from the time of the knights of the sword.

  Upon Hungary, from the time of Henry II.

  Upon Lorraine, by the treaty of 1542; acknowledged an estate of the empire, paying taxes to support the war against the Turks.

  Upon the duchy of Bar down to the year 1311, when Philip the Fair, who conquered it, did homage for it.

  Upon the duchy of Burgundy, by virtue of the rights of Mary of Burgundy.

  Upon the kingdom of Arles and Burgundy on the other side of the Jura, which Conrad the Salian, possessed in chief by his wife.

  Upon Dauphiny, as part of the kingdom of Arles; the emperor Charles IV. having caused himself to be crowned at Arles in 1365, and created the dauphin of France his viceroy.

  Upon Provence, as a member of the kingdom of Arles, for which Charles of Anjou did homage to the empire.

  Upon the principality of Orange, as an arrièrefief of the empire.

  Upon Avignon, for the same reason.

  Upon Sardinia, which Frederick II. erected into a kingdom.

  Upon Switzerland, as a member of the kingdoms of Arles and Burgundy.

  Upon Dalmatia, a great part of which belongs at present wholly to the Venetians, and the rest to Hungary.

  PRIDE.

  Cicero, in one of his letters, says familiarly to his friend: “Send to me the persons to whom you wish me to give the Gauls.” In another, he complains of being fatigued with letters from I know not what princes, who thank him for causing their provinces to be erected into kingdoms; and he adds that he does not even know where these kingdoms are situated.

  It is probable that Cicero, who often saw the Roman people, the sovereign people, applaud and obey him, and who was thanked by kings whom he knew not, had some emotions of pride and vanity.

  Though the sentiment is not at all consistent in so pitiful an animal as man, yet we can pardon it in a Cicero, a Cæsar, or a Scipio; but when in the extremity of one of our half barbarous provinces, a man who may have bought a small situation, and printed poor verses, takes it into his head to be proud, it is very laughable.

  PRIESTS.

  Priests in a state approach nearly to what preceptors are in private families: it is their province to teach, pray, and supply example. They ought to have no authority over the masters of the house; at least until it can be proved that he who gives the wages ought to obey him who receives them. Of all religions the one which most positively excludes the priesthood from civil authority, is that of Jesus. “Give unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s.”—“Among you there is neither first nor last.”—“My kingdom is not of this world.”

  The quarrels between the empires and the priesthood, which have bedewed Europe with blood for more than six centuries, have therefore been, on the part of the priests, nothing but rebellion at once against God and man, and a continual sin against the Holy Ghost.

  From the time of Calchas, who assassinated the daughter of Agamemnon, until Gregory XII., and Sixtus V., two bishops who would have deprived Henry IV., of the kingdom of France, sacerdotal power has been injurious to the world.

  Prayer is not dominion, nor exhortation despotism. A good priest ought to be a physician to the soul. If Hippocrates had ordered his patients to take hellebore under pain of being hanged, he would have been more insane and barbarous than Phalaris, and would have had little practice. When a priest says: Worship God; be just, indulgent, and compassionate; he is then a good physician; when he says: Believe me, or you shall be burned; he is an assassin.

  The magistrate ought to support and restrain the priest in the same manner as the father of a family insures respect to the preceptor, and prevents him from abusing it. The agreement of Church and State is of all systems the most monstrous, for it necessarily implies division, and the existence of two contracting parties. We ought to say the protection given by government to the priesthood or church.

  But what is to be said and done in respect to countries in which the priesthood have obtained dominion, as in Salem, where Melchisedek was priest and king; in Japan, where the dairo has been for a long time emperor? I answer, that the successors of Melchisedek and the dairos have been set aside.

  The Turks are wise in this; they religiously make a pilgrimage to Mecca; but they will not permit the xerif of Mecca to excommunicate the sultan. Neither will they purchase from Mecca permission not to observe the ramadan, or the liberty of espousing their cousins or their nieces. They are not judged by imans, whom the xerif delegates; nor do they pay the first year’s revenue to the xerif. What is to be said of all that? Reader, speak for yourself.

  PRIESTS OF THE PAGANS.

  Father Navarette, in one of his letters to Don John of Austria, relates the following speech of the dalai-lama to his privy council: “My venerable brothers, you and I know very well that I am not immortal; but it is proper that the people should think so. The Tartars of great and little Thibet are people with stiff necks and little information, who require a heavy yoke and gross inventions. Convince them of my immortality, and the glory will reflect on you, and you will procure honors and riches.

  “When the time shall come in which the Tartars will be more enlightened, we may then confess that the grand lamas are not now immortal, but that their predecessors were so; and that what is necessary for the erection of a grand edifice, is no longer so when it is established on an immovable foundation.

  “I hesitated at first to distribute the agremens of my water-closet, properly inclosed in crystals ornamented with gilded copper, to the vassals of my empire; but these relics have been received with so much respect, that the usage must be continued, which after all exhibits nothing repugnant to sound morals, and brings much money into our sacred treasury.

  “If any impious reasoner should ever endeavor to persuade the people that one end of our sacred person is not so divine as the other—should they protest against our relics, you will maintain their value and importance to the utmost of your power.

  “And if you are finally obliged to give up the sanctity of our nether end, you must take care to preserve in the minds of the reasoners the most profound respect for our understanding, just as in a treaty with the Moguls, we have ceded a poor province, in order to secure our peaceable possession of the remainder.

  “So long as our Tartars of great and little Thibet are unable to read and write, they will remain ignorant and devout; you may therefore boldly take their money, intrigue with their wives and their daughters, and threaten them with the anger of the god Fo if they complain.

  “When the time of correct reasoning shall arrive—for it will arrive some day or other—you will then take a totally opposite course, and say directly the contrary of what your predecessors have said, for you ought to change the nature of your curb in proportion as the horses become more difficult to govern. Your exterior must be more grave, your intrigues more mysterious, your secrets better guarded, your sophistry more dazzling, and your policy more refined. You will then be the pilots of a vessel which is leaky on all sides. Have under you subalterns continually employed at the pumps, and as caulkers to stop all the holes. You will navigate with difficulty, but you will still proceed, and be enabled to cast into the fire or the water, as may be most convenient, all those who would examine whether you have properly refitted the vessel.

  “If among the unbelievers is a prince of Calkas, a chief of the Kalmucks, a prince of Kasan, or any other powerful prince, who has unhappily too much wit, take great care not to quarrel with him. Respect him, and continually observe that you hope he will return to the holy path. As to simple citizens, spare them not, and the better men they are, the more you ought to labor to exterminate them; for being men of honor they are the most dangerous of all to you. You will exhibit the simplicity of the dove, the prudence of the serpent, and the paw of the lion, according to circumstances.”

  The dalai-lama had scarcely pronounced these words when the earth trembled; lightnings sparkled in the firmament from one pole to the other; thunders rolled, and a celestial voice was heard to exclaim, “Adore God and not the grand lama.”

  All the inferior lamas insisted that the voice said, “Adore God and the grand lama;” and they were believed for a long time in the kingdom of Thibet; but they are now believed no longer.

  PRIOR, BUTLER, AND SWIFT.

  It was not known to France that Prior, who was deputed by Queen Anne to adjust the treaty of Utrecht with Louis XIV., was a poet. France has since repaid England in the same coin, for Cardinal Dubois sent our Destouches to London, where he passed as little for a poet as Prior in France. Prior was originally an attendant at a tavern kept by his uncle, when the earl of Dorset, a good poet himself and a lover of the bottle, one day surprised him reading Horace; in the same manner as Lord Ailsa found his gardener reading Newton. Ailsa made his gardener a good geometrician, and Dorset made a very agreeable poet of his vintner.

  It was Prior who wrote the history of the soul under the title of “Alma,” and it is the most natural which has hitherto been composed on an existence so much felt, and so little known. The soul, according to “Alma,” resides at first, in the extremities; in the feet and hands of children, and from thence gradually ascends to the centre of the body at the age of puberty. Its next step is to the heart, in which it engenders sentiments of love and heroism; thence it mounts to the head at a mature age, where it reasons as well as it is able; and in old age it is not known what becomes of it; it is the sap of an aged tree which evaporates, and is not renewed again. This work is probably too long, for all pleasantry should be short; and it might even be as well were the serious short also.

  Prior made a small poem on the battle of Hochstädt. It is not equal to his “Alma”; there is, however, one good apostrophe to Boileau, who is called a satirical flatterer for taking so much pains to sing that Louis did not pass the Rhine. Our plenipotentiary finished by paraphrasing, in fifteen hundred verses, the words attributed to Solomon, that “all is vanity.” Fifteen thousand verses might be written on this subject; but woe to him who says all which can be said upon it!

  At length Queen Anne dying, the ministry changed, and the peace adjusted by Prior being altogether unpopular, he had nothing to depend upon except an edition of his works; which were subscribed for by his party: after which he died like a philosopher, which is the usual mode of dying of all respectable Englishmen.

  Hudibras.

  There is an English poem which it is very difficult to make foreigners understand, entitled “Hudibras.” It is a very humorous work, although the subject is the civil war of the time of Cromwell. A struggle which cost so much blood and so many tears, originated a poem which obliges the most serious reader to smile. An example of this contrast is found in our “Satire of Menippus.” Certainly the Romans would not have made a burlesque poem on the wars of Pompey and Cæsar, or the proscription of Antony and Octavius. How then is it that the frightful evils of the League in France, and of the wars between the king and parliament in England, have proved sources of pleasantry? because at bottom there is something ridiculous hid beneath these fatal quarrels. The citizens of Paris, at the head of the faction of Sixteen, mingled impertinence with the miseries of faction. The intrigues of women, of the legates and of the monks, presented a comic aspect, notwithstanding the calamities which they produced. The theological disputes and enthusiasm of the Puritans in England, were also very open to raillery; and this fund of the ridiculous, well managed, might pleasantly enough aid in dispersing the tragical horrors which abound on the surface. If the bull Unigenitus caused the shedding of blood, the little poem “Philotanus” was no less suitable to the subject; and it is only to be complained of for not being so gay, so pleasant, and so various as it might have been; and for not fulfilling in the course of the work the promise held out by its commencement.

  The poem of “Hudibras” of which I speak, seems to be a composition of the satire of “Menippus” and of “Don Quixote.” It surpasses them in the advantage of verse and also in wit; the former indeed does not come near it; being a very middling production; but notwithstanding his wit, the author of “Hudibras” is much beneath “Don Quixote.” Taste, vivacity, the art of narrating and of introducing adventures, with the faculty of never being tedious, go farther than wit; and moreover, “Don Quixote” is read by all nations, and “Hudibras” by the English alone.

  Butler, the author of this extraordinary poem, was contemporary with Milton, and enjoyed infinitely more temporary popularity than the latter, because his work was humorous, and that of Milton melancholy. Butler turned the enemies of King Charles II. into ridicule, and all the recompense he received was the frequent quotation of his verses by that monarch. The combats of the knight Hudibras were much better known than the battles between the good and bad angels in “Paradise Lost”; but the court of England treated Butler no better than the celestial court treated Milton; both the one and the other died in want, or very near it.

  A man whose imagination was impregnated with a tenth part of the comic spirit, good or bad, which pervades this work, could not but be very pleasant; but he must take care how he translates “Hudibras.” It is difficult to make foreign readers laugh at pleasantries which are almost forgotten by the nation which has produced them. Dante is little read in Europe, because we are ignorant of so much of his allusion; and it is the same with “Hudibras.” The greater part of the humor of this poem being expended on the theology and theologians of its own time, a commentary is eternally necessary. Pleasantry requiring explanation ceases to be pleasantry; and a commentator on bon mots is seldom capable of conveying them.

  Of Dean Swift.

  How is it that in France so little is understood of the works of the ingenious Doctor Swift, who is called the Rabelais of England? He has the honor, like the latter, of being a churchman and an universal joker; but Rabelais was not above his age, and Swift is much above Rabelais.

  Our curate of Meudon, in his extravagant and unintelligible book, has exhibited extreme gayety and equally great impertinence. He has lavished at once erudition, coarseness and ennui. A good story of two pages is purchased by a volume of absurdities. There are only some persons of an eccentric taste who pique themselves upon understanding and valuing the whole of this work. The rest of the nation laugh at the humor of Rabelais, and despise the work; regarding him only as the first of buffoons. We regret that a man who possessed so much wit, should have made so miserable a use of it. He is a drunken philosopher, who wrote only in the moments of his intoxication.

  Dr. Swift is Rabelais sober, and living in good company. He has not indeed the gayety of the former, but he has all the finesse, sense, discrimination, which is wanted by our curate of Meudon. His verse is in a singular taste, and almost inimitable. He exhibits a fine vein of humor, both in prose and in verse; but in order to understand it, it is necessary to visit his country.

  In this country, which appears so extraordinary to other parts of Europe, it has excited little surprise that Doctor Swift, dean of a cathedral, should make merry in his “Tale of a Tub” with Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism; his own defence is that he has not meddled with Christianity. He pretends to respect the parent, while he scourges the children. Certain fastidious persons are of opinion that his lashes are so long they have even reached the father.

  This famous “Tale of a Tub” is the ancient story of the three invisible rings which a father bequeathed to his three children. These three rings were the Jewish, the Christian, and the Mahometan religions. It is still more an imitation of the history of Mero and Enégu by Fontenelle. Mero is the anagram of Rome; Enégu of Geneva, and they are two sisters who aspire to the succession of the kingdom of their father. Mero reigns the first, and Fontenelle represents her as a sorceress, who plays tricks with bread and effects conjuration with dead bodies. This is precisely the Lord Peter of Swift, who presents a piece of bread to his two brothers, and says to them, “Here is some excellent Burgundy, my friends; this partridge is of a delicious flavor.” Lord Peter in Swift performs the same part with the Mero of Fontenelle.

  Thus almost all is imitation. The idea of the “Persian Letters” was taken from that of the “Turkish Spy.” Boyardo imitated Pulci; Ariosto, Boyardo; the most original wits borrow from one another. Cervantes makes a madman of his Don Quixote, but is Orlando anything else? It would be difficult to decide by which of the two knight-errantry is more ridiculed, the grotesque portraiture of Cervantes, or the fertile imagination of Ariosto. Metastasia has borrowed the greater part of his operas from our French tragedies; and many English authors have copied us and said nothing about it. It is with books as with the fires in our grates; everybody borrows a light from his neighbor to kindle his own, which in its turn is communicated to others, and each partakes of all.

  PRIVILEGE—PRIVILEGED CASES.

  Custom, which almost always prevails against reason, would have the offences of ecclesiastics and monks against civil orders, which are very frequent, called privileged offences; and those offences common which regard only ecclesiastical discipline, cases that are abandoned to the sacerdotal hierarchy, and with which the civil power does not interfere.

  The Church having no jurisdiction but that which sovereigns have granted it, and the judges of the Church being thus only judges privileged by the sovereign, those cases should be called privileged which it is their province to judge, and those common offences which are punishable by the prince’s officers. But the canonists, who are very rarely exact in their expressions, particularly when treating of regal jurisprudence, having regarded a priest called the official, as being of right the sole judge of the clergy, they have entitled that privilege, which in common law belongs to lay tribunals, and the ordinances of the monarch have adopted this expression in France.

  To conform himself to this custom, the judge of the Church takes cognizance only of common crime; in respect to privileged cases he can act only concurrently with the regal judge, who repairs to the episcopal court, where, however, he is but the assessor of the judge of the Church. Both are assisted by their register; each separately, but in one another’s presence, takes notes of the course of the proceedings. The official who presides alone interrogates the accused; and if the royal judge has questions to put to him, he must have permission of the ecclesiastical judge to propose them.

  This procedure is composed of formalities, and produces delays which should not be admitted in criminal jurisprudence. Judges of the Church who have not made a study of laws and formalities are seldom able to conduct criminal proceedings without giving place to appeals, which ruin the accused in expense, make him languish in chains, or retard his punishment if he is guilty.

  Besides, the French have no precise law to determine which are privileged cases. A criminal often groans in a dungeon for a whole year, without knowing what tribunal will judge him. Priests and monks are in the state and subjects of it. It is very strange that when they trouble society they are not to be judged, like other citizens, by the officers of the sovereign.

  Among the Jews, even the high priest had not the privilege which our laws grant to simple parish priests. Solomon deposed the high priest Abiathar, without referring him to the synagogue to take his trial. Jesus Christ, accused before a secular and pagan judge, challenged not his jurisdiction. St. Paul, translated to the tribunal of Felix and Festus, declined not their judgment. The Emperor Constantine first granted this privilege to bishops. Honorius and Theodosius the younger extended it to all the clergy, and Justinian confirmed it.

  In digesting the criminal code of 1670, the counsellor of state, Pussort, and the president of Novion, wished to abolish the conjoint proceeding, and to give to royal judges alone the right of judging the clergy accused of privileged cases; but this so reasonable desire was combated by the first president De Lamoignon, and the advocate-general Talon, and a law which was made to reform our abuses confirmed the most ridiculous of them.

  A declaration of the king on April 26, 1657, forbids the Parliament of Paris to continue the proceeding commenced against Cardinal Retz, accused of high treason. The same declaration desires that the suits of cardinals, archbishops, and bishops of the kingdom, accused of the crime of high treason, are to be conducted and judged by ecclesiastical judges, as ordered by the canons.

  But this declaration, contrary to the customs of the kingdoms, has not been registered in any parliament, and would not be followed. Our books relate several sentences which have doomed cardinals, archbishops, and bishops to imprisonment, deposition, confiscation, and other punishments. These punishments were pronounced against the bishop of Nantes, by sentence of June 25, 1455; against Jean de la Balue, cardinal and bishop of Angers, by sentence dated July 29, 1469; Jean Hebert, bishop of Constance, in 1480; Louis de Rochechouart, bishop of Nantes, in 1481; Geoffroi de Pompadour, bishop of Périgueux, and George d’Amboise, bishop of Montauban, in 1488; Geoffroi Dintiville, bishop of Auxerre, in 1531; Bernard Lordat, bishop of Pumiers, in 1537; Cardinal de Châtillon, bishop of Beauvais, the 19th of March, 1569; Geoffroi de La Martonie, bishop of Amiens, the 9th of July, 1594; Gilbert Génébrard, archbishop of Aix, the 26th of January, 1596; William Rose, bishop of Senlis, September 5, 1598; Cardinal de Sourdis, archbishop of Bordeaux, November 17, 1615.

  The parliament sentenced Cardinal de Bouillon to be imprisoned, and seized his property on June 20, 1710.

  Cardinal de Mailly, archbishop of Rheims, in 1717, made a law tending to destroy the ecclesiastical peace established by the government. The hangman publicly burned the law by sentence of parliament.

  The sieur Languet, bishop of Soissons, having maintained that he could not be judged by the justice of the king even for the crime of high treason, was condemned to pay a fine of ten thousand livres.

  In the shameful troubles excited by the refusal of sacraments, the simple presidial of Nantes condemned the bishop of that city to pay a fine of six thousand francs for having refused the communion to those who demanded it.

  In 1764, the archbishop of Auch, of the name of Montillet, was fined, and his command, regarded as a defamatory libel, was burned by the executioner at Bordeaux.

  These examples have been very frequent. The maxim, that ecclesiastics are entirely amenable to the justice of the king, like other citizens, has prevailed throughout the kingdom. There is no express law which commands it; but the opinion of all lawyers, the unanimous cry of the nation, and the good of the state, are in themselves a law.

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  2: Heinrich Rommen, The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy [1936]

  Heinrich Rommen, The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, trans. Thomas R. Hanley. Introduction and Bibliography by Russell Hittinger (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1998).

  Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/676 on 2008-03-05

  The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.

  ---

  

  HEINRICH A. ROMMEN

  nihil obstat

  Matthaeus Britt, O.S.B.

  imprimi potest

  Raphael Heider, O.S.B.

  Abbas S. Martini de Lacey

  nihil obstat

  Ioannes McCorkle, S.S.

  Censor Librorum

  imprimatur

  Geraldus Shaughnessy, S.M.

  Episcopus Seattlensis

  Die 15 Ianuarii, 1946

  Introduction

  Heinrich Rommen is known in the United States primarily as the author of two widely read books on political philosophy, The State in Catholic Thought: A Treatise in Political Philosophy (1945) and The Natural Law (1947), and as a professor at Georgetown University (1953–67). Yet, before 1938, when he fled the Third Reich for the United States, Rommen was neither a scholar nor a university professor, but a professional lawyer—trained in civil and canon law—who had devoted considerable energies to Catholic social action during the dissolution of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazi Party. The two books that secured his academic reputation in the United States were written in Germany in the midst of his legal and political work, for which he was imprisoned by the Nazis.1

  Although The Natural Law displays erudition in a number of academic specialties (law, philosophy, history, theology), the reader will appreciate that the book was written by a lawyer in response to a political and legal crisis.2 As a practicing lawyer, Rommen watched with alarm as the Nazi party deftly used German legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions to impose totalitarian rule. “Our modern dictators,” he remarked, “are masters of legality.”3 “Hitler,” Rommen concluded, “aimed not a revolution, but at a legal grasp of power according to the formal democratic processes.”

  Every generation, it is said, finds a new reason for the study of natural law. For Rommen and many others of his generation, totalitarianism provided that occasion.4 As he put it in his book on the state, “When one of the relativist theories is made the basis of a totalitarian state, man is stirred to free himself from the pessimistic resignation that characterizes these relativist theories and to return to his principles.”5 Rommen’s writings were prompted by the spectacle of German legal professionals, who, while trained in the technicalities of positive law, were at a loss in responding to what he called “Adolf Légalité.”6

  What caused this loss of nerve, if not loss of moral perspective? Rommen points to the illusion that legal institutions are a sufficient bulwark against government by raw power—as though a system of positive law takes care of itself, requiring only the superintendence of certified professionals. “Forgotten is the fact that legal institutions themselves can be made the object of the non-legal power struggle. Who does not know that in a nation the courts or the judges themselves are subject to the power strife, showing itself in the public propaganda of contradictory social ideals?”7

  The reader will find that Rommen is relentlessly critical of legal positivism. He distinguishes between two different kinds of positivism.8 The first, he calls world view positivism. A world view positivist holds that human law is but a projection of force—proximately, legal force is the command of a sovereign; ultimately, however, the sovereign’s decree replicates the force(s) of nature, history, or class. Whereas the world view positivist makes metaphysical, scientific, or ideological claims about law, the second kind of positivism is methodological, and its adherents are committed to the seemingly more modest project of studying and describing the law just as it is, without recourse to metaphysical or even moral analysis.

  It is important to note that Rommen is not entirely critical of methodological positivism. He allows that so-called analytical jurisprudence can be subtle and refined.9 After all, lawyers should study law as it is—in the statute books, judicial decrees, and policies of the state. Yet, by consigning the moral predicates of law (good, bad, just, unjust) to a realm of ethics that is separated, rather than merely distinguished, from jurisprudence of the positive laws, the methodic positivists can become world view positivists by default. In Germany, their “tired agnosticism” with respect to the moral bases and ends of positive law left the German legal profession intellectually defenseless in the face of National Socialism.10

  In The Natural Law, Rommen traces the historical and philosophical roots of this “tired agnosticism.” He wants to show that the disrepair of constitutional democracy is the result of skepticism and agnosticism, which themselves are the cultural effects of disordered philosophy. The idea that the project of constitutional democracy suffered from philosophical neglect was a lesson drawn not only by Rommen but also by a number of other influential European émigrés to the United States. In 1938, the year that Rommen arrived in the United States, three other important émigrés debarked on these shores: the French political theorist Yves R. Simon, the Austrian legal philosopher Eric Voeglin, and the German philosopher Leo Strauss. The most famous Catholic thinker of the century, Jacques Maritain, arrived in New York in 1940, one year before Hannah Arendt. These émigré intellectuals explained the European problem to Americans and proposed also to explain America to itself.

  Beginning in the late 1930s and through the 1950s, there was a renascence of interest in natural law—one that corresponded almost exactly to the American careers of the European intellectuals who had fled the chaos of Europe. The extraordinary talents of these émigrés were almost immediately recognized. Consequently, they were able to introduce Americans to a more classically oriented philosophy and taught a new generation of students in law and political philosophy to ask questions and to look for answers in places long forgotten by American schools. Arguably, they rescued the American departments of political science from positivism and behavioralism.

  After stints at small Catholic colleges, Heinrich Rommen became a member of the faculty at Georgetown. The rest of the cohort of Europeans tended to cluster at three other universities. Dr. Alvin Johnson, President of the New School for Social Research in New York City, recruited Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, and other European-trained social theorists. At the University of Chicago, Robert Hutchins, Mortimer Adler, and John Nef, head of the Committee on Social Thought, also recruited Europeans, many of whom (Simon, who came by way of Notre Dame, Strauss, and Arendt) would eventually hold posts at Chicago. Ninety miles away, in South Bend, Indiana, Notre Dame’s president, John F. O’Hara, began building what was called “the Foreign Legion.” Most of the émigrés were either Catholic or Jewish, and Father O’Hara took full advantage of the Catholic connection to build the faculty at Notre Dame. Waldemar Gurian and F. A. Hermans came to the University of Notre Dame in 1937. Although compared with Maritain and Strauss they were lesser lights in the constellation of émigré scholars, Gurian and Hermans founded the Review of Politics, which led to the foundation of the Natural Law Forum (today, the American Journal of Jurisprudence).11 Both journals quickly became important media for both Catholic and Jewish émigrés.

  In the brief course of five years, therefore, the New School, the University of Chicago, and Notre Dame became, in a curious way, sister institutions. Political philosophy was pursued in the light of the ancient and medieval traditions, with a multidisciplinary breadth that was distinctively continental. It would be anachronistic to characterize this group of thinkers as “conservative.” In their respective European contexts, they rejected the various species of nineteenth-century romanticism that formed the staple of European conservatism in fin-de-siècle Europe. In hindsight we see that the advent of a conservative intellectual movement in the United States would have been unthinkable without these Europeans. Among other contributions, for present purposes, they called attention to the perennial debate over natural law.

  With respect to the problem of natural law, what did these Europeans find upon their arrival? The answer is that, in the first decades of this century, American thinkers had given relatively little attention to natural law. If natural law was ever mentioned, it was usually in the context of theories of jurisprudence (rather than philosophy or political philosophy) and even then in a derisive or dismissive tone. In his brief but nonetheless influential 1918 essay “Natural Law,” Oliver Wendell Holmes declared, “The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere.”12

  It is a historical fact that ideas of natural law and natural rights shaped the Founding of the United States and in the 1860s its refounding. Nonetheless, American academicians and jurisprudents generally regarded natural law as an antique metaphysical ghost—an abstraction drawn from an obsolete philosophical conception of nature and the human mind’s place within it. At the turn of the twentieth century, the educated classes thought of “nature” not according to the classical conception of an ordered cosmos of ends, nor even according to the Enlightenment understanding of fixed physical “laws of nature”; rather, nature was conceived according to one or another evolutionary scheme within which the human mind exercises creative, pragmatic adjustments.

  At the same time, American legal theorists and jurisprudents resisted the pure positivism entrenched in England and in some legal cultures on the Continent.13 They recognized that neither laws nor a legal system as a whole could be explained simply on the basis of the will of the sovereign. Nor for that matter were the Americans satisfied with a formalistic treatment of legal rules. Having jettisoned both the classical and modern theories of natural law, the American legal mind was forced to turn elsewhere for an account of the extralegal bases of law. Such advocates of “sociological jurisprudence” as Louis Brandeis urged judges to set aside mechanistic and formalistic logic of “rules,” and to interpret law in the light of economic and social facts. While not fully reducing law to social policy, sociological jurisprudence took the first step in that direction. Legal realists, including Karl Llewellyn and Benjamin Cardozo, took the argument further, contending that judges make law (ius facere) rather than merely discovering it (ius dicere). To them, law is to be made after considering multiple social, economic, and political facts. The tag “legal realism” thus conveyed the notion that a proper account of law is less a matter of explicating legal doctrines than of observing what judges actually do when they interpret and apply law, namely, contribute to the formation of social policy.

  Although it might be doubted that these schools of jurisprudence rescued American law from the clutches of positivism, certainly they depicted the law as something more complicated and dynamic than the command of a sovereign; at least temporarily, these schools of jurisprudence satisfied the quest to have positive law rooted in something more than itself. The theories were tailor-made for a people agnostic about metaphysical truths but irrepressibly earnest in pursuing the tasks of progress and social reform.

  There were, of course, notable exceptions to this rule. Edward S. Corwin’s 1928–29 articles in the Harvard Law Review, eventually published as The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (1955), traced both the theory and practice of American constitutional law to ideas of natural justice implicit in the English common law tradition, and beyond that to the ancient concept of ius naturale. It is worth noting, however, that Corwin’s work was not widely read until it was assembled into a monograph in 1955, after the natural law renascence was well under way. In the early 1930s, Charles Haines’s The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1930) and Benjamin Wright’s American Interpretations of Natural Law (1931) also investigated the role of natural law in American jurisprudence.

  Still, Corwin, Haines, and Wright were not especially interested in the philosophical grounds of natural law. Like the advocates of sociological jurisprudence and the legal realists, they were interested primarily in what judges do. To be sure, until the 1890s there was relatively little reason for judicial review to ignite debates over natural law. For example, in federal cases adjudicated during the early years of the Republic, the theme of natural law arose infrequently and even then only indirectly. Admittedly, the federal courts of the nineteenth century did face problems of natural justice in connection with slavery. Even so, most federal judges enforced the written terms of the fugitive slave clause.14 The Dred Scott case in 1857 was perhaps a premonition of a debate as to whether judges should avail themselves of moral theories in adjudicating constitutional cases, but the problem was settled by Congress after the Civil War. Abolitionist enthusiasm for natural justice found expression in the legislative rather than the judicial arena.

  Corwin, Haines, and Wright’s interest in natural law was piqued by judicial events that began to transpire three decades after the Civil War. In the 1890s the Supreme Court embarked on a new interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process guarantees were invested with “substantive” meanings and purposes, especially with regard to rights of property and contract. Over the next two decades, federal courts struck down hundreds of state laws under the rubric of “substantive due process.” Both partisans and critics of this new jurisprudence understood that the courts were using something like natural law reasoning.15

  In varying degrees, Corwin, Haines, and Wright approved of what seemed to be a fresh “revival” (to cite Haines’s term) of natural law, especially in defense of individual liberty against government.16 But this attitude was not widely shared, and it certainly did not represent a significant movement in the universities or law schools, not to mention the wider public. This is easily explained. At that time, the judicial discovery of natural rights was perceived not only as antipopulist but as contrary to social reform. By their advocates, these newly discovered rights were deemed to be bulwarks of individual economic liberty, upheld against the policies of social reform enacted by state legislatures in the early part of this century, and then by the New Deal Congress during the Depression. In defending individual property rights from the bench during a time of economic crisis and dislocation, the Court made natural law appear contrary to the common good. Here, of course, we are not passing judgment on that jurisprudence (natural law theory, after all, is typically used to check legislative will, whether of kings or of democratic majorities); rather, we are explaining why a very interesting episode of natural law reasoning in the 1930s fell flat. Not only in America, but even more so in Europe, there prevailed a popular urge to remove whatever was deemed an impediment to strong legislative and executive action in addressing the crises of the decade. In any event, with the retirement in 1938 of Justice George Sutherland this era of judicially enforced natural rights came to a close.17

  Interestingly, although Heinrich Rommen has relatively little to say about the Anglo-American traditions of natural law jurisprudence, he does mention the institution of judicial review.18 Indeed, he refers approvingly to the project of juridically applied natural law. On this matter, two points need to be made. First, Rommen was not trying to insinuate himself into a debate over American constitutional law. He shows little or no awareness of the currents and riptides of debate over use of natural law by the Supreme Court. Rommen refers to the institution of judicial review in order to make the philosophical (rather than constitutional) point that the mere fact that a law is posited by the will of a lawmaker is neither the first nor the last word in what constitutes a law. Wherever there is a Bill of Rights, he observes, there is a “strong presupposition” that the law is not out of harmony with natural law.19 Second, we need to remember that in Europe—in Germany and Italy in particular—the problems of the Great Depression quickly led to centralized state authority that brutally trampled on individual rights in the name of the common good. Thus, for many Europeans like Rommen,20 the discovery and defense of individual rights by the United States judiciary, especially in the face of a public emergency like the Depression, certainly appeared to be evidence of a tradition lost in Europe.

  The renascence of natural law theory in the 1940s and 1950s owed little to this rather specialized issue of judicial review; if anything, it had to overcome an allergic reaction to that subject.21 In any case, the recently transplanted Europeans were far more interested in philosophical, and in what might be called civilizational, issues. Consider, for example, the first round of publications produced by these thinkers: Rommen’s The Natural Law was published in English translation in 1947; Leo Strauss’s National Right and History in 1950; Simon’s Philosophy of Democratic Government, and Maritain’s Man and the State in 1951; and Voegelin’s New Science of Politics in 1952. In these books the problem of the moral foundations of law and politics are treated speculatively, broadly, and, for lack of a better term, classically.

  To some extent, the interests of these émigrés overlapped. They agreed, for example, that the origins of modern totalitarianism are to be found in the Enlightenment; they also agreed that the Romantic reaction worsened rather than corrected the Enlightenment’s consequences. The contrast between the philosophy of the ancients and moderns became a trademark of the Straussian school, but virtually all of the émigré thinkers, including Rommen in The Natural Law, drew some version of that distinction. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that their common interests and overlapping research programs amounted to a common doctrine of natural law. Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and Catholics like Rommen, had distinctively different approaches to the subject.

  Besides the obvious fact of their religion, the Catholic thinkers had at least three things in common that distinguished them from the other émigrés. First, Rommen, Simon, and Maritain shared a philosophical vocabulary that was rooted in scholastic thought, specifically in the work of Thomas Aquinas. Second, for the Catholic thinkers the philosophy of natural law was a living tradition: that is to say, it was not only a concept to be expounded according to the philosophy of the schools, it was a tradition formed by centuries of application to a wide array of intellectual and institutional problems. Third, the Catholic thinkers were more confident in building and deploying a system of natural law. Not only Heinrich Rommen, but also such well-known Thomists as Jacques Maritain and the American Jesuit John Courtney Murray wanted to rescue the concept of natural rights from what they deemed the dead-ends and errors of modern philosophy—a project that was a contradiction in terms to many, if not most, of the writings and students of Leo Strauss.

  At midcentury, then, these Catholic thinkers were confident that the crisis of the Second World War provided an opportune moment for reconsidering democratic institutions in light of traditional natural law theory. Because this Scholastic tradition informs almost every page of Rommen’s The Natural Law, it will be helpful briefly to examine it.

  The word scholasticism derives from the dialectical method of the medieval schools, in which the dicta of authorities (auctoritates) in matters of theology, law, and philosophy were submitted to a very complex and open-ended form of systematization. Beginning with the compilation and classification of authoritative dicta, the data were to be interrogated, distinguished, and disputed. The scholastic method was in part the legacy of the legal revolution of the twelfth century, when the Roman Catholic Church, having secured its legal autonomy from the Carolingians, consolidated its independence by systematizing ecclesiastical customs and legal rulings. In about 1140, for example, Gratian, a Camaldolese monk from Bologna, produced the Concordantia discordantium canonum (Concordance of Discordant Canons). Comprising some four thousand different texts and authoritative dicta, the so-called Decretum Gratiani formed the first part of what eventually became the Corpis iuris canonici (the Code of Canon law). Gratian’s work was a conduit for legal, philosophical, and theological opinions about natural law as well as for many other legal subjects. His method of reconciling, or harmonizing, diverse opinions became a model for the golden age of scholasticism in the schools of the thirteenth century.

  About fifteen years later (circa 1155), Peter Lombard adopted a similar method in treating theological opinions in Sententiarum libri quatuor, and as a young student in Paris a generation later, Thomas Aquinas studied and wrote a commentary on the four books of the “Sentences of Lombard.” Thomas’s unfinished Summa theologiae, which he composed off and on for more than a decade in Paris and Italy during the mid-thirteenth century, is widely regarded as the most masterful expression of medieval scholasticism. This is because Thomas set out not only to harmonize nearly a millennium of theological opinions but also to treat the “new” learning of the recently recovered pagan philosophers, especially Aristotle.

  Though he was well aware of the emerging legal systems of both civil and canon law, Thomas was not professionally trained in the laws. He was, instead, a Dominican theologian. In all his writings there is but one discussion of law for its own sake; this is found in the prima-secundae (I-II) of the Summa theologiae, questions 90 through 108. Most of this so-called “Treatise on Law” examines human and divine positive law as well as the lex nova, or “New Law,” of the Gospel. It is perhaps paradoxical that while Thomas’s treatment of natural law is by far the most influential and certainly the most quoted discussion of the subject in the history of philosophy, Thomas himself had relatively little to say about natural law. Whereas his Summa theologiae consists of more than five hundred discrete questions, only one is devoted exclusively to the lex naturalis.22

  In this case, however, quantity is misleading; for in terms of the clarity of its analysis and exposition, the synthesis of materials (legal, theological, philosophical, political), and the deft application of natural law to disputed issues of human conduct (just war, theft, polygamy, etc.), Thomas’s work in this area was a significant achievement. It is written serenely and in a manner that a modern reader might regard as understated, but it is all the same a tour de force. It outlived its immediate medieval context and the various “Thomisms” that have evolved in the intervening centuries.

  Thomas’s natural law theory had its greatest influence long after the Middle Ages. During the period of late scholasticism (roughly, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) Dominican and Jesuit theologians resurrected Thomas in order to respond both to the Reformation and to a series of international political crises. These crises were brought about by new and potent expressions of royal absolutism on the part of Protestant and Catholic sovereigns and by moral and political conflicts ignited by their colonial policies in the New World. In a period of civil wars and domestic disturbance, theories of royal absolutism were geared to enhance executive power. It is the recurrent story of natural law theory that it crops up precisely when the political order removes barriers to legislative and executive will.

  Such is what happened during the Baroque era, where these issues were debated in the seminaries and in the courts of the Hapsburgs. Two centuries before the American Revolution, and nearly three centuries before the American Civil War, issues of political self-determination and slavery were debated in terms framed by Thomistic natural law theory. For example, the Dominican theologian Francisco Vitoria argued successfully for the natural rights of native peoples in the Indies and developed exacting criteria for the use of war by nations. His lectures, called the Relectiones (1527–40), influenced Hugo Grotius and the emerging modern jurisprudence of international law. Another Spanish Dominican, Bartolomé De Las Casas, whose Historia de las Indias (1561) was translated into several languages, worked and wrote tirelessly for the natural rights of Indians to political liberty and property. Consequently, the transition from medieval doctrines of natural law to modern conceptions of natural rights was achieved in no small part by Spanish scholastics.23

  The best known of the late scholastics was the Spaniard Francisco Suérez (1548–1617), whose De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (1612) was the most ambitious effort in the modern period to construct a Thomistic legal theory. Noteworthy for our purposes is that Rommen’s first book, Die Staatslehre des Franz Suarez (1927), was on Suárez, and there are repeated references to the Spanish Jesuit in The Natural Law. It was Suárez who vigorously defended the legality of natural law, which he applied to problems of political consent, just war, and right of revolution against unjust political authority. His emphasis upon the divine ground of natural law, and his critical application of it against the exaggerated imperial power of temporal sovereigns suggests that Suárez is more deserving of the title “father of modern natural law” than merely to be known as a “late” interpreter of Aquinas. Indeed, Suárezian natural law exerted considerable influence on both Catholic and Protestant legal and political theorists. That during the Second World War the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a Latin-English edition of Suárez’s De Legibus is but one measure of his continuing influence.

  More immediately, Rommen and his fellow Catholic thinkers were the products of a new wave of scholasticism that can be traced to Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1878). Leo called for a return to the primary sources of scholastic philosophy, especially to Thomas Aquinas. Whereas “late scholasticism” was bred primarily in Roman and Spanish seminaries, the “neo-Thomism” prompted by the Leonine reform was led by lay scholars, many of whom taught in secular universities.

  Neo-Thomism was marked by two main traits. The first was scholarly attention to original texts, which in turn led to fresh interpretations of the premodern natural law traditions. The second, and somewhat opposite tendency, was a lively interest in making the old traditions relevant to contemporary political and legal problems. Indeed, it was the combination of the two that made neo-Thomism the most creative period of scholasticism, which flourished in the absence of anything resembling the medieval schools.

  Papal encyclical letters became another significant transmitter of the scholastic tradition by setting forth in brief form the principles that ought to apply to controverted issues of social, political, and economic policy. Rommen was imprisoned by the Nazis precisely because of his efforts in behalf of just such encyclical teachings. Pope Leo XIII himself issued more than eighty such encyclicals that addressed social issues such as the rights of workers and church-states relations, as well as more philosophical questions such as the origin of political authority. As Europe moved through the crises of the First World War, the Depression, the rise of Fascism, and the Second World War and its aftermath, the encyclicals became an increasingly important source of Catholic thinking on political matters.

  Two points need to be made about the social encyclicals. The first is that these encyclicals produced an extensive body of applied natural law on issues both great and small, from the problem of socialism and rights of private property to the morality of dueling. The second point is the more important one for understanding Rommen’s work. The encyclicals provided a model for integrating two philosophical perspectives that had not been successfully unified in scholastic natural law doctrines. On one hand, the encyclicals were “conservative” on the intellectual grounding of natural law and quite traditional on particular matters of moral conduct; on the other hand, they were operationally “liberal” on many of the great political questions of modernity. For example, they favored the principle of subsidiarity against the practically unlimited powers of modern states; they supported the people’s right to select the particular form of government; they upheld the rights of individuals to organize into labor unions, to hold property, and to enjoy religious liberties.

  Rommen, Maritain, Simon, and John Courtney Murray certainly shared the conviction that a traditional metaphysics of natural law could be expounded without its having to adopt an antimodernist stand on political institutions. As Rommen put the question in The State in Catholic Thought, the perennial philosophy must eschew the romantic reaction against modernity, a reaction that led many Catholic apologists of the nineteenth century to want to “restore the lost thrones and support restored ones.”24 On that view, natural law would degenerate into an ideology that aspires to identify contingent social and political forms with first things in the metaphysical order. Perhaps the greatest achievement of Rommen and the other European neo-Thomists of his era was to decouple the traditional doctrine of natural law from the nineteenth-century conservative reaction against the constitutional democracies born in the age of revolution.25 This freed such American Thomists as Mortimer Adler and John Courtney Murray to be, at once, metaphysical conservatives and partisans of constitutional democracy.

  Having surveyed the historical background and foreground of Rommen’s The Natural Law, let us turn to his philosophy. Rommen divides The Natural Law into two parts, historical and systematic. At the outset, Rommen poses his central question: “How can laws bind the conscience of an individual? Wherein lies, properly speaking, the ethical foundation of the coercive power of the state’s legal and moral order?”26 Whatever else law accomplishes—teaching civic values, inducing harmony, preserving social order, rendering justice, punishing the recalcitrant—everyone will admit that law is a peremptory command: it does not merely give advice or counsel but takes something off the menu of options for private judgment and choice. Etymologically, the word law (lex) is derived from the verb “to bind” (ligare). The perennial question is how law binds a multitude of free agents who are capable of forming their own judgments and making their own decisions.

  Answers to the question of how law binds free agents gravitate toward one of two poles, which Rommen characterizes as lex-ratio versus lex-voluntas.27 In the first part of the book he investigates the intellectual history of the question; in the second part, he investigates the philosophical issues. Here, it will suffice to give a brief summary of Rommen’s position.

  For Rommen, natural law thinking has always thrived in the lex-ratio tradition. According to this tradition, law binds by way of rational obligation. To use the older scholastic terminology, law is neither force (vis coactiva) nor mere advice (lex indicans) but is rational direction (vis directiva). The lex-ratio position contends that the intellect’s grasp of what ought to be done comes first; the force executing that judgment comes second, after the directive of reason. Interestingly, Thomas Aquinas insisted that command is principally a work of reason. He believed that without the measure of action grasped and communicated by the intellect executive force is blind and arbitrary.28 For example, when we say that force must be justified by law, we recognize at least implicitly that law and force are not the same thing. So, it is one thing to say that force without law is unjustified, but it is quite another thing to suppose that law is force. Thus, for the intellectualist tradition, law and liberty are not necessarily in opposition, because they are grounded in the same source, namely the intellect’s measuring of action.29 The lex-ratio tradition holds that only on the ground of the primacy of reason can we make sense of law as obligation rather than as a literal binding in the fashion of force.30

  The lex-voluntas tradition, however, holds that law binds human liberty because of the superior power or will of the legal authority. That authority may have proper credentials to exert such force (the governed perhaps have willed for him to do so). Moreover, the sovereign may take care to express his commands in proper syntactical form. Nevertheless, the law remains a species of force. It may be a human artifact that proves quite useful and even necessary for social life, but it is force none the less. Thus, the lex-voluntas tradition insists that the will comes first, and reason, which guides the application of the command, comes second. On this view, law and liberty stand in opposition, for the free motion of an individual can be counteracted or redirected only by the will of another. Hence, the coercive function of law is not secondary, but primary.

  Rommen traces the idea of law as force majeur to debates in the Medieval schools—debates that initially concerned issues of theology and metaphysics rather than jurisprudence.31 In deference both to divine omnipotence and to supernatural charity—traditionally understood to be perfections of the volitional power—Franciscan theologians (e.g., Ockham and Scotus) depicted God’s governance principally in terms of the will. The doctrine of voluntarism holds that the will legislates and reason executes. Some scholastic theorists in this school held that by a pure posit of the will God can change the terms of justice, even to the point of abrogating the Decalogue and the natural moral law. Accordingly, reason cannot count as a reason, as it were, against a unilateral projection of will on the part of the sovereign, beginning with the divine sovereign. Rommen believes that modern secular varieties of world-view positivism are the legacy of this theological debate.

  He likewise calls attention to the philosophical doctrine of nominalism, also advanced by Franciscan theologians in the medieval schools. Nominalists held that the human intellect is capable of grasping only singulars; universals are but vocal utterances or names imposed upon an aggregate of singulars. Thus, nominalists could assign to the human intellect only the work of logically and analytically organizing names, which, at bottom, are arbitrary, possessing no extramental foundation. This philosophy could not but influence jurisprudence. Debates over what is to be deemed “good,” “bad,” “just,” and “unjust” could be resolved on nominalist premises in one of two ways: either by looking in a dictionary or by imposing a solution by dint of force. Again, for Rommen, this medieval debate provided the historical background for the disrepair of the legal profession as he knew it. Law was to be conceived as a unilateral projection of will on the part of the sovereign, and lawyers became technicians of the dicta.

  In Rommen’s view, despite claims of giving preeminence to reason in public affairs, the Enlightenment generally followed the lex-voluntas philosophy. Concerning Locke, for example, Rommen writes, “Locke substitutes for the traditional idea of the natural law as an order of human affairs, as a moral reflex of the metaphysical order of the universe revealed to human reason in the creation as God’s will, the conception of natural law as a rather nominalistic symbol for a catalog or bundle of individual rights that stem from individual self-interest.”32 Legal and distributive justice are reduced to the model of contract, in the fashion of commutative justice; the will of the contractors creates not only the determinate form of political institutions but the political common good itself. So, in answer to the question of how law binds the conscience to act in accord with the common good, Locke emphasizes the principle of consent, which itself is motivated chiefly by interest in preserving life and property. Though the Enlightenment natural law theories began (in Grotius) and ended (in Kant) with efforts to preserve the principle of lex-ratio, Rommen interprets the era as a cumulative erosion of the philosophical grounds for maintaining the authority of reason with respect to the will, the priority of the natural order of sociability and common good with respect to contracts, and generally the notion of a moral law not reducible to the lower “laws” of psychophysiological forces. Thus, for Rommen, the Enlightenment delivered into the hands of its successors a natural law tradition much weakened and ill-prepared to resist the full-fledged positivisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

  Of all the versions of law as force majeur the one that triumphed in Germany developed in the soil of nineteenth-century romanticisms and vitalisms, which viewed the state as an expression of a nonrational Volksgeist or la tradition. Rommen was convinced that the Fascist idea of the state as an organic expression of a collective racial or ethnic will was the legacy not just of Rousseau but of medieval Franciscan mysticism and supernaturalism.33 But, however its mythology differed from the positivisms of the English-speaking world, and however its notions of collective vitalism and will differed from the individualist doctrines of appetite across the English Channel, European Fascism took the side of lex-voluntas.

  The classical definition of justice is giving to each what is his due, ius suum cuique tribuere.34 Rommen points out that in commutative justice the ius is what is owed to another person; in distributive justice the ius is what the community owes to the individuals; and in legal justice the ius is what individuals owe to the polity. In any case, there can be no act of giving, and hence no command to perform the act, unless there is first a ius. Until or unless someone can rightfully claim “this is owed to me [him, or them],” there is literally no issue of justice. So, the most rudimentary form of natural law thinking arises in connection with the question of whether the ius is the mere artifice of positive law. Does this life, property, dignity, and status belong to me (him or them) exclusively by virtue of a contract or decree of the state or, for that matter, by the assertion of an individual?35

  Both natural lawyers and positivists agree that some terms and relations of justice arise by the artifice of legal contracts and positive decrees. There is no natural law requiring motorists to drive on the right side of the road (legal justice), or for money lent to be repaid at a certain rate of interest (commutative justice), or for providing college education benefits to veterans (distributive justice). Undoubtedly, in each of these examples the issue of what is “mine and thine,” and of who owes what to whom, is determined by customs, contracts, or statutes. In this respect, Rommen calls attention to what every lawyer knows: namely, that much of the law consists of norms that are quite arbitrary—arbitrary, that is, not in the pejorative sense of being irrational or merely willful, but rather in the sense that the material norm is not in itself an issue of morality. “Many police ordinances (e.g., traffic regulations), which serve merely a subordinate purpose of means to an end, exhibit no materially moral content. The same is true of the technical rules governing legal procedure or the organization of law courts. These norms bear such a technical, formal, and utilitarian character that the qualifications of moral or immoral cannot be applied to them.”36 Because these laws have no material moral content in themselves, they can bind conduct only because there exists a prior scheme of obligation. One might presume that the traffic ordinance is related to an antecedent obligation of legal justice to act in accord with the common good; so, no one naturally or even morally owes the community the act of stopping at a red light until that ordinance is seen in the context of a more fundamental obligation.

  And this brings us back to the deeper and more interesting question: Are laws, all the way down, as it were, merely a human posit, none having material moral content until conjoined with a declaration of the will? Whether that will be the little will of an individual, the communal will of custom, or the sovereign will of the state makes no difference to the central philosophical question. The train of causality in law will have to begin and end in an act of force. The terms of justice must be arbitrarily constructed and laid as a template over a social world that bears no objective terms of relations of justice. Indeed, if law is but a posit of the will, then the law can make it “right” to give death to an innocent person intentionally, or to make the perpetrator of violence the innocent person; to exact penalties with no finding of guilt or fault; to treat adults as children, persons as chattel; and to declare property ownership by individuals a crime. To be sure, most positivists would declaim the aforementioned acts. They might claim that if the law tries to reverse everyone’s ordinary expectations of justice, disorder would quickly ensue. Further, the positivist might agree that there are some limits—of a physical, psychological, or even social nature—that influence the making of positive law and set parameters for any efficient posit of the will.

  For the natural law tradition, what stands prior to the declaration of the will is not a set of contingent facts that a lawgiver would be prudent to bear in mind; rather, positive law presupposes obligations that arise independent of any decree or application of force by a human legislator. The social and legal world does not consist of mere facts organized and moved around by acts of force, but of principles of obligation, discovered by experience and reason. As Rommen points out, natural law is opposed to positivism, not to the positive law.37 The art of positive law is a creative extension of the order of justice discovered by the intellect. The positive law neither creates all obligations from scratch nor deduces every new term of obligation from the natural law. Thus Rommen insists that the positive law cannot be well understood either by positivism or by rationalism. The former, he explains, requires human law to arbitrarily construct all norms of justice; the latter leaves to human law no creativity or novelty.38 Rommen writes:

  The natural law calls, then, for the positive law. This explains why the natural law, though it is the enduring basis and norm of the positive law, progressively withdraws, as it were, behind the curtain of the positive law as the latter achieves a continually greater perfection. This is also why the natural law reappears whenever the positive law is transformed into objective injustice through the evolution and play and vital forces and the functional changes of communities.39

  Here, our brief review of the philosophical question makes the problem look deceptively simple. In The Natural Law Rommen is at pains to show that although the question is relatively simple the vindication of a jurisprudence of natural law is quite complicated. This is because the vindication depends upon an array of principles about the human person, the relation between intellect and will, and the nature of society. In a relatively healthy culture, these principles are given expression through social, political, and legal institutions as well as through the judgments of common sense. When these institutions are challenged, however, it becomes necessary once again to inquire into first things. It is fitting, then, to conclude this introduction just where we began. The Natural Law is not the work of an academician but is the effort of a German lawyer to understand the moral and social bases of the positive law and to exert philosophical intelligence in the face of Adolf Légalité. The problem of the German legal profession in the 1930s rendered the book timely, but the philosophical inquiry leads the reader to the perennial questions.

  RUSSELL HITTINGER

  • University of Tulsa

  Translator’s Preface

  The present volume is a translation of Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts (Leipzig: Verlag Jakob Hegner, 1936). The English version, however, amounts to a revised and enlarged edition of the original work. The author has, at my suggestion, added many new sections; and he has further made, or consented to, several alterations in the text itself. Thus the worth and importance of an already valuable study of the history and philosophical foundations of the idea and doctrine of natural law have been considerably enhanced, especially for readers of the English-speaking world.

  The studies and activities of the author peculiarly fitted him to interest himself in the striking phenomenon of the perpetual recurrence of the natural-law idea. Having completed his studies and obtained degrees in political economy as well as in civil and canon law at the universities of Muenster and Bonn, he dedicated his talents and abilities to the cause of Catholic social action in Germany during the last fateful years of the Weimar Republic. From 1929 to 1933 he was head of the Social Action Department, Central Office of the Volks-Verein at M.-Gladbach. More or less simultaneously, too, he served as chairman, vice-chairman, director, and executive vice-president of various other national and local German Catholic organizations and institutes with educational, social, and economic aims. In one of these he was closely associated with such well-known German Catholic students of society as Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S.J., G. Gundlach, S.J., P. Tischleder, Goetz Briefs, Franz Mueller, and the late Theodore Brauer.

  With the advent to power of Hitler and his Nazi party, Dr. Rommen, who had distinguished himself in the struggle against the Weltanschauung and concrete aims of growing Nazism, was closely watched, carefully investigated, and finally arrested. His thorough knowledge of law, however, besides the care he had taken to destroy evidence which might prove incriminating in Nazi eyes, contributed at length, after a month of confinement, to procuring his release. With his former sphere of activity now closed to him, he lived henceforth under continual police surveillance. For some years he worked as legal advisor of a Berlin corporation. It was during this period of stress and personal insecurity that, in his leisure time, he wrote and published the German original of the present volume, intended as a protest against the widespread abuse of the idea of natural law in contemporary legal and political philosophy generally, but in particular in those circles most influenced by the Nazi Weltanschauung. It is to this circumstance that the author attributes what he modestly refers to as shortcomings of the work.

  In 1938 Dr. Rommen at last secured permission to go to England. Having then obtained a teaching position in a Connecticut college, he brought his family to the United States in the same year. Since that time he has been engaged in teaching, in lecturing, and in writing. An American citizen, he now holds the position of professor of political science in the College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.

  Dr. Rommen is the author of numerous scholarly and semipopular books, articles for periodicals, and articles for encyclopedias in the field of legal and political philosophy. In 1945 appeared his The State in Catholic Thought; a Treatise in Political Philosophy (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.).

  Except in works destined for restricted scholarly circles, the use of footnotes has been declining in recent years. When scholars write for the general public, or even for the educated portion of the public, they are accustomed to omit all scholarly apparatus. Their reputation is the presumed guaranty of their undocumented statements and of the authenticity of what quotations they do make. Thus the German original of the present translation is entirely devoid of footnotes. However, the provenance of the scattered quotations is almost always indicated by the respective author’s name in parentheses, and the relatively few specific references to passages in such works (especially in the case of St. Thomas Aquinas) are similarly inserted in the text.

  Nevertheless, it seemed best, in adapting the volume to the Anglo-Saxon cultural milieu, to take liberal advantage of the handy device of the footnote. Wherever it has been practically possible, all citations and references have been identified and given in full for those who may wish to check them. But a few quotations, which could not be readily located, have been retained on the author’s responsibility. Moreover, in view of the importance of many aspects of the problem of natural law in history and philosophy, I have considered it desirable, and indeed eminently worth while, to add on my own responsibility a considerable number of footnotes of a bibliographical, illustrative, explanatory, and critical nature. It is hoped that the reader will find them stimulating and helpful rather than distasteful and impeding; at all events, they can be skipped or ignored at will. It would not, of course, have been difficult to multiply such footnotes, particularly on the bibliographical side; but to overload the book with footnotes would undoubtedly have been to defeat the purpose of the author.

  Accordingly, apart from perhaps a dozen bibliographical indications furnished by the author himself and a small number of precise references to passages in the works of St. Thomas and in Roman law, the translator must be held responsible for all footnotes, bibliographical and other.

  An extensive treatment of moral problems from the standpoint of the natural law or rational ethics often leaves the impression that ethics, as a branch of philosophy, is quite sufficient to lead man to perfection and happiness, individual and social. From such a viewpoint the supernatural order, with its elevation of man, divine revelation, and divine grace, all too often takes on the appearance of something artificial or unnatural, something unnecessary and superfluous. Mature reflection, however, will show that such an impression is quite unwarranted. Neither as a science nor as an art is ethics, or the doctrine of the natural moral law in its concrete applications, able of itself to lead man as he actually is to his individual and social goal.

  In the first place, past and present human experience forces us to agree with theologians who hold that in the present condition of mankind divine revelation is morally necessary in order that the natural moral law itself may be known by the masses of men with sufficient ease, certainty, and fullness. It is true that by the light of unaided reason men can know with certainty the more general and more fundamental principles of right and wrong in their simplest applications; but for the more remote conclusions of the natural moral law and for more complicated cases of human conduct they stand practically in need of some help over and above natural reason; and such assistance is afforded by divine revelation. In this sense revelation is morally necessary for the sure and complete knowledge of the natural law. In addition to divine revelation itself, an authentic and authoritative interpreter of both divine revelation and the natural moral law, the Church, is likewise morally necessary to safeguard and inculcate moral truths and values, to apply with sureness explicit and implicit moral principles to concrete, complex, and changing circumstances of human life and activity, and to settle moral difficulties and doubts that harass even the most learned. This is true especially in domains where human interests and passions of great driving power continually urge the acceptance of solutions that are specious but disastrous. It is indeed undeniable that the great development, refinement, and certainty of rational ethics in Christian circles owe very much to the extrinsic aids afforded by divine revelation and Christ’s Church. Surely, as St. Ambrose, I think, so well expressed it, Non in dialectica voluit Deus salvum facere populum suum.

  But there is much more to the matter than this. Knowledge of what our duty is is one thing; but, as daily personal experience teaches every one of us, the actual doing of our duty is quite another thing. As the practical science which, in the light of the primary moral principle and of human nature adequately considered, tells men what acts are good and what are evil, ethics has its great drawbacks. What, then, shall we say of ethics as the art which seeks to teach mankind an easy and efficacious way of doing good and avoiding evil? Experience seems to teach clearly that it is far easier to discover and propagate moral truth than to generate and generalize moral action. If divine help is morally necessary for mankind’s adequate and sure knowledge of the natural moral law, divine assistance is even more necessary for its due observance. Indeed, the Church teaches that without special aid or grace from God a person cannot observe the entire natural moral law for any great length of time.

  In the second place, it is a fundamental article of the Christian faith that man has from the very beginning been gratuitously elevated by God to an order of existence which totally exceeds the strict requirements and capacities of his nature. This supernatural order, with the supernatural goal to which man is destined, calls for a supernatural principle of knowledge—revelation of both speculative and practical truths—and a supernatural principle of activity in man, divine grace in its various aspects and with its various effects. Hence no system of natural ethics, however perfect might be man’s knowledge and observance of it, can meet all the needs of his de facto supernatural elevation and orientation. As a consequence, divine revelation and divine grace, besides being morally necessary for the knowledge and observance of the natural law, are absolutely necessary for the knowledge and observance of the supernatural obligations incumbent upon man by virtue of his actual destination to a supernatural end.

  But this supernatural order is neither artificial nor unnatural. Grace does not destroy nature; it presupposes, perfects, and elevates it. The supernatural order perfects and elevates the natural order in such a way that the latter is, as it were, integrated into the former. Yet human nature, unchanged in principle, retains its full value as a source of knowledge of the direction in which man’s individual and social development, perfection, and happiness lie. In fact, the Church and its theologians have always viewed human nature, man’s natural end and inclinations, man’s natural faculties and their objects, the natural law—in a word, the natural order—as indispensable sources for determining the proper lines of human conduct which, with the aid of divine grace and with supernatural equipment, man must follow in his quest of his supernatural goal. We can and must distinguish, but without separating, the natural from the supernatural order. Rational ethics, founded on the natural moral law, preserves, therefore, its independence and value like any other branch of philosophy. In this way it performs the valuable function of serving as a basis of understanding and agreement between Catholics and all those who fail or refuse, for one reason or another, to recognize consciously their actual and inescapable incorporation into the supernatural order and their call to actual, full, and living membership in the authentic Church of Christ.

  In the arduous task of preparing this translation for the English-speaking world, my requests for assistance met with a heartening response. The author himself, with unfailing kindness and patience, rendered invaluable help by clearing up numerous points which sometimes perplex the translator of a German work. Several other scholars also contributed valuable suggestions in regard to certain thorny and involved questions with which I have dealt: Rev. Dr. Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., of the Catholic University of America; Rev. Dr. Francis B. Donnelly of the Seminary of the Immaculate Conception, Huntington, New York; Rev. Dr. John J. Galvin, S.S., of St. Edward’s Seminary, Kenmore, Washington. But I owe most to the courteous generosity of several of my confreres and colleagues. Rev. Leo P. Hansen, O.S.B., prepared the first rough draft of the present translation before he left to serve as chaplain in our armed forces. Rev. Meinrad J. Gaul, O.S.B., and Rev. Luke O’Donnell, O.S.B., gave unstintingly of their time and special knowledge throughout the preparation of the manuscript. As on a former occasion, however, it is to Rev. Matthew W. Britt, O.S.B., that I am most profoundly indebted. Expertly and meticulously he labored over the entire manuscript and strove mightily to impart a degree of readability to the translation. In many other ways, too, his patience, knowledge, interest, and encouragement made it possible to bring to a conclusion a task which, it is now easy to feel and see, should have been left to another.

  THOMAS R. HANLEY, O.S.B.,

  • St. Martin’s College,
  • Lacey, Washington

  PART ONE

  History of the Idea of Natural Law

  CHAPTER I

  The Legacy of Greece and Rome

  The doctrine of the natural law is as old as philosophy. Just as wonder,1 according to Aristotle, lies at the beginning of philosophy, so, too, is it found at the beginning of the doctrine of natural law.

  ‡In the early periods of all peoples the mores and laws, undifferentiated from the norms of religion, were looked upon as being exclusively of divine origin. The order according to which a people lives is a divinely instituted order, a holy order. This is true of the ancient Greeks, among whom all law was stamped with the seal of the divine. It likewise holds good for the early Germans: their law bore in the primitive period a distinctly sacred character. Nor is it any less true of the Roman people, whose legal genius enabled its law twice to become a world law.2 For among the Romans, too, law in the earliest times was divine law. Moreover, even the later period, when the Romans had already hit upon the distinction between strictly sacred law (fas) and profane law (ius), still afforded clear evidence of the sacred origin of Roman law: the pontifices remained the dispensers and custodians of the law until Roman legal reason emancipated itself from this secret law of the priests.

  This theological cast of all primitive law has two characteristics. Such law is essentially unchangeable through human ordinances, and it has everywhere the same force within the same cultural environment.

  The idea of a natural law can emerge only when men come to perceive that not all law is unalterable and unchanging divine law. It can emerge only when critical reason, looking back over history, notes the profound changes that have occurred in the realm of law and mores and becomes aware of the diversity of the legal and moral institutions of its own people in the course of its history; and when, furthermore, gazing beyond the confines of its own city-state or tribe, it notices the dissimilarity of the institutions of neighboring peoples. When, therefore, human reason wonderingly verifies this diversity, it first arrives at the distinction between divine and human law. But it soon has to grapple with the natural law, with the question of the moral basis of human laws. This is at the same time the problem of why laws are binding. How can laws bind the conscience of an individual? Wherein lies, properly speaking, the ethical foundation of the coercive power of the state’s legal and moral order? Closely connected with these problems is the question of the best laws or best state, a matter which from the time of Plato has engaged the attention of nearly all exponents of the great systems of natural law. Before long, however, a related idea made its appearance. This was the view that the tribal deities are not the ultimate form of the religious background of reality. For if an eternal, immutable law obliges men to obey particular laws, behind the popular images of tribal deities exists an eternal, all-wise Lawgiver who has the power to bind and to loose.3

  It is quite understandable, then, that the philosophical conception of the natural law should have made its first appearance in the area of Western culture among the ancient Greeks. This dynamic people was endowed with a penetrating critical intelligence, with an early maturing consciousness of the individual mind, and with great power of political organization. Indeed, Western political philosophy likewise originated in this gifted people.

  It is a remarkable fact that at the very beginning of the Greek philosophy of law (or rather of the laws), and therewith of the natural law, a distinction came to light which has survived down to the present time, a distinction between two conceptions of the natural law. One is the idea of a revolutionary and individualistic natural law essentially bound up with the basic doctrine of the state of nature as well as with the concept of the state as a social unit which rests upon a free contract, is arbitrary and artificial, is determined by utility, and is not metaphysically necessary. The other is the idea of a natural law grounded in metaphysics that does not exist in a mythical state of nature before the “laws,” but lives and ought to live in them—a natural law which one would fain, though somewhat ineptly, style conservative. It is further significant that the notion of God as supreme Lawgiver is intimately connected with the latter conception. Both of these tendencies are already plainly visible in the first Sophists and in Heraclitus, the great forerunner of Plato.

  Heraclitus of Ephesus (cir. 536–470 b.c.) is famous for his thesis that “all things flow; nothing abides.” But this ceaseless changing of things led him directly to the idea of an eternal norm and harmony, which exists unchangeable amid the continual variation of phenomena. A fundamental law, a divine common logos, a universal reason holds sway: not chance, lawlessness, or irrational change. Natural occurrences are ruled by a reason that establishes order. Man’s nature as well as his ethical goal consists, then, in the subordination or conformity of individual and social life to the general law of the universe. This is the primordial norm of moral being and conduct. “Wisdom is the foremost virtue, and wisdom consists in speaking the truth, and in lending an ear to nature and acting according to her. Wisdom is common to all. … They who would speak with intelligence must hold fast to the (wisdom that is) common to all, as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by one divine law.”4 The laws of men are but attempts to realize this divine law. Wherefore, declares this conservative aristocrat, the people ought not to resist the laws, which to him are the embodiment of the divine law. On the contrary, “the people ought to fight in defense of the law as they do of their city wall.”5 Thus in the diversity of human laws (not beyond them) there flashed upon Heraclitus the idea of an eternal law of nature that corresponds to man’s reason as sharing in the eternal logos. The variety of human laws does not exclude the idea of the natural law. For through the contingency and diversity of human laws rational thought perceives the truth of the eternal law, whereas sense perception—the eye and the ear—notices only what is different and unlike. With Heraclitus, the “Obscure Philosopher,” the thinker who speaks in obscure symbols, the idea of the natural law for the first time emerged as a natural, unchangeable law from which all human laws draw their force.

  Heraclitus’ doctrine had a practical aim. It was intended to stress the value of the laws and their binding force against the fickleness of the uncritical masses. Prone to novelties of all kinds and woefully lacking in powers of discrimination, the masses were subject to capricious fluctuations of opinion. They thus fell easy prey to the demagogy of the Sophists.

  It is no easy matter to judge the Sophists fairly. For one thing their teachings have come down to us in a very fragmentary form and are known to us chiefly from the dialogues of Plato, their great adversary. Moreover, as popular orators with a leaning toward demagogy, they were fond of oversimplified slogans and paradoxical statements. This earned for them, among posterity, the sinister reputation of philosophical ropedancers, rationalistic revolutionaries, and contemners of the law. For this reputation Plato has been particularly responsible. But this judgment is, to say the least, far too harsh. That the Sophists had of necessity to appear to the Greeks as revolutionary rationalists is explained, on the one hand, by their reckless criticism of contemporary social institutions and their cynical skepticism in political matters, and, on the other, by the high esteem in which their opponents held the laws and the polis, or city-state.

  Their laws were the pride of the citizens of the Greek polis, and the Sophists were mostly foreigners. Heraclitus had looked upon the laws as equal in worth to the walls of the city. The philosophers spoke of the nomoi, or laws, with the greatest respect: the peoples who had no polis were to them barbarians. Hence it happened, too, that Socrates, despite his distinction between what is naturally right and legally right, pronounced the laws of Athens to be “right” without qualification. The citizens, consequently, were under obligation to obey them, even as he also obeyed them to the bitter end. For Plato likewise the laws of Athens were for the most part something inviolable. He regarded the social order founded upon them as good, even if capable of improvement; never did he term it bad. Therefore to these aristocrats in political outlook as well as in thought, the social criticism of the Sophists necessarily passed not only for an attack upon the foundations of a particular order of a particular polis, but also for a malicious assault upon the right order of the polis itself.

  Moreover, in point of fact the Sophists had much in common with the revolutionary natural-law ideas of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, especially with Rousseau’s doctrine and its reckless criticism of existing society. In the case of the conservative natural law (if one wishes to speak of a political tendency) the distinction between natural and positive law served to justify and improve the existing positive law. It was, however, the tendency, an avowedly political tendency, of the natural-law concept of the Sophists to point out, by contrasting the current positive law with what is right by nature, not merely the accidental need for reform of the laws but the substantial wrongness of the laws. To the Sophists the laws were not venerable because of tradition or by reason of having stood the actual test of life in the city-state: they were artificial constructs and served the interests of the powerful (Thrasymachus). Thus the laws possessed no inherent value, for only what is right by nature can have such value, and to this the Sophists were continually appealing. They did not deny, therefore, the form of the natural law and of what is moral by nature. They merely brought out the sharp contrast between the prevailing order of the city-state and the natural law as they preached it, and they ridiculed Socrates who looked upon the laws of Athens as purely and simply “just.” Callicles, who was the first to advance the thesis that might makes right, wished thereby to give expression to a fact which he was criticizing. This was that the ruling classes, while they declared their laws, i.e., those which worked to their advantage, to be naturally just, were misusing the idea of truly natural justice, and were desirous only of subjecting the people to their class interests.

  By contrasting, in the light of their social criticism, what is naturally right with what is legally right, the Sophists attained at this early date to the notion of the rights of man and to the idea of mankind. The unwritten laws, said Hippias, are eternal and unalterable: they spring from a higher source than the decrees of men. To Hippias’ way of thinking, all men are by nature relatives and fellow citizens, even if they are not such in the eyes of the law. Therewith the distinction between Greeks and barbarians, fundamental for Greek cultural consciousness, vanished into thin air. “God made all men free; nature has made no man a slave” (Alcidamas). The whole ethical and legal foundation was thereby taken away from slavery, which was in turn the very basis of the Greek social and economic system. Nevertheless Plato held fast to the institution of slavery, and Aristotle was ever striving to justify it by means of his theory that certain men are slaves by nature.

  Three ideas, heavily charged with social explosives for the world of Greek culture, were thus put forward by the Sophists as part and parcel of the natural law. These ideas were thenceforth to be subjected to a ceaseless reprocessing in the history of the mind. Time and again they were to serve revolutionary thinkers as molds and vessels into which these could pour their revolutionary emotions, their schemes for reform, and their political aims. The first idea was that the existing laws serve class interests and are artificial constructions. Only what is naturally moral and naturally right can be properly called moral and right. Next came the idea of the natural-law freedom and equality of all human beings and, as a consequence, the idea of the rights of man as well as the idea of mankind, the civitas maxima, or world community, which is superior to the city-state. According to the third idea, the state, or polis, is nonessential: it owes its origin to a human decision, i.e., to a free contract, not to a necessity of some kind. The political organization of man must therefore have been preceded by a state of nature (portrayed optimistically or pessimistically), in which the pure natural law was in force. According to the optimistic view of the state of nature, this law can in its essential contents be neither altered not abrogated by the state; in the pessimistic view, which leads to positivism, it is merged in the will of the state. But after the lofty flight of speculation had been exposed to the needed self-criticism, the successors of the Sophists fell quickly into skepticism and into a sheer positivism when the underlying optimistic outlook ran afoul of the facts. This was, for instance, the case with the Epicureans, who were the first legal positivists.

  The Sophists’ criticism of the positive laws, together with the rapidly growing prominence of the notion of utility, led Epicurus, whose sensistic epistemology left no room for metaphysics, to doubt that anything can be objectively and naturally right. Utility and pleasure became for him the sole principles of ethics and law. But since the resultant subjectivism must endanger the social order and with it the peaceful enjoyment of pleasure, he inferred from the principle of utility that justice as such is a chimera, that it rather exists only in agreements which have been entered into for the prevention of mutual injuries. Justice thus consists entirely in positive laws. Before men entered into agreements and before there were laws founded upon such agreements, men had lived in a haphazard manner, like wild beasts, lawlessly. The state of nature, upon which the Sophists had placed an optimistic construction but which they had not particularly stressed, was thus interpreted in a pessimistic sense in Epicurean circles. From this, however, sprang also the respect of the Epicureans for the existing laws as well as their emphasis upon the value of the legal notions and customary law of individual peoples. The parallelism between the Sophist and Epicurean doctrine on the one hand and, on the other, the natural-law schools of modern times is quite unmistakable. Rousseau, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Thomasius, and the adherents of historical schools of law, who variously combine the elements of individual systems, merely repeat and develop these ancient ideas.

  The starting point of the Sophists was a criticism of the nomoi of the Athenian democracy. In their role and guise of popular philosophers and in their political and skeptical snobbery they frequently defended the opposite theories. As if the revolutionary criticism of the nomoi in behalf of slaves and non-citizens, considered barbarians, and the conservative utilitarianism of Epicurus were not sufficiently unsettling, Callicles, if we are to trust tradition, stood forth as champion of the doctrine of the right of the stronger, i.e., that might makes right. A pure materialist in his philosophy, Callicles reached the conclusion that law, such as obtained in the Athenian democracy, was in reality injustice. For, he contended, the many who are weak have united to fetter with the bands of law the few who are strong. But nature teaches, as a glance at the animal kingdom and at warring states reveals, that the stronger naturally overcomes the weaker. Natural law, then, is the force of the stronger. For this snobbish leader of the oligarchic faction such was the way one could and should get at the Athenian democracy. But other Sophists, among them Hippias, put forward the demagogic formulas of human rights and of the freedom and equality of all to achieve the selfsame purpose—the overthrow of the bourgeois democracy.6

  The metaphysical natural law of Plato as well as the more realistic one of Aristotle formed the high-water mark of moral and natural-law philosophy in Greek civilization. Stoicism, on the other hand, in a remarkable eclectic synthesis of single principles drawn from many philosophers, furnished in its system of natural law the terminology or word vessels into which the Church Fathers were able to pour the first conceptions of the Christian natural law and to impart them to the world of their time.

  The danger of skepticism, to which the extreme rationalism of the Sophists lay exposed, was first clearly perceived by Socrates. The Sophists’ juggling of ideas and their paradoxes threatened to dissolve the notion of goodness and morality, just as their extremist social criticism and their libertarian ideology, directed in the name of the natural law against law and custom, called into question the value of the nomoi. Socrates did not merely teach the essence of goodness and justice by his inductive, question-and-answer method. Through the thesis that virtue consists in knowledge, he also showed that there exists a knowable objective world of such values as goodness, beauty, and justice, and that no one does evil for evil’s sake but because it somehow, culpably or through ignorance, appears to him as good. Wherefore knowledge means the contemplation of the idea of justice, and so on. The daimonion, conscience and its voice, he regarded as a reflection and testimony of these ultimate values and of the divinely instituted order of the world. Herein lies the significance of Socrates for the idea of the natural law. It does not lie in his frequently stressed fidelity to the law, although, to counteract the criticism of the Sophists, he placed so much emphasis upon the value of the laws that, out of respect for the law’s function of safeguarding right, he went so far as to condemn absolutely any disobedience to a particular unjust law.7

  The great masters of Greece, Plato and Aristotle, also directed their attacks at the Sophists and their destructive criticism. Plato and Aristotle were chiefly, though not in the same degree, concerned with goodness and with its realization in the state. Their interest, however, did not center in the individual. It is quite common, rather, to speak of both as leaning toward state socialism or totalitarianism. For them, then, in accordance with the idea of order, the first and fundamental aim of justice is not freedom for its own sake, but order. Freedom is aimed at only so far as it realizes order. For this reason the law occupied the foreground of their thought. They were at great pains to discover and to establish the ethical basis of the laws; not like the Sophists, however, in the interest of freedom from the laws. The state and its order as the sphere of morality, as the realization of all virtue, engaged their attention. This explains their preoccupation with the best form of state or government, in which the individual, whom the Sophists made so much of, is swallowed up. If we should think of the natural law in terms of its long accepted identification with socio-philosophical individualism, there would really be little room for the idea of the natural law in Plato or even in Aristotle.

  A deeper penetration into the thought of Plato and Aristotle will show, however, that they too distinguish between what is naturally just and what is legally just. Nor is this distinction merely a borrowed formula: it is an integral part of their doctrinal structure. Yet in the case of both we can observe a certain aversion to the “naturally just,” which is accounted for by the Sophists’ abuse of this distinction, an abuse which Plato severely censured.

  The disciples of Socrates arrived at the notion of something naturally just by quite another route than the one the Sophists had taken. They arrived at it by way of the doctrine of ideas and through teleological thinking. Following in the footsteps of Heraclitus, Plato acknowledges the world of the senses and the world of ideas that become manifest in intellectual contemplation. For speculative reason, sense phenomena are the bridge of memory to the ideas, which dwell and live on in their supermundane, heavenly abode. The things of this world are or exist only so far as they participate in the being of the eternal ideas, or so far as man in his creative capacity of craftsman, artist, and especially lawmaker copies these ideas. Here teleological thinking enters the scene. In the concept which gropes after and apprehends the essence or the idea of the thing there is contained at the same time also its end, the completion or perfection of the idea of the thing. Inversely, too, the mind lays hold of the essence of a thing by finding the ideal concept which corresponds exactly to the literal meaning. Hence we speak of the true physician, the true judge, the true lawmaker, the true law. These two starting points of Platonic speculation lead then to such conclusions as that the judge ought to be a true judge, i.e., he ought to complete in himself the idea of judge. The ideal concept becomes a norm. So declares the Athenian in Plato’s Laws: “When there has been a contest for power, those who gain the upper hand so entirely monopolize the government as to refuse all share to the defeated party and their descendants. … Now, according to our view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws right which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notions of justice are simply unmeaning.”8 The law should be a true law: one that benefits the common weal. Therein its idea achieves its completion. Thus Plato contrasts the true and proper law with the positive law, and he makes the former the measure and criterion of justice for the latter.

  This true law, this true right, abides in the realm of the ideas and remains forever the same. On the other hand, the positive laws change, and they may claim legal force only because and so far as they partake of the idea of law. Indeed they are but a reflection of true law. The lawmaker must look up into the realm of the ideas, where dwells the real essence of the immutable, eternally valid law. However, philosophers and philosopher-kings, freed through disciplined thinking from the blinding illusions of the senses, can alone do this. Moreover, this world of ideas, whereof the world of sense appears only as an imperfect copy, is kosmos, or order; it is not akosmia, or disorder. But this order of the ideas is the pattern for the fashioning of moral and legal conduct in the present world. The being of the ideas is oughtness for man who shapes things in accordance with contemplative knowledge, whether he forms himself or a community unto goodness. Underlying all this, of course, is the conception of a human nature with impaired powers of contemplation. Only the man of disciplined mind, not the great mass of men, can see intellectually. This doctrine is the opposite of the optimism of the Sophists. If Plato, then, scarcely ever makes use of the Sophists’ antithesis of physis and nomos, he by no means identifies the natural law, which he recognizes, with the positive law.

  The difference between Plato and the Sophists lies elsewhere. The Sophists started from the freedom of the individual, who had to be liberated from traditional religious and politico-legal bonds. For the polis, the state, is not something eternal, nor is its law. It is mankind that is eternal: the civitas maxima of free and equal men. In the eyes of Plato, however, the polis and its law were the indispensable means for realizing the idea of humanity, which reaches completion in citizenship, in the ethical ideal of the citizen, of the law-abiding and just man. The state is the great pedagogue of mankind. Its function is to bring men to morality and justice, to happiness in and through the moral virtues. Hence Plato’s thought revolves continually around the idea of the best state or government. But this is also why he recognizes a natural law as ideal law, as a norm for the lawmaker and the citizen, as a measure for the positive laws. His metaphysics and the ethical system which he built thereon made a natural law possible and furnished the foundation.

  Aristotle passed for centuries as the “father of natural law.” St. Thomas, in that section of his Summa theologica which deals with law, repeatedly appeals to him as the Philosopher par excellence. Aristotle, however, as should now be clear, was not the father of the natural law. Nevertheless his theory of knowledge and his metaphysics have provided ethics, and consequently the doctrine of natural law, with so excellent a foundation that the honorific title, “father of natural law,” is readily understandable.

  Plato had totally separated the world of sense perception from the world of pure ideas, the objects of scientific, necessary, and true knowledge (universalia ante rem). Aristotle transferred the idea as the form which determines the formless matter into the individual (universalia in re). This “becomes” through the union of the form (or the essence or the true whatness) with the matter (or the potency or the possibility) and thus gives actuality to the individual. The archetype for Aristotle was human artistic activity: the architect who constructs a house according to the plan in his mind; the sculptor who molds a statue in accordance with his artistic conception; even organic nature which causes the plant to grow from the actualizing essential form that exists in the seed in an incorporeal manner. Aristotle wished to comprehend motion, development, becoming. To him, therefore, the essence, and the perfect expression of it in the individual, is also the telos, or end. The form is thus the efficient and the final cause at one and the same time. Applied to the domain of ethics, however, this means that pure being or the pure essential form is likewise the goal of becoming for the man who is to be fashioned by education into a good citizen. From the essential being results an oughtness for the individual man. In this way, from the content of the primary norm, “strive after the good,” arises the norm, “realize what is humanly good,” as it appears in the essential form of man. The supreme norm of morality is accordingly this: Realize your essential form, your nature. The natural is the ethical, and the essence is unchangeable.

  But a criterion of actions is thereby established. Some actions correspond to nature, and hence are naturally good; others are repugnant to nature, and hence are naturally bad. This settled, Aristotle advances to the distinction between what is naturally just and what is legally just. Both are objects of justice. Justice, however, taken in the narrower sense (for in the wider sense the virtuous man is the just man purely and simply) and distinguished from morality, is directed to the other, to the fellow man, whether as equal (commutative justice) or as fellow member of the comprehensive polis-community (distributive and, in the behavior of the member with regard to the whole, legal justice). It finds expression in the natural law and in the positive law. The latter originates in the will of the lawmaker or in an act of an assembly; the natural law has its source in the essence of the just, in nature. That which is naturally right is therefore unalterable. It has everywhere the same force, quite apart from any positive law that may embody it. Statute or positive law varies with every people and at different times. Yet the natural law does not dwell in a region beyond the positive law. The natural law has to be realized in the positive law since the latter is the application of the universal idea of justice to the motley manifold of life. The immutable idea of right dwells in the changing positive law. All positive law is the more or less successful attempt to realize the natural law. For this reason the natural law, however imperfect may be its realization in the positive law, always retains its binding force. Natural law, i.e., the idea and purpose of law as such, has to be realized in every legal system. The natural law is thus the meaning of the positive law, its purpose and its ethically grounded norm.

  Recognition of the fact that no system of positive law is altogether perfect brought Aristotle to the principle of equity. The law is a general norm, but the actual matters which it has to regulate issue from the diversity of practical life. Of necessity the positive law exhibits imperfections; it does not fit all cases. Equity thereupon requires that the individual case get its right, i.e., that the imperfection of the formal law be overcome by means of material justice, through the content of the natural law. Thus Aristotle already viewed the judge’s function of filling up gaps in the law as an attempt to apply the natural law—if indeed the positive law is rightly to bear the name of law at all. The gaps are consequently the gateways through which the natural law continually comes into play. In such cases the judge has to decide in accordance with the norm which the true lawgiver would himself apply if he were present; the true lawgiver of course is always assumed to will what is just. This is a celebrated formula which in these very words or in the form, “which he [the judge] would lay down as lawmaker,” still found its way into the great codifications of civil law undertaken in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g., the Austrian and Swiss Civil Codes).

  Concerning the content of the natural law Aristotle had as little to say as Plato. This was in sharp contrast to the Sophists, who because of their political and socio-critical bias had admitted many reform proposals and demands into their natural law. The silence of Plato and Aristotle finds its explanation in their idea of the natural law: they set out from the conservative conviction that the positive law wishes to realize the natural law. Added to this was their strong belief in the excellence of the existing laws of the polis as well as in the conformity of such laws to the natural law. The city-state, its general welfare, and its happiness occupied so prominent a place in the ethical thinking of Plato and Aristotle—for whom indeed the idea of man achieves ultimate perfection in the good citizen—that they looked upon the existing laws as something holy. In contrast to the individualistic attack launched by the Sophists against them, the natural law of Plato and Aristotle served precisely to justify the existing laws and not merely as a basis for criticizing them, although the function of criticism was regarded as included in the idea of natural law. Furthermore, for Aristotle as for Plato the polis or city-state was the great pedagogue, against which, strictly speaking, no natural, subjective right of the citizen could be admitted. They acknowledged no goal of man that transcends the ideal polis. They remained state socialists. Their doctrine of natural law was from the political standpoint conservative, but it was based on metaphysics. With the effective discovery, through Christianity, of human personality and with the recognition of God’s intellect and will as the source of the natural moral law, rational thought would thenceforth be in a position to work its way through to the true natural law.

  In the public squares of Athens and on the steps of its public buildings the wordy Sophists had once taught their rationalistic philosophy, their revolutionary natural-law doctrine. In the same places Socrates, the “lover of wisdom,” and Plato and Aristotle, following him, had risen up against the skepticism that was already making its appearance among the Sophists, a skepticism evoked by the doctrine of man as the measure of all things9 and by the resultant subjectivism in epistemology and ethics. This trio of thinkers had anchored anew in philosophy the natural law which at the hands of the Sophists had been threatening to decline into a mere rationalization of political interests.

  With the disappearance of these intellectual giants from the scene, however, the Skeptics, the positivists of their day, began at once to hold forth in the same halls and gardens of the Academy at Athens. The senses, they taught, do not convey true knowledge but only illusion; even reason does not guarantee the truth and certitude of knowledge; certainly, then, truth cannot arise from the illusions of both the senses and reason. All laws, whether of art, speech, morality, or right, are arbitrary. They have their origin in mere agreement, and they vary with the change of the free will which establishes them. As no assertion is of more value than its opposite, so, too, no law is worth any more than its opposite. Likewise, since we cannot perceive the essence or nature of things and of man, a natural law is impossible.

  Skepticism attained its highest point in the teaching of Carneades (cir. 215–125 b.c.), who for a long time was scholarch at Athens. About 155 b.c., in Rome, he directed his attacks against the natural-law doctrine of the Stoics, a contest which he had made the principal mission of his life. There he won fame through his pro-and-con method of demonstration, whereby he strove to heap ridicule upon the notion of justice. One of his most celebrated arguments was drawn from the borderline case known as “the plank of Carneades.” At a time of shipwreck two persons swim to a plank and grasp it simultaneously. But the plank can hold up and save only one of the two. In the light of this case what is right, and who has the right to the plank? Both and neither, he answered, in such a case of dire necessity and self-preservation. (Seventeen centuries later Suarez furnished the correct solution: the order of justice here terminates, and the order of charity governs the case.) Positivism in ethics and law reached its climax with Carneades, again in connection with the repudiation of objective knowledge of reality and essences and with the denial of metaphysics.

  Stoicism prepared the way for the Christian natural law. It was founded in Greece as a school of philosophy by Zeno, who lived from about 340 to 265 b.c. It came to its full flowering in Rome in the imperial age. The great figures of Seneca and the emancipated slave Epictetus as well as the appealing personality of Emperor Marcus Aurelius there adorned the Stoic school. Cicero, however, was its great popularizer, and the wealth of Stoic thought was handed down to the medieval world mainly in his writings. Stoicism, moreover, greatly influenced the various schools of Roman jurisprudence. The passages of Roman law which touch the natural law have their source mostly in Stoic philosophical literature.

  ‡Stoicism thus reached its height at a time when the society of the ancient world was definitively splitting into two classes. On the one side stood the plebeian proletariat, kept tractable by largesses of food and other articles and by shows; on the other side stood the new aristocracy and bourgeoisie, largely given over to unrestrained pleasure-seeking and vice. Over both classes, deified and sometimes crazed Caesars eventually established a despotic rule. This environment conditioned the eclecticism of the Stoa, that circle of the few from all ranks and provinces of the world empire who placed the idea of a virtuous life and of attaining happiness of mind through the true, the good, and the beautiful above base sensuality, pursuit of wealth, and pride of life. The Stoics were individualists but, unlike the Sophists, they were not militantly opposed to the polis; indeed, the city-state no longer existed, only the world empire. Therefore they extolled, besides the individual, the social impulses and feelings. They drew upon and assimilated the intellectual goods of Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

  The core of Stoic teaching is ethics with its Socratic and, in final analysis, general Greek stamp of intellectualism, according to which correct knowledge is the basis of ethics, and the unity of knowledge and conduct forms the ideal of the sage. This last and most striking representative of the spirit of the declining civilization of antiquity comes closest to the grander representative of Christianity, the saint.

  The sage is the man who carries his happiness within himself, who in inner self-sufficiency remains undisturbed by external events. Knowledge and conduct are not dependent on the irregular influences of the world: the sage is calm, unmoved by passion. It is owing to the passions and their excesses that clearness of perception and judgment becomes impossible. For this reason man does not attain to a clear knowledge and judgment of what is truly worth striving for. This consists essentially in conformableness to the rational nature of the sage. Virtue consists in the positive determination of conduct through will power in accordance with rational insight into man’s essential nature. Virtue is right reason. Nature and reason are one. Right reason and the universal law of nature, which holds undisputed sway throughout the universe, are also one. Obedience to the eternal world law in a life lived according to reason: such, embraced with religious fervor, is the ethical principle of Stoicism. It thus means to live in harmony with oneself, to live in accordance with one’s rational nature; for the latter manifests the world law.

  Law, too, has its basis in nature. Man has an inborn notion of right and wrong, and law in its very essence rests not upon the arbitrary will of a ruler or upon the decree of a multitude, but upon nature, i.e., upon innate ideas (non scripta sed nata lex).10 Cicero (106–43 b.c.) was the interpreter and transmitter of the Stoic doctrine of natural law. The lex nata, the law within us, he regards as the foundation of law in general. It is not to be gathered, as a general concept by way of abstraction, from the law of the Twelve Tables or from the praetor’s edict—that is, from the positive law—but ex intima philosophia. Since it is identical with right reason, it is universally valid, unchangeable and incapable of being abrogated; for its author is the divine reason itself—taken, of course, in a pantheistic, impersonal sense. It is also called eternal law. Cicero could thus write: “If the principles of Justice were founded on the decrees of peoples, the edicts of princes, or the decisions of judges, then Justice would sanction robbery and adultery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were approved by the votes or decrees of the populace. But if so great a power belongs to the decisions and decrees of fools that the laws of Nature can be changed by their votes, then why do they not ordain that what is bad and baneful shall be considered good and salutary? Or, if a law can make Justice out of Injustice, can it not also make good out of bad? But in fact we can perceive the difference between good laws and bad by referring them to no other standard than Nature: indeed, it is not merely Justice and Injustice which are distinguished by Nature, but also and without exception things which are honourable and dishonourable. For since an intelligence common to us all makes things known to us and formulates them in our minds, honourable actions are ascribed by us to virtue, and dishonourable actions to vice; and only a madman would conclude that these judgments are matters of opinion, and not fixed by Nature.”11 Time and again the gifted rhetorician contrasts in this manner the law of nature, as the measure and inner source of validity, with the positive law, which to him is a shadow and reflected image of the true law.12

  Epictetus (cir.a.d. 60–110) likewise called attention to the diversity of the laws that prevail at various times and among different peoples. He taught that the test of whether or not a law accords with nature consists in its agreement or non-agreement with reason. The laws that upheld slavery he called laws of the dead, an abysmal crime. Seneca (d. a.d. 65), in the teeth of the prevailing institution of slavery, gladiatorial combats, and shows featuring the throwing of human beings to beasts, voiced this magnificent sentiment apropos of human dignity: homo sacra res homini.13 What were originally Sophist doctrines were gaining fresh currency: the dignity of the human being and the natural-law basis of freedom and equality. Slaves, too, are men, blood relations and brethren. Like freemen, they are God’s own children, members of a great community. The city-state has thus lost its power, and with it has disappeared the differentiation of mankind into Greeks and barbarians, into freemen and slaves. “All that you behold, that which comprises both god and man, is one—we are the parts of one great body. Nature produced us related to one another since she created us from the same source and to the same end. She engendered in us mutual affection, and made us prone to friendships. She established fairness and justice.”14 A magnificent statement of the civitas maxima, the great society or world state, and of its fundamental law, the natural law! As Marcus Aurelius expressed it: “My city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world.”15

  These Stoic views are singularly impressive in an environment that was replete with despotic brutality and contempt for man, with excesses and misuse of power, with a many-sided suppression of freedom. It is of far greater consequence, however, that they penetrated into Roman law, led to a recognition of the individual in private law, and elevated to the dignity of natural law the more liberal principles of the ius gentium which had developed out of the law of foreigners. Above all, they brought to the original tribalism and formalism of Roman law a universalism which fitted it “to survive, as a world law, the life of the nation in which it had originated” (Puchta). Among the later Stoics, too, we find the doctrine of a state of nature, a happy condition of mankind in which all the Stoic ideals of right and freedom had been realized and where the pure natural law had consequently been in force.16 The status civilis, on the other hand, with slavery organized and protected by the positive law, was looked upon as a state of affairs in which the natural law, though continuing in force, no longer holds sole sway.

  In Stoicism, then, the mind of the ancient world had come to embrace whatever views Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, and the moderate Sophists had held regarding the natural law—all that they had taught touching the lex aeterna, recta ratio, lex naturalis, ius naturale, as well as concerning the connections of these with positive law and their evaluating force in relation to it. It thus preserved the “seeds of the Logos,” and it found the literary forms or word vessels into which the Christian spirit was to pour its own ideas, which eventually matured into a new, yet related, doctrine of natural law.

  Under the influence of Stoic philosophy the doctrine of the natural law passed into Roman law. The great jurists of the golden age of Roman law were for the most part also philosophers. Through the medium of eclectic Stoicism they were acquainted with Aristotle’s teaching on justice and with Zeno’s work On the Laws; especially, however, they were familiar with the writings of Cicero, the popular philosopher of Stoicism. Besides, the forensic orators were interested in philosophy in their pleadings at the bar. Among these Cicero held first place, but there were also Q. Mucius Scaevola, Calpurnius, and Rutilius, as Cicero himself informs us. This philosophical bent is likewise evidenced by the frequency with which the jurists cite the philosophers. Gaius, for example, quotes Aristotle and Xenophon; Ulpian and Celsus quote Cicero; Paulus mentions Graeci in general. The peculiar function of the jurists, “responding,” i.e., imparting legal information and counsel to the judges and litigants alike,17 involved for the jurists this deeper kind of intellectual labor. Thus Stoic philosophy may with considerable justice be called the mother of Roman jurisprudence. The latter, to keep up the metaphor, sucked in the doctrine of the ius naturale with its mother’s milk.

  Down to the time of Cicero neither science nor the natural-law doctrine had exercised any practical influence on Roman law. Then, however, theory broke in along a broad front. For Gaius, Paulus, and Marcian the ius naturae is a norm which from the very beginning lies forever imbedded in the nature of things; since it also reveals itself in things, it can be discovered in them. The Stoic idea of an eternal law of the order of the universe was present to their minds. This law emanates from the logos, which in turn is itself the law of things. The logos, moreover, expresses itself conceptually in the nature of things, and it destines them for harmony with the universe. Hence wherever two beings, whether man and thing or two men, find themselves related to each other, a rule covering what is naturally and essentially conformable to this relationship is present in the law of the logos—and is at the same time expressed a priori in the very nature of the correlates. A law rules as an ordering force in the natura rerum, in the world of both irrational and rational creatures.

  This became of practical importance as a norm for positive legislation and for the deciding of cases for which the positive law contained no norm. But the natural law especially became the magic formula whereby the jurists in their responsa replaced the ancient law, which had by then become inadequate, with new law introduced under the concepts of lex naturae and aequitas. This they accomplished by means of the edict of the magistrates who were under their influence as well as through the imperial constitutions. In addition, the new law had in its favor the splendor of inherent truth or reason, the charm of simple conformity with nature, and the grandeur of transcending peoples and ages. But to the jurists aequitas was the echo of the lex naturae, the command of an inner voice through which speaks the ratio of the natura rerum immanent in things. Aequitas is the legal conscience which speaks even when a positive norm is at hand, for it is the “meaning” of the positive law. Adjudication, or applying the law, is not a logical and automatic process of subsuming under a general norm: it is interpretation in the light of aequitas.

  As material contents of the law of nature the jurists designated such things as the rules touching kinship (marriage—family), good faith, adjustment or weighing of interests (suum cuique), the real meaning of the actual will of the legal subject as opposed to the formalism of the law governing expression of will. To these may be added the original freedom and equality of all men, and the right of self-defense (vim vi repellere).

  Furthermore, the jurists, e.g., Paulus, Ulpian, and Marcian, regarded the ius civile as possessing special force. Yet even according to them the ius naturae must prevail in case of conflict: what the ius naturae forbids, the ius civile may not allow; nor may the ius civile repeal such prohibition (compare the scholastic teaching: the negative precepts of the natural law are forever immutable). To be sure, this question occasioned no real trouble, since the responsa of the jurists possessed, so to speak, legislative force. Thus their doctrine of the ius naturae forthwith gained a footing, along with the finding and the judgment, in the responsa. It also took on positive form in the lex casus, in accordance with which the magistrates were thereafter to proceed in similar cases. In like manner, too, the royal judge in Anglo-Saxon lands, bearing the law, i.e., the natural law, “in the shrine of his breast,” in the very act of handing down a decision conferred positive character upon the natural law in the rule of the case.

  The Roman world empire, with its toleration of the legal institutions of subject peoples, placed in the hands of the jurists still another important source of knowledge. This was the unwritten ius gentium, which arose out of actual practice and was substantially “found” by the jurists and magistrates. The ius naturale, derived from metaphysical and ethical reflection, appeared identical with the universal element in the legal systems of individual peoples. As the idea of law thus issued from ethical speculation as a teleological apriorism for the positive law, so it emerged as concept of law in the positive law through abstract treatment of the legal systems of particular peoples. This led to the ius gentium. Consequently the results which philosophical thinking arrived at by way of deduction from logos, ratio, and rerum natura turned out to be identical with the idea of law in the systems of positive law. These in turn are products of the universal, law-creating societas humana and of reason that governs in it.

  The equating of ius naturae and ius gentium that is met with even in Gaius has here its origin. Ulpian, on the contrary, defined ius naturale as “that which nature teaches to all animals” (quod natura omnia animalia docuit); but this is the ordo rerum. The ius gentium thereupon becomes that part of the ius naturale which has force for mankind.18 This, however, is a product of the will of universal reason, not of the will of some particular historical lawgiver.

  The Roman jurists still lacked a clear distinction between law and morality. Even the norm “worship must be paid to God” pertained to law, and so did “live honorably.” To the jurists, indeed, jurisprudence was “a knowledge of things divine and human, the science of what is just and unjust.”19

  But the greatest intellectual gain stemmed directly from Stoic ethics. The Greeks, except for a few revolutionary Sophists, had regarded the citizens of the polis as the sole subjects of law. For the Roman jurists, on the other hand, it was not merely the Roman citizen who was in the true sense a subject of law, but every member of human society (the civitas maxima of the Stoics). Therefore they held that man as such is possessed of natural rights, which he continues to retain even in a state of slavery. Slavery was thereby, in contrast to Aristotle’s doctrine, a positive-law institution which could and should be displaced in keeping with being and oughtness.

  Even after the revival of imperial sovereignty in the later Roman Empire (under Justinian, a.d. 527–65), the natural law remained the first, supreme, and true legal norm: the basic law of human relations, the model and ideal set before the eyes of the lawmaker for realization. But it was no longer such for the judge, who was henceforth dependent upon the law, or for the citizen. For these the positive law alone had force. Nevertheless the idea of ius naturae had so strong a hold that, in contrast with modern absolutism, as, for instance, in the doctrine of Hobbes, the lawmaker remained subject to the natural law not merely as an empty form, but as a system of content-laden norms.

  It remains an eloquent proof of the eternal truth of the doctrine of natural law that Roman law, the finest legal system yet developed in the West,20 enveloped the natural law in its deepest thinking and taught it in its noblest terms.

  Like Stoic philosophy, Roman law also passed on this idea to the new Christian era and to the age of scholastic philosophy, which as true philosophia perennis21 has remained the permanent home of the natural law. Scholastic philosophy has been the place of sanctuary for the natural law when arid positivism has driven the latter out of secular jurisprudence. Yet it has always come back into jurisprudence whenever the human mind, weary of the unsatisfying hunt for mere facts, has again turned to metaphysics, queen of the sciences.”22

  Everyone is at least familiar with the distinction between legal norm and moral law, even though he does not completely separate them. It must surely have come as something of a surprise, then, that in antiquity such a distinction, let alone a separation, was altogether wanting. Aristotle in his treatise on ethics says that justice, which in this context he takes in the narrower sense, is directed “to another,” and, as essentially concerning the social order, governs the relations of man with his fellow man. But he speaks still more frequently of justice as the general virtue which embraces all others, makes man virtuous, and guides him to the highest goal. He likewise asserts, on this point following Socrates, that the just man is obedient to the laws, i.e., to the written laws and to the unwritten mores. Among these he includes the relations of man to himself, e.g., the curbing of the passions, as well as the ceremonial law and reverence for the divine.

  This view rests substantially upon the fact that the sole and exclusive moral fulfillment of the idea of man was held to lie in citizenship. Whence, too, the acceptance of slavery. The slave, it was maintained, is by nature unfitted for citizenship; he is incapable, in the Aristotelian sense, of being educated to virtue. The virtuous life is the goal of man. But he can achieve this goal only as citizen of the polis and in obedience to its laws. All education and training in virtue consequently become politics, and the latter is ethics. The ancients knew only a politico-legal morality. The city-state, in their view, is the ultimate and absolutely supreme pedagogue, the fulfillment of the moral being of man.

  The notion of human personality was in its deepest meaning hidden from the ancients, as was also the eternal, superterrestrial goal of the immortal soul. Moreover, they had but a faint idea of a personal God as the supreme lawgiver distinct from the world; nor did they know anything of a Church as the medium of salvation. For them the polis and its divine worship remained the ultimate. Wherever the idea of human rights forced its way through (among the moderate Sophists and in Stoicism), its effect was revolutionary: either it dissolved the city-state or it encouraged dreams of the great society (civitas maxima) of mankind, which of course merely raised the question of its own meaning. Thus the ancients failed to arrive at the distinction between natural law and natural moral law.

  Nevertheless, the main problems connected with the idea of natural law existed already in antiquity. The positivism of the Skeptics, of Epicurus, and of Carneades stood in opposition to the natural law in its two recurring forms: the metaphysical one in Plato and Aristotle, and the individualistic one in the earlier Sophists. Furthermore, the continually recurring definitions of law, which have stirred up and divided philosophico-legal thinking down to the present day, had already been formulated: law is will, law is reason; law is truth, law is authority. The doctrine of an original state of nature, of fundamental importance for individualism but of merely persuasive value for other thinkers, appeared already among the Sophists. It appeared also among the Stoics for a similar reason but with another object in view, namely, to provide the basis for a distinction between a primary and a secondary natural law. This distinction, valuable to the Church Fathers in connection with their doctrine of original sin, served the Scholastics to differentiate the self-evident principles of the natural law from the conclusions obtained through reasoning the content of the natural law is more exactly determined—as well as to solve more or less successfully certain thorny theological problems.

  CHAPTER II

  The Natural Law in the Age of Scholasticism

  A new philosophy and a new world order did not follow at once upon the entrance of the Christian faith into the ancient world, into a sociocultural complex that was in process of dissolution and was addicted to somber mystical beliefs and practices. Indeed, precisely because of the advancing disintegration, or rather decomposition, of ancient society and culture, a considerable number of early Christians were eschatologically minded; that is, they were unduly concerned with the supposed imminence of the last things, the end of the world and the second coming of the Lord. At all events and for a variety of reasons, the transforming power of Christian doctrine could at first accomplish little.

  Christianity, however, contains three ideas of decisive importance for the present problem: the idea of the supermundane, transcendent, personal God as Lawgiver in the absolute sense, the idea of Christian personality, whose eternal goal transcends the state, the law, and the mores of the polis; and the idea of the Church as the institution charged with the salvation of mankind standing alongside and, in matters of faith and morals, above the will of the state. Such ideas had in the long run to affect the whole problem of natural law: not, indeed, in order to revolutionize it, but to explore it more thoroughly, to strengthen its foundations, and to complete it materially.1

  The history of the natural-law idea shows that Christianity took it over at a very early date. Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles, declares that the natural law is inscribed in the hearts of the heathen, who do not have the Law (of Sinai), and is made known to them through their conscience. It is valid both for pagans and for Jews because it is grounded in nature, in the essence of man. (Cf. Rom. 2:12–16).

  The Fathers of the Early Church made use of the Stoic natural law, finding in its principles “seeds of the Word,” to proclaim the Christian doctrine of the personal Creator-God as the Author of the eternal law as well as of the natural moral law which is promulgated in the voice of conscience and in reason. Thus, for instance, we read in St. John Chrysostom (d. 407): “We use not only Scripture but also reason in arguing against the pagans. What is their argument? They say they have no law of conscience, and that there is no law implanted by God in nature. My answer is to question them about their laws concerning marriage, homicide, wills, injuries to others, enacted by their legislators. Perhaps the living have learned from their fathers, and their fathers from their fathers and so on. But go back to the first legislator! From whom did he learn? Was it not by his own conscience and conviction? Nor can it be said that they heard Moses and the prophets, for Gentiles could not hear them. It is evident that they derived their laws from the law which God ingrafted in man from the beginning.”2

  The Fathers also took over the Stoic distinction of a primary and a secondary natural law, which they interpreted in a theological sense. They regarded the former as applying to the state of unimpaired nature or innocence, while they assigned the latter, with the coercive authority of the law, with bondage and slavery, to the theological condition of fallen nature. Nature, somehow wounded indeed but not destroyed, is therefore still able fully to recognize the first principles of morality and law. But the conclusions from the first principles, which were also plainly intelligible in the state of unimpaired nature, are now attainable only by means of deductive reasoning, since the practical reason is also weakened. Accordingly law takes on a harsh, compulsory character, and the state bears a sword. But the state as such was not regarded by the Fathers as some sort of consequence of sin. An age ignorant of tradition has been able to take such a view of the state only on the basis of patristic texts torn from their context and because of a want of understanding of the mental outlook of the Fathers.

  The Fathers did not attempt to construct a system of ethics and jurisprudence. Their speculative thinking was wholly taken up with elucidating the truths of faith, which were in danger of being swamped in the upsurge of pseudomystical doctrines characteristic of the numerous mystery cults of declining antiquity. In addition, their heavy pastoral duties in the period of persecutions, organization, and evangelization left them little leisure for thorough theoretical treatment of questions of moral and legal philosophy.

  St. Augustine (d. 430), it is true, forms an exception, and a very brilliant one. In his extremely fertile mind the ideas of ancient philosophy came once again to life and were worked into the new Christian mentality. His talents and the struggles against the Pelagian and Manichaean heresies, as well as the shattering experience of the breakdown of the Roman Empire, of the earthly city, brought ethico-legal problems home to the great bishop of Hippo.

  For Augustine the substantial ideas, which Plato had conceived of as dwelling in a heavenly abode, became thoughts of God. The impersonal world reason of the Stoics became the personal, all-wise and all-powerful God. The purely deistic Nous of Aristotle became the Creator-God who transcends the world, but who continually sustains it through His omnipotence, directs it through His providence, and governs it according to His eternal law. This eternal law was for Augustine identical with the supreme reason and eternal truth, with the reason of God Himself, according to whose laws the inner life and external activity of God proceed and are governed. God’s reason is order, and His law rules this ontological order, the order of being, of essences and values. But since this norm is identical with the immutable, immanent nature of God, it does not stand above Him; it is connatural to Him, and it is as unchangeable as He. No power, no chance event, not even the complete collapse of all things can alter it. No obscure, occult fate is any longer enthroned, as in ancient thought, above the personal God.

  Through this law God, so far as He produces external effects, directs, guides, and sustains the universe. God, supreme reason, unchangeable being and omnipotent will: this is oneness in its highest form. But the natural moral law and its component part, the ius naturale, is precisely this divine law with reference to man, so far as the latter participates in the divine law. The eternal law dwells as blind necessity in irrational nature. As oughtness, as norm of free moral activity, it is inscribed in the heart of man, a rational and free being. It appears in the moral, rational nature of man; it is written into the rational soul. There is no soul, however corrupt it may be, in whose conscience God does not speak, if only it is still capable of rational thought. There are human actions, consequently, which are in themselves good or bad. Bad acts are not qualified as such by force of law, but because they are such in themselves: because they constitute a disturbance of the natural order. Thereupon, because they are such, the lawmaker prohibits them under threat of punishment, which thereby obtains its moral justification. Not the will of the earthly lawgiver, but variance with natural reason is the ground of the intrinsic immorality of determinate actions.

  The doctrine of natural law was transmitted to the golden age of Scholasticism not only in the works of the Church Fathers but also through the study of Roman law and through the development of canon law. The classical authors of the Corpus iuris civilis, as has been seen, stood in close contact with natural-law thinking. It is not merely in passing that we meet with the natural law in their writings: the natural law is there pronounced valid, unconditionally binding law. Considerably greater, however, was the influence of canon law in the form of Gratian’s Decretum (cir. 1148), especially since during the first period of the flowering of Scholasticism the study of Roman law by theologians was frowned upon and even, for a time, prohibited. Gratian distinguished between ius naturale and the mores. The ius naturale, which is contained in the Law (i.e., the Decalogue) and the Gospel, is of divine origin. It resides in human nature, it is alike in all men, and it has force independently of human statute. Natural rights and duties may indeed have to be more closely defined by positive law, but they stand as a norm and rule above the positive laws. To Gratian the latter were, like customary law or mores, liable to change according to time, place, and people. In short, Gratian merely set forth what tradition had handed down.

  As the great philosophical movement of the Middle Ages, Scholasticism,3 approached its peak, the natural-law doctrine attained its most masterly expression. It was carried to speculative heights which have never been surpassed in the centuries that followed. Since then the doctrine of natural law has never wholly perished. Even though it might be neglected in the official academic philosophy which has been dominant in the chairs of the secular universities, and even though at the close of the nineteenth century and at the opening of the twentieth century jurisprudence might pronounce it dead, the natural-law doctrine has ever found a home and tender care among the adherents of the philosophia perennis. These have preserved it even throughout the decades in which legal positivism held fullest sway. Moreover, they carried it over, as Christian natural law, into an environment that is once again more favorable to the idea of natural law. For World War I and its consequences, to say nothing of World War II and its effects (which promise to be still more fateful), have brought men to recognize more and more openly the questionableness of a philosophy without metaphysics, of an epistemology without certainty of truth, of a jurisprudence without an idea of right.

  The history of the natural-law idea exhibits a uniform doctrinal development from the first Scholastics down to the able leaders of the scholastic revival of recent times. Its two culminating points were the synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas and, following the heaviest assault made inside Scholasticism by the Occamists on the idea of natural law, the work of Vittoria, Bellarmine, Suarez, Vasquez, and De Soto (to mention only the most distinguished of the Late Scholastics). And the period after World War I again produced more understanding and esteem for a uniform doctrinal development that has been substantially independent of fashionable philosophies and of a jurisprudence with special sociological or political ties.

  Scholasticism has dealt exhaustively with the problem of natural law. Not one of its exponents has failed to treat of the natural law, either in general in connection with the discussion of the virtues or in particular under such headings as De legibus or De iure et iustitia. And with the lex naturalis they handled, though not always with the aid of special distinctions, the ius naturale and ius gentium in the sense of the traditional formulas of Roman law. This holds true from Alexander of Hales to Thomas Aquinas, and thence down to the great masters of Late Scholasticism. It further holds good for the theologians and philosophers of the philosophia perennis, whether they were contemporaries of Pufendorf and Thomasius or of Savigny, down to the increasingly esteemed representatives of the scholastic revival which set in at the close of the nineteenth century.

  ‡In following the doctrinal development it is worthy of note that the antithesis of lex-ratio and lex-voluntas, applying here in the setting of theological speculation and in general to the lex naturalis inclusive of the natural law in the stricter sense, coincided structurally with the doctrines of the respective thinkers concerning God. But it is also noteworthy that later, when the natural-law doctrine had been severed from its theological moorings and hence secularized, the same thought patterns repeated themselves. Now, however, they were detached from the medieval form of Summa and applied solely to law in the narrower sense. The result has been that natural law is the consequence of the doctrines of the priority of the intellect over the will (law is reason) in both God and man, of the knowability of the essences of things and their essential order, their metaphysical being and the ordered hierarchy of values. Positivism, on the other hand, is the consequence of the doctrine of the primacy of the will with respect to the intellect in both theology and human psychology. Besides, voluntas here means more than mere will: it denotes passion, irrational appetite, and so on. Positivism signifies the renouncing of all efforts to know the essences of things (nominalism), the repudiation of the metaphysics of hierarchized being and value. Accordingly it is also found in the same conceptual pattern in the thinking of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even though it is concealed under different names.

  Relativism in ethics, legal positivism, the theory of will in public and international law, nominalism and agnosticism in epistemology and metaphysics form down to the present a united front with the mysticism of a biological positivism appearing in natural-law dress. On the other side stands the conviction of unalterable principles of morality and law, of the idea of right as object of a philosophy of right, of the natural law, of the possibility of knowing the nature of things, of objective values and an ultimate unity of being and oughtness as well as the possibility of a true theodicy, or natural theology. And this antithesis continues on, in an ever more acute form, into the domain of constitutional theory and practice. The powerful position, in Anglo-Saxon countries, of the judiciary which understands and interprets (functions of the intellect) in contrast to the enactment of law through the will of the legislature rests ultimately upon the philosophical view that law is reason, not will. This means that right is discernible in the nature of the case or lies in the legal institution regulated by law, not in the will of the legislator: not, that is to say, in the wording of the law representing such a will or command. Such formulas as those found in the administration of justice in Anglo-Saxon countries (especially in the United States), where formal natural-law thinking has never disappeared among judges, are continually recurring even today.4

  It was not with St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), often called the first of the Schoolmen, that Scholasticism began to concern itself more seriously with the natural law, but rather with the first great author of a Summa, Alexander of Hales (d. 1245). Deeper interest in it thus arose first and foremost from the philosophical preoccupation with laying a solid foundation for ethics, for law and the social forms of family and state, for a doctrine of society and the state. This interest was considerably heightened, however, in connection with the exegesis of certain passages in the Old Testament.

  That is, the thesis of the immutability of the lex naturalis and ius naturale presupposes the intrinsic immorality and unlawfulness of certain actions, and it consequently excludes any dispensation from the norms of the lex naturalis. But such a position seemed to conflict with some Old Testament stories, whose moral tone and authority made it necessary to conclude that a dispensation is nevertheless possible. Such cases are, for instance, Yahweh’s command to Abraham to offer up his son Isaac in sacrifice (Gen. 22:2); the polygamy of the patriarchs; God’s instruction to the prophet Osee: “Go, take thee a wife of fornications” (Osee 1:2; cf. also ibid., 3:1); the injunction laid upon the Jews or permission accorded them at the time of the Exodus to take away with them vessels of silver and gold as well as raiment lent to them by the Egyptians (Exod. 3:21 f.; 11:2 f.; 12:35 f.); divorce openly allowed to husbands in the Mosaic legislation (Deut. 24:1–4); the reply of the angel Raphael to Tobias’ question about his identity: “I am Azarias the son of the great Ananias” (Tob. 5:18), which seems materially and formally to amount to a lie. All these cases called for a thorough discussion, from the theological and exegetical angles, of the question of the immutability, i.e., the essential nature, of the lex naturalis. But at the same time they were a warning not to be too doctrinaire in determining the content of the natural law.

  Alexander of Hales, falling back upon St. Augustine’s teaching, hit upon a beautiful figure: the eternal law is the seal, and the natural moral law is its impression in the rational nature of man, which in turn is an image of God. Now, the laws of thought, as unchangeable norms of thinking, must govern speculative reason, the understanding, if the latter is to serve the purpose of its nature, the perception of truth; and such laws are immediately evident and certain. In the same way there exist for willing and acting in the domain of the practical reason supreme moral principles which are equally evident and sure. Thus every deed and action is moral only when it is performed in accordance with these principles. Moreover, this immanent natural moral law can never be destroyed. Yet the further conclusions from the supreme principles may well become obscured in individuals through the working of the passions and through a turning away from God, the Author of the natural law. To explain this possibility Alexander borrows a figure from Plato: the sun ever remains the same, yet darkness ensues when clouds pass before the sun or when, during a solar eclipse, the moon prevents the sun’s light from reaching the earth.

  Although he held fast to the immutability of the first principles, Alexander of Hales at first sought to explain the changeableness of the further conclusions, observable in the Old Testament as well as elsewhere, by adopting the Stoic distinction, transmitted in the writings of the Church Fathers, of a primary natural law anterior to original sin and of a secondary one subsequent to original sin. The status naturae integrae, the theological state of nature preceding original sin, would in itself, as St. Augustine had already taught, have produced life in society, marriage, the family, and the political community. (This state of nature accordingly differs considerably from the individualistic state of nature, which indeed was directly opposed to the status civilis.) But had this state of nature been realized, community of goods, equal personal freedom, and a legal order unaccompanied by the use of force would have prevailed. Only in the state of fallen nature, after original sin, did private property, restrictions upon liberty, the coercive power of the state, and personal inequality arise. But the natural law underwent thereby no alteration; for even now the basic norm, men must live peacefully with one another, remains in force. Hence only the application of this norm has changed, not the norm itself. The secondary natural law, the second table of the Decalogue (i.e., the last seven of the Ten Commandments), is a consequence of original sin.5

  But this theory had to be completely abandoned. For this type of argument was unable to furnish what it was intended to provide, namely, an ethico-philosophical explanation of the actions apparently contrary to the natural moral law recorded in the Old Testament. And so Alexander of Hales had recourse, as did St. Albert the Great and other contemporaries, to the doctrine of the primacy of the will in God as well as to God’s sovereign dominion that transcends all laws. These thinkers perceived clearly enough that in this way everything again became uncertain, but they were unable to prevent this outcome. For an adequate solution of the problem the genius of a Thomas Aquinas was needed.

  St. Thomas (1225–74) starts from the likeness of human nature to the divine nature. Understanding and free will are the most essential marks that distinguish man from every other earthly creature. It is precisely through them that man is in a special degree the image and likeness of God. Man’s intellect and free will constitute the closest image of God in the material universe, His creation. St. Thomas, indeed, is fond of setting out from the notion of analogy of being: namely, that all created being, though of an altogether different kind from the divine Being, is an image of the latter and a participation in it—from merely inanimate being of inorganic nature up to man, whom God created after His own image.

  Here teleology, the doctrine of ends or final causes, enters the scene.6 The essences of things, which are exemplifications of the ideas conceived by the divine intellect, constitute at the same time the end or goal of the things themselves. The perfection or fulfillment of the things is their essence: formal cause and end are one (causa finalis is ultimately identical with causa formalis). Accordingly in the essential nature of the created world, as it came forth in conformity with the will of the Creator, are imbedded also the norms of its being. In the essential nature is likewise founded essential oughtness, the eternal law, which is God’s wisdom so far as it directs and governs the world as first cause of all acts of rational creatures and of all movements of irrational beings. The eternal law, then, is the governance of the world through God’s will in accordance with His wisdom. This law is thus the order of this world. Creatures fulfill this law in conformity with their nature as it has been fashioned by God: from the lifeless and inorganic realm of creation, through the living but dumb creatures, to the rational and free beings.

  The eternal law, therefore, comprises several elements. First, it includes what today we call the laws of the natural sciences: the laws of movement taken generally, in accordance with which the stars in the heavens and the stones upon earth are moved from without. Secondly, it embraces what in living creatures, plants and animals, we term the laws of their evolution and growth, the laws of reaction to external influences or stimuli, instinct, and the like, which, however, involve movement from within, after the manner of an entelechy.7 Thirdly, it contains the laws by virtue of which man, as a rational and free being, knows and wills, hence the laws of theoretical and practical reason. Since man is quodammodo omnia—herein consists his likeness to God, who is eminenter omnia—he is wholly subject to the eternal law in his material, sentient, and rational being, but ever in keeping with his essence. Oughtness, not blind compulsion and necessity, characterizes the way man obeys the law. Hence for man, as a free rational being, the eternal law becomes the natural moral law. Man must (i.e., ought to) thus both will and achieve the perfecting or fulfillment of the potentialities of his being which God has put into his nature, as he perceives them in virtue of his reason and becomes conscious of them.

  Furthermore, this natural moral law is alone law in the proper sense: a norm which ought to be obeyed, not one that must be blindly obeyed. Our modern laws of nature are law only in a metaphorical sense. Law, indeed, is a norm and measure for acts which rational creatures alone are capable of. Its basic norm may be simply stated: Act in conformity with your rational nature. For rational nature, known through self-consciousness or reflex thinking, constitutes the ontological criterion of man’s oughtness. Through its free realization he becomes a man, a free rational being. God’s wisdom and knowledge as well as His will stand revealed in the essential idea of man.

  St. Thomas reaches the same conclusion from still another consideration, from the metaphysical notion of goodness.8 Reason is the first and proximate rule for judging the moral quality of an action, which is moral precisely because it is inherently conformable to reason and nature, or immoral because it is at variance therewith. By what does reason gauge, however, whether an action or object is suited to the essential nature? St. Thomas gives the following explanation. Every agent, supposing that he is actually in possession of reason and freedom of will, acts for an end or purpose. The moving principle, the end, is thereby perceived and willed as something good. But a thing is an end only so far as it is a good, whose acquisition makes it worth one’s while to act. Goodness induces one to act. Goodness is, in final analysis, that which is in itself worth desiring and striving for. As cognition is directed to being, so the will is directed to goodness. And just as the intellect knows the thing so far as it has being, so the will lays hold of the thing, perceived as desirable or worth striving after, as good. All being is good. A being is a good so far as it appears suited to the essential nature. Now the supreme principles of speculative reason (the principle of contradiction, and so on, the immediately evident, axiomatic laws of thought) guide the intellect in its thinking. In the same way St. Thomas recognizes a supreme principle, a law, for the practical reason, for the will: good is to be done. The very same being which the theoretical reason knows as being and in which it apprehends truth, the agreement of knowledge with being, appears to the will and the practical reason as a good. That which is, also ought to be. Being, truth, and goodness are convertible. The law is truth; it wills what is good; and it presupposes knowledge of being.9

  Good is to be done: such is the supreme commandment of the natural moral law. The highest and basic norm of the natural law in the narrow sense, then, may be stated thus: Justice is to be done. Yet this principle is altogether general. It needs still to be determined to what extent the object striven for by means of a concrete action is a true good. This is done more or less with the aid of a syllogism (which, of course, is not worked out in every case by concrete reasoning): Good is to be done; this action is good, it strives after a good; it is therefore to be performed. Good is that which corresponds to the essential nature. The being of a thing also reveals its purpose in the order of creation, and in its perfect fulfillment it is likewise the end or goal of its growth and development. The essential nature is thus the measure. What corresponds to it is good; what is contrary to it is bad. The measure of goodness, consequently, is the essential idea of a thing and the proportionateness thereto of actions and of other things. That is, “Good is to be done” means the same as “Realize your essential nature.” Moreover, since this essential nature issued from God’s creative will and wisdom in both its existence and its quiddity, the principle continues: “You thereby realize the will of God, which is truly manifested to you in the knowledge of your essential nature.” The same being is truth to the theoretical reason, and goodness to the practical reason.10

  The train of thought thereupon widens. It follows that there are some actions which, because they correspond to the essential nature and its end, are in themselves good, moral, just; and that there are others which, because they are at variance therewith, are in themselves bad, immoral, unjust.11 At any rate, this is true on the assumption that both in God and in man the intellect, not the will, holds the primacy. For a natural moral law as an immutable basic norm, and the essential nature as a valid measure of what is moral and just, are possible only when this essence is itself unalterable. This presupposes, however, that the essential nature owes its idea, its quiddity, and its existence to the unchangeable essence of God Himself, of which they are reflections. “If, too, human nature is the immediate measure of moral goodness, it can be the norm of unalterable moral judgments only insofar as it itself embodies the idea of man as this rests from all eternity in the divine mind. But the ideas of things in the divine mind are, in their content, nothing else than the images through which God knows His own essence as imitable. This is true also of the idea of man.”12

  The divine essence and, in one and the same act, the divine knowledge thereof and the creative will of God, likewise thereby informed in one and the same act, are (or rather, is) the basis for the essential nature and its immutability. “That God of necessity enacts and cannot alter that law which we call the natural law comes merely from the fact that His will cannot do away with His most perfect essence, that God cannot be at variance with Himself and cannot, as the Apostle says, deny Himself” (Kleutgen). This is the fundamental reason for rejecting moral and legal positivism. The will is not the law; on the contrary, it can only be right law when it is guided even in God by reason and intellect. “But to say that justice depends upon mere will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, which is blasphemy.”13

  Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided: this basic norm of the natural moral law has thus the character of an axiom. The real question, however, is that of its application to the concrete case. As another expression for the first rule of the lex naturalis, as general principles known to all, St. Thomas mentions love of God and of one’s neighbor. Man knows other principles only through deductive reason, yet not with altogether unerring certitude. For, in contrast with the speculative reason, the knowledge of the practical reason is more severely menaced in its clarity by the passions, by sinful inclinations. These conclusions from principles are for St. Thomas, as he explains in a searching inquiry into the problem, identical with the Decalogue, or Ten Commandments. The Decalogue contains the most essential conclusions for the simple reason that its precepts do not result from an arbitrary arrangement made by God, but from the fundamental distinction of good and evil. The first table of the Decalogue (first three Commandments) embraces the moral norms that relate to the worship of God; these required a special promulgation, in the view of St. Thomas, because they are not so evident as the laws found in the second table. The latter (the last seven Commandments), which are derived from the mutual relations among men and from the essence and goal of human nature, are, on the other hand, known more readily and with greater evidence. Human society in all its groupings ought to be built up in accordance with justice.

  The Decalogue (second table) presents the norms that follow from the essential relationships which in their turn are given in the essential nature of man as a rational, free, and social being. These precepts, as norms with a material content, protect the family and parental authority (Fourth Commandment), human life (Fifth Commandment), the person in the capital sense of husband and wife (Sixth Commandment), property (Seventh Commandment), and honor (Eighth Commandment); lastly they forbid (Ninth and Tenth Commandments) inordinate, illicit longing for those goods which are especially exposed to covetousness and, moreover, whose wrongful appropriation does not arouse that natural abhorrence which infractions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Commandments do.14 St. Thomas regards it as self-evident that the further deductions from these conclusions do not possess the same evidence, since they necessarily lose, in favor of particular prescriptions, the universal character required for evidence. Furthermore, they are not so unmistakably recognizable that errors about them may not arise in the minds of individuals as well as among groups.15 Moreover, they do not share in the prerogative of immutability enjoyed by the principia communissima as well as by the conclusions which make up the contents of the Decalogue.

  For instance, from the nature of the legal institution, from the agreement with reason and from the right of property, which in the general sense is protected by the Seventh Commandment, it follows that goods held in trust should be restored to their owner. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas points out, such goods may be withheld from their owner in case they are to be used for treasonable purposes.16 Here the further conclusion does not hold good, although the universal norm of acting according to reason, the suum cuique, continues absolutely to govern the case. Some “matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various circumstances. Not all are able to do this carefully, but only those who are wise.”17 “In the very application of the universal principle to some particular case a mistake can occur through an inadequate or false deduction, or by reason of some false assumption”;18 and in the matter of its secondary precepts, “the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions … or by vicious customs and corrupt habits.”19 Therein, moreover, practical reason differs significantly from theoretical reason, which is less subject to such disturbing influences.

  This does not, then, mean merely that there is in St. Thomas no trace whatever of the extravagances of the rationalistic natural law current in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, since according to him only the Decalogue belongs to the contents of the natural law. It further means that the lex naturalis or ius naturale does not render positive laws superfluous, but actually calls for them. St. Thomas gives scarcely any attention to the doctrine of a state of nature, because he has no need of the latter for establishing the natural law. Now, the farther removed the conclusions are from the principia communissima, the more numerous and varied become the possible decisions. Hence a positive law must determine, must decide with greater exactness for concrete cases, what the correct application and conclusion are. There is all the more need of such determination because human nature, deprived and hence wounded somehow (though not destroyed or depraved) by original sin,20 must be—and in conformity with its inner goal also ought to be—constrained to good and restrained from evil. Self-education or addiction to goodness does not pertain to man as such. Consequently men stand in need of a clearly prescribed and adequately sanctioned system of norms, which emanate from an authority and power that in their inmost reality serve justice, and in the individual serve to perfect the essential nature of man. They are therefore ethical. St. Thomas is no romantic optimist like Rousseau.

  Furthermore, it is precisely the object of the positive law to render the citizen virtuous. It is not merely a question of maintaining order, or external peace; the law should rather act as a medium of popular education to transform those who live under common legal institutions into perfect citizens. For this very reason positive norms, determinate coercive measures, and a more exact definition of the circumstances in which the general principle shall be applied, are imperative. Thus the definition of what theft consists in is given with the lawfulness of private property. But the punishment which should follow theft, if arbitrariness is to be avoided, requires, with respect to the procedural verification of the theft as well as to the sentence and its execution, exact legal provisions which vary with times, cultures, and individual peoples.

  Here, in connection with the positive law which is therefore always “something pertaining to reason,” St. Thomas arrives at the nature of law. It has to do essentially with community life. On the other hand, it is distinguished from and contrasted with social ethics through its being directed to external order. The law wills that man conduct himself in such and such a manner; it concerns the external forum (vis directiva). It is the norm to be enforced: compulsion (vis coactiva) is proper to law, not to morality.

  From this inner connection of every positive law with the lex naturalis St. Thomas rightly concludes that the positive law may not conflict with the natural law. So far as it is in conflict with the latter, i.e., with the unchangeable norms, it is not law at all and cannot bind in conscience. For the force and significance of the law consist precisely in the obligation in conscience. Yet it may at times be right to obey even an unjust positive law (one that is not against the natural law: e.g., a law that imposes an unjust tax burden), because the higher natural-law norm enjoins in individual cases the sacrifice of a particular good to a more general good. For instance, the general goods of security under law and the external order of peace constitute a higher value than does the individual right to just treatment in the levying of taxes. It is consequently not the unjust law that binds, but the higher norm of peace and of maintenance of the community.

  In this fashion, then, all law, down to and inclusive of its positive individualization, is connected by means of the natural moral law with the eternal law and lives on the latter. Thus rectitudo practica, reasonableness or the relation to human nature still is, and ought to be, the essential element even in the positive law. For St. Thomas the law is somehow reason, not mere arbitrary will.21 The natural law remains the measure of the positive law. But this position is intimately connected with the doctrine of the immutability of the natural law and the enduring essential nature of man, as well as with the primacy of the intellect over the will in both God and man.

  But can God, by His absolute power, dispense from the precepts of the Decalogue? St. Thomas unqualifiedly answers that the Ten Commandments admit of no dispensation whatever. “Precepts admit of dispensation when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If, therefore, there be any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. …

  “Now the precepts of the Decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, namely, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the Decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the Decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.”22

  ‡But what of the Old Testament passages that appear to involve divine dispensations from the natural law? In reply, St. Thomas notes the sovereign dominion of God over men and over concrete human actions and institutions: “The precepts of the Decalogue, as to the notion of justice which they contain, are unchangeable; but as to any determination by application to individual actions—for instance, that this or that be murder, theft, or adultery, or not—in this point they admit of change; sometimes by divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively of divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely, in such matters as are subject to human jurisdiction; for in this respect men stand in the place of God, though not in all respects.”23

  With Duns Scotus (d. cir. 1308), and with the principle of the primacy of the will over the intellect so much emphasized by him, there began inside moral philosophy a train of thought which in later centuries would recur in secularized form in the domain of legal philosophy. The principle that law is will would be referred in legal positivism, as well as in the theory of will in jurisprudence, to the earthly lawmaker (self-obligation).

  For Duns Scotus morality depends on the will of God. A thing is good not because it corresponds to the nature of God or, analogically, to the nature of man, but because God so wills. Hence the lex naturalis could be other than it is even materially or as to content, because it has no intrinsic connection with God’s essence, which is self-conscious in His intellect. For Scotus, therefore, the laws of the second table of the Decalogue were no longer unalterable. The crux of theology, namely, the problem of the apparent dispensations from the natural law mentioned in the Old Testament and thus seemingly granted by God (the command to sacrifice Isaac, Raphael’s apparent lie, Osee’s alleged adultery, the polygamy of the patriarchs, and so on), was now readily solved.24 Yet St. Thomas, too, had been able to solve such cases. Now, however, an evolution set in which, in the doctrine of William of Occam (d. cir. 1349) on the natural moral law, would lead to pure moral positivism, indeed to nihilism.

  The will is the nobler faculty; the intellect is but the ministering torch-bearer of the will, which is the master. Between God’s essence and that of man there exists, apart from the fact of creation, no inherent connection, no analogy of being. Hence, too, there exists no unchangeable moral order grounded in the nature of things, in the ordered universe of being and value. As all being is founded on the mere absolute will of God without participation in His essence, so all oughtness or obligation rests solely on the same absolute will. Oughtness is without foundation in reality, just as the universals are merely vocal utterances (flatus vocis) and not mental images of the necessary being of the ideas in God. In this way Occam arrived at a heightened supernaturalism, but only to deprive almost completely the natural order of its value.

  For Occam the natural moral law is positive law, divine will. An action is not good because of its suitableness to the essential nature of man, wherein God’s archetypal idea of man is represented according to being and oughtness, but because God so wills. God’s will could also have willed and decreed the precise opposite, which would then possess the same binding force as that which is now valid—which, indeed, has validity only as long as God’s absolute will so determines. Law is will, pure will without any foundation in reality, without foundation in the essential nature of things. Thus, too, sin no longer contains any intrinsic element of immorality, or what is unjust, any inner element of injustice; it is an external offense against the will of God.

  As a result, Occam, who sees only individual phenomena, not universals, the concepts of essences, can likewise admit no teleological orientation toward God is inherent in all creation and especially in man; or at least he cannot grant that it can be known. The unity of being, truth, and goodness does not exist for him. Moral goodness consists in mere external agreement with God’s absolute will, which, subject only to His arbitrary decree, can always change. To such an extent were God’s omnipotence and free will extolled that much subtle speculation was devoted to the question of whether God can, through His absolute power, will hatred of Himself; a question which Occam and many of his disciples answered in the affirmative. Man sins, therefore, because and only so far as a positive law, by which he is bound, stands over him. God, on the other hand, cannot sin because no law stands above Him, not because it is repugnant to His holiness. Hence there exists no unchangeable lex naturalis, no natural law that inwardly governs the positive law. Positive law and natural law, which indeed is also positive law, stand likewise in no inner relation to each other. The identity of this thought structure with The Prince of Machiavelli, with the Leviathan of Hobbes, and with the theory of will of modern positivism (the will of the absolute sovereign is law, because no higher norm stands above him) is here quite obvious.25

  The dispute over whether the intellect of the will is the nobler faculty had, in the moral positivism of Occam’s school, split the scholastic doctrine of natural law to its very core. The scholastic revival of the age of the Protestant Revolt, however, successfully understood the speculative rehabilitation of the lex naturalis and ius naturale on an ontological basis, just as it also went back to St. Thomas in its theology.

  The philosophy of law received special and thoroughgoing treatment at the hands of the Late Scholastics. The outstanding figures in this field were, to mention but a few of the many important scholars, the Spaniards Vittoria (d. 1546), Suarez (1548–1617) and Vasquez (d. 1604), and the Italian St. Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621).

  The reasons for this more intensive preoccupation with the problems of the natural moral law and philosophy of law were many. To begin with the doctrinal ones, Occamism had wrought havoc in theology as well as in metaphysics and ethics. Reason had been rendered barren. The so-called Reformers had drawn the ultimate conclusions from Occamism with respect to theology. Contemptuous of reason, they had arrived at a pregnant voluntarism in theology as well as at the doctrine of natura deleta, of nature as destroyed by original sin. Thereby the traditional natural law became speculatively impossible.26 The spirit of the Renaissance, too, had made use of Occam’s separation of faith and knowledge to emancipate secular thought or worldly wisdom, and to place it in opposition to sacred learning. Pomponazzi (1462–1530), after the manner of the Averroists, had spoken of a twofold truth: what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, and vice versa. Law as such was separated in a positivist fashion from the eternal law when the natural moral law had been made into a positive act of God’s absolute will. Machiavelli (1469–1527) had secularized this view and had drawn the consequences for politics. The absolute power of God in Occam’s doctrine became at the hands of Thomas Hobbes the absolute sovereignty of the king.

  But there were also practical reasons. Not only in idea, but also in actual fact the orbis christianus had ceased to be “the world.” The Spanish and Portuguese discoveries had brought to light the East Indies and America, and the gentes dwelling there. This event raised new and great problems for the ius gentium. The first and extremely important treatise on international law, the work of Francis de Vittoria, bears the title, De bello et de Indis. Besides, the enormous expansion of trade in the early period of modern capitalism raised new moral problems for the Late Scholastics, as did also the process of political transformation from feudal society to a world of states ruled by absolute sovereigns. Thus it came about that nearly every scholar of the time composed treatises entitled De legibus and De iure et iustitia.

  The task of the Late Scholastics was, then, as Petavius so well pointed out, to work out further, to develop fully and completely, what the thinkers of the golden age of Scholasticism, in particular St. Thomas Aquinas, had taught implicitly and in outline. They saw and carried out this task in the case of the natural-law doctrine, too. The decline of the doctrine of natural law set in only after them. So competent a scholar as Joseph Kohler has held that “if, then, a natural law is to be fashioned today, it must be attached to these Spaniards of the age of Spain’s greatness, not to Hugo Grotius.”

  In their theology and psychology these thinkers of Late Scholasticism restored to honor the Thomistic doctrine of the divine essence as source of the entire moral order and, with it, that of the primacy of the intellect over the will. The natural law is grounded in essence and reason, not in mere absolute will, in God’s absolute power. God’s omnipotence is subordinated, humanly speaking of course, to the decrees of His wisdom. Like these, therefore, the essences of things are also unchangeable. Potentia ordinata is that power in virtue of which God has created, among all possible worlds and orders of being, precisely the present one. Absolute power, on the other hand, is the power through which He can do everything that is not in itself contradictory. Hence God cannot cooperate in human sinning, and still less can He be its total cause. The Occamist question of whether God could will hatred of Himself involves an intrinsic impossibility.

  In short, the intellect grasps the pure essence of a thing, its quiddity or whatness, and prescinds from actual existence. The will, on the contrary, can lay hold of a being only as something existing or to be brought into existence; it is directed to the particular, to the individual. Intellectual apprehension is more immaterial; it grasps essential being. The will in itself is blind, in contrast to the intellect which apprehends the object immediately. The will lays hold of the object only when the latter is presented by the intellect as a known and valuable good. On this depends the question of the possibility of an immutable natural law. Positivism in law and ethics corresponds to agnosticism in epistemology.

  Like the idea of God, the idea of law was also purged of Occamist positivism. For the Late Scholastics the law belongs more to the reason than to the will. The will, it is true, moves all faculties to action. Yet it is blind: to arrange and direct are the work of reason. The will is related to the intellect as a queen is to a king. The will, the queen, manifests her desires to the king and moves him. But the intellect, the king, enacts the law (Bellarmine).

  The lex naturalis, therefore, is not related to the will of God in a simple positivist manner. It is related to God’s essence, to His reason, whence emanates the eternal law whereof in turn the natural law is, and ultimately every moral and positive law should be, a participation. The natural law has for its proximate principle the essential nature of man. It is a judgment of reason concerning the conformity of moral action and nature. But at the same time it shows that what is good ought also to be done. God, who fashioned the essential nature of man with reason and will, is simultaneously recognized as Lawgiver, too. To state it in another way, what the eternal law is in God actively, i.e., as will in accordance with His essence, that the natural law is in man passively: a law flowing from his essence and imbedded in it. The mere light of natural reason that indicates the agreement or disagreement of an action with man’s essential nature (Vasquez) is insufficient by itself. There must in addition be the rational insight that an act in accord with reason and nature is also God’s will (Suarez, Bellarmine).

  This controversy had a still deeper significance. Suarez and Bellarmine wished to stress the inner oneness of natural law and eternal law. They wished to do this, moreover, by way of the recognition of God as the Lawgiver who wills that actions correspond to being, to essential nature. Vasquez, the Spanish Augustine, had regarded rational nature, irrespective of the positive will of God, as the primary ground of the obligation to obey the natural law. For him, consequently, since an act of the lawmaker’s will belongs necessarily to the nature of law, the natural law is not properly law in the strict sense: it is not lex praecipiens, merely lex indicans. This view, a very uncommon one among the Late Scholastics,27 assumed great importance in the rationalist doctrine of natural law. Arriaga and Grotius were already teaching, in order fully to bring out its immutability, that the natural law would have force even if there were no God.28 Out of this there developed an autonomy of abstract human reason conditioned by the separation of the eternal law and the natural law, and also the ethico-legal rationalism of the individualistic natural law (a development which, by the way, Suarez had foretold in his controversy with Vasquez). This loosening was thus the signal for the outbreak of a fanatical rationalism in speculation, which was bent upon drawing all possible conclusions from this isolated and, later still, individualistically interpreted pure rational nature. Moreover, such fanaticism lacked all corrective of history as the domain of God’s providential activity. To the rationalistic natural law corresponded Deism in theology.

  The natural moral law is therefore a judgment of reason which presents actions as commanded or forbidden by the Author of reason, because the light of reason shows them to be in agreement or disagreement with man’s essential nature; and at the same time reason judges that God wills that which accords with nature: essential being ought to be realized. In its essence and intellectual content the natural law is absolutely dependent upon the divine intellect; in its real existence, upon the divine will.29

  In this way, not only was the connection between the eternal law and the natural law maintained for later ages, but, for contemporaries, the true character of law was upheld against the so-called Reformers who belonged to the school of Occam. For the latter saw the natural law exclusively in the words of Scripture. Indeed, with their doctrine of natura deleta they could not even attain to a moral law that is naturally good. Gratian’s formula, ius naturae quod in Evangelio et lege (Decalogue), which was now being misinterpreted, vanished. So, too, did Ulpian’s formula, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Only now was an elucidation of the ius gentium possible.

  The Late Scholastics, like St. Thomas, included the Decalogue, regarded as belonging in its entirety to the lex naturalis, in the contents of the natural moral law. They distinguished in this connection the supreme principle, “Good is to be done, evil avoided,” and equally evident though already less universal principles, which therefore embrace specific kinds of goodness. Such are the following: Give to everyone his due; Worship must be paid to God; Justice must be observed; Agreements must be kept. From these follow by way of deduction additional precepts, which concern individual goods and the institutions that protect them. Thus theft, lying, adultery, and perjury are always forbidden because they are intrinsically evil.

  These teachers came to speak of the relationship of the natural law to the positive law mostly in connection with political science, and particularly in reference to the end of the state. Moreover, connected with this problem is the question of the nature of law in relation to morality.

  Any positive law which offends against the natural moral law is not a law that is binding in a moral sense, i.e., in conscience. But only those laws are absolutely null and void that run counter to the prohibitive natural law. Therefore a law that would positively prescribe murder or perjury would not be a law at all, nor may one obey it. The case where a law is opposed to the affirmative natural law is different. The citizen must put up with encroachment on the part of a government that deals unjustly, e.g., in the matter of taxation, if through resistance the public order, already threatened by the very fact of the unjust law, would be still more gravely menaced. Only such authority as enacts laws which are in conflict with the prohibitive natural law ceases to be authority in the rightful sense and becomes tyranny. Mere power can impose no inner duty of obedience. But this truth has nothing to do with the fact that among the Indians, for instance, laws prevail which are contrary to natural law. For such laws are made by lawgivers and accepted by subjects or members of the community, not because these laws are immoral and bad, but because conscience, darkened through deficient rational insight and troubled by passions, is unable to recognize their inherent badness. Indeed, St. Thomas admitted such a possibility in the case of conclusions from the natural moral law.

  Conversely, however, it follows from the fact of natura vulnerata as well as from the ethical character and goal of community life, and of the state in particular, that positive human laws are absolutely necessary for determining the further inferences from the first principles in the interest of a more exact and readily discernible establishment of order and for the setting up of institutions needed for community life. The natural-law prohibition of adultery implies at the same time an affirmation of marriage and of the general norms that are most needed for its functioning as an institution. “Thou shalt not steal” presupposes the institution of private property as pertaining to the natural law; but not, for example, the feudal property arrangements of the Middle Ages or the modern capitalist system. Since the natural law lays down general norms only, it is the function of the positive law to undertake the concrete, detailed regulation of real and personal property and to prescribe the formalities for conveyance of ownership.

  The nature of law was likewise explored. As a rule, the Late Scholastics employed the terms lex naturalis and ius naturale as synonyms. But Suarez and Bellarmine, for instance, made a distinction when they expressly declared that violation of the lex naturalis on the part of the Indians by no means constitutes grounds for a just war: hence Christian princes are not justified in subjugating these gentes by alleging their transgression of the lex naturalis. Only an offense against the ius naturale warrants such action. In this respect, indeed, states stand in the same relationship to one another as do persons, and the Indian states are true states in the sense of law. Law, therefore, stands out in the overall picture of the moral realm by reason of its social character, its reference to another (whether person or group). Justice is the virtue which has right (with which law in the technical sense is concerned) for its object. It is essentially directed to one’s fellow man. As commutative justice it has to do with those who are upon an equal footing in the social complex; as legal justice it concerns the rights of authorities or superiors, which it commands subjects to respect; as distributive justice it obliges authorities, in their administrative activity, to give to everyone his right according to his function and merit in the ordered whole. Thus the norms that have to do with the life in common of men and groups (their social units, arrangements, and social functions) are the object of justice. They are thereby law.

  These norms constitute natural law insofar as such regulations pertain, as immediately necessary, to the essential nature and essential fulfillment of man in the vita oeconomica (marriage, family, and occupational groups organizing themselves according to social functions in the service of the common good, for the peaceful ordering of the people) and in political life (state and international community). Since these regulations are necessary, their realization, improvement, and maintenance against lawbreakers are enforceable by the public authorities. Law wills that this be done without further ado, not merely because morality demands it. The debitum iustum (ex iustitia) thus differs from what is owed ex pietate or ex gratitudine precisely because gratitude is of its very nature unenforceable: if obtained by force, it ceases to be a moral action at all. Seneca in his day raised the question of why no suit can be brought against an ingrate. Owing to the failure of the ancients to work out this distinction, he did not find the right answer, namely, that gratitude, like pietas, is simply unenforceable. The son who has to be compelled by court action to support his impoverished, incapacitated father fulfills indeed a legal duty, and the state rests satisfied. No one will contend, however, that through this fulfillment by court order he has complied with the moral duty of pietas.

  The great accomplishment of the Late Scholastics lay in the domain of the ius gentium. They cleared up, before Grotius, the ambiguous distinctions of Roman law that had crept in during the course of centuries. Ius gentium in the proper sense is not ius naturale, although the precepts of the latter are evidently valid for the ordering of the community of peoples. Thus differentiated, ius gentium is the quasi-positive law of the international community: it is founded upon custom as well as upon treaty agreements. The basic norm of this positive ius gentium is, besides the material principles of the natural law, especially the axiom, pacta sunt servanda. To positive international law belong the doctrines of war, truce and peace, international trade and commercial treaties, and, in addition, the law concerning envoys. But the requirements that a war must be just, and that the community of peoples must establish and foster friendly intercourse, pertain to the natural law.

  From this ius gentium (most properly so called), they further distinguished international private law. The latter contains norms regarding legal institutions that are common to nearly all peoples, and hence are closely related to the natural law. Such are the general formal legal institutions touching purchases, leases, promissory notes, contracts, ownership, the family and inheritance. For, despite regulations that differ in detail, all these legal institutions have, among almost all peoples, many things in common over and above their natural-law foundation.

  CHAPTER III

  The Turning Point: Hugo Grotius

  Among historians of philosophy the view prevailed for some time that René Descartes (1596–1650), a deus ex machina as it were, founded modern philosophy with its primary, indeed almost exclusive, concern with the thinking subject, with the study of individual consciousness and experience. But this view has long since been shown to be unwarranted. Descartes’ philosophical system was no creation ex nihilo. The latest research has conclusively demonstrated. Descartes’ connection with Scholasticism. There existed before Descartes no “desolate waste of scholastic subtleties and sophistries.” What did exist was a great philosophical system, and Descartes still stood in its stream, as the history of the various philosophical problems proves.

  Quite as untenable is the view, long held, that the doctrine of natural law began with the Dutch scholar, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), often hailed as the Father of Natural Law. For Grotius was still closely connected with the teachers of the preceding centuries. He stands out more through the first formal inclusion of natural law and positive law in international law than through any intellectual contribution of his own. He may be said to have marked the transition from the metaphysical to the rationalist natural law. The notion that the natural law would still have some validity, etsiamsi daremus … non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana,1 played a certain role in his thinking. Yet Grotius did not profess the implied complete autonomy of human reason as the sole and not merely the proximate source of the natural law. He considered God to be the highest source of the natural law, and he likewise regarded Holy Scripture as a principle of knowledge on an equal footing with reason. Grotius still lived too much in and with tradition to be able to construe the natural law in a deistic manner.2 He understood recta ratio in the same sense as did the great Spaniards. One may even say that, in a world which had forgotten the achievement of past ages, his celebrated definition of natural law represents an attempt to settle by compromise the controversy between Suarez and Vasquez, a controversy that bulked large in his day.3

  The famous definition runs as follows: “The law of nature [ius naturale] is a dictate of right reason which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational [and social] nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God.”4 Here, in fact, is Vasquez’ doctrine of lex indicans combined with Suarez’ intention to bring out the character of the lex naturalis as lex, which, in its coming into force or in its existence, is derived from the will of God. In addition, the significant adjective socialis occurs in the same way among the Late Scholastics for the purpose of distinguishing and contrasting lex naturalis and ius naturale. In Grotius’ thought the socialitas of rational nature was not yet, as it was to be for Pufendorf, the sole source of natural law.

  Grotius followed the Scholastics even in his psychology. He placed the rectitude of voluntary action in a twofold conformity: that of the intellect with the thing or object, and that of the will with the intellect. Nevertheless his design of vindicating the absolutist doctrine of James I of England drove him back again to the primacy of the will. He accordingly defended the nominalist doctrine that essentially bad acts are evil, not because they are intrinsically at variance with God’s essence, but because they are forbidden by God. Of course he looked upon the further question of why God in His freedom has so decreed as unanswerable by human reason.

  The Late Scholastics had sought to determine the relationship between law and morality from the standpoint of the virtues: right is the specific object of justice as distinguished from the other cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, fortitude). In its threefold form (commutative, distributive, and legal), justice regulates the social relations: first, of those possessed of equal rights; secondly, of public authorities to their subjects; and thirdly, of citizens to public authorities or to the state. In Grotius’ system sociality plays a disproportionate part. Law is that which results from the appetitus socialis. Morality has little to do with sociality; it rather represents normative judgments concerning the worth or worthlessness of things.5 Furthermore, like Suarez, Grotius did not regard the debitum ex pietate as a debitum iustum, since it is neither subject to an action at law nor enforceable. Again, as among the Greeks and Scholastics, the ancient conception of justice as virtue itself is found in his writings. Thus the ius naturale comprises the whole of natural ethics.

  It was unfortunate for Grotius that he gave little or no heed to the circumstances which the Scholastics had always stressed: the circumstances and conditions which in the case of the affirmative precepts of the ius naturae determine the application of a norm that in itself is unchangeable. (Suarez says, for instance, that obedience to the state in time of war takes precedence over the natural-law duty of a son to care for his parents.) The Scholastics had held that only the first principle of the natural law is clearly evident, and that at most the immediate conclusions (the Decalogue) share in such evidence, which, however, may yet be obscured by the passions. On this ground they had acknowledged the necessity of positive law, whose function, they contended, is to enlighten us on the good to be done and by penal sanctions to restrain us, dominated as we are by our passions, from the evil to be avoided. But Grotius was a rationalist. He believed it possible to derive by strict logic a suitable system of rational law having force that would be great enough to bind the will: a body of law with detailed prescriptions covering debts and property, the family institution and inheritance. The Scholastics, on the other hand, considered only the general institutions themselves of marriage, property, and contract as belonging to natural law, not the particular prescriptions about marriage and the family, possession and the form of private ownership, and the like.

  Grotius’ undying merit was his systematizing of international law, which he placed upon the solid foundations provided by natural law. Grotius, who paid homage to his predecessors, to Vittoria and Suarez among others, lived in an age of fierce wars. The civitas christiana was being rent asunder in its great civil war (Thirty Years’ War, 1618–48), which, like all civil wars, was being fought with enormous cruelty and frequently outside the pale of legal norms. In the midst of all this, however, he put forward with great power and impressiveness, cogently and systematically, the idea of the rule of law even in wartime. He thereby revived the intellectual unity of the West, after its religious unity had been rent, by means of the great traditions of the very Christianity which had always honored reason. Thus he substituted intellectual solidarity based upon reason for solidarity based upon a now divided faith.

  Yet it must be said that Grotius, precisely because of such rationalism, was not so happy in his treatment of the ius gentium as were the Late Scholastics. The clear separation between the natural-law contents and positive contents of the ius gentium, as occurs in Suarez’ treatment, was, at the hands of Grotius, again partly lost. The path was thus cleared for Pufendorf’s equation of ius naturale and ius gentium.

  Grotius thus stood in the twilight between two great epochs. Still linked by many ties to the preceding age, he yet served to transmit to the natural-law theory of the modern period its distinguishing marks: rationalism, sociality, and particular political aims. In all this he resembled Descartes, whose close connection with the epistemology and metaphysics of Late Scholasticism has been uncovered by recent research. Nature makes no leaps: this axiom is valid also in the history of thought. Historians of philosophy, unfortunately, sometimes mistake emphasis for novelty.

  CHAPTER IV

  The Natural Law in the Age of Individualism and Rationalism

  The so-called age of natural law did not, properly speaking, commence with Hugo Grotius. It began rather with Pufendorf, who undertook to expound the doctrine of Grotius. The net result of the age was a disastrous setback, from the opening of the nineteenth century, for the natural-law idea among the modern philosophers and practitioners of law who were unacquainted with the older Christian tradition.

  The new natural law differed in many respects from the traditional one. It represented a peculiar hypertrophy of the older conception. Numerous factors were responsible for this development, and they arose from the intellectual evolution and political circumstances of the period.

  Humanism had declined, and with it had gone exaggerated esteem for antiquity in general and, in particular, for Roman law as ratio scripta. Roman law, in its degenerate form of usus modernus and with its many archaic-sounding formulas, could not satisfy this age of reason.

  Deism in theology led to a high regard for the element of law in nature. It led also to an abhorrence of all sorcery, of belief in demons, of any supposed mystical influence of the transcendent Deity upon a world that moves in accordance with unalterable laws. A real enlightenment was declared necessary for a clear knowledge of the laws. Not faith, however, but reason was to provide such enlightenment. For the law lies in reason, and speculative reason is able to derive from itself, from contemplation of its own abstract nature, all laws, all morality, and all right in the form of axioms. Indeed this holds good even if there be no God, who thenceforth appears as merely the ultimate source of morality and law (apart from the continuation of tradition at the hands, for instance, of Leibnitz and the theologians). Whole systems of ethics and law were now worked out in minute detail by scholars who were carried away by a veritable passion for speculation. Such speculation also differed considerably from the prevailing inferior law which still recognized sorcery, belief in demons, and things of a mystical nature.

  Furthermore, a jurisprudence adapted to the needs of the administrative machinery of the centralized absolute monarchy seemed, at least in the eyes of the rationalists, out of the question on the basis of the existing law. For this law was split up according to provinces and estates or social classes. Besides, its feudal forms had been rendered antiquated by the rise and growth of capitalism; it had also become rigid and unsuited to the time in the case of privileged guilds, not to mention the monstrosity of imperial law which no less a person than Pufendorf had so thoroughly ridiculed in a work, De statu imperii, that appeared under a pseudonym.

  The thesis of the autonomy of human reason, as well as the view that the existing law constituted unwarranted fetters, was closely bound up with the nascent socio-philosophical individualism of the age. The clearest manifestation of this individualistic bent is found in the doctrine of the state of nature, which now became the starting point of natural-law speculation after having been in the Middle Ages but a condition of mankind with theological significance alone. (The difference may be schematized thus: the natural law as the idea of law in and above the necessary positive law—the natural law as law of the state of nature before and above the positive law.)

  From the same source stemmed the peculiar methodological starting point of all these systems of natural law. Thinkers did not set out, as in the earlier period, from the essentially social nature of man in which the entire order of social institutions (marriage, family, state, international community) and the basic norms of these exist potentially in such a way that the essence is fulfilled only in the completion and hierarchical ordering of social forms through the various “imperfect” societies up to the “perfect” society. The point of departure was empirical nature discovered by means of abstraction, from whose psychological motive force, viewed as fundamental, the system of ethics and of natural law was deduced in a rationalistic manner. For Hobbes this was selfishness; for Pufendorf, sociableness as mere formal sociality; for Thomasius, happiness, i.e., “praiseworthy, pleasant, carefree life.”

  In this way a whole detailed system of natural law was in existence, or was considered to have been in force, before social life, with its essential forms and with the historically contingent particularities of such forms, had worked itself out in history, i.e., had evolved after the manner of an entelechy. This natural law was held to cover the civil law of contracts, the family, inheritance, and property; it was even made to include procedural law and especially constitutional law. Surrounded with the halo of naturalness and reasonableness, the various natural-law systems accordingly signified, in respect to existing conditions that cried out for reform, an ideal which the codifications of the close of the eighteenth century sought to realize, whether in a revolutionary (Rousseau) or conservative (Hobbes) or reformist manner (enlightened despotism). With all this was now readily combined the ancient Stoic glorification of the pre-political state of mankind, except where this condition was construed by Hobbes, as already indeed by Epicurus, as a war of all against all.

  To these favorable factors of an ideal order corresponded practical ones that were no less favorable. The Enlightenment was first of all an affair of the ruling class, the nobility and the intellectuals of the age, clerics and men of science. The latter, however, were encouraged by the princes precisely because and so far as these recognized their function of governing as a duty. Enlightened despotism, to use the label current in resentful liberal circles, was a great patron of the natural law or, as it henceforth was usually and quite significantly styled, the law of reason. For this law placed in the hands of the princes the weapons with which to break down the class privileges of the nobility, and perhaps of the guilds and provincial estates as well, which hampered the uniform administration of the state. Furthermore the Enlightenment with its accent on education assigned to the state the task, through the agency of the police, of educating the citizen and of making the state wealthy in the mercantilist sense.

  Thus this individualistic natural law was especially adapted to loosen the traditional, hardened social order and to furnish the princes with subjects, not, of course, as mere objects of arbitrary will, but as legal subjects with innate subjective rights. They were then, as objects of education, admirably suited to the higher idea of man that was proper to the Enlightenment. If, therefore, the individualistic root of this natural law was everywhere the same, this was in no way the case regarding the liberalist consequences which resulted from it when deeper thought was given to the matter. These consequences appeared in Rousseau’s system and in the French Revolution, as well as in the natural-law doctrines of Locke and of early German liberalism: what was desired was a bourgeois natural law. They were wanting, however, both in Hobbes’ doctrine and in the natural-law systems of Pufendorf and Thomasius.

  Closely connected with this political consequence, whether of the police-state with its educational function or of the liberal state with its restricted function of guaranteeing individual liberty, was a further break with tradition on natural-law grounds. This newer natural law constituted the first attempt to construct a lay or secularist theory of ethics and politics. Hobbes’ purpose in devising his doctrine of natural law was admittedly the destruction of independent ecclesiastical law. His aim was to subordinate the latter to, and incorporate it in, the natural law of the omnipotent and sole person of the state represented by the monarch. Enlightened despotism likewise held the view that the Church, though indeed of importance sociologically and practically, was but a division of the cultural and educational department of the absolute monarchy. The peculiar totalitarian character of the ius naturae of that period, identical as it was with moral philosophy, was the means adopted for forcing the Church into the service of the state.

  Moreover, rationalism and the Enlightenment had rendered the old, mystical foundation, which had emerged from the semiobscurity of immediate divine origin, incapable of supporting the state and royal power. Now, however, the doctrine of a state of nature together with the various contract theories concerning the transition to the status civilis afforded a new basis, though an insecure and perilous one. The same intellectual device served Hobbes for laying the foundation of state absolutism; it served Pufendorf for laying the foundation of enlightened despotism, which denied the ancient, traditional right of the people to resist; and it served Rousseau for laying the foundation of the sole admissible omnipotence of the democratic state. The French revolutionaries also made use of it for reducing state functions to a minimum; for establishing the rights, acknowledged also on other grounds, of man and of the citizen; and for vindicating the right to resist the power of the state (Constitutions of 1792 and 1793). “The tamest and lamest theories, no less than the preaching of world betterment through the guillotine and the French wars of conquest, were carried out in the name of the law of reason. Natural law was an intellectual trend, not a uniformly expounded doctrine” (Pfaff and Hoffmann).

  For social reformers, that is, for enlightened despots and for social revolutionaries like Rousseau, this magnified natural law based on individualism thus became the starting point. It was set down in constitutions as fundamental law. In the comprehensive codifications of the time it served to break down the organization of society by estates and to build up the modern bourgeois social order. As a special science, however, or as a general conviction, it thereupon vanished just as quickly. This outcome was caused either by the achievement of such eminently political aims of a natural law with reformist or revolutionary overtones; or by the fact that after the climactic orgy of 1793–96 the goddess Reason was deposed and History (Haller, De Maistre, Donoso Cortes) or rather Providence, working in history and discernible in its activity, was again enthroned.

  What differentiated this newer natural law from the ius naturale perenne were not of course its political aims alone; these were merely more conspicuous. The essential distinguishing mark was the importance of the doctrine of the state of nature, which attained, as in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), such unexpected and widespread popularity. Thence stemmed the pregnant ideas of liberty and equality. And fully in keeping with it was also the comprehensive moral philosophy of deism, which concealed itself under the title of ius naturale and, after first disregarding the eternal law, finally culminated in the complete moral autonomy of reason (Kant).

  The individualist starting point led also to a failure to recognize the necessary forms of social life. If the past had looked upon these as, so to speak, germinally contained in the idea of man, they could now, from the standpoint of the free individual, be regarded only as status adventicii, as superadded for various, nonessential reasons: sociality, utility, or mere external perfection. In view of the original freedom, they could no longer be acknowledged as intrinsically necessary; in their contents as well as in their existence they must be founded solely upon free association, upon the free contracts of individuals. For this type of natural law the contractual form is the basis not only for the coming into existence of concrete social forms, but also for their normative contents. The essence of social forms is not something objective; it is rather, like their existence, dependent upon the will of individuals. For the individualist doctrine there exists, as has already been stated, no categorical or a priori sociality of man as such, but only a pure sociability. In keeping with this view was a political theory that manifested itself in the two extremes of Hobbes’ omnipotent monarchy and Rousseau’s omnipotent democracy: the princely police-state with a maximum of functions and the constitutional state of 1789 and later with a minimum of functions. Individual rights belonging to the state of nature were viewed either as definitively surrendered in the political and governmental contract (Hobbes), or as inviolable and hence to be brought over intact into the status civilis.

  These natural-law doctrines displayed little understanding of the graduated order of the forms of social life that resides in the nature of man as a social animal. They showed no appreciation for the family as a social institution with an essential end of its own (they dealt only with marriage and the parental relationship). They showed no concern for the occupational-group or corporative structure, hence for the multifarious social forms that in all domains of life lie between the state and the individual. They showed no regard for the well-known principle of subsidiarity, according to which the highest community, the state, should leave to other associations the functions and ends which these should and can fulfill. They knew, in effect, only the harsh antithesis of individual and state. They likewise lacked an understanding of the particular nature of the Church as a “perfect” society: it became either a department of the state or a spiritual free fellowship, not an institution.

  These specific types of the newer natural law, so varied in their consequences, manifested themselves most clearly in Hobbes, with his pessimistic view of man; in Rousseau, who took an optimistic view of human nature; in Pufendorf and Thomasius, who lived in the shadow of enlightened despotism; and, finally, to say nothing of the numerous mixed forms, in Kant.

  It was here that the definite break with tradition took place. From the time of Pufendorf fun began to be poked at the “fancies of the Scholastics.” From here on, an anti-Aristotelian nominalism became, expressly or tacitly, the basis of philosophy. And it is permissible to believe that this disdain for tradition was later avenged when, in the nineteenth century, this natural-law thinking came in turn to be disparaged. Indeed, the same failure to understand tradition then led the nineteenth century to assume that, by refuting this natural-law doctrine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it had overthrown the natural law itself with its philosophical tradition of over two thousand years.

  The entire theory of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) amounts at bottom to a denial of the natural law. The English thinker, who stands forth as a gloomy fellow-traveler of Epicurus, the cheerful ancient, pictured the state of nature as a savage, lawless condition of war of all against all, as chaos. Here we have another illustration of the relationship that exists between epistemology and moral philosophy. Hobbes, the nominalist of Occam’s school, held that reason is utterly unable to know universals, i.e., ideas. Words denoting universal concepts are mere names. Reason finds itself obliged to devise and assign them arbitrarily, without any foundation in fact and reality, for the purpose of introducing order into the chaos of sense impressions. In moral philosophy, too, the passions hold first place. Man in the depths of his being is what the state of nature shows him to be: a wolf, wicked, devoted solely to self. In the state of nature, consequently, there exist only lawless individuals, in whom is found no natural tendency to live in society; and man’s life is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”1 The war of all against all is the reverse side of the widely cherished and taught right of all to all things. In reality, no law of the status naturalis exists, as we find it in the dreams of Rousseau and in the fanciful deductions of Pufendorf and many of his disciples.

  The same selfishness and the dictates of right reason, that is, the consideration of one’s greater advantage and of peace, determine the individuals to enter by way of a covenant into the status civilis and to give up as many of their rights to everything as may make peace possible. But, that peace may be possible, all contracting parties must yield their rights to the Sovereign, the state personified, whether this be organized through the covenant in a monarchical manner or in a more or less democratic manner; either form is admissible, according to Hobbes.2 Moreover, properly speaking, only this covenant, which springs from the basic natural-law norm of self-preservation, is natural law. For Hobbes, then, the natural law, despite all the formulas he adopts and cites from time to time, is wholly comprised in the axiom, “Agreements must be kept.” Upon this fundamental principle is based the will of the omnipotent state, so that henceforward all law is but public authority; it is but the positive law of the state, inclusive of Church law. The political aim of the Hobbesian natural law, the ideological justification of absolute government (especially of the Stuart kings), becomes exceedingly plain here. Hobbes, whose individualism led him to insist that contract affords the sole possible basis of rights, derived from the principle that agreements must be kept even a son’s duty to obey his father, and so on. The reckless rationalism of the man found expression both here and in his demand that in speculation one must start by viewing men as beings that have shot forth from the earth like mushrooms, as at once full-grown.3 From his individualism sprang likewise his antagonism toward corporative organizations like the guilds and other self-governing economic and social groups. As sharers in the absolute power of the sovereign or limitations upon it, he considered such bodies directly opposed to the natural law: they are “like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.”4

  In the hands of Hobbes, therefore, the natural law became, paradoxically enough, a useless law, compressed into the single legal form of the social and governmental contract of subjection. The natural law effectively comprises only the basic norm, “agreements must be kept,” if one disregards the still more paradoxical natural law of the state of nature with its norm of selfishness. All else is pure will. Hobbes’ doctrine is the theodicy of Occam secularized, and the extreme consequence of the proposition that law is will.

  Thus Hobbes altered the meaning of the words “nature” and “natural,” a process that characterizes the entire period of modern philosophy from the time of Descartes. “Nature” and “natural” become the opposite of civitas, “reason,” and “order.” In the philosophy of Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) human nature is at bottom governed by the passions and not by reason. The status naturalis is a condition without any obligation or duty. It is a state in which, as Spinoza repeatedly asserts, might is right. This natural state of man is ruled by two things: fear of the might of others and power to instill fear into others. Hobbes denied that man has a natural inclination toward mutual help and love, which St. Thomas speaks of so frequently. Hence law and the order of law cannot be derived from human nature; they become the work of the sovereign. What remains of the older conception of human nature as the source of natural law is the contention that the state originated in the fear of violent death and in the urge to render life and property secure. The state, together with its law which has its source in the absolute will of the sovereign, is the savior of man from the natural law of “might is right”; it affords security and protection by monopolizing all power; and it demands as a price strict obedience and subordination through identification of natural law with positive law.

  The older idea of natural law as an ethical system with material contents thus loses all its functions: namely, to serve as a moral basis for positive law; to give men a standard and critical norm for the justice of positive law; to represent the eternal ideal for which the historical state, as lawgiver and protector of justice, ought to strive. As a consequence the state, unlimited because even the revealed divine law is authoritatively interpreted by it, becomes, in Hobbes’ phrase, the “Mortall God.” No appeal from this all-powerful being to natural law is possible, because the state is law in all its plenitude. In reading Hobbes we can feel the solemnity with which he invests the state, the sovereign power, a solemnity which earlier centuries reserved for God Almighty. What Hegel later says of the idea of the state, Hobbes, the nominalist denier of ideas, asserted of the individual historical state. The consequence of this change in the meaning of “nature” is thus clear. Since nature is bad, and since the status naturalis is a condition of “warre of every man against every man,”5 the state becomes good, and its positive will becomes the supreme norm of justice, admitting of no appeal. The phrase “Mortall God” is to be taken literally, not as a mere figure of speech.

  The philosophy of René Descartes underlay another shift in the meaning of human nature. From this shift sprang, as from its source, the individualist and starkly rationalist strains of the newer natural law. According to St. Thomas, it is, properly speaking, neither the intellect nor the senses that understand, but man through both; the natural law is a participation in the eternal law; and the moral law is objectively “given” in human nature and in the essential order of things. For Descartes, on the other hand, man is a res cogitans, a being that thinks. It has indeed been pointed out by Jacques Maritain that Descartes gives man the intellectual power of an angel, that his is an angelic epistemology. Descartes holds that man, from his innate ideas, from the ideas present in his consciousness, can construct the world along the lines of mathematical reasoning, the ideal of science. All that man needs to do is constructively to develop what is in human reason, that is, the innate ideas. The individual intellect or reason thus becomes self-sufficient. It does not need the educative cooperation of other minds. Thus the very spiritual root of sociability is denied. Through his “angelism,” therefore, Descartes became the father of the individualist conception of human nature.6

  But this is not all. The doctrine of the res cogitans, of self-sufficient human reason that has now become the nature of man, led to a passion for systematic constructions so typical of rationalism. According to St. Thomas, human reason was never the criterion of truth. The ordo rerum, of which man’s nature is a part, is the measure of man’s knowledge. Things themselves, as objective data, measure the human mind. But the angelic qualities of Descartes’ res cogitans, as well as the view that all truth exists germinally in the mind, render the objective ordo rerum superfluous. Suarez’ prediction of what would happen should human reason be made the source of the natural law now came true. Rationalism soon made human reason and its innate ideas the measure of what is. Human reason could now indulge in the uncontrolled construction of systems that has ever characterized the natural law of rationalism.

  This process reached its climax in Kant. Human reason now becomes the sovereign architect of the order of knowledge; it becomes the measure of things. The objective basis of natural law, the ordo rerum and the eternal law, has vanished. What was termed natural law is a series of conclusions drawn from the categorical imperative and from the regulative ideas of practical reason, not from the objective and constitutive ordo rerum. These regulative ideas received their somewhat dubious validity from the feeling that without their validity human moral life would be impossible. The ensuing materialism, however, proved only too quickly that this argument lacks force, and that man can live, at least when human nature becomes a purely biological entity, without such regulative ideas. What a fall of the angels! At the beginning of the development lay Descartes’ “angelism”; at the end emerged materialist naturalism: man the angel became man the higher animal. From a being whose reason is the supreme source of morality man became a powerless agent governed by the conditions of economic production.

  John Locke (1632–1704) was as individualist in his social philosophy as was Hobbes, though he rejected Hobbes’ glorification of the state as the “Mortall God” and denied that the Leviathan is the exclusive source of law. Although Locke, in opposition to Hobbes and Spinoza, depicts the state of nature as idyllic, as a condition of peace, good will and mutual help, he contends that the state, or rather government, is in practice indispensable. For Hobbes the function of the status naturalis and of the idea of natural law is merely to furnish a basis for the institution of the status civilis and the positive law, whereupon the natural law disappears. For Locke, on the other hand, the function of the state of nature and of the idea of natural law is to establish as inalienable the rights of the individual. But these rights by no means vanish in the status civilis; indeed, the true purpose of the latter is the more perfect preservation and development of such rights. Thus these innate and indefeasible rights of individuals afford an ultimate criterion for judging all acts of the government and all laws of the state. The rights to life, liberty, and estate or property make the law; the law does not create them.

  ‡Locke’s philosophy of law does not view the law as an objective order of norms out of which individual rights flow by intrinsic necessity; the rights of the individual are prior, and in them originates whatever order exists. Order is consequently the product of contracts between individuals, who are induced by their rather selfish interests to enter into these contractual relations. The status civilis is thus not the objective result of man’s social nature itself: it is not a realization, through man’s moral actions, of the natural order in the universe. The state is the utilitarian product of individual self-interest, cloaked in the solemn and venerable language of the traditional philosophy of natural law. Locke substitutes for the traditional idea of the natural law as an order of human affairs, as a moral reflex of the metaphysical order of the universe revealed to human reason in the creation as God’s will, the conception of natural law as a rather nominalistic symbol for a catalogue or bundle of individual rights that stem from individual self-interest. Any order of law is accordingly the product of the contractual will of the individuals concerned, and it has for its object the protection and promotion of individual self-interest. The characteristic note of individualism (the preponderance of commutative justice and of self-interest over distributive and legal justice and the common good) is obvious in Locke’s thinking.

  The hidden root of this position is, of course, an overconfidence, born of optimism, in the typically individualist presumption that the common good is nothing real, that it is merely the sum of the particular goods or interests of individuals. If this is true, the free pursuit of self-interest on the part of individuals who are restricted only by the like freedom of others must work like the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith and produce, as it were automatically, a sort of social harmony.

  The concept of natural law had thus degenerated from an objective metaphysical idea into a political theory which sought to justify and promote definite political changes. But the uselessness of such a degenerate concept, once these political changes had been effected and consolidated, is evident. The idea of natural law, once the eternal objective norm of all social life, served Hobbes as a means of establishing the absolute rule of the state as the “Mortall God.” It served Locke as a means of vindicating the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688–89 and of laying the juridical foundations of bourgeois society. It served rationalism as a means of promoting the codifications of law at the hands of princely absolutism, which was the destroyer of feudalism and medieval constitutionalism, and hence as a means of strengthening the bases of bourgeois society.

  But Locke’s empiricism in epistemology undermined the philosophical bases of the natural law at least as much as this political theory endangered its very idea. Thus Locke prepared the way for the destructive criticism of Hume and Bentham. Basically a skeptic in metaphysics, Locke could not attain to certainty in moral philosophy, a prolongation of metaphysics. His moral philosophy, had he ever worked it out, would have ended in a barren utilitarianism of the Benthamite type. But Locke, quite unaware of the implications of epistemological empiricism and oblivious of the consequences of his skepticism concerning metaphysics as the basis of any valid theory of natural law, contented himself with a belief in natural law as a dictate of common sense. His feeling for political realities, as well as the fact that the English common law retained many of the traditional concepts of the natural law, prevented him from drawing the conclusions to which Hume’s acid criticism would later lead. In Locke, therefore, we have an excellent example of the revenge which common sense so frequently takes upon empiricists and philosophical skeptics. Locke allowed his common sense to affirm in practice what his philosophy implicitly denied. In this he was like Karl Marx, the most typical instance of such behavior. Marx was wholly intent upon destroying, as a merely instrumental ideology, the ideas of justice and truth. Yet at the same time he thundered like an Old Testament prophet against the injustices and deceits of bourgeois society and philosophy. He thereby implicitly affirmed justice and truth as objective and transcendent, and not as merely relative to and immanent in the conditions of socio-economic production.

  The doctrine of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) stands almost diametrically opposed to Hobbes and his conception of the natural law. Hobbes’ theory glorifying absolutism had aroused a strong reaction. Although this reaction, led by such thinkers as Locke, Montesquieu, and Hume, did not go so far as democracy, it was transforming the freedom of subjects in the unlimited monarchy into constitutionally guaranteed natural rights (power checks power and creates the condition of freedom). This line of thought attained its harshest expression in Rousseau.

  Whereas for Hobbes the state of nature was a “warre of every man against every man,” the Geneva dreamer preached a state of nature that resembled the biblical Paradise. For Hobbes the state, the legal order, and consequently goodness, are, in the interest of mere order, the goal of an historical philosophical movement that wishes to be rid of nature, of the status naturalis, and to attain to the status civilis in which the ruinous liberty of human wolves comes to an end. For Rousseau, on the contrary, the status civilis and the objective, enforced order of unfreedom in the state constitute precisely the condition of corrupt human nature, whereas the state of nature is, taking an optimistic view of man’s nature, exactly what it ought to be. “Back to nature” was, in Rousseau’s teaching, something more than a game played by a bored and snobbish nobility. Civilization, in the literal sense of becoming a civis (citizen), only then does not spell ruin when the original, natural rights of liberty and equality form the essential reservations of the social contract. Men do not have to enter into the social contract. They enter into it freely; they are driven by no mysterious impulse out of the war of all against all into the enforced peace of absolutism. But they can enter into it because it is their will, the will of everyone in the general will that now comes into being.

  At bottom, for Rousseau the historical status civilis is the world after man’s fall, whereas the status naturalis was the garden of Eden. Consequently, the state as such, as ordo rerum humanarum, is not a necessary, ethical institution; it is but the minister of human rights. It is for this reason that the right of revolution exists, if natural rights are violated by the positive law. Rousseau’s fanatical passion for liberty, virtue, and right lived on in the men responsible for the Reign of Terror of 1793–94, in men like Robespierre. The highly emotional way Rousseau treated of liberty and man’s unalterable rights accomplished more in this respect than the specific doctrinal passages of his books. Besides, he had less influence upon the thought of the age of natural law, upon the countless treatises of ius naturae et gentium, than upon the publicists and political writers of the time.

  The era of natural law as a homogeneous epoch in the history of ideas was determined far more by the jurists and philosophers and their systems than by Rousseau’s emotional philosophizings that were becoming the daily reading matter of the educated classes. Therefore the historical school of law directed its attacks chiefly against the former, whereas the conservative school and the writers inspired by the romantic movement (e.g., Burke, De Maistre, De Bonald, Goerres, Arndt) were more concerned with refuting Rousseau.

  This period, celebrated in the history of ideas and of science as par excellence the age of natural law, is chiefly associated with the names of Pufendorf, Thomasius, and Kant. Side by side with these, however, innumerable scholars of lesser renown were active in the professorial chairs established at that time for the ius naturae et gentium. They were filling the libraries of educated people, government officials, and judges with numberless systematic but conflicting expositions of natural law. With few exceptions (e.g., Wolff, Zallinger, Schwarz) these men claimed that they were the first to discover the natural law or to free it from the fancies and verbiage of the Scholastics. It was precisely this break with tradition that was responsible for the confounding of this doctrine of natural law with the perennial idea of the natural law. So it was, then, that the nineteenth century could believe that, with the refutation of this doctrine, the natural law itself had been proved a chimera. This was an extremely fateful fact in the history of the philosophy of law as well as in the history of philosophy in general. Or was it not fateful that Pufendorf was well acquainted with scarcely a single Greek or Scholastic, and that Kant, the watershed from which flow so many and such varied streams of modern thought, knew Aristotle and St. Thomas only from a very imperfect history of philosophy?

  The decisive differences between this newer natural law and that of the Scholastics are three in number. The first is the individualistic trait manifesting itself in the predominance of the doctrine of the state of nature as the proper place in which to find the natural law. The second is the nominalist attitude which found expression in the separation of eternal law and natural moral law, of God’s essence and existence, of morality and law. The third is the resultant doctrine of the autonomy of human reason which, in conjunction with the rationalism of this school, led straight to an extravagance of syllogistic reasoning, of deductively constructed systems that served to regulate all legal institutions down to the minutest detail: the civil law governing debts, property, the family, and inheritances as well as constitutional and international law. And, in contrast with the imperfect historical law, these legal systems possessed the inestimable merit and value of emanating from the pure rational nature of man.

  These differences especially characterized the leading figures of the new school of natural law, Pufendorf and Thomasius. The latter was particularly concerned with separating morality and law. He thereby stands out in the history of philosophy as a precursor of Kant.

  Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–94), in his concept of man’s nature, did not take man in his teleologically determined totality of human nature. Man is not essentially social, so that, as earlier thinkers had held, the essential forms of community living evolve by inherent necessity out of his natural tendency for society. On the contrary, he should develop sociality because it is of advantage to him. Man is an animal sociabile, not sociale. What had for earlier thinkers been but a sign of man’s internal and natural tendency, a realization of his nature itself in time, became in the newer natural law mere capability, mere impulse. Accordingly, empirical nature and any impulse or capacity whatever (sociality or, as in the case of Thomasius, felicity) formed the starting point of speculation. The presupposition of such natural-law thinking is the individual as an isolated being in the state of nature, hence abstracting from the essential forms of human nature as such that find expression in the historical forms of state, law, marriage, and family. Wherefore Pufendorf proceeded to set forth how man in the original state of nature, abstracting from the historical status civilis, from positive law and from the legal order, has as an individual to behave toward God, toward himself, and toward his fellow men.

  Pufendorf first draws up a list of duties toward God, i.e., principles of natural religion, and then, in a most exhaustive fashion, a catalogue of duties toward oneself and toward others. Such duties toward others are, for instance, that everyone must keep his word, must not swear falsely, must be sincere in speech. He shows what norms for the acquisition and use of property, for marriage, the family, and inheritance, can and must be deduced from reason alone. He describes the procedural law in the state of nature, and he indicates the norms of distraint which must find application in that state. Thus in reality the entire positive law, so far as it has to do with the civil law and its procedure in lawsuits, is straightway transformed into natural law. It logically becomes supra-historical or prehistorical (in Pufendorf’s case) and in itself unalterable. But the status civilis is a superadded status with laws that in final analysis are only formal.

  Because of its revolutionary possibilities, however, the basically critical attitude shifted at once to a conservative one: the existing law is in itself good, and is merely in need of reform. The law of the state of nature is an ideal law, a model law; it is not a law that is actually in force. This follows from the determination of the relationship between positive law and natural law. The former is needed on account of the sinful propensities of men, who cannot adequately be kept in order through mere knowledge of the natural law and solely out of reverence for it. Hence the public authorities enact positive laws in order that the natural law may be observed. As soon, then, as the state is founded as status adventicius in virtue of the original contract, and as soon as a sovereign authority is set up by means of the governmental contract, man must comply with the positive laws by reason of the fundamental principle of natural law, “agreements must be kept.” The distinction between the prescriptions which pertain to the prohibitive and directly binding natural law and the further norms of the hypothetical natural law (the ius naturale permissivum of the older writers) made it possible for Pufendorf to explain all positive laws as hypothetical natural law. In this way the whole body of concrete civil laws (the laws concerning debt, property, the family, and inheritance, in particular the modes of acquiring ownership, conveyance by will and succession, the monetary system and contracts involving monetary considerations), i.e., the entire contents of those positive laws which were viewed as necessary, became natural law. The preceding age, on the other hand, had conceded to only a few basic norms (Decalogue) the dignity and grandeur of natural law.

  Pufendorf’s theory of international law throws light on his doctrine of natural law. Princes and states live in the status naturalis, since no status adventicius, no civitas maxima, as yet exists. Hence international law consists merely of natural law. There is no positive international law because there is no sovereign authority. Measured by the contributions of Grotius and the Late Scholastics, this view marks a great stride backward along the path which Hobbes had already taken.

  Those of his contemporaries who had not succumbed to the rationalist temper of the period charged Pufendorf with being “not much of a jurist, and a philosopher not at all” (Leibnitz) and with having totally abandoned tradition.7 As a matter of fact, Pufendorf had never understood the traditional view that moral philosophy with its partial content, the ius naturale, is a continuation of metaphysics, the science of being, which, when applied to the free will of rational man, becomes the science of oughtness. But his unrestrained and unhistorical rationalism arises precisely from this fact. The doctrine of the eternal law he had never grasped. It is true that he encumbers his writings with formulas culled from his readings. Yet they have there a different meaning, because they are torn from their proper intellectual setting. The ius naturale, therefore, is not related to God’s essence as a participation of the eternal law. It is rather, in typically nominalist fashion, placed in God’s will. It has to do with the external order of sociability as an actual fact. It is in force because God has so willed to create man; it was not in force, it did not exist, when man did not as yet exist. It is thus not a participation in the divine law, eternally present in God’s essence. It is “eternal” only so far as it is of the same age as man; hence it has only been in force since man has been in existence, since God created him. This position is diametrically opposed to the view of Arriaga and Grotius, that the natural law would still possess some validity even if there were no God.

  This position, however, formed the basis of extreme rationalism. For henceforth not God’s essence, but human nature, viewed existentially as well as merely in the abstract, would be regarded as the source of natural law. Thence also originated the abstruse intellectual sport of a logically deduced law for man in the state of nature, as well as the widespread unhistorical attitude and the inability to comprehend Aristotle’s everlastingly true proposition, that outside the state (not society) man is either a beast or a god. For this line of thinkers the idea of law does not live in the historical legal systems, nor was the eternally valid natural moral law recognized as the essential norm from its exemplification in the legal forms. Rather, the natural law was derived from a purely imaginary state of nature, or from a state of nature that was supposed to have once existed (theoretically and without regard for concrete historical exemplifications). In practice, indeed, the improvements and reforms of the historical positive legislation that were deemed good, useful, and necessary assumed the guise of natural law. That explains the significant politico-legal function of this brand of natural-law philosophy of the Enlightenment.

  At the hands of Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) the sociality of Pufendorf received a utilitarian interpretation. The aim of ethics is mastery of the passions, because these endanger the temporal happiness, i.e., the peaceful existence, of the individual. The supreme, central principle is therefore this: “Whatever renders the life of men long and happy is to be done, but whatever makes life unhappy and hastens death is to be avoided.” It is no longer sociality or an appetitus socialis that is the source of natural law, but rather, after the manner typical of the Enlightenment, it is the happiness of the individual. Instead, the forms of community life appear as mere status adventicii, not as essential perfections of man. Happiness consists in a pleasant, carefree life; and evidently it is attainable only through a virtuous, respectable, and just life. A man should live virtuously in order to preserve inner peace; respectably, in order that others may come to his assistance; justly, lest others be provoked and external peace be disturbed. Law is therefore something external and is unrelated to the honestum, to the morally good. It produces only external obligations, whereas morality produces only internal ones. Legal duties are enforceable duties; moral duties are subject to compulsion solely through one’s own conscience.

  This conception reacted unfavorably upon the doctrine of the state of nature. The latter was interpreted in a pessimistic sense: legal force can be exerted only by means of self-help and self-defense. Hence the state arose by way of contract, merely out of considerations of individual utility. An external power is a more effective guarantor of external peace than is the individual’s right of self-help. Thus the absurdities mount.

  The grandiose pessimism of a Hobbes possesses, by comparison, a consistency that is refreshing. Besides, Thomasius also drags in the old formulas, such as that of God as the ultimate foundation of the natural law. For him, however, this merely means that even the natural law owes its existence to God as the Creator of all things. But the ground of its validity is not God’s will, since in particular cases we know what God’s will is through revelation alone, not by means of natural reason. The principle of the natural law thus remains temporal happiness understood in a highly subjective sense.

  The metaphysics of the natural law was by now altogether lost to sight. Deductive, autonomous reason could henceforth, without let or hindrance, evolve natural and detailed systems of law. Into such legal systems were admitted, of course, as unalterable and supreme postulates all those parts of the positive law which the individualistic spirit of the Enlightenment regarded as good, as well as whatever it considered worthy of enactment into law.

  In the course of this evolution the individualistic trait grew steadily more pronounced. Pufendorf had already conceived of sociality, not as a category bound up with the nature of man, but as a capacity, a mere potency, a tendency. Marriage, the family, property, and the state are not institutions, derived from natural-law social forms, germinally present in the idea of social animal and proceeding of necessity therefrom (and hence in their essence independent of the will). They were viewed from the standpoint either of the advantage accruing to the individual or of their utility for a happy temporal life taken subjectively. As a consequence, too, it was not the family but marriage “relations” and the relations between parents and children, viewed as relations between individual and individual, that received attention. Such an approach was, of course, incapable of appreciating the position that the institution alone, considered in its essence, possesses natural-law character, whereas the juridical regulation of individual relations can be discovered in various ways from the evolution of society, and the positive law in turn from the whole complex environment; as in the case of paternal authority, forms of ownership, property rights in marriage.

  Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) exhibits in his philosophy the individualist natural law in its final, highest form. Among German natural-law thinkers he was the most radical in making freedom of the individual the starting point of his system. Liberty or autonomy is the sole right that belongs originally to every man in virtue of his humanity. Man’s innate equality and the entire list of the other primal rights are comprised in it. As the supreme law of right, emerges the formula: “Act externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy Will may be able to co-exist with the Freedom of all others, according to a universal Law.”8

  This is likewise the basis of Kant’s allegedly great achievement: the separation of ethics and law, of morality and legality. That law essentially concerns the external order was, however, a tradition of long standing. Equally ancient was the corresponding view that legal duties are, without any self-contradiction, enforceable by physical means, in contrast to such duties as love, gratitude, and reverence (love of country, for instance, is unenforceable, whereas obedience to the laws of the state can indeed be enforced). But both classes had always been conceived as moral duties. Up to that time there were no merely juridical duties, even though there existed merely ethical duties, e.g., gratitude. Yet no one recognized any mutually exclusive opposition between ethical duties and juridical duties, although people knew how to distinguish them. Juridical duties are enforceable, and they are enforceable because without such enforcement there can be no durability to the social order, through which and in which the idea of man as a social animal finds completion. Permanence is a special attribute of law. Violation of the law is a negation of this order. But precisely because this order must exist, the fulfillment of legal duties is likewise always a moral duty. Consequently the state is not a pure apparatus for compulsion; it is always a moral community, too. Moreover, it does not live by law alone, though it lives in the law; it lives rather by the exercise of all the social virtues. Accordingly thinkers had in the past always assigned to the state as its essential task, to render the citizens virtuous.

  Despite such accurate discrimination (precisely for the sake of morality as free fulfillment of duty), this inner connection was first torn asunder by Thomasius in the separation of ethics (equivalent to inner peace of the individual soul) and law (equivalent to external peace of society). Kant, on the other hand, replaced inner peace by autonomous freedom. Inner freedom, the moral autonomy of the individual person, is the sphere of morality. “A person is subject to no other laws than those which he (either alone or jointly with others) gives to himself.”9 External freedom, according to Kant, requires coercive laws; on this point he found himself in full agreement with tradition. Therefore, Kant infers, the condition of external freedom (i.e., law) is something purely external. Morality and law differ not so much by reason of the diversity of duties (e.g., justice, love of neighbor, filial and parental love) as because of the disparity of legislation. The motive of moral legislation is duty, derived from the autonomy of reason and appearing in the form of the categorical imperative and practically deified by Kant. The motive of juridical legislation is not morality but the keeping of external freedom, the carrying out of the coercive measures that are necessary thereto. The legal order is devoid of moral character. “Hence ethical legislation cannot be external (not even that of a divine will).”10 Thus the impersonal, formal, categorical imperative takes the place of the eternal law. The natural law, therefore, as part of the lex naturalis, is no longer connected with the eternal law, for the very reason that it can no longer be understood as part of the lex naturalis, of the rational moral law. Furthermore, not enforceability but external physical force is directly and necessarily included in the concept of law.

  Freedom as a starting point and first principle of the natural law in its purely formal character renders impossible a material natural law, a natural law with a material content. This follows also from Kant’s pronounced dualism of speculative and practical metaphysics, the coordinated knowledge contents of theoretical and practical reason. Theoretical reason affords no sure knowledge of the essence of things; it can posit the existence of external reality only as a postulate. Practical reason alone yields certitude about the metaphysical. Practical reason “believes” in God, freedom, and immortality, things which theoretical reason is unable strictly and necessarily to know and demonstrate from the world of phenomena; for without them morality would be impossible. This primacy of the practical reason parallels to some extent the nominalist contention that the will is a higher faculty than the intellect and that supernatural faith as well as the positive divine law is the positive rule of knowledge and action. As in the case of the nominalist Occam, on this primacy of practical reason rests Kant’s ethical rationalism, his deductionism uncontrolled by the intellect and consequently by reality. For otherwise the intellect would have to perceive the ideas in things and to be able to present that which is to the will as that which strictly ought to be.

  Kant’s formalism, i.e., the theory of mere conditions of knowledge and of moral autonomous freedom, is the main cause of this peculiarity of his ethics. It did not allow him to develop a doctrine of material values, but only the doctrine of conditions under which values can be “given.” The principle of freedom is too formal and hence too unfruitful to permit a material ordo, whether of oughtness or of essential being, to find acceptance, in relation either to knowledge or to volition. Since metaphysical being can thus exercise no control with regard to thinking, deductive free thought loses itself in rationalist constructions. Only too frequently, moreover, it clothes empirical, historical contents with the sheen of pure and absolutely valid deductions from reason. Indeed, this can be verified even in the case of the Neo-Kantian theories of formal and pure law, as, for example, in the writings of Stammler and Kelsen. (However paradoxical it may appear, Karl Bergbohm would actually have uncovered, in virtue of his peculiarly keen scent, abundant traces of natural-law thinking even in Kelsen.) Hence every external mode of action whereby the arbitrary freedom of the citizens is not mutually impaired would have to appear as juridical. That is to say, the joint consent and approval of the citizens would necessarily be able to render, in a positivist fashion, any action whatever a juridical one, quite apart from its material moral quality (here the well-known strong influence of Rousseau upon Kant is discernible). Thus, on the sole condition of the formal freedom of others, it would be possible for such intrinsically immoral actions as usury, theft, and adultery to become juridical, which Occam, who taught the same dualism of theoretical and practical reason, had admitted even in the case of the lex naturalis. The inherently immoral character of an action is no longer of importance for its juridical qualification.

  This formalism thereupon led to abstruse deductions that altogether disregard the social value of, for instance, marriage and the family as institutions. To Kant the entire world of law appeared exactly like a variegated, intrinsically uncoordinated aggregate of subjective rights. Marriage becomes for him “the Union of two Persons of different sex for life-long reciprocal possession of their sexual faculties.”11 The use of another’s sexual organs is, in Kant’s view, a gratification for the sake of which one party gives himself to the other. But thereby a man makes himself a thing, which is contrary to the law of the humanity in his person. Only because the other person similarly acquires another as a thing does he regain himself and recover his personality. “The Acquisition of a part of the human organism being, on account of its unity, at the same time the acquisition of the whole Person, it follows that the surrender and acceptation of, or by, one sex in relation to the other, is not only permissible under the condition of Marriage, but is further only really possible under that condition.”12 The act of generation is “a process by which a Person is brought without his consent into the world, and placed in it by the responsible free will of others. This Act, therefore, attaches an obligation to the Parents to make their Children—as far as their power goes—contented with the condition thus acquired. Hence Parents cannot regard their Child as, in a manner, a Thing of their own making, for a Being endowed with Freedom cannot be so regarded. Nor, consequently, have they a Right to destroy it as if it were their own property, or even to leave it to chance, because they have brought a Being into the world who becomes in fact a Citizen of the world, and they have placed that Being in a state which they cannot be left to treat with indifference, even according to the natural conceptions of Right.”13

  In Kant’s thought also the state of nature, which is contrasted not with the social but with the civil or political condition of mankind, plays the same great role that it did in the individualist conception of natural law. Kant held that the state of nature is already social, and that the norms of natural law have force in it as private law. Accordingly the whole body of law derivable from reason (the law covering marriage, the family, inheritance, contracts, property and the ways of acquiring it, as well as trial and verdict) is dealt with in this connection. The status civilis is looked upon as something superadded, not as equally original. It is the domain of public law, in which “through public laws the ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ [is] safeguarded,” hence not created. It has the important function of presenting these norms of private law, which are projected upon or into the state of nature conceived as social, as sacred to the public or positive coercive law of the state. The rights and institutions existing in the state of nature are at most to be protected by the state with its force; they are not to be substantially altered or to be abolished. For what did not previously belong to the law of nature cannot become matter of civil law.14 The circle of subjective rights, which is continually widening, and the maintenance of these rights in the status civilis form together the contents of the natural law. They are projected into the state of nature in order to protect them from encroachment on the part of the state. In this way the state itself is merely an institution resting on a free contract: it does not result intrinsically and necessarily from the essence and reason of man. At most it arises from eudaemonist and utilitarian motives, so far as the passions, which were generally viewed by rationalism after the Stoic fashion as devoid of value, menace the state of nature in its very existence and hence render coercion necessary.

  The era of the individualist natural law, conditioned by the theory of a purely imaginary, unreal world of the state of nature and adopting as a starting point any propensity or attribute whatever of empirical human nature, brought to light nearly as many supreme principles of law and resultant natural-law systems as there were chairs and professors of natural and international law. Such were sociality, external peace, urge for earthly happiness, and, finally, freedom. As Warnkoenig has shown, eight or more new systems of natural law made their appearance at every Leipzig booksellers’ fair since 1780. Thus Jean Paul Richter’s ironical remark contained no exaggeration: Every fair and every war brings forth a new natural law.

  The reforming zeal of the eighteenth century considered useful, right, and good its ideal of civil liberty and equality, economic freedom as a condition of social harmony, and liberation from the rigid bonds of guild law and corporations. All this was taken, together with and in addition to the traditional contents, into the natural law and transferred to the state of nature. Thus the particular systems of natural law became compendiums in which the norms of the positive law (only now rationally demonstrated), vindicated by speculative thought and before the bar of reason, appeared side by side with proposals for improvement arising from the criticism of the positive laws. Moreover, in these systems the natural-law norms handed down from the past were dealt with alongside both the ideas of political reform stemming from the spirit of the time and the subjective rights of citizens and men. With these last were combined, with more or less good fortune or skill, the personal and often abstruse desiderata of the individual teacher.

  For these reasons Anselm Desing, O.S.B. (1699–1772), who as a Catholic, in contrast to the majority of natural-law teachers, was still in close contact with the Scholastic tradition, could rightly point out that the pretended natural law of his time was in no way a “dictate of reason”; that it was rather a rationalization of the positive law of the period, yes, even of the laws of the nation to which the author belonged; hence that it was not at all derived, as asserted, from reason alone, but was little more than “the civil law adorned with some spoils of philosophy and moral theology.” How are we otherwise to explain the fact that, side by side with the natural right to liberty and equality, a natural law of feudalism was taught; and that, alongside the new French constitution, the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire was shown to belong to the natural law? Or that the postal system was converted into a natural-law institution? Nature, state of nature, natural reason, natural theology, and natural ethics were the dominant ideas and viewpoints of the age. Whoever was desirous of representing something as good and worth while had now to make of it a requirement of the natural law, and to show that it is a conclusion of reason and that it existed in the state of nature.

  This individualist natural law of rationalism did not, however, owe its importance in world history to its absurdities. It owed this significance rather to its ethical and politico-economic aims, which were raised to the sublime dignity of natural justice and held in altogether singular esteem by the spirit of the eighteenth century. Through its acid criticism of society, it certainly served to dissolve the traditional and rigid forms of feudal and guild law in the reforming legislation of enlightened despots like Frederick the Great of Prussia and Joseph II of Austria. This causal connection is verified in the authors of these reforms, who lived and taught wholly under the spell of this natural law. Nor did it only smash these forms to pieces in a revolutionary manner, as the Jacobins inspired by Rousseau did in France. It also preserved from ultimate extinction a goodly part of the old national legal heritage by investing much of the latter with the splendor of natural justice. For example, Thomasius rejected the free testamentary disposition of Roman law and opposed to it, as a requirement of natural law, the Germanic system of succession according to blood. Moreover, in conjunction with the Enlightenment, it again did away with the belief in demons, which since the close of the Middle Ages had been working havoc in the sphere of law (witchcraft delusion); and it thus deprived torture of all justification arising from belief in demons, from the supposed “possession” of the criminal. Finally it upheld, in Germany by means of reform, in France through revolution, human and civil rights against a personal absolutism of princes that towered above everything; in this way it once more helped the idea of the constitutional state on to victory. Yet we should not overlook that it likewise vindicated to the point of chicanery the police-state of enlightened despotism along with its tutelage of the citizens.

  On the other hand, the separation of morality and law, and the assignment of law alone to the state and of morality to the individual, aided materially in the suppression of the police-state. The state, it was held, is not to concern itself with the morality of the citizens, which is an internal matter. Among the consequences of this view in the moralizing century was not only the victory of civil toleration in matters of religious belief, but also the victory of the liberal constitutional state over the totalitarian educational state, whereof Maria Theresa’s morals commissions still afforded evidence. For, supposing that the Church as a free community pre-eminently concerned with faith and morals is lacking or is not recognized, the identification of morality and law leads readily to a state which no longer respects a sphere of personal moral responsibility or a personal nature and goal which transcend the state.

  We can, therefore, readily understand that the rationalist natural law should have lost ever more and more of its importance as its aims were progressively achieved in political life and in positive law. Yet it is a singular thing, and a sort of poetic vengeance for its own betrayal of tradition, that throughout the entire nineteenth century this natural law passed in the scientific world for the natural law par excellence, and that thus the battle against it was regarded as a fight against the natural law. Thus positivism, which was now beginning its triumphal march, obtained its laurels all too easily, since it was indeed able to vanquish this historical form of a philosophy of law which called itself natural law, but not the idea itself of natural law. The latter was carried along by the philosophia perennis even through the centuries flushed with passion for deduction. It sought for fresh confirmation in every historical setting of the problem until, with the exhaustion of positivism, with the resurgence of metaphysics, and with the collapse of the spirit of the nineteenth century, it came back renovated. It returned, not of course absolutely speaking, for it had always been cherished in the shadow of moral theology and the metaphysics of the philosophia perennis, yet return it did even into the realm of jurisprudence, from which positivism had attempted to banish it.

  CHAPTER V

  The Turning Away from Natural Law

  The attack upon the idea of natural law came mainly from two quarters. It came, in the first place, from skeptics and agnostics like David Hume or from utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and their disciples. In the next place, it came from the leaders of the romantic movement, which was antirationalist and antirevolutionary and was based upon the philosophy of traditionalism as expounded by De Maistre and De Bonald.

  Common to both groups, however, though for very different reasons, was a pronounced distrust of the power and abilities of human reason in individual men. This distrust resulted from a strong reaction against the overestimation of that same human reason in the era of rationalism. For both groups, law is not a system of clear rational conclusions from some axiomatic or self-evident principles. It is not a body of deductions which human reason can construct more geometrico, as Baruch Spinoza, in keeping with the predilection for the mathematical method which dominated the rationalist era, attempted to work out in his Ethics. On the contrary, law becomes the effect of habits, the product of the experienced utility of conventional behavior for individualist self-interest. Hume never tires of pointing out that reason is and ought to be the servant of the passions, and that consequently man is ruled by the passions and not, as the rationalist must contend, by reason. Similarly the romantic movement (in legal philosophy, the historical school of jurisprudence) would insist that law is merely the creation of the Volksgeist or spirit of the people which works in an irrational manner and reveals itself in the establishment of legal conventions and customary law. Law itself is constituted by such time-honored customary laws, which emerge from the mysterious soul of the nation that grows like an organism and is not deliberately fashioned. It is not the legislator of rationalism, deliberating in the rational clarity of consciousness, who makes the law; and it is not the will of the state, informed by abstract logical reasoning and vesting the natural law with the cloak of positive law, that makes the law. The law is the silent, almost subconscious, historical product of a particular Volksgeist, of the spirit of a particular people. The law is not made; it grows.

  Both ways of thinking result in the rejection of the theory of natural law. Yet there exists between them a significant difference. The skeptics, agnostics, and utilitarians sought definitely and completely to undermine and destroy the very idea of natural law. The historical school of law, on the other hand, launched its attack rather against the antihistorical, abstract thinking of the age of rationalism. It leveled its guns against that passion for constructing systems out of the whole cloth of abstract reasoning which was so typical of the natural-law theorizing of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was at the same time so destructive, as appears in the excesses of the French Revolution, which appealed to the idea of natural law in justification even of its most wanton injustices. This school of law was antirevolutionary and antirationalist, but it was not, like the agnostic school of thought, antimetaphysical.

  It has been pointed out that the forces which would destroy the hold exercised over men’s minds by the idea of natural law were already germinally contained in John Locke’s empiricism. Locke began with a certain distrust in the power of human reason that was only slightly neutralized by his philosophically rather inconsequential confidence in practical common sense. The point has also been made that Cartesian rationalism, with its conception of the human intellect as practically angelic, contained within itself a fall of the angels by leading to relativist sensualism. In the philosophy of David Hume (1711–76) these forces became mature. “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”1 Reason fails us, but only in order that nature herself (reason and nature are now opposed; no longer is reason the dominating element of human nature) may step into the breach.2 What, then, is this “nature”? It is the passions, the propensities, and an assorted bundle of perceptions.

  Hume’s dissolving criticism leaves no method for determining what is intrinsically good or bad in these passions and in the acts that proceed from them. Whatever may be the moral principles that guide our actions, they are not founded on objective truth and on reason. Indeed, they are not principles at all. They are only names, symbols for emotions, i.e., for feelings of pleasure and pain. What the earlier philosophers called natural law is but a common name conventionally agreed upon for moral sentiments of approval or disapproval. Thus the morality of an action is determined not by its conformity with reason but simply by the sentiment of approval: “Morality is determined by sentiment.” As a consequence, Hume defines “virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.”3 The reason for such sentiments is not the intellectually apprehended conformity of the action with objective principles. Such a conformity supposes powers of intellectual cognition which Hume, in his epistemology, denies to the human mind. The single remaining explanation and ground of these sentiments is the usefulness of the action to serve human needs, as repeated experience shows. The sentiment of approval is a sign that the respective action is useful, either directly to self-interest, or indirectly, inasmuch as the action is useful for the preservation of society in its function as framework for the realization of self-interest, which ultimately is the sole thing that matters. Out of repeated individual experiences which evidence the utility of an action, arises the presumption of standards of behavior and the fixing of habits.

  The moral law is far from being intrinsic and objective; even the utility of our actions is not an objective quality. It is consequently but a sum of societary conventions that are adapted to serve human needs and urges according to our experiences, which, however, may be superseded by different experiences at some future time. Thus the moral law has no basis in the intelligible rational and social nature of man; it has to do with no eternal, unchangeable verity rooted in the metaphysical order of the universe established by the Creator. Hume rejects the fundamental conception of St. Thomas that being, truth, and goodness are intrinsically linked together (ens et verum et bonum convertuntur). For Hume, being does not appear to the human intellect as the true because man’s mind has no access to the thing-in-itself, to the essences or ideas of things. Similarly, being, which confronts theoretical reason as the true, cannot appear before practical reason and the will as the good to be realized, as the objective norm of human action. Conventions cannot, of course, claim intrinsic validity. Utility or usefulness, in addition to its inherently subjective slant, is a quality which changes with socio-political circumstances and with accidental and more or less arbitrary estimates of human needs.

  All that remained after this analysis was empiricist positivism. The good and the just are what is here and now deemed useful to the self-interest of individuals and to their life in common. The latter, of itself and through educational enforcement, develops a social habit of considering a common interest, which, however, is not such in reality: it is but a nominalist symbol for the sum of tangible individual interests.

  This “destruction” of the idea of natural law at the hands of Hume4 was, in the Anglo-Saxon world, of less importance for the survival of the natural-law concept in jurisprudence than one might have expected. This fact must be attributed to the tenacity with which the spirit of the English common law retained the conceptions of natural law and equity which it had assimilated during the Catholic Middle Ages, thanks especially to the influence of Henry de Bracton (d. 1268) and Sir John Fortescue (d. cir. 1476). For a long time natural law remained the critical norm for common-law judges who, much like the Roman praetors acting under the influence of the philosophically minded juris-consults and their responsa, allowed the principles of equity to control the rigid formalism of the original common law. In addition, the decisions of the Christian courts or ecclesiastical courts, applying canon law which is imbued with the idea of natural law, constituted a vessel in which this idea could be handed down to later generations. The English religious revolt of the sixteenth century brought with it the grave danger that the resulting caesaropapism might pave the way for a revival on English soil of Byzantine absolutism. According to Byzantine legal theory the emperor as lex viva was above and not under the law, a conception which might be used by the king to establish his supremacy over the law. But the Christian elements of the common law continued to keep alive in the minds of the judges the traditional belief in the supremacy of natural law. Thus Sir Edward Coke upheld in Bonham’s Case (1610) the general principle that statutes are void if they do not conform to the natural law.5 Ideas such as these, inimical to arbitrary power and unlimited governmental prerogatives, found a peculiarly favorable socio-cultural environment in the New World, though here they came to receive a starkly individualist interpretation which, owing to the Zeitgeist of liberalism and to special economic and social conditions, culminated in so-called rugged individualism. It was mainly with the growth of the analytical method of John Austin (1790–1859) and with the progress of pragmatism that the dilution of the Christian legal heritage advanced to an alarming degree.

  The other offensive against natural law was launched by the romantic movement and its legal offshoot, the historical school of law. The genius of jurisprudence became exhausted by the airy abstractions of the cosmopolitan natural law; it was sobered and shaken by the passionate rhetoric and the horrible, legally infamous sentences of the murderous tribunals of the French revolutionaries. Now it bowed before the vigorous life of the legal sense flourishing in the popular mind and committed itself to the strictly antirevolutionary sway of the historical process. Just as it had formerly been driven on by the arrogantly rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment, so now it was propelled by the conservative thinking of romanticism. But the historical school of law was not yet positivism, although it adopted a hostile attitude toward natural law. Karl Bergbohm (1849–1927), the diligent tracker of natural law, has made this point sufficiently clear. Yet what Bergbohm (and many others with him) overlooked is the fact that the historical school directed its attacks against the individualist natural law. The blame for this gross error is to be ascribed to the total ignorance of the great Western tradition of natural law, together with the antimetaphysical mood of the closing nineteenth century.

  The historical school of law showed an affectionate regard for the past of peoples, especially for that of one’s own people. “The motley world of legal forms, like language, art, and mores, does not evolve in virtue of deliberate natural reflection or reasoned considerations of utility; it springs rather from the common conviction of the people, from the like feeling of inner necessity which excludes all thought of fortuitous and arbitrary origin” (Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 1779–1861). The state does not create the law; it should only formulate it, just as in earlier times the national judge merely “found” the law and applied it. The consciousness of law and its contents are the law. Law is the general will of those living together under law. The spirit of the people is the source of human or natural law, of legal principles. Consequently the law of each people is as different from that of other peoples as is its language. “Hence to the German people corresponds a German law” (Puchta). Within law, as in language, are found provincialisms. Customary law is thus the first form of the law which emerges from the dim workshop of the spirit of the nation. Law does not originate through action of the state. On the contrary, the state presupposes a legal consciousness, a law, even though the state is a necessary complement of the latter.

  In this way the historical school acknowledged three sources of law: customary law, statute law duly promulgated, and the science of law which brings the law, so to speak, into consciousness by the path of jurisprudence. In its view, moreover, these sources flow forth in chronological sequence. First on the scene is customary law which, as the legal consciousness of the community, also represents, as it were, the higher law. With advancing civilization, as the state becomes conscious of its special mission toward the law, the state regulates the various domains of life by means of legislation. Last of all appears the science of law, which gathers up the customary law, interprets the statute law, and, in conjunction with the judiciary and the legal profession, brings customary and statute law into agreement. The historical school thus upheld a sort of hierarchy of these sources of law. Customary law, which is in force among a people prior to the legislative activity of the state, ranks highest. The state does not enact law that is new and foreign to the people; it decides what in doubtful cases is to be considered the general will so that it may itself adhere thereto. The science of law, however, brings into consciousness principles of law which are, so to say, concealed in the abundance of the concrete and intuitively known legal rules acknowledged by the citizens as well as in the laws of the state. In the order of importance this law of jurists ranks lowest, for it is all too much in danger of becoming abstract. Wherefore both the genius of jurisprudence and the genius of legislation must seek to find the law where it abides par excellence, that is, in the general legal consciousness of the people. Furthermore, the law must be “found.” It cannot be derived from unsubstantial principles by a process of abstraction and rationalist deduction, since it has but one principle: the obscure depths of the national spirit.

  The historical school, therefore, acknowledged only positive law. “There is no law but positive law. What underlies the conception of a natural law are precisely those concepts and precepts of the divine order of the world, the ideas of law. But these possess neither the requisite definiteness nor the binding force of law. They are the motives for the perfecting of the commonwealth, not already valid norms. Hence there are indeed demands of reason on law, but there exists no law of reason.” Thus wrote the philosopher of the historical school, F.J. Stahl (1802–61). Consequently, he continued, “the human community whose function it is freely to give to the concept of law its definite shape, can convert the latter into its opposite and command what is unjust and unreasonable; and even in this condition of opposition to God the law retains its binding authority. The binding authority of law is nothing else than the divine order of the world, but its abode is the existing law which can come into conflict with God’s order of the universe.”

  Such was the first reaction of the positivist spirit to the individualistic natural law, in particular and designedly to the idea of natural law. “For,” as Stahl insisted, “the highest principles touching the binding force of the positive law—that one must obey the public authorities; whether there is a limit to this obedience and what the limit is; whether active resistance is permissible—lie beyond positive law. Yet this pertains not to natural law but to ethics, and hence everyone according to his conscience will judge for himself before God what stand he should take on the matter.”

  Structurally, however, this position is akin to the speculation characteristic of the law of reason. What we have here is, on the one hand, the higher law of custom which, though not set up by the state as a higher norm, rules prior to the state and over it; and on the other hand, statute and jurist-made law which takes its norm from customary law. Such at least is the way it ought to be. But in keeping with its conservative attitude, like the whole romantic movement antirevolutionary, the historical school, faced by the decisive question of a conflict between positive law and natural law (or ethics, as Stahl termed it), could only say: “Subjects may not, relying upon the natural law, set themselves singly or collectively in opposition to the positive law; that would be the crime of the Revolution.” Besides, customary law is related to the statute law of the state as the conservative natural law of the state of nature was related, e.g., in the thinking of Christian Wolff, to the statute law of the prince. The sole difference, though it is a decisive one, is that customary law was historically existing law, not abstract law deduced from abstract principles. The historically minded romanticism of the antirevolutionary era stood no longer in need of such a natural law, for it felt no call to make laws as did the reform-minded age of the law-of-reason enthusiasts.

  But there is one more striking point. For the historical school, too, the eternal law was not a genuinely binding norm, no more than it was for Occam. Just as Occam had raised the question of whether God (by willing it) can oblige a person to hate Him, so Stahl declared that a positive law which is contrary to God’s law is none the less binding. Despite the historical metaphysics of the national spirit, law in the eyes of the historical school is will rather than reason. To state the matter more exactly, for the historical school law is a product of the vital, irrational impulse in historical development, a result of historical necessities and of the spontaneously working power of the popular mind, rather than a product of clear, cool, non-historical reason. Nevertheless, although the historical school was positivist, it did not disavow justice, but referred the latter to moral philosophy. Its object was to replace the eternal and unchanging natural law with its cosmopolitan appeal to enlightened reason by the rich and varied abundance of the positive, historical, national law. This it did in order effectively to oppose the demands, clothed in natural-law dress, of the revolutionary publicists and of the jurists who were clamoring for reform and pressing for the codification of the law. The historical school was neither able, nor did it wish, to dispute the right, in principle, of ethics to pass judgment upon existing historical law. Stahl, as has been indicated, expressly stated: “What underlies the conception of a natural law are precisely those concepts and precepts of the divine order of the world, the ideas of law.” And he assigns to the philosophy of law the knowledge of what is just and valid independently of all recognition.

  It is, then, no wonder that out of the same spirit of romanticism and in spite of the struggle of the historical school, the natural law forthwith reappeared in a purified form. With the victory of empiricism, scientism, and antimetaphysical thinking, however, it was once more driven back to the confines of Catholic moral philosophy and the adherents of the philosophia perennis, but only to return at once.

  Thus the idea of natural law remained alive throughout the entire nineteenth century. Certainly, open profession of the doctrine through employment of the name itself was no longer so common. But the systems of philosophical right, of conceptual or pure law, and of law in itself are indicative of the vitality of the natural-law idea. They are likewise indicative of the fact that the nineteenth century was for the most part acquainted only with the individualist natural law of Pufendorf and his successors, especially with that of German idealism and that formulated by Kant. The natural law and philosophy of law of earlier centuries, with the exception of a few stereotyped formulas which were repeated ad nauseam and in their isolation had very little meaning, were wholly unknown to nineteenth-century legal thinkers. This remarkable telescoping of tradition to the period of from 1600 on had disastrous consequences, as no less a scholar than Rudolf von Jhering complained. As is well known, the latter asserted, amid severe reproaches leveled at contemporary philosophy, that he would probably not have written his work, Der Zweck im Recht, had he been acquainted with the philosophy of the past, in particular with that of St. Thomas Aquinas. For, he went on to say, “the basic ideas I occupied myself with are to be found in that gigantic thinker in perfect clearness and in most pregnant formulation.”6

  Noteworthy, however, is the fact that though this epoch, down to about the time of the victory of scientism and even earlier in the case of historical materialism, was often ashamed of the name “natural law,” it did not repudiate the thing itself, that is, a real law before and above the positive law. We observe that this idea was upheld particularly in penology. Certainly it is much more difficult to maintain that murder, manslaughter, perjury, theft, and adultery constitute breaches of the law solely because the positive law so determines than, e.g., that a written form is required for the legal validity of a promise of gift or that, since a person can make free testamentary disposition of his property (in contrast to the right of succession) only in writing, this is law because the positive law so ordains. No, the positive law prohibits such crimes and threatens their perpetrators with the heaviest penalties because the deeds are wrong in themselves: no agreement or statute could make them lawful. In like manner the idea of natural law was further applied in the case of international law. Here, too, the norms governing the international community did not consist of positive law alone, nor did actual practice suffice. In particular, the first principles of international law, e.g., the much-invoked fundamental rights of states, are rules of law, not because some congress of states has so decreed or because a usage may exist—political history proves how frequently this usage is overridden—but because here the legal conscience still strives with unyielding vigor to prevent might from making right.

  The second reason for this continued existence of the natural law in the disguise of a pure, absolute law was the circumstance that the separation of ethics from law, inaugurated by Thomasius and Kant, could not be carried through. The great function of the idea of natural law, to preserve morality in the law, continued to be performed even during this period. That the importance of the natural-law idea was outwardly not so great is readily explainable. The great codifications of the early nineteenth century had taken over the moral, yes, “natural” principles of law almost without exception and explicitly in the form of general clauses. Consequently ethics was embodied in the law.

  But down to the last decades of the nineteenth century the natural law maintained itself even outside the Christian doctrine of natural law which lived on in the native soil of a great tradition. It was taught, for instance, by the Aristotelian, F. A. Trendelenburg (1802–72), in his system of a natural law grounded in ethics.

  Nevertheless, throughout all the centuries the tradition of natural law held its ground in the philosophia perennis. It is true that it was treated with contempt by Pufendorf and Thomasius. But this attitude is not difficult to understand. The adherents of the traditional natural law, even in the seventeenth century, had exposed the extreme rationalism of Pufendorf and others, just as later on, in the era of revolutions, they did battle with the revolutionary dynamic of individualism. They also stood in the front line when the notion again gained ground in international life that the fact creates right.

  In his Syllabus of 1864, Pius IX condemned the following propositions: “Moral laws do not require a divine sanction, nor is there any need for human laws to be conformable to the law of nature or to receive their binding force from God” (56); “Rights consist in the mere material fact, and all human duties are an empty name, and every human deed has the force of right” (59); “The commonwealth is the origin and source of all rights, and enjoys rights which are not circumscribed by any limits” (39).7 In connection with the revival of Thomistic philosophy under Leo XIII, Catholic scholars began afresh to occupy themselves with the natural law in the context of moral philosophy. As a result a large number of important and comprehensive treatises made their appearance under such titles as Institutiones iuris naturalis. Leo XIII himself, in his encyclicals on political and social matters, afforded a shining example of the strength of the natural-law idea, which precisely from that time on was exposed within the sphere of jurisprudence to the fiercest attacks at the hands of positivism.

  The doctrine of natural law also proved to be extraordinarily valuable for constructing Christian social theory as well as for establishing Christian social policy. The social encyclicals of Leo XIII (Rerum Novarum, 1891) and Pius XI (Quadragesimo Anno, 1931) are themselves weighty evidence of this value. At the same time, these very encyclicals and the treatment of the social question undertaken in numerous and sometimes authoritative writings, together with the critical analysis of that fossil of the individualist natural law, individualist liberalism with its purely economic basis, constitute a strong proof of the vitality of this Christian doctrine of natural law. Other by-products of the same movement were the development of the so-called natural-law doctrine of the state and the grounding of sociology in social metaphysics, which received systematic treatment and a solid foundation in the natural-law doctrine. Further telling evidence of all this is found in the lifework of Heinrich Pesch, S.J. (1854–1926),8 among others, as well as in the important part played by the natural-law doctrine in the theoretical and practical policies and reforms sponsored by the Catholic social movement and developed in its literature.

  CHAPTER VI

  The Victory of Positivism

  The attack of positivism proceeded from several quarters along an ever-widening and enveloping front. It came first from scientific empiricism, which was generally lacking in a sense of the normative. The conflict of ethics with sociology opened, so to speak, a second front. The third point of assault was the spread of philosophical and historical materialism. For, in the “overthrow of the titans” of German philosophy, even the power of German idealism after Schelling and Hegel had been broken, notwithstanding the efforts of the post-Kantians (Feuerbach, Marx).

  Empiricism, which dismisses metaphysics as epistemologically impossible (agnosticism), believed that, since it had won such great triumphs in the natural sciences, it is also the right method to follow in the so-called cultural sciences.1 It penetrated into legal philosophy in proportion as the historical school, which in this matter had acted somewhat as a forerunner, came more and more to adopt what amounted to Kant’s view of the connection of law with morality. According to K. Binding, for example, the sole way to true knowledge of the law is exact analysis of actually existing law, present and past. The philosophy of law should therefore not only rest upon mere external experience, but it should be restricted thereto. Every project of passing beyond it is rejected as metaphysics.

  Philosophy of law, however, means understanding the ultimate and highest principles of law: it means understanding the essence or nature of law, the source of its obligatory character, the essential and intrinsic difference between right and wrong, justice and injustice. ‡Experience teaches us nothing about all this. It merely tells us that such and such laws were enacted by the constitutional organs, that this or that rule was once recognized as law. But certainly all true understanding of law calls for something more. It demands to know just why in final analysis this law was right, and why this law could become binding in conscience. It is thus no wonder that empiricism led not only to relativism, but to skepticism as well. No right exists as an eternal idea. There are merely positive rights which are only to be known, not to be recognized. The ignoramus et ignorabimus (“We do not know and we shall never know”) of the natural scientists invades legal philosophy. The will of the state, the formal general will of the citizens, is the source and criterion of law. Sociology thereupon explains by the mechanism of environment, by the struggle of interests, the further question of why this particular norm is chosen by the will. Lastly, historical materialism reduces law to the level of a mere reflex of the modes of production and the class struggles, or to a line of demarcation between classes.2

  To be fair, therefore, we must distinguish two forms of positivism: first, positivism as a consequence of an empiricist narrowing of reality, as a method; secondly, positivism as a philosophy of life, as a conception of the meaning of the universe and of man’s place in it, as a Weltanschauung. The crudest expression of this second form of positivism has been materialism, whether in its metaphysical (Feuerbach, Buechner, Haeckel) or historico-economic dress (Marx). Moreover, the second form of positivism has played by far the more important role.

  Positivism as a method was already present in the historical school of law. It developed with the victorious advance of scientism, of natural-science modes of thought.3 This approach to reality became the standard methodological pattern for all scientific thinking, as was once the case of deductive, mathematical rationalism which insisted on conceiving and handling ethics and law more geometrico. The essential feature of this view of reality is the prominence assigned to the empirical knowledge of individual things, and the restricting of the mental horizon to the empirical and the individual. Whatever else there may still be is ethics and not law, for it is not a law that is immediately experienced. This attitude held relatively little danger so long as moral philosophy itself did not become positivist. But when this occurred, there resulted from methodological positivism, which relegated the natural law to the background of ethics, either a world view that was frankly materialist or a self-denying skepticism which, with an almost ascetical self-restraint, merely gathered, compared, and verified. Or positivism simply referred to the newly emergent science of sociology what had hitherto been assigned to ethics; it tried thereby to rid itself of responsibility for answering the fateful question of the foundation of law.

  The jurisprudence of materialism must boil down to mere positivism. Materialism regards man as nothing more than a highly evolved animal; the soul is a mere concept, required by the law of parsimony, for the manifold functions of the brain: it is not an immaterial, immortal substance. In place of a personal God, materialism is a doctrine of impersonal eternal force or of perpetually recurrent changes of matter in accordance with the blind necessity of the laws of nature. There thus exists no free will, and hence no morality in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense, or in that of the Roman jurists, or in that of the entire Christian tradition. Right as idea and the order of justice are things, concepts, which have as little relation to reality as have God, immortality, and free will. Positive law alone exists, i.e., coercive law, for only what is actually enforced is law; and it is merely a creation of the state. Moreover, the state itself is not recognized as a moral collective person, as a moral phenomenon. It is rather a necessary product of the evolution of social forces or, as historical materialism declares, of the conditions of production. It is a natural product in the proper sense of the term. In this way it is, what it is in fact, merely a thing of the class that actually has the upper hand, the ruling class.

  The positive law, on the other hand, is “the boundary, fixed for the time being by the social groups struggling for power and influence in the state, of their authority and their influence” (Gumplowicz). This boundary is continually shifting; a common body of ethical and legal ideas is wanting. Here the law of the stronger holds sway. Callicles had spoken of this long before, and he as well as Spinoza had identified it with the natural law because they regarded nature as the antithesis of mind. Consequently there is no eternal justice, nor is there an unalterable moral law. The state is the creator of morality and law, but the state in turn is merely a product of the struggle of social classes and servant of the class that rules at any given time. Hence “the political order is the moral order for the time being, and the self-interest of the state [which is itself a product of naked power] is an element of morality. … All the highest goods that man possesses—freedom, property, family, personal rights—he owes to the state” (Gumplowicz). Law is thus not a genuine norm. It does not tell what ought to be, but is merely an indication of how far the power, the material and psychological power, of the ruling class extends. The law indicates what the sociological situation is. This is the extreme form of materialist jurisprudence. In this view, the law is neither reason nor will: it is but the line of demarcation of the relations of social power. Therefore real force, whether physical or psychical, is of necessity the essential note of law. Law is merely what is actually enforced, not what is enforceable. Jurisprudence is an inept expression, handed down from a metaphysico-theological age, for the materialist sociology of a purely experimental science that tells how the power pattern of the groups within a society stands at the moment in the struggle for the machinery of political control.

  ‡In contrast with this crassly materialist positivism stands a moderate form of positivism. The latter simply acknowledges the positive law as legally binding, and believes it possible to forgo a philosophy of law, i.e., to avoid the question of the basis of the binding character of law. Law is the will of the state that is expressly declared to be such, is enacted in conformity with constitutional provisions, and is then duly promulgated. Any further criterion, as, e.g., the inherent justice or the moral lawfulness of the action commanded by the positive law, is rejected as irrelevant for the sphere of law. The legal sphere is identified with the creation of law by the state, the carrying out of the law by the administration and the citizens, and the applying of the law by the judges. This is the position taken by the so-called theory of will, which has gained numerous adherents in political science and international law. It has found its strongest expression in the idea of the absolute sovereignty or the juristic personality of the state. Such sovereignty is even greater than that of the absolute monarch of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who considered himself bound by the natural and divine law. Indeed, upon closer examination, the doctrine of sovereignty transfers states, after the manner of Hobbes, into a pure state of nature with its single rule of self-preservation. Thus international law is dependent at every moment upon its actual acceptance or rejection by the states, just as parliamentary majorities in states like England may in theory pass any measure whatever. Law is consequently no true norm or something pertaining to reason, but mere actual will in the psychological sense. It does not depend upon the essential being of things or upon the nature of the case, which L. von Baer, following here the Anglo-Saxon judicial tradition, designated as the basis of law.

  Such views can emanate from a tired agnosticism that admits no metaphysical foundation of law. They can also spring from a strong feeling against the rationalist deductions of the natural-law doctrine which prevailed in recent centuries. Often, too, they are the result of a hostility, stemming from a conservative outlook, toward the revolutionary components of the newer natural law. These components hold danger for the state, whose inspirational value and sublime dignity are held to need no further justification. Moreover, the reason for such views often lies in the typical attitude of the modern scientific mind: satisfaction with the mere ascertainment of what actually exists, industrious search for facts, idolatrous worship of the factual. On the other hand, many students of law are much concerned about the great blessing of legal certainty. These hold that even a poor law and its application are more conducive to the general welfare than the riddling of the positive law by appeals to natural law or moral principles. This contention is based on the importance of the secure expectation of the members of the community that they may count on a definite and, if need be, enforced mode of conduct on the part of the rest. They clinch this contention by pointing out that no uniformity of views and convictions concerning this higher law prevails either among the members of the community or on the bench or among jurists.

  With the exception of the group of agnostics, these jurists in no way deny the value of justice or the validity of the ethical norm. What the older writers termed natural law they regard as an ethical norm. But such norms, so far as these are not contained in the positive law, they exclude from “law.” In their eyes, law and justice, law and right, are not identical. The lawmaker, of course, should enact no unjust laws. Yet if he enacts a law of this kind, it is law in the true sense. One may not look upon it as non-binding from the viewpoint of a natural law, but only from the viewpoint of ethics. This matter, however, everyone must settle for himself with his own conscience. Legal dualism, the doctrine of a natural law functioning as real law concomitant with and superior to the positive law, is flatly repudiated.

  The ultimate basis of this moderate positivism was and is the paralyzing realization of the unsettled condition of philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was and is quite apparent even in moral philosophy, which itself was not long in becoming positivist. For so must we designate an ethics which holds with Friedrich Paulsen, for example, that morals or mores “are, like instincts, … purposive modes of behavior for solving the various problems of life,”4 or in the form of pragmatism identifies the good with what is useful and successful, and evil with what is detrimental and unsuccessful (biologism). This school of thought has been unable to find a distinction between a material, unalterable ethics and such positive, interested, historical moral codes as those of the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and the peasants. Thus, in the face of ethical relativism and the rejection of all metaphysics, it could see no other possibility than a self-denying positivism in law.5

  The great speculative outburst of German idealism had given way to a purely formal criticism of knowledge, to which the contents of thought were a matter of indifference or which was even frankly skeptical about the possibility of attaining scientific knowledge of the content of ideas. Stahl’s work on the philosophy of law, which was representative of the thinking of the historical school of law, appeared in a final (fifth) edition in 1878, that of H. Ahrens, in a second (last) edition in 1860. Roeder’s work on the natural law appeared in a second (last) edition in the same year, 1860, and the already mentioned treatise of the Aristotelian Trendelenburg on the natural law based on ethics appeared in a final edition in 1866. It is likewise significant that, toward the close of the century, the compiling of the first volume, dealing with legal philosophy, in Holzendorf’s well-known Encyclopedia of Law was entrusted to A. Merkel, the first thoroughgoing positivist. The philosophy of law, the theoretical doctrine of the natural law, now became a general science of law, a nonmetaphysical science founded on generalization and comparison, in full agreement with the evolution in philosophy.

  Positivism, of course, could be no more permanently satisfying than could the historical school of law with its one-sided preference for customary law and the purely historical element in a science which has to do with oughtness, with norms. This external mark of the formal will of the lawmaker can by no means answer the perpetually arising question about the intrinsic difference between right and wrong. “Legal statutes must be measured by some standard or other to prove that they are justified”; moreover, “the doubt whether the existing law is in conformity with reason cannot be simply pushed aside” (R. Stammler). The existing law must also be one that ought to exist. The much-acclaimed consciousness of right is not a creator of law but an intimation that a legal fact is perceived and acknowledged as one that also ought to be.

  It is a continually recurring experience that, even when we are wholly disinterested in a matter, we keep trying to distinguish laws as good and bad according to their purpose, but as just and unjust laws in accordance with an intrinsic criterion. Yet that is possible only if this intrinsic criterion is the very basis for the qualification of right and wrong. Hence pure positivism has at no time been carried through in actual practice, even in the countries that make the judges wholly dependent on the formal law. It is simply repugnant to the notion of a true judge to be merely a subsuming automaton. Even the positive law has again and again had recourse to morality, to natural-law norms. This it does since the presupposition of positivism, that is, the lack of gaps in the statute law, is not verified. Moreover, not only do legal codes refer to the natural principles of law (e.g., Austrian General Civil Code, Code of Canon Law), but even the law itself refers to good faith and to good morals. In these references there is no thought at all of that which is merely proper, of that which passes at a given period for respectable or conforms to the mores of a certain class of society. Frequently in such cases it is far more a question of the conclusions and further inferences from the natural law as well as of applying them. Nor does it do any good to explain, in a spirit of unshakable loyalty to positivism, that the lawmaker has precisely willed all this. For such an explanation presupposes not the actual lawmaker but an ideal one, i.e., a lawmaker who wills what is just.

  “The individual experience of law is, when clearly grasped, dependent upon the universally valid concept of law, not vice versa. The concept of law cannot be derived from particular legal experiences (through induction or comparison), since these really become possible only through the former” (R. Stammler). Law exists prior to jurists and legal philosophers. They have not created law, but, inversely, law is the precondition of a legal profession and philosophy of law.

  We have recorded the victory of positivism. But this must not be taken to mean that positivism won a definitive and total victory on all intellectual, moral, and political fronts. The victory, such as it was, was the outcome of the eventual undermining of metaphysics and the progressive dilution of the Christian heritage at the hands of both Kantian criticism and empiricism. The immediate result of these trends of modern thought was an agnostic and skeptical relativism, whose mock heroism showed itself in an almost ascetic, disillusioned search for “facts” and whose contempt for the theological and metaphysical era was pretentious and likewise ridiculous. Wherever these presuppositions of positivism did not prevail, the idea of natural law continued to live its now hidden life. It is true that most university professors and most practical jurists, to say nothing of the popularizers of shifting scientific fashions, spoke of natural law as a dead letter. Yet the idea of natural law once more found refuge in the philosophia perennis which, as we have repeatedly pointed out, had been its home whenever it was exiled from the secular universities and law schools. And the idea, divested of its academic dress, went on living also in common sense, in the minds of ordinary men.6 Bergbohm, the Quixotic assailant of natural law, was forced to admit that all men are born natural-law jurists. How right he was! The spirit of skeptical agnosticism, which denies to the human mind access to transcendental truth and objective values and, doubting the inner logic of the universe, constructs subjective systems of thought, is more an attitude for the academic ivory tower or for the private study of one who enjoys economic security.

  In real life this attitude is untenable. When he acts, and does not merely turn things over in his mind, even the skeptic acts as if such a thing as natural law or objective justice existed, as the common sense of ordinary men and women has always implicitly held. And the reason is obvious. If anyone were to attempt to realize a strict and consistent positivism in the everyday life of society, his sole possible attitude would be an unbearable cynicism. When he becomes interested in problems of economic, social, or political reform, the avowed positivist frequently turns, in practice and as it were unconsciously, to the idea of natural law and to standards of unchanging justice. The “scientific mind” may skeptically deny the existence of the natural law, but the heart, in which, as St. Paul says,7 the natural law is recorded or inscribed, affirms it. It is easy to profess and proclaim positivism in a culture that is secure and is saturated with materialism. Positivism is the typical by-product of a solidly established, economically secure, and politically unendangered ruling class (beati possidentes). Yet man with his unquenchable thirst for justice cannot long be content with such an attitude. The hunger and thirst after justice are no less pressing than the ceaseless quest for truth. The idea of the natural law may thus be compared to the seed which, buried under the snow, sprouts forth as soon as the frigid and sterile winter of positivism yields to the unfailing spring of metaphysics. For the idea of natural law is immortal.

  CHAPTER VII

  The Reappearance of Natural Law

  The genius of the legal sciences could not be detained for long in the arid waste of positivism. Bergbohm, who tracked down the natural law into all the nooks and crannies in which it was supposed to have hidden itself from positivism, found everywhere, even among self-styled positivists, natural-law thought patterns. His intention was to dislodge it definitively. The year was 1885. Had Bergbohm repeated his hunt for the natural law about 1925, forty years later, he would have been shocked at the many new camouflages of his quarry. There is manifestly something invincible and eternal about that body of spiritual and moral ideas which for thousands of years has been called natural law and is once more coming back into honor. This is true even if those who admit these ideas in fact look back with false shame at the deductive extravagances of the rationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and suppress the name of natural law. Not many concepts have had to endure so much violence as the notion of natural law. Yet few conceptions have had so proud and so great a tradition and a past, and are destined to have so great a future.

  Positivism had no sooner achieved its position of dominance than men began to turn away from its Stoiclike self-denial. This first occurred, in a rather timid fashion, in the Neo-Kantian philosophy of law, of which the doctrine of Rudolf Stammler (1856–1938) affords a specific and typical instance. Stammler distinguishes between form and content of law—in the Kantian sense, of course, not in the Aristotelian. For Stammler, “formal” means the same as “conditioning,” and he accordingly asks under what conditions positive law can be true law. Thus it is not a question of a legal content, but, as in Kant’s ethical system, a question of a purely formal and empty concept which can receive various contents. Law thus becomes a “conditioning and determining form” of social life as the matter, the content. But this form hovers as far above every merely historical content as, in Kant’s philosophy, the world of noumena soars above that of phenomena. Yet just as Kant did not attain to a material ethics determined by being, so Stammler fails to achieve a material jurisprudence. On the contrary, he arrives at a natural law with historically changing contents, for natural law is merely his concept of formal law. Such at least should be the case.

  In reality, however, Stammler’s doctrine of law does attain to contents—by way of the “social ideal” of the community of “freely willing men.” By this path he arrives at universally valid legal principles which, because of their emptiness, are in part merely tautological. An instance in point is the principle that the individual should not be compelled to renounce interests to which he is fully entitled. But the whole question, of course, is to determine what makes him fully entitled to certain interests. Or “the unconditioned law for man is the good will, i.e., the direction and determination of empirical ends, which can present themselves as universally valid, abstracting from subjective selfish impulses.” However, good will has precisely little to do with the rightness of a law; and whether or not the will is good, i.e., free from subjective selfish impulses, needs precisely to be ascertained by comparison with objective, legitimate, unselfish impulses. In this way, then, Stammler ascribes to his formal law contents that are “right,” measured by the social ideal which likewise is not without a content that supplies a standard. The community of freely willing men implies, according to Stammler, rejection of slavery, polygamy, and despotism. But the rejection of adultery, perjury, theft, and intentional killing of an innocent person is equally well founded. It is no wonder that the positivists have charged that Stammler’s natural law with a changing content still retains a sort of sediment of unchangeable “old” natural law.1

  Many jurists separate the juridical and social aspects. Jellinek, for instance, in his political philosophy makes a distinction between legal theory and social theory. The legal theory is constructed along positivist lines; and then in social theory the old natural law at times breaks through. It is altogether surprising how often recourse has been had to the natural law, i.e., the idea of unalterable norms, in social philosophy and sociology for the building of social institutions, after it had been banished from jurisprudence. And yet this should not be wondered at, since social philosophy has from of old been closely connected with moral philosophy, as may be seen in every table of contents of the great Institutiones iuris naturalis of Theodor Meyer, Cathrein, Costa-Rosetti, Taparelli, Schiffini, and others. It is astonishing solely for the social doctrine that really wishes to be purely empirical and yet judges the empirical world of social phenomena by an unexpressed but ever-present social ideal of a just social order as a standard. The same is true of ethics. Even in the more recent systems of ethics, as in that of Nicolai Hartmann, we find principles aplenty which contain good old natural law. The institution theory of Maurice Hauriou (d. 1929),2 the eminent French jurist, likewise contains, as even his respect for St. Thomas Aquinas would indicate, principles corresponding to the old natural law.

  On the whole, in this advance of the idea of objective order as opposed to conditions and relations arising from the arbitrary will of individuals, we can and must see a sign of an intellectual revival that is open to the natural law. German legal scholars sometimes speak of the flight of certain natural-law principles (such as good faith, good morals and what we have the right to expect somebody to do or to tolerate) into the general clauses of the German Civil Code. This fact is most embarrassing for the formal jurist, particularly for a jurist who simply regards as an ideal the obligation of the judge to adhere to the formal law. But this is merely one more clear indication that alongside the positive law stands yet another law which often exactly resembles the old natural law. Indeed, it is an experience repeatedly verified that natural law makes its appearance whenever, through an altering of the circumstances, to use St. Thomas’ expression, the positive law would work material injustice if it were applied. This situation occurs when the ontological foundations of the law have undergone a substantial change or when improved understanding reveals the inadequacy of this positive law. Ever since the dogma of the absence of gaps in the positive law was overthrown, natural-law concepts have been pushing in more and more; and the necessity of a moral quality in the law is receiving recognition in continually widening circles. The French Civil Code threatened with punishment the judge who would refuse to hand down a decision on the plea that the law is silent on the matter. When the judge finds no positive rule in the code, he is to make use of the principles of natural equity in reaching a decision.

  From still another angle legal positivism has proved itself utterly inadequate. Positivism has only one criterion for law: the will of the sovereign formulated in accordance with the legislative process prescribed by the constitution. This formal criterion, consisting in the observance of the method and form of legislation as provided by the technical constitutional rules, is all; any material criterion (conformity of the law with the ethical end of the state, with the objective common good, with the objective moral law) is repudiated by positivism. The latter acknowledges only formal legality; it has no place for material legitimacy. Now either the will of the legislator, formulated with legal correctness, must be taken as a mere psychological act, or the will, i.e., the law, is to be regarded as the act of rational beings which has, or must be presumed to have, a content determinable by reason. Yet even the positivists agree that, for the jurist at least, the will of the legislator is no mere psychological act. The jurist has to concern himself with the intent of the law, with the ratio legis; that is, he has to concern himself with the normative intention of the lawmaker, not with the psychological facts of formulating and declaring or enouncing the intention. As applied in juridical and administrative practice, therefore, the psychological will disappears, and rightly so, and a new idea makes its appearance, namely, the rational intention of a normative character. In this way, what matters is not the psychological will enunciated in a legal document which represents the sole fact, but the normative intent of an abstract legislator who deliberates and resolves in a rational manner. The latter is substituted by the courts and administrative agencies for the factual lawmaker.

  The law thus acquires an objective mode of self-existence which is independent of the psychological acts or of all persisting acts of will. Practically speaking, the law contained in the statute books is no longer any conscious and enduring will. It is construed as a regulative norm, as the result of the deliberations and reasonable intentions of a legislator who is presumed rational as well as prone to regulate certain social relations in a reasonable manner. The jurist imputes reasonableness to the will of the lawmaker; he is little concerned with the psychological process of willing. The law as a norm frees itself from the psychological will as soon as it is inscribed in the statute books and interpreted in the courts. Very often, indeed, it even frees itself from the actual intentions of the concrete legislators and acquires an existence of its own in virtue of the end or purpose in the law. It is not the subjective intention that matters, but the objective intention of an abstract reasonable legislator, whom the jurists assume to have, as a rational being, intended a reasonable regulative norm. The formal text of the statute is construed in this sense, and not by a study of the subjective, psychological moods, intentions, and wills of the accidental members of the legislature whose action may have been very unreasonable. This liberation of the law as an objective, reasonable norm from the actual concrete psychological will of the legislator proves that law is essentially reason and not arbitrary will.

  In the second place, no positivist can get around the problem of limitations of governmental authority or limitations on the will (sovereign will) of the legislator. It is a common conviction that the law limits the will of the legislator, that the latter cannot will what he pleases. In effect, limitations of this sovereign will represent a dilemma for the positivist, who contends that the duly formulated and promulgated will of the legislator makes the law. Jellinek thought to resolve this dilemma of the positivists by saying that the lawmaker limits himself (theory of auto-limitation). But this theory does not solve the juridical dilemma, even though in practice the legislator may feel himself bound by promises of auto-limitation. For as long as the auto-limitation is itself dependent on the will of the lawmaker, those who are subject to this will are at the mercy of the uncontrolled arbitrariness of the lawmaker.

  It may indeed be objected that at least under a representative form of government such an auto-limitation is workable enough in practice. Since in the system of representative government the will of the legislature is the product of a rational deliberation and ample discussion of pros and cons, it may safely be considered to represent the general will. In other terms, the legislative will is identified with the will of the citizens: the lawmakers and those subject to the law are in some way identical. But this contention is superficial and untenable. In actual practice, the general will, because representative government is almost necessarily party government, is always at best a majority decision against which the minority will ever claim the protection of the law. For the formal will of the numerical majority cannot logically be asserted to be always reasonable and just, however great the presumption may be that the majority has more and better reasons for its decision than has the minority. This claim of the minority to protection by the law against the will of the majority functioning as the positive law clearly shows that there exists prior to the positive law an a priori element of a material character which qualifies the legislative will as just or unjust. It is strange but common to see many jurists who adhere to positivism bow before this a priori limitation of the will when they turn social reformers. On these occasions they do not condemn the existing law as technically inefficient, as failing to achieve its juridically and morally indifferent purpose. On the contrary, they condemn the injustice of the purpose itself, the immorality and unreasonableness of the will itself. They thus acknowledge and establish pre-existing conceptions of justice, morality, and reasonableness as limitations of the legislative will and as material criteria of the positive law, in place of mere political prudence that seeks to avoid armed resistance on the part of a strong minority which has been defeated at the polls.

  The influential French jurist, Léon Duguit (1859–1928), was quite conscious of this necessity of limiting the legislative will through the law. Nevertheless he stubbornly maintained that he was a positivist, and he labored to refute the idea of natural law. But how can the legislator’s willing be limited by the law, if the latter is the creature of his will? According to the positivist school the state as legislator is the omnipotent creator of the law; but Duguit certainly did not agree with such a juridical deification of the legislator. If the state is the omnipotent creator of the law, a conflict between the law and the lawmaker is, as positivism indeed affirms, obviously out of the question. The will of the legislator may be economically unreasonable, financially disastrous, socially inefficient and futile, and morally perverse, yet juridically it is, if duly enacted, the law. The real problem, however, is that of the limitations on such legislative fiats by means of the law.

  Duguit vehemently rejects all identification of law with the duly enacted will of the legislator. He protests strongly against the tendency of the majority of German jurists to regard any enactment duly emanating from the legislative organ as a legal norm before which the jurist has simply to bow and which he has to accept without subjecting it to critical evaluation.3 Duguit insists that, on the contrary, there exists a rule of law that imposes itself upon rulers and governed alike, upon the state and its subjects. He contends that this rule of law exists and is valid apart from any intervention of the state, and that it is not the creature of the state’s will. Yet he denies the seeming consequence that this rule must originate in a superior principle of the metaphysical order.4

  What, then, is the nature of this rule of law? It is a social norm which has become juridical in virtue of the fact that the mass of individual consciences has come to understand that the material sanction of this norm can be socially organized.5 Thus the rule of law does not contain a moral and juridical obligation of conscience; it is a mere indication that it will be wise for the individual to observe the rule lest he incur the organized resentment of the group. Yet it is the undeniable essence of law, of the juridical and moral norm, that it involves an imperative and binds the conscience, as Duguit himself is forced to concede.6 Law by its very nature places an obligation on free rational beings, irrespective of the fear of retaliation at the hands of the group or social milieu. Yet what is it that obliges in the strict sense, and does not merely counsel on the basis of utilitarian motives or prudential considerations? What, in final analysis, legitimates the juridical norm? Duguit denies that a superior norm, a real or hypothetical basic norm, such as the natural law, which he rejects, can provide this legitimacy. However, he concedes that “the mass of individual consciences does not create the juridical norm.” The bare fact that such a norm is held or accepted by the mass of individuals does not, of course, necessarily give to this norm an imperative character which binds consciences, however much, by threat of ruthless enforcement, it may compel people to outward conformity.

  At this point in his argument Duguit, after the manner of Jhering, introduces the teleological concept. The social norm is a “law of purpose” which governs the cooperation of the individuals who form the social group, limiting their actions and imposing certain acts while it leaves intact the substance of their will.7 Thus the end or object of the norm becomes the criterion by which acts are judged right or wrong: acts which are conformable to the end are right, those which are not conformable thereto are wrong. But then the same problem recurs. For the question inevitably arises: What ends are to be approved of as right, or disapproved of as wrong? It appears obvious, indeed, that not all ends actually intended by a concrete group are intrinsically right or good. To this Duguit replies that social solidarity is the universal end. Right is what strengthens social solidarity, wrong is what weakens it. But this criterion also is too formalistic. How may we distinguish a state or commonwealth from a robber band? To attain their ends both need social solidarity. As St. Augustine said, “Take away justice, and what are realms but great robber bands?”8 Duguit is fully aware of this objection. Hence he adds that, besides the solidarity experienced as necessary by the mass of individual consciences, these consciences must also have a sentiment of the justice, both commutative and distributive, of that sanction.9 Thus the rule of law is characterized by the end of social solidarity and by the justice of the sanctions of the rule. Consequently the justice of the sanction, not the justice of the end, would be the superior rule, the criterion of the rightness or wrongness of the positive law, of what the legislator wills. To this rather formalized justice, to this “rule of law” Duguit ascribed an over-all general validity for the law of all countries and for all branches of the law, private as well as public. They all obey the superior norm.10 At the same time, he asserts that the spirit with which one has to approach the study of law, of all branches of the law, is the spirit of justice. In truth, Duguit seems to have come to the vestibule of natural law. His next step should have been a discussion of the rightness and wrongness of the concrete ends as measured by the objective ends in the metaphysical order.11

  The work of Duguit leads to the inevitable conclusion that either positivism is sound—a contention which Duguit ably confutes—or the time-honored doctrine of natural law must be accepted in order that the legitimacy of the positive law can be founded on a superior norm of material justice, unvarying and general. The juridical norm cannot be based on the accidental historical fact of the will of the legislator; it must rest ultimately on being. Oughtness and being must in final analysis coincide. Normative oughtness must be grounded in metaphysical being. By attacking legal positivism Duguit had, as it were in spite of himself, to open the way to the idea of natural law.

  It is true that a refutation of positivism does not lead straight to the idea of natural law. Yet it opens the way thereto, inasmuch as it raises the problems of the higher law, of the legitimacy of the positive law, of the intrinsic limitations of the power and will of the legislator. A rejection of positivism means a refusal to solve these problems by simply referring to the psychological motivation in the subjects, a motivation that makes it wise and profitable to comply with the demands of authority in view of the undesirable consequences of non-conformity. As a result, the contemporary criticism of the modern concept of sovereignty must logically turn against legal positivism and thereby break down one of the greatest obstacles to the revival of the natural-law idea.

  Numerous jurists have criticized the positivist concept of sovereignty. Positivism conceives sovereignty as legal and political power limited only by physical or psychological facts, not by the natural and divine law. This modern concept of sovereignty, which became particularly poisonous in combination with an essentially materialist rationalism, was not the brain-child of Jean Bodin. It stemmed rather from Hobbes, who allowed the idea of natural law, which was still held by him, to disappear in the will of the state. Bodin, on the other hand, stood for centralized state authority against feudalist pluralism and decentralization of political authority, but he never doubted that all such authority is subject to and limited by natural and divine law. Therefore the modern concept of absolute sovereignty could appear on the scene only after positivism (as a general philosophical trend) had freed sovereignty from the limitations which Christian tradition and the ideas of natural and divine law had placed upon it. These restrictions had in earlier times made Bills of Rights relatively unnecessary; the modern positivist conception of sovereignty has rendered formal and positive declarations of human rights a practical necessity.

  For the past half-century this positivist concept of sovereignty has been vehemently criticized. Léon Duguit, H. Krabbe, Otto von Gierke, Hans Kelsen, and Harold J. Laski have led the attack. The sovereign authority must itself be subject to the law as a higher norm. The state, i.e., the political will-power, whether the latter is invested in an individual or in a majority group that can enforce conformity to its demands or to its will, is not the source of law; that is to say, will is not the essence of law. The irreducible source of law is, according to Krabbe, the sentiment and conviction of the members of the community as to what is law. The positive law thus becomes a mere declaratory agency which gives expression to the law residing in the people’s consciousness and sentiment of right.12

  Kelsen contends that it is impossible to found a normative oughtness upon a fact, upon being. A norm must always be founded upon another, a higher norm. The notion of sovereignty wrongly implies that a fact, a psychological being, the actual will of the legislator plus his socio-psychological power of coercion, is looked upon as the source of law or of oughtness. But every norm must be based on and derived from another, a higher norm, and, since this process cannot go on ad infinitum, Kelsen postulates a formal basic norm or original norm. It seems that his thoroughgoing agnosticism prevents him from anchoring his basic norm in a fundamental being of the metaphysical order. Hence his basic norm is a mere hypothetical construct, even if it is not inappropriately called civitas maxima, which of course is again a being.13

  Had his agnosticism not stood in the way, Kelsen could have attained to the idea of natural law. In this conception rational nature, viewed in the Thomistic sense as a metaphysical being, is the rule of oughtness for the concrete being, and essence is the final cause of existence. Kelsen, however, does not make this latter distinction since for him being is simply existence. Yet it is interesting and significant that Kelsen’s view of the relation between the positive law and the basic norm, however indistinct the character of the latter may be in his theory, shows a similarity of formal structure with the philosophy of natural law. But for his agnosticism this thought structure would have led straight to the conclusion that the basic norm must be the law of God, in whom being and oughtness are identical and who has revealed His law in the order of being, in the ordo rerum, from which through intuition or by discursive thinking we derive the precepts of natural law.

  It is readily understandable that natural-law principles are for the most part being applied in the spheres of social life where the law itself is in the process of formation (e.g., social legislation, labor laws). The new legislation may set down, for instance, the principle of the social responsibility of the entrepreneur for his workers or the principle of mutual fidelity governing those engaged in a common business enterprise. These principles were overlooked in an age which out of an excessive concern for individual freedom would not allow ethical duties to be made strict legal obligations. Yet precisely because it is law in a formative stage, the new legislation has left undetermined the specific facts and conditions to which and in which these principles have to be applied. In such cases the legal determination and adjudication of facts and conditions have been made on the basis of natural-law concepts, by means of judicial decisions and with the help of such formulas as “from the nature of the case” and “in virtue of natural equity.” Compare, e.g., what the papal social encyclicals, following in the footsteps of tradition, call natural law and what the courts designate from the nature of the matter as mutual legal responsibilities, duties, and rights in the field of labor relations. It will be found that the decisions of the courts and the demands of the encyclicals not only have much in common but are practically identical in content.

  Furthermore, the ideas of the autonomy of nation and nationality in relation to the state have furnished a powerful inducement to criticize positivism. These ideas were already alive in the period before World War I, but they have since attained great force. From the standpoint of the right of a nationality to an autonomous life, it proved impossible to uphold the principle that law is what the state wills; and this is true in a state composed of a single nationality as well as in one that comprises several nationalities. The special value of the nationality had of necessity to become its special right which exists prior to the state and constitutes the natural-law limit of the state’s centralized power. The “spirit of the nation” was at one time conjured up to do battle with the natural law. But now the same national spirit, with its natural-law claim to respect for its special value and therewith for its prerogatives, is rising up against the modern centralized administrative state with its continually expanding control of all domains of life. Here too, then, being has become the source of an ought. Liberal and nationalist thought maintained the identity of state and nation (viewed as a society of individuals). But this identity is being exploded by an appeal to the difference of values and thereby of the natural right of the nationality. The omnipotent state of positivism is turning into the instrumental order of the autonomous nation or people, whose members are not citizens or individuals but rather families, kindred and national groups with their culture growing out of blood, native province, and intellectual life.

  International law is likewise law in process of formation. It is in this field that the old natural law is most noticeably returning to life. International law cannot be based solely on the mere self-obligation of sovereign states. A positivist foundation of international law is impossible because an international lawmaker is wanting. Consistent positivists logically deny altogether the legal character of international law. On the other hand, Franz von Liszt (1851–1919) asserts: “The international legal community rests upon the concept of the co-existence of different states with reciprocally delimited spheres of sovereignty, with a mutually recognized sphere of power. From this fundamental concept [more properly, from this essential being of the state exemplified in sundry states] follows immediately a whole series of legal norms, by which rights and duties of states are reciprocally determined, that need no special recognition through agreements to possess binding force” (whose source is therefore not the will of the states that form the union, but rather reason which derives these norms from the nature of the international legal community). “… The rights which result from this fundamental concept are due forthwith to each and every state as a member of the international legal community. … So far as these ‘basic rights’ form the object of special agreements between two or more states, these have either exclusively declaratory character or it is a question of carrying out in an individual case the principle which is self-evident.”14 Statements such as these could stand word for word in a natural-law treatise of the Late Scholastics, Vittoria, Suarez, or Bannez.

  The protection of national minorities should also be mentioned in this connection. Since this protection ought to be the concern of international law, and not a mere matter of municipal law solely for reasons of internal policy within states which have minorities, this right to protection has come as a matter of course to be founded upon the natural-law prerogatives of national minorities. That is, it has come to be based on rights which already had juridical existence prior not only to the purely declaratory positive constitutional principles of states with minorities but also to international legislation touching the protection of minorities. Writers of repute, like Wolzendorf, thus find it quite natural to speak openly of the natural law governing national minorities. If a foundation in the natural law is indispensable wherever law is in process of formation, this is certainly true today in the case of international law.

  But all this does not yet, and without further ado, mean natural law. But it surely signifies one thing: There are still other sources of law besides the positive will of the legislator. The will of the state is not the sole source of law. Of equal importance as a source of law, and prior to it, is the “nature of the case,” which is synonymous with what the older writers used to call the ordo rerum, the essential order of being. And, through the breaches thus effected in positivism, jurisprudence is subject to continual invasion on the part of ideas whose relationship with the old natural law grows steadily more apparent. Frequently, to be sure, because of the discredit into which the individualist natural law brought it, the old natural law goes under such designations as “sentiment of right,” “a priori foundations of law,” “consistent cultural norms.”

  In 1925, Niemeyer published in his review, Niemeyers Zeitschrift fuer Internationales Recht, the results of a questionnaire submitted to a representative group of professors of international law and jurists. These had been asked whether Grotius’ theory of natural law (whose close connection with tradition has been pointed out) has validity today for the interpretation and completion of the positive international law, which rests upon the legal will and consent of states, so that international and national courts as well as arbitration tribunals ought to follow the principles of this theory. Of the forty-one best-known teachers of international law and jurists who replied to the query, fourteen answered with a flat “yes” and only eleven professed positivists gave a negative answer; the remaining sixteen adopted, it is true, a neutral position with respect to the natural law, but, on the other hand, they did not declare in favor of positivism. Of the last group one, for instance, rejected Wolff’s conception of natural law, but he demanded that the judge effect just settlement of matters in dispute; another declared that positivism is impossible, that it has now passed its peak, and that international law may not be torn from its ethical roots; a third affirmed that Christian morality, as the native soil of the natural law, must have force even in international law.15

  Many signs, therefore, point unmistakably to a renascence of natural law. Such renascence, moreover, concerns the metaphysical natural law, the ius naturale perenne, not the individualist natural law. It has coincided with a return to a doctrine of material values in ethics, and with a return to metaphysics in philosophy. This recent revival of the natural law is a fresh proof of its perpetual recurrence.

  Despite appearances, the rise and spread of contemporary totalitarianism do not invalidate the contention that a distinct revival of natural law is occurring today. Modern totalitarianism is an end product; it is not the opening period of a new era. It is indeed the final outcome of positivism as a general philosophy, as an intellectual atmosphere, as a scientific method raised to the level of the absolute and divine. The position that law is will has come to mean that the human will is freed from all universal ideas, from any objective moral order beyond class interests, beyond nationalist or racial programs, beyond economic considerations, beyond unlimited evolutionary progress. But modern totalitarianism has provided the reductio ad absurdum of the axiom, Voluntas facit legem; indeed, it has revitalized in its victims and adversaries the idea of natural law. For resistance to totalitarianism, in which the end results of positivism appear as ethical and intellectual nihilism, had to look for support beyond any mere national tradition or status quo ante and base itself on something superior to history, race, class, scientific method, and the like.

  In the first place, the nationalist form of totalitarianism arose and flourished most in the two countries where juridical and moral positivism had obtained a dominant position in the universities, in the legal profession, and in the official philosophies of law which conditioned or determined the outlook and practice of courts and government. For in Italy and Germany, more than anywhere else, positivism had filled the void created by the dissolution of the idealistic philosophies of the nineteenth century. In the eyes of this juridical positivism the mythical will of the state, formally established in accordance with constitutional norms, was the sole, exclusive, and sufficient source and foundation of law. When, therefore, the totalitarian revolutions had succeeded by formally legal methods, whence could a positivist, whether judge or jurist, derive a critical norm that would enable him to pass judgment on the legitimacy of the legally correct totalitarian revolution? Or how could a positivist determine the intrinsic injustice of a formally legal act of the now totalitarian government? An appeal to former legal traditions, to juridical ideas that formerly were commonly accepted, could be of no avail since, according to positivism, these possessed validity only because they had been the then will of the state. Any criticism of, or resistance to, totalitarianism had consequently to find a deeper juridical basis of criticism or resistance than the mere actual will of the state formulated with legal correctness and enforced with an irresistible power. Is it far-fetched to contend that the predominance of positivism among judges, high government officials, and teachers of jurisprudence robbed them of any juridical support against the will of the now totalitarian state?

  It is worth observing in this connection that the resistance which Catholicism has offered to totalitarianism and its pseudoreligious political creeds is not based exclusively on dogmatic theology but above all on natural law. Nathaniel Micklem has rightly pointed out16 that the Confessional (Protestant) Church in Germany, under the influence of Barthian theology, which rejects a natural theology and with it the idea of natural law, has had a less advantageous basis for its resistance to Hitlerism, whereas the Catholics have had the natural-law doctrine to lean on in addition to their religious principles.

  It is further deserving of mention that totalitarian propaganda, aware of the recent revival of natural-law thinking, has abused the term “natural law.” Such abuse of revered terms is indeed typical of totalitarianism: witness today the sorry abuse of the term “democracy” at the hands of totalitarian leftist regimes. As if out of reverence for them, terms like “natural law” and “natural rights of the nation” have been frequently used in propaganda and even in serious books.17 But it is quite evident that the term “natural” has here undergone an even more wanton disfigurement than it suffered at the hands of Hobbes, Hume, or the utilitarians. “Nature” no longer refers to the rational nature of each individual man or to man’s endowments of intellect and free will, on which rest the dignity, liberty, and initiative of the individual person;18 nor does it refer to the universal order of being and oughtness, to the transcendent reality of reason. On the contrary, nature is transformed into an altogether materialistic concept. It is viewed as the blood, the hereditary biological mass of animal nature, deprived of its personalist and spiritual values. Thus metamorphosed, the law of nature has but one principle: Right is what profits the German folk-community—just as a deformed proletarian natural law would yield the single principle: Right is what profits the proletariat. This vicious alteration of the meaning of the terms “nature” and “natural” makes it possible for Huber on one page to abuse the venerable terms in the interest of the blood-and-race ideology and on another to maintain that “there are no personal liberties of the individual which fall outside the realm of the state and which must be respected by the state. … The constitution of the Reich is not based upon a system of inborn and inalienable rights of the individual.”19

  ‡As a consequence the internal and external opponents of totalitarianism have had to base their defense and their criticism on the perennial idea of natural law as it has been preserved in the philosophia perennis, in common sense, and in the juridical tradition of Western civilization. Moreover, they have had to take this stand in spite of and against the prevailing evolutionary materialism, philosophical positivism, or the refined historical materialism of the Neo-Marxist and pragmatist schools of thought. Thus the natural-law doctrine became willy-nilly the ideological basis of the struggle against totalitarianism. Totalitarian regimes are in their very nature the ultimate consequences of the positivist denial of natural law, i.e., of a transcendental and universal moral and juridical order valid for all nations, races, classes, and individuals, of an a priori for all legal institutions and for any will of the state. The growth of totalitarian regimes, far from checking or reversing the revival of natural law, has on the contrary contributed mightily to this revival in ever wider circles. For totalitarianism has opened the eyes of more and more thinking people to the ultimate consequences to which the denial of the natural law must lead. Such consequences were not obvious or clearly predictable so long as modern society, though infected with positivism, continued to live on, beguiled by an optimistic faith in an inevitable and automatic evolutionary progress and under the protection of a constitutional form of government which was still feeding on an inherited Christian substance. People and their leaders were therefore not yet sufficiently aware of the depths of evil and perversion to which the evolutionary product, man, supposedly determined by blood or mere economic conditions, could sink, if once the age-old moral and intellectual molds and floodgates were shattered.

  In the next place, totalitarianism and the struggle against it have also brought to light the weakness of a more refined form of juridical positivism. This subtle form of juridical positivism (sometimes referred to as juristic monism or analytical jurisprudence), though it does not deny the absolute character of the moral law, maintains that legally the state can do anything, since positive law as the will of the state does not find a legal limit in the moral law. Juridically, it holds, there exists only the self-limitation of the state’s will. But this contention rests on an illicit separation of positive law from its matrix, the natural law, which is simultaneously ethical and juridical. The Kantian separation of morality and legality, which was a reaction to Hobbes’ effort to identify morality and legality, may underlie this position. Yet the consequences are the same.

  The formula according to which the state can legally do anything (which recalls the description of the emperor as lex animata in Late Roman jurisprudence) appears to be equivocal. If by the phrase “can do legally” is meant that the state, i.e., the persons in authority or holding power, controlling the legislative organ and the enforcement machinery of a totalitarian regime, can declare anything law and can by physical force and psychological threat compel subjects to active obedience or at least to passive conformity, then this is merely a statement of experimentally verified fact. Totalitarianism has indeed proved how far a modern tyrannical regime can legally go in declaring lawful any act which it deems advantageous to its arbitrary aims, from the suppression of religious freedom to the shooting of guiltless hostages and the killing of innocent persons in the interest of scientific research or of purity of the racial stock. By applying all the means at the disposal of the modern state with its intricate compulsory mechanism (propaganda, terror, fear, indoctrination and control of economic life), the totalitarian state is comparatively or even practically certain of the obedience and conformity of its subjects. For the life and fortune of these would be at stake should they fail to conform. In addition, the totalitarian state will always find, among the citizens, individuals who by reason of indoctrination, perversion, or brutalization will serve as its agents and actively compel all others to conform.

  But this actual fact of being able legally to do anything or of being able to declare any act lawful is not the real problem. Actually, when we use the term “can” we mean “may.” We have in mind the moral problem: How far is the state permitted to go? By “state” we here mean the persons who have at their disposal the means of compelling conformity of the citizens and active obedience of the law-enforcing agencies to their commands, duly declared legal or lawful. The problem is thus whether resistance to the state on the part of the citizens and refusal to obey on the part of the executive organs become lawful if the commands clothed with legality go beyond the line which separates licit and illicit use of legal power, of the legal “can.” It seems clear that the question cannot be solved by saying that the line is where the state is certain to find open and violent resistance and insurmountable mass disobedience. For this is a matter of mere psychological fact or experiment; it is a matter of expediency. An answer is possible only if a paramount law is acknowledged that serves as a measure and critical norm both for acts which are formally declared legal and for the lawfulness of resistance and disobedience. Furthermore, what is to be said of the execution of orders of superiors, orders which in a totalitarian state are indubitably lawful inasmuch as the will of the state is always lawful? Is the minor war criminal, who hides behind the lawful orders of the supreme war lord as head of the state, free from moral and legal responsibility for execution of a lawful act of his superior, of an act that is obviously in conflict with natural law and reason though not with the laws of his state?

  To put these questions is to answer them. “Every positive law, from whatever lawgiver it may come, can be examined as to its moral implications, and consequently as to its moral authority to bind in conscience, in the light of the commandments of the natural law.”20 It is inadmissible to separate the legal “can” and the moral “may,” the formal legality of the positive law and its material morality (the agreement or disagreement of the positive law and its material morality, i.e., the agreement or disagreement of the positive law with the natural law). Totalitarianism has merely verified once more the profound wisdom of St. Augustine’s dictum: “Take away justice, and what are realms but great robber bands?”21 The natural law binds all men collectively and each one separately: the sovereign lawmaker, the executive or administrative official, the judge or juror, the citizen and subject. Duguit as well as the Roman jurists had a higher opinion of the jurist’s office and function than merely to bow before all acts of the state clothed in due legal forms.

  To repeat, such theories as this can flourish only so long as their sociological and political presuppositions prevail: a consciousness of political unity in spite of a pluralism of groups; free associations in religious, economic, and cultural life; a limited sovereignty under an unquestioned constitution which includes a bill of rights, some division of powers, a procedure to protect officials against arbitrary acts of repression on the part of their superiors, and, above all, a truly independent judiciary. As soon as these institutions are suppressed de facto or de jure by totalitarian regimes, the weakness of this subtlest form of juridical positivism and the necessity of a moral basis for positive law appear with unmistakable clarity and force.

  PART TWO

  Philosophy and Content of the Natural Law

  CHAPTER VIII

  Being and Oughtness

  The history of the natural-law idea shows that there are many ways of clothing any system of ideal law with the appeal of the natural or the rational. In periods when the positive law, grown rigid, is no longer the order of justice that people believe in, but rather a means in the struggle of the ruling class to maintain its social and political power which can no longer be justified in the name of the general welfare, revolutionary and reforming groups, unwilling or unable to appeal to the “good old law,” have to appeal to the natural law. On such occasions, however, the natural law all too readily appears as something impure, as almost inextricably entangled with juridical demands arising from the concrete sociological situation: demands whose bases are not solid from every point of view, whose support lies in passion rather than in reason.

  Yet one point history does make clear. The idea of natural law obtains general acceptance only in the periods when metaphysics, queen of the sciences, is dominant. It recedes or suffers an eclipse, on the other hand, when being (not taken here in Kelsen’s sense of mere existentiality or factuality) and oughtness, morality and law, are separated, when the essences of things and their ontological order are viewed as unknowable.

  The natural law, consequently, depends on the science of being, on metaphysics. Hence every attempt to establish the natural law must start from the fundamental relation of being and oughtness, of the real and the good. Since the establishment of the natural law further depends upon the doctrine of man’s nature, this human element has also to be studied, especially inasmuch as the question of the primacy of intellect or will in man is related to being and oughtness. In the next place, justness, or right as the object of justice, needs to be considered if we are to grasp the distinction between lex naturalis and ius naturale. A brief survey of the order of the sciences will thereafter be in place. Only then, finally, will it be worth while to go into the details of the natural law, in order to explain, from the theoretical side as well, the actual historical fact of the perpetual recurrence of the natural law.1

  If moral philosophy and, in moral philosophy and with it, legal philosophy are to have a solid foundation, they must be a continuation of metaphysics. At least this is true of a natural system of ethics and jurisprudence, though not of a positivist one which is grounded only in a will as such. In this connection “being” does not denote simple existence, the imperfect form of being. It means essential being, the esse essentiae. Kelsen, who repeatedly asserts that oughtness has nothing to do with being, with the factual, and that the science of law must be constructed in a purely normological fashion, has not heeded this distinction which is basic for the metaphysics of realism. His rationalism, therefore, leads him to a theory of law devoid of contents and constructed apart from the factual, the existent. Yet since his atheistic relativism prevents him from acknowledging with Occam a supreme omnipotent will of God as the source of all norms, Kelsen’s rationalism ends by bringing him to the position that factual reality is indeed the ultimate, primordial norm, that is, the existence of the order of the civitas maxima, the factually existing world legal order. But this position is downright paradoxical in view of his ideal of a science of pure, normative law built upon the unbridgeable opposition between being and oughtness. Thus for Kelsen, precisely because he lacks Occam’s supreme will which lays down the positive norm, existence and oughtness ultimately coincide. Thus he arrives at an extreme empiricism. Had he had a metaphysics, the doctrine of essential being, he would have avoided this contradiction.

  For being and oughtness must in final analysis coincide. Or to express it differently, being and goodness, the ontological and deontological or moral orders must at bottom and ultimately be one.

  Accordingly, the first prerequisite of an unalterable, permanent, standard natural law is the possibility of a knowledge of being, of a knowledge of the essences of things; in other words, a realistic epistemology or theory of knowledge. For Pufendorf, Kant, and others, who have no realistic epistemology, not being but some impulse or other, a special property like sociality or a postulate of practical reason like freedom, is the source of oughtness, the principle of ethics and of natural law. Deductive reason is thereby freed from control by reality and consistently indulges in an increasingly hollow rationalism which, to be meaningful, borrows continually from the actual political and sociological ideals of the age. Natural law in the strict sense is therefore possible only on the basis of a true knowledge of the essences of things, for therein lies its ontological support.

  Thomistic philosophy lays the foundation of the natural law in the following manner: Man perceives individual things through the imagination and the senses, and he is thus able to apply the universal knowledge which is in the intellect to the particular thing; for, properly speaking, it is neither the intellect nor the senses that perceive: it is man who understands by means of both. The intellect alone does not understand; that is to say, objective reality or the things of the external world do not release in the soul ideas of things which are already innate. Nor do the senses alone perceive: it is not individual things alone that exist, and the concepts of essences, which the intellect forms in a quasi-authoritarian manner from motives of economy of thought, are not without foundation in reality, as both nominalism and sensism maintain. Again, it is not the intellect alone that understands, as rationalism pretended when it placed the conditions and the measure of knowledge in the intellect as subjective forms of the latter, and when it failed to make things or reality the measure and condition of knowledge. As a result, the deductive intellect, for which the essences in real things remain unknowable, can no longer control itself by reference to reality. But man understands by means of senses and intellect. Consequently, through intellectual activity he knows the essences from the things. Things in their reality, i.e., that which actually is, are the measure of knowledge. The entire domain of that which is (and is therefore knowable) in the context of the first principles and ultimate particulars constitutes the intellect’s field of investigation.

  The things themselves are the cause and measure of our knowledge. The speculative intellect is moved by the things themselves, and thus the things are its measure. The being of the thing is the measure of truth. We constantly meet with these and similar propositions in the writings of St. Thomas. It further follows that there is nothing in the intellect that has not first been in the senses.2 For the senses are the gateway through which things or reality pass, according to the mode of the intellect, into the latter’s immaterial possession. But the senses always portray only the particular. Phantasms, the images of things, transmitted by the senses constitute material for the intellect, and this material has to be transformed from sense perception into intellectual knowledge. Knowledge, however, is the apprehension of essences. A thing is not known through the senses, but through the intellect with the aid of the senses, since the intellect apprehends or takes into itself the thing in its essence, in that which it is. At first, then, the intellect is passive. Reality exists prior to the intellect. The mental image is a copy whose original is the real. This real, moreover, presupposes for its actuality only God the Creator, the first creative intellect, who as the All-actual and All-operative gives things their measure. But reality is independent of its being thought of or noticed by the finite intellect. It exists whether or not the finite intellect thinks of it.

  The human mind is at first passive, receptive, open. It is not, however, as though the intellect were affected by the senses and, looking into itself, perceives innate ideas released through sense impressions. Nor is it as though there were in the intellect a thought-mechanism which now in accordance with subjective conditions works the images into ideas, independently of the being of the thing represented. On the contrary, the human mind is able to understand only by remaining in contact with reality: by continually adjusting its knowledge to reality. For true cognition is the agreement of the thing as known with the object of knowledge, the thing itself. Or, according to the recent way of stating the matter, it is the agreement of the assertion expressed in the judgment with the actual reality, of the logical with ontological truth, of the intellectual equation with a real equality. Hence the great importance of experience, the incessant self-orientation toward reality which is the norm of thought. Continual experience of reality, not a sort of geometrical deduction from a principle, is the adequate method. This is all the more important, too, the farther thought wishes to proceed with its deduction. St. Thomas himself requires experience in particular for moral philosophy and the science of law. Not doctrine, but experience over a long period of time proves the goodness of a law. The difference between realism and an empiricism that glories in experience does not, consequently, lie in the preference of empiricism for experience (induction) whereas realism, so to say, prefers speculation (deduction). The difference consists rather in the fact that empiricism remains content with what is in the foreground, with actual reality, whereas realism, with its delight in knowledge, holds it to be both possible and necessary to push beyond the cheerfully affirmed actuality to that which is in the background, to the metaphysical, to the essences and their laws of being in the actual facts.

  The object of rational knowledge or cognition is therefore not the particular or the individual as such; this the senses lay hold of. The object of cognition, what judgments assert of the individual thing in the predicate, is what the thing is: the essence of the thing which lies hidden in the core of phenomena as an idea in every thing of the same kind; in a word, the form. The intellect does not attain to the core of the being by way of intuition, by the immediate contemplation of the being, but by way of abstraction. This brings us to the famous dispute over universals and to the distinction, basic for the possibility of all metaphysics, between essence (quiddity, whatness) and existence (haecceity, thisness).

  Sense perception grasps only the particularity of the existent being, of the individual thing, as, e.g., this man or this concrete state. But cognition is founded on the perception of the universal, of that which is in all things of the same kind as their quiddity or essence. The thing is that which the abstract concept of the thing, the object of intellectual knowledge, represents, signifies, means; and this object of intellectual knowledge is really in the thing. Being belongs to a nature, e.g., to the nature of a stone, in a twofold manner: existential being, so far as the nature is in this stone and that one, which it therefore possesses in the individual thing; and intentional or mental being, which the nature attains in the individual intellect, in mine and in yours, so far as it is thought of by us. But the nature becomes universal and hence representative of the essence, the quiddity of the thing, when it is abstracted, as St. Thomas says, ab utroque esse, when it is viewed apart from existence in things of the external world as well as from existence in the thought of some intellect. It is this nature, considered absolutely and in itself, which is predicated of all individuals as their quiddity, their form, their essence, their nature.

  The universals are not substances.3 They do not live in a heavenly region, nor does the soul, affected by sense impressions, remember them from its premundane sojourn in that region, as Plato held. Nor are they mere names or vocal utterances (flatus vocis) which, lacking a foundation in reality, were arbitrarily devised by human agreement for the purpose of bringing order into the welter and chaos of sense impressions; hence they are not arbitrary products of the human intellect or of the human will. Finally, neither are they types derived by a process of pure induction from individual things: certain uniformities which lead only to an empirically probable general validity, so far as our experience has gone. On this distinction rests that of existence and essence; upon it also is founded teleological thinking as well as the unity of being and oughtness in the metaphysical order.

  This essence in the thing is the measure of our knowing. It is the universal predicate in the judgment which establishes the truth of our knowledge. For a judgment does not say that the abstract concept in my mind is the thing, but that the objective content, which is independent of the mere fact that I am thinking of it, of the abstract concept is perceived by me in the individual. For example, a state in itself does not exist. Concrete states alone exist. But a social unit, a territorial corporation, I call a state because and so far as it is a realization of the idea “state.” Accordingly the intellect alone does not know, nor do the senses alone know, but man knows by means of both.

  To be sure, as has been stated, things as bearers of essence can be the measure of our knowledge only because they themselves in turn receive measure from the supreme creative intellect of God, who measures all things with wisdom. The divine reason by thinking creates the essence of things. The divine will brings them into existence either immediately as first cause or indirectly through secondary causes. This is basic for the possibility of the natural law, because it means that the essential forms are not dependent in their quiddity on the absolute will of the almighty Spirit, but only in their existence. The essential forms of things are unalterable because they are ideas of the immutable God. Occam’s question of whether God must be able to will that His rational creatures hate Him is the foundation for his moral positivism. Conversely, the doctrine of the immutability of the natural law, of the natural goodness of certain moral actions that follows from the nature of things, has meaning only if the unchangeableness of essences is acknowledged. These lines of thought are of importance because the principle that law is positively something pertaining to reason and not mere arbitrary will depends upon this realistic epistemology. This is also shown indirectly by the fact that the principle that law is arbitrary will (auctoritas facit legem, and other equivalent formulas) is founded upon a nominalist or purely empiricist theory of knowledge.

  The principle that being and truth coincide is a further consequence of the foregoing considerations. Intellect and reality stand in a threefold relationship to each other. From the viewpoint of the intellect we speak of knowing, of the thing, of the real, of being known, and the unity of both is called truth. To know a thing, however, means to apprehend or assimilate the essence of the thing or its form. In contrast to creatures which lack cognition, the intellect is capable of having, and even of becoming, the form of another (every created) thing. The knowing mind is in a certain manner everything. Knowledge is possession of forms. “The intellect in act is wholly, i.e., perfectly, the thing understood.”4 The attainment of the abstract concept, of the universal, whose content is the essence, is the function of the active intellect. The latter gathers from the real, which is given in the mental image of the sense impressions, the immaterial essential core, intelligible being itself, which however is identical with the natural being in the real. Hence a being, so far as it is intelligible, is also true. All that is is true, because it is knowable.

  But the essence (form) which constitutes the real thing in its being is also the end, the final cause, of the thing. The Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of knowledge starts essentially from the actual fact of motion, of self-change or of being changed, in short, from the attempt to comprehend becoming. Thence came the distinction between an inner, enduring core, the form, and a changeable element, the matter, that which is formed or molded in every material thing. The prototype of such thinking is the creative activity of the artist, who fashions the form out of the material or matter, as well as organic growth in the realm of animate nature, as in the case of plants: in seeds the incorporeal form, acting after the manner of an entelechy, unfolds itself in the matter. The form is not only the proximate efficient cause of the thing; it is also its end. All beings aim at, strive after, desire, their own perfection. But goodness is that which all things aim at, strive after, desire, since the essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Therefore perfection and whatever leads to it are good.5 Becoming, the proper condition of all created being, is the way to perfection, to fullness of being. Hence the more perfectly a created being becomes its essence, and the more its thisness approaches its quiddity, the more does the essence overcome the imperfection in the existence. In God, the most perfect Being, essence and existence are consequently identical. God is pure Act; He is absolute, most perfect Being. The creature, however, is its quiddity in an imperfect manner only; yet it is intended to become this quiddity, to realize its idea. Becoming is the condition of the creature; being is the nature of God. The full realization of its nature, of the idea, is the end or goal of a thing, ever greater realization of the quiddity in existence. This holds true of inanimate nature, so far as it is moved from without, as the artist fashions more and more perfectly the form of the statue out of the material. But it also holds good of animate nature, which in the process of becoming realizes more and more perfectly the form which is germinally present in it. Whence the axioms: every being, as being, is good; being, truth, and goodness are convertible.

  Let us take an example or two. The so-called marriage that legally existed for a while in Soviet Russia was rejected by the more or less Christian West because it was not distinguishable from concubinage. But this position did not rest on a comparison of the Soviet view of marriage with the marriage law of the French Civil Code, or with the matrimonium of Roman law, or with the marriage legislation of Germany or of the Anglo-Saxon countries. It was based upon a measurement by the idea of marriage which is expressed and exemplified in the positive legal institutions of these codes. We speak of the imperfection of a piece of marriage legislation by measuring it against the idea of marriage. Moreover, in the history of marriage legislation we distinguish stages according as the positive, historical, legal forms realize the idea of marriage in a more or less perfect manner.

  Again, a territorial corporation or a tribe does not become a state by the fact that international bodies or other states recognize it, as though international recognition were constitutive of right. No; this recognition takes place, and the territorial corporation has a right to this recognition, because an actual case is present which realizes, however imperfectly, the idea of state; in this way a state can become known, and it thereupon has a right to formal recognition. The basis of the obligation to recognize this state lies in the degree in which the idea of state is realized. Incidentally, the school of comparative law leaves us unsatisfied because, for fear of natural law, which nevertheless makes its appearance, it avoids taking the final step to the nature, to the idea, of legal institutions. Its work thereby becomes interesting, instructive, informative. But it enters only the vestibule of the philosophy of law, where its skepticism detains it.

  The teleological conception, grounded in the metaphysics of being, is therefore the basis of the essential unity of being and oughtness, of being and goodness. The entire past had to be forgotten before the theory of pure law, the normological school, could maintain that being has nothing in common with oughtness. It was right when it was unwilling that empirical existence should be regarded as a root of oughtness. The factual cannot become right in virtue of mere factuality. There is no factuality of right. A basis of right exists only when in something factual an essential being is striving for realization. Right can never arise from a violation of right. Yet even laws of an illegitimate ruler can bind in conscience, not in virtue of the illegitimate power, but by reason of the actual fact of the common good realized through the laws, irrespective of their factual source, and so far as they realize it. The distinction between essence and existence would have preserved from its antimetaphysical formalism the theory of pure law, whose criticism of the thesis that the fact creates right is so effective. It would likewise have saved it from its ultimate relapse into the thesis of the factuality of right in the case of the civitas maxima or great society.

  The essence of a thing is the norm and the goal of its becoming. But the creature is always in the state of becoming or development, whether toward the goal, toward goodness, or away from the goal, toward evil, that is, toward the lack of being. But goodness is the final embodiment or realization of the essence in existence, of the tendency of the existent being toward its essence. The fullness of being is the goal. Every being (everything that is real) tends naturally to become its essence, to realize its idea. But that toward which a nature has always an essential bent is a good; for it is an inclination toward perfection. Every real thing moves toward its essence. The perfection of being is the end, the good, the essence. Fullness of being is the real in the repose of the goal of becoming, of self-movement, or of motion from without.6

  Thus in the essence lies the norm, the end or goal is in the quiddity, and the good is the full being. Therefore all that is, so far as it is real being, is good. But since the good also ought to be, it follows that in the domain of metaphysics being and oughtness coincide.

  These ideas lead further to the conception of an order of reality, that is, according to the degree of being which things possess. This order rises from purely potential being which is not yet real through the stages of created actual being with a greater and greater content of being and with less and less mere potentiality. It mounts from the inanimate creation through the world of animate beings to the living rational being that is man as the norm of creation. It culminates in God, the most perfect Being, who is both infinitely superior to the whole of creation and essentially different from it. In God all distinctions between being and becoming, motion and immovableness, potency and act, essence and existence, become meaningless. For God is purest Being, purest Act, unmoved Mover of all things, and therefore most perfect Goodness, deepest Truth, ultimate Norm and highest End, in whom there is no distinction between essence and existence. Hence God as the supreme Good is also the goal of all created being, as indeed the latter is being solely in virtue of its participation in the divine Being, although merely in an improper, analogical sense. God is the final end of all human life and activity. His glory is the goal of creation.

  The world is order. The order of creatures according to the differentiation of their natures and their gradations proceeds from God’s wisdom. Chance is not the origin of things, nor is the world a chaos into which our intelligence had to bring order. The law of order corresponds to God’s wisdom, which first conceived it in idea prior to God’s will calling it into existence. This order is therefore an order in accordance with the essence of God. Whatever is real is an imperfect exemplification of the ideas of God which are embodied in things. Man recognizes this order as directed to one final end, to God Himself, who at one and the same time is origin and end of the order. For the rational creature endowed with free will, who cooperates in shaping the world, the order of being thus becomes an order of ends, culminating in the final and highest end, the glory of God.7

  CHAPTER IX

  Intellect and Will

  The order perceived by reflective thought is not, however, a rigid, static order of motionless things. It is not external compulsion, a clocklike mechanism which, once wound, runs according to mechanical laws. The order conforms to the natures of the things. It is indeed an order of necessity for inanimate as well as for living but irrational creatures. But it is an order of freedom, a moral order, for beings endowed with reason and free will. Therefore, so far as man perceives that he is a creature possessed of free will who is not subject to blind necessity but to the law of freedom, he also perceives that this order, in accordance with God’s will, ought to be. The ontological order becomes, in relation to man endowed with free will, the moral order. The order of being confronting the intelligence becomes the order of oughtness for the will. Since, therefore, from knowledge of the essences of things the order is perceived as established by God in conformity with His essence, this order necessarily appears to the will of the rational and free creature as likewise an order to be attained and preserved and as a norm of the finite will. But this order is naturally and really “given.” It is not projected by human reason, in keeping with subjective, regulative forms, into an external world which in itself is unrecognizable as order. It is objective order, independent both of our thought and of its being thought of here and now.

  In its essence this order is established by God’s wisdom; in its existence it has proceeded from God’s will. In its meaning and end it is again directed to God, the highest end. Teleologically also there is but the one order, because being is both true and good.

  The law of order, then, does not lie in the bare, positively promulgated will of God, but in the nature of things as God’s wisdom ordains them. The order of being can be a moral order only if its essential basis is God’s wisdom, only if in God the intellect is, humanly speaking, the nobler faculty. Otherwise we could never derive a norm from the essential order of the world, but solely from the revealed will of God.

  It has already been shown how in moral philosophy this thesis of the will as the nobler faculty led, and had to lead, through Duns Scotus to Occam, i.e., to the most one-sided moral positivism, for the doctrine of the will as the nobler faculty is itself the root of nominalism. But nominalism, directed only to the individual, particular thisness, to the existence which is related to the will, arrives in its extreme forms at the denial of the clear and distinct knowability of the essences of things, of the essence which is related to the intellect. The universals are but vocal utterances. Reality, since in its quiddity it is not unmistakably knowable for us, is likewise not the measure of our knowledge. The order of being cannot of itself become a norm of the will; the absolute, omnipotent will of the Supreme Being can alone become that.

  The entire doctrine of the eternal law and natural moral law is undermined by such a view. Just as the theory of will in municipal and international law cannot admit a law beyond the positive one (or, more precisely stated, beyond the factual will as a persisting act), so Occam, for instance, could not admit a morality that does not have its first, proximate, and sole norm in omnipotent will, in the absolute power of God. If, then, the idea of God and therewith the supreme personal will are lost to sight or rejected, nothing is left as the source of norms but the concrete will of the earthly lawmaker. Or, as in the case of Spinoza, the deep impulses of nature (here taken as contrasted with mind) are regarded as the natural norm. The biological as well as materialistic ethical systems and theories of law have here their roots.

  From this it follows that the doctrine of the priority of the intellect over the will in God as well as in man is a prerequisite of the possibility of a natural moral law and hence of the natural law in the narrower sense. It is significant that traditionalism is congenial both to the historical school of law and to the conservative thinking of Donoso Cortes, De Maistre, and A. von Haller, a consequence of the deep feeling against rationalism. The principles of morality, it appeared to them, are not to be discovered in being. They are a positive revelation, a primordial revelation, mysteriously handed down through the centuries and millennia in the hearts of men.

  The objective, the real, is the measure of knowledge. The order subsisting in reality is perceived by man. At first it is known in a speculative, purely intuitive way. Reason is thus for a long while absorbent, receptive. But man is not only pure reason; as a free agent and part of the order, he is himself called to realize it. As reason turns from pure, merely receptive knowledge, from the idea as end, to existent being, it becomes practical reason which is directed to doing and making. Being is perceived as oughtness; the idea is perceived as goal and norm of making and doing. Realistic metaphysics sets out from artistic activity as a model as it does also from self-consciousness, from man’s self-knowledge. Man does not act blindly. There are not two reasons in man. On the contrary, the rational soul, while it apprehends being as truth, directs the known truth to action. The position that the practical reason is the extension of the theoretical reason corresponds to the position that moral philosophy, the science of moral action, is an extension of metaphysics, the science of being. The speculative intellect becomes practical. First the theoretical reason knows, and the real exists prior to it. The known truth thereupon appears to practical reason as truth to be accomplished through the will.1

  In this priority of the real or of being over knowing, and of knowledge over willing, lies the basis of the possibility of a natural moral law. The structure of moral action is built up from the knowledge, through the theoretical reason, of the idea as goal of the being by way of the recognition, through the practical reason, of this being as a good. This good is then proposed to the will as something to be striven for.

  Knowable being is the principle of oughtness. The supreme principle of oughtness is simply this: Become your essential being. For the rational, free nature of man this signifies: Act in accordance with reason; bring your essential being to completion; fulfill the order of being which you confront as a free creature.2 The order of all being has its principle in God: as order of essences in God’s essence, as created existing order in God’s will. The essences of things, as first creatively conceived by God’s intellect, are, once established, unalterable.3

  This order of the world is the eternal law. The purposiveness of things, their continual pursuit of their ends, which reveals the order, points to the supreme Lawgiver. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions (of rational creatures) and all movements (of irrational creatures) to their due end.4 Or as St. Augustine had defined it, “the eternal law is the divine order or will of God, which requires the preservation of natural order, and forbids the breach of it.”5 But order results from the steady pursuit of their ends on the part of the various natures, from the natural activities implanted in things by God in conformity with the natures of the things. “All things partake in some way of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.”6 But they participate in it in keeping with their natures: the unfree, irrational creatures in an unfree manner, blindly obeying the compulsion of their nature; the rational, free beings in the freedom of oughtness. The order of the world is an order of absolute necessity for unfree creatures, but it is an order of oughtness, a moral order, for rational and free beings. In the former case the eternal law is a law of necessity; in the latter, it is a moral law of freedom.7

  The natural moral law is therefore the eternal law for rational, free beings. The ontological law becomes a moral law; the order of being becomes an order of oughtness. The natural moral law may be defined8 as “the light of reason inherent in us by nature, through which we perceive what we ought to do and avoid; or also: the knowledge, communicated to us by the Creator through nature, that we must strictly observe in our conduct the order which corresponds to our nature.”9

  CHAPTER X

  The Structure of the Sciences

  The realistic theory of knowledge is the basis both of the unity of knowledge and of the internal coherence and organic structure of the sciences. Despite all distinctions of objects or ways of experiencing and looking at the one reality, and notwithstanding all the differences of methods, the sciences form an integrated system. Not only do they all rest upon metaphysics as the foundation of knowledge in general, but they also find their crowning in metaphysics as the philosophy of being, the science which affords the deepest knowledge concerning the principles and causes of being itself. The individual sciences deal with being from specific viewpoints. For instance, ethics deals with the norms which determine the deeds and actions of free persons, with the oughtness which springs from being; and physics treats of material things in their causal connection, their mode of existence, their motions. At the end of every science, moreover, there stands, not the value of the science for practical use, but its discharge into knowledge as such, the most profound impulse of the human spirit. Indeed, man is so dominated thereby that we must affirm that his deepest urge is to know as much as possible about everything. Wherefore Genesis has quite rightly designated pride, the desire to be like God (“You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil”; 3:5), as the greatest sin. And the modern age merely betrays its shallow, vulgar, and unphilosophical mentality when it ascribes the temptation of the first human pair to concupiscence, as though sexual love itself were not at bottom a kind of impulse to know.1

  Metaphysics is the logical foundation of all science. All science is a system of general, necessary judgments touching the existence or essence of their objects, and to that extent they constitute true and genuine knowledge. Thus jurisprudence is a systematic formulation of judgments about the general and particular positive institutions of the legal order: their existence, essence, sources, principles, normative coherence, validity in space and time. The history of law is a systematic exposition of judgments relating to legal arrangements that were formerly in force. International law is a system of judgments about the legal ordering of the community of states. But the formal element of every judgment is contained in the verb “to be”: jurisprudence is a normative science. Hence the science of being (of its forms, principles, and modes) is the basis of every other science. Being is universally “given” simultaneously with every act of knowledge: knowledge is true knowledge through its agreement with a being. Being, however, is reality differentiated according to act and potency, according as being is determined or is capable of determination. Being is reality before the intellect and truth in the intellect; it is goodness before the practical reason and in the will.

  Certain fundamental laws result from being: the principle of contradiction (nothing can both be and not be at the same time under the same respect), the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of causality. They are absolutely universal; they are always valid, even in regard to purely conceptual possible being, provided it is something conceivable by reason. Yet this does not mean that metaphysics as the first science must necessarily be also the first in time, as though the cultivation of other sciences were rendered possible only through it. It merely means that its essential principles first render science possible. In this way we positively hold in our secure, habitual possession the principles of contradiction, causality, and differentiation between being which determines and being which is capable of determination: and this possession is unconscious because it is continually experienced. These principles guide our entire thinking. They are valid for every object of knowledge, so far as it must possess a minimum of being in order to be apprehended or known at all. The first principles of theoretical reason are self-evident. Even an actual theoretical doubt about them proves their axiomatic validity: to doubt them is to affirm them in the very act of doubting.

  “Philosophy does not inquire about particular subjects in so far as each of them has some attribute or other, but speculates about being, in so far as each particular thing is. … Physics studies the attributes and the principles of the things that are, qua moving and not qua being (whereas the primary science … deals with these, only in so far as the underlying subjects are existent, and not in virtue of any other character).”2 The various kinds of being, participations of universal being by the many particular beings, particular reality in contrast to universal reality: all this conditions the diversity of the sciences. Nevertheless the different sciences are interconnected and they have a single object: that which is, and a more and more comprehensive and profound knowledge of it. How well and aptly, then, the creative spirit of all languages speaks of the craving for deep knowledge, for what lies beneath the surface, for the obscure that lies under and behind the clear and obvious! Realistic philosophy has no tendency to separate the sciences in place of distinguishing them; it has no tendency toward a fanatical excessive specialization.

  Just as the speculative intellect by extension becomes the practical intellect, so metaphysics becomes moral philosophy. That which is, so far as it is, also ought to be. The essences or natures of things ought likewise to be the goal of the development and active formation, through the secondary cause, of the existing organic thing as well as of the thing to be produced by art. And the order of the world, as it exists ideally in the natures of the things ordered, is for the free will an order that ought to be realized. Likewise the essential nature of rational and free man ought to be. Realize your essential nature: such is the primary norm of moral action, the perfecting of the idea of man.

  There are in man, however, as the slightest reflection makes plain, different modes of being. Man belongs to the corporeal world, to the world of sentient creatures, and to the world of rational, free, and social beings. To this complex reality correspond various sciences which concern themselves with man inasmuch as he belongs to these worlds. But as a rational, social being endowed with free will, he is the object of the sciences that are properly human: of psychology, as a rational being; of social philosophy, as a being that is essentially social; of sociology, as a being that exists in concrete social forms. Yet as a creature that shapes his own rational and social life and being in freedom and not through compulsion, man is the object of the moral sciences which lay down norms of action in the light of the idea or essential being of man.

  The first principle of ethics, that good is to be done and evil avoided, obtains its material content (the determination of what is good) from the essential being of the rational, free, and social nature of man. Thence result a natural social ethics, which also rests upon social philosophy, and, as part of it, a natural law, the natural law in the strict sense. When they were not treating of law in the narrower sense, the Scholastics and their successors frequently called their entire moral philosophy institutiones iuris naturalis. This served a good purpose: the unity of morality and law was thereby safeguarded. Moreover, law, through its inclusion in moral philosophy, was given its metaphysical basis. The science of law received its foundation, the philosophy of law its objects, and positive legal institutions their legitimation in the natural law, which in its turn rested upon social philosophy and hence upon the metaphysical doctrine of man. The oughtness or obligation of legal norms also obtained thereby a material foundation in the essential being of man’s social and rational nature. Thinkers thus escaped positivism, which believes that it has to acknowledge and recognize only a factual willing of the norm by a lawmaker who has force at his command. Positivism has always originated in philosophical skepticism, or it is a purely arbitrary short cut in the matter of determining the structure and interconnection of the sciences. It renounces inquiry into the reason of the norm.

  The essentially social nature of man means that his mode of being is social being, and that the idea of man is perfected in the community and its gradations. This is not a requirement of some impulse or other, but a reality which in ever increasing human experience shows itself as “given.” Social being, the necessary communities of the social animal, is the object of social philosophy. Social being is in reality. Therefore continual contact with reality and observation of social life are needed in order to be able to make assertions and form judgments about the nature of social being. Only then can we discern what is permanent amid the changing situations, amid the alterations of outward forms in the course of history. With regard to social science, then, social philosophy plays a role similar to that of metaphysics in respect to the sciences in general.

  It follows, consequently, that in this case also essential being becomes oughtness to the practical reason. In this case, too, essential being becomes the goal and norm of what is taking shape through the free activity of the human will. Social ethics and the philosophy of law are extensions of social metaphysics. As the mind by cognition draws out or abstracts the nature of social being from the social data, from reality, it discovers the first social ideas and principles. It does not itself construct them or postulate them from some abstract principle or other, such as freedom.

  There is a philosophy of law, a doctrine of juridical oughtness, to the extent that law and every legal order constitute a peculiar order of social oughtness, a coordination of the various social relations and connections among men from the loose and ephemeral to permanent and firmly established forms of community living, since there exists a legal form of social being. The philosophy of law cannot be detached from ethics, since it is part of the latter. Furthermore, to the extent that it exists, it is as oughtness and norm grounded in essential being, in the nature of social being. Its first principles and the further conclusions form the content of the natural law. The laws of being become norms of doing and acting for the creative will. The eternal law, the law of the world’s being, becomes the natural law in relation to the rational and free creature. Whatever necessarily appertains to the perfecting of a nature which is essentially social ought also to exist and to be realized by the will. What necessarily belongs thereto, no more, but also no less, is by nature right and moral.

  As social philosophy is distinguished from sociology, and social ethics from historical moral systems or codes of an epoch or class, the positive science of law is distinguished from the philosophy of law, and the positive law from the natural law. The natural law embraces the contents of both the science of law and the philosophy of law. As in metaphysics the first ideas of being in general are presupposed, so here the ideas of individual person, community, morality, and of law are “given” beforehand. “The individual legal experience depends for its clear comprehension upon the universally valid concept of law, not vice versa” (R. Stammler). Moreover, this concept of law is immediately present to us who grow up in the legal community of family and kindred-group, of professional group and village or town, and of the state with its officials, judges, and courts. This holds true even if only in the form of the general normative appurtenance of certain things, and in the form of the relation of certain persons and their action to us as individual equal or unequal members of the community. Indeed this concept of law is so present to our minds that, upon attaining the use of reason, we at once become immediately conscious of the basic juridical and moral principles and we apply them in practice. Such fundamental principles are: Good ought to be; what is mine ought to belong to me, what is yours, to you; no one may molest me in what is mine. It is precisely the same as in the case of cognition where we immediately possess the intuition of certain principles, such as the principle of contradiction.

  The science of law and the philosophy of law accordingly differ in their specific objects. The science of law views its objects, legal ordinances, from the precise standpoint of their positive validity and practical application in the administration of justice, their historical evolution, their logical coherence and consistent interpretation, and their positively established legal institutions. The philosophy of law, on the other hand, has for its object the necessary universal norms; and the legitimation of every positive legal ordinance implies an attempt to realize such norms. Hence its object is what has for centuries been known as ius naturale. For this reason, too, every attempt to philosophize about law bears willy-nilly a natural-law character. For without this going back to ultimate, necessary, and permanent norms, there exist only empirical generalizations, systems of legal types, genetico-historical explanations of the factual development of a legal institution (e.g., the loan), but not knowledge of the real grounds for the universally existing principle that what is borrowed ought to be returned.

  The essential nature of man, the idea of man as a rational, free, and social being is, as the normative goal, the principle of social ethics and of the natural law. The legitimation of all law must ultimately be a moral one. This is possible, however, only if the normative oughtness of practical reason is ultimately being perceived by the theoretical reason. The circle of the mind and the sciences is thus closed. The given reality and the ideal core in it, as measure of man’s knowledge and the object of theoretical reason, appear now to the practical reason, the extension of theoretical reason, as a valuable good and end, as a task to be realized. But the concrete realization does not get its legitimation from the will that does the realizing, but from the end or goal of the realization, the idea. Metaphysics is the presupposition and the crown of the philosophy of law, whose object is the natural law.

  CHAPTER XI

  The Nature of Law

  It may be said with some exaggeration that the era of individualism was the first to pursue a philosophy of right or rights (in the subjective sense), whereas the preceding age had rather developed a philosophy of law. That would be especially justifiable were one to conceive right more as a subjective permission and power to demand, and law as objective order and the basis of duties and rights. The suum would then be first, while the norm, through which the suum would be determined and guaranteed, would come later.

  The Christian doctrine of natural law, however, does not first posit the suum and the person, and only afterwards the law. But as the community is perceived simultaneously with the person, because it is “given” with the latter, so the norm which determines it is simultaneously posited with the suum. Man is continually viewed in an order that is simultaneously given, whose natural laws, arising from the nature of the essential order, require observance. Thus since thinkers did not set out from the isolated, abstract individual and did not begin by asking what are to be considered his inalienable rights, but always regarded man as a member of an order instituted by God and manifesting itself in man’s essential being, attention was paid more to the law, to right in the objective sense.1 Besides, whoever is of the opinion that law and morality may not be separated, and hence that positive law and moral law belong together, will be especially capable of appreciating this view. Laws have then an ethical aim or end. They are not merely a safeguard or protection of previously given rights. They have in addition the positive ethical function of making men better, more virtuous. But this implies that the positive law is inwardly connected with the object which the moral law has in view.

  ‡In St. Thomas Aquinas we find at first an entirely general concept of law. “Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting.”2 This rule or law is an ought, not a blind necessity. It applies to creatures possessed of free will while it leaves their freedom intact. It is not physical compulsion. (Hence the laws established for the movements—motus, not actus—of irrational nature, the laws of nature in the present-day meaning of the phrase, are laws only in an improper sense.) Law is thus a norm for human actions which proceed from free will and are therefore actions of a being who is master of his deeds and omissions, of a being who is a person. But free will presupposes reason, in keeping with the priority of the latter. Consequently it pertains to the nature of human actions that they are somehow determined by reason and are in agreement with it. It is thus nature, and, more explicitly, rational nature, which provides the proximate criterion in passing a judgment of values on a specifically human (morally free) action. But reason, as practical reason, further regulates action since it apprehends the connections and relationships of ordered things among themselves and in relation to their end, because order arises through common direction to an end. Again, all action occurs for the sake of an end. Without purpose, action would be meaningless; without purpose, the will has nothing to strive for. But reason alone can grasp the appropriateness of the actions for attainment of the end; it alone can conceive the means and the series of intermediate ends that lead to achievement of the final end. This activity of reason, through its decision for or against a proposed course of action, precedes the will, the converting of the deliberation and the judgment into act. The content of every norm, therefore, as well as all that has in any way a normative character, is related to reason as essential nature and as principle of knowledge.3

  It follows from the foregoing that law is “something pertaining to reason.”4 To the concept of law belongs “an ordinance of reason,”5 not (as it is occasionally thought) an ordinance for reason, although law is this too. For law does not speak to the blind will as such, but to the will guided and informed by reason.

  Man acts for an end. Hence every action has an immediate goal. It is evident, however, that the immediate end, e.g., writing, is subordinated as a means to a higher end, e.g., the communication of thoughts. Ever wider investigation brings to light an ultimate end, to which the subordinate ends are related as to a final cause. Their relation to the final end is that which is common to them all. It belongs to the nature of law to serve a supreme purpose that is ultimate in the respective order. The purpose or end is a creative element in law and right. The final end of all human action and at the same time the principle of such action is felicitas, happiness.6 But universality belongs to this end: it is the common good of all who strive for it. To that extent law is directed to the common good in the general sense, from which it receives the property of universality. Law is thus a general norm of reason which directs the actions of free man to the common good, not to a private or particular good.7 This may not be restricted to the general welfare of the state, although this is its foremost application, but holds good for every higher community with an end of its own, in particular for the Church and the international community, but also for the family and the larger kindred-group.

  To law pertains also a lawgiver. For a group of people, order among the individuals who compose it and their direction to the common end are essential. The group first receives its unity and concrete form, its sociological and juridical individuality, through the unity of order and through the end. However, the production of this unity and the enduring realization of the common good through the direction of the acting members to this goal presuppose one or more directors in the specific sense of that term. Chance or accident is not the creator of the community. For this reason the lawmaker pertains to the notion of law, which must be directed precisely to the general welfare. Consequently, too, he is the lawmaker upon whom devolves concretely the care for the common good, whether it be the corporate body itself, the people, or the constitutionally determined holder of the public authority.

  Furthermore, since law is the rule of action for rational and free beings, it has of necessity to be made known to them, that they may direct their actions in keeping with it. Promulgation likewise belongs to the nature of law.

  Accordingly law is a general rule of reason which is directed to the common good, emanates from public authority, and is duly promulgated.8 The will, too, is included therein. For the framing of a legal decree is just as essentially an act of the will, but only on the basis of a precedent rational weighing of the ends and means which concern the law. A rule that does not issue from the activity of reason, an arbitrary rule or an arbitrary decree, “would savor of lawlessness rather than of law,” says St. Thomas categorically.9

  Law, then, is primarily not will, although it owes its positive concrete existence to a volitional act of the lawgiver. Materially considered, it has to be a rule of reason and for reason (in the one subject to the law). That is, only thereby can it obtain the decisive qualification of true law. For rational nature must be directed and guided in accord with reason, i.e., it must be in conformity with truth. That has been common intellectual property ever since the Greeks established the truth of the nomos: law is truth (veritas facit legem).

  Closely connected with this idea is the doctrine that the end or aim of law is to make those who are subject to it good.10 Law as a rational norm for the free activity of man must have at bottom this objective; it is not a mere safeguard against the antisocial impulses in man which menace the community. The dignity of the laws rests on this consideration. Wherever, as already among the Greeks, law had this ethical aim, law became something sublime and venerable. This idea corresponds likewise to the ethical character of the community, especially of the state. All law wishes to educate the members of the community. All true politics is education of the people. It has required the entire emptying and disparagement of the state at the hands of individualist liberalism to bring about the denial of the educative function of the law, and to assign to law merely a protective function in behalf of the autonomous, even morally self-sufficing, individual.

  Such is the nature of law. It is universal and holds good for all laws: for the moral law and the positive law, whether the latter is a statute of some corporative body or a law of state or Church.

  The natural moral law, too, bears the character of law. Indeed, as has already been mentioned, a heated controversy over this point took place among the Late Scholastics. It reached its climax in the dispute between Vasquez and Suarez. The argument turned on the nature of law: Is law an act of reason, or is it an act of the will? Vasquez was in agreement with tradition when he said that law is an act of the intellect on the basis of an act of the will. Materially, therefore, he regarded law as an act of the intellect; formally, as an act of the will. Therefore Vasquez was unwilling to characterize the natural law as law proper, simply because the law of nature as an intimation of that which is good in itself, i.e., in accord with reason, and of what is bad in itself, i.e., at variance with reason, contains no element of will. Some had on this account termed the natural law a lex indicans, in contradistinction to lex praecipiens.

  The idea that rational nature as such is the natural law, and that the latter has force even in the impossible hypothesis that there be no God, was carried forward by Arriaga and Grotius almost to the point of the autonomy of human reason. The contrary position was the Occamist doctrine that law is but an act of the will: hence the natural law is divine positive law, and the basis of the goodness and rightness of certain actions is not found in their conformity with nature, but in the absolute will of God, who is completely free to prescribe even the opposite course of action. That meant the dissolving of the concept of natural law. Therefore Suarez was at pains to point out that, as the light of natural reason indicates by way of judgment the inner agreement or internal contradiction of actions with rational nature, it likewise indicates in the very same act that this corresponds also to the will of God, the Author of nature.11

  All law is first and foremost an act of reason. Even technically the deliberation precedes the decree. Yet law is also a decree of the will.12 The answer to the question about the nature of law is thus the answer to the question of the relationship between intellect and will. And the answer to this decides the question of whether a natural law is possible at all. The historical theories of the nature of law down to the present time cover the whole range of the antithesis: Law is reason—law is will. Besides, the nature of the law provides the basis for differentiating forms of government, and it renders philosophy of law possible or impossible.

  In the United States, the judge, in virtue of his right to review the law, inquires whether an act of the legislative body is unconstitutional. Actually, however, he examines whether the act is reasonable, and he disallows it if he finds it arbitrary. The judge, or the Federal Supreme Court, thus becomes in the United States the first chamber, wholly unprovided for in the Constitution, with absolute right of veto.

  The demand for a public consideration of the laws in parliament or congress, i.e., for the discussion of the reasonable grounds pro and con, is likewise understandable only on the basis of the view that law must be reason. Furthermore, paradoxical as it may sound, the same view underlay even the absolutism of a Louis XIV of France. For, as the latter passed not for a mere man but for a vicegerent of God, the reasonableness of a law which emanated from him was by inference a presumption of law and of right. The same is true of the enlightened despotism of the following century, which rested on the view that the ruler, because of his superior, enlightened reason, can manage the state to the advantage of the people.

  Only Occam’s positivism in moral philosophy and that of the closing nineteenth century in jurisprudence, by clinging to the principle that law is will, held fast to the theory of will. The unfruitfulness of this theory is at the same time the reason for its rejection.

  Law must be reason, too, for the sake of man’s dignity. The human person is not a means for the ruler’s use. Obedience, to be ethical, must be reasonable obedience. This requires a certain insight into the reasonable character and the purpose of the norm. Hence the lawgiver, precisely in those governments in which the laws do not originate in public deliberation, almost always adduces, generally in a detailed and solemn form, the motives of the law.

  Somewhat different is the question of whether the unreasonableness of a law or an actually deficient insight into its reasonableness exempts one from obedience. Here the Christian doctrine and individualist liberalism part company. The latter optimistically considers that the individual is always sagacious enough to have the requisite insight. In addition, it proceeds from a preconceived notion that the law, as a restriction of freedom, is rather a necessary evil than a means for making the citizen good. Lastly, it is filled with a distrust on principle toward the lawmaker, whether he is a single tyrant or a hundred tyrants, i.e., a parliamentary majority. The legislator should lay down only the formal rules of procedure. The individuals themselves determine the material content of law through their contracts, which, moreover, constitute the principal form of individualist jurisprudence.

  The Christian philosophy of law, however, absolutely demands the positive law. And if it declares reasonableness to be an essential note of the concept of law, it can still, with St. Thomas, characterize only the absolutely unreasonable law, i.e., one that is at variance with the natural law, as savoring of lawlessness rather than of law. But since order is a very great good, just as is the will of the state which realizes and preserves this order, so along with the demand, addressed to the lawmaker, for the reasonableness of laws goes a demand addressed to the subjects to preserve the great good of order even when a particular law cannot be entirely justified before the bar of reason. The continuance of any order at all, however mixed it may be with injustice and arbitrariness, is of greater value than the utter lack of order, than total disorder. The Christian philosophy of law can demand this because in its eyes the nature of the state is not exhausted in the legal order, although the state must be essentially a constitutional state: it must be in the law. But the state is more than that, for it does not live by law alone; it also lives by the acts of all the social virtues through which the idea of man is perfected.

  We have this antithesis: law is reason (veritas facit legem); law is will (auctoritas facit legem). The Christian philosophy of law holds that, although auctoritas alone can enact the law, veritas so pertains to the nature of law that law is quite as essentially reason, i.e., an act of the intellect; indeed, from the standpoint of the precedence of the intellect, law is primarily reason. For only then can human law feed on the eternal law and be truly a norm of rational nature. The dignity of law is founded on the fact that it is “an ordinance of reason for the common good,” that it is a “dictate of the practical reason.” As norm of human conduct, i.e., of rational behavior, law must be a reasonable norm.

  For the same reason, too, coercion cannot enter into the definition of law, even though, in contradistinction to moral law, physical enforceability is proper to the positive law of the state. “Hence compulsion is rather an element of wrong than of right, since the latter, so long as it functions normally, has no need at all of forcible execution” (F. von Martens). Coercion is the consequence of the dignity and necessity of the positive law. The rational end or goal of the positive law is the ethical legitimation of compulsion.

  The genius of legal reason cannot, therefore, rest content with self-denying positivism. It keeps returning to the natural law, to reason and truth in the law.

  CHAPTER XII

  Morality and Law

  It is a universal conviction of mankind that morality is a higher norm than the positive law. This conviction is so universal that lawmakers and judges continually appeal to morality; and every revolutionary relies upon a moral, higher law of justice in his opposition to the positive law. But morality itself must then be absolute; it must cause the order of values to be terminated and at the same time grounded in a supreme value and good (finis et principium). Morality bases its norms upon the hierarchy of being and of goods, which obtain their rank and proper value in their instrumental relationship to the highest good. The highest good is the Godhead, purest Being. God’s honor and glory, to which the whole of creation bears witness, are also its highest end. Therefore human morality consists in the preservation and execution of the order of being: in the perfecting and ennoblement of the unique godlike being not only in the domain of his altogether individual personality but also in the ever more perfect rightful development of communities, and this too from the first community, the family, up to the state and even up to mankind itself. This requires the more perfect development of the spheres within which human life unfolds: economics, labor, and technology quite as well as the arts and sciences. They are the great Benedicite of creation and of human culture as a whole. From the highest good they all receive due measure and their rightful place in the order of essential being. Hence it is an immoral state of affairs when economics, an instrumental department of life, becomes the dominant one: when the economic category of profit and utility is placed above man, that is, above sovereign and autonomous personal values, whether in the case of individuals or in that of national political communities.

  Therefore, ethics, the doctrine of absolute morality, ranks higher than the other normative sciences such as art, medicine, hygiene, politics, legal and social philosophy. But this does not signify any narrow-minded moralization of the spheres of human life and activity. For the laws of art, hygiene, and legal organization remain for all that specific, independent laws which result from the very being of these subjects. This truth is founded upon the confidence, derived from the philosophy of being, that the realization of the specific modes of being, e.g., biological being, is at the same time a fulfillment of morality. Morality calls for fidelity to the laws of biology, whose ultimate coincidence with morality is capable of easy and ever fresh demonstration.

  Every system of ethics which acknowledges a Deity distinguishes three orders of duties: duties toward God, toward one’s self, and toward ones’ fellow man. The Greeks, the Roman jurists influenced by Stoicism, the entire period of the Middle Ages, Pufendorf and Leibnitz, and Christian moral teaching down to the present day have all accepted this threefold division of duty.1

  Without a doubt right is correlated with the third class of duties, with social ethics. There exists no right against oneself; the right to oneself means a right against others. Right or, to use a term familiar since Aristotle, justice (whose object is right)2 is “directed to another”:3 “it denotes essentially relation to another.”4 For justice “directs man in his relations with other men.”5 In relation to God and to oneself there exist moral duties, but no rights and legal duties in the proper sense.

  But the rest of the specifically social virtues are also directed to another: love of neighbor, friendship, liberality, charity, and gratitude. How is right or justice distinguished from these? The simplest answer is: By the fact that it is derived from, and is enforced by, the will of the state, the factual will of the lawful legislator. The state admits an action at law to obtain the fulfillment of certain duties and enforces the decision of the court. Since a duty arising from gratitude or friendship is not actionable, it is consequently an ethical duty. For the most part, as is well known, a lawsuit destroys friendship. Yet this positivist explanation is inadequate. It contradicts mankind’s conviction of right: all peoples distinguish between law and right. The English Parliament is in theory sovereign: it can, to quote an expression which has become almost proverbial, “do everything but make a woman a man, and a man a woman.”6 Yet even though it is held to be able to make the wife of A the wife of B, it can never declare adultery lawful (Lord Hale, 1701). A saying attributed to the eleventh-century writer, Wippo, corresponded to the old Germanic law: “The king must learn and hearken to the law, for to keep the law is to reign.”7 The Sachsenspiegel, an early thirteenth-century treatise on the law of the Saxons, expressly differentiates the natural law, as genuine and true law, from the positive law of the state.

  The proposition that law is a mere product of the factual legal will has long been flatly qualified as heresy. The contrast between legality and legitimacy, an altogether critical difference in political philosophy, would otherwise be but a play on words, and justice would be but an empty sound. Furthermore, there is assuredly a Church law (canon law) which, applicable concurrently with the law of the state on the strength of a concordat, is autonomous with respect to the state. Besides, the doctrine that the whole body of international law is derived solely from the will of states could not be upheld in view of the inherent injustice of the peace settlements of 1919 dictated in the suburbs of Paris. Since these treaties actually came into existence through consent on the part of the will of the states, their qualification as unjust must necessarily come from another source of law than the consent of the states. Lastly, is not the will of the state much more concerned with the ascertainment or finding of the law which is already in use among the members of the community than with the making of law? It would be much closer to the truth to say that right, as it were, antedates the law than to term the law of the state the sole source of right.

  A specious attempt to solve the problem has been the distinction between internal morality and external legality (Thomasius, Kant). Certainly the law is for the most part satisfied with the outward fulfillment of the legal norm—for the most part! Often, however, inner motives also come into question, especially in criminal law where premeditation or cold-bloodedness is more severely punished in cases that otherwise are objectively the same. The situation is similar also in private law, where good and bad faith or the actual will of the parties to a contract, which is surely something internal, is the decisive factor, and not purely and exclusively the external document containing the contract unless, of course, the higher principle of legal security and of ability to count upon the semblance of law decides the matter. That acting in fraudem legis, i.e., with the intent of evading the law, receives no legal protection, points to the same thing. Perhaps the supposition that the distinction mentioned above is explainable by the political conditions of the time is not far wrong. The restriction of law to external conduct may well have arisen from the need to limit absolutism in the interest of a sphere of freedom for the individual. “Grant liberty of thought,” the Marquis of Posa, in Schiller’s Don Carlos, adjures King Philip II of Spain.8

  However, the limitation of morality to inner peace, to that which is internal, is wholly unsatisfactory. Ethics embraces the total activity of man, his inner and outward acts. Acts of obedience toward parents, of truthful speech, and of fidelity to one’s given word certainly do not lose their moral character merely because through their externalization they become legal acts. Since they are good in themselves, even without a law they are righteous actions; and their opposite is unrighteous, even though no positive norm explicitly lays this down. It is not difficult to believe that the same motive prevailed here as in the other case. The domain of law, in the concrete sense of absolutism, was to be restricted. Only external facts and circumstances were to fall under it. The state was to be able to enjoin security, external order; but, beyond this, nothing. It was to have no ethical function. It might in this way be possible to circumvent, in the interest of liberty, moral education at the hands of the police-state.

  ‡St. Thomas teaches that justice “directs man in his relations with other men” in a twofold manner: “first as regards his relations with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community.”9 All this is brought out in the age-old saying, “Give to everyone his own” (suum cuique). But that is termed a man’s own which is directed to him, which must be regarded as due or owed to him, from the standpoint of his essential idea. It is therefore that which must be left to him. The objectively and subjectively teleological or purposive character of things, goods, and actions, as the existential basis of persons, is, in the form of “being owed,” of being necessary and hence of being enforceable, the specific feature of law. Man has a natural legal dominion over external things because he can, in virtue of his reason and will, make use of external things to his own advantage. “One’s own” denotes not merely the physical tie, the causal connection, though it can also mean this, but rather the destination for the person. “To have a right means: there is something here that belongs to us, and the will of the state recognizes this and protects us” (R. von Jhering).

  “Mine,” however, presupposes an “I,” a person, i.e., a subject whose aims and end things serve and whose advantage is a goal of the actions of others, solely by reason of being a person. Right does not consider the inner, moral quality. The citizen does not owe obedience to the head of the state because of the latter’s interior moral goodness, but because he has charge of the common good. It is therefore profoundly significant when the legal reason sees only in the person a subject of right and confers legal personality upon groups of persons or associations which serve permanent human goals as bearers of rights and duties. The person exists for himself and for his own sake. He is the coordinating center of things and actions. The legal reason confers juridical freedom upon man and the human association in consequence of man’s psycho-ethical liberty, i.e., independence or autonomy. Here also being is the ultimate ground of one’s own, of a legal suum, and therefore of what ought to be done or respected by others. Hence to every right corresponds a duty. For the same reason, too, every man is legally competent. The person, the subject of right, can never by natural law become a thing, i.e., a mere means, either for another individual or for the community. That the Christian legal reason overcame slavery10 is one of the most important achievements in the history of culture.11

  Love also embraces the other, but in the form of complete union, of two-in-oneness. Justice, however, embraces the other for the precise purpose of accentuating and maintaining the otherness. Separateness, the delimitation of spheres of control, the closing of the latter to others, is an essential trait of right; not fusion, but clear separation. Law gives man an absolutely private sphere, a fixed place of independence in respect to others as well as to the community. The “I” and the “you” appear before the law as separate equals, distinct first of all in themselves and only then related to each other. “Mine” and “thine” appear as the debitum juridicum, as clear, firm determinations in the same plane. Therefore my sphere of rights is separated from that of the other, and it forms the boundary of his legal competence and the goal of his duty, and vice versa.

  Not all of human activity falls under the law. Only what strikes the senses, only what is meant to be manifested, is matter for the law. It has been well said that “human law does not order this to be done for the sake of that, but simply that this be done,” and that “the purpose of the law does not fall under the law.” The possibility of applying force is thus a necessary consequence of the notion of law. With ethics law has in common the power to direct. But the power to compel pertains exclusively to law. Every act or omission which relates to another, so far as it can be enforced without intrinsic contradiction, is a legal matter. The juridical character of an act is evidenced by the perception and recognition that this possible use of force is not in conflict with the inner nature of the act in question. The actual employment of coercion, therefore, in no way alters the inner quality of the legal action. On the other hand, a moral decision obtained by force is inwardly voided as a moral action or decision by the very fact of compulsion. Gratitude and pietas impel a son to care for his feeble and aged father. If he fails to do so, the law uses its force to compel him. The son’s support of his father is then a fulfilling of a legal duty, but so long as the constraint is needed the moral law remains unfulfilled.

  In the sphere of law there is no place for an arbitrary decision. The legal order is essentially different from the order of love or friendship. As there is no such thing as forced love, friendship and love freely embrace the special quality of the friend or loved one: the core of his person as wholly unique, as this “you.” Law does not penetrate so deeply. It embraces the individual, i.e., a personal unity, only to the extent that he can be known by the legal mind, and then not in the uniqueness of his individual personality but in his universal nature as a person. Law presupposes a certain equality. That is the boundary of the order of justice. This leaves the inner core of the person free. Nay more, it affords him the prerequisites of free activity and guarantees such freedom. The legal order forms a network of rules around the person without regard for such individual qualities as peculiar and distinctive character traits: things and actions are thereby related to the person or are subjected to his control and competence. It compels one to cooperate or to refrain; but it likewise constrains the others to cooperate or to refrain. It erects and upholds the structure and organization of such social units as the state. It further regulates the activity, and confines within due bounds the unreasonable arbitrariness, of the holders of political power, and it turns this into moral power in the service of the general welfare. Here again, however, it is not a matter of the special, individual quality of the concrete person. The moral quality of a holder or organ of public authority does not enter into the question of his or its lawful position and of the legitimate exercise of his or its power. Catholic social philosophy was right in maintaining this view in opposition to all the sixteenth-century antimonarchists who wrote under the influence of Calvinist sectarianism. The moral necessity of living within the legal order coincides with man’s inner goal, namely, to become a moral person. Wherever law binds, absolute power is impossible.

  The law is an external, objective norm. My subjective right is attached solely to my quality as an independent being, a being with a goal that is altogether its own. Especially is it independent of the coming and going of my moral qualities. It guarantees the permanence of a community as well as of the individual person. The law is not an end in itself. It organizes the community for the sake of the latter’s essential goal, and it gives me my rights for the purpose of rendering socially possible the achievement of my innate end as man. Thence comes its power to coerce.

  But even though no enduring community can live without law—neither the family nor the state nor any association whatever—yet such communities do not live through the law but in the law. The married couple, the family, lives through love. Love grips the spouse in the uniqueness of his innermost being. The law touches merely his general quality as spouse. Wherever this is forgotten, wherever attempts are made to force into juridical categories each and every relation of man to man, the meaning of life is being lost. When in its panjurism, to coin a word, the natural-law doctrine of the Enlightenment sought to embrace everything with juridical categories and to explain the community as a mere product of legal conveyances, the great driving forces of society languished or became perverted. Formlessness was the final outcome in all departments of life. At least this was the case wherever the mere conservation of the existing order of things for the sake of the continued existence of society itself did not simply carry the day. The idea of the state dissolved when the state was made into a pure legal order. The idea of the family suffered an eclipse when people began to speak only of the right to self-enjoyment. The law cannot engender life, nor can it take the place of love. It can and should be but an inherently limited order that exists for the purpose of protecting life.12

  In this connection one cannot fail to perceive the greatness of the philosophia perennis. It does not consist in linear thinking which, as fanaticism is accustomed to do, detaches a single notion from the ordered universe of ideas, thinks it completely through, and then becomes an ism of some sort. It is, as it were, spherical thinking. All essential ideas, which struggle with one another in their mutual interdependence, are beheld in a due and prudent equilibrium. Indeed fidelity to reality distinguishes this system of thought.13 This means that such thinking is a kind of second intellectual creation which imitates the original creation of God, the supreme Intellect, who has willed order by creating reality as a cosmos. Accordingly no prison of norms that are essentially alien to them is erected for the spirit and the irrational vital forces. These forces are first perceived in an intuitive, experiential act. (It should not be forgotten that St. Thomas, for instance, was at the same time a composer of hymns and a liturgist.) But reason thereupon constructs for the vital forces the forms in which they ought to function. It gives them the clear rational norm which is a reflection of its essential being. It gives them the rule, the framework wherein, in conformity with their nature, they can alone exist. For essential being and oughtness are correlative. The form, the law, is not life; it only guides the unruly vital forces (e.g., self-interest, the sex drive, the will to power, the acquisitive urge) in order that man can really live as man.

  This explains the necessity and importance of the clear, cool rationality of law as such. But it also explains why law is insufficient for complete human living, and why law is meant to be enforced.

  But law and morality are not separated. Of course, since it is the peculiar property of law to be enforceable, the boundary line of the distinction is a shifting one in history. It has shifted according as whether or not the fulfillment of definite moral duties was regarded by public opinion as necessary for the preservation of the concrete being of the community, and according as whether or not these duties were clothed in legal form. The Middle Ages were not intolerant out of mere narrow-mindedness, but by reason of the spiritual fullness of the uniform Christian culture. The heretic was not punished by the secular power because he had committed the moral sin of heresy. He was punished because in and with heresy he was doing harm to the internal stability of the community, to Christendom.14 Juridical or civil toleration, which must be carefully distinguished from dogmatic tolerance,15 had to be put into effect when the one Christian faith ceased to be a fact, when it had given way to differing creeds or denominations. Henceforth unity of faith could be looked upon as no longer necessary for political homogeneity. Whether or not disadvantageous legal effects are attached to illegitimate birth depends on whether the moral disqualification is viewed as necessary for the maintenance of the idea and institution of marriage and the family and hence as deserving of enforcement.16

  ‡These very examples show forth the nature of law in its inner connection with morality. There is no law without morality. An immoral law is a contradiction in terms or simply a statement of fact, namely, that this positive legal norm conflicts with the moral law and hence can impose no obligation, though the state may have the physical power to enforce it. All law requires a moral foundation.17 The will to achieve an ever greater approximation of the positive law to the norms of morality is so deeply rooted in man that even the positive law is always referring to morality. Often enough the judge, as was already the case among the Romans with their doctrine of aequitas, is not content with a mechanical subsuming of particular instances under the general norm but allows equity to play its part. In extreme cases, however, he goes back to the will of the lawmaker, who is assumed to will only what is moral; or, if the literal meaning is impossible, he puts forward an independent interpretation of the meaning of the law, on the ground that the lawgiver could not have willed anything unjust.

  Yet all this does not exclude the fact that there is also a law on the periphery of law which is pure law without a materially moral character. Nor is every law necessarily a moral norm. Many police ordinances (e.g., traffic regulations), which serve merely a subordinate purpose of means to an end, exhibit no materially moral content. The same is true of the technical rules governing legal procedure or the organization of law courts. These norms bear such a technical, formal, and utilitarian character that the qualifications of moral or immoral cannot be applied to them. Questions touching a monarchical or democratic constitution, lay courts or a professional judiciary, collegiate or bureaucratic organization of offices, fall likewise into this category. Hence it is plain that these norms bear only an instrumental character in relation to the material law. The legislative process serves the law, not vice versa.

  It devolves, however, upon the idea of natural law, as part of the natural moral law, to verify the morality in the law. And the high professional ethos of the true judge and of every custodian of the law also evidences it. Ulpian has given immortal expression thereto. Speaking of those who apply themselves to the study of law, the art of knowing what is good and just, he wrote: “Anyone may properly call us the priests of this art, for we cultivate justice and profess to know what is good and equitable, dividing right from wrong, and distinguishing what is lawful from what is unlawful; desiring to make men good through fear of punishment, but also by the encouragement of reward; aiming (if I am not mistaken) at a true, and not a pretended philosophy.”18

  CHAPTER XIII

  The Content of the Natural Law

  ‡From a purely factual standpoint the history of the natural-law idea teaches one thing with the utmost clearness: the natural law is an imperishable possession of the human mind. In no period has it wholly died out. At least since the advent of Christianity, it has always had a home in the philosophia perennis whenever it appeared to be temporarily banished from the secular wisdom of the jurists. Even in jurisprudence it has never entirely lost its efficacy. No one has better established this fact than Bergbohm, who was tireless in uncovering traces of the natural law. He discovered natural law everywhere, even in the thinking of the strictest positivists of the late nineteenth century. Ironically enough, Bergbohm, who had set out to banish natural law once and for all from jurisprudence, lived to hear Joseph Kohler say of his formidable attack on the natural law that he had merely demonstrated the utter untenableness of legal positivism, i.e., the complete untenableness of the doctrine directly opposed to the natural law. Indeed, even in Bergbohm’s own lifetime a distinct revival of the natural-law doctrine was observable.

  But history teaches still another lesson. Whenever the sole possible foundation of the natural law vanished on account of doubts about metaphysics, not only did voluntarist ideas bring positivism to the fore, but rationalism itself discredited the natural law through its passion for deductions uncontrolled by being. For this abuse of deduction, together with the resultant absurdities, produced a skeptical attitude toward the idea of natural law.

  The natural law is not in the least some sort of rationalistically deduced, norm-abounding code of immediately evident or logically derived detailed rules that fits every concrete historical situation. And this statement holds equally good of the natural moral law, of which the natural law is but a part. Yet the natural law is also no purely ideal, regulative norm which hovers over the whole of history. It is no objective mind which, as pure form, may receive ever-changing contents from the real situation. Hence it is not a norm that would not in any strict sense be valid, would never have legal validity, but would leave binding force and reality to the positive law alone.

  The truth, like virtue according to the age-old Aristotelian-Thomistic axiom, lies in the mean. It lies midway between the excess of deductive rationalism and the self-denying defect of a practicalness that is held prisoner by purely external facts. St. Thomas points repeatedly to the fundamental importance of experience for the normative sciences themselves. “What pertains to moral science is known mostly through experience.”1 He unequivocally demands a long-continued study of positive legal ordinances and of customary law. Experience is far more necessary than a doctrinaire approach for those who would be experts in the normative sciences.2

  A deep chasm exists between the treatises of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries supported by tradition (e.g., De legibus De iustitia et de iure), as well as the nineteenth-century works which are products of the natural-law doctrine of the philosophia perennis (the Institutiones iuris naturalis), on the one hand, and, on the other, the comprehensive treatises of the individualist and rationalist schools of natural law compiled in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Following the deductive method, these last regulate all legal spheres down to the minutest detail. Scarcely more than the formal decree of the legislator would be needed to transform them into codes of positive law.

  The difference is not to be explained by theological preoccupations, as though it were the part of prudence to restrict the norms in view of the inability of Old Testament exegesis to explain away certain singular actions of the patriarchs or recorded commands of God which are in seeming conflict with the natural law. But neither is it to be explained on the ground that the natural-law thinking of these theologians, in contrast to the deistic disregard of the positive divine law, had, for what might be called practical reasons, to be limited to a few norms in order to safeguard the positive law.

  The real reason for the difference lies elsewhere. There are but few natural-law norms whose intrinsic agreement with justice, with the essential being of human nature, is as self-evident as “Honor thy parents,” “Thou shalt not kill,” “Thou shalt not steal,” “Thou shalt not commit adultery,” “Thou shalt not perjure thyself or slander another.” Other norms can be obtained only by a thorough consideration of the various circumstances. But the same degree of evidence does not belong to these as belongs to the first principles. This explains not only the diversity of the positive laws according to peoples and times, but also the fact that primitive peoples (barbari) hold many things as lawful which are regarded by the legal reason of more mature and more advanced peoples as contrary to the natural law. Normative science definitely requires a more disciplined and more penetrating study, one which perpetually adjusts itself to the being and end of man and rests upon experience and comparison, than do the theoretical sciences.3

  Since even St. Thomas had constantly emphasized the value of observation and experience for the normative sciences and especially for the science of law, and since he had expressly demanded extensive studies in comparative law4 for all who were to occupy themselves with moral science, it was more than a gesture in conformity with the spirit of the nineteenth century when Taparelli wished to construct his systematic exposition of the doctrine of natural law on the basis of experience. Indeed his labors were altogether in line with the whole tendency of the natural-law doctrine of the philosophia perennis. Consequently, too, the doctrine of the state of nature has had no importance for it, quite in contrast to the rationalist natural law whose foundation was precisely this state of nature (which for the most part was even viewed as historically existent).

  For the same reason a development in the doctrine of natural law is possible. This does not hold good in regard to the first principles of natural law, but it is quite true in the case of the further conclusions. Thus, for example, the institution of private property has, through the teaching of Leo XIII which was occasioned (but not determined) by the situation and problems of his time, without doubt marked a notable advance in its natural-law contents over many a conception of earlier centuries. The same must be said regarding the more exact determination of the relations between the individual and the state. In fact, many matters of a similar nature have received a fuller and more searching treatment in keeping with the growing complexity and maladjustments of contemporary society. Besides, the permanent necessity of the positive law rests on the fact that the positive law gives, in accordance with natural-law norms, its positive organization to the social order. For the social order grows out of historical contingencies: it takes shape in concrete decisions drawn from the unique historical situation in conformity with the special character of the individual people in its capacity as community of persons bound together and united under law.

  This reserve toward rationalist deductions provides the correct explanation of the fact that the natural law of the philosophia perennis could never be ousted by positivism, and that within this philosophical system legal positivists like Durandus and Occam have ever remained isolated instances. Furthermore, this same reserve constituted a protection against the danger of embellishing political aims with the dignity, inalienability, and eternity of natural law. Hence this natural law neither could disappear nor did it need to disappear when the political aims were achieved, in contrast to what befell the individualist natural law. On the other hand, this implies no increasingly hollow repetition of traditional, general, and therefore barren formulas. For the distribution of emphasis, conditioned by the dominant problems of the period, brought out of the wealth of inferences and deeper insights, which certainly were not always present to the minds of thinkers, an ever more thorough comprehension of the norms, their interrelations and applications. By natural law, for example, more than one form of state or government is legitimate. Yet a political ideal does exist, as acknowledged by every doctrine of natural law: the reign of the principle of subsidiarity5 and a sharing in the formation of the collective will that stresses the dignity of the person as well as of the sub-political communities which have proper ends of their own. That is to say, the political ideal peculiar to the natural law of the philosophia perennis includes a preference for the mixed form of government, and a repudiation of the attempt to turn the organized people into mere material for rulers or managers of absolutist states. “All should take some share in the government, for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring.”6

  As self-evident principles, only two norms belong, properly speaking, to the content of the natural law in the narrow sense. These are: “What is just is to be done, and injustice is to be avoided,” and the age-old, venerable rule, “Give to everyone his own.” These norms of the practical reason are for the latter of the same fundamental importance as the self-evident, indemonstrable principles of the theoretical reason.7 Moreover, such primary norms of the practical reason, judgments of the primordial conscience, have the same certainty and evidence as the others.

  These norms, however, are not purely formal rules devoid of contents. For there exist no merely indefinite justice and one’s own, which differ materially at all times. What is just and what is one’s own actually exist for everyone. In the case of the ius naturale, just as in that of the lex naturalis, the proximate and primary cognitive principle is the rational, social nature of man. As the good, so too the just or right (as part of the good) is precisely that which is conformable to rational nature.8 Thence results a syllogism: What is just, as corresponding to nature, is to be done; but this way of acting corresponds to nature; therefore one must act in this way. Or the matter may be stated with sole reference to cognition: What accords with reason and essence is the just; but this action is in conformity with reason and essence; therefore it is (materially) just.

  In this manner, from the highest principles follow conclusions, of which the first share in the highest degree in the self-evidence of the first primordial norms. They present themselves immediately to human reason either as just and hence to be carried out, or as unjust and therefore not to be done. They are the same ones that have already been mentioned as the contents of the natural moral law. They have received immortal expression in the second table of the Decalogue: Honor thy father and mother; Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not bear false witness.

  These general conclusions share also in the immutability of the first principles. At first sight, however, this appears as anything but immediately evident. “Thou shalt not kill,” for instance, certainly does not seem to be valid everywhere and forever. Thus, on the strength of the natural law itself, the state is empowered to put criminals to death, and one who acts in self-defense is entitled to slay an unjust aggressor. But this objection misses the point. The brief statements of the Decalogue are not full and adequate formulations of the respective ethical principles. The humanly exact, and indeed self-evident, meaning of “Thou shalt not kill” is: “Thou shalt not kill an innocent person,” just as “Thou shalt not steal” properly means: “Do not take the goods of others against their reasonable will.”9 It is, moreover, the direct killing of an innocent person that is forbidden. This principle holds good always and everywhere.10 The killing of an innocent person has at all times been considered a crime. Nor does the attitude of certain primitive peoples toward the killing of the stranger prove anything to the contrary. For the stranger is in their eyes an enemy; he is therefore not innocent, i.e., he is not non-nocens.11

  This norm is of greatest importance for the doctrine of the just war. The strict ethics of war that prevailed in former times conceived even war in ethico-juridical categories and not merely as a non-moral, law-transcending event in the life of Leviathans existing in a state of nature relatively to one another. Only a just war could warrant the killing of enemy soldiers. To be just, a war had (and, of course, still has) to be waged for a just cause, with due measure, and by public authority.12 Moreover, “enemy” or “foe” is not primarily and solely an existential concept but a juridical one: hostility, or the state of being an enemy, is a juridical quality. Hence the wounded, defenseless soldier ceases to be in the strict sense an enemy. To slay a wounded, defenseless man is murder; it is the killing of an innocent person. Even though raging passion may at times drive one to do it, the true soldier, the chivalrous warrior will ever regard such an act as contrary to his special type of honor.13 Besides, the cruelty of civil wars is due to the fact that in this case the adversary takes on the appearance of an actual enemy, without any saving juridical status. For this very reason, however, civil war is not war in the meaning of international law, and the factions involved in civil war are not regarded as belligerent powers. Were they so considered, not war itself but civil war would cease, since two states, and not the citizens of a single state, would then be carrying on a war. In this case the norms of international law would be applied, whereas in a civil war the norms of the state’s penal law tend to be applied. This means, as is well known, that each of the factions more or less formally prejudges the prisoners in accordance with the paragraph of the penal code which deals with high treason or according to martial law.

  In like manner, the killing of a slave, which the positive law occasionally does not punish because it fails to prohibit it, proves nothing to the contrary. For in the view of such a legal order a slave is not innocent, since only a person can be innocent. As a thing to be held as property, the slave is subject to the ius fruendi, utendi, et abutendi, i.e., to the right which an owner possesses of full, free, and exclusive use and disposition of his property.14 Nor does the “plank of Carneades” create a real difficulty. For, as has been mentioned, the Late Scholastics rightly pointed out that in this extreme instance the order of justice leaves off and the order of charity governs the case.

  What radically distinguishes these natural-law norms in their unchangeableness from the further conclusions is their prohibitive character. They pertain to the prohibitive natural law. When they are fully and precisely formulated, it is impossible to conceive of any situation or circumstance in which they do not bind.

  Correct deductive reasoning thereupon yields additional norms; such, for instance, is the rule that what is borrowed must be returned. However, this principle does not apply with the same universality as, for instance, the prohibition against direct killing of an innocent person. For should a weapon be demanded back by the lender because in a fit of rage he is preparing to slay his adversary (inimicus, not hostis) with it, the borrower’s refusal to give it back then and there is justified. That private property must be respected follows from its validity in natural law, which is presupposed in the norm, “Thou shalt not steal.” Yet a person who finds himself in dire need may make use of another’s relatively surplus property to meet the emergency; by the same token the owner is obliged to suffer this action and may not appeal to the principle of self-defense, since it is not a question of an unjust, unwarranted invasion of property.15 Even under the old Germanic law of the Frankish period dire need removed the taint of unlawfulness: a wayfarer might cut wood in a strange forest to repair his cart, or he might allow his cattle to graze in a strange meadow. Moreover, the right of self-defense has been recognized at law since the beginning of the historical period. No fine was exacted for an injury inflicted in self-defense upon an aggressor, for the aggressor was ipso facto a breaker of the peace (exlex, outlaw). But with the progressive development of the positive law, corresponding to the evolution of social conditions, the number of such situations authorizing self-help necessarily grew smaller. The matter underwent a change and with it the application of the natural-law norm, whose validity however remains the same.

  From the norm of truthfulness of speech follows the natural-law norm, agreements must be kept. But, as the history of law proves, the correct application of this principle has required a most subtle and careful consideration on the part of reason. It is owing to the discriminating intelligence of wise men that liability for non-fulfillment of a contract arising from malice or negligence is differentiated from the liability which is owing to no fault, which is therefore accidental (such as an “act of God”); accordingly, the two forms of liability are differently dealt with in law.

  This example also shows that the farther deductive reasoning descends from first principles and universal norms to particular norms, the more the evidence diminishes; and a keener and more penetrating consideration of all the circumstances is needed for the correct application of the conclusions to facts which become ever more contingent.16 From this, too, the necessity of the positive law becomes evident. Consideration of these circumstances requires in addition a great deal of experience and wisdom. It is not a matter for everybody, but for the wise: not for the young, but for the old. Among all peoples judges and lawmakers are traditionally the wise old men.17

  Only in these first, self-evident, and unalterable principles and conclusions, do all peoples agree.18 In the further inferences agreement and unchangeableness cease.19 St. Thomas would never have taught, as did many exponents of natural law in the eighteenth century, that the oath of two witnesses and the jury system (together with a definite number of jurors) pertain to natural law. The natural-law doctrine of the philosophia perennis knew full well that legal reason advances toward true law only slowly, step by step and after following many a wrong path. This, it was clearly aware, is particularly the case in complex social conditions and in view of the uncertainty of judgment which is proper to the practical reason in contrast to the theoretical reason. For the practical reason concerns itself with the contingent element in human actions.20 However necessary and certain the universal norms may be, such necessity and certainty grow fainter and fainter as one passes from the general to the particular and the singular. The more uncertain becomes the judgment of practical reason, the greater also becomes the variety of judgments concerning juridical and moral questions. All this shows the great necessity of deciding such matters by means of positive laws and of adjusting the latter to the individual case.21

  In another respect, too, the danger of error where judgments of the practical reason are concerned is greater than in operations of the theoretical reason. The passions, diverse interests, and selfish appetites disturb the judgment. However correct the knowledge of the theoretical reason may be, and however possible it may be for the practical reason to apply this knowledge to conduct in the judgment of conscience, passions and appetites often bring about in the concrete a blotting out of this knowledge and of the natural law which otherwise is discernible by natural reason.22 One should not wish to construct a system of natural law by methods proper to geometry; one must, on the contrary, continually consult experience and comparative law. Hence the existing laws and mores, which cannot be totally and in every respect contrary to reason (what would then be left of man?), form the material of experience from which we recognize what is just through reference to rational nature and through knowledge of the being in the laws. This is not the strict, positivist antithesis to the deductive process, but rather the mean: deduction and induction, analysis and synthesis.23

  This healthy skepticism toward the deductive, arrogant, or naively romantic natural-law doctrine of rationalism, which attempted to set up detailed norms deduced from reason and valid for all men and all times, in no way implies, as has already been remarked, the acceptance of positivism. The admitted diversity, which leads the positivists to hold that the positive will of the lawmaker, and not agreement with rational social nature, is the foundation of justice, signifies merely that in respect to the more remote conclusions there can be, so to speak, a natural law with a changing content; but this does not hold good for the most general norms and proximate conclusions. For incest (sexual intercourse between ascendants and descendants) remains contrary to the natural law, even though some primitives, in consequence of a corruption of morals, may consider it lawful.24 Moreover, the natural law does not remain limited to the formal element, in the sense that the principles, “Good or justice is to be done” and “Give to everyone his own,” leave always and exclusively to the positive law the determining of what may here and now be good or just, of what may in the concrete be one’s own, and in the sense that it is the function of the positive law to fill in the empty form with contents. Such has been the position of Neo-Kantian jurisprudence down to Kelsen. On the contrary, the natural law also includes material, content-filled norms.25

  ‡The proximate cognitive principle of the natural law (as part of the lex naturalis) is the rational, social, essential nature of man,26 i.e., his personal, essential being immanently determined through the concepts of individual and community.27 The rational substance of the person, endowed with free will, is the bearer, the possessor of rights. Animals have no rights.28 And whenever, owing to a failure to recognize the native personality of every human being, the slave’s character as a person is denied to him (by the positive law),29 this is a defect in such positive law but no disproof of the fact that all positive law presupposes persons. The individual person is the logically necessary prerequisite of every, even imaginary, legal order, and all the more so of the positive and actual legal order. For the latter is a normative order, an order of oughtness. But a norm logically presupposes a rational being, possessed of free will, as addressee or subject of the norm. Otherwise a distinction between the laws of physical nature and law based on right would be impossible. Moreover, socio-philosophical materialism, as it has taken concrete shape in Russian Communism, is quite absurd for the simple reason that one can indeed understand the masses in a materialist sense but not the elite which directs the masses. For this elite must assuredly view itself as a union of rational beings, as a collective group of social engineers, if only in order to distinguish the masses as a materialist phenomenon.

  The personal being of man exists as a datum prior to all positive law, at least for the formation of the legal community. But this means that it also exists as a datum for the positivist theory of law. For precisely this state of being a person, this state of being an end in oneself, is the first fact, and in it lies the original germ of right. At the beginning, as Jhering has noted, stands not right itself, but one’s right. No European positivist would now maintain that the state of being a person and the rights which flow immediately therefrom (first of all, the right to be regarded even legally as a person) originated through the will of the state. Rather, as Dernburg has said, “the state regulates private rights, but it does not invent them; it safeguards them, but it did not first create them.” Or, like Cosack, positivists speak of subjective rights as being guaranteed (hence not given or “granted”). Prior to the state, then, there exist rights of the person. Yet these rights are not mere facts, to which the state thereupon attaches legal effects, as asserted by the latest form of positivism, the normative school. They appear rather as claims against the positive law, claims that demand recognition. In 1878 the German Imperial High Court of Justice rightly spoke of the natural right which an author has to his name. Here it is really a question of a natural right. For this reason, too, the suum cuique is not simply dependent upon material realization through the positive law. There exists a suum, a right, which comes into existence with us.

  This is, in the first place, the right to life and property. Upon this all exponents of natural law, Aristotle and St. Thomas, Hobbes and Rousseau, and even all positivists are in agreement. The conservatio sui ipsius seu membrorum suorum is not peculiar to Hobbes; on it rests the right of self-defense. The latter is grounded in the natural law, and it excludes unlawfulness purely and simply, not merely that which is contrary to the positive law. The integrity of this sphere of personal being, this first circle of right of one’s own individual life, is an absolute presupposition of the legal order. The safeguarding or guaranty of this first suum of the person is exactly what essentially differentiates the legal order from the order of love. Personality, i.e., the state of being a person, is likewise the root of honor, of one’s good name. For what else do honor and good name signify than the radiation of one’s personality into the world of law? They are simply the special form of fellowship under law. Their negation is the negation of fellowship under law, of the basis of social life. They are consequently a presupposition of every positive legal order. The latter does not confer them; it protects them with the power proper to law. This legal good, by the way, is so prepositive that it always obtains recognition even in spite of the positive law, which pays too little heed to injuries inflicted upon a person’s honor.

  In the same way, personality carries with it personal liberty, which in the positive legal order finds expression in guaranteed rights to liberty. This holds good for all legal orders, and all natural-law systems recognize it. Such rights also outline the sphere of right that is “given” with the nature of a person. In the course of history, indeed, they may expand or contract. Yet they cannot so contract that all freedom whatever comes to an end. In such a case human personality would cease effectively to exist. The person would then become a means, would existentially vanish and become an impersonal “thing,” an inherent contradiction. Varied as may be the expansions and contractions of the sphere of freedom that are encountered in the history of law, there still exists a real legal difference between the serf (bound to the soil) under the feudal system and the slave of Greco-Roman antiquity.

  ‡Materially this freedom is closely bound up with the institution of private property. “The conception of property is the direct outcome of the conception of the ego. Just as the expression ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ occur in every language to indicate ownership, so the consciousness of self contains the consciousness of property. … Hence property is no arbitrary idea, but is founded in man’s natural impulse to extend his own personality.” So wrote Heinrich von Treitschke, although shortly beforehand he had observed that without the state and its law “there could be no property or security of property.”30 This is an evident, typically positivist contradiction, unless this last statement is taken to mean merely that the institution of property can in the long run be maintained only if the state protects it, so that for the sake of natural-law ownership itself man was compelled to pass from the status naturalis to the status civilis. According to St. Thomas, “that which is ordered to a man is what is said to be his own.”31 In other words, one’s own is an extension of the ego. Definite things are not of their very nature and forthwith ordered by natural law to this person. On the other hand, it is self-evident that the person has a right to the products created by his labor (with, of course, the proper reservations) and to have these pass into his ownership.32 The institution of private property is of natural law. In the long run man cannot exist, cannot make good his right to marriage or to a family or to security of life, and cannot maintain his sphere of individual right to a life of his own, unless he is entitled to ownership through the acquisition of goods. The right to private property follows from the physical, ontological make-up of the individual person, from the body-spirit nature of man. “With reason, therefore, the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have maintained the opposite view, has found in the study of nature, and in the law of nature herself, the foundations of the division of property, and has consecrated by the practice of all ages the principle of private ownership, as being pre-eminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducing in the most unmistakable manner to the peace and tranquillity of human life.”33

  In ownership lies the guaranty not only of security of the material conditions of existence, but also of the specifically human perfection, greater personal freedom.34 To state the matter negatively, whoever has no property all too easily becomes property, a mere means in the hands of one who possesses a superabundance of property.35 This right of private property, already shown to be suited to the needs of the individual person, follows also from the need of the family. “That right of property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons must also belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; nay, such a person must possess this right so much the more clearly in proportion as his position multiplies his duties.

  “For it is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, nature dictates that a man’s children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance.”36 The truth of this line of thought is established also by the fact that all social utopias which reject the very institution of private property, as well as Russian Communism with its juridical rejection of private ownership of productive property, tend equally to reject the family as a permanent community.

  However, only the legal institutions of private property and inheritance are of natural law. That is to say, the natural law requires only that there be private ownership and the right of inheritance. It does not demand the property and inheritance institutions of feudalism, or of liberalist capitalism, or of a system in which private, corporate, and public forms of ownership exist side by side. These are positive-law determinations which spring from the diversity of peoples and which change with the socioeconomic evolution.37

  But individual personality does not exhaust the essential nature of man, even if in itself it may provide the basis of an original sphere of right. Sociality is just as constitutive of the essential nature of man as is his rationality. Sociality, indeed, so pertains to man’s nature that a definition which omits this constitutive element must be considered incomplete. It is therefore nothing superadded; it is equally original. The individual person and the community are ontologically so related to each other that they can have no existence independently of each other. Even though the individual person may always have genuine self-subsistence and hence a unique kind of being, he has at the same time a limited existence that does not yet realize perfectly the idea of man. For man is perfected only in the community. It is essential for him to be a member of enduring communities. “Man comes into existence as fruit of these communities, and only by becoming a member in them does he experience full incarnation. … But because ‘being a member’ denotes uniqueness and differentiation from all others, the individual as person is not submerged but rather expands his personality from a cramping, impoverishing state of isolation and self-sufficiency into the full man. Wherefore all shutting of oneself off from the fullness of life in communities means for the individual a personal atrophy and mutilation, a failure to realize one’s being.”38 In the concrete, of course, a person is always a member of his family, his nationality, his occupational group, his state, and lastly of mankind. The individual, as Max Stirner conceived him,39 simply does not exist.

  Moreover, Hugo Grotius and Leibnitz, as well as the entire past in company with the adherents of the Christian natural law, still held fast to the principle that the union of men with God carries with it the union of men among themselves. The ultimate metaphysical principle of the order of communities was thereby strikingly expressed. For it affirms the unity of the ontological and teleological orders that extend from the individual through the communities of persons, which serve to perfect the idea of man and thereby to preserve their super-individual partial ends, on up to God as the supremely perfect Person and the highest End and Good of all creation; and then down again from God to the individual, to whom the communities are prior in the sphere of ends. The necessary communities or societies that are grounded in the nature of man, without which man cannot live, have thus at any given time partial ends of their own which cannot be permanently absorbed by the higher community.40 And throughout them all there remains intact the primordial personal goal of man, his eternal happiness or the salvation of his soul in the beatific vision and in the union of love with God.

  This ultimate metaphysical foundation, which enters the domain of theology, does not need to be considered now. As a matter of fact, not only metaphysics but every deeper social and moral science reaches into the realm of theology. But thought can stop short of ultimates and yet grasp the natural-law existence of communities and their orders. For the ontological necessity of, say, the family, nationality, occupational group, and state clearly results from the idea of man, not from the idea of the state. The family and its basis, marriage, are prior to the state. The national community, which is built up through community of blood, language, and culture (national spirit) out of families (basically therefore upon biological being, and not upon the nomos), is also prior to the state, even though it may tend toward the form of statehood and may be on the way to becoming a state. But nation and state do not coincide conceptually: as there is a national state, so there is a non-national or multinational state. Furthermore, inside the national economy and culture the members of the nation are organized according to their professional function into occupational groups, and according to locality into political groups, for the complete achievement of the common good. These necessary societies are always present, at least in rudimentary forms. Their essential characteristic is by no means merely their super-individual goal or their juridical organization, but precisely their necessity derived from the idea and end of man. They are consequently distinguished by their permanence: in the domain of the earthly and temporal they are everlasting societies. Besides these, however, men form numerous other societies for particular purposes. The latter societies belong to history and to it alone, not to the idea of man, whereas the former are the very medium of history.41

  The family is prior to the state. The state may never take over entirely the end and functions of the family, even though it may have the duty, in virtue of its right of guardianship, to intervene in case this or that family is delinquent in its own duty.42 It is likewise competent and obligated to re-establish, whenever necessary, the natural foundation of the family in economic life and in legislation through such measures as housing projects, a family wage, tax exemption or alleviation, reform of marriage legislation, protection of parental rights. Such necessity is present whenever a general failure in their essential functions on the part of concrete families is due to a faulty economic or juridicoethical evolution (e.g., in the case of the propertyless, proletarian family of modern capitalist society).43

  This essential structure of the family, which exists prior to the state, signifies also that the family is an autonomous sphere of right. Parents, especially the father, have natural rights which the positive law does not confer upon them, but which, as already existent, it protects and guarantees. From the marriage contract spring the natural rights of the husband and wife to each other’s person, so that the breach of such rights (adultery) is accounted unjust in itself and therefore unjust independently of the positive law. Otherwise why should people have waxed indignant at the early marriage legislation of Soviet Russia? The fact of the matter is that the end or meaning of marriage and the family is independent of the will of the state as well as of the will of the parties to the marriage contract.44 Marriage and the family produce rights and duties that are grounded in the very nature of these institutions. The recognition and juridical relevance of these rights and duties, and not the fiat of the state, make it possible to decide whether in a concrete case marriage or concubinage is present.

  In the same way, a national community comprising a number of families is a necessary and true society. It is this essential being that gives meaning to the assertion of the natural rights of a nationality, as these rights, in the national state or in the state which includes national minorities, become a concrete problem with regard to language, schools, and national culture. The treaties about minorities did not invent or create this right; it existed before them. No one will question that the betrayal of one’s nationality is a crime. This is true even if no penal code of a state which includes minorities expressly defines the actual case of treason to one’s nationality and threatens it with punishment.

  For the application of the principle of suum cuique, there exists inside these communities of family and nation a material suum of the member as well as of the subordinate society in relation to the higher community.

  The social process of perfecting the idea of man reaches its fulfillment in the state, which since the time of Aristotle has been termed perfect society, i.e., a society which is genuinely self-sufficient, because in it the natural tendency to live in society finds its completion. The family, even the large patriarchal family or clan, requires a higher social form for secure and permanent existence, for earthly happiness, for genuine self-sufficiency. Political life is a third necessary domain, specifically distinct from household economy. Individuals are not free to unite or not to unite to form a state. On the contrary, the natural moral law imposes such union upon them in conformity with the goal of perfecting their social nature. On this necessity, then, is based the authority of the state and of its head. The suum which the state or the public authority is entitled to demand rests on the realization of the idea of the state as a necessary society. This suum, moreover, is not the sum of the rights which individuals transferred to the state, to the sovereign, in some supposed social and governmental contract. It is a specific suum which is grounded in the essential function of the state, namely, the establishment, maintenance, and promotion of the common good, of the ordo rerum humanarum. All this is more than a mere legal order. It involves the promotion of the welfare of families and individuals in their various spheres of life: economic, occupational, cultural. It is a question of promoting, not of creating. The state as such does not produce culture. This is done by persons in the family as well as in their national and religious communities.45 For this reason, too, the common good is not really separated from the good of the individual members. Rather, a coincidence takes place, just as the health of an organism is indeed predicated of the entire organism, yet consists in the fact that the organs are sound and in good order.46

  Nevertheless, though the idea of man is thus perfected in the state, the individual state is not the final form of community. For the nation-states, the nations and their states, form in their totality the international community, mankind as a whole, whose supernatural counterpart is the world Church, the Church of the nations. And in this international community or great society individual rights and rights of the community recur in an analogous sense. As a result, the personified states and nations as values in themselves possess natural rights of their own to their existence, to freedom (i.e., the right to self-determination for the concrete realization of the common good), and to their honor as the basis of their legal partnership in the international community, whose object is order and peace. The tragic conflicts which are inevitably bound up with the rise and decay of individual states and nations as a biological and ethical life-process arise because the positive law exerts itself more vigorously here to uphold permanently the status quo than it does in the individual state. These conflicts must be settled on the basis of justice, on the basis of the common good of the international community. The positive international law also has its foundation in the natural law.47

  In view of all this, it is impossible to speak purely and simply either of a primacy of the individual person or of a primacy of the community. For none of these societies is absolute, however much it may have its own end-values in the order of ends and its autonomy in the social process. None of them is in an absolute sense an end-community in which the individual person would be merged and would become a mere means. His eternal goal, the salvation of his soul, imparts to the person an ultimate transcendence.48 Thence result certain natural rights for the individual person in relation to the state. These rights are not first conferred upon him by the positive law; they are at most explicitly recognized by it. Thus it is not in virtue of this recognition that such rights have force; they are recognized because they are valid absolutely.49 They are precisely those rights which at bottom are always presupposed: the rights of the individual person and of the necessary societies, the family and the nation, which exist between the person and the state. Whenever the state demolishes these rights to material justice, it does away with its own juridical being. For justice is the foundation of the state.50

  The natural law contains the necessary structural laws of societies. Hence also the close relationship between natural law and social philosophy: natural law is social philosophy for the practical reason. A science of pure law is consequently unsatisfying. For law is at bottom founded on the essentially teleological character of social being, and in practice its concrete contents are always social life which requires the form of law. But this is not to assert that sociologism is alone warranted in law. For the sociological school of law is indeed able to explain the origin and effect of positive legal norms from the actual sociological facts, but it cannot explain law itself. The two schools of thought constitute a positivist cleavage of the natural-law doctrine. Natural law, of course, implies an ultimate unity of essential being and oughtness.

  To the natural law corresponds a genuine pluralism, from which the principle of the subsidiarity of the state takes its origin. The natural-law sub-political spheres in which the individual person lives his life (the family, the local community, the nation in its occupational groups) are autonomous partial or imperfect societies with ends of their own. These societies combine organically for the ordering of the common good in the same way as the persons and communities which never lose their proper being are joined together in the organic unity of the state. Such societies are not, consequently, mere genetico-historical rudiments of the state. They are not stages of the social process that gradually wither away. On the contrary, they are enduring institutions, and their specific functions can never by wholly and permanently taken over and fulfilled by the state.51 The opposite view rests upon the inherently false antithesis between individual and state. It either removes social life entirely from the political sphere (liberalism), or it makes all community life a matter of complete state control (Russian Communism, Italian Fascism, German National Socialism).

  There exists a true economy of the social virtues. Communities do not live through law, although they do live in the law. They live through specific virtues correlated with their being. The family is the natural nursery of the virtues of obedience, self-sacrifice, loyalty, and mutual responsibility and care. All succoring love, too, is stamped with the family spirit. Economic and occupational life is founded upon the exercise of the virtues of social justice, fidelity to one’s given word, and social solidarity in action. The total emptying or sabotage of the idea of the state which occurred at the hands of individualism rests ultimately upon the individualist belief that the sole source from which the community lives is law, and that its order alone is needed. For the rest, the free individuals, through short-term contracts corresponding to their selfish interests of the moment, would create of themselves and almost automatically the social harmony that is here and now fitting.

  No, neither individuals in their selfishness nor a bureaucratic industrial state which hinders the free unfolding of personality and the functioning of imperfect societies can act creatively. Creative action belongs to the person as well as to the national community in its capacity as the imperishable ground and native soil of the state. Yet, since the state regulates and promotes the continuous life of the communities and individuals; since, in accordance with distributive justice, it guides the stream of moral, intellectual and material goods, which constitute the common good and concomitantly the good of its members, back to these members; since it fashions a true human order: dignity, honor, and a high degree of sovereignty belong to the state and must be accorded to it.

  Positivism is incapable of a correct view of these things which form the basis of the life of the state. The doctrine of the natural law, on the other hand, can give to the state a true ethical foundation through the morality in law.

  CHAPTER XIV

  Natural Law and Positive Law

  Legal positivism, that is, the theoretical rejection of the natural law according to form (as non-positive source of valid law) and content (as law contained in no positive norm), maintains that the natural-law doctrine represents a dualism which is inimical to legal security; or that for fixed objective norms it substitutes subjective opinions concerning a juridical oughtness; or that in a dualistic fashion valid legal norms are drawn from a system of norms which is set in contrast to the positive law (ethics, law of reason, reform proposals for new legislation, Roman law as written reason). Hence positivism regards the natural law as a non-law in the proper sense of the word. It refers, instead, to ethics, to fabricated ideal norms for new legislation, to politico-legal aims, and so on.

  Law, according to positivism, is only positive law, that is, statute law and such customary law as is recognized by the state. More precisely, positivism characterizes as law to be applied by the judge and alone to be considered by jurisprudence those norms only which are enacted as such by the factual and published will of the legislative organ in due conformity with constitutional law or which are explicitly or tacitly admitted by it. The positivist is ever seeking for the written or actually enforced factual decision of the will which converts a potential norm into an actual norm. Moreover, he is concerned solely with this formal origin of law, with the source of the norm and its manner of formation, not with its content. Auctoritas facit legem, law is will. The question of whether something can be wrong in itself is meaningless for him. To him, right and wrong are not material qualities of norms; they merely denote the presence or absence of agreement with the factual will of the lawmaker. ‡In contrast, for instance, to the Roman jurist, the positivist does not search for justice by way of the positive norm in which it is contained materially; he inquires rather for the norm which is derived from the will of the legislator. The establishing of this fact settles for him the question whether a legal norm lies before him. He presumes its justice, or he asserts that the question of justice is an ethical question, not a juridical one.

  In constitutional states, however, the typical positivist runs into difficulties. Particularly when it comes to applying the law, he must inquire not only whether the path of legislation prescribed by the constitution has been followed, but also whether the law (including customary law) is not in conflict with the higher norms of constitutional law. And there the legal positivist readily runs afoul of natural law. To the positivist, many constitutional provisions are not genuine legal norms but rather programmatic utterances of the constituent or constitution-making power. Take, for instance, such a constitutional provision as “Property imposes obligations; its use must at the same time be a service of the common weal.” The positivist characterizes this provision as a mere guiding rule, not as a binding norm for either lawmaker or citizen. He insists upon taking such a view even though this provision is aimed directly at the individualist concept of property, and though property and obligation obviously are juridical concepts. Here, in our view, lies the typical positivist short circuit. The positivist, who for that matter does not know what to do with such highly important constitutional preambles, perceives in these cases invasion points for natural law to be applied by the judge. In the United States the judge, by referring to the natural-law foundation of man’s rights to liberty, has set himself not only above the lawmaker but in theory even above the framers of constitutional law. For the real lawmaker is not the one who enacts the laws, but the one who sovereignly expounds them. But the interpreter refers precisely to natural law and justice. This formalist method makes positivism possible even for Catholic thinkers, when they regard ethics and the moral law as norms derived from God’s will. Such norms do not indeed have legal validity, but they do have the moral force of oughtness.

  It is generally acknowledged today that positivism is inadequate from the standpoint of both legal theory and legal philosophy. One of its bases, the theory of the completeness of the law or absence of gaps in the law, has been given up. The theory of legal monism has likewise been widely abandoned. For good faith, the principles of morality and the carefulness of the ordinary merchant are often used by the judge as valid norms not only beyond or in addition to the positive law, but even contrary to the positive law. That is, they are used contrary to the factual will of the lawmaker, even if generally on the basis of the unwarranted fiction that the lawmaker could have willed no wrong.

  ‡To look more closely into the matter, we may note several phenomena as sources of legal positivism. In periods of philosophico-ethical uncertainty and barrenness the jurist, who is of course concerned with the practical settlement of legal questions, rightly holds to the positive law that is sure because it is enforced and applied. This is all the more true when the abstract speculations of rationalism have split into increasingly subjective views of various schools.1 At times when no natural order obtains, but, as in Communist Russia, even the national community is viewed as a social mechanism to be organized along engineering lines, positivism may well be congenial.

  The predominance of positivism or of the natural law is likewise connected with types of state or forms of government. Royal absolutism provides in itself a more favorable environment for positivism than do liberal democratic states in which the judge is more or less sovereign. Even forms of government are determined by the antithesis of reason and will, for governmental types are differentiated also by their types of legislation.

  But the natural law need not stand diametrically opposed to the positive law, nor has such an opposition always existed in history. Natural law and positivism are, indeed, directly opposed to each other. But natural law and positive law are, as the Christian doctrine of natural law expresses it, directed immediately to each other. The natural law calls imperatively for specification by positive enactments, even though it is at the same time the measure and guideline of the positive law. It requires the positive law; or, as the Christian tradition affirms in an apt distinction, it requires human law, i.e., enactment by earthly authority. In this question of the relationship between natural law and positive law the schools of natural law differ as much as they do over principles. For the Sophists as well as for Rousseau’s individualist natural law the positive law was the direct opposite of the law of nature. The positive law, since it served to secure the interests of the ruling class, was even materially opposed to the natural law. The democratic revolution was the first to make its natural law the exclusive law. The natural law of rationalism believed that, from principles that varied from time to time, a materially complete system of law could be deduced, which thereupon needed but the formal legal decree to become also positive law.

  The natural law of the philosophia perennis, on the other hand, contains but a few universal norms and forgoes deductive extremes. It states explicitly that in the normative sciences certainty and necessity decrease in proportion as deduction moves farther away from the first self-evident principles. It has so strong a feeling for the great blessing of a secure and reliable legal order, which it considers a most essential element of the common good, that it regards as non-binding only that positive law which has been changed into non-law by the prohibitive norms of the natural law. Of course, it accords the permissive natural law and equity their proper place. It is revolutionary only in respect to the law that has become materially immoral. Its attitude toward the imperfections of the positive law is merely reformist. It may with some exaggeration be called a skeleton law. It determines what positive arrangements, in themselves capable of being willed in given historical circumstances, can be right. Thus it does not affirm that private ownership of capital is wrong, or that the attainment of just wage claims by means of a strike (break of contract) is wrong when state protection of labor is lacking. Nor does it assert that dictatorship is intrinsically wrong, since dictatorship becomes wrong only through the misuse of the dictatorial power that for the time being is historically necessary, just as it does not pronounce parliamentary democracy to be inherently wrong. Nor, finally, does it declare every war unjust. Yet it does say that, where no fault of the owner exists, complete expropriation without compensation is unjust. It does declare that the general strike for the illegitimate achievement of the rule of the proletariat is wrong. And it does say that disregard of the natural rights to life and to the necessary liberties of the person is wrong, irrespective of by whom and under what circumstances they are infringed.

  The natural law calls both for the positive law and for the lawmaker. To begin with, only the first principles and proximate conclusions (Decalogue) are immediately evident and epistemologically necessary. The theoretical reason proceeds from the particular, which is given in sense perception, to the general. Therefore its knowledge bears the stamp of certainty and necessity far more than does that of the practical reason. The practical reason proceeds from the general principle to the singular, to the contingent, to the multiplicity of possible means and intermediate ends in a world which is incessantly changing in virtue of the actions of others and one’s own development, although the higher end, e.g., the common good, remains ever the same. Consequently the more the practical reason descends from the principles to the further conclusions and comes to apply them to increasingly more concrete situations of fact, its knowledge becomes more uncertain, variable, and questionable in application.2 St. Thomas rightly observes that “to suitably introduce justice into business transactions and personal relations is more laborious and difficult to understand than the remedies in which consists the whole art of medicine.”3 Owing to this very uncertainty, men stand in great need of the positive norm which derives and determines what is to be inferred from the general principle, regard being had for the national character and the concrete historical situation. Without such a positive norm no certainty and no order at all could arise in view of the number and diversity of the deductions. Above all, everyone who has not succumbed to rationalism and does not regard men as purely thinking and inferring beings knows how great a danger reason runs of being misled by passions when it comes to applying norms to one’s own as well as to opposing interests. He also knows how easily the voice of conscience is drowned out by the tempestuous demands of selfishness. An authoritative determination of the conclusions is plainly needed in order that these, as norms which emanate from authority and demand obedience, may be able to support conscience and reason.

  For the same reasons the natural law as well as what is derived from it requires also a positive, earthly sanction, which it does not of itself immediately possess. Indirectly, of course, it does have a sanction. Every people that disregards the laws of moral living is doomed to deterioration and to destruction. Justice remains the foundation of the state, and world history continues to be world judgment. Yet an immediate sanction is needed, a direct threat of force. The menace to order is inherent in the imperfection of all that is human, in the disordered vital impulse and immoderate instinctive drives of individuals and their groups and communities.4 The propensity to disorder which is found in man and his associations is just as strong as, nay even stronger than, the rational longing for ordo. All this calls for a positive ordering and safeguarding of human existence and welfare at the hands of a concrete power. The philosophia perennis does not subscribe to the unfounded optimism of Rousseau’s idea of natural law. It is aware of the demonic element in man’s nature, of the dark forces which produce disorder and destruction. Even though, for example, the natural law forbids theft, there is need of the positive penal law which attaches the penalty as a legal consequence to the actual fact of theft. Justice determines what this penalty is in the light of the principle of proportionateness; and prudence aids in its determination by drawing upon the principle of suitableness of means to the end and upon the requirements of education. For punishment is not an end in itself: its object is requital (iustitia vindicativa) as well as deterrence and education.5

  The special form of the virtue of prudence for the lawmaker consists not only herein, but also in deriving the positive norm from the principles with due regard for concrete circumstances. St. Thomas, it will be recalled, repeatedly mentions the function of circumstances in determining the reasonableness of a law. “The execution of justice, in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues—prudence and justice—belong most properly to a king,” i.e., in his principal function of lawmaking.6 For prudence combines the knowledge of general principles with the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, since it governs the right choice of means for attaining the end.7 The prudence of the lawmaker is the most perfect species of prudence, and it is compared to the prudence of subjects as mastercraft to handicraft.8

  It is thus sufficiently established that all positive laws should in some way be derivations from the natural law or determinations of it. But this does not mean that every positive law which is not a correct derivation or determination of the natural law is therefore not binding and is devoid of obligation. Only those positive laws are purely and simply non-obligatory which command one to do something that in itself is immoral and unjust. To this category belong laws that are at variance with the prohibitive precepts of the natural law. There is nothing revolutionary about this; it is something self-evident. Scarcely anybody will regard as right a law which allows assassination, adultery, or perjury. Few will call the early Christians contemners of law because they refused obedience to the pagan laws which prescribed sacrifices to idols.

  On the other hand, an unjust law (e.g., a tax law which is in conflict with the principle of justice and proportionateness) is not solely on that account devoid of obligation. An unjust law is not forthwith an immoral law in the strict sense, that is, a law which prescribes a sinful action. In cases of this kind the maintenance of even an imperfect ordo takes precedence over resistance to a particular unjust law. The natural law is, of course, a norm for the lawmaker. Such a view has been held by nearly all philosophers of law, including the founders of the modern theory of sovereignty, Bodin and for a time even Hobbes. Yet a positive law which is certainly unjust but does not contradict the natural law in its prohibitive norms does not give to judges and other public officials, whom the constitution obliges to apply and execute the law, or to the subjects of the law a right to consider the law non-binding and invalid. Even a tax law which agrees neither with distributive justice nor, say, with the principle of expenditure in the general interest does not justify a person in defrauding the revenue. The natural-law principles of obedience and truthfulness here again take precedence. The proper remedy is not disobedience but use of the means provided by the constitution. Since, however, the prohibitive precepts of the natural law have precisely the function of protecting the social order in its deepest foundation, a positive law that commands something which is in itself unjust and immoral must be regarded as non-law.9 When little or no respect any longer exists for any authority; when marriage generally ceases to be differentiated from concubinage and promiscuity; when the honor of one’s fellow citizen is no longer respected and oaths no longer have force, then the possibility of social living, of order in human affairs, vanishes altogether.

  So far as the other norms of the natural law (ius naturale permissivum vel praecipiens) are concerned, the positive law is free in its efforts to give effect to these precepts. For in this case questions of national character, suitableness of means, circumstances, and forms of government are decisive. Here, in other words, the prudence of the lawmaker is the decisive factor. This prudent reserve of the traditional natural law (ius naturale perenne) also implies that there are no points of irreconcilable opposition between the natural law and the historical school of law: the two can and should complement each other.

  Some examples may serve to illustrate this. The institution of private property is at the very least in accordance with the natural law. But this does not mean that severe restrictions on the use of property, or even expropriations for reasons of general welfare, are absolutely contrary to the natural law. Nor does it mean that the Roman law idea of property or the feudalist or capitalist systems of ownership pertain to the natural law. It involves merely the directive to the lawmaker to fashion the actual order of ownership in such a way that property may here and now be qualified to perform (for the individual person, for the family in general, and for most of the members of the nation) its natural-law social function in keeping with the national character and the stage of economic development. The property system of private capitalism with its unrestrained freedom of ownership, with its mobilization of all real property, with its tendency toward giant corporations and trusts, and with its division of each people into a relatively few “haves” and a great many “have-nots,” has been for a long time in no position to perform this function. Taking their stand on the natural law, and often enough in prophetic loneliness, Catholic social reformers since Bishop von Ketteler (1811–77), and even since the romantic movement, have been making this clear in their struggle against economic liberalism. They have also been at pains to point out that the liberty of the propertyless is largely a fiction. To save the family they have demonstrated its right to property as a material substratum of its biological and moral existence. Furthermore, it was owing to its individualism that the Roman people fashioned its positive institutions of property along individualist lines. It was in accordance with the corporative spirit of the German people, however, to fashion in Germanic law a substantially different system of property, one which imposed heavy obligations upon owners, and included specific forms of joint ownership (e.g., in the apportionment of the returns of property among many joint claimants), and especially to treat personal and real property according to separate forms. Hence Bishop von Ketteler, the adherent of natural law, in his proposals for social reform significantly called for the restoration of Germanic law. The positive institutions of property do not have the character of something holy. On the contrary, the common good requires of the lawmaker that he prudently introduce changes into the system of property and adapt it to new economic conditions. A complex commercial and industrial economy obviously calls for a different system of property than is required by a simple natural economy.

  The rationalist school of natural law had inferred from its own view of natural law that either absolute monarchy or pure democracy, according to the preferences of the writers and the supposed needs or trends of the times, is alone authorized by natural law. The older natural-law doctrine had never advocated sharply defined ideal governments of this sort. Its ideal government was the system of mixed government, which in any event included the participation of the people.10 St. Thomas holds that the constitution must be suited to the character of the people and to its moral vigor. ‡An earnest, moderate, and responsible people which cherishes the general welfare may with full right govern itself through republican institutions and freely elected officials.11 Here indeed the natural-law principle, salus populi (taken concretely in the sense of an individual people in its historical peculiarity) suprema lex,12 is valid, and not the positivist axiom which declares that the will of the prince is the supreme law. Thus the Christian natural law has never indulged in the mania for deduction which characterized rationalism. On the contrary, it has been able to take into account the peculiarity of individual peoples and their legal genius, the course of their historical development, and their economic evolution. For only the eternal structural laws of the social life of man as such are of natural law, not the concrete architectural form. The stylistic variation of the art-forms of individual peoples is no disproof of the eternal laws of beauty in art.

  The natural law calls, then, for the positive law. This explains why the natural law, though it is the enduring basis and norm of the positive law, progressively withdraws, as it were, behind the curtain of the positive law as the latter achieves a continually greater perfection. This is also why the natural law reappears whenever the positive law is transformed into objective injustice through the evolution and play of vital forces and the functional changes of communities.

  For the same reason the practical jurist is generally satisfied with the theory and exclusive application of the positive law. “Our quarrel does not turn on the thing, but on a word: on the meaning in which we use the word ‘law.’ We term law only the positive norm which emanates from the will of the state. What you call natural law we consider ethics, the moral foundations of law which we also acknowledge” (H. Ermann). Natural law is viewed simply as non-applicable law, as devoid of force in the legal sense. But such a view is altogether inadequate. In the first place, it mistakenly presupposes the completeness of (the lack of gaps in) the positive law. Next, it does not square with all legal systems. It stems rather from a politico-legal conviction that, since the judge is bound to apply the positive law, he should not meddle with the function of the legislator whose express duty it is to realize justice. In states where judicial supremacy prevails (in ancient Rome, in medieval German law, in countries of the Anglo-Saxon common law)13 the judges’ ruling is directly creative of law. Certainly these judges appealed and still appeal precisely to the natural law or natural justice. Finally, as has already been indicated, even the positive law frequently refers to the natural law, especially under the form of equity.

  ‡It seems that, with regard to the matter of validity, two things have to be distinguished: the validity of law which is related to the order of mere existence (practical and historical factuality) and the validity of law which is related to the order of essence (the metaphysical order). The positive law has validity to the extent that it is promulgated by the duly constituted lawmaker as his factual will. The natural law has validity independently of its embodiment in a factual volitional act. It is thereby valid at least for the lawmaker. Whether and to what extent it binds the judge or has validity for him is more a question of the constitution of the state: it depends rather upon the public-law principle of the division of powers. According to this principle the judge, i.e., the judicial power, has only to apply the laws or the law of the land. Yet it would be decidedly narrow and illogical to exclude natural law from the laws, and to contend that only such laws are meant as are duly enacted in conformity with the formal legislative procedure established by the constitution without any regard to matter and content, to what is intrinsically just or unjust, i.e., without regard to the natural law. Under constitutional government bulwarked by a bill of rights there exists indeed a strong presumption of law and of right that all laws enacted in keeping with constitutional procedure are not out of harmony with the natural law. It is from this assumption that such laws derive not only their factual enforceability but also their ultimate validity before conscience. Nevertheless this presumption is precisely what it means, a practical device which in particular circumstances does not exclude the duty of the judge to invalidate or not to apply a certain positive law which is clearly at variance with the natural law. In any event the prohibitive precepts of the natural law bind even the judge.14

  Under constitutional, free government with the added safeguard of a bill of rights there thus exists a strong presumption that the positive law is a determination and derivation of the natural law. For this reason and also because of the consequent de facto legal peace, which enables and permits men to accept without further scrutiny the order of positive law, the idea of natural law remains as it were latent. But it makes itself felt whenever the positive law, in itself or in the eyes of a large number of people, appears to be in conflict with the natural law. Then the primordial rights of the person, the family, and the national group stand forth with elemental force against the power of the state, which develops into tyranny by denying the foundations of political community, its own moral root: the natural law. But this is juridically permissible and can meet with ethical approval only if the natural law is real, valid law; otherwise such disobedience toward the positive law could not be approved of. If the old distinction between unlawful sedition and justifiable resistance to the power of the state (i.e., revolution)—a distinction which played such a vital role in medieval legal thought in the form of the common subjection of people and ruler to the law15 —has progressively disappeared in the modern age, this is due to several factors. First, the people take an increasingly greater part in the development of the positive law, in lawmaking as well as in administering and applying the law. Thus is produced a greater unity of law with the spirit of the people. Secondly, interpretation of the written law in accordance with justice and equity is achieved through the ethos of the true judge. Lastly, the world of positive law has been progressively penetrated by the principles and prestige of Christian ethics.16

  CHAPTER XV

  Conclusion

  Modern totalitarianism with its depersonalization of man, with its debasement of man to the position of a particle of an amorphous mass which is molded and remolded in accordance with the shifting policy of the “Leader,” is of its very nature extremely voluntaristic. Voluntas facit legem: law is will. How seldom the theorists and practitioners of totalitarianism mention reason, and how frequently they glory in the triumph of the will! The will of the Leader or of the Commissar is not bound by or responsible to an objective body of moral values or an objective standard of morality revealed in the order of being and in human nature. The will is not bound by the objective, conventional meaning of words or by the relation of these to ideas and things. Ideas, as well as the words which express them, are mere tools for the will: they are to be remolded whenever this is expedient. Accordingly an appeal from decisions of this will to natural law, to intrinsic right, to justice and equity, to ideas, must appear as “treason” which stems from democratic decadence or from bourgeois prejudices. The defense against totalitarianism cannot plead greater efficiency, more economic productivity, which are the categories in which the totalitarian “social engineer” thinks. Such a defense must appeal to justice, to the rule of reason; it must plead in the name of the natural law and of the natural rights of human persons and their free associations. Natural law is not only an ideal for the positive law, for legislation to realize; it is also a critical norm for the existing positive law.

  Natural law, however, is essentially a framework law, a skeleton law. It does not ordinarily give us a concrete norm directly applicable to action here and now in the involved situations of actual life. It does not, for instance, tell us which of the many possible forms of laws about property is right in the abstract. Neither the capitalistic nor the feudal system of property is imposed by the natural law. But it judges each and every existing system of property in terms of justice. Moreover, natural law does not condemn the wage contract as such or the socioeconomic order of which the wage contract is so important a part, but it makes clear that a social order in which the so-called iron law of wages rules the labor market violates justice and equity. Further, natural law does not proclaim that democracy as a form of government is the sole admissible mode of political organization; yet it does tell us that any form of government, even one that is decked out in the trappings of democracy, which does not recognize the fundamental rights of the person and of the family is tyrannical and may, therefore, rightly be resisted. Natural law, finally, does not say that the Security Council of the United Nations is, in its concrete form, good and efficient; but it does forbid the independence of a small nation to be sacrificed out of mere expediency for the sake of the “security” of a great power. This quality of the unvarying natural law, which elevates it above the changing historical positive law, which makes it both the ideal for lawmakers and the critical norm for existing laws, renders it possible for the natural law to govern the acquisition and exercise of political power itself.

  Politics is and remains a part of the moral universe. For it is inexcusable to view politics merely as the technique or art of achieving and retaining social power for some selfish end through the skillful exploitation of human weaknesses, by deceit or by terrorist methods. Politics is rather the great architectonic art by which men build the institutions and protective forms of their individual and communal life for a more perfect realization of the good life. Its main function is to establish an order and unity of cooperation among free persons and free associations of persons in such a way that these, while they freely pursue their individual and group interests, are nevertheless so coordinated that they realize at the same time the common good under the rule of law. But the rule of law is the natural law which justifies the use of political power and before which power itself as well as resistance to arbitrary acts of those in authority must establish its legitimacy: through the natural law alone can we solve the crucial political problem of the legitimacy of power and the duty of free persons to obey. Thus the rule of law, the paramount law binding both the ruler and the ruled, necessarily implies the idea of natural law as the critical norm for the existing positive legal order and for the demand to change it, if it has become unjust. The hope of a peaceful change of the legal status quo within each nation as well as in the community of nations depends on the acceptance of such a higher law that measures both the legal rights of the status quo and the claims of those who would alter it; and it measures them because it is based on natural reason, in which all men participate. For the natural law, ultimately of divine origin but revealed in the very order of being, is but the rule of reason founded upon the rational and social nature of man. Veritas facit legem: law is truth.

  “All men are born natural-law jurists.” This fact, which Bergbohm notes at the beginning of his great attack on the natural law, should surely have shown an unbiased person that the very essence of man as a moral, social being points to the nature of law. For all men are born natural-law jurists because in the human soul lies the ineradicable demand that the law must live in morality. All law must be just: only then can it obtain that power which primarily holds together and continually renews every community, and in particular every political community, the power to bind in conscience. But the proper function of the natural-law doctrine is precisely to show forth the connection between morality and law. Consequently it must, for the sake of the very existence of man and his concrete legally ordered communities, ever recur, and it does in fact always return whenever the genius of law seeks out its own foundations.

  The foundation of law is justice. “Truth grants or refuses the highest crown to the products of positive legislation, and they draw from truth their true moral force” (Franz Brentano). But truth is conformity with reality. And just as the real and the true are one, so too the true and the just are ultimately one. Veritas facit legem. And in this profound sense of the unity of truth and justice the words, “And the truth shall make you free,”1 are applicable to the community of men under law. True freedom consists in being bound by justice.2

  Select Bibliography

  Because the subject of natural law touches at least five disciplines in the modern academy—law, philosophy, theology, politics, and history—the literature is extraordinarily diverse. The best single source is the American Journal of Jurisprudence (formerly the Natural Law Forum), which publishes articles, reviews, and bibliographies reflecting the entire spectrum of natural law themes and methods. See, for example, the recent bibliography by Schall.

  • Schall, James V. “The Natural Law Bibliography.” American Journal of Jurisprudence 40 (1995): 157–98.

  general studies

  Historical summaries and interpretations of natural law vary considerably. The book by Rommen’s Italian contemporary, d’Entrèves, is still useful, but one should get the 1994 edition, which includes new appendices reflecting changes in the author’s thinking. The encyclopedia entry by Leo Strauss is perhaps the best summary of Strauss’s approach to the problem of natural law. Simon’s book, based on his 1958 lectures at the University of Chicago, is a remarkably clear exposition of the philosophical problems that attend theories of natural law.

  • d’Entrèves, A. P. Natural Law. 2d rev. ed. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1972. Reprint, with new Introduction by Cary J. Nederman. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994.
  • Gierke, Otto. Natural Law and the Theory of Society. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934.
  • Simon, Yves R. The Tradition of Natural Law: A Philosopher’s Reflections. Ed. Vukan Kuic. 1965. Reprint, with an introduction by Russell Hittinger. New York: Fordham University Press, 1992.
  • Strauss, Leo. “On Natural Law.” In Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, 137–46. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Originally published in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills, 2:80–90.

  ancient

  Systematically developed theories of natural law are the work of medieval and modern minds. But the problem of natural justice was addressed by Plato, Aristotle, and the Greek and Roman Stoics. Works by Barker, Miller, Maguire, Spanneut, A. Watson, and G. Watson treat the concept of justice by nature in the philosophers of antiquity; Novak studies its development in Jewish thought. In The Natural Law, Rommen depicts the transition from classical to medieval theories as being smooth and cumulative. The essay by Koester, however, suggests that the transition was more abrupt. He argues that the introduction of biblical ideas of creation and law into the Graeco-Roman world is chiefly responsible for the concept of “natural law.” The essay by Mahoney traces some of the early theological formulations and uses of natural law.

  • Barker, Ernest. “Aristotle’s Conception of Justice, Law, and Equity in the Ethics and the Rhetoric.” In The Politics of Aristotle, 362–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958.
  • Koester, Helmut. “The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought.” In Religions in Antiquity, ed. Jacob Neusner. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968.
  • Maguire, G. P. “Plato’s Theory of Natural Law.” Yale Classical Studies 10 (1947): 151–78.
  • Mahoney, John, S.J. “Nature and Supernature.” In Natural Law and Theology, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, 413–63. New York: Paulist Press, 1991.
  • Miller, Fred D. “Aristotle on Natural Law and Justice.” In A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, ed. David Keyt and Fred D. Miller. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991.
  • Novak, David. “Natural Law, Halakhah and the Covenant.” Jewish Law Annual 7 (1988): 43–67.
  • Spanneut, M. “Stoicism: Influence on Christian Thought.” In New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 13, 719–21. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
  • Watson, Alan. “The Legacy of Justinian Natural Law.” In Roman Law and Comparative Law, 214–20. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991.
  • Watson, G. “The Early History of Natural Law.” Irish Theological Quarterly 33 (1966): 65–74.

  medieval and scholastic

  Today, the work of Thomas Aquinas is widely regarded as the preeminent example of medieval natural law theory. For general studies on Thomas Aquinas, see the books by Chenu and Torrell. By no means, however, is contemporary Thomism a united front. Adler, Brock, and Grisez provide three very different interpretations of Thomas’s natural law theory. The essays and books by Bourke, Davitt, Dewan, and McInerny treat various Thomistic themes and issues. While not being explications of Thomas’s texts, the books by Maritain, Simon, and Messner represent some of the best neo-scholastic work on natural law in Rommen’s generation. Murray’s influential collection of essays tries to reconcile the scholastic tradition with American institutions. Finally, the essay by Alasdair MacIntyre reflects upon the papal use of natural law in the recent encyclical Veritatis Splendor.

  Historically, Thomas was only one tributary of medieval natural law thinking. Works by Berman, Gilby, Gratian (new edition by Thompson and Gordley), Kuttner, Pennington, Post, and Ullmann explore the political and jurisprudential themes that formed the institutional context and background of the philosophical and theological debates in the medieval schools. Works by Oakley, McDonnell, Gewirth, and Tuck examine the non-Thomistic channels of medieval natural law thinking, some of which proved very influential for the development of modern theories of law and rights.

  • Adler, Mortimer. “A Question About Law.” In Essays in Thomism, ed. Robert E. Brennan, 207–36. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942.
  • Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
  • Bourke, Vernon. “The Background of Aquinas’ Synderesis Principle.” In Graceful Reason, ed. Lloyd Gerson. Toronto: Institute for Mediaeval Studies, 1983.
  • ———. “The Synderesis Rule and Right Reason.” Monist 66 (1983): 71–82.
  • Brock, Stephen L. “The Legal Character of Natural Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas.” Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 1988.
  • Chenu, Marie-Dominique. Toward Understanding Saint Thomas. Trans. A. M. Landry and D. Hughes. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964.
  • Davitt, Thomas E. The Nature of Law. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1951.
  • Dewan, Lawrence. “St. Thomas, Our Natural Lights, and the Moral Order.” Angelicum 67 (1990): 285–308.
  • Donagan, Alan. “The Scholastic Theory of Moral Law in the Modern World.” In Aquinas, ed. A. Kenny, 328–29. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.
  • Gewirth, Alan. Marsilius of Padua: The Defender of Peace. Vol. 1 of Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.
  • Gilby, Thomas. Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953.
  • ———. The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
  • Gratian. The Treatise on Laws (Decretum DD. 1–20), with the Ordinary Gloss. Trans. Augustine Thompson, O.P., and James Gordley Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993.
  • Grisez, Germain. “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae 94.2.” Natural Law Forum 10 (1965): 168–201.
  • Kuttner, Stephen. “The Natural Law and Canon Law.” Proceedings of the University of Notre Dame Natural Law Institute 3 (1950): 85–116.
  • MacIntyre, Alasdair. “How Can We Learn What Veritatis Splendor Has to Teach.” Thomist 58, no. 2 (1994): 171–94.
  • Maritain, Jacques. La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite. Fribourg: Éditions universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1986.
  • McDonnell, K. “Does William of Ockham Have a Theory of Natural Law?” Franciscan Studies 34 (1974): 383–92.
  • McInerny, Ralph. “The Basis and Purpose of Positive Law.” In Lex et Libertas, ed. L. J. Elders and K. Hedwig, 137–46. Vatican: Pontificia Accadmia Di S. Tommaso E Di Religione Cattolica, 1987.
  • Messner, Johannes. Social Ethics: Natural Law in the Western World. Trans. J. J. Doherty. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1965.
  • Murray, John Courtney. We Hold These Truths. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960.
  • Oakley, Francis. “Medieval Theories of Natural Law: William of Ockham and the Significance of the Voluntarist Tradition.” Natural Law Forum 6 (1961): 65–83.
  • Pennington, K. The Prince and the Law. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
  • Post, Gaines. Studies in Medieval Legal Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.
  • Simon, Yves R. Philosophy of Democratic Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
  • Torrell, Jean-Pierre. The Person and His Work. Vol. 1 of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Trans. Robert Royal. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996.
  • Tuck, Richard. Natural Rights Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
  • Ullmann, Walter. Jurisprudence in the Middle Ages. London: Variorum Reprints, 1980.

  enlightenment

  Although there are family resemblances between premodern and modern theories of natural law, the Enlightenment era theorists reworked natural law in the light of new philosophical vocabularies and under the pressure of new political and institutional forces. Ruby and Rapaczynski investigate how the new sciences changed the logic of predicating “law(s)” of “nature.” Windolph and Bobbio examine the most important figure in that change, Thomas Hobbes. Leo Strauss’s book recommends itself. Strauss emphasized the discontinuity of ancient and modern theories of natural right. There is much disagreement, however, about how this discontinuity applies to John Locke. Different readings of Locke are to be found in the books by Grant, Andrew, and Haakonssen. Haakonssen examines the Enlightenment generally, and Scottish tradition in particular. Buckle, Schneewind, Waddicor, and Windolph take up the issue of natural law in various Enlightenment philosophers.

  • Andrew, Edward. Shylock’s Rights: A Grammar of Lockian Claims. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.
  • Bobbio, Norberto. Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
  • Buckle, Stephen. Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1991.
  • Chroust, Anton-Hermann. “Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition.” New Scholasticism 17, no. 2 (1943): 101–33.
  • Grant, Ruth. John Locke’s Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
  • Haakonssen, Knud. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
  • Rapaczynski, Andrzej. Nature and Politics: Liberalism in the Philosophies of Hobbe, Locke, and Rousseau. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
  • Ruby, Jane E. “The Origins of Scientific ‘Law.’” Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986): 341–59.
  • Schneewind, J. B. “Kant and Natural Law Ethics.” Ethics 104 (October 1993): 53–74.
  • Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
  • Waddicor, Mark H. Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
  • Windolph, F. Lyman. Leviathan and Natural Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951.

  anglo-american

  The Atiyah-Summers volume compares English and American legal cultures, including their respective attitudes toward natural law. For the English situation, see the works of Hart (1958), Postema, and Stanlis; for the American, see Brownson, Corwin, Hittinger (1990), and Tiedeman. The famous debate of a generation ago, between Fuller and Hart, exemplifies many of the differences between the English and American minds on natural law.

  Concerning the role of natural law in judicial review, see my remarks in the Introduction on the books by Corwin, Cover, Haines, and Wright. For the Fourteenth Amendment and the jurisprudence of due process, see Arkes (1994), Ely, Nelson, and Stevens. The Barnett volume includes essays on the Ninth Amendment. Arkes (1990), Dworkin, and Richards agree that the Constitution requires a moral interpretation but differ considerably on both the substance and the logic of the morality that ought to guide jurisprudence. The essay by Hittinger explores natural law grounds for judicial restraint. Ely argues that theories of natural law provide no such restraint.

  • Arkes, Hadley. Beyond the Constitution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
  • ———. The Return of George Sutherland: Restoring a Jurisprudence of Natural Rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
  • Atiyah, P. S., and R. S. Summers. Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1987.
  • Barnett, Randy E., ed. The Rights Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Fairfax: George Mason University Press, 1989.
  • Brownson, Orestes A. “The Higher Law.” In Essays and Reviews, Chiefly on Theology, Politics, and Socialism, 349–67. New York: D. and J. Sadlier, 1880.
  • Corwin, Edward S. The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955.
  • Cover, Robert M. Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.
  • Dworkin, Ronald. “‘Natural’ Law Revisited.” University of Florida Law Review 34 (1982): 165–88.
  • Ely, John Hart. Democracy and Distrust. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
  • Fuller, Lon. The Morality of Law. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.
  • Haines, Charles Groves. The Revival of Natural Law Concepts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930.
  • Hart, H. L. A. “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morality.” Harvard Law Review 71 (1958): 593–629.
  • ———. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.
  • ———. “Review of Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law.” In Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 343–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1983.
  • Hittinger, Russell. “Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition.” Wake Forest Law Review 25, no. 3 (1990): 429–99.
  • ———. “Natural Law in the Positive Laws: A Legislative or Adjudicative Issue?” Review of Politics 55, no. 1 (1993): 5–34.
  • Nelson, William. The Fourteenth Amendment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.
  • Postema, Gerald. Bentham and the Common Law Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
  • Richards, David A. J. Toleration and the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
  • Stanlis, Peter J. Edmund Burke and the Natural Law. Shreveport: Huntington House, 1986.
  • Stevens, Richard J. Frankfurter and Due Process. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987.
  • Tiedeman, Christopher G. The Unwritten Constitution of the United States. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890.
  • Wright, Benjamin Fletcher. American Interpretations of Natural Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931.

  contemporary debates

  In addition to the issue of judicial review, contemporary debates about natural law often crystalize around two other problems: first, the ongoing debate over legal positivism; second, the role of subjective rights in natural law theory. The book by John Finnis is a good place to begin in understanding both of these problems. A professor at Oxford, Finnis has developed an influential theory of natural law that has affinities to both the scholastic and analytical traditions. Finnis also systematically develops a theory of natural rights. The works by George, MacCormick, and Raz indicate that debates between natural lawyers and positivists are more refined today than they were a generation ago. On the problem of natural rights, see the two works by Fortin, who questions the compatibility between the older natural law tradition and the modern notion of personally possessed (i.e., subjective) rights. McInerny and Veatch also explore philosophical problems of welding together the two traditions. Maritain’s book is a famous example of the effort by some neo-Thomists to affirm the modern notion of inalienable rights. Hervada, on the other hand, develops an older conception of natural rights, not unlike Rommen. Writings by Tierney, Tuck (above), and Villey take different positions on the historical question of whether modern natural rights are rooted in the medieval scholastic tradition. Books by Gewirth, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl are recent efforts to make sense of natural or human rights completely apart from the scholastic tradition. Finally, Shapiro provides an intellectual history of the evolution of modern rights theories.

  • Finnis, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1980.
  • Fortin, Ernest. “The New Rights Theory and the Natural Law.” Review of Politics 44 (October 1982): 590–612.
  • ———. “‘Sacred and Inviolable’: Rerum Novarum and Natural Rights.” Theological Studies 53 (1992): 202–33.
  • George, Robert P., ed. Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1992.
  • ———. The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1996.
  • Gewirth, Alan. Reason and Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
  • Hervada, Javier. Natural Right and Natural Law: A Critical Introduction. Trans. Alban d’Entremont. Pamplona, Spain: University of Navarra, 1987.
  • MacCormick, Neil. “Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals.” In Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, ed. Robert P. George, 105–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1992.
  • Maritain, Jacques. Man and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
  • McInerny, Ralph. “Natural Law and Human Rights.” American Journal of Jurisprudence 36 (1991): 1–14.
  • Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Douglas J. Den Uyl. Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1991.
  • Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1986.
  • Shapiro, Ian. The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
  • Tierney, Brian. “Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights.” In The Weightier Matters of the Law, ed. John Witte and F. S. Alexander. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988.
  • ———. “Aristotle and the American Indians—Again.” Christianesimo Nella Storia 12 (Spring 1991): 295–322.
  • Veatch, Henry B. Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985.
  • Villey, Michel. Le droit et les droits de l’homme. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1983.

  This book was set in Caslon, an English type designed in 1722 by William Caslon. It is often used in body text because the individual letters have a simple charm and are interesting and legible.

  Printed on paper that is acid-free and meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48-1992.(archival)

  Book design by Betty Palmer McDaniel, Athens, Georgia

  Composition by Monotype Composition Co., Inc., Baltimore, Maryland

  Printed and bound by Edwards Brothers, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

  [1.]Der Staat in der katholischen Gedankenwelt (1935) and Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts (1936).

  [2.]Despite copious references to the works of great philosophers and jurisprudents, Rommen’s original text contained no footnotes. The notes in the present volume were supplied later by his English translator.

  [3.]The State in Catholic Thought: A Treatise in Political Philosophy (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1945), p. 212 (hereafter abbreviated SCT).

  [4.]The original German title of The Natural Law is Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts (1936). Literally translated, “The Eternal Return of the Natural Right.”

  [5.]SCT, p. 48.

  [6.]SCT, p. 212. For a recent study of the Nazi legal system, see Ingo Müller, Hitler’s Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich, trans. D. L. Schneider (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

  [7.]SCT, p. 718.

  [8.]Infra p. 110.

  [9.]Infra p. 136.

  [10.]Infra p. 113.

  [11.]While still in Germany, Gurian allegedly threw the fascist legal philosopher Carl Schmitt down some stairs during a philosophical argument.

  [12.]Oliver W. Holmes, “The Natural Law” (1918), in Collected Legal Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), p. 312.

  [13.]For a comparison of English and American law, emphasizing the American dissatisfaction with formalism, see P. S. Atiyah and R. S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1987).

  [14.]On the conduct of judges in the antebellum Republic, see Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

  [15.]Even today, “natural law” often means any species of moral theory used by appellate judges when they interpret and apply law. See, for example, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

  [16.]Corwin wrote, “Invested with statutory form and implemented by judicial review, higher law, as with renewed youth, entered upon one of the greatest periods of its history, and juristically the most fruitful one since the days of Justinian.” The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 89.

  [17.]See Hadley Arkes, The Return of George Sutherland: Restoring a Jurisprudence of Natural Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

  [18.]Infra pp. 36–37 , 220–21 , 232–33 .

  [19.]Infra p. 232.

  [20.]Jacques Maritain, for example, wrote, “I think that the American institution of the Supreme Court is one of the great political achievements of modern times, and one of the most significant tributes ever paid to wisdom and its right of preeminence in human affairs.” Reflections on America (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), p. 171. Maritain, who helped shape the UNESCO and UN statements on universal human rights, believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was a model for checking the mistaken notion of state sovereignty. Like Rommen, Maritain was vaguely aware of the Court’s natural law jurisprudence in applying that Amendment; and, like Rommen, he was more interested in the problems drawn from the European experience than in U.S. constitutional law.

  [21.]Of course, the problem of judicial review would reemerge later, but long after the renascence.

  [22.]Summa theologiae I–II, q. 94 (hereafter abbreviated S.t.). At II–II, q. 57.2, there is one article devoted to ius naturale.

  [23.]This chapter of intellectual history is covered by Brian Tierney, “Aristotle and the American Indians—Again,” Christianesimo Nella Storia 12 (Spring 1991): 295–322.

  [24.]SCT, p. 9.

  [25.]See, for example, SCT, p. 113, for Rommen’s critical remarks about the reactionary French political movement Action Française, which attracted the young Jacques Maritain, who broke with the movement after it was condemned by Rome in 1926. Both in France and in Spain, Catholic thinkers had to come to grips with the possibility that antimodernist political movements were only superficially traditional.

  [26.]Infra p. 4.

  [27.]Infra p. 36.

  [28.]S.t. I–II, q. 17.1.

  [29.]Thomas Jefferson called law, very simply, “written reason.” Thomas Jefferson, The Writings, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New York, 1898), 9:480, 18:1 (“The Batture at New Orleans”), 15:207.

  [30.]Infra p. 169–72. Here, Rommen discusses the famous definitio legis of Thomas Aquinas: “law is naught else but a work of reason, made and promulgated by a competent authority for the common good.” S.t. I–II, q. 90. Thomas did not include the coercive aspect of law in the definition, for he held that although coercion is an act of law (q. 92.2), it is not of the essence of law. This stands in marked contrast to the equally famous definition of law given by the English positivist, John Austin, who said in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832. Reprint, New York: Noonday Press, 1954) that law is the command of a sovereign, backed by sanctions, and habitually obeyed. The Austinian definition also contains four elements: (1) the command expresses “a wish that I shall do or forbear from some act, and if you will visit me with an evil in case I comply not with your wish”; (2) the sanction is the “evil” or “pain,” either threatened or imposed; (3) the sovereign is defined, first, as one who has “might,” which is to say “the power of affecting otherwise with evil or pain, and of forcing them through fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to one’s wishes,” and, second, as one who is not so affected by any other agent; (4) whose wishes, when stated in imperative form, produce a predictable result, namely, habitual obedience, at least by “the bulk of a given society.” Provided that certain syntactical and sociological conditions obtain (that words can express imperatives, and that a chain of power terminates at a determinate superior), law is the unilateral projection of force.

  [31.]Infra p. 51–58.

  [32.]Infra p. 79.

  [33.]SCT,p. 19.

  [34.]Infra p. 182–83.

  [35.] Infra p. 204 –9.

  [36.]Infra p. 188.

  [37.]Infra p. 221–22.

  [38.]Infra p. 190–91.

  [39.]Infra p. 230–31.

  [1.]“It is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g., about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end” (Metaphysica, A. 2, 982b; trans. W. D. Ross).

  [2.]That is, in the third and fourth centuries of the Christian era, after all the free inhabitants of the Roman Empire had been made citizens (212), and in the Middle Ages through its incorporation in the canon law of the Church, its systematic study in the universities, and its subsequent reception in Western Europe. Cf. Roscoe Pound, “The Church in Legal History,” in Jubilee Law Lectures, 1889–1939. School of Law, The Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C., 1939), p. 25, quoting Rudolph von Jhering. Of considerable value, especially for the historical portion of the present volume, is Jerome Hall, Readings in Jurisprudence (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938).

  [3.]See, in general, Otto Karrer, Religions of Mankind, trans. by E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936), chaps. 1 and 2.

  [4.]Fragments 112–14, in Charles M. Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907), p. 34.

  [5.]Fragment 44; ibid., p. 31.

  [6.]On these ideas of the Sophists, see the excellent discussion of George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1937), pp. 25–34.

  [7.]On the other hand, Socrates’ older contemporary, the dramatist Sophocles (496–406 b.c.), has the heroine of the tragedy Antigone declare that her conscience is altogether clear even though she had deliberately overstepped a law of King Creon by burying her brother against the royal orders. She defends herself by appealing to a law higher than any ordinance made by man (ll. 450–60):

  • “Because it was not Zeus who ordered it,
  • Nor Justice, dweller with the Nether Gods,
  • Gave such a law to man; nor did I deem
  • Your ordinance of so much binding force,
  • As that a mortal man could overbear
  • The unchangeable unwritten code of Heaven;
  • This is not of today and yesterday,
  • But lives forever, having origin
  • Whence no man knows: whose sanctions I were loath
  • In Heaven’s sight to provoke, fearing the will
  • Of any man.” (George Young’s translation.)

  The validity of this particular use of the higher-law doctrine is beside the point.

  [8.]Laws, IV, 715 (Jowett’s translation).

  [9.]Cf Werner Jaeger, Humanism and Theology (The Aquinas Lecture, 1943. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1943), pp. 38–40, 50 f.

  [10.]This phrase is used by Cicero in his speech For T. A. Milo, apropos of the right of self-defense: “This, therefore, is a law, O judges, not written, but born with us, which we have not learnt, or received by tradition, or read, but which we have taken and sucked in and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we were not taught, but to which we were made, which we were not trained in, but which is ingrained in us, namely, that if our life be in danger from plots or from open violence or from the weapons of robbers or enemies, every means of securing our safety is honourable” (Yonge’s translation). Cicero’s conclusion, it is worth observing, is too broad: not every means of self-preservation is morally allowable.

  [11.]Laws, I, xvi, translated by C. W. Keyes, in the Loeb Classical Library. Cf. also ibid., I, x, xv, xvii f.

  [12.]The following is another celebrated passage of Cicero on the same subject: “True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment” (The Republic, III, xxii, trans. by C. W. Keyes, in the Loeb Classical Library).

  [13.]Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, XCV, 33.

  [14.]Ibid., XCV, 52, trans. by R. M. Gummere, in the Loeb Classical Library. The pantheistic cast of Stoic thought is here unmistakable.

  [15.]Meditations, VI, 44.

  [16.]Cf. R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West (6 vols., Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1903–36), I, pp. 23 ff.

  [17.]On “responding” and on its later development, the ius respondendi, see, e.g., W. W. Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), pp. 14 f.; James Hadley, Introduction to Roman Law (reprint, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), pp. 61–69.

  [18.]Cf. Digest, I, i, 1–4; Carlyle and Carlyle, op. cit., I, 34–44.

  [19.]Digest, I, i, 10.

  [20.]Anglo-Saxons will be disposed to demur. But this is not the place to attempt to weigh the claims of the English system of common law, in which the natural law has also played an important role, to equal or superior excellence. In a general way, cf. W. W. Buckland and A. D. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law. A Comparison in Outline (Cambridge: The University Press, 1936).

  [21.]Philosophia perennis (a term seemingly coined by Steuchus in 1540, used by Leibnitz, and popularized by the Neo-Scholastic movement) denotes a body of basic philosophical truths that is perennial, enduring, abiding, permanent, eternal—a philosophy that “is as old and as new as philosophical speculation itself.” It is one whose “validity and truth content is not confined to any particular age or civilization but is absolute and enduring” (K. F. Reinhardt, A Realistic Philosophy [Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1944], p. 17; cf. also pp. 18 ff.). In other words, philosophia perennis is the accumulated fund of sure philosophical truths: “the eternal store of primordial philosophical truths which remains in spite of all evolutions and changes” (Philosophia Perennis. Abhandlungen zu ihrer Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, herausgegeben von Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen [2 vols., Regensburg: Josef Habbel, 1930], I, ix); “a stock of fundamental truths which survive the change of time and prevail over and above the difference of systems” (Franz Sawicki, “Die Geschichtsphilosophie als Philosophia Perennis,” ibid., I, 513). It is in the main identified with the philosophy of Aristotle as purified, synthesized, developed, deepened, and enriched through the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas. Its leading traits are aptly summarized by Jacques Maritain: The “philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas is in fact what a modern philosopher has termed the natural philosophy of the human mind, for it develops and brings to perfection what is most deeply and genuinely natural in our intellect alike in its elementary apprehensions and in its native tendency towards truth.
  
  “It is also the evidential philosophy, based on the double evidence of the data perceived by our senses and our intellectual apprehension of first principles—the philosophy of being, entirely supported by and modelled upon what is, and scrupulously respecting every demand of reality—the philosophy of the intellect, which it trusts as the faculty which attains truth, and forms by a discipline which is an incomparable mental purification. And for this very reason it proves itself the universal philosophy in the sense that it does not reflect a nationality, class, group, temperament, or race, the ambition or melancholy of an individual or any practical need, but is the expression and product of reason, which is everywhere the same; and in this sense also, that it is capable of leading the finest intellects to the most sublime knowledge and the most difficult of attainment, yet without once betraying those vital convictions, instinctively acquired by every sane mind, which compose the domain, wide as humanity of common sense. It can therefore claim to be abiding and permanent (philosophia perennis) in the sense that before Aristotle and St. Thomas had given it scientific formulation as a systematic philosophy, it existed from the dawn of humanity in germ and in the prephilosophic state, as an instinct of the understanding and a natural knowledge of the first principles of reason and ever since its foundation as a system has remained firm and progressive, a powerful and living tradition, while all other philosophies have been born and have died in turn. And, finally, it stands out as being, beyond comparison with any other, one; one because it alone bestows harmony and unity on human knowledge—both metaphysical and scientific—and one because in itself it realizes a maximum of consistency in a maximum of complexity, and neglect of the least of its principles involves the most unexpected consequences, distorting our understanding of reality in innumerable directions” (An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. by E. I. Watkin [New York: Sheed & Ward], pp. 99–101).

  [22.]See, in general, Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937), pp. 298–320. Metaphysics is but “the knowledge gathered by a naturally transcendent reason in its search for the first principles, or first causes, of what is given in sensible experience. … As metaphysics aims at transcending all particular knowledge, no particular science is competent either to solve metaphysical problems, or to judge their metaphysical solutions” (ibid., pp. 308–10).

  [1.]It is thus correct to speak of a Christian natural law, but solely in the sense in which we use the term Christian philosophy. A Christian philosophy, to adopt the balanced view of Etienne Gilson, is one “which, although keeping the two orders [of reason and the supernatural] formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason” (The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. by A. H. C. Downes [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936], p. 37). See also his Christianity and Philosophy, trans. by Ralph MacDonald, C.S.B. (New York-London: Sheed and Ward, 1939), p. 101. As Johannes Messner has pointed out, “when we speak of a ‘Christian’ natural law, this does not mean that the natural law knowable by us through reason alone is replaced or amplified by one derived from supernatural revelation, but that our knowledge of its existence, its essence and its content is confirmed and clarified through the guidance of reason by faith. … For the Catholic the designation ‘Christian’ natural law further includes the conviction that the Church, in virtue of its divine mission, is the unfaltering guardian and infallible expounder of the same” (Die Soziale Frage [5th ed., Innsbruck-Vienna: Verlagsanstalt Tyrolia, 1938], p. 492).

  [2.]Ad pop. Ant., XII, 4 (Migne, PG, Vol. CXXXII), quoted by Stanley Bertke, The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the Natural Law. The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, No. 58 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1941), p. 8, where also (pp. 5–11) the views of the other Church Fathers on the natural law are conveniently presented in summary fashion. Bertke’s study is a real contribution to the whole problem of the natural law.

  [3.]Scholasticism, which follows the main lines of Aristotle’s thought, in part “advocates a natural dualism of God and creature, mind and matter, thought and thing, as against monism and pantheism; it defends a moderate realism, as against ultrarealism, nominalism, and conceptualism, in the problem of the universals; it is spiritualistic and not materialistic, experimental and not aprioristic, objectivistic and not subjectivistic; in sense-perception it is presentational and not agnostic or representational or idealistic; concerning intellectual knowledge it defends a moderate rationalism, as against sensism, positivism, and innatism; it is common-sense knowledge critically examined and philosophically vindicated” (Celestine N. Bittle, O. M. Cap., Reality and the Mind [Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1936], p. 146).

  [4.]Cf. Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), pp. 104–234; Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., American Interpretations of Natural Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), especially pp. 292–306.

  [5.]It may be observed that the common assignment of the first three of the Mosaic Commandments to the first tablet of stone, and of the last seven Commandments to the second tablet, is merely conventional. We simply do not know how the Ten Commandments were distributed on the two stone tablets, as the Bible itself gives no information on the matter. Cf. Louis Hartman, C.SS.R., “The Enumeration of the Ten Commandments,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly, VII (1945), 105, note 1.

  [6.]For an excellent discussion of the all-important and universal metaphysical principle of finality, “every agent acts for an end,” see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., God: His Existence and His Nature, trans. by Bede Rose, O.S.B. (2 vols., St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1934–36), I, 199–204; also K. F. Reinhardt, A Realistic Philosophy, pp. 87–89.

  [7.]“In Aristotle’s vitalistic holism,” entelechy “is the substantial form or soul which unites with primary matter to constitute the unitary substance of the organic body; it is primarily an entitative principle” (Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M. Cap., The Whole Man [Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1945], p. 632). For a comparison of the Aristotelian notion of entelechy with that of Hans Driesch, cf. ibid., p. 473.

  [8.]See, in general, Gustaf J. Gustafson, S.S., The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas. The Catholic University of America Philosophical Series, Vol. LXXIV (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944), especially pp. 84–90. Among the numerous recent analyses and expositions of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the natural moral law, may be mentioned: Walter Farrell, O.P., The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez (Ditchling, England: St. Dominic’s Press, 1930); A Companion to the Summa (4 vols., New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938–42), II, 365–89; Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Frederic Eckhoff (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1944), pp. 455–73; Karl Kreilkamp, The Metaphysical Foundations of Thomistic Jurisprudence. The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. LIII (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1939), pp. 39–73; Stanley Bertke, op. cit., pp. 1–45. For an undoubtedly well-intentioned but pathetic attempt to outline, weigh, and criticize the moral philosophy of a St. Thomas (as well as to devise a positivistic methodology which will advance ethics from the alchemy stage to the high plane of science and thus accelerate the urgently needed moral progress of mankind), see Louise Saxe Eby, The Quest for Moral Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944).

  [9.]“Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension absolutely, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action (since every agent acts for an end, which has the nature of good). Consequently, the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the nature of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this; so that all the things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good belong to the precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done or avoided” (Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.94, a.2). Wherever possible, all English quotations from St. Thomas are taken from Anton C. Pegis, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (2 vols., New York: Random House, 1945). “For St. Thomas truth and goodness are one; there is a science of truth which is a science of the good; there is accordingly a truth of conduct which carries with it its own stringent obligations. There is, of course, a distinction between knowledge and action but there is only one intellect which is both speculative and practical. We might then define the object of St. Thomas’ moral science as ‘what conduct ought to be in virtue of what man really is, the right ordering of life to life’s true goal.’ The viewpoint is completely realistic” (Gustaf J. Gustafson, S.S., op. cit., p. 100).

  [10.]But it is man’s natural tendencies or inclinations which disclose to his reason and will in what direction the perfection of his essential nature lies and, therefore, more precisely what is to be done as good, and what is to be avoided as evil. “Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of the contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Therefore, the order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. For there is in man, first of all, an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances, inasmuch, namely, as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature; and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals; and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, the education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him. Thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society; and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law: e.g., to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination” (Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.94, a.2). “It is at this point that the theory of natural appetency enters the field of ethics. To know what man must do, one must first of all know what man is, know his nature, his needs, his possibilities and his limitations. In more technical language, this is to know his natural appetites, which, as orientations of that nature, point out his goal and the means which are at his disposal for its attainment” (Gustaf J. Gustafson, S.S., op. cit., p. 101).

  [11.]The “first necessary and natural dictate of practical reason is: Do good, avoid evil. The ‘good’ here is that which is according to natural inclinations, the ‘evil’ that which is against those inclinations; for the whole purpose of man’s natural inclinations, as natural, is to indicate what nature needs for its perfection.
  
  “… In the practical order, which deals with actions, the first principle is founded on the object of appetite, the root of desire and action—on ‘good’—and is: ‘good is to be done, evil is to be avoided.’ In other words, the goal or end, the object of desire, is at the root of all action, is indeed the sole explanation of intelligent action; this first principle demands that man act for his end.
  
  “But what is good? That is easy. Good is what is in accordance with the natural inclinations of man. The natural inclinations guide the practical reason to good; then the practical reason guides the appetites of man and their inclinations to the attainment of that good. Nor is this a vicious circle. The inclinations of man’s appetite are his guide to truth relative to the end or goal; for the means by which that end is to be attained, reason takes the lead and points out the path. This is only to say again that law does not establish an end, or point it out, but rather, as an act of the virtue of prudence, guides our steps to that end” (Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, II, 380 f.). Michael Cronin likewise observes that “the natural law is wider in its scope than the ends of the appetites. It extends also to the means necessary for attaining those ends. For, if we must attain the end, then we must also adopt the means” (The Science of Ethics [2 vols., 2nd rev. ed., New York: Benziger Brothers, 1929–30], I, 644).

  [12.]Viktor Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie (2 vols., 4th ed., Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1904), I, 185 f. All this, too, should enable one to appreciate the profound statement of St. Thomas: ‘We do not wrong God unless we wrong our own good” (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, chap. 122).

  [13.]St. Thomas, De veritate, q.23, a.6.

  [14.]The problem of the correct numbering of the Ten Commandments is well handled by Louis Hartman, C.SS.R., article cited, Catholic Biblical Quarterly, VII (1945), 105–8.

  [15.]Cf. Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, trans. by Doris C. Anson (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1943), pp. 62–64.

  [16.]Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.94, a.4.

  [17.]Ibid., q.100, a.1.

  [18.]De veritate, q.16, a.2 ad 1.

  [19.]Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.94, a.6. Cf. ibid., q.77, a.2; q.94, a.5; Maritain, loc. cit.

  [20.]It is well to point out that, in developed Catholic teaching, original sin is not something positive but the privation of those supernatural (especially sanctifying grace with its allied virtues) and preternatural gifts which God had gratuitously bestowed upon the human race in the person of its head, Adam. Yet it is an habitual sin of human nature itself which consists in a privative aversion toward God as man’s supernatural end and whose voluntariness springs from the actual will of Adam in his capacity as the natural head of the human race. Cf. J. M. Hervé, Manuale theologiae dogmaticae (4 vols., 17th ed., Paris: Berche et Pagis, 1935), II, nos. 429–43. Moreover, it is the far more common teaching among Catholic theologians that the natural powers of man have not been intrinsically weakened by original sin: fallen man no more differs from man in the (hypothetical) purely natural state than one who has been despoiled of his clothing differs from him who has been going about in the nude; but it is quite commonly held also that the natural powers of fallen man have been extrinsically weakened. Such traditional formulas as vulneratus in naturalibus and natura vulnerata must seemingly be understood, consequently, of nature taken historically, not philosophically (cf. ibid., II, nos. 444–48). In short, the difficulty which man in the present order experiences in doing good “comes rather from the obstacles to virtue that man encounters than from any intrinsic diminution of his natural powers.” Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., in The American Ecclesiastical Review, CXIII (1945), 70. See also John A. Ryan, Original Sin and Human Misery (pamphlet, New York: Paulist Press, 1942), particularly pp. 39–42, 52–55.

  [21.]Hence St. Thomas is easily able to bring custom into harmony with law: “Therefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and set forth; furthermore, something can be established which obtains the force of law, in so far as, by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will and the conceptions of the reason are most revealingly declared. For when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law” (Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.97, a.3).

  [22.]Ibid., q.100, a.8. For “God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one another” (ibid., ad 2). Walter Farrell, O.P., aptly indicates the metaphysical basis of this position of St. Thomas: “These precepts do not depend on the will of God; they are not extrinsically but intrinsically valid, for the Natural Moral Law, like all law, is essentially the work of reason not of will; in this case it is the divine reason which cannot be changed” (The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez, p. 120).

  [23.]Ibid., ad 3. Cf. also ibid., q.94, a.5 ad 2. In other words, St. Thomas supposes that in such cases of apparent dispensation God did not act as Lawmaker, but as Lord and Master, with sovereign dominion over human life and property. But see the cautious and sobering remarks of Jacques Leclercq, Les droits et devoirs individuels, Part I, “Vie, disposition de soi” (Namur: Maison d’Édition Ad. Wesmael-Charlier, 1937), pp. 53 f., on this now common solution. Of course, whether or not the traditional exegesis of all such Old Testament episodes and passages is correct is another question. For instance, there is neither any need nor any sound reason for holding that Yahweh ordered Osee to commit fornication or adultery. Cf. A. Van Hoonacker, Les douze Petits Prophètes (Paris: J. Gabalda & Cie., 1908), pp. 13 ff.

  [24.]Cf. Walter Farrell, O.P., The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez, pp. 122–30.

  [25.]On the positions of Scotus and Occam in this far-reaching controversy, see Anton-Hermann Chroust, “Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition,” The New Scholasticism, XVII (1943), pp. 101–12.

  [26.]The true relationship between the natural order (the realm of natural laws and of the natural moral law) and the supernatural order (the realm of divine grace) is clearly and concisely set forth by Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S.J.: “Elevation to supernature leaves human nature unchanged in principle. Therefore, human nature retains its full value as a source of knowledge for social order. All principles for the structural plan of human society are impressed upon human nature by God, and remain so; therefore, they can be recognized in and deduced from this human nature with certainty. This is also true of man exalted by grace or abased by sin. Just as grace elevates man above his mere nature as a being without taking away anything from his human nature, so sin has not changed the condition of human nature into something else. True enough, there is no longer a purely natural order since God has introduced a supernatural order and has destined man for a supernatural goal; in fact, there never existed a man in the purely natural order. (Thus the sinner can miss the supernatural goal, but he cannot nullify his destiny for this goal.) The natural order is consummated by the supernatural order in such a way that it remains fully unchanged. That is why the natural order, although we can separate it from the actually given supernatural order only by abstract thinking, is not merely a fancy, but a living reality whose misappreciation, denial, or debasement at the same time not only misappreciates, denies, and debases supernature, but actually deprives it of its foundation, thus making it untenable” (Reorganization of Social Economy. The Social Encyclical Developed and Explained, trans. by Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J. [Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1936–37], p. 17, note).

  [27.]Cf. A.-H. Chroust, article cited, The New Scholasticism, XVII (1943), 114 f.

  [28.]This important problem, together with its bearing on the nature of moral obligation, is discussed in Part II.

  [29.]On Suarez’ doctrine of the natural law, see the widely divergent expositions and appraisals of Heinrich Rommen, Die Staatslehre des Franz Suarez, S.J. (M.-Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1927), pp. 43–77, and Walter Farrell, O.P., The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez, pp. 48–72, 147–55. For an excellent presentation of Bellarmine’s doctrine in its historical setting, cf. Franz Xaver Arnold, Die Staatslehre des Kardinals Bellarmin (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1934), pp. 13–75.

  [1.]“What we have been saying would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him” (De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, Prolegomena, II, trans. by Francis W. Kelsey and others for The Classics of International Law, edited by J. B. Scott, Oxford-London, 1925). According to A.-H. Chroust, “this famous passage from Grotius is but a rebuke of William of Occam’s and Hobbes’s voluntarism or ‘positivism’—by that we mean something valid because of its being posited or willed by someone—and an indirect proof of Grotius’s belief, quite in accordance with the Thomistic tradition, in the perseitas boni et iusti” (“Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition,” The New Scholasticism, XVII [1943], 126). Cf. also, ibid., notes 88 and 89.

  [2.]The thesis of Chroust is that “Hugo Grotius constitutes but a direct continuation of the great Natural Law tradition which stretches from St. Augustine to Suarez, and which culminated in St. Thomas” (“Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition,” ibid., p. 125).

  [3.]Chroust is of the same opinion (ibid., pp. 129 f.).

  [4.]De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, Bk. I, chap. 1. The important qualifying phrase and social is strangely missing both in Kelsey’s English translation and in the Latin edition (1646) on which it is based.

  [5.]But see A.-H. Chroust, op cit., pp. 131–33.

  [1.]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. by A. R. Waller (Cambridge: The University Press, 1904), Part I, chap. 13.

  [2.]Hobbes argues as follows: Whereas the agreement of irrational creatures is natural, “that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somwhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.
  
  “The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to define them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.
  
  “And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT” (Leviathan, Part II, chap. 17).

  [3.]Because of his clarity and pungency of style (not to mention his “scientific” materialism), George H. Sabine regards Hobbes as “probably the greatest writer on political philosophy that the English-speaking peoples have produced” (A History of Political Theory, p. 457). On Hobbes’ political philosophy, cf. especially J. Vialatoux, La cité de Hobbes. Théorie de l’état totalitaire (Paris: J. Gabalda et Compagnie, 1935).

  [4.]Leviathan, Part II, chap. 29.

  [5.]Ibid., Part I, chap. 13.

  [6.]Cf. Jacques Maritain, Three Reformers.Luther-Descartes-Rousseau (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929), pp. 54 ff.

  [7.]Cf. A.-H. Chroust, “Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition,” The New Scholasticism, XVII (1943), 122–25.

  [8.]Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law. An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, Introduction, C, trans. by W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1887), p. 46. Kant further lays down (p. 45): “Every Action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such that it can co-exist along with the Freedom of the Will of each and all in action, according to a universal Law.”

  [9.]Immanuel Kant, Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, IV, 24, trans. by T. K. Abbott, Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics (6th ed., London–New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), p. 279.

  [10.]Ibid., III, 19, trans. by T. R. Abbott, op. cit., p. 275.

  [11.]The Philosophy of Law, Part I, no. 24 (ed. W. Hastie, p. 110).

  [12.]Ibid., no. 25 (p. 111).

  [13.]Ibid., no. 28 (pp. 114 f.).

  [14.]Cf. ibid., nos. 41 and 44 (pp. 155–57, 163–65).

  [1.]A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II, Part III, § 3, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 415.

  [2.]Cf. ibid., Bk. I, Part IV, § 1, pp. 180–87.

  [3.]An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix I, i. Hume, Selections, ed. by Charles W. Hendel, Jr. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1927), p. 241.

  [4.]George H. Sabine, op. cit., pp. 598–605, gives an enthusiastic exposition of Hume’s alleged destruction of the natural law. He candidly admits, however, that Hume’s destructive criticism of natural law stands or falls with his psychology and analysis of causation. But Hume’s psychology and analysis of causation flatly constitute an affront to, and a mutilation of, the human intellect. Cf., e.g., Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M. Cap., The Whole Man, pp. 316–21, 540 f.

  [5.]In the following century Sir William Blackstone laid down explicitly that “the law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original” (Commentaries, i, p. 40, cited by A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution [9th ed., London: Macmillan and Co., 1939], p. 62).

  [6.]Der Zweck im Recht (2nd. ed.), II, 162, cited in Martin Grabmann, Thomas Aquinas. His Personality and Thought, trans. by Virgil Michel, O.S.B. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 162.

  [7.]The entire text of the Syllabus in English translation may be found in Raymond Corrigan, S.J., The Church and the Nineteenth Century (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1938), pp. 289–95.

  [8.]Cf. especially Franz H. Mueller, Heinrich Pesch and His Theory of Christian Solidarism. Aquin Papers: No. 7 (St. Paul, Minnesota: College of St. Thomas, 1941).

  [1.]See, in general, John Wellmuth, S.J., The Nature and Origins of Scientism. The Aquinas Lecture, 1944 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1944).

  [2.]For a brief but penetrating exposition and criticism of recent American schools of jurisprudence which pass for philosophies of law—sociological jurisprudence, economic determinism, and realism with its psychological, experimental or skeptical approaches—see Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J., and James V. Hayes, Jurisprudence (3rd ed. rev., New York: Fordham University Press, 1938), pp. 70–81.

  [3.]On scientism and on the proper relations between natural-science modes of thought and philosophy, see John Wellmuth, S.J., op. cit.; Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. by Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938), chap. 1; Jacques Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, trans. by Mortimer J. Adler (New York: Macmillan Co.), chap. 2.

  [4.]A System of Ethics, ed. and trans. by Frank Thilly (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899), p. 346. Italics in the original.

  [5.]In regard to ethical relativism, see the remarkably forthright admissions, and no less remarkable confusions, of Friedrich Paulsen, op. cit., pp. 19–25, who reaches the following general conclusion (p. 25): “Every moral philosophy is, therefore, valid only for the sphere of civilization from which it springs, whether it is conscious of the fact or not.” Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société (2nd ed., Namur: Maison d’Editions Ad. Wesmael-Charlier, 1933), pp. 25–43; Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, Vol. II, chap. 21.

  [6.]On the important question of the relation between philosophy and common sense, cf. Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 8.

  [7.]Rom. 2:14–16.

  [1.]For an exposition and criticism of Stammler’s Neo-Kantian philosophy of law, cf. Erich Kaufmann, Kritik der neukantischen Rechtsphilosophie (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1921), pp. 11–20.

  [2.]Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, pp. 276–78.

  [3.]Traité de droit constitutionnel (2nd ed., 5 vols., Paris: E. de Boccard, 1920–25), I (3rd ed., 1927), 174 f.

  [4.]Cf. ibid., I, 97.

  [5.]Cf. ibid., I, 81, 93. Notice that Duguit says that the material sanction can be, not ought to be, organized.

  [6.]Cf. ibid., II, 169 f.

  [7.]Cf. ibid., I, 80 f.

  [8.]De civitate Dei, Bk. IV, chap. 4. Cf. C. H. McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West from the Greeks to the End of the Middle Ages (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), pp. 154–61.

  [9.]Op cit., I, 124 f.

  [10.]Cf. ibid., I, 685 f.

  [11.]For a good exposition of Duguit’s theories of law as well as for a criticism of the same from the inadequate standpoint of an analytical jurist, see Westel W. Willoughby, The Ethical Basis of Political Authority (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), chap. 21. Cf. also Charles G. Haines, op cit., pp. 260–72.

  [12.]For the theories of Krabbe, cf. Westel W. Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 410 ff.; Charles G. Haines, op. cit., pp. 274–77.

  [13.]For a forceful criticism of Kelsen’s theory, see Erich Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 20–35; Herman Heller, Die Souveraenitaet, ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats- und Voelkerrechts (Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1927); Heinrich Lenz, “Autoritaet und Demokratie in der Staatslehre Kelsens,” Schmollers Jabrbuch, L, 4, pp. 93–124.

  [14.]Das Voelkerrecht systematisch dargestellt (10th rev. ed., Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1915), p. 65.

  [15.]For a rather full account of the results of Niemeyer’s questionnaire, see Charles G. Haines, op. cit., pp. 294–300.

  [16.]National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939).

  [17.]Cf. Ernst R. Huber, Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlag, 1939), pp. 194 ff.

  [18.]Cf. St. Thomas, De potentia, q.9, a.5.

  [19.]Op. cit., p. 361.

  [20.]Pius XI, Encyclical Mit brennender Sorge (1937), cited by Michael Oakeshott, The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), pp. 53 f.

  [21.]De civitate Dei, Bk. IV, chap. 4.

  [1.]In his otherwise valuable study, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, Charles G. Haines resolutely forgoes dealing “with the philosophical and psychological processes which underlie natural law thinking” (p. viii). Yet this self-imposed limitation, psychologically very difficult if not impossible of observance, does not prevent the author from freely criticizing and evaluating the natural-law doctrine in its various forms—which only an epistemology and a metaphysics would rightly allow him to do. E.g., the exposition of natural law by Viktor Cathrein, S.J., is unjustly but altogether typically taxed with being religious and supernatural (pp. 286 f.). This merely means, of course, that the thinking of the Jesuit moral philosopher is theistic and not utterly secularist, does not view nature as a self-subsisting, closed whole, and does not eschew ultimates so far as they are attainable by the natural powers of the human mind. Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., is similarly unphilosophical-minded. He concludes his volume, American Interpretations of Natural Law, with the words: “Natural law, in its essence, is the attempt to solve the insolvable” (p. 345). But such a conclusion stands or falls with its particular frame of reference, characterized by metaphysicophobia.

  [2.]It is amazing how frequently this fundamental proposition of Aristotelian and scholastic epistemology, nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu, is described as John Locke’s contribution to psychology. Locke’s sole claim to fame on this point is to have emphasized this axiom against Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas.

  [3.]I.e., not primary substances in the Platonic sense. See, e.g., K. F. Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 43.

  [4.]St. Thomas, Quaestiones duodecim quodlibetales, VII, art. 2. Cf. also Joseph Pieper, Die Wirklichkeit und das Gute (Leipzig: Jakob Hegner, 1935), pp. 31 ff.

  [5.]Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologica, Ia, q.5, a.1.

  [6.]See in particular Gustaf J. Gustafson, S.S., The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas, pp. 68–90, and, for an excellent psychological analysis of appetency on the sensuous and rational levels, Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M. Cap., The Whole Man, pp. 242–46, 354–59.

  [7.]A brief but clear treatment of the important concept of God’s eternal glory, fundamental and formal, as the end or purpose of the created universe (so frequently misunderstood) will be found in John F. McCormick, S.J., Scholastic Metaphysics. Part II, Natural Theology (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1931), pp. 201–05; Ignatius W. Cox, S.J., Liberty—Its Use and Abuse (2 vols., New York: Fordham University Press, 1936–37), I, 9–11.

  [1.]“It is at this juncture then that moral philosophy assumes its specific role, linking action to being, doing to thinking, ethics to metaphysics, and posing the all-important question as to how rational animals can guide themselves to their proper ends. And if … all activities, including all human acts, flow from the natures of created beings, then it is the order of being and reality which establishes an unshakable norm for the order of action or the moral order. And it is that same order of reality which exacts sanction and retribution whenever its laws are violated in the sphere of human action.
  
  “This primacy of the laws of being and reality over the rules of action or conduct extends to every kind of human activity: it applies to individuals and groups, to the spheres of law, politics, and economics, to national and international life. In every field of human behavior and endeavor the ontological order or the order of being sets the rules and norms for the practical or moral order. The nature of a thing (its being) determines the modes of its activity, and the supreme categories of being … retain their validity in the sphere of action” (K. F. Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 109). That is, action or operation necessarily follows being (operari sequitur esse): all beings act in accordance with their specific natures.

  [2.]In other words, man’s basic and prime duty is to become (in fact, actually, fully, completely) what he is (in idea, potentially, germinally, essentially) through the consistent and persistent use of his reason and free will in the light and direction of his natural inclinations.

  [3.]The primary norm of the natural moral law, “Do good and avoid evil” (i.e., act for your rational end in conformity with your total nature), must be understood and applied in the light of human nature adequately considered, i.e., in terms of man’s individual and social constitution, ends, and essential relations. Indeed this intrinsic finality of human nature is the proximate criterion for determining effectively not only the good or perfection proper to individual men but also the common good of humanity as such. Now the finality of human nature necessarily expresses itself in man’s natural inclinations or tendencies in which reason discerns the proper ends of all human acts. But these natural inclinations are themselves essentially bound up with man’s natural faculties and their proper objects or ends. Hence the natural law generally obliges man to order each of his faculties, in each of their operations, in conformity not merely with the finality of the unitary whole which is man or of the common good, but also with the intrinsic finalities of the single faculties themselves according to the hierarchy of values discoverable by reason. As St. Thomas puts the matter, “it is good for everything that it obtain its end: and its evil is that it turn from its end. This applies to the parts as well as to the whole: so that man’s every part, even as his every act, should attain to its due end” (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, chap. 122). Natural morality, based on intrinsic finality in the first place, consequently demands that no single faculty or operative power of man be used except in consonance with its finalization adequately understood. That is, the natural law prescribes not only the end or ends to be achieved by man as his good but also the specific means thereto, i.e., the proper exercise of his faculties. For reason constrains us to view in the hierarchically ordered faculties of man and their proper exercise, adequately considered, the means judged best by the Author of both the finality and the law for the attainment of His purposes in regard to man. Hence the moral law per se forbids the perverse use of a human faculty, i.e., a use of the faculty plus the positive frustration of its direct and necessary effect or, again, a use which involves the positive and direct frustration of the very good to which the faculty is intrinsically ordained. This is so because the ends or objects of the natural inclinations or appetites to which the faculties are related constitute the primary criterion of man’s moral judgments. This criterion, however, is not applicable in all cases with the same ease and accuracy, nor is it the sole criterion of moral good and evil; it is of the greatest service in connection with the most fundamental problems of ethics. Nevertheless, as man may, for sufficient reasons, completely subordinate the intrinsic finality of an animal organism or faculty to his own good (e.g., in scientific experiments or artificial breeding) without being guilty of really abusing or frustrating the animal’s nature viewed adequately, so, too, a person may, for proportionately serious reasons and within reasonable limits, in any way utilize, exercise, or sacrifice, without incurring the note of real abuse or frustration, a lower human faculty or organ for the good of the individual as a whole or of another person. For every faculty in man “has its own end or object, but is subordinate to the wider faculty which contains it and to the whole organism, since the end of the whole organism includes the end of each part” (Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, I, 138). But it would be utterly contrary to the order of man’s rational and social nature itself for a person directly to frustrate in their very use the intrinsic good of his rational faculties and especially those faculties whose end or function is primarily social and directed to the common good (speech and sex), even at behest of the public authorities; yet induced temporary suspension of a rational faculty for a sufficient reason would not constitute frustration. In certain instances, moreover, faculties appear to be used outside rather than against their proper finalization, inasmuch as no loss of a good seems to be involved in such use. Cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit.; Michael Cronin, op. cit., I, 127–74; John A. Ryan, The Norm of Morality Defined and Applied to Particular Actions (Washington, D.C., 1944); especially James B. Sullivan, O.M.I., The Principle of Finality and the Problem of Contraception, unpublished dissertation of the University of Ottawa (1943), chapter 3.

  [4.]Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.93, a.1. As St. Thomas likewise observes (ibid., q.93, a.5 ad 1), “the impression of an inward active principle is to natural things what the promulgation of law is to men; because law, by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human action.”

  [5.]Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, XXII, 27 (trans. R. Stothert). Elsewhere St. Augustine more loosely states that the eternal law “ea est qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima.” De libero arbitrio, I, vi, 15.

  [6.]St. Thomas, op. cit., Ia IIae, q.91, a.2.

  [7.]“No theistic and teleological system of philosophy that acknowledges an intelligent supreme Being can omit the concept of a supreme and eternal law” (Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 463). Man’s general obligation, then, is to live according to right order adequately considered. The natural law does not merely command us to avoid whatever may harm ourselves, our fellows, or society; it commands us rather to observe the natural order of things, imposed upon us by the Author of nature as means to the end, lest such harm ensue. Indeed, we are not bound by the natural law to attain certain ends so much as we are bound by it to observe the order of nature as the means to their attainment. Since, therefore, it is not so much the immediate and proximate duty of man to attain the various ends of his nature as it is to observe the order itself which has been established for the sake of such ends, a person may not consider himself no longer bound to observe the natural order simply because some end is in a given case accidentally unattainable. God does not, by means of the natural law, impose obligations upon human nature through the individuals who share in it; He rather imposes obligations upon individual men through their human nature itself. Take, for example, the case of fornication on the part of a man or woman who has been sterilized, or the case of two parties who solemnly and sincerely bind themselves to take good care of any offspring that may result from their illicit relations. Does the natural-law prohibition of fornication lose its force or become unmeaning in the premises? Not at all. The natural law does not merely enjoin the due multiplication of men upon earth and the proper education of offspring; it rather obliges men to observe the order of rational nature, namely, the orderly and controlled satisfaction of their sex cravings in the marriage union alone, which has been instituted precisely for the attainment of these important ends. Hence any violation of that order viewed adequately, no matter what the results may be, is already an infringement of the natural law, a sin against the end of nature to which man is intrinsically ordered. And a substantial violation of the essential order of things constitutes a serious infringement of the natural law, a grave sin—which occurs in all extramarital use of the sex function as well as in certain marital abuses, for complete and unconditional restriction of human sexual activity to natural use in lawful wedlock is, especially but not solely in view of the disastrous operation of the wedge principle in sexual matters, absolutely required for individual and social well-being. Yet it must be frankly admitted that it is far from easy always to discriminate in the light of reason alone, in a very complex situation or very complicated set of circumstances, between what the natural order of things strictly requires, what the natural law precisely forbids, and what it permits as a genuine aid or supplement to nature itself adequately considered, i.e., in its constitution, end, and essential relationships. In such cases even the most intelligent, upright, and balanced moralists can and do disagree. Certain borderline cases have defied, and perhaps will continue to defy, clear and certain rational solution.

  [8.]Or, in the clear words of Hans Meyer (The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 466), the natural law is “the complexus of all those prescriptions which flow from human nature, which are directed to the fulfillment of man’s ultimate end, which are known by the light of reason, and which appear in the consciousness of man armed with a claim to absolute obedience.” According to Jacques Maritain, “natural law is the ensemble of things to do and not to do which follow” from the principle that we must do good and avoid evil “in necessary fashion, and from the simple fact that man is man, nothing else being taken into account” (The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 63). Natural law, says J. P. Steffes, comprises “all those binding norms which are valid for the whole of mankind on the basis of nature itself and not just in consequence of the authoritative expression of some will or other, which may however be added to finished nature, whether on the part of God or man” (“Das Naturrecht im Rahmen einer Religionsphilosophischen Weltbetrachtung,” Philosophia Perennis, II, 1020). The essence of the natural moral law consists in three elements taken in some way collectively: man’s natural inclinations, the light of reason with which he is endowed, and the resultant dictate or proposition of reason; more precisely, however, it consists in the third element, the dictate of practical reason. “Like all other animals, man has natural inclinations; unlike all others he has the faculty of reason which recognizes these natural inclinations naturally; and the result of these two is a natural dictate or command of reason. … Separately the inclinations of man or the light of reason do not at all answer to the description of law; separately the dictate of reason does not answer to the qualifications of the natural, for it is not born in us. With the three elements taken together all difficulties about the Natural Moral Law vanish. This dictate is natural, necessary as flowing immediately and inevitably from the two preceding elements, dependent upon them.” (Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, II, 379 f.). Cf. also: The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez, pp. 82 ff.

  [9.]Viktor Cathrein, S.J., op. cit., I, 344 f.

  [1.]The very Hebrew idiom for denoting sexual intercourse, “to know a woman,” lends color to this view.

  [2.]Aristotle, Metaphysica, K. 4, 1061b 26–32 (trans. W. D. Ross).

  [1.]“The story of the spectral analysis of the law of nature into the prismatic colours of ‘natural rights’ is a long one. The chief influence was undoubtedly the Christian religion” (J. H. Muirhead, “Rights,” Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, edited by James Hastings [12 vols. and Index, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1924–27] X, 771). Moreover, as Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J., and James V. Hayes explain, “all rights come from law and they come from law because it places a duty on the subject. But the fundamental law from which all other laws derive their force and efficacy is the Natural Law. Now the Lawgiver of the Natural Law is God, who has the right man’s obedience. Immediately consequent upon this right of God is duty in man. Hence, prior to every right in a man is his duty, general or particular, and prior to every duty is God’s right to the ultimate purpose of creation and to the submission and service of mankind” (Jurisprudence, p. 136). Accordingly, man’s primary right is the right to do his duty, i.e., to achieve his end, to perfect himself, to realize his essential nature, and thus to attain true happiness, his subjective end, in this life and in the next.

  [2.]Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q. 90, a.1.

  [3.]For men “an action is natural only in so far as it harmonizes with the law of reason. This agreement with reason is not only the mark of naturalness, of humanity, it is the stamp of virtue; our actions are virtuous or good exactly in so far as they harmonize with the commands of reason, or, in other words, precisely in so far as they follow the directions of reason and move towards the goal of man” (Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, II, 382).

  [4.]St. Thomas, op. cit., Ia IIae, q.90, a.1.

  [5.]Ibid., a.4.

  [6.]“The first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is happiness or beatitude” (ibid., a.2). Cf. ibid., q.1, a.6; q.2, a.7; q.3, a.1; q.69, a.1. What man’s last end or happiness does and does not consist in, how far and in what way it is attainable in the present life, and how we are to conceive the final and perfect happiness of the next life, St. Thomas deals with, ibid., q.2–5; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, chaps. 1–63.

  [7.]Cf. Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.90, a.2.

  [8.]Law is “an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community” (ibid., a.4).

  [9.]“Reason has its power of moving from the will … ; for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; or otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law” (ibid., a.1 ad 3). “Command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves to the execution of the act” (ibid., q.17, a.1); see also the commentary of Cardinal Cajetan upon this article of the Summa theologica. The way the intellect and will mutually react and interact at all stages of conceiving, formulating, issuing, and executing a command is convincingly depicted by Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, II, 49–62.

  [10.]Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.92, a.1.

  [11.]Yet it must be insisted that the obligation of the natural law does not depend for its efficacy on a knowledge either of God as legislator or of the divine will. For in the impossible hypothesis that God might not will the natural law, the latter would nevertheless become known to men and would oblige men in the same way as now because human nature would be constituted in the same way as now by command of the divine reason, and both human nature and its acts would be ordained to the last end—a truth glimpsed by Grotius. “The essential order of things, more particularly the rational good of man, is the proximate source of the obligation of the Natural Moral Law. It is a secondary but true cause in the moral order, producing a true effect, a true obligation.” Ultimately, of course, the efficacy of this secondary cause of moral obligation, which simply results from the necessity of an act in relation to an absolutely necessary end, depends on the first and supreme cause, God and His eternal law. Obviously, if there were no God, nothing would exist, and hence there would be no natural law of any kind. Yet “the obligation of the Natural Moral Law no more demands a knowledge of God as legislator for its efficacy than do the first principles of the speculative order for their validity. This obligation follows from a first principle, the principle of finality, which like the other first principles has ontological value.” To command is the function of law, however, and obligation on the part of the subject is but the inseparable corollary or consequent of command. Since the act of command is immediately and substantially directive or ordering (and not intimating and moving), obligation is primarily a product of the intellect; yet since the act of command is fundamentally and radically motive or effective, obligation is also a product of will. Thus the natural moral law implies the existence of God and His eternal law, and all men are in some degree aware of its obligation as a dictate of practical reason concerning necessary means to an absolutely necessary end, namely, personal perfection and happiness. For nature itself imposes this end upon man by physical necessity—he cannot but will it; and, on the other hand, reason can perceive that certain particular goods and actions suited to man’s rational nature pertain to that end as necessary means or conditions of this perfection and ultimate happiness and that certain others do not. The natural moral law is no mere ideal to be pursued or not in accordance with one’s whims or temperament; it imposes a strict obligation. It simply involves the obligation to apply the supreme moral principle, “Do good and avoid evil,” to every deliberate human course of action. Cf. Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, I, 383–88; The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez, pp. 6–13, 54–61, 130–41, 148 ff.; “The Roots of Obligation,” The Thomist, I (1939), 14–30; Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, I, 211–30; O. Karrer, op. cit., pp. 52–57, 233 ff.

  [12.]Law as it is in the legislator consists in an act of command. But “command is immediately and substantially from the intellect, radically it is from the will; it is an elicited act of the practical reason, presupposing an act of the will” (Walter Farrell, O.P., “The Roots of Obligation,” The Thomist, I [1939], 17).

  [1.]Strictly speaking, one cannot directly have duties to oneself. But “one has duties indirectly to himself inasmuch as he is bound by Natural law to attain certain ends” (Charles C. Miltner, C.S.C., The Elements of Ethics [2nd rev. ed., New York: Macmillan Co., 1936], p. 154).

  [2.]Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologica, IIa IIae, q.57, a.1.

  [3.]Ibid., q.58, a.5.

  [4.]Ibid., a.2.

  [5.]Ibid., a.5.

  [6.]Cf. A. V. Dicey, op. cit., p. 41.

  [7.]Cited by Carlyle and Carlyle, op. cit., III, 128.

  [8.]Act III, scene 10.

  [9.]Summa theologica, IIa IIae, q.58, a.5.

  [10.]In conjunction, of course, so far as the actual fact of abolition is concerned, with fundamental socio-economic changes.

  [11.]On the ethical problems raised by slavery in its varying degrees and with its different origins, see in particular Jacques Leclercq, Les droits et devoirs individuels, Part I, pp. 158–83; Luigi Sturzo, “The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Conceptions,” Thought, XX (1945), 97–99.

  [12.]“Life and law are as closely intertwined as motion and its direction to a goal. Stating the nature of life in saying that it is a motion to a goal, we have also stated the nature and purpose of law; for law is exactly the direction of the motion which is life to the goal of life. It deals only with the direction of life; it does not constitute life, nor does it establish the end of life. …
  
  “The identification of human life and moral life is an immediate indication of the close connection of law and morality. Indeed morality is nothing more than conformity with the rule which regulates human life—the rule of reason or law.
  
  “Human life is reasonable life, morality is accord with the rule of reason, and law to establish that morality and rule that reasonable life must be the product of reason. It is not the result of caprice, even of divine caprice; it is not the decree of a superior will. The power of command is a power of the reason and not of the will. It is an ordination, a direction of motion, an effective directive motion; so it is an act proceeding immediately from the intellect on the presupposition of the movement of the will. …
  
  “Our view of life will determine our view of law. If life is a motion to a goal and law the direction of that motion, of course our view on the goal of life will determine our view on both life and law” (Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, II, 386 f.).

  [13.]Cf. K. F. Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 13–26.

  [14.]In the same way the modern national state does not punish the traitor or the disturber of national unity because he is guilty of a sin against the moral virtue of patriotism, but because he is endangering national unity.

  [15.]See especially Jacques Leclercq, L’État ou la politique (2nd ed., Namur: Maison d’Éditions Ad. Wesmael-Charlier, 1934.), pp. 82–90; Karl Adam, The Spirit of Catholicism, trans. by Justin McCann, O.S.B. (rev. ed., New York: Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 196–201.

  [16.]Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Marriage and the Family. A Study in Social Philosophy, trans. by Thomas R. Hanley, O.S.B. (2nd ed., New York: Frederick Pustet Co., 1942), pp. 381 ff.

  [17.]“No human law can violate the Natural Moral Law and still claim to be a law, because it cannot still pretend to aim at the ends of nature, the common good of the state and the individual” (Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, II, 378).

  [18.]Digest, I, i, 1, trans. by S. P. Scott, The Civil Law (17 vols., Cincinnati: Central Trust Co., 1932), II, 209.

  [1.]St. Thomas, Ethicorum, I, 3. Cf. Simon Deploige, The Conflict between Ethics and Sociology, trans. by Charles C. Miltner, C.S.C. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1938), pp. 272–75, for a good treatment of this point and for other pertinent texts of St. Thomas.

  [2.]“It is necessary for anyone who wishes to be an apt student of moral science that he acquire practical experience in the customs of human life and in all just and civil matters, such as are laws and precepts of political life” (Ethicorum, I, 4, cited by Deploige, op. cit., p. 274).

  [3.]Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.94, a.4; Deploige, op. cit., pp. 318 ff. It is worth stressing, in view of the widespread confusion which prevails on this fundamental point, that the sociological basis of the doctrine of the natural moral law is a fact, the moral or ethical fact: “All men judge that there is a difference between right and wrong, good and bad in man’s free activity. In consequence, therefore, they judge that there are some free actions which man ought not to elicit and some which he ought to elicit” (Ignatius W. Cox, S.J., Liberty—Its Use and Abuse, I, 1; see also nos. 45, 75, and 91). That is to say, wherever we find men, we observe that they attribute to their actions qualities which correspond to what we call the ideas of good and evil, right and wrong. The good or right action is worthy of praise, esteem, approval, whereas the bad or wrongful act evokes disapproval, blame, contempt. The good, the right thing, is to be done; the bad or wrong thing is to be avoided. The good man deserves to be loved, and he who does right merits a reward; on the other hand, the bad man deserves to be hated, and the evil-doer is worthy of punishment. These ideas precise in themselves, and their presuppositions (intelligence and free will) are found among all men, no matter how primitive the latter may be and despite the vague, incoherent, and sometimes contradictory ways such ideas are applied. Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, pp. 94–96.

  [4.]In Octo Libros Politicorum Aristotelis Expositio, II, 5.

  [5.]Pius XI, in his Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of 1931, thus enunciates this fundamental principle of social philosophy: “Just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too it is an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies. … Of its very nature, the true aim of all social activity should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them” (ed. Oswald von Nell-Breuning, § 79). For an adequate understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, cf. Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S.J., op. cit., pp. 206–09; Johannes Messner, Die soziale Frage, pp. 517 ff., 651 f., and Die Berufstaendische Ordnung (Innsbruck: Verlagsanstalt Tyrolia, 1936), pp. 22 ff. and passim; Yves R. Simon, Nature and Functions of Authority. The Aquinas Lecture, 1940 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1940), pp. 46 ff.

  [6.]St. Thomas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.105, a.1.

  [7.]“The precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason, because both are self-evident principles” (ibid., q.94, a.2). Cf. ibid., q.90, a.1 ad 2; q.91, a.3; Deploige, op. cit., pp. 291–93.

  [8.]“The good of anything consists in this that its action be proportionate to its form. But the proper form of man is that by which he is a rational animal. Hence an action of man must be good in so far as it conforms to reason” (St. Thomas, Ethicorum, II, 2, cited by Deploige, op. cit., p. 294). “In human affairs a thing is said to be just from being right, according to the rule of reason” (Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.95, a.2). “Whatsoever has a determinate nature must have determinate actions, becoming to that nature: since the proper operation of a thing is consequent to its nature. Now, it is clear that man has a determinate nature. Therefore there must needs be certain actions that are in themselves becoming to man” (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, chap. 129).

  [9.]Cf. Stanley Bertke, op. cit., p. 70. Strictly speaking, however, even this formulation is inadequate. Certain Old Testament episodes afford us the occasion of perceiving that we must apparently add the qualification: “save on the absolutely clear and express order of God, supreme Master of human life and property.” Yet no such ultimate qualification can be conceived or admitted in the case of such ethical dictates as those against blasphemy, lying, and abuse of the sex functions which are intrinsically connected with the very essence of human nature adequately considered in its constitution, end, and essential relations. After all, not even God can alter the essential properties of a triangle without changing its nature, or do anything else which involves non-sense.

  [10.]This absolute prohibition (i.e., at least so far as human authority is concerned) includes, therefore, any form whatever of direct killing of an innocent person for any reason whatever; it includes abortion, therapeutic as well as criminal, and euthanasia or “mercy-killing.” But it also includes the grave mutilation—especially direct sterilization—of an innocent person, except where such mutilation is necessary for the good of the whole body or seemingly even where, in general, a person consents to sacrifice an organ for the good of his neighbor. The ethical problem of the indirect killing or maiming of an innocent person is governed by the principle of the double effect. For “no one may intend or choose harm to another person, but at most may permit it for just cause; so that every harm to another which follows as a consequence upon a voluntary human act is either entirely unjustifiable, or can be justified only on the principle of the double effect.” Now the principle of the double effect may be formulated as follows: It is morally permissible to perform an act (whether of commission or omission) good or indifferent in itself from which follow a good effect and a bad effect, provided (a) that the good effect follows from the act at least just as immediately as the bad effect, and is not obtained by means of the latter; (b) that the good effect alone is intended, the bad effect though foreseen being merely permitted; and (c) that the good resulting from the act outweighs or equals the evil. Killing or maiming a human being in the case of individual or social self-defense is justifiable only to the extent that it is a strictly necessary measure of last resort against an unjust aggressor. The state, in particular, has no blanket, unconditional power over human life and bodily integrity. See T. Lincoln Bouscaren, S.J., Ethics of Ectopic Operations (2nd ed., Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1944), pp. 25–64; Edgar Schmiedeler, O.S.B., Sterilization in the United States (pamphlet, Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1943), pp. 25–34; Joseph B. Lehane, The Morality of American Civil Legislation Concerning Eugenical Sterilization. The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, No. 83 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944), pp. 63–98; Bert J. Cunningham, C.M., The Morality of Organic Transplantation. The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, No. 86 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944), pp. 16, 100–06.

  [11.]Cf. Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J., and James V. Hayes, op. cit., p. 45; Regina Flannery, “Nationalism and the Double Ethical Code,” Thought, IX (1935), 610–22.

  [12.]See John K. Ryan, Modern War and Basic Ethics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1940); John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland, C.S.C., Catholic Principles of Politics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1940), pp. 251–71; John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—Catholic Association for International Peace, 1935), pp. 65–146; Luigi Sturzo, Les guerres modernes et la pensée catholique (Montreal: Éditions de l’Arbre, 1942), pp. 31–102; Jacques Leclercq, Les droits et devoirs individuels, Part I, Vie, disposition de soi, pp. 109–32.

  [13.]All this is true a fortiori of the direct killing of innocent non-combatants, even under conditions of total warfare. Cf. John K. Ryan, op. cit., pp. 97–118; John C. Ford, S.J., “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” Theological Studies, V (1944), 261–309.

  [14.]Abuti does not mean here to abuse, but to use up. Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Les droits et devoirs individuels, Part II, Travail, Propriété (Namur: Maison d’Édition Ad. Wesmael-Charlier, 1937), p. 89.

  [15.]Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologica, IIa IIae, q.66, a.7.

  [16.]“Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally … : from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise” (ibid., Ia IIae, q.100, a.1).

  [17.]Deploige thus sums up the teaching of St. Thomas on this point: “At other times men do not act rightly because they do not see clearly. To guide themselves, all assuredly have certain general precepts of the natural law, supreme norms which are found in the different moralities of peoples, first principles which no human intelligence can be ignorant of. Still, to regulate the details of conduct, the consequences of these precepts must be clearly deduced and they must be applied judiciously.
  
  “Reason, instructed by experience, is the instrument of this work of orientation. But its sharpness of vision is very unequal from one individual to another; and its strength is not exercised in the same way at different moments of life. Youth is ignorant and presumptuous; at a mature age reflection is calmer. Experience is the privilege of those who have lived a long time and have seen much.
  
  “Young or old, hemmed in by ignorance or enlightened by science, all will be able through a bit of attention, if the case is clear, to solve it suitably by recourse to general principles: each, for example, will spontaneously recognize that he must honor his parent, condemn murder or theft.
  
  “If the situation is complicated, only wise men will be able to take account of all the circumstances. And it will take all the subtlety of their minds to discover, in the series of occasions, the laws of right living” (op. cit., pp. 316–18).

  [18.]Jacques Maritain is altogether correct in his assertion that “natural law is not a written law. Men know it with greater or less difficulty, and in different degrees, running the risk of error here as elsewhere.” But he appears to go too far when he adds that “the only practical knowledge all men have naturally and infallibly in common is that we must do good and avoid evil” (The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 62 f.). Yet whatever may be the case in regard to individuals, “the peoples of the world, however much they differ as to details of morality, hold universally, or with practical universality, to at least the following basic precepts. Respect the Supreme Being or the benevolent being or beings who take his place. Do not ‘blaspheme.’ Care for your children. Malicious murder or maiming, stealing, deliberate slander or ‘black’ lying, when committed against friend or unoffending fellow clansman or tribesman, are reprehensible. Adultery proper is wrong, even though there be exceptional circumstances that permit or enjoin it and even though sexual relations among the unmarried may be viewed leniently. Incest is a heinous offense. This universal moral code agrees rather closely with our own Decalogue understood in a strictly literal sense. It inculcates worship of and reverence to the Supreme Being or to other superhuman beings. It protects the fundamental rights of life, limb, family, property and good name” (John M. Cooper, “The Relations Between Religion and Morality in Primitive Culture,” Primitive Man, IV [1931], 36). Cf. also Stanley Bertke, op. cit., pp. 73–83.

  [19.]When St. Thomas “finds himself in the presence of different moralities, of contradictory laws, of diversely organized institutions,” he neither regards every variation as an anomaly nor attributes all divergences to the same cause. The explanations scattered through his works may be grouped under three heads: “1. the influence of the passions; 2. the unequal development of reason, of insight, and of civilization; 3. the diversity of conditions, of situations, and of circumstances” (Deploige, op. cit., p. 314).

  [20.]“The practical reason is concerned with operable matters, which are singular and contingent, but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Therefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of the sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus” (St. Thomas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.91, a.3 ad 3).

  [21.]Cf. Deploige, op. cit., p. 313 f., for the pertinent texts of St. Thomas.

  [22.]Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.94, a.6; Deploige, op. cit., p. 315.

  [23.]Cf. Deploige, op. cit., pp. 334 ff.

  [24.]Deploige, op. cit., pp. 324–26, gives the various texts of St. Thomas which deal with this type of incest as well as with sexual relations in the collateral lines. Cf. also John M. Cooper, “Incest Prohibitions in Primitive Culture,” Primitive Man, V (1932), 1–20; “Near-Kin Marriages: the Ethics of Human Interbreeding,” The Ecclesiastical Review, LXXXVII (1932), 136–48, 259–72.

  [25.]Such formulas as that of the Neo-Kantian Rudolf Stammler, “natural law with a changing content,” and that of Georges Renard, “natural law with a progressive content,” are consequently altogether unsatisfactory. Much more adequate is the formula, “natural law with changing and progressive applications.” Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, pp. 45, 57 f. In this sense the natural law is truly dynamic. If man must become what he is, he must continually strive to advance, individually and socially, toward an ever higher degree of human perfection. In other words, the natural law indicates, prescribes, and governs man’s basic individual and social duty to make progress, progress that is at once material, intellectual, and moral, and that has no visible earthly limits. Cf. ibid., pp. 148 ff., and, in general, E. Stanislaus Duzy, Philosophy of Social Change According to the Principles of Saint Thomas. The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. XCI (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944).

  [26.]In this narrow or strict sense, to keep an important point clear, the natural law is the natural “moral law so far as it applies to the regulation of social relations” (Leclercq, op. cit., 18).

  [27.]For the ensuing discussion of the weightiest and most fundamental problem of social philosophy in its chief aspects, see in general ibid., pp. 325–39; Hans Meyer, op. cit., pp. 417–54; K. F. Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 141–47; Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 1–19; Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 56–88; Charles de Koninck, De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes. Le principe de l’ordre nouveau (Quebec: Éditions de l’Université Laval, 1943); Rudolph John Harvey, O.F.M., The Metaphysical Relation Between Person and Liberty and Its Application to Historical Liberalism and Totalitarianism, The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. LXIV (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1942); James H. Hoban, The Thomistic Concept of Person and Some of Its Social Implications, The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. XLIII (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1939); Franz Mueller, “Person and Society according to St. Thomas,” in Theodore Brauer and others, Thomistic Principles in a Catholic School (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1943), pp. 184–263; Wilhelm Schwer, Catholic Social Theory, trans. by Bartholomew Landheer (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1940), pp. 115 ff.

  [28.]Cf. Jacques Leclercq, op. cit., pp. 15 f.; Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J., and James V. Hayes, op. cit., pp. 140 f.

  [29.]But also in Aristotle’s slave-by-nature doctrine. Cf. Politica, I, 4–7, 1253b 23–1255b 40.

  [30.]Politics, trans. by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille (2 vols., New York: Macmillan Co., 1916), I, 390 f. and 388 f.

  [31.]Summa theologica, Ia, q.21, a.1 ad 3.

  [32.]Other major or original titles of acquiring ownership are the effective first occupation of unclaimed property and natural increase or accession; minor and more or less derived titles are carnal intercourse, gifts and bequests, hereditary succession, prescription, contracts of various kinds. Cf. Oswald von Nell-Breuning, op. cit., p. 120; Charles C. Miltner, C.S.C., The Elements of Ethics, pp. 227–31; Ignatius W. Cox, S.J., Liberty—Its Use and Abuse, II, 93–108.

  [33.]Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (1891), § 8, ed. by Oswald von Nell-Breuning, op. cit., p. 370. The question of whether and in what precise sense private ownership, or the institution of private property, is a positive and strict dictate of the natural law or is rather merely in eminent accord with the natural law is not an easy one. It has numerous facets, and it must be viewed from many angles. In the thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas, observes Jacques Leclercq, “property is an institution necessary to man, and it must be established to the extent that it is necessary or useful. But it is not one of those institutions which, like the family, flow directly from nature. It is natural in the sense that it is natural for man to live in society and that property is an institution indispensable to the social order, but its immediate establishment comes from society and the latter, in consequence, regulates its forms. Furthermore, the use of property must be directed above all toward the common good” (Les droits et devoirs individuels. Part II, Travail, Propriété, pp. 93 f.). For an excellent and full treatment of the right of private property in the light of the natural law, see ibid., pp. 81–170. Cf. also William J. McDonald, The Social Value of Property according to St. Thomas Aquinas. The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. XLVIII (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1939); John A. Ryan, Distributive Justice (rev. ed., New York: Macmillan Co., 1927), pp. 57–66; Ignatius W. Cox, S.J., op. cit., II, 66–86; Charles C. Miltner, C.S.C., op. cit., pp. 218–31; Oswald von Nell-Breuning, op. cit., pp. 94–122.

  [34.]“Property is an essential guaranty of human dignity. For, in order that a man may be able to develop himself in a human fashion, he needs a certain freedom and a certain security. The one and the other are assured him only through property. … If man has the right to dispose of himself, he has the right of property, not only in the sense that the property of those who are owners in consequence of fortuitous circumstances must be respected, but in the sense that the state has the obligation of organizing society in such a way as to render as easy as possible the acquisition of a minimum of stable property according to a rule of equality” (Jacques Leclercq, op. cit., pp. 130 f.).

  [35.]Such persons become proletarians, urban or rural, “owning no property, possessing no land or tools or any capital of their own, dependent exclusively on daily wages, and living in rented rooms” (Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe [2 vols., New York: Macmillan Co., 1932–36], II, 47). Cf. also Goetz A. Briefs, The Proletariat (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937). In this respect it makes little or no difference whether the masses of people are completely dependent economically upon wealthy individuals, great corporations, or the state itself. Moreover, the natural-law defense of the right to private property is essentially the defense of well-distributed property, not of an abstract right that can in practice be exercised only by the few.

  [36.]Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, §§ 9 f., ed. by Oswald von Nell-Breuning, op. cit., pp. 370 f. Cf. Jacques Leclercq, op. cit., pp. 133–40.

  [37.]“Since the right to life is primary and paramount, the natural law ordains that the organization of property must be such as to provide all who claim membership in the human species with a reasonable opportunity for the adequate satisfaction of their needs. In the present order the institution of private property, in its essentials, is best calculated to serve this purpose. But the basic institution itself is not to be confused with particular forms it may assume in different ages or regions. These will be justified according as they continue to show that they are achieving the general aim of ministering to the good of human life. The decrees of nature oppose any attempt at complete collectivization but natural right may also be violated under a regime in which a great number, although theoretically free, are in practice excluded from the possibility of acquiring property” (William J. McDonald, op. cit., p. 183).

  [38.]August Pieper, Organische und mechanische Auffassung des Gemeinschaftslebens (3rd ed., M.-Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1929), pp. 20 f.

  [39.]Cf. W. W. Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 36–39.

  [40.]For an illuminating discussion of necessary societies, see Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, pp. 278–322.

  [41.]Indeed, as Jacques Leclercq has succinctly pointed out, “if the particular societies within the state are not necessary, each one taken by itself—if the commune is not necessary, or the province, or the professional group—what is necessary is that there be some particular societies, and indeed in every political society as soon as it exceeds the stage of a village community.” Imperfect, dependent or non-sovereign as such societies may be, they are yet genuine societies, i.e., permanent unions of men formed for the purpose of achieving a common end. Le fondement du droit et de la société, pp. 284 f.

  [42.]Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Marriage and the Family. A Study in Social Philosophy, pp. 358 ff.

  [43.]Cf. ibid., pp. 243–46.

  [44.]Marriage involves the special type of contract known as contract of adherence. Cf. ibid., pp. 29–33.

  [45.]A good summary statement of the proper functions, primary and secondary, of the state is found in John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland, C.S.C., Catholic Principles of Politics, pp. 127–39; cf. also ibid., pp. 108–26, for a trenchant discussion of erroneous theories about the functions of the state.

  [46.]What is the meaning of the pregnant phrase “common good”? The beneficial objects denoted by the term “good” “are all the great classes of temporal goods; that is, all the things that man needs for existence and development in this life. They comprise all these orders of goods, spiritual, intellectual, moral, physical and economic; in other words, all the external goods of soul and body. The common good means not only the good of all in general, or as a whole, but the good of every class and, so far as practicable, the good of every individual. To put the matter in summary terms, the State is under obligation to promote the welfare of its citizens, as a whole, as members of families, and as members of social classes” (ibid., pp. 104, 106 f.).

  [47.]For an illuminating and cogent natural-law discussion of state and national sovereignty with its limitations and inadequacies as well as of the imperative material and moral necessity of an organized world society, see Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, pp. 285–322. Cf. also the admirable “Preliminary Recommendation on Post-War Problems” formulated by the Inter-American Juridical Committee at Rio de Janeiro, September 5, 1942, in Bulletin of the Pan American Union (April, 1943), pp. 212–24; Thomas R. Hanley, O.S.B., “Some Interpretations of the Present World Crisis,” The National Benedictine Educational Association Bulletin, XXV (1943), 159–75; Luigi Sturzo, “The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Conceptions,” Thought, XX (1945), 101–10; Guido Gonella, A World to Reconstruct. Pius XII on Peace and Reconstruction, trans. by T. Lincoln Bouscaren, S.J. (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1944), especially pp. 246–78; John J. Wright, National Patriotism in Papal Teaching (Westminster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1943), in particular pp. 195–323; Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945)—with certain reservations, particularly with regard to the chapter entitled “Failure of Religion” which, for all the justice of some of its criticisms and strictures, must be set down as altogether sophomoric. Of great value, likewise, are the pamphlets prepared by specialists and issued by the Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D.C.: The World Society (1940); International Ethics (4th ed., 1942); A Peace Agenda for the United Nations (1943). Lastly, for certain sobering, though perhaps not entirely convincing, reflections upon the problem of a world state, see Heinrich Rommen, “Realism and Utopianism in World Affairs,” The Review of Politics, VI (1944), 193–215.

  [48.]In the final analysis, the person is a rational substance, a substantial reality, whereas any society whatever is but an accidental reality, a reality of order, of the category of relation, not a super-person. Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, pp. 325–28, 360–64.

  [49.]However, even though man’s natural rights are commonly termed absolute and inviolable, they are limited by the requirements of the universal order to which they are subordinated. Absolute, in the sense in which it is here used, does not mean unlimited. Specifically, the natural rights of man are limited intrinsically by the end for which he has received them (self-development within order) as well as extrinsically by the equal rights of other men, by his duties toward others. Cf. Jacques Leclercq, op. cit., pp. 329–33.

  [50.]John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland, C.S.C., op. cit., pp. 13–27, deal very ably with the subject of natural rights; cf. also Hans Meyer, op. cit., pp. 474–93; Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 64–68, 73–114; K. F. Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 154–58. Thomas P. Neill nicely sums up the whole matter: “It is from natural law, and from it alone, that man obtains those rights we refer to as inalienable and inviolable. Man’s only right, in the last analysis, is the right to be a man, to live as a human person. Specific human rights, then, are all based on man’s right to live a human life. Some of these rights belong to man simply as a man and therefore are above and beyond the reach of the State. His right to existence, for example, the right to perfect his moral nature, his right to personal freedom, the right to be treated as a free, intelligent, responsible human being in no way depend upon the state. But there are other rights that man enjoys as a member of political society: freedom of expression, freedom of association, equal access to the law. And there are still others that he derives from his particular position in society, rights without which he could not properly perform his social functions: the right to form vocational groups, to a living wage, to human working conditions, to be treated as a responsible person rather than as a unit of labor energy.
  
  “Each of these rights, of course, involves an obligation on the part of all others to respect it. But each of these rights, it should be remembered, is also founded on a corresponding duty on the part of its possessor. The right to freedom of religion, for example, is based on the duty to worship God, just as the right to work is based on the duty of self-preservation and self-perfection. Each of these human rights, moreover, is limited by the rights possessed by all other men. No right is, properly speaking, an absolute right. Even freedom of religion is limited by the human rights of all others within the state. Thus the state has the right, based on its duty of protecting its citizens, to forbid a religious group from practicing infanticide or polygamy.
  
  “Human rights can have no foundation other than natural law. Legally, of course, they come from the state, but if a legal ‘right’ is truly to be a right it must be based on natural law—which is only another way of saying that it must be based on man’s very nature. And since they are based in human nature they are really inalienable and morally inviolable. Only the Creator of human nature can take them away, and God could do that without contradicting Himself only by changing human nature itself. Thus the soundest, the only foundation of those human rights so flagrantly violated today is natural law. The only foundation for a sound structure of government and of all social institutions is natural law” (Weapons for Peace [Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1945], pp. 155 f.).

  [51.]No one has made this point more lucidly or more strongly than Leo XIII: “Particular societies, then, although they exist within the State, and are each a part of the State, nevertheless cannot be prohibited by the State absolutely and as such. For to enter into ‘society’ of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State must protect natural rights, not destroy them; and if it forbids its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence; for both they and it exist in virtue of the same principle, namely, the natural propensity of man to live in society” (Rerum Novarum, § 38, ed. by Oswald von Nell-Breuning, op. cit., pp. 388 f.).

  [1.]Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, p. 57.

  [2.]This is the true meaning of certain passages of Aristotle (Ethica Nicomachea, I, 3, 1094b 11–26; II, 2, 1103b 26–1104a 9) and St. Thomas (Ethicorum, II, 2) which are sometimes cited to show that even these weighty authorities did not regard ethics as a science that yields conclusions which are certain. Summarizing what has been said on this subject in the preceding pages, we may affirm that the primary principles and proximate conclusions of ethics, together with their applications to the simplest problems of human living, enjoy a degree of certainty that is either absolute or borders on the absolute. This is evidenced, too, by the agreement between the fundamental prescriptions or presuppositions of the moral codes of primitive and civilized peoples alike. There exists, moreover, a much larger area of human activity in which developed practical reason can attain at least moral certitude, i.e., certainty of a kind that will satisfy the mind of a prudent man, and this area of more remote conclusions includes all the basic and common duties of ordinary life, individual and social. Finally, there is a peripheral area of considerable and elastic dimensions, an area of very remote conclusions consisting of involved, complex, and extremely contingent cases and relationships with which especially the human lawmaker has largely to deal. It is in part with the second category of ethical conclusions, but especially with the third one, that the remarks of Aristotle and St. Thomas have to do. If it is nonsense to hold that the findings of ethics are no more than mere opinions, it is quite as impossible to accept, without the most serious qualifications and reservations, the view of John M. Cooper (except perhaps in the matter of private ownership) that “ethics is not an exact science. Its major conclusions are woven of probabilities. Moreover, in all ethical discussions of larger problems, such, for example, as the right or desirability of life, of truthfulness, or of property ownership, our final practical ethical judgments must be arrived at after a careful weighing of the prospective or actual gains to welfare as compared with the prospective or actual losses” (“Contraception and Altruistic Ethics,” The International Journal of Ethics, XLI [1931], 459). Cf. Charles C. Miltner, C.S.C., op. cit., p. 7; Stanley Bertke, op. cit., 63–73; Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, I, 21–25, 127–74.

  [3.]Ethicorum, V, 15, cited by Deploige, op. cit., p. 314.

  [4.]Cf. in general Miriam Theresa Rooney, Lawlessness, Law, and Sanction. The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. XXXIV (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1937). It is important to note, in connection with the intrinsic sanction attached to the natural moral law, that neither ignorance nor good faith on the part of either individuals or entire societies suffices to ward off the harmful psychological, moral, social, and often physical consequences of actions that are in themselves bad that are violations of the natural moral law. The invincible ignorance, good faith or sincerity of individuals and groups provide the basis for the weighty and often disconcerting distinction between objective wrong and subjective guilt, between material sin and formal sin and hence they serve to excuse one from formal guilt in the sight of God. Yet certain consequences of evil acts are inexorable; they lie in the nature of things. They are the inescapable penalties for the want of deep and correct insight into, and faithful adherence to, the conditions fixed by nature, and ultimately by nature’s Author, for human individual and social development and happiness. Furthermore, they are the needed spur to a reconsideration of the moral quality of actions hitherto regarded as good; they constitute necessary and salutary incentives to moral reform as the indispensable means to genuine and rounded human progress; and they give the lie to the senseless but oft-heard saying, “There is nothing wrong or bad but thinking makes it so.” An excellent illustration of this point is furnished by the widespread practice of positive contraception or artificial birth control, which, objectively, as a deliberate perversion whereby the essential order between the sex act and its primary end is destroyed (as in final analysis nothing but mutual masturbation), is intrinsically immoral and therefore justifiable under no circumstances whatsoever. Now, even if we largely grant invincible ignorance and good faith to the non-Catholic masses and their moral leaders regarding this rather remote conclusion from the primary principle of the natural moral law (on the possibility of the invincible ignorance of some Catholics in this matter, cf. Stanley Bertke, of. cit., pp. 97 ff.), will the wedge-principle in ethics cease to operate? Will birth rates cease to fall or populations to decline? Will the various and complicated untoward economic, social, political, international, and interracial consequences of a widespread practice of artificial birth control be avoided? Will men more readily master the sexual part of their nature and more easily subject it to reason? Will the consequent small family really promote the moral growth of parents and the moral education of children? Will the moral fiber of individuals and societies be strengthened? Will the mounting pleasure complex be checked? Will the principle that the end justifies the means, the implicit assumption mostly underlying the acceptance and defense of positive contraception (as also of eugenic sterilization, therapeutic abortion, artificial insemination as usually practiced, euthanasia, and the like), be restricted in its applications to this single case? To ask these and other pertinent questions is to answer them. Whether in good faith or in bad faith, a society addicted to artificial birth-control practices will inexorably pay the terrible penalties of its contravention of the natural moral law, first indeed in subtle ways, and then more and more openly and upon an ever vaster scale. It is a mere question of time.

  [5.]For a thorough and severe criticism of the notion of punitive justice, apparently accepted here, as confused, sentimental, irremediably obscure, and unnecessary, see Jacques Leclercq, Les droits et devoirs individuels. Part I, Vie, disposition de soi, pp. 82–96: social self-defense and emendation of the guilty person provide a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of punishment, which may be reparational, repressive (personal and exemplary), and educational. For an exposition of the dominant scholastic view of punishment in terms, rightly or wrongly, of the philosophy of St. Thomas, cf. George Quentin Friel, O.P., Punishment in the Philosophy of St. Thomas and among Some Primitive Peoples. The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. XLVII (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1939).

  [6.]St. Thomas, Summa theologica, IIa IIae, q.50, a.1 ad 1, 3.

  [7.]Cf. ibid., q.47, a.6, 15.

  [8.]Cf. ibid., q.50, a.1 f.

  [9.]Why may society never demand from one of its members an action that is unjust, immoral, sinful? Because “the reason for the existence of society is to aid in developing men in accordance with their human nature, and because sin is that which is contrary to the requirements of human nature. To sin is to act as though one were not a man, to go counter to one’s nature as a reasonable being, to deny one’s humanity” (Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, p. 335).

  [10.]In a long and temporarily discontinued series of penetrating and diffuse (and also somewhat confusing) articles on “The Theory of Democracy” in The Thomist (Vol. III, July, 1941–Vol. VII, January, 1944), Mortimer J. Adler and Walter Farrell, O.P., challenge some of the traditional conclusions of natural-law political thinking. The authors are wholly intent upon establishing their proposition that “democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government,” and in reformulating the basic problem of the classification of states. Cf. ibid., III (1940), 398.

  [11.]Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.97, a.1, quoting St. Augustine. “All should take some share in the government, for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring. … Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, wherein one is given the power to preside over all, while under him are others having governing powers. And yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e., government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers” (ibid., q.105, a.1).

  [12.]This principle has, however, been all too frequently interpreted and applied in the sense of raison d’Etat, the canon of political non-morality, Machiavellianism, power politics. Cf. Jacques Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, pp. 295 ff.

  [13.]This is scarcely true of modern England itself, where parliament is, at least in theory, legally omnipotent.

  [14.]Caution is especially imperative, however, where the remote conclusions of the natural law, where borderline cases are concerned. Is a judge, e.g., bound to condemn a defendant who, though known to the judge to be innocent, is judicially proved guilty? St., Thomas answers yes, but St. Bonaventure teaches the contrary. Cf. Stanley Bertke, op. cit., p. 73.

  [15.]Carlyle and Carlyle point out that the general political principles of the Middle Ages were “the supremacy of law, the community as the source of political authority, the limited authority of the ruler, and the contractual nature of the relations between the ruler and the community,” and they rightly insist that the development of these principles was not more than incidentally related to the frequent conflicts which occurred between the temporal and spiritual powers. A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, V, 438; see especially pp. 441–74.

  [16.]It is a pleasure to recommend to the law student, and to practicing lawyers as well, the mature and balanced volume of William Francis Clarke, The Soul of the Law (Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1942).

  [1.]John 8:32.

  [2.]But the most important lesson of this entire study of the history and philosophy of the natural law may be succinctly stated in a paraphrase of a law of philosophical experience formulated by Etienne Gilson (The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 306): “The natural law always buries its undertakers.” Or, as Horace has expressed it (Epistles I, x, 24): Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret. “You may drive out nature with a pitchfork, yet it will always return!”

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  3: Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature [1672]

  Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, translated, with Introduction and Appendix, by John Maxwell (1727), edited and with a Foreword by Jon Parkin (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005).

  Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/1353 on 2008-03-05

  The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.

  ---

  FOREWORD

  The seventeenth century witnessed what has been called the “heroic” period in the development of modern natural law theory.1 Beginning with Hugo Grotius, Protestant thinkers began to experiment with scholastic natural law ideas to produce a distinctive and highly successful tradition of natural jurisprudence that would come to dominate European political thought. Viewed from the eighteenth century, the success of the tradition could be, and often was, taken for granted, but such retrospective views could often conceal the extent to which the early pioneers faced real challenges in their attempts to reconcile natural law ideas with the rigors of Protestant theology. In this context, Richard Cumberland is perhaps one of the great unsung heroes of the natural law tradition. Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae constituted a critical intervention in the early debate over the role of natural jurisprudence at a moment when the natural law project was widely suspected of heterodoxy and incoherence.

  Hugo Grotius’s work undoubtedly generated a great deal of interest among Protestant thinkers, but it also occasioned a critical response that threatened to undermine the whole project. The most dangerous writer in this respect was Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes simultaneously adapted and subverted the new jurisprudence, producing a theory that would become notorious for its apparent atheism and absolutism. As a result, early natural law writers were dogged by accusations of Hobbism, the charge that behind their attempts to forge a new tradition lay the reduction of moral and political obligation to self-interest alone. Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae, with its sustained assault on Hobbes’s ideas, constituted one of the most important and influential responses to this damaging accusation. Cumberland not only produced one of the most effective critiques of Hobbes’s ideas, but he also used the opportunity to propose a new and distinctively scientific approach to questions of moral and political obligation. Cumberland’s achievement was to provide a much-needed defense of the natural jurisprudential project while laying important theoretical foundations for the work of such later writers as Clarke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson.2

  Richard Cumberland (1632–1718)3

  Cumberland was born in London, the son of a Salisbury Court tailor. He attended St. Paul’s School, and in June 1649, barely five months after the execution of Charles I, he entered Magdalene College, Cambridge. At Magdalene, Cumberland supplemented his regular studies with a rich diet of natural philosophy, developing the scientific knowledge that informs almost every page of the De Legibus. Cumberland’s interest in the new science was crucial to his natural law theory; the union of natural philosophy and natural theology created the basis for his science of morality and his logical demonstration of divine obligation.

  Cumberland left Cambridge after receiving his master of arts in 1656, becoming rector of the small Northamptonshire parish of Brampton Ash in 1658. This rural posting might have marked the end of Cumberland’s significance, but in 1667 he became a client of, and possibly domestic chaplain to, Sir Orlando Bridgeman, formerly lord chief justice of the Common Pleas and now in 1667 newly appointed lord keeper of the Great Seal.4 An ex-Magdalene man himself, Bridgeman employed a number of Cumberland’s colleagues, including Cumberland’s friend Hezekiah Burton. It is likely that Burton’s recommendation secured Cumberland’s new and politically important patronage.

  The connection with Bridgeman placed Cumberland at the center of English politics in the later 1660s and led directly to the publication of De Legibus Naturae. During this period, Bridgeman sponsored Hezekiah Burton and another of Cumberland’s friends, John Wilkins, in their attempts to construct a religious compromise with Presbyterian nonconformists. Although the negotiations ultimately failed, the discussion of the role of natural law in such a settlement formed the immediate political context to Cumberland’s work on the subject. In 1670, Bridgeman established the newly married Cumberland in comparatively affluent livings in Stamford, enabling him to complete De Legibus Naturae. Burton supervised the publication of the work, which was dedicated to Bridgeman. The book was published in the spring of 1672.

  The same year would see Bridgeman resign in protest at Charles II’s decision to issue the Declaration of Indulgence, suspending the penal laws against Catholic and Protestant dissenters. Cumberland appears to have survived his patron’s fall, devoting himself to his parochial duties. In 1680 he proceeded to a doctorate at Cambridge University. His thesis maintained (against the Roman Catholic position) that St. Peter had no jurisdiction over the other apostles and (against the nonconformist position) that separation from the Anglican Church was schismatic.5 In the 1680s, Cumberland produced two works. The first was a pamphlet dedicated to his school friend Samuel Pepys, by this time president of the Royal Society, entitled An Essay Towards the Recovery of Jewish Measures and Weights (1686). The Essay, originally designed as an appendix to a new edition of the Bible, was widely respected for its scholarship. During the same time, Cumberland also produced Sanchoniatho’s Phoenician History in manuscript. This work claimed to find the sources of Roman Catholic idolatry in the Phoenician corruption of sacred history. The anti-Catholic bias of the work was such that, on the eve of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Cumberland’s publisher felt that the manuscript was too inflammatory to be released. The book appeared posthumously, in 1720.

  In the wake of the revolution, Cumberland was called upon to replace the nonjuring bishop of Peterborough, Thomas White.6 Cumberland was consecrated in July 1691, at age fifty-nine. From this time until his death, Cumberland administered his diocese diligently but with declining efficiency as old age took its toll. He attended the House of Lords regularly until 1716, a loyal Whig supporter of Archbishop Tenison. Intellectually, Cumberland busied himself with studies in ancient chronology. He died after suffering a stroke on October 9, 1718.7

  De Legibus Naturae

  De Legibus Naturae was a theoretical response to a range of issues that came together during the later 1660s. The immediate political circumstances were English debates over the toleration of religious dissent. Cumberland’s Latitudinarian friends sought to reach an accommodation with moderate nonconformists based upon an appeal to natural law ideas.8 If the nonconformists could accept that the magistrate had a natural right to regulate adiaphora (religious ritual not prescribed by Scripture), intractable theological disputes might be avoided, which would open the way for accommodation within the church. The negotiations failed, resulting in the rise of more strident demands from dissenters for a pluralist, toleration-based settlement. For some Latitudinarian Anglicans, notably Samuel Parker, such demands were unacceptable. For Parker, natural law required nonconformists to submit to the legal requirements imposed by the sovereign for the common good. Parker’s illiberal use of the natural law argument soon attracted accusations that he was following the arguments of Thomas Hobbes. Notoriously, Hobbes’s political theory had appeared to pay lip service to the obligations imposed by natural law, whereas in practice vesting all practical authority in the hands of an arbitrary and absolute sovereign. Although Parker and others attempted to demonstrate that they were not Hobbists, their attempt to justify extensive sovereign power appeared to undermine their avowed commitment to natural obligation. By the time Cumberland began to write De Legibus Naturae, there was a clear need to separate the Anglican use of the natural law argument from Hobbes’s account. Such a project required a decisive attack upon Hobbes’s subversive natural law theory, but it also provided an opportunity to demonstrate the character of the obligation to natural law. Cumberland sought to do both in De Legibus Naturae.

  The question of moral obligation lies at the heart of Cumberland’s treatise, and it was a question that created profound difficulties for Protestant natural law theorists.9 Protestant thinkers were skeptical about Grotius’s appropriation of scholastic ideas. John Selden in particular was scathing about the Dutchman’s apparent assumption that conclusions of reason alone could have the force of law. A law was properly the command of a superior, in this case God. How, then, could it be shown naturally that the conclusions of reason or empirically observed norms were the will of God and thus properly obligatory laws? Hobbes made the same criticism: If the laws of nature are simply rational theorems, then they are not properly laws at all and need the command of a superior to give them obligatory force. Hobbes’s deeply skeptical answer was that providing such obligatory force was the role of the sovereign, a position that potentially ruled out the possibility of divine moral obligation altogether.

  Cumberland accepted the force of this critique but rejected Hobbes’s destructive conclusion, turning instead to a solution in dicated by Selden. Selden preferred to sidestep the problem by arguing that God had spoken directly to Adam and Noah; the natural law precepts delivered were handed down within the rabbinical tradition. His second, rather underdeveloped, suggestion was that individuals might be capable of apprehending God’s will more directly, but he was understandably reluctant to develop a theory that blurred the distinction between reason and command. Like many readers of Selden, Cumberland was less convinced by the first solution, but he saw the potential in the second argument.10

  Cumberland’s optimism about Selden’s hint derived from two related sources. The first was the revaluation of man’s rational capacity encouraged by such Cambridge thinkers as Benjamin Whichcote and Nathaniel Culverwell, both of whom sought an enhanced role for reason and empirical observation in Protestant natural law discourse.11 The second major influence was Cumberland’s conviction that science might offer a more effective means of demonstrating both the contents and the obligatory force of the law of nature. At a time when Hobbes’s work appeared to suggest that the appliance of science undermined rather than supported the idea of obligatory natural law, Cumberland’s De Legibus would recover a godly role for natural philosophy.12

  To this end, Cumberland deployed the latest scientific evidence to reject Hobbes’s narrow emphasis upon self-preservation as the beginning and end of natural obligation. Cumberland used evidence from “the nature of things” to show that an awareness of self-preservation is merely the starting point in developing an awareness of the natural duty of sociability. The logical consequence of such evidence is to reinforce the idea that individuals are bound, both by their limitations and their potentiality, to a common social good. Given that the pursuit of the common good results in a greater fulfillment of human nature than the narrow pursuit of individual self-interest, the pursuit of the common good presents itself as the logical priority for individuals, given that their own interests will be best served as a result. Such a proposition offered the prospect of a handy summary of the law of nature in one universal formula: Man’s proper action should be an endeavor to promote the common good of the whole system of rational agents.

  Although Cumberland had derived this practical proposition from a scientific examination of the nature of things, he still needed to demonstrate that such a proposition could be considered the will of God. His solution to this problem, discussed at length in chapter 5 of De Legibus, is Cumberland’s most distinctive theoretical move. Cumberland argued that it was possible to identify the sanctions attached to the law of nature, namely the structures of reward and punishment that God had ordained for the observance and dereliction of the law of nature. Punishments take various forms, ranging from the traditional scourges of conscience through to the state of war, a natural punishment for unreasonable, Hobbesian behavior. Rewards include simple happiness through to the benefits of peace, prosperity, and security. Cumberland stressed that such sanctions are not in themselves the causes of moral obligation. They are merely clues indicating that the practical proposition concerning the common good is indeed the basic principle of God’s justice. The knowledge that such a proposition is God’s will gives the proposition the force of law. Cumberland’s theory of obligation risked the suggestion that God himself is bound by the laws of nature, but Cumberland avoided the implication by arguing that an essentially free God binds himself to the observance of the regularities in his creation. Although not an unproblematic solution, Cumberland’s scheme allowed a reconciliation between natural law and the requirements of Protestant theology, one of the many reasons for Cumberland’s profound in fluence upon later writers in the tradition.

  The practical implications of Cumberland’s solution are scattered throughout the book but particularly in chapter 9, where the political implications of his argument are made clear. Having clarified the differences between Hobbes’s natural law theory and his own, Cumberland attempted to show that his position sustains a more durable account of sovereignty justified by the common good. The magistrate’s competence extends “universally to things divine and human, of foreigners and fellow-subjects, of peace and war.”13 Cumberland’s sovereign possesses extensive civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, all warranted by divinely ordained natural law. Paradoxically, one of Cumberland’s majorachievements was to demonstrate that an almost Hobbesian sovereignty could be part of an orthodox natural law theory.14

  Reception

  The reception of De Legibus gives some indication of its impact upon the natural law tradition. Cumberland’s thesis was particularly important for Samuel Pufendorf, whose De Jure Naturae et Gentium was published in the same year. Pufendorf was accused of Hobbism and in response deployed Cumberland’s arguments in his own defense. The second edition of De Jure Naturae (1684) included no fewer than forty references to De Legibus, reinforcing Pufendorf’s anti-Hobbesian credentials but also adding weight to his theory of obligation.15 In England it is perhaps no surprise to find Samuel Parker freely adapting the central argument of De Legibus in his Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature (1681). James Tyrrell, who had urged John Locke to publish something similar, produced an English abridgement of the work (with Cumberland’s approval) under the title A Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature (1692). Cumberland’s combination of positive theory and anti-Hobbesian critique ensured that the work would continue to find an audience until the early eighteenth century. After that time, Cumberland’s ideas were developed by writers like Samuel Clarke; Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury; and Francis Hutcheson; but the waning of the Hobbesian threat and Cumberland’s outmoded science made the book itself less urgent and rather dated to an audience that had become used to more sophisticated treatments of natural law.16

  Editions

  The original Latin edition was published by the Little Britain bookseller Nathaneal Hooke and seen through the press by Hezekiah Burton; but as Burton admitted in his address to the reader, the job was not well done.17 The text is littered with transcription errors allegedly perpetrated by an unnamed youth who did the typesetting. The first edition was licensed by Samuel Parker on July 25, 1671, and the work was advertised in the term catalogues in February 1671/72. As Linda Kirk has established, there are two variants of this edition, with slightly different definitions of the law of nature at the beginning of chapter 5.18 The possible significance of these differences is discussed in this edition in the notes to that chapter. A second edition of the Latin text was published in Lϋbeck and Frankfurt a.d.O. by Samuel Otto and Johann Wiedermeyer in 1683, followed by a third in the same places in 1694. A fourth edition of the Latin text, based upon the 1672 edition, was published in 1720 by James Carson in Dublin.

  In terms of translations, Cumberland’s text was, as we have seen, adapted by Samuel Parker and James Tyrrell, whose Brief Disquisition went into a second edition in 1701. Cumberland’s work would have to wait until 1727 for a full translation into English, by John Maxwell, the text used in this edition. Maxwell was prebendary of Connor and chaplain to Lord Carteret, then lord lieutenant of Ireland. Maxwell’s preface makes it clear that his intention was to produce a full translation for the first time, given that Cumberland’s original Latin text was both difficult to acquire and complicated to read. Cumberland’s anti-Hobbism may have appealed at a time when Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1714, 1723) appeared to revive central Hobbesian arguments. Maxwell’s project was probably also occasioned by discussions of natural law inspired by Francis Hutcheson’s work. Hutcheson headed a private academy in Dublin during the early 1720s and developed his own natural law position in his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), a work critical of some aspects of Cumberland’s project but with clear debts to the argument of De Legibus. Maxwell was familiar with Hutcheson’s work and saw the latter’s project as a supplement to Cumberland’s own.19

  Whatever the gains Maxwell hoped for, his Treatise of the Laws of Nature also registers considerable anxieties about the text. The translation comes with two introductory essays and lengthy appendixes by Maxwell, all of which are designed to head off wayward readings of Cumberland’s work.20 The opening essays, in particular, qualify Cumberland’s use of pagan philosophy, both by rejecting deist assumptions that might flow from such sources but also by asserting the importance of revelation in guiding the use of natural reason. The appendices carry out the same task with lengthy extracts from Samuel Clarke’s defenses of the immateriality of a thinking substance and Maxwell’s own essay on obligation, which reinforces the orthodox character of Cumberland’s theory of obligation. Cumberland’s work, so advanced for its own time, contained rather too many hostages to fortune to be published on its own in the very different world of the 1720s.

  The next major translation of Cumberland’s work produced what is undoubtedly the best edition of De Legibus, Jean Barbeyrac’s Traité Philosophique des Loix Naturelles, published in Amsterdam in 1744. Barbeyrac was able to obtain a transcript of Cumberland’s manuscript alterations, together with Richard Bentley’s corrections,21 and these were incorporated into extensive notes, together with commentaries on the text and even on Maxwell’s English translation. As a critical edition, Barbeyrac’s work is an astonishing feat of scholarship, an essential starting point for a modern editor.

  The last edition of Cumberland’s work was produced in Dublin in 1750 by John Towers. Towers produced a new but rather wayward translation and annotation inferior to Maxwell’s earlier attempt. Towers also included considerable ancillary material, including translations of prefatory addresses that Maxwell had left out. These pieces have been included in appendixes 1 and 2 of this edition.

  A NOTE ON THIS EDITION

  The current edition reproduces Maxwell’s complete text, together with additional material taken from Cumberland’s copy of De Legibus, Barbeyrac’s Traité Philosophique, and Towers’s Philosophical Enquiry. The only substantial changes to Maxwell’s text are to the footnotes. Maxwell’s footnotes use a variety of conventions, but they are unnumbered and in the introductory essays and appendixes consist usually of very general abbreviated references that provide hardly any guidance for a nonspecialist modern reader.

  For ease of reference, Maxwell’s footnote callouts (normally as terisks) in the text have been silently deleted and replaced by arabic-numbered footnotes for each essay or chapter. In some instances multiple references occurring close together have been rationalized into one note. In Maxwell’s supplementary essays, the notes have been expanded to include the full title of the work referred to and, where it can be identified, the edition used. Book, chapter, page, and section numbers have been left in the form of the original note. In his supplementary essays, Maxwell often both loosely paraphrases his source and quotes it verbatim in the original Greek or Latin; in those cases, the quotation is left out and only the reference is retained.

  In the translation of Cumberland’s text, Maxwell supplemented Cumberland’s brief textual references (mostly to Hobbes’s works) with notes of his own. Maxwell’s comments are identified in the notes to this edition, as is material taken from Barbeyrac’s notes and Cumberland’s manuscript. Additional information is the work of the current editor. In order to facilitate comparison, references to appropriate modern editions of Hobbes’s major works have been used.

  A TREATISE OF THE LAWS OF NATURE

  a

  TREATISE

  of the

  LAWS of NATURE.

  By the Right Reverend Father in God, Richard Cumberland, Lord Bishop of Peterborough.

  Made English from the Latin by John Maxwell, M.A. Prebendary of Connor, and Chaplain to his Excellency the Lord Carteret, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

  To which is prefix’d,

  An Introduction concerning the mistaken Notions which the Heathens had of the DEITY, and the Defects in their Morality, whence the Usefulness of Revelation may appear.

  At the End is subjoin’d,

  An Appendix, containing two Discourses, 1. Concerning the Immateriality of Thinking Substance. 2. Concerning the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance, of the LAW of NATURE, by the Translator.1

  LONDON:

  Printed by R. Phillips; and Sold by J. Knapton, in St. Paul’s Church-Yard, J. Senex, over against St. Dunstan’s Church, in Fleet-Street, F. Fayram, at the South-Entrance of the Royal-Exchange, J. Osborne, and T. Longman, in Pater-Noster-Row, and T. Osborne, by Gray’s-Inn-Walks. 1727.

  TO His EXCELLENCY, JOHN, Lord CARTERET, Lord Lieutenant of IRELAND.1

  May it please your Excellency,

  When I was to publish the following Sheets, I knew not under the Authority of what great Name so properly to introduce them to the Publick as your Excellency’s, and that for several Reasons.

  The Design of the Work, is, to enforce the Obligation of the Dictates of Reason, and the Necessity of Revelation, the Practice of Virtue and Religion, to Mankind; which could, with no Propriety, be address’d to a Person of an exceptionable Character.

  How I have succeeded in my Performance, no one is a better Judge than your Excellency, who have made the Authors of Antiquity, which I have made use of in the following Work, the Diversion and Improvement of your retir’d Hours.

  The Relation also, which you bear to my native Country, which is happy under your Excellency’s Administration, was another Inducement to my taking the Liberty of this Address, to which I was the more embolden’d, by having had the Honour of being receiv’d into your Excellency’s Service.

  That your Country may long enjoy the Advantage of your Example and your Counsels; that you and your Family may be long Happy in one another; and that, after a long and prosperous Life here, you may receive an eternal Reward of all your Labours hereafter, is the sincere Prayer of him, who is, with the profoundest respect,

  May it please your Excellency,
  your most devoted, and
  most faithful humble
  Servant and Chaplain,

  London March 8th, 1726–7.

  John Maxwell.

  THE TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

  The Original ofMoral Obligation, and the fundamental Principles ofLawsDivine and Human, ofSociety, ofVirtue, and ofReligion, are Points, which, in my Opinion, best deserve our Consideration, of any, which the Mind of Man can contemplate. ’Tis to these we chiefly owe all the Happiness we enjoy here, or hope for hereafter. ’Tis from Enquiries of this kind, that we learn our Duties of every sort, to God, our Creator and supreme Governor, our Fellow-creatures, and Ourselves; that we learn that unerring Rule and Standard of right Reason, by pursuing whose Dictates we regulate our Passions, and preserve them in a due Subordination. Whilst we preserve them under the Conduct of that governing Principle in the Mind of Man, which they were form’d to obey, they are our chief Instruments of Happiness; as, when they grow exorbitant, headstrong, and irregular, they are the Causes of all our Misery.

  For these Reasons, being led as much by Inclination, as in pursuance of the Profession which I have undertaken, I was willing to inquire into what those Authors had offer’d, who had treated upon this Subject, among whom BishopCumberlandseems to me, to have handled it in the most masterly and rational Manner, and to have gone farthest in the Argument, of any I have had the good Fortune to meet with. But at the same time that I own myself an Admirer of his Reasoning in the main, I cannot but acknowledge, that his Periods are very perplex’d and intricate, and that his Language is too Scholastick and Philosophical; which have deterr’d many from reading him, and have been the Occasion of his valuable Work’s not being so universally known as it deserv’d. His Book labour’d also under another Dis-advantage; his Manuscript was transcrib’d for the Press (as he himself says) by a Person unskillful in such Matters, whose Performance was, in consequence, very incorrect;1and the Author, living in the Country at a distance from London, where the Book was printed, left the Care of the Edition to a Friend, who was not at sufficient Pains, to see that it came out correctly,2as whoever examines the Original with attention, will perceiveinevery Sheet of the Book, in which many of the Errata are more than literal Mistakes, or Mispointings, and disturb the Sense extremely, which are a great Hinderance to the Reader, especially in an Argument otherwise intricate. This Fault has not been corrected in the subsequent Editions, but in the last greatly increas’d.3His Paragraphs also, in many places, are not divided in such a manner as to give the most Light to his Argument, sometimes joining them where they should be divided, and dividing them where the Reasoning requires that they should be join’d. All these Circumstances conspire to make the Reading of his valuable Work, a laborious Task, which, therefore, few Readers will be at the Pains to do. This I thought well deserv’d a helping Hand, to which I have, therefore, contributed what lay in my power.

  In order to remedy these Inconveniences, I thought it would be no disservice to the Publick, to publish his Work in English; Morality and the Law of Nature being Subjects, which many, who don’t understand Latin, would willingly inquire into; and the Poison, which Mr. Hobbes and other Writers of his Stamp, have spread far and wide, subversive of the Principles of all Morality and all Religion, having strongly infected many, who don’t understand that Language; beside, that many, who are conversant in other Latin Authors, don’t care to be at the Pains of readingCumberland.

  In my Translation I have us’d my utmost Endeavours, throughout, religiously to preserve my Author’s Sense, and at the same time to free him from as many of his Scholastick Terms as I could, without hurting the Sense, explaining such of the restasseem’d most to require it, altering and increasing the Breaks into Paragraphs, where it seem’d necessary, and giving the Heads of each Section at the Beginning of it, in order to render more clear the Connexion of the Author’s Reasoning, and his Transitions; for which purpose I have likewise frequently made use of “inverted Commas” and a difference of Character, adding at the End a particular Analysis of the whole Work, and a copious Index. In the Notes at the Bottom of the Page, I have endeavour’d, either to explain, illustrate, or confirm, what the Author has advanc’d, and in some places where I differ’d from him, to give my Reasons for it, which are submitted to the Judgment of the Reader, with all due deference to the Character of so Judicious and Learned a Writer. I have added, likewise, at the End of most of the Chapters general Remarks, with the same View.

  The Appendix which I have added, consists of two Parts. The Author, in the Beginning of his second Chapter, which is concerning the Nature of Man, where he comes to touch upon the Distinctness of the Soul from the Body, refers, for the Proof of it, to Several Authors, Des-Cartes, More, Digby, andWard, whom the Reader may, perhaps, not have at hand, nor Leisure and Inclination to consult ’em, if he had:4And, as that is a most important Point in the present Inquiry, and has, in my Opinion, been set in a clearer and stronger Light by Dr. Clark, than by any other Writer I have met with, I have reduc’d into as narrow a Compass as I could, the Substance of his Controversy upon that Head, with an Anonymous Adversary; as to which, I dare venture to appeal to both the Gentlemen themselves, whether or no I have not fairly represented their Arguments.5The second Part of the Appendix is a Discourse concerning the Promulgation, Obligation, and Observance of the Law of Nature, in which I have endeavour’d to supply what seem’d to me wanting inCumberland’s Scheme, in order to render it more compleat.

  Inquiries of the present kind and upon the present Argument, are such as can be made concerning the Will of God, as discoverable by the Light of Nature; but yet, tho’, by the help of Reason only, we may discover many and important Truths, with respect to our moral and religious Conduct, Human Reason alone and unassisted is not sufficient to inform us of all those Truths, which it greatly concerns us to know, with such a degree of Certainty, as that the Mind of Man can acquiesce therein with Satisfaction; and, consequently, a farther Light, the Light of Revelation I mean, must be added to crown our Inquiries, without which we do but still grope in the Dark, as I have endeavour’d clearly to make out in my Introduction; for I would lay no greater stress upon any thing, no, not even upon Reason itself, than I think it can bear. If we strain the String too high, it will crack, and then it is of no farther Service. In order to discover the true Foundation of all Religion and Piety, and what our Duty to God is, we must first know who he is; that is to say, we must first learn so to distinguish him from all other Beings, whether Real or Imaginary, as not to give his Glory to another. The Heathens, indeed, plainly discover’d, what it was impossible they should avoid discovering, that there was a God, a wise, powerful, and good Governor of the World, but yet they did not discover the one true God; for their supreme God was only the Imperial Head of their Polity of Gods, whom they set at the Head of their Heathen Religion; so that their supreme God was as different from the true God, as their Heathen Religion was from the true Religion. And the better Sects of the Heathen Philosophers, such as thePythagoreans, Platonists, andStoicks, made God no better than the Soul of the World, so deifying the World as a part of God, and his Body; and this Notion introduc’d the Worship of the Universe, and of the Heavenly Bodies among them. And as forAristotle, he made no more of Religion, than a mere Civil or Political Institution. Thus the true God and the true Religion were Strangers among them all. As for their Morality, I have likewise shewn how imperfect that was. Thus were their Notions defective, with respect to God, Religion, and Morality; and without the Knowledge of the true God it is as impossible to form a true Religion, as it is impossible for a blind Man to take a true Aim, or for an Architect to raise a firm Building without a Foundation. This, therefore, is the Scope of my Introduction; for, as great a value as I set upon Reason, I would not over-rate her: Where she convinces me, that she is a sufficient Guide, I will follow her Directions; but where she owns herself at a loss, and that another Guide is necessary, I will follow her Directions in the Choice of that Guide, among the Pretenders, and in explaining the Directions and Institutions given me by that Guide. Thus is Reason justly subservient to, and consistent with, Religion; and thus, if our Practice be suitable, we make a right Use of both.

  There is only one thing more, with which I think it proper to acquaint the Reader, and I have done. In the last Page but one of the Introduction I affirm, “That the Knowledge of the Being and Attributes of God are previously necessary to the Belief of a Revelation;” and I have before in the same Introduction prov’d, “That the Heathens were ignorant of the true God;” my Meaning, which is perfectly consistent, is this. It is plain, that they may believe in a God, who are ignorant of the true God, as was the Case of the Heathens. All that is necessary for me to know, in order to give a firm Assent to a Revelation, is, to be convinc’d that the Revelation comes from one, who neither can be deceiv’d himself, nor will deceive me; for, otherwise, how can I give a firm Assent to any thing upon his Testimony, if either He himself may be mistaken, or He be willing to misguide me? But more than this is not necessary, in order to the Belief of a Revelation. And so far the Heathens might and did know without the help of Revelation, by the Light of Nature only, tho’ at the same time they were ignorant of the true God. For tho’ they believ’d in a wise, powerful, and good Governor of the World, in consequence of which they must believe, that his Wisdom could not be deceiv’d, and that his Goodness would not suffer him to deceive; and tho’ all this was a true Notion of God, yet it was not a Notion of the true God, because they tack’d to it one or both of these Notions, “That he was the Soul of the World;” and, “That he was the supreme of their Heathen Deities;” both which, being equally false, could be no parts of the Notion of the true God. If then this wise and good Governor of the World, in whom they before believ’d without a Revelation, thought fit to give proper Credentials to any Missionaries, as coming from him, by whom they were inform’d, that this Governor of the World was the supreme God (contrary to whatPlatotaught,) and that he was the only God (contrary to what was taught by thePlatonistsandStoicks,) and that he was the Creator of the World, not the Soul of it (contrary to what was taught by thePlatonists, Pythagoreans, andStoicks;) and if these Missionaries should likewise inform them, that Religion was not a merely Civil and Political Institution (asAristotlemade it;) would not they, in Reason and Duty, be bound to believe all this, and to practice accordingly? Yes undoubtedly. And thus both parts of my Assertion are very consistent.

  I know not, whether it be worth while to take notice here of a Passage in Page 12th of the Introduction,6where I say, “That the Canaanites, among whom the Patriarchs sojourn’d ’till their Descent into Aegypt, were all of them Idolatrous Nations;” I do not mean, that all the Canaanites were then Idolaters, but only all the Canaanites, among whom the Patriarchs sojourn’d; because it is certain, that Melchizedek, and probably his People, were no Idolaters then; but then we have no Account that the Patriarchs ever sojourn’d in Salem.

  NAMES OF SUBSCRIBERS

  Those mark’d with * are for large Paper.

  • A.
  • *His Grace the A. Bp. of Ardmagh.
  • *Sir Arthur Atcheson.
  • The Rev. Mr. Abbot.
  • Mr. John Abernethy.
  • Mr. Nathaniel Adams.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Addenbrooke.
  • The Rev. Mr. Alexander Alcock, Dean of Limerick.
  • Edmund Allen, Esq;
  • *Francis Allen, Esq;
  • *James Anderson, Esq;
  • John Arbuthnot, M. D.
  • Mr. Charles Arbuthnot.
  • Henry Arkwright, Esq; Collector of Dublin.
  • *Margeston Armar, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Edward Arrowsmith.
  • *Benjamin Arthur, Esq;
  • Capt. Beaumont Astle.
  • *William Aston, Esq;
  • *The Rev. Mr. Walter Atkin, Vicar-general of Cloyne.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Thomas Atkin.
  • Mr. Henry Aubin.
  • Mr. Richard Auchmooty.
  • Capt. Sheffield Austen.
  • Nicholas Aylward, Esq;
  • B.
  • The Rt. Hon. the E. of Barkshire.
  • The Hon. William Brabazon, Esq;
  • The Hon. Mr. Justice Bernard.
  • Montague Bacon, Esq;
  • John Bailie, Esq;
  • William Baker, Esq;
  • *Seignior Beneditti Baldassari.
  • *The Rev. Dr. Richard Baldwin, Provost of Dublin-College.
  • William Balfour, Esq;
  • Mr. Samuel Ballard.
  • Mr. Thomas Ballard.
  • Benjamin Barrington, Esq;
  • Mr. William Barwell.
  • Mr. Richard Baylis.
  • Capt. Philip Beard.
  • Lieut. Peter Beaver.
  • William Becket, Esq;
  • Mr. William Becket.
  • *Henry Bellingham, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Edward Benson.
  • Mr. Bentham, for 2 Books.
  • *The Rev. Dr. Geo. Berkely, Dean of Derry.
  • William Berry, Esq;
  • Mr. David Bindon.
  • The Rev. Dr. Birch, Chan. of Worcester.
  • The Rev. Mr. George Black.
  • Robert Blackwood, Esq;
  • James Blackwood, Esq;
  • Francis Blake, of the Mid. Tem. Esq;
  • *Col. William Blakeny.
  • Mr. John Blackley.
  • The Rev. Mr. Francis Bland.
  • Arthur Blenerhasset, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Richard Bolton.
  • Mr. Sam. Bonamy Jun. of Guernsey.
  • Edward Bond, Esq;
  • Mr. Arden Bonell.
  • Mr. John Bonvill.
  • The Rev. Mr. Peter Bonworth.
  • *The Rev. Mr. Booth.
  • Mr. John Boushman.
  • Mr. Bowles.
  • Mr. David Boyd.
  • Mr. Will. Boyle, of Cork, Merchant.
  • *The Rev. Mr. Alexander Bradford.
  • Mr. William Bradford.
  • Mr. Graham Bradford.
  • Mr. Rowland Bradstock.
  • Mr. Robert Bransby.
  • *The Rev. Mr. Jasper Brett, Chancellor of Connor.
  • The Rev. Mr. William Brett.
  • Edward Brice, Esq;
  • William Bromley, of the Middle Temple, Esq;
  • *The Rev. Mr. Brooke, Fellow of Brazen-nose-College, Oxford.
  • Mr. John Broughton.
  • Mr. John Brown.
  • Mr. Ulick Brown.
  • ——— Brown, Esq;
  • Mr. Daniel Brown.
  • Mr. Ellis Brownsword.
  • Charles Brumstead, Esq;
  • Eustace Budgell, of the Middle Temple, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Robert Bultfell.
  • *Mr. Josiah Bullock.
  • Mr. Burchett.
  • Thomas Burgh, Esq;
  • William Burgh, Esq;
  • *——— Burroughs, Esq;
  • Mrs. Jane Burton.
  • *Francis Burton, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Butler.
  • C.
  • *His Grace the A. Bp. of Canter.
  • *His Excellency the Ld. Carteret, Lord Lieut. of Ireland.
  • His Grace the A. Bp. of Cashel, for 4.
  • The Rt. Rev. the Ld. Bp. of Clogher.
  • *The Right Hon. Thomas Clutterbuck, Esq; 4 Books.
  • *The Rt. Hon. Marma. Coghill, Esq;
  • *The Hon. John Chichester, Esq;
  • *The Hon. Mr. Justice Caulfield.
  • Mr. Andrew Caldwell.
  • Stratford Canning, of the Middle Temple, Esq;
  • *The Rev. Mr. Robert Carlton, Dean of Cork.
  • *Henry Cartwright, Esq; one of the Commissi. of the Victualling Office.
  • Rev. Mr. Cartwright, Fell. Dub. Coll.
  • Mr. John Carty.
  • Francis Cashell, Esq;
  • Mr. John Caswell of London, Merch.
  • *Mr. Patrick Cassedy.
  • *Mr. Thomas Causlon.
  • Mr. Samuel Chandler.
  • Bejamin Chapman, Esq;
  • Capt. John Charlton.
  • Capt. Philip Chenevex.
  • Mr. Chester.
  • Mr. William Cheselden.
  • Mr. Richard Choppin.
  • Thomas Christmass, Esq;
  • *The Rev. Dr. Samuel Clark, Rector of St. James’s.
  • Mr. Darby Clark.
  • Mr. Francis Clay.
  • *The Rev. Dr. Clayton, Fellow of Dublin College.
  • *Theophilus Clements, Esq;
  • Mr. Clements.
  • The Rev. Mr. Samuel Close.
  • The Rev. Dr. Cobden.
  • *William Cockburn, M. D.
  • David Cockburn, M. D.
  • John Coddington, Esq;
  • Henry Coddington, Esq;
  • Mr. Dixey Coddington.
  • Mrs. Mary Coghill.
  • *James Coghill, L. L. D.
  • Thomas Coke, Esq;
  • Mr. Thomas Colborne.
  • Mr. Colebatch.
  • Richard Colley, Esq;
  • *Anthony Collins, Esq;
  • Mr. Alexander Colvil.
  • The Rev. Mr. Conybeare, Fellow of Exeter College.
  • *Williams Conyngham, Esq;
  • Capt. Henry Conyngham.
  • Mr. Richard Conyngham.
  • Mr. Daniel Conyngham.
  • *Edward Cooke, Esq;
  • *Mr. Thomas Cooke.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Cooke.
  • Mr. Peter Cooke.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Cooper.
  • The Rev. Dr. Chidley Coote.
  • The Rev. Mr. Richard Corbet.
  • Mr. Thomas Corbet.
  • *Mr. Richard Cosins.
  • Rev. Mr. Cotterel, Dean of Raphoe.
  • Major John Cotterel.
  • Mr. Courthope.
  • Joshua Cox, Esq; for 2 Books.
  • *Richard Cox, Esq;
  • Mr. John Cox.
  • *Brigadier Creighton.
  • *Mr. Joseph Creswick.
  • Mr. James Croft.
  • Mr. Edward Crowe.
  • The Rev. Mr. William Crowe.
  • John Cuffe, Esq;
  • Maurice Cuffe, Esq;
  • Capt. Cumberland.
  • The Rev. Mr. James Cunningham.
  • George Cunningham, Esq;
  • Mr. Daniel Cunningham.
  • William Curtis, Esq;
  • Mr. William Curtis.
  • Mr. John Curtis.
  • Mr. Christopher Cusack.
  • Mr. Thomas Cutbert.
  • Mr. Nathaniel Cutler.
  • D.
  • His Grace the A. Bp. of Dublin.
  • *The Rt. Rev. the Lord Bp. of Derry, for 2 Books.
  • The Rt. Rev. the Lord Bp. of Down.
  • *The Rt. Rev. the Ld. Bp. of Dromore.
  • *Sir Francis-Henry Drake.
  • Mary Lady Dunne.
  • *Mr. Isaac Dalton.
  • Mr. Thomas Dance.
  • The Rev. Mr. Richard Daniel, Dean of Ardmagh.
  • *Gebhard D’Antheny, Esq; for 2.
  • Mr. Ferdinando Davis.
  • Mr. Charles Davis.
  • Ephraim Dawson, Esq;
  • Thomas Dawson, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Dawson.
  • The Rev. Caleb Debutz, L. L. D.
  • Edward Deering, Esq;
  • *Stephen Delacreuze, Esq;
  • *Charles Delafay, Esq;
  • The Rev. Dr. Delany, Fellow of Dublin-College.
  • Mr. Samuel Derham.
  • The Rev. Mr. Benjamin Digby.
  • Robert Dillon, Esq;
  • Mr. Henry Dixon.
  • Robert Dixon, Esq;
  • Arthur Dobbs, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Dobbs, Fellow of Dublin-College.
  • Mr. John Dobyns.
  • Mr. Robert Donaldson.
  • The Rev. Dr. Richard Dongworth.
  • The Rev. Mr. Dean Dopping.
  • *John Dowdall, of the Middle Temple, Esq;
  • Edward Dowdall, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Lancelot Dowdall.
  • Whitfield Doyne, Esq;
  • *Montague-Gerrard Drake, Esq;
  • Mr. Francis Drake.
  • The Rev. Dr. Edward Drury.
  • Lieut. James Drysdale.
  • The Rev. Dr. Pascal Ducasse, Dean of Ferns.
  • Jeremiah Dummer, Esq;
  • Jeremiah Dunavan, Esq;
  • Mr. James Duncan.
  • The Rev. Mr. Hancock Dunbar.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Dunlap.
  • Mr. Samuel Dunlap.
  • John Dunne, Esq;
  • The Rev. Dr. Dunstar.
  • *Mr. James Durand, for 4 Books.
  • *Mr. Dynes.
  • E.
  • *Sir Joseph Eyles.
  • *Sir Laurence Esmond.
  • Sir Henry Echlin.
  • Mr. John Eastman.
  • The Rev. Mr. Robert Echlin.
  • Mr. John Eden.
  • Mr. William Edgell.
  • Mr. Thomas Edlin.
  • *Francis Edwards, Esq;
  • Richard Elliot, Esq; Commissioner of the Excise.
  • Mrs. Frances Empson.
  • Bury Erwin, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Charles Este, Student of Christ-Church.
  • Eyre Evans, Esq;
  • Benjamin Everard, Esq;
  • Kingsmill Eyre, Esq;
  • F.
  • The Rt. Rev. the Ld. Bp. of Ferns.
  • *The Rt. Hon. the Lord Ferrard.
  • The Rt. Hon. the Lord Fitz-Morris.
  • Mr. Thomas Fairchild.
  • *Mr. Henry Faure, of Lond. Merch.
  • Mr. Francis Fayram.
  • Felix Feast, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Philip Fernesly.
  • The Rev. Mr. Richard Fisher.
  • Michael Fleming, Esq;
  • Mr. Fletcher.
  • The Rev. Mr. Arthur Fletcher.
  • Warden Flood, Esq;
  • *Martin Folkes, Esq;
  • Mr. John Foord.
  • *Richard Forster, Esq;
  • Mr. John Forsyth.
  • James Forth, Esq;
  • *Mr. Nathaniel France.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Frazier.
  • *Mr. Stephen Freeman.
  • The Rev. Mr. William Freeman.
  • *Mr. Edmund French.
  • Nicholas-Ambrose French, Esq;
  • Mr. William French.
  • John Fuller, Esq;
  • Samuel Fuller.
  • G.
  • *The Hon. Mr. Justice Gore, for 2.
  • *Sir Ralph Gore.
  • Arthur Gahegan, Esq; for 5 Books.
  • The Rev. Mr. Gale.
  • *Luke Gardiner, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Nicholas Garnett.
  • Mr. John Garnett.
  • The Rev. Mr. Garwood.
  • Mr. William Gavan.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Giffard.
  • The Rev. Dr. Gilbert, Vice-Provost of Dublin-College.
  • Mr. Henry Gill.
  • Mr. Thomas Gladstanes.
  • Mr. Thomas Glen.
  • Philip Glover, Esq;
  • Mr. John Glover.
  • The Rev. Mr. Goolat.
  • Mr. Hugh Gordon.
  • Mr. John Gore.
  • Mr. Robert Gosling.
  • *Mr. Nathaniel Gould, of London, Merchant.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Graham.
  • Mr. George Graham.
  • *Mr. Hugh Granger.
  • ——— Granger, Esq;
  • James Gratton, M. D.
  • The Rev. Mr. Robert Gratton.
  • Mr. William Graves, of Drogheda, Merchant.
  • Mr. William Green, of the Post-Office, for 2 Books.
  • Mr. William Green, Surgeon.
  • Mr. Thomas Green.
  • The Rev. Mr. Benjamin Gregory.
  • Mr. John Gregory, for 2 Books.
  • Mr. John Griffitt, for 2 Books.
  • Mr. William Grigson.
  • Mr. Groenewege.
  • Mr. Nicholas Groubere.
  • Mr. Fletcher Gyles.
  • H.
  • The Rt. Hon. the Ld. Vis. Hatton.
  • *The Rt. Hon. the Ld. C. B. Hale.
  • Mr. Samuel Haliday.
  • Mr. John Hall.
  • The Rev. Dr. Hall.
  • Mr. Hannibal Hall.
  • Edward Hamage, Esq;
  • Mr. Henry Hamage.
  • Mr. Alexander Hamilton.
  • *John Hamilton, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. John Hamilton.
  • The Rev. Mr. Hamilton, Arch-Deacon of Ardmagh.
  • Mr. William Hamilton.
  • Anthony Hammond, Esq;
  • Mr. James Haning.
  • *Mr. Nicholas Hansard.
  • The Rev. Mr. Ralph Hansard.
  • Mr. John Hara.
  • Ambrose Harding, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. John Hare.
  • Mr. Harper.
  • Mr. Samuel Harper.
  • Mr. John Harris.
  • Nicholas Harris, of the Inner-Temple, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Harrison.
  • William Harrison, Esq; Commissioner of the Revenue in Ireland.
  • *Francis Harrison, Esq;
  • Marsh Harrison, Esq;
  • *The Rev. Mr. Henry Harrison.
  • The Rev. Mr. Hartson.
  • *Pryce Harstonge, Esq;
  • Mr. John Hasty.
  • The Rev. Mr. William Hatsell.
  • Mr. Francis Hauksbee.
  • John Hawkshaw, L. L. D.
  • The Rev. Mr. Heald, Fellow of St. John’s Cambridge, and Curate of St. George’s, Southwark.
  • *Mr. Paul Heeger.
  • *Hugh Henry Esq;
  • Mr. Henry.
  • The Rev. Mr. Henry Herbert.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Herbert.
  • Mr. Philip-Parry Hetherington.
  • *Mr. Richard Hewerdine.
  • Mr. Robert Higinbothom.
  • Mr. Rowley Hill.
  • Major Edward Hill.
  • *Henry Hoare, Esq;
  • *The Rev. Mr. Samuel Holt.
  • *Mr. Christopher Hopkins.
  • The Rev. Mr. Richard Hopkins.
  • Mr. John Horan.
  • James Horn, Esq;
  • The Rev. Dr. Howard, Dean of Ardagh.
  • Jabez Hughes, Esq;
  • Mr. Hughes, of Wadham-College.
  • The Rev. Mr. Bartholomew Hughes.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Hunt.
  • Miler Hussey, Esq;
  • Mr. Hans Hutcheson.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Hutchinson, 2.
  • The Rev. Mr. Samuel Hutchinson.
  • The Rev. Mr. Charles Huxley, Fellow of Brazen-nose.
  • *Mr. Thomas Hyam.
  • I.
  • Thomas Jacomb, Esq;
  • The Rev. Dr. Jenkins.
  • Mr. Thomas Ingram.
  • Thomas Jobber, Esq;
  • Mr. Serjeant Jocelyn.
  • Robert Johnson, Esq;
  • George Johnston, Esq;
  • Mr. Hugh Johnston.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Johnston.
  • The Rev. Mr. Jones, Fellow of Baliol-College.
  • Mr. Lewis Jones.
  • Roger Jones, Esq;
  • Valentine Jones, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Walter Jones.
  • Mr. William Jones.
  • Mr. Matthew Jones.
  • Mr. Talbot Jones.
  • James Jurin, M. D. Secretary to the Royal-Society.
  • K.
  • The Rt. Rev. the Lord Bp. of Kilmore.
  • *The Rt. Rev. the Lord Bp. of Killala.
  • *The Rt. Rev. the Ld. Bp. of Killaloo.
  • Mr. Nathaniel Kane.
  • The Rev. Dr. Kearny.
  • Col. Maurice Keatinge.
  • Maurice Keatinge, Jun. Esq;
  • William Keatinge, Esq;
  • Mr. Samuel Keeling.
  • Benjamin Keene, Esq; Consul at Madrid.
  • John Kelly Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Daniel Kemble.
  • Mr. Robert Kendal.
  • John Kennedy, M. D.
  • John Ker, Esq;
  • Col. Peter Ker.
  • *Abel Kettleby, Esq;
  • Mr. Benjamin King.
  • The Rev. Mr. Oliver King.
  • The Rev. Mr. James King.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Kinnersly.
  • Mr. James Kirkpatrick.
  • Mr. James Knapton.
  • Mrs. Anne Knight.
  • Mr. William Knight.
  • The Rev. Mr. Knipe.
  • Mr. Ralph Knox, of London, Merch.
  • L.
  • *The Rt. Rev. the Lord Bp. of London.
  • Sir Richard Levinge.
  • Montague Lambert, Esq;
  • Mr. James Lancashire.
  • The Rev. Mr. Vere-Essex Lanergan.
  • The Rev. Mr. La Placette.
  • The Rev. Mr. Leche, Fellow of Brazen-nose.
  • ——— Lee, of the Mid. Tem. Esq;
  • Thomas Le Hunt, Esq;
  • Mr. Leigh, Fellow-commoner of Wadham-College, Oxford.
  • *The Rev. Mr. Theophilus Leigh, Head of Baliol-College.
  • Mr. John Leland.
  • Mr. John Lennox.
  • Capt. Edmund Lesly.
  • The Rev. Mr. Lewis, Arch-Deacon of Kells.
  • The Rev. Mr. William Lewes.
  • Mr. Thomas Lewes.
  • Mr. Lindsay.
  • Mr. William Lingen.
  • The Rev. Mr. Richard Lisset.
  • Mr. John Lisset.
  • Mr. William Livingstone.
  • The Rev. Dr. Anthony Locay.
  • Mr. Christopher Lock.
  • The Rev. Dr. Edward Lovell.
  • Robert Lowry, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Richard Lucas.
  • Mr. Cornelius Lyde.
  • The Rev. Mr. Roger Lynden.
  • The Rev. Mr. Patrick Lyon.
  • *Colley Lyons, of River-Lyons Esq;
  • Capt. John Lyons.
  • M.
  • *The Rt. Hon. the E. of Meath.
  • *The Rt. Hon. the Ld. Mountjoy.
  • *The Rt. Rev. the Ld Bp. of Meath.
  • *The Hon. Mr. Justice Maccartney.
  • The Hon. Edward Moore, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. John Mac Arthur.
  • Mr. Alexander Mac Aulay.
  • George Maccartney, Esq;
  • Mr. Isaac Macartney of Belfast,
  • Mer. Major John Maccollum.
  • *Mr. Richard Macguire.
  • Mr. Archibald Maclane.
  • James Macmanus, Esq;
  • Mr. Bartholomew Macneighten.
  • Mr. Edmund Macneighten.
  • Mr. Archibald Macneile.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Maddin.
  • Mr. John Mairs.
  • Mr. William Maple.
  • Thomas Marley, Esq; Sollicitor-general of Ireland.
  • The Rev. Mr. George Marley.
  • The Rev. Mr. Able Marmyon.
  • *Jeremiah Marsh, D. D. Dean of Kilmore.
  • *John Marsh, Esq; Recorder of Rochester.
  • *Robert Marshall, Esq; Recorder of Clonmell.
  • George Martin, M. D.
  • Mr. John Martin.
  • Mr. Adam Martin.
  • Mr. Enoch Mason.
  • Mr. John Mason.
  • The Rev. Mr. Charles Massy.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Mathers.
  • Mr. Edward Matthews.
  • The Rev. Dr. Mawl, Dean of Cloyne.
  • Colin Maxwell, M. D.
  • *Henry Maxwell, Esq;
  • *Hugh Maxwell, Esq;
  • John Maxwell, Esq;
  • *Mr. John Maxwell.
  • The Rev. Dr. Robert Maxwell, of Fellows hall, for 8 Books.
  • The Rev. Dr. Rob. Maxwell, of Graies.
  • Robert Maxwell, Esq;
  • Capt. Robert Maxwell.
  • Mr. Nathaniel May.
  • *William Maynard, Esq; Collector of Cork.
  • *Edward Maynard, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Mears.
  • Mr. Roger Medcalf.
  • Thomas Medlicott, Esq; Comissioner of the Revenue in Ireland.
  • The Rev. Mr. Medlicott.
  • *Mr. Charles Mein.
  • *Thomas Meredith, Esq;
  • Mr. William Meredith.
  • Mr. Jean-Baptist Meulenaer.
  • Mr. Samuel Mills.
  • Charles Milne, Esq;
  • Pooley Molyneux, Esq;
  • William Monsell, Esq;
  • *Alexander Montgomery, Esq;
  • William Montgomery, Esq;
  • Charles Moore, of the Middle-Temple, Esq;
  • Mr. John Moore.
  • *William Moore, Esq; Commissary-general of Ireland.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Morgan.
  • Mr. Richard Morgan.
  • Richard Morley, of Gray’s-Inn, Esq;
  • Mr. Thomas Mosely.
  • Mr. John Murry of Chester, Merch.
  • N.
  • *Sir Isaac Newton.
  • The Rev. Mr. Arthur Nevin.
  • Mr. Thomas Nevin.
  • Brabazon Newcomen, Esq;
  • Mr. Newton.
  • The Rev. Mr. Nicholson.
  • Mr. John Noon.
  • Mr. Robert Norman.
  • Mr. William Norman.
  • Mr. Richard Norris.
  • The Rev. Mr. Bernard Northcote.
  • Mr. Richard Nuttall.
  • O.
  • *Sir John Osborne.
  • *Mrs. Susannah OBryen
  • *George Ogle, Esq;
  • *Charles O Hara, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Felix Oneile.
  • *Arthur Onslow, Esq;
  • *Richard Ord, Esq;
  • Mr. John Orr.
  • Mr. John Osborne.
  • Mr. Thomas Osborne.
  • Mr. Osborne of Eaton.
  • Mr. Henry Overton.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Owen.
  • P.
  • *The Rt. Hon. the E. of Pembroke.
  • *The Rt. Hon. Benja. Parry, Esq;
  • The Hon. Mr. Baron Pocklington.
  • Sir Charles Potts.
  • *Sir Henry Piers.
  • Mr. Thomas Page.
  • Laurence Paine, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. William Paine.
  • Mr. Samuel Palmer.
  • Mrs. Mary Parker.
  • Mr. James Parker, Fellow of Oriel and Brazen-nose Colleges.
  • Mr. Richard Parker.
  • Robert Parkinson, Esq;
  • *Robert Paul, Esq;
  • Edward Palwet, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Francis Peck.
  • Mr. William Peers.
  • Mrs. Pendarvis.
  • Col. Matthew Pennyfather.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Penwarne.
  • Mr. George Pepyard.
  • Mr. William Peters.
  • Mr. James Petit.
  • *Ambrose Philips, Esq;
  • Chichester Philips, Esq;
  • Thomas Philips, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Marmaduke Philips.
  • Mr. David Philips.
  • Southwell Piggott, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Pilkington.
  • *Mr. Thomas Pocklington.
  • Col. Thomas Pollexsen.
  • The Rev. Mr. Edward Pordage.
  • Mr. John Porter.
  • Mr. Joseph Pote.
  • Mr. John Power.
  • *Benjamin Prat, Esq;
  • Col. John Preston.
  • Daniel Preverau, Esq;
  • Brigadier Nicholas Price.
  • *Cromwell Price, Esq;
  • William Price, Esq;
  • Mr. Thomas Prior.
  • Thomas Proby, Esq; Surgeon-general of Ireland.
  • George Purdon, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Edward Purdon.
  • Mr. William Pyms.
  • The Rev. Mr. Cornelius Pyne.
  • Q.
  • The Rev. Mr. Questburn.
  • R.
  • *The Rt. Hon. the Bp. of Raphoe, for 2 Books.
  • Dorothy Lady Rawdon.
  • *Matthew Raper, Esq; for 3 Books.
  • The Rev. Mr. John Ratcliffe, Fellow of Pembroke-College, Oxford.
  • The Rev. Mr. Gersham Rawlins.
  • Mr. Edward Raymond.
  • James Reilly, Esq;
  • Mr. Reynolds, for 3 Books.
  • The Rev. Mr. Thomas Rice.
  • *Mr. Thomas Richardson 7 Books.
  • *William Richardson, Esq;
  • Edward Richardson, Esq;
  • Mr. Robert Rigmaiden.
  • Mr. Patrick Riley.
  • The Rev. Mr. David Roberts.
  • Col. George Robinson.
  • Tancred Robinson, M. D. Physician in Ordinary to his Majesty.
  • The Rev. Mr. Rogers, Fellow of Dublin-College.
  • Mr. Rogers, Commoner of Wadham-College.
  • Woods Rogers, Esq;
  • *William Rogerson, Esq; Attorney-general of Ireland.
  • Edward Roome, of Lincoln’s Inn, Esq;
  • Dr. William Rowen, Fellow of Dublin-College.
  • *Hercules Rowley, Esq;
  • The Rev. Dr. Rundle.
  • S.
  • *The Rt. Rev. the Lord Bp. of Salisbury.
  • *The Rt. Hon. the Ld. Southwell.
  • The Rt. Hon. Edw. Southwell, Esq;
  • *The Rt. Hon. Oliver St. George, Esq;
  • The Hon. Henry Southwell, Esq;
  • *The Hon. Mrs. Wargaretta Sabine.
  • *The Lady Stanley.
  • Sir George Savil.
  • Oliver St. John, Esq;
  • Mrs. Elizabeth St. John.
  • The Rev. Mr. St. Paul.
  • *John Sale, Esq;
  • Mrs. Judith Sambrooke.
  • Francis Savage, Esq;
  • Dr. Sayer.
  • The Rev. Mr. Sayer.
  • John Gasper Scheuchzer, M. D.
  • *Mr. David Scott.
  • Mr. Hewit Scriven.
  • Mr. John Senex.
  • Capt. Shakleton.
  • Mr. Francis Shaw.
  • Mr. Hugh Shaw.
  • Mr. Thomas Shaw.
  • *Abraham Sherigly, Esq;
  • Mr. Edward Shewell.
  • Mr. John Shipton, Surgeon.
  • *Mr. John Shipton, for 7 Books.
  • Thomas Shrewsbridge, Esq; Consul at Cyprus.
  • Stephen Sibthorp, Esq;
  • *Mr. Isaac Sierra.
  • Mr. Henry Sisson.
  • The Rev. Dr. Skerret.
  • William Sloan, Esq;
  • The Rev. Mr. Archdeacon Smith.
  • The Rev. Dr. Smith.
  • Mr. Christopher Smith.
  • Mr. John Smith.
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  TWO Introductory ESSAYS

  I. Concerning the City, or Kingdom, of GOD in the Rational World, and the Defects in Heathen Deism.

  II. Concerning the Imperfectness of the Heathen Morality; from both which, the Usefulness of Revelation may appear.

  LONDON:

  Printed in the YEAR, MDCCXXVII.

  ESSAY I

  Of the City, or Kingdom, of God in the Rational World, and the Defects in Heathen Deism

  Man consider’d in his various Capacities.“Know thy-self,” was certainly the Wisest of the Sayings of the seven Wise-Men of Greece; that Knowledge being the greatest Wisdom, as being the only Method, by which we are enabled to discharge those Duties and Obligations we lie under, and to obtain Happiness.

  Man is consider’d, in a double Capacity, Natural and Political.

  Man, in his natural Capacity, is compos’d of two Parts, Body and Mind.

  His Body is consider’d, by the Anatomist, as it is an Organiz’d Body; and by the Physician, and Surgeon, as it is a Body liable to Distempers, that may be prevented, or remedied.

  The Natural Philosopher, commonly so call’d, considers the Nature of the human Mind, and of its Faculties; of which the two Principal are the Understanding and the Will, the Object of the former being Truth; and of the latter, Good. Logick conducts our Understanding in the Search after, and Delivery of, Truth.1Morality and Religion conduct our Will in the Pursuit of Good.

  Man Political is consider’d, as a Member of Society.

  The Societies are various, of which a Man may at the same Time be a Member, who may, therefore, be considered in as many various Political Lights.

  Oeconomics regulate his Conduct, as Member of a Family; the Laws of his Country, as Member of the Common-Wealth; the Laws of Nature, as he is a Member of Human Society; and Religion, as he is a Member of a holy Society of rational Agents, with God at their Head, which constitute what we call a Church.

  The Denyers of Providence, Atheists.§II. Whoever does not consider himself, as Member of a Society, at whose Head God is, seems to me, to be truly an Atheist. For, whoever pretends to acknowledge a God, or universal Mind, considering him only Naturally, as the Soul of the World, and not Politically, as the supreme Governor there of, and so not acknowledging a Providence, (a particular Providence, for, without that, a general Providence is an unintelligible Notion;) as he cannot prove the Being of such a God, so neither does the Acknowledging him influence our Conduct, or answer any valuable Purpose in Life. If God were the Soul of the World, and not its supreme Governor, it would be impossible for us to prove his Being, which we can discover, only from the Effects of his Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, in Forming and Governing the World. If you take away these, you may as well call him by the empty Names of Chance, or Fate, or Nature, or any Thing else, as well as God: Nor could the Acknowledgment of such a God influence our Conduct, any more than the Gods of Epicurus did his.

  Future Rewards, and Punishments, prov’d.§III. Now every Wise, Good, and Powerful Governor, must be a Law-Giver; for, without Laws, there is no Government: Such a Law-Giver must therefore have promulg’d his Laws, which God has done by Reason only, to those, to whom he has not afforded Revelation; and they can oblige no farther, than they have been promulg’d. Such a Law-Giver must also have fenc’d his Laws, with the Sanction of sufficient Rewards and Punishments, otherwise his Laws were in vain; but a wise Being does nothing in vain. Right Reason, from Experience, pronounces, “That the Rewards, and Punishments, naturally connected with the Observance, or Non-Observance, of the Laws of Nature, are not a sufficient Sanction.” Human Wisdom has, therefore, every where guarded such of the Laws of Nature as could properly fall within their Cognizance, with the additional Sanction of positive Rewards, and Punishments; which, however, tho’ they pretty well support Civil Society, are by no Means a sufficient Fence to the Law of Nature, and that upon several Accounts, 1. Many of the Laws of Nature are of such a Kind, as not properly to fall within the Design of human Laws, such as those, which enjoyn Gratitude, Veracity, in many Cases, Temperance, Liberality, Courtesy, &c.2. Other Crimes, of which human Laws can take Notice, are sometimes committed so secretly, as to escape the Knowledge of those, who should put the Laws in Execution. 3. Others, sometimes, escape unpunish’d, for want of a sufficient Power to enforce the Laws; the Crimes of some being of such a Kind, as, in their own Nature, tend to enable the Criminal to trample upon the Power of the Laws, as the unjust Acquisition of Arbitrary Power. 4. Human Wisdom cannot proportion Punishments to Crimes, because that depends upon such a through Knowledge, both of Things and Circumstances, as none but God has; the Pillory, being a far greater Punishment to some, than the Gallows is to others. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the supreme Law-Giver, and Governor of the World, as he would effectually Vindicate the Honour of his Laws, and promote the publick Happiness, to let no Crime pass unpunish’d; but that a super-added Punishment should await Criminals after this Life, of what Kind soever these Punishments may be; whether such as are naturally Connected with evil Habits, and the evil Company of the Wicked, with one another, or by the farther Addition of Punishments positively inflicted, as the Nature of the Case and of Things requires. All Crimes fall properly within his Cognizance; no Privacy excludes him; no Power can resist him; no Prejudice can byass him; and he, and he only, knows how to proportion Punishments to the Crimes, and to the Nature of the Sufferer, and to what the greatest Good of the Whole requires, which seems to be the Measure of the Intensenes sand Duration of Punishments.

  If it be objected, “That future Rewards and Punishments, super-added to those of this Life, are not sufficient, if by the Word [Sufficient] be meant, what fully prevents the Transgression of the Law, in all the Members of the Society. But that if by [Sufficient] be meant, that which renders the Observance of the Law more eligible, than the Breach, to a well-inform’d Mind; the natural Consequences of Action, without any future Rewards, or Punishments, super-added, are, in this Sense, Sufficient.” I answer, “That, according to this Reasoning, all civil Sanctions, super-added to those of Nature, would be unnecessary, Minds well-inform’d not needing such Motives, and wicked Men, not being restrain’d by these Sanctions super-added to those of Nature; yet we see, that Civil Laws and Sanctions, are of great Use, notwithstanding the Appearance of this Reasoning to the contrary, many being mov’d by both Sanctions, that would not be mov’d by one only, as also others by the treble Sanction of natural Rewards and Punishments, positive Rewards and Punishments, inflicted by Men, and by the super-added Rewards and Punishments of another Life, who would not be influenc’d by the former Two.”

  Without such a State of future Rewards and Punishments, no End can be assign’d, why such a Maker and Governor of the World should have placed us here, such as we are. Upon that Supposition, the Shortness and Uncertainty of human Life is unaccountable, and our Reason is often a disadvantage; the Bulk of Mankind losing Life, before they come to the full and true Exercise of their Reason; and when we do, to what purpose is this Mind possess’d of it, and of so many exalted and capacious Faculties, but, “like the Soul of a Swine,” (as our Author well observes,) “in-stead of Salt to preserve the Body from Putrefaction”;2 which, without that Reason, and those Faculties, it might support much longer than it does; several Brutes, without them, living longer than Man, and many Vegetables, without even a Sensitive Soul, much more without a Rational One, longer than either. Could such a Creator and Governor of the World, have given us Reason and Reflexion, with unbounded Prospects and Desires, with respect to Futurity and Eternity, with Anxieties and Doubts from thence arising innumerable, at the End of a short Farce to shut up the Scene in Death? A Farce, where the Wicked often thrive by their Vice, and the Good suffer, even on account of their Virtue. And Wisdom, united with Goodness, would rather have so ordered it, that we should neither have fear’d to die, nor desir’d to live beyond the Time appointed by Nature, as it is with the Beasts of the Field, often the Happier of the Two, if that were the Case, neither knowing, nor caring, whence they come, or whither they go. The many and grievous Calamities, (beyond what the Brutes are subject to,) lengthen’d out by the Memory of what is past, and the Fears of what is to come, can fairly be accounted for, if this Life be a State of Probation, and there be a Retribution afterwards, otherwise not, under the Conduct of a Wise and Good Governor of the World, and he would have made us satisfy’d with, and acquiesce under, our present Lot, whatever it were, like the Brute Creation, who when they suffer, do not redouble the Force of it by Reflexion; and if we were like them in the one Circumstance, why not in the other so? Why were we so made, that the Remembrance of certain past Actions creates in us Grief, Fear, and Horror, from which neither the Tyrant, nor the Polititian, can free himself, if our Maker had not design’d us for accountable Creatures, in giving us such an Idea of Guilt, and Punishment, even for the most secret Crimes?

  But I would not be mis-understood here, as if I thought, “That human Affairs were so disorderly, as not clearly to shew plain Marks of a governing Providence.” To say, “That the present moral Appearances are all regular and good,” is false. But, “That there is no moral Order visible in the Constitution of Nature,” is equally false. The Truth seems this, “Moral Order is prevalent in Nature; Virtue is constituted, at present, the supreme Happiness, and the Virtuous generally have the happiest Share of Life.” The few Disorders, which are exceptions to this general Proposition, are probably left to us as Evidences, or Arguments, for a future State. This Argument has been finely touch’d upon by Lord Shaftsbury, in his Rhapsody, thus. “If Virtue be to it-self no small Reward, and Vice, in a great Measure, its own Punishment, we have a solid Ground to go upon. The plain Foundations of a distributive Justice, and due Order in this World, may lead us to conceive a further Building. We apprehend a larger Scheme, and easily resolve ourselves, why Things were not compleated in this State; but their Accomplishments reserv’d rather to some further Period. For, had the Good and Virtuous of Mankind been wholly prosperous in this Life; had Goodness never met with Opposition, nor Merit ever lain under a Cloud; where had been the Trial, Victory, or Crown of Virtue? Where had the Virtues had their Theater, or whence their Names? Where had been Temperance, or Self-denial? Where Patience, Meekness, Magnanimity? Whence have these their Being? What Merit, except from Hardship? What Virtue without a Conflict, and the Encounter of such Enemies as arise both within, and from abroad?

  “But as many as are the Difficulties which Virtue has to encounter in this World, her Force is yet superior. Expos’d as she is here, she is not however abandon’d, or left miserable. She has enough to raise her above Pity, tho’ not above our Wishes: And as happy as we see her here, we have room for further Hopes in her behalf. Her present Portion is sufficient to shew Providence already ingag’d on her side. And since there is such Provision for her here, such Happiness, and such Advantages, even in this Life; how probable must it appear, that this providential Care is yet extended further to a succeeding Life and perfected Hereafter?”3

  Antient, Current, and Famous, were the Notices in Paganism, touching the Soul’s Immortality, the Rewards and Punishments of another Life, touching Hades, Elysium, the Isles of the Blessed, Orcus, Erebus, Tartarus, Mercury the Soul-Carrier, the Judges of Hell, which the Stoicks laugh’d at, as vulgar Errors, because they were the Doctrines of vulgar Paganism. But without them Natural Religion would be but Matter of Ridicule. And, accordingly, it is an Article of natural Religion, which is antecedent to any Institution of Paganism, Judaism, or Christianity. And the Christian Doctrine, touching the Rewards and Punishments of a future Life, is so con-natural to the Mind of Man, (which hath the Conscience of Good and Evil,) so agreeable to his Reason, and his Notions of a God and Providence, that it has met with a general Reception, and Approbation. Agreeably to these Sentiments, the generality of Pagan Religionists stiled the Soul Divine, of Kin to the Gods, a Part and Particle of God, deducing it from Heaven, and reducing it thither again, worshipping their Heroes and Benefactors. All which imply’d, that their Religion had this generous Sentiment in it, which Cicero (de Leg. 2.) accounteth one of its Principles, “That Virtue and Piety are Things which raise Men unto Heaven.”4 The Egyptians are particularly fam’d for their Doctrine of the Soul’s Immortality, and the Rewards of the Pious in another Life, as is most conspicuous, from a Funeral Rite of theirs recorded by Porphyry, and which deserveth to be everlastingly remember’d. When they embalm’d one of their Nobles, they took out the Belly, (which it is hence plain, they did not make a God of,) and put it into a Chest, which they held up to the Sun, one of the Embalmers making this Oration for the Dead Man. Porphyry de abst. L. 4. §. 10

  “O LORD the Sun, and all ye Gods that give Life to Men, receive me, and transmit me into Consortship with the eternal Gods; for so long as I liv’d in the World, I piously worshipp’d the Gods, whom my Parents shewed me; those that generated my Body I always honoured; I neither kill’d any Man, nor defrauded any of what was committed to my Trust; nor have I done any Thing else of an atrocious Nature. If, in my Life-Time, I committed any Offence in Eating and Drinking what was not Lawful, the Offence was not done by my-self, but by those,” pointing at, or shewing, the Chest, wherein the Belly was. And having so said, he threw it into the River. The Rest of the Body was embalm’d apart, as Pure.5

  The Immortality of the Soul, agreeable to the Notions we naturally Form of the Deity.§IV. It is evident, that his making us capable of Happiness, was the Effect of his Goodness. It will therefore, from thence, and from the Immutability of his Nature, necessarily follow, “That he, who will’d us once into Being, will always Will the Continuance of our Being, and that too in a happy State, except where the Vindication of the Honour of his Laws, and the Common Good requires the contrary.”

  It is the Will of God, that we should practise Religion.§V. God, the Author of Nature, has imprinted Characters of his independent Power, Wisdom, Goodness, Providence, & c. upon his Works; he has given us Reason, by which we cannot but discover, if we attend, these his Attributes, and the Relation we bear to him. It is, therefore, his Will, that we should know, and, knowing, acknowledge these his Perfections, and the Relation He and We, his dependent Creatures, bear to one another; that is, that we should pursue and promote, to our Power, those beneficent Ends, which he had in creating us, and other Beings like our-selves, capable of Happiness, and give him the Honour due to him, that is, that we should practise Virtue and Religion, which are, therefore, his Laws to us.

  A View of the Pagan System of the Rational World.II. Let us, in the next Place, consider the several Parts of that Society of Rational Agents, of which God is at the Head; first, according to the Notion of the Pagans, and next, according to the Idea we have of it, by Revelation, and the Scriptures; for Truth, and Error, like all other Opposites, will best illustrate each other. For we can no otherwise come to the Knowledge of our-selves, in the political Sense, of our Duty, and the Obligations we lie under, without considering the Relation we stand in to the Kingdom of God, that great and holy Society, of which we are a Part; and to any other Society, if such there be, with which we may have to do; for it is impossible, to understand a Duty which is Relative, without first understanding the Terms of the Relation, (to make use of a Logical Expression.) To begin then with the Pagan System.

  In which they consider’d, 1. One intellectual Head of the Universe.The Heathen Philosophers, who acknowledg’d a Deity, acknowledg’d but one single intellectual Head of the Universe, (whom they call’d Jupiter, Zeus, Baal, &c.) and but one Universe; not such a One as the Epicureans imagin’d, who incoherently talk’d of infinite incoherent Worlds in infinite Space, but one total universal System, made up of several coherent subordinate Systems.

  This one Universe is capable of being consider’d Politically and Naturally: Politically, the Heathens consider’d it as a Universe of Rational Agents.

  Whom they suppos’d also the Soul of the World.The Universe was Politically considered by the Heathen Theologers; for they suppos’d it to be a Political System, or Monarchy, having the foremention’d intellectual Head presiding in and over it. But they consider’d it also Naturally, supposing it to be an Animated System, or Mundan Animal, with the foremention’d intellectual Head, as the Soul thereof; yet so, as to be also the imperial Head of the Monarchy of the Universe.

  Representing the Universe of rational Agents as but one political System, which is a fundamental Mistake.§II. The Heathen Theologers, who do not acknowledge any such Society as the Church of God, represented the Universe of Rational Agents, as but one Political System, which is their prime fundamental Mistake. For, in this Scheme, God and the Creature are not sufficiently distinguish’d, but criminally confounded by deifying Creatures. The Kingdoms of Good and Bad Angels (or Demons) are not distinguish’d. The Church and the World are not distinguish’d, but confounded, or rather, the Church is shut out of Being, for which there is no Place in the Heathen System. Heaven, Earth, and Hell, are not duly distinguish’d, but confounded into one Political Society, under one Monarch; and they are suppos’d, as friendly conspiring together, whence they thought themselves secure from any Disaster after Death. And, because they thought themselves by Nature, the Citizens of God’s Kingdom already, they could not be prevail’d with, to enter into the real Kingdom of God, when the Gospel was preach’d, which they oppos’d, as opposite to their System. Upon this fundamental Error, was grounded their whole Morality; and upon this Notion, That they were Fellow-Citizens with the Gods, their Practice was, doubtless, grounded of making new Gods, as it were by a right of Suffrage in Heaven it-self.

  §III. Some Christian Writers have, in great Measure, adopted these Sentiments, not discerning the Difference between a Holy Divine Republick, and a Heathen Mundan System, heedlesly entertaining false Notions of the State of the Universe, and speaking the Language of Heathen Philosophers, which is irreconcileable with the Jewish, and Christian Religion.

  The Worshippers of the true God indeed are, in a large Sense, Citizens of this lower World; they have a Duty to discharge as such, and must not fail of a dutiful and virtuous Correspondence with Nature, and common Providence; but the proper Design, and Effect of God’s reveal’d Laws, was not to instate men Citizens of the World at large, nor was it the proper Law of that Estate of Life, nor was it the Law of Nature governing all Things as such, but it was the Law of that King, who governeth all Things as Law-Giver of his Church.

  From which our Author is not free.The foregoing Language of the Heathen Philosophers, our Author usually speaketh, “The most ample Society of all rational Agents, the City of God. The System of all rational Agents, or the whole natural City of God. The whole Aggregate of rational Beings, or the whole City, the Head where of is God. The System of all rational Agents, the Kingdom of God. God, the Head and Father of all rational Beings, and other rational Agents, as his Sons. All men, altho’ they are not under the same human imperial Power, yet are in the most ample City of God. In the City of God, or in the Universe, they are Subjects, that in a human City are Supreme. This Law of Nature, Care of the publick Good, is the natural Law, uniting all rational Beings. The Summary of the Laws of rational Nature, or of the City of God, which is the Aggregate of Mankind, subordinate to God the Rector, his City constituted by the Nature of it. The whole System of rational Beings, that City, the Head of which is God; the Members, all his Subjects.”6 Such Christian Doctrines, in their Scheme, agree with the Heathens, in making the Universe of rational Agents a Kingdom; in making it one Kingdom; in making common Reason, which directeth to common Good, to be the common Law, which uniteth the Universe of rational Agents into one Kingdom; and in making degenerate Mankind to be by Nature, in the State of Society with God, the Citizens of the City of God, and the Subjects of his Kingdom. But in these Respects they differ. The Heathens deify’d subordinate rational Agents, which these Christian Divines do not; as the Heathens were much more Curious than the Christians, in distinguishing several Orders in their Kingdom of rational Beings, which they generally divided into 6 Classes.

  The Heathens divided their system of rational Agents into 6 Classes, 1. The supreme God. 2. Subordinate Gods Invisible. 3. Visible. 4. Demons. 5. Heroes. 6. Men. The Word God, taken by the Heathens in a larger, and more refrained Sense.§IV. 1. The supreme God. 2. Subordinate Gods Invisible. 3. Visible, such as the 12 Dij majorum Gentium, namely, the 7 Planets, the 4 Elements, and the Earth, and such like. 4. Demons. 5. Heroes, or Souls of illustrious Men deify’d. 6. Men.

  In a large Sense they call’d every Thing Superior to Man, a God, as in Ovid, “Deus & melior Natura,” are the same; and Cicero argueth, “There is something Superior to Man, therefore there is a God.”7 But in their classing, or distinguishing, the System of rational Agents, they took the Word God in a restrain’d Sense.

  §V. These several Orders of rational Beings, the Heroes only excepted, belong to the original Constitution of the Universe, in the Heathen Scheme. The middle Order of Demons does not proceed from any fall of Angels, as Revelation informs us, but is suppos’d originally necessary to the Polity of the Universe. 1. That all the Regions of the Universe may be replenished with proper Animals, and rational Inhabitants. 2. That there may be due Order amongst rational Agents, which requires some First, some Last, and some Middle, according to the usual Method of Nature, which gradually ascends. 3. That the Gods might not be polluted, as it were, nor descend beneath their Majesty, in managing human Affairs by themselves.Of the Order of Demons. 4. For the Management of the Affairs of their Religion and Virtue, and rendering their Souls more Happy, presiding over Oracles, and managing the Affairs of Prophecy and Divination. Hence that Prayer in the Golden Verses of Pythagoras, as they are call’d.

  • Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἤ πολλϖν τε κακῶν λύσειας ἅπαντας
  • Ἤ πἂσιν δ είξαις οἴῳ τῷ δαίμονι χρϖνται

  “Jupiter Father, either do thou thy-self loose all Men from those manifold Evils, or shew them all what Demon is to be made use of for that Purpose.”8 5. For carrying on an Intercourse between Gods and Men, and to be Mediators between them. 6. To manage (in subserviency to the Gods) Nature, Providence, and human Affairs.

  The Universe of rational Agents, being thus united into one friendly and harmonious System, constitutes one Monarchy thereof, which is a fundamental Pagan Mistake.

  Of Demons Good and Evil, and a Good and Evil Principle.III. These Demons, the Heathens distributed into Good and Evil, (call’d Vejoves.) the former worshipp’d in hopes of their Help, the latter, lest they should Hurt. At the Head of the Good Demons, some set a Good Principle, at the Head of the Evil, an Evil. This Doctrine was embrac’d by the antient Persians, of which Prideaux giveth the following Account. “Zoroastres did not found a new Religion, but only took upon him to revive and reform an old one, that of the Magians, which had been, for many Ages past,The Doctrine of the Magi reform’d by Zoroastres. the antient national Religion of the Medes as well as of the Persians.—The chief Reformation which he made in the Magian Religion, was in the first Principle of it. For, whereas before they held the Being of two first Causes, the First, Light, or the good God, who was the Author of all Good; and the other, Darkness, or the evil God, who was the Author of all Evil; and that of the Mixture of these two, as they were in a continual Struggle with each other, all Things were made; he introduc’d a Principle superior to them both, one supreme God, who created both Light and Darkness, and out of these two, according to the alone Pleasure of his own Will, made all Things else that are.——But to avoid making God the Author of Evil, his Doctrine was, that God originally and directly created only Light, or Good, and that Darkness, or Evil, follow’d it by Consequence, as the Shadow doth the Person; that Light, or Good, hath only a real Production from God, and the other afterwards resulted from it, as the Defect thereof. ——That, in the Struggle between them, where the Angel of Light prevails, there the most is Good, and where the Angel of Darkness prevails, there the most is Evil: That this Struggle shall continue to the End of the World: That there shall be a general Resurrection, and a Day of Judgment, wherein just Retribution shall be rendered to all, according to their Works. After which the Angel of Darkness, and his Disciples, shall go into a World of their own, where they shall receive the Punishments of their evil Deeds. And the Angel of Light, and his Disciples, shall go into a World of their own, where theyshall receive, in everlasting Light, the Reward due unto their good Deeds; and that after this they shall remain separated for ever, and Light, and Darkness, be no more annex’d together to all Eternity. And all this, the Remainder of that Sect, which is in India and Persia, do, without any variation, after so many Ages, still hold even to this Day,”9 as is affirm’d by Ovington, in his Travels, Lord in his Discovery of the Sects of the Banians, and Persees, and other Travellers.10 The good Principle they call’d Oromasdes, the evil Principle, Arimanius; to both which Zoroastres taught them to Sacrifice, as Plutarch relates.11 This Doctrine of two Principles was introduc’d, in order to account for the Evil observ’d in the World, and as it stood before Zoroastres reform’d it as above, was the most evident Ditheism, or acknowledgment of two supreme co-ordinate independent Deities, that ever was, or that can be imagin’d; in whom there was not so much as an Unity of Will, their Wills being always in direct Opposition to one another. Upon this Occasion, I cannot but take Notice of a remarkable Passage, in A Discourse of the GroundsA mistake of the Author of the Grounds, &c. corrected.and Reasons of the Christian Religion, P. 139, 140. “It is to be observ’d, that the Jews, who were greatly departed from the Law of Moses, and especially from the Doctrine of the Unity of God, went Idolaters into Captivity; that they went into Chaldea, a Country, where one God had from remote Antiquity been believ’d and worshipp’d; that the religious Books of that Nation give a Relation of Matters from the Creation to the Time of Abraham, so little different from that contain’d in the Pentateuch, that one of the Accounts must, in all probability, be borrow’d from the other. That particular Care was taken among the Chaldees, to instruct the Jewish Youths of Quality and Parts, in the Chaldean Discipline and Learning; that the Jews came out at different Times from Chaldea, such firm Believers and Worshippers of one God, and that under the high Patronage and Protection of the Kings of Chaldea, ordaining such Belief and Worship among them, that they have continu’d in that Belief and Worship ever since; that it seems more Natural for a Body of Slaves and Captives to be form’d by their Masters and Conquerors, than that the Conquerors should be form’d by them; and that the Slave should rather receive Histories, and Antiquities, from the Master, than the Master from the Slave; that, particularly, it seems improbable, that the Jews, who chang’d their own idolatrous Notions and Practices for those of the Chaldeans, should have so much Credit with the Chaldeans, as to introduce new History and Antiquities among them; and that it seems more probable, that the Jews, who became compleat Converts to the Notion of one God, receiv’d among the Chaldeans, and were, in many Respects, form’d and disciplin’d by them, should receive their History and Antiquities from the Chaldeans.”12 Thus far the Author of the Grounds, &c. Let us now examine upon what Authority he has advanc’d this Assertion. “That the Chaldeans were, from remote Antiquity, Worshippers of one God only,” he advances upon the Authorities of Hyde, in his Account of the Religion of the antient Persians; of Prideaux, in his Connexion, Vol. 1. of Lord, in his Account of the Religion of the Persees; of Pocock, in his Specimen of the History of the Arabians, P. 148.13

  Now all these Authors speak there only of the Religion of the Persians, but not a Syllable of the Religion of the Chaldeans, or Babylonians, concerning which is the present Question.

  That those different Nations did not profess the same Religion, we shall see presently, the Persians being Magians, and the Chaldeans, or Babylonians, Sabians. But, if the Babylonians, to whom the Jews were Captives, had been of the same Religion with the Persians of that Time, I do not see how it would prove the Babylonians, Worshippers of one God only, at that Time; for the Persians were then Magians, and Ditheists; Zoroastres not having reform’d Magianism ’till after the Babylonian Captivity, as above.

  Therefore it does not appear, that even the Persians believ’d in one first Cause, and supreme Governor of the World, ’till after the Babylonian Captivity; asserting two first and independent Principles, the one Good, and the other Evil, as above, ’till Zoroastres reform’d Magianism, and establish’d one first and good Principle, which, according to Dr. Prideaux, and Sir Isaac Newton was not ’till the Days of Darius Hystaspes, about 492 Years before Christ.14 Now Cyrus put an End to the 70 Years Captivity of the Jews, in, or about, the Year before Christ 536, that is, 44 Years before the first Appearance of Zoroastres at the Persian Court.

  Now it does not appear, that the Babylonians were ever of the Magian Sect; but that, from the earliest Times we have any Account of them, they were Polytheists, and Idolaters; and, more particularly, during the Time of the Jewish Captivity under them; how then could the Jews imbibe their Notion of the Unity of God, and aversion to Idolatry, from those who were themselves Polytheists, and Idolaters?

  The Chaldeans, from among whom God call’d Abraham, were an Idolatrous Nation. Joshua (24. 2) thus accosteth the Children of Israel, “Your Fathers dwelt on the other Side of the Flood (i.e. of the River Euphrates) in old Time, even Terah, the Father of Abraham, and the Father of Nahor, and they serv’d other Gods.” The Canaanites, among whom the Patriarchs sojourn’d, ’till their Descent into Egypt, were all of them Idolatrous Nations, as were the Egyptians, to whom they were so long in Bondage. Rachel Stole the Gods of her Father Laban the Syrian. And, as for the Babylonians particularly, it is so far from being true, that the Jews ow’d their Belief of the Unity of God, and Detestation of Images, to them; that we have undoubted Proof, of their being an Idolatrous Nation at that Time. When the ten Tribes were carried away Captive by the King of Assyria, he planted Samaria with Colonies from his other Dominions. We are told (2 Kings 17. 28.) that these Colonies did not “Fear the Lord,” that is, the one God; but that, when they settled in Samaria, they set up and worshipp’d their own Idols. “The Men of Babylon made Succoth-Benoth, the Men of Cuth made Nergal, &c. 2 Kings 17.30.” which Images, we are told v. 41. that their Fathers before them had worshipp’d. We find likewise Sennacherib, King of Assyria, “Worshipping in the House of Nisroch, his God, 2 Kings 19. 37.” We are likewise told by Ezra, (1. 7.) That “Cyrus the King brought forth the Vessels of the House of the Lord, which Nebuchadnezzar had brought forth out of Jerusalem, and had put them in the House of his Gods.” Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, set up a Golden Image, in the Plain of Dura, to be worshipp’d by all his Subjects, under Pain of Death, for refusing to comply with which, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego, were cast into the Fiery Furnace, Dan. Chap. 3. which, I think, is a pretty plain Proof, that the Jews did not learn their Aversion to Idolatry from the Babylonians, their Masters. Belshazzar, the Son of Nebuchadnezzar, and his Princes, in a remarkable Feast, “Drank Wine, and prais’d the Gods of Gold, and of Silver, of Brass, of Iron, of Wood, and of Stone,” Dan. 5. 4. Upon which Occasion, Daniel delivers himself thus to Belshazzar, (23.) “Thou hast prais’d the Gods of Silver, and Gold, of Brass, Iron, Wood, and Stone, which see not, nor hear, nor know; and the God in whose Hand thy Breath is, and whose are all thy Ways, hast thou not glorify’d.” Great Marks of the Babylonians attachment to the Belief of the Unity of God, and Aversion to Idolatry! The Occasion also of Daniel ’s being thrown into the Lyons Den, is another Proof of the like Kind. “Babylon is fallen, is fallen, and all the graven Images of her Gods he hath broken unto the Ground.” Is. 21.9. “Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth, their Idols were upon the Beasts, and upon the Cattle,” saith Isaiah (46. 1.) speaking of the Idols of Babylon. “Babylon is taken, Bell is confounded, Merodach is broken in Pieces, her Idols are confounded, her Images are broken in Pieces.” Jer. 50. 2. “A Sword is upon the Chaldeans, saith the Lord, and upon the Inhabitants of Babylon, and upon her Princes, and upon her Wise-Men:—A Drought is upon her Waters, and they shall be dry’d up; for it is the Land of graven Images, and they are mad upon their Idols.” Jer. 50. 35–38. “I will do Judgment upon the graven Images of Babylon.” Jer. 51. 47. 52.

  Thus, therefore, I think it evident, “That the Author of the Grounds, &c. has not given a probable Account, how the Jews came out of the Babylonian Captivity, more firm Believers of the Unity of God, and more averse to Idolatry, than they were, when they went into Captivity; Dr. Prideaux, in his Connexion, seems to me, to have given amuchmore probable Solution of that Affair.15

  As for what the Author of the Grounds, &c. affirms, (from Berosus in Josephus, against Apion, Book 1.) That “the religious Books of the Chaldeans give a Relation of MattersFrom the Creation, to the Time of Abraham, so little different from that contain’d in the Pentateuch, that one of the Accounts must, in all probability, be borrowed from the other.”16Josephus is here quoted, for what he does not say, who expresses himself only thus. “Berosus, after the Manner of the most antient Historians, treats of theDeluge, and the Destruction of Mankind, just as Moses reports it; and of theArkalso; and how the first Father of our Race was preserv’d in it a-float upon the Mountains of Armenia. He runs thro’ the Genealogy likewise of the Sons of Noah, their Names, and their Ages; and so carries on the Train, from Noah himself to Nabulassar.” Now an Account from the Creation, and from the Deluge, are two very different Things; nor do I see any Reason, which makes it probable, that Moses borrow’d his Account of the Origin of Things from the Chaldeans, as this Author would insinuate; Moses having had no intercourse, that we know of, with the Chaldeans; nor the Jewish Nation, indeed, ’till after the Building of Solomon’ s Temple, to which, both their Civil and Religious Establishments, and, consequently, their Accounts of Things, were long prior. The Chaldean Account, from the Flood downward, agreeing with the Mosaick, is, indeed, a very good Proof of the Truth of the Chaldean Accounts of those Affairs; but no Proof at all, that Moses, who had no intercourse with the Chaldeans, borrow’d his Accounts of the Creation and downwards, from them. Besides, Josephus affirms, “That most antient Historians agreed with the Mosaick Account of the Deluge”; which is no more a Proof, that Moses borrow’d his Account from the Chaldeans, than from the Aegyptians, or Phoenicians, with whom Moses, and the Jews, had then much more intercourse. All that we can fairly infer from the Passage quoted, I think, is this, “That most antient Historians agreeing with the Mosaick Account of the Deluge, shews, that the Tradition of that Affair was pretty General, and, consequently, that it is very probable, that it was true”; which is a great Confirmation of the Truth of the Mosaick Account of Things. But so much for this Digression, which I hope the Reader will pardon.

  The Egyptian TyphonThe Aegyptian Typhon seems to have been of the same Stamp with the Persian Arimanius. And Plutarch says, That “Typhon begat two Sons, Hierosolymus, and Judaeus”;17 which is a small Sample of the Kindness the Aegyptians had for the Hebrews: He also Interprets the antient Stories of Giants, and Titans, concerning evil Demons; for he, with some other Grecian Philosophers, acknowledg’d such, which the Stoicks, as well as Epicureans, utterly deny’d, deriding the Punishments of another Life.

  The Doctrine of Evil Demons, according to the Heathens.§II. Plutarch acknowledges powerful and surly evil Demons, who were the Authors of unlucky Days, who were worshipp’d by Beating, Lamentations, and Fasting, obscene Words, and contumelious Speeches, by which their Fury was appeas’d, contrary to the Nature of the good Demons.18 These Demons, they conceiv’d to have Bodies, and some of them so gross, that they might be wounded with a Sword, whence Spencer explains a Magical Rite, mention’d Ezek. 33. 26. Ye stand upon your Swords.19 For they had their Swords in readiness drawn and glittering, to keep the Ghosts and Demons in awe, whom they had conjur’d up. Which is not a more unphilosophical Notion, than that of several of the Hebrew Doctors, “That the Aerial Demons, Eat, and Drink, Generate, and Die, as Men.”20 Nor than that Conceit of several of the Fathers, “That the Fall of Angels, was their falling in Love with Women, and having impure Commerce with them,” whence the Giants were begotten, as some of them say; Demons, as others. Most of the Fathers believ’d, “That they had Bodies of apurer Kind.” The Heathens generally believ’d, “That the Demons were pleas’d and allur’d by the Scent and Fumes of the Sacrifices they offer’d to them, and which they thought a Sort of Food to them”; whence it was customary for the Sacrificers, to pour the Blood upon the Ground, or into a Ditch, to entice the Demons to come, themselves Banquetting, about the Blood, upon the Sacrifice, that so they might gain the Friendship and Society of the Demons, and the Faculty of Divination. Whence the Jews were commanded to bring the Animals, which they sacrific’d, unto the Door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and their Blood was to be sprinkled upon the Altar, that the Children of Israel might no more offer their Sacrifices to Devils, Sehirim, to hairy, or Goat-like Demons. Lev. 17. 7.21 This Kind of Idolatry, amongst others, the Israelites learn’d from the Aegyptians, who had a mighty Veneration for the Goat, which they religiously abstain’d from killing; and the Mendesians (a People of Aegypt) thought it an Honour to bear the Name of Mendes, a Goat in their Language, which they deify’d, and to which they built Temples.

  §III. A second Class of Evil Demons, or Genij, is acknowledg’d by some later Heathen Writers, (who, probably, took the Hint from the Christians, whose Doctrines were then well known;) these were said to be vitious in their Nature, and to tempt Men to vice. “There are differences of Virtue and Vice among Demons, as among Men,” says Plutarch.22 The same Author, in the Life of Galba, relates the Speech of an Officer to his Soldiers, then about to revolt, wherein he represents the Fickleness of their Temper, “That chang’d so often in so short a Time, not upon any rational Consideration, but by the impulse of some Demon, that hurried them from one Treason to another.” As the former Class of Evil Demons were suppos’d to bring upon Men Natural Evils, so the latter were suppos’d to tempt them to Moral Evil.

  Now this Doctrine of the Pagans, concerning Evil Demons, must, of necessity, fall in, either with the Manichean, or with the Christian, Scheme; with the Manichean, if they were originally constituted Evil; with the Christian, if they became such by an abuse of their own Liberty.

  Petavius saith, that several of the Fathers suppose, “That, when the World was made, the several Parts of it were committed to several Orders of Angels, that he who is now the Devil, was the Chief of the Terrestrial Order, and that his Sin was this, that, He envy’d and could not brook the Dignity bestow’d upon Man.”23 Which Conceit of theirs, That Envy was the Devil’s Sin, has been entertain’d by many.

  Of Nemesis and the Furies, Ministers of divine Vengeance.§IV. A third Class of Evil Demons, but not so reputed upon account of their vitious Nature, are the Ministers of divine Vengeance, call’d Furies, Dirae, Erynnyes, Alastores, Dii impii, Hecate, Proserpina, with Nemesis at their Head. So, according to some Expositors, the Evil Angels, mention’d Psal. 78. 49. were not morally Evil, but are denominated Evil, as being Angels of Punishment. Such were those, which Atteius invok’d by Name, when he curs’d Crassus, as Plutarch relates in his Life.24 Some of these they suppos’d, to go about and punish enormous Crimes in this World, (which seem to be no more than the Stings of Conscience,) supposing it inconsistent with the Nature of the Gods, to be themselves the Punishers of wicked Men; but not so, to appoint these their Executioners upon such Occasions. For Plutarch, enquiring the Reason, why the Romans cloath’d their Lares, or domestick Gods, with Dog-Skins, makes this Conjecture. “As Chrysippus supposeth, that certain evil Genij go about, which the Gods make use of, to do the Work of Executioners upon impious and unjust Men; so the Lares may be thought certain direful and punitive Genij.” In this Author’s Description of the Punishments of another Life, certain Lakes are said to be there, “and certain Demons stand by, which plunge Souls in, and draw them out.”25 As in the famous Apologue of Er in Plato, there are “Men ferine and of igneous Aspect,” the Tormentors of Souls.26 This Sort of Evil Demons is acknowledg’d by Plato; and one of his School (who acknowledgeth no Demons morally Evil, yet) affirmeth, “That there are Demons, which punish Souls; that the Sins of Men make the Gods their Enemies, not that the Gods are angry, but they separate them from the Gods, and joyn them to the punitive Demons; that the Souls of the Flagitious, after their departure from the Body, are tormented by them, and that there are, for separate Souls, expiatory Gods and Demons, who purge them from their Sins.”27 It was this Sort of Demons, which the Pagans suppos’d maleficent Magicians to hold Correspondence with.

  Of the Sentiments of the Jews concerning evil Demons.§V. The Jews are said by Hulsius28 and others, to acknowledge Angels of 3 Classes, 1. Separate Intelligences, who appear not in a corporeal Form, nor can be comprehended by bodily Senses, but only by prophetick Vision, and incompass the Throne of the Divine Majesty, such as Michael, Gabriel, Raphael. 2. Angels of Ministry, created by God for the Welfare and Ministry of Men. 3. Angels of Punishment, or Torment, Destruction, Mischief, and Death; possessing the Sublunary and Infernal Mansions, whose Head is Samael, the Angel of Death, as the Jews call him, who is suppos’d to kill Mankind, and other Animals.29 But these Angels of Punishment, are consider’d by the Jews, not as Tormentors only, but as morally Evil, and Tempters also of Mankind. For they affirm, “That Mankind Sin by the Seduction of the Serpent;30 That Samael rode upon the Serpent, for bigness like a Camel, when he tempted Eve;31 That Satan has his Name from הטש (Satah,) for he it is that causeth Man toDeclinefrom the Way of Truth.” Asmodeus, whom the Jews suppose the King of the Tempters, is by Graves suppos’d probably to be deriv’d from the Persian Word Azmoud, he tempted, or solicited to Evil, and therefore signifieth the Tempters.32Moses in Deut. 32. 17. saith of the Israelites, that they sacrific’d unto Devils, םידש (Sheddim,) which Fagius upon the Place saith, that the Jews suppose to be evil Spirits, that come out of the Waters, and are said to have their Name from דדש (Shadad) Vastavit because they devastate a good Mind with bad Opinions and Affections. There are several Passages cited by Windet, Spencer, and Hoornbeck, from the Hebrew Doctors, insinuating, or acknowledging, the Fall of Angels;33 such as these of Rabbi Eleazar, “The evil Angels were driven out of Heaven by a fiery Scepter. Samael and his Armies, God cast them out of Heaven. Aza and Azael were the two Angels that accus’d their Lord, and God cast them Head-long out of the Holy Place.” The Book Zohar says, “God threw Aza and Azael down Head-long, bound and chain’d.” And, in another antient Book (of the Death of Moses,) it is said of them, “Descending from Heaven, they corrupted their Way.” So in Jonathan’s Targum, Samcha, Zai, and Uziel, (the same with Aza, and Azael,) are said to have fallen from Heaven, and are suppos’d to have begotten Giants. Also the Rabbinical Name of their Prince דודמ (Marod) signifieth an Apostate,34 who is call’d by several other Rabbinical Names,35 which likewise imply the Fall of Angels, such as, “The Prince of Gehennah, the Head of the Satanae.” The common Name, among the Jews in our Saviour’s Time, for the Prince of the Devils, was Beelzebub, or Beelzebul, which may signify Lord of Matter, that is, the presidentiary Ruler of the material World; for לובז (Zebul) is the same with κόπρος which, in the Orphic Verses, signifieth the Matter;

  • Ζεῦ κύδιςε, μέγιςε Θεῶν, εἰλύμενε κόπρῳ

  Jupiter, most Illustrious, the greatest of the Gods, involv’d in Dung, or the Matter.

  Empedocles’s Doctrine of Demons, which fell from Heaven, and are agitated by the Gods.As among the Jewish Doctors, so among the Heathen Philosophers, a fall of Demons, or Angels from Heaven, is, in some Measure, acknowledg’d; for some of them discourse of a Sort of evil Genij, passively and penally such, which are called by Plutarch, “The Demons of Empedocles, who are agitated by the Gods, and have fallen from Heaven,”36 whom Empedocles thus describes;

  • • Άἰθέριον μὲν γὰρ σϕε μέ;νος πόντονδε διώκει,
    • Πόντος δ’ ἐς χθονὸς ον̂̔δας ’απεπτυσε, γαῖα δ’ ἐς αὐγας
    • Ήελίου ϕαέθοντος, ὁ δ’ αἰθέρος ἒμβαλε δίναις.
    • Άλλος δ’ ἐξ ᾂλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες
  • • From the Etherial Region
    • down Into the Sea in Rage they’re thrown.
    • The raging Sea rejects this Rout
    • Unto the Land, and Spews them out.
    • The Land unto the Sun them Hurls,
    • The Sun into the Ether’s Whirles.
    • Thus they are toss’d (the Out-Law’s Fate!)
    • By universal Nature’s Hate.37

  The Heaven-Fallen Demons of Empedocles, pursu’d by the Vengeance of the Gods, altho’ they are an approach to the Christian Doctrine, cannot reasonably be thought a Tradition from the Jews, who themselves then talked not so clearly upon this Head.1. This Doctrine of Empedocles greatly befriends the common Hypothesis of the Lapse of Angels from Heaven, which must be call’d the Christian Hypothesis, tho’ it has been weakly oppos’d by some Christian Writers, who have asserted the Evil Angels, to be, originally, the Inhabitants of the Air and Earth, and never to have been in Heaven, and enjoy’d the Beatifick Vision there. For their height of Felicity might be so far from securing them from a Fall, that it might occasion it, thro’ Pride, Self-Admiration, and Self-Love; and, in consequence, affecting a Dominion over Subjects withdrawn from the Subjection of God, agreeably to the Heads of Empire, which Satan usually setteth up in the World, that usually affect an unbounded Liberty. And that himself, in Consort with his Fellow-Rebels, should be like-minded, and therefore should chuse to make a total Revolt from God and their Duty, was not incompatible with their coelestial Condition; nor is it at all incredible, the like prodigiously-frantick Enormities being no Rarities amongst intelligent Agents. Wherefore the usual Doctrine is unexceptionable, which is clearly enough express’d in H. Scriptures, which represent the Holy Angels, as originally the Inhabitants of Heaven. Matt. 22. 30. Luc. 20. 36. Heb. 12. 22. And the laps’d Angels, originally, of the Number of the Holy Angels, 2 Pet. 2. 5. Jud. 6. 2. 2. The Heathen Doctrine of Demons befriends the Christian Hypothesis of a Kingdom of evil Angels. For the Heathen Demonologists suppos’d, “That the Evil Demons have an imperial Head over them.” Therefore, in consistence with themselves, they ought to have suppos’d, “That there is a distinct Kingdom, or Polity, of Evil Demons,” as Christianity asserteth. But they have so qualify’d this Doctrine of Evil Demons, as to make it no Contradiction to their Doctrine of the Unity of the Monarchy of the Universe, or their City of God; for they were Gods themselves, and Part of the common Polity of their Gods, which is monstrously, both Absurd and Impious. For whoever has any Veneration for God, will not count it a small Matter, to deify Evil Demons, and to pay them religious Worship. Yet this Worship of Demons was the Religion of popular Societies amongst the Heathens, as Plutarch plainly acknowledges,38 there by giving a great Attestation to the Truth of Christianity, (which chargeth upon Paganism, the Sacrificing unto, and having Fellowship with, Devils;) and to the peculiar Excellency of the Christian Learning, which alone, to the Purpose, discovereth Satan. For both Jews and Pagans (notwithstanding their slender Notice of Evil Angels) are far from knowing him as they ought, and so far as is needful to the Purpose of Piety and Sanctity. 3. The Heathen Doctrine of Demons greatly befriends the Christian, by asserting and ascertaining (in Consort with it) the Existence of Evil Demons. They were assured of their Existence from their Operations and Effects; and, from this Hypothesis, Plutarch gives an Account of the Apparitions to Brutus and Dio, upon which, after his Manner, he reflects finely. “If Brutus and Dio,” (saith he,) “Philosophical Men, of great Strength of Mind, and not apt to fancy horrible Appearances, were put into such Commotion by Apparitions, that they solicitously related them to their Friends; perhaps we may be forc’d to embrace that (seemingly) most absurd Opinion of the Antients, That there are Evil and Envious Demons, that, envying good Men, and withstanding their Actions, raise Fears and Troubles to them, to shake and overthrow their Virtue; lest, if they should persist stedfast and uncorrupted in Good, they should, after their Decease, enjoy a better Condition than theirs.” The Laws of the XII Tables, in condemning and punishing hurtful Magick, acknowledge the Being of evil Demons. And who can doubt, but that those Learned Heathen Philosophers were in the Right, who suppose the antick and barbarous Rites of their Religion, to be the Worship of powerful evil Demons. For the Pagan Religion is a Demonstration of the Being of evil Demons, because it cannot be suppos’d, that any Power, but a Diabolical, could have subjected the World, for so many Ages, to such an Institution as Paganism is. The Heathens justly argued for the Existence of Aerial Demons, in this Manner, “Would Nature, that has replenish’d all other Regions with Inhabitants, suffer the spacious Air to be an uninhabited Waste?” With whom, in this, both Jewish and Christian Divines agree, whence the Chief of them is call’d by the Apostle, the Prince of the Power of the Air, and the Rulers of his Empire are call’d Spiritual Wickedness (ὀν τοῖςἐπουρανίοις) in Heavenly, or Aerial, Places. But yet these Aerial Demons are sometimes under penal Confinement in the Subterraneous Regions, as that Petition of theirs implies, Luk. 8. 31. They besought him, that he would not command them to go out into the Deep, or Abyss, the same with the bottomless Pit, mention’d Rev. 20. 3. where Satan was chain’d.

  In this Doctrine then of Evil Spirits, Pagans, Jews, Mahometans, and Christians, agree, the common Sense of Mankind concurring with Revelation.

  Of Genij, or Guardian Angels.IV. The Pagans agreed, “That Good Demons are Guardian-Genij, which, tho’ Servants to the supreme God, or subordinate Deities, are Patrons of particular Persons, Nations, or Societies; of Things, and of Places.” So Servius, “The Genius, according to the Sense of the Antients, is the natural God of every Place, or Thing, or Person.” And this was a common antient Inscription, “To Jupiter the Best and Greatest, and to the Genius of the Place.” The Genius of the Roman People, (distinct from the tutelar God of the City, whose Name was kept secret,) was call’d the Publick Genius, and is usual in antient Coins. So the Trojan Palladium was not a Thing that fell from Heaven, but a Telesm, or Image, made by a Philosopher and Astrologer, under a most fortunate Horoscope, and enclosing the Genius, or Fortune, of the City, by Virtue of Astrological Magick. So the Lares were look’d upon, as the proper Guardian-Genij of their Houses, whence they were call’d Prestites, and, as Plutarch tells us, cloath’d with Dog-Skins. Among the personal Guardian-Genij, that of the Prince was thought by far the most August, whence arose a Custom among the Romans, of swearing by Caesar’s Genius, which if any did forswear by in a Suit, he was Bastinadoed, but Perjury, by the Name of God, was not punish’d, they supposing that God would sufficiently avenge the Abuse of his own Deity. It was a receiv’d Opinion “That every Nation had a Tutelar-Deity, with subordinate Demons.” The Nomes, or Prefectures of Aegypt, had each their distinct God, whilst Isis and Osiris were worshipp’d over the Whole, see Sir Is. Newton’s Chronology.39

  With respect to this Doctrine, the Heathens were divided in their Sentiments, some allowing a good-Genius, only to every Man,40 others a good and a bad to each,41 which Doctrine Mahomet has adopted. Many Christians, especially they of the Church of Rome, have embrac’d the Doctrine of good-Genij, converting them into Guardian-Angels. The determining every Man’s Genius at his Birth, those who gave into the Astrological Scheme, ascrib’d to the Stars, and to every Man’s Horoscope at his Birth.

  • Geminos, Horoscope, varo Producis Genio.42
  • The Horoscope produceth Twins of diversity of Genius.

  Heathenism, a Religion of Patron-Deities, and their Clients.§II. This Doctrine of Genij, the Heathens ow’d to their Notion of the Polity of the Universe; every thing superior to Man, and subordinate to the supreme Deity, being with them a Genius, each other Being, nay, and Mode of Being, having their Genius. Jupiter was the President, or Genius, of Heaven, Neptune of the Sea, Pluto of the Infernal Regions, a Triumvirate. The Planets had each their Genius, the Elements theirs: Nations, Societies, and individual Persons, had theirs. Venus was Goddess of the Passion of Love; Mars and Bellona were Patrons of the State of War; Janus of Peace; Terminus of Bounds; Mercury, Apollo, and the Muses, of the Professions of Eloquence, Poetry, and several Parts of Learning; Esculapius, of Physick; Vulcan, of Smiths; and Minerva, of the Faculty of Prudence.

  With which the Church of Rome greatly Symbolizes.Hence it appears, “That the Religion of the Heathens is a Religion of Patron-Deities and of their Clients, in subordination to the supreme God.” Herein consisted their Polytheism: How much, in this respect, Christian-Rome has borrow’d from Heathen-Rome, is but too obvious; pursuant to which the Romanists pray to one Saint in Child-Bed; to another, in the Tooth-Ach; to a third, when they are Travelling by Land; to a fourth, by Water: as if the Providence of the one God, supreme over All, did not extend over All, and equally over All: as if he were not the God, both of Land and Sea, Hills and Valleys; and as if he had not appointed one Mediator and Intercessor, sufficient for All; who has requir’d these Things at their Hands?

  Different Senses of the Word, Demon.The Word Demon is sometimes taken in a larger, sometimes in a stricter, Sense; sometimes as extensively as God in the largest Sense: So Homer calls his Gods, Demons; and the Pagans say of St. Paul, Act. 17.18. He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange Demons, that is, Gods. Sometimes it is taken in a stricter Sense, for a class of Beings between Gods and Heroes. Thus, according to the Heathens, were all things full, not of God, but of Gods; and they were guilty of the Worship of Demons, in both Senses of the Word, from which neither the Platonists, nor Pythagoreans, were free; but were great Promoters of it.

  The Jewish Notion of the Government of the Universe, falls in with that of the Heathens, in great Measure;§III. The Jews fell into the Heathen Notion of the Government of the World, believing, “That their Nation had a Guardian-Angel, who could transact nothing without leave of the Divine Providence”; supposing, “That all other Nations were committed to the care of their Angels, who were to them as Gods”; believing also “Bread, the Water, the Fire, the Hail, the Winds, &c. had each their Angel-President over them.” They assign “Seven President-Angels to the seven Days of the Week, twelve to the twelve Months, and four to the four Seasons;43Arch-Angels to the 7 Planets;44 every Nation, the Israelites excepted, being subject to its particular Planet.”45 Also, with allusion to the Government of the Nations by Angels in Stars and Constellations, and not by immediate Divine Providence, the Jews, in their Liturgy, give to God the Name of the King of Kings, that is, the King of those Angelical Powers, who rule over the Potentates of the Earth. They are also of Opinion, “That the Number of Nations and Languages upon Earth is 70, having 70 President-Angels, by whom the Division of Languages was made at Babel.”46 This their Opinion is visible in the Septuagint-Translation of Deut. 32. 8. “When the most High divided the Nations, when he separated the Sons of Adam, he set the Bounds of the People, according to the Number” [not of the Children of Israel, as the Hebrew hath it, but] “of the Angels of God”; which they say are 70, and whom they call the Sanhedrim above.

  As does that of many Christian Divines.§IV. This Notion, which transforms the Universe into a Paganlike Republick, and the holy Angels into Pagan Gods and Demons, has been embrac’d by many of the Christian Fathers, modern Divines, and Philosophers; allowing, among other Parts of their Scheme, each of the heavenly Bodies their Intelligence, as they call it. Upon this Plan has Idolatry principally prevail’d, both among Heathens and Christians: Upon this Plan also, the Devil, with his Angels under him, was suppos’d by some to have been President of our Earth, and never to have been an Inhabitant above, the Disagreement of which with Scripture is above shewn. The above-mention’d Mistranslation of the Septuagint seems, to have been a leading Cause of Error, in this Point, to the Fathers, who generally did not understand Hebrew, but made use of that Translation. This Notion was at last enlarg’d by many, even to the Assigning a Guardian-Angel to every individual of Mankind, which is nothing but the Heathen Doctrine of Demon-Genij with a new Name, and must have given the Heathens a great Advantage against those Christians, when they charg’d the Heathens with the Worshipping of many Gods and of Demons.

  The Scripture-Notion of the Holy Angels, who have no Prefecture, nor Magistracy, in the Government of the World; nor are employ’d, as Guardian-Angels to particular Persons.§V. The Scriptures, indeed, do acknowledge the holy Angels as a sort of Potentates superior to Man, and as occasionally subservient to the Divine Providence in the Government of the World; but not as sublunary Prefects of various Faculties, Offices, Places, Stations, and Persons, residing upon their several Charges. A misunderstanding of Dan. 4. 17. “This Matter” (the Judgment upon Nebuchadnezzar) “is by the Decree of the Watchers, and the Demand” (or Ordinance) “by the Word of the holy Ones,” seems to have led many into various and gross Mistakes upon this Head. This Text seems to be rightly thus explain’d. This Matter is by more than human Appointment, it is nothing less than the Decree of the most High. For thus the Prophet, in his Interpretation of the Dream, interpreteth the Angels saying v. 24. This is the Decree of the most High, which is come upon my Lord the King. Therefore the Angels saying is a Mode of expressing the Decree of the most High. For the Decree of the Watchers, and the Word of the holy Ones, are not their own Decree and Word, but God’s, whose Agents they are. This remarkable Scripture is, therefore, no Foundation for that Jewish Notion of God’s consulting with his Sanhedrim above, or that the President-Angels of the Babylonian Monarchy decreed the Matter, at the Petition of the Tutelar-Angels of the several Provinces, who complain’d of Nebuchadnezzar’s Tyranny; or that the greater Angels made this Decree, at the Request of the inferior Angels. But here is a clear express Testimony for the Superintendence of the Holy Angels, in subordination to the divine Providence. So the Elect Angels are consider’d by the Apostle, as the Spectators of our Actions, along with God and Christ, 1 Tim. 5. 21. “I charge thee before God and the Lord Jesus, and theelect Angels.” And, agreeably to the Name of Watchers in Daniel, we read, in the Revelations, of the “7 Lamps of Fire burning before the Throne of God, which are the 7 Spirits of God”; of “seven Angels, which are and stand before the Throne”; of “the 7 Horns, and the 7 Eyes of the Lamb, which are the 7 Spirits of God, sent forth into all the Earth”;47 so, in the Prophet Zechariah, (as Interpreters have observ’d,48 ) 7 Angels are represented by the Candlestick of 7 Lamps, which burn’d continually in the Temple; and those seven Angels (because appointed to exercise, both in Heaven and in this World, an inspection and superintendence over us and our Affairs) are styled “the 7 Eyes of the Lord, which run to and fro, through the whole Earth.” The Scripture, therefore, describeth the Court of Heaven conformably to the Persian Court,49 where there were 7 Princes, who saw the King’s Face, and sat first in the Kingdom, (to be Officers of the Presence, such as see the King’s Face, denoteth the principal Persons at Court, Jer. 52. 25.) who are sometimes styled the King’s seven Counsellors. And, because these 7 Angels in the Court of Heaven are plainly Analogical, or Correspondent, to the 7 Princes in the Persian Court; because we read of Angelical chief Princes;50 therefore some of the Holy Angels are consider’d as a sort of Heavenly Potentates, agreeably to the Style of the New-Testament.

  For, in the New-Testament, some of the Holy Angels are usually intituled Authorities, Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers,51 with Christ, who created them, at their head; between which the Difference is no greater than this, that the Apostle considers them, as the several general Names and Notions of the most Eminent created Potentates in the Universe. So the highest Rank of Potentates, in Satan’s Kingdom, are call’d Principalities and Powers.52 Wherefore it seems a great Mistake of many, to suppose, “That the Apostle maketh a distribution of the Holy Angels into four or five subordinate Ranks, Orders, and Classes, which are signify’d by so many Names,” whereas he means, only in general, “Whatever is high and eminent in Government.” Had the Apostle made a distribution of human, or angelical, Authority, into several subordinate ranks, he must have noted them by proper Names of Distinction, which these are evidently not, according to any Rules of Criticism, any Model of Government, or any Titles of Honour. There is, however, a Subordination of Angels, for we read of Michael, and his Angels, Apoc. 12. 7.

  “In Scripture the holy Angels are represented as the occasional Missionary Ministers of God’s governing Providence, and the Works there of are represented as done by their Ministry”; which their very Name denotes, and the many Instances of their being employ’d, in God’s Appearances, in making Revelations, and bringing Messages to Mankind; in guiding, succouring, and defending, the Just; in opposing the Enmity and Malice of evil Spirits; in dispensing Benefits to, and executing Judgments upon, the World, at the End of which they are to be the Reapers. But this their occasional Ministry, at the immediate and particular Command of God upon every Occasion, is far from vesting them with such a Magistracy in the Government of the World, as the Heathens ascrib’d to their Deities; the Church of Rome, to the Virgin Mary, St. Peter, St. Paul, &c. nor does infer a Guardian-Angel, as will appear from a View of the Texts quoted for that purpose.

  So Act. 12. 15. where the Christians at Jerusalem say of Peter knocking at the Gate, “It is his Angel,” Dr. Hammond renders the Word Messenger, or one that came from him, or made use of his Name; because the Faithful cannot be suppos’d so ignorant as to think, that an Angel would not come in without knocking, or having the Door open’d.53 Others suppose, That it is St. Peter’s Guardian-Angel, in the usual Sense, which they meant. But 1. It does not appear, That the Jews then embrac’d that Notion; nor 2. Will it follow, That the Notion was true, if they did believe it. But 3. What need was there, that an Angel should be sent to deliver St. Peter out of Prison, or St. Paul from Shipwreck, or to strengthen our Lord in his Agony, if an Angel-Guardian were their inseparable Attendant? Beside, 4. If they did not believe it a Messenger, but an Angel, they might have suppos’d it an Angelical Appearance, in his Likeness, and Personating him, whom they might have styled his Angel, as Lightfoot supposes.54 To as little Purpose do they quote Matt. 18. 10. “Take heed” (saith Christ) “that ye despise not one of these little Ones; for I say unto you, that, in Heaven, their Angels do always behold the Face of my Father, which is in Heaven.” Our Saviour sheweth, That the Sin and Danger of despising his little Ones, is not little; because, tho’ they be little in the eye of the World, yet really they are of so great Quality and Value, that their Angels, (that is, not their Guardian-Angels, but the Spirits that Minister unto them, which is the Apostles Notion of Angels, Heb. 1. 13.) always behold the Face of his Father in Heaven. This Place also speaketh not of inferior Angels, but of the Angels of Presence, which correspond to those in Power next to the Prince, who have always the Privilege to see the King’s Face. But it cannot be thought, that every pious Person hath an Arch-Angel for his Guardian; therefore our Saviour speaketh not of such Guardian-Angels.

  The Angel of the Name and Presence of God.From Jacob’s Prayer, Gen. 48. 16. The Angel, which redeem’d me from all Evil, bless the Lads. And from Eccles. 5. 6. Neither say thou before the Angel, that it was an Error; wherefore should God be angry at thy Voice, and destroy the Work of thine Hands? Some infer a Guardian-Angel, but not justly. For the Angel, which the Preacher speaketh of, is the Angel of the Name and Presence of God; the Difference between whom and a mere Angel, is visible in the Israelites Case, who, before their Idolatry of the Calf, had an Angel to conduct them, of whom God saith, Exo. 23. 21. “My Name is in him.” But, after that Idolatry of theirs, God threateneth, That he “will send an Angel before them, but himself will not go up in the Midst of them.”55 As the Angel of the Name of God, so the Angel of his Presence, transcendeth a mere Angel; for Moses would not be satisfy’d with the Guardianship of a mere Angel, but petitioneth for the Continuance of God’s Presence,56The Angel of his Presence,57 which is manifestly the same with the Angel of God’s Name. Such an Angel, because God’s Name is in him, is more than a mere Creature; and therefore great charge is given to the Israelites, to revere and obey him.58 By such an Angel God exhibited his own Presence, and a Declaration of his Mind by the Angel’s Voice, who bears the Name, and sustains the Person of God, speaketh and is spoken to as God, as appears from many Instances in the Old-Testament. For this Reason, this Angel is to be look’d upon, as God exhibiting himself by an Angel; therefore the Name of God is in him; and God may be fitly styled the Angel, which may therefore be one of the Names of God, not simply, but as exhibiting himself by an Angel; and thus it is to be understood in the two Texts now under consideration. And that this is the Preacher’s Sense, appears from the Context, “Neither say thou before the Angel, that it was an Error; wherefore should God be angry at thy Voice?” The 70 also render that which is in the Hebrew, “Before the Angel” [πρὸ προσώπου τοῦ θέου] in the Sight of God. Agreeably hereunto, when Jehovah, or the Lord, is said to do any Thing, the Arabick Version saith, the Angel of the Lord did such a Thing; see Walton’s Polyglot.59

  Some Prophetick Parts of holy Writ are alledg’d, in favour of a sublunary Magistracy of the holy Angels. In Zech. 6. 1. There is a four-fold Division of the Angelick Host, concern’d in the Affairs of the World, into 4 Chariots, as in antient Times their Hosts consisted of Chariots. These are said, to “Come out from between two Mountains, to go forth from standing before the Lord of the whole Earth, into the four Quarters of the World, to execute God’s Judgments,” v. 1–5. Of these 4 Chariots the Prophet enquireth, “What are these, my Lord?” The Angel answereth, “These are the four Spirits” (or Winds) “of Heaven”; like that of the Apocalypse 7. 1. where there is mention of 4 Angels at the 4 Corners of the Earth, holding the four Winds of the Earth, that they should not blow on the Earth, nor Sea. The Name of Winds, given to the Angels, denoteth their Subtilty and Agility, according to the Psalmists Description of them,60“Who maketh his Angels” (Messengers) “Spirits” (Winds,) “his Ministers a flaming Fire.” It denoteth also their Activity, in the Commotions and Changes of human Affairs, in raising new Empires, and demolishing the old; for that the great things, in the Vicissitude of Kingdoms and Empires, are done by the Angels, is an Hypothesis, that both Daniel and the Revelations plainly suppose.

  This plain Hypothesis will enable us to form a true Notion of the Princes of Persia and Grecia, which are Parties in the Conflict of the Angelical Powers, which are spoken of in Daniel 10. 13, 20, 21. As Michael there, the Jews Prince, is an Angel, so, doubtless, the Princes of Persia and Grecia are Angels also, not evil, but good, Angels (v. 21. There is none that holdeth with me in these things, but Michael your Prince.) And these Angels conflict with each other,61 as opposite Parties at Court, that have an Interest there. Here is therefore an Appearance, “That the Court of Heaven resembleth the Court of Rome, where several Nations have their several Cardinal-Protectors, as their Patrons and Tutelar-Angels.” And, because Michael is usually thought the Presidentiary-Angel of the Jewish Nation, and, because the Prince of the Kingdom of Persia is certainly an Angel; hence some infer, It is plain, that there are Presidentiary-Angels of all Kingdoms, Nations, and Countries, which are suppos’d to have a settled Prefecture over them. Whereas it is plainly incongruous to suppose, “That the Nations of Greece, usually at War with one another, and not united into one Estate, are the Prefecture of one Angel; and that the holy Angels bandy against, and conflict with, each other, in behalf of their several Nations and Countries”; which is as unlikely, as that they should fight with each other, when those Nations fight.

  It is incongruous also to suppose, “That two great Pagan Nations have two angelical Princes, or chieftain Angels, for their Prefects, unless all such other Pagan Nations have the like”; and to suppose, “holy Angels the Prefects of unholy Pagan Nations,” is incongruous; and it is much more incongruous, to infer this from the Names of Persia and Grecia, in the Prophecy, which do not signify two Nations, but two great Monarchies, wherein the fate of God’s People was involv’d. The Princes of Grecia and Persia, (understood according to the Hypothesis above-mention’d,) are the angelical Agents of raising those two Empires, (as the Arch-Angel Michael is, by divine Appointment, the Agent of the Jews deliverance out of captivity, and of re-erecting their Government;) which imperial Administration of theirs, maketh them adverse and punitive to the Jews; for the Prince of the Kingdom of Persia withstandeth the Jews Deliverance out of Captivity, (probably pleading the demerit of their Crimes,) and withstandeth the Angel, that spake to Daniel 21 Days. To this Account of these Princes, it may be proper to add; That as “The seven Arch-Angels, or 7 Eyes of the Lord, Zech. 4. 10. are usually employ’d in the affairs of the several parts of the World, (inspecting, superintending, administring them, Zech. 1. 10) as occasional Missionaries of Providence only, without being constituted the Presidentiary-Angels of any parts of the World”; and as “The Angel Gabriel is usually employ’d in the Affairs of Prophecy, and of the Prophets, as an occasional Missionary of Providence only, without being constituted the Presidentiary-Angel of Prophecy, or Prophets, like Mercury the Heathen President of Eloquence”; so we may reasonably suppose, “That the Prince of Persia and his Angels, (which are thought to have the Name of Kings, Dan. 10. 13.) were usually employ’d in the Affairs of Persia: That Michael and his Angels were usually employ’d in the Affairs of the Jews, without being constituted the Presidents, or Prefects, over Persia and the Jewish Nation.” They were no more, than occasional Missionaries62 of Providence, God’s Messengers and Ministers, that do nothing but by his Command, Angels employ’d in such animperial, national, Administration.

  Arguments against their subordinate mundan Magistracy, and the Doctrine of the Guardian-Angel.§VI. The holy Angels belong not to the Polity of this World, of which they are, therefore, no Magistrates; which if they were, this World would be the City of God, and his Republick: Nor are they Guardian-Angels, inseparably attending upon Men all their Days. But they are occasional Missionaries (“Ministring Spirits sent forth,” Heb. 1. 14.) they are the “Angels of God in Heaven,”63 they are the Courtiers and Citizens of Heaven; and such are the Guardian-Angels, which our Saviour speaketh of, that “always” (save only when they are sent abroad) “behold his Father’s Face in Heaven,” and have their abode and dwelling there.

  In Ezek. Chap. 1, and 10. the holy Angels (which are signify’d by the hieroglyphical figures of Cherubims) are represented, as the imperial Chariot of the God of Israel; which importeth, “That he is the supreme Governor in Power Imperial, thro’ their ministerial Power, flying, as it were, upon their Wings”; agreeably to which, the God of Israel is usually describ’d, as “sitting upon the Cherubims, dwelling between the Cherubims,” and the holy Angels are represented as his regial Seat, or Throne; the Posture of the Cherubims, in the Tabernacle and Temple, was standing; they were furnish’d with Wings, and their Faces were towards the Mercy-Seat; all which Notices of the holy Angels (and many more) represent them, as Ministers of, and constant Attendants upon, the Divine Majesty, not as Magistrates of this World, attending upon their Charges.

  As God has appointed, by Nature, all Men to live in civil Society; so hath he ordain’d, by Grace, that his holy People should live in holy Society, under the Guidance of publick Officers, which Body-Politick is the Church. Agreeably whereunto, the invisible World is constituted; for the holy Angels are Sons of the divine Family, and live in Society as other Families do.64 They are Members of the Church-Triumphant, and live in Communion with it as Church-Members.65 They are Citizens of the heavenly-Jerusalem, there bearing Offices, and enjoying Honours. How else can they constitute a Family, a City, a Church? They are the Host of Heaven, and therefore live in angelical Society, residing in Heaven; which is inconsistent with their sublunary Magistracy in this World, (which was a fundamental Error of Paganism, embrac’d by many Jews and Christians,) and with the Hypothesis of the Guardian-Angel, for such an Angel liveth out of angelical Society.

  The Angels, which minister to the welfare of the Just, usually go forth by Troops and Bands.66 And, agreeably to the Platonick Notion,67Christianity allotteth a Convoy of Angels for the departing Soul of one pious Man, Lazarus, to conduct him to Paradise; which Office the Heathen Poets assign’d to Mercury; which is also agreeable to the Notion of the Jews. But, if they convey single departed Souls in Troops, they, doubtless, minister to their welfare in this Life, in Troops also. Numbers of them associate with us in our religious Assemblies, and are inspectors of our Behaviour there.68 When the Jews were the holy People, the holy Angels, in some sort, resided among them; to which some, reasonably enough, refer that Voice, which was heard in the Temple, immediately before its Destruction, “Let us go hence”; those Angels of the Shechinah, or Divine Majestick Presence, then leaving the Jews naked and expos’d to all Calamities.

  The company and custody of the holy Angels is, according to the Scriptures, a principal Privilege of God’s People, and a Privilege is an uncommon Right. This Principle, therefore, destroys the Heathenish sublunary Magistracy of the holy Angels, and of the Angel-Guardian, common to all Mankind. Yet we must acknowledge the holy Angels general Guardianship of Mankind in general. The evil Demons are under Laws and Government; God is the Founder and supreme Governor of the World; as he hath an universal Dominion, so he exercises that Right in a Superintendence of all, as the Sovereign Disposer of the private and publick Affairs of Men. In which Administration of Things, the holy Angels are employ’d in defence of Mankind in general, of publick Persons, and publick Societies of Men, which are not wholly abandon’d to the will of Satan and his Partisans, unless sometimes for their Punishment.

  If we suppose the holy Angels to be sublunary Rectors and Magistrates, Lords and Rulers of this World, in their several Provinces, to whom Mankind are rightfully subjected; if our good and evil Things, our Welfare and Punishment, are in their Hands to dispense: This is that Notion, which the Pagan-Theology supposeth, a delegated Providence, whereby the World is govern’d. Whereas the Providence, which the Scripture-Theology supposeth and teacheth, is God’s own undelegated Exercise of Providence, in his divine Decrees, and the Execution of them. The Scripture-Theology representeth God, as the universal Inspector, (to the meanest Sparrow,) Protector, and Benefactor; the sole Arbiter of our Fate, upon whose Pleasure our well, or ill, being intirely depends. Pious Men submit to Afflictions, as to God’s Hand, give him Thanks for Mercies, as his Gifts, in Wants and Dangers, they trust to his Aid, and in all their Ways and Enterprizes, the Eye of their Observance and Regard is upon him alone, and their Service is to this their sole Lord.69 The holy Angels, indeed, are sent to execute his Commands. Psa. 103. 20, 21.

  If the holy Angels are sublunary Magistrates and Rectors, they are, to Mankind, governing authoritative Powers; they must resemble Kings and civil Governors, God’s Vicegerents, but excelling them in Dignity; there must be Societies, consisting of the holy Angels, as Regents, and of Mankind, as Subjects; and the Societies of the World must be such Societies, more than human, or civil, Power and Authority belonging to such Rectors. But of such Political Societies, the Scriptures know nothing, unless we suppose them in the Kingdom of Darkness, which consisteth of Heathen Mankind, and of the Rulers of the Darkness of this World; nor are these Political Societies consistent with true Religion, for they manifestly imply and introduce Idolatry, and Demonolatry, by appropriating to them divine Honours, and subjecting themselves to them, taking them from their immediate Dependence upon, and Addresses to, God.

  §VII. To bring what I have been laying down to a point. From what I have said, and, from a through Consideration of the Pagan Religion, it appears, “That the Kingdom of God does not consist of all rational Agents, as of one political System, with God at their Head”; there being a Kingdom of Darkness too, and a divided State of rational Beings: And it also appears, “That the Heathens were so far ignorant of the true God, that he is not to be found amongst their Deities,” notwithstanding what has been advanc’d by many Christian Divines to the contrary.

  1. The supreme Deity, in the Heathen Religion, is the supreme among Heathen Deities. The Heathens acknowledg’d a supreme God, but not the true kind of supreme God. “This is Life Eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent,” Joh. 27. 3. They Atheistically explain’d away the true Deity of God, into a Jupiter of the Heroe-kind, sometimes into a mystical first Nature, sometimes into the Soul of the World, and sometimes into infinite Matter. “It is much more easy, to deviate from the true God, than from the true” [partial] “Notion of the Deity; for the Gentiles, how good soever their Notion of the Divinity was, which they had in their Mind, yet in this they seem to have miscarried in the first Place, they did not attribute it to him, to whom it belong’d.”70 Many of the Heathens had a true Notion of the Deity; they suppos’d him to be the great Father of Nature, the Former and Governor of the Universe; yet every imaginary Deity, that has these Attributes, is not the true God, nor is the Heathen Deity such.

  2. The true God was not the Deity of Religion amongst the Heathens. Among the Romans, Capitoline Jove was the supreme Deity of their Religion, with Augurs for his Prophets, and Juno and Minerva for his Coassessors; attended by a Nurse too, so confounding Cretan and Cosmical Jupiter. Capitoline Jove was the same with Babylonian Bel, threaten’d by God, Jer. 51. 44. The same with Jupiter Olympius, whom Antiochus Epiphanes endeavour’d to substitute instead of the true God, and to have the Temple in Jerusalem, call’d the Temple of Jupiter Olympius, who is therefore call’d the Abomination that maketh desolate.71 The same with Baal and Moloch, which are Names too that signify a supreme God, but extremely different from the true God. Summanus (Summus deorum Manium) was the proper Name of Jupiter Capitolinus himself; and denoteth what he was in the best Notion of him, only the chief of the Heathen Gods. Accordingly, in Scripture, the Gentiles are said to worship Idols, but never to be God’s Worshippers; the Assyrian Colonies, in their Heathenism, “feared not the Lord”;72 all the Deities of Religion amongst them, are constantly intitul’d no-Gods, Idols, other Gods, strange Gods. The Apostle saith, “When they knew God,” (had natural Notices of the true God of Religion,) “they glorify’d him not as God,”73 (they did not acknowledge him for their God, the Object of their religious Worship,) worshipping the Creature instead of the Creator. This the Apostle affirms of them, v. 25. ἐσεβάσησαν καί ἐλάτρευσαν τη̣̂ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which our Translation thus renders, They worshipp’d and serv’d the Creature, more than the Creator. The Words are also capable of this other rendering; They worshipp’d and serv’d the Creature besides the Creator. And, according to either of these Versions, as some observe, “It is suppos’d, that the Pagans did worship the true God, though they worshipped the Creature also besides him, or perhaps in some sense above him, and more than him also.”74 But the Words are capable of a third rendering, which is probably the true, for παρὰ is here render’d in the vulgar Latin, potius quam, rather than, as it usually signifieth, and, in this Version, there will be no difficulty, if the Word [Creature] be understood to signify [that which is not the Creator;] and then the Words will run thus, “They worshipp’d and serv’d that which is not the Creator, rather than the Creator”; which is perfectly agreeable to the following Words, v. 28. “They did not like to retain God in their knowledge.” Therefore they chose to worship the Creature, rather than the Creator.

  3. The supreme Deity, among the Heathens, is the Deity of a Heathen Religion; which the true God is not. Accordingly, the Apostle argueth, that the religious Service of the Heathens was a false religious Service: “God, that made the World and all the Things therein, seeing that he is Lord of Heaven and Earth, dwelleth not in Temples made with Hands. Neither is worshipp’d with Mens Hands, as though he needed any Thing, seeing he giveth to all Life, and Breath, and all Things. For as much then as we are the Offspring of God, we ought not to think, that the God-head is like unto Gold, or Silver, or Stone, graven by Art, or Man’s Device.”75 In which the Drift of the Apostles Discourse is, to persuade the Athenians to change the great Object of their Worship, not their corrupt Manner of Worshipping him; otherwise the Apostle would not have preach’d to them in such a style as he does, telling them of their profound Ignorance of God, that his design was to declare God to them, and exhorting them to seek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him and find him.76

  4. The true God is intituled the unknown God at Athens; unknown, as when we say, a Thing is Foreign, Alien, and not of our acquaintance; not in such an honourary Sense, as when the Platonists call their first Deity, altogether unknown; or as if the Athenians design’d it to signify, the Deity invisible and incomprehensible by Mortals. “Most learn’d Expositors probably think that Altar, which St. Paul found at Athens, had been erected upon occasion of some famous Victory, whose procurement the Athenians not knowing, by any Circumstance, unto what known God it might be ascrib’d; and hence fearing, left by attributing it to any of those Gods whom they worshipp’d, the true Author of it might be wrong’d, or neglected, they ascrib’d it to an unknown God.”77 Whence will follow,

  First, “That the true God was not one of the Athenian Deities”; for all these were sufficiently well known to themselves. All the Deities of the Athenian Religion were to them well known; therefore the true God, whom St. Paul intitul’d the unknown God at Athens, could not be one of them.

  Secondly, “That the unknown God at Athens was not the same with Zeus, or Jupiter,” as some imagine. The Apostle citing Aratus, “for we are his Offspring,” is by them said to interpret it of the true God; which is suppos’d to be a plain Scripture-acknowledgment, that by the Zeus of the Greekish Pagans was, sometimes at least, meant the true God. But, if Jupiter is the true God, he is necessarily the same with the unknown God at Athens, and it follows, “That the Athenians were in profound Ignorance of their own Jupiter; that they worshipp’d him, not knowing him; that they ought to have grop’d after him, and that St. Paul ’s Business at Athens was to preach up the Pagan Jupiter, to those too, that knew him at least as well as himself; and that the Pagan Jupiter is the very same Deity, who set up an Anti-Pagan Religion in Judaism and Christianity; that the great Crime of the Gentiles was, they knew not their own Jupiter, nor glorify’d him as God, nor made him their God, whose Oracles, therefore, Priests, and Temples, were the Oracles, Priests, and Temples, of the true God.” Fine Consequences! The Apostle discourseth of the Deity, from an Heathen Author, to Heathen Auditors; citeth the Saying of a Poet touching the Deity, as a true Notice of him, that is of kind and quality the true God, (which is ill apply’d to, and understood of, an Heathen kind of Deity, but is rightly apply’d to, and interpreted of, him that is the true God,) representeth him according to their own Notices; but doth not affirm, or intend to say, that by God, the supreme God, Zeus, Jupiter, or Dios, the Poet meaneth determinately him that is the true God, or that an Anima Mundi (which is Jupiter in the best Notion of him) is God blessed for evermore.

  5. The Difference between the Heathen and the true Theology, is a Dispute between two pretending Wholes, the Church and the World. Both Theologies have the same Notion of a City, Polity, and Kingdom; both agree touching the Rules and Measures of Duty to the Whole; and both agree, that there is a System, which is the City and Kingdom of God. But these Attributes the Pagan Theology attributeth to the World; the Christian, to the Church. The Dispute between these two Theologies, is a Dispute to which of these two Catholick Systems the true supreme God belongeth. Both Theologies agree, that he cannot belong to both these Catholick Systems, which are manifestly inconsistent. The Pagan Catholick System shutteth out of Being that holy Society, the Church of God. And the Hypothesis of this holy Society is of a ruinous Nature to their Whole, to the supreme Deity of their Religion, to their native State of Mankind, which they suppose to be by Nature that of Fellow-Citizens with, Domesticks and Sons of, God; which is built upon a false imaginary State of the Universe.

  6. “The Heathens, therefore, knew not God,” in the truly religious Sense of knowing him, in which consists the whole of true Piety, in order to recover Mankind out of which unenlighten’d State, the Revelation, contain’d in the holy Scriptures, which God has been pleas’d to make of himself to Mankind, has been a favour of the highest Kind, as it is of the utmost Importance.

  ESSAY II

  Concerning the Imperfectness of the Heathen Morality

  The Rules of Piety among the Stoicks.I. To begin with the Stoicks, whose pretentions ran highest in this way, and who acknowledg’d Virtue to be the only Good. Their Principles shall be extracted from Epictetus, M. Antoninus, Seneca, and Plutarch; and, to do them Justice, we shall begin with what is excellent in their Doctrine.

  The State of Life which they propose to themselves, is that of Jupiter’s Subjects, Friends, Ministers, Soldiers, Citizens, Sons; to be, and to be intitul’d, Θεῖοι Divine. The Law of their Subjection to Jupiter they consider as an Obligation, both to active and passive Obedience, discarding all Externals, the Body, Riches, Fame, Empire; they made it their Business to be, and to do, what was agreeable to Nature, to our proper Nature, which is Rational, Social, Human; to the Will of the governing Nature of the Universe; to the governing right Reason of Jove, which is a Law; and being Philosophers, they were the Interpreters of Nature, and of the Will of God. They thought themselves unconcern’d in the Applause, or Contumelies, in the Approbation, or Reprehensions, of Men, as having no Power to do them Good, or Hurt. As good and dutiful Subjects, they profess themselves Friends to God in the first Place, chiefly to regard his Eye over them, whom they ought to please; to concern themselves about this only, how to fulfil their own Province orderly and obediently to God; to understand and mind his Commands and Interdicts, and to be conversant in his Affairs; in all their Actions to have respect to him; to desire to seem fair to him, and to be pure with themselves and with God; in all Circumstances to enquire, what God would have them to do, and to divine (if it be possible) what his Will is; to imitate him in Faithfulness, Beneficence, Liberality, Magnanimity; continually to praise and celebrate, and to give Thanks to, the Divinity; to give Thanks for all Things, especially for their virtuous Living without their former Vices and Crimes; for the Sustenance of Life, but especially for the Faculty of understanding and using Things; to submit their Minds to the Governor of all Things, as good Citizens to the Laws of the City; not only to obey, but to approve and praise his Administration of Things; to will the Things that happen in the World, the Estate, or Usage, that is allotted them, because God willeth them; to will nothing, but what God willeth; to be devoted to his Commands; so to eat, as to please the Gods; to confide in the Governor of all; to live in mindfulness of him; to worship the Gods, and to invocate them in all Affairs; for Man is made to worship the Gods. To them that ask, where hast thou seen the Gods, or whence is thine Assurance of their Existence whom thou worshippest? From those Things that are Indications of the Power of the Gods, I am assured of their Existence, and therefore worship them. These are their Rules of Piety; their Rules of Duty to themselves, and of Humanity follow.

  Their Rules of Duty to themselves.§II. What (say the Stoicks) doth the divine Law command? To keep the Things that are our own, and not to challenge to our-selves the Things of others; but, if granted to us, to use them; if not granted to us, not to desire them; when taken away, to restore them cheerfully, and to be thankful for the Time that we have had the Use of them. Hast thou not a Commandment from Jupiter? Hath he not given thee thine own Things, exempt from Prohibition and Impediment, the other Things, which are not thine own, liable to Prohibition and Impediment? What Commandment therefore, what Prescript hast thou brought from him? The Things that are thine own, keep by all means, desire not the Things that belong to others. Faithfulness is thine own, who can take away such Things as these, who shall hinder thee from using them beside thy-self? When thou mindest the Things that are not thine own, thou hast lost the Things that are thine own. Man must do what his Reason and Mind enjoyneth, which is a Decerption from Jupiter, and which Jupiter (a severe Exacter of Virtue) hath given him to be his Leader and Prefect.

  Their Rules of Humanity.From the same Principle (the Laws of Subjection to the Governor of the World) the Stoicks infer various Rules of Duty to Mankind. For (say they) Man is not absolute and unbound, but a Part of a certain Whole, a Member of the one universal System of rational Agents, a Citizen of the World, and, therefore, he is an intellectual social Animal, in conjunction with his Fellow-Rationals, that are of the same Nature and Kind, of one Tribe, or Alliance, his Kinsmen, Fellows, Associates, Neighbours, Brothers, (not as deriving their Origin from the same Blood, or Seed, but from the same parental Mind, of which their Minds are so many Branches pluck’d off,) Fellow-Members of one Body, that are born to be Fellow-Workers, (as the Feet, the Hands, the Eye-Lids, the Rows of the upper and under Teeth,) and by Nature Friends. Let this be laid down in the first place; I am a Part of the Whole, which is govern’d by Nature. In the next place, I am nearly allied to those other Parts, that are of the same Kind. The Mind of the Universe1 is Social; wherefore the principal thing intended in the Constitution of Men, is the social Design, which is the End and Good, and ought to be the Scope, of Man; and whatever Practice of his hath not reference (immediately, or remotely) to the social Design, destroyeth the Uniformity of Life, and is Seditious; as a factious Person, among the People, divideth his own Party from the common Consent. We ought not to be hurried away by such Motions, as are unsocial, but to pass from one social Practice to another, with mindfulness of God; to treat Men socially, according to the natural Law of Fellowship, kindly and justly. What do I care for more than this, that my present Action be the proper Action of one that is Rational, one that is Social, and that is govern’d by the same Law of right Reason with God?

  To Man that is rational and social, it is proper to do nothing, but what the Reason of his regial and legislative part suggests for the Good of Men. He ought to love them truly and from the heart, to take care of the Welfare of all Men, to worship and praise the Gods, and to do good to Men, to bear with them, forbearing to injure them, to do them good unweariedly, persisting in an uninterrupted Series of good Actions, accounting Beneficence to others, his own Emolument and (because they are Members of the same Body) a doing good to himself. The Joy of a Man is to do what properly belongeth to a Man; and it properly belongeth to a Man, to be kindly affected to those of the same Tribe, or Kindred. It is proper and agreeable to a Man, to love those that off end against him, (for by Nature they are his Friends and Kinsmen;) to bear good-Will to them that hate and disparage him; not to be angry with the Stupid and Ungrateful, but to take care of them; to be friendly and benevolent to every Man: Men are made for one another; teach them better, or bear with them. A Branch, cut off from Continuity with its Neighbour-Branch, is necessarily cut off from the whole Tree; a Man divideth himself from his Neighbour, hating him, and having an Aversion from him, yet knoweth not, that at the same Time he divideth himself from the whole Body. As a Citizen of the World, and a part of the whole, Man is oblig’d to have no private Self-Interest, or Advantage, to consult about nothing, as unbound; but, as the Hand, or Feet, if they had Reason and Understanding of the natural Order, should have no Motions, nor desire any Thing, but with respect to the whole; to direct his whole Endeavour to the common Good, and to abstain from the contrary; for the whole is of greater regard than a part, and a City than a Citizen. He that is unjust to any, is impious; for the Nature of the Universe having made all rational Animals one for another, that they should benefit one another, according to every one’s Worth, but in no wise hurt one another; he that transgresseth this her Will, is manifestly guilty of Impiety towards the most antient and venerable of the Gods.

  But their Institution is, in great Measure, unpopular and irreligious, subverting Religion, 1. By discarding future Rewards and Punishments.§III. So far excellently well, and the bright Side of Stoicism; but now follows its dark Side, which, in consequence at least, destroyeth its better part. For one great Article of natural Religion is, the Immortality of human Souls; that after this Life they exist in a happy, or calamitous, State; and that Mankind ought to be govern’d by hope of Reward, or fear of Punishment; the two chief Pillars of all Society, whether civil, or religious; of which, amongst others, Lucretius and the Epicureans were very sensible.

  But these grand Articles of natural Religion, the Stoicks discard as vulgar Errors, designing to rid themselves of the Passions, to rescue themselves intirely from all Bondage of Mind, and to enjoy perfect Liberty and Tranquility; designing to institute a Philosopher, (a whimsical Kind of Virtuoso, by them call’d a Wise-Man, and his Institution, Wisdom,) they undermine the Fundamentals of Religion; they conspire with the Epicureans, in razing and demolishing the principal Pillars of it; and make their own Laws, the Law of Subjection to the Governor of the World, not Law, but an extravagant Hypothesis. They suppose, “That an imperial Head presideth over an Universe of rational Agents, which must be govern’d by Law, but without the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments; That the Virtuous must hope for no other Reward, the Vicious need to fear no other Punishment, but their being such; That no thing must be thought our Good or Evil, save only the things that are in the Power of our own Will, lest we curse the Gods, when they seem to neglect, or cross us.” Upon which Terms there can be no dutiful Submission to divine Chastisements and Punishments, no pious Addresses for preventing, or removing, them, and for promoting the external Blessings of this, or a better, Life. According to them, “It is of no concern, for how long you shall Practice virtuously; three Hours are sufficient. Prorogation of Life conduceth nothing to Felicity; a blessed Life that is short, is no less desirable than that which is long; both are alike; Happiness is not encreas’d by length, nor diminish’d by shortness, of Time; Time is of no Moment to happiness; there is no difference between a Day and an Age; Life by that is made longer, but not happier.” An Institution, which, at this rate, affronteth the common-Reason of Mankind, corrupteth their natural Notions, quencheth their innate Desires and noble Breathings after Immortality, to which an Institution of Virtue ought to conduct Men, and is doubtless, in great Measure, no Institution of serious Virtue, but of unpopular and irreligious Humour.

  The Stoicks are also extremely Irreligious, in depriving the supreme Governor of distributive Justice; in ascribing to him an extravagant indulgent Goodness, destructive to the true Use of Sacrifices, methods of Atonement, penitential Sorrow, and the pious Fear of a Deity. For, altho’ they sometimes acknowledge, that the Governor of the World inflicteth castigatory Punishments in this Life, yet they do not suppose, that he inflicteth any properly penal Evils. Hence it is with them a Maxim, “The State of absolute Liberty, is, neither to fear Men, nor God.”2 So, according to Zeno, one thing requisite in an happy Man, is, “Not to fear the Gods.” The Platonists agree with the Stoicks, in attributing an irreligious Kind of Goodness to the Deity, yet they suppose castigatory Punishments in a future Life. The Gods themselves, all the subordinate Deities, are suppos’d by the Stoicks, to be Mortal and Corruptible, and they are all to be swallow’d up in the universal Conflagration: Nor is their Jupiter absolutely indissoluble, indiscerpible, and incorruptible, being nothing better than a corporeal fiery Nature.

  2. By ridiculing the Fear of Death,§IV. Secondly, they ridicule the Fear of Death, explode the laudable Usage of Burying the Dead, and of Mourning for them; all which is absurdly unpopular and irreligious. Nor could the World be govern’d, if all Men entertain’d a persuasion, That Death, and, consequently, the Execution of Criminals, is no penal Evil, no Evil at all, as the Stoicks suppose. According to them, “All ways of dying are alike,” and so there is no difference between the easiest natural Death, and Death aggravated by horrible Tortures, Modes, and Circumstances, of Dying. Plato also and Socrates affirm, “That Death is good, and better than Living with the Body, not to some only, but simply unto all.”3

  And allowing, nay, in some Cases, enjoyning Self-murder.If the Wise-Man be in tragical Circumstances, and weary of Life, their Philosophy alloweth and enjoyneth “an Exit agreeable to Reason (that is, Self-Murder.) The Gate is open, none hath Reason to complain of Life, for none is forc’d to live against his Will; if he liveth miserably, it is his own Fault; doth it please you? Live; doth it not please you? You may return whence you came.” This Doctrine was practis’d by several of the Philosophick Pagans, and the School of Plato became somewhat infected with it, notwithstanding he himself has reason’d so well against it; but the Popular Pagans, following Nature, were of better Principles.

  3. By their denying Pain to be an Evil.§V. The Stoical Doctrine of Pain, Sickness, & c. is so far from being Wisdom, that it is an unpopular irreligious and paradoxical Humour, or Madness, shall I rather call it? Their magnificent Pretentions are, “That Pain and Torture of Body are not Evil; or, if it be Evil, it is another’s Evil, not ours, the Body being no part of us, but our Organ only. Socrates affirm’d, that Pain remain’d in the Foot, it doth not affect the Mind with Evil. They can live in great hilarity of Mind, altho’ the wild Beasts pull in sunder their bodily Members. Men of Learning are furnish’d with Fortitude against things Painful and Dolorous, which suffereth them not to pass within the Porch of the Soul, but, considering them as apropos’d Exercise, beareth them without Grief and Affliction. Doth sensitive Pain, or Pleasure, touch thee? Let Sense look to it, let the Body and bodily Members make it their care, if they can, that they suffer not; and when they suffer, let them complain, if they can, and judge that Pain is Evil. The Soul may keep her proper Tranquillity and Serenity, and not suppose it Evil. Not Fire, nor Iron, nor a Tyrant, nor contumelious Language, can touch the Mind.” Noble Rant this! But, if they really can abstract the Mind from all sympathizing with the Body, and from uneasiness by the Pains of it, whence is it, that they cannot keep her from Disturbance by the Humours of the Body? For they acknowledge themselves as liable as other Mortals to Fevers, Ravings, and Madness. Whence is it, that, upon account of extremity of Pain, they think it decent, to take away their own Lives? And why do they talk of Pain intolerable, and make use of the Epicurean Consolation, “If Pain be intolerable, it is not long; if it be long, it is not intolerable?” Such Philosophy does little more for the Cure of human Evils, than to make Men wranglers about Names and Terms, as if changing the Names chang’d the Natures of Things.

  Externals, and whatever Things do not depend upon our own Will, they will not have call’d human Goods, but Things indifferent; but, “altho’ the Things be indifferent, the Use of them is not indifferent: As Children, when they play with Shells, their Sollicitude is, not about the Shells, but to play with them dextrously.” Upon which Terms there may be Well-doing, but no such Thing as doing Good to others, in the Use of Externals; yet the Stoicks pretend to Beneficence, and write Books concerningBenefits: Altho’ they are like a Physitian, whose Care and Concern is, not the Life and Welfare of his Patient, but only, that his own Management may be according to Art. They most inconsistently exhort Mankind to be Thankful for their Life, and the Helps of Life, the Fruits of the Earth, when they are at the same Time instituting them to an indifference as to “Life and Death, Health and Sickness, bodily Pain, or Pleasure, Honour, or Ignominy, Plenty, or Penury, Wife, Children, Country, Fame, Possessions, Friends, and their own Bodies.” “If a Tyrant threatneth me with Bonds,” (saith Epictetus4 ) “I say, he threatneth the Hands and the Feet: If to cut of my Head, I say, he threatneth the Neck: If to Imprison me, the Body. Doth he therefore threaten nothing to me? If I look upon these Things as nothing to me, he threatneth nothing to me. But, if I fear any of them, he threatneth me. Is thy Son dead? What hath happen’d? Thy Son is dead. Is that all? That is all. That Ill hath happen’d, is thine own additional. If thine Hearing he incommoded, what is that to thee? No ill News can come to thee from Rome, for what Evil can befal thee there, where thou art not? Banishment is but to be elsewhere. Dost thou want Bread? The Door is open, thou may’st go out of a smoaky House.” (But, if these Things be no Evils, what meaneth that sovereign Antidote against them, To die readily?) “But is not Life a Good? No. May we not desire Health? No, by no means, nor any Thing else of the Aliena,5from which the Appetite must be far remov’d; or else thou submittest thy Neck to Servitude, to the Things first, and next to the Men, who have the Disposal of them. Health is not Good, nor Sickness Evil; the Good is, to be Healthful as you ought: In like Manner, be Sick as you ought, and Sickness becometh Good and Profitable. The right Use of the Externals which present themselves, is a MERCURY’s Rod, which turneth every Thing that it toucheth into Gold. Sickness, Death, Penury, Contumely, capital Sentence, touch them with the Rod of MERCURY, and they all become Profitable. Why then should we seek our Good and Evil in Externals, seeing it is in our own Power, to make all Externals Good?” But, in order to rectify their Philosophy of Good and Evil, it ought to be consider’d, That good Things are of two Kinds. For some Things are Good, as constituent Parts of our true Perfection and Happiness of Life, and these we call the End. Other Things are Good, as conducive thereto, and these are call’d the Means. In the first Notion, the good Things, commonly so reputed, (Life, Health, Honour, Plenty, &c.) cannot be Evils, consider’d in the Nature of an End; and the Evils, commonly so reputed, (Death, Sickness, Infamy, Penury, &c.) cannot be Good. In the second Notion of Means, the Evils, commonly so reputed, may be Good, and the good Things, commonly so reputed, may be Evils; and usually are, not helps, but hindrances, to our true Perfection and Happiness in a future State.

  Their regal and happy Estate, and Self-sufficiency.§VI. The Stoick’s Wise-Man, according to their Institution, is Noble, Brave, Rich, Prosperous, free from Servitude and Misery; but quite out of the Road, both of civil and religious Society. For they suppose, “That nothing but our intelligent Nature is our-self, and that those Things only, which properly belong thereto, and fall within the Power of our own Wills, do concern us, or are our Good and Evil Things. Discarding, therefore, the many Things, they place their one Thing, and their All, in cultivating their intelligent free-agent Nature; in its being Virtuous, and such as the proper Nature of Man requireth; thus attaining a State of Felicity without Impediment, or danger of Misfortune, never failing of what they desire, nor falling into what they have an Aversion to; living, therefore, in a State of perfect Liberty, which they account the greatest Good. Being obnoxious to no superior Power, they are all Kings. Having dismiss’d the desire and fear of Externals, none can hurt them, they inhabit an impregnable City, none can have access to their Riches, they have no Enemy, they complain of none, criminate no Body. Hearken to me,” (saith Epictetus,) “and you shall never live in Envy, nor be in Anger, Grief, or Fear, never be prohibited, or hinder’d, nor ever Flatter any. To me” (continueth he) “no Evil can happen, to me there is no Thief” (he that stole his Lamp was no Thief to him) “nor any Earthquake; but all Things are full of Peace and Undisturbance. I seek Good and Evil within, only in mine own Things, (i.e. in judging aright of Things, in having my Desires and Aversions right, and in the right Use of Externals,) not giving the Name of Good, or Evil, of Utility, or Damage, or any thing of that Nature, to Things not in my own Power.” Such are the Principles of the Stoicks in their Schools, which they relinquish, or dissemble, when they betake themselves to the management of publick Affairs. For these they manage, (as Plutarch well observes,) as if they accounted Externals (Health, Riches, and Glory,) good Things; for how can they be throughly concern’d, to avert publick Calamities, if they suppose them no Evils, or not their Concern?

  “The Body” (saith the Stoick) “is nothing to me; the Parts of it are nothing to me; Death is nothing to me. This is the State and Character of a Philosopher, he looketh for all his Utility and Damage from himself. If another can hurt me, then I do nothing: If I expect that another help me, then I am nothing. The Mind devoid of Passions is inexpugnable, collected into it self, it is self-content, a Cittadel; a stronger Place, where-unto to make his Refuge, and so to become Impregnable, and better fortify’d than this, hath no Man. So that” (as Plutarch has observ’d) “if he be Imprison’d, he suffereth no Prohibition; if thrown down a Precipice, he suffereth no Constraint; if Tortur’d, he is not Tormented; if Bound, he is not Hurt; if he falleth in Wrestling, yet he cannot be Vanquish’d; if encompass’d by a Wall, yet he cannot be Besieged; and if he be sold by Enemies, yet he cannot be Captivated; he hath Riches and a Kingdom, and is Fortunate and Prosperous, Unindigent and Self-sufficient, without a Penny in his Purse. The Wise-Man” (saith the Stoick) “hath created Peace to himself, by fearing nothing, and Riches, by not desiring any Thing: Altho’ without City, House, or Harbour, yet he wanteth nothing. He can be happy by himself in a State of Solitude, as being happy and sufficient from himself,” without the innumerable and inestimable Benefits of Society. And, because he liveth in the Perfection of Virtue and Happiness, neither publick nor private Calamities do at all diminish the Wise-Man’s Happiness. Not publick Calamities, for “the overturning and ruin of his City, will he count it any great Thing? If he supposeth it a grand Evil, or any Evil at all, he will be ridiculous, and no more Virtuous, accounting Wood and Stone, and the Death of Mortals, some great Matters. Wars, Sedition, the Death of Multitudes of Men, the Overturning and Burning of Cities, are no great Things: As the Death of Multitudes of Cattle, the Overturning and Burning of Birds nests, are no great Matters. Not private Calamities, that befall himself, or his Relations. For, without any title to a future Happiness, the Wise-Man is happy in the midst of Torments; his Happiness receives no addition from Health, Ease, and Pleasures, nor any diminution from their opposites.” Is such an Institution as this fit for human Minds?

  Apathy.§VII. Not less extravagant is their Doctrine of Apathy, or being free from animal Affections and Passions, which at once discards all things external, whether Good or Evil, both of this and another World, substituting certain mental Operations, instead of the Passions of the lower or animal Soul; “Will, instead of the Passion of Desire; mental Joy, instead of the Passion of Joy; Caution, instead of the Passion of Fear; but, instead of Grief, or Sorrow, they substitute nothing, because they deny any such Thing in a Wise-Man.” If Ulysses (said Epictetus) in truth lamented for his Wife, was he not unhappy? “But what good Man is unfortunate, or unhappy? Therefore, if he cri’d and lamented, he was not a good Man.” Sorrow for the Death of Friends, they account a very bad Thing, their Philosophy being a contrivance to live in perfect Indolence: Nor alloweth it Sorrow for our Sins and Vices, as Plutarch charges them. But, if this be Philosophy, the old Man had great Reason to tell his Son, “Hear me, my Son! you must Philosophize, but you must have Brains too: These are egregious Fooleries.” As likewise are these their Maxims. “The Wise-Man is never mov’d by Grace, or Favour; never pardoneth the Crimes of any. None commiserate, but the Vain and Foolish. It is not the Property of a Man, to be exorable, or placable.”

  But, doubtless, it would be better for Mankind to be left to the Sentiments of Nature, than to be instituted to such a harden’d Virtue, that is neither possible, nor tolerable, being absolutely Destructive, both of Good-Nature, and of the Exercise of divine and gracious Affections and Passions. For Fear and Desire are truly said to be divine Virtues, if their Objects be Things divine; and to sympathize with others in their Joys and Sorrows, is inseparable from true Benevolence. But the Stoicks admit of no sympathizing Sorrow, but in political Appearance. “If you see a Man” (saith Epictetus) “lamenting his Misfortunes, you may in Words accommodate your-self to him, and, if you be so dispos’d, lament with him: But take care, that you do not internally lament.”

  Arrogance, with respect to the Gods, as well as Men.§VIII. The Pagans charg’d the Stoicks with Arrogance, and not without great Reason; for it was but a natural Consequence of their extravagant Liberty, Security, Tranquillity, Self-Sufficiency, Wisdom, Royalty, and Apathy; insomuch that their Wise-Man is no less than one of Jove’s Peers, that liveth as well as the Gods live. “And, as it is agreeable to Jove” (saith Chrysippus) “to elate himself upon account of his Life, to think great, and (if I may so speak) to lift up his Head, to glory, and magnify himself, living worthy of a magnifying Elation: So these Things agree to all good Men, that in nothing come behind Jove. As to the Body,” (saith Epictetus,) “thou art a small part of the Universe. But in respect of the Mind, or Reason, not worse, nor less, than the Gods; for the greatness of the Mind is not to be judg’d of by Longitude, nor Altitude, but by decretory Sentiments.” In this Philosophy, one of the fundamental Maxims is, “That all the Wise and Good are Equal,” being all of them happy to the height of Bliss. For Virtue, the true and the sole cause of Happiness, is equal in them all; it is not capable of increase, nor diminution, and as for Externals, which are of no consideration, they make no disparity. Time also maketh no disparity. Whence it follows, “That Jupiter and Dio, being both Wise, are equals. In Virtue Jupiter doth not transcend Dio. In Felicity God doth not transcend the Wise-Man, although he surmounteth him in Age,” which maketh no disparity. But is not Jupiter the more Powerful and Opulent? “Sextius was wont to equalize Jupiter and the good Man; Jupiter indeed hath more, and can do more for Mankind: But between two that are Good, the Richer is not the Better. Do you inquire of the difference between a Wise-Man and the Gods? The Gods will exist a longer Time. But it is a great Artifice, to inclose the whole in a little Room,”6i.e. for a Wise-Man to have the whole in his Age, which God hath in a long Succession of Ages. In this and some other respects, the Wise-Man transcendeth Jupiter, and he admireth himself above him. “There is something whereinthe Wise-Man may have the Precedence of God: He is one of the Wise, by the Benefit of Nature, not by his own Efficiency, as the Wise-Man is. The Wise-Man seeeth and contemneth all Things which others possess, with as equal a Mind as Jupiter: And upon this Account more admireth himself; Jupiter cannot make use of them, the Wise-Man will not.”7 Very modest and pious Doctrines! If this be not rampant Luciferian Pride, I know not what is.

  “The Wise-Man” (say they) “is always alike, and of the same Countenance, as Socrates was, in all Circumstances. He doth not assent to any Opinion, is ignorant of nothing, never deceiv’d, never unsuccessful, never repenteth of any Undertaking, wondereth at nothing, nothing befalleth him contrary to Opinion. The good Man is perfect, sinneth in nothing, is impeccable, suffereth no Injury, is not mad, altho’ maniacal, is inebriated, yet not drunk. All Things are the Stoical Wise-Man’s, he is the only King and Freeman; he alone is rich, beauteous, noble, the only Citizen, Magistrate, Judge, Orator, Poet, Priest, Prophet.” Fine Prerogatives! The Popular Pagans fell so far short of Stoical Wisdom, as to acknowledge their good Endowments the Gift of God: But the Stoicks say of their Wisdom, “Every one that hath it, oweth it to himself.” Sometimes they huff at praying for the divine Aid. “What need is there of Prayers? make thy-self Happy.”8 In a better Humour they assert the Concurrence of divine Assistance with human Endeavours; they exhort us to pray for Virtue, a good Mind, and the divine Aid. “But so, that the Effect is properly to be ascrib’d to our own Power, because it is a Thing which properly belongeth to our own Power.” For this Philosophy distinguishes Things that properly belong to our own Power, from the Things that do not properly belong to our own Power: The Works of Providence are not the Things that properly belong to our own Power; they are properly to be ascrib’d to the Gods: But the Stoicks Virtue, and its consequent Felicity, are Things that properly belong to our own Power; according to that of Cotta in Cicero, “All Mankind ascribe the Commodity and Prosperityof Life to the Gods, but none ever ascrib’d his Virtue to the Diety.”9 So the Poet, speaking the Sense of the Stoical Philosopher, ascribeth Life and Riches to Jove, but not a virtuous Mind; for that is an Effect, which properly belongeth to his own Power. “Let him give Life and Riches, I will get to my-self a good Mind.”10 But as Riches are the Gift of Providence, yet not exclusively to human Endeavours, so the Virtue of our Mind belongeth to our own Power, yet not exclusively to divine Assistance; “for who hath told thee” (saith M. Antoninus,) “that the Gods do not help us even to those Things, that they have put in our own Power?” Whence an appearing inconsistency in another Poet, who also speaketh the Sense of the Stoical Philosopher, is easily reconcileable.

  • Orandum est, ut sit Mens sana in corpore sano,
  • Monstro quod tibi ipsi possis dare.

  • Juvenal.11

  Because the Gods help us in those Things that properly belong to our own Power, therefore the Poet saith, “Pray for a virtuous Mind”: Yet, because the Virtues of the Mind are Things that properly belong to our own Power, and must be ascrib’d thereto, therefore the Poet saith, “I tell thee of that which thou mayst bestow upon thy-self.” For the help of the Gods is not requisite in any great Degree, nor otherwise than as a less Principal, and adjuvant Cause: Nor is Man suppos’d to be impotent for Virtue and Happiness in any great Degree. Thus the Spirit of Stoicism is that of a criminal Self-sufficiency, Self-confidence, Self-dependence, and Boasting. “He thanketh the Gods, but with audacious Gloriation.”12 His Joy is an elation of Mind, “trusting to his own Possessions and Abilities.” “He knoweth his own Strength, and that no Burden is too much for him.” “The Agency of his Free-will, Jupiter cannot vanquish.”

  Their haughty Temper appears, not only in their Demeanour towards Jupiter, but in their carriage to their Civil Governors. For they suppos’d, That no Man had Dominion over them, being Jupiter’s Sons and Subjects, set at liberty by him from all Servitude and Constraint. And having discarded all regard to Rewards and Punishments, whereby Societies are govern’d, they discarded therewith their due Subjection and Reverence to the Civil Power, which was very unbecoming the Citizens of the Universe, as they call’d themselves. “How do I (saith the Cynick) treat those as Slaves, whom you fear and admire? Who is there, that when he seeth me, doth not suppose, that he seeth his Lord and King? What is Caesar to a Cynick, or the Proconsul, or any other, save only Jupiter, that sent him down, and whom he serveth?”

  Of their Transcendentals and passive Obedience to the divine Will.§IX. Instead of sober Morality, they deal much in superlative Extravagancies; for such is their superlative Strictness, “not to move a Finger, unless Reason dictateth,”

  • (Ni tibi concessit Ratio, digitum exere, peccas.)

  Their Severity of Temper, “never speaking any thing for pleasure, nor admitting any thing of that kind spoken by others,” which is Sowrness and supercilious Gravity. Their enjoyning “silence for the most part, and speaking seldom,” is an Excess; also their conformity to the Pharisees in a supercilious Contempt of the Vulgar. The Patience, which they prescribe, is nothing better than a haughty sullen Insensibility, for he “must seem to the Vulgar, devoid of Sense and a Stone.” Their invariable Constancy of Temper was no Virtue, but an inconsistency with true Virtue, which exerciseth various Affections and Passions upon various Occasions, Anger, Mildness, Boldness, Fearfulness, Joy, Sorrow. But the Stoical Wise-Man is criminally uniform of Countenance; none ever saw Socrates more joyous, or more sad; agreeably to the Conceit of Aristo Chius, That the final Good is, “To live in an absolute indifferency of Mind, without any Variation, or Motion either way, carrying ones self with the same equal Tenour always.”13“The Wise-Man” (saith Epictetus) “must be always alike, in acute Pains, in the loss of Children, in Chronical Diseases.” Their Passive Obedience also, and Conformity of Will to the divine Will, is a superlative Extravagance. “How” (saith Epictetus) “shall I become of free-Estate? For he is a Free-Man, to whom all Things happen according to his Mind, and none can be his hindrance; naturally I would have all Things to happen, as I please; but to be learned, is to learn to will all Things to be as they are. Will nothing but what God willeth, and none can hinder thee; none can force thee, no more than Jupiter. I was never hindred in my Desires, nor necessitated in my Aversions, because I have render’d my Appetite accommodate to God. Is it his Will, that I should be in a Fever? It is my Will. Is it his Will, that I should obtain any Thing? It is my Will. Is it not his Will? It is not mine. Who can now hinder me, or force me against mine own Mind? Seek not, that Events should be as thou willest; but will them to be as they are, and thou canst not fail to be prosperous.”14

  How Specious soever such a conformity of Will to the Divine may seem, it will be found, if examin’d, far from Pious. For it is not pious to pray with the dying Stoick, “Place me in what Region thou pleasest. Take me and throw me where thou wilt, I am indifferent.” It is not pious, to entertain all afflictive Providences with a Stoical Indifference. It is not pious in him, notwithstanding all his own Sins and Sufferings, the Sins and Miseries of Mankind, “to be devoid of Sorrow, Fear, Passion, Perturbation, nor to Grieve upon any one’s Account.” It cannot be thought a due Conformity to the divine Will, to discard the humbling Methods of Piety, for the Cure, or Removal, of the disastrous Events of Providence, such as afflicting the Soul, Deprecation, Intercession, and to substitute in their stead that magnanimous Voice, “With God I affect and pursue, with him I desire, my Volitions are simply and absolutely coincident with the supreme Volitions.” For these settled Maxims of the Stoick are irreligious Errors, “That the divine Nature cannot be angry, and that the Events of Providence are Fatalities.” Beside; they that will all Things to be as they are, must necessarily will the State of Things in the World to as bad as it is, which is repugnant to all true Virtue, to the use of Prayer, and to the Stoicks Desires and Endeavours for the amendment of Mankind. Their Passive Obedience teaches them, indeed, to suffer Afflictions, but not to act in a becoming Manner in such a State, in which the grand Duties of Piety are, the humbling our-selves under the divine Hand, searching and trying our Ways, practice of Repentance, and improving in Devotion. Their Passive Obedience is of a spurious Kind, the insolent Boldness of an affected Liberty, (which rivals Jove,) and the Stoutness of a Bravo. “Look” (saith Epictetus) “at the Powers which thou art furnish’d with, and, having view’d them, say, Bring upon me, O Jupiter, what Hardship thou wilt, I am sufficiently furnish’d by what thou hast given me, to make whatever happeneth Ornamental to me. At length erect thy Neck, as one out of Servitude, fearing nothing that can happen: Dare to lift up thine Eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest, I am of the same Mind with thee, I am equal to any Thing.” Their running the Pit and slinking out of harm’s Way, by taking away their Lives in bad Circumstances, is Heroism and Passive Valour of the illegitimate Kind. Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates himself, should have consider’d, that there may be such a Conformity to the divine Will of Events, as may clash with the divine Will of Duty and Precept. Their Passive Obedience is founded upon bad Principles. “Dost thou call that a Mischance to a Man, which is no Mischance to the proper Nature of Men? Let that part which judgeth of Things be at rest, altho’ the Body, which is next the Thing, be cut, or burn’d, suffer Corruption, or Putrefaction. That which maketh not the Man worse, which doth not involve him in any Crime, doth not make his Life the worse, nor can it hurt him. All Things that befall Men, are allotted them by that Whole, or Universe, whereof they are a part; and that is good for every one, which the Nature of the whole bringeth upon every one. Whatever shall come to pass, the World loveth to have it so: I say therefore to the World, I concur with thee in Affection, and love to have it so.” Which cannot be thought a very virtuous Saying; for what Virtue is there in deifying this Region of Sin and Mortality, and Misery, the Laws of whose Administration are manifestly Penal and Calamitous?

  Altho’ the Stoicks pretended to follow Nature, and altho’ they call their Philosophy Moral, yet their Morality is extremely different from the institution of Nature, being that of unpopular Humorists, of abstract Mentalists, and Enthusiasts. “Shew me a Man” (saith the Stoick) “that desireth to be made a God of a Man, and in this mortal Body to have consortship with Jove?” The Religion, therefore, and Piety of Stoicism, is not Natural Religion, but a jumble of Self-sufficiency, Independency, Liberty, Apathy, Prosperity, and undisturb’d Tranquillity. It is not hard to determine, which were the better sort of Religionists; whither the Popular Pagans, who complain’d, when they were hurt, (provided they abstain’d from cursing their Deities,) were touch’d with their Afflictions, and looked upon mournful Spectacles with the Eyes of Mourners: Or the strutting Philosophers, who took a Pride in trusting to their own Strength and invincible Maxims, deriding all Events; that were to live at the rate of Pagan Deities, who are above Passion, in Human Flesh. Agreeably to their Hypothesis, “That the Perfection of Felicity is attainable in this Life,” they contriv’d a method of arriving at so transcendent a condition; which was by placing all their good in their own things only, that are in the disposal of their own Wills, contemning all that belong not to their own Free-agent Nature. Being thus instituted to live in Safety, Liberty, Independence upon Others, not liable to be constrain’d, hurt, or hindred by any, never failing of prosperous Success, never being unfortunate, nor conflicting with any Adversity; they could bear whatever happen’d without Humiliation, or brokenness of Mind. They assumed to themselves a greatness of Mind, (as supposing that nothing could hurt them, and that they were beyond the power of Evil,) and were able to make this resignation to Providence from their whole Soul, “Carry me, O Jupiter! and thou, O Fate! whithersoever I am destin’d by you.”

  Such is the Stoicks Passive Obedience, neither Natural, nor Christian. And, if we agree not with the Stoicks touching Passive Obedience, (which is the top flower of their Philosophy,) nor think it safe to rely upon the Maxims of the Heathen Philosophers, (both because they are Heathens and Philosophers, i.e. Teachers of unpopular Doctrines,) we are not likely to entertain a late Conceit, That all the Agenda in Christianity, the two Sacraments excepted, are nothing but what was taught before by the Moral Philosophers. For, altho’ of all things in our Religion, there are Affinities and Resemblances in their Religion and Institutions of Learning and Virtue; yet the best of them must be thought bad Teachers of Duty and Virtue, all of them being Aliens from true Piety, and some of them extremely deficient in Philosophizing.

  Their monstrously absurd Conceits.§X. For, as to their Natural Philosophy, the Sun, Moon and Stars are nourish’d by Vapours; and when these fail, there will be a Conflagration of the Universe, a resolution of the Gods (Jupiter only excepted) and of Men into their first Elements, God and Matter; after which there will be a Restauration of the same World, and the same Men, and so in endless Rounds. The Night, Day, Evening, Morning, our Arts, Memories, Fancies, Assents, Passions, Virtues, Vices, Wisdom also and Good, are all Bodies; nay, and Animals too. An Imagination so wild could never have enter’d into the Head of any Man, but a Philosopher, or a Rabbi. “Virtue is nothing else but the Mind modified, therefore it is an Animal,” saith Seneca.15 Agreeably to their Notion of the Soul of the World, who, in this Philosophy, is a subtle fiery Body, the Mind of Man is a Body, “a part of God, and a God too.” And this deified Mind of Man is that, which they mean by their Holy or Divine Spirit in Man. “Reason in Men” (saith Seneca) “is nothing else but a part of the Divine Spirit immers’d in a Human Body.” At the same rate the Pythagoreans and Platonists deify the Human Nature, forbidding Man to pollute, by corporeal Passions, their Domestick God.16 The Platonists suppos’d the Souls of all Animals to be parts of the Divine Substance; the Stoicks, the Minds of Men only; the more tolerable Hypothesis of the two; yet, because it supposes a Separation of the parts of the Deity, and that the parts of God may be miserable, it is to be rejected with Indignation.

  A like intermixture of absurd Fancies has overspread their Moral Philosophy; “That all Sins are equal; That all, who are not of the Wise of the first Form, are equally foolish, bad, vicious, morbid, miserable, mad.” This earthly Region is visibly a Region of Sin and Suffering; But in Stoicism, which is a sullen and surly contempt of Human Calamities, the State of the World is a Festival Solemnity. Death is the Nature of Man, not Punishment; and the serious Calamities of Mankind, “Deaths, Rapines, the slaughtering Men and sacking Cities, are to be contemplated as the scenical Shiftings on the Theatres; the Tears of Mourners as shews of Lamentations, and (the affairs of Life being a Play) as Childrens crying.” They are not troubled for their own Vices, “for who hindreth them from rectifying their own Principles?” Nor are they troubled at the Impieties of others, or angry and offended at their Sins and Injuries. “If any one hath sinn’d” (saith the Stoick) “the hurt is only his own. Wickedness doth not at all hurt the World. Jupiter hath so dispos’d things, that there should be Summer and Winter, Fruitfulness and Barrenness, Virtue and Wickedness, and all such contrarieties, for the good and symphony of the Universe. The worst of Men do but act according to their own Opinion, and are to be rectify’d, not destroy’d. All that offend, it is against their Will. All Men miss of the Truth against their Will. Nothing is hurtful to a part, which is for the good of the whole. What is not hurtful to the City, hurteth not a Citizen. Bad Men are neither affected with Benefits, nor have they any Benefactors, nor are they guilty of neglecting their Benefactors.”

  Their gross Immoralities.§XI. The great Imperfection of the Stoical Institution (applicable also to the other Pagan Institutions) appears from the gross Immoralities wherein they liv’d; for they were not well disciplin’d against the foul Vices of Drunkenness, Uncleanness, and irreligious Swearing. Seneca pleadeth for Drunkenness, Zeno liv’d in it, and Chrysippus died by it.17 The great Hercules, celebrated for a great Drinker, (his Cup also is celebrated,) is a Divine Man in the Style of Epictetus’s Dissertations; and Cato, a Stoical Wise-Man of the first Form, is of the same Character: But No-Body must call his Drunkenness a Crime; “for it is easier” (saith Seneca) “to make it no Crime, than Cato a Criminal.” But, as a Stoick is extravagant in his Supposition, “That he remaineth safe and unhurt in Drink and in Melancholy; that his Body may be in Drink as to all its Senses and Powers, yet his Mind remain unprejudic’d,” (which is the meaning of that Maxim, The Wise-Man is liable to be inebriated, but not drunk;) so it is a wild kind of Virtue, that is consistent with so great a Vice, which is indeed all Vices in one, and the Mother of all Wickedness. But these impure Heathens suppos’d, “That there is a right and prudent use of Drunkenness, which contributeth to Virtue, and that it ought not to be extirpated from a well-govern’d City.” “Plato forbiddeth Children to drink any Wine, before they be 18, and to be drunk before they come to 40. But such he is content to pardon, if they chance to delight themselves with it, and alloweth them somewhat largely, to blend the influence ofBacchusin their Banquets, that good God who bestoweth cheerfulness upon Men, and Youth unto aged Men, who allayeth and asswageth the Passions of the Mind, (even as Iron is made flexible by the Fire;) and, in his profitable Laws, drinking-Meetings are look’d upon as necessary and commendable, (always provided there be a chief Leader among them, to contain and order them;) Drunkenness being a good and certain Tryal of every Man’s Nature, and therewithal proper to give aged Men the courage to make merry in Dancing and in Musick, things allowable and profitable, and such as they dare not undertake being sober and settled.”18Anacharsis was addicted to Drunkenness, as Plutarch informs us; and the Prince of Philosophical Heathen Saints, even Socrates himself, “tho’ he was not forward to drink at Banquets” (as we are inform’d by one of his Scholars,) “when he was compell’d, master’d all; and, which is most to be wondred at, no Man ever saw Socrates drunk.” We are told, that he spent whole Nights in drinking, and that the Greeks praise him exceedingly, that having spent a whole long Night, drinking for Victory with Aristophanes, he was able at Day-break, to delineate and demonstrate a subtil geometrical Problem, thereby shewing, that the Wine had no noxious Effect upon him.19

  Socrates was a great Lover; and it was in his Time so genteel for Men to be Lovers of Boys, that it was forbidden to Slaves; tho’ at Athens the Laws prohibited the Practice universally, but ineffectually. Socratici Cinaedi were proverbial. Both the Popular and Philosophical Pagans were addicted to this Vice. Such Love of Boys as was at Thebes, Elis, and in Crete, is condemn’d by Plutarch in his Treatise of Education, who alloweth that which was at Lacedaemon and Athens; yet we are assured, that it prevail’d criminally in all parts of Greece, but at Athens most. Euripides, being invited to a Banquet by King Archelaus, became Drunk, and in that Mood kiss’d the Poet Agatho (who sat next him) being then 40 Years old. Whereupon the King ask’d him, if his Paramour were yet delectable? To which Euripides answer’d, That not only the Spring, but the Autumn of the Fair, is delectable. It is certain, That Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Cebes, Cicero, approv’d the Masculine Amours, which among the Philosophers was without Disgrace, or Reprehension.20 It was they which wrote Love-Dialogues and Discourses, which the Coelestial Venus never inspired. Socrates and Cato communicated their Wives to their Friends. “All manner of Incest, Adultery, and Masculine Mixtures, some of the famous antient Philosophers accounted Things indifferent.”21 Some of the Stoicks befriended Chastity at an extraordinary Rate, commending chast Eyes, forbidding obscene Speech, advising Men to be Pure, as much as may be, from Things Venereal before Marriage;22 yet most of them agreeing with the Popular Pagans, amongst whom the Harlotry of simple Fornication was accounted no Crime, and which almost all the great Philosophers are known to have liv’d in.23 But the generality of that Sect are prodigiously Paradoxical in their Unchastities; Teaching the Father to commit Incest with the Daughter, the Son with the Mother, and the Brother with the Sister; Men and Women to wear the same Garments; that no Speeches are obscene, and that every Thing should be call’d by its own Name, themselves not scrupling the most immodest Actions.24Zeno (as Laertius informs us) was a lover of Boys, made use of both Sexes, and sware by a He-Goat, a lascivious Animal. As for Socrates, he has had the Happiness of eloquent Apologists. As for Plato, he is charg’d with Unchastity by some of his greatest Admirers, who own’d, that the subject Matter of his Convivium is not the Love of Men and Women, but the Love of Men towards Boys, and that not merely as a Platonick Lover. When it was objected to Apuleius, that his Love-Verses were not suitable to a Platonick Philosopher, he justifies himself by Plato’s Practice, who had no Verses extant, but Love-Verses upon the Boys After, Alexis, Phadrus, and Dion: And Ficinus (in Argum. in Charmid.) changeth and omitteth part of the amatorious Things in Plato’s Charmides, as offensive to chast Ears.25Plato will have young Soldiers that behave themselves Valiantly, gratify’d in their Amours, whether Masculine, or Feminine. Following Lycurgus’s Institution, he will have Women expos’d Naked to the Eyes of Men. Transcending Lycurgus’s Institution, and the Impieties of the Popular Pagans, he abolisheth Marriage, and instituteth the Community of Women; which was likewise the Doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus, the Founders of Stoicism. Such are the unpopular and irreligious Institutions of the Heathen Philosophers; which are partly to be attributed to the Spirit of Uncleanness, predominant in the Philosophick Pagans, (insomuch that Lais once laughed, to see more of the Philosophers with her, than of any other sort of Men;) and partly to their cross-grain’d unpopular Humour, express’d by Diogenes, who entering into the Theater opposite to the People that were coming out, was ask’d, why he did so. “This,” said he, “I study to do thro’ my whole Life”; as Laertius relates in his Life.26 But, altho’ the Philosophers had a great Affectation, to distinguish themselves from the Popular Pagans, yet they transcend them in the absurdity of their Institutes; and the Popular Pagan Doctors may at least vie with them for sound Morality, whence Horace prefers Homer before them.

  • Qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
  • Plenius & Melius Chrysippo & Crantore dicit.27

  Christianity forbiddeth common and customary Swearing, whether by Creatures, or by the Deity; and all irreligious Swearing. But no Moral Philosophers ever prohibited Swearing by the Creatures. Socrates ordinarily practis’d it, (doubtless out of Reverence to the Gods,) sometimes Swearing by Animals, a Dog, a Goose, a Goat, and sometimes by Plants, an Oak, or a Plane-Tree. Nor is this the only Defect in their Discipline touching Oaths; for being Separatists from the Popular Pagans, whom they contemn’d at a great Rate, and no great Friends to their Civil Government, they were shy of solemn judicial Oaths, which are of all other the most allowable and needful, but made no scruple of idle criminal Swearing. Clinias the Pythagorean, in a Suit depending before the Judge, might have freed himself from a Fine of three Talents, by taking a true and just Oath: But he chose rather to pay the Mulct, than to take the Oath; so great a respect had these Pythagoreans for their own Philosophical Institution, and so little for Civil Government. For it is well known, that they were not so shy of Swearing by the Master of their Institution, as Religionists Swear by their God: And Hierocles, who hath given many wise Cautions touching the Use of Oaths, with respect to the Honour of the Gods, justifieth their Practice. Touching a solemn judicial Oath Epictetus saith, Refuse it altogether, if it be possible: If not, “as much as may be”; yet himself ordinarily swears in his Dissertations, “I swear to you” (saith he) “by all the Gods.”

  The Epicurean Tenets of Morality.§XII. So much for the Stoicks, who “plac’d Happiness in Virtue only.” The Epicurean Scheme, which makes the whole Man to be only a corporeal Engine, may be dispatch’d (from Bp. Parker) in a few Words.28 For Epicurus, consistently with that Principle, “plac’d all Happiness in the Pleasure of the Body alone,” which Doctrine at once destroys all Obligations to Virtue and Honesty, and to Religion, which he trampled under Foot. Epicurus himself plac’d all Happiness in the Enjoyments of the Palate, and such like. Metrodorus, his favourite Disciple, made the Belly, the only Seat of Happiness. In freedom from Pain, in sensual Enjoyments, and in Reflexions upon them, he plac’d the whole of Happiness. Indolence is the Happiness of Stones, and Sensual Pleasures, of Swine, in as great perfection as Epicurus himself enjoy’d them, forought we know. So that all the boasted Happiness of the Epicureans, without a future State, was equally vain and insecure, which at once effectually overthrows it; shocking us, even in the Enjoyment of what is mean and low, with the Fears of losing even that. And then, to comfort us under all the Miseries of Life, they throw out a parcel of Falshoods and Subtleties. As that Length of Time doth not increase Happiness; as if either Happiness, or Misery, for 2 Hours were not twice as great as Happiness, or Misery, for one Hour. That Pain is short, if great; light, if long, which will afford but very little Relief to a Man under those Chronical Diseases of great Torture, Gout and Stone. That we must lop off the Fear of future Evils, and the Remembrance of those which are past. Easily said! The Difficulty lies in the Application. That we are to resist Pain with all our Power; for, if we fly, we shall be conquer’d, if we stand our Ground, we shall gain the Victory. As if we could either fly from, or resist, Pain, as a Man does his Enemy.

  Of a piece with these, are their Consolations against the Fear of Death; against which nothing is a solid Comfort, in the midst of our present Enjoyments, but the well-grounded Hopes of a happy Immortality. How ridiculous an Antidote is it against that which takes away all our Enjoyments, to tell us, That, when that comes, it cannot hurt us, because when that is, we are not? Self-Love and the Fear of Annihilation are Instincts too powerful to be baffled by such a subtlety. Just (as Plutarch well observes) as if you should tell a Man in a Storm at Sea, that your Ship has no Pilot, and that there is no hope of allaying the Tempest; but yet, however, be not afraid, for in a little Time the Ship shall split and sink, and, when you are drown’d, the Storm will trouble you no longer. According to this Scheme, if we have all the Enjoyment in Life we can expect, we lose Happiness in a little Time after we come to know what it is, of which too we are in continual Apprehensions; but the Wretched come into the World, only to lament and leave it; than which how much better would it be, not to have been born. But, say they, we ought to bear with Patience what we cannot avoid. But the Fear of it, upon their Scheme of Annihilation, is as Death it-self is, tho’ the Philosopher should take ever so much Pains to expose it as foolish; whose Rules cannot take away what is Natural, and, consequently, not in our Power. “In the next Place,” say they, “we are already Dead to so much of our Life as is past and gone; so that so much as we live, we die, and that which we call Death, is but our last Death; and, therefore, as we fear not our Death that is past, why should we that which is to come?” But, if we have been dying ever since we were born, that is it which grieves us, that we cannot be doing so for ever. Such was the Reasoning of the Epicurean Old Man, who reconcil’d himself to his approaching Death, because “it is as absurd to fear Death as old Age, which yet all desire, in that as old Age follows Youth, so Death follows old Age.” For old Age is desirable, not because it follows Youth, but because it defers Death. “Such is that other Reasoning, that, whereas we now count our-selves Happy, if we live to an hundred Years, yet, if the natural Course of our Lives were as much shorter, we should be as much satisfy’d with twenty; and, if our natural Course reach’d to a thousand Years, we should then be as much troubled to die at 600, as now at 60, and so forward.” Which proves nothing, but that there is no Time, in which an Epicurean can be content to die. No better is that Device of Gassendus, “though a Man’s Life may be short in it-self, yet may he make it equal with the Duration of the whole World, because he may converse with the Transactions of all former Times, and be as well acquainted with them, as if himself had then actually liv’d. And, as for the Time to come, he, knowing that nothing shall be but what has been, understands all future Events as if present; so that a wise Man, partly by Memory, partly by Foresight, may extend his short Life to all Ages of the World.”29 But, if he could, unless he could make himself Immortal too, the Objection would still be as strong as ever. His other Arguments, to persuade us to be content with our Condition, are as ineffectual. As first, that “otherwise we forget our mortal Nature expos’d to Misery,” that is, that a Man must be content with his Condition, because he knows his Condition to be miserable. And, secondly, that “it is some Comfort, that, when all Men are expos’d to Misery, you are less miserable than others,” that is, that, tho’ I endure most of the Calamities of human Life, yet I am happy, if I think one more miserable; according to which there can be no Misery, but the greatest.

  Secondly, The Epicureans destroy all Virtue, by making it wholly subservient to sensual Pleasure, making Virtue the Means, and Sensuality the End; so that what we now call Vice would be Virtue, if it promoted the Delights of the Body the more effectually of the two. A hopeful Foundation of Morality!

  If Epicurus liv’d soberly and abstemiously, on coarse Bread and Water, and sometimes Sallet, it was more owing to the Weakness of his Stomach and Constitution, than to the Strength of his Principles, which were as much in contradiction to that method of living, as his denying Providence, with his pretending, that he had left Devotion; his teaching, that all Friendship is for Self-interest, and yet that Men are bound to undergo even Death for the sake of Friends. If sensual Pleasures be the chief Good, he must be happiest, that enjoys them most, and wisest, that procures them most; and then Apicius will be a happier and wiser Man than Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato.

  As for Justice, it is no farther a Virtue, upon the Epicurean Scheme, which turns to ridicule the Ties and Checks of Conscience, than as it promotes bodily Pleasures; that is, we are not oblig’d to act according to Justice, when we can promote them by any Action, which we are cunning enough to conceal, or powerful enough to support. All Virtue, according to them, any farther than it promotes their own sensual Pleasure, is owing only to Custom, popular Opinion, and the Prejudices of Education, which a wise Man, say they, must comply with, in order to promote his own Ends. If this were the Case, the Encouragement to Virtue, and Restraints upon Vice, are not sufficient.

  And, if there be no obligation to Justice, there can be no place for Fortitude, which is only in defence of an honest and a just Cause, separated from which it is Folly, and in opposition to it, Oppression. But, upon the Epicurean Scheme, every thing ought to be sacrific’d to the preservation of Life, and the enjoyment of sensual Pleasure, which it would, therefore, be folly to hazard, and madness to sacrifice, in defence of either Friends, or Country; for Religion is with them out of the Question.

  It may justly be question’d, Whether the Heathen Philosophers, in the whole, were of Service to the Cause of Virtue.§XIII. The Philosophers, amongst the Greeks, succeeded the Poets in the profession of teaching Virtue; and they certainly made improvements in moral Discipline, they reduc’d it into the form of an Art, enrich’d it with variety of Arguments, fortified its Precepts with great Reasons, propos’d many wise Considerations for subduing exorbitant Affections and Passions; they set forth the praises of Virtue, its excellency and importance, with great Vigour and Eloquence; and, in several instances, excellently declaim’d against Vice with great Wit and Judgment; they disparag’d the Vanities of the World, and the Follies of human Life. There is amongst them an unpopular kind of Virtue, which, altho’ greatly distant from the holy Life, yet, in several respects, does resemble it. Their Discipline and Institution had a considerable effect upon some of themselves; some of the Philosophers were great Examples of the Virtue which they taught, and they made some few Converts from Debauchery to Philosophy; and some few Commonwealths have had their Laws from Philosophers. The Philosophers, therefore, may seem to have done a great deal of Service to the Interest of Virtue; but, if their Disservices be set against their Services; if their Ignorance, Vice, and Extravagance, be compar’d with their Virtue; it may justly be doubted, upon a full Comparison, whether they have done any real Service at all to the Cause of Virtue and Goodness. The mighty Prejudices, which they have done to the Interests of it, clearly enough appear in the accounts already given; for the further setting of which in a clear Light, we will here take a brief Survey, both of their moral Learning and of their Life.

  As appears, from a Consideration of the Divine Virtue of the Philosophick Pagans;1. The sublimer sort of them distributed the Virtues into three Kinds, the Ethical, Political, and Divine. The Ethical and Political Virtue may be called the common Morality, which constitutes a good Man; but the Divine Virtue is suppos’d to be his Assimilation to God, and his Deification. This Divine Virtueis Philosophic-Pagan, the Popular-Pagans having no concern in it, and was the invention of Philosophy, but was not for the Interest of Virtue, but was rather to its Prejudice and Disservice; for it is not truly Divine Moral Virtue, constituting a divinely-good Man, but an Imposture, unpopular Humour, Fancy; and a wicked sort of Bravery is made the End, the Chief Good, the Divine Virtue, and the Happiness, of Man, his Assimilation to God, and his Deification. Apollonius ask’d the Brachmans, “What they were”? Jarchas, the Prince of them, answer’d, “They thought themselves Gods.” Apathy they thought a great and a Divine Thing, “To live in the Body, as the Soul of the World in the World, which cannot be struck, or impress’d upon, from without. Heis devoid of Grief; is not a compound of Soul and Body; accounteth not the Death of Mortals, or the Ruin of his Country, any great Matter; he is above the Fear of any thing; trusteth to himself, that he shall have nothing of Evil, so he shall be fearless of any thing,” saith Plotinus.30 Thus they oppose the sufficiency of Virtue against all Externals. But to be thus unapprehensive of Danger, is Folly and Fool-hardiness; it is as unnatural, as it is irreligious, and ruinous to all true Virtue and Goodness. They thus impiously deified themselves, and their Virtue, by their self-Sufficiency, self-Security, and Confidence. “They that are furnish’d with the Virtues, living in greatness and celsitude of Mind, are always in Happiness. Philosophy setteth them intirely in the Fortress of Virtue, above Grief and Fear.”31

  And from the excessive Pride of the Stoicks.2. There is much of Pride and Arrogance, complicated with other Vices, in the Philosophick Pagans rampant Affectation of Divinity. They were as highly conceited of their own Merits, as Diogenes was, who fancied, that he merited his Alms. In Aristotle’s Composition of Magnanimity32 there is a large Dose of Pride, and Celsus’s Generosity33 is of the same Character. Much of the Stoical Philosophy is a rant and huff of Pride; the greatness and height of Mind, to which they pretend, is bloated and unsound; and the Constancy of their Wise-Man is a System of such Maxims, as are the very Quintessence of Pride. “The Wise-Man is not obnoxious to any Injury. The Wise-Man can suffer no Evil. An Injury detracteth and diminisheth, whereas nothing can be taken from the Wise-Man,” who hath all in himself. “Wickedness is not so strong as Virtue, therefore the Wise-Man is not hurt by Malice. None can benefit the Wise-Man,” who wanteth nothing, “therefore none can hurt him. An Injury is from Hope, or Fear; the Wise-Man is touch’d with neither. None receiveth an Injury unmov’d, the Wise-Man is not mov’d. A Contumely is a Contempt, and thence hath its Name; which the Wise-Man doth not look upon as belonging to him, who knows his own Greatness. He thinketh also, thatall others are so much inferiour, that they have not boldness to despise Things so high above them. If he once debaseth himself, so as to be mov’d with Injury, or Contumely, he can never be secure; whereas Security is the proper Good of the Wise-Man.”34 If Pride and Stomachfulness had not been one of the Stoicks Cardinal Virtues, they could not have applauded Cato’s barbarous Self-Murder, “who scorn’d to be a Petitioner to any, either for his Death, or his Life, and was a contemner of all Powers.”35 They call themselves great Men, and accordingly found their Happiness, not upon the Favours of God and true Piety, but upon their Greatness of Spirit, the Greatness and Stoutness of an high invincible Mind;36 whence their Virtue becomes a sort of Self-magnifying and Self-deifying, which is but an illegitimate kind of Bravery of Spirit, incongruous to their Condition as Creatures, much more incongruous to frail miserable Men, and most of all incongruous to wicked miserable Sinners. Nor is there any Thing more distastful to a truly pious Mind, than the haughty Pharisaical Humour of these Philosophick-Pagan Magnificoes swaggering with their Virtue, their Magnitude, their Celsitude, their Altitude, their Fortitude, their Beatitude. Pride suggested that Stoical Maxim of Heraclitus. “The Wise need not any Friends.” Whence all the wonderful Provision, which Divine Grace has made for a World of wicked Sinners, was lost upon these Philosophers; for they that need no Friend, need no Saviour, or Salvation. They were able to live of themselves, and had an imaginary Happiness of their own making, wherein they took Satisfaction and Content; they look’d upon their Philosophy as the Perfection of Wisdom and Virtue, in it-self and to them; and thought, both themselves and their Institution, far Superiour to Popular Mankind; and, therefore, it was but agreeable to their Philosophick Grandeur and Magnificence, to contemn Christianity, which is a popular Institution, design’d for, and adapted to, the Salvation of miserable Sinners; whereas they were rais’d to a Superiority above Sin and Misery, and suppos’d themselves nothing less than Divine Men, and Kings, Jupiter’s Sons and Peers, and petty Deities. “It must be something Super-Human, Celestial, and Magnificent, that constituteth the Wise-Man. If thou ask, What that is? As God and his Beatitude is Constituted, so is the Wise-Man.”37Chrysippus affirmed, “That the Happiness of Jove is in no respect more Eligible, nor more Fair, nor more Venerable, than that of the Wise-Man.” Virtues are thought to be true and genuine, when they are lov’d and desir’d for their own sake; but it appears, from the Stoicks Elation of Mind, that when Virtues are desir’d for their own sake, in a way of Separation from God, and without any Relation to him, they are proud and tumid, and are rather Vice than Virtue. Plato is much more modest in his Accounts of Virtue, than the strutting Stoicks; yet some of the Stoick’s principal Maxims, which nothing but Pride inspir’d, particularly that eminent One, “The Wise-Man is self-sufficient,” are derived from Socrates and Plato. Pride made Plato an envious Man, Socrates an ireful Man, the Cynick a Boaster in his great Atchievements in the Conquest of Vice. The best of these Masters alloweth us μεγαλοϕρονἕιν, “to be proud of the Conquest of any Vice.”38 And, “We rightly glory in our Virtue,” saith Cicero, a great Wit, but a very vain-glorious Man, who also complaineth to his Wife, “Neither the Gods, whom thou hast most chastly serv’d, nor Men, whom I have constantly sav’d, have requited us.”39

  These Philosophers have been justly call’d, what they certainly were to a Crime, Animals of Glory, and Traffickers for Fame; yet so, as to be great Adversaries to the Appetite of Vain-Glory, as appeareth from the Tenor of their Philosophy. They despis’d the Popular Pagans, their Judgment, Fame, Pomp, Acclamations, and Applause, at a great Rate; they expatiate upon the Emptiness of Fame, as also, how narrow, inconstant, and devoid of Judgment it is; and the Folly and Iniquity of those who affect it; that we ought to consider the Quality of Persons that praise, or dispraise; that Fame is one of those Things, which are not in our power, which others give and take away at pleasure; and therefore, say they, they are Fools who affect it, that desire to be esteem’d Beneficent for doing Good; who suppose, that the Applause of such is of great Moment, that know not themselves, and would be had in Admiration by those, who themselves call Mad: That Fame and Honour is not worth the while, being but a mere noise and clattering of Tongues, some Body telling these Things to some Body; they that praise another, soon dispraising him, and both being quickly buried in Oblivion: Good is not the better for being prais’d; we should be indifferent whether we do our Duty, disprais’d, or prais’d: The Lovers of Good practise it, as Lovers enjoy one another, secretly, without desiring any Hearers, or Spectators, to praise them: That we ought not to accept the Praise and Approbation of ill Men, nor guide our Life by the Opinion of the Injudicious, nor place our Happiness in the Minds and Thoughts of others, nor so much as take into our Thoughts what others say, or think, of us. Some that were not Stoicks40 count themselves mean Proficients, except a Reproach be as welcome to them, as a Mark of hearty Approbation. The Stoicks exercise themselves to an indifferency as to Praise and Dispraise; and, notwithstanding their Pharisaical Humour in other respects, in all Things to avoid Ostentation, and to do nothing for Opinion. They are urgent with Men, to chuse that which is Good, because it is Good, and not for popular Opinion; and some of them will not stretch out a Finger for a good Fame.41 They deride the Ambitious and Vain Glorious, ridicule their Folly, who are puffed up with Honour, neither admire, nor desire Greatness, (some thinking Riches and Principalities inconsistent with virtuous Living,42 ) hugely disparage a great Name and Fame after Death; forewarn all that will be Philosophers, to expect Derision and Reproaches at their Entrance upon the Philosophick Life; teach them to bear Reproaches well, with great Equanimity and Benevolence; to do well, tho’ it expose them to Disgrace, and not to desist from good Practice, nor to fear Contempt, but to contemn Infamy. In this their Doctrine they were much more severe, than those who suppose, “Ambition to be of use in correcting the other vicious Affections, but must itself be put off in the last Place, as Plato hath call’d it the last Coat.”43 But their Pride and Arrogance was of an unpopular Kind, mix’d with a vicious Affectation of Vain-Glory; for the Greek Philosophers usually reproach’d one another with their Vain-Glory;44 thus Antisthenes, Crates, Diogenes, Plato, Pyrrho, were reproach’d by their Fellow-Philosophers; Socrates espied it thro’ the Holes of Antisthenes’s Cloak; and of Socrates himself, perhaps, Cardan has made a right Judgment, “That he was extremely desirous of Glory, altho’ he most of all dissembled this.”45 They glory’d in their contempt of Glory, supposing that a contempt of Glory was the best way to obtain it. Therefore, tho’ they may justly be accounted Animals of popular Glory, yet their Philosophy was a great Adversary to the Appetite of it, and they reproach’d one another with it, as a vicious Affection.

  The Stoicks, in consequence of their excessive Pride, were too stout to humble themselves under the afflicting hand of Providence. The Platonists will not always allow this Supposition, “That Calamities are from a divine Hand,” or, “That God is the Dispenser, both of Things Good and Evil to us.”46 But the Popular Pagans were not too high to be humbled; they looked upon their Calamities, as the Effects of the Anger of their Gods, acknowledg’d their Dependence upon them, and, in any great Distress of their Affairs, betook themselves to their most humble Supplications, in order to atone their Displeasure, and gain their Favour.

  One of the bravest Exploits, which the Philosophick Pagans constantly celebrate, is the killing of Tyrants, and delivering Cities and Nations from them. The Practice of this applauded Virtue occasion’d the Torture of Zeno Eleates, who is said, to have kept the Doctrine of Parmeendes inviolate as Gold in the Fire, “And by his Deeds he shew’d, that a great Man feareth nothing but to be base; that it is Children and Women, andMen, who have the Souls of Women, that are afraid of Pain.”47 From which Idea of a great Man it appeareth, that the Fortitude of the Heathen Philosophers is of no better Kind than the common Military Fortitude, or the Fortitude of those celebrated Popular Pagans, Mutius and Regulus, of Cleopatra and Asdrubals Wife, who threw herself and her Children into the Fire; or of that famous Harlot at Athens, who, knowing of a Conspiracy against the Life of the Tyrant there, with great Bravery suffer’d her-self to be tortur’d to Death, rather than she would discover the Conspirators, and, biting off a piece of her Tongue, spit it out into the Tyrant’s Face.

  Philosophy cannot boast of many great Examples of Patience; the Grandees of the Stoical Family, Cato and Brutus, falling into Troubles fell into transports of Rage and Impatience. So Hierocles, according to Saidas, being whipp’d at Byzantium ’till the Blood came, took the Blood in the Hollow of his Hand, and threw it upon the Judge, saying, “Cyclops, there is Wine for you, seeing you have eaten Man’s Flesh.” Some, indeed, of the Philosophick Pagans have express’d an admirable Constancy of Mind in shaking Circumstances. As Cleanthes, who stood unmov’d without changing Countenance, when he was publickly reproach’d in the Theatre by the Poet Sositheus.48 And Polemo did not so much as wax Pale, when his Leg was torn by mad Dogs. Yet, because this Philosophick Firmness was but of the same Kind with Epicurus’s in his Strangury, or the Sceptick Pyrrho’s, who endur’d cuttings and burnings with great constancy of Mind; or that of well disciplin’d Gladiators, and the Spartan Boys, who were whipp’d at the Altar, ’till the Blood gush’d out of their Bowels, without whimpering; therefore some have rightly pronounc’d concerning that Patience which Philosophy professeth, that it is Spurious, only a proud Sullenness; so much the more Spurious, as it is the more Proud. Lipsius therefore, otherwise an extravagant Admirer of Stoicism, lying upon his Sick-Bed, and strugling with grievous Pain, discarded the Stoical Patience, and having our Saviour’s Picture hanging near his Bed, he pointed to it, and gave his Patience its due Character, “That is the true Patience.”49

  Several of the Philosophers have discours’d against Revenge, or retaliating Injuries, for the bearing them with Meekness, and for universal Benevolence;50 and there are several Instances of these Virtues amongst the Greek Philosophers.51 But their Practice of them looks more like unpopular Humour, than serious Goodness; in laying the Foundation of them, they intermix much of Pride, and Paradoxical Stoical Conceit, That the Wise-Man can suffer no Injury: And the most considerable Instances of these mighty Virtues are Aristides and Phocion, who may justly be reckon’d among the Popular Pagans. Aristides, after great Services, being banish’d by his Citizens unjustly, at his Departure pray’d the Gods, that the Athenians might never, by any Trouble, or Distress, be forc’d to recal him. And Phocion, being unjustly condemn’d, charg’d his Son Phocas, that he should never revenge his Death. But these Resemblances of Christian Virtue in Heathen good Men, did not issue from a divine Kind of Charity, but were Branches of their Human-Social Virtue, and issued from a mighty Love to their Country, which is most eminent in Heathens. The Virtue of these Popular Pagans pretendeth not to be Divine, nor do they, therefore, deserve to be celebrated as divine Men upon account of it: But the Philosophick Pagans, by far lesser Matters than these, got the Reputation of divine Men. One of their principal Virtues was their abandoning the Superfluities of Life. Whence Diogenes, seeing one take Water out of a River with his Hand, and drinking it out of his Hand, threw away his Dish, which he us’d to carry about him to drink Water in, resolving thence forth to drink it out of the hollow of his Hand; and for this Freak, with others of like Nature, this unpopular Humourist is celebrated by his Fellow-Philosophers as a “Divine Man.”

  The Philosophick Pagans were like the Popular, in not discerning what is truly Divine and Holy, from what is Atheous and Unholy. Altho’ they liv’d in gross Crimes, beside their Pagan Religion, yet they did not discern between Sin and Holiness. They were Self-justifiers at the Rate of the Pharisees, and, therefore, perfectly indispos’d for such a Religion, that is a Religion for Sinners; and they were too high for Repentance, which the Popular Pagans were not, who had a Sense of Sin, and of their need of Pardon, which they often express’d at Death: But Apuleius52 pretends, “That he always accounted all Sin a Thing detestable”; Xenophon saith, “No one ever saw Socrates do, or heard him speak, any Thing that was Impious and Irreligious”: Socrates himself had no Sense of Sin at his Death, nor express’d any Repentance; nor is there any Appearance of either in Epictetus’s Preparatives for Death.53 Such mistaken Teachers of Virtue were these Sages of this World, that they thought themselves made Gods by such a Virtue, that could not make them the People of God, which was a very gross Mistake, and speaketh their Philosophy to be no better, than a worldly Kind of Wisdom, and their Virtue could be of no better a Character than their Philosophy. By their introducing their Philosophy, true Religion was much more prejudic’d, than it was before by their Pagan Religion, they made an additional Prejudice to it, they rais’d up a new Enemy, they introduc’d a Mountebank, who pretendeth to do all Cures, that a divine Physician might be thought needless.

  3. The Spuriousness of the divine Virtues of the Platonists.3. The Super-Ethical, as they are called, or the Divine Virtues of the Platonists are of the spurious and illegitimate kind, and so blended with what is fanciful, or bad, that, in the whole, they signify little or nothing to the constituting a Divinely-good Man. This is the Character, not only of the Stoicks, but of the Platonists Divine Virtue, in all these Parts of it.

  Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is their intellectual Form of Life, contemplative of the Platonick Intelligibles, and visionary of their T’Agathon,54 which cannot be discern’d but by a boniform Light, which is beyond all that is intellectual.

  Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is Theurgick;55 for they pretend by a converse with the Gods in Theurgy, to be freed from Passion, to partake of Divine Perfections, and to have, what in their Dialect they call, a Deifick Union; which one Party of them pretendeth to in the Mystick-Metaphysical Way. And these say, “The End and Scope is, not to be without Sin, but to be a God.”56

  Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is the Platonick Faith and Love; for this Love is only an Amatorious Madness. “When the Mind becometh Unmental” (or Mad) “being drunk with Nectar, this is the Mind, that is in Love.”57 Much of this sort of Divine Virtue there is in Platonism; an Ignorance, that is better than Knowledge; a Madness, that is better than Sobriety of Mind, a Divine Madness.

  Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is the Virtue of the Mysticks and Quietists, “Who being seated in the Bay of super-essential Goodness, enjoy a super-natural Quietism”;58 to which Isidore the Platonist pretended. He said, “That his Soul itself, in sacred Prayers, became wholly a Divine Sea, having in the first Place collected her-self from the Body into her-self, having in the next place” (extatically) “parted with her own Morals, and be taken herself from rational Notions to those that are Congenial to Intellect; and in the third place being possess’d with Divine Afflation, and chang’d into an extraordinary Serenity, deiform, not human.

  Such is their Divine Virtue, as it is an Aversation from Terrestrial, Material, and Mortal, Nature, and an Affectation of being wholly incorporeal and immaterial; for this Affectation of Immaterial Intellectual Nature, and to be mere intellectual Souls, is an irreligious Philosophick Vanity and Extravagance, not intirely free from Magick. For, in order to the Purity of the Soul, Pythagoras prescrib’d strict Abstinence from several sorts of Meats.

  The Platonists agree, that, according to Plato in his Theaetetus, Virtue is a Similitude to God, or the Gods; “which Assimilation” (saith Plato) “consisteth in becoming Holy and Just with Prudence.” But to what God, or Gods, this divine Similitude relateth, in this they do not agree, nor wherein this Similitude consisteth. For some say, That this divine Similitude relateth to the Pagan Deities in general; others say, That it relateth to the Platonists divine Intellect; and others are of Opinion, That it relateth to their T’Agathon. Some place this divine Similitude in the speculative Virtue, and intellectual Form of Life; others place it in the practick Virtue, (Ethical and Political,) which seemeth to be the Sense of Plato; for Prudence, Holiness, and Justice, are practical Virtues. In his Fourth of Laws, he placeth the divine Similitude in Temperance, and in his Phaedo, he placeth it in Temperance and Justice; thus saying, “Are not they most Happy and Blessed, and such as go to the best Place, that have exercis’d the popular and political Virtues, which we call Temperance and Justice?” Plato, therefore, seemeth to place the divine Similitude in the Popular Pagans Holiness and Justice; which the generality of his Followers will not admit, counting the Civil Virtues only the Way to get the divine Similitude, and that this was the Sense of Plato. But, whatever may be thought of his Sense, his Account of Virtue, and of the divine Similitude, is an Instance, that the Philosophick-Pagans may in Words agree with our Religion, when in Sense there is an extreme Disagreement. For Plato’s divine Similitude, however it may be interpreted by his Followers, is extremely alien from, and opposite to, that truly divine Similitude, which is Wisdom, Righteousness, and true Holiness, wherewith he had no Acquaintance. For, had he been acquainted with that truly divine Kind of Justice, which is Righteousness, he could not have been a Pagan-Religionist; nor could he have instituted a Community of Women and of Goods in his Republick; nor would he have taken care to regulate the Drinking in the Feasts of Bacchus, without endeavouring to abolish them; nor could he so grosly have mistaken himself, as in a Book of Justice (his Fifth de Republicà,) to discourse in this manner touching the Greeks and Barbarians. “All Greeks are near of Kin, but extraneous and different from Barbarians. When the Grecians and Barbarians Fight with one another, this is properly called Fighting, for they are Enemies by Nature, and such a Feud must be called a War: But, if Grecians, that are Friends by Nature, quarrel with Grecians, this is an unnatural Distemper, and Greece must be said to be troubled with Sedition, and such a Feud must not be called a War, but a Sedition.”59 The Greeks had their Philosophy from the Barbarians, as they call’d them, and yet they commonly reproach’d them, and, usually, were so uncivil and unjust towards them, that they look’d upon them as “Enemies by Nature and wild Beasts.”60Plato follow’d the Popular Pagans in their Injustice, as well as in their irreligious Religion. So Plutarch, in the Life of Lycurgus, can find no Injustice in the Lacedamonians Common wealth, which was instituted for War, and fighting, not for Peace, as Aristotle observeth and blameth;61 the Spartan Virtue was the Love of Glory; they were train’d up and exercis’d to be expert Thieves; exposed and murder’d their weak and deform’d Infants, and even this horrible Injustice Plutarch approveth. Aristotle, also, is known to teach, “To expose Children that are maimed, and Women to cause Abortions, that they may not exceed their Number”;62 and he agrees with Plato in supposing, “That War is a natural Thing between the Greeks and Barbarians.”63Plato is justly chargeable with Injustice, in patronizing Lying, where in he follows the general Sense of the Heathens, which was, that a Lye is not bad, if it be expedient, and not pernicious in the Affairs of Men. So, in his Third and Fifth de Republicà, Plato would have Governours, “To make use of frequent Lying and Deceit for the Benefit of the Subjects; this must be granted to publick Governours, but not be touch’d by private Men.” If the Platonists human Justice is so bad, it is reasonable to suppose, that in their Divine, or super-human Virtue, they were not very good.

  Aristotle pretended not to an Institution of Divine Virtue.4. Aristotle pretendeth not to an Institution of Divine Virtue, or to institute a Divine-Good Man. For, altho’ he acknowledges a Divine Virtue, yet it is in so slender a Degree, that he denies, that there can be any Friendship between God and Man; the Happiness that he insisteth on, is but the Civil; as the Virtue that he insisteth on, is but the Civil and Military;64 his Ethicks are but a Branch of worldly Politicks; his active Virtue consisteth in that Mean, which the worldly Man’s Prudence determineth; and what can living well signify, in a Civil Worldly Mans Institution of Virtue, but to live without Vice, or Crime, in the Notion of the Civil World? Therefore it is not to be wonder’d at, that Aristotle, differently from the Sense of other Philosophers, patronizeth Revenge;65 or that Cicero agrees with him in this Point, (for this must be acknowledg’d, notwithstanding what a learned Bishop hath said to the contrary;66 ) for the former of these did not pretend to be a Religionist, and the latter of them, altho’ a Philosopher, yet was not of any Philosophick Institution, and was so uncertain an Admirer of Philosophy, that sometimes he preferreth that one little Book of the XII Tables, before the Libraries of all the Philosophers, both for Utility and weight of Authority. The Lawyers, not without Reason, prefer their Institution to their Civil Virtue, before the Philosopher’s Institutions to their Divine Virtue; which yet must be acknowledg’d, to have a limited agreeableness to the truly Divine moral Virtue; but so that, in the whole, the Disagreement is far greater than the Agreement.

  The Agenda of Christianity not agreeable to the Reason of the Philosophick Pagans.5. Whence we may make a Judgment of this Saying of the same learned Bishop; “All the Agenda of Christianity are so far from being opposite, that they are most agreeable to Human Reason, as ’tis cultivated and heighten’d to its utmost Improvement by Philosophy.”67 If this Saying be converted thus, All the Philosophers improv’d Reason (which is their Divine Virtue) is so far from being opposite, that it is most agreeable to the Agenda of Christianity, it will be a monstrous Proposition. For nothing can be more opposite to the Agenda of Christianity, than a great part of the Philosophers Divine Virtue; therefore the Agenda of Christianity are not so suitable to the Philosophers Reason, as is pretended. That this Saying may have any Appearance of Truth, it must be limited to the particular Agenda of Christianity; for these general Agenda of Christianity (which are also in part the general Agenda of Judaism) are directly and expressly opposite to the Philosophers improv’d Reason. “To have no other Gods but me; to worship the Lord thy God, and to serve him alone; to seek the Kingdom of God and his Righteousness; to take the Kingdom, enter into it, and buy it at any rate; to put off the Heathen Old Man, and to put on the New Man, in the (Christian) New Birth, in the New Covenant; to come out of the mundane Society, and the state of Sin and of Death, to pass into the state of Life, to incorporate with the Divine Family, and become a Citizen of the Holy Empire; not to adhere to, but to abandon the Kingdom of Darkness, and to manage an Holy War against its Powers, Interest, and Adherents; to live to him that died for us and rose again; to live for God and his Service, and to make it our daily Care and Prayer, that his Name may be hallow’d, and his Kingdom come.” All which Fundamental Agenda of the Christian Institution, and such like, are altogether alien from, and opposite to, the Philosophick Pagans Sentiments, as they are Pagans; nor is that plain Principle and summary of Piety, the Fear of God, suitable to their Reason; for they destroy’d it, which the Popular Pagans did not, by their Maxims, “Ira Deorum nulla est,”68The Gods are never angry, yet a learned Man saith, “He knows not any Evangelical Precept or Duty belonging to a Christian’s Practice, which natural Men of best Account” (the Philosophers) “by the mere Strength of Human Reason have not taught and taken upon them to maintain as Just and Reasonable.”69 But it would be far better to say; there are not any of the particular Agenda of Christianity, the Reasonableness where of may not be illustrated, by what they have suppos’d to be Just and Reasonable: So the Christian Martyrs Contempt of Death may be shew’d to be reasonable, which yet was so unsuitable to their improv’d Reason, that it is call’d by one of them70“mere Obstinacy”; and another of them imputeth it to “Madness and Custom.”71 The Agreement, therefore, between Christianity and Philosophy touching this Virtue, the Contempt of Death, is complicated with such Disagreement, that the Christians Virtue, of that Name, Philosophy discardeth as Vice and Folly; and the Philosophers Virtue, of that Name, Christians discard as Self-Murder, or profane Bravery.

  There is, therefore, a want of Judgment and Piety in many of our Modern Elogies of the Christian Religion, and Vindications of its Morality, as in this following. “Christ Jesus taught Morality, viz. the Way of living like Men, and the fifth Chapter of Matthew is an excellent Lecture of this Kind.”72 To live like Men is a general ambiguous Expression, and to make it of a determinate Signification, it must be understood, to signify in a Sense of Disparagement, To live as mere Men; or in a Sense of Excellency, To live as more than mere Men. If in the former Sense our Saviour hath taught us, To live like Men; he was a Teacher of Morality, at the same rate with Homer, of whom Cicero complaineth, “He maketh the Gods to live like Men, whereas he ought to make Men live like the Gods.”73 So our Saviour is suppos’d, to teach Christians to live like Men; whereas his Business was, to teach Men to live like Christians. Things more Vulgar, and accommodate to the human Size, have the Name of Man call’d upon them in Scripture; but they are Things great and extraordinary, that have the Name of God call’d upon them, Job 1. 6. Psal.65. 9. 104. 16. Isa. 8. 1. Gal. 1. 7, 11. To live like Men, therefore, is far from being expressive of the Christian Godliness, which is a living according to God, and to sink it into such a Morality, is a debasing the Divinity of the Christian Religion. Whose holy Laws are Christianity, which cannot be of one Piece with the Moralities of Jews and Heathens, and, therefore, must not be call’d Morality, merely such, but the Divine, or Christian Kind of Morality, which ought to be contradistinguish’d to mere Heathen Morality. And what can be more apparent, than that our Saviour’s Beatitudes, “Blessed are the Poor in Spirit, blessed are they that Mourn,” are not Rules of mere Morality, teaching to live like Men, but are Rules initiative into the Christian Sanctity, which is the Life of the regenerate Children of God? So the following Precepts, “Ye are the Salt of the Earth, the Light of the World, let your Light shine before Men, that they may glorify your Father which is in Heaven,” are not Precepts of Morality, enjoining nothing more than to live like mere Men. And, in the Progress of a Sinner’s Conversion to Godliness, such Difficulties and Conflicts usually occur, that speak it a sort of Virtue, greatly distant from, and transcendent to, ordinary Moral Virtue, which is so remote from it, that it may indispose Men to the Acquisition of it. “For Men, never much affrighted with the Danger, wherein all by Nature stand, nor inflam’d with the Love of a better Country than they enjoy, cannot address themselves to any resolute, or speedy Departure out of the Territories of Civil Moralities, within which, if Satan hold us, he maketh full reckoning of us, as of his Civil, or Natural, Subjects.”74 Therefore, to the way of removing out of Satan’s Territories to the Territories of Godliness, the Civil Moralities may, by Accident, be a great Impediment. For the Way is a duly humbling Repentance. The high and brave Spirit of Man must be broken; it must be Poor, that he may be Rich; empty, that he may be filled; have nothing, that he may possess all Things; be Condemn’d, that he may be Pardon’d; be a Fool, that he may be Wise; and Die, that he may be made Alive. All Virtue, which is not the Christian, is but that of the Will of Man, of Mind and Quality, the Human. Inter Ethnicam Philosophiam & Christianam tantum interest, quantum a divino Spiritu humanum a best ingenium.75

  The Virtue and Religion of the Heathen Philosophers, were of so spurious a kind, as, in part, to cause the unjust Persecution of the Primitive Christians.The Sufferings of the Primitive Christians may reasonably be thought an Effect, not only of the Popular Pagan’s Vice and Folly, but of the Philosophick Pagans Wisdom and Virtue; for their truly great and generous Maxims of Virtue, in their Sense and Application, lead to the Persecution of the Christian Church and Religion, and make it Virtue and Duty. Their most noble and generous Maxims of Virtue, are touching the social Duty of Man, Duty to the Publick, to the Whole, to the Universe of rational Beings. For they suppos’d, “That every particular Man is a Member of the Publick, and of the Whole consisting of Heathen Gods and Men, a Part of that Whole; and that, as a Part, he is for the Whole intirely, (for himself, only as a Part of the Whole,) for its Being and Well-being, to Constitute and Preserve it, and to be Useful and Subservient to its Interest. But the Physician cutteth off distemper’d Parts of the Body, for the Safety and Welfare of the Whole. As particular Men, and lesser Systems, must suffer for the Whole; so they are design’d and oblig’d, faithfully to take care of, and co-operate to, the Welfare of the Whole, of their Fellow-Members and Fellow-Citizens, wherein their own Welfare is involv’d, as a Part in the Whole. The Publick and Universal Good, is the great Good. As Cato was minded,”

  Non sibi, sed toto genitum se credere Mundo.

  Lucan.76

  “He believ’d, That he was not born for his own private Advantage, but for that of the whole World. And, on the contrary, base Selfishness is the Sum of all Evil. Because I am of Kin (saith Marcus Antoninus) to those Parts of the Universe, that are of the same kind, I will Practise nothing unsocial: But rather, I will take care of those that are my Kindred, and incline my whole Man to the common Utility, and avoid the contrary; often say to thy-self, I am a Member of the System of Rational Beings. But, if thou say, I am a distinct Part of that System, thou dost not love Men from the Heart, nor considerest thy-self as comprehended in the Whole.77 And he that is not thus affected, is not naturally affected, is not well, nor justly, nor charitably, nor sociably, nor honourably, nor humanly, affected; he hath put off the Man, as the Philosophers suppose.”

  But, altho’ these Notions and Maxims of theirs touching Virtue and Duty to the Whole, are, all of them, extremely Solid and truly Generous, if applied and determin’d to a genuine and legitimate Whole, or Universe; yet, in their Pagan Application and Determination of them to their Whole, Universe, or Catholick System, consisting of Heathen Gods and Men, they are extremely false and wicked, and manifestly lead them to Persecute the Christian Church and Religion. For the Christians were a People separated or broken off from their Whole, or Universe; and, consequently, were such as Marcus Antoninus calls Apostems of the World. Therefore it was but to their own mundane Tribe, that the Popular and Philosophick Pagans were charitably and sociably Affected; the World will love its own; the Christians that were Aliens, and who profess’d, that Jerusalem was their Country, they treated as those, who were no longer Men. The Philosophers thought themselves oblig’d, to have regard for rational Beings who were Congenial and Cognate to them; and, accordingly, they thought themselves oblig’d, to take care of their Gods and Demons; for these they look’d upon as Congenial and Cognate. But Christ and Christians erected and constituted a Whole, or Universe, opposite and destructive to their Whole Universe, or Catholick System, which if they look’d upon themselves oblig’d to take care of and uphold, they must necessarily think themselves oblig’d to destroy Christianity. Every Man must strenuously endeavour to maintain the old Religion of their Ancestors, succour the ruinous Empire of the Gods, which Christianity came to demolish, and to restore it to its Grandeur and Magnificence.

  The supreme God, who was the chief Object of the religious Worship of the Heathens, was the Soul of the World.6. In the Pagan System of the Universe, one of their supreme Deities, altho’ it was not absolutely their supreme Deity, may be justly called the supreme Deity of their Religion and Laws. This Name, a supreme Deity, is ambiguous, with respect to Heathens and Christians. For, if it be understood in a general and indeterminate Notion, it is Matter of Agreement between them both; but, when once it comes to a particular Determination, it is not Matter of Agreement, but of Difference between the Pagan and Christian Theists; and, in some sort, among the Pagan Theists themselves, they understanding the supreme Deity in various Notions, and, so far, making various supreme Deities. But, as the Name, Prince of Philosophers, in the Schools of the Aristotelians, must be understood of their Prince of Philosophers, reputed such, the Platonists and Epicureans have another Prince of Philosophers: So this Name, the supreme Deity, amongst the Pagan Theists, and the several sorts of Pagan Theists, must be understood of their supreme Deity, reputed such, several sorts of Pagan Theists having several sorts of supreme Deities. So that the Epithet, which they gave to the Jews supreme Deity, properly belongs to their own.

  • • ——— Dedita Sacris
    • Incerti Judaea Dei ——— Lucan.78
  • • Judaea, the Worshipper of an uncertain God.

  The supreme Deity, among the Pagans, is of this particular Determination, not merely, a Deity Supreme, but the supreme of their Pagan Deities, Summus Deorum. A usual Form of Invocation amongst them was, O Jove, and the Gods, understanding by Jove, the God of the Gods. Their Prayers were made to Jupiter the King, and to the other Gods. He is usually styl’d in Homer, Virgil, and the other Poets, the Father and King of the Gods. By the Gods they understand the supreme Deity and the other Deities, and, for that Reason, they speak of God and the Gods promiscuously, because they consider them as one System. They consider’d their Deities collectively, celebrated a Festival of them all in common, called θεοξενία, and consecrated Altars to all the Gods and Goddesses. They are his Associates, Collegues, and Allies, and he is the Head of the Family of Pagan Deities. It is the Title of a Chapter in Eugubinus,79“That Aristotle affirmeth with Homer, that the supreme God is the Father of the Gods and of Men, of the same Kind, Kindred, and Family with them,” as Sons and Father.

  Homer, therefore, and Aristotle, the Poets and the Philosophers, the Popular and the Philosophick Pagans, agree in the Acknowledgment of a supreme Deity, in the Way of Polytheism, and with Relation to sub-ordinate Deities. They agree, therefore, in the Acknowledgment of a supreme Deity, in the Sense of their Religion and Laws, but not in the Sense of their Schools. When the Philosophers speak of the supreme Deity, in the peculiar Sense of their Schools, they mean one supreme Deity; and when they speak of the supreme Deity popularly, in the Sense of their Religion and Laws, they mean another.

  The Pagans Theism being their Polytheism, and the supreme Deity being a Term of their Polytheism, it is manifestly inconsistent with the Acknowledgment of the true God, to whose Supremacy and Sovereignty it belongeth, to subsist in the Quality and Condition of God alone. The Atheism charg’d upon Anaxagoras, (for which the Athenians banish’d him, fin’d him five Talents, and had put him to Death, if his Scholar Pericles had not interpos’d,) was only a denying the Deity of the Earth, the Sun, the Moon, the Stars, shutting out of Being the Soul of the World, destroying the Deity of the World, and the Parts thereof, making them inanimate and unintelligent, calling the Moon an Earth, and the Sun a Mass of Fire; whilst at the same time he acknowledg’d a single supreme Deity existing separately, whilst he discarded the Soul of the World, which deified all the Parts thereof, which was no less than a Subversion of the main of the Pagan Theism; for which Plato charges him with Atheism. And Ficinus80 affirms, “That Plato in his Book of Laws asserts the Coelestial Gods only, because the Contemplation of the higher Deities is very foreign to the matter of Laws.” Which is an Insinuation, that those higher Deities in Platonism are properly Gods of Philosophical Speculation only, no Deities of Religion and Laws. Nor could the Platonists suppose their first Principle a Deity of Religion and Laws; for they look upon it, as quite above all external Adoration; and such was Numa’s Deity, to whom he would neither allow Image, nor material Sacrifice. “Plato” (saith Eugubinus81 ) “did not so clearly propose the greatest God as an Object of Worship, because he could not be worshipp’d; what he is, and how to be worshipp’d, cannot be describ’d, or declar’d. In three Places he calleth him undeclarable, in the Timaeus, difficult for Thought, undeclarable by Speech, or Word. According to Philo also he is unconceivable, unthinkable, undeclarable; being thus unspeakable and inexplicable, and such as the old Theologers call innominable, some invisible, others to be worshipp’d in silence, others uninvestigable; therefore Plato hath said nothing of him in his Book of Laws, nor set down any Thing concerning his Worship, because he could not, this Deity being unknowable, both as to Name and Nature.” If Plato’s supreme Deity is of no Religion; if all Understanding, Conception, Name, Word, Speech, be utterly incompetible and unapplicable to this first Principle; if there be no Doctrine, no Learning, no Discipline, or Institution, touching such a Deity, and, consequently, no Religion; this is not discoursing, nor reasoning, but dreaming of such a Deity; for there can be no Proof of the Being of such a Deity, neither à Priori, nor à Posteriori, no more than could be given of such Gods as Epicurus suppos’d, who did nothing, and who could not be known, either directly, or by their Works.

  However, the Followers of Plato thought this supreme Deity was to be worshipp’d, but by Silence, pure Cogitation, and As similation to him, which is the Sacrificing our Life to him. But such a kind of Deity and his Worship being foreign from matter of Law, and altogether unsuitable to the generality of Mankind, Plato thought it a Solecism to mention him in his Book of Laws. “He taketh care that the Matters of his Acroamatical Theology, his Acroamatical Deity, do not fall into the Hands of unskilful Men; for scarce any Thing, as I suppose, would be Matter of more Derision amongst the common People. From Plato, therefore, you have the true Cause, why we may not speak of the first Deity amongst the Vulgar, why it is not lawful to publish to the Vulgar the Parent of the Universe: For, not understanding the Things that are said of him, they deride them, being Things remote from popular Custom, and gross Ears; therefore, treating of Laws which ought to be publish’d to the People, he spake nothing of that great uninvestigable Deity, proposing only the Worship of Heaven to the People, to whom he must speak only of that, which they thought certain Religion.”82

  The Platonists, therefore, tho’ they had higher Deities in their School, do yet agree, That the supreme Deity of their Religion and Laws, is the Soul of the World, or the Mundane System as animated by a governing Mind, which Deifies it, the supreme Deity of the Popular Pagans, and the same with Zeus, or Jupiter. Speusippus, also, agreeable to Plato, is said by Cicero to have held “a certain Force, or Power, whereby all Things are govern’d, and that Animal.”83 Such also was Pythagoras’s Notion of the Deity, as others, and Cicero also in the same Treatise relates; “Pythagoras also acknowledg’d one God, an incorporeal Mind, diffus’d thro’ the whole Nature of Things, the Origin of vital Sense to all Animals.” In like manner Onatus the Pythagorean defines “God, the Mind and Soul, and Ruler of the whole World.” The Jove of the Orphick Theology is the mundane Soul and System.

  • • Πάντα γδ ῤν μεγάλῳ Ζῆνος τάδε σώ ματι κεῖται.
  • • All these Things lie in the great Body of Jove.

  “A Spirit that pervadeth the whole World,” was one of the Aegyptian Notices of God.84 The Supreme Deity of the Peruvians was of the same kind, as appeareth from his Name Pachacamac, which signifieth the Soul, or Life, of the World. The Stoicks usually intitle the Supreme Deity, The Mind and Understanding of the Whole, the common, or universal, Mundane Nature, and the common Reason of Nature, the ruling Principle of the World; and, as Zeno defin’d God, a Spirit pervading the whole World. And the Indians, according to Megasthenes, suppos’d, That the God, who is the Maker and Governour of the World, pervadeth the Whole of it. Agreeably to these Sentiments, the Romans styled Capitoline Jove, “the Mind and Spirit, the Guardian and Governour of the Universe, the Artificer and Lord of this Mundane Fabrick, to whom every Name, Fate, Providence, Nature, the World, is agreeable.”85 So true is that of Macrobius; “Jupiter among the Theologers is the Soul of the World.”86 The Soul moveth and governeth the Body, which it presideth over, saith Cicero, “As that chief God governeth the World.”87 St. Austin saith thus of Varro; “When Varro elsewhere calleth the rational Soul of every one a Genius, and affirmeth such a Mind, or Soul, of the whole World to be God; he plainly implieth that God is the Universal Genius of the World, and that this is he, whom they call Jove. Those only seem to Varro to have understood what God is, who thought him a Soul governing the World by Motion and Reason.”88 Such a Soul of the World the Stoicks call’d, The artificial Fire orderly proceeding to the Generation of the Things of the World.

  Many Christian Writers have grossly symboliz’d with the aforesaid Doctrine of the Pagans; and, particularly, all those Christian Divines, who account the Platonists Triad the same with the Christian Trinity, if they are consistent with themselves, suppose the H. Ghost, to be the same with the Platonists Soul of the World, which is the Pagan Jove, thus perverting the Scriptures, confounding Things Sacred and Profane, Human and Divine, God and the World, God and Belial, the Kingdom of Darkness and of Light, Paganizing Christianity. It is one Thing to say, That mundane, animative, intelligent Nature is God, as being somewhat, that he inclusively is; and another Thing to say, That mundane, animative, intelligent Nature, form’d by the Pagans into a Jove, is, as such, God. The former Assertion is legitimate Theism, the latter is Heathenism.

  This Jupiter of the Popular Pagans, the Soul of the World, may justly be thought the best sort of Jupiter in the Pagan Theology. But the Heathenism of the Notion will, in great Measure, appear from the Original of it. For the Heathens were carried to this Notion of the Supreme Deity, partly by the first Original Theism of their Institution, and partly by their Method of proving the Existence of a Deity against Atheism. The first Original Theism of their Institution, or their eldest Idolatry, was the deifying the visible Heaven, or World, as the Supreme universal Deity, or chief God. As amongst the Chinese, “Some suppose, that the Sun, Moon and Stars, and chiefly Heaven itself, whence the Earth deriveth all her Advantages, must be worshipp’d with all possible Devotion.”89

  This Pagan Idea of a Supreme Deity, was also a Consequent of their Method of proving the Existence of a Deity against Atheism; which, tho’ it hath much of true Reason and sound Philosophy in it, does also involve the Deity of the World; which is of the same Importance in the Pagan Religion, with the Existence of a Deity. Plato’s Theism, which he asserts in his Book of Laws, we have already seen to be only an asserting a Soul of the World. So Cicero disputeth. “There is assuredly a Caelestial Force, or Power Divine. An animative Principle of Life and Sense, which is in our Bodies and in our Meanness, is not wanting in the Greatness of universal Nature, and the illustrious Motion thereof; unless, perchance, they think there is no such Thing, because it is not visible, nor sensible: As if our Mind, whereby we are Wise and Provident, whereby we do and say these very Things, was Visible, or Discernible by Sense.”90 The Philosophick Emperour and others argue, “Can there be Order in Thee, and none in the World? It is absurd to say, that the Heaven, or visible World is without a Soul, seeing we, that have but a part of the Body of the Universe, have a Soul. For how could a Part have Soul, if the Universe was devoid of it?” Socrates’s Discourse with Aristodemus, against Atheism, is thus represented by Cicero. “The Humour, and Heat, and Breath, and Earth, which is in our Body, if any one asketh, whence we have them? It is manifest, that we took one of them from the Earth, another of them from the Water, the other from the Fire and Air. But that which surmounteth all these, Reason, Mind, Counsel, Cogitation, Prudence, where found we it? Whence took we it? Whence hath Man snatch’d to himself such a Thing as this? So Zeno, the Father of the Stoicks, discourseth against Atheism. “What is devoid of Soul and Reason, cannot generate an Animal and a Rational. But the World generateth Animals and Rationals. Therefore the World is an Animal and Rational. That which is Rational, is better than that which is not Rational: But nothing is better than the World. Therefore the World is Rational. In like manner we may infer, that the World is Wise, that the World is Blessed, that the World is Eternal.” So Balbus, in Cicero, discourseth for the Theism of the Pagans (the Worshippers of the mundane System) against Atheism; “From that Ardor, or Vital Heat, which is in the World” (the mundane Soul of the Stoicks) “all Motion ariseth: Which, because it is self-moving, is necessarily a Mind; whence it followeth, that the World is an Animal. Hence also we may infer, that it is intelligent, because the World is certainly better than any particular Nature, which is but part of the World. The World, because it comprehendeth all Things, nor is there any Thing which is not in it, is every way perfect: Nothing can be wanting to what is the best: There is nothing better than Mind and Reason: These, therefore, cannot be wanting to the World; wherefore it is Wise and Good.”91 At this rate these Heathen Philosophers deified the World in their Disputes against Atheism, the main Scope of which is to prove the Being of an Animative Mind of the World; the acknowledgment where of constituted a Pagan Theist, and distinguish’d him from an Atheist. “Allothers” (saith Plutarch) “affirm, that the World is animated and administred by Providence: But Democritus and Epicurus, and so many as introduce Atoms and Vacuum, do neither acknowledge the World to be animated, nor to be govern’d by Providence; but by an irrational Nature.”92

  In their Disputes against Atheism the Pagan Theists design to establish their own Theism, which is their Religion of worshipping the Universe, Heaven, and the Stars. For their governing Mind and Soul of the World, for whose Existence they dispute is Universal, Mundane, Animative Nature, Animative of the World, (as the Soul of Man is of his Body,) involv’d in the World, and deifying the World. In the Stoicks Account of the Mundane System, there are various Complications of Jupiter and the World; and they are so complicated, that each communicateth to the other his Name and his Properties. For the Deity is called the World. “If you call the Deity the World, you are not mistaken in so doing,” saith Seneca. And as the Deity is call’d the World, both the Whole and the Parts of it, is call’d God, according to that of Manilius;

  • • Quâ pateat Mundum Divino Numine verti,
    • Atque ipsum esse Deum ———
  • • The World is govern’d by the Deity,
    • And is itself the Deity.93

  The Doctrine of the Soul of the World inforceth the Unity of the Universe, and that all Things are one, one animated mundane System. “The chief Philosophers have declared, That all is one.”94 So Linus;

  • • Omnia sunt unum, sunt omnis singula partes.
  • • All Things are Part of the Universe, and that All is One.95

  The Unity of the Universe, which is a fundamental Mistake, and very pernicious to true Religion, is a principal Maxim among the Stoicks. “This whole” (saith Seneca96 ) “in which we are contain’d, is both one Thing and God. This All, the Comprehension of divine and human Things, is one Thing. We are the Members of one great Body.” The Universe is suppos’d to be one Body, because of its informing Soul, which connecteth and holdeth the Parts of it together. So Sextus Empiricus represents the Sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italick Philosophers. “We Men have not only a Conjunction amongst our-selves, with one another, and with the Gods above us, but also with the Brutes below us: Because there is one Spirit, which, as a Soul, pervadeth the whole World, and uniteth together all the Parts of it.”97

  This vital Constitution of the Universe is the Origin of Natural Magick, which is a vital Sympathy and Antipathy, between several Things in the World. But, under the pretence of Natural Magick, Arts Magical, in the foulest Sense, were introduc’d. The Heathens thought, that there was a Sympathy and Consent amongst the Parts of the Universe, as being Parts of one Whole; such, as is amongst the Parts of the human Body, or the Strings of a Musical Instrument. Into this they resolv’d the Efficacy of Charms and Fascinations, Mystick Ceremonies, Symbols, and Sacrifices, and Prayers to the Sun and Stars, attracting Influences from them, in the same manner as when the lower Part of a Chord that is stretch’d, is put into Motion, the upper Part is put into Motion also. This one animated Mundane System is necessarily One Mundane Animal, upon which Account they attribute a Magical Constitution to the Universe. For they suppose, That this Universe is one, and one Animal, so that nothing is so remote, as not to be near, because of the Sympathy and Consent of Motion, which is between the Parts of one Animal. Now an Animal Fabrick must have Distinction of Parts. So the Stoicks say, That God is the Mind of the Universe, the Body of it is his Body, and the Sun, Moon, and Stars, are the Eyes of this great Mundane Animal, which was thought of the Hermaphrodite Kind, because it was believ’d to be a generative Animal, and therefore both Sexes are attributed to it in Jarchas the Brachman’s answer to Apollonius. “The World is an Animal; for it generateth all Things, being of both Natures, Male and Female, and doing the Part, both of Father and Mother, for Generation.” Because the World consists of active and passive Principles, and, because the Virtue of Generating and Conceiving, the Masculine and Feminine Virtue, are united in universal Nature, it is not unfitly intituled αρρενοθηλυς, Male and Female. The Orphick Doctrine concerning the Deity, of which the following Lines are a remarkable Compend, assert the same Notion; ascribing both Sexes to the All-generating Deity.

  • • Ζεὺς πρω̑τος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕςατος ἀρχικέκαυνος
    • Ζεὺς κεϕαλνὶ, Ζεὺς μέσσα διος δ’ὀκ πάντα τέτυκτἀι.
    • Ζεὺς πυθμνὶν, γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανού ἀςερόεντος.
    • Ζεὺς ᾅρονιν γένετο, Ζεὺς ᾂμζροτος ἕπλετο νύμϕη.
    • Ζεὺς πνοίη πάντων ἀκαμὰ του Ζεὺς πυρὸς ὀρμη.
    • Ζεὺς πόντου ρὀζα, Ζεὺς ἠλιος, ἠδὲ σελήνη
    • Ζεὺς βασιλgr;ευς, Ζεὺς ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων ἀρχικέραυνος:
    • Πάντας γάρ κρίψας ᾂυτους ϕάος ἐς πολυγεθές,
    • Έξ ἱεροῦς κραδίης ἀνενέγκατο, μέρμερα ῥέζων.98
  • • Primus cunctorum est & Jupiter ultimus idem.
    • Jupiter & caput & medium est, sunt ex Jove cuncta.
    • Jupiter est terra basis, & Stellantis Olympi.
    • Jupiter & mas est, estque idem Nympha perennis.
    • Spiritus est cunctis, validusque est Jupiter ignis’
    • Jupiter est Pelagi radix, est Lunaque, solq;
    • Cunctorum Rex est, Princepsque & Originis Author;
    • Namque sinu occultans, dulces in luminis auras,
    • Cuncta tulit, sacro versans sub pectore curas.

  The Popular Pagans call their Deities sometimes by Masculine, sometimes by Feminine Names, not pretending to know their Sexes;99 or judging it matter indifferent, which of their Sexes they ascrib’d to their Deities; or, perhaps, supposing them Hermaphrodites. In the Septuagint, also, Baal is sometimes of the Masculine, and sometimes of the Feminine Gender.

  The one animate Mundane System is also one Deity, some say the first God, others the Second, and some call it the Third God. In the Stoicks Theology the World is the supreme God. The Platonists usually call it the third God: But Origen saith, that they call it the second. Which is very agreeable to what Plato saith in his Timeus, according to Cicero’s Version of it, “Deus ille aeternus hunc perfectè beatum Deum procreavit,” The eternal God procreated this perfectly happy God. The visible, sensible, fabricated World, being thus confronted to an invisible, intelligible, parental, eternal Deity, in this Antithesis, it falleth to the World’s Share, to be called the second God. So Celsus the Platonist and others have intituled the animated World, the Son of God.100 And, consequently, there is in Platonism a twofold Son of God; the one is the Metaphysical Intellect of the Mundane System, the other is the intelligent Mundane Animal, the only-begotten sensible Son of God.

  The one Mundane System is also intituled one Temple, House, or Habitation, which Appellations denote such an Unity and undivided State of the Universe as perfectly disagrees with Christianity. The Habitation of the Immortal God, is one of the usual Names of the World. One Philosopher calleth it, The Temple of the Father; another calleth it, Amost Holy and God-becoming Temple; another styleth it, The Fire-refulgent House of Jove. By Cicero it is intituled, The Caelestial and Divine House; and by the Aegyptians, The Kingly House of the Deity. “Is God shut up within the Walls of Temples?” said Heraclitus. “The whole World variously adorn’d with Animals, and Plants, and Stars, is his Temple.” The Stoicks say, “The whole World is the Temple of the Gods, and the only Temple becoming their Amplitude and Magnificence.” Whence the Persians and the Magi condemn’d all artificial Temples; and Xerxes, by the Persuasion of the Magi, burnt the Temples of the Greeks, themselves doing their religious Worship to the Gods under the open Heaven; to whom they supps’d, that all Things should be open, and that this whole World is their Temple and Habitation. Zeno, the Father of the Stoicks, is likewise said, to have disallow’d the Building of Temples; and Plato, as some will have it, privately prohibited the having Statues of the Gods, as knowing, “That the World is the Temple of God.” The World is call’d by Plato, The House of the Gods, and, The made Image of the Eternal Gods. Agreeably to this Notion of the Philosophick Pagans, the Apocryphal Book of Baruch (3. 24.) looks upon the visible Universe as “The House of God.” But no such Language ever occurreth in the Holy Bible; which should have taught Christian Writers so much Discretion, as not to speak the Sense and Language of the Heathen Philosophers, which they frequently do.

  In the Stoicks Philosophy, the one Mundane System Jove is All Things, and All Things are Him, as his Parts and Members. Particularly Souls are Parts of God, and Avulsions from Him. Visible and Corporeal Things are the Parts of his Body. Thus is he One and All Things. Their Deity is so intimate, complicate, united, and connected with all Things, as to constitute with them One Mundane Intelligent Animal; therefore the whole animated World, and all the Things thereof are Jove, and Jove is the animated World, and the Things thereof.

  • • Jupiter est quodcumque vides, ———
  • • Jove is whate’er you see.

  The eldest Idolatry was the Worship of Heaven, the World, and the Stars, as appeareth from the Jove of the eldest Times, and of all Nations. Of the Persians, Herodotus reporteth, “That they did not, like the Greeks, think the Gods of human Birth and Original; but their way was, ascending to the Tops of the Mountains, they Sacrific’d to Jove, calling the whole Circle of the Heaven, Jove.”101Strabo saith of them, “They Sacrifice in an high Place, thinking the Heaven, Jove.”102 So Plutarch says of the Aegyptians, “They take the first God, and the Universe, for the same Thing.” Universal Mundane Nature, the Aegyptians deified under the Name of Isis, which was their supreme Deity, as the Inscription before her Temple at Sais sheweth; “I am all that hath been, is, and shall be; and my Veil no Mortal hath ever yet uncover’d: And that other Inscription on the Altar at Capua (“Tibi una. Quae es omnia. Dea Isis.”) which maketh her one, and all Things. The Aegyptian Serapis, another Name of their supreme Deity, is the World, for, “Serapis being ask’d by Nicocreon” (King of the Cypriots) “what God he was? Made answer, I am a God, such as I describe myself. The Starry Heaven is my Head, the Sea is my Belly, the Earth is my Feet, mine Ears are in the Aether, and mine Eye is the bright Lamp of the Universe, the Sun.”103 The Orphic Theology makes a like Description of Jupiter.104 So Cicero hath shew’d from Ennius and Euripides, (who is called the scenical Philosopher,) That the Heaven, or circumambient Aether is the European Pagans Jove, the supreme universal Deity.105 So in the Poet Aeschylus, Jupiter is Universal Mundane Nature. “Jupiter is Aether, and Earth, and Heaven, and all Things. And, if there be any Thing above these, Jupiter is it.” “The Naturalists” (saith Macrobius106 ) “called the Sun” ( Διόνυσον διὸς νοῦν) “Dionysus, the Mind of Jove, because the Mind of the World. The World is called Heaven, which they call Jove. Whence Aratus, being to speak of Heaven, saith, Let us take our rise from Jove.” So in an antient Inscription, the visible Heaven is intituled, Eternal, the best and greatest, Jupiter.107 Agreeably to which Sense of the antient Pagans, that Tradition of theirs, reported by Aristotle, is to be understood touching the Divinity of the Heavens. “It hath been delivered to us by those of very antient Times, both that the Stars are Gods, and that the Divinity containeth the whole of Nature.”108

  This Notion was so familiar with the Pagans, that Strabo, writing of Moses, could not but suppose the Gods of his Religion to be of this Nature and Notion; “That which containeth us all, and the Earth, and the Sea, which we call Heaven, and the World, and the Nature of the whole,” Universal Mundane Nature.109 So Juvenal describes the God of the Jews.

  • • Nil praeter Nubes & Caeli numen adorant.
  • • They Worship no Deity but the Clouds and the Heavens.110

  So Diodorus Siculus reporteth Moses to have been of Opinion, “That the Heaven which surroundeth the Earth, is the only God and Lord of all.” These Pagans did not imagine, that the Jews could Worship any other God than their supreme Jove, the Heaven, which, in the larger Sense of the Word, signifieth the whole corporeal World.

  Pliny thus; “The World, or the Heavenly Canopy, must, in Reason, be thought a Deity.” Such a Deity was the European-Pagans Jove, and such a Deity was the Asiatick Bel, or Baal; for that Name, as Selden111 informs us, means the Heaven, the Comprehension of the Aether, and the Stars; and the Heaven was called Bel by the Chaldeans, as Eustathius reporteth from the Antients; and Philo saith of the Chaldeans, “They suppos’d the visible World, or Heaven, the Supreme Deity.”112 The Proclivitie of Heathen Mankind to such a Notion of the supreme Deity is visible in a late Writer of the Affairs of China. “A mighty Nation of the Tartars, though they are not, by what appeareth, of any particular Religion, but in differently receive all Religions, which they are acquainted with, and conform themselves to all, not knowing, or caring to know, what it is they adore, and they have no Knowledge of the Idols, or Deities, which the Antients ador’d; nor doth it appear, that they receive, or retain those first Notions which the Instinct of Nature, without the Assistance of any supernatural Light, impresseth upon the very Breast of every Man; yet they Worship the Heavens, and to these they pay their greatest Adoration; and this maketh the greatest Impression upon the Minds of the People.”113 Of the barbarous Nation of the Gallans, bordering Habissina, we have this Account. “They have no Idols, and but very little Divine Worship. If you ask them concerning God, or any supreme Deity, or who it is that governeth the Earth with so much Order and Constancy? They answer, Heaven, which embraceth in their View all the rest.”114 A great Nation on the North of Japan, are said to have no other Religion, save only the Worship of Heaven; and the supreme Deity of the Chinese is said to be the Heaven, which they suppose increate, without Beginning, unbodily, and a Spirit.115

  According to the Testimony of the Scriptures, and of Heathen Authors the consent of all the Christian, and the best of the Hebrew Writers, the first and earliest Idolatry of the Heathen, was the Worship of the Lights of Heaven, which inferreth the Antiquity of the Worship of Heaven, and that the first Original Pagan Theism, was the deifying the Mundane System. Vossius indeed affirmeth, (agreeably to their Opinion, who suppose the Sun to have been the Pagans Supreme Deity,) that their Worship of the Coelestial Lights was antecedent to the Worship of the Aether, Heaven, or the World; which is a supposition altogether as groundless, and unreasonable, as if he should suppose them the Worshippers of Mountains and Rivers, before they were the Worshippers of their great Goddess, the Earth.116Plato supposes, that the Worship of the Heaven and the Stars was the eldest Religion of the Pagans; and that the Worship of the Heaven was contemporary with that of the Stars, both amongst the Greeks and Barbarians. The Greeks receiv’d Astronomy, and the Knowledge of those Coelestial Deities, the Stars, from the Barbarians, those antient Pagan Nations, which were the Inventors of Astronomy, and which, in Aegypt and Syria, had great Advantage for the Knowledge of the Stars, because of the Serenity of their Country. The Theology, therefore, of those antient Pagan Nations may be understood from the Greek Theology of the elder Times, which Plato, in his Cratylas, thus representeth. “The first Inhabitants of Greece seem, as many of the Barbarians now, to have thought, that the Sun, and the Moon, and the Earth, and the Stars, and the Heaven, were the only Gods. When they beheld these running round perpetually, they call’d them Θεοὺς from Θέω which signifieth, to run. Afterwards taking Notice, that there were other Gods, they called them also by the same Name.” As the first Inhabitants of Greece deified, not only the Sun, Moon, and Stars, but the Heaven above them: So, when Diodorus saith of the Men of antient Times, “That, beholding the World and universal Mundane Nature, being struck with Admiration, they thought the prime eternal Gods were the Sun and Moon, calling the one Osiris, and the other Isis”; this is not to be understood, as if they deified the Sun and Moon, exclusively of the rest of the World above them: But, beholding the World and universal Mundane Nature, and being struck with Admiration, they deified it, and such illustrious Parts of it, as the Sun and Moon. So, when Maimonides saith of the Zabii, that their Tenet was, “There is no other God but the Stars”;117 this is not to be understood exclusively of the Heaven, as if the Zabii did not suppose it the Supreme Deity; for the same Author saith of them; “All the Zabaists held the Eternity of the World; for the Heavens, according to them, are the Deity.” So Philo saith of the Chaldeans, “They suppose the Stars to be Gods, and the Heaven and the World” (which must consequently be the Supreme) “to which they refer the Fates of Men, acknowledging no Cause of Things abstract from Sensibles.”118 If the first Heathen deified the Lights of Heaven, because of their Amplitude, Pulchritude, Utility, and Residence in Heaven, they could not fail, upon the same Account, to deify the illustrious Canopy of Heaven.

  The one Mundane System Jove is, in some sort, the multitude and variety of the Pagans Gods and Goddesses; and there is a certain Polytheism of theirs, which is nothing more than a Polyonymy of this one Supreme God, or a calling him by various Names. For it is not unusual with the Pagan Theologers, to reduce the Multitude and Variety of their Deities to one Jupiter, in various Senses, and upon various Accounts. Sometimes they consider the Mundane System Jove, as Originally and Comprehensively the All of their Deities, as Valerius Soranus representeth them.

  • • Jupiter Omnipotens, Regum Rex ipse deumque,
    • Progenitor Genitrixque Deum, Deus unus & omnis.
  • • Omnipotent Jupiter, the King of Kings and Gods,
    • The Father and Mother of the Gods, one God and all Gods.119

  Thus Jupiter is all the Gods; not as if there was no Polity of Gods; but as the Founder, the Father and Mother, of the Polity, and a Deity comprehensive of all the Deities; for Jupiter is the same with Pan, universal mundane Nature, whom, in the Certamina at Athens, they look’d upon as a Pantheon, the comprehension of all the Gods. So the Author of the Orphick Verses, “having suppos’d the World a great Animal, and having call’d this Mundane Animal Jupiter,” placeth Heaven, the Earth, the Sea, and the Whole of the Universe in Jupiter’s Womb,

  • • Πάντες τ’ ἀθάνατοι μάχαρε’ θεοὶ ἠδε θέιναι.
  • • And all the blessed immortal Gods and Goddesses.

  The Rabble of Deities contain’d in him, are necessarily his Parts and Members, both as he is Politically Imperial, and as he is Animatively Vital, in a Political, and in a Physiological Sense; they are the Members of his Body Politick, and of his living Animal-Body; as Seneca saith of Mankind, “Et socii ejus sumus & Membra,” “We are his Associates” (the Members of his Body Politick) “and the Members of his Animal-Body.” Both these Notions are glanc’d at by the Poet introducing Jupiter, thus speaking to the other Gods;

  • • Coelicola mea membra Dei, quos nostra potestas
    • Officiis divisa facit. ———120
  • • Ye Gods my Members, to whom my Imperial Power
    • allotteth Diversity of Offices.

  The Gods, to whom Jupiter allotteth Diversity of Offices, are not mere Names, or Virtues, but so many Substantial Beings, distinct Personal Deities; yet these, being contain’d in him, are, in some sort, reducible to him; but there is another sort of Deities, which the Stoicks suppose to be nothing more than so many several Names, Notions, and particular Considerations of the one Supreme Jupiter; or, only so many several Powers, Virtues, Functions and Agencies of his, fictitiously personated and deified, which explaineth an eminent Mode of their Idolatry. Pervading, acting, and ruling in the Air, he may be call’d Juno; in the Earth, Pluto; in the inferior Parts of it, Proserpina; in the Sea, Neptune; in the lower Part of it, Salacia; in the Vineyards, Liber; in the Smith’s Forges, Vulcan; and in the domestick Hearths, Vesta; as he bestows Corn, he may be called Ceres; Wine, Bacchus; Health, Aesculapius; as he governeth the Wars, Mars; and the Winds, Aeolus. “The Names that denote a certain Force or Effect of Things Coelestial are, any of them, properly applicable to him. His Appellations may be as many as his Gifts, or Functions.”121 Which Polyonymy of the one Supreme God inferreth, that the Pagans Polytheism was, in part, and so far, not real, but apparent only. Thus, as the Mythical Theology personateth and deifieth the Parts and Powers of Mundane corporeal Matter; so the Philosophick Theology personateth and deifieth the several Powers, Virtues, and Agencies, of the one Supreme God. By this Mythical Plea, they defended their Worship of the several Parts of the Corporeal World. For their Polyonymy of the one Supreme God, was not design’d to deprive the Parts of the World of their Godship, but to give a plausible Account and Reason of their Worship.

  The Reason of this Stoical Polyonymy was double; partly, because of a Fancy which they had, to apply, to the Supreme Deity, the proper Names of other Deities; and partly, because they discarded the Deities, which they called Mythical and Commentitious, which are Things Physical represented by Fictitious Deities; which having discarded, they substituted in their stead the various Powers, Virtues, Effects, and Agencies, of the Mundane System Jove; “Calling him Minerva, because his Rule is extended in the Aether; Juno, as pervading the Air; Vulcan, Neptune, Ceres, as pervading and acting in the Artificer’s Fire, in the Sea and the Earth.”122 So Balbus in Cicero, having rejected the Deities, which he calleth the Mythical, substituteth in their Room, “God passing thro’ the Nature of every Thing.” Agreeably to which Stoical Notion, it is most reasonable to understand the saying of Antisthenes the Cynick, “Populares Deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens,”123 that is, one natural God ought to be substituted in the stead of those many Popular Deities, which the Stoicks, and their Brethren, the Cynicks, rejected as Mythical and Commentitious.

  It is, however, here to be observ’d, that the Stoicks Polyonymy is so far from destroying the Pagans Polytheism, that it maketh no considerable Abatement in the Multitude of their Deities. For they deified the Parts of the Corporeal World, as living Members of the Mundane Animal, Residences of the Powers and Virtues of the Supreme God, Sections of the Soul of the World. Both Varro and Balbus plainly affirm, That the Stars are animated with intelligent Souls,(they might as well say the same of the Earth;) and, consequently, they are so many distinct Personal Deities.124 And, accordingly, Plutarch representeth the Stoical Polyonymists as the most extravagant Polytheists in all the Pack, “That filled the Air, Heaven, Earth, Sea, with Gods.”125 Wherefore their Reduction of Deities to the Polyonymy of one Supreme God, signifieth nothing to the Prejudice, or Diminution of their Polity of Gods. When they call Jove by the proper Names of several other Deities, they must not be thought to deny the Existence of those Synonymous Genial Deities of the vulgar Theology, Liber Pater, Mercury, and the like; for in their various Allegorizings, Interpretations, Accommodations, and the various honourary Appellatives which they bestow upon Jove, they do not speak privatively with respect to their Genial Deities, but Accumulatively; not with intention to destroy them, but to super-add to them the Polyonymy of their Supreme God. And, if this is the true Account of the Stoicks Polyonymy, as certainly it is, there is no Reason imaginable, why they should condemn the vulgar Polytheism, as a learned Writer supposes they would have done, if fear of disturbing the Commonwealth, and creating a Socrates-like Danger to themselves, had not restrain’d them.126 For the Sense of the Stoicks, and of all the genuine Pagan Theologers, must be thus represented. The Constitution of the Universe being Politically consider’d, and Jupiter, as Politically Imperial, they conceiv’d (as they usually say) all full of Gods and Demons: But withal, the Constitution of the Universe being Physiologically consider’d, and Jupiter, as Vital and Animative of the Whole, they conceiv’d Jovis omnia plena, all full of Jove, his various Virtues, Powers and Effects.

  The Mundane System Jove must be consider’d, both as Animatively, or Physiologically, and as Politically-Imperial to the World. For, being he Mundane Soul, he is Animatively-Regent and Imperial, as the Soul of Man is. “That is a God, which is Vigent, Sentient, Reminiscent, Provident, which ruleth, and governeth, and moveth, that Body, whose Prefect it is, as the chieftain God does this World.”127“As we have a Soul that is an Animative Regent: So the Government of the World is by a Soul, that containeth and keepeth it in Consistence, which is call’d Zeus.”128 Who, as an Animative Regent, is suppos’d, regularly to agitate the Mundane Matter, to form all Things Coelestial and Terrestrial, to figurate his own Animal Body, and to generate all sorts of Animals, as the Poet Philosophizeth,

  • • Principio Coelum, ac Terras camposque liquentes,
    • Lucentemque globum Lunae, Titaniaque Astra,
    • Spiritus in tus alit; totamque infusa per artus,
    • Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet,
    • Inde Hominum, Pecudamque genus, vitaeque volantûm,
    • Et quae marmoreo fert Monstra sub aequore Pontus. Virg. Aen. 6.
  • • From first, Earth, Seas, and Heavens all spangled Robe,
    • The golden Stars, and Phoebe’s silver Globe,
    • A Spirit fed, and to the Mass conjoin’d,
    • Inspiring the vast Body with a Mind.
    • Hence Men, and Beasts, and Birds, derive their Strain,
    • And Monsters floating in the smooth-fac’d Main.

  By Physical Motion, and as Animatively-Regent, the Mundane System Jove steereth the World,129“As a Pilot doth a Ship, or as a Charioteer doth a Chariot, circumvolving the Heavens, keeping the Earth in Consistence, ruling the Sea.”130 (So Apuleius saith of the Goddess Isis, “Thou whirlest about the World, lightenest the Sun, rulest the World;”) and variously influencing the Minds of Men, according to that of Homer,

  • • Τοῖος γὰρ νόος ὲοτὶν επιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
    • Οῖον ἐπ’ ἥμαρ ἄνησι πάτηρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.
  • • Men hold not constant in one Mind; such is their Sense,
    • As daily is instill’d by Jove’s hid Influence.

  Because the System-Jove is Animatively the Regent of the World, he ought to have his Regent part seated in some principal Part of the World, (agreeably to the Soul of Man, whose rational Faculty is seated in the Head;) either in the Aether, as some; in the Heaven, as others; or in the Sun, as Cleanthes suppos’d;131 which latter, doubtless, was the Sense of the Pythagoreans in those illustrious Epithets, which they gave the Sun, styling him

  • • Ζηνὼς πύργον, Διὸς ϕνλακιὼν, Διὸς θρόνον,
  • • The Tower, Custody, or Hold, and Throne of Jove.

  But the System-Jove is also Politically the Regent of the World, the Universe being suppos’d one Imperial Polity, one common City of Gods and Men; for such a governing Power the Pagan Philosophers disputed with great Reason and Strength of Argument. “Without Political Government, neither any House, nor City, nor Nation, nor Mankind in general, can subsist, nor the whole Nature of Things, nor the World itself.”132“Seeing a City, or a House, cannot continue for the least time without a Governour and Curator, how is it possible, that so great and illustrious a Structure as the World, should be so orderly administred fortuitously and by chance?”133“The Knowledge and Contemplation of Things Coelestial, the beholding how great Moderation and Order there is among the Gods, begetteth Modesty; and the beholding the Works and Facts of the Gods, causeth a Greatness of Mind; and Justice also, when you understand the Supreme Rector and Lord, what his Will and Counsell is,” (in the Constitution, Government, and Administration of this Universe of Things,) “Reason suited to his Nature, being call’d by Philosophers the true and Supreme Law.”134 As politically-Imperial, the supreme Rector appointeth to the subordinate Deities their Lots and Prefectures, and their Function and Employment is to execute his Appointments. “For the Sun, as also the other Gods, was made for some Work, or Function.”135

  But, in order to form a just Notion of the Pagan Polytheism, it is requisite to distinguish the various Acceptations of Saturn, Jupiter, and other Deities, in the Gentile Theology. Sometimes they are taken Cosmically; as when Jupiter is said to be the whole World, or the Soul of it, and Saturn is confounded with Uranus, or Heaven. Sometimes they are taken Astrally; as when by Jupiter is meant the Sun, or the Planet so called: So the highest of the Planets is a Saturn. Sometimes they are taken Physically; as when by Saturn is meant Time, and by Jupiter some Elementary Nature. So Empedocles calleth the igneous Nature, or Aether, Jupiter; the Air, Juno; the Earth, Pluto; the Water, Nestis.136 Sometimes the Names of the Pagan Deities signify Historically, or of the Hero-Kind, in which Notion there are many Joves, and not a few Saturns.

  The Mundane-System Jove is Order, Law, Providence, Fate, and Fortune, amongst the Heathens.7. Jove, the Rector of the Universe, is Order, Law, Fate, Fortune, Providence. “Either this Universe is a mere Hotch-Potch and casual Implication of Things, which may be dis-joyn’d and dissipated; or there is in it Union, Order, and a Providence.”137 But it could not be κόσμος, a regular and comely Piece, without Order; and this Order, and the Law that is visible in the Universe infer a Providence, “whereby the World, and all the Parts of it, were at first constituted, and are at all Times administred.138The equable Motion and Circumvolution of the Heaven, the Sun, Moon, and all the Stars, their Distinction, Variety, and Pulchritude, Order; the Sight of these Things sufficiently sheweth, that they are not by Chance,”139 but “by an eternal Law, or Prescript, a Law of the World,”140 which the Stoicks call Fate.

  • • Sed nihil in totâ magis est mirabile mole,
    • Quam Ratio, & certis quod Legibus omnia parent.
  • • The Course and Frame of this vast Bulk display
    • A Reason and fix’d Laws, which all obey. Manil. L. 1. Astron.141

  But, as the governing Mind, or Reason, which constituted and administreth the corporeal World, is Law to it: So all Things that befal Mankind are of his Pre-Ordination and Appointment, as the Stoicks suppose; and, therefore, they derive all Things from a Law of Fate. “All Things proceed by a fix’d sempiternal Law; Fatality leadeth us; by a long Series and Concatenation of Causes all Things necessarily emerge; your joyous and mournful Occurrences were appointed long ago.”142 A wise Man will understand, “That whatever happens is a Law of” (universal) Nature. “It was ordinated to him, and he to it.143Whatever happens to thee, it is that which from Eternity was predestinated unto thee; thy subsistence and such an Accident are, by an implex’d Series of natural Causes from Eternity, fatally connected, or spun together.”144 Fatality, by this Hypothesis, is screw’d up to a high pitch of Extravagance; especially, as this their Dogma, That all Things come to pass fatally, is understood by the antient Stoicks, for they subvert, as appeareth, all contingency and human Liberty of Agency, and, consequently, all Humanity and Divinity.145 In the Constitution of the World, they suppos’d Jupiter hamper’d by material Necessity, (that, because of the in obsequiousness of the Matter, some Men are unavoidably made of an evil Disposition, and good Men are obnoxious to external Evils;) and not being able to do what he would, he is willing to do what he can.146 In his Administration of the World and Sovereign Disposal of Things, he can alter nothing of his own Fatal Decrees;147Scripsit fata, sed sequitur, having once written the Fates, he always obeys them; (some suppose, that the three Fates wrote his Decrees;) and, consequently, the supreme Deity, with respect to his Administration of Things, is nothing but Intelligent Fate in himself, and to the World; (as Plastick Natures are nothing else but blind Unintelligent Fate in themselves, and to the World;) and unchangeable and inexorable Fate is the supreme Deity.

  • • Μόνη γὰρ ῤν θεοῖσιν οὐ δεαϖόζεταμ.
  • • For Fate alone among the Gods is not subject

  But, altho’ their rigid Genius hath introduc’d much of extravagant Fatality, yet some of the antient Stoicks attempted to mollify the rigor of Fate, to accommodate it to human Liberty.148 They refuse not the Name of Fortune; for they advise Men to commit Externals τω δαιμονίῳ, τῇτύχῃ, To the Divinity, to Fortune,149 understanding there by the Disposal of Things by Providence. Notwithstanding their rigid Genius, they are no Friends to that rigid Doctrine of absolute Reprobation; “for God” (as they suppose) “hath made all Men to Felicity and good Estate of Mind, and hath given them what is requisite thereunto.150If the Gods have consulted concerning me, and those Things that ought to happen to me, they have well consulted; for a God devoid of Counsel is scarce conceivable: But to do me a Mischief, what should impel them? For what Emolument would accrue from thence, either to them, or to the Publick, which they chiefly take care of?”151 Inexorable Fate, according to their generally receiv’d Maxims, is their sovereign Deity, yet some of them are prone to think, that there is a placable and flexible Providence;152 and others of them tell us, that they had better Notices of the supreme Jupiter. “They call Jupiter placid, being such to them who change from Injustice; for he is not irreconcileable to them, Whence their Altars to Jupiter placid to suppliants.”153 They allow not God, or Man, to be properly angry with Criminals; yet suppose, that the Rector of the Universe is just and good Government to the Whole. “That he hath made the Parts for the Use of the Whole,154and ordereth all Things, as is most conducive to the Good of the Whole.155Good Men are his Witnesses, that he existeth; and governeth the Universe of Things well, and neglecteth not human Affairs, and that nothing Evil shall happen to a good Man, either alive, or dead.”156 He disposeth all to a good Use, as is most necessary for the Good of the World. “For he, the Governour of the Universe, will not fail to put thee to a good Use.157Neither willingly, nor unwillingly, doth he commit any Error.158His Government is Paternal, as a Father taking care of all, that his Citizens may be happy like himself.159Making a distribution of Things as it is fit and just”;160 (whence they style him νομος, from νέμα, to distribute;) the better Men have the better Part,161 and the Good are not afflicted without great Reason, and for wise and good Ends.162

  The Doctrine of the Antients, concerning Fate, being somewhat intricate and perplex’d; and the Reverend Mr. John Jackson having, in my Opinion, set that Matter in a clear Light in his Defence of Human Liberty P. 150, &c.163 I believe it will not be unacceptable to the Reader, to lay it before him in Mr. Jackson’s Words, as follows.

  “That there is such a Thing as Fate, and that many Events are effected by it, was the general Opinion of all Philosophers, Anaxagoras amongst the Gentiles, and the Sadducees among the Jews, only excepted; who were both of Opinion, that nothing was the Effect of Fate, and that it was a mere empty Name. And as these wholly deny’d Fate in every Sense, so it must be confess’d, that there were some others, who carried the Notion of it as far in the other Extreme, and taught, that every Thing, all Events, and even human Actions, were effected by the impulsive Necessity of it. I shall, therefore, shew the Reader, who those were, who really held the Sentiments of the Fatalists; and then set forth distinctly and particularly that Notion of Fate, or Necessity, which was the concurrent receiv’d Opinion of all Sects of Philosophers.

  “Plutarch tells us, that Parmenides and Democritus held, ‘That all Things came to pass by Necessity; and that this Necessity was Fate, and Justice, and Providence, and the Maker of the World.’164Heraclitus was of the same Opinion.165 To these Cicero joyns Empedocles, and, by mistake, Aristotle.166 That this was a mistake of Cicero’s, appears from Plutarch, in his Treatise of the Opinions of the Antient Philosophers, where he remarks no such Thing concerning Aristotle, tho’ he does observe, that Democritus and Heraclitus, to whom he adds Parmenides, were of that Opinion, which Cicero ascribes to them; and had Aristotle, who was so much more eminent than the others, been of the same Opinion, he could hardly have neglected to have taken notice of it. But farther; Hierocles expressly says, that Aristotle’s Philosophy agreed with Plato’s, and that the most learned Ammonius, who perfectly understood the Philosophy of both of them, shew’d that they agreed together.167 The concurrence of the Platonick and Aristotelian Philosophy he again insists on; and speaks with contempt of those who pretended they disagreed; and in particular declares, that they were of the same Opinion in the Notion of Fate, and that he himself agreed with them.168 ‘That it was not the senseless Necessity of the Fortune-tellers; nor the Stoical Compulsion—but that it was the judicial Operation of the divine Power, effecting Events according to the Laws of Providence, and determining the Order and Series of our Circumstances in the World, according to the free Purposes of our voluntary Actions.’169 And Aristotle himself expressly asserts and explains at large the Freedom of human Actions. He lays the Foundation of Praise and Dispraise in Mens voluntary Actions.170 He proves Freedom from Deliberation and Desire, which he makes to be the same with Choice.171 He expressly declares, that our Actions are Voluntary and by Choice; that the Practice of Virtue and Vice is in our own Power: And that this is evidently the Opinion, not only of all private Persons, but of Legislators themselves, who punish those who commit Evil, if they do it not through Compulsion, or involuntary Ignorance; and reward those who do well.172 And the learned Alexander Aphrodisius and Ammonius Hermias have wrote each a Treatise, to shew the Agreement of Aristotle with the Platonick Notion of Fate and human Liberty. It appears also from Cicero, that the antient Diodorus was a Fatalist, maintaining, that all Truths in Futurity, as well as those which are actual, are necessarily such, and cannot but be.173

  “These are the principal Asserters of the Doctrine of absolute Fatality that we know of; and they who follow’d their Opinion, all founded the Arguments and Reasons of it in the Supposition of the Truth of the Material System, or that nothing existed but Body and Matter.

  “First; Those of the Atomical Sect, who follow’d the Opinion of Democritus, alledg’d, that all Things, even human Actions, were effected by the eternal necessary Motion, and perpendicular Impulse, of self-existent corporeal Atoms, by whose fortuitous Concourse and Union all Things were form’d.174

  “Secondly; Those amongst the Stoicks, who adher’d to the Doctrine of Heraclitus, were of three several Opinions.

  “‘Some derived all Things from the first Cause of the Universe, which they said pervaded all Things, and not only gave Motion to, but was the Efficient Cause of, every Thing; styling it Fate, and the Supreme Cause, and supposing it to be itself all Things; and that, not only all other Things which exist, but even the inward Purposes of our Minds also, proceeded from the efficient Power of it, as the Members of an Animal are not mov’d of themselves, but by that governing Principle, which is in every Animal.’175 This was making no Agent in the World, but God only, and human Actions to be nothing but the Operations of God in Men, actuating them and every Thing else, as the Soul does the Body.

  “Thirdly; The Astrological Notion of Fate was this; ‘That the Circumvolution of the Universe effected all Things by its Motion, and by the Position and Appearances of the Planets and fix’d Stars with respect to each other; and, founding upon these the Art of Prognostication, would have it, that every Thing came to pass thereby.’176 This is but another way of ascribing every Thing we do, our Purposes and Passions, our Wickedness and Appetites, to the Universe, or to God.

  “Fourthly; Another Notion of Fatality was founded on the Supposition of ‘a mutual eternal Concatenation and Chain of Causes, whereby Things posterior always follow those which are antecedent, and are resolv’d into them, as existing by them; and are necessarily consequent to those which precede them: This was another way of effecting an absolute Fatality.’177 And this was the most plausible, and most insisted on by the Maintainers of Necessity; and was grounded on the Supposition, that every Motion was caus’d by an external impulse of Matter, and that there was no internal Principle, or Cause of Motion, or Action, in the Mind at all.

  “These are the several Opinions of the antient Fatalists, which resolv’d into two; the one made every Thing the necessary Effect of the eternal Motion and Concourse of Atoms; the absurdity of which, as supposing an eternal Chain of Effects, without any original Cause, or Agent at all, evidently appears; and which, by inferring the Necessity of human Actions, and thereby taking away the Foundation and Distinction of Virtue and Vice, and the consequent Praise and Dispraise due unto them, was rejected by Epicurus himself on this very Account.178 The other made no Agent in the World but God, who was suppos’d to be infus’d, like a Soul, thro’ the whole Universe, and to act in every Thing by an eternal Chain of Causes, necessarily connected with each other; and all deriv’d from God (who was called Fate) as the original, or supreme Cause of all.

  “This latter, tho’ more plausible than the former, yet so plainly inferr’d such a Fate as made Mens Actions necessary, (as both Plotinus and Cicero observe,179 ) whereby the Nature of Virtue and Vice, of Rewards and Punishments, were so wholly destroy’d, that it made the Notion it-self intolerable, as Cicero calls it; insomuch that the Defenders of it were forc’d to allow notwithstanding, (tho’ inconsistently with themselves,) that there was a Power of Action, or Free-Agency in Mens Minds; and durst not affirm, that human Actions were necessary: And the opposite Party was so averse to it on this Account, as to recur to the other Extreme, and maintain that the voluntary Motion, or Exertion of the Mind was not at all influenc’d by Fate, or antecedent Causes. These two rigid opposite Tenents, as they were thought, made the famous Chrysippus,180 and the most Reasonable and Learned of the Antients of all Sects, step in as Moderators between these two Opinions, and come to an Agreement on all Sides, that on the one Hand Necessity was to be excluded from human Actions, that so the Distinction of Virtue and Vice, and the Rewards and Punishments, both of divine and human Laws, founded upon them, might be preserv’d inviolated; so on the other Hand Fate, even with respect to human Actions, (as well as to external Events consequent upon them, in which it was absolute and uncontroulable,) was so far to be restrain’d, as that it was to be allow’d, that antecedent Causes were the Motives of acting, or influenc’d the Mind to act, tho’ the principal and efficient Cause of Action was a natural Power and free Exertion of the Mind itself.

  “This Distinction of Fate and Necessity, and middle Opinion founded upon it, prevail’d amongst all sorts of Philosophers, Stoicks as well as Platonicks, &c. (excepting the ignorant Astrologers and Fortune-tellers amongst the Stoicks;) accordingly, we learn from Plutarch, that Plato (the great Assertor of the Freedom of the Mind) ‘admitted Fate with respect to the human Soul and Life; but adds withal, that the Cause (of Action) is in ourselves. The Stoicks, in agreement with Plato, say, that Necessity is an invincible and compulsive Cause; but that Fate is the determin’d Connection of Causes, in which Connection our Power of Action is contain’d: So that some Things are destin’d, and others not.’181

  “And Austin says, ‘That the Stoicks distinguish’d the Causes of Things (into antecedent and efficient, as hath been before observ’d) that they might exempt some from Necessity, and subject others to it: And amongst those which they allow’d, not to be under Necessity, they plac’d our Wills; lest otherwise, if subjected to Necessity, they should not be free.’182

  “Hence it appears, that there is no real Difference betwixt the Platonical and Stoical Philosophy, in the Opinion of Fate, and the Freedom of human Actions; and that which hath led Men, thro’ Mistake, to think, that it was the constant and settled Doctrine of the Stoicks, that human Actions were subject to an absolute Fatality, or Necessity, is their asserting in general Terms, that all Things were originally fix’d and determin’d by the Laws, or Decrees of Fate, and are carried on and effected by an immutable Connection and Chain of Causes; whereas this Fatality, or Necessity, with respect to Men, was only understood of external providential Events, which were appointed consequential to the Nature of their Actions, presuppos’d to be free and in their own Power. For the most eminent and rigid Stoicks plainly assert the Freedom of human Actions, as hath been prov’d above; and the Platonicks, who are known to be most zealous for the Cause of Liberty, do yet with the Stoicks constantly maintain Fate, and a determined Order and Series of antecedent Causes.

  “From the preceding Observations, then, we learn what was the true Opinion, in general, both of the Platonicks and Stoicks concerning Fate; namely, that it was no other than the Laws of divine Providence, whereby all Things are govern’d, according to their several Natures; and therefore, particularly in respect of Men, it was understood to be the Rules and Decrees of divine Providence, determining the Events of human Life, and dispensing Rewards and Punishments, according to the Nature of Mens voluntary Actions.

  “They thought, that God govern’d the World by his sovereign Will, which they call’d Providence, by which he made fix’d and unalterable Laws for the Administration of the whole Universe; and that he determin’d Mens Conditions, and their Happiness, or Misery, whether here, or hereafter, according as their Actions freely chosen, and done voluntarily, should be. So that Fate, in reality, was no other than Providence,183 or the immutable Law and Rule of God’s Government of the World; and which was call’d Necessity, (not as being suppos’d to effect necessarily, or to be the necessary efficient Cause of human Actions, but) because it was the necessary Law of all Nature; and the external Effects of it, or the Events produc’d by it, by a Series of antecedent Causes, in consequence of Mens voluntary Actions, were unavoidable and necessary.

  “That this is the true antient Notion of Fate and Necessity, I shall further distinctly prove, by a brief and indisputable Deduction of Particulars.

  “Zeno, the Father of the Stoicks, in his Letter to King Antigonus tells him, ‘It is manifest, that you are not only by Nature inclin’d to Greatness of Mind, but by Choice also.’184 Again; ‘That which is Good is Eligible, as being that which is most worthy to be chosen.’185

  “Cicero tells us, concerning Chrysippus, (who was a rigid Stoick, and whom his Adversaries charg’d as holding the Necessity of human Actions in consequence of his Assertion, that all Things proceeded from Fate, or a Chain of antecedent Causes) that in order ‘to assail the Argument from whence Necessity was inferred, holding at the same time, that nothing happened without a preceding Cause, he distinguish’d the Kinds of Causes, that he might avoid Necessity, and still hold Fate. Of Causes, saith he, some are perfect and principal,’ (efficient) ‘Causes, others are assistant, and immediately precedent. Wherefore, when we say, that all Things come to pass by the Fatality of antecedent Causes, we do not understand this Fatality to belong to the perfect and principal ’(efficient) ‘Causes, but only to the immediately-precedent assistant Causes; upon which Distinction he thus reasons; If all Things come to pass by Fatality, it doth indeed follow, that they come to pass with antecedent Causes, but these are not the perfect and principal ’ (efficient) ‘Causes of the Event, but only the assistant Causes, which are nearest to the other; which assistant Causes, altho’ they are not in our Power, it does not thence follow, that our Affections are not in our Power; but this would follow, if the perfect and principal Causes were not in our Power.’186

  “Cicero acknowledgeth this Reasoning of Chrysippus to be very much labour’d and obscure; but what he meant, he endeavoured ingeniously to explain by the rolling of a Cylinder and Whipping of a Top, which, tho’ they could not begin to move without being impelled by an external Force, yet, after Motion was given to them, they would continue to move, as it were, of themselves, by the Internal Power of their own Volubility, which belongs to their Nature, and was not given to them by that which was the first and immediate external Cause of their Motion. So in like manner he suppos’d, that external impulsive Causes, which were Subject to Fate, or out of our Power, were the antecedent and first Causes, or Occasions, of the internal Motion of the Mind, i.e. that they set the Mind on Work; but yet, that our Inclinations, Purposes and Actions following, were in our Power, and under the Direction and Government of the Will.187 From which Explanation it appears, that Chrysippus meant, by the perfect and principal Cause of Action, the internal efficient Cause, or the voluntary Motion or Exertion of the Mind itself into Action; and by the Assistant precedent Cause, he meant the external Cause, or Motive, of Action; and so his Reasoning is just and right.

  “And that Chrysippus really meant, that Mens Actions were in their own Power, (tho’ external Causes out of their Power, which he call’d Fate, concurr’d to the Production of them,) and that they were the Effects of voluntary Choice; Gellius informs us from his own express Words: ‘Wherefore (says Chrysippus in Gellius) it is a Saying of the Pythagoreans; you may know that Men bring Evils voluntarily upon themselves: Mens Calamities proceeding from their own selves; and their Sins and Vices resulting from their own Appetites, Intentions, and Purposes. Wherefore, says Chrysippus, we ought not to endure or hear those wicked, slothful, pernicious and audacious Men, who, when they are convicted of a Fault, or of an Offence, fly to a necessary Fatality for refuge, and attribute their wicked Actions, not to their own Temerity, but to Fate.’188

  “From this Explanation of the Notion of Chrysippus it will appear further, that the Dispute betwixt him and his learned Scholar Carneades and others (who deny’d there were any antecedent Causes, or Fatality, of Mens Actions, and affirmed, that the Motion, or Exertion, of the Mind was purely voluntary189 ) was only a Dispute about Words; each of them understanding the Word Cause in a different Sense. His Reasoning, which the Epicureans urg’d against Chrysippus, Cicero sets forth thus, viz.

  “‘When they’ (the Epicureans) ‘had admitted, that there was no Motion without a Cause, they needed not’ (Carneades taught them) ‘grant, that all Events came to pass by antecedent Causes: For that there was no external and antecedent Cause of our Will; therefore the common Custom of saying, that any one will, or will not, do a Thing without a Cause, is an Abuse of Speech; for, when we say, without a Cause, we mean only, without an external and antecedent Cause, not without any Cause at all.—An external Cause is not requisite to the voluntary Motion of the Mind; for voluntary Motion, in the Nature of the Thing, is in our own Power and Choice; and that not without Cause; for the Cause of it is the Nature of the Mind itself.’190 Presently after he shews (which was the Point of the Dispute) what is truly and properly the Cause of a Thing, viz.

  “‘That is the Cause, which effects that, of which it is the Cause; as a Wound causeth Death; ill Digestion, a Disease; Fire causeth Heat. Therefore Cause is not so to be understood, as if that which is antecedent merely to a Thing was the Cause of it; but that only is the Cause, which is the antecedent efficient Cause.’191

  “Whence it is evident, as Cicero observes upon the matter, that they, who thought the voluntary Motions of the Mind were not affected by any Fatality;192 and Chrysippus, who held a Fate to belong even to human Actions, tho’ he allow’d them to be voluntary, and not effected by Necessity, really meant the same Thing; only those external Motives, which Chrysippus styl’d antecedent Causes and Fate (expressly declaring his meaning at the same time, that they were not the perfect and principal, i.e. efficient, Causes of Action) Carneades, and others, the Academicks, wou’d not allow to be properly Causes at all; insisting, that the efficient Cause, only, was the true Cause of Action; ‘and that in what Things soever the antecedent Causes were such, that it was not in our Power, that the Things should be otherwise, these Things were properly effected by Fate; but those Things, the effecting of which are in our own Power, are wholly exempt from Fate.’193 Understanding Fate, which they excluded from Mens Actions, in the Sense of a necessary impulsive Cause; whilst Chrysippus understood the Fate which he ascrib’d to them, in the Sense of a concurrent Cause, or Motive, of Action only: Which shew’d, there was no real Difference in their Opinions; and that both agreed, that Mens Actions were in their principal, perfect or efficient Cause truly voluntary.

  “And hence we may observe, That when Plutarch charges Chrysippus with holding, ‘That not the least Thing, either rests, or moves, otherwise than according to the Appointment of God, whom he makes the same with Fate—and that he makes Fate (which he calls Necessity, &c.) an invincible and uncontroulable and immutable Cause;’194 He either mistakes, or strains Chrysippus’s Notion too far; or else Chrysippus is only speaking of the Fatality, or Necessity, of external Providential Events, and not of human Actions; from which Fatality, or Necessity, Plutarch himself implies, that he exempts them; owning that, with respect to Mens Actions, he (Chrysippus) ‘made Fate, not the perfect ’ (i.e. the efficient, as hath been above observed from Cicero) ‘but only the precedent (i.e.) the concurrent Cause only.’

  “Again; Cicero himself answers the Argument against Liberty, which is here made, in these Words; viz.

  “‘Altho’ some are more inclin’d to some Things than others are, thro’ natural antecedent Causes, it does not thence follow, that there are natural antecedent (efficient) Causes of our Wills and Desires: For, if so, nothing would be in our own Power. But now we readily own, that to be acute, or dull, of strong, or of weak, Constitutions, is not in our Power: But he that thinks it thence follows, that even to sit, or to walk, is not Matter of Will and Choice, does not perceive the Tendency of that Consequence. For, altho’ there are antecedent Causes of Men’s being born with quick, or slow, Capacities, with robust, or infirm, Constitutions; Yet it does not follow, that our sitting and walking, and doing any Action, is determined and appointed by these Causes.’195 He adds presently;

  “‘Vices’ (he means vicious Inclinations, as his preceding Instances shew) ‘may grow from natural Causes; but to extirpate and eradicate them, so as that he who hath these vicious Propensities may be wholly freed from them, is not in the Power of natural Causes, but is effected by the Will, by Study and Discipline.’196 Than which Reasoning nothing can be more truly and strongly offer’d.

  “To the same Argument the learned Alexander Aphrodisius thus replies; ‘Those Things which proceed from a Cause, do not always proceed from an external Cause; on which account something is in our own Power, of which we ourselves are the proper Cause, and not any external Cause. Wherefore those Things which in this respect are without Cause, have yet a Cause from ourselves. For Man himself is the original and Cause of those Actions which are done by him, and this is properly to be a Man, to have a Principle of Action within himself, as it is the Property of a Globe to be roll’d down a steep Place. Wherefore other Things are impelled by external Causes, but Man is not; because it is essential to him, to have a Principle and Cause (of Action) within himself, so as not to be impell’d by exterior Causes. If we had one View in our judging about Actions, it might with Reason be said, that our Judgments about the same Things was always the same: But since it is not so, (for those Things we make choice of, we choose sometimes for the Goodness, sometimes for the Pleasure, sometimes for the Profit of them, and these do not produce the same Effects;) it happens, that we sometimes prefer the Motives to that which is good, before all others; again, at other times our Judgment leads us to prefer that which is pleasant, or profitable. For, as we seek for no other Cause, why the Earth is carried downward according to its Gravity, and why Animals act, as they do, by Appetite, than that each of these has, of itself, an efficient Cause derived from its Nature; so neither is there any other Cause to be sought of those different Actions, which we do at different Times, in different Circumstances, but only the Man himself. For this is to be a Man, namely, to be the Original and Cause of those Actions, which are done by him.’197

  “To which, on the same Argument, I shall add the Opinions of the two most learned Christian Philosophers, Eusebius and Origen.

  “Eusebius says; ‘Altho’ a thousand external fortuitous Obstacles oppose the Temper of our Bodies, and the voluntary Desires of our Minds, yet the freely-exerted Virtue of the Soul is able to withstand them all; demonstrating, that the Power, which we have within us, of choosing that which is good, is unmatchable and invincible.’198

  “Origen’s Observation is as follows, viz.

  “‘We confess (saith he) that many Things which are not in our Power, are Causes of many Things that are in our Power; without which, namely, those Things which are not in our Power, other Things, which are in our Power, would not be done. But those Things which are in our Power, and are done consequentially to antecedent Things, which are not in our Power, are done so as that, notwithstanding these antecedent Things, we might have done otherwise. But, if any one would have it, that our Free-will is wholly independent of every Thing in the World, so as that we do not choose to do some Things by reason of certain (precedent) Accidents, he forgets, that he is a Part of the World, and comprehended within human Society, and the circumambient Air.’199

  “It is evident, that after Reasons, or Motives, not in Mens Power, are offered to them to act, and they cannot help thinking it right to act upon them, and are in their last Judgment determined to act upon them, (and the Event shews that they do act upon them;) they can yet deliberate with themselves before they act, and can suspend the Action without any external Motive whatsoever; which clearly shews, that the Action proceeds from Will and Choice, and is voluntary, not necessary.

  “My Adversary himself allows, That Choice and Preference imply Doubt and Deliberation; which tho’ not true, as I have shewn; yet, on the other side, it is true, that Deliberation and Suspension imply Will and Choice: For it is, I think, Demonstration, that, if the Motives of acting are such as impell the Mind necessarily to act, i.e. to act, not by Will, but by Necessity, then there can be no Suspension of Action; but the Moment that the Mind is impelled, it must act, just as a Balance moves the Instant that the Weight is hung upon it: Necessity has no Regard to Time, but, if it acts at all, acts equally in every Moment of Time; and, if it is the immediate efficient Cause, or Power of Action, must act as soon as it takes place, or impells the Mind; and I would desire to be told, what Power of the Mind it is, (if it is not that which we call Will,) which is able perpetually to resist, without the Assistance of any external Motive, the Operations of Necessity by Suspension of Actions. That this Suspension is caus’d by the Will, and, consequently, that the Action following is voluntary, may farther appear by there being no Suspension, or Deliberation, where the Actions, or Effects, are not voluntary, as whether the Pulse, or Heart, should beat, and in the case of the Actions of Madmen, of Men in a Fever, or under a violent Surprise, or Passion; the more of Necessity there is, there is always the less of Deliberation and Suspension; and, if the Motive necessarily produces the Action, it produces it also instant aneously. This Argument may be worth Consideration; and to it I shall subjoin the Opinion of the great Aristotle; who thus argues;

  “‘Deliberation and Choice is one and the same Thing; for that which was deliberated upon is the Matter of Choice.—Now the elective Faculty, being deliberative, and that which desires those Things which are in our Power, the Choice itself is the deliberative Desire of those Things which are in our Power: For, judging upon Deliberation, we afterwards desire what we deliberated upon.’200

  “And the learned Alexander Aphrodisius says;

  “‘Certainly Man hath not the Power of Deliberation in vain, as it must be, if he acts by Necessity. But it plainly appears, that Man alone hath, by Nature, this Power above the rest of Animals, that he is not like them led merely by Sense, but is endued with Reason, whereby to judge of Objects. By which Reason examining the Objects of Sense, if he finds them to be really what at first they appear’d to be, he assents to the Evidence of his Senses, and pursues the Objects of them. But, if he finds them different from what they appeared, he does not continue in his Conception of them, being convinc’d by Reason, upon Consideration, of the Falsity of them. Wherefore we deliberate only about such Things, as are in our Power to do, or not: And, when we act without Deliberation, we often repent and blame our-selves for our Inconsideration. Also, if we see others act unadvisedly, we reprehend them as guilty of a Fault, and the Ground of our Consultation with others is, that Things are in our own Power.’201

  “Let us proceed, farther to explain the Doctrine of Chrysippus and the Stoicks, whose Notions, concerning Human Liberty, have been much mistaken and misrepresented.

  “Chrysippus says, ‘Fate is the Reason of the World, or the Law of Providence, by which all Things in the World are govern’d.’202 And Gellius tells us, that Chrysippus held, that the ‘Order and Reason and Necessity of Fate was a Motive of Action, to the general and efficient Causes of it; but that every one’s own Will and Dispositions directed the Exertion of our Minds and Purposes, and the Actions of them.’203 And Diogenianus the Peripatetic, writing against Chrysippus, says, ‘It is manifest, from the Distinction which he (Chrysippus) makes, that the Cause (of Action) which is in us, is exempt from Fate.’204 And he cites Chrysippus as declaring, ‘That it is evident, that many Things are done by our own Power, but yet, nevertheless, that these Things are connected with Fate, by which the Universe is govern’d.’205

  “Whence it appears, that the learned Dr. Cudworth is mistaken, when he says, that the antient Stoicks, Zeno and Chrysippus, asserted, that God acted necessarily in the general Frame of Things in the World; from whence, by a Series of Causes (they thought) doth unavoidably result whatsoever is done in it. Which Fate is a Concatenation of Causes, all in themselves necessary.206

  “For which Opinion, concerning these two most eminent Stoicks, the learned Doctor produceth not the least Evidence. That which deceived him, and hath also deceived others, both antients (as Cicero and Gellius observe) and moderns, is, their Notion of a Series and Concatenation of Causes; which Causes, tho’ they were supposed necessarily to produce each other, yet they were not supposed, to proceed necessarily from God, the original and first Cause, but to be derived from the perfect Wisdom of his Nature, and his Will, as Seneca, the Stoick, has informed us: And were not thought to be the efficient Causes of human Actions, (which they expressly exempted from the Coercion of them,) but were only understood, to be Motives, or secondary Causes; whilst they placed the principal and efficient Cause of Action within the Mind itself: So that the Necessity of this Stoical Chain of Causes was only supposed, to operate in the Production of external providential Events, consequential to Mens Actions, which were taught to be voluntary and in their own Power. And it plainly appears, from the Words of Balbus, the Stoick, mention’d by Cicero (de nat. Deor. L. 2.) that the antient Stoicks agreed with the Platonicks, in asserting the free and voluntary Motion, Exertion, or Agency, of the human Mind. To proceed therefore;

  “Cicero, in the Person of Velleius, represents the Stoical Notion of Fate to be, ‘That all Events proceed from the eternal Truth and Connection of Causes.’207Diogenes Laertius says it was their Opinion, ‘That Fate is the Connection of the Causes of Things, or that Reason, by which the World is govern’d.’208

  “Seneca (the Stoick) says; ‘Fate is nothing else, but the Connection of Causes.’209

  “Marcus Antoninus the Emperor, and Stoical Philosopher, frequently expresses his Notion of Fate in like manner.210 But that in this Fate, or Chain of Causes, the Power of Action in Men was contain’d, and was (υπὲρ μὸρον) exempt from the Necessity of Fate, we are assur’d (from Plutarch211 ) was the common Opinion of Stoicks and Platonists. And Tacitus, speaking of the Stoicks, says, ‘They attribute, indeed, a Fatality unto Things, but not as proceeding from the Motion of the Planets, (which was the Astrological Notion only,) but from the Principle and Connection of natural Causes: And yet they leave the Conduct of our Life to our own Choice, which being chosen, a certain Order of Events (they think) follows.’212

  “Alcinous sets forth Plato’s Opinion of Fate, in the following Manner: ‘He understands Fate to be this; That, if any Person chooseth such a sort of Life, and will do such and such Actions, such and such Consequences will follow. Wherefore the Soul is unrestrain’d, and hath it in its own Power to act, or not, and in this respect (of any particular Action) is not compelled: But the Consequence of it’s Action will be effected by Fate: As for Example, if Paris will carry away Helen, which it is in his Power to do, or not, the Event will be, that the Grecians will make War against the Trojans for her.’213

  “Hierocles teacheth, that ‘Fate is the judicial Operation of the Deity, effecting Events according to the Laws of Providence, and directing human Affairs in the Order and Course that is suitable to their free Purposes and voluntary Actions.’214 The precedent Arguments, upon which he builds his Notion, are, viz.

  “‘If (says he) bodily and external Events fall out fortuitously and by Chance, what becomes of the Superintendency of God, to judge and recompense every one according to his Deserts? For we will not suppose these Things to happen without Appointment, and say, that our just Purposes, and our Judgments and Desires, proceed from an overruling Necessity: For, if so, we should not impute Virtue and Vice to ourselves, but to that Necessity. Nor is it reasonable to suppose all Things to be the necessary Effects of them, I mean the Actions of the Soul, as well as the Things that are without us, and concern the Body. Nor ought we to ascribe all Things to the unintelligent and undirected Circumvolution of the Universe; there being a Mind, that presides over all Things, and a God, who is the Author of the World. That which necessarily remains, therefore, is, that the Choice we make is in our own Power, and that a righteous Recompense is awarded, according thereto, by coelestial Beings and Judges appointed by God, and who have the Care of us committed to them.—And the Supposition of a Recompence, according to our Merit, immediately infers a Providence and Fate, as the consequent of it; and judicial Providence, which orders the Events of human Affairs, according to Right and Equity, depends upon the Principle of our Will and Choice: So that Fate is a Part of universal Providence, and the Rule of Judgment upon the Souls of Men.’215

  “To which he adds presently after; ‘To choose, is in the Power of the Mind; but the Events following the Choice, are determined by a judicial Providence, recompensing the Purposes of the Soul, according to its Desert: And thence we are said, both to choose our Condition of Life, and to have it destin’d to us. For the Recompense, ordain’d to follow our Works, both manifests the free Motion (or Operation) of our Mind, and the divine Superintendency over us. So that it is evident, that the Motions (or Operations) of our Minds, from Beginning to End, are free—and that the Recompence of our Deserts is not without Appointment,—as neither is Fate, which is the Chain and Connection of the human Will, with the divine Judgment: So that we choose what we will, thro’ an unrestrain’d Liberty, but often suffer against our Will, thro’ the unavoidable Power of Providence.’216

  “Chalcidius expresseth the Platonick Notion of Fate in like manner; viz. ‘Such, (says he) in my Opinion, is that heavenly Law, which is call’d Fate, commanding Men that which is right, and forbidding the contrary; but to obey, is in our own Power, and free from the Coercion of Fate. To praise him that does well, is both agreeable to this Law, and to the common Judgment of all.—Moreover, to live ill, is in the Power of Man, and, therefore, Punishment proceeds from a fatal Necessity, in consequence of the Law. All these Things relate to the Mind of Man, which is free, and acts by its own Choice.’217

  “Again; ‘Fate is the Decree of Providence, comprehending our voluntary Actions, as the precedent Grounds of it; comprehending, also, the Recompence of our Deserts. Punishment and Approbation, which are by Fatality, and all those Things which happen fortuitously, or by Chance, are the Consequents of it.’218

  “But, in order to understand more fully and distinctly the antient philosophical, or theological, Notion of Fate, or Necessity, we are to observe, that it was distinguished into two Senses, (tho’ in Reality amounting to the same,) in the one of which it was understood, substantially to mean that intelligent divine Being, or Substance, which govern’d the World by the Administration of the Laws of Providence; in the other it was taken abstractedly, or virtually, for the Laws, or Decrees themselves, of the divine Government of the World.

  “‘Fate (says the great Philosopher Chalcidius) was understood by Plato in a two-fold Sense, the one relating to its Substance, the other to its Energy and Power.’219

  “Thus also Plutarch represents it;220

  “Fate, in the Sense of Operation, or Power, is call’d by Plato, ‘in his Phaedrus, an unavoidable Decree; in his Timaeus, the Laws, which God endited to coelestial Beings221 concerning the Nature of the Universe.’222 The Sense of which he immediately explains; viz.

  “‘By unavoidable Decree, we may understand an irrepealable Law, proceeding from an irresistible Cause, (viz. the supreme God,) and by the Laws which God endited to (coelestial) Beings concerning the Nature of the Universe, the Law which is consequential to the Nature of the World, and by which the Universe is governed.

  “‘Fate, in the Sense of Substance (he proceeds to tell us) is the Soul of the World.’223 Which Plutarch also informs us it was.224

  “It was call’d Lachesis, or (ἀνάγνινι) Necessity; both as being supposed to be necessarily-existent, and the necessary Substratum for the Formation of rational Beings; as also, because the Laws of it were fix’d and immutable, and to which they supposed God had subjected all Beings, and even bound himself under an irreversible and necessary Obligation.

  “Chalcidius styles this Lachesis, or Necessity, ‘the divine Law,’225 by which Things future are connected with Things past and present.

  “And it is, with respect to the immutable Laws of Providence, that Plotinus calls God ‘the Necessity and Law of all Things.’226

  “Cicero in like manner (speaking of the Platonick Philosophy) observes, that this Fate, or Soul of the World, by whose providential Wisdom all Things, both in Heaven and Earth, are governed, is call’d Necessity; because nothing can happen otherwise than according to the Laws of it, whereby the eternal Order of the Universe is immutably preserved by Fatality.227

  “The Stoϊcks express their Notion of Fate (substantially) in Agreement with the Platonists.

  “‘Heraclitus styles the Substance of Fate, that Reason which pervades the Substance of the Universe; the same (he adds) is an aethereal Body, the generating Seed of the Universe.’228

  “Euripides expresses the Stoical Sense; ‘Jupiter, or the Necessity of Nature, or the Reason of Men. For Necessity and Mind is the (substantial) Power, which diffuseth itself thro’ the Universe.’229

  “Velleius, in Cicero, represents the Opinion of the Stoick Chrysippus; ‘That he says; that the Power of that perpetual and eternal Law, which is, as it were, the Guide of our Life, and Director of our Duty, is Jupiter; the same he also calls Fate and Necessity.’230 Again; ‘The Stoicks held a Necessity, which they called Fate.’231

  “Again; Diogenes Laertius tells us it was the Stoical Notion, ‘That God, and Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, were one and the same, to which they gave many other Names also.’232

  “Alexander Aphrodisius says; ‘They (the Stoicks) say that Fate, and Nature, and Reason, by which the Universe is governed, is God.’233

  “Lastly, Seneca the Stoick says; ‘What else is Nature but God, and the divine Reason, which is infused into the whole World and the Parts of it?—And, if you call the same Fate, you will not be mistaken.’234

  “There was no other Difference betwixt the Platonick and Stoick Notion of Fate, but only, that the Stoicks thought that Fate considered (Substantia, or κατ’ οὐσίαν) as a substantial divine Being, which was the Soul of the World, was the (πρῶτος θεὸς) supreme God, whom they styled ‘The first Cause of the Universe;’235 and ‘Fate and the Necessity (or necessary Cause) of Things:’236 Whereas the Platonicks made Fate (δεύτερον θεὸν, ἕτερον νοῦν, secundam Mentem) a second God, a second Mind, inferior and subservient to the supreme God.

  “The preceeding Observations will explain the Meaning of the strong poetical Expressions of the Gods, or even of Jupiter himself, the supreme God, being subject to Fate; by which, agreeably to the Platonical and Stoical Philosophy, was understood, that all subordinate Beings, how divine soever, were subject to the immutable Laws of Providence, which were the Will and Command of the supreme God; and, according to which, God himself was determined invariably to act, and so was said to be bound by, and to obey, his own Laws, as being most wise and perfect.

  “With respect to the Subjection of the inferior Deities to Fate, Chalcidius gives us Plato’s Opinion;

  “‘The Command of God, which the subordinate Gods obey, is, I think, that Reason, call’d Fate, which contains the eternal Government of Things, and is deriv’d from Providence.’237

  “To the same purpose Plato himself cites Pindar saying, ‘That the Law (of Providence) rules over all, both mortal Men, and the immortal Gods.’238

  “And Simonides; ‘The Gods themselves do not resist Necessity,’ i.e. the uncontrouble Laws of divine Providence.

  “And Seneca; ‘Whatsoever it is that commands us thus to live, or die, it binds the Gods also under the same Necessity: An irrevocable Course (of Providence) carries on, both human and divine Things; the very Maker and Governor of all Things wrote indeed the Fates, but also follows them; commanded once for all, and himself always observes what he commanded.’239

  “Lucan expresses the same Notion in a lively and poetical Manner.240

  “With respect to God’s being unalterably determined to act according to the fixed Laws of his Providence, and so to be, as it were, bound by them; Seneca styles God his own Necessity.241

  “And Cicero interprets a Greek Poet, as saying; ‘That the supreme Jupiter cannot prevent that which is decreed to come to pass.’242

  “And Herodotus; ‘It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destin’d Fate.’ And again; ‘God himself is a Servant of Necessity.’243

  “Which Passages do not mean, as if there was thought to be any Fate, or Necessity, distinct from, and really superior to, the supreme God; but only, that the Laws of divine Providence, as being the Result of infinite and perfect Wisdom, were the immutable Rule, by which God was determined to order the Event of Things, and to act in the Government of the World. To proceed therefore:

  “Fate (κατ’ ὀνέργειαν) in the abstract Sense, as implying Energy, Power, or Operation, ‘is the Laws’ (of Providence) ‘with which the Soul of the World is invested, for the good Government of the Universe.’244 Hence we see the Reason, why the Soul of the World is call’d Fate, viz. As containing in it those Laws of Providence, which are that which is call’d Fate.

  “Again; ‘It is a Decree, existent Order, and an all-comprehending Law, which derives its precedent Causes from our Deserts, as the Grounds’ (of the Events) ‘of it; and the Events, which proceed necessarily from it, are the consequential Effects of our precedent Merits, and of the Necessity’ (or immutable Sanction) ‘of that Law.’245

  “Chalcidius goes on; ‘The Foundation therefore of the divine Law, that is, of Fate, is Providence: But it is call’d Fate, because it contains, as in a Decree, the Duty of Obedience, and the Contumacy of our Disobedience to it. And Punishments and Rewards proceed from it, according to our precedent Deserts. But our precedent Deserts, whether good, or bad, are the Motion of our own Minds; and the Judgment, Consent, Desire, and Aversion of them, which are in our own Power; because the Choice of these and their contraries is in our own Power.—Therefore the Soul of the World is Fate, as it signifies a substantial Being; and that Law also, with which it is instructed for the well Governing of all Things, is that Fate, which consists in Operation and Act, and the Order and Consequence of it is; if we do this, that will follow: Therefore, the precedent Action is in our Power; the Event that follows it, is the Decree of Fate; which is otherwise call’d Fatal, and differs very much from Fate. So that there are three Things, viz. that which is in our own Power; and Fate,’ (or the Law of Providence,) ‘and the Recompence of our Deserts according to the Law of Fate.’246

  “Chalcidius concludes the Platonick Notion of Fate, from many foregoing Arguments in these Words, viz.

  “‘That some Things are effected by Fate, is true; and that some Things are in our own Power, has been prov’d to be true also. Wherefore, they who ascribe all Things to Fate, are justly found fault with by those, who prove, that some Things are in our own Power. Again; they who place every Thing in our Power, and attribute nothing to Fate, are plainly mistaken. For who knows not, that something is effected by Fate, and is not in our Power? Therefore, that Reasoning alone is true, and that Opinion firm and solid, which teacheth, that some Things happen by Fate, and other Things proceed from the Choice and Will of Men.’247

  “Thus, I think, it is clearly and indisputably prov’d, that the Freedom of human Actions was the general and prevailing, and almost unanimous Doctrine, of the most eminent and numerous Sects of Philosophers, particularly, the Five great Sects amongst the Heathens, which comprehended all the Philosophy of Greece and Rome, namely, the Epicureans, Stoicks, Platonicks, Aristotelians, and Academicks; and that the Opposers of this Doctrine were chiefly Leucippus, Empedocles, and Democritus, the first Founders of the Epicurean Sect, but oppos’d herein by Epicurus and his Followers; Heraclitus, Diodorus, and some Astrologers and Fortune-tellers amongst the Stoicks, which were greatly despised and condemned by the most learned of that Sect also. And I have also shewn distinctly, and at large, that the antient Platonick and Stoical Notion of Fate and Necessity agreed with each other, and was declar’d to be consistent with the Liberty of Mens Actions; and was not understood to be a necessary efficient Cause of human Actions at all, but only to be the determinate Will and Decrees of God, or the Laws of his Providence, by which the Universe was govern’d, and Good and Evil was dispensed unto Men, according to the free and voluntary Actions, and Conduct, of their Life.

  “And, from the preceeding Proofs of the Freedom of human Actions, as being the Sense and Opinion of the most Wise and Learned, as well as greatest Part of Mankind in all Ages, I beg leave to make one Observation, namely, that upon the Supposition of the Necessity of Mens Actions, it must appear very extraordinary and directly absurd, that the Light of natural Reason should necessarily lead Mankind at all Times to conclude their Actions to be in their own Power and Choice, and to be voluntary and free, if they are indeed necessary: That Necessity should form Mens Minds and Notions so opposite to its own Operations, and make them necessarily think their Actions are not necessary but voluntary. To which Purpose, the learned Ammonius Hermias argues; ‘Does this Reason, which’ (as they teach) ‘necessarily effects all Things, make it necessary for Men to affirm, either that all Things are necessary, or that some Things are in our Power? If the latter is true, then all Things are not necessary; but, if the former, how come many to think the contrary, viz. that many Things are in our Power? For it is altogether absurd to suppose, that Nature, which’ (they say) ‘necessarily effects all Things, should move us against Nature, to contradict the Truth of its own Operations.’”248

  So much for the Sentiments of the Antients concerning Fate, Necessity, Liberty, and Providence, from the Reverend Mr. John Jackson.249

  That the Heathens knew not the true God.8. From what has been already laid down, and from what follows, it is apparent, “That the Heathens knew not the true God,” which is their distinguishing Character, differencing them from the true People of God. The not knowing God, is distinguishable into several Sorts and Kinds; that which is Unprophetick, that which is Unphilosophick, and that which is Irreligious. That which is Unprophetick, relates only to Matters of Intercourse between God and his Prophets, and his Method of manifesting himself to them, 1 Sam. 3.7. “Samuel did not yet know the Lord, neither was the Word of the Lord yet reveal’d unto him.” That which is Unphilosophick, relates only to Philosophick Disquisition and Comprehension, Job 36. 26. “God is great and we know him not, neither can the number of his years be searched out.” That which is Irreligious, is the Opposite to such knowing God, which belongeth to Religionists as such, and constitutes the true Theists of Religion. 2 Thess. 1. 7, 8. “The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels, in flaming Fire, taking Vengeance on them that know not God.” A truly religious knowing God, a knowing him so as to be truly religious towards him, is the Essence and Summary of true Religion, the Whole of Piety. Therefore some judicious Interpreters expound the Knowledge of God by Piety, or Godliness, others by the Fear of God, which comes to the same Thing. Hos. 4. 1. “There is no Truth, nor Mercy, nor Knowledge of God in the Land.” Jer. 9.6. “They refuse to know me, saith the Lord.” Jer. 22. 16. “Was this to know me? saith the Lord.” In this Sense the Knowledge of God is preferr’d before Burnt Offerings. Hos. 6. 6. and this Knowledge of God will make holy and happy Times, Isa. 11. 9. “They shall not hurt, nor destroy in all my holy Mountain; for the Earth shall be full of the Knowledge of the Lord.” When God foretelleth by the Prophet, Jer. 24. 7. “I will give them a Heart to know me, that I am the Lord”; the Meaning is, they shall be true Pietists towards him; and by another Prophet, Hos. 2. 20. “Thou shalt know the Lord”; it is to signify, that he, on his part, would enter into a League of Amity with them, and make himself known to them at a more than ordinary Rate; and they, on their Part, shall be true Pietists. But the Sons of Eli were monstrous Impietists, and their being such was a “not knowing the Lord.” 1 Sam. 2. 22. They knew not the Lord, as David chargeth his Son Solomon, “Know the Lord God of thy Father, and serve him with a perfect Heart,” 1 Chron. 28. 9.

  Sometimes the knowing God must be explain’d by Wisdom in Divine Matters. Thus it is to be understood, Col. 1. 10. “Increasing in the Knowledge of God.” And God foretelleth by the Prophet, that the meanest Christian shall be Wise in Divine Matters. Jer. 31. 34. “They shall teach no more every Man his Neighbour, and every Man his Brother, saying, Know the Lord, for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them.” i.e. They shall all comprehend what ought to be known of God, in conjunction with Piety.

  Sometimes the Phrase of knowing God must be explain’d by what we commonly call Acquaintance, in which Sense also the Wicked are called Aliens. 1 John 4. 7, 8. “Every one that loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is Love.” 1. John 2. 4. “He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his Commandments, is a Liar,” and 3. 6. “Whosoever Sinneth,” (habitually,) “hath not seen him, neither knoweth him.” In the same Sense of knowing, the Prophet saith of crooked Paths, (Isa. 59. 8.) “Whosoever goeth therein shall not know Peace,” (so as to have any Dealings therewith;) “the Way of Peace havethey not known”; (Rom. 3. 17.) The Apostle saith of Christ, (2 Cor. 5. 21.) “He knew no Sin,” so as to have any intercourse with it; and our Saviour will say to some, as being none of his Acquaintance, “I never knew you.” Matth. 7. 23.

  Sometimes the Phrase of knowing God is best explain’d by that due Discernment and Understanding of God, which constitutes Men of the Divine Family, Subjects of his Kingdom, he being to them a God, they being to him a chosen People, which is the true Light, Wisdom and Knowledge of Believers. 1 John 5. 20. “The Son of God is come, and hath given us an Understanding that we may know him that is True,” and 2. 12. “I write unto you, Little Children, because ye have known the Father,” and John 16. 3. “These Things will they do unto you, because they have not known the Father, nor me.” The World is in such an Atheistical Ignorance of God. “O righteous Father, the World hath not known thee.” John 17. 25. In the same Sense the Psalmist saith (9. 10.) “They that know thy Name, will put their trust in Thee.” When our Saviour saith, John 17. 3. “This is Life Eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God,” the Meaning is, that to know God, as one of his Pietists, as wise in Divine Matters, as of his Acquaintance, as Children of his Family, and Subjects of his Kingdom, is Life eternal to a Man.

  But sometimes the Phrase of knowing God must be explain’d by Understanding of God and his Matters, (speaking of God in such Sense as we speak of Kings and Governments,) as our Saviour saith, Matth. 11.27. “No Man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any Man the Father, save the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him.” As to that great and saving Revelation of himself, the Christian Religion, God did not make himself known to any mere Man, “The only-begotten Son, which is in the Bosom of the Father,” (highly beloved by him, and most intimate with him,) he only hath declar’d him.

  And sometimes Mens knowing God must be explain’d, of his being barely notic’d to them, which is consistent with the greatest Atheism of Religion and Condition, as when the Apostle saith of the Gentiles, Rom. 1. 28. “They knew God, but did not like to retain God in their Knowledge,” or to make an acknowledgment of Him, which is a religious knowing God. But thus the Gentiles knew him not; for, as the acknowledg’d Deity of Religion and People, “There is no God in all the Earth, but in Israel.” 2 Kin. 5. 15.

  How far the Gentiles did know God.The Gentiles, therefore, in a certain Sense knew God, but so as not to know him in the more usual, or religious, Sense. Rom. 1. 19, 20. “That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for, God hath shewn it unto them; for the invisible Things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the Things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead.” And, accordingly, it is generally acknowledg’d, “That God is knowable by Natural Light, and is actually known by all Nations.” But this must be understood with due Distinctions and Limitations, touching the Bounds and Measures of the Gentiles knowledge of God, such as these following.

  1. The Heathen World knew God, as understood without specifick and individual Determination. They were not so ignorant, but that they acknowledg’d one Cause, or Principle, whence all Things have their Origin. This is so conspicuous in Nature, that natural Light cannot miss of him; nor is this his Existence matter of Faith, so much as of common Reason, and Proof by Argument. “The Pulchritude of the World, and the Order of the Coelestial Bodies, forceth an acknowledgment, that there is a certain excellent and eternal Nature, which is to be honour’d and ador’d by Mankind.”250 The Pagan Theologers, in Terms, agree with the Christian, that the visible World proclaimeth the invisible God, and speaketh audibly, with a Voice that is gone out through all the Earth, that God made me. One that was no under-graduate in Atheism, yet in a lucid interval, saith; “If any Man shall view throughly all the Organs, both of Generation and Nutrition, and doth not perceive them to have been made and order’d to their respective Offices by some Mind, he is to be reputed himself void of Mind.”251 To suppose, therefore, that the Existence of God is not discoverable by mere Reason, or natural Light, is a great Extravagance in Socinus, and some others.

  2. God, as of the true Specifick and individual Determination, (being plainly notic’d unto them in the Nature of the Thing,) was in Nature fairly notic’d to the Heathen World. For, as in the Old-Testament, a Messiah is notic’d and reveal’d to the Jews, not without, but with, true Specifick and individual Determination, (the true Messiah, the true kind of Messiah, is there in good Degree reveal’d:) So, in Nature, God is fairly notic’d to the Gentiles, not without, but with true, Specifick and individual Determination. They are blind and unintelligent in the Nature of Things, that do not discern, in case of Competition, which is the true God. The Jews mundan Kind of Christ, is an Anti-Christ Kind of Christ. So the Gentiles Pagan Kind of God, their Jove; being in one Part merely mundan, and in the other, diabolical and wicked; and being the Deity of a Religion, that is in one Part merely mundan, and in the other diabolical and wicked, is an Anti-God kind of God. All these Matters are so plain in the Nature of the Thing, that it must be said, a Christ is in Scripture so notic’d to the Jews, as that the true Christ, the true Kind of Christ, is fairly notic’d unto them: A God is in Nature so notic’d to all Mankind, as that the true God, the true Kind of God, is fairly notic’d unto them. “A Philosopher is no other than a true Philosopher; but, because some counterfeit Philosophy, therefore the Epithet of true was added.” So Christ is no other than the true Christ, God is no other than the true God: If God, therefore, (or a God,) was in Nature made known to the Gentiles, the true God must necessarily be notic’d unto them. And some learned Men somewhat mistake the Case, when they say. “As Oedipus knew himself to have a Father, yet did not know that Laius was he: So the Gentiles, by the Light of Nature, might reach so far as to know, there is one God, and that he is the Fountain of all Good, without knowing who was this God, as suppose the God of Israel.”252 For, in the Case of Oedipus, there was no Competition, there was no Competition between two pretending Fathers; whereas, in the Gentiles Case, there was a Competition between two pretending Gods. And Laius, (being but a particular Man) could not be known but by an individual Determination: Whereas, in Case of Competition, the true God is distinctly and certainly notic’d by a mere Specifick Determination. For as the Divine-kind of Messiah is the true Messiah: So the Divine-kind of God, (and the Deity of such a kind of Religion) is the true God; but the Ungodly-kind of God (and the Deity of such a Religion) is the false God. It is not a Divine Being, nor a Supreme Being, nor a Supreme God, but the Divine-kind of God, which Specifick Determination is plainly notic’d in the Nature of the Thing; and therefore God, as of true Specifick Determination, is in Nature, fairly notic’d to the Reason of all Men. For suppose, that Oedipus could not know, that the Man Laius was his Father; yet, in the Nature of the Thing, this was plainly notic’d, That one of Mankind was his Father: So, in the Nature of the Thing, and therefore in Nature, this is plainly notic’d to the Reason of all the World, that God is not an unholy, or ungodly, but a Divine-kind of, God. If this God, the Deity of true Holiness and Godliness, was not, as such, fairly notic’d to the Heathen World; if they had not much of the Knowledge of him and of his Truth, (touching his Truth, their Duty and their Sin, his Rewards and Punishments,) this Knowledge could not be said, to be manifest in them, because God hath shew’d it unto them: Nor could they be said, to hold the Truth (stifled, smother’d, and imprison’d) in Unrighteousness. This being their great Crime, from thence it appeareth, that the true God was so far notic’d to them, as that they were under an Obligation, to erect an Holy Empire, imperfectly such, by being in common his Religionists.

  3. As the Jews reject the true Divine-Kind of Messiah, which is notic’d unto them, such not being grateful and agreeable unto them, nor what they like and love; they are for a Messiah of another Kind: So the Gentiles did not like that of the true Divine-Kind of God, his Truth, and his Service, which was notic’d unto them, they were for another Kind of supreme God, which was more grateful to them, because of their own Kind and Quality; and so far (in setting up their Jove of several Notions jumbled and confounded together) they transform’d the Godhead into their own Similitude. According to that of Xenophanes the Colophonian; “If Horses and Oxen could draw Pictures, they would paint the Gods like Horses and Oxen, as of their own Form and Family.” The same Philosopher observeth, “That the Aethiopians paint the Gods Black, and Flat Nos’d;the Thracians paint them Reddish and Ceruleous; the Barbarians suppose them Wild and Ferine; the Greeks suppose them more Gentle and Placid.”

  4. The Heathens having form’d their Polity of Gods, and set up Jove as Chieftain of their Deities, the true God was hid from the Eyes of their Mind; and, altho he was notic’d to them, and known by them, yet no otherwise than as a Stranger-Deity (foreign to the Polity of their Gods) as they were Aliens from knowing him. For such a Degree of knowing, is knowing, not knowing, as the Apostle saith, Rom. 10. 19. “Did not Israel know?” They knew, but so as not to know. The Heathens knowing, not knowing, constituted them the Heathen People. To such a Degree the Athenians knew God, when they erected an Altar to the unknown God. To such a Degree the Kings of the Amorites and the Canaanites knew God, whose Hearts melted, “When they heard that the Lord had dried up the Waters of Jordan from before the Children of Israel.” Josh. 5. 1. And the God of Israel saith of himself, Mal. 1. 14. “My Name is dreadful among the Heathen.” To such a Degree those Pagan Magicians knew God, who made use of his Name, The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in their Inchantments.

  In what Sense they did not know God.That extraneous People the Gentiles knew not God, as a People know their God; who is the imperial Estate of their Religion, and who are none of the Strangers, Foreigners, and Aliens from his Theology and Religion. In such Sense the Gentiles Character signifieth in the Scripture, wherein the Gentiles, that knew not God, are oppos’d to God’s People; and in such Sense the God of Israel saith to Cyrus, Isa. 45. 5. “I girded thee, though thou hast not known me.” So in Ecclesiastical Writers, the Conversion of a Pagan to be one of God’s People, is express’d by a Transition from the Heathenism of the World to the Acknowledgment of the true God. And the Heathens usual Quere to the Primitive Christians, “Who is that God, which ought alone to be worshipp’d?” shews their prodigious Alienation from the Knowledge of God, and that the true God was no Deity of their Theology. Cicero hath remark’d the wild Conceits of the Stoicks concerning the Ruler of the World, or the Godhead. “Zeno and the generality of the Stoicks suppose, that the Aether is the supreme God, having a Mind whereby all Things are govern’d. Cleanthes, a Prime Stoick, andScholar of Zeno, thinketh the Sun hath the Dominion, or is Lord of us, and all, and swayeth all. Therefore, by the Dissension of the Wise, we are necessitated to be Ignorant, who is the Lord over us; for we know not, whether to pay our Service to the Sun, or Aether.”253 The Philosophers had the true Knowledge of God, as some say; but the Apostle ranketh their Knowledge of God, with the Popular-Pagan. 1 Cor. 1. 21. “Seeing that in the Wisdom of God” (that instructive Wisdom which God furnisheth in Nature) “the World by Wisdom knew not God,” (by Philosophy, they did not attain to the Knowledge of God,) “it pleas’d God by the Foolishness of Preaching to save them that Believe.”

  This Idea the King, or he that Reigneth over us, may be understood and taken, either without, or with that individual Person, who is King, or doth Reign. He that knoweth and honoureth the King only in general and indefinitely, (to use a Logical Term,) knoweth and honoureth the King according to the true Idea of a King, without any true, or determinate Knowledge of the Individual, who is King, whom he may unwittingly oppose. Many are for Truth, for Justice, Virtue, and Piety, according to some true general Notion which they have of them, that are Adversaries to that, in particular Cases, which is really and materially the Truth, Justice, Virtue, and Piety. Thus the Heathen are said to know and honour God, by having this, or the like, honourary Idea of Him in their Mind, The King of the World; The Lord of All; but with this honourary Idea some of them invested a Star; others, an Hero; others, a Demon; and others, a Platonick Idea. Some applied it to the visible Universe, being Pan-Theists; others were altogether uncertain, to what definite specifick individual Nature, it ought to be applied, and, therefore, were Theists at random, not determin’d to any one Thing; “Thou Jupiter, whether thou be the Heaven, or the Aether, or the Earth,” saith one in the Poet: Such Theists, altho’ they have a true Notion of God in their Mind, The Lord of the World, The Lord of All, or the like; yet, because they apply it not to him to whom it belongeth, they are not Theists truly such, they do not know, or acknowledge, him, who is Lord of the World, or Lord of All.

  It is not possible, that God’s Religionists should have the same Deity of a Religion in common with the Gentiles that know not God, which being their genuin and usual Character, we may infer from it, by way of Consectary, these five Branches of their Heathenism, and of ours too, so far as we symbolize with them. 1. Their Atheous Darkness, as to matter of Understanding. 2. Their Atheousness and Flagitiousness of Life. 3. The Agreeableness of Heathenism of Religion to them. 4. The Badness of their Virtue and Goodness. 5. The Deadliness of their State and Condition. For all these are our criminal not knowing God.

  Heathenism is the State of Atheous Ignorance.Consect. 1. Heathenism is the State of Atheous Ignorance. Agreeably to Platonism, the Christian Theology contra distinguisheth two opposite States and Conditions, and two opposite Kinds of People, Parties, and Families, the one Divine and of Light, the other Atheous and of Darkness. Matt.5. 14. Luk. 4. 18. Job 9. 6. and 12. 46. &c. The Apostle of the Gentiles was sent upon this Errand, “to turn them from Darkness to Light,” (Act. 26.18.) from Heathenism to Theism and Christianism of Condition, which was “a calling them out of Darkness into marvellous Light.” (1 Pet. 2. 9.) Heathenism is the Darkness of this World, of which the infernal Powers are the Rulers, Ephe. 6. 12. and therefore the Apostle saith (Ephe. 5. 8) “Ye were sometimes Darkness, but now are ye Light in the Lord.” And, because of the direct Opposition of these two States, therefore the Apostle asketh, “What Communion hath Light with Darkness?” 2 Cor. 6. 14. The Region of outer Darkness has been well explain’d by the Blindness of the Wicked; a Region of Blindness, or not-discerning, as well as of Darkness; and the Inhabitants of it are the Fools and Blind,254the Blind Leaders of the Blind, the blind People that have Eyes and see not, the Wretched and Miserable, Poor and Blind. He that lacketh these Things (Divine Graces) is Blind, living in a State of Gracelessness and Wickedness, they had need to have their Eyes open’d. Act. 26. 18. They were blind and unintelligent, to a prodigy, in the matters of Holiness and Salvation (Ephe. 4. 18.) “walking in the” (Heathenish, or Atheous) “Vanity of their Mind, having the Understanding darken’d,” (having obliterated, or at least obscured, their natural Notices of the matters of God and Godliness,) “being alienated from the Life of God, through the” (Atheous kind of) “Ignorance, that was in them, because of the Blindness of their Heart.” Their Wise Men (Rom. 1. 21, 22.) “professing themselves to be Wise, became Fools,” (unwise and unintelligent in the matters of God,) “and becoming vain in their Imaginations,” (full of Heathenish and Idolatrous Conceits, which are Atheous,) “their foolish Heart was darken’d.” The Words of Philo are lively expressive of the sad benighted Estate of the Heathen World; “The Region of the Wicked, where there is no Sun, but depth of the Night, endless Darkness, and vast Multitude of Shades, Ghosts, and Spectres, and Dreams.”255 These are always stirring in the night-time of sottish Superstition, (the Day-Light banisheth them,) they are the Issue and resembling Progeny of the dark Region of Paganism, wherein Mankind seem “to have been fetter’d by a long Night, as Prisoners of Darkness,” Wisd. 17. 2. Had the Aegyptians Eyes, who deified that blind Animal Mus Araneus, μυγαλήν, because they suppos’d Darkness elder than Light?256 Or the generality of the Pagans, were they not as blind as that Aegyptian Deity, who affix’d all manner of Infamy and Villainy to their Gods, yet thought themselves Pious? They had a Notion of Piety, Purity, Sanctity, and Justice towards their Deity; but their Sanctity was Sin; their Piety was Villainy; their Purity, Pollution; their Laver was their Stain, and their Righteousness, the highest Wickedness; they counted Evil Good, and Good Evil; Darkness Light, and Light Darkness.

  All Mankind, therefore, natively and originally, want their Eye-Sight, and must be denoted such as are born Blind, an effect of Man’s Fall. There would be no need of a divine Physician, to heal and open the Eyes of Men; nor of divine Illumination, nor of a new Birth, whereby we are born into the Region of Light, if Mankind were not in some degree born Blind: No Account can be given of that more-than-Cimmerian Darkness, which for many Ages involv’d the World of Mankind, but from this Hypothesis, that they are born without their Eye-Sight; as without the Life, so without the Light, Spiritual; as in some degree Heathen ungodly Sinners, so Heathen Sons of Darkness. Upon the loss of the divine Image, which is the Soul’s Life and Light, an opposite Darkness succeedeth; for such is the Reign of the Animal-Sensitive Nature, the Flesh, which is blind and foolish, unintelligent and unreasonable, the occasion of Blindness, Error, and Folly, to the Mind; as suggesting atheous Conceits, (vain and heathenish Imaginations, Rom. 1. 21.) as being full of vile and corrupt Affections; as being productive of all Vice and Wickedness, (“their own Wickedness hath blinded them,” Wisd. 2. 27.) and the Mind, concurring therewith, becometh a fleshly Mind.257 For, being moulded after the Flesh, she becometh carnally Minded, affected, and addicted; of an atheous, carnal, and mundan Genius and Disposition; which is an Indisposition of the Soul to unite itself to God in any respect (in her Discernments, Apprehensions, and Conceits, Opinion and Judgment, Sentiment and Estimation of Things, as also in her Designs, Elections, and Pursuits;) and a Propension to the blind and carnal Conceits of mundan Religionists, and to the various sorts of Atheous Error and Folly. Such an Atheous and Heathen-kind of Genius, in some degree native to Mankind, is by degrees increas’d, as vitious Affections grow to greater Height, and as Sinning against God becomes their Trade and Practice. Bad Education also, Converse and Company, Example, prevailing Custom, publick reigning Error and Vice, bad Government and Laws, beget, confirm, and encrease, Atheousness of Mind. From these concurrent Causes, all, or many of them, the antient Times of the Heathen were “the Times of Ignorance.” (Act. 17. 30.) And thence it is, that the generality of Mankind, in all Times, are criminally involv’d in Atheous Darkness, Error, Ignorance, and Foolishness, touching Matters of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, Virtue and Vice, Nobility and Baseness, Sanctity and Sin, God and his Service, and the divine Kind of Things, the World also and its sensitive Good and Evil, touching themselves, their Interest, and their Happiness, their Souls and their future State, they prodigiously deceive themselves through Pride and Self-Love; and touching their present State, and their Ways, “not knowing what they do, nor whither they are going, because the Darkness hath blinded their Eyes.” (Luk. 23. 34. 1 Joh. 2. 11.)

  The principal and summary Reason of the Heathens Blindness was, They did not emerge out of the State of Gracelessness and Wickedness; and, therefore, they were in the State of Atheous Ignorance. From whence it follows, that all Men, who are in the same State of Gracelessness and Wickedness, are in the State of Atheous Ignorance, and want their Eye-Sight, as well as they. Flashes of Light, and some Convictions of Mind, are consistent with this Estate; and there may be in it a superficial and ineffectual knowing the matters of Religion; yet, because all that are in it have a Veil upon their Minds, they are necessarily in the State of Atheous Ignorance. As was the Case of those false Religionists, the carnal Jews; who, if they had had their Eyes, must have discern’d the Light of the World shining in their View; could not have mistaken God for the Devil; or thought themselves Virtuous, when they were Vile; or Wise, when they were Fools; or Safe, when they were in their Sins; nor could they have made their Religion, their Sin and Delusion. Both Jews and Gentiles shew, what Man is in his Unregenerate State; that this being the State of reigning Wickedness and Ungodliness, is the State of reigning Atheous Ignorance, Error and Folly.

  Atheous Mankind being themselves, in great degree, unreasonable, the things of the Holy Spirit seem to them absurd, foolish, and unreasonable, 1 Cor. 2. 14. “The natural Man receiveth not the Things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him; neither can he know them, because they are Spiritually discern’d.” The Matters of the Holy Christian Life, have always seem’d ridiculous and foolish to Men of the Atheous, Mundan, and Prophane Genius, which so prevaileth in Nations, call’d Christian, that serious Piety is not matter of Honour and Estimation, but of Disparagement with the most and greatest; and to be a Christian indeed, is to be Vile in their Eyes; if not to have the Usage, which such as departed from Iniquity in antient Times had, Laughter and Derision. Christians, so call’d, suppose, that they may be Leud, Sensual, and Worldly, yet genuine Christians; that Sin is a very small Matter, and, accordingly, their Life is the Sinning Trade; that God is the God and Patron of the Ungodly; that it is needless, ridiculous, and a sneaking Thing, to be Religious; that Heathenish Perfunctoriness, and outside Modishness, in God’s Service, is good Devotion; that high Profaneness is Gallantry; that a Life of Flesh-pleasing Vanity is better than an Holy; that the Worlds delusive Phantasms are the great and goodly Things; that the Concerns of this Animal-sensitive Life, are chiefly to be minded; and that it is Madness to bear the Cross, and suffer for Righteousness sake.

  In Christendom, in reform’d Christendom, such Atheous Ignorance, Error and Folly prevaileth, so high a Degree of Unreasonableness, as to be perfect Madness and Phrenzy. It is Madness for Men to dream of a worldly-happy Estate, and a sensual Felicity, and to make it their chief End and Good; to be the World’s Admirers and Lovers, that are deluded by Shadows, and idolize momentary fantastick Nothings, neglecting and losing the true inestimable Possessions of the Kingdom of God and the Soul; to chuse the Evil, and refuse the Good, running counter to their own Intention, designing to be Honourable and Happy, yet making themselves Vile and Miserable to Extremity; in a State of present Danger, wherein they are surrounded with Enemies, to be regardless of their Safety; and as regardless of the future over-whelming Calamities, which few forecast to prevent; to be merry and jovial in a mournful State, and fearless and careless in a fearful Case; to lose their Salvation for want of a little Care and Pains, and to spend their Care and Time about that which is not worth the while; to part with their All for Nothing; for a momentary Folly to plunge themselves into Miseries endless; to be deluded and befool’d in the plainest Things, and in all their great Concerns, not knowing what is good for Themselves, but sporting Themselves in their own Deceiving.

  In Heathenism we lead the Atheous Life.Consectary 2. In Heathenism we live the Atheous Life. Atheism of Life and Practice is connected with Atheism of Understanding, both as an Antecedent Cause, a Concomitant, and a Consequent thereof. For the Atheous kind of Life, and Practice, causeth the Atheous kind of Ignorance, Error, and Folly, as Steams and gross Exhalations from the Earth cause a dark Air. Sins and Vices, Lusts and Passions, are to the Mind, what a Suffusion is to the Eye, or Rust to Metal; an Atheous Temper, and Disposition, is prone to Atheous Conceits, and affecteth Atheous Opinions; carnal Affections so powerfully blind the Understanding, and byass the Judgment, that evil Men must be suppos’d to have bad Notions of God. All Men judge as they are affected; he that hateth any Man, is prone to believe and judge all manner of Evil of him; and when he is otherwise affected toward him, he will be apt to believe and judge the contrary: Therefore the Lovers of the World magnify the Things of the World, and form to themselves a worldly kind of Religion: So the Lovers of fleshly Pleasures are averse from believing a Resurrection and future Judgment; and (as Chaucer saith of the People of England) “what they not like, they never understand”; the Truth is against the Wicked, and they are, therefore, against the Truth.

  Ignorance is connected with Vice and Wickedness, as a Concomitant inseparable; for it is impossible to be Wise and Wicked at the same time. The being Wicked is to be a Fool, the greatest of Fools; reigning Wickedness is, therefore, necessarily connected with the greatest Ignorance, Error, and Folly: Nor do any commit a sinful Fact, preferring the Evil before the Good; but, upon their Repentance, they acknowledge themselves to have been deceiv’d, in making a false Valuation of some apparent Good connected with great Evil. The grosly ignorant in matters of true Religion, do not know them, nor decline the opposite Evils. Their sinful Ignorance, therefore, is, both in itself, and in its Consequences, manifest Wickedness. The whole of true Religion, Virtue, and Duty, is Matter of Wisdom and Knowledge; for they must be Men of good Understanding, that know the Divine Empire, and the Laws thereof, and understand the matters of Divine Learning and Philosophy; that know the great Things, which alone are worthy to be known, and understand the true Nature, Worth and Use of Things; that discern between Truth and Falshood, the true and false Religion, between Good and Evil, (chusing the one, and refusing the other,) between Realities and Resemblances, and are not impos’d upon by Shews and Appearances; that escape Error, Deceit, and Delusion, (in their Opinions, Elections, Hopes and Confidences,) and the many tempting Baits of Sin; that understand the true Rates of Things, and estimate them aright; that know their Bounds, and observe them; their Dangers, and avoid them; their Enemies, and how to vanquish them; their Diseases, and how to cure them; that conduct themselves by wise Maxims, and do well and wisely; that know how to demean Themselves aright in all Cases and Circumstances, and do their Business and Office well; that are not foolishly and viciously affected, but agreeably to the Nature of Things,(contemning what is Contemptible, fearing what is really Formidable, loving what is Amiable in due Degree and Measure,) that govern themselves well, and are well advis’d in their doings, foreseeing and preventing the great Evils, making sure of their true Happiness, and so successfully managing their Affairs, that they are eternally safe and secure. But they that lack Understanding, know not their Sin, fear not their Danger, regard not their great Interests, discern not the Things that differ, mistake Trash for Treasure, and Fables for Truth and Wisdom; their Designs and Elections are ignorant and unwise; they run upon their Evils, which, in general, they would desire to avoid, for they wish well to themselves; their Atheous Life engendreth Atheous Opinions and Errors, and their Atheous Opinions and Errors, necessarily lead to Atheous Life and Practice.

  Not that we are to imagine, with some, “That Mankind do not sin by Will, but only by weakness of Judgment and Ignorance; that really we would not do Evil, nor do we chuse it, but through Ignorance we judge that Good, which really is Evil.” For this is an extravagant Conceit; nothing being more apparent, than that Men usually Will and Chuse, Intend and Design (which is a perverse Appetite and Will) the Evil of manifest Injustice, for carnal Self-gratification and Advantage; therefore a Conceit, which supposeth all their Sins, “to be Sins of excusable Ignorance,” is it-self a Branch of Ignorance inexcusable: Yet, because there is Ignorance in every actual Sin, and it is in part the Principle of it, the Maxim is true, “All Sin hath its rise from Ignorance.”

  In Heathenism, the atheous Life of profane Drunkards, Swearers, Whoremongers, and Worldlings, mainly intent upon the concerns of this Animal-Sensitive Life, was the Pagan Popular Life, (notwithstanding the Institutions of Virtue and Philosophy, and the arcane Institutions of Religion, that were in Paganism;) their brutish Appetites concurr’d with the ignorant Conceits of their Minds, touching a sensitive Felicity, to instigate them to unclean Practices; and being past feeling (having lost the Sight and Sense of the Turpitude and Sinfulness of their Practices, which should have restrain’d them, adimit nox atra colorem258 ) they gave themselves over unto Lasciviousness, to work all Uncleanness with greediness. The Sins of Uncleanness were the Pagans eminent Vice; for, altho’ there are among them Instances and Institutions of Continence, yet so generally and outrageously were those Heathen Sons of Darkness addicted to the Sins of Unchastity of all sorts, (some of which were not only thought allowable, but genteel and creditable,) that the Pagan World may justly be thought nothing better than a Brothel-House of Uncleanness. The principal Corruption in the World, was thro’ this sort of Lust;259 and, because of these Things principally, “the Wrath of God came upon” (these enormous Sinners) “the Children of Disobedience.” The Gentiles are characteriz’d by the Lust of Concupiscence, as a Consequent of their Ignorance, and not knowing God. And the New-Testament, in its black Catalogues of atrocious Sins, commonly joyneth the Sins of Uncleanness with Heathen Idolatry, and eating Things offer’d to Idols with committing Fornication (which in a large sense signifies all Whoredom;) and the Gentile Converts are by a special Decree forbid Fornication, as a Rite of gross symbolizing with the Gentiles, who are usually call’d by the holy Writers ÿoi porno’i, Fornicators, the Heathen World being a World of impure Fornicators. Their Doctrine did not condemn Fornication and Stews; and both Sexes were prostituted in their Stews, which were every where allow’d, and paid their Tribute. The Persians, Aegpytians, and Athenians, are infamous for their infamous Marriages, the Stoicks and Chrysippus, for allowing them; they are infamous also for unnatural Lusts, their Wise-Man is not averse from Love; Community of Women was practis’d in several Pagan Nations; some are superlative Instances of Masculine Amours; the Lacedaemonians are noted for lending their Wives; Plato, for countenancing Perjury in Love-Matters; Plato and Lycurgus banish’d Modesty from their Commonwealth, for they will have Men Spectators of naked Women; Plutarch was shameless, when he wrote his Amatorius; the Greek Philosophers are remark’d for their impure Masculine Amours, to which, not only the Athenians, but the Roman Senators, were addicted, and the Oracle of Apollo alloweth it. The Apostle hath remark’d their monstrous Uncleanness, (Rom. 1. 28) which he looketh upon as the Consequence of a reprobate Mind. But these soul Carnalities, the Sins of Uncleanness, are only one eminent Limb, or Member, of the Heathen Old-Man, that “hath his Conversation in the Lusts of the Flesh, fulfilling the Desires of the Flesh, and of the Mind, walketh according to the Course of this World, according to the Prince of the Power of the Air, in Lasciviousness, Lusts, excess of Wine, Revelling, Banquettings, and abominable Lewdnesses,” Ephes. 2. 2, 3. which were so fashionable in the Heathen World, that it was a Thing wonder’d at, that the Christians, who seem’d an odd out-of-the-way People, (1 Pet. 4. 3, 4.) “Did not run with them into the same Excess of Riot. Being fill’d” (Rom. 1. 29, &c.) “with all Unrighteousness, Fornication, Wickedness, Covetousness, Maliciousness, full of Envy, Murder,” (Homicide was the Gladiators Discipline, and matter of Glory, they slew their Slaves at pleasure, usually expos’d their Children, Romulus made a Law, that Children born deform’d, should be expos’d and stifled), “Debate, Deceit, Malignity, Whisperers, Back-Biters, Haters of God, Despiteful, Proud, Boasters, Inventors of evil Things, Disobedient to Parents, without Understanding, Covenant-Breakers, without natural Affection, Implacable, Unmerciful.” Such were the worse and the greater part of them; and of all them it must be said, that by several degrees of Wickedness, they constituted a World of flagitious People, “an evil World,” (a World of evil Men, and a World of Evils,) “a World of the Lust of the Flesh, and the Lust of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life, which are not of the Father, but are of the World.” 1 Joh. 2. 15.

  Of Original Sin.This degenerate Condition of the World of Mankind, is an uncontroulable Evidence of Original Sin in some Significations of it. For, in the first place, Original Sin may signify, That Mankind, antecedently to their being Holy, (which prior Condition may be called their Original Condition,) are ungodly Sinners. Of this Original sinful State, the current of Scripture, the frame of Christianity and Judaism, the frame of Man, the degenerate Condition of the World, the Order and Course of Things in it, are an uncontroulable Evidence. For Darkness is now before Light, antecedently to Sanctification we are Unholy, and the Proselytes were first Aliens; in Christianity, Unregeneracy is before Regeneracy, the Old is before the New Man, Servitude is before Freedom, all the Holy People were of the World before their coming out of the World, their Original Condition is that of mere Mundan Heathen People. The Religion also of a Saviour-King, of Redemption, and an Expiatory Sacrifice, of Saving Faith, Repentance and Conversion to God, of a new Covenant, and a new Kingdom of God, of Regeneration and Remission of Sins, of Justification and Sanctification, proclaimeth this Original sinful State, which inferreth the Existence of Original Sin in another Notion. For,

  In the second place, Original Sin may signify, that Mankind are now natively and originally ungodly Sinners, in a degree of prevalent Tendency that way: or, that the Original of Sin is in such Degree originally in Man. If Mankind are now the Flesh-Born, and Mundan People in all respects; both privatively, being born without the Life of Grace, or the Divine Love; and positively, a vicious carnal selfishness of Nature, being now our Nature, which is called Concupiscence: If this Original of Sin is now natively Original to Mankind, this vicious Tendency must be counted an Original Sin. And an Original Sin of this Nature and Notion, must be look’d upon, not as the Whole, but as a Branch of the Article of Original Sin, and is certainly a Branch of the Christian Religion, John 3. 6, 7. “That which is born of the Flesh, is Flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit, is Spirit. Marvel not, that I said unto thee, ye must be born again, or born from above.” Our Saviour plainly affirmeth, (as the New-Testament ordinarily doth throughout,) that there are two opposite Families of Men: The one, those that are born of the Spirit, the Heaven-born; the other, those that are born of the Flesh only, the Earth-born. That, by natural Generation, none are of the Spirit-born, or Heaven-born, but all are of the Flesh born, or Earth-born, Family. Man is therefore natively so constituted, as to be one of the Animal-vital, not one of the Spiritual-vital, Family. And, of Man so constituted, impartial, Christian Reason cannot but pronounce, “That he is natively a carnal and mundan Kind of Man, and Liver, in a Degree of prevalent Tendency that way. Agreeably to our Saviour, the Apostles establish the same Distinction of two opposite Families, Gal. 4. 29. Rom. 9. 8. Joh. 1. 13. Hence appeareth, that Infants, by their first Birth, belong to that Family, which is opposite to the Spiritual and Divine Family, (both as Natural and Carnal is oppos’d to Spiritual,) they belong to the Family of those that are in the Flesh devoid of the Holy Spirit. At the time of their Conception and Nativity, thus far they are of this Family; they are then the carnal andmundan Kind of Livers, in a degree of prevalent Tendency that Way. And in such Sense the Psalmists Words may commodiously be interpreted, 51. 5. “Behold! I was shapen in Iniquity, and in Sin did my Mother conceive me.” The Animal Nature in Brutes, is wicked and carnal; and the Animal Nature in Mankind, is manifestly the same. Infants are therefore such, in the way of prevalent Tendency that way, and, consequently, they are, in such Degree, by Nature the Children of Wrath. Which is not so to be understood, as if Mankind committed Sin, not through the Fault of their Will; for all the Servants of Sin are more, or less, Volunteers; the Sins which they commit, at the time of their Commission, are their Will and Choice, altho’ at other times (usually in their sober retired Thoughts) they are otherwise minded. But Man’s Nature is full of Inclinations to that which is Evil; all sort of Wickedness issueth from the Heart or inward Man, and Man is warn’d to take heed of walking “in the Ways of his Heart, and in the Sight of his Eyes.” If in fact all Men, in their unregenerate State, live in that which is Carnality and Wickedness, if they are under the Power of the Flesh, of Sin and Vice; this is a Demonstration, that Infants, at their Birth, are the Servants of Sin, in a degree of prevalent Tendency that Way.

  All the Wickedness that is in the Animal Nature, involveth in it an inordinate Self-Love, whence it ariseth. Self-Love is unquestionably innate in all, and a vicious carnal Self-Love is innate in all, in a degree of prevalent Tendency that Way, for it is a Root of Bitterness in all Men; therefore, in that Degree, the sourse and summary of Wickedness is innate in all Men; and so are the reigning Lusts, and Passions of the Flesh, which are nothing else but its prevalent impetuous Propensions and Tendencies. Hence Conflicts between the upper and lower Soul, between Reason, and the Motions of irrational Nature; and hence it is, that there is in him originally a Body of Sin and Death.

  Agreeably whereunto, as some of the Learned suppose,260 the Pythagoreans, and Platonists, discourse of a Strife innate in Man, an alien Animal of Kin to us from Generation, which some call, the many-headedBeast; others call it, a moral Species of Life. They suppose, that every Man, from his Birth, hath a bad Genius, inclining him to Evil, that a Purgation is necessary for Human Souls; that they have lost their Wings, are estrang’d from God, obnoxious to inordinate Passions; and Archytas, the Pythagorean, said, “We cannot arrive at the top of true Good, because of a bad Nature.” So the Hebrew Doctors ordinarily speak of the Ferment which is in the Mass (evil Concupiscence,) and the evil Formation, or Figment, of which they say, “The evil Figment is born with a Man, and goeth about with him all his Days, as ’tis said, The Imagination of Man’s Heart is Evil from his Youth”:261 Which Character of Mankind speaketh a powerful Proclivity in Man’s Nature, to that which is Evil, which implyeth both an Aversion and Impotence to that which is Good. Agreeably where unto the Apostle saith, “The Law was weak through the Flesh,” Rom. 8. 3. therefore the Flesh was more powerful to make Men Sinners, than the Law was to reform them. And, if they are Sinners thro’ the Flesh, then they are “Carnal, sold under Sin, not doing what they like, the Good they would, but what they hate, the Evil that they would not, a Law in their Members warring against the Law of their Mind, and bringing them into Captivity to the Law of Sin, which is in their Members.” Rom. 7. 14, 15, 19, 23. Against their Knowledge and Convictions of Mind, against the Dictates of Prudence and of Conscience, against their own Resolutions and Vows, Mankind, in their Unregeneracy, are frequently carried away captive to perpetrate Wickedness; Convictions of the Mind, against the Flesh, is an unequal Contest. Servitude under Sin, therefore, with all the other Evils of an unregenerate condition, is, as it were, our Inheritance, by our first Birth, without which Hypothesis, no tolerable Sense can be made of the Christian Religion, no tolerable Account can be given of the World’s Wickedness. For what is this lower World, but a Sink of Impurity, a Sea of Wickedness, a Stie of Sensualists, a Sodom of Uncleanness, a Den of the Sons of Darkness, a Shop of Frauds, a Cock-pit of Contention, an Aegypt for Oppression, a Bedlam of Distractions, an Amphitheatre of Gladiators, a Wilderness of noxious Animals; insomuch, that one had reason to style it “very near to Hell.” Mankind, universally, in all times and places, are degenerate into Vice and Wickedness; it operateth early, usually it beareth down all Obstacles, frustrateth all Remedies, it floweth in upon the World, with so high a tide, and so strong a torrent, that in all Ages, not only Vice and Wickedness, but Prodigies and Outrages of Vice and Wickedness, have been current Practices. The Age of Youth is rude, unskilful, and unwise, (without governing Prudence, of little insight into Things, and less foresighted) incautious, careless and inconsiderate, rash, heady and fearless, full of Confidence and foolish Hopes, hardly governable, or manageable by the greatest Wisdom, or capable of good Counsel; of vehement and fervid Desires, Pursuits and Passions, of flagrant Lusts, enormously addicted to sensual Mirth and Pleasure, of gay and wanton Humour, averse from Seriousness, (as apt to contemn and deride serious Piety, as Dangers,) extremely Proud, and apt to take a Pride in pranks of Lewdness and Injuriousness, (nor is there any sort of Wickedness, to which untam’d Youth is not apt to be carried by Pride,) full of disorderly Motions and Appetites, and abounding with Vice, as fat and rank Grounds with Weeds. As the Age of Manhood succeedeth that of Youth, so the manly Vices succeed the Youthful; and so gross and palpable Vice gradually ariseth in the Nature and Life of Man, commencing its Reign from his Birth. Several particular Temperaments are strongly inclin’d to several Vices; some are naturally of a bad Temper, and some are observ’d to be of a natural Malignity; which common Observations befriend the Hypothesis of Original Sin.

  Against this Name the Pelagians object, (their principal Objections reach not to the Thing, but the Name only,) “That no defect in Infants, without the use of Reason and Understanding, can be truly and properly Sin, for nothing can be Sin, which is not voluntary. Sin is also that, which is the Transgression of a Law; where no Law is, there is no Transgression; but Laws are not given to mere Infants, that are not capable of Obligation, or, as the Jews say, they are not Sons of the Precept, no more than Brutes; for Laws are not given to Infants, or those who have lost their Understanding.” These Objections may be thus answer’d.

  1. The inordinate Concupiscence, of which our Animal Nature is full, may be contemplated in Brutes; for in them there is a Pravity of Nature, which, being predominant, constitutes many of them Evil Beasts; as in Mankind there is a Pravity of Nature, which being prevalent in them, constituteth them Evil Men. In Brutes we may contemplate the very Nature and Idea of the several branches of Vice and Wickedness, of inordinate Self-Love, Lust, Pride, Wrath, Cruelty, and such like; for there the very Face and Form of them appeareth. The Morals of degenerate Mankind, that live after the Flesh, have the same origin with those of Brutes, which they lively resemble; some being Wolves, others Foxes, others Serpents, others Neighing Horses, others Dogs and Swine.

  2. The inordinate Concupiscence, of which our Animal Nature is full, is Sin in a limited sense. It is the very Nature of that which is Sin, Vice, and Wickedness, so far imputable to us, as it is in any degree Voluntary, and no farther. As it is in the Animal Nature of Brutes, it is the very Nature of that which is Sin, Vice, and Wickedness; the Pride and Selfishness which we contemplate there, is the very Nature of the Sins of Pride and Selfishness, and sheweth the odious face of them: These, therefore, have in Brutes, the materiality of Sin, without the formality, (as the Logicians use to distinguish;) for they are not imputable to them as Sin, nor do they constitute them in a proper Sense, Sinners. But, in Man, inordinate Concupiscence is imputable as Sin, Fault and Crime, so far as it is in any degree Voluntary. This the Apostle sometimes calleth, “Sin that dwelleth in me,” Rom. 7. 17. and sometimes “Sin in the Flesh” (8. 3.) that is, in the Animal Nature.

  3. This Branch of Original Sin, which we have under Consideration, does not infer, that in ordinate Concupiscence is actually in mere Infants; much less, that it is imputable to them, as their Crime, or that they offend against any Law of God, or commanded Duty. It only supposes, that by a Fall, or Lapse, inordinate Concupiscence, and the Reign of it, is in them in a Degree of prevalent Tendency that Way. So that, if Grace does not interpose, the Infant will be like the rest of unregenerate Mankind, an Alien and an Enemy, living and loving the carnal and worldly kind of Life, and its Gratifications; having a Soul destitute of its true Pulchritude, Health, and Vigour; Naked, Deformed, Diseased, Weak, and Languishing.

  Mundan Mankind are of a Disposition so Atheous, that Heathenism of Religion is to them agreeable.Consectary 3. Mundan Mankind are of a Disposition so Atheous, that Heathenism of Religion is to them agreeable. Such as Mens State, Life, and Genius is, such is their Religion, which is a plain Demonstration of Original Sin; for it shews, that Mankind are born the Heathen-Kind of Religionists, in a Degree of mighty tendency that Way. All Mankind, without a preternatural adventitious Institution of Religion, would be of the Heathen Religion, or none at all; for other Religions were introduc’d by extraordinary supernatural methods of Providence; under the Oeconomy of mere Nature and general Providence, Heathenism was universal. This appeareth also from the continued History of the Jewish Church, the Rise and the Progress of it; for the Progeny of Noah, the Offspring of Shem, even in the Family of Heber (the Father of the Hebrews) while Noah, Shem, and Heber were yet alive, fell to Heathen Idolatry, Josh. 24.2. Abraham was doubtless bred an Heathen; the God of Nabor is thought an Heathen Deity, Gen. 31. 53. Laban’s Images, call’d his Gods, shew, that he was not clear of Heathen Idolatry, and Jacob’s House was infected with it, Gen. 31. 30. and 35. 2. When the Children of Israel went into Aegypt, they conform’d themselves to the Aegyptian Idolatry, and when they came out of Aegypt, they did not leave it behind them, as they were charg’d, witness the Golden-Calf, their worshipping the Host of Heaven, their joyning themselves to Baal-Peor, and sacrificing to Sehirim.262 When God had brought them out of the Wilderness into Canaan, and cast out the Heathen Nations for their Idolatries and Impieties, and warn’d the Israelites to take heed of their Abominations, and of doing as they had done, yet they “forsook the Lord God of their Fathers, served Baalim and the Groves” (Idols in the Groves,) and succeeded the Heathen Nations in their Morals, as well as in their Lands.263 Such was their Religion, during the time that they were govern’d by Judges; their Heathen Idolatry brought them into heavy Calamities, and no sooner were they deliver’d, but they relaps’d to their old Trade again. For this was the State of Things in Samuel ’s Days. Solomon, the wisest of their Kings, tho’ the Lord appeared unto him thrice, and warn’d him against the Idolatry of the Heathen, yet fell to this foul Impiety. After his days, the ten Tribes fell to the Idolatry of Jeroboam, complicated with that of Baal, out of which they never emerg’d. Nor were things much better in the Tribe of Judah, that adher’d to the House of David; for, altho’ Rehoboam, had lost the greatest part of his Kingdom for the Heathenism of his Father, yet he, together with Maacah his Wife, trod in his Father’s Steps, as Abijam his Son did in his. Out of this State Judah could never perfectly recover. For, after Asa’s and Jehosaphat’s imperfect Reformation, Jehoram ( Jehosaphat’s Son) and Amaziah his Son, symboliz’d with the House of Ahab, the latter of them having Athaliah his Counsellor to do wickedly. Joash, who succeeded her in the Government, was courted out of his Religion by the Princes of Judah. Amaziah ( Joash’s Successor) after some time of reigning laps’d into Heathen Idolatry at a great rate. Uzziah and Jotham succeeding Amaziah, the affairs of Religion were in a tolerable good Posture; but Ahaz ( Jotham’s Son and Successor) was mad after his Idols. In the days of Hezekiah, true Religion recover’d its Lustre, (which had suffer’d a sad Eclipse in the Days of Ahaz,) and a considerable Reformation was made; but no sooner was Hezekiah dead, but all things ran to ruin again, in the days of Manasseh, whom Amon his Son imitated in his outrageous Heathenism. Josiah made a great Reformation, but his Reformation was a striving against the Stream; for the People still retain’d their affection for their old Heathenism, and those Heathenish Practices were in his days, which God menaceth by the Prophet, Zeph. 1. 4, 5. “I will cut off the Remnant of Baal from this place” (Jerusalem) “and the Name of the Chemarims with the Priests; and them that worship the Host of Heaven upon the House-tops; and them that worship and swear by the Lord, and that swear by Malcham.” After the Death of Josiah, God began to do unto Judah, as he had done to the Tribes of Israel, they being alike obstinate in their idolatrous Disposition. No Persuasions, no Menaces, no Warnings, no Punishments, or Disasters, which befel them, avail’d to reclaim them. The succeeding Kings of Israel took no warning by their Predecessors Calamities; the Tribe of Judah took no warning by the ten Tribes; they would not desist from their Heathenism of Religion, when they were upon the brink of Ruin; they went on in their old Track, even in the very Times of the Babylonian Captivity, and those of them that went into Aegypt, after their City and Temple was ruin’d, were resolved Heathen Idolaters. Jer. 44. 17. The prevalency of this Religion amongst God’s antient People, speaketh it a darling to Animal Nature. It is from this Nature, that Mankind are not Theists, Religionists, or Pietists, but the Atheous Kind of Theists, the irreligious Kind of Religionists, and the impious Kind of Pietists; they bestow their devotional Esteem, Affection, and Service upon what Animal Sensitive Nature liketh, and accounteth fine Things. By an Idolatrous Kind of Superstition, the adulterous Kind of Devotion, their devotional Propension is gratified, and the way of doing it is pleasing to sensitive Nature, which they follow.

  As from the History of the Jewish, so from the History of the Christian Church, the proneness of Mankind to a Religion of Idolatry is apparent; for, altho’ in the three first Centuries, and some time after, there is no appearance of a lapse of the Church into Idolatry; yet the time was not long, before “the holy City was trodden under Foot by the Gentiles”; when the World was come into the Church, then she began, by degrees, to model Religion after the old Heathen manner, and degenerated at such a rate into Paganism, that the Religion of unreform’d Christendom hath been, for many Ages, an Imitation of the Rites and Vices of that Idolatrous Religion. It is manifestly a Parallel for old Heathenism in Atheous Blindness, Darkness, and Ignorance, in its Ghosts, Spectres, and Dreams; in blind heathenish superstitious Conceits and Opinions; in the heathenish Life, and all the Limbs and Branches of the Old-Man; in Swearing, Revelling, Drunkenness, Debauchery; in Fornication, Harlotry, Incest, Sodomy, Stews, Curtesans, Carnavals, and in making the World a Brothel-House, or Sodom of Uncleanness; in Encouragements, as well as Practices of Looseness and Lewdness of Life, and the old heathen Profanenesses; in heathenish Pretensions to Antiquity, Duration, Universality, Unity; in heathenish Worldliness, Pride, and Ambition, State, and Grandeur; in heathenish Infidelity, and traditional Kind of Faith; in heathenish Vice, and an heathenish kind of Virtue; in numerous Festivals celebrated at the heathen rate; in unclean Institutions of Continence and Virginity; in a pharisaical kind of Monasticks and Asceticks, the Institution whereof is originally Pagan; in the Theology and Devotion of the Mysticks; in lying Stories and Legends; in processionary Pomps and Jubilees, which answer to the antient Ludi seculares; in slight methods of obtaining Pardon for Sin; in the extravagant Pomps of their Religious Service, the Consecration of their Altars and of their Temples, and Celebrations of the Dedication of them; in their holy Water and enjoyned Celibacy; in their Whippings and monstrous Barbarity and Cruelty; in their Purgatory and Funeral Rites; in their Reliques and Theurgical Consecrations of Agnus Dei’s and other Trinkets; in the external Perfunctoriness of their Religious Service; in substituting silly exterior Rituality instead of true Religion, and antick instead of true Devotion; ( for such are their numerous turnings, bowings, crossings, changes of Posture, mutterings, droppings of Beads, kissing the Pix, praying in an unknown Tongue, praying for Souls in Purgatory, saying so many Masses, offering Sacrifice for the Quick and Dead, repeating the name Jesus so many Times in a breath, translating Reliques, making Pilgrimages and Shrines, and making Oblations to them; holy Vestments, holy Scapularies, holy Oil, Anointings, holy Salt and Candles, &c.) In their Incense, lighted Candles in their Temples, Procession with burning Candles in their Hands on Candlemas-Day, consecrated Bells and baptismal Spittle; in the Canonizations, Patronage, and Offices, of the Tutelar Saints, or Deities; in consecrating the Pantheon at Rome to them, and the seven Hills of the City to so many Saints; in ascribing miraculous Feats to them, making magnificent Presents and Oblations to them, swearing profanely by their Names, as the Heathens did by their Gods; in consecrating, adorning, adoring their Images, carrying them in Procession, and concealing them in Lent, as the Heathens, for some time, conceal’d their Idols from the People; in having impure and profane Images in many of their Churches, like the Heathen; in the whole Affair of Church-Demonolatry, the Design of it, and Method of introducing it, where Idolatry recover’d its deadly Wound, and Paganism liv’d again. A principal Method of introducing Paganism; in several Branches of it, was by counterfeit Visions, Apparitions, Revelations, Miracles; and by the same Artifices Demonolatry was introduc’d, and Christianity was chang’d into Heathenism. So that the Christian Church hath imitated the antient Jewish Church in her lapse into a Religion of Idolatry, and hitherto she continueth to imitate her Obstinacy and Irreclaimableness.

  But Heathen Mankind, most properly such, are those that are without the Pale of the visible Church; the Universality of Mankind in antient Times were such; whose addictedness thereto appeareth from the Antiquity of it, its wide spreading, the long uninterrupted Duration of it, the World’s resolv’d and firm Adherence to it, (for the Heathen World resolv’d not to change the Religion of their Ancestors,) the Laws that were made in favour of it, and against the introducing of any new Religion, (which was thought a Thing not to be endur’d, according to Mecaenas’s Advice to Augustus,) the many violent Persecutions, which Christianity suffer’d in its attempts to undermine and ruin it. Nor was it only the Popular-Pagans, that were so vehemently addicted to their Heathenism of Religion; for the Philosophick-Pagans were, for the main, of the same Mind in Religion with the Popular; their Rule was, “To worship the Divinity according to the Law and Rites of their Country, and the Custom of their Ancestors.” Some few Branches of this Heathen-Popular Religion were disliked by the Philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Plutarch, Cicero, Seneca, Porphyry, Varro, and the Stoicks;) but themselves were in good earnest Pagan-Religionists, Pagan-Theologers, Pagan-Saints, and Champions for Paganism. They were far from designing a change of Religion, as Plato affirmeth in his Apology for Socrates; Plutarch styleth it the “Pious Faith deriv’d from their Ancestors”; and again, “The divine Dignity of Piety receiv’d from their Ancestors.”264 He supposeth it a plain Case, that their Deities were truly such, and their Religion of right Catholick; “That the Sun and Moon are Animals, whom all Men sacrifice, pray to, and worship.” Other of them style their Pagan Devotion, “The pure Worship of the Divinity.”265 They affect an higher strain of Devotion towards their Deities, than the Popular Pagans; and it was thought a grand Incongruity in a Philosopher, to violate their Religious Rites; whence Stilpo, the Philosopher, sleeping in the Chappel of the Mother of the Gods contrary to Law, was thus reprimanded by the Goddess in a Dream; “Art thou a Philosopher, and dost thou Violate the sacredLaws?”266Philosophers were, least of any, addicted to change their Religion; yet Plutarch, who maketh such high Elogies of his Heathen-Popular Religion, sometimes saith of it: “The ridiculous Practices and Passions of Superstition, and Speeches, and Gestures, and Inchantments, and magical Tricks, and Running about, and Drummings, and impure Lustrations, and sordid Purifications, and barbarous and absurd Castigations in the Temples, and contumelious Usages, give occasion unto some, to say, That it is better there were no Gods at all than such Deities, that accept, and are pleas’d with, such Things as these, of so petulant, so mean, so peevish an humour: Were it not better for the Gauls and Scythians, to have no Notion at all, no Imagination, no History, of Gods, than to suppose, That there are Gods which delight in the Blood of sacrific’d Men, and account that the most perfect Sacrifice and religious Service? Had it not been better for the Carthaginians at the first, to have taken Critias, or Diagoras, for their Lawgiver, to suppose, that there is neither God nor Demon, rather than to make such Sacrifices as they do to Saturn?267It is not easy to judge, which of these two extremes is most conducive to Mankind, some have no respect for any Gods, the God-service of others is shameful.”268

  Such was the Heathen Idolatry, and their manner of serving their fictitious Deities was extremely Shameful and Abominable, as it is visible in their Lupercalia, Floralia, Bacchanalia, the usual Drunkenness of the Women amongst the Romans, when they sacrific’d to Bona Dea; the infamous Drunkenness, Madness, and antick Gestures of Cybele’s Priests, Priapus’s Sacra, their Worship of the Goddess Venus, their nasty Eleusinian Mysteries, their unclean Fables touching their Deities, and their Images of them, which sometimes represented the Painters Harlots, (and usually in their Houses they set up the representations of monstrous Lust,) the obscene Spectacles and Speeches usual in their Sacra, (of which their Theologers say, that they were design’d to cure them of their filthy Affections, by gratifying them,) their perpetrations of Uncleanness, and Sodomy, in honour of their Deities, and under pretext of Holiness and Religion in many Places, the Memoirs in Scripture, of “Sodomites doing according to the Abominations of the Nations,” and the conjoining of Idols with Sodomites, 1 Kin. 14. 24. and 15. 12. and 2 Kin.23. 7. Uncleanness, Drunkenness, Revelling and Debauchery, were not only the Sins of their Lives, but of their Religion. The Histories of their impure Deities instigated them to the practices of Uncleanness, their shady Groves were an Invitation to them to perpetrate them, they perpetrated them in their Sacred Places, Fornication was annex’d to their revelling Idol-Feasts. As it is a false Religion, it is like the Oriental Languages, and must be read backward; for its Holiness, in many Parts of it, is the grossest Lewdness and Profaneness; its Deities are abominably Profane, as is also their Service, and their Sacra; it maketh the Divinity a Drama, Heaven a Scene, and Religion a Stage-Play; it venerateth its Deities in the Temples, and exposeth them to Derision upon the Theatre. Their Religion was, in the main, devoid of Religion, Truth and Righteousness, made up of Lies, Folly, Madness, and consummate Wickedness. Yet, this their Religion (Religio Deorum immortalium) the Pagans counted their Glory; not themselves, but the Christians, they counted Nefarious, and most Flagitious; they furiously persecuted them, calling them the Impious, supposing themselves the Pious. O unparallell’d Darkness!

  The Pagans Religion, as bad as it was, was hugely agreeable to their Genius and Humour; which proveth the World of Mankind, a blind and wicked Generation, extremely Atheous, sunk, and degenerate from God, and such as Seneca calls the Herd of Pagan-Religionists, “insanientium turba,” a mad Rabble. For the Pagan Writers themselves usually impute Madness to the Aegyptians, (a learned Nation, but a Fountain and Store-house of Idolatry, as well as Grain,) because of their monstrous Worship of Animals. And what were Hercules’s Sacra at Lindus, but height of Madness, which were celebrated with Evil-speakings and Cursings; and, if any one, by chance, let fall a good Word, it was thought a violation of them? In this wild Religion, there was a great mixture of profane Frolick and Jovialty, which rendred it hugely agreeable to the Humour of the Popular-Pagans. Whence it is generally reported of Gregory Thaumaturgus, (who, in this, was far from imitating the Apostles,) that he, observing that corporeal Delights and Pleasures allur’d the Vulgar, and caus’d them to persist in their Idolatry, permitted them, in lieu of their former Jollities, to jovialize in memory of the Holy Martyrs. The Heathens had their numerous Festivals (celebrated after the Israelites Mode, who “sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play,” Exod. 32. 6.) with Sports, Dancings, Shews, Musick, Banquets, Drunkenness, Lasciviousness. Their Gods gave them no Precepts of good Life, but licens’d Wickedness, authoriz’d Vice, encourag’d Lewdness, (their Oracles patroniz’d it,) and therefore it was a Flesh-pleasing Kind of Religion. Which also had the Glories of Antiquity, Universality, uninterrupted Duration and Succession, and Shews of Sanctimony. It abounded with Inspirations, Visions, Revelations, Oracles, Miracles, Prophets, Saints, and, which is extremely taking and desireable, the Pagans had their Gods nigh unto them, to speak to them, to converse with them, to consult them in Difficulties, to have present Access to them, and their Help at hand; by visible Signs, their Gods testified their Presence, they saw them in their Effigies, and often had Appearances of the Gods themselves. Their Religion was a Temple-kind of Religion, the Religion of a Temple-state and Stateliness, ritual and external, Pompous and Splendid, which is a Religion, after the manner that unregenerate Mankind affecteth. Their Temples, Altars, Images, (gross and visible Objects of Worship, which sensitive Souls dote upon,) their Priests, Sacrifices, Feasts, Aspersions, Lustrations (easy Methods of cleansing themselves from Sin) belong to their Temple-State of Religion. They had their splendid and magnificent Temples, their Idols sumptuously adorn’d, their mode of God’s Service Stately, with Lights, Musick, Odours, Vessels shining with Pearl, and the Priests Garments shining with pretious-Stones, the processionary Pomps of their Gods also, their Triumphs, Games, and Sights, (Sword-fightings, Scenical Plays, and Ludi seculares, which were in honour of their Gods,) were part of the Pomps and Vanities of this World, which are hugely taking to a carnal Mind. As themselves were a mundan-kind of People, so the principal Design of the Heathen-Popular Religion, was a mundan Felicity. The Idolatry, both of Rome-Heathen, and Heathen-Christian is, in the design of it, a worldly Religion, (it designeth to swim in worldly Felicity, and the Enjoyments of this present Life,) both have been attended with secular Pomp and Grandeur, Plenty, and Prosperity.

  The badness of the Heathen Virtue and Goodness.Consectary 4. The fourth Consectary, concerning the badness of the Heathen Virtue and Goodness, hath been already consider’d, in the first Part of this Essay; after which, it may not be improper here to consider that branch of the Pelagian Controversy, “Whether the seeming Virtues and good Works of the Gentiles are true or false, Sins and Vices, or Virtues and Well-doings, in what sense, and how far they are so?” If we say, “That all their Virtues, and good Works, are in no sense true,” we contradict the Apostle, Rom. 2. 14. “The Gentiles do, by Nature, the Things contain’d in the Law.” But, if we say, “That the true Virtues, and good Works, are found in the Gentile World,” we destroy the Necessity of Christianity, confound Nature and Grace, Gentilism and Christianism, the Atheous World with the City of God; we contradict the Nature of Things, by supposing, that Men do what is truly Holy and Pious, antecedently to the first Principles of true Piety and Sanctity; we contradict the scriptural Account of the Heathen State and Life, the whole Stream of the sacred Penmen, who affirm, That “without Faith it is impossible to please God,” Hebr. 11. 6. Which must not be understood of such a Faith as is common to Infidels, as some understand it; but of the Faith, which constituteth Divine Believers, and God’s Religionists that come unto God. The Gentiles “have their Hearts purified by Faith.” The Mind and Practice of Unbelievers is “defiled, impure, and unholy. The Carnal Mind is no keeper of the Law of God; they, that are in the Flesh, cannot please God. Ye are married to another” (saith the Apostle) “to have your Fruit unto Holiness, and to bring forth Fruit unto God. We are created in Christ unto good Works.” The genuine kind of Virtues are, “The Fruits of the Holy Spirit, a corrupt Tree cannot bring forth good Fruit, of Thorns Men do not gather Figs, nor of a Bramble-Bush gather they Grapes. When ye were the Servants of Sin, ye were free from Righteousness,” the Practice whereof is “a Walking, not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit. Every one that doth Righteousness, is born of God.” The true and genuine Kind of Virtue, Goodness, and Righteousness, is that which is of the Kingdom of God, of the Divine Image, and the New-Man that is renewed in Knowledge, (which is inconsistent with a State of Atheous Ignorance,) whichis of a new Creature, a new and divine Birth unto Righteousness, of the new Covenant and Dispensation of Things, of the true Vine, and of a Divine Charity, which is the Essence, and Summary, of the truly Divine Moral Virtue, and the genuine kind of good Works. “Though I bestow all my Goods to feed the Poor, and give my Body to be burn’d, and have not Charity, it profiteth nothing.” The Natural Man’s Kind of Virtue, Goodness, and Righteousness, therefore is, according to these Notices of Scripture, on this side that, which is the true and genuine Kind of Virtue, Goodness, and Righteousness; nor can the true Virtues, Goodness, and Justice, exist without being truly Virtuous, Just, and Good, as to God, which is true Piety, Sanctity; nor can that be the true Kind of Virtue, Goodness, and Justice, which cannot constitute Men of the truly Good and Virtuous Kind, God’s Kind of Virtuous, Good, and Just Men, whose Judgment is according to Truth. But, as there is a secular and mundan Kind of Wisdom and Prudence, in itself laudable, ornamental and useful, (such is the common Jurisprudence,) yet originally it is Base and Vile, being but Earth-born, not Divine, and Heaven-born; objectively it is Base and Vile, not being conversant about Divine Things; of Kind and Quality, it is also Base and Vile, being of Kind common, Graceless, and Unholy; and effectively it is not Wisdom, for it cannot constitute any Man truly Wise, nor Wise as to the main, but it continueth him where it found him, in the State of Atheous Ignorance, Error and Folly: So there is a secular and mundan Kind of Virtue and Goodness, which, in its own Nature, is Laudable, Ornamental, and Useful at a great rate; yet Originally, Objectively, and also of Kind and Quality, it is but Base and Vile, and effectively it is not Virtue, Justice, and Goodness; for it cannot constitute any Man Virtuous, Just, and Good; not Virtuous, Just, and Good, as to the main, but it continues him where it found him, in the State of reigning Sin and Unrighteousness. His Works are not “wrought in God,” as our Saviour says, Joh. 3. 21. by which he certainly means Theism of Religion and Condition. The Heathens are not truly Holy and Religious towards God in any thing, but are Atheous, Graceless, and Unholy, not only in their indifferent Actions, and their Evil-doings (materially such,) but in their Religious Actions, in their Virtue, Goodness, and Well-doing (materially such;) these are not of Kind, and for the main, the truly good and holy Kind of Virtues, Duties, and good Works. Their manner of doing what is materially Good, partakes not of the truly Good and Holy in the main Principle, Motive, End, and formal Object. They are not right in those grand Ingredients, which are essential to every one of the truly good Actions; for they live not to the true God, as his Servants, in the Exercise of all Divine Virtues; they, therefore, so sin in practicing their Virtue, as to be inconsistent with Sanctity; and, therefore, they are Wicked and Ungodly in all their Virtuous Practice, and Well-doing.

  With this account of the Virtues and good Works of the Gentiles, the general Sense of Christians agreeth. “It is a plain and granted Truth among all that are truly Pious, that without true Piety, that is, the true Worship of the true God, no Man can have the true” (kind of) “Virtue.”269 The Pagan Theologers themselves say, that Piety is μή τηρ τών ἀρετών, the Mother of the Virtues;270 their Virtues, therefore, could not be of the holy and godly Kind, if their Religion and Piety was of a contrary Kind and Family. Warm have been the Disputes among Christians, “Whether all the Actions of Infidels be Sins, or not?” But the greater Number seem to be of Opinion, That all the Works of the Unregenerate have the Nature of Sins (as the Church of England determineth) and are not good Works (wanting some Essentials thereto) but Sins in the sight of God, altho’ they be materially Good.

  It is not reasonable to attempt a Reconcilement of all the jarring Accounts of the Pagans Virtues and good Works, for none can reconcile Contradictions; but the most of them may commodiously be reconcil’d, by considering their Ethical and Political Virtue, (which may be call’d the Human Moral, or Human-Social Virtue,) and representing the true Character thereof. This sort of Virtue (which separate from the true Divine-Moral Virtue is manifestly competible to Heathen Mankind) is an Atheous and unholy Kind of Virtue, and, therefore, is of Character a virtue-less Kind of Virtue, and a bad Kind of Goodness. But, amongst the sinful Kinds of doing Duty, (the evil manner of doing what is materially Good,) there is this remarkable Difference; in some of them, that which is materially Good, is done in so criminal a Manner, and out of Ends and Principles so Vitious, that the Nature of Virtue is intirely lost out of the Action, and it becomes (like Pharisaical Holiness) Vice simply so called; but it is otherwise in this alien Kind of Virtue and Well doing, which is a different evil Kind of doing what is materially Good, for the Nature of Virtue and Well-doing is in part really preserv’d and retain’d in it, as the Nature of an Olive is in the Wild-Olive. The Virtues of the Gentiles, therefore, are Sin in one sense, but not in another. He that saith, They are Sin, Vice and Crime, not Righteousness and true Holiness, saith true; but he that saith, They are not any sort of Virtue, saith false. They are not so Vice, as not to be an unholy Virtue and Well-doing. They are not simply, either Vice, or Virtue; for they are not the true and genuine, but the spurious and illegitimate, Kind of good Works. The case is the same, if we consider them with respect to the Law, or Rule of Virtue and Duty. For, as the holy kind of Virtues are of kind and for the main, according to the Law of our Piety and Holiness towards God, who is the formal Object of our Obedience, whom we ought to obey out of dutiful Affection to him, and to make the pleasing him, his Honour and Service the chief End of our Doings and Business of our Lives: So the Atheous unholy kind of Duties, Virtues, and good Works, are, of kind and for the main, against the Law of our Piety and Holiness towards God, and, therefore, have the Nature of Sins; they are against the Law of our Piety and Holiness, both by way of privation and opposition; for the not living unto God, is an undeifying him (as far as is in our power,) a being an Enemy to him, and a living to ourselves; the not regarding and affecting him dutifully, is a disregarding him, and a disaffecting him, and a regarding and affecting somewhat else above him and against him, and therefore the natural Man, by his unholy Kind of Virtue, is no otherwise Virtuous, than so as to be an Impietist towards God. Yet it has so much in it of the Nature of Virtue, that the Apostle styleth it “a doing the Things contain’d in the Law”; God himself hath so much respect to it, that he rewardeth it several ways: No Man, upon his Conversion, so repenteth of it, as he doth of his Sins simply so called. It is not only a doing what is materially Good (which is of good Example to others, and may be of great advantage to the Publick:) But in its Principle, impulsive Cause, and End, there is so much Good as serveth to constitute it a spurious and degenerate kind of Virtue and Well-doing, as will appear from the Heathens Principles of laudable Practice, which may be reduc’d to these Four. 1. Good-Nature and natural Instinct.2. Human-Socialness. 3. An unholy Kind of respect for Worth and Virtue, Honesty and Duty, Justice and Equity, Reason and Ingenuity, Civility, Decency, and Order, and a like respect for himself, his own Perfection and Felicity. 4. Religion on this side true Religion.

  Of the Principles of laudable Practice amongst the Heathens.In the first place, Animal Temper and the kindly Instincts, which are in Animal Nature, may be call’d Good-Nature, which is a Principle of laudable Practice; for Mankind have this in common with the Brutes, of whom some are tame, tractable, placid; others are fierce and savage, and have the Name of Evil Beasts, which Name implyeth, that there are good-natur’d Beasts. Cato was of a good Nature, if, as Cicero says of him, “Nature had fram’d him to Gravity and Temperance”; or, if, as Velleius Paterculus saith, “He was therefore Virtuous, because he could not be otherwise.” Some are by natural Temper and Constitution averse from certain Vices, (Sordidness, Cruelty, Impudence;) and disposed to the contrary Virtues, (Generosity, Clemency, Modesty;) so amongst the Romans some Virtues are observ’d to have been Hereditary in certain Families in continued Succession, and great Vices, (Fury, Luxury, Libidinousness,) in others; “I am of Opinion” (saith Quintilian Declam. 260) “That the Morals of all are born with them, and the proper Virtues of every Nature.” Plato (in his Tenth of Laws) speaketh of a sort of good-natur’d Atheists, “who think that there are no Gods at all, yet are by Nature of a just Disposition, hating bad Men and Injustice, they will do no such Practices themselves, and those Men that are not just they shun, and love them that are just.” Altho’ Instances of Ferity and Barbarity are no Rarities amongst Men, yet a certain Goodness, Kindness, Benignity, and Tenderness, is part of our natural Constitution, and an effect of our bodily Temper, which so far prevaileth in the World of Mankind, that it commonly beareth the Name of Humanity, as Cruelty is call’d Inhumanity, and the Rod of Mansuetude, “the Rod of Men,” 2 Sam. 7. 14. As bodily Temper, so the kindly Instincts which are in Animal Nature, are Principles of laudable Practices. Such as natural Affection towards Children and near Kindred, Commiseration for the Afflicted, a natural Sympathy, Gratitude, and Kindness, for our Friends and Benefactors (remarkable in Dogs, Lions, and even Birds,) common Sociableness and Friendliness, particular Friendship, a Propension to please and oblige others, a natural Benignity and Generosity, desire of our own Welfare and Happiness, care of our Reputation, aversion from Infamy, Misery, and Death.

  A Second Principle of laudable Practices is a Human-Social Disposition, (which is a goodness of Nature, and in great degree an innate Instinct in Man;) for all the Human-Social and Human-Moral Virtue and Duty, commonly call’d the Political and Ethical, is compriz’d in, and may be inferr’d from, this one Principle. For all political Virtue and Duty towards Mankind in general, towards our Country, all Civil-Social Charity and Justice, the common Offices of Humanity and Civil Neighbourhood, the oeconomical Duties, Duties of near Relations and of Friendship, belong to Man as Social, as Human-Social, and he is not Man without the Human-Morals. In this great Law, great Virtue and Duty, of Man’s being Human-Social, Civil-Social (not Anti-Social) is manifestly compriz’d “a Civil-Social kind of universal Benevolence to ourselves and all Mankind, which affecteth and endeavoureth the Good of the Publick, and is opposite to what is hurtful;”271 from which Benevolence Universal (“Caritas humani Generis” Cicero calls it) all Mundan Political Virtue is deduceable. As it is also from another great Principle compriz’d in the Pagan Human-Social Disposition; “The Subordination and Relation of all Men, and lesser Societies of Men, to the great Body of Mankind, as of Parts to the Whole, and of Citizens to the Mundan City.”272 From these Principles both the Popular and Philosophick Pagans practis’d Civil Virtue, as the Bees do in some sort, that have political Order and Government amongst them: And this their Practice of political Virtue constituted and denominated a good and just Man of their Idea. One Antenor, who wrote the Cretan History, was nam’d Δέλτα (amongst the Cretans δέλτος signified Good,) διὰ τὸ ὰγαθὸς ἐἵ καὶ ϕιλόπολις, “becausehe was good and a lover of his City;273To live well” (saith Plutarch) “is to live Sociably and Friendly, and Temperately and Justly.”274 The generality of the Pagans suppos’d, that the observance of their political Laws constituted them just Men.

  A Third Principle of laudable Practices is a respect for Worth and Virtue, Honesty and Duty, Justice and Equity, Reason and Ingenuity, Civility, Decency, and Order; and a like respect for ourselves, our own Perfection and Felicity, without any regard to God, or Holiness. For, as there is a Human-Social Virtue, which is on this side the Holy-Social, so there is a regard for Worth and Virtue, Honesty, Reason, and Justice, which is on this side true Holiness and Godliness. The Pagans practis’d the Virtue which they teach, “fugiendae turpitudinis causa, to shun that which is base and shameful,”275 τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα because it was Just and Good, Virtuous, or Honest.”276 Their Maxim was “Honestum per se expetendum, that which is Virtuous, is Self-desirable”; and some of them have said, “A Feast is nothing else but the doing one’s Duty.”277 Out of regard to Decency and Order, they practis’d the small Morals, (that may well be defin’d, as the Stoicks define Modesty, the Science of decent Motion,) which are the opposites to Rudeness, Rusticity, and Impoliteness of Behaviour. And for their great Morals, (altho’ their practice of them was without any regard to God, or Holiness,) their Notions were so high and generous, that they profess’d a contempt of Life, and “to throw the Body into the Fire, when Reason, when Dignity, when Fidelity, requireth it,278A virtuous Man will die for his Friends and Country, he will throw away his Money and Honours, and all the Goods that Men contest about ϖριποιούμρυος ἒαυτῳ τὸ καλὸν, acquiring, or preserving to himself that which is Beautiful in matter of Life and Practice.”279Miltiades taught the Athenians, “to acknowledge no Lord but the Laws, and to be afraid of nothing more than that which is Evil andUnjust”;280 and of Themistocles the Orator saith, “That willingly he would not set any Thing before Virtue and his Duty.281To be Virtuous is a great Accomplishment, and every Virtue is an Accomplishment.”282 The Philosophick Pagans, therefore, (at least the better sort of them,) betook themselves to the Study and Exercise of Virtue out of regard to their Perfection and Felicity, which they suppos’d to consist in their Virtue, which in many Instances was (in some respect) very laudable and imitable. Such was the Platonists disaffecting ta’tni’de, the Things that are here, the not desiring or using them any farther, than so far as there is need; and the Stoicks gacnr kekolasménh, restrain’d Belly, or narrow-bounded Appetite. The Pagans, both Popular and Philosophick, had also a regard to Self-approbation and the Tranquillity of their own Mind. “There is no greater Theatre” (saith Cicero283 ) “for Virtue, than our own Mind, approving and applauding.” They had also a Self-reverence, or regard to their own Dignity of Person.—Πάντων δὲ μάλις’ ἀιοχύνεο σαυτὸν, Above all others reverence thy-self. ”284

  A fourth Principle of laudable Practices is Religion on this side true Religion; for it was from a Principle of Religion, and out of regard to a Deity, that Heathens thought themselves oblig’d, to do nothing against their Consciences, but to keep them unspotted;285 that they look’d upon the Dictates of their practical Reason as Laws;286 that they had Hopes and Fears, Peace and Perplexity, Joys and Anxieties, from their Consciences,287 That they look’d upon themselves as bound to Innocence, to Gratitude, to keep Faith, to take care of their Children and Parents, to have a special Kindness for their near Kindred, to do the Offices of Humanity towards Mankind in general, and acts of Heroical Virtue for the publick Benefit;288 that they thought Men criminal and punishable, not only for Facts of Wickedness (such as Adultery, Theft, Homicide,) but for the Will of Evil-doing;289 that they shun’d the perpetration of Wickedness in secret, dreaded Perjury, rever’d an Oath;290 that they accounted Injustice towards Men, and all vicious Errors in Life and Practice,(which they called ἁμαρτνίματα, Sins,) nothing less than Impieties;291 that the Philosophick-Pagan Religionists thought themselves oblig’d to practise all the Virtues which were in their Institution, and to shun all the Vices;292 that they propos’d to themselves an Imitation of the Deity, and suppos’d, that nothing could be well done, “without having respect to the Things Divine”;293 and therefore (as some of themselves say) “they had an Eye to the Deity in every thing great and little”;294 and lastly, that they look’d upon themselves as bound to an intire Subjection to the Governor of the World, and to all the Branches of active and passive Obedience to him, real, or imaginary.295 The natural Man, therefore, in a considerable degree, hath Notices of what is Good and Bad, Virtuous and Vicious, Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust (towards the Deity, as well as towards Men,) of what is Worthy and Unworthy, that some things are very Vile and Dishonourable, others are Becoming, Excellent and Honourable; and, altho’ he is an Impietist, yet he hath his Virtues and Well doings, “that are from Conscience, not Vain-Glory.”296 The Heathen joineth Religion and Justice towards Men; as Nicias, (of whom Thucydides saith, “He was the Man of all the Grecians of my time, that least deserv’d to be brought to so great a degree of Misery,297 ) who, falling into a great Calamity in Syracuse, told his afflicted Army, “I have worshipp’d the Godsfrequently according to the Laws, and liv’d justly and unblameably towards Men.” The Heathen will be just, because, in his way, he is religious. “He that is unjust is impious. For the Nature of the Universe having made all rational Beings for one another, so as to benefit one another, as they are worthy, but in no wise to hurt; he that transgresseth the Will hereof, is manifestly impious towards the most antient of the Gods.”298

  The Virtue of the Heathens was an unholy and degenerate kind of Virtue.It is one thing, to say, that a Man is an ungodly Heathen; and another thing, to say, he is an ungodly virtuous Heathen: And it is one thing, to say, of an Action of his, it is an ungodly Action; and another thing, to say, it is an ungodly virtuous Action. When the natural Man doth that which is materially good, it may be done, for the main, from such good Principles, and for such good Ends, as are competible to the mere natural Man. An Heathen may venture into the Fire, to pull his Child our, partly from a Principle of Good-Nature, and natural Instinct, partly for the conservation of Human Society, partly out of an unholy respect to Fortitude, and partly from Religion on this side true Religion; and this Action of his, in venturing into the Fire for his Child, is of an opposite Nature, both to the Sin of exposing his Child, and also to the Sin of venturing into the Fire (like the Indians) for Vain-Glory. Both the Actions of this latter sort are Sin, simply so call’d: But to declaim against the former as such, is the Voice of a Barbarian, not of a Christian. This Maxim, therefore, needeth a limitation, That the same Action cannot be both morally Good and Evil. For, altho’ the same Action cannot be a true and genuine kind of morally good Action, and a morally evil Action; yet one of the Heathen Man’s kind of good Works is therefore Sin, because it is opposite unto Holiness, and it is so far Sin (and therefore morally Evil,) as it is opposite unto Holiness, (which is not a true and genuine kind of morally good Action;) yet this hindereth it not from being a spurious and degenerate kind of morally good Action.

  On the other hand, altho’ it is of kind, and for the main, a sort of Virtue and Well-doing; yet no carnal, wicked, unholy kind of Man (remaining such) doth any thing that is, of kind and for the main, Righteousnessand true Holiness, no holy kind of Duty, or good Work: But, when he doth that which is materially good, out of his kind of virtuous Principles, and for his kind of virtuous Ends, yet he is carnal, wicked, and unholy-virtuous in those his Doings; and they are like himself, of kind and for the main wicked, carnal, and unholy kind of virtuous Doings; or they are the carnal, wicked and unholy Man’s kind of Doings, not simply so; but they are the carnal, wicked, unholy Man’s kind of virtuous Doings. His kind of living is an Atheous kind of living; his virtuous kind of living is the Atheous-virtuous kind of living, which is not the living unto the true God as his Servant, but opposite thereto, an ungodly kind of virtuous living. Let us suppose, that Hercules undertakes immense Labours, to save Mankind from Monsters and Tyrants, out of no better Principle than Good-Nature, natural Instinct of kindness for his Relations, regard to the preservation of human Society, a regard to an unholy kind of Fortitude, and from something of Religion on this side true Religion, (suppose an imitation of Jove, called his Father,) this the Pagans accounted Heroical Virtue.299 But Hercules’s kind of virtuous living was an Atheous kind of virtuous living, it was devoid of true Piety and Holiness, and repugnant to it. The Character, therefore, of the ungodly Man’s virtuous Actions, or Well-doings, consisteth of two parts: For every one of them, being consider’d as a part of his whole living, appeareth to be, both depriv’d of, and opposite to, Holiness and Godliness, and so complicated with Sin, as to be only a spurious and illegitimate kind of Virtue, rather Vice than Virtue; because, in reference to God, it is not Virtue. And, if those virtuous Doings of the Pagans are so vicious, which issu’d from Principles, that ought to be conjoin’d with, and subordinate to, true Piety and Holiness, (Good-Nature, natural Instinct, and a human-social Disposition,) what foul Crimes are the greater part of their virtuous Doings, which manifestly issued from, and were subordinated to, one of the foulest of Vices, the inordinate Appetite of Vain-Glory? For so the Orator Isocrates (whom Dionysius Halicarnasseus preferreth before the Philosophers as a Teacher of Morality,) who calleth himself a Philosopher, and a great acquaintance and admirer of Socrates, professedly maketh Vain-glory the Principle, End, and Rule of all his Actions, and of other Mens.

  As for the Fact of the Aegyptian Mid-Wives,(which is all eg’d to prove, that mere Heathens do good Deeds, that are not, of kind and for the main, sinful,) it is not difficult to answer such Allegations. For, either the Aegyptians were the Religionists of the true God, or they were not. If they were God’s Religionists, (imperfectly, or more perfectly,) their case is no parallel for mere Heathens. If they were not, then their Fact was, for the main and of kind, sinful; yet being, of kind and for the main, spurious and degenerate Virtue and Well-doing, it was rewarded with Temporal Blessings. It is commonly said, That God does not so much regard what we do, as why we do it: But we ought rather to say, The thing that God regardeth is, of what kind our Doings are. For, unless we ourselves be holy and godly Persons, of kind and for the main such, and unless our Doings be of the same sort, neither we, nor they, otherwise than in a limited improper sense, can be pleasing and acceptable in God’s Eyes. The Heathen Philosophers were not holy, or godly kind of Persons, their divine Virtue was not the holy and godly kind of Virtue, it was not a faithful serving and pleasing the true God; but a self-serving, self-pleasing, self-adorning, self-excellence, self-beatitude, separate from, and contrary to, the life of true Piety and Holiness. Therefore no other Virtue is competible to unregenerate Mankind, than such as is consistent with the reign of the inordinate carnal Self-love, (which is the Essence and Summary of all Wickedness, which reigneth in all that are void of the divine Love, which is the Essence and Summary of all divine vital Virtue;) the Atheousness of their Virtue and Well-doings is imputable to the inordinate carnal Self-love, which causeth the want of the love of God; and, because they are devoid of the Love of God, and are none of his Servants, therefore their Virtues and Well-doings (from whatever Principle they issue) are a certain self-serving, and self-pleasing, not a serving and pleasing God. Therefore their specious Well-doings symbolize with the rest of the specious Things of this World, they are not what at first sight they seem to be.

  Of the Deadliness of our Heathen State.The fifth consectary is touching the Deadliness of our Heathen State; for the Scripture looketh upon us, antecedently to the Life and State of true and saving Religion, as deadly Criminals, as dead, and as the Subjects of Satan’s Kingdom: As deadly Criminals, our Character consisteth of two branches, which imply and infer one another; for, in our Heathen State, we are aliens from the Life of Righteousness, deadly Sinners in Life and Practice; and we are not Faithful Friends to God and Holiness.

  1. Mankind are, in Scripture, divided into two opposite Parties and Families (that are contrary kind of People, of a contrary Genius and Temper, that walk in contrary Ways, belonging to contrary Societies,) which are known by the Names of the Righteous and the Wicked, the Just and the Unjust, the Godly and the Ungodly, the Pious and the Impious, the Holy and the Unholy, the Good and the Evil, the Saints of God and Sinners that are not Saints, the Children of Light and the Children of the World, the Children of God and the Children of the Devil, the Carnal and the Spiritual; all which Distinctions and Descriptions of two opposite Parties denote their different Life and Practice. The one are the Servants of Sin, not the Servants of God and of Righteousness; the other are the Servants of God and of Righteousness, not the Servants of Sin. Rom. 6. 18, 20, 22. The one are the Workers of Iniquity, not the Practisers of Righteousness; the other are the Practisers of Righteousness, not the Workers of Iniquity. Psal. 14. 4. and 15. 2. Of this Kind, Quality, and Character, are all that are in the State and Life of the true and saving Religion; notwithstanding that they are guilty of Weaknesses, Sins of Ignorance and Surprize, altho’ they have inter mixtures of blemish in their Souls, and of blame in their Lives; yet their Life is not the wicked, sinning, unrighteous kind of Life, but the contrary; their tenor, course, and way of living is the Way of Righteousness, not only in some particular Acts, but of kind, and for the main. They perpetrate no heinous Iniquity, no deadly atrocious Sin; so far they are faultless, perfect, and undefiled. They keep no Favourite Sin, allow of no Sin, nor allow themselves in any, nor can they dispense with sinning against God; and, therefore, they are not, in any respect, Children of Disobedience, nor Rebels against God. They are also the Doers of Righteousness, both towards God and Man; and the Righteousness which they practise, is not the counterfeit and illegitimate, but the true and saving kind of Righteousness, contra distinguish’d from the Righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees. The Wicked, in several degrees, are such as the Old-Test a ment characterizeth and complaineth of; that are estrang’d and are far from God, that forsake him, and live in forgetfulness and contempt of God, and have not the Fear of God before their Eyes, that are altogether become Filthy and do abominable Works, that are far from Righteousness, and desire not the knowledge of God’s Ways, presumptuous Sinners that Sin with a high hand, and make a Mock of Sin, Sons of Belial that know not the Lord, lewd Debauchees, revelling voluptuous Sensualists, Unclean, Evil-speakers, Lyars, Slanderers, Falsifiers of Trusts, Oaths and Contracts, unjust Dealers, the Children of Pride, Sons of Violence and of Blood, disobedient to Parents, perpetrating the horrid Sins against God (Atheism, Idolatry, Blasphemy, Magick,) the horrid Sins against Nature (Sodomy, Bestiality, Incest,) the horrid Sins against human Society (Robbery, Rapine, Murder,) the heinous Violaters of the Duties of both Tables, the Duties of Piety, Charity, Justice, Sobriety. They are not those that walk with God in the Duties of religious Society, that have clean Hands and a pure Heart.

  In the New-Testament, all Mankind, antecedently to the State and Life of true and saving Religion, are represented as deadly “Sinners, the Ungodly, all under Sin” (as deadly criminal Livers are under it,) “a guilty World” (subjected to Condemnation) “before God; for all have” (deadly) “sinned, and come short of the Glory of God” (as to the having with him Glory.) As we were carnal, “those that are after the Flesh,” so we liv’d after it, and brought forth the Fruits of it, “fulfilling the Desires of the Flesh, and of the Mind,” Eph. 2. 3. As we were those that are “of the World,” so we lived “after the course of it,” not living a Life of doing God Service, but of serving Sin (the Flesh) and “diverse Lusts, the Lust of the Flesh, the Lust of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life,” Tit. 3. 3. which live and reign in unregenerate Mankind, whose Life is a serving and pleasing them as a Law. They are not of a Divine Kind of Nature, but Aliens, and at Enmity with God, by doing evil Works, Col. 1. 21. not the Lovers of God, and of their Brother, but of the World, that have not “the Love of God in them, Man-haters, Man-slayers,” 1 Joh. 3. 13–17. and “have not eternal Life abiding in them.” And, because they are of the evil kind, (“Dogs, Swine, Serpents, Vipers,” Rev. 22. 15. Mat. 7. 6. and 3. 7. and 23. 33.) they are necessarily the Children of the Evil-one, and his resembling Off-spring, making a worldly-happy Estate, or a carnal selfish Interest of Credit, Prosperity, and sensual Delight, their chief Good, End, and Business, and preferring it before the Favour of God, the Interest of his Service and Kingdom, and their everlasting Happiness. Themselves, their Virtue and Religion, (for all Men pretend to Virtue, and almost all to Religion,) have their Character from the three grand Enemies of Christianity and Godliness, the Devil, the Flesh, and the World; for they are the wicked, carnal, and worldly kind of Men, of virtuous Men, and of Religionists. Their Virtue, Righteousness, and Religion, is of Kind illegitimate, and continueth them in their Wickedness, Carnality, and mundan Alliance.

  2. Mankind, antecedently to the State and Life of true and saving Religion, are deadly Criminals also, upon account of a second branch of their Character; for, whether they be open Aliens and Enemies, or pretenders to God and Holiness, they are not the faithful Friends of God and Holiness. In all Relations of Friendship, Unfaithfulness is the summary of all Vice and Crime, and Faithfulness is the summary of all Virtue and Duty; for Unfaithfulness is a failure of Duty, in Mind, Will, and Meaning; Faithfulness, the contrary. God’s People are without Guile, and, therefore, the Righteous and Uncondemnable in the judgment of Equity, no Guilt is imputable to them; they are absolutely Sinless, as in the future State, or at least unchargeable with Wickedness. “Blessed is the Man, unto whom the Lord imputeth no Iniquity, and in whose Spirit there is no Guile.” Of this truly noble Character, is every faithful Adherent to God and Righteousness, such as “Abraham was, whose Heart was faithful before God.” He forsaketh Iniquity, in Will and Affection, universally and unreservedly, so that he is not dead in Sin, nor in the State of reigning Sin, and his course of Life is the Holy and Sinless. Wittingly and willingly he doth no Iniquity (therefore is no Rebel, no Traitor,) practiseth no heinous deadly Sinning. His Bent, Mind, and Will, is not partially and dividedly (which is a traiterous with-holding our Love and Affection,) but fully and intirely for God and Righteousness, which have sincerely his utmost Esteem and Affection, being his chief Good, (as Sin the chief Evil;) nothing being so dear to him, but what he will part with for them, whom he serves with his Best, and with his All, notwithstanding all Difficulties and Discouragements. And, as a Sovereign and a Master cannot repute such Men that ought to be his Subjects and Servants, Upright, Honest, Sincere, and Faithful, that are not dutifully affected and dispos’d towards Him and his Service: So God cannot repute any Man Upright in Heart, Honest, Sincere, and Faithful, that is not dutifully, uprightly, sincerely, and faithfully affected and dispos’d towards him and his Service. Therefore we ought to consider who they are, that may be denominated simply, and without addition, the faithful Friends of God and Holiness; for all others are such, that are devoid of this intire Integrity and Faithfulness, (which alone is constitutive of the truly Righteous,) notwithstanding a partial, or limited, Integrity and Faithfulness which they have. They are so far from being dutifully and rightly Affected, that they are the Disaffected; so far from being faithful Friends to God and Righteousness, that they are Enemies (usually deadly Enemies, and such as may be called faithful Enemies,) their Mind, Will, and Meaning is in excusably amiss, because they are not, simply, and without addition, The faithful Friends of God and Righteousness, and the faithful Enemies of Sin and Wickedness.

  Many are loyal and faithful to a secular Master, or Sovereign, that are not God’s faithful Servants. Robbers (some of them) will be faithful to those of their own Gang. Many Men, of Civil-social Virtue only, will be faithful in matters of ordinary Justice, and, in some particular affair, faithful Messengers, Servants, Soldiers. If we suppose Abimelech an evil Man, as some will have him; yet, as to the business of Abraham’s Wife (Gen. 20. 6.) there was no Iniquity, no Pravity in his Mind, Will, or Meaning; he meant no Wrong to Abraham, whose Wife she was (to him altogether unknown,) and, therefore, in that particular affair, he was “Upright, Right, and without Iniquity.”

  There is a Faithfulness in Judaism, as well as in Christianity; for when any one will change his Religion, and become a Proselyte of Justice, the Jews require, “that he do it, not for the Vanity of the World,” (any secular Advantage,) “but out of Love, and from the whole Heart.” Such a Faithfulness and Integrity in adhering to their God, in opposition to Idols and false Gods, was requir’d of the Jews, in the antient times of their Commonwealth, as the Condition of their temporal Blessings. A Faithfulness to their Institution, as it was carnal Judaism, those Jews had, who thought, they did God good Service in killing Christians, Joh. 16. 2. And thus the Apostle, when he outrageously persecuted the Christians, was Faithful to his Institution, he never wilfully violated the Rules of Well-doing according to carnal Judaism, and, therefore, had the carnal Judaical Man’s good Conscience, as he professeth, Acts 26. 9. “I have lived in all good Conscience before God until this Day.”

  There is a Faithfulness in Paganism, as well as in Judaism. For Numa consecrated a Temple to Faithfulness. Regulus is a known Instance of Faithfulness. Pyrrhus said of Fabritius, that it was harder to turn him out of the way of Justice, than the Sun out of his Course.300Papinianus, the Lawyer, being commanded to defend the wicked Fact of the Emperor Caracalla, who had barbarously killed his Brother Geta, he chose rather to dye than to do it.301 In China, there is a Temple of Chastity, erected in commemoration of five Virgins, who, being taken by Thieves, took away their own Lives, to avoid being ravish’d.302 Several of the Heathens were sofar faithful and uprightly dispos’d, that, in several particular Actions, neither Shame, Torment, Exile, or Death, could prevail with them to violate the Dictates of their Minds; and several of them were true and faithful Worshippers of false Gods; they were Faithful to their Institution of Heathenism, and these may be said, to have The Heathen Man’s good Conscience.

  Yet, in the unsound Profession of Christianity, in carnal Judaism, and in Heathenism, there are no such Persons as the Upright, the Sincere and Faithful; and, consequently, there is no such thing as the Uprightness of the Upright, the Sincerity of the Sincere, the Faithfulness of the Faithful. For, in these Regions, all are the Wicked and the Ungodly; whereas, if any of them were the Upright and the Faithful, these must necessarily be the Righteous, and in the State of justified Persons. Wherefore the Natural and Heathen Man’s Uprightness, Sincerity, and Faithfulness, is of the same Nature and Character with the rest of his Virtue, it is of a spurious and degenerate Kind, (as being on this side Holiness and Godliness,) not the intire Integrity, not the right Kind of Uprightness, not the holy and godly Kind of Sincerity, 2 Cor. 1. 12.) but a faithless Kind of Faithfulness. And this is what is meant by “a natural and moral Integrity.”303 Which sort of Integrity is competible to Rebel-Sinners, to such as are revolted from God and his Kingdom, and from true Righteousness and Holiness, in whom it is necessarily complicated with the most heinous Disloyalty and Unfaithfulness; from which none can be excus’d, who are not, as his Liege-Subjects and Servants, loyally affected unto God and unsinning Righteousness towards him: The Ignorance of the Jews and Gentiles did not excuse them, because they might have known better, and would have known better, if they had been, so far as they might have been, the faithful Friends of God and Righteousness, and the faithful Enemies of Sin and Wickedness. With this Limitation the Philosopher’s Rule ought to be propos’d, which otherwise is not, universally, a safe Rule of Practice. “That which appeareth to thee” (as a faithful Adherent to God and Righteousness) “to be the best, let that be to thee a Law inviolable.”304

  It is, however, to be observ’d, that some, who are not properly and formally the Upright and Faithful, are such in aptness of Disposition, and in an initial degree; being such as mean well towards God and Righteousness, who are out of the State and Life of true and saving Religion, but with abatement of sense. These are they, that are denominated “Christ’s Sheep,” Joh. 10. 4, 10. those that “are of the Truth,” Joh. 18. 37. and Luk. 8. 15. those that have “an honest and good Heart”; which is a degree of that Integrity, which constituteth the Faithful and Upright in Heart, simply so called. The Phrase denoteth an honest and good Heart, in respect of the Word of true and saving Religion, and the receiving thereof, (an honest and good Heart so far;) by receiving which Honestly, Sincerely, and Faithfully (that is, without Vice, or Crime, as to Mind, Will, or Meaning) the Receiver becomes one of the Faithful and Upright in Heart, in a plenary Sense, whereas at first he is only so initially, and by way of preparatory Disposition. The Faithful and Upright, in aplenary sense, are Religionists of several Degrees. For many holy and good Men, under the Mosaical Oeconomy, were the faithful Lovers of God and of Righteousness; yet were very imperfect Religionists, agreeably to that Oeconomy. Our Saviour’s Disciples, while he was on Earth, that betray a great deal of Ignorance, Weakness, and many Imperfections at every turn, were the faithful and sincere Lovers of God and of Righteousness, but so as to be Religionists of a very mean Rank. And it seemeth reasonable to suppose, touching Cornelius, a Gentile, and a Proselyte, (and such like,) that God, from the Beginning of the World, having made Provision in Christ, that his and Christ’s Religionists should be in the State of Remission of Sins, Cornelius was imperfectly in this Divine Condition, before Conversion to Christianity: But, after the Gospel-settlement was made, his Conversion to Christianity was necessary, both for the continuance of what he had, and the completion of what he wanted.

  3. The Scripture looketh upon Mankind, antecedently to the State and Life of true and saving Religion, not as alive, but as dead, or in the State of the Dead. So in the Oriental Philosophy they call’d those Men dead, “that are fallen from their Dogmata, are become Aliens from the discipline of Truth and Virtue, whence the Soul hath her Life, and have subjected their Mind to the Animal Passions.”305 As, when any one was ejected out of the Pythagoreans Society, they set up an empty Coffin in his Place, to signify, that he ought to be look’d upon as Dead. And the Platonists say, “That the Death of a rational Substance is, to be devoid of God and of Mind.” The Mahometans use the same way of speaking. The Hebrews also use this Symbolical way of expressing the Condition of the Wicked.306 Our Saviour also useth the same Mode of Expression, when he saith, Matth. 8. 22. “Let the dead bury their dead,” i.e. leave it to them, who are in a deadly State of Sin, to busy themselves about burying the Carcases of the Dead. And, as the Jews will not allow the Gentiles, to be reckon’d amongst the Living, so the Apostle looketh upon the World of Heathen Sinners, as in the State of the Dead. 1 Pet. 4. 6. “The Gospel was preach’d to them that are dead, that they might be judg’d according to Men in the Flesh,” i.e. suffer Death, the Death of Mortification, to which they are sentenc’d by the Gospel, that they who are dead in their Carnality, by the Death of it might live Spiritually. And this plain Notion of the Dead sufficiently explaineth a very obscure Phrase, which this Apostle useth, speaking of Christ, 1 Pet. 3. 18, 19, 20. “Being put to Death in the Flesh, but quicken’d by the Spirit. By which also he preach’d to the Spirits in Prison, which sometimes were Disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the Days of Noah.” If, instead of this Phrase, the Spirits in Prison, the Apostle had made use of this Expression, those that are in the State of the Dead, there had been no difficulty in his Words; every Interpreter would have said, those who are in the State of the Dead, is a Phrase expressive of the sadly-degenerate Condition of Mankind, who are dead in a moral Sense; that this Generation, those that are in the State of the Dead, was sometimes disobedient to the preaching of Noah, (degenerate Mankind were then incredulous, and now are so;) and that Christ by the Spirit, after his Resurrection, going preach’d to them, not in his own Person, but by his Apostles, in which sense St. Paul saith, he came and preach’d, Ephes. 2. 17. If there had been no difficulty in the Apostle’s Words, supposing that he had made use of this Phrase, those that are in the State of the Dead; the difficulty in them must not be thought great, altho’ the Apostle useth this Phrase, the Spirits in Prison, (which is of more affinity with the Spirit that he was speaking of, than the other;) because the Spirits in Prison, and those that are in the State of the Dead (vitiously Dead) are plainly equivalent Expressions. Now, if the Apostle had said, that, by the Spirit, Christ preach’d to those that are in the State of the Dead, every one would have said, the Apostle is his own Interpreter, he meaneth nothing but what himself saith in the compass of a few Verses (1 Pet. 4. 6.) that the Gospel was preach’d to the Dead; therefore, when the Apostle saith, that, by the Spirit, Christ preach’d to the Spirits in Prison, every one ought to Interpret his Meaning, by what himself saith a few Verses after, that the Gospel was preach’d, toi˜c nekroi’c, to them that are in the State of the Dead. The Spirits in Prison, in a literal Meaning, are the Dead in a literal Meaning; the Spirits in Prison, in a moral Meaning, are the Dead in a moral Meaning.

  The Heathen, the Wicked, tho’ they live the Animal, the Human, and Human-Social, Life; tho’ they are alive unto Sin, and to their worldly and fleshly Interests and Concerns; tho’ they are not without their happy Life, and are alive in their own Conceit; yet they are dead 1. with respect to God and the Life of living to him. Thus the Prodigal Son was dead to his Father, who gave him over for lost. And, as they are departed from God, and, therefore, are dead to him; so God is departed from them, upon which account also they are dead, as the Body is dead, when the Soul is departed. They are dead, as to the proper Life of the Soul, the diviner Part, the only truly valuable Life, Excellency and Happiness. 2. The Wicked, in several Respects, resemble the Dead. They are in a Spiritual and Atheous kind of Darkness. “Weep for the Dead, for he hath lost the Light; and weep for the Fool, for he wanteth Understanding,” Eccles.22. 11. They have a lively Sense of their secular Interests, but have no perception of those Things, which are truly Good, or Evil. An holy vital Warmth and Fervour, Liveliness and Vigour is extinct in them; in Matters of true Religion, Virtue and Piety, they are torpid and inactive; their Virtue and Religion is but the Carcass of good Works. They are Vile, Worthless, Useless. “A living Dog is better than a dead Lyon.” Degenerate Mankind, in this respect also, resemble the Dead, they are impure and unclean. 3. They are surrounded by, and are subject to, those Evils, which are Death to the Soul, deadly Enemies, deadly Sins, deadly Sentence, and deadly Punishment. The State of the Wicked is a privation of true Light, Life, Truth, Wisdom, Health, Beauty, Order, Beatitude, Liberty, Nobility, Vigour, Power, Ease, Rest, Peace, Serenity, Delight, Pleasures, Goodness, Worth, Usefulness, Innocence, Purity, the Divinity, and Beatitude of the Soul; and a position of all the contrary Evils. This is a State of deadly criminal Evils; for which reason they fall into a deadly penal State, a penal privation of Remission of Sins, Peace and Reconcilement, Grace and Favour, of divine Alliance and Acceptance, of Election and Adoption, of the Inheritance, of Freedom and Citizenship in the Kingdom of God; and a position of the contrary.

  In our Heathen State, we were related to God as Aliens and Enemies, and, therefore, we could have no Rights in the holy City, nor to the holy Deity thereof. Nor was it possible, that God should look upon us as his Allies, Subjects, Servants, or Liege-People; but our Estate was that of Apostates from, Traytors and open Rebels against, our Sovereign Liege-Lord, which is a State of Death. If any of the Heathen, remaining such, might be saved, it must be by a Deity; but there is no Deity, whereby they can be saved, who are not the People of the true God. The true God, being the Deity of true Religion and Godliness, will certainly punish the Atheous and Ungodly. And, if it be by a Deity, that Mankind must be saved, then they must be sav’d by being truly Religious. Therefore both the Popular and Philosophick-Pagans, that acknowledg’d a future Happiness, foully mistook the Way thither; for they rely’d upon their Mystick-Metaphysical Sanctity, their Teletae and the Hieratick Way, their Theurgick Method of the Souls Purgation, Liberation, Reduction; they promis’d themselves a future Happiness, from an Initiation into their Mystick-Religious Institutions, their Heathen Piety, and Civil-Social Virtue, of which their Love of their Country was a principal Branch. But the Virtue of the Heathens is far from being saving; something of it is found in all Men, for all are in some sort, in some degree, Virtuous, Honest, Sincere; if, therefore, it was saving to any, all Men would be saved. The Religion of the Heathen, which should have been saving to them, was of a contrary Nature, constituting them A-Theists and Anti Theists, the main Branches of it being so many mortal Sins. But from this Hypothesis (without which the necessity of Christianity is not maintainable, nor can the Grace of God towards us Christianiz’d Gentiles be duly illustrated without it) a terrible Conclusion will be inferr’d, That all, who are in the Heathen State, are finally lost; which seemeth to be a grand Difficulty in Providence, and they that think it so, if they be Wise and Religious, ought to be allow’d great Liberty of Thought, to salve the Phaenomenon. We will content ourselves to observe, that this Dispute, touching the Heathens Salvation, is partly concerning Matter of Fact, and partly concerning Matter of Right.

  Of the Dispute touching the Salvation of the HeathensIf the Salvation of any be call’d in question as Heathens, the Matter of Fact ought to be debated in the first place, whether they were Heathens in this definitive Notion, The Theists, that do not acknowledge the true God? Usually, they that plead for the Salvation of Heathens, make them No-Heathens in Religion and Morality, making them God’s Religionists, and as good as Christians, and yet suppose, that they plead for the Salvation of Heathens, whereas they alter the Subject of the Question, and contradict themselves, as well as apparent Matter of Fact. But some, also, of great Learning and Piety, and not guilty of the Folly of Christianizing gross Heathens, yet have thought the Condition of some of the better sort of Pagans not desperate, but that their future Happiness is hopeful upon account of their Heathen Virtue; and some doubt not of the Happiness of all of them, who were sincere. Touching which Opinion, which carrieth a great shew of Charity and Goodness, I will only say; That our Heathen State is certainly the state of Death; that all the better Sort of Pagans are saveable, if any be so; that mere Heathen Virtue is not available to Salvation; that the Pagans Sincerity is of no better quality, than the rest of their Virtues; that we are apt to have an extravagant Esteem for their Virtue, and every one hopeth well touching his particular Favourite; but we are incapable of pronouncing any Thing touching their future Happiness, save only, That, in respect of us and our Notices, their Condition is not at all hopeful; yet, not knowing, what Transactions there may be between God and their Souls, who, in external appearance, dye gross Heathens; not knowing, whether Death rendreth every one’s Condition, and particularly theirs who were never tried with the Gospel, as remediless and desperate, as it doth theirs, who have been tried with it, and frustrated that Remedy; not knowing, but that all Ages of the World, as well as that wherein the Apostles preach’d (Act. 18. 10.) have afforded many Souls prepar’d for Christianity, touching whom we may doubt, whether they will finally perish, or not; not knowing, what their Condemnation will amount to, who have been, in all Ages, invincibly Ignorant of Christianity, and are, therefore, unconcern’d in the Condemnation, which it denounceth against Hypocrites and Unbelievers; we ought not to be dogmatical in such abstruse Points, or pretend to fathom the Depths of Providence.

  In order to reconcile the Dispute about the Heathens Salvation, as it is Matter of Right, so far as the different Opinions about it are reconcileable, it is to be consider’d, That all true and genuine Theists may be call’d Christians in a large sense, as being the Christian-kind of Theists and Religionists. In this large sense it must be acknowledg’d, that the Earth and Heavens, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, the Works of Nature, and of Providence, have always preach’d Christianity to the World of Heathens; that, from the Beginning of the World, Christianity hath been the only way to Righteousness and Salvation; for Mankind could never attain them otherwise, than by being God’s Believers and Religionists, the Men of Faith, and Faithful Religionists, which is to be, in great degree, Christ’s Believers and Religionists, and thus it may be express’d. The way to Righteousness and Salvation, from the Beginning of the World, was, to be Christ’s Believers and Religionists, so far as the being God’s Believers and Religionists importeth. If, therefore, the World of Mankind which was Heathen, had been God’s Believers and Religionists, (such as the Apostle speaketh of, Heb. 11. 6.) they could not have fail’d of a State of Alliance and Favour, of Righteousness and Salvation, more, or less perfect; for God, in providing Christ, had made Provision, that his Divine Believers should be in that Divine Condition. And, as that Divine Condition, which Divine Believers, in the antient Times, enjoy’d, was founded upon Christ; so the coming of Christ was reveal’d to these Divine Believers, and they had Prophetick Notices of it. But those Prophetick Notices cannot be called the way to Remission of Sins and Salvation, they were not propos’d as the Condition of a Treaty, or Covenant, nor was the Knowledge of them requir’d of those, to whom they were not at all reveal’d; but different Obligations arise from different Revelations. The generality of Mankind in these elder Times of the World, antecedently to any Revelation of the Messias to them, were no farther oblig’d, to be God’s Believers and Religionists, than according to natural Revelation. And, because they were not so far his Believers and Religionists, the Apostle looketh upon them as inexcusable, Rom. 1. 20. for nothing hindred them from being such, but their own Wickedness, wicked Unwillingness, or Averseness from Godliness, nor could they pretend any other Impotency but the Moral Impotency, which is not an Excuse, but an Aggravation. “Else how shall God Judge the World?” Rom. 3. 6. If the Existence of the one true God be fairly notic’d to all Mankind; if they do, or may easily, know, that his being God consisteth, in having the Rights and Dues of his God-head, (as the being King consisteth in having his Rights and Dues, which to bereave him of, is a making him no King;) if they are oblig’d to be Virtuous, Good, Just, and Grateful; and cannot but know, that of Right, and by Obligation, they are his Liege-People, Subjects, and Servants: Mankind must necessarily be in excusable, if they do not serve and glorify him as God, and, if they become not his Believers and Religionists, which is a relinquishing their Heathenism. The Heathen could not plead that they were so destitute of Means, that it was naturally impossible, for them to be God’s Believers and Religionists, of that their becoming such would be in vain; for his Parental Providence towards them demonstrated, that he had not abandon’d all Care and Concern for their Welfare. Act. 14. 16, 17. “In times past he suffer’d all Nations to walk in their own Ways. Nevertheless he left not himself without witness,” (a Testimony of his Care for their Welfare, and that he had not abandoned all Concern for it, altho’ he suffer’d all Nations to walk in their own Ways,) “in that he did Good, and gave us Rain from Heaven, and fruitful Seasons, filling our Hearts with Food and Gladness.” and 1 Tim. 9. 10. “He is the Saviour of all Men,” (taketh care of their Welfare,) “especially of those that believe.” Rom. 2. 4. His Goodness and Patience, toward the World of Mankind, hath a mighty Tendency to their Repentance, and is design’d to induce them to it; which is an Assurance, that their Repentance, if not illegitimate, shall not be ineffectual; and, if God commandeth them the Practice of the Duties of Religion in order to that End, that so they may obtain a future Happiness, they are bound to believe, that such Practice will not be in vain. Act. 17. 26, 27. “They are planted on the Face of the Earth, that they should seek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him and find him.” Which demonstrateth God’s Will and Intention to be found of them, if they did faithfully seek him, and his Willingness to be a God to them: Nor is it possible, that God should disown and damn any, that is a faithful Religionist towards him; “But in every Nation he that feareth him and worketh Righteousness, is accepted with him.” (Act. 10. 35.) “Glory, Honour, and Peace to every Man that worketh Good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile.” Rom. 2. 10. That is such Gentiles, as Melchizedeck, Job, the Ninevites and Cornelius. Touching the Salvation of the Heathens, and the Method of obtaining it, I will only add a wise and good Saying of a Divine of our own. “If any amongst Heathens had done what he could, in seeking and serving God, he should either for Christ’s Sake have been accepted with that little Knowledge he could attain; or else, as Calvin saith in his Comment on Acts 8. 13. Rather than he should have perish’d, God would have sent an Angel to reveal further Things to him.”307

  In our Heathen State we were Subjects of Satan’s Kingdom.A principal Branch of the Deadliness of our Heathen State, is, our being the Subjects of Satan’s Kingdom; which implieth, that the Heathen World of Mankind were under the Imperial Rule and Domination of Satan, (several ways the Subjects of the Kingdom of Darkness,) constituting his Mundan Empire. His usual Names denote him an Imperial Potentate; for he is styled “the God of this World, the Prince of this World.” Himself and his Angels are called ἀρχαὶ καὶ ’δξουσίαι, which Names denote them, Principalities and Powers of a mundan Empire, κοσμοκράτορες the Rulers of this World. Being fallen from Heaven, their Residence is now in the Air, where they constitute amongst themselves a Kingdom, or Empire, consisting of lower and higher Orders, some being of inferior, and others of superior, Rank and Condition; but all of them subjected to, and united in, one Imperial Head, their great Lord and Master, “the Prince of Devils, the Prince of the Power” (or Powers) “of the Air.” The Wisdom and Justice of Providence, by banishing them out of Heaven, hath placed them in the Air, in a Region of Vicinity to, and a Station of Superiority above, Mankind; and, accordingly, maketh use of them, to do the work of Publick Officers, in the Polity of our System. But this Power, which the Evil Demons exercise over Mankind, (by divine Concession, by a probational, or penal Tradition of Men into their Hands, and sometimes by divine Mandate and Appointment,) is rather Ministerial than Imperial. 2 Chron. 18. 20, 21. Job 1. 12. and 2. 6. Psal. 78. 49. Matt. 5. 25. and 18. 34. Luk. 22. 31. 1 Cor. 5. 5. and 10. 10. 1 Tim. 1. 20. Rev. 12. 10. Besides this Power of mere Officers and Executioners, they have acquir’d a Power of Empire and Sovereignty over Mankind; which Power is, morally speaking, in great degree unavoidable, supposing their evil Neighbourhood to degenerate Mankind. For, as these Aerial Powers are, in Place and Station, superior to Mankind; so their Spiritual Nature, Angelical Order, Policy, and Strength, is superior to the Human; (spiritual unbody’d Wickedness is paramount to weak Flesh and Blood, Ephes. 6. 12. they are also vastly numerous and closely united amongst themselves, which addeth to their Power; and, therefore, if not confin’d by a higher Power, they can domineer and lord it over Mankind; and, doubtless, they want not Will to do it, seeing Empire and Dominion is their great Interest, Design, and Business; Strength with them is the Law of Justice, and, therefore, as amongst the Brute-Animals, the Stronger beareth Rule over the Weaker, so the Stronger Wicked Angels will have the Mastery, and bear Rule, over the Weaker Wicked Men. They are, also, the most accomplish’d Tempters imaginable, and have the greatest Advantages to make Men Wicked, (of themselves prevalently prone to be Wicked;) for they are not wanting in depth of Malice, in great intellectual Abilities, in knowledge of us and our Affairs, in large Experience, Cunning, and Dexterity, Activity and assiduous Diligence, Hypocrisy, Imposture, Closeness, and Secrecy, in variety of Methods and Artifices; they are furnish’d with all sorts of Agents and Instruments, assisted with the World’s tempting Objects, and with the many and great Weaknesses and vicious Inclinations of Man’s Nature; in their Temptations they are mighty in Operation, (“working efficaciously, with strong Delusions, carrying Captive,” Ephes. 2.2. 2 Thess. 2. 11. 2 Tim. 3. 26.) sometimes acting the Fox, and sometimes the roaring Lion, sometimes the old Serpent, and sometimes the bloody red Dragon; upon all which accounts, what can be reasonably imagin’d, but that they will inveigle and vanquish the World of Mankind, and subject them to live under their Domination? As the Holy Ghost saith, Rev. 12. 9. “The old Serpent, called the Devil and Satan, deceiveth the whole World.” The Heathen World, therefore, must be considered, as Satan’s mundan Empire, which he reigneth over as an Imperial Potentate, and which was subject to his Rule and Domination; whence it is plain, that his magnificent Pretension to our Saviour, was not al together groundless, or devoid of Truth, “That the Kingdoms of the World, the Power and Glory of them was his, and at his disposal.” Luke 4. 5, 6. The Devil and his Angels are styled, Ephes. 6. 12. “The Rulers of the Darkness of this World,” to signify, that they are the Rulers of that Darkness which Heathenism is, and, consequently, of the dark benighted Heathen World. Agreeably whereunto, the Doctor of the Gentiles is sent to them upon this Errand, “to open their Eyes, and to turn them from Darkness to Light, and from the Power of Satan unto God,” Act. 26. 18. So the Converts to Christianity, that were translated into the Kingdom of God’s Son, are said to “be deliver’d from the Power of Darkness,” to which they were Subject, Col. 1. 13. But this subjection to the Power of Darkness, is not to be confin’d to Heathens, commonly so called, it is the common Condition of Mankind in general, antecedently to the State and Life of true and saving Religion, as will appear from an Enumeration of the several Ways, whereby Mankind are subject to Satan’s Kingdom and Domination, which are these three. 1. By way of Penal Subjection. 2. By way of criminal Subjection. 3. By way of criminal-religious Subjection.

  1. All Mankind, antecedently to their being in a State of true Religion, belong to Satan’s Kingdom, and are under his Domination, by way of Penal Subjection. For the Apostle, Hebr. 2. 14. expressly attributeth to the Devil, the Power, or Empire of Death (τὸ κράτος) as his Empire. Which is an Empire agreeable to his name Apollyon, and to those Names which the Jews give him, the Destroyer, the Angel of Death. This Empire of Death, which the Apostle attributeth to the Devil, Christ died to destroy, therefore it must not be understood of temporal Calamities, and bodily Death only: But, principally, of the penal Death of the Soul, which is Death everlasting. And, because he had this Branch of his Imperial Power by the Law, therefore a principal Branch of his Empire was not by mere Usurpation, but by a legal Settlement of the penal State of Death upon unrepenting Sinners, by which he had an Authority to detain them under his Power after Death; and even in their Life-time, so long as they continued ungodly Sinners, and, if God, in Christ, had not made Provision for their Freedom: This being the State of Death, to belong to his Kingdom, and to be under his Domination and Power. If, without being freed by the Redemption of Christ, Mankind would have remain’d in the State of Death, then, without this Redemption, they would have remain’d under Satan’s Domination and Power by Law. So far as Christ hath redeem’d them from being in the State of Death, so far he hath redeem’d them from being under Satan’s Domination and Power by Law, either in this Life, or after their Death. From which plain and intelligible Explication of a principal Branch of the State of Death, the Collect for Easter-Day in the Common-Prayer-Book, becometh plain and intelligible: Almighty God, who, through thine only-begotten Son Jesus Christ, hast overcome Death, and open’d unto us the Gate of everlasting Life. The Apostles Account of Christ’s Victory upon the Cross, becometh easy and intelligible, which otherwise is unintelligible, Col. 2. 15. “Having spoil’d Principalities and Powers, he made a shew of them openly, triumphing over them in it.”

  Not only the Souls of Men, but their Bodies also, are penally subjected to Satan’s Domination and Power, as appeareth from unquestionable Instances of diabolical Possessions and Infestations of the Body, which have great Analogy and Agreement with Temptations of the Soul. For, as all Temptations are not from the Devil; so Bodily Diseases ordinarily are from Natural Causes. The Evil Demonsare of various Kinds, adapted to various Imployments, and as their Temptations are various, so are the Impressions which they make, and the Diseases which they produce in a Human Body. As some, by their Wickedness of Nature, tempt the Tempter, invite and draw wicked Spirits to associate with them: So some are of such a Disposition of Mind and Body, that Evil Demons as naturally enter into and inhabit them, as in Pestilential times, People, that are pre-dispos’d, catch the Contagion. Sometimes it is not discernible, whether a Temptation, be merely Natural, or in part Diabolical: So, in some Cases, it is not by us discernible, whether a Disease of Mind and Body be merely Natural, or in part Diabolical; and, therefore, Diabolical Possession and Infestation is a matter liable, both to wilful Imposture and innocent Mistake. But, as some Temptations are manifestly Satan’s Suggestions, and have the Marks and Characters of a Diabolical Original: So, in some that are Distemper’d in Mind and Body, there are evident Marks and Characters of a Diabolical Original and Infestation; as when they tell People their Secrets, discover such Things done at a distance, and Things to come, as are beyond human reach; or when they are oppress’d, afflicted, abus’d, in measure and manner beyond the reach of Natural Causes; or when from the Nature, Symptoms, Causes, and Circumstances of a Distemper, it plainly appears to be nothing better than a Diabolical Possession and Infestation. By these Indications Demoniacks and Persons acted by an evil Spirit, are discernible by us, who have no extraordinary Faculty of discerning them. Ignorance, Atheism, Fanaticism, and Witchcraft (with other Vices and Diseases) abound much more in some times than others; so do Diabolical Possessions and Infestations, which Providence might permit to abound about our Saviour’s Time, to give occasion for his glorious Miracles. If they had not abounded in those Times, it is not reasonable to believe, that they would have abounded then so much in the Trade of Exorcists, and that the Jews should generally have entertain’d this Opinion, that their more grievous Diseases were from the Operation of evil Demons or complicated with them. “Indeed in this Distemper” (the Epilepsy) “there appear so obscure Footsteps, or rather none at all, of a morbifick Matter, that we may deservedly suspect here the Afflatus of a maleficent Spirit.”308 The much greater part and most eminent sort of Demoniacks, which our Saviour had to do with, (tho’ not the only,) were Epileptical, Melancholical, Lunatic, and Maniacal Persons, (as appeareth from the Gospel,) whose horrible Distempers were either originally caus’d by, or complicated with, evil Demons. He gave a Demonstration, both of his Divine Goodness and Power in giving them relief from their hideous Calamities, rescuing them from under the Domination and Power of those infernal Spirits, and therefore the Apostles celebrate him for this God-like Atchievement. Act. 10. 38. “He went about doing Good, and healing all that were oppress’d of the Devil.” His Disciples experimented the Divinity of his Power, and that his Empire was superior to the Diabolical; and, therefore, after he had sent them abroad, they return’d to him with Exultation and Triumph, Luk. 10. 17. “Lord, even the Devils are subject to us thro’ thy Name.”

  2. All Mankind, antecedently to their being in a State of true Religion, belong to Satan’s Kingdom, and are under his Domination and Rule, by way of criminal Subjection. The Devil’s usual Name, “the Wicked and Evil One,” (Matth. 13. 19. 1 John 2. 13.) denoteth him the Prince of all Wicked and Evil Ones; he the Leader, and they the Followers, “that are turn’d aside after Satan,” Tim. 5. 15. He ruleth them in making them Atheous and Wicked; and, when they become such, their Life is an obeying, pleasing him, doing him Service, and “his Servants they are, to whom they obey.” His Rule and Empire, therefore, is commensurate to the Reign of Sin. They walk “according to the Prince of the Power of the Air,” which Prince and Power taken collectively are “a Spirit mightily operative in the Sons of Disobedience,” by way of Inspiration, Afflatus, internal Motion, Persuasion and Suggestion, Eph. 2. 2, 3. They are animated by the Agency of that great one that is in the World, 1 John 4. 4. who influences them, not only by tempting Objects, and external Means, but by internal Operation, “blinding the Mind, putting into the Heart, filling the Heart”(2 Cor. 4. 4. John 13. 2. Act. 5. 3.) Like a mighty Pharaoh he commandeth them, and putteth upon them the vilest Practices, the basest and most painful Drudgeries, and they serve and obey, not considering what a Master they serve, usually designing only to serve their own Lusts, in the Fury whereof he hurrieth them like the Swine to Perdition. He is the Father of their Family, they are a Serpentine Brood and Race,309 and Devils incarnate; agreeably to which our Saviour saith of a Miscreant among his Disciples, “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a Devil?” Joh. 6. 70. such is a Son of Belial (for Belial is one of Satan’s Names, 2 Cor. 6. 15.) and such are the Children of the Wicked One in various degrees, and all that belong to the Synagogue of Satan, who are necessarily under his Domination, by way of criminal Subjection.

  3. Almost the whole World of Mankind were some time under Satan’s Domination and Power by way of criminal-religious Subjection, as being the Religionists of his Institution, and his religious Worshippers. One sort of these Diabolical Religionists are Witches and Magicians, whose Existence has been so well attested by Experience and by Persons of unquestionable Learning and Veracity, so acknowledg’d by Heathens, by all wise Laws and Governments, and by the Holy Scriptures, is of Theory so unexceptionably Rational, and the Objections against it so inconsiderable, that, notwithstanding the many Impostures and false Stories of this kind, he that would reject them all, must be a superlative Believer. Another Instance of Diabolical Religionists are the Heretical-Pagan-Gnosticks, that infested the Primitive Church, who invented a Theology and Religion, which was a mixture of Magick and Demonolatry; upon which account, some part of them were called Ophitae, Serpent-Worshippers, others Sataniani, Satan’s Religionists; which is the heavy Character of the whole World of Heathen Religionists, as appeareth from the Historical Accounts of Heathen Countries, from their Theology and Religion, from the Nature of Christianity, and the Sense of all Christians, and from this Testimony of the Holy Scripture, which is also the Acknowledgment of several learn’d Pagans, That what the Gentiles and Gentilizing Israelites sacrific’d, they sacrific’d to Devils, not to God.310 The Christians usually call’d their Doctrines, Doctrines of Devils; their Altars, the Devil’s Altars; their Priests, the Devil’s Priests; their Religion, the Devil’s Institution; their Inspirations, Afflatus’s, and Methods of Divination, Diabolical; their Sacrifices, the Delight of Devils; their Gods, unclean Demons. Agreeably whereto, the Renunciation of Heathenism at Christian Baptism was compos’d. The Apostle opposeth “the Cup and Table of the Lord to the Cup and Table of Devils,” in the Heathen Idol-Feasts, 1 Cor. 10. 21. So the Heathen-Roman Empire is said to be “subjected to Satan the Chieftain, and to his Angels the Demons, by way of Religious Subjection”;311 by the Holy Ghost it is represented as a Demonarchy, (Satan and his Angels were in reigning Condition, whilst Paganism flourish’d, but Christianity threw them down, Revel. 12. 8.) And all that Empire’s Idol-worship is styled the Worship of Devils, Revel. 9. 20. Christianity therefore supposeth, that the World of Heathens, thro’ their own Weakness and Wickedness, and the Artifices of Satan (Visions, Prodigies, Oracles, Vaticinations, Healings, and moving the Images) were seduc’d into an Opinion, that the Evil Demons were Gods, that they prostituted their Souls to be corrupted by them, were enslav’d by them, and subjected to their Domination and Power, as the Religionists of Satan, who had at Rome, and in other Places, as it were, his Imperial Seat and Throne, Rev. 2. 13 and 13. 2. They invited these Evil Demons to be the Inmates and Inhabitants of their Souls; these they deputed to be the Guardians of their Life; to these they attributed a mundane Presidency, pay’d divine Honours and a Religious Subjection, managing both their Civil and Religious Affairs by their Conduct. The learn’d Writers of the Gentiles do not only inform us, That they worshipp’d Arimanius, Cacodaemones, Vejoves, whom they knew to be evil Spirits; but some of their learn’d Theologers were of Opinion, that a considerable part of their Religion was the Religion of Evil Demons, whom the generality of Pagans ignorantly worshipp’d.312Porphyry discourseth at large of Evil Demons, of their Religious Worship amongst the Pagans, and of their Delight in bloody Sacrifices.313Plutarch discourseth, that the Order of Demons is obnoxious to Passions and brutal Affections, which are Properties, “of which there are Footsteps and Marks in their Sacrifices and Mysteries.”314 And, having enumerated several Rites of their Religion, “the tearing and devouring raw Flesh, and other Discerptions, Howlings, obscene Speeches in their Sacra, Madnesses excited with noise and tossing of the Neck,” he saith of them, “They are not the Worship of any of the Gods, but are instituted to sweeten and appease Evil Demons.”315 These Acknowledgments of learned Heathens are great approaches to the Christian Hypothesis, that the Heathen World were Satan’s Religionists, of the Truth whereof we have so many authentick Proofs.

  The great usefulness of Revelation is evident from the foregoing Consideration of the State of the Heathen World.This, therefore, seems to have been the State of the Heathen World. Abraham was educated in Idolatry, as appears from Jos. 24. 2. When Abraham was call’d out of Ur of the Chaldeas, the only Country, in which we have any account that the true Religion was profess’d, was Salem, afterwards call’d Jerusalem, of which Melchizedek was King and also Priest of the most high God.316Job also and his Friends worshipp’d the one true God; which appears likewise to have been the legal Establishment in the Country where he liv’d; for, speaking of worshipping the Sun and Moon, which he disclaims the ever having been guilty of, he says, “That were an Iniquity to be punish’d by the Judges,” Job 31. 28. It seems also pretty plain, from another Passage ( Job 23. 11, 12.) that Job had something more than the mere Light of Nature to walk by, and that he was no Stranger to supernatural Revelation; for he saith there of himself, “My Foot hath held his Steps, his Way have I kept, and not declin’d, neither have I gone back from the Commandments of his Lips; I have esteem’d the Words of his Mouth more than my necessary Food.” Which Words some will have to be meant of the Light and Law of Nature, merely as such, which seems an extremely absurd Construction of the Place, which is plainly meant of some Law or Doctrine, that was God’s Word by his Prophets, of which Number Job himself seems to have been One. He must also have been no Stranger to the 7 Precepts of the Sons of Noah, as they are called, and to the Revelations made by God to Abraham, if that Opinion be true, which is generally embrac’d by the most learn’d and judicious Commentators, that Job was a descendent of Abraham, probably an Edomite, the Land of Uz being part of Idumea; and that he liv’d before the giving of the Law to Moses. But the first Mention we find made of the Religion of the Inhabitants of Jerusalem, after the Children of Israel’s coming into the Land of Canaan, is that they were Idolaters; as were also the Children of Edom, where we first find their Religion mention’d, after the Israelites began to have any Intercourse with them; which was also the Case of all the other Nations descended of Abraham, and of the several People inhabiting Arabia and Canaan. So that, when God gave his Laws to the Israelites, we know not of any one Nation in the World, where the Worship of the one true God was profess’d, the Israelites excepted. As for Zoroastres, who set up the Worship of the one true God in Persia, that was not ’till the Days of Darius Hystaspes, after the Babylonian Captivity: And that Zoroastres learn’d that Truth from the Jews, has been render’d highly probable by several who have treated of that Subject.

  It appears from what hath been said, that the Heathens look’d upon the whole Universe of Rational Agents, consisting of Gods, Demons, (Good and Bad), Heroes, and Men, as but one Political System; and that the current Doctrine of the best Sects among them, was Polytheism and the Worship of Demons. These their Practices were in great measure owing to their believing God to be the Soul of the World, which prevail’d universally among the better sort of them; for they could never think it a Crime to worship what they thought Parts of the Deity. From this Opinion of God’s being the Soul of the World, even Socrates himself was not free, and some modern Deists have endeavour’d to revive it.

  From what has been said it appears, that the Heathens were universally ignorant of the one true God, who was an unknown God at Athens. The best Sects of their Philosophers, as they were Ignorant of many important Truths, so they taught many gross Errors, as well with respect to Religion, as Morality; so that it may justly be question’d, whether the Heathen Philosophers, in the Main, were of any real Service to the Cause of Religion and Virtue. The Bulk of Mankind have been always very careless and inconsiderate, so as not to be at the Pains of discovering those important Truths, which they might have discover’d by the Light of Nature; and from the same Causes they were not sufficiently influenc’d by those Truths, which they did come to the Knowledge of, the strong Impressions of sensual and present Objects greatly weakening or destroying the Force of more remote ones, tho’ of much greater Consequence. The Prejudices of Education, as it were imbib’d with their Mother’s Milk, were also so great and so many, and the perverse Customs and Opinions of those about them influenc’d them so strongly, as greatly to obscure and give a wrong Biass to that Natural Reason, which, if it had been left to itself, would have made a much greater and clearer Discovery of the Law of Nature. The Affairs of the World, the Pursuits of Ambition, the Baits of Pleasure, and the Desire of Riches, employ so much of Mens Thoughts and Time, that they cannot attend to the still and calm Voice of Reason, which is seldom heard in so tempestuous a Sea. And when once, by such means as these, evil Habits had taken deep Root in the Minds of Men, to which by an innate Concupiscence, they had a prevalent Tendency, their Foolish Heart became darken’d, and they were given up to a reprobate Mind, by which the Light of Nature was, in great measure, extinguish’d, the Blindness of their Hearts darkening their Understandings, and blunting the Stings of Conscience. Amidst so great Corruptions, arising from such Causes, both within and without, which had, to so great a Degree as we have seen, benighted the Heathen World, what Wonder is it, if those few Heathen Philosophers, who gave themselves up to search after Truth, and to practice the Truths they discover’d, made so small a Progress as we find they did, in reforming so degenerate and corrupt a World? Polytheism, Demonolatry, and Idolatry, we have seen how universally they prevailed; and that, with respect to the one true God, the whole Heathen World lay in a State of Atheous Ignorance, not excepting even the greatest of the Philosophers themselves, who were also defective, with respect to many of the Branches of Morality, as hath likewise been shewn. Of Justice, indeed, as it is a Virtue necessary to the support of Civil Society, they seem to have had very just Notions; but such Justice is only a Political, not a truly Religious Virtue, a mere Civil Institution. From what hath been said, I think it plainly appears, that all their Virtues were of the spurious and illegitimate Kind; and that for want of the true and solid Foundation of all Virtue and all Religion, The Knowledge of the true God and his Attributes.

  Most of those who call’d themselves Philosophers, were never in earnest in their pretended Researches after Virtue; they made it matter of mere Ostentation, and to shew their Parts, and an Affair of as great Indifference, as Problems in Mathematicks, or Natural Philosophy; thinking it sufficient, if they could but amuse the Vulgar, and dispute learnedly about it; and accordingly in by far the greatest Number of those who affected to distinguish themselves by that glorious Title, it reach’d no farther than the Head, not to the Heart, as is plain from the profligate Manners of many of them from the Accounts of their Contemporaries. And how should Mankind be reform’d by such Instructors? They who were influenc’d by the Truth they taught appear, upon Examination, to be much fewer than is generally imagin’d. And even those very few, we have seen that they grossly err’d in most important Points, as well with respect to God, as the Cause and Cure of the present corrupt Condition of Mankind, and the End for which our great Creator intended us. No less Men among them than Plato, Cicero, and Epictetus advise Men to comply, each with the establish’d Religion of his Country; but was that the way to enlighten and reform a benighted and idolatrous World? The Wisest of them have profess’d their Ignorance, how the Deity was to be worshipp’d, and how those who had done amiss were to be reconcil’d to him; of which Plato represents Socrates so sensible, as to introduce him in one of his Dialogues, declaring his Ignorance upon these Heads, and wishing for the Guidance of a Divine Revelation in such Matters, for which our wiser modern Deists think there was no occasion. Those also among the Heathen Philosophers, who have upon some occasions argued the most strenuously for the Soul’s Immortality, sometimes express themselves doubtfully upon the Matter. ’Tis the Christian Religion only, which hath clearly brought Life and Immortality to Light. The refin’d Reasonings and long Deductions of acute and speculative Philosophers upon this and other important Points, the Attributes of God, and the Obligations to Virtue, were too fine-spun, and required too long and close an Application, to influence the generality of Mankind. None of them was able to form any thing like a tolerable Scheme with respect to Providence, the Forming and the Governing the World, the Dignity and the Corruption of human Nature, whence the Obligation to Virtue originally arises, and to what it ultimately tends, and the happy Immortality of the Righteous. All of them were Ignorant of some of these Truths, and the imperfect Truth they did discover, lies so scatered and blended with Error, that the greatest Genius among them was never able to collect them into one Body; and there is so strict a Dependence of one of these Truths upon another, that it is like breaking a Link in a Chain, or taking a Corner-Stone from the Foundation of a Building, to separate one of them from the rest; so close is their Connexion. What is more; whilst the Hearers of the Philosophers consider’d that these Instructors were but Men like themselves, the Truths they were able to discover and support by plain Reason, were able to make but a weak Impression upon them, for want of sufficient Weight, and because they were not enforc’d by a Divine Authority. It awakens and rouses the Attention and Consideration of Men at another sort of a rate, not only to have it laid before them, that such a Practice is agreeable to the Dictates of Right Reason, that it is Beautiful, Honourable, and Decorous, that we ought to do it, and that such Advantages will naturally and necessarily attend it; but also to have it clearly made out to ’em, that it is moreover the Will and positive Command of the Creator and supreme Governor of the World, to whom they owe what they are and what they have, and at whose hands they expect all they hope for; which makes a much deeper Impression upon them, than barely to have the fitness of the Practice propos’d to ’em, without the Interposition of the Authority of a competent Legislator, to whom they are under the greatest Obligations in point of Gratitude, and who will certainly vindicate the Honour of his Laws.

  After all these Considerations, let any impartial Man judge, whether a Revelation was useful or necessary for the Reformation of Mankind. No, says the modern Deist; for the Light and Law of Nature, Natural Religion, and Morality are sufficient, as they have been laid down by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, M. Antoninus, and others among the Antients; by Grotius, Puffendorf, Crellius, Sharrock, Wilkins, Cumberland, Clark, Wollaston, and others among the Moderns. In answer to this, I desire that it may be observ’d, That there is a great Difference between mere natural Reason, and Reason assisted by Revelation, and super natural Help. Our Reason assents to many Things, when propos’d to us, which it could never have found out. The greatest Genius’s among the Heathen Philosophers, seem to have been extremely sensible of the Weakness, the Short-sightedness, and the Uncertainty of their Reasonings about most important Truths. Let us hear what they themselves say upon the Point, “Nature gives many Indications of her Will; but we” (saith Cicero317 ) “are deaf, I know not how, nor hear her Voice.” “Nature hath afforded us some small Sparks, which we so quickly extinguish by evil Habits and false Opinions, that the Light of Nature no where appears.”318“We seem not only blind with respect to Wisdom, but dull and stupid with respect to those very Things, which in some measure we seem to see.”319“Our Minds” (saith Aristotle) “with respect to those Things which are naturally the most plain of all, are like the Eyes of Bats in Day-light.”320“Truly” (saith Cicero) “the so great Dissention of the most learned Men in an Affair of the utmost Importance [the Nature of the Gods] will stagger even those, who before thought that they had arriv’d at Certainty in the Point.” And “I wish” (saith Cicero in the same Discourse) “that I could as easily find out the Truth, as confute Error.”321 Even Socrates express’d himself with doubt concerning a Future State, tho’ he seem’d strongly to incline to the Belief of it, and tho’ he brought the best Arguments in support of it, as they are represented to us by Plato, that we meet with offered by any Heathen Philosopher. Cicero, in his Tusculan Questions, is still more doubtful upon that Head, tho’ inclining to the same side with Socrates. Seneca look’d upon it as a point more desirable, than probable.322“If (says Cicero323 ) in the Opinion of all Philosophers, no-one has attain’d Wisdom, we, for whose welfare you pretend the Immortal Gods have made the best Provision, are in a most wretched State; for, as there is no material Difference, whether no Man does enjoy his Health, or no Man can enjoy it; so I do not see that it is of any consequence, whether no Man is or can be made wise.” What wonder then is it, if the best and wisest of the Philosophers, thus sensible of their own Ignorance, and of the Weakness of human Reason, with respect to matters of the utmost Importance, (such as the Nature of the Deity, how he would be worshipp’d, and a future State; as also the Original of Evil, and of the present corrupt Condition of Mankind, of which they were as sensible, as they were ignorant of the Cause,) should be sensible of the Want of a Divine Revelation, and earnestly long for it, as has been already mention’d? Now, whoever would go about rationally to make a comparative Judgment of assisted and unassisted Reason, let him compare the Schemes of Natural Religion and of Morality, left us by the Heathens, with those which have been publish’d by Christians. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Epictetus, and M. Antoninus, are clearly the greatest Heathen Writers upon these Subjects. How defective these are all, I have already, in great measure, laid before the Reader, some of them making no more of Virtue and of Religion, than mere Civil and Political Institutions; all of them conforming to the Idolatrous Establishments of their several Countries, and advising others to do the like; Polytheism and the Worship of Demons being essential Parts of the Platonick and Stoick Theology, as Magick and the Worship of Demons were of the Pythagorean; and yet these have been reputed the best Sects, and to have produc’d the greatest Moral Philosophers, which Heathen Antiquity could boast of. I have already observ’d, that what Truths lay scatter’d among them, no-one of them had discernment enough to separate from the Errors, tho’ that be a point which that great Genius, Cicero, seems particularly to have labour’d. Now any one with half an Eye may see, how much the Systems of Natural Religion and of Morality, deliver’d by the above-mention’d Christian Writers and others, exceed those of the foregoing Heathen Philosophers, some of whom seem to have been greater Genius’s than any of those Christian Writers I have now mention’d. To what then must the Advantage of the Christian Writers upon these Subjects over the Heathen Philosophers be owing? To the Assistance of Revelation certainly, which has evidently improv’d our Notices, even of Natural Religion and Morality, as from what I have already advanc’d, but much more by comparing the above-mention’d two Sets of Writers, will abundantly appear. Therefore, when modern Deists, in order to prove, that there was no Necessity or even Usefulness of a Revelation, alledge, that Natural Religion and Morality are sufficient, let them confine themselves to any Scheme they please among the Heathen Philosophers, among whom the latest seem plainly to have much improv’d from Hints they had from the Christian Religion, to which they were no Strangers. When once we become assur’d of the Truth of any Doctrine, tho’ merely from Testimony, it naturally puts us upon the Inquiry, to find out Arguments from Reason, in order to prove that Doctrine; and in such a way, and by such means, it is evident, that the great Truths of Natural Religion, and the Fundamentals of Morality, have been more throughly discover’d, and establishd upon better Principles, than was ever perform’d by the greatest Genius’s of the Heathen World, tho’ they were in themselves, perhaps, the greatest the World ever produc’d. If there had never been any Revelation, with what Vanity can any of our Modern Deists pretend, that they would have had better Notions of Religion, of God, and of Morality, than Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, &c.? And in how many important Points, with respect to these, were they ignorant, and of how many more were they very doubtful? Nay, I will venture to go one step farther, and to affirm, that I think it highly probable, That our Inquiries, into the very Frame of Nature and the Material System of the World, would not have been so successful as they have been, were it not for the Hints we have receiv’d from a Divine Revelation, and more particularly this, That the World is the Creature of God; which is a most important Truth, that the Heathen Philosophers were not very well acquainted with; of which as great a Philosophical Genius, and as successful an Inquirer into Nature, as this Age and Nation, or, perhaps, any other, has produc’d, has made no inconsiderable Use. All our Knowledge of Natural Religion and Morality, is ultimately resolv’d into our Knowledge of the Frame of Nature; as our Belief of Reveal’d Religion is founded upon the pre-suppos’d Truth of that which is Natural. “He that cometh to God, must first believe, that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” “That which may be known of God, is manifest in them; for God hath shew’d it unto them. For the Invisible Things of him are clearly seen from the Creation of the World, being understood by the Things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead; so that they are without Excuse.”

  To conclude; there seems to me, to be two opposite Extremes, into which Men have run. Some cry up Reason, and the Light of Nature, at such a rate, as to think them alone sufficient Guides, in consequence of which they think all Revelation useless and unnecessary; whose Mistake I have at large endeavour’d to shew, and that they who wanted Revelation, were sensible of their being at a loss in most important Points, for want of it. Others, with a mistaken View of magnifying Revelation and Faith, undervalue and vilify Reason and the Light of Nature most immoderately, as if they were no proper Guides at all, nor fit to be trusted, in Divine Matters and the Truths of God. But, if that were the Case, how should we ever come to the Knowledge of God at all? So it is plain St. Paul thought, by the Passages just now quoted from him. The Belief of a Revelation is grounded upon the Veracity of God the Revealer, and we must first be convinc’d by Reason of the Veracity of God, (that he is Omniscient, and cannot be deceiv’d, that he is perfectly Good, and cannot deceive,) before we can give a firm Assent to a Revelation, as coming from him. So the Knowledge of the Being and Attributes of God, are previously necessary to the Belief of a Revelation. Socinus indeed held, that we can no otherwise come to the Knowledge of God, but by Revelation; but those who have follow’d him in other Matters, have been wise enough to drop him upon that Head. Beside; without making use of Reason in Divine Matters, how should we be able to judge of a Revelation, or a Miracle, and distinguish the True from the False? Or how should we judge of the Meaning of a Revelation, when we have it? Without applying our Reason to the Discussion of Matters reveal’d, how should we come to know, that these Words, “This is my Body,” are not to be taken in a literal Sense, or those other Words, “If thine Eye offend thee, pluck it out?” We must, therefore, either use our Reason in the Study of the Scriptures, or we have no Reason to study them at all; nor need we fear any evil Consequences from such a Practice: For all the Doctrines of Revelation, when freed from the Errors of the mistaken, and the Imposition of the designing, Part of its Votaries, and taken as they stand in the Scriptures themselves, free from all human Figments and unwarrantable Deductions, will stand the test of Reason. Nor do I know a more disadvantageous Idea, that can be given of the Christian Religion, than to decry the use of Reason in matters belonging thereto; for does not that plainly seem to imply, that it is an unreasonable Scheme, as being what will not stand the test of Reason? several Points, indeed, there are in it, which we cannot comprehend, which yet, that they are so, we have very good Reason to believe, tho’ we cannot solve all Difficulties, or answers all Objections, that may be started about them; no more than we can explain all the Difficulties that occur about Self-existence, Eternity and Immensity, which yet, we are very certain, are Attributes that belong to some Being that really exists. Such are the Difficulties about the infinite Divisibility of Space, which yet is demonstrated, and those about Liberty, of which however we have the same Proof, that we have of our own Consciousness. The Distinction, therefore, is very just and well-grounded, between Matters above our Reason, and contrary to Reason. Propositions of the former Kind, we may give an unshaken Assent to, as well in Religion as Philosophy; but Propositions of the latter Kind are equally unintelligible, incredible, and impossible. Reason, therefore, and Revelation reflect a mutual Light upon one another; Natural and Reveal’d Religion communicate such Strength and Firmness of Parts to each other, as do the several Parts of an Arch, out of which a Stone taken at the Top weakens the whole Frame, as much as one at the Bottom. Without Natural Religion, Reveal’d Religion is a Building founded upon the Sand; but by the help of it, it is a House founded upon a Rock, against which we know who has told us, That the Gates of Hell shall not prevail; notwithstanding all the Assaults of those, who have taken a great deal of Pains, racking their Brains for Arguments, and ransacking all Antiquity for Testimonies, in order to invalidate and depretiate that, which if we wanted, we should, with all their boast’d Light of Nature, be like a Ship at Sea out of sight of Land, and without Chart or Compass. And so much for the System of Rational Agents, the Kingdom of God in the rational World, and the mistaken Notions of the Heathens, about these Matters, in order to shew, not only the Usefulness of Revelation, but the Necessity of it, in order to the Reformation of Mankind, and their Increase of Happiness in this Life, but principally in that which is to come.

  a philosophical

  INQUIRY

  into the

  LAWS of NATURE,

  In which their Form, chief Heads, Order, Promulgation, and Obligation, are deduced from the Nature of Things: Also the Elements of Mr. Hobbes’s Philosophy, as well Moral as Civil, are consider’d and refuted.

  Love is the Fulfilling of the Law.

  —Rom. 13. 10.

  Thou shalt love the LORD thy GOD with all thy Heart, and with all thy Soul, and with all thy Mind. This is the first Commandment; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self. On these two Commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets.

  —Matt. 22. 37–40.

  LONDON:

  Printed in the YEAR MDCCXXVII.

  THE INTRODUCTION

  The Design of this Treatise.§I. It concerns us both, friendly Reader, “That you should be briefly acquainted with the Design and Method of this Treatise”; for thence you will immedately perceive, “What I have perform’d, or, at least, attempted; and what is further to be supply’d from your own Understanding, or the Writings of others.” The Laws of Nature are the Foundations of all moral and civil Knowledge, as in the following Work will at large appear. But these, as all other Conclusions, discoverable by the Light of Nature, may be deduc’d two ways; either from those manifest EffectsTwo ways of deducing the Laws of Nature.1. From their Effects. which flow from them, or from the Causes whence they them selvesarise. I have endeavour’d to discover them in this latter Method, by arguing from the Cause to the Effect. To the former Method of proving their Obligation, (by arguing from the Effect to the Cause,) belongs what has been written by Hugo Grotius, and by his Brother, in his Posthumous Work, and by our Countryman Sharrock, who establish them from the approv’d Sentiments of various Authors of different Nations and Ages,This insisted on by Grotius, Sharrock, &c. as also from a Harmony in the Manners and Laws, if not of all, at least of the politer, Nations.1 Hitherto also is to be referr’d that Work of Selden’s, concerning the Laws of Nature and Nations, according to the Sentiments of the Hebrews.2 And, in my Opinion, all these Authors have deserv’d well of Mankind. But especially the Work of Hugo Grotius, which was the first of the kind, I think worthy, both of the Author, and of Immortality. For a few Slips, and those in Matters, in which the Customs of his Country seem to have biass’d that great Man, will easily obtain Pardon from a candid Reader.

  Useful, tho objected against.§II. Nor, truly, are the Objections, which are usually brought against this method of proving the Laws of Nature, (by arguing from the Effect to the Cause, as Grotius does,) of so great weight, as to prove it altogether fallacious and useless; altho I readily acknowledge, that they may so far prevail with candid Inquirers after Truth, as to convince them, That it would be more useful and safe, to find out a fuller Proof, by searching into the Causes, which produce in the Mind of Man the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature. This, however, will more plainly appear, if we briefly propose those Objections, with the Answers to them.

  First Objection from insufficient Induction.In the first place it is objected, “That the Induction is weak, which infers, from the Writings or Manners of a few Men, or Nations, the Opinion or Judgment of all.” Now there is scarce any Person so well acquainted with the Laws and Customs of any one State, that can ever have a perfect Knowledge of them all; much less that can attain to such a Knowledge of the Laws of all States, still less, of the inward Sentiments of each Individual, as may enable him, upon a just Comparison, to conclude, what those Notions are, in which all agree.

  To this it is answer’d, “That the Judgments made by different Nations concerning matters of daily publick Practice, (such are Religion, or some sort of divine Worship in general, and a degree of Humanity, sufficient to prohibit Murder, Theft, and Adultery,) may with ease be every where observ’d by any Man, without so profound a Knowledge of their Laws”: and such Judgments sufficiently declare that they agree in the Laws of Nature; for that which we know by Experience, to be, as it were, naturally acknowledg’d good by many Nations, we presume, upon account of the likeness of human Nature, to be likewise acknowledg’d good by the rest; especially when our Adversaries cannot produce one undoubted Instance, to prove any Nation to be of different Sentiments. To me, truly, those Narratives of some few barbarous Americans, and the Hottentots, “That they have no religious Worship,” seem, not suspected only but, false; for such a negative Assertion is hardly capable of ever being prov’d by Testimony. Therefore Acosta3 and some others seem rashly to have form’d a Judgment concerning those, with whose Language, Manners, and Sentiments they could not thorowly acquaint themselves in so short a time. For we read, that both Jews and Christians were sometimes falsly accus’d by many, of the greatest Impieties, tho their Religion was more holy than that of other Nations. But, be that as it will, it is manifest, “That those Truths are with sufficient Clearness propos’d to all, which are readily acknowledg’d by almost every one, altho the same should be either overlook’d, or even oppos’d, by some few.” But this Observation will be the most proper, and of greatest use, when it appears manifestly from other Proofs than Testimony and Custom, “That these Propositions teach the true Means to the best End, and that all are indispensably oblig’d to pursue that End by those Means”; which may be best prov’d by a consideration of the Causes, which suggest such conclusions of Reason to our Minds.

  Obj. 2. That they want a sufficient enacting Authority.§III. A second Objection is, “That, altho certain Conclusions of Reason are approv’d of by our own Judgment, and the Practice of many others, yet the Authority of a known Law-giver is wanting, to give them the force of Laws to all Men; for otherwise,”(say they,)“who ever holds them in contempt, has the same Right to reject the Judgment of any others whomsoever, that they exercise in condemning his Opinion by their Words and Actions.” To this purpose, both Hobbes and Selden object, (beside the Antients,) but with very different Views.4

  According to Hobbes,For, as we shall shew in the following Treatise, the Point Mr. Hobbes aims at, is, “That none should believe themselves oblig’d by the Conclusions of Reason, with respect to their outward Actions, before a civil Magistrate is appointed; and that all his Appointments should be look’d upon, as the perfectly obligatory Judgments of right Reason.” It is to this purpose that he affirms, that “The Laws of Nature, altho they are laid down in the Writings of Philosophers, are no more, for that Reason, to be look’d upon as written Laws, than the Opinions of Lawyers are Laws, and that for want of a sovereign Authority.”5 He would not indeed deny them the Name of Laws, which he had before vouchsafed to give them, (tho improperly, as he elsewhere confesses;)6 he was willing however to insinuate, that they were not promulg’d by a sufficient Authority, tho Philosophers learn them from the Nature of Things, and thence transcribe them into their Writings. It is nevertheless manifest, if they be already truly Laws made by the Author of Nature, that they need no new Authority, after they are set down in writing by any one, to make them become written Laws.

  And Selden, but with different Virtues.But Mr. Selden denies, “That the Conclusions of Reason, consider’d barely in themselves, have the Authority of Laws,” upon no other account, than, in order to shew “the Necessity of having recourse to the Legislative Power of God, and of proving that God has commanded our Obedience to them, and, by making them known to us, has proclaim’d them his Laws.” And indeed he has judiciously, as far as I can judge, given this Hint to the moral Philosophers, who are wont to consider the Conclusions of their own Reason as Laws, without due Proof, that they have the necessary Form of a Law, or that they are establish’d by God. But when he is to shew the Manner wherein God might manifest to Mankind, these to be his Laws, he proposes two ways.7 1. That God himself pronounc’d them with his sacred Voice to Adam and Noah, in joining them perpetual Obedience; whence these Precepts of the Sons of Noah were handed down to all their Posterity by Tradition only. 2. That God has endow’d rational Minds with a Faculty able, by Application of their Understanding, to discover those Laws, and to distinguish them, when discover’d, from all positive Institutions.

  He only transiently hints, in such general Terms, this latter Method, which however to me seems to want much Explanation and Proof; but he betakes himself wholly to the former, and endeavours to prove, from the Traditions of some Jewish Rabbins, “That God gave seven Precepts to the Sons of Noah, in the observance whereof all Justice amongst Men should consist.” And truly he has abundantly prov’d,8 “That the Jews thought that all Nations, altho they did not receive the Laws of Moses, were nevertheless oblig’d by some divine Laws, whose chief Heads they look’d upon the Precepts of the Sons of Noah to be.” And this proves at least, “That, in the Opinion of that Nation, which was not inconsiderable either for Numbers or Learning, there are Laws, not made by any State, that bind all Mankind.”Not sufficiently answer’d by the latter. It is likewise to be own’d, that this learned Man chiefly aim’d at this Point, and that with good Success; and that the Knowledge of this Matter is of considerable use in Christian Divinity. Selden, however, has not sufficiently answer’d his own Objection, which we before mention’d. For, altho these Jewish Traditions were thorowly known, and perhaps firmly believ’d, by him,9 they were not however manifested to all Mankind; and those things which that Nation looks upon as the greatest Mysteries of Religion, are by many ridicul’d. And to me truly it seems self-evident, “That an unwritten Tradition of the learned Men of one Nation, is not a sufficient Promulgation of a Law of Nature, which is to oblige all Nations.”

  To answer this Objection, the Author chuses the second Method of deducing the Laws of Nature from their Causes, by their divine-Promulgation and Sanction.§IV. Wherefore, that the Conclusions of Reason in moral Matters might more evidently appear to be Laws, Laws of God, I have thought it proper to make a philosophical Inquiry into their Causes, as well Internal as External, the nearer and the more remote; for by this Method we shall at last arrive at their first Author, or efficient Cause, from whose essential Perfections, and internal Sanction of them by Rewards and Punishments,10 we have shewn that their Authority arises. Most others have been satisfy’d with saying in general Terms, “That these Conclusions, or Actions conformable to them, are taught by Nature”; but to me it seems necessary, especially at this time, to trace more distinctly, after what manner the Powers of things, as well without as within us, conspire to imprint these Conclusions upon our Minds, and to give a Sanction to them. Our Countryman, the Lord Verulam, has reckon’d such an Inquiry among the things which are wanting.11 This, if solidly perform’d, will therefore be of very great use; because thence will appear, both how our Mind is, by the Light of Nature, let into the Knowledge of the Will or Laws of God, so as that it cannot be free from the warning of Conscience; and what that Rule is, whereby the Justice and Rectitude of the Laws of particular States is to be measured, and their Injustice and Imperfection to be corrected and amended by the supreme Authority if they have at any time deviated from the best and greatest End. Hence also, (that it may appear, that Morality is not the Artifice of Ecclesiastics or Politicians,) is further shewn, “That there is something in the Nature of God, of other Men, and of our selves, which in good Actions affords present Comfort and Joy, and a well-grounded Expectation of future Rewards.” On the other hand, “That there are Causes which must naturally produce the most violent Grief and Fear, after evil Actions; so that the Sentence of Conscience may be justly look’d upon as armed with Scourges against Impiety.”12

  Without insisting on innate Ideas of them.§V. The Platonists, indeed, clear up this Difficulty in an easier manner, by the Supposition of innate Ideas, as well of the Laws of Nature themselves, as of those Matters about which they are conversant; but, truly, I have not been so happy as to learn the Laws of Nature in so short a way.13 Nor seems it to me well advised, to build the Doctrine of natural Religion and Morality upon an Hypothesis, which has been rejected by the generality of Philosophers, as well Heathen as Christian, and can neverbe prov’d against the Epicureans, with whom is our chief Controversy. I was resolv’d, however, not to oppose this Opinion, because it is my earnest desire, that whatever looks with a friendly Aspect upon Piety and Morality, might have its due weight; (and I look upon these Platonists to be favourers of their Cause;) and because it is not impossible, that such Ideas might be both born with us, and afterwards impress’d upon us from without.

  Or supposing, without Proof, their eternal Existence in the divine Mind.§VI. Moreover, the same Reasons, which hinder’d us from supposing innate Ideas of the Laws of Nature in our Minds, hinder us likewise from supposing, without Proof, that these Laws have existed from Eternity in the divine Mind. I have therefore thought it necessary to remove the Difficulty, and assert and prove the Authority and eternal Existence of these Conclusions in the divine Mind, in the following Method; assuming those Notices which we have from Sense and daily Experience, I demonstrate, “That the Nature of things, which subsists,Their Promulgation and Obligation, and eternal Existence in, or agreeableness to, the divine Mind, prov’d. and is continually govern’d, by its first Cause, does necessarily imprint on our Minds some practical Propositions, (which must be always true, and cannot without a Contradiction be suppos’d otherwise,) concerning the Study of promoting the joint Felicity of all Rationals: And that the Terms of these Propositions do immediately and directly signify, that the first Cause, in his original Constitution of Things, has annex’d the greatest Rewards and Punishments to the observance and neglect of these Truths.” Whence it manifestly follows, “That they are Laws,” Laws being nothing but practical Propositions, with Rewards and Punishments annex’d, promulg’d by competent Authority. Having hence shewn, “That the Knowledge and Practice of these Laws, is the natural Perfection or most happy State of our rational Nature,” I infer, “That there must be in the first Cause, (from whom proceed both this our Perfection, and that most wise Disposition which we see, every Day, of Effects without us, for the common Preservation and Perfection of the whole System,) a Perfection correspondent, but infinitely superior, to this Knowledge and Practice of the Laws of Nature.” For I look upon it as most evident, “That we must first know what Justice is, and from whence those Laws are deriv’d, in the observance whereof it wholly consists, before we can distinctly know, that Justice is to be attributed to God, and that we ought to propose his Justice as our Example.” For we come not at the Knowledge of God by immediate Intuition of his Perfections, but from his Effects14 first known by Sense and Experience; nor can we safely ascribe to him Attributes, which from other Considerations we do not sufficiently comprehend.

  The chief Heads of the following Book.§VII. Having hitherto shewn, in general, the Difference between our Method and that of others, I think it proper, to shew briefly here the chief things which are more at large and dispersedly deliver’d in the following Discourse. Having undertaken only, “to deliver the Precepts of moral Philosophy, and to deduce them from some little Knowledge of Nature presuppos’d”; what natural Philosophers, especially those who reason upon mathematical Principles, have often demonstrated, I assume, as sufficiently prov’d.The Effects of corporeal Motions, Effects of the divine Will. But my principal Supposition is, “That all Effects of corporeal Motions, which are necessary, according to the common Course of Nature, and depend not upon the Will of Man, are produc’d by the Will of the first Cause”: for this comes to no more than saying, “That all Motions are begun by the Impression of a first Mover, and are by the same Impression continued, and perpetually determin’d, according to certain Laws.” For I thought it superfluous to prove that which had been already prov’d by most natural Philosophers, and is plainly acknowledg’d by Hobbes himself, whose Doctrine I am now examining. Leviath. Chap. 12. After he has assign’d the Cause of Religion, among Men, to their anxious Concern about Futurity, he adds thus, (whether insidiously or no, let others judge;) “The acknowledging of one God Eternal, Infinite and Omnipotent, may more easily be deriv’d from the Desire Men have to know the Causes of natural Bodies, and their several Virtues and Operations, than from the fear of what was to befal them in time to come: for he that from any Effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate Cause thereof, and from thence to the Cause of that Cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of Causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confess’d) one first Mover; that is, a first and eternal Cause of all things, which is that which Men mean by the Name of God.”15 But if it be granted, “That every natural Effect points out God as its Author,” no Man can deny, “That all such Effects are determin’d by his Will,” unless he is inconsistent enough to acknowledge God the Cause of those Effects, and at the same time to contend, that he is not a voluntary Agent.

  Apprehending, comparing, judging, the natural Effects of such Motions, and consequently of the divine Will.§VIII. Moreover, “Every Motion impress’d upon our Organs of Sense,” (such Motions are by the Peripateticks call’d sensible Qualities,16 ) “by which the Mind is led to apprehend Objects, and to form Judgments concerning them, is an Effect plainly natural, and therefore, whatever second Causes intervene, owes its Original to the first.” And thence it follows, “That God, by these Motions, as by a Pencil, delineates the Ideas or Images in our Minds of all sorts of things, especially of Causes and their Effects. And, by imprinting on us, from the same Object, various Notions imperfectly representing it, he excites us to bring them together, and to compare them among themselves; and, consequently, determines us to form true Propositions concerning things understood by us.” So, because an Object is sometimes expos’d to sight whole, and at once, and at other times is view’d narrowly, and by parts; and the Mind perceives that the Idea of the Whole plainly represents the same thing, with all the Ideas of the single Parts taken together, it is obliged to form a Proposition concerning the Sameness of the Whole and all the Parts; or to affirm, “That the Causes which preserve the Whole, preserve also all its essential Parts.”

  All particular Laws of Nature reduc’d to one Proposition.§IX. Lastly, upon a diligent Consideration of all those Propositions which deserve to be rank’d amongst the general Laws of Nature, I have observ’d they may be reduc’d to one universal one, from the just Explication whereof all the particular Laws may be both duly limited and illustrated. This general Proposition may be thus express’d. “The Endeavour, to the utmost of our power, of promoting the common Good of the whole System of rational Agents, conduces, as far as in us lies, to the good of every Part, in which our own Happiness, as that of a Part, is contain’d. But contrary Actions produce contrary Effects, and consequently our own Misery, among that of others.” Wherefore the whole of this Treatise is employ’d upon these Heads, which regard either,(1.) the Matter of this Proposition; that is, the Knowledge of its Terms, to be drawn from the Nature of Things; or (2.) its Form, that is, the joining these Terms in such a practical Proposition as may deserve the Name of a Law, upon account of the Rewards and Punishments annex’d by the Author of Nature; or (3.) lastly, The Deduction and natural Limitation of the other Laws of Nature, by their Respect to the common Good or happiest State of the whole Body.

  Its Matter, that is, the Terms, explain’d.§X. To the Knowledge of the Terms belongs all that we have said in general of the Nature of Things, especially of Man, as also of the common Good. But I must ask the Reader’s pardon for sometimes as cribing Reason to God, and ranking him amongst rational Beings; and that we are sometimes said to bear a good Will towards God, or to desire something agreeable to his Nature, that is, Good. For in the beginning we declare, that these Expressions are not properly, and in the same Sense said of God, in which we use them, when we speak of Men. For we suppose in him absolute Omniscience and Wisdom, which Cicero himself could not better express, than by the Name of “Reason in its Perfection.”17 Nor do we imagine, “That we can testify our Love of God, by adding any thing to his Perfections, which from Eternity were infinite.” Yet it is not to be doubted, but that in our Actions, Obedience, and Imitation of his Care of the common Good of Mankind, whose Being is continued from Day to Day by his Favours; and also in our Words, and Thoughts, and Affections, Honour, Worship, and Love, are more agreeable to his beneficent Nature, and more acceptable to him, than Neglect or Hatred, or direct and wilful Opposition.18 For, if we abstractedly compare two rational Natures between themselves, we must acknowledge a better Agreement when they consent and co-operate, than when they dissent, and the End propos’d by one of them, is oppos’d by the other. Nor do I see that it alters the Case, tho one of these rational Natures should be suppos’d to be God, and the other, Man. Therefore, as we know by the help of our Senses, “That it is more acceptable to any Man to be lov’d and honour’d, than to be hated and despis’d”; so it is evident to Reason, by a manifest Correspondence, “That it is more grateful to the supreme Rational, God, to be lov’d and honour’d by the Obedience of Men, than to be the Object of Hatred and Contempt.” For, as it is certain, that to desire to be belov’d, implies no Imperfection in Man; in God, it is so far from carrying any Suspicion of Imperfection, that, on the contrary, it is an Argument of the Benignity of his Nature, because Men arrive at their greatest Perfection, by loving him: which being manifest, both by Reason and Experience, it thence evidently follows, “That God has inseparably annex’d the greatest Reward to the Love of himself”; which he never would have done, if it were not agreeable to his Will to be belov’d.19

  But the Reader, in perusing the three Chapters of this Treatise, whose Titles I have just now mention’d, will see, that while we explain the Terms (to use a School-Phrase) of the foregoing Proposition, we are not busy’d about the Interpretation of Words, but about Ideas, and the Nature of those Things whence they arise, as far as it is necessary to our present purpose: And at the same time he will observe, that I directly and immediately explain the Consequences and Necessity of those human Actions, which are either necessary to the common Happiness of all, or to the private Happiness of Individuals:20 Altho it seem’d advisable to use words so general, that they might in a sound Sense be ascrib’d to the divine Majesty; and that to this very purpose, that by the help of Analogy, or Correspondence, prudently apply’d, not only our Obligation to Piety, but the Nature of the divine Justice and Dominion, might thence be understood.

  Its Form consider’d, Practical, declaring the Cause of the best Effect.§XI. As to the Form of the Proposition, (to make use of a logical Term,) it is manifest, that it is practical, as pronouncing concerning the Consequences of human Action.

  It is, however, to be observ’d, that the Proposition (altho the Word [conduces] be used in the present Tense, because the Observation is collected from things present) is not limited to the present time, but is equally to be understood of what is future; and, because its Truth chiefly depends upon “the Whole’s being the same with all its Parts,” is as manifestly true of the future, (which from other Arguments we prove in this Treatise,) and with respect to Futurity, it is always by us made use of.

  Moreover, this Proposition is the better fitted to our purpose, that it builds upon no Hypothesis. For it does not suppose Men born either in, or out of, civil Society. It does not suppose a Relation between all Men as born of the same common Parents, which the Scriptures teach us; (for the Obligation of the Laws of Nature is to be demonstrated to those who acknowledge not the sacred Scripture:) Nor, on the contrary, does it suppose, as does Mr. Hobbes, that “the Earth produc’d suddenly, like Mushrooms, the Bulk of Mankind at their full Growth.”21 But our Proposition, and all the Deductions from thence, might be both understood and acknowledg’d, even by our first Parents, considering themselves in the Relation they stood in to God, and to the Posterity which might be born of them; nor is it less easy to be understood by all those Nations, who are unacquainted with the History of our first Parents.

  And, consequently, the Means to the best End.§XII. Nor shall I think it improper here to take notice, “That the foregoing Proposition, in the same words it declares the Cause of the greatest and best Effect, declares the Means to obtain the best End”: for the Effect of a rational Agent, after he has consider’d it in his Mind, and has resolv’d to produce it, is call’d his End; and the Actions or Causes, by whose Power he endeavours to effect it, are called the Means. So also in geometrical Problems, the Causes of the geometrical Effects are the prescrib’d Drawings of Lines: But if such Effect is consider’d as a Problem, whose Solution is requir’d, or is propos’d to us as an End, then the words of the Problem suggest to the Geometrician, the proper Means to obtain his End. From this Observation the Method is shewn, “How to reduce whatsoever the Moralists have said concerning the Means of obtaining the best End, into Theorems concerning the Power of human Actions in producing the Effects propos’d”; in which Form they may more easily be examin’d, and if they be true, more evidently demonstrated. In like manner we hence learn, “How easily all Knowledge concerning the Power of Causes, (which we can any way make subservient to our Purposes,) suggests the Means to attain the End known, and so may be apply’d to Practice, as occasion requires.” Lastly, it is also hence evident, “That the Proposition we are treating of, does in this respect, at least, partake of the Nature of a Law, that it respects an End truly worthy of a Law, the common Good of all Beings,” or the Honour of God, in conjunction with the Happiness of all Mankind.

  Proceeding from a competent Author, God.§XIII. But, at first view, perhaps, these two necessary Requisites to enforce a Law may not be perceiv’d in that Proposition, viz. a competent Author, and a sufficient Sanction by Rewards and Punishments. But if it be more closely examin’d, we shall perceive, “That upon this very account, that the nature of things impresses it upon our Minds, it necessarily points out its Author, the firstCause, as of all Things, so of all Truths arising from them”; among the principal of which Truths is to be reputed this true Proposition, which we affirm to contain the fundamental Law of Nature. Nor can any one in reason desire, that it should be more evidently prov’d, “That God is the Author of this Proposition,” than it is prov’d, “That he is the Author of the Nature of Things, whence the Truth of this Proposition arises.” Wherefore, having come to the Knowledge of its Author, it only remains that we should shew, “That there is a sufficient Sanction annex’d by the same Author, and that it is clearly contain’d in the said Proposition.”

  Confirm’d by a sufficient Sanction.§XIV. I am not ignorant that a Sanction, in the strictest Sense of the Word, is call’d by Cicero and Papinian, that Part of the Law, which inflicts a certain Punishment upon those who have not obey’d what the Law enjoins.22 But I have thought it proper to use the Word in a more extensive Sense, so as to take in the Rewards which the Law promises to the Obedient; for by these also are the Laws guarded against the Injury of Men, and thence are styled [Sanctae] Sacred, according to Marcian’s looser Definition of the Word Sacred: “That is sacred, which is defended and guarded against the Injury of Men.”23 In which Sense it is, that, upon account of the Rewards and Punishments wherewith they are confirm’d, Ulpian, in the following Law, affirms them to be sacred.24 Nevertheless, if any one is unwilling to depart from the stricter Signification of the Word, there is no occasion to dispute about it, provided we agree in the Thing. I have added therefore, upon their account, this Proposition, “Such Actions as are contrary to a Care of the publick Good, whether by a Neglect or Violation thereof, bring Evil upon each part of the System of Rationals, but the greatest upon the Evil-doers themselves”; and this plainly expresses Punishment, without any mention of Reward. But we have almost wholly employ’d our selves in the Proof of the former Part of the Proposition, which relates to the Rewards included in Happiness, because hence the latter is evidently demonstrated; and because the Nature of Punishment includes Evil,25 that is, a Privation of those good things which our Nature makes necessary to our Happiness; but these Privations cannot be understood, unless those good things be first apprehended, to which they are oppos’d. Finally, the Nature of Things (whose Footsteps were by us most carefully to be traced in this Treatise) lays it self out almost wholly, in letting in upon our Minds the positive Notion of Causes and their Effects by our outward Senses, which cannot receive Negations and Privations; and we are more early affected with the love of present, and hope of future Good, than with the hatred or fear of Evil: for no Man therefore loves Life, Health, or such grateful Motions to the Nerves and Spirits as we call corporeal Pleasures, or desires their Causes, that he may avoid Death, Diseases, and Pain; but because of their intrinsic Goodness, or positive Agreement (to borrow a Phrase from the Schools) with the Nature of our Body. In like manner, no Man therefore desires the Perfections of the Mind, (such as a more extensive and distinct Knowledge of the noblest Objects in all respects most agreeably consonant to it self, and the most grateful Perception of Benevolence, of a well-grounded Hope, and of a Joy in the Prosperity of all Rationals;) barely that he may avoid the Uneasinesses of Ignorance, Ill-will, Envy and Commiseration; but because of that superlative Pleasure which we experimentally find in such Acts and Habits, which is the Reason that to be depriv’d of them is most ungrateful, and that the Causes of such Privations are themselves irksome. Hence therefore it is manifest, that even Civil Laws, when they receive the Sanction of Punishments, Death, for example, or Forfeiture of Goods, if we closely examine the Matter, do oblige Men to Obedience from a Love of Life, or of that Wealth, which the Laws shew us, how to preserve thereby. For an Aversion to Death and Poverty, is nothing but a Love of Life and Riches; as he that by two Negatives says, “That he would not want (that is, not have) Life,” says but the same thing as if he affirm’d, “That he would enjoy Life.” To which also this may be added, that Civil Laws themselves seem to me to be much more establish’d from the End, which as well their Enactors as the best Subjects regard, viz. the publick Good of the Society; part whereof falls to the Share of every good Subject, and therefore naturally brings along with it the Reward of Obedience; much more, I say, than by those Punishments which they threaten; the Fear whereof moves but a few, and those the worst.

  And, being promulg’d, is therefore a Law.§XV. That the Summary of all the Precepts and Sanctions of the Law of Nature, is contain’d in our Proposition, and its Corollary concerning the opposite Behaviour, I thus briefly shew. The Subject (to borrow a School-Term) of the Proposition is, an Endeavour, according to our Ability, to promote the common Good of the whole System of Rationals. This includes our Love of God, and of all Mankind, who are the Parts of this System. God, indeed, is the principal Part; Men, the Subordinate: A Benevolence toward both includes Piety and Humanity, that is, both Tables of the Law of Nature. The Predicate of the Proposition (to borrow another Phrase from the Schools) is, conducing to the good of every Part, in which our own Happiness, as of a Part, is contain’d. In which, as all those good Things we can procure to all, are said to be the Effect of this Endeavour, so among the rest is not omitted that Collection of good Things, whence our own Happiness arises, which is the greatest Reward of Obedience; as Misery, arising from Actions of a contrary kind, is the greatest Punishment of Wickedness. But the natural Connexion of the Predicate with the Subject, is both the Foundation of the Truth of the Proposition, and the Proof of the natural Connexion between Obedience and Rewards, Transgression and Punishments.

  Hence the Reader will easily observe the true Reason, why this practical Proposition, and all those which may be deduc’d from thence, oblige all rational Beings who understand them; whilst other practical Propositions, (suppose Geometrical ones,) equally impress’d by Nature, and consequently by God, upon the Mind of Man, do not oblige him to conform his Practice to them; but may safely be neglected by most, to whom the Practice of Geometry is not necessary: Which is wholly owing to the Nature of the Effects, arising from the one and the other Practice. The Effects of the Practice of Geometry are such as most People may want without Prejudice. But the Effects of a care of the common Good, do so nearly concern all, of whom we our selves are a part, and upon whose Pleasure the Happiness of each Individual does in some measure depend, that such care cannot be rejected, without the hazard of losing that Happiness, or the Hope thereof: and this God has manifested to us, by the very Nature of Things, and thereby he has sufficiently promulg’d, that he himself is the Author of the Connexion of Rewards and Punishments with our Actions; whence this Proposition, and all others which flow from thence, commence Laws by his Authority.

  Actions agreeable thereto, good.§XVI. From the very Terms of our Proposition, it is manifest, “That the adequate and immediate Effect of that Practice which this Law establishes, is, that which is acceptable to God, and beneficial to all Men; which is the natural Good of the whole System of Rationals, even the greatest of all those good things which can be procur’d for them, as being greater than the like Good of any part of the same System.” Moreover, it sufficiently implies, “That the happiness of each Individual”(from the Prospect of enjoying which, or being depriv’d of it, the whole Sanction is taken) “is deriv’d from the best State of the whole System,” as the nourishment of each Member of an Animal depends upon the nourishment of the whole Mass of Blood diffus’d thro’ the whole.

  Hence it is manifest, “That this greatest Effect” (not any small Portion thereof, the private Happiness, suppose, of any single Person) “is the principal end of the Lawgiver, and of every one who truly obeys his Will.” It is likewise hence evident, “That those human Actions, which, from their own natural Force or Efficacy, are apt to promote the common Good, are call’d naturally Good, and indeed better than those Actions which are subservient to the private Good of any Individual, in proportion, as the publick Good is greater than a private.”

  Right.In like manner, “Such Actions as take the shortest way to this Effect, as to their End, are naturally Right, because of their natural resemblance to a right Line, which is the shortest that can be drawn between any two given Points.” Nevertheless, the same Actions, afterward, when they are compar’d with the Law, whether natural or positive, which is the Rule of Morality, and they are found conformable to it; are call’d morally Good, as also Right, that is, agreeing with the Rule: but the Rule itself is call’d right, as pointing out the shortest way to the End.

  Beautiful.So also, because that State of all Men, which most abounds with all the natural Goods, both of Mind and Body, fitly proportion’d among themselves, and appointed to the best End, is naturally the most beautiful, (as plainly agreeing with the Definition of Beauty, taken from the Figure and Symmetry of the Parts;) it is manifest, “That those Actions which have a natural Tendency to produce or preserve such a State, may justly be call’d Beautiful or Decent.” And hence may be explain’d the τὸ καλον and τὸ πρέπον, the Beauty and Decency, which Philosophers so often celebrate in virtuous Actions.

  Amiable.Lastly, seeing in the Chapter concerning Good it is largely shewn, “That it may be distinctly understood, without any regard to our selves,” the Reader cannot doubt but that we must acknowledge, “That the Good is in itself Amiable, which contains in it every particular Good of each Individual.” Therefore it is very absurd, that it should be made subordinate to the Happiness of any one Man, which is so small a part of so great a Good.

  Honourable.By a like Reasoning it is manifest, “That Actions conducive to this End, as being the best and most beautiful, are in themselves amiable, and highly to be commended by all rational Beings, and therefore, upon account of that high Honour, to which their beneficent Nature in titles them, deservedly call’d Honest or Honourable.”

  These Observations I thought the more necessary, lest any one should erroneously imagine, that I did not sufficiently acknowledge the intrinsic Perfections of Piety and Charity, because I have deduc’d the Sanctions of the Laws of Nature, by which such Actions are enjoin’d, from the happiness or misery of Individuals, consequent upon their Obedience, or Disobedience to the said Laws. Even in Civil Laws, the Sanctions of the Laws are sufficiently distinguish’d from the End and adequate Effect, viz. The publick Good; part, however, of the Effect of a Civil Law, is the infliction of Punishments, or the conferring of Rewards, by which the Law is guarded.

  The Evil often happens to the observers of the general Law of Nature, and Good to those who violate it; the Sanction mention’d prov’d sufficient, by a general Proof.§XVII. But because the Connexion of Rewards and Punishments with such Actions as promote the public Good, or the contrary, is some what obscur’d by those evil Things which happen to the Good, and those good Things which happen to the Evil; it seems necessary to our purpose, more carefully to shew, “That (notwithstanding these) that Connexion is sufficiently constant and manifest in human Nature, so that then cemay, with certainty, be inferr’d the Sanction of the Law of Nature, commanding these Actions, and forbidding those.”

  We suppose, 1. That Punishment, or that Reward, a sufficient Sanction, whose Value, all things rightly consider’d, exceeds the Advantage arising from the breach of the Law.

  2. In comparing the Effects of good and evil Actions, those good or evil Things, which can neither be procur’d, nor avoided, by human Industry, are not to be taken into the Account. Such are those which happen by natural Necessity, or by mere Chance, from external Causes: for these both may, and do, happen alike both to good and bad. We shall therefore here consider those only, which can be taken care of by human Reason, as in some measure depending upon our Actions.

  Having thus premis’d a general Proof, deduc’d from this Consideration, “That the particular Persons who promote or oppose the common Good, are parts of that Whole, which their Actions either befriend or prejudice, and therefore necessarily partake of the Advantage or Disadvantage thence arising”: We come to particular Proofs taken, partly from the Causes of such Actions, which are treated of in the Chapter concerning human Nature; partly from their Effects and Consequences, which are consider’d more at large in the Chapter concerning the Obligation of the Law of Nature. But that Chapter is more prolix, and less clear, than the rest, because therein I have been frequently forc’d to follow my Antagonist, into that most confus’d State which he supposes,26 in order to confute him from his own Concessions; and have been oblig’d to answer many Objections, not only of his, but also of some other better Philosophers. Wherefore I shall here briefly lay before the Reader, both what I there aim’d at, and the manner how all these things make to our purpose, lest he should suspect, that I had lost my way in so great a variety of Matter.

  By particular Proofs taken from the Causes of human Actions.§XVIII. The Causes of human Actions are the Powers of the Mind and Body of Man. Wherefore, because I have observ’d it to be manifest, “That Happiness, or the highest Reward, is necessarily connected with the most full and constant exercise of all our Powers, about the best and greatest Objects and Effects, which are adequate and proportionable to them”; I hence collect, “That Men endow’d with these Faculties, are naturally bound, under the Penalty of forfeiting their Happiness, to employ or exercise them about the noblest Objects in Nature,” viz. God, and Man his Image. Nor can it be long a Question, “Whether our Faculties may be more properly employ’d in cultivating Friendship or Enmity with these, in engaging with them in a State of Peace or War.” For it is plain, “That there can be no neutral State, in which God and Men shall be neither lov’d, nor hated and irritated; or in which we shall act neither acceptably nor unacceptably to either, especially when we make use of things without us.” For of necessity, we must either take care, not to deprive others of things necessary to their Happiness, which, without Benevolence, cannot be suppos’d; or we shall, willingly, take them away, which is a sure indication of a malicious Mind. But if it be acknowledg’d, “That there is an evident Necessity, in order to Happiness, of cultivating friendship with God and Man,” the Sanction of that most general Law of Nature, which alone we are here tracing, is of course granted. For that alone establishes, both all natural Religion, and every thing that is necessary to the happiness of Mankind. Such are, beside Piety, (1.) A peaceful Commerce among different Nations, which is the Subject of the Law of Nations: (2.) The Establishment and Preservation of civil Society, which is the Scope of civil Laws: (3.) The Firmness of domestic Affection and of Friendship, which are establish’d, both by those general Rules which settle the Peace of Nations, and by the more particular Laws of Oeconomics. We have therefore collected very many things in the Chapter concerning human Nature, by which Individuals, in some measure, become capable of so great a Society,27 and are, remotely atleast, dispos’d toward it.28 And here we in treat the Reader, “That he would not consider these Observations, apart only, but together, that from them all united may result one Argument,” proving the Sanction of this most general Law from this, “That Men must necessarily fall short of their greatest Happiness, which consists in Action, or the proper and adequate use of their Faculties, unless they exercise them in cultivating a Friendship with God and Men”: to produce this Effect they were most especially fitted by Nature, which truly leaves the Transgressors of the Law without excuse.

  From the Effects of human Actions.§XIX. From the Effects of human Actions, with respect to the common Good of rational Beings, we thus shew, “That a Sanction by Rewards and Punishments is annexed to them.” It is manifest, “That by the above mention’d Endeavour, in the first place, God, as being in the highest degree both wise and beneficent to all rational Beings, is lov’d and honour’d; the Life and all other Possessions of Men of all Nations, are safely preserv’d, according to the measure of our Ability; civil Government is readily constituted, where it is wanting, and as readily preserv’d, where it is found; and all Advantages, consistent with the good of the Whole, are procur’d to each, and, consequently, to our selves also; and nothing done to any one, which a regard to the Whole does not permit.” In Man, nothing but a Propension toward the good of all, guided by the Conduct of a prudent Understanding, can produce so great Advantages; nor, if such an Endeavour be not wanting in us, can any thing be desir’d to obtain this End, which we are not willing, to the utmost of our power, to perform. Wherefore, since these Effects may be certainly foreseen to follow from this Endeavour, no one can be ignorant, that in them are contain’d the present Comfort and Joys of Religion, which in all places are ever join’d with the hope of a happy Immortality; that moreover to this Study and Endeavour are annex’d as Rewards, the many Advantages of peaceful Commerce with Foreigners, of civil and domestic Government, and of Friendship; and that these Advantages cannot be obtain’d by any other Method in our power: And consequently, that whoever rejects the care of the common Good, does so far reject the Causes of his own Happiness, and embrace the immediate Causes of his Misery and Punishment.

  To be brief; seeing it is manifest from the Nature of Things, “That the chief Happiness which we can procure to our selves, arises jointly from promoting Piety and Peace, mutual Commerce among Nations, civil and domestic Government, and also firm Friendship; and that the care of all these things together is to be found only in his Mind, who studies the common Good of all rational Beings”; it follows, “That the greatest Reward which Man can procure, is the natural Consequence of this Endeavour, as the want thereof, or Punishment, is the necessary result of Actions of a contrary kind”: The former of these, “Which as signs the Causes of that Happiness, which single Persons are wont or able to obtain,” we have prov’d from Effects confirm’d by Experience; the latter, “That Piety and universal Benevolence toward all Men, are contain’d in the care of the common Good,” we have shewn from its Definition and Parts in the Corollaries, Chap. 9. But a Conclusion drawn from such Premises, is known by the Light of Nature.

  The contingent.§XX. I acknowledge, however, “That all these Effects are not entirely in our Power, but that many of them depend upon the Benevolence of other rational Beings.” But since we know from their Nature, as being analogous, or like, to our own, “That the common Good is the best and greatest End, which they can propose to themselves; and that the Perfection of their Nature requires, both that they should act for an End, and for this, rather than for any other not so good”; and since moreover we know from experience, “That such Effects of universal Benevolence may generally be procur’d from others by our Actions”: It is but reasonable, “That they should be reckon’d and esteem’d among the Effects of our Actions, or such Consequences of them, as for the most part happen.” Because every one is thought to be able to do, whatsoever he can perform by the help of his Friends. The whole Reward, which is annex’d to good Actions by the natural Constitution of the Universe, may not unfitly be compar’d to the Treasury or public Stock, which does not arise only from certain Payments, but also from various contingent Taxes: Suppose the Tolls paid upon account of Harbours, High-ways, and publick Bridges, whose Value is great, tho not certainly and distinctly known, yet often farm’d out at a determin’d Price. In like manner, in computing the Value of this Reward, there ought to be taken into the Account, not only those Parts of it, which necessarily accompany good Actions, (such as that formal Happiness, as it is call’d, which consists in the Knowledge and Love of God, and perhaps of those Men whose Wills conspire with his, the absolute Government of all our Passions, a most pleasant Harmony and Agreement of all our Principles of Action with all the Parts of our Life, the Favour of God, and the well-grounded Hope of a happy Immortality,) but there ought also to be taken into the Account, the contingent Advantages of good Actions; such are all those Blessings, which either accrue to us from the religious Disposition of other Men, or flow from civil Society, the good Correspondence of different Nations among one another, or from private Friendship: the Interests of all these several States, being as much taken care of, and promoted, by our good Actions, as in us lies. By a like Reasoning we understand, of what Parts the whole Punishment consists, which is the Consequence of Actions hurtful to the Publick; the Law prohibiting them, receives its proper Sanctions from all those Consequences, which are opposite to those just now mention’d.

  Because they may be sufficiently estimated.§XXI. We all of us learn, from the Necessity of that Condition to which we are born, and in which we live, how to estimate contingent Advantages, that is, such Causes as will probably benefit us; and by the hope of such we are inclin’d to Action. For the Air itself, to the breathing of which we are forc’d by an impulse which is natural, is not always an Advantage to our Blood and Spirits, but is sometimes infected with a deadly Contagion; Meat, Drink, and Exercise, don’t always preserve Life; even they are often the Causes of Diseases. Husbandry sometimes rewards our Labours with Loss, instead of Gain; yet we are naturally inclin’d to such Actions from the hope of Good thence probably arising; as naturally, by a like hope of probable Good, are we mov’d to cultivate the common Interest: which Hope, nevertheless, is of itself neither the only, nor the principal Cause impelling, but as it conspires with those other Rewards already mention’d, which are naturally inseparable.

  But with how great Probability we hope, from all other Men jointly consider’d, for a return which may repay our Labours laid out upon the common Good; we shall hence form the best judgment, if we consider what both the Experience of the present Time, and the History of the past, witness concerning the Practice of all Nations hitherto nown, with regard to this End. Among every one of them we may openly observe some reverence of one Deity, at least, by which when they have taken an Oath, they are deterr’d from Perjury: You may every where observe an advantageous Commerce carried on between such Nations as are mutually known to one another, unless it be interrupted by a formal War: Civil Government, and a distinction of Property depending thereon, is every where preserv’d: The Ties of Blood and Friendship are generally every where observ’d. But because the whole Endeavour to promote the common Good, means nothing more than the Worship of a Deity, a Care of Commerce and Peace among Nations, of civil and domestic Government, and also of Friendship, as its Parts jointly consider’d; it is manifest, “That the care of that Good is in some measure every where to be found among Men”; whence many Advantages of Peace and mutual Aid necessarily accrue to Individuals.

  Nay, it seems to me manifest, “That each one who has reach’d Man’s Estate, owes his past Years much more to the Pains of others, than to any care of his own,” which in his Childhood is little or nothing. For we then wholly depend on that Obedience, which others yield to those Laws, whereby the Affairs of Families, of the State; and of Religion are govern’d; all which flow from a Care of the common Good. Hence it comes to pass, “That, if afterwards we hazard, nay lose, our Lives for the publick Good, we part with less for its sake, than we had already receiv’d from it”: for we lose only an uncertain Hope of future Joys, if we should live, nay, not that; for it is rather certain, that scarce any Hope can remain to particular Persons, where the common Good is trampled under foot. But we had before receiv’d from it the real Advantages of Life, and all those Perfections which adorn’d us.29

  Nor doubt I, but that the greatest Advantages we experience from mutual Assistance in a social State, might have been foreseen from the Nature of Man, by our first Parents, if we suppose them to have deliberated, “Whether they should more effectually promote the true Happiness of their Children, by persuading them to the exercise of Piety towards God and their Parents, and of mutual Benevolence among Brethren,” (which is the Summary of Religion, and of civil Government, which was first exercis’d in a single Family, as well as of the Law of Nations,) “than by initiating them in the Mysteries of Atheism, and exhorting each to claim every thing to himself, and so immediately to commence Robbers and Murderers of one another.” But the good and bad Consequences (thus naturally known from the Nature of Things) of such human Actions, because they are fore shewn by God, to Men deliberating concerning their Actions, in order to incline them to, or deter them from, Action, are intirely in the Nature of Rewards and Punishments, by which a Law receives its Sanction.

  And that Estimate is farther confirm’d, by the natural Manner of nourishing and preserving Animals.§XXII. These Observations seem to me most evidently just, because they shew a Method of preserving the several Members of the rational System, extremely like that whereby Nature instructs all Animals to preserve the Health and Strength of the several Members of their Bodies. Nature obliges them, in order to this End, to take Nourishment, and breathe the Air, which, tho by reason of internal Diseases, or external Hurts, (Bruises, Wounds, and Fractures) they do not always give the Members the intended Strength, do yet most commonly immediately preserve that Temper of the Blood, which is necessary to the Life of the whole Body. She teaches us in the same manner, that by Actions immediately promoting the common Good, the various Perfections of Individuals,(who are Members of the rational System,) are ordinarily to be expected, as being not less naturally deriv’d from thence, than the Strength of our Hands from a just Temper in the Mass of Blood. We must confess, however, that many things may happen, by means whereof this general Care of the Whole may not always produce the propos’d Happiness of Individuals, without allay; as breathing and eating, however necessary to the whole Body, do not ward off all Diseases and Accidents. For, as well by an irregular Behaviour of our Fellow-Citizens, like an indisposition in the Bowels, as by foreign Invasion, good Men may be depriv’d of some of the Rewards of their good Actions, and may suffer Evils from without. But because such Evils are generally warded off by the force of Concord and Government, (which always flow from a care of the publick Good,) and are often, after short suffering, remov’d by our own Strength, and the Aid of the civil Power, as Diseases retire upon Nature’s taking a healthful turn; and are often also compensated with greater Advantages, partly by the Virtues of others, but chiefly by means of civil Government, and of foreign Leagues: hence it comes to pass, “That the Race of Men has in no Age been extinguish’d, and that most Societys have lasted longer than particular Men, or even the most long-liv’d Animals.”

  From these Considerations it is evident, “That the wicked Dispositions of some Men, and those Motions of the Affections, which sometimes arise in all Men, contrary to the common Good, do no more hinder us from acknowledging, That the more powerful Inclinations of all Mankind, jointly consider’d, are carried towards that which we daily see procur’d thereby, the preservation and further perfection of the whole; than Diseases sometimes arising in the Parts of Animals, hinder our confessing, That the whole frame of the human Body, and the natural Functions of the Parts, are adapted to preserve Life, propagate the Species, and preserve the vigour of each Member for it susual Term of Duration.” For from hence are not only first constituted Societies, Embassies, and foreign Leagues; but also, if at any time a League with any Nation be broken, even the breaker of the League immediately betakes himself to the Faith of other Nations, by Engagements enter’d into with them, and so by his own Action condemns himself: And if at any time one Religion is suppress’d in a Nation, another is immediately replac’d, in order to procure the Favour of the Deity: So when any Commonwealth is dissolv’d by Sedition or War, another is immediately thence form’d or enlarg’d. Now these Observations make it manifest, “That the whole System of Rationals, is as much, or more, form’d for its own Preservation, and the subordinate one of its Members, than the universal corporeal System is form’d for its Preservation: whilst the Generation of one Body follows from the Corruption of another; and, in the Generation of single Animals, they are form’d with Organs, by which they for some time preserve themselves, and propagate their kind.”

  The Author’s Method of deducing the Sanction of the Laws of Nature, confirm’d by universal Consent.§XXIII. I have thus briefly laid down the Method, by which I have deduc’d the Sanction of the Laws of Nature; in which I have consider’d the Happiness which naturally flows from good Actions, as the Reward annex’d to them by the Author of Nature; and the loss thereof as a Punishment, not less naturally connected with evil Actions. For whatever Good or Evil is the necessary Consequence of human Actions, must necessarily be contain’d in such practical Propositions, as truly declare the Consequences of those Actions. And God himself is suppos’d to declare those practical Propositions, which are necessarily suggested to our Minds by the Nature, as well of our own Actions, as of those of other rational Beings, and which truly foretel what Consequences will follow. But those “Advantages and Disadvantages, which God himself pronounces annex’d to human Actions, and by which we are admonish’d to pursue those, and avoid these,” are really and truly Rewards and Punishments.

  In these things, however, I agree, as well with those who say, “That Virtue contains Happiness in itself, and so is its own Reward: as also with those others, who beside look for other Advantages, whether of Mind or Body; from God, their own Conscience, their Family, or their Friends, from their own Country, or from foreign Nations; whether we enjoy them in this Life, or with reason hope for them in one here after.”30 And our Method seems much to be confirm’d by this, that all, of how different Sentiments soever in Morality, yet agree in this, “That good Actions ought by all means to be honour’d with suitable Rewards, and that they are actually so honour’d; and that evil Actions ought necessarily to be restrain’d by Punishments, and that they are so restrain’d.” In these Points, Philosophers, however otherwise differing, agree, as do the Founders of all Religions, and all Lawgivers.

  Even they, who would seem to neglect Rewards, and would deduce all the Virtues from Gratitude, must needs own, “That Gratitude flows from the Remembrance of Benefits receiv’d.” But it argues as much Self-love, to be excited to good Actions from Benefits already receiv’d, as to do them for the sake of the Hopes of such;31 nay, even he seems to act somewhat the more generously of the two, who is mov’d by the Hope only of Good, because there is somewhat of uncertainty for the most part mix’d with Hope, than he who does as much for equal Benefits, which he already enjoys. But besides, the Memory of past Benefits affects the Mind with a certain Pleasure, which is a part of Happiness, and consequently of a Reward, which we therefore acknowledge to be a proper motive to good Actions. Nor seems it possible, that the Consent of all Men in these Matters should be so unanimous, unless the common Nature and Reason of all dictated this one and the same thing to them all, “That the chief End, the common Good of all, could not otherwise be preserv’d unviolated, than by Rewards and Punishments; and that it is therefore every where guarded by them.”

  The reduction of the Laws of Nature to one, useful.§XXIV. Moreover, this Method, by which I have reduc’d all the Precepts of the Law of Nature to one, seems useful; because the Proof of this one Proposition is more easy and expeditious, than that of those many, which are usually propos’d by Philosophers; and the ease of the Memory is better consulted, to which daily calling to mind a single Sentence, is not a Burden: and, (which is the greatest Advantage of all,) from the very Nature of the common Good, which in this Proposition we are directed to promote, a certain Rule or Measure is afforded to the prudent Man’s Judgment, by the help whereof he may ascertain that just Measure in his Actions and Affections, in which Virtue consists. This Task Aristotle has assign’d to the Judgment of the Prudent, in his Definition of Virtue,32 but has not pointed out the Rule by which such Judgment is to be form’d. Our Proposition shews, “That the Rule is to be taken from the Nature of the best and greatest End, respect being had to all the Parts of the whole System of Rationals, or of that Society of which God is the Head, the Members, all God’s Subjects.” For hence we shall be directed to such Acts of Piety towards God, as are perfectly consistent with that Peace and Commerce, which is to be preserv’d among all Nations, with the Establishment of civil Government, and with that Obedience which is to be paid to it; as also with the more private care of the Happiness of Individuals: And we shall likewise be directed to such Acts of the most diffusive Humanity, as shall be perfectly subordinate to true Piety: And universally, “Each of our Affections and Actions will bear that Proportion to the whole of our Strength, and to one another; which that Good, to the procuring which each of these Actions is subservient, bears to the greatest Good of the Whole, which in the whole Course of our Lives, we are able to effect”: Whence we shall certainly take care, “Not to be diligent about Matters of smaller Moment, and remiss about those of more Importance; not slothful about Matters of publick Concern, and earnest about those of private; but shall, in our Affections and Endeavours, take our Measures from the Value of that which is to be effected.”

  Lastly, from this Fountain is to be deriv’d that Order among the particular Laws of Nature, according to which a former, in some measure, limits a latter; which the learned Dr. Sharrock has very judiciously and solidly observ’d in his Book of Offices, especially in the tenth Chapter: so that greater Regard ought to be had to the not in vading another’s Property, than to the keeping our Promise; to keeping a lawful Promise, than requiting a Benefit, &c.33 The reason of which is to be deduc’d from our Principle, “Because it conduces more to the common Good, that the principal special Law of Nature, concerning dividing and preserving Property, should not be violated by the Invasion of another’s Right, than that any one should stand to such a Promise, as could not be perform’d, without invading another’s Right.” And the Reason is alike in comparing the other Laws, which I hereafter rank according to the Order of their Dignity. He that desires more upon this Head, let him consult the Author now cited; it is sufficient for my Purpose, to have deduc’d the Reason of the Order that is among the Laws of Nature, from our Principle. Unless perhaps it may seem necessary here to add, That it ought not to seem strange to any, that I have said, “That no Right whatsoever, no Virtue, can be fully explain’d, without respect had to the State of all rational Beings, or of the whole intellectual System.” For we see in Natural Philosophy, “That those Accidents of Bodies which are daily obvious to our Senses, such as the communication of Motion, Gravitation, the Action of Light and Heat, Firmness and Fluidity, Rarefaction and Condensation, cannot be clearly explain’d, without having a respect to the whole material System, and to that Motion which is to be preserv’d therein.” It is likewise manifest in Mechanics, “That no Effect of any Motion, connected with others, and subordinate to them in a continued Series, can be exactly deduc’d, except all their Motions, and that according to the Order in which they depend upon one another, be calculated and compar’d.”

  Further, from this Order among the Laws of Nature, (by which all particular ones are subordinate to the general Law, and among particular ones, the latter to the former,) we may best, in my Opinion, demonstrate, “That God never dispens’d with any of them; but that in such Cases, in which the Obligation of the latter might seem taken away, the matter was so chang’d, as that only the prior Laws took place”: so it is evident, “That the Law establishing a division of Property, and prohibiting to invade what is another’s, was not dispens’d with, when God gave permission to the Israelites to invade the Land of the Canaanites, who had transgress’d his Laws.”34 For that same Law determines, “That it is necessary for the public Good, that God should have a Dominion paramount over all, as well Things as Persons, in right of which (when soever he shall judge it conducive to the common Good) he may take away any Creature’s Property in his own Life or Goods, and transfer it to another, by a proper Signification of his Will,” as we read was done in the Case propos’d; whence it appears, that the Israelites only claim’d their own, and were not authoriz’d to invade what was another’s. In like manner also, the Law is not dispens’d with, which, for the common Good, prohibits the hurting Innocents, if at any time an innocent Person is commanded (when the common Good requires it) to expose him self to Danger, or undergo even Death, if God clearly enough reveals his Will in the Affair: for by this means God, the Lord of All, receives his due Honour; and in the properest manner, because the chief End is provided for, according to his Judgment. Therefore in this Case, the Safety of a single Person is neither a Part nor a Cause of the common Good; but on the contrary, his Detriment is suppos’d to be the Means necessary to that End. This will be yet clearer, if we consider, that the Truth of this generalProposition, “The Cause, to its power, preserving the Whole, to its power preserves all the Parts,” is not chang’d in any particular Case; altho sometimes it should happen, that a sound Hand expos’d to danger, in defence of the Head, should be cut off by outward Violence: for we have already shewn, that the perpetual Obligation of these Laws is founded on the Truth of a practical Proposition, which is founded on this, and is therefore in no case changeable.

  More, useful, Inferences may be deduced from this general Law, than our Author has drawn.§XXV. I shall here say nothing concerning the Corollaries, which I have drawn in the Close of the following Treatise, because I know of nothing, by which I might render their Proof more concise, or more clear. I will take upon me, nevertheless, to affirm, “That I have not pointed out all those useful Deductions, which naturally flow from our Principles”;nor truly can I enumerate the mall. For in these are contain’d the most general Rules of Equity, which both Magistrates and private Persons may apply to all the new Cases that daily happen. From these, Magistrates may understand what civil Laws are equitable, and, consequently, fit to be retain’d; and what want to be corrected by Equity. They may likewise thence perceive, what Conditions of Leagues, and what Causes of foreign War, are just, what unjust. Hence also private Persons will learn always to obey the Laws, whether Divine or Human, which thence derive their Authority; and in those Cases, in which by these Laws they are left at liberty, (of which innumerable daily happen,) they will be directed to regard always the best End, and be restrain’d from all unlawful Methods of pursuing their private Happiness. Both will perceive, that they are oblig’d to make daily a greater Progress in Virtue, and that in such proportion, as their Skill and Strength to promote the publick Good be come greater by Experience, and as the publick Happiness becomes capable of any farther increase.

  His Account of the Origin of Societies, and Duties of Humanity, agreeable to the Scriptures.§XXVI. The Origin of civil Societies I have deduc’d from two Laws of Nature, which are therefore to be consider’d together: (1.) From that which commands the Settlement of Property, as well in Things as in human Labour, where it is not found already established; but, where it is found, the Preservation of the same inviolably, as a Means principally necessary to the common Good. And, (2.) From that which enjoins a peculiar Benevolence of Parents towards their Children; for, in consequence of that Benevolence, our first Parents must have granted to their Children, when of Age, both a Patrimony of their own, out of that full Dominion, which they had over all things by the former of these Laws, and also a paternal Power over their own Offspring. Hence it might easily happen, when Families were increased, that some Heads of Families, either in their own Life time, or by their Testaments at their Death, might divide their Dominion among many Sons, by giving to each an absolute Command over his own Family, or over many; whence many Monarchies might arise:35Other Heads of Families might also elsewhere settle Aristocracies, others, Democracies; but among all these sovereign Powers, the Obligation would still continue, “To promote the common Good, and to observe those Precepts thence necessarily arising, concerning the settlement and preservation of Property, keeping Promises, requiting Benefits, a limited Care of themselves and of their Off-spring, and an universal Humanity”; which are the principal Heads of the Law of Nations. But this is only an account of a possible and rightful Constitution of different Commonwealths, which also exhibits all their general Properties; nor does true Philosophy search for other Hypotheses. The Question concerning their actual Formation, is wholly concerning a Matter of Fact, depending on free Agents, and therefore is not demonstrable from Principles of Reason; the Proof here is to be taken from Testimony only. Facts, within the Memory of Persons now living, are to be prov’d from the personal Testimony of Witnesses: But Matters more antient, the Wit of Man cannot hand down otherwise to Posterity, than either by oral Tradition, (such as is no where to be found worthy of Credit in this Affair,) or by Writings compos’d on purpose to preserve their Memory; such are the Monuments preserv’d in the Archives of States, and Histories.

  Seeing therefore it is manifest, “That the Original of all States that we know, exceeds the Memory of all Men now living,” the only way we have left to form a Judgment concerning their Origin and Constitution, is from the antient Laws and other Records of each State, publickly preserv’d and approv’d of; or, if we would inquire farther, we must have recourse to the most authentic and credible Histories; but, amongst these, we find none of equal Antiquity and Credit with that of Moses, which acknowledges no antienter Authority, under God, over Things and Persons, than is that of Fathers of Families over their Wives and Children, and, after them, of their eldest Sons. We do not read there, “That Adam and Eve had such a Right to all things, as made it lawful for them,” (if they had thro’ a mistake imagin’d it conducive to their own Preservation,) “to wage War with God, and with one another, without the Provocation of an Injury; and so mutually deprive one another of Food and Life.” On the contrary, there are Intimations, “That they knew, and acknowledg’d, the Obligation of all those things, that were then requisite to the common Good of the Kingdom of God in its yet Infant-state.” The Exercise of the divine Dominion in giving Laws, and the Derivation of human Property from the Gift of God, both there spoken of, oblige us to acknowledge such a Division of Property, as we have affirm’d to be necessary. Nay, without violating the Donation of God, neither of our first Parents could rob the other of the Necessaries of Life, much less of Life it self. Yet farther, they were so far from entring into a State of Enmity, that we read, “They contracted a Friendship at first sight,” which could not subsist without Fidelity and Gratitude, limiting their Self-love; and presently follows, “A Desire of propagating their Species, and consequently of preserving it.” But seeing, according to this History, our first Parents had only themselves and their Children, to consider as Parts of human Kind, it is manifest, “That in this singular friendly Intercourse between themselves as Husband and Wife, and natural Affection toward the Children to be born of them, is contain’d Humanity towards all, as the less is contain’d in the greater.” From hence it is evident, “That our Philosophy does perfectly agree with the sacred History.”

  The Author abstains from Theological Disputes.§XXVII. Nevertheless, I have, in the following Treatise, purposely contain’d myself wholly within the Bounds of Philosophy, and have therefore altogether abstained from Theological Questions, concerning the Right of the divine Dominion in the Affair of Predestination, or of the Satisfaction made by Christ; nor have I consider’d, how much the Faculties of Mankind have been impair’d by the Transgression of our first Parents, concerning which we ought to form our Judgment from the Testimony of Scripture; but I have endeavour’d to prove the Law of Nature, only from that Reason we find ourselves at present possess’d of, and from Experience. We are however certain, “That nothing contradictory to the just Conclusions of our Reason, could ever be revealed by God.” And we therefore believe the sacred Scriptures to be the Word of God, the Author of Nature, because they every where illustrate, confirm, and promote the Law of Nature.

  It is in consequence of this Purpose of abstaining from all Theological Controversies, that I would not dispute with Mr. Hobbes about the Sense of Scripture; which moreover seem’d therefore to me principally needless, because I cannot bring my self to believe, that he is seriously mov’d by its Authority, as being what he looks upon to be wholly deriv’d from the Will of particular States; and has in consequence taught, that it is changeable at their Pleasure; here, of Force, and elsewhere, of none.36

  The Laws of Nature eternally, because necessarily, true.§XXVIII. I have said little or nothing of the Eternity of the Laws of Nature; to which, however, I have with the greatest Diligence every where had an Eye, whilst I endeavour to demonstrate the unchangeable Truth of those Propositions, by a natural Connexion between their Terms; for their Eternity entirely depends upon their necessary Truth. For there is no doubt, but that “Propositions which are necessarily true, are true when soever they can be thought of”; and it is equally evident, “That the Truth of such was from Eternity known to the divine Mind.” Such an Eternity, none, that I know of, denies to mathematical Propositions, even newly invented or known among Men. To this purpose I think it proper only further to observe, “That the Connexion is no less necessary between human Actions, however free, whenever they are perform’d, and their Effects, than between the Actions or Motions of mere Bodies, and the Effects thence demonstrated.” Three Right Lines, for example, freely drawn by a Man, according to the Direction of the first of Euclid’s Elements, do not less necessarily form a Triangle, than if they were drawn by necessary Causes.37 In like manner, “Love towards God, and all Men, altho most freely exerted, after it is exerted, necessarily makes any Person as happy as his Power can make him,” as I have at large explain’d. Nor is it less manifest, “That a Consent to the Division of Property in Things themselves, and in human Labour, or to preserve the Division when made, by Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, a limited Care of our selves, and of our Off-spring, and Humanity exercis’d towards all, are Parts of that universal Love, and therefore proportionably conducive to the Happiness, as of the Whole, so of Individuals, especially his, in whom they are found”; than, “That Quadrants, or other lesser Arches, or Sectors, are Parts of a Circle.” Therefore the Eternity is equal, as well of Propositions of the one Kind, as of the other.

  The Author’s Manner of handling his Subject.§XXIX. So much may suffice, by way of Preface, as to the Matter treated of; as to the Manner of treating it, I shall add but little. There are many things in our Style, candid Reader, which will greatly stand in need of your favourable Construction; being extremely sollicitous about the Matter, I was but too negligent of its Dress. It was written by Starts at Intervals, such as an uncertain State of Health, and the weighty Cares of my holy Function, would permit.38

  I have illustrated my Subject with Comparisons now and then taken from Mathematicks, because they, with whom I dispute, reject almost all the other Sciences. Moreover, it seem’d worth while to shew, “That the Foundations of Piety and moral Philosophy were not shaken,” (as some would insinuate,) “but strengthen’d, by Mathematicks, and Natural Philosophy, that depends thereon; and that therefore those natural Philosophers, who endeavour to overturn the Precepts of Morality, by Weapons drawn from Matter and Motion, may by their own Weapons be both oppos’d and confuted.”

  I have designedly abstain’d from any physical Hypothesis concerning the System of the World, as upon other Accounts, so upon this chiefly, because the Reader may, without prejudice to our Reasoning, assume any Hypothesis he pleases; provided it be but such a one, as, from the Order among the natural Causes of Phaenomena, leads us to the first Cause. I have sometimes however had respect to the mechanical Hypothesis, a Specimen whereof the most ingenious Des-Cartes has given us, (other Hypotheses, according to the Laws of Matter and Motion, nevertheless, may and ought to be invented, if the Appearances of things so require;) because it leads us the shortest way to the first Mover, and is receiv’d by most of our Adversaries.39

  I would make this further request to the Reader, that he would not pass a severe Censure upon this Work, before he has thorowly read the Whole, and compar’d all its Parts together; because certainly, if there be either Strength or Beauty, in this Off-spring of our Brain, it chiefly arises from the firm Connexion of all the Parts, and the apt Proportion of each of them, as well to attain their own, as the common End. Its Face is not painted with the florid Colours of Rhetorick, nor are its Eyes sparkling and sportive, the Signs of a light Wit; it wholly applies it self, as it were, with the Composure and Sedateness of an old Man, to the Study of natural Knowledge, to gravity of Manners, and to the cultivating of severer Learning.

  Conclusion.§XXX. Lastly, my chief aim in writing, was to promote the publick Good, by plainly proposing to the Minds of Men, the Standard of Virtue and Society, taken from the Nature of all Things; for I did not think it worth while to spend the whole Book, or the greatest Part of it, in confuting Hobbes’s Errors, tho I judg’d it necessary to be at some Pains in refuting his Mistakes, which had so grosly perverted so many. I thought it sufficient for this Purpose, thorowly to demolish the Foundations of his Doctrine, which are laid down, as well in his Treatise de Cive, as in his Leviathan; and openly to shew, “That they are diametrically opposite, not to Religion only, but to all civil Society.” These being plainly overthrown, all the wicked Doctrines, which Hobbes has rais’d upon them, fall at once to the Ground. But what we have in reality perform’d, we leave to the Reader’s Judgment. As to the Confutation which I have given, I am not very sollicitous; nor in treat I the Reader’s Favour, let him censure it as strictly as he pleases. But in the Confirmation of my Opinion, (because I know, that I neither do distinctly understand all, that the Nature of Things suggests toward our Institution in Virtue; nor could recollect in time all those things, which I had once distinctly consider’d, and which I was willing to have express’d in this Treatise;) I must intreat the Reader, not only to consider my Words, but to enquire strictly into the Nature of God and Men, and diligently to examine his own Breast; for thus he will daily make innumerable Observations, which will more perfectly direct him thro’ the Paths of Virtue to the same End. Moreover, because I know, that I differ from the Sentiments of some very learned Men, as to the Causes which imprint the Laws of Nature upon our Minds, I thought fit to add, that it is never the less reasonable, that we should love one another, and so fulfil that Law, which we both acknowledge God has written in our Hearts. As for my own part, I never would have committed my Thoughts upon this Subject to writing, much less would I have made them publick, unless the Importunity of some Friends at Cambridge, (with whom I used to converse with pleasure upon this Subject,) had extorted it from me. They, who first sollicited, and have principally influenced me to this, were Dr. Hezekiah Burton, and Dr. John Hollings, two very excellent and learned Men, my worthy Friends, with whom, to my great Advantage and Satisfaction, I have cultivated a most intimate Friendship these twenty Years.40 I pay so great a Deference to their Judgment, and owe so much to their Friendship, that I thought it a Crime, any longer to resist their Importunity. Do you, courteous Reader, make use of these our Endeavours, for the Benefit of others; enjoy them to your own, and may all Happiness attend you.

  A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE LAWS of NATURE, &c. AND A Confutation of the Elements of Mr. Hobbes’s Philosophy.

  CHAPTER I

  Of the Nature of Things.

  The Laws of Nature, defined. Altho’ the Scepticks and Epicureans of old denied, and others of like Principles still persist in denying, that there are any Laws of Nature;1 we are, nevertheless, on both sides agreed, what is intended by that Name; for we both understand thereby, certain Propositions of unchangeable Truth, which direct our voluntary Actions, about chusing Good and refusing Evil; and impose an Obligation to external Actions, even without Civil Laws, and laying aside all Consideration of those Compacts, which constitute Civil Government. “That some such Truths are, from the Nature of Things and of Men, necessarily suggested to the Minds of Men, and by them understood and remember’d, (whilst the Faculties of their Minds continue unhurt,) and that therefore they really exist there”; This is what we affirm, and our said Adversaries as expressly deny.

  The Author’s Method of Inquiry, concerning their Existence.Wherefore, that the Nature of these Propositions may more plainly appear, it is necessary, that we first examine the Nature of Things universally, then, of Men, and lastly, of Good, as far as they relate to this Question. We must afterwards shew, what sort of Propositions direct Mens Actions, and naturally carry along with them the Force and Obligation of Laws, as pointing out what is necessary to be done, in order to obtain that End, which Nature has determin’d Men to pursue. Lastly, that there are such Laws, will sufficiently appear from the certainty and necessary influence of those Causes which produce them.

  The Consideration of the Nature of Things, necessary in this Question;§II. Nor ought it to seem strange to any, that I said, “That the Nature of Things in the Universe ought first to be consider’d”; because the extensive Faculties of Man, which need many Things for their Preservation and Improvement, and are excited by all to Action, can’t be otherwise understood: For how can any one understand, what is most agreeable, or most hurtful, to the human Mind or Body, unless he considers (as far as he is able)2 all those Causes, as well remote, as near, which form’d, and now preserve, Man, and may hereafter support, or destroy, him? Nor is it possible to know, what is the best Thing a Man can do, in the present Case, unless the Effects, as well remote as near, which may proceed from him, in all variety of Circumstances, be foreseen and compar’d among themselves. But the Consideration of the Causes, upon which Men depend, and of those Effects, which may be produc’d by the Concurrence of their Powers, will necessarily lead every Man to consider, not only other Men, where soever dispers’d, and himself, as a small part of Mankind, but also this whole Frame of Nature, and God, its first Founder, and supreme Governor. These things being consider’d, in the best manner we are able, our Mind may by some general Conclusions pronounce, “What sort of human Actions chiefly promote the Common Good of all Beings, especially such as are Rational,” wherein each Man’s proper Happiness is contain’d. And we shall hereafter see, that in such Conclusions, provided they be true and necessary, the Law of Nature is contain’d.

  Because all moral Philosophy is finally resolved into the Knowledge of Nature.§III. Yet the Nature of our Undertaking does not require, that we should take a particular View of all kinds of Beings. We congratulate, indeed, the happy Genius of this learned Age, that the intellectual Part of the World has been much illustrated by that great Accession of Light, which former Proofs of the Being of God, and the Immortality of the Soul have receiv’d from the daily increasing Knowledge of the inferior Part of Nature. We also congratulate, both the present Age and Posterity, that, now at length, the material Part of the Universe begins to be explain’d by introducing Mathematicks into the Study of Nature. It is truly a vast Undertaking, “To resolve the visible World into its most simple Principles, Matter, variously figur’d, and Motion, differently compounded, and after the Geometrical Investigation of the Properties of Figures, and of compounded Motions, from Phaenomena faithfully observ’d, to shew the History of the whole corporeal System exactly conspiring with the Laws of Matter and Motion”; but that is an Undertaking, not only unequal to the Abilities of any one Man, but of an Age. It is, nevertheless, worthy of the united Endeavours, and unwearied Industry of those great Genius’s of which the Royal Society is compos’d: Worthy of his most excellent Majesty, King Charles its Founder, Patron and Example.3 We may therefore safely commit so important and difficult an Affair to so faithful and skilful Hands. It is sufficient for us, in the beginning of this Undertaking, to have admonish’d the Reader, “That the Whole of moral Philosophy, and of the Laws of Nature, is ultimately resolv’d into natural Observations known by the Experience of all Men, or into Conclusions of true Natural Philosophy.” But Natural Philosophy, in the large Sense I now use it, does not only comprehend all those Appearances of natural Bodies, which we know from Experiment, but also inquires into the Nature of our Souls, from Observations made upon their Actions and distinguishing Perfections, and at length leads Men, by the Chain of natural Causes, to the Knowledge of the first Mover, and acknowledges him to be the Cause of all necessary Effects. For the Nature, as well of the Creatures, as of the Creator, suggests all those Ideas, of which the Laws of Nature are form’d, and discovers the Truth of those Laws, as practical Propositions; but their full Authority is deriv’d from the Knowledge of the Creator. And these things require to be a little farther explain’d in this Place.

  The Natures of Things consider’d only as necessary to explain one general Law of Nature, whence all particular Laws of Nature may be deduc’d.§IV. But altho there are innumerable things, which, in the Knowledge of the Universe, may be made use of for the Matter of particular Propositions, which are to form our Manners; I have, nevertheless, thought proper to select only a few, and those the most general, which might, in some measure, explain that general Description of the Laws of Nature, which I at first propos’d, and are a little more manifestly contain’d in one Proposition, the Fountain of all Nature’s Laws. Which general Proposition is this, The greatest Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all, forms the happiest State of every, and of all the Benevolent, as far as is in their Power; and is necessarily requisite to the happiest State which they can attain, and therefore the common Good is the supreme Law.4

  The Method observ’d in treating of this general Law.The Sense of this is first rightly to be explain’d. Secondly, We are to shew, how it may be learned from the Nature of Things. Lastly, I hope it will plainly appear, from what follows in this Treatise, that it has the Force of a Law, and that all the Laws of Nature flow from it.

  Its Parts explain’d, Benevolence.The Reader is to observe, that I no where understand by the Name of Benevolence, that languid and lifeless Volition of theirs, which effects nothing of what they are said to desire; but that only, by force whereof we execute, as speedily and thorowly as we are able, what we heartily desire. We may likewise also comprehend in this Word, that Affection, by which we desire things grateful to our Superiors, which is particularly distinguish’d by the Name of Piety, towards God, our Country, and our Parents; and therefore I chose to make use of the Word [Benevolence] rather than [Love], because, in virtue of its Composition, it implies an Act of our Will, join’d with its most general Object, and is never taken in a bad Sense, as the Word [Love] sometime is.The greatest Benevolence of all I here use the Words, the [greatest] Benevolence, because I would express the intire or adequate Cause of the greatest Happiness. We shall elsewhere shew, how those Scruples which some object here, may be easily solv’d. By the Word[All] I understand that whole System which consists of the Individuals consider’d together, in order to one End, which It here mention by the Name of [the happiest State.] By the Name of [Rationals] I beg leave to understand, as well God as Man; and I do it upon the Authority of Cicero, whom I think I may safely take for a Guide, as to the Propriety of a Latin Word.Rationals, For he acknowledges Reason, common both to God and Men, and has taught, That “Wisdom” (which all ascribe to God) is nothing else but “Reason in Perfection.”5Forms the happiest State of all, I have us’d the Word [Forms] to intimate, that Benevolence is both the intrinsic Cause of present, and the efficient Cause of future Happiness, and is necessarily requisite in respect of both. I have added [as far as is in their Power] to insinuate, that the Assistance of things external, is often not in our Power, altho they are requisite to the Happiness of the animal Life;As far as is in their Power. and that no other Assistance to a happy Life is to be expected from the Laws of Nature and moral Philosophy, than Precepts about our Actions, and those Objects of Actions, which are in our own Power.6 And altho it happens, that different Men, according to their different Abilities of Mind and Body, nay, that the same Men, in different Circumstances, are not equally able to promote the public Good; nevertheless, the Law of Nature is sufficiently observ’d, and its End obtain’d, if every one performs what he is able, according to his present Circumstances. But of this there will be a fuller Explanation in what follows.

  How we come to the Knowledge of the Terms of the foregoing Proposition.§V. I must now shew, “Both how the Ideas contain’d in the foregoing Proposition, necessarily enter into the Minds of Men, and that when they are there, they are necessarily connected, that is, that they make a true Proposition”; which we shall afterwards prove to be practical, and to have the force of a Law. Seeing therefore it is well known by the Experience of all Men, that those Ideas or Thoughts, which the Logicians call simple Apprehensions, are two ways excited in the Mind of Man; (1.) By the immediate Presence and Operation of the Object upon the Mind; after which manner the Mind is conscious of its own Actions, and also of the Motions of the Imagination, or of the Ideas its Objects; and by Analogy to these, we judge of the Minds of other rational Beings, God and Men. (2.) By the Means of our external Senses, Nerves, and Membranes, in which manner we perceive other Men, and the rest of the Parts of this visible World; it presently appears, that the Terms of our Proposition become known, partly by internal, partly by external, Sensation. For what Benevolence is, and what are its Degrees, and, consequently, what is any ones greatest Benevolence, we do not otherwise understand, than by the Mind’s reflecting upon itself; nor needs there other help; for such is the Frame of the Mind, that it cannot but be thorowly sensible of its own Actions and Affections, as being what are intimately united with it self. I acknowledge, however, “That it is to the Assistance of our outward Senses, we owe the Knowledge of external Advantages, which Benevolence distributes amongst all,” of which hereafter. In the same manner we come to the Knowledge of Reason, by our inward Sense thereof; and we apprehend what are rational Agents, mention’d in the Subject of the Proposition. “That there are others besides our selves who have the use of Reason,” we collect by Observations made by our outward Senses. We come at the Knowledge of the Causes constituting any thing, whether intrinsically, or in the way of an Efficient, generally by the Assistance of our outward Senses, and by Reasoning founded on Appearances. The inward Nature of our Mind, and its active Powers by which it determines the voluntary Motions of our Bodies in pursuit of apparent Good, the Mind it self perceives, partly by reflecting upon it self, partly by the Aid of the Senses observing the Effects consequent upon the Command of our Will. Lastly, we come to the Knowledge of the State of Men, and of their Happiness, by the same Means, by which we hinted, that their Nature, and those good Things, in the Enjoyment whereof their Happiness consists, were known; for the State of Things adds nothing to their Nature, besides the Notion of some Duration, or Continuance. And a State is called Happy, from the Possession of good Things, very many, and very great.

  And of the Connexion of these Terms, or its Truth.§VI. As to the Connexion of the Terms of this Proposition, in which its necessary Truth consists, it seems to me sufficiently plain; for it signifies the same as if we should say as follows; That the Willing, or Prosecution, of all good Things situated in our Power, which is most effectual to the Enjoyment of them by our selves and other Rationals, is the most that Men can effect, that they themselves, and others, may most happily enjoy them. Or, There is no Power in Men greater, by which they may procure to themselves and others a Collection of all good Things, than a Will to pursue every one his own Happiness, together with the Happiness of others.

  In which words, what is first obvious, is, “That there is no Power in Men greater to effect any thing, than a Will determin’d to exert its utmost Force.”

  In the next place, it is also most evident, “That the Happiness of single Persons, for example, of Socrates and Plato, and other Individuals,” (mention’d in the Predicate) “cannot singly be separated from the Happiness of all,” (whose Cause is contain’d in the Subject,) because the Whole does not differ from all the Parts taken together. This universal Proposition, pronouncing concerning the Benevolence of all, may be observ’d to agree with Laws from this, that it declares, “Not what any one Person, or a few, ought to do to procure their own Happiness, without any regard to that of others, but what both all unitedly can do, in order to be happy, and what each separately, without any Repugnancy amongst themselves, (for that is not consistent with Reason, of which all are Partakers,) may do, in order to obtain the common Happiness of All, in which the greatest Happiness possible to Individuals is contain’d, and most effectually promoted.” It is first and better known, as flowing from the common and essential Attributes of human Nature, “What all in general can, or cannot, do, conducing to the common Good,” than, “What any particular Person can do in determinate Circumstances,” for these are infinite, and, consequently, impossible to be known by any Man. As, several Armies being brought into the Field, it is better known, that they cannot all get the Victory, than which Army shall overcome.

  Thirdly, in the last place, “One or a few particular Persons can neither enjoy a present Happiness, or with probability hope for it hereafter, by acting without any regard, or in opposition, to the Happiness of all other rational Beings”; for to a Mind so affected, an essential Part of its Happiness is wanting, “That inward Peace, which arises from an uniform Wisdom, always agreeing with it self,” for it is inconsistent with it self, when it determines to act after one manner in relation to itself, and after another manner in relation to others, that partake of the same Nature: That “great Joy” is also wanting, “which arises in a benevolent Mind, from a Sense of the Felicity of others.” Not to say any thing at present of Envy, Pride, and those Legions of other Vices, which besiege the Malevolent, and necessarily render him miserable, as labouring under the worst Distempers of the Mind.

  Beside, “No Person, in such an Attempt, can have a well-grounded Hope of Happiness,” because in it he neglects, nay provokes to his Destruction, other external rational Causes, God and Men, upon whose Aid that Hope necessarily depends. “There is therefore no other way, which can lead any particular Person to his Happiness, than that which is to lead all to the common Happiness.” Let it suffice, briefly to have hinted these things in this place, which I have done only with this View, that I might shew from such Observations as are most obvious by common Experience, that the Truth of the aforesaid Proposition is very evident; but these things we shall deduce more at large hereafter.

  Which kind of Truths are as necessary as Mathematical ones.§VII. However, I acknowledge, that this Proposition cannot be effectual, to the forming any Man’s Manners, before he has propos’d to himself as his End, the Effect here discoursed of, “His own Happiness in Conjunction with that of others,” and has taken “those various Actions into which Benevolence is branched,” for the Means. The Proposition, however, and all just Inferences from it,(such as those less general ones, which declare the Power of Fidelity, Gratitude, natural Affection, and the other particular Virtues, towards obtaining any part of human Happiness,) may, before such Proposal, be prov’d necessarily true. For the whole Truth, as well of that general Proposition, as of those which are thence deduced, depends upon the natural and necessary Efficacy of such Actions, as Causes, to produce such Effects. For they do not suppose, that there are such Actions, which, indeed, depend upon the Agency of free Causes. And it is sufficient to evidence this Truth, “That, when soever there are such Causes, Effects of such a kind shall thence follow.” It is an undisputed Point in the Solution of all kind of Mathematical Problems, in relation to which no one questions, but that we come at true Science. All know, “That to draw Lines, and to compare them, in Geometrical Calculation, depends upon the Will of Men. We freely add, subtract, &c. and yet whoever performs these Operations, according to the Rules prescribed, necessarily finds out the true Sum, which is equal to all the Parts added.” The like may be said of the Remainder in Subtraction, the Product in Multiplication, the Quotient in Division, and the Root in Extractions: And in general, in every Question, whose Solution is possible from what is given, the Answer is necessarily found from the Operations duly perform’d. The Connexion is necessary, between the Effect desired, and its Causes assigned by this Science. According to this Pattern are other practical Arts to be modell’d, and this we have endeavour’d to attain, in delivering the Principles of Morality, by reducing to one general Name [Benevolence], all those voluntary Actions, which fall under the Direction of Moral Philosophy, by inquiring into its Branches; and lastly, by shewing the Connexion between this Act and the End design’d.7

  All those Actions which fall under the Consideration of Moral Philosophy, are comprehended in Benevolence.§VIII. But seeing only voluntary Actions can be govern’d by human Reason, and those only which regard intelligent Beings, are consider’d in Morality; and seeing the Object of the Will is Good, (for Evil is rated from the Privation of Good;) it is evident, “That a more general Notion of such Actions cannot be form’d, than what falls under the Name of Benevolence,”8 because it comprehends the Desire of all kinds of goodThings, and consequently the avoiding all kinds of Evils. But beside, the force of Benevolence extends it self to all the free Acts of the Understanding, (whether we consider or compare good Things among themselves, or enquire concerning the Means of obtaining them;) and of our bodily Faculties, which are directed by our Will in the pursuit of Good. But it is universally true, “That the motion of a Point does not more certainly produce a Line, or the Addition of Numbers a Sum, than that Benevolence produces a good Effect (to the Person to whom we wish well) proportion’d to the Power and Affection of the Agent, in the given Circumstances.” It is also certain, “That keeping Faith, Gratitude, natural Affection, &c. are either Parts or Modes of a most effectual Benevolence towards all, accommodated to particular Circumstances; and that they must certainly produce their good Effect, after the same manner, as it is certain, that Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division, are Parts or Modes of Calculation; and that a right Line, Circle, Parabola, and other Curves, do express the various Effects, which Geometry produces by the motion of a Point.”

  General Mathematical Theorems, necessary to the Construction of Problems, are freed from the uncertainties of such Guesses as are made concerning future Contingencies, “By not affirming that such Constructions shall be, only demonstrating their Properties and Effects, if ever such Constructions are produc’d”; I have thought fit to proceed in the same Method, and “To deliver some evident Principles, concerning the natural Effects, the Parts, and the various respects of universal Love, without affirming that there is such Love”; being, however, certain, because such Benevolence is possible, that many Consequences may be thence drawn, which may direct us in the Practice of Morality, “which is what Theorems perform in the possible Construction of Problems.” I confess, notwithstanding, that whilst we, with the greatest Prudence, endeavour some things which require the concurrence of others, we may sometimes not succeed according to our wish; but this does not prove any error in the Rules. The Trial shews, “That the Effect was not in our Power,” or, as the Mathematicians speak, “That the propos’d Problem could not be solved, or thorowly determin’d, from what was given”; and as they acquiesce in such Discovery, so in like Cases may prudent Minds very justly enjoy Tranquillity. But the Experience of past Events, and the Observation of our own Strength, will quickly enable us to form a Judgment, “whether any Effect propos’d, be in the given Circumstance in our power, or no”; and that, for the most part, without the trouble of making an Experiment. And Reason requires, that such Judgment should be made; because he can hardly avoid the Imputation of Folly, “Who greatly labours the gaining a Point, which he did not know, that his Strength, together with the Assistance he had reason to expect, might obtain.” This, at least, is necessary, that he be certain, “That the probable Hope of obtaining his End, is of greater Value, than any Effect his Endeavours could produce in the same time.” For I hereafter shew, “That some Propositions of unchangeable Truth, can be form’d concerning the Value of contingent Advantages.”9

  Which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature.§IX. Moreover, the Nature of Things instructs us, “That we must first distinctly know, what is the best Effect in our Power, before we can distinctly know the chief End we ought to regard.” For the Answer to the former Question consists of more simple Terms, and consequently, of more certain Signification. The Answer to the latter, as it ought to contain all that is in the former, so it moreover denotes, “That the rational Agent has determin’d within himself, to use the means proper to produce that Effect.” But because from this Consideration, “That many Effects tending to the common Good are in our Power; and that they, by the Will of the first Cause, are made necessary to the Attainment of our own Happiness,” there arises, both an Obligation to intend the producing those Effects, and the actual Intention it self also, whenever it is found in Men: We must of necessity lay the Foundation of the Laws of Nature, in those manifest Observations on the Powers of Men, by which duly regulated they are enabled to make each other happy, nay will certainly do so. But these Laws are all summ’d up in [Benevolence] or [Universal Love.]

  I have observ’d, “That Mathematicians, in laying down the Principles of their Science, make no mention of the End, which the Doctrine by them deliver’d respects”; altho the more eminent of them most diligently pursue a most noble End. For they propose to investigate the Proportions of all kinds of Bodies and Motions, whence arise all the Phaenomena of Nature we are wont to admire, and the most useful Effects in common Life. The Mathesis universalis, (such as Des Cartes and his Commentators have deliver’d in their Geometry)10 is however content in the beginning briefly to suggest, towards the establishment of its Theorems, “That all kind of Proportions may be exhibited, by the help of such right Lines as we can draw,” and “That those which are unknown, may without great difficulty be investigated, by Geometrical Calculation, from those that are more easily known.” But it especially admonishes, “That, in order to the Preparation of those Lines whose knowledge is inquir’d after, nothing else is to be done, than that some Lines should be added together, subtracted, multiplied, or divided,” and “That the Extraction of Roots, which is of principal use, should be look’d upon as a kind of Division.” It uses no long Exhortation to induce you, “To investigate an accurate knowledge of all kinds of Things, from a mutual Comparison of their Proportions,” altho that be its principal End; but it supposes, “That it is desirable for its own sake, and of the greatest use in Life.” It thinks that it has sufficiently discharg’d it self, if it has briefly hinted, “How such Operations may be applied to the solution of all kinds of Problems.” Nor does it think it any diminution, either of its Truth or Dignity, “Tho most Men should, thro’ Unskilfulness or Sloth, neglect, or even oppose, its Rules.” Just so it is with the Doctrine of Morality, which is contain’d in the Laws of Nature. For it is wholly conversant, “In computing the several Proportions of human Powers, which at all contribute to the common Good of rational Beings,” which indeed are different in all Variety of possible Cases; and it may justly be said to have perform’d its Part, if, having in the Beginning, in general, hinted, “That all those Powers are comprehended in universal Benevolence,” it afterwards particularly shews, “That a Division of all Things, Fidelity, Gratitude, a care of our selves and of our Off-spring, is herein contain’d,” and, “In what cases they are to be made use of”; and, “After what manner thence necessarily proceed, Virtue, Religion, Society, and every thing else which contributes to the Happiness of Life.” For in this consists the Solution of that most useful Problem, whose investigation moralPhilosophy teaches. Nor is the Truth and Authority of its Precepts in any measure diminish’d, “Because many will not obey, or will oppose them”; this only thence follows, “That they will make shipwrack of their own Happiness, and perhaps, in some measure, involve others in the same Calamity.” Nevertheless, after it is made manifest, “That so excellent an Effect may certainly be produc’d, by Actions within the compass of their own Power”; it is not to be doubted, but that Men may more easily be persuaded, “To propose this Effect, so far as it is in their Power, as their End; and to take those Actions, from which, as from its Causes, it is produc’d, as the necessary means.” As Men are excited to the making Parabolic Specula, or Hyperbolic Telescopes, for the sake of the Effects which Mathematicians have demonstrated, will thence follow.11

  Of which Laws, God is the Author.§X. Here I shall only add, “That this Truth” (as all others equally evident, but especially those which are hence necessarily deriv’d) “does proceed from God, and has annex’d to its Observance Reward; to its Transgression, Punishment; and is, in its own Nature, a proper Rule to direct our Manners.” The case being such, I see not what is wanting, to give it the Force of a Law: However, I shall add, in the Conclusion of this Work, “That in this Proposition is contain’d, both Piety towards God, and Charity towards Men.” In which the Sum of both Tables of the Divine Law, as well Mosaical as Evangelical, is contain’d. I shall at the same time shew, “That from hence all moral Virtues, and the Laws of Nations, in respect both of Peace and War, may be deduc’d.” That a Truth so evident, is impress’d by God as its Author, is very readily shewn from that natural Philosophy, which shews, that all Impressions upon our Senses are made, according to the natural Laws (as they are call’d) of Motion; and that Motion was first impress’d upon this corporeal System by God, and is by him preserv’d unchang’d. By this Method, which to me seems most certain, and is wholly built upon Demonstration, all necessary Effects are immediately resolv’d into the first Mover. But the Impression of the Terms of this Proposition (at least as far as it proceeds from Matter and Motion) is a natural Effect; and the Perception of the Identity, or Coherence of these Terms, as they are in the Imagination, is nothing else than a Perception, that each Term is an Impression made upon us by the same Cause. But the Perception of the Mind, by which it apprehends the Terms, as they lie in the Imagination, and perceives their Connexion, and is sensible of its own Strength and Actions, so naturally and necessarily follows their Presence in the Imagination, and that internal, natural, and unblameable Propension of the Mind, to the Observation of those things which are plac’d before it, that they cannot but be ascribed to the Mind’s efficient Cause, that is, to God, by him who acknowledges God to be the Creator of all Things, or the first Mover. But all other Methods of explaining Nature, how much soever they differ from the foregoing, or amongst themselves, agree in this, that they acknowledge God the first Cause of such necessary Effects: Altho many seem not to have remark’d sufficiently, that the simple Apprehension of Ideas, and their Composition, when they plainly agree, (whence arises a necessary Proposition,) are to be reckon’d amongst necessary Effects, that is, such as (first supposing the natural Impressions of Motion, and an intelligent Nature, to which they are clearly and distinctly propos’d) cannot but exist: which however conduces much to our Purpose, because God being acknowledg’d the Author of these necessary practical Truths, which point out Actions necessary to that End, which Nature has determin’d us to pursue, it gives them the Authority of Laws.

  (Hobbes contradicts himself, with respect to the Existence of God.§XI. But what Mr. Hobbes thinks of the resolving such necessary Effects into God as their first Cause, and of the Authority of Laws thence arising, is not easy to affirm; for his Writings seem in some Places to acknowledge thus much, and yet there are many other Passages in him, which contradict, as well the Existence of God, (which is prov’d by this very Argument,) as the Authority of the Laws of Nature, which is establish’d by the same Reasoning. As to the first, it is certain, that the following Syllogism is plainly Atheistical, “Whatsoever is not Body, or an Accident thereof, does not exist. But God is neither Body, nor an Accident thereof. Therefore,” &c.12 But altho Hobbes has in many Places very sollicitously inculcated both the Premises, yet he denies the wicked Conclusion, and affirms it to be only “a Sin of Imprudence,” either to assert it, or any otherwise to blaspheme God.13 The Sense of the foregoing Syllogism, he does but too openly advance, where he contends, that “Incorporeal Substance are Words, which, when join’d together, mutually destroy one another, as if any one should say, A bodiless Body”; and that, “there is no real Part of the Universe, which is not Body.”14 And “what any one shall affirm to be mov’d, or produc’d, by an incorporeal Substance, is affirm’d without Grounds.”15 But the Minor, that “God is not Body,” he seems plainly enough to advance, where he denies, “That God has any Properties of Body; such as Figure, Place, Motion or Rest.”16 It is true, indeed, that, in the Appendix to his Leviathan lately publish’d, he openly declares, “God to be a Body,” in the beginning of the Third Chapter; and he endeavours to prove it; for getting in the mean time, that in the First Chapter of the same Appendix (near the end) he had promised not to deny the First Article of the Church of England, in which it is expresly said, that “God is without Body, and without Parts.”17 But if that Authority,18 which is the only one for which he seems to contend, is of less weight with him, let him hearken to himself, Lib. de Cive c. 15. § 14. where he teaches, “That those Philosophers spoke unworthily of God, who said, that he was either the World itself, or the Soul (that is, a Part) of the World; for they do not attribute any thing to him, but wholly deny his Being.”19 But does not Hobbes affirm him to be “Part of the World,” or “the Whole,” when he says that he is Body? For it is very certain that he has asserted, Leviath. c. 34. “That the Universe is an Aggregate of all Bodies, and that it has no Part, which is not it self Body; and that nothing can be properly called Body, which is not some Part of the whole Universe.”20 But that the World and the Universe, with him signify the same thing, any one will easily perceive, who reads these his Words of the Universe and Stars, Every Object is “either a Part of the Universal World, or an aggregate of the Parts; &c.”21 I am afraid therefore, that he is convicted by his own Authority; “Of denying the Being of God.” But it is not to my purpose, to insist any longer upon these things. I do not however doubt, but that the Properties of Body (such are, to be capable of being measured, and to be divided into Parts, to undergo all the Changes of Generation and Corruption, and to exclude all other Bodies out of its Place) are so well known now-a-days, both to Mr. Hobbes and all others, not to be consistent with the divine Perfections, that it would be easier for him to persuade most Men, “That God did not at all exist,” than, “That he was Corporeal.” This however we are pleased with, that, in contradiction to his own Principles, he professes to believe the Being of God, and acknowledges the Force of the Argument, by which we discover it; for he grants, “That there necessarily exists one first and eternal Cause of all Things.” Leviath. c. 12. § 6.22

  And the Authority of the Laws of Nature.But as to the Authority of the Conclusions of Reason flowing from these Principles, (which, tho immediately discover’d by Reason, yet, by the Intervention of that, must appear to proceed from God, who is the Author of that natural Necessity, by which our Reason is determin’d to acknowledge them;) Hobbes is neither consistent with himself, nor with Truth. Leviath. c. 26. § 7. “The Laws (saith he) of Nature, which consist in Equity, &c. in a State of mere Nature, are not properly Laws, but Qualities disposing Men to Peace and Obedience.”23 He gives a Reason for this, “Because a Law, accurately and properly speaking, is the Speech of one, who with Right commands others, to do or for bear any thing.” Hence in the same Place he infers, that, “As they proceed from Nature, they are not Laws.”24As if “God were not properly included in the Name of Nature”; or, as if “a Proposition, the Scope of which consists in declaring to us, what things are to be done, or omitted, under the Reward or Punishment of having our Happiness either increas’d or diminish’d, and which is form’d in the Mind of Man by the Necessity of that Nature which he has receiv’d at the hands of God, were not a sufficient Signification of the divine Will”; or as if “it were not properly enough called, the Speech of him who has a Right to command.” For what else does he who “commands in plain words,” than “make us most assuredly understand, that he has so determin’d concerning our Affairs, that if we act thus, Punishment, if otherwise, Reward is to be the Consequence; and that, in right of the Dominion which he has over us?” In the same place he contends, “That they are not otherwise the Laws of God, than as they are declar’d in Scripture.”25 But if any one inquires, how it appears, “That the Scriptures are the Word of God,” or, “That ever there was at all any Prophet, who either receiv’d them or any other Revelation from God”; in answer to this Question put by himself, he roundly affirms, “That it is plainly impossible, that any Person can be certain of a Revelation made to another, without a Revelation particularly given to himself; no, not even by Miracles.” Leviath. Part 2. c. 26. § 40. of the English Edition.26 Yet he affirms in the same place, “That it is essential to a Law, that the Person to be oblig’d by it be certain of the Authority of the Legislator”:27 And this renders what he says, in the Passage just cited, and in the last Paragraph of the Fifteenth Chapter of his Leviathan, wholly ineffectual. Wherefore, if we will believe him in both places, we shall deny them to be Laws, both as they are from Nature, and as they are revealed in Scripture, because we cannot be certain that those things were revealed; but there ought rather to be no Credit given to what he says, who contradicts himself: For the same Person, (as if he had done it on purpose, that his Readers might conjecture, that one Part of the Contradiction was advanced, out of respect to the Christian Magistrate, the other, from his own real Sentiments,) in the same Treatise de Cive, § next following, and cap. 4. § 1. professes, that “The Law, usually called Natural and Moral, is not unjustly called a divine Law; both because Reason, which is it self the Law of Nature, is immediately given by God, to every one for the Rule of his Actions; and because the Precepts of Life which are thence derived, are the same which were deliver’d from the divine Majesty, for the Laws of the Kingdom of Heaven, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the holy Prophets and Apostles.”28 Here truly, (perhaps that his Reader might see how much he can comply with the Manners of those among whom he lives,) he acknowledges “Those Conclusions, not unjustly to be called Laws,” which but a little before he denied, “To be Laws, properly and accurately speaking.” As if, “When he, who is by right a Sovereign, gives immediately to his Subject, a Rule of his Actions with Rewards and Punishments annex’d,” he did not “properly command him, that something should be done or forborn,” or “ordain a Law.”

  Nevertheless, his real Sentiments may be discover’d, which, in such Cases, are always on the impious side of the Contradiction.)§XII. But I will insist no longer on shewing these Contradictions; I will only give the Reader this Hint, (which may be every where useful, to his more certain Discovery of this Author’s real Sentiments;) That these latter Passages in favour of moral Rules have this Mark, by which one may guess they were affirm’d for fear of others, he does not offer any Reason to support what he seems to grant. That “Reason was given by God for a Rule of Action,” That “its Conclusions are promulg’d by Revelation,” he elsewhere endeavours, as I have shewn, to disprove by reasoning, tho here he seems to assert it: But to the contrary Positions he has added a Reason, such as it is, from his Definition of a Law; that you might know his real Sentiment to be, “That the Conclusions of Reason, which direct us to Equity, Modesty, and other Virtues, are not” (as they are wont to be esteem’d) “Laws of Nature properly so called.” He here seems to have done, what he says cautious Men do, in another Affair relating to Religion; they speak of God agreeably to the Sentiments of others, “not dogmatically but piously.” Leviath. c. 12. § 7.29

  Who (viz. God) has guarded these his Laws, by the double Sanction of Rewards, Internal or Essential, and External or Adventitious.What I propos’d to my self to prove, was only this, “That as the Being of the first Cause, so the Authority, or full Power of Obligation, which the Laws of Nature derive from their Author, may be made appear from the Consideration of the Universe; from whence the first Cause of all is found out.” In the mean time, I take notice also, “That the Laws of Nature have an intrinsecal and essential Proof of their Obligation, taken from the Rewards or Increase of Happiness which attends the benevolent Person from the natural efficacy of his Actions, and follows the Man who studiously observes these Laws; and from the Punishments, or Degrees of Misery, which, whether they will or no, they call upon themselves, who either do not obey, or do oppose, the Conclusions of right Reason.” For the Connexion of these Rewards with Benevolence, which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature, is plainly express’d in the above-mention’d Proposition, by the most happy State of all; and so the want thereof, and Misery, its Opposite, is sufficiently shewn to be the Consequence of the Malevolence of all towards all.

  The Terms of the foregoing Proposition, and their Connexion (i.e. Truth,)§XIII. These things being suppos’d, which I have briefly premis’d concerning God, the Author of natural Effects, and, in consequence, of the Laws of Nature; (they being by the Supposition we have just hinted at, in the present State of Things necessarily introduced into the Minds of Men, as soon at least as they come to Years of Discretion;) I shall now proceed to the Distinction and Explanation of the simple Ideas, of which this Proposition and its Corollaries consist; and also of the complex Truth, which arises from the Composition of those Terms. Its Subject is the greatest Benevolence towards all Rationals, which, it is evident, does consist in a constant Volition of the greatest Good towards all, so far as the Condition of our Nature, and of other Things, makes it practicable. In this place it seems proper to consider, how, together with a Knowledge of the visible World, (of which our Body is a part,) is let in upon our Senses and Minds, the Knowledge, (1.) of good Things; (2.) and, more particularly, of those which are common to many; (3.) amongst which one is often greater than another; (and that we call the greatest, than which we can perceive no greater;) (4.) of which we easily perceive that some are daily in our Power, and therefore practicable; some, in certain Circumstances, exceed the narrow Limits of our Faculties.

  Become known two ways, to the Vulgar, more confusedly; to Philosophers, more distinctly.But seeing we come at the Knowledge of the Nature of these Things, two ways, (1.) More confusedly, by obvious Experience and daily Observation; (2.) More distinctly, by Contemplation and Philosophical Enquiries, founded upon Experiments cautiously made, and diligently compar’d amongst themselves: By both these Methods we receive some Knowledge of the Laws of Nature. Hence it comes to pass, that they become known, even to the Vulgar, but confusedly and imperfectly, according to the Degree of Knowledge which they have of Nature: But Philosophers must more accurately observe, both the Connexion of the most general Notions, (of which they are composed,) with the universal Causes and Principles of Things, and the Train of Consequences, by which particular Precepts are deduced from the general Fountain of them all; as also their mutual Relation and Rank, according to which one gives place to another; when, in the same case, the Observance of several of them together seems impossible. The former Manner of coming at the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature, I thought not fit to be intirely slighted, because it is that by which almost all Men learn them; and because the Principles, into which Nature is to be philosophically resolved, are so much disputed, that there might be some danger, if I built the Doctrine of Morality upon those physical Principles alone, which I embrace, that many would reject it, for that very Reason, as not agreeing with me in their Natural Philosophy.30 I shall therefore call to mind the common Phaenomena, in which almost all agree; and from them I shall shew briefly in this Chapter, that the Simple Knowledge of the Terms of the aforesaid Proposition, and their Connexion by which they are form’d into a true Proposition, may be deduced.

  The former Method.§XIV. All daily behold, “That the Enjoyment of very many Things,” (produc’d upon the Surface of this Earth, and compriz’d under the Name of Victuals, Clothing and Houses,) “and the mutual Assistance of one Man to another, contribute naturally to the Life, Preservation, Strength, Comfort and Tranquillity of Man.” Such kind of Effects we conceive to have this in common, that they agree with that Nature for whose sake they are; that is, we esteem them Good; and so we come to represent that Affection of Man, whence the external Acts, productive of these Effects, proceed, under the Notion of Benevolence. Again, all are sensible, “That this their Benevolence may profit, not themselves only, or a few, but very many, partly by Counsel, partly by Strength and Industry”; and whereas they see others altogether like themselves, they cannot but think “them able to make like Returns,” and consequently, see “much Good and Advantage to each Man, arising from mutual Aid and Assistance, which all must want, and in their stead suffer innumerable Dangers, with extreme Poverty, if each, regarding himself only, were always malevolent to others.” But such Endeavours, profitable to many rational Beings, necessarily produce in the Mind a Notion of common Good, which, from the obvious Likeness of Rationals among themselves, may easily alike regard all, whom we have ever an Opportunity of coming to the knowledge of. To which this also may be added, that it is most obvious, by constant Experience, “That we have it more in our power to assist Men, than other Animals,” to say nothing of the inanimate Kind: for the Nature of Man (and consequently, his Good and Evil) is most known to us, from that Knowledge of ourselves which we cannot avoid; and is also capable of enjoying more good Things, to the Attainment whereof we can lend our Aid; and liable to greater Calamities, in guarding against which, our Power may most usefully be employ’d. Besides, we may procure innumerable Advantages to Men, by our Prudence and Counsel communicated by proper Signs, of which other Animals are wholly incapable.

  Moreover, because of the Likeness of the Nature of other rational Agents. “To will such things to them, as we are naturally inclin’d to desire for ourselves, Reason cannot but judge more agreeable to our inward Principles of Action,” (whatever they may be,) “than to desire the like to Beings widely different.” Further, as we perceive our selves more willing to benefit others who are like our selves, we may with reason hope, “That they whom we benefit, will be mov’d with our Benefits, to return us the like, or greater, that they may likewise oblige us.”

  Lastly, it is well known by the Experience of all, “That there is no more valuable Possession upon Earth, no greater Ornament or Safeguard, than is the sincere Benevolence of all towards all”; (which is very consistent with a particular Friendship for a few select Persons;) because Men, if they are malevolent, may easily force from others, as all other things, so Life it self. Nor is there a more effectual Method to procure either of these, than “by our Actions to shew the same Affection towards others, that we desire from them,” that is, Benevolence, as occasion offers, towards all, but a more particular Regard and Kindness toward chosen Friends. But if (as is meet, and as is every where the Practice, even of the Vulgar;) we take care “to sollicit the Aid of the first Cause, to the Establishment of human Happiness,” we shall find nothing in ourselves more Divine, by which we may please the Deity, than that sincere and most extensive Love, (of which we have been hitherto discoursing,) which reaches even God himself, as the Head and Father of rational Beings, and all other rational Agents, as his Children, more like to himself than the rest of his Creatures are; and, in consequence, the most dear to him: “For we are his Offspring.” is the Saying of Aratus the Cilician, approv’d by the Athenians, when Heathens.31 I could easily quote innumerable Testimonies to the same purpose, but ’tis folly to light a Candle to the Sun.

  Which is as certain and clear, as Mathematical Reasoning.§XV. The things now propos’d concerning human Happiness, appear so plain by common Experience, or obvious Reasoning, that I know nothing belonging to human Nature more evident; and they have the same Respect to the Direction of our Practice in Morality, which the Postulates of Geometricians have to the Construction of Problems; such are for plain Problems, that we can draw a Right Line from any one Point to any other; or that we can describe a Circle with any Center and Radius: And other more difficult ones, for the Construction of solid and linear Problems. In all these Cases are suppos’d Actions, depending upon the free Powers of Men; yet Geometry does not become uncertain, by any Disputes arising from the Explanation of Freewill. The like may be said of Arithmetical Operations; for it is sufficient for the Truth of these Sciences, that the Connexion is inseparable between such Acts (which it supposes may be done, and which we find placed in our power, when we go about the Practice of Geometry,) and the Effects desir’d. And either the Pleasure arising from such Contemplations, or the manifold Uses in Life, are sufficient to invite Men to search after such Effects. By a like Reasoning, the Truth of Moral Philosophy is founded in the necessary Connexion between the greatest Happiness human Powers can reach, and those Acts of universal Benevolence, or of Love towards God and Men, which is branch’d out into all the moral Virtues. But in the mean time these things are suppos’d as Postulates, “That the greatest Happiness they can attain, is sought by Men”; and, “That they can exercise Love, not only towards themselves, but also towards God, and Men, partaking of the same rational Nature with themselves.”

  I will here only add,32 “That the same Experience which proves that the Benevolence of each towards all, is the most effectual Cause of the Happiness of the Benevolent, does most necessarily prove, by a Parity of Reason, that the Love of any Number, towards any Number, has an Effect in proportion; and that likewise Malevolence towards all, brings most certain Destruction upon particular Persons, how much soever they may love themselves.” For “what takes away the necessary Causes of Happiness, and places in their stead the Causes of all kinds of Calamities, threatens nothing short of extreme Misery.”

  (Hobbes himself allowing the Principles, tho he over-looks their natural Consequence.)§XVI. The justness of this Consequence is every where acknowledg’d by Mr. Hobbes, whilst from his Supposition, “That every one naturally provides for his own Life only, and arrogates to himself a Right over all Things and Persons,” he infers, “A War of all against all,” and then proclaims, “That from thence all kinds of Miseries, even Death it self, hang over the Heads of all.” Nay, he supposes, “That all Men are sensible of this, before they consent to enter into Compacts of Society with others.”33 The Man is very sharp-sighted, in the Causes of Evil, and of Fear; but he is perfectly blind, with respect to the Causes of Good, and the Hopes of Happiness altho these latter are certainly equally obvious, nay first in the Order of distinct Knowledge, because the Causes constituting and preserving the Natures of Things, (which are Good,) come first to be discovered, before the Causes corrupting and dissolving the same, which are call’d Evils. I cannot therefore doubt, but that it is manifest, even to Hobbes himself, that the Study and Pursuit of the common Good, under the prudent Conduct of Reason, avails as much toward the Security and Happiness of all, as the Neglect thereof can toward the Destruction of all, whilst every one is intent upon his own particular Advantage: But, whatever he may think, it is certain, that from ourselves this Truth may be learn’d by every Man of common Sense, that is come to Years of Discretion. For from their Experience, “That the Activity of their Will in procuring Good, is, at proper times, both sufficient to benefit themselves and others,” they cannot but understand, “That a like Will in other Men is neither less effectual, nor less necessary, to the obtaining the same end.” But ’tis tedious to inculcate with many Words a thing so plain; yet I would not pass it over in silence, because all that follows is deduc’d from thence, as presupposed.

  But seeing the Deduction of the particular Laws of Nature from this general one, is Matter of philosophical Enquiry, and does therefore belong to the second Method of deducing them, it seem’d proper to premise some Considerations drawn from Natural Philosophy, in order to make it appear, “That a philosophical Contemplation of Nature does very much assist the Minds of Men, in forming a more distinct Notion of that general Law.”

  How, in pursuance of the second Method, the Mind comes to form universal ideas,§XVII. In the first place, I think it proper to take notice, “That those more general Notions,34 whose use very frequently occurs in all the Laws of Nature, are observ’d in Things corporeal, and that the Mind may therefore perceive them, even by the assistance of their Senses”: Such are those universal Ideas, of Cause and Effect, and of their connexion; of Number, compos’d of Units, and consequently of Summ, (whence all collective Notions,) of Difference, &c. of Order, of Duration, &c. But, altho I think this Observation conduces much to our present purpose, because such Notions are essential Parts of the Laws of Nature, yet because this is no matter of Debate between us and our Adversaries, and is obvious to all, there is no occasion farther to enlarge upon this Point.

  As also, of natural Good and Evil.2dly, Natural Philosophy does very distinctly explain, “What Things, or Powers and Motions of Things, are to others either Good or Evil”; and, “How necessarily and unchangeably this is brought about.” For seeing it is the only Scope of this Science, “To discover the Causes of Generation, Duration, and Corruption,” (all which we behold daily to happen to most Bodies, but especially to Men,) and “To demonstrate the necessary Connexion of such Effects with their Causes”; and seeing it is certain, “That the Causes generating and preserving Man, for example, by Efficacy of which he continues for some time, and flourishes with Faculties, as well of Body as Mind, enlarg’d, and determin’d to their proper Functions, are call’d Good to him,” but “That the Causes of Corruption, Grief, and Troubles, are to him naturally Evil”; it evidently follows, “That Natural Philosophy explains what things are to him naturally Good and Evil, and demonstrates that they are necessarily such.”

  I esteem as Parts of natural Science, the Knowledge of all those things, which Nature produces for the Food, Cloathing, Habitation, and Medicine of Man. We may also refer to natural Science, the Knowledge of all human Operations and Effects, of use in human Life: for, altho the voluntary Actions of Men, whose Effects are external, do not take their Rise in the same manner with Motions merely natural, from the impulse of other Bodies, but are determin’d by our Reason and Free-will; nevertheless, since they are true Motions produc’d by, and receive their Measure or Proportion from, the Powers of our Body, which are of the same Nature with the Powers of other natural Bodies, they must, after once they exist, by a like Necessity and altogether in the same manner, as other natural Motions, produce their Effects according to the Laws of Motion. This is most clearly and universally evident, in the Operations of the simple mechanical Powers, (such are the Lever, the Pully, and the Wedge, into which all the rest may be resolv’d,) which (as is well known to all) produce the same Effects, when they are enforc’d by human Strength, as, when, instead thereof, the Weight of inanimate Bodies is apply’d.

  Which are such necessarily, and invariably.§XVIII. It is likewise commonly known, “That the Industry of Man, by the Motions of his Body,” (which the Philosopher easily resolves into the mechanic Powers,) “is both able and wont to be subservient to the Preservation of himself and others, in preparing and preserving Victuals, Medicine, Apparel, Houses, and Ships.” Upon these Effects is laid out the whole Power of Man, exerted in Agriculture, Architecture, Ship-building, Merchandizing, and other handycraft Trades, of Smiths, Carpenters, and Weavers. Even the Propagation of the Species, the Suckling and Nourishment of Infants, may be resolv’d into the same Principles, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, to which he has my Concurrence. Nor are those other more liberal Arts, in which, by the help of sensible Signs, articulate Sounds, Letters, and Numbers, the Minds of Men are enrich’d with Sciences, or directed to various Operations, wholly exempt from these Laws of Motion; the natural Powers of our Hands and Mouths, are our Instruments, for Writing, or Speaking, in the making Contracts, in the Distribution, Conveyance, and Preservation of Rights; in which, Justice, the principal Effect of Ethicks and Politicks, almost wholly consists. For, to say nothing of Action, the Power of Words and Letters, which are perform’d wholly by bodily Organs, is not inconsiderable, either in the Instruction of the Mind, or in the Government of the Passions, altho both the first Institution of Words as Signs, and their Choice and Composition, be entirely the Work of the Mind, directing the Imagination and the Tongue; and altho, after Men have heard Sermons, and perused the Laws, they are still left to the free Determination of their own Will. Let us consider, for Example, after what manner Laws written, or spoken, operate. How great soever the Force of these Laws is, it consists entirely in these two Things, the Promulgation, and foreseen Execution of them by the Distribution of the Punishments and Rewards therein express’d: but both these become known to Men, by the help of the Senses, which are affected by corporeal Motions necessarily producing their genuine Effect; which I therefore thought proper here to remark, because, seeing the Promulgation and Execution of Laws are good, that is, conducing, as efficient Causes, to the Happiness of all rational Beings; it may be hence prov’d, “That there are things which are good, necessarily and naturally”; and this could be certainly known, before any Laws at all were made by Men: for these Signs35 conduce to the formation of Mens Manners, after the like manner, as the North-Star, the Observation of the Motion of the other Stars, the Mariners Compass, Sea-Charts, and other Mathematical Instruments, are of use to the Safety of Ships, altho they may thro’ Carelessness be neglected. But the Operation and Concurrence of the Mind with the bodily Powers, to produce these Effects, may be compar’d with the Action of the Steersman, plac’d at the Ship’s Helm, and of the Merchant carried in that Ship, estimating the Prices and Uses of the Lading;36 who can do nothing without the help of an Interpreter, and of Signs; without the Conveniences of Ports and Winds; and unless the Ship be tight in the Seams, and furnish’d with Sails and Rigging; unless also different Countries produce such Merchandizes, as may relieve mutual Wants, which yet, every one must own, depend upon necessary Causes.

  37Altho it cannot be imagin’d, “That such Arts had arriv’d to their present Perfection, or even their Improvement and bringing to Perfection could be distinctly foreseen, before Men enter’d into Societies”; yet Mr. Hobbes himself must acknowledge, “That all were appriz’d, mutual Assistance would prove very advantageous”; and “That all were able, sufficiently to make known their Inclinations to others by Signs”: Because he founds Societies upon Compacts, enter’d into for that very Purpose.

  By Parity of Reason, all Actions and Motions contrary to these, are naturally and necessarily Evil; such are those, by which human Bodies are brought to decay, either by withdrawing what is necessary to Life and Strength, as Food, Raiment, and Houses; or by introducing hurtful things in their stead: as also those Motions, by which the Minds of Men are debarr’d from Knowledge and Virtue; or, in their stead, Errors and unbridled Affections, which stand in opposition to the common Good, are introduc’d.

  And may be common to many.§XIX. When we treat of Good or Evil, with relation to the Laws of Nature, we regard not the Body or Mind of any particular Man, or of a few, (because the Suffering or Punishment of these may sometimes contribute to the public Good;) but the collective Body of all Mankind, as naturally subordinate to God their Governour, which will afterwards be more clearly explain’d. But the Good of the collective Body is no other, than the greatest which accrues to all, or to the major Part of the Whole.

  But these things, which I have here enlarg’d upon, concerning the natural Efficacy of many human Actions, to the preserving or assisting others, I have mention’d only for this Purpose, that we might distinctly consider, “How Men, from the Observation of the Faculties of others, may naturally come to the knowledge of Things naturally good, and those both great and necessary; and so be induc’d to do what they have in their power, for the Benefit of the Bodies and Minds of other Men.” It will not now be difficult to shew, “That these Faculties and Actions are not so limited, as to profit one only, but that their Force and Benefit extends to many; so that the Knowledge, Art, and Industry, the Benevolence, Fidelity, or Gratitude of one Man, may gratify very many; and being themselves good and common to many, may naturally imprint upon the Minds of the Observers, an Idea of common Good.” What is more, by means of the Union of the Mind with the human Body, the Power of Man reaches farther, and performs greater Things, than the much greater bodily Force of other Animals. For that Power has invented the Art of Navigation, knows how to enter into and observe Compacts with others at a great Distance, hath shewn us how, by the benefit of Letters and Numbers, to maintain Commerce with the East and West-Indies; and at so great a Distance, can treat of Peace, or wage War: But, of necessity, innumerable Motions must hence be determin’d. Nevertheless, it is not unusual in other Causes, whose Force is only Mechanical, to observe an evident Efficacy, productive of Advantage or Disadvantage to many. This is acknowledg’d, even by the Peripatetic Philosophy, and by common Experience, which shews, “That the Rays of the Sun convey vital Nourishment, to innumerable Vegetables over the whole Earth, and necessary Heat to the Blood of all Animals.” But a more accurate Inquiry into Nature, does upon several Occasions demonstrate, “That every Motion of every corporeal Particle does very widely extend its Force, and consequently, in some measure, however little, necessarily concur with many other Causes, to produce many Effects.” The Proof of this Assertion is easy, nor at all foreign to the matter before us: But because it depends upon Principles which are partly Physical and partly Mathematical, which to most would seem too remote from the Doctrines of Morality, and because it will be readily allow’d, even by our Adversaries, I chose to omit what I had prepar’d upon this Head.38

  (It is therefore a Mistake in Hobbes, to assert the variable Nature of Good and Evil, even upon his own Principles.)§XX. This, however, I have here thought fit to take notice of, “That Hobbes, in this matter, seems to grant more than sufficient,” when in the last Paragraph but one, of his Treatise De Corpore, he expressly asserts, “That there can be no Motion in a Medium admitting of no Vacuity, unless the next part of the Medium give way, and so on infinitely, so that the particular Motions of every particular Body contribute somewhat to every Effect.”39 Mean-while he is not aware, that this will thence follow, “That any human Action may, by its own Nature, contribute somewhat to this Effect, viz. The Preservation and Perfection of many, who do not desire it,” that is, may be naturally Good to many. Otherwise, he would not so crudely assert, “That Good respects only him who desires it”;40 and hence infer, “That the Nature of Good and Evil is variable, at the pleasure of single Persons in the State of Nature, and at the pleasure of the Government in every civil State.”41 Which are the fundamental Principles of Hobbes’s Ethicks and Politicks, as I shall shew in the Chapter concerning Good.42

  I propos’d in this Place only to shew, “That certain Motions, Powers, and Actions of all Things whatsoever, and consequently also of Men, whence we perceive that something is done tending to the Preservation or more flourishing Condition of others, do naturally imprint upon us the notion of a Good common to many”; and because the Nature of Things will not permit us, to think all kinds of Motions or Actions equally conducive to this End, that therefore Nature does sufficiently instruct us. “That there is a difference between Things good and evil, whether they relate to many, or to Individuals.” Yet further, seeing the Generation, Preservation, and Perfection of natural Bodies, (Men for Instance,) and on the contrary, their Destruction and Corruption, are nothing else than certain Motions, variously complicated, of those Particles whereof they consist, and that all these Motions are produc’d by their Causes, according to the Laws of certain Theorems geometrically demonstrated; it is clearly manifest, “That all things are generated, preserv’d and perfected by their Causes with the same necessity, that these Theorems are geometrically demonstrated to be true.” But the constituting, preserving, and perfecting Causes of Things or Men, are those Things which we call good, and the contrary to these, evil, whether their Efficacy reaches one only, many, or all. Wherefore, supposing “such Motions and Actions, of some Men in relation to others, as we now see tend to their Preservation,” they produce this Effect with the same necessity, that the geometrical Theorems concerning such Motions are true; and therefore they are naturally Good, altho no Laws were yet suppos’d, by which they are commanded.

  Therefore Hobbes’s Fiction, “That Good and Evil are changeable,” is perfectly inconsistent with the necessary and immutable Causes, which he every where asserts, of the Being and Preservation of Man. Nor can he come off this by saying, (which yet he often inculcates,) “That before civil Laws there is no measure of Them”; for there is the same measure of Good and Evil, that there is of Truth and Falshood, in those Propositions which relate to the Efficacy of those Motions, that tend to the Preservation or Corruption of other Things, namely, the Nature of Things; and whatsoever Proposition points out the true Cause of Preservation, does at the same time shew, what is true Good.

  From the limited Powers of all Finite Beings, appears,§XXI. We have now briefly seen, “How the Nature of Things imprints on us as certain and firm a Knowledge of Good and Evil, even of that which is common to many, as is that by which we know the Causes of Generation and Corruption.” I now proceed to consider, “That the Matter and Motion, in which the Powers of a human Body, as of all other parts of the visible World, do consist, have a finite Quantity, and certain Limits, beyond which they cannot extend themselves.” Whence flow these most evident Axioms concerning all natural Bodies: That the same Bodies cannot at the same time be in more Places than one: That the same Bodies cannot at the same time be mov’d toward several Places, (especially if contrary,) so as to be subservient to the opposite Wills of several Men; but that they are so limited, that they can be determin’d by the Will of one only, unless several conspire to one and the same Effect or Use. Nor is this peculiar to Bodies only, but common to the Minds of Men, and to all created Beings, as being Finite.

  1. The Justness and Usefulness of that Distinction of the Stoicks, between Things in our Power, and, out of our PowerFrom hence I would infer two Things, of great Consequence to our Purpose. (1.) That from the Knowledge of Nature, especially that of ourselves, we learn that celebrated Distinction of the Stoicks, between those things which are in our Power, (such are the Actions of our Mind, and some bodily Motions, both which, by the Effects we daily perceive, are obedient to the Will, and thence, by a parity of Reason, we may easily collect, what we shall be able to do hereafter;) and those things which are not in our Power: Such are by far the greatest, and the most, of those Motions which we daily perceive in the Universe, which we (little Animals) cannot obstruct, and by whose Force all things are in a perpetual Change, and which are the continual Sources, even to Men themselves, of the Vicissitudes of Adversity and Prosperity, Birth, Maturity, and Death.43

  Which is a great help to Prudence,This Distinction, constantly attended to, is of great use in forming our Manners, and regulating our Affections and Endeavours. For hence we are taught, “Not to seek any other Happiness to alleviate our Labours, than that which arises from a prudent Management of our Faculties, and from those Aids, which we know the Providence of God, in the Administration of the Universe, will afford us.”

  And to the Government of our Passions.By this means we are freed from those fruitless Labours, to which vain Hopes sollicit most Men; nor shall we ever disturb our selves upon account of those Evils, which, without our Fault, have hitherto happen’d to us, or may hereafter happen; and so a great part of the Troubles, which usually arise from those restless Affections, Grief, Anger, and Fear, will be prevented. Nor shall we be hence only directed how to avoid Evils, but we shall also be shewn the most compendious Way, by which we may by degrees proceed to the best Things, which are possible to be obtain’d by us, namely, the cultivating our Mind, and the Dominion over our Affections. But I have no purpose to prosecute any farther, this Subject, in this Place.

  2. The Necessity of Benevolence, in order to our Happiness.I will only make this Observation, which is to our present Purpose,44 that it is well known by the Experience of all Men, “That the Powers of any single Person, in respect of that Happiness, of which from without he is both capable and stands in need, are so small, that he wants the Assistance, both of many Things and Persons, to lead his Life happily; but that every one can nevertheless afford many Things for the use of others, which himself does not at all need, and which therefore can be of no use to him.” But seeing we are certain, from the known limits of our Powers, “That we cannot compel all those whose Aid we want, (God and Men,) to co-operate with us in the procuring our Happiness”; the only Method we have left to obtain this End, is, “To procure their Good will, by making a tender to them of our Service, and by a faithful Performance.” But, altho that greatest Benevolence, (mention’d in our foregoing general Proposition) consists in a hearty, constant, universal Inclination so to act; and therefore also in Cases, where often no Retaliation is expected, nay, where we know there will be no return of reciprocal Affection: Yet it does not hinder us, from cultivating Friendship chiefly with them, from whom Reason persuades us to hope for the grateful return of a mutual Benevolence.

  This is the first Conclusion which I draw from the finite Nature of all Things, of our selves especially. It thence follows,

  3. The Necessity of limiting the uses of certain Things, and of human Services, to particular Persons for a limited time.§XXII. Secondly. If Men, or other Things, do, or afford, any thing for the use of Men; such Service or Benefit is naturally and necessarily limited to certain Persons, Times, and Places. Therefore, if right Reason enjoins, “That the Use of Things, or the Services of Men, should be useful to all Men,” it necessarily enjoins, “That, for a certain Time and Place, that use of Things and of human Services should be limited to certain Persons.” The Consequence is manifest, because “That is right Reason in commanding, which commands that to be done, which is possible to be done, according to the Nature of Things.” The Consequence tends to prove, “That a Division of Things, and of human Services, at least for the time they may be of use to others, is necessary for the Advantage of all.”

  (Which over-throws Hobbes’s fundamental Principle, of every Man’s Right to every Thing.)And, certainly, that necessary Limitation of the use of one Thing to one Man for the time it benefits any Person, is a natural Division, that is, Separation from the use of any other Person for the same time. It is manifest, that I here call those things one, that are necessarily wholly employ’d, in one use at one time. For other things are likewise call’d one, which at the same time may be of use to many, as one Island, one Wood, &c. concerning whose Division I have yet affirm’d nothing. From the above-mention’d natural Division of Things, and its necessity to the Preservation of all, is deriv’d that primitive Right to Things by first Occupancy, (which is so frequently mention’d by Philosophers and Lawyers, and which they teach is to take place, supposing all things common;) for Right is the Liberty of acting any thing, granted by a Law: But in that suppos’d State there is no other Law, but the Conclusions of right Reason, concerning Actions necessary to the common Good, promulgated by God. Therefore, because right Reason grants, as necessary to the common Good, to every Man the use of Things and human Services, for so long time as such Use is beneficial to him, by that Grant a Right is given him (the first Occupant) to the use of that Thing or Person, for that time. The Will or Benevolence conformable to this Conclusion, is as truly Justice, as that which gives every one his Rights afterwards arising in civil Society. And the same Benevolence, as far as it permits such Rights to every one, and restrains those Affections which have a contrary Tendency, is laudable Innocence. But it is most evident, that no one can in any measure promote the publick Good, except he preserve his Life, Health, and Strength, by the use of Things, and of human Labour; and that therefore such Occupancy of Necessaries is a means plainly necessary to that End. For the Preservation of a Whole, consisting of mutually divided Parts, (such as Mankind is,) consists in the Preservation of the divided Parts, (not to mention any thing now of the Order to be preserv’d among them:) But the Preservation of the divided Parts, that is, of particular Men, requires the divided use of Things and of human Labour; therefore that is necessary to the Preservation of the Whole. Such Division, which is a kind of Property, after things are occupied and applied to uses truly necessary, is very consistent with some Community, like that in Feasts and Theatres; such as several of the antient Philosophers have suppos’d,45 not contrary to Reason indeed, but not very consistent with the sacred History; and directly inconsistent with that Right of all to all, which Hobbes has feign’d, in order to prove, “That, before the Institution of civil Government, preceded a State of universal War, of every Man against every Man; and that then a License of doing any thing against any Man, was both just and necessary.”46

  Here may be collected, by the way, “How every Man comes to have a right to preserve his own Life and Limbs,” from this, that these are his most certain Means of serving God and Men, in which consists that common Good, I have been treating of. It is also plain, that the Right of every one is under these Restrictions: (1.) That if Religion, or the publick Welfare of Men, requires it, we be ready to part with the last drop of our Blood: And, (2.) That no innocent Person is to be hurt, to procure to our selves any Advantage.

  This is most clearly deduc’d from the Principles which I have here briefly touch’d upon, and overthrows Hobbes’s whole Doctrine of the Laws of Nature and Empire. For the whole of that does first suppose (not prove, nor limit) “A right to preserve this mortal Life, as the Foundation of all natural Laws, and of Society”; and then is intirely employ’d, “In applying to that End some Means, which are often most enormous.” Lib. de Cive, c. i. §. 7. and elsewhere.47

  And this is what we must assert, concerning the Original of Meum and Tuum, of Property and Dominion, (in the large Sense of the Words,) without taking into consideration what is reveal’d in the Mosaic History, as those Philosophers necessarily did, who had not receiv’d that Account. But this Example of introducing a Division being given by Nature, it is easy, and agreeable to the Genius of a human Mind, by a parity of Reason, from observing those Inconveniences, which every Man experiences, of holding all things in common, to proceed (for the benefit of all) to a further Division of Things and human Services, and to introduce amore complete Dominion or Property in both, that might be in some respect perpetual.

  Whence also is deduc’d the Origin of Property and Dominion.§XXIII. The Reader, I believe, will not expect, “That I should recite all the most grievous Mischiefs, that would arise from a Parity introduc’d amongst all, or from having in common, Wives, Children, and all other Goods,” for of these Mischiefs, others have abundantly treated. See Aristotle, in the second Book of his Politicks, and his Commentators.48 For what he had said of a particular Society, may be easily applied to the general Society, made up of Mankind, the Subjects, and God, the Governour. It is sufficient, that the common Experience of the World teaches us, “That, where any thing is yet left in common, that thing generally comes to a Division, to avoid needless Contentions”: And “That it is a natural Vice, to neglect that which is possess’d in common, and to think he has nothing, that has not the Whole.”49 For the Dangers of Contentions, and Want, the Effect of neglecting to cultivate the Earth, would (especially after Mankind grew numerous, and Vices, arising from Ignorance and a neglect of Discipline, became prevalent) reduce human Affairs to such a State, “That all must see it equally necessary to their common Happiness, to make a Distribution of Things and the Services of Men, which shall be fix’d and valid for the time to come, as to permit the present enjoyment of them to him, who first gets them into his Possession.”

  From whence it follows, “That as Nature” (according to what we have above shewn) “confers the right of using Necessaries present, so she does, in the same manner, grant the right of a stated and durable Division of Things, and Offices, which is call’d direct Dominion.” For nothing is more evident, “Than that the future use of Things, or of human Labour, has the same relation to future Life or Health, which the present Enjoyment has to present Life”; there is in both the relation of a necessary Cause. Wherefore the Case is almost the same in this, as in Geometrical Propositions, where from three given Terms a fourth is found; and we may justly think, that Mankind, in a State of Nature, (which Hobbes himself supposes,) may thus reason: As a right to the Life of this Day, proves a right to its necessary preserving Causes, viz. A limited and divided use of Things and of human Labour, whilst they are now at hand; so also a right to Life for the time to come, shews a right to limit the use of Things and Persons for the future. There is no occasion here for artificial Multiplication and Division, which are requisite to find out a fourth Proportional in large Numbers; for such reasoning is obvious to every Man in his Senses, and is daily practis’d by all, even whilst they are not aware of it, nor distinctly dispose the Terms into such an order. I have shewn, that the two first Terms are given by Nature. And it is evident, that the third Term also is given, because it contains nothing that is not known by all. For all Men provide for the future, and suppose it probable, that themselves and other Men, or even their own Posterity, and that of others, shall hereafter continue some time upon the Earth, and have a right of preserving their Life. Nay, to foresee Things future at a great Distance, to be very sollicitous about them, and to inquire into the Causes of such Things as present themselves to his Thoughts, is peculiar to Man above other Animals.50 They will therefore come at the above-mention’d fourth Proportional, which is the certain and limited Causes of preserving their Life for the future, which are no other, than “The divided use of Things, and of human Labour, to be ratify’d and ascertain’d by common Consent for the future,” avoiding all the Hazards of Contention, and banishing that Scarcity, which we suppose Experience taught them to have taken its Rise from a Neglect of the Cultivation of Things.

  But such Reasoning from an exact Similitude of Cases is so strong, that in evidence it rivals Euclid ’s Method (Elem. 6.) of finding a fourth Proportional, by drawing a Parallel to a Line given, and in easiness exceeds it; which yet no one will deny to be suggested by natural Reason.51

  From this Example of a further Division, appears first, “How from a Change of Circumstances,” (or from a Consideration of some Things, which, not being essential, are not contain’d in the primary and universal Notion of Mankind;) “human Actions of a new kind may become necessary to the publick Good”: And secondly, “After what manner, from such Necessity, arises a Right,” (antecedent to the Institution of Civil Government,) “to perform such Actions.”

  And of a Right to self-preservation, and self-defence.Nor upon these Suppositions, will there be any Right to do any thing, except what right Reason declares to be necessary to the common Good, or at least consistent with it; of which the first is therefore commanded by Reason, the last permitted, which I shall explain more at large in the Chapter of the Law of Nature. This, however, I thought proper here carefully to inculcate, “That all Right, even to the Use of those Things, which are absolutely necessary to every one’s Preservation,” (as it is distinguish’d from the mere force of seizing those Things, in which Sense only its Original is here inquir’d into,) “is founded in the Command, or at least in the Permission, of the Law of Nature,” that is, of right Reason, pronouncing concerning those things which are necessary to the common Good, according to the Nature of Things; and that therefore it cannot be known, “That any one has a Right to preserve himself, unless it be known, ‘That this will contribute to the common Good,’ or That it is at least consistent with it.” But, if this be the Rise of our Right to our own Preservation, our Powers will be hereby so limited, that we may not invade the equal Rights of others, nor break forth into a War against all; that is, make an Attempt towards the Destruction of all.

  In short, I affirm first, “That a Right,” (distinguish’d from mere Power,) “even to Self-defence, cannot be understood without Respect had to the Concessions of the Law of Nature, which consults the Good of all”; and that all solid Arguments, “by which any one can claim any Right to himself,” do prove, “That there is such a Law, and that it is at the same time of equal Force to the Protection of others.” But secondly, since the Right to the making such a Division can only be deduc’d from a Care of the common Good, it manifestly follows, that the Dominion of God over all Things is preserv’d unviolated; and that, from this Principle, no Right of Dominion can accrue to any Man over others, which will license him to take from the Innocent their Necessaries; but on the contrary, that the Right of Empire is therefore given to them, that the Rights of all may be protected from the Evils of Contention, and may be encreased, as far as the Nature of Things, assisted by human Industry, will permit.

  A brief Deduction of the principal particular Laws of Nature.§XXIV. Having already briefly deduced, from the Law which commands an Endeavour to promote the common Good, the Property of particular rational Beings, at least in things necessary, some Right is granted, which every one may justly call his own; and, by the same Law, all others will be obliged to yield that to him, which is usually included in the Definition of Justice.52

  Justice;It seems moreover proper, more distinctly to shew, “what kind of Actions have a natural Tendency to promote the publick Happiness”; for thence will appear, both what Actions are commanded, and what permitted to Individuals.

  Abstaining from,It is manifest, First, That to abstain from hurting any innocent Person, is necessary: For the Damage of any Part is a detriment to the Whole, unless it be inflicted as a Punishment, for some Crime committed against the publick Welfare. Hence all Invasion of another’s Property, is prohibited; for all Damage done to the Mind, Body, Goods, or good Name of any Person, is a Loss to the Publick.

  And repairing, Injuries;Hence also the same natural Law, which requires to give every one his own, must, for the publick Good, command Reparation of Injuries.

  Secondly, It is manifest, that this greatest and noblest End cannot be obtain’d by a bare Abstaining from doing Evil; but it is necessary, that every one contribute his Share, by a true, certain, and constant Application, as well of Things external, as of his Powers, towards the gaining this Point. For, otherwise, neither will the publick Happiness, nor our own, be the greatest we can effect.53 It is upon this account a natural Precept, that if at any time, (the Nature of the chief End so requiring it,) we should transfer to another some Right of ours, either by Gift, at present, or by Promise, or Compact, afterwards to be perform’d; we make that Transfer validly and faithfully, and not with an Intention to deceive;Liberality; making, and faithfully performing Promises and Compacts; for it is only such a firm transferring of any Thing, or of our Services, to the Use of another, as I have mention’d, which can at all conduce to the End commanded us. Hence arises the obligation to make and keep promises; but our Pains is most wisely and happily laid out, in the prosecution of the common Good of all rational Beings, if we observe the following Order in our Actions.

  Piety, Loyalty, Gratitude to Parents, Benefactors, and Ambassadors;We should, first, perform what is acceptable to the intelligent Agents,54 who are Causes of the common Good, and, consequently, of our own; that is, every one should take care to make himself acceptable to God, to Princes, and the whole Body of the State, (upon supposition that there are such in being,) to Parents, to Benefactors; but especially to Negotiators of Peace, or Ambassadors.

  Self-Preservation and Improvement;Secondly, Every one should study his own Preservation, and further Perfection; but always preserving the Rights of others, by that Innocence which I have already shewn to be commanded. Hither I refer our being oblig’d to study the Improvement of our Minds, with all useful Knowledge and Virtue, and to preserve the Life, Health, and Chastity of our Bodies.

  Natural Affection;Thirdly, Men should provide for their Families and Offspring, because (to omit, that they are the Substance of their Parents, form’d into the same Species with them, whence they may justly claim to themselves the Rights of human Nature) they are the only Prop of the approaching old Age of the present Set of Men, and by them only we can hope to raise a succeeding Generation. To this Care of our Offspring, I refer Love towards our Kindred, (who are the Offspring of our Parents,) and towards our whole Posterity.

  And Humanity, towards All;Fourthly, Every one should study to make himself acceptable to all others, by good Offices, and to benefit others, without the detriment of any, by all Acts of Humanity, as they are called, such as, to shew the way, to raise the Fallen, &c. in proof whereof there is no Occasion to add any thing farther, than that, in order to the preservation of any aggregate Body, whose Parts are transient, (as is the Case of all Mankind,) it is necessary, “That the Causes of its Corruption, especially those which happen to its inward Parts, be taken away; that there be a certain Communication of Motion between its Parts; that its Causes of Preservation, and all its essential Parts, be cherish’d, not only those which are at present, but also those which shall hereafter be produc’d, by the Motion which is intrinsick to that aggregate Body; and that its Parts and Motions, which have a less Proportion to the Whole, give way to those which have a greater Proportion to the same.” For scarce any thing can be prov’d more plainly, than this general Proposition, which immediately flows from the Definitions of Things preservative and destructive,55 of Whole and Part, of Cause and Effect; and yet in all things suits with those Particulars, which, in the foregoing Section, I affirm’d to be necessary to the Preservation of Mankind.

  This illustrated by various Examples from Nature, of the Contrivance of its Author, for the Preservation of the whole, with respect, 1. To Individuals;§XXV. But, lest any thing should be wanting, which might suggest such Thoughts to the Minds of Men, and might demonstrate their necessary Connexion among themselves, Nature lays before us a sufficient Number of Examples, in Beings of various Kinds. Let the Nature of any Animal be consider’d, as an Aggregate made up of Parts very different, that defends it self, for the time appointed by universal Nature, by the Methods already mention’d; (1.) By expelling, according to its Power, those Things which are hurtful, which it diligently separates from the vital Nourishment; (2.) by circulating the Blood, and perhaps other useful Fluids, as the Lymph, the Bile, and the nervous Juices; (3.) by repairing what is wasted, by a new Succession of like Parts; (4.) and by the mutual good Offices of every Part, perform’d according to the general Laws of Motion, which nevertheless hinder not, but that each may take to themselves what is sufficient for their proper Nourishment and Strength.

  2. To Animals of the same Species;If we turn our Eyes to the mutual Behaviour of different Animals, but of the same Kind; it is evident, that they continue their Species, by a certain kind of Innocence, Retaliation of Benefits, limited Self-Love, and a most powerful Love of their Offspring.

  • Parcit cognatis maculis similis fera.

  • Juv. Sat. 15.56

  i.e. Wild Beasts of the same Kind do not fight with one another.

  3. To the Frame of the visible World.Lastly, If we consider this visible World, with Des-Cartes and others,57 as a most exquisite Machine, we may perceive, that this our Vortex is no otherwise daily preserv’d, than by resisting some contrary Motions of the neighbouring Vortices; by changing or removing Bodies of Figures or Motions less agreeable; by a circular Motion of the Parts; by propagating the different Species of Things, by such kind of Motions, as those by which it has produc’d the Individuals which now are; and by causing its Parts to yield to one another, according to the Proportion which their Dimensions and Motions have to one another, and to the Whole. But I am determin’d, not to insist upon such Hypotheses, altho I know, that we may fairly reason from them, provided the natural Laws of Motion be exactly observ’d in them; and I dare affirm, that has been perform’d by Des-Cartes, with great Care and Exactness, in most Parts of his Hypothesis. Howbeit, whatsoever Hypothesis be assum’d, in order to explain the Phaenomena of Nature, such Laws of Motion must of necessity be allow’d, as, amidst all natural Changes, preserve the State of the System of the World, by such Methods as I have mention’d. Such being the Case, it is manifested by a most illustrious Example, what things are necessary to the Preservation of the greatest and most beautiful aggregate Body; the Consideration whereof cannot but most certainly convince Men, “That human Actions, not unlike these, may be the no less proper Causes of preserving the whole System of Mankind, and making them happy.” Upon which account I am of opinion, that it would not be unprofitable to consider the special Laws of Motion, from the necessary Observance whereof the above-mention’d general Effects arise: But because this is too remote from my present chief Aim, the Philosophical Reader is referr’d, either to his own Experience, or to Galileus, Des-Cartes, Wallis, Wren, and Huygens, all celebrated Writers.58 But all these Theorems, or Laws of Motion, may be deduced from this Supposition, “That Motion is not annihilated, after it has been impress’d upon Matter by the first Cause”: And for this very Reason. “That it exists in a World that admits no Vacuum, it is necessarily still further propagated, till it return into it self”:59 And, on the contrary, the Truth of this Supposition is demonstrated, by all the Theorems of Motion observ’d in Nature, by the help of the Senses. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that, in what State soever Men are suppos’d to exist, the Power of doing those things which I have mention’d is plainly necessary to be permitted them, that the collective Body or Race of Men may be preserv’d; and that the Will to do so is no less necessary to the actual Happiness of Men: And to these Heads may be reduc’d whatever is necessary to this Effect.

  How it appears to be the Will of God, that we should promote the publick Good, i.e. be Virtuous.§XXVI. What I have hitherto said, concerning the necessary Connexion between the aforesaid Actions and the common Good, is advanc’d with this View, “To fix unchangeably, by their Relation to this Effect, the Nature of those human Actions, wherein Piety, Probity, and every Virtue consists”; for the Relation between entire adequate Causes (that is, Causes consider’d in all their Circumstances requisite to Action) and their Effects, is wholly immutable. In every State, as well of holding Things in common, as of divided Property, such a Course of Life, as deceives no Man by Lyes or Perfidiousness, as injures no Man in his Life, Reputation, or Chastity, as makes Returns of Gratitude to Benefactors, and provides for himself or his Posterity, without hurting another, always has been, and will be, a Cause of the common Good, and is therefore to be distinguish’d by the Name of Virtue. This is only to be taken care of, that we have in view an Effect great enough, that is, that some Advantage accrue to the Whole, or, at least, that it suffer no Damage, whilst we endeavour to gratify a Part; whatsoever is acted otherwise, is to be look’d upon as Vice. And because the Nature of Things makes known to Men, “That by such Actions the common Good” (in which their own proper Happiness is contain’d) “may be obtain’d, and that in the highest degree, that is to them singly possible; but that contrary Actions do likewise make Men miserable; and that these things are so, because of the Connexion made by the Will of the First Cause, between such Actions and their Effects”; it evidently follows, “That Men are oblig’d, by the same Will of the First Cause, to exercise Virtue, and Shun Vice; under the Penalty of losing Happiness, or for the Hope of acquiring it.”

  1. From the Evils necessarily connected with a vicious Action.Innumerable Evils, to the Doer himself, naturally attend every Action injurious to others; for he himself, because he contradicts better practical Principles, (which are known to himself,) sets his own Mind at variance with itself, so as to be Self-condemn’d; and he that but once delivers himself up to the Conduct of Rashness and of blind Affections, rather than to the Counsel of his own Reason, will, for the future, be more easily hurried away by them, whence he will at last with ease procure his own Ruin: He sets others also an Example, which may be highly prejudicial to himself: He increases Suspicion and the Causes of Distrust, the Inconveniencies of which he will some time or other experience. Nay, further, every vicious Action may be said to contain all that Punishment, to inflict which, it will excite any rational Agents, out of their regard to publick or private Good, in order to restrain Malefactors.

  2. From the Punishments inflicted, for evil Actions, by other rational Beings,Now this Influence of Actions, to excite Observers to inflict Punishment, tho it extends only to rational Natures, God and Men, yet is of great moment, and ought always to be consider’d, before we undertake any Action, lest we should thereby, even unwillingly, draw Destruction upon our own heads; because our whole Hope depends upon God and Men, who judge of the Merit or Demerit of our Actions, by their Relation to the common Good.

  Whether God,“That God is privy to, and punishes, the most concealed Wickedness,” perhaps I should seem impertinent, if I went about to prove, after so many Philosophers, antient and modern, and also so many Christian Fathers; especially since he, whose Opinions I am now examining, does no where, that I know of, deny it. Nevertheless, the manner, by which we naturally come to the Knowledge of this, I shew afterwards, where I more fully set forth my Opinion, concerning the Obligation of the Laws of Nature.60

  or Men.Besides, the Author of no Villany can be secure; because Men (whose Interest it is universally, that a most extensive Benevolence, and that Justice should take place) may come to the Knowledge of, and punish, the most secret Crimes, which may be discover’d a thousand ways, that no one can avoid. Wicked Persons have often betray’d themselves in their Dreams, in their Ravings, in their Cups, or in a sudden Fit of Passion.61 And this even Epicurus and his Followers have confess’d; they, who have used great Endeavours to shake off the Fears of a divine Providence, have yet frequently own’d, that the Fear of Man cannot be shook off: The Reader may have recourse to the fundamental Maxims of Epicurus, with Gassendus’s Notes.62 I will add only this, that, beside the divine Vengeance, which the Conscience of almost all wicked Men dread, as the Avenger of the most secret Crimes, among Men, consider’d even out of a State of civil Government, Revenge generally follows any Act of Wickedness, after it has been discover’d. For seeing it is the Interest of all, “That Crimes should be punish’d,” any Person, that is able, has a Right to exact those Punishments, which a regard to the publick Good requires should be taken by some body. For, by the Supposition, all Inequality among Men being taken away, that Saying of the Latin Poet takes place, I am a Man, and therefore no Calamity that befals Mankind seems to me indifferent.63

  (Hobbes is inconsistent with himself, in denying the foregoing Obligation of the Laws of Nature, in a State of Nature;)Nor certainly can Hobbes, who says, “That every Man has in that State a Right of warring against all,” justly deny him the Sword of Justice to punish Crimes. Nor do I see any just Reason why he (who teaches, that the obligatory Force of Civil Laws proceeds from the Punishments annex’d, and the Fear thence arising) should not allow some Obligation to accrue to the Laws of Nature, even to external Actions, either from the Punishments which Conscience foresees will be inflicted by God; or even from the Punishments which any Man, in a State of Nature, has a Right to exact from the Transgressor of Nature’s Laws. Truly, the hands of so many Avengers were to be fear’d, and it were strange, if none of them were sufficiently furnish’d with Strength and Courage, so as to be both able and willing to revenge a Contempt of the common Good. But even Hobbes himself does elsewhere (Leviathan, Chap. 31. near the End) acknowledge, that we may observe such natural Punishments; and asserts, that they follow Crimes not by positive Appointment, but by Nature. “There is (saith he) no Action of Man in this Life, that is not the beginning of so long a Chain of Consequences, as no human Providence is high enough to give a Man a Prospect to the End. And in this Chain, there are link’d together, both pleasing and unpleasing Events, in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his Pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the Pains annex’d to it; and these Pains are the natural Punishments of those Actions, which are the beginning of more harm than good. And hereby it comes topass, that Intemperance is naturally punish’d with Diseases, Rashness with Mischances, Injustice with the Violence of Enemies, Pride with Ruin, Cowardice with Oppression, negligent Government of Princes with Rebellion, and Rebellion with Slaughter; for seeing Punishments are consequent to the Breach of Laws, natural Punishments must be naturally consequent to the Breach of the Law of Nature, and therefore follow them, as their natural, not arbitrary, Effects.”64 But this same Philosopher of Malmsbury, altho he asserts a War of all against all in that State, hath entirely overlook’d this Cause of War, that they might punish Crimes against the publick Good, or defend it against Invaders; yet he sets all a fighting, to take from others what they are either justly possess’d of, or lay claim to.65 And whereas the immediate effect of the Right to punish, for example, an Invader, be an Obligation to abstain from that Crime, Hobbes does indeed acknowledge the Cause, viz. that all have a Right to punish, by acknowledging their Right to War, but does not see the Effect, viz. the Obligation thence arising, or rather discover’d. He acknowledges almost all Virtues to be necessary to Peace and mutual Defence, and that Men do agree, that this State of Peace is good, and that War (in which is included the Right of punishing Offences) has a natural Connexion with the neglect of moral Virtues; and yet he does not see, that Men are obliged, for fear of that War as of a Punishment, to the outward Acts of those same Virtues, whose inward Acts only will not preserve Peace and mutual Defence, which Nature dictates are to be pursued. Compare Chap. 3. § 27. with § 31.66

  Upon a mistaken Notion, of all Mens Right to all Things, which is here examin’d;§XXVII. But because, from this general consideration of all things, I have briefly shewn, “That it is necessary to the common Good, that all Rationals should constantly desire, that the use of Things and the mutual Services of Men, at least for the time in which they may be of advantage to particular Persons, should be divided or look’d upon as their Property”; and also, “That this Dictate of Reason declares Rewards to those who observe it, and Punishments to those who violate it; and that the same is necessarily impress’d upon the Minds of Men, and has therefore God, the Author of all natural Effects, for its Author and Enforcer,” in which the whole Power of a Law is contain’d; it will not be improper to examine likewise briefly Hobbes’s Assertion, concerning the Right of all Men to all Things: for as we think, that the Foundation of universal Justice, and consequently of all Virtue, is establish’d by our Doctrine; so we are of opinion, that the same is entirely overthrown (as far as in him lies) by these his contrary Notions. Hobbes affirms, That “in a natural State” (that is, without the civil Authority) “every one has a Right to all Things”; which he thus explains, that “every one has a Right to do whatsoever, and against whomsoever, he pleases,” or “to have and to do all things,” as he says in the Conclusion of that Article.67 That this monstrous License is necessarily contain’d in the Law of Nature, he in the same place endeavours to prove, from what he had advanc’d in the ninth Article, and in the rest, from the seventh to the end of the Annotation subjoin’d to the tenth; which because I think not worth while to transcribe word for word, the Reader is desir’d attentively to consider, whether I have not justly reduc’d their whole force into this Syllogism. In a State of Nature every one has a Right to, or may lawfully have, all things, and do all things against all, which he himself shall judge necessary to his own Preservation. But every one will judge it necessary to his own preservation, to have all things, and to do all things against all. Therefore every one has a Right to, or may lawfully, do thus.68

  But lest any one, perhaps, should not have Hobbes’s Treatise at hand, and to avoid Suspicion, that I have not fairly stated his Argument, I will transcribe the Abridgment of this Reasoning of Hobbes’s, which he himself has set down in these words, in his Annotation upon c. 1. §. 10. “Every one has a right to preserve himself, by Art. 7. Therefore he has a right to make use of all the means necessary to that End, by Art. 8. But the Means necessary are those, which he shall judge such,” by Art. 9. Therefore he has a Right to do, and to possess all things, which he himself shall judge to be necessary to his own Preservation. “It is therefore by the Judgment of the Doer, that what is done, is either rightfully or wrongfully done; it is therefore rightfully done. Therefore it is true (which I propos’d) that in a State of Nature every one has a right to do all things against all, &c.”69 From that last Consequence, “Every one has a right to do and to possess all things, which he himself shall judge necessary, &c. therefore every one has a right to possess and to do all things against all”; it is manifest, that this Minor Proposition is to be understood: But to possess all things, and to do all things against all, every one will judge necessary to his own Preservation; for otherwise the Conclusion would not follow from the given Major. But both the Premises of that Syllogism are false; and, in the first place, that Minor which is understood, which he seems to presume to be so evident, that he does not so much as mention, much less prove it; unless perhaps he thinks it sufficiently prov’d, from what he had said in the 7th §, That “every one is carry’d to the Desire of that which is good to himself, and that by a natural Necessity, not less than that by which a Stone is carry’d downwards”;70 for I do not see, even tho this be granted, “Why every one should judge every Good to be necessary to himself.” Certainly Hobbes himself elsewhere (c. 1. § 4.) grants concerning some, that they think otherwise, in these words; “For another, according to natural Equality, permits to the rest all those things which he claims to himself, which is the Part of a modest Man, and one who rightly estimates his own Strength.”71 Certainly, if he judges according to right Reason, who permits to others like things with himself, whosoever will arrogate all things to himself, as necessary to his own Preservation, can acquire no right to himself by such his irrational Judgment; for Hobbes himself has defin’d “Right to be a Liberty of using our natural Faculties according to right Reason.”72 Therefore no one will have a Right to disturb that natural Equality, which he had but just before confess’d that right Reason dictates. But if Individuals judg’d according to right Reason, at the same time that they determin’d, “That a plenary Disposition, Use, and Enjoyment, of all Things and Persons, according to their several Wills, tho perfectly contrary to one another, was necessary to the preservation of each particular Person”; it might be concluded, “That the matter were so”; for the matter is always as right Reason pronounces it. But, on the contrary, the Nature, both of all Bodies and of Motion, and common Experience, testify, “That it is impossible that any body” (much less that all) “should at once be subject to so many contrary Motions, as there would be contrary Wills of Men, concerning its Use; and therefore that that is, in the Nature of Things, impossible, which Hobbes supposes each particular Person to judge, according to right Reason, necessary.”

  And which he endeavours to support by a groundless Supposition, That every Man has a Right to what he himself shall judge necessary to the Preservation of his Life,§XXVIII. My Readers now, I suppose, perceive the Reason, why I rank’d that common Observation, that the Powers and Uses of things are limited, amongst the Notions chiefly necessary to the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature: for hence both a fundamental Error of Hobbes is detected, and a most useful Truth is inferr’d, “That both the Uses of Things, and Services of Men, are necessarily to be divided, or to be determin’d to one Person for one time, if we design they should effect any thing at all; and consequently, if we would promote the publick Good”: Hence also, when many have a like Right to Things to be enjoy’d in common, the first Occupant has always the Preference.73

  And so much may suffice concerning the Minor of the foregoing Syllogism, that it contradicts the most general Notions upon which Laws are founded; but the Major of that Syllogism is more diligently defended by Hobbes, and is by us therefore more at large to be confuted. But it cannot be done here so pertinently, because the Nature of this Right cannot be so distinctly understood, unless the Knowledge of the Law of Nature be first suppos’d. Wherefore Hobbes seems to have transgress’d the Rules of Method; who, altho he openly acknowledges, that by the Name of “Right,” he understands a “Liberty left by the Laws”;74 yet supposes it in Men, and sets forth to them its vast extent, before he explains even Natural Laws: and yet it is certain, that, without respect had to them as prior, what Right is cannot be understood; which very thing has given occasion to many of his Errors. But that Hobbes has thus transgress’d, may be understood from his Definition, who has defin’d “Right” to be “A liberty of using the natural Faculties according to right Reason”; which is the very Law of Nature, by him not yet explain’d, c. 1.§7.75 Notwithstanding, because this Syllogism is before us, we will briefly consider how he proves the Major, in order to make the Falshood of it more evidently appear. His Proof of it, reduc’d by me into the Form of a Syllogism, stands thus: Every one has a Right to possess all Things, and to do against all what the Judge shall have judg’d necessary to the Preservation of every one’s Life: But what he himself shall judge necessary, that the Judge judges necessary to his Preservation; for he himself is the Judge of those things which are necessary to his own Preservation, Art. 9. Therefore, &c. The Sense of the major Proposition is contain’d in these words, which are found Art. 10. “But we suppose himself Judge, whether these things conduce to his Preservation or no; so that those things are to be look’d upon as necessary, which he himself judges to be such. And by Art. 7. Those things are, and are esteemed to be, according to the Law of Nature, which necessarily conduce to the defense of a Man’s proper Life and Limbs.”76

  Which ought to be parted with for a greater Good;But I affirm that Major to be false, (I.) Because Life it self is to be parted with for a greater good, such as the Salvation of a Man’s Soul, the Glory of God, and the common Good of Men. These are not to be given up, altho it were necessary to the Preservation of Life. (2.) Because a Judge may in the State of Nature falsly affirm those things to be necessary, which really are not necessary.Nor does his mistaken Judgment of the Means necessary to that End, alter the unalterable Nature of Things. Nor can any Reason be given, “Why in a State of Nature the Sentence of a Judge should have power to confer a Right upon any one, if that Sentence disagrees with the Rule according to which Judgment ought to be given.” But the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Things, whence they are drawn, are the Rule of Judgment in that State; so that it will come to the same thing, which of these two we take for the Standard of Judgment. No State can be imagin’d, in which there is either no Rule of Judgment, or wherein things immediately become such, as the Mind shall rashly determine. The usefulness of things to the preservation of human Life, much more their Necessity to that End, depends upon the natural Powers of things, nor can be chang’d at the Pleasure of Men. If any one, in a State of Nature, should have judg’d Wolfsbane to be a wholesom Herb, or even necessary to the Nourishment of his Body, and should therefore have gorg’d himself with its Juice, it will not therefore become wholesom Nourishment, but will kill him, notwithstanding the Opinion of the Judge to the contrary. Nor is the Efficacy of those things less determin’d, which are good or evil to the whole collective Body of Men, whether they be voluntary human Actions, (concerning which the Laws of Nature, or moral Philosophy pronounces,) or whether they be the natural Powers of Meats and Drugs, (in which Medicine instructs us;) nor are they chang’d by the Opinions of Men, however they may be Judges, from whom no Appeal is permitted. According to the same unalterable Laws of Motion act all those universal Causes, which at once profit or hurt many, as doth any particularCause, Wolfsbane for instance, when it takes away the Life of one only.77

  The Rise of Hobbes’s Error, “That a mistaken Judgment, in a State of Nature, confers a Right,” proceeds from the obligatory Force of even the unjust Sentence of a civil Judge, for Reasons which will not hold in a State of Nature.§XXIX. But this Error of Hobbes, concerning the Force of that Sentence (which falsly pronounces a Dominion over all Things and Persons to be necessary to Self-preservation) to give any Persons such a prodigious Right, has arisen hence, that in civil Society he observ’d, “That the Sentence of the supreme Judge bound the Subjects, however it may have been given contrary to what the Nature of the Case requir’d.” But this (which is supported only by a probable Foundation) has been introduc’d by the Consent of Parties, to put an End to Contentions in civil States. Nor is the Sentence of a Prince of so great efficacy, as to make things in their own Nature impossible, or not necessary to the Preservation of the Life of any Person, become necessary to that end.78 It does indeed transfer Property, which Subjects are oblig’d not to resist; for all Subjects are oblig’d to acknowledge the supreme Judge (whenever there is occasion) as an equal Arbitrator to all, and in Law-suits are understood to have subjected themselves to his Arbitration. This Judge is supposed to be chosen out of the most skilful Lawyers, so as to be able, and to be under the Obligation of an Oath, so as to be willing, to give Sentence according to the known Laws, the Allegations, and the Evidence.

  But all think with themselves, “That this conduces more to the common Happiness, That a few should suffer that Evil, which may follow from an unjust Sentence, (which will sometimes happen, notwithstanding the above-mention’d Precautions,) than that Strifes should never be ended, but by Wars.” So that a greater care of the publick Good, than of the Life of any particular Person, may be suppos’d as the Foundation of this Prerogative granted to the ruling Powers in States.79 But in a Stateof Nature, (which Hobbes supposes and defines to be the Condition of Men out of civil Society,) it is manifest, that these Considerations can have no place: for where every one is a Judge, there no Skill or Probity can be suppos’d, by which the Judge excels others; no Power of citing Witnesses, and of doing those other things which are requisite to come at the exact Knowledge of a Cause; as is the Case of civil Judgments. There is no Agreement of all in the State of Nature to be suppos’d, by which particular Persons should trust both themselves, and such things as are necessary to them, to the publick determination and integrity of supreme Powers. Nor is there at all any Reason, why this great Privilege of the chief Magistrates should be indulg’d to particular Persons in a State of Nature, however ignorant and wicked. On the contrary it is evident, that the State of Nature affords no other final Determination of any doubtful Case, except that Evidence which arises from Things themselves, or from Testimony, by which the Mind of Man is freed from all Scruples, and is fully satisfy’d that it is not deceiv’d; and that there could be no end of a Dispute among several, unless one Part willingly came into the Opinion of the other, being thereunto moved, either by the weight of Reason, or thro’ an Opinion of the other’s Knowledge and Veracity: for this is evident from the Nature of Judgment, (of which we are every one of us conscious within our own Breasts,) that its Doubts cannot be clear’d by any coercive Power, but by Arguments only, and that they are all deduc’d from the Nature of Things, or from the Authority of the Teacher, which the Learner receives as authentick. Nature acknowledges a Distinction between true and false Judgment, right Reason, and that which is corrupted; and Truth and right Reason have this Privilege, that Man has a natural Right to do those things which they command; for the very Definition of Right declares it to be nothing else but a Liberty of using our natural Faculties according to right Reason:80 But Error, or a false Judgment of the Mind, whether it be concerning things necessary to support Life, or other matter of Practice, gives no one a Right of doing that which he falsly thinks necessary to be done, in order to preserve his Life: for the Reason of him who is in an Error, is not right; nor can any one use his Faculties according to right Reason, (which is to act by Right,) whilst he acts according to Error, which contradicts it. It is therefore a gross Error of Hobbes, when he teaches, “That all things are to be look’d on as necessary to any Man’s Preservation in a natural State, which he himself judges necessary; and that therefore every one has a Right to all things, and to do any thing against every Man.” But it was particularly a shame for Hobbes to commit such a Mistake in this Matter, or in this Place:

  First,81 Because it was absurd to ascribe to any Man in a State of Nature, that which is the peculiar Privilege of a civil State, even there where he pretends to treat with the greatest accuracy of the difference of these two States:

  Secondly, Because he boasts to have demonstrated that to be necessary, which is naturally impossible, That the same Body should be mov’d towards parts diametrically opposite, according to the opposite Wills of Men; for that Conclusion will justly cause the truth of the Premisses to be suspected:

  Thirdly, Because every thing that is particular to Hobbes in Politicks falls to the ground, when this Foundation is taken away; for that State of War vanishes, whose necessary Connexion with a State of Nature he hath hence inferr’d, Art. 12. where he hath rashly concluded, “That every one, from his own arbitrary Opinion, has a Right to invade all others; and that likewise every one has a Right of resisting, whence War ariseth.”82 All the rest likewise fall to the ground, which he thinks he has demonstrated from these Principles: but there will be a more convenient Opportunity for refuting these, when I shall have more fully propos’d better, Principles, whence both the Laws of Nature take their Rise, and a Liberty is left within the Bounds prescribed by them.

  By means of which Error, Hobbes proposes Means that are impossible, as necessary to obtain an End, which is too narrow.I will only mention this by the way, “That Hobbes has propos’d too narrow an End on this first Head now under examination, viz. the mere Preservation of Life and Limbs”; for Men may be very miserable, tho these were safe. “The Means by him requir’d are likewise too narrow, viz. only Necessaries, c. 1. § 8.”83 For this World, whose Inhabitants we are born, and which first offers it self to our Consideration, supplies us with things innumerable, which solicit the Mind to the acknowledging and honouring its first Cause; and which, with regard to our selves, are subservient to the Perfections of the Mind, and do not only preserve the Life of the Body, but also contribute sufficiently to its Health, Strength, Activity, Beauty, and Ornament. All these, as well as the Necessaries of Life, do afford both Matter to the Laws of Nature, directing us in their Use, and Room for the exercise of Liberty, according to right Reason. But seeing these are manifest, from so superficial an Observation, that Hobbes could not be ignorant of them, any one may easily conjecture, for what cause he assign’d no larger Bounds to Right and the Laws of Nature, than the Preservation of this frail Life; as if Men, like Swine, had Souls given them only, instead of Salt, to preserve the Body from Putrefaction;84 and in the mean time, to obtain so diminutive an End, has given every one all things as means necessary; so that here he has been as faulty in excess, as there in defect: nor can any one more shamefully transgress the Rules of right Reason, than by neglecting the best End, and by looking on things impossible as means necessary.

  Nor can such a Right of all Men to all things be prov’d, from an original holding all things in common;§XXX. Vain is Mr. Hobbes’s Attempt to maintain or prove this absurd Right of all Men to all Things, from that primitive holding things in common, which some Philosophers suppose, and some Histories have affirm’d:85 For besides that Mr. Selden hath taught, and prov’d from the divine Donation, Gen. i. 28. “That private Dominion was a most acknowledg’d Right from the days of Adam,” as you may see in his MareClausum, l. 8. c. 4.86 it is certain, that both Philosophers and Historians thought, “That the use of such an universal Right had so much in it of the nature of Property, that what any one had seiz’d for himself, it were an Injury in another to force from him.” This may be explain’d by an Example us’d by Cicero. Altho the Theatre be common, it may justly be said, that the Place which any one has taken possession of, is his.87

  Nor from the Power of Individuals.But no Mortal, before Hobbes, ventur’d to assert such a Right of every one to all things; which, if you will believe him, contains in it self a Right of reigning over all, coeval with their very Nature;88 that is, from their Infancy; altho, according to the same Person, it be founded in Power: Which destroys all Property in another, so that it is impossible to invade that which is another’s, and lawful to claim every thing to himself:89Which makes it lawful to lie with every Woman, to break the Faith pledg’d to another: Which makes it lawful to wage War against all, and therefore to kill any Person, even the most innocent: Which leaves every Determination of disputed Cases, to every Man’s proper arbitrary Judgment, and Children at liberty to honour their Parents or not.90 He in the mean time forgot, that he had said elsewhere, “That it cannot be understood, that a Son can exist in the State of Nature”;91 and that, therefore, neither has the Right proper to this State any place in Sons. Of a-piece with this, is what he has added in the end of c. 14. § 9. That “there is no occasion to give Testimony, whether true or false, in a State of Nature, because there are there no publick Courts”;92 as if a private Judge had no occasion for Testimony, in order to give his Award, where he hath been chosen Umpire between Persons at Variance; or, as if a false Testimony in such a Case were not criminal, (as contrary to the common Good,) altho there were yet no Civil Laws; such as he there contends the Precepts of the second Table of the Decalogue to be. Here may be added that of Hobbes, which he sometimes expresly acknowledges, That “all Violation of the Laws of Nature consists in the false Reasoning, or in the Folly of Men who do not see,” (and why not as well, of Men who do not observe?) “their Duties toward other Men, necessary to their own Preservation.”93 And he acknowledges that the Laws of Nature, in the State of Nature, do oblige in the inward Court, or that of Conscience;94 therefore they at least oblige to pass a true Judgment, that all Things, and a Dominion over all Persons, are not necessarily requir’d to the Preservation of every one. But if every one is under an Obligation so to judge, vain will be the Judgment of him whose Sentiments are contrary; nor can that prodigious Right over all things accrue to him from so gross an Error. To be brief, there can be no Right of acting contrary to the Law of Nature, or the Dictates of right Reason, because Right is defin’d to be a Liberty of acting according thereto. But right Reason, as I have shewn, points out the necessity of coming to a division of Things; and, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, forbids the retaining a Right to all Things, c. 2.§3.95

  Another Error of Hobbes, by which he endeavours to support a Right of every Man to every thing in a State of Nature, is, “That Right and Wrong depend upon human Laws.”§XXXI. Let us therefore proceed to examine, what other Arguments Hobbes has brought to establish this his wild Doctrine: He suggests, “That what any one does in a State merely natural, cannot be injurious to any Man; because Injustice toward Men supposes human Laws, such as in that State are not.”96 Yet he grants that even then, Men may sin against God and the Laws of Nature; but he in vain and without proof assumes what is most false, “That an Injury against Man supposes human Laws.” For from the Dictates of right Reason, altho they be the natural Laws of God only, accrues to Man a Right to those things, which Reason has dictated to be granted to him by God: As for example, “The innocent Person has a Right to his Life, to preserve his Limbs entire, and to necessary Sustenance, without which it is well known, that he cannot be subservient to the common Good.” Therefore an Injury is done him, if any one, upon Hobbes’s Principles, shall maim or kill him, in pursuit of his Claim of all things: for every Opposition to, or Violation of, another’s Right, is an Injury, by what Law soever that Right accrued to the other; but much more, if that Right was yielded him by the divine Laws, than if by any human Law or Compact. Hobbes indeed supposes, “That no one can injure another, but after he has transferr’d by compact his own Right of doing what he pleases.” But this supposes that it has been prov’d, “That a Right of doing what he pleases belongs to every one”; which I have prov’d to be impossible. Therefore in vain he seeks a Support to his tottering Foundation, from this Consequence, which wholly depends upon the Supposition (which I have overthrown) of every Man’s Right to all Things. Even Hobbes himself, altho he asserts here, and more openly c. 3.§4. “That no Injury can be done to any one, with whom we have not enter’d into compact”;97 yet elsewhere more justly, and as the Truth it self requires, he has most expresly taught, “That it is injuriously done, whatsoever is done contrary to right Reason.”98 Seeing all grant, “That to be rightfully done, which is not done against right Reason”; we ought to think, “That injuriously done, which is contrary to right Reason”; and so he there acknowledges, That to be a Law. You observe he does not here require a transferring our Right to another, before an Injury can be done. Now seeing he acknowledges these Dictates of Reason to be divine Laws,99 I desire that he will shew, “What hinders, but that these may confer upon every one such a Right to Life, as without Injury cannot be taken away, or how any one can have a Right to oppose and violate another’s Right”: For every Man’s Right is a Liberty granted by right Reason, which can never allow, that Men speaking or acting by its Prescription, can contradict or oppose one another. It will be in vain for him to say, that the Injury is done to God only, seeing only his Laws are violated; unless he shew, that these Laws of God cannot confer on Men a Right to their Life and its Necessaries, nor prohibit others to violate the Right so granted.

  This however I here thought fit to add by the by, “That if an Injury consists only in the Violation of Compacts transferring Right, then no Injury could possibly be done to God, according to Hobbes’s Principles, altho his natural Laws, both concerning the Cultivation of Peace amongst Men, and concerning the Worship which ought to be paid himself, should be violated by Crimes of the deepest Dye, and even by Blasphemy it self”: for Man is suppos’d, “Not to have enter’d into a Compact with God, to yield Obedience to his Laws”;100 nay, he openly declares, c. 2. § 12, 13. “That a Compact cannot be enter’d into with God, except as he has thought fit, by the sacred Scriptures, to substitute in his Place certain Men, with an Authority to consider and accept of such Compacts.”101 God therefore and Men are in such a State, according to Hobbes, that without Injury Men may be Enemies to God, and have a Right (as the Giants are fabled to have done)102 to make war upon him, and to hate him. God indeed will have a Right (according to Hobbes’s Principles) to kill such, which he might with equal Justice have done, tho they had not sinn’d. But they, who so reject all Reverence towards God, as not to submit to his Precepts, nor fear his Threats, are not look’d upon as his Subjects, but his Enemies, or as living without the Limits of the Kingdom of God, whom he may at pleasure invade, as he hints,c. 15. § 2.103 But, in my Opinion, even Atheists and Epicureans, who deny a Providence, are oblig’d by the Law of Nature, (which is sufficiently promulg’d, altho by them neglected and deny’d,) to obey God; and they are Subjects by Birth, not Compact, and may therefore be punish’d by God for their Crimes as rebellious Subjects, and not invaded only, as Persons born without his Jurisdiction. But this by the by.

  Nor does War, as Hobbes supposes, necessarily arise from the Passions.§XXXII. Let us now consider, if you please, what the same Author has advanc’d in his Leviathan, towards the establishing this Right of every one to all Things; for he there endeavours to infer it from different Principles. However, I cannot but observe, that Hobbes is no less inconsistent with himself, than with all others in this Point, which is the Foundation both of his Morality and Politicks. For, in his Treatise de Cive, he deduces the War of every Man against every Man, from this Right of every Man to every Thing, as from a Cause, which made it both lawful and necessary.104 Whereas, in his Leviathan, he first affirms the State of Nature to be a State of War; and thence infers a Licence to do every thing in that State, as will appear from considering the Thirteenth Chapter, and comparing the former part thereof with this in the Close. “To this War” (saith he) “of every Man against every Man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust; the Notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force and Fraud are in War the two cardinal Virtues, &c.”105There he affirm’d, that the Invasion of the one Party, and the Resistance of the other, were both just, whence a War must needs arise just on both sides. But here he refers the Original of this War to the Nature of the human Passions, little sollicitous about the Right of commencing it; and, War once suppos’d, he affirms (without proof) that it will follow, That there is nothing unjust, That there is no Property, &c. This Reasoning in the Leviathan is more popular, but less conclusive; for it is acknowledg’d by all judicious Writers, that a War must first be prov’d just, before it can justify any Proceedings against the Enemy; nor are all things lawful, even in the justest War. The Law of Nature must therefore first be acknowledg’d; whence we may determine, whether the War to be undertaken be just, or at least permitted by right Reason, before we can infer the lawfulness of those things, which are necessary in the carrying on such War. And this is so evident, that even Hobbes himself, tho in the latter part of this Chapter he contends, that, in a State of Nature, there is no Distinction between Just and Unjust; yet in the former Part of it he endeavours to prove, “That this Power of waging War ought to be allow’d to every Man in that State, as necessary to Self-defense”;106 which is equivalent to saying, “That such a War is just or lawful.” Wherefore he is inconsistent with himself, even in the same Chapter; for whatever Argument proves, that any thing is Just and Lawful in a State of Nature, proves that there is a Distinction between Lawful and Unlawful in that State, and supposes the Obligation of some Law, by whose Permission, at least, that War may be licens’d: which is the chief Point I would establish, and which Hobbes (as we have seen) expresly denies, when he affirms nothing to be Just, or Unjust.

  Let us examine by what Arguments he would prove a War of all against all to be necessary or lawful. In his Leviathan, he has not that close and compact way of Reasoning, which he aims at in his Treatise de Cive. However, he refers the Original of War to three principal Causes, Competition, Defense, and Glory.107 And he affirms, that it must necessarily take its Rise from these Passions. War from Competition arises from the Hope of Gain: A defensive War, in which we prevent others by Force or Fraud, proceeds from Fear, lest others should usurp a Dominion over us; and we wage War to acquire Fame, from a Desire of Glory.

  But I care not to transcribe all his unconclusive Reasonings, in order, from these Affections, to persuade the necessity of a State of universal War; he that pleases may turn to them in the Author himself. I think it sufficient to give this general Answer: “That Men are not necessarily led or compell’d by these Passions, but that both these, and all other Passions may be temper’d and guided by Reason and Counsel; so that it is false, that they hurry Men by a natural and irresistible Force to such a War; and the Reasoning is weak, which thence concludes it lawful.” Inhuman Passions, what is produc’d in Man by a Necessity arising from the Impulse of external Objects, cannot be forbid by any Law of Nature, because Laws direct only such Actions as are in our power. But those Passions, whence Hobbes would infer the Necessity, and consequently the Lawfulness, of War, are of such a kind, (because they look into Futurity, and that often at a great distance,) as depend upon the Reason and Counsel of Men, and consequently may by these be govern’d. Even Hobbes himself elsewhere openly owns, That “those who cannot agree concerning the present” (because of their contrary Appetites) “may yet agree concerning the future, which is the Work of Reason; for Things present are perceiv’d by the Senses, Things future by Reason only.”108 And hence he acknowledges the Agreement of Mankind in this, (which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature,) that Peace is to be sought after. He is therefore inconsistent with himself, when in the Leviathan he sets them at War from those Affections, which depend upon Reason taking a prospect of Futurity, thro’ the whole Course of Life.

  What is more, in the Close of this very Thirteenth Chapter, he acknowledges Men to have those Passions which have a peaceable Tendency, which are, Fear, especially of a violent Death, the Desire of the Necessaries and Comforts of Life, and the Hope of obtaining them by Industry. These Passions, if narrowly examin’d, are certainly the same with those, of which he had but just before affirm’d that they compell’d Men to War. This is the same Fear with that before-mention’d, lest others should lord it over us at pleasure, and should, in consequence, rob us of Life, whenever they so thought fit; by which Fear he had before affirm’d them to be prompted, to secure themselves by preventing and invading others. The like may be said of the Desire of Glory, which may be reckon’d among the Necessaries of Life, and also of the Hope of Gain. And thus Peace and War, according to Hobbes, are Effects of the same Causes. Certainly, if any thing in these Affections be absolutely necessary, it ought carefully to be examin’d on both sides, in order to find out, whether they more powerfully incline human Nature to Peace or War; which Hobbes has no where in his Writings done. Yet it is no less absurd to affirm any thing concerning the State of Man, and his natural Inclination to future Actions, from the sole Consideration of those things which incline him to War, without examining those things which persuade him rather to Peace, than it would be to affirm, which way a Balance would incline, from the knowledge of the Weight thrown into one Scale only. But when I have compar’d, as diligently as I can, the Causes of these Effects, and the Forces of the Powers on each side, both as they are natural Motions arising from the Impulse of external Objects, and (in some measure) depending upon the Constitution and Frame of a human Body; and also, which is of much greater Consequence, as they are excited and govern’d by Reason, taking a prospect of Man’s whole future Existence: They seem more powerfully to persuade universal Benevolence, and that Peace, which may reasonably be expected from the Exercise thereof, than that War of all against all; in which, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, is “continual Danger of violent Death, and a Life solitary, poor, brutish, and short”;109 in which therefore no Safety can with Reason be expected.

  Hobbes’s Objection, That perfect Security of all possible Happiness is not, by the practice of Benevolence, to be obtain’d, Answer’d, by proving it the most effectual means of Happiness in our power, and therefore to be chosen.§XXXIII. The only Appearance of Difficulty in this Question, is, “That a perfect Security of procuring to our selves all kinds of Happiness is not to be obtain’d, tho we should promote the common Good and Peace, by the Exercise of universal Benevolence; and that, because of the unbridled Passions of some others, who, thro’ Folly and Rashness, will not propose to themselves the same End.” But this will appear no Difficulty, if we consider, “That we can do nothing with respect to Men, which will more effectually secure our Happiness”; or, (which comes to the same thing,) “That it is evidently impossible to obtain that perfect Security from all Misfortunes, proceeding from the unbounded Desires of Men; and that it is therefore necessary that we should be content to do that, among all those things which are in our power, which will be most effectual to the procuring this End.” That is, that, by constantly promoting the Happiness of all, we should first bring them over to some degree of Friendship, and then to civil or religious Society, as effectually as we can; and that afterwards, by the same Benevolence, we should continue them in that State. Whatever is short of, or contrary to, this Endeavour, is so far short of, or contrary to, our utmost Endeavours to promote our own and the common Happiness of all, by those means which, by the Light of Nature, we know to be the most effectual. By this Method we sollicit to our Aid and Defence all rational Beings, whose joint Happiness is that common Good we are in pursuit of, who will therefore concur with us in the same Views, except they be blinded by some Passion, and have so far divested themselves of their Reason. If, thro’ any Inconstancy of Mind, we neglect this End, or hurt any one innocent Person, it is evident, that all are, in some measure, neglected and provok’d; for every one will have just reason to fear the same Evil at our hands, which we have done to the Innocent.110 And this Hobbes himself was aware of, in his Explanation of Compassion upon his own Principles, in his Treatise of Human Nature.111 In short, the Force of these Passions, Hope, Fear, &c. which may incline Men either to Peace or War, is to be estimated from the Force of those Causes, which excite those Passions in Men; for, since these Causes are Things good or evil, which our Reason judges possible or certain, in consequence of the Actions of other rational Agents, we can no otherwise know the Force of those Causes, than by considering the Nature of those Agents. Wherefore the present Question, when we are in search after a Rule of Action pointed out by Nature, is brought to this short Issue, whether, (without any regard to Civil Government,) it be manifest to Men, from such Knowledge of the Nature of God and other Men as is easily attainable, that they shall better consult the Happiness and Security of all, and of themselves in particular, by universal Benevolence, (which includes Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and all the other Virtues,) than by Hobbes’s “Anticipation” (explain’d by him in this Chapter) as “The most reasonable way for any Man to secure himself in this Diffidence of one another; that is, by Force or Wiles to master the Persons of all Men he can, so long, till he see no other Power great enough to endanger him?”112 I affirm it to be evident, that whoever best consults both his own Happiness, and that of others, will compose and settle all those Passions, which may stir up needless Quarrels and Disturbances, such as vain Hopes, Fears, &c. Nor is it less evident, that rational Agents are the principal Causes of such Happiness. Wherefore he takes the best Measures to obtain this End, who most effectually reconciles these Causes to himself, which he does, who accommodates himself to their most prevailing and natural Principles of Action, viz. the Power and the Will of acting according to Reason, by pursuing that Happiness only, which is connected with, and subservient to, the Happiness of All. Hence all may conspire and co-operate with us to the same end, securely, and without prejudice to their rational Desire of obtaining their own Happiness.

  No one can rationally desire or expect, from external Causes, greater degrees of Happiness, than what may proceed from the nature of other rational Causes, (between whom and him the dependence is mutual,) and which is therefore consistent with that Happiness of them all, which they all naturally desire. But it is manifest, that this common Good of all is greater than the Good of any one, or of a few, as the Whole is greater than a Part; and that the like Sentiments in all other rational Beings, are the necessary result of the nature of Things.

  Upon these Principles, those rational Beings, who have so far cultivated their own Understanding, as to know certainly that this common Good is the greatest, and that the adequate Causes thereof will effect the greatest Happiness of each Individual which is possible in Nature, will most assuredly pursue the same End with us, and will therefore be ready to assist us. Nor are these Principles of living happily so difficult to know, but that we may reasonably presume them, both understood and approv’d of, by almost all other rational Beings; or, at least; that they may be all instructed to believe these Principles, except it appear evidently, that they have entirely given themselves up to the Conduct of unreasonable Passions. These Propositions seem to me to have the greatest Evidence, little different from that of mathematical Axioms. “The good of the Whole, is greater than the good of a Part. The Causes, which most effectually preserve and perfect a Whole, or Aggregate, whose Parts mutually require one another’s Assistance, do in like manner preserve and perfect the Parts thereof.” The Aid of those, who do not acknowledge such first Principles of acting rationally, is either not to be sought after; or, if necessary, it is to be procur’d by the Assistance of those who do acknowledge them. On the contrary, Hobbes’s Anticipation endeavours to compel all others to things evidently impossible to be done, which they would therefore be as unwilling to undertake, as unable to execute; for, upon that Principle, every particular Person would endeavour to force all, to obey him only as his sovereign Lord. But since such Dominion of every particular Person is in direct opposition to the like Dominion of all others, it is no less impossible, that several such Dominions should at once take place, than that the Motion of the same Body should at once have a thousand contrary Directions. It is equally absurd to suppose, that Men should attempt such Impossibilities, after they clearly understand them to be such, as it is that they should effect them. These Observations, drawn from the nature of rational Beings, and from the practical Principles of a right Judgment, (which all rational Beings, as such, are endow’d with,) prove, that universal Benevolence is a more effectual means of Happiness, than Hobbes’s Method of Anticipation. I shall offer more that may be reduc’d to this Head, where I designedly treat of Human Nature.

  Likewise, universal Experience confirms Men’s general Tendency, rather to Acts of Benevolence, than Malevolence.§XXXIV. I shall confirm what I have said, by the addition of only two Observations, confirm’d by the concurring Experience of all Ages.

  First, Bordering States enjoy a greater Security and sweeter Fruits of Peace, by means of Alliances, which subsist only by Fidelity and some degree of mutual Benevolence, than when they are at open War, and practising upon one another by Force or Fraud.

  Secondly, Even in civil Society there are numberless Cases, in which the Authority and coercive Power of the State cannot exert themselves, in which, however, we frequently observe, that Men mutually obey the Laws of Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and all the other Virtues, and much less frequently presume upon a liberty of hurting others, than is usual in a State of War. No one has greater Security, that his Life or Possessions shall not be wrested from him by the Perjury and false Testimonies of his Fellow-Subjects, than what arises from the Fidelity of Men, the Violation whereof the civil Magistrate can rarely detect or punish. But it is needless to add more in answer to what Hobbes has advanc’d, of the necessity or lawfulness of warring against all, from the nature of the Passions.

  In pursuit of the same Point he advances a new Argument in these words: “The Desires and other Passions of Men are in themselves no Sin: No more are the Actions that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which, till Laws be made, they cannot know; nor can any Law be made till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.”113 I answer, that Actions forbid by right Reason, (which is the natural Law of God,) are Sins; tho Men do not see this Legislator, nor make him their Governor; provided it sufficiently appear to them, that he has a Right of Dominion over all, and that he has enacted those Laws. Both which Hobbes elsewhere often acknowledges. Altho here he affirms, that Men are not bound by Laws, to which they themselves have not given their consent. Certainly, since Sin is the Transgression of a Law, if it be prov’d that there are Laws of Nature, the Transgression of them will be truly a Sin, tho none had consented to the Authority of God enacting them. But because I have before prov’d this in a summary way, and shall do it more at large hereafter, there is no occasion to insist upon it here.

  Which Hobbes offers to disprove; by pointing out what the Dictates of Reason are, from the practice of Animals void of Reason;However, I will not dismiss this Article of his Thirteenth Chapter, before I have advertis’d the Reader, by how strenuous an Argument Hobbes has confirm’d this his Position, of the Right of War of all against allout of the Bounds of civil Society; which, in the last Edition, he has added to the rest, near the Close, in these words. “But why am I at the pains to demonstrate to Men of Learning, what even Dogs themselves are not ignorant of, who bark at those who approach them, by Day at Strangers only, but by Night at all?”114 Notably argu’d! The Rights of Nature (that is, the Power granted by right Reason) are to be learn’d from the Example of Dogs void of Reason; they bark at all that approach them in the dark; therefore it is lawful for Men, in a State of Nature, to murder all, even their familiar Friends, whom they meet with by Day. Let Hobbists rather learn to warn others, by their harmless barking, to be upon their guard; but let them not, as he has instructed them, attack the unguarded by Force or Wiles: Let them learn to watch before their own Doors; but let them not invade the Rights of others. But it is time to dismiss such Levities.

  And by falsly asserting, “That Justice cannot be the Quality of a man existing alone in the worldWhat he afterwards adds to the same purpose, has more of Subtilty in it. “Justice and Injustice are none of the Faculties either of the Body or Mind: If they were, they might be in a Man that were alone in the World, as well as his Senses and Passions: They are Qualities that relate to Men in Society, not in Solitude.”115 But what he would insinuate is false, if it be understood of a Society form’d by human Compact. I own indeed, that external Acts of Justice for the most part respect others, (tho it is possible for a Man to be injurious to himself;) but the Propension or Will, to give every one his own, (in which the Nature of Justice consists,) both may and ought to be in a Man in Solitude. Were there but one Man in the World, he might be dispos’d to allow others, whenever they should be created, equal Rights to those he claim’d to himself. Nor is there any reason, why such an Inclination should not be call’d natural, tho it could not produce external Acts, in a Man existing Single. As Hobbes himself (I believe) will not deny Man’s Propension to propagate his Species to be natural, as he is an Animal, tho he were suppos’d alone, as Adam was before the Creation of Eve.

  Lastly, Hobbes, in order to support his Hypotheses, gives absurd Definitions of Right, and of Right Reason.§XXXV. Lastly, because Hobbes’s whole Hypothesis is built upon this one Principle; and (as I believe) he perceiv’d, that this Right of every Man’s warring against all, and of arrogating every thing to himself, was not very consistent with the true Definition of Right, which he himself had given in the Passage above quoted, therefore in the beginning of his Fourteenth Chapter of the Leviathan, he has given a different Definition of natural Right, thus: “The Right of Nature is the Liberty each Man hath to use his own Power as he will himself, for the Preservation of his own Nature.”116Now truly, by the Name of Right, is to be understood, not the Liberty of acting according to right Reason, or any Law of Nature; but of acting any thing, as he will himself.

  But lest Hobbes should seem too inconsistent, in order to reconcile him to himself, I will discover the truth of this Affair, which is, that by the Name of “right Reason,” he before understood, in his Treatise de Cive, “every Man’s own Opinion,” (as appears from his Note on c. 2. § 1.)117 not excepting what is most absurd, and contradictory to the Judgment of the same Person at another time, as well as to that of all others; and in this Sense, indeed, right Reason is consistent with every Man’s own Will: But neither right Reason, nor Right, are thus pliable to every Man’s pleasure. These are as inflexible as the Beam of the Balance is suppos’d to be; for right Reason consists in a rigid conformity with Things themselves, whose Natures are invariable, as I shall hereafter prove at large; and Right extends it self no farther than right Reason permits, or pronounces to be consistent with that End, which it proposes to all rational Agents. It is in vain, and without example, to affirm that any one has a Right to do those things, which are neither allow’d nor permitted by any Law. There is no doubt, but that Man has a natural Power, or Will, which he himself may determine to act which way he pleases. But when we are enquiring into the Right of Acting, the Question is, “Which, among those Actions which are in our power, are lawful?” Any Answer to this Question, without respect had to some Law, at least that of Nature, is absurd. Any one can either hang, or throw down a Precipice, either himself, or any other innocent Person; yet no one will affirm, that any one has a Right to do these things, because Right and right Reason which directs it, respect a good or true End, namely, that Happiness which is attainable consistently with the Rights of others, and the Means subservient to that End. But the Will of Man may rashly depart from both these. All others, if at any time they call Liberty by the name of Natural Right, understand a Liberty allow’d and guarded by the Laws of Nature. But if Hobbes pretends that he has a Licence to call such a Liberty of acting any thing at pleasure for Self-preservation, by the name of Right, (tho no one beside himself ever used that Word in this Sense,) because Philosophers are at liberty to limit the Significations of Words according to their own Definitions; this will be a sufficient Answer: Allowing his confining that Word to that Sense, in which he alone uses it, (for others are not oblig’d to make use of that Word in the same Sense;) it is incumbent upon him to prove, “That such a liberty of acting whatever he thinks fit for his own Preservation, does, or ever did, exist in that State”; or, “That there is nothing to forbid, and, consequently, to hinder Men so to act, laying aside the Consideration of Civil Laws.” I affirm, “That, even in that State, there are certain Dictates of right Reason, which God suggests, by the Nature of Things, to the Minds of Men, which denounce most grievous Punishments attending them, who attempt any thing, tho for their own Preservation, contrary to the common Good.” Nor is this a bare Assertion, I prove it undeniably.

  Hobbes no otherwise proves, that such a Liberty, as what he calls Right, is granted us, than by affirming, that we cannot will to act otherwise;118 which is contrary to every Man’s manifest Experience. For my own part, I profess, that I can will to act otherwise, and believe, that great Numbers have willingly laid down their Lives for the common Good. So weak is this Foundation, which supports all the rest of his Morality and Politicks; so that all those Arguments, which I offer, in order to establish the Law of Nature, as it respects the Good of others, will prove that, even before the erecting Civil Government, it was not lawful for any one to preserve himself by the Violation of that Law: And they render ineffectual and ridiculous that unbounded Right asserted by Hobbes, which it will never be lawful to use, except when a Man’s Will is conformable to the Law, and consequently limited.

  But to what purpose take I so much pains to prove this Right of acting arbitrarily against all, vain? since even Hobbes, tho in contradiction to himself, acknowledges almost as much; for he allows (c. 1. § 11.) “That this Right is unprofitable.”119 He himself, who had concluded the immediate foregoing Article with affirming, “That Profit is the Measure of Right,”120 does yet here immediately affirm, “That this Right,” which he had taken so much pains to establish, “is unprofitable.” Nay the very words, Right (as he himself has defin’d it) and unprofitable, (which he has join’d to Right in the Margin of that Article,) are inconsistent; for in both places he defines “Right” by “An Use of Liberty”: but he affirms, upon the same Subject, that no Use of Liberty consists in what is “unprofitable.” But right Reason does not use to tack together such contradictory Notions, nor is so regardless of Futurity, as to affirm that War to be necessary to every one’s Preservation, which it will immediately perceive to be destructive to all: Therefore Hobbes’s Reason, by which he endeavours to establish these Opinions, is not right.

  Remark on Chapter I

  I think our Author is abundantly too general in this Chapter of the Nature of Things; and that he should either here, or in his Chapter concerning Human Nature, or in that concerning Good, have shewn more particularly, “How the most of our Enjoyments are general or extensive in their Use,” and, “That publick and private Happiness are so interwoven, that the very Actions which promote the private Interest of any particular Person, do in all, at least in all common Cases, necessarily tend to the Advantage of the Publick: That our Possessions of all Kinds, our Lands, our Houses, our Money, are all enjoy’d by many”: And, “That it is not possible to confine them to the Use of one.” The very Clothes we wear are, in some measure, common in their Use: Nay, the very Food we eat is not confin’d to one, but returns to its Parent Earth, and there contributes to the growth of those Vegetables, which may, perhaps, serve for the Nourishment of the Inhabitants of the most distant Countries. Nay, the very individual Particles of Air we breathe, are not our Property, but perform the same kindly Office to Thousands. Our bodily Labour too is always general in its Use: We can’t so much as plant a Tree, or manure a Field, but Thousands reap the Fruit of our Labours; and tho our Labour be most extensive in its Use, yet we are utterly unable, without Assistance, to provide for our selves the most simple Necessaries of Life. The most ingenious Mechanick would not, perhaps, be able of his own proper Labour, to furnish himself out so much as a commodious Garment. Who, that but reflects upon the Number of Hands that one single Garment must pass thro’, before it becomes fit for Use, and upon the Number of curious Arts that contribute to its Perfection, (a competent Knowledge in none of which can be attained without the Industry of some Years:) Who, I say, that yields but the least Attention to these things, can doubt of our Dependence, nay, of the Necessity of our Dependence, on one another?

  These things, which I but hint at, are, I think, worthy of the most serious Contemplation; and were they but fully laid open to our View, we should have a clearer insight into the Beauties of the moral World, and be at once fill’d with Love and Admiration of its Author.

  The Force of the Reasoning, that is built upon the Observations that are above hinted at, may be thus express’d. It appears, from those Observations, “That the publick Good is, in the greater Number of Cases, most plainly connected with private Advantage. Therefore we have reason to believe, from the Uniformity of Nature, that there is the like Connexion in those other Cases, wherein, from our Short-sightedness into the Consequences of Action, we can’t perceive it with so great Evidence.”

  CHAPTER II

  Of Human Nature, and Right Reason.

  Man defin’d, By the Word [Man], I understand an Animal endow’d with a Mind; and Hobbes himself, in his Treatise of Human Nature, acknowledges the Mind to be one of the principal Parts of Man.1 Natural Philosophers, both antient and modern, Des-Cartes, Digby, More, but especially Seth Ward, in opposition to Hobbes himself, have sufficiently proved the distinctness of the Mind from the Body, under which all the Animal Faculties are compriz’d;2 so that I should but light a Candle to the Sun at Noonday, in offering to add to their Arguments. However, I cannot but take notice, that Hobbes has unluckily stumbled at the Threshold of his Treatise de Cive, in reducing the Faculties of human Nature to four Kinds, bodily Force, Experience, Reason, and the Passions:3 For beside, that the first of these, bodily Force, contains all the rest, in his Opinion, who acknowledges no other Force, but that of Body; it is contrary to all Use of Words, to call Experience a Faculty of our Nature; whereas it is properly to be reckon’d among those things, which are accidental to our Senses, both internal and external, of which Memory is sometimes the Effect, tho it is not it self Memory, as it is by him defin’d, in his Treatise of Human Nature, Page 36.4 Nay further, it is well known, that things we have experienc’d, do sometimes slip out of our Memory: But, if by the word Experience, he understands a Habit acquir’d by Experiments, it is a mistake to reckon it among the Faculties; except he would reckon Geometry, a Knowledge of the Law; and other Sciences, both Theoretical and Practical, amongst our Faculties, because they are Habits. But this is not a Matter of sufficient importance to dwell longer upon: Let us rather a while consider the foregoing Definition of Man.

  As Animal.By the word [Animal] I understand, what the Philosophers agree is to be found in Brutes, the Powers of receiving Increase by Nourishment, of beginning Motion, and of propagating their Species; and I also willingly so far allow them a sensitive Power, as we may bestow the Name of Sensation5 (in which I see no Absurdity) on the Motions impress’d on the Organs by the Objects, and thence transmitted, by the Nerves appropriated to the Senses, into the Brain, and sometimes thence communicated to the Muscles, where they excite Motion, or to the Heart or Lungs, and perhaps to other Intestines, by means whereof various Affections are excited. However, I suppose the Power of observing or distinctly perceiving these Motions to be peculiar to the Mind, so as freely to contemplate what in them, for example, determines the Figure of the Object, what, a Situation in the Object, different from that which is in the Retina; what, its Magnitude, what, its Motion; what in the Surface thereof, or what Refraction in the Medium, does so diversify the Motions of Light, as to exhibit all the various Phaenomena of Colours: for I do not see, what in the corporeal substance of the Brain can separate from one another all these (crowding at once into the Eyes, by means of the same percussion of the Rays of Light;) compare them with one another, and distinguish them; or what should hinder them from appearing always confused, as they are perceiv’d in the Camera Obscura,6 or in the bottom of the Eye of an Animal, whence they naturally rush at once into the Thalami of the Optick Nerves, which penetrate the inward substance of the Brain. But these are Matters of physical Consideration.

  To the Mind we ascribe Understanding and Will; to the Understanding we reduce Apprehending, Comparing, Judging, Reasoning, a methodical Disposition, and the Memory of all these things, and of the Objects about which they are conversant: To the Will we ascribe, both the simple Acts of chusing and refusing, and that Vehemence of those Actions which discovers it self in the Passions, over and above that emotion or disturbance of the Body, which is visible in them.

  Endow’d with Mind.In the Memory of Propositions, Theoretical and Practical, consist Habits, as well Theoretical, which are distinguish’d by the Name of Sciences, as Practical, which are called Arts. Here Ethicks, which is the Art of Living, or of directing the whole of all human Actions to the best End, comes under Consideration.

  (Whence variety of Manners proceeds. See ch. 5. § 9.)§II. Here it may be proper to take some notice of the various Manners of particular Nations; nay, and of most Men too: for various Habits are acquir’d, partly from diversity of Disposition or natural Genius, more prone to Habits of some sorts than others; partly from the Temper of the Body, Climate, Soil, Education, Religion, Fortune, and kind of Business about which Men are employ’d. From Manners, thus procur’d, arises to Men as it were a second Nature; they are therefore to be consider’d in the framing Laws, and that so far, that very antient Laws, tho not in all respects, if consider’d in themselves, the best, ought nevertheless to be retained, were it but upon this account, that Men long accustom’d to them would not readily suffer better to be substituted in their stead, without publick Commotions, and, consequently, greatly endangering the Rights of all.

  Man (notwithstanding Hobbes’s Assertion to the contrary) is rational, and fitted for Society, by Nature.I thought it also proper to observe here by the way, that I, (as all other Philosophers do,) in the following enquiry into the Laws necessarily connected and agreeing with human Nature, always understand or suppose human Nature as it is in adult Persons, who have a sound Mind in a sound Body; so far, at least, as is necessary to the exercise of Reason and Virtue: for Laws are not framed for Infants, Ideots, or mad Men; nor of such do we form Societies; nor therefore ought we, from their irregular Appetites and Actions, to form a Judgment of the Rights and Inclinations of human Nature. Tho, I think, what ever we perceive in them (after Maturity) agreeable, whether to the animal or rational Nature, that we may look upon as a Proof, that such Actions are very natural to Men; so in them we may perceive, both an expectation of Compassion from Men, and a Sympathy to be accounted for upon Principles which I shall afterwards explain, by which they rejoice with those that rejoice, and weep with those that weep. In vain therefore does Hobbes, (explaining the Reason why, in opposition to the Opinion of most Philosophers, he affirm’d Man not to be Ζωον πολιτικὸν,7 which he translates, “An Animal form’d by Nature for Society,”) bring this Proof for his Opinion, that since “civil Societies are Leagues, whose Obligation Infants and the unlearned are ignorant of; and whose Usefulness is not understood by those” (whom he afterwards affirms to be “very many, perhaps the Majority, thro’ distemper of Mind, or want of Discipline) who have not experienc’d the Damage arising from want of Society: Whence it comes, that those cannot, and these care not to enter into Society; yet these, both Infants and Adult Persons, partake of human Nature, therefore Man is not made apt for Societyby Nature, but by Discipline.”8 This is the Substance of Hobbes’s Annotation, these the words, tho somewhat contracted for brevity’s sake. I at present pass by his false Supposition, “That Societies are Leagues”; and that he sets Discipline, which entirely accommodates it self, and is subservient, to Nature, in opposition to Nature; for whatever we learn from others; they draw from their own Nature and that of the Universe. I here also affirm, “That Experience it self (for want whereof he accuses the Generality as unfit for Society) is resolv’d into Nature, which, without doubt, teaches whatsoever Experience testifies to be true.” Altho many acquire most of their Knowledge by words of arbitrary Appointment, yet the Ideas or Sense affix’d to these words, and Connexion of these Ideas, in which all Truth consists, are from Nature; whence they are the same every where, tho Languages differ. Hobbes, it seems, forgets here, where he sets Experience in opposition to human Nature, that he had before made it one of its Faculties. I would only observe, “That all Philosophers and Writers of Politicks, tho they were neither ignorant nor forgetful, how unqualify’d, Infants, and adult Persons of distemper’d Minds, were for forming Leagues, or doing the Duties of Society, have thought Man form’d by Nature for that, which, when come to years of Maturity, he was prompted to by Nature, except something preternatural, such as all Distempers of the Mind are, interpos’d.” The Observation of Juvenal is well known,

  • • Nunquam aliud Natura, aliud Sapientia dicit.
  • • Nature does not teach one thing, and Wisdom another.9

  And Aristotle (Politic. 1. c. 2.) affirms, that “we ought to judge of Nature from her Intention or perfect State”;10 and it is certainly a childish Inference, favouring more of the Grammarian than the moral Philosopher; “Men are born Infants, therefore they are born unfit for Society.” This is much of a-piece with Hobbes’s accounting (in his Physicks) for the Noise of Thunder from the breaking of Ice, which, in spite of Staticks, he suspends in the Air in the middle of Summer.11 Altho the word Nature be deriv’d from Nascor [to be born,] yet it is well known, that by human Nature we mean that Force of Reason, whose first Rudiments only are to be found in new born Infants. So Man is by Nature fitted for propagating his Species, which yet neither an Infant, nor one whom Distemper hath render’d impotent, is capable of, nor any Person without the help of a Woman. So likewise, we call the Powers of Plants and Fruits to afford us both Nourishment and Medicine, natural, which yet are not to be found in them, upon their first Appearance out of the Earth or Trees, but then only, when the Sun and Rain have brought them to Perfection, and they have escap’d the Malignity of blasting Winds: but that Reason, nay right Reason, is a Faculty of human Nature, and therefore natural to us, Hobbes himself acknowledges in these words, “Right Reason therefore is a kind of Law, which may be call’d natural, since it is no less a part of human Nature, than any other faculty or affection of the Mind.”12 Yet the same Hobbes elsewhere denies this very thing; Leviath. c. 5. p. 21. where he says, “Reason is not, as Sense and Memory, born with us, nor gotten by Experience only, as Prudence is, but attained by Industry.”13 Let him free himself, if he can, from Contradiction. I will not therefore waste my time in proving what is self-evident; especially when I had before affirm’d expressly, that I consider’d the Nature of Man come now to Maturity, at which time Nature usually confers upon him the use of Reason.

  Which suggests the Law of Nature in the same manner as it does the Art of Numbering;§III. I shall think that I sufficiently prove my Point, when I have made it appear, “That human Nature suggests certain Rules of Life, in the same manner that it suggests the Skill of Numbering.” All Men, when come to Maturity, except they labour under some Distemper of Mind, of their own accord reckon things by Numbers, adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing them, if the Numbers be small, without any Rules of Art. The Sentiments of all Nations are necessarily the same, concerning the Sum of two Numbers found by Addition, and concerning their difference by Subtraction, how much soever they may differ in the Names and Characters by which they express the Numbers, which every Nation fixes for it self arbitrarily. It seems to me, that all, in the same manner, under the same conduct of Nature, necessarily acknowledge, (1.) That the Good of all rational Beings is greater than the like Good of any part of that aggregate Body; that is, That it is truly the greatest Good: and (2.) That in promoting the Good of this whole Aggregate, the Good of Individuals is contain’d and promoted: Also, (3.) That the Good of every particular Part requires the introducing and settling of distinct Property in such Things, and such Services of rational Agents, as contribute to the common Happiness; that is, such as are necessary to testify the Honour we pay to God, or to preserve the Life, Health, and Faculties of every particular Man. In these three Propositions we shall find the Seeds and Force of all the Laws of Nature to be contain’d. Skill in Numbering is much assisted by Industry, by artificial Characters, and by their Places: but these very Helps we owe to Nature, as to their Original; nor can they ever cause that, which without Art we know to be true and of necessary use in Life, to become false or useless. “Whatever Assistance we may procure from Art, the whole Effect is to be ascrib’d rather to Nature than to Art.” Just as, after the Art of Cookery has fitted Meat for Nourishment, no one will deny, that we are nourish’d by the Power of Nature, otherwise Life it self were not natural.

  The Mind is necessarily determin’d, in forming simple Apprehensions, in chusing Good, and refusing Evil in general.This I think proper to premise as a Postulatum, which, I believe, no one will think unreasonable, “That the Mind of Man, and every Faculty thereof, especially the Intellectual, is prone to such Actions as are proper thereto, as often as Occasion is offer’d, and Matter suggested, either from without, or from the Body united to it. ” It is confirm’d by continual Experience, “That the Mind (whenever Light, Colour, or Sound, is presented to it thro’ the Senses, the Eyes, for example, or the Ears) is immediately apt to observe what is offer’d.” And the Case is the same, in observing painful or pleasant Sensations, taking their rise from the inward State of the Body. Simple Apprehensions, the more obvious Comparisons of Ideas among themselves, and certain Judgments or Propositions thence form’d, are in some sort necessary; the evident Connexion between Causes and Effects does also lead Men to form Propositions affirming that Connexion; and they involuntarily return upon the Mind, when any occasion is offer’d from the inward force or vigor of the Memory; nor can the Will at all put a stop to such Actions, tho it may indeed promote them. For we can excite our selves to recollect those things which had almost slipt out of the Memory, and attentively to consider what our Senses had observ’d, and diligently to form Comparisons and Propositions from Ideas compar’d among themselves, to form Syllogisms from Propositions compar’d, and from these to infer new Conclusions. Every one come to maturity, in proportion to the natural vigor of his Mind, is by the same Nature spontaneously carry’d on to such Operations, at once with the greatest pleasure, and with absolute necessity. Into this natural Impulse, I would resolve most of those Propositions, which I call the natural Dictates of Reason, (namely, the primary and self-evident ones;) as also those Acts of the Will, which are conversant, either about Happiness in general, that is, about the whole sum of all possible good Things; (for there is in this Case no occasion for the Judgment to deliberate and compare, because Happiness is, as defin’d by Cicero, “A Collection of all good Things”;)14 or about those several parts of our Happiness, which are desirable for their own sakes; such are Wisdom, Health, the seeing a Light not too strong, and such other agreeable Sensations as come in our way. Nor do I suppose that Hobbes, the great Patron of all kind of Necessity, will contradict me here, who hath affirm’d, that all “Conceptions are nothing really but Motion in some internal substance of the Head; which Motion proceeding to the Heart, if it help the vital Motion, is called Delight, Contentment, or Pleasure; and, with reference to the Object, Love. But when such Motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital Motion, then it is called Pain; and in relation to that which causeth it, Hatred, which the Latins express some times by Odium, and some times by Taedium; and that this Motion is also a Sollicitation, or Provocation, either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, and is then called Appetite, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth, and is then called Aversion.” Human Nature, p. 69, 70.15 I do not indeed perceive any such Power of the material World over our Minds, that necessarily determines them by mechanical Principles; yet I concur with all Philosophers, that I know of, in affirming, “That the first Apprehensions of Things, and the desire of Good and aversion from Evil in general, are necessary”: for the innate Activity of the divine Nature of the Mind, permits it not to be perfectly idle; nor can it do any thing else than (as occasion offers) understand, chuse, refuse, and determine certain Motions of the Body, in order to obtain what it has chosen.

  A distinct enumeration of those Powers of the human Mind, (which has greater Powers than what are necessary to preserve the Life of the Body,) which dispose Men, beyond other Animals, to enter into Society with God, and other Men;§IV. But because the Laws of Nature enjoin those things only, which proceed from innate Principles of Action, it is therefore proper to take a thorow view of the State and Power, both of the Mind and Body, separately and jointly, that it may thence appear, for what kind of Action Man is fitted by his inward Frame.

  There are most evident Indications, that the Mind has much greater Powers, and is created for much nobler Purposes, than only to preserve the Life of one inconsiderable Animal; which I shall now endeavour to explain.

  And here, in the first place, I must not omit its spiritual, incorporeal, and God-like Nature, which is capable of a better Employment than that of the Soul of a Swine, instead of Salt, to preserve a Carcass from Rottenness: For it may and ought to be observ’d in general, “That Powers of the Mind, far inferior to those which we find in Man, are sufficient to preserve Life for a long time”; which is evident in long-liv’d Brutes, nay, and in Trees, as the Oak, whose long continuance in a flourishing State is even without Sense, much more without Reason: Nay, “That the Sagacity of our Mind does not consist in discovering what kinds of Nourishment, Medicines, Exercise, &c. are most conducive to our long continuance in this State,” for even the best Physicians are strangely at a loss in these Particulars; but, “That it rather excels in those Qualities, which relate to the Knowledge and Worship of a Deity, and to Acts moral and civil.” But Dr. Ward, now Bishop of Salisbury, hath excellently manag’d this Argument, beyond any other, whether antient or modern, Philosopher, and vindicated it from the Objections of Mr. Hobbes.16

  Nevertheless, it is necessary to lay before the Reader some Powers and Actions of the Mind, whence it may appear, “That it is naturally fitted to become a Member of the greatest Society, (consisting of all rational Beings with God at their head,) and that it neglects its principal use, and loses the best Fruits of its natural Disposition, if it do not enter therein”; and that for a better Reason, than we affirm that the Earth (which here spontaneously produces Ears of Corn, and there Fruit-Trees) is naturally fit to encourage and reward the Industry of the Tiller; for Soils have their different natural Dispositions. The human Faculties are so fitted for Society, that it appears, (1.) “That all Men can both know and observe the Laws of Nature, which must in the first place be evident, because otherwise both the Admonitions of others, and our own Endeavours would be vain: (2.) That the Observance of those Laws is in it self pleasant and grateful; that the Precepts which point out to us such a Method of Action, for this very reason that they lead us to things naturally pleasant, promise a Reward to Obedience; and that a suitable Practice brings along with it no inconsiderable Advantage, namely, that Pleasure or part of our Happiness, which is necessarily contain’d in such natural employment of the human Faculties, as leads to the best End we can propose in Life, and to the fittest Means to attain it”: for all exercise of natural Powers, especially of the highest Order, in which we neither miss our aim, nor turn out of the direct Road, is naturally pleasant; nor can we conceive any other pleasure in Action, except what arises from Actions of this kind.17Freedom from Evil, and from Uneasiness, and grateful Impressions of some kinds, may be effected in us by external Objects;18 but no other Pleasure can take its rise from within our selves, than what either immediately or mediately depends upon such kind of Actions as I have now been describing. This is the only Happiness to which moral Philosophy directs us; nor can we be instructed how to obtain that, which in no sort depends upon our own Actions and Faculties. Hence it follows, “That the more things there are in the human Faculties, fitted for the knowledge and observance of the Laws of Nature, and consequently for the Practice of Virtue, so much greater are the Rewards annex’d to such Actions of the Mind, or, a Happiness so much the greater and more peculiar to Man, may be obtain’d by acting virtuously”: For each Faculty is render’d happy, by those Actions tending to promote the publick Good, to the exercise whereof it is fitted by Nature; for I shall shew hereafter, “That Happiness’s proceeding necessarily from such Actions as take their rise from Nature, is a most evident natural Proof, that it is the Will of the first Cause to oblige Men to such Actions, or that he enjoins them by his Law.”

  Which Powers are, 1. Right Reason. 2. The Power of forming universal Ideas, Judgments from them, and consequent Volitions, and of representing these Ideas by arbitrary Signs, i.e. Words.I have selected as fittest for my purpose,

  First, Right Reason, and the Standard of its Rectitude;

  Secondly, Universal Ideas, (such, for example, as that of human Nature in general,) and the Judgments or Propositions thence arising concerning the Properties agreeing or disagreeing with those Ideas, and general or undetermined Acts of the Will agreeable to, and consequent upon, such Judgments. Hither also is to be referr’d the power of appointing arbitrarySigns, such as words spoken or written, accommodated to such universal Ideas, Propositions and Volitions. For Speech, because it is a help to the Memory and Reason,19 is rather subservient to Virtue, than Vice; to Society, than Sedition. Hence arises the power of forming general Rules of Life or Action, from Ideas of Actions20 agreeing in their general Nature with the Idea of human Nature: But such Propositions are more easily remember’d, if they be express’d in Words accommodated to this purpose, and to the Ideas of the generality of Mankind, and be applied by common Consent to express them. Thence are form’d Rules common to many, or publick Laws, which, as the State of Affairs happens to require, may be enacted, abrogated, or alter’d: As a Physician may justly prescribe to the same Patient, at different times, sometimes a slenderer, sometimes a more plentiful, Diet, now Restoratives, and then evacuating Medicines.

  3. The Knowledge of Number, Measure, and Weights.Thirdly, The knowledge of Number, Measure, and Weights, and consequently the power of collecting many Particulars (lesser good Things, for example) into one Sum, and comparing the same with one another, according to their Difference and mutual Proportion. Hence Man can discover the chief Good, that is, the Collection of all good Things, and a comparative Good, perceiving one Good to be greater or less than another; and can subtract some from others; and is able to estimate the Proportion between things equally and unequally Good. To direct such Actions in such manner, as that they may best promote the best End, is the business of all the Laws of Nature.

  4. The Power of observing and establishing Order.Fourthly, The Power (nearly related to this) of either observing Order already established, or of establishing it, in the Conduct of our Affairs, and of knowing of how great moment it is in uniting several Powers, in order to produce the same Effect, especially the common Good, as we may observe in modelling an Army or Common-Wealth. Whilst I was more attentively considering this Subject, I imagin’d, “That the best way of distinctly knowing the Nature and Force of Order, was to consider it in the most simple Matter, that shews its most simple Effect.” But I no where meet with Order in a more simple Matter, nor a more simple Effect thence demonstrable, than that Geometrical Order of right Lines and compounded Motions, whence Descartes has demonstrated (Geom. 1. 2.) that his Geometrical Curves might be generated.21 For he has there prov’d from Analytical Principles, “That the Nature and Properties of a Line describ’d by compounded Motions, is not subject to accurate Calculation or Demonstration, unless all the other Motions, in subordination to one another, be regulated by one.” What he has observ’d concerning a Line, the most simple Effect of compounded Motions, holds equally true in all Effects, depending upon the Concurrence of many Causes; namely, that it is necessary, that, among such Causes, some should be regulated by others in a certain Order, and all by one supreme Power; otherwise it will be uncertain, what Effect will follow from their Concurrence; and so either no End will be procured by the common Assistance of them all, or by Means which we know not, whether they be proper or no. By means of this Knowledge, and from the Train of subordinate Causes, which we perceive by our Senses, the Mind comes to a more distinct Knowledge of a first Cause, which is God the Governor of the World, who is able to foresee, what will be the Effects of the power of all rational Agents, placed and acting in a known Subordination; both which Considerations will have a natural Tendency to persuade Men, to consider themselves, both in their Thoughts and Actions, as subordinate Members of the most enlarg’d Society, in which all are contain’d, as it were in the Kingdom of God.

  5. The Power of the Mind, to raise, stop, and moderate the Passions.Fifthly, From these arises that exalted Privilege belonging to the Mind of Man, of great force to establish and preserve this Society, namely, the Power of the Mind, to raise, stop, and moderate the Passions, and to direct them to desire greater Good, and to avoid greater Evil, than what any other Animal is capable of knowing; because we comprehend good Things, both more in number, and universal as to extent, their Sums, and their orderly Series; and we are conscious, that we can divert our Minds from such Thoughts and Affections as respect only our own private Good, and fix them upon the Care of the Publick Good, in which Liberty principally consists. I will not meddle with the Disputes about Liberty, which have been handled by others. This seems to be beyond all Controversy, “That the Nature of Man has so much Liberty, that he is determin’d to nothing (in external Actions, such as are Contracts, their Observation and Violation) without using his own Judgment, in forming which he may call in the Aid, not of the Senses only, but of the Memory; and to consider, Is this which I am going to do, consistent with the publick Good, which except it be preserv’d unviolated, the Happiness of particular Persons cannot be secur’d? Is this consistent with the well-grounded Motives of Virtue? &c.” I have observ’d that even Hobbes’s Politicks do, and that justly, suppose this Postulatum, “That Men may agree among themselves, or covenant, to transfer their Rights to another Person, for the common Good, (c. 5. §. 6.)”22 tho elsewhere he contends, “That they can regard nothing but their own private Good.” But since there is naturally in Men so large and noble a Faculty, which can both comprehend and pursue that vast Good, the greatest united Happiness of all rational Agents, the Reader will easily judge, whether the greatest Happiness of every particular Person does not consist in the perpetual vigorous Exercise of that Faculty. I do not contend that this Faculty is any thing distinct from the Powers of the Understanding and the Will: It is sufficient, if from the Concurrence of them the Power I have mention’d, arises. Every one sees, how immediately this Power of the Mind disposes or qualifies Men to restrain themselves from any sudden Sally of Passion, and to conform their Manners to the Laws, first of Nature, then of the Society; and, consequently, to establish at once the greatest and strictest Society of all rational Beings. Concerning right Reason and universal Ideas, I think proper to treat more at large; it will be sufficient to handle the rest briefly.

  Of right Reason, (which consists, as well of selfevident Truths, as of Conclusions thence deduced, and stored up in the Memory;)§V. We must treat of right Reason the more particularly, both because what is right discovers both it self and what is crooked; it holding the same Rank in Morality, that Health does in Physick, the knowledge whereof is prior and more distinct in the Order of Nature, than the Theory of Diseases: and because Hobbes agrees with other Philosophers, that it is the Rule of human Actions, even before Civil Laws are fram’d; (See de Cive, c. 2. §. 1. and the Annotation.) 23 And, if he will be consistent with himself, we shall not differ much with him about its Definition. For c. 2. §. 1. in a Parenthesis (which he seems to place there for a Definition) he hints, that it is “Truth inferr’d from true Principles by right Reasoning.”24 But I think that, in this Argument, the notion of right Reason is somewhat more extensive; for it comprehends, as well first Principles, or self-evident Truths, as Conclusions thence form’d. The Etymology of the Word [Ratio] favours this Sense, which implies only a Proposition, that is rata, i.e. certain, unchangeable, and agreeable to the Nature of Things, whether it be self-evident, or prov’d by the help of an inference. Custom also, which is the Rule of Language, favours the same Sense of the Word; for all acknowledge the most evident Propositions, (such as “It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to beat the same time”) for the Dictates of Reason, no less than those which require proof. Nor do I believe that Hobbes himself will oppose this larger Sense of the Words. I agree, however, with him, that by right Reason is not to be understood an infallible Faculty, (as he affirms many, but I know not who, to understand it;) but yet by it is to be understood a Faculty, not false in these Acts of judging. Nor is it properly understood to be an Act of Reasoning, (as he too rashly asserts,) but an Effect of the Judgment; that is, true Propositions treasur’d up in the Memory, whether they be Premisses or Conclusions, of which some that are practical are called Laws; for Actions are compar’d with these, in order to examine their Goodness, not with those Acts of Reasoning which discover them; yet I willingly allow, that these Acts of Reasoning are also included in the Notion of right Reason.

  Of which, not every Man’s proper Reason, but the Nature of Things, is the Standard.But that which he immediately adds in the Annotation, (in order to give a Reason, why, in his Definition of right Reason, he lays down “every Man’s proper Reasoning as the Standard ”) is most false. “Out of civil Society, where no one can distinguish right Reason from wrong, except by making a Comparison with his own, every Man’s proper Reason is to be esteem’d, not only the Standard of his own Actions, which he does at his own peril, but also the measure of other Mens Reason with respect to his Affairs.”25 For, out of civil Society, any one may distinguish right Reason, without making a Comparison with his own. Because there is a common Standard, by which every Man’s own Reason (or Opinion) and that of others, is to be try’d, namely, the Nature of Things, as it lies before us, carefully to be observ’d and examin’d by all our Faculties. That is the Rule with which all, both Premisses and Conclusions, are to be compared, whether form’d by me or by any other Man, or by the Commonwealth it self, after it is form’d. For it is most certain, “That the Truth or Rectitude of Propositions concerning Things and Actions, present or future, consists in their Conformity with the Things themselves, concerning which they are form’d.” For since all our Ideas, or simple Apprehensions of Things, are the Images of those Things, (and the Truth and whole Perfection of Images consist in their exact Correspondence to the Objects they are design’d to represent;) and since true Propositions are the joining, by Affirmation, of Apprehensions impress’d upon the Mind by the same Objects, or the separating, by Negation, of Notions representing different Objects; it is necessary, that their Truth and Rectitude should entirely depend upon their Conformity with the Things themselves; as all agree, that the Truth of simple Apprehensions is to be deduced from that Standard.

  This therefore is beyond Controversy, “That the Man who judges of Things otherwise than they are, does not judge according to right Reason, or does not make a right use of his Judgment; but that he pronounces according to right Reason, who affirms or denies, as Things really are.”

  Wherefore such Propositions only are true, as agree with the Nature of Things.§VI. Nor is it material in this case, “Who it is that judges otherwise than the Thing really is, whether a sovereign, or a subordinate, Judge”; because the Truth, or Rectitude, of a Proposition in no respect depends upon the Order established amongst Men, but only upon the Agreement there of with the Things, concerning which a Judgment is made. Nor is it any Proof of the contrary, that there are some Mathematical Propositions,26 and others of like kind might be invented, which may be called true, tho there be nothing in Nature, to which they are conformable. For such conditional Propositions, because they pronounce nothing concerning Things without the Mind, are not to be compar’d with them; for their Truth consists only in an Agreement among the Terms, of which they are compos’d; and that is all which is to be look’d for in this Case. But these are of no use in human Life, except we find something external done, or possible to be done, which differs in nothing considerable from our Ideas.27 If their Subject, or something extremely like it, cannot exist, the Propositions are trifling, and are only equivocally called true. For the Truth of Propositions, which consists only in the Agreement of the Terms, if the Terms themselves cannot exist,28 is not of the same nature with that, which affirms the Agreement of Terms, possible, at least, if not present or future. The former kind of Truth is perfectly useless. However, let this Point be determin’d as it will, this is clear, “That a Proposition, whose Subject does or will exist, that is, whose Subject is conformable to Things without the Mind, which either now are, or hereafter shall be, does require, that what is affirm’d of that Subject should be conformable to the same things; and that therefore the whole ought to agree with the Nature of Things without us”; which is the principal Point I at present contend for.

  It is also certain, “That every particular Man, and his Right over Things and Persons, whatever it may be, is not something merely chimerical and fictitious, but to be consider’d as something real, and existing without the Imagination”: because the Rights of particular Persons relate to the use of Things, and to Effects grateful to Men; and therefore the Truth of Propositions, or of the Dictates of Reason, concerning them, does necessarily consist in their Conformity to the State of Things; which is what I would lay as a Ground-work, in order to overthrow Hobbes’s Fundamentals: for it hence immediately follows, “That contradictory Propositions, concerning the Right of any two to the same Things or Persons, cannot be the Dictates of right Reason”; which is the Foundation of Hobbes’s Scheme.

  An Explanation of practical right Reason, which points out the end, and the means thereto;§VII. I think it proper to observe here, by the way, “That by the Dictates of practical Reason, I understand Propositions, which point out either the end, or the means thereto, in every man’s power”; for all Practice is resolv’d into these: and, “That practical Reason is then called Right, when it determines truly, or as the thing is in it self, in Propositions declaring what is every man’s best and most necessary End, and what are the most proper Means of obtaining it”; or (which comes to the same thing) which pronounces, according to Truth, what Effects of our own Counsel and Will will render our selves and others happy, and how we shall, with the greatest certainty, produce them; just as in Geometry, that speculative Reason is right, which affirms a Quantity, which is really in its own Nature greater, to be greater, than another. And that practical Proposition is right, which teaches that method of constructing Problems, which if we pursue, we shall really produce the effect propos’d. Nor is an Opinion, or Proposition of this kind, truer, when affirm’d by a King, than when by a Subject. Since then all right Reason is conformable to those things, about which we have form’d a Judgment, since each thing is, in its nature, but one, and uniform with it self; it follows, “That right Reason in one cannot dictate that, which contradicts right Reason, concerning the same things, in any other Person.”

  And is uniform and consistent,From this Principle follows that Precept of universal use, concerning the Actions of all Men, That human Actions ought to be uniform and consistent with themselves, thro’ the whole course of every Man’s Life; and that he cannot act always agreeably to right Reason, who, as Horace expresses it,

  • • Aestuat, & vitae disconvenit ordine toto.
  • • Fluctuates, and disagrees with himself thro’ the whole course of Life.29

  It is included in the Notion of a true Proposition, (a practical one, for instance,) and is consequently a necessary Perfection of a Man forming a right Judgment in that Affair; that it should agree with other true Propositions framed about a like Subject, tho that like Case should happen at another time, or belong to another Man: And therefore, if any one judge, “That his Act of taking to himself the Necessaries of Life, not yet possess’d by any other, would promote the common Happiness”; it is necessary that the Judgment, “That the like Action of another in like Circumstances, would equally conduce to the same End,” must be undoubtedly right.Forming like Judgments in like Cases, whether our own, or those of other Men. Whoever therefore judges truly, must judge the same things, which he thinks truly are lawful to himself, to be lawful to others in a like Case. In the same manner, whatever Assistance any Man rightly and truly believes, he may or ought to demand according to right Reason, it is equitable, and consequently a Dictate of right Reason, that he should think, that any other in like Circumstances justly may or ought to demand the like help from him.

  The reason of Hobbes’s making so gross a Blunder in this Argument, was, because he did not observe, “That there was the same Standard to all, by which the Reason of every one is to be tried, whether it be right or no”; namely, the Nature of Things, especially, of the End necessary to all rational Beings, and of the Means naturally leading thereto.

  (To which sight Reason, and consequently to God, its Author, Hobbes imputes Contradictions;§VIII. We may observe here, by the way, how honourable Hobbes’s Sentiments are concerning God, ruling naturally by the Dictates of Reason; that is, that God, instructing Men in the Laws of Nature by the Dictates of right Reason, does enjoin Contradictions; that he first tells us, “We must fight against all, and so engages Men in a War, in which all that fall, are unjustly murder’d on both sides, because they claim only their own Rights”; that afterwards, “By the same right Reason he forbids War, and commands us to relinquish those very things, which yet he affirms are justly to be retain’d, and defended by the Sword, because they are Rights”: For he must necessarily ascribe to God all those Contradictions, which he imputes to the right Reason (as he calls it) of Men, contradicting one another with relation to the Necessaries of Life; for he affirms, that “God rules by this Reason, as by a Law,”30 and consequently, that he permits all those things which Reason permits; and teaches that all those things may be done consistently with his Laws, which right Reason has taught may be done, by natural Right. For Hobbes himself does not extend “Right” (where he purposely defines it) beyond “the Liberty of using our Faculties according to right Reason.”31

  It is hence evident, “That God, according to Hobbes, first gives a Right to invade the Properties of all others, that his right Reason includes a Licence to commit any Crimes, and then involves all Men in the Miseries of a destructive War.” But after he has render’d Men miserable by the Evils of Wickedness and War, he points out a somewhat better road to Justice, such at least as may be sufficient to avoid the Punishment of the civil Power; and then at last endeavours to bring over wretched Mortals to such a Peace, as that Justice would establish.

  Whereas right Reason judges alike in all.)That Reason, which I acknowledge as Right, first examines all the Parts, both of our own and others Happiness, and foresees, at a great distance, the Causes thereof that are lodg’d in our own Power; then, perceiving them in their own Nature so interwoven, that a prudent care of our own Happiness cannot be separated from the pursuit of the Happiness of others, that is, of the common Society of all rational Beings, it determines, that the strictest Justice is to be cultivated, with respect both to God and Men, and presages, that the Fruit there of shall be a most happy Tranquillity. By the same Reasoning it foresees, that the Actions of Men, who arrogate each all things to himself, or are guilty of such Practices, will involve all in War and extreme Calamities; and that so evidently, that there need not for Information be made so rash and fatal an Experiment. Therefore it will never allow a Right to act in such a manner; but, on the contrary, it will command Men to contract Friendships, to establish civil Government where it is wanting, and to preserve it when establish’d; that not only those Miseries of War, which it forsees may arise from the Folly of some Men, may be avoided, but the greatest Assistances to the most perfect Virtue and Happiness be procur’d. Hobbes therefore thought that this would be done, (and that necessarily too,) because he did not observe, “That there was the same Rule (the Nature of Things) for all, by which the Reason of all ought to be tried, whether it be right or no.”32

  Here, I think, the fundamental Corner-Stone of the Temple of Concord is laid by Nature; for hence is deriv’d that Law of Nature uniting all rational, or wise, Beings (for Reason in perfection is Wisdom)33 among themselves, and with God as the wisest; which is thus express’d, Whoever determines his Judgment and his Will by right Reason, must agree with all others, who judge according to right Reason in the same Matter. Whence it also follows conditionally, (which I shall afterwards prove from proper Principles,) “If any right Reasoner, any wise Person, shall assign to each his proper Office, in order to the publick Good, all others who judge rightly, shall approve of the Distribution.” But of this more hereafter.

  How to prevent false Reasoning.§IX. I shall hereafter observe, “That, in order to preserve our Reason right, we ought not only to avoid false Deductions, but especially the rash Admission of any thing as self-evident, without proof.” And we ought to take care, in the first place, “That our simple Ideas be both clear, from strong and frequent Impressions of the same thing known in various Circumstances; and distinct, by a separate Observation of the Parts singly; and adequate also (as far as we can) by the Assistance of the Memory and Understanding, added to the Discoveries of Sense.” It is to be observ’d, “That in these external Impressions there can be no Falshood, properly so called.” The Unwary, indeed, take occasion of judging falsly, from the Distance, the Refraction, or the tinging of the Rays of Light in the Eyes of Persons infected with the Jaundice: but if all things in the Medium between the Organ of Sense and its Object be consider’d, as they ought, before we pass a Judgment, (to this Head is to be referr’d the Temper of the Blood, that of the Animal Spirits, and the Brain;) we may avoid falling into Error. In the Medium are the partial Causes34 of the Impressions made, and they are therefore necessarily to be consider’d. What is more, before we determine any thing concerning the Sameness, and Connexion, or the Diversity, and Opposition of the Terms, they are most carefully to be compar’d with one another; and we ought to take care, especial care, when we contemplate the first and most universal Truths, not to give our Assent to any Proposition, without the strongest and most inevitable Necessity; for Truth depends not on our Will, but upon the Connexion of Things, and of those distinct Ideas, which are impress’d upon us by Things; but what we perceive, we necessarily perceive, whenever the Faculty is attentive, altho that Attention generally depends upon our own Will: and upon this Rule depends the main Point now in dispute. For since the whole Truth of affirmative Propositions consists in the Connexion of two Terms; and since these are naturally connected, because both Terms are imprinted upon the Mind by the same thing, and are evidently Representatives of one and the same Thing under different Respects; it is evident, “That Truths depend, not upon the Will of Men imposing and connecting Names arbitrarily, but upon the Natures of Things delineating their own Representations upon the Mind. But whatever Motions are impress’d upon us by the Nature of Things, are necessary, and proceed from the first Mover, the Author of Nature; so, consequently, do all those Ideas, which, impress’d upon the Senses and Imagination by a Motion evidently natural, represent practical Truth to the Mind, concerning Actions most conducive to the common Good. Truths of this kind are natural Laws, as I shall hereafter prove; and their Impression upon the Mind is the Inscription and Promulgation of Laws; and they may for the same reason be affirm’d to be by the first Mover imprinted upon us, (by means of the Nature of Things;) that speculative Axioms (such as, “Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference of the same Circle are equal”) may be truly affirm’d to be necessarily planted in our Minds by the First, thro’ the intervention of Second, Causes. Justly therefore may we ascribe to the Law of Nature the words of Demosthenes, which Marcian, in the Pandects, has inserted into his general Description of Laws, that it is “The Invention and Gift of God.”35 They, who do not acknowledge the Proof of a Deity from the Necessity of a first Mover, (which Hobbes however acknowledges,)36 take away the most antient, and, in my Opinion, the strongest, Prop of Religion. Nevertheless, if they own the Proof of a God from that Order which is visible in the World, the mutual Relations of Things, and the Beauty thence arising, or from this, that they perceive so many of them design’d by Nature for our Use, as their final Cause, they will be oblig’d, by this our Argument, to acknowledge God as the Author of all necessary Impressions.

  To which we are never necessarily determin’d, Judging, Willing, or Acting, wrong, being owing only to an Abuse of Liberty;§X. This Observation, concerning the Truth of simple Apprehensions, or of all natural Impressions, seems to me of so great importance, that I will venture thence to conclude, that “Neither does our own Nature, nor that of Things without us, ever necessarily or unavoidably determine us to form a false Judgment, nor, consequently, to chuse or act amiss”; which always proceeds from the Uncertainty or Error of the Understanding Whatever, at any time, we judge, chuse, or act, contrary to those Notices, which a thorow Examination into the Nature of Things affords; that I think wholly owing to a hasty, rash, and unseasonable Use of Liberty, which is generally deluded thro’ the Sollicitation of a present Advantage, and incites the Judgment to determine Points not yet sufficiently clear’d up. “All Truths, (even in Morality,) which are unchangeable and never deceive, are owing to Nature, and to a Necessity of assenting to things evident. And to Nature they only (exclusive of Errors) are to be ascrib’d, if we would not be injurious, to our own Faculties, no one of which ever necessarily determines us to embrace a Falshood; to natural external Agents, that cannot deceive; and, to God himself, to whose Nature it is a Contradiction to suppose him willing to deceive us.” We thus determine upon these Points, on better Authority, than Physicians, who call only those Motions of the Humors, for instance, Natural, which tend to the Preservation and Health of the Individual, calling the rest, which tend to Disease and Death, Preternatural; and with Reason, because by Nature here they understand the Nature of the Individual, whose Preservation is the End of their Art: Yet they will not deny the most fatal Alterations of the Humours, to be according to the universal Laws of Nature. But, in Man, the Error of the Judgment, and Perverseness of the Will, are neither agreeable to the Nature of the Individual endeavouring its own Perfection, nor proceed from any necessary influence of things external upon him; but first from mere Inadvertency and Rashness, afterwards from Habits or Example, the Imitation of himself or others. Hobbes is therefore very unfair, who proposes whatever Transaction he has observ’d among Cabals of Villains, as a momentous Discovery in human Nature, and a Foundation of a new Set of Politicks.

  And human Judgment acting most agreeably to Nature, whom it approaches nearest to Necessity.I am of Opinion, that not only speculative Axioms, but the first Principles of moral Habits are thus necessary. It is sufficient, indeed, that those Dictates which determine many particular Actions, as they are circumstanc’d, are supported by probable Reasons, such as the Weakness of our Mind, which cannot examine all things present, much less foresee all the Consequences of the present Action, can attain, whilst urg’d by an immediate Necessity of Acting. Those things which proceed from Examination and cautious Deliberation, from Experience, and the faithful Testimony of competent Witnesses, such are Civil Laws and Precedents, or Cases adjudg’d in Courts of Judicature, make the nearest Approaches to Necessity. We ought therefore to form a Judgment of the Inclination of human Nature from these, rather than from the rash Actions of Men. For Deliberation, Experience, and all the other helps to discover Truth, do continually bring us nearer to that State of Mind, by which, because of the Influence of Things upon it, it cannot think otherwise than it does think, which is the Case, when it judges from the Evidence of Sense, or clear Demonstration: And thus the more necessary and unavoidable any Judgment is, so much the more natural, or approaching to what is natural, it is to beesteem’d. Hobbes, on the contrary, forms a mistaken Judgment of human Nature, from rash Actions, as absurdly, as if we were to judge of the Nature of a Tree, from the fungous or mossy Excrescencies sometimes growing to its Bark.

  2. Of universal Ideas,§XI. 2. Next comes under Consideration, that peculiar Power of the human Mind, by which it forms universal Ideas, omitting those Accidents, by which particular things are distinguish’d. Hence arises a great help to the Memory, and consequently to Prudence thence arising; nay, to every Virtue, as connected therewith, and to every Action and Habit, which ministers Steadiness, Beauty, and Happiness, to human Life. For the Mind can easily apply to innumerable Individuals and their various Circumstances, Properties agreeing to one or a few Natures consider’d in themselves, whether those Properties respect their inward Frame, or their Causes and Effects: Hence all Sciences take their rise, as compos’d of Universals. By the help of these, Abstracts, and the chief Heads, of Natural History are easily collected; whence (to omit other Advantages) we readily learn what things are necessary, to preserve and perfect, both our own Nature and that of others. In like manner the Precepts of Arts, since they too are universal, compendiously instruct, by what means any Persons, whose Faculties are capable of them, shall or may attain the Ends by them propos’d. So Logick, Physick, Ethicks, (or the Art of Morality,) the Arts of Navigation and Architecture, do not instruct one particular Person only, how Aristotle, for example, shall direct his Reason, in one Affair, to the Discovery of Truth; or Hippocrates preserve, or recover, his own Health; or Palinurus reach one Port only; but they instruct all Artists without distinction: They consider the End, and, consequently, the propos’d Good of every Man in general, chusing, and prescribing the use of, Means as general; and, therefore, both they who teach, and they who learn, these Arts, first contemplate these general Precepts. Which proves, by the way, that Men not only can, but that in all Arts it is their universal Practice, to respect a general Good, earlier than their own: Altho nothing hinders, but that Hippocrates, applying his general Precepts to a particular Case, may preserve his own Health, for instance, as well as that of others; and Vitruvius may build himself a House, as he had done before for others. It is of this further Advantage to observe these universal Ideas and Propositions, both Speculative and Practical, which are naturally form’d by the Mind of Man, because from such universal Notions are form’d Unchangeable, and consequently in some Sense Eternal, Rules of human Action. In the following Sheets, I shall lay before the Reader many such Propositions or Rules, whence he may distinctly perceive, what those universal Notions are, of which they are form’d; and how peculiar they are to the Mind of Man; and how much they promote Religion, civil Government, and the Peace and Commerce of different Nations.

  And Speech, which is compos’d of Words, which are the arbitrary Signs of universal Ideas.But first I must make a few Observations on the Power and Inclination of the Mind of Man to form Words, spoken or written, and other arbitrary Signs, by help of which it may either recollect, or communicate to others, its Notions, both universal and particular. This remarkable Difference, between Men and other Animals, contributes much both to the forming and preserving Societies: The great Agreement observable among Men, in the use of such Signs, will easily be accounted for, if we consider (as becomes Christians) what the sacred History informs us, “That all Mankind have sprung from one Original,”37 so that Eve might, without Difficulty, have used words in the same Sense that Adam first appointed them, and their Posterity might suck in their Signification with their Mother’s Milk. But if Hobbes would rather consider them in his State of Nature, as suddenly sprung out of the Earth (like Mushrooms) of full Growth, and without any Relation to one another;38 even in that Case Reason would persuade them, that many, (namely, all those who wanted to maintain a mutual Intercourse,) might agree in the same words, or other Signs, to express the same things. Nor was it at all of any Consequence, who first express’d this Idea or Thing by that Sign; but it would greatly concern them all, to agree among themselves in some common Marks of their Ideas, by help whereof each particular thing might be made known to all. Hereby each Person, by communicating his Observations to others, is enabled to “Improve their Minds with a further Degree of Knowledge”; so that the Experience and Endeavours of the present Age may point out to the succeeding ones a shorter way to Prudence and Happiness, and by a more easy Method produce in them all kinds of Virtue; hereby Men are inabled to “Debate concerning Covenants, and Laws, to be made,” to “Promulgate such as have been agreed upon,” to “Examine, whether they have been observ’d”; to“Produce and receive Testimonies”; and to “Give Judgment according to the Proofs.” Hobbes himself will not deny, both that these things are peculiar to human Nature, and that they fit Man for Society.

  Of the Reflex Acts of the Mind, and of Conscience.§XII. Shall I not reckon among the Perfections of the human Understanding, that it can reflect upon it self? Consider its Habits, as Dispositions arising from past Actions? Remember and recollect its own Dictates, and compare them with its Actions? Judge which way the Mind inclines? And direct it self to the Pursuit of what seems fittest to be done? Our Mind is conscious to it self of all its own Actions, and both can, and often does, observe what Counsels produced them; it naturally fits a Judge upon its own Actions, and thence procures to it self either Tranquillity and Joy, or Anxiety and Sorrow. In this Power of the Mind, and the Actions thence arising, consists the whole force of Conscience, by which it proposes Laws to it self, examines its past, and regulates its future Conduct. Nor appear any Traces, in other Animals, of sonoblea Faculty. Great are the Powers of this Principle, both to the Formation and Increase of Virtue, to the erecting and preserving Civil Societies, both among those who are not subject to the same Civil Power, and among Fellow-Subjects. And, indeed, the principal Design of this Treatise is to shew, “How this Power of our Mind, either of it self, or excited by external Objects, forms certain universal practical Propositions, which give us a more distinct Idea of the utmost possible Happiness of Mankind, and pronounce by what Actions of ours, in all Variety of Circumstances, that Happiness may most effectually be obtain’d.” For these are the Rules of Action, these are the Laws of Nature.

  I will here add nothing to what I have already mention’d of the Knowledge of Number, Measure, Order, Free-Will, &c. altho these be both peculiar to Man, and are very material in the present Argument.

  Indications enforcing universal Benevolence, from a Survey of the human Body, considr’d.§XIII. I will now apply my self to the Consideration of the Human Body, in which I meet with several things worthy of Observation for my present Purpose, which are usually neglected, or at least omitted, by others who have handled this Argument.

  For, since the Life, Health, and most perfect State, of the human Body, which can be acquir’d, (every thing else being regarded according to its Value or Dignity,) is part of that End which right Reason proposes to its self, and its Powers and various Uses are Means highly useful to the whole Man, both to procure the Improvement of the Minds of Individuals, and to promote the common Good; it is impossible, but that the Consideration thereof must suggest somewhat useful to direct us in the Choice of the supreme End, and in the Application of the Means; but in Dictates concerning that End, and the Means conducing thereto, does the whole of the Law of Nature, whose original and principal Parts I here propose to enquire into, consist.

  In the first place, I think that this may be affirm’d universally, That whatever (1.) demonstrates, from the divinely-contriv’d Make of our Body, “That the whole possible Happiness of Man depends upon many Causes, the chief whereof are Rational; and that, therefore, it cannot reasonably be expected but in conjunction with the common Happiness”; whatever (2.) proves further, “That every one can, by the proper Power of his own Body, effect somewhat, by which this common End may be promoted, and the Assistance of others procur’d, and that, by his Endeavours of this kind, every Man will procure to himself the greatest Happiness in his Power”: That demonstrates certainly, “That the Nature of the human Body affords a sufficient Indication of our Obligation to such Endeavours.” And this will appear plainly, from the Consideration of natural Obligation, and of Law, which I shall afterwards explain.

  Further, the more evidently and constantly the Manner and Method is pointed out, according to which it is necessary, in order to our own Happiness, that we should co-operate with others to procure the common Happiness; and the greater any one’s Powers are, or the stronger his Inclination to such Actions; so much the easier it is to pay this Debt due to the Publick, and the Crime the greater, which is committed by the Breach of the Commandment; and from hence our clearer and stronger Obligation to such Actions may with the utmost Certainty be inferr’d: For these Reasons I thought it proper to propose some Indications of this kind, taken from the human Body. The Observation and Sagacity of others will add more, or will pursue these Hints further.

  In the human Body are to be consider’d, (1.) What belongs to it as Body; (2.) What it has, as a Body endow’d with Life and Sense, like other Animals; (3.) What are peculiar to it self.

  I. As a Body in General, I. It has these things in common with all other Bodies.

  1. Having its Motions, necessary for its Preservation, dependent upon, and limited by, the Motions of other Bodies, especially those of other Men.1. That all its Motions, and consequently those which preserve its Life, Health and Strength, (whose Preservation each Person proposes to himself as a principal part of his End,) proceed from the first Mover, and are necessarily complicated with, and in some measure depend upon, innumerable Motions of other corporeal Parts of the same System. Among these are chiefly to be consider’d the Bodies of other Men, and their Motions which can limit ours, and are govern’d by Reason, which we have just ground to hope may be brought to concur with our Reason.39

  2. That its Motion (as that of all other Bodies) is propagated far and wide, and does not perish, but concurs with other Motions to perpetuate the Successions of Things, or to preserve the Whole.2. Being equally able to promote those Motions in other human Bodies, which are equally necessary for their Preservation. And as the first Observation instructs us, “That our private Good depends upon common Powers”; so this second Observation proves, “That the Powers of particular Persons may be of publick and most extensive Advantage.” The former forbids, “To hope for the Happiness of particular Persons separately from the Good of the Whole,” and consequently points out “The common Good” as “The fruitful Cause of private Happiness”: the latter shews, “That the Pursuit of the common Good will not be in vain, because it conspires with the Endeavours of the whole Universe.” In both these complicated Motions, namely, that, by which almost all Things concur in some measure to the Preservation of any particular Body for some time, and that, by which any particular Body concurs with others to the Preservation of the whole System, a certain Order is preserv’d, by which some Motions are determin’d by others in a continued Series, and all are govern’d by the continued circular Motion of the whole System. I need not any particular Hypothesis concerning the System of the World, to prove what I have advanc’d concerning the necessary Order, and the Powers of complicated Motions; for these are demonstrated from geometrical Principles, which no Hypothesis can hurt. Tho a Contemplation of this kind may at first seem merely speculative, yet it is not without its Use in human Affairs; for hence we know distinctly, and from general Principles, “How necessary a certain Order among Causes which act by a corporeal Force, is, that many of them should conspire to produce any Effect foreknown and design’d in the Mind.” It further shews, “How we may judge with Certainty, which Cause has contributed more, which less, to the Effect design’d.” Whence the value and worth of Causes, with respect to any Effect, is fix’d and determin’d by their proper and natural Force; and, consequently, we are instructed by the very Nature of Things, both, “Which Causes are more highly to be valued, upon account of what they have already effected,” and, “The Aid of what Causes we ought chiefly to sollicit, in order to procure what we farther desire.” We thus come to know, “That those Causes, which Philosophers call Universal,40 (such as the Motion of the Aetherial Fluid, & c.) but chiefly the first of them, God, are the principal Sources of the common Good, which we either all enjoy, or which we expect from the Nature of Things.” We thus also know, “That Motions of Bodies ever so little subject to the Determination and Direction of the human Will,(too mit the Consideration of those which are exempted from it,) when govern’d by the universal Benevolence of all rational Beings towards all, are the principal Causes of the publick Happiness of all, whence is deriv’d the private Happiness of each.” For universal Benevolence is the Spring and Source of every Act of Innocence and Fidelity, of Humanity and Gratitude, and, indeed, of all the Virtues by which Property and Commerce are maintain’d. They are govern’d by it, as particular Motions are determin’d by the universal Motion in the System of the World; or as all the Functions of the Spirits, Bowels, Vessels, and Limbs, in the Body of an Animal, proceed from the general Motion of the Blood. If we embrace this Opinion, from a thorow Examination of the Nature of Things, it will doubtless oblige us to pay Obedience to all the Laws of Nature, and to take diligent care, that the same be paid by others: This is the utmost we can do, to make our selves, as well as others, happy; nor can Reason propose to any one a greater End.

  Knowledge, and the Use of Signs, in Mankind, consider’d as a corporeal System, supplying the want of Contiguity in communicating Motion.§XIV. However, in this Comparison of the Aggregate of Mankind, as they act by a corporeal Force, with the natural System of Bodies, I am not ignorant of this wide Difference between them, “That the Effects of Systems merely corporeal, are perform’d, not without Contiguity between the Bodies moving and moved, for the most part without Sense, but always without the interposition of Counsel and Liberty; whereas Men act often at a considerable distance, and make much use of their Reason and Liberty.” It is, nevertheless, likewise evident, (1.) “That the corporeal Force of all Men, when it is exerted, is subject to the same Laws of Motion with other Bodies”; and, (2.) “That the force and necessity of Subordination between the Motions arising from Man, is the same with that which is among those of any other Bodies”; whenever many Men co-operate to any Effect which relates to others, (which they daily practise more than any one can “be well aware of”:) with respect to these two Points only, I propos’d the foregoing Comparison; which, therefore, was made and apply’d justly. I will, upon this occasion, venture to go farther and affirm, “That, because Men have frequent Opportunities of meeting, by which they mutually profit or hurt one another, and many ways of doing, by Words or Actions, good or harm to Persons at a great distance, especially, if Men form Schemes for the Conduct of their Lives, (which it is certain every one naturally and constantly does, because every one desires that all his future Existence should be happy”;) I will venture to affirm, I say, “That the whole Race of Mankind ought to be consider’d as one System of Bodies, so that nothing of any Moment can be done by any Man, relating to the Life, Fortune, or Posterity of any one, which may not some way affect those things which are alike dear to others; as the Motion of every Body, in the System of the World, communicates its Motion to many others, especially neighbouring ones.” For that vast Privilege of extensive Knowledge, with which Men are endow’d, supplies the want of Contiguity, which is requisite in other Bodies, to the Communication of Motion; for Men are excited to Motion by the least Signals, whether Natural or Arbitrary, by which they quickly perceive what has been, or ought to be, done by other Men at the greatest distance. What is more, they retain a Memory of those things, done either to themselves or those who are dear to them, and by it are excited to take the first Opportunity of Retaliation; they are also naturally provident, and presage, from what has been done to others, what is to be expected by themselves, and those they love; and this induces them to many things, with a view to prevent Evils, and to create a probable Prospect of very remote future Advantages. This Remembrance of Things past, and Foresight of Things to come, are the Reason why Men, at a distance, are more mov’d by what is done to others, than inanimate Bodies are by the Motion of neighbouring ones, which act nothing, except they be present: for from these they immediately and justly conclude, “That being like in Nature and Condition, with respect to Necessaries, they also are to expect like things.” Thus they cannot but be affected with those Actions of any towards others, which, if often repeated, or copied after by others, naturally work a considerable Change (either for the better or the worse) in the Condition of Men in general.

  I own, however, that all are not equally affected with such Actions, but some more, some less, according to their different degrees of Sagacity, in apprehending the Causes or Hindrances of the common Good. Nor is the Influence communicated from some Men to others, by such Actions as respect the common End of all, for that Reason less natural, than that between Bodies of the same System with respect to natural Motions, which are communicated to more subtle and fluid Matter in a greater, to grosser Matter in a less, degree. It is sufficient, that “To perceive in Men a Likeness of Nature and Condition with respect to Necessaries,” and “To infer from what is done to others, what we are to hope or fear will be done to our selves,” are Acts, Natural and Universal, and not of less Efficacy to influence Men, than mutual Contact between Bodies moving and moved, is to communicate Motion among the Parts of a corporeal System. I will infer no more from hence, than what is otherwise evident, and seems to be naturally accounted for upon these Principles, that all Men may hence learn, “That their Security from Evils, and their whole Prospect of Assistance from others, in their pursuit of Happiness, necessarily depend upon the voluntary Assistance of many, who do not less stand in need of many others, that it may be well with them.” Whence we are immediately oblig’d to acknowledge, “That the mutual good Offices of all are useful to all.” Just as natural Bodies in the same System cannot perform their Motions, unless other Bodies concur with, and give place to, them.

  From the Necessity of mutual Offices it follows necessarily, “That he that would, to the utmost of his Power, provide for his own Happiness, must, according to the measure of his Ability, procure to himself the Benevolence and Assistance of all others.” Every one may easily know, that he has Power to confer upon others Assistance and innumerable good Offices, and to conspire with the whole System of rational Beings to the same End, and in pursuit of the common Good: but, on the contrary, that he can no more compel so many Causes, which are singly of force nearly equal with himself, to lend him their Assistance, and at the same time to relinquish and neglect all natural Endeavours to promote such things as are necessary for themselves, than one Pound Weight can, in a just Balance, raise a Weight of some thousand Pounds in the opposite Scale. For all Struggles between Men, by force merely corporeal, are perpetually determin’d according to the natural Laws of Motion; all which Laws Wren and Huygens have shewn how to exhibit by the Beam of a Balance, suspended either upon a single Center, or upon two Centers at equal distance from the Center of Gravity.41 Nor is the Cunning or Craft of any one above all the rest, of so great Powers as to force the Beam, which is depress’d by the real Necessities, Powers, and Counsels of a great Number, toward the common Good, to incline to the contrary Part, that is, to the private Advantage of any particular Person. Wherefore it cannot but appear evident, from the general Nature of human Power, “That we can more surely procure its Assistance, by promoting the common Good, than by Force and Fraud, or a savage Rapaciousness”; to which, according to Hobbes’s Doctrine, (in the Epistle dedicatory to his Treatise de Cive,) even good Men must have recourse in a State of Nature;42 and their natural Right resto perve themselves, makes it no Vice.

  Which is illustrated from the known Laws of Matter and Motion.§XV. Our Opinion seems to be much illustrated by the general Principles of Mechanical Philosophy, (the only Principles Hobbes himself seems to me to agree to,) which inculcate this principally, as necessary in every Hypothesis, “That the Motion of the corporeal World, dispersed thro’ the several Parts thereof, is preserv’d by that mutual Communication, Cession, Acceleration, or Retardation, of all Motions, which the Powers and Impulses of every particular Body, reduced to an exact Calculation, require: yet so, That the Motion of the whole System about the common Center, (which is compos’d as a whole, of the Motions of every particular Body added together,) is preserv’d always without In terruption or Alteration, and determines and adjusts the Motion of all its Parts.” All Bodies have the same Power and Necessity to continue in Motion, which is in each proportionable to their Quantity of Matter, or their Bulk and Solidity compar’d together: but even this Force is subordinate, in every particular Body, to the Motion of the whole System; and is therefore it self, as well as the whole, preserv’d by that which determines it. Thus the Motions of particular Bodies agree with the general Motion of the Whole, and are subservient thereto; and that general Motion of the System governs and preserves the Powers of all particular Bodies, in the most effectual manner, by the Nature of things consider’d, either together, or each by it self; which Nature consists in perpetual Motion and Change. All things are so order’d, “That not the smallest Quantity of Matter nor Motion may be lost,” which is demonstrated from Mechanical Principles; and universal Experience, and the most authentick Histories of past Times, witness, “That the same Kinds of Animals are perpetuated, and their Numbers rather increas’d than diminish’d, notwithstanding the fierce Passions of some few Animals.” In this Perpetuity of Matter and Motion, and of the Kinds of all things continued by a Succession of Individuals, consists the Preservation, or natural Good, of the material Universe, which is promoted, according to the unchangeable Laws of Motion. Nor can any sufficient Reason be assign’d, “Why the Preservation of Mankind should not be look’d upon as establish’d and continued by the force of Causes equally certain and natural, as the Successions of any other Animals, which entirely depend upon the unchangeable Nature of the material World, and the necessary Laws of Motion, since they perfectly agree in all that is essential to an Animal.” Certainly the Conjunction of the Mind with the Body, very often makes its Condition better than that of Brutes, but never worse; which will be evident to any one who considers, what Advantages the Body receives from the Conduct of Reason, which abundantly compensate some Mischiefs, which happen to the Body thro’ the Error of the Mind: nay, it is certain, that the Errors of the Mind about Food, Pleasure, and other things which relate to the care of the Body, proceed from hence, that the Mind, regardless of the Admonitions of its own Reason, gives way to the Appetite, and the corporeal or animal Affections.

  Whence it appears, that the common Good is the noblest Effect possible, and inseparable from that of particular Persons.These Observations, concerning the necessary Causes of the Preservation of the corporeal Universe, and (to omit other things) of the several Kinds of Animals, and consequently of Mankind, make such Impressions upon the Minds of Men, as these which follow, and conduce much to our present purpose, viz.

  1. That the Preservation (or common Good) of Mankind is a matter not only possible, but that it depends upon so many Causes, so certainly determin’d, that we have the greatest reason to believe, that it will undoubtedly be perpetuated, notwithstanding the malevolent Endeavours of any to the contrary.

  2. That this Effect is both in its own nature the most noble, and most closely united with the Preservation, and possible Happiness, of every Individual.

  3. That the Matter and Motion of all particular Bodies, and, consequently, of Men themselves, is, in some measure, naturally and necessarily subservient, whether they will or no, to the Preservation of the corporeal Universe, (which includes human Bodies,) namely, as every particular Body is determin’d in its own Motion, by the general Motion of the whole System, by which it is perpetuated.

  Does not the Nature of Things, and consequently God its Author, powerfully persuade and command an Endeavour to promote the common Good of Mankind, by every Indication they give, that it is both a possible Effect, and the greatest; and also more closely united with the private Happiness of every one, than any other Effect which we can foresee as possible, and by making us in some degree to promote it necessarily, even then when we give way to our natural Affections, and oppose it to the utmost of our Power? Is it not evident, that he acts most agreeably to practical Reason, and to the imprinted Ideas of the Causes of both publick and private Good, who promotes the first Attempts of corporeal Nature, and exalts them to a greater height, by the additional Force of the human Mind?

  Which is effected by the Subordination and balancing of Powers.But this seems to be sufficiently evident to all, especially because the whole Operation of the Mind, necessary to compleat human Happiness, may be deduced from what I have said concerning the manner in which the corporeal World is preserv’d; for it consists in these two Things, (1.) That the Endeavours of all particular Persons toward their own Preservation be made subordinate to such Endeavours or Actions as are evidently necessary to the Preservation of the Whole. (2.) That by this Method those Powers of all Individuals, necessary for Self-defence, be so pois’d, that no one can be destroy’d by any other, to the hazard and damage of the Whole. Something like these is observable in the Motions of the Mundane System, which arises from the Plenitude of the World,43 and the Contact of Bodies, and therefore extends it self to them all. It is the work of the Mind and Reason to observe, “That every one’s proper Happiness depends in a nobler manner upon the voluntary Actions of other rational Agents, even at a great distance”; and therefore to take care, “That all human Actions do in like manner contribute to the common Good of all rational Beings; as the Motions of all Bodies contribute to the Preservation of the corporeal System.” This we shall effect, if these two Things which I have now mention’d, be observ’d in all voluntary Actions which respect others. Thus therefore we are instructed by the Nature of things, “How to promote the common Happiness, and our own, which is necessarily included therein”: which is the same as to say, “We are taught what Actions are commanded by the Law of Nature.” And certainly all prudent Persons, in all kind of Deliberations, where Civil Laws take no place, or leave the matter to every Man’s own Determination, naturally fix their Eyes on these things, and can agree among themselves upon these things only, which serve to promote the common Good of the Parties consulting, and so to balance the Powers of all, that it may be every one’s Interest, that no one have Power to oppress another. Thus, among all neighbouring States, who are not subject to the same Government, this is the chief View in all Embassies, Covenants, and Leagues, so to balance the Powers of every particular State by mutual Assistance, that it should be difficult for them to destroy one another, but sufficiently easy to preserve, and, in some measure, enrich, themselves, which was the End of first erecting Civil States.

  Which is illustrated from the Consideration of the Nature of Government,§XVI. In like manner, at the first Establishment of any Commonwealth, the Powers of all Orders and Parts are mutually balanc’d with the greatest Exactness, and are all subjected to the supreme Power, so as to be able mutually to assist, but hardly to hurt, one another. Nay, further, the Preservation of the Commonwealth, both from seditious and internal Evils, and from foreign Invasion, is only a continued Establishment of the same Balance of Power, and proceeds from Causes plainly alike. Moreover, whenever new Laws are to be enacted, or old ones to be amended, or receive an equitable Construction, all wise Men will ever have recourse to the Principles I have mention’d; and, universally, in all Cases where civil Laws are silent, or cannot bring a seasonable Relief, or where they allow a Liberty of acting, to Persons, whether in a publick or private Station, (which Cases, as Hobbes himself owns, are almost innumerable,)44natural Rules of human Actions can be taken from nothing else, than from the Consideration of the common Good, as the End, and from the Advantage of preserving that Balance of Power, which either Nature hath made, or the Constitution of the Commonwealth hath establish’d.

  And of the System of the World, without assuming any particular Hypothesis.Tho’ I own, that the Power of Order and of conspiring to one common End, and also the Necessity of a Balance of Power in all Parts of any System, in order to the Preservation of the Whole, both may be, and usually are, observ’d in the Frame, whether Natural or Artificial, of such things especially as are most obvious, without any Skill in Mathematicks, and the mechanical Philosophy of the System of the World; in like manner, as much is discover’d concerning the Numbers and Magnitudes of Things, without any other Arithmetick and Geometry, than what is learn’d by common Experience only, without the Help of Books: Yet I thought it proper, in this stricter Research into the Nature of Causes, where we are endeavouring to obtain an exact Knowledge of the whole Matter, sometimes to have recourse to those Sciences, in which these Notions are most distinctly explain’d, and in so general a manner, that they may, with great Advantage of Illustration, be thence easily apply’d. So it is usual to have recourse to the artificial Rules of Arithmetick and Geometry, when any Difficulty arises relating to those Things, whose Number or Measure we have guess’d at by the Help of natural Sagacity only, or when we have occasion for an exact Computation. I chose to illustrate the present Argument by the Example of the System of the World; both because some general, tho confus’d, Notion thereof is always present to the Minds of all, and imprints upon them some Idea of the greatest End, the common Good, and of mutual Assistance, as the only Means to obtain it; and because, from those general Motions of the System of the World, (of which only the Learned frame a distinct Idea,) the Powers, Orders, and Limits, of all lesser Motions, as from the most general Causes, are deduced; so that, in this Enquiry into Causes, we can never stop, till we arrive at the First Causes among those which are created, which lead us immediately to God. But let it suffice, to have hinted these things in general; from them it easily appears, “That those Powers, which, consider’d either singly or jointly with others, are very unequal, may yet be conveniently enough balanc’d among themselves in the same System, to the Preservation of the Whole.” I thought it proper, not to make use of any particular Hypothesis, with respect to the System of the World; both because the Resemblance between the Manner and Causes, by which this material World and Mankind are preserv’d, does not extend it self to all Circumstances, (which is not necessary, in order to the Mind’s learning something, which may be of publick Advantage;) and because what I have advanc’d is so manifestly true, that it must be admitted in every Hypothesis: Lastly, because to have added more, was not necessary to those who are conversant in Natural Philosophy, and to others it would be unacceptable, and seem impertinent.

  II. As a Body, endow’d with Life and Sense, like other Animals.§XVII. II. That Power and that Necessity of being subservient to the Motions of innumerable other Bodies, which I have shewn, from the general Nature of Matter and Motion, to be in all Bodies, as long as they continue in Motion, are found likewise in human Bodies, and seem to persuade, and readily incline, each particular Person to lend his Assistance to Mankind. But if to these we add those things which distinguish the Nature of Animals from other Bodies, they will more strongly incline us, and will lay before us a sufficient Reason, why we should be chiefly sollicitous to assist those of our own Species, with little comparative regard to other Bodies.

  Bodies Animate are distinguish’d from Inanimate, by that Temper of Parts, and Configuration of Organs, which are sufficient for Nutrition, Generation, Sensation, Imagination, Affections, and voluntary Motions; and all unanimously agree, that, by these Actions, all kind of Animals endeavour their own Preservation, and Perfection, or Happiness, for the time appointed by the universal Causes of the World. Nor is it difficult, in some measure, to explain the Power and Causes of this Endeavour, from the Observations of Anatomists and Physicians, on the Circulation of the Blood and other useful Juices, and on the spreading of the Nerves thro’ the whole Body of Animals, together with what Natural Philosophers have thence deduced, concerning the Causes of Hunger and muscular Motion; but it is not worth while to insist upon the Proof of Truths universally acknowledg’d; from these, as allow’d us by our Adversaries, it will be proper to draw some Inferences, which may make for our present Purpose. Such are,

  First, “That, from the same inward Frame of Animals, which determines them to Self-Preservation, there are beside afforded manifest Indications, that their behaving themselves innocently and beneficently towards Animals of the same Species, is necessary to their own Preservation and happiest State”: and then,

  Secondly, “That, from the Concurrence of the same internal Causes, Animals cannot but be sensible of, and retain in Memory, these Indications.” The former of these summarily includes the Precept and the Sanction of the Laws of Nature; the latter respects their Promulgation, or the manner by which they become known: There fore both these must be explain’d in their proper order.

  Whence the first Indication to Benevolence is this, That Men, being Animals of the same kind with other Men, have therefore their Appetite of Self-preservation limited in like manner; which is therefore very consistent with a Permission to others of the same Species, to preserve themselves likewise.In the first place it offers it self to our Observation, “That the Bodies of each Animal are contain’d within very narrow Limits, and that the time of their possible Duration is but small”; which is a sufficient Indication, that each has occasion for a few things only, in order to its Welfare; or that, if some sort of concurrence of many things be necessary, it is no other, than what may at the same time be communicated to many. Hence they are by Nature induced to desire but few things for them selves separately, and to desire those things in common with others, whose Use may conveniently be common to many, such as Air and Light. The same Surface of Skin, which in every Animal limits the spreading and circulation of its Blood, by the same Power, sets Limits to those Necessities, which urge it to Self-preservation. All the Necessities of the Body are enclos’d within the Circumference of the Circle describ’d by the Blood of that Animal: Those few things which are sufficient to fan and repair this vital Fluid, are sufficient to the Preservation of Life, Health, and natural Strength. The Quantity of that Juice is very small, which, by twitching the Stomach and Throat of an Animal, excites Hunger and Thirst; and it therefore needs no great Quantity of Meat and Drink to rebate its force. Lastly, the Capacity, of those Vessels in which the Nourishment is prepar’d and fermented, of the Chyle-Vessels, and of the Veins and Arteries receiving it, is fill’d by a Quantity so determin’d and small, that I believe it evident, that no Animal, even of the Brutekind, ever fell into Hobbes’s Error, so as to think all things necessary to its own Preservation.

  It is hence evident, from the inward Frame of Animals, “That it is necessary to their Preservation, that they take to themselves only a few things, to satisfy their Hunger and Thirst, and to repel the inclemency of the Weather, and leave the rest of fruitful Mother Earth’s abundant Productions to those others, to whom they may be useful.” Thus the Quantity of the Bodies of Animals, which is naturally limited, limits their Appetites, to seek only a few things necessary for themselves, leaving the rest to the use of others; whence naturally arises some kind of division of Things, among several Animals, in which is laid the Foundation of that Concord and mutual Benevolence, which we are inquiring after. For on this very account, that Self-Love, which is natural to Animals, is limited and satisfy’d in the manner I have now shewn, there is no inducement to their opposing the Preservation of others, either by debarring them from a free use of what is not necessary to themselves, or even by refusing to lend them their Labour, when it is of no further use to themselves; but they are rather, on the contrary, thence dispos’d to assist others; whether from the Pleasure, tho it were not suppos’d very great,45 which they receive from the Society of others, and the present Happiness thence arising; or from the Hope of their afterwards rewarding them with the like Assistance. Animals (I believe) are sensible, I am sure Men cannot be ignorant, that when once they have provided themselves with Necessaries, there remains nothing that can be of greater Advantage to them, than Tranquillity, and the Society of Animals of their own Kind, which can be procur’d or preserv’d, only by Benevolence towards them.

  Secondly, That Likeness of Images, by which Animals of the same Species are represented, disposes them to Affections, like to those, by which they are inclin’d to their own Preservation.§XVIII. We may take the second Indication, from the Effects of the Senses, Imagination, and Memory, when they are employ’d about Animals of the same kind; for those Impressions, which, made upon the Senses of Animals, discover others to have a Nature very like their own, passing immediately into the Brain (where they goby the Name of Imagination) dispose them to Affections towards those of their own kind, like those they bear towards themselves, and that from the Constitution of their own Nature. Here I will industriously avoid all Controversies, concerning the Knowledge of brute Animals, of what Kind it is, and of the manner how the Affections are mov’d by the Imagination; I take this only for granted, “That the Imagination excites the Affections,” and “That a like Imagination (as such) excites like Affections.” The latter is a Consequence of the former; whence I would infer only thus much, “That a known Likeness of Natures, when discover’d, does somewhat promote Benevolence among those who are alike, except it be join’d with some unlikeness more strongly enforcing Enmity.” To this it is owing, that Animals cannot wholly forget others of the same Kind, whilst they remember themselves. For like Animals (as far as they are such) are represented under the same Image; they also cannot but know, that they are subject to like Hunger and Thirst with themselves; and that they are therefore equally urg’d by Nature, to seek Nourishment for themselves; and that therefore it is pleasing to them, when they are permitted a free use of it, or when they are assisted in procuring it. Because Animals have perpetually such Images of others of the same Kind, and some benevolent Efforts thence necessarily arising from the Condition of their Nature, it follows, “That their natural Disposition is so far thwarted, as any thing contrary to such natural Efforts proceeds either from Madness or Pleasure, or any violent Desires or Passions”: As all look upon it as a Dies temper, and praeter natural Disposition of a Dog, who, thro’ Rage or Madness, is unusually excited to bite every other Dog he meets. Nor can I see any Reason, why all kinds of Affections, which so disturb the Oeconomy of any particular Animal, as to hurry it on to Actions destructive to Animals of the same Species, (such as Malevolence, Envy, violent Fits of Anger, &c.) should not be look’d upon as certain Distempers of the Blood, and Brain perhaps, and somewhat a kin to the Rage of a mad Dog. Such Affections are attended with manifest Symptoms of Distempers, an overflowing of the bilious Juices, a dangerous Effervescence of Blood, a Jaundice Colour, Paralytick Tremblings, and other such Effects, well enough known to Physicians. Nor is raging Anger against Animals of the same Species, the only Passion which turns to a formal Disease; an excessive Fear of them is no less Praeter natural; that is, it is no less different from that Manner of all Animals, which arises from their natural and found Disposition; and, like other Distempers, it prejudices their Health by reducing them to Sadness, Solitariness, and unseasonable Watchings, with the other Symptoms of a predominant Melancholy, which hastens untimely Death; nor can any Measure or Bounds be set to this Fear, which is rooted in a false Imagination and Opinion, that all other Animals of the same Species, are naturally and necessarily inclin’d, to hurt, and fight against, them.

  The Condition of such Animals, (and such Hobbes feigns all Men in a State of Nature,) is perfectly like the wretched State of those, who are seiz’d with a Hydrophobia;46 they are afraid of Water and all Liquids, without which, (tho they sometimes hurt accidentally,) Life cannot be supported. And as this Opinion proceeds not from the Nature of the Water, but from an Imagination disturb’d by the Bite of a mad Dog, so it proceeds from a distemper’d Brain and Imagination, that any Animal is afraid of its whole Species, when in reality there is nothing pleasanter to those whose Brain is not disturb’d. It is too well known to need Proof, “That Animals, if by any Accident they have for some time been separated from others of the same Kind, as soon as they have come within sight of one another, even at a distance, immediately rejoice, shew their Joy by Gestures, run to one another, and with Pleasure eat, drink, and play together, but very seldom fight with one another; and, if at anytime they happen to fight, that immediately after a Victory, for the most part obtain’d without any Damage, the same Animals herd again very lovingly and peaceably together.” But because it is evident, “That the Causes of their thus peaceably associating and agreeing with one another, which are essential to Brutes, are plainly necessary; nor other than those, by which their Blood, Spirits, Brain and Nerves, are preserv’d in a sound State”; it thence follows evidently, “That the Health of every one of them cannot be separated from an Inclination to associate friendly with those of the same Species, but is easily and naturally preserv’d therewith”; which was what was to be prov’d from this second Indication, which is common to all kinds of Animals, and consequently to Men.

  Thirdly, The Love Animals bear to those of their own Species, is a pleasant Affection, and its Exercise therefore closely connected with that Self-love, which is common to all Animals.§XIX. Near of kin to this is the Third Indication, taken from the Pleasantness of those Affections, which are conversant about Good common to many: This is of near Affinity with the precedent, because the Rise, and all the Powers, of the Affections, depend upon the Imagination. Natural Philosophers very well know, “That the Motion of the Blood and Heart, which is necessary to Life, is befriended by Love, Desire, Hope and Joy, especially when conversant about a great Good; whence the Arteries and Veins are fill’d with better and more flowing Juices, brisker Spirits are produced, and the whole Circulation, and consequently all the animal Functions, perform’d with greater Ease.” Nor is it less evident, “That the Good, which is known to extend it self to very many, (among which the Animal it self, concerning which we speak, is comprehended,) will upon this very account appear the greatest.” Wherefore it self will necessarily be much befriended by those very Affections, by which it befriends other Animals of the same kind with it self:47 And for this very Reason, that it has naturally a perfect Sense of this Effect in it self, it will have a strong Propension to those benevolent Affections, as very useful to, and intimately united with, its own Preservation, and a natural Reward will follow such Affections. I affirm’d indeed, that every Animal perceives this agreeable Effect, or the Pleasure of such Passions; yet the manner how these Passions have this friendly Influence, is unknown to most Men, who are ignorant of natural Philosophy, much more is it above the Knowledge of Brutes: It is, however, sufficient, to excite the Inclinations I have mention’d, that they are sensible of the Effect. On the contrary, “In Envy, Hatred, Fear and Grief, the Motion of the Blood is retarded, and the Heart is clogg’d, so that it contracts, and expels the Blood, with difficulty; whence the Countenance of Man becomes pale, and numberless Mischiefs, in the whole Animal Oeconomy, but especially in the Functions of the Brain and Nerves, follow; such are the Distempers usually ascrib’d to the Spleen and Melancholy.” This Matter belongs properly to the Consideration of Physicians; I therefore willingly resign it to the Skilful in that Art, who are daily industrious to adorn it with noble Discoveries for the Good of Mankind. I will, however, transcribe one extraordinary Case, from Harvey’s Anatomical Exercitation concerning the Circulation of the Blood, which will be a noble Illustration of what I have advanc’d. “I knew” (says he) “a high-spirited Man, who, thro’Anger and Indignation conceiv’d for an Injury, join’d with an Affront, receiv’d at the Hands of a powerful Person, so kindled with Rage, that, Envy and Hatred continually increasing for want of Revenge, and the strong Passion which rankled in his Mind being disclos’d to no one, he fell at length into a strange kind of Distemper, and was miserably afflicted with a great Oppression and Pain, both of his Heart and Breast, so that receiving no Relief from the Advice of the most Skilful, he fell, after some Years, into a sscorbutick Habit of Body, which threw him into a Consumption, of which he died. He had some Ease, only as of ten and as long as the whole Region of his Breast was compress’d. His jugular Veins were swell’d, as thick as a Man’s Thumb, with a Pulse high and strong, as if each of them were it self the Aorta, or great descending Artery, and appear’d like two oblong Aneurisms;48when I had dissected the Body, I found the Heart and Aorta so distended, and stuffed with Blood, that the Size of the Heart and Cavities of the Ventricles were as great as those of an Ox.”49 Whence we may observe, that such Passions obstruct the Motion of the Blood in the small Branches of the Arteries, which are dispers’d thro’ the Brain; and that vast Mischiefs arise thence to the Heart, and consequently to the whole Animal, with dire Symptoms of Distempers, whence Life it self (common to Man with other Animals) is greatly endanger’d. It is hence evident, “That the very Nature of an Animal, and of the Passions, admonishes Men, that it will be of Advantage to them, to be of a benevolent Disposition towards others, all, if possible”; since fierce Hatred against one Man brought so great Mischiefs to the Cherisher of the Passion.

  Fourthly, The same is prov’d, from their natural Propension, to propagate their Species, and rear their Offspring.§XX. Next follows the fourth Indication of the same thing, which is taken from hence, “That Animals are incited to endeavour the Propagation of their own Species, by the force of the same Causes, which preserve the Life of every Individual, so that these Two are connected by Tie evidently natural.” Hence it is, that, Animals of the same Species but, different Sexes are united, by a strong Friendship, whence they perform to one another many mutual good Offices, and that Offspring is propagated, which they love and cherish as their own Blood, except something very unusual happens to change their natural Inclinations. But those things, which so rarely happen, ought not to be brought into the account, when we are taking a Survey of the ordinary and regular State of Nature. The Connexion is very close between the Propagation of the Species, and that natural Affection, which excites to an Endeavour of nourishing the young when brought forth. Preservation is only a kind of continued Generation of a thing; therefore the same natural Causes will incline an Animal to both: But it is evident, that their Offspring cannot be preserv’d, except Animals of the same Kind mutually cultivate Peace or Benevolence. Therefore they naturally desire, that this Benevolence may be of as long Continuance, as they wish to their Offspring: in such a Benevolence, which is extensive and durable, consists the Pursuit of the common Good of the whole Species, in proportion to the Capacity of the Animal, which, indeed, if Man be excepted, is but of a small reach, and not at all provident. Yet that low degree of Sagacity, which all Animals are possess’d of, is sufficient to enable them, to provide for themselves and their Young, by the exercise of some kind of Benevolence towards Animals of the same Kind. Because I hinted, “That the natural Love of their Offspring, proceeds from the same Causes, which incline Animals to propagate their Species,” I must shew, “That this Inclination is essential to Animals, whose Powers are come to their greatest Perfection, and that it flows from the same Causes, which are necessary to the Preservation and Perfection of every Individual”: Whence it follows, “That it is necessary, that Animals should, along with their own Welfare, endeavour the Continuation of their own Species, and, consequently, promote the common Good.” And this is evident, from the manner in which Animals are form’d, and nourish’d: for it is certain, (as Harvey has observ’d,)50 that the same Causes which, in the Womb or Egg, form the Parts requisite to the Nourishment of the Individual, (as the Stomach, Heart, &c.) do likewise form the spermatick Vessels, and difference of Sexes, in the first rough-draught of Animals. From the same Mass of nutritious Juice mingled with the Blood, part goes into Nourishment, part into Seed for propagating the Species. The whole Circulation of the Blood, and every thing instrumental thereto, as the muscular Force of the Heart, and the Contrivance of the Valves in the Veins, is at the same time subservient to the private Nourishment of the Individual, and to the publick Good by propagating the Species, whilst it sends off the Materials of the Seed to the spermatick Vessels. Lastly, whatever any of the Bowels, or other Parts of the Body, perform towards preserving the natural State of the Blood, at the same time tends to preserve the Life of the Individual, and, remotely at least, disposes to the Procreation of Offspring, which is hinder’d by every great Disorder of the Blood.

  I might here expatiate very largely; but, lest I should be too prolix, I thought it proper to leave the Remainder of what be longs to this Subject, to be farther pursued by such Readers as are skilful in Natural Philosophy and Medicine, and to be apply’d, by a Parity of Reason with what I have already suggested, to the forming a Rule of Manners from the Indications of Nature, I will add only this, that it is very evident, “That Animals are in the manner above-mention’d inclin’d to the Love of the other Sex, and of their Offspring, and thus divest themselves of a contracted Selfishness, which when they have once laid aside, they are easily induc’d to proceed still further in the Love of others, till at last, upon account of their Likeness of Nature, it takes in all of the same Species”; and, consequently, that the Observation of common Experience hasits Foundation in the common Nature of Animals, “That Men are more inclin’d to Peace after begetting Children, and that their natural Propension to beget Children disposes all to the Love of Peace.”

  (All our Actions cannot be resolv’d into a principle of Self-Love; and, tho they could, that would not take away the Obligations to promote the common Good.)I must here, however, take notice of that common Evasion, by which many are wont to elude this and other Indications taken from natural Inclinations, whence human Reason may learn the Law of Nature, “That, altho it often happens that, by means of these Inclinations, many are profited, yet they all proceed from the Love of our own Pleasure only, and, consequently, that all the Actions flowing from hence have no other End, and that they therefore discover no thing but mere Self-Love.”

  I answer, 1. It is evident from what I have already said, that I do not take any Indication of a Law of Nature, obliging to promote the common Good, from the End which Animals propose to themselves; I affirm nothing concerning their Intentions.

  2.51 It cannot be prov’d, that Animals, in those voluntary Actions, by which they actually promote the Good of others, as well as themselves, do not alike intend and will both. It is certainly much more probable, that both Effects are equally intended; since it is so in all those Cases, where Men act deliberately; for they intend to produce all the foreseen Effects of their Actions, tho some of them move them to Action much more strongly than others, and delight them much more, after the Action is over; yet every thing which they intend to effect, is justly call’d an End of Action.

  3. Supposing, but not granting, that Animals sought their own Preservation and Happiness only, as their End, and that they exercis’d Benevolence towards other Animals of the same Kind, as the Means, naturally and perpetually necessary to that End; yet even this Supposition would prove, that there was an Indication from Nature, “That the common Good of the whole Species was to be promoted,” and thence would arise an Obligation to the use of Means so necessary, which would be no less valid than our Obligation to the End suppos’d, viz. Self-preservation. For the Obligation is the same to the necessary Means, and to the End it self. And this Obligation is equally valid, with any which can arise from the Punishments of Civil Laws, which can inflict nothing greater than Death, and which these Objectors contend, is by far the greatest, or rather the only real Obligation we lie under. For this Reason therefore, among many others, Hobbes’s Argument is vain, who (that he might take away all natural Obligation to promote the common Good) endeavours to resolve all natural Propensions tending thereto, into a Desire of preserving or of pleasing one’s self only. So, partly in his Treatise of human Nature, (Chap. 9. § 10, 15, 16, 17.)52 partly in that de Cive (Chap. 1. § 2.) he affirms, not only that the Love by which Animals are inclin’d to the Propagation of their Species, but also, that the natural Affection, with which they embrace and rear their Offspring, and all Charity towards others, and Compassion towards the Afflicted, arise from hence, “That Animals, by these Actions, either seek some Advantage to themselves, or, at least, that they may think magnificently of their own Powers, or have a good Opinion of themselves,”53 which is Hobbes’s Definition of Glory; but, beside that the inward Force of these Affections, and their Effects, by which they are much more serviceable to others, than to the Agents themselves, are an evident Proof of the contrary; and that those Animals, in which these Affections are vigorous, are sensible enough of this, and therefore cannot but intend greater Advantages to others than to themselves: If it be granted, “That these Affections are necessarily in Animals, that they may make themselves happy by certain Advantages and this imaginary Glory,” nevertheless the Obligation to Actions advantageous to others would remain, lest they should in any respect be wanting to themselves, in those things which he supposes to be naturally and necessarily, and, consequently, perpetually desir’d. For it is impossible, but that they must be influenc’d by the Hope of enjoying these Advantages, and by the Fear of losing them, if those Actions, which respect the Good of others, be neglected; and Hobbes acknowledges, that natural Obligation takes place, where human Liberty is restrain’d by Hope or Fear, de Cive, c. 15. §7.54 This Reasoning seems to me conclusive against Objections upon Hobbes’s Principles. In what consists the Nature of moral Obligation, I have elsewhere explain’d; I will here only add, “That in the true Rules of Morality, whence natural Obligation arises, so diminutive an End as the Preservation of one Man only, is not regarded, but the common Happiness of all rational Beings.” On the contrary, Hobbes proposes this little End as the Rule of all human Actions, with this View, that they may neglect any Actions whatsoever, and any natural benevolent Propensions, when soever they shall not seem to make for their own private Advantage, altho in reality “The Desire of the publick Good testify’d by outward Actions, is always a Means necessary to the chief Happiness of every particular Man”; which yet most, who are blinded with Self-Love, are generally ignorant of.

  Lastly, Not to dwell too long upon the Solution of this Objection, it is to be consider’d, that I have drawn my Conclusion, not from voluntary Actions, whose Ends are various in different Animals, and in the same Animal at different times, but from such Actions and Inclinations as are evidently necessary, which are in Animals even not conscious of them, and sometimes opposing them; and which, as I briefly hinted, proceed from the very Frame and Temper of their Bodies; for it is not owing to their chusing and desiring to preserve themselves, but to the natural Contraction of the Heart, that the Blood is sent off to the spermatick Vessels, and the Seed thence separated and brought to Perfection, whence arise in all Animals, venereal Inclinations, and a Desire of begetting and preserving Offspring. For both Appetites are Effects of the same Cause: Just as from the same matter an Animal is at first form’d, and for some time nourish’d and grows in the Egg or Womb; yet of these things the Parents are so little conscious, that, tho they concur, as Instruments to the Production of the Effect, yet they know not before their Offspring comes into the World, whether what they have begotten be Male or Female, whether it receives its Nourishment by the Mouth or Navel, or both: Nay, whether it is at all nourish’d, or whether it lives or no. It is hence evident, “That, in the forming and nourishing the Foetus, Animals are not directed by their Knowledge foreseeing the Effect or End, much less by the Prospect of preserving their own Life by this Method, for that is rather weakened by the Propagation of the Species; but that these Actions are done by them without Deliberation, and that the Propensions to these Actions are in a high Degree necessary”: In these Actions Animals are plainly like Plants, which, tho they are void of Sense and all Prospect of an End, yet do not draw in Nourishment for themselves alone, but produce Seed for the Propagation of their Species. And as in Eggs are contain’d both the Body of the Chicken, and proper Nourishment for it, till it becomes strong enough to procure its Food elsewhere, and to digest it; so also in Seeds, beside the small Bud, (which is the rough-draught of a future Plant,) is contain’d also a fit Substance, which, after moistening, and a certain kind of Fermentation arising from a proper Heat, insinuates it self into the tender Roots of the Bud, which it nourishes till it has got Strength enough to imbibe Nourishment out of the neighbouring Earth. But afterwards, when the Foetus is born, Animals perceiving, that an Animal like themselves is form’d from their own Blood, by the Concurrence of their own natural Powers, they are inwardly dispos’d not to destroy it, by any Act or voluntary Neglect of theirs. What I have now advanc’d, is well enough known to natural Philosophers; which if any one desires to see more distinctly explain’d, he may consult Harvey and Highmore of Generation, and Needham in his learned Treatise of the Formation of the Foetus.55 These few Observations are sufficient to prove “That a strong Tendency, not only to propagate their Species, but to nourish it when propagated, arises from the very Frame and natural Disposition of Animals (nay, and of Plants too) which proceeds from universal and determin’d Causes.” What is more, it is well known from Experience, “That these Propensions grow stronger in Animals by Age and Practice, so that any Accident thwarting these, produces in them strong Resentments.” Hence Mankind shed those Tears, which fall in case of disappointed Love, of Barrenness, or Loss of Children. Therefore one may easily infer, from these, and innumerable other like Instances which daily happen, “That the ordinary State of Animals would, for the most part, be very disagreeable to ’em, unless (to the best of their Power) they enter, by Benevolence towards others of the same Species, into a friendly Society with them, by whose Assistance they may beget Offspring, and rear them as safely as possible.”

  Fifthly, Benevolence among Animals of the same Species, prov’d from the intire Frame of Animals.Lastly, The whole Frame of Animals, (because it is the necessary Cause of their usual Functions and Actions,) plainly indicates, “That from the same internal Causes proceed both Actions in order to Self-preservation, and Affections of so great Benevolence, as are sufficient for a friendly Association with other Animals of the same Species”: for these two are generally exerted by all Kinds of Animals, altho it happens sometimes, but rarely, thro’ Ignorance or irregular Passions, that they hurt either themselves or others of the same Species. Therefore, because Concord among them is much more frequent than Discord, it follows, “That the natural and internal Causes of Concord are stronger, or that their Nature, without the Assistance of civil Society, does more strongly incline them to this Affection than to Discord”; which is the principal Point I contend for. For (unless it appear, that the Animal Nature in Men is fiercer or less inclinable to Peace than the same in Brutes) this is sufficient to prove, that in all Deliberations upon future Events (in which we can only reckon upon what happens for the most part) we may conclude in general, “That a peaceable Association with others will be more agreeable to our natural Inclinations, and that the same is more probably to be expected in others, than the contrary, tho in some Cases it may happen otherwise.” As any one may with truth affirm, that it is more agreeable to the Nature of a Die, that a Six should not be thrown at the first Cast, than that it should; because there are five possible Cases inconsistent with this Cast, and but one that favours it. That Brute Animals act, for the most part, benevolently with others of their own Kind, is easy to prove, by taking a View of all those things, which I have in the first Chapter shewn to be requisite, that any thing may be said to be subservient to the publick Good of any Species.56 They generally abstain from mutually hurting one another.57Juvenal has long since observ’d what makes much for our present Purpose.

  • ———Mollissima corda
  • Humano generi dare se natura fatetur,
  • Quae lacrymas dedit. Haec nostri pars optima sensus.
  • Plorare ergo jubet casum lugentis amici,
  • Squaloremque rei, pupillum ad jura vocantem
  • Circumscriptorem, cujus manantia fletu
  • Ora puellares faciunt incerta capilli.
  • Naturae imperio gemimus, cum funus adultae
  • Virginis occurrit, vel terra clauditur infans,
  • Et minor igne rogi. Quis enim bonus & face dignus
  • Arcana, qualem Cereris vult esse sacerdos,
  • Ulla aliena sibi credat mala? separat hoc nos
  • A grege mutorum, atque ideo venerabile soli.
  • Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces,
  • Atque exercendis, capiendisque artibus apti
  • Sensum à coelesti demissum traximus arce,
  • Cujus egent prona, & terram spectantia. Mundi
  • Principio indulsit communis conditor illis
  • Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque, mutuus ut nos
  • Adfectus petere auxilium, & praestare juberet,
  • Dispersos trahere in populum, migrare vetusto
  • De nemore, & proavis habitatas linquere silvas;
  • Aedificare domos, Laribus conjungere nostris
  • Tectum aliud, tutos vicino limite somnos
  • Ut collata daret fiducia: protegere armis
  • Lapsum, aut ingenti nutantem vulnere civem;
  • Communi dare signa tuba, defendier iisdem
  • Turribus, atque una portarum clave teneri.
  • Sed jam serpentum major concordia: parcit
  • Cognatis maculis similis fera. Quando leoni
  • Fortior eripuit vitam leo? quo nemore unquam
  • Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri?
  • Indica tigris agit rabida cum tigride pacem
  • Perpetuam: saevis inter se convenit ursis.

  • Juven. Satyr. 15.58

  • Compassion proper to Mankind appears,
  • Which Nature witness’d, when she lent us Tears.
  • Of tender Sentiments we only give
  • Those Proofs: To Weep is our Prerogative;
  • To shew by pitying Looks, and melting Eyes,
  • How with a Suff’ring Friend we Sympathize!
  • Nay, Tears will ev’n from a wrong’d Orphan slide,
  • When his false Guardian at the Bar is try’d:
  • So tender, so unwilling to accuse,
  • So oft the Roses on his Cheek bedews,
  • So soft his Tresses, fill’d with trickling Pearl,
  • You’d doubt his Sex, and take him for a Girl.
  • B’Impulse of Nature (tho to us unknown
  • The Party be) we make the Loss our own;
  • And Tears steal from our Eyes, when in the Street
  • With some betrothed Virgin’s Hearse we meet:
  • Or Infant’s Fun’ral, from the cheated Womb
  • Convey’d to Earth, and Cradled in a Tomb.
  • Who can all Sense of Others Ills escape,
  • Is but a Brute at best in Human Shape.
  • This natural Piety did first refine
  • Our Wit, and rais’d our Thoughts to Things Divine:
  • This proves our Spirit of the Gods descent,
  • While that of Beasts is prone and down-ward bent.
  • To them but Earth-born Life they did dispense,
  • To us, for mutual Aid, Coelestial Sense;
  • From straggling Mountainers, for publick Good,
  • To rank in Tribes and quit the Salvage Wood;
  • Houses to build, and them contiguous make,
  • For chearful Neighbourhood and Safety’s sake;
  • In War, a common Standard to erect,
  • A wounded Friend in Battle to protect;
  • The Summons take of the same Trumpet’s Call
  • To sally from one Port, or man one publick Wall.
  • But Serpents now more Amity maintain!
  • From spotted Skins the Leopard does refrain;
  • No weaker Lion’s by a stronger slain.
  • Nor, from his larger Tusks, the Forest Boar
  • Commission takes his Brother Swine to gore.
  • Tyger with Tyger, Bear with Bear you’ll find
  • In Leagues Offensive and Defensive join’d.

  • English’d by Mr. Tate.59

  What is more, they behave more mildly toward those, with whom they have herded for some time; and the Practice of the Storks, who feed their disabled Parents, in which are to be found some Footsteps of Gratitude, is notorious.60 In all these is observable a limited Love, both of themselves and their Offspring, and they are inclin’d to do several mutual good Offices, not trifling ones only, as when they play together, but very considerable, as when they assist one another against a common Enemy; and they signify their Expectation thereof, by a particular kind of Voice, by which most Animals, when sensible of approaching Danger, call others to their Assistance. These things are (if you consider the Substance of the Actions) the same with those which I have affirm’d to be necessarily included in the care of the publick Good, which, indeed, are perform’d very imperfectly by Brutes, yet in proportion to that slender Knowledge, which they use about things necessary to their own Preservation.

  Sixthly, Benevolence is inforc’d among Animals of the same Species, by their numerous wants, and the most probable Method of relieving them, from natural Assistance.§XXI. If we inquire into those Causes, which are so interwoven into the Frame of Animals as to become part of their Nature, and which determine them generally to such a Conduct, besides those whence I have taken the foregoing Indications, the following are peculiar to them, as they are distinguish’d from inanimate Bodies. First, their Frame, as being made up of Parts very different, needs more things for its Preservation, than Minerals or Plants do. For the Blood, and other Liquors necessary to Life, as the Lymph, Bile, Pancreatick Juice, and perhaps a Nervous Fluid, and Animal Spirits, are so perpetually subject to Change and Perspiration, that there is continual Occasion for new Recruits, and also for Exercise, Rest, Sleep, Watching, and moderate Affections, to restore to a just Temper what has been chang’d, or repair what has been spent. Hence arise very uneasy Sensations of Hunger, Thirst, and various Diseases, and these excite them to search for, and try, the most convenient Methods of acquiring Nourishment, Medicine, and other Helps, such as an Estimate of their own Powers, and a Knowledge of things about them shall suggest. But they are conver sant with nothing better known to them, than Animals of their own Species, of whole Powers and Necessities they make an easy Estimate from their Likeness to their own, and, from the same Likeness of Nature, they conceive some Hope of their Love and Assistance. The Cause of that Hope is, partly, because like Things usually beget like Images of themselves, and, consequently, like Affections (except there arise some great Impediment, such as Passion, Error, a very disagreeable unlikeness, &c.) causing them to embrace other Animals of the same Kind with themselves, with the same Love as themselves: Partly, because they foresee great and innumerable Evils arising from Discord and Contention, but that scarce any Good can be thence expected. For Equality of Strength, or many Accidents which may set a smaller Power upon a level with a greater, (such as Sleep, Weariness, Diseases, the Confederacy of several weaker Powers, various accidental Advantages arising from the Place, by means whereof the weaker may overcome the stronger,) will give them frequent Opportunities of mutually hurting or killing one another. For if contending Powers by any means become equal, they are to one another mutually, as Weights counterpoising one another, of which each can with-hold the other from the lower place, to which it tends, and neither of them can reach the Place, to which it-self tends. Such are the Mischiefs arising from the Contention of one Animal with another of equal Power, tho each were at Peace with all the rest. But if each One should wage War with all the rest, there would be so frequent Contests with Forces vastly superior, that there would remain no Hope of Life to any. To be brief, it is probable, “That, even in the Judgment of Brutes, it is better, where there is plenty of all things necessary to the Preservation of every Individual, amicably, as occasion offers, to share in the Use of Things, and assume only what is at present necessary, than to expose themselves to the Hazards of perpetual War, in order to acquire Plenty of Things not necessary.” But in the Will to allow such a Division of Things and mutual Services, and to preserve it after it is made, is contain’d the Sum of all Actions, by which the common Good of every one’s Species is procur’d; wherefore “Even Brutes themselves, in some measure, perceive the Connexion between their own Preservation, and Actions contributing to the common Good of their Species, and for this Reason act benevolently to one another”; which was to be prov’d. I will add only this, that all those things which I have observ’d in Animals, are to be consider’d jointly, as concurring to enable and incline Animals to promote the common Good of their own Species, and that so strongly and constantly, that, except Animals comply therewith, they will want a great part of their Happiness, (which consists in the gratifying of their natural Inclinations,) and will find a Grief arising from this Struggle of vain Passions, which oppose those most natural Principles of Action, whose Force depends upon no Delusion of the Imagination; and are therefore justly distinguish’d from those Passions which I call’d vain, because they proceed from a deluded Fancy. It is with this View, that I inquir’d into the Causes of this Benevolence towards Animals of the same Species, which by the help of Reason may be rais’d to a greater Degree of Pefection.

  Hobbes’s Objections against the Argument, drawn from the Association of other Animals, answer’d,§XXII. Hobbes was not ignorant, that this was no way consistent with his Principles, and therefore he abounds with such Insinuations as these to the contrary: That “Men are fiercer than Bears, Wolves, and Serpents”; that “Their natural State is a State of War of All against All,” that “Among them there is no such thing as publick Good or Evil, before the Establishment of civil Government,” and that “Therefore there is no Knowledge or Desire of such Good.” I have elsewhere cited the Passages in which he has advanc’d this Doctrine;61 but here falls properly under Consideration a Passage in his Leviathan, Chap. 17. (which is agreeable to what he advances, de Cive, c. 5. § 5.) where he thus objects to himself, “That certain living Creatures, as Bees and Ants, live sociably one with another”;62 and he asks, What hinders but that Men may do the same? He reduces his Answer to six Heads; of which the Substance is this.

  1. “Men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these Creatures are not.”63 I reply; “That civil Honours (about which Contentions sometimes arise) have no place in a State of Nature, or before the establishing civil Government among Men, and that, therefore, they cannot contend about them in a State of Nature, (concerning which is the present Question,) more than Brute Animals.” In the next place, “true Glory,” of such Honour as can be attain’d out of civil Society, according to Cicero’s Definition, is “The concurrent Praise of good Men, and the incorrupt Voice of those who form a true Judgment of eminent Virtue.”64 But the Pursuit of the common Good comprehends all Virtues, and thence only is procur’d the Praise of good Men. War, and that against all, is so far from being an Effect of the Desire of such Honour, that, on the contrary, Men are by this Motive excited, beyond other Animals, to the Exercise of all the Virtues, which Hobbes himself owns to be necessary Means of the common Peace. Leviath. 15.65

  2. He answers, 2dly. That “Among all those Creatures, the Common Good differs not from the Private, and being by Nature inclin’d to their Private, they procure thereby the Common Benefit. But Man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himself with other Men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.”66 To this I answer; “That we are oblig’d to Hobbes, that he has unawares acknowledg’d, that there is such a thing as the publick or common Good, out of civil Society, and that this is really procur’d by Brutes themselves.” Elsewhere he affirms the contrary; see his Treatise de Homine, c. 10. in the latter end.67 I am of opinion, “That the Knowledge of the publick Good, disposes Men to Peace and Virtue, as in its own Nature amiable, and the strongest Security of private Good.” Its differing (in some Cases) from the private Good of some Particulars, is not a sufficient Reason, why Men should war amongst themselves, rather than Bees or Ants, whose common Good is distinguish’d from the Private in the same manner. What he adds concerning Men, if it be taken universally, as the Words seem to import, is most false and groundless; unless, perhaps, he sends us to that general Demonstration, as he calls it, of such Matters, which he hints in the Preface to his Leviathan;68Hobbes, truly, knew himself, and that with respect to his own Possessions, he relish’d nothing but what was Eminent, upon comparing himself with other Men, and thence he concludes, that all others are in the same Sentiments. But he ought to have shewn something in the Nature of Things, or of Men, that imposes a Necessity upon all Men to form such a Judgment. All who reason justly, know certainly, from their natural Wants and the Use of Things, what Judgment to pass upon their own Affairs, whether they relish them or not, and in what degree, without comparing them with those of other Men. They are foolish or envious Persons, who take pleasure only in the Excess of their own Enjoyments above those of others. But if he would have his Assertion understood, with Limitation to such Men only, he does not assign a sufficient Cause of a universal War of All against All, but only of some accidental Contention rais’d by the Foolish and Envious, which the Reason or Force of wiser Men may easily restrain from hurting All.

  3. He answers, 3dly. That “These Creatures, having not (as Man) the Use of Reason, do not see, or think they see, any Fault in the Administration of their common Business: Whereas amongst Men it is otherwise: Hence War.”69 To which I thus answer; “That this Reason suggests nothing to hinder Men from living peaceably with one another, tho they were subject to no civil Government; in which case their natural Propensions to universal Benevolence, and all the Laws of Nature, would take place, notwithstanding any thing here alledg’d to the contrary.”70 Nor does he offer any thing which proves, but that such Men may agree among them selves to erect Civil Government, (for the Causes of such hindrance are what we at present inquire into;) he only objects what may hinder the Preservation of Government already establish’d by Consent alone. Let Hobbes look to it, whether or no what he here asserts concerning the Temper of the Generality of Mankind, will not as effectually unsettle the Foundation of Peace, in a Commonwealth establish’d by his fictitious UNION. “Among Men” (saith he) “There are very many that think themselves wiser, and able to govern the Publick better, than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way, and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civil War.”71 Do not Men, so dispos’d, usually violate the Compacts they have mutually enter’d into, and break into Civil War? It is farther to be consider’d, “That human Reason does much more effectually promote Peace and Concord, by discovering numberless Delusions of the Imagination and Passions, than Discord, by its own Fallibility, in such Things as are always necessary to the common Peace, which are but few, and very evident.” Farther, “Men don’t immediately make War, as soon as they think they see any Fault in the Administration of the Publick”; the same Reason, which discovers the Fault, also admonishes them, that many things are to be borne with for Peacesake, and suggests several Methods, by which the redressing such Grievance may be peaceably attempted. I appeal to your Judgment, candid Reader, whether Reason makes the Condition of Man worse than that of Brutes? Does not Hobbes rather form an unjust Judgment of Men, who accuses their Reason of all the Miseries arising from War and Discord, and for this Reason contends, that Men live less peaceably with one another, than irrational Brutes? But this whole Answer of Hobbes’s is nothing to the Purpose. The Question is, “Concerning the Obligation of the Precepts of right Reason, before the erecting of Government”: The Answer is, “That the Reason of many Men is so erroneous, as to dissolve Governments already erected.”

  4. He asserts, 4thly. That “Men cannot live sociably with one another as Bees, &c. because those Animals want that Art of Words, by which some Men can represent to others, that which is Good in the Likeness of Evil, and Evil in the Likeness of Good, &c. discontenting Men, and troubling their Peace at their Pleasure.”72 Truly, because it sometimes happens, that Seditions are rais’d by the help of the false colouring of Speech; therefore Men, because they can make such use of Speech, certainly will not preserve Peace among themselves. Here is evidently no Consequence. For he ought to prove, “That Men necessarily, or at least certainly, have the Will to use, and that constantly, such seditious Speeches as tend to raise War”; especially, since there are so many Causes, both within and without them, that rather persuade them to cultivate Peace. He ought likewise to prove, “That such Speeches necessarily, or at least always, have so great an Effect upon all or most of their Hearers, as to ingage them immediately in War.” For “They may, perhaps, be too sharp-sighted, to suffer themselves to be imposed upon by rhetorical varnish.” It is possible, “That they may rather listen to the peaceable Speeches of the Prudent, supported by more solid Arguments.” It is possible, “That they may rather weigh the importance of Things, than the empty Sound of Words”; to which they certainly have a natural Tendency; for they well know, that Words will not feed or defend them from Injuries, but that Actions, proceeding from mutual Benevolence, will. What hinders, but that the Persuasion of good Men may prevail, which the Reason, both of the Speaker and Hearer, and the very nature of Things themselves, favour? Why may not the Tongue of the Ambassador of Peace prevail above that which sounds the Trumpet of War? All cautious Person regard diligently, rather what others do, than what they say; and, beside, take care, that the Power of those whom they trust be so balanc’d, that they may not be able to hurt them, without their own great Peril. But, if the Reader further considers, how great Force Words, both spoken and written, are of, to the making of all Contracts, and to the preserving the Memory of Laws, (by which two subsists all peaceable Society;) I doubt not, but that he will agree with me, “That they have a much greater Tendency to establish, than banish, Peace, and that they are, therefore, to be reckon’d among the Advantages of Mankind, and not among those things, which make Men more inhuman than Brutes themselves.”

  5. Hobbes urges, “Irrational Creatures cannot distinguish between Injury and Damage, and, therefore, as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their Fellows. Whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdom, and censure the Actions of them who govern the Common wealth.”73 The Antithesis, or Opposition, here insinuates thus much; “That Men are of a less peaceable Disposition than Brutes, because they distinguish between Injury and Damage.” I am of a very different Opinion, “That Men more patiently bear Damage done them by other Men, provided it be not injuriously done, and that all Distinction between these two, is founded in the Knowledge of Right and Laws, which I readily acknowledge, to be proper to Man alone.” But I utterly deny, “That this Knowledge inclines Men to violate Peace, or to trample upon the Laws, and the Rights of others like their own.” I acknowledge, indeed, “That Men may violate the Rules of Justice thro’ unbridled Passions, notwithstanding this Knowledge”; but the Knowledge of the Difference between those things, which are done rightfully and injuriously, can never make Men more prone to injure others. But they will envy others, (as the Antithesis insinuates,) and will “Love to shew their Wisdom, by censuring the Actions of them who govern the Commonwealth.” It is certainly very injurious, “To impute to all Mankind the Faults of a few, and that without Proof, ” except that, perhaps, he has found such Affections in himself, and has thence concluded, that they are natural to all Men; for, in the Preface to his Leviathan, he recommends this Method of knowing Mankind, to Rulers and all others, affirming, that “There is no other Proof of such Matters”; but he admonishes us to examine, “Whether these things agree with our own Thoughts.”74 With mine they certainly do not agree. Provided I am happy, tho others be happier, I envy them not; I shall lose nothing by it. I believe human Nature more modest, than to delight in censuring Princes. He must be long harden’d in Wickedness, who will venture upon Rebellion, which is a Complication of innumerable Acts of Murder, Plundering, Sacrilege, and, in short, of all kinds of Villany. But Hobbes very improperly imputes that Crime to Man, in his suppos’d State of Nature, which State, according to his Hypothesis, is previous to the Establishment of Civil Government.

  6. Let us now see, whether, in his last Answer, he brings any better Proof, that Mankind is less aptthan Brutes, to a mutual Agreement. “The Agreement” (says he) “of these Creatures is Natural, that of Man is by Covenant only, which is Artificial; and, therefore, it is no wonder, if there be somewhat else requir’d (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting, which is a common Power to keep them in awe, and to direct their Actions to the common Benefit.”75 I answer; “That the natural Causes, which are woven, as it were, in the Constitution of human Nature, as they are Animals, and which induce them to agree in the Exercise of mutual Benevolence, are plainly equal to those, which are found in any other Animals”; for instance, in Oxen, Lions, Bees; and this I have already endeavour’d briefly to prove:76 I will afterwards prove them to be greater.77Hobbes cannot shew any thing wanting in Man, that is the Cause of such peaceful Agreement as is found in Brutes. What he adds, that it is from Covenant among Men, and therfore artificial, may perhaps deceive the Vulgar, but will easily be refuted by Philosophers. For these Covenants are form’d by the Power, both of the animal and rational Nature. Certainly, “If Men had neither enter’d into Covenants, nor made any use of their Reason, the common Nature of Animals of the same Kind, would, nevertheless, be of as great Efficacy among them, to procure their Agreement in cultivating mutual Benevolence, as far as among all Brutes of the same Species”; now such an Agreement among Brutes there is, which is acknowledg’d to be natural. What therefore hinders, but that, after Reason and the Use of Speech are added to Men, that Agreement may still continue to be natural? Reason does not destroy natural Endeavours and Propensions to Concord, nor is an Agreement which is natural, less firm or durable, because it is express’d in Words: As the desire and use of Nourishment cease not to be natural Actions in Man, tho he signify this Appetite by Words, and by his Reason appoint the Place, Time, and Kind of Food to be taken. Besides, Hobbes himself, sometimes, acknowledges Reason to be a Part of human Nature, and a natural Faculty,78 and all others (that I know of) constantly acknowledge the same; whence it follows, “That any further Agreement or Society, which Reason persuades to establish by Covenants, proceeds from the rational Nature of Man; and that it may therefore be justly called Natural, tho it be much firmer, and bound by more Ties, than can be met with among Brutes.” It will appear also, “That Agreement, proceeding from Reason, is therefore more properly called Natural, if we consider that practical Reason is wholly determin’d by the Nature of the best End we can propose, and of the best Means we can use”: And further, “That nothing else is effected by the whole Process of Reason, than that those Propensions to Concord with others of the same Kind, which are natural to all Animals, (but exert themselves in Brutes in a very confused and improvident manner,) are directed to their adequate Object, namely, all rational Beings; and that every Action is, under its Conduct, exerted in the best Time, Place, and other Circumstances, which can be imagin’d.” Thus that taking of Meat or Drink may justly be called most natural, which both, in general, takes its Rise from the Constitution of the Animal, and, in all particular Cases, is most perfectly directed by Reason, taking care of the Animal’s Health, without any Error in Diet. These Precepts of regulating Diet, whose Efficacy and Truth Reason observes from the Nature of Things, may also properly be called Art: For Art is a Habit directing Actions, as the Nature of the End and Means points out: Yet such a Habit may justly be called Natural to a rational Agent, as consisting of Parts or Precepts so few, and so obvious, that they may be easily learn’d from the Nature of Things, without teaching, or so much as intending it; as Brutes collect the manner of regulating themselves, with respect to their Food, from Experience only; and even Plants, without Sense, much less Art, without Error extract from the Earth agreeable Juices only, for their Nourishment. Habits, properly so call’d, are the first Principles of Arts, and indeed essential Parts of the Arts, to which they belong; so that upon this account, perhaps, they may be called Artificial; but, because they are always learn’d without Art, they are by all acknowledg’d to become known naturally; and they, who write concerning Arts, do not teach, but suppose, them. Thus the Skill of adding small Numbers, and Right Lines, together, so as to make a Sum; and a like Subtraction in little or well known Quantities, may be called a Habit, and an essential part of Arithmetick and practical Geometry; yet Teachers of Mathematicks suppose their Scholars to have acquir’d this Skill by their own natural Parts, without Instruction, and, consequently, that it is plainly natural. Euclid therefore, in those common Notions, which he calls Axioms, supposes “Equal Quantities added to, or taken from, Equals,” and that it is known, that “Their Sums, or Differences, will be equal.” The Reason of my observing which, is only to make it evident, “That some Skill of acting (adding, for instance, or subtracting) is at once an essential Part of an Art, and yet may be perfectly natural to Man, as a reasonable Creature.” Wherefore I think Hobbes has not done right, in affirming, that the Agreement among Men, which is express’d in Covenants, is Artificial, in such Sense as to be oppos’d to Natural. I do not deny, that those Words, in which Covenants are express’d, proceed from arbitrary Appointment: But that Consent of Minds, relating to mutual Offices of Benevolence, of which Words are only the Signs, is wholly Natural. But in that Consent of Minds to exchange good Of fices consists the whole Nature of a Covenant, and from thence flows all its obligatory Force. The Knowledge also, and the Will, of appointing some Signs, by which such Consent may be mutually declar’d, is so easy and obvious to Man, without Instruction, that it may justly be called Natural, tho the use of some Signs rather than others, be arbitrary, (for so I would chuse to call it, rather than artificial.) To be brief, the Agreement express’d by Covenants, (especially about the most general Acts of Benevolence, of which, only, we treat in an Inquiry in to the Laws of Nature,) ought either not to be called Artificial, or if it be so called that Term is to be taken in such Sense, as to be consistent with, not oppos’d to, what is natural, as if such Agreement were less constant or lasting, as Hobbes would have it. For the signifying a natural Agreement by Words, contriv’d by some kind of Art, does not make it less firm or durable.

  It therefore remains firm, what at first I advanced, “That there are in Men, for this very reason, because they are Animals, at least such benevolent Propensions, as are to be found in other Animals, towards those of the same Species,” which, I have taken notice, do in several Cases observe the chief Heads of the Law of Nature, in proportion to their Knowledge.

  And retorted.I thought it worth while, to examine separately these Answers of Hobbes’s, partly, that the Reader might see, how gross an Error he is forc’d to defend, in his Attempt to deface the Indications of the Sanction of the Laws of Nature, taken from natural Inclinations: Partly, because I have observ’d, that all these Particulars, whence Hobbes would infer, that Man is more malevolent toward his own Species, and more unsociable, than Brutes, may, with great Advantage, be retorted upon himself, as the clearest Indications, that Man is by Nature fitted for greater Benevolence toward those of his own Species, than any other kind of Animal is. For, 1. He loves Honour, which flows naturally from such Benevolence. 2. He knows more perfectly the Influence of the publick Good, towards securing his own private Happiness. 3. He has the Use of Reason, which disposes him equally, either to obey or to command, as occasion offers.4. He knows how, by proper words, to give, both an Edge and Beauty to the Force of his Reason. 5. He understands a Law, by means whereof he distinguishes an Injury, from a Damage done without Injury. 6. Lastly, to this Agreement, once made amongst Men, not Nature only imparts Constancy, but Art, the Assistant of Nature, communicates, by means of writing, many Preservatives against even less probable Accidents, and gives it a Continuance beyond the Age of Man. However, I will not insist longer upon explaining these things more particularly in this place, but leave it to the Reader’s unbyass’d Judgment, whether Hobbes’s Answers, or these Retorsions, be juster? or, whether these things, peculiar to Man, do not rather promote benevolent Inclinations, which, it is evident, are perpetually united to the Animal Nature, than extirpate or weaken them?

  Lastly, Benevolence is enforced, 1. From those Particulars, which are peculiar to a human Body; such are those which assist the Fancy and Memory, and, consequently, Prudence. (This falls under the Head of the foregoing second Indication, § 18.)§XXIII. My Method requires, that I now take into Consideration some things, which are peculiar to human Bodies, in order to discover, whether these do not dispose Men, more than other Animals, to the Exercise of mutual Benevolence, and, consequently, to the forming more friendly Societies than they do? This will come more pertinently to be consider’d in this place, because even these things belong to them as Animals; and therefore they are to be consider’d, not as of any Efficacy by themselves, but as co-operating with what I have before observ’d common to them with other Animals, whence, from their united Force, we may expect an Effect of the same Kind, but greater and more certain. I, therefore, thought it proper to range these Particulars in such Order, that they may easily be referr’d to the same Heads, which we have but now perceiv’d to indicate, “That the same Formation and Structure of Parts, which inclines all Animals to preserve themselves, inclines them also to Benevolence towards others of the same Species.”

  I find nothing peculiar, remarkable in a human Body, to refer to the first Indication, which is taken from the limited Quantity of its Parts; but there are many Particulars, which may be referr’d to the second, which is taken from the Powers or Effects of the Imagination and Memory, in which a human Body excells the Bodies of other Animals. To these is to be premis’d this general Observation, “That, whatever increases the Powers of the Fancy and Memory, or makes them of longer Continuance in Man, than in other Animals, that all contributes much to their learning many things, from natural and common Experience, relating to the Causes (subject to their Power) of both their own and the common Good, and therefore contributes to their greater Stock of Prudence, which will both inable and incline them to direct their Actions in pursuit, both of their own and the publick Good, which two are, from the Nature of Men, inseparably united and intervoven.” But whatsoever tends to increase this kind of Prudence, equally disposes to the Practice of all moral Virtues, that is, to the Observance of all the Laws of Nature.

  This being premis’d, I will, out of Anatomical Writers, and also from my own Observations, and those of others, take notice of some things peculiar and remarkable in a human Body, which contribute to the enlarging and strengthening the Fancy and Memory in Men, which singly consider’d are of little Advantage, but if survey’d as united among them selves, and with those things which are common to Animals of all kinds, and also in Subordination to the divine Powers of the Mind, of which these parts of our Body are the proper Instruments, they seem to afford great Light to the present Argument.

  The human Fancy and Memory are assisted by, 1. The Brain, which, in proportion to the Bulk of his Body, is much greater in Man, than in any other kind of Animal: 2. Greater Quantity of Blood and animal Spirits thence form’d, and their greater Purity, from the erect Posture of the Body; a greater Vigor and brisker Motion, by means of a freer Passage into the Brain, thro’ the unbranch’d Tubes of the Carotid Arteries: The longer Continuance, both of Childhood, in which great Plenty, both of Things and Words is treasur’d up, and of Manhood, in which our former, and our later, Observations are with greater Judgment rang’d under their several Heads, is of particular use to the Memory. I will enlarge a little upon each of these, to set the whole in a clearer Light.

  Under this Head are consider’d, 1. The Brain, much greater in Man, than in other Animals, in proportion to the Bulk of his Body.By the Brain, I here understand all that white Substance, which is contain’d in the Membranes within the Skull, which is sometimes divided into the Brain, properly so called, and the Cerebellum, of which Bartholin writes thus. “The Bulk of the human Brain is remarkable, in proportion to the Body, as Aristotle has observ’d. And a Man has generally twice as much Brains as an Ox, to the Quantity of four or five Pounds.”79 Hence, I think, we may thus reason. The weight of a middle-siz’d human Body amounts not to more than a fourth Part of the weight of an Ox, and yet has a Brain twice as large, to govern so little a Body; it hence follows, that he has eight times the Quantity of Brain, to govern an equal Quantity of Body. I have found the Bodies of large Sheep, and of Hogs, to equal, in weight, a human Body; and that their Brain weighs, but about the eighth Part of the Brain of a Man. But what other Inference can we draw from so great a Disparity, in this matter, between these Animals, than that Man is so form’d by Nature, that the Influence of his Brain, on the Government of his Actions, may be much greater and more conspicuous? It is certain, (to omit other Uses of the Brain, common to Man with other Animals, upon account whereof no Reason can be assign’d for the excess of Weight,) that Man, by the help of this part, 1st. Observes sensible Objects more accurately, and examines, (besides other Effects of less Consequence,) how much all those things, which are in our Power, can bring of Good or Evil to Men singly or jointly consider’d. 2dly. Because all the Nerves take their Rise from the Brain, or from the spinal Marrow, which is only the Substance of the Brain continued, it is evident, that all voluntary Motions of the Body are directed and govern’d by means of the Brain. This may more clearly appear, from what Willis has observ’d of the Origin of all the Nerves, which are us’d in voluntary Motion, from the Brain properly so called. From these Observations it naturally follows, “That both the greater Quantity and Force of the Brain, which are visible in Man, are naturally of use to him, to direct the various Actions or Motions thence depending, with more circumspect Deliberation, Counsel and Care, which are the peculiar Offices of the Brain.”80 But this can no otherwise be effected, than by proposing to himself the greatest End, (which is the common Good of the Universe, but of rational Beings especially,) and, in the best manner, procuring the assistance of the best means, that is, by procuring to himself the Favour of all rational Agents, by an active Benevolence. Certainly, a more simple Apparatus of Organs, such as is found in Trees, is sufficient for the Preservation of one Individual; (for most of them flourish longer than the Age of Man;) nay, is sufficient for the Propagation of the Species, in which is contain’d somewhat of the common Good. Therefore so great a Quantity of Brain, with so many admirable Instruments thereto pertaining, (such as the Organs of all the Senses, and of voluntary Motion,) must be design’d for nobler Uses. In some Birds and Fish, the bulk and weight of the Brain is not greater, but sometimes less, than that of the Eyes, (which, with many other Anatomical Observations, was first communicated to me by my worthy Friend, that learned and successful Physician, Dr. Hollings;)81 yet even these want not Understanding enough, to live peaceably with those of their own Species. How much less can it be wanting to Men in general, (consistently with their Happiness,) who have the largest Organs for acquiring Knowledge; especially, since the greatest part of human Happiness consists in the Use of the Brain, in order to the attainment of Truth and the greatest Good? To this Head belongs what Willis has deliver’d, that, in the Dissection of the Body of one who was a Fool from his Birth, he discover’d nothing amiss in the Brain, but that it was extremely small: And in the Anatomy of a Monkey he observ’d, that the Brain differ’d but little from that in a Dog or Fox, except that, in proportion to the Bulk of its Body, it was much greater, and its winding Passages larger, whence this Animal makes nearer Approaches than the rest, to the Understanding of Man.82

  2. The greater Quantity, Purity, and Vigour, of the Blood and Animal Spirits.§XXIV. Secondly; In the human Body are observable the Quantity, Purity, and Vigour, of the Blood and Animal Spirits thence form’d, greater than are to be found in Brutes, which may justly be reckon’d among the Helps of the Fancy and Memory, and, consequently, of Prudence it self. The Quantity of Blood varies, for several Reasons, in all Animals, and, consequently, in Man. Charlton, Lower,83 and other Anatomists, have observ’d, that it is rarely more than 25, or less than 15, Pounds, therefore its Weight may be estimated, at a Medium, at 20 Pounds. If, therefore, we suppose the Body of such a Man, freed from Blood, to weigh 200 lb. (which exceeds the Weight of a middle-siz’d Man,) the Blood will be to the rest of the Body, as 1 to 10, or it will be the eleventh part of the Body of a living Man. Glisson’s Computation is not much wide of this, who affirms the Blood to be the twelfth part of the whole human Body.84 But in a Sheep, Calf, and Hog, I have often found, that the Blood is, in proportion to their bloodless Body, as 1 to 20, or, at most, to 18. Hence we may infer, “That the Blood of a Man is to his Body, almost in a double Proportion to that of Beasts.” But, in Fish and Birds, the Proportion of the Mass of Blood to the Bulk of their Bodies, is still far less. Anatomists likewise agree, that Man’s Blood is warmer than that of other Animals. From the Plenty and Heat of the Blood, it is obvious to collect the Plenty and Briskness of the Spirits. I thought proper to add here this one Remark, “That I affirm nothing of the Form of the Spirits, whether it be Aerial or no,” which I perceive is oppos’d by Harvey85 and his Followers; but that by that Name I understand the most active Part of the Blood, thence convey’d into the Brain, to assist the Imagination and Memory, and also into the Nerves and Muscular Fibres, there to be subservient to the Motions of the Animal, such as Harvey himself does not deny. The manner how the Spirits, or more active Parts of the Blood, are separated from the rest, has not yet, perhaps, come to the Knowledge of those curious Inquirers into Nature, the learned in Physick. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that they are almost unanimously agreed, “That the Blood, whose more spirituous, or active, Parts have been in some measure freed from the rest by Fermentation, is convey’d to the Brain, that there the Spirits may be thorowly separated or distill’d.” This further, only, I would observe, in order to my present Argument, that it is easily intelligible. “That the greater Quantity of Brain and Blood in Man may produce greater Plenty of Spirits in him, than in other Animals,” however it is effected in either.

  Further, it may not, perhaps, be wholly impertinent, to take notice of what Dr. Glisson, our learned Physic-Professor, has observ’d in rickety Children, that the Head grows greater, thro’ the wasting of the other Parts; and that, at the same time, the Understanding is inlarg’d, in proportion to the Brain, by means of the affluence of a greater Quantity of Blood.86 Nor ought it to be omitted, that the Posture of our Body, which, when we are awake, is generally erect, contributes some what to this effect. For, hence, we are not only symbolically instructed, to contemplate higher Causes, which have an equal Influence upon all Men every where, and so upon this whole sublunary World, which has been observ’d by many of the Antients;87 but, hence also, the Brain of Manis dispos’d to produce greater Plenty of brisker Spirits, whence we are naturally qualify’d the better, to execute all the extensive Duties of Reason; which are all discharg’d by a friendly Association with other rational Beings. The reason why I am of Opinion, that this Situation of the human Brain contributes somewhat to the Production of more, and more active, Spirits, is drawn from statical Principles, accommodated to the Functions and Situation of the Arteries and Veins, belonging to the human Head; the Influence of which Principles, tho they may to many seem impertinent, and foreign to our present purpose, appears to me to be extended thro’ the whole material World; and, consequently, to have no inconsiderable Effect upon human Bodies. It seems to me, that, while the whole Mass of Blood rushes into the Aorta, by the impulse receiv’d from the Contraction of the Heart, all its Parts do not receive an equal degree of Velocity from that Impulse, because of their difference of Magnitude, Vigure, Solidity, and Motions, which are in the different Parts of the Blood; (which is a Liquor consisting of very heterogeneous Parts, which have different Motions, as they are fluid, as they are warm, as they are fermented, and as they are more or less heavy, in proportion to their Bulk; but that some of them are, for these Reasons, mov’d more swiftly, which I therefore take leave to call, the brisker and lighter Parts of the Blood. Hence I think it probable, that a great Number of these Particles free themselves from the gross ones in the windings of the Arteries, and may with greater ease mount upwards by force of the Pulses perpetually renew’d, by which an unequal degree of Velocity is communicated to the different Particles of the Blood; to the Active, a greater; to the Gross, a less degree. Hence I imagine, that the Blood is somewhat brisker, which rises in the narrow ascending Trunk, than that which passes into the wider descending Trunk, thro’ which the grosser and heavier Blood is forc’d with greater ease. From the ascending Trunk, the yet purer Blood passes into the Carotidal and Vertebral Arteries, whence the Brain is supply’d with Materials for forming the Spirits. I do not think, that the Difference is great, between the arterial Blood which passes thro’ the Head, and that which passes thro’ the lower Parts of the Body; but I thought, that even the minutest Things, which seem’d deducible from clear and universal Principles, were not to be wholly pass’d over in silence, when they came pertinently in my way. I will there fore add another Observation, of a like kind, concerning the perpendicular Situation of the Veins belonging to the Brain, which favours the quicker Circulation of the Blood, descending by its own Gravity; the Branches of the Jugular and Vertebral Veins are hereby quickly emptied, and way the sooner made for a Tide of fresh Blood, from the Carotid and Vertebral Arteries, which would otherwise be retarded by the Resistance of the venal Blood. From the happy Concurrence of these two Causes, that is, from the ascent of the more spirituous Blood, in the Arteries allotted to the Brain, and from the precipitate Descent of the same Blood, (after the Spirits are separated) in the Veins, thro’ the erect Situation of a human Body, the Consequence will be a swifter Circulation of the Blood in the Head, than in other Parts of the Body, or than is in the Heads of other Animals; and, from the swifter Circulation, fresh Blood is more quickly supply’d, whence greater Plenty of Spirits is separated.

  To confirm the Ascent of the more spirituous Blood, by the Arteries of the Head, I might easily bring many Arguments, and those taken from the more frequent Obstructions in the Region of the lower Belly, arising from impurer Blood; from the swelling, and sometimes bleeding, of the haemmorhoidal Veins, which Distemper (in my Opinion) peculiar to Man, seems to proceed, in part at least, from the erect Posture of his Body; but I study Brevity. The Reader, who desires more to this Purpose, may consult what Lower has writ in his learned Treatise de Corde, cap. 2. from Pag. 133 to the end of the Chapter, most of which (tho intended by him for another purpose) may, by the judicious Reader, be easily adapted to the present Argument.88 Nor is it any Objection to what I have advanced, that some long-neck’d Birds walk with their Heads upright. It may be granted, that, in them too, the lighter and more spirituous Blood, by that means ascends; yet, from hence, no great Advantage to their Understanding is to be expected, because they have very little, of either Blood or Brain, in proportion to the Bulk of their Body. Moreover, so small a Quantity of Blood, tho it were not spirituous, might ascend thro’ their Carotid Arteries, by a gentle impulse of the Heart’s Contraction, because they are so very slender, that they partake much of the Nature of Capillary Glass Tubes, in which common Water, especially if heated, ascends, as it were spontaneously, to the height of several Inches.

  I should now take notice of the swifter Motion of the Blood into the human Brain, proceeding from this, that the Carotid Artery is not divided in Man, as in most Brutes, into a great many Branchings and Windings like Net-work, which check the Motion of the Blood in them; whereas, in Man, it flows in one large and open Channel, till it enters the Brain; whence all its Parts, and, consequently, the Spirits themselves, must necessarily be mov’d with greater Force, its whole Circulation be sooner perform’d, and room sooner made for the Admission of fresh Blood. All which contribute much, to the greater briskness and plenty of the Spirits. But Willis, and Lower, have treated this Matter so fully, and accurately, that they have left no room for our Industry, and ought themselves to be consulted, as Originals.89 It is sufficient for me, to have apply’d these Observations, borrow’d from them, to my present Argument. This, however, I think proper to add, “That, tho in the human Head there are so many Helps to the Imagination and Memory, which are of great Service to the Mind, these are no way sufficient, to resolve the above mention’d Operations into the mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion.” On the contrary, I think Malpighius’s Observation very just, “That, the better we understand the nature and functions of the Brain, the more we shall despair of the Possibility of explaining the Operations of the Mind by its Motions.” See Malpigh. de Cerebri cortice, cap. 4.90

  3. Longer Life.§XXV. I now proceed to the last help, to the Memory, and, consequently, to Prudence; this Advantage Mankind usually enjoy beyond other Animals, which proceeds from our ordinary length of Life. The Power of our Memory is certainly wonderful, which comprehends some Thousands of Words, above a Million of Sentences or Propositions thence form’d, and an almost infinite Variety of Things and Actions, observ’d with in the Compass of our Life. Which, however short it is, if compar’d with that Eternity we hope for, or with the long Lives of the Antediluvian Patriarchs, which we learn from sacred History, is yet much longer, than that of most other Animals we know. They sooner come to Maturity, and generally decay sooner, so as not to reach sixty or seventy Years, the usual Limits of the Life of Man. It is also providently contriv’d by Nature, “That the Memory of Children should be retentive, by means whereof, before we become fit for transacting Business, we retain much concerning God and Men, the Causes of the common Good, and of that Happiness we hope for”; and thence learn, “How necessary it is, both to pursue this greatest End, and to exercise a most extensive Benevolence towards them as the only Means to obtain that End.” Yet Hobbes, in this Article as well as in others, prefers Brutes to Men; and in his Leviathan, chap. 3. where he treats of Prudence, he asserts thus. “There be Beasts, that at a Year old, observe more, and pursue that which is for their Good more prudently, than a Child can do at ten.”91 I, who have often, with wonder, observ’d, the Contrivance of Children in their Plays, the Pertinence of their Answers to Questions, and their remarkable Happiness of Memory in learning Languages, have never met with any thing in Brutes comparable thereto: I therefore leave it to the Reader’s Judgment, whether this be not affirm’d by Hobbes, with more Ill-nature than Truth and Ingenuity. He frequently acknowledges, “That many Years Experience, especially after we come to Years of Discretion, naturally produces Prudence”;92 yet he sees not “The advantage, which Men, in this particular, have over Brutes, whose Life is shorter, whose Understanding improves but very little by time, and who cannot so easily communicate to others, what they have learn’d by Experience, especially at a considerable distance of Time or Place, as Men can, and usually do, to their great increase of Prudence and mutual Happiness.”

  Secondly, There are some things which,(1.) enable him better to rule his Affections, (This and the following § may be referred to the third Indication, § 19.)§XXVI. Having dispatch’d what relates to the human Imagination and Memory, let us now consider those Properties of a human Body, which seem more nearly to respect the Government, and Determination of the Affections to pursue, rather the Good, than Hurt of others. At present I suppose, and lay down as a foundation, what I have observed in the third Indication, taken from the common nature of Animals, “That those Affections, which are employ’d in pursuit of Good, do naturally more befriend and delight all Animals, in which they reside, and that they therefore incline to these Affections, as more conducing to the Preservation of their own Life, with the same necessity, that all Principles of Action, essential to them, are determined to preserve, rather than destroy, Life and Health.” This being suppos’d, there are two peculiar properties of a human body, which ought to incline them, with a diligence greater than that of other Animals, to govern their Affections; of which the first enables them, better than other Animals, to effect it; the second renders it more necessary to the Health, and, consequently, to the Life, of Man, that he should govern his Affections, than it is to other Animals. If, in either Article, any thing seems not sufficiently proved to the Reader, let him remember, that what I add here is more than is necessary to my Argument, which is otherwise sufficiently prov’d; and that it may be of some use, here to recount these things peculiar to Man, that others, at least, may more happily explain their uses. I make no question, but that they serve other purposes also: yet I think it probable, that they are not ineffectual to those noble ends, which I have hinted. And they are these,(1.) A Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man;93 (2.) The connexion of the Pericardium with the Diaphragm, and a like communication between the Nervus Diaphragmaticus and the Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, which is chiefly subservient to the Praecordia. With respect to these, I think proper, only briefly to sum up the observations of Anatomists, and to accommodate to my present purpose, what they have advanced in general, concerning the Affections hence depending. It is evident, “That the strongest Passions of Men are employ’d about those things, which are the Objects of Laws, whether natural or civil”; for the business of these, is to settle and preserve Property, both in Things and in human Services, than which nothing moves Men more strongly; therefore it is not to be doubted, but “That all those things in a human body, which naturally serve to excite or allay the Passions, have a considerable share in settling and defending a distinction of Property, in which the whole matter of the Laws of Nature consists.”

  as a Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man.I will begin with transcribing, from Willis, a few things concerning the Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man. The Reader, if he has the Author by him, may consult himself, and receive it with greater pleasure at first hand, where he may find what is here describ’d, represented to his view in the ninth Plate.94 “The Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, is about the middle of the Neck, in the Trunk of the intercostal Nerve, which, beside the Fibres sent off into the Blood-vessels and Gullet, and those small Branches, which it sends into the Trunks of the Nervus Diaphragmaticus, and of thePar Vagum, and into the recurrent Nerve, detaches, beside, on each hand, two Branches toward the Heart, which are joined by another rising somewhat lower, and these, at length, meeting more from the other side, form the Plexus Cardiacus; thence proceed both those remarkable Branches of Nerves spreading over the Region of the Heart, and those nervous Loops, which gird the pneumonick Artery and Vein,” (the principal conveyance of the blood, whence the spirits, which contain the first seeds of the Passions, break forth) “and the same intercostal Nerve afterwards winds about the subclavian Arteries, before the rise of the vertebral Arteries, which convey the Blood to the Head. The intercostal Nerve, by these Branches, supplies the Place of an extraordinary Courier, communicating, to and fro, the mutual Sensations of the Heart and Brain. By means of this Communication, the Conceptions of the Brain affect the Heart, and move the Vessels thereof along with the Diaphragm, whence the motion of the Blood, and the Respiration, receive various Alterations, and the State of the Spirits, which are thence to be form’d, is somewhat chang’d.” He farther adds, “That the Thoughts, relating to Acts of the Will or Understanding,” (in which the Powers of Prudence, and the Virtues, are conspicuous,) “may be duly form’d, it is necessary, that the torrent of Blood in the Breast be kept within bounds, and the inordinate motions of the Heart be restrained, by the Nerves, as by Reins, and be reduc’d to regularity.” He observ’d also, “in the Dissection of one who was a Fool from his Birth, that the foresaid Plexus Nervosus was very slender, and attended with an unusually small Train.” And, moreover, he observed “in a Monkey” (which Animal makes the nearest Approaches to human Sagacity and Passions) “some Branches sent off to the Heart and its Appendix, from the intercostal Nerve, before its insertion into the Plexus Thoracicus,” (as he calls it,) “which is different from what it is in other Animals.”95 I will transcribe no more from him upon this head. It is sufficient to have shewn, “That Man is naturally furnish’d with these Instruments, (beside the Powers of his Mind, and, perhaps, yet other undiscover’d Properties of the Brain,) for the Government of his Affections,” which would not be foreign toour present Purpose, tho something of the same kind were to be found in Brutes, conducing to their living peaceably among themselves. But, since these things are peculiar to Man, it cannot but suggest to his Mind, “That it is its Province, diligently to attend the Helm committed to its care, and to steer skilfully.”

  A.	The Nerves of the fifth Pair, with its two Branches A. A. the upper of which tending straight forwards, distributes shoots into the Eyes and Face, into the Nose, Palate, and the upper part of the whole Mouth; beside, it reflects two shoots a. a. which are the two roots of the intercostal Nerve: The other lower Branch of the fifth Pair tending downwards, is dispers’d into the lower Jaw and all its Parts.
  a. a.	Two shoots sent down from the upper Branch of the fifth Pair, which meeting together with the other shoot b. reflected from the Nerve of the sixth Pair, constitute the intercostal Trunk D.
  B.	The Nerve of the sixth Pair tending straight forwards into the Muscles of the Eyes, out of whose Trunk a shoot b. which is the third root of the intercostal Nerve, is reflected.
  b.	The third root of the intercostal Nerve.
  D.	The trunk of the intercostal Nerve consisting of the three aforesaid Roots about to pass into the Plexus Ganglioformis.
  E.	The Original of the Par vagum, consisting of many Fibres.
  G.	The principal Branch of the Par vagum, lost in the neighbouring Plexus Ganglioformis.
  H.	The upper Plexus Ganglioformis of the Par vagum, which admits a shoot K. out of another neighbouring Plexus of the intercostal Nerve.
  i.	A shoot sent from the Plexus cervicalis of the intercostal Nerve into the trunk of the Par vagum.
  K.	The lower Plexus of the Par vagum, from which many Nerves proceed for the Heart and its Appendix.
  l.	A shoot sent to the Plexus Cardiacus.
  m.	Nervous Fibres distributed into the Pericardium and the Vessels hanging to the Heart.
  n.	The left recurrent Nerve, which, being reflected from compassing about the descending Trunk of the Aorta upwards to the Cartilago scutiformis, imparts in its ascent many shoots **** to the aspera Arteria, and at length meets with a shoot h, sent from the Plexus Ganglioformis. This returning back from the knot of reflexion, sends some shoots toward the Heart.
  L.	The recurrent Nerve in the right side, which, being reflected much higher, binds about the axillary Artery.
  O.	A branch sent down from the trunk of the Par vagum, in the left side towards the Heart, one shoot of which presently becoming forked, compasses about the trunk of the Pneumonick Vein; the other, attaining the hinder Region of the Heart, is dispersed into many shoots, which cover over its surface: A like Cardiack branch sent out of the trunk of the other side, meets with this.
  p.	The shoot of the aforesaid branch going about the Pneumonick Vein.
  q.	Another branch of the same imparting to the Heart many shoots which cover over its hinder surface, turned back beyond their proper Situation.
  r. r. r.	Small shoots sent out of the trunk of the Par vagum, which are inserted by a long tract to the Gullet.
  S.S.S.	Many shoots cut off, the branchings of which being distributed into the Substance of the Lungs, variously streighten and bind about the Blood-vessels.
  γ.	The middle or Cervical Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, is placed nigh the middle of the Neck, in the trunk of the intercostal Nerve.
  δ.	A branch out of the second vertebral Pair, going into this Plexus, whereby this communicates with the Nervus Diaphragmaticus in its first Root.
  εε.	Two branches from the same Plexus into the Trunk of the Nervus Diaphragmaticus.
  ζζ.	Many nervous Fibres which come from the Plexus Cervicalis into the recurrent Nerve and into the Blood-vessels, and are also inserted into the aspera Arteria and Gullet.
  θ.	A shoot from the same into the trunk of the Par vagum.
  Χ.	Another shoot into the recurrent Nerve.
  χχ.	Two shoots sent down towards the Heart, which another branch D follows, arising a little lower: These being carried downwards between the Aorta and the Pneumonick Artery, meeting with the like branches of the other side, constitute the Plexus Cardiacus D. out of which the chief Nerves proceed which are bestowed on the Heart.
  Δ.	Plexus Cardiacus.
  μ.	The loop or handle going from the same, which binds about the Pneumonick Artery.
  ν.	The lower loop binding the Pneumonick Vein.
  Ξ.	The intercostal Nerve demersed into the cavity of the Thorax, where it binds the axillary Artery.
  ξξξξ.	The four vertebral Nerves sent down into the Plexus Thoracicus, the uppermost of which binds the vertebral Artery.
  οοο.	Three branches sent down from the Plexus Cardiacus, which cover the anterior Region of the Heart, as the Nerves p. q. going from the trunk of the Par vagum, impart branchings to its hinder part.
  ϖ	The vertebral Artery bound about by the vertebral Nerve.
  ςςς.	Nervous shoots covering the anterior Region of the Heart.
  τττ.	Shoots and nervous Fibres distributed to its hinder part.
  Θ	The Plexus Thoracicus, into which, beside the intercostal Nerve, four vertebrals are inserted; the uppermost of these in its descent binds about the vertebral Artery.
  Τ.	The Nervus Diaphragmaticus, a shoot of whose root d. comes to the Plexus Cervicalis, and a little lower two other branches from the same Plexus ee. are reach’d out into its Trunk. This communication is proper to Man.
  ϕ.	The other root of the Diaphragma, from the second and third brachial Nerve.
  χ.	The lower trunk of the Nervus Diaphragmaticus being removed out of its place, which, in its proper Situation, passing through the cavity of the Thorax without any communication, goes straight forward to the Diaphragma, where, being stretched out into three shoots, it is inserted into its muscular part.

  (2.) Make Man’s Government of his Passions of greater Importance to him, as the connexion of the Pericardium with the Diaphragm, and other Causes, which render his risques greater than those of other Animals, in violent Passions.§XXVII. We are, in the second place, to consider the connexion between the Pericardium and Diaphragm, (which is not at all to be found in other Animals,) to which I thought proper to add the Communication between the foresaid Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, and the Nervus Diaphragmaticus; because, as Willis has observed in the same Place, two, and sometimes three, Nerves are inserted, from this Plexus, into the Nervus Diaphragmaticus: Nor is it to be omitted, that, from the same intercostal Nerve, in which the aforesaid Plexus is found, innumerable Branches are spread thro’ all Parts of the lower Belly, so that the Heart, in some measure, communicates with them all.

  I should be too prolix, if I endeavoured to enlarge upon all these particulars, and it would be rashness, to offer to determine the use of each of these Nerves, which to me seems not yet sufficiently discover’d. It is sufficient for my present Argument, to make a few Observations concerning their general use, in which Anatomists are agreed, which is, (1.) That they serve to begin, or stop, motion; (2.) That they convey to the Brain Sensations of Pain or Pleasure, from the Parts in which they are inserted; (3.) That those Nerves, with which they are complicated, sympathize with them. These Particulars being suppos’d, I assume what is evident from innumerable Experiments, “That our Heart and Diaphragm, and all the Bowels of the lower Belly, the Stomach, for instance, the Liver, Spleen, Spermatick Vessels, &c. are variously affected in all violent Passions about Good or Evil, whether our own or another’s; especially, when our own Concerns are found involv’d, from the nature of Things, with those of others, which, because of the known likeness of the Condition of all Men, is always easy to observe.” It is evident, “That the Nerves inserted in these Bowels, are the Instruments of these Motions, perhaps, not without the Concurrence of the arterial Blood.” Hence I infer, “That the Heart of Man is, in such Passions, more affected than that of other Animals”; because it communicates or sympathizes with the other Bowels, by that connexion, peculiar to Man, of the Nerves and Pericardium, which I have mentioned; and because both his Heart and other Bowels, in every kind of Passion, are mov’d by the Influenceof a more powerful Brain, and the Impulse of more active Spirits. And, because the Heart, and the Blood circulated by means thereof, is the Fountain of Life and Health, and, in consequence, of all the Pleasure we enjoy; those Passions, which assist, or retard, its Motion more powerfully in Men than Brutes, must necessarily affect us more than they do them, whose Hearts do not so many ways communicate with their Bowels: Beside, their Brains are more sluggish; and their Spirits, whether in the Blood or Nerves, are fewer and less active. How much it conduces to our present Argument, that, from the very Structure of our Body, we are continually admonish’d of the necessity of governing our Affections with a strict hand, they will easily understand, who consider, “That all the Virtues, and the whole Observance we owe to the Law of Nature, are contain’d in the Government of those Passions, which are employ’d in settling or securing every Man’s Property.”

  But, because I have observ’d, from Anatomists, beside those general Phaenomena, concerning which I have treated, two particular ones, peculiar to Man, accurately explain’d from this Connexion between the Heart and other Bowels, which are Laughing and Sighing, I presently imagin’d, that these are Symptoms of our two principal Passions, that of a profuse Joy, this of Grief; and that all the rest of our Affections are like these; so that we may hope, from a Parity of Reason, that, in time, their Symptoms too may in like manner be explain’d. I therefore resolv’d briefly to explain, and to apply to my present purpose, these, as Specimens of what I have before asserted, only in general Terms.

  First, therefore, I observe from Willis, in the Chapter before quoted, that, from the above-mention’d Communication, between the Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, and the Nervus Diaphragmaticus, the true Cause appears, why Risibility is a Property of human Nature; which is, because the Diaphragm, as well as the Heart, is affected with the pleasing Motion of the Imagination, and is drawn upward by the Intercourse of the Nerves proceeding from this Plexus, and is excited to repeated Heavings as it were; whence, because the Pericardium is joined to it, the Heart itself and the Lungs are likewise mov’d; then, because the same Intercostal Nerve is continued upward with the Nerves of the Jaws, when once the Laugh is begun in the Breast, the Posture of the Mouth and Countenance pathetically corresponds thereto. Willis has more upon this Head. What Lower delivers upon this Subject, differs somewhat from this, but yet may be reconcil’d with it: The Place is worth the Reader’s Inspection.96 I observe, to my present purpose, “That Laughter gives a most agreeable Relish to human Life, and, especially, to friendly Society, but is of little or no use in Solitude, or in such Affections, as are conversant about any great Evil, as in Anger, Envy, Hatred, Fear; and is, therefore, to be reckon’d amongst those things, which frequently make human Conversation more agreeable, but seldom the contrary.” Because this Motion, repeated at proper Intervals, is wonderfully agreeable, and strongly throws off all Uneasiness of Grief, we may conclude, “That human Nature, (on this very account, that it is fitly fram’d to procure its own Preservation,) is inclinable to this sweetner of Society, which is peculiar to Man; and that therefore, in this respect also, there is a natural Connexion between our Care of our-selves, and a Desire to please others.”

  The Sigh, tho’ it be not peculiar to Man, is yet more frequently observ’d in him; nor is it, that I know of, in other Animals reckon’damong the Signs of Grief or Melancholy; however, it is more prejudicial to the Heart in Man, than in other Animals, because of the Connexion between his Pericardium and Diaphragm, by whose Motion it is produc’d; for the Motion of the Heart, so necessary to the Life of Man, is disturb’d by that extraordinary Motion of the annex’d Diaphragm. The Inconvenience of Sighing, when seldom, is but small; but, if frequent and of long Continuance, it wonderfully tires the Heart, and disqualifies it for its Functions. This Evil is near a-kin to that Distemper, which is call’d the Hiccough, which, (as Lower has rightly observ’d,)97 tho’ it generally takes its Rise from the Stomach, to which it is prejudicial, is properly an Affection of the Diaphragm; and which, tho’ it hurt but little, when its Stay is short, yet, when it is of long Continuance, and is attended with other Symptoms, (which Physicians are acquainted with from the Aphorisms of Hippocrates,)98 is often a Harbinger, and partly a Cause, of Death.

  Whilst I was considering a Sigh, as an Effect of Grief, a probable Conjecture (as it seems to me) came into my Mind, concerning the Cause of Tears, which is one of the Effects of Grief, and almost proper to Man alone. I am of Opinion, “That in Grief the Motion of the Blood, in the Extremities of the Veins and Arteries in the Head, is somewhat obstructed, so that it cannot so freely circulate as before,” (nor are we without other Proofs of this Obstruction in this Passion,) “in which case the Lachrymal Glands” (for whose Explication we are indebted to Steno)99 “can make a more plentiful Secretion of the Serum from the Blood, and empty it, by their Passages, into the Eyes.” I took the first Hint of this Conjecture, from that noble Experiment of Lower, in which, after he had tied the Jugular Veins in a live Dog, all the Parts above the Ligature swell’d prodigiously, Tears flow’d plentifully, and Spittle as copiously, as if in a Salivation. Read the Experiment, useful upon many Accounts, in its Author, in the Chapter above quoted, and I believe, my Conjecture will not seem improbable: But, perhaps, Man alone weeps, either because his Blood is more obstructed in Grief, in proportion to the Size of his Brain, and the Quickness of his Apprehension; or because his Blood, being more copious and warm, and of swifter Circulation in the Head, cannot suffer such Obstructions, without the Secretion of a salt Humour from the Glands, which breaks forth in Tears. However, if in Grief there were no such Obstructions in the Brain as we suppose, yet, if in that Passion the Blood either became too thick to find aneasy Passage thro’ its usual Windings; or if, on the contrary, it were more rarify’d, or its Velocity ever so little increas’d from the Heart toward the Head, because it does not find a proportionably freer Passage, thro’ its winding Canals, into the Veins, the Arteries must of Necessity swell, and there will be the same reason of the watery Parts breaking forth in Tears, as if such Obstructions, as I suppos’d, had oppos’d its Course, which might easily be prov’d from hydrostatical Principles. However this happens, the breaking forth of Tears, in these Obstructions, is an Indication, “That the Health of Man is more endanger’d from giving way to Grief, than that of other Animals”; for the Lachrymal Glands will scarce suffice for evacuating the whole Serum, after it has made an Eruption in some other Part of the Head, tho some Ease may arise from this Partial Evacuation. The clouding the Fancy, and the Symptoms of various Diseases, which usually follow, according to the various Circumstances, and Temper of Body, of the Persons grieving, especially in those of a melancholy Disposition, make it evident, that all the ill Consequences of Grief are not carry’d off by Tears, which are seldom shed by Men come to Years. Yet it is remarkable, that a Stag, whose Blood, especially when heated and accelerated by the Chace, approaches near to the State of human Blood, when he cannot make head against the Fury of the Dogs bearing in upon him, and sees Death approaching, bursts forth into Tears.

  But, to cut these Speculations short, I will conclude with this Remark, that it is evident, by the manifold Experience of all, “That human Passions, if not restrain’d by Reason, give Birth and Increase to several Distempers, especially Hypochondriacal, to which Man is subject, more than other Animals; but that the same Passions, under the Conduct of Reason, make Men hale, brisk, lively, and fit for all Duties.” And, therefore, as we would lead our Lives pleasantly, we must endeavour to govern our Passions, whether their Causes be now at length discover’d to us, or whether they remain yet unknown, in whole or in part.

  From this Effect, which we certainly know sufficiently, arises a Necessity of finding out some Rules of Reason, by which they may be confin’d within certain Bounds; but those Rules are the same with those, which command us to employ our Affections, only about the Means conducing to the best and greatest End, or the common Good. But the Means to this End, in the Power of Man, are only those free Actions, by which is either made or preserv’d such a Division of Things and human Services, as most conduces to the Happiness of all. And these Rules are the very Laws of Nature, as I shall afterwards shew; and such Actions are Acts of universal Justice, or of Virtue conformable to such Laws. Wherefore, from the Premises, I may conclude, “That all those Properties of a human Body, which effect, either that he is better able to govern his Passions, or that to do so is more necessary to him than to Brutes, do very much conduce, both to his Knowledge of the Laws of Nature, and to his inclining, in some measure, to the doing those things, which they enjoin.”

  Thirdly, Mankind are more particularly influenc’d to Benevolence, by their more uninterrupted Inclinations to beget, and, consequently, to rear, their Offspring, than are to be found in other Animals. (This is to be referr’d to the Head of the fourth Indication, § 20.)§XXVIII. What remains will be soon finish’d. With respect to the fourth Indication, common to all Animals, taken from their Propension to propagate their Species, a human Body has this only (that I have observ’d) peculiar to it, which is, “That its venereal Inclinations are not limited to certain Seasons of the Year, as in most other Animals, but are, in some sort, perpetual.” Hence it is, that most Men find it necessary to marry, and hence proceeds a strong Desire of propagating their Species; whence are inseparable, Appetites, and also Covenants, relating to the Maintenance and Government of their Families. And because the Uninterruptedness of this Propension, and its Consequences, proceed from the greater Activity of the human Blood, and the greater Force of the spermatick Vessels, they must necessarily be proportionably greater in Men than Brutes; his Care therefore must be greater, to support and govern his Family; and this necessarily supposes the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature, and some Inclination to observe them. For no Provision can be made for a Family, without settling and preserving some Division of Things and of mutual Services, for that purpose. But when this is once understood and approv’d of in the Care of one Family, the Parity of Reason is so evident, in those things which are equally necessary to the Happiness of other Families, that it cannot be, but that the Necessity of such a Division, must in like manner be understood, nor can any sufficient Reason be assign’d, “Why it should not in like manner be approv’d of by, and so extend it self to, all Mankind.” But in the Knowledge and Approbation of such a Division, necessary for the Good of all, is contain’d the Knowledge and Approbation of the Law of Nature. Meanwhile, the manner, how the seminal and active Particles of the Blood excite the Idea and Appetite of Procreation, is to be explain’d by natural Philosophers upon some physical Hypothesis; for since these Particles, thro’ their minuteness, fall not under the Observation of our Senses, their particular Effects and Motions cannot be methodically explain’d from Observation and Natural History. From the beginning I determin’d to abstain from such Hypotheses; let every one take that, which is most consistent with his own Observations and Reason. It is sufficient for my Purpose to have shewn, “That natural Affection, or the Appetite of preserving and educating Offspring brought into the World, is only a continued Appetite of begetting it, or causing it to exist, which includes an Opposition to those Causes, which hinder its Existence.” But of this enough already. However, this I think proper hereto add, “That, because the Offspring of Man continues longer weak, and in need of the help of its Parents, it is certain, that, thro’ length of Time, and frequent repeated Acts of their Love, that Affection grows stronger in Parents; so that the longer they have bestow’d Pains upon their Education, they with less Patience bear any Evil, but especially Death, happening to them; and so the very Difficulty of forming Men, in order to the common Good, because it is overcome by Hope founded in their Nature, causes Parents to set about it with a greater Earnestness and Industry, and daily to give much greater Proofs of their natural Affection, than what are any where to be met with in other Animals.”

  All the Indications, deduc’d from this Head, are the more carefully to be observ’d, because into it finally is to be resolv’d, both the reciprocal Love of Children toward their Parents, and the Benevolence of Relations toward one another, which will, at length, extend it self to a Love of all Mankind; when once we come to know, from the most authentick Histories, (the only means antient Facts can be known by,) “That all Men are descended from the same common Parents.”

  Fourthly, From the Consideration of the whole Frame of a human Body, by which is is fitted for Society; (This is to be referr’d to the fifth Indication, § 20.)§XXIX.100 To the last Indication, taken from the entire Frame of Animals and their united Actions, is to be referr’d the Consideration, “That the Bodies of Men are generally more fitted, for discharging the Offices of friendly Society; and, that the manifest Effects of a stricter Union among Men than Brutes, is visible in civil Government, which has always taken place, over the whole habitable World, at least under Heads of Families.” Yet I confess, “That this is not to be ascrib’d wholly to the Frame of their Bodies, as in Brutes, but in much greater measure to the governing Mind, which in Man sits as it were at the Helm.” In this place we are not so much to consider the Privileges of some particular Parts, as the apt Dis-position of them all, with respect to one another, by which they are better enabled to mutual Assistance, of which Disposition it is more easy to perceive the Effects, than to explain wherein it consists. It is, however, to be observ’d, “That almost all these Parts are somewhat more powerful, by their being influenc’d by a larger Brain, by a greater quantity of Blood and Spirits, and a Heart more under command, by means of Nerves peculiar to it-self.” Yet I thought it proper, to take notice of something remarkable in two Parts of a Man’s Body, (by which he is better fitted for friendly Society,) the Countenance and the Hand.

  Especially of the Countenance,Of the Countenance, Cicero has long since observ’d, “That it is to be found in no other Animal; their Faces not making near so many Discoveries of their Thoughts and Affections.”101 These Discoveries are of singular use, in beginning and keeping up an Intercourse among Men, but in Solitude are of no use at all. These Signs, what they are, we all perceive, but can hardly distinctly express; yet these are very conspicuous, the Blush in Shame, Paleness in Fear and Anger. These two owe their being visible in Man, to the Transparency of the Scarf-skin of his Face, so that the greater or less Quantity of Blood, which lies under it, and its various Motions, are easily perceiv’d. From the same cuticular Transparency, peculiar to Man, proceeds great part of that extraordinary Beauty, which is conspicuous in the human Countenance, which is of great Efficacy in procuring Good-will among Men, and was, therefore, not to be pass’d over in silence. For hence we see, not only that agreeable Mixture of the bright Colour of the Blood with that of the Skin, but its various Motions, according to the Variety of the Passions: a very agreeable Spectacle! To these may be added Laughter and Weeping, (whose Causes peculiar to Man I have already hinted,) Symptoms of Passions, of great use to give a Relish to Society, and to banish Savageness of Temper. All other Diversities of Countenance, (which can hardly be enumerated,) according to the Diversity of Passions, arise, either from the various Motions of our Blood, which may, in some measure, be perceiv’d by the change of Colour in the outer Skin of the Face, or from the Motions of the Muscles belonging to the Eyes and the rest of the Face, which are excited by the Nerves of the fifth or sixth Pair, which owe their Original to the Intercostal Nerve, and so communicate more immediately than others, with the Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man. Hence it is, that in the Nature of Man alone is founded that common Observation, “The Countenance is the Image, the Eyes the Index, of the Mind.”102 Moreover, that remarkable Diversity of Face, by means whereof, among so many Millions, scarce two can be found alike, is of vast use in forming and preserving Societies; for hence all may be easily distinguish’d from one another, so that every one may discern, with whom it is that he hath made any Covenant, or transacted any Affair, and Men may give certain Testimony, concerning those things, which any one has done, said, or attempted; which would be impossible, were there not something in the Faces of Men, by which they might be distinguish’d from one another.

  and the Hand.The Make of the human Hand, consider’d with its Arm, is very particular;103 and its various Powers, with respect to Agriculture, Planting, Architecture, whether in building Houses, Fortifications, or Ships, and all other kinds of mechanical Contrivances, would be almost useless, unless Men mutually assisted one another, and enter’d into friendly Society. I had not any Opportunity of dissecting an Ape, or Monkey, to compare, in every particular, their Fore-feet, which resemble our Hands, with the dissected Hand, Arm, and Shoulder of a Man. But, without dissecting them, it is evident, both that no Effects of so great Dexterity are produc’d by those Animals, as appear in the Works of Man above-mention’d; and that the Muscles, both in the Extremity of the human Hand, Arm, and Shoulder, are stronger, in proportion to the Bulk of their Body, and the Joints much more pliable every way. It is also evident, that, in Man, the Bone of the Arm, properly so called, which reaches from the Shoulder to the Elbow, is very long, so as to exceed in length the Bones of the Cubit, which terminate in the Wrist, and that the said Bone of the Arm is so conveniently inserted into the Scapula, (which is plac’d upon the Back, and not so forward, as in Brutes,) and govern’d by its Muscles, that the Hands may by that means be extended more widely from one another, and even so turn’d backward, as to be able to grasp a great Bulk, or lift a great Weight.104 By this very particular, and truly mechanical, contrivance of Nature, it is, that a Man’s Hand is not only fitted for many more Motions and Operations, but that it has much more Strength, both in sustaining and carrying Weights, and in communicating Motion to other Bodies. For, when the Hand is to sustain and carry a great Weight, the Hand, with the Weight it holds, is so let down along the side, by the Motion of the Joints of the Arm, as to be at the least distance possible from the Line of Direction;105 whence it is, that the Weight is poiz’d, with the smallest Force, upon the Center of Gravity of the whole Aggregate, compounded of our Body and the Weight to be sustain’d. And this they perform spontaneously, who are perfectly ignorant of the Doctrine of the Center of Gravity, being taught by Experience only; which were not possible, except the Hand were so conveniently fitted to the Shoulder, and to the upright situation of the Body. On the contrary, when our Hand is to communicate Motion to a lighter Body, (to a Stone, for instance, to be thrown, a Hammer, or any other Instrument;) it is from this convenient Frame of our Hand, that we learn to raise it; whence, because it is farther distant from the Center of its Motion, it moves more swiftly, and exerts a greater Force. As in a longer Sling, because of the greater distance from the Center of its Motion, a greater Force (caeteris paribus) is communicated to the Stone to be slung. The Center of Motion, whence the distance of the Hand, and, consequently, the increase of Force, is to be computed, is not always in the Articulation of the Bone of the Arm in to the Scapula, (whence, however, the Stroke of a Man would receive an additional Force, greater than what is to be met with in other Animals,) but in many Cases, as when the whole Body, and, consequently, the Shoulder it self, is, in striking, mov’d along with the Arm, the Center of Motion is in the Foot on which we stand, and the distance is to be computed from the Foot to the elevated Hand, if we would understand the degree of Acceleration, and the Force thence arising. Thus a new and further Strength is added to that of our Hands, as peculiar to Man, as his erectness of Stature. And it is further to be observ’d, that the elastick Force of the many Muscles, spread almost thro’ our whole Body, do both conspire to begin such Motions, and concur with the foresaid distance from the Center of Motion, to accelerate them, when once begun. These Instruments of greater Power may, indeed, be made use of for Slaughter, and other mischievous Purposes, against other Men: Yet I think it evident, “That all those things, which inlarge the Power of all Men in general, provided a due Equality or Balance be preserv’d, are Arguments to persuade each to use his Power, rather to assist, than to hurt others, and, consequently, to recommend that mutual Benevolence, which I endeavour to establish”; this is prov’d, Step by Step, in the following Propositions.

  Notwithstanding these Advantages peculiar to Men, their Powers, how great soever, being nearly equal, afford much stronger Arguments to Benevolence than Malevolence.§XXX.106 1. A Power of hurting others, balanc’d by an equal Power in them to hurt, (in Defence or Revenge,) does not afford a proper Motive to any one, who with Caution provides for his own Security, to endeavour to hurt others. For it is manifest, because the Forces of the Powers are suppos’d equal on each side, that, so far, no Reason is assign’d, why the Scale should incline one way, rather than the other. On the contrary, because, if they fight, it is certain, that both the contending Parties may be kill’d or maim’d, and it is also certain, that neither of them can gain as much by the Victory, as he who is kill’d in fight loses, nor as much as he hazards, who commits his Life to the Chance of War; it is both their Interest, “Not to engage.” The hazarding my Life deprives me of more Good, than can accrue to me from this, that my Enemies Life is in equal Danger; nor is his Security therefore the greater, because my Life is insecure; but hence both lose something which neither gains. Nay, if we, for a while, lay aside the Consideration of Life and Health, and regard only our outward Possessions, it is certain, “That the Conquerors do not get all the Conquer’d lose, and that they acquire greater Advantages, who cultivate Peace, by which they may enjoy their own.”

  2. A Power of helping others, balanc’d by an equal Power in them of helping, suggests to every one a proper Motive, to desire to help others, especially, when it is certain, such Assistance may be given without Damage to our selves. For a possible Compensation partakes of the Nature of Good, and is, therefore, a sufficient Motive to influence the Will of Man, especially, when, for the most part, we lose nothing by our Beneficence, (the Compensation whereof is at least possible,) which can deserve to be brought into the Account. From comparing this with the former Proposition, it is evident, “That the Consequences (tho they should be suppos’d equally contingent) of Power, determin’d to act benevolently, have a greater Force to influence the Mind, foreseeing these Consequences, to Benevolence, than the Consequences of Power, determin’d to act malevolently, have to influence the Mind that way”; which is sufficient for my present purpose. For the Mind is chiefly influenc’d by the foreseen Consequences of its own Actions. In the former case, we foresee it possible, “That we may bring Evil upon others”; and we see it equally possible, “That we may suffer Evil from them”: on each side there is an equal Evil, but nothing which may allure the Will, which always inclines to the greater Good: In the latter case, we foresee Good, which we are capable, both of doing and receiving, but no damage to draw back the Scale leaning this way; it is not, in this case, so much as possible, that both should lose any thing by Actions of this kind, and here more accrues to the one, than is taken from the other. I can benefit others by Innocence, by Humanity, by performing Covenants in support of the common Good; yet, if I duly consider every thing, I lose nothing thereby; nay, by thus acting, I gain inward Strength and Pleasure, and the Hope of a plentiful Return; which yet, how small soever, can scarce be so small, as what by such Actions I deprive my self of, to bestow upon the Publick. For, if I am consider’d, not only as every one is, alone, but also without the Benevolence, Peace, and Assistance, of others, I have so very little, that I am not sufficient to supply my own Wants, but am, on all sides, so surrounded with extreme Necessity, that I can hardly make my Condition worse by serving others, which will be plainly understood by him, who considers the State of Man in a War of all against all, on all sides unjust. There is no occasion to assert with Hobbes, “That such a War is just and necessary, by means of the right Reason of every particular Person, judging all things to be necessary to himself, before the Establishment of civil Society”; since we may grant to him, that it may be very useful to consider, “How great Evils may proceed from universal Injustice, and the mistaken Judgments of any Number of Men, arrogating each everything to himself.” But this is widely distant from Hobbes’s Error, who has taught, “That the right Reason of all, living out of civil Society, necessarily leads all into these Evils, so as to leave to Reason no Power of doing Good, beside what proceeds from the Authority of civil Government.” I, on the contrary, affirm, “That it is impossible, that right Reason should teach us to arrogate all things to our selves only; nay, that it commands us, to agree benevolently to make and preserve a Division, by which every one acquires some Property; and that, as for many other reasons, so also, because it easily foresees Floods of Evils, that threaten all, and, consequently, every Individual, upon this one Supposition, that each regarded himself only, and with a Desire insatiable arrogated all things to himself.” The two precedent Propositions prove my Point, if the Power of each be consider’d, as balanc’d by the Power of one other Person only. But the Matter will become yet more evident, if we consider,

  3. That the Power, in any single Person, of hurting others, is far exceeded by the Power of many, or of all, by which they defend themselves, or revenge an Injury: And, 4. That the Power of any one, by which he may benefit others, is far exceeded by the Power of Requital, which is in many, or in all. For these Considerations will most strongly persuade us, to determine our Powers, how great soever, rather to benefit, than to hurt others. Nor can it be imagin’d, “That the Powers of all will be always so divided, that one will in this War fight only with one”; and by what Accident soever it happens, that an unequal Number of a side engage in the Combat, two against one, for Instance, this will carry on the War to the more certain destruction of that Person; and, if at first an equal Number engage of a Side, they may be reduc’d to an Inequality by the Death of one. But thus much seems abundantly sufficient to prove, “That the very Powers of Men, whilst they are suppos’d nearly equal, rather suggest Arguments for mutual Benevolence, than for attempting mutual Destruction.” It has been already prov’d, “That the other Particulars, which I have shewn to be peculiar to human Nature, enforce the same more strongly.”

  (Hobbes falsly asserts, that Men generally refuse equal Conditions of Society, and he argues from accidental and partial Causes, instead of necessary and universal ones.)§XXXI.107 Here, Reader, I desire it may be observ’d, “That Hobbes has no where offer’d any thing, in this manner natural and essential to the Mind or Body of Man, which can suggest to any one a necessary Argument, or can otherwise necessarily determine Men, that each should claim all things to himself alone”; but that he sometimes imputes it to the Passions, which I have already disprov’d; sometimes, that he says only in general, That “They will not bear equal Conditions of Society, tho they desire Society it self. ”108 I answer, “That, altho there are some Men, who sometimes will not accept of necessary and equal Conditions of Society, yet, neither the Nature of all Things, nor of themselves, teaches or determines them to refuse those Conditions. The Manners, which a few sometimes fall rashly into, and from which the Conduct of most others, and often of themselves too, differs, are not to be imputed to the Nature of Man, nor of the Universe; but as those Manners themselves are Contingent, so they have a contingent Cause, which is the rash Determination of their Free-will. He, who would affirm any thing to be Natural, ought to consider the constant, necessary, and essential Powers and Tendencies of all things, especially, of Man, by which his Life, and ordinary Happiness are preserv’d; rather than those accidental Irregularities, by which they are weaken’d: For it is certain, “That, while we live and are in health, the Causes of Life and Health are stronger, than those which, by their Irregularity, disturb us; and that, therefore, an Estimate is to be made of our Nature from those, not these.” The reason is the same, in pronouncing concerning all Mankind, or all Ages of all Men, which succeed one another, like the Parts of a River. As to the Manners of Men, it is generally, tho contingently, true, “That they will accept equal Conditions of Society,” which is evident from Experience, because we see, “That such Societies have been long ago voluntarily form’d every where by them, and that they are preserv’d oftener and longer, than they are dissolv’d”; but to be willing to maintain civil Society, or to preserve Peace with another State, is only a constant and continued Will to establish it. Nay it is sometimes more difficult to continue, than at first to form, a Society; yet that Difficulty is overcome by almost all, thro’ the Powers of their Reason and Nature.

  The Advantages of Society, and convenient Subordination, and consequently of Government, may be shown from the natural Union of the Mind with, and Dominion over, the Body.Lastly, the Nature of Man does not comprehend only his Mind and Body, which are his essential Parts, but also the Union of these two to one another. And, therefore, I thought it proper to observe, “That Men may hence also be led to the Knowledge and Desire of a Good common to many, nay, and of Society and Government, and that these are agreeable and grateful to the Will of the first Cause.” For we perceive in our selves, that our Body is naturally, and, consequently, at the divine Appointment, not only united to our Minds, but also, that, in most acts of the Memory, Affections, and Motions, especially Muscular, it is subject to their Government. And hence, as by an Idea or Plan of Polity, inseparably united to the Mind, we are continually admonish’d, “How many different things, because of the mutual Assistance which they afford, are necessarily to be consider’d as one Aggregate, whilst we are in pursuit of the Causes of a happy Life; how necessary it is, that, among our Parts, some should be determin’d by others: Of how great Advantage the mutual Order of Parts is, and how necessary the orderly Concurrence of many Causes is to almost all Effects grateful to our Nature: Of how great use the mutual Offices of Parts are, and how pernicious the Separation of some from others, is, which threatens Death.” Having thorowly treated of these, I proceed next to the Consideration of Good, the greatest Good, which is any way in our Power to attain.

  General Remarks on Chapter II

  It is highly probable, “That Men are more nearly equal in natural Disposition to Benevolence, than is generally imagin’d, and that the Difference chiefly arises from Habit.”

  If this Disposition depends so much upon Habit, surely every Person has the greatest reason, to use all the Industry in his power, to improve it, which, I believe, might, in great measure, be effected, by a strict regard to the little common Occurrences of Life, which are, for the most part, wholly disregarded, as trifling, and of no import. Of the many Incidents in Life, which may be used, either to the Blasting, or Nourishment, of this amiable Disposition, I shall only mention one, which seems to me of the greatest consequence, and the least regarded; and that is, our Behaviour to one another in Company. No Man who considers, “That the Strength of any Habit depends upon the Strength and Number of the Acts which constitute that Habit, and that we have the most frequent occasions in conversation, of acting in a good or ill-natur’d manner”; I say, none who considers these things can doubt, “That our Behaviour in Company is of the last consequence, towards the settling a Habit of Benevolence, or avoiding the contrary Disposition.” I believe no Man, who would but seriously reflect, that, by every little piece of ill-natur’d Raillery, or malevolent Contradiction, that Disposition of Mind, upon the Strength of which the whole Happiness of his Life does in a great measure depend, could take pleasure in giving another Uneasiness. The Politeness of the higher Ranks, which chiefly consists in being agreeable, and avoiding every thing which may give Pain to any of their Company, is, in my opinion, no inconsiderable reason, why Good-nature is to be found more frequently among them, than those of the lower Degrees, among whom there is little else to be found, but Rudeness and Rusticity.

  There is also another very considerable use to be made of this Observation, “That Benevolence principally consists in Habit,” which regards the Education of Childhood and Youth. It is most certain, “That this flexible Age is the most proper for laying the Foundations of Habits”; and yet it is, with regard to Benevolence, almost wholly neglected. I believe there can be no other Reason assigned, “Why all our Dispositions, which are approv’d of by Reason, except Benevolence, gather Strength and flourish, as the Person grows in Years and Understanding; and that this, the most amiable, the most noble, of all, does wither and decay.” I say, there can hardly be any other tolerable Reason assign’d for this, than what may be drawn from the above-mentioned Observation. For, tho the Reason of an enlarg’d, well-inform’d Mind does perfectly approve of the highest Benevolence, yet, there are many, of so little, narrow, souls, as to take in nothing but the present: And as a small degree of Understanding may make a cunning, but not a wise, Man; so it generally makes a Man selfish, but never prudent.

  General Remarks on Chapters I and II

  In the first and second Chapters, most of what the Author says, tends to shew, “That Benevolence contributes to the common Good; and that, from the Nature of Things, and from Human Nature, in particular, it appears, That it is the Will of the Author of Nature, that Men should, in general, assist one another; because he hath framed Man in such a manner, and hath adapted the Nature of Things to the Constitution of Man in such a manner, as that Man, partly from the Instinct of Benevolence, but, chiefly, from Self-Love, in consulting his own Advantage, acts in many cases for the Good of others.” What can be collected chiefly for his purpose, from these things, is, in my opinion, this, “That, from what we know of Nature, it plainly appears, That God is a most benevolent Being; and that, in most grand cases, he hath plainly connected private with publick Good; and that, therefore, we have good reason to believe, from the uniformity of Nature, that private Happiness is in all cases perfectly connected with the publick Good, even in this Life; altho we are often so short-sighted, as not fully to perceive that connexion: Or, that, if private Happiness is not perfectly connected with publick Good in this Life, it is by superadded Rewards and Punishments in another.”

  CHAPTER III

  Of Natural Good.

  Natural Good is defin’d, and divided into Good, proper to one, and common to many.Good, is that which preserves, or enlarges and perfects, the Faculties of any one Thing, or of several. For, in these Effects, is discover’d that particular Agreement of one thing with another, which is requisite to denominate any thing good, to the Nature of this thing, rather than of others.1

  In the Definition of Good, I chose to avoid the Word [Agreement], because of its very uncertain Signification. Nevertheless, those things, whose Actions or Motions conduce to the Preservation, or Increase, of the Powers of other things, consistently with the nature of the Individual, may justly be said to agree with them. For we do not otherwise use to judge, whether the Nature or Essence of any thing agrees with another, or no, than by the Effects of the Actions thence proceeding. The Effects are what disclose the hidden Powers and inward Constitution of all things; these strike our Senses, and afford us a Knowledge of those things, whence they flow. In Actions are laid the Foundations of all Respects or Relations, to explain which, is almost the whole Business of Philosophy. So that is Good to Man, which preserves or enlarges the Powers of the Mind and Body, or of either, without Prejudice to the other. “That is Good to any thing, which preserves it,” says Aristotle, (Pol. 1. 2.c. 1.) speaking of Cities.2

  What I affirm concerning any one particular thing, I would have understood concerning a Series of many things, in which some things profitable are inseparably connected with others that are hurtful; in which case, those things which hurt, are to be compar’d with those that profit, and the whole is to be denominated from the prevailing Power, whether of hurting or profiting.

  Good of this kind, of which we form an Idea, without the Consideration of any Laws whatsoever, I call natural Good; both because it respects the Nature of a thing, a Brute, for instance, or a Tree, whose Powers are capable of Preservation and Increase; and, beside, such is the Effect of such kind of Beings,3 nay, of the Earth it self, that they may be subservient to the Preservation of their own Natures, or even of ours, or to our Improvement by farther Knowledge.

  It is distinguish’d, by its greater Extensiveness, from that Good, which is called Moral, which is ascrib’d only to such Actions and Habits of rational Agents, as are agreeable to Laws, whether Natural or Civil, and is ultimately resolv’d into the natural common Good, to the Preservation and Increase of which alone all the Laws of Nature, and all just civil Laws, do direct us. Of Moral Good, more hereafter; let us now turn our Thoughts, for a while, to that which is Natural.

  Such Actions and Habits of moral Agents, as may be subservient to the common natural Good of all, are enforc’d by Laws; and, when such Acts or Habits are embrac’d, upon account of their agreement with moral Rules, they are call’d morally Good.Having shewn, “That neither the Notion, nor the Name, of Good, does confine it to him only, who thinks or speaks of it, but that it may likewise relate to every other Man, nay, and to all other Animals,” (to say nothing of inanimate Beings, which are capable of Preservation, or further Perfection, consisting in the Order or Motion of their Parts;) we must proceed to the Consideration of those Aggregates, which may be form’d of many, nay of all, Animals of the same Species; I add, and of all Beings making use of Reason, how much soever they may otherwise differ, such as Man and God. For, as the Mind considers them under an indefinite Notion, equally applicable to all, it can also unite them into one general Body, in order to discover what is Good or Evil for it, which we shall therefore call the common or publick Good or Evil of Mankind, or even of all rational Agents; and can likewise judge, of the diverse good or evil things propos’d, which is possible or impossible, greater or less. Nor, in most Cases, is this very difficult to determine, at least in general; for, since they all have the same Nature, when we know wherein the Happiness of any one consists, we thence know, what kind of Happiness is to be sought for by every Individual. For it is evident, “That those natural Perfections of the Mind, and that Health and Vigour of Body, in which the whole Happiness of one consists, do also comprehend, when universally extended, all the Happiness of all,4 consequently, both the different Degrees of Happiness, and the nature of Means generally necessary to each, in order to attain it, may be equally apprehended in relation to all: That all require Nourishment, for instance, Exercise, Sleep, &c.” because such things are necessary to each, and the whole is the same with all its Parts: hence also, “Whatever adds any thing, tho but to one part of this whole, without changing, and, consequently, without hurting the rest, that increases the whole, which is compos’d of that, and the other Parts.” He who does Good to one Man, without hurting any other, may justly be said to do Good to the whole Aggregate of Mankind, which may with reason encourage every one of us, from the Consideration of the publick Good, “So to take care of our selves, as not to hurt any other Person.”

  (Hobbes’s Opinion concerning Good, stated,§II. I own, therefore, “That to be call’d Good, which agrees with another, and, consequently, that the Term is Relative”; but it is not always referr’d to the Desire, nor always to that one Person only, who desires it. In these two Points Hobbes has often err’d grosly, (tho he sometimes comes out with the Truth, in Contradiction to himself;) and on these fundamental Mistakes is supported most of what he has writ amiss, concerning the Right of War of all against all, in a State of Nature, and a Right of exercising arbitrary Power, in a State of civil Society. Concerning Hobbes’s Opinion, that any thing is therefore call’d Good, because it is desir’d. See De Homine, cap. 11. § 4. “All things (saith he) which are desir’d, are, as such, call’d by the common Name of Good, and all things which are shun’d, Evil, &c. whereas different Persons desire and shun different things, it must needs be, that many things which are good to some, should be evil to others, &c. Therefore Good and Evil are Correlatives to Desire and Aversion.”5 Of a Piece with which, is what he has written in his Treatise of Human Nature, where he teaches, that “That Motion, wherein” he thinks “our Conceptions of Things consist, passes from the Brain to the Heart, without any Intervention of Judgment, and there,” (says he,) “As it either helpeth or hindreth its vital Motion, is said to please or displease. And every Man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth and is delightful to himself, Good; and that Evil, which displeaseth him. Insomuch, that while every Man differeth from other in Constitution, they differ also from one another,” (naturally, and therefore necessarily, and, according to his Opinion, in a State of Nature, unblameably; why not so in civil Society, where, the soundest Philosophers think, natural Necessity takes away Fault?) “Concerning the common Distinction of Good and Evil.”6 And says he, “Such is the Nature of Man, that every one calls that Good, which he desires for himself, Evil, which he avoids. It therefore happens, thro’ the Diversity of Affections, that what one calls Good, another calls Evil; and that what the same Man now calls Good, he presently calls Evil; and that he looks upon the same thing to be Good for himself, and Evil for another; for we all estimate Good and Evil, from the Pleasure and Uneasiness it creates to us.”7 This, he contends, arises, not from a Fault of the Will, which may be avoided, but from the Nature of Man, and that it is therefore necessary and perpetual, and, before civil Laws are fram’d, blameless. In his Leviathan, chap. 6. he expresses himself in like manner, and adds, “These words of Good, Evil, and Contemptible, are ever used with respect to the Person that useth them, there being nothing simply or absolutely so; nor anycommon Rule of Good and Evil, to be taken from the Nature of the Objects themselves, but from the Person of the Man, (where there is no Commonwealth;) or, (in a Commonwealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator, or Judge, whom Men, disagreeing, shall by consent set up, and make his Sentence the Rule thereof. ”8

  and confuted by the Author,I, on the contrary, am of Opinion, “That things are first judg’d to be Good, and that they are afterwards desir’d, only so far as they seem Good: That any thing is therefore truly judg’d Good, because its Effect or Force truly helps Nature: That a Private Good, is that which profits One; Publick, which is of advantage to Many; not because it is desir’d from Opinion, whether true or false; or delights, for this or that Moment of time.” The Nature of Man requires, “That Reason, examining the Nature of Things, should, from the Evidence thence unalterably arising, first determine and judge what is Good, (whether in relation to our selves, or others) before we desire it, or are delighted therewith”: And it is the Part of Brutes only, “To measure the Goodness of Things, or of Actions, by Affection only, without the Guidance of Reason.” Men of brutish Dispositions, experience in themselves such a way of acting, and are pleas’d with being told by Hobbes, That this is agreeable to Nature: Out of this Set of Men, the number of his Followers is increas’d. It is, however, more certain, “That a Mad-man suffers a real Evil, tho he be wonderfully pleas’d with his own Madness”; and, on the contrary, “That a Remedy is good for the Patient, tho he should ever so obstinately refuse it.”

  and contradicted by Hobbes himself,)And even Hobbes himself sometimes relapses into a just way of thinking, and, tho he elsewhere most frequently inculcates, “That any thing is Good or Evil at the Pleasure of the supreme Powers, or of any private Person, without any respect had to the Good of Civil Society”; yet, Leviath. chap. 30. where he reckons it among the Duties of a supreme Governour, that he should frame good Laws, he plainly affirms, “That all Laws are not Good, tho they are for the Benefit of the Sovereign”; and he defines “Good Laws” to be such, “as are needful for the Good of the People, and withal perspicuous.”9 Behold the Good of the People, which is certainly common to Many, acknowledg’d by himself, as the End, which ought to be propos’d by the Legislator! But the End is supposed to be first known, and, consequently, its Nature determin’d, before the Law have prescrib’d to the People, what is Good or Evil. So also, Leviath. chap. 6. he defines “Benevolence and Charity” to be a “Desire of Good to another”: Nor do I believe he would have defined this Affection, if he had not thought it possible. In the English Edition of his Leviathan, he acknowledges this Affection, when it extends itself to all Men, to be “Good-Nature”: But in the Latin Edition he has omitted this; I suppose, as not consisting with his other Opinions.10 For the nature of Good, and the efficacy of Things, to the Preservation and Perfection of the Nature of one or more Persons, is perfectly determin’d, and is to be estimated from the agreement of Things with all the Faculties of human Nature, or the Principles11 of those Faculties; taking likewise in to Consideration, either the whole Course of Life, or its better part: not from any unreasonable Affection, and transient Motion of the Blood, either somewhat promoted or retarded, from a superficial Apprehension of Things.

  The Necessity of establishing the true Notion of Good.§III. It is of the last consequence, to establish a well-grounded and irrefragable Notion of Good; because, if this totters and wavers, we must, necessarily, be fluctuating and uncertain in our Opinions of Happiness, (which is the greatest Good of every particular Person;) and of the Laws of Nature; and of particular Virtues, Justice, &c. which are nothing else, but the means of obtaining that Good, and, in some respect, the Causes, in part, thereof.

  Men agree in the general nature of Good, and in the principal Branches of the Law of Nature concerning it.Altho, because of something peculiar in the different Constitutions of Men, it sometimes happens, “That the same Nourishment or Medicine is prejudicial to one, which to most is harmless, or, perhaps, wholesome”; the like to which we may observe, “In the Genius and Manners of Nations,12 some widely differing from others in some particular Establishments” yet, this no more destroys the Consent of Men in the general Nature of Good, and its principal Parts or Kinds, than a light diversityof Countenances takes away the Agreement among Men, in the common Definition of Man, or the Resemblance that is among them, in the Conformity and Use of their principal Parts. There is no Nation, which is not sensible, “That our Love of God, and Observance of the Laws of Nature, in Instances which shall be just now mention’d, afford both present Pleasure, and a well-grounded Hope of future Happiness.” And this Hobbes himself somewhere confesses, as de Cive, cap. 15. § 9. and the following;13 tho elsewhere he affirms, That the Honour due to God consists in Fear only, and an Opinion of his Power; as in Leviath. Part I. chap. 10, 11.14 There is no Nation, which is not sensible, “That Gratitude towards Parents and Benefactors, is beneficial to all Mankind.” No difference of Constitution causes any one to imagine, “That it is not for the Good of the Whole, that the Lives, Limbs, and Liberties of particular innocent Persons should be preserv’d”; and, therefore, the Murder of the Innocent is every where prohibited. What Man is of so particular a Taste, as “Not to think it good for single Families, and, consequently, for all Nations, that the Faith of the Marriage-bed be preserv’d unviolated?” And the same may be said of the Right of using and enjoying those out-ward Things, which are necessary to Life, Health, Fame or Honour, the Education of Children, and the cultivating Friendship. In judging of the Goodness of these Things, to take care of which is the whole Business of the Laws of Nature, and of most Civil Laws, all Men every where agree, as much as Animals do in the Motion of the Heart, and Pulse of the Arteries, or all Men, in their Opinion of the Whiteness of Snow, and the Brightness of the Sun. Even Hobbes himself acknowledges, that Civil Laws teach the same thing; “That in all Cases omitted by Civil Laws,” (which he acknowledges to be “Almost Infinite,” (c. 14. § 14) and may produce infinite Disputes,) “The Law of natural Equity is to be follow’d.”15 He therefore grants, that the Laws of natural Equity may be discover’d, without the help of the Laws of the State, and that more Cases may be sufficiently determin’d thereby, than are determin’d by civil Laws, which are not “Almost Infinite.” This is all I contend for at present, “That since Rules of Equity are, naturally, so well known, that no Men, of common Understanding, differ about them. ” On the other hand, I freely grant, “That there are many things indifferent, or concerning which human Reason cannot universally pronounce, that it is necessary to the common Good, that the Matter should be transacted this way rather than that.” In such cases, the different Constitutions of different States take place, which, altho they might, without a Crime, have been oppos’d, before they were enacted into Laws; yet, after once they have been establish’d by publick Authority, are to be most religiously observ’d, both out of Conscience toward God, whose Vicegerents Magistrates are, and for the publick Happiness of the Subjects, which is chiefly secur’d by the supreme Authority’s being preserv’d unviolated. For it evidently conduces more to the publick Good, “That the Opinion of the Magistrates should prevail; in things indifferent and doubtful, and that the Subjects should take that for Good, which seems such to the supreme Power, rather than eternal Broils should continue among them, whence may reasonably be expected Wars and Murders, which are, without all question, Evil.”16

  It is a Mistake in Hobbes to assert, That Man pursues only his own private Good.§IV. There is another Error of Hobbes, concerning Good, which is, that “The Object of the” human “Will is that, which every Man thinks good forhimself. ”17 Which he thus expresses elsewhere, “Every one is presum’d to pursue his own Good, naturally; that which is just, for Peace only, and by Accident.”18 What is just, respects the Good of others, which he does not think any Man seeks, unless from a Fear of those Evils, which arise from a State of War. Of a Piece with these Passages, are the places above quoted out of him; and numberless others, scatter’d thro’ his Writings, insinuate the same thing. Upon this is grounded that Passage, “Whatever is done voluntarily, is done for some Good to him who wills it.”19

  All these Passages have this one Tendency, to prove, that “Men are so fram’d, that it is contrary to their Nature, and, consequently, plainly impossible, that they should desire any thing but their own Advantage, and their own Glory.”20That, therefore, since it is evident, that every one can more effectually obtain these things, by Dominion over, than by Society with, others, “All naturally desire such Dominion, and are, consequently, led into a State of War against all, for the sake of obtaining it”; that “They are with-held from War, and forc’d to accept the Conditions of Society, by Fear only.” But if we examine what led him into an Opinion, so contrary to that of all Philosophers, I can see nothing, but that one Hint, which he affords, by the Bye, in the same Section, where he explains “Nature” by “The Affections planted in every Animal, till by inconvenient Consequences, or by Precepts, it is effected, that the desire of things present is check’d by the remembrance of things past.” He judges of human Nature, and the adequate Object of the Will, from those Affections, which are previous to the use of Reason, to Experience, and to Discipline, such as are found in Children and Mad-Men; see his Preface to his Treatise de Cive.21 But I, as well as all other Philosophers, that I know of, think, “That we are to take an Estimate of the Nature of Man, rather from Reason, (and that therefore the Will may extend it self to those things, which Reason dictates to be agreeable to the Nature of any Person;) since such irrational Affections are to be look’d on, rather as Perturbations of the Mind, and, consequently, as Preternatural”; which even Hobbes himself, since the publishing his Book de Cive, confesses in his Treatise de Homine.”22 I also own it possible, thro’ an Abuse of his Free-will, “That a Man (thro’ his own Fault) of a narrow Soul, may consider nothing beside himself, and may therefore desire almost nothing, but what he judges profitable to himself ”; but I could never observe any Symptoms of such a Will, in any Man, except in Hobbes only. Others are certainly of a more generous Disposition, “Who do not think that alone to be Good, which is such to themselves; but whatever conduces to the Preservation and Perfection, to the Order and Beauty of Mankind, or even of the whole Universe, as far as we have any Conception of it; that they think Good, that they will and desire, that they hope for, for the future, and rejoice in, when present.” Nor see I any thing to hinder, but that what I judge agreeable to any Nature, I may desire should happen to it; nay, that I should endeavour, as far as in me lies, that it should be effected. But whatever any Faculty (and, consequently, the Will) can be employ’d about, is included in the adequate Object of that Faculty. To this appertains that Precept of Aristotle, concerning Legislators, “It is the Duty of a good Law-giver, to consider how his Country, and all Mankind, and every particular Community, may live honestly, and enjoy all possible Happiness.”23 And elsewhere, “That is uniformly right, which conduces to the Advantage of the whole Commonwealth, and to the common Good of all its Members.”24 For what Aristotle asserts, in this last place, concerning the Laws of the State, “That in them, not the Good of a part, but of the whole, is to be taken care of; which is to be look’d upon as the measure of Right by the Legislator”; this sufficiently instructs us, if the whole World be consider’d, as one State, what is universally Right, and, consequently, ought to be intended in the Laws of the Universe, or of Nature. For, since every Legislator is only a Man, and he both can, and ought, to provide for the publick Good, that being the end for which he is appointed, what hinders, but that we may allow it, to be in other Men’s Powers, to do the same?

  Nay, this may be demonstrated à priori, to those, who acknowledge the Nature of the Will to consist, in the Consent of the Mind with the Judgment of the Understanding, concerning things agreeing among themselves. For it is certain, “That the Understanding is capable of judging, what promotes the Good of others, as well as what promotes our own”; nor is there any Reason, “Why we cannot will those same things, which we have judg’d to be good.” (Nay, it is hardly possible, that we should not will those things, which we have judg’d to be good.) But it is to be observ’d, “That, whatever a Man can will, he can also resolve to effect the same, as far as it is in his Power.” Good thus will’d by us, is said to be intended, and, by virtue of this Intention, it assumes the complete Nature of an End: Therefore the common Good of the Universe may be an End propos’d by Men. And, because that is the greatest Good, which we can will, the Understanding, forming a right Judgment, will affirm such a Volition, to be more necessarily and essentially connected with the Perfection of Men, possess’d with a just Notion of the publick Good; than the Volition of any smaller Good. But, for the present, it is sufficient to have prov’d, “That the common Good may be the End of Man, and the principal one too; provided it be prov’d, to be greater than any other Good.” But, whether any Man be oblig’d to pursue this End, we shall afterwards discover, when we inquire, concerning the Obligation of the Laws of Nature. Here I will only add, that Hobbes himself, in the Latin Edition of his Leviathan, Cap. 31. in the last Section, contradicts all that he had advanc’d, concerning Man’s seeking, only, his own proper Good; and does not only acknowledge, that the publick Good may be regarded, but openly declares, that he hopes his Leviathan will, sometime or other, be serviceable to that End. His words are these, I do not despair, but that hereafter, when Princes shall have more attentively consider’d their Rights, and Professors their Duty, and that of Subjects, this very Doctrine, softned by Custom, shall, sometime or other, be commonly receiv’d, to the Benefit of the Publick.”25 Here, truly, he presages, that his Doctrine, tho not yet establish’d by Princes, shall, hereafter, promote the publick Good; and insinuates, that it is adapted to the Good (not of one State only, but) of all the Nations in the World. Of the Falshood of which, tho I am abundantly convinc’d, yet it is a sufficient Proof, that his Thoughts were sometimes employ’d about this End, and that he knew it might be sincerely intended, otherwise he would, not only, not intend it, but he would not so much as pretend, that he had intended it.

  What is more; That to please others, is naturally pleasant, and consequently seems good, to Man, may be prov’d from Hobbes himself, because in his Treatise of Human Nature, Chap. 9. § 15. he plainly asserts, “That even venereal Pleasure is, partly, a pleasure of the Mind, taking its Rise from this, That we are sensible we please another.”26 But it is highly absurd, “That he should acknowledge a Pleasure of the Mind to arise hence, that something grateful is done to one Person only, and that in a Matter of the smallest Consequence,” when in the mean time he will not acknowledge, “That the Mind of Man receives a greater Pleasure from this, that we at once more highly gratify many in more important Matters, when we benefit both their Minds and Bodies, in procuring the common Good, by Fidelity, Gratitude, and Humanity, even when we are not subject to the same civil Power.”

  Lastly, in his Treatise de Homine, cap. 11. § 14. where he purposely inquires, among good Things, which is greater, and which less, he plainly declares, that the Good, which is a Benefit to many, is greater (other Considerations being equal) than that which is so to few.27

  General Remarks on Chapter III

  It would have been very proper for the Author in this Chapter, to have briefly enumerated or compar’d the chief of the human Pleasures.

  What follows, (taken from Wollaston’s Religion of Nature, Sect. 2.)28 seems here pertinent.

  Prop. I. Pleasure is a Consciousness of something agreeable, Pain of the contrary; and they are proportionable to the Perceptions and Sense of the Subjects, or Persons affected with them. Note on Chap. 5. § 6.)

  Prop. II. Pain consider’d in it self is a real Evil, Pleasure a real Good.

  Prop. III. By the general Idea of Good and Evil, the one [Pleasure] is in it self desirable, the other [Pain] to be avoided. What is here said, respects mere Pleasure and Pain, abstracted from all Circumstances, Consequences, &c. But because there are some of these generally adhering to them, and such as enter so deep into their Nature, that unless these be taken in, the full and true Character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what Happiness is, I must proceed to some other Propositions relating to this subject.

  IV. Pleasure compar’d with Pain may either be equal, or more, or less: also Pleasures may be compar’d with other Pleasures, and Pains with Pains. Because all the Moments of the Pleasure must bear some respect, or be in some Ratio to all the Moments of Pain: as also all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and so must those of one Pleasure, or one Pain, be to those of another. And if the degrees of intenseness be multiply’d by the Moments of duration, there must still be some Ratio of the one Product to the other.

  That this Proposition is true, appears from the general Conduct of Mankind; tho in some Particulars they may err, and wrong themselves, some more, some less. For what doth all this Hurry of Business, what do all the Labours and Travels of Men tend to, but to gain such Advantages, as they think do exceed all their Trouble? What are all their Abstinencies and Self-denials for, if they do not think some Pleasures less than the Pain, that would succeed them? Do not the various Methods of Life shew, that Men prefer one sort of Pleasure to another, and submit to one sort of Pain rather than to have another? And within our selves we cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the Pain with the Pleasure obtain’d by it, or miss the Pleasure, being excus’d from the Pain.

  V. When Pleasures and Pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: when the one exceeds, the Excess gives the true Quantity of Pleasure or Pain. For nine degrees of Pleasure, less by nine degrees of Pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, less by three degrees of the other, give six of the former net and true.

  VI. As therefore there may be true Pleasure and Pain: so there may be some Pleasures, which compar’d with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into nothing, but may even degenerate into Pain, and ought to be reckon’d as Pains; and v. v. some Pains, that may be annumerated to Pleasures. For the true Quantity of Pleasure differs not from that Quantity of true Pleasure; or it is so much of that kind of Pleasure, which is true (clear of all Discounts and future Payments): nor can the true Quantity of Pain not be the same with that Quantity of true or mere Pain. Then, the Man who enjoys three degrees of such Pleasure as will bring upon him nine degrees of Pain, when three degrees of Pain are set off to balance and sink the three of Pleasure, can have remaining to him only six degrees of Pain: and into these therefore is his Pleasure finally resolv’d. And so the three degrees of Pain, which any one endures to obtain nine of Pleasure, end in six of the latter. By the same manner of computing, some Pleasures will be found to be the loss of Pleasure, compar’d with greater: and some Pains the Alleviation of Pain; because by undergoing them greater are evaded. Thus the Natures of Pleasures and Pains are varied, and sometimes transmuted: which ought never to be forgot.

  Nor this neither. As in the Sense of most Men, I believe, a little Pain will weigh against a great deal of Pleasure: so perhaps there may be some Pains, which exceed all Pleasures; that is, such Pains as no Man would choose to suffer for any Pleasure whatever, or at least any that we know of in this World. So that it is possible the difference, or excess of Pain, may rise so high as to become immense: and then the Pleasure to be set against that Pain will be but a Point, or Cypher; a Quantity of no Value.

  VII. Happiness differs not from the true Quantity of Pleasure, Unhappiness of Pain. Or, any Being may be said to be so far happy, as his Pleasures are true, &c. That cannot be the Happiness of any Being, which is bad for him: nor can Happiness be disagreeable. It must be something, therefore, that is both agreeable and good for the Possessor. Now present Pleasure is for the present indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he who enjoys it must pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his Good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his Happiness. Nor, again, can that Pleasure be reckon’d Happiness, for which one pays the full Price in Pain: because these are quantities which mutually destroy each other. But yet since Happiness is something, which, by the general Idea of it, must be desirable, and therefore agreeable, it must be some kind of Pleasure: and this, from what has been said, can only be such Pleasure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one’s Happiness will be as his true Quantity of Pleasure.

  One, that loves to make Objections, may demand here, whether there may not be Happiness without Pleasure; whether a Man may not be said to be happy in respect to those Evils, which he escapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether there may not be such a thing as negative Happiness. I answer, an Exemption from Misfortunes and Pains is a high Privilege, tho we should not be sensible what those Misfortunes or Dangers are, from which we are deliver’d, and in the larger use of the Word may be styled a Happiness. Also, the Absence of Pain or Unhappiness may perhaps be called negative Happiness, since the meaning of that Phrase is known. But in proper speaking Happiness always includes something positive. For mere Indolence resulting from Insensibility, or joined with it, if it be Happiness, is a Happiness infinitely diminish’d: that is, it is no more a Happiness, than it is an Unhappiness; upon the confine of both, but neither. At best, it is but the Happiness of Stocks and Stones: and to these I think Happiness can hardly be in strictness allow’d. ’Tis the Privilege of a Stock to be what it is, rather than to be a miserable Being: this we are sensible of, and therefore, joining this Privilege with our own Sense of it, we call it Happiness; but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the Stock itself. A Sense indeed of being free from Pains and Troubles is attended with Happiness: but then the Happiness flows from the Sense of the Case, and is a positive Happiness. Whilst a Man reflects upon his negative Happiness, as it is called, and enjoys it, he makes it positive: and perhaps a Sense of Immunity from the Afflictions and Miseries every where so obvious to our Observation is one of the greatest Pleasures in this World.

  VIII. That Being may be said to be ultimately happy, in some degree or other, the sum Total of whose Pleasures exceeds the Sum of all his Pains: or, ultimate Happiness is the Sum of Happiness, or true Pleasure, at the Foot of the Account. And so on the other side, that Being may be said to be ultimately unhappy, the Sum of all whose Pains exceeds that of all his Pleasures.

  IX. To make itself happy is a Duty, which every Being, in proportion to its Capacity, owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent Being may be supposed to aim at, in general. For Happiness is some Quantity of true Pleasure: and that Pleasure, which I call true, may be consider’d by itself, and so will be justly desirable (according to Prop. II, and III.) On the contrary, Unhappiness is certainly to be avoided: because being a Quantity of mere Pain, it may be consider’d by itself, as a real, mere Evil, &c. and because, if I am oblig’d to pursue Happiness, I am at the same time oblig’d to recede, as far as I can, from its contrary. All this is self-evident. And hence it follows, that,

  X. We cannot act with respect to either our selves, or other Men, as being what we and they are, unless both are consider’d as Beings susceptive of Happiness and Unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other. Other Animals may be consider’d after the same manner in proportion to their several degrees of Apprehension.

  But that the Nature of Happiness, and the Road to it, which is so very apt to be mistaken, may be better understood; and true Pleasures more certainly distinguish’d from false; the following Propositions must still be added.

  XI. As the true and ultimate Happiness of no Being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with Truth, and denies the Natures of Things: So neither can the Practice of Truth make any Being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts Nature and Truth, opposes the Will of the Author of Nature; and to suppose, that an inferior Being may, in opposition to his Will, break through the Constitution of Things, and, by so doing, make himself happy, is to suppose that Being more potent than the Author of Nature, and, consequently, than that very Being himself, which is absurd. And it is also absurd to think, that by the Constitution of Nature and Will of its Author, any being should be finally miserable, only for conforming himself to Truth. As if God had made it natural to contradict Nature; or unnatural, and therefore punishable, to act according to Nature and Reality. Which must come to pass, either thro a defect of Power in him to cause a better and more equitable Scheme, or from some delight, which he finds in the Misery of his Dependents. The former cannot be ascribed to the first Cause, who is the Fountain of Power; nor the latter to him, who gives so many Proofs of his Goodness and Beneficence.

  XII. The genuine Happiness of every Being must be something, that is not incompatible with or destructive of its Nature, or the superior or better part of it, if it be mixt. For instance, nothing can be the true Happiness of a rational Being, that is inconsistent with Reason. For all Pleasure, and therefore be sure all clear Pleasure and true Happiness must be something agreeable (Prop. I.): and nothing can be agreeable to a reasoning Nature, or (which is the same) to the Reason of that Nature, which is repugnant and disagreeable to reason. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational Being, which is not agreeable to Reason, it is plain his Reason is lost, his Nature deprest, and that he now lists himself among Irrationals, at least as to that Particular. If a Being finds Pleasure in any thing unreasonable, he has an unreasonable Pleasure; but a rational Nature can like nothing of that Kind without a Contradiction to itself. For to do this, would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Lastly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with Reason, interferes with Truth, and to contradict either of them is the same thing; then what has been said under the former Proposition, does also confirm this: as what has been said in proof of this, does also confirm the former.

  XIII. Those Pleasures are true, and to be reckon’d into our Happiness, against which there lies no Reason. For when there is no Reason against any Pleasure, there is always one for it, included in the Term. So when there is no reason for undergoing Pain (or venturing it), there is one against it.

  Obs. There is therefore no Necessity for Men to torture their Inventions in finding out Arguments to justify themselves in the Pursuits after worldly Advantages and Enjoyments, provided that neither these Enjoyments, nor the means by which they are attained, contain the Violation of any Truth, by being unjust, immoderate, or the like. For in this Case there is no reason why we should not desire them, and a direct one, why we should; viz. because they are Enjoyments.

  XIV. To conclude this Section, The way to Happiness and the Practice of Truth incur the one into the other. For no Being can be styled happy, that is not ultimately so: because if all his Pains exceed all his Pleasures, he is so far from being happy, that he is a Being unhappy, or miserable, in proportion to that Excess. Now by Prop. XI. nothing can produce the ultimate Happiness of any Being, which interferes with Truth: and therefore whatever doth produce that, must be something which is consistent and coincident with this.

  Two things then (but such as are met together, and embrace each other), which are to be religiously regarded in all our Conduct, are Truth (of which in the preceding Sect.) and Happiness, that is, such Pleasures, as accompany, or follow the Practice of Truth, or are not inconsistent with it: (of which I have been treating in this). And as that Religion, which arises from the Distinction between moral Good and Evil, was called Natural, because grounded upon Truth and the Natures of Things: so perhaps may that too, which proposes Happiness for its End, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true Pleasure and Pain, which are Physical (or Natural) Good and Evil. And since both these unite so amicably, and are at last the same, here is one Religion which may be called natural upon two accounts.

  CHAPTER IV

  Of the practical Dictates of Reason.

  All human Actions are not voluntary and, consequently, do not suppose practical Dictates of Reason. I must begin this Chapter with observing, that not all the Actions of Men are grounded upon the Dictates, or upon Notions equivalent to the Dictates, of Reason. For our first Apprehensions, and certain Motions of the Spirits, or Imagination, sometimes also muscular Motions, as the winking of the Eyes, or a sudden starting back from our Friends, seem to be effected without any Dictate of Reason;1 also, most Actions of Infants, as Comparing, Judging, &c. concerning things pleasant and hurtful, by which, nevertheless, their Treasure of Knowledge is increas’d: And, perhaps, the Desire of Good in general may be reckon’d among these.

  How the practical Dictates of Reason are form’d.For the Author of Nature has so fram’d us, “That, in our Childhood, we, even unwillingly, perceive many things by our Senses, and firmly retain them in Memory, and judge by a spontaneous Comparison, whether some are greater than others, like or unlike, profitable or hurtful”; but, above all, (because we are always present to our selves, and from the particular Frame of our Mind, reflecting upon it self,) “We are necessarily conscious of the Acts of our Understanding and Will, and how much we have it in our Power, to excite, and govern, certain Motions of our Body,” which are, therefore, usually call’d voluntary; and, therefore, we necessarily know by experience, “What Actions of these Faculties bring us Harm, or Benefit and Perfection,” with which Knowledge, Desire and Pursuit, or Aversion and Avoidance, are naturally connected. Further, we easily perceive, by a Parity of Reason, (without any other Guide than Nature,) “That the like, both Advantages and Disadvantages, accrue to, and are perceiv’d by, other Beings also, as far as they resemble us, either in Mind, or Body, or both.” Hence we draw some Conclusions, concerning Actions acceptable to God, but many more, concerning such as are advantageous, and disadvantageous to Men.

  When we have attain’d to a Maturity of Reason, we take into Consideration the whole of our Life, or the whole future exercise of all our Powers; and, because a greater Number of Actions, probably future, and also of good Effects, which we hope for from thence, presents itself now at once to our Mind, than formerly; and a longer Train of Events, which are to succeed in order, and mutually depend upon one another, is contemplated by the Mind, now come to a ripeness of Judgment: Therefore the Mind calls in, to the Assistance of the Memory, not single Words only, but Propositions, distinctly exhibiting the Connexion of our Actions of all Kinds, with their natural Effects. These Propositions are called Practical, nor is it necessary, that they should be pronounc’d in the Form of a Gerund, “This, or that, ought to be done,” as some Schoolmen teach; because that Fitness, which is express’d by a Gerund, wants Explanation, which is to be fetch’d, either from the necessary Connexion of the Means with the End, or from the Obligation of a Law. The Obligation of Laws is not yet to be suppos’d known by those, who are in quest of their Original. And the necessary Connexion, between the Means and the End, is sufficiently express’d, in the Connexion of them, as of Causes, with their design’d Effects.

  Moreover, as we approach Manhood, it is natural for us, to compare, with one another, the Powers of several Causes, to produce the like Effects, as also the several Degrees of Perfection of those Effects, from which Comparison we form a Judgment, that this is greater, or less than, or equal to, that. Hence, for example, we conclude, “That some of those Actions, which are in our Power, can contribute more than others, or most of all, to our own Happiness, and that of others.” Such kind of practical Propositions, I call comparative Dictates of Reason.

  It is not necessary for us, who only inquire into the Formation of the Laws of Nature, to assert, that such Dictates, even after we know that they have the Force of Laws, do always determine Men to Action; it is sufficient, that they tell us, how we ought to determine. For, concerning the Power, which determines us to Action, there are different Opinions, and I care not to engage in the Dispute. All, however, I think, acknowledge, “That a practical Dictate of Reason is previously necessary to our deliberate Acts, and does, in some manner, direct the Determination of our future Actions.” Nevertheless, the essential Parts of a practical Dictate, and its Form, require, in the next place, to be more attentively consider’d; for thence its Formation, in our Mind, will more easily be apprehended.

  Three Forms of practical Dictates of Reason,A practical Proposition is, sometimes, thus express’d. “This possible human Action” (universal Benevolence; for instance) “Will chiefly, beyond any other Action at the same time possible, conduce to my Happiness, and that of all others, either as an essential part thereof, or as a Cause, which will, some time or other, effect a principal essential part thereof.” It is sometimes express’d, in the Form of a Command. “Let that Action, which is in thy Power, and which will most effectually, of all those which thou can’st exert, promote the common Good in the present Circumstances, be exerted”; often also, in the Form of a Gerund; “Such an Action ought to be done.” In my Opinion, these several Forms of Speech, relating to the Law of Nature, mean the same thing, whether the Understanding judges this best to be done, or commands it, or tells me, in the Form of a Gerund, that I am bound to do it.Compar’d. For the Understanding (which in this Affair is call’d Conscience) sufficiently hints the natural Obligation, when it says, “This is best to be done, both for your self and others.” For, in omitting what is declar’d best for me, it is thence evident, that I bring mischief (which may be called Punishment) upon my self. If the Dictate be consider’d, under the Form of a Command, the same thing is inculcated, by representing every Man’s own Understanding, as a Magistrate deputed, and authorized, to make Laws: Which, because it sounds somewhat metaphorically, is, therefore, less philosophical; it is useful however, because the Comparison has a very just Foundation in Nature. The Form of a Gerund teaches the same thing; but as an inferior Judge, or Counsellor, admonishing concerning a Law already made, and requiring a Conformity of the future Action therewith. The first manner is most becoming a Philosopher, which, if we consider the Form, appears a speculative Proposition; if the Force, a Practical, as teaching the natural Foundation of Obligation. The second best becomes a Sovereign Prince; the third, a Divine. But they may all be us’d promiscously, provided we retain in Mind the Distinction, such as it is, between these Forms. The Nature of Things represents to the Mind, what is best to be done. The Mind, considering the Government of Things, does, from the Idea of God, conclude, that he wills, or commands, them to be done, and, in his Name, imposes the Command on it self, in the second Form. In the third, it reflects upon the two former, and pronounces, that an Action agreeable to that Command, will be just; the contrary, unjust.

  A fourth Form,§II. There is also another manner of expressing the Laws of Nature, as thus, “This, or that, possible Action is most agreeable to human Nature.” But the Sense is doubtful; for, (1.) Human Nature, either signifies the particular nature of the Agent, and then it is not expressive enough of what ought to be consider’d before Action: For, not the Happiness of one particular Person only, but the greatest common Good, ought to be regarded. Or, (2.) Human Nature respects all Men, and so God is not taken into Consideration. But, if, in either of these Notions, the publick Good is, by consequence, implied, this Form of speaking is coincident with the first, which is therefore to be preferr’d, because it is free from this Ambiguity.Coincident with the first, which is less ambiguous, Again, it is doubtful, to what the Expression [is agreeable] relates: For, (1.) An Action may be said to be agreeable to any Nature, when it is agreeable to the Principles of acting, such are Faculties, Habits, and Objects, either treasur’d up in the Memory, or solliciting to Action from without; and to these Heads may be reduced the practical Dictates of Reason, (that is, Propositions, which are the Rules of Action,) whose Terms, having taken their Rise from Objects, are retain’d in the Memory, and are, by the Mind, form’d into Propositions, where by they determine our Actions, and constitute Habits. (2.) An Action may be said to be agreeable to human Nature, when its Effects preserve, or improve, the Nature of one or more Men. This latter Sense coincides with the Form 1 first propos’d, which is free from Ambiguity: And the first Sense of the Agreeableness of Actions, may, for the most part, be reduced thereto. For practical Propositions, which are among the internal Principles of Action, relate all to the Desire of an End, the chief principally, and to the Use of the Means. Those Propositions, which relate to the Desire of the ultimate End, pronounce only to this Purpose, “This is, in its own Nature, Good, or a part of human Happiness, and that the greatest possible in the present Circumstances.” Those, which determine concerning the Means, inculcate only thus, “This conduces to the obtaining such Good, and that the most effectually in the Case propos’d.” And these Forms of speaking coincide with the first. The first Form is to be preferr’d, because this manner of resolving a Proposition, concerning the Agreeableness of an Action, is not, for the most part, obvious to the Understanding; and, beside, what I aim at, is, “To explain the manner of forming these first Dictates of Reason, with which Actions ought to agree”; wherefore it is not sufficient to our purpose, to say, “That an Action is agreeable to Dictates already form’d, such as, alone, are the immediate Principles of human Actions.” It may not, however, be useless, to remark, that we may truly affirm, “That all good Actions, or Virtues, do perfectly and essentially agree with the Notion or Idea of a rational Agent, whose Reason has ripen’d into Prudence, whither it naturally tends.” For Prudence necessarily includes, both the Desire of the best and greatest End, which is within the reach of any one’s Faculties, and the Prosecution of the same, by the most effectual means. The greatest End is the common Good of all rational Agents, and the Consent of all, to give mutual Assistance toward obtaining that End, is the most effectual means of promoting it. In Actions pursuant to such Consent, consists all Religion and Virtue. And it may be presum’d, even before Compacts are enter’d into, that all will agree, that this is the greatest End, and this the only Means plainly necessary, because no Cause can be assign’d to human Actions, of mutual Assistance, beside the Consent of the Will.2 Therefore, if we reckon such Dictates of Reason, (which, whilst they are stored up in the Memory, determine us to Action,) among the inward Principles of human Actions, (which we may very justly do, since they contain in them selves the whole Essence and Force of Habits,) then it may, truly and agreeably to what we have said, be affirm’d, “That every thing is Just, which agrees with these Principles, and the Laws of a rational Nature.”

  Whether the Law of Nature be sufficiently promulg’d.§III. We are next to consider, especially with respect to the first, which is Nature’s principal Form of proposing its Laws, “Whether that Law, or practical Proposition, be taught, or promulg’d, with sufficient clearness, when its Terms, (and consequently their Connexion, or the Truth of the Proposition,) are obvious, and as it were expos’d to the View of those Men, who are willing to attend to the Consequences of their own Actions?” Or, “Whether we are to think, that Nature has not with sufficient Plainness declar’d such a Truth, so as to oblige those, who, thro Wickedness,3 or other Cares with which they distract their Mind, do not compare these Terms with one another, nor form such practical Propositions, for the future Direction of their Actions”? The former Opinion seems to me the more probable, because whoever shews me a Triangle, shews me with sufficient evidence, that the two sides of a Triangle are longer than the third, altho he does not form the Proposition for me. It is, however, incumbent upon me, in this Treatise,4 to prove, (1.) “That the Terms of the Laws of Nature are, as things are fram’d, in the same manner clearly enough laid before the Minds of Men.” (2.) “That the Minds of Men are in like manner excited, by their own Nature, or by their Union with the Body and the rest of the System of the World, to consider, abstract, and compare, those Terms among themselves, and thence to form Propositions for the Conduct of their Actions; and that, therefore, all Persons, in their Senses, retain such Propositions in their Mind, tho sometimes blended with what is impertinent or false, and thereby obscur’d.”

  The Terms of those practical Propositions, which are called the Laws of Nature, are such human Actions, as are capable of being guided by Counsel or Reason; and which, after they are exerted, do jointly contribute to the greatest Happiness of all rational Agents, and to our own in particular. Such Actions are commonly divided, justly enough, into,(1.) The Elicit (that is, the proper and immediate) Acts of the Understanding and Will, and, consequently, of the Affections, (at least so far as the stronger Affections have place in the Mind itself;) and, (2.) The Imperate, which are exerted, in the Body, by the Power of the Mind.

  The Nature of the practical Dictates of Reason illustrated by a Comparison of them with mathematical Practice.§IV. But, before we consider these Laws more particularly, it will be worth while, to insist somewhat longer, on treating of the nature of practical Propositions, and first to shew their great Affinity, or Agreement in meaning, whether they be Absolute or Conditional, with speculative Propositions. 2dly, That, in them all, the Effect is look’d upon as the End; Actions in our Power, as the Means.

  In order to which we are first to observe, that those are properly called practical Propositions, which declare the Origin of an Effect from human Actions, which Definition I think proper to illustrate by Examples.Practical Propositions, Such is this in Arithmetick, “The Addition of Numbers forms the Sum,” or, “The Subtraction of one Number from another, leaves their Difference.” So in Geometry, “The Practice, prescrib’d in the first Proposition of Euclid ’s Elements, will effect an Equilateral Triangle, ” is, a practical Proposition, pronouncing concerning the Effect of a certain Series of human Actions.

  which are near of kin to Theorems,Moreover, the Mind certainly understands the Truth of such a practical Proposition, in the same manner it does that of any Theorem, which is, by considering its Terms, of which one includes the other. So the Truth of this Proposition, “The Construction of a whole Equilateral Triangle is made, by constructing and uniting all its Parts,” is known after the same manner with this Theorem, “A whole Equilateral Triangle is the same, with all its Parts united among themselves.”

  consider the Effect as the End, Actions as Means.It comes to the same thing, if the Construction of this Whole be consider’d as the End, and the several Motions, by which the three sides of that Triangle are form’d and fitted to one another, are consider’d as the Means necessary to that End. The same Proposition, as to Sense, may be otherwise thus express’d. “It is necessary to the Construction of a whole Equilateral Triangle, that all its sides be form’d, and mutually join’d, after the manner prescrib’d by Euclid, or some equivalent Method.” For, truly, the End is the Effect intended, and all the Causes, effecting a proper Union of all the Parts, include at once all the Means. What we have already said about the Construction, may be very easily accommodated to these other Operations,5 the Preservation or Perfection, of any Whole, which needs such Operations. Seeing the Preservation of any thing, is only the continuing those Actions, by which it was first form’d. Hence this practical Proposition, “It is necessary, in order to procure the Preservation of the whole System of rational Agents, as far as in us lies, that we should preserve, as much as possible, all its Parts, and their Union among them-selves, (such as the Perfection of such a System requires.)” This, I say, has a like Evidence with that Theorem, which affirms, “That the Whole is the same with all its Parts united.” And in that Proposition, rightly understood, I will prove are contain’d the Foundations of all natural Laws. What I have offer’d, concerning the Conversion of Euclid’s first Problem into a Theorem, I would have, by a Parity of Reason, understood universally. For nothing hinders, but that “The Solution of all those things may be perfectly propos’d in Theorems, which are usually sought after in the Form of Problems.” Therefore Archimedes, in his second Book of the Sphere, plainly professes, “That, of Problems, whose Solution consists of Propositions directing Practice, he form’d Theorems.” And Ramus, in Imitation of him, in his Geometry, converts all Euclid’s Problems into Theorems.6 And in specious Arithmetick, (the happiest art of solving Problems,) at the end of the Operation is always produc’d a Theorem, pointing out the Solution of the Problem.

  Nor is it to be doubted, but, as Des-Cartes, Vieta, Wallis, and others, have successfully taught an expeditious Method of solving Problems in pure Mathematicks, (Arithmetick and Geometry,) by Theorems algebraically invented and exhibited: so also Problems might be solv’d, in the same manner, in mixt Mathematicks; not in Astronomy only, (which Ward has excellently perform’d,) but also in Mechanicks, Staticks, &c. and in great part of natural Philosophy.7

  Yet farther; the science of Morality and Politicks, both can, and ought to, imitate the Analytick Art, (in which I comprehend, not only the Extraction of Roots, but also the whole doctrine of specious Arithmetick or Algebra,) as the noblest Pattern of Science.

  (1.) By delivering the Rules of its Practice, and the whole Substance of its Art, in a few universal Theorems. Where I think proper to observe, “That its certainty is no more weaken’d, or usefulness lessen’d, because we cannot exactly determine what is fit to be done, in our external Actions, with relation to a Subject involv’d in a vast Variety of Circumstances; than the Truth or Usefulness of Geometrical Principles, about measuring Lines, Surfaces or Solids, is overthrown, because neither our Senses, nor Instruments, will enable us, to form without us a Line exactly strait, or a Surface perfectly plane or spherical, or a Body, in all respects, regular.” It is sufficient, that we approach so near to Exactness, that what we want of it, is of no consequence in Practice. We may attain a like Degree of Exactness, in Morality, by the help of its Principles. I confess, however, “That those things which, in Morality, are granted, or assumed as known, such as GOD and Man, their Actions and mutual Relations, are not soexactly known, as those things, which in Mathematicks are assum’d, in a fix’d determinate Proportion or Quantity; and that, therefore, the Conclusions thence drawn must labour under the same want of Exactness.” Yet the Method, the Rules of Operation, and the Manner of drawing Consequences, is the same. Nor is Exactness necessary for the Uses of Life; as neither is it requir’d, in the Practice of measuring Planes and Solids.

  (2.) As Algebra, by beginning with, and supposing, the most compounded and involv’d Aequations, where the known Quantities are mingled with the unknown, then diligently comparing among themselves the several Terms, does at length discover some simple uncompounded thing, of which the compounded parts may be compos’d, and which, consequently, leads us to the Knowledge and Explanation of the unknown Quantities, by the known. So, likewise, moral Philosophy begins with contemplating an End very intricate, and Means variously involv’d. For the End is a Collection of all those good things within our Power, which are capable of adorning the Kingdom of God, the whole System of intelligent Agents, and its several Parts. The Means, by which this End is to be obtain’d, are all our possible free Actions, about what Object soever. And, from an Equality suppos’d between these two Ideas, as between the Powers of the Cause, and their adequate Effect, are to be drawn all moral Rules, and all virtuous Actions enjoin’d by them. It is evident, that these Things are equal, because the End is the intire Effect to be produc’d, and all our possible Actions make up the intire efficient Cause. But in this consists the Art of Life, “To consider every publick Good in our Power, and all our particular Actions, and their Order, (by which some may prepare Matter for, or add Force to, others,) with such Attention and Care, that having, at length, trac’d out the most easy Actions, which may serve to promote to that End, by their Help we may proceed to the more difficult, and, at last, reach those utmost and most intricate bounds of our Faculties.” And this Practice perfectly corresponds to that of Algebra.

  (3.) As Algebra supposes the Quantity unknown, and yet sought after, in some sort already known, by a certain Anticipation of the Mind, and expresses it by a proper Character, and is thus enabled to exhibit its given Relation to the known Quantities, by means whereof it-self at last becomes known: So Ethicks, also, forms some kind of Idea of the End or Effect propos’d; by the help of those Relations, which it bears to our Operations in some measure known, (at least in general,) it distinguishes it by the name of the chief Good, or of Happiness, from other Objects, altho’ it knows, “That it does not yet exist,” and altho’ it does not distinctly know, “What shall at last be the Effect of our Operations, and of the Concurrence of Things without us”; whence it may justly be called Unknown: But, by the help of those Actions and Faculties, to which it is related, as the Effect to its Causes, and on which, consequently, it most certainly intirely depends, it at last gradually becomes known. Hither also is to be referr’d, that, whereas the End propos’d by every one, is that intire and greatest Good, which he can procure to the Universe, and to himself in his station, it follows, “That the End is to be conceiv’d as the greatest Aggregate, or Sum, of good Effects, most acceptable to God and Men, which can be effected, by the greatest Industry of all our future Actions.” It often happens, (and we ought to endeavour that it should happen as often as may be,) “That the good Effects of our Power increase in a Geometrical Progression”; (as in increase arising from Interest upon Interest, or in Husbandry, or Merchandizing, when every year the increase of the former is added to the main Stock;) whence arises a vast increase, both of publick and private Happiness, beyond what can be distinctly foreseen.

  (4.) Since it is manifest, “That Man, without the Concurrence of God, can contribute nothing, without that of other Men, almost nothing, toward the common Good (the Glory of God, and Happiness of Men;)” but on the contrary, “That by any Action entering into, or preserving, Society with God and Men, any one may contribute much (comparatively speaking) to the publick Good”: The Judgment of Reason must, therefore, necessarily determine Man to such Actions, as tend to the forming or preserving such Society. But little, or nothing, is transacted in Society among Men, which does not depend upon the Knowledge of Numbers and Measure; and, therefore, if all Questions, concerning Practice, were handled accurately, they might be reduced to mathematical Evidence and Certainty; such are the determining the Value, both of Things and human Labour or Actions, either by comparing them among themselves, or with a third Thing, Money, of which also there are various Species; to reduce the Values of which to the most known and convenient Denomination, there is need of Arithmetick, either Natural or Artificial. To this Head are to be reduced, the Calculation of Prices in all Commerce, the Computation of Time, the investigating the Proportion of every Man’s Profit, or Loss, in Partnership. It would be endless, to attempt enumerating the Uses of Mathematicks in Tacticks, in Navigation, in the Contrivance and Application of all Kinds of Engines, in Surveying, and in Building, whether Houses, Ships, or Fortifications. It is sufficient, in few Words, to affirm, “That in all Affairs, whether private or publick, Mathematicks is the principal Instrument of Certainty and Justice in Action, where soever Exactness is requisite.” Which I do not advance, with a view to commend Mathematicks, (which is needless,) but to demonstrate the Certainty of the Rules of Life and Morality, upon this Account, that Natural Prudence almost always makes Use of the Assistance of a Science that is certain, or of self-evident Principles. To this Head also, I think, may be referr’d, “That, whereas we know not what shall hereafter happen, we may, nevertheless, know what is possible: And things possible may be compar’d among themselves; and it may be certainly known, not only, which of two possible Things will be of greater or less Value, when they do happen; but, also, which of them may be produc’d by more, which by fewer, Causes, that do now, or shall soon, exist. But that is more probable, which may happen more ways, and its Chance or Expectation is of greater Value.” Now it is of great Consequence, in the Management of Affairs, “To know certainly the Probability, and Value, of the Hope of the several Things, or Effects, we have occasion to consider.” For such is the condition of human Life, that we must lay out almost our whole Labour, our Expence often, nay expose Life it-self to Danger, for the Hope of such Things, as conduce to the Preservation or Happiness of our-selves, or of others, altho’ that Hope be probable only, not certain; even in Affairs of Peace, such as Agriculture, Merchandize, &c. much more in the Chance of War. That skill of investigation by Analysis, which all Men exercise naturally, teaches how to weigh these things very well; how the Value may be farther ascertain’d by Analysis, improv’d by Art, the famous Huygens hath finely shewn in his Calculations of the Chances of the Dice, which you may find at the End of Schooten’s Miscellaneous Mathematical Exercitations.8

  It is an Observation pertinent to this Head, “That, as in Matters of Prudence we must sometimes try several Ways, before we can know certainly, whether the Affair shall succeed, according to our Wish, in this or that manner? Or whether we can at all obtain what we hop’d for? So, also, in Algebraick Investigations, sometimes various Comparisons, sometimes various Divisions, and other Kinds of Reduction, are to be tried, before we can solve the Problem propos’d.” It would not be impertinent here, to proceed farther, in tracing the resemblance between these Arts, in shewing, how the Method of Operation in both, does sometimes discover the Supposition built upon, to be false or impossible, not much less usefully, than it discovers another Supposition to be true or possible: And, moreover, by shewing, how negative Signs resemble Motions contrary to the Motion design’d, and how the Labours of different Men, conspiring to the same Effect, are correspondent to a compounding of Motions, concurring to form one and the same Line. But, since such matters are not very obvious, and the Resemblance is seldom carried on throughout, I thought it properer to stop here, whither those, who are but superficially conversant in Mathematicks, or who have a genius happily form’d by Nature for Science, may go along with me; than, by Comparisons with Things little known, to obscure, instead of reflecting light upon, Morality.

  General Remarks on Chapter IV

  Tho’ the Nature of future Contingencies will not admit of a Demonstration, “That any particular virtuous Action will be more for the Advantage of the Agent upon the whole in this Life”: Yet a Man of an enlarged Understanding may, in most moral Actions, have an intuitive Knowledge, that it is highly probable, “The Action will be for his Advantage,” altho’ he has not a precise Knowledge of the Degree of the Probability, or Value of the Chance. And perhaps it is not impossible to the human Capacity, to determine even the exact Degree of Probability in most moral Cases of Action, tho’ this wou’d be a Work of very great Difficulty, most Cases being exceedingly complicated. An exact Enumeration and Comparison of our Ideas of Pleasure, would be a great Step towards this Work. Tho’ this would be of great Use in Morality, yet we may with Pleasure observe the Benevolence of the Deity, “in giving us so great a Knowledge of the Consequences of Action, without any great Pains or Labour, as that, in most Cases, we may have a certain Knowledge of the Probability, That the Action will be for the Advantage of the Agent upon the whole, tho’ we have not an accurate Knowledge of the Degree of the Probability.” And this is sufficient to influence Action. For any Probability of Advantage, whatever the Degree of it be, if it be sufficient to overcome our natural Indolence and Inactivity, is sufficient to determine us to Action, upon a calm and thorough Deliberation.

  CHAPTER V

  Of the Law of Nature, and its Obligation.

  The Law of Nature defined. Having prepar’d the Way for all that is to follow, I shall begin this Chapter with the Definition of the Law of Nature.1The Law of Nature is a Proposition, proposed to the Observation of, or impress’d upon, the Mind, with sufficient Clearness, by the Nature of Things, from the Will of the first Cause, which points out that possible Action of a rational Agent, which will chiefly promote the common Good, and by which only the intire Happiness of particular Persons can be obtain’d. The former Part of this Definition contains the Precept, the latter, the Sanction; and the Mind receives the Impression of both, from the Nature of Things. “Those Rewards and Punishments are sufficient, which are so great and so certain,2 as to make it evidently conduce to the intire Happiness of particular Persons,” (which the Nature of Things, both compels them to desire, and makes possible for them to obtain,) “if they continually promote the public Good, more than if they attempt any thing to the contrary.” And whereas Privations are best understood by means of their opposite Positives, Actions and Omissions contrary to this End, and the Mischiefs connected with them, seem by this Method to be both discovered and prohibited. For “Right” (or strait) “shews what is crooked, as well as what is strait.” That which takes the shortest Way from the given Term, or State of Things, to this End, is called Right, by a Metaphor taken from the Definition of a right Line, in use among Mathematicians. An Action, attaining the most desireable Effect in the quickest Manner, takes the shortest Way to this End. Therefore it is Right. And that very Comparison, by which such Action is discover’d, supposes all things so consider’d, that it is known, both what will less conduce to the End, and (with much greater Ease) what would obstruct the effecting it.

  It is a true Proposition.I will now consider the Particulars of the Definition given. A Proposition] Viz. a true one, as what follows will make evident. This Word seem’d more simple and plain than the Phrase, The Dictate of right Reason, which yet comes to the same thing, when all Ambiguity in the Expression is taken away. Nor did I think it proper, to make use of the word Oration for the Genus, as Hobbes has done,3 lest any should in a Mistake imagine, that the use and knowledge of Words, or any arbitrary Signs whatsoever, were essential to a Law. The Knowledge (or Ideas form’d in the Mind) of Human Actions, of Consequences good or evil to human Nature, but, especially, of Rewards and Punishments naturally connected with such Actions, and those Ideas reduc’d into the Form of Practical Propositions, such as I have describ’d, are all that is essential to a Law. Such Ideas may be produc’d, by Observation, in the Minds of those who are born Deaf, tho’ they form no notion of the sound or force of Words; and so the Laws of Nature will become known, even to them.

  Imprinted by the NatureBy Nature] It was proper, to mention the efficient Cause in this Definition, because we were not inquiring into the Definition of a Law in general, but of the Law of Nature, which Word denotes the Author or efficient Cause.

  of ThingsThe Nature of Things] Does not only signify this Lower World, whereof we are a Part, but its Creator and supreme Governor, GOD. For, to our forming a true Judgment of Actions necessary to the publick Good, conspire (1.) the World without us, especially, those Men with whom we have to do, who, as Objects, excite us to think of, and consider, them; (2.) ourselves, both as parts of Mankind, and as free Causes of our own Actions; (3.) God, as the common Cause, and supreme Governor of all Things, whose Authority comes often into consideration.

  It is certain, “That only true Propositions, whether speculative or practical, are imprinted on our Minds by the Nature of Things”; because a natural Action points out that only which exists, and is never the Cause of any Falshood, which proceeds wholly from a voluntary Rashness, joining or separating Notions, which Nature has not join’d or separated. If therefore the Terms are connected by Nature, a true affirmative Proposition may be form’d of them. The Terms are connected, when the different Ideas (for the most part inadequate or incomplete) of an Object are imprinted upon the Mind, by the same Object view’d in different Lights, or compar’d with different Things. It is hence easy, to form a Judgment of true negative Propositions. It is, therefore, with great justness, that these Laws or Propositions are ascrib’d to Nature, since Nature exposes to the Observation of the Mind, both the Terms of those Propositions, and the Connexion of those Terms.

  on our Minds,Farther; “Rational Agents are so fram’d, that, whilst they continue in this State, they are led, by Necessity of Nature, to perceive or apprehend the Terms of these Propositions; nay, are also inclin’d, by an inward Propension, to compare them, so as to frame affirmative Propositions of those which agree, negative, of those which disagree; nay farther, so to compare two Propositions among themselves, as to draw from these, as Premises, a third in the Form of a Conclusion.” The Nature of a rational Agent exacts, that self-evident Propositions (especially, concerning the Consequences of our own Actions, relating to our own Happiness, or that of others) be form’d, such are the primary Laws of Nature; and from them be deduced other Propositions or Conclusions, which may be call’d the secondary, or less obvious, Laws of Nature.

  from the Will of the first Cause,We cannot doubt of the Nature of created Beings, but that both Things external, exciting Thoughts in us, and our Mind comparing these Thoughts, are the Causes of necessary Truths.4 As to the Nature of the Creator, there will remain no doubt, but that he too is to be look’d upon as the Cause of those Truths, if we seriously consider, both what has been already said, and what we now think proper to add; which is, “That all Truth is from the first Cause of those Things, in which it is founded, and the uncorrupt Effect or Work of God, without any Tincture from the preternatural Stain of Mankind.” Therefore, if any true Proposition declares, what ought to be done, it declares so from God. Nor is it more certain, “That those natural Things are form’d by God, to produce their natural Effects, the Sun, for Instance, to enlighten the Air, and Rain to moisten the Earth”; than “That such Propositions as naturally regulate our Actions, are given to us by God for that very Purpose.” For that Regulation is the only Effect they can have, and that they do necessarily, from their own inward Nature.

  with sufficient Clearness.“That Proposition is propos’d, or imprinted by the Objects, with sufficient plainness, whose Terms, and their natural Connexion, are so expos’d to the Senses and Thoughts, by obvious and common Experience, that the Mind of an adult Person, not labouring under any Impediment, if it will attend or take Notice, may easily observe it.” Such, for Example, are these Propositions; “That a Man may be kill’d, by a profuse Loss of Blood, by Suffocation, by Want of Food, &c. That Life may for some time be preserv’d by Air, Nourishment, and Cloathing: That the mutual Assistance of Men contributes much to a happy Life.”

  But, if any one has a Mind to add, to these Reasons, another from the Effect, and will affirm, “That the Laws of Nature are so called, because they supply its Necessities, and are the principal Means of perfecting it,” I will not contradict him; because the same Person, and, much more, different Persons, may have different Reasons for imposing the same Name on Things.

  (Justinian’s Definition of the Law of Nature, oppos’d, by Authority,§II. But, because the Law or Right (for these Words are there used in the same Sense) of Nature is defin’d in another Sense by the Civilians,5 both in the Pandects, and Institutions, Lib. I. “That which Nature has taught all Animals”;6 and they thus distinguish it from “the Law of Nations, which all Nations use, and which natural Reason establishes among all Men”:7 I think it proper, to oppose to so great an Authority, both an equal Authority, and Reason, which is of greater Authority among Philosophers. As to the First, the same Justinian, (in Instit. Lib. 2.) treating of Property, expresses himself thus. “We acquire a property in some things by the Law of Nature, which, as we are inform’d, is call’d the Law of Nations.”8 Behold, how here the Law of Nature does with him signify the same Thing with the Law of Nations, which he defines in the same manner, as to sense, that we do the Law of Nature! And Cicero also, who, as to proper Latin, will not give Way, even to the Emperor, in the third Book of his Offices, has made use of these two expressions, as signifying the same thing, “By Nature, that is, by the Law of Nations.”9 And, as part of the Law of Nature, he reckons the Precepts of Religion, which are peculiar to Man, and not common to him with other Animals.10 Hence it appears, that these antient Authors us’d the Law of Nature and of Nations in the same sense; so that it would be superfluous to prove, that modern Philosophers us’d the same way of speaking.by Reason.) The Reason, why I affirm the Laws of Nature to be proper to Man alone, is this, because they are Propositions concerning consequences depending upon the influence of actions, or Determinations of the Judgment compounding or dividing Terms, whose chief Authority depends upon this, “That they are known to proceed from God.” And I meet with nothing to convince me, “That Brutes form Propositions,” such as these especially, “and regulate their Lives by them,” much less can they know, “That they are imprinted upon them by God.”

  which points out§III. I am not ignorant of what Modestinus affirms, “The Law has power to command, forbid, permit, punish,”11. to which may also be added, to reward. And yet I have mention’d none of these, in the Definition of the Law of Nature, which, nevertheless, I acknowledge to have all those powers.12 For they all seem to follow from this one, wherein their whole force consists, the pointing out of those Actions, which are most conducive to the Common Good. Philosophy, and those Notices, which are impress’d upon us by external Objects, shew, of what Kind those actions are, and what they do. These expressions, to command, &c. seem more adapted to the Style of Magistrates, when they signify their Will, than to the simple Indications afforded by Things; from which, however, the whole force of Commands, Prohibitions, Punishments, and Rewards, is easily deduc’d.

  (and, by doing so,For, “after the supreme Governor of the World has declar’d plainly, that he wills the Publick Good; he plainly commands, by pointing it out, what promotes that, and, by that Command, evidently forbids contrary Actions or Omissions. And he, whose Will it is, that every Man’s particular Happiness, and peace of Conscience, should depend upon his endeavours to perform these things, and upon the publick Happiness, in which it is contain’d, hath decreed a certain Reward to such Actions, as procure the Common Good, and hath added the sanction of a Punishment to contrary Actions; which is, his Want of that part of the Publick Good, which would have fallen to his share, if he had endeavour’d to promote it.”commands, forbids, rewards, punishes, permits) The Law of Nature may be said to permit those things, which it discovers, not to be necessarily requisite to the Common Good, and yet to be consistent with it. If such things were unnecessarily restrain’d by Rulers, it is plain, that Nature would be hurt, which consists in such motion, as tends to perpetual Variety. Positive Rewards and Punishments will be considered hereafter. All these points will be better understood, after I have explained the nature and causes of the Publick Good.

  that possible ActionThe following words insinuate the subject Matter of the Laws of Nature, which are such Actions as the Schoolmen call Human; those, for Instance, which we can govern by Counsel, and which are, therefore, not either Necessary, nor Impossible. For the Law of Nature, or “Reason, weighing the powers of Nature, cannot propose to us that which is impossible, as an End, nor prescribe the making use of such Means, as exceed the limits of our power”; because both would be vain, and inconsistent with our faculties. But Reason is plainly averse to vain attempts and inconsistencies.13 For, tho’ it may happen, thro’ an unforeseen concurrence of external causes, that affairs (in this Life) may succeed very prosperously with those, who have neglected to use the best means in their power to promote their own happiness: Yet, because such Effects are, with respect to us, purely contingent, and do but rarely happen, it is evident, that our Reason, or Judgment, does not advise, much less does the Law of Nature command, any such Actions. This, however, Natural Reason teaches evidently enough, “That it will much more probably promote our Happiness, that we should act for a foreseen End, and by the best Means in our power adapted to that End, than that, laying aside Counsel, we should commit our-selves to uncertain chance.” Nor does the Law of Nature promise greater Happiness, than what arises from a rational behaviour toward God and Man, beyond what can be hop’d for from a Life, whose conduct is committed to rashness and chance. The ground of this greater hope is founded upon this, “That our Reason will not hinder the accession of such good things, as may come to us from any other quarter, without our care, but will add there to all those, which it can effect or obtain from God and Men.” Beside, I would exclude from the title of Human Actions, those, which throw the whole affair upon Fortune, without the least probable cause of hoping for a good, rather than an evil Event.

  (i.e. Series of Actions)The Action, here describ’d, is to be understood universally,14 not the action of one Man only, nor those of a Day; but all the human Actions of all Men, thro’ their whole Life, ought to be directed to the Common Good of all. I chose to treat expresly of the actions of Men only, because they are well known to us by daily Experience; and, if the Law of Nature leads us at all to philosophize, concerning the actions of God or Angels, it is to be deduc’d from an analogy or resemblance, founded on Human Actions.

  of a (i.e. Every) Rational Agent.The words [of a Rational Agent] plac’d in the Definition, are indefinite, and are, therefore, applicable to any Man whomsoever; for Example, to the first Man, yet alone; and then the Common Good would be, whatsoever would be acceptable to God and Him. But this indefinite proposition, connecting those things which are in nature necessarily connected, amounts to, or is in sense, an Universal; i.e. after more than one Man is suppos’d, it extends to all and every one, taken jointly or severally. This I thought proper to mention, for this reason, because the most known Laws of Nature, which direct to the practice of Justice and Charity among Men, suppose them to have increas’d to some Number; and do chiefly aim at this point, to manifest to them, by what mutual actions they may make one another most happy. The Laws of Nature therefore speak, as Civil Laws usually do, to many at once. Hence the Lawyers call the Law, a common command;15 and we have an account, that Solon (if I remember right) expresly provided for it by a Law, “That no Law should be made for the case of any particular person.”16 Beside, the joint endeavours and Actions of many may effect something considerable toward the common Good; and, therefore, the truth of this Proposition, “Fidelity, Gratitude, natural Affection, or the Innocence of all or many, conduces to the Publick Good,” is more evident, than that such Actions in any single person should have the same effect.

  which will chiefly promote the Common Good.§IV. “The principal, and most distinguishing, Character of the Laws of Nature, is taken from the Effect of those Actions they prescribe, which is, the Publick Good.” That it should be so, the matter it-self requires. For, since the Nature of Actions, which are the Objects of Laws, is best perceiv’d by their Effects; since these Laws, as being Propositions, and, consequently, form’d of Ideas combin’d among themselves, are distinguish’d from all Laws of different kinds, by their Objects, the inward nature of the Laws themselves must be seen in the Effects, to which they direct.

  This, the greatest End of human Actions,The Effect (as the Idea thereof, preconceiv’d in the Mind, first moves a Rational Agent to intend the producing it, and afterwards limits his actions in order thereto) is called the End. All agree, that whoever acts deliberately, must (1) propose an End to himself, then (2) search out, chuse, and apply the Means, by which it may be obtain’d. “Therefore Laws, perfectly fitted to a Rational Nature, must both point out the best End, and the most suitable Means for obtaining it.” Wherefore, in the given Definition, for the End, I propose the Publick Good, (in a more extensive sense than Ulpian, who defines the Publick Good “That which conduces to the benefit of the Roman state, and consists in sacred Rites, Priests, and Magistrates”;17 for my notion of it includes the Good of all Men, and the Honour of God,) which is certainly the greatest End, which can possibly be propos’d by us: For the Means, I propose all those Actions, which are in our power, and, in the given circumstances, are most effectual to obtain that End.

  is here consider’d as their Effects,But, because the words, End and Means, are of very doubtful signification, and suppose the free, the mutable, intention of a rational Agent, which can never be certainly known; and because they, consequently, present to our Minds a matter not so proper for Demonstration; I thought it fit, without changing the matter in hand, to consider it under another notion; that is, because the connexion is more conspicuous, and perfectly inseparable, between Efficient Causes, and their Effects; and continual experience and frequent observation plainly discover, what Effects will follow Causes assign’d; therefore “I have laid down in the Definition, the Publick Good as the Effect, our Actions and Powers, from which any thing of that kind is hop’d for, as the Efficient Causes.”

  and Morality thereby render’d more Demonstrable.“By this means, Moral and Political Questions are converted into Terms in use among Natural Philosophers, Whether these Efficient Causes can produce this Effect, or no? And to Questions thus express’d, an Answer may be given, which is capable of Demonstration, from the formerly-observ’d efficacy of human Actions, consider’d, both by themselves, and in concurrence with other Causes, not unlike those at present suppos’d.” Altho’, while we deliberate, we may truly be called Free, and the future effects of our Actions, with respect to that Liberty, may, with great propriety, be called Contingent; yet, after we have determin’d to act, the connexion, between our Actions, and all the Effects thence depending, is necessarily and plainly natural, and, therefore, capable of Demonstration; we may observe this in Mathematical operations, which are not less free than any other human actions. Therefore, “as a long series of consequences, beyond the expectation of such as are not vers’d in such matters, concerning the mutual proportion of Lines or Angles, may be demonstrated from this, That a few Lines have been drawn according to Geometrical Rules: So, from the principles of Natural Philosophy, may be demonstrated many Effects of a Human Action, communicating a known motion to a Body in a known system of other Bodies; and, consequently, often, what will prejudice the Life of Man, the soundness, intireness, and power of beginning Motion (in the use of which consists Liberty, as it is oppos’d to external restraint) in his Members, or even the Goods which he possesseth; or what, on the contrary, will benefit any one Man, or many.” A rational inquiry into Nature hath demonstrated, (if I am not mistaken,) “That all the changes of all Bodies, even Human, which are produc’d by external Causes,” (for determinations, arising from the inward Liberty of the Will, must be excepted,)“whether they are for the better or the worse, are produc’d, according to those Theorems concerning Motion, which are investigated and demonstrated by a Geometrical Analysis.” I confess, they are but few things, tho’ of great moment, which have yet been produc’d upon this Subject: Yet a method has been shewn, of subjecting all Motions, however complicated, to a Geometrical Calculation, and of finding out all Theorems, concerning Lines, Figures, and the determinations of Motion thence arising; and, consequently, (since the whole Nature of Body is to be resolv’d into its Extension, Figure, and variously-compounded motions;) “a general Method is discovered, of reducing all the effects of Body to Demonstration.”18 I take Notice of these Things by the way, only that I might shew, “in what method we must proceed, to come at a perfect demonstraion, from the necessary connexion of the Terms, of those things which are well enough known, from common observation and continual experience, to exist in Nature, and to depend mutually on each other, as Causes and Effects,” and which others endeavour to deduce from other natural principles. Such are those Actions, by which Men usually destroy, or preserv the Lives, Liberties, and Fortunes of others.

  Virtue and the only Good.§V. Upon this head, the Stoicks are to be reprehended, who affirm’d, “nothing to be Good, but Virtue; nothing Evil, but Vice.”19 For, whilst they endeavour to establish the transcendent Goodness of Virtue, and the egregious Evil of Vice, they, incautiously, intirely take away the only reason, why Virtue is Good, and Vice, Evil. For Virtue is therefore Good, (and in truth it is the greatest Good,) because it determines Human Actions to such effects, as are principal parts of the Publick Natural Good; and, consequently, tends to improve in all Men the Natural perfections, both of Mind and Body, and to promote, as much as possible, the Honour of God, by imitating the Divine Beneficence. Further, seeing one part of Universal Justice (which is Virtue it-self conspicuous among Men) consists in Innocence, that is, in restraining Murder, Theft, &c. it is manifest, “That they can give no reason of the Law prohibiting such Injuries, unless they acknowledge, that such actions, as the robbing an Innocent person of his Life or Goods, (by which Life is preserv’d,) are Evil, or hurtful to one or more, antecedently to all Laws, and, consequently, without respect to Virtue, which consists in paying obedience to Law.”

  Good and Evil antecedent to Civil Laws.Whether this be denied by Hobbes, or no, I know not; for he openly allows, that there is a Damage in such actions, and that it is Evil to him who is thereby the sufferer, in these words. “In the Commonwealth, if any one hurts another, with whom he has enter’d into no Compact, he damages him, upon whom he has brought the Evil; he injures him only, who has the power of the Commonwealth.”20 Elsewhere he as expressly contends, That “Civil Laws are the Rules of Good and Evil, and that, therefore, what the Legislator hath commanded, is to be esteem’d Good; what he has forbid, Evil; and that it is seditious to say, that the knowledge of Good and Evil belongs to private persons.”21 I would willingly reconcile these passages, by distinguishing a word of doubtful Signification, and supposing, that Evil in the former passage signifies that which is hurtful to Nature; but in the latter, that which disagrees with the Laws. But I am afraid, this way of reconciling him to himself will not please him, because from this concession may be inferr’d, “That some things may be known, before the declaration of the Law, to be Evil, or hurtful, either to a single person, or to a multitude, and thence some Civil Constitutions may be prov’d Evil or hurtful to the People.” To avoid this inconvenience, he determines, “That no Definition, no Reasoning, in all Mathematicks, Natural Philosophy, or Politicks, should be acknowledg’d, unless approv’d by the Civil Powers.”22 Truly, what he denies of “Christ, that he came into the World to teach Logick,”23 that he contends belongs to the Prerogative of Monarchs and all supreme Powers. They, truly, are rais’d to the Throne, to teach Logick and other Natural Sciences. O happy times, not ours only, but even all times of all Nations! All Kings and Republicks have perpetually philosophiz’d; and the Decrees of them all have been acknowledged Axioms, however they may have contradicted, either themselves, or one another. But let him reconcile these his inconsistencies more happily himself; and, at the same time, I intreat him to remove this scruple, “How all effects (beneficial and hurtful, good and evil) of Natural Agents, and even of Men themselves, are necessary: And yet it depends upon the mutable Will of Princes, to determine, whether these same effects be Good or Evil ”? Which are two Fundamental doctrines of his, tho’ they are in direct contradiction to one another. What is more; the latter opinion is inconsistent with those things, which are necessarily and essentially requisite to Society, and acknowledged by Hobbes himself for Laws of Nature (cap. 3 de Cive) such as, the rejecting a right over all things and persons, keeping Faith in Compacts, and Gratitude.24 Certainly, if any Prince should enact general Laws contrary to these, in order to establish his State, he would do it with the same Success, as if he should decree the use of Poison, or of Air and Garments infected with the Plague, for preserving the health of his Subjects. For the force and efficacy of such methods do, with as great certainty, introduce the Evils of Discord, Murder, Robbery, and the like, among Men, as Poison or the Plague corrupts the Blood. Xerxes may lash the Hellespont,25 but it will not obey him; nor will things hurtful change their Natures, and become profitable, in obedience to the Decrees of Princes. Suppose a Law, commanding the Subjects of any State, to kill one another, without any regard to Sex, Age, or Actions by them done; to break all Compacts; to be universally ungrateful: Suppose it universally obey’d, and see, whether it would not immediately introduce a general Slaughter, (nothwithstanding any obligation of Conscience to the contrary, which he would seem to acknowledge, only to impose upon the unwary;) till at last only One surviv’d, whom now elated with the murder of the rest, no fear of a greater power (the only obligation acknowledg’d by Hobbes) would restrain from killing his Prince, whom we may, without absurdity, suppose less strong than his Subject. Let him likewise shew, “How all his Philosophy is Demonstrative, and necessarily true, when as yet it has been confirm’d by no Prince whomsoever; but on the contrary, many of his opinions (particularly that concerning Necessity, in opposition to Free-will) are condemn’d by almost all Princes professing Christianity.”

  Whatever his real Sentiments may be, it is not very material; yet it is a more favourable construction to judge, “That he was either deceiv’d by the ambiguity of the words, Good and Evil, or was willing to deceive his unwary Readers”; than to believe him come to that pitch of Madness, “as to think natural Good and Evil (that is, such Actions, especially Human, as benefit or hurt the Bodies or Minds of Men, singly or collectively) are not determin’d by their own Nature, to produce their natural effects, but advantage or prejudice us, merely at the Pleasure of Princes.

  The Principles of Human Actions, as naturally Good or Evil, as are their Effects.§VI. We may, therefore, suppose the following sensible Phenomena, which are confirmed by constant Experience, if not already demonstrated, are capable of being demonstrated from the Principles of Natural Philosophy, (whose business it is, to discover and demonstrate the Causes and Effects of such things;) “That Men, by a proper course of Diet, by mutual Benevolence, by permitting every one by his own labour to acquire things necessary for Life and Health, by Innocence and Beneficence, by observing Compacts, by Gratitude to our Benefactors, by a particular Affection for our Children and Kindred, both in the ascending and descending Line” (who are distinguish’d from others by that peculiar character of a Sameness of Natural Principles deriv’d from one and the same fountain;) that by such methods (I say) “Men formerly were of mutual advantage, and that, the more they pursue the like Methods, they will hereafter be of the greater advantage to one another, both with respect to the health and strength of the Body, and the Knowledge, Prudence, Joy, Tranquillity in every state, and well-grounded Hope of the Mind, even in Death it-self.” On the other Hand, “That, from actions of a contrary kind, arise Errors and grievous Anxieties of Mind; to the Body, loss of Limbs, Distempers, the inconveniencies of Hunger and Thirst, and to many Men Death it-self”; Evils, which, by using our power otherwise, might have been prevented. Wars arise from Discord, Drunkenness, breach of Faith, &c. as from their natural causes. Hence Massacres, Plundering of Goods, and Burning of Houses, arise as necessarily and naturally, as Men die in consequence of the Plague; or as the ruin and swallowing up of a City sometimes proceeds from a great Earthquake; so that both are equally natural, and equally publick Evils. In the same manner, a well-regulated Diet, mutual Concord, Fidelity and Gratitude, are as truly natural and publick Advantages, as are uncorrupted Air, or the benign influence of the Sun, which are beneficial to all. For the powers of these dispositions (tho’ they lie scatter’d among particular persons) may be jointly consider’d, and they are truly natural causes, affecting the whole body of Mankind, or a considerable part thereof: Just as the several seeds of Animals and Plants, tho’ Nature hath assign’d to each their peculiar place, wherein only they exert their powers, may, nevertheless, be consider’d jointly; and it may truly be affirm’d of them, that they are Principles and necessary Causes of Life, Increase, and innumerable other effects in Plants and Animals. For the whole collection of Effects is no less necessarily connected with the whole collection of Causes, than particular Effects are with their particular Causes.

  It may, therefore, be look’d upon as certain, “That Propositions of eternal truth may be form’d concerning the Effects of external Human Actions, whether virtuous or vicious”: And, on the contrary, “That from the Effects of human Action, hurtful or beneficial to particular persons, but especially to many, it may be known, whether the internal practical Principles were advantageous or prejudicial, that is, naturally Good or Evil.”

  The difficulty of calculating future effects, arises from mixture of concurrent causes.All the difficulty of foreseeing, “whether a good or ill Effect will follow from any Action suppos’d,” arises hence, “That it is generally not known, what Concurrence there will be of other causes with that.” For hence it may happen, that what at first seem’d to have a good tendency, may afterwards have a bad effect. As Mathematicians demonstrate the Genesis of Lines and Figures from natural Motion, abstractedly consider’d; several things are with ease demonstrated, concerning Human Actions and their Effects, under the same abstract and general consideration. Hence it is evident, “That the greatest perfection of Moral and Political Prudence, consists in a through Knowledge of the circumstances, concurring with Human Actions to produce their effects, or obstructing them; whose principal part is an intimate Knowledge of those particular persons, with whom we are to act in conjunction, or whom we are to oppose, as well with respect to their Understanding and practical Principles, as their peculiar turns of Affection; as also with respect to their Friends, Servants, Possessions, and assistance from the State, now Commonwealths are founded.”

  A summary of the foregoing fourth and sixth sections.§VII. This is the Sum of what I have said, “That the consideration of our Powers and Actions, as Causes, and the End desir’d, as the Effect, seems the most convenient general method of resolving moral Rules into the Phaenomena, or appearances, of Nature”; which ought to be the principal scope, both of a Writer upon the Law of Nature, or of him who would live according to it. For certain Actions, and their Object, (which in this case is one or more Men,) being suppos’d, Natural Philosophy will discover, “whether the Preservation and Perfection of the Object, which is Good; and its Corruption or Damage, which is call’d Evil, will ensue.” By this means, in order to foresee what Effect will follow, we bring under our view and deliberation, all we know of the nature of our Powers, and of other Causes co-operating with us, as also of those persons, who are to be the Objects of our Action.

  But the consequence of our considering and comparing, among them-selves, the various Effects, which would follow the various Actions in our power, is this, that we shall take sufficient care of these Two things,(1.) That we alwaies propose a possible End (or Effect,) and, of those which we can attain, the best: (2.) That we apply those Actions as Means, which are the most suitable and adequate Causes of the foreseen intended Effect. In these two consists the Whole of Moral and Political Prudence. The Dictates of Prudence, directing Human Actions every where to the Greatest Possible Good of all rational Agents, are the very Laws of Nature. When these procure the assent of any Man’s Under-standing, and so actually determine his Will, that they influence his Actions, and, being treasur’d up in his Memory, return upon proper occasions to determine him, they are the Habit of moral Virtue. If to these Dictates of Prudence there be any thing added, which respects the particular constitution of any State, or the Publick office and Private affairs of any Person therein, they then become Civil, Political, or Private Prudence, according as that addition requires. But, perhaps, I have already said too much upon this head in this place.

  A further explanation of [Common] Good, the End or the Effect of the Law of Nature§VIII. I proceed, more fully to explain the [Common] (which also I call the Publick) Good. By these words I understand “the Aggregate or sum of all those good things, which, either we can contribute towards, or are necessary to, the Happiness of all rational Beings, consider’d as collected into one Body, each in his proper order.” For I consider God, and all Men, upon account of some resemblance in Reason, or an intelligent Nature, as represented under one Notion, which is extended to every particular by the word, All. ’Tis easy for every Man, to form an Idea of rational Being in General, and to conceive the meaning of the word, All.

  Both which are above the capacity of Brutes, who can neither Abstract from Particulars, nor cast up Sums, much less perceive that Agreement in Nature, which is between God and Man. For which reason, amongst others, “They cannot regard the Common Good, and are, therefore, incapable of Virtue, and of Society with Men, which is founded in the consideration of the Common Good.”

  Altho’ I affirm’d, “That the Common Good of rational Beings is immediately regarded in the Laws of our Nature,” I would not however, deny, “That they extend our care to things of inferior Nature, to things irrational and corporeal”; They oblige us, for Example, to feed Animals, sow Vegetables, and till the very Ground, as far as these Actions promote the Honour of God, and Happiness of Men; but, while we are so imploy’d, the perfection of these things is not properly, at least not ultimately, sought after; their use, and concurrence with our Actions towards the Good of rational Beings, is the thing intended.

  For, in examining Nature, we observe, “That all Bodies are govern’d by God, the Supreme Rational Agent”: And, whilst we experience, that, at the command of our Judgment and Will, our Muscles and many neighbouring Bodies are moved, we see, “That our own Bodies, and, by means of them, very many others, are necessarily determin’d by Human Reason”; and thus, by the constitution of the Universe, we find the subordination of Bodies, one to another: For the Mind cannot but conceive some order, between that which determines and those things which are determined, so that what determines must be before, what is determin’d must be after, in acting. But it is our interest, to observe the order settled by Nature, and by that means, as far as lies in our power, to promote our own perfection. Whence I may justly conclude, by the way, “That he, who seeks the chief Good of rational Agents, seeks the Good and order of the whole World; and that, from the slightest observation of the natural Determinations of Motion, some notion of Order and dependence is produc’d in the Mind; which regular Dependence, as it proceeds from the judgment of a rational Mind, is properly called Government.” Wherefore, since we are perfectly conscious of such manner of proceeding within our-selves, and, by the natural assistance of our Senses, we see the like transacted without us; we may truly affirm, “That we have receiv’d the Idea of Order and Government from Nature.” So much may suffice for the word Publick or Common.

  Of [Good] Natural, with respect both to the Creatour and his Creatures.§IX. By the word [Good] plac’d in the Definition, I understand, “That which by the Philosophers is usually call’d Natural Good, and, which I have already defin’d, with respect to Created Beings, as that which preserves, or renders them more perfect or happy: With respect to the Divine Nature, as being completely happy in himself, what is grateful or pleasing to him”; i.e. by Analogy or resemblance, because what things we perceive to preserve or perfect us, those we call grateful to us, that is, they leave the Mind in a state of Tranquillity and Joy. Now, though it is inconsistent with the infinite perfection of God, that he should be preserv’d or render’d more perfect; yet, because Tranquillity, Joy, or Complacency, may be conceiv’d separately from Imperfection, these may safely be ascrib’d to the Divine Majesty.

  Those things which are Naturally Good and belong to Man, subdivided into advantages of the Mind,But, to return to Man, his Natural good things, or Advantages, are of two kinds,

  (1) Those, which adorn and chear the Mind, the foundation of all which seems to be laid in such things as perfect the Knowledge and Judgment, to which if the Will consents, it is likewise perfect.

  (2) Those, which preserve and increase the powers of the Body. For publick good things are the same with the good things of particular persons; and, from a true Idea of any Man’s Happiness, may easily be deduc’d, by Analogy, the happiness to be sought after for any Civil State, or even for all Men jointly consider’d.Body. For a Society, compos’d of particular persons, is only then happy, when each of its members, especially the principal ones, have their Minds endow’d with the natural perfections of the Understanding and Will, and their Bodies sound, and with vigor ministring to their Minds.

  The Reader is to observe, “That I have called these things Naturally Good, in that sense, in which these words, as being of a more extensive signification, (and, consequently, more general and first known in the order of Nature,) are distinguish’d from things Morally Good”;Moral Good. for these are only voluntary actions conformable to some Law, especially, that of Nature. Therefore Good is not to be taken in this sense, when it is inserted in the Definition of the Law of Nature, because it is absurd, to Define any thing, by what supposes the thing Defin’d, already known. There are many things Naturally Good, that is, such as contribute somewhat to the Happiness of Man, which are not Morally Good, as being either not voluntary Actions, or not commanded by any Law: such are an enlarg’d Understanding, the ornaments of the Sciences, a tenacious Memory, strength of Body, the assistance of external Possessions, &c. On the contrary, I am of opinion, “That no action of the Will is enjoin’d or recommended by the Law of Nature, and, consequently, Morally Good, which does not, in its own nature, contribute somewhat to the Happiness of Men.” The Moral Philosopher supposes, “That it is known from Natural Philosophy or Experience, what preserves or increases the powers of the Mind, and what renders Life more vigorous and lasting; and that, above the rest, some Human Actions, which are distinguish’d by the name of Virtues, contribute much to these effects, and that all these Actions are very consistent with one another.” The Mind of Man, conscious of its power to perform such Actions, observing these things, in particular instances or examples belonging to it-self or some other known person, concludes, “That such kind of Actions will make all Men happier, or, at least, consist with the happiness of all Men.” Such general Conclusions are Laws of Nature. So, from the observ’d resemblance between Human Bodies, and from the experienc’d advantage of Meats and Drinks, of Sleep and Exercises, and of the whole Materia medica, are form’d general Aphorisms, with relation to Diet and Medicine, in use among all Nations; tho’ many medicinal precepts, according to the variety of Soils and Climates, may vary, and indeed are various, as the Civil Laws of different States. When, afterwards we act in pursuance of these Conclusions, and, upon comparison, find our actions conformable to them; beside the previously known appellation of natural Goodness, there accrues to these actions this, that they are morally Good, from their conformity with the Laws of Nature already enacted.

  I will add nothing here, concerning the word [possible], which I inserted, because the utmost bounds of Obligation to action, never exceed the limits of the Faculty oblig’d. Altho’ the words ‘Publick Good ’ have a great sound, no man is oblig’d to promote it beyond his ability.

  The word [chiefly] shews, that the Affirmative Laws of Nature, or those enjoining Action, are Comparative Dictates of Reason, and prescribe the best action, we can either think or say, is in the given circumstances in our power; alwaies the Best.26 It is, however, to be observ’d, That what is equal to the Best, may justly be called the Best, and, when we can perceive no material difference, we may act either way. In such cases, the Law of Nature has left us at Liberty.

  Now I have here describ’d Affirmative Laws only, because Negative Laws may easily be thence deduced; and Nature, which consists wholly in things Positive, seems to imprint immediately these only.

  The last words, concerning [the necessity of promoting the Common Good, in order to intire private happiness,] explain’d.§X. The last words of our Definition implied, “That the Law of Nature alwaies declares those actions only, which tend to promote the Publick Good, sufficient to procure the intire and chief Happiness of particular agents”; and they express “The Sanction of these Laws, which is discover’d from the happiness annex’d to their observance, and the misery consequent upon their violation.” I affirm’d, “That the intire and chief happiness possible was aim’d at in them,” because all men naturally and necessarily desire, not any part only thereof, but the whole which seems possible to them, according to the will of the First Cause. And this desire is highly rational, and evidently more conducing to our perfection, than the desire of any less Good. To this it is owing, (which is of great importance with respect to Universal Justice,) that no proposition is to be look’d upon as a Law of Nature, which declares what sort of actions can procure bodily Pleasure, Wealth, Honours, or any other portion of Happiness, for a time, but those only, which certainly foreshew, by what methods, we may procure the greatest quantity of all good things, especially the Greatest, which may render our Minds perpetually Happy. It is, for this reason, necessary, “That we should deliberate and determine with our-selves, not with respect to any small parts of our Life, (for example, what we ought to do to-day, in order to spend this day happily,) but with respect to our whole life to come, what will conduce alwaies, and in all circumstances, to our perpetual Happiness.” Because in the whole series of actions, to be perform’d thro’ the whole course of our future life, is contain’d, as in its cause, that whole Happiness, which is or will be in our power, which we naturally desire. “Almost all the Crimes of Wicked Men arise hence, that they regard only Corporeal and Immediate Pleasures, and regulate their actions accordingly, not at all solicitous about those, which respect the Mind, or which are not to happen, till after a long series of Actions.”

  These words [the happiness of particular agents, &c.] insinuate, “That some part of those good things, which are, by the will of the First Cause, as it were laid up at the Creation for the Common Happiness,27 is by the same act allow’d and given to particular persons in the ordinary preservation of the World, and, therefore, that the measure of each one’s share may be adjusted by Human Reason, in that proportion, which particular persons bear to the whole collective Body of rational Agents.” As the Heart, by the same Circulation of the mass of Blood, preserves the Life of the whole Animal, and distributes a justly-proportioned nourishment to every Member. Only there is this difference, “That, by the Members of the Body, their proportion is imbib’d without Reason: But, in Men, the judgment of Reason, considering each man’s proportion, claims to itself that share of good things, which is consistent with the welfare of the Whole.”

  §XI. Before I come to consider, “What kinds of actions are necessary to the Publick Good, or consistent with it,” I thought it necessary to shew these Two things,

  The Law of Nature has the whole force of a proper Law.(1.) That, in this our Definition, are contain’d (at least, by an easy consequence, may be thence deduced) all those things, which are requisite to the general nature of a Law;

  (2.) Also those things, which are peculiar to the Law of Nature.

  The obligation of a Law arises from the Legislator’s annexing Rewards and Punishments to it.As to the First, that Passage of Modestinus, before cited out of the Digests, comes pertinently into consideration; “The force of a Law is to command, forbid, permit, punish,”28 to which also may be added, in some Laws, to confer rewards: In these words are certainly contain’d, what some express by the Metaphorical words of Obliging and creating a Duty. Obligation is defin’d by Justinian “That bond of the Law, by which we are tied with the necessity of paying any thing, according to the Laws of that State to which we belong.”29 Where it is to be observ’d, “That he respects the Laws of his own State only, that of Rome; whereas Papinian, with much greater reason, acknowledges a Natural Obligation (distinct from the Civil,) which is supported by the bond of Equity only”:30 As also, “That it breeds obscurity, that he uses Metaphorical words, which are generally of doubtful meaning.” For those words, bond and tied, are not more easily understood, than Obligation, which is to be defin’d. But, if we consider the matter attentively, this is plainly insinuated, “That Punishments, and also Immunities and Privileges, are annex’d to the Laws, by the authority enacting them; and that Men, partly from the prospect of Good arising from obedience, partly from the fear of Evil from disobedience, are determined, or at least in some measure moved, to act as the Laws prescribe.” For no other necessity determines the mind of Men to act, than that of shunning apparent Evil, and of obtaining apparent Good. All (that I know of) acknowledge this Necessity, which is consistent with the freest power of inquiring into the goodness of things, to be essential to Human Nature. Therefore the whole force of Obligation is this, That the Legislator has annex’d to the observance of his Laws, Good; to the transgression, Evil; and those Natural, in prospect whereof men are moved to perform actions, rather agreeing than disagreeing with the Laws.

  The Greatest Good, and Evil, connected with our Actions observing, or violating the Law of Nature.The good Things, connected with the observance of the Laws of Nature, are the very same, which compose mens chief happiness, and, therefore, they are evidently the Greatest: Those Evils also, which are the consequence of a state in perpetual opposition to those Laws, are those, which produce the greatest Misery. The connexion of these with Human Actions, is Natural and Necessary, that is, does not wholly depend upon the pleasure of sovereign Powers; (tho’ in every Civil State some part of these Rewards and Punishments are dispensed according to the will of the Governors;) but, if there were no Civil Government, they would partly follow from the nature of the actions, and partly be necessarily added by private persons: And, now that Civil Government is every where set up, the well-known necessity of preserving that Nature, which is common to all Political societies, every where determines Rulers to exact Punishments and confer Rewards, tho’ with some diversity in different times and places.

  This Connexion is either Immediate or Mediate.§XII. But, because this is the chief debate in this controversy, I must shew, more accurately, “The Connexion between all the actions of every particular person, directed (as far as may be) thro’ the whole course of Life, to promote the Publick Good, and the greatest possible happiness and perfection of Each.” And it is twofold, (1.) Immediate, (2.) Mediate, upon account of Good procur’d, by such actions, from Men, nay, from God himself.

  1. Immediate Happiness consisting in the due exercise of all our Faculties about the Common Good.I intend to treat first of the former, because it is a reward of Virtue, inseparable from the very action, and the most easily demonstrable, as being present, not liable to uncertain chances of Futurity, nor intangled in that multiplicity of Causes, on which Future Rewards depend. The immediate connexion, between every man’s greatest happiness of Mind, that is in his power; and the actions, which he performs to promote most effectually the common Good of God and Men, consists in this; “That these are the very actions, in the exercise and inward consciousness whereof, every man’s Happiness (as far as it is in his own power) consists.” The same actions consider’d, “As distinguish’d, from all others of a different kind, by their Objects and most extensive external Effect,” are call’d Actions promoting the Publick Good: But, consider’d, “As the exercise of the Agent’s greatest powers, or as his greatest perfections, producing Tranquillity and the greatest Joy to him from a consciousness of them,” are called the greatest Happiness he can procure to himself. After the same manner, as we perceive a connexion, between the Health and unimpair’d Powers of the Body, and its Actions; both Natural (relating to nourishment and generation,) and Animal.

  This evinced from some Observations concerning (1.) the Perfection of the Mind in General,I suppose what follows in this Paragraph, known from the study of Nature, or learn’d by Experience, (1.) in General, “That it conduces to the natural perfection of the Mind of Man, that his Faculties, of Understanding and Will, be conversant about Objects of all kinds, especially, about God and Men.” For they have a nature resembling, or analogous to, the Mind of every Man, and, so far, capable of being known from our own Actions, of which we cannot but be conscious; and, beside, most of their actions very nearly affect our-selves; and they (as acting according to right Reason) may be mov’d by our Actions, to concur with us in promoting our Happiness.

  (2) the perfection of the Understanding in particular, and(2.) In Particular, that there are requir’d to the perfection of the Understanding (1.) “That it abstract Universal Ideas from particulars, and compare them with others, and observe, that their necessary Attributes belong to other individuals we meet with”; for Example, that, from a Knowledge of it-self, abstracting what is peculiar, it may learn the Essential Properties of the Rational, or Animal, &c. Nature; and, among other things, observe, in all, some endeavours to their own preservation and perfection. (2.) “That it search into the productive and preserving Causes of things, in some measure, dependent upon our power.”(3.) “That it form like Judgments in like cases, and alwaies agree with itself, after once it has form’d a right Judgment.” (4) “That it deduce, not speculative Propositions only, but practical ones also, from known Principles.” (5.) That it follow the order of Nature, as occasion requires, some times in the Analytick, sometimes in the Synthetick method.

  To this head31 is to be reduc’d that known Axiom, That the perfection of a rational Agent requires, that he should resolve upon the End before theMeans: Or, that he should consider, as throughly as he can, the Effect propos’d, before he makes use of Means to produce it. And that, therefore, he should first propose to himself the End of his whole future Life, before he can reasonably enter upon Actions; the influence whereof, as of Means or Causes, may affect his whole Life, and render it more or less happy. We shall easily perceive the use of this observation, in what follows, where we shall see, “That all and every one of our actions may increase the whole of our Happiness, nay, that they must necessarily, either improve or diminish it; and that Reason enjoins a Uniform direction of all our future actions to this End.”

  Nay, the Synthetick method of considering the intire trayn of our voluntary Actions, comes to the same thing. For, if voluntary Action be consider’d in General, without respect to this or that particular case, “Its Object and Effect is Good, even the most diffusively extensive, whether acceptable to the Doer, or to any others whomsoever.” The other Property of Voluntary Action in General, is, “The Avoiding all manner of Evil, whether it be Evil to one, or to many, whether it thwart our own Good, or that of others.” Our Acts of the Will, whether Chusing, or Refusing, according to the degree of Good or Evil, and other circumstances, are call’d by the names of several Passions, on the one hand, of Love, Desire, Hope, Joy; on the other, of Hatred, Fear, Aversion, Grief. At length, we proceed “To the consideration, of particular actions, both those, which may be perform’d at present, and those, which will probably be exerted hereafter; and, of that Order among those actions, by the assistance whereof arises (as it were the Sum of a Geometrical Progression) the greatest Sum of good things, which can be done, or enjoy’d, thro’ the whole course of Life.” This is call’d every Man’s Happiness, or chief Good.

  Of the Will.I judge it requisite to the natural perfection of the Human Will, “That it follow the most perfect Reason, both in its calmer resolutions, which are simply call’d Desires and Aversions; and in those more vehement ones, which usually go under the name of Passions.”

  Hence we may perceive, “That Actions, contrary to these, are Imperfections and Diseases of the Mind, as Lameness, or Paralytick and Convulsive Motions are Symptoms of Diseases of the Body.” Such are the Assents given to contradictory Propositions, because it is certain, that one member of a Contradiction must be false: Unlike Judgments in like Cases, &c.

  The same prov’d from hence, that, “Happiness consisting in the vigorous employment of our Faculties on their noblest Objects”; God and Man, whose Common Good we pursue, are such.§XIII. I have no inclination, very curiously to inquire, “Whether the Happiness of Man be an Aggregate of the most vigorous Actions, which can proceed from our Faculties; or rather a most grateful Sense of them, join’d with Tranquillity and Joy, which by some is call’d Pleasure.” These are inseparably connected, and both necessary to Happiness. This I will affirm, that we have nothing more in our power, towards making ourselves happy, than Actions: And that Actions are incapable of any other Augmentation, than what is to be perceiv’d in their own inward Vigour, and the natural excellency of the Object or Effect. Therefore, seeing the Common Good of God and Man is the greatest and most excellent Object we can imploy ourselves about; (for the Happiness of every one contains his Perfection, and the Common Good unites the Happiness of all;) our most vigorous Actions respecting that Object, and the Complacency arising from the consciousness of them, will, beyond any thing in our power, render us the most Happy. Most of the wiser Philosophers placed, both the Happiness and Virtue of the Human Mind, in Action, or in the right use of both its Faculties, which Plutarch has compriz’d in a few Words, “Happiness consists in right reasonings ending in a steady disposition of Mind.”32 Yet all do not sufficiently explain, “about what object and effect all these Actions conducing to Happiness, are immediately and adequately to be imploy’d.” For, to assign Happiness, as that Object or that End, is not satisfactory. For, since Happiness itself is a certain Aggregate, whose parts we are continually enjoying, and itself is confess’d to consist in Action; to say, We act for Happiness, is to say no more than that, We act, that we may act. When we say that, the Object and Effect of those our Actions which render us happy, are the Honour and Glory of God, we say, indeed, something; but, instead of the whole, we express part only, of the Object about which They are conversant, who live well and happily. It may indeed be affirm’d, “That the Knowledge of our-selves and others, and also Charity and Justice towards Men, may be deduced from the Study of God’s Glory.” But the Knowledge and Love of our-selves and other Men include a natural Perfection, (in possession whereof some part of Human Happiness consists,) essential and proper to themselves, which we can come to the Knowledge of, without deducing it from God’s Honour. Nay, we seem first to know and love Man, before the Mind raises it-self to the knowledge and love of God, whose Being, and amiable Goodness are discovered from his Works, and chiefly from Man. Be it, therefore, concluded, “That God and Men are the immediate and intire Object, what is grateful and good to Them is the Effect, of those Actions, which are principally conducive to our Happiness.” Certainly, there cannot be a greater Object of Beatifick Actions, than what comprizes all Things and their mutual Relation to one another, nor can that Object be consider’d under a notion more General, Perfect and Pleasant, than that by which it is represented in these Words, the COMMON GOOD. For, beside that Good is as extensive as Being, and so takes in all Individuals, especially Rational; there is this further consideration, that it does not only respect the internal and essential Perfections of things, but all those Ornaments, which can afterwards accrue to them, whether consider’d singly in themselves, or in whatever Relation: And beside; Beings are consider’d only as they are capable of Doing or Receiving Good, when voluntary Actions, relating to them, are directed by Laws: Hence it is, that the infinite Extent of such an Object, calls forth, exercises and suffices, the whole force of the most capacious Faculties, and delights the same with perpetual Pleasure, (for nothing can be pleasanter than Happiness.) Surely he is stupid, whom the Sight, even of Trees and Herbs flourishing in Spring and Summer, does not much more delight, than when Winter has carried off their Bloom and Verdure. But he has intirely divested himself of Human Nature, who, fore seeing in his mind the greatest Happiness which would arise from the observance of the best Laws, is not greatly delighted with the prospect and hope thereof. It is looked upon as a Fault in the Eye, if a Person in the Jaundice sees every thing ting’d with his own Colour only, or if nothing but a Man’s own Image were always presented to his Sight; much more is it an Imperfection and unhappiness of the Mind, to imploy its thoughts upon the Preservation of One only Body united to it-self, and to neglect all others.

  The Pleasures of Beneficence further shewn.§XIV. However it is certain, “That Nature has furnish’d almost all Men of sound Mind and Body with such Powers, that, without any detriment to themselves, they may do many things of great advantage to others, which would be of little or no use to themselves”; such as, “To counsel others in the preservation of their Life or Health, to shew the way to him that knows it not, &c.”33 If such Powers are not exercised upon proper occasions, they are vain, and a perpetual reproach to their owner; like an uncultivated field, and seed spoil’d thro’ neglect, which, sown, would have commended and rewarded the Husbandman’s care and pains. For to act (which we certainly do, when we serve others) contributes more to our Health and Pleasure, than to be wholly idle; for, by Exercise, we recollect what we can do, which is a Pleasure to the Able; we preserve, and often augment, our Faculties; and strengthen those Habits, which render us expert in Acting: Without Acting, both the Habits would be lost, and the Faculties themselves grow languid.

  It is evident, “That no Action relating to others can be consistent with those necessary and right Actions conducing to our own Good, unless the Practical Dictates of Reason, by which we are determin’d to that Action, be plainly conformable to those, by which we are directed in pursuit of our own Happiness, that is, unless they enjoin us to desire such things to them as to our-selves.” For we must of necessity desire like things, to things which are necessarily judg’d alike, i.e. of equal importance to the Whole; unless the Understanding judges Falsly or Inconsistently, or the Will resist its Judgment; either of which destroys that Internal Peace, that is necessary to Happiness. Hence we desire to others, equally Innocent or Useful, equally Free or Bound, &c. like Advantages as to our-selves. And such Judgments are so essential to the Understanding, that whoever acts accordingly, acts agreeably to his Intellectual Nature. And what is agreeable to Nature, gives it Pleasure. This hinders not, but that from Generation,34 in Families, and from Compacts, in Civil States, may arise an Inequality, or Superiority of some over others.

  Further; because it is very agreeable to the Mind of Man, to succeed as much as possible, in what he labours to obtain, and vain Endeavours are extremely disagreeable; therefore, He will be much more happy, in bestowing his pains in benefiting, than in endeavouring to hurt, Many. For most Men will very willingly accept of, and second, our Benevolent Endeavours, who, if they should perceive us endeavouring to hurt them, would vigorously oppose us; so that attempts of that kind would generally be in vain.

  Those Enjoyments, which are necessary to the preservation of Life, are therefore more distinctly known, and desir’d, by all, because necessary Causes are naturally connected with their Effects, and can only be deduced from them: And their deduction and application to their Effects, is very agreeable to the Mind of Man, which is always in pursuit of the greatest Certainty.

  Further; greater Knowledge, and Sagacity, and Industry, are requir’d to preserve and perfect Human Nature, for Example, than to destroy and corrupt it; which may be easily effected by mere Neglect or Ignorance, and is often effected by the Strength of very weak Men, or perhaps of some other most despicable Animal. But the prosecution of the Publick Good (which contains every Good of every Man, and consequently is the greatest) requires the greatest Wisdom; and the least Folly may in some measure lessen, and disturb it. But I suppose Wisdom to be much more natural, than Folly, to any Rational Nature. Our Volitions, therefore, and external Endeavours to promote the Publick Good, must needs be naturally more perfect, grateful and agreeable to that same Rational Nature; unless, perhaps, some Error of the Judgment, or Habit arising from Error, and consequently Evil, have been introduc’d into the Mind; which may make what is hurtful to Nature, seem acceptable to it, as too much Drink appears to one in a Dropsy, or a Fever. For it is certain, “That the inward and natural perfection of the Will, or of the Man, consists in Willing what the Wisest Understanding (most perfectly comprehending the most and the best of things) shall have most truly determin’d, to be most highly beneficial to the most and best of Beings.” Consent and Harmony between the actions of the same Man, (one of which, (the Act of the Understanding,) is acknowledg’d to be right and perfective of Nature;) are better proofs of a right disposition of Mind, than their Disagreement, by which a Person is at variance with, and opposes, himself: Therefore, where the Understanding is suppos’d to act most perfectly, (which is, when it considers, and puts together, the most and best Objects, in such a manner, that thence, in Idea, arises the best state and order of the Universe, wherein all, Rational Beings especially, enjoy the happiest and most convenient Peace and Agreement;) there a Will perfectly right must of necessity approve such a Judgment. And, consequently, since it is the Business of both Faculties, to determine our Actions, whether Immanent or Transient,35 when they are dispos’d as above, (i.e. are Right) they must determine us to do as much Good, and to as many, as we can. That the Care of the Common Good, as of the greatest End, implies actions of this sort (i.e. Beneficent and Consistent,) is too evident to need proof: As also, that the Internal Perfections of our Mind require us to employ all our Faculties, in their natural and proper order, in an active and vigorous pursuit of Good; of the Good of the Noblest Beings, with whom we are concerned; of the Greatest Good of all those Beings.

  These Reasons confirm’d by Experience.§XV. This Reason, by which we have prov’d the Happiness of the Will to consist in the most extensive Benevolence, is greatly confirm’d by Experience, which gives us vast Pleasure in the acts of Love, Hope and Joy, whether employ’d about our own Good, or that of others. These Affections are Essential Ingredients of Happiness; they bring Pleasure along with them, and we find them continually mov’d by the Happiness of others. He, therefore, robs Man of great part of his Happiness, who deprives him of that most pleasant affection of Love and Benevolence towards others, and of that Joy, which arises from their Happiness. Our own Advantages can afford but small matter of Joy; the Subject will be exceedingly inlarged, if we are delighted with the Happiness of every other person. For This to That will bear the same Proportion, which the Infinite Happiness of God and of all Mankind has to the scanty imaginary Happiness, with which the Goods of Fortune can supply one Man, and him too, Envious and Malevolent. For, certainly, no virtue can adorn his Mind, who has divested himself of all Benevolent Affections toward Mankind. Nay, Hatred and Envy, which fill the Mind of him who regards his own Good only, are necessarily accompanied with Trouble and Sadness, Fear and a Solitary State, which are evidently inconsistent with a Happy Life. If we examine our Faculties separately, we shall perceive, after we have arriv’d at Man’s Estate, that they grow, as it were, Prolific, and too great, to be confin’d and exercised about ourselves only. The Understanding has a strong Natural Propension, to make itself Master of those things, which may be useful to others as well as to ourselves. Hence all the Sciences, which have been found out by great application of Mind, and made Publick for the Common Benefit, have taken their rise. The pleasanter Affections of the Will (which are conversant about Good) such as Love, Desire and Joy, in the rational use whereof consists our chief Happiness, are seldom found in a Timon, a Man-hater.36 ’Tis certain, they can neither be frequent, nor afford much Pleasure, unless we are diligent in our endeavors after the Good of many, Common Reason enjoins us to exert all our Faculties in pursuit of the Publick Good, as the most effectual method of obtaining our own Happiness. When we have added to the Common Stock by our greatest Industry, we may take out our own share with Innocence, and enjoy it with Pleasure.

  Private Good cannot be the greatest End prescrib’d by Reason.§XVI. Because much of what I have to say concerning Morality, depends upon what I am now laying down, I will add more to the same purpose. Since it is certain, from the Nature of the Will and of voluntary Action, that the effecting the Greatest Good is the Greatest End prescrib’d by Reason; That Good must either be the greatest Common Good (wherein I include whatever is consistent with it,) or the greatest Private Good, which every Man can desire or propose to himself as Possible, and to which he directs all his Actions. For the Good of any particular Family or Commonwealth, is either not yet suppos’d to be consider’d; or, if it be consider’d, it is press’d with almost the same Consequences with the prosecution of the Private Good of any particular person.

  Reason will not suffer, that the greatest Private Good should be propos’d as the ultimate End. For, since that Action is certainly Good, which will lead directly, or the shortest way, to that End, which is truly ultimate; supposing different ultimate Ends, whose Causes are opposite, Actions truly Good will be in mutual opposition to one another, which is impossible. For Example; if right Reason instructs Titius, that his greatest Happiness, which he is to pursue as his ultimate End, consists in the enjoyment of a plenary Property in the Possessions, and an absolute Dominion over the Persons, of Seius and Sempronius, and of all others: Right Reason cannot dictate to Seius and Sempronius, that their Happiness, the object of their pursuits, consists in the enjoyment of plenary Property in the Possessions, and Dominion over the Person, of Titius, and of all others. For these contain a manifest Contradiction; and, there-fore, one only of these Dictates can be suppos’d true. But, since there is no, Cause, why the Happiness of one of these should be his ultimate End, rather than the Happiness of another should likewise be his ultimate End; we may conclude, that Reason dictates to neither, that he should propose to himself his own Happiness only, as his greatest End, but to every one, rather his own in conjunction with the Happiness of others; and this is that Common Good, which we contend is to be sought after. For that only is that one End, which is consistent with, and most promotes, the greatest possible Happiness of every particular person. In that End, alone, can agree, both natural Instinct, regarding its own, and Reason, respecting the Common Good.

  It is, certainly, essential to the perfection of Practical Reason, or of Prudence, (in what subject soever it be seated,) “That to all, who are to be guided by right Reason, one only End be propos’d, as a Common Standard of Good and Evil to all”; or, “That all Rational Agents should intend one and the same Effect”; whose essential parts and causes, whether they contribute to its Existence, Preservation, or Perfection, are called Good; and those which hinder its Existence, &c. Evil. Otherwise, the Terms, Good and Evil, will be uncertain, and altogether Equivocal, signifying differently, when they are made use of by different persons; and whatever is called Good by one, because it answers his particular purposes, That all others will call Evil, because it is not subservient to their desires; which is inconsistent with the design of Speech, which is the communication of Knowledge. But if these words be applied to signify those things, which are of common benefit to Mankind, they have a determin’d meaning of great advantage to all.

  I add further; if any one would regard his own Good only, and endeavour to force all Rational Agents to carry on that only, as the chief end they ought to pursue, he would be able to effect nothing, but, perhaps, draw down his own destruction upon himself. For it is evidently impossible, “That all, both Things and Persons, should be order’d according to the Wills of all particular persons willing things contrary.” The effect of every volition upon things external, is some determination of Local Motion; as is evident in the taking of Nourishment, Cloathing, Attendants, &c. But contrary determinations of the Motions of Natural Bodies mutually destroy one another. For, if any Body were at the same time mov’d toward opposite points, it must of necessity be in different places at the same time. But, if it is impossible for every particular Person, to subject all Persons and Things to himself, that Reason, which proposes this end to every one, which can happen to one only, would, oftener than a Million of times, propose an impossibility, and, once only, what was possible; and, therefore, any one may easily calculate, whether that Reason were Right or Erroneous. Others have both their Natural Powers, and Innocent Appetites, which, whether we will or no, they will obey; they have Reason also, which, directing them to pursue greater things than the pleasure of any one Man, they will by all means follow; and Strength, to defend themselves with ease from the overbearing of one or a few; so that he must needs be a Mad-man, not a Reasonable Creature, who could not foresee these consequences, but would attempt, by force of arms, to assert to himself that prodigious Right, which Mr. Hobbes maintains every Man has over every Thing and Person. He himself defines “Right” to be “a Faculty of acting according to right Reason. ”37 Now I should call that Practical Reason only, Right, which directs us to endeavour after things possible only, and not ingage us in the fruitless, if not destructive, attempt of gaining an Universal Dominion over all Things and Persons. See his Chap. 1. §. 10, 12.38On the contrary, when any one serves the Publick, he never loses his labour; his Power, though it perhaps, immediately, reach but one only, is often, in its consequences, useful to many; and, sometimes, when we expected no other fruit of our Beneficence, than that Joy which arises in our minds from the prosperity of others, brings ourselves home a plentiful Harvest.

  Benevolence to all Rational Beings is necessarily connected with our own most perfect Estate.Further; to study, and endeavour after the Common Good of all Rational Beings, superadds to the attempts of an Innocent Self-love, many noble Actions in favour of Objects like our-selves, and thereby begets and compleats a Habit of Love towards Mankind, of which Philanthropy the Love of our-selves is but a finall Portion. I suppose every one seeks his own Good, and that to act in pursuit thereof, adds to the perfection of his Nature. Therefore, to act in like manner with respect to others, (among whom is God by far more excellent than himself,) will add a perfection of the same nature with that, which consists in acting in pursuit of one’s own Good; namely, a Joy arising from the Harmony and Agreement of our Actions. For it is more pleasing to the Mind of Man, to observe agreement in it-self and its own actions, than in Musical Notes and Geometrical Figures. As ’tis a Perfection of the Human Mind, to form like Judgments, so is it, to entertain like Affections, concerning like Things. To have contrary Judgments of like Things, implies a Contradiction, and is a kind of Madness, and, in Speculation, is shunn’d as a Disease of the Mind. In Practice, it argues as great an imperfection, and is a direct contradiction, in cases perfectly alike to have different Judgments, and different Volitions, according as my-self or another is concern’d. Nay, since every one’s Nature, as always intimately present, is fully known to himself; since, from thence, the Nature of other Men is not less known, as to those essential and general things, in which all agree, and in which, both our own Right, and that of others to the means necessary to the preservation of Life, is founded; it follows, “That he, who, with respect to a like Right, determines otherwise in another man’s case than in his own, contradicts himself in a most known matter, which lies perpetually before him.” And such a Contradiction, above all others, greatly hurts the Soundness, Peace, and Contentment, of the Mind in its Actions; as Uniformity in these Matters produces the greatest Tranquillity.

  The Common Good, the only End, in which Mens equal Claims to Happiness can unite.§XVII. To this Head it belongs, “That whoever has judg’d any Actions necessary to his own Happiness, cannot, with Reason, but consent, that any other should judge, in like manner, the same Actions necessary to his Happiness, and, in pursuance of that Judgment, put them in execution.” Therefore, if any one takes an exact survey of what is contain’d in those practical Propositions, which determine every Man to endeavour his own preservation, he will perceive something that dictates Self-preservation to others as well as himself, and that will hinder him from opposing any others in the same pursuit. For, in this Proposition, “It is lawful for Human Nature (in Hobbes) to take those things which will preserve, and perfect its Faculties,” is included, as Antecedent in Nature, this indefinite Proposition, (which, by the necessary relation of Identity in the Terms, becomes Universal, and, therefore, holds equally true in all cases;) “It is lawful for Human Nature (in any person) to take, or to do, those things, which will preserve and perfect its Faculties.” Let Hobbes tell me, what the addition of a proper name does, toward making the former Proposition a more evident Dictate of Reason, that is, a Law of Nature, than the latter, which affirms the same with respect to every one? But, if he assert, “That every one thence acquires a Right to act at pleasure,” (as he contends Chap. 1. §. 10.) because I have already shewn the Absurdities thence arising,39 I think it sufficient to make this reply, “That the application of such a general Law to the Nature of any particular person (Hobbes for instance) can neither immediately, nor by good consequence, contradict a like application of it to any other person: Nor can any one’s Right or Liberty, allow’d by any Law, extend so far, as to make it lawful to oppose those things, which the same Law commands to be done by others.” Nay, without doubt, any person’s delighting in a good Law, and inclination to Uniformity in Action, and Reverence to the Law-giver, will influence him to assist others in observing the same Law, as far as he can without any prejudice to himself; the effect of which will be, “That every one will promote the Common Good, who, with due deliberation, considers the Principles enjoining Self-preservation.”

  The following Reasoning, in the form of a Syllogism, will finish this Argument, and prepare the way to what follows relating to the Mediate, or more remote, Effects of Benevolent Actions. “Those Actions of ours, which make us perfectly conscious, That we have, to our power, contributed to the Happiness, both of our-selves and others, do affect us with the most pleasing Joy, and, therefore, render us happy. Actions promoting the Publick Good effect this, Therefore, &c.” The Major is taken from the Definition of our Happiness (as far as it is in our own power;) and, therefore, needs no Proof. The Minor is very easily prov’d, by considering, that Human Nature is such, that it cannot but be perfectly conscious of its own deliberate Actions; and we alwaies suppose every Wise person, studious of the Common Good, to act in such a deliberate manner. But he cannot neglect his own Happiness, who wisely endeavours to profit that Whole, of which he himself is a Part. His care of the End will cause him to preserve and increase all his own Powers and Perfections, because they are the only Means, by which he can attain that End. Nor can any thing more effectually procure him the favour and concurrence of God, of Men, and of all the most operative Causes, in his endeavours to promote his own Happiness jointly with that of others. For what can more effectually procure him the assistance, both of God and Men, than such sincere Affections and Endeavours of doing things acceptable to all? Certainly, since there is nothing greater in Human Faculties, nothing greater can be expected from Man, by God or Men. Lastly, among the Rewards, immediately connected by Nature with our Endeavours to promote the Publick Good, is to be reckon’d that manifold Pleasure, which arises from the exercise of all those Powers and Inclinations, which I have shewn at large to be implanted in Human Nature, and to be chiefly fitted for this very purpose, in the Chapter concerning Human Nature, whither I refer the Reader.40

  2. The Mediate connexion of Happiness with acts of Universal Benevolence, is upon account of Advantages procured by such Actions from God and Men.§XVIII. Let us proceed to consider the good Effects, we may, with certainty, expect from God, and, with greater probability, hope to obtain from Men, by a continual course of Universal Benevolence, than by arrogating to our-selves all things by Fraud or Force. We shall be able, more distinctly, to foresee the consequence, if the whole state of Life be, in both cases, compar’d, than if a few Actions only; and to those who deliberate upon future Actions, of which they must of necessity chuse one, ’tis sufficient to shew, when Demonstration cannot be had on either side of the Question, that on this lies the more probable expectation of the greater Good. Upon this account it was, that Seneca long ago complain’d, and not without reason, “That Men, tho’ they deliberated concerning parts of their Life, did not deliberate concerning” (the uniform conduct of) “the whole.”41The Good or Bad Actions of Men will probably gain the Favour or Hatred of other Men; If they did this, they could not but see most evidently, “That the Man, who, disregarding the Rights of God and all other Men, alwaies arrogated all things to himself, and made himself, alone, the only End of all his Actions, must be hateful, both to God and all Men, and must needs pull down Destruction upon himself.” On the contrary, “That He, who, by Love and Obedience to God, by Innocence and Benevolence towards all Men, sought his own Happiness, in consistence with that of others, and in dependence upon their Concurrence, acts more advisedly, and may very justly hope for better success.” Altho’ the judgment we make of the future Actions of other Men, whose Favour we endeavour to procure, be probable only, yet, because it has the greatest Evidence we can obtain about such Future Contingencies; and, because the necessity of affairs requires, that the Mind, taking a Prospect of the future Actions of Men, should not remain in a state of perfect Indifference, but must incline to believe, that rather such Actions shall come to pass than others; hence it is, that it is more reasonable, to do that, which will more probably turn to our increase of Happiness; than either, by doing nothing, neglect all opportunities of procuring to our-selves the assistance of Men, or, by attempting Men by Force or Fraud, commit our Hopes to the uncertain Chance of War. For, among Future Contingencies, some are much more probable than others; and the Hope of Those is of much greater Value than that of These. And Reason, supported by Experience, knows how to ascertain the Difference between the values of this and that Hope, and reduce it to an exact Mathematical Calculation, (which Huygens has made evident in his reasonings upon that subject in his Treatise of the chances of the Dice.42 ) Therefore the same right Reason will command us, where greater Certainty cannot be obtained, to chuse that way, which, upon account of the Assistance of other Men, most probably leads to Happiness.

  Hence we may conclude, “If we cannot procure the external Necessaries and Conveniences of Life, by deserving as well as we can at the hands of all; that, then, those Advantages are to be reckon’d among those things, which are not in our Power”; and this is the Foundation of that Rule of the Law of Nature, “What we cannot do lawfully, is to be reckon’d amongst Impossibilities.”43 This, in the Matter before us, is therefore with more safety injoin’d, because it is most certain, that, “by acting for the Good of the Whole, the main point is insured.” For, by this course, we shall do, both all that is in our own Power, and what is of the greatest Importance toward making our Life happy, as I have already shewn: And the Favour of God (the supreme Disposer of all things) will most certainlymost certainly the Favour or Displeasure of God.be procured, as I shall presently make appear, from Principles acknowledg’d, both by Hobbes and Epicurus. For, since Men can pay nothing more than Love, and the consequences thereof, toward all Rational Beings, (the Head whereof is God,) it is most evident by the Light of Nature, that he owes nothing more, because we cannot be oblig’d to Impossibilities; and, therefore, that nothing more than Love is requir’d of him. Now no One who acknowledges, from the Light of Nature, “That God is the Governour of the World,” will ever deny, “That those, who have perform’d their Duty toward God and Men, shall find themselves highly favoured by Him.” Reason, therefore, may dictate, “That Innocence and Benevolence are the most effectual Means of promoting our own Happiness, as well as that of other Men”; tho’ we cannot demonstrate, “That They will act with Benevolence and Gratitude towards us, and be faithful in the Observance of their Compacts.”

  This prov’d from two Topicks.§XIX. I will briefly lay down what I have to say upon this Head. Every Man’s Obligation, to act in pursuance of the Common Good of all, (which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature,) becomes known by those methods, by which we know, “That God, the First Cause of all Things, wills that such Actions should be performed by Men”; or, “That, in his ordinary Government of this World, he has so order’d or adjusted the Powers of all things, that such Actions should be rewarded, and the contrary punished.”

  It is of no consequence, whether this Distribution of Rewards and Punishments be made immediately, or put off for a time; provided, that interval of Time be compensated by the greatness of the Rewards and Punishments; and the Reasons for believing that Compensation, manifestly, outweigh all grounds of suspecting the contrary.

  Waving, in the present Argument, the consideration of Revelation made by the Prophets in the Scriptures, the Will of God, in these matters, is naturally known, (1.) From those his known Attributes, which, in the order of distinct Knowledge in the Synthetick way,44 go before and incline his Will, to put these things in execution, and may, therefore, be consider’d as Causes of his Willing and Acting thus. (2.) From the Effects, arising from his Will before determined so to act. Of this latter Method of knowing the Divine Will, I have said somewhat already, and more remains yet to be spoken. On the former I shall insist more sparingly, because our Adversaries will hardly grant any thing relating thereunto, and all the Attributes of God are to be deduced by us in the Analytical Method, from his Effects.45 I have, however, thought fit to suggest the little that follows.

  1. From the Knowledge of those things, which, as it were, antecedently incline Him to act thus, The Perfection of His Understanding and Will.We must needs conceive, that the Framer of the World is endow’d with Reason, Wisdom, Prudence, and Constancy. For “these are Perfections, which, in some degree, we are sensible of in ourselves (his Workman-ship;) nor is it possible, that any Perfection should be found in the Effect, which is not contained in its Cause. But these Perfections are prior to such a Will as we are now inquiring about, and, as it were, lead to it. Therefore we know such a Will to be in God.” The Minor is prov’d by this, That the Practical Right Reason of Man, and the consequent Volition, must, of necessity, agree with the Judgment and Will of God, in respect to the same Object. For the Judgments of both, as being Right, must agree with the same thing, and, consequently, with one another. The thing, concerning which ought is determined by the Practical Judgment, is either the End, or the Means to the End, concerning both which is determin’d, which is Best. Wherefore God will determine the same End and Means to be best, which the Reason of any Man truly judges to be so. The Matter will become plainer by an Example. If any Man rightly judge, “That the Common Good of All, who act according to the Rule of Reason, is a greater Good than the Good or Happiness of one Man,” (and this is no more, than to judge the Whole to be greater than its Part;) there is no doubt, but that God thinks the same. And it will come to the same thing, if it be affirm’d, “That the Happiness of All is greater than the like Happiness of any smaller Number.” But “that Happiness is the greatest, which is greater than any other assignable.” Nor is it a different Judgment, that by which we affirm, “The greatest Happiness of all Rational Beings is the greatest or chief End, which any Rational Agent can pursue.” For a possible End is nothing else, than that Good or Happiness, which any one may propose to himself to pursue. Therefore there is no room to doubt, but that we shall here also have God’s Concurrence. For, since He himself is Rational, and it cannot be conceiv’d, how he can act rationally, without proposing an End to himself, nor can there be a greater End than the aforesaid Aggregate of all Good Things; we cannot but think, he judges this to be the best End he can propose to himself. Nor is it to be doubted, but that the most perfect Being will pursue that End, which he has rightly judg’d to be the best, all Circumstances rightly consider’d. For no reason can be assigned, why he should stop short of it; nor can the most perfect Will act without Reason, much less, against it. For, altho’ here the Obligation of a Law properly so called, which proceeds from the Will of a Superior, has no place, yet that Perfection, which is Essential to Him, and Invariable, will invariably determine his Will, to concur exactly with his omniscient Understanding. For it implies a Contradiction, that the same Will should at once be Divine or most perfect, and disagree with the most perfect Dictates of the Divine Understanding. But supposing, “That God proposes to himself the Common Good, as an End,” the consequence is easy, “That he Wills, that Men should pursue the same End.”

  It is evident, “That the distribution of Rewards and Punishments among Men, is absolutely necessary, and the most certain Means, to lead them to consent and concur with the Divine Will, in promoting this End, and to deter them from Actions contrary thereto.” God, therefore, Wills such Rewards and Punishments, as he knows sufficient to secure this End; he Wills, I say, both to decree them, and actually to distribute them, as occasion requires. Whence may be inferr’d, “That, if any thing, necessary to this End, be wanting in this Life, it will be supplied by God in a Life to come.” And upon this ground, chiefly, it was, that the Heathens formed their Presages of the Happiness, or Miserie, of Men departed this Life, according as their Actions were Good or Evil. But this may be easily learned from their own Writings.

  From whence whom are deduced his Moral Attributes and Providence;§XX. I chuse the rather to observe, that, from what I have prov’d concerning the Reason and End of God, may be demonstrated, “That Benevolence, Justice, Equity, and those other Attributes, which have any Analogy with Human Virtues, are actually to be found in God and in his actions; and that it is, therefore, his Will to govern Men by Precepts guarded with Rewards and Punishments”; because it thoroughly over-throws Epicurus’s Notion, That the World is not govern’d by Providence. For it is manifest, both that all these Attributes have a view this way, and, besides, that the whole affair of Government (or Divine Providence, for which we contend) consists in this only, that we know of, “That the Common Good of all Rational Beings should be promoted by the most proper Means.” Which will appear more clearly, from what shall afterwards be laid down, concerning the Virtues and Civil Government.

  Here I have thought proper to add only thus much; in vain do the Epicureans ascribe to God Happiness and Majesty, unless they acknowledge in him Wisdom, or Prudence, and Justice, and, consequently, every kind of Virtue. For all the Virtues spring from Prudence, (which directs to the Best End by Proper Means,) as from their Fountain, which Epicurus has acknowledg’d:46 And they are all only integral parts of Universal Justice. But there can be no Happiness, no Majesty, nor even Dignity, in any Rational Agent, if he has not Prudence, nor any Virtue Analogous thereto.47 Nor can there be any Prudence, except the best End be chosen, and the Means most suitable thereto; nor can these be chose, if they are not, in their own Nature, fixt and determin’d: That is, if nothing be good, before it is chose, and one End be no better than another, nor any Means more conducive than the contrary, to that End. For Example, if the Publick Good be not greater than any Private; and if Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, &c. are not properer Means to attain this End, than Cruelty, Perfidiousness, and Ingratitude. Certainly Power, how great soever it may be imagin’d, if it be consider’d without Wisdom and Justice, has in it no more of Happiness or Majesty, than what is to be found in a Mass of Lead of infinite Weight; for Weight is equivalent to any Power, as those skill’d in Mechanicks very well know. This Reasoning is yet of more Force against the Epicureans, because they themselves, if we may believe Gassendus, or even Velleius, who, in Cicero, defends their opinions, acknowledge the Happiness of the Gods to consist in this also, that they rejoice in their own Wisdom and Virtue.48 But there is left no Subject for them to work upon, except they own, that they take care of that chief common End, and the Means leading thereto. Take them away, and the name only of Wisdom, or Virtue, or Deity, remains, the thing itself is gone.

  also from his being the First Cause.§XXI. Of near affinity with this Argument, drawn from the Divine Attributes, is that which is taken from the notion of a First Cause, the first notion Men learn of God from his Works; for that implies, “That all Creatures, but especially Rational, have receiv’d their Existence, and, consequently, all the Powers essential to their Nature, from his Will.” Now, because it is certain, that the Common Good of Men signifies nothing else, but the Preservation of their Nature, and the most flourishing State of their essential Powers; the Mind of Man cannot but conclude it far more probable, “That the same invariable Will, which gave Men Existence, would will rather their Continuance and Happiness, so far as is consistent with the necessary nature of the rest of the System, which he made at the same time, than that they should be thrown down from that State, in which he himself had plac’d them, without any real necessity, which can arise only from a regard to the preservation of the Whole.” For I suppose it known from true Principles of Natural Philosophy, “That the natural Vicissitudes of Things, their Generation and Corruption, always rise from the Laws of Motion, by which the whole System of the World is preserv’d.” It must certainly proceed from the same Goodness, “To cause Men to be,” and, “To cause them to be preserv’d and assisted, according to the condition of their Nature, as far as the Welfare of the Whole permits.” But, because neither the Understanding of Man can conceive, nor the Power of Man effect, any thing greater relating to the Creatures, than what regards the Preservation of Mankind, he must of necessity think, that this is the greatest affair God Wills them to take care of. And, doubtless, seeing he commits the care of this to Man, he will reward his Fidelity and Diligence, and will punish his Perfidiousness or Sloth. Thus, from this Will to create, is discover’d his Will to preserve and protect Man, and, from hence, our Obligation to be subservient to the same Will so known.

  Almost in the same manner we collect, that it is the Will of God, “That Men should honour Him.”49 Because it was his Will, that there should be so many Proofs of his Perfections, in the Creation and Preservation of this System which we inhabit; and that Men should be so form’d, that, if they would but exert the powers of their own Understanding, they could not but observe these things; he Will’d, that they should both know and acknowledge, what he is. And, because he Will’d, that Men should be Rational, that is, consistent with themselves, and averse to all contradiction, he Wills, that their Words and Actions should keep pace with their Thoughts concerning his Perfections, that is, he Wills, that they should Worship and Honour Him.

  From our knowledge of those Effects which suppose this Will, viz.§XXII. The second method of knowing that God Wills, “That Actions conducing to the Common Good of Rational Agents should be perform’d by Men”; or, that he wills, “That such Actions should be honoured with Rewards, or the contrary restrain’d by Punishments,” is taken from the Effects of this Will, that is, from the Rewards and Punishments themselves, which, by means of the inward Constitution of all Men, and of this whole System of the World, fram’d by the appointment of the Divine Will, are the natural and ordinary consequences of Human Actions; and do render Men, either miserable by Evil, or happy by Good. For it is not to be doubted, but that God, who has so establish’d the natural Order of all things, that the Consequences of Human Actions, with respect to the Actors themselves, should be such; and who has caus’d, that these ordinary Consequences may be fore-known, or expected, with the highest probability, by them; Will’d, that, before they prepar’d for Action, they should consider these things, and be determin’d by them, as by Arguments contain’d in the Sanction of the Laws.

  the Internal Pleasures and Pains, or External Good and Evil, which accompany the pursuit or violations of the Common Good.Such kind of Effects are, those Internal Pleasures of Mind, which accompany every noble Action intended for the publick Good; and, on the contrary, those Fears and Anxieties of Mind, which, like Furies, pursue the Wicked: And also those External Rewards and Punishments, by which other Rational Agents, according to the Dictates of right Reason concerning the best End and Means, preserve Mankind from Destruction, and promote the common Happiness. For, since as many as form a true judgment concerning the Greatest End and the Means of obtaining it, (viz. That the common Good is the greatest End which can be propos’d, and that Rewards and Punishments are the Means conducing thereto,) are determin’d to those Practical Judgments, by the Nature of those things about which they deliberate, whose impressions upon the Human Understanding are perfectly necessary; and, since the Connexion between necessary Causes and all their Effects proceeds from the First Cause; it follows, “That those Dictates of right Reason, by which any Men resolve upon the necessity of distributing Rewards and Punishments in order to the common Good, proceeds from God.” That is, “All Men are determin’d by God, by the intervention of the Nature of Things, to judge both, that the common Good is the Best End, or the Greatest Good, which can be obtained, and in which all men may naturally agree, as that which contains (as far as the Nature of all Things will permit) the private Happiness of all particular Persons: And, that it is likewise necessary, as the Means to this End, that every one take as much care as possible, that Rewards and Punishments be distributed, by which Actions in pursuance of this End may be encouraged, and the contrary restrain’d.

  are the Effects of his Present Will, and the Declarations of his Future.But, since in those Propositions, concerning the Best End and the Means leading thereto, or concerning the Greatest Good and its Causes, which are within the power of Men, are contained all those Conclusions which we call the Laws of Nature, it follows, “That all those Laws are, together with the aforesaid Propositions, imprinted upon the Minds of Men by the Will of the First Cause; and, therefore, that he will’d, that Rewards and Punishments should be distributed, according as these Practical Dictates of Reason suggest, as far as can be done by Men”: Whence the Conclusion is, “That every such Punishment, and every Reward, so distributed, is distributed according to his Will, and that they are all Effects and Declarations of the Divine Will”; which when known, Men cannot be ignorant of their Obligation thence arising. It is further manifest, “That the same God, alwaies consistent with himself, who will’d, that Men should secure, to the utmost of their power, the Common Good by Rewards and Punishments, will also take care, where the Power of Men does not sufficiently defend it, to protect it by his own Power.

  I thought it proper, to insist the longer upon this Argument in this Treatise, because I hop’d my Antagonists, who are so intent upon their own Preservation, would the more willingly acknowledge its Force; and, because the Nature of Things seem’d to propose many Proofs of this matter, which requir’d a very particular Explication. I, therefore, resolve Moral Obligation, (which is the immediate Effect of Nature’s Laws,) into their First and Principal Cause, which is the Will and Counsel of God promoting the Common Good; and, therefore, by Rewards and Punishments, enacting into Laws the Practical Propositions which tend thereto. Mens care of their own Happiness, which causes them to consider, and be moved by, Rewards and Punishments, is no Cause of Obligation; That proceeds, wholly, from the Law and the Lawgiver: It is only a necessaryDisposition in the Subject, without which the Rewards and Penalties of the Law would be of no Force to induce Men to the performance of their Duty.50 As Contact is necessary in the Communication of Motion from Body to Body; tho’ Force impress’d be the only Cause of that Motion.

  It ought, also, in confirmation of this Point, to be consider’d, “That the Obligation lies upon them too, whose Mind is so stupid, that they wholly neglect the Divine Will, and the Sanction thereby annex’d to the Law.” I must add, “That the Care of preserving and perfecting our-selves, which is natural and inseparable from Man, and that which is super-induced by right Reason, and, which I acknowledge, has some place among the Motives to good Actions, tho’ not a Cause of our Obligation to them, are both wholly from God.” From thence it follows, “That the force of this Care detracts nothing from his Authority or Honour, and that it ought to have its due Influence.”

  However, his own Happiness is an extremely-small part of that End, which a truly-rational Man pursues, and bears only that proportion to the whole End, (the Common Good, with which it is interwove by God the Author of Nature,) which one Man bears to the collective Body of all Rational Beings, which is less than what the smallest grain of Sand bears to the whole Mass of Matter. Because God (between Whom and Man there is no Proportion) is reckon’d among Rational Beings, and the Care of the Publick Good includes in the first place, his Honour, and then the Happiness of all Men, which exist at present, or shall exist hereafter.

  The Obligation, however, of the Laws of Nature is immutable, the Natures of Things remaining as they are.§XXIII. Lastly, to prevent all Suspicion, that I imagin’d the Obligation of the Laws of Nature, which I have deduc’d from the Will of the First Cause, to be Arbitrary and Mutable, I have thought fit to add, “That, laying aside the Consideration of the Divine Command, the Exercise of Benevolence, and, consequently, of all the Virtues, does as naturally and necessarily produce the private Happiness of every Rational Agent, and the common Happiness of All, as any Natural Cause produces its Effect, or a Necessary Mean its End”; that is, as two and two make four, or as the Operations prescrib’d by Geometry and Mechanicks solve the propos’d Problems. A Necessity this so Immutable, that neither the Wisdom, nor the Will of God can be thought capable of appointing a contrary Law or Constitution, whilst the Nature of Things remains such as now it is. It is, however, certain, that every Human Action and Effect, and, consequently, Arithmetical and Geometrical Operations with all their Effects, depend upon the Will of the First Cause. Our whole inquiry is concerning the Existence of the Laws of Nature, and of their Obligation, which must intirely be deduced from the Will of the First Cause; I mean that Act of his Will, (and that only, as will appear by what follows,) by which the Powers, Actions, and Natures, of Rational Beings exist. Wherefore any Mutability in the Obligation of the Laws of Nature, is so far from being hence to be inferr’d, that, on the contrary, it has been my chief aim to prove, “That it is not possible, without manifold Contradictions, that God should at the same time will, that Rational Agents should be such as they are, and that they should not be oblig’d by those Laws of Nature, which we shall afterwards lay down.” This is the only Method, by which any thing can be prov’d impossible to God; for he can do any thing, which does not imply a Contradiction. But, if any one imagines, that He can make contradictory Propositions be at the same time true, by parity of Reason it may be true, That he cannot do so; and therefore the Assertion is vain. All considerate Persons, therefore, I believe, will think, that I have prov’d the Law of Nature sufficiently immutable, when I have shewn, “That it cannot be chang’d without Contradiction, whilst the Nature of Things, and their actual Powers, (which depend upon the Divine Will,) remain unchang’d.” And this Is ufficiently prove, when I make it appear, “That both the common Happiness of All proceeds from the natural efficacy of the Actions of universal Benevolence, and that the Happiness of particular Persons is naturally in separable from the Common, with which all are bless’d.” Partly, because the Happiness of the particular Parts is not, in reality, distinguished from the Welfare of the Whole: Partly, because we in some measure render our-selves happy by those Actions, by which we benefit others, and, as far as in us lies, thereby determine them to a grateful Return. Thus it is, that Actions of publick Benefit naturally reward their Authors: Where as contrary Actions no less naturally pull down Punishments and Destruction upon their Contrivers.

  These Evils more particularly deduc’d, and shewn to to be Punishments.§XXIV. I will now (having discarded that Right of every Man to every thing, and the War thence arising, which, as I have shewn, Hobbes in vain endeavours to establish) assume that, which, forced by the glaring truth of the Matter, he grants, “That there follows War and the Destruction of All, upon the violation of those Dictates of Reason, which forbid, that any one should claim to himself a Right to all things, and which command to perform Compacts, &c. in observing which Dictates all Virtues consist.” I say, that these Evils of War are truly Punishments inseparably united with such Crimes, by the Will of the supreme Governour, when he settled the order of the Universe. From this, that the Mind of Man is forewarn’d by the Nature of Things, and, consequently, by God its Author, of the Punishment connected with such an Action, the Obligation to abstain from such Action, is publish’d; or the Mind is sufficiently forbid, so to act; and the Prohibition is so much the plainer, as it appears, that the Action will be hurtful, as well to others, as to its Author.

  In my Opinion, “The Common Good” (under which I comprehend the Honour of God, and the greatest Happiness of Mankind) “is pleasanter than even Life itself, and, alwaies, to be preferr’d before it”; and, therefore, “Those Evils, which either detract from the Honour of God, or endanger the greatest Perfection of Human Minds, are to be esteem’d a greater Evil, than the loss of any one’s Life.” Whence I reckon it amongst the Natural Punishments, that the Violation of the Laws of Nature is attended with, that it hurts the principal Faculties of the Transgressor, introduces Folly and Error into the Understanding, and a perverse Choice of Evil under the Appearance of Good.

  Whence we may easily proceed to a further Proof of the same kind, from the Joies and Griefs arising in the Mind, from a Consciousness of our Consent with, or Dis-sent from, the Benevolent Will of God.But, because Reasonings of this kind, as depending upon much Reflexion on our own Minds, do not so sensibly affect the Minds of those, who have of a long time, studied only the Safety or Delights of their Body, I think it proper to lay before them those external Evils, which Hobbes acknowledges proceed from the Violation of the Precepts of Virtue, the necessary Means to Peace,51 and to consider them as a Punishment annex’d to the Laws of Nature by the Author thereof, that thus, by Instances frequently obvious to Sense, I may prove, “How the Mis-chief, which redounds to those who are Enemies to the Publick Good, by the natural Establishment of Physical Causes, but principally by the Intention of Rational Agents, is properly and truly a Punishment, and an Indication, that the Author of Nature has establish’d that Law, the Violation whereof was so punish’d.” By the same Reasoning it will appear, “That all Advantages, which are the Fruits of that Peace and Concord, which are establish’d by the pursuit of the Common Good, become truly a Reward, and prove the obligatory Force of a Law to be given by God to the affirmative Precepts of Virtue.” Afterwards it will hence easily appear, how those Things Good or Evil, with respect to our Minds, which may be foreseen as the Consequences of our Actions or Omissions relating to the Common Good; and also, how the Joies and Griefs proceeding from our Sense of the Happiness or Misery of others; point out, to what kind of Actions we are oblig’d. “The Mind of Man, by these steps, may at length easily raise itself, to have some Notion or Taste of that most delightful Joy, which arises from the Consciousness, that in Practical Principles our Mind agrees with the Mind or Will of God, the most Benevolent Being; and to conceive the Bitterness of that Grief, which arises from the Consciousness, that our Thoughts and Affections are directly opposite to those of God, conspicuous in his Government of Men.” In these Joies is the highest pitch of our Happiness, in these Griefs consists the most wretched Misery. And, therefore, I affirm, the Dictates of Reason do hence chiefly receive their power of Obligation. Wherefore, seeing they obtain all the Force and Efficacy of a Law, from the Will ofGod joining so great Rewards to their Observance, and Punishments to their Violation, there is no reason to refuse them the appellation of Natural Laws. But it is proper to begin with Instances sensible and confess’d.

  The Evils inflicted on others, at the command of right Reason, for Actions hurtful to Mankind, are properly Punishments, and the Sanctions of a Divine Law.§XXV. It is manifest, from the very Terms themselves (as the Logicians call them) well understood, “That so great an innundation of Evils, from War or the less cruel Enmities of every Man against every Man, would overflow Mankind, that, for the Preservation of the Whole, it is necessary to seek Peace”; but the Means necessary to obtain Peace, are, To permit to others those things which are necessary for them, Faithfully to observe Compacts, To behave ourselves Gratefully and Beneficently to all, and To practice all the other Virtues, which (if they be throughly consider’d) all promote the Common Good. These Truths, even Hobbes himself acknowledges, as appears de Cive, c. 1. §. 15. c. 2. §. 3. & c. 3. §. 1. and the following; and he repeats the same in the Leviathan, but deduces them from the care of Self-preservation only;52Publick Good, at least before the establishment of Civil Societies, he does not acknowledge. Mean-while he most diligently inculcates this, “That a War of All against All, in which there are no grounds to hope for Safety, will follow from those Actions, by which any one claims to himself a Right over all Persons and Things, as being contrary to those plainly necessary Means to Peace, which are usually celebrated under the Name of Virtues.”53 It is most certain, “That Men, in all States, are forc’d by Self-preservation, to oppose and punish those, who would force from them, however Innocent, either their Life or the Necessaries there of.”54 But, for this very Reason, that these Evils are inflicted upon others, at the command of right Reason, upon account of Actions prejudicial to Mankind, they are Punishments, and those Practical Propositions, which teach, that it is necessary to Peace, “That we should do to others, what we would that they should do unto us,”55 have this Punishment annex’d, by the Author of our rational Nature, to their Violation, and are hence known, to obtain the intire force of Laws: Nor are, now, any more to be look’d upon, as mere Practical Propositions, which one may use or neglect to use with Safety, (such as those that teach the Construction of Mathematical Problems;) they are properly Laws, and claim to themselves the Obedience due to Laws.

  Here (as in the Laws of Civil States) the Obligation of the Law is discover’d, from its Sanction by Rewards and Punishments; the Right of guarding the Laws of Nature by such Sanctions, is to be resolv’d into the natural Authority of God, in right of which he exercises an universal Dominion: The real Goodness of these Laws becomes known, from the natural and necessary Connexion of the Actions commanded, with the preservation or increase of the Common Good: Almost in the same manner, as the Right of annexing Penalties to Civil Laws is resolv’d into the Authority of the chief Governours, and their Goodness into the Fitness of the Actions commanded, to promote the Common Weal. For Example, that universal Proposition, which we have premis’d concerning the force of Benevolence towards all Rational Beings, to procure the Happiness of the Benevolent, naturally obliges Men to such Benevolence, upon this account, “That the Ruler of Mankind has given them natural means of knowing, that he himself is so inclin’d toward the Common Good, and has so constituted the order of Nature, that they, who endeavour to promote the Common Good, shall thereby, not only have the concurrence of the Natural, but gain the favour of those Rational, Agents, which can contribute to their Happiness,” (which assistance is also a Natural Reward:) And they, who act otherwise, shall, by such Actions, excite against themselves the causes of their Destruction.

  As many learn the Laws of their own Country, not from the Laws themselves publish’d in Writing, or from the Mouth of the Legislators, but from the judgment of their Reason concerning the proper Causes of the Publick Good, and from the Observation of those Things, which they perceive to be publickly rewarded, permitted, or punish’d; so, what are the Laws of a Rational Nature, or of the Kingdom of God, we learn first, by a diligent consideration, what things are necessary to the Happiness of all the Subjects, and to the Honour of God, the Sovereign of that greatest State; and afterwards by observing, how naturally and necessarily Men are inclin’d, to restrain those who pursue contrary Measures.

  It is not to be doubted, but “That the First Cause commanded that Punishment to be inflicted, which right and necessary Reason commands to be inflicted”; for that is intirely determin’d by the nature of things exactly weigh’d, and, consequently, by God the Maker of all Things. We may likewise infer, “That God decrees Rewards to such Actions, as the right Reason of Man decrees Rewards to”; and also, “That it is his Will, that those Propositions, concerning Actions contributing any thing to the Common Good, should obtain the force of Laws, which he has honour’d” (beyond other True and Practical Propositions, Geometrical, for Instance) “with Rewards and Punishments thus establish’d.”

  God will certainly punish such crimes as escape Human Knowledge, and those that Human Power is too weak to restrain.Further; if God teaches Men to judge, “That it is necessary, both to the Common Good and the Private Good of particular Persons, that all violations of the Peace should be, when they come to know of what evil consequence they are, restrain’d by Punishments”; we may clearly gather by a Parity of Reason, “Not only that he himself so judges, and Wills that Men should do so too; but also, that he makes the same judgment on all Actions equally hurtful, which Men either do not know, or cannot punish.” For it is most certain, That every Right Judgment, and consequently the Divine, determines alike concerning Cases wholly alike; and that the most secret Actions cannot be conceal’d from him: And that, therefore, there can be no Reason, why he should forbear to pass a Judgment upon them, as Men are often oblig’d to do, left by a rash Judgment they should hurt the Innocent.” This reasoning is obvious to all, whence they cannot but think with themselves, “That God has appointed Punishments to their secret Crimes,” and, “that he will avenge the insults upon the Weak.” For there is no reason to doubt, but that he will pursue this End, the Common Good, in which both his own Honour and the Happiness of all Rational Beings is contain’d. For a greater End there cannot be; and a less End cannot be taken for the Greatest, by him who judges truly. Thus the Pangs and Obligation of Conscience take their Origin from the Government of God.

  Human Rewards and Punishments, foreseen as probably, tho’ not certainly, future, may be justly rated at a certain present value, and are therefore properly said to lay us under an Obligation, and are sufficient Motives of Action.§XXVI. But let us return to the Punishments inflicted by Men, for violating the conditions necessary to Peace; more things concerning the Obligation, which we have prov’d from thence, remaining to be explain’d. For it is to be observ’d, that, altho’ such Crimes sometimes escape unpunish’d by Men, yet we may truly affirm, that they are determined by Nature and right Reason to punish them, as far as lies in their power; and that it is therefore by accident only, that they sometimes permit wicked Persons to escape unpunish’d. So other Effects, which we either do or suffer to be done, thro’ natural Ignorance or Weakness, are imputed rather to Chance than to human Nature, and are usually reckon’d by wise Men among those things which rarely happen. Now right Reason, while it delivers the Precepts and Rules of Action, will never advise us to place our Hopes in such Events, or expect the Means of Happiness from thence. On the contrary, it will tell us the safest way to Happiness is by Benevolent Actions, which, upon this very account, is more particularly acceptable to God and agreeable to our own Nature; in which we need neither fear the Divine Vengeance, which neither the Force nor Stratagems of Men can elude; nor the Punishments threatened by Men, which ought to be consider’d, at least, as probable. Concerning these, however contingent, right Reason concludes thus much with certainty, that, as Advantages, contingently future only, have a certain determinate Value, and contain in themselves the real nature of Good, which wise Men, from the observation of the Causes upon which they depend, know how to estimate at a certain Price to be paid at present; (This is done daily in the purchase of Reversions, and in other like cases:) So also Future Contingent Evils, (among which the Punishments Reason teaches to inflict upon all who are hurtful to the Innocent, ought to be reckon’d,) are to be estimated as Evils present and certain, but somewhat less. So the Hazard of losing Life, Health, Expence, and Pains,(all which happen in human affairs,) every where, with Reason, increases the Price of Labour; and is therefore compensated at a certain and present Rate, no less than a present and certain Evil accruing and Gain ceasing. Wherefore, natural right Reason plainly teaches, “That the Hazard of imminent Punishment may be rated as a present and certain Evil, tho’ it sometimes happens, that the guilty Person may avoid it”; which, however, will be lessen’d, according to the Degrees of Hope, which anyone, from a through knowledge of all Circumstances, has of escaping those Punishments. Let therefore that Punishment, to the Hazard of which the Invader of another’s Property exposes himself, be suppos’d somewhat less than it would be if it were actually inflicted, as soon as the Crime were committed; that is, let as much be subtracted from the Greatness thereof, as Reason prescribes upon this account, that it is uncertain, whether it will be inflicted or no; and yet there will remain more Evil, than can be compensated by the unjust Gain: That Excess then of Evil is a Penal Sanction to the Dictate of Reason, which forbids the Invasion of another’s Property.

  ’Tis of great importance to this Argument, to observe, “That natural Reason instructs all Men, even out of civil Society, so to enhance the Punishments of Crimes, that, tho’ much should be detracted from them upon account of uncertain Execution, the present estimated Evil of the foreseen Punishments should much overbalance the Gain expected from the Crime.” This is manifest, both in the Punishments, which are by either Party inflicted by the right of War56 for smaller Injuries done those, who are not subject to the same Civil Government; and in those Cases, in which Civil Laws permit the Punishment of the Crime to the Discretion of the Subjects aggriev’d; for Example, the Vengeance on those, who by night break open other Mens Houses, or who rob upon the Highway.57 In such Cases Men are, in some measure, reduc’d to Hobbes’s State of Nature, and, in that, even smaller Crimes are punish’d capitally: Nor unjustly, for, because the Civil Magistrate is often unable to come to the knowledge of such Crimes, they often escape unpunish’d; therefore, when soever Punishment can be taken, it is taken most heavily, that, by how much the more they are embolden’d, from the Hope of frequent Impunity, so much the more they may be check’d by the fear of the severest Punishment. And this seems to me the true Reason, why such Revenge as appears very horrible, is sometimes necessary in War; And why, even in Civil States, more grievous Punishments are inflicted, than would be requisite, if all Crimes that are committed, were immediately judg’d and punished. For these Reasons I think it evident, “That the foreseen Hazard, especially of more grievous Punishment, (altho’ the Certainty of its future Execution could not be known,) has a constant and perpetual power of determining the Will, to avoid all deliberate Actions, against which those Punishments are threaten’d.” In like manner; “The foreseen Probability of a very great Good, is a proper Weight to determine Men to those Actions, which may be any way instrumental in procuring it.” Or, to explain the Metaphor, these considerations furnish an Argument concluding necessarily, “That a Practice conformable to the Law is one of the causes of that compleat Happiness we naturally desire,” which is sufficient to infer an Obligation. For the Natural Obligation of the Laws of Nature leaves those who are oblig’d, at liberty to act otherwise at their own peril: It furnishes only a proper Argument, to induce the Person oblig’d, to act or to forbear, as Reason or the Law commands him.

  The Nature of Moral Obligation explain’d, and Justinian’s shewn to express the same sense, that the Author’s does but more obscurely.§XXVII. Here, lest I should be thought to use Words in a Sense different from what is usual, I shall briefly shew, that what I have said is implied in the received Definition of Obligation.

  Justinian gives this Definition of it, “Obligation is that Bond of the Law, by which we are tied with the Necessity of paying any thing, according to the Laws of our State.”58 It is evident, that what is said of “payment” and “his State” is special, and ought, therefore, to be omitted in the general notion of Obligation, after which we are inquiring; and that the rest that goes before in the Definition, is indeed general, but somewhat obscure from Metaphors; for the Mind of Man is not properly “tied with Bonds.”

  There is nothing which can super induce a Necessity of doing or forbearing any thing, upon a Human Mind deliberating upon a thing future, except Thoughts or Propositions promising Good or Evil, to ourselves or others, consequent upon what we are about to do. But, because we are determin’d, by some sort of natural Necessity, to pursue Good foreseen, especially the Greatest; and to avoid Evils; hence those Dictates of Reason, which discover to us, that these things will follow from certain of our Actions, are said to lay upon us some kind of Necessity of performing or omitting those Actions, and to oblige us; because those Advantages are necessarily connected with our Happiness, which we naturally desire, and our Actions are evidently necessary to the attainment of them.

  I, therefore, think, that Moral Obligation may be thus universally and properly defin’d. Obligation is that Act of a Legislator, by which he declares, that Actions conformable to his Law are necessary to those, for whom the Law is made. An Action is then understood to be necessary to a rational Agent, when it is certainly one of the Causes necessarily requir’d to that Happiness, which he naturally, and consequently necessarily, desires. Thus we are oblig’d to pursue the Common Good, when the Nature of Things (especially of Rational Causes,) expos’d to our Observation, discovers to our Minds, that this Action is a Cause necessarily requisite to compleat our Happiness; which, therefore, naturally depends upon the pursuit of the Common Good of all Rational Agents; as the Soundness of a Member depends upon the Soundness and Life of the whole Animated Body; or, as the Strength of our Hands can not effectually be preserved, without first preserving that Life and Strength, which is diffus’d thro’ our whole Body. For every Man’s proper Happiness does no less naturally depend upon the influence of the First Cause, and the mutual assistance of other Rational Agents, which is to be procured by the pursuit of the Common Good, than the Hand depends upon the rest of the Body; altho’ the Dependence of one Man upon others consists in fewer particulars, and is often more remote, and, therefore, not alwaies so evident: I have shewn before, “That the prosecution of the Common Good is essentially requisite to every one’s Happiness”; by proving, “That in such Actions consists the most happy State of our Faculties”; here we learn, “That by these Actions its Preservation and further Perfection may most effectually be procured from God and Men.” But we resolve all into those voluntary Acts of the First Cause, by which he has determin’d the Measure of our Faculties, and their proper Happiness thence arising; and by which he has plac’d and continues us depending in such a System, upon other Rational Causes. For these things being establish’d, the Foundation and natural Discovery of our Obligation are necessarily establish’d, and thence arise, with the same Necessity, first our Knowledge, and then our actual Obligation.

  It amounts to the same thing, when we say, “That the Obligation is an Act of the Legislator,” or of the First Cause; as if in this place we had call’d it, “An Act of the Law of Nature.” For the Legislator obliges by the Law sufficiently promulg’d, and he sufficiently promulges it, when he discovers to our Minds, “That the prosecution of the Common Good is the Cause necessarily requisite to that Happiness, which every one necessarily desires.”

  Upon discovering this, all Men are oblig’d; whether it be of so great Weight with them, as perfectly to incline their Minds to what it persuades; or whether what is alledg’d in favour of the contrary Opinion, weigh more. Those Bodies, which, thro’ a Fault in the Balance, are raised by a smaller Weight in the opposite Scale, are yet in themselves heavier, or have a greater tendency toward the Center of the Earth.

  It is to be observ’d, that those Arguments, which prove our Obligation, in this case would certainly prevail; unless the Ignorance, turbulent Affections, or Rashness of Men, like the Fault in the Balance, oppos’d their Efficacy; as discovering, beside Rewards and Punishments manifested or express’d, that others greater (if there be occasion) will be added at the pleasure of the supreme Governour of the World.

  The Obligation to promote the Common Good, as a necessary End, being once settled, it will hence follow, “That the common Obligation of all Men, to pursue the Dictates of Reason concerning the Means necessary thereto, is likewise known.”

  The Sum of all these Dictates is contain’d in our Proposition, “concerning the Benevolence of each Rational Agent towards All”; from whence ’tis evident, that a War of each against All tends to the Common Destruction, and cannot by any method be a Means conducing to the Happiness of All, or even be consistent with the Means necessary to that End; and, therefore, can neither be enjoin’d, nor permitted, by right Reason.

  Every Man’s own Happiness, tho’ necessarily sought by him, is not his Adequate End of Action.§XXVIII. Altho’ I have suppos’d, That every one necessarily seeks his own greatest Happiness, yet I am far from thinking that to be the intire and adequate End of any one. I was willing to assume, what my Adversaries would allow, in order to carry them farther with me, if it were possible: For, as the Frame of our Body cannot subsist, or enjoy Health, except the great System of Bodies about us contribute somewhat to this Effect; nor can any one, rightly understanding the Nature of Things, wish that it were otherwise, because he knows it to be impossible: So the intire Happiness of every particular Man naturally depends upon the Benevolence of God, and of other Men; but neither can the Benevolence of God toward any one be separated from his regard to his own Honour; nor the favourable inclination of others towards us, be disjoin’d from their care of their own Happiness; nay, we must needs acknowledge this to be stronger in them, than their Affection towards us: Wherefore it is impossible, that he who duly considers the Nature of Rational Beings, should desire that they should assist us, except their own Preservation were at the same time taken care of; and, therefore, he cannot propose to himself his own Happiness, separately from that of others, as his adequate End.

  But jointly (1.) with the Honour of God,But let us distinctly consider, what I have but now briefly hinted; and, First, no one, who acknowledges the Divine Providence to be sufficiently prov’d from the Nature of Things, can deny, “That every Man’s Happiness depends upon the Benevolence of God, as upon a Cause necessarily requisite.” But, who can ground his Expectations of the Divine Favour upon right Reason, except he sincerely render God that Honour, which he has Reason to believe acceptable to Him? Hence the various Precepts of Religion; hence the Precepts of Justice, and of every Virtue that can be mutually exercised among Men, are shewn to be Means necessary to every Man’s Happiness, and therefore to oblige every Man; because it is most certain, “That the Governour of the World is by no Means honour’d, except all his innocent Subjects be justly and kindly treated, according to the Conditions necessary to the Preservation of Universal Peace”; that is, as all the Virtues prescribe.

  and (2.) the Happiness of Men.§XXIX. What I have hinted, beside, “That every Man in some measure depends upon the Benevolence of other Men,” I believe to be most true; but not so obvious, but that it requires the attentive Consideration of what I shall presently offer, and perhaps of other matters, which every one’s Experience may easily suggest to him.

  As First, “That every Man’s Happiness consists in a great Collection of many Good Things, and that it is not sufficiently safe, unless we provide for the Future long before, and reconcile to ourselves, as far as in us lies, all the Causes, which can contribute any thing to this Effect.” This makes way for the Concurrence of innumerable Causes, so that there is scarce any part of this Visible World, but what may be in some measure useful to every one; much less is there any Man, who neither was, nor is, nor may be, contributing, something at least, to our Preservation or Perfection. For (after Mankind is suppos’d to become numerous) “No-one can be imagin’d, whose Happiness and Pleasures of Life do not immediately depend upon two (at least;) each of these two stands in need of other two, in order to live happily.” In like manner, “Every Nation wants the Commerce of two other Nations, and others are likewise necessary to these.” By proceeding in this manner we shall find, “That every one assists every one.” It is not however necessary, minutely to consider, “What Benefit we receive from every Individual”; it is sufficient that we perceive, that all contribute somewhat to the Common Stock, which ought to be compensated by us with like pains bestow’d upon the Publick. Such kind of human Actions as these, seem to me fitly to be compar’d to the general Motions of Bodies Natural, which at once contribute to many Effects.

  It is in the next place to be consider’d, “That the Word Benevolence is taken by me in the largest Sense, so as to include the lowest degrees of Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, or any kind office of Humanity perform’d by others to us.” Any one has it in his power, but at his own Peril, a thousand waies to create to others innumerable Troubles spreading themselves far and wide; if Men act otherwise, and stop short of that wild Malevolence, which threatens War, that is, all the greatest Evils to All, it is to be attributed to some degree of Benevolence. Whatever is done, which in its own Nature ever so little conduces to the preservation of Peace and a general Good-Will among Men, that protects many from most grievous Evils, and is, therefore, of great Advantage.

  It were endless to attempt recounting all the particular Advantages, which accrue from a Benevolence of each towards All. It is very well known, that they who have least in their power, benefit others; either by the Exchange of Things or Services, or by observing Compacts, or by giving us reason to place a Confidence in them, even without Compacts, or by the Examples which they afford (if not of great Exploits, yet) of Industry, Patience or Innocence. These things are consider’d by Men, even without any respect to Civil Government, and extend their influence over the whole Earth. The very Imperfections and Infirmities of Men, so far as they naturally excite Pity, and point out the necessity of Government, do strongly persuade all to concur in instituting and preserving it, and are, therefore, of considerable use to all, as they any way contribute to the vast Advantages of Society. I own, however, that the Advantage is but small, which each receives from many, especially the more remote, but we give them in return only a like share of the effects of our Industry; yet even these cannot with safety be neglected, because the whole Happiness, and that not small, of particular Persons, grows out of such minute offices of Humanity included in the care of the Common Good, almost in the same manner as this most beautiful Frame of the Material World arises, from the regular Motions and Figures of the minute Particles of Matter. But, having in the Chapter concerning Human Nature enumerated many particulars, which demonstrate, “That Men have, from Nature, both Power and Inclination to do good Offices to others, provided they are consistent with their own Happiness”; the little I have mention’d may warrant my supposing it at present as sufficiently prov’d, “That Men, of all Created Beings, are the principal Causes, upon which every one must acknowledge his present and future Happiness upon Earth necessarily depends.” For the same reason there is no occasion to add here any thing farther, to shew “the Unreasonableness of expecting, that Men should willingly labour to make those happy, whom they know to be in themselves Malevolent, Perfidious, Ingrateful, Inhuman”; or the Reasonableness of taking it for evident, “That others will concur to restrain or destroy such by condign Punishments.”

  The Law of Universal Benevolence obliges, with respect to all Persons, and at all Times, the Weak as well as the Strong; in Private, as well as in Publick.§XXX. It is to be observ’d, “That there is so strict a mutual Dependence among all Rational Beings, that it admonishes Man, thro’ the whole course of Life, of the Vanity of imagining, that he has sufficiently provided for his own Happiness, tho’ he have performed all the offices of Humanity to one Person, or for one Time; if he has at pleasure broke thro’ them, with respect to another Person, or at another Time.” This is evident, not only from what I have now been saying, viz. Because the Happiness of every particular Person perpetually depends, immediately indeed upon Many, but remotely, and with respect to smaller Matters, upon All who regard the Common Good: But also because the same Common Father of All, the First Cause, takes care of All: And lastly, because whatever any one of these, from the Dictates of right Reason, wills should be done to himself or others, That do all, who are truly Rational, will necessarily and alwaies, so far as they come to the knowledge there of.59For “all, (both God and Men) who think justly of the same thing, agree.”

  Hence it is, “That to deny any one his own,” that is, those Necessaries without which he is incapable of promoting the Common Good, “is to act in prejudice to the Common Benefit, and contrary to the Opinion and Will of all who judge rightly”; whence it follows, “That every one, in a state of Equality here suppos’d, has a Right, and is excited, to punish such Invasion, as Opportunity offers, which all Men can never long be without, but God never; against whom no Place of Concealment, nor Power, nor even Death itself, can defend the Wicked.”

  Which Observation I make chiefly with this view, that it may thence appear, “That the Obligation to study to promote the Common Good (which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature,) which is discover’d naturally by the Punishments and Rewards annex’d to Actions, according as they are contrary, or suited, to this End, is evidently perpetual, and binding in all Circumstances; and, therefore, a sufficient Motive to Universal Justice and Benevolence, as well in Secret as in Publick, with respect to the Weak as well as to the Strong.” For, since it is hence evident, “That all who are perfectly Rational are united among themselves, because right Reason, wherever it is, is alwaies consistent with right Reason, and because the Causes of their Common Happiness are the same”; and since it has been also specially shewn, “That He, whoever he is, who is about to do any Act, hurtful or beneficial to others, does so depend upon other Rational Beings, that all that Happiness he necessarily seeks, is to be received from their Concurrence, or at least free Permission, as the Reward of past, or Encouragement of future Benevolence”: It follows, “That his Right can be denied to no-one, how weak soever, even in Secret, without so far slighting and lessening the Publick Good, and thereby provoking all who have it truly at heart, (that is, all who are truly Rational in Practical Matters,) to refrain such Invasions of another’s Property by Punishments.” For the Common Good is the only End, in the pursuit whereof all Rational Beings can agree among themselves; because it comprehends the greatest possible Happiness of all; and it is most certain, that only that Practical Reason is true, which discovers to all an End and Means, in which all who make a true Judgment can agree; and that those, therefore, act according to true Practical Reason, who have this End at heart, and make use of the Means necessary thereto. Hence we may conclude, “That the Reason of God, which seeth all Things, and of all truly Rational Men, are upon the watch to discover every Invasion of another’s Right, that is, every Injustice, even out of Civil Society; so that there remains not the least hope of escaping the Knowledge of God, and but very little of deceiving the Sagacity of Man”: And, That, after Wickedness is discover’d, God and Men will neither want the Will nor the Power, toward off the intended Injury, or to punish that which has been committed.”

  Not only the External, but Internal, Causes of our Happiness conspire to produce the same End by the same Means, viz. perpetual and universal Benevolence towards all Rational Agents.§XXXI. In a word, the Invader of another’s Right, in that he opposes Reason, conspiring in all to promote the Common Good, forsakes Truth, and so far deprives himself of the innate Beauty of Practical Right Reason; and, by admitting one Practical Error, makes way for innumerable in the same kind; and delivers himself up to the conduct of his blind Passions, among Precipices innumerable. All these Consequences, both because they are Evil, and because they follow the Evil Action in the ordinary course of Nature establish’d by God, are justly called Punishments.

  “In every Deliberation concerning our future Actions ’tis necessary to consider, what other Rational Agents will think of them,” because (beside that they form the most noble Class of Beings,) they are the principal and Universal Causes, necessarily and perpetually requisite, of that Happiness which we aim at by Action: For the greatest diligence in procuring the Concurrence of such Causes, is above all and alwaies necessary to every Man, who would provide for his own Happiness according to the Dictates of Reason. I call those Universal Causes, which concur to many Effects, and of other kinds, beside that which is the subject of the present Inquiry. I don’t believe it necessary to be at much pains to shew, “That all the Necessaries to Happiness are dispos’d according to the Will of God and Men”; to procure which, their Concurrence or free Permission is no less requisite, than the rising of the Sun to dispell the darkness of the Night. It may be sufficient to take notice, that, as in the Sciences, those Propositions, which explain the most general Causes or Properties of Things, (the Laws of Motion, or the Properties of Triangles, for Example,) imply no contradiction in particular Cases, tho’ they be there much diversified: So in Practice, the care of procuring the Favour of the Universal Causes, (Rational Agents, suppose, jointly consider’d,) can never be laid aside, much less oppos’d, by him, who in reality and with right Reason pursues their natural Effect, which is his own Happiness: On the contrary, the care of gaining the First and most necessary Causes, prepares the way to, and directs and governs, the use of the Inferior when acquired; as the knowledge of General Truths assists the Judgment of the Skilful in forming Conclusions in all variety of Cases, and continually leads them to farther Discoveries.

  The help then of other truly Rational Beings, (that is of God, and such Men as concur in promoting the Common Good,) being thus found to be the most universal external Means to our Happiness (a Means in the first and principal Place and at all Times necessary;) it immediately follows, “That Nothing ought to be committed against any one, secretly or openly, thro’ the whole course of Life, by which we may be depriv’d of this Help; that is, that we ought never to invade another’s Right, but, on the contrary, endeavour by all methods to procure this Assistance perpetually to our-selves.”

  It happens likewise most favourably, “That within us nothing can more intimately and abundantly promote our Happiness, than the most enlarged Contemplation and Love of, and Joy in, such Things and Actions as are acceptable to God and such Men, the noblest Objects”: Now all these acts of Justice and Beneficence, by which we endeavour to please both God and Men, are the Effects, the Fruits, of that Universal Benevolence, which I inculcate; which will therefore naturally, by the most powerful Persuasive (that of Benevolent Actions) both implore and obtain the assistance of all Rational Beings; and, consequently, most happily unite the Internal and External Causes of our Happiness, and give rise to Virtue, Religion and Society. This Reason, (by which ’tis asserted, that we should in the first place take care to procure the Favour of the first and principal Causes of the End desired,) is indeed most General, and agreeable to the Rules of Logick, (which are prior to those of Morality;) but does not therefore agree the less with Experience and the natural Order of human Operations, which is sometimes very justly objected against some Logical Subtilties unskilfully applied to Practice.60

  Benevolence prov’d the necessary means to Happiness, first, by shewing the Opposite Practice naturally and unavoidably to tend to Misery.§XXXII. To make this appear yet more evident, I will illustrate this whole Matter, by considering, first, the Opposite Case, next a Parallel Case.

  To the perpetual pursuit of the Common Good, (by which, to the best of our power, we ingage in our favour the most universal Causes of our Happiness,) is oppos’d every wilful neglect thereof; by this therefore we leave in the hand of God or Men, wholly to take away our Happiness, or to diminish it to such a degree, as to their right Reason shall seem necessary to deter us or others (by way of sufficient Punishment) from a like Neglect.

  What is more; he who by a neglect of such Universal Benevolence neglects those Universal Causes, which I have mentioned, of his Happiness, alwaies substitutes others less effectual in their place, perhaps his own Force or Cunning, or the Assistance of a few like himself; hence the Mind forms new Rules of Practice, which do not satisfy, because of their inward Deformity, that is, because they are not equally rational, or fit to produce the End propos’d; and yet perplex and disturb the Mind by their Opposition to the former. They moreover presently beget in us and those that imitate us, a most mischievous off-spring, I mean most restless Passions, and Vices most destructive of Peace, such as Hatred, Envy, Fear, Sorrow, Inhumanity, Pride, &c. which (as is fabled of the Viper’s brood61 ) eat thro’ their Mothers Bowels. For he who perseveres in such measures, brings upon himself certain Destruction, both from within and without; but, if he returns from that to a right Mind, he finds his Happiness so impair’d in both Respects, that he cannot doubt, but that it had been better for him never to have laid aside the Care of the Publick Good. He that comes to himself will certainly take less Comfort (to say no worse) from the Remembrance of his past malevolent Actions: He will have less reason to hope for and expect a future happy Progress; either in the Improvement of his internal Faculties already hurt, (which might have been strengthen’d by constant well-doing,) or in the acqui sition of external Assistances from those he had offended, which he has reason to expect more sparingly for the Future. And these Evils follow necessarily, whether the Offenders will or no, from every wilful Neglect of perpetually soliciting the Favour of God and Man. Wherefore we may conclude, from the Punishment naturally annex’d to this neglect, “That the Duty (of always endeavouring by Benevolence to obtain the Favour of God and Men,)” which I undertook to prove from the consideration of its Opposite, “ought in no case to be omitted.” And even Hobbes himself acknowledges, “That such Evils may be said to be Punishments divinely inflicted, if we acknowledge God the Author of Nature,” Leviath. Chap. 28. in the sixth Consequence, which he has deduc’d from his Definition of Punishment.62

  Secondly, by considering a Parallel Case of the Necessity 1. of the moderate Influence of the Sun to Human Life, compar’d to the Divine Favour.§XXXIII. “That the engaging these universal and principal Causes of Human Happiness in our favour, ought to be our principal and perpetual Care, in order to obtain the End desir’d,” remains now to be shewn by the help of an Example, or like Practice in the affairs of Life and Health, which they are very careful of, who disregard Justice and Probity. And this I shall do with this view only, “That the Force and Scope of the foregoing Reasoning may more evidently appear,” for no rational Person will expect a strict Proof in such Comparisons.

  All acknowledge the Powers of the Sun and Air to be very great, and absolutely necessary to the Preservation of Human Life. These are those universal Causes, which, beside numberless other Effects, claim in this the principal Share. Yet so, that they require the Concurrence of many other Causes in some sort subordinate; such are a just Temper of our Body, a justly-proportion’d Configuration of its Parts, a healthful Soil, a sufficiency of Nourishment and Cloathing, and mutual Human Assistance, which yet all depend upon those Universal Causes. For the Rays of the Sun do daily produce such Alterations and Dispositions to productions of all kinds, in the Earth, the common Mother of all, in Plants and Animals, which are raised and nourished by her, and in the vital Blood of Man, drawn from the Juices of Plants and Animals, that all, who with moderate Attention search into the Causes of Things, must readily confess the Sun, above any other created Being, the most universal Cause of all those Changes so necessary to Life, which we experience in our-selves. Seeing therefore the Dependence of the Life of Man upon the moderate Influence of the Sun, is in some measure Analogous to the Dependence of Human Happiness upon the Divine Favour; it follows, “That the Necessity of procuring to our-selves God’s Favour by Benevolence or Universal Charity, (which comprehends all, both Religious Worship and Justice,) is taught by the same Reason, that teaches the necessity of inhabiting such Places as enjoy the benefit of the Sun’s Influence.” The same Reason likewise forbids “Rendering our-selves obnoxious to his Wrath by acts of Wickedness,” that forbids “Continuing in such Places, where those Assistances to our innate Heat cannot be had, which here we daily receive from the Sun,” or that teaches us, “To withdraw from those excessive Heats of Climates and Seasons, by which the Sun exhales and dissipates in too great a degree our Blood and vital Spirits.”

  2. Of the Air, compar’d to mutual human Offices.§XXXIV. But, leaving this part of the Comparison, as having no occasion to treat at large of Natural Theology, let us proceed to that other Branch of it, which is taken from the Air, which is so necessary to the Life of Man, that from thence I thought it proper to shadow out the Dependence of every particular Person upon the surrounding Multitude of other Men; and I shall insist the longer upon this Comparison, because hence may be illustrated the mutual Offices of Men, which I have chiefly undertaken to explain.

  How necessary Air is to the Life of Man, even the Vulgar, from Experience, readily acknowledge; and Philosophers have more plainly demonstrated by instructive Experiments, which they have found out. This has been prov’d by means of Animals endow’d with Blood, which immediately died in the Air-Pump (the Honourable Robert Boyle’s most ingenious Contrivance) upon the Air’s being exhausted.63 Dogs, dissected by the Learned Mr. Hook, testify the same; who after the Aspera Asteria was cut through below the Epiglottis, and the Ribs, Diaphragm and Pericardium were cut away, liv’d above an Hour by the help of fresh Air blown into the Lungs by the help of a pair of Bellows.64 It is therefore certain, in the Judgment of all, that the Air is one of the necessary Causes of Life, and that which is healthful is therefore every where sought; altho’ all its essential Properties, and the Manner of its acting upon us, be not yet fully discover’d. In like Manner (supposing many Men to exist together out of Civil Society, endow’d with natural Powers sufficient to assist, or to hinder one another from enjoying the Necessaries of Life, and consequently Life it-self, which is the soundest Part of Mr. Hobbes’s suppos’d State of Nature;) it is certain, “That they could not live out the Time appointed by Nature, unless they so far at least consented to one another’s Welfare, as to abstain from mutual Harms, and to permit to every one the Use of those Necessaries which Nature has produc’d”: This Agreement therefore is necessary almost in the same Manner as the Use of the Air is to Life, and includes some kind of Benevolence, greater certainly than Hobbes’s State of War; for it both regards the End of Benevolence, and, as it is a voluntary Act about Means naturally fit, regards their Use also. Nay, farther, every one will necessarily consider his own Powers, as able to contribute something to the Happiness of many, and will accordingly apply them to that purpose, when he perceives that by so doing he will not lessen, but rather enlarge his Power, his own Faculties being improv’d by Exercise, and new foreign Assistance gain’d, at least reasonably hop’d for, in Compensation; thus in this Agreement alone will be contain’d, not Innocence only, but Beneficence, which two make up both Tables of Universal Benevolence, and of the Law of Nature.

  For this Reason therefore, because such Agreement is necessary to every one, we ought always to endeavour, as much as possible, to obtain it from Men; tho’ we no more understand the inward Constitution of Men, than of the Air; nor can we foresee all that, whether Good, or Harm, which may arise from their Society: As in like Manner we are ignorant, what draught of Air is perfectly Healthful, and which will bring along with it a contagious Distemper; yet we know, that certain Death is the Consequence of Respiration stopt, but that the Continuance thereof is, for the most part, a vast advantage to Life.

  Farther; that Universal Influence of other Men upon every Man’s Happiness makes it requisite, “That we should be so diligent in procuring their favour, (wholly neglecting, or willingly provoking, no one) as never to suffer our-selves to be carried off from thence to other Methods of acquiring, and to particular or partial Causes of, Happiness, (for Example, Gain, Glory, or Pleasure;) tho’, in their proper Places,(due regard being had to the most general Causes,) they are not without their Use.” For no Man in his Senses will so throw himself into the Depth of the Sea, in pursuit of those most pretious Treasures, which lie scatter’d here and there, in the Bottom thereof, as to deprive himself of the necessary Use of Air, and, consequently, of Life it self. For they know it to be extremely foolish, to provide for only a few Occasions of Life, and, in the mean while, to neglect the whole of future Happiness, and the necessary Causes thereof, and, consequently, Life it-self. Wherefore, the same Reason, which instructs us to direct our Organs of Respiration, (which, in some measure, may be obstructed or excited at the command of our Will,) and the other voluntary Motions of our Body, that we may always, as far as in us lies, enjoy the Use of wholesome Air, will also teach us to regulate all our inward Affections, and outward Actions, that regard other Men, with that Humanity,65 that, to the utmost of our Power, we may cause them all to entertain and refresh us with their Benevolence, so Necessary to our Happiness.

  We are cautious, not to fill the Air of our Houses with noxious Steams and Vapours, but especially, that this perpetual Nourishment, both of our own Lives and that of others, may not be corrupted with Pestilential or other contagious Effluvia; which is a faint Resemblance of Innocence, and teaches the necessity thereof in all our Actions.

  The Air, which we have drawn into our Lungs, we immediately breathe back again; or, if a small Portion thereof be retain’d for some little time, for the refreshing our Blood and vital Spirits, it is afterwards, along with the Blood it-self and vital Spirits, as it were with Interest, restor’d by insensible Perspiration to the common Mass of Air; this reciprocal Natural Motion, which is intermixt with some what Voluntary, thus resembles Gratitude, and points out its Necessity for the Good of the Whole.

  And because, not only everyone’s Blood and vital Spirits are nourished by this Air, but that also a procreative Juice, subservient to the Continuation of the Species, is thence perfected by Organs appointed by Nature to that End, a limited care of our-selves and our Posterity, is by the same Method pointed out.

  Moreover; because the Powers of Man, recruited by Respiration, are naturally applicable to the Common Use of All;66 and the Air it self, which we breathe back out of our Lungs, is restor’d for the Common Good of All; we, by Respiration, shadow out some slight touches of Humanity. But this natural Action, so far as it is a Motion merely Mechanical, perform’d by Brutes and Men asleep, is only a mere Shadow of these Virtues: Yet this Shadow exactly represents all the particular Branches of Living-Virtue, and their mutual Connexion, with their Real Motions, or Effects; which will appear evidently to those, who compare what I have now said, with what I had before advanc’d concerning Actions necessary to the Common Good: And they will moreover be of opinion, that Virtue is nothing but an habitual Will to obey the Laws of Nature, which injoins Actions necessary to that End. But so far as Respiration itself, and other Acts common to Brutes, are guided in Man by Reason, if they are perform’d with a perpetual regard to the noblest End, the Common Good of the Kingdom of God, in which is included the Honour of God the Governor, and the Happiness of Men his Subjects, then at length these Actions become true Virtues; as Feasts and Fasts become religious Exercises, when they are observ’d to religious Purposes.

  Finally; not to be tedious in pursuing this Comparison, I will add this only, in which there seems to be a farther mutual Correspondence between them. “Altho’ the mutual Benevolence of Men and the free Use of the Air be General and Necessary Causes, the one of Life, the other of Happiness; yet neither is the Total, or” (to use a School-term) “the Adequate, Cause of the Effect;67 for many things beside are requisite to secure Life and Happiness, but nothing that can exclude these Causes; also the determinate Influence of neither to produce the desir’d Effect, is throughly known, and neither is intirely in the Power of those who need them”: Hence it is, that having taken all possible care about them, we are not therefore certain of obtaining the desir’d Effect, without the Concurrence of other Causes, which are not in our Power to influence. Yet this ought not to deter any one from the Pursuit of Virtue, or Universal Benevolence; because we see, that a Reason, in all respects alike, persuades no one to throw away the Care of breathing wholesome Air, and betake himself to places infected with such a deadly pestilential Contagion, that not one of a Million can escape thence with safety. Such an infected Air were like a State of War of each against all; and such a State necessarily follows, wheresoever the Common Good is not taken for the Rule of Action, but every one proposes to himself his own Good only, as the End of all his own Actions, and the Measure of all other Mens.

  (The Evils which happen to the Good, prove only all Degrees of Happiness not to be in our Power, whereas all that are, are to be obtain’d by Virtue only.)This only can be inferr’d from those Evils, which sometimes happen to the Followers of Virtue, “That all degrees of Happiness cannot always be obtain’d by our whole Power, even when perfectly regulated by the best Moral Precepts.” It is, however, certain, “That by obeying them we shall do every thing that is in our Power, to procure the Happiness of Life,” which is all that Morality, or practical right Reason, undertakes to perform. And hence we shall reap this Advantage, “That we shall most surely escape numberless Calamities, which many bring upon themselves by their Vices, and by Patience surmount those we cannot avoid.” Mean-while we enjoy a sound and serene Mind in Fortitude and Tranquillity, which, thro’ a most pleasing Reflexion upon good Actions, will render us Happy in present Joy, and the Hope of a future Reward. Whereas, on the contrary, they who, neglecting the Pursuit of the Common Good, slight the Favour of God and Men, in neglecting the principal Causes upon which, both their Being and Happiness necessarily depend, wittingly undermine the Foundations of their own Happiness, and convert that Friendship, which they themselves know to be necessary to them, into most deserved Hatred. Whence they must unavoidably dread Punishment, and when they perceive inevitable Evils coming upon them, acknowledge themselves the Authors of their own Calamities, and upbraid themselves with most shameful Folly, that they would live to themselves alone, who were by no means self-sufficient.

  From hence inferr’d, That we can never, with impunity, neglect God or Men in our pursuit of Happiness.§XXXV. I have thus far treated of these Things, only to shew; “That the most useful Precept concerning Method, That we ought to form Conclusions Universal, as well as True, concerning Universals,68 takes place also in the Rules of Human Practice,” (which lay down the Art of procuring Happiness;) “and that, therefore, the Universal Causes thereof” (God, and Men, or the Aid of Rational Agents) “ought universally to be regarded, and their Favour sought, at all times, in every place, &c. never wholly neglected, much less provoked; which will certainly be the Case, if in any Circumstances, tho’ in private, or but seldom, any thing be committed in prejudice of the Publick Good.” The Pleasure in Vice is but of momentary Duration; but Injuries committed against God, or Men, endure for ever. Tenacious is the Memory of the Sinner himself, which both upbraids him with his Crime, and often betrays him against his Will: Tenacious also is the Memory of those, whom the Infringer of the Publick Good has offended; which, if there be no present opportunity, may minister to future Revenge, or commit the Retaliation to late Posterity. But above all, God is not forgetful of Crimes, even when he defers Punishment. From these Considerations, and others, which are obvious to every one, we may conclude, “That Reason, duly considering all the necessary Causes of Human Happiness, can never pronounce, That any Thing can be committed against the Common Good by any one, without lessening those Causes, and, consequently, destroying some part of his own Happiness.”

  Let us now shew, “That from the foresight of this Penalty on the one hand, and a probable Expectation of Retribution on the other, Men may know their Obligation to do nothing prejudicial to the Common Good; but, on the contrary, to endeavour to deserve the Favour of Others by all kind of Benevolence.” Whence will be deduced their Obligation to exercise all Acts of Virtue, (which are only Universal Benevolence variously diversified;) and to shun all Vices, whose Nature cannot be unknown, when the Virtues are known. For, since the avoiding such Punishments, and the obtaining such Rewards, are contained in the essential Idea of that Happiness Nature lays us under the necessity of seeking; as being a Collection of every Good, which we can obtain: All acknowledge, that Motives, or Arguments to inforce the Observance of Laws, may be drawn from hence. But the intrinsick Force69of all those Arguments, with which the Legislator (God) uses to enforce Universal Benevolence, is, in my opinion, all that is meant by the Obligation of Laws: The Rewards annext to Universal Benevolence by the right Reason of Men, chiefly oblige, because they promise, beside the Favour of Man, the Friendship of the Chief of Rational Beings, God, the Supreme Governour of the World. The Punishments they inflict by the same Reason, are both Parts of the present, and most certain presages of the future, Divine Vengeance. For Right Reason in God cannot differ from the same in Men: Which that saying of Cicero (1. de Legibus) shews to have been well enough known by the Light of Nature, where he thus expresses himself with respect to God, “That to whom Reason is common, Right Reason is common.”70 Nor can I conceive any thing, which could bind the Mind of Man with any Necessity, (in which Justinian’s Definition places the Force of Obligation,71 ) except Arguments proving, that Good or Evil will proceed from our Actions; of which since the greatest is the Favour or the Wrath of God, their Connexion with our Actions sufficiently shews, what it is which his Authority commands, where in consists the true Nature of Obligation.

  It is however necessary to remember, “That all those things, Good or Evil, which, at the Divine Appointment, are evidently connected, in the Nature of Things, with such free Actions as respect either the Common Good or Hurt, are to be esteem’d Rewards, or Punishments”: Whether that Connexion be immediate, as when any Action, honourable to God, or beneficial to Men, is perform’d, it carries with it its own Reward, by that inward Pleasure, which every one experiences upon such occasions: (Let us take, for Instance, useful Contemplations, or Acts of Love towards God, or Man; or, on the other hand, Envious, Wrathful, or Malicious Dispositions, which are immediately connected with uneasiness and anxiety of Mind:) Or, if the Connexion be not immediate, when a Series of Causes, whether necessary, or free, intervenes between our Actions and the Good, or Evil, that follows them; thus, by the appointment of Rational Beings, (God or Men,) are Positive Rewards or Punishments connected with human Actions. That God will distribute such after this Life, the natural Reason, even of those who wish the contrary, is throughly sensible.

  But it ought to be our principal Care, “Not to take our measure of the Sanction of the Law of Nature, only from the outward and contingent Rewards and Punishments of this Life.” For this would be, to neglect the greatest Evidences of its Obligation, whence the step would be easy, to slight the Law it-self; and, if we did any good, only from the Hope or Fear of these Advantages or Disadvantages, it were the sign of an abject and mercenary Spirit. But, if you seek also that internal Reward with which the Mind is bless’d, and the everlasting Favour of God, while you co-operate with him in promoting the Publick Good; there can never be hence wanting to you a sufficient Spur to Virtue, and you shall avoid all Suspicion of Mean-Spiritedness.

  These following are certainly honourable Rewards, always connected with the Practice of Virtue.

  1. A fuller Knowledge of God and Men, the most noble Causes, not of your Happiness alone, but of the Common Happiness of all Rational Beings. And whilst you study to do things acceptable to God and Men, upon whom we depend, you will perceive, that you draw every Virtue from the Sourses of the Being, Preservation, and Perfection of Human Nature, which can never be exhausted.

  2. The Conformity of our Nature with the Divine, consisting in an imitation of the Divine Goodness, conspicuous in his Providence over all his Subjects.

  3. The Dominion of your Reason over your Passions, and all your voluntary Motions. It is hence evident, that Piety and Justice,(which consist in what I have been just laying down,) their Improvements and immediate Effects, (that Joy and Tranquillity, which arise from an inward Sense of them,) are the principal Part of the Reward of Virtue. Thus may the Opinion of the Stoicks and others, who would have Virtue sought for its own sake, be reconcil’d to Truth.72 For this Reward I acknowledge to be so intimately connected with it, as to be inseparable from it by any Misfortune whatsoever. But, because this Reward may be distinguish’d, in Thought at least, from Virtue, and is proper to it, and may be foreseen as a Reward, it seem’d necessary to consider it under the Notion of a Sanction annex’d to that Practical Dictate of Reason, which prescribes the Pursuit of the Common Good, (or the Practice of all manner of Virtues;) and by this particular Mark this Dictate is distinguish’d from all other Practical ones, which are true indeed, but not necessary to be observ’d by all. Such are the Propositions about the Solution of Arithmetical and Geometrical Problems, which are not Universal Laws, because they want such a Sanction. For a Law is a practical Proposition concerningthe Prosecution of the Common Good, guarded by the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments.

  Lastly, The Reader may observe, That I do not deduce the Obligation of Laws, from this kind of Sanction, (I have assign’d, another efficient Cause, another End, far greater;73 ) I explain only that part of the Definition, which affects the Necessity of such pursuit of the Common Good, in order to the Private Happiness of every particular Person; from which Necessity it is, that Actions commanded by the Laws are calld Necessary. An absolute Necessity cannot here be understood, such as is in Mechanical Motions, but relative and upon supposition, with respect to some effect, if we would produce it. In that most Universal Law, which I chiefly consider, concerning the pursuit of the most General Good, the Honour of God join’d with the Happiness of Men, it is evident, that the Action commanded, is not necessary to any superior or greater Effect, since no such there either is, or can be. It is also manifest, that, if this Pursuit be said to be necessary to the producing this very Effect, the Proposition will be Identical,74 and will propose no incitement to Action; therefore the Pursuit or Production of this Effect (as far as we are able) is to be look’d on as necessary to some lesser Effect thence depending; that is, in order to procure, by the Assistance of all Causes, our own Happiness, which we are justly suppos’d to desire. The Proposition, understood so, does most powerfully excite to Action. However, I most readily acknowledge, that, after this Obligation is made known to us from the Effects, as above, it is much confirm’d by considering the Efficient Cause from which I have deduc’d it, that is the Will of the First Cause. For it is thence certain, both that the infinite Wisdom of God has approv’d of those Laws and their Sanction, and that all the Divine Perfections conspire to the same Effect. For there can never be any Disagreement between the Will of God and his other Perfections. Wherefore, these all will encourage Men to hope for greater Rewards, and will afford sure Presages of greater Punishments, to confirm the Sanction of these Laws, and the necessity of Obedience.

  The Cause of Mens not observing the Laws of Nature;The Original, as well of all Ignorance about the Law of Nature, as of Negligence in observing them, seems to me to be this, “That most Men do not sufficiently consider, either what are the genuine Parts of their own and others Happiness, and what Proportion there may be between them, so as to understand, which contains in it more, which less, Good; or that afterwards they do not consider their genuine Causes, and which Cause contributes more, and which less, to this End, or Effect.” Hobbes’s Principles, according to which he thinks Men should govern themselves in the State of Nature, are faulty in both respects, both, because they propose an End too mean, the Preservation of Life and Limbs, neglecting the Perfections of the Mind, and hope of Immortality: And, because he alledges, “That the Power of Rational Causes (God and Men) to restrain all Invasion of Right, is ineffectual, without the Declaration of the supreme Civil Authority.” Whereas, tho’ I willingly acknowledge, that they are much strengthen’d by Civil Society, yet I affirm, “That, supposing no Civil Government were erected, there is no necessity to pursue our own Happiness, by first invading others, either by Force or Fraud, that is, by entering into a State of War; but that there is reason abundantly sufficient, arising from the Nature of God and Men, why we should rather be desirous to solicit all Rational Beings, by Universal Benevolence, and, consequently, by all manner of Virtue, to Peace, Benevolence, and lastly, to Society, both Civil and Sacred.”

  Two Objections against the foregoing Notion of Moral Obligation, propos’d.§XXXVI. Having explain’d, as briefly as I could, the Substance of my Opinion, concerning the Nature and Original of Natural Obligation, I thought it necessary to obviate two Scruples, which might disturb Minds of the better sort. 1. That the Punishments of Vice seem uncertain, and the Rewards of Virtue not well enough known, so as to be sufficient Declarations of Natural Obligation, and the Will of the First Cause. 2. That according to this Opinion it might seem, that the Common Good is postpon’d and subordinate to the Private Happiness of every particular Person.75 I shall shew, that my Opinion is liable to neither of these Objections.

  Object. I. The Rewards and Punishments of the Law of Nature are too uncertain.As to the First, which suggests the Uncertainty of the Connexion of Rewards and Punishments with Actions publickly useful or hurtful, I make the following Reply. Let us begin with the Connexion of Punishment with Wickedness, of which we shall treat more at large, because it is the more difficult affair, and what respects the Reward of good Actions may thence be easily judg’d of.

  Answer. Not so; The Punishments not uncertain, for(1.) Altho’ some wicked Actions may escape some kind of Punishment, that is, such as is inflicted by Man, yet even these Crimes do not wholly go unpunished; and, therefore, there is not wanting an Obligation arising from the consideration of this Punishment, which cannot be avoided. For it is impossible to separate from the Crime all degrees of Anxiety of Mind, arising from the struggle between the so under Dictates of Reason, which enforce our Duty,1. Struggles of Conscience, Fears of Divine and Human Punishment, Greater Corruption, Tortures of Envy and Malice, are Unavoidable Punishments of Wickedness. and those rash Follies which hurry Men on to Wickedness: There likewise ensue Fears (which cause present Grief) of Vengeance, both Divine and Human, and an Inclination to the same Crimes, or even worse; which, because it hurts the Faculties of the Mind, seems to me that it ought to be also reckon’d among Punishments: Even the very Malice and Envy, which are essential to every Invasion of another’s Right, do necessarily and naturally torture every malevolent Mind; and so the wicked Man drinks deep of the poyson’d Draught of his own Mixture.76

  (2.) Whoever will prudently consider, what he has done, or is about to do, to the Prejudice of others, must of necessity consider and estimate those Punishments,II. The Expectation of contingent Evils is equal to a present Evil, and may therefore in Reason be esteem’d a certain Punishment; for the Mind of Man cannot avoid expecting many contingent Evils, as Consequences of his Evil Actions; for which are not the certain, but the contingent only and probable, Consequences of bad Actions. Seeing therefore I have already prov’d, “That the Chance of a future contingent Evil is of a determinate present Value”; it follows, “That such Evil, (which, in as much as it may be inflicted with the Approbation, at least, of the Supreme Governour of the World, is to be look’d upon as a Divine Punishment,) is an Argument made use of by Him, to persuade his Subjects, not to expose themselves to so great Danger, for the sake of any Advantage, which may accrue from injuring another; and, therefore, certainly obliges all those, who weigh, as Reason directs, every Impediment of their Happiness.” This Consequence is sufficiently plain, from what I have already laid down, concerning the nature of Obligation.

  I am now briefly to shew, “That the Consider ation of Human Actions hurtful to other Rational Beings, necessarily leads the Mind of Man to the Prospect of great Danger from that Punishment, which there is the greatest reason imaginable to fear, tho’ we cannot certainly foresee, what the Event will be.” This will be evident from what follows.

  In the first place it is manifest, “That all Human Actions hurtful to others, as such, have in them the Force of a meritorious Cause, sufficient to incite every other Rational Agent,(1.) they deserve, and incite to, Punishment. those especially who have been Sufferers by them, to restrain by Punishments, to the utmost of their Power, those who have injur’d other innocent Persons.” This inciting, impulsive, Force is not Fictitious and Imaginary, but altogether as Real, as any Impulse from external Objects upon our Senses. I confess, this impulsive Force alone is not sufficient to inflict Punishment on the Off enders, and, therefore, Punishment does not always follow such Incitement, such Provocation to it: But, because whoever would act reasonably, must consider the Force, and all the Effects of his Actions, but principally, how far they may influence other Rational Beings, in defence of the Common Good, to punish, or not, I thought fit to make this Observation. Desert is justly reckon’d among, and joined with, partial, assisting Causes, such as Invitation of Objects, the Temptation of Opportunity, the Authority of an Adviser, or Persuader; and, therefore, ought not to be neglected, because our Mind is hence led to consider, “That the Efficacy of our own Actions may be join’d with that of many other Causes, in the Production of great Effects, which could not be hoped for, from any or all of those Causes, singly or separately consider’d.” And for this Reason that Paradox, which I just now advanc’d, is most true, “That whoever will consider, in such manner as Prudence directs, our noxious Actions, must, of necessity, take into consideration those probable Punishments, which the Concurrence of external Causes renders not necessary indeed, only contingent.” It is certain, that by Innocence we shall not pull Mischief down upon our own head: By Injuries we give being, at least to one, and that the first Cause of our Destruction;77 we lay down a Motive, an Incitement, to others to contribute to that Effect. And how probable their Concurrence is, we may conclude from what follows. I must first add a few Remarks concerning other Effects of wicked Actions, which render their Punishment more certain.

  (2.) They are infinitely Productive of other evil Actions, prejudicial to both Publick and Private Happiness.§XXXVII. It is in the second place certain, “That every Action proceeding from Malevolence towards others, has a natural endless Tendency to produce other Malevolent Actions of the like kind, thwarting the Common Happiness, and consequently diminishing that of the Malevolent Person himself,” (which upon many accounts depends upon the Common Good:) Partly, because it paves the way to evil Habits, and a corruption of Manners: Partly, because it lays him under a sort of Necessity, to defend one Wickedness by another; what is begun by Fraud and Covertly, comes to be finish’d by Force and open Violence: Partly also, because the contagious Example infects others far and wide. And it is evident, “That, the more Malevolence gains ground, the more openly all things tend to a State of War, which is but too productive of severe Punishments, and threatens Destruction, not less certain to the Leader in Wickedness, than dreadful to all.”

  (Mr. Hobbes’s Acknowledgment of the Calamities consequent from his State of War, employ’d to overturn his Method of deducing the Laws of Nature.)Altho’, therefore, the Fear of a War of each against all, on all sides Just, be wholly Vain, as being what, I have already prov’d, can never happen; yet any One, suppos’d to live out of Civil Society, may with the greatest reason fear to raise up by his own Wickedness, and unite against himself in a just War, the Forces of many, either to preserve their own Property, or to take Vengeance for Injuries offered. He may also fear the overwhelming his Confederates with himself, (if perhaps he has drawn over many to his Defense,) in the Calamities of an unjust War. Nay, if he chances to come off Conqueror, which is more than he had reason to expect from the Justice of his Cause, he has reason to fear, lest his prosperous Wickedness stir up Others, in hopes of the like Success, in like manner to invade his Rights. We may most evidently perceive, both from the consideration of Human Nature, and from the observation of those things which pass daily among bordering Nations, that Wars may draw their Original from such like Causes as these. It is likewise evident, that these Wars are no less prejudicial to the preservation of particular Persons, than if they owed their Original to Hobbes’s fictitious Right of every Man to every Thing. Wherefore, when he contends, “That the Calamities of his State of War affords, not only a sufficient, but a necessary, Reason, to incline all Men every where, laying down the Arms they had taken up, to submit themselves to Absolute Government, and to whatever Laws their Governours please to impose upon them”;78 he will be inconsistent with him-self, if he will not allow, from a Parity of Reason, “That a Prospect of a War no less dangerous, which may arise from the Invasion of the Rights of Others, or from any kind of Wickedness, may be a sufficient Motive to the same Men, to abstain from unjust Actions, or such as oppose the Common Good, and mutually to cultivate, from the beginning, Peace, and all its friendly Offices, towards one another; and, consequently, never to attempt that War, which he dreams of, of each against all.” For it is a most evident Dictate of right Reason, “That the same Evils of War, certainly foreseen, are sufficient to deter Men from entering into War, which are able to dissuade them from continuing War already begun.”

  If “These pernicious Effects of unjust Actions, which recoil upon the guilty Person, are understood to be necessarily connected with the Guilt, by Virtue of that Order among all Things, which the First Cause, and Supreme Governour of the World has appointed,” they are justly to be look’d upon as Punishments appointed by God. And “That Proposition, which, according to the determination of the Nature of Things, (and consequently of the Author of Nature,) pronounces that Action, not to be Good, or Eligible, which at once both hurts Others, and pulls down Mischief upon our own head,” will be a Law of Nature, sufficiently discoveringit-self to be such by these Characters, 1. That the subject Matter thereof are Actions of Publick Mischief or Advantage (the proper Subject of Laws); 2. That it has a Sanction, a Punishment, annex’d by the Supreme Governour of the World.

  I agree with Hobbes, “That the Prospect of the Evils of War may conduce much, to the causing Men mutually to perform toward one another the Offices of Peace, by the exercise of all kinds of Virtues”; but I do not allow, as he has done (de Cive, C. 1. §. 10.) “That every Man has a Right of waging War, in order to support his Claim to every Thing.”79 I consider only the Possibility and the Consequences of a War, just on one side, unjust on the other. Before I would venture to affirm any thing, concerning the Right to do any Action, especially to wage War, I first consider, what Things are necessary to necessary Ends, and thereby settle the Nature of Property: I acknowledge the Nature of Things has immutably determin’d, what Things are necessary: I have shewn, “That, not those Things only are naturally determin’d, which are necessary to particular Persons singly considered, but those also, which are necessary to many, or even to all, jointly consider’d”: Moreover, I have by the way demonstrated, “That those Propositions which truly, that is, agreeably to the determination of Nature, declare, what kind of Human Actions are necessary to the Common Good of Mankind, and what are inconsistent with that End, are Laws of Nature”; I have collected the Sum of them into one general Proposition, and have reduc’d to a few Heads the particular Precepts enjoined thereby; and, in these particulars, I have sufficiently differ’d from Hobbes. And now, when I treat of Obligation, which is the proper Effect of Laws, and becomes known to our Senses by the Rewards and Punishments consequent upon the Observance and Violation of those Laws, and is, therefore, a proper Evidence, that they are Laws; I may assume what Hobbes himself has with reason granted, provided I take care to avoid the many Errors he has intermixt therewith. But that I have sufficiently taken care of, both by what I have but now said, and by maintaining, “That this just War, of which I now treat, is the Effect of the Laws of Nature, and of the Nature of Rational Agents acquainted with those Laws, which, in order to defend Themselves and their Property, and to restrain Aggressors, will have recourse to Arms, which are therefore just, because they are in this Case necessary Means to the Common Good.” Whereas Mr. Hobbes supposes, “A War just on all Sides, both of the Invader and Resister, before the Laws of Nature, upon which Justice is founded, are established; their business being,” as he endeavours to prove, “To propose the Means necessary to avoid this War, which,” according to his Doctrine, “Is at the same time just on all Sides, and destructive to All.”80 But of this elsewhere.

  He, who, by invading another’s Property, commences an unjust War, has no Prospect of any Advantage equal to Life, the Loss of which he hazards in the Quarrel.§XXXVIII. It is sufficient for our present Purpose, what, I believe, no Man in his wits will deny, “That any Invasion of another’s Property does naturally tend much to the stirring up Strife and kindling War”: And, “That right Reason dictates this to every Man, that greater Damage is to be apprehended from this open’d Sluice of all Evils, than can be compensated by the hope of the trifling Advantage, which can be procur’d by the Injury, especially in that State, where no Civil Government is suppos’d, which might restrain Anger and Revenge within some bounds; and where one Contention may breed others without end; and the least Strife may bring Life in danger.” It is most certain, “That as soon as a Duel is commenc’d upon an equal foot, where each of the two has an equal Hazard of Life and Death, the Hope of the Life of each becomes but of half its former Value.” As if any One should hold close twenty Shillings in one Hand, in the other, nothing; and should give his Choice to a Person ignorant of what was done, to take what was contain’d in which Hand he pleas’d; it is certain, that such a Gift, or the Hope there of, before the Choice made, is worth ten Shillings, that is, half the whole Sum exposed to Hazard, which in this Case is, as it were, in an even uncertain Balance. And, for this reason, it is likewise certain, “That Reason, rightly weighing Things, would not permit any One to throw his Life into such Hazard,” (altho’ our Lives were as much at our own disposal, as the Money in our pockets,) “Except for the Gain of that, the uncertain Hope whereof is equal to half the Value of our Life”; or, which comes to the same thing, “For the sake of that, whose certain Gain is worth the certain Loss of Life.” The Invader of another’s Property has scarce a certainty of gaining any thing to compensate so great a Hazard, so great a Loss. The Life of the Conquered vanishes into Air, wholly useless to the Conqueror. Those Goods, which, because they were really necessary to him he called his, will not be in like manner necessary to the Conqueror, nor will they therefore, in this State, become his Property. For I justly suppose, “In a State where all Things are in Common, both that Nature has liberally afforded as much as is necessary to every particular Person, where human Industry has not been wanting, and that those Things which are truly necessary to any one, are not likewise necessary to any other.” The latter is a Consequence of the former. But the certain Acquisition of those Things, which before were not, nor do now become, necessary by the Death of the conquer’d Person, is not of so great Value, as that it ought to be purchas’d by the certain Loss of Life. But, after the Victory, in that State of Community which Hobbes supposes, they will still remain Common to all; so that, beside the Hazard of Revenge which may be taken by Others, there accrues nothing to the Conqueror.

  (Hobbes’s Prospect of Security by preventing others by Force or Fraud, in a State of Nature, is absurd.)That Security, which, according to Hobbes, is gain’d, in this State, by preventing others, either by Force or Fraud, is either of no Value, or, at least, not of so great.81 For, in our Deliberation, whether we shall invade others, and give them a just Cause of War, or no, they are of necessity suppos’d Innocent, and such as would not take Arms, unless they were forced by an Attempt to deprive them of Necessaries, or, at least, have not as yet had recourse to Arms: But, where there is no reason for Fear, Security ought not to be purchas’d at the Hazard of Life. Much less would any Man in his senses think a War against all, a way to secure himself.

  In this Inquiry, concerning the Obligation of the Laws of Nature, and the Prospect of Punishments to be apprehended from violating them by Invasion of another’s Right, I have affirm’d Men are necessarily suppos’d Innocent: both, because we allow, that it is lawful to punish the Guilty by the Loss of Goods, or of Life it-self; and, because it is a mad Rashness to suppose Men, who have shew’d no Signs of Malevolence towards us, entertain a Will to hurt us, and, for that reason, either by Force, or Fraud, to set upon and kill them, that we may be secure from them, which yet is the Sum of Natural Right, according to Hobbes; and also, because I think it may be collected from Hobbes’s Hypothesis, tho’ he often contradicts it. For he supposes, in his State of Nature, several Persons as rais’d out of the Earth at the same Time, and of full Growth, C. 8. §. 1.82 I ask, Does right Reason dictate to these, as soon as they come in sight of one another, that they should mutually cultivate the Offices of Peace, that is, behave themselves Benevolently, Faithfully, and Gratefully; or that they should rather rush into a War of every Man against every Man? Is their State, when they have not as yet done, or determin’d to do, to one another, either Good or Harm, that of Peace or War? I affirm it to be Peace, and that all Men are as yet to be look’d upon as Innocent, and that Reason dictates, that they should preserve this Peace, by trusting others, and faithfully discharging the Trust that is repos’d in themselves, by Gratitude and Beneficence in their external Actions: And that, partly, because such Actions are in their own Nature most pleasant, and in some measure bring their own Reward along with them; whereas the contrary Actions, as they are necessarily accompanied with Hatred and Envy, so they are inseparable from Grief, which is essentially connected with those Affections; which was my first Reason:83Partly, because whoever is Malevolent towards others, and denies to them their reasonable Demands, hazards the engaging himself in a War, whose Consequences, I am sure, are very Penal; which is my second Reason,84 which I now handle. What is more, since Hobbes acknowledges, that it is the first Law of Nature in the State of Nature, “That Peace is to be sought after”;85 and likewise teaches, “That Right is natural Liberty left by the Laws,”86 it necessarily follows, “That Man in this State has no Right to act contrary to the Law of Nature, by rushing into War, before it appears, that he cannot enjoy Peace; or by arrogating to himself a Right to all Things, since the Law of Nature forbids a Man to exercise such a Right, even tho’ he were supposed once to have had it,” both which Hobbes hath taught.87 His Subterfuge, sought from thence, “That these Laws do not oblige to external Acts for want of Security,” is elsewhere by me examin’d;88 here I affirm only thus much, “That they have no obligatory Force, and, consequently, that they have nothing in them of the Nature of Laws, if they respect not external Actions.” Because it is impossible to cultivate Peace with others, or to depart from one’s Right, by any internal Action; for these are transient Actions in their own Nature, that is, they have a relation to Men without us. But, if he answer, “That these are improperly call’d Laws,” as he insinuates (De Cive. C. 3. §. 33.) I thus reply, “That those Arguments which I have already advanc’d, and which I shall presently offer, do prove them properly Laws.” However, with respect to Hobbes, this is a necessary Consequence; if there be no Laws, properly so called, in a State of Nature, there are no Rights, properly so called; hence this Right, suppos’d by him, of every Man to every Thing, and to wage War with all, are improperly Rights, and improper Foundations of Morality and Politicks. For they are not more properly Rights, than they are the Concessions of Laws properly so call’d; nor are there any other Laws in that State, beside those of Nature. Wherefore, if the Laws of Nature are not properly Laws, neither are the Rights of Nature properly Rights;89 and Hobbes, when he lays these down as the Principles of Moral Philosophy and Politicks, is but improperly a Philosopher, improperly a Polititian; and all these Conclusions, which depend upon these Premises, and which Hobbes would pass upon the World for strict Demonstrations, are but improperly demonstrated.

  3. Reason inclines God and Men to punish all Acts of Malevolence.§XXXIX. But these Contradictions are tedious. Let us, therefore, proceed to the third Reason, on account whereof the Transgressors of the Laws of Nature may justly fear Punishment. This is taken from that Rational Nature, which is common to God with Men, and which is the immediate Cause of inflicting Punishment: Of which thus much is certain, whence every Man cannot but presage to himself what will follow.

  It is certain, “That right Reason (and consequently the Divine) declares it to be a necessary Means in order to the Common Good, that Punishments be appointed to such Human Actions as are inconsistent with it, the Sharpness and reasonable Fear of which may restrain the Malevolent.” Whence it is manifest, “That right Reason licenses the punishing such, and that they are, therefore, liable to Punishment, whensoever others have it in their Inclination and Power to inflict it.”

  It is, moreover, certain, “That all who have the Common Good at heart” (in the Number of which are God and all good Men), “and all beside, whose Interest it is, that no-one’s Rights should be invaded” (under which are compriz’d almost all, even bad, Men), “are actually willing to inflict Punishments upon those, whom they have found, either to have perpetrated such Actions, or even to have discover’d an Inclination to have perpetrated them.”

  What is more; altho’ the Will, both of God and Men, sometimes leaves room for Pardon, it is, nevertheless, certain, “That Reason so far every where takes place, with respect to the Common Good,” (because it is every one’s Interest, that it should be sufficiently secur’d,)“that there should never be given so great Incouragement to hope for Pardon, but that it may appear plainly, that it were better, not to transgress, and not to stand in need of Pardon.” For the Reason of all does inviolably require, “That such Actions as are inconsistent with the Common Good of all, should be guarded against by such Punishments as are sufficient to secure it, and that no Punishments are sufficient, if there remains a greater Probability of Pardon than Punishment.”90 Hence Reason dictates it as necessary, “That all hope of escaping Punishment should be much outweigh’d, partly by the frequency of the Punishments, partly by their sharpness”: For a small Difference between the causes of Fear and Hope will be scarcely discernible. It is necessary, “That the prospect of Impunity should be taken away, rather by the frequency than the sharpness of such Punishments as are actually inflicted”: Because, by this Method, a proportion between Crimes and their Punishments will be better observ’d, and there will be no room left for that Complaint, “That the Punishments of some are unjustly enhanc’d, on purpose that others, guilty of the like Crimes, should escape unpunish’d”: Lastly, because nothing can be inflicted by Man beyond Death; but Death, tho’ it were certain, seems not to me to be a sufficient Punishment for their Crimes, who have bereav’d of Life many, or such as were greatly serviceable to the Publick, and have, beside, put them to horrid tortures: Common Reason would forsake its office, that is, would act contrary to Reason, if it should neglect such things; and Men, unless they punish’d them, would, by the prospect of Advantage arising from unpunish’d Crimes, as it were hire the Wicked to injure them.

  But, if it be doubted, not whether Rational Agents will, but whether they can, apprehend and punish those that transgress against the Common Good, it immediately occurs, “That nothing can shun the Divine Knowledge and Power.” Nor is it to be doubted, but that the Will of God inclines to do that, which right, and consequently, the Divine Reason has determin’d to be necessary to the chief End.

  It were easy to prove, with respect to Men, whilst they are consider’d as out of a State of Civil Society, in a State of Equality, according to Hobbes’s Hypothesis, since in that case none could claim a Property except in things necessary to him-self,91 “That there would be room for fewer Crimes, and that they could be more easily discover’d, and punish’d without difficulty; especially, if several should mutually agree to restrain the Malevolent, whose Wickedness would, in this case, be look’d upon as equally dangerous to all.”

  Since, therefore, it is the Interest of all, that they who oppose the Common Good, by violating the Laws of Nature, should be punish’d; since Nature has endow’d Men with an eminent Sagacity, beyond other Animals, by which they may discover latent Criminals; and does also strongly spur on all with a desire of Glory, (of which other Animals are insensible,) to restrain the common Enemies; then are there the greatest Reasons to fear Punishments, and but very small Hope of avoiding them.

  Neither are the Rewards, or positive Advantages of pursuing the Common Good, uncertain.§XL. I am weary with insisting so long upon the Proofs of Obligation, taken from Punishment or the Hazard thereof; especially, because those Advantages or Rewards, which are connected with the pursuit of the Common Happiness, (altho’ they are not generally reckon’d among the essential Ingredients of a Law, and Proofs of Obligation;) yet to me seem clearer and prior Proofs of the Divine Will, than the Punishments most certainly consequent upon the contrary; and these come now under our Consideration. I suppose here, as before, “That all Connexion or Concatenation between Causes and their Effects, in Nature, proceeds from the Will of the First Cause.” For the same Reason, which proves the Things themselves to have been made by a First Cause, demonstrates all the Order or natural Connexion among them, to proceed from the same Cause. For which Reason, even here, where it is disputed, “whether it is the Will of the First Cause or no, to govern the World by the Practical Dictates of Reason, or Natural Laws,” it may be taken for granted, “That both the good and bad Effects of Human Actions are always in consequence of the Will of the First Cause.”

  This prov’d by shewing, 1. That greater Advantages follow Virtue, than what can, with Reason, be expected from the contrary Practice.Two things are here briefly to be consider’d. I am to prove from the known Order of Nature, 1. “That Advantages follow such Actions, and those so great, that we cannot with reason hope for equal from the opposite Vices.” 2. “That the so obtaining these Advantages; is a sufficient Natural Discovery of the Divine Will’s commanding such Actions.”92 Nor will it be necessary here to use many words, because what would here be pertinent, may easily be collected from what I have laid down concerning Punishments, as from Opposites parallel’d or compar’d together.

  (1.) Security from the foregoing Punishments.In the first place, therefore, I reckon among these Advantages, “A Security from pulling down those Mischiefs, which we shall otherwise bring upon our-selves, which I have just now prov’d, most frequently to fall upon the Wicked”; nor need they be repeated here. Only this I think fit to add, “That the shunning and fear of Evil does in the same manner express the pursuit and acquisition of Good, as two Negatives make an Affirmative.”93 For Evil denotes the want of that Good, which Naturerequires, and the shunning of that is in reality the pursuit of Good, which is only therefore express’d by the avoiding Evil, because, tho’ most are not sufficiently careful of those Good things which they Enjoy; yet they are strongly excited to pursue, or defend them, when they either feel or fear the Loss of them. However, tho’ such negative Ideas, and Words denoting them, be in use among Men, yet that which compells them to act, is really a positive Good, the procuring, or continuing whereof is hop’d for, from the removal of the contrary Causes. Privations and Negations do not move the Will of Man; nor does it upon any other account chuse to avoid Evil, than as that implies the Preservation of some Good. Whatever Force is usually attributed to Punishments, or Natural Evils, in exciting Men to avoid them, that is wholly to be resolv’d into the attractive Influence of those Advantages, of which they would be depriv’d by Punishments, or Evils. All those things, which are said to be done for fear of Death, or of Poverty, would more properly and Philosophically be said, to proceed from the love of Life, or of Riches. Death could not take place, had not Life preceded; nor could that be fear d, except this were first desir’d. The Reason is the same in all Evils, and, therefore, in all voluntary Actions, the Love or Pursuit of Good necessarily precedes the shunning Evil. Every Motion, indeed, is promiscuously denominated, sometimes from the Point whence the Motion begins, sometimes from that toward which it tends; yet, certainly, it is distinguish’d, or receives the most perfect Limitation of its Nature, from that Point toward which it tends. In voluntary Motions there is a particular Reason, why they should rather be denominated from Good, for they not only tend to Good, but are first excited by it.

  The first Reason of my making this Remark, is, “To oppose that Assertion of Epicurus, which places the chief Pleasure, (which with him is the chief Good and End,) in the absence of Pain”:94 A-kin to which seems the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes, who asserts, “That Men seek Society from their fear of Evil”; whereas the hope, at least, of Good thence arising is easily perceiv’d; nor can any greater Good be requir’d in this State of Human Affairs, than what Society affords, since that Dominion of each over all, which Hobbes imagines to afford a Good, greater than that of Society, is evidently impossible. See de Cive, C. 1. §. 2.95

  The next Reason, and, indeed, the principal One, of my making this Remark, was, to evince, “That the Proofs of Obligation, drawn from the Advantages and Rewards, which are the Effects of pursuing the Common Good, have altogether the same Force with those, which are usually taken from Punishments”; tho’ the Common Herd of Mankind, in their confus’d way of Thinking, are more sensible of these. If any one were desirous to form a distinct Idea of the Force of Punishments, I am of opinion, that it must be reduced to the natural desire of preserving and increasing our Happiness. For, as such speculative Conclusions as are demonstrated by a Reduction to that which is Absurd, or Impossible, from the supposition of the contrary, may much better and more naturally be deduc’d directly from Definitions, or the Properties thence arising: So also Practical Conclusions, which would determine us to act in a certain manner, because of Evils following from the contrary Actions, are much better prov’d from the Good thence directly flowing, especially, if it be the greatest. Certainly, the best Abridgment of Ethicks is the Idea of that true Happiness which is attainable by every one, and of all its Causes methodically dispos’d. For hence, both the Force and Consequences of Human Actions, and also their proper Order is immediately perceiv’d, so that nothing is wanting, which may direct and influence the Will.

  Altho’ Human Legislators seem not to enter into this Method, making frequent use of Punishments, but very rarely of Rewards; nevertheless, if we throughly examine the matter, we shall find, “That all Civil Laws are contrived, recommended, and enacted, sometimes also alter’d, relax’d, or even abrogated, and all with respect to this End, Happiness, inasmuch as it may be promoted by Civil Society.” This I might easily prove by numberless Instances, out of the Civil Law, or even from our own. Nay, and the Reason of the Law it-self, whence Laws are Interpreted, and even sometimes Corrected, has a respect to the Common Good. I will cite only one Law from Modestinus, “No Reason of the Law, or favourable Interpretation of Equity, permits, that what was profitably introduc’d for the Advantage of Men, should by a harsh Interpretation be severely stretch’d to their Prejudice.”96 Here it is implied, that both Laws and Equity chiefly respect the Advantages of Men, under which two are compris’d all the Means of Happiness which can be obtain’d by the help of Laws. And these are indeed Rewards sufficiently great for our Obedience to the Laws. But, because Protection from Injuries, and the Security thence arising, with the other Advantages of well-constituted Governments, are common to all Subjects, and flow from obeying all the Laws together, therefore it was not proper to propose these great Advantages in any one Law: But every particular Law, if the scope thereof be well consider’d, brings along with it its own Reward. Obedience to them all, has for its Reward, the Sum of all those Advantages, which are procur’d and preserv’d in any State by the force of Government. The avoiding and fear of any Misery that may be avoided, if at any time it proceeds from clear and distinct Knowledge, is subsequent to, and deriv’d from, the Knowledge of Happiness that may be attain’d.

  Wherefore, even upon this account the Method of the antient Philosophers, who taught, “That the Virtues, and their Rules, the Laws of Nature, were to be cultivated as Means necessary to Happiness, the constant Aim of all Men,” is far more excellent than that of Hobbes, who would have them, “To be only the Conditions of Peace to be made, or of finishing a certain War of every Man against every Man,” which no one in his senses would ever undertake; he would rather preserve Peace, as being always esteem’d by him, a Part, or a Means, of acquiring and preserving Happiness.

  For Peace does not necessarily presuppose War, nor ought to be defin’d by the removal thereof, as Hobbes defines it,97 to favour that Hypothesis, which he design’d afterwards to establish. For it is that State, in which Rational Agents enjoy among themselves the Advantages of Concord and mutual good Offices; and War ought to be defin’d by the removal of Peace: As Health is evidently to be defin’d, not by the absence of Diseases, but Disease, by its contrariety to Health. Nature has always the first place; with it are immediately connected, both the Causes preservative thereof, and its Effects, or unhurt Operations; afterwards is gain’d, by comparison with these, the distinct Knowledge of Diseases, and of every thing opposite to Nature. Health is not desir’d, that we may avoid the Painfulness of Diseases, but for its own sake: So Peace is sought after, for the sake of the consequent Advantages, not, that we may avoid the Mischiefs of War. But this is no proper place for further Inquiries of this kind; it is sufficient, that, among the good Effects of Virtue, is reckon’d Security, both from inward Evils, such as unruly Affections, a restless Conscience, &c. and from outward Punishments, which, in Hobbes’s State of Nature, are called Wars, which the Wicked pull down upon themselves. These, good Men are free from, tho’ from other Causes they sometimes suffer Grievances, to which others are likewise liable.

  (2) Greater Rewards, arising within the Mind it-self;§XLI. Let us now proceed to those greater Rewards, which, being intimately and essentially connected with the Common Good, Nature promises, and certainly bestows on those who cultivate it. They are the internal Perfections of the Mind, all the Moral Virtues, all the Benefits of Natural Religion; a Life equal to it self throughout, by means where of a wise Man is always consistent with himself; Tranquillity of Mind; and what arises from a grateful Consciousness of all these, a Joy, which is both uninterrupted, and, because its rise is in our-selves, affects and satisfies the most inward Recesses of the Soul. Out of a desire of Brevity, I have, as it were, crowded all these together; ’tis the unanimous Opinion, of even the very Heathens, and of the most disagreeing Philosophers, “That in these, incomparably the greatest Pleasures are situated, and that they are intimately connected with Human Happiness.”

  (with Respect to which there has been a wonderful Agreement among all Sects of Philosophers, Epicurus’s not excepted;I might here easily shew “The wonderful Agreement between the Peripateticks, the old and new Academy, and even the Epicureans themselves”; tho’ some taught Virtue to be the only Good; others, only the chief Good; some, that it was it-self the very End; others, that it was the most proper and absolutely-necessary Means to the obtaining it. This even Epicurus himself frequently inculcates, both, in what he affirms concerning the Wise Man,98 and in his Maxims.99 What is more, he has approv’d of it by his own Example, (at least if any credit is to be given to his last Words, which to me seem to be but a Rant;) for he affirms, “That he endur’d the Torments of the Stone, and of an Ulcer in his Bowels, which were so exquisite, as to be incapable of an increase of Pain; yet that he look’d upon that Day as happy, by means of that Joy of Mind, which arose from the Remembrance of his Reasonings and Inventions.” The Reader, if he pleases, may find these his Words in the Epistle to Idomenes in Laertius.100 Certainly, tho’ there be something of Boast in these Words, they, at least, prove thus much, that he openly acknowledg’d, “That, from the true Knowledge of Nature, and from a Life spent under the Conduct of Reason, proceeded a great Joy of Mind, which might afford Comfort to a Man afflicted with the most violent Agonies, and, as a Reward, might excite the Minds of Men to Virtue.” He contends, “That Virtue alone is inseparable from Pleasure,”101 and with him Pleasure is only another Name, for the chief Happiness. But, if these things are acknowledg’d by a Philosopher, who, of all others, has made the greatest Blunders in the pursuit of natural Knowledge, (as perceiving no Foot-steps of the Divine Wisdom, Goodness, and Providence, in so surprizing a Disposition and Usefulness of all Things;) How much greater Pleasures are they sensible of, in the Paths of Virtue, and pursuit of the Common Good, who, from a more through consideration of the very long and regular Train of natural Causes, concurring to produce the most beautiful Effects, contriv’d and executed with the most consummate Wisdom and greatest Power, can with ease demonstrate, “That it is impossible, that this Universe should spring from Epicurean Principles; but that it is necessarily requisite, that a Divine Power and Wisdom should preside over the Motions and Dispositions of Natural Affairs, especially those relating to Man?” Hence they will immediately perceive, “That God himself continually attends the Preservation of the Universe,” (which is the Common Good,) and (as I have prov’d,) “That he commands Men, according to their Abilities, to promote the same”; whence they will immediately perceive a most grateful Harmony between their Actions and the Divine: From the Perception of this Consent with God, necessarily results a most agreeable Joy and Tranquillity of Mind, as under his safe Protection, accompanied with great Hopes of receiving Immortal Happiness at his bountiful hands.

  the Principles of whose Natural Philosophy, by which he endeavour’d to banish the Belief of a Providence, are briefly refuted.)Epicurus’s Sect alone, among all the Philosophers, denied, “That God took care of the Universe,” and, consequently, “That he favour’d the cause of Justice among Men,” which comes to the same thing: Of which this seems to me the Reason, because (as Cicero, in the Person of Possidonius, often hints in his Treatise of the Nature of the Gods,102 ) he intended “in words only to acknowledge, but in reality to deny, a Divine Nature”: And, therefore, what he has affirm’d concerning the Gods, was only to avoid Odium and Danger. Among many things which led him into this wicked Error, this seems to me, not to have been the least, “That his knowledge of Nature, in confidence whereof he had the Rashness to deny a Divine Providence, was but very mean and superficial.”103 Altho’ I am not ignorant, that Gassendus has labour’d much in his defence;104 yet, notwithstanding, it is evident, “that his Natural Philosophy must be resolv’d into certain Principles, which assume many Suppositions not to be granted; which yet, if they were granted, would not be sufficient to establish this most beautiful System which we behold.” For he supposes, “All Things to be compos’d of Atoms moving thro’ the Void with a double natural Motion, one Perpendicular, the other Inclining, and that they owe their Motion to an innate Gravity.”105 As if Gravity were any thing distinct from Motion, or a Conatus to Motion, downward; or, as if the Cause thereof were not to be inquir’d into. But I will insist no longer upon the reciting such Opinions, the bare recital of which, in an Age of so great Discoveries, is a sufficient Confutation. He was a perfect Stranger to the Laws of Motion, nor did he sufficiently consider that remarkable Order, Connexion, and Dependence, which is conspicuous in those innumerable complicated Motions, whence the uninterrupted Revolutions of all kinds of Productions and Changes in this System proceed; yet in these, and in the Proportions of Figures and Motions thence arising, consists almost the whole Beauty of this Material System, in the investigating where of are chiefly employ’d the Powers of the most excellent natural Disquisitions, or rather of Mathematicks, (for the Knowledge of these exalted Sciences is nearly allied.) But it is confess’d, “That Epicurus was so utter a Stranger to Mathematicks, that he was not sensible of the Spherical Figure of the Earth, contending, that it was a Plain,” which is easily refuted from the first Elements of Geometry.106 Who then would expect any thing Rational from this Man, concerning the whole System of the World, and the most beautiful Order that is between its more remarkable Parts and Motions, whence both the Existence of the First Mover, and his Providence in the Government of them, may be demonstrated? It certainly to me discovers the greatest Stupidity of Mind in him, that he affirms, “So curious a Texture of all Plants and Animals to have arisen from a casual concourse of Atoms without any conduct of Reason.” I could rather believe, “That Cities adorn’d with Edifices and Temples, set forth with Columns and other Furniture, displaying, or even exceeding, all the Ornaments of Vitruvian Architecture, were fitted up by a confus’d jumble of Materials, proceeding from an Earthquake.”107 But the extravagance of his Notions out-did even it-self, when he affirm’d, “That the Human Mind, and consequently, even Reason, Wisdom, and all Arts and Sciences, ow’d their Original to a fortuitous concourse of the same Atoms, without the help of Reason.” And these Absurdities must first be believ’d, before you can learn from his Natural Philosophy, “That the Precepts of Religion and Justice are not discover’d to us from the Nature of Things govern’d by the Divine Will; and before the Hope of an ample Reward for the Observance of them, and the Dread of Divine Vengeance upon those who violate them, could be razed out of the Minds of Men.”

  But it is now time to dismiss Epicurus and his Herd, tho’ lately increas’d.108 There is, however, something in his Maxims, which openly acknowledges, “That the Just Man gains this point of Happiness by his Virtue, that of all Men he enjoys the greatest Tranquillity, or freedom from perturbations of Mind.”109 Nor is it to be wonder’d at, that he would not acknowledge the Divine Reason and other Perfections to interest themselves in Human Actions, who denied, that they were visible in the Formation and Preservation of the Universe. His esteeming it necessary to deny “such Divine Interposition in the forming and preserving the World,” that Men might neither hope for, nor fear, any thing from God, upon account of their Actions; sufficiently shews, “That he thought the Hope of a farther reward for Justice, and the Fear of Punishment, was no less rational, than it is certain, that the World is form’d and govern’d by the Divine Reason.” But, since this has been evidently prov’d by others, I shall pursue it no farther, content to have brought my Argument to this Issue. It is certainly prov’d sufficiently, “That such a Proposition is a Law of Nature, which is prov’d to have receiv’d the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments from that Cause, which has establish’d the Connexion between all Causes and their Effects in the System of the World.”

  Virtue it-self the Principal, both Cause and Part of Happiness.§XLII. Mean-while the judicious Reader will observe, “That I reckon all the Virtues, and that perfection of Mind which accompanies them, among the happy Consequences, or natural Rewards, of Universal Benevolence.” But they are, as I shall afterwards shew, after the same manner the Consequences of that practical Dictate of Reason which enjoins them, as the Skill of demonstrating and constructing the various Cases in any general Geometrical Problem, follows from the Knowledge of the general Method of solving that Problem; in the use of which, however, it is well known, that an attentive Mind is requisite, which may diligently mark all those Particulars in which the several Cases differ; for otherwise it may easily slide into Error. However, because all the several Virtues are the Parts of this diffusive Love, and the several Modes of practising it, and therefore, in reality, all taken together, constitute it, (as Parts the Whole;) I acknowledge, “that Virtue is great part of its own Reward,” and do declare, that much of that Happiness, which we seek after, is contain’d therein. This I understand in the same sense as we say, “that Health is great part of that Happiness sought by Animals.” That is a state of Mind fit for rightly performing its Functions; this is a correspondent condition of the Body: Both States imprint a pleasing Sense of themselves upon the Mind, and thence produce a certain gentle uninterrupted Joy, even when other matters succeed less happily. I care not in this Argument to distinguish between this Health of Mind, and the Consciousness, or Enjoyment thereof by Reflexion, since Nature has so intimately united these two, that the free Exercise of the Virtues, and the Perception or inward Sense thereof, are inseparable: Nor will I contend with them who would rather call “Virtue the immediate efficient Cause of Formal Happiness,” provided they agree in the Thing, “That it both enriches Man in his present Condition with an essential and noble part of Happiness, and paves the way to the future Acquisition of that greater Happiness, towards which it raises his Hopes.” For nothing hinders, but that the same Thing may be a Part of a Whole whose Parts exist successively, (such as Human Happiness is,) and, nevertheless, an efficient Cause of other Parts of the Same Whole, which are afterwards to exist; just as the same Man may be a Part of the Roman State, and the Father of a Son, who will afterwards be a Member of the same State.

  Which is therefore a Proof from Nature, and the strongest possible, that it is the Will of God, that we should practise Virtue.Much has been advanc’d by Philosophers, especially the Stoicks and Academicks, which with strength and perspicuity demonstrates, “That the Virtues necessarily bring Happiness along with them, as essentially connected therewith”: Which I did not think fit to transcribe, as being what the Learned are already sufficiently acquainted with. It is sufficient, that I readily acknowledge them to be the principal Parts of Human Happiness, so that neither without them can any Man (tho’ abounding with all other Advantages) be Happy: Nor, if he posesses them, can he be miserable, however unfortunate. They are therefore, upon account of their own intrinsick Perfection, worth the pursuit, tho’ they were enjoin’d by no Law of Nature; which I would have been at more pains to prove, but that I find it not only granted, but prov’d at large by Torquatus in Cicero de Fin. even when he is defending Epicurus’s Doctrine.110 What I would infer from these Reasonings or Concessions of Philosophers, is, “That we have a proof, from Nature, that virtuous Actions have a Reward annex’d to ’em by the Will of the First Cause; and, therefore, that it is the Will of the same Cause, that Men, whom he has instructed how to foresee the Rewards consequent upon such Actions, should act so as to obtain that foreshewn Happiness.” In this discovery of the Divine Will consists the Promulgation of the Law of Nature, and thence directly flows Natural and Moral Obligation. And this is what even those Philosophers, who taught Virtue to be the chief Happiness, seem not sufficiently to have regarded. For, in my opinion, it adds vast weight to the Arguments drawn from the Pleasures consequent upon virtuous Actions, if they be consider’d as Rewards annex’d to Virtue by the Will of the First Cause, for that very purpose, that He might discover to Men, that it is His Will, “That they should rather do those things which he has honour’d with Rewards natural and easily foreseen, than Actions of a contrary kind, which are known to lead Men to Destruction naturally, in that Scheme of all Things which he has establish’d.

  A Proof superior to what can be given by any arbitrary Signs.God’s constantly and naturally rewarding any Actions, is the plainest and most effectual Method, that can be by natural Signs, of persuading to such Actions, and authentically declaring, that he has commanded them. No one in his senses expects from God, in the ordinary course of Nature, arbitrary Signs, such as Words spoken or written, in order to promulge his Laws. Nor, if he afforded such, could we so certainly come at the Knowledge of their Signification, as we understand the Force of a Reward to incline the Minds of Men to do such things, as they perceive to be thereby honour’d. It is from Conjectures not perfectly demonstrative, that we collect, in our Childhood, what others mean by those Words, which Men use among themselves: Yet these are generally sufficient to explain to us the Meaning of Civil Laws. What is more; I have observ’d many of such a Disposition, “That they would willingly part with the Perfections of their Minds, and be content to want that share of Happiness, provided they might indulge their favourite Passions; who yet, after once it sufficiently appears, that the Divine Will has, by Rewards and Punishments, establish’d a Law which restrains those Passions, and calls upon them otherwise to bestow their Pursuits and Labour, reverence and observe it; and readily conjecture, that greater Good or Evil may, by the Interposition of the Divine Will, follow from their Actions, than what can be distinctly foreseen.” For the smallest Hint, provided it be certain, of the Will of the Supreme Lord of All, is of the greatest Weight among all, who are truly Rational; because whatever is of the utmost Importance may be justly expected, both from his Favour, and from his Anger.

  Whence Reason promises Good Men, Happiness, not in this Life only, but in a future Immortal State.Among these Rewards is that happy Immortality, which natural Reason promises to attend the Minds of Good Men, when separated from the Body. For it perceives the Mind, as exerting more noble Powers, to be a Substance of a different kind from the Body, and is sensible of its firm Resolution of practising perpetual Benevolence, and, consequently, all the Virtues. Now it is evident, “That Substance will enjoy a happy Immortality, which upon account of the Diversity of its Nature, is not hurt by the Death of the Body; and which still enjoys the charming Remembrance of its former Virtue, and is ready to lay hold of all Opportunities, which an endless Duration will afford, of practicing Virtue.” For it appears from what I have already said, which is confirm’d by all Experience, “That the Happiness of Good Men is inseparable from the Remembrance and Exercise of Virtue.” But it is sufficient for me briefly to have hinted this, which has by others been handled more at large.

  (3.) All the Advantages of Civil Society.§XLIII. In the third and last place, all the various Advantages of Political Societies come to be reckon’d among the Rewards naturally consequent upon endeavouring to promote the Common Good: For they are at first establish’d, and afterwards preserv’d, with that view. States, indeed, have a particular respect to their own Subjects; yet so, that their Rulers take an especial Care, not to injure, violate Faith, or refuse any office of Gratitude, or Humanity, to those who are without their State; to these Heads are reduc’d the principal Rights of Peace and War; which, by the Intervention of the supreme Powers are by all good Subjects observ’d, with respect to those of all other Nations. I shall elsewhere, if there be occasion, shew more at large, that the Reason of forming all States is to be drawn from this Principle. Even Mr. Hobbes himself in many places grants, “That the Advantages of Societies are great, and that they can neither be establish’d nor preserv’d, unless the Precepts of most Virtues be incorporated into, and confirm’d by the Authority of, the Laws of the State”;111 so that it would be superfluous to add more here upon that head. This Remark, however, it may not be improper to make here, “That to this Class I reduce all those Advantages of Society, which, altho’ they be not always enjoin’d by all, and are consequently to be look’d on as Contingent, are yet such as may with some probability be expected.” Such Contingent Advantages are of no contemptible Value in this Argument; such are Plenty of Necessaries, Security of Life, Honours, Riches, a happier Education of Youth, a greater share of Learning, &c. These indeed fall not to the share of All, at least, not equally, from the Advantages of Society. Yet I am of opinion, that All do thence enjoy a much greater share of such Benefits than they could obtain, if Men did not study to promote the Common Good, and no Civil Societies were form’d, but that all liv’d in that Brute-like State, to which Hobbes contends, that the right Reason of Individuals would reduce all, before Societies were erected. It is necessary, “That we should set a value upon such contingent Advantages, when we deliberate upon those Affairs, which we are to transact with other Men”; because all Effects which we can hope for from such free Agents, by our behaviour toward them, are in their own Nature Subject to such Contingency. So that either we are not to hope that any Good can be obtain’d from them, which is contrary to all Experience; or we must set some value upon that Civil Good, which is liable to many Hazards. As for my own part, I so highly prize the Advantages (I have enumerated) which flow immediately from Civil Society, but draw their Original from the Observance of the Law of Nature by pursuing the Common Good, that I sincerely believe, even the Loss of Life (which the Laws of Nature sometimes oblige us to lay down for our Country112 ) is abundantly recompensed, and even surmounted by them. A liberal Education, Learning, the Security arising from Government, the agreeable Intercourse of Mankind, and all other Ornaments which we owe to mutual Assistance, are what make Life worth enjoying; therefore, after we have for several years reap’d these Advantages, from the Benevolence of our Fellow-Subjects promoting the Publick Good, they would make no unreasonable demand, should they command us to restore, or lay out for their benefit, that Life which was at first receiv’d, and afterwards often preserv’d, by their means. Nay, after all, we should still be Debtors to our Native-Country, or Fellow-Citizens, tho’ in some uncommon Cases, and when our Country is in the utmost Necessity, we should, at their Desire, repay that Life, which it gave us, and which it daily and perpetually preserv’d.

  There are few who would hurt others upon account of their observing the Precepts of the Law of Nature, and therefore to guard them, smaller certain Rewards, or obscure Hints of greater ones, will be sufficient. But, because many Persecutions arise, in opposition to those Articles, which are peculiar to the Christian Faith, or Discipline; therefore, to strengthen Christians it was necessary, that the Resurrection, and the Glory of the Kingdom of Heaven, should be reveal’d, lest Christians should be of all Men most miserable.113

  II. That such Advantages are a natural Declaration of God’s commanding such Actions, in pursuit of the Common Good.§XLIV. Having now prov’d what I first propos’d, “That those Human Actions which promote the Publick Good, obtain the greatest Advantages for their Reward”;114 the second remains to be dispatch’d, “That the conferring these Advantages, or Rewards, by the Appointment of the First Cause, is a sufficient Proof from Nature, that God wills or commands, that Men should in all their Actions perpetually pursue the Publick Good.” Because I think I have sufficiently prov’d this already, where I treated of Punishments, and of that Happiness of the Mind, which is united to Virtue, I shall here contract the Force of that Reasoning into one Syllogism.

  The supreme Governor of the World, or First Rational Cause, by whose Will things are so dispos’d, that it is with sufficient clearness discover’d to Men, that some Actions of theirs are necessary Means to an End, which Nature determines to pursue, wills, that Men should be oblig’d to those Actions, or he commands those Actions.

  But things are so dispos’d by the Will of God, that it is sufficiently discover’d to Men, that the Pursuit of the Common Good is such a Means to an End plainly necessary to them, by Nature determining them to the Pursuit thereof, namely, their Happiness, which is contain’d in the Common Good, and can with Reason be expected from thence only.

  Therefore it is his Will, that they shall be oblig’d to this Pursuit, or to such Actions as flow from thence: That is, he enjoins Universal Benevolence, which is the Sum of the Laws of Nature.

  The Major is taken from that Definition of Obligation, which I have before establish’d. The Minor is now prov’d. Therefore the Conclusion holds good. I am to advertise the Reader, that by their Happiness I here mean their true and intire Happiness; which comprehends all the attainable Perfections both of Mind and Body, and extends it-self, not to the present Life only, but to that which is to come, as far as it may be known by the Light of Nature. Likewise by those Actions which are suppos’d to be the Means of this Happiness, I understand, principally, the intire Series of Actions thro’ the whole course of Life, which may promote that End; tho’ every single Action, necessary to procure any part of that true Happiness, is by this Argument prov’d to be commanded by the Author of Nature. It is necessary to this constant and solid Happiness (which I treat of) of particular Persons, “That every Rational Being should come to some resolution within himself, concerning some constant Tenor of his Actions looking that way.” Such is the natural Constitution of all those Causes, upon procuring the Concurrence whereof that Happiness depends, that the right Reason of Men (namely, that which is agreeable to the Nature of Man, and promises the desir’d Effect from Causes which will certainly produce it) can discover no other Action of ours effectual to produce this End, but this only, “That, to our power, we should procure to ourselves the Favour of God and Men by Universal Benevolence.” Or, which comes to the same thing, the Nature of God and Man rightly consider’d discovers this, “That every one uses the best Method in his Power, to procure his own Happiness” (which is a part of the Publick Happiness) “who constantly promotes the Common Good”: And therefore it is necessary, “That he should thus act, if he would use his utmost Endeavours to make himself Happy.” All who form a right Judgment of the Nature of God and Men, in which are contain’d the Causes of the Happiness of every particular Person, may agree in this consistently with the care of their own Happiness; and they are mov’d or solicited by sufficient Discoveries from Nature, and, consequently, from its Author, that they should actually agree, “That this Proposition is perpetually true, and the perpetual Rule and Law of Action.” Altho’ it may sometimes, but very rarely, happen, “That some particular Person may obtain for a time some greater Advantages, than what are consistent with the Common Good”; yet because, “If the whole course of Existence be taken into consideration, greater Happiness may be obtain’d by neglecting those Advantages, than by pursuing them,” that Person cannot reckon them among the Parts of his greatest possible Happiness. Under this one most general Dictate is comprehended all Philosophy Moral, Civil, and Oeconomical, all true Prudence, and every Virtue. By this Method we shall best consult the Interest, both of others, and ourselves; nor shall we disturb the Order of Nature, by making all Things subordinate to ourselves, which was the second Objection.

  Obj. 2. That by the Author’s Method the Common Good (the Honour of God, as well as the Happiness of other Men) is postpon’d to the Happiness of every particular Person. Answ. No; for§XLV. I will now proceed to the Solution of that Objection which suggests, “That the Effect of my Method of deducing the Laws of Nature, is, that the Common Good, and, consequently, the Honour of God, and the Happiness of all other Men, will be postpon’d to the Happiness of every particular Person, and be made subservient thereto, as to the chief End.” Far be it from me to advance any such Doctrine. On the contrary, I here endeavour to establish, what overthrows the very Foundation of that Opinion, because I have asserted, “That no Man has a Right to Life, or to the Necessaries thereof, but so far as the Life of every Man is either a Part, or a Cause, of the Common Good, or at least consistent with it.” But I will here distinctly shew the Consistency of these things.115

  I. The Rational pursuit of a Man’s own Happiness obliges him to pursue the Common Good, the Honour of God, and the Happiness of other Men.First then I am to observe, “That natural Obligation is not discover’d by Man in the same Order, in which it is founded and establish’d in Nature by the Author thereof.” We are under the necessity of first using the Analytical Method, by rising from those Effects which immediately affect us, to various and very complicated second Causes, ’till at length we arrive at the First. But we are by no means injurious to him, if at the End of our inquiries we acknowledge, “That all those necessary Effects which we had before observ’d, ow’d their Original to his Will; and, if we refer to him all that Perfection, which we had taken notice of in them.” So, with respect to our present Subject, we have first “some Knowledge of our own Nature, and of the Necessity of some things to its Happiness, and of some plainly natural Propensions and Endeavours to obtain such Necessaries.” We then observe, “That some free Actions of ours are, whether we will or no, naturally oppos’d and restrain’d, as far as in them lies, by those with whom we have to do; while others of our Actions (such as are beneficial to others) are chearfully recompens’d with reciprocal Affection”; we further perceive “ourselves so fram’d by Nature, that we incline, with out deliberation, to repel Force with Force, and, to return Like for Like”;116 nor does the most consummate Reason dictate otherwise. From innumerable and perpetual Observations of this kind, and others that I have before suggested, the Mind of Man becomes persuaded, “That the Benevolence of each towards all paves the way to the Rewards and Happiness of all other Men alike; and that so much the more, by how much it is the more diffusive.” When afterwards the Mind considers, “That this is all effected by the most provident Author of Nature,” it cannot doubt, “But that he would have this regarded by Men, as it really is, to be a sufficient Argument afforded by the supreme Governor of the World, to incline them to the exercise of Universal Benevolence”: That is, (as I have shewn,) as a Proof of our Obligation, and a certain Mark of the Law enjoining it. Altho’, therefore, this be last discover’d, yet here the Obligation of the Laws of Nature takes its first Rise, namely, from the Discovery of the Will of God, whom, from his Works, we had learn’d to be a most perfect Being, the Cause of all Things, upon whose Pleasure depends the whole Happiness of All, and consequently our own, concerning which we are naturally most solicitous. The Obligation arises no otherwise from the Love of our own Happiness, than the Truth of Propositions concerning the Existence of Things natural, and of their First Cause, which is thence discover’d, arises from the Credit given to the Testimony of our Senses. Yet no-one would say, “That we, therefore, preferred our Senses to the whole World, and to God himself”; since we readily acknowledge, “That their very Existence, and all their Use, depends upon God as their First Cause, and upon the System of the World, as upon Causes subordinate to him.” That is first in Nature, at which we arrive last in this inverted Method of Reasoning. Therefore, altho’ this Method of coming at Knowledge, be evidently natural and very common; altho’ our Passions also, and several Appetites, are excited according to the discoveries we make of Good and Evil; yet we may not, therefore, thence affirm, what is most worthy to be known, or amiable above all other things. But, as by the help of our Senses, we learn some very general Principles, (as for Example, the most universal Theorems of Arithmetick and Geometry,) whereby we may successfully correct those Errors, which the generality are wont to imbibe from misapprehended Sensations; in like manner, from the Love of our own Happiness, under the conduct of Prudence, all who are truly Rational attain such a Knowledge of Natural Things and of God himself, and such Affections towards his Honour, and the Common Happiness of all, as either prevent or root out all perverse Self-Love: Those, (or at least some of those,) first Natural and Necessary Appetites, which we suppose in Men, of procuring their own Preservation and Happiness, are confin’d within a very narrow compass, and are perfectly free from Fault; as our simple Sensations, with respect to the proper objects of our Senses, under proper Regulations, are free from Error.117 Which were it otherwise, there would be no hope left, either of knowing Nature, or of conforming our Actions to the Laws of Nature; but a fruitless and perpetual Scepticism would be necessarily introduc’d into the place of Science, and a casual Determination of our Actions into that of Prudence, and the regular Conduct of our Passions; and there would be no difference between the Wise Man and the Fool.

  Because, from the Knowledge and Love of those Effects, which immediately affect us, our Mind, by natural methods, comes to know and love all those various Causes upon which we depend, especially those Causes which are Rational; which recommend themselves to our Understanding and Passions, not only upon account of the Effects which they produce, but also of the Resemblance of their Nature to our own; it is evident, “That those first Notions which we form of ourselves, and Inclinations towards our own Happiness, are only, as it were, Steps to the Knowledge of more exalted Objects, and to Affections more diffus’d and more intense, in proportion to that Goodness and Perfection which we discover in other Objects.” It is certainly too plain to need proof, “That the Degrees and Measure of our Love do not depend upon the Order of Time, when the Objects begin to be known or lov’d; but upon our Judgment of that Measure of natural Goodness, which we discover in Persons and Things.” I have prov’d, in the Chapter concerning Good, “That any thing is esteem’d good, not with respect to ourselves only,” which alone Hobbes acknowledges in a State of Nature, “but upon account of the Influence it has in preserving or perfecting others, especially that Aggregate Body, which is compos’d of all Rational Beings.” This Goodness or Happiness will readily be acknowledgd to be greater in all Mankind, than in any single Person; but in God by far the greatest; he will, therefore, be amiable above all Things.

  The whole Matter therefore is reduc’d to this Point; we are excited by the Love of our own Happiness, (which we look upon as a thing that may be effected,) to consider those Causes upon which it depends; those especially, which have the principal share in effecting it, and which are inclin’d, according as we behave, to increase or diminish it; such are God and all other Men. Upon a through examination of the Nature of these Causes, we observe in them a Perfection and Goodness, or an aptness to preserve and improve the State of the Universe, evidently like to what render’d us amiable to ourselves; but in God we perceive it infinitely greater. Farther; we find that every one of them is no less determin’d by its own Reason, to pursue those things which are agreeable to its own Happiness, than we ourselves are; so that there is evidently no Reason, “Why we should either desire or expect, that all should be subservient to us, rather than to others, or themselves.”

  The only way of reconciling all Rational Agents being, That all should agree in and pursue one End, The Common Good.§XLVI. There is but one way of reconciling all Rational Beings to all and every one, so far as the Frame of the Universe permits; and that Reason suggests from the Knowledge of a Sum or Aggregate of Particulars, a Knowledge peculiar to Rational Beings, namely, That all should agree in and pursue one End, the Common Good. This every particular Person may easily do, because the Nature of every Rational Agent is possess’d of an Understanding in some measure comprehending it, and of a Will inclinable to pursue it. For by this means the Happiness of Individuals will be provided for, in the best manner that the Nature of Things permits; for each Individual is a Part of the Community: But that Happiness which any one may rashly hope for, which is inconsistent with the Happiness of the Aggregate Body compos’d of all Rational Beings, is impossible, as being inconsistent with the determinate Force of Causes much more powerful than the Will of him, who aims at such Happiness; and, therefore, cannot be rationally propos’d.

  This I would chiefly have observ’d, “That, tho’ the Care of our own Happiness led us to consider the Nature of Rational Causes; yet that Reason which is essential to all, and the natural Determinations of their Will to pursue their possible Happiness; and all that Perfection and Goodness, which we perceive in them relating to the State of the Universe, do both enable them to propose to themselves this Common End, and make it necessary, “That they should resolve actually to pursue it, if they would come to any rational Resolution concerning their own Practice.” For that is the only End, in pursuit of which all can conspire; and it is most certain, “That no Method of Action can be propos’d according to right Reason, in which all cannot agree.” Therefore there arises a necessity from the common Nature of Rational Agents, that every one, by the exercise of Universal Benevolence, should always seek the Common Good, and his own only as a Part thereof, and consequently subordinate thereto, which is the Sum of the Law of Nature.

  Altho’ the Nature of all other Rational Beings, among which every Man may reckon his own, discovers to us, what, in the present System, is necessary to be done, in order to obtain an End, greater than our own Happiness, which End will yet bring along with it the fullest Enjoyment of that, so far as it can be obtain’d; yet because in this System of Rational Beings, there is but one Author, Preserver, and Lord of All, at whose pleasure all that is necessary to the Happiness of all others is principally dispos’d; and the Necessity of pursuing this End, and of exerting suitable Actions, as the Means to attain it, does, consequently, proceed from his Will made known to us by his Works: “The Obligation to such Actions is justly ascrib’d to his Will alone, as commanding them.”

  In the Analysis of the Question which we propose, “concerning the Method of acquiring the Happiness of any particular Person in any given Circumstances,” it happens, (what may perhaps seem strange to many, tho’ very usual in Geometrical Analysis;) “That at the End of the Inquiry is found, not only that which was at first sought after, but also other matters relating to the Subject, about which the Proposer of the Question was not at all solicitous.” For,

  First, there comes out an Answer, or general Solution, which is not suited to the Circumstances of that one Person only, but of any other, as equally depending upon God and other Men; nay, whole Nations are directed by the same method to their Happiness. This Universal Benevolence, and all those Precepts which are contain’d in the Care of the Common Good, do oblige, both every Man, and whole Nations, for the same reason that they are to be observ’d by any one, as is evident upon consideration.

  Secondly, it appears from the same Analysis, how the Question (which was propos’d without any Limitation) must be limited, to make the Solution possible and certain. For it is requir’d, “That the Happiness propos’d by any one be such, as may be consistent with the Nature and determinate Inclinations of other Rational Causes, whose force is greater”; that is, “That it be consistent with, and subservient to, the Honour of God, and the Common Good of Men.” Whoever would propose to himself any other Happiness, is admonish’d by this Solution, “that his desire is to be look’d upon as an impossible Problem, and therefore to be wholly rejected.” I forbear mentioning Geometrical Examples of such Solutions, because they are familiar to the skilful in the Analytick Art, and to others they would be ungrateful, and seem too foreign to our purpose. And this may serve for the First Part of our Answer to the propos’d Objection.

  2. The End of the Legislator, and of the Observer of the Law of Nature, is far greater than the Sanction, which regards the Private Happiness of any Individual.§XLVII. I add Secondly, “That the End of the Legislator, and also of him who fulfils the Law of Nature, is far greater and more excellent, than the avoiding that Punishment, or the obtaining that Reward, whence the Law receives its Sanction, and which is what immediately affects every Subject; though the Obligation of every Subject to yield Obedience be indeed, immediately, discover’d by those Rewards and Punishments.” For the End, that is, the Effect directly intended by both, is the Publick Good, the Honour of the Governor, and the Welfare of all his Subjects. But these are manifestly greater than the Happiness of any single Person, who pays Obedience to the Law. No-one does truly observe the Law, unless he sincerely propose the same End with the Legislator. But, if he directly and constantly aim at this End, it is no diminution to the Sincerity of his Obedience, “that, at the Instigation of his own Happiness, he first perceiv’d, that his Sovereign commanded him to respect a higher End.” Laws would receive the Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments in vain, “unless the Consideration of them might be effectual, to incline those Subjects, whose Happiness they increase or diminish, to a sincere and intire Obedience.” For such a Sanction is added to the Law for this very Purpose, “That it might incline the Subjects to pursue a greater End than every one his own Happiness.”(Writers of Ethicks, when they speak of each Person’s particular Happiness, as his ultimate End, how to be understood in a sound Sense.) Therefore, when Moral Writers speak of every Man’s Happiness as his ultimate End,118 I would willingly interpret them in this sense, “That it is the chief End among those, which respect the Agent himself only”; and I doubt not, but that every Good Man has an End, that is, intends an Effect, that is greater, namely, the Honour of God, and the Increase of other Mens Happiness. I conceive the one chief End or best Effect, to be compos’d of our own Happiness, and that of all other Rational Beings, (which we endeavour as opportunity offers.)

  Our present Inquiry is, not that common one of the antient Philosophers, “which of several good Things possible is greater, and, therefore, more industriously to be pursued”; but, supposing Human Happiness is made up of the Concurrence of many good Things of different kinds, and may be successively enjoy’d thro Man’s whole natural course of existence, the Question is, whilst we are in pursuit of a continual Succession of such Advantages, or even greater; “Whether the Nature of Rational Causes, on which depends the Hope of this Happiness, requires, That I should procure their Favour by preferring the Common Good of all to my own private Happiness, and by considering that only as a Part of the Common Happiness, which cannot be procur’d; unless that of the Whole be preserv’d intire?” Or, “Whether the Nature of Rational Causes does rather admonish, that I should endeavour to secure my-self by preventing others, by Force or Fraud, as if they naturally regarded the Good of themselves alone, and were therefore my Enemies?” This is plainly enough Mr. Hobbes’s Doctrine, De Cive C. 5. §. 1.119 But I apprehend such a natural Benignity in Rational Agents, as inclines them to befriend all others, provided they will concur with them to promote the Common Good. The Cause of this Benignity is, “That all, the more Reason they are endow’d with, are the more ready to consent to this End, as the greatest of all, and to judge, that their own Happiness can be best promoted by this method only”:120 Whence it follows, “That every one of these is inclinable, either by Words or Actions to propose this End to others, and to enforce it by Persuasion, as soon as there is an opportunity of meeting, and that no one can rationally with-hold his Consent”; so that we ought not to presume of any one, that he would refuse to consent to this End, except we have sufficient Proof, that he hath divested himself of right Reason; but ought to treat all others, as if they had expressly concurr’d with us in such Consent. But on this very account, “that any one resolves with himself to pursue the Common Good, preferably to that of any particular Person,” he proposes to himself an End compos’d of his own Happiness and that of others, and obtains some Part of it, whenever he benefits either others or himself, ever so little, without hurting any other Person.

  The End of a Rational Agent is, not only his own Happiness, but every Effect, which he intends to produce: His principal End is that which limits all his Actions, in pursuit of his other Ends.Upon this occasion it may be very pertinent to observe, “That an End is not that only, which any Rational Agent enjoys,” (His own proper Happiness for Instance,) “but all the whole Effect, which he wittingly, willingly, and designedly produces, or endeavours to produce.” And hence those things which we advisedly do, that we may profit or please others, are no less justly to be esteem’d our Ends, than that inward Happiness, with which we are formally blessed. That internal Happiness of any one seems to me upon no other account to be called his End, than “as all the Parts thereof are Effects, towards which, as points in view, our Actions and Affections are directed by Reason.” Nor can any Reason be assign’d, why “other Effects, towards which, as certain Aims plac’d without us, such kind of Actions and Affections are directed by the same Reason, may not for the same Cause be called Ends.”

  From the forgoing Principles, the Author infers the Common Good, to be the chief End.Farther; among such Ends, that is justly look’d upon as Chief, upon account whereof, according to the Dictates of right Reason, we willingly limit our Operations relating to all other Ends whatsoever, even those which respect our own Happiness. But from the consideration of the Common Good, as our intire and adequate End, and of our own Happiness as a small Part thereof, we determine all those Operations which respect our-selves. Therefore I make the Common Good the chief End in that Method, which I here prescribe to Human Actions.

  The Proof of the Minor is evident from what I have advanc’d in the First Chapter, where I prov’d, “That the Measure of good Things every one is intitul’d to, and may rationally seek, is no otherwise to be determin’d and settled, than by that Proportion he bears to the System of all Rational Beings, or to the whole natural Kingdom of God.” Perfectly in the same manner as the Nourishment fit for the Preservation and Increase of each particular Member in a healthful Animal is determin’d, by that Proportion which it bears to the most flourishing State of the whole Body.

  Our pursuit of private Happiness must be limited by a regard to the Common Good.§XLVIII. We are necessarily led, to make this Limitation of the Happiness we hope for, by those Principles I have laid down, representing God and other Men, as the voluntary Causes thereof, so that it is necessary for us, (the Nature of God and Men requiring it,) to procure their Favour, by gratifying them in all things, as by far the greatest and principal Parts of the whole natural Community, before we can with reason expect their Assistance, which is plainly necessary to our Welfare. For, “In acting for an End, it is perfectly repugnant to Reason, to hope for, or intend, any other Effect, than what is determin’d from the Nature of all those Causes, especially the principal ones, which concur thereto.” And, therefore, “Since the principal Causes of our Happiness are other Rational Agents, beside ourselves, only such a Measure thereof ought to be expected, as the Will and Reason of such Causes, which are naturally necessary thereto, will permit.” For, altho’ in the Investigation of Causes (as in the Solution of Problems) we begin at the Effects, of which we have, for the most part, only a confus’d Idea, or barely wish for, (which is every one’s possible Happiness, in our general Conception of it,) yet (having finish’d the Analysis, and distinctly discover’d and rang’d in our Minds the Consequences, as well as their immediate Effects,) in Action we proceed Synthetically, from weighing, and considering, and procuring the Assistance of particular Causes, (God, for Instance, and Mankind, which precede in the Order of Nature,) to those good Effects relating to the publick Happiness, which may be obtain’d by their Powers and natural Tendencies concurring with our Endeavours. Just as in the Construction of Geometrical Problems, we use a regular Synthesis, (which the Analytick Method had before discover’d,) which, from the real or suppos’d Position of Points, or drawing of the most simple Lines, and their known Properties, throughly determines the Nature of the Effect desir’d.

  This illustrated by the Geometrical Method of finding and a Mean ProportionalLet us illustrate this whole matter by an easy Geometrical Similitude. One has occasion to find out a Mean Proportional between two given Lines; he presently makes an Analytical Inquiry into the Causes by which that may be determin’d, and finds, “that by the Circumference of a Circle, whose Diameter is the Sum of the two given Lines, the business may be most conveniently done.”121 Here then another Operation, and that greater than the drawing one strait Line, namely, the Mean Proportional wanted, is offer’d to the consideration of our Geometrician. The two given Lines are to be connected, and the middle Point is to be found out in the Line compos’d of them both. With this Center, and the Distance thence measur’d to either End of the compound Line is to be describ’d a Circle, from whose Circumference a Perpendicular let fall upon the Point of Connexion of the two Lines, will finish the affair. It is evident in this Construction, “That the Synthetick Method is requisite; and that the Operations of our Geometrician are not directed only by a respect had to the Length of that right Line which he seeks, but also by the consideration of the Nature of the Center, Diameter, Circumference, and Perpendicular to be let fall upon the given Point”: For “from the Natures or Definitions of these, and their mutual Relations, the Efficacy of the Practice to obtain the End desir’d, is demonstrated”; from them is also prov’d, “That the same Construction is sufficient to determine the Length, not of this one Line only, but of innumerable others of the like kind, which may perhaps be of use to others”; because that Diameter may be divided in any Point thereof into two other right Lines, between which the same Circle exhibits a Mean Proportional, which, upon another Occasion, may perhaps be of use to some other, or to himself. In like Manner, all particular Men, in their natural search after Happiness, first discover, “That the Object of their Pursuit ought to be a determinate Measure of Good, proportionable to their Wants, which is somewhat distincter than their Idea of the Happiness they are in search of.” Afterwards they make a stricter Inquiry into (the Causes, whence such Good is to be hop’d for, and proceeding in their Analysis from the next immediate Causes, to those which are more remote from us in the System of Things, are led by Nature to understand, “That all the Rational Agents about us are to be regarded as Causes upon which we in some measure depend, and are accordingly to be made our Friends by Universal Benevolence.” Wherefore this Analysis instructs us, “That a greater End is to be pursued, than what at first offer’d it-self to our view, as what, from the Nature of the Universe, (of which we are a Part,) our own greatest Happiness is necessarily connected with; and, therefore, we must either pursue it in conjunction with that nobler End, the Publick Good, (the Honour of God and Happiness of Mankind;) or throw away all hopes thereof, founded in the Nature of Things.” These discoveries thus made by the Analysis of those Causes, the Mind applies it-self to the prosecution of that nobler End, (in which our own Happiness is abundantly contain’d,) and ranks and rates all Causes, according to the Measure of the Powers and Inclinations it finds in them with respect to this End. Hence, since it perceives that God and Men, both can and will contribute most to this End, as their Common Good is the End; it acknowledges, that their Powers are the Causes, or fittest Means thereto; and therefore it unites it-self to them and makes use of them, in a manner agreeable to their Rational Nature and Dignity, that is, either by proposing to them some things to be done which may conduce to this End, or by consenting with them in such Actions as they convince us to be necessary, or at least discover to be permitted without prejudice to this End. Since all these things are done for the sake of this noblest End alone, it follows, “That we, thro’ our whole Train of Action, and, consequently, thro’ our whole Course of Life regulated according to this method, will unite ourselves to those Causes, which we know most able and willing to promote that End, that is, God especially, and Good Men; and prefer the greater Parts of this End, before the lesser; Publick Advantages, for Example, before Private, &c.” that is (to pursue the Parallel) when we proceed to operation, we shall in the first place take care to find out the Center and first Principle of that most noble Problem which is propos’d, and to keep our due distance from it; that is, we shall have an Eye to God, and those Discoveries of his Will, which are visible in his Works, afterwards considering those particular Men, which every way encompass us, as the infinite Points of the Circumference, and preserving inviolably that Order and Situation of all, which is establish’d by the First Cause, by the help of a Circular Motion, or of Benefits mutually exchang’d, we at length find out a happy Opportunity, as the Point of Connexion of the two Lines, in which what is sufficient for us may be allow’d without Injury to others; and so the Measure proportionate to our Condition, that we may promote the Good of the whole System, is limited by all others around us, as the Length of the Mean Proportional inquir’d after, is determin’d by the Circumference. Mean-while it is owing to this most noble Motion of reciprocal Beneficence, that others reap like, and often, as occasion offers, greater Benefits, than those we obtain for ourselves; as by drawing the same Circle, not only a Mean Proportional may be found out between two given Lines, but also like Mean Proportionals between infinite other Lines, into which the same Diameter may be divided; and those Means useful to others may be often greater than that we have occasion for. Lastly; the Power, Perfection, and Rank of the Circle among Figures, is not valued by the skilful Geometrician from any single Effect, but from all its Effects united, or from the Construction of all Problems, which may be any way solv’d by it. In like manner, every Rational Person will value the Perfection and inward Force of the First Cause, and of all Mankind, not only from that Influence upon his own Happiness he discovers in them, but from that prodigious variety and greatness of Effects, which have hitherto proceeded, or may hereafter proceed, from these Causes; but especially from the Good of the Universe, or the Common Happiness of all Rational Beings, which is daily preserv’d, and even increas’d, by their Powers. For the only Measure of Power, is the Sum of all its Effects, and, therefore, the Power of Beneficence is to be estimated from the Aggregate of all the Benefits thence arising. And the natural Rank among Beneficent Causes, is according to the Measure of their Beneficence, so that the less Beneficent may, with respect to this Attribute, be called Inferior, or Subordinate, to the more Beneficent; as in an increasing or ascending Series of Numbers, the smaller are called Inferior.

  The Natures of Things are not to be estimated from any one particular, but from their adequate Effect.§XLIX. It is hence manifest, “That our Minds are sufficiently instructed, from the Natures and essential Powers of Things, how to form a just Judgment or Estimation of the Goodness, Order, and Dignity of Things; and that, not from their Relation to ourselves little Mortals, but to the whole collective Body of Rational Beings, or to that whole Society, of which God is the Head; altho’, perhaps, the first Inducement to a more strict Inquiry into the Nature of all Things, was a regard to our own Happiness.”

  It is likewise evident, “That, if we will compare the Parts of that greatest End, of which I have been treating, and contemplate their Order among themselves, that Part of the End will be Superior, which is grateful to the Nature of the more perfect Being. So that the Glory of God is Chief, then follows the Happiness of many Good Men, and Inferior to this is the Happiness of any particular Person.”

  Among the Means to this End or Causes of this Effect, each will claim a greater Share of Esteem, Love, and Care, as it is more Effectual to obtain that End; whence the first Place will here be given to God, the next to the Assistance of the most and best Men; but any particular Person, (and consequently, he that deliberates with himself upon his own Affairs,) will take up with the lowest Place, if he act agreeably to the Nature of Things.

  And thus, I think, I have abundantly remov’d all Suspicion of any Consequences from my Method, which might prefer the Happiness of any single Person, to the Honour of God, or the Publick Good.

  The Words, [End] or Effect, [Means] or Cause, are only external Denominations, no way measuring the inward Perfection of Things.But lest any one should take offence, “That even the First Cause and all Mankind should be consider’d as the Means to that noblest End, a small Part whereof is the Happiness of any particular Person”; I think it proper here openly to affirm, what I have often hinted, “That these Words, [End] and [Means], are only external Denominations ascrib’d to Effects and Causes, so far as they proceed from the Deliberation and Intention of Rational Agents”: Any Effect propos’d by them is call’d an End, and any Cause, whose force contributes any thing towards it, is call’d the Means. But such extrinsick Denominations are neither the proper Measures of the intrinsick Perfection of Things, nor of that Esteem they are in with others. For it is obvious, “That neither God, nor the Body of Mankind, lose ought of their Dignity or Honour, by voluntarily contributing to the Happiness of an Inferior.”

  Every particular Effect is Inferior to its Cause.“A particular Effect may be far inferior to its Cause, and is generally so reputed”; and therefore the particular End, at which a Rational Agent aims, may be less noble than himself. It is sufficient, if his whole or adequate End be agreeable to his Dignity. However, the Honour of superior Causes is sufficiently provided for, even when they condescend to the lowest Effects, both because they do it voluntarily and deliberately, and because there is no other Method of procuring their Assistance, but by consenting voluntarily to serve their Interest, in denying to ourselves whatever is dearest to us, if at any time the Publick Good so requires.122

  Farther; that great Joy, in which great Part of the Happiness of every particular Man consists, is founded in the Consciousness, of our having endeavour’d in our past Life, and of our firm Resolution and Disposition of endeavouring for the future, to please both God and Men; and in a sincere Will to contribute to, and rejoice in, the Happiness of all others. So that it is impossible, that he who seeks such Happiness to himself, should be found guilty of selfishness. For in this manner he repays others the Happiness he has receiv’d from them, as a River returns into the Ocean the Waters it has thence receiv’d.

  (Hobbes denies, That the Laws of Nature, in a State of Nature, oblige to external Actions, and that for want of Security.)§L. Having, as I hope, at length remov’d those Difficulties, which seem’d to weaken some Part of my Method of deducing the Laws of Nature, and their Obligation; let us now proceed to examine Hobbes’s Principles, by which “he endeavours to destroy intirely all Obligation of the Laws of Nature to external Actions, and so leaves them only the Name of Laws, and that but improperly; and allows every one a Right in the State of Nature to violate them at pleasure, that is, as often as the Authority of the State is either silent, or can be evaded.”123 He offers only one Reason in the Places referr’d to, for wholly denying their Obligation, in that State, to external Actions; Because “we cannot be secure, that others will observe them, in those things which respect our Preservation”; Hence he infers, “That every one’s whole Hope of Security consists in this, that he should prevent his Neighbour by his own Force or Contrivance, either openlyor treacherously.” This is that unanswerable Argument, which he thinks strong enough to break intirely the whole Force of the Laws of Nature, out of the bounds of Civil Society. For, tho’ he would seem to leave them some Power, to oblige in the internal Court of Conscience to the Study of Peace, it is evident, that he expresses himself thus, only to throw a Mist before the Eyes of his unwary Reader; for, since almost all the Laws of Nature relate only to external Acts, and impose only these Commands, “Not to arrogate all things by such Acts, but to abstain from hurting the Innocent, to observe Compacts, make grateful Returns for Benefits receiv’d,” &c. he must be blind who does not see, that the Force of these Laws is wholly taken away, where he contends, that external Actions contrary to these may be lawfully done, as in the Places above quoted, and Chap. 14. §. 9.124 and elsewhere. I answer therefore,

  That Reason insufficient: For 1. Perfect Security is not necessary, to make an Obligation valid; andFirst, “That there is no Necessity of Security, (especially such as is free from all Cause of Fear,) that others shall likewise observe the Laws of Nature, in order to oblige us to external Actions in conformity to them.” The Will of the First Cause, when discover’d, by which he adds his Sanction to these Laws enjoining external Action, is in it self a sufficient Cause of Obligation to such Actions; and whilst that continues, the Obligation cannot be taken away; (the Divine Will, with respect to this, may be known by those Methods, which I have already explain’d;) altho’ the Manners of many are so deprav’d, that they often return Evil for Good.

  is not afforded by Civil Government, whose Laws are confess’d to oblige to external Acts; andThis will be made clearer by a Comparison with the Obligation of Civil Laws, by which Mr. Hobbes himself will not deny, that all Subjects are bound to external Obedience. Now, tho’ all Men are not subject to the same Human Government, they are all Members of the great Society of Rational Agents, whose Governor is God. And it is obvious, “That they who are subject to the same Human Government, cannot be perfectly Secure, either that their Fellow-Subjects will observe the Laws of the State, by abstaining from Rebellion, and all Invasion of another’s property, or that their chief Governor will be both able to punish the Transgressors of his Laws, (especially when Factions happen to be powerful,) and willing to take the greatest care he can of the Publick Good.” The most Cautious of those, who have thrown off all sense of Religion, think, “If it be probable, that the Magistrate both can and will secure the Authority of his Laws, by protecting the Obedient, and punishing the Disobedient, that there is all the Security necessary to oblige us to observe those Laws.” Men of Piety towards God, (who are incomparably the best Subjects,) do indeed go farther, and think “The Obligation of Civil Laws sufficiently firm, altho’ both the Power of the Magistrate should be suspected, and his Will prove defective, with respect to many points of his Duty, provided that from their Obedience they procure to themselves Tranquillity of Mind, and a well-grounded Hope of the Divine Favour”; or (in a word) “whilst the natural Proofs of Obligation to promote the Common Good remain unshaken.” From this Comparison it is therefore evident, “That, if Hobbes’s Reasoning were conclusive, all Obligation of Civil Laws would at the same time be destroy’d”; and it is impossible, but that their Force should be enervated by all Principles, which destroy or lessen the Force of the Laws of Nature, because in these is founded, both the Authority and Security of Civil Government, and the Energy of Civil Laws.

  is an Impossibility.I add; Whoever requires absolute or perfect Security, concerning future Human Actions, whether in a State of Nature, or under Civil Government, requires an Impossibility; for the Actions of Men are in their own Nature Contingent.

  2. There is a greater comparative Security in the State of Nature, by observing its Laws in our External Actions, than by entering into Hobbes’s State of War.§LI. Secondly, if by Security be meant a State of greater Freedom from fear and hazard of Misery; I affirm, (and the Proof appears from what I have said concerning the Indications of Obligation,) “That God has manifested to all, that, even out of Civil Society, he will be freer from all kind of Evils consider’d together, who shall constantly observe the Laws of Nature by external Actions, than he, who, according to Mr. Hobbes’s Doctrine, shall aim at Security to himself, by endeavouring to prevent all others by Force or Fraud”;125 and therefore, “this comparative Security is afforded by God to all, even consider’d in a State of Nature.”

  In the Comparison, all Evils and Dangers should be taken into the account.We must, however, when we compare the Dangers or Security of the Just (such are they only, who observe the Laws of Nature, even in their external Actions) and of the Unjust, in order to observe which of them has the greatest Security, take into the account, not only those Evils, which both are liable to from other Men; but those also, which the Unjust bring upon themselves, by an inconstant and inconsistent manner of Life, by irregular Affections, Envy, Anger, Intemperance, &c. and those beside, which may with reason be fear’d from God. Nor are these to be compar’d in one Case, or in a few Circumstances only, but in all Cases and Circumstances which can happen through the whole course of our Existence: For it is otherwise impossible we should form a true Judgment, which State of Life, whether uniform Justice, or Injustice in all its inconsistent Forms, be most secure. I have already prov’d, “That their Condition is the Happiest, who steddily observe the Law of Nature in all their Actions”; and I will not repeat the Proof.

  Hobbes, inconsistently with his own Scheme, acknowledges some Things, that shew our Obligation to observe the Law of Nature in external Actions, viz. That they who do otherwise,However, I thought fit hereto add, “That Mr. Hobbes himself,(altho’, where he treats of the Security requisite to the Observance of the Laws of Nature, he insists wholly upon Security from the Invasion of other Men, and contends, because that is not to be had, that therefore no-one is oblig’d to external Acts of Justice, but that every one has a Right to all Things, and a Right of Warring against every one, Chap. 5. §. 1.126 ) elsewhere, as it were forgetting himself, acknowledges some things, but very sparingly, which prove him sensible of a sufficient Obligation, even to an external Conformity with the Law of Nature, lest we should fall into other Evils, beside those which may be apprehended from the Invasion of Men.” As for Example, when he endeavours to prove, “That we ought to keep Faith with all,” (De Cive C. 3. §. 2, 3.) he gives this Reason, That “he who breaks his Compact, falls into a Contradiction”; which he acknowledges to be an absurdity in Human Practice.127 Since therefore, in this Instance, he allows it to be better, not to break, than to break,1. fall into a Contradiction a Compact, lest we fall into a Contradiction; what reason is there, why we may not infer Universally, “Concerning every Law of Nature, and its Obligation, even to external Actions, that it is better, not to violate it by any external Actions in the State of Nature, than to violate it; because the Violation thereof necessarily brings along with it a Contradiction and Absurdity in Practice?” For whoever diligently considers the Nature of all Beings, especially Rational, must acknowledge, that all his possible Happiness naturally depends upon the Common Happiness, as upon its adequate Cause; and he wills, therefore, to seek them both jointly: But, whensoever he breaks any Law of Nature, he wills to separate his own Good from that of the Publick, which implies a Contradiction, and raises a Civil War in the breast of Man, and miserably disturbs his Tranquillity. That Misery is no contemptible Part of the Punishment naturally inflicted for Crimes, and destroys the Security of the Criminal.

  2. bring on themselves Punishments annex’d by God to such Violation in the ordinary Course of Nature.Of a piece with this is what he acknowledges (Leviath. Chap. 31. §. last but one), “That there are Natural Punishments, with which, Transgressions of the Laws of Nature are punish’d in the ordinary Course of Nature”; and in the English Edition he expressly acknowledges them to proceed from God; so Violence is punish’d by foreign Force, Intemperance by Diseases, &c. In the Latin Edition this Passage is somewhat maim’d; yet there he acknowledges Natural Punishments.128 But, if these Punishments follow the Violations of the Laws of Nature by external Actions, from the inseparable Connexion of Things appointed by God, without all doubt these Laws will oblige Men to external Actions conformable to them. For Punishment cannot be inflicted upon any one for an Action to which he was not oblig’d; and Security is in vain fought for by preventing others by Force or Fraud, if God has appointed a Punishment to such an Invasion.

  Tho’ Security were to be estimated, in relation only to Hazards from Men; the external Observance of the Law of Nature were a more probable way of obtaining it, than a violent or fraudulent Prevention of others.§LII. Altho’ the Security of Just Men were to be estimated from the consideration of those Hazards only, which might be expected from other Men, (which, however, is very false;) I think it evident, “That there remains more Security to all Just Men, consider’d thro’ all the parts of Life, than to all Unjust Men who would seek for Security, according to Hobbes’s Advice, by preventing others by Force or Fraud, if all Circumstances relating to them be likewise consider’d.” Nor do some Examples to the contrary prove it to be otherwise; two Sices have been often thrown at the first Cast of two Dice, tho’ it is certain, there are 35 Chances to that one.129

  Because I have before prov’d this at large, I will here add only two Arguments, which bear particularly hard upon Mr. Hobbes.

  1. From the Presumption of Civil Laws, “That Men are Good, ’till the contrary be prov’d.”The first of these is suggested by the Presumption of Civil Laws in our own and all other States; which shews, what Rulers think of Human Nature. Every Man is presum’d to be good, ’till the contrary be prov’d fromsome Action sufficiently testified. But, because Mr. Hobbes every where affirms, “That the Reason of the State, or of the supreme Magistrate, only is right and true”; he must needs acknowledge, “That other Men ought not to be esteem’d so grossly wicked, that we should kill them, tho’ yet innocent, for our own Security.” They ought rather to be reckon’d so good, that we may safely keep Faith and Peace with them; safer certainly, than by rushing into a War against All. This Presumption is of greater force against Hobbes, because he resolves that Security, which he acknowledges to be found sufficient in Civil States, into those Punishments, by which the Magistrates restrain all Invaders of the Rights of others. Now it is certain, no Punishments are inflicted in any Government, but according to the Sentence of Judges, who always give Judgment according to this Presumption. Either therefore this Presumption is true, and, consequently, fit to direct Actions in the State of Nature, or there is not even in Civil States a sufficient Security afforded, by Punishments inflicted only according to this Presumption; and, consequently, even Civil Laws do not oblige to external Actions, and so all States would be dissolv’d. But we experience, “That Publick Judgments, given according to this Presumption, do for the most part secure the Life of Man; much more certainly, than if they presum’d all who were brought before their Tribunal to be publick Enemies, and adjudg’d them all to Death, by Hobbes’s method of Anticipation.” Whence it follows, “That even the private Judgments of particular Persons made concerning others, according to this Presumption, do conduce more to the Security of All, than that rash Presumption of Hobbes’s, which persuades to prevent all others by Force or Fraud.”

  2. From hence, that Hobbes’s Universal War is the necessary Consequence of an Universal Violation of the Laws of Nature in external Actions.§LIII. The second Argument which proves, “That the Violation of the Laws of Nature, by external Actions in order to prevent others, affords less Security, than an exact Observance of them,” is brought from this; “that from hence,” as Hobbes himself confesses, “will necessarily follow a War of each against all”; and the Consequence is undoubted, if all would take his advice, “that such a War would be inevitable, tho’ it were no where Just.” This War once suppos’d, he very justly acknowledges, “That all would immediately be most miserable, and quickly be destroy’d”; whence I infer, “That in vain is Security sought or hop’d for in this Method,” contrary to Hobbes’s Doctrine, who tells us, De Cive. C. 5. §. 1. and Leviath. Chap. 13. That, “While Men are afraid of one another, no Body can have a better Security, than by Prevention, so that every one should endeavour to oppress all others either by Violence or Fraud, while there are any remaining to be afraid of, ” that is, ’till there remains not one Man but himself, and the Earth is become the common Sepulchre of all the rest.130 No Man can procure Aid in this State, because mutual Compacts, by which only one can enter Society with others, will oblige no-one to external Actions in this State, de Cive. C. 2. §. 11.131 There is, therefore, no Security by this method of Anticipation: And therefore, if there be but the least Security in the Nature, Reason, or Conscience of Men, or, if but even a few of them do ever so little incline to promote the Common Good, (in which their own Happiness is contain’d,) they will spare the innocent and benevolent Person, who endeavours by outward Actions to deserve well of them all, and so his Security will be greater than can be expected by Anticipation, because that is certainly none at all.

  Nay, Hobbes himself acknowledges, “There may be one at least in his State of Nature, who, according to natural Equality, will permit to others the same undisturb’d Enjoyment of all Things which he claims to himself. ”132 Now, if but a few such Men should associate themselves by mutual Compacts, which they will acknowledge valid for the sake of that Common Good they all endeavour to promote, those few will easily defend themselves from all others at Enmity and War amongst themselves.

  Hobbes gives every Man a Right to commit Treason, which he asserts, not to be a Transgression of the Law Civil, but Natural, which, according to him, does not oblige to external Acts.That Hobbes did not perceive, “That those numberless Evils of a State of War of each against all, are sufficient to deter all in a State of Nature from that mad desire of preventing all others,” is very surprizing; because he has asserted nothing else beside the Evils of such a War, to deter Men, who have already erected themselves into a Civil State, from Treason and Sedition, by which the State is dissolv’d, and all Obligation of Civil Laws is taken away. For he contends, “That the Sin, which by the Law of Nature is Treason, is a Transgression of the Law of Nature, not of the Law of the State—and therefore, that Rebels and Traitors are punish’d, not as bad Subjects, but as Enemies of the State, not by Right of Empire, but by Right of War.”133 I take notice here by the way only, that those two Laws, that of the State, and that of Nature, are too crudely and rashly set in opposition to one another. Nay, it is dangerous, and tends to Sedition, to affirm, “That Treason is not a Transgression of the Law of the State, and that Rebels are not punish’d as evil Subjects, by Right of Empire”; but I will not here insist any longer upon this Point.134 I ask of Mr. Hobbes, “Whether this Punishment to be inflicted by Right of War, namely, Death, or the Hazard thereof, be a sufficient Proof, that the Law of Nature concerning keeping Compacts, and, in consequence, abstaining from Treason, is obligatory as to external Actions?” If he denies it, he allows a Right to commit Treason; and leaves no natural Proof, by which that Law can be known to oblige Subjects to abstain from Rebellion. If he affirms, “That this Punishment sufficiently proves the Obligation of Subjects to observe Compacts by external Actions,” let him tell me, “Why the same Punishment, to be inflicted in a State of Nature by a like Right of War, does not sufficiently prove a like Obligation to observe Compacts by external Actions with all others out of Society?” And the Reason is the same, with respect to all the other Laws of Nature. Hobbes is confus’d upon this Head; for in the Latin Edition of his Leviathan, in the last Consequence drawn from his Definition of Punishment, he expresses himself thus, “Harm inflicted upon one that is a declar’d Enemy, falls not under the Name of Punishment, because Enemies are not Subjects:Altho’ they had formerly been Subjects, yet, if they afterwards profess themselves Enemies, they suffer, not as Subjects, but as Enemies. From whence it follows, that, if a Subject shall by Fact or Word, wittingly and deliberately, deny the Authority of the Representative of the Common-Wealth, (whatsoever Penalty hath been formerly order’d by the Law for Treason,) he may be lawfully made to suffer by an arbitrary Punishment, as an Enemy, seeing he hath now profess’d himself an Enemy of the State.”135 In these Words there are many Passages deserving Censure, which yet all follow from what he had before advanc’d in his Treatise De Cive, in the Place above quoted136 : I will take notice of a few of them only. 1. He contradicts himself, when, in the Beginning of them, “He does not comprehend under the Name of Punishment the Evil inflicted upon an Enemy,” and at the latter End affirms, “That a Rebel, who has already declar’d himself an Enemy, is punish’d, as an Enemy, by an arbitrary Punishment”: For an arbitrary Punishment is comprehended under the Name of Punishment. 2. It deserves Censure, “That he would not have the Evil inflicted on an open Enemy called Punishment.” For it follows, “That the Evil inflicted upon a Rebel for Treason, because he has already declar’d himself an Enemy of the State, is not Punishment.” Certainly Punishment is nothing else than Evil inflicted for the Transgression of the Law; and he that denies Evil inflicted to be Punishment, denies it to be inflicted for a Crime, or Transgression of the Law; and insinuates, “That an Enemy, and consequently a Rebel, who is now become an Enemy, does not suffer for a Crime, or that he has either not broken any Law, or that he has not, for the Breach thereof, deserv’d Punishment.” And, truly, since all Enemies are in Hobbes’s State of Nature, he speaks agreeably to his own Principles, if he says they are not guilty of any Crime; because they have a Right to do any thing: But Rebels, according to his Doctrine, are Enemies, and, therefore, they are not to be charg’d with any Crime. Yet they may be put to Death Arbitrarily, but not punish’d, unless you would, with Hobbes, contradict what was said before. So unavoidably does Hobbes free Rebels from the Punishment and Guilt of their Crimes, who allows “to Enemies of all kinds a Right to all Things”; and denies, “that the Laws of Nature” (whereof Treason is one Transgression) “oblige to external Actions.” And he allows “no proper Punishment of Rebellion,” who denies, “that the Evils of War, into which any one hath thrown himself by violating the Laws of Nature, are Punishments”; and who contends, “that Hostile Anticipation, by Force and Fraud, which gives rise to such War, is the readiest way to Security.” I think, however, that I have prov’d, “That the external Acts of Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and the Aids which they procure, afford any one greater Security out of Civil Society; and that it is therefore better for all, even in a State of Nature, to abstain from invading others, than to endeavour to prevent them by Force or Fraud.”

  Farther; Hobbes Himself acknowledges, “That such comparative Security is sufficient to oblige to external Acts of Obedience to be paid to the Laws, not of Nature only, but also to all those of the State”; for, where he purposely describes this Security, he has these Words; “Nothing else can be contriv’d for this Purpose,” (namely, sufficient Security,) “but that every one should procure to himself sufficient aid, by which the Invasion of one another should be render’d so dangerous, that each should think it more adviseable to keep Peace, than make War.”137 It is evident, that this Security is not perfect, but that all its force consists in this, that, if the Dangers on both sides be fairly compar’d with one another, it may appear less hazardous, to keep Peace, than make War. Altho’ I readily grant, “That those Aids which may be procur’d in Civil Society by means of that Fidelity, which most Subjects are wont to yield their Magistrates, do generally render the Invasion of a Fellow-subject much more hazardous”; yet I affirm, “That, without this Assistance of Civil Aid, there is sufficient Reason, why every one should think it more adviseable to abstain from Invading others, than to engage in a War against all, for the sake of such things as are not necessary.” Hobbes must needs own “the Danger arising from such a War, greater than all other Dangers,” and therefore “sufficient to deter any one, in a State of Nature, from invading others”; because, upon his Principles, “the Prospect of Evils threatening all from such a War, is the only Reason which deters all, after they have enter’d into Civil Society, from trampling upon the Laws of the State, as well as of Nature, and from dissolving all States by Rebellion, and so relapsing into a State of Nature.”

  If “every Man be the sole Judge of Right and Wrong in his own Actions,” then Hobbes’s Distinction, “That the Laws of Nature oblige to Internal, but not to External, Actions,” is vain.§LIV. I see nothing that Hobbes can reply to this, except he will shelter himself under that Principle peculiar to himself, which I have already refuted; namely, “In this State every one is a Judge of his own Actions, whether they are done according to Right and Justice, or not: But he will affirm concerning the Violation of the Laws of Nature, That they are made in order to his own Preservation, and with the View of procuring Peace. Therefore they are rightfully made.”138 Thence is deriv’d what he adds, That “The Notion of Just and Unjust in the State of Nature, is not to be taken from the Actions, but from the Design and Conscience of the Agents. What is done thro’ Necessity, or a desire of Peace, or for Self-preservation, is rightfully done.”139

  1. If he will abide by that Opinion, I thus answer, “That, if this Principle could be depended upon, whoever had no Inclination to observe the Law of Nature in external Acts, needs not have recourse to this Distinction, which supposes him oblig’d to observe it in internal Acts only, that is, in the Approbation and Desire of his Mind.” For, since the Person himself is Judge, he may with equal safety allow, “That the Law obliges to external Acts,” and then either deny the Fact, or say, it was no Violation of the Law of Nature. For it is evident, That the Sentence of a Judge concerning Fact, is of no less validity than concerning Right, or the Law. It can as well make an unjust Fact, a Just one, or no Fact at all; as it can do what he says it does, give a Man a Right to do any thing against any one, for this reason only, because, “Since he himself is Judge, he thus determines concerning his Right, and concerning the use of things necessary to his own Preservation.” A cautious Deduction of the Laws of Nature is evidently in vain, whilst Mr. Hobbes’s Man continues in his State of Nature. For every Determination of his concerning things necessary to the Preservation of his Life, is a Law, and gives him a Right to do any thing, altho’ that very Determination should contradict a thousand others affirm’d by himself.

  2. Secondly, I suppose, what Hobbes himself supposes in this Deliberation, “That the Man has not yet come to any arbitrary and rash Resolution, but that he now doubts, and would make a cautious inquiry, whether it were better to keep Peace, or make War?” That is, supposing others to have an equal, or not much different Right, “Whether it would more probably contribute to his Happiness, Government being not yet settled, to cultivate Peace with others, by permitting them to enjoy all natural Advantages equally with himself, by lending them his Assistance, when it can be done conveniently; in a word, by acting according to the Laws of Nature?” Or rather “slighting the equal or proportional Right of others, to begin or continue against all indifferently an offensive War, in order to subject every thing to himself?” Truly, if I have any Judgment, the Question is not very difficult; for a Man of moderate Understanding will easily perceive, “That there can be no Safety in so unjust a War, which one wages against all; but that there is some, tho’ doubtful, Hope founded in the Dictates of Reason teaching all, that an universal Proposal and Pursuit of the Common Good as their End, would promote the Common Happiness,” and consequently, “that of all particular Persons.” This is likewise confirm’d by Experience. We have Instances of it in all bordering States, who can sometimes continue in Peace for a long time together, (as it is the Interest of all, so to do,) tho’ they have no common Superior but God.

  Hobbes denies, “That the Laws of Nature, even that of observing Compacts, obliges the Rulers of different States to external Actions conformable to them.” His Words are express, “The State of Independent Governments, with respect to one another, is a State of Nature, that is, of Hostility. Nor, if they cease to fight, is it therefore to be called Peace, but a Breathing-time; in which each Adversary, watching the Motions and Countenance of the other, judges of his Security, not from Compacts, but from the Force and Councils of his Adversary.”140 And elsewhere thus, to the same purpose; “What else are most Republicks but so many Camps mutually guarded and fortified against one another; whose State (because they are restrain’d by no common Power, notwithstanding the Intervention of uncertain Peace, like a short Truce) is to be esteem’d a State of Nature, that is, a State of War?”141 And again most expressly, to the same purpose, “That Compacts of mutual Faith, in a State of Nature, are vain and invalid; for, since by the Contract something is to be perform’d on both Sides, if either fear, that the other will not perform what he has promis’d, he is not bound to perform what he himself had covenanted to do first. But, whether his Fears be just, that the other will not perform, he who fears is himself the Judge.”142 Whence, according to his usual manner, he would conclude, “That he justly fears, whensoever he fears.” But this reason is so general, that, if it have any force, it would conclude, “That Compacts, not only in which nothing has been perform’d on either part, are invalid; but also those, in which any thing of moment remains yet to be perform’d by each Party.” For “He, who has no mind farther to perform his Contract, need only fear, (he may do it justly, since himself is Judge,) that the other will falsify his Promise; his reason therefore, which is always right, will not enjoin him to perform his Compact, but that will be plainly of no validity.” His requiring in the Note, a “new cause of Fear,”143 does not hinder Compacts to be invalid, if the Reason he brings in §. 11. holds good; for the Fear of another’s Non performance arises either from the remembrance of the evil Disposition of Mankind, which he who now fears had not sufficiently consider’d before the Compact; or he takes any the most innocent Act of the other for a sufficient Proof of his Intention, not to perform. Nor is there any thing in a State of Nature, which can make a fearful Man perfectly secure of the Fidelity of others, so as to oblige him to perform his Contract, which is an external Action, as Hobbes himself affirms, Chap. 5. §. 1, 2. and Chap. 7. §. 27.144“All Hope,” says he, “of Security is plac’d in the Power of preventing others by Force or Fraud.”145 This is that notable Discovery, in which Hobbes excels even his Master Epicurus, who thought he had sufficiently subverted Justice, when he asserted in his Maxims, “That there was no Justice among those Nations, who either could not, or would not, enter into mutual Compacts, neither to give nor receive Damage; but left the Force of Compacts unshaken, tho’ no common Governor presided over both Nations.”146Hobbes ascribes even this Force to his darling Passion, Fear, “That in a State of Nature,” (such as is that of different States,) “it may justly violate Compacts of mutual Faith.”

  The Security of Ambassadors, of Commerce, of the Rights of Hospitality, and of Leagues, is detroy’d by Hobbes.§LV. From this Doctrine it is easy to deduce the greatest Inconveniences to all Mankind. The Safety of Ambassadors, how innocent soever, is immediately destroy’d. The whole Force of Leagues between Princes and different States, is taken away; Hobbes expressly pronounces them “vain and invalid.” Finally, all Security of Merchants, and, consequently, all Commerce, with the Rights of Hospitality necessary to Travellers, are intirely overthrown; and there remains no Security to small States from the Power of the Greater. Consequences, all contrary to daily Experience; for we daily see Leagues enter’d into, to be perform’d at a distant Time, which are therefore “Compacts,” as he calls them, “of mutual Faith.” Nay, Ambassadors, Merchants, and other Travellers into foreign States, are safe enough, altho’, according to this Doctrine, they are Enemies, and have put themselves in the Power of Foreigners: For Hobbes reasons thus, “That Foreigners, as being stronger, may justly compel these being weaker to give Security for their future Obedience,” (except they would rather die;) and that “nothing can be thought of more absurd, than by letting him go, to make him at once both strong and an Enemy, whom you have weak in your Power.”147 These Words, “Security for their future Obedience,” plainly enough insinuate what he afterwards expressly declares, “That no Security seems to him sufficient, but that Union, by which Men become Members of the same State, and in all things subject to the same Government”;148 which how ill it agrees with the Rights of Ambassadors and of Commerce, every one sees. But, if all Ambassadors and others who Travel abroad, both could rightfully, and would, subject themselves to others in all respects; no Law of Nature (according to Hobbes’s Doctrine) could oblige Foreigners to any external Acts of Benevolence, but it would be free for them to chuse, “Whether they would signify by any external Act, their acceptance of this Surrender, or would rather feast their Eyes with the Blood of Innocents.” These Consequences, I suppose, will not move Mr. Hobbes, or those his Disciples, who are throughly instructed in the more hidden Mysteries of his Philosophy. For these, and innumerable other such, Corollaries they both plainly perceive, and earnestly desire: However, I thought it proper slightly to glance at them, and expose them to view, that they whose Tastes are not yet so throughly deprav’d may try, whether their Reason, and every thing Human about them, is not shock’d at such monstrous Opinions.

  Innumerable Advantages, both to private Persons and to States, without the Influence of Civil Society, from observing the Laws of Nature.My present View is only to prove from the Actions of Men, as from Effects known by Observation and constant Experience, “That there generally accrue greater Advantages, both to every particular Person (abstractedly from the Influence of Civil Society,) and to different States, from Innocence, Gratitude, Fidelity, Humanity, and other Virtues enjoin’d by the Law of Nature, than from Violence, Ingratitude, Perfidiousness, and other Vices thereby forbid; that our natural Obligation to observe these Laws in our external Actions, may evidently appear, not only from the intrinsecal Pleasures of Virtue, but from these Advantages, as from a natural Reward; and from the opposite Evils annex’d as Punishments to such Actions, by the very Nature of Men.” We see great Numbers, who are not particularly Interested, run voluntarily to extinguish a House a-fire, without any constraint of the Civil Laws. We see daily, Lies, Frauds, Oppression, that have never been brought before, much less punish’d by, a Court of Judicature, render their Authors so odious, often so contemptible and wretched, that the very Disgrace and the Difficulties, and want of Friends, consequent there on, are justly reckon’d among their Punishments. It has also often happen’d, that they, whose Crimes have justly render’d them odious, have prefer’d Death to Life with Infamy; and that others (wickedly enough inclin’d) abstain from many Crimes, merely to avoid Infamy: In like manner we may observe, that Obedience to the Laws of Nature obtain’d in Heathen Rome the name of Honestas, from that Honour which most are wont to confer upon good Men, without the Injunction of Civil Laws. Innumerable are the Advantages, which, without the Authority of the Laws, at the pleasure of private Persons only, daily accrue to the Innocent, Grateful, Faithful, and Benevolent, rather than to the Wicked,(as in the Contracts of doing Business for them gratuitously, being Bound, or giving Pledges for them, of Lending them without Interest, and of Partnerships with them; or in taking Care of their Families as Executors, or even in making them their Heirs or Legatees:) and these sufficiently shew, “That Men naturally incline to reward Virtue.” As for different States, which are perfectly in a State of Nature, it is evident, 1. Tho’ sometimes Wars happen between them, that they are not therefore on both Sides just, which both the contending Parties confess, tho’ one Side only can justly wage War.149 And 2. which I here chiefly regard, That no-one ever yet saw, or has met with it in the most antient Records, that All States waged War against All, which yet Hobbes boasts that he has demonstrated.150 3. Nay, we see that many States have for many Years most religiously observ’d Leagues of mutual Faith with other States, to the Improvement and carrying on in time of Peace, a Commerce very advantageous to both sides, and that they have mutually assisted one another, as occasion requir’d in War, tho’ they thereby expos’d themselves to Danger. This is so notorious, that it would be superfluous to quote Examples from History, since there has scarce ever been any considerable War carried on, but that on one side at least, if not on both, Confederates from other States have undergone some part of the Hazard.

  No State should either be establish’d or preserv’d by such Men, as Mr. Hobbes contends that all men are.§LVI. To this, if any one thinks fit to reply, “That this is done, in order to balance in some measure the Powers of different States, for fear they themselves should at length be destroy’d by the overgrown Greatness of any one”; I answer, “That in this place I inquire concerning Fact only, whether it be usual for Men, in a State of Nature, to do good Offices to one another, and to perform Compacts of mutual Faith, even when accompanied with Hazard”; and that, from this Fact allow’d, I would infer, “That like Things may in like Cases with probability be expected from Men; and that, therefore, Compacts of mutual Faith, even in that State, are not in vain; and that he does not act unreasonably, who first performs what he covenanted to do.” I prove this Fact, and draw this Inference, in order to shew, “That one Man may reasonably do the first good Office to another (tho’ subject to a different State,) and lies under no necessity to invade him, as a threatening Beast of Prey.” Hobbes indeed alledges, “That one Man is a Wolf to another,” (except they be both under the same Civil Government,) in a stricter sense than that of the Proverb; so that, in our first Intercourse with others, we should necessarily be as Savage as Brutes. (see his Epistle Dedicatory to his Treatise De Cive.151 ) But this Expression is in the Epistolary manner, too soft, too full of Compliment. He tells us afterwards, where he is Philosophizing strictly, “That Man exceeds Wolves, Bears, Serpents, (who are ravenous only to satify their Hunger, and upon Provocation,) in Rapacity and Cruelty.”152 I look upon these Expressions as unjust Reproaches of Mankind, (whether justly or no, let any Reader of Humanity judge,) and contrary to all Experience. Yet upon these Principles has Hobbes built all his Politicks.

  And, if they were true, it were evidently impossible, “To reduce such Beasts of Prey, always thirsting after the Blood of their Fellows, into a Civil State.” For Hobbes’s Method of effecting this by Compacts, “by which each Individual is said to transfer to the Magistrate his Right of resisting,” will effect nothing. For such Animals cannot be so contain’d within the bounds of their Duty, by the Conscience of Compacts or Promises, but that they would immediately re-demand and resume the Power before conferr’d upon the Prince. But, if the greatest Part of the Subjects have a mind to make void those Compacts, by which they had constituted a Prince, the whole Force of restraining by Punishments the Violation of plighted Faith, vanishes; on account of which Force only, Hobbes contends, that Compacts are binding in Civil Society, which in a State of Nature did not oblige to external Actions. If Men were as Faithless as he represents them, they could contribute no Power to the Prince whom they had chosen, either to punish Rebellion against himself, or Injuries done his Subjects; and, therefore, according to his Principles, a State would almost as soon be dissolv’d for want of Security, as it had been establish’d, and all would relapse into that State of War, which he pretends to be Natural.

  Upon Hobbes’s Principles, the obligatory Force of Compacts cannot be accounted for.)It is necessary, “That Compacts should oblige to those external Acts, which gave and continue to the Prince the Power of punishing the Transgressors of his Laws.” But “these Compacts cannot receive this obligatory Force from the Prince already establish’d and continued.” For the Powers of the Cause are prior to the Powers of the Effect produc’d by that Cause; it is therefore necessary, “that the Force of those Compacts, by which a State is establish’d, should be resolv’d into something prior, both in Nature and in Time, to that Power of punishing, which a State has after it is establish’d.” Nor can any adequate Cause of such an Effect be found, except the Nature of Men, and the Will and Nature of the First Cause thence in some measure discover’d. If these be not sufficient to produce in the Mind of every Man, a knowledge of, and reverence for, the Laws of Nature; and to model even his outward Behaviour to Innocence, Fidelity, and Gratitude; it is in vain to expect that a bad Man will become a good Subject. When the Foundation is undermin’d, the Building, however elegant, rais’d thereon, falls to the ground; and vitiated Chyle can never become healthful Blood.153 So much may suffice for the Definition and Obligation of the Laws of Nature in General.

  From the foregoing Data is concluded, That there is given one Fundamental Law of Nature, That the Common Good of Rational Beings is to be promoted.§LVII. I will here lay before the Reader the Substance of what I have advanc’d upon this Head, reduc’d into one Proposition, in imitation of Euclid’s Data, (which are best adapted to Practice,) That, it appearing manifestly from the Nature of Things, that the Common Good of Rational Beings is the greatest Good in the Power of Man; and that the diligent Pursuit thereof will be naturally rewarded with the greatest Happiness attainable by each particular Person, and, on the contrary, that the neglect thereof will be punish’d with Misery proportionable: it appears evidently, That it was the Will of the First Cause, to oblige Men to a diligent Pursuit of that Good: Or, which comes to the same Thing, There is given a Promulgationof the first and most general Law of Nature. Or thus briefly, There being given a Knowledge of the necessary Dependence of the Happiness of particular Persons, upon the Pursuit of the Common Good; it appears evidently, That each particular Person is oblig’d to pursue that Good. This Proposition is prov’d evidently, from the bare Definitions which I have already given of the Law of Nature, and of Obligation.

  The Phenomena of Nature relating to that Proposition reduc’d into one Lemma.That all these Things are Given or appear manifestly, which are suppos’d in the Subject of this Proposition, I have abundantly prov’d from the Phenomena of the Nature of all Things, and especially of Man; the Sum of which is contain’d in this Fundamental Lemma. He who, as far as is in his Power, best consults the Good of the whole Body of Rational Agents, does, likewise, best consult the Good of those Parts of that Whole, which are essential thereto, and receive all from its Influence; and, consequently, of himself in particular: Because, for the most part, it is in the Power of any one to contribute more to the flourishing Condition of his own Mind and Body, without hurting others, than to that of any other; and this increases the Happiness of the whole aggregate Body.

  The Lemma prov’d, as to the external Causes of Happiness.It is very well known, “That the Happiness, especially the External, of every Individual, depends upon the Aid, or at least upon the Permission, of almost all other Rational Beings, at least remotely, and in part.” We find by Experience, “That the Will of the First Cause has so complicated all the Parts and Powers of the System of the World, that there is nothing which may not give either Force or Opposition to any other Body whatsoever, either now or hereafter.” This Complication is yet more conspicuous in Human Powers, because their Faculties are more extensive, upon account of the additional Force, which the Powers of our Mind give to our Bodily Motions. I cannot illustrate this Point better, than by a Comparison with a Balance. It is evident, that the smallest Particles of a Weight laid in one Scale, contribute something to the Counterpoizing an equal Weight, how great soever, laid in the opposite Scale; it adds both Force to its own Side, and Opposition to the contrary. So, in Nature, according to the Aristotelian Hypothesis, every Particle of the Earth contributes something to the Poizing the whole Earth upon its Center: Or, if the Cartesian Hypothesis seem more Philosophical, every Part of this Vortex, in which we are whirl’d, is, as it were, in a Balance reverse, upon account of the Centrifugal Force of all the Parts; and, in Proportion to its quantity of Matter and Motion, contributes somewhat to that Equilibrium or Poize between the Parts of the whole System jointly consider’d, by which the whole System is preserv’d.154In like manner Politicians are wont to consider the Powers of different States, as counterpoizing one another; to which it is owing, that they are not able to destroy one another. Just so, if particular Men be consider’d without any Common Governor, to which they are subject, (which is the Case of different States,) yet there is a certain Proportion between those natural Powers of Defence and their natural Necessities: And the same Arguments, which move different States to exercise mutual Commerce, and to confederate against Common Enemies, and to endeavour to prevent one’s destroying the rest, would likewise prevail with Individuals to enter into Compacts, by which their mutual Happiness may be both secur’d and increas’d.

  The Resemblance between the Cases and Conditions of all Men, is plainly Natural; and it is equally Natural for them to reason from the Dangers, as well as from the Advantages, which they observe happen to those like themselves, to like Events which may happen to themselves also. Hence all are mov’d with Hope and Fear, by means of what happens to those in like Circumstances, and unavoidably think, that he threatens them with immediate Danger, whom they see invade the Innocent; and look upon the Foundations of their own Security to be destroy’d by him, who breaks thro’ the bonds of Compacts, or of Gratitude. It is no less Natural to a Man, to be mov’d with an Argument drawn from the likeness of Cases, than it is Natural for Bodies, to be mov’d by a stroke, or a weight; for to Man, Reason is equally Natural. Nor would it be difficult to prove, “That all our Reasoning, with respect to Futurity, (by which only, deliberate Human Actions are regulated,) is drawn from such a Resemblance between Causes and their Effects, past and future.” The Condition, therefore, of their Nature will incline Individuals, to preserve Innocence, keep Faith, and exercise Gratitude. By these Methods the Powers of some will of necessity be counterpoiz’d by others; and some Friendships will be establish’d, on which the Foundations of Societies may be laid. These Methods of acting may happen, indeed, to be slighted by some for a time, and in some particular Instances; but it is certain, whenever they do so, they divest themselves, even of Reason it-self, or of the far better part of Human Nature. And the same Principles return to them, as certainly as repuls’d Nature (that is, Reason blinded for a time) returns, or as they return to themselves.155Reason therefore, which is Natural, led by the natural Resemblance of Men, inclines Men for the most part, (for the general Principles of Reason for the most part prevail among them,) to assist one another mutually, but especially to repay, to the utmost of their Power, the Benefits which they have receiv’d at the hands of others. I have laid down these Observations, in order to shew the Reason, “Why I consider’d all Mankind as one Whole, whose Parts are in some measure connected, by an obvious Resemblance of Nature and Necessities; and that there is a Probability of procuring Friendship among them, especially after one has begun, by Benevolence, to deserve well at their hands.”

  As to the internal Causes of Happiness.§LVIII. The Truth of the foregoing Lemma, altho’ it be made manifest from these and other foregoing Observations, with respect to the outward Helps of Human Happiness, appears yet more clearly in those parts of our Happiness, which lie principally in every Man’s own Power; that is, in a Tranquillity of Mind consistent with it-self in all things, in the Government of the Passions, and the pleasing Reflexion upon good Actions, or a Joy, that it has with its utmost endeavours pursu’d the best End, by the properest Means; and in a well-grounded Hope of the Divine Favour.

  Other Advantages, which we cannot procure by Benevolent Actions, are excluded, as things not in our Power, by the very Words of the Lemma, whose Truth therefore they cannot render uncertain, tho’ they themselves be uncertain. For it is not to be expected, “That things impossible to Man should be natural Rewards of Human Actions promoting the Common Good”: It is abundantly sufficient to prove, “That the Author of Nature would oblige us to promote the Common Good”; because “He has ascertain’d the Rewards I have mention’d; and has beside given a greater Certainty, that we shall, by this Method, procure the Benevolence and Assistance of Men, than that we should secure our-selves by attacking all others by Force or Fraud.” These Effects of the Actions of other Men, are in their own Nature contingent, and, therefore, Human Reason performs its part, if it directs us to make that Choice, which will most probably happen. The value of a probable Gain is certain, (as is evident, not only in Games of Hazard, but also in Agriculture, Merchandize, and in almost every thing, about which Human Industry is employ’d;) and this is the natural Reward of the more prudent Choice. Altho’ therefore he who has aim’d at securing himself by Hobbes’s Methods of Force and Fraud, may sometimes escape Mischiefs, which Prudence would rather expect should have overwhelm’d him; or may even procure some Advantages, which he who acts more prudently may fall short of; yet these Events do not prove, that his Reasonings were more Just, nor that Nature generally bestows these Rewards upon such Actions. Just as it may happen, “That he who has undertaken to throw two Sices at the first Cast with two Dice, may get the better of him who laid an equal Wager, that he would not do it”; yet it is demonstrable, from the Nature or cubical Figure of a Die, “That the odds are 35 to one; and that therefore the Expectation of the one is worth so much more than that of the other; and that this difference between the Value of the Chances may be justly esteem’d as the Advantage or natural Reward of the more prudent Choice.”156 The like Judgment is to be made of Damage, in the Nature of Punishment, sustain’d by an imprudent Choice. But, if an Illustration from Nature would be more agreeable, (tho’ here the matter cannot be reduc’d to exact Calculation,) it is at hand. The Stomach and Intestines by digesting the Nourishment, the Liver by separating the Bile, the Heart by its Contraction and Dilatation, are of immediate use to the Health of the whole Body, and at the same time preserve their own sound State in the best manner they are able: Yet it may happen, thro’ the Disease or Defect of other Parts, that they may be defrauded of their due Nourishment, without any Fault of their own. But, because that will more certainly be effected, if they be wanting to the whole Body, the Preservation they generally gain by performing their Offices, is a kind of Image of a Natural Reward, and may therefore serve to illustrate our purpose.

  The knowledge of this Lemma imprinted on our Minds, by the Will of the First Cause,But, because the knowledge of this most certain Lemma, as that of all other Truths concerning Causes and their natural Effects, is imprinted upon the Mind of Man from the Nature of Things, by the Determination of the First Cause; it is evident, “That His Will discovers this Truth to us.”

  who therefore persuades to Universal Benevolence,Farther; Since the assent given to this Lemma naturally persuades and inclines us, to procure the Publick Good; it is equally true, “That the First Cause persuades the same thing in this manner.” There is no danger of our making the First Cause the Author of any Evil, whilst we esteem him the Cause of Natural and Necessary Effects only. For all Moral Evils come thro’ the Interposition of Human Ignorance, Inadvertency, or Rashness, arising from the Abuse of our Liberty. “The First Cause, therefore, persuades whatever the Judgment of Right, that is, True Reason persuades, concerning what is necessary to obtain this chief End by the properest Means.”

  nay commands it.But “His Admonition, who persuades by Arguments drawn from the greatest Rewards and Punishments, which he himself, who is superior to all in Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, has annex’d to our Actions, according as they are agreeable or disagreeable to his Admonitions, is a Law”; and for this very reason, “He who thus persuades is a Law-giver.” What the Roman Senate judg’d was best to be done, tho’ it did not pass into a Law, thro’ a defect in the Number of those who were conven’d, or in the Place, or in the Time, or because of the Interposition of a Tribune, claim’d the respect due to Authority, as Dion Cassius declares, Lib. 5.157 How much rather ought that to be look’d upon as enforc’d by Authority, which the First Cause has, without any defect, discover’d as best to be done for the Common Good, and establish’d by the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments, altho’ by the Nature of Second Causes, which he himself has limited and determin’d? For his Will, for this very Reason, that it is the First, is the Supreme Cause, the Wisest, Best, and most Powerful; for other Causes can have nothing but what they receiv’d from him: And, because of his Infinite Perfection, his Will cannot disagree with the Dictates of his Understanding.

  From what I have laid down it is easy to shew, “How the Laws of Nature, defin’d as above, have the Power of Commanding, Forbidding, Permitting, &c.” Nor is it difficult to reconcile my Definition with those to be met with in the most approv’d Authors, by a proper Interpretation of those doubtful Expressions, which they have made use of. But these Points I thought fit to leave to the Industry of the Reader.

  General Remarks on Chapter V

  The Nature of Things in the Natural World is so exactly fitted to the Natural Faculties and Dispositions of Mankind, that were any Thing in either otherwise than it is, even in Degree, Mankind would be less Happy than they now are. Thus the Dependence of all natural Effects upon a few simple Principles is wonderfully Advantageous in many respects. The Degrees of all the sensible Pleasures are exactly suited to the Use of each: So that, if we enjoy’d any of them in a greater Degree, we should be less Happy; for our Appetites of those Pleasures would by that means be too strong for our Reason; and, as we are framed, tempt us to an immoderate Enjoyment of them, so as to prejudice our Bodies. And where we enjoy some of them in so high a Degree, as that it is in many Cases very difficult for the strongest to regulate and moderate the Appetites of those Pleasures, it is in such Instances where it was necessary to counterpoize some Disadvantages, which are the Consequences of the pursuit of those Pleasures. Thus the pleasing Ideas, which accompany the Love of the Sexes, are necessary to be possess’d in so high a Degree, to balance the Cares of Matrimony, and also the Pains of Child-bearing in the Female Sex. The same may be said of our Intellectual Pleasures. Thus, did we receive a greater Pleasure from Benevolence, Sloth would be encouraged by an immoderate Bounty. And, were the Pleasures of our Inquiries into Truth greater, we should be too speculative and less active. It seems also probable, That the Degree of our Intellectual Capacity is very well suited to our Objects of Knowledge; and that, had we a greater Degree thereof, all other Things remaining as they are, we should be less Happy. Moreover; it is probably so adapted to the inward Frame of our Bodies, that it could not be greater, without either an Alteration in the Laws of Nature, or in the Laws of Union between the Soul and Body. Farther; were it much greater than it is, our Thoughts and Pursuits would be so spiritual and refined, that we should be taken too much off from the sensible Pleasures. We should, probably, be conscious of some Defects or Wants in our Bodily Organs, and would be sensible, that they were unequal to so great a Capacity, which would necessarily be follow’d by uneasiness of Mind. And this seems to hold in the Brute Creation. For methinks it would be for the Disadvantage of a Horse, to be endued with the Understanding of a Man. Such an unequal Union must be attended with continual Disquietudes and Discontents. As for our Pains, they are all either Warnings against Bodily Disorders, or are such as had we wanted them, the Laws of Nature remaining as they are, we should either have wanted some Pleasures we now enjoy, or have possessed them in a less Degree. Those Things in Nature, which we can’t reconcile to the foregoing Opinion, as being ignorant of their use, we have good reason from Analogy, to believe are really Advantageous and adapted to the Happiness of the Intelligent Beings of the System; tho’ we have not so full and compleat a Knowledge of the intire System; as to be able to point out their particular Uses. From these Observations we may conclude, “That all the various Parts of our System are so admirably suited to one another, and the Whole contrived with such exquisite Wisdom, that, were any Thing in any Part thereof in the least otherwise than it is, without an alteration in the Whole, there would be a less Sum of Happiness in the System, than there now is.” From this it follows, “That whatever would have added to our Happiness, consistently with the other Parts of our System, the Author of Nature has given us.” But we can’t imagine it impossible to Infinite Power, consistently with the other Parts of our System, to order the Consequences of Human Actions, and the Human Sourses of Pleasure in such a manner, as that Private should be perfectly connected with Publick Good. But this would contribute much to the Happiness of Mankind. Therefore there is such a Connexion. This Argument from Analogy, tho’ it is not a Demonstration, yet it is very strong, and obtains a very firm Assent. Our Belief, that the Human Bodies we daily see, are actuated by like Minds with our own, is founded upon the like Reasoning; together with numberless other Instances of Belief, which are so strong as not to be accompanied with the least Doubting.

  The Argument taken from the Benevolence of God, and express’d in this manner, is, I think, inconclusive.

  A perfect Connexion between Private and Publick Good would be for our Advantage. God is infinitely Benevolent. Therefore he has made such a Connexion.

  For this Argument will equally conclude, that he hath given us all possible Happiness. We have not a Knowledge of the Divine Motives to Action. But, if we would indulge our-selves in Conjectures of that kind, it is probable, That he takes pleasure, not only in the Happiness of his Creatures, but in the variety of their Happiness; and that he therefore hath created a great number of Systems, the Inhabitants of each of which differ from those of another, both in the Kind and Degree of their Happiness.

  II. I am of opinion, that the Author’s Scheme would have been more compleat, had he included Benevolence towards Brutes. First, because we can’t imagine, but that the Deity takes pleasure in the Happiness of all his Creatures, that are capable thereof. Neither can it be said, that the Benevolence of the Deity does not extend to them, because they are incapable of Law, and, consequently, of Rewards and Punishments. For it is highly probable, “That there are Species of Beings, whose Happiness does as much exceed ours upon the whole, as ours does that of the lowest Brute.” Farther; it is to me utterly inconceivable, that a Being, who is pleas’d with a great Degree of Happiness in another Being, shou’d not, from the same Constitution of Nature, be also pleas’d with a lesser.

  The second Reason for our Benevolence towards Brutes, is, that a merciful and compassionate Behaviour towards them, feeds and cherishes that natural Disposition; whereas a barbarous and cruel Treatment of those Creatures must undoubtedly have some Effect, to harden our Temper, even against Rational Beings. Every Man that examines his own breast, will find the same tender and benevolent Disposition, tho’ in a lesser Degree, towards the lowest and most imperfect Being, that is capable of Sensation, as towards those of his own Species.

  The third Reason is, that it adds to our own Happiness. A truly Benevolent Man receives pleasure, even from the Happiness of the Brute Creation. Nevertheless, it seems probable, that our Custom of killing them for Food, and of using their Labour in a moderate and merciful manner, is consistent with Benevolence, and agreeable to the Will of the Deity, because it is highly probable, that such a practice contributes to the Happiness of the whole of the sensitive System, which comprehends both Men and Brutes; besides, that Man seems to be form’d by Nature a Carnivorous Animal, see Barbeyrac (in his Notes on Puffendorf) upon this Head.158

  III. I shall subjoin the chief Advantages of Benevolence, that are mention’d by our Author, together with several others, that he has not taken notice of, that the Strength of his Reasoning may appear more forceable and collected.

  Acts of Benevolence are accompanied with Pleasure, but the contrary Actions with Pain. By the former is gain’d the Good Will, by the latter, the Evil Will of others. The former begets Self-approbation, and the latter Self-condemnation. By the smaller Faults against Benevolence, there is a Habit contracted, or at least the contrary Habit broken; and the Person becomes wavering and unsettled in his Actions, and for the most part guided by a narrow and short-sighted Self-Love. In the Execution of Benevolent Designs others concur, and by that means the Agent is seldom disappointed; but the Case is just the reverse in contrary Actions. Benevolence is an additional Spur to the Acquisition of Knowledge, and constant Industry is seldom excited by a bare Ambition. Benevolence has very frequent, almost perpetual, Occasions of Gratification, and that in the most common Affairs of Life; whereas the selfish Pleasures are small in number, of short duration, and infrequent, if compar’d with the Pleasures of Benevolence. By Actions of Malevolence there is a Habit of Indifference, with regard to the Happiness or Misery of others; for by Custom we not only become hard and insensible, with regard to the Misery of others, but we gain a Habit of thinking so much upon ourselves and our own Happiness, that our Thoughts are thereby engross’d and taken off from a regard to the Happiness of others. Therefore the Pleasure, which accompanies the Actions of Benevolence of a vitious Man, is far short of that, which accompanies the Benevolence of the habitually Virtuous. As the Pleasure of Benevolence is lessen’d by a contrary Habit, so it is much increas’d by a Habit of Benevolence. The Benevolence of the virtuous Man extends much farther than that of the Vitious; for the latter is so weak, that it seldom extends farther, than the Circle of his Acquaintance, whereas the former extends to all Mankind, and not only to his Contemporaries, but to latest Posterity. And for this reason also their Pleasures in Benevolence are vastly different. The truly Benevolent enjoy, even the selfish Pleasures with greater Advantage, from a Consciousness that they give Pleasure to others.

  The Contemplation of the Happiness of others, especially of those of superior Rank, often occasions Envy and Discontent, which arises from a reflexion upon our own Condition compar’d with that of others, whom we think more Happy. But to a truly Benevolent Man the Happiness of others gives real Delight, which takes up the Attention, and prevents the Sorrow and Uneasiness of the Malevolent. Many Actions which produce private Pleasure, are also productive of the Good of the Publick; so that in those Actions the Benevolent Man has a double Pleasure. The Malevolent Man not only wants all the above-mention’d Advantages, but wherever the Benevolent, as such, receives Pleasure, he receives real positive Pain.

  The Benevolent are at Peace with all Men, and enjoy the Advantages of good-Neighbourhood, not only in the common Offices, but often in extraordinary Cases; whereas the Malevolent not only want all those Advantages, but are disquieted by Feuds and Animosities, and do often suffer Injuries from their Enemies. One Offence generally introduces many others, either to defend or hide it; and one Malevolent Contention naturally introduces others, by which the Enmity is increas’d.

  The Tranquillity of Mind, which arises from Self-approbation is constant and uninterrupted, and disposes the Mind for the Enjoyment of all its other Pleasures, whereas most other Pleasures are of a short duration. And to a Man, who upon sedate Reflexion does not approve of his own Actions, his Pleasures are pursued in a broken, turbulent, and interrupted manner, and as it were by a War within a Man’s self; and, when past, give Uneasiness, when reflected on.

  CHAPTER VI

  Of those Things which are contain’d in the general Law of Nature.

  Two Questions propos’d. Having already establish’d the general Precept to promote the Common Good, it seems proper in what follows, to explain 1. What those Things are, which we comprehend within the Common Good? 2. What Actions any way tend to promote it, and are, therefore, directed by this Law?

  The first answer’d.As to the First, it may be sufficient to make the few following Additions to what I have already laid down in the Chapter concerning Good. Since the Parts of that System, whose Good we here chiefly consider, are God and Men, it follows, “That all those Things come under this Head, which are contain’d in the Honour, or Glory of GodThe Common Good comprehends the Honour of God, and the Good of Men, viz. of, and in the whole compass of the Happiness of Men, or what Things soever tend to the Perfection, either of their Minds, or Bodies.” But, because the aggregate Body of Mankind (as are generally such collective Bodies) is most naturally resolv’d, first into its greater Parts, these afterwards into smaller Ones, and those at last into the least of all; namely, first into different Nations, then into Families, and lastly into Men consider’d singly;Nations} collectively, singly; for the same Reason, those Things which are good for Mankind, are, some of them, profitable to whole Nations, or to many such, or to them all; such are the Points about which Moral Philosophy, and the Law of Nations, (which two are very nearly related,) are conversant;Families, Men,} singly. others are profitable to a single State, or to those who live under the same Civil Government, which are the Subject of their Civil Laws; others respect the Advantages of only one Family, with respect to which the Rules of Oeconomy prescribe: Lastly, there are other Advantages proper to one Man only, which are the Subject, as of Logick, and the Regimen of Health by Diet, so of all the abovementioned Arts; of Ethicks, as it limits the Actions of particular Persons regarding their own private Advantages, by the respect due to the Good of all rational Beings, namely, the Honour of God, and the Rights of all other Men; of Civil Laws, as they limit every one, with respect to the Good of the State; of Oeconomical Rules, with regard to the Care of their Family. Yet one general Law of Nature at once provides, both for the whole System of rational Beings, and its Parts, according to the Proportion which they bear to the Whole.

  The Good of the Greater Society ought to limit the Power and Actions of the Less.§II. It seems to have given Occasion to many Errors, “That some believ’d it the whole business of Ethicks, to instruct Man consider’d in a solitary State, without any respect to others”; whereas universal Justice, which is the Summary of all the Moral Virtues, almost wholly relates to others:1 Nay, if the Matter be throughly examin’d, it is evident, “That true Ethicks instructs Men to enter into, and keep up, the most enlarg’d Society with God and all Men.” Many of its Precepts do indeed abstract from the Consideration of Society, both Civil and Sacred, that is, are not limited to either; yet their Influence extends to every Society, and confers upon them all their chief Force and Ornament. For it is to be observ’d, “That all lesser Societies, their Powers and Actions, are limited with respect to the Good of the Greater and more worthy Society.” Thus States are oblig’d to enjoin nothing contrary to the Law of Nations, by which I understand those Natural Laws, by which the Actions of all States and private Men toward all of what State soever, are directed; or (if they are not yet consider’d as reduc’d into the Form of a State) such Laws of Nature as inforce an innocent Behaviour toward the Innocent, and Fidelity and Gratitude: In like Manner, neither are Civil Laws, by which the safety of the State is secur’d, to be violated, in order to promote the Advantages of a Family, much less of any one Man.

  The Good of the Whole is nothing else but Good communicated to all the Parts, according to their natural mutual Relation.§III. The Mind, while it rightly pursues these Advantages, proceeds wholly in the Analytick Method, from Things more compounded, to those that are more simple; that is, its first and principal Regard is to the Whole, the Parts are its second Care. Nor do they lose by this Method, they all reap their proportionable Share of Happiness from the Happiness of the Whole. For the Whole is nothing else but the Parts consider’d jointly, and in their proper Order and Relation to each other; and, consequently, “The Good of the Whole is nothing else but Good communicated to all the Parts, according to their natural mutual Relation.” Therefore, when it is requir’d, “That regard be first had to the Whole,” nothing more is intended, but “That we take Care in the first Place, that Fidelity, Gratitude, and the other Bonds of mutual Assistance, by which the Union and Order of all is establish’d and preserv’d, be not violated.” For by these, as by Blood-Vessels and Nerves, dispers’d thro’ the whole Body, the Parts of Mankind, like Members of the same Body, are united among themselves, and perform their mutual Offices; whether they be Members of the same State, or no. By means of these Ties, we often gain Wisdom by the Counsels and Prudence of others, become better by their Virtues, are enabled by their Strength to procure and preserve such Things as are of use to our-selves, and are enriched by their Wealth. But, because it is obvious, “That those Perfections of the Mind, which are distinguish’d by the Names of the intellectual and moral Virtues, and also the Powers of the Body, and Riches, are those Advantages, in Plenty whereof the Happiness of each particular Person is commonly and justly suppos’d to consist”; it follows, “That all these are common Advantages composing the Publick Happiness, when by observing Compacts, by Gratitude, Humanity, &c. they are thrown into the Publick Fund. He, I confess, encreases the common Stock of Happiness, who benefits even one, without hurting any other; but this cannot be deliberately done, without taking care, that the Rights of others be not violated; nor will this be taken care of, except we have universal Benevolence, which regards the Rights of God, of other Nations, our native Country, and Family; in all which consists the common Good of the Whole: This, therefore, must be taken care of, if we would innocently profit one; and the Care thereof will lead us to the Consideration and Observance of all Laws, (not Natural only, but Positive, which are promulged, whether Sacred, or Civil.) For it is certain, that all good Laws, nay, and all wise Admonitions of Parents, and Counsels of Philosophers, respect the same ultimate End; and do therefore, in proportion as they are more or less necessary to this End, and more or less evident from the Nature of Things, partake of the Force of natural Laws, or fall short thereof.

  The Author’s Method proper, however Societies were first form’d.§IV. Lastly, if any one should find fault, “That I suppose the collective Body of all Mankind distinguish’d into different Nations, States, and Families, without explaining their Origin out of a confus’d Chaos.” I answer, 1. That it is not necessary to suppose so confus’d a State of Mankind, in order to explain the Origin of States and Families; nay, that, in the Judgment of Reason only, it is most probable, “That Mankind, and, consequently, all States and Families, have descended from one Man and one Woman,”2 and that, therefore, all Authority derives its Original from that which is most Natural, the Paternal. 2. That, though no mutual Relation were suppos’d among all Mankind, yet my Method is sufficient to account for the Original of all, both greater and lesser, Societies; because it is naturally evident, “That it is both a necessary and principal Means to procure the Common Good, that the collective Body of Mankind, (if they were not all willing to form one State, which we do not perceive at present to be the Case,) should be divided into different Political Societies, all subordinate to God alone; and that these should be distributed into lesser Societies and Families; that by that means some Things should become the Property of particular Persons, to be by them laid out upon the Publick, according to the Rules hereafter to be deliver’d”: Just as if we should consider, in an unhatch’d Egg, the Condition of Matter and Motions of Particles, necessary to form the Animal; it is manifest, that this only is wanting to the common Perfection of them all, “That they should be form’d into the distinct Parts of an Animal, and then to each should be assign’d their proper Offices, subservient to the sound State of the Whole.” But as Physicians suppose the Parts of Animals already form’d, so Moral Philosophers suppose Societies already establish’d. Yet what I have laid down concerning the Origin of Dominion over Things necessary,3 laying aside the Knowledge of those Things which are deliver’d in Scripture, does in the same Method explain the Original of Dominion over Persons, both Paternal over Families, and Civil over States; and, in consequence, the fundamental Principles (which only Reason can reach) of the Rights necessary in every Society.

  The second Question answer’d. With respect to the Kind of Actions which promote the Common Good, they are all such as can be directed by Reason, &c. as Means to that End.§V. To the second Question, namely, “What Actions tend to promote the Common Good,” I give this general Answer. In my Opinion, “All Human Actions, as they can be regulated by Reason, Counsel, or any introduc’d Habit, as Means to the Common Good, do contribute to, or are Part of, the Pursuit thereof.” And they are either Acts of the Understanding, or Will and Affections, or Acts of the Body determin’d by the Will.4

  First then it is enjoin’d by the Law of Nature, (which commands us to pursue, to the utmost of our Power, the Common Good,) “That we should exert the natural Powers of our Understanding about all Things and Persons, which we can any way direct to this End, in order to acquire that Habit of Mind, which above all others conduces to it, and is called Prudence.”Hence is enjoyn’d in the Understanding Prudence in all Kinds of Actions relating to God and Man. Its Foundation lies in a true Knowledge of all Nature, but especially the rational Part thereof; its chief Parts are a Knowledge of the chief Ends, (of which the greatest is that we are inquiring after,) and a practical Knowledge of the Means conducing thereto. For the whole thereof consists in giving assent to the practical Dictates of Reason. To the acquiring both these Parts are subservient the Operations of the Mind, 1. Invention, which consists in the Observation of Things present, and the pertinent Recollection of Things past: And 2. Judgment, whether Intuitive, or Discursive,5 which consists in the Deduction and methodical Ranging of Truth: We may hence infer, “That Nature recommends to us the Use of true Logick”; and we may hence also understand, “In what sense are naturally commanded those Acts and Habits, which in the Invention are called, Sagacity in investigating, Wisdom in deliberating, Caution, Presence of Mind, Subtilty, or quickness of Apprehension; and in the Judgment, Clearness in Judging, Rectitude in Determining, &c.6 If the Judgment is supported by artificial Arguments, it is called Science; but, if it makes use of sufficient Testimony, Belief. ”7 All these, so far as they are in the Power of particular Persons, and are necessary to the chief End, are commanded by that Law.

  From Prudence arise 1. Constancy of Mind,§VI. The immediate, most general, and essential Effects of Prudence, are 1. Constancy of Mind, by which we adhere without wavering to its Dictates, as being of unchangeable Truth, and fitted to all Circumstances. For there is a kind of Immutability in the practical Judgment, concerning the best End and Means, and in the Will consequent thereupon, which proceeds immediately from the Perception of the immutable Truth of those practical Propositions, which relate to the End and the Means necessary. Prudence bears the same relation to Inconstancy, that Science does to the giving assent to contradictory Propositions at the same time. Constancy in the Prosecution of this great End, in opposition to foreseen Dangers and Difficulties, is Fortitude;And its various Modes, Fortitude and Patience. the same continuing under present Evils, Patience.

  2. Moderation is “an effect of Prudence restraining our Affections and Endeavours within those Bounds, which are most suitable to the Goodness of the End, and the Necessity or Usefulness of the Means.”2. Moderation, But, because Prudence always directs the Mind to pursue the best End intire, or in all its Parts, and to use all the necessary Means; therefore true Moderation is inseparable from Integrity, and from Diligencewhich comprehends Integrity, and Diligence, or Industry., or Industry. I suppose in the foregoing Description of Moderation, that it is both known and allow’d, “That the most intense Affections and most earnest Endeavours of Men relating to the chief End, and the Means principally necessary to that End, are commanded by the general Law of Nature”: This being granted, by discovering the Proportion between any other End and the Chief, and also between the Use and Necessity of any other Means, we discover the Proportion, that ought to be between our Affections and Endeavours in those Cases.

  (Moderation the same with the celebrated Mediocrity of the Peripateticks.)From this Moderation, which I have prov’d consistent with the greatest Earnestness about the best End and Means, differs nothing (in my Opinion) that Mediocrity, (which the Peripateticks celebrate as the Essence of all Kinds of Virtue,8 ) provided it receive a favourable Interpretation. I own, Moderation is more conspicuous in Acts of the Will and Affections; yet, because the discovering and determining the Measure and Proportion, which is essential thereto, is a power proper to the Understanding; and beside, because some Measure is to be fixt to the Inquiries of the Understanding, lest Doubt and Caution should degenerate into perpetual Scepticism; and lest a diligent Endeavour to search out Causes should turn to impertinent Curiosity; I thought it proper to shew, that Moderation was enjoin’d here, and from them to pass to those Acts of the Will, which are enjoin’d by the same Law.

  In the Will is enjoin’d Universal Benevolence;§VII. They may all be comprehended in the general Name of the most extensive and operative Benevolence. For this exerts itself in all kinds of Affections and Endeavours to effect Things acceptable both to God and Men, or to remove Things disagreeable to either of them. It belongs to the same Benevolence, to endeavour that nothing be done contrary to the Common Good, and to correct and amend it, if there has; hence Equity(from a Concurrence of which with Prudence, arises Equity.) is an essential Branch of this Virtue; by Equity I mean, “A Will prepared by the Rules of Prudence to correct those Things, which were determin’d by the Law, or civil Judicature, perhaps otherwise than the Nature of the Common Good in such Circumstances requir’d.” For it often happens, that by means of Expressions too general, or some human Weakness, even in Legislators and Judges, which cannot provide for all possible Cases, Rulers miss that Mark at which they sincerely aimed. But the Love of the Common Good requires, “That” (after they have more exactly consider’d the Circumstances of the present Case, than was possible for them, when they beheld it at a Distance,) “they should amend those Things, from a more perfect Knowledge of the Circumstances now in full View, which had been less happily establish’d, with respect to the same Circumstances view’d more imperfectly from afar.”

  From this Law of Nature, equitable Judgment derives all its Authority, and, therefore, this is the true Foundation of Equity; nor is it impertinent to mention it in this Place; tho’ I own, that its most remarkable Use in correcting Civil Laws, cannot here be so distinctly explain’d, the establishment or original of Civil Laws having not been yet explain’d. Yet, because it has other Uses, in Cases where Civil Laws are Silent, and in the making Civil Laws, which ought to be equitable, it was not in this Place to be pass’d over in Silence.

  And the Government of the Passions, which are§VIII. The Sum of what I have hitherto advanc’d comes to this, “That a Prudent Benevolence toward all Rational Beings, fulfils the most general Law of Nature.” This will propose the best End to our Affections and Endeavours of all Kinds, and prescribe that Measure to them, which will be most effectual to the obtaining that best End, which, upon this Account, is naturally their best Measure.

  here accounted for;There is no Necessity, (tho’ many seem to think otherwise,) that we should assign a distinct Virtue to the Government of every Affection, since the same Care of attaining any End will cause us, to love those Things which promote it; to desire them, if absent; to hope for them, if they seem probable; to joy in them, when present: And on the contrary, to hate those Things which stand in opposition thereto; to shun them, when absent; fear them, when probable; and grieve, when they are present. Therefore, if we seek that End which the Law of Nature directs, and our Care to acquire it be conformable to the same Law, the Motions of all our Affections, (as what depend thereon from the Condition of Human Nature,) will naturally be in proportion to that Care, unless the Understanding be blind, in distinguishing their particular Objects, or Causes; which yet that due Love (that is suppos’d) of the End, will move every one to endeavour to prevent as much as he can.

  and those Virtues, which respect the special Laws of Nature, Innocence, Gentleness, Repentance, Restitution, Self-denyal, Candour, Fidelity.This same Universal Benevolence, as it restrains and corrects in us all voluntary Motions opposite to the Common Good, those especially, by which we would prefer our own private Advantages to those of the Publick, comprehends Innocence, Gentleness, Repentance, Restitution, and Self-denial: As it includes a constant effectual and avow’d Intention to do Good, it will cause us to think favourably of others, which is Candour; and both to promise and perform good Offices to others, which is Fidelity. The same Benevolence, because it loves, in a greater Measure, known Causes of the common Good, will make Men highly Grateful. For Gratitude is nothing else than “Benevolence heighten’d towards those, who have been first Benevolent to us,” nor does it oblige any one, unless when the Benefit is conferr’d without injuring another: It excites us to repay Benefits receiv’d, to our Power, but without Prejudice to the Publick Good.Gratitude;

  Our Duty to our God, our Governors, our selves, and our Family.Finally, the same Universal Love, tho’ it endeavours to do Things acceptable to all the Parts of the System of Rational Beings, will, in an especial manner, regard those who both can and will most profit the whole Community, (such are God, and they who preside over Things Civil and Sacred by his Appointment;) or who, by the Condition and State of our Nature, may be most profited by us, as every one can be of greatest Benefit to himself and his own Family, to his Posterity and Kindred.

  In these few Heads are contain’d the Primary Special Laws of Nature, and the fundamental Principles of all Virtues and all Societies, whether Sacred, Civil, or Oeconomical; it is likewise shewn, how the same Affection toward the Common Good is naturally sufficient for all these Offices, because it naturally opposes contrary Motions, and assists Affections, which are Causes and Parts of it-self.9 Whence it is evident, that the same Law which enjoins this Affection, does at the same time command, that Motions opposite thereto should be restrain’d with our utmost Efforts; that the Causes conspiring therewith should be assisted; and that all the Parts of its proper Object, those especially now mention’d, should be regarded.

  The Distinction explain’d between Actions necessary and indifferent, in which there is room for Liberty, and the interposition of the supreme Powers by positive Laws.§IX. Lastly, I thought it proper to suggest in this Place, “That the Distinction between Actions necessary and indifferent takes its Rise from the Relation, which they naturally have to the Effect, or End propos’d by this Universal Law.” Those Actions, without which it is impossible to obtain the End propos’d, are necessary. Those, to which there are others equivalent, or equally effectual to promote this End, are Indifferent; as concerning which the Law of Nature does not determine, whether we ought to act after this, or that Manner, solicitous only, that we contribute as much as we can to the Publick Happiness by some Method or other. In these Cases there is room for the greatest Liberty; and also for Positive Laws, contracting such Liberty within narrower Bounds.10 I, usually in my own Mind, illustrate this Distinction between necessary and indifferent Actions, by comparing them with the Methods of Practice subservient to the Construction of Geometrical Problems. Of these, some are so necessary, that the Construction of a Problem is impossible without them: Yet, in many Questions, various Methods of constructing the given Problem, without transgressing the Rules of Geometry, offer themselves; so that the Geometrician is at liberty, to use this, or that Method of Construction; yet still with this Limitation, that, whatever Method of Practice he follows, he must observe certain Rules, necessary to bring him in the end to the same Solution. As it is free, now that the Earth is well-peopled, for a Man to live Single, or Married; yet our equal Obligation in both States, not to violate, but pursue, the Common Good, lays us in either, under the Restraint of certain Laws.

  How to reduce any moral Virtue to the Form of a Law of Nature.§X. I have not, however, thought it necessary, “To reduce all those Particulars, which I have prov’d to be contained in one General Law, into the Form of Laws of Nature, and so to lay them before the Reader.” Every Reader may, by his own Skill, form the Law enjoyning the Acquisition, and Exercise (always in order to promote the Common Good,) of Prudence, Constancy, Moderation, Benevolence, &c. provided he remembers, that their Form, made evident from the Appearances of Nature, is this, or to this Purpose. The first Cause of Nature would have it known to all, that it is necessary to the common Happiness, and to the private Happiness of every particular Person, which is to be expected only from the Prosecution of the Common Good, That every one ought to pursue it with Prudence, Constancy, &c. or, a Law being given to prosecute the Common Good according to our Abilities; a Law is likewise given, commanding Prudence, Constancy, Fidelity, &c. Nor is there a different Reason of the Laws commanding us to plight and keep Faith, and to practice Gratitude; for these also take place in our Actions towards all Rational Beings whomsoever. There are many other Human Actions, which, tho’ they promote the Good of the whole Society of Rational Beings, are yet immediately and in a peculiar Manner appropriated to certain Parts thereof; the Origin, therefore, of Property and Dominion (in a somewhat larger sense of the Words, than what is in use among the Civilians) is next to be enquir’d into.

  CHAPTER VII

  Of the Original of Dominion, and the Moral Virtues.

  A Comparison between the Animal Oeconomy, and the Society of all Rational Agents, in order to illustrate the Origin of Dominion and Property. As the Animal Oeconomy is truly, tho’ not sufficiently, explain’d by saying, That the whole Fabrick of the Body is supported by the continual Circulation of the Blood; so the Society of all Rational Agents is truly said to be preserv’d by a Circulation of Good Offices for the benefit of the Publick; yet is not sufficiently explain’d, ’till it be shewn what Kind of Actions are necessarily to be assign’d to the chief Parts of that Society, and allotted to the peculiar Uses of these Parts respectively, in order to obtain that End; as to a distinct Explanation of the Nature of Animals it is requisite to shew, what proportion of the Blood should circulate thro’ the Brain, and upper Parts of the Body, what thro’ the lower, as the Liver and Hypochondria, and how the Nourishment should be distributed to the other, at least to the more noble, Parts of the Body.

  It ought, however, to be observ’d, That, as the Vessels, which convey the Spirits and Nourishment to one Part, are not subservient to the particular Benefit of that Part alone, but also to the Well being of the Whole at the same time, since every Part of the Body is of some Use to the Whole: so those Things, which become the Property of the particular Parts of this Society, do not cease to be subservient to the Whole in the most advantageous Manner.

  The Origin of Property and Dominion over Things and Persons, is deduc’d from the Law of Nature, commanding the making and preserving a Division of Rights.§II. The Original of Right over Things and Persons, (which I take leave to call by the Names of Property and Dominion,) seems deducible in the following manner from what I have already said. It has been prov’d, “That in the Common Happiness are contain’d, both the highest Honour of God, and the Perfections, both of the Minds and Bodies of Men”; moreover, it is well known from the Nature of Things, “That, in order to these Ends, are necessarily requir’d, both many Actions of Men, and Uses of Things, which cannot, at the same time, be subservient to other Uses”; from whence it follows, “That Men, who are obliged to promote the Common Good, are likewise necessarily oblig’d to consent, that the Use of Things and Labour of Persons, so far as they are necessary to particular Men to inable them to promote the Publick Good, should be so granted them, that they may not lawfully be taken from them, whilst the aforesaid Necessity continues; that is, that those Things should, at least during such time, become their Property, and be called their own.” But such Necessity continuing by reason of the Continuance of like Times and Circumstances, a perpetual Property, or Right to the Use of Things, and to the Assistance of Persons necessary, will follow to each Person during Life. Farther; if the same Thing (as Lands, or Trees) can promote the aforesaid End for several Days, or Years, the same Reason, which gave a Right to them the first Day, will give a like Right the following Day, and so on, whilst Things continue as they were. And, by such Steps as these, does Reason lead Men to consent to the settling a plenary Dominion over Things, and at length also over Persons, or such Labours of Persons as are necessary to the Common Happiness. For the Obligation (which I have already demonstrated) to prosecute the End, obliges likewise to the absolutely-necessary Means, namely, the Consent of every Individual to some Division of Things and Human Labour; because it is impossible, “That the same Thing, or the Labour of the same Man, can serve the contrary Wills of many Men.” For the Things which we make use of, and the Members of Men, by which their external Labour is perform’d to the Benefit of others, are Bodies, and therefore limited at any one Time to one Place, and therefore their Motion, by which they can be subservient to any one, is at any given time directed to one Point only; hence it is, “That the same Nourishment and necessary Cloathing, which preserves the Life of one Man, cannot at the same time perform the same Office for any other”; tho’ remotely indeed, or by the Intervention of the Assistance of that Person, it may be useful to many. It is, therefore, evident, “That the Nature of Things discovers, that it is necessary to the Happiness, Life, and Health, of every particular Person, upon which all other Advantages depend, that the Uses of Things should be limited, at least for a time, to particular Persons exclusive of others.” It is hence further evident, “That the same is likewise necessary to the Common Happiness of All, because the Whole is not distinguish’d from all its Parts taken together.” Lastly, it is manifest by a parity of Reason, “That this Limitation, made for a time, ought necessarily to be continued thro’ all succeeding Times, in order to obtain the same End, either in the same Things, or in others equivalent.” But in this continued Limitation of Things and Human Labour, which are necessary to the Life and Health and intire Happiness of Individuals, is contain’d the whole Essence, Force, and Efficacy, of Property and Dominion, tho’ it may be cloathed with some additional Circumstances by Civil Laws. Nature, therefore, evidently teaches, “That a Dominion over Things and Persons ought necessarily to be settled for the Common Good of All,” (if it be suppos’d, that it was not settled at the very Beginning;) or rather, “That it should be received and continued as already settled by the First Cause.”

  §III. These Things are thus reduc’d into the Form of a Law of Nature.

  Here reduc’d to the Form of a Law of Nature,The Nature of Things made by the First Cause, plainly discovers, That it is his Will, that all voluntary Actions of Rational Agents, which are necessary to the establishing and preserving a Property in Individuals to some Things, or Persons, should be absolutely necessary to the enjoyn’d Pursuit of the Common Good; and, therefore, that all Rational Agents are oblig’d by the same Law, (by which they are oblig’d to promote the Publick Good, as far as in them lies,) and the same Rewards and Punishments, to establish (or acknowledge) and preserve some kind of Property, or Dominion. Or thus briefly, There being given a natural Law to procure the Common Happiness of All, there is given a natural Law, to establish and preserve, to particular Persons, Properties in those Things, which are evidently necessary to the Happiness of Individuals, as well in Persons and their Actions necessary to mutual Assistance, as in other Things.1

  consisting of two Parts, relating to the Rights of God and Men.In this Law are contain’d these two Parts: 1. Let there be given to God such Things as are his: 2. To Men likewise such Things as are theirs: Both are necessary to be done, that God’s Honour may be preserv’d to him, and that those Advantages may be preserv’d to Men, by which they may preserve and perfect themselves, and be useful to all others; both which are contain’d in the End propos’d, the Common Good.

  What is intended by the Words Property, or Dominion in this Argument.I chose to use those indefinite Words [some kind of Property, or Dominion,] because I readily acknowledge, “That Nature does not always discover it to be necessary, that such kind of Property as consists in an intire Division of Things should be establish’d”; all that is essential to true Property, or Dominion, is, “That any one should have a Right secur’d by Law, to possess or dispose of certain Advantages, in a Thing, for Example, an undivided Field, which we use and enjoy in Common with others, and from which others have no Right to exclude us.” If any one will contend, that this word Property, or Dominion, is improperly us’d in this Case, I will not dispute with him about Words, being solicitous about the Thing only. Grotius acknowledges “such a Restriction of the universal Right to be instead of Property.”2 I chose this Word, because I could not find one more convenient to signify, “That the Prosecution of the Common Good requires such an Appropriation of some Things to particular Persons, as makes it unlawful for others to deny them to them, or take them from them”; and that I might by this Method shew, “That Mr. Hobbes’s War, which would necessarily arise from his imaginary Right of every one to every Thing, was not lawful.” It is certain, “That in the best regulated States many Things are possess’d by many in Common, and that some of these have a Right to a greater Share of the Profit than others, and that they peaceably enjoy it”; and it is no question, but that the same may happen, when by Abstraction of Mind we suppose the Removal, or Non-existence, of Civil Power. Such Right (to the use and disposal of Things, and to some human Assistance,) which can be taken from no-one, without violating the Respect due to the Law of Nature, and to God its Author, I call by the Name of some kind of Property, or Dominion.

  (Justinian’s Definition of Justice supposes this Law.)§IV. To these Things thus explain’d, I thought it proper to add, “That the Law of Nature, which I have now laid down, is the very same that enjoins Universal Justice.” For it enjoyns nothing but what is contain’d in Justinian’s Definition of Justice, when rightly explain’d, which runs thus. “Justice is the constant and perpetual Will to give every one his Right.”3 Now I have affirm’d, that all voluntary Actions are to be directed by the Law, which enjoins consummate Prudence, and, in consequence, Constancy, Moderation, Benevolence, &c. I have, therefore, taken sufficient Care, that the Will employ’d about these be both Constant and Perpetual. What he affirms ought “to be given to every one,” that I alledge respects all Rational Beings, and therefore God himself.4 Hence I affirm, That some Things ought to be look’d upon as belonging to God, others to Men; some Things as Sacred, others as Profane. Lastly, I thus understand that Right is to be given, that whatsoever has been made any one’s Property, either by God, or Man, should be acknowledg’d, and reserv’d to them inviolably; and besides, that we should consent that those Things, which have not become any one’s Property, should, in such Manner, be distributed amongst All, as may best conduce to the establishing and preserving the Common Peace and Happiness of All. The Words of the Definition may be thus conveniently explain’d; and it certainly belongs to the same Virtue and Disposition of Mind, to divide Things and human Services for the Common Good, and to keep up their Division for the same End; to make the Division, and to consent to it when made. Wherefore the same general Law of Nature commands either of these Actions, that, namely, which the present State of Affairs shall require, in order to that End, which it commands should be chiefly regarded.

  Justice enjoins Repentance and Restitution.We may further add, “That the same Law does clearly enough direct Men to Repent, and to make Reparation of Damages, as far as we can, if in any Thing we have transgress’d the Law.” For, in the Laws of Nature, the Letter is not regarded, as is generally the Case in Positive Laws, but the most effectual Prosecution of the End propos’d: The Publick Good is best obtain’d by unerring Justice, but next by Repentance and Restitution, in case of Transgression, which often happens thro’ human Frailty.

  From this Law is prov’d the Justness of the Distinction between Things, or Persons Sacred, and those appointed to Common Use.§V. Here opens a spacious Field of Inquiry, 1. Concerning the Right of God over Things and Persons, and concerning the Manner how Men discover that such Right belongs to him: 2. Concerning the Dominion of Men, or those Things which are ours, either by a common Right of All, or our own particular Right; which are the Subject of the two Tables of the Decalogue, and of which Grotius treats at large.5 The First I pass over, to avoid falling into Theological Disputes; and the Second, lest the present Treatise should swell to too great a Volume. However, I think proper to observe, “That this general Law establishes some difference between Things and Persons which are consecrated to God, and those which are allow’d for the common Uses of Men.” For it is an Effect of this Division of Dominion, “That, beside the universal Dominion over all Things which belongs to God, which is consistent with a subordinate Property of Men in the same Things, there should, beside, be some Things peculiar to God, both among Persons, as Kings and Priests; and among Things, as Times and Places, as being consecrated to him.” And further, “That from this Fountain are deriv’d all good Laws, which limit, or direct, Men in Things to be set apart for God”; such are those, by which some Privileges are granted them; or, on the contrary, by which some Measure is prescrib’d to Things, which (to use a Law-Term) may fall into Mort-Main:6 I think it sufficient to mention these Things by the way, because my chief Aim is to shew, “That all Right acquir’d by us, either over our-selves, which is called Liberty; or over Things by Occupancy, or by Division; or in Persons distinct from ourselves, by Paternity, Consent, or Forfeiture; is granted to us by the Will of the First Cause, establishing that primary Law of Nature, enjoyning the Prosecution of the Common Good.” For hence is prov’d by an Induction of Particulars, “That every Right of Men is deduc’d from that Law, and that by the same Law the Rights of all particular Persons are so limited, that no-one has a Right to violate the Publick Good, or to take away from any other, who has not hurt the Community, either Life, or those Things which are necessary to enable him to promote the Common Happiness.”

  The Divine Dominion is deduc’d from the Dictate of the Divine Wisdom,§VI. Altho’ I have adapted these Things (the Nature of Laws, properly so call’d, requiring it) to the Condition of Rational Creatures, yet I have taken care, that every Thing should be so laid down, as that they might all be ascrib’d to God in such an Analogical Manner, as the Observance of the Laws of Nature is ascrib’d to him, when he is by all acknowledg’d Just, Liberal, Merciful. Certainly, no-one in his Senses can imagine, “That the First Cause is bound by any Laws, if Laws be taken for practical Dictates (or Rules of Action) receiving the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments from the Will of a Superior”; from whence it follows, That no-one can imagine his Dominion over the Creatures to be founded in, or regulated by, a Law in that Sense. On the contrary, no-one can think honourably of God, who does not acknowledge, “That his Wisdom proposes to him the best End, namely, his own Honour, and the Happiness of other Rational Beings, by the Use of that Understanding and Will which is natural to them; and that the same Wisdom requires, as the Means necessary to this End, that Necessaries, at least, be so granted to each Individual, that it should not be lawful to violate them.” But this is to prescribe and establish the distinct Rights of Individuals, or Dominion.

  approv’d of by his Will;Nor is there less necessarily included in the Perfection of the Divine Nature, “A Will to pursue this best End by proper Means, in concurrence with infinite Prudence,” in which Concurrence the greatest Benevolence is included. Because it is necessary to the supreme Honour of God, and to the Preservation and Perfection of the whole System of Things, that God should govern and dispose all Things, according to the Counsel of his own Understanding, his own Wisdom cannot but dictate this to him: Nor can there be suppos’d in him a Will dissenting from this Dictate of his own Wisdom.

  which is Analogous to a Natural Law.It is further evident, “That the Dictate of the Divine Understanding concerning the End, and the Means conducing thereto, is Analogous to a natural Law, and that the Necessity of his continuing to Will perfectly, that is, agreeably to his Infinite Wisdom, does in Effect far surpass all the Sanctions of a Law by Rewards and Punishments.”7Consequently, “All his Actions will be conformable to the Dictates of his Understanding, concerning promoting the best End, the Common Good, and may be called Just, for the same Reason those Dictates are allow’d to have the force of Laws.” And, in like manner, his Power of disposing of all Things, as he shall think fit, in consistence with this End, and the Means necessary, may be called the Right of God, or his Dominion over Things and Persons, from all Eternity, proceeding (as I have shewn) from his essential Perfections, as from a natural Law. Upon the maturest Deliberation, I can find nothing to hinder, but that this Dictate of the Divine Understanding, It is necessary for the Common Good, that the most full and supreme Power of governing all Creatures should be assum’d by God, and reserv’d to him, has the full Force of a Law, and may, therefore, be a solid Foundation for the Divine Dominion; unless, perhaps, it be objected, “That it is not enjoin’d by, nor has receiv’d a Sanction from, any Superior”: But to give it the essential Force of a Law, it is sufficient, “That it is a true Proposition formed by the supreme and most perfect Being, concerning the best End, and the Means necessary thereto,” tho’ it proceed not from a Superior, which in this Case is impossible. Whereas this Dictate is in itself most perfect, (containing an evident Truth concerning the noblest Subject,) and has for its Author a Being infinitely superior in Perfection to all others, that can exist: It cannot need an external Recommendation from another Author, and it must as little need a Sanction by Punishments to be inflicted by another, because the intrinsick Propension of the Divine Will, to advance this greatest Good, will not suffer him to violate this Dictate. For, if it were suppos’d, “That the Divine Will had departed from the best End, and the Means necessary to it,” he would at the same time be suppos’d “to have fallen from his infinite Perfection,” (for he would have been more Perfect, if he had not so departed;) that is, he would be suppos’d “to have laid aside his Deity,” which implies a Contradiction. The Dictates, therefore, of the Divine Understanding, do in the same Manner pass into Laws, binding him by the Immutability of his own Perfections, as we use to say, that the Oath of God is ratified, when he swears by himself, or by his own Life; that is, by his immutable Perfections, which will endure for ever.8

  and is free from Injury to any;However, this Dominion over All, which we assert God reserves to himself, is on this Account free from all suspicion of Injury, because “No Law can be imagin’d prior, which can be thereby violated, and no reason of Competition can be produc’d on the Part of the Creatures, who can yet be only considered as possible, whose future Existence, and all their future Right to any kind of Dominion, depends intirely upon the Bounty of the Divine Will.” Further; the very End, in order to which I affirm’d it necessary, that God should take to himself the Exercise of this Dominion, namely, the Common Good, has so full a View to the Happiness of the Creatures, that no-one (except thro’ his own Fault) can be hurt by this, or any other Means necessary to the Prosecution thereof.

  Lastly; I think this resolving the Divine Right into such a Dictate of the Divine Understanding, and the other incommunicable Perfections of his Will, ought, therefore, to be admitted, because “No Creature, from an Opinion of his own Wisdom, or Goodness, much less Power, can ever arrogate to himself, from this Example, a right of Dominion over other Creatures.” Whereas, on the contrary, “Hobbes’s(Hobbes’s Resolution of the Divine Dominion into his irresistible Power, absurd.) Resolving the Divine Dominion into his irresistible Power, so evidently leads Men to seek Dominion over others by Force, or Fraud, by Right, or Wrong, that I doubt not, but that it was invented by him, and ascrib’d to God, for that End only, that it might countenance his pretended Right of all Men to all Things.”9

  to which his Creatures, judging according to the Dictates of the Law of Nature, cannot but consent,I may here add, “That the Law of Nature, properly so called, (which takes place in the Minds of Men, and which, because of the Will of God, whom we discover to be the supreme Governor in the Manner above-mention’d, obliges Men to pay him Honour and Worship,) may be justly said to give him this Right of Dominion, as it obliges us to acknowledge that Right in him, and voluntarily to offer him the same.” For it is evident, “That, if we would propose to ourselves this noblest End, as we ought, we could not in a more prudent Manner promote it, than by giving the Glory of Commanding to God, and by reserving to ourselves only the Praise of Obedience, and so a Right to Things and Persons, in Subordination to him, and to the Common Good.” For it is apparent, “That this subordinate Right to the Use of many Things, and of human Aid, is plainly necessary to support the Lives and Powers of Men, and, consequently, to all that Worship and Honour which they can give to God in this Life”; the Immortal God, however, standing not in the least need of these Things, and, therefore, not requiring them, except for the more liberal Support of those who in a more particular Manner serve and represent him upon Earth, namely, Civil Magistrates and the Ministers of Holy Things.

  Reasons against the common Method of deriving the Dominion of God from his Act of Creation, and for deducing it from the Dictate of the Wisdom of God, in concurrence with his Goodness.§VII. Before I had universally and distinctly consider’d the Original of all Dominion and Right whatsoever, I us’d, indeed, as most others do, “to deduce the Divine Dominion intirely from his being the Creator”: For I thought it Self-evident, “That every one was Lord of his own Powers,” which are little different from the Essence of any Thing, and that, therefore, any Effect must be subject to him, from whose Powers it receiv’d its whole Essence, as is the case in Creation, by which the whole Substance of the Thing is produc’d into Being.

  But, because all Dominion supposes some Right, and all Right is a Power granted or permitted by some Law, at least Analogically such; therefore, the Law granting or permitting Dominion ought first to be acknowledg’d. But Law there is none prior to the Natural Law, or that Dictate of the Divine Wisdom, concerning the Best End, and the Means thereto necessary, which is perfectly agreeable to the Law of Nature, and may Analogically be called, the Law of the Divine Actions; I, therefore, came to this Conclusion, “That the Dominion of God is a Right, or Power, given him by his own Wisdom and Goodness, as by a Law, for the Government of all those Things which ever have been, or shall be, created by him.” In the Divine Wisdom is necessarily contain’d “a Dictate to pursue the best End by the necessary Means”; and in the Goodness, or Perfection, of the Divine Will is by a like Necessity included “a ready Consent to promote the same”: And these, by a natural Analogy, answer to a Ratification of this eternal Law, whence the Divine Dominion may take its Original.

  Nor can any one justly complain, “That the Dominion of God is contracted within too narrow Limits by this Explication, which amounts to this only, that no Part thereof consists in the Power of doing any Thing contrary to the best End, the Common Good, that is, his own Honour, and that Happiness of other Rational Beings, which both the Nature of Things made by himself admits of, and to the procuring whereof the Faculties given them by himself are fitted.” For it is plain, “That infinite Wisdom and Power can dispose of all Things and Men after infinitely-different Manners, yet so, that in each of these Ways the Common Good of the whole System might be equally obtain’d.” And it is as plain, “That perfect Liberty does not consist in the Power of doing better, or worse, but in the Power of equally doing for the best, whether God confers his own Benefits more abundantly upon these, or others, respect being always had to the best End.” We ought, however, to be cautious, lest we imagine, “That nothing is consistent with this End, which our Understanding does not comprehend, in what Manner it can promote it”; for we know, that the Weakness of our Mind is not able to comprehend an End so great, nor can reach that infinite Variety of Means, which can be fitted by God to the procuring of it; and we shall afterwards learn much concerning these Things, of which we are at present ignorant. Thus, for Instance, we know in general, that all the Parts of an Animal are some way useful to it, tho’ we do not yet distinctly and throughly understand the Use of many Parts, as the Spleen, Brain, &c. However, because the Perfection, both of the Divine Understanding and of his Will concurring therewith, is intrinsecal to God himself; it is evident, that his Dominion, explain’d in this Manner, is not understood to be receiv’d from without, nor to be less Eternal than those Perfections, from which it is discover’d and demonstrated by us, rather than properly deriv’d. The Question concerning the Original of the Divine Dominion, must needs be thus understood, for no Man in his wits would search for a Cause, properly so called, of a Right that had no Beginning.

  I hope the Reader will pardon this Digression, which I have not made without reason, because it seem’d almost necessary, “To give some Account how a Right of imposing those Laws upon Men, which are the Subject of our present Inquiries, belongs to God,” which might be better grounded than what Hobbes has propos’d, where he contends, “That the irresistible Power of God gives him (and consequently any other) a Right to do any Thing, without any respect to the Common Good.” I, on the contrary, (by shewing that the Care of the chief Good, by Means naturally sufficient and necessary, is necessarily included in the Perfection of the Divine Nature, as it is Rational,) have pointed out that fundamental Principle, whence it may be demonstrated, “That Universal Justice, and, consequently, every Moral Virtue requisite in a Governor, display themselves in God above all others,” just in the same Manner, that I shall in what follows prove “Men are oblig’d to the Exercise of the same.” For that being what I have undertaken to explain in this Treatise, I resolv’d not to insist upon the Disputes which may be raised, concerning the Right of the Deity over his Creatures.

  What Regulations the Law of Nature laid Men under, in a State suppos’d prior to a plenary Division of Property by Consent.§VIII. Let us, therefore, now resume the Consideration of the Law lately discover’d, which commands, “That Necessaries, at least, be allow’d to all without Violation”; that is, “That they become their Properties, at least for the Time they continue necessary to ’em, whence they are called their Rights.” The Reason of my proposing that Law in such general Terms, as I have used, was, “That the same Rule might oblige and direct Men, as well in that State which may be suppos’d prior to, as in that which follows, the Division of Things and mutual Offices made by consent.” In the former State it obliges only to a limited Occupancy and Use of Things and human Assistance, such as may be consistent with the Convenience of others: Such may be imagin’d the State of our First Parents, if nothing were suppos’d divinely Reveal’d of the Power of the Husband over the Wife.

  The Reasons, from the Nature of Things, enforcing the coming to such a Division.And, in this State, many Things may be suppos’d to have happen’d, which would demonstrate it the Interest of all, “to make by consent a Division of Things and mutual Offices”; such as the Disputes of many, where it was not very evident, what was necessary to each; and the Sloth of some neglecting to cultivate the Common Fields, and the like. In such Cases, the Laws concerning the End and the Means necessary, being applied to the given Circumstances, would oblige to a further Division of Property, and the same Laws would oblige, both them and those who should be born after them, to preserve this Division, so highly conducive to the Common Good. After this Manner their Rights will be gradually settled, to each particular Man, Family, City, State, and that, both over Things and the Services of Men; whence will arise the Rights of Commerce and Friendship, and also the Rights of Government in Families, and States, both in Things Sacred and Civil.

  The present Methods for making such a Division; when it is necessary, and the Parties cannot amicably agree it among themselves: Namely, by Arbitration, or Lots.§IX. Of the making this Division, I will not say much, because we all find it ready made to our Hands, in a Manner plainly sufficient to procure the best End, the Honour of God, and the Happiness of all Men, if they be not wanting to themselves. I will, therefore, offer only in few Words, That, “wherever such a Division is farther necessary, and a Difference arises between them, whose necessity requires that it should be made,” It is evident, “That it tends more to the Common Happiness, to entrust the Division to the Arbitration of any prudent Man, who has no Interest to favour either Party, than to commit the Event to Force, or Fraud.” For it is more probable, that any one’s Reason will prescribe that Method which is consistent with the known End, the Common Good, than that either of them should by blind Force hit that Mark, at which neither Aims: For I agree with Hobbes in supposing, “That, in such a War, each Party seeks only his own Safety in Victory.” But, “If it so happen, that the disagreeing Parties can agree upon no Umpire, it will be more reasonable to leave the Division, or the whole Property of the Thing in Dispute, if it cannot be divided, rather to Chance than to War”; because “In War both Parties may perish, and so fall short of the End propos’d, which cannot happen, if the Affair be committed to Chance.”10

  Upon what Reason the Rights of Primogeniture and First Occupancy are grounded.I mention this, by the way, in order to shew the Reason, “Why we ought to acquiesce in some Methods of disposing of Things and Employments, which partake more of Chance than of Rational Choice”; such are, beside casting Lots, Primogeniture, and First Occupancy.

  It is unjust, to attempt any innovation in the present settlement of Property.“The same Reason and Law of Nature, which commands the establishing a distinct Dominion over Things and Persons, commands also more evidently to preserve them inviolable, now that they are establish’d and prov’d by Experience to answer the design’d End.” For it is evident, “That the Division of Dominion, which we find made by our Ancestors, and establish’d by the Consent, or Permission, of all Nations and States, has been sufficient for the Procreation and Preservation of all that now exist, and to the Procuring all that Happiness, which we now see Mankind possess’d of; and, beside, that it affords such Intercourse among Men, such Opportunities of mutual Assistance, that all may attain greater Degrees of Happiness, both in this Life and a future.”

  It is beside manifest, “That the Happiness we now enjoy, and have the greatest Reason to expect from the present Division, is greater than any prudent Man could hope to obtain, by violating and overturning all settled Rights, Divine and Human, and endeavouring to introduce a new Division of all Property, according to the Judgment, or Affections, of any one Man whatsoever.”

  For it is obvious, “That this is an Undertaking, to which the Understanding of no one Man, or Assembly of Men, is equal”; and it is easy to foresee, “That the Opinions of so many Men would differ so widely upon this Head, that all would immediately be reduc’d to a State of War and Misery.” Wherefore, “A Desire of Innovation in Things pertaining to Property, is unjust, because it is inconsistent with this Law, which is inseparable from the Common Good.” I do, therefore, not only highly approve (with Grotius) of that Sentence of Thucydides, “It is just for every one to preserve that Form of Government in the State, which has been deliver’d down to him.”11 But I am of Opinion, that what he has affirm’d of one State only, ought to be extended to the great Society of all Rational Beings, (which I call the Kingdom of God;) and that it ought not to be limited only to the Form of Government, which contains the Division of the principal Offices in the Administration, but extended universally to the Division of Things: And in this Latitude I assert it Just, “To preserve inviolably the antient Division of Dominion over Things and Persons, both among different Nations, and in particular States.” For Experience has shewn it conducive to the best End, and no Laws of Nature can be conceiv’d, which, consistently with this End, could prohibit such a Division’s being at first made; That, therefore, could be injurious to no-one. But the same Reason, which first oblig’d Men to make this Division, (since they who rightly judge must unavoidably agree,) will also oblige their Successors to approve and confirm the same.

  Of transferring Property by Compacts, whose Obligation,I own, indeed, That the various Vicissitudes of Human Life and Actions, do necessarily introduce various Alienations of antient Rights, and many new Regulations concerning them; but, because all Conveyance of Rights and new Regulations are made by the Will of them, to whom they were (at least Mediately) at first granted, the antient Division of Property is still preserv’d, for this very Reason, “That their Will is observ’d.” For it must be suppos’d, “To have been the Intention of the Authors of the first Division, along with the Property to have conferr’d a Power of conveying it, and of making many new Regulations, with respect, both to the first Possessors, and to their Successors.” For Dominion contains a Power to dispose of that Thing, or Labour, which is Ours, but a Compact consists in the Consent of two concerning such Disposal; the same Law, therefore, ratifies such Compact, which gives a Man Power to dispose of that Thing, or Labour, which is his.

  and Limitations, are deduced from the same Law.But, because this Power, or the Dominion it-self, which is conferr’d on any, is only in order to the Common Good, it follows, “That no Compact (whose Obligation is intirely owing to that) can oblige any One to such Things as are inconsistent with that End, or which are forbid by the Law of Nature”; and, consequently, both the Obligation and Restrictions of Compacts are deriv’d from the same Fountain.12

  From the same Law is deriv’d the Obligation to Beneficence and Gratitude;§X. A Dominion over Things and Persons being establish’d, from the General Law of Nature, particular Persons have somewhat of their own to Give, or to Promise, Absolutely, or upon Condition. A Property in Things is suppos’d, before there is any room for keeping Faith. For, seeing the very same Reason, that establishes Dominion, in which the Power of bestowing is included, namely, the Common Good of all Rational Beings, but of those especially, to whom this Power is allow’d in any particular Case, renders a free Gift valid; it is, evidently, the perpetual Will of God, and of all Authors of Dominion subordinate to him, “That Men should in all Giving and Receiving aim at this End, without which the Law of Nature would allow no place for such Actions.” Wherefore, “He who accepts of a Benefit, is understood, by the very Action, to have consented to accept it under this Limitation, and upon this Condition, that it should be better for the Publick, but especially for his Benefactor.” But this Consent includes a kind of tacit Compact, “To return the Benefit, as occasion offers,” in which the whole Force of Gratitude displays itself: And, beside, such Consent is only “an Approbation of the general Law, to promote the Common Good, and to settle Dominion, or Property, for that very End”; Gratitude, therefore, is hence clearly enough enjoin’d. It is “Another’s giving, of his own, what we were not intitled to,” that lays us under Obligations of Gratitude to him, and makes us know, and acknowledge, his Benevolence.

  to a limited Self-love (including Frugality, Temperance, and Chastity;)To proceed; the Measure of our Property being fix’d and determin’d by its respect to the Common Good, (as I have already shewn,) we hence learn the Limits of a laudable Self-love: For we must always, in providing for our-selves, “Abstain from invading another’s Property,” and take care, “That we promote the Publick Good.” This limited Self-love displays it-self chiefly in Temperance, Frugality and Modesty.

  to a limited Natural Affection;Lastly; the same Law of Nature, which distributes Property, and the same Justice, (or Will to preserve Property so distributed to each,) which takes care, both of our selves and others (as I have shewn) does farther enjoin and limit the natural Affection of Parents towards their Children, which is highly subservient to the Common Good. Our Children are something compounded of our-selves and others; and it is therefore necessary, that the Virtue, by which we are inclin’d to the Care of our-selves and others, should in a particular Manner regard those, in whom we ourselves are, as it were, united and mix’d with others, and both Branches of the Object of this Virtue meet. To this is owing that eminent Care of Posterity, which all States manifest in their Laws concerning the Succession to the Goods, and often to the Employments, of the Deceased.

  From what has been said upon this Head, it is obvious to any One.

  1. That Beneficence towards others, the Obligation and Faith of Compacts, Gratitude, Temperance, Frugality, Modesty, Natural Affection, cannot be clearly explain’d, unless a Division of Property, by which what is ours may be distinguished from what is anothers, be first establish’d, or suppos’d.

  2. That the same General Law, by which this Division is made and preserv’d, obliges Men to the Exercise of all these Virtues, and to all others, that are either contain’d in them, or may be deduc’d from them.

  to the Laws of Nations and of Civil Societies, whether they regard Sovereigns, or Subjects.§XI. Lastly; all particular Moral Rules, or Laws; as well those, by which the Rights of different Nations are guarded from mutual Invasion; as those, by which the Authority of the Supreme Powers is founded and preserv’d from the Attempts of the Seditious, and the Rights of Subjects are protected from the Violence of the Powerful; are deriv’d from the same Command to distribute and settle Property, with a view to the Common Good.

  I affirm’d, “That Civil Authority was founded on this Command,” because it is evident, “That the establishing Civil Government is a much more effectual Means to promote the Common Happiness of Mankind, and to preserve Peace, than an equal Division of Things, which is inconsistent with Civil Dominion.” Yet Hobbes contends, “That such an equal Distribution of all Things and Rights is commanded by the Law of Nature,” and would have natural Equity to consist in this; led, truly, by the likeness of Words, as became him, who is frequently inculcating, “That all Reasoning depends upon Words.” This Doctrine of the equal Distribution of Property, he gradually instills, Lib. de Cive. Cap. 3. a §. 13. ad 19.13 Which I care not to spend time in refuting, both because he has nothing there which can deceive a prudent Man, and because the very Foundation, on which all the rest is built, “That it is necessary to promote Peace, that Men be look’d on as equal,” §. 13. does not seem even to Hobbes himself, a Means proper to that End, “The procuring Peace and Security,” but he requires the establishing a coercive Power, which must immediately destroy such an equality, as is evident from his Fifth Chapter. It is, however, dangerous to teach, “That an equal Distribution is commanded by the Laws of Nature,” because, by his own Confession, they are wholly Unchangeable, C. 3. §. 29.14 and, therefore, according to his Principles, an unequal Distribution of Dominion, altho’ it be absolutely necessary to a Monarchical Constitution, can never be Lawful, because it is contrary to the Laws of Nature.

  It is necessary, “That the forming and preserving States be enjoin’d by a Natural Law, obliging to the Performance of External Actions, before the Foundations of such States.” Hence, not receiving its Force from the Magistrate, it binds him indispensably, as also all Nations, with respect to one another.§XII. I ought rather to observe, “That the Division of all Kind of Property, or Dominion, is by me deduc’d from a Law, which does not suppose the Erection of any Civil Government, and, therefore, depends not upon the Will of the Civil Magistrate, and is, consequently, a Rule proper to direct the Actions of different States, and impose Restrictions which are not to be broke thro’, even by Princes.” Because “such a Law only, can guard those Things that are necessary to the Happiness of every One, from the Invasion of all Others”; it follows, “That Peace amongst all can be establish’d, only by such a Law, and that it actually will be establish’d, as far as can be done by Virtue of a Law, and the Power, or Right, thence granted to Men”; nor can more be desired. On the contrary, “If Property may be arbitrarily settled and unsettled by the sole Will of the Supreme Powers in every State, and the Nature of the Best End, or of the Common Good, and of the Means naturally leading thereto, fixes no Rule,” (as Hobbes every where teaches,15 ) “Which even their Wills are obliged to obey in external Actions,” there is no Law to restrain States from perpetual War; no Law to oblige the Rulers of States to seek the Publick Good of their Subjects, and to preserve them their Rights by external Acts; (for their Will, which only, Hobbes acknowledges for a Law, may lead them to the contrary:) No Law to forbid a Faction, powerful enough to overturn the State, to commit Treason. For, on this very Account, that a Faction is suppos’d too Powerful for the State, there is no longer any coercive Power in the State, either to protect the Obedient, or to punish the Disobedient; and, therefore, according to Hobbes’s Principles, there is no Security to be had, such as is necessary to oblige to the Observance of the Laws of Nature, (for Example, to keep Faith,) by external Actions, and, therefore, this Law will not oblige, but it will be lawful to dissolve that State, which was founded upon Compact: And, therefore, any State may be crumbled into Parts less and less without end, and that lawfully, according to Hobbes’s Doctrine; because no Law, of Force in that Case, will be violated; not the Law of Nature, which for want of Security, in that Case, will not oblige to external Actions, (so he tells us de Cive, Cap. 3. §. 27;16 ) nor the Law of the State, because they are not violated by Rebellion, or Treason, according to his Assertion, c. 14. §. 21.17

  The same Law of Universal Justice teaches to acknowledge and preserve Natural Governments;§XIII. This Law of Universal Justice (which I have laid down, for this Reason, that it lays the Foundation of Dominion Divine and Human, both over Things and Persons, in the Respect due to the Common Good,) teaches us to acknowledge and preserve all Government establish’d naturally, (such as is that of God over all Creatures, and of Parents over their Children:) And by this Means chiefly does this Law provide for the Necessities of Human Nature, and admonishes us, where they are wanting, to erect the most convenient Forms of Government according to these Patterns, and to preserve Peace with them who are not under the same Civil Power.and, after these Patterns, to establish Civil Government: Hence it is, that the Dictates of ReasonGives the Dictates of Reason the Force of Divine Laws;, (naturally, that is, from the Will of the First Cause establishing the Nature of Things,) laying down many clear and general Precepts concerning the Common Good, are justly esteem’d Divine Laws: And that large Room is left for Divine Revelation, or Human Authority, to superadd, in order to the same End, Positive Laws, (as they are called,) which shall, in the given Circumstances, be our special Rule of Action.18

  Moreover; these general Laws of Nature, concerning the Care of the Publick Good, and the settling and preserving Dominion, require, “That both God and Men take care,and leaves room for Positive Laws by God and Men; whenever they please to enact any Positive Law, to give sufficient Evidence of their doing so”; for such Discovery is necessary to the Promulgation thereof, without which no-one can be oblig’d. Hence it is necessary, that, “if God would command any Thing by a Revelation,” it must first appear plain, “That the Command is perfectly consistent with his unchangeable Laws known from Nature.”all which must be plainly promulg’d; For it is certain, “That the Divine Reason cannot contradict it-self.” And it is farther required, “That his Will to enforce this new Law be discover’d to those for whom it is enacted, by enabling his Messengers to foretel future Contingencies without Mistake, or Deceit, or else to work true Miracles.”and also consistent with the Laws of Nature. Hence also Human Legislators, when they enact Laws, do in the first Place declare, “that they tend to the Publick Good,” and, therefore, have the same View with the Laws of Nature; and then add “some Signs, or Testimonies, to make it known, that they have been actually promulg’d by their Authority.”

  CHAPTER VIII

  Of the Moral Virtues in particular.

  The Author proceeds to a particular Description of the more limited Moral Virtues.Having explain’d the Original of Dominion, and, by the way, declar’d its Progress thro’ all Society, whether Sacred, or Civil, or between different States, or between the different Parts of the same Family; I will now “proceed to a particular Description of the more limited Moral Virtues.” Something upon this Head I have already suggested in the foregoing Discourse, where I have shew’d, “That they were contain’d as Parts in that Universal Benevolence enjoyn’d by the Law of Nature.” But, because these Virtues are properly conversant only about such Matter, as is, of right, in our own Power; and because in these there is a distinction between Debts and Gifts, between Superiors and Inferiors, between different States, and between the several Members of the same State, and between the Parts of a Church, or Family; it was necessary to lay down something, in general, concerning the Original of Dominion over Things and Persons, whence all these different Relations arise; and that it was to be deduc’d from Principles, which did not suppose any Obligation to the special Acts of the Virtues.

  All Obligation to the exercise of Moral Virtues, arises immediately from this, “That such Actions are commanded by the Law of Nature.”First, then, we are to observe, that, “As Universal Justice is a Moral Perfection, to which we are therefore oblig’d, because such a Will, or Inclination of Mind, is commanded by the Universal Law of Nature, enjoining the settling and preserving to every one his Rights; So we ought to possess all particular Virtues, or we are therefore oblig’d by them, because they are commanded by some particular Law of Nature, which is contain’d in that Universal One, which I have mention’d.” They are indeed, in their own Nature, Good, tho’ there were no Law, because they conduce to the Good State of the Universe: But Moral Obligation, and the Nature of a Debt thence arising, is unintelligible without a respect to a Law, at least, of Nature. Nay, farther; the very Honour, from which Actions are distinguish’d by the Title of [Honestas] laudable Practice, or are called Honourable, seems wholly to come from this, “That they are prais’d by the Law of the supreme Ruler, discover’d by the Light of Nature, and honour’d with the greatest Rewards, among which is to be reckon’d the concurring Praise of Good Men.”1 And justly they are called naturally Lawful and Honourable, because the Law, which makes them such, does not depend upon the Pleasure of the Civil Power, but arises necessarily, in the Manner already explain’d, from the very Nature of Things, and is altogether unchangeable, whilst Nature remains unchang’d.

  From the Law requiring the settlement of Property, in order to the Publick Good, are inferr’d the Duties 1. Of Giving to others. 2. Of Receiving to our-selves, those Things, which are either necessary, or highly serviceable, to this End.§II. The special Laws of the Moral Virtues may, after this Manner, be deduc’d from the Law of Universal Justice. There being a Law given, which fixes and preserves the Rights of particular Persons, for this End only, That the Common Good of all be promoted by every one, all will be laid under these two Obligations, in order to that End: 1. To contribute to others such a Share of those Things which are committed to their Trust, as may not destroy that Part which is necessary to themselves for the same End: 2. To reserve to themselves that Use of what is their own, as may be most advantageous to, or at least consistent with, the Good of others.

  In order to explain these Laws, it is to be observ’d, “That others and our-selves are Terms, which, in every one’s Mind, divide the whole System of Rational Beings; and may, indifferently, be referr’d to God and Men”; whence both “his Honour is to be regarded by Men in the consideration of the Common Good”; and he himself may be understood, by an easy Analogy, “to act towards other Rational Agents, according to the Rules of the Moral Virtues.” The former Law, which commands us “to regard others in order to the Common Good,” enjoins Liberality, and the Virtues of common Conversation2 in a strict Sense, (for in a large Sense every part of Universal Justice promotes Conversation with others;) the latter Law enjoins Temperance and Moderation about those Things which are to be reserv’d to our-selves, so as may best enable us most effectually to promote the Publick Good, of God and all Mankind, and, in a particular Manner, of our native Country and Family.

  All the Virtues, Parts of Universal Justice, and consequently connected, but not confounded.In both Laws, both Members of the Division, that is, the Whole, of which we our-selves and others are Parts, comes into consideration; and, therefore, “All the Virtues prefer the Publick Good before the Private Advantages of any one, tho’ some of them may be said to regard one Part of that Whole, more immediately than another.” For this Reason some may perhaps think, “That these parts of Justice, and, consequently, all the particular Virtues, are not sufficiently distinguish’d from one another, but confounded.” But whoever throughly considers the Matter will see, “That their mutual natural Connexion, and the reciprocal Assistance which they mutually afford to one another, and to the Common Happiness, can hardly otherwise be more conveniently express’d.” And, therefore, no-one can say, “that these Virtues are confounded,” who would not accuse Nature it-self of Confusion; because she provides for the Health of the whole Body, and of a particular Part, by the same Motions of the Blood, and by the same Arteries and Veins. Thus, for Example, the Animal Nature performs these two Offices by straining the Blood thro’ the Vessels of the Liver: 1. It prepares fit Blood (which would otherwise produce a Jaundice) for all the other Parts, being in the mean time not forgetful of nourishing the Liver it-self:2. It nourishes the Liver, at the same time not forgetting the other Parts. Thus the Publick Office of the Liver is naturally interwove indeed, but not confounded, with the Private.3 These two Offices may be understood distinctly, and some Peculiarities may be ascrib’d to each of them thus consider’d; and this is sufficient to prevent Confusion. Yet these two Offices cannot be actually separated from one another in a healthful State, or whilst Nature remains undisturb’d. So neither can the subordinate Virtues be really divided from one another, consistently with Justice, or the Publick Good; yet there is no Confusion, whilst each may be consider’d separately, by its respect to those Parts, which it immediately regards, tho’ they all ultimately promote the Good of the Whole. The ultimate End and Effect of both Laws, and, consequently, of all the Virtues enjoin’d by them, is one and the same; but the immediate Ends which they regard, and Effects which they attain, are no less various, than are the several Parts of the System of Rational Agents, each of which may be provided for, in order to the greatest Good of the Whole.

  The Minds of Men, in the Practice of all the Virtues, are always conversant, tho’ not always explicitly, about the Common Good.§III. Hence we may understand the Reason, “Why the Minds of Men do not always very explicitly view and intend the Common Good, even when they act according to the rule of Virtue”: ’Tis this, “The immediate Object of their Pursuit is some Part thereof, but which they otherwise very well know, to be perfectly consistent with its other Parts, and necessary to the Composition of this Whole.” But in every act of Virtue there are many Things which prove, “That the Care of the Common Good is never laid aside.” For, in these, Care is always taken, “That every one confine himself within the Bounds of his own Rights, and invade not those of another.” But, “Rights cannot be consider’d as so limited, without some respect to the Rights of others; and, consequently, to the Good of all others, on account of which the Properties of all are limited.” All States, and their Founders, “acknowledge that general Division of Rights and Property, whereby certain Things are appropriated to God as Sacred, and their proper Bounds are assign’d to other Nations”; by their acknowledging their own Territories to be bounded, by their practising Religion, and entering into Leagues and Commerce with other States. Private Persons, because they subject themselves to, and govern themselves by, the Laws of their own Country, “whilst they give themselves up to the Practice of Virtue, of necessity do so far consent with their own and other States, that such general Division of Dominion is necessary to the Good of the Whole.” Lastly; because in every Virtue the Mind is dispos’d to give their Rights to God and to all Men, to Foreigners, to Members of the same State, to those of the same Family; and that always in this Order, that the Rights of God should take the first Place, those which are common to all Nations the second, and the Rights of any particular State the third; those of lesser Societies, such as Corporations, Colleges, Families, following: Hence is easily inferr’d, “That their principal End is the Common Good of the whole System of Rational Agents”; for “this is not really distinguish’d from the Good of those Parts, consider’d in that Order, and mutually united by those Bonds, of Society.”

  Mediocrity consists in giving to no Part more or less, than a due regard to the Whole requires.“From this End, and the Parts thereof consider’d in the Order now mention’d, is to be taken the Measure of all Actions and Affections, so that they may justly be said to be faulty thro’ excess, or defect, if at any time they give more, or less, to any Part, than the Preservation of the Good of the Whole will permit.” Thus may easily be found out a certain Measure of Action from stated and known Rules, namely, “The Laws which determine the Rights of God, of Nations, of that State under which every one lives, and of lesser Societies, and Individuals”; so that it is without doubt, “That all those Actions are within the Bounds of Mediocrity, which violate none of these Laws”; and as certain, “That every Action departs from thence, or is Vitious, that breaks any of these Laws.” I suppose “these Laws to agree among themselves, so that the Rights of lesser Societies may in all Things be consistent with the Rights of the Superior; That, in Families, nothing can be rightfully enjoin’d, which contradicts the Laws of that State, of which they are Parts; in States, that nothing can be commanded rightfully, contrary to the Laws binding all Nations, (such are those concerning the Division of Dominion, or the not violating Property, concerning keeping Faith, &c.) And in these, that nothing contradict the Dominion of God over his Creatures.” For “all the Force which inferior Laws have to oblige, is deriv’d to them, from the Force of the Superior; which Power of obliging must, therefore, be wholly wanting in those Laws, which contradict others of a higher Nature.” For “an Inferior Power cannot abrogate the Law of a Superior; tho’ it may variously limit the Liberty left by the Law of the Superior”; because the Power of further determining, in Cases undetermin’d by a Superior, is perfectly consistent with Subordination; nay, and is the chief Reason, why subordinate Rulers are appointed.”

  From the former of the two Laws are deduc’d Precepts 1st. Concerning Gifts, in which Liberality, and 2dly, Concerning Conversation, in which the Virtues peculiar to that are conspicuous. The Virtues observant of the First Law, are,§IV. Having explain’d the Measure of that Mediocrity, which is usually requir’d in Moral Virtues,4 it is easy to describe them separately, because their Essence consists in “the Inclination of the Will to obey the Laws deduc’d from the general Law of Justice.” Let us, therefore, consider those two former Laws, which I have just now shewn to be deriv’d from the Law settling Dominion, or Property, for the Common Good.

  The former of these commands us, for this End, to communicate of our own to others in such Manner, that we may, nevertheless, reserve to our selves sufficient to pursue our own Happiness. It is obvious enough that this is commanded, “Because it is evidently necessary to the Common Happiness, without which it is absurd to expect our own private Happiness,” as I have already shewn at large. In this Law are contain’d, both a Regulation concerning “Gifts,” for which either no Reward is expected, or where it is left wholly to the Will and Opportunities, of him who receives the Benefit; and also a Precept concerning “that less, but most useful, Benevolence, which is practis’d in all kind of Agreements, Compacts, and Commerce, in which we either promise, or perform, any Thing to others, under a Condition to be by them executed.” We may bestow upon others, either our Goods, or our Services, or both. The Will to obey this Law is conspicuous, either in beneficent Actions, which are its proper Effects, and, therefore, natural Signs of it; or in the voluntary Signs of it. To the first Head belongs Liberality; to the Second, the Virtues of common Conversation.

  Liberality,§V. Liberality is Justice conspicuous in Actions, bestowing gratis upon others what is our own.5 I make Liberality a Species of Justice, to avoid repeating the Definition of Justice, viz. A Will to obey the Law of Nature, and to shew by the same Word, “that the Necessity and true Measure thereof was to be taken from the Law.” For, “every Part of Justice ought to be conformable to a Law; and all the Laws an Agent is subject to, (the Natural and Positive Law of God, the Laws of Nations, Laws Civil and Municipal, and those of smaller Societies,) are to be consider’d, before his Action can be pronounc’d Just, or Virtuous.” For, in all these, the best End, and the particular Parts thereof,” (the Honour of God, the Peace and mutual Commerce of different Nations, the proper Polity of particular States, the Wealth and Security of smaller Societies, and of Families,) “are regarded.” And all, either Excess, or Defect in free Gifts is forbid, by which any of these is violated: “But such a free bestowing of Things and Services, as tends to establish and enlarge the particular Parts of this End in their proper Order, is commanded.”

  (with the Virtues subservient thereto,But, because “it is impossible to support a liberal Expence, without an honest Endeavour to acquire, and to preserve our Acquisitions,” this also is commanded by the Precepts and Admonitions deduc’d from the Consideration of the same End, and of the particular Parts thereof, consider’d in the same Order; and, therefore, “The same Liberality, which principally denotes a Will to expend, subordinately at least includes a Will obedient to the same Commands in Acquiring and Preserving”: That is called Providence, or Prudence, and is oppos’d, both to Rapacity, and improvident Negligence; this is call’d Frugality, or Parsimony; which, on the one hand, is oppos’d to sordid Niggardliness,6 and, on the other, to Prodigality. So Providence and FrugalityProvidence and Frugality;) may be defin’d Justice in acquiring and in preserving, and the same correspond to Justice in laying out, and are subservient to it.

  and the different Branches of Liberality, as Generosity,Liberality is distinguish’d by various Names, according to the Variety of Objects, upon which it is exercis’d: For, if it exerts it-self in Things of signal Publick Use, it is call’d Generosity, or Publick-Spiritedness;7 to which, on the one hand, is oppos’d the Lavishness of the Ambitious; and, on the other, the Mean-Spiritedness of sordid Wretches. Towards the Miserable, it is called Compassion;Compassion, Alms-giving, Hospitality: and towards the Poor in particular, Almsgiving. Toward Strangers it is called Hospitality, especially, if we entertain them in our Houses. In all these, the Measure of Beneficence is taken “from that which is most conducive to the various Parts of the chief End; to Piety, which establishes some kind of Society between God and Men; to mutual Assistance, Fidelity, and Commerce among various States; to Concord, and the other Duties of the Parts of the same State towards one another; and to the most flourishing State of lesser Societies and Families, which can be obtain’d consistently with prior Obligations.” I have explain’d these Things the more distinctly, in settling the Mediocrity, or Measure, of this first special Virtue, “to supersede the Necessity of adding more, to discover the Method of deducing with the greatest Certainty, the true Measure of the following Virtues.”

  And the Virtues of common Conversation§VI. Let us now proceed to the Virtues of common Conversation, which consist in Obedience to the same Law. I define them thus in General. The Virtues of common Conversation are Justice, doing good to others by a Use of voluntary Signs subservient to the Common Good.

  I have express’d the End in the Definition, not that it was necessary, because a respect to that is included in the general Notion of Justice, which aims thereat wholly; but for Perspicuity.

  By voluntary Signs I understand, chiefly indeed Speech, but I respect also the Gesture and Habit of the Body, and all Motions of the Countenance, which make a voluntary Discovery of the Mind. Gravity and Courteousness observe a just Measure in all these. But with respect to Speech especially, Taciturnity, Veracity, (which in Promises is call’d Fidelity,) and Urbanity, keep us within due Limits. Of each of these in particular I shall treat briefly.8

  and, in particular, Gravity and Courteousness,I cannot better explain Gravity and Courteousness, than by considering, that all the various acts of Justice towards others, require, in the Agent, true Prudence and extensive Benevolence, as I have already shewn. But the Conversation of a Man, in which are conspicuous all the various Signs of a just Prudence, is call’d Grave. And that, in which all the Marks of a sincere Benevolence shine, is call’d Courteous. Wherefore I would define Gravity to be A Virtue of common Conversation which is distinguish’d by proper Signs of Prudence; Courteousness, A Virtue of common Conversation adorn’d with the Marks of great Benevolence. These two are as consistent with one another, as Prudence and Benevolence, of which they are Marks. Hence the opposite Vices may easily be understood: To Gravity are oppos’d, on the one hand, a certain affected Severity and Stiffness of Manners, when one uses either more such Signs than the Nature of the End requires, or such as are not proper to promote, either the Honour of God, or the Happiness of Men, (which are the Parts of it;) or when one neglects the Thing it-self, whilst he industriously affects the Signs of it: On the other hand, Levity, which the Reader may easily understand, from the Description of the contrary Virtue, and opposite Vice. In like Manner are opposed to Courteousness and an obliging Civility of Manners, on the one hand, Flattery, or the soothing Arts of the Parasite; on the other, Moroseness.

  But, because Speech is the principal Interpreter of the Mind, and peculiar to Mankind, therefore the Law of Nature commanding us, on proper occasions, to express a prudent Benevolence towards others, does, more particularly and expressly, prescribe to our Words a Measure, which various Virtues do observe with care. For, in the first place, we are enjoin’d to be sometimes Silent; namely, whenever the Reverence due to God, or to others our Superiours, requires it; or to avoid revealing, to any one’s Prejudice, either the Secrets of the State, or of our Friends, or Family, or our own, when the concealing them will more effectually promote the Publick Good. TaciturnityTaciturnity, pays Obedience to these Laws, which is a Virtue of common Conversation, keeping Silence, when the Common Good requires it. The Excess of this is an unseasonable Niggardliness of Speech, which greatly prevents the Communication of Knowledge, and the principal Advantages of Human Society. Again; we are sometimes by the same Law commanded to speak to others, when the Common Good requires it; there is no Name of any one Virtue, which can fully, in one Word, express the Obedience due to this Law: It may, perhaps not improperly, be called, a Prudent Liberty of Speech, or a just and due Liberty in Speaking, and consists in “a readiness of the Mind to express every Thing in Words, which Reason suggests may be any way advantageous to the Community of Rational Agents.” The Words, about which this Law is conversant, either respect Things past and present; concerning which it commands us, in order to this End, “to declare the Matter as it is, so far as it is known to us,” in which consists Veracity:Veracity, or they respect Things hereafter to be done by us, with respect to which it commands us, “to promise such Things to others as “may turn to the Publick Advantage”; and that, either without a Condition, or with one, as the nature of the best End requires. “Promises, mutually agreed upon among several,” form a Covenant, Contract, or Compact, to which is owing almost all the Commerce that is among Rational Agents. There is no Name of any one particular Virtue, which obliges Rational Beings to make such Promises, or Contracts, as may most effectually promote the Publick Good; but that Virtue, which keeps such Promises and Compacts, is every where celebrated by the Name of Faith, or Fidelity.Faith, or Fidelity, They are Acts of the same Disposition of Mind, and of the same Virtue, to will the making such Compacts, and to will the Observance of them, when made. Nor is it lawful to observe Compacts, unless the Performance of the Thing covenanted be Lawful, that is, permitted by the Laws of Nature, as consistent with the Publick Good. It is so far from being true, that all Justice (which properly consists in the Observance of the Laws) may be resolv’d into Fidelity in observing Compacts, that, on the contrary, before it can be known, “Whether any Compact ought to be observed,” it ought to be certain, That the Laws of Nature enjoin’d, or at least permitted, the making that Compact.”9Lastly, “The greatest Benevolence is not express’d in our Conversation, except something Pleasant be seasonably intermix’d therewith, according to every One’s Talent that way,” which is what is called Urbanity, or Facetiousness.Urbanity, or Facetiousness. This Virtue is limited by all the Parts of the chief End, in the same Manner as the rest. For it is enjoin’d Universally, “That nothing be said, tho’ it were but in Jest, which may diminish the Honour of God, or the Happiness of Mankind”; which we shall observe, “If we do not, by a base and wanton Satyricalness, expose, to Contempt and Ridicule, the Laws of Religion; nor the Rights of Nations, nor of particular States, nor of smaller Societies, or Families, or of particular Persons.” They who, by their Jesting, transgress these Laws, are justly tax’d with Scurrility. They, who in their own Conversation wholly neglect, or condemn in that of Others, innocent Pleasantness of Speech, fall into Rusticity. And so much may suffice for the first special Law deriv’d from the general Law of Justice, and for all its different Branches, together with their correspondent Virtues.

  Virtues observant of the second Law, are the several Branches of a limited Self-Love;§VII. The second special Law of the Moral Virtues is thus deriv’d from the Law of Universal Justice. There being given a Law (of Universal Justice) fixing and preserving the Rights of every particular Person for this End only, that every One may promote the Common Good of All, every One is oblig’d, in the second Place, so to consult his own Interest in the Use of his own Advantages, that they may be of the most Advantage to all Others, or at least may diminish no Part of their Common Good. The Meaning of these Words has been explain’d just now, when I deduc’d the two special Laws from the general Law of Justice. This Law is observ’d, “When we limit our Love of our-selves, by the Bounds prescrib’d by Universal Justice, which gives to God and Men their several Rights.” This limited Self-love, being enjoin’d in this Law of Nature, and that in order to the best End, cannot but be Just and Laudable. Nay, as I have shewn, “That some Rights ought necessarily to be given to every One, that it might be well with All”;10 we may, by a Parity of Reason, infer, “The necessity of a Law commanding every one constantly to use his own Things in order to his own Happiness, where that is no way Inconsistent with, or Prejudicial to, the Happiness of the whole Community”; for “The Happiness of the Whole consists in the Happiness of all the Parts”; and therefore “The Care of the former being commanded, the Care of the latter also must of necessity be commanded therein”; nor can the Happiness of every One be procured by Others, if they neglect Themselves.

  with regard, First, to our Essential Parts, the Mind and the Body.Seeing “every Man’s essential Parts are his Mind and Body,” this Law is understood to command “The proper Improvements of both, in order to the Common Good, and by Means agreeable to that End, that is, by making use of our own Rights over Things and Persons, and not invading those of others.” I need not inculcate any Thing particularly, concerning the Method of cultivating the Mind, because it is the whole Business of “Moral Philosophy, and every Thing subservient to it, to instruct and improve and fit the Mind for this End.” The Care of our Body, in order to this End, is commanded by those Precepts, or Laws of Moral Philosophy, the Observance whereof is distinguish’d by the Name of Temperance. For the Moral Laws concerning Meat, Drink, Sleep, Exercise, and Venereal Enjoyments, are distinguish’d from the Precepts given by the Physicians concerning the same Things, in this, “That all these Things, which Physicians prescribe only for the Health of particular Persons, the immediate End of Medicine, are in Morality directed to a higher End.” I, certainly, would not call him Temperate, that is, Virtuous, “Who most diligently observ’d all the Precepts of the Physician relating to the Preservation of Health, without any regard to the Laws providing for the Common Good, and, consequently, to the End propos’d by them.” It is, however, sufficient to make Actions Virtuous, “If the Mind of the Agent has a general Inclination to do those Things, which are acceptable to God, and to all Men, proceeding from an habitual Intention to promote this End, and, consequently, from an Assent formerly given to such Practical Propositions and Laws.” For the whole Force of practical Habits arises “from the Assent of the Understanding to Practical Propositions, formerly given, and still remaining in the Memory.”

  Temperance in the Moderation of our Natural Desires, respecting the Preservation.§VIII. Temperance may, therefore, be defin’d, Justice towards our-selves, employ’d in taking Care of our Body, in order to the Common Good. If “any one, while he indulges his Body, is so far forgetful of his Mind, as to drown, or lessen its Powers, and render himself less qualified for Things Divine, or Human, Civil, or Domestick; altho’ this may sometimes be done consistently with Health, and, consequently, with the Rules of the Physicians,” he is Intemperate. For Instance, if any one breaks a Religious Fast, which may, consistently with Health, be either observ’d, or neglected; or fares so Luxuriously, but without loss of Health, as to waste his Fortune, and become unable to pay the Publick Taxes, he is certainly guilty of Intemperance. But “they who impair their Health by their pursuit of Pleasures, do not prejudice themselves only, but, in some measure, both their Friends and their Country, so far as their want of Health renders them less qualified to do Good to others.” We may estimate this from the “Proportion Health bears to Life.” Civil Laws (which take care of Matters of greater Consequence only) usually judge a Self-Murderer injurious, not to himself alone, but to the Publick also, which he robs of a Subject; and that Fact is justly reckon’d amongst the greatest Crimes. Every voluntary Diminution of our Health approaches to this Crime against the Publick Good, in the same Proportion, that the Value of Health lost does to the Value of Life; both the Health and Life being estimated, chiefly in relation to Publick Duties, the Execution whereof is in some Measure expected from All.

  The Matter will become yet plainer, if we consider particularly, “That the Care of Our Body consists in the Moderation of our Natural Desires, which respect the Preservation, either of the Individual, or of the Species.”

  of the Individual, with respect 1. to Meats.To the Preservation of the Individual, belongs the Desire 1. of Meats, which Abstinence limits, with respect to the End aforesaid; to which are oppos’d, both a keeping the Body too low, and Gluttony. 2. Of Drinks, the desire of which is limited by Sobriety, to which is oppos’d Drunkenness.2. Drink. 3. Of Sleep, the desire of which is limited by Watchfulness, which shakes off the opposite Drowsiness. 4. Of Recreations and Exercises, the Virtue setting Bounds to which, has no proper Name (that I know of,) nor the Vices opposite thereto, either in Excess, or Defect.3. Sleep. 5. Of Ornaments belonging to outward Decency, in Furniture, Cloaths, and Buildings; Neatness and Elegance, in Proportion to every Man’s Fortune,4. Recreation and Exercise. observing a due Measure in these; which Niceness exceeds, and Nastiness, or Slovenliness, does not come up to.

  5. The Ornaments of Life.§IX. Lastly; to the Preservation of the Species belongs the Appetite to Venereal Enjoyments, to which Chastity, from the same Rules, fixes Bounds, which Incontinence breaks thro’; whose various Kinds are too well known to need Enumeration. We may hence easily perceive, “How we may be many ways injurious to Others, in an intemperate indulging Ourselves; both as he who hurts himself, wounds a Member of a Family,Of the Species, with respect to Chastity, of a State, of Mankind; which, whilst sound, is in numberless ways subservient to the Good of Others: and as hence follows some Neglect of Piety, and of all severer Studies, for which the Intemperate Person is wholly unqualified; which is a loss to the whole System of Rational Beings, which had a Right hence to expect some Advantage.” Not to insist upon this, “That Men are incited to seize the Property of Others, to satisfy their own Intemperate Desires; that Intemperance raises the Price of Victuals, to the great Mischief of the Poor: What Mischief does not Drunkenness produce?”11 The publick Inconveniencies which flow from Incontinence, are too filthy to be mention’d with Modesty, too manifest to need an Enumeration. It may be sufficient to mention, “That Crimes of this kind cannot be committed without a Partner,” whence they cannot be confin’d to the breast of One alone, but are communicated to more; hence Families, and the Rights of Succession are confounded; whence the hidden Mischief spreads, and bears hard upon all those, who had a Right to expect any thing from the abused Family, or from the Inheritance; and thus by this Crime whole States are sometimes reduc’d to great Streights, and the Condition of all Mankind is made worse.

  Nor is it less manifest, “That the Business and Tendency of the known Laws of Chastity,12 both in a single and married State, is, not only to benefit the Minds and Bodies of the Chast; but to found new Families, to preserve old Ones, and to extend Friendships, rising from Affinity by Marriage”; whence arises a closer Union and Society between the Parts of the same State, and also between the Members of different States, and, consequently, of all Mankind.

  For this Cause, in my Opinion, has Natural Reason instructed almostall Nations, (since Mankind has been multiplied into numerous Families, and the Memory of their Primitive Relation, by descent from the same First Parents, came to have little Influence on them;) “To prohibit Marriage between the nearest Relations”; for this very Cause, I say, “That Marriages might unite and engage distant Families, whom Relation could not, into greater Friendships and Intimacies”: For Example; Marriages between Brothers and Sisters are now forbidden by the Dictates of Reason consulting the Common Good of Mankind, by a more widely extending the Friendships of Affinity, which Marriages in the first Age of the World were Lawful; because necessary to propagate that Race of Men, and to raise those Families, which Reason now endeavours to Preserve, by prohibiting such Marriages, in order to extend Friendships.

  Thus the Sovereign Goodness of the same End renders it Just, both to grant that Liberty in the beginning, and to forbid it afterwards, when the State of Human Affairs was chang’d.

  and Affection in the Preservation and Education of our Posterity.Lastly; because “The desire of preserving our Off-spring,” which is call’d Natural Affection, is only a Continuation of that Appetite, by which Animals are inclin’d to Procreation; it is evident, “That Natural Affection ought to be both excited and limited by a respect to the same chief End, and the several Parts thereof”: We ought, so far, to love our Children, as that conduces to the Honour of God upon Earth, and to the Happiness of all Nations, of our respective Countries and Families. It is evident, “That the Happiness of all Posterity depends upon the Care of Educating our Off-spring”: And, because our Off-spring is a kind of Compound of Our-selves and Others, it is plain, “That our Care thereof affords a Specimen of the Virtues, which relate both to Our-selves and to Others.”

  Secondly, to the Goods of Fortune:§X. But the due Care of Our-selves, in order to the Common Good, implies, not only the Consideration of those Parts, of which we are each of us compounded, the Mind and Body, of which I have already treated; but also of the Means, (even the remote Ones,) by which both Parts of us may be any way assisted; which the Lawyers call by the general Name of our Goods and Rights over Things and Persons, in plenty whereof consist every One’s Riches and Honours.

  Riches,Therefore the same Law of Nature, which limits our Will, and, consequently, all our Affections toward Our-selves, by their relation to the best End, will, for a like Reason, from the consideration of all the Parts of this End, limit all our Affections about the acquiring and preserving Wealth and Honour. For these are sought after by all, for no other reason, than as Means to the Happiness of their Possessors; which I have prov’d, “No-one is to look for in any other Measure, than what is subordinate to, or at least consistent with, the Common Happiness of All.” What I have already, by the way, said concerning the Limitation of our Care of acquiring and preserving Riches, as a necessary Means, in order to Liberality, may be sufficient to limit our Desires about them, as Means to our Happiness.

  and Honour;All that I have to add upon this Head, is, in few Words to admonish my Reader, “That all are commanded by this Law to pursue Honours, in such Measure only, and by such Means, as are not only consistent with the Health both of Body and Mind, but also with a due Care of their Family, lest we ruin that in pursuit of Honours; and with the Peace of the State, lest any One should raise Himself to Dignities by seditious Practices; with the Peace of other Nations, lest the Rights of Nations should be violated, in order to swell our Titles; and lastly, with Piety towards God, lest any one, to encrease the Glory of his Name, become guilty of Profaneness against the Divine Majesty, or violate Things and Offices Sacred.”

  Modesty,The Will, when its Motions are agreeable to these Laws, has obtain’d that just Mediocrity, which ought to be observ’d in pursuing Honours, and avoiding Infamy; the Virtue of such a Disposition is called Modesty, which may be defin’d, Justice toward our-selves, consisting in a pursuit of Honours subordinate to the Common Good. The same Modesty, “as it restrains the Will from pursuing Things higher than what are consistent with this End,” is call’d Humility: But, “as it raises the Mind to the Pursuit of the greatest Honours subservient to this End,” is true Magnanimity.13with its Branches, Humility, and Magnanimity; The Vices opposite being Pride (including Ambition, Arrogance, and Vain-glory) and Pusillanimity. I suppose every one knows, “That it belongs to the same Virtue, to acquire and preserve Honour, and to avoid and ward off Infamy.” From these Definitions of the Virtues, the Nature of the Vices opposite is easily discover’d: For Pride, which displays it-self in Ambition, Arrogance, and Vain-Glory, is in direct opposition to Humility; as Pusillanimity is to Magnanimity.

  §XI. I have thus briefly consider’d all the Virtues, and made it appear, “That in each of them is contain’d some respect to the Common Good of Rational Beings,” (which I take leave to call the City, or Kingdom, of God in the largest Sense;) “and that, whether they more immediately concern Others,All sorts of Virtues respect the Publick Good: and Man, acting according to them, pursues that Good; either in the Synthetick way, as does the Private Man; or Our-selves, the greatest Good of all is always ultimately intended.”

  The Mind of Man, acting according to the Precepts of Virtue, prosecutes this Common Good, both in the Synthetick, and in the Analytick, Way.14 A private Person imitates the former Method, when he so regulates his several Cares, that, beginning at his own proper Affairs, he does nothing in the Management of them, which the settling, the preserving, or advancing and improving his Family, does not persuade, or at least permit: In his Provision for his Family, he does nothing inconsistent with his greater Care to preserve the State: In his regard for the State, nothing but what is accommodated to, or at least permitted by, the Happiness of other Nations; which he is oblig’d, at least, not to diminish, and even to promote, as far as is in his Power. Lastly, in his pursuit of the Good of Mankind, nothing inconsistent with the Honour of the Divine Majesty, and the Preservation of the Rights of the Kingdom of God, in which are contain’d all Things both Divine and Human; and these several Rights he generally supposes already settled and appropriated.

  or in the Analytick Method, as do Legislators.But they who preside over others, and have a Power to distribute such Rights, begin at their Regard to the whole System, and so rather pursue the Analytick Method. They think they sufficiently discharge their Duty to the whole Kingdom of God, by paying him, as Sovereign King, supreme Honours, and giving to all Nations, as his Subjects, their several Rights over Things and Persons; the Regard due to the Rights of each several Nation is satisfied, by a just Care of the Rights of the several lesser Societies, Families especially, comprized in it; as the lesser Societies are sufficiently provided for, if the Goods and Interest of the several Members be taken care of. It was very easy and necessary, to use this Method in the first Division, or Settlement of Property over Things and Persons, when our First Parents (reserving to God his Rights) divided all other Things among their Children;15 for the Happiness of the whole Rational System is that single End, in its own Nature the best and greatest, (because the Sum of all Good Things, and therefore Naturally better and greater than any Part thereof, that is, than any other Good,) which they who rightly understand, cannot but pursue; and the Necessity of pursuing it renders Necessary the Settlement of distinct Properties over Things and Persons, that is, gives Original, both to all Laws, and to the Rights every one derives from them. But, when we proceed from the Care of the Whole to the Care of the Parts, it is evident, that the Analytick Method takes place.

  Hence Mankind are possess’d of an unerring Rule of Virtuous Actions.§XII. These Laws being establish’d, which regulate and bind the several Societies and Relations between God and Men, between different Nations, and also between the Members of the same State and Family, we have undoubted Marks, by which we can judge of Piety, and of all kinds of Virtue; so that their Name given to Actions overturning the Rights of Religion, of Nations, States, or Families, need deceive no-one hereafter. For it is evident, “That all the Parts of Universal Justice,” (which I have briefly recounted,) “and all the Acts of every Virtue, are commanded by these Laws for the Common Good alone”; for “such Acts do,” as is evident by constant Experience, “Naturally either give Honour to God, or promote the Peace and Happiness of different Nations, or benefit some State, or smaller Society, or some particular Person”; but “of these Parts, consider’d in this Order, is the Common Good wholly made up.”

  Wherein right Reason, prescribing Mediocrity in Human Actions, consists.Farther; hence may very clearly be explain’d, “What is that right Reason, which enables the Prudent Man to prescribe that Mediocrity, which ought to be observ’d in Human Actions.” For it consists wholly, in“such Practical Propositions, as propose to us the greatest End, and discover to us the proper Means in our Power, by which we may attain it.” Now they are, “Those Human Actions that are commanded by the Laws, which found, preserve, and regulate, Religious Worship, the mutual Commerce of Nations, the Interest of States and Families; or directed by the Dictates of Private Men; provided such Laws and Dictates be agreeable to our Experience, concerning the natural Efficacy of Human Actions.” Thus the Means, by which we may obtain or hinder our own Happiness, or that of others, are ultimately resolv’d into the Natural Powers of Actions to help, or hurt, Men, consider’d either singly, or jointly, as in a Family, or in one, or more Nations.16 We judge of those Things which belong to, or are proper Expressions of, the Honour of God, by Analogy drawn from those Actions, which tend to Honour Men. And Experience no less evidently teaches, “what kind of Human Actions are beneficial or hurtful to most others”; than it shews, “what kind of Food nourishes and refreshes most Men, what on the contrary breeds Distempers and hastens Death.”

  All our Moral Knowledge is ultimately resolv’d into our Experience of the Powers of Natural Causes.17 Nor do we with greater difficulty learn from Experience the Truth of these Propositions, “That it is necessary to the Common Good, that a distribution of Things and mutual Services should be made”; and, “That it should be preserved, by acting, both with respect to Others and Ourselves, as the Preservation of Nations, single States and Families, whereof we are Part, requires”: (From which all the Laws of Nature, and the Virtues proceed:) Than we learn, “That it is necessary to the Life and Health of an Animated Body, that Nourishment should be communicated to all its Parts, and that the Distribution made by Nature should be preserv’d by every Member so discharging its proper Office;In this § is explain’d the Manner of naturally deducing these Dictates of Reason, by which all our Actions are regulated according to all the Virtues, that first the principal Parts, then the less Principal, and the Meanest, may have their Obstructions remov’d, their Decays repair’d, and their Growth continued, ’till they arrive at the Stature and Strength prescrib’d by Nature.”

  The truth in both Cases is resolv’d into these, or such like, Propositions; “That those Things which preserve the Whole, preserve all its Parts”; and “That the Preservation of the less Principal or subordinate Parts, proceeds from the Preservation of the Principal”; which, because they are evident from the Definitions of such Causes, may justly be said to be discover’d by the Nature of Things to our Experience. For, “Definitions are learn’d from our Experimental Knowledge of the Nature of Things.”

  by an unerring Method,18 Farther; as the whole Certainty of the rules of Medicine and Diet proceeds from the unchangeable Efficacy of such corporeal Causes to produce their Effects in an Animate Body; in like manner all Certainty of those practical Propositions, which are Laws of Nature, and which compose Moral Philosophy, and determine the Nature of all the Virtues, proceeds from the unchangeable Influence of Human Actions, upon the Preservation or Damage of particular Men, of Families, of Common wealths, and of all Nations.

  in all Variety of Circumstances,Moreover; that Variety of Actions which is enjoin’d Men, with respect to their various Conditions, Families, Commonwealths, and other Circumstances, is no more inconsistent with that necessary and constant Care of preserving and perfecting all the Parts of the best End, which I have often enumerated; than Diversity of Diet in diverse Climates, Ages, and Constitutions, of Men, is inconsistent with that constant Care in all, of every where nourishing all their Members, and every where satisfying their natural Necessities, with relation to Hunger and Thirst, and Sleep, and of prescribing Bounds to their Exercises, their Venery, and their Affections, according as their several Natures require.

  Tho’ not to a Mathematical exactness,In these, as in Things necessary to the Publick Good, we can not attain our End, by acting any Thing at pleasure: But the Nature of the End sets some Limits, tho’ our Understanding cannot reach Mathematical Exactness in settling them.

  which is not necessary.We take sufficient Care of our Life, without Lessius’s Method of weighing our Food;19 and, in like manner, we may truly promote the Publick Good according to our Power, tho’ we cannot reach what is exactly best in all Cases; provided we endeavour, as far as we can, to reach it in all given Circumstances.

  The Common Good is the proper Measure of every lesser Good and Evil, and of their comparative value;§XIII. This I think necessary here to add, “That the Common Good of all Rational Beings, on this very account, that it is the Sum of all Things naturally Good, and, therefore, the greatest Good, is the fittest natural Measure, by a comparison of other good Things with which, we may safely pronounce, whether they be Great, or Small; and, therefore, whether they ought to have the first Place in our Desires, or should be postpon’d to others.” The same Measure, by which we compare the Proportion that good Things bear to one another, affords likewise a true Standard for the measuring Evils, and therefore discovers, what is more, or less, to be avoided, or griev’d for. Hence we shall likewise learn, “what kind of Affections ought to prevail over others, and which should give way”; since it is certain, “that only that Measure of all our Affections is consistent with the Nature of a Rational Being, and of the Universe, which exactly corresponds to the true Valuation of those Things, Good and Evil, by which they are excited.”

  because it is naturally determin’d,20Because the Government of our Affections is an affair of the utmost Importance, (as that from which every Virtue, and every Degree of Happiness in our own Power, proceeds;) and because That Government (as I have now hinted) depends intirely upon the Knowledge of the true Measure, according to which all Things, Good and Evil, are to be esteem’d Great, or Little; I therefore think proper, more largely to explain what I have just now affirm’d, “That the Common Good is this Measure,” and, “That it is fix’d by the Nature of Things.” This is evident, from what I have already shewn, “That the Common Good of all Rational Beings is the End, to the pursuit whereof all are naturally oblig’d.” But “the End is more known than the Means, and is the Measure by which Rational Beings must (from the Condition of their Nature) rate the greater or lesser Goodness of all the Means”; therefore, “this being establish’d as the principal End, the Good of any particular Person will be a Means to the Good of the whole Rational System”; as the Soundness of any Member in an Animal, is a Means to the Soundness of the whole Animal.

  and divided into proper Parts;Nor is it at all unusual, to find out the Quantities of Things by a Measure greater than the Things to be measured, with this only Precaution, “That the Measure be divided into Parts small enough, every one of which has a known Proportion to the Whole.” For Instance; we may measure a Line shorter than the tenth Part of a Foot, by a two or three-foot Rule, provided this be divided into Feet, and the Feet into Twelve, a Hundred, or a Thousand, equal Parts: Just in the same manner, altho’ the Common Good be by far the greatest, yet because its Parts, both the greater and the smaller, are known, and the Proportion of each of them to the Whole is sufficiently understood; we can, therefore, most commodiously determine by this Measure, both how great every Good is, and among good Things, which is Greater, or Less.

  by means whereof the Value of all Good and Evil,21 The Parts, into which the Common Good, consider’d as a Rule, is divided, are, “All the Advantages of All, which are contain’d in the happiest State of the System of Rational Beings, and are subordinate thereto”: Such are those which belong, to the Worship of God, or to Religion; to the Peace and mutual Assistance of Nations; and those which belong to the happiest Condition of single States, Families, and Persons, which can be procur’d by Human Industry; this Order of the Parts among themselves being preserv’d, in order to the Preservation of the Whole.

  Farther; as, from a Division of a Rule into Feet, of a Foot into Tenth, Twelfth, or any other Parts, and of these into Hundredth Parts, and so on, the Proportion of the smallest Part to the Whole may become known: So, from the known Order and Proportion of the several good Things to one another, and of them all to the Common Good, the Proportion, of any Good assign’d, to that greatest Good, which is the Collection of all others, is easily discover’d. Thus, from the known Proportion of any true Proposition to Science, of Science to the Tranquillity of the Mind, and Government of the Affections, of this to the Happiness of the Person, of the Person to the Family, of the Family to the State, of the State to all Nations, and of these to the whole System of Rational Beings; it at length becomes known, “How much the Knowledge of one Truth contributes to the Good of the Universe.” Like to this is the Method of valuing the Advantages of the Body; we estimate what Proportion, for Instance, the Soundness of the smallest Member, or the Benefit of a Garment, or Portion of Meat, bears to the Preservation of the Body; and may, by the like method, find out the Proportion of the Body to the whole Man, to the Family, to the State, and at length to the Universe. Lastly; the most Skilful in Mensuration, I mean the Geometricians, are wont to use this Method of determining the Proportion of Quantities, by comparing them with the greatest, to which they can bereferr’d. The Reason of this Method can easily be accommodated to our present Purpose. ’Tis this; the smallest Quantities escape both our Senses and our Understandings; the intermediate Ones, between the Greatest and the Smallest, are Infinite; nor is there any Reason, why one of them should be taken for a Measure, rather than another; nay, the same Quantity is called both great and small; with respect to different Quantities: But the Greatest is but One, and is more obvious to our Understandings than the rest; it is, therefore, the fittest to be taken for a Measure, in which is requir’d, “That it should be a determinate Quantity, and better known.” Thus the Mathematicians discover the Length of Lines inscrib’d in a Circle, by comparing them with the Diameter, which, of all the Lines inscrib’d, is the Greatest. And the determining the Sines, in the Table of Sines, by comparing them with the Radius, comes to the same Thing. For the Sines are the Halves of Lines inscrib’d subtending double their Arches, and the Radius is Half the Diameter. And it is obvious, “That Halves are in Proportion as their Wholes.” So also the Regular Bodies are measur’d, by comparing them with the Sphere, which is the greatest Body, in which all the rest are inscrib’d.22 But I care not to be tedious in such Examples.

  and, consequently, the Measure of all Affections conversant about them, may be naturally ascertain’d.The only Reason, why I have said thus much concerning the Measure of Good Things, is, “That we may esteem Good, or Evil, Great; not as it is more Helpful, or Hurtful, to Our-selves only, but as it adds more to, or detracts from, the Common Happiness: And, in comparing Good Things, may reckon that Greater, which is the greater Part of the Publick Happiness; that Less, which adds less to the Common Advantage.” For from hence, I think, may be drawn “An universal Remedy for all irregular Affections, injurious to Others, or Destructive of our own Quiet, which generally proceed from too great a love of Ourselves.” He, who esteems nothing a Great Good, but what contributes much to the Common Happiness, will never inordinately desire any Thing; and, consequently, will never so offend against the Publick Good, as to be disturb’d with the Conscience of any Crime; nor, if Human Affairs suffer by the Wickedness of Others, or by Causes superior to the Power of Man, will this rob him of his Tranquillity; partly, because he knows these Things to be out of his Power; partly, because, being well aware of that Inconstancy to which all Human Affairs are subject, he expects many such Events Daily; but especially, because it is certain, from the Experience of so many Ages, that the innumerable Revolutions of Human Affairs have left us the World in a better, rather than in a worse; State, whence we have just reason to hope, that it can hardly happen otherwise with our Posterity.

  CHAPTER IX

  Corollaries.

  From the precedent General Law are deduc’d, Having drawn, from Nature, the most general Moral Precepts, and thence explain’d the Moral Virtues in particular; I shall now briefly shew, “How these most general Precepts, which I have deliver’d, may lead us to others more limited, and of more common Use”; for hence it will be prov’d, “That God hath both promulg’d, even those particular Laws, by Natural Signs, and given them the Sanction of Natural Rewards and Punishments”: This I will make evident, by briefly considering the Decalogue and Civil Laws.

  1. The Decalogue,The Decalogue is usually divided into two Tables, of which the former contains Precepts concerning our Behaviour toward God, the latter, toward Men: Both are fulfilled by Love toward God and Men. But it is evident, “That the Precept, which we have drawn from Nature concerning Universal Benevolence or the Pursuit of the Common Good, contains these two”; because it respects God, as the Head of the Intellectual System, and Men, as his Subjects.

  Table the first, containing the Duties toward God;§II. The first Table is contain’d, particularly in that part of the Law of Universal Justice, by which I have prov’d we are taught, “That it is necessary to the Common Good, and, consequently, to the Happiness of each of us in particular, which can thence only be obtain’d, To give, God what is his own, that is, all things, in our Power, necessary to maintain and express our sense and acknowledgment of his Supremacy over All, and beget in others a Conviction, that it is the chief Interest of all, That he have a Supereminent Dominion over All Things and Persons.” That he has such Dominion, we may perceive from hence, “That he is the first Free and Independent Cause of all Things.” His Right to, or the Necessity of, such Dominion, in order to the Common Good, is understood from hence; “That he alone, both can and will most perfectly attain this End, who is indued with infinite Wisdom, comprehending all the Parts, and the properest Means, of this End; and a Will, because of its essential Agreement with his Wisdom, always embracing the best End, and the fittest Means; and lastly, with Power, which can never fail in the Execution of those Things, which his infinite Wisdom has once made the Object of his Choice.”

  Having discovered, from these Natural, and consequently Eternal, Perfections of God, this Necessity of the Divine Dominion, in order to the Common, that is, the Greatest, Good; the Law of Nature giving him that Dominion, in the manner I have already explain’d, is discover’d. For it is manifest, “That the right Reason of God, (which is to him a kind of Natural Law,) would from Eternity assume this Dominion, in order to that End”; and, “That the right Reason of Man, as soon as it exists and perceives this, will, of necessity, concur therewith”; for, because it is Right, it cannot disagree with the Divine Reason. But, there being given a Law, “To acknowledge the Divine Dominion,” there are given Laws, “Commanding, toward him, the greatest Love, Trust, Hope, Gratitude, Humility, Fear and Obedience, and what other Sentiments and Affections are expressed, by Prayer and Thanks giving, and hearing the Word of God; and, by consecrating Things, Places, Times, and Persons, to the Honour of him alone.”

  We are hence sufficiently caution’d, “Not to give any other equal Worship with him,” which is forbid by the First Commandment; “Not to liken him to Men, or any other Animals, or ascribe to him any Bodily Shape,” which is forbid in the Second; “Nor to provoke him to Anger by Perjury,” which is inculcated in the Third; we here also find an Injunction, “To allot a fit Proportion of our Time to his Worship,” which is intimated in the Fourth Commandment, by the Example of the Sabbath.

  Table the Second, containing the Duties toward Men, viz. Innocence,§III. In like manner the Second Table of the Decalogue may be deduced from that part of the Law of Nature concerning Universal Justice, by which I have shewn, “That it is commanded, (because it is necessary to the Common Good,) that a distinct Dominion over Things and Persons, and their Actions, should be settled and preserv’d inviolably among all Men; that is, that a Distribution should be made, wisely accommodated to the best End, and that the Distribution should be preserv’d, which we find so settled, by which Necessaries, at least, may be allow’d to every one, both to preserve himself and be of use to others, both which contribute to the Publick Happiness.” This Division of Things, and Actions, or Human Services, to every one, is therefore necessary to this End, because “No-one can live, much less be happy, without the use of many Things, and the Assistance and voluntary Permission of many Men”; and because “The Welfare of all Mankind, which is most evidently connected with the Common Good, consists in the Welfare of particular Men.” But, if we more narrowly inquire, “What is necessarily to be allow’d to every one, that it may be well with all,” the result will be this, 1. “That the Power of preserving Life and Limbs intire, is necessarily to be allow’d to every Man, whose Offences against the Common Good do not exceed the Value of his Life.” This is enjoin’d by the Sixth Commandment, which, therefore, not only permits, but commands, a limited Self-love. 2. “That Compacts, consistent with the Common Good, must have full Force and Credit among All.” Among such Compacts, Marriage is one of the most useful to Mankind; as that, in which all hope of Posterity, and support of approaching Old Age is contain’d. Therefore the Seventh Command enjoins every one, “To keep the Marriage-Bed unviolated”; and, thereby, promotes an extraordinary Affection of every One towards his Off-spring, which, by this Method, is more certainly known. 3. “That some Share in other Things, and in the Services of Men, is necessary to every one, to enable him to support his Life and Family, (which are allow’d him in the Laws foregoing,) and to promote the Common Good of others.” It is, therefore, necessary to the Common Good, both; “That such Goods should be allow’d to every one in the first Division of Things,” and, “That, after they are given, they should be preserv’d unviolated.” This is enjoin’d by the Eighth Commandment. Farther; it conduces to the Publick Good, “That, not only the Actions, but the Words and Desires, of Men be restrain’d from hurting others in the possession of those Things, which have been hitherto allow’d them.”1 This Restraint is the business of the Ninth and Tenth Commandments. In obedience to all these Negative Precepts consists Innocence.

  Humanity,§IV. It is farther evident, that it conduces to the Publick Good, not only, “That we should abstain from hurting others”; but, “That we should, upon proper Occasions, assist them by our Affections, Words, and Actions, in such Things as these Commandments insinuate the necessity of, in order to that End”; and this is a representation, or description, of the most diffusive Humanity. And thus the Publick Good is provided for, by “Removing its Impediments, and placing in their stead Benevolent Affections, which may extend themselves to all the Parts of the Rational System, and give to every one what is necessary.

  Gratitude,But as, according to the Mechanick Philosophy, the Material System is indeed preserv’d by a Motion communicated to all its Parts; but it is necessary, that such Motion should return into it-self, and, by that means, be perpetuated: In like manner, in the Moral System, a Universal Benevolence, once begun, is daily renew’d by the reciprocal Force of Gratitude, and by its Aid, or even by a prospect or hope thereof, gains new Strength, and an eternal Youth. It is, in it-self, evident enough, “That Benevolence, rightly and in a peculiar manner, directed towards those who had been first Benevolent to us,” (which is the Definition of Gratitude,) “contributes much to the Perpetuity of the Common Good.” We may understand, from what has been laid down in the former Chapter, “That Gratitude is then rightly dispos’d, when it returns good Offices to a Benefactor, without invading the Right of any Person, Family, State, much less of Nations”: And for this Reason I would not treat of it, ’till I had prov’d, from the other Commandments, “That the Rights of others were in no wise to be violated.” This Virtue is enjoin’d in the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue: For, tho’ Gratitude to our Parents, who are our first Benefactors, next after God the common Parent of All, be there more expressly enjoin’d; this Example instructs us, by Parity of Reason, “To repay to all our Benefactors the Favours they have conferr’d upon us.” These few Precepts, in my Opinion, contain all the Universal Laws of Nature; and, applied to the Actions of different States, with respect to one another, limit also and settle all the Rights of Nations.

  2. Civil Government and Laws, necessary to the Publick Good; and, therefore, prescrib’d by the Law of Nature, commanding us to promote this End.§V. From this abstract of the more General Laws of Nature, the Transition is easy to the Consideration of those “Dictates of Reason, which direct all to the forming and preserving Societies with a Power, not only of making Rules, but enforcing them by Punishments.” For “such Societies are necessary, to enforce the Observance of the Laws of Nature, to the Honour of God, and Happiness of Mankind, but especially of those, who are Members of such Societies.” And, therefore, a Law of Nature being Given, “which commands us to promote the End,” a Law is likewise Given, “prescribing the Settlement and Preservation of so necessary a Means as Society with Sovereign Power.” The Necessity of this Means to this End, is easily learn’d from the common Experience of All, “in those Things which respect, the care of a Family, or the building a House, or the production of any other Effect, to which the different Services of several Persons are requir’d”; where we percieve, “that all our Labour is bestow’d in vain, except some Command, and others Obey.” For it is evident, “That the procuring the greatest Good the whole Society of Rational Beings is capable of, is an Effect more complicated and intricate than any of these now mention’d,” and, “That it depends necessarily upon the concurrent Assistance of every one, by mutual Services of very different Kinds,” and, “That it is therefore impossible to obtain such Effect, tho’ foreseen and design’d, with Certainty and Steddiness, except a Subordination of Rational Beings be establish’d, and all obey God, as the Supreme and most Perfect Rational Agent, by observing those Natural Laws, common to all Nations, which I have explain’d.

  This demonstrated from Mathematical Principles.I am of Opinion, that this Reasoning, which is grounded on common and obvious Experience, proves, “the necessity of establishing Order,” to all Men not blinded with Prejudice. But, because my Adversaries in this Dispute are usually very importunate in demanding Demonstrations, I will endeavour to point out some Mathematical Principles, whence is universally demonstrated “the necessity of a known Subordination among any number of Corporeal Causes co-operating to the Production of an Effect certainly foreseen and design’d”: Such is the Common Good, in the Estimation of all who would obey the general Law of Nature. For I do not contend for any other Necessity of establishing Order, than what proceeds from the Necessity of this End. We learn, from the second Book of Des-Cartes’s Geometry, “That the most simple Effects arising from compounded Motions (the Descriptions and Properties of Curve Lines) may be exactly known, and certainly produc’d, if the several Motions whence they arise, be so adjusted, that the Latter are govern’d by the Former, but by no means without such a Subordination.”2 And it is certain, “That the fix’d Determination of all kinds of Surfaces, which can thence be produced, as well as of Lines, requires the same Subordination of Motions,” from which will therefore proceed “the certain Genesis of all kinds of Figures.” But true Natural Philosophy (I mean, that which owes its Original to Mathematicks) teaches, “That all natural Effects are produc’d by compounded Motions, and the Figures of Bodies limited by a due Subordination.” It will therefore farther instruct us, “That those natural Effects, by which the Industry of Men can certainly promote the Publick Happiness, must be produc’d by a like Subordination of the Motions proceeding from Human Bodies.” It is evident, “That some bodily Motions of Men are requisite in every good Office, especially in the Aquisition, Use, and Alienation, of Dominion over Things and Persons, in which, all Justice is contain’d.” It is therefore necessary, “To establish a Subordination among such Motions of theirs, and, consequently, among Men themselves, in order to their conspiring to produce one and the same Effect, the Common Good.” But, whilst I attentively consider this somewhat tedious Deduction, I perceive it may be much contracted thus. “If the smallest Effect of compounded Motions, the Description of a Geometrical Curve, cannot be certainly perform’d without a Subordination of Motions; much less can so complicated an Effect of many Causes, as is the Common Good, be procur’d, in any certain Method, without such a Subordination.”

  Yet I would not reject the former Deduction, because it may perhaps be acceptable to some, to see, “That there is some kind of Connexion between Natural Philosophy and Civil Government.”

  Nevertheless, tho’ the Necessity of establishing Order, “That many may successfully unite their Powers in bringing about any great Effect,” may be demonstrated from such Principles, yet that Necessity was not first learn’d by Men from this Deduction, but from obvious daily Experience in the manner above hinted.

  The first Beginnings of Empire are to be seen in a Family. The Power of the Husband over his Wife, of the Parents over their Children, and the just Bounds of Empire, are all drawn from the Relation, which they bear to the Common Good, as to their End.§VI. Having prov’d the Necessity of Government in General, from its End, these Things may easily be applied, to prove the Necessity, both of Domestick and of Civil Government, in order to obtain the several Parts of the best End, first the Happiness of Families, next of particular States, and lastly of the Universe.

  I will carry this Geometrical Illustration only thus much farther,“ That, as in Geometry, tho’ the first Example of Subordination is between two Motions, of which one is govern’d by the other; yet Order is most conspicuous and remarkable, when the Subordination is among more Causes: So, when we consider Human Affairs, tho’ the first Example of Order and Government is between the Husband and Wife,3 in which the Husband is by Nature Superior, as generally having a greater Strength, both of Body and Mind, and, therefore, contributing more to the Effect design’d from their Society, the Common Good of both in Things belonging both to God and Man; yet Paternal Government is more remarkable, after Children have been born of that former Society.” Therefore, from the Paternal Power are we to take the Copy, and deduce the Origin, of Power, both Civil and Ecclesiastical. For, in order to that necessary End I have mentioned, both must have been lodg’d in the First Father; a Family, therefore, was the first regular Society, the first Civil State, and, at the same Time, the first Church: And as Families encreas’d in number, so did States and Churches. As these Things agree with the Nature of Things, and, consequently, with right Reason, which is thence deriv’d, so do they with the most Antient and Faithful History, I mean the Mosaick, which is also Divine.4

  I must farther observe, “That Government, or the Civil Power, is naturally and necessarily limited by the same End, for which it is establish’d.” Every Means ought to be fitted exactly to its End, so as neither to fall short of, nor exceed, it. It is therefore evident, “That, in order to the Honour of God, and the Happiness of all Nations, no Government can be establish’d, that can have a Right to destroy these.” But, since all Things, absolutely necessary to these Ends, are but few and very evident, and, as I have already shewn, clearly enough laid open in the Decalogue, the Limits of the Civil Power still remain very extensive. Nothing is prohibited the supreme Power, but the Violation of the necessary Division of Dominion, by which their Rights are distinctly assign’d to God, and Men; and the overturning those other Laws of Nature, for preserving which it is it-self founded, and to which the whole Security and Happiness of Rulers is owing. Consequently, from these Restraints nothing harsher is commanded them by the Author of Nature, than“ Not to over-turn the Foundations of their own Happiness and Dominion, nor to destroy themselves along with others, by opposing such Things as are necessary to the Common Good.” However, because “The Dictate of Reason, by which the establishing and preserving Government is commanded, is a Law of Nature,” (as appears from what is already said;) it follows, “That it owes its Original to God,” and “That the Limits I have mention’d, are assign’d by him only,” which makes much for the Honour of Government.

  Supreme Powers cannot lawfully be punish’d by their subjects.§VII. This is the peculiar Privilege of the supreme Powers, “That God has appointed, under himself, no Coercive Power to punish them, if they have transgress’d the Laws of Nature, with respect to their Subjects.”5 If this were the Case, for the same Reason “another Power ought to be set over this, to punish it, if it have unjustly punish’d that Power, which I have before suppos’d Supreme”; and for the same Reason “Powers Superior to the Supreme must be establish’d in an infinite Progression,” than which nothing can be imagin’d more absurd. We must, therefore, stop at those, upon whom the supreme Power is devolv’d, and they are not liable to any Punishment from their own State. They who endeavour to subject them to Punishment, do, by this very Action, as far as in them lies, destroy the very Nature of Civil Government; because, “they reduce those who are Supreme to the Condition of Subjects.” For it is no less inconsistent with the Nature of Government, that in it all should be Subjects, than that in it all should be Sovereigns. The Nature of Order (which is essential to Government) necessarily requires, “That something should be First, and nothing before that”: And, therefore, in the present Case it is necessary, “That, among Men in the same State, there should be some First Subject of Coercive Power, from whom it may be deriv’d to all others”; but it is certain, “That they who have receiv’d that Power from it, can thereby have no Right to punish the very Author of their own “Power.” Yet this is no Reason, “Why they should not be punish’d by God, if those Powers, which are Supreme among Men, should transgress the Laws of Nature.” For they are Subjects in the Kingdom of God, or in the Universe, who in a Human Kingdom are Supreme. Therefore it cannot be said, that they have a Right to do those Things, which they do with Impunity from Men; because Right signifies a Power granted by every Law, to which we are subject; and, therefore, Actions done rightfully cannot be punish’d by any Legislator; where as the Crimes, even of supreme Powers, committed against the Laws of Nature, may be justly punish’d by the Author of Nature. By thus distinguishing between Impunity from Civil Laws, and an absolute Right, of which the Law of Nature, and the End or Design of Civil Laws, is the Measure, I think, that both Caesar has his Due, and that their Due is reserv’d, both to God and his other Subjects.

  According to the foregoing Principles, a very extensive Power is allow’d to Sovereign Powers.§VIII. How large an Authority may be given to the supreme Powers, within the Bounds of the Laws of Nature, he will easily discover, who considers, from what is already prov’d, “That they extend universally to things Divine and Human, of Foreigners and Fellow-Subjects, of Peace and War”; the Consequence of which is, “That the Magistrate, in order to pursue the Common Good, according those Laws, must be constituted Guardian of both Tables of the Decalogue; and have Right, with relation to Foreigners, to make War and Peace; with relation to his own Subjects, to make Laws, to Judge, Punish, confer Honours, publick Gifts, and all kind of Advantages.” But, because the Publick Happiness of all Mankind, and of every single State, may (as far as Men can judge) be almost equally procur’d by Constitutions, Manners, and Laws, very different; and the Welfare of the Society permits a various distribution of Honours and Advantages, nay, of Pardons and Punishments, where the Persons concern’d are not differenc’d by their Merit; it is evident, “That innumerable Articles may be (as they usually are) with safety permitted to the Discretion of Rulers”; tho’ they are always oblig’d to the Care of the chief End, which is unchangeable; and to very many Means, which are naturally Necessary thereto. And no Body can be ignorant of these Things, who has observ’d “those Changes, which are daily made in the Fortunes of Subjects at the Pleasure of Princes, without any remarkable Prejudice to the State”; or who compares “the several Constitutions of the Kingdoms or Republicks in Europe”; and perceives, “That in each of them prudent Men may live happily,” and, “That all these States do so mutually balance one another, by Commerce and Intercourse of various kinds in Peace, and by mutual Assistance in War, that much is by each contributed to the present Happiness of Europe.” For, altho’ it wants many Advantages, and may justly complain of many Disadvantages, Europe will appear very Happy, “if we reckon and justly value all the Advantages we enjoy, of Society, whether between the Members of the same State, or with Foreign Nations, and compare them with the Miseries which would follow, if all, according to Hobbes’s Scheme, consulted their own Interest only, and every one thence arrogated to himself a Right to every Thing, and engag’d in a War against All.” Now we ought to reckon, as Effects of the Principles of Concord, and of a Propensity to the Common Good, “all those Advantages which would be wanting, if the Principles of Discord and unbounded Self-love only, prevail’d among Men, of which kind are those, which Hobbes has advanc’d for the Dictates of right Reason in a State of Nature.”6 Having shewn thus much in general, it will neither be necessary to my present Purpose, “To enter into a particular Explication of all the Rights of supreme Powers”; nor “To explain the various Forms of Government, and the Causes whence they are form’d, or dissolv’d,” (which belongs to Polititians) the usefulness of our Principles in Civil Government will be abundantly prov’d, if I briefly shew, “That Hobbes’s Doctrine to the contrary, is so inconsistent with the Establishment and Continuance of all States; that, if that obtain’d, they could either never be form’d, or must, of necessity, be immediately dissolv’d.” This will appear in the following Observations.

  Hobbes’s Principles overturn the Foundations of all Government.§IX. 1. First; “All those Reproaches Hobbes has thrown upon all Men are thrown also upon all supreme Powers, of what kind soever; and, consequently, upon all Kings, our own not excepted.”

  For Kings do not divest themselves of Human Nature, when they put on a Crown. The Nature of Kings remains the same, “as if no State, or Kingdom had ever been erected upon the foot of Hobbes’s Contracts.”1. Because they represent the Nature of Princes, as more Fierce and Cruel, than that of wild Beasts. These are so far from changing the Mind of the Prince for the Better, that Hobbes openly declares, “He is not oblig’d by them,” de Cive Cap. 7. §. 12.7 And thence infers, That “Princes cannot injure their Subjects,” how much soever they may hurt them. §. 14.8 Therefore, whatever he has affirm’d as naturally and necessarily true of all Men universally, and laid down as the Foundation of his Politicks, That “in Cruelty and Ravenousness they exceed Wolves, Bears, and Serpents, who are Ravenousno farther than to satisfy their Hunger, and do not Rage unprovok’d.”9 And, That “Nature has made them Unsocial, and inclin’d them to mutual Slaughter. ” Leviath. Chap. 13.10 And much more to the same Purpose. All these Reproaches, I say, bear hard upon Royal Majesty. Who could love one whom he believ’d to be such? Who could trust such a one with his Life and Fortune and all his Hopes? Must not all of necessity be afraid, “That he will destroy them one by one?” They would have the same, or rather greater, reason to shun and esteem him an Enemy, than any other; because his Inclination to hurt, which Hobbes pretends necessary to all, would be equal to that in them, and his Power would be greater, because the Force of all is in him united.

  And deny to all, and consequently, to Princes, that right Reason, by which they might determine according to the Nature of Things, what sort of Actions are good, or Bad to others.11 All those Arguments, by which he endeavours to prove, “That Human Reason is wholly unfit for a Rule of Manners, as not discerning between Good and Evil, but only as we desire that to be done to us, and shun this”; do in the same manner destroy “the Dignity of Monarchs, and all Polity whatsoever. We all” (says he) “rate Good and Evil by our proper Pleasure, or Pain.”12 Therefore, if Hobbes’s Doctrine be true, noone, not even a Prince, either can, or will consider, “what is profitable, or hurtful to others.” And there would remain no Reason drawn from the Common Good, “why a Prince should be appointed, or continued,” because, according to him (as I have shewn in the Chapter concerning Good,13 ) “The Nature of Man,” (not excepting the supreme Magistrate, whether Prince, or Council,) “does not understand Good, or Evil, except with relation to the Person who uses those Words.” Therefore whatever the King commands as Good, is to be understood “Good to the King, or the Representative of the Common-Wealth.” Leviath. C. 6.14 But “not to the Common-Wealth it-self, much less to the Universe,” such as others think those Actions to be, that promote, both the Honour of God, and the Happiness of Mankind. By reasoning thus, “he makes all Government unfit for the End for which it is desir’d, and thereby does but too plainly insinuate, That it ought wholly to be rejected.”

  Nor can this Wound given Sovereign Powers, be heal’d by the help of all those Blandishments, with which he afterwards sooths Rulers, namely, that “That is Good, or Evil, Just, or Unjust, whatever they pronounce to be such, and that they make all Things Just by commanding them, Unjust by forbidding them.”15 Whence it follows, “That they are infallible in such Judgments and Declarations, and that they have no occasion to ask the Opinion of Lawyers, or consult with Men of Experience, to inform themselves what will promote, or hinder the Happiness of their State.” Nor will it avail, that he has defin’d “A Crime, to be that only, which has been either done, or omitted, said, or will’d contrary to the Reason of the Common-Wealth,” or, “of the Representative of the Common-Wealth, ”16 as he elsewhere explains himself: And that he has asserted, That “his Reason is to be always esteem’d, Right by the Subject.”17 Because he himself has affirm’d, That “the Commands of States may be contrary to right Reasonin matters of Religion;18and contrary to the Laws of Nature” (in Human Affairs) “which are the Dictates of right Reason.”19 And has also depriv’d States of all Rules that might be taken from the Nature of Things, according to which States might rectify their Commands, since he has expressly asserted (Leviath. C. 6.) That “there is no Common Rule of Good, or Evil, and Contemptible, to be taken from the Nature of the Objects themselves.”20 And elsewhere he plainly enough teaches, “That he does not believe the Reason of the Common-Wealth to be really right Reason”; but that, in order to end Controversies, “The contending Parties, by their own Accord, set up, for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, to whose Sentence they will both stand, or their Controversy must either come to Blows, or be Undecided, for want of aright Reason constituted by Nature.” Leviath. Chap. 5.21 Where afterwards he compares right Reason to the Trump in playing at Cards, to which the Superiority is given, partly by the Consent of the Players, and partly by Accident.

  Hobbes’s Argument is refuted, by which he endeavours to prove, “That we ought therefore to obey the Reason of the Common-Wealth, because there is no such thing as right Reason, or which can judge according to a Rule establish’d and enforc’d by the Nature of Things.”22 Upon this Head he is certainly so far in the right; “In Controversies which it is necessary to end, it makes for the Common Good, that the contending Parties willingly relinquish their Decision to the Reason of the Common-Wealth, and fully acquiesce therein.” And this common and right Reason persuades; because it is certain, “That this Decision will either be right, or that a righter cannot be had, consistently with the Common Good.” And this Reason is both evident enough, and is preferable to that given by Mr. Hobbes upon this account, that it supposes, “That there is somewhere among Men a practical right Reason; and gives them such Directions, that they may either reach it exactly, or that which approaches nearest it, which is sufficient for all the purposes of Human Happiness and our Duty.” But Hobbes’s Reason supposes, “That there is no right Reason settled by Nature,”23 and upon this Account appoints us, “To stand to the Reason of the Common-Wealth,” as if that were Right, than which nothing can be affirm’d more absurd, or mischievous. For one of the Premisses so contradicts the Conclusion to be thence deduced, that it might much more justly be inferr’d, (upon supposition, that there were no right Reason settled by Nature,) “Therefore, we ought not to stand to the Reason of the Common-Wealth.” This reasoning of Hobbes is so much the more dangerous, because it may easily lead the unwary, when they perceive the falsity of one of the Premisses, to suspect the useful Conclusion he would infer from thence; or the notorious Truth of the Conclusion may cause that most false Principle whence Hobbes infers it, to seem true. Mean while, nothing more reproachful can be said of Sovereign Powers, than, “That their Laws are not the Dictates of right Reason, but only to be taken for such, because they have now got the Supreme Power by their own Fortune and our Consent, but that other Laws in perfect Contradiction to all these would equally conduce to the Common Happiness, and might justly claim an equal Respect, if by chance of War, or the Success of cunning Counsels it should happen, that a Mad-Man should get uppermost, who would enact Laws favouring Universal Cruelty, Perfidiousness, Ingratitude, and the Lust of Rule over all Things and Persons.” There is nothing which could more effectually encourage the most profligate Wretches to raise Rebellion, than the view of filling the Thrones of their deposed Sovereigns, and thereby procuring to their own wild Opinions, and depraved Affections, the Honour of being esteemed Actions of right Reason and Virtue.24

  2. Hobbes’s Doctrine of the Right of every one to every thing, would not suffer any one to enter into Civil Society;§X.25 2. “Hobbes’s Doctrine of the Right of every One, to every Thing, in a State of Nature,” (which I have explain’d and refuted in the First Chapter,) “does not permit Men who have imbib’d it, to enter into Civil Society, and disposes them who have imbib’d it, whilst in a State of Society, to throw off all Obedience to Civil Laws,” that is, (according to his own Exposition,) “To commit Treason.”

  The former part of this Assertion is thus prov’d. Mr. Hobbes, if we may believe his Principles, (de Cive, C. 1. §. 7–10.26 ) demonstrates, “That every one has a Right to every Thing”; from thence, “That right Reason gives every one a Right to preserve and defend himself.” Farther, he himself asserts, “That a Right can be transferr’d only in this manner, when any one declares to another, by proper Signs, that it is his Will, that it should not hereafter be lawful for him to resist the other, who is willing to accept of this Right, as he might justly before resist him.”27 But (he says) that “Noone can be oblig’d, by such Compacts, not to resist another threatning Death, Wounds, or any other bodily Harm,”28 and that “Every one retains a Right to defend himself against Violence,” and that he does not transfer that to the Common-Wealth, “When he consents to that Union, by which it becomes a Common-Wealth.”29 Therefore, “If a Right to all Things, and to wage War against All, can be inferr’d from his Right to preserve and defend himself,” I affirm, “He stills retains it, even against the Common-Wealth.

  It were easy here to prove, “That every one, according to Hobbes’s Principles, is judge, whether the Common-Wealth is about to inflict Death, or any other corporal Punishment upon him, and consequently, whether Rebellion be necessary to his Defenceorno”; and to shew, “That that is a necessary Means to every one’s Preservation, or Defence, which he, as the proper Judge, has pronounc’d to be such”; nay, and “That that right Reason, which had before taught, that all things were necessary to the Preservation of every One, cannot afterwards contradict it-self, and affirm that less is sufficient.” But any Reader, who understands Hobbes’s Doctrine, may make these Objections to it; nor do I see what Hobbes can reply. I therefore hasten to the second Part of my Assertion, which, I believe, will give Hobbes greater Displeasure.

  and excites Subjects to Rebellion.30 This might be prov’d by the same Argument, by which I now proved, “That the Right of claiming all things to himself by War, cannot be transferr’d”; for thence it follows, “That every one, according to Hobbes, retain’d to himself a right of waging War against any one, and, consequently, against his own State, except it grant to each Man a Right to every thing, which yet is evident can be granted in no State.” But let us rather have Hobbes’s Sentiments in his own Words. He, from an unlimited Right of preserving and defending Themselves, has openly allow’d the Subjects a Liberty of defending Themselves with united Arm’d Force against the Sovereign Power of the State. Leviath. Chap. 21. he proposes the Question, and Answers it in these Words. “In Case a great many Men together have committed some capital Crime against the Sovereign Power, for which they all, except they defend themselves, expect Death, Whether have they not the Liberty to join together, and assist and defend one another? Certainly they have. For they but defend their Lives, which the guilty Man may as well do as the Innocent. There was, indeed, Injustice in the first Breach of their Duty, but that they afterwards took Arms to defend themselves, is no new Crime.”31 In the English Edition of the Leviathan he asserts the same things, but somewhat more boldly, for, instead of the last Clause, he inserts these two, “Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, tho’ it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust Act, and, if it be only to defend their Persons, it is not unjust at all.”32 I think, indeed, he was to be commended, that, in the Latin Edition he somewhat soften’d so wicked a Doctrine; yet even these second Thoughts seem destructive enough, and to breathe forth nothing less than Rebellion. For, let us imagine that Capital Crime, which he supposes many to have committed, to have been this; “Many had conspir’d together to kill the King, this Crime is brought to the King’s Ears by some One that is privy to it; hence the Conspirators are afraid of that Death, which they deserve: It is lawful (says our Casuist) for them to take up Arms in their mutual Defence, and to do this, is no new Crime.” But, I think, “such Conspirators, taking up Arms against their King, that they might ward off that Punishment they have deserv’d, wage an unjust War, and are truly guilty of Rebellion; and that they, therefore, by this Step add another Crime to their Conspiracy; altho’ both Crimes are equally included in one general Name, and both be a Breach of Faith, it is nevertheless a new Crime, that is, it is another newly added to the First, and they increase their Crimes by every Act in Prosecution of this War. The taking up Arms against the Sovereign Power, endeavouring to bring Criminals to condign Punishment, tends to Sedition and Civil War. Nor, if this be permitted, can they be forbid to kill the King, offering to lay hands upon any of them”; which of how ill consequence it may be, I leave others to judge.

  3. Hobbes’s Doctrine of Compacts,§XI.33 3. “Some things also, which he has advanc’d concerning the Laws of Nature, threaten all Civil Government with Ruin; particularly, what he has deliver’d concerning the Obligation of Compacts and Oaths.”

  It has a dangerous tendency to Governments, his Assertion, “That Compacts” (by which only, he has affirm’d, they are establish’d and preserv’d) “Do not oblige, except where Credit is given to him who promises.” This is insinuated in his Definition of a Compact, de Cive, Cap. 2. §. 9. which he explains and applies, Cap. 8. §. 3, & 9. where he treats of the Obligation of Slaves. “The Obligation” (of Slaves) “arises from Compact; but there is no Compact, where Credit is not given, as is evident from C. 2. §. 9. where a Compact is defin’d, to be the Promise of him who is believ’d. There is, therefore, along with the Benefit of Life pardon’d, join’da Confidence, in which his Lord leaves him his corporal Liberty, so that, except an Obligation by the Ties of a Compact had interven’d, he might not only run away, but also deprive his Lord, who had sav’d his Life, of Life.”34

  He adds more to the same Purpose, in the ninth Section of the same Chapter, where, explaining by what Methods Slaves may be freed from their Bondage, he at last affirms, “That the Slave who is thrown into Chains, or any other way depriv’d of his Corporal Liberty, is thereby freed from that other Obligation of his Compact. For no Compact (says he) can take place, except where Credit is given to him who Covenants; nor can that Faith be violated, which is not given and receiv’d.”35 Nay, he speaks more plainly, §. 4. of the same Chapter, “Slaves, if they be thrown into Prison, or Chains, do nothing against the Laws of Nature, if they kill their Lord.”36 All these Positions are advanc’d by him, in order to explain the Rights of Empire, or of a natural Common-Wealth, which is acquir’d by Power and natural Force, which he affirms, “To be then establish’d, when Captives in War, or the Conquer’d, or those who distrust their own Strength, promise the Conqueror, or the Stronger, that they will serve him,” as appears from the first Sect. of the same Chapter.37 And it is notorious, from the most authentick Histories, that most of the Governments now in being have been set up in this manner. It is, therefore, of the worst Consequence to all those States, “That,” (according to Hobbes’s Principles,)“immediately after a Prince has made any Discovery, that he does not give Credit to any of his Subjects promising him their Obedience, they should befreed from their Subjection, and, notwithstanding their Compacts, may, without any Violation of the Laws of Nature, lawfully kill their Prince. If a Subject be imprison’d, and can escape by breaking Prison, or corrupting his Keepers,” according to Hobbes, “He is freed from his Covenant and Oath of Allegiance, and may raise Rebellion without a Crime.”38 These things are of the more dangerous Consequence, because the Signs are very uncertain, by which we discern, “Whether Princes believe us or no,” and the Caution necessary to their Safety may make Men of suspicious Tempers easily conclude, “That they are not trusted, and that they are, therefore, freed from their Subjection.” Nor may we take bare Imprisonment, or corporal Restraint, for a sufficient Sign, “That we are not trusted,” (which Hobbes has asserted, but not prov’d;) that is often intended, “Only to secure the Innocent, perhaps in order to be examin’d, or to answer for smaller Crimes,” but never as a by Leagues.” But these Sign, “That it is the Will of the Prince, to set the Subject at Liberty from his Covenanted Fealty.”

  39 Farther; “It overturns the Foundations of all States, what he asserts,” That “Compacts, in which the Parties contracting mutually give Credit to one another, neither Party performing any thing immediately, are invalid in a State of Nature, if a just Fear arise on either side,”40 that the other Party will not perform what he has promis’d. For it is certain, “The Compacts, by which Common-Wealths (according to Hobbes’s Scheme) were form’d, are made in a State of Nature, and that both Parties, that which is to take upon them the Governing Power, and therefore promises Protection, and that which promises Obedience, cannot immediately perform what they promise”; and, without all doubt, “The contracting Parties may afterwards fear being deceiv’d, and they will think this their Fear just, and therefore (according to Hobbes) it is just, because they themselves are the proper Judges, and there is no third Power able to compel both Parties to observe their Compacts.” Therefore, “These Compacts are not valid”; and, consequently, “The Common-Wealth, which seem’d to be rais’d and supported by them, falls to the ground, like a Building upon an infirm Foundation.” But this short Hint may be sufficient here, for I have already handled at large, in its proper Place, this whole affair of the Obligation of the Laws of Nature, especially that which relates to Compacts.41

  and of Oaths, pernicious to supreme Powers.42 Let us now proceed to Hobbes’s Notion of Oaths, “which, in effect, destroys Civil Society, by destroying, or rendering ineffectual its greatest Security.” Chap. 2. §. 22. He has this marginal Note, “An Oath adds nothing to the Obligation of a Compact.” But, in the Text, he expresses himself more equivocally, “That a simple Compact does no less oblige than that which we have confirm’d by an Oath.”43 I readily own, “a Compact not confirm’d by Oath, is Obligatory.” To which I add, that it is thence certain, “That God will punish the Breach of plighted Faith, according to the Prayers of him who takes a lawful Oath,” because, “It is the Trans gression of a natural Law, which God has enforced by a Sanction for the Common Good”; and “That this is known from the Nature of Things, so that there is no need of Revelation, or any Person standing in the place of God, to signify that God accepts to be Guarrantee of such a Vow,” as Hobbes seems to insinuate.44 However, an Oath introduces a new Obligation, because “then we owe Obedience to another Divine Law, by which we are forbid, under a new and most grievous Punishment, to invoke the Name of God rashly, and in confirmation of a Falshood.” Nor is Hobbes’s exception to the contrary, of any validity, when he affirms, that “he who in an Oath renounces the Divine Mercy,” unless he perform his Promise, “does not oblige himself to any Punishment, because it is always lawful for him, to deprecate Punishment how ever provok’d, and to take the benefit of God’s Pardon, if it be granted.”45 For “even they, who may lawfully deprecate Punishment, when they have deserv’d it, are oblig’d, both to caution, not to deserve Punishment, and also to bear it patiently, when they have.” After all these things are duly weigh’d, I beseech the Reader to consider, what firmness Hobbes has left in Civil Society, who contends, “That an Oath adds no Obligation.” Kings are deceiv’d, and vain are the Laws enjoining Oaths of Fidelity to them. In vain are their Privy-Counsellers, their nearest Attendants about their Person, or their Arm’d Guards, sworn. Neither sworn Witnesses, nor Judges, are at all the more oblig’d upon account of Oaths, in publick Judicature. Mr. Hobbes, truly, has by a slight reasoning freed them from all Obligation of this kind, and, with the same ease, has subverted all Civil Government.

  4. His Original of Government inconsistent with its stability.§XII.46 4.“Hobbes’s Doctrine, concerning the Original of Civil Power, contains some Principles evidently inconsistent with the Stability thereof.”

  Its Original, in a Common-Wealth form’d by Compact, according to him, is this. Many, out of mutual Fear, transfer all their Rights to one Political Person, (whether a single Man, or a Council,) by a Compact of this sort made with all their future Fellow-Subjects.47“I transfer my Right to this Person, upon this Condition, that you will transfer your Right to the same Person.” And to the same purpose, Leviath. C. 17.48 As soon as the Person design’d for Government has accepted of this, the Common-Wealth is form’d. The other two kinds of Common-Wealths, the Despotick, which is the Government of the Conqueror over the Conquered, whose Lives are preserv’d, (who are call’d Slaves;) and the Paternal, which is over Children begotten and educated, and, consequently, preserv’d from that Death, which it was in the Power of the Parent to have inflicted, he insinuates to be form’d by the same Compacts; not express’d indeed, but implied and understood; Reason (truly) teaching, “That Conquerors and Parents do not on other Conditions spare those Lives, which are once in their Power”; and the same Reason commanding, “both the Conquered and Children, to accept their Lives on these Terms.” These Conclusions may easily be inferr’d, from what he says Cap. 1. §. 14. and Cap. 8. §. 1. &c. and Cap. 9. §. 2.49 Therefore the whole matter is briefly resolv’d into a conveyance of Rights by Compacts.

  But, if we inquire how, according to Hobbes, they convey their Rights, he informs us, C. 2. §. 4. He says, This is then perform’d, when any one “declares it to be his Will, that it should no longer be lawful for him to resist the other, doing any certain thing, as he might before with Right resist him.”50 Therefore Subjects, in Hobbes’s Scheme, in their Compacts with the Person going to take upon him the supreme Power, promise only this, “That they will not resist him Doing, or Commanding, any thing (consistent with Self-preservation.”) And, from this Principle Hobbes justly infers, That “the Obligation to yield unlimited Obedience does not immediately arise from the Compact, by which we have convey’d all our Right to the Common-Wealth.”51 That Compact obliges only to a Passive, not to an Active Obedience. And, indeed, Civil Power will be very scanty, if by this Compact, to which it entirely owes its existence, no-one be oblig’d to obey it, only not to hinder the King, for Example, “from doing what he can with his own Hands.” But (says Hobbes) “from this Compact, indirectly, arises an Obligation, viz. thus, that, without Obedience, the Right of Empire would be vain; and, consequently, a Common-Wealth would not at all have been form’d.”52 But I affirm, that this is a juster Consequence, “That Hobbes’s Compact to convey Right, which contains nothing more than a promise, not to resist, does not truly and sufficiently explain the Original of Civil Power”; for “such a Right of Empire is in vain conferr’d,” so that (according to Hobbes’s own Concession) “a Common-Wealth is not formed by conveying that Right,” because “no-one would be thereby obliged to yield Obedience to the Prince appointed.” And, according to Hobbes’s Principles, “Right cannot otherwise be convey’d”; because “he, to whom any Right is to be convey’d, is suppos’d to have that Right before”; for “he has a Right to all Persons and Things,” which yet he could not use, because “others had a Right to resist him”; whence “Compacts were, only to remove this Obstacle, that The Right of Ruling over all,” which is “in every one coeval with his Nature,” (C. 15. §. 5.53 ) should exert it-self, when Impediments were taken away.

  But let us pass by this Difficulty, and grant, “That Hobbes’s Subjects had, along with the Compact conveying their Rights, involv’d a Covenant to yield as much Obedience as was necessary, that the Right of Empire might not be wholly in vain.” Yet still the Bounds of that Empire are too narrow, which is only not vain, or null. Besides; “since Hobbes obliges Subjects to no certain Measure of Obedience to be yielded to Sovereign Powers, but to so much only, that the Right of Empire may not be conferr’d in vain; and since this very Thing is to be deduced by themselves, by a consequence arising from Compacts about transferring their Rights”; of necessity he has left them Judges of this Question, “How much Obedience is necessary to be given, that the Right of Empire they have convey’d be not in vain?” For “they themselves can best judge of the End intended by themselves in making such a Compact”; nor can it be known, “whether any Act be vain, but by him who perfectly understands the End of that Action.” But, how dangerous this would be in a settled Government, every one must see: For “Subjects will, at pleasure, set Bounds to their Obedience” whereas “the supreme Powers,” as I have already shewn, “are to be limited by the Divine Laws only, which are not changeable by the Will of Man”: And “Subjects are oblig’d by the same Natural Laws, to obey in all things not forbidden by an evident Law of Nature.” The sagacious Reader will hence observe, “That the principal and direct Cause of Sovereign Power in every Common-Wealth, is, according to Hobbes, that imaginary Right to all Things, which he pretends Nature has given every one, and, consequently among the rest, to him who is design’d for Government.” And, “That the Compacts of others, conveying their Right to him, only remove the Impediment, or Resistance of others, by which the Exercise of that Right, coeval with the Nature of the Sovereign, might be restrain’d”: And, “That Fear is no otherwise the Cause of forming a Common-Wealth, than as it obliges to remove that Impediment”: And, “That the Nature which he bestows on Man, more Savage than that of wild Beasts, is no otherwise necessary to the forming Hobbes’s Common-Wealth, than as it is the Cause of such Fear, that is, as a remote Cause, upon account whereof it may be necessary by Compacts to remove that Resistance of others, by which the Right of one to Rule over all was restrain’d.” He professes this openly enough, where he discourses of the Original of the Right to punish a Subject. Leviath. Chap. 28. In the beginning, where he has these Words. “It is manifest, therefore, that the Right which the Common-Wealth (that is, he, or they, that represent it) hath to punish, is not grounded on any Concession, or Gift of the Subjects. But I have also shew’d formerly, That, before the Institution of a Common-Wealth, every Man had a Right to every Thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own Preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any Man, in order thereto. And this is the true Foundation of that Right of punishing, which is exercised in every Common-Wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Sovereign that Right, but only in laying down theirs, strengthen’d him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the Preservation of them all, so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only.”54 It is evident, “That in this Power are contain’d, a Power to guard the Laws by Sanctions,” and “To cause those Sanctions to be executed,” and “To make War,” and, consequently, “All the Sinews of Government.” But what is this else than to say, “That all Rights of Empire may be overturn’d by all those Arguments, by which a Right of every one to every Thing is overturn’d,” which destroys it-self by implying infinite Contradictions, and which I have prov’d in the first Chapter, not to be supported by any Reason?

  To all which I will here add this Remark only; “That, upon these Principles, any Enemy and Invader of a Foreign Dominion, has as good Right to kill lawful Princes, as Hobbes allows Kings to punish their rebellious Subjects”; which may make Subjects more remiss in defending their Princes from Foreign Invasion. An Enemy invades rightfully, because he has a Right to every Thing: And a Prince has no other Right to punish a Rebel, than because in a state of Nature he had a Right to all Things, and that Right is still left to him. Nay, a Subject (by Hobbes’s confession) becomes an Enemy by Rebellion; but every Enemy has that Primitive Right, as well as a Prince, “To punish every one at pleasure”: It therefore follows, “That a Rebellious Subject acquires, by his Rebellion, the same Right to punish his Prince at pleasure, which the Prince has to punish his Subject for any Crime whatsoever.”

  5. The Power Hobbes ascribes to Princes, more than what other Philosophers have done, pernicious Flatteries, particularly;§XIII.55 5. “All those Powers, which, under the notion of Rights, he ascribes to supreme Powers, more than what other Writers concerning Government acknowledge, must, of necessity, weaken the Power and Firmness of Common-Wealths, if they were put in practice”; and he himself, in other places, denies them those same Rights; whence we have just Reason to suspect, “that he first inserted those Passages, only to flatter them.” I will give only two Instances, but those the Principal, 1. His attributing to them a Right to make what Laws they please concerning Property, Just and Unjust, Honest and Dishonest, Good and Evil. 2. His declaring them free from all Obligation by Compacts.

  First, the pretended Right of making what Laws they please concerning Property, Just and Unjust, Good and Evil.On the first Head he writes thus. “What a Legislator has commanded, that we are to esteem Good, what he has forbid, Evil: He is the Legislator, in whom the supreme Power of the Common-Wealth is lodg’d”; and a little after, “Before Common-Wealths were form’d, there was no Difference of Just and Unjust, whose Nature relates to a Command, and every Action is in its own Nature indifferent.”56Except in Civil Life, there is no common Standard of Virtue and Vice to be found, which therefore can be no other, than the Laws of every Common-Wealth. For” (says he) “the Laws of Nature, after a Common-Wealth is establish’d, become part of the Laws of theState.”57 Hence he defines “a Crime, what any one has done, or omitted, said, or will’d, contrary to the Reason of the Common-Wealth, that is, contrary to the Laws.”58 Numberless are the Passages in which he inculcates this Doctrine, especially Cap. 6. §. 9. which he closes thus, “The Civil Laws are the Commands of him, who is invested with supreme Power in the Common-Wealth, with relation to the future Actions of his Subjects.”59 Truly, Whatever he commands to be done, tho’ it proceed from asudden Fit of Passion, and contradict his own deliberate written Laws, is a Law nevertheless, and the only Measure of Honesty. For he affirms, “That it cannot be exactly and certainly known, that the Laws promulg’d are enjoin’d by him who has the Sovereign Power, except by those who have received them from his own Mouth.”60 To apply such Laws, that is, Arbitrary Commands, to particular Cases, is to judge according to Laws, as he affirms in the close of the same Section;61 whether it be done, immediately by the Sovereign himself, or by any other, with whom the Power of promulging and interpreting these Laws is entrusted. But the great Privilege of Princes, which he endeavours to prove from hence, is this, “That they are incapable of committing a Crime,” and, consequently, “that they can never be justly blam’d”; because “they are not subject to the Laws of the State,” for “no-one can be brought under an Obligation to himself,” as he asserts C. 12. §. 4.62 And, therefore, “they cannot invade the Property of another”; for, since “their Will is the Law, whatever they will, is their legal Property; they can be guilty of no Dishonesty”; because “that only is Dishonest, which they forbid, whose Will is the only Measure of Honesty”; but “they forbid themselves nothing,” nor “can any one bebrought under an Obligation to himself.”63 And it is insidiously said by Hobbes, “That the Ruling Powers are not bound by Civil Laws,” because in truth there are many Civil Laws made, only to regulate the Actions of Subjects, which, consequently, bind them only. But the principal Point which Hobbes would here insinuate lies deeper, “That Rulers are neitheroblig’d by the Laws of Nature, nor by any others Reveal’d by God.” He has directly asserted, “That the Laws of Nature are not properly Laws,”64 and therefore are not properly Obligatory, except as they are part of the Laws of the State, (as I have already shewn;) and “That it is impossible, that Civil Laws can contradict the Laws of Nature.”65 He has also laid down both the Premisses of this Syllogism, and left the Conclusion to be drawn by any one that pleases. “The Sovereign Power is not oblig’d by Civil Laws. The Precepts of the second Table of the Decalogue are only Civil Laws,” Cap. 14. §. 9. Cap. 6. §. 16. C. 17. §. 10.66Therefore “the Sovereign Power is not oblig’d by those Precepts of the Decalogue,” (which are really Laws of Nature.) Elsewhere he affirms, “That the whole Body of the sacred Scriptures are in no other respect Laws, than as they are incorporated by the Sovereign Power into the Laws of the State, (which he may change at pleasure;)” and, therefore, “the Commands of Scripture do not oblige the Supreme Powers.” Leviath. C. 33.67 By these Arguments, truly, Hobbes has taken care, (out of his great Veneration for all Sovereign Powers,) to prove “they are wholly unblameable,” (how wicked soever all others may think them;) nay, “that they are most Just and Holy,” because “their Actions are conformable to their own Will, and therefore always agree with that, which is the only Rule of Action.” Whereas I am of Opinion, “That nothing more Reproachful can be said of Princes; nothing, which could expose them so much to the Hatred of all, both their own Subjects and Foreigners; and consequently nothing, which would so surely deprive them of the Good-Will of all, which is the greatest Security of Rulers.” For this Apology for Princes professedly allows all those Charges, which their bitterest Enemies usually draw up against them. “That their Actions are not at all regulated by any certain Rules, or Laws, taken from the Nature of the best End, and of the Means naturally fitted to that End”; and, therefore, That they are wholly lawless. He openly professes, That he cannot otherwise vindicate them from the Crimes laid to their Charge, than by endeavouring to shew, “That their Actions ought not to be reduced to the Standard of the Laws of Nature, or of the Scriptures, in that sense, in which others are oblig’d to obey them; but that they are Rules to be warp’d to the pleasure of Princes, so as to have no other meaning, than what they are pleas’d to put upon them; and that, by this method only, they can be justified from those Crimes, which seditious Spirits, for the most part falsly, lay to their charge.” Without doubt, all Good Princes will reject such a Defense, as no less false, than reproachful. And among the Bad, there is not one so perfectly profligate, who would not suffer and desire, that some, at least, of his Actions should be tried by some certain Rule besides his own Will; and, therefore, would justly spurn at this Defence by Mr. Hobbes.

  68 Moreover, whilst Hobbes endeavours, by this method, to free Princes from all imputation of Fault, he is most highly injurious to them; because “at the same time, he deprives them of all Praise, arising from Wisdom and Justice.” For “those Virtues (and, consequently, all others which flow from them) are conspicuous in such Actions only, as are govern’d by certain Rules taken from the Nature of the subject Matter, about which they are conversant.” Practical Wisdom consists in the Skill of designing an End, or Effect, in its own Nature worth our Pains, and of chusing and applying means naturally sufficient to produce the design’d Effect. And Universal Justice is nothing else than a constant Will agreeing with that Wisdom, which designs the best and greatest End, the Common Good, as I have already shewn. No Praise, therefore, is due to Princes for the Practice of any Virtue, “if they themselves both act, and command others to act, according to Hobbes’s Doctrine, without any respect to the Nature of the End and the Means.” No Prince is reckon’d Wise, or Just, “for doing whatever chances to come into his Thoughts, or to be his Will, without any regard to the Nature of God and Men, and of those things which may be applied to their Service.” If every Action were Wise, and Just and Good, for no other Reason, but “because the Prince Will’d it,” there would remain no difference between Nero, whom the Senate condemn’d as an “Enemy of Mankind,” and Titus, to whom they gave the Title of the “Delight of Mankind”; no Praise, by which to distinguish Tiberius and Caligula from the two Antonines, the Pious and the Philosopher.69 All the Actions of each of these Emperors were equally agreeable to their own Will; and were, therefore, according to Hobbes, equally Good, Just, and Honest. But Mankind can never be so blinded, as not to see, “That the Safety of any particular Common-Wealth, (and, consequently, that of all Nations,) is a natural Effect, not of every Action of the Prince, or the Subjects, but of a due Search and Application (in Laws, Judicature, and the whole publick Administration) of those natural Causes, which are proper to preserve the Lives, Fortunes, and Minds of Men, in a perfect State.” These Causes are no other, than such Actions as I have already prov’d, to be commanded by the Laws of Nature; namely, “A voluntary Division of Things and mutual Services, by which may be assign’d and preserv’d to each, at least, what is necessary to the Preservation of Life and Health, and the Improvement of the Mind; the Exercise of all the Virtues, and the Establishment of Civil Government, where it is wanting, or the Preservation of it, where it is already established.” And, therefore, unless Sovereign Powers frame their Laws, and administer publick Affairs in such a manner, as to make it evident, “they have a view to this End and apply Means some way suitable thereto”; Subjects will of necessity lessen their Reverence for the Laws. For “Men, as being Rational, and in some measure endued with the Knowledge of Truth, do naturally and necessarily set a great Value upon that alone, which appears to be greatly Valuable; and therefore they set the greatest Value upon, and pay a sort of Divine Veneration to, that publick Administration of Affairs, which they see promotes the Publick Good, which is by much the greatest Effect of Human Industry.” But, because, on the contrary, “it is below the Dignity of the meanest of the People, to act without respect to an End, or to take improper Measures, even in Affairs of the smallest Consequence; and it is much more beneath the Dignity of Princes, to act wholly by a blind Impulse, without any care of the common Safety, by means naturally adapted to this End, in matters of the greatest Consequence; where the Interest of the whole Common-Wealth is concern’d”; therefore, “Men cannot so highly esteem the Laws of Princes, in which they plainly perceive any thing inconsistent with the Means necessary to this End, which are contain’d in the Laws of Nature, already explain’d.” Nevertheless I own, “That, where the same good End may be obtain’d by Actions of diverse kinds,” (such Actions are called Indifferent,) “it is not to be expected, that any weighty Reason should be given, why one indifferent Action is commanded, rather than another.” It is sufficient, “if the proper End may be obtain’d by the Method commanded.” For such a Command is truly rational; nor is Obedience to such a Command less rational, whether in Affairs Ecclesiastical, or Civil. I own farther, “that it is not necessary, that the whole Reason of every Law should be particularly explain’d to all”; it is sufficient, “if they are not inconsistent with, or may any way serve to promote, the chief End, and the Means necessary there to”; and, therefore, Princes usually Preface their Laws with Reasons, briefly drawn from the Publick Good, and the known Rules of Equity, as appears from many of the Constitutions of Justinian and Leo in the Body of the Civil Law, and in most of our own Acts of Parliament. But, on the contrary, to teach openly, “That it is owing only to the Command of the Common-Wealth, or of the Law, that any Action is Good, and the contrary, Evil; and that, therefore, the most useful Actions, if not commanded, conduce nothing to the Publick Good; and that it cannot be foreseen by the Legislators, that a good Effect will naturally follow from them,” (all which follow from Mr. Hobbes’s Doctrine;) this were to make the Government of Sovereigns, and the Obedience of Subjects, equally brutish and unreasonable; either of which Assertions is a Reproach to them both, and threatens the Ruin of the Common-Wealth. For, if every thing were Good, for this Reason, “that it is commanded by the Prince”; he would have no occasion for a Council, in order to deliberate, by what means the Safety of the Common-Wealth might best be provided for: Any Means would be best for this Reason, “that it was commanded.” For “the same Power, which can make Actions Good, can give them any Degrees of Goodness; and, consequently, make any Actions to be the best, or serviceable, beyond all others, to the Common-Wealth.” The Prince, who thinks his Commands thus Effectual, would in vain consult with Men of Experience. He will always believe his own Method of Government, however rash, to be the best, which he will find by experience to be of the worst Consequence, both to Himself and his Subjects.70

  This Doctrine is the more pernicious to Princes, because “It at once hurries them on to Rashness in Action, and destroys all hope of correcting in their Laws, whatever, thro’ human Frailty, may be foundamiss in them.” For Hobbes has taken away all Standard of Good and Evil, except the single Will of Sovereign Powers; and has, therefore, left no Rule, by which That, when Wrong, may be set Right. Yet we see, that all States and Princes every where candidly and freely own in subsequent Laws, “That they have observ’d many Things not sufficiently provided for in former Laws”; and, “That they themselves have learn’d by experience, that many things are prejudicial to the Common-Wealth, which they before were of opinion would be of publick Benefit”; consequently, they openly acknowledge, “That they have discover’d, from the natural Effects of Human Actions, what kind of Actions will be publickly Useful, or Good”; and, therefore, “That they cannot make all such Actions Good, as they are pleas’d to command.” To this Head belongs all amendment of Civil Laws, and of Judicial Sentences given in pursuance of them by Equity and the known Rules of the Law of Nature. For which there would be no Room, “If Civil Laws only, (or the Will of the Prince made known by them,) were the Rule of Action.” But it is certain, “That no Common-Wealth can subsist long, where such Equity is excluded”: And, therefore, in all Common-Wealths we know, “Many things are left to the decision of Equity, in a manner different from what the Laws determine.” Wherefore Princes themselves every where reject this Privilege, which Hobbes allows them.

  71Lastly; “Hobbes contradicts himself upon this Head, and deprives Common-Wealths of what he had before allow’d them.” So C. 6. §. 13. after he has given Examples of unjust Commands, with respect to which he denies, that the Subject is oblig’d to obey the Common-Wealth, as in case of a Command to kill himself, his Prince, or his Parent, he proceeds thus. “There are many other Cases, in which what is commanded, being unlawful to some, but not to others, the latter may justly obey, but not the former; and that consistently with the absolute Right granted to the Sovereign Power. For the Right is in no Case taken away from him, of putting those to Death, who shall refuse Obedience. But they, who thus put Subjects to Death, altho’ they do it by a Right granted from him who had Authority to do so, yet using that Right, otherwise than right Reason requires, sin against the Laws of Nature, that is, against God.”72 In this Passage I observe, 1. That Hobbes confesses, “Some things are unlawful to some, tho’ they are enjoin’d by the Will of the Supreme Power, or by the Laws of the State”; whence it follows, “That the Laws of the State are not the only Standard of what is Lawful,” which he has elsewhere affirm’d. 2. That he confesses, “That Sovereigns, when they punish Subjects for disobeying their Laws, may sin against right Reason, the Laws of Nature, and God”; tho’ he has elsewhere affirm’d, “That their Commands cannot contradict the Law of Nature, because their Subjects have covenanted to yield them absolute Obedience.”73 3. It implies a Contradiction, where he affirms, “That they can use their Right otherwise than right Reason directs.” For “No one can have a Right to act contrary to right Reason,” because Hobbes himself defines “Right” to be “The Liberty which every one has to use his Natural Faculties according to right Reason.”74 And elsewhere he teaches, That “Sovereign Powers may many ways sin against the rest of Natures Laws, as by Cruelty, Injustice, Reproach, and by other Crimes, which are not properly Injuries,”75 that is, are no breach of Compact.

  I shall presently76 inquire into this last Crime.77 Here I shall only take notice, “That he confesses that the Wills of those who have the Right of making Laws may be corrupted by many Vices,” whence it follows, “That he prescribes some certain Rule of Action, even to Sovereigns,” and consequently, “That he does not leave every thing to their Will”: Whence I infer, “That Subjects are certainly no less oblig’d by such Laws of Nature”; and therefore, “That all their Actions ought not to be in Obedience to the Will of their Sovereigns, unless they would chuse to sin against God in Obedience to Man.” And thus much Hobbes himself has own’d, where he treats of the Duties which are owing to Men. To the same purpose he acknowledges, where he treats of the Commands of Natural Reason, about the Worship and Respect due to God. For after he had affirm’d, “That Obedience is to be given to the Common-Wealth, commanding us to worship God by an Image,” (that is, openly commanding Idolatry,) and other gross Absurdities of that Kind, he confesses, That “such Commands may be contrary to right Reason, and, therefore, may be Sins in those who command them”;78 and he acknowledges, That “Common-Wealths are not at their Liberty, nor can be said to make Laws, with respect to God”; and, consequently, “That they have no Right to make Laws, to the dishonour of God.”79 Whence I infer, “That the Reason of the Common-Wealth, is not always Right,” and, consequently, “That it is not always the Measure of what is Good, Honest and Just; but then only, when it is conformable to the Nature of those Things, or Actions about which it is conversant”; and, therefore, That Hobbes contradicts himself, elsewhere (C. 14. §. 17.) defining “Sin” to be nothing else, than “what is contrary to the Reason of the Common-Wealth.”80

  Secondly, The pretended freedom of Supreme Powers, from all Obligation by Compacts to their Subjects.81 There remains to be consider’d the second Instance of exorbitant Power, which Hobbes gives to Sovereigns, which is not so extensive as the former, and might have been comprehended under it: But, because Hobbes has handled it a-part, and because it is press’d with Absurdities peculiar to it-self, I thought it proper also to considerit distinctly, namely, That Sovereign Powers are bound by no Compacts to any One. It is incumbent upon me to shew, “That this pretended Right of theirs, does in reality lessen or destroy their Power, and that he is not here very consistent with himself.” This is affirm’d by him in general terms C. 7. §. 14. and is inferr’d from what he has advanc’d §. 7, 9, 12. of the same Chapter,82 in which he speaks of Compacts with their Subjects only, by which he denies Princes are obliged, and therefore concludes, “They can do no Injury to their Subjects.”

  This is an Opinion before unheard of, new out of Mr. Hobbes’s Mint. For Epicurus, from whom he has borrow’d most of his other Sentiments, altho’ “He has much weakened Justice in its other Parts, allowing them no other Force, than what they receive from the Faith of Compacts,” yet, “Would have this unshaken in every State.”83 Let us then hear Hobbes’s Reason, by which he would support so extraordinary a Paradox. It is to be taken wholly from C. 7. §. 7. where he affirms, That “The People84are bound by no Obligation to any Subject.”85For “The other Kinds of Sovereign Powers, the Senate in an Aristocracy, and a Monarch, receive all their Rights, according to Hobbes’s Doctrine, from the People,” and are, therefore, “Freed from the Obligation of Compacts, in the same manner with the People.” Take it in his own Words from the Place last quoted, “Aftera Common-Wealth is established, if a Subject enters into a Compact with the People, it is void; because the People include, in their Will, the Will of that Subject, to whom they are suppos’d to be oblig’d, and, therefore, they can free themselves at pleasure, and, consequently, they are now actually free.”86 The force of this Reasoning lies here. Because “A Subject has power to free any one from the Obligation of Compacts enter’d into with himself, by renouncing his own Right; and has conveyed all his Power to the People”; therefore “The People can free themselves from their own Compacts,” and “What they can, they will.”

  I answer, 1. No Reason can be brought to prove, that at the framing the Common-Wealth, the future Subjects agreed in this grant to the People, “That it should be in their Power to free themselves from all Obligation of Compacts they should afterwards make with the Subjects themselves”: For “This is so far from being necessary to the forming a Civil Government, that it is wholly inconsistent with that End, for which it is form’d, The common Happiness of all.” I own it is necessary, “They should renounce all Right, to compell those, whom they have invested with Sovereign Power.” But there is another Obligation, by which the People are bound to observe Compacts enter’d into with their Subjects, the Obligation of the Law of Nature, which owes both its Authority and Sanction to God. “The Benefit arising from this, Subjects can safely reserve to themselves,” and it is to be suppos’d, “That it is their Will to reserve it,” because it is necessary to the common End. And truly I believe, “That it is neither lawful for Subjects to give their Sovereigns a Liberty to break their Faith, nor lawful for Sovereigns to accept it when offer’d,” because “The Obligation to the Law of Nature cannot be dispens’d with”; by which, for the sake of the Common Good, both Parties are oblig’d by the Authority of God, to procure, as far as in them lies, that the Faith of Compacts be preserv’d inviolable.

  2. I answer, That the Inference is false, by which Hobbes immediately draws his Conclusion. “The People can free themselves by their own Will, therefore they are actually free.” The falsity of the Inference is hence evident, because “The Contradiction to Hobbes’s Conclusion, may be inferr’d by a Consequence just as good, Thus.” The People can chuse, not to free themselves (from the Obligation of their Compacts) by their own Will, therefore they are not actually free. In neither Case will the Consequence hold, from the Power to the Will in free Agents. The only Reason why, upon Mr. Hobbes’s Principles, the former Conclusion should rather hold good than the latter, is this, “That he supposes all Mankind, and consequently Princes, cannot but Will what is Evil to others, if ever so little Power accrues thence to themselves.” But I beseech the Reader to observe, “How odious to their Subjects, and consequently how weak, this would make Princes.” Why might we not as well infer, “That it is the Will of the People, to neglect that Security which is necessary to the Subjects,” because “They have a Power to do so?” And then every Common-Wealth would be dissolv’d immediately, because (according to Hobbes, C. 6. §. 3, 4.87 ) “No-one is supposed to have submitted himself, or to have stept out of a State of War against All, if he be not sufficiently secur’d by Punishments so great, that it would be evidently a greater Evil, to hurt a Subject, than not to hurt him.” The Common-Wealth can indeed sometimes lawfully dispense with punishing a guilty Person. It were, nevertheless, of mischievous consequence thence to conclude, “That the State is free from all Obligation to punish the Guilty.”

  From what I have said, I think it is plain, “That Hobbes has not sufficiently prov’d this extraordinary Doctrine of his, which sets Sovereigns free from any Obligation, to keep Compacts they make with their Subjects.” I have at the same time prov’d “It of pernicious consequence to Common-Wealths.” To which I will add only this, “That Sovereign Powers can neither be set up, nor preserv’d, by Men making use of their Reason, but for some End common to them All”; that is, unless it appear, “That their Government will be a means to promote the Publick Welfare, of those especially, by whom it is set up and preserved.” But, because this is future, and depends upon the Will of the Sovereigns, it can no otherwise be ascertain’d, than from the Promises, or Compacts, (which may be confirmed by Oath,) of the Supreme Powers, and from their Care that they be exactly observ’d. Hobbes, therefore, having destroyed the Obligation of such Compacts, there remains no Reason, “Why Subjects should hope that Sovereigns would perform these Compacts”; there is likewise no Reason, “Why Sovereigns should trouble themselves about keeping their Promises,” and so all Reason is taken away, “Why States should be either erected, or continued,” and so of course “They fall to the ground.” Nay farther; “That Subjects may have no Security left, from any thing their Sovereigns can say,” Hobbes advances, That “An Oath adds nothing to the Obligation of Compacts,” C. 2. §. 22.88 And therefore, “Where the Obligation of Compacts is void,” (which, according to Hobbes’s Doctrine, is the case, where Princes Covenant,) “The Obligation of Oaths added to them, at Coronations and in some Leagues, will likewise be void and null.” This makes the Condition wretched, not of Subjects only, but of Princes also; for, “If this Doctrine were true, their Subjects would never have reason to believe them, nor is there any method left, by which they could assure Men who deserv’d well at their Hands, that they should receive the Rewards they promised them.” But in these Circumstances, (where there is no Faith, no prospect of Rewards,) the Power of Princes is nothing, and all the Sinews of Civil Government are cut asunder, by which they might move their Subjects to Fidelity, or Courage, in Peace, or War.

  89 Let us now inquire “What Hobbes’s Sentiments are, of Compacts between different States.” This we may discover with ease, from what he before affirmed of the State of Nature, in which he alledges, “That the Laws of Nature do not oblige to external Acts.”90But “To keep Faith, and to perform Compacts, is a Precept of the Law of Nature, and an external Act is here requisite.” So he affirms “That the Laws of Nature are silent in the midst of Arms,”91 (or in a State of War of every one against every one,) at least “With relation to external Actions”; and, “That those common Measures, which are usually observed in War between Nation and Nation, are not to be looked upon, as what they are obliged to by the Law of Nature.” He elsewhere (C. 13. §. 7.) gives a direct Answer to this Question, “The State of Common-Wealths with respect to one another” (says he) “Is a State of Nature, that is, a State of War. Neither, if they leave off Fighting, is it therefore to be called Peace, but a Breathing-time, in which each Enemy, watching the Motion and Countenance of the other, judges of his own Security, not from Compacts, but from the Forces and Counsels of his Adversary. And this from the Law of Nature, as is shewn, Chap. 2. §. 11. from this, That Compacts are not Obligatory in a State of Nature, whenever a just Fear interposes.”92“In all times” (says he, Leviath. C. 13.) “Kings, and Persons of Sovereign Authority are in a Posture of War.”93 But “What is a just Cause of Fear in the one Party, That the other Party will not perform his Promise, he who Fears, is the proper Judge,” according to Hobbes, C. 2. §. 11.94 And, therefore, “Any new Cause of Suspicion will be sufficient to make void any Compact of mutual Trust,” (such all Leagues between different States are,) as is evident from the Passages already quoted, compared with Leviath. C. 14.95because, truly, “There is no Power which can compell both States, to hinder one from deceiving the other.” Upon these Principles has Hobbes allow’d “A Right to Princes, to falsify their Faith to other Princes, whenever they please.” This, tho’ it seem to flatter them, under the appearance of Liberty, does in truth greatly weaken their Power, and leaves them hardly any Security. For “There is no State Self-sufficient, or that can support it-self against the united Force of all neighbouring States, except in Confederacy with other Nations, by means of Treaties of Commerce and of mutual Aid.” And this even those Princes, who are most guilty of Breach of Faith, are sensible of. For “They no sooner break their Leagues with one State, or Monarch, than they find it necessary to strengthen themselves with new Alliances, to prevent being oblig’d to fight singly against all”; and so change their Leagues or Compacts, but do not reject all; and, by having recourse to the Faith of Others, condemn “their own Perfidiousness.”

  Farther; it is evident by common Experience, “That all States limit the Power of other States by the help of Leagues, and that it is a principal part of Political Prudence, to know the various methods of balancing the Power of their Enemies by Leagues.” But these could never take place, “if Compacts of mutual Faith between different States, were not obligatory,” according to Hobbes’s Doctrine. If these things were true, “our King,96 when he was banish’d from his own Dominions, by a Rebellion prevailing in Britain, might justly have been put to death, (I mention it with Horror,) by the French, Spaniards, or Dutch, among whom he sojourn’d; and that after Friendship promis’d by Compacts.” But God instructed them better by the Laws of Nature imprinted upon their Minds; tho’ Hobbes at that very time publish’d, thro’ France and Holland, his Doctrine favouring Perfidiousness, and boasted he had demonstrated it in his Treatise De Cive, and inculcated the same among the English by his Leviathan.97

  Lastly; “If the State of Common-Wealths, with respect to one another, were necessarily a State of Enmity, and Force and Wiles were therein Cardinal Virtues, as Hobbes teaches, Leviath. C. 13.,98 there would be no Intercourse, or Commerce among them, which would deprive them all of many Advantages, they now enjoy.” Princes would then receive no Customs arising from Traffick, and so would lose a great part of that Wealth, by which they are now strengthen’d; there would be no safety, nor indeed any use for Ambassadors; for it were vain to make Leagues, if the slightest Suspicion of Non-performance render’d them immediately void, as he affirms Lev. C. 14. These, truly, are the glorious Privileges, which Hobbes offers to Princes; these are the Gifts and no-Gifts, which he bestows on them. Yet he himself has justly render’d suspected his so great Officiousness to serve Princes, because he avows, “That to flatter others, is to honour them”; because, truly, “it is a sign that we stand in need of their Protection, or Assistance,” (Lev. C. 10. P. 45. of the Latin Edition.99 ) But it is obvious, “That to say things which we believe to be false of any one, provided they seem great, is essential to Flattery.” Princes have, therefore, just ground to suspect, “that Hobbes has complimented them with such Powers, not because he believ’d them true, since he so often contradicts himself, upon that Head, but because they seem’d to be great, and he believ’d he did them Honour by Flattering.”

  6. Hobbes’s Doctrine concerning Treason encourages subjects to commit that Crime.§XIV.100 6. “Hobbes’s Doctrine concerning Treason,” consider’d in company with the principal of his other peculiar Notions, “encourages Subjects to commit this Crime”; and, therefore, “tends openly to the Subversion of Civil Government.”

  For he affirms, That this Crime “is a Trans gression of the Law of Nature, not of the Civil Law.” And, consequently, “those guilty of this Crime are punish’d, not by Right of Dominion, but by Right of War; not as bad Subjects, but as Enemies of the Common-Wealth.”101 It is obvious hence to conclude, “That any Member of the State, may, by Rebellion, free himself from the condition of a Subject, and transfer himself into a Hostile or Natural State.” Hence it directly follows, “That this Rebel has recover’d his Natural Right to put his Sovereign, from whom he has revolted, to death, in like manner as his Sovereign has a Right to put him to death.” For in a State of War, or Hobbes’s State of Nature, the Rights are on both sides equal. It will farther follow, “That a Subject deserves no other Punishment for Treason, than that to which he is expos’d for defending his Right to the Necessaries of Life in a State of Nature.” For then also he will be treated as an Enemy, by any other claiming to himself a Right to all things. Nay, Hobbes openly teaches (Leviath.C. 28.) That “Harm inflicted upon one that is a declar’d Enemy, (tho’before subject to the Law,) falls not under the name of Punishment.”102 Whence it follows, “That Rebels are not liable to any Punishment, tho’ they are expos’d to the Calamities of the State of Nature.” Farther; since there are numerous Civil Laws in most States, particularly our own, which have enacted most grievous Punishments against Traytors, nothing can be affirm’d more in opposition to the Laws, than “that they are not liable to Punishment, or that their Crime is no Transgression of the Laws of the State, which threaten them with Punishment.” It is a ridiculous Evasion to say, That “the Obligation is superfluous to that which we were before oblig’d to, by the Law of Nature.”103Several Bonds are certainly a stronger Tie than a single One. Beside; he himself has many ways attempted to weaken, or even to destroy, the Obligation of the Law of Nature; and it was therefore necessary, “To have recourse to the assistance of Civil Laws”; that they, whom he had instructed to throw off all Reverence for the former, might be kept within some Bounds of Duty, thro’ fear of the Civil Power. For it is evident, “That every thing, which weakens or destroys the Obligation of the Laws of Nature, especially, of that which commands Fidelity in keeping Compacts, does so far extenuate or take away the Sin in Treason; and does, consequently, allure Men to perpetrate that detestable Crime.” Therefore, whether Hobbes will, or no, he solicites Men to be guilty of this Crime, as often as he affirms, “That the practical Dictates of Reason are improperly called Laws, and are only Theorems, concerning such things as conduce to the Preservation of Men,” as Leviath. Chap. 15. and De Cive Chap. 3.§.33.104 where he says indeed, “That, as they are enacted by God in Scripture, they are properly Laws”; but, if we inquire of him, “Whence the Holy Scripture is a Law?” He answers Leviath. C. 3. “That they to whom God has not supernaturally revealed, That the Scriptures are from him, are oblig’d by no Authority to receive them, except His, who is invested with supreme Power in the Common-Wealth; for He is the only Law-giver.”105 Hence it follows, “That the Law of Nature, even as contain’d in Scripture, is not properly a Law, except by the Sanction of the State.” For, altho’ he just before acknowledges, “That it is the Law of God, and of manifest Authority”; yet, because he would have this Authority to be no other, than what belongs to every Moral Doctrine, if true, he would insinuate, “That it is not sufficient to make them Laws properly so call’d, if they be not enacted by the Authority of the Common-Wealth.” It will hence follow, “That Treason is not forbid by any Law properly so called,” and therefore, “That it is not properly a Crime.” For “the Law of Nature forbidding it,” according to Hobbes, “is not properly a Law”; and, according to him, “this Crime is not a Transgression of the Law enacted by the Civil Power.”

  All those Passages also favour this Crime, where he affirms, “That the Laws of Nature,” (for Example, this of keeping Compacts, by which Rebellion is forbid,) “do not oblige to external Acts,” (for Example, do not forbid the external Act of Regicide;) “except sufficient Security be given to every one by the Civil Power, which can compell both Parties to obey the Laws of Nature, that they shall not be injur’d by any others,”C. 5. §. 1, 2, &c.106 But here he teaches, “That the Civil Power it-self can neither be constituted, nor preserv’d safe from Treason, except by virtue of the Obligation of the Law of Nature,” which, if it does not reach even to external Acts, Princes will not be secure from Rebellion. Wherefore he must needs confess, “That the Civil Power, and the Obligation to obey it,” (in the intire Violation whereof Treason consists,) “are supported by a Foundation, which he himself has taught to be of no validity, but whilst it is supported by the force of its own Effect.” But it is impossible, “That the Effect can, before it exists, give strength to its Cause, by which it must be at first produc’d, and afterwards preserv’d.” But whatever invalidates the ground of the Obligation to Civil Obedience, that lessens, or rather takes away intirely, the Crime in Treason, by which is at once thrown off all Obedience to the Civil Power.

  Lastly; “Men are animated to Rebellion by Hobbes’s Principles, as they allow equally all Rights of Empire, to those who have ascended the Throne by Rebellion, or Regicide, as to Kings with the best Titles.” This is evident, because he openly declares, “That from the natural Right of every one to all Things, every one has a Right, coeval with his Nature, to rule over All.”107 And, therefore, “whoever can any how shake off all superior Power, does, in so doing, remove all Impediment debarring him of the Exercise of his Right”; and, after he has seiz’d the Throne, according to these Principles, “he shall be esteem’d rightfully possess’d of it, and,” consequently, “no Usurper.” Hence it is that Hobbes, consistently enough with his own Principles, affirms, “That, in time of Rebellion and Civil War, there are two supreme Powers form’d out of one,” C. 6. §. 13.108 The Author of the Civil War has by his Rebellion, truly, acquir’d Sovereign Power over his Accomplices, and may rightfully defend himself and them against their Sovereign; as I have before shewn, from the express Words of the Leviathan. Hence also he most justly confesses, in the Epistle Dedicatory prefix’d to his Leviathan, That “he defends the supreme Powers, as the Geese, by their cackling, defended the Romans, who held the Capitol”; for “they favour’d them no more than the Gauls their Enemies, but were as ready to have defended the Gauls, if they had been possess’d of the Capitol.”109 The Reader may compare, (if he thinks it worth while,) the Epistle before his English Edition of the Leviathan, which was publish’d, when the Rebellion in Britain was at the height, and our lawful King banish’d, (where he professes this Doctrine more openly,) with the Latin Edition of the same, somewhat chang’d, where he thought it proper to insinuate the same Thing more covertly, after our most gracious Sovereign had recover’d his Rights.110 What I have already said, seems to me a sufficient Proof, “That Hobbes, whilst he pretends with one Hand to bestow Gifts upon Princes, does with the other treacherously strike a Dagger to their Hearts.”

  finis.

  EDITOR’S NOTE

  At the end of his own copy, Cumberland included an extra section in manuscript (Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, three leaves following p. 421). The original manuscript is in Latin, but Barbeyrac also translates the addition into French (Traité Philosophique, pp. 423–25). The text below gives an English translation translation of Cumberland’s manuscript addition prepared for this edition.

  §XXIV.1 It seems quite clear, in my opinion, through the observations that I have made on many of Hobbes’s principles, that whilst with one hand he offers them gifts, he holds in the other a sword ready to pierce their breast. Let us nonetheless add two other consequences which are born of these principles, equally pernicious to civil government and especially to the sovereignty of princes and monarchs. Firstly I say that princes could never be safe from the designs of their successors apparent. One always knows them, both by Hobbes’s principles and by those of other politicians. But, following the doctrine of our philosopher, there is no law, which can properly be called such, which obliges these successors to abstain from killing the kings which they must succeed. For he destroys the obligation of the natural laws, and founds the authority of the Holy Scripture on civil law alone: But this law could have no sway with regard to the person who, having treacherously slain the reigning king, seized that very power that the deceased had; and who henceforth is subject to no penalty, unless he punishes himself, which situation no-one will think to fear. The consequence of this is particularly pernicious, not only for our king, whom God preserve from such attempts on his life, for all other monarchs of this world, and all those who will succeed them, be it legitimately or by the crime in which Hobbes encourages whosoever may wish to replace the reigning king. These villainous successors will be exposed to the same danger from those around them, who are just as entitled, by Hobbes’s principles, to commit all sorts of crimes. But the real maxims of true reason forbid all that, as being contrary to the majesty of God, whose lieutenants here below are the kings, and to the well-being of all peoples, and even to the interest of those who commit such infamous deeds, by which they call down upon themselves very great evils, amongst which is that of which I have just spoken, which is included in part of the sanction of natural law, which is to say, in that part which is associated with the defense of murder, and above all the murder of kings. In his English edition of Leviathan, Hobbes himself mentions the consequence with which I am dealing here, of the danger to which he is exposing kings, namely that of being killed by their successors.2 But all that he says in response, is that such an act is contrary to reason, 1. Because one could not reasonably hope that in such a way the successor could immediately make himself master of the kingdom; and 2. because he would teach others, by his example, to undertake the same action against himself. But here is my reply to that. It is clear that such a crime can very often be committed successfully; especially if the successor has found a way of including in his party many people who, imbued with Hobbes’s principles, and believing them to be proven, are persuaded that there is no other actual law than the civil law, and that in the case in point, there is nothing to fear from this law. As for our philosopher’s second response, I say that, when reason makes the successor envisage the identical danger to which he himself will be exposed by the person who must follow him next, either it imposes this like a law that it prescribes, accompanied by a sanction which is binding with regard to exterior actions, quite apart from the fear of civil laws, or it does not impose it in this way. If Hobbes means the former, he destroys his own principles, and he recognizes a law with sufficient support from a natural sanction. If the latter, he is in truth arguing consequentially, but then he is delivering up to the dagger of a successor the life of his king and that of all other monarchs, since he leaves them no safety founded in actual law, which might shelter them from the murderous actions of their successors. These principles of Hobbes must therefore be abhorrent to all princes.

  I note secondly that these same principles are destructive of the safety of all sovereigns, excepting one. And who should that be, that one sovereign? We know not: unless we may conjecture, that it will be the empire of the Turk. For the arguments of our politician seem to establish, that there can be no justice on Earth, whose laws are common to all men, unless we suppose that all kingdoms and states subject them-selves to a single, common Sovereign. Either Hobbes’s arguments prove that or they prove nothing. I am persuaded that they are very false, and thus that one can draw from them no well-founded conclusion. But those who believe them to be true, must also accept the conclusion that I have just indicated. Thus, all princes have no other recourse but to reject and condemn Hobbes’s principles; unless they wish either to be perpetually at war with all others, or to be subjects of one powerful prince, that is the Turk, who is the one whom Hobbes may have had in mind as such. We must therefore believe one of two things, either that this philosopher wrote for the good of no prince or state, but recklessly poured out his wild imaginings, to corrupt the morals of all men; which is very likely: or that he desired to clear a path to universal domination for the Turk, for the destruction not only of Christianity, but also of all rights of property that subjects have over their goods. There are here certainly only the principles of the Muslims, with which Hobbes’s opinions concur, in matters ranging from the fatal necessity of all human actions, to the absolute power of sovereigns. And his lessons on atheism are closely linked with the ideas of that political sect of Turks which, if I remember correctly, Ricaut, the modern author, calls the sect of the Muserim.3

  Let us also note, that all that Hobbes wrote on the duties of sovereigns, in a chapter of his treatise On The Citizen,4 is either false, or does not agree in any way with his principles. For, if the natural laws do not bind princes with regard to exterior actions, as he teaches, the princes are not obliged to do anything for the good of their people, since, according to him, neither they, nor their subjects, were bound by the natural laws to perform any exterior action, in keeping with it, before the conventions drawn up for the establishment of civil societies; and the princes themselves are in no way bound by these conventions, nor in consequence since they were made. If Hobbes takes as true and compelling the maxims that he prescribes for princes, it follows that the natural laws, whence these precepts come, bind princes at least with regard to exterior actions, but also to interior actions, or conscience, independent of the weight of conventions constituted by the state. So assuming this to be the case, all the foundations of Hobbes’s thesis and all the individual principles that he built on it, necessarily collapse.

  APPENDIX:
  
  containing

  I. A Summary of the Controversy between Dr. Samuel Clark and an anonymous Author, concerning The Immateriality of Thinking Substance.

  II. A Treatise concerning the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance, of the Law of Nature.

  LONDON:

  Printed in the Year M. DCC. XXVII.

  Appendix I

  A Summary of The Controversy between Dr. Samuel Clark and an anonymous Author, concerning the Immateriality of Thinking Substance.

  That the Soul of Man is an Immaterial Substance, and, therefore, distinct from the Body, has, in my Opinion, been set in a clear light by Dr. Samuel Clark, whose reasoning I shall, therefore, here transcribe, in his own Words, from his Defenses of an Argument made use of in a Letter to Mr. Dodwell, &c.1

  Note; By Consciousness, in the following Reasoning, the Reader may understand, indifferently, either the Reflex Act, by which a Man knows his Thoughts to be his own Thoughts; (which is the strict and properest Sense of the Word;) or the Direct Act of Thinking; or the Power or Capacity of Thinking; or (which is of the same Import;) simple Sensation; or the Power of Self-motion, or of beginning Motion by the Will: The Argument holding equally in all or any of these Senses. And by Individual is understood the same with Undivided, or Single, as oppos’d to Specifick.

  A Material Substance cannot think.That the Soul cannot possibly be material, is demonstrable from the single Consideration, even of bare Sense and Consciousness it-self. For Matter being a divisible Substance, consisting always of separable, nay of actually separate and distinct Parts, ’tis plain, unless it were essentially conscious, in which case every Particle of Matter must consist of innumerable separate and distinct Consciousnesses, no System of it, in any possible Composition or Division can be an individual conscious Being: For suppose three, or three hundred, Particles of Matter, at a Mile, or any given Distance, one from another, is it possible, that all those separate Parts should in that State be one individual conscious Being? Suppose then all these Particles brought together into one System, so as to touch one another, will they thereby, or by any motion or composition whatsoever, become any whit less truly distinct Beings, than they were at the greatest Distance? How then can their being dispos’d in any possible System, make them one individual conscious Being? If you suppose God, by his infinite Power, superadding Consciousness to the united Particles, yet still those Particles, being really and necessarily as distinct Beings as ever, cannot be themselves the Subject, in which that individual Consciousness inheres; but the Consciousness can only be superadded by the Addition of Something, which, in all the Particles, must still it-self be but one individual Being.

  Suppose the smallest imaginable Particle of Matter, indued with Consciousness or Thought, yet, by the Power of God, this Particle may be divided into two distinct parts; and then what will naturally and consequently become of its Power of thinking? If that Power will continue in it unchanged, then there must either be two distinct Consciousnesses in the two separate Parts, or else the Power, continuing in the inter-mediate Space, as well as in the Parts themselves, must there subsist without a Subject; or else, not the material Substance, but some other thing, is the Subject of the Consciousness. If the Power of thinking will remain only in one of the separated Parts, then either that one Part only had at first the Power residing in it; and then the same Question will return, upon the supposition of its being likewise divided; or else it will follow, that one and the same individual Quality may be transferred from one Subject to another, which all Philosophers, of all Sects in the World, have always confess’d to be impossible. If, in the last place, it be said, that, upon the Division of the Particle, the Power of thinking, which was in it, will wholly cease; then it will follow, that That Power was never at all a real Quality inhering or residing in the Substance (in which mere Separaration of Parts makes no Alteration;) but that it was merely an external Denomination, such as is Roundness in a Globe, which perishes at its being divided. And this, I suppose, will be granted to be sufficiently absurd. The Soul, therefore, whose Power of thinking is undeniably one individual Consciousness, cannot possibly be a material Substance.

  “Which Argument the Doctor has reduc’d to the following fifteen Propositions.”2

  I.

  Every System of Matter consists of a Multitude of distinct Parts.

  The several kinds of Qualities ascrib’d to Matter, considered.This, I think, is granted by all.

  II.

  Every real Quality inheres in some Subject.

  This also, I think, is granted by all: For whatever is called a Quality, and yet inheres not in any Subject, must either subsist of itself, (and then it is a Substance, not a Quality,) or else it is nothing but a mere Name.

  III.

  No individual or single Quality of one Particle of Matter can be the individual or single Quality of another Particle.

  The Heat of one Particle is not the Heat of another. The Gravity, the Colour, the Figure, of one Particle, is not the same individual Gravity, Colour or Figure of another Particle. The Consciousness or Sensation of one Particle (supposing it to be a Quality of Matter) is not the Consciousness or Sensation of another. If it was, it would follow, that the same thing could be Two in the same sense, and at the same time, that it is but One.

  Note; From hence may be drawn an evident Confutation of that absurd Notion, which Mr. Hobbes suggests in his Physicks (Chap. 25. Sect. 5.) that all Matter is essentially endued with an obscure actual Sense and Perception, but that there is required a Number and apt Composition of Parts, to make up a clear and distinct Sensation or Consciousness. For from this Notion it would follow, that the resulting Sensation or Consciousness at last, being but One distinct Sensation or Consciousness (as is that of a Man;) the Sensation or Consciousness of every one of the constituent Particles, would be the individual Sensation or Consciousness of All and Each of the rest.

  IV.

  Every real simple Quality that resides in any whole material System, resides in all the Parts of that System.

  The Magnitude of every Body is the Sum of the Magnitudes of its several Parts. The Motion of every Body is the Sum of the Motions of its several Parts. The Weight of every Body is the Sum of the Weights of its several Parts. The Heat3 of every Body is the Heat of its several Parts. And the same is universally true of every simple Quality residing in any System: For residing in the Whole, and not residing in the Parts, is residing in a Thing, and not residing in it, at the same time.

  These Qualities are always the Aggregates of Qualities of the same Kind, inhering distinctly in every part of the Material Subject.

  V.

  Every real compound Quality, that resides in any whole material System, is a Number of simple Qualities residing in all the Parts of that System; some in one part, some in another.

  Thus, in the Instance of mixt Colours, when the Simples, Blue, suppose, and Yellow, make the whole appear Green; in this case, that Portion of the System, in which any one of the particular simple Qualities resides, is a whole System, with respect to that Quality, and the Quality residing in it, resides in the several Particles, of which that Portion of the System is constituted: And so of the rest.

  VI.

  Every real Quality, simple or compound, that results from any whole material System, but does not reside in it, that is, neither in All its distinct Parts, nor in All the Parts of some Portion of it, according to the Explication of the two foregoing Propositions, is the Mode or Quality of some other Substance, and not of That.

  All sensible secondary Qualities, Heat, Colour, Smell, Taste, Sound, and the like, are of this kind, being in reality not Qualities of the Bodies they are ascrib’d to, but Modes of the Mind that perceives them. These Qualities, not really inhering in the Subject to which they are usually as cribed, but being indeed Modes excited, and residing in some other Subject, do not at all exist in that Subject to which they are usually ascribed, but in some other Subject.

  VII.

  Every Power, simple or compound, that results from any whole material System, but does not reside in it, that is, in all its Parts in the manner before explained; nor yet resides in any other Substance, as its Subject; is no real Quality at all, but must either be it-self a real Substance, (which seems unintelligible) or else it is nothing but merely an abstract Name or Notion, as all Universals are.

  Thus the Power resulting from the Texture of a Rose, to excite in us the Sensation of Sweetness, is nothing but an abstract Name, signifying a particular Motion and Figure of certain parts emitted. For the Sweetness of a Rose is well known, not to be a Quality really inhering in the Rose; but a Sensation, which is merely in him that smells it, and a Mode of the Thinking Substance that is in the Man. And these Qualities, in no Sense wherein they can be ascribed to a System of Matter, are individualPowers. They are Individuals, only as they are Modes of the thinking Substance that perceives them; but in the Bodies themselves, they are only specifically, not individually, single Powers; that is, they are only a Number of similar Motions or Figures of the Parts of the Body. Nay, they are not always so much as specifically single Powers. Thus compound Colours, as certain Greens, for Example, which are individual Modes in the thinking Substance that perceives them, may in the Objects be nothing but a Number of Figures or Motions even specifically different, namely, such as usually represent both Blue and Yellow. And the same may be said of Heat, Light, Taste, Sound, and all those others, which are called sensible Qualities. The Power of a Clock to shew the Hour of the Day, is nothing but one new complex Name, to express at once the several Motions of parts, and, particularly, the determinate Velocity of the last Wheel to turn round once in twelve Hours: Upon the stopping which Motion, by the Touch of a Finger or any other Impediment, without making any Alteration at all in the Number, Figure, or Disposition of the parts of the Clock, the Power wholly ceases; and, upon removing the Impediment, by which nothing is restored but mere Motion, the Power returns again, which is, therefore, no new real Quality of the whole, but only the mere Motion of the Parts. The Power of a Pin to prick, is nothing distinct from its mere Figure permitting it to enter the Skin. The Power of a Weight in one Scale of a Balance, to ascend or descend, upon increasing or diminishing the Counterpoise in the other Scale, is not a new real Quality, distinct from its absolute Gravity, tho’ it occasions a new Effect, there being no alteration at all made in the Weight itself. The Power of the Eye to see, is not a real Quality of the whole Eye, but merely an abstract Name, signifying a transmitting and refracting of the Rays of Light in a certain manner thro’ its several parts; which Effect, by the Interposition or Removal of an opake Body, is destroyed or renewed, without any Alteration at all in the Eye it-self. A Key, by having many new Locks made to fit it, acquires a new Power of producing Effects, which it could not before; and yet no new real Quality is produced, nor any Alteration at all made in the Key it-self. And so, universally, of all Powers of this kind: These Qualities not really inhering in any Subject at all, but being mere abstract Names, or external Denominations, to express certain complex Ideas framed in our Imaginations; or certain general extrinsick and relative Effects, produced upon particular Systems of Matter by foreign Agents, or certain Dispositions of the particular Systems of Matter, requisite towards the producing of those Effects, such as are Magnetism, Electricity, Attraction, Reflexibility, Refrangibility, and the like. These have no real Existence, by way of proper inhering, in any Subject. If these Powers were any thing else, but mere abstract Names, they would signify Qualities subsisting without any Subject at all; that is, such as must themselves be distinct Substances, which is unintelligible.

  VIII.

  Consciousness is neither a mere abstract Name, (such as the Powers mentioned in Prop. VII.) nor a Power of exciting or occasioning different Modes in a foreign Substance, (such as are all the sensible Qualities of Bodies Prop. VII.) but a real Quality, truly and properly inherent in the Subject it-self, the thinking Substance.

  If it was a mere abstract Name, it would be nothing at all, in the Person that thinks, or in the thinking Substance it-self, but only a Notion framed by the Imagination of some other Being: For all those Powers, which are only abstract Names, are not at all in the Things whose Powers they are called; but are only Notions, framed in the Imagination, by the Mind that observes, compares and reasons about different Objects without it-self.

  If it was a Power of exciting or occasioning different Modes in a foreign Substance, then the Power of thinking must be, before, in that foreign Substance; and that foreign Substance alone would in reality be conscious, and not This, which excites the different Modes in That foreign Substance: For the Power that is in one Substance, of exciting different Modes in another Substance, pre-supposes necessarily, in that other Substance, the Foundation of those Modes; the Power of thinking is, beforehand, in that Being, wherein those Qualities excite or occasion different Modes of thinking.

  It remains, therefore, that it must of necessity be a real Quality, truly and properly inhering in the Subject it-self, the thinking Substance; there being no other Species of Powers or Qualities left, to which it can possibly be referred. And this indeed is, of it-self, as evident by every Man’s Experience, as it can be render’d by any Explication or Proof whatsoever.

  IX.

  No real Quality can result from the Composition of different Qualities, so as to be a new Quality in the same Subject, of a different Kind or Species, from all and every one of the component Qualities.

  If it could, it would be a Creation of something out of nothing. From compound Motion can arise nothing but Motion: From Magnitudes, nothing but Magnitude: From Figures, nothing but Figure: From Compositions of Magnitude, Figure and Motion together, nothing but Magnitude, Figure and Motion: From mechanical Powers nothing but mechanical Powers: From a composition of Colours, nothing but Colour, which it-self (as appears by Microscopes) is still the simple Colours of which it was compounded. From Mixtures of Chymical Liquors, nothing but Ferments, which are only mere Motions of the Particles in mixing, such Motions, as arise from placing of Iron and a Loadstone near each other. Gravity is not a Quality of Matter, arising from its Texture, or any other Powers in it; but merely an Endeavour to Motion, excited by some foreign Force or Power. Magnetism or Electricity are not new Qualities, resulting from different and unknown Powers; but merely Emission of certain Steams of Matter, which produce certain determinate Motions. Compositions of Colours can never contribute to produce a Sound, nor Compositions of Magnitude and Figure to produce a Motion; nor necessary and determinate Motion, to produce a free and indetermined Power of Self-motion; nor any mechanical Powers whatsoever, to produce a Power not mechanical. And the same must of necessity hold universally true, of all Qualities and Powers whatsoever, whether known or un-known; because otherwise, as hath been before said, there would in the Compound be something created out of nothing.

  X.

  Consciousness, therefore, being a real Quality, (Prop. VIII.) and of a kind specifically different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themselves acknowledged to be void of Consciousness, can never possibly result from any Composition of such Qualities.

  This is as evident from the foregoing Propositions, as that a Sound cannot be the Result of a Mixture of Colours and Smells; nor Extension the Result of a Composition of parts unextended; nor Solidity the Result of parts not solid, whatever other different Qualities, known or unknown, those constituent parts may be supposed to be endued with.

  XI.

  No individual Quality can be transferred from one Subject to another.

  This is granted by all.

  XII.

  The Spirits and Particles of the Brain, being loose and in perpetual Flux, cannot, therefore, be the Seat of that Consciousness, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years since; but also is conscious that he himself, the same individual conscious Being, was the Doer of them.

  This follows evidently from the foregoing.

  XIII.

  The Consciousness that a Man has at one and the same time, is one Consciousness, and not a Multitude of Consciousnesses; as the Solidity, Motion or Colour of any piece of Matter, is a multitude of distinct Solidities, Motions or Colours.

  This is granted by all, who deny that the Particles of the Brain, which they suppose to constitute a conscious Substance, are themselves each of them conscious.

  XIV.

  Consciousness, therefore, cannot at all reside in the Substance of the Brain or Spirits, or in any other material System, as its Subject, but must be a Quality of some immaterial Substance.

  This follows necessarily from the foregoing Propositions compared together: For, since every possible Power of Matter, whether known or unknown, must needs be either, First, A real Quality of the Matter to which it is ascribed; and then it must inhere in the several distinct parts: Or, Secondly, A Power of exciting or occasioning certain Modes in some other Subject; and then it is truly the Quality, not of the Matter, but of that other Subject: Or, Thirdly, A mere abstract Name or Notion of what is, properly speaking, no real Quality at all, and inheres in no real Subject at all: And Consciousness is acknowledged to be none of these: It follows unavoidably, that it must of necessity be a Quality of some immaterial Substance.

  XV.

  Difficulties that arise, afterwards, concerning other Qualities of that Immaterial Substance, as, whether it be extended or unextended; do not at all affect the present Argument.

  For thus even abstract mathematical Demonstrations; as those concerning the infinite Divisibility of Quantity, the Eternity of God, and his Immensity, have almost insuperable Difficulties on the other side: And yet no Man, who understands those Matters, thinks that those Difficulties do at all weaken the Force, or diminish the Certainty, of the Demonstrations.

  What follows, is the Sum of Objections that have been made to the foregoing Reasoning, and of the Answers, that have been given to those Objections by Dr. Clark.4

  Objections against the foregoing Reasoning,It is Objected, That there are some real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are ascribed; which yet are not, like Magnitude and Motion, Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of the same Kind, inhering distinctly in the several Parts of the Subject: And that, therefore, thinking, though it be not an Aggregate of the Powers of the same kind, may, nevertheless, be a real Quality inhering in Matter.

  That numerical Powers, or particular and individual Modes, are such real inherent Qualities, residing in a System of Matter, without inhering distinctly in its several Parts; in contradistinction to generical Powers, such as Magnitude and Motion, which the Objector acknowledges to be the Sums of the Magnitudes and Motions of the several Parts.

  That, for Instance, the Power of the Eye to contribute to the Act of Seeing; the Power of a Clock, to shew the Hour of the Day; the Power of a Musical Instrument, to produce in us harmonious Sounds; the particular Figures, such as Roundness or Squareness; and particular or individual Modes of Motion, are such numerical Powers, not at all resulting from any Powers of the same kind, inhering in the parts of the System: And that Thinking, therefore, in like manner, not being an Aggregate of Powers of the same kind, may yet inhere in a System of Matter, as one of those numerical or individual Modes of some generical Power.

  That, upon this Supposition, of Thinking being a numerical Mode of some generical Power of Matter, it may be conceived, that as the Roundness of a Body is not the Sum of the Roundnesses of the Parts; nor the Squareness of a Body, the Sum of the Squarenesses of the Parts, nor the Power of a musical Instrument to cause an harmonious Sound, the Sum of the Powers of the same kind in the Parts singly considered; nor any particular Mode of Motion, the Sum of the same Modes of Motion in all the several Parts; so the Consciousness that inheres in a System of Matter, may yet not be the Sum of the Consciousnesses of the Parts.

  That the Argument, therefore, drawn from Consciousness not being made up of several Consciousnesses, concludes no more against the Possibility of its residing in a System of Matter, than the like Argument would conclude against the Possibility of the Existence of Roundness, or any other numerical Mode in a Body.

  For Roundness no more consists of several Roundnesses, than Thinking or Consciousness does of several Consciousnesses.

  And Roundness is as specifically different from other Figures, of which it may be composed, as Consciousness is from a circular Motion.

  So that Sensation may be conceived to be in the parts of an Animal’s Body, just as Roundness is in the parts that compose a round Body: Each part has as much of Sensation, singly consider’d, as each part of a round Body has of Roundness: And when the parts are duly disposed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundness exists by the Conjunction of parts.

  For Consciousness, being supposed to be a real numerical Power, such as Roundness is, may result from the Composition of different Qualities, as Roundness does from different Species of Figure: and is consequently a new Quality in the same Subject, of a different kind or Species from all the component Qualities considered together.

  Wherefore, tho’ Consciousness be a real Quality, and different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themselves acknowledged to be void of Consciousness; yet it may result from such Qualities, as, singly considered, are void of Consciousness; In like manneras Roundness is a real Quality specifically different from other Qualities void of Roundness, and yet may be the Result or Composition of such Qualities.

  That Consciousness may be considered particularly, as an individual Mode or Species of Motion.

  For, as nothing more goes to the Composition of Roundness, than the Conjunction of several Particles, not singly indued with Roundness; so, upon this Supposition, nothing more needs go to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of several Particles, not each indued with that Species of Motion called Thinking.

  Answered.To this (says Dr. Clark) I answer, as follows.5

  Every real Quality of any material System, resides distinctly in the several parts of the System, the Qualities of the parts being of the same kind with that of the whole.It is absolutely impossible, that any real Quality should truly inhere in a System of Matter, without being the Aggregate of a Number of Qualities, residing distinctly in the several Parts of the System, and being always of the same kind with the whole that results from them. For, as the Substance it-self of a System of Matter is nothing but a Sum of its parts, existing distinctly and independently from each other, and the whole cannot but be of the same kind with the parts that constitute it; so no Power or Quality of the Substance can be any thing else, but the Aggregate of the Powers of the several Parts: and that Aggregate, without a Creation of something out of nothing, cannot but be of the same kind with the Powers that constitute it. If the Parts of the Substance be similar, the System it-self is an uniform or homogeneous Substance: If the Parts be dissimilar, then the Substance is difform or heterogeneous; but still always of the same kind or kinds with the parts that compose it. In like manner, if the Powers of the several Parts of the System be similar, the Power of the whole will be a simple and uniform Power: If the Powers of the several Parts be dissimilar, the Power of the whole will be a compound difform Power; but still always necessarily of the same kind or kinds, with the Powers of which it is compounded. Since therefore you acknowledge Thinking to be a Power not compos’d of a multitude of Thinkings; and ’tis evident (as shall in the Sequel be made fully appear) that no Power void of thinking can be made of the same kind with the Power of thinking, so as to be Parts of it, and that from a Composition of them the Power of thinking may arise; it follows, that Thinking is not made up at all of Parts, and consequently, that it cannot reside in a Substance, that consists of distinct and independent Parts, such as all Matter is confessed to be.

  To suppose any real Power or Quality arising from, or belonging to, any whole System of Matter without belonging to the several Parts of which that Whole consists, is an express Contradiction: ’Tis supposing, either an Universal to exist without Particulars, or an Effect to be produced without a Cause, or to have more in it than was in the Cause, or that a Quality is, by the Power of God, made so to arise out of nothing, as to be superadded to a Subject, and to subsist without inhering in that Subject, to which it is, at the same time, supposed to belong.

  For, if the whole, or Result, be specifically different from all and every one of the particular Powers contributing to it; as Thinking manifestly is, from all the Powers of Particles not indued with Thought, it is certain that such a particular Power is a Whole bigger than all its parts; a Whole that contains something in it, besides all and every one of its Parts; which is, evidently, an Universal without Particulars. As if it were asserted, that a Smell and a Colour could be joined together to make up a Sound; or, as if Hardness and Figure could be the Particulars contributing to constitute a Motion.

  Tho’ the different Powers, in the single and separate Parts of a System of Matter, (as for Instance, their Magnitude, Situation, Figure and Motion,) may, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, be the cause of the Existence of another Power of the same Species, which did not exist in the Particles, singly considered; that is, may constitute another Magnitude, another Figure, another Motion, than was in the single Particles; just as twenty different Numbers, added together, constitute a new Number, different from any of the Particulars: Yet those Powers cannot, without an evident Contradiction, be the cause of the Existence of any other Power of a different Species, (as Thinking is confessedly of a different Species from Magnitude, Figure, Motion, or whatever other Properties may belong to unthinking Particles of Matter;) for the same reason, as that the Addition of different Numbers in Arithmetick cannot, without a manifest Contradiction, be the Cause of the Existence of a Line or a Figure; or the mixture of Tastes constitute a Colour; namely, because thus the Effect would contain more in it than was in the Cause; that is, something would, without any Efficient, be produced out of nothing.

  Because Wholes are nothing specically different from their Parts;That which has been apt to deceive Men, in this matter, is this; that they imagine Compounds to be somewhat specifically different from the things of which they are compounded; which is a very great Mistake; As when two Triangles, put together, make a Square, that Square is still nothing but two Triangles: And in short, every thing, by Composition, Division or Motion, is nothing else but the very same it was before, taken either in the Whole, or by Parts, or in different Place or Order, so as to excite in our Minds different complex Notions, and occasion new abstract Names of things, but by no means to produce any new real Quality in the things themselves, such as Consciousness is agreed to be, inhering truly and properly in the Subject it is ascribed to. For Instance: All possible Changes of Figure, are still nothing but Figure: Of Magnitude, but Magnitude: Of Motion, but Motion: All Compositions of Magnitude, Figure and Motion together, are still nothing but Magnitude, Figure and Motion.

  and the mutual Relations of things to one another are not really Qualities of the things themselves:The true State of this case seems, in brief, to be this. Sometimes we consider one and the same Quality of a thing, indifferent Circumstances and Respects, and with relation to other different things, which Relation may be changed, by the Alteration or Removal of those other things, and a new Effect be produced, without any Alteration at all of the thing it-self, or any of its Qualities; and yet, then, we give it a new Name, and are apt to think that new Name a new Quality. Sometimes we consider several distinct Qualities of different Parcels of Matter, together; and, because some new Effect is thereby occasioned in some other Being, we give the imaginary Whole a new Name, and think that new Denominati on a new Quality. But with how little reason this is done, will abundantly appear by the following Instances. The same Particle of Matter, which makes a Point in the Surface of a Globe, may, by other Parts being shaved off, become the Point of the Angle of a Cube, without undergoing any Alteration it-self, and produce an Effect which it could not produce before: But is this truly a new Quality or Power in the Point it-self? Blue and Yellow Powder, mingled together, occasion a new Effect, and are called by a new Name, Green: But is this really a new Quality or Power? Is it not plainly the same two Qualities, which they had when separate, acting still distinctly, as appears in a Microscope?

  As is evident from the Power of a Clock to shew the Hour of the Day,That particular and determinate degree of Velocity in a Wheel, whereby it turns once round, precisely, in twelve Hours, is that which is called the Power of a Clock to shew the time of the Day; and, because such a determinate Velocity of Motion is made use of by us for the Measure of Time, and has an abstract Name given it to express that use, is it therefore a new Quality or Power, distinct from the Motion it-self? As the Number a thousand is the Sum of a great many Numbers, but cannot with any Sense be imagined to be a Composition of Sounds and Colours, so the numerical Power of a Clock, being it-self nothing but Motion and Figure, cannot be the Result of any other Powers in the Parts, but such as are themselves singly of the same kind, in the manner before explain’d; namely, Motions and Figures: And in like manner my present numerical Consciousness, if it were at all a Quality inhering in a System of Matter; tho’ it need not indeed be the Sum of the like individual Thoughts, inhering in the several distinct parts of the System; yet it must be the Sum of such Powers in the Parts, as would themselves singly be of the samekind, namely, Consciousness or Thoughts. It being equally, and for the very same reason, impossible that my Consciousness should be the Result of such Powers in the parts of my Brain, as are, toto genere, different from Thinking; (such as are Figure and Motion, and all other Powers which are void of Consciousness;) as that the fore-mentioned number a thousand, should be a Composition of Sounds or Colours, or of any thing else but Numbers.

  When a Weight, in one Scale of a Balance, does, by taking one part of the Weight that was in the other Scale, begin to preponderate, which it did not before; Is this any Quality or real Power in the Weight that is not altered, different from what it had before?

  of a musical Instrument to produce harmonious Sounds,The Power of a musical Instrument to produce harmonious Sounds, is not indeed a Result from the like individual Powers, residing in the several Parts of the Instrument; any more than the Circumference of a Circle is made up of a Number of the like whole Circumferences: But, as the Circumference of a Circle is a Sum of a Multitude of convex Arches of like Curvity, but cannot be an Aggregate of strait Lines, or of Cubick Bodies, or of Arches of unlike Curvity; so the Harmony produced by a musical Instrument, being, it-self, in the Mind that perceives it, nothing but Sound; and, in the Instrument, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Sensation, nothing but a Motion of Parts, cannot be the Result or Composition of any other Powers, but what are themselves singly of the same kind in the several Subjects respectively; namely, in the Mind that perceives them, Sounds likewise; and in the Instrument it-self, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Sensation, Motion of the Parts. And in like manner Consciousness, if it were a Power inhering in a System of Matter, could not be the Result of any other Powers in the Parts, but some sorts of Consciousness; for the very same reason as the Circumference of a Circle cannot (as we before said) be an Aggregate of strait Lines, or of Cubick Bodies; nor an harmonious Sound a Composition of Colours, or of any thing else beside Sounds.

  and of the Eye to see.The Power of the Eye to see, is nothing else but such a Power as is in the Object-Glasses of Telescopes, of transmitting and refracting Rays of Light, so as to paint the Image of the Object in the bottom of the Eye. And this is evidently nothing but a Sum of Powers of the same kind, namely, Powers of transmitting and refracting of Rays, residing distinctly in the several Parts of the Eye, or of the Glass. Every part of the Eye transmits and refracts Rays, and those Rays paint several Parts of the Image: And the whole Image differs no otherwise from all its parts; nor that which you call the numerical Power of the whole Eye, from the single Power of all its Parts; than the Idea of a Dozen differs from the Idea of twelve Units: Which, if it be as great a Difference, as is between the Idea of Consciousness, and the Idea of a Circular or any other Motion, I confess I have lost my Understanding. Moreover, to shew the Unhappiness of chusing the Power of the Eye to see for an instance in the present Argument; even every Part of the Eye has the same Power as the whole, (differing only in degree,) of painting at the Bottom the whole Image of the Object. For, as each Half of a broken Object-Glass of a Telescope, or any Piece of it that retains the Polish on both Surfaces, will represent distinctly the whole Object, only with less Brightness and Luminousness than the whole Glass would do; so each part of the Eye, paints every part of the whole Object: And, if half of the Eye, or almost the whole Eye, be covered, so that you look only through a Pin-hole; still the whole Object is seen distinctly, even by that very small part of the Eye, and, consequently, the Power of the Eye is the same, both in the Whole and in every Part.

  For the clearer Explication of the present Argument, the Ambiguity of the Words [kind] and [species], [of the same kind] and [of the same species] is cleared up.For the clear Explication of this whole Argument, and to vindicate the Notion from all the Objections, and pretended Instances brought to the contrary; it is to be observ’d, that the Terms, Kind and Species, and of the same Kind or Species, are very ambiguous Terms.

  For Example: It is an evident Truth, that All Circles of four Foot Diameter, are of one and the same kind or Species; and this is what the Logicians call Species specialissima. It is true in another Sense, that all Circles whatever, are of the same Species: In another Sense, that all curvilinear Figures, are of the same Species: In another, that all plain Figures, both strait-lin’d and curvilinear, as oppos’d to Solids, are of the same Species: And in another, that All Figures whatsoever, whether plain or solid, are of the same kind or Species, as contradistinguished from Motion or Thinking, or from any thing else of a totally different kind. This is what they call the Genus generalius. And it is not true to say, that Figure and Motion, or Figure and Colour, or Figure and Thought are of the same Kind; because there is nothing common in their Ideas, by which they can be rank’d together; save only, as they are all comprehended, perhaps, under the mere abstract Name of Quality in general. Which makes it appear, by the by, with what Truth and Sense the Objector affirms, that Roundness is as specifically different from all other Figures, as Consciousness is from a circular Motion; That is, that a Circle differs as much from an Ellipsis, not only as it differs from a Cube, but even as much as it differs from the Reason of a Man: Or, as the Logicians would express it, that the Species specialior differs as much from the Species next and immediately superior to it, as it does from the Genus generalissimum; and not only so, but as it does also from any thing that is not so much as included even in That Genus.

  In what Sense the Powers or Qualities of the whole, and of its parts, are said to be of the same kind;Now, to apply this to my present Question: When I affirm, that every real Power or Quality, inhering in a System of Matter, must, of necessity, be the Sum of Powers of the same kind, residing distinctly in the several Parts of that System; ’tis manifest, that by this Term, of the same kind, is not to be understood the Species specialissima, but some of the Species generaliores. For Example, When I say the Magnitude of a Cubick Foot of Gold, is the Sum of the Magnitude of its Parts; I do not mean to say, that it is a Sum or Aggregate of Cubick Feet, but of other Magnitudes which constitute a Cubit Foot, and which are of the same kind with it, in the Sense that all Magnitudes are of the same kind, and may be parts of one another: But Magnitude and Motion, or Magnitude and Figure, are not in any sense of the same kind, and cannot be part, one of another; neither can Figure or Motion be a piece of a Thought.

  applied to the Objector’s favourite Instance of the Roundness of a Globe,In like manner: When I say Roundness or Globosity, or any other Figure of a Body, must needs be the Sum of Qualities of the same kind, inhering in the several parts; ’tis plain I do not mean to affirm, that Globosity is made up of Globosities, any more than the Number Twenty is made up of Twenties, or the Motion of a Cubick Foot of Matter made up of the Motions of Cubick Feet: But that a whole round Figure must necessarily be made up of Pieces of Roundness, which are all of the same kind with it; just as the Numbers, which are Parts of Twenty, are of the same kind with the whole, and the Motions of the Particles of a Cubick Foot of Matter, which are Parts of the Motion of the whole, are of the same kind with the whole Motion. But Figure, and whatever is not Figure, are not in any sense of the same kind; neither can any thing that is void of Figure, be part of any Figure whatsoever; nor any thing that is void of Curvity in particular, be part of a round Circumference; nor any thing that is void of that particular Degree of Curvity, which makes a Circle of a determinate Diameter, be part of the Circumference of that Circle; nor any thing that is void of Thinking, be a Part or Constituent of a Thought.

  It is as evident, that the superficial Roundness of a Globe, is the Sum of its convex Surfaces of its outward parts; and its solid Figure, the Sum of all its solid Parts, taken together, considered like so many concentrick Shells, or any other Figures, which can be constituent Parts of the solid Content of a Globe; as it is that the Motion of a Globe, is the Sum of the Motions of its Parts. And the convex Outsides of its outward parts, and the concentrick Roundnesses of its inward parts, are as much of the same kind with the whole Roundness, or the whole Globosity of which they are Pieces, as the several distinct Motions or Magnitudes of its parts are of the same kind with the whole Motion or Magnitude which they constitute. For why is not a Semicircle of the same kind with the Circumference of a Circle; as much as the Motion or Magnitude of half a Foot Cube of Matter, is of the same kind with the Motion or Magnitude of the whole Foot Cube?

  As the individual Roundness of a Globe, is a numerical Quality of that individual Globe, so the Objector can only say, that the individual Consciousness, which I find in my-self, at any particular Moment of Time, is a numerical Mode of some Power, inhering in that System of Matter, which constitutes my Brain. Now, as the individual Roundness of a Globe, is not indeed made up of a number of the like whole Roundnesses, (even as the Number a Hundred is not made up of Hundreds;) but yet must needs be made up of such Figures as are Parts of Roundness, nay, Parts indued with that particular numerical Degree of Curvity or Roundness; and cannot be made up of strait Lines, nor of any Figures which are not Pieces of Roundness, or not Pieces indued with that particular determinate Degree of Curvity or Roundness: So the individual Consciousness, that I find in my-self, at any particular Moment of Time, (supposing it to be a Quality inhering in a System of Matter,) must be made up, though not indeed of a Number of the very same Consciousnesses, yet of such Powers, as are much of the same kind with that numerical Consciousness, as Arches of Circles are of the same kind with the whole circular Circumference: That is, it must be made up of different Consciousnesses indeed, but still of Consciousnesses only, and not Motions or Figures or any thing else, any more than the Roundness of a Circle can be made up of strait Lines, or of Colours, or Sounds, or any thing else besides Pieces of circular Roundness. Every part of the Circumference of a Circle is not only not wholly void of Roundness, but has really as much Roundness or Curvity (as much in Degree, tho’notas much of it in Quantity) as the whole Circle it-self has: And therefore Consciousness, in like manner, if it was a Quality answering to, or that could be compared with, the Roundness of a Circle; must consist of Parts, every one of which would have as much Consciousness (in Degree) as the whole.

  It is evident, that no whole can possibly differ from all its parts in any thing else, but only in the abstract Name, the mere external Denomination of its being a whole, which is nothing at all in the thing it-self, but merely a manner of Conception, a Conjunction of Ideas in the Imagination of the Person that thinks upon it. Thinking, if it was the Quality of a System of Matter, that is, the Sum or whole of the Powers of its Parts; must differ from the distinct Powers of those Parts, no otherwise, than as the Idea of the Roundness of a Circle differs from the Idea of two Semicircles joined together, or as the Idea of twice six, differs from the Idea of the Number Twelve. If, therefore, Thinking was, as the Objector supposes, a Composition or Result of several Powers, and those Powers such, as were themselves utterly void of Consciousness; Thinking would be either a mere outward Denomination, and nothing at all really in the thinking Substance it-self; just as a Dozen is only a mere Name, and nothing at all different really in the thing it-self from twelve Units: or else it must unavoidably be a Whole bigger than all its Parts; that is, containing all its Parts, and Thinking besides: As a Cube would be bigger than all its Parts, if it were made up of Parts, that had none of them singly any Magnitude at all.

  As nothing that is not Curve can have any Tendency towards Curvity; as nothing that is not Colour, can have any Tendency towards Colour; as nothing that is not Sound, can have any Tendency towards Sound: So nothing that is not Consciousness, can have any Tendency towards Consciousness: As it is plainly impossible, that any Colour should have any Tendency towards being any Sound, nor that any Figure should have any Tendency towards being any Motion; so it is likewise ridiculous to imagine, that any Motion, or any other Quality of Matter void of Consciousness, should have any Tendency towards being Consciousness. The Curvities of several little Arches, that constitute the Circumference of a Circle, are not properly Tendencies towards Roundness, but they are themselves, taken together, the whole Circle, or the Roundness it-self.

  and to the Squareness of a quadrilateral Figure.To the Objection, That a Square Figure may consist of Parts, that are none of them singly indued with any thing like Squareness: I answer, that the Squareness of the Figure of a Body, is a mere external Denomination, a mere Relative, comparing together, in the Imagination, the Bounds of a Surface, the Situation of four strait Lines, with Respect one to another; and has not properly any real Existence in things themselves, so as Consciousness is acknowledged to have in the Thinking Substance. And Roundness it-self, being considered in the same manner, might this way likewise afford a just Answer to the Argument drawn from thence.

  Arguments to prove, that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion;To prove the Absurdity of supposing Consciousness to be a Mode of Motion, I offer the following Arguments.

  I. Every Mode of any Power or Quality, is nothing else but That Power or Quality, of which it is a Mode, understood with some particular Limitation; that is to say, ’tis nothing but a particular Instance of that general Power or Quality, considered under this or that particular Modification.I.Blue and Red, and all other Modes of Colour, are nothing but several particular Colours, and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the Genus of Colour. Acute and Grave, and all other Modes of Sound, are nothing but several particular Sounds, and can contain nothing in their Idea beyond the Genus of Sound. Circular and Triangular, and all other Modes of Figure, are nothing but several particular Figures, and can contain nothing in their Idea beyond the Genus of Figure. In like manner, All Modes of Motion, are nothing else but merely particular Motions, and cannot contain any thing in their Idea beyond the Genus of Motion. Now, if simple Ideas be the Foundation of all our Knowledge, and clear and distinct Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of those Ideas, be the best and greatest Criterion of Truth, that our Faculties enable us to attain to; then it is as evident as any Truth in the World, that Consciousness cannot possibly be a Mode of Motion. For I have as clear and distinct Perception, that the Idea of Consciousness contains something in it, besides and beyond the Genus of Motion, as I have that it contains something in it beyond the Genus of Figure. The Idea of Consciousness is totally and generically different from the Idea of circular Motion, or an elliptical Motion, or any other Mode of Motion whatsoever, as it is from the Idea of a Circle or a Cube, or any other Mode of Figure whatsoever. I have, therefore, exactly the same intuitive Certainty, that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion, as I have that a Circle or a Cube is not a Thought, or that an Acute Sound is not a Purple Colour, or that any one thing in the World is not another, whose Idea is the remotest and most different from it, that can be imagined.

  Local Motion can have no other Effect upon any System of Matter, than only producing in it a different juxta-position of Parts: To which to ascribe Wisdom and Knowledge, nothing would be more absurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of Position, which ’tis impossible should give Thought and Knowledge to them. Lock’s Essay, Book IV. Chap. 10. Sect. 16.

  To this Argument it has been objected; That we have no Idea of all the possible Modes of Motion; that, though we have, indeed, Ideas of the more simple Modes of Motion, yet of the very complex ones we have no Distinction in our Minds; that, therefore, we can no more prove or know, that Thinking is not one of these more complex Modes of Motion, than we can know, whether two things agree or differ from one another, that we have no Idea of at all; that it is not possible for us to say, that Thinking does not consist in the peculiar Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, till we have a particular Idea of the Motion of those Spirits, and an Idea of Thinking, as something distinct from a Mode of Motion; that Thinking has the Genus of Motion, by arising from Motion, by being varied by Motion, by producing other Motions, by having Succession, and Parts, and innumerable Modifications; that no Idea of human Consciousness can be produced beyond the Genus of Motion: that saying we have an intuitive Certainty, that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion, is only affirming the Question in Debate, which can signify nothing to any body that wants Conviction.

  In this is, at last, declared the fundamental Error (ϖρῶτον Ψεῦδος) of the Objector’s whole Hypothesis; namely, that he intends to make Thinking, not a real Quality, but a mere empty Name, or external Denomination, such as I at first ranked under the Third Head: For the most complex Modes of Motion possible, whatever Name we call them by, are still nothing but Motions; and the Name we give them, is nothing but a mere external Denomination. Thinking, therefore, according to the Objector, being only a very complex Mode of Motion (or of any other Quality of Matter,) is nothing but a mere external Name or Denomination of that Mode.

  Every Man has, within himself, the Idea of Consciousness, which, tho’ he cannot produce (as the Objector absurdly requires,) that is, cannot define, nor describe, any more than the Objector can describe his Idea of any Colour or Sound; yet he as certainly knows it not to be any complex Mode of Motion, as the Objector knows his Idea of Colour not to be any complex Mode of Sound; which intuitive Certainty, if it be only a bare affirming the Question in Debate in one case, and can signify nothing to any Body that wants Conviction; ’tis so in the other likewise: And then there’s an End of all human Knowledge, and no Man can pretend to know any one thing not to be any other.

  Thinking has, indeed, Succession and Modes, and many other things, in common with Motion; but so has every thing with every thing.

  We cannot, indeed, frame in our Minds distinct Images of the more complex Modes, as we can of the more simple ones: But are we not, nevertheless, equally certain, that they are alike imaginable, though our narrow Imaginations cannot comprehend them? And that, if we could represent them to our Imaginations, they would all appear as remote from the Idea of Thinking, as any one of them does? Because we cannot comprehend, in our Imagination, a distinct Conception of a vast number in Arithmetick, as we can a small one, do we not, therefore, know, but that a vast Number may possibly prove so different from a small one, as to turn into a Plant or an Animal? Because we cannot form, in our Minds, an Image of a Space ten thousand Millions of Miles square, as we can of ten Foot square; are we not, therefore, sure, that such a great Space may possibly be something, whose true Idea shall have no Similitude, no Relation, to Extension?

  II.II. If Thinking was any Mode or Species of Motion, it would follow, that All Motion would be some degree or kind of Thinking: For Motion, in the thing moved, excepting only the Difference of Degrees, of its Swiftness or Slowness, is a similar Quality, and has no Variety in it: All its different Determinations, Modes, or Species, being nothing really in the Body it-self, that is moved; but mere abstract Notions, or external Denominations, conceived only in our Imagination. For, moving with one Determination, or with another; from North to South, or from South to North, is merely relative, and not really a different thing from the Body moved, that one of these Motions should be Consciousness, the other not. In like manner, circular Motion, or Motion in any other Figure, is not any thing, really and truly inherent in the Body it-self, different from Motion in a strait Line. For the Determination of any Body, that moves in a Circle, is nothing else, at any given Point of Time, but a Determination to move in a certain strait Line; and, at another given Point of Time, to move in another strait Line; and so on: So that there is no such thing as a circular Motion, of any Particle of Matter, co-existent at once; but all Motion is, strictly and properly speaking, a similar and uniform Quality, to wit, a Body’s Going on according to its Determination; which Determination is always in a strait Line, and causes the Body to go on actually in a strait Line, where it meets with no Resistance; and where it meets with Resistance, by Intervals, there to go on into new strait Lines successively, into which it is diverted by such Resistance; and where it meets with continual Resistance, there to go on in a curve Line, into which it is continually diverted: And every such curvilinear Motion, whether circular or of any other Species whatsoever, is but the Idea of a Number of successive Motions of a Body, never existent together; apure Ens Rationis, or Operation of the Mind; which considering past Motion and future, and recollecting the whole, by the Memory and Fancy, calls that whole, sometimes by one Denomination, and sometimes by another. How then can any of those Modes of Motion be the Efficient of Thought, or (according to the Objector’s Supposition) be themselves Thought; when they are, evidently, nothing, but the Effect and Product of it, viz. Ideas fram’d merely by the Imagination and Memory?

  And the same, that has been said concerning the Modes of Motion of a single Body, may, easily, be applied to the Modes of Motion of any Number of Bodies, in any System or Composition whatsoever. It being very evident, that, if the Progression of one Particle of Matter directly in a strait Line, be not Consciousness or Thought; the like Progression of twenty Particles at the same time in strait Lines, cannot be Consciousness neither: The Position of those Lines with respect to one another, which determines the particular Mode of Motion of the whole System, being merely imaginary, relative, and comparative; a Figment only in the Mind or Imagination, and not any thing really existing in the Bodies themselves, at any one and the same Moment of Time.

  In like manner, the Impulse also, or Beating of one Particle of Matter against another, is a thing similar, and in all Cases alike; differing in nothing, but in the Degrees or Quantity of the Force: And, therefore, must always, and in all cases, if ever in any case at all, be some Degree of Thought. From whence it would follow, that there must be as many several incoherent Consciousnesses, as there are Particles of the Brain or Spirits, or of any other Matter in any System, that ever dash one against another.

  With respect to this Argument, the Objector allows, that every Motion is a Degree of Thought, in that Sense, wherein it is proper to say, that every Motion is a Degree of Fire, &c. That is, he allows every Motion, to be as much a Degree of the Sensation itself, of Heat, for Instance, or of any other Sensation or Thought arising in the Mind, as it is a Degree of that Mode of Motion in Matter, which excites in us such or such a particular Sensation: Which is allowing every the slowest Motion of a Needle, to be as much, and as properly, a Degree of Pain, as it is a Degree of that Motion, which causes it to prick the Skin.

  III.III. No particular Mode of any Power can contain under it so great a Variety of Modes as the superior Power it-self does; for the same reason that quadrilateral Figure, which is a Mode of Figure, cannot contain under it so great a Variety of Modes, as Figure in general does: And, therefore, if Thinking was a particular Mode of Motion, there could not possibly be so many Modes of Thinking, as there are of Motion. But, now, on the contrary, ’tis evident, there are more Modes of Thinking, than there are of Motion, because every Mode of Motion has a Mode of Thinking (an Idea) answering to it, and there are innumerable other Modes of Thinking besides: Thinking, therefore, cannot possibly be a Mode of Motion. [And the same Argument holds against the Possibility of its being a Mode of any other Power of Matter whatsoever.] There are as many Ideas of Figure, as there are Figures; and as many Ideas of Motion, as there are Modes of Motion; and as many Ideas of other things, as there are other things in the World, that can be thought upon: And all these Ideas are Modes, and Sorts or Kinds of Thinking. Now, if Thinking is a Power more various, more extensive, than Motion, ’tis manifest, that it cannot be a Mode or Species of Motion, as Roundness is a Mode or Species of Figure.

  IV.IV. “If it was the Motion” of the parts of a corporeal System, “on which its Thinking” depends; “all the Thoughts, there, must be unavoidably accidental and limited,” because each one of “the Particles, that by Motion cause Thought, being in it-self without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions; much less be regulated by the Thought of the whole; since that Thought” of the whole, “is not the Cause of Motion, (for then it must be Antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the Consequence of it; whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational, and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: So that such a thinking Being, would be no better nor wiser, than pure blind Matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of blind Matter, is the same thing: Not to mention the narrowness of such Thought and Knowledge, that must depend on the Motion of such Parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibilities in this Hypothesis, (however full of them it be,) than that before mentioned; since, let this Thinking System be All, or a Part of, the Matter of the Universe; it is impossible, that any one Particle should either know its own, or the Motion of any other Particle, or the whole know the Motion of every particular, and so regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or, indeed, have Thought resulting from such Motion.” Lock’s Essay, Book IV. Chap. 10. Sect. 17.

  or if any other Property of Matter, whether known or unknown.The same Arguments prove no less strongly, that it is not possible for Thinking to be a Mode of Figure, or of any other known Property of Matter; and, also, that it is not possible for it to be a Mode of any un-known Power of Matter, which in the general is void of Thinking: Because every unknown Power, which is void of Thinking, is as different from Thinking, as Motion it-self is, or Figure, or any other known Power; for the same reason, that a Smell or a Taste, or any other known or un-known Quality, which is not a Colour, must of necessity be as different from Blue or Scarlet, as the Sound of a Trumpet is.

  Nor, since it would imply a Contradiction, is it possible, that the Power of Thinking should be superadded to Matter.The Argument, drawn from the Divisibility of Matter, proves, that Matter is not a Subject capable of having the Power of Thinking super-added to it, even by the divine Omnipotence. And, if it be not, then recurring to the divine Omnipotence for the making out an Impossibility, is not magnifying, but destroying the Power of God. For the same reason, it is of no consequence, in the present Argument, what Properties, unknown to us, Matter may be indued with; Thinking cannot be the Result or Effect of any such, because it is inconsistent with one of its certainly known Properties.

  Our being tired with Contemplation; Forgetfulness upon Discomposures of the Brain, &c. do not prove the Soul it-self a bodily Organ.Our being tired with Contemplation; the mutual Reaction of our Ideas and Words; our Forgetfulness, that follows upon certain Defects or Discomposures of the Brain, &c. do not prove, that the Soul it-self is a bodily Organ; but only, that it acts upon, and is acted upon by, bodily Organs; and is assisted by them, as Instruments in its Operations. Experience shews us, that the Sight is better’d by the use of good Telescopes, and the Hearing by Instruments of conveying Sounds; but not that those Instruments, therefore, hear or see: That all Sensation is better’d by good Organs of Sense; but not that the Organs themselves are sensible: That Imagination and Memory depend on the Brain; but not that the Brain imagines or remembers. The Organs of the Senses are intirely distinct from one another; but the thing, which perceives by those different Organs, is one and the same thing; one Thinking Being, which every Man calls himself. And this one Thinking Being has not some Powers in some Parts, and other Powers in other Parts; some Actions in some Parts, and other Actions in other Parts; but all its Powers are the Powers of the Whole; and all its Actions are the Actions of the Whole. The Whole Thinking Substance sees both the whole Object, and every part of it; the same whole Substance hears every Sound, smells every Odour, tastes every Savour, and feels every thing, that touches any part of the Body. Every Imagination, every Volition, and every Thought, is the Imagination, Will and Thought, of that whole thinking Substance, which I call my-self. And if this one Substance (which we equally style the Soul or Mind) has no parts, that can act separately, it may as well be conceived to have none, that can exist separately, and so to be absolutely indivisible.

  If the fleeting Substance of a material System were the Subject of Thinking, it would be impossible for us to preserve the Consciousness of our past Actions;In answer to the foregoing twelfth Proposition, it is alledg’d; That, in order to retain the Consciousness of an Action, it is only necessary to revive the Idea of it before any considerable Flux of Particles; and, by reviving the Idea of that Action, is imprinted afresh the Consciousness of having done that Action, by which the Brain has as lively an Impression of Consciousness (though it be not intirely composed of the same Particles) as it had the Day after it did the Action, or as it has of a Triangle, or any other new Idea not before imprinted on it. Consciousness of having done that Action, is an Idea imprinted on the Brain, by recollecting or bringing into view our Ideas, before they are quite worn out; which Idea continues in me, not only the Memory of the Action it-self, but that I did it. And if there is, every now and then, a Recollection of a past Action; it may hereby be conceived, that a Man may be conscious of things done by him, tho’ he has not one Particle of Matter the same that he had at the doing of those things; without Consciousness being transferred from one Subject to another, in any absurd Sense of those Words. And again: If Matter can know at this Instant, that it thinks, the Objector can see no reason, why it may not remember Tomorrow, what it thinks of to-day, though some Particles will be then wanting which it has at present: And, if it can remember at all, then the Memory of things may be continued, even after we have lost all the Particles of Matter that we had at the doing them, by continual intermediate repeating or imprinting afresh our Ideas, before they are quite lost or worn out. But the Fallacy of this Reply is very evident: For to affirm, that new Matter perpetually added to a fleeting System may, by repeated Impressions and Recollections of Ideas, participate and have communicated to it a Memory of what was formerly done by the whole System; is not explaining or proving, but begging the Question, by affirming an impossible Hypothesis: For how is it possible, That new Ideas, printed upon new Particles, should be a Memory of old Ideas, printed upon old Particles? But supposing, if it were possible, That the Memory, in general, of such or such an Action’s having been done, might be preserv’d in the Manner supposed; yet it is a manifest Contradiction, that the Consciousness of its being done by me, by my own individual self in particular, should continue in me after my whole Substance is chang’d, unless Consciousness could be transferr’d from one Subject to another, in the absurdest Sense of these Words. For, to suppose, That one Substance should be conscious of an Action’s having been done by it-self, which really was not done by it, but by another Substance; is as plainly supposing an individual Quality to be transferred from one Subject to another, in the most absurd Sense, as it is plain, that Consciousness is a real individual Quality, and different from bare General Memory.

  And there would be no Principle of individual Personality in Man;If it be answered, That what we call Consciousness, is not a fixt individual numerical Quality, like the numerical Figure or Motion of a solid Body; but a fleeting transferrible Mode or Power, like the Roundness or Mode of Motion of Circles upon the Face of a running Stream; and, That the Person may still be the same, by a continued Super-Addition of the like Consciousness, notwithstanding the whole Substance be chang’d: This, I say, is to make individual Personality, to be a mere external imaginary Denomination, and nothing at all in Reality: Just as a Ship is called the same Ship, after the whole Substance is changed by frequent Repairs; or a River is called the same River, tho’ the Water of it be every day new. The Name of the Ship is the same; but the Ship itself is not at all the same: And the continued Name of the River, signifies Water running in the same Channel, but not at all the same Water. So, if a Man, at Forty Years of Age, has nothing of the same Substance in him, neither material nor immaterial, that he had at Twenty, he may be called the same Person, by a mere external imaginary Denomination; in such Sense as the aforesaid Ship: But he cannot be really and truly the same Person, unless the same individual numerical Consciousness can be transferred from one Subject to another. For, the continued Addition or exciting of a like Consciousness in the new-acquired Parts, after the Manner supposed, is nothing but a Deception and Delusion, under the Form of Memory; a making the Man seem to himself to be conscious of having done that, which really was not done by him, but by another.

  Nor Justice in rewarding or punishing a man, after a Change of his Substance.And such a Consciousness in a Man, whose Substance is wholly chang’d, can no more make it just and equitable, for such a Man to be punished for an Action done by another Substance; then the Addition of the like Consciousness (by the Power of God) to two or more new created Men, or to any Number of Men now living, by giving a like Modification to the Motions in the Spirits of the Brain of each of them respectively, could make them all to be one and the same individual Person, at the same time that they remain several and distinct Persons; or make it just and reasonable, for all and every one of them to be punished for one and the same individual Action, done by one only, or, perhaps, by none of them at all. The Objector replies, A Man who, during a short Frenzy, kills another, and then returns to himself, without the least Consciousness of what he has done, cannot attribute that Action to himself, and therefore the mad Man and the sober Man, are really two as distinct Persons, as any two other Men in the World, and will be so considered in a Court of Judicature. Extraordinary Reasoning indeed! because, in a figurative Sense, a Man, when he is mad, is said not to be himself, and, in a Forensick Sense, is look’d upon, as not answerable for his own Actions: Therefore in the natural and philosophical Sense also, his Actions are not his own Actions, but another Persons; and the same Man is really two distinct Persons.

  And it would be possible for two different Men at the same time to be the same Man.To say, that God’s Justice and Goodness will not permit him to put any such inevitable Deceit upon Men, is nothing to the purpose: For, if it be but naturally possible for him to do that, which, upon Supposition of the Truth of the Objector’s Notion, will be a plain Contradiction; this is a certain Demonstration, that the Notion is false. And I think it a Contradiction plain enough, to say, that God’s impressing permanently upon an hundred Mens Minds, after the manner of the Representation of a Dream, the like Consciousness with that which I find in my own Mind, would make every one of them, to be, not Persons like me, but the same individual Person with my-self.

  The Indivisibility of a Thinking Substance infers necessarily, that its Power of Thinking can never be destroy’d by any Power of Nature;It is Objected, that, though Consciousness were allowed necessarily to infer Indivisibility, and Indivisibility to infer Immateriality: yet, even then, not the Soul, the thinking immaterial Being, but only the bare immaterial Subject or Substance it-self would be proved to be naturally immortal; since Thinking is a Power which may commence after the Existence of its Subject, and may cease, its Subject still remaining: It is answered, that the contrary is evidently true; namely, that, not only the bare immaterial Subject, but the Subject and the Power together, the thinking immaterial Being it-self, is hereby proved to be naturally immortal: Because, whatever Substance is wholly indiscerpible, is plainly by Virtue of that Property, not only it-self incapable of being destroy’d by any natural Power (for so also is the most discerpible Substance likewise;) but all its Qualities and Modes also, are utterly incapable of being affected in any measure, or changed in any degree, by any Power of Nature; for all real and inherent Qualities of any Substance, are either Modifications of the Substance it-self, or else Powers super-added and connected to the Substance, by the immediate Power of God; and, in either of these cases, ’tis manifest, no Quality can be altered by any natural Power, which is not able to affect and make some Alteration (in the Disposition of the Parts at least) of the Substance it-self; which, in an indiscerpible Substance, ’tis evident cannot be done. The Soul, therefore, the whole conscious Being; the Power of Thinking, as well as the bare immaterial Subject or Substance it-self; (whatever may be said concerning the Power of God in this Question;) will clearly, notwithstanding what any finite Power can do, of necessity be naturally immortal. The Truth of this Reasoning is evident, from what we cannot but observe, even in the material World; namely, that all the Changes, which are caused therein by any Powers of Nature, are nothing but Changes of the Order, and Disposition of the Parts of compound Bodies. The original and perfectly solid Particles of Matter, which are, (not indeed absolutely in themselves, but) to any Power of Nature, in discerpible; are utterly incapable of having, not only their Substance, but even any of their Qualities or Properties altered, in any measure, by any Power of Nature: As is evident, from the Form or Species of those we vulgarly call simple or elementary Bodies, remaining always unalterably the same, and indued continually with the same Powers and Qualities.

  Tho’ they may be acted upon by other Substances.I do not here mean, that indiscerpible Substances cannot be acted upon at all by any Power of Nature. But, as the solid Particles of Matter may be acted upon, and struck by each other, may be removed this way or that way, upwards or downwards; all which make no real Alteration in them: So an indiscerpible immaterial thinking Substance, tho’ it may be transferred from one part of the Universe to another, tho’ it may be acted upon by a Multitude of things, tho’ it may have different Ideas represented to it, tho’ the Organs of the Senses may, at times, transmit different Species, or hinder them from being transmitted to it; yet all this makes no real Alteration, either in the Substance, or its inherent Powers; nor can its Power of Thinking be destroy’d or altered by these, or any other natural Powers; any more than the Mobility or Hardness of the original perfectly-solid Particles of Matter can be destroy’d, by any of their Actings one upon another.

  Immaterial Substance may be indivisible, tho’ it were extended, tho’ whether it be extended or no, we are not certain, nor is it material in the present Argument;It is objected, that immaterial Substance, also, may, as well as Matter, be conceived capable of Division, and, consequently, incapable of Thought; supposing Extension not excluded out of the Idea of Immateriality. I answer: That in immaterial Beings we do not know of any such Properties, as any way simplies Discerpibility. It cannot be collected from any Property we know of them, but that they may be such Beings, as can no more be divided than annihilated, that is, whose whole Essence may be necessarily one, and their Substance essentially indivisible, upon the same ground as their Existence continues: Nay, the only Properties we certainly and indisputably know of them, namely Consciousness and its Modes, do prove (as hath been before shewn) that they must necessarily be such indiscerpible Beings: As evidently as the known Properties of Matter prove it to be certainly a discerpible Substance, whatever other un-known Properties it may be indued with; so evidently the known and confessed Properties of immaterial Beings prove them to be indiscerpible, whatever other unknown Properties they likewise may be indued with. How far such Indiscerpibility can be reconciled, and be consistent, with some kind of Expansion; that is, what unknown Properties are joined together, with these known ones of Consciousness and Indiscerpibility; is another Question of considerable Difficulty, but of no Necessity to be resolved in the present Argument. As the Parts (improperly so called) of Space or Expansion it-self, depend upon each other for their Existence; not only because of its Infinity, but because of the Contradiction, which a Separation of them manifestly would imply, and they can therefore demonstrably be proved to be absolutely indiscerpible; so it ought not to be reckon’d an insuperable Difficulty, to imagine, that all immaterial thinking Substances (upon Supposition that Expansion is not excluded out of their Idea) may be so likewise.

  No more than it is, whether they always act in a material Vehicle, or whether they always actually think or no.In like manner, other Difficulties, that arise from any other Hypothesis concerning other Properties of immaterial indiscerpible Substance, as whether it acts wholly separate, or always in some material Vehicle, whether it always actually thinks, or no, and the like, affect only the particular Hypothesis, from which they arise.

  Lastly, It is objected, That, by the foremention’d Argument, all the sensible Creatures in the Universe are put in the same Condition with Man, and made capable of eternal Happiness, as well as he; or else that, to avoid this consequence, all those Creatures must be supposed, to be only mere Machines;Lastly, the foregoing Doctrine does not put the Souls of Men and Brutes upon a Level, with respect to future Rewards and Punishments. or else, that their Souls shall be annihilated at the Dissolution of their Bodies; And if so, then the Proof of the natural Immortality of Mens Souls, from their Immateriality, tends not to prove, that their Souls shall really be immortal. It is answered, That, though all sensible Creatures have certainly something in them that is immaterial, yet it does not at all follow, either that they must needs be annihilated upon the Dissolution of their Bodies, or else that they must be capable of eternal Happiness as well as Man. As their present subsisting implies not, that they must needs be capable of the Expectations and Conditions of eternal Happiness as well as Man; so neither does their future eternal Existence, if they should never be annihilated or reduced to a state of Insensibility, prove that they shall enjoy eternal Happiness, as well as Man. This is just such an Argument, as if a Man should conclude, that whatsoever is not exactly like himself, can therefore have no being at all: Or that all the Stars of Heaven, if they be not exactly like our Globe of Earth, cannot possibly be any Globes at all. Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wise God, may, without Difficulty, be suppos’d to have more ways of disposing of his Creatures, than we are at present let into the secret of. He may, indeed, if he pleases, annihilate them, at the Dissolution of their Bodies; (and so he might, if he thought fit, annihilate the Souls of Men; and yet it would be nevertheless true, that they are in their own Nature immortal;) or he may, if he pleases, without either annihilating them, or suffering them to fall into a State of Inactivity, dispose of them into numberless States, concerning the particular Nature of which we are not now able to make the least Conjecture. So far Dr. Clark.

  The following Reasoning, upon the same Subject, is Mr. Ditton’s, in his Appendix to his Discourse concerning the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.6

  To argue or infer one thing from another, is wholly irreconcilable to, and simply impossible to be effected by, any mere mechanical Laws.

  Thinking cannot be mechanical.For, the same Parts of Matter, cohering together after the same manner, moving in the same Direction, and with the same Velocity, in the same Space or System, will continue to produce the very same Effect, whatever that Effect be, which was once produced by them. And, therefore, if Thought be the Result of any sort of Motion, Pressure, or Contranitency, of the solid, figured, divisible Parts of Matter; it is necessary, that in the Production of different sorts of Acts, of Thought and Reflexion, if all other Circumstances continue the same, the Circumstance of Motion should be some way diversified, either as to Velocity, or Direction, or both: And, vice versâ, if in different Acts of Thought and Reflexion, the Circumstance of Motion continue unvaried, as to Velocity and Direction; there must needs be some Variation in the other Circumstances. Suppose then, in order to diversify our Ideas or Modes of Thinking, that the Change is made in point of Motion; for it will come to the same thing, were the Change supposed in the Solidity, Cohesion or Configuration of the Parts of Matter. This Change in the Motion, whether with respect to the Velocity or Direction, must be by the Impulse of some external Mover. For they cannot change their own Condition, and throw themselves out of one Motion and Direction into another: This Mover must still be Matter, and must therefore be moved or acted on it-self, by some prior Mover, and so on in infinitum. And this must be the case of every individual Thought. But how absurd such an infinite Progression is, let the Philosophical Reader judge.

  If, to avoid this Difficulty, it be alledg’d, that the Parts of Matter determine themselves to the Production of those Effects, then All Matter is made active and self-moving, and indued with an innate Power of Thinking, which is as contrary to the Supposition, as it is to all Experience and Philosophy.

  Appendix II

  A Treatise concerning the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance of the Law of Nature

  CHAPTER I.

  The Obligation of the Law of Nature.

  The Notion of the Law of Nature, according to the Jews.The Law of Nature is a moral Law, discover’d to all Men by the Light of Nature.

  The Jews divide the Precepts of their Law into “Intellectual” and “those which are received by Tradition.”1 The former are such Precepts, as, tho’ not written, the Understanding would find out; such as the Precept of honouring Parents, against Homicide, Theft, false Witness, Adultery, and such like.

  Christian Fathers, So the Fathers of the Christian Church say. “Before the Law of Moses, written in Tables of Stone, there was an unwritten Law, which was discovered by the Light of Nature.—Before the Jews receiv’d the Law, all Nations and the whole World receiv’d the Law of Nature.—That Law, which is written in the Heart, extendeth to all Nations, and no Man is unacquainted with it.—We have, in our-selves, a natural Discernment of the Good from the Evil.—What is the Law of Nature? Our Conscience hath given us plain Notice of it, and hath made the Knowledge of the Things that are honest, and that are otherwise, to be self-taught.”2

  Civilians,The Civilians sometimes, unwarily, extend the Law of Nature to irrational Animals; yet, when they define it properly and accurately, they do it agreeably to the Sense of the Christian Fathers. “The Law of Nature is the Rule of right Agency, which Nature discovers, and flows from natural Affection and Reason.”3

  Modern Divines, and School-men,Modern Divines, and School-men, define it thus, “The Law of Nature is that which proceedeth from the Institution of Nature it-self, and this is common to all.”4

  and also of the Heathen Philosophers.The learned Heathens define it “Reason from the Nature of Things, which enjoineth the Things which ought to be done, and forbiddeth the contrary.”5 By Aristotle it is call’d, “The Law, which is common to all, that just and unjust, which is by Nature, and common to all.”6

  The Notion of the Law of Nature is Twofold;Therefore, the Law of Nature, according to all these Definitions, is, the true Moral Philosophy; a Law of the great Morals of Nature’s Institution. But this great Law must be several Ways distinguish’d: For it must be consider’d, under a two-fold Notion, in a three-fold Respect: In Respect of the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance of it.

  First, in respect of its Obligation.First, in Respect of its Obligation, it is of a two-fold Notion; for the Law of Nature signifieth what is, in its own Nature, Law to all intelligent Agents; and it is, also, Law to all intelligent created Agents, by an Obligation from Authority. But, antecedently to this Obligation from superior Authority, it is of an Obligatory Nature, and must be consider’d as what is, in its own Nature, Matter of Law, or of Obligation; for, that this Law is of this Nature, will appear, as from other Considerations, so from a due Explanation of the Good, which it requireth, and of the Evil, which it forbiddeth.

  Of the Meaning of the Word, Good.§2. Altho’ Mankind are, by Nature, furnish’d with, and agree in, the true Notions of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Decorous and Indecorous; yet they are not of one Mind about the Application of those Names to the Things themselves, to which they belong; and this is the matter of their Disagreement. There is no Appearance, indeed, of any considerable Disagreement, amongst the ancient Philosophers, touching the Definition of Good: But such a Disagreement there is in the Christian Schools; for the Metaphysicians, and learned Writers of Morality, are not agreed about the Notion of (Bonum) Good, the principal Source of which Disagreement is, an unavoidable Ambiguity in the Word.

  For, sometimes, it is used Ironically; because Men are denominated Good, upon account of their Innocence and Harmlessness; hence, among the Heathen, it became a Term of Reproach, and, so us’d, it importeth Silliness. O bone, ne tu frustrere, Horat. Satyr. 2. O bone, num ignoras? Pers. Sat. 6. Bone custos, defensorque Provinciae, Cicer. 7. Ver. 10. Ehodum, bone vir, quid ais? Terent. Andr. 3. 5. 10.7 But, except when the Name Good is thus us’d Ironically, it always denotes, what is to be lik’d, and, in some Degree, commended, either really for sufficient Cause and Reason, or in the Opinion of the Speaker; for so it signifies, even when it is connected with Vices and Crimes. As when we say, A good Pick-pocket, a good Flatterer, it signifies one that is dextrous and expert at picking Pockets and Flattery. Usually Good signifieth (Bonum utile) the profitable Good, as every Tree, that is good for Food, Gen. 2. 9. So we say, A good House, a good Field, good Advice: And as usually it signifieth (Bonum jucundum) the pleasant Good; thus a joyful Day is call’d a good Day, Esth. 9. 22. Thus, also, we say, a good Companion. We say, Security is good, Money is good, a Bargain, Tender, or Grant is good, which is unexceptionable, and, so far, is to be lik’d. When we perform our Promises, we are said to make them Good, what is to be lik’d and allow’d of. If any Man’s Property be taken away, or damaged, Restitution, or Reparation, is call’d making it Good, as what is to be lik’d, and allow’d of, as an Equivalent. When Alexander was dying, his Friends ask’d him, to whom he would leave the Kingdom; his Answer was (ἀρ,ίςῳ) to the best Man, namely, with Respect to military Fortitude, which was a Quality in the highest Esteem among the Greeks, with whom κακὸς signifies a Coward. Usually, Things are denominated Good, with respect to their Size and Measure, which are to be lik’d, and Persons, with respect to their Rank and Degree in the World, in which Sense we say, A goodwhile, a good Way off, good Business, a good Estate, a good Price, Man of good Note, good Rank and Fashion, good Towns, a good Family. Good, therefore, usually signifieth, with respect to Rank and Degree; for, in such sense, Equals are denominated as Good; and the Best Man signifies him, that is highest in Rank and Degree, who, with regard to Esteem, is most to be lik’d, and superiors are styl’d the Betters. So the superior in Strength and Power is, in that respect, the better Man. Amongst the Lawyers [boni & legales homines] good and lawful Men are those who are to be lik’d, and are unexceptionable in Law. Well-born, are those who are of a Rank to be lik’d, with respect to their Birth. Bonus, sometimes, signifies a learned Man. “Viz. bonus & prudens versus reprehendet inertes.” Horat. in Arte Poet. 90.—“Boni quoniam convenimus ambo, Tu calamos inflare leves, ego dicere versus.” Virg. 5. Eclog. “Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.” Horat. in arte Poet. 73. Bonus sometimes signifies propitious, or favourable. “Adsit laetitiae Bacchus dator, & bona Junc.” Virgil I. Aeneid. “Sis bonus ô, faelixque tuis.” Virg. 5. Eclog. 6. Bonus, sometimes, signifies a Benevolent Man. “Vir bonus, qui prodest quibus potest, nocet nemini.” Cicer. 3. Offic. “Deus Optimus Maximus, optimus, i.e. Beneficentissimus,” says Cicero 2. de Nat. Deor. 92, and 93. Sometimes a virtuous Man. “—Nemo sine crimine vivit, Optimus ille, qui minimis urgetur.” Horat. Bonus, sometimes, signifies Just, as in the Latin Phrase, Bonum & aquum. We likewise say, Good-nature, good Courage, a good Intention, Good-will, a good Old Age, (that is, such as Men desire to reach,) Anima melior, that is, fitter; “Hanc tibi Erix meliorem animam pro morte Daretis Persolvo.” Virgil. 5. Aeneid. 96.8 So we likewise say, Artes bonae, bonis avilus, a good Climate, a good Cause, a good Condition, a good Conscience, to take in good Part, a good Quantity, a good Event, a good Action, that is, such as ought to be done, good Fame or Name, Good-faith, a good Countenance, a good Family, a good Wrestler, Singer, &c. Good-liking, goodParts, Memory, Judge, Judgment, Journey, good Right, good Reason, &c. In all which Instances, and in numberless more, which might be given, without any Exceptions, that I know of, Good always signifies what is to be lik’d, or approv’d of, in its Kind. Somewhat near the Use of the Name Good, as it is expressive of Rank and Degree, is a peculiar Use of it in our English Language, wherein Things are said to be as good, (without any Intention to say, that they are good) only to signify, that one Thing is little less than the other, not valuably or considerably deficient. For, when we have near finish’d any piece of Work, we say, it is as good as finish’d; when any Thing is well nigh gone, we say, it is as good as lost; and our Translators say of Abraham, Heb. 11. 12. “Him as good as dead,” to signify, that he was little less than dead.

  The Metaphysicians Maxim is of great Truth and Certainty; Every Being, as it is a Being, is Good. Every Being, properly so call’d, hath, as its Nature is, a certain Perfection and Form, whereby it is, what it is. And as a Being is that which is of some Kind, so it is that, which is necessarily of a certain Rank and Degree amongst Beings, above Nothing, and better than such a Something, that is worse than Nothing, which is a Good, or Well-being. Existence may be so complicated, as to be, in several respects, worse than Non-Existence; for we love Existence as a Good, and, therefore, prefer not Being before Ill-being. But Existence is, of itself, better than Nothing and Non-existence, and must, therefore, be counted a Good. To which the Schoolmen add, That Good, as an Attribute of Being, denotes that which is perfect. Every Being is without Defect of its essential Perfections, which is well-being, and that which is to be lik’d, as this Word [Good] always signifies.

  §3. Good and Evil so far depends upon Perception, that, if there were no Perception of them, they would be of no more Regard or Consideration, than if they were not at all. But, notwithstanding this Connexion between Good and Perception, it ought not to be thus defin’d; “Good is that which is pleasant to a perceptive Life, jointly with the Preservation of the Perceiver.”9 For the Nature and Notion of Good does not consist in being pleasant, but in being worthy to be pleas’d with. This Definition of Good does not belong to the Metaphysical Good of Being in general, before describ’d; nor does it belong to profitable Good, as such, which is often painful and afflictive: Nor can it pretend to be the Definition of the Good of Duty and Virtue, as such; for nothing can be the Good of Duty and Virtue, which is good Practice, merely as pleasant to a Perceptive Life, jointly with the Preservation of the Perceiver. Intelligent Agents must not be told, “That nothing is good, but as it is pleasant to a perceptive Life, jointly with their Preservation.” But they should be told, “That they ought to make the Things that are Good, the matter of their Pleasure; that there is sufficient Cause and Reason, why they should be pleased with them, and that, upon this Account, they are good.” If nothing is good, but as it is pleasant to Perception, there can be no other Good in the Universe, than the Good of Happiness: Nor can the Evil of Sin and Wickedness, as such, be in the World, but only the Evil of Infelicity. But such Definitions of Good and Evil are defective and partial, and much too narrow, to be the Definition of Good and Evil in general; and there is the like Exception against another celebrated Definition of Good, That “Convenience and Inconvenience, to some Body, are the Definitions of Good and Evil. Good is that which is convenient to the Nature of a Thing, or what is not hurtful, but really helpful to Nature.” And Bp. Cumberland himself has given in to this Definition of Good, which is not only faulty, but productive of many Mistakes in the Contemplation of the Law of Nature.10 For,

  Cumberland’s Definition of Good, supposes the Nature of Things, not to be Good.(1.) The Nature of Beings is manifestly a Good Antecedent to what is convenient and helpful thereto, preservative or perfective thereof. But, if nothing is good, except only as convenient to the Nature of Beings, their Nature, even the Nature of rational Beings, must not be suppos’d, to be good; and, consequently, there can be no sufficient Reason for, or Obligation to, an universal Love, which is a Summary of the Law of Nature; for it is not possible, much less laudable, to love that which is not suppos’d to be good. The Notion of Good, therefore, must be so large and general11 as to take in the Nature of Beings, especially, of created rational Agents, and, more especially, the Nature of God, who must not be thought good, only as convenient to himself and to us, as some suppose, who yet style him Goodness itself, which Attribute would not belong to him, if he be good only relatively.

  2. It is not agreeable to that Notion of Good, which God is. (2.) In our Elogies, both of God and Creatures, Good usually signifieth in such a Sense, as cannot be explain’d by convenient. For we pronounce an Angel, to be superlatively good and excellent, where superlatively good and superlatively excellent are Words of the same Signification, but superlatively good, and superlatively convenient, are not so. So when God is intitul’d, The Supreme Good, the infinite and absolutely perfect Good, the Attribute Good must mean his Excellence. If we should suppose, what is impossible, God to do any thing contrary and destructive to the Godhead; such an Evil would not be merely an Inconvenience to himself, and to the Creatures, but it would be a horrible Wickedness beside. Evil, therefore, is not merely an Inconvenience to himself and to Creatures, therefore Good is not merely a Convenience to these. Men, truly religious, are the Admirers and Lovers of the Deity, and adhere to it by their devotional Esteem and Affection, not merely as supposing it a Convenience to any, but also upon account of its own intrinsick Worth, Excellence, and Pulchritude. That Good, which is merely relative, which is good only as convenient to something, cannot be absolutely the ultimate and final Good, which the Deity is.

  3. It makes Self the ultimate End of all Agents. (3.) If nothing be good, but respectively only, as convenient to Nature, there can be no other ultimate End of Things, but Self and a great System of Selves, the Aggregate of all rational Beings. Whatever is good, merely as convenient to something, must be convenient to some or all of these; and it may be either natural Good, or moral Good. If it be natural Good, that is convenient to all these, it is call’d the common or publick Good or Happiness. If it be moral Good, that is convenient to all these, it is call’d Moral Virtue, which moral Good is productive of the natural Good, and is a Means subservient to the common Good and Felicity. “The common Good of all rational Agents is the greatest End.12Virtue is therefore good, because it determines human Actions to such Effects, as are principal Parts of the publick natural Good.13Moral Good is a kind of Profitable Good, which doth effect Delectable Good, the end of all our Actions, the Universal Good.14The general Preservation of Mans natural Good is the sole Root and Fountain of the moral: The universal Profit and Pleasure, the publick Happiness of human Life, giveth Being and Denomination to every Virtue and Vice; and the true Rules and Directions, to preserve and secure that Happiness, make the whole Volume, the Code and Pandect of the Law of Nature.”15 The Law of Nature, according to this Scheme of it, is an Institution of mere publick Self-convenience as the End, and of mere publick Self-convenience as the Means. For the publick Happiness, as such, is nothing else but the common and publick Self-convenience, of which an Aggregate of Selves, and every private Self, in his publick Capacity, is the ultimate End. “Happiness is the End of those good Things possess’d by Man, but Man is the End of Happiness; for we love our Happiness for our own Sake.”16 What Cicero says of Pleasure, must be said of Happiness, “We love it for the Sake of our-selves, but do not love our-selves for the Sake of it.”17 Wherefore, according to this Scheme of the Law of Nature, which supposeth, that nothing is good, but as convenient to Nature, there can be no other End of Things, but natural Self, or an Aggregate of Natural Selves; nor can there be any other ultimate Reason of Things, but private or publick Self-conveniency. And this would really be the State of Things in the Universe, if the whole Universe of rational Beings were Self-existents and Independents, that combin’d of themselves into Society, merely for their common Happiness, and for their own Sake; or, if they were merely political Animals, that were so combin’d into Society by Nature. But in the Kingdom of God, a Kingdom of Virtue and of Holiness, they are not thus combin’d into Society, but they are link’d together by an Adamantine Law of right and due Agency, and, by this legal Necessity, they are obliged, not to be wicked, but to be holy and virtuous. They practise Righteousness and true Holiness, for other ultimate Reasons, than personal Self-respects, and they shun Sin, for other ultimate Reasons, than merely because it is a publick Nusance and Inconvenience. In the Kingdom of God, Holiness and Virtue do not exist merely for the sake of the publick Happiness, nor is the Holiness of God to be considered as a Means to that End, but the publick Happiness existeth for his Holiness and Rectitude of Will.

  4. It destroys the Self-eligibleness of Virtue, which it degrades to the Rank of profitable Good.(4.) This Scheme of the Law of Nature, and its Definition of Good, because it supposeth, “That nothing is good, but as convenient to Nature, that Virtue is of the Rank of profitable Good, and is no otherwise Virtue, but as it contributes to this great End, the common Good of rational Agents,” destroyeth the Self-amiableness and Self-eligibleness of Virtue, and the Self-odiousness of Sin and Wickedness. For it does not, nor can, acknowledge any other Beauty in Virtue, than the Fitness of it to this greatest End, the common Happiness of rational Agents; whereas, abstracting from all respect to Happiness or Misery, publick or private, “a foul Action, because it is foul, ought not to be done,” as Cicero18 usually insisteth and inculcateth. Wickedness is to be shun’d, not only as a publick Inconvenience, but for its own intrinsick Turpitude, as all the virtuous Philosophers, in consort with Christians, agree, and that Sin, as such, is to be avoided with an infinite Aversion. “To do an Injury is to be avoided for its own sake, whose Turpitude outweighs all Rewards encouraging to the Commission of Wickedness,” saith Seneca.19 It has been a Question, “Whether Justice be for Society, or Society for Justice? Do Men live in Society, merely that they may live justly? Or, do they live justly, merely that they may live in Society?” Neither of these can be affirmed with Truth, but Men live in Society for Society-sake, the innumerable Benefits of it; and they ought to live in Society for Justice-sake, which obligeth Children to live in Society with their Parents, and rational Beings to live in Society with God. Justice, therefore, is, in part, for its own sake,20 and, in part, for Society; and Society is, partly, for its own sake, and, partly, for Justice-sake. So Virtue is, partly, for Felicity, Holiness for Happiness: Felicity and Happiness are, partly, for Virtue and Holiness. For Virtue and Holiness design and endeavour the publick Happiness, and consist in the faithful Love of the Whole and its Interest; but, besides this Love of the publick Good, there is in all Men a good Disposition, a faithful Esteem and Love of Righteousness, and Hatred to Sin, for their own sakes. They practise Righteousness, ultimately, for Righteousness-sake, because of its own intrinsick Worth, Rectitude, and Pulchritude, “for this sole reason, because it is decorous, right and just.”21 So the virtuous Philosophers call that which is honest, “Self-amiable, Self-laudable, Self-desirable.”22“That which is right and just, is eligible, because it is such.”23 There is more good in Justice, than, merely, a Subserviency to the publick Happiness, and, consequently, it is not good, merely as a Convenience to Nature; else it is nothing better than a Contrivance for living in Society, and for publick Convenience.

  5. It introduces a Virtue, not truly moral, but merely politick and prudential. (5.) This Scheme of the Law of Nature, and its Definition of Good, introduceth an Institution of Morality, not truly moral, but merely politick and prudential. For it supposeth, “That all the Acts of the Virtues are commanded, merely for the common Convenience of rational Agents; that the Dictates of Prudence, directing the Actions of Men to the publick Good, are the very Laws of Nature; that the Maker of the World must be suppos’d to be endowed with Prudence, in which there is a Volition of the best and greatest End, the common Good of all rational Agents, and a Prosecution of it by the most effectual Means, in which sort of Acts all Religion and Virtue is contain’d.”24 The Maker of the World is suppos’d, from a Principle of Prudence, to will the greatest End, the common Happiness; and, from the same Principle of Prudence, also to contrive and enjoin the most effectual Means thereto, which are called the “Acts of Religion and Virtue”; and this his prudential Institution of End and Means is the Scheme of the Law of Nature, which, therefore, is not a virtuous, but a political Institution. For it is one thing, to institute Men to live well, only as to a certain Interest; and another thing to institute them to live well, simply and absolutely. A mere prudential Institution of Morality careth neither, for Virtue nor Vice, for living well nor living ill, as such and for their own sake, nor any further than as they promote or hinder the publick Convenience. As if one, who foundeth a Family, should prudentially institute the Members of it to demean themselves humbly, that they may live in peace, without caring, either for Pride or Humility, but only for the common Peace. So this Institution affirmeth, “That the Laws of Nature, and all the Virtues, are nothing else but Means of obtaining the common Good.” It supposeth, “That Virtue is not good, but only as a Means to the common Happiness; and that Vice and Wickedness is not Evil, but as productive of publick Misery,” as will further appear presently.

  6. It contradicts this Truth, That Virtue is the Rule and Measure of endeavouring the common Happiness of rational Agents.(6.) This Scheme of the Law of Nature, agreeably to its Definition of Good, supposeth, “That the common Good or Happiness is the whole Rule and Measure of Virtue,” as the adequate End is the Rule and Measure of the Means.25 It supposeth, also, That there is no other Rule or Measure of endeavouring the common Happiness of rational Beings, but “The Will determin’d to this supreme End and Good, to the utmost of its Power.”26 The “eternal Happiness of the whole Universe ought to have the greatest Strength of Volition that can be, which is no less than infinite.”27 Both which Propositions clash with this plain and certain Principle, That Virtue is the Rule and Measure of endeavouring the common Happiness of rational Beings. Which, including our own Happiness, may be sought, merely as an Interest, and, out of Interest, from a Principle of natural and lawful Self-love. But the common Happiness of rational Beings, must be sought also from a principle of Duty and Virtue, and, consequently, it must be sought, only in consistence with Virtue, nor otherwise than Virtue requireth. A Man may not violate Virtue, nor touch with Wickedness, no, not for the Happiness of the Universe. He may, in some degree, part with his own Happiness, which is part of the publick Happiness, and chuse his own Unhappiness, or several Inconveniences of Life; but no Man may chuse Wickedness in any degree, altho’ himself only were the material Object of his Sin; so much greater and stricter are his Obligations with respect to Virtue than Happiness. To chuse Annihilation rather than Sin is a laudable Choice, and it is therefore laudable, because it is virtuous. When Moses wisheth his own Name “blotted out of the Book of Life”;28 when St. Paul saith, “I could wish, that my-self were accursed from Christ, for my Brethren, my Kinsmen according to the Flesh”;29 these holy Men, in some degree, with their own Unhappiness, for the sake of a more publick Happiness; but their wishing is not to be understood absolutely, but with this Restriction and Limitation, so far as it is lawful and virtuous so to do. Virtue, therefore, is the Rule and Measure of endeavouring, both our own, and the publick, Happiness. God himself promotes the publick Happiness, yet cannot be said to do it, “to the utmost of his Power,” but so far as it is fitting so to do. We are obliged to endeavour his Glory, which is one Branch, and the chief, of the publick natural Good; but such a kind of endeavouring it, which is not consistent with Virtue, true Holiness, and Godliness, is not acceptable, but criminal in his Eyes. No pious Frauds. No doing Evil, that Good may come thereof. We are oblig’d to endeavour the Unhappiness of rational Creatures, but so, as to endeavour the Unhappiness of the Apostate Angels, and the Ruin of their Kingdom. And, if any Men be in the same State of Reprobation with the Apostate Angels, by notoriously sinning the Sin unto Death,30 we are not obliged to seek their Happiness.

  7. According to Cumberland ’s Scheme, nothing is good but Happiness; other Things, only as productive of Happiness. (7.) According to its Definition of Good, this Scheme of the Law of Nature condemneth the Philosophy of the Stoicks, “Because, whilst they endeavour to establish the transcendent Goodness of Virtue, and the egregious Evil of Vice, they, incautiously, intirely take away the only Reason, why Virtue is Good and Vice Evil. For Virtue is therefore Good, (and in Truth it is the greatest Good,) because it determines the Actions of Men to such Effects, as are principal Parts of the publick natural Good, or Happiness.”31 Agreeably whereto, it is affirm’d, “That the best Compend of Ethicks is the Idea or Plan of that true Happiness, which is in every one’s Power, and of all the Causes thereof, dispos’d in their natural Order.”32 In this Scheme of the Law of Nature, nothing is counted good but Happiness, other Things, only as productive of Happiness; nothing is counted evil, but Misery, other Things, only as productive of Misery. Virtue, therefore, is degraded, to be of the same Rank with Food, Sleep, and Houses, that are good and necessary, as promoting the common Happiness of Mankind; which Happiness is generally suppos’d, to consist merely in Pleasure;33 and, consequently, Virtue is suppos’d to be good, only as subservient to Pleasure, private and publick; therefore the only Competition between Vice and Virtue, must be touching the Pleasure which they afford: And this must be the only Fault of the Pleasures of Sin, they are deficient in matter of Pleasure, or clash with greater Pleasure, as a lesser Good with a greater; no Vice or Villainy is to be discommended, but only as opposite to Pleasure, in itself, or its Effects; and, if it were not opposite to Pleasure, it would not be a Vice, nor at all to be discommended, as Epicurus said of Luxury. Vice and vicious Persons would be as good as Virtue and virtuous Persons, if the Nature of the Universe could be so contrived, that the former could be as subservient to Pleasure as the latter. Accordingly, the Goodness of Virtue and the Law of Nature is said to be no otherwise, nor any further, unalterable, than “whilst the Nature of Things” (that is, of Causes and their Effects) “continues such as now it is.”34 As the same Subserviency to Happiness, so the same Unalterableness, is ascribed to Virtue and to natural Things, (Victuals, Cloaths, Physick,) which are said to be unalterably good, that is, tending to the Preservation and Happiness of Mankind. The Immutability, therefore, of Virtue is not absolute, nor is it of an immutable Nature, in and of itself, as a Square and a Cube, but the Immutability which it hath, is owing to the unchang’d Nature of the Universe, to the Happiness whereof it is a Means subservient.

  8. And Virtue is not good, as amiable, but as convenient. (8.) This Scheme of the Law of Nature, agreeably to its Definition of Good, derives the Necessity of Virtue in Men, merely from Necessity of publick Good, which necessarily requires it, and from their being enjoin’d it, merely in Order there to.35 Man must practise universal Benevolence, Justice, Temperance, Chastity, only for this great End. According to this Maxim, the Virtues have nothing to recommend them, at least nothing to necessitate their Practice, but only their necessary Serviceableness to a common Self-Convenience, for which sole Reason the several Clans of Thieves and Robbers strictly practise Justice among themselves. As they practise it, because it is necessary to their common Good, and Injustice would be a grand Inconvenience to their System of rational Agents; so, if Mankind, in general, practise Justice, merely because it is necessary to their common Good, and Injustice would be a grand Inconvenience to their System of rational Agents, altho’ their System, and the Good thereof, is of a different Nature from that of Thieves, yet is not their Respect to Justice and Injustice both of the same Kind?

  But these Maxims not only destroy the Self-Amiableness of Virtue, and the Self-Odiousness of Vice, but their being by Nature, not by arbitrary Appointment. For let us suppose, that, antecedently to the Constitution of rational Agents, there was one only solitary Rational in being; this one solitary Rational, according to these Maxims, cannot practise any Virtue, nor is he, in his solitary State, capable, either of Virtue or Vice, which, therefore, are not in themselves necessary. Such they are not, according to these Maxims, after the Universe of rational Beings is constituted; they are necessary, only and merely, for the common Good of this constituted Universe, and by his Will, who, constituting this Universe, appointed them, only and merely, for the common Good thereof. They are, therefore, as arbitrary, as the constituted Universe, and as his Will and Appointment, in constituting the Universe. But whatever is in itself, in its own Nature, Well-doing, the right and due Practice, is, upon that Account and for itself, not merely for publick Good, indispensably necessary, upon that Account it is commanded by God, upon that Account it is Virtue, because it is Well-doing, and not, merely, because it is a promoting the common Good. To endeavour the common Good of rational Beings, is so far from comprehending all Virtue, that, unless our Endeavours to promote this common Good be duly qualified, it is not Virtue, but Vice and Crime. Such is all Benevolence and Beneficence, which is against Righteousness. To benefit another may sometimes be ill-doing, according to that of Ennius in Tullie’ s Offices, Book 2:

  • Benefacta male locata malefacta arbitror.36

  “I look upon Benefits misplac’d, to be evil Actions.” All are not oblig’d to perpetual and universal Benevolence and Beneficence without Limitation; but all are oblig’d to Righteousness without Limitation; this, therefore, is Virtue, and the Rule of Virtue, which must rule and limit our endeavouring to promote the common Good of rational Agents. Therefore Benevolence is but a Branch of good Life. So the Philosophers suppos’d, who so discoursed of Virtue, as to make Men the Admirers and Lovers of it for its own sake; and so Christians are Admirers and Lovers of the divine Image, the Life of Righteousness and true Holiness.

  9. And the Sovereignty of God is not founded upon a sufficient Authority. (9.) This Scheme of the Law of Nature, agreeably to its Definition of Good, deriveth the Dominion and Sovereignty of God himself, merely “from the Necessity of publick Good, God did assume it to himself, because the common Good necessarily requir’d it.”37 But, if the divine Dominion and Sovereignty over all Creatures is thus founded, it is not so well founded as human Sovereignties; for these are founded upon Necessity of publick Good, and also the Law of a superiour Sovereign, from whom they derive their ruling Authority. But the divine Dominion and Sovereignty is suppos’d to be founded, merely, upon Necessity of publick Good, and the Dictate of the divine Mind concerning it. Which Dictate can give no Authority, unless one can give Authority to himself, merely, by the Dictate of his own Mind; nor can it pretend to be a Law, unless one can make a Law antecedently to his Sovereignty and legislative Power; nor are any oblig’d to be subject to this assum’d Sovereignty, founded merely upon the Necessity of the publick Good, but by the great Law of endeavouring the publick Good, which, therefore, must be made antecedently to this Assumption of the Sovereignty, and, consequently, it must be made by one, that had no Sovereignty, no legislative Power. To this assumed Dominion and Sovereignty, assumed merely from Necessity of common Good and in order thereto, he cannot claim our Subjection, save only from Necessity of the common Good, and in Order thereto. But, if this is the whole of the divine Dominion and Sovereignty, he is far from having the most supreme Dominion possible, which the Deity must have; nor hath he the supreme governing Power originally and essentially, for he could not have it, if the common Good did not require it; it accrueth to him adventitiously and derivatively; he is not sole Owner of his own Dominion, nor is it independent or plenary; but all is the Publick’s, the Publick is necessarily supreme Lord of all, for whatever Dominion God has, is from the Publick, from the Necessity of publick Good; for the Publick, for the sake of the Publick, and the Use thereof. But thus to derive his Dominion and Sovereignty from the Necessity of publick Good, is to say, that he must be God, merely because the publick Good requires it; for his Dominion and Sovereignty is his Godhead.

  10. But a subordinate and subservient Means to the common Good. (10.) This Scheme of the Law of Nature, agreeably to its Definition of Good, makes God’s Dominion and Sovereignty, a subordinate and subservient Means to the publick Good. For it supposes “all Rights and Dues to be deriv’d from the common Good, and to be Means subordinate and subservient there to”;38 it supposes, “That the divine Dominion and Sovereignty is in Order to the common Good, and the Means necessary to the obtaining thereof. ”39 The Means are subordinate and subservient to the End; the End always excells the Thing which is to the End; the End is always desir’d for itself, the Means for the End, which are necessary, when the End cannot be had without them, not otherwise; they have their Goodness and Measure from it, and the Reason of them is taken from the End. The End has a greater Sovereignty in all Actions, than the Actor himself; he rules others, but the End rules him. The common Good of rational Agents, therefore, is highly dignified, because it is suppos’d, to be the End, the best and greatest End.40 But, with respect to this, we must distinguish between a made and unmade, a human and divine, Sovereignty. If the Sovereignty is a human Sovereignty made by the People, or made by God for the People, altho’ it has all the usual Rights of Sovereignty, yet it is necessarily, in the strict and proper Sense, a subordinate and subservient Means to an End, the common Good. But Things are quite otherwise, if the Sovereignty is unmade, and maketh the People, and is infinitely better than they; for such a Sovereignty is necessarily unsubordinate, and cannot be the subordinate and subservient Means to any End, but is, absolutely, as without an Efficient, so without any Final Cause. Whence a Judgment may be form’d; whether a pious Man would say, “That the common Good is a Law and End above God, that his Goodness is but a Means to it, that he is no further necessary, than in order to it; not so good, or great, or excellent, or amiable, or honourable, as the publick Good; nor are we to love him, or devote ourselves to him, or to adhere to him, so much as the common Good, in which we ought finally to acquiesce, which is thus exalted, even above God himself.”

  11. And only one half of the common Good is represented as such. (11.) In this Scheme of the Law of Nature, agreeably to its Notion of Good, but one half of the common Good is represented, as such; for, by the common Good of rational Agents, it means only their Happiness, to which it renders God and Virtue subordinate. Whereas the common Good of rational Beings must be distinguish’d, into the Good which is for them, which is their Happiness, and into the Good which they are for, which is their Holiness, the Good of Virtue. “That which is absolutely good, is every way superior to us, and we ought always to be commanded by it, because we are made under it: But that which is relatively good to us, may sometime be commanded by us. Eternal Truth and Righteousness are, in themselves, perfectly and absolutely good, and the more we conform ourselves to them, the better we are.”41 If the Deity, if Virtue and Righteousness, were only relatively good, as convenient and commodious to us, if they were merely for us, as their End, they must be look’d upon as Things merely subservient to our Pleasure, and must be esteemed and loved accordingly. But, because they are absolutely and in themselves good, superior to us and our Pleasure, therefore our Pleasure ought to be accommodated to them, and all rational Agents should take the highest Complacence in them, both for their own sake, their own Excellence, and for our sake, as being our true Excellence and Felicity. “We love the Virtues for the sake, both of themselves, as being in themselves excellent and honourable; and of something else, that is, our Happiness.”42 So the Pagans philosophize at a more virtuous Rate, than those Christian Divines, who say, “There is some first and chief Good, which a Man desireth for itself, and for it all other Things, which Good is the Good of Pleasure, or the delectable Good. For this Good only a Man enjoyeth. Of the Good of Honesty, Profit, Decorum, there is in itself no Enjoyment. Only the Pleasure which resulteth from it, or is conjoin’d with it, a Man can enjoy. The Evil, contrary to this Good, can be nothing else but Misery or Pain, and that perpetual. For there is no Man, who does not hate that at the highest rate, and all other Things upon the account of it.”43 With this Discourse of a foreign Divine, I will confront a better and more religious Discourse of a Divine of our own, “Those are ignorant of the Nature of Sin, that imagine any Evil greater than it, or so great. Cicero’s Saying, in the first Book of his Tusculan Questions, hath, without doubt, not a little of Truth in it. Ne malum quidem ullum, cum Turpitudinis malo comparandum. There is no Evil comparable to that of Sin. Hierocles, a sober Philosopher, and very free from the high-flown Humour and ranting Genius of the Stoicks, though he would allow, that other Things, beside Sin, may be χαλεπὰ καὶδυσδιάθετα, very grievous and difficult to be borne, yet he would admit nothing besides, to be, ὄντως κακὸν, truly evil; and he giveth this Reason; viz. Because that certain Circumstances may make other Things Good, that have the Repute of Evil; but none can make this so. He saith, the Word καλῶς (well) can never be join’d with any Vice, but so it may with every Thing besides. As it is proper to say concerning such or such a Person, νοσεῖκαλῶς, ϖένεται καλῶς he is well diseas’d, he is well poor, that is, he is both these to good purpose, behaving himself well in his Sickness and Poverty, as he ought to do: But it can never be said, ἀδικεῖ καλῶς, ἀκολας αίνει καλῶς, he doth Injury well, or he is rightly and as becometh him intemperate.”44

  12. And the Order of our Obligation is inverted. (12.) In this Scheme of the Law of Nature, agreeably to its Notion of Good, the due Order of Reasoning and of our Obligations is inverted. For, antecedently to the Law of endeavouring the common Good, there is an Obligation upon Mankind, and therefore a Law, of conscientious Subjection and Obedience to the Authority of the Lawgiver. He would not make this Law for them, if they were not antecedently under such an Obligation, if he could not claim Subjection and Obedience from them. Their Subjection to this the supreme Lawgiver is, therefore, the first Law of Nature. As all Governments, in the first Place, take care, to establish their Authority; and as a Man is bound to acknowledge Subjection to the King, before he is bound to obey the Law of endeavouring the common Good of the Kingdom: So Mankind are first oblig’d to consent, to be Subjects to God, and then, as his Subjects, to endeavour the common Good. The Order of their Obligations is not, to endeavour the common Good in the first Place, and so to be pious and virtuous towards God; but to be pious and virtuous towards God, and so to endeavour the common Good; for, if they endeavour the common Good, they are bound to do it, from a Principle of Piety towards God; and the Law of Nature is not Religion, if it does not oblige them to it. So in all our Actions Inquiry must be made, whether they be right in respect of Matter, Manner, Object, Measure, Principle, End, Circumstances, which sort of Inquiries would be impertinent, if Virtue is not Virtue, but merely as it is an Endeavour of the common Good. The Law of Nature instituteth Men, in the first Place, to be the Well-doers, not the Evil-doers, the Righteous, not the Wicked, and as such, Men have Rewards promis’d, and Punishments threaten’d in Laws; as such, they are justified or condemned in Law. Ethicks is the Art of living well, as to Virtue, and as to Felicity.

  (13.) And Laws have no Obligation, but their Sanction. (13.) This Scheme of the Law of Nature, agreeably to its Definition of Good, seems to acknowledge no other Obligation of it, but merely from the Sanction of it, which is Self-Interest. “The whole Force of Obligation” (saith Cumberland45 ) “is this, that the Legislator hath annex’d to the Observance of his Laws, Good; to the Transgression, Evil; and those natural: In Prospect whereof Men are moved to perform Actions, rather agreeing than disagreeing with the Laws. The Mind of Man is not properly tied with Bonds. ...46I think that moral Obligation may be thus universally and properly defin’d. Obligation is that Act of a Legislator, by which he declares, that Actions conformable to his Law are necessary to those, for whom the Law is made. An Action is then understood to be necessary to a rational Agent, when it is certainly one of the Causes necessarily requir’d to that Happiness, which he naturally, and consequently necessarily, desires. I cannot conceive any Thing which could bind the Mind of Man with any Necessity, (in which Justinian’s Definition places the Force of Obligation,) except Arguments proving, that Good or Evil will proceed from our Actions.47Natural Rewards and Penalties, those Motives of Obedience, are the proper Sanction, to make the Law obligatory. For Obligation properly signifieth nothing, but laying a Necessity upon us, to act according to the Direction of the Law.”48 So that, according to this Scheme, the Law-giver is suppos’d to indicate to Men, “That the endeavouring the common Good, or universal Benevolence, is a necessary Means to that End, which Nature has determin’d them to pursue, which is their own Happiness contain’d in the common Good, and that, if they do not so act, this will be pernicious to themselves.” But, if this be the whole of the Law’s Obligation, the Transgression of the Law is not Unrighteousness, Sin, and Crime, but only Imprudence, and Infelicity, for the Sanction of the Law importeth no other Evil. But the Obligation or Bond of the Law is the jural Restraint, which is express’d by (Non licet) you may not do it; but, because a bare non licet or prohibition is not sufficient to enforce the Law, therefore the Sin and Punishment, the Precept and the Sanction both concur, to make the jural Restraint, which must be thus fully express’d,(Non licet impune) you may not do it with Impunity. But, altho’ Sin and Punishment are closely connected, yet the Obligation of (non licet) it may not be done, is distinct from the Obligation of (Non impune) not with Impunity, as Sin and Punishment are of distinct Consideration. But a Man is bound, both when he cannot do a Thing without Sin, and when he cannot do a Thing without Punishment, and both these Obligations are in every Law, and both concur to make the Obligation of it. But, because the Obligation of non licet is antecedent to the Obligation of non impune, the Precept to the Sanction, and the Sin is made by the Law, the Law hath so much Obligation, as to make the Sin, before the Penalty is enacted; therefore the Law has an Obligation antecedently to the Sanction of it. For every one is bound to avoid what is Sin, because none can have a Right to do what is unrighteous, which is a Contradiction to the Law of Religion (which is suppos’d to have its Name a Religando, which is call’d [Religionis nodus, vinculum Pietatis] the Tie of Religion, the Bond of Piety) cannot rationally be thought obligatory, merely from the Sanction of it; for to do any Thing contrary to the Holiness of the Deity, is necessarily, and in itself, Sin. No ingenuous Man looks upon himself as oblig’d to be grateful to his Benefactors, to love his Wife and Children, or to love and honour his God and Saviour, merely by the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments. Is there no Obligation upon Men from Right and Wrong, due and undue, Sanctity and Sin, Righteousness and Wickedness, Honesty and Dishonesty, Integrity and Guile, Worthiness and Baseness, Conscience or Crime, Virtue or Villainy, but merely from a prudent Regard to their own Happiness? But, if a Man should be so imprudent, as to discard all care and regard to his own Happiness, would he be discharg’d by this Imprudence from all his Bonds and Fetters of Obligation, and become loose and unbound, to live as he pleas’d? Cicero asketh the Men of Prudence, if they were secure from the Sanction of the Law, whether they would be dishonest or not?49 If they say, they would, let them (saith he) confess themselves wicked; if they say, they would not, let them acknowledge, that all Things foul and base are to be shun’d, because they are such. If a truly wise Man had Gyges’s Ring, “He thinketh not, that he hath more License to Sin, than if he had it not. We ought to be of this Persuasion, that, if we could be hid from all the Gods and Men,” (and, therefore, were secure from the Sanction of the Law,) “yet nothing is to be done avaritiously, unjustly, libidinously.”50 The Vulgar say, I am bound in Duty, in Justice, in Gratitude, in Conscience; and the Schools say, “That the Obligation of the Law of Nature is a Bond of Conscience.” According to our Author’s Scheme, a Man is oblig’d to choose to be annihilated for the Welfare of others, if the common Good did require it; which yet no Man can be oblig’d to do, out of regard to his own Happiness. Nor is it possible, to deduce a conscientious Obligation, merely from a Politick and Prudential regard to our own Happiness. But, because the Legislator annexes [honum jucundum] delectable Good to his Law, and, for the Sake of this, Men choose Virtue and Obedience; hence some infer, That delectable Good hath the precedence of [bonum honestum] the Good of Virtue; which Argument may be thus retorted. The Legislator annexes to his Law the Sanction of the Good of Pleasure, for the Sake of the Good of Virtue, which the Law enjoineth; this, therefore, is the principal in the Estimation and Intention of the Law-giver. Whose Will, if it be made known, is, without a Sanction, a Bond or Obligation upon us; for we owe Obedience thereto, and every one is bound to pay what he oweth.

  (14.) And the Law of Nature is not Matter of Conscience, but Prudence; not a spiritual, but a civil Institution. (14.) The Law of Nature is certainly a Matter of Conscience, not of mere Policy and Prudence, not of mere civil Society, as it is made in this Scheme of it, which is a System of human Policy and Prudence, modelling the Universe of rational Agents into a civil Society, by Consent and Agreement in their Politicks, for the common Happiness of civil Life. The Universe of rational Agents is in a very divided State, but they are modell’d into one Society in this Scheme,51 which is an Institution to civil Society, into which the whole Universe of rational Agents is suppos’d to be combin’d. Civil Society, being Civil-religious, is not without a sacred Society; for all Civil People have their Deity, their Religion, their Priests, and their Sacra, which must be in this great Civil-Society, which consisteth of the Under-rational Agents, and of God the Head-rational, which looketh like, but is not, a Divine Society. Into this Society the Universe of rational Agents is suppos’d to be combin’d, not by the Bands of Right and Due, but in the Methods of human Policy and Prudence, by one common Interest (their common Happiness) and by Consent and Agreement in their Politicks. The Universe of rational Beings is suppos’d to be united, in order to the common Good, which is the common End. For God, in order to the common Good, assumeth to himself the supreme governing Power, and the under-rationals, for Necessity of common Good, do and must yield it unto him;52 by which Agreement in Politicks they are related as Rector and Subjects in Society. Which Society, being of no higher Kind than Civil, the common Happiness (that is, the End of the Association) can be no more than the Happiness of Civil Life; and, consequently, the universal Benevolence, and the other Virtues, which are in this Scheme of the Law of Nature, are no other, than those of Aristotle’s and Cicero’s Institution. This, therefore, being not satisfactory, we are obliged to recede from it, and to give a different Account of the Law of Nature, and of the Good, to which it instituteth.

  What follows from my Lord Shaftesbury seems to me so just, so rational, and so much in Confirmation of what I have been here advancing, that I have thought it proper to add the Force of his Reasoning to what I have laid down.

  I have known a Building, which by the Officiousness of the Workmen has been so shor’d, and screw’d up, on the side where they pretended it had a Leaning, that it has, at last, been turn’d the contrary way, and overthrown. There has something, perhaps, of this kind happen’d in Morals. Men have not been contented to shew the natural Advantages of Honesty and Virtue. They have rather lessen’d these, the better, as they thought, to advance another Foundation. They have made Virtue so mercenary a Thing, and have talk’d so much of its Rewards, that one can hardly tell what there is in it, after all, which can be worth rewarding. For to be brib’d only, or terrify’d into an honest Practice, bespeaks little of real Honesty or Worth. We may make, it’s true, whatever Bargain we think fit; and may bestow in favour what Overplus we please. But there can be no Excellence or Wisdom in voluntarily rewarding what is neither estimable, nor deserving. And, if Virtue be not really estimable in it-self, I can see nothing estimable in following it for the sake of a Bargain.53

  If the Love of doing Good, be not, of it-self, a good and right Inclination; I know not how there can possibly be such a thing as Goodness or Virtue. If the Inclination be right; ’tis a perverting of it, to apply it solely to the Reward, and make us conceive such Wonders of the Grace and Favour which is to attend Virtue; when there is so little shewn of the intrinsick Worth or Value of the Thing it-self.

  I have known it ask’d, Why should a Man be honest in the Dark? What a Man must be to ask this Question, I won’t say. But for Those, who have no better a Reason for being honest, than the Fear of a Gibbet or a Jail; I should not, I confess, much covet their Company, or Acquaintance. And, if any Guardian of mine who had kept his Trust, and given me back my Estate when I came of Age, had been discover’d to have acted thus, thro’ Fear only of what might happen to him; I should for my own Part, undoubtedly, continue civil and respectful to him: But for my Opinion of his Worth, it would be such as the Pythian God had of his Votary, who devoutly fear’d him, and therefore restor’d to a Friend what had been deposited in his Hands.

  • Reddidit ergo metu, non moribus; & tamen omnem
  • Vocem adyti dignam templo, veranique probavit,
  • Extinctus tot â pariter cum prole domoq;54

  I know very well, that many Services to the Publick are done merely for the sake of a Gratuity; and that Informers, in particular, are to be taken care of, and sometimes made Pensioners of State. But I must beg pardon for the particular Thoughts I may have of these Gentlemens Merit; and shall never bestow my Esteem on any other than the voluntary Discoverers of Villany, and hearty Prosecutors of their Country’s Interest. And in this respect, I know nothing greater or nobler, than the undertaking and managing some important Accusation; by which some high Criminal of State, or some form’d Body of Conspirators against the Publick, may be arraign’d and brought to Punishment, thro’ the honest Zeal and publick Affection of a private Man.

  I know too, that the mere Vulgar of Mankind often stand in need of such a rectifying Object as the Gallows before their Eyes. Yet I have no Belief, that any Man of a liberal Education, or common Honesty, ever needed to have recourse to this Idea in his Mind, the better to restrain him from playing the Knave. And, if a Saint had no other Virtue, than what was rais’d in him by the same Objects of Reward and Punishment, in a more distant State; I know not whose Love or Esteem he might gain besides: But for my own part, I should never think him worthy of mine.55

  As to the Belief of a Deity, and how Men are influenc’d by it; we may consider, in the first place, on what account Men yield Obedience, and act in conformity to such a Supreme Being. It must be either in the way of hisPower, as presupposing some Disadvantage or Benefit to accrue from him: or in the way of hisExcellency and Worth, as thinking it the Perfection of Nature to imitate and resemble him.

  If (as in the first Case) there be a Belief or Conception of a Deity, who is consider’d only as powerful over his Creatures and inforceing Obedience to his absolute Will by particular Rewards and Punishments; and, if on this account, thro’ Hope merely of Reward, or Fear of Punishment, the Creature be incited to do the Good he hates, or restrain’d from doing the Ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse; there is in this Case (as has been already shown) no Virtue or Goodness whatsoever. The Creature, notwithstanding his good Conduct, is intrinsically of as little Worth, as if he acted in his natural way, when under no Dread or Terrour of any sort. There is no more of Rectitude, Piety, or Sanctity in a Creature thus reform’d, than there is Meekness or Gentleness in a Tyger strongly chain’d, or Innocence and Sobriety in a Monkey under the Discipline of the Whip. For, however orderly and well those Animals, or Man himself upon like Terms, may be induc’d to act, whilst the Will is neither gain’d, nor the Inclination wrought upon, but Awe alone prevails and forces Obedience; the Obedience is servile, and all which is done thro’ it, merely servile. The greater degree of such a Submission or Obedience, is only the greater Servility; whatever may be the Object. For, whether such a Creature has a good Master, or an ill one, he is neither more nor less servile in his own nature. Be the Master or Superiour ever so perfect, or excellent, yet the greater Submission caus’d in this Case, thro’ this sole Principle or Motive, is only the lower and more abject Servitude, and implies the greater Wretchedness and Meanness in the Creature, who has those Passions of Self-Love so predominant, and is in his Temper so vitious and defective, as has been explain’d.

  As to the second Case. If there be a Belief or Conception of a Deity, who is consider’d as Worthy and Good, and admir’d and reverenc’d as such; being understood to have, besides mere Power and Knowledg, the highest Excellence of Nature, such as renders him justly amiable to All; and, if in the manner this Sovereign and mighty Being is represented, or as he is historically describ’d, there appears in him a high and eminent regard to what is good and excellent, a Concern for the good of All, and an Affection of Benevolence and Love towards the Whole; such an Example must undoubtedly serve (as above explain’d) to raise and increase the Affection towards Virtue, and help to submit and subdue all other Affections to that alone.

  Nor is this Good effected by Example merely. For, where the Theistical Belief is intire and perfect, there must be a steddy Opinion of the Superintendency of a Supreme Being, a Witness and Spectator of human Life, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the Universe: So that in the perfectest Recess, or deepest Solitude, there must be One still presum’d remaining with us; whose Presence, singly, must be of more moment, than that of the most August Assembly on Earth. In such a Presence, ’tis evident, that, as the Shame of guilty Actions must be the greatest of any; so must the Honour be, of well-doing, even under the unjust Censure of a World. And in this Case, ’tis very apparent how conducing a perfect Theism must be to Virtue, and how great Deficiency there is in Atheism.

  What the Fearof future Punishment, and Hopeof future Reward, added to this Belief, may further contribute towards Virtue, we come now to consider more particularly. So much in the mean while may be gather’d from what has been said above; That neither this Fear or Hope can possibly be of the kind call’d good Affections, such as are acknowledg’d the Springs and Sources of all Actions truly good. Nor can this Fear or Hope, as above intimated, consist in reality with Virtue, or Goodness; if it either stands as essential to any moral Performance, or as a considerable Motive to any Act, of which some better Affection ought, alone, to have been a sufficient Cause.

  It may be consider’d withal; That, in this religious sort of Discipline, the Principle of Self-Love, which is naturally so prevailing in us, being no-way moderated, or restrain’d, but rather improv’d and made stronger every day, by the exercise of the Passions in a Subject of more extended Self-Interest; there may be reason to apprehend, lest the Temper of this kind shou’d extend it-self in general thro’ all the Parts of Life. For, if the Habit be such as to occasion, in every Particular, a stricter Attention to Self-Good, and private Interest; it must insensibly diminish the Affections towards Publick Good, or the Interest of Society; and introduce a certain Narrowness of Spirit, which (as some pretend) is peculiarly observable in the devout Persons and Zealots of almost every religious Perswasion.

  This, too, must be confess’d; That, if it be true Piety, to love Godfor his own sake, the over-solicitous regard to private Good expected from him, must of necessity prove a diminution of Piety. For, whilst God is belov’d, only as the Cause of private Good, he is no otherwise belov’d, than as any other Instrument or Means of Pleasure by any vitious Creature. Now the more there is of this violent Affection towards private Good, the less room is there for the other sort towards Goodness it-self, or any good and deserving Object, worthy of Love and Admiration for its own sake; such as God is universally acknowledg’d, or at least by the generality of civiliz’d or refin’d Worshippers.

  ’Tis in this respect that the strong Desire and Love of Life may also prove an Obstacle to Piety, as well as to Virtue and publick Love. For the stronger this Affection is in any one, the less will he be able to have true Resignation, or Submission to the Rule and Order of The Deity. And, if that which he calls Resignation depends only on the expectation of infinite Retribution or Reward, he discovers no more Worth or Virtue here, than in any other Bargain of Interest: The meaning of his Resignation being only this, “That he resigns his present Life, and Pleasures, conditionally for That which he himself confesses to be beyond an Equivalent; eternal Living, in a State of highest Pleasure and Enjoyment.”

  But, notwithstanding the Injury which the Principle of Virtue may possibly suffer, by the Increase of the selfish Passions, in the way we have been mentioning; ’tis certain, on the other side, that the Principle of Fear of future Punishment and Hope of future Reward, how mercenary or servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many Circumstances, a great Advantage, Security, and Support to Virtue.

  It has been already consider’d, that, notwithstanding there may be implanted in the Heart a real Sense of Right and Wrong, a real good Affection towards the Species or Society; yet, by the violence of Rage, Lust, or any other counter-working Passion, this good Affection may frequently be controul’d and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the Mind capable to render such ill Passions the Objects of its Aversion, and cause them earnestly to be oppos’d; ’tis apparent, how much a good Temper in time must suffer, and a Character by degrees change for the worse. But, if Religion interposing creates a Belief, that the ill Passions of this kind, no less than their consequent Actions, are the Objects of a Deity’s Animadversion; ’tis certain, that such a Belief must prove a seasonable Remedy against Vice, and be in a particular manner advantageous to Virtue. For a Belief of this kind must be suppos’d to tend considerably towards the calming of the Mind, and disposing or fitting the Person to a better Recollection of himself, and to a stricter Observance of that good and virtuous Principle, which needs only his Attention, to engage him wholly in its Party and Interest.

  And as this Belief of a future Reward and Punishment is capable of supporting those who thro’ ill Practice are like to apostatize from Virtue; so when by ill Opinion and wrong Thought, the Mind it-self is bent against the honest course, and debauch’d even to an Esteem, and deliberate Preference of a vitious one; the Belief of the kind mention’d may prove on this occasion the only Relief and Safety.

  A Person, for Instance, who has much of Goodness and natural Rectitude in his Temper, but withal, so much Softness, or Effeminacy, as unfits him to bear Poverty, Crosses or Adversity; if by ill Fortune he meets with many Trials of this kind, it must certainly give a Sourness and Distaste to his Temper, and make him exceedingly averse to that which he may falsly presume the Occasion of such Calamity or Ill. Now, if his own Thoughts, or the corrupt Insinuations of other Men present it often to his Mind, “That his Honesty is the Occasion of this Calamity, and that if he were deliver’d from this Restraint of Virtue and Honesty, he might be much happier”: ’Tis very obvious that his Esteem of these good Qualities must, in Proportion, diminish every Day, as the Temper grows uneasy, and quarrels with it-self. But, if he opposes to this Thought the Consideration, “That Honesty carries with it, if not a present, at least a future Advantage, such as to compensate that Loss of private Good which he regrets”; then may this Injury to his good Temper and honest Principle be prevented, and his Love or Affection towards Honesty and Virtue remain as it was before.

  In the same manner, where instead of Regard or Love, there is rather an Aversion to what is good and virtuous (as, for Instance, where Lenity and Forgiveness are despis’d, and Revenge highly thought of, and belov’d) if there be this Consideration added, “That Lenity is, by its Rewards, made the cause of a greater Self-Good and Enjoyment than what is found in Revenge”; that very Affection of Lenity and Mildness may come to be industriously nourish’d, and the contrary Passion depress’d. And thus Temperance, Modesty, Candour, Benignity, and other good Affections, however despis’d at first, may come at last to be valu’d for their own Sakes, the contrary Species rejected, and the good and proper Object belov’d and prosecuted, when the Reward or Punishment is not so much as thought of.

  Thus in a civil State or Publick, we see that a virtuous Administration, and an equal and just Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, is of the highest service; not only by restraining the Vitious, and forcing them to act usefully to Society; but by making Virtue to be apparently the Interest of every one, so as to remove all Prejudices against it, create a fair Reception for it, and lead Men into that Path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For thus a People rais’d from Barbarity or despotick Rule, civiliz’d by Laws, and made virtuous by the long Course of a lawful and just Administration; if they chance to fall suddenly under any Misgovernment of unjust and arbitrary Power, they will on this Account be the rather animated to exert a stronger Virtue, in opposition to such Violence and Corruption. And even where, by long and continu’d Arts of a prevailing Tyranny, such a People are at last totally oppress’d, the scatter’d Seeds of Virtue will for a long time remain alive, even to a second Generation; e’er the utmost Force of misapply’d Rewards and Punishments can bring them to the abject and compliant State of long-accustom’d Slaves.

  But, tho’ a right Distribution of Justice in Government be so essential a cause of Virtue, we must observe in this Case, that it is Example which chiefly influences Mankind, and forms the Character and Disposition of a People. For a virtuous Administration is in a manner necessarily accompany’d with Virtue in the Magistrate. Otherwise it cou’d be of little effect; and of no long duration. But, where it is sincere and well-establish’d, there Virtue and the Laws must necessarily be respected and belov’d. So that as to Punishments and Rewards, their Efficacy is not so much from the Fear or Expectation which they raise, as from a natural Esteem of Virtue, and Detestation of Villany, which is awaken’d and excited by these publick Expressions of the Approbation and Hatred of Mankind in each Case. For in the publick Executions of the greatest Villains, we see generally that the Infamy and Odiousness of their Crime, and the Shame of it before Mankind, contribute more to their Misery than all besides; and that it is not the immediate Pain, or Death it-self, which raises so much Horror either in the Sufferers or Spectators, as that ignominious kind of Death which is inflicted for publick Crimes, and Violations of Justice and Humanity.

  And as the Case of Reward and Punishment stands thus in the Publick, so, in the same manner, as to private Families. For Slaves and mercenary Servants, restrain’d and made orderly by Punishment, and the Severity of their Master, are not, on this account, made good or honest. Yet the same Master of the Family, using proper Rewards and gentle Punishments towards his Children, teaches them Goodness; and by this help instructs them in a Virtue, which afterwards they practice upon other Grounds, and without thinking of a Penalty or Bribe. And this is what we call a Liberal Education and a Liberal Service: The contrary Service and Obedience, whether towards God or Man, being illiberal, and unworthy of any Honour or Commendation.

  In the Case of Religion, however, it must be consider’d, that if by the Hope of Reward be understood the Love and Desire of virtuous Enjoyment, or of the very Practice and Exercise of Virtue in another Life; the Expectation or Hope of this kind is so far from being derogatory to Virtue, that it is an Evidence of our loving it the more sincerely and for its own sake. Nor can this Principle be justly call’d selfish: For if the Love of Virtue be not mere Self-Interest, the Love and Desire of Life for Virtue’s sake cannot be esteem’d so. But, if the Desire of Life be only thro’ the Violence of that natural Aversion to Death; if it be thro’ the Love of something else than virtuous Affection, or thro’ the Unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any sign or Token of real Virtue.

  Thus a Person loving Life for Life’s sake, and Virtue not at all, may, by the Promise or Hope of Life, and Fear of Death, or other Evil, be induc’d to practise Virtue, and even endeavour to be truly virtuous, by a Love of what he practises. Yet neither is this very Endeavour to be esteem’d a Virtue. For tho’ he may intend to be virtuous; he is not become so, for having only intended, or aim’d at it, thro’ Love of the Reward. But, as soon as he is come to have any Affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such Good for its own sake, as good and amiable in it-self; then is he in some degree good and virtuous, and not till then.

  Such are the Advantages or Disadvantages which accrue to Virtue from Reflexion upon private Good or Interest. For, tho’ the Habit of Selfishness, and the Multiplicity of interested Views, are of little Improvement to real Merit or Virtue; yet there is a Necessity for the Preservation of Virtue, that it should be thought to have no quarrel with true Interest, and Self-Enjoyment.

  Whoever, therefore, by any strong Persuasion, or settled Judgment, thinks in the main, That Virtue causes Happiness, and Vice Misery, carries with him that Security and Assistance to Virtue which is requir’d. Or, tho’ he has no such Thought, nor can believe Virtue his real Interest, either with respect to his own Nature and Constitution, or the Circumstances of human Life; yet, if he believes any Supreme Powers concern’d in the present Affairs of Mankind, and immediately interposing in behalf of the Honest and Virtuous, against the Impious and Unjust; this will serve to preserve in him, however, that just Esteem of Virtue, which might otherwise considerably diminish. Or should he still believe little of the immediate Interposition of Providence in the Affairs of this present Life; yet if he believes a God dispensing Rewards and Punishments to Vice and Virtue in a future, he carries with him still the same Advantage and Security; whilst his Belief is steddy, and no-wise wavering or doubtful. For it must be observ’d, that an Expectation and Dependency, so miraculous and great as this, must naturally take off from other inferior Dependencies and Encouragements. Where infinite Rewards are thus inforc’d, and the Imagination strongly turn’d towards them, the other common and natural Motives to Goodness are apt to be neglected, and lose much by Dis-use. Other Interests are hardly so much as computed, whilst the Mind is thus transported in the Pursuit of a high Advantage and Self-Interest, so narrowly confin’d within our-selves. On this account, all other Affections, towards Friends, Relations, or Mankind, are often slightly regarded, as being worldly, and of little moment, in respect of the Interest of our Soul. And so little thought is there of any immediate Satisfaction arising from such good Offices of Life, that it is customary with many devout People zealously to decry all temporal Advantages of Goodness, all natural Benefits of Virtue; and magnifying the contrary Happiness of a vitious State; to declare, “That, except only for the sake of future Reward, and fear of future Punishment, they would divest themselves of all Goodness at once, and freely allow themselves to be most immoral and profligate.” From whence it appears, that in some respects there can be nothing more fatal to Virtue, than the weak and uncertain Belief of a future Reward and Punishment. For the Stress being laid wholly here, if this Foundation come to fail, there is no further Prop or Security to Men’s Morals. And thus Virtue is supplanted and betray’d.56

  Tho’ the disinterested Love of God be the most excellent Principle, yet, by the indiscreet Zeal of some devout well-meaning People, it has been stretch’d too far, perhaps, even to Extravagance and Enthusiasm, as formerly among the Mysticks of the antient Church, whom these of latter Days have follow’d. On the other hand, there have been those, who, in Opposition to this devout Mystick way, and as profess’d Enemies to what they call Enthusiasm, had so far exploded every thing of this ecstatick kind, as, in a manner, to have given up Devotion; and, in reality, have left so little of Zeal, Affection, or Warmth, in what they call their rational Religion, as to make them much suspected of their Sincerity in any. For, tho’ it be natural enough for a mere political Writer to ground his great Argument for Religion, on the Necessity of such a relief, as that of a Future Reward and Punishment; yet ’tis a very ill Token of Sincerity in Religion, and in the Christian Religion more especially, to reduce it to such a Philosophy, as will allow no room to that other Principle of Love; but treats all of that Kind as Enthusiasm, for so much as aiming at what is call’d Disinterestedness, or teaching the Love of God or Virtue for God or Virtue’s Sake.

  Here, then, we have Two Sorts of People, who, in these opposite Extremes, expose Religion to the Insults of its Adversaries. For as, on one hand, ’twill be found difficult to defend the Notion of that high-rais’d Love, espous’d with so much Warmth by those devout Mysticks; so, on the other hand, ’twill be found as hard a Task, upon the Principles of these cooler Men, to guard Religion from the Imputation of Mercenariness, and a slavish Spirit. For how shall one deny, that to serve God by Compulsion, or for Interest merely, is Servile and Mercenary? Is it not evident, that the only true and liberal Service paid, either to that Supreme Being, or to any other Superior, is that “which proceeds from an Esteem or Love of the Person serv’d, a Sense of Duty or Gratitude, and a Love of the dutiful and grateful Part, as good and amiable, in it-self ?” And where is the Injury to Religion, from such a Concession as this? Or what Detraction is it from the Belief of an After-Reward or Punishment, to own, “That the Service caus’d by it, is not equal to that which is voluntary and with Inclination, but is rather disingenuous and of the slavish kind?” Is it not still for the Good of Mankind and of the World, that Obedience to the Rule of Right should, some way or other, be paid; if not in the better way, yet, at least, in this imperfect one? And is it not to be shewn, “That, altho’ this Service of Fear be allow’d ever so low or base: Yet Religion still being a Discipline, and Progress of the Soul towards Perfection, the Motive of Reward and Punishment is primary, and of the highest Moment with us; ’till being capable of more sublime Instruction, we are led from this servile State, to the generous Service of Affection and Love?”

  To this we ought all of us to aspire, so as to endeavour, “That the Excellence of the Object, not the Reward or Punishment, should be our Motive: But that where, thro’ the Corruption of our Nature, the former of these Motives is found insufficient to excite to Virtue, there the latter should be brought in Aid, and on no account be undervalu’d or neglected.”

  Now this being once establish’d, how can Religion be any longer subject to the Imputation of Mercenariness? But thus we know Religion is often charg’d. “Godliness, say they, is great Gain: Nor is God devoutly serv’d for nought.”—Is this therefore a Reproach? Is it confess’d there may be a better Service, a more generous Love?—Enough, there needs no more. On this Foundation it is easy to defend Religion, and even that devoutest Part, which is esteem’d so great a Paradox of Faith. For, if there be in Nature such a Service as that of Affection and Love, there remains then only to consider of the Object, whether there be really that Supreme-One we suppose. For, if there be Divine Excellence in Things; if there be in Nature a Supreme Mind or Deity; we have then an Object consummate, and comprehensive of all which is Good or Excellent. And this Object, of all others, must of Necessity be the most amiable, the most engaging, and of highest Satisfaction and Enjoyment. Now, that there is such a principal Object as this in the World, the World alone (if I may say so) by its wise and perfect Order must evince. Thus far the Lord Shaftesbury.57

  That Good, to which the Law of Nature instituteth, is the Beauteous-Beneficial.§IV. The Good, to which the Law of Nature, and the Discipline of Morality, instituteth, is the good Life and Practice, of which there are many Branches, the Notion whereof is compounded of Two Notions, Beauteous-Beneficial. As the Works of Nature, are therefore said to be Good, because the Make of them is Beauteous-Beneficial. “For all the Parts of the World are so constituted, that they could not be better, either for Beauty or Usefulness.”58 The Lacedemonians had regard for both these, when they pray’d for [oulchra cum bonis] Things good and comely. The Antient Philosophers had regard to both these in their Definitions of Good and Evil. “All the good things are those that are profitable, conducive, beauteous, comely, cognate; but the Evils are the contrary, those things that are hateful, noxious, incommodious, alien, uncomely, and foul.” So Perfections in general, are ornamental, and useful, agreeably whereto the good Morals must be defin’d the Beauteous-Beneficial. “The Grecians, most divinely” (saith Judicious Mr. Hooker)59“have given to the active Perfection of Men, a Name expressing both Beauty and Goodness (καλοκ’ ἀγαθία) because Goodness, in ordinary Speech, is for the most part applied only to that which is beneficial; but we, in the Name of Goodness, do here imply both.” Good, therefore, in Morality, the good of Virtue, is τὸ καλοκ’ ἀγαθὸν the Beauteous-Beneficial Life and Practice. “Aristotle teacheth that all the Virtues are compriz’d τῇ καλοκ’ ἀγαθία, in what is Beautifully-beneficent.”60

  Its Beauty;What is Beauteous is amiable, and is to be lik’d and lov’d; whence it is called τὸ καλὸν which signifieth it to be both Beauteous and Good; in both which Significations the Word is frequently us’d. Agreeably to this, the Nature of Good is to consist in these three things in Modo, in Specie, in Ordine; in Measure, in Comeliness, in Order, all which are certain Modes of Beauty.61“The good of Honesty [bonum honestum] is laudable for its Beauty and Form.62Wherein appeareth an Ornament and gracefulness of Life, Temperance, Modesty, a quieting of Perturbations, and a due measure of things, which is τὸ ϖρέπον, that which is decorous.63How come we to understand what is Virtue? By seeing the Order and Decorum that is in it.64Virtue is so graceful, that even bad Men approve of better things.”65 Of the excellent Beauty of Justice Aristotle saith, “Neither the Evening nor the Morning is so admirable.66Virtue sendeth its Light into the Minds of all, even they that are no Followers of it, yet see it.”67 Virtue is an Honourableness, as well as Amiableness, of Practice, whence it hath the Name of Honestas. Vice and Wickedness is that which is “foul, dishonest, indecorous, bad, flagitious, filthy,”68 that is, Foulness and Deformity, the Crookedness and Obliquity of Practice. The various Names, which the Philosophers, in concurrence with the generality of Mankind, have given to the virtuous practice, denote its Regularity and Beauty. τὸ εὖ, that which is well, τὸ δέον, that which ought to be, τὸ ϖρέπον, that which is decorous, τὸ ἴσον, that which is equal, τὸ καλὸν, that which is fair, τὸ ἁρμοζὸν, that which is fit, congruous, proportionate, τὸ ’Ορθὸν, that which is right.

  We have all a Sense of what is naturally graceful and becoming. There is an Ear in Musick, an Eye in Painting, a Fancy in the ordinary things of Ornament and Grace, a Judgment in Proportions of all kinds; and a good Taste in most of those Subjects, which make the Amusement and Delight of the Ingenious.

  How do we admire Beauty in the inanimate World, in Architecture, Musick, Stones, Metals, Vegetables, Mountains, Vales, Rivers; the terraqueous Globe, our whole solar System, and probably others like innumerable? Rising to the animate World, How do admire Beauty in a Dog, a Horse, a Hawk?

  But, of all Beauties, the most delightful, the most engaging and pathetick, is that which is drawn from real Life, and from the Passions; such as the Beauty of Sentiments, the Grace of Actions, the Turn of Characters, and the Proportions and Features of a human Mind. What is the Beauty of Poetry, but, “In Vocal Measures of Syllables and Sounds to express the Harmony and Numbers of an inward Mind, and represent the Beauties of a Human Soul, by proper Foils and Contrarieties, which serve as Graces in this Limning, and render this Musick of the Passions more powerful and enchanting?”

  Whoever has any Impression of what we call Politeness, is already so acquainted with the Decorum and Grace of Things, that he will readily confess a Pleasure and Enjoyment in every Survey and Contemplation of this Kind. Now, if in the way of Polite Pleasure, the Study and Love of Beauty be essential; the Study and Love of Sympathy and Order, on which Beauty depends, must also be essential in the same respect.

  ’Tis impossible we can advance the least in any Relish or Taste of outward Symmetry or Order, without acknowledging, that the proportionate and regular State, is the truly Prosperous and Natural in every Subject. The same Features, which make Deformity, create Incommodiousness and Disease. And the same Shapes and Proportions which make Beauty, afford Advantage, by adapting to Activity and Use. Even in the imitating or designing Arts, the Truth or Beauty of every Figure or Statue is measured from the Perfection of Nature, in her just adapting of every Limb and Proportion to the Activity, Strength, Dexterity, Life and Vigor of the particular Species or Animal design’d.

  All Beauty is Truth. True Features make the Beauty of the Face, and True Proportions the Beauty of Architecture, as True Measures that of Harmony and Musick.

  Thus Beauty and Truth are plainly join’d with the Notion of Utility and Convenience, even in the Apprehension of every ingenious Artist, the Architect, the Statuary, and the Painter. ’Tis the same in the Physicians Way. Natural Health is the just Proportion, Truth, and regular course of Things, in a Constitution. ’Tis the inward Beauty of the Body. And when the Harmony and just Measures of the rising Pulses, the circulating Humours, and the Spirits are disturbed or lost, Deformity enters, and with it Calamity and Ruin.

  Should not this, one would imagine, be still the same Case, and hold equally as to the Mind? Is there nothing there, which tends to Disturbance and Dissolution? Is there no Natural Tenor, Tone or Order of the Passions? No Beauty or Deformity in this Moral kind? or, allowing that there really is, must it not of consequence, in the same manner, imply Health or Sickness, Prosperity or Disaster? Will it not be found in this respect above all, “That what is Harmonious and Proportionable, is True; and what is at once both Beautiful and True, is, of consequence, Agreeable and Good ”?

  There is nothing more certain, than that a real Genius, and thorow Artist, in whatever kind, can never without the greatest Unwillingness and shame, be induc’d to act below his Character, and for mere Interest, be prevail’d with to prostitute his Art or Science, by performing contrary to its known Rules. Whoever has hear’d any thing of the Lives of famous Statuaries, Architects, or Painters, will call to Mind many Instances of this Nature. Or whoever has made any Acquaintance with the better Sort of Mechanicks, such as are real Lovers of their Art, and Masters in it, must have observ’d their Natural Fidelity in this respect. Be they ever so idle, dissolute or debauch’d; how regardless soever of other Rules; they abhor any Transgression in their Art, and would chuse to lose Customers and starve, rather than, by a base Compliance with the World, to act contrary to what they call the Justness and Truth of Work.

  “Sir, (said a poor Fellow of this kind to his rich Customer,) You are mistaken in coming to me, for such a Piece of Workmanship. Let who will make it for you, as you fancy; I know it to be Wrong. Whatever I have made hitherto, has been true Work. And neither for your sake or any bodies else, shall I put my Hand to any other.”

  This is Virtue! real Virtue, and Love of Truth; independent of Opinion, and above the World. This Disposition transferr’d to the whole of Life, perfects a Character, and makes that Probity and Worth, which the Learned are often at such a loss to explain. For, is there not a Workmanship, and a Truth in Actions? Or is the Workmanship of this kind less becoming, or less worthy of our Notice; that we should not in this Case be as surly as the honest Artizan, who has no other Philosophy, than what Nature and his Trade have taught him?

  Who can admire the outward Beauties; and not recur instantly to the inward, which are the more real and essential, the more naturally affecting, and of the highest Pleasure, as well as Profit and Advantage? Of which the Roman Orator thus expresses himself. “Honestum is what may be justly Commended upon its own Account, tho’ destitute of any Advantage or Reward; which what it is, cannot be so well understood from any Definition as from the common Sentiments of Mankind; from the Pursuits and from the Actions of the Virtuous, who do many things for no other Reason, but because it is Decent, Right, Honest, tho’ they see no Advantage to ensue.” The Men of Pleasure, who seem the greatest Contemners of this Philosophical Pleasure, are found often to confess her Charms; they can as heartily as others commend Honesty, and are as much struck with the Beauty of a generous Part. See Ld. Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks Vol. 1.p. 135 &c. p. 142. p. 261, 262. Vol. 3. p. 182, &c. See also a further Explanation and Defence of these Principles by the Author of the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.69

  Its Beneficialness.§V. Virtue is likewise the good Life and Practice, upon account of its Beneficialness and Utility, to which some have erroneously confin’d the Notion of Good. But, without confining thereto the Notion of Good, the Philosophers observe, “That Good, in common Acceptation, is Profit.” Which is agreeable to the common Sense of Mankind; for we all desire Profit. In their private Capacity, Mankind are intent upon their private Profit, and in their publick Capacity, upon their common Profit; for Laws are made for the common Profit, which is the End of the Society. What is profitable and beneficial, useful and needful, altho’ it be only wholesome, not sightly nor pleasant, for sufficient Cause and Reason ought to be liked, and is therefore Good. “He is a good Man (saith Cicero70 ) who profiteth whom he can, is hurtful to none.” The several Branches of Vice are mischievous and maleficial, simply and absolutely. In enormous Selfishness, Malevolence, Pride, Ambition, Fraud, Guile, Perfidiousness, Envy, Avarice, Circumvention, Wrath, Enmity, Calumny, Theft, Cruelty, Homicide, Profaneness and Contempt of God, and in all unjust and uncharitable Actions, there is a deadly Maleficent Deformity. The Definition, therefore, of the vicious Life and Practice, is the foul and ill-favour’d maleficial; as, on the contrary, the virtuous Life and Practice is the Beauteous-Beneficial. All the Branches of it are absolutely beneficial, and not only of Utility, but indispensible Necessity, to the Happiness of every one and of all. Thus Purity and Charity are, in Religion, inseparably connected, and the Connexion of them is a joining Beauty with Beneficialness. Now, tho’ the Beneficialness of the good Life may, in a large Acceptation of Beauty, be call’d the Beauteousness thereof; yet, in the strict Acceptation, these are distinguish’d, as the Beauty of the Rose is distinguish’d from its Medicinal Virtue.

  He, therefore, is the good Man, who is voluntarily benevolent to others thro’ goodness of Affection, whence it will be proper to examine, which are the good and natural, and which the ill and unnatural, Affections, which I find already excellently-well done to my Hand by the noble Author lately quoted. Charact. Vol. 2. Pag. 22, &c.

  In the first Place then, it may be observ’d, that if there be an Affection towards any Subject consider’d as private Good, which is not really such, but imaginary; this Affection, as being superfluous, and detracting from the Force of other requisite and good Affections, is in it-self vitious and ill, even in respect of the private Interest or Happiness of the Creature.

  If there can possibly be suppos’d in a Creature such an Affection towards Self-Good, as is actually, in its natural degree, conducing to his private Interest, and at the same time inconsistent with the publick Good; this may indeed be call’d still a vitious Affection: And on this Supposition a Creature cannot really be good and natural in respect of his Society or Publick, without being ill and unnatural towards Himself. But if the Affection be then only injurious to the Society, when it is immoderate, and not so when it is moderate, duly temper’d, and allay’d; then is the immoderate degree of the Affection truly vitious, but not the moderate. And thus, if there be found in any Creature a more than ordinary Self-Concernment, or Regard to private Good, which is inconsistent with the Interest of the Species or Publick; this must in every respect be esteem’d an ill and vitious Affection. And this is what we commonly call Selfishness, and disapprove so much, in whatever Creature we happen to discover it.

  On the other side, if the Affection towards private or Self-Good, however selfish it may be esteem’d, is in reality not only consistent with publick Good, but in some measure contributing to it; if it be such, perhaps, as for the good of the Species in general, every Individual ought to share: ’Tis so far from being ill, or blameable in any sense, that it must be acknowledg’d absolutely necessary to constitute a Creature Good. For, if the Want of such an Affection as that towards Self-Preservation, be injurious to the Species; a Creature is ill and unnatural, as well thro’ this Defect, as thro’ the Want of any other natural Affection. And this no-one would doubt to pronounce, if he saw a Man, who minded not any Precipices which lay in his way, nor made any Distinction of Food, Diet, Cloathing, or whatever else related to his Health and Being. The same would be averr’d of one, who had a Disposition which render’d him averse to any Commerce with Womankind, and of consequence unfitted him thro’ Illness of Temper (and not merely thro’ a Defect of Constitution) for the Propagation of his Species or Kind.

  Thus the Affection towards Self-Good, may be a good Affection, or an ill-one. For, if this private Affection be too strong, (as when the excessive Love of Life unfits a Creature for any generous Act,) then is it undoubtedly vitious; and if vitious, the Creature who is mov’d by it, is vitiously mov’d, and can never be otherwise than vitious in some degree, when mov’d by that Affection. Therefore, if thro’ such an earnest and passionate Love of Life, a Creature be accidentally induc’d to do Good (as he might be upon the same terms induc’d to do Ill) he is no more a good Creature for this Good he executes, than a Man is the more an honest or good Man, either for pleading a just Cause, or fighting in a good one, for the sake merely of his Fee or Stipend.

  Whatsoever therefore is done which happens to be advantageous to the Species, thro’ an Affection merely towards Self-Good, does not imply any more Goodness in the Creature, than as the Affection it-self is good. Let him, in any particular, act ever so well; if at the bottom, it be that selfish Affection alone which moves him; he is in himself still vitious. Nor can any Creature be consider’d otherwise, when the Passion towards Self-Good, tho’ ever so moderate, is his real Motive in the doing that, to which a natural Affection for his Kind ought by right to have inclin’d him.

  And indeed whatever exteriour Helps or Succours an ill-dispos’d Creature may find, to push him on towards the performance of any one good Action; there can no Goodness arise in him ’till his Temper be so far chang’d, that in the Issue he comes in earnest to be led by some immediate Affection, directly, and not accidentally, to Good, and against Ill.

  For Instance; If one of those Creatures suppos’d to be by Nature tame, gentle, and favourable to Mankind, be, contrary to his natural Constitution, fierce and savage; we instantly remark the Breach of Temper, and own the Creature to be unnatural and corrupt. If at any time afterwards, the same Creature, by good Fortune or right Management, comes to lose his Fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and treatable, like other Creatures of his Kind; ’tis acknowledg’d that the Creature thus restor’d, becomes good and natural. Suppose, now, that the Creature has indeed a tame and gentle Carriage; but that it proceeds only from the Fear of his Keeper; which is set aside, his predominant Passion instantly breaks out: Then is his Gentleness not his real Temper; but his true and genuine Nature or Natural Temper remaining just as it was, the Creature is still as ill as ever.

  Nothing therefore being properly either Goodness or Illness in a Creature, except what is from natural Temper; “A good Creature is such a one as by the natural Temper or Bent of his Affections is carry’d primarily and immediately, and not secondarily and accidentally, to Good, and against Ill”: And an ill Creature is just the contrary; viz. “One who is wanting in right Affections, of force enough to carry him directly towards Good, and bear him out against Ill; or who is carry’d by other Affections directly to Ill, and against Good.”

  When in general, all the Affections or Passions are suited to the publick Good, or Good of the Species, as above-mention’d; then is the natural Temper intirely good. If, on the contrary, any requisite Passion be wanting; or if there be any one supernumerary, or weak, or anywise disserviceable or contrary to that main End; then is the natural Temper, and consequently the Creature himself, in some measure, corrupt and ill.

  There is no need of mentioning either Envy, Malice, Frowardness, or other such hateful Passions; to shew in what manner they are ill, and constitute an ill Creature. But it may be necessary perhaps to remark, that even as Kindness and Love of the most natural sort (such as that of any Creature for its Offspring) if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, is undoubtedly vitious. For thus over-great Tenderness destroys the Effect of Love, and excessive Pity renders us uncapable of giving succour. Hence the Excess of motherly Love is own’d to be a vitious Fondness; over-great Pity, Effeminacy and Weakness; over-great Concern for Self-preservation, Meanness and Cowardice; too little, Rashness; and none at all, or that which is contrary (viz. a Passion leading to Self-destruction) a mad and desperate Depravity.

  We know that every Creature has a private Good and Interest of his own; which Nature has compell’d him to seek, by all the Advantages afforded him, within the Compass of his Make. We know that there is in Reality a right and a wrong State of every Creature; and that his right-one is by Nature forwarded, and by Himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every Creature a certain Interest or Good; there must be also a certain End, to which every thing in his Constitution must naturally refer. To this End if any thing either in his Appetites, Passions, or Affections be not conducing, but the contrary; we must of necessity own it ill to him. And in this manner he is ill, with respect to himself; as he certainly is, with respect to others of his kind, when any such Appetites or Passions make him any-way injurious to them. Now, if by the natural Constitution of any rational Creature, the same Irregularities of Appetite which make him ill to Others, make him ill also to Himself; and if the same Regularity of Affections, which causes him to be good in one sense, causes him to be good also in the other; then is that Goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real Good and Advantage to himself. And thus Virtue and Interest may be found at last to agree. So far Ld. Shaftesbury.71 This Cumberland has set in a clear and a strong Light.

  “We ought (saith Gassendus in his Treatise concerning the moral Philosophy of Epicurus)72to admire the Contrivance of the most wise Author of Nature, who, because all Action, even the most Natural, such as Seeing and Hearing, was in it-self laborious and troublesome, which Use makes so familiar to us as to become insensible, hath therefore season’d every Operation with the Blandishment of Pleasure, and that so much the greater, by how much the Action it-self was more Necessary, whether to the Preservation of the Species, or of the Individual. Animals would either not care, or they would forget, or not take Notice, at what times it might be proper to propagate, their Species, or to Eat and Drink for prolonging the Life of the Individual, unless they were naturally spurr’d by an uneasiness exciting them to such Operations, whose concomitant Pleasure takes that uneasiness away, whence we are naturally allur’d to such Actions.” This seems to be the true Reason, why the Deity has made such Actions Pleasurable, as we ought to do, were no such Pleasure connected with them.

  Suppose a Brute possess’d of many good Affections, as Love to his Kind, Courage, Gratitude, or Pity. If to this Animal Reason and Reflexion were added, it would at the same instant approve of Gratitude, Kindness and Pity; and this would be Virtue, this would be the having a Sense of Right and Wrong, when Worth and Honesty as such, were the Objects of his Affection; which one may do, before they have any settled Notions of a Deity, which early Youth, and the more unciviliz’d Nations, do not much refine upon, who yet are not void of a just Notion of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong.

  If by Temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous;yet resists these Passions, his Virtue is the greater, provided his resistance arise from his Affection towards Virtue it-self, not from Self-Interest, as is already prov’d. Yet Propensity to Vice is no ingredient in Virtue, or any-way necessary to compleat a virtuous Character. If there be any part of the Temper in which ill Passions or Affections are seated, whilst in another part the Affections towards moral Good are such as absolutely to master those Attempts of their Antagonists; this is the greatest Proof imaginable, that a strong Principle of Virtue lies at the bottom, and has possess’d it-self of the natural Temper. Whereas if there be no ill Passions stirring, a Person may be indeed more cheaply virtuous; that is to say, he may conform himself to the known Rules of Virtue, without sharing so much of a virtuous Principle as another. Yet if that other Person, who has the Principle of Virtue so strongly implanted, comes at last to lose those contrary Impediments suppos’d in him, he certainly loses nothing in Virtue; but on the contrary, losing only what is vitious in his Temper, is left more intire to Virtue, and possesses it in a higher degree. So far Lord Shaftesbury.73

  To it the Names of Praise and Commendation belong.§VI. If the Beauteous-Beneficial is the good Life and Practice, the Names of Praise and Commendation necessarily belong to it; for what is Good, compriseth in it-self all Praise and Commendation: And to the contrary Life and Practice, the Names of Odiousness and Disgrace, of Infamy and Dispraise belong. “What is dispraisable for it-self, is upon that account named Vice.”74 And “The Good of Honesty is that which maketh them Praise-worthy, that have this Good worthy of Praise.”75 The Operations of Virtue are called the laudable Operations. To understand what is Virtue and what is Vice, a great Philosopher prescribeth a Young Man this Method. “Consider what sort of Men it is, that you praise, when you are unbyas’d with any Affection: Is it the Just or the Unjust? The Just. Is it the Temperate, or Intemperate? The Temperate. Is it the Continent or Incontinent? The Continent.”76 Virtue is, therefore, the laudable Practice, and thence it is, that all Mankind would be in some sort reputed Virtuous. “For who is there that would not seem Beneficent? That doth not desire to be accounted good in the midst of all his atrocious Villanies and Injuries? That doth not put some colour of Right upon those things that he hath done most outrageously?”77

  The good Life and Practice is also excellent and Productive of the Happiness of others; otherwise it were not Praise-worthy; upon which account, ordinary self-regard for our own Happiness is not Virtue. “To Love one’s self, to Spare one’s self, to get to one’s self; what is there excellent in so doing?”78

  The good Life and Practice is also the Honourable and Comfortable. There is a Dignity in it, which exempts its Possessors from being Vile, and affords Comforts of another sort than the Pleasures of Sin do; those Substantial vital Enjoyments, which are infinitely Comfortable.

  The good Life and Practice is also the true Perfection of Man. As all Beings have their Perfection by their proper Virtue, which is their Nature raised to its Height, such as Sharpness of Sight is in the Eye, Quickness of Hearing in the Ear, Swiftness in the Feet; So the good Life and Practice is the proper Virtue of Man, raised to its Height and Perfection.

  The good Life and Practice must not be thought merely a Publick self-Convenience, which is necessary for Men, only because of the necessity of their Affairs, but it is the doing what is simply and absolutely convenient. “Wisdom is a doing what is convenient—As a Stage-player must not have any, but a certain Action; and a Dancer must not have any, but a certain Motion: So a Man must live not any, but a certain kind of Life, which we call Convenient and Consentaneous.”79

  The Beauteous-Beneficial Life and Practice is likewise Righteousness, which is a threefold Comprehension of Duty, as to God, to others and to our-Selves; Piety towards God, Justice and Charity towards Men, and Sobriety, as to our-selves. Hence we may resolve a celebrated Question in Morality, What is the Rule and Measure of Good and EvilThe Rule and Measure of Good and Evil., Just and Unjust? For Righteousness is the Rule and Measure of Practice, all intelligent Agents must be regulated by it; but of Righteousness there is not properly any Rule or Measure but its own Nature, which is the Beauteous-Beneficial Life and Practice, consider’d as that which ought to be. This is the Rule and Measure of Righteousness constitutively such. But, beside this, there may be a Rule and Measure of Righteousness evidentially and declaratively such. The common Opinion is, “That right Reason is the Rule and Measure of Good and Evil.” Which may signify, that the Discernments and Dictates of Reason are only evidentially and declaratively the Rule and Measure of Good and Evil; as a positive Law is, in Matters of positive Institution, constitutively the Measure of Good and Evil. In this latter Sense, the right Discernments and Dictates of Reason are not the Rule and Measure of Good and Evil, as they are not in such Sense, the Rule and Measure of Good Air, or Good Medicines. As things are not true, so neither are they right and good, because they are conformable to Reason: But Reason is therefore right and good, because it is conformable to the Things that are so. This, therefore, is not a good Definition; That which is agreeable to a rational Intelligent Nature, as it is such, is Good; That which is dissentaneous or disagreeable to it, is Evil. For Good is not to be accommodated to a rational Nature, but the rational Nature is to be accommodated to Good, and its Reason is then right, when it rightly discerneth between Good and Evil. Some suppose, that the Happiness of the System of Rational Agents, is the Sole End and Measure of Good: But this Opinion maketh Virtue to be Policy, rather than Virtue. The only Rule and Measure of Good and Evil is the Beauteous-Beneficial Practice, and the various means of discerning what is so; but the common Happiness of the whole, rightly understood, may be counted the Measure of it as it is Beneficial.

  The Arbitrary Will of God is not the Rule and Measure of Good and Evil.§VII. A Mistake, touching the Rule and Measure of Good and and Evil, of greater Importance than any of these, is this; “That the Arbitrary Will of God is constitutively the adequate Rule and Measure of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, and that nothing is Good or Evil, but because it is commanded or forbidden.” With which absurd Notion, Bp. Taylor falleth in, affirming, “That nothing is just or unjust, of it-self, until some Law of God or Man doth supervene. God cannot do an unjust thing; because whatsoever he willeth or doeth, is therefore Just, because he willeth and doeth it, his Will being the Measure of Justice. It is but a weak Distinction, to affirm, some things to be forbidden by God, because they are unlawful, and some to be unlawful, because they are forbidden. For this last part of the Distinction taketh in all that is unlawful in the World, and therefore the other is a dead Member, and may be lopp’d off. So Occham affirmeth against the common Sentence of the Schools, (as his manner is,) Nullus est actus malus, nisi quatenus a Deo prohibitus est, & qui non potest fieri bonus, si a Deo praecipiatur &c converso: Every thing is good or bad, according as it is commanded or forbidden by God, and no otherwise.”80 These Sayings are attended with a self-Contradiction, “That it is actually and indispensably necessary, that we love God, and that he cannot Command us to hate him.”81 And ’tis but reasonable, that they should contradict themselves, who contradict Common Sense, and contemplate Goodness at the same rate of Extravagance, that some others contemplate Truth, who affirm, “That God indeed does necessarily conceive those Truths, which immediately relate to himself, his Nature, Essence, and Attributes: He was never indifferent as to these; but as for all other Truths, which are not God himself, these wholly depend upon the most free and arbitrary Determination of his own Will, and are only therefore true, because he appointed them to be so; and that there might, if God had so pleased, either have been none of these at all, or else quite different from what they now are.”82 If Truth is of so indeterminate a Nature, Good must be as Arbitrary, as some say, “That by the mere Light of Nature, without Divine Revelation, it cannot be made appear, that there is any difference between Vice and Virtue; altho’ we were assur’d, that there is a God. That nothing is Just and Good, but that only, which he commandeth, and for no other Reason, but because he doeth so.”83 They that discourse at this rate, are extremely deficient, either in their Reason, or in their Religion. According to this Scheme, Law is suppos’d to make Justice, whereas, without antecedent Justice, it is impossible, that there can be any made Law. For no Law can be made, but by one, who hath Right to be obey’d, and to whom Obedience is due: Right and due Obedience, and consequently Just and Unjust, is necessarily antecedent to any made Law. If nothing is Unrighteous, but by a made Law, Mankind must be consider’d, as perfectly at Liberty and un-obliged, antecedently to that Law; and, if we suppose them to be perfectly at Liberty and un-obliged, then that Law could not oblige them; for no Command or Prohibition can oblige them to Obedience, who are Persons perfectly at Liberty and unoblig’d. Nor can they oblige themselves by any Pacts or Covenants of their own making; for, if there be nothing in its own Nature Unjust, it cannot be in its own Nature an unjust thing, to break their own Pacts and Covenants, but they may unmake them, as fast as they make them. And, consequently, if we suppose them, to be once perfectly at Liberty and unoblig’d, they must for ever continue, so, if there be nothing unjust in its own Nature. If nothing is, essentially and in its own Nature, unrighteous, there is nothing so bad, which God may not do, (lye and deny himself, condemn the Obedient and reward the Disobedient;) there is nothing so Wicked, which God may not command, (Atheism, Blasphemy, Demonolatry, Fraud, Cruelty;) and a System of Moral Truths, Virtues, and Duties, might be made, by Divine Appointment, just contrary to those which are now such; and, by arbitrary Will and Appointment, all manner of Wickedness would be Righteousness; Good would be Evil, and Evil Good: But, if Religion and Virtue were thus destroy’d, God himself would be destroy’d, for, without Virtue, God is but a Name. If God is essentially Good and Holy, a good and holy Nature and Life is essential to God; which is, therefore, not a mere Arbitrary Determination of the Divine Will. The several Attributes of Benignity, Mercy, Justice, Veracity, Faithfulness, and such like, as they are in God, are that which is essentially and in its own Nature Good; therefore they are so, as they are in Man.

  Nor of Truth.If God, by his free Appointment, did not make this Proposition to be a Truth, “A Being absolutely perfect is necessarily-existent”; it is a fond Imagination, to suppose, that by his free Appointment, the like self-evident Propositions are made Truths. The Mind clearly discerneth, that this is essential to the Whole, to be bigger than the Part; that it is essential to a Cause, To be, in Order of Nature, before the Effect; that it is essential to a plain Triangle, To have its three Angles equal to two right ones; these are therefore necessary, unchangeable and eternal Truths. But what ever the Mind clearly perceives to be repugnant to the essential Nature of Things, that she calleth Impossible and a Contradiction, which is as repugnant to Conception as it is to Reality, and which determines the extent, even of Power omnipotent; for it can do nothing that is a Contradiction or impossible.

  Which are such antecedently to the Divine Appointment.§VIII. Bonum Honestum or Virtue is, not a mere Name, but hath its proper specific Nature, which is the Beauteous-Beneficial Practice, as is already prov’d; which it is as certain, that this Name, [Virtue] denotes, as that the Word [Man] denotes a Rational Animal, or that a Square signifies a Plain Figure with Four equal sides and right Angles. Moral Good is, therefore, the Beauteous-Beneficial Practice essentially and in its own Nature, and consequently it is necessarily, unchangeably, eternally so. “Order, Measure, Comeliness, Pulchritude, Elegance, and Congruity of Parts, which no Animal but Man discerneth, Reason transferreth to the Mind, and thinketh, that they ought to be observed there, and the Observance of them is that which maketh that Honestas, which is in its own Nature laudable.”84 If therefore Beauty, Pulchritude, Order, Measure, Congruity, Proportion, are not wholly of Arbitrary Determination and Institution, not variable at pleasure, but of a fix’d determinate Nature; if in Pulchritude of Body there must be a certain Figure, Order, and Symmetry of Parts; if in a good and Virtuous Soul there must be such an orderly Subordination of Parts, as there is in a well-order’d City; hence it appeareth, that the Good in Morality, is that which is essentially and in its own Nature such, and is not a matter of Arbitrary Determination. In several instances, indeed, Mankind are of different Sentiments, touching what is graceful and handsome, regular and beautiful; yet none can deny, that the natural Position and Situation of the Parts of the Face is Beautiful, and that a Distortion of them is hideously ill-favour’d. Such Deformities of the Body are a faint resemblance of those of the Mind. And as the politer part of Mankind are extremely averse to any Filthiness or Deformity of Body; so in the truly-virtuous there is greater Aversion to any Vice in the Mind. “Take not, says Temperance, whence it becometh not, Eat not, Drink not; sustain, endure, nay, rather die, than commit any thing contrary to Decorum.”85 So much for Virtue in its Beauteous Light.

  The Good in Morality, as it is the Beneficial Kind of Practice, is that which is Essentially and in its own Nature Good, and is not of arbitrary Institution. “Charity, Peace, Brotherly Love are Good, not only, because God hath commanded them, or willed us to follow them: But God, by his Law, doth will and command us to follow after those things, because they were always Good, even before he willd or commanded us to follow them. The Time will never be, wherein Innocency, Brotherly-Love, Charity, Peace and Loving-Kindness shall be as displeasing to God, as Murder, Hatred, Malice, Cruelty and Uncharitableness hitherto always have been. He cannot enact a Law, either to authorize these or the like Practices, or to prohibit the contrary Virtues.86Whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as Justice and Injustice, Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong; according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous and true. If the mere Will, Decree, or Law of God, be said absolutely to constitute Right and Wrong, then are these latter Words of no Significancy at all. For thus, if each Part of a Contradiction were affirm’d for Truth by the supreme Power, they would consequently become true. Thus, if one were decreed to suffer for another’s Fault, the Sentence would be just and equitable. And thus, in the same manner, if arbitrarily, and without Reason, some Beings were destin’d to perpetual Ill, and others as constantly to enjoy Good; this also would pass under the same Denomination. But to say of any thing, that it is just or unjust, on such a Foundation as this, is to say nothing, or to speak without a meaning.”87 If a City maketh Laws and Statutes, which seem to them profitable, yet, really, they may be pernicious; for Things are not profitable and hurtful, merely in our Opinion, but they are really and in their own Nature such; and a Law cannot make Things noxious to be wholesome. Theft, Adultery, falsifying Wills, (Crimes forbidden by the moral Law,) can never be made innocent or salutary by any Votes or Statutes, as the contrary Virtues cannot, by any Authority whatsoever, be made Evil. The Virtue of the Eye, or of a Watch, is their Beauteous-beneficial Properties, which is their Goodness and Perfection, and their Aptitude for their End and Use, and no other Properties can constitute a good Eye or a good Watch: So the Virtue of intelligent Agents is the Beauteous beneficial Life and Practice, which is their Goodness and Perfection, and their Aptitude for their End and Use; and no other Life and Practice can possibly constitute them good, or good Agents, that is, the Well-doers, and not the Evil-doers. Whence, in the Nature and Reason of the Thing, it is indispensably requisite in all intelligent Agents, and is to them matter of Law or Obligation. For Law or Obligation (in a large but very proper Sense) is nothing else, but a Non licet, or a Boundary to License. Thus, according to Aristotle, ὁ νόμος το μέσον, Measure is Law, ἡ τάξις νόμος, Concinnity of Order is Law, so Plato saith in his Gorgias. “As the ordinate Dispositions of the Body are called Health: So this Name Law and Legitimate belongeth to the ordinate Dispositions and Ornaments of the Soul, (whence Men become Legitimate and Decorous,) which are Justice and Temperance.” The Rules of Musick, by which the Measures of Singing and Playing are determin’d were call’d by the Greeks Νόμοι, Laws, from those Bounds which the Musicians of old prescrib’d for the tuning of Voices and Instruments, they observing in every Nomus, its proper Intention. “They were call’d Nomi (Laws) because in every one of them it was not lawful to transgress the prescrib’d (νενομισμένον) sort of Intention.”88 If the old Musicians had prescrib’d no Rules of Musick, yet there would be unavoidably Laws of Musick in their own Nature such, without the Observance whereof there could be no Singing or Playing well: So in the Discipline of Morality, if no Law were made by a Superior Authority, yet some Practices would be notic’d to the Mind as Well-doing, that cannot be left undone without Crime, and the contrary as Evil-doing, which Notices are necessarily Laws, as being Boundaries to License. Human Practice must be the Good, in one Sense; it must be the Beauteous-beneficial, or it cannot be the Good, in the other Sense, that which is to be lik’d. Nothing is done, as it ought to be, unless it be well done, and a Mechanick Work is not well done, unless it is Beauteous-beneficial; the Works and Doings of Men, therefore, ought to be of that Character.

  The good Life and Practice is the just Practice towards all the Objects of Practice.§IX. The Beauteous-beneficial Life and Practice is Righteousness, not only in respect of the Agent, as being what he ought to do, but in respect of the Objects, as being that which ought to be done to them, and a giving them what is their Right and Due. Jus suum cuique tribuit. Therefore this Life and Practice may not unfitly be call’d, the just Life and Practice, (the opposite to the injurious,) which, being a Debt unto all, is, therefore, the Good of Duty to all, and such Duty, as is not of arbitrary Appointment, but is natural and necessary Justice, that which, in its own Nature, is Right and Due, Just and Good; the Rights and Dues of the Universe of Rational Agents being Necessary, Immutable, and Eternal. For such are the Right and Dues of God, of the natural Relations of Parents and Children; and that the Rights and Dues of Mankind in general are such, will appear by considering a Summary of the Philosophers Discipline of Virtue. Moral Philosophy, in the first place, adjusteth the Rates of Things, allotting to all Things that Measure of Esteem, which belongs to them: And, in the next place, it takes care, that the Bent of the Soul about them (wherewith the Actions must accord) be ordinate, proportionate, and agreeable to the Dignity of the Things. Whence the virtuous Life necessarily becomes Beauteous; for Order, Measure, Congruity, Proportion and Symmetry are Beauteous things, and the Rectitude of the Soul, in duly valuing and affecting the things Divine and Excellent, and duly depreciating the Vile, is also a Nobleness of Nature, an Excellency and Pulchritude of the Soul: Hence, also, the virtuous Man reapeth this inestimable Utility and Benefit, he escapeth those Snares, whereby Men are drawn to the vile and maleficent Practices. For the vitious Opinions that Men have of secular Honour, Riches and Pleasure, are the Fountain of the greatest Part of flagitious Practices. Therefore, towards Man, do those Things which are according to his Dignity, which Valuation is his Due. Accordingly, he is so valued in the Beauteous-beneficial Life, which consisteth in observing an Equality between Man and Man, another Man and one’s self, without any inordinate Partiality or warping to our own side. If another Man must be rated according to his Dignity, he must be rated, compar’d with Self; and, therefore, must be of impartially-equal Consideration and Regard, and must have an impartially-equal share in the Distribution of our Esteem and Affection; and, consequently, another Man must be another self. He is such in Constitution and Condition, and it is, therefore, necessarily his Due, to be such in our internal and external Practice, our Will and Actions; therefore these great Laws, Whatsoever ye would, that Men should do to you, do ye even so to them; Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy-self, (which are the summary of Justice and Charity to our Neighbour,) are in the Nature and Reason of the Thing, Matter of Duty and Justice, of Law and Obligation; such is the Gratitude of a Beneficiary towards his Benefactor, who hath merited it, and whose Right and Due it is; and, in the Nature and Reason of the Thing, it is the Right and Due of a Righteous Person, and therefore matter of Law, to be justified, not condemn’d: So to be free from any intended Hurt, is the Right of an innocent Person. Therefore, to hate him and bear him ill-will, to bear any evil Passions against him, evil Thoughts of him, malignly to censure him, proudly to despise him, to speak against his Credit, to do him Prejudice in Soul, Body or Possessions, is against his Right and Due, and is, essentially and in its own Nature, Injury and Injustice. And, in general, we must pronounce touching every Man, that whatever cannot be denied him, without repugnance to the Beauteous-Beneficial Practice, is necessarily his Right and Due.89 Whence Rights and Dues accrue unto Men by Contract, and the several sorts of Contracts amongst Men are so many Settlements of Rights and Dues, because no Man may break Faith, or be faithless in his Dealings, which is a gross repugnance to the Beauteous-Beneficial Life and Practice, as is also the denying Alms to an Honest Poor Man, which is, therefore, a sort of Due to him. Prov. 3. 27. So if a Man denieth Necessaries to his own Soul and Body, if he doth not order them well, and keep them in Chastity and Temperance; if he prostituteth, hurteth, diseaseth and destroyeth them, if he taketh not an ordinate care of his Welfare, of his Reputation and Maintenance in this Life, and of his future Felicity, his Practice is a Repugnance to the Beauteous-Beneficial, he denieth to himself, what he may not deny to himself, and what cannot be denied to any one of Mankind, without being injurious and unjust towards him.

  We should do all things no otherwise, “than as if Justice it self did them”;90 Justice regardeth Things, as they are in themselves without partial Regard to this or that Person. If, upon a true Judgment of Things, another appeareth to deserve any Love of Complacence, Praise and Honour, as much as my-self, Justice saith, he ought to have an equal share of it. If the Temporal and Eternal Concerns of another be equally valuable with mine own, I am not equally (or well) affected, if they be not of impartially-equal Regard with me. So the Good of Two, being twice as much as the Good of One, is to be, ordinarily, so far preferr’d before the Good of One. Justice saith, if an Owner leaveth his Ground uncultivated for many Years, it is fit he should lose it; if any will not Work, neither shall he Eat: But what a Man getteth by his honest Labour and Industry, of Right and Due belongeth to him and is his Property. Such Dictates of Justice introduc’d Dominion and Property amongst Men. For, altho’ there is much of Irregularity and Confusion in Human Affairs, and Power ordinarily prevails against Right; yet it is not to be suppos’d, that Property was introduc’d among Men, merely by Division of the Earth, and by Occupancy (arbitrarious and fortuitous,)91 or merely by positive Law;92 but upon Grounds and Reasons of Justice. When a Dish of Meat is brought to the Table, before it is cut up, and every Man has taken his Share, then what part one hath taken to himself, that is not common to the rest, but is proper to him. But this Property is not merely from Occupancy or Possession, or Division by Consent; it ariseth from this Ground and Reason of Justice; to every Man, that hath not forfeited it, of Right and Due belongeth (altho’ not this or that particular share, yet in general) a share of the Food which the Earth affordeth; and his Occupancy or Seizure of this or that particular Piece of Food at the common Table, is a particular Determination and Limitation of his general Right, and an Inclosure made thereby, which none may invade without Leave. This Similitude is easily applicable to the Original Partition of the Earth, and the Accommodations thereof, and to the introduction of Property; for, antecedently thereto, the Founder of the Earth had made a Donation of it to Mankind; and, when they divided the Earth by Occupancy, (for so they divided it,) this their Occupancy was an Inclosure made by a particular Determination and Limitation of their Rights in general to some Part of the Earth, and some of its Accommodations, for their Place, Food and Raiment; Nor can there be any such Community of Things, wherein every one must not have his peculiar Place and Share of Food and Raiment, distinct and apart from all others. Therefore Natural and Necessary Justice, in a great degree, introduced Property of Goods amongst Men, and made them Owners, who, doubtless, have Right, to transfer their Rights, and to alienate their Property by Donation or by Contract; upon which account, as well as by the Obligation of keeping Faith, Contracts become Settlements of the Rights and Dues of Men usually, they lose and forfeit their Rights and Dues by a change of their Qualifications; for so Men forfeit their Estates and Lives into the Hands of Justice; the due Objects of Favour become worthy of Punitive Displeasure; as on the contrary, he that is an apt and worthy Object of punitive Justice to-day, may be a fit and due Object of Clemency to-morrow. And who does not applaud and honour such Beauteous-Beneficial Practice? Nature constraineth us to love those, in whom Liberality, Beneficence, Justice, Fidelity, and such other Virtues appear; because Bonum Honestum, of it-self, and for its own sake, is pleasing, and by its Beauty, is moving and taking to the Minds of Men.

  The good Life and Practice is the social.§X. The Good in Morality, that is the Beauteous-Beneficial Life and Practice, and the just Practice, is, in conjunction therewith, the living socially. The Obligation that is upon rational Beings to this social Life and Practice as such, (to live in Society, and to live the good Life in Society, and to be of a social Disposition and Practice,) may seem to be of mere arbitrary Appointment, because it must be deduc’d from the Creation of the Universe, which was Arbitrary. Yet, notwithstanding this Deduction of it, it must be denominated a natural necessary Obligation; For, altho’ the Creation of the Universe was Arbitrary, yet, supposing this Creation, the rational Beings that were made, were necessarily of Right and by Obligation Gods Subjects and Servants; they were therefore made to be in Society with him, the Citizens of his Kingdom, the Parts of this Whole; and, consequently, they were made for the Whole, to constitute and conserve it, and for the Common Good thereof. Of this Whole the Pagan Theologers mistaken Account of the Universe is an Image and Resemblance. They look’d upon the World as the common City of Gods and Men, and every one as a Part thereof, which naturally and necessarily inferreth, that we ought to prefer the common Utility before our own. So Holy Men live and lay down their Lives for the Interest of the Kingdom of God, which is the truly Noble and Illustrious Whole, and the Interest thereof is the truly noble Common Good, to which all the Parts are to cooperate and be subservient. If they were made to be Parts of this Whole, and to promote the Commonweal thereof, they were necessarily made for the Holy-social (or the God-social) Life and Practice, which chiefly consists in the Holy-social Practice of Love, or the Practice of the Divine Love. The Holy-social Life and Practice is also necessarily the Just Practice towards all in their Social Capacity; the Holy-social Duty to God, (universal Piety, without which there is no living in Society with him;) the Holy-social Duty to our Fellow-Citizens, and to our-selves, who are also Parts of the Whole, whence, by prejudicing our own true Perfection and Felicity, we are injurious to the Whole. To which Holy-social Practice Rational Creatures are oblig’d, not merely by one solitary Obligation, but by innumerable necessary Obligations, from the Nature and Reason of Things, conjoin’d with the necessary Constitution of the Universe. For how innumerable are their Obligations from thence, to be and live in the State of Society with God and his Liege People, as his Servants and Subjects? To Piety, and all the Branches of universal Piety? How many and great Obligations have the regenerate and Divine Family to Unity and Concord, to a special Love and Kindness towards the Fellow-Citizens of the Holy Empire, that are Members of the same Mystical Body, animated by the same Holy Spirit, Children of the same Heavenly Father, so nearly related to him, so highly belov’d by him, and that are Co-heirs of the same Inheritance? How many and how great Obligations are there upon every one of them, not to live only or chiefly for self, but that their Care and Concern be for the Interest of the Whole, and for themselves as Parts of the Whole? The Law of the Kingdom of God, therefore, must be consider’d as the Law of Nature, that is, not of mere arbitrary Appointment; but the whole of it is what is in its own Nature (supposing the Constitution of the Universe) necessarily and immutably Matter of Law, Duty, and Justice. We cannot doubt, but it may be denominated, so far and in such Sense, the Law of Nature.

  There is great Analogy and Resemblance between the Human-social and the Holy-social Life and Practice; for, altho’ the World of Mankind is not properly a Polity as the City of God is, yet they are the Aggregate of several Polities, Families, Cities, and Kingdoms, every one of which is an Image of the City of God. The Civil-social Virtue requireth, that the Parts of them be subservient to the Whole, and co-operate to the Good thereof, else their Practice is not the social; nor is their Practice the Human-social, but destructive to Society, if it is not in some sort, the Just Practice towards the Deity. “For it is more possible for a City to subsist without a Foundation, than that a Polity should consist, if the Opinion of the Gods be taken away. If you go about the Earth, you may find Citys without Walls, Letters, Kings, sumptuous Houses, without Riches, Money, Theatres and places of Exercise: Butan Atheous City, a City without a Temple, Prayers, Oaths, Vaticinations, Sacrifices for procuring Good and averting Evil, none ever saw, or will see.”93 The Human-Social Practice is the just Practice towards various special Relations, Sovereign and Subject, Parents and Children, Brethren, Husband and Wife, Master and Servant, (the Nature of which Relations is necessarily a Law to those that live in Society with such Relations,) and in general towards all, that all that are Fellow-Citizens, who could no more support Society, if they refuse and rob one another of their Rights, than an Animate Body could subsist, if the Members did so by one another. In every Polity, therefore, the just Practice, towards Fellow-Citizens in general, is indispensably necessary, as being the only social Practice, which social Practice is not to be confin’d to the particular Polities of Men; for there is no living the Good Life without exercising towards Mankind in general the Beauteous-beneficial Practice, (Innocence, Inoffensiveness, universal Benevolence, Beneficence, Justice and Equity, Mansuetude and Peaceableness, Veracity, Fidelity, C and or and Humanity;) nor without exercising towards them the just Practice; for every Man is a Citizen of this World, hath his Rights and Dues, with respect to the universe of Mankind; and, till he hath made a Forfeiture, it is necessarily his Right and Due to have a place upon Earth, and a portion of its Accommodations, and not to be prejudic’d by any in his Life, Liberty, or other secular Concerns. Mankind, therefore, are related to one another as Fellow-Citizens (tho’ not in the strict Polical Notion) and as Human-Societists, whence they are oblig’d to the human-social Life and Practice towards one another. As every particular Country is a part of the World, which is every Man’s Country, so every particular Man and Nation is a part of this great Nation, (which are all one Kindred, Family and Tribe,) a Part of this Whole, and is for the Whole, to promote its Good, but no farther than it is consistent with, and so as to render it subordinate to, the Interest of a far greater and better Whole.

  The Law of Nature Immutable, Eternal, Universal.§XI. The Law of Nature therefore, besides that it is impos’d by a superior Authority, appeareth to be a comprehension of what is, in its own Nature, matter of Law or Obligation, antecedently to that Authority; whence these three honorary Attributes necessarily belong to it, Immutability, Eternity, Universality, which Cicero hath conjoin’d. “All Nations are at all times within the Extent of one Law sempiternal and immutable.”

  (1.) In opposition to its Immutability, which is generally acknowledg’d by Philosophers, Lawyers and Divines, some dispute (or rather loosely declaim), “That the Law of Nature can be dispens’d with by Divine Power.”94 But these will have (what none will allow them) an altering the case and a changing the matter, to be a dispensing with the Law. They have alledg’d nothing, that looks like an Argument, save only these few Matrimonial Cases, The dispensing with Polygamy, and permission of Divorces in the Old-Testament, and the dispensing with the Law against the incestuous Marriage of Brother and Sister in the beginning of the World. But these Matrimonial Cases are weak Allegations; for it is not certain, how far they are determin’d by the Law of Nature, and how far they properly belong to positive Law. The Objector himself affirmeth, “Thatthe Marriage of Brother and Sister is unlawful only, because forbidden by positive Law.”95 But the Lawyers say, “Those are incestuous Marriages, which are prohibited by Nature.” And it is more reasonable to suppose, that all the Laws in Scripture against Incest are, not absolutely, but in a degree and measure, greater or lesser, Laws of Nature, or Branches of the Law of Nature, at least the slenderer and remoter Branches thereof: Of which sort is the Law against setting the younger before the first-born, Gen. 29. 26. and 48. 18. Deut. 21. 16, 17. which must be reputed, in some sort, a Branch of the Law of Nature, because the doing otherwise is ordinarily in the Nature of the Thing an Incongruity; yet is not such an Incongruity, but that it may be outweigh’d by a greater Good or Congruity, and in such a Case the Law is not obligatory, or not Law; so the Law, against the Marriage of Brother and Sister must be reputed, in some sort, a Branch of the Law of Nature, because the doing otherwise is ordinarily, in the Nature of the Thing, an Incongruity; yet not such, but that, in the beginning of the World, it was outweigh’d by a greater Good and Congruity, that all Mankind might issue from a common Parent; and, among the Jews also, it was outweigh’d by a greater Good, as in case a Brother died without a Child; and in such a Case the Law was not obligatory, or not Law. The Reasons, why certain degrees of Kindred were forbidden to marry, I suppose may have been the following. Probably, in these Laws some regard was had to the inlarging Friendships in the World, by Alliances. Probably, some regard was had to the bettering the Breed of Mankind; for it is commonly observ’d, that without crossing the Strain (as it is called) the Breed of some Animals is not Good. Parents and Children, (the right ascending and descending Line,) Mothers-in-Law and the Husbands Children, Uncles and Nieces, Aunts and Nephews, cannot marry without some (greater or lesser) violation of a certain Sanctity (greater or lesser), which superior natural Relations have, and of a Religious distance which it requireth, to be observ’d; for as the antient Greeks call’d our Parents Θεονς (Gods), so they call’d our Parents Brethren Θεονς (Divine), as Simplicius upon Epictetus observeth: Probably, another Reason of the Prohibition might be, that, were not the Marriages of so near Relations prohibited, the intercourse and familiarity between them is so great, that Chastity, among them, could not generally be otherwise preserv’d, than by the restraint of that Horrour, which generally attends such Mixtures, which are thereby the most effectually prevented that is possible. And, touching all the prohibited degrees of Kindred, we may affirm, that, for this Reason, they may not marry, because in the Nature of the Thing there is an Incongruity (more or less), which is (more or less) discern’d by common Reason, as the Reasons above-mentioned (and perhaps others which may be assign’d) make appear; and so far as there is such an Incongruity, there is a moral Turpitude in Incest. But this Incongruity ceaseth in case of a greater Good and Congruity, whence there is no difficulty in the case of Cain’s marrying his Sister. And as for the Polygamy and Divorces, that were permitted in the times of the Old-Testament, they were repugnant, indeed, to the primitive Institution of Marriage in Paradise, to which our Saviour has reduc’d us, but seem not to have been contrary to the Light of Nature, or any Law which it revealeth; for it discovers nothing of the Creation of one Man and one Woman only in the beginning of the World, nor their Paradisaical State, nor the establishment of the conjunction of one Male and one Female, in single Wedlock, at the beginning. But, from the permission of Polygamy and Divorces, there is great Reason, to infer the Imperfection of the Institution of Piety in the Old-Testament-Times, and that the famous Ancestors of old Israel, who practised Polygamy, (altho’, in the main, real and spiritual Religionists, yet) were in great Degree secular kind of Pietists; and that God, for increasing their Seed, dispens’d with his own Institution of Marriage: But no just Inference can be made from thence, that the Law of Nature can be dispens’d with by Divine Power.

  (2.) The Eternal Law is of various acceptation. The Pagan Theologers call Themis the Eternal Law,96 where by they mean the universal Law prescrib’d to the World and unintelligent Nature, which observeth a settled Law and Order. In the School of the Stoicks there is a two-fold Eternal Law,97 the one merely providential, (as when they say, omnia aeternae legis imperio fieri, all things are by Law, Fate, or providential Decree;) the other moral and preceptive, called by Cicero sempiterna Lex, which is the eternal Mind or right Reason of Jove, consider’d as commanding some things to be done, and prohibiting others.98 This two-fold Eternal Law of the Stoicks conjoin’d into one, is the Eternal Law of the Schools; for their Eternal Law is, “Ratio gubernativa totius Universi in mente divina existens,”99 Reason existing in the Divine Mind as governing the whole Universe. The Stoicks look’d upon their morally-Preceptive Eternal Law as the Law of Nature, and, therefore, look’d upon the Mind and right Reason of Jove (commanding and forbidding) as the primary and original Law of Nature, the Mind and right Reason of Man commanding and forbidding (a derivative from the eternal Mind of Jove) they look’d upon as the secondary and derivative Law of Nature. So Cicero, agreeably to their sense, saith, “Lex nihil aliud est nisi recta & a numine Deorum tracta Ratio, imperans honesta, prohibensque contraria”;100 Law is nothing else but right Reason, deriv’d from the Gods, commanding things virtuous, and forbidding the contrary. So the Schools say, “Lex naturalis est quaedam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura,”101 The Law of Nature is a certain Participation of Law Eternal in a rational Creature. Right Reason is represented as the Law of Nature constitutively; and this Law is suppos’d to exist from Eternity: But, as we do not acknowledge, that right Reason is in such sense Law, so neither do we suppose, that the Law of Nature is in such sense denominated the Eternal Law: But it is so denominated, in the same sense that necessary Propositions are denominated Eternal Truths. And they are so denominated, not to signify, that such Propositions existed from Eternity, and had a Truth from Eternity as so existing; or that the Truth of the Thing, which they express, mentally or really existed from Eternity: But the sense is, that, supposing those Propositions to exist, which cannot but be Truths (necessary Truths), they are Truths of eternal Necessity. They are Eternal Truths, not as being Truths which cannot but exist, (as some say, that they necessarily exist in an eternal Mind,) but as being Truths, which cannot but be Truths, there is an eternal Necessity of their being Truths. As these Verities, Eternal Truths, are of eternal immutable Necessity, and there is an impossibility of their being otherwise: So the Laws of Nature are Eternal Laws, as being of eternal immutable Necessity, and it cannot be, but they must be the things that are the just, the right and the good. In such sense they are Laws that had no beginning, but always were, according to the saying of Antigone in Sophocles, who having buried her Brother Polynice, and being accus’d of doing it against the Laws, she made answer, that, altho’ she had offended against the Laws of Creon, yet she had committed no Offence against the unwritten Law, which is not of late or yesterday’s standing, but always was. “These are not matters of to-day or yesterday, but they ever live, and none knoweth their Date, or from whence they came.”102

  (3.) A third honorary Attribute of the Law of Nature is the Universality of it, and that in several respects. In respect of the Universe of Mankind, it is the Law universal. The Matters of it are call’d by the Greek Writers κοινα των α’νθρώπων δίκαια. “the common Rights of all Men.”103 And the Lawyers say, “All People that are governed by Laws, have a proper civil Law of their own, and the common Law of all Men besides.”104 So Aristotle saith, “I distribute Law into that which is proper, and that which is common; for there is that which all Men suppose a common Just and Unjust, which is by Nature such, and is immutable.”105

  But the Law of Nature is not only universal in respect of the Universe of Mankind, but in respect of the vast Universe of rational Creatures. Agreeably whereto Empedocles sang of natural Justice; “It is extendedthrough the vast Aether, and the infinite Regions of Light.”106Celsus having said from Pindar, “that Law is the King of all,” Origen answereth, that, if he meaneth the Law of Cities, this is false; for all are not under the Rule of that Law; but Christians acknowledge a Law, “that is by Nature King of all,” “The true Law (saith Cicero) is right Reason, congruous to Nature, diffus’d into all, constant, sempiternal, which calleth to Duty by commanding, and by forbidding deterreth from Villany.” If right Reason is the Law of Nature (as declaratively it is;) or, if the Law of Nature “is the Force of the Intellect, whereby we discern those things that are in themselves good, from those that are in themselves evil”;107 or, if it is Lex vera impressa mentibus, a Law impress’d upon intelligent Minds; it cannot be a Law wholly appropriate and peculiar to the Universe of Mankind, but is necessarily the Law of the vast Universe of Men and Angels. So in the School of the Stoicks the Law of Nature is, “The Law of the Universe, one Law the common Reason of all intelligent Beings, the Reason and Law of the most antient City and Polity.”108 For they argue, “That Reason, which prescribeth what is to be done, and not to be done, is common to us all; if that, then Law; if so, then are we Fellow-Citizens, and the World is as a City.”109 So Cicero argueth, “They that have Reason in common, have right Reason in common, which is a Law; therefore Men are thus consociated with the Gods, they are of one common Law, and consequently they are of the same City or Polity.”110 But supposing, right Reason to be Law, that all rational Beings have something of it, and, consequently, that they have something of one Law; yet they have not one Law, as Citizens of the same City; for rational Beings are not Fellow-Citizens, and of the same Society as Rationals, but as a special kind of Rationals, (as Salts that associate are those of the same kind), divine, diabolical, or human.

  The Law of Nature, therefore, is the Comprehension of what is in its own Nature Matter of Obligation, and ought to be, abstracted from the preceding Authority of Command of the subsequent Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments.

  CHAPTER II.

  The Promulgation of the Law of Nature.

  The Law of Nature, with respect to its Promulgation, is the Comprehension of our natural Notices of what is Law. The divine moral Law is thus far the Law of Nature, it is the Comprehension of what is in its own Nature Matter of Law, and this is the Law that is notic’d by the Light of Nature, yet it may not be called the Law of Nature without Distinction and Limitation of Sense. For the Law of Nature, according to its true and usual Definition, is this moral Law, only as it is notic’d by natural Light; so that the Law of Nature, considered with respect to the Promulgation of it, must be defined, The Comprehension of our natural Notices of what is Law. These natural Notices are of two sorts, (so that the Law of Nature is of a two-fold Notion, as in respect of the Obligation of it, so in respect of the Promulgation of it;) for some of them have only the Verity of natural Notices, others have not only the Verity, but the Notoreity of natural Notices, which, therefore, have a greater Promulgation. By Nature here I understand Mundane Nature, or the natural Constitution of the World, especially of our-selves, which, in the first place, noticeth the Being of God, whose Existence is Law.

  Our natural Notices of what is Law, are from the Existence of God notic’d by Nature.§1. Mundane Nature (that Comprehension of the Works of the Creation) clearly noticeth to Mankind the Existence of God, which is written in this great Book, or Volume of the World, in Capital Letters, to be seen and read of all Men. “For the invisible things of him, from the Creation of the World, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead,” Rom. i. 20. “There is no Speech nor Language where their Voice” (the Voice of the Heavens and the Heavenly Bodies) “is not heard : Their Line” (or loud Voice rather) “is gone out thro’ all the Earth, and their Words to the End of the World,” Psal. xix. 3, 4. If we ask, whence it is, and whose doing it is, that there is such an admirable System as our Eyes behold, with all the Excellencies and Conveniences, the Parts, Furniture, and Inhabitants thereof? In answer thereto universal Nature proclaimeth, the great God formed allthings. Such is the Origination of things in Theism, where with Atheism thus far agreeth, they both suppose, That a thing cannot be made by itself, (for then it must be existent before it is existent;) that it is impossible that all things should be made; that if at any time there was nothing, there never could have been any thing, (for something cannot come from nothing;) that something was, from Eternity, unmade, increate, self-existent, and absolutely independent. Thus far there is no Disagreement between the Atheists and the Theists (or Religionists;) the only Matter in Debate, is, whether this acknowledg’d eternal Something (which is necessarily in create, necessarily existent, and absolutely independent) is such an eternal Something as the Religionists God or whether it be only universal Matter, or the material World, as the Atheists suppose.

  Matter is not the self-existent Being.Matter cannot be the self-existent Being. The self-existent Being, having the Reason of its Existence within it-self, and in its own Nature, as it has existed always, so it exists every-where, always and invariably the same; its Necessity, being absolute, is uniform, with respect to all Time and all Place, absolute Necessity being every-where and always alike, admitting of no Change, no Variety; the Properties of such a Being, being as necessary as the Being it-self, to which they belong; which is, therefore, incapable of suffering any Change. But universal Matter, or the material Universe, is not such a Being. For, 1. If Matter were the self-existent Being, it must, according to the foregoing Reasoning, exist every-where, and a Vacuum, with respect to it, would be impossible; but if there be no Vacuum, how is it possible that there should be any Motion? or, whence arises the different specifick Gravities of Bodies? or how could Bodies be rarify’d and condens’d? or, how could the Parts of it be actually separated from one another? All motion is rectilinear, till its Determination be chang’d; but, upon the supposition of a Plenum, in case of any Motion, the Protrusion, and consequently the Resistance, would be infinite. The Motion of the Planets and Comets prove a Vacuum. “Against filling the Heavens with fluid Mediums, unless they be exceeding rare, a great Objection arises from the regular and very lasting Motions of the Planets and Comets in all manner of Courses through the Heavens. For thence it is manifest, that the Heavens are void of all sensible Resistance, and by consequence of all sensible Matter.

  “For the resisting Power of fluid Mediums arises partly from the Attrition of the Parts of the Medium, and partly from the Vis inertiae of the Matter.1 That part of the Resistance of a spherical Body which arises from the Attrition of the Parts of the Medium is very nearly as the Diameter, or at the most, as the Factum of the Diameter, and the Velocity of the spherical Body together. And that part of the Resistance which arises from the Vis inertiae of the Matter, is as the Square of that Factum. And by this difference the two sorts of Resistance may be distinguish’d from one another in any Medium; and these being distinguish’d, it will be found that almost all the Resistance of Bodies of a competent Magnitude moving in Air, Water, Quick-silver, and such like Fluids, with a competent Velocity, arises from the Vis inertiae of the Parts of the Fluid.”

  “Now that part of the resisting Power of any Medium which arises from the Tenacity, Friction or Attrition of the Parts of the Medium, may be diminish’d by dividing the Matter into smaller Parts, and making the Parts more smooth and slippery: But that part of the Resistance which arises from the Vis inertiae, is proportional to the Density of the Matter, and cannot be diminish’d by dividing the Matter into smaller Parts, nor by any other means than by decreasing the Density of the Mediums. And for these Reasons the Density of fluid Mediums is very nearly proportional to their Resistance. Liquors which differ not much in Density, as Water, Spirit of Wine, Spirit of Turpentine, hot Oil, differ not much in Resistance. Water is thirteen or fourteen times lighter than Quick-silver, and by consequence thirteen or fourteen times rarer, and its Resistance is less than that of Quick-silver in the same Proportion, or there abouts, as I have found by Experiments made with Pendulums. The open Air, in which we breathe, is eight or nine hundred times lighter than Water, and by consequences eight or nine hundred times rarer, and accordingly its Resistance is less than that of Water in the same Proportion, or there abouts; as I have also found by Experiments made with Pendulums. And in thinner Air the Resistance is still less, and at length, by rarifying the Air, becomes insensible. For small Feathers falling in the open Air meet with great Resistance, but in a tall Glass well emptied of Air, they fall as fast as Lead or Gold, as I have seen tried several times. Whence the Resistance seems still to decrease in proportion to the Density of the Fluid. For I do not find by any Experiments, that Bodies moving in Quick-silver, Water or Air, meet with any other sensible Resistance than what arises from the Density and Tenacity of those sensible Fluids, as they would do, if the Pores of those Fluids, and all other Spaces, were filled with a dense and subtile Fluid. Now if the Resistance in a Vessel well emptied of Air, was but an hundred times less than in the open Air, it would be about a million of times less than in the Quicksilver. But it seems to be much less in such a Vessel, and still much less in the Heavens, at the height of three or four hundred Miles from the Earth, or above. For Mr. Boyle has shew’d that Air may be rarefied above ten thousand times in Vessels of Glass; and the Heavens are much emptier of Air than any Vacuum we can make below. For since the Air is compress’d by the weight of the incumbent Atmosphere, and the density of Air is proportional to the Force compressing it, it follows by Computation, that at the height of about seven English Miles from the Earth, the Air is four times rarer than at the Surface of the Earth; and at the height of 14 Miles, it is sixteen times rarer than that at the Surface of the Earth; and at the height of 21, 28, or 35 Miles, it is respectively 64, 256, or 1024 times rarer, or thereabouts; and at the height of 70, 140, 210 Miles, it is about 1000000, 1000000000000 or 1000000000000000000 times rarer; and so on.”

  “Heat promotes Fluidity very much, by diminishing the Tenacity of Bodies. It makes many Bodies fluid which are not fluid in cold, and increases the Fluidity of tenacious Liquids, as of Oil, Balsam and Honey, and thereby decreases their Resistance. But it decreases not the Resistance of Water considerably, as it would do, if any considerable part of the Resistance of Water arose from the Attrition or Tenacity of its Parts. And therefore the Resistance of Water arises principally, and almost intirely, from the Vis inertiae of its Matter; and by consequence, if the Heavens were as dense as Water, they would not have much less Resistance than Water; if perfectly dense, or full of Matter without any Vacuum, let the Matter be never so subtile and fluid, they would have a greater Resistance than Quick-silver. A solid Globe in such a Medium would lose above half its Motion in moving three times the length of its Diameter, and a Globe not solid (such as are the Planets) would be retarded sooner. And therefore to make way for the regular and lasting Motions of the Planets and Comets, ’tis necessary to empty the Heavens of all Matter, except perhaps some very thin Vapours, Steams or Effluvia, arising from the Atmospheres of the Earth, Planets and Comets, and from such an exceedingly rare Aethereal Medium as we described above. A dense Fluid can be of no use for explaining the Phaenomena of Nature, the Motions of the Planets and Comets being better explain’d without it. It serves only to disturb and retard the Motions of those great Bodies, and make the Frame of Nature languish: And in the Pores of Bodies, it serves only to stop the vibrating Motions of their Parts, wherein their Heat and Activity consists. And as it is of no use, and hinders the Operations of Nature, and makes her languish, so there is no evidence for its Existence, and therefore it ought to be rejected.” Newt. Opt. Eng. Edit. 2d. p. 339, & seq.2

  As to Rarefaction or Condensation and the different specifick Gravities of Bodies, the same Author reasons thus in his Principles, drawing these Corollaries from L. 3. Prop. 6. Corol. 1.3 “Hence the Weights of Bodies do not depend upon their Forms and Textures. For, if they could be varied with their Forms, they would be greater or less, according to the difference of Forms, in an equal Quantity of Matter; which is altogether contrary to Experience. Corol. 2. All Bodies about the Earth gravitate towards the Earth, and the Weights of all Bodies, which are equally distant from the Earth’s Center, are as the Quantities of Matter in their Bodies: This is the Quality of all Bodies, upon which we can make Experiments, and, therefore, by Rule the third, is to be affirm’d of all Bodies whatsoever. If the Aether, or any other Body whatsoever, were altogether destitute of Gravity, or did gravitate less, than in proportion to the quantity of its Matter: Because (according to the opinion of Aristotle, Des Cartes, and others) it differs from other Bodies, only in the Form of the Matter, the same Body might, by the change of its Form, gradually be converted into a Body of the same constitution with those, which gravitate most in proportion to the Quantity of Matter; and, on the contrary, the most heavy Bodies might gradually lose their Gravity, by gradually changing their Form. And, therefore, the Weights would depend upon the Forms of Bodies, and might be chang’d with them, contrary to what is prov’d in the foregoing Corollary. Corol. 3. All spaces are not equally full. For, if all spaces were equally full, the specifick Gravity of that Fluid, with which the Region of the Air would, in that case, be fill’d, upon account of the most perfect Density of the Matter, would not be less than the specifick Gravity of Quick-silver, or Gold, or any other the most dense Body; and, therefore, neither Gold, nor any other Body whatever, could descend in the Air: For Bodies specifically lighter do not at all descend in Fluids. But, if the Quantity of Matter in any given space, might be diminished by any Rarefaction whatever, what hinders, but that it might be diminish’d infinitely? Corol. 4. If all the solid Particles of all Bodies are equally dense, nor can be rarefied without Pores, there is a Vacuum. I call those Bodies equally dense, whose Powers of Inactivity (Vires inertiae) are as their Magnitudes.” Fourthly, if there can be no Vacuum, I cannot see how any Part of Matter could be divided from that which is next adjoining, any more than it is possible, actually to divide the Parts of absolute Space from one another, which in the Continuum were at no distance from one another, one beginning where the other ended; but such separating the Parts of Matter must infer Vacuities between. As for the Figures of the Parts of Bodies, upon the supposition of a Plenum, their Surfaces must be, either all Rectilinear, or Concavo-Convex, the Concavities of the one exactly fitting the Convexities of the other, otherwise they could not adequately fill Space: But that all Bodies are so figur’d, we do not find true in Fact. Lastly, the denying a Vacuum supposes what is impossible for any one to prove to be true, That the Material World has no Limits. Thus we see, that Matter is not infinite or commensurate with Space, as it must be, if it were the self-existent or a necessarily existing Being; in which case it must be both Uniform and Invariable, as well with respect to its Modes and Properties, as to its Substance; and, consequently, it must be a Contradiction to suppose, that it ever did, or could, exist in any other manner, than that, in which we see it now to exist. But we know, that it has undergone and continues to undergo perpetual Changes and Alterations in all its Parts that we are acquainted with. We plainly perceive, that it is no Contradiction or Absurdity, to suppose, that the World were in some respects otherwise than it is; that the kinds of Animals or Plants, &c. were more or fewer than they are, and that there were more or fewer Individuals of any Kind than there now are; that there were a greater or less Quantity of Motion in the World than there is, and the like. If the material World existed necessarily, it were impossible for it to exist in any respect otherwise than it does; but we can easily conceive it existing otherwise, which we could not do, if it were impossible for it to exist otherwise, for we cannot conceive Impossibilities. As for Uniformity, which is necessarily connected with Necessity of Existence, we see no such thing in Matter, but the reverse. Farther; necessary Existence, which is itself the greatest Perfection, does in itself include all possible Perfections; otherwise, there might be some Perfection in a dependent Being, which an Independent Being might want; which to suppose, were absurd. But how can that Being have all Perfections, which has no Power, and is perfectly Passive, as is the case of Matter, which always continues in that state of Rest or Motion, in which it is once plac’d, till it receives some external Impression? The self-existent Being must actually have all possible Perfections. Whatever Perfections Matter may have, it seems not to be sensible, that it has any. Understanding is certainly a Perfection, which therefore, surely, Matter must have, if Matter were self-existent; and, consequently, all Matter would be Intelligent, which is so far from being true, that no Matter is Intelligent, or can Think.4

  If there be no God, all is Mechanical; but all is not Mechanical, therefore there is a God.§2. If there be no God, every thing in the World is Mechanical, according to the Laws of Mechanism, of Matter and Motion. But every thing is notMechanical; therefore there is a God. The Minor in this Syllogism, which I think is all in it that can be controverted, is thus prov’d.

  1. Motion must have had a Beginning, which could not be mechanical.First; there must be a First Mover, and, therefore, a Beginning of Motion, which could not be Mechanical. If Motion be Essential to Matter, it must be a Contradiction to suppose Matter or any part of it, at Rest, equally as to suppose it Indivisible, Unextended, or Penetrable. But it is no Contradiction to suppose Matter, or any part of it, at Rest; therefore Motion is not Essential to Matter. We can form an Idea of Matter at Rest, but we can form no Ideas of Contradictions or Impossibilities—If Motion be necessary to Matter in the Nature of the Thing, this Necessity must be Uniform and act Uniformly, in all Matter, absolute Necessity being always and every where the same. Now this Motion cannot be suppos’d to have any particular determination to move any one way, rather than the contrary, for what shall determine it, to move one way rather than another? But every Motion must have a particular Determination; for an equal Tendency to move every way, is being at Rest. If Matter move necessarily, it must move necessarily with some particular Direction, because without a Direction it cannot move at all, and then that necessary Direction must be unchangeable, as also its Velocity, both which are contrary to all Experience. If Motion be Essential to Matter, then all Matter must have the same Direction, or each independent Part must have a particular and independent Direction of its own, each of which is contrary to Experience. If Matter be the self-existent Being, it must exist in every point of Space, and then whither could it move; or how would the Motions of the different and even contrary Determinations be practicable?

  2. Gravity is not Mechanical.Secondly; Gravity is not Mechanical, but must be owing to the actual incessant Concurrence of an Immaterial Being. It is not the Matter of the Sun, that causes the Earth to gravitate towards it; because nothing can act, but where it is. Whatever it is, that is the immediate Cause of Gravity, it is something that acts as freely, and as powerfully upon the central parts of all the solid Substances we know, as upon the superficial; for the interior parts of a solid Globe of Gold gravitate as much as the exterior, nor will beating it out into a thin Plate encrease its Gravity at all, which it must necessarily do, if the immediate Cause of Gravity did not act as strongly upon the inward as the outward Parts of the Gold, which is not easily conceivable, if that Cause were a material Fluid, how subtile soever; but, supposing it, as some do, an extremely subtile elastick Fluid, surrounding all gross Bodies, increasing in its Density directly as the Squares of the Distances increase, whose Parts, endeavouring to re-cede from one another, impell neighbouring Bodies to move that way, where they find the least Resistance, that is, towards the great and gross Collections of Matter, such as the Sun, Stars and Planets, in the neighbourhood of which this subtile elastick Fluid is more rare, and consequently less active; what supports the Tortoise, and causes the Parts of this elastick Fluid to recede from one another, and is the Cause of that their Motion mutually Receding from one another? Nothing mechanical, certainly, can be the beginning of this, more than of any other Motion.

  “This Gravitating Power acts upon Bodies equally, when they are in the most violent Motion, and when they are at Rest; as the Celerity of Descending Bodies with us, and Celerity of the Comets in the Heavens, Geometrically computed, do particularly shew. Now this is absolutely impossible; that any Mechanical Pressure or Impulse from a Body, let its Motion be never so swift, or its Pressure never so strong, should equally accelerate another Body, when at Rest, and when in Motion; it being a known Law of Mechanism, that a Body in Motion impells another at Rest, with its whole Force; but one in Motion, which it over-takes, with only the excess of its own Velocity above the others; as is most obvious also on the least Reflexion.” Whiston’s Astronomical Principles, p. 45.5

  3. Nor the Cohesion of Matter.Thirdly; The Cause of the Cohesion of the Particles of Matter is also Immechanical. It cannot be a Material Vinculum, which connects them; for then the Question recurs, What keeps the Parts of the Vinculum together? And the Pressure of a circumambient Fluid will by no means salve the Phaenomenon.

  4. Nor Elasticity.Fourthly; That Power, by which some Particles of Matter, Air for Instance, mutually repell one another, which is the Cause of Elasticity, is also as Immechanical, as that Power, by which all Particles of Matter mutually tend toward one another.

  5. The Frame of the Solar System is not Mechanical.Fifthly; The Frame of the solar System is not Mechanical. See Fig. IV.

  “The Comets, by reason of their great Number, and great Distance of their Aphelia from the Sun, where they are long detain’d, must needs be somewhat disturb’d by their mutual Gravitations towards one another, and have their Eccentricities and times of their Revolutions, sometimes a little encreas’d, sometimes diminish’d. Whence it is not to be expected, that the same Comet should revolve exactly in the same Orbit, and in the same periodical Times. It is sufficient, if there do not happen greater Changes, than what may arise from the Causes aforesaid.6

  “And hence a Reason is assign’d, why the Comets are not comprehended in the Zodiack, as the Planets are; but deviate therefrom, and are carried by various Motions towards all Parts of the Heavens. And that for this End, that, in their Aphelia, where they move most slowly, they might be mutually at the greatest Distance, and their mutual Attraction might be the weakest. For which reason the Comets, which descend the lowest, and therefore move slowest in their Aphelia, ought to ascend the highest.

  “The Comet, which appear’d in 1680, in its Perihelion was not a sixth part of the Sun’s Diameter distant from the Sun; and, upon account of that near Approach to the Sun, and some Density of the Sun’s Atmosphere, it must meet with some sensible Resistance, and be somewhat retarded, and approach nearer to the Sun; and, by continually making nearer Approaches every Revolution, it will at last fall down to the Body of the Sun. And also in its Aphelion, where it moves slowest, it may sometimes be retarded by the Attraction of other Comets, and for that reason fall into the Sun. Thus the fix’d Stars, which gradually decrease by the emission of Light and Vapours, may be recruited by Comets falling into them, and their Fires being repair’d by the addition of new Fuel, by means thereof they may blaze out afresh, and so pass for new Stars. Such kind of fix’d Stars then are those, which appear suddenly and all at once with a very great Brightness, but afterwards by degrees disappear. But those fix’d Stars, which appear and disappear periodically, and whose Increase of Light is gradual, but seldom or never exceeding that of the Stars of the third Magnitude, seem to be of a different kind, and, by revolving upon their own Axes, to turn toward us, periodically, a bright and a dark side. Those Vapours, which proceed from the Sun and fix’d Stars and Tails of Comets, may fall, by their Gravity, upon the Atmospheres of the Planets, and be there condens’d, and converted into Water and moist Spirits, and may afterwards pass gradually by a gentle Heat into Salts, and Sulphurs, and Tinctures, and Mud, and Clay, and Potters Earth, and Sand, and Stones, and Corals, and other terrestrial Substances.

  “The Hypothesis of Vortices is press’d with many Difficulties. That each Planet, with a Radius drawn to the Sun, may describe Areas proportional to the Times, the Periodical Times of the Parts of the Vortex ought to be in a Duplicate Proportion of their Distances from the Sun. That the Periodical Times of the Planets may be in a sesquiplicate Proportion of their Distances from the Sun, the Periodical Times of the Parts of the Vortex ought to be in the same Proportion of their Distances. That the lesser Vortices, which roll round Jupiter, Saturn, and the other Planets, may be preserv’d, and swim undisturb’d in the Vortex of the Sun, the Periodical Times of the Parts of the solar Vortex should be equal. The Revolution of the Sun and Planets upon their Axes, which ought to agree with the Motions of the Vortex, differ from all these Proportions. The Motions of the Comets are exactly regular, and observe the same Laws with the Motions of the Planets, and cannot be explain’d by Vortices. The Comets are carried by Motions very Eccentrical toward all Parts of the Heavens, which, upon the supposition of Vortices, is impossible.

  “Projected Bodies, in our Air, meet with no Resistance but that of the Air. The Air being taken away, as it is in Mr. Boyle’s Air-Pump, the Resistance ceases, seeing soft Down and solid Gold fall, in such a Vacuum, with equal Velocity; and the case is the same in those Celestial Spaces above the Earth’s Atmosphere. All Bodies ought to be mov’d most freely in those Spaces, and, therefore, the Planets and Comets ought perpetually to be revolv’d according to the Laws already explain’d, in Orbs, such in Kind and Position, as we have suppos’d. They will, indeed, be retain’d in their Orbits by the Laws of Gravity; but they could by no means acquire such a regular position of their Orbs by those Laws.

  “The six Primary Planets revolve round the Sun in Circles concentrical to the Sun, with the same Direction of their Motion, and, very nearly, in the same Plain. The ten Moons (or secondary Planets) revolve round the Earth, Jupiter and Saturn, with the same Direction of their Motion, and very nearly in the plain of the Orbs of the Planets. And all these regular Motions have not their rise from Mechanical Causes, seeing the Comets are carried in Orbs very Eccentrical, and that very free lythro’ all parts of the Heavens. By which kind of Motion the Comets pass very swiftly and easily thro’ the Orbs of the Planets, and in their Aphelia, when they move more slowly and are longer detain’d, they are the most remotely distant from one another, and their mutual Attraction by much the weakest. This most elegant System of the Planets and Comets could not be produced, but by and under the Contrivance and Dominion of an Intelligent and Powerful Being. And, if the fix’d Stars are the Centers of such other Systems, all these, being fram’d by the like Counsel, will be subject to the Dominion of One; especially seeing the Light of the fix’d Stars is of the same Nature with that of the Sun, and the Light of all these Systems passes mutually from one to another. And He has placed the Systems of the fix’d Stars at immense Distances from one another, lest they should mutually rush upon one another by their Gravity.

  “He governs all Things, not as The Soul of the World, but as The Lord of the Universe; and, because of his Dominion, he is wont to be called (παντοκράτωρ) Universal Emperor. For God is a Relative Word, and hath a Relation to Servants; and the Deity is the Empire of God, not over his own Body, as is the opinion of those who make him the Soul of the World, but over his Servants. The Supreme God is a Being Eternal, Infinite, absolutely Perfect; but a Being, however Perfect, without Dominion, is not Lord God. For we say, My God, your God, the God of Israel, God of Gods, and Lord of Lords; but we do not say, My Eternal, your Eternal, the Eternal of Israel, the Eternal of Gods; we do not say, My Infinite, or my Perfect. These Titles have no Relation to Servants. The Word [God] frequently signifies Lord,7 but every Lord is not God. The Empire of a Spiritual Being constitutes God; true Empire constitutes the true God; Supreme, the Supreme; Feigned, the Feigned. And, from his true Empire, it follows, That the true God is Living, Intelligent, and Powerful; from his other Perfections, that he is the Supreme, or supremely Perfect. He is Eternal and Infinite, Omnipotent and Omniscient, that is, he endures from Eternity to Eternity, and he is present from Infinity to Infinity; he governs all Things, and knows all Things, which are done, or which can be done. He is not Eternity and Infinity, but he is Eternal and Infinite; he is not Duration and Space, but he endures and is present. He endures alwaies, and is present every where; and, by existing alwaies and every where, he constitutes Duration and Space, Eternity and Infinity. Whereas every Particle of Space is Alwaies, and every indivisible Moment of Duration is Every Where, certainly the Framer and Lord of the Universe shall not be [nunquam, nusquam] Never, No Where. Every sensible Mind is, at different Times and in the different Organs of its Sense and Motions, but one and the same individual Person. There are successive Parts in Duration, and co-existent Parts in Space; neither of these are compatible to the Person of Man or to the Thinking Principle in him; much less can they be ascrib’d to the intelligent Substance of God. Every Man, as a sensitive Being, is one and the same Man, during his whole Life, in all and each of the Organs of his Senses. God is one and the same God alwaies and every where. He is Omnipotent, not Virtually only, but also Substantially, for Power, without Substance, cannot subsist. In him are contain’d and mov’d all Things, but without being mutually affected. God is not at all affected by the Motions of Bodies; nor do they suffer any Resistance from the Omnipresence of God. It is confess’d, That the Supreme God exists Necessarily, and by the same Necessity he exists Alwaies and Every Where. Whence he is all similar, all Eye, all Ear, all Brain, all Arm, all the Power of Perceiving, Understanding, and Acting; but after a manner not at all corporeal, after a manner not like that of Men, after a manner wholly to us unknown. As a blind Man has no Notion of Colours, so neither have we any Notion of the Waies, by which the most Wise God perceives and understands all Things. He is wholly destitute of all Body, and of all bodily Shape; and, therefore, cannot be seen, heard, nor touch’d; nor ought he to be worshipp’d under the representation of any thing corporeal. We have Ideas of his Attributes, but we know not at all what is the Substance of any thing whatever. We see only the Figures and Colours of Bodies, we hear only their Sounds, we touch only their outward Surfaces, we smell their Odours, and taste their Savours; but we know not by any Sense, or reflex Act, their inward Substances; and much less have we any Notion of the Substance of God. We know him, only by his Properties and Attributes, and by the most wise and excellent Structure of Things, and by Final Causes; but we adore and worship him upon account of his Dominion. For we worship him, as his Servants; and God, without Dominion, Providence and Final Causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature. There arises no Variety in Things, from blind Metaphysical Necessity, which is always and every where the same. All Diversity, in the Creatures, could arise only from the Ideas and Will of a necessarily-existent Being. We speak, however, allegorically, when we say, That God sees, hears, speaks, laughs, loves, hates, despises, gives, receives, rejoices, is angry, fights, fabricates, builds, composes. For all Speech concerning God, is borrowed, by Analogy or some Resemblance, from Human Affairs, not a perfect Resemblance indeed, of some sort however. And so much concerning God, of whom to discourse from Phaenomena, belongs to Experimental Philosophy.

  “Hitherto I have explain’d the Phaenomena of the Heavens and of our Sea by the Power of Gravity, but I have not at all assign’d the Cause of Gravity. This Power, however, arises from some Cause, which penetrates even to the Centers of the Sun and Planets, without any Diminution of its Force, and which acts not in proportion to the Quantity ofthe Surfaces of the Particles upon which it acts, (as Mechanical Causes use to do,) but according to the Quantity of solid Matter; and whose Action is every way extended to immense Distances, decreasing always in a Duplicate Proportion of those Distances. Gravity towards the Sun, is compos’d of the Gravities towards each Particle of the Sun, and decreases from the Sun-ward, accurately in a Duplicate Proportion of those Distances, as far as the Orb of Saturn, as is evident from the Rest of the Aphelia of the Planets; and as far as the remotest Aphelia of the Comets, if their Aphelia also rest. But I have not yet been able to deduce the Reason of these Properties of Gravity from Phaenomena, and I do not form Hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from Appearances, is to be term’d an Hypothesis; and Hypotheses, whether Metaphysical, or Physical, or of occult Qualities, or Mechanical, have no place in Experimental Philosophy. In this Philosophy Propositions are deduced from Appearances, and render’d General by Induction. So the Impenetrability, Mobility, and the Force of Bodies, and the Laws of Motion and of Gravity have become known: And it is enough, that Gravity really exists, and acts according to the Laws explain’d by us, and suffices for all the Motions of the Heavenly Bodies, and of our Sea.” Sir Isaac Newton’s Principia. Ed. 3. p. 525, &c.

  “For rejecting a dense Aethereal Fluid, we have the Authority of the oldest and most celebrated Philosophers of Greece and Phoenicia, who made a Vacuum and Atoms, and the Gravity of Atoms, the first Principles of their Philosophy; tacitly attributing Gravity to some other Cause than dense Matter.8 Later Philosophers banish the consideration of such a Cause out of Natural Philosophy, feigning Hypotheses for explaining all things mechanically, and referring other Causes to Metaphysicks: Whereas the main business of Natural Philosophy is, to argue from Phaenomena without feigning Hypotheses, and to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is not Mechanical; and not only to unfold the Mechanism of the World, but chiefly to resolve these and such-like Questions.

  “What is there in Places almost empty of Matter; and whence is it, that the Sun and Planets gravitate towards one another, without dense Matter between them? Whence is it, that Nature doth nothing in vain; and whence arises all that Order and Beauty, which we see in the World? To what End are the Comets, and whence is it, that Planets move all one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, while Comets move all manner of ways in Orbs very eccentrick, and what hinders the fix’d Stars from falling upon one another? How came the Bodies of Animals to be contriv’d with so much Art, and for what End were their several Parts? Was the Eye contriv’d without Skill in Opticks, and the Ear without Knowledge of Sounds? How, do the Motions of the Body follow from the Will, and whence is the Instinct of Animals?9 Is not the Sensory of Animals that Place, to which the sensitive Substance is present, and into which the sensible Species of Things are carried through the Nerves and Brain, that there they may be perceiv’d by their immediate presence to that Substance? And these things being rightly dispatch’d, does it not appear from Phaenomena, That there is a Being, incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who, in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, sees the Things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself: of which Things the Images only, carried through the Organs of Sense into our little Sensoriums, are there seen and beheld by that which in us perceives and thinks. And, tho’ every true Step made in this Philosophy brings us not immediately to the Knowledge of the First Cause, yet it brings us nearer to it, and on that account is to be highly valued.” Sir Isaac Newton’s Opticks.” Ed. 3. p. 343, 4, 5.

  “When Spirit of Vitriol poured upon common Salt or Salt-petre makes an Ebullition with the Salt and unites with it, and in Distillation the Spirits of the common Salt or Salt-petre comes over much easier than it would do before, and the acid part of the Spirit of Vitriol stays behind; does not this argue, that the Alcaly of the fix’d Salt attracts the acid Spirit of the Vitriol more strongly than its own Spirit, and not being able to hold them both, lets go its own? And when Oil of Vitriol is drawn off from its weight of Nitre, and from both the Ingredients a compound Spirit of Nitre is distilled, and two parts of this Spirit are poured on one part of Oil of Cloves or Caraway Seeds, or of any ponderous Oil of vegetable or animal Substances, or Oil of Turpentine thicken’d with a little Balsam of Sulphur, and the Liquors grow so very hot in mixing, as presently to send up a burning Flame: Does not this very great and sudden Heat argue, that the two Liquors mix, run towards one another with an accelerated Motion, and clash with the greatest Force? And is it not for the same reason, that rectified Spirit of Wine poured on the same compound Spirit flashes; and that the Pulvis fulminans, composed of Sulphur, Nitre, and Salt of Tartar, goes off with a more sudden and violent Explosion than Gun powder, the acid Spirits of the Sulphur and Nitre rushing towards one another, and towards the Salt of Tartar, with so great a violence, as by the shock to turn the whole at once into Vapour and Flame? Where the Dissolution is slow, it makes a slow Ebullition and a gentle Heat; and where it is quicker, it makes a greater Ebullition with more Heat; and where it is done at once, the Ebullition is contracted into a sudden Blast or violent Explosion, with a Heat equal to that of Fire and Flame. So when a Drachm of the above-mention’d compound Spirit of Nitre was poured upon half a Drachm of Oil of Caraway Seeds in vacuo; the Mixture immediately made a flash like Gun-powder, and burst the exhausted Receiver, which was a Glass six Inches wide, and eight Inches deep. And even the gross Body of Sulphur powder’d, and, with an equal weight of Iron Filings and a little Water, made into Paste, acts upon the Iron, and in five or six Hours grows too hot to be touch’d, and emits a Flame. And by these Experiments compared with the great quantity of Sulphur with which the Earth abounds, and the warmth of the interior Parts of the Earth, and hot Springs, and burning Mountains, and with Damps, mineral Coruscations, Earthquakes, hot suffocating Exhalations, Hurricanes and Spouts; we may learn that sulphureous Steams abound in the Bowels of the Earth and ferment with Minerals, and sometimes take fire with a sudden Coruscation and Explosion; and, if pent up in subterraneous Caverns, burst the Caverns with a great shaking of the Earth, as in springing of a Mine. And then the Vapour generated by the Explosion, expiring through the Pores of the Earth, feels hot and suffocates, and makes Tempests and Hurricanes, and sometimes causes the Land to slide, or the Sea to boil, and carries up the Water thereof in Drops, which by their weight fall down again in Spouts. Also some sulphureous Steams, at all times when the Earth is dry, ascending into the Air, ferment there with nitrous Acids, and sometimes taking fire cause Lightening and Thunder, and fiery Meteors. For the Air abounds with acid Vapours fit to promote Fermentations, as appears by the rusting of Iron and Copper in it, the kindling of Fire by blowing, and the beating of the Heart by means of Respiration. Now the above-mention’d Motions are so great and violent, as to shew, that in Fermentations the Particles of Bodies which almost rest, are put into new Motions by a very potent Principle, which acts upon the monly when they approach one another, and causes them to meet and clash with great violence, and grow hot with the Motion, and dash one another into pieces, and vanish into Air, and Vapour, and Flame.” Newt. Opt. Eng. Ed. p. 353, 4, 5.

  “The Parts of all homogeneal hard Bodies, which fully touch one another, stick together very strongly. And for explaining how this may be, some have invented hooked Atoms, which is begging the Question; and others tell us that Bodies are glued together by Rest, that is, by an occult Quality, or rather by nothing; and others, that they stick together by conspiring Motions, that is, by relative Rest amongst themselves. I had rather infer from their Cohesion, that their Particles attract one another by some Force, which in immediate Contact is exceeding strong, at small distances performs the chymical Operations above-mention’d, and reaches not far from the Particles with any sensible Effects.

  “All Bodies seem to be composed of hard Particles: For otherwise Fluids would not congeal; as Water, Oils, Vinegar, and Spirit or Oil of Vitriol do by freezing; Mercury, by Fumes of Lead; Spirit of Nitre and Mercury, by dissolving the Mercury and evaporating the Flegm; Spirit of Wine and Spirit of Urine, by deflegming and mixing them; and Spirit of Urine and Spirit of Salt, by subliming them together to make Salarmoniac. Even the Rays of Light seem to be hard Bodies, for otherwise they would not retain different Properties in their different Sides. And therefore Hardness may be reckon’d the Property of all uncompounded Matter. At least, this seems to be as evident as the universal Impenetrability of Matter. For all Bodies, so far as Experience reaches, are either hard, or may be harden’d; and we have no other Evidence of universal Impenetrability, besides a large Experience without an experimental Exception. Now, if compound Bodies are so very hard as we find some of them to be, and yet are very porous, and consist of Parts which are only laid together; the simple Particles which are void of Pores, and were never yet divided, must be much harder. For such hard Particles being heaped up together, can scarce touch one another in more than a few Points, and therefore must be separable by much less Force than is requisite to break a solid Particle, whose Parts touch in all the Space between them, without any Pores or Interstices to weaken their Cohesion. And how such very hard Particles which are only laid together and touch only in a few Points, can stick together, and that so firmly as they do, without the assistance of something which causes them to be attracted or press’d towards one another, is very difficult to conceive.

  “The same thing I infer also from the cohering of two polish’d Marbles in vacuo, and from the standing of Quick-silver in the Barometer at the height of 50, 60 or 70 Inches, or above, when ever it is well purged of Air and carefully poured in, so that its Parts be every where contiguous both to one another and to the Glass. The Atmosphere by its weight presses the Quick-silver into the Glass, to the height of 29 or 30 Inches. And some other Agent raises it higher, not by pressing it into the Glass, but by making its Parts stick to the Glass, and to one another. For upon any discontinuation of Parts, made either by Bubbles or by shaking the Glass, the whole Mercury falls down to the height of 29 or 30 Inches.

  “And of the same kind with these Experiments are those that follow. If two plane polish’d Plates of Glass (suppose two pieces of a polish’d Looking-glass) be laid together, so that their sides be parallel and at a very small distance from one another, and then their lower Edges be dipped into Water, the Water will rise up between them. And the less the distance of the Glasses is, the greater will be the height to which the Water will rise. If the distance be about the hundredth part of an Inch, the Water will rise to the height of about an Inch; and if the distance be greater or less in any Proportion, the height will be reciprocally proportional to the distance very nearly. For the attractive Force of the Glasses is the same, whether the distance between them be greater or less; and the weight of the Water drawn up is the same, if the height of it be reciprocally proportional to the height of the Glasses. And in like manner, Water ascends between two Marbles polish’d plane, when their polished sides are parallel, and at a very little distance from one another. And if slender Pipes of Glass be dipped at one end into stagnating Water, the Water will rise up within the Pipe, and the height to which it arises will be reciprocally proportional to the Diameter of the Cavity of the Pipe, and will equal the height to which it rises between two Planes of Glass, if the Semidiameter of the Cavity of the Pipe be equal to the distance between the Planes, or thereabouts. And these Experiments succeed after the same manner in vacuo as in the open Air, (as hath been tried before the Royal Society,) and therefore are not influenced by the Weight or Pressure of the Atmosphere.

  “And if a large Pipe of Glass be filled with sifted Ashes well pressed together in the Glass, and one end of the Pipe be dipped into stagnating Water, the Water will rise up slowly in the Ashes, so as in the space of a Week or Fortnight to reach up within the Glass, to the height of 30 or 40 Inches above the stagnating Water. And the Water rises up to this height by the Action only of those Particles of the Ashes which are upon the Surface of the elevated Water; the Particles which are within the Water, attracting or repelling it as much downwards as upwards. And therefore the Action of the Particles is very strong. But the Particles of the Ashes being not so dense and close together as those of Glass, their Action is not so strong as that of Glass, which keeps Quick-silver suspended to the height of 60 or 70 Inches, and therefore acts with a Force which would keep Water suspended to the height of above 60 Feet.

  “By the same Principle, a Sponge sucks in Water, and the Glands in the Bodies of Animals, according to their several Natures and Dispositions, suck in various Juices from the Blood.

  “If two plane polish’d plates of Glass three or four Inches broad, and twenty or twenty five long, be laid, one of them parallel to the Horizon, the other upon the first, so as at one of their ends to touch one another, and contain an Angle of about 10 or 15 Minutes, and the same be first moisten’d on their inward sides with a clean Cloath dipp’d into Oil of Oranges or Spirit of Turpentine, and a Drop or two of the Oil or Spirit be let fall upon the lower Glass at the other end; so soon as the upper Glass is laid down upon the lower, so as to touch it at one end as above, and to touch the Drop at the other end, making with the lower Glass an Angle of about 10 or 15 Minutes; the Drop will begin to move towards the Concourse of the Glasses, and will continue to move with an accelerated Motion, till it arrives at that Concourse of the Glasses. For the two Glasses attract the Drop, and make it run that way towards which the Attractions incline. And if when the Drop is in Motion you lift up that end of the Glasses where they meet, and towards which the Drop moves, the Drop will ascend between the Glasses, and therefore is attracted. And as you lift up the Glasses more and more, the Drop will ascend slower and slower, and at length rest, being then carried downward by its Weight, as much as upwards by the Attraction. And by this means you may know the Force by which the Drop is attracted at all distances from the Concourse of the Glasses.

  “Now by some Experiments of this kind, (made by Mr. Hauksby,) it has been found that the Attraction is almost reciprocally in a duplicate Proportion of the distance of the middle of the Drop from the Concourse of the Glasses, viz. reciprocally in a simple Proportion, by reason of the spreading of the Drop, and its touching each Glass in a larger Surface; and again reciprocally in a simple Proportion, by reason of the Attractions growing stronger within the same quantity of attracting Surface. The Attraction therefore within the same quantity of attracting Surface, is reciprocally as the distance between the Glasses. And therefore where the distance is exceeding small, the Attraction must be exceeding great. By the Table in the second Part of the second Book, wherein the thicknesses of colour’d Plates of Water between two Glasses are set down, the thickness of the Plate where it appears very black, is three eighths of the ten hundred thousandth part of an Inch. And where the Oil of Oranges between the Glasses is of this thickness, the Attraction collected by the foregoing Rule, seems to be so strong, as within a Circle of an Inch in diameter, to suffice to hold up a Weight equal to that of a Cylinder of Water of an Inch in diameter, and two or three Furlongs in length. And where it is of a less thickness, the Attraction may be proportionally greater, and continue to increase, until the thickness do not exceed that of a single Particle of the Oil. There are therefore Agents inNature able to make the Particles of Bodies stick together by very strong Attractions. And it is the Business of experimental Philosophy to find them out.

  “Now the smallest Particles of Matter may cohere by the strongest Attractions, and compose bigger Particles of weaker Virtue; and many of these may cohere and compose bigger Particles whose Virtue is still weaker, and so on for divers Successions, until the Progression end in the biggest Particles, on which the Operations in Chymistry and the Colours of natural Bodies depend, and which by cohering compose Bodies of a sensible Magnitude. If the Body is compact, and bends or yields inward to Pression without any sliding of its Parts, it is hard and elastick, returning to its Figure with a Force rising from the mutual Attraction of its Parts. If the Parts slide upon one another, the Body is malleable or soft. If they slip easily, and are of a fit size to be agitated by Heat, and the Heat is big enough to keep them in Agitation, the Body is fluid; and if it be apt to stick to things, it is humid; and the Drops of every fluid affect a round Figure by the mutual Attraction of their Parts, as the Globe of the Earth and Sea affects a round Figure by the mutual Attraction of its Parts by Gravity.

  “Since Metals dissolved in Acids attract but a small quantity of the Acid, their attractive Force can reach but to a small distance from them. And as in Algebra, where affirmative Quantities vanish and cease, there negative ones begin; so in Mechanicks, where Attraction ceases, there a repulsive Virtue ought to succeed. And that there is such a Virtue, seems to follow from the Reflexions and Inflexions of the Rays of Light. For the Rays are repelled by Bodies in both these Cases, without the immediate Contact of the reflecting or inflecting Body. It seems also to follow from the Emission of Light; the Ray, so soon as it is shaken off from a shining Body by the vibrating Motion of the Parts of the Body, and gets beyond the reach of Attraction, being driven away with exceeding great Velocity. For that Force which is sufficient to turn it back in Reflexion, may be sufficient to emit it. It seems also to follow from the Production of Air and Vapour. The Particles, when they are shaken off from Bodies by Heat or Fermentation, so soon as they are beyond the reach of the Attraction of the Body, receding from it, and also from one another with great Strength, and keeping at a distance so as sometimes to take up above a million of times more space than they did before in the form of a dense Body. Which vast Contraction and Expansion seems unintelligible, by feigning the Particles of Air to be springy and ramous, or rolled up like Hoops, or by any other means than a repulsive Power. The Particles of Fluids which do not cohere too strongly, and are of such a smallness as renders them most susceptible of those Agitations which keep Liquors in a Fluor, are most easily separated and rarified into Vapour, and in the Language of the Chymists, they are volatile, rarifyed with an easy Heat, and condensing with Cold. But those which are grosser, and so less susceptible of Agitation, or cohere by a stronger Attraction, are not separated without a stronger Heat, or perhaps not without Fermentation. And these last are the Bodies which Chymists call fix’d, and being rarified by Fermentation, become true permanent Air: those Particles receding from one another with the greatest Force, and being most difficultly brought together, which upon Contact cohere most strongly. And, because the Particles of permanent Air are grosser, and arise from denser Substances than those of Vapours, thence it is that true Air is more ponderous than Vapour, and that a moist Atmosphere is lighter than a dry one, quantity for quantity. From the same repelling Power it seems to be that Flies walk upon the Water without wetting their Feet; and that the Object-glasses of long Telescopes lie upon one another without touching; and that dry Powders are difficultly made to touch one another so as to stick together, unless by melting them, or wetting them with Water, which by exhaling may bring them together; and that two polish’d Marbles, which by immediate Contact stick together, are difficultly brought so close together as to stick.

  “And thus Nature will be very conformable to her self and very simple, performing all the great Motions of the heavenly Bodies by the Attraction of Gravity which intercedes those Bodies, and almost all the small ones of their Particles by some other attractive and repelling Powers which intercede the Particles. The Vis inertiae is a passive Principle by which Bodies persist in their Motion or Rest, receive Motion in proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted. By this Principle alone there never could have been any Motion in the World. Some otherPrinciple was necessary for putting Bodies into Motion; and now they are in Motion, some other Principle is necessary for conserving the Motion. For from the various Composition of two Motions, ’tis very certain that there is not always the same quantity of Motion in the World. For if two Globes joined by a slender Rod, revolve about their common Center of Gravity, with an uniform Motion, while that Center moves on uniformly in a right Line drawn in the Plane of their circular Motion; the Sum of the Motions of the two Globes, as often as the Globes are in the right Line described by their common Center of Gravity, will be bigger than the Sum of their Motions, when they are in a Line perpendicular to that right Line. By this Instance it appears, that Motion may be got or lost. But by reason of the Tenacity of Fluids, and Attrition of their Parts, and the Weakness of Elasticity in Solids, Motion is much more apt to be lost than got, and is always upon the Decay. For Bodies which are either absolutely hard, or so soft as to be void of Elasticity, will not rebound from one another. Impenetrability makes them only stop. If two equal Bodies meet directly in vacuo, they will by the Laws of Motion stop where they meet, and lose all their Motion, and remain in rest, unless they beelastick, and receive new Motion from their Spring. If they have so much Elasticity as suffices to make them rebound with a quarter, or half, or three quarters of the Force with which they come together, they will lose three quarters, or half, or a quarter of their Motion. And this may be tried, by letting two equal Pendulums fall against one another from equal heights. If the Pendulums be of Lead or soft Clay, they will lose all or almost all their Motions: If of elastick Bodies, they will lose all but what they recover from their Elasticity. If it be said, that they can lose no Motion but what they communicate to other Bodies, the consequence is, that in vacuo they can lose no Motion, but when they meet they must go on and penetrate one anothers Dimensions. If three equal round Vessels be filled, the one with Water, the other with Oil, the third with molten Pitch, and the Liquors be stirred about alike to give them a vortical Motion; the Pitch by its Tenacity will lose its Motion quickly, the Oil being less tenacious will keep it longest, but yet will lose it in a short time. Whence it is easy to understand, that if many contiguous Vortices of molten Pitch were each of them as large as those which some suppose to revolve about the Sun and fix’d Stars, yet these and all their Parts would, by their tenacity and stiffness, communicate their Motion to one another, till they all rested among themselves. Vortices of Oil or Water, or some fluider Matter, might continue longer in Motion; but, unless the Matter were void of all Tenacity and Attrition of Parts, and Communication of Motion, (which is not to be supposed,) the Motion would constantly decay. Seeing therefore the variety of Motion which we find in the World is always decreasing, there is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it by active Principles, such as are the Cause of Gravity, by which Planets and Comets keep their Motions in their Orbs, and Bodies acquire great Motion in falling; and the Cause of Fermentation, by which the Heart and Blood of Animals are kept in perpetual Motion and Heat; the inward Parts of the Earth are constantly warm’d and in some places grow very hot; Bodies burn and shine, Mountains take Fire, the Caverns of the Earth are blown up, and the Sun continues violently hot and lucid, and warms all things by his Light. For we meet with very little Motion in the World, besides what is owing to these active Principles. And if it were not for these Principles, the Bodies of the Earth, Planets, Comets, Sun, and all things in them would grow cold and freeze, and become inactive Masses; and all Putrefaction, Generation, Vegetation and Life would cease, and the Planets and Comets would not remain in their Orbs.

  “All these things being consider’d, it seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form’d Matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other Properties, and in such Proportion to Space, as most conduced to the End for which he form’d them; and that these primitive Particles being Solids, are incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded of them; even so very hard, as never to wear or break in pieces: No ordinary Power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first Creation. While the Particles continue intire, they may compose Bodies of one and the same Nature and Texture in all Ages: But should they wear away, or break in pieces, the Nature of Things depending on them would be changed. Water and Earth composed of old worn Particles and Fragments of Particles, would not be of the same Nature and Texture now, with Water and Earth composed of intire Particles, in the Beginning. And therefore that Nature may be lasting, the Changes of corporeal Things are to be placed only in the various Separations and new Associations and Motions of these permanent Particles; compound Bodies being apt to break, not in the midst of solid Particles, but where those Particles are laid together, and only touch in a few Points.

  “It seems to me farther, that these Particles have not only a Vis inertiae, accompanied with such passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that Force, but also that they are moved by certain active Principles, such as is that of Gravity, and that which causes Fermentation, and the Cohesion of Bodies. These Principles I consider not as occult Qualities, supposed to result from the specifick Forms of Things, but as general Laws of Nature, by which the Things themselves are form’d: their Truth appearing to us by Phaenomena, though their Causes be not yet discover’d. For these are manifest Qualities, and their Causes only are occult. And the Aristotelians gave the Name of occult Qualities, not to manifest Qualities, but to such Qualities only as they supposed to lie hid in Bodies, and to be the unknown Causes of Gravity, and of magnetick and electrick Attractions, and of Fermentations, if we should suppose that these Forces or Actions arose from Qualities unknown to us, and uncapable of being discovered and made manifest. Such occult Qualities put a stop to the Improvement of natural Philosophy, and therefore of late Years have been rejected. To tell us that every Species of Things is endow’d with an occult specifick Quality by which it acts and produces manifest Effects, is to tell us nothing: But to derive two or three general Principles of Motion from Phaenomena, and afterwards to tell us how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal Things follow from those manifest Principles, would be a very great step in Philosophy, though the Causes of those Principles were not yet discover’d: And therefore I scruple not to propose the Principles of Motion above mention’d, they being of very general Extent, and leave their Causes to be found out.

  “Now by the help of these Principles, all material Things seem to have been composed of the hard and solid Particles above mention’d, variously associated in the first Creation by the Council of an intelligent Agent. For it became him who created them to set them in order. And if he did so, ’tis unphilosophical to seek for any other Origin of the World, or to pretend that it might arise out of a Chaos by the mere Laws of Nature, though being once form’d, it may continue by those Laws for many Ages. For while Comets move in very excentrick Orbs in all manner of Positions, blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable Irregularities excepted, which may have risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Reformation. Such a wonderful Uniformity in the Planetary System must be allowed the Effect of Choice. And so must the Uniformity in the Bodies of Animals, they having generally a right and a left side shaped alike, and on either side of their Bodies two Legs behind, and either two Arms, or two Legs, or two Wings before upon their Shoulders, and between their Shoulders a Neck running down into a Back-bone, and a Head upon it; and in the Head two Ears, two Eyes, a Nose, a Mouth, and a Tongue, alike situated. Also the first Contrivance of those very artificial Parts of Animals, the Eyes, Ears, Brain, Muscles, Heart, Lungs, Midrift, Glands, Larinx, Hands, Wings, Swimming Bladders, natural Spectacles, and other Organs of Sense and Motion; and the Instinct of Brutes and Insects, can be the effect of nothing else than the Wisdom and Skill of a powerful ever-living Agent, who being in all Places, is more able by his Will to move the Bodies within his boundless uniform Sensorium, and thereby to form and reform the Parts of the Universe, than we are by our Will to move the Parts of our own Bodies. And yet we are not to consider the World as the Body of God, or the several Parts thereof, as the Parts of God. He is an uniform Being, void of Organs, Members or Parts, and they are his Creatures subordinate to him, and subservient to his Will; and he is no more the Soul of them, than the Soul of a Man is the Soul of the Species of Things carried through the Organs of Sense into the place of its Sensation, where it perceives them by means of its immediate Presence, without the Intervention of any third thing. The Organs of Sense are not for enabling the Soul to perceive the Species of Things in its Sensorium, but only for conveying them thither; and God has no need of such Organs, he being every where present to the Things themselves. And since Space is divisible in infinitum, and Matter is not necessarily in all places, it may be allow’d, that God is able to create Particles of Matter of several Sizes and Figures, and in several Proportions to Space, and perhaps of different Densities and Forces, and thereby to vary the Laws of Nature, and make Worlds of several sorts in several Parts of the Universe. At least, I see nothing of Contradiction in all this.

  “If Natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method, shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will be also enlarged. For so far as we can know by Natural Philosophy what is the First Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so far our Duty towards him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of Nature. And no doubt, if the Worship of false Gods had not blinded the Heathen, their Moral Philosophy would have gone farther than to the four Cardinal Virtues; and, instead of teaching the Transmigration of Souls, and to worship the Sun and Moon, and dead Heroes, they would have taught us to worship our true Author and Benefactor, as their Ancestors did under the Government of Noah and his Sons, before they corrupted themselves.” Ibid. P. 363, &c.

  What can be more just than the Conclusions drawn by this great Philosopher from the Phaenomena of Nature; viz. That the World owes not its being such as it is, to Mechanism, Chance, or Necessity; but to the Will of a Wise and Powerful Being, who first form’d, and continually governs, the same; in opposition to those Atheists who hold, with Epicurus and others, that the present Frame of Nature had a Beginning, but not from God? And does he not, with equal Strength of Reason, conclude, That Motion is, of it-self, continually decreasing; and, That this Frame of Nature does, of it-self, tend to Decay, Confusion, and Ruin; and, consequently, That it could not, of it-self, have subsisted from all Eternity; which is, at present, the more prevailing Opinion among Men of Atheistical Principles?

  6. The Formation of Animals is not Mechanical.The Formation of Animals is not Mechanical. Of this Truth there are several Indications; but I shall here make use only of the following Observation and Reasoning of Dr. Pitcairn, in the Beginning of his Dissertation of the Circulation of the Blood in Animals, before and after Birth. “I am confident, nothing in Life can be found more useful, or more agreeable to the Mind, inquiring into the Original of Things, (known only to God, the Author of All,) than to have found out, and be convinc’d, that the first Rise of Animals is owing to God himself. For ’tis now known, from the Law of Circulation, that the Blood is receiv’d by, and propell’d from, the Heart of an Animal alternately; for which reason, neither Heat, nor any Ferment, nor Liquor, however charg’d with Spirits or Salts, or any other Power constantly and not alternately impress’d, expels the Blood or nutritious Juice, from the Heart or its Neighbourhood; otherwise, when once propell’d, it would never return back to the Heart, that Force perpetually opposing it, as not being alternately impress’d. But the Force, which is alternately communicated to the Heart, does not proceed from the Womb of the Mother; for whatsoever goes from the Womb to the Heart of an Embryo, is discharg’d into its Ventricles, and not into the Ducts of its Fibres, by which it is contracted; and beside, the Heart of an Embryo will still continue its Contraction, and the Blood its Circulation, tho’ freed from the Uterus. Therefore the moving Force is to be deduc’d from some part of the Embryo. For the Law of Circulation shews, that nothing can be remitted to the Heart from any part in an Animal, that was not first sent to that part from the Heart along with the Blood; and we have shewn, that the Secretion of Fluids in an Animal, (whether they return to the Heart or not,) are perform’d by means of Circulation opposing the secernible Fluid to the secretory Orifices equal in Magnitude to the Particles to be secern’d; and that there is no other Mechanical Reason of Animal Secretion: and, therefore, that there do not only exist secretory Vessels, and others, before any assign’d Secretion; but also, that the Secretion of those Powers return’d to contract the Heart, is perform’d before any assign’d Constriction of the Heart, or any Circulation of the Blood is begun; or that the Contraction of the Heart propelling the Blood to the part secerning the Body or Powers for the contracting the Heart, is perform’d before any Secretion, or return and communication of the contracting Powers. Farther; Circulation teaches us, that the Medullary Substance of the Brain and Spinal Marrow are the Parts, from whence the Power, which alternately expels the Blood, is communicated to the Heart: Nor, by the Changes and Metamorphoses common to some kind of Animals, are the Powers, or Relations of Powers, alter’d, whereon their Life and Circulation depend; so that the Communication between the Heart and Spinal Marrow is not chang’d. Whence it follows, that the Heart, Brain, and Spinal Marrow, have the same mutual Dependence by the same Powers operating after the same manner, which was the same at the first Contraction of the Heart, as in any subsequent one. For which Reason, the Powers of the Heart and Brain were form’d at the same time, and exist together; and, therefore, no Animal is produc’d Mechanically.”10

  The World is a System or Whole, whose Parts are design’d and contriv’d mutually for one another; which plainly proves it to have been fram’d by a Being Powerful, Wise, and Good.§3. The World is a System or Whole, whose Parts are design’d and contriv’d mutually for one another; which plainly proves it to have been fram’d by a Being powerful, wise, and good. I shall here close my Quotations of Arguments to prove the Being of a God, with one upon the Head now laid down, taken from Lord Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks Vol. 2. P. 282, &c. where he introduces one talking to his doubting Friend, in the following Words.

  “O my ingenious Friend! whose Reason, in other respects, must be allow’d so clear and happy; how is it possible that, with such Insight, and accurate Judgment in the Particulars of Natural Beings and Operations, you shou’d no better judge of the Structure of Things in general, and of the Order and Frame of Nature? Who better than yourself can shew the Structure of each Plant and Animal-Body, declare the Office of every Part and Organ, and tell the Uses, Ends, and Advantages to which they serve? How, therefore, should you prove so ill a Naturalist in thisWhole, and understand so little the Anatomy of the World and Nature, as not to discern the same Relation of Parts, the same Consistency and Uniformity in the Universe!”

  “Some Men, perhaps, there are of so confus’d a Thought, and irregularly form’d within themselves, that ’tis no more than Natural for them to find fault, and imagine a thousand Inconsistences and Defects in this wider Constitution. ’Tis not, we may presume, the absolute Aim or Interest of the Universal Nature, to render every private-one infallible, and without defect. ’Twas not its Intention to leave us without some Pattern of Imperfection; such as we perceive in Minds, like these, perplex’d with froward Thought. But you, my Friend, are Master of a nobler Mind. You are conscious of better Order within, and can see Workmanship and Exactness in yourself, and other innumerable Parts of the Creation. Can you answer it to yourself, allowing thus much, not to allow all? Can you induce yourself ever to believe or think, that where there are Parts so variously united, and conspiring fitly within themselves, the Whole itself shou’d have neither Union nor Coherence; and where inferior and private Natures are often sound so perfect, the Universal-One shou’d want Perfection, and be esteem’d like what soever can be thought of most monstrous, rude, and imperfect?”

  “Strange! That there shou’d be in Nature the Idea of an Order and Perfection, which Nature her-self wants! That Beings which arise from Nature shou’d be so perfect, as to discover Imperfection in her Constitution; and be wise enough to correct that Wisdom by which they were made!”

  Nothing, surely, is more strongly imprinted on our Minds, or “more closely interwoven with our Souls, than the Idea or Sense of Order and Proportion. Hence all the Force of Numbers, and those powerful Arts founded on their Management and Use. What a difference there is between Harmony and Discord! Cadency and Convulsion! What a difference between compos’d and orderly Motion, and that which is ungovern’d and accidental! Between the regular and uniform Pile of some noble Architect, and a Heap of Sand or Stones! Between an organiz’d Body, and a Mist or Cloud driven by the Wind.”

  “Now as this difference is immediately perceiv’d by a plain Internal Sensation, so there is withal in Reason this account of it; That whatever Things have Order, the same have Unity of Design, and they which concur in One, are Parts constituent of oneWhole, or are, in themselves, intire Systems. Such is a Tree, with all its Branches; an Animal, with all its Members; an Edifice, with all its exterior and interior Ornaments. What else is even a Tune or Symphony, or any excellent Piece of Musick, than a certain System of proportion’d Sounds?”

  “Now in this which we call the Universe, whatever the Perfection may be of any particular Systems; or whatever single Parts may have Proportion, Unity, or Form within themselves; yet, if they are not united all in general, inOneSystem, but are, in respect of one another, as the driven Sands, or Clouds, or breaking Waves; then there being no Coherence in the Whole, there can be inferr’d no Order, no Proportion, and, consequently, no Project or Design. But, if none of these Parts are Independent, but all apparently united, then is the Wholea System compleat, according to one Simple, Consistent, and UniformDesign.”

  “Here then is our main Subject, insisted on: That neither Man, nor any other Animal, tho’ ever so compleat a System of Parts, as to all within, can be allow’d in the same manner compleat, as to all without; but must be consider’d as having a farther relation abroad to the System of his Kind. So even this System of his Kind to the Animal-System; this to the World (our Earth;) and this again to the bigger World, and to the Universe.”

  “All Things in this World are united. For as the Branch is united with the Tree, so is the Tree as immediately with the Earth, Air, and Water, which feed it. As much as the fertile Mould is fitted to the Tree, as much as the strong and upright Trunk of the Oak or Elm is fitted to the twining Branches of the Vine or Ivy; so much are the very Leaves, the Seeds, and the Fruits of these Trees fitted to the various Animals. These again to one another, and to the Elements where they live, and to which they are, as Appendices, in a manner fitted and join’d; as either by Wings for the Air, Fins for the Water, Feet for the Earth, and by other correspondent inward Parts, of a more curious Frame and Texture. Thus in contemplating all on Earth, we must of necessity view All in One, as holding to one common Stock. Thus too in the System of the bigger World. See there the mutual Dependency of Things! the Relation of one to another; of the Sun to this inhabited Earth, and of the Earth and other Planets to the Sun! the Order, Union, and Coherence of the Whole! And know (my ingenious Friend) That by this Survey you will be oblig’d to own the Universal System, and coherent Scheme of Things, to be establish’d on abundant Proof, capable of convincing any fair and just Contemplator of the Works of Nature. For scarce wou’d any one, ’till he had well survey’d this universal Scene, believe a Union thus evidently demonstrable, by such numerous and powerful Instances of mutual Correspondency and Relation, from the minutest Ranks and Orders of Beings to the remotest Spheres.”

  “Now, in this mighty UNION, if there be such Relations of Parts one to another as are not easily discover’d; if on this account the End and Use of Things does not every where appear, there is no wonder; since ’tis no more, indeed, than what must happen of necessity: Nor could Supreme Wisdom have otherwise order’d it. For in an Infinity of Things thus relative, a Mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing fully: And since each particular has relation to all in general, it can know no perfect or true Relation of any Thing, in a World not perfectly and fully known.”

  “The same may be consider’d in any dissected Animal, Plant, or Flower; where he who is no Anatomist, nor vers’d in Natural History, sees that the many Parts have a relation to the Whole; for thus much even a slight View affords: But he who like you, my Friend, is curious in the Works of Nature, and has been let into a Knowledge of the Animal and Vegetable World, he alone can readily declare the just Relation of all these Parts to one another, and the several Uses to which they serve.”

  “But, if you would willingly enter farther into this Thought, and consider how much we ought, not only to be satisfy’d with this our View of Things, but even to admire its Clearness; imagine only some Person intirely a Stranger to Navigation, and ignorant of the Nature of the Sea or Waters, how great his Astonishment would be, when finding himself on Board some Vessel, anchoring at Sea, remote from all Land-prospect, whilst it was yet a Calm, he view’d the ponderous Machine firm and motionless in the midst of the smooth Ocean, and consider’d its Foundations beneath, together with its Cordage, Masts, and Sails above. How easily would he see the Whole one regular Structure, all things depending on one another; the Uses of the Rooms below, the Lodgments, and Conveniences of Men and Stores? But, being ignorant of the Intent or Design of all above, would he pronounce the Masts and Cordage to be useless and cumbersome, and for this Reason condemn the Frame, and despise the Architect? O my Friend! let us not thus betray our Ignorance; but consider where we are, and in what a Universe. Think of the many Parts of the vast Machine, in which we have so little insight, and of which it is impossible we should know the Ends and Uses; which instead of seeing to the highest Pendants, we see only some lower Deck, and are in this dark Case of Flesh, confin’d even to the Hold, and meanest Station of the Vessel.”

  “Now, having recogniz’d this uniform consistent Fabrick, and own’d the Universal System, we must of consequence acknowledge a UniversalMind; which no ingenuous Man can be tempted to disown, exceptthro’ the Imagination of Disorder in the Universe, its Seat. For can it be suppos’d of any one in the World, that, being in some Desart far from Men, and hearing there a perfect Symphony of Musick, or seeing an exact Pile of regular Architecture arising gradually from the Earth, in all its Orders and Proportions, he should be persuaded that at the Bottom there was no Design accompanying this, no secret Spring of Thought, no active Mind? Would he, because he saw no Hand, deny the Handy-work, and suppose that each of these compleat and perfect Systems were fram’d, and thus united in just Symmetry, and conspiring Order, either by the accidental blowing of the Winds, or rolling of the Sands.”

  “What is it then should so disturb our Views of Nature, as to destroy that Unity of Design and Order of a Mind, which otherwise would be so apparent? All we can see either of the Heavens or Earth, demonstrates Order and Perfection; so as to afford the noblest Subjects of Contemplation to Minds, like yours, enrich’d with Sciences and Learning. All is delightful, amiable, rejoicing, except with relation to Man only, and his Circumstances, which seem unequal. Here the Calamity and Ill arises; and hence the Ruin of this goodly Frame. All perishes on this account; and the whole Order of the Universe, elsewhere so firm, intire, and immoveable, is here o’er thrown, and lost by this one View; in which we refer all things to ourselves; submitting the Interest of the Whole to the Good and Interest of so small a Part.”

  “But how is it you complain of the unequal State of Man, and of the few Advantages allow’d him above the Beasts? What can a Creature claim, so little differing from ’em, or whose Merit appears so little above ’em, except in Wisdom and Virtue, to which so few conform? Man may be Virtuous; and by being so, is Happy. His Merit is Reward. By Virtue he deserves; and in Virtue only can meet his Happiness deserv’d. But, if even Virtue it-self be unprovided for, and Vice more prosperous be the better Choice; if this (as you suppose) be in the Nature of Things, then is all Order in reality inverted, and Supreme Wisdom lost: Imperfection and Irregularity being, after this manner, undoubtedly too apparent in the Moral World.”

  “Have you then, e’er you pronounc’d this Sentence, consider’d of the State of Virtue and Vice, with respect to this Life merely; so as to say, with assurance, When, and How far, in what Particular, and how Circumstantiated, the one or the other is Good or Ill? You who are skill’d in other Fabricks and Compositions, both of Art and Nature, have you consider’d of the Fabrick of the Mind, the Constitution of the Soul, the Connexion and Frame of all its Passions and Affections; to know accordingly the Order and Symmetry of the Part, and how it either improves or suffers; what its Force is, when naturally preserv’d in its sound State; and what becomes of it, when corrupted and abus’d? ’Till this (my Friend) be well examin’d and understood, how shall we judge either of the Force of Virtue, or Power of Vice? Or in what manner either of these may work to our Happiness or Undoing?”

  “Here therefore is that Inquiry we should first make. But who is there can afford to make it as he ought? If happily we are born of a good Nature; if a liberal Education has form’d in us a generous Temper and Disposition, well-regulated Appetites, and worthy Inclinations, ’tis well for us; and so indeed we esteem it. But who is there endeavours to give these to himself, or to advance his Portion of Happiness in this kind? Who thinks of improving, or so much as of preserving his Share, in a World where it must of necessity run so great a hazard, and where we know an honest Nature is so easily corrupted? All other things relating to us are preserv’d with Care, and have some Art or Oeconomy belonging to ’em; this which is nearest related to us, and on which our Happiness depends, is alone committed to Chance: And Temper is the only Thing ungovern’d, whilst it governs all the rest.”

  “Thus we inquire concerning what is good and suitable to our Appetites; but what Appetites are good and suitable to us, is no part of our Examination. We inquire what is according to Interest, Policy, Fashion, Vogue; but it seems wholly strange, and out of the way, to inquire what is according toNature. The Balance of Europe, of Trade, of Power, is strictly sought after; while few have heard of the Balance of their Passions, or thought of holding these Scales even. Few are acquainted with this Province, or knowing in these Affairs. But were we more so (as this Inquiry would make us) we should then see Beauty and Decorum here, as well as elsewhere in Nature; and the Order of the Moral World would equal that of the Natural. By this the Beauty ofVirtue would appear; and hence (as has been shewn) the Supreme and SovereignBeauty, the Original of all which is Good or Amiable.”

  “But, lest I should appear at last too like an Enthusiast, I chuse to express my Sense, and conclude this Philosophical Sermon, in the Words of one of those antient Philologists, whom you are us’d to esteem. For Divinity it-self, says he, is surely Beauteous, and of all Beauties the brightest; tho’ not a beauteous Body, but that from whence the Beauty of Bodies is deriv’d: Not a beauteous Plain, but that from whence the Plain looks Beautiful. The River’s Beauty, the Sea’s, the Heaven’s, and Heavenly Constellation’s, all flow from hence, as from a Source Eternal and Incorruptible. As Beings partake of this, they are fair, and flourishing, and happy: As they are lost to this, they are deform’d, perish’d, and lost.”11

  Atheism inverteth all natural Order, and deduceth the Origin of Things in an impossible Manner.§4. The Origination of Things in Theism is in such Order, which is Natural and Possible: But Atheism inverteth it, beginning at the wrong End, and deduceth things in such an Order, as is Unnatural and Impossible.

  That an Universe of imperfect Beings should issue from a Being absolutely perfect, is no more Unnatural and Impossible, than that a Poet should make a Verse, or the Sun produce Vapours: But that an Universe of Beings of great Perfections (Vital and Intellectual, Natural and Moral,) should be produc’d merely by Matter (which is of all things the most Imperfect,) is as Unnatural and Impossible, as that the Verse should make the Poet, or the Vapours should produce the Sun. That Nonsense should generate Sense, and the imperceptive Stupidity of Matter should produce perceptive Life, Cogitation, Reason, and Understanding; that the Ascent of Things should be upwards, from Matter producing all the higher Orders of Beings, of manifold Species and Ranks, of various Kinds and Degrees of Perfection, (Inanimate, Animate, Vegetative, Sensitive, Rational;) that the greater Plenty of Perfection should be the Product of the greater Penury, is, in the Judgment of common Sense, plainly Impossible; as if the Matter of an House should, without an Architect, build it-self into an House, and furnish it with Inhabitants, providing them with all Accommodations.

  Mankind are not Self-existent.§5. The Self-existence of Mankind from Eternity is an impossible Supposition. No rational Man, or Men, now in being, can possibly be of this Opinion, that he or they are Self-existent; and soit was in all Generations that are past. Nor could they be Existent from Eternity; for, since each in the Succession had a Beginning, the Whole must have had a Beginning.

  “An infinite Succession of Effects will require an infinite Efficient, or a Cause infinitely Effective. So far is it from requiring none.”

  “Suppose a Chain hung down from the Heavens of an infinite Height, and, tho’ every Link of it gravitated towards the Earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its Situation; and upon this a Question should arise, What supported or kept up this Chain: Would it be a sufficient Answer to say, that the first (or lowest) Link hung upon the second (or that next above it), the second, or rather the first and second together, upon the third, and so on ad infinitum? For what holds up the Whole? A Chain of ten Links would fall down, unless something able to bear it hinder’d: One of twenty, if not stay’d by something of a yet greater Strength, in proportion to the increase of Weight: And, therefore, one of infinite Links certainly, if not sustain’d by something infinitely Strong, and capable to bear up an infinite Weight. And thus it is in a Chain of Causes and Effects tending, or as it were gravitating, towards some End. The last (or lowest) depends, or (as we may say) is suspended upon the Cause above it; this again, if it be not the First Cause, is suspended, as an Effect upon something above it, &c. And, if they should be Infinite, unless (agreeably to what has been said) there is some Cause upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite Effect without an Efficient: And to assert there is any such thing would be as great an Absurdity, as to say, that a Finite or little Weight wants something to sustain it, but an infinite one or the greatest does not. Suppose a Row of blind Men, of which the last laid his Hand upon the Shoulder of the Man next before him, he on the Shoulder of the Man next before him, and so on, ’till the foremost grew to be quite out of sight; and somebody asking, What Guide this String of blind Men had at the Head of them, it should be answer’d, that they had no Guide, nor any Head, but one held by another, and so went on ad infinitum, would any rational Creature accept this for a just Answer? Is it not to say, that Blindness, in an infinite Progression, could supply the Place of Sight, or a Guide?” Wollaston’s Religion of Nature delineated. P. 67,68.12 This is equally applicable to the Proof of the Necessity of a First Mover.

  The Earth is of late Formation.That our Earth is of late Formation, appears from the late Invention of Letters and Arts, the known Plantation of most Countries, the gradual Decrease of Mountains, and gradual Increase of Mankind.

  The Proof of a God from Final Causes in the World Inanimate,§6. “If any Man” (says Cicero L. 2. de N. D.13 ) “should carry to Scythia such a Sphere as Posidonius made, that doth but represent the Motion of the Planets, who amongst these Barbarians could doubt but that such a Sphere was made by Reason?” No Man is so mad as to think, that an artificial Sphere, an excellent Book, or a magnificent Building, were made by themselves merely by the mechanical Motion of their own Materials; yet what mean and contemptible Pieces of Artifice are all artificial Spheres, Books, and Buildings, compar’d with the Stars and Planets, the immense and goodly Volume and stupendious Structure of the visible World? The Parts whereof relate to certain Operations and Uses, to which they are admirably fitted; and they relate to one another, and are aptly combin’d into one harmonious habitable World, wherein Artificialness and wise Design are every where visible; such Artificialness and wise Design; such Order and Regularity, as the contemplative Mind of Man can never fathom, nor sufficiently admire; and which plainly demonstrateth, that things were not left to the blind Agitation of Matter, (which cannot Model, Distinguish, Proportionate, nor do things in Number, Weight, and Measure, nor do them so well as the greatest Reason can do no better,) but that there is a Maker of all Things, who well understood what he had to do, is of immense Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, and that the World is, in all the Parts of it, the Work of a Wonderful Providence. Such is the Light of the Sun and Heavenly Bodies; and such is our Earth, with its diurnal Revolution to make the Succession of Day and Night; and its annual Revolution about the Sun, with its Axis so inclin’d, but always parallel to it-self, as regularly to bring about the 4 Seasons of the Year, with so nearly equal a distribution of Light and Heat thro’ the Whole; having its Surface cloath’d with Green; being a Terraqueous Globe, involv’d in a convenient Atmosphere, furnish’d with copious Stores of Water, with various Sorts of Minerals, Animals (in all respects suited to their Elements,) Vegetables (of admirable Con-texture, many of them of exquisite Beauty, and others of as great Use,) with all Sorts of Seeds or Seminal Principles, (which are also propagated for continuance of the Species.) It is not probable, that any of these had been, if there had been no higher Cause of Things, than the undirected Agitation of Matter, which knoweth no Beauty, Order, Regularity, or Final Cause. No Reason can be assign’d, why any of them are, but only from the Final Cause (it is for the Best, that they should be so;) and from the Wisdom of the Creator of all Things, who design’d them for End and Use. For who can doubt, but the Parental Nature, which hath furnish’d Animals with Organical Parts for the Reception, Mastication, Digestion, and Distribution of Food, hath also provided the Herbs and Grass, and Plants, and their Fruit, to be their Food and Physick, and that they were made for this End and Use? That the Feet were made for Walking, the Hands for Working, the Eyes for Seeing, and that Light and Eyes were design’d for one another? Who is it then, that hath suited and adapted this to that, and that to this? That hath made the Fruits of the Earth for Animals, Animals for Men, as the Horse for carrying him, the Ox for ploughing, the Dog for hunting and keeping House?

  Animate.It must be an intelligent Cause, (not senseless Matter,) that diversified the Matter into such innumerable Species of Beings as this World consisteth of, (all which are of regular Idea, and have their Specifick Natures and Properties;) that instituted a beauteous Order and gradual Subordination of them (of Plants to Animals, and Animals to Men;) that adjusted the Growth of Animals, determin’d their Stature, gave them their Beauty and their Usefulness, their distinction into Male and Female, (which are manifestly design’d, the one for the other,) made some of them Oviparous, and others Viviparous, some with Wings, and others with Fins, of which differences amongst Animals no Mechanical Cause can be assign’d, but a Reason may be assign’d from the Final Cause, which she weth, that they were not so made without Reason. Which also appeareth from the Fabrick of the Bodies of Animals, of the Formation and Organization whereof it is Madness to pretend to give a Mechanical Account (why the Brains and Lungs, the Nerves and Membranes, the Veins and Arteries, the Bones, Joints, and Ligaments, the Valves and Fibres, were so fram’d and situated,) in which we find nothing unfit, nothing in vain, and the Artifice that is in them so amazingly exquisite and elaborate, that all the Works of Human Art are but a Bungle, if compar’d with the Body of an Animal. That the rudely-agitated Matter can form it-self into Clocks, Engines of War, and Musical Instruments, is much more credible than that it can form it-self into the Bodies of Animals. And, if one should suppose, that the undirected Agitation of the Particles of senseless Matter did of old, of their own accord, spin themselves into Threads; these Threads, of themselves, did weave them-selves into Pieces of Cloth (of numerous Kinds); that these Pieces of Cloth did make themselves into Garments of Thousands of regular Shapes hugely different, and also into some Hundreds of the same Shape; and that when those Garments were worn out, the Matter, of its own accord, should make it-self into new ones exactly like the former (altho’ the odds are infinite to one, that it does not twice hit upon the same Form); this would be a much more credible Hypothesis, than the Atheistick Hypothesis touching the Origin of Animals; that the rude lyagitated Particles of Matter did, of their own accord, form themselves at first into certain Stamina of the Parts of Animals, next in to Organical Parts, and next into perfect Animals of numerous and hugely-different Kinds, and into a great Number of Individuals of several Kinds, which are propagated from one Generation to another, with as great regularity as the Body of an Animal is form’d, which consists of a vast variety of Parts and Organs, of exquisite Size, Situation, Temper, Texture, Connexion, Distinction; every Animal is form’d with such Organs as are suitable to it, its Organical Parts are admirably fitted for their several Functions, and these Functions are such as the Oeconomy of the Whole requireth (Mastication, Deglutition, Concoction, Fermentation, Chylification, Sanguification, Separation, Percolation, Respiration, Nutrition, Generation, Local Motion, various Sensation, and other Functions of Life;) the Parts of an Animal and their Functions constitute one orderly Oeconomy of the Whole; therefore they were made by an intelligent Contriver, who had the Whole in his Mind, and design’d the Good thereof. The several Parts of it are the Wonders of his Divine Art; for such is that astonishing Organ the Eye, which is of socuriousa Structure and so many Excellencies, and so admirably fitted for its Function and Office, that every one who will not shut the Eyes of his Mind, cannot fail to discern, that it was made by a Divine Artist, for the Use of Seeing. Not less wonderful, tho’ not so much expos’d to view or taken notice of, is the Organ of Hearing, the Ear. Such is the rete mirabile in the Brain; the Fabrick of the Aspera Arteria, which is cover’d with the Epiglottis, and is smooth in that part, which toucheth the Oesophagus; the bending of the Arteria Aorta a little above the Heart, and the Fabrication of the Valves of the Blood-Vessels; the most numerous concurrent Organs for the enlarging and contracting the Breast in Respiration; “About which Motions,” as Dr. Willis observes, “the Mechanick Artifice of the Creator, which is plainly adapted to Mathematical Rules, we cannot sufficiently admire.” And who can chuse but admire that wise and useful Provision of temporary Parts, and of Nutriment, which Provident Nature maketh for the Foetus during the time of Gestation? What we have said of the Bodies of Animals, is in great Degree, applicable to Plants, in which the Root, the Stalk, the Flower, the Seed, with their numerous constituent Parts (the Skin, Cortical Body, Vessels, Fibres, Covers, Pith, Radicle, Lobes, and such like) and even the Claspers, Thorns, Hairs, Globulets, are admirably fitted for an Use and Purpose, some Service of the Plant, and are manifestly design’d thereto.

  Atheism can give no Account of the Origination of Mankind.Atheism can give no account of the Origination of Mankind, or indeed of any Animal; for those Accounts, which the old Atheistick Philosophers gave of it, are as gross Absurdities as the Fictions of the Poets. Such is the Conceit of Anaximander,14 That the first Men were generated in the Bellies of Fishes, and were there nourish’d, ’till they were able to help themselves, and then they were cast upon dry Land. Which ridiculous Conceit is as wise as that of Epicurus,15 That the Slime of the Earth, being heated, there grew out of it certain Wombs or Bags, wherein the first Men (and other Animals) were form’d; for whose Nourishment these Wombs drew out of the Earth a Milky Liquor; and these being excluded from their Wombs (the Earth still affording them Milk) and Adult propagated their Kind. So Democritus suppos’d, That Men at first were generated out of Water and Slime. But, if Mother Earth thus produc’d Mankind at first, it is much, that in so long a time, there were never since any of the like Productions, (seeing she observeth fix’d and determinate Laws, and is constant in observing them,) and that now Mankind cannot be generated, but by Propagation from their Kind. As the King of Siam ask’d the French Missionaries,16 If the Sun in Europe was the same with theirs in the Indies? So we must ask the Epicureans, If their Child-bearing Earth was the same with ours? For our Earth is as unfit for Child-bearing, as Fishes for engendering Human Flesh. That which formerly seems to have given any a Handle for this wild Conceit, is, with certainty, discover’d to be a Mistake, by Experiments and Microscopical Observations. They thought that Vermin, atleast, proceeded frequently from Putrefaction, and that sometimes Animals of a higher Order were produc’d by the Slime of Nile expos’d to the Rays of the Sun, no one Instance of which has been sufficiently vouch’d. On the contrary, it is now, I think, universally agreed by all Natural Philosophers, that every Animal proceeds from an Egg, that was before produc’d by another Animal of the same Species; as every Vegetable is, in like Manner, produc’d from its proper Seed. Were it otherwise, how comes it about, that we see no Instance, inany Age or Country, of either Animal or Plant arising of a new Species? And as the Earth hath no Seminal Principles for Human Productions, nor any Faculty of conceiving with Child; so, if any Nurslings were committed to her Care, she must necessarily expose them, and could not educate them. If of old she afforded Milk, she could not thereby originate Mankind, unless she could also contrive and form Human Bodies; nor would her Nutriment signify any thing, unless she could also furnish them with all the wonderful Organs of Deglutition, Nutrition, and Concoction; their Tunicles, Muscles, Glands, Fibres, their Shape and Situation, their Dilatation and Contraction, opening and shutting, Faculties of Digestion, Retention, Expulsion, the Commixtures and Secretions that are made in them, with the Causes of them, the Peristaltick Motion of the Intestines, their Valves to hinder Regurgitation, their Convolution, Corrugation, and Cells, their wonderful Intertexture (the Mesentery,) and the Net-work that covereth them; the Lacteal Vessels, with their Insertion into the Intestines, and their Valves, wherein a superlative Wisdom of Parental Providence appeareth. From these Legends of the old Atheistick Philosophers, it appeareth,(and I do not find their Successors among the Moderns have a-whitmended the Matter,) that the Philosophy of Atheism is the merest Credulity in the World, and that they are of all Persons the most Guilty of what they are so apt, at every turn, to object to their Adversaries, an irrational, absurd, and implicit Belief. The Atheist’sCreed, and Believing, That this Frame of Nature (which appears most evidently, to consist of the Wisest Means fitted to the Best Ends, by a most powerful Intelligent Agent,) does not owe its being what it is, to Design, is as unreasonable and foolish, as if a Man should believe in all the Stories of Witches and Apparitions that ever were invented, all the Fables of the Poets, Paradoxes of the Stoicks, and the Fables of Aesop, ina literal Sense, all in one. “But this is the principal Wisdom of our Times: It is an easy Matter to deny any Thing, that thou mayst be counted Wiser than others,” as Cardan complain’d in his Time.17

  And from a more particular Consideration of the peculiar Frame of Man, his Powers and Properties:§7. The Soul of Man is of such a Nature, that it cannot be deriv’d from Matter, whence it appears, that God is the Maker of it, and of the World. For such are the Faculties and Operations of the Mind of Man, Sensation, Cogitation, Imagination, Memory, spontaneous Motion, Self-consciousness, Self-reflexion, Understanding, and the noble Operations of Reason, Liberty of Will, and Agency, that are plainly in competible to Matter in general, and to an Organiz’d Human Body in particular. See the first Part of this Appendix. No Effect can transcend the Perfections of its Cause: But these Faculties and Operations are certainly great Perfections, that far transcend Matter with its Modifications. Spontaneous Motion (our immitting and directing the Animal Spirits into the Muscles, in order to Local Motion, by an Act of Volition, upon consulting and deliberating within ourselves touching Good and Evil,) is an Act of free Self-determining Agency; whereas all the Motions of Matter (in respect of it-self) are purely necessary, and according to certain Laws of Motion. A Body cannot act but necessarily, as it is caus’d to act by some other; that is in Propriety of Speech, it cannot act at all: Atheism, therefore, that maketh Man nothing more than a mere Corporeal Machine, bereaveth Mankind of that Liberty of Agency, whereby they are capable of deserving Praise or Dispraise, Rewards or Punishments, and thereby destroyeth Laws and Government. Our Consciousness of Liberty is as strong a Proof of its Existence, as it is possible for us to have of the Existence of any thing; therefore all the Cavils brought against the Possibility of Liberty, are as vain and idle, as the Metaphysical Subtleties brought by some against the Possibility of Motion, or of as wifter Bodies overtaking a flower at a distance before it, when we have perpetual Experiments to the contrary; against the infinite Divisibility of Quantity, when we have Demonstration for it; or against the Possibility of an Eternal Duration already past, and come to an End, tho’ it be as certainly so, as that there is a Duration present. The reasoning Mind also inquireth into the Natures and Causes of Things, maketh a judgment of them, and rectifies the Errors of Sense; its Cogitations are not confin’d to the Objects of Sense, it searcheth into recondite and mysterious Things, contemplates Things purely intelligible, reckoneth and numbereth; and the Natures and Essences of Things, that are Universal and beyond the reach of the Senses, are its Objects of Science. The Soul herself exerteth the second Notions, and because a Corporeal Substance can have no Perceptions but only Corporeal Impressions, therefore these second Notions of the Mind, which are no Corporeal Impressions, are a certain Proof, that there is an Incorporeal Substance in Man. Not only the Logical and Mathematical Terms, but our ordinary Terms of Language,(as Relation, Difference, Good, Evil,) have a certain Meaning and intelligible Notion, but no Phantasm or Image belonging to them. The intelligent Mind with standeth the Hurry of Passion, the Inveiglements of Sense, the Impostures and Tricks of Fancy; she compareth the Phantasms of Sense and Imagination, and judgeth of them, formeth Propositions, maketh Deductions, and cannot but form those Propositions called common Notions, which she knoweth to be Eternal Verities, without any Information from Sense.

  In Human Nature, degenerate as it is, there are such Moral and Religious Endowments, such laudable Qualities and Properties, such a kindly Sort of Instincts and Inclinations, that plainly speak its Divine Original, and give Attestation to the Existence of God. For who doth not approve and applaud Beneficence, Faithfulness, and Justice? And who doth not detest Maliciousness, Fraud, and Injustice? A common Goodness of Nature, Humanity, Ingenuity, Gratitude, Sociableness, Friendship, a singular Affection towards near Relations, and Civil Virtue, is common to Mankind in general, and was found in great Plenty, even in the Heathen World. Atheism, therefore, is monstrously unnatural, which, together with the Existence of God (Parental Nature,) discardeth all good Nature, all Obligation to it, any Institution to it by the Author of Nature, and any such Instincts in Man’s Nature. “A Father is nothing, a Son is nothing,” (Atheistsmakeno account of Natural Relation and Affection,) “with them Affection to our Off-spring is not Natural.”18“You Epicureans suppose, that Men would not be benign and beneficent, if they were not weak,” (if it were not merely out of Self-Interest, as fearing or needing others,) “not acknowledging any Natural Love or Affection.”19 Atheism, therefore, is destructive of common Goodness of Nature, which is manifestly implanted in Men by Parental Nature, whence the Ants have their Prudence, the Bees their Polity and sexangular Cells, the Birds their Contrivance in building their Nests, and their Care of their Young. There could have been no such Goodness in Man’s Nature, as now there is, if God was not the Author of Nature; Nor would there be such Civil Virtues, as there are amongst Men, if God was not the Maker and Governor of Mankind, and if Man was not made Social by God. In such Sense Cicero may be understood to say, and to say well “Mind, Fidelity, Virtue, Concord, whence could they come among Men, but from above? ”20

  The Wisdom and Goodness of Parental Providence is seen in the Usefulness of those Instincts of Nature, called the Passions, which are implanted in Man and other Animals; for the substantial Happiness of Life consisteth in them, thereby Man hath a little Kingdom within himself, consisting of Subjects and Sovereign; the Passion of Veneration is requisite in Government; Anger, for the Exercise of Fortitude; Commiseration is for succouring the Afflicted; Fear, for avoiding Danger; and all the other Passions are of great Use, which sheweth that Nature had a very Wise and Designing Author; and some of them, as the Passion of Devotion, are plain Indications, that Man was made for Religion. Mankind are by Natural Instinct, insomesort, the devotional Suppliants of an invisible superior Power, and have so strong a Propension to Religion, that they will rather worship Rivers, Trees, and a Red Cloth, than live without a Religious Worship, of which the Deity alone is the due Object. And as there would not have been such a natural Appetite as Hunger, if there had been no Meat, for Nature doth nothing in vain: So, if there had not been a God, there would not have been in Man a Natural Propension to Religion. Mankind hath also Natural Conscience, which is a Consciousness of Duty and of Sin, of well and evil Doing, with respect to an invisible superior Power. The Fear of Conscience is one of their Natural Passions, and upon violating the Dictates of their Conscience they have naturally a Remorse, and a Presage that some penal Evil will befal them from an invisible superior Power, because of the moral Evil which they have done; and upon well-doing, according to their Conscience, they have naturally a Hope and Confidence of their Safety and Prosperity, and that doing well they shall fare well. If any seem to themselves, to have extinguish’d the Sense of Conscience, usually they find the contrary, that they have only laid it to sleep, and that when Troubles and Dangers come, it awaketh like a sleeping Lyon. Or, if there be any that have totally extinguish’d it, these have manifestly extinguish’d the Light of Nature, and have done such Violence to their Minds, as is done to the Sensories of the Body by a violent Disease, whereby Sensation is destroy’d. Natural Conscience implieth, that there is in Man the Faculty called [Liberum Arbitrium] Free Will, (elseitwould be Folly, for Men to be troubled for their Evil doings,) and that there is a Law of Nature, a natural Ethicks and Discipline of Morality, a Well-doing and Evil-doing, Duty and Sin, antecedently to any Human Institution, which is a plain Truth, and plainly subversive of Atheism.

  As the Natural World is a well-made System, so is the Human World, or World of Mankind, as it consisteth of Societies, lesser and greater Polities, that are beauteous and useful Structures. These give an Attestation to the Existence of God; for none else can reasonably be suppos’d to be the Founder of them; and they shew, that Man is made and design’d for Society, whence the Existence of God appeareth. The Atheists, that discard the Existence of God, discard therewith the Natural Sociableness of Man, and not without great Reason; for that God existeth, and is the Maker of Man, is as evident, as that Man is made and design’d for Society. And it is evident, that Man is so made; for he is not only Sociable towards those of his own Kind by kindly Natural Instinct and Inclination, as the Brutes are; but he is capable of proper Laws and Government, of cultivating the Common Good, and of Arts needful for Human Society. He hath the Power of Speech, which would be in vain, if Man was not design’d to live in Society. His natural Passions of Veneration, Glory, Shame, manifestly relate to Society. So doth the thin Skin of his Face, thro’ which his Thoughts and Passions make a discovery of themselves; the Beauty of his Countenance; the Differences of Mens Countenances in vast variety, whereby they are known, one from another; and the different Qualifications of Men, some being Magnanimous, others of softer Temper, some being fitted for the Pen, others for the Plough, some to command, others to obey, that the Welfare of the Whole might be provided for, by that which every Joint supplieth. Mankind are born in Families, constitute and live in Families, in which there is a constant Cohabitation of both Sexes for their mutual Help and Comfort, for the Propagation of their Species, and to take care of their Off-spring, (which continueth weak and feeble much longer than that of the Brutes, and therefore requireth a constant Cohabitation, and continual Care of the Parents;) these Family-Societies are plainly by the Order and Design of Nature, Mankind are manifestly design’d to live in Family Societies, the first elementary Societies, which there fore derive their Origin from Parental Providence, which also continueth the different Sexes of Animals, Male and Female, in due Proportion throughout all Ages of the World. “And, because Solitude is intolerable to every Man, even with an infinite Abundance of Pleasure, hence it is plain, that we are naturally design’d for a Conjunction and a Community.”21 Mankind are by Nature design’d and necessitated, to live in Society, in which there is no living without a God and Providence, a Life to come, and a Religion. For there can be no Good of Virtue in Human Life, if there be no Religion; nor any thing to restrain Men from any Heart Villainy, or any secret Villainy, or any Villainy that they can commit with Safety and Impunity in this World, nor from any Villainy, save only so far as they want an Opportunity to commit it. The Religion of an Oath must be out of doors. None can have the Right of Authority and Sovereignty, nor can others be under a conscientious Obligation to Subjection and Obedience. Princes cannot be conscientiously oblig’d to keep Faith with their Neighbours, or to govern their Subjects with Wisdom and Justice, or to stand to the Compacts or Covenants, which they make with them, nor can themselves have any Security from Assassination and Violence; “for Strength must be the Law of Nature.”

  From the Consent of Nations;§8. The Antients report an universal Consent of Nations touching the Existence of a Deity. Some Modern Travellers say otherwise, and make an Exception of some barbarous unciviliz’d Nations, at the Bay of Soldania, in Brasil, and the Caribee Islands, in New-found-Land and New-France, the Natives whereof are said to live without any Acknowledgment of a God, and Sense of Religion. But, altho’ these Savages are so extremely degenerate into Brutishness, that they scarce deserve to be reckon’d amongst Mankind; and, if they live without Civil Government, they must be acknowledg’d hugely anomalous and dissonant from the Nations; yet it is great Rashness and Unadvisedness to believe the Reports of their total Irreligion. For some of these Reporters contradict themselves, as Johannes Lerius manifestly doth; others of them are contradicted by other Travellers, that were better acquainted with these Savages, and better understood their Sentiments. It is possible, that some Persons among them may live in the total Neglect of a God, and a Religion; that those who have but little of Political Government, which they cannot, however, be wholly without, have but little Religion; and that the Universality of them make no great shew of any Religion: And this seemeth to be all the Truth that is in the Story. The Existence of a Deity hath certainly the general Consent of Nations to recommend it, and it is so evident, that the World of Mankind have always stood convicted of the Truth of it; it may justly be reckon’d one of their common Notions; and, because it is the commonest Sense of Mankind, it must be accounted true in the Judgment of common Sense, and according to the Light of Nature. Had it been wholly an arbitrary Fiction or Imposture, it is not possible, that there could have been so universal an Agreement, both touching the Existence of a Deity, and also the Properties and Attributes of a Deity, and that these Notices and Opinions should not wear away and vanish, (as Impostures do, that in process of Time are discover’d,) but continue firm and immoveable, throughout all Countries and Ages. No Cause can reasonably be assign’d of this so Universal a Consent, but Nature, Universal Mundan Nature, and the Nature of Man. “Seeing this Opinion is not establish’d by any Institution, Custom, or Law, and among all without exception a firm Consent doth continue, it must necessarily be understood, that there are Gods, we having implanted, or rather innate, Notices of them; but that, about which there is a Consentof All by Nature, must necessarily be true.”22 The Belief of the Soul’s Immortality, and of a Life to come, which is the general Sense of Mankind, and which inferreth the Existence of a Deity, both issue from the same Cause, and are the eminent Branches of Natural Religion, which is a Property of Man’s Nature.

  and from extraordinary and special Providences.§9. To these evident Notices of God from Nature, we may annex extraordinary and special Providences. For, altho’ Providence is a somewhat lubricous Argument, the ways of governing Providence being Various and Mysterious; and altho’ this sort of Providences are no sensible Miracles, nor can so easily be distinguish’d as they, from what is done by the mere Agency of a second Cause: Yet there are several Occurrences in Human Affairs, that, in fair and reasonable Construction, must be accounted Special Providences, and carry the Marks of a Divine Hand. Such is the Dispersion of the Jews, and their continuing a distinct People in their Dispersion, a thing that hath no Parallel in History; the portentous Presignifications that have usher’d in calamitous Wars; strange Deliverances of good Men, and of Societies of good People; strange Discoveries of Plots and Murders; remarkable Judgments, that have befallen Persecutors and Tyrants, and other wicked Grandees of the World; signal Answers of Prayer, the Decay and Ruin of many great Families for their Injustice, and prophetick Dreams. The sudden Rise of the Mace-donian, and Ruin of the Persian Monarchy, was plainly an Act of Divine Providence; the Heathen Poets and Historians, with great reason, ascribe it to Fate, for Darius was manifestly blinded in his Conduct, when he fought with Alexander. The Greatness of the Roman Empire was decreed by Fate, saith Machiavel; and the Ruin of it was by a Divine Fate, for the barbarous Northern Nations that laid it waste, acknowledg’d, that their Invasion of it was not of themselves, but that they were divinely impell’d thereto. The Justice of Providence is very visible in those Temporal Judgments, that have a conformity or resemblance to the Sin, that was the Cause of them. The Issue of many Wars and Battles hath been determin’d by some special Providence. The Impunity, in this Life, of some Men outrageously wicked, is not so great an Objection against Providence, but that some remarkable Instances of its Justice may reasonably move an ingenuous Pagan, to make such an Acknowledgment, as Manlius Torquatus made, when, finding Annius lying dead at the foot of the Steps of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, (after an insolent Speech he had made against the Romans,) he cried out, “Est coeleste numen, es, magne Jupiter!” There is a God in Heaven, thou art, O mighty Jupiter!23 The Lord is known by the Judgments that he executeth, as he is by Mundane Nature.

  The Knowledge of the Being of God noticeth the Law of Nature to Mankind.§10. If the Existence of God is naturally noticed to Mankind, a Law of Religion and Virtue, which is the Law of Nature, is naturally notic’d unto them; for to be the Sovereignty of God to us is necessarily the Law of our Subjection and Service unto him, and of that Universal Righteousness, that we sin not against him. But this Natural Notice of the Existence of God, and of a Law of Religion and Virtue, is of a two-fold Notion. For the Existence of a Deity (Supreme Deity) in general, and a Law of Religion and Virtue in general, hath the Notoreity of a natural Notice to the World of Mankind; whence they are necessarily oblig’d to all that Religious Subjection and Service, Honour and Worship (internal and external), which Sanctity and Piety is the Comprehension of, and which is manifestly and in its own Nature Piety and God-service, a virtuous and honorary Congruity unto God. If he is notic’d to them, as of Right and Due the Sovereignty of God to them, they must necessarily have this Notice, that they are of Right, and by Obligation, his Subjects and Religionists, that are bound to give unto him the Rights and Dues of his God-head, which is a terrible Prohibition to them, not to live in Atheism (speculative or practical), Profaneness, Neglect, Oblivion, or Contempt of God and his Service, not to alienate themselves from him, or be Evil-doers towards him, Injurious, Unthankful, and Unworthy, not to disparage and vilify, not to put Disgraces and Contumelies upon him, not to deny his Sovereignty and Attributes, (by not making a virtuous and honorary Acknowledgment of them,) not to give his proper Honour to another, deifying Abominations, and thereby blasphemously reproaching God, which was a principal Crime of the Heathen World, which swarmed with Idols and fictitious Deities, yet knew God, (had the true God notic’d to them,) γνωςὸν τοῦ θεοῦ that which may be naturally known of God was notic’d to them, was manifest in them (in their Minds,) for God had shew’d it unto them.24 His Truth therefore,(his practical Truth, namely, these Notices and Instructions, Rules and Precepts, which concern the Service of God,) is not unknown to them, as the Apostle affirmeth. His Truth and their Duty could not but be notic’d, if the Existence of the Sovereignty of God was notic’d unto them; knowing this, they could not but know, in great degree, that just and agreeable Worship and Service, which they ow’d unto him, and that Man must be Religious towards God. Not only singly, but in Society, Man must be Religious towards God, (the publick religious Worship in Assemblies and Societies of Men, being highly honorary to God, and beneficial to Man;) and seeing God is naturally notic’d unto all Men, as a Sovereign Power over them, that superintendeth their Affairs and Ways, is just in his Government, and will reward or punish them, as they are Well-doers or Evil-doers, (so that they cannot be ignorant, that they must fare as they observe or violate the Truth which is notic’d unto them,) it is manifest, that they are under the Obligation of Non licet impune, that they may not with Impunity be Evil-doers; and that a necessity of living the good Life, and of Universal Righteousness, is notic’d, to all Men by the Light of Nature, which noticeth the Existence of God. The Heathen World that walk’d in Impieties and Impurities, yet knew the judgment of God, that Men ought not to be Evil-doers, and that they which do such Things are Evil-doers, and worthy of Death.25“Verily there is a God, that heareth and seeth what we do, who will deal with every Man, as he is well or ill deserving,” saith an Heathen Comedian.26

  The Law of Nature is discern’d by natural Reason.§11. The Law of Nature is notic’d to Mankind by the Nature of Well and Evil-doing, as understood by the Mind, and discern’d by our natural Reason and Understanding. As every Man hath the Existence of God externally notic’d unto him, and as the Mind of Man of it-self discerneth the Well and Fit that is in external Nature: In like manner what is Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, is (in good degree) notic’d to every Man, and the Mind herself discerneth, what is the Beauteous-beneficial, and the Foul-maleficial Practice. The Mind is of such a Frame, that she naturally and rightly noticeth unto all Men, touching some things, that they are of such a Nature, that they cannot be done, and touching other things, that they cannot be left undone, without the Guilt and Crime of being Evildoers; and that their being such is contrary to the Mind of God, and subjecteth them to his punitive Displeasure: As on the contrary, their being Well-doers is according to the Mind of God, and intitleth them to his Favour and Rewards: And the System of these natural Notices is the Law of Nature. It may here, therefore, be not improper to consider the Objections against this Notice of the Law of Nature.

  Objections against this Proof of the Law of Nature answer’d.1. Objection, That it supposeth, without Proof, the Legislative Power of Reason.§12. The first Objection against this Proof of the Law of Nature, is, That it supposes, without Proof, the Legislative Power of Reason, which is not to be suppos’d. “Reason is not the Law, or its Measure; neither can any Man be sure, that any thing is a Law of Nature, because it seems to him hugely reasonable, neither, if it be so indeed, is it therefore a Law. For Reason can demonstrate, and it can persuade, and invite, but not compel any thing but Assent, not Obedience, and therefore it is no Law. ”27 ’Tis true, that mere Reason is not Law, but Reason, complicated with what is Law, is necessarily Law. For as right Reason noticeth what is the Well-doing and the Evil-doing, it is complicated with what is, in its own Nature, matter of Law. And as it noticeth, that the Well-doing, and the being Well-doers, is according to the Mind of God, and the Evil-doing, and the being Evildoers, is against the Mind of God, it is complicated with what is Law, by a superior Authority. The Laws of Nature must be consider’d, not as the Dictates of mere right Reason, but as the Dictates of conscientious right Reason.

  2. Objection, That the Proof of its Legislation from God is wanting.§13. A second Objection against this Account of the Law of Nature, is, That the Proof of its Legislation from God is wanting. This Objection Cumberland hath sufficiently answer’d. However, the Doctrines and Practices of the Heathens (which have been particularly set forth in the Introductory Essays) shew, “That their Reason wanted a Rectification; that the perfect Revelation and Legislation from God, adapted to all Mankind, are the Laws of supernatural Revelation; and that (altho’ Mankind by considering the Nature of any Practice may, and ordinarily do, know whether it be a Branch of the Law of Nature, yet) Men need the Aids of supernatural Revelation, to better their Knowledge of the Law of Nature.”

  3. Objection, That the Notices of Reason are an uncertain Guide, about which Men are not agreed.§14. A third Objection against this Account of the Law of Nature, is, an uncertain Notice of the Morals of it, of Religion and Virtue; for they suppose, that right Reason is that which noticeth to Mankind the Virtuous Morals, and is the noticing Rule thereof. But according to the Pyrrhonians and Scepticks, there is no Truth in the Reasonings of Men.28 “The Professors of right Reason (the Philosophers) were hugely different touching Good and Evil, and the great Principle of conducting Life, the Chief Good; what some account a Principle or Conclusion evidently true, others, no less intelligent, account extremely false; some of them believ’d the worst Crimes to be Innocent, as Theodorus the Philosopher allow’d of Adultery, Theft, Sacrilege; Plato allow’d Adultery and Community of Wives, so did Socrates and Cato; Zeno and Chrysippus approv’d of Incest, and so did the Persians. So that we may well say as Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus; When we hear the Name of Silver or Iron, all Men that speak the same Language, understand the same Thing: But, when we speak of Just or Good, we are distracted into various Apprehensions, and differ from each other, and from ourselves. Every Man maketh his Opinions to be Laws of Nature, if his Persuasion be strong and violent. And some are Atheists that believe no God, nor any thing to be dishonest, which they can do in Private, or with Impunity. Some have believ’d, that there is nothing in it-self Just, and only regarded what is profitable, so did Carneades, and so did Aristippus. And it is not sufficient to say, some Persons are unreasonable, unless we first know some certain Rule and Measure of Reason. Now we cannot take our Measures of Reason from Nature; or, if we do, we cannot take the Measures of Nature from Reason. If we judge of what is natural by its Conformity to right Reason, we cannot judge of right Reason by its Conformity to what is natural.” Thus Reason is made use of against it-self, various Reasons are alledg’d to shew the uncertainty of the Notices of Reason in Moral Matters. But, as was said of the Milesians of old, “The Milesians are no Fools, but they do the same things that Fools do”: So they that are not Irrational, yet sometimes argue at an unreasonable rate. For the Dissent of Pyrrhonians and Scepticks doth it signify any thing, to destroy the certainty of Reason? Or the Dissent of Atheists, to destroy the certainty of the Existence of God? The Name of Theodorus was not the Philosopher, but the Atheist, and Aristippus was of no better Character. The Philosophers were not the genuine Professors of right Reason, but generally they were extravagant unpopular Humorists, that affected to maintain Paradoxes. Heraclitus held, that contradictory Propositions are consistent. Zeno Eleates held, that Motion is impossible; and Anaxagoras, that Snow and Coal are of the same Colour. If any one should alledge these absurd Paradoxes of the Philosophers, to destroy and impair the certainty of Logick and external Sense, such Allegations would not signify any thing, such Uncertainties do not make an Uncertainty; and the Allegation of their absurd Conceits, touching Moral Matters, signifies as little, to destroy or impair the evident Certainty of the Notices of right Reason, and the Morals of the Law of Nature. Of which we must affirm.

  1. So great a Certainty there is in the Law of Nature, that there is no invincible Difficulty in the Whole of it, or the Science of it, as there is in other Sciences, Metaphysicks, Natural Philosophy, nay, in Mathematicks it self, in which there are invincible Difficulties. But the Science of Universal Right eousness hath no such invincible Difficulty in it, as rendereth it impossible for Mankind, to arrive at an evident Certainty, touching the whole of it. For it must be suppos’d, that they that are oblig’d to fulfil all this Righteousness, may have an evident Certainty, touching what it is, as several Righteous Men have had; that this whole Duty of Man is not a thing incomprehensible by Man; for then it could not be the whole Duty of Man, nor could it be taught or learned.

  2. So great a Certainty there is in the Law of Nature, that none can innocently be grossly Ignorant of, or mistake, any of the Morals of it, but it is their Sin and their Crime; so the Polytheism, Idolatry, Un-chastity, and bloody Spectacles, which were the Practice of the Heathens in their Night of Ignorance, was their Sin and their Crime. By their Reason God had notic’d to the World of Mankind in general, the Knowledge of Himself, his Truth, and their Duty, which is the Law of Nature; so far the Truth was not unknown to them: But they were not Sincere, Upright, and Faithful towards it, holding the Truth in Unrighteousness; whence they were involv’d in Atheous Ignorance, which was their deadly Sin, and their Crime, and no excuseable invincible Ignorance, but an Effect of their Unfaithfulness and Insincerity. Their Polytheism does not prove, that Mankind have but uncertain Notices touching the Unity of the God-head: Nor does the Philosophers allowing Adultery and Incest prove, that Mankind have but uncertain Notices of the Law of Nature. It is certain, they had better Notices, and, if these better Notices were not to them evidently certain, yet they would have been evidently certain, if they had been Sincere and Faithful; so great a Certainty there is in the Notices of the Law of Nature. Would it not have been evidently certain to Carneades, that there are things in themselves Just, if he had not been a Villain? To be a sound Moralist towards God and Man, is not a business of abstruse and subtile Speculation, but of Sincerity, Faithfulness, and Integrity; it is not so much in the Head and a piercing Judgment, as in the Heart and a Rectitude of Will; nor is it so requisite to be a Philosopher, as to be Honest, and duly Conscientious.

  3. So great a Certainty there is in the Law of Nature, that there is a certain Rule of right Reason in Morality, which is the Beauteous-beneficial Practice. If the Mind noticeth or dictateth what is the right Practice, this is necessarily right Reason; if therefore she noticeth or dictateth touching the Beauteous-beneficial Practice, that this is to be done, and touching the Foul-maleficial Practice, that this is not to be done, this is right Reason. And there is no more difficulty in discerning what is right Reason in Morality, than there is in discerning, what is the Beauteous-beneficial, and what is the Foul-maleficial Practice. Now, it is as evident and certain, that the Virtues, commonly so call’d, are the Beauteous-beneficial Practice, and the Vices, commonly so call’d, are the Foul-maleficial Practice, as it is evident and certain, that hating and hurting, is not helping, that to be a Lyar is not honourable, that the Soldanian Diet of Guts and Garbage is not cleanly, and that Thersites is not handsome.

  4. So great a Certainty there is in the Law of Nature, that a great part of it is of unquestionable Evidence and Certainty, with Mankind in general, and is ascertain’d by the Consent of Nations; with respect where unto the Lawyers define the Law of Nature. “That which natural Reason hath settled among all Men. That which is alike observed amongst all People or Nations. The natural Laws are those, which are alike observ’d in all Nations.”29“The Consent of all Nations in every Thing is to be reputed a Law of Nature,” saith Cicero.30 So Aristotle defineth the Law of Nature, “That which hath every where the same Force, as Fire alike burneth here and among the Persians.”31 The Law of Nature therefore is of a larger and narrower Acceptation; the one the more comprehensive, the other them ore famous. In the more comprehensive Sense it is that whole System of Law, which a just Providence requireth the Observance of from all Mankind, antecedently to supernatural Revelation, which hath the Verity of natural Notice. But, in the narrower and more famous Sense, it is only that part of the Law of Nature, which hath the Notoreity of natural Notice, the common Acknowledgment of the World. But, as Miracles are not a sufficient Proof of the Divinity of a Doctrine, unless, upon impartial Examination, the Nature of it appeareth to be Divine: So the Consent of Mankind, alone, is not a sufficient Proof touching any Morals, that they are Laws of Nature, unless, upon impartial Examination, they appear to be in their own Nature Good or Evil, and there fore of them selves Matter of Law. But, if any Morals are receiv’d or acknowledg’d by the common Consent of Nations, as Branches of the Law of Nature, and upon impartial Examination they appear to be in their own Nature Good or Evil (agree ably to the general Acknowledgment of Mankind,) of such Morals we have the greatest Assurance imaginable, that they are Branches of the Law of Nature. For they are so in the Judgment of common Sense, to Notoreity, and so as to be common or general Notions; and they must be grossly plain and evident Branches of the Law of Nature, that have the general Acknowledgment of Mankind, in this their degenerate Condition. This general Agreement concerning them, their firm Continuance through out all Ages, the impossibility of eradicating them out of the Minds of Men, plainly demonstrate, that they are not from any arbitrary Institution of Man, but are natural Notions; that the Mind is of such a Nature as to notice them, and the Soul of Man is naturally dispos’d to the Belief of them. The Consent of Nations, there fore, both demonstrateth the Existence of the Law of Nature, and is in part a certain Notice of the Morals of it. It demonstrateth the Existence of the Law of Nature, for it appeareth from the Consent of Nations, that there is a just Providence, which requireth of all Men, that they be the Welldoers, not the Evil-doers; and that a System of Morals, which are in their own Nature Well-doing, are naturally and convictively, even to the Notoreity of a general Acknowledgment, notic’d to Mankind. The certainty of noticing the Morals of the Law of Nature from the general Consent of Nations, hath many Objections made against it. But they are made without a due Clearness and consistency of Discourse, and without any considerable Strength of Reasoning. For sometimes it is said, “That a Body of the Law of Nature is not to be look’d for from the Consent of Nations,” which no Man will contradict.32 Sometimes it is said, “That the Hebrew Doctors do not unwisely, to make no reckoning of the Consent of Nations in the Designation of the Law of Nature”;33 and “That the Lawof Nations is no Indication of the Law of Nature.”34 Which are Positions hugely extravagant, maintain’d by Reasons extremely insignificant. For what if all Nations are not known? If some known Nations are Savages, and in great degree live without Law? If in some other known Nations, some of the grossest Immoralities have been commonly practis’d and authoriz’d? What signify these Exceptions to the invalidating this great Certainty; That the Existence of the Law of Nature hath the Consent of Nations, and the general Acknowledgment of Mankind, as also severalgreat Moralities, particular Branches of that Law, which is an Indication, that they are of the Law of Nature? If a judicious Heathen Lawyer Paulus saith,35 that Theft is prohibited by the Law of Nature; if Ulpian, another of the same Character, calleth it (Naturae turpe) an Action of natural Turpitude, there are few but will look upon these Sayings as considerable Indications, that the Prohibition of Theft is of the Law of Nature; how much more ought they to think so, if the Generality of Mankind say so? The Persians practis’d and authoriz’d an incestuous Mixture with their own Mothers, and Antiochus Soter married his Father’s Wife: But such incestuous Mixtures were against the general Sense of Mankind, as we learn not only from the Poets, and from Cicero, but from a better Author, 1 Cor. 5. 1. which ought to be look’d upon as an Indication, that they were against the Law of Nature. “The Nations differ about their Superstition, but what Nation is there, that does not like and love Mansuetude, Benignity, and a grateful Mind? And that doth not vilify and hate the Proud, the Malitious, the Cruel, and the Ungrateful?”36

  5. In written Laws, both Divine and Human, the reissuchun certainty, that Men are of various Opinions touching their Interpretation, and touching what is the Sense of those Laws, what is Just and Good (according to the Saying of Socrates to Phaedrus,) and every one thinketh that his own Opinion is Law; yet this uncertainty does not hinder, but that there is an evidently certain Interpretation of these written Laws: So there is a Diversity of Opinions touching what is right Reason, Just and Good, according to the Law of Nature, such uncertainty there is in it; yet this does not hinder, but that there is an evidently certain right Reason (in Moral Matters) well and evil Doing, according to the Law of Nature: Touching which the Differences of Mankind would not be very great, if they were duly conscientious. “Let no Man pretend, that through Ignorance be neglecteth Virtue, or because he hath none to shew him the Way, for we have Conscience a sufficient Teacher.”37He hathshew’dthee, O Man, what is good, Mic. 6. 8.

  4. Objection from the Absurdity of the Supposition of innate Ideas and Principles, which this Notion of the Law of Nature implieth.§15. A fourth Objection against this Account of the Law of Nature, is, the Supposition of Innate Ideas, Notions, and Principles, which it involveth. The antient Writers look upon the natural Law, as an innate Law (Nata Lex, as Cicero calleth it) as a natural Inscription or Impression upon the Minds of all Men; and the Apostle manifestly favoureth this Notion of it, Rom. 2. 14, 15. For, altho’ he doth not say, that the Moral Lawis written in the Heart of the Gentiles, yet he saith, That the Law, as to the Work of it, is written in their Hearts (their inward Man) and that they are a Law unto themselves, as to the Work of the Law, which is to indicate, direct, dictate, command, and forbid, to judge, Joh. 7.51. to criminateor accuse, Joh. 5. 45. to convince and condemn, Jam. 2. 9. The Apostle affirmeth, that the Law in some sort (as to the Work of it) is written in the Heart of the Gentiles, and consequently, in some respect, it is the Law written in the Minds of Men, as the antient Moralists style it. They suppose it to be written in the Soul as having τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, the leading part, τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, right Reason, τὸ συνειδὸς, Conscience, τὸ κριτνίριον ϕυσικὸν, that natural discernment whereby we distinguish Good from Evil. This is their Sense, as appeareth from their Accounts of it, and this is all that they mean, when they speak of a Law naturally written and impressed upon the Soul, “That right Reason” (which is the Law of Nature) “is innate to the Soul, and written or implanted in her.”38 They suppose, that it is Innate or Natural to the intelligent reasoning Mind, to understand and reason rightly, in some degree at least, touching the Matters of Morality, and consequently to form those Notices or Dictates, which are the Law of Nature. In this Sense they suppose it Innate, a natural Inscription or Impression, and in this Sense we ought to assert in nate Ideas, Notions, and Principles, that are not adventitious. For all Arts and Sciences had their Origin from Nature, all Mankind are by Nature, in some degree, Logicians and Mathematicians, in some degree they are born such, and in the like degree they are born Moralists and Religionists. The Design and Business of Arts and Sciences, is only to make up what is begun in Nature. It is innate, therefore, to the Mind of Man, to form Logical, Mathematical, Religious, and Moral Ideas, Notions, and Principles, which are not adventitious Notices or Evidences. It is innate in a Child to grow up to be a Man in Mind and Understanding, as well as Stature of Body; and, consequently, it is innate to him, to grow up to understanding the common Notions, which is essential to one who understandeth at the rate of a Man. Reasoning is certainly innate to the reasoning Mind; and, if the Mind is, by natural Constitution, Religious as well as Rational, Religious Reasoning must necessarily be innate to her. Her innate Reasoning implieth, that the Method of Reasoning is innate to her, which is to form Ideas, to compare them, to make a Judgment of them, to make Deductions of Causes from Effects, of Effects from Causes, of Consequents from Antecedents, and of Conclusions from evident Principles. In this Method of Reasoning the Mind findeth, that it is natural and innate in her, to form those Propositions call’d the common Notions, to think of them, and to think them true, that they are not in her as adventitious Notices and Evidences; but they are as much innate in her, as it is innate to Man, to be actually a Rationalist and a Religionist, and, therefore, she calleth them innate Notions and Principles. As she hath an innate Power, so (being made both Rational and Religious) she hath an innate Propension, to notice and dictate the common Notions, which are hereby distinguish’d from adventitious Notices and Evidences. Because of this innate Propension, they are self-taught, by an untaught Gift of Nature, nor can the Mind disbelieve them, without doing Violence to her-self. This innate Propension appeareth from the general Consent, that hath been amongst Mankind, in good degree, touching the Laws of Nature. For in all Ages, without any Philosophical Disquisitions about them, or any abstruse Inquiries into the Causes or Reasons of them, Mankind had the Knowledge of them. Which plainly sheweth, that they deriv’d this their Knowledge of them, from one great Universal Teacher, and that they were notic’d and dictated to them from an innate Propension of their own Minds. Of the common Notions that are speculative, we must affirm, that the Mind, merely by her innate Power of distinguishing between True and False, hath, virtually at least, the Notice of them, and the Discernment of the Truth of them, without needing any adventitious Notice or Evidence. Of the common Notices that are practical, we must affirm, that the Mind, merely by her innate Power of distinguishing between well and evil Doing, hath, virtually at least, the Notice of them, and a Discernment of their Obligation, without needing any adventitious Notice or Evidence. These are, therefore, justly counted Ideas, Notions, and Principles, that are innate to us, not in every Sense, but so as is explained, which seems to be intirely the Sense in which the Antients understood them; and, in such Sense, innate Ideas, Notions, and Principles, may and ought to be asserted against all Objections that are made against them.

  Objections against innate Principles, answer’d1. Objection, Infants and Ideots do not know them.1. Against innate Principles in general, it is argu’d, “Infants and Ideots do not know them, therefore they are not imprinted on their Minds.”39 But how vastly remote and distant is this Argument from concerning innate Ideas and Principles in the genuine Sense of asserting them? Alike remote and distant is this other Reasoning. “If these suppos’d innate Principles were native Characters and Impressions, they would appear faire stand clearest in Naturals, in Children, Ideots, Savages, and illiterate People, being of all other the least Corrupted by Custom or borrow’d Opinions.” For it is not imaginable, that the Principles of Science and of Law, and the Dictates of right Reason should appear fairest and clearest in them, that are almost totally devoid of Reason; nor do Infants know them, ’till they come to the Use of Reason. But the Objector proceeds and affirms; “It is utterly false, that the Use of Reason assisteth us in the Knowledge of these Maxims, or that Children know or assent to these Maxims, as soon as they come to the Use of Reason; some time after during a Man’s Life, they maybe assented to, and so may all other knowable Truths.” All Mankind call these common Notions, the Dictates of right Reason; the Use of Reason, therefore, assisteth us in the Knowledge of these self-evident Maxims: Which are not of the Condition of other knowable Truths, (that may be known or not known by Mankind;) but the Notice of the common Notions is essential to such Rationalists and Religionists as all Men are by Nature. And proportionably as common Reason displayeth it-self in Mankind in their Growth from their Non-age, these common Notions are discover’d, and, as they have the Use of Reason in a greater degree, they are discover’d in a greater degree.

  2.2. Objection, Thieves and High-way-men do not own them. Against innate Principles it is argu’d; “That Thieves and High-way men do not own Faith and Justice as Principles; the Principles of Morality, therefore, are not own’d by all Men,” (have not universal Consent,) “therefore they are not innate.” But they know very little, who do not know, that Thieves and High-way-men, many of which are educated in the Christian Religion, do ordinarily own Faith and Justice, as to the Notice, Conviction, and Dictate of their own Minds, which they sin against. It is argu’d also; “That there are no Practical Principles where in all Men agree, (not any Practical Truth that is universally receiv’d without Doubt or Question,) therefore none innate.” But, if Mankind universally desire their own Felicity, if they are universally Social, there is an universal Agreement of Mankind in great practical Principles; and such an Agreement implyeth and inferreth their Agreement in a great number of practical Principles. But the Hypothesis of innate Ideas and Principles does not require, that there should be any practical Truth universally receiv’d, without Doubt or Question by Mankind. It is enough to justify that Assertion, if all Men have Notices and Dictates of practical Truth, that are innate. And of these we must affirm, that, as to be actually a Sinner, is innate to every Child of Man in a degree of prevalent Tendency that way; to be actually a Rationalist, a Logician, an Arithmetician, a Societist, is innate to every Child of Man in a degree of prevalent Tendency that way.

  3. Objection, A Reason may be requir’d of every Moral Rule; they are therefore not self-evident nor innate.3. It is argu’d; “That not one Moral Rule can be produc’d, whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason, and therefore it is not self-evident, as every innate Principle must needs be.” But may a Reason justly be demanded of the great Rules and Principles of Morality, which cannot be denyed without a Contradiction? The Good is not to be hated, but is that which is to be lik’d and chosen: The Evil is not to be lov’d, but is that which is to be dislik’d and avoided. The Beauteous-beneficial Kind of Practice is the Good, the Foul-maleficial Kind of Practice is the Evil. The Good is the Well-doing, the Evil is the Evil-doing. The Well-doing is Righteousness (the Right-doing), the Evil-doing is (the Wrong-doing) Unrighteousness. To be an Evil-doer, is Vice and Crime. That which cannot be done without Vice and Crime, is not allowable, may not be done. None can have a Right to do the Wrong, that which is Unrighteousness, nor may do that which ought not to be done. It is necessarily Wickedness and Crime to be a Doer of Unrighteousness. To be a Criminal or Malefactor, is not lawful or tolerable, but punishable. Innocence, Piety, Order, Aptitude, Congruity, and Proportion, in our Practice, is Beauteous. The sincere Benevolence is Goodness of Will and Affection. To reverence the Elders, to keep Faith, to do to others as we would be done to, is the Beauteous-beneficial Practice. The Malevolent Nature and Practice is the Evil. Guile and Hypocrisy is Villainy. To act the Part of an Enemy to a Friend, to design Evil to the Innocent, to condemn the Righteous, are the Foul-maleficial Practice. The great Rules of Morality are as self-evident, as the Principles of the speculative Sciences. Luk. 12.57. “Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is Right?”

  4. Objection, If Moral Principles were innate, Man could not transgress them with Confidence and Serenity.4. The Objector saith; “I cannot see, how any Man should evertransgress the Moral Rules with Confidence and Serenity, were they in nate and stamp’d upon their Minds. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer pretence to be innate than this, Parents preserve and cherish your Children. But have there not been whole Nations, and those of the most civiliz’d People, amongst whom the exposing their Children, and leaving them in the Fields to perish by Want or wild Beasts, hath been the Practice, as little condemn’d or scrupled as the begetting them? It was familiar and uncondemn’d Practice amongst the Greeks and Romans, to expose, without Pity or Remorse, their Infants.” But whether Moral Rules be extrinsecally imprinted upon the Mind (from a Book, a Teacher, or the Frame of the World,) or whether they be imprinted in the way of innate Principles, the Case is the same, as to the Possibility of transgressing them with Confidence and Serenity. If Men can with Confidence and Serenity transgress any Moral Rules, that are imprinted upon their Minds, they may so transgress those, that are impress’d in the way of innate Principles. And nothing is more usual than for Men, with Confidence and Serenity to transgress the Moral Rules imprinted upon their Minds; for the Jews and Papists transgress this Commandment, Thou shalt not kill; and so the Protestants transgress these Moral Rules, Be not drunk with Wine, Let there be no Divisions among you. There is no Sect of Religionists, that doth not violate some Moral Rules, imprinted on their Minds, with greater Confidence and Serenity than the Greeks and Romans expos’d their Children; for, altho’ the Objector hath some to bear him company in his Exaggerations of their inhuman Practice, yet it is certain, there are several Mistakes in his Account of it. For, as the exposing Children was condemn’d40 amongst the Aegyptians, and the Germans,41 so among the Greeks it was severely prohibited by the Theban Law. Aelian, who was a Roman, altho’ he wrote in Greek, saith of this Theban Law, which made the exposing an Infant, Capital, “It was a Law of the greatest Rectitude and Philantrophy.”42Isocrates condemneth these Crimes in other Cities, and vindicateth his own City from them. The Greeks and Romans were far from being totally devoid of natural Love and Tenderness to their Children (commonly call’d by them σοργἠ) and usually there was a Mixture of Kindness and Tenderness in their exposing their Infants, as there was also in their Pawning and Selling them. For these their Practices were not with design to have their Children destroy’d, but preserv’d. They had this Law of Nature, Parents preserve and cherish your Children, not only imprinted upon their Minds, but upon their Bowels; yet because of Poverty or Want, and to avoid the Burden of them, they often kill’d some of their Children, in so much that the Emperor Constantine, to prevent the killing their supernumerary Children, made a Law for their relief. But those Parents that were more Parental than to kill their Children, chose rather to expose them (as the lesser of the two Evils,) not with a design to have them destroy’d, but that some might shew Pity on them, take them up, and educate them. There was, therefore, a Mixture of Humanity and Pity in the Pagans exposing their Children; and, doubtless, it was from a Principle of Heathen Piety, and great respect to their aged Parents, that some barbarous Nations kill’d them, when they grew very Old, accounting it ignominious to be decrepit;43 and others sacrific’d and ate them, accounting this the most honourable Burial, to entomb them in their own Bowels. So the Mahometans, from a Principle of mistaken Piety and Devotion, have a great Veneration for Distracted Men and Leud Miscreants that have the Garb of Asceticks, and give them an universal License to do any thing, even to lie with their Wives, accounting the Children they beget, Holy.44 But, considering these and the like Instances of the Paradoxical Nature of the World’s Piety, our Objector should not have ask’d, “Where are those innate Principles of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity, and Chastity?”45 But, in all reason, he ought to have ask’d, Where are they not? For the Principles of Piety and Virtue in general we find all the World over, the World of Mankind are agreed in them; but it is with this difference, what one Party of Men call Virtue and Piety, another Party calleth Vice and Impiety. And with great Reason; for with unregenerate Mankind many Enormities have the repute of Virtue, or at least of sinless Practices. Which is not for want of the innate practical Principles, “But this is the Cause of all Evils unto Men, they have not skill to accommodate and apply the common Notions (τὰς προληψεις, τὰς κοίνας ἐννοίας) to particular Matters of Practice.”46 They know the true Notions of Good, Justice, Virtue, and Piety, and that they ought to chuse and practice them: But are often grossly unacquainted with what is materially so. Whence it is too possible, for a whole Nation to allow the Transgression of a Practical Rule, which is imprinted on their Minds; for they may do it from a false Opinion of Well-doing, as the Church of Rome alloweth (and more than alloweth) the Transgression of the second Commandment. And they may do it from an Opinion of the Necessity of Affairs, as the Church of Rome hath allow’d Stews, and the Persians allow’d the grossest Incest from an extravagant Affectation of Magianism.

  • Nam Magus ex matre & gnato nascatur oportet.

  Whence it is easy to a Judgment of this remaining Part of our Objector’s Argument; “That no practical Rule, which is any-where universally, or with publick Approbation or allowance, transgress’d, can be suppos’d innate. It is impossible to conceive, that a whole Nation of Men should all publickly reject and renounce what every one of them certainly and in fallibly know to be a Law; for so they must, who have it naturally imprinted on their Minds.” From the Necessity of Affairs, and an Opinion of greater Good, the Greeks and Romans in some degree, and but in some degree, tolerated the Transgression of this Law, Parents preserve your Children: But they were far from publickly rejecting and renouncing it; the Transgression of it was not uncondemn’d amongst themselves, and from themselves it appeareth, that they had it deeply imprinted in their Natures. “Nature” (saith Cicero) “impelleth Men, to love those that they have begotten, and ingendereth in them a special Love to their Off-spring, and taketh care to make Provision for Wife and Children, which are counted dear, and ought to be taken care of. ”47 There is nothing more that is worth considering in our Objector’s Discourses against innate practical Principles, save only his Demand of a Catalogue of them, which is like the Demand, made by our Adversaries of the Church of Rome, of a Catalogue of Fundamentals.

  Objections against the innate Idea of God.5. Our Objector disputeth against the innate Idea of God, and therein some others of the Learned agree with him. But by this innate Idea they mean, “An original Notion and Proposition that God is, actually imprinted on us antecedently to all use of our Faculties. An anticipating Principle, engraven upon our Souls before all Exercise of Reason.”48 Such an original Notion or Proposition needeth not to be confuted by any operose Reasonings; for in so absurd a Sense I know not who ever held it, being a Notice of God by Reason, antecedent to all use of Reason, which is Nonsense and a Contradiction. But a Prolepsis or Anticipation concerning God, rightly understood, is only antecedent to the Argumentative Deductions of Reason, as other common Notions are; it is a natural and spontaneous Exertion of Reason, “An innate Notion to all Men,” whereby we mean, “that it is innate to the Mind of Man, to suggest and notice to him the Existence of a Deity in general” (an invisible Sovereign Power over us, an Object of Religious Worship,) “not without noticing to him the true God and his Service.” As it is also innate to the Mind of Man, to suggest and notice to him a future State of the Soul, and Rewards and Punishments there; both which are prime Dictates and Suggestions of the Mind, made Rational and Religious, and prime Branches of natural Religion. So far the Soul of Man is naturally Christian. But against the innate Idea of God, some incredible Stories of some Savage Nations, that live in total Atheism, are objected; in answer to which I will add nothing to what I have already said upon this Head, except the following Quotation from Lord Shaftesbury. “It must certainly be something else than Incredulity, which fashions the Taste and Judgment of many Gentlemen, whom we hear censur’d as Atheists, for attempting to Philosophize after a newer manner than any known of late. For my own part, I have ever thought this sort of Men to be in general more credulous, tho’ after another manner, than the mere Vulgar. Besides what I have observ’d in Conversation with Men of this Character, I can produce many anathematiz’d Authors, who, if they want a true Israelitish Faith, can make amends by a Chinese or Indian one. If they are short in Syria, or the Palestine; they have their full measure in America, or Japan. Histories of Incas or Iroquois, written by Fryars and Missionaries, Pyrates and Renegades, Sea-Captains and trusty Travellers, pass for authentick Records, and are Canonical, with the Virtuosos of this sort. The Christian Miracles may not so well satisfy them; they dwell with the highest Contentment on the Prodigies of Moorish and Pagan Countries. They have far more pleasure in hearing the monstrous Accounts of monstrous Men and Manners; than the politest and best Narrations of the Affairs, the Governments, and Lives, of the Wisest and most Polish’d People.”49

  It is objected also, that an innate Idea of God is not requisite. “A Man, by the right Use of his natural Abilities, may, without any innate Principles, attain the Knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him.”50“Without any such primitive Impression, we may easily attain to the Knowledge of the Deity, by the sole Use of our natural Reason.”51 It is possible, that, without any original Impression, Men, by the sole Use of their Reason, might discover, that there is a God, as Propositions in Euclid have been found out and discover’d: And it must be acknowledged, “That they who made the Discovery, had made a right Use of their own Reason.”52 But it must be acknowledg’d also, that an εὕρνιχα had well become them upon so wonderful and important a Discovery; and it is great pity that, amongst the Inventors of useful Things, their Names are not recorded, who first made this momentous Discovery, That there is a God. Men, by the sole Use of their Reason, may discover, that there is a God; but there is much of peradventure and hap-hazard, whether Mankind discover the Being of God, or not. For we are told, that, “if Men do not make Inquiry into the admirable Contrivances that are in the World, they may live long without any Notion of such a Being.”53 It is more than probable, therefore, that the Generality of Mankind (who do not Philosophize) will be universally Atheists, as void of any Notion of God, as the Soul is suppos’d to be originally, by them that style her, Tabula abrasa, a blank Sheet of Paper. Without innate Principles, or primitive Impressions, it is possible, that Men may attain the Knowledge of a God; but is it not possible, that they may not? “That they may live long without any Notion of such a Being?” In which tract of time, they must necessarily have no Conscience, nor any Law, or “Work of the Law,” nor any “Thoughts accusing or excusing,” they must necessarily be Atheists without being Rebels, without the Guilt of the Heathen, who when “they knew God, did not glorify him as God, nor lik’d to retain God in their Knowledge”; and they must necessarily be ungodly and unrighteous, “without holding the Truth in Unrighteousness.” It must be suppos’d, that God made them, without making them Religionists; for as Men cannot be said, to be made Philosophers, merely because by their natural Abilities they may become Philosophers; so neither can they be said, to be made Religionists, merely because by their natural Faculties they may become such. Are they not born by Nature Atheists, if they have no innate Idea of God, no primitive Impression, “if they may live long without any Notion of such a Being?” That Mankind may be by Nature Religionists, innate Idea is requisite, “A necessary and innate Notion, which is naturally in every Rational, without a Human Teacher or operose Deductions of Reason,” as an Antient well expresseth it. This legitimate innate Idea of God, is incumbred with no valuable Objections, but it is possible that those Objections may be made against it, that are urg’d against an erroneous innate Idea of God and primitive Impression, therefore we will briefly consider them.

  First, it is argu’d, “That such an Impression taketh away the Commendableness and Rewardableness of Faith, by rendering the Belief of a God irresistible and necessary.”54 But our legitimate innate Idea of God is not liable to this Objection; for, altho’ it is innate to the Minds of all Men, to notice to them the Existence of God, as a Principle of natural Religion, yet they may be Atheists: But it will be very hard, if not impossible, to be thorough-pac’d Atheists; and so some wise Men have thought, that the Fool who saith in his Heart, there is no God, “rather saith it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can throughly believe it, or be persuaded of it.”55 The Commendableness of Faith is not taken away in any such case, where there is place for a virtuous Disposition; whence, altho’ the Apostle Thomas had the Evidence of Sense (which may seem to necessitate Assent) for our Saviour’s Resurrection, yet his Faith was commendable and rewardable. In his Case there was place for virtuous Disposition; whence the Watch, and from them the Chief Priests, altho’ they had the Evidence of Sense as well as he, yet being devoid of his virtuous Disposition, continued in Unbelief, Matth.28. 11. Evidence of Sense, Evidence plainly Mathematical, will not necessitate Assent in such Cases, where a requisite virtuous Disposition is wanting, and a powerful Interest and Inclination is against it, of which Transubstantiation may be an Example.

  Another Argument against an erroneous innate Idea of God, is drawn from the Apostle’s Preaching to the Athenians, Act. 17. 27. “of seeking the Lord, if happily they might feel after him and find him.” Whence this Inference is made, “That it requireth some Industry and Consideration, to find out the Being of God by the Light of Nature.”56 This Inference being part of a Dispute against an innate Idea, must mean thus; That the finding out the Being of God by the Light of Nature, is merely by Industry and Consideration, exclusively of an innate Idea; which is no just Inference from the Apostle’s Text, whose Scope is not, to exhort the Athenians to seek and find out the Being of God; nor did he preach to them as to Atheists, or such Heteroclites, that had not made the Discovery, but as to Pagan Theists, who had Gods too many; nor doth seeking after the Lord and finding him, signify the finding out this Proposition, That there is a God; nor are all those who have found out this Proposition, such as have found out God in the Apostle’s Sense. But he considereth the Athenians as Aliens from the true God, and from knowing him; he exhorteth them, therefore, to seek the Lord, to feel after him, and find him, which is to come out of their Heathen State, to know him so, as to become his Religionists. To find out the Being of God, the Existence of a Deity, this needed not “a seeking the Lord with Meditation and Study”;57 their innate Notion of the Being of God, and the obvious Phaenomena of Nature, made them a sort of Theists; but to be in Theism of Religion and Condition, This was the thing which requir’d a seeking the Lord with Meditation and Study; and, because they were without it, therefore they were a Heathenish Atheistical Kind of Theists, and the true God was to them a Stranger-Deity.

  The law of Nature is notic’d to Mankind by the Nature of Things.§16. The Stoicks define Duty, A Practice agreeable to the natural Constitutions.58 So the Apostle supposeth Sodomy, Bestiality, and other Heathen Pollutions, were Crimes against the Law of Nature, because they were repugnant to the Order and Constitution of Nature, to the manifest Institution of the great Author of Nature, and to the natural Use of Things, Rom. 1. 26, 27. “Men and Women chang’d the natural Use into that which is against Nature.” The Heathen Idolatry was against the Nature of Creatures, that were deified by it, and upon this account also it was a Crime against the Law of Nature; it was repugnant and injurious to the Dignity of Man made after God’s Image, to fall down before Stocks and Stones, with all manner of submissive and lowly Adoration. As Idolaters sin against their own Dignity, So he that committeth Fornication, sinneth against his own Body, (and therefore against his own Dignity,) prostituting it, and making it so abominably Vile, as to make it the Member of an Harlot, 1 Cor. 6. 15, 16, 17. Fornication was manifestly forbidden, because of the Turpitude which such things have, when they are out of a certain Orbit, within which they ought to be confin’d, and without which they are foul, criminal, shameful Contaminations, repugnant to that graceful and ornamental Purity and Chastity, which is the Honour and Ornament of the Body and of the Reason, 1 Thes. 4. 4. The sensual Excess of Drunkenness is in like manner manifestly repugnant to the natural Use of Things, the Honour and Dignity of Man, (indeed to common Civility, Gravity, Modesty, Discretion.) For where as Man is naturally a beauteous, noble, and cleanly Animal, there is no Beast of the Field so Beastly as a Drunkard, a most foul, nasty, noxious, and mis-shapen Animal, with staring distorted Eyes, a fetid Breath, a stammering bauling Tongue, leud Demeanour, and, as Chaucer telleth him, “Thy Face is turn’d into a new array.” His Trade is gorging, surcharging, disgorging, and “shameful Spewing is upon his Glory.” The Life of Sensualists is opposite to the regular Frame and Constitution of Man, which consisteth in the Sovereignty and Rule of his Intellectual Rational Nature, and the Subjection of the Sensitive; for in them Animal-sensitive Nature is predominant and beareth the Sway, and the Head is, where the Heels should be. Whence evil Men are reproach’d with the Names of brute Animals, Wolves, Dogs, Foxes; with being Brutes in the Shapes of Men, which are Monsters in Nature. All Vices are repugnant to Nature, the Nature of Things; all of them are inordinate. Inordinate Self-love, Self-magnifying, Fear, and Care, inordinate Anger, and all “in-ordinate Affections (Col. 3. 5.) the Lust of the Flesh, the Lust of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life” (the Summary of all Wickedness) are Vitious and Criminal, because of their Inordinacy; for they are Nature grown Unnatural, Enormous, Disproportionate, and like a Musical Instrument out of Tune. Gross Irreverence to a Prince, Ingratitude to a Benefactor, insulting a Friend, are Repugnancies and Incongruities to the Object; and such is the justifying the Wicked, the befriending Sin, the profaning that which is Holy, all Impiety towards God, the minding Private Interest, and slighting the Publick, the taking Care of the Body and neglecting the Soul, to which, in worth, the World bears no Proportion.

  The Instincts of Nature,§17. The Law of Nature is, in some degree, notic’d by the kindly Instincts that are in Nature, which is below Reason, Will, and Choice. So Nature, in the narrow Sense, usually signifies the natural unintelligent Agents Nature. “The Antients call’d the Passions Natural and devoid of Reason.”59 In this Notion of Nature, Custom is said to be a second Nature, or an acquir’d Nature. Nature in this Notion, Nature in the Universe, altho’ she acteth not electively or with intention, but fatally, yet she doth nothing in vain, but all for Ends and Uses. As Nature blindly operateth in the great World, so in Animals and in Men, in whose Animal Nature, as in brute Animals, there are blind Instincts, which are not the Law of Nature, and ought to be in subjection to Reason (as Reason to God) which they usually rebel against, and dethrone. The Animal Nature in Man is full of inordinate Concupiscence, which is not so Nature, as not to be vitious Nature; for the Nature of Man is sadly out of Frame by it. Nor is it Nature, as being Natural to the Soul of Man, but it is extraneous and adventitious, and requireth a Purgation. Nor is it kindly and agreeable, and in such Sense natural to the Soul, “But consider, if Virtue and Sanctity be not more kindly and pleasant.”60 Yet a Nature it is, as being the Animal Nature, and so far the Nature of Man; it is now, in a certain degree, his innate Constitution, and it is the specifick Nature of the Carnal and Mundan Family; whence the Apostle saith of inordinate Concupiscence (the Lust of the Flesh, the Lust of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life), “it is not of the Father, but it is of the World,” 1 Joh. 2. 16. It is of the World, as it is lapsed, and become this wicked World.

  But, if this Animal Nature be consider’d, as it is Nature, but not vitiated Nature, the kindly Instincts of it are Notices of the Law of Nature, and contradict the Atheists Politicks, that are founded upon Slanders of Mankind, (whereby it appeareth, how highly well they deserve of Mankind,) That natural Relations are nothing, that there is nothing of Honesty, Justice, or Philanthropy, in human Nature, no natural Charity, or Friendliness, that Man is not sociable by Nature, (as Brute Animals are, that have a sort of Benevolence for those of their own kind,) but that all Benevolence is either from Fear or Feebleness. If these unnatural Abusers of Nature and worst of Impostors teach, That nothing is Just or Unjust in the State of Nature; that every Man by Nature hath a Right to every Thing (whatever his Appetite inclineth to,) and whatsoever one doth to another it is no Injury; so that a Son may lawfully kill his own Parents, and the Innocent may be tortur’d to all extremity: the innate Humanity and natural Affection, that is in Mankind, the natural Affections of Gratitude and Commiseration that are in Human Nature, contradict these lewd and wicked Maxims; and this other ill-natur’d Maxim also, That Man seeketh that which is Good for himself, as the only Object of his Desires, is contradicted by Nature, for Ants, Bees, and Storks do some things for the sake of others. “The Inclination to Goodness is implanted deeply in the Nature of Man; insomuch that if it issue not towards Men, it will take unto other living Creatures; as is seen in the Turks, a cruel People, who nevertheless are kind to Beasts, and give Alms to Dogs and Birds: Insomuch as Busbequius reporteth, a Christian Boy in Constantinople had like to have been ston’d for gagging in Waggishness along-bill ’dFowl.”61 Many Instincts of Nature instigate to what is manifestly a sort of Goodness or Well-doing, and these are Indications, that the being devoid of them, and the Practice which is contrary to them, is criminally Unnatural. Such is the Instinct to common Modesty, call’d by the Atheists Foolishness, and the Instinct to natural Affection, Rom. 1. 31. Such is the Instinct of Nature to an ordinate regular Self-love, Desire of our own Good, Self-preservation, Well-being, and Felicity, and an Aversion from the contrary. Naturâ enim sibi quisque amicus est, “for every one by Nature is a Friend to Himself,” was a common Saying. “No Man ever hated his own Flesh” (without being criminally Unnatural) “but loveth and cherisheth it,” Ephes. 5. 29. Nature instigateth Mankind to take care of themselves and their Off-spring, so making a natural Society, Kindred, and Friendship, and taking care of the Conservation of the Species, and to extinguish and controul these Instincts, is criminally Unnatural. In disposing of their Estates, Men rightly suppose themselves oblig’d to proportion their Kindness to others, to their Degree in Nearness to themselves, as the kindly Instincts of Nature incline them. “There are various Degrees of Society and Conjunction among Mankind; and as every one is nearer, so ordinarily he is to have a greater Share of our Kindness with its Effects.”62 The Instincts of Nature to Religion and Society, by shewing the Design of the great Author of Nature, are manifestly Notices of the Law of Nature.

  and the Sense of Conscience.§18. The Law of Nature is notic’d by the Sense of Conscience, the peaceful and joyous Sense of Innocence and Well-doing, and the dolorous, torturing, Sense of Guilt. Conscience is certainly of this Definitive Notion, it is the Mind as conscious of Duty and of Sin, and so far it is the same with the Practical Mind. For Conscience denoteth that which is conscious in a Man, as such; it denoteth therefore, the Mind as conscious, and it must necessarily denote the Mind as conscious of Duty and of Sin, because nothing else in Law or Religion is matter of Conscience. Those Passions of the Mind as conscious of Duty and Sin, The Stings of Conscience, the Mind’s Satisfaction and Complacency in itself, (which is Peace and Quiet of Conscience,) and Repentance, are the Conscience in Man; therefore the Conscience is the Mind of Man, as conscious of Duty and Sin. Of Conscience, so defin’d, there are two Branches; the one Directive, which respecteth Duty and Sin not yet done, (which is call’d the practical Understanding and Synteresis, or System of common practical Notions;) the other is Reflexive, which respecteth Duty and Sin already done; and from both these Branches of Conscience, but chiefly from the latter, Conscience hath its Name. Conscientia signifieth Consciousness of our Doings, sometimes the Consciousness of others, but most usually our own Consciousness. So Tacitus saith of Nero, that he fell in Love with Acte, “Having taken two young Men into Consciousness of his doing.”63 So Cicero saith, that Epicurus Philosophiz’d in such a manner, “That there is nothing so foul, which he seemeth not willing to do for Pleasure-sake, if Men be not conscious thereof. ”64 But most usually Conscientia signifieth our own Consciousness of our own Doings. As when Cicero saith, “Every one’s flagitious Doing exagitateth him and affecteth him with Madness: His evil Cogitations and Consciousness of Mind terrify him.”65“The Consciousness of a well-spent Life and the Remembrance of many Well-doings is most pleasant.”66“The Consciousness of a right Will is the greatest Consolation of incommodious Affairs.”67“In the very Consciousness of Well-doings there is Fruit enough of our Labours.”68 The same Author somewhere says, “I use not so much to rejoyce in any thing as the Consciousness of my Duties.”69 In these Sayings and such like, Conscientia is rightly render’d Consciousness, as appeareth from many parallel Sayings of the antient Writers.70 From whose usual Phraseology it is manifest, that Conscience has its Name from Consciousness (the Mind’s Consciousness of well and evil Doing), whence it must be defin’d, the Mind as conscious of Duty and of Sin. Agreeably to which Definition of Conscience, the usual Distributions of Conscience may easily be understood and explain’d. For, if the Mind, as conscious of Duty and Sin, is uncriminal, this is the good Conscience: If it be criminal, this is the evil Conscience. As conscious of Duty and Sin, the Mind may be quiet or troubled: The one is a quiet, the other a troubled Conscience. If the Mind is tenderly conscious of Duty and of Sin, this is a tender Conscience: If Senseless and not apt to check, or to check but feebly, this is a stupid Conscience. And what is an erroneous, doubtful, scrupulous Conscience, but the Mind conscious in general of Duty and of Sin, and erroneous, doubtful, or scrupulous, touching some particular Matters of Practice? The Notion of Conscience in the New-Testament, (where the Name occurreth no less than 32 times,) is the Mind as conscious of Duty and of Sin. When the sacred Writers speak of being convicted by our own Conscience,71 of being condemn’d by it, of the Testimony of our Conscience, and our Conscience bearing Witness, of commending ourselves to every Man’s Conscience, and being made manifest in their Consciences, and having no more Conscience of Sins; Conscience signifies as in profane Authors, the Consciousness of our Mind, the Mind as conscious of Good and Evil. To do any thing for Conscience-sake, for Conscience towards God, is to do it as conscious of Duty to God, and of Sin against him, Rom. 13. 5. 1 Pet. 2. 19. Some ate things offer’d to an Idol with Conscience of the Idol, as conscious of Duty and religious Worship to the Idol, 1 Cor. 8. 7. their being so conscious of Duty and of Sin, was their sinful Weakness, and therefore their Conscience was weak, 1 Cor. 8. 7. and it was also render’d criminal by the Practice of Idolatry. So the Mind of ungodly Infidels, as such, is defiled, and their Conscience is defiled by their deadly criminal Practice, Tit. 1. 15. Christians were at liberty, to eat what was offer’d unto Idols, asking no Question forConscience-sake,72 (asking no Question upon account of their own Minds Consciousness of Goodand Evil:) But they might note atitunder this Notion, as Idols Meat, in the apprehension of those who made Conscience of a Worship of Idols, but were bound to abstain, because of their Conscience (their Consciousness of Good and Evil;) for, if they did in such manner externally symbolize with them, their Liberty would be judged (construed and interpreted) by their Conscience (their Consciousness of Duty and Sin) who made Conscience of the Worship of Idols. How then could a Christian think it a reasonable Thing, to symbolize with them? Christians have not only a Conscience, but the good Conscience;73 which is sometimes called a Conscience void of Offence, sometimes a pure Conscience. And, because by Virtue of Christ’s Sacrifice, uncondemnably Sinless and Guiltless, as to the Mind, Soul, and Conscience, therefore they are said to have their Hearts sprinkled from an evil Conscience, Heb. 10. 22. to have their Conscience purg’d from dead Works (those deadly Works, that were deadly Crimes and deadly Pollutions, Heb. 9. 14.) and Christ’s Sacrifice is said to make them perfect as pertaining to Conscience, Heb. 9. 9. For they are perfect as to the Expiation of Sin, or are perfectly expiated by Christ’s Sacrifice, being made by it uncondemnably Sinless and Guiltless, as to the Mind, Soul, and Conscience. In one place more of the New-Testament mention is made of Conscience, but it is of a superlatively evil Conscience, for the Apostle speaketh of a Conscience seared with a hot Iron, 1 Tim. 4. 2. Such is the Conscience of an habituated atrocious Criminal. The Phrase may signify, that his Conscience is deeply maculated with the Marks of his Crimes; it may signify, that he is of a branded stigmatiz’d Conscience, an infamous Villain; and the Phrase may allude tofear’dcauteriz’dFlesh, and therefore may signify, that he is become insensible as to his Conscience, and is so far harden’d in his Villainy.

  At this monstrous Pitch of Wickedness they are arriv’d, that have overcome their checking and controuling Mind, that can commit grosse and flagrant Sins without Reluctance or Regret, Remorse or Shame, and perpetrate notorious Wickedness with an Opinion of its Generosity, Gallantry, and Bravery. So the Philosophers distinguish between ἀκρασία Incontinence, and ακολασία Intemperance.74“In Incontinence the Man keepeth his Judgment right, but is carried away by the Appetite, that is too strong for Reason.” But of Intemperance they say, “It addeth a vitious Judgment to a vitious Appetite, and it destroyeth the Sense of the Sins.” The Man “from his whole Soul inclineth and consenteth to his sensual Pleasures, and such commit Uncleanness with Greediness,” Ephes. 4. 19. How far Men may thus degenerate, to be past feeling, having the Mind clouded, and the Conscience deaded, is best known to them that make the desperate Experiment: But in some of the greatest Monsters for Wickedness amongst the Heathen, (Tiberius, Caligula, Nero,) the Sense of Conscience was so far from being extinguish’d, that in the height of their Greatness, and in an affluence of Prosperity and sensual Pleasures, they found the Rebukes and Lashes, the Anguish and Terrors of their own guilty Minds unavoidable. Whence the Historian observeth, that “if the Minds of Tyrants were laid open, the Verberations and Laniations might be seen.”75 By the Vultur gnawing Ixions’s Liver were meant the Torments of an evil Conscience. By their Erinnyes, Eumenides, Furies, the Heathens meant the Horrors and Terrors of a guilty Mind. They found that certain gross Sins did sensibly wound their Consciences, which also wounded them, convicting and condemningthem, and scourging them with silent Strokes, disquieting them with Anguish and Pensiveness, with doleful Fears and sad Presages; and this Sense of Guilt in their own Minds was a manifest Notice and Indication to them, to look upon those Practices as Wickedness, and to avoid them as such, which did clash with the Frame of their Minds, and brought so many and so great Evils of an evil Conscience upon them. By internal Sense and Experience they found, they had a Conscience bearing them Witness, acquitting and comforting, or accusing and condemning them; they found a difference between Well-doing and Evil-doing in general, that some Practices were peaceful and pleasant to their Mind, as harmonious and agreeable thereto, and that others they could not dispense with; whereby the Duties of Honesty and Justice were notic’d to them, to be Laws inviolable, and they were warn’d of a future Judgment. They found that Sin had another Face, after the Commission of it, than it had before, and that the only way to Peace, was, not to sin against their Consciences.76

  CHAPTER III.

  The Observance of the Law of Nature.

  The Observance of the Law of Nature, two-fold.§1. As in respect of its Obligation and Promulgation, so, in respect of its Observance, the Law of Nature is of a two-fold Notion. For, abating an additional restriction which is in its Definition (that limiteth it to the Notices of the Light of Nature), the Law of Nature is intirely the same with the Divine Moral Law. The Law of Nature therefore must be consider’d, as also the Mosaick Moral Law must be, both as it is of Civil-religious, and as it is of Spiritual-religious, Observance. The one constituteth the Civil-religious, the other the Spiritual-religious, People. The one is necessary to Civil-religious Society, the other is Righteousness and true Holiness, which alone is available to constitute Men Righteous as to their Soul-Interests.

  The Law of Nature, or the Moral Law, is a Civil-religious Institution, promoting the Welfare of Civil Society, in order to the Preservation and Happiness of Temporal Life;§2. The Law of Nature, because of this different Observance of it, is an Institution of Spiritual-religious Virtue and Duty, in order to Mens Soul-interests, and also an Institution of Civil-religious Virtue and Duty, in order to their secular and Civil Interests, as the Apostle considereth the Mosaick-moral Law. 1 Tim. 1. 9, 10. “The Law is not made for a righteous Man, but for the Lawless and Disobedient, for the Ungodly and for Sinners, for the Unholy and Profane, for Murderers of Fathers and Murderers of Mothers, for Man-slayers, for Whore-mongers, for them that Defile themselves with Mankind, for Man-stealers, for Liars, for perjur’d Persons.” As a Philosopher is far from supposing, that a Virtuous Man’s proper Institution of Virtue is not made for a Virtuous Man: So, if the Apostle had consider’d the Moral Law, as the Law of Righteousness and true Holiness, he would not have said, that it is not made for a righteous Man; for it is his proper Institution of Righteousness, Rom. 2. 13. and 8. 7. and 13. 8, 10. Jam. 2. 8.–11. But as the Philosophers say of the Civil Law of the Common-Wealth, “It is not made for the Good,”1 it is not needful to make such Laws for them: So the Apostle saith of the Civil-religious Law of the Jews, it is not made for a righteous Man, as necessary to be made for him, but for the Lewd and Flagitious, that by the Authority of the Law they may be disciplin’d with the Civil-religious Morals, restrain’d from violating them, or punish’d, if they do violate them. The Mosaick Law, as it was the Law of the Judaical Common-Wealth, that Political Law, was an Institution of Civil religious Virtue and Duty, and of Civil-religious Observance. Whence a young Man telleth our Saviour (Matth. 19. 20.) that he had always observ’d the Moral Precepts of the Law; and the Favour which our Saviour had for him, sheweth, that he spake nothing but Truth; for, as to the Civil-religious Observance of the Precepts of the Moral Law, he was train’d up to Virtuously, that he had kept them from his Youth. So the Apostlein his Judaical Religion,touching the Righteousness which is in the Law (consider’d as a Civil-religious Institution of Civil Societists) was blameless, Phil. 3. 6. Such also is the Law of Nature, as it is the Law of Civil Societists, merely in order to their secular Interests. For the Civil Law of every Nation, in great part, consisteth of the Law of Nature, which Civil Law is a Civil-religious Institution, (an Institution of Civil-religious Virtue and Duty, and of Civil-religious Observance,) and, consequently, the Law of Nature whereof it consisteth, is of the same Character. Such a Civil-religious Institution as the Civil Lawyers Discipline, which is defined by themselves, The Knowledge both of Divine and Human Things, the Science of Just and Unjust. This sort of Religion and Virtue, necessary for Human Society and Civil Life, Human Laws institute, and, in consort with them, the Law of Nature doth the same. As a Civil-religious Institution, and for the Conservation of Human Life, the Law of Nature had an agreeable Observance, among the Virtuous Popular Pagans; for their Observance of it was (in their way of Religion) Civil-religious; which was Virtus civilis, non vera, sed verisimilis, quae ad veras virtutes, aeternamque beatitudinem non profecit, Civil Virtue, not the True, but a Resemblance thereof, wholly ineffectual to make the Soul truly Holy and eternally Happy.2

  and also a Spiritual-religious Institution, in order to everlasting Happiness and Life Eternal.§3. But the Law Natural and Mosaical is the Law or Religion of Soul-interests, “for so the doers of the Law shall be justified,” Rom. 2. 13. “The Commandment was ordain’d to Life,” Rom. 7. 10. When a young Man ask’d, Good Master, what shall I do, that I may inherit Eternal Life?, Christ answer’d, If thou wilt enter into Life, keep the Commandments, which he reckoneth in their Order. The Commandments of the Law, therefore, were such, and that by the Purpose and Design of the Law-giver, who intended to lead Men to Life and eternal Salvation. In like manner Luk. 10. to a Lawyer that asked, What shall I do to inherit Eternal Life? Christ answer’d, What is written in the Law, how readest thou? Signifying plainly, that the Law was given as the way of obtaining Eternal Life. The Moral Law, therefore, Natural and Mosaical, is not merely a Civil-religious Institution, but an Institution of Religion and Virtue, in order to Life Eternal, which may therefore properly be call’d, The Law-religion touching Soul-interests. Our Saviour, in his Discourse with the Lawyer, expresseth the very Terms (the Condition and premiant Part of the Sanction) of this Law-religion; for he having repeated to our Saviour the grand Precepts of the Moral Law, touching the Love of God and Man, our Saviour replyeth to him, This do, and thou shalt live. Therefore, if the Moral Law, Natural and Mosaical, is a Settlement or Covenant of Life Eternal, it is necessarily also a Settlement of Condemnation and of Death, Spiritual and Eternal. Therefore, if the Moral Law hath this tragical Effect, in the Sense of the New-Testament, if the Design of aSaviour was to redeem Mankind from the manifold Evils brought upon them by the Moral Law, it must be thought a Premiant and Penal Settlement of the Soul-interests of Men. Nor is it possible, that it can be a HolySpiritual Law, as the Apostle styleth it, unless the Sanction of it be the Settlement of the Spiritual and Soul-interests of Men. From whence it followeth, that Life and Death, as they are the Sanction of the Law, must be understood in a two fold Notion, the one Civil-religious, the other Spiritual-religious, the one of which is Figurative of the other; therefore Life must signify secular Prosperity as premiant to Civil-religious Obedience, and Life Eternal as premiant to the Spiritual-religious fulfilling the Law.

  The Moral Law is a Law of Spiritual-religious Morals, and Spiritual-religious Observance.If the Moral Law, Natural and Mosaical, is the Law or Religion of Soul-interests, it is necessarily, in the preceptive Part of it, an Institution of the Spiritual-religious Morals, and of Spiritual-religious Observance, which belongeth to it, as it is the Holy Spiritual Law, Rom. 7. 12, 14. Such a kind of Law requireth, that Men be truly Spiritual kind of Livers (not of the wicked and carnal Kind,) and that they live the holy Spiritual kind of Life, which is the Righteousness and true Holiness of theinward Man, and the Spiritual-religious Observance of the Law. The Law is Spiritual, both in respect of the Life and Practice, and in respect of the Virtue and Duty which it requireth; for it requireth the holy Spiritual Life and Practice, and the Spiritual-religious Virtue and Duty, which are the same Things, but with this difference; the Holy Spiritual Life and Practice is contradistinguish’d to Carnality and Wickedness of Life and Practice; but the Spiritual-religious Virtue and Duty is contradistinguish’d to the Civil-religious, which, if alone, is but a Carnality of Religion and Virtue. Such was the Religion and Virtue of the Jews after the Letter, that serv’d in the Oldness of the Letter, being totally devoid of the Holy Spiritual Life, and therefore they were under the Curse of the Holy Spiritual Law, for all that are under the Letter, are under the Curse. They are in their Carnality of Life and Practice, and in their Carnality of Religion and Virtue, and are a Family of Virtuous People, and of Religionists, opposite to the Spiritual and Divine Family of regenerate Religionists, in whom the Righteousness which the Holy Spiritual Law requireth, is fulfilled (in the main, tho’ not in the rigour of it,) Rom. 8.4. and 13. 10. Regenerate Christians, that walk not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit (live the Holy Spiritual Life) fulfil the Righteousness of the Law; the Law is therefore the Institution of the Spiritual-religious Duty and Virtue. None are the Doers of it, and of the Righteousness which it requireth, but they that belong to the New-Testament, that have the Law, not written on Tables, but in their Hearts by an intimate and faithful Love of God and of Righteousness, which is the Spiritual-religious Observance of the Law. To do the Commandments of the Moral Law from servile Fear of Punishment, which is to do them against one’sWill, is not to be a Well-doer. The Law is not observ’d, but by the Love of God and of Righteousness, and delight in Things Spiritually good, and by that equitable Charity, which doeth to all, as we our-selves would be done to. And, if the Life of Divine Charity is the only genuine Observance of the Law, it is necessarily of Spiritual-religious Observance. The Christian Moral Law is of Spiritual-religious Observance, and the Mosaick Moral Law is of the same Nature; for our Saviour in his Sermon on the Mount, which is the Christian Moral Law, is said to have perfected and filled up the Mosaick Moral Law upon this account, because what was obscurely implyed therein, our Saviour hath clearly and distinctly explain’d. That part of his Moral Law, wherein he seemeth to dilate, extend, and fill up the Mosaick (using the Phrase, But I say unto you) is in the main, nothing else but the Contents of the Mosaick Moral Law, clearly unfolded, and so as to be chang’d into Christianity. The Law of Nature, therefore, is of various Acceptation; for the whole Divine Moral Law, without restriction to Natural Light, (the whole System of that Moral Law, of which there are Notices by the Light of Nature,) is sometimes called the Law of Nature. And by confining it to the Notices of Natural Light, this large Acceptation of it is made narrower; for it is not to be suppos’d, that the Light of Nature, so fully and perfectly noticeth the Moral Law, as the Mosaical Scripture doth.

  As the Summary of what the Law of Nature, or the Moral Law, requireth, is the good Life, and Well-doing or Universal Righteousness: So it appeareth, that the good Life must be distinguish’d into two Kinds, the Civil-religious, and the Spiritual-religious. The Civil-religious good Life maketh a flourishing State, or Civil Society, and a Civilly-good People. The good Life of the Virtuous Pagans, who did by Nature theThings contain’d in the Law, cannot be thought of a better Character than the Civil-religious, which is only a bad kind of good Life, which continueth Men in the State of Death; for the Divine Moral Law is not only a Law of external good Deeds, and of a carnal Commandment, but also a Spiritual Law.

  finis.

  Appendix 1

  Richard Cumberland’s Original Dedication to De Legibus Naturae

  The Author’s Dedication.1

  To the Right Honourable Sir Orlando Bridgman Knight and Knight Baronet, Lord High Chancellor of England, Keeper of the Great Seal, and of his Majesty King Charles the Second’s most honourable Privy Council.2

  My most noble LORD,

  The two Reasons which chiefly prevail with all Authors, who dedicate Books, are either, First, the Importance of the Subject; or, Secondly, The particular Situation and Circumstances of the Author himself. Both these Reasons prevail with me to address this Performance to your Lordship.

  For since the Laws of Nature, the Subject-matter of this Work, are the Solid Foundations of that Equity which your Lordship, from your own innate Disposition, so fondly admire; and since in the High Court of Chancery, where, by the Royal Favour of our most gracious So vereign, you preside as supreme Judge, it must appear a Piece of unpardonable Injustice in me, to have sought after any other Patron.

  In this controversial Treatise, however, we do not only discourse upon the Maxims of Equity in particular, but upon Religion, upon Justice, and upon Civil Government in general.

  These Principles, which your Lordship holds in the highest and dearest Esteem, are, as we complain, attacked by Mr. Hobbes.

  For, altho’ this Gentleman, at some times, allows the Dictates of Reason, which concern these Points, to be impressed upon every human Mind, by Almighty God, as Rules of Action [De Cive, ch. 4. Sect. 1.]; yet he, notwithstanding this Concession, obstinately denies any such Dictates to lay an Obligation upon outward Acts, conformable to these Dictates [De Cive, ch. 3. Sect. 27]: Or, that they are, in any Propriety of speaking, Laws, unless they first be established upon Civil Authority[De Cive, ch. 5. Sect. 2, 5.]: And, unless they first are guarded by the Sanctions of the Civil Magistrate [De Cive, ch. 6. Sect 3.]. In short, he utterly denies that any such Laws are the Concern of those who are not Members of the same Civil Community.

  These are the prevailing Opinions, the ruling Principles, the Κυρία Δόξα of Mr. Hobbes; and, from which his most fundamental Maxims are deduced. Hence he concludes [Leviathan in English, Chap. 26. pag. 143], that in all the several Constitutions of Civil Government, from the highest to the lowest, one with another, the Members of one Community may act as they please by the Members of any other; all being, as he says, in a perpetual State of War, notwithstanding that the Compacts of mutual Faith and Fidelity be as binding and obligatory as possibly can be devised.

  From hence, he peremptorily insists upon it, That all Men lawfully may take away Life, with the Necessaries and Comforts thereunto belonging, from all Men, provided they be in a State which he imagines and calls natural; or, provided they be not Members of the same Civil Community.

  Whereas we, on the contrary, maintain, That these Principles are not only repugnant to the Divine Authority over the external Acts and Behaviour of Mankind, and which Natural Religion dictates; but we also affirm this Conclusion to follow as a direct Consequence from his Principles, That Almighty God has not laid an Obligation upon any Man to the external Acts of Justice and Fidelity, without which it is, in the Nature of Things, impossible for any peaceable Society or Intercourse amongst Mankind to subsist.

  For, taking away the Sanction of that Obligation, which these Dictates of Reason derive from the Authority of Almighty God, it is no Matter of Wonder if Mr. Hobbes cannot produce any other Tye of Obligation binding enough to restrain the unbounded Liberty of Mankind.

  For all Civil Authority, as being inferior to the Divine Authority of the Laws of Nature, becomes weak and helpless, unless aided by Nature’s Laws, which lay the Obligation upon outward Acts, as the wise Foundation, and the well-connected Security of such Authority.

  But, besides this: He is not satisfied totally to demolish the Foundations of Civil Society and Laws, unless he can overset and change Laws, even after they were written and established, to favour every Vice according to the Humour of his Leviathan.

  In order, therefore, that Lawyers may have no Business at all upon their Hands, he introduces armed Force, as the Interpreter of Law, which is, with Sword in Hand, to cut short all knotty Points. And, he openly declares, in the very same Chapter of his Book called the Leviathan, That our Judges of the English Common Law are not Judges but Lawyers [Leviathan in English, Pages 143 and 147].

  Since, therefore it is so well known, my Lord, to all the World, how zealous you have always appeared in the Cause of Piety, Religion and Justice, you justly claim the first Right to this Treatise: Because, you constantly and propitiously promote that universal Good of the whole Community, under which [universal Good] are contained Religion and universal Good-will, and in these we shall find comprehended all the Laws of Nature.

  Your Lordship’s Piety towards God, is fully demonstrated from your Bounty to his Church, by endowing the Episcopal See of Chester with Land, as also many Parishes with Glebes, for the Accommodation of resident Curates.3

  You, my Lord, in one capacity, exercise and practice Benevolence to Mankind in general, as a Member of the Privy Council, (where the grand Concernments of universal Trade and public Treatiesare transacted) and where your Lordship most religiously reveres the Laws of Nations, of Public Contracts, of Public Peace; and where, in all Consultations, you utterly abhor and abominate even every the least Appearance of, Invasion upon Property.

  In your Lordship’s other Capacity, you likewise shew yourself a steady, faithful Subject to that Constitution of Government under which you are born, and for the Support of which (in Lucan’s Character of Cato) you delighted to stand, when it was even overcome and oppressed.

  • Victrix causa Diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.4

  Neither would your Lordship submit to an usurping Tyrant, altho’ in actual Possession, and at a Time when Mr. Hobbes avowedly maintained and openly supported, as Doctrines, that this usurped Power, and a quiet Submission to it, were lawful [Leviathan in English, at the Conclusion, pag. 300].

  In short, the Subject Matter of this Treatise apologizes best for me; and, to speak ingenuously, is the original Source of this Dedication.

  As to the AUTHOR; it is sufficient to say, That he lies under Obligations to your Lordship as his Patron, which he with Pleasure and Gratitude acknowledges: And, that the Production of his Studies and Labours belong of Right to you, he being, in a Manner, born under your Lordship’s Roof.5

  I have, indeed, these further Views in dedicating this Book to your Lordship, that it may prove more acceptable to Men of Letters, who rise and flourish under your Lordship’s Protection;6 and because I am, in my Conscience convinced, that this Treatise will be most highly acceptable to your Lordship’s Sons, who inherit their Father’s Virtues.

  What now only remains is, humbly to ask Pardon, that I have presumed to declare publicly, those Acts of Goodness which you liberally performed for the Good of the Church with all possible Secrecy.

  I have not addressed myself to your Lordship with the least View towards Flattery, but from an inward Persuasion, that your great Liberality will redound to the Glory of the Reformation, and shine as an Example illustrious enough for men of the highest Figure and Fortune to behold, admire, and as truly worthy of their own Imitation.

  Above all, I beseech your Lordship’s Pardon for having detained you too long from Affairs of the first Importance. I therefore now retire to my daily Supplication, which is, That God may, as long as possible, preserve your Lordship a Blessing to his Church, to our gracious Sovereign, to these Realms, and to us all: All Mankind.

  I am, MY LORD,
  Upon Many Accounts,
  Your Lordship’s most obedient,
  And most devoted humble servant,

  R.C.

  Appendix 2

  Hezekiah Burton’s “Address to the Reader”

  The Reverend Doctor HEZEKIAH BURTON’s ALLOQUIUM AD LECTOREM: or, A short Admonition to the Readers of this Philosophical Enquiry, &c. Translated into English by J.T.1

  I beg the Favour of the learned Readers to take Notice, that our Author, in this his Philosophical Dissertation, did not study to captivate the Fancy with enticing Words, nor with the laboured Refinements of Rhetoric.

  He did not waste his Time and Pains in collecting far and near, elegant Turns of Expression, nor in modelling the Harmony of his Periods.

  As his Readers, however, are not, on the one Hand, to walk in the Flower-gardens of Oratory; so, neither are they, on the other, to tread the thorny Ways of dry Schoolmen, nor travel a dreary Journey thro’ the wild Thickets of Briers and Brambles only. They will not find in our Author Monkish Barbarisms; and but few, if any, Terms of Art, as they are commonly called, neither, in short, will he ensnare them with the Fallacies of Sophistical Reasoning.

  Our Philosopher does not cherish such rigid, austere, Stoical Principles; neither does he abominate all kind of Elegance with such an Abhorrence, as to place the whole Value of his Performance upon a careless, wild Neglect: And yet, he cannot be ranked in the Class of what are termed your finished Men, your nice, polite, courtly Authors. He does not set up for so absolute an Admirer of Cicero, neither did he exert all his Talents in pleasing those, who place the whole Value of Writing in Language and Expression: He values Expression, indeed, so far, as to understand his own Meaning himself, and convey the full Sense of it to others. And, since he could not be exact in every minute Article, he would not neglect the most material.

  [Objection] “But, his Attention being closely engaged upon his Subject, like all those who chiefly study the main Point, he appears in a Negligence of Style, and in a Sort of an Undress.”

  [Answer] In order to clear him from this kind of Imputation, he entrusted me with his Manuscript. Whether thro’ Inability or Idleness, or (which is pretty much the same Thing) thro’ many other Avocations and trifling Kinds of other Business, I certainly have not fully executed the Task by some expected of me.

  I must therefore intreat the Readers, to take off every Imputation of this Kind from our Author, and to lay it at my Door.

  Now as to that most heinous Offence which I have committed against the grammatical Folks (which to be sure is an Offence no less than capital) I acknowledge myself deservedly worthy of their severest Indignation and Punishment.

  If none of these Excuses, in short, can plead my Pardon, I must appeal to Scioppius,2 and the other critical, strict Judges of the Latin Tongue; I will call them to my Assistance, who never refused Patronage to such Votaries as invoke their Aid. These Gentlemen are, to be sure, the high and mighty Judges, who have a Right to ascertain and vindicate the just Forms, and proper Modes of Expression.

  It is the usual Practice of these Critics, and with the whole Weight of their Authority, to transplant and naturalize foreign Phrases. Now they will, beyond all Doubt, strenuously maintain, That a plain stile is agreeable to a Philosophical Subject; because it is the easiest, and the most naturally adapted to handle every such Subject well.

  Take heed therefore, my good Readers, and be advised by me, not to find Fault with our Author’s Stile, lest ye proclaim and wage War publicly with the whole Herd of Critical Grammarians.

  There is also another Caution necessary, and that is, not to expect in this Treatise any witty Points, satyrical Turns, or facetious Jokes, either in the Thought or in the Expression. Because, our Author was, to be sure, an utter Enemy to all that Kind of Confutation; and from which Sort of Reasoning, in such numberless Instances, he so heavily reproaches his Adversary, and would never have spared him, but that he did not care always to give a Loose to his just Indignation.

  It is the most difficult Thing in the World, to refrain from Satyr, in treating that rude, barbarous Philosophy, which lays the Foundations of all Irreligion, Injustice, Villainy, and even Rebellion itself.

  However, our Author, who is of a most beneficent Nature, chose to use a gentle, mild Expression, and that upon many Accounts:

  First, He was fully resolved to treat Mr. Hobbes with Humanity and Gentleness, not only upon Account of his great Learning; but, more especially, because Mr. Hobbes,—poor Gentleman! is now emaciated, and almost quite sunk beneath the Weight and Infirmities of Age.3

  Secondly, Because, our Author imagines it equally barbarous, to declaim with bitter Invectives against a dying old Man, continually under the dreadful Apprehensions of Death, as to insult over the last Remains of a departing Soul, or to torture the Manes of the Dead.

  Thirdly, Because, our Author employed a great deal of his Time and Pains in mathematical Studies, from which Kind of Studies he learned a Simplicity and Purity of Expression, quite disengaged from rhetorical Ornaments, and free from all Points of Wit.

  Fourthly, No possible Reason can be assigned, why our Author should not use this plain Manner of Writing, altho’ upon a Subject different from Mathematics.

  For the Case is pretty much the same, in writing upon other Subjects, as upon those of Mathematics. You seldom find Authors, well principled in the mathematical Science, mistaken in Point of Reasoning; unless, perhaps, it happens, now and then, that a mathematical Scholar may grow somewhat mad: A melancholy Instance of which we have in Mr. Hobbes!

  That our Author, therefore, might investigate and trace our Truths of the most Importance and Difficulty, and fairly lay these Truths before his Readers in a clear, regular Stile, he judged, that reasoning upon a moral Subject with mathematical Demonstration, could the better banish from his Thoughts and Writings the uneven and turbulent Irregularities of an unsettled Genius.

  In a Word, to avoid Prolixity, whoseover will cavil at this Book (as a jejune, barren Performance, without any Spirit, Wit or Beauty) ought to consider, that our Author’s sole Intent was, to discover and lay the most weighty Truths open in the clearest Manner, and confirm them by the most conclusive Demonstrations; which, if he has not effectually performed, we may despair of ever seeing such a Work well executed, even unto the End of Time.

  This Caution, however, I give you, by the Bye, That whatsover Commendation I most deservedly bestow either upon our Author or upon his Performance, not to understand it as if I would pre-engage your Favour by too early, hasty an Encomium.

  Every one is at all the Liberty in the World (notwithstanding any Thing that I have said to the contrary) to judge for himself: But with this Proviso, that he first reads over, with Patience and Attention, the Book itself; and that he thoroughly understands it; and then, when this is done, he may (but yet with Candour and Impartiality) pass Sentence upon it.

  Whatever ignorant, malevolent, invidious Scoffers object against our Author, or his Performance; whatever muttering Noises, by way of Contradiction, lazy Sophists may snarl out against it; whatsoever little Cavils Atheists, and the Enemies to God and Man, we shall esteem, rather praise than reproach.

  The best of Men will, to be sure, behave themselves with Candour; and they all, even to a Man, will take upon themselves the Defence of that Cause [the common Good] which our Author defends. Nay,—I have no Doubt upon me, but that this Book will be acceptable to all, except the very worst of Men, especially since the main Design of this Under-taking is to prove, That every Individual, to the best of his Abilities, must promote the common Happiness of All.—And, unless I am mistaken in my Conjecture, the present Generation will highly commend, and Posterity, with Wonder and Surprize, esteem our Author. For, if I have the least Judgement at all, this Book is written, not only for the present Age, but for endless Ages to come.

  Go on, therefore, O thou most excellent Author, according to that boundless, diffusive Benevolence with which thou art blessed! Go on, I say, to deserve the best Gratitude from the whole human Race! That is, go on and communicate to ALL, those most excellent Precepts which you yourself have traced out:—Precepts which truly may be called your own,—Precepts incessantly flowing from your own Mind, as from a Fountain of the clearest, purest, best Ideas: And,—may the whole Universe reap the blessed, most delicious Fruits of your Learning, your Wisdom, your Integrity.—Fruits which very few,—too few, indeed, as yet, either feel, taste or understand.

  And now—by way of Conclusion—I address myself to all, the whole rational System of created Agents, and who, upon Principles of Universal Benevolence, are my Parents and Brethren. I address myself to you all, as many as ye be, altho’ in Number passing Numeration, diffused and spread over the whole Expanse of boundless Space, whether ye be Indians, or Scythians, or Africans, or the Inhabitants of Regions and Countries as yet unknown; whether ye be more widely different on your Sentiments of Religion, in your Notions and Affections, than in Situation and Place. I address and beseech you all, with Care and Observance, to peruse The Holy Bible, and this admirable Book of our Author, if happily, by any Means, these two most excellent Books of divine Instruction happen to fall into your Hands—Hearken to your own Reason,—Hearken to your own Experience,—Hearken unto your own Senses,—All silently admonishing and pronouncing Instructions— Hearken, in a Word, to Universal Nature, with one Voice declaring, That nothing is more humane, more lovely, more amiable, more perfective of human Nature: That nothing more nearly resembles the Nature of God, than Benevolence universally extended and exerted towards All.

  All these Monitors with a clear, with an audible Voice, (A Voice by the deep Ear of Meditation heard) and with one Consent declare, That a Good-will, the most diffusive and boundless, is the first Principle, the just Measure, and the only sure Rule of all our Duty: That is the ultimate End of all our Actions; the amplest Reward the Fulness of Hope can reach: And—in short,—that it is Man’s chief Good.

  To what exorbitant Degrees of Excess, or to what Ends and Purposes, therefore, shall we, a wretched Race of stupid, absurd Mortals, indulge our Hatred and Malice, our Envy and Jealousy, our Simulation and Dissimulation?

  Let us rather, having laid aside Malevolence, Anger, Wrath, and an Over-violence of Self-love [Nimia ϕιλαντία,] provoke one another to Love, to a Love unfeigned, to a Love without End and without Bounds towards All.

  By these Means we shall arrive at the highest, most exalted State of human Happiness, where we shall consult and act, not only the Good of ourselves, and of our own Flesh and Blood: Not only the Good of those who agree with us in Opinions and Sentiments: Not only the Good of our Friends and Countrymen, but the Good of All, let that All be as many, as numberless, as Imagination can conceive. Rare is the Happiness of such an Age! A Golden Age scarce to be found! When ALL, with their highest their purest Affections, and with their best-united Endeavours will promote the Happiness of ALL.—O Blessed Time!—O most amiable Age!—Let us, my Brethren, as much as in us lies, press forward to so blessed a State.—And—that—our most bountiful God, the one eternal Fountain, Prototype and original Parent of Love, would assist our own Endeavours, and (having purged all Rancour and Malignity of Envy and Malice from our Souls) plentifully pour into our Hearts and Minds his holy Spirit, his Mankind-loving Spirit. That we All, all who inhabit the universal Frame of Nature, may firmly unite and be linked together by indissoluble Bonds of beneficent Affection. And this, from the inmost Recesses of a sincere Soul, is my fervent Prayer, who am, with ardent Zeal,

  Your truly Benevolent,

  hezekiah burton

  SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Published Works of Richard Cumberland

  • De Legibus Naturae Disquisitio Philosophica, in qua earum Forma, Summa Capita, Ordo, Promulgatio, & Obligatio è Rerum Natura Investigantur; quinetiam Elementa Philosophiae Hobbianae, cùm Moralis tum Civilis, Considerantur & Refutantur. London, 1672.
  • De Legibus Naturae . . . editio secunda. Lübeck-Frankfurt, 1683.
  • De Legibus Naturae . . . editio tertia. Lübeck-Frankfurt, 1694.
  • De Legibus Naturae . . . Dublin, 1720.
  • An Essay Towards the Recovery of the Jewish Measures & Weights, comprehending their monies; by help of ancient standards, compared with ours of England. London, 1686.
  • Les loix de la nature, expliquées par le Docteur Richard Cumberland. . . Traduits du Latin, par Monsieur Barbeyrac . . . Avec des notes du traducteur. Translated by Jean Barbeyrac. Leiden, 1757.
  • “The Motives to Liberality Considered.” In The English Preacher, ix. London, 1774.
  • Origines Gentium Antiquissimae; or, Attempts for Discovering the Times of the First Planting of Nations. In several tracts. London, 1724.
  • A Philosophical Enquiry into the Laws of Nature: . . . Wherein also, the Principles of Mr. Hobbes’s Philosophy, . . . are examined into, and confuted. Translated by John Towers. Dublin, 1750.
  • Sanchoniatho’s Phoenician History, translated from the First Book of Eusebius de Praeparatione Evangelica. With a continuation of Sanchoniatho’s History by Eratosthenes Cyrenaeus’s Canon. London, 1720.
  • Traité Philosophique des Loix Naturelles, ou l’on recherche et l’on établit, par la Nature des Choses, la forme de ces Loix, leurs principaux chefs, leur ordre, leur publication & leur obligation: on y refute aussi les Elémens de la Morale & de la Politique de Thomas Hobbes. Traduit du Latin par Monsieur Barbeyrac, . . . avec des notes du traducteur, qui y a joint celles de la Traduction Angloise. Translated by Jean Barbeyrac. Amsterdam, 1744.
  • A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. By the Right Reverend . . . Richard Cumberland, Lord Bishop of Peterborough. Translated by John Maxwell. London, 1727.

  Other Works Referenced in the Text and Notes

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  • ———. “Moral Philosophy and Natural Law: From the Cambridge Platonists to the Scottish Enlightenment.” Political Science 40 (1988): 97–110.
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  • ———. A Paraphrase and Annotations upon the Books of the Psalm. London, 1659.
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  • ———. Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans. Translated by J. Norris. Oxford, 1682.
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  • ———. Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Secunda de Homine. London, 1658.
  • ———. Humane Nature: Or, the Fundamental Elements of Policy. London, 1650.
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  • ———. On the Citizen. Edited and translated by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
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  • Popkin, Richard H. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
  • Porphyry. Select Works of Porphyry. Translated by T. Taylor. Frome, England: Prometheus Trust, 1999.
  • Prideaux, Humphrey. The Old and New Testament Connected in the History of the Jews and Neighbouring Nations. London, 1717.
  • Pufendorf, Samuel. De Jure Naturae et Gentium. Lund, 1672.
  • ———. Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis. Translated by W. A. Old-father. Oxford: Clarendon, 1931.
  • Purchas, Samuel. Purchas his Pilgrimage. London, 1619.
  • Rycaut, Paul. The Present State of the Ottoman Empire. London, 1668.
  • Sanderson, Robert. XXXIV Sermons. London, 1671.
  • Sarasohn, Lisa. “Motion and Morality: Pierre Gassendi, Thomas Hobbes and the Mechanical World View.” Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (1985): 363–80.
  • Schneewind, Jerome B. The Invention of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
  • Schneider, Hans. Justitia Universalis. Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1967.
  • Schooten, Frans van. Exercitationum Mathematicarum Libri Quinque. Leiden, 1657.
  • Scott, W. L. The Conflict between Atomism and Conservation Theory 1644–1860. London: Macdonald, 1970.
  • Selden, John. De Diis Syris Syntagma II. London, 1617.
  • ———. De Jure Naturali et Gentium. London, 1640.
  • ———. Mare Clausum. London, 1635.
  • Seneca. Epistulae Morales. 10 vols. Translated by R. M. Gummere. Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb, 1920.
  • ———. Moral Essays, 3 vols. Translated by J. W. Basore. Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb, 1928.
  • ———. Naturales Quaestiones. Translated by T. H. Corcoran. Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb, 1971.
  • Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of. Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. London, 1711.
  • ———. The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody. London, 1714.
  • Sharrock, Robert. De Finibus Virtutis Christianae. Oxford, 1673.
  • ———. De Officiis Secundum Naturae Jus. Oxford, 1660.
  • Skinner, Quentin. Visions of Politics. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
  • Smith, John. Select Discourses. Edited by J. Worthington. London, 1660.
  • Sorell, Tom. “Seventeenth Century Materialism: Gassendi and Hobbes.” In The Renaissance and Seventeenth Century Rationalism. Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson. London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 235–72.
  • Spencer, John. De Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus. Cambridge, 1685.
  • Spencer, William. Origenis Contra Celsum. London, 1658.
  • Stearne, John. Anima Medela. London. 1653.
  • Stewart, Larry. The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain 1660–1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
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  [1. ]For discussion of the “modern” theory of natural law, see Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (1979), and also his “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law” (1987), 99–122. For more recent discussions of the same tradition, see Haakonssen, Natural Law and Modern Philosophy (1996); and Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (2000).

  [2. ]For Cumberland’s contribution to the natural law tradition, see Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England: Richard Cumberland’s “De Legibus Naturae” (1999), especially ch. 7; Kirk, Richard Cumberland and Natural Law (1987); Haakonssen, “The Character and Obligation of Natural Law According to Richard Cumberland” (2001), pp. 29–47; Schneider, Justitia Universalis (1967), pp. 166–75; Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought” (1995), pp. 80–108; and Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (1998), pp. 101–17. For Cumberland’s influence upon Scottish Enlightenment thought, see Forbes, “Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment” (1982), pp. 186–204. See also Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics (1975), pp. 18–26; Moore and Silverthorne, “Gerschom Carmichael and the Natural Jurisprudence Tradition in Eighteenth-Century Scotland” (1983), pp.73–88.

  [3. ]The main source for Cumberland’s life is a short biography written by his sonin-law Squire Payne: “Brief Account of the Life . . . of the Author,” prefaced to Cumberland’s Sanchoniatho’s Phoenician History (1720). Linda Kirk has produced the best modern account in “Richard Cumberland (1632–1718) and His Political Theory,” Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1976. Kirk’s discussion forms the basis for ch. 1 of her Richard Cumberland and Natural Law. Some additional information is provided in Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, Introduction.

  [4. ]The lord keeper of the Great Seal was the judicial officer appointed in lieu of the lord chancellor. As well as being the head of the legal side of the government and the senior judge in the Court of Chancery, the lord keeper authorized grants of offices, privileges, and royal charters. Virtually in distinguishable from the office of lord chancellor in theory and practice, the post was abolished in 1760. See G. E. Aylmer, The Crown’s Servants (2002), p. 18.

  [5. ]Squire Payne, “Brief Account,” p. ix; Cambridge University Library Grace Book, Supplicats 1677–80.

  [6. ]The nonjurors were the eight bishops and some four hundred priests who, because of their belief in the divine right of kings, continued to see the Stuarts as the legitimate monarchs and hence refused to take the oath of allegiance to William and Mary.

  [7. ]Payne, “Brief Account,” p. xxvi.

  [8. ]For a discussion of the political context, see Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, ch. 1.

  [9. ]Ibid., ch. 2.

  [10. ]See below, Cumberland’s “Introduction,” sect. III.

  [11. ]Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, ch. 2, especially pp. 72–87; see also Haakonssen, “Moral Philosophy and Natural Law: From the Cambridge Platonists to the Scottish Enlightenment” (1988), pp. 97–110.

  [12. ]For discussion of Cumberland’s science, see Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, chs. 4–6; Forsyth, “The Place of Richard Cumberland in the History of Natural Law Doctrine,” pp. 23–42; Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain 1660–1750 (1992), pp. 37–39.

  [13. ]Ch. 9, sect. VIII.

  [14. ]Kirk, Richard Cumberland, ch. 4; Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, ch. 1, pp. 48–55.

  [15. ]For discussion of Pufendorf’s critics, see Palladini, Discussioni Seicentesche su Samuel Pufendorf (1978), pp. 99–122, and Haakonssen, Natural Law and Modern Philosophy, pp. 43–46. For Cumberland’s influence, see Kirk, Richard Cumberland, ch. 5; and Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, ch. 7. For another view, see Palladini’s discussion in Samuel Pufendorf: Discepolo di Hobbes (1990).

  [16. ]For Cumberland’s impact upon these writers, see Kirk, Richard Cumberland, chs. 5 and 6. For Cumberland’s place in the wider tradition, see Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”; and Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy.

  [17. ]A translation of Burton’s “Alloquium ad Lectorem” (Address to the Reader) is reproduced as an appendix to this edition.

  [18. ]Kirk, Richard Cumberland, ch. 2.

  [19. ]Ibid., ch. 6.

  [20. ]Maxwell borrowed most of this material from Richard Brocklesby’s An Explication of the Gospel—Theism and the Divinity of the Christian Religion (1706). On some copies Maxwell acknowledged his debt to the obscure Brocklesby on the title page, but the most common state of the work lacks any reference to the earlier writer.

  [21. ]Cumberland’s son Richard had supplied Bentley with his father’s interleaved copy (Trinity College, Cambridge, MS. adv.c.2.4), containing Cumberland’s own revisions for future publication of a corrected Latin edition. The project never came to fruition. For Barbeyrac’s account of how he came by this material, see his Traité Philosophique des Loix Naturelles (1744), pp. v–viii.

  [1. ]In some copies the following variant text replaces “by the Translator”: “the Introduction and latter part of the Appendix being chiefly extracted out of the writings of the learned Mr. Brocklesby, by the translator.” Richard Brocklesby (1636–1714) was the author of An Explication of the Gospel—Theism and the Divinity of the Christian Religion (1706). Maxwell makes liberal use of Brocklesby’s text, particularly books I and V, adapting, paraphrasing, and sometimes plagiarizing the text without reference.

  [1. ]John Carteret (1690–1763), 1st earl of Granville, but more commonly known as Lord Carteret, was lord lieutenant of Ireland between 1724 and 1730. Maxwell was Carteret’s domestic chaplain.

  [1. ]In the errata to the first edition of De Legibus Naturae, Cumberland blames the inaccuracies upon the youth who did the typesetting.

  [2. ]Cumberland lived in Stamford in the early 1670s and left the printing in the hands of his friend Hezekiah Burton. See also Burton’s “Alloquium ad Lectorem,” reproduced as appendix 2 to the current volume.

  [3. ]Maxwell refers to subsequent editions of the Latin text; slightly improved second and third editions were published in Lu¨beck and Frankfurt by Samuel Otto and Johann Wiedermeyer in 1683 and 1694. The problematic fourth edition, based upon the 1672 edition, was published in Dublin by James Carson in 1720.

  [4. ]René Descartes, Henry More, Kenelm Digby, and Seth Ward. For the works referred to, see ch. 2, n. 2.

  [5. ]Maxwell’s piece summarizes the arguments that emerged from Samuel Clarke’s attack upon Henry Dodwell; the anonymous adversary was Anthony Collins, who attacked Clarke’s work in turn. See “A Summary of the Controversy Between Dr. Samuel Clark &c.,” in Cumberland’s appendix 1, below, pp. 759–93.

  [6. ]Maxwell refers to p. xii of his opening essay (p. 39 of this work).

  [1. ][Maxwell] “I take Logick here, not in the common restrain’d Sense, but so as to comprise all Arts, or Methods of Reasoning, such as the Algebraical, Geometrical, Metaphysical, &c.”

  [2. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature (1727), 1.29. For the source of Cumberland’s analogy, see Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.64; De Finibus, V.13.

  [3. ]Shaftesbury, The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody (1714), p. 275. The first edition was published in 1709; Maxwell is using the second edition.

  [4. ]Cicero, De Legibus, II.19.

  [5. ]Porphyry, De Abstinentia (in Select Works of Porphyry), IV.10.

  [6. ]Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae (1672), VII.9, p. 350; V.48, p. 296; V.49, p. 300; V.3, p. 190; I.14, p. 22; V.50, p. 303; IX.7, p. 388; II.8, p. 88; I.19, p. 28.

  [7. ]Ovid, Metamorphoses, I.21; Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.16.

  [8. ]Maxwell quotes from Hierocles’s Golden Verses of Pythagoras, lines 61–62. As with so many of Maxwell’s citations, it is not clear which edition or collection the quotation comes from.

  [9. ]Prideaux, The Old and New Testament Connected in the History of the Jews and Neighbouring Nations (1717), pt. I, bk. IV, p. 169.

  [10. ]Ovington, Voyages to Suratt in 1689 (1696); Lord, A Display of Two Forraigne Sects in the East Indies (1630).

  [11. ]Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride (in Moralia).

  [12. ]Collins, A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion (1724), pp. 139, 140.

  [13. ]Hyde, Historia religionis veterum Persorum (1700); Prideaux, Old and New Testament; Lord, A Display of Two Forraigne Sects in the East Indies (1630), vol. I;Pocock, Specimen Historiae Arabum (1650), p. 148.

  [14. ][Maxwell cites Prideaux] “In the Passage above quoted, and in his Defence of it, in the Letters which pass’d between him and Mr. Moyle, in Moyle’s works, Vol. 2d.” See n. 9 (above) and his defense of his ideas in Moyle, The Works of Walter Moyle (1726), vol. II. The work by Newton is the unauthorized Abregé de la Chronologie de M. le Chevalier Newton (1725).

  [15. ]Prideaux, Old and New Testament.

  [16. ]Collins, A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons.

  [17. ]Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride (in Moralia).

  [18. ]Plutarch, De Defectu Oraculorum (in Moralia).

  [19. ]Spencer, De Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus (1685), II.11.

  [20. ]Mu¨nster, Biblia Hebraica (1534–35), Leviticus 17.7n.

  [21. ]Ibid.

  [22. ]Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride (in Moralia).

  [23. ]Pétau (Petavius), Opus de Theologicis Dogmatibus (1644), vol. 3, III.2.8–9, 3.5.

  [24. ]Plutarch, Vitae Parallelae (Parallel Lives), XIV.6.

  [25. ][Maxwell] “In his Treatise, concerning such whom God is slow to punish.” Maxwell refers to Plutarch’s De Sera Numinis Vindicta (in Moralia).

  [26. ]Plato, Republic, X, 613e–621d.

  [27. ]Sallust (the Platonist), De Diis et Mundo, chs. 12, 14, 19.

  [28. ]Hulsius, Theologiae Judaicae (1653), pt. 1, bk. 1, pp. 71, 72.

  [29. ]Lightfoot, Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae (1664), p.59, on 1 Corinthians 10.10.

  [30. ]Hulsius, Theologiae Judaicae, p. 169.

  [31. ]Maimonides, Moreh Nevuchim, pt. II, ch. 30.

  [32. ]Maxwell is probably referring to Greaves’s Anonymus Persa de Siglis Arabum & Persarum Astronomicis (1648).

  [33. ]Windet, De Vita Functorum Statu (1663), sect. 13; Spencer, De Legibus Hebraeorum (1686), bk. III, diss. 8, p. 457; Hoornbeek, Pro Convincendis et Convertendis Judaeis Libri Octo (1655), IV.2, p. 309.

  [34. ]Spencer, De Legibus Hebraeorum, p. 455.

  [35. ]Windet, De Vita Functorum Statu, p. 126.

  [36. ]Plutarch, De Vitando Aere Alieno and De Iside et Osiride (both in Moralia).

  [37. ]Maxwell’s source is not indicated; for a modern edition of the passage quoted, see Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments (1981), pp. 138, 270–75.

  [38. ]Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride and De Defectu Oraculorum (both in Moralia).

  [39. ]Newton, Abregé de la Chronologie.

  [40. ]Iamblichus, De Mysteriis (1678), p. 170; Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis (in Moralia), p. 1051.

  [41. ]Plutarch, De Tranquillitate Animi (in Moralia), p. 474; Iamblichus, De Mysteriis (1678), p. 317.

  [42. ]Persius, Satirae, VI.18.

  [43. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali et Gentium (1640), bk. IV, ch. 7.

  [44. ]Mede, on Zechariah 4.10, in Diatribae. Discourses on Divers Texts of Scripture (1642).

  [45. ]Tenison, Of Idolatry (1678), p. 106.

  [46. ]Ibid.

  [47. ]Revelations 1.4, 4.5, 5.6, 8.2.

  [48. ]Mede, on Zechariah 4.10, in Diatribae.

  [49. ]Esther 1.14; Ezra 7.14.

  [50. ]Daniel 10.13.

  [51. ]I Peter 3.22; Ephesians 1.21; Colossians 1.16.

  [52. ]Ephesians 6.13; Colossians 2.15.

  [53. ]Hammond, A Paraphrase and Annotations upon All the Books of the New Testament (1659), p. 384.

  [54. ]Lightfoot, A Commentary upon the Acts of the Apostles (1645), p. 324.

  [55. ]Exodus 33.2, 3.

  [56. ]Exodus 33.15.

  [57. ]Isaiah 63.9.

  [58. ]Exodus 23.21.

  [59. ]Walton, Biblia Sacra Polyglotta (1657).

  [60. ]Psalms 104.4.

  [61. ]Grotius, Annotationes ad Vetus Testamentum (1644), on Daniel 10.13 and 10.20.

  [62. ][Maxwell] “In this Notion Cyrenius is call’d Governor of Syria.” The reader is referred to Hammond’s Paraphrase on Luke 2.2.

  [63. ]Matthew 22.30; Luke 15.10.

  [64. ]Ephesians 3.15.

  [65. ]Hebrews 12.22, 23.

  [66. ]Luke 2.13; I Corinthians 11.10; Matthew 13.41; Revelations 12.7; Psalms 91.11,34.7.

  [67. ]Windet, De Vita Functorum Statu (1664), 2d ed., pp. 116, 119, 120.

  [68. ]I Corinthians 11.10.

  [69. ]Genesis 15.1, 24.7; I Samuel 2.6–9; Job 34.29; Psalms 16.8, 44.4, 62.11–12, 75.7,119.11; Proverbs 3.6; Isaiah 5.12, 26.12, 14, 45.7; Acts 4.28; I Corinthians 16.2; James 4.12, etc.

  [70. ]Arminius, Orationes (1611), I.

  [71. ]Daniel 11.31; 2 Maccabees 6.2.

  [72. ]2 Kings 17.25.

  [73. ]Romans 1.21.

  [74. ]Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), pp. 472–73.

  [75. ]Acts 17.24, 25, 29.

  [76. ]Acts 17:23, 27, 30.

  [77. ]Jackson, A Treatise Containing the Originall of Unbeliefe (1625).

  [1. ][Maxwell] “God.”

  [2. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, LXXV.

  [3. ]Simplicius, Commentarius in Epicteti Enchiridion, ch. 10, p. 58.

  [4. ]Epictetus, Discourses, II.6, III.20.

  [5. ][Maxwell] “Those Things which are not in our own Power, as they stand distinguish’d from those Things which are in our own Power.”

  [6. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, LXXIII.

  [7. ]Ibid., LIII, LXXIV.

  [8. ]Gataker, Markou Antoninou tou autokratoros ton eis heauton (1653), p. 65.

  [9. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, III.86.

  [10. ]Horace, Epistles, I.18.

  [11. ]Juvenal, Satires, X.356, 363, pp. 219, 221: “You should pray for a sound mind in a sound body . . . what I commend to you, you can give to yourself.”

  [12. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, XCIII.

  [13. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, VII.

  [14. ]A composite quotation including sections from Epictetus, Discourses, I.1 and I.6.

  [15. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, CXIII.

  [16. ]Gataker, Markou Antoninou, p. 201.

  [17. ]Plutarch, De Tranquillitate Animi (in Moralia), ultimate chapter.

  [18. ]Montaigne, Essays, II.2.

  [19. ]Della Casa, Galateus de Moribus (1653), ch. 29, p. 123.

  [20. ]Maimonides, De Idolatria, ed. Vossius (1641), I.4.

  [21. ]Marsham, Chronicus Canon Aegypticus, Ebraicus, Graecus, et Disquisitiones (1676), p. 172.

  [22. ]Marcus Antoninus and Epictetus.

  [23. ]Grotius, De Veritate Religionis Christianae (1627), II.18.

  [24. ]Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposeon, III.24, 25.

  [25. ]Maxwell is referring to Marsilio Ficino’s edition of Plato’s works, Platonis Opera Omnia (1484).

  [26. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VI.

  [27. ]Horace, Epistles, I.2.3–5, p. 263: “Who tells us what is fair, what is foul, what is helpful, what not, more plainly and better than Chrysippus or Crantor.”

  [28. ]Parker, Disputationes de Deo et Providentia Divina (1678).

  [29. ]Maxwell is referring to Pierre Gassendi, whose Syntagma Philosophicum (1658) revived neo-Epicurean philosophy.

  [30. ]Maxwell provides no source for this quotation, but very similar sentiments can be found in Plotinus, Enneads, I.4.4 and I.4.7.

  [31. ]Cicero, De Finibus, V.

  [32. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.5, IV.7, 8.

  [33. ]Origen, Contra Celsum, I.

  [34. ]Seneca, De Constantia Sapientis.

  [35. ]Seneca, De Providentia, ch. 2; Epistulae Morales XXIV.

  [36. ]Ibid. XCII; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, V.

  [37. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, XCVII.

  [38. ]Crinitus, De Honesta Disciplina (1508), III.1; Grotius, De Veritate Religionis Christianae, II, annotations to sect. 18; Gataker in Markou Antoninou, p. 94; Epictetus, Dissertationes, II.18.

  [39. ]Cicero, Letters to Friends, XIV.4.

  [40. ]Plutarch, De Profectibus in Virtute (in Moralia), p.m. 82.

  [41. ]Gataker in Markou Antoninou, p. 138.

  [42. ]Simplicius, Commentarius in Epicteti Enchiridion, p. 69.

  [43. ]Ibid., p. 95.

  [44. ]Gataker in Markou Antoninou, pp. 434, 435.

  [45. ]Cardan, De Rerum Varietate (1557), XVI.93.

  [46. ]Porphyry, De Abstinentia, II.38, 41.

  [47. ]Plutarch, Adversus Colotem (in Moralia), p.m. 1126.

  [48. ]The life of Cleanthes in Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VIII.

  [49. ]The source of this anecdote is Woverius’s Assertio Lipsiani Donari (1607); the piece appears in Iusti Lipsii Opera Omnia (1675), I., pp. 184–86.

  [50. ]Simplicius, Commentarius in Epicteti Enchiridion, p. 140; Grotius, Annotationes in Novum Testamentum (1646) on Matthew 5.44, 45.

  [51. ]The note refers the reader to Benjamin Oley’s note on bk. X of Oley’s edition of Thomas Jackson’s Works (1653).

  [52. ]Apuleius, Apology, p. 450.

  [53. ]Epictetus, Discourses, III.5.

  [54. ]T’Agathon, meaning “the Good.”

  [55. ][Maxwell] “Theurgy is a kind of super-natural Magick, procuring an extraordinary and immediate intercourse with the Gods, by means of particular Rites and Ceremonies.”

  [56. ]Plotinus, Enneads, I.2.6.

  [57. ]Ibid., VI.7.35.

  [58. ]Proclus, In Platonis Theologiam, I.25.

  [59. ]Grotius, Annotationes in Novum Testamentum (1646) on Matthew 5.43.

  [60. ]Isocrates, Panathenaicus, p.m. 572.

  [61. ]Grotius, De Veritate Religionis Christianae, bk. II, sects. 12, 14.

  [62. ]Aristotle, Politics, VII.16.

  [63. ]Grotius, De Veritate Religionis Christianae, bk. II, sects. 12, 14.

  [64. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.7.

  [65. ]Grotius, De Veritate Religionis Christianae, bk. II, sects. 12, 14.

  [66. ]Wilkins, Sermon on Romans 12.19 in Sermons Preached upon Several Occasions by the Right Reverend Father in God, John Wilkins (1682), pp. 429–56.

  [67. ]Ibid., p. 442.

  [68. ]Cicero, De Officiis, III.

  [69. ]Marcus Aurelius, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the Roman Emperor, His Meditations Concerning Himselfe [hereafter Meditations], translated by Casaubon (1634), preface.

  [70. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, XI.3.

  [71. ]Epictetus, Discourses, IV.7.

  [72. ]Glanvill, The Way to Happiness (1670), pp. 113, 114.

  [73. ]Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I.

  [74. ]Jackson, A Treatise Containing the Originall of Unbeliefe, sect. 1, ch. 5.

  [75. ]Maxwell does not cite a source for the quotation: “Between Pagan and Christian Philosophy there is as much difference as exists between the Holy Spirit and human intelligence.”

  [76. ]Lucan, Pharsalia, II.383.

  [77. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, X.6, VII.13.

  [78. ]Lucan, Pharsalia, II.592–93.

  [79. ]Eugubinus, or Steuchus, De Perenni Philosophia (1540).

  [80. ]Maxwell refers to Plato, Laws, X, in Ficino’s Platonis Opera Omnia.

  [81. ]Eugubinus, De Perenni Philosophia, V.3.

  [82. ]Ibid.

  [83. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.32.

  [84. ]Horapollo, Hieroglyphica, bk. I, n. 61.

  [85. ]Seneca, Naturales Quaestiones, II.40.

  [86. ]Cicero, In Somnium Scipionis, I.17.

  [87. ]Ibid., II.12.

  [88. ]St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VII.13.

  [89. ]Maffeius, Historiae Indicae (1605).

  [90. ]Cicero, Pro T. Annio Milone Oratio.

  [91. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.

  [92. ]Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum (in Moralia), II.3.

  [93. ]Manilius, Astronomicon, I.

  [94. ]Macrobius, Saturnalia, I.7.

  [95. ]Maxwell refers to a text by Grotius.

  [96. ]Lipsius, Physiologia Stoicorum (1604), bk. I, diss. 8.

  [97. ]Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, p. 331.

  [98. ]It seems likely that Maxwell took this Greek Orphic hymn from Eusebius’s Praeparatio Evangelica, III.9; a slightly different version can also be found in Aristotle, De Mundo [401a28–b7]. It is not clear where the Latin translation comes from. A full English translation of the Greek can be found in Cory, Ancient Fragments (1832), n.p.:

  • Zeus is the first. Zeus the thunderer, is the last.
  • Zeus is the head. Zeus is the middle, and by Zeus all things were fabricated.
  • Zeus is male, Immortal Zeus is female.
  • Zeus is the foundation of the earth and of the starry heaven.
  • Zeus is the breath of all things. Zeus is the rushing of indefatigable fire.
  • Zeus is the root of the sea: He is the Sun and Moon.
  • Zeus is the king He is the author of universal life;
  • One Power, one Daemon, the mighty prince of all things:
  • One kingly frame, in which this universe revolves,
  • Fire and water, earth and ether, night and day,
  • And Metis (Counsel) the primeval father, and all-delightful Eros (Love).
  • All these things are United in the vast body of Zeus.
  • Would you behold his head and his fair face,
  • It is the resplendent heaven, round which his golden locks
  • Of glittering stars are beautifully exalted in the air.
  • On each side are the two golden taurine horns,
  • The risings and settings, the tracks of the celestial gods;
  • His eyes the sun and the Opposing moon;
  • His unfallacious Mind the royal incorruptible Ether.

  [99. ]Selden, De Diis Syris Syntagma II (1617), ch. 2.

  [100. ]Origen, Contra Celsum, I.6, p. 308.

  [101. ]Herodotus, Historia, I.

  [102. ]Strabo, Geographia, XVI.

  [103. ]Lipsius, Physiologia Stoicorum, bk. II, diss. 10.

  [104. ]Maxwell supplies an unsourced Latin quotation, which can be translated as follows: “Behold this excellent head, beautiful face, illuminating the universe.”

  [105. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.

  [106. ]Macrobius, Saturnalia, I.18.

  [107. ]Maxwell supplies an unsourced Latin quotation: “Optimus Maximus, Coelus aeternus, Jupiter.”

  [108. ]Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIV.8.

  [109. ]Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, p. 516.

  [110. ]Juvenal, Satires, XIV.97.

  [111. ]Selden, De Diis Syris, ch. 1.

  [112. ]Philo, De Abrahamo, p. 244.

  [113. ]Palafox y Mendoza, The History of the Conquest of China (1676), p. 440.

  [114. ]Ludolf, A New History of Ethiopia (1682), I.16.

  [115. ]Hoffman, Umbra in Luce sive Consensus et Dissensus Religionum Profanorum (1680), p. 88; Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage (1619), pt. I, bk. IV, ch. 19, sect. 2; bk. 5, ch. 15, sect. 7.

  [116. ]Maimonides, De Idolatria, ed. Vossius, II.37, VII.2.

  [117. ]Maimonides, Moreh Nevuchim, pt. 3, ch. 29.

  [118. ]Philo, De Nobilitate, p. 622.

  [119. ]St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, I.9.

  [120. ]Maxwell’s textual comments suggest that this is a quotation from Virgil, but in fact the passage comes from Maurus Servius Honoratus’s commentary on the Aeneid, In Vergili Carmina Comentarii, IV.638.

  [121. ]Seneca, De Beneficiis, IV.7.

  [122. ]Life of Zeno in Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VII.

  [123. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.

  [124. ]St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VII.6; Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.

  [125. ]Plutarch, De Communibus Notitiis Adversus Stoicos (in Moralia).

  [126. ]Maimonides, De Idolatria, ed. Vossius, VII.7.

  [127. ]Cicero, In Somnium Scipionis, II.12.

  [128. ]Phurnutus, De Natura Deorum, p. 4.

  [129. ]Aristotle, De Mundo, ch. 6.

  [130. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, III.

  [131. ]Ibid.

  [132. ]Cicero, De Legibus, III.

  [133. ]Epictetus, Discourses, II.14.

  [134. ]Cicero, De Finibus, IV.

  [135. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VIII.19.

  [136. ]Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum (in Moralia), I.3.

  [137. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV.27, VI.10.

  [138. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.

  [139. ]Ibid.

  [140. ]Seneca, De Providentia, ch. 1; Quaestiones Naturales, II.29.

  [141. ]Manilius, Astronomica, I.

  [142. ]Diogenes Laertius, “Zeno”; Seneca, De Providentia, ch. 5; De Vita Beata, ch. 15.

  [143. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, XII.1.

  [144. ]Ibid., X.5.

  [145. ]Maimonides, De Idolatria, ed. Vossius, II.40.

  [146. ]Lipsius, Physiologia Stoicorum, bk. I, diss. 14.

  [147. ]Ibid., diss. 12.

  [148. ]Ibid., diss. 14.

  [149. ]Epictetus, Discourses, IV.4.

  [150. ]Ibid., III.25.

  [151. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VI.44.

  [152. ]Ibid., XII.14.

  [153. ]Phurnutus, De Natura Deorum, p. 17.

  [154. ]Epictetus, Discourses, IV.7.

  [155. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, V.8.

  [156. ]Epictetus, Discourses, III.26.

  [157. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VI.42.

  [158. ]Ibid., XII.12.

  [159. ]Epictetus, Discourses, ch. 24, pp. 328, 330, 331.

  [160. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV.10, VII.31, X.25.

  [161. ]Epictetus, Discourses, III.17.

  [162. ]Seneca, De Providentia, III.

  [163. ]Jackson, A Defence of Human Liberty (1725), pp. 150–85. Maxwell inserts this lengthy extract of Jackson’s work (ending on p. 161) and his footnotes (some of them mistranscribed) at this point.

  [164. ]Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum (in Moralia), p. 884.

  [165. ]Eusebius, De Praeparatio Evangelica, VI.7.

  [166. ]Cicero, De Fato, p. 359.

  [167. ]Hierocles, De Providentia & Fato (1673), p. 42.

  [168. ]Ibid., p. 46.

  [169. ]Photius, Bibliotheca, p. 552.

  [170. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.1.

  [171. ]Ibid., III.5.

  [172. ]Ibid., III.7.

  [173. ]Cicero, De Fato, pp. 346, 349.

  [174. ]Ibid., p. 352.

  [175. ]Plotinus, Enneads, III.1.2. Maxwell’s text mistranscribes Jackson’s note as I.3.

  [176. ]Ibid.

  [177. ]Ibid.

  [178. ]Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis (in Moralia), p. 1050.

  [179. ]Plotinus, Enneads, III.1.4.

  [180. ]Cicero, De Fato, p. 359.

  [181. ]Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum (in Moralia), pp. 884, 885.

  [182. ]St. Augustine, The City of God, V.10.

  [183. ]Chalcidius, In Platonis Timaeum, 7, p. 237.

  [184. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VII, p. 370.

  [185. ]Ibid., p. 476.

  [186. ]Cicero, De Fato, pp. 360, 361.

  [187. ]Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, VI [actually VII.2], p. 367.

  [188. ]Ibid., p. 366.

  [189. ]Cicero, De Fato, p. 359.

  [190. ]Ibid., pp. 352–53.

  [191. ]Ibid., p. 357.

  [192. ]Ibid., p. 363.

  [193. ]Ibid.

  [194. ]Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis (in Moralia), p. 1056.

  [195. ]Cicero, De Fato, pp. 354, 355.

  [196. ]Ibid., p. 345.

  [197. ]Ibid., pp. 80, 83.

  [198. ]Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, VI, p. 252.

  [199. ]Origen in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, p. 290, and Commentary in Genesis, p. 11.

  [200. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.5.

  [201. ]Eusebius, Praeparatio Evengelica, VI, pp. 271, 272; Aphrodisius, De Fato.

  [202. ]Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum (in Moralia), p. 885.

  [203. ]Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, VI, pp. 365, 366.

  [204. ]Eusebius, Praeparatio Evengelica, VI.8.

  [205. ]Ibid.

  [206. ]Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, p. 4.

  [207. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.

  [208. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VII, pp. 459, 460.

  [209. ]Seneca, De Beneficiis, IV.7.

  [210. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, V.8, X.5.

  [211. ]Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum (in Moralia), pp. 884, 885.

  [212. ]Tacitus, Annales, VI.

  [213. ]Albinus [not Alcinous, as Jackson states], De Doctrina Platonis, ch. 6.

  [214. ]Hierocles, De Providentia et Fato, p. 42.

  [215. ]Ibid., pp. 26, 27.

  [216. ]Ibid., pp. 31, 32.

  [217. ]Chalcidius, In Platonis Timaeum, p. 271.

  [218. ]Ibid., p. 279.

  [219. ]Ibid., p. 236.

  [220. ]Plutarch, De Fato (in Moralia).

  [221. ]Chalcidius, In Platonis Timaeum, p. 236.

  [222. ]Jackson: “By coelestial Beings, Chalcidius seems to mean Providence, which he speaks of as the second God, and the Soul of the World.”

  [223. ]Chalcidius, In Platonis Timaeum, p. 237.

  [224. ]Plutarch, De Fato (in Moralia).

  [225. ]Chalcidius, In Platonis Timaeum, p. 237.

  [226. ]Plotinus, Enneads, VI, p. 743.

  [227. ]Cicero, Academicae Quaestiones, I.

  [228. ]Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum (in Moralia), p. 885.

  [229. ]Plutarch, De Animi Procreatione (in Moralia), p. 1026.

  [230. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.

  [231. ]Ibid.

  [232. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VII, p. 450.

  [233. ]Aphrodisius, De Fato, p. 107.

  [234. ]Seneca, De Beneficiis, IV.7.

  [235. ]Plotinus, Enneads, III.1.

  [236. ]Tertullian, Apologeticus, ch. 25.

  [237. ]Chalcidius, In Platonis Timaeum, p. 239.

  [238. ]Plato, Georgias.

  [239. ]Seneca, De Providentia, ch. 5.

  [240. ]Lucan, Pharsalia, II.

  [241. ]Seneca, Naturales Quaestiones, Preface.

  [242. ]Cicero, De Divinatione, II, p. 275.

  [243. ]Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, p. 5.

  [244. ]Chalcidius, In Platonis Timaeum, p. 239.

  [245. ]Ibid., p. 240.

  [246. ]Ibid., pp. 242, 243.

  [247. ]Ibid., pp. 279, 280.

  [248. ]Ammonius Hermias, Commentaria in Aristotelem, p. 215.

  [249. ]Jackson, A Defence of Human Liberty, pp. 150–85.

  [250. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.

  [251. ]Hobbes, Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Secunda De Homine (1658) [hereafter De Homine], ch. 1.

  [252. ]Vossius, Historiae de Controversiis quas Pelagius (1618), bk. III, pt. 3, thes. 6.

  [253. ]Cicero, Academicae Quaestiones, IV.

  [254. ]Matthew 13.13, 15.14, 23.19; Isaiah 43.8; Revelations 3.17.

  [255. ]Philo, Opuscula Tria, p. 163.

  [256. ]Plutarch, Symposium, IV.5.

  [257. ]Colossians 2.18; Romans 8.5; Ephesians 2.3.

  [258. ]Virgil, Aeneid, VI.272: “black night has stolen from the world her hues.”

  [259. ]I Peter 1.14; II Peter 1.4; Ephesians 5.5, 6; I Thessalonians 4.5.

  [260. ]Grotius, Annotationes in Novum Testamentum on Luke 2.2; Casaubon, Persii Flacci Satirarum (1605), V, p. 439.

  [261. ]Buxtorf, Lexicon Talmidicum et Rabbinicum (1639), col. 2303; Hammond, A Paraphrase and Annotations upon the Books of the Psalm (1659), note B; Spencer, Origenis contra Celsum (1658), p. 88.

  [262. ]Ezekiel 23.2, 20.7, 8; Exodus 32.31; Acts 7.43; Psalms 106.68; Leviticus 17.7.

  [263. ]Judges 2.11–19, 3.7; Ezekiel 16.3.

  [264. ]Plutarch, De Pythiae Oraculis, p. 402; De Superstitione, p. 166; Adversus Colotem, p. 1123 (all in Moralia).

  [265. ]Proclus, In Platonis Theologiam, V.36.

  [266. ]Vossius, De Idolatria, V.46.

  [267. ]Plutarch, De Superstitione (in Moralia), p. 171.

  [268. ]Pliny, Natural History, II.7.

  [269. ]St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, V.19.

  [270. ]Hierocles, In Aureum Pythagoreorum Carmen Commentarius, p. 126.

  [271. ]Simplicius, Commentarius in Epicteti Enchiridion, p. 141.

  [272. ]Epictetus, Discourses, II.

  [273. ]Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 190, col. 485.

  [274. ]Plutarch, Adversus Colotem (in Moralia), p. 1108.

  [275. ]Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, II.

  [276. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.

  [277. ]Origen, Contra Celsum, VIII, p. 392.

  [278. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, XIV.

  [279. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX.8.

  [280. ]Aristides, in Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 246, col. 1282.

  [281. ]Ibid., col. 1292.

  [282. ]Stobaeus, Anthologium, pp. 185, 187.

  [283. ]Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, II.

  [284. ]Hierocles, In Aureum Pythagoreorum Carmen Commentarius.

  [285. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, II.17.

  [286. ]Sharrock, De Officiis Secundum Naturae Jus (1660), p. 12.

  [287. ]Ibid., p. 22.

  [288. ]Ibid., chs. 3–8.

  [289. ]Ibid., p. 92.

  [290. ]Epictetus, Discourses, I.14.

  [291. ]Stobaeus, Anthologium, p. 181.

  [292. ]Ibid.

  [293. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, III.13; Gataker, Markou Antoninou, note, p. 360.

  [294. ]Epictetus, Discourses, XII.1, 9.

  [295. ]Ibid., I.14.

  [296. ]Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, II.10.

  [297. ]Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, VII.

  [298. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IX.1.

  [299. ]Cicero, De Officiis, III; De Finibus, III.

  [300. ]Gataker in Markou Antoninou, p. 410.

  [301. ]Spartian, Caracella.

  [302. ]Hoffman, Umbra in Luce, p. 134.

  [303. ]Sanderson, Sermon Ad Populum, on Genesis 20.6 in XXXIV Sermons (1671), pp. 157–86.

  [304. ]Epictetus, Enchiridion, ch. 75.

  [305. ]Grotius, Annotationes in Novum Testamentum, note on Matthew 8.22.

  [306. ]Ibid.

  [307. ]Truman, A Discourse of Natural and Moral Impotency (1675), p. 113.

  [308. ]Willis, Pathologiae Cerebri et Nervosi Generis Specimen (1667), ch. 2.

  [309. ]Matthew 3.7, 12.38, 23.33; John 8.44; I John 3.8, 10.

  [310. ]Leviticus, 17.7; Deuteronomy 32.17; Psalms 136.37; I Corinthians 10.20.

  [311. ]Mede, Clavis Apocalyptica ex Innatis et Institis Visionem (1627), to ch. 6.11.

  [312. ]Grotius, De Veritate Religionis Christianae, IV.3; Windet, De Vita Functorum Statu, sect. 3.

  [313. ]Porphyry, De Abstinentia, II.42, 43.

  [314. ]Plutarch, De Defectu Oraculorum (in Moralia), p. 417.

  [315. ]Ibid.

  [316. ][Maxwell] “It seems no improbable Conjecture, that Melchizedek was Shem, who was Contemporary with Abraham for 151 Years, and liv’d 66 Years after the Congress of Melchizedek with Abraham, according to Ussher’s Chronology. Now it is highly probable, that Shem persever’d in the true Religion, having had so great Opportunities of knowing the State of the World and Mankind from the Beginning, and the two most exemplary Punishments that ever had been inflicted by God on Man for Sin, in the Fall of Man and in the Flood; for Methusalem, who was born 243 Years before the Death of Adam, did not die ’till Shem was 98 Years old; and he himself was a Witness of the Flood. Accordingly we find his Piety particularly taken notice of, and that he was the most highly favour’d by God among the Sons of Noah. It is also highly probable, that he liv’d as a Prince among such of his Posterity as were willing to persevere in the Worship of the true God; which seems perfectly to tally with the Account we have of Melchizedek, who was King of Salem, and Priest of the most high God; and it is reasonable to believe, that his Subjects profess’d the same Religion with himself, and, consequently, that the true Religion was the legal Establishment in Salem. The greatest Difficulty that seems to offer in supposing Shem to be Melchizedek, is, his settling in the midst of Canaan’s Posterity. As for the Difference of the Names, it is easily accounted for, the H. Ghost seeming designedly to have conceal’d his Parents, Birth and Death, that he might be the more remarkable Type of the Messiah. See Heb. 7. 3.”

  [317. ]Cicero, De Amicitia.

  [318. ]Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III.

  [319. ]Lactantius, Divinarum Institutionum, III.

  [320. ]Aristotle, Metaphysics, II.1.

  [321. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.

  [322. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, CII.

  [323. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, III.

  [1. ]Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625); Grotius, De Principis Juris Naturalis Enchiridion (1667); Sharrock, De Officiis Secundum Naturae Jus (1660).

  [2. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali et Gentium (1640).

  [3. ]Acosta, Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias (1591).

  [4. ]Hobbes, Elementa Philosophica De Cive (1647); references are to On the Citizen (1998), 2.1, pp. 32–33; Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.6, pp. 75–85.

  [5. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.15, p. 161.

  [6. ]Ibid., 3.33, pp. 56–57; Hobbes, Leviathan with Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668 (1994), ch. 15, p. 100.

  [7. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.7–9, pp. 86–108.

  [8. ][Maxwell] “In the book before-mention’d.”

  [9. ]“by him”: Cumberland’s Latin indicates that he meant “by them” (meaning the Jews rather than Selden); Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, Prolegomena, a3r.

  [10. ][Maxwell] “The internal Sanction of the Laws of Nature, consists of those Rewards and Punishments, which are necessarily connected, according to the common course of Nature, at the Appointment of the first Cause, with the Observance or Non-observance of those Laws.”

  [11. ]Bacon, Of the Advancement and Proficience of Learning (1640), VIII.3, p. 424.

  [12. ]An allusion to Juvenal, Satires, XIII.193.

  [13. ]Cumberland’s rejection of innate ideas can be compared with similar positions in Pufendorf and Locke: cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, II.3.13; Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), I.

  [14. ]“from his Effects”: a possible mistranscription in the Latin suggests that Cumberland meant “by their effects” [the perfections].

  [15. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 12, p. 64. Maxwell tends to quote from the English Leviathan, but Cumberland generally refers to the Latin edition of 1668, which is occasionally different. Where Maxwell’s quotation has, “As even the Heathen Philosophers confess’d,” the Latin edition quoted by Cumberland has,“with the sounder of the ancient philosophers,” apparently an approving reference by Hobbes to Aristotle. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, Prolegomena, a4v.

  [16. ]“species sensibiles”: Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, Prolegomena, a4v.

  [17. ]Cicero, De Legibus, I.vii.23.

  [18. ]“θεομαχία,” Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, Prolegomena, b1v.

  [19. ][Maxwell] “If the Deity be good, he must desire the Happiness of his Creatures; this cannot be among Rationals without kind Affections: Kind Affections cannot be supposed toward indifferent Agents, where there are none towards Benefactors, and chiefly the Deity. Therefore, if the Deity love his Creatures, he must desire that they should love him; since, without loving him, they cannot be happy.”

  [20. ]Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, Prolegomena, n.p.: “That is what was required by the purpose and intention of my work. For the terms, of which the general proposition encompassing all natural laws is composed are ideas which represent the natural efficiency of human actions necessarily required, according to the present system of things, to procure the good, both public and individual, which man lacks. And the words are necessary here only as familiar signs, whose purpose is to recall to mind those ideas, which might be recalled even if we made no use of such signs. For the nature of things, and of human actions, is sufficient to produce, to imprint, to perpetuate, and to recall to mind, these sorts of ideas, even if one were deaf and mute, and consequently not in a state to recognise the usage of such signs, in which the word consists.”

  [21. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 8.1, p. 102.

  [22. ]Cicero, Oratio In C. Verrem, IV.66; Justinian, Digest, XLVIII.19.41.

  [23. ]Justinian, Digest, I.8.8.

  [24. ]Ibid., I.8.9.3.

  [25. ][Maxwell] “See the Notion advanced here by the Author, examin’d in a Note on chap. 5. § 40.”

  [26. ][Maxwell] “His State of Nature, which he makes a State of War.”

  [27. ][Maxwell] “By the great Society, the Author here means the Kingdom of God, or System of Rationals.”

  [28. ]Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, Prolegomena, n.p. Replacement manuscript text (to the end of the paragraph): “But, since the natural causes, as much internal, disposing man to form and maintain this universal society, as external, attracting them to do so, act conjointly: and it is through the united forces of all these causes that society is now established and preserved: I must beg the readers, who will seek the whole cause or complete reason for this effect to consider all the partial causes, which I have detailed, as joined together, and each in its rank; by which he will see, that there results from considering them in such a way, an argument which is sufficient of itself to prove the sanction of the most general law of nature.”

  [29. ]Ibid. Manuscript addition: “Setting aside even the duty imposed by gratitude, this proves the sanction of the most general law of nature, as one may foresee that, from a life constantly modeled on the demands of the public good, there will be more benefit than if one follows the promptings of boundless self-consideration.”

  [30. ]Stoic philosophers believed that virtue was its own reward; by those who look for goods in this life, Cumberland signals the Peripatetic philosophers. Barbeyrac, Traité Philosophique des Loix Naturelles (1744), p. 26, n. 2.

  [31. ][Maxwell] “Actions from Gratitude, cannot be said to flow from Self-love, or desire of private Good to the Agent; since in a grateful Office, the Intention of the Agent, is not to obtain any farther private Advantage. ’Tis this Intention only, of obtaining private Good, which denominates an Action Self-interested. This is not the Case of real Gratitude, however it may be in some pretended Offices of Gratitude—The Mistakes of many Writers upon this Head, arise from the ambiguous Use of these Words, (per, propter, ob,) or of their corresponding English Words, (for, on account of, for the sake of, in consideration of,) a Benefit. They denote either, First, Acting with intention to obtain a Benefit; this is from Self-love: Or, Secondly, When remembrance of a Benefit raises Love in the Receiver toward the Benefactor, and desire to please him, without Intention of farther private Good to the Receiver; this is not from Self-love. We see a like Affection, but perhaps a little weaker, arises from observing Beneficence toward a Third Person. See the true Answer to this whole Difficulty, in a Note, on Chap. 5. § 45.”

  [32. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.6.

  [33. ]Sharrock, De Officiis Secundum Naturae Jus, ch. 10.

  [34. ]Deuteronomy 20.16–17.

  [35. ]Cf. ibid., 9.6.

  [36. ]Cumberland may be thinking about Hobbes’s argument in Leviathan, ch. 33.

  [37. ]Euclid, Elementa Geometriae.

  [38. ]Cumberland was rector of Brampton Ash in North amptonshire from 1657 but in 1670 he also became vicar of All Saints, Stamford, and rector of St. Peter’s church in the same town. Internal evidence suggests that De Legibus was prepared for publication during the later 1660s. Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England, pp. 13, 117.

  [39. ]Cumberland’s qualified use of Cartesian ideas was typical of his latitudinarian contemporaries; see Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England, pp. 152–53.

  [40. ]Cumberland became friends with Hezekiah Burton (1632–81) at Magdalene. Burton, a Fellow of the College, went on to become domestic chaplain to Sir Orlando Bridgeman, and Cumberland probably owed Bridgeman’s patronage to his friend’s connection with the Lord Keeper. Burton saw De Legibus through the press and provided a prefatory Alloquium ad Lectorem (reprinted here in appendix 2). Dr. John Hollings (1635–1712) was also a member of Cumberland’s circle at Magdalene. He eventually became a Fellow of the College and took his M.D. in 1665. He would become a successful physician based in Shrewsbury.

  [1. ]The ancient skeptics to whom Cumberland refers probably included Sextus Empiricus, whose works were revived in the sixteenth century. Modern skeptics included Montaigne (Essays, II.12) and Hobbes. For the history of skepticism in general during this period, see Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (1979); for the relationship between skepticism and natural law ideas, see Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law” (1987), pp. 99–122.

  [2. ][Maxwell] “Which is as far as is necessary to discover his Obligation to obey the Laws of Nature, as will appear in the Sequel of this Treatise.”

  [3. ]The Royal Society was founded in 1660, with Charles II as patron. Cumberland was not a member of the society, which was not unusual for provincial virtuosi. Scientific references in De Legibus Naturae show that Cumberland kept up with the society’s activities through its journal, Philosophical Transactions. For the history of the Royal Society and its fellows during this period, see Hunter, Science and Society in Restoration England (1981) and Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society (1989).

  [4. ]Maxwell refers the reader to his note on section VIII. The last line of Cumberland’s formula adapts the Roman law maxim “salus populi suprema lex.”

  [5. ]Cicero, De Legibus, I.vii.22–23.

  [6. ]The distinction can be found in Epictetus, Discourses, I.1.

  [7. ]The fascination with the possibility of a moral science was common to ethical theorists of the period. See, for example, Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis (1660), 1.3; 11.16; More, Divine Dialogues (1668), p. 6; Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4.3.18.

  [8. ][Maxwell] “The Author here means by Benevolence, ‘A Desire of Good, both Private and Publick.’ In this Sense of the Word his general Proposition, § 4. amounts to no more than this; ‘If all Mankind use all Means in their Power to procure the greatest Happiness to Mankind, Mankind would enjoy the greatest Happiness in their Power,’ which Proposition is indeed self-evident; but wants another Argument to make it conclusive, which Argument I shall have occasion to mention in a following Note. For it is no good Consequence to say, ‘Such a Method of acting in any Individual contributes most to the Sum of the Happiness of Mankind upon the Whole; therefore it contributes most to the Happiness of that Individual.’ Much less, is it a Consequence to say, ‘Such a Method of acting in any Individual contributes most to the Sum of the Happiness of Mankind upon the whole; therefore such a Method of acting would contribute most to the Happiness of any single Person, whether the rest concurr’d or no.’
  
  “By Benevolence, he sometimes seems to mean, ‘The Instinct, or those Actions only, which proceed from the Love of others:’ But, I think, the Word in his general Law, is not to be understood in this Sense; for, ‘Were the Instinct or Passion of Benevolence much greater than it usually is, I believe Mankind would not be so happy as they now are, because private Advantage would not be sufficiently regarded, Sloth would be incourag’d, and industry discourag’d.’ Nay, even as present, we have some Examples of the bad Consequences of an excessive Benevolence, especially in the weaker Sex. Neither can it be said, ‘That the bad Consequences would be prevented, were our Understandings enlarg’d in proportion to our Benevolence; for the curbing a violent Instinct, is always very painful and disagreeable.’ Upon the Whole, I conclude, ‘That the Author of Nature, who hath done every Thing most for our Advantage, has given us a Measure of Benevolence most exactly suited to our Understandings and Manner of Dependence on one another.’ But yet we are from Habit more commonly defective in Benevolence, than Understanding; and the strongest Endeavour, in a Man of tolerable Strength of Understanding, to improve his Benevolence, will not be able to render it excessive. If he here used Benevolence in this Sense, he might, with as much reason, have said, ‘That the greatest intellectual Capacity, or Understanding, in every Person, in things that are for his private Advantage, forms the happiest State; and therefore, private Good is the supreme Law’: For in all Cases, what is most for private, is most for publick, Advantage, and vice versa.
  
  “But here I would have it observ’d, ‘That I don’t make this Remark with a Design to overthrow our Author’s Scheme, but to render it more intelligible, and to guard the Reader from some Mistakes, which the Confusion of his Method, and some seeming Inconsistencies might lead him into.’ In the following Notes also, where I seem to disagree with our Author, my Design is, ‘Partly, to explain him, and partly, to make some small Additions, which, I think, contribute somewhat to the rendring of his Scheme more complete.’”

  [9. ]See also ch. 5, sects. 18, 43, and 58.

  [10. ]For Descartes’ discussion of mathesis universalis in the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii (1628), see Cottingham, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (1985), vol. I, p. 19.

  [11. ]Cumberland is referring to Christopher Wren’s geometrically designed lens-grinding machine described in Philosophical Transactions 48 (1669), p. 961.

  [12. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 46, p. 459.

  [13. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.19, pp. 163–64.

  [14. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 34, pp. 261–62.

  [15. ]Hobbes, Elementorum Philosophiae sectio prima De Corpore (1655), p. 394.

  [16. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 15.14, pp. 178–79.

  [17. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, Appendix, ch. 3, p. 540; ibid., appendix, ch. 1, p. 519.

  [18. ][Maxwell] “That is, the Authority of the Legislature, which establish’d the 39 Articles, and which he makes to be the only Standard of Good and Evil.”

  [19. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 15.14, p. 178.

  [20. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 34, p. 261.

  [21. ]Hobbes, De Corpore, 26.1, p. 236.

  [22. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 12, p. 64.

  [23. ]Ibid., ch. 26, p. 174. Maxwell notes section 7, whereas the reference should be to section 4.

  [24. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.33, p. 56; see also Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 100.

  [25. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.33, pp. 56–57.

  [26. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 26, pp. 186–87.

  [27. ]Ibid.

  [28. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 4.1, pp. 58–59.

  [29. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 12, p. 65.

  [30. ]Cumberland acknowledges that his readers might not share his preference for Cartesian natural philosophy.

  [31. ]Aratus, Phaenomena, 5; cited by St. Paul in Acts 17.28.

  [32. ][Maxwell] “As common Benevolence of all towards all, is of use to Mankind, consider’d as one Body, so the several Species of Benevolence, are of use to their respective particular Societies, wherein they are found. In as much as the Members of those inferior Societies are also in divers manners dependent of one another; and as there is a more strict and necessary Dependence of the Members of those inferiour Societies upon one another, than upon the Members of the universal Body: So the Species of Benevolence, that are distributed among those lesser Societies, do each of them exceed the common Benevolence; and the Author of Nature has most exactly proportion’d the Measure of the Benevolence of each Society to the Degree of the Dependence of its Members upon one another. Thus the most necessary and absolute Dependence of one Person upon another that is any where to be found among Men, is that of an Infant upon its Parent; and here hath Nature provided the strongest Benevolence, which is not only absolutely necessary for the Preservation of the helpless Infant, but is productive of a grateful Return of like care and support in the old Age and Imbecillity of the Parent. In like manner there are several other things, which naturally add to common Benevolence, the chief of which are, Benefits receiv’d, a Similitude of Pursuits among Youth, and of the settled Methods of Life in middle Age, Acquaintance, Union of Interests, Neighbourhood, & c. All which, if strictly examin’d both in themselves and in their various Degrees, and applied to the several Relations among Mankind; it will be found, ‘That they naturally produce the greatest Benevolence, where it is the most useful; that is, where there is the strictest Dependence, and where the Parties have the most frequent Occasions of mutual Assistance.’
  
  “Nothing, but the most sottish Stupidity can be insensible of Love and Amazement, upon the most transient Glimpse of those astonishing Instances, both of the Wisdom and Benevolence of that Being, whose Goodness is over all his Works.”

  [33. ]This account is drawn from Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.10–13, pp. 28–30; Leviathan, ch. 13.

  [34. ]Cumberland refers to “transcendental notions,” a scholastic usage effaced by Maxwell. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 24.

  [35. ][Maxwell] “i.e. Arbitrary Signs or Words.”

  [36. ]“Load,” or “cargo.”

  [37. ]In the original work, Cumberland begins section XIX here. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 27.

  [38. ]A comment indicating that Cumberland’s original version contained much more by way of scientific illustration.

  [39. ]Hobbes, De Corpore, 30.15, p. 261.

  [40. ]Hobbes, De Homine (1658), 11.4, p. 62.

  [41. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 6, pp. 28–29.

  [42. ]Ch. 3.

  [43. ]The distinction is drawn from Epictetus, Discourses, I.1.

  [44. ][Maxwell] “This Head being a distinct one from both the precedent and sub-sequent, but not taken notice of as such by the Author, it would seem to be a Paragraph inserted by him, after writing the rest; which has occasion’d the Translator to make a Head more than the Author.”

  [45. ]For example, Epictetus, Discourses, II.4; Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VI.72, II.4; Cicero, De Finibus, III.20; Seneca, De Beneficiis, VII.12.

  [46. ]A paraphrase of the argument from ch. 13 of Leviathan.

  [47. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.7, p. 27.

  [48. ]Aristotle, Politics, II.

  [49. ]Justinian, Digest, 8.2.26; Justinian, Code, 10.34.2.

  [50. ]Cf. Cicero, De Officiis, I.4.

  [51. ]Euclid, Elementa Geometriae, VI, prop. 12.

  [52. ]Cf. Justinian, Digest, 1.1.10.

  [53. ][Maxwell]. “That is, we shall be wanting, both to the publick Happiness, and to our own.”

  [54. ]The original text has “Causis perceptivis boni communis . . .” (p. 39). Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 74, n. 3) plausibly argues that Cumberland intended “praecipuis” rather than “perceptivis”; the amended passage would be: “We should first perform what is agreeable to the principal causes of the common good.”

  [55. ]Maxwell notes that he corrects “Contrariorum seu Corrumpentium” to “Conservantium et Corrumpentium.” Barbeyrac agrees (Traité Philosophique, p. 75, n. 4) although the phrase is left uncorrected in Cumberland’s interleaved edition (p. 41).

  [56. ]Juvenal, Satires, XV.159.

  [57. ]Cumberland’s reference to vortices indicates his familiarity with Descartes, Principia Philosophica (1644).

  [58. ]Galileo Galilei (1564–1642); René Descartes (1596–1640); John Wallis (1616–1703); Christopher Wren (1632–1723); Christiaan Huygens (1629–95).

  [59. ]Cumberland’s discussion is based upon Cartesian conservation theory. He makes similar use of the theory in 2.15. It is worth noting that at the time he was writing, Wren and Huygens’s experiments were revealing evidence of entropic tendencies in ballistic impacts, which undermined the analogy Cumberland sought to draw. See Scott, The Conflict Between Atomism and Conservation Theory 1644–1860 (1970), pp. 6–13. Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 77, n. 2) also notes that by the eighteenth century, plenism had been abandoned by the best philosophers, especially in England.

  [60. ]Chapter 5.

  [61. ]Cf. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, III.1155.

  [62. ]Gassendi, Animadversiones in Decimum Librum Diogenis Laertii (1649), vol. III, p. 1758.

  [63. ][Maxwell notes the Latin] “Homo sum, humani nihil à me alium alienum puto.” The line is from Terence, Heautontimorumenos [the self-tormentor], act 1, scene 1, verse 25.

  [64. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 31, p. 243. Maxwell has simply quoted the English text of Leviathan here, and Barbeyrac follows him (Traité Philosophique, p. 79, n. 5). However, Cumberland’s Latin text (De Legibus Naturae, p. 45) draws attention to an important change between the English and Latin editions of Leviathan. Cumberland quotes Hobbes’s Latin edition from “There is no action of man” to “suffer all the pains annexed to it.” He then notes that in the English edition, Hobbes comments that “these pains are the natural punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more harm than good.” Hobbes not only removed this sentence from the Latin, but he also truncated the paragraph, thereby removing an extensive discussion of natural punishments. Curley’s edition does not note this change; see Hobbes, Leviathan (1668), p. 172.

  [65. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.11–12, p. 29.

  [66. ]Ibid., 3.27, p. 53: “In the face of an inordinate desire for an immediate good, most men are disinclined to observe the laws given above, however well they recognize them.” Cf. 3.31, p. 55: “All men easily recognize that this state [of war] is evil when they are in it; and consequently that peace is good.”

  [67. ]Ibid., 1.10, p. 28.

  [68. ]Ibid., 1.7–10n, pp. 27–29.

  [69. ]Ibid., 1.10n, pp. 28–29.

  [70. ]Ibid., 1.7, p. 27.

  [71. ]Ibid., 1.4, p. 26.

  [72. ]Ibid., 1.7, p. 27.

  [73. ]Cumberland’s property theory favors the first occupant following Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II.2.2; see also Parkin, “Probability, Punishments, and Property: Richard Cumberland’s Sceptical Science of Sovereignty” in Hunter and Saunders, eds., Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty (2002), pp. 76–90.

  [74. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.3, p. 156.

  [75. ]Ibid., 1.7, p. 27. Hobbes’s intention, much clearer in Leviathan, is to distinguish between laws and rights. Cumberland argues that it is impossible to define right without reference to law. The argument revolves around the concepts of subjective and objective right, reflecting Hobbes’s skepticism on the one hand and Cumberland’s optimism about knowledge of an objective order in nature on the other.

  [76. ]Ibid., 1.10, p. 28.

  [77. ]Wolfsbane (Aconitum napellus) was a well-known poison reputed to be derived from the saliva of Cerberus (Pliny, Natural History, XXVII.4). It was also used therapeutically from the eighteenth century onward.

  [78. ]Cf. Cicero, De Legibus, I.xvi. 43–45.

  [79. ]Cumberland includes a small addition in his own manuscript copy: “Thus one may never presume that men might have accorded to any supreme Judge the power to ignore the natural causes of the public good, or to replace them, as it might please them, with others which are not adequate.” Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, p. 51.

  [80. ]Referring to Hobbes’s definition in On the Citizen, 1.7, p. 27.

  [81. ]The numbering here is added by Maxwell.

  [82. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.12, p. 29.

  [83. ]Ibid., 1.8, p. 27.

  [84. ]Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.lxiv; De Finibus, V.xiii.

  [85. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.9; Latin Leviathan, ch. 17, p. 107, n. 2: “The histories of ancient Greece teach the same thing also, that where there were no authorities except the paternal, theft, on land and sea, was a trade not only lawful, but also, provided they abstained from cruelty and from the tools of agriculture, honorable.”

  [86. ]Genesis 1.28–29; Selden, Mare Clausum (1635), I.4 [Maxwell copied Cumberland’s mistaken reference to VIII.4], p. 11–15.

  [87. ]Cumberland refers to Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II. 2.2, and the Ciceronian allusion is to De Finibus, III.xx.67.

  [88. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 15.5, p. 173.

  [89. ]As Barbeyrac notes (Traité Philosophique, 88, n. 4), it is true that the passage states that individuals have a right to all things from power, but Hobbes suggests (On the Citizen, 9.2) that no individual has this power from infancy because they are under the power of the parent. Cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, I.6.9.

  [90. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.9, p. 158.

  [91. ]Ibid., 1.10n, pp. 28–29; Cf. 14.9, p. 158.

  [92. ]Ibid., 14.9, p. 158.

  [93. ]Ibid., 2.1n, pp. 33–34.

  [94. ]Ibid., 3.27, p. 54.

  [95. ]Ibid., 2.3, p. 34.

  [96. ]Ibid., 1.10n, p. 28; cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, I.7.13; I.8.1.

  [97. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.4, p. 45.

  [98. ]Ibid., 2.1, p. 33: “However, all men allow that any act not contrary to right reason is right, and therefore we have to hold that any act in conflict with right reason (i.e. in contradiction with some truth reached by correct reasoning from true principles) is wrong.”

  [99. ]Cumberland may be referring to On the Citizen, 15.3, pp. 172–73.

  [100. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.12, p. 37.

  [101. ]Ibid.

  [102. ]Cumberland refers to the wars of the giants against the gods of Olympus reported in Pseudo-Apollodorus, Bibliotheca, I.6.1, and mentioned in numerous classical sources.

  [103. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 15.2, p. 172: “Nor do we count Atheists, because they do not believe that God exists.” Cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, III.4.4.

  [104. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.12, p. 29.

  [105. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, p. 78 (see also p. 78, n. 9). Maxwell quotes the English text, but Cumberland follows the Latin, which omits “Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.” Cumberland, DeLegibus Naturae, p. 58.

  [106. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, p. 75.

  [107. ]Ibid., p. 76.

  [108. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.31, p. 55.

  [109. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, p. 76.

  [110. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 94, n. 1) detects in Cumberland’s Latin an allusion to one of Publius Syrus’s Sententiae: “Multis minatur, qui uni facit injuriam.” He that injures one, threatens many.

  [111. ]The title refers to the English translation (1650) of The Elements of Law (1640), 9.10.

  [112. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, p. 75.

  [113. ]Ibid., p. 77.

  [114. ]Ibid., p.77, n. 6.

  [115. ]Ibid., p. 78.

  [116. ]Ibid., ch. 14, p. 79.

  [117. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.1, pp. 33–34.

  [118. ]Ibid., 1.7, p. 27.

  [119. ]Ibid., 1.11, p. 29: “But it was of no use to have a common right of this kind. For the effect of this right is almost the same as if there were no right at all. For although one could say of anything, this is mine, still he could not enjoy it because of his neighbour, who claimed the same thing to be his by equal right and with equal force.”

  [120. ]Ibid., 1.10, p. 28.

  [1. ]Hobbes, Humane Nature: or, The Fundamental Elements of Policy (1650), 1.5, p. 3. Cumberland mistakenly attributes Hobbes’s comment to 1.3. Note that this work is the first English version of Hobbes’s Elements of Law (1640).

  [2. ]Cumberland refers to Descartes, Les Passions de l’Ame (1649); Digby, Of the Immortality of Man’s Soul (1644); More, The Immortality of the Soul (1659); and Ward, In Thomae Hobbii Philosophiam Exercitatio Epistolica (1656). [Maxwell] “Dr. Samuel Clarke having, in my opinion, set the Immateriality of the Soul, and its Distinctness from the Body, in the best light, of any Writer I have met with; I have, in the Appendix to this Treatise, given his Reasoning upon that Head in as succinct a manner as was consistent with Perspicuity.”

  [3. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.11, p. 21.

  [4. ]Hobbes, Humane Nature, pp. 35–36.

  [5. ][Maxwell] “Tho Motions, impress’d upon the Organs of Sense, may occasion Sensation, yet no Motion, of any kind, is Sensation: If it were, Matter, which is capable of all kinds of Motion, would be capable of Sensation and Thought. But for a Proof, that Matter is incapable of Thought, I refer the Reader to Dr. Clarke’s Reasoning in the Appendix.”

  [6. ][Maxwell] “A Camera Obscura is a darken’d Chamber, into which the Light is let only by one little Aperture in one Window; in which Aperture or Opening, if one or more Glasses, of proper Figures, be plac’d according to the Rules of Opticks, and the Light passing thro’ them falls upon a Sheet of white Paper, &c. at a proper distance, the Images of those external Objects which could be seen by the Eye thro’ the Aperture, will be very distinctly delineated upon the Paper in their proper Figures and Colours, especially if the Sun shine upon the Objects, whose very Motions also, if they be in motion, will be represented. If the Rays of Light pass in at the Aperture thro’ one Glass only, the external Objects will appear inverted; if thro’ two Glasses of proper Figures, and properly apply’d, the external Objects will appear erect.”

  [7. ]Aristotle, Politics, I.2.

  [8. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.2n, pp. 24–25: “But civil Societies are not mere gatherings; they are Alliances [Foedera], which essentially require good faith and agreement for their making. Infants and the uninstructed are ignorant of their Force, and those who do not know what would be lost by the absence of Society and unaware of their usefulness. Hence the former cannot enter Society because they do not know what it is, and the latter do not care to because they do not know the good it does. It is evident therefore that all men (since all men are born as infants) are born unfit for society; and very many (perhaps the majority) remain so throughout their lives, because of mental illness or lack of training [disciplina]. Yet as infants and adults they do have a human nature. Therefore man is made fit for Society not by nature, but by training.” The quotation here is a translation of the passage quoted in Maxwell’s footnote in Latin.

  [9. ]Juvenal, Satires, XIV.321.10.

  [10. ]Aristotle, Politics, I.2.

  [11. ]Hobbes, Problemata Physica (1662), ch. 6, pp. 90–93.

  [12. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.1, p. 33.

  [13. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 5, p. 25.

  [14. ]Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, V.x.28–29.

  [15. ]Hobbes, Humane Nature, 7.1–2.

  [16. ]Cumberland is probably referring to Ward’s A Philosophicall Essay Towards an Eviction of the Being and Attributes of God (1652) and his lengthy refutation of Hobbes, In Thomae Hobbii Philosophiam Exercitatio Epistolica (1656).

  [17. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 111, n. 4) suggests that Cumberland alludes to the classical discussion of pleasure in motion and pleasure in rest, referring to Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X.136, and Cicero’s distinction between voluptas in motu and voluptas stabilis in De Finibus II.x.29–32, II.xxiii.75–77.

  [18. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 112, n. 5): “The deliverance from some evil, and a certain peace of mind, or even perhaps some not disagreeable impression, may come to us from without.”

  [19. ]Maxwell correctly translates the original but failed to note that Cumberland corrects the sentence in his errata. The sentence should read: “In addition speech, because it is a help to. . . .”

  [20. ][Maxwell] “That is, such Actions as are productive of natural Good to Men.”

  [21. ]Descartes, La Géométrie (1637), I.2.

  [22. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 5.6, p. 72.

  [23. ]Ibid., 2.1, p. 33.

  [24. ]Ibid., 2.1n.

  [25. ]Ibid.

  [26. ][Maxwell] “Such as Demonstrations concerning imaginary Worlds or Systems would be.”

  [27. ][Maxwell] “Thus, tho there are perhaps no Bodies in the World exact Spheres or Cubes, such as are the Subjects of Mathematical Demonstration, and tho the Curves in which the Planets revolve, are not perfect Ellipses; yet such Spheres, &c. as we meet with, differ so little from those which are exact, that the Difference is of no consequence in human Life, in Surveying, Gauging, Astronomy, &c.”

  [28. ][Maxwell] “If the Terms cannot exist, I do not see, that any thing can be demonstrated concerning them; for example, what can be demonstrated of a Square Circle?”

  [29. ]Horace, Epistles, I.1.97.

  [30. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 15.8, p. 175: “Since the Word of God (God reigning through nature alone) is defined simply as right reason; and since the laws of Kings can only be known from their Word, it is evident that the laws of God reigning through nature alone are the only natural laws.”

  [31. ]Ibid., 1.7, p. 27.

  [32. ]Cumberland provides a manuscript replacement for this sentence: “Hobbes on the other hand is reduced to having to affirm generally that all the maxims of true reason, even on the effects of natural causes, and on the properties of numbers and figures, however varied they might be, are indeed maxims of true reason in a state where the sovereign approves them, but they are not so in another state, where the sovereign, through folly or ignorance, rejects and contradicts them.” Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, p. 88.

  [33. ]Following Cicero, De Legibus, I.7.

  [34. ][Maxwell] “That is, those Causes, which give occasion to Error.”

  [35. ]Justinian, Digest, 1.3.2.

  [36. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 12, p. 64.

  [37. ][Maxwell] “It is observable, that those Nations have the fairest Complexion, who live near the Poles, and that they generally grow darker, as they approach nearer the Equinoctial, so the Swedes, English, French, Spaniards, and the Natives of Barbary, grow gradually of a more dusky Hue, each than the other, which is evidently owing to the greater Heat of Climate. The Natives of Africa, who live between the Tropicks, have receiv’d the deepest Dye, beyond either those of America or Asia in the same Latitude, which is probably owing to one of two Causes, or to both conspiring; either, 1. Certain subterranean Exhalations, whither of the mineral Kind, or others, which may be peculiar to those Parts of Africa: Or, 2. A greater Heat in those Parts of Africa, than what is to be found in Asia and America in the same Latitude. The Inland Parts of Africa are the worst water’d Countries we know; for the Vapours, which, in form of Dew, Rain, &c. moisten the Earth, do, most of them, fall to the Ground, before they can reach them, lying at so great a Distance from the Ocean, whence those Vapours are exhaled. Also the Soil of those Parts of Africa is generally more sandy than the correspondent Parts of the other Quarters, which greatly increases the reflected Heat; to which more of the Heat we feel is owing, than is generally imagin’d, as appears from this, that Snows lie long unmelted on the Tops of high Mountains, under, or very near, the Equinoctial, the direct Heat of the Sun, even there, being often not sufficient to melt them. Therefore the Parts of Asia and America, which lie between the Tropicks, are more temperate than those of Africa in the same Latitude, as not being so sandy, as receiving more Rain, &c. and abounding more with Rivers, with which South-America is mighty well supply’d. Beside, the Line cuts Asia among the Islands, and in such Parts of the Continent, as being near the Sea, are much refreshed with Breezes from thence. It is therefore, for these Reasons, to me highly probable, that the Colour of the Negroes, which is immediately owing to a Mucus between the inner and the outer Skin, is remotely owing to the Climate they inhabit, and that the Whites and Blacks are all come from the same common Stock.”

  [38. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 8.1, p. 102.

  [39. ][Maxwell] “Because right Reason is the same in all rational Agents, as having but one and the same invariable Standard, the Nature of Things, See § 5.”

  [40. ][Maxwell] “That is, such Causes, as concur with others to the producing many Effects of different Kinds; such as Universal Gravitation, the Solar Heat, &c. The Aetherial Fluid, or Materia Subtilis of Des-Cartes, which our Author gives as an instance of this Kind, is rejected as a fictitious Substance, since the introducing the Newtonian Philosophy.”

  [41. ][Maxwell] “The Author is here proving, ‘That in all Struggles between Men, by force merely corporeal, the greatest Force must as certainly prevail, as in a Balance that Scale in which the greatest Weight lies, must certainly preponderate,’ which he proves thus. All such Struggles are according to those Laws of Motion, which take place in the Shock of two Bodies meeting; which Laws of Motion Wren and Huygens have shewn to be truly exhibited by a Balance, whose Beam, in some Cases, is suspended upon one Center, the Center of Gravity; in other Cases, upon two Centers, each of which is at equal distance from the Center of Gravity. That the Reader may the better understand this, I have subjoin’d what Wren and Huygens have said upon this Subject, to which our Author refers.” Maxwell (p. 117n) includes an extract from Wren’s discussion of the laws of collision from the Royal Society journal Philosophical Transactions 43 (1668/69), pp. 867–68 and Huygens’s contribution to Philosophical Transactions 46 (1669) pp. 925–28.

  [42. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, Dedicatory Epistle, sect. 2, p. 4: “But between commonwealths, the wickedness of bad men compels the good too to have recourse, for their own protection, to the virtues of war, which are violence and fraud.”

  [43. ][Maxwell] “This Hypothesis, asserting the Plenitude of the World, or denying any Vacuum therein, is a fundamental Principle of the Cartesian Philosophy, and embrac’d by our Author, in whose time that Philosophy prevail’d much; but has since been disprov’d by Sir Isaac Newton; which, however, does not in the least affect our Author’s Reasoning, which stands equally firm in either Case: For, whenever he makes use of an Hypothesis, it is only in order to illustrate, but not to prove any thing, to which Purpose the contrary Hypothesis would have serv’d as well.”

  [44. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 13.15, pp. 150–51.

  [45. ][Maxwell] “I am of Opinion, that the Author here, in supposing the Pleasure, which Brutes receive from the Society of one another, not very great, means no more, than that it is very small, when compar’d with the Pleasures of Society among Men. For we have good reason to believe, from the Uniformity which we perceive in the Works of Nature, which we are acquainted with, that the Pleasures of Benevolence, as well among Brutes as Men, are the greatest and most refin’d of any which they enjoy. If it be objected, ‘That the Pleasures of Benevolence are probably in different degrees, in proportion to the Usefulness of Society among them, but that Society is much more useful among Men than Brutes;’ it may be answer’d, ‘That to Bees, Ants, and some other Species, Society is as useful, in proportion to their Sources of Pleasure, as to Mankind.’ And in most other Species it is also of great use. I believe, it will appear from a following Note, concerning the Behaviour of Men towards Brutes, that the Inquiry is not altogether unworthy of Regard.”

  [46. ]Cf. Hobbes’s use of the hydrophobia metaphor, Leviathan, ch. 29, p. 215.

  [47. ][Maxwell] “To what the Author has said upon this Head, may be added, ‘That those who live to an healthful old Age, are, for the most part, remarkable, for an easy Chearfulness of Disposition, but that a natural unconstrain’d Chearfulness is always accompanied with Benevolence, is, I believe, sufficiently testify’d by every one’s Experience.’”

  [48. ][Maxwell] “An Aneurism is a Tumour, form’d by the inward Coat of an Artery’s being broke, and the Force of the Blood’s distending the outward Coat.”

  [49. ]Harvey, Exercitatio Anatomica de Circulatione Sanguinis (1649), pp. 89–90.

  [50. ]Harvey, Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium (1651), exert. 69, pp. 305–14.

  [51. ][Maxwell] “The Author seems too complaisant to Hobbes in this Point. ’Tis certain, we often desire the Good of others, without ever considering it as the means of private Good, or having any such selfish Intention, as is evident in the Natural Affections of Parents Toward Their Children, Friendship, Patriotism.”

  [52. ]Hobbes, Elements of Law, 9.10, 15, 16, 17. These sections deal with pity, lust, love, and charity.

  [53. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.2, pp. 21–25.

  [54. ]Ibid., 15.7, pp. 174–75.

  [55. ]Harvey, Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium (1651); Highmore, The History of Generation (1651); Needham, Disquisitio Anatomica de Formata Foetu (1667).

  [56. ]See Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 1.24, 25.

  [57. ][Maxwell] “Goodness of Temper, and Proneness to Society, mutual Aid, and Compassion, tho in a weaker Degree, yet is observable among all Brutes toward their own Species. Where Animals of the same Species are found prone to fighting, they are such as do not continue in their natural State, but are pamper’d and artificially fed by Men. And, this too happens only among some few Species, and will not continue, if they are restor’d to their natural manner of Feeding.”

  [58. ]Juvenal, Satires, XV.131–64. Cumberland quotes only lines 159–64. (Maxwell highlights the original quotation in italics.)

  [59. ]The translation comes from Nahum Tate’s contribution to John Dryden’s The Satires of Decimus Junius Juvenalis (1693), pp. 303–5.

  [60. ]Pliny, Natural History, X.xxxii.63 [Maxwell incorrectly cites X.23]: “Storks nourish their parents’ old age in their turn”; Solinus, Polyhistor, ch. 40: “Storks show extraordinary loyalty; indeed see how much time they spend in bringing up their young, the young supporting them as much in turn.”

  [61. ]Hobbes, De Homine, 10.3; On the Citizen, 1.13.

  [62. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 17, p. 108; On the Citizen, 5.5, p. 71.

  [63. ]Ibid.

  [64. ]Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III.ii.3–4.

  [65. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 100.

  [66. ]Ibid., ch. 15, p. 108. Maxwell quotes the English version. There is a minor difference in the Latin version quoted by Cumberland, for which see Leviathan, p. 108, n. 4.

  [67. ]Hobbes, De Homine, 10.5, p. 60.

  [68. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction, pp. 4–5.

  [69. ]Ibid., ch. 17, p. 108.

  [70. ]Maxwell, as Barbeyrac notes (Traitè Philosophique p. 152, n. 8), in an attempt to make sense of the confused original, makes Cumberland say something odd: Replying to Hobbes’s accusation that conflict is caused by individuals assuming they know better than others how common business is to be transacted, Maxwell’s translation stresses that men will find it easy to live together even with out civil government, whereas the logic of the original passage is to emphasize that even without civil government, there is nothing to suggest that their natural propensions to benevolence and the law of nature would prevent them from transacting common business, notwithstanding anything Hobbes says to the contrary. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 125: “Rationem hanc nihil suggere quò minus hominess pacatè inter se agerent, si nullam esset regimen Civile cui subjicerentur; quo casu propensiones naturals ad benevolentiam universalem, legèsq; naturae omnes locum haberent, his non obstantibus.”

  [71. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 17, p. 108.

  [72. ]Ibid. Cumberland paraphrases Hobbes’s Latin to reveal Hobbes’s concerns about the instability of language. For discussion, see Skinner, “Hobbes on Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality” in Skinner, Visions of Politics (2002), vol. III, pp. 87–141.

  [73. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 17, pp. 108–9.

  [74. ]Ibid., Introduction, p. 4.

  [75. ]Ibid., ch. 17, p. 109.

  [76. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, ch. 2., sections 17–21.

  [77. ]Ibid., sections 23–31.

  [78. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.1, p. 21; 2.1, pp. 32–34.

  [79. ]Bartholin, History of Anatomy (1668), III.3, pp. 133–34; the report of Aristotle refers to De Partibus Animalium, II.7.

  [80. ]Willis, Cerebri Anatome, cui accessit nervorum descripto et usus (1664).

  [81. ]For Hollings, see introduction, n. 38.

  [82. ]Willis, Cerebri Anatome, ch. 26, pp. 184–91.

  [83. ]Walter Charleton (1627–1707); Richard Lower (1631–91).

  [84. ]Glisson, Anatomia Hepatis (1654), ch. 7, pp. 77–90.

  [85. ]William Harvey (1578–1657), discoverer of the circulation of the blood.

  [86. ]Glisson, De Rachitide (1650), pp. 15–16.

  [87. ]Barbeyrac (Traitè Philosophique, 164, n. 3) indicates Cumberland’s likely sources: Ovid, Metamorphoses, I.84; Cicero, De Legibus, I.ix; De Natura Deorum, II.lvi.

  [88. ]Lower, Tractatus de Corde (1669), 2.2, pp. 132–50.

  [89. ]Willis, Cerebri Anatome; Lower, Tractatus de Corde.

  [90. ]Malpighi, De Cerebri Cortice (1666), ch. 4.

  [91. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 3, p. 14.

  [92. ]Ibid. Cumberland may also be thinking of arguments in ch. 5, p. 26; ch. 8, p. 40; ch. 13, p. 74–75; ch. 46, p. 454.

  [93. ][Maxwell] “Plexus Nervosus, is agreat number of minute complicated Branches of the Nerves.”

  [94. ]Maxwell includes the illustration mentioned from Willis, Cerebri Anatome, plate 9, p. 223. Cumberland was not able to include the plate in the 1672 edition of De Legibus.

  • A. The Nerves of the fifth Pair, with its two Branches A. A. the upper of which tending straight forwards, distributes shoots into the Eyes and Face, into the Nose, Palate, and the upper part of the whole Mouth; beside, it reflects two shoots a. a. which are the two roots of the intercostal Nerve: The other lower Branch of the fifth Pair tending downwards, is dispers’d into the lower Jaw and all its Parts.
  • a. a. Two shoots sent down from the upper Branch of the fifth Pair, which meeting together with the other shoot b. reflected from the Nerve of the sixth Pair, constitute the intercostal Trunk D.
  • B. The Nerve of the sixth Pair tending straight forwards into the Muscles of the Eyes, out of whose Trunk a shoot b. which is the third root of the intercostal Nerve, is reflected.
  • b. The third root of the intercostal Nerve.
  • D. The trunk of the intercostal Nerve consisting of the three aforesaid Roots about to pass into the Plexus Ganglioformis.
  • E. The Original of the Par vagum, consisting of many Fibres.
  • G. The principal Branch of the Par vagum, lost in the neighbouring Plexus Ganglioformis.
  • H. The upper Plexus Ganglioformis of the Par vagum, which admits a shoot K. out of another neighbouring Plexus of the intercostal Nerve.
  • i. A shoot sent from the Plexus cervicalis of the intercostal Nerve into the trunk of the Par vagum.
  • K. The lower Plexus of the Par vagum, from which many Nerves proceed for the Heart and its Appendix.
  • l. A shoot sent to the Plexus Cardiacus.
  • m. Nervous Fibres distributed into the Pericardium and the Vessels hanging to the Heart.
  • n. The left recurrent Nerve, which, being reflected from compassing about the descending Trunk of the Aorta upwards to the Cartilago scutiformis, imparts in its ascent many shoots **** to the aspera Arteria, and at length meets with a shoot h, sent from the Plexus Ganglioformis. This returning back from the knot of reflexion, sends some shoots toward the Heart.
  • L. The recurrent Nerve in the right side, which, being reflected much higher, binds about the axillary Artery.
  • O. A branch sent down from the trunk of the Par vagum, in the left side towards the Heart, one shoot of which presently becoming forked, compasses about the trunk of the Pneumonick Vein; the other, attaining the hinder Region of the Heart, is dispersed into many shoots, which cover over its surface: A like Cardiack branch sent out of the trunk of the other side, meets with this.
  • p. The shoot of the aforesaid branch going about the Pneumonick Vein.
  • q. Another branch of the same imparting to the Heart many shoots which cover over its hinder surface, turned back beyond their proper Situation.
  • r. r. r. Small shoots sent out of the trunk of the Par vagum, which are inserted by a long tract to the Gullet.
  • S.S.S. Many shoots cut off, the branchings of which being distributed into the Substance of the Lungs, variously streighten and bind about the Blood-vessels.
  • γ. The middle or Cervical Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, is placed nigh the middle of the Neck, in the trunk of the intercostal Nerve.
  • δ. A branch out of the second vertebral Pair, going into this Plexus, whereby this communicates with the Nervus Diaphragmaticus in its first Root.
  • εε. Two branches from the same Plexus into the Trunk of the Nervus Diaphragmaticus.
  • ζζ. Many nervous Fibres which come from the Plexus Cervicalis into the recurrent Nerve and into the Blood-vessels, and are also inserted into the aspera Arteria and Gullet.
  • θ. A shoot from the same into the trunk of the Par vagum.
  • Χ. Another shoot into the recurrent Nerve.
  • χχ. Two shoots sent down towards the Heart, which another branch D follows, arising a little lower: These being carried downwards between the Aorta and the Pneumonick Artery, meeting with the like branches of the other side, constitute the Plexus Cardiacus D. out of which the chief Nerves proceed which are bestowed on the Heart.
  • Δ. Plexus Cardiacus.
  • μ. The loop or handle going from the same, which binds about the Pneumonick Artery.
  • ν. The lower loop binding the Pneumonick Vein.
  • Ξ. The intercostal Nerve demersed into the cavity of the Thorax, where it binds the axillary Artery.
  • ξξξξ. The four vertebral Nerves sent down into the Plexus Thoracicus, the uppermost of which binds the vertebral Artery.
  • οοο. Three branches sent down from the Plexus Cardiacus, which cover the anterior Region of the Heart, as the Nerves p. q. going from the trunk of the Par vagum, impart branchings to its hinder part.
  • ϖ The vertebral Artery bound about by the vertebral Nerve.
  • ςςς. Nervous shoots covering the anterior Region of the Heart.
  • τττ. Shoots and nervous Fibres distributed to its hinder part.
  • Θ The Plexus Thoracicus, into which, beside the intercostal Nerve, four vertebrals are inserted; the uppermost of these in its descent binds about the vertebral Artery.
  • Τ. The Nervus Diaphragmaticus, a shoot of whose root d. comes to the Plexus Cervicalis, and a little lower two other branches from the same Plexus ee. are reach’d out into its Trunk. This communication is proper to Man.
  • ϕ. The other root of the Diaphragma, from the second and third brachial Nerve.
  • χ. The lower trunk of the Nervus Diaphragmaticus being removed out of its place, which, in its proper Situation, passing through the cavity of the Thorax without any communication, goes straight forward to the Diaphragma, where, being stretched out into three shoots, it is inserted into its muscular part.

  [95. ]Willis, Cerebri Anatome, ch. 26, pp. 184–91. The lessons drawn from this passage were popular among Cumberland’s contemporaries. Samuel Parker uses it to the same effect in Tentamina Physico-Theologica de Deo (1665), pp. 79–98, 100–108, 116–20, 138–39; see also his A Free and Impartiall Censure of the Platonick Philosophy (1666), p. 66. Robert Sharrock also used Willis in De Finibus Virtutis Christianae (1673), pp. 114–15.

  [96. ]Lower, De Corde, ch. 2, p. 90.

  [97. ]Ibid., ch. 2.

  [98. ]Hippocrates, Aphorisms, sect. III.

  [99. ]Niels Stensen, or Steno (1638–86), published detailed descriptions of the lachrymal glands in Observationes Anatomicae (1662).

  [100. ]Maxwell breaks up Cumberland’s original section XXVIII to provide a tidier break between topics. This involves inserting a new section (XXIX) at the beginning of paragraph 3 of p. 151 of the 1672 edition. The effect adds an extra section to the translation and complicates the relationship with the section numbers of the original text until the end of the chapter.

  [101. ]Cicero, De Legibus, I.ix.

  [102. ]The phrase comes from Cicero, De Oratore, III.lix: “vultus est animi imago indices oculi.”

  [103. ]Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.lx.150–52.

  [104. ]Cumberland’s manuscript is corrected to read “introrsum” (inward) rather than “retrorsum” (backward). Maxwell translates the error with its rather odd effect.

  [105. ][Maxwell] “The Line of Direction, is that right Line, which may be conceiv’d drawn from the Center of Gravity, to the Earth’s Center.”

  [106. ]Section XXIX in the 1672 edition.

  [107. ]Section XXX in the 1672 edition.

  [108. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.2n, p. 25: “For even those who arrogantly reject the equal conditions without which society is not possible, still want it.”

  [1. ]A definition drawn from Aristotle, Politics, II.2, and one echoed by many of Cumberland’s latitudinarian contemporaries. See, for example, Wilkins, On the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675), p. 12.

  [2. ]Cumberland’s reference is misleading; the quotation comes from Aristotle, Politics, II.2, 1261b9–10.

  [3. ][Maxwell] “That is, such kind of Beings, as, having neither Reason nor Will, are incapable of Laws.”

  [4. ][Maxwell] “The Author means, That we can as well compute the degrees of Happiness arising from any State or Circumstances of others, or of a whole Species, as we can the degrees of Happiness, from like Circumstances, enjoy’d by our selves.”

  [5. ]Hobbes, De Homine, 11.4, p. 62.

  [6. ]The first section of this quotation (“That Motion . . . displease”) paraphrases Hobbes’s Humane Nature (the English version of the Elements of Law) 7.1, p. 69. The second half (beginning, “And every Man . . .”) quotes 7.3, p. 71.

  [7. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.17, p. 162.

  [8. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 6, pp. 28–29.

  [9. ]Ibid., ch. 30, p. 229.

  [10. ]Ibid. The English text reads: “Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.” In the Latin edition, the last sentence, as Cumberland rightly observes, is dropped, probably because it opens the possibility of a generalized standard of good, which works against the relativism of his other definitions.

  [11. ]Cumberland and Bentley have amended “principiis” to “praecipuis” (particulars).

  [12. ][Maxwell] “Diversity of Manners, in various Nations, and Ages, may be thus accounted for:
  
  “1. From different Opinions of Happiness, and of the most effectual means to obtain it. Thus, in one Country, where there prevails a couragious Disposition, where Liberty is accounted a great Good, and War an inconsiderable Evil, all insurrections in defence of Privileges, will have the appearance of moral Good to our Sense, because of their appearing benevolent; and yet the same Sense of moral Good in Benevolence, shall, in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more abject and timorous, where Civil War appears the greatest natural Evil, and Liberty no great purchase, make the same Actions appear odious. So, in Sparta, where, thro’ contempt of Wealth, the Security of Possessions was not much regarded, but the thing chiefly desir’d, as naturally good to the State, was to abound in a hardy shifting Youth; Theft, if dextrously perform’d, was so little odious, that it receiv’d the countenance of a Law to give it impunity. But in these, and all other Instances of the like nature, the Approbation is founded on Benevolence, because of some real, or apparent, tendency to the publick Good; and Men differ upon these Heads, only from mistaken Computations of the Excess of the natural Good, or evil Consequences of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv’d, is still some Tendency to the greater natural Good of others, apprehended by those who approve it. In the same manner, we may account for strange Cruelties practis’d toward the Aged, or Children, in certain Countries, but under some Appearance of Benevolence; such as to secure them from Insults of Enemies, to avoid the Infirmities of Age, which, perhaps, appear to them greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous Citizens from the Charge of maintaining them. A Love of Pleasure and Ease may, in the immediate Agents, be stronger in some Instances, than Gratitude towards Parents, or natural Affection to Children. But it is still a sufficient Proof of their natural Affection, that such Nations are continued, notwithstanding all the Toil in educating their Young. We know, very well, that an appearance of publick Good was the Ground of Laws, equally barbarous, enacted by Lycurgus and Solon, enjoyning the killing the deform’d, or weak, to prevent a burdensom Crowd of useless Citizens.
  
  “2. The next Ground of Diversity in Sentiments, is the Diversity of Systems, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their Benevolence. It is regular and beautiful, to have stronger Benevolence towards the morally good Parts of Mankind, who are useful to the Whole, than toward the useless or pernicious. Now, if Men receive a low or base Opinion of any Body of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but useless Burdens of the Earth; Benevolence it self will lead them to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason, why, among Nations, who have high Notions of Virtue, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for just; why Romans and Greeks, could approve of making those they call’d Barbarous, Slaves. To this Fountain is owing all Party-zeal, Rage, and Bigotry.
  
  “3. A third Ground of Diversity of Manners is, false Opinions of the divine Will, producing Idolatries, Superstitions, Murders, &c. from a mistaken Sense of Virtue and Duty. See this Passage more at large, in the Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue. Part II.
  
  §4. Ed. 2d.” Maxwell refers to the second edition of Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1726).

  [13. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 15.9, pp. 175–76. This section is only tangentially related to Cumberland’s case, dealing as it does with defining honor as a subjective appreciation of power and goodness. This perhaps explains why it is not quoted.

  [14. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 11, pp. 62–63. Cumberland also refers to ch. 10 of Leviathan, but the issue is not discussed there. Hobbes does discuss fear as the root of religion in ch. 12.

  [15. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.14, p. 161.

  [16. ]Cumberland’s admission of a positive role for an arbiter may reflect the debate over the role of the magistrate in religion, a live issue in the discussion of toleration during the period and one that framed much of the discussion of Hobbes in the later 1660s. See Parkin, Science, Religion, and Politics, ch. 1.

  [17. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.2, p. 23.

  [18. ]Ibid., 3.21, p. 52.

  [19. ]Ibid., 2.8, p. 35.

  [20. ]Ibid., 1.2, p. 23: “For since a society is a voluntary arrangement, what is sought in every society is an Object of will, i.e., something which seems to each one of the members to be Good for himself. Whatever seems Good is pleasant, and affects either the organs (of the body) or the mind. Every pleasure of the mind is either glory (or a good opinion of oneself), or ultimately relates to glory; the others are sensual or lead to something sensual, and can all be comprised under the name of advantages.”

  [21. ]Ibid., preface to the readers, p. 11.

  [22. ]Hobbes, De Homine, 12.1, p. 67: “They [the emotions] are called perturbations because they frequently obstruct right reasoning.”

  [23. ]Aristotle, Politics, VII.2, 1325a7–11. Cumberland quotes in Greek, De Legibus Naturae, p. 169.

  [24. ]Aristotle, Politics, III.7, 1283b40–43.

  [25. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 31, pp. 244 and 244, n. 15.

  [26. ]Hobbes, Humane Nature, 9.15, pp. 105–6.

  [27. ]Hobbes, De Homine, 11.14, p. 66.

  [28. ]Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722), pp. 23–29.

  [1. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 194, n. 1) suggests that Cumberland’s classical source for this discussion is Seneca’s De Ira, II.iv.1–2.

  [2. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 198, n. 1) suggests that this sentence lacks the reference to rational ideas required by the subsequent sentences and suggests that Cumberland’s sentence should have read, “Nulla praeter consensum INTELLECTUS ET voluntatis esse potest causa.” It could be argued that Cumberland presupposes that the consenting will is rational and that Barbeyrac’s correction here is possibly superfluous. Neither Cumberland nor Bentley amended this passage in the corrected copy.

  [3. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique p. 198, n. 1) indicates that Maxwell, in translating injuriam, has translated a printer’s error. The word should be incuriam (negligence), and this does sit more naturally with the rest of the sentence.

  [4. ][Maxwell] “The Author considers these two Points in the following Chapter.”

  [5. ]The original Latin text here is “ad operations conservantium,” which Maxwell has translated as “to these other operations, the Preservation.” Bentley and Barbeyrac felt that the operations under consideration in the passage were linked to preservation and perfection, and sought different solutions to make the parts of the sentence agree. Bentley’s solution is the neatest. He amends the text to “operation is conservantionem.” See Barbeyrac, Traité Philosophique, p. 200, n. 1.

  [6. ]Euclid, Elementa Geometriae; Archimedes, De Sphaera et Cylindro, II; Ramus, Arithmeticae (1555).

  [7. ]Cumberland refers to Descartes, La Géométrie (1637); Vieta, Canon-Mathematicus (1571) and In Artem Analyticum Isagoge (1591); Wallis, Arithmetica Infinitorum (1656) and De sectionibus conicis tratatus (1655); Ward, Astronomia Geometrica (1656).

  [8. ]Huygens, Tractatus de ratiociniis in aleae ludo in van Schooten, Exercitationum Mathematicarum libri quinque (1657), vol. V.

  [1. ]This definition has attracted much critical attention owing to the existence of a variant text in some copies of the first (1672) edition of Cumberland’s work. The first, shorter, version of the definition reads, “Lex Nature est propositio natura rerum ex voluntate primae causae menti satis aperte oblata vel impressa, quae actionem agentis rationalis possibilem communi bono maxime deservientem indicat, & integram singulorum foelicitatem exinde solum obtineri posse.” The second, “corrected,” printed version reads after “impressa”: “actionem indicans Bono Rationalium communi observientem, quam si praestetur praemia, sin negligatur poenae sufficientes ex Natura Rationalium sequunter” (p. 185). This is followed by a section that has no counterpart in the original (in Maxwell’s translation, herein, “The former Part” to “anything to the contrary,” p. 331). Linda Kirk is undoubtedly correct to suggest (Richard Cumberland and Natural Law, p. 79) that Cumberland revised this passage, and the crowding of the longer version on p. 85 of Cumberland’s text suggests that it was a late revision. However, Kirk goes further and argues that the different versions reveal that Cumberland vacillated between a proto-utilitarian formula, by which moral obligation arises from the good consequences of rational actions, and a “conventional,” voluntarist account that stresses rewards and punishments of a divine legislator. Knud Haakonssen (“The character and obligation of natural law according to Richard Cumberland” in Stewart, ed., English Philosophy in the Age of Locke [2001], pp. 35–41) has suggested that a conflict between the two versions is inadmissible on the basis of Cumberland’s own assertions, especially in 5.3 where Cumberland argues that although the initial definition seems to omit the concepts of commanding, forbidding, punishing, and rewarding, “nevertheless I acknowledge that [the law of nature] to have all those powers.” My own work on Cumberland suggests that there was, as Kirk perceived, a tension between a naturalist (utilitarian) and voluntarist account, but that the whole point of De Legibus was to reassert the connection between voluntarism and naturalism, i.e., to demonstrate that natural law could carry all of the formal qualities of law that Hobbes had denied. Cumberland’s revision simply removed a hostage to interpretative fortune (Parkin, Science, Religion, and Politics, p.108n). Max-well offers what Barbeyrac calls “un mélange assez bizarre” (Traité Philosophique, p.209, n. 1) in that he reproduces the first definition entire, ignoring the amended passage after “impressa” and then joins it to the second section of the corrected version beginning “Huius definitionis.” It is possible that Maxwell felt that to reproduce the long version involved some repetition of the discussion of sanctions and opted for a combination that covered all of the ideas discussed in the two variants. Barbeyrac translates the corrected version in the belief that this represented the author’s intentions. Translated from the Latin (following Linda Kirk) this runs as follows: “The law of nature is a proposition presented to or impressed upon the mind clearly enough by the nature of things from the will of the first cause pointing out the action which will promote the good of rational beings and whose consequences, from the nature of rational beings, will be rewards if it is performed and sufficient punishments if it is neglected.” Kirk, Richard Cumberland and Natural Law, 31.

  [2. ][Maxwell] “The following Observations, from Mr. Wollaston, (in his Religion of Nature, sect. II) seem here pertinent.
  
  “Pleasure is a consciousness of something agreeable, Pain of the contrary.
  
  “Obs. 1. Pleasures and Pains are proportionable to the Perceptions and Sense of their Subjects, or the Persons affected with them.
  
  “Obs. 2. Whatever increases the Power of Perceiving, renders the Percipient more susceptive of Pleasure or Pain. Among the principal Means, by which Perceptions and the inward Sense of Things may be heighten’d and increas’d, is Reflexion. All Perceptions are produc’d in time; Time passes by Moments; there can be but one Moment present at once; and therefore all present Perceptions, consider’d without any Relation to what is past or future, may be look’d upon as momentaneous only. In this Kind of Perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any Thing before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in Reflexion there is a repetition of what is past, and an Anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet to come; there is a connexion of past and future, which by this are brought into the Sum, and superadded to the present or momentaneous Perceptions.
  
  “Obs. 3. The Causes of Pleasure and Pain are relative Things: And in order to estimate truly their Effect upon any particular Subject they ought to be drawn into the Degrees of Perception in that Subject. When the Cause is of the same Kind, and acts with an equal Force, if the Perception of one Person be equal to that of another, what they perceive must needs be equal. And so it will be likewise, when the Forces in the producing Causes and the Degrees of Perception in the Sentiments are reciprocal. For (which doth not seem to be considered by the World, and therefore ought the more particularly to be noted) if the Cause of Pleasure or Pain should act but half as much upon A, as it does upon B; yet if the Perceptivity of A be double to that of B, the Sum of their Pleasures or Pains will be equal. In other Cases they will be unequal. As, if the causa dolorifica should act with the same impetus on C with which it acts upon D; yet if C had only two Degrees of Perception, and D had three, the Pain sustain’d by D would be half as much more as that of C; because he would perceive or feel the Acts and Impressions of the Cause more by so much. If it should act with twice the Force upon D which it acts with upon C, then the Pain of C would be to that of D as 2 to 6: i.e. as one Degree of Force multiplied by two Degrees of Perception, to two Degrees multiplied by three of Perception. And so on.
  
  “Obs. 4. Mens respective Happinesses or Pleasures ought to be valued as they are to the Persons themselves, whose they are; or according to the Thoughts and Sense, which they have of them: Not according to the Estimate put upon them by other People, who have no Authority to judge of them, nor can know what they are; many compute by different Rules; have less Sense; be in different Circumstances; or such as Guilt has render’d partial to themselves. If that Prince, who having Plenty and Flocks many, yet ravish’d the poor Man’s single Ewe lamb out of his Bosom, reckon’d the poor Man’s Loss to be not greater, than the Loss of one of his Lambs would have been to him, he must have been very defective in moral Arithmetic, and little understood the Doctrine of Proportion. Every Man’s Happiness is his Happiness, what it is to him; and the Loss of it is answerable to the Degrees of his Perception, to his Manner of taking things, to his Wants and Circumstances.
  
  “Obs. 5. How judicious and wary ought Princes, Lawgivers, Judges, Juries, and even Masters to be! They ought not to consider so much what a stout, resolute, obstinate, harden’d Criminal may bear, as what the weaker Sort, or at least (if that can be known) the Persons immediately concern’d can bear: that is, what any Punishment would be to them. For it is certain, all Criminals are not of the former Kind; and therefore should not be used as if they were. Some are drawn into Crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public Justice, they scarce know how themselves: Some fall into them through Necessity, Strength of Temptation, Despair, Elasticity of Spirits and a sudden Eruption of Passion, Ignorance of Laws, want of good Education, or some natural Infirmity or Propension: And some, who are really innocent, are opprest by the Iniquity or Mistakes of Judges, Witnesses, Juries, or perhaps by the Power and Zeal of a Faction, with which their Sense or their Honesty has not permitted them to join. What a Difference must there be between the Sufferings of a poor Wretch sensible of his Crime, or Misfortune, who would give a World for his Deliverance, if he had it, and those of a sturdy veteran in Rognery; between the Apprehensions, Tears, Faintings of the one, and the Brandy and Oaths of the other; in short, between a tender Nature and a Brickbat!
  
  “Obs. 6. In general, all Persons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other is concern’d. Otherwise they may do they know not what. For no Man can tell, by himself or any other way, how another may be affected.
  
  “Obs. 7. There cannot be an equal Distribution of Rewards and Punishments by any stated human Laws. Because (among other Reasons) the same thing is rarely either the same Gratification, or the same Punishment to different Persons.
  
  “Obs. 8. The Sufferings of Brutes are not like the Sufferings of Men. They perceive by Moments, without Reflexion upon past or future, upon Causes, Circumstances, &c.
  
  “Time and Life without Thinking are next Neighbours to nothing, to No-time, and No-life. And therefore to kill a Brute is to deprive him of a Life, or a Remainder of Time, that is equal to little more than nothing: Tho’ this may perhaps be more applicable to some Animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be taken Care of in this Matter, is, that the Brute may not be killed unnecessarily; when it is killed, that it may have as few Moments of Pain as may be; and that no young be left to languish. So much by the Way here.” Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722), pp. 23–25.

  [3. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.33, p. 56, where Hobbes suggests that laws, properly speaking, are utterances of one who commands. Cf. Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 100.

  [4. ][Maxwell] “Created Beings are the second Causes of necessary Truths, the Creator, the first Cause of them.”

  [5. ][Maxwell] “The Civilians universally acknowledge, ‘That the Division into the Law of Nature, and that of Nations, according to Justinian’s explication, is only the explaining two different senses of the same Word;’ the former, improper and Metaphorical, as Naturalists use the word Law, to denote those uniform Effects, which are observ’d in the Motions of Bodies. The latter is proper. By the Laws of Nature, the Emperor understands only uniform Instincts observ’d in all Animals, by the Law of Nations he denotes, what our Author, with most Moderns and Ancients, calls the Law of Nature. Some later Writers, by the Laws of Nations, understand that Branch of the Law of Nature, which relates to sovereign States or Princes, or those Conventions about certain Privileges of Ambassadours, about Goods taken in open War, and certain Limitations of the Methods of Hostility, to which, perhaps, antecedently to Conventions express or tacit, there would have been no obligation.”

  [6. ]Justinian, Digest, I.1.1.3; Institutes, I.2.

  [7. ]Justinian, Digest, I.1.1.3; Institutes, I.1.

  [8. ]Justinian, Institutes, II.1.1.

  [9. ]Cicero, De Officiis, III.v.23.

  [10. ]Cicero, De Inventione, II.xxii.65.

  [11. ]Justinian, Digest, I.3.7.

  [12. ]This sentence supports the suggestion that the allegedly utilitarian definition in 5.1 is in fact conventional. See n. 1 above.

  [13. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 213, n. 3) suggests a similarity with Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, V.17.

  [14. ][Maxwell] “It can not only be prov’d, ‘That a course of Virtue is most for a Man’s advantage,’ but that perhaps in most common Cases ‘every single virtuous action is most for the advantage of the Agent, be his preceding or following actions what they will.’”

  [15. ]Justinian, Digest, I.3.1: “Lex est commune praeceptum.”

  [16. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 214, n. 6) suggests that this reference comes from Aeneas Gazaeus, a fifth-century Platonist, who quotes Solonin his Theophrastus.

  [17. ]Justinian, Digest, I.1.1.2.

  [18. ]Cumberland is following Descartes’ description of mathesis universalis, for which see n. 10 in ch. 1.

  [19. ]Again, Cumberland demonstrates the compatibility of his work with Stoic sources. For the contemporary authority for these ideas, see Lipsius, Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam (1604), II.20.

  [20. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.4, p. 45.

  [21. ]Ibid., 12.1, pp. 131–32: “For it has been shown that the civil laws are the rules of good and evil . . . and that therefore one must accept what the legislator enjoins as good, and what he forbids as evil. . . . When private men claim for themselves a knowledge of good and evil, they are aspiring to be as Kings. When this happens the commonwealth cannot stand.”

  [22. ]Ibid., 17.12, pp. 214–15.

  [23. ]Ibid.

  [24. ]Ibid., ch. 3.

  [25. ]Herodotus, Historia, VIII.35.

  [26. ]Cumberland quotes the phrase in Greek. Possible sources are Epictetus, Enchiridion, 52, or Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, III.6.

  [27. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 226, n. 1) notes that there should be an ampersand instead of a comma here. Maxwell follows the text.

  [28. ]Justinian, Digest, I.1.1.3.

  [29. ]Justinian, Institutes, III.14.

  [30. ]Justinian, Digest, XLVI.3.95.4.

  [31. ][Maxwell] “This is an instance of the Analytick method.”

  [32. ]Plutarch, De Consolatio ad Uxorem (in Moralia), 611a.

  [33. ]The quotation here echoes Ennius in Cicero, De Officiis, I.xvi.50–51.

  [34. ][Maxwell] “Consider’d as the Foundation of the Relation between Father and Son.”

  [35. ][Maxwell] “Immanent Actions of the Mind, are such as terminate within the Mind itself, such as all Acts of the Understanding; Transient, such as produce Effects without the Mind, such as those acts of the Will, which begin Motion, or produce any Effect without the Mind.”

  [36. ]From Lucian’s dialogue, Timon the Misanthropist.

  [37. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.7, p. 27.

  [38. ]Ibid., 1.10, 12, pp. 28–30.

  [39. ]See Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 1.28.

  [40. ]Ibid., 2.17, 2.19.

  [41. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, LXXI.2–3.

  [42. ]Huygens, Tractatus de ratiociniis in aleae ludo. See ch. 4, n. 7.

  [43. ]Cumberland’s formula recalls Justinian, Digest, 28.7.15.

  [44. ][Maxwell] “Arguing à Priori, from the Cause to the Effect.”

  [45. ][Maxwell] “A Posteriori, from the Cause to the Effect.”

  [46. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X.132.

  [47. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 244, n. 3) suggests Seneca, Epistulae Morales, XCV, as a possible source here.

  [48. ]Cumberland refers to Gassendi’s Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma (1649); the reference to Velleius comes from Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.viii–xx.18–56.

  [49. ][Maxwell] “It ought not to be said, as some say, ‘That God demands Honour of us merely out of Goodness to us.’ For God, consider’d as Imperial over the Universe, is necessarily the Law of true Religion. The Duties of Religion are founded upon his being God, which, supposing our Existence, is to be unto us a sovereign Liege-Lord. These Duties are founded upon the Rights of his Godhead (which are singular, proper, incommunicable, inviolable, unalienable, and essential to his being God,) upon the immutable Nature of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, Gratitude and Justice, and his Interest as well as our Interest. The religious acknowledgment of his Rights is the Interest of his Pleasure, Honour, Service, of his Kingdom and Government, and of his being God. If we make not a religious acknowledgment of them, if we oppose them, this is a doing him the most real and deadly Displeasure and Injury, it is a denying and bereaving him of his Subjects and Service; a fighting against God, a vilifying him, and pouring Indignities upon him, a despoiling him of his Worth and Excellence, and of his Attributes and Perfections, a deposing, dethroning, and undeifying him. Therefore it is God’s Interest, that we should do him Honour. Kings and Parents do not require, that their Subjects and Children should honour them, merely for that Party’s Benefit, but for the Publick Interest. Can it be imagin’d, that merely for our Benefit he forbids us, to vilify and undeify him, and to make him a Lyar? That his Honour and Interest is subordinate and merely subservient to our Advantage. For what is Man to God, or the Creature to the Creator? As his Honour is his Interest, and he is infinitely superiour to us, so his Interest is transcendent to ours; agreeably to the order of the two great Commandments, the first of which requireth our superlative Love for God, the second enjoineth the Love of our Neighbour in due Equality with our-selves. So our Lord’s Prayer allotteth the second place to the Matters of our Benefit in the three last Petitions, Our Bread, the Forgiveness of our Sins, and the leading us not into Temptation: But the three first Petitions are, Thy Name be hallowed, thy Kingdom come, thy Will be done.” Maxwell is keen to reinforce Cumberland’s point that religious worship is not simply a transactional arrangement in return for benefits received.

  [50. ]This passage makes clear Cumberland’s theory of obligation. A common misunderstanding is that Cumberland was proposing that rewards and punishments in themselves were a source of obligation. As Cumberland states, obligation arises from a knowledge of the law and the lawgiver alone. Reward sand punishments can provide a clue to the nature of God’s will, but they do not oblige of themselves.

  [51. ]See ch. 1.27ff.

  [52. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.15, p. 31; 2.3, p. 34; 3.1, pp. 43–44; Leviathan, chs. 14–15.

  [53. ]A paraphrase of the arguments in On the Citizen, 1.10–13.

  [54. ]Ibid.

  [55. ]Cf. Hobbes’s use of the Golden Rule (Matthew 7.12) in On the Citizen 3.26, p. 53, and also Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 99.

  [56. ][Maxwell] “I question, whether this increasing of Punishment, because of the uncertainty, should take place in the State of Nature, or among Independent States, tho’ it is just that it should in any one State. The reason of the Difference is probably this. In the natural Equality of Men, or among sovereign States, the Balance of Power is generally kept so even, that there is no great probability, that the just Side shall prevail, in External Force, against the unjust; and, the severities of the one will provoke the like severities of the other. But, in a well-regulated State, there is still much greater Probability of Justice in the Sentences of the Judges, and of Superior Force to support the Just Cause. The want of these circumstances in the State of Nature, shews the reasons of our preferring the more Human Methods of War, to the more Cruel, which once prevailed.”

  [57. ]Cumberland’s argument here has interesting parallels with Locke’s treatment of the same issue in the Two Treatises on Government, II.19; cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, II.5.17, 18.

  [58. ]Justinian, Institutes, III.14.

  [59. ][Maxwell] “Because every Person, who is truly rational, will assist every other Person, how weak soever, in favouring and promoting his reasonable Desires and Expectations; so far as it comes to their Knowledge, and as they have it in their Power.”

  [60. ][Maxwell] “Such as those Arguments by which it is offered to be prov’d, That a Traveller, ignorant of the Situation of the Country, and without a Guide, coming to a Place, where the Road parts into two, equally fair, and equally probable to be the right, will stand still, and not proceed either Way, which is contrary to all Experience.”

  [61. ]Herodotus, Historia, III.9.

  [62. ]In fact the reference is to Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 27, pp. 204–5.

  [63. ]The experiments referred to were carried out by Robert Hooke in 1659 and are recorded in Robert Boyle’s New Experiments Physico-Mechanical (1660).

  [64. ]This gruesome experiment was performed before the Royal Society in October 1667. It was recorded in Philosophical Transactions, 2 (1667), pp. 539–40.

  [65. ]Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae, p. 253) uses the Greek term here.

  [66. ]Maxwell follows Cumberland’s Latin (De Legibus Naturae, p. 254: “ad communem omnium usum,” p. 254), but Barberyrac (Traité Philosophique, pp. 268–69, n. 2) thinks that the text is corrupt at this point, the sentence referring to the common use of all the parts of the body, and a variant he follows in his text (“l’usage commun de tous les Membres de nôtre Corps”). This does seem to make better sense of Cumberland’s developing analogy of the benefits accruing from respiration.

  [67. ]The “School-term” is causa adequata, De Legibus Naturale, p. 255.

  [68. ]Maxwell cites Cumberland’s Greek quotation in a footnote, “Γένιχα γενιχως,” a formula possibly taken from Aristotle’s treatment of the subject in On Interpretation.

  [69. ][Maxwell] “The intrinsick Force of these Arguments consists in the necessary Connexion, according to the establish’d Course of Nature, between Virtue and Happiness, Vice and Misery.”

  [70. ]Cicero, De Legibus, I.vii.22.

  [71. ]Justinian, Institutes, III.13.

  [72. ]For examples of this position, see Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, V.6, VII.73, IX.42; XI.4; Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VII.94; Epictetus, Discourses, III.7.

  [73. ]In footnotes Maxwell briefly glosses each term to reinforce Cumberland’s argument that such sanctions are not the cause of obligation. The cause is the divine will whose end is the common good of all, not just the good of individuals.

  [74. ][Maxwell] “An Identical Proposition is that, which affirms any thing of it-self, as Happiness is Happiness.”

  [75. ][Maxwell] “See the Answer to this Objection in the 45th and following Sections of this Chapter.”

  [76. ]“And so the wicked Man . . .”: a version of a quotation attributed to Attalus by Seneca in Epistulae Morales, LXXXI.22–23.

  [77. ][Maxwell] “This first or leading Cause, the Motive, is what Logicians call the Procatarctick Cause.”

  [78. ]A paraphrase of the argument in Hobbes, On the Citizen, ch. 5.

  [79. ]Ibid., 1.10, p. 28.

  [80. ]Ibid., 1.12, 13, 15, pp. 29–31; 3.33, pp. 56–57.

  [81. ]Ibid., 5.1, p. 69.

  [82. ]Ibid., 8.1, p. 102, where Hobbes deploys his notorious “mushroom men” metaphor.

  [83. ][Maxwell] “See the second Paragraph of the precedent Section.”

  [84. ][Maxwell] “See the third Paragraph of the precedent Section.”

  [85. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.2, p. 34.

  [86. ]Ibid., 14.3, p. 156.

  [87. ]Both Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae, p. 269) and Maxwell cite De Cive 2.23 here, but this seems to be a misprint; De Cive 2.3 is the passage that actually refers to the continued exercise of natural rights being opposed to the law of nature. Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.3, p. 34.

  [88. ][Maxwell] “In the fiftieth and following Sections of this Chapter.”

  [89. ]In his own copy, Cumberland strikes out the last (abusive) sentence of the section and replaces it with the following: “But such rights, which are improperly so called, however drawn together and united they might be, also improperly, to constitute the civil government, could never result in a right of sovereignty. Yet, in matters of politics, one always supposes that there are sovereign rights, properly so-called: and Hobbes himself has to attribute them, in a proper sense, to all civil states; otherwise he is only spouting empty phrases.” Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, p. 270.

  [90. ][Maxwell] “Tis true, that the Roguish, and consequently, the Inconsiderate, part of Mankind are, generally, IN FACT not deterr’d from the Commission of Villainy, if they think the Probability greater of escaping, than of suffering, Punishment; how great soever the Punishment is, with which they are threaten’d, if they are detected, and brought to Justice. Yet, IN REASON, and to one who balances the Motives for and against any Action deliberated upon, the Motives may be stronger against committing a Crime, than for committing it, tho” the Probability were greater of escaping, than of suffering, the Punishment threatened. For Example; Suppose a Man stealing three Pounds, is threaten’d by the Law with a sevenfold Restitution, that is, with a Fine of Twenty-one Pounds, and that the Chance of his escaping, is to that of his suffering, Punishment, as four to three, or that he has four Chances fore scaping, and three for suffering, Punishment. That Fine of twenty-one Pounds, threaten’d with such a degree of Probability, is equal to nine Pounds certain; and, consequently, the Motive to Steal is but as three, but the Motive not to steal is as nine, that is, is thrice as great as the former; and, consequently, in Reason, sufficient to deter, tho’no regard were had to any other Consideration, than barely to the Punishment threaten’d by the Civil Power.”

  [91. ]See Cumberland’s views on property, 1.22–23; 7.

  [92. ][Maxwell] “See the Proof of this in the 44th § of this Chapter.”

  [93. ]Cf. Introduction, sect. 14, where Cumberland also deploys Cicero’s refutation of the Epicurean position; Cicero, De Finibus, II.x.32. [Maxwell] “There are many Evils, of which we have as positive Ideas, as of the good Things opposite; our Aversion from Evil is as positive an Action, as our pursuit of Good: Pain is no more shunn’d from desire of opposite Pleasure, than Pleasure is desir’d from Aversion from Pain. Both are positive Sensations; nor can we suppose any Negative Ideas. The Word, Incidence, is Negative, and may denote a State, without either Pleasure, or Pain: But Negative Ideas are not Intelligible, much less are they the Objects either of Desire, or Aversion. When we compare any State of Pain, with a State of Freedom from that Pain, the latter does, from the Contrast, become very pleasing and agreeable; whereas, did we consider it barely in it-self, and without any regard to the opposite State, there would be scarce any discernible Pleasure therein; or, at most, none so great, as to raise a desire sufficient to influence an Endeavour after it. Hence it happens, that there is, for the most part, not only an Aversion from the present Evil, but a Desire of the opposite State, which rises in Proportion to the Degree of the Aversion. But, as the Impression of Pain upon the Mind, is generally more deep and lasting than that of Pleasure, the Emotion of Mind excited by the former is proportionably more strong and violent than that occasioned by the latter: Hence, in case of present Pain, the Aversion does often in so great Measure in gross the Attention, that the Desire of the opposite State is scarce discernible. From this Cause, as I take it, proceeds their Opinion, who think that the Aversion from Evil does, of it-self, for the most part, influence the Volition of the Means to avoid the Evil then hated, without any desire of a State of Freedom from that Evil accompanying it. On the contrary, the Mind is sometimes so much taken up about the Means, that its Attention is diverted from the Evil it seeks to avoid: The Volition of every of which Means is immediately preceded by a Desire. Hence it happens, that many think there is no Aversion from Evil at all, distinct from the Desire of Good; and that the only Emotion of Mind, which influences Action, is Desire. Whether Desire always accompanies Aversion; or whether it sometimes does not accompany it, according as we happen to think of a State of Freedom from the present Evil, I will not determine: But that we often think of the Happiness of the opposite State, and consequently desire it, I think is certain.”

  [94. ]For this argument, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X.139.

  [95. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.2, 21–25. It was a common move for Hobbes’s critics to associate him with Epicurus and Epicureanism, and there was some justification for this given Hobbes’s close relationship with the neo-Epicurean philosopher Pierre Gassendi. That said, there were important differences, not least in terms of Hobbes’s more Stoic position on free will and determinism. For the relationship between Hobbes and Epicureanism, see L. Sarasohn, “Motion and Morality: Pierre Gassendi, Thomas Hobbes and the Mechanical World View,” Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (1985), pp. 363–80; Sorell, “Seventeenth-Century Materialism: Gassendi and Hobbes,” in Parkinson, The Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Rationalism (1993), pp. 235–72.

  [96. ]Justinian, Digest, 1.3.25.

  [97. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.12, pp. 29–30.

  [98. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X.117–21.

  [99. ]Ibid., X.139–54.

  [100. ]Ibid., X.22; Cicero, De Finibus, II.xxx.96.

  [101. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X.138.

  [102. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.xliv.123.

  [103. ]Cumberland follows the critique of Epicurean philosophy in Cicero, De Finibus, I.iv.17–21.

  [104. ]Cumberland refers to Gassendi’s works on Epicurus, including the An imadversiones in Decimum Librum Diogenis Laertii, qui est de Vita, Moribus, Plascitisque Epicuri (1649), the Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma (1649), collected with his works in the Syntagma Philosophicum (1658).

  [105. ]The main classical sources for Epicurus’s theories are Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X.40–42; Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, II.216.

  [106. ]Gassendi, Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma, vol. I, p. 672ff.

  [107. ]Cumberland is glossing a passage in Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.xxxvii.94.

  [108. ]Cumberland is referring to the revival of Epicureanism. For the impact of Epicureanism in England, see Mayo, Epicurus in England 1650–1725 (1934);Kroll, The Material World: Literate Culture in the Restoration and Early Eighteenth Century (1991). The phrase “Epicurus’s Herd” comes from Horace, Epistulae, I.iv.15, 16.

  [109. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X.144.

  [110. ]Cicero, De Finibus, I.ix–xxi.

  [111. ]E.g., Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 26.

  [112. ][Maxwell] “It may be objected against our Author’s Scheme, That there are some Actions for the Good of the Publick, which, Revelation tells us, are Duties, which, nevertheless, don’t appear, from the Light of Nature, to be enforced with Rewards and Punishments. Such are the laying down Life for the Good of our Country, or in Case of Persecution, for what we believe a true Religion. To this I answer, That we can scarce conceive it possible for the Constitution of Things to have been so fram’d, as that from the natural Consequences of Action in this Life, a Rational Agent would have had a sufficient Motive to lay down his Life upon any Occasion whatever: Unless the Nature of Things were so contriv’d, as that the Consequences of avoiding that Action would render Life less eligible, than Non-existence; or, at least, so far inferior in Happiness to that future State of Existence, which from the Light of Nature, we have hope of enjoying, so that the Excess of Happiness of the latter, would, upon a rational Deliberation, be sufficient to overbalance the Excess of Certainty of the former. And our Author asserts, and I think with Reason, That Things are so constituted, that it is certain, that what the Nature of Things would admit of for our Happiness, our Creator has given us, namely, such inward Dispositions and Propensities of Mind, as have sometimes produced such noble Actions, as are above-mention’d. But, let natural Reason, amongst the Bulk of Mankind, should not have been sufficient to have perform’d these Heroick Acts of Virtue, and, because Passion, not temper’d by Reason, is always fickle and unsteddy, the Author of our Being, in the overflowing of his Bounty, has given us a supernatural Revelation of his Will, to fill up the Defects of Nature, and compleat our Happiness; which Assistance of Revelation, that it is sufficient, the innumerable Army of Martyrs, of each Sex, is an undeniable Proof.”

  [113. ]Cumberland here echoes St. Paul, I Corinthians 15.19: “If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.”

  [114. ]Cumberland refers us back to the start of the discussion at 5.40.

  [115. ][Maxwell] “This Objection against our Author and some other Moralists, is very unjust; ’tis perhaps true, that ‘No Action can be called Virtuous, so far as the Agent is excited to it by Private Interest, or Self-Love.’ And yet it is plainly impossible for any Moralists to set other Motives to Action before Men, but these from Self-Love. These Motives will not excite Benevolent Affections directly, since no Man can love another, only out of intention to obtain private Good to himself: But Benevolence is really Natural to all Men, and the only Reason why it does not excite them to act for Publick Good, is this, That upon some false Views they imagine their private Interest would be oppos’d by it. Remove these false Views, and Benevolence, when the seeming Obstacle is remov’d, must influence Men: Nay, Self-Love must conspire with it, to excite to the very same Actions. Moralists indeed may do this to raise Benevolent Affections, (which perhaps we cannot call proposing Motives to Action,) viz. represent Objects as morally Good. Such Representation does necessarily raise Benevolent Affections. This our Author has done in his Representation of the Goodness of the Deity, and the Constitution of Human Nature, in opposition to the Odious and Horrible Idea Hobbes has given of both. This our Author’s Scheme, tho’ it raises Mens Attention to their Actions, first from regard to their Private Interest, does not necessarily represent all Virtue, as only the Effects of Self-Love, or intended ultimately for private Good.
  
  “According to our Author’s Scheme, Private and Publick Good never interfere, but are perfectly connected, and the same Actions are productive of both.
  
  “If it be objected, ‘That, by our Author’s Scheme, the Force of moral Obligation consists in Rewards and Punishments:’ I answer, ‘That, consistently enough with our Author’s Scheme, Benevolence does morally oblige, as well as Rewards and Punishments.’ For the only Obligation to Action, which Human Nature admits of, is the Influencing of the Human Will: But Benevolence influences to Volition, as well as the Determination of the Understanding, with regard to the greater Good. It may therefore, with as much Reason, be allow’d me to say, ‘That the Force of moral Obligation consists in our Love of the Deity, and of our Fellow-Citizens,’ as to the Objector, ‘That it consists in the Rewards and Punishments, with which the Laws of Nature are enforc’d.’ The Truth being, ‘That both Benevolence and Self-Love morally oblige;’ sometimes each operating singly, but, for the most part, both jointly concurring in exerting their Power, with regard to the same Action.
  
  “If it be objected, ‘That, according to our Author’s Scheme, the Principle of self-Love is more strong and uniform than that of Benevolence.’ Or, ‘That we have a stronger and more constant Desire of our own Happiness, than of the Happiness of others.’ I answer, ‘That I don’t see, that our Author has advanc’d any thing from which it particularly follows, That we desire our own Advantage more strongly than that of others.’ However, I am of Opinion, that it is so in most People, and that it is not inconsistent with Virtue: Nevertheless, I believe there are some, of so exalted and generous a Disposition, as to entertain as great, nay, a greater, Desire of the general Good of Mankind, than of any private Advantage; and that a Desire of doing things that are pleasing and agreeable to the Will of God, proceeding from a pure disinterested Benevolence, is, in some, more vehement and forceable, than any particular Affection for private Good.”

  [116. ]Cf. Seneca, De Beneficiis, IV.16–17.

  [117. ]Cf. Cicero, De Finibus, V.ix.24.

  [118. ]Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.7.

  [119. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 5.1, p. 69: “Each man’s hope therefore of security and preservation, lies in his using his strength and skill to stay one step ahead of his neighbour either openly or by stratagems.”

  [120. ][Maxwell] “The Benignity of Human Nature is in part only, not wholly, resolvable into Conclusions of Reason. We have kind Affections, wherever there is no opposition of Interest, even before any Reasoning, in the same manner in which we love our-selves, tho’ generally in a weaker degree. Our Benignity, in nearer Ties, sometimes continues, where there is opposition of Interest, as toward Off-spring and Friends, whose Ease and Pleasure we sometimes study more than our own, and without intention of our own. Reason indeed, as our Author excellently explains, does confirm and direct both these Affections.”

  [121. ]Euclid, Elementa Geometriae, VI. Prop. 13.

  [122. ][Maxwell] “When it is objected, ‘That Virtue is intended for the Pleasure of the Agent, and, consequently, that all Ends are subordinate to Private Good;’ it is to be consider’d, ‘That in virtuous Actions the Intention of Agents is the Good of others, or Pleasing the Deity from Gratitude, either without Intention of Private Good, or with this Intention only as concomitant to some kind Affection—. There is a plain difference to be made between the natural Tendency of an Action to make the Agent Happy; and the Design which the Agent had in doing it, or that which he chiefly desir’d to be effected by his Action. Private Good is not in this sense the Design, at least not the sole Design, of virtuous Actions.’”

  [123. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.33 [Maxwell’s translation]: “The Law of Nature is not, properly speaking, a law”; ibid., 3.27[Maxwell’s translation]:“Because most Men are apt, thro’ an unjust Desire of present Advantage, to neglect the Observance of the aforesaid Laws, (namely, of Nature,) tho’ known to them; if perhaps any, more modest than the rest, should practice the equitable and beneficent Dictates of Reason, whilst others practis’d the contrary, their Practice would be most absurd; for they would not thereby procure to themselves Peace, but sure and speedy Destruction, and those who observ’d the Laws of Nature, would become a Prey to those who did not observe them. We must not therefore imagine, That Men are oblig’d by Nature, (that is, by Reason,) to the Practice of all those Laws, among Men who do not likewise exercise them. We are, however, oblig’d to a Disposition to observe them, whensoever the Observing of them shall seem to conduce to their design’d End. We may therefore conclude, ‘That the Law of Nature obliges at all Times, and in all Places, in the internal Court, or that of Conscience, not always in the external Court;’ but only then, when it is consistent with our Security’; ibid., 5.1 [Maxwell’s translation]:“Everyone’s prospect of Security and Self-preservation is owing to this, That he should prevent his Neighbour, by his own Force or Cunning, Openly or by Wiles”; ibid., 5.2 [Maxwell’s translation]: “It is a common Observation, That in War Laws are silent; and it is true, as well of the Law of Nature, as of Civil Laws, if we do not respect the inward Disposition, but the outward Actions.”

  [124. ]Ibid., 14.9, p. 158: “For the natural law did give rise to obligation in the natural state, where, first, nothing was another’s (because nature gave all things to all men), and it was consequently not possible to encroach on what was another’s; where, secondly, all things were in common, for which reason also all sexual unions were licit; where, thirdly, it was a state of war, and hence licit to kill; where, fourthly, the only definitions were those of each man’s own judgement, and that would include the definition of the honours due to parents; finally where there were no public courts and therefore no practice of giving testimony whether true or false.”

  [125. ]Ibid., 5.1, p. 69.

  [126. ]Ibid.

  [127. ]Ibid., 3.2, p. 44: “Therefore either one should keep faith with every one or one should not make agreements, that is, one must either declare war or maintain a firm and faithful peace”; ibid., 3.3, p. 44: “He who is compelled by arguments to deny an assertion he had previously upheld, is said to be reduced to absurdity; in the same way he who, through weakness of will, does or fails to do what he had previously promised by agreement not to do or not to fail to do, does a wrong, and falls into a contradiction no less than someone in the schools who is reduced to absurdity.”

  [128. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 31, p. 243: “Having thus briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God, and his Naturall Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter a short declaration of his Naturall Punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a chayne of Consequences, as no humans Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this Chayn, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more Harme than Good. And here by it comes to passe, that Intemperance, is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise, with Oppression; Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are consequent to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therefore follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.” The Latin edition omits everything from “Diseases” to the end of the passage, replacing it with “&c. & tales sunt quas voco Poenas Naturales.” [“of such kind are called natural punishments”]. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan (1668), p. 172.

  [129. ]Huygens, Tractatus de ratiociniis in aleae ludo, Prop. 9.

  [130. ]Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, p. 75.

  [131. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.1, p. 37: “In the state of nature agreements made by a contract of mutual trust . . . are invalid if a just cause for fear arises on either side.”

  [132. ]Ibid., 1.4, p. 26: “One man practises the equality of nature, and allows others everything which he allows himself; this is the mark of a modest man, one who has a true estimate of his own capacities.”

  [133. ]Ibid., 14.21, p. 166: “The sin which is the crime of treason by natural law is a transgression of natural, not civil, law.”; Ibid., 14.22 (166): “It follows from this that rebels, traitors and others convicted of treason are punished not by civil right, but by natural right, i.e. not as bad citizens, but as enemies of the commonwealth, and not by the right of government or dominion, but by the right of war.”

  [134. ]Cumberland takes up the topic in 9.14.

  [135. ]Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 28, pp. 205–6. Cumberland is right to suggest that Hobbes confuses the argument in the Latin edition by arguing that rebellious subjects are punished. Cf. Leviathan (1668), p. 148. The English edition consistently argues that enemies cannot be punished as such.

  [136. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.21, 22, p. 166.

  [137. ]Ibid., 5.3, p. 70.

  [138. ]Ibid., 1.10n, pp. 28–29: “Each man has a right of self-preservation (by article 7), therefore he also has the right to use every means necessary to that end (by article 8). The necessary means are those that he shall judge to be so himself (by article 9). He therefore has the right to do and to possess everything that he shall judge to be necessary to his self-preservation. In the judgement of the person actually doing it, what is done is rightly done, even if it is a wrong, and so is rightly done. It is therefore true that in the natural state, etc.”

  [139. ]Ibid., 3.27n, p. 54.

  [140. ]Ibid., 13.7, p. 144–45.

  [141. ]Ibid., 10.17, p. 126.

  [142. ]Ibid., 2.11, p. 37.

  [143. ]Ibid., 2.11n. [Maxwell’s translation]: “The Fear cannot be thought just, unless there appear some new Cause of Fear, from some overt Act, or other Signification of his Will, that the other Party does not design to perform his Part. For that Cause, which could not prevent his contracting, ought not to prevent his performance.”

  [144. ]Ibid., 5.1–2, pp. 69–70; ibid., 3.27 [Maxwell copies Cumberland’s mistaken reference in De Legibus Naturae, p. 134], p. 54.

  [145. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 5.1, p. 69; see also Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 5.50 above.

  [146. ]Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X.150, maxim 33, 36.

  [147. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.14, pp. 30–31: “And the victor may rightly compel the vanquished (as a strong and healthy person may compel the sick or an adult an infant) to give a guarantee of future obedience, unless he prefers to die. For since the right of protecting ourselves at our own discretion proceeds from our danger, and the danger arises from equality, it is more rational and gives more assurance of our preservation if we make use of our present advantage to build the security we seek for ourselves by taking a guarantee, than to attempt to recover it later with all the risks of conflict when the enemy has grown in numbers and strength and escaped from our power. And from the other side it is the height of absurdity, when you have him in your power in feeble condition, to make him strong again as well as hostile by letting him go.”

  [148. ]Ibid., 5.5–8, pp. 71–73.

  [149. ]Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II.1.

  [150. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.12, pp. 29–30.

  [151. ]Ibid., Dedicatory Epistle, p. 3, quoting the proverb from Plautus, Asinaria, 2.4.88: “There are two maxims which are surely both true: Man is a God to Man, and Man is a wolf to Man. The former is true of the relations of citizens with each other, the latter of relations between commonwealths. In justice and charity, the virtues of peace, citizens show some likeness to God. But between commonwealths, the wickedness of bad men compels the good too to have recourse, for their own protection, to the virtues of war, which are violence and fraud, i.e. to the predatory nature of beasts.”

  [152. ]Hobbes, De Homine, X.3, p. 59.

  [153. ]Descartes uses the same structural metaphor in Meditations, I.2. The view that blood is made from chyle was derived from Galen and was developed by seventeenth-century anatomists such as Harvey.

  [154. ]For the Aristotelian hypothesis, see Aristotle, De Caelo, II.14; Cumberland refers to Descartes’ theory of vortices from the Principia Philosophiae (1644).

  [155. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 328n) suggests that Cumberland is alluding to Horace’s “Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret” (“Though you drive nature out with a pitchfork, she will still find her way back”), Epistles, I.x.24.

  [156. ]Another reference to Huygen’s Tractatus de ratiociniis in aleae ludo; see also ch. 4, n. 7, and ch. 5, n. 42.

  [157. ]Cassius Dio Cocceianus, Roman History, LV.3.1–6. Cumberland’s reference is incorrect.

  [158. ]Barbeyrac himself (Traité Philosophique, p. 332) suggests looking at his edition of Pufendorf, Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens (1706), III.4, 5; IV.

  [1. ]Cumberland’s original use of Greek at this point (De Legibus Naturae, p. 326), αλλότριον αγαθον, identifies Cumberland’s source as Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.1.17.

  [2. ][Maxwell] “See Note on Chap. 2. §. II” [see ch. 2, n. 2].

  [3. ]Cf. Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 1.21, 22.

  [4. ]Maxwell cites Cumberland’s Latin in a footnote: “Actus Eliciti” and “Actus Imperati.”

  [5. ]Maxwell cites Cumberland’s Latin in a footnote: “Noeticum” and “Dianoeticum.”

  [6. ]Cumberland’s original Greek terminology follows Aristotle’s discussion of the components of prudence in Nicomachean Ethics, VI.10–13; Eudemian Ethics, V.9–12.

  [7. ][Maxwell] “In the Original here is evidently some Word wanting, answering to Fides, and which should be the nominative Case to Dicitur, as Fides is to Appellatur: Which Word wanting appears plainly by the Sense to be Scientia (probably omitted by the Fault of the Transcriber of the Manuscript for the Press) or some other Word signifying SCIENCE, which I have accordingly inserted.” There is no correction in Cumberland’s own copy, and Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 338n) is right to suggest that Maxwell’s addition has damaged the sense of the text. Cumberland’s original simply appears to be drawing a distinction between judgment based upon artificial arguments (intelligence, good sense) and judgment based upon sufficient testimony (belief), without requiring the mention of science at all; Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 329: “In Judicio sngesic, σνγεσις, γιώμη &c. si artificialibus nitatur argumentis, dicitur; at si Judicium idoneo nitatur testimonio, Fides appelatur.”

  [8. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.6–9.

  [9. ]Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 342, n. 3) identifies a fault in the original text, which also escaped Bentley. The original has “& [idem affectus] causas partesque sui affectus juvat.” Barbeyrac suggests that the copyist may have mistranscribed “sui affectus” for “sui objecti.” This gives Barbeyrac’s more plausible rendering: “and because it assists the causes capable of procuring the good that is its object, and the parts of which that good is composed.”

  [10. ][Maxwell] “Indifferent Actions, in this Explication, are indeed one part of the Materials of Human Laws, but not the only Subject of them. For as the Civil Laws order a particular Form for the Prosecution, or Defense of Rights given by the Law of Nature, in that Manner which is most convenient for the Society, and not intirely Indifferent; so they particularly determine the Obligations arising from the Constitution of the Society, which often are not Indifferent: And, in order to the regular Defense, or Prosecution of Rights, or even the Management of our Goods, make some general Limitations of some Points, which in the Whole are most convenient, different from what was determin’d by the Laws of Nature. An Instance will explain this. The Law of Nature requires, ‘That no Contract shall be valid, if one of the Parties, by reason of Child-hood, could not understand what he was doing;’ and also requires ‘That Men of full Understanding should have the Administration of their own Affairs.’ Now ’tis impossible for Courts to make particular Inquiries into the Abilities of every Youth; ’twas therefore necessary to determine a precise Age, which should, in the Whole, be most expedient, by excluding as few Persons of ripe Judgment, and yet including as few of unripe Judgment, as possible. It cannot be called wholly Indifferent, where the Bounds shall be set, whether at the Age of 10 Years, or 30, or 40. ’Tis plain, from universal Experience of civilized Nations, that the former would be too early, and the latter, too late; that, consequently, between 20 and 25 is really most convenient, and not an Arbitrary or Indifferent Decision; excluding few Men of Judgment, and including as few without it, as possible.”

  [1. ][Maxwell] “See Carmichael ’s and Barbeyrack’s Puffendorf upon this Head of the Original of Dominion upon which our Author is very General.” Maxwell refers to Gershom Carmichael’s lectures on Pufendorf, published as Supplements and Observations upon Two Books of Samuel Pufendorf’s On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1724); see also Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, IV.4.

  [2. ]Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II.2.2. no. 1.

  [3. ]Justinian, Institutes, I.1.

  [4. ]For the Ciceronian lineage of these comments, see Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, V.xxiii. 65–66; Tusculan Disputations, I.xxxvi and III.xvi.

  [5. ]Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II.2.

  [6. ]Mort-main: Inalienable ownership, from Old French and medieval Latin for “dead hand.”

  [7. ]Cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, II.1.3, II.3.5–6.

  [8. ]Cumberland adopts the quasi-voluntarist “middle way” between voluntarism and intellectualism detailed in Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (1612), II.2.4, and taken up by several English writers; Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (1651), p. 65; Parker, An Account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion and Goodnesse (1666), pp. 150–51.

  [9. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 15.5, pp. 173–74; Cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, I.6.10.

  [10. ]Cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, III.2.5.

  [11. ]Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, VI.89; Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II.4.8.

  [12. ][Maxwell] “There are certain Affairs, in which ’tis necessary for the Publick Good, that Men should be constituted valid Disposers; such as concerning their Labours and Goods: Concerning the disposition of these there are many general Laws, both of Nature and Revelation, but scarce any special Laws, determining any precise Quantities, or Proportions of either. These General Laws leave all Men valid Disposers, since they leave all precise Determinations to their own Prudence. Now, to know whether we are oblig’d by a Contract, we are only to inquire, whether the Parties were valid Disposers, or not: for Men are often obliged to observe very foolish Contracts, when they are valid Disposers, and by such Contracts others do acquire external Rights. But no Man can be a valid Disposer, so as to oblige himself to any Violation of the Honour of God, or perfect Right of another.”

  [13. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.13–18, pp. 49–51.

  [14. ]Ibid., 3.29, p. 54.

  [15. ]For Hobbes’s views on property, see On the Citizen, 12.7, pp. 136–37; Leviathan, ch. 18, p. 114; ch. 24, pp. 160–63.

  [16. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.27, pp. 53–54.

  [17. ]Ibid., 14.21, p. 166. Here Hobbes argues that treason is an offense against natural law rather than civil law, because civil law presupposes obedience.

  [18. ]Cumberland manuscript addition: “It is from the natural laws, inasmuch as they establish the estate of God, that flows the obligation on men to obey the precepts revealed in the Gospel. Consequently it is on them that the strength of the ecclesiastical power also depends originally, which power is immediately inferred from the precepts and examples that are to be found in the books of the New Testament. It should not be suggested that the primitive basis of this power is the authority of every Civil Government, since we are also obliged to recognise it in all states to which the laws of the Gospels are sufficiently published: but we must relate it to the Natural Laws, or the Right of Men, which, according to Roman jurisconsults, encompass the precepts of natural religion.” Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, p. 355. The Roman law reference can be found in Justinian, Digest, I.1.2.

  [1. ]The language here echoes Cicero’s discussion of true glory from Tusculan Disputations, III.ii.3.

  [2. ]Maxwell cites Cumberland’s Latin in a footnote: “Virtutes homileticae.”

  [3. ]Cumberland’s knowledge of the functions of the liver appears to come from Glisson’s Anatomia Hepatis, cited in ch. 2, n. 83.

  [4. ]Cf. 6.7–8, where Cumberland links this position to the virtuous mean of Aristotelian moral theory.

  [5. ]Cumberland draws upon Aristotle’s discussion of liberality in Nicomachean Ethics, IV.1.

  [6. ]Cumberland’s Latin phrase (De Legibus Naturae, p. 362) is “Sordidae Euclionum parcitati,” a reference to the miser Euclio in Plautus’ Aulularia. Cumberland adds a note in the manuscript mistakenly attributing the character to Terence, but this is corrected by Bentley. See also Barbeyrac, Traité Philosophique, p. 369, n. 2.

  [7. ]Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV.2.

  [8. ]What follows draws upon Aristotle’s account of the social virtues in Nicomachean Ethics, IV.6–9.

  [9. ][Maxwell] “See note at the End of Chap. 7. §. 9” [ch. 7, n. 12].

  [10. ]See ch. 8.2.

  [11. ]In the original text, Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae, p. 369) italicizes the quotation, which is from Horace, Epistulae, I.v.16: “Quid non ebrietas designat?”

  [12. ]Maxwell departs from the Latin (De Legibus Naturae, p. 369), which has “civitatis” rather than “castitatis.” Barbeyrac (Traité Philosophique, p. 376, n. 2) points out that, although the original text is not correct grammatically, it is closer to Cumberland’s meaning. Cumberland is referring to the known laws of the state concerning the single and married condition.

  [13. ]Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV.3.

  [14. ]Maxwell translates “genetico” as “Synthetick,” but it is not clear that Cumberland wanted to contrast analytic with synthetic. The subsequent sentences indicate the suggestion that the mind of man prosecutes the common good both in terms of their construction and their analysis. See Barbeyrac, Traité Philosophique, p. 378, n.1.

  [15. ][Maxwell] “This Supposition of a Division actually made by Adam and Eve, as it is not necessary to our Author’s Scheme, so it is precarious. The Grant of the Use of all Things was not confin’d to them; so that the World was made Negatively Common to Mankind, so that any one might, without Consent of the rest, use what was not occupied, as we now may do with running Water and Air; and not positively Common, like a Theater, or Common of a Town, which cannot be appropriated without Consent of All, nor can be used by any, but the joint-Proprietors, without their Consent.” Barbeyrac comments on this passage, Traité Philosophique, p. 378, n. 3.

  [16. ][Maxwell] “In the Original it runs thus, [Sic ultima tandem Resolutio fit in vires Naturales, &c.] Resolution of what? The Word [mediorum] seems plainly to be wanting after [Resolutio] which, the Sense requiring it, I have accordingly supplied.”

  [17. ]Section XIII of the Latin text begins here. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 374.

  [18. ]Section XIV of the Latin text begins here. Ibid.

  [19. ]Cumberland refers to Leonard Lessius’s Hygiasticon (1613), a popular treatise on preserving strength and achieving longevity.

  [20. ]Section XV of the Latin text begins here. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 376.

  [21. ]Section XVI of the Latin text begins here. Ibid., p. 377.

  [22. ]Section XVII of the Latin text begins here. Ibid., p. 378.

  [1. ][Maxwell] “That is, in the foregoing Commands.”

  [2. ]Descartes, La Géométrie, II.

  [3. ][Maxwell] “The true Foundation of the Power of Husbands over their Wives seems this, That in a Society of two, ’tis necessary there should be in one the casting Voice: The generally greater Ability of Men for management of private Affairs does make it Prudent in any State, if they make a general Regulation, to lodge the casting Voice in the Man, where the Parties make no contrary Agreement. The Gospel has done no more. But in this Case I see not, why the old Axiom may not take place, Provisio Hominis tollit provisionem Legis; as well as in Jointures, Division of Estates, and many other Cases, where the Regulation of the Law is only to take Place, when the Parties have made no contrary Covenant. So the Woman, knowing the general Regulation, either Divine, or Civil, and yet contracting Marriage without reserve, does tacitly contract to submit herself. But, if any Woman, conscious of her Superiority of Sense, or Fortune, should stipulate the contrary, and the Man consent, she would have Right, by the Law of Nature, to the same Dominion, which now is in the Husband, according to the Custom of our Country; nor do I see that the Gospel would invalidate this Contract. Greater Strength of either Body, or Mind, is not universal in Men.” Maxwell seems to be following Locke’s argument here, Two Treatises of Government, II.82.

  [4. ][Maxwell] “Parental Power is wholly upon a different Foundation from Civil, see Mr. Locke on Government. Nor does the Mosaick History assert such Power in Parents, much less in elder Brothers, as can be called Civil Power.” See Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II.1–3; Cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, VI.2.10.

  [5. ][Maxwell] “There is nothing in this Section contrary to the Right of Resistance in Subjects, who have reserv’d to themselves certain Privileges in the Constitution of the supreme Power, or who see the supreme Magistrate openly counteracting all Ends of Government. This Resistance does not suppose the Subjects Superior to the supreme Magistrate, nor that they have a proper Right of punishing him, any more than the rising in Arms against an Independent State upon their Invading us, supposes us Superior to them, or having a Right, as Superiors, to judge, or punish them.” Although Maxwell wishes to reconcile Cumberland’s statement with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Cumberland is unlikely to have supported such a position in 1672, and his argument explicitly endorses an account of passive obedience. Indeed, Cumberland’s text is remarkable for the absence of any discussion of tyrannicide.

  [6. ]Section IX of the Latin text begins here. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 390.

  [7. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 7.12, p. 96.

  [8. ]Ibid., 7.14, p. 97.

  [9. ]Hobbes, De Homine, X.3, p. 59.

  [10. ]The quotation translates the passage from Hobbes’s Leviathan, printed in his Opera Philosophica (1668), ch. 13, p. 65: “Naturam hominess dissociavisse, & ad mutuam caedam aptos produxisse.” The milder English version reads: “that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade and destroy one another.” Hobbes, Leviathan, (1994), ch. 13, pp. 76–77.

  [11. ]Section X of the Latin text begins here. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 391.

  [12. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.17, p. 162–63.

  [13. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 3.2ff.

  [14. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 6, pp. 28–29.

  [15. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 12.1, pp. 131–32.

  [16. ]Ibid., 14.17, pp. 162–63.

  [17. ]Ibid., 2.1n, p. 33.

  [18. ]Ibid., 15.18, pp. 183–85.

  [19. ]Ibid., 6.13, pp. 81–84; 7.14, p. 97.

  [20. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 6, p. 29.

  [21. ]Ibid., ch. 5, p. 23.

  [22. ]Section XI of the Latin text begins here. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 392.

  [23. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 5, p. 29.

  [24. ]In the margin Cumberland added the following: “It follows from this, that the subjects need respect the laws of their sovereign no more than the fall of the dice; and that they would be acting just as reasonably if they allowed decisions to be made about their lives by any sort of blind fate, as if they subjected themselves to the judgement of princes whose reason can never be safely directed by the nature of things.” The addition is deleted, but it is not clear whether by Cumberland or Bentley. Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, p. 393.

  [25. ]Section XII in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 393.

  [26. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.7–10, pp. 27–29.

  [27. ]Ibid., 2.4, pp. 34–35.

  [28. ]Ibid., 2.18, pp. 39–40.

  [29. ]Ibid., 5.7, p. 72.

  [30. ]Section XIII of the Latin text begins here. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 394.

  [31. ]Hobbes, Leviathan (1668), ch. 21, p. 109.

  [32. ]Ibid., p. 143. The change to the lines in the Latin edition is typical of several alterations that Hobbes made to tone down the argument of Leviathan.

  [33. ]Section XIV in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 396.

  [34. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 8.3, p. 103.

  [35. ]Ibid., 8.9, p. 105; cf. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, VI.3.6; Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, III.7.1, 6.

  [36. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 8.4, pp. 103–4.

  [37. ]Ibid., 8.1. In his note, Maxwell paraphrases Hobbes in Latin, which can be translated as follows: “The natural commonwealth (as distinguished from the commonwealth by institution) is acquired by natural power and strength . . . if, on being captured or defeated in war, or losing hope in one’s strength, one makes (to avoid death) a promise to the victor or the stronger party, to serve him, i.e. to do all that he shall command.”

  [38. ]Not a quotation from Hobbes, but an argument based upon the implications of On the Citizen, 8.3–4, pp. 103–4.

  [39. ]Section XV in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 397.

  [40. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.11, p. 37.

  [41. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 5.54.

  [42. ]Section XVI in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 398.

  [43. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.22, p. 41.

  [44. ]Ibid., 2.12, 13, pp. 37–38: “From the fact that acceptance of the transferred right is a requirement of all gifts and agreements, it follows that no-one can make an agreement with someone who gives no sign of acceptance. . . . Nor can one enter in to agreements with the majesty of God, nor be bound by a vow to him, except in so far as it has pleased him, through the holy scriptures, to make certain men his substitutes, with authority to review and accept such vows and agreements and to accept them as his representatives. Thus men who live in a state of nature, where they are not bound by any civil law, make vows in vain (unless they know by certain revelation that the will of God accepts their vow or agreement).”

  [45. ]Ibid., 2.22, p. 41.

  [46. ]Section XVII in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 399.

  [47. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 5.12, p. 74.

  [48. ]Ibid., 6.20, p. 90; Leviathan, ch. 17, p. 109.

  [49. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.14, p. 38; 8.1, pp. 102–3; 9.2, p. 108.

  [50. ]Ibid., 2.4, pp. 34–35.

  [51. ]Ibid., 6.13, p. 82.

  [52. ]Ibid.: “The obligation to offer it [simple obedience] does not arise directly from the agreement by which we transferred every right to the common-wealth, but indirectly, i.e. from the fact that the right of Government would be meaningless without obedience, and consequently no common-wealth would have been formed at all.”

  [53. ]Ibid., 15.5, pp. 173–74.

  [54. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 28, p. 204.

  [55. ]Section XVIII in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 403.

  [56. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 12.1, pp. 131–32.

  [57. ]Hobbes, De Homine, XIII.9, p. 75.

  [58. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.17, p. 163.

  [59. ]Ibid., 6.9, p. 79.

  [60. ]Ibid., 14.13, p. 160.

  [61. ]Ibid., p. 161.

  [62. ]Ibid., 12.4, pp. 134–35.

  [63. ]Ibid.

  [64. ]Ibid., 3.33, pp. 56–57.

  [65. ]Ibid., 14.10, pp. 158–59: “Since therefore the obligation to observe those laws is older than the promulgation of the laws themselves, because contained in the actual formation of the commonwealth, natural law commands that all civil laws be observed in virtue of the natural law which forbids the violation of agreements. For when we are obligated to obey before we know what orders will be given, then we are obligated to obey universally and in all things. From this it follows that no civil law can be contrary to natural law except a law which has been framed as a blasphemy against God (for in relation to Him commonwealths themselves are not sui juris, and are not said to make laws).”

  [66. ]Ibid., 14.9, p. 158; 6.16, pp. 86–87; 17.10, pp. 213–14.

  [67. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 33, pp. 250–61.

  [68. ]Section XIX begins here in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 406.

  [69. ]For Nero’s reputation, see Pliny, Natural History, VII.45; for Titus, see Suetonius, Vitae duodecim Caesarum, XI.1.

  [70. ]Cumberland manuscript annotation: “Experience, drawn on the nature of the effects necessarily produced by human actions, teaches all men, that the surest way is to deliberate with people educated by long observation of what has happened, for having noted the natural results of such and such an action which has already occurred, they usually foresee those of similar actions which are to occur.” Cumberland, Trinity College MS.adv.c.2.4, p. 408.

  [71. ]Section XX begins here in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 409.

  [72. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 6.13, p. 83.

  [73. ]Ibid., 14.10, pp. 158–59.

  [74. ]Ibid., 1.7, p. 27.

  [75. ]Ibid., 7.14, p. 97: “There are however many ways in which a people, a council of optimates and a Monarch can sin against natural laws, by cruelty, for example, or by unreasonableness, by insolence and by other vices, which do not come under the strict and accurate signification of wrong.”

  [76. ][Maxwell] “In the following Paragraph, and to the end of the Chapter.”

  [77. ][Maxwell] “Breach of Compact.”

  [78. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 15.18, pp. 183–85: “For instance, if an order were given to worship God in the form of an image in the presence of people who believe that to do so is a sign of honour? Certainly it must be done. . . . For although such commands may sometimes be against right reason, and are therefore sins in those who command them, yet they are not against right reason nor sins in subjects.”

  [79. ]Ibid., 14.10, p. 159.

  [80. ]Ibid., 14.17, pp. 162–63.

  [81. ]Section XXI begins here in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 411.

  [82. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 7.14, p. 97: “Since it has been shown above (articles 7, 9, 12) that those who have obtained sovereign power in a commonwealth are not bound by any agreements to anyone”; 7.7, p. 95; 7.9, p. 96; 7.12, p. 96.

  [83. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 5.54.

  [84. ][Maxwell]: “In a Democracy.”

  [85. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 7.7, p. 95.

  [86. ]Ibid.

  [87. ]Ibid., 6.3, 4, pp. 77–78.

  [88. ]Ibid., 2.22, p. 41.

  [89. ]Section XXII begins here in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 415.

  [90. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 5.50.

  [91. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 5.2, pp. 69–70: “It is a commonplace that laws are silent among arms. This is true not only of the civil laws but also of natural law, if it is applied to actions rather than to state of mind.”

  [92. ]Ibid., 13.7, pp. 144–45; Cumberland silently corrects Hobbes’s mistaken reference to 2.10 in On the Citizen.

  [93. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, p. 78.

  [94. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 2.11, p. 37.

  [95. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14, p. 84.

  [96. ]Charles II.

  [97. ]On the Citizen was published in Paris in 1642, with the second edition appearing in Amsterdam in 1647. Leviathan was published in London in 1651, the Latin version was published in Amsterdam with the 1668 edition of Hobbes’s two-volume Opera.

  [98. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, p. 78.

  [99. ]Ibid., ch. 10, p. 52.

  [100. ]Section XXIII begins here in the Latin text. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, p. 417.

  [101. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.21, 22, p. 166.

  [102. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 28, p. 205.

  [103. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 14.21, p. 166.

  [104. ]Ibid., 3.33, pp. 56–57; Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 100.

  [105. ]Ibid., ch. 33, p. 259. Maxwell’s reference in the text omits a “3.”

  [106. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 5.1, 2, pp. 69–70.

  [107. ]Ibid., 15.5, p. 173.

  [108. ]Ibid., 6.13, p. 82.

  [109. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, Dedicatory Epistle, p. 2; the reference is to Livy, History of Rome, V.47.

  [110. ]Cumberland is referring to the slight changes Hobbes made to the Latin version of the dedication. In the English edition, Hobbes had written: “But yet, methinks, the endeavour to advance the civil power, should not be by the civil power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that power too great.” This is replaced with “But I see no reason why either side would be angry with me. For I do but magnify as much as I can the civil power, which any one who possesses it wishes to be as great as possible.” Hobbes, Leviathan, Dedicatory Epistle, pp. 1–2 and n. 4.

  [1. ]The section number continues from the final section of the Latin edition (see ch. 9, n. 100).

  [2. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 15, pp. 92–93.

  [3. ]Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (1668), II.12, pp. 129–31.

  [4. ]Hobbes, On the Citizen, 13, pp. 142–52.

  [1. ]Maxwell refers to a sequence of works in which Samuel Clarke attacked Henry Dodwell for his belief that the soul is naturally mortal before baptism. Clarke also attacked Anthony Collins, who was soon embroiled in the debate. See Dodwell, An Epistolary Discourse, proving, from the Scriptures and the First Fathers, that the Soul is a Principle Naturally Mortal (1706). Clarke responded with A Letter to Mr. Dodwell (1706) and several defenses of his arguments, passages of which are reproduced by Maxwell.

  [2. ]Clarke, A Second Defence of an Argument Made Use of in a Letter to Mr. Dodwell. The passages can be found in Clarke, The Works of Samuel Clarke D.D. (1738), vol. 3, pp. 795–99.

  [3. ][Clarke] “Note, by Heat here, is meant that Motion which causes in us the Sensation of Heat; by Colour that Magnitude and Figure which causes particular Rays to be transmitted to us, &c.”

  [4. ]Clarke, A Third Defence of an Argument Made Use of in a Letter to Mr. Dodwell, in Clarke, Works, vol. 3, pp. 825–27.

  [5. ]Ibid. Maxwell’s extract contains passages from pp. 825–53.

  [6. ]Ditton, A Discourse Concerning the Resurrection of Jesus Christ (1712), appendix.

  [1. ]J. H. Hottinger, Thesaurus Philologicus seu Clavis Scripturae (1649), p. 546.

  [2. ]Tertullian, Adversus Judaeos, ch. 2.

  [3. ]Zouch, Elementa Jurisprudentiae (1629), pt. I, sect. 3; Selden, De Jure Naturali et Gentium (1640), I.8.

  [4. ]Sharrock, De Officiis Secundum Naturae Jus (1660), ch. 2; Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (1612), I.3.

  [5. ]Cicero, De Legibus, II.

  [6. ]Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.13.

  [7. ]Horace, Satires, II; Persius, Satires, 6; Cicero, In Verrem, II.V.12; Terence, Andria, 3.5.10.

  [8. ]Horace, Ars Poetica, 90; Virgil, Eclogues, 5; Horace, Ars Poetica, 73; Virgil, Aeneid, I; Virgil, Eclogues, 5, 6; Cicero, De Officiis, III; Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.92–93; Horace, Satires, II.3; Virgil, Aeneid, V.96.

  [9. ]More, Enchiridion Ethicum (1668), I.4.

  [10. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 3.1, 2.

  [11. ][Maxwell] “The constituting, preserving, and perfecting Causes of Things or Men, are those Things, which we call Good. Chap. 1. § 20.”

  [12. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 4.2.

  [13. ]Ibid., 5.5.

  [14. ]Bright, An Essay in Morality (1682), pp. 14, 55, 57.

  [15. ]Bentley, Of Revelation and Messias. A Sermon Preached at the Publick Commencement at Cambridge (1696), pp. 14, 15.

  [16. ]Buridan, Quaestiones in decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, p. 49.

  [17. ]Cicero, De Finibus, V.

  [18. ]Cicero, De Officiis, III.

  [19. ]Seneca, De Beneficiis, IV.15.

  [20. ]Cicero, De Finibus, III.

  [21. ]Ibid., II.

  [22. ]Ibid.

  [23. ]Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. 19.

  [24. ]Maxwell attributes this to Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, but it is not a direct quotation.

  [25. ]A general reference to Cumberland.

  [26. ]Ibid.

  [27. ]Bright, An Essay in Morality, pp. 38, 64.

  [28. ]Exodus 32.32.

  [29. ]Romans 9.3.

  [30. ]1 John 5.16.

  [31. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 5.5.

  [32. ]Ibid., 5.40.

  [33. ]Ibid., 5.12, 13; Bright, An Essay in Morality, pp. 55, 90; Sharrock, De Officiis, ch. 1, n. 3; More, Enchiridion Ethicum, I.2; Stearne, Anima Medela (1653), I.13.

  [34. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 5.23, 8.1.

  [35. ]Ibid., 5.48; 8.1; 2.7. [Maxwell] “Only for this noblest End, Cumber. c. 5. § 48. Because they conduce to the happy State of the Universe, Ibid. c. 8. § 1. For this End only, that the common Good of all be promoted by every one, Ibid. § 2, 7.”

  [36. ]Cicero, De Officiis, II.xviii.62.

  [37. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 7.6, 7; 9.1, 2.

  [38. ]Ibid., 7.3, 6.

  [39. ]Ibid., 7.6.

  [40. ]Ibid.

  [41. ]Smith, Select Discourses (1660), pp. 159, 160.

  [42. ]Apuleius, De Philosophia.

  [43. ]Episcopius, De Liber Arbitrio, ch. 4.

  [44. ]Fowler, The Design of Christianity (1671), sect. 2, ch. 9.

  [45. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 5.11.

  [46. ]Ibid., 5.27.

  [47. ]Ibid., 5.35.

  [48. ]Parker, A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature, and of the Christian Religion (1681), p. 60. This work adapted Cumberland’s ideas.

  [49. ]Cicero, De Officiis, III.ix.38–39.

  [50. ]Ibid.

  [51. ]Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 6.2.

  [52. ]Ibid., 9.1; Introduction, sect. 24.

  [53. ]Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1714), I, pp. 97, 98.

  [54. ]Juvenal, Satires, XIII.204: “He therefore restored the money, through fear, and not from honesty; nevertheless he found all the words of the Oracle to be true and worthy of the shrine, being destroyed with his whole race and family and relations, however far removed.”

  [55. ]Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 125–27.

  [56. ]Ibid., II, pp. 54–69.

  [57. ]Ibid., II, pp. 271–74.

  [58. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.

  [59. ]Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1594), I.

  [60. ]Maxwell’s cryptic note [Casaub. Not. m. Matth. 22. 49] suggests Isaac Casaubon’s contribution to Novi Testamenti Libri Omnes recens nunc editi cum notis (1587), but I have been unable to find the reference—Matthew 22 has only forty-six verses.

  [61. ]Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. Qu. 5. Art. 5.

  [62. ]Cicero, De Finibus, II.

  [63. ]Ibid., De Officiis, I.

  [64. ]Seneca, Epistulae Morales, C.

  [65. ]Ibid., De Beneficiis, IV.17.

  [66. ]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.3.

  [67. ]Seneca, De Beneficiis, IV.17.

  [68. ]Cicero, De Finibus, III.

  [69. ]Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1726).

  [70. ]Cicero, De Officiis, III.

  [71. ]Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, pp. 15, 16.

  [72. ]Maxwell is referring to Gassendi’s Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma (1649).

  [73. ]Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, pp. 37, 38.

  [74. ]Cicero, De Finibus, III.

  [75. ]Diogenes Laertius, “Zeno” in Lives, VII.

  [76. ]Epictetus, Discourses, III.1.

  [77. ]Seneca, De Beneficiis, IV.17.

  [78. ]Ibid., IV.14.

  [79. ]Cicero, De Finibus, III.

  [80. ]Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium (1660), II.1, no. 4, 52, 58.

  [81. ]Ibid., Rule 9, no. 12.

  [82. ]Poiret, Cogitationum Rationalium de Deo (1685), III.10; Descartes, Epistolae (1668), pt. I, no. 37.

  [83. ]Cuper, Arean Atheism, II.10. I have not been able to identify this text.

  [84. ]Cicero, De Officiis, I.

  [85. ]Sharrock, De Officiis, ch. 2, n. 9.

  [86. ]Jackson, The Works of the Reverend and Learned Divine, Thomas Jackson (1653), B. 10. th. 89. p.m. 3180.

  [87. ]Shaftesbury, The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody, pp. 49, 50.

  [88. ]Plutarch, De Musica (in Moralia), pp. 1132, 1133.

  [89. ][Maxwell] “Grotius says otherwise”; De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II.11.3.

  [90. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, XII.24.

  [91. ]Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II.2.

  [92. ]Selden, Mare Clausum (1635), I.5.

  [93. ]Plutarch, Adversus Colotem (in Moralia), p. 1125.

  [94. ]Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, II.1, n. 9, p. 200.

  [95. ]Ibid., II.2 n. 24; Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.6.

  [96. ]Pighius, Themis Dea (1568), p. 13.

  [97. ]Lipsius, Physiologia Stoicorum (1604), I, diss. 12.

  [98. ]Cicero, De Legibus, II.

  [99. ]Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a. 2ae. Qu. 91, art. 1.

  [100. ]Cicero, Phillippicae, XI.

  [101. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.8.

  [102. ]Aristotle, Rhetorica, I.13, 15.

  [103. ]Selden, Mare Clausum, I.3.

  [104. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.3.

  [105. ]Aristotle, Rhetorica, I.13.

  [106. ]Ibid.

  [107. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.8.

  [108. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VII.9; II.16.

  [109. ]Ibid., IV.4.

  [110. ]Cicero, De Legibus, I.

  [1. ]Maxwell quotes at length from the second edition of Newton, Opticks (1717), p. 339ff.

  [2. ]Ibid., pp. 339–43.

  [3. ]Maxwell translates from the third edition of Newton, Principia Philosophiae (1726), p. 402ff.

  [4. ][Maxwell] “See the Argument upon this Head in the foregoing part of this Appendix.”

  [5. ]Whiston, Astronomical Principles of Religion (1717).

  [6. ]Maxwell translates material from Newton’s Principia, pp. 525–30.

  [7. ][Maxwell] “Pocock derives the Word [Deus] from the Arabick Word [du] (in the Genitive Case, di,) which signifies Lord. Hence the chief Magistrate in Algiers is called the Dey. And in this Sense Princes are call’d Gods. Ps. 84. 6. and Joh. 10. 45. and Moses is call’d the God of his Brother Aaron, and the God of King Pharaoh, (Exod. 4. 16. and 7. 1.). And in the same Sense the Souls of Princes decess’d were, of old, by the Heathen call’d Gods, but falsly, because they had no Dominion.” Maxwell refers to Pocock, Specimen Historiae Arabum (1650).

  [8. ]Newton, Opticks, pp. 343–45.

  [9. ][Maxwell] “The Instinct, as it is called, in Animals, is truly wonderful; and can be nothing less than the Contrivance of a Wise and Powerful Providence, for the Preservation of Individuals and the Propagation of the Species. Upon this occasion, I shall here only take notice of some common Actions in Birds. Two Gold-finches, for Instance, who never had young ones, make it their first care, after Coupling, to make, in a convenient Place, a convenient Nest; which they know how to build, the first time they go about it, with as much Art and Regularity, as if they had before built an hundred. They begin with twisting little Sticks with Fibres of Plants, which they cover with Moss on the outside, to defend it against the Rain; and garnish it within with Hay and Hair, and a kind of Cotton, soft and warm, of which they make their Bed. In this the Female laies her Eggs, which she keeps warm, by sitting upon them, and spreading a little her Wings, in order to cover them. Tho’ Hunger prompts her to go out, she will not leave them, till the Male be ready to take her place, left the Eggs, growing cold, should become addle and produce nothing. When the young Ones are hatch’d, the Male and Female are continually busied in bringing them Worms, which they never eat themselves, and which they equally divide in sufficient Quantities to each; who fail not to open their Mouths out of a desire to receive it; and, from the beginning, always keeping their Nest clean; at proper time, betaking themselves to the open Air and to shift for themselves. Who taught them at first to make a Nest with so much Art, and exactly after the same manner, as all others of their kind do? Who declared to them, that the Female had Eggs in her, and that she should quickly lay them, and that it would be necessary for her and the Male, to cover them alternately with all possible Care, and that, after a certain time, those Eggs would bring forth young ones? Who inform’d them, that they should not feed their young with Seeds, upon which they live after they are grown big; but that they should chuse out for them such Insects, as were most easy of Digestion? Who taught these young ones to open their Bill, almost as soon as they come out of the Shell, to take their Food, and to keep their to Bed so clean? Where is the Artificer among Men, who is so ingenious, as to make a House so well contriv’d and of so regular a Symmetry, as if he were the most skilful Architect? or what Man can provide for an unforeseen Event, as they for their Eggs and young? Is it credible, that Beasts should partake of so excellent Prerogatives, and that the wonderful Things, which we admire most in them, should be the Effects of their Reason and Knowledge? If this be so, how can the surprising Things which they do, be reconcil’d to their other Actions, in which they appear to be altogether Brutes? How comes It, that they are so much superior to Man, only in what concerns their Preservation and the Propagation of their Kind, and so much inferior in all other Things? Must not all this, and every thing of the like kind, call’d Instinct, in Animals, be ascrib’d to the Care and Contrivance of a Wise, a Powerful, and a good Providence? For these Actions have too plain Marks of Wisdom, to be the Effects of a blind Cause; nor can it be a supereminent Reason, which these Brutes are endow’d with above Rational Animals, they being, in other matters, so stupid.”

  [10. ]Maxwell translates from Pitcairne, “Dissertatiode Circulatione Sanguinisin Animalibus Genitis et non Genitis” (1713).

  [11. ]Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, II, p. 282ff.

  [12. ]Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722), pp. 67–68.

  [13. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.

  [14. ]Plutarch, Symposium, VIII.8.

  [15. ]Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, IV.

  [16. ]Compte, Memoirs and Observations (1697), p. 487.

  [17. ]Cardan, De Rerum Varietate, XVI.92.

  [18. ]Epictetus, Discourses, I.23; II.20.

  [19. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.

  [20. ]Ibid.

  [21. ]Cicero, De Finibus, III.

  [22. ]Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.

  [23. ]Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, VIII.6.

  [24. ]Romans 1.18–21.

  [25. ]Romans 1.32.

  [26. ]Plautus, Captivi, 2.2.

  [27. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.7; Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, II.1, n. 30.

  [28. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.7; Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, II.1, n. 31.

  [29. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.6–8.

  [30. ]Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I.

  [31. ]Selden, De Jure Naturali, I.6–8.

  [32. ]Ibid., I.6.

  [33. ]Ibid.

  [34. ]Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, II.1, n. 28.

  [35. ]Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, I.1.10.

  [36. ]Cicero, De Legibus, I.

  [37. ]Vossius, Historiae de Controversiis quas Pelagius, III, pt. 3. theses 10.

  [38. ]Hierocles, In Aureum Pythagoreorum Carmen Commentarius, p. 107.

  [39. ]Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I.1.27.

  [40. ]Wits, Aegyptiaca (1683), I.5.

  [41. ]Lipsius notes in book V of his edition of Tacitus, C. Corn. Taciti Annalium et Historiarum (1574).

  [42. ]Aelian, Varia Historia, II.7.

  [43. ]Isocrates, Panathenaicus, p. 444.

  [44. ]Sharrock, De Officiis, ch. 3, n. 5.

  [45. ]Locke, Essay, I.2.9.

  [46. ]Epictetus, Discourses, III.16.

  [47. ]Cicero, De Finibus, I; De Officiis, I.

  [48. ]Bentley, “A Confutation of Atheism from the Structure and Origin of Humane Bodies,” pt. I, pp. 5, 6; published in The Folly and Unreasonable ness of Atheism (1693).

  [49. ]Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 345.

  [50. ]Locke, Essay, I.3.12.

  [51. ]Bentley, “A Confutation of Atheism,” p. 5.

  [52. ]Locke, Essay, I.3.10.

  [53. ]Ibid., I.3.23.

  [54. ]Bentley, “A Confutation of Atheism,” p. 5.

  [55. ]Bacon, “Of Atheism” in Essays (1601).

  [56. ]Bentley, “A Confutation of Atheism,” pp. 1, 6.

  [57. ]Ibid, p. 7.

  [58. ][Maxwell] “Officium est actio naturalibus constitutionibus conveniens.”

  [59. ]Cicero, Academicae Quaestiones, I.

  [60. ]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, V.9.

  [61. ]Bacon, “Of Goodness,” in Essays.

  [62. ]Cicero, De Officiis, I.

  [63. ]Tacitus, Annales, XIII.

  [64. ]Cicero, De Finibus, II.

  [65. ]Cicero, Pro Sextus Roscio Amerino Oratio.

  [66. ]Cicero, De Senectute, I.iii.9.

  [67. ]Cicero, Ad Familiares, VI.4.

  [68. ]Maxwell notes Philippics, V, but the passage does not occur there.

  [69. ]Maxwell is referring to Cicero, Ad Familiares, V.7.

  [70. ]Sharrock, De Officiis, ch. 1, n. 11; Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, I.1, R. 2, n. 9.

  [71. ]John 8.38; Wisdom 15.13; Titus 3.11; I John 3.20; Romans 2.15, 9.1; II Corinthians 1.12, 4.2, 5.11; Hebrews 10.2.

  [72. ]I Corinthians 10.25, 27, 28, 29.

  [73. ]Acts 23.1, 24.16; I Timothy 1.5, 19; 3.9; Hebrews 13.18; II Timothy 1.3; I Peter3.16, 21.

  [74. ]Plutarch, De Virtute Morali (in Moralia), pp. 445, 446; Casaubon, Persii Flacci Satirarum, pp. 249, 250.

  [75. ]Grotius, De Veritate Religionis Christianae, I.

  [76. ]Tacitus, Annales, XIV.10.

  [1. ]Grotius, Annotationes in Novum Testamentum on I Timothy 1.9–10.

  [2. ]Vossius, Historiae de Controversiis quas Pelagius, III, pt. 3, theses 8 and 11.

  [1. ]Richard Cumberland’s original dedication (Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, A3r–a2r), translated into English by the Rev. John Towers for his edition of Cumberland, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Laws of Nature (1750), Appendix, Part IV, pp. 83–85. The references in square brackets occur as marginal notes in Cumberland and Towers.

  [2. ]Orlando Bridgeman (1606–74) was made Lord Chancellor in 1667. Educated at Magdalene, Cambridge, Bridgeman went on to become a lawyer and M.P. for Wigan and was knighted in 1640. At the Restoration he was made a baronet and presided over the trial of the regicides. Bridgeman fell from office after refusing to endorse Charles II’s Declaration of Indulgence in 1672. For full details of Bridge-man’s career, see The Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, issued various years).

  [3. ]Bridgeman’s father, John (1577–1652), was Bishop of Chester; and Bridgeman maintained active links with the diocese.

  [4. ]Lucan, Pharsalia, I.128: “The victorious cause was pleasing to the Gods, but a lost cause to Cato.”

  [5. ]Cumberland became Bridgeman’s client in 1667. This patronage was decisive in Cumberland’s promotion to two posts, the vicarage of All Saints and the rectory of St. Peter’s, both in Stamford, Lincolnshire.

  [6. ]Bridgeman acted as patron to several intellectuals and writers, notably John Wilkins, Hezekiah Burton, and Thomas Traherne.

  [1. ]Hezekiah Burton’s “Address to the Reader” (Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, “Alloquium ad Lectorem,” A3r-b1r), translated into English by the Rev. John Towers for his edition of Cumberland, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Laws of Nature (1750), Appendix, Part IV, pp. 86–88.

  [2. ]Kaspar Schoppe, or Scioppius (1576–1649), was the author of several Latin pedagogical texts.

  [3. ]In 1671 Hobbes (1588–1679) was 83 years old.